diff --git a/crypto/openssh/.depend b/crypto/openssh/.depend index 5226523aa2ad..259bf3b2f136 100644 --- a/crypto/openssh/.depend +++ b/crypto/openssh/.depend @@ -1,179 +1,178 @@ # Automatically generated by makedepend. # Run "make depend" to rebuild. # DO NOT DELETE addr.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h addr.h addrmatch.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h addr.h match.h log.h ssherr.h atomicio.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h atomicio.h audit-bsm.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h audit-linux.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h audit.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h auth-bsdauth.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h auth-krb5.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h xmalloc.h ssh.h packet.h openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h dispatch.h log.h ssherr.h sshbuf.h sshkey.h misc.h servconf.h uidswap.h hostfile.h auth.h auth-pam.h audit.h loginrec.h auth-options.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h xmalloc.h ssherr.h log.h sshbuf.h misc.h sshkey.h match.h ssh2.h auth-options.h auth-pam.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h auth-passwd.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h packet.h openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h dispatch.h sshbuf.h ssherr.h log.h misc.h servconf.h sshkey.h hostfile.h auth.h auth-pam.h audit.h loginrec.h auth-options.h auth-rhosts.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h packet.h openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h dispatch.h uidswap.h pathnames.h log.h ssherr.h misc.h xmalloc.h sshbuf.h sshkey.h servconf.h canohost.h hostfile.h auth.h auth-pam.h audit.h loginrec.h auth-shadow.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h auth-sia.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h -auth.o: authfile.h monitor_wrap.h compat.h channels.h +auth.o: authfile.h monitor_wrap.h channels.h auth.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h xmalloc.h match.h groupaccess.h log.h ssherr.h sshbuf.h misc.h servconf.h openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h sshkey.h hostfile.h auth.h auth-pam.h audit.h loginrec.h auth-options.h canohost.h uidswap.h packet.h dispatch.h auth2-chall.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h xmalloc.h ssh2.h sshkey.h hostfile.h auth.h auth-pam.h audit.h loginrec.h sshbuf.h packet.h openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h dispatch.h ssherr.h log.h misc.h servconf.h auth2-gss.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h -auth2-hostbased.o: canohost.h monitor_wrap.h pathnames.h match.h -auth2-hostbased.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h xmalloc.h ssh2.h packet.h openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h dispatch.h kex.h mac.h crypto_api.h sshbuf.h log.h ssherr.h misc.h servconf.h compat.h sshkey.h hostfile.h auth.h auth-pam.h audit.h loginrec.h +auth2-hostbased.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h xmalloc.h ssh2.h packet.h openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h dispatch.h kex.h mac.h crypto_api.h sshbuf.h log.h ssherr.h misc.h servconf.h sshkey.h hostfile.h auth.h auth-pam.h audit.h loginrec.h canohost.h +auth2-hostbased.o: monitor_wrap.h pathnames.h match.h auth2-kbdint.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h xmalloc.h packet.h openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h dispatch.h hostfile.h auth.h auth-pam.h audit.h loginrec.h log.h ssherr.h misc.h servconf.h -auth2-none.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h atomicio.h xmalloc.h sshkey.h hostfile.h auth.h auth-pam.h audit.h loginrec.h packet.h openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h dispatch.h log.h ssherr.h misc.h servconf.h compat.h ssh2.h monitor_wrap.h +auth2-none.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h atomicio.h xmalloc.h sshkey.h hostfile.h auth.h auth-pam.h audit.h loginrec.h packet.h openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h dispatch.h log.h ssherr.h misc.h servconf.h ssh2.h monitor_wrap.h auth2-passwd.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h packet.h openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h dispatch.h ssherr.h log.h sshkey.h hostfile.h auth.h auth-pam.h audit.h loginrec.h monitor_wrap.h misc.h servconf.h auth2-pubkey.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h xmalloc.h ssh.h ssh2.h packet.h openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h dispatch.h kex.h mac.h crypto_api.h sshbuf.h log.h ssherr.h misc.h servconf.h compat.h sshkey.h hostfile.h auth.h auth-pam.h audit.h loginrec.h auth2-pubkey.o: pathnames.h uidswap.h auth-options.h canohost.h monitor_wrap.h authfile.h match.h channels.h session.h sk-api.h -auth2-pubkeyfile.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h ssh.h log.h ssherr.h misc.h compat.h sshkey.h digest.h hostfile.h auth.h auth-pam.h audit.h loginrec.h auth-options.h authfile.h match.h -auth2.o: digest.h -auth2.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h atomicio.h xmalloc.h ssh2.h packet.h openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h dispatch.h log.h ssherr.h sshbuf.h misc.h servconf.h compat.h sshkey.h hostfile.h auth.h auth-pam.h audit.h loginrec.h pathnames.h monitor_wrap.h -authfd.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h xmalloc.h ssh.h sshbuf.h sshkey.h authfd.h cipher.h cipher-chachapoly.h chacha.h poly1305.h cipher-aesctr.h rijndael.h compat.h log.h ssherr.h atomicio.h misc.h +auth2-pubkeyfile.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h ssh.h log.h ssherr.h misc.h sshkey.h digest.h hostfile.h auth.h auth-pam.h audit.h loginrec.h auth-options.h authfile.h match.h +auth2.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h atomicio.h xmalloc.h ssh2.h packet.h openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h dispatch.h log.h ssherr.h sshbuf.h misc.h servconf.h sshkey.h hostfile.h auth.h auth-pam.h audit.h loginrec.h pathnames.h monitor_wrap.h digest.h +authfd.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h xmalloc.h ssh.h sshbuf.h sshkey.h authfd.h cipher.h cipher-chachapoly.h chacha.h poly1305.h cipher-aesctr.h rijndael.h log.h ssherr.h atomicio.h misc.h authfile.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h cipher.h cipher-chachapoly.h chacha.h poly1305.h cipher-aesctr.h rijndael.h ssh.h log.h ssherr.h authfile.h misc.h atomicio.h sshkey.h sshbuf.h krl.h bitmap.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h bitmap.h canohost.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h xmalloc.h packet.h openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h dispatch.h log.h ssherr.h canohost.h misc.h chacha.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h chacha.h channels.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h xmalloc.h ssh.h ssh2.h ssherr.h sshbuf.h packet.h dispatch.h log.h misc.h channels.h compat.h canohost.h sshkey.h authfd.h pathnames.h match.h cipher-aes.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h cipher-aesctr.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h cipher-aesctr.h rijndael.h cipher-chachapoly-libcrypto.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h cipher-chachapoly.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h log.h ssherr.h sshbuf.h cipher-chachapoly.h chacha.h poly1305.h cipher.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h cipher.h cipher-chachapoly.h chacha.h poly1305.h cipher-aesctr.h rijndael.h misc.h sshbuf.h ssherr.h digest.h openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h cleanup.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h log.h ssherr.h clientloop.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h xmalloc.h ssh.h ssh2.h packet.h dispatch.h sshbuf.h compat.h channels.h sshkey.h cipher.h cipher-chachapoly.h chacha.h poly1305.h cipher-aesctr.h rijndael.h kex.h mac.h crypto_api.h clientloop.o: myproposal.h log.h ssherr.h misc.h readconf.h clientloop.h sshconnect.h authfd.h atomicio.h sshpty.h match.h msg.h hostfile.h -compat.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h xmalloc.h packet.h openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h dispatch.h compat.h log.h ssherr.h match.h kex.h mac.h crypto_api.h +compat.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h xmalloc.h packet.h openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h dispatch.h compat.h log.h ssherr.h match.h dh.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h digest-libc.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h ssherr.h sshbuf.h digest.h digest-openssl.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h -dispatch.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h 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kexgen.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h sshkey.h kex.h mac.h crypto_api.h log.h ssherr.h packet.h openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h dispatch.h ssh2.h sshbuf.h digest.h kexgex.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h kexgexc.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h kexgexs.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h kexsntrup761x25519.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h ssherr.h krl.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h ./openbsd-compat/sys-tree.h openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h sshbuf.h ssherr.h sshkey.h authfile.h misc.h log.h digest.h bitmap.h utf8.h krl.h log.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h log.h ssherr.h match.h loginrec.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h xmalloc.h sshkey.h hostfile.h ssh.h loginrec.h log.h ssherr.h atomicio.h packet.h openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h dispatch.h canohost.h auth.h auth-pam.h audit.h sshbuf.h misc.h logintest.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h loginrec.h mac.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h digest.h hmac.h umac.h mac.h misc.h ssherr.h sshbuf.h openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h match.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h xmalloc.h match.h misc.h misc.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h xmalloc.h misc.h log.h ssherr.h ssh.h sshbuf.h moduli.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h monitor.o: chacha.h poly1305.h cipher-aesctr.h rijndael.h kex.h mac.h crypto_api.h dh.h packet.h dispatch.h auth-options.h sshpty.h channels.h session.h sshlogin.h canohost.h log.h ssherr.h misc.h servconf.h monitor.h monitor_wrap.h monitor_fdpass.h compat.h ssh2.h authfd.h match.h sk-api.h monitor.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h ./openbsd-compat/sys-tree.h openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h atomicio.h xmalloc.h ssh.h sshkey.h sshbuf.h hostfile.h auth.h auth-pam.h audit.h loginrec.h cipher.h cipher-chachapoly.h monitor_fdpass.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h log.h ssherr.h monitor_fdpass.h monitor_wrap.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h xmalloc.h ssh.h sshbuf.h sshkey.h cipher.h cipher-chachapoly.h chacha.h poly1305.h cipher-aesctr.h rijndael.h kex.h mac.h crypto_api.h hostfile.h auth.h auth-pam.h audit.h monitor_wrap.o: loginrec.h auth-options.h packet.h dispatch.h log.h ssherr.h monitor.h monitor_wrap.h atomicio.h monitor_fdpass.h misc.h channels.h session.h servconf.h msg.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h sshbuf.h ssherr.h log.h atomicio.h msg.h misc.h mux.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h xmalloc.h log.h ssherr.h ssh.h ssh2.h pathnames.h misc.h match.h sshbuf.h channels.h msg.h packet.h dispatch.h monitor_fdpass.h sshpty.h sshkey.h readconf.h clientloop.h nchan.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h ssh2.h sshbuf.h ssherr.h packet.h dispatch.h channels.h compat.h log.h packet.o: channels.h ssh.h packet.h dispatch.h sshbuf.h packet.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h xmalloc.h compat.h ssh2.h cipher.h cipher-chachapoly.h chacha.h poly1305.h cipher-aesctr.h rijndael.h sshkey.h kex.h mac.h crypto_api.h digest.h log.h ssherr.h canohost.h misc.h platform-misc.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h platform-pledge.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h platform-tracing.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h log.h ssherr.h platform.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h log.h ssherr.h misc.h servconf.h openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h sshkey.h hostfile.h auth.h auth-pam.h audit.h loginrec.h poly1305.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h poly1305.h progressmeter.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h progressmeter.h atomicio.h misc.h utf8.h -readconf.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h openbsd-compat/glob.h xmalloc.h ssh.h ssherr.h compat.h cipher.h cipher-chachapoly.h chacha.h poly1305.h cipher-aesctr.h rijndael.h pathnames.h log.h sshkey.h misc.h readconf.h match.h kex.h mac.h crypto_api.h -readconf.o: uidswap.h myproposal.h digest.h +readconf.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h openbsd-compat/glob.h xmalloc.h ssh.h ssherr.h cipher.h cipher-chachapoly.h chacha.h poly1305.h cipher-aesctr.h rijndael.h pathnames.h log.h sshkey.h misc.h readconf.h match.h kex.h mac.h crypto_api.h uidswap.h +readconf.o: myproposal.h digest.h readpass.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h xmalloc.h misc.h pathnames.h log.h ssherr.h ssh.h uidswap.h rijndael.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h rijndael.h sandbox-capsicum.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h sandbox-darwin.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h sandbox-null.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h sandbox-pledge.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h sandbox-rlimit.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h sandbox-seccomp-filter.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h sandbox-solaris.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h sandbox-systrace.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h scp.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h openbsd-compat/glob.h xmalloc.h ssh.h atomicio.h pathnames.h log.h ssherr.h misc.h progressmeter.h utf8.h sftp.h sftp-common.h sftp-client.h -servconf.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h openbsd-compat/glob.h openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h xmalloc.h ssh.h log.h ssherr.h sshbuf.h misc.h servconf.h compat.h pathnames.h cipher.h cipher-chachapoly.h chacha.h poly1305.h cipher-aesctr.h rijndael.h sshkey.h -servconf.o: kex.h mac.h crypto_api.h match.h channels.h groupaccess.h canohost.h packet.h dispatch.h hostfile.h auth.h auth-pam.h audit.h loginrec.h myproposal.h digest.h -serverloop.o: cipher-aesctr.h rijndael.h kex.h mac.h crypto_api.h hostfile.h auth.h auth-pam.h audit.h loginrec.h session.h auth-options.h serverloop.h -serverloop.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h xmalloc.h packet.h dispatch.h sshbuf.h log.h ssherr.h misc.h servconf.h canohost.h sshpty.h channels.h compat.h ssh2.h sshkey.h cipher.h cipher-chachapoly.h chacha.h poly1305.h -session.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h xmalloc.h ssh.h ssh2.h sshpty.h packet.h dispatch.h sshbuf.h ssherr.h match.h uidswap.h compat.h channels.h sshkey.h cipher.h cipher-chachapoly.h chacha.h poly1305.h cipher-aesctr.h -session.o: rijndael.h hostfile.h auth.h auth-pam.h audit.h loginrec.h auth-options.h authfd.h pathnames.h log.h misc.h servconf.h sshlogin.h serverloop.h canohost.h session.h kex.h mac.h crypto_api.h monitor_wrap.h sftp.h atomicio.h +servconf.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h openbsd-compat/glob.h openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h xmalloc.h ssh.h log.h ssherr.h sshbuf.h misc.h servconf.h pathnames.h cipher.h cipher-chachapoly.h chacha.h poly1305.h cipher-aesctr.h rijndael.h sshkey.h kex.h +servconf.o: mac.h crypto_api.h match.h channels.h groupaccess.h canohost.h packet.h dispatch.h hostfile.h auth.h auth-pam.h audit.h loginrec.h myproposal.h digest.h +serverloop.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h xmalloc.h packet.h dispatch.h sshbuf.h log.h ssherr.h misc.h servconf.h canohost.h sshpty.h channels.h ssh2.h sshkey.h cipher.h cipher-chachapoly.h chacha.h poly1305.h cipher-aesctr.h +serverloop.o: rijndael.h kex.h mac.h crypto_api.h hostfile.h auth.h auth-pam.h audit.h loginrec.h session.h auth-options.h serverloop.h +session.o: hostfile.h auth.h auth-pam.h audit.h loginrec.h auth-options.h authfd.h pathnames.h log.h misc.h servconf.h sshlogin.h serverloop.h canohost.h session.h kex.h mac.h crypto_api.h monitor_wrap.h sftp.h atomicio.h +session.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h xmalloc.h ssh.h ssh2.h sshpty.h packet.h dispatch.h sshbuf.h ssherr.h match.h uidswap.h channels.h sshkey.h cipher.h cipher-chachapoly.h chacha.h poly1305.h cipher-aesctr.h rijndael.h sftp-client.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h xmalloc.h ssherr.h sshbuf.h log.h atomicio.h progressmeter.h misc.h utf8.h sftp.h sftp-common.h sftp-client.h openbsd-compat/glob.h sftp-common.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h xmalloc.h ssherr.h sshbuf.h log.h misc.h sftp.h sftp-common.h sftp-glob.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h xmalloc.h sftp.h sftp-common.h sftp-client.h openbsd-compat/glob.h sftp-realpath.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h sftp-server-main.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h log.h ssherr.h sftp.h misc.h xmalloc.h sftp-server.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h atomicio.h xmalloc.h sshbuf.h ssherr.h log.h misc.h match.h uidswap.h sftp.h sftp-common.h sftp-usergroup.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h ./openbsd-compat/sys-tree.h log.h ssherr.h xmalloc.h sftp-common.h sftp-client.h openbsd-compat/glob.h sftp-usergroup.h sftp.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h xmalloc.h log.h ssherr.h pathnames.h misc.h utf8.h sftp.h sshbuf.h sftp-common.h sftp-client.h openbsd-compat/glob.h sftp-usergroup.h sk-usbhid.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h sntrup761.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h srclimit.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h addr.h canohost.h log.h ssherr.h misc.h srclimit.h xmalloc.h ssh-add.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h xmalloc.h ssh.h log.h ssherr.h sshkey.h sshbuf.h authfd.h authfile.h pathnames.h misc.h digest.h ssh-sk.h sk-api.h hostfile.h -ssh-agent.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h xmalloc.h ssh.h ssh2.h sshbuf.h sshkey.h authfd.h compat.h log.h ssherr.h misc.h digest.h match.h msg.h pathnames.h ssh-pkcs11.h sk-api.h myproposal.h +ssh-agent.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h xmalloc.h ssh.h ssh2.h sshbuf.h sshkey.h authfd.h log.h ssherr.h misc.h digest.h match.h msg.h pathnames.h ssh-pkcs11.h sk-api.h myproposal.h ssh-dss.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h ssh-ecdsa-sk.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h sshbuf.h ssherr.h digest.h sshkey.h ssh-ecdsa.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h ssh-ed25519-sk.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h crypto_api.h log.h ssherr.h sshbuf.h sshkey.h ssh.h digest.h ssh-ed25519.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h crypto_api.h log.h ssherr.h sshbuf.h sshkey.h ssh.h ssh-keygen.o: cipher-chachapoly.h chacha.h poly1305.h cipher-aesctr.h rijndael.h ssh-keygen.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h xmalloc.h sshkey.h authfile.h sshbuf.h pathnames.h log.h ssherr.h misc.h match.h hostfile.h dns.h ssh.h ssh2.h ssh-pkcs11.h atomicio.h krl.h digest.h utf8.h authfd.h sshsig.h ssh-sk.h sk-api.h cipher.h -ssh-keyscan.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h xmalloc.h ssh.h sshbuf.h sshkey.h cipher.h cipher-chachapoly.h chacha.h poly1305.h cipher-aesctr.h rijndael.h kex.h mac.h crypto_api.h compat.h myproposal.h packet.h dispatch.h log.h -ssh-keyscan.o: ssherr.h atomicio.h misc.h hostfile.h ssh_api.h ssh2.h dns.h addr.h +ssh-keyscan.o: dispatch.h log.h ssherr.h atomicio.h misc.h hostfile.h ssh_api.h ssh2.h dns.h addr.h +ssh-keyscan.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h xmalloc.h ssh.h sshbuf.h sshkey.h cipher.h cipher-chachapoly.h chacha.h poly1305.h cipher-aesctr.h rijndael.h digest.h kex.h mac.h crypto_api.h compat.h myproposal.h packet.h ssh-keysign.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h xmalloc.h log.h ssherr.h sshkey.h ssh.h ssh2.h misc.h sshbuf.h authfile.h msg.h canohost.h pathnames.h readconf.h uidswap.h ssh-pkcs11-client.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h ssh-pkcs11-helper.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h xmalloc.h sshbuf.h log.h ssherr.h misc.h sshkey.h authfd.h ssh-pkcs11.h ssh-pkcs11.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h log.h ssherr.h sshkey.h ssh-rsa.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h ssh-sk-client.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h log.h ssherr.h sshbuf.h sshkey.h msg.h digest.h pathnames.h ssh-sk.h misc.h ssh-sk-helper.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h xmalloc.h log.h ssherr.h sshkey.h authfd.h misc.h sshbuf.h msg.h uidswap.h ssh-sk.h ssh-sk.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h ssh-xmss.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h ssh.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h xmalloc.h ssh.h ssh2.h canohost.h compat.h cipher.h cipher-chachapoly.h chacha.h poly1305.h cipher-aesctr.h rijndael.h packet.h dispatch.h sshbuf.h channels.h ssh.o: sshkey.h authfd.h authfile.h pathnames.h clientloop.h log.h ssherr.h misc.h readconf.h sshconnect.h kex.h mac.h crypto_api.h sshpty.h match.h msg.h version.h myproposal.h utf8.h ssh_api.o: authfile.h misc.h version.h myproposal.h sshbuf.h openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h ssh_api.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h ssh_api.h openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h cipher.h cipher-chachapoly.h chacha.h poly1305.h cipher-aesctr.h rijndael.h sshkey.h kex.h mac.h crypto_api.h ssh.h ssh2.h packet.h dispatch.h compat.h log.h ssherr.h sshbuf-getput-basic.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h ssherr.h sshbuf.h sshbuf-getput-crypto.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h sshbuf-io.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h ssherr.h sshbuf.h atomicio.h sshbuf-misc.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h ssherr.h sshbuf.h sshbuf.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h ssherr.h sshbuf.h misc.h -sshconnect.o: authfd.h kex.h mac.h crypto_api.h -sshconnect.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h xmalloc.h hostfile.h ssh.h sshbuf.h packet.h openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h dispatch.h compat.h sshkey.h sshconnect.h log.h ssherr.h misc.h readconf.h atomicio.h dns.h monitor_fdpass.h ssh2.h version.h authfile.h +sshconnect.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h xmalloc.h hostfile.h ssh.h sshbuf.h packet.h openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h dispatch.h sshkey.h sshconnect.h log.h ssherr.h misc.h readconf.h atomicio.h dns.h monitor_fdpass.h ssh2.h version.h authfile.h authfd.h +sshconnect.o: kex.h mac.h crypto_api.h sshconnect2.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h xmalloc.h ssh.h ssh2.h sshbuf.h packet.h dispatch.h compat.h cipher.h cipher-chachapoly.h chacha.h poly1305.h cipher-aesctr.h rijndael.h sshkey.h kex.h mac.h crypto_api.h -sshconnect2.o: myproposal.h sshconnect.h authfile.h dh.h authfd.h log.h ssherr.h misc.h readconf.h match.h canohost.h msg.h pathnames.h uidswap.h hostfile.h utf8.h ssh-sk.h sk-api.h +sshconnect2.o: sshconnect.h authfile.h dh.h authfd.h log.h ssherr.h misc.h readconf.h match.h canohost.h msg.h pathnames.h uidswap.h hostfile.h utf8.h ssh-sk.h sk-api.h sshd.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h ./openbsd-compat/sys-tree.h openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h xmalloc.h ssh.h ssh2.h sshpty.h packet.h dispatch.h log.h ssherr.h sshbuf.h misc.h match.h servconf.h uidswap.h compat.h cipher.h cipher-chachapoly.h chacha.h -sshd.o: poly1305.h cipher-aesctr.h rijndael.h digest.h sshkey.h kex.h mac.h crypto_api.h myproposal.h authfile.h pathnames.h atomicio.h canohost.h hostfile.h auth.h auth-pam.h audit.h loginrec.h authfd.h msg.h channels.h session.h monitor.h monitor_wrap.h ssh-sandbox.h auth-options.h version.h sk-api.h srclimit.h dh.h +sshd.o: poly1305.h cipher-aesctr.h rijndael.h digest.h sshkey.h kex.h mac.h crypto_api.h authfile.h pathnames.h atomicio.h canohost.h hostfile.h auth.h auth-pam.h audit.h loginrec.h authfd.h msg.h channels.h session.h monitor.h monitor_wrap.h ssh-sandbox.h auth-options.h version.h sk-api.h srclimit.h dh.h ssherr.o: ssherr.h sshkey-xmss.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h sshkey.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h crypto_api.h ssh2.h ssherr.h misc.h sshbuf.h cipher.h cipher-chachapoly.h chacha.h poly1305.h cipher-aesctr.h rijndael.h digest.h sshkey.h match.h ssh-sk.h openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h sshlogin.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h sshlogin.h ssherr.h loginrec.h log.h sshbuf.h misc.h servconf.h openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h sshpty.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h sshpty.h log.h ssherr.h misc.h sshsig.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h authfd.h authfile.h log.h ssherr.h misc.h sshbuf.h sshsig.h sshkey.h match.h digest.h sshtty.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h sshpty.h ttymodes.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h packet.h openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h dispatch.h log.h ssherr.h compat.h sshbuf.h ttymodes.h uidswap.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h log.h ssherr.h uidswap.h xmalloc.h umac.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h xmalloc.h umac.h misc.h rijndael.h umac128.o: umac.c includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h xmalloc.h umac.h misc.h rijndael.h utf8.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h utf8.h xmalloc.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h xmalloc.h log.h ssherr.h xmss_commons.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h xmss_fast.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h xmss_hash.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h xmss_hash_address.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h xmss_wots.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h diff --git a/crypto/openssh/.github/ci-status.md b/crypto/openssh/.github/ci-status.md index d13bbfa8c038..c57c3d83d11a 100644 --- a/crypto/openssh/.github/ci-status.md +++ b/crypto/openssh/.github/ci-status.md @@ -1,10 +1,11 @@ master : [![C/C++ CI](https://github.com/openssh/openssh-portable/actions/workflows/c-cpp.yml/badge.svg)](https://github.com/openssh/openssh-portable/actions/workflows/c-cpp.yml?query=branch:master) [![C/C++ CI self-hosted](https://github.com/openssh/openssh-portable-selfhosted/actions/workflows/selfhosted.yml/badge.svg)](https://github.com/openssh/openssh-portable-selfhosted/actions/workflows/selfhosted.yml?query=branch:master) [![Upstream self-hosted](https://github.com/openssh/openssh-portable-selfhosted/actions/workflows/upstream.yml/badge.svg)](https://github.com/openssh/openssh-portable-selfhosted/actions/workflows/upstream.yml?query=branch:master) [![CIFuzz](https://github.com/openssh/openssh-portable/actions/workflows/cifuzz.yml/badge.svg)](https://github.com/openssh/openssh-portable/actions/workflows/cifuzz.yml) [![Fuzzing Status](https://oss-fuzz-build-logs.storage.googleapis.com/badges/openssh.svg)](https://bugs.chromium.org/p/oss-fuzz/issues/list?sort=-opened&can=1&q=proj:openssh) +[![Coverity Status](https://scan.coverity.com/projects/21341/badge.svg)](https://scan.coverity.com/projects/openssh-portable) -9.1 : -[![C/C++ CI](https://github.com/openssh/openssh-portable/actions/workflows/c-cpp.yml/badge.svg?branch=V_9_1)](https://github.com/openssh/openssh-portable/actions/workflows/c-cpp.yml?query=branch:V_9_1) -[![C/C++ CI self-hosted](https://github.com/openssh/openssh-portable-selfhosted/actions/workflows/selfhosted.yml/badge.svg?branch=V_9_1)](https://github.com/openssh/openssh-portable-selfhosted/actions/workflows/selfhosted.yml?query=branch:V_9_1) +9.2 : +[![C/C++ CI](https://github.com/openssh/openssh-portable/actions/workflows/c-cpp.yml/badge.svg?branch=V_9_2)](https://github.com/openssh/openssh-portable/actions/workflows/c-cpp.yml?query=branch:V_9_2) +[![C/C++ CI self-hosted](https://github.com/openssh/openssh-portable-selfhosted/actions/workflows/selfhosted.yml/badge.svg?branch=V_9_2)](https://github.com/openssh/openssh-portable-selfhosted/actions/workflows/selfhosted.yml?query=branch:V_9_2) diff --git a/crypto/openssh/.github/configs b/crypto/openssh/.github/configs index bdd5ddbdfaf0..8f21fc54a268 100755 --- a/crypto/openssh/.github/configs +++ b/crypto/openssh/.github/configs @@ -1,313 +1,313 @@ #!/bin/sh # # usage: configs vmname test_config (or '' for default) # # Sets the following variables: # CONFIGFLAGS options to ./configure # SSHD_CONFOPTS sshd_config options # TEST_TARGET make target used when testing. defaults to "tests". # LTESTS config=$1 if [ "$config" = "" ]; then config="default" fi unset CC CFLAGS CPPFLAGS LDFLAGS LTESTS SUDO TEST_TARGET="tests compat-tests" LTESTS="" SKIP_LTESTS="" SUDO=sudo # run with sudo by default TEST_SSH_UNSAFE_PERMISSIONS=1 # Stop on first test failure to minimize logs TEST_SSH_FAIL_FATAL=yes CONFIGFLAGS="" LIBCRYPTOFLAGS="" case "$config" in default|sol64) ;; c89) CC="gcc" CFLAGS="-Wall -std=c89 -pedantic -Werror=vla" CONFIGFLAGS="--without-zlib" LIBCRYPTOFLAGS="--without-openssl" TEST_TARGET=t-exec ;; cygwin-release) # See https://cygwin.com/git/?p=git/cygwin-packages/openssh.git;a=blob;f=openssh.cygport;hb=HEAD CONFIGFLAGS="--with-xauth=/usr/bin/xauth --with-security-key-builtin" CONFIGFLAGS="$CONFIGFLAGS --with-kerberos5=/usr --with-libedit --disable-strip" ;; clang-12-Werror) CC="clang-12" # clang's implicit-fallthrough requires that the code be annotated with # __attribute__((fallthrough)) and does not understand /* FALLTHROUGH */ CFLAGS="-Wall -Wextra -O2 -Wno-error=implicit-fallthrough -Wno-error=unused-parameter" CONFIGFLAGS="--with-pam --with-Werror" ;; *-sanitize-*) case "$config" in gcc-*) CC=gcc ;; clang-*) # Find the newest available version of clang for i in `seq 10 99`; do clang="`which clang-$i 2>/dev/null`" [ -x "$clang" ] && CC="$clang" done ;; esac # Put Sanitizer logs in regress dir. SANLOGS=`pwd`/regress # - We replace chroot with chdir so that the sanitizer in the preauth # privsep process can read /proc. # - clang does not recognizes explicit_bzero so we use bzero # (see https://github.com/google/sanitizers/issues/1507 # - openssl and zlib trip ASAN. # - sp_pwdp returned by getspnam trips ASAN, hence disabling shadow. case "$config" in *-sanitize-address) CFLAGS="-fsanitize=address -fno-omit-frame-pointer" LDFLAGS="-fsanitize=address" CPPFLAGS='-Dchroot=chdir -Dexplicit_bzero=bzero -D_FORTIFY_SOURCE=0 -DASAN_OPTIONS=\"detect_leaks=0:log_path='$SANLOGS'/asan.log\"' CONFIGFLAGS="" TEST_TARGET="t-exec" ;; clang-sanitize-memory) CFLAGS="-fsanitize=memory -fsanitize-memory-track-origins -fno-omit-frame-pointer" LDFLAGS="-fsanitize=memory" CPPFLAGS='-Dchroot=chdir -Dexplicit_bzero=bzero -DMSAN_OPTIONS=\"log_path='$SANLOGS'/msan.log\"' CONFIGFLAGS="--without-openssl --without-zlib --without-shadow" TEST_TARGET="t-exec" ;; *-sanitize-undefined) CFLAGS="-fsanitize=undefined" LDFLAGS="-fsanitize=undefined" ;; *) echo unknown sanitize option; exit 1;; esac features="--disable-security-key --disable-pkcs11" hardening="--without-sandbox --without-hardening --without-stackprotect" privsep="--with-privsep-user=root" CONFIGFLAGS="$CONFIGFLAGS $features $hardening $privsep" # Because we hobble chroot we can't test it. SKIP_LTESTS=sftp-chroot ;; gcc-11-Werror) CC="gcc" # -Wnoformat-truncation in gcc 7.3.1 20180130 fails on fmt_scaled CFLAGS="-Wall -Wextra -O2 -Wno-format-truncation -Wimplicit-fallthrough=4 -Wno-unused-parameter" CONFIGFLAGS="--with-pam --with-Werror" ;; clang*|gcc*) CC="$config" ;; kitchensink) CONFIGFLAGS="--with-kerberos5 --with-libedit --with-pam" CONFIGFLAGS="${CONFIGFLAGS} --with-security-key-builtin --with-selinux" CFLAGS="-DSK_DEBUG -DSANDBOX_SECCOMP_FILTER_DEBUG" ;; hardenedmalloc) CONFIGFLAGS="--with-ldflags=-lhardened_malloc" ;; tcmalloc) CONFIGFLAGS="--with-ldflags=-ltcmalloc" ;; krb5|heimdal) CONFIGFLAGS="--with-kerberos5" ;; libedit) CONFIGFLAGS="--with-libedit" ;; musl) CC="musl-gcc" CONFIGFLAGS="--without-zlib" LIBCRYPTOFLAGS="--without-openssl" TEST_TARGET="t-exec" ;; pam-krb5) CONFIGFLAGS="--with-pam --with-kerberos5" SSHD_CONFOPTS="UsePam yes" ;; *pam) CONFIGFLAGS="--with-pam" SSHD_CONFOPTS="UsePam yes" ;; libressl-*) LIBCRYPTOFLAGS="--with-ssl-dir=/opt/libressl --with-rpath=-Wl,-rpath," ;; openssl-*) LIBCRYPTOFLAGS="--with-ssl-dir=/opt/openssl --with-rpath=-Wl,-rpath," # OpenSSL 1.1.1 specifically has a bug in its RNG that breaks reexec # fallback. See https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=3483 if [ "$config" = "openssl-1.1.1" ]; then SKIP_LTESTS="reexec" fi ;; selinux) CONFIGFLAGS="--with-selinux" ;; sk) CONFIGFLAGS="--with-security-key-builtin" ;; without-openssl) LIBCRYPTOFLAGS="--without-openssl" TEST_TARGET=t-exec ;; valgrind-[1-5]|valgrind-unit) # rlimit sandbox and FORTIFY_SOURCE confuse Valgrind. CONFIGFLAGS="--without-sandbox --without-hardening" CONFIGFLAGS="$CONFIGFLAGS --with-cppflags=-D_FORTIFY_SOURCE=0" TEST_TARGET="t-exec USE_VALGRIND=1" TEST_SSH_ELAPSED_TIMES=1 export TEST_SSH_ELAPSED_TIMES # Valgrind slows things down enough that the agent timeout test # won't reliably pass, and the unit tests run longer than allowed # by github so split into separate tests. tests2="integrity try-ciphers" tests3="krl forward-control sshsig agent-restrict kextype sftp" tests4="cert-userkey cert-hostkey kextype sftp-perm keygen-comment percent" tests5="rekey" case "$config" in valgrind-1) # All tests except agent-timeout (which is flaky under valgrind), # connection-timeout (which doesn't work since it's so slow) # and hostbased (since valgrind won't let ssh exec keysign). # Slow ones are run separately to increase parallelism. SKIP_LTESTS="agent-timeout connection-timeout hostbased" SKIP_LTESTS="$SKIP_LTESTS ${tests2} ${tests3} ${tests4} ${tests5}" ;; valgrind-2) LTESTS="${tests2}" ;; valgrind-3) LTESTS="${tests3}" ;; valgrind-4) LTESTS="${tests4}" ;; valgrind-5) LTESTS="${tests5}" ;; valgrind-unit) TEST_TARGET="unit USE_VALGRIND=1" ;; esac ;; *) echo "Unknown configuration $config" exit 1 ;; esac # The Solaris 64bit targets are special since they need a non-flag arg. case "$config" in sol64*) CONFIGFLAGS="x86_64 --with-cflags=-m64 --with-ldflags=-m64 ${CONFIGFLAGS}" LIBCRYPTOFLAGS="--with-ssl-dir=/usr/local/ssl64" ;; esac case "${TARGET_HOST}" in aix*) # These are slow real or virtual machines so skip the slowest tests # (which tend to be thw ones that transfer lots of data) so that the # test run does not time out. # The agent-restrict test fails due to some quoting issue when run # with sh or ksh so specify bash for now. - TEST_TARGET="t-exec TEST_SHELL=bash" + TEST_TARGET="t-exec unit TEST_SHELL=bash" SKIP_LTESTS="rekey sftp" ;; debian-riscv64) # This machine is fairly slow, so skip the unit tests. TEST_TARGET="t-exec" ;; dfly58*|dfly60*) # scp 3-way connection hangs on these so skip until sorted. SKIP_LTESTS=scp3 ;; fbsd6) # Native linker is not great with PIC so OpenSSL is built w/out. CONFIGFLAGS="${CONFIGFLAGS} --disable-security-key" ;; hurd) SKIP_LTESTS="forwarding multiplex proxy-connect hostkey-agent agent-ptrace" ;; minix3) LIBCRYPTOFLAGS="--without-openssl --disable-security-key" # Minix does not have a loopback interface so we have to skip any # test that relies on one. # Also, Minix seems to be very limited in the number of select() # calls that can be operating concurrently, so prune additional tests for that. T="addrmatch agent-restrict brokenkeys cfgmatch cfgmatchlisten cfgparse connect connect-uri exit-status forwarding hostkey-agent key-options keyscan knownhosts-command login-timeout reconfigure reexec rekey scp scp-uri scp3 sftp sftp-badcmds sftp-batch sftp-cmds sftp-glob sftp-perm sftp-uri stderr-data transfer" # Unix domain sockets don't work quite like we expect, so also skip any tests # that use multiplexing. T="$T connection-timeout dynamic-forward forward-control multiplex" SKIP_LTESTS="$(echo $T)" TEST_TARGET=t-exec SUDO="" ;; nbsd4) # System compiler will ICE on some files with fstack-protector # SHA256 functions in sha2.h conflict with OpenSSL's breaking sk-dummy CONFIGFLAGS="${CONFIGFLAGS} --without-hardening --disable-security-key" ;; openwrt-*) CONFIGFLAGS="${CONFIGFLAGS} --without-openssl --without-zlib" TEST_TARGET="t-exec" ;; sol10|sol11) # sol10 VM is 32bit and the unit tests are slow. # sol11 has 4 test configs so skip unit tests to speed up. TEST_TARGET="tests SKIP_UNIT=1" ;; win10) # No sudo on Windows. SUDO="" ;; esac case "`./config.guess`" in *cygwin) SUDO="" # Don't run compat tests on cygwin as they don't currently compile. TEST_TARGET="tests" ;; *-darwin*) # Unless specified otherwise, build without OpenSSL on Mac OS since # modern versions don't ship with libcrypto. LIBCRYPTOFLAGS="--without-openssl" TEST_TARGET=t-exec ;; esac # If we have a local openssl/libressl, use that. if [ -z "${LIBCRYPTOFLAGS}" ]; then # last-match for i in /usr/local /usr/local/ssl /usr/local/opt/openssl; do if [ -x ${i}/bin/openssl ]; then LIBCRYPTOFLAGS="--with-ssl-dir=${i}" fi done fi CONFIGFLAGS="${CONFIGFLAGS} ${LIBCRYPTOFLAGS}" if [ -x "$(which plink 2>/dev/null)" ]; then REGRESS_INTEROP_PUTTY=yes export REGRESS_INTEROP_PUTTY fi export CC CFLAGS CPPFLAGS LDFLAGS LTESTS SUDO export TEST_TARGET TEST_SSH_UNSAFE_PERMISSIONS TEST_SSH_FAIL_FATAL diff --git a/crypto/openssh/.github/run_test.sh b/crypto/openssh/.github/run_test.sh index 8eeaf5e9b09d..d5fd487d9009 100755 --- a/crypto/openssh/.github/run_test.sh +++ b/crypto/openssh/.github/run_test.sh @@ -1,48 +1,48 @@ #!/bin/sh . .github/configs $1 [ -z "${SUDO}" ] || ${SUDO} mkdir -p /var/empty set -ex # If we want to test hostbased auth, set up the host for it. if [ ! -z "$SUDO" ] && [ ! -z "$TEST_SSH_HOSTBASED_AUTH" ]; then sshconf=/usr/local/etc hostname | $SUDO tee $sshconf/shosts.equiv >/dev/null echo "EnableSSHKeysign yes" | $SUDO tee $sshconf/ssh_config >/dev/null $SUDO mkdir -p $sshconf $SUDO cp -p /etc/ssh/ssh_host*key* $sshconf $SUDO make install for key in $sshconf/ssh_host*key*.pub; do echo `hostname` `cat $key` | \ $SUDO tee -a $sshconf/ssh_known_hosts >/dev/null done fi output_failed_logs() { - for i in regress/failed*; do + for i in regress/failed*.log; do if [ -f "$i" ]; then echo ------------------------------------------------------------------------- echo LOGFILE $i cat $i echo ------------------------------------------------------------------------- fi done } trap output_failed_logs 0 if [ -z "${LTESTS}" ]; then make ${TEST_TARGET} SKIP_LTESTS="${SKIP_LTESTS}" else make ${TEST_TARGET} SKIP_LTESTS="${SKIP_LTESTS}" LTESTS="${LTESTS}" fi if [ ! -z "${SSHD_CONFOPTS}" ]; then echo "rerunning t-exec with TEST_SSH_SSHD_CONFOPTS='${SSHD_CONFOPTS}'" if [ -z "${LTESTS}" ]; then make t-exec SKIP_LTESTS="${SKIP_LTESTS}" TEST_SSH_SSHD_CONFOPTS="${SSHD_CONFOPTS}" else make t-exec SKIP_LTESTS="${SKIP_LTESTS}" LTESTS="${LTESTS}" TEST_SSH_SSHD_CONFOPTS="${SSHD_CONFOPTS}" fi fi diff --git a/crypto/openssh/.github/setup_ci.sh b/crypto/openssh/.github/setup_ci.sh index e4480e614f31..691c70dd7ed6 100755 --- a/crypto/openssh/.github/setup_ci.sh +++ b/crypto/openssh/.github/setup_ci.sh @@ -1,201 +1,201 @@ #!/bin/sh PACKAGES="" . .github/configs $@ case "`./config.guess`" in *cygwin) PACKAGER=setup - echo Setting CYGWIN sustem environment variable. + echo Setting CYGWIN system environment variable. setx CYGWIN "binmode" - chmod -R go-rw /cygdrive/d/a - umask 077 + echo Removing extended ACLs so umask works as expected. + setfacl -b . regress PACKAGES="$PACKAGES,autoconf,automake,cygwin-devel,gcc-core" PACKAGES="$PACKAGES,make,openssl-devel,zlib-devel" ;; *-darwin*) PACKAGER=brew brew install automake exit 0 ;; *) PACKAGER=apt esac TARGETS=$@ INSTALL_FIDO_PPA="no" export DEBIAN_FRONTEND=noninteractive #echo "Setting up for '$TARGETS'" set -ex if [ -x "`which lsb_release 2>&1`" ]; then lsb_release -a fi # Ubuntu 22.04 defaults to private home dirs which prevent the # agent-getpeerid test from running ssh-add as nobody. See # https://github.com/actions/runner-images/issues/6106 if [ ! -z "$SUDO" ] && ! "$SUDO" -u nobody test -x ~; then echo ~ is not executable by nobody, adding perms. chmod go+x ~ fi if [ "${TARGETS}" = "kitchensink" ]; then TARGETS="krb5 libedit pam sk selinux" fi for flag in $CONFIGFLAGS; do case "$flag" in --with-pam) TARGETS="${TARGETS} pam" ;; --with-libedit) TARGETS="${TARGETS} libedit" ;; esac done for TARGET in $TARGETS; do case $TARGET in default|without-openssl|without-zlib|c89) # nothing to do ;; clang-sanitize*) PACKAGES="$PACKAGES clang-12" ;; cygwin-release) PACKAGES="$PACKAGES libcrypt-devel libfido2-devel libkrb5-devel" ;; gcc-sanitize*) ;; clang-*|gcc-*) compiler=$(echo $TARGET | sed 's/-Werror//') PACKAGES="$PACKAGES $compiler" ;; krb5) PACKAGES="$PACKAGES libkrb5-dev" ;; heimdal) PACKAGES="$PACKAGES heimdal-dev" ;; libedit) case "$PACKAGER" in setup) PACKAGES="$PACKAGES libedit-devel" ;; apt) PACKAGES="$PACKAGES libedit-dev" ;; esac ;; *pam) PACKAGES="$PACKAGES libpam0g-dev" ;; sk) INSTALL_FIDO_PPA="yes" PACKAGES="$PACKAGES libfido2-dev libu2f-host-dev libcbor-dev" ;; selinux) PACKAGES="$PACKAGES libselinux1-dev selinux-policy-dev" ;; hardenedmalloc) INSTALL_HARDENED_MALLOC=yes ;; musl) PACKAGES="$PACKAGES musl-tools" ;; tcmalloc) PACKAGES="$PACKAGES libgoogle-perftools-dev" ;; openssl-noec) INSTALL_OPENSSL=OpenSSL_1_1_1k SSLCONFOPTS="no-ec" ;; openssl-*) INSTALL_OPENSSL=$(echo ${TARGET} | cut -f2 -d-) case ${INSTALL_OPENSSL} in 1.1.1_stable) INSTALL_OPENSSL="OpenSSL_1_1_1-stable" ;; 1.*) INSTALL_OPENSSL="OpenSSL_$(echo ${INSTALL_OPENSSL} | tr . _)" ;; 3.*) INSTALL_OPENSSL="openssl-${INSTALL_OPENSSL}" ;; esac PACKAGES="${PACKAGES} putty-tools" ;; libressl-*) INSTALL_LIBRESSL=$(echo ${TARGET} | cut -f2 -d-) case ${INSTALL_LIBRESSL} in master) ;; *) INSTALL_LIBRESSL="$(echo ${TARGET} | cut -f2 -d-)" ;; esac PACKAGES="${PACKAGES} putty-tools" ;; valgrind*) PACKAGES="$PACKAGES valgrind" ;; *) echo "Invalid option '${TARGET}'" exit 1 ;; esac done if [ "yes" = "$INSTALL_FIDO_PPA" ]; then sudo apt update -qq sudo apt install -qy software-properties-common sudo apt-add-repository -y ppa:yubico/stable fi tries=3 while [ ! -z "$PACKAGES" ] && [ "$tries" -gt "0" ]; do case "$PACKAGER" in apt) sudo apt update -qq if sudo apt install -qy $PACKAGES; then PACKAGES="" fi ;; setup) if /cygdrive/c/setup.exe -q -P `echo "$PACKAGES" | tr ' ' ,`; then PACKAGES="" fi ;; esac if [ ! -z "$PACKAGES" ]; then sleep 90 fi tries=$(($tries - 1)) done if [ ! -z "$PACKAGES" ]; then echo "Package installation failed." exit 1 fi if [ "${INSTALL_HARDENED_MALLOC}" = "yes" ]; then (cd ${HOME} && git clone https://github.com/GrapheneOS/hardened_malloc.git && cd ${HOME}/hardened_malloc && make -j2 && sudo cp out/libhardened_malloc.so /usr/lib/) fi if [ ! -z "${INSTALL_OPENSSL}" ]; then (cd ${HOME} && git clone https://github.com/openssl/openssl.git && cd ${HOME}/openssl && git checkout ${INSTALL_OPENSSL} && ./config no-threads shared ${SSLCONFOPTS} \ --prefix=/opt/openssl && make && sudo make install_sw) fi if [ ! -z "${INSTALL_LIBRESSL}" ]; then if [ "${INSTALL_LIBRESSL}" = "master" ]; then (mkdir -p ${HOME}/libressl && cd ${HOME}/libressl && git clone https://github.com/libressl-portable/portable.git && cd ${HOME}/libressl/portable && git checkout ${INSTALL_LIBRESSL} && sh update.sh && sh autogen.sh && ./configure --prefix=/opt/libressl && make -j2 && sudo make install) else LIBRESSL_URLBASE=https://cdn.openbsd.org/pub/OpenBSD/LibreSSL (cd ${HOME} && wget ${LIBRESSL_URLBASE}/libressl-${INSTALL_LIBRESSL}.tar.gz && tar xfz libressl-${INSTALL_LIBRESSL}.tar.gz && cd libressl-${INSTALL_LIBRESSL} && ./configure --prefix=/opt/libressl && make -j2 && sudo make install) fi fi diff --git a/crypto/openssh/.github/workflows/c-cpp.yml b/crypto/openssh/.github/workflows/c-cpp.yml index e6ea49550f71..f3163884a037 100644 --- a/crypto/openssh/.github/workflows/c-cpp.yml +++ b/crypto/openssh/.github/workflows/c-cpp.yml @@ -1,125 +1,126 @@ name: C/C++ CI on: push: paths: [ '**.c', '**.h', '**.m4', '**.sh', '.github/**', '**/Makefile.in', 'configure.ac' ] pull_request: paths: [ '**.c', '**.h', '**.m4', '**.sh', '.github/**', '**/Makefile.in', 'configure.ac' ] jobs: ci: if: github.repository != 'openssh/openssh-portable-selfhosted' strategy: fail-fast: false matrix: # First we test all OSes in the default configuration. target: [ubuntu-20.04, ubuntu-22.04, macos-11, macos-12, windows-2019, windows-2022] config: [default] # Then we include any extra configs we want to test for specific VMs. # Valgrind slows things down quite a bit, so start them first. include: - { target: windows-2019, config: cygwin-release } - { target: windows-2022, config: cygwin-release } - { target: ubuntu-20.04, config: valgrind-1 } - { target: ubuntu-20.04, config: valgrind-2 } - { target: ubuntu-20.04, config: valgrind-3 } - { target: ubuntu-20.04, config: valgrind-4 } - { target: ubuntu-20.04, config: valgrind-5 } - { target: ubuntu-20.04, config: valgrind-unit } - { target: ubuntu-20.04, config: c89 } - { target: ubuntu-20.04, config: clang-6.0 } - { target: ubuntu-20.04, config: clang-8 } - { target: ubuntu-20.04, config: clang-9 } - { target: ubuntu-20.04, config: clang-10 } - { target: ubuntu-20.04, config: clang-11 } - { target: ubuntu-20.04, config: clang-12-Werror } - { target: ubuntu-20.04, config: clang-sanitize-address } - { target: ubuntu-20.04, config: clang-sanitize-undefined } - { target: ubuntu-20.04, config: gcc-sanitize-address } - { target: ubuntu-20.04, config: gcc-sanitize-undefined } - { target: ubuntu-20.04, config: gcc-7 } - { target: ubuntu-20.04, config: gcc-8 } - { target: ubuntu-20.04, config: gcc-10 } - { target: ubuntu-20.04, config: gcc-11-Werror } - { target: ubuntu-20.04, config: pam } - { target: ubuntu-20.04, config: kitchensink } - { target: ubuntu-20.04, config: hardenedmalloc } - { target: ubuntu-20.04, config: tcmalloc } - { target: ubuntu-20.04, config: musl } - { target: ubuntu-latest, config: libressl-master } - { target: ubuntu-latest, config: libressl-2.2.9 } - { target: ubuntu-latest, config: libressl-2.8.3 } - { target: ubuntu-latest, config: libressl-3.0.2 } - { target: ubuntu-latest, config: libressl-3.2.6 } - { target: ubuntu-latest, config: libressl-3.3.6 } - { target: ubuntu-latest, config: libressl-3.4.3 } - { target: ubuntu-latest, config: libressl-3.5.3 } - { target: ubuntu-latest, config: libressl-3.6.1 } - { target: ubuntu-latest, config: libressl-3.7.0 } - { target: ubuntu-latest, config: openssl-master } - { target: ubuntu-latest, config: openssl-noec } - { target: ubuntu-latest, config: openssl-1.0.1 } - { target: ubuntu-latest, config: openssl-1.0.1u } - { target: ubuntu-latest, config: openssl-1.0.2u } - { target: ubuntu-latest, config: openssl-1.1.0h } - { target: ubuntu-latest, config: openssl-1.1.1 } - { target: ubuntu-latest, config: openssl-1.1.1k } - { target: ubuntu-latest, config: openssl-1.1.1n } - { target: ubuntu-latest, config: openssl-1.1.1q } - { target: ubuntu-latest, config: openssl-1.1.1s } - { target: ubuntu-latest, config: openssl-3.0.0 } - { target: ubuntu-latest, config: openssl-3.0.5 } - { target: ubuntu-latest, config: openssl-3.0.7 } - { target: ubuntu-latest, config: openssl-1.1.1_stable } - { target: ubuntu-latest, config: openssl-3.0 } # stable branch - { target: ubuntu-22.04, config: pam } - { target: ubuntu-22.04, config: krb5 } - { target: ubuntu-22.04, config: heimdal } - { target: ubuntu-22.04, config: libedit } - { target: ubuntu-22.04, config: sk } - { target: ubuntu-22.04, config: selinux } - { target: ubuntu-22.04, config: kitchensink } - { target: ubuntu-22.04, config: without-openssl } - { target: macos-11, config: pam } - { target: macos-12, config: pam } runs-on: ${{ matrix.target }} steps: - name: set cygwin git params if: ${{ startsWith(matrix.target, 'windows') }} run: git config --global core.autocrlf input - name: install cygwin if: ${{ startsWith(matrix.target, 'windows') }} uses: cygwin/cygwin-install-action@master - uses: actions/checkout@main - name: setup CI system run: sh ./.github/setup_ci.sh ${{ matrix.config }} - name: autoreconf run: sh -c autoreconf - name: configure run: sh ./.github/configure.sh ${{ matrix.config }} - name: save config uses: actions/upload-artifact@main with: name: ${{ matrix.target }}-${{ matrix.config }}-config path: config.h - name: make clean run: make clean - name: make run: make -j2 - name: make tests run: sh ./.github/run_test.sh ${{ matrix.config }} env: TEST_SSH_UNSAFE_PERMISSIONS: 1 TEST_SSH_HOSTBASED_AUTH: yes - name: save logs if: failure() uses: actions/upload-artifact@main with: name: ${{ matrix.target }}-${{ matrix.config }}-logs path: | config.h config.log regress/*.log regress/valgrind-out/ regress/asan.log.* regress/msan.log.* + regress/log/* diff --git a/crypto/openssh/.github/workflows/selfhosted.yml b/crypto/openssh/.github/workflows/selfhosted.yml index 50bc9fffb723..d38cba520500 100644 --- a/crypto/openssh/.github/workflows/selfhosted.yml +++ b/crypto/openssh/.github/workflows/selfhosted.yml @@ -1,116 +1,119 @@ name: C/C++ CI self-hosted on: push: paths: [ '**.c', '**.h', '**.m4', '**.sh', '.github/**', '**/Makefile.in', 'configure.ac' ] jobs: selfhosted: if: github.repository == 'openssh/openssh-portable-selfhosted' runs-on: ${{ matrix.host }} timeout-minutes: 600 env: HOST: ${{ matrix.host }} TARGET_HOST: ${{ matrix.target }} TARGET_CONFIG: ${{ matrix.config }} strategy: fail-fast: false # We use a matrix in two parts: firstly all of the VMs are tested with the # default config. "target" corresponds to a label associated with the # worker. The default is an ephemeral VM running under libvirt. matrix: target: - alpine + - centos7 - debian-i386 - dfly30 - dfly48 - dfly58 - dfly60 - dfly62 - fbsd10 - fbsd12 - fbsd13 - minix3 - nbsd3 - nbsd4 - nbsd8 - nbsd9 - obsd51 - obsd67 - obsd69 - obsd70 - obsdsnap - obsdsnap-i386 - openindiana - sol10 - sol11 config: - default host: - libvirt include: # Then we include extra libvirt test configs. - { target: aix51, config: default, host: libvirt } + - { target: centos7, config: pam, host: libvirt } - { target: debian-i386, config: pam, host: libvirt } - { target: dfly30, config: without-openssl, host: libvirt} - { target: dfly48, config: pam ,host: libvirt } - { target: dfly58, config: pam, host: libvirt } - { target: dfly60, config: pam, host: libvirt } - { target: dfly62, config: pam, host: libvirt } - { target: fbsd10, config: pam, host: libvirt } - { target: fbsd12, config: pam, host: libvirt } - { target: fbsd13, config: pam, host: libvirt } - { target: nbsd8, config: pam, host: libvirt } - { target: nbsd9, config: pam, host: libvirt } - { target: openindiana, config: pam, host: libvirt } - { target: sol10, config: pam, host: libvirt } - { target: sol11, config: pam-krb5, host: libvirt } - { target: sol11, config: sol64, host: libvirt } # VMs with persistent disks that have their own runner. - { target: win10, config: default, host: win10 } - { target: win10, config: cygwin-release, host: win10 } # Physical hosts, with either native runners or remote via ssh. - { target: ARM, config: default, host: ARM } - { target: ARM64, config: default, host: ARM64 } - { target: ARM64, config: pam, host: ARM64 } - { target: debian-riscv64, config: default, host: debian-riscv64 } - { target: openwrt-mips, config: default, host: openwrt-mips } - { target: openwrt-mipsel, config: default, host: openwrt-mipsel } steps: - name: shutdown VM if running run: vmshutdown working-directory: ${{ runner.temp }} - uses: actions/checkout@main - name: autoreconf run: autoreconf - name: startup VM run: vmstartup working-directory: ${{ runner.temp }} - name: configure run: vmrun ./.github/configure.sh ${{ matrix.config }} - name: save config uses: actions/upload-artifact@main with: name: ${{ matrix.target }}-${{ matrix.config }}-config path: config.h - name: make clean run: vmrun make clean - name: make run: vmrun make - name: make tests run: vmrun ./.github/run_test.sh ${{ matrix.config }} timeout-minutes: 600 - name: save logs if: failure() uses: actions/upload-artifact@main with: name: ${{ matrix.target }}-${{ matrix.config }}-logs path: | config.h config.log regress/*.log + regress/log/* regress/valgrind-out/ - name: shutdown VM if: always() run: vmshutdown working-directory: ${{ runner.temp }} diff --git a/crypto/openssh/.github/workflows/upstream.yml b/crypto/openssh/.github/workflows/upstream.yml index 1e2c2acb7ac0..b280793d31f3 100644 --- a/crypto/openssh/.github/workflows/upstream.yml +++ b/crypto/openssh/.github/workflows/upstream.yml @@ -1,52 +1,53 @@ name: Upstream self-hosted on: push: branches: [ master ] paths: [ '**.c', '**.h', '.github/**' ] jobs: selfhosted: if: github.repository == 'openssh/openssh-portable-selfhosted' runs-on: 'libvirt' env: HOST: 'libvirt' TARGET_HOST: ${{ matrix.target }} TARGET_CONFIG: ${{ matrix.config }} strategy: fail-fast: false matrix: target: [ obsdsnap, obsdsnap-i386 ] config: [ default, without-openssl, ubsan ] steps: - name: shutdown VM if running run: vmshutdown working-directory: ${{ runner.temp }} - uses: actions/checkout@main - name: startup VM run: vmstartup working-directory: ${{ runner.temp }} - name: update source run: vmrun "cd /usr/src && cvs up -dPA usr.bin/ssh regress/usr.bin/ssh" - name: make clean run: vmrun "cd /usr/src/usr.bin/ssh && make obj && make clean && cd /usr/src/regress/usr.bin/ssh && make obj && make clean && sudo chmod -R g-w /usr/src /usr/obj" - name: make run: vmrun "cd /usr/src/usr.bin/ssh && case ${{ matrix.config }} in without-openssl) make OPENSSL=no;; ubsan) make DEBUG='-fsanitize-minimal-runtime -fsanitize=undefined';; *) make; esac" - name: make install run: vmrun "cd /usr/src/usr.bin/ssh && sudo make install" - name: make tests` run: vmrun "cd /usr/src/regress/usr.bin/ssh && case ${{ matrix.config }} in without-openssl) make OPENSSL=no;; ubsan) make DEBUG='-fsanitize-minimal-runtime -fsanitize=undefined';; *) make; esac" env: SUDO: sudo timeout-minutes: 300 - name: save logs if: failure() uses: actions/upload-artifact@main with: name: ${{ matrix.target }}-${{ matrix.config }}-logs path: | /usr/obj/regress/usr.bin/ssh/obj/*.log + /usr/obj/regress/usr.bin/ssh/obj/log/* - name: shutdown VM if: always() run: vmshutdown working-directory: ${{ runner.temp }} diff --git a/crypto/openssh/ChangeLog b/crypto/openssh/ChangeLog index 4251831a1732..f1d1b37d583c 100644 --- a/crypto/openssh/ChangeLog +++ b/crypto/openssh/ChangeLog @@ -1,11196 +1,11238 @@ -commit 6dfb65de949cdd0a5d198edee9a118f265924f33 +commit cb30fbdbee869f1ce11f06aa97e1cb8717a0b645 Author: Damien Miller -Date: Thu Feb 2 23:21:54 2023 +1100 +Date: Thu Mar 16 08:28:19 2023 +1100 - crank versions in RPM specs + depend -commit d07cfb11a0ca574eb68a3931d8c46fbe862a2021 +commit 1dba63eb10c40b6fda9f5012ed6ae87e2d3d028e Author: Damien Miller -Date: Thu Feb 2 23:21:45 2023 +1100 +Date: Thu Mar 16 08:27:54 2023 +1100 - update version in README + crank version -commit 9fe207565b4ab0fe5d1ac5bb85e39188d96fb214 -Author: Damien Miller -Date: Thu Feb 2 23:17:49 2023 +1100 +commit ba7532d0dac9aaf0ad7270664c43837fc9f64a5f +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Wed Mar 15 21:19:57 2023 +0000 - adapt compat_kex_proposal() test to portable + upstream: openssh-9.3 + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 8011495f2449c1029bb316bd015eab2e00509848 -commit 903c556b938fff2d7bff8da2cc460254430963c5 -Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Thu Feb 2 12:12:52 2023 +0000 +commit 6fd4daafb949b66bf555f3100f715a9ec64c3390 +Author: dtucker@openbsd.org +Date: Tue Mar 14 07:28:47 2023 +0000 - upstream: test compat_kex_proposal(); by dtucker@ + upstream: Free KRL ptr in addition to its contents. - OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 0e404ee264db546f9fdbf53390689ab5f8d38bf2 + From Coverity CID 291841, ok djm@ + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: f146ba08b1b43af4e0d7ad8c4dae3748b4fa31b6 -commit 405fba71962dec8409c0c962408e09049e5624b5 +commit 1d270bd303afaf6d94e9098cbbf18e5e539e2088 Author: dtucker@openbsd.org -Date: Thu Jan 19 07:53:45 2023 +0000 +Date: Tue Mar 14 07:26:25 2023 +0000 - upstream: Check if we can copy sshd or need to use sudo to do so + upstream: Check pointer for NULL before deref. - during reexec test. Skip test if neither can work. Patch from anton@, tweaks - from me. + None of the existing callers seem to do that, but it's worth checking. + From Coverity CID 291834, ok djm@ - OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 731b96ae74d02d5744e1f1a8e51d09877ffd9b6d + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: a0a97113f192a7cb1a2c97b932f677f573cda7a4 -commit b2a2a8f69fd7737ea17dc044353c514f2f962f35 -Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Thu Feb 2 12:10:22 2023 +0000 +commit d95af508e78c0cd3dce56b83853baaa59ae295cf +Author: dtucker@openbsd.org +Date: Sun Mar 12 10:40:39 2023 +0000 - upstream: openssh-9.2 + upstream: Limit number of entries in SSH2_MSG_EXT_INFO - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: f7389f32413c74d6e2055f05cf65e7082de03923 + request. This is already constrained by the maximum SSH packet size but this + makes it explicit. Prompted by Coverity CID 291868, ok djm@ markus@ + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: aea023819aa44a2dcb9dd0fbec10561896fc3a09 -commit 12da7823336434a403f25c7cc0c2c6aed0737a35 -Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Thu Feb 2 12:10:05 2023 +0000 +commit 8f287ba60d342b3e2f750e7332d2131e3ec7ecd0 +Author: dtucker@openbsd.org +Date: Sun Mar 12 09:41:18 2023 +0000 - upstream: fix double-free caused by compat_kex_proposal(); bz3522 + upstream: calloc can return NULL but xcalloc can't. - by dtucker@, ok me + From Coverity CID 291881, ok djm@ - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 2bfc37cd2d41f67dad64c17a64cf2cd3806a5c80 + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 50204b755f66b2ec7ac3cfe379d07d85ca161d2b -commit 79efd95ab5ff99f4cb3a955e2d713b3f54fb807e -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Wed Feb 1 17:17:26 2023 +1100 +commit 83a56a49fd50f4acf900f934279482e4ef329715 +Author: dtucker@openbsd.org +Date: Fri Mar 10 07:17:08 2023 +0000 - Skip connection-timeout test on minix3. + upstream: Explicitly ignore return from fcntl - Minix 3's Unix domain sockets don't seem to work the way we expect, so - skip connection-timeout test on that platform. While there, group - together all similarly skipped tests and explicitly comment. + (... FD_CLOEXEC) here too. Coverity CID 291853. + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 99d8b3da9d0be1d07ca8dd8e98800a890349e9b5 -commit 6b508c4e039619842bcf5a16f8a6b08dd6bec44a +commit 0fda9d704d3bbf54a5e64ce02a6fecb11fe7f047 Author: Damien Miller -Date: Wed Feb 1 12:12:05 2023 +1100 +Date: Fri Mar 10 15:59:46 2023 +1100 - fix libfido2 detection without pkg-config + bounds checking for getrrsetbyname() replacement; - Place libfido2 before additional libraries (that it may depend upon) - and not after. bz3530 from James Zhang; ok dtucker@ + Spotted by Coverity in CID 405033; ok millert@ -commit 358e300fed5e6def233a2c06326e51e20ebed621 -Author: deraadt@openbsd.org -Date: Wed Jan 18 20:56:36 2023 +0000 +commit 89b8df518f21677045599df0ad3e5dd0f39909b5 +Author: dtucker@openbsd.org +Date: Fri Mar 10 04:06:21 2023 +0000 - upstream: delete useless dependency + upstream: Plug mem leak on error path. Coverity CID 405026, ok djm@. - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: e1dc11143f83082e3154d6094f9136d0dc2637ad + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 8212ca05d01966fb5e72205c592b2257708a2aac -commit a4cb9be1b021b511e281ee55c356f964487d9e82 -Author: deraadt@openbsd.org -Date: Wed Jan 18 20:43:15 2023 +0000 +commit bf4dae0ad192c3e2f03f7223834b00d88ace3d3e +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Fri Mar 10 14:46:57 2023 +1100 - upstream: Create and install sshd random relink kit. + Add prototypes for mkstemp replacements. - ../Makefile.inc and Makfile are concatenated for reuse, which hopefully won't - be too fragile, we'll see if we need a different approach. The resulting sshd - binary is tested with the new sshd -V option before installation. As the - binary layout is now semi-unknown (meaning relative, fixed, and gadget - offsets are not precisely known), change the filesystem permissions to 511 to - prevent what I call "logged in BROP". I have ideas for improving this further - but this is a first step ok djm + Should prevent warnings due to our wrapper function. + +commit 4e04d68d6a33cdc73b831fd4b5e6124175555d3d +Author: dtucker@openbsd.org +Date: Fri Mar 10 03:01:51 2023 +0000 + + upstream: Expliticly ignore return code from fcntl(.. FD_CLOEXEC) since - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 1e0a2692b7e20b126dda60bf04999d1d30d959d8 + there's not much we can do anyway. From Coverity CID 291857, ok djm@ + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 051429dd07af8db3fec10d82cdc78d90bb051729 -commit bc7de6f91a9a0ae2f148a9d31a4027d441a51999 -Author: jmc@openbsd.org -Date: Wed Jan 18 06:55:32 2023 +0000 +commit d6d38fd77cbe091c59e1bb720c3a494df4990640 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Fri Mar 10 02:32:04 2023 +0000 - upstream: tweak previous; ok djm + upstream: Like sshd_config, some ssh_config options are not - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: df71ce4180c58202dfdc1d92626cfe900b91b7c3 + first-match-wins. sshd_config.5 was fixed in r1.348, this is the same for + this file + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 7be55b9351cde449b136afcc52d07aa4113b215e -commit a20b7e999773e6333c8aa9b0a7fa41966e63b037 -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Tue Jan 31 19:35:44 2023 +1100 +commit 7187d3f86bf8f2066cc9941f217d23b0cacae25e +Author: dtucker@openbsd.org +Date: Fri Mar 10 02:24:56 2023 +0000 - Skip connection-timeout test under Valgrind. + upstream: Remove no-op (int) > INT_MAX checks - Valgrind slows things down so much that the timeout test fails. Skip - this test until we figure out if we can make it work. + since they can never be true. From Coverity CID 405031, ok djm@ + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 9df3783b181e056595e2bb9edf7ed41d61cf8e84 -commit c3ffb54b4fc5e608206037921db6ccbc2f5ab25f +commit 77adde4305542ebe3005dd456122624fe2347b01 Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Wed Jan 25 21:58:40 2023 +1100 +Date: Fri Mar 10 13:27:29 2023 +1100 - Skip connection-timeout when missing FD passing. + Wrap mkstemp calls with umask set/restore. - This tests uses multiplexing which uses file descriptor passing, so - skip it if we don't have that. Fixes test failures on Cygwin. + glibc versions 2.06 and earlier did not set a umask on files created by + mkstemp created the world-writable. Wrap mkstemp to set and restore + the umask. From Coverity (CIDs 291826 291886 291891), ok djm@ -commit 35253af01d8c0ab444c8377402121816e71c71f5 -Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Wed Jan 18 02:00:10 2023 +0000 +commit 633d3dc2a1e9e2a013d019a0576a0771c8423713 +Author: jcs@openbsd.org +Date: Thu Mar 9 21:06:24 2023 +0000 - upstream: when restoring non-blocking mode to stdio fds, restore + upstream: modify parentheses in conditionals to make it clearer what is - exactly the flags that ssh started with and don't just clobber them with - zero, as this could also remove the append flag from the set; + being assigned and what is being checked - bz3523; ok dtucker@ + ok djm dtucker - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 1336b03e881db7564a4b66014eb24c5230e9a0c0 + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 19c10baa46ae559474409f75a5cb3d0eade7a9b8 -commit 7d17ea151c0b2519f023bd9cc7f141128833ac47 -Author: millert@openbsd.org -Date: Wed Jan 18 01:50:21 2023 +0000 +commit 733030840c4772f858de95d5940ec0c37663e8b0 +Author: dtucker@openbsd.org +Date: Thu Mar 9 07:11:05 2023 +0000 - upstream: Add a -V (version) option to sshd like the ssh client + upstream: Re-split the merge of the reorder-hostkeys test. - has. OK markus@ deraadt@ + In the kex_proposal_populate_entries change I merged the the check for + reordering hostkeys with the actual reordering, but kex_assemble_names + mutates options.hostkeyalgorithms which renders the check ineffective. + Put the check back where it was. Spotted and tested by jsg@, ok djm@ - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: abe990ec3e636fb040132aab8cbbede98f0c413e + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: a7469f25a738db5567395d1881e32479a7ffc9de -commit 62360feb7f08f2a4c6fc36f3b3449309203c42c9 -Author: millert@openbsd.org -Date: Tue Jan 17 18:52:44 2023 +0000 +commit 54ac4ab2b53ce9fcb66b8250dee91c070e4167ed +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Thu Mar 9 06:58:26 2023 +0000 - upstream: For "ssh -V" always exit 0, there is no need to check opt + upstream: include destination constraints for smartcard keys too. - again. This was missed when the fallthrough in the switch case above it was - removed. OK deraadt@ + Spotted by Luci Stanescu; ok deraadt@ markus@ - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 5583e5d8f6d62a8a4215cfa95a69932f344c8120 + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: add879fac6903a1cb1d1e42c4309e5359c3d870f -commit 12492c0abf1eb415d08a897cc1d8b9e789888230 -Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Tue Jan 17 10:15:10 2023 +0000 +commit bfd1ad01d974a316b60622759ad17537fa2d92b4 +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Thu Mar 9 18:24:54 2023 +1100 - upstream: also check that an active session inhibits + Limit the number of PAM environment variables. - UnusedConnectionTimeout idea markus@ + xcalloc has its own limits, but these are specific to PAM. From + Coverity CID 405198, ok djm@ + +commit a231414970e01a35f45a295d5f93698fa1249b28 +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Thu Mar 9 18:19:44 2023 +1100 + + Limit the number of PAM environment variables. - OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 55c0fb61f3bf9e092b0a53f9041d3d2012f14003 + From Coverity CID 405194, tweaks and ok djm@ -commit cef2593c33ac46a58238ff998818754eabdf64ff -Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Tue Jan 17 10:02:34 2023 +0000 +commit 36c6c3eff5e4a669ff414b9daf85f919666e8e03 +Author: dtucker@openbsd.org +Date: Wed Mar 8 06:21:32 2023 +0000 - upstream: regression test for UnusedConnectionTimeout + upstream: Plug mem leak. Coverity CID 405196, ok djm@ - OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 7f29001374a68e71e5e078f69e4520cf4bcca084 + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 175f09349387c292f626da68f65f334faaa085f2 -commit aff9493a89c71d6a080419b49ac64eead9730491 -Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Mon Jan 16 04:11:29 2023 +0000 +commit dfb9b736e1ccf9e6b03eea21cd961f4fd0634c98 +Author: tb@openbsd.org +Date: Wed Mar 8 05:33:53 2023 +0000 - upstream: unbreak test: cannot access shell positional parameters + upstream: ssh-pkcs11: synchronize error messages with errors - past $9 without wrapping the position in braces (i.e. need ${10}, etc.) + A handful of error messages contained incorrect function names or + otherwise inaccurate descriptions. Fix them to match reality. - OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 3750ec98d5d409ce6a93406fedde6f220d2ea2ac + input/ok djm + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 165a15db52f75b31e1804b043480c36af09f3411 -commit 0293c19807f83141cdf33b443154459f9ee471f6 -Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Tue Jan 17 09:44:48 2023 +0000 +commit 51875897b81b5c21b80c256a29597916edbde454 +Author: guenther@openbsd.org +Date: Wed Mar 8 04:43:12 2023 +0000 - upstream: Add a sshd_config UnusedConnectionTimeout option to terminate - - client connections that have no open channels for some length of time. This - complements the recently-added ChannelTimeout option that terminates inactive - channels after a timeout. + upstream: Delete obsolete /* ARGSUSED */ lint comments. - ok markus@ + ok miod@ millert@ - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: ca983be74c0350364c11f8ba3bd692f6f24f5da9 + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 7be168a570264d59e96a7d2d22e927d45fee0e4c -commit 8ec2e3123802d2beeca06c1644b0b647f6d36dab +commit a76085bda883c2104afb33ab0334eca190927362 +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Wed Mar 8 17:25:37 2023 +1100 + + Extra brackets to prevent warning. + +commit 147ae57d4dfa0508109f93b78a7d8b92819e1f83 Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Sun Jan 15 23:35:10 2023 +0000 +Date: Wed Mar 8 00:05:58 2023 +0000 - upstream: adapt to ed25519 changes in src/usr.bin/ssh + upstream: use RSA/SHA256 when testing usability of private key in - OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 4b3e7ba7ee486ae8a0b4790f8112eded2bb7dcd5 + agent; with/ok dtucker + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: fe1382e2fdf23fcae631308e72342bad56066a56 -commit 9fbbfeca1ce4c7ec0001c827bbf4189a3ba0964b +commit 27fd251bc906a763e70ce0f27c8abdf8bbd1e416 Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Sun Jan 15 23:05:32 2023 +0000 +Date: Wed Mar 8 00:05:37 2023 +0000 - upstream: update OpenSSH's Ed25519 code to the last version of SUPERCOP + upstream: use RSA/SHA256 when testing usability of private key; - (20221122) and change the import approach to the same one we use for - Streamlined NTRUPrime: use a shell script to extract the bits we need from - SUPERCOP, make some minor adjustments and squish them all into a single file. + based on fix in bz3546 by Dmitry Belyavskiy; with/ok dtucker - ok tb@ tobhe@ + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 0ef414cc363a832f9fab92a5da0234448bce2eba + +commit eee9f3fc3d52ae7d2106929bb06b7f291fb0b81a +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Tue Mar 7 21:47:42 2023 +0000 + + upstream: refactor to be more readable top to bottom. Prompted by - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 1bc0fd624cb6af440905b8ba74ac7c03311b8e3b + Coverity CID 405048 which was a false-positive fd leak; ok dtucker@ + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: fc55ec2af622a017defb9b768bf26faefc792c00 -commit 6283f4bd83eee714d0f5fc55802eff836b06fea8 +commit 42a06b29a4c99272bf690f9b3be520b08b448dc5 Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Sat Jan 14 22:02:44 2023 +1100 +Date: Tue Mar 7 18:34:41 2023 +1100 - Allow writev is seccomp sandbox. - - This seems to be used by recent glibcs at least in some configurations. - From bz#3512, ok djm@ + Add header changes missed in previous. -commit 923c3f437f439cfca238fba37e97a7041782f615 +commit 4710077096edff2e6926dd5b15bf586491d317db Author: dtucker@openbsd.org -Date: Sat Jan 14 10:05:54 2023 +0000 +Date: Tue Mar 7 06:09:14 2023 +0000 - upstream: Shell syntax fix. From ren mingshuai vi github PR#369. + upstream: Fix mem leak in environment setup. - OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 6696b2eeefe128099fc3d7ea9f23252cc35156f9 + From jjelen at redhat.com via bz#2687, ok djm@ + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 9f9e4ba3cac003e6f81da3bcebd1b9ec43e7f353 -commit 4d87a00f704e0365e11c3c38b170c1275ec461fc +commit 03acc50d0ccb78fc91d1570de1cd0fdfea646028 Author: dtucker@openbsd.org -Date: Sat Jan 14 09:57:08 2023 +0000 +Date: Mon Mar 6 12:15:47 2023 +0000 - upstream: Instead of skipping the all-tokens test if we don't have + upstream: Unit test for kex_proposal_populate_entries. - OpenSSL (since we use it to compute the hash), put the hash at the end and - just omit it if we don't have it. Prompted by bz#3521. + OpenBSD-Regress-ID: bdb211d80d572a08bf14b49fe2a58b9ff265c006 + +commit 3f9231c2e1f374ebb08016ba00ea97b47c0ed20b +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Tue Mar 7 05:37:26 2023 +0000 + + upstream: fix memory leak in process_read() path; Spotted by James - OpenBSD-Regress-ID: c79ecba64250ed3b6417294b6c965e6b12ca5eea + Robinson in GHPR363; ok markus@ + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: cdc2d98e6478b7e7f3a36976845adae3820429d8 -commit b05406d6f93b8c8ec11ec8b27e7c76cc7a5a55fb -Author: jmc@openbsd.org -Date: Fri Jan 13 07:13:40 2023 +0000 +commit c5e6e890839ec520ab9301a92cba56303749dea2 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Tue Mar 7 01:30:52 2023 +0000 - upstream: fix double phrase in previous; + upstream: correct size for array argument when changing - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 671e6c8dc5e9230518b2bbfa143daaa88adc66c2 + UMAC_OUTPUT_LEN Coverity CID 291845; ok dtucker@ + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 2eb017d10705bb623d4418691f961c930eafaec0 -commit 40564812b659c530eb1f4b62d09e85612aef3107 +commit 9641753e0fd146204d57b2a4165f552a81afade4 Author: dtucker@openbsd.org -Date: Fri Jan 13 03:16:29 2023 +0000 +Date: Mon Mar 6 12:14:48 2023 +0000 - upstream: Document "UserKnownHostsFile none". ok djm@ + upstream: Refactor creation of KEX proposal. - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: f695742d39e34ecdcc3c861c3739a84648a4bce5 + This adds kex_proposal_populate_entries (and corresponding free) which + populates the KEX proposal array with dynamically allocated strings. + This replaces the previous mix of static and dynamic that has been the + source of previous leaks and bugs. Remove unused compat functions. + With & ok djm@. + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: f2f99da4aae2233cb18bf9c749320c5e040a9c7b -commit d03e245e034019a37388f6f5f893ce848ab6d2e2 -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Fri Jan 13 23:02:34 2023 +1100 +commit aa59d6a489fb20973fa461d0fdb1110db412947b +Author: dtucker@openbsd.org +Date: Sun Mar 5 09:24:35 2023 +0000 - Retry package installation 3 times. + upstream: Fix mem and FILE leaks in moduli screening. - When setting up the CI environment, retry package installation 3 times - before going up. Should help prevent spurious failures during - infrastructure issues. + If multiple -Ocheckpoint= options are passed, the earlier ones would + be overwritten and leaked. If we use an input file that wasn't stdin, + close that. From Coverity CIDs 291884 and 291894. + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: a4d9d15f572926f841788912e2b282485ad09e8b -commit 625f6bc39840167dafb3bf5b6a3e18503ac986e8 +commit 23b8cb41767af99a1aac24589d1882d9c8c2c205 Author: dtucker@openbsd.org -Date: Fri Jan 13 04:47:34 2023 +0000 +Date: Sun Mar 5 08:18:58 2023 +0000 - upstream: Move scp path setting to a helper function. The previous + upstream: Plug mem leak in moduli checkpoint option parsing. - commit to add scp to the test sshd's path causes the t-envpass test to fail - when the test scp is given using a fully qualified path. Put this in a - helper function and only call it from the scp tests. + From Coverity CID 291894. - OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 7533dc1c4265c1de716abb062957994195b36df4 + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 9b1aba2d049741ae21c8dc4560a7e29ab17310f4 -commit 6e6f88647042b3cde54a628545c2f5fb656a9327 +commit fc7f8f2188d4a4fc8ba77eddbe863c7665666db5 Author: dtucker@openbsd.org -Date: Fri Jan 13 04:23:00 2023 +0000 +Date: Sun Mar 5 05:34:09 2023 +0000 - upstream: Add scp's path to test sshd's PATH. + upstream: Remove unused compat.h includes. - If the scp we're testing is fully qualified (eg it's not in the system - PATH) then add its path to the under-test sshd's PATH so we can find - it. Prompted by bz#3518. + We've previously removed a lot of the really old compatibility code, + and with it went the need to include compat.h in most of the files that + have it. - OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 7df4f5a0be3aa135495b7e5a6719d3cbc26cc4c0 + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 5af8baa194be00a3092d17598e88a5b29f7ea2b4 -commit 8a5e99a70fcf9b022a8aa175ebf6a71f58511da3 -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Fri Jan 13 15:49:48 2023 +1100 +commit 6c165c36246d8004c20e1df5cec4961a5ac422d6 +Author: dtucker@openbsd.org +Date: Sat Mar 4 03:22:59 2023 +0000 - Remove skipping test when scp not in path. + upstream: Use time_t for x11 timeout. - An upcoming change renders this obsolete by adding scp's path to the - test sshd's PATH, and removing this first will make the subsequent sync - easier. + Use time_t instead of u_int for remaining x11 timeout checks for 64bit + time_t safety. From Coverity CIDs 405197 and 405028, ok djm@ + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 356685bfa1fc3d81bd95722d3fc47101cc1a4972 -commit 41f36dd896c8fb8337d403fcf476762986976e9d +commit 4a3918f51bd2d968387e7aa87e33b32c78077fb4 Author: dtucker@openbsd.org -Date: Fri Jan 13 02:58:20 2023 +0000 +Date: Fri Mar 3 10:23:42 2023 +0000 - upstream: Add a "Host" line to the output of ssh -G showing the + upstream: Ensure ms_remain is always initialized - original host arg. Inspired by patch from vincent at bernat.ch via bz#3343, - ok djm@ + similar to what we do in ssh_packet_write_wait. bz#2687, from jjelen + at redhat.com. - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 59c0f60a222113a44d0650cd394376e3beecc883 + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: a50e0541cf823f8d1c72f71ccde925d3dbe6dfac -commit f673b49f3be3eb51074fbb8a405beb6cd0f7d93e -Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Fri Jan 13 02:44:02 2023 +0000 +commit e44846a4487d2885ac7f2610be09b1e2bf52249b +Author: dtucker@openbsd.org +Date: Fri Mar 3 09:48:51 2023 +0000 - upstream: avoid printf("%s", NULL) if using ssh + upstream: Check for non-NULL before string - -oUserKnownHostsFile=none and a hostkey in one of the system known hosts file - changes; ok dtucker@ + comparison. From jjelen at redhat.com via bz#2687. - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 7ca87614bfc6da491315536a7f2301434a9fe614 + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 0d9b2e0cac88a311b5766b1aef737082583c285f -commit 93fc7c576563e3d88a1dc019dd213f65607784cc +commit 1842d523fae63b862ce8e60725c9b606cddb86a6 Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Wed Jan 11 05:39:38 2023 +0000 +Date: Fri Mar 3 05:00:34 2023 +0000 - upstream: clamp the minimum buffer lengths and number of inflight + upstream: guard against getsockname(-1, ...) from Coverity CID - requests too + 291832 - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: c4965f62fa0ba850940fd66ae3f60cf516bbcd56 + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: e58d5227327917d189229b7f0b37d2780f360d5f -commit 48bf234322e639d279c5a28435eae50155e9b514 +commit 78571a5fe9847d40d7f220c92b707574ae9ec4ce Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Wed Jan 11 05:36:50 2023 +0000 +Date: Fri Mar 3 04:36:20 2023 +0000 - upstream: ignore bogus upload/download buffer lengths in the limits + upstream: some options are not first-match-wins. Mention that there - extension + are exceptions at the start of the manpage and label some of them in the + option description. - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: c5b023e0954693ba9a5376e4280c739b5db575f8 + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 3b74728446fa6fc8742769eeb8c3674e233e84c4 -commit 36b00d31833ca74cb0f7c7d8eda1bde55700f929 +commit d1c1b3272e8895a96c4f5889bd6e07a8525bd9f1 Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Wed Jan 11 02:13:52 2023 +0000 +Date: Fri Mar 3 04:34:49 2023 +0000 - upstream: remove whitespace at EOL from code extracted from SUPERCOP + upstream: actually print "channeltimeout none" in config dump mode; - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 1ec524ff2fbb9387d731601437c82008f35a60f4 + spotted via Coverity CID 405022 + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: b074b52bf138b75f08264e8da15880b29c7a630f -commit d888de06c5e4d7dbf2f2b85f2b5bf028c570cf78 -Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Wed Jan 11 00:51:27 2023 +0000 +commit 8bf61e95610b48192d4e1720cc15d9004617301d +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Fri Mar 3 14:50:03 2023 +1100 - upstream: rewrite this test to use a multiplexed ssh session so we can + Add Coverity badges. + +commit 93291bd723959adf462b1df958106cf07a7734dd +Author: dtucker@openbsd.org +Date: Fri Mar 3 03:12:24 2023 +0000 + + upstream: Check return values of dup2. Spotted by Coverity, ok djm@ - control its lifecycle without risk of race conditions; fixes some of the - Github integration tests for openssh-portable + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 19fb1b53072826d00c67df677731d2f6c1dd602b + +commit e37261dff33af23f37202cfce0848d36f5c1055c +Author: dtucker@openbsd.org +Date: Fri Mar 3 02:37:58 2023 +0000 + + upstream: Use time_t for x11_refuse_time timeout. We need - OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 5451cad59ba0d43ae9eeda48ec80f54405fee969 + SSH_TIME_T_MAX for this, so move from misc.c to misc.h so it's available. + Fixes a Coverity warning for 64bit time_t safety, ok djm@ + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: c69c4c3152cdaab953706db4ccf4d5fd682f7d8d -commit 4bcc737a35fdd9cc4af7423d6c23dfd0c7ef4786 -Author: Damien Miller -Date: Wed Jan 11 11:45:17 2023 +1100 +commit 32755a98c29114b13f4c9d47454bbb265b932ad7 +Author: dtucker@openbsd.org +Date: Fri Mar 3 02:34:29 2023 +0000 - remove buffer len workaround for NetBSD 4.x + upstream: Check return value from fctnl and warn on failure. - Switching to from pipes to a socketpair for communicating with the - ssh process avoids the (kernel bug?) problem. + Spotted by Coverity, ok djm@ + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 2097c7db3cf657f1e3a6c5077041bacc63143cab -commit f5154d2aac3e6a32a1b13dec23a701a087850cdc -Author: Damien Miller -Date: Wed Jan 11 11:44:19 2023 +1100 +commit 5fc60e8246c36b8255f72a937ebe9787b39648c6 +Author: dtucker@openbsd.org +Date: Thu Mar 2 11:10:27 2023 +0000 - add back use of pipes in scp.c under USE_PIPES + upstream: Remove SUDO in proxy command wrapper. Anything that needs - This matches sftp.c which prefers socketpair but uses pipes on - some older platforms. + sudo is already run by it, and it breaks if root isn't in sudoers. + + OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 6cf22fda32a89c16915f31a6ed9bbdbef2a3bac9 -commit eec737b59cf13841de46134967a206607000acd4 -Author: millert@openbsd.org -Date: Tue Jan 10 23:22:15 2023 +0000 +commit 0d514659b23a257247491179cfbb53a6dd64e164 +Author: dtucker@openbsd.org +Date: Thu Mar 2 08:24:41 2023 +0000 - upstream: Switch scp from using pipes to a socketpair for + upstream: Fix breakage on dhgex test. - communication with it's ssh sub-processes. We no longer need to reserve two - descriptors to ensure that we don't end up using fd 0-2 unexpectedly, that is - handled by sanitise_stdfd() in main(). Based on an original diff from djm@. - OK deraadt@ djm@ + This was due to the sshd logs being written to the wrong log file. + While there, make save_debug_logs less verbose, write the name of the + tarball to regress.log and use $SUDO to remove the old symlinks (which + shouldn't be needed, but won't hurt). Initial problem spotted by anton@. - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: b80c372faac462471e955ddeab9480d668a2e48d + OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 9c44fb9cd418e6ff31165e7a6c1f9f11a6d19f5b -commit d213d126a4a343abd3a1eb13687d39c1891fe5c8 -Author: jmc@openbsd.org -Date: Fri Jan 6 08:44:11 2023 +0000 +commit 860201201d4ae655702807966901682cff30a171 +Author: dtucker@openbsd.org +Date: Thu Mar 2 08:14:52 2023 +0000 - upstream: tweak previous; ok djm + upstream: Quote grep and log message better. - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 229c493452766d70a78b0f02f6ff9894f9028858 + OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 3823d9063127169736aa274b1784cb28e15b64d4 -commit 4a5590a5ee47b7dfd49773e9fdba48ad3089fe64 -Author: Damien Miller -Date: Mon Jan 9 16:33:56 2023 +1100 +commit 03a03c6002525f5ad9c8fc874a5d5826a35d9858 +Author: dtucker@openbsd.org +Date: Thu Mar 2 06:41:56 2023 +0000 - try to improve logging for dynamic-forward test + upstream: Always call fclose on checkpoints. - previously the logs from the ssh used to exercise the forwarding - channel would clobber the logs from the ssh actually doing the - forwarding + In the case of an fprintf failure we would not call fclose which would + leak the FILE pointer. While we're there, try to clean up the temp file + on failure. Spotted by Coverity, ok djm@ + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 73c7ccc5d4fcc235f54c6b20767a2815408525ef -commit 715bc25dcfccf9fb2bee820155fe071d01a618db +commit 13fe8f9785e6d90400ce548939a0b0ddc11fcb3c +Author: dtucker@openbsd.org +Date: Wed Mar 1 21:54:50 2023 +0000 + + upstream: Remove old log symlinks + + before creating new ones. In -portable some platforms don't like + overwriting existing symlinks. + + OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 7e7ddc0beb73e945e1c4c58d51c8a125b518120f + +commit 131fcbcaffd1e3bcf5ab766ec497b5d768955310 Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Sat Jan 7 23:24:50 2023 +1100 +Date: Wed Mar 1 23:23:02 2023 +1100 - Skip dynamic-forward test on minix3. + Adjust test jobs for new log directory. + +commit a6f4ac8a2baf77e5361cfa017d0dc250d1409bec +Author: dtucker@openbsd.org +Date: Wed Mar 1 09:29:32 2023 +0000 + + upstream: Rework logging for the regression tests. - This test relies on loopback addresses which minix does not have. - Previously the test would not run at all since it also doesn't have - netcat, but now we use our own netcat it tries and fails. + Previously we would log to ssh.log and sshd.log, but that is insufficient + for tests that have more than one concurent ssh/sshd. + + Instead, we'll log to separate datestamped files in a $OBJ/log/ and + leave a symlink at the previous location pointing at the most recent + instance with an entry in regress.log showing which files were created + at each point. This should be sufficient to reconstruct what happened + even for tests that use multiple instances of each program. If the test + fails, tar up all of the logs for later analysis. + + This will let us also capture the output from some of the other tools + which was previously sent to /dev/null although most of those will be + in future commits. + + OpenBSD-Regress-ID: f802aa9e7fa51d1a01225c05fb0412d015c33e24 -commit dd1249bd5c45128a908395c61b26996a70f82205 -Author: Damien Miller -Date: Sun Jan 8 12:08:59 2023 +1100 +commit 8ead62ed5e86c7df597d8604f332f49cd1527b85 +Author: dtucker@openbsd.org +Date: Tue Feb 28 21:31:50 2023 +0000 - don't test IPv6 addresses if platform lacks support + upstream: fatal out if allocating banner string fails to avoid + + potential null deref later in sscanf. Spotted by Coverity, ok deraadt@ + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 74e8d228ac00552e96e9e968dfcccf8dd1f46ad5 -commit d77fc611a62f2dfee0b654c31a50a814b13310dd +commit 44ca56ba0b3f531f1d85730cc701097cd49e6868 Author: dtucker@openbsd.org -Date: Fri Jan 6 12:33:33 2023 +0000 +Date: Tue Feb 28 08:45:24 2023 +0000 - upstream: When OpenSSL is not available, skip parts of percent test + upstream: Explicitly ignore return from fchmod - that require it. Based on github pr#368 from ren mingshuai. + similar to other calls to prevent warning. - OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 49a375b2cf61ccb95b52e75e2e025cd10988ebb2 + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: fdc5287dcee0860b5a493186414226c655b0eb0a -commit 1cd2aac312af9172f1b5cb06c2e1cd090abb83cf -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Sat Jan 7 23:01:11 2023 +1100 +commit 803392933a3a6f09f834aa5f0c2aab06a3b382f4 +Author: dtucker@openbsd.org +Date: Mon Feb 27 22:12:40 2023 +0000 - Use our own netcat for dynamic-forward test. + upstream: Plug mem leak on globbed ls error path. - That way we can be surer about its behaviour rather than trying to - second-guess the behaviour of various netcat implementations. + Spotted by Coverity, ok deraadt@ + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: de28476025db29820a9a2e56e98b964d8a02861c -commit 26cab41c05d7b0859d2a1ea5b6ed253d91848a80 +commit aa33b4d396abf47a2a45f982f28d054fb1dcb5c3 Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Sat Jan 7 14:30:43 2023 +1100 +Date: Mon Feb 27 21:04:22 2023 +1100 - Use autoconf to find openssl binary. + Cast time_t's in debug output to long long. - It's possible to install an OpenSSL in a path not in the system's - default library search path. OpenSSH can still use this (eg if you - specify an rpath) but the openssl binary there may not work. If one is - available on the system path just use that. + Should fix Coverity warning about truncation of 64bit time_t. -commit 5532e010a0eeb6aa264396514f9aed7948471538 +commit b0fd60a9de62a03189ad57d0c07f0ac51dc00e95 Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Sat Jan 7 10:34:18 2023 +1100 +Date: Mon Feb 27 17:28:59 2023 +1100 - Check openssl_bin path is executable before using. + Do shadow expiry calcs using "long long". + + Coverity flags these as potentially not 64bit time_t safe so use + long long for the calculations and debug output. ok djm@ -commit 5d7b16cff48598d5908db970bfdc9ff9326142c8 -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Fri Jan 6 23:19:07 2023 +1100 +commit 01dbeb3084d714bbd001ff9d03b9de542e8cdf58 +Author: Damien Miller +Date: Mon Feb 27 17:07:52 2023 +1100 - Set OPENSSL_BIN from OpenSSL directory. + avoid clash between for getopt's struct option + + Since we don't use getopt_long() nothing outside the getopt() + implementation itself uses this structure, so move it into the + source to remove it from visibility and clashes with libc's + + ok dtucker@ -commit 344a0e8240eaf08da5d46a5e3a9ecad6e4f64c35 -Author: dtucker@openbsd.org -Date: Fri Jan 6 08:50:33 2023 +0000 +commit eb88d07c43afe407094e7d609248d85a15e148ef +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Sat Feb 25 14:45:41 2023 +1100 - upstream: Save debug logs from ssh for debugging purposes. + Revert explicit chmods on private keys. - OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 109e40b06de1c006a3b8e0d8745b790b2c5870a0 + This should no longer be needed on Cygwin test runners due to previous + commit. -commit e1ef172646f7f49c80807eea90225ef5e0be55a8 -Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Fri Jan 6 08:07:39 2023 +0000 +commit 52b75db61030a6c8baf66b73644380cf3f58e26a +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Sat Feb 25 14:43:28 2023 +1100 - upstream: regression test for ChannelTimeout + Remove extended ACLs from working dirs. - OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 280bfbefcfa415428ad744e43f69a8dede8ad685 + This should allow umask to work as expected and prevent tests from + failing due to excessive permissions on private keys. -commit 2393ea8daf25853459eb07a528d7577688847777 -Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Fri Jan 6 07:18:18 2023 +0000 +commit 0c5d4c843df5605b043a758d69f9a611ef63c479 +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Fri Feb 24 13:44:13 2023 +1100 - upstream: fix typo in verbose logging + Explicitly set permissions on user and host keys. - OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 0497cdb66e003b2f50ed77291a9104fba2e017e9 + On cygwin, the umask might not be sufficient. Should fix tests on + Github runners. -commit 161a5378a3cc2e7aa3f9674cb7f4686ae6ce9586 +commit 6c9fc9d7a9f7abf82c3294d74e6d4a25735862ce Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Fri Jan 6 02:59:50 2023 +0000 +Date: Wed Feb 22 03:56:43 2023 +0000 - upstream: unit tests for misc.c:ptimeout_* API + upstream: fix progressmeter corruption on wide displays; bz3534 - OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 01f8fb12d08e5aaadd4bd4e71f456b6588be9a94 + feedback/ok dtucker@ + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: f4affee067cec7c182f3e0b307d758e0472762a3 -commit 018d671d78145f03d6f07ae9d64d51321da70325 -Author: tb@openbsd.org -Date: Wed Jan 4 22:48:57 2023 +0000 +commit fe0bd3cde9665d364e5eedd2c2c2e60d4cdc3786 +Author: dtucker@openbsd.org +Date: Tue Feb 21 06:48:18 2023 +0000 - upstream: Copy bytes from the_banana[] rather than banana() + upstream: fseek to end of known_hosts before writing to it. - Fixes test failure due to segfault seen on arm64 with xonly snap. + POSIX and ANSI C require that applications call fseek or similar between + read and writing to a RW file. OpenBSD doesn't enforce this, but some + (System V derived) platforms need this to prevent it from writing a + spurious extra byte (in this case, a newline). ok djm@ deraadt@ - ok djm + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 33e680dcd8110582a93a40a8491024e961f45137 + +commit 357fb8ae14c07cd025eeed66e73de91bab569849 +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Tue Feb 21 17:51:09 2023 +1100 + + Also run unit tests on AIX VMs. - OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 86e2aa4bbd1dff1bc4ebb2969c0d6474485be046 + In the past these tests took too long, but these days it only adds + about 5 min to the run. -commit ab6bb69e251faa8b24f81b25c72ec0120f20cad4 -Author: Damien Miller -Date: Fri Jan 6 19:13:36 2023 +1100 +commit 17781aaa5188ee1477f7779b280d105512e3dbed +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Tue Feb 21 17:38:55 2023 +1100 - unbreak scp on NetBSD 4.x + Wrap stdint.h inside ifdef. + +commit ef798bad38505f7bf1b5fa5c0843dfc5a2b192b9 +Author: Mayank Sharma +Date: Mon Feb 20 17:37:15 2023 +0530 + + Add includes to ptimeout test. - e555d5cad5 effectively increased the default copy buffer size for SFTP - transfers. This caused NetBSD 4.x to hang during the "copy local file to - remote file in place" scp.sh regression test. + Fixes test failures on AIX due to type mismatches. + +commit ab69dda05d5268454209f529fa80f477e60d846a +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Mon Feb 20 18:24:39 2023 +1100 + + Always use the openssl binary configure tells us. - This puts back the original 32KB copy buffer size until we can properly - figure out why. + This fixes tests on platforms that do not have the openssl tool + installed at all. + +commit 2a7e3449908571af601a4c2d12ab140096442e47 +Author: dtucker@openbsd.org +Date: Fri Feb 17 04:22:50 2023 +0000 + + upstream: Remove now-unused compat bit SSH_BUG_RSASIGMD5. The code - lots of debugging assistance from dtucker@ + to set this was removed in OpenSSH 7.7 when support for SSH implementations + dating back to before RFC standardization were removed. "burn it all" djm@ + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 6330935fbe23dd00be79891505e06d1ffdac7cda -commit 2d1ff2b9431393ad99ef496d5e3b9dd0d4f5ac8c -Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Fri Jan 6 02:47:18 2023 +0000 +commit 0833ccf2c8b7ae08b296c06f17bd53e3ab94b0b0 +Author: dtucker@openbsd.org +Date: Fri Feb 17 03:06:18 2023 +0000 - upstream: Implement channel inactivity timeouts + upstream: Remove now-unused compat bit SSH_BUG_BIGENDIANAES. This - This adds a sshd_config ChannelTimeouts directive that allows channels that - have not seen traffic in a configurable interval to be automatically closed. - Different timeouts may be applied to session, X11, agent and TCP forwarding - channels. + was previously set for OpenSSH 2.3 (released in 2000) but this check was + removed in OpenSSH 7.7 (2018). ok djm@ deraadt@ - Note: this only affects channels over an opened SSH connection and not - the connection itself. Most clients close the connection when their channels - go away, with a notable exception being ssh(1) in multiplexing mode. + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 326426ea328707fc9e83305291ab135c87f678af + +commit c81c2bea6e828d52b62b448b4ffdd3c163177975 +Author: Damien Miller +Date: Fri Feb 17 10:12:40 2023 +1100 + + whitespace fixes + +commit 500f90b39db5f0014e6b0c49ff1f45c994b69293 +Author: Damien Miller +Date: Fri Feb 17 10:02:08 2023 +1100 + + whitespace at EOL + +commit 68350152406339170721c15e97afdf827a5e4001 +Author: dtucker@openbsd.org +Date: Thu Feb 16 10:10:00 2023 +0000 + + upstream: Remove SSH_BUG_PASSWORDPAD compat bit - ok markus dtucker + since it's no longer used. ok markus@ - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: ae8bba3ed9d9f95ff2e2dc8dcadfa36b48e6c0b8 + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: b92c21f56fe4b7f9a54790d6a9650725c226820b -commit 0e34348d0bc0b1522f75d6212a53d6d1d1367980 -Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Fri Jan 6 02:42:34 2023 +0000 +commit 537cccd804eaf65f32bdce037cc31db4e0ab0f44 +Author: dtucker@openbsd.org +Date: Thu Feb 16 07:55:15 2023 +0000 - upstream: Add channel_set_xtype() + upstream: Remove SSH_BUG_IGNOREMSG compat flag - This sets an "extended" channel type after channel creation (e.g. - "session:subsystem:sftp") that will be used for setting channel inactivity - timeouts. + since it's only applicable to SSH1 and thus no longer used. ok markus@ + "kill it with fire" djm@ - ok markus dtucker + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: ea13318b1937795d9db4790d3ce0a6ed01584dab + +commit 285cf6cd4b91a0a0ce33193c358c99085af33e43 +Author: jmc@openbsd.org +Date: Fri Feb 10 06:41:53 2023 +0000 + + upstream: space between macro and punctuation; sort usage(); - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 42564aa92345045b4a74300528f960416a15d4ca + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 6141610cfca037700730e41f868d1d9124958f8c -commit ceedf09b2977f3a756c759a6e7eb8f8e9db86a18 -Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Fri Jan 6 02:41:49 2023 +0000 +commit d39a96f70f81878c77336ed35f5c648c1804b71a +Author: jmc@openbsd.org +Date: Fri Feb 10 06:40:48 2023 +0000 - upstream: tweak channel ctype names + upstream: space between macro and punctuation; - These are now used by sshd_config:ChannelTimeouts to specify timeouts by - channel type, so force them all to use a similar format without whitespace. + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: abc95e550be9e6d9a7ff64b65c104c7be21ab19e + +commit 16e82bf53fc34e43e3b948d43b68d5b27a7335e6 +Author: jmc@openbsd.org +Date: Fri Feb 10 06:39:27 2023 +0000 + + upstream: sort SYNOPSIS; - ok dtucker markus + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: dacd9da33277d5669a51213d880632599c890c1e + +commit d9685121ff6d57b8797411f3cb123884a4b96e30 +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Sat Feb 11 12:32:19 2023 +1100 + + Improve seccomp compat on older systems. - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 66834765bb4ae14f96d2bb981ac98a7dae361b65 + Check if flags to mmap and madvise are defined before using them. + Should fix problems building on older Linux systems that don't have + these. bz#3537, with & ok djm@. -commit c60438158ad4b2f83d8504257aba1be7d0b0bb4b +commit 6180b0fa4f7996687678702806257e661fd5931e Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Fri Jan 6 02:39:59 2023 +0000 +Date: Fri Feb 10 05:06:03 2023 +0000 - upstream: Add channel_force_close() + upstream: test -Ohashalg=... and that the default output contains both - This will forcibly close an open channel by simulating read/write errors, - draining the IO buffers and calling the detach function. + specified hash algorithms; prompted by dtucker@ - Previously the detach function was only ever called during channel garbage - collection, but there was no way to signal the user of a channel (e.g. - session.c) that its channel was being closed deliberately (vs. by the - usual state-machine logic). So this adds an extra "force" argument to the - channel cleanup callback to indicate this condition. + OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 26f309208c8d8b8fa9c5f419767b85f1e9b22f51 + +commit d651f5c9fe37e61491eee46c49ba9fa03dbc0e6a +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Fri Feb 10 04:56:30 2023 +0000 + + upstream: let ssh-keygen and ssh-keyscan accept - ok markus dtucker + -Ohashalg=sha1|sha256 when outputting SSHFP fingerprints to allow algorithm + selection. bz3493 ok dtucker@ - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 23052707a42bdc62fda2508636e624afd466324b + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: e6e07fe21318a873bd877f333e189eb963a11b3d -commit d478cdc7ad6edd4b1bcd1e86fb2f23194ff33d5a +commit 18938d11a90b74d63c20b2d3c965d5bd64786ab1 Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Fri Jan 6 02:38:23 2023 +0000 +Date: Fri Feb 10 04:47:19 2023 +0000 - upstream: replace manual poll/ppoll timeout math with ptimeout API + upstream: add a `sshd -G` option that parses and prints the - feedback markus / ok markus dtucker + effective configuration without attempting to load private keys and perform + other checks. This allows usage of the option before keys have been + generated. - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: c5ec4f2d52684cdb788cd9cbc1bcf89464014be2 + bz3460 feedback/ok dtucker@ + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 774504f629023fc25a559ab1d95401adb3a7fb29 -commit 4adf3817a24efe99b06e62630577d683c7cd8065 +commit df7d3dbf7194db8e97730ee0425d4d9d7bdb8b10 Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Fri Jan 6 02:37:04 2023 +0000 +Date: Fri Feb 10 04:40:28 2023 +0000 - upstream: add ptimeout API for keeping track of poll/ppoll + upstream: make `ssh -Q CASignatureAlgorithms` work as the manpage says - timeouts; ok dtucker markus + it should bz3532 - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 3335268ca135b3ec15a947547d7cfbb8ff929ead + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 0ddb17b3fcbd99bfb5baea4ac5e449620cbd3adc -commit 8c7c69d32375d2f3ce9da0109c9bffc560842316 -Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Thu Jan 5 05:49:13 2023 +0000 +commit d3b8d4198b6595f23b5859d43dc8fc701f97429b +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Fri Feb 10 14:26:44 2023 +1100 - upstream: suppress "Connection closed" message when in quiet mode - - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 8a3ab7176764da55f60bfacfeae9b82d84e3908f + Add CentOS 7 test targets. -commit 845ceecea2ac311b0c267f9ecbd34862e1876fc6 -Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Mon Jan 2 07:03:57 2023 +0000 +commit 22efb01e355bba4755b730ed417f91c081445bfc +Author: dtucker@openbsd.org +Date: Thu Feb 9 09:55:33 2023 +0000 - upstream: regression test for PermitRemoteOpen + upstream: Test adding terminating newline to known_hosts. - OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 8271aafbf5c21950cd5bf966f08e585cebfe630c + OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 5fc3010ac450195b3fbdeb68e875564968800365 -commit b3daa8dc582348d6ab8150bc1e571b7aa08c5388 -Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Mon Jan 2 07:03:30 2023 +0000 +commit caec6da1a583ed8c32c6ad3b81bbcaab46ac8b61 +Author: dtucker@openbsd.org +Date: Wed Feb 8 08:06:03 2023 +0000 - upstream: fix bug in PermitRemoteOpen which caused it to ignore its + upstream: ssh-agent doesn't actually take -v, - first argument unless it was one of the special keywords "any" or "none". - - Reported by Georges Chaudy in bz3515; ok dtucker@ + so the recently-added ones will result in the test not cleaning up + after itself. Patch from cjwatson at debian.org vi bz#3536. - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: c5678a39f1ff79993d5ae3cfac5746a4ae148ea5 + OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 1fc8283568f5bf2f918517c2c1e778072cf61b1a -commit 0872663a7be0301bcc3d49acdbc9b740a3d972d4 -Author: jmc@openbsd.org -Date: Mon Dec 26 19:16:03 2022 +0000 +commit 3c379c9a849a635cc7f05cbe49fe473ccf469ef9 +Author: dtucker@openbsd.org +Date: Thu Feb 9 09:54:11 2023 +0000 - upstream: spelling fixes; from paul tagliamonte amendments to his + upstream: Ensure that there is a terminating newline when adding a new - diff are noted on tech + entry to known_hosts. bz#3529, with git+openssh at limpsquid.nl, ok deraadt@ + markus@ - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: d776dd03d0b882ca9c83b84f6b384f6f9bd7de4a + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: fa8d90698da1886570512b96f051e266eac105e0 -commit 797da2812a71785b34890bb6eb44767a7d09cd34 -Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Fri Dec 16 07:13:22 2022 +0000 +commit 95b6bbd2553547260b324b39d602061c88b774bc +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Tue Feb 7 08:43:47 2023 +1100 - upstream: Mention that scp uses the SFTP protocol and remove - - reference to legacy flag. Spotted by, feedback and ok jmc@ - - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 9dfe04966f52e941966b46c7a2972147f95281b3 + Replace 9.1 with 9.2 on CI status page. -commit 93f2ce8c050a7a2a628646c00b40b9b53fef93ef -Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Fri Dec 16 06:56:47 2022 +0000 +commit 195313dfe10a23c82e9d56d5fdd2f59beee1bdcf +Author: Damien Miller +Date: Fri Feb 3 16:33:09 2023 +1100 - upstream: Clear signal mask early in main(); sshd may have been + harden Linux seccomp sandbox - started with one or more signals masked (sigprocmask(2) is not cleared - on fork/exec) and this could interfere with various things, e.g. the - login grace timer. + Linux mmap(2) and madvise(2) syscalls support quite a number of funky + flags that we don't expect that sshd/libc will ever need. We can + exclude this kernel attack surface by filtering the mmap(2) flags + and the madvise(2) advice arguments. - Execution environments that fail to clear the signal mask before running - sshd are clearly broken, but apparently they do exist. + Similarly, the sandboxed process in sshd is a single-threaded program + that does not use shared memory for synchronisation or communication. + Therefore, there should be no reason for the advanced priority + inheritance futex(2) operations to be necessary. These can also be + excluded. - Reported by Sreedhar Balasubramanian; ok dtucker@ + Motivated by Jann Horn pointing out that there have been kernel bugs + in nearby Linux kernel code, e.g. CVE-2020-29368, CVE-2020-29374 and + CVE-2022-42703. - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 77078c0b1c53c780269fc0c416f121d05e3010ae + Feedback Jann Horn, ok dtucker@ -commit 4acfaabfae41badb9d334a2ee88c5c6ad041c0d5 -Author: jmc@openbsd.org -Date: Fri Dec 16 06:52:48 2022 +0000 +commit 6dfb65de949cdd0a5d198edee9a118f265924f33 +Author: Damien Miller +Date: Thu Feb 2 23:21:54 2023 +1100 - upstream: add -X to usage(); - - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 1bdc3df7de11d766587b0428318336dbffe4a9d0 + crank versions in RPM specs -commit e555d5cad5afae7d5ef2bbc02ca591178fe16fed +commit d07cfb11a0ca574eb68a3931d8c46fbe862a2021 +Author: Damien Miller +Date: Thu Feb 2 23:21:45 2023 +1100 + + update version in README + +commit 9fe207565b4ab0fe5d1ac5bb85e39188d96fb214 +Author: Damien Miller +Date: Thu Feb 2 23:17:49 2023 +1100 + + adapt compat_kex_proposal() test to portable + +commit 903c556b938fff2d7bff8da2cc460254430963c5 Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Fri Dec 16 03:40:03 2022 +0000 +Date: Thu Feb 2 12:12:52 2023 +0000 - upstream: add a -X option to both scp(1) and sftp(1) to allow - - control over some SFTP protocol knobs: the copy buffer length and - the number of inflight requests, both of which are used during - upload/download. + upstream: test compat_kex_proposal(); by dtucker@ - Previously these could be controlled in sftp(1) using the -b/-R options. - This makes them available in both SFTP protocol clients using the same - option character sequence. + OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 0e404ee264db546f9fdbf53390689ab5f8d38bf2 + +commit 405fba71962dec8409c0c962408e09049e5624b5 +Author: dtucker@openbsd.org +Date: Thu Jan 19 07:53:45 2023 +0000 + + upstream: Check if we can copy sshd or need to use sudo to do so - ok dtucker@ + during reexec test. Skip test if neither can work. Patch from anton@, tweaks + from me. - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 27502bffc589776f5da1f31df8cb51abe9a15f1c + OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 731b96ae74d02d5744e1f1a8e51d09877ffd9b6d -commit 5a7a7acab2f466dc1d7467b5d05d35268c3137aa -Author: deraadt@openbsd.org -Date: Thu Dec 15 18:20:39 2022 +0000 +commit b2a2a8f69fd7737ea17dc044353c514f2f962f35 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Thu Feb 2 12:10:22 2023 +0000 - upstream: The idiomatic way of coping with signed char vs unsigned - - char (which did not come from stdio read functions) in the presence of - ctype macros, is to always cast to (unsigned char). casting to (int) - for a "macro" which is documented to take int, is weird. And sadly wrong, - because of the sing extension risk.. same diff from florian + upstream: openssh-9.2 - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 65b9a49a68e22ff3a0ebd593f363e9f22dd73fea + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: f7389f32413c74d6e2055f05cf65e7082de03923 -commit b0b58222c7cc62efd8212c4fb65a545f58ebb22d -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Mon Dec 19 18:49:51 2022 +1100 +commit 12da7823336434a403f25c7cc0c2c6aed0737a35 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Thu Feb 2 12:10:05 2023 +0000 - Simply handling of SSH_CONNECTION PAM env var. + upstream: fix double-free caused by compat_kex_proposal(); bz3522 - Prompted by bz#3508: there's no need to cache the value of - sshpam_conninfo so remove the global. While there, add check of - return value from pam_putenv. ok djm@ + by dtucker@, ok me + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 2bfc37cd2d41f67dad64c17a64cf2cd3806a5c80 -commit ed8444572ae684fdb892f97bae342c6cb6456f04 +commit 79efd95ab5ff99f4cb3a955e2d713b3f54fb807e Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Mon Dec 19 18:42:34 2022 +1100 +Date: Wed Feb 1 17:17:26 2023 +1100 - Add tests for LibreSSL 3.7.0 and OpenSSL 1.1.1s. + Skip connection-timeout test on minix3. + + Minix 3's Unix domain sockets don't seem to work the way we expect, so + skip connection-timeout test on that platform. While there, group + together all similarly skipped tests and explicitly comment. -commit abb9a8aaddfcacbd12641f6e4f203da0fa85a287 -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Sun Dec 18 21:36:25 2022 +1100 +commit 6b508c4e039619842bcf5a16f8a6b08dd6bec44a +Author: Damien Miller +Date: Wed Feb 1 12:12:05 2023 +1100 - Use sudo when resetting perms on directories. + fix libfido2 detection without pkg-config + + Place libfido2 before additional libraries (that it may depend upon) + and not after. bz3530 from James Zhang; ok dtucker@ -commit 2f5664c5908d84697cbe91302d5d5c4d83cb2121 -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Sun Dec 18 21:19:33 2022 +1100 +commit 358e300fed5e6def233a2c06326e51e20ebed621 +Author: deraadt@openbsd.org +Date: Wed Jan 18 20:56:36 2023 +0000 - Set group perms on regress dir. + upstream: delete useless dependency - This ensures that the tests don't fail due to StrictMode checks. + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: e1dc11143f83082e3154d6094f9136d0dc2637ad -commit 137196300fc1540affadde880210f02ba6cb4abf -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Sun Dec 18 21:13:42 2022 +1100 +commit a4cb9be1b021b511e281ee55c356f964487d9e82 +Author: deraadt@openbsd.org +Date: Wed Jan 18 20:43:15 2023 +0000 - Fetch regress logs from obj dir. + upstream: Create and install sshd random relink kit. + + ../Makefile.inc and Makfile are concatenated for reuse, which hopefully won't + be too fragile, we'll see if we need a different approach. The resulting sshd + binary is tested with the new sshd -V option before installation. As the + binary layout is now semi-unknown (meaning relative, fixed, and gadget + offsets are not precisely known), change the filesystem permissions to 511 to + prevent what I call "logged in BROP". I have ideas for improving this further + but this is a first step ok djm + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 1e0a2692b7e20b126dda60bf04999d1d30d959d8 -commit 5f93c4836527d9fda05de8944a1c7b4a205080c7 -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Tue Dec 13 20:59:54 2022 +1100 +commit bc7de6f91a9a0ae2f148a9d31a4027d441a51999 +Author: jmc@openbsd.org +Date: Wed Jan 18 06:55:32 2023 +0000 - obsdsnap test VMs runs-on libvirt too. + upstream: tweak previous; ok djm + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: df71ce4180c58202dfdc1d92626cfe900b91b7c3 -commit 8386886fb1ab7fda73069fb0db1dbe0e5a52f758 +commit a20b7e999773e6333c8aa9b0a7fa41966e63b037 Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Tue Dec 13 20:55:37 2022 +1100 +Date: Tue Jan 31 19:35:44 2023 +1100 - Run upstream obsdsnap tests on ephemeral runners. + Skip connection-timeout test under Valgrind. + + Valgrind slows things down so much that the timeout test fails. Skip + this test until we figure out if we can make it work. -commit b6e01459b55ece85d7f296b2bc719d1841e1009e +commit c3ffb54b4fc5e608206037921db6ccbc2f5ab25f Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Tue Dec 13 20:48:56 2022 +1100 +Date: Wed Jan 25 21:58:40 2023 +1100 - Move obsdsnap test VMs to ephemeral runners. + Skip connection-timeout when missing FD passing. + + This tests uses multiplexing which uses file descriptor passing, so + skip it if we don't have that. Fixes test failures on Cygwin. -commit ea6fdf9a1aa71a411f7db218a986392c4fb55693 -Author: Damien Miller -Date: Fri Dec 9 18:00:21 2022 +1100 +commit 35253af01d8c0ab444c8377402121816e71c71f5 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Wed Jan 18 02:00:10 2023 +0000 - use calloc for allocating arc4random structs + upstream: when restoring non-blocking mode to stdio fds, restore - ok dtucker + exactly the flags that ssh started with and don't just clobber them with + zero, as this could also remove the append flag from the set; + + bz3523; ok dtucker@ + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 1336b03e881db7564a4b66014eb24c5230e9a0c0 -commit 4403b62f5548e91389cb3339d26a9d0c4bb07b34 -Author: dtucker@openbsd.org -Date: Fri Dec 9 00:22:29 2022 +0000 +commit 7d17ea151c0b2519f023bd9cc7f141128833ac47 +Author: millert@openbsd.org +Date: Wed Jan 18 01:50:21 2023 +0000 - upstream: Warn if no host keys for hostbased auth can be loaded. + upstream: Add a -V (version) option to sshd like the ssh client - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 2a0a13132000cf8d3593133c1b49768aa3c95977 + has. OK markus@ deraadt@ + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: abe990ec3e636fb040132aab8cbbede98f0c413e -commit a6183e25e3f1842e21999fe88bc40bb99b121dc3 -Author: dtucker@openbsd.org -Date: Fri Dec 9 00:17:40 2022 +0000 +commit 62360feb7f08f2a4c6fc36f3b3449309203c42c9 +Author: millert@openbsd.org +Date: Tue Jan 17 18:52:44 2023 +0000 - upstream: Add server debugging for hostbased auth. + upstream: For "ssh -V" always exit 0, there is no need to check opt - auth_debug_add queues messages about the auth process which is sent to - the client after successful authentication. This also sends those to - the server debug log to aid in debugging. From bz#3507, ok djm@ + again. This was missed when the fallthrough in the switch case above it was + removed. OK deraadt@ - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 46ff67518cccf9caf47e06393e2a121ee5aa258a + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 5583e5d8f6d62a8a4215cfa95a69932f344c8120 -commit b85c3581c16aaf6e83b9a797c80705a56b1f312e -Author: cheloha@openbsd.org -Date: Sun Dec 4 23:50:49 2022 +0000 +commit 12492c0abf1eb415d08a897cc1d8b9e789888230 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Tue Jan 17 10:15:10 2023 +0000 - upstream: remove '?' from getopt(3) loops + upstream: also check that an active session inhibits - userspace: remove vestigial '?' cases from top-level getopt(3) loops - - getopt(3) returns '?' when it encounters a flag not present in the in - the optstring or if a flag is missing its option argument. We can - handle this case with the "default" failure case with no loss of - legibility. Hence, remove all the redundant "case '?':" lines. + UnusedConnectionTimeout idea markus@ - Prompted by dlg@. With help from dlg@ and millert@. + OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 55c0fb61f3bf9e092b0a53f9041d3d2012f14003 + +commit cef2593c33ac46a58238ff998818754eabdf64ff +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Tue Jan 17 10:02:34 2023 +0000 + + upstream: regression test for UnusedConnectionTimeout - Link: https://marc.info/?l=openbsd-tech&m=167011979726449&w=2 + OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 7f29001374a68e71e5e078f69e4520cf4bcca084 + +commit aff9493a89c71d6a080419b49ac64eead9730491 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Mon Jan 16 04:11:29 2023 +0000 + + upstream: unbreak test: cannot access shell positional parameters - ok naddy@ millert@ dlg@ + past $9 without wrapping the position in braces (i.e. need ${10}, etc.) - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: b2f89346538ce4f5b33ab8011a23e0626a67e66e + OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 3750ec98d5d409ce6a93406fedde6f220d2ea2ac -commit 9a067e8d28a2249fd73f004961e30c113ee85e5d -Author: dtucker@openbsd.org -Date: Wed Dec 7 11:45:43 2022 +0000 +commit 0293c19807f83141cdf33b443154459f9ee471f6 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Tue Jan 17 09:44:48 2023 +0000 - upstream: Fix comment typo. + upstream: Add a sshd_config UnusedConnectionTimeout option to terminate - OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 3b04faced6511bb5e74648c6a4ef4bf2c4decf03 + client connections that have no open channels for some length of time. This + complements the recently-added ChannelTimeout option that terminates inactive + channels after a timeout. + + ok markus@ + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: ca983be74c0350364c11f8ba3bd692f6f24f5da9 -commit ce3c3e78ce45d68a82c7c8dc89895f297a67f225 -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Wed Dec 7 18:58:25 2022 +1100 +commit 8ec2e3123802d2beeca06c1644b0b647f6d36dab +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Sun Jan 15 23:35:10 2023 +0000 - Add SANDBOX_DEBUG to the kitchensink test build. + upstream: adapt to ed25519 changes in src/usr.bin/ssh + + OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 4b3e7ba7ee486ae8a0b4790f8112eded2bb7dcd5 -commit bc234605fa3eb10f56bf0d74c8ecb0d91ada9d05 -Author: Damien Miller -Date: Wed Dec 7 18:38:25 2022 +1100 +commit 9fbbfeca1ce4c7ec0001c827bbf4189a3ba0964b +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Sun Jan 15 23:05:32 2023 +0000 - disable SANDBOX_SECCOMP_FILTER_DEBUG + upstream: update OpenSSH's Ed25519 code to the last version of SUPERCOP - It was mistakenly enabled in 2580916e4872 + (20221122) and change the import approach to the same one we use for + Streamlined NTRUPrime: use a shell script to extract the bits we need from + SUPERCOP, make some minor adjustments and squish them all into a single file. - Reported by Peter sec-openssh-com.22.fichtner AT 0sg.net + ok tb@ tobhe@ + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 1bc0fd624cb6af440905b8ba74ac7c03311b8e3b -commit b087c5cfa011b27992e01589314fec830266f99d -Author: Rose <83477269+AtariDreams@users.noreply.github.com> -Date: Tue Nov 29 15:12:54 2022 -0500 +commit 6283f4bd83eee714d0f5fc55802eff836b06fea8 +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Sat Jan 14 22:02:44 2023 +1100 - Update autotools + Allow writev is seccomp sandbox. - Regenerate config files using latest autotools + This seems to be used by recent glibcs at least in some configurations. + From bz#3512, ok djm@ -commit d63f5494978a185c7421d492b9c2f6f05bb54138 -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Tue Dec 6 12:22:36 2022 +1100 +commit 923c3f437f439cfca238fba37e97a7041782f615 +Author: dtucker@openbsd.org +Date: Sat Jan 14 10:05:54 2023 +0000 - Fix typo in comment. Spotted by tim@ + upstream: Shell syntax fix. From ren mingshuai vi github PR#369. + + OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 6696b2eeefe128099fc3d7ea9f23252cc35156f9 -commit 73dcca12115aa12ed0d123b914d473c384e52651 +commit 4d87a00f704e0365e11c3c38b170c1275ec461fc Author: dtucker@openbsd.org -Date: Sun Dec 4 11:03:11 2022 +0000 +Date: Sat Jan 14 09:57:08 2023 +0000 - upstream: Remove duplicate includes. + upstream: Instead of skipping the all-tokens test if we don't have - Patch from AtariDreams via github PR#364. + OpenSSL (since we use it to compute the hash), put the hash at the end and + just omit it if we don't have it. Prompted by bz#3521. - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: b9186638a05cb8b56ef7c0de521922b6723644ea + OpenBSD-Regress-ID: c79ecba64250ed3b6417294b6c965e6b12ca5eea -commit 3cec15543010bc8d6997d896b1717a650afb7e92 -Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Fri Dec 2 04:40:27 2022 +0000 +commit b05406d6f93b8c8ec11ec8b27e7c76cc7a5a55fb +Author: jmc@openbsd.org +Date: Fri Jan 13 07:13:40 2023 +0000 - upstream: make struct sshbuf private + upstream: fix double phrase in previous; - and remove an unused field; ok dtucker + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 671e6c8dc5e9230518b2bbfa143daaa88adc66c2 + +commit 40564812b659c530eb1f4b62d09e85612aef3107 +Author: dtucker@openbsd.org +Date: Fri Jan 13 03:16:29 2023 +0000 + + upstream: Document "UserKnownHostsFile none". ok djm@ - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: c7a3d77c0b8c153d463398606a8d57569186a0c3 + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: f695742d39e34ecdcc3c861c3739a84648a4bce5 -commit 5796bf8ca9535f9fa7d01829a540d2550e05c860 +commit d03e245e034019a37388f6f5f893ce848ab6d2e2 Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Fri Dec 2 11:43:36 2022 +1100 +Date: Fri Jan 13 23:02:34 2023 +1100 - Restore ssh-agent permissions on exit. + Retry package installation 3 times. - ...enough that subsequent builds can overwrite ssh-agent if necessary. + When setting up the CI environment, retry package installation 3 times + before going up. Should help prevent spurious failures during + infrastructure issues. -commit ccf5a13868cbb4659107458cac1e017c98abcbda +commit 625f6bc39840167dafb3bf5b6a3e18503ac986e8 Author: dtucker@openbsd.org -Date: Thu Dec 1 02:22:13 2022 +0000 +Date: Fri Jan 13 04:47:34 2023 +0000 - upstream: Clean up ssh-add and ssh-agent logs. + upstream: Move scp path setting to a helper function. The previous - OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 9eda8e4c3714d7f943ab2e73ed58a233bd29cd2c + commit to add scp to the test sshd's path causes the t-envpass test to fail + when the test scp is given using a fully qualified path. Put this in a + helper function and only call it from the scp tests. + + OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 7533dc1c4265c1de716abb062957994195b36df4 -commit 7a8b40cf6a5eda80173140cc6750a6db8412fa87 +commit 6e6f88647042b3cde54a628545c2f5fb656a9327 Author: dtucker@openbsd.org -Date: Thu Dec 1 02:19:29 2022 +0000 +Date: Fri Jan 13 04:23:00 2023 +0000 - upstream: Log output of ssh-agent and ssh-add + upstream: Add scp's path to test sshd's PATH. - This should make debugging easier. + If the scp we're testing is fully qualified (eg it's not in the system + PATH) then add its path to the under-test sshd's PATH so we can find + it. Prompted by bz#3518. - OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 5974b02651f428d7e1079b41304c498ca7e306c8 + OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 7df4f5a0be3aa135495b7e5a6719d3cbc26cc4c0 -commit 4a1805d532616233dd6072e5cd273b96dd3062e6 -Author: dtucker@openbsd.org -Date: Tue Nov 29 22:41:14 2022 +0000 +commit 8a5e99a70fcf9b022a8aa175ebf6a71f58511da3 +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Fri Jan 13 15:49:48 2023 +1100 - upstream: Add void to client_repledge args to fix compiler warning. ok djm@ + Remove skipping test when scp not in path. - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 7e964a641ce4a0a0a11f047953b29929d7a4b866 + An upcoming change renders this obsolete by adding scp's path to the + test sshd's PATH, and removing this first will make the subsequent sync + easier. -commit 815c4704930aa449edf6e812e99d69e9ffd31f01 -Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Mon Nov 28 01:38:22 2022 +0000 +commit 41f36dd896c8fb8337d403fcf476762986976e9d +Author: dtucker@openbsd.org +Date: Fri Jan 13 02:58:20 2023 +0000 - upstream: tighten pledge(2) after session establishment + upstream: Add a "Host" line to the output of ssh -G showing the - feedback, ok & testing in snaps deraadt@ + original host arg. Inspired by patch from vincent at bernat.ch via bz#3343, + ok djm@ - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: aecf4d49d28586dfbcc74328d9333398fef9eb58 + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 59c0f60a222113a44d0650cd394376e3beecc883 -commit f7cebbbf407d772ed71403d314343766782fe540 +commit f673b49f3be3eb51074fbb8a405beb6cd0f7d93e Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Mon Nov 28 01:37:36 2022 +0000 +Date: Fri Jan 13 02:44:02 2023 +0000 - upstream: New EnableEscapeCommandline ssh_config(5) option - - This option (default "no") controls whether the ~C escape is available. - Turning it off by default means we will soon be able to use a stricter - default pledge(2) in the client. + upstream: avoid printf("%s", NULL) if using ssh - feedback deraadt@ dtucker@; tested in snaps for a while + -oUserKnownHostsFile=none and a hostkey in one of the system known hosts file + changes; ok dtucker@ - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 7e277595d60acb8263118dcb66554472257b387a + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 7ca87614bfc6da491315536a7f2301434a9fe614 -commit d323f7ecf52e3d4ec1f4939bf31693e02f891dca -Author: mbuhl@openbsd.org -Date: Fri Nov 18 19:47:40 2022 +0000 +commit 93fc7c576563e3d88a1dc019dd213f65607784cc +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Wed Jan 11 05:39:38 2023 +0000 - upstream: In channel_request_remote_forwarding the parameters for + upstream: clamp the minimum buffer lengths and number of inflight - permission_set_add are leaked as they are also duplicated in the call. Found - by CodeChecker. ok djm + requests too - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 4aef50fa9be7c0b138188814c8fe3dccc196f61e + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: c4965f62fa0ba850940fd66ae3f60cf516bbcd56 -commit 62cc33e6eed847aafdc29e34aa69e9bd82a0ee16 -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Wed Nov 30 11:23:11 2022 +1100 +commit 48bf234322e639d279c5a28435eae50155e9b514 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Wed Jan 11 05:36:50 2023 +0000 - Use -fzero-call-used-regs=used on clang 15. + upstream: ignore bogus upload/download buffer lengths in the limits - clang 15 seems to have a problem with -fzero-call-used-reg=all which - causes spurious "incorrect signature" failures with ED25519. On those - versions, use -fzero-call-used-regs=used instead. (We may add exceptions - later if specific versions prove to be OK). Also move the GCC version - check to match. + extension - Initial investigation by Daniel Pouzzner (douzzer at mega nu), workaround - suggested by Bill Wendling (morbo at google com). bz#3475, ok djm@ + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: c5b023e0954693ba9a5376e4280c739b5db575f8 -commit f84b9cffd52c9c5c359a54a1929f9948e803ab1d -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Mon Nov 28 21:09:28 2022 +1100 +commit 36b00d31833ca74cb0f7c7d8eda1bde55700f929 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Wed Jan 11 02:13:52 2023 +0000 - Skip unit tests on slow riscv64 hardware. + upstream: remove whitespace at EOL from code extracted from SUPERCOP + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 1ec524ff2fbb9387d731601437c82008f35a60f4 -commit 9f2747e0bed3faca92679eae69aef10c95dc82f5 -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Sun Nov 27 15:26:22 2022 +1100 +commit d888de06c5e4d7dbf2f2b85f2b5bf028c570cf78 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Wed Jan 11 00:51:27 2023 +0000 - Rework how selfhosted tests interact with runners. - - Previously there was one runner per test target (mostly VMs). This had - a few limitations: - - multiple tests that ran on the same target (eg multiple build - configs) were serialized on availability or that runner. - - it needed manual balancing of VMs over host machines. + upstream: rewrite this test to use a multiplexed ssh session so we can - To address this, make VMs that use ephemeral disks (ie most of them) - all use a pool of runners with the "libvirt" label. This requires that - we distinguish between "host" and "target" for those. Native runners - and VMs with persistent disks (eg the constantly-updated snapshot ones) - specify the same host and target. + control its lifecycle without risk of race conditions; fixes some of the + Github integration tests for openssh-portable - This should improve test throughput. + OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 5451cad59ba0d43ae9eeda48ec80f54405fee969 -commit d664ddaec87bdc7385be8ef7f1337793e1679d48 -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Sun Nov 27 12:19:37 2022 +1100 +commit 4bcc737a35fdd9cc4af7423d6c23dfd0c7ef4786 +Author: Damien Miller +Date: Wed Jan 11 11:45:17 2023 +1100 - Run vmstartup from temp dir. + remove buffer len workaround for NetBSD 4.x - This will allow us to create ephemeral disk images per-runner. + Switching to from pipes to a socketpair for communicating with the + ssh process avoids the (kernel bug?) problem. -commit 0fa16e952b1fc1c4cf65e3dd138b0e87003e2e45 -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Sun Nov 27 12:14:00 2022 +1100 +commit f5154d2aac3e6a32a1b13dec23a701a087850cdc +Author: Damien Miller +Date: Wed Jan 11 11:44:19 2023 +1100 - Make "config" in matrix singular and pass in env. + add back use of pipes in scp.c under USE_PIPES - This will allow the startup scripts to adapt their behaviour based on - the type and config. - -commit e8857043af54809187be1e8b06749db61112899f -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Sun Nov 27 11:42:22 2022 +1100 - - Add "libvirt" label to dfly30. + This matches sftp.c which prefers socketpair but uses pipes on + some older platforms. -commit 9775473d84902dc37753686cd10ae71fbe67efda -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Sun Nov 27 09:28:20 2022 +1100 +commit eec737b59cf13841de46134967a206607000acd4 +Author: millert@openbsd.org +Date: Tue Jan 10 23:22:15 2023 +0000 - Rename "os" in matrix to "target". + upstream: Switch scp from using pipes to a socketpair for - This is in preparation to distinguish this from the host that the runner - runs on in case where they are separate (eg VMs). - -commit 04fd00ceff39f4544ced6f5342060abe584835d0 -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Sun Nov 27 09:23:04 2022 +1100 - - Remove unused self-hosted test targets. + communication with it's ssh sub-processes. We no longer need to reserve two + descriptors to ensure that we don't end up using fd 0-2 unexpectedly, that is + handled by sanitise_stdfd() in main(). Based on an original diff from djm@. + OK deraadt@ djm@ + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: b80c372faac462471e955ddeab9480d668a2e48d -commit c9d9fcad2a11c1cd1550a541f44091d65f0b5584 -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Sun Nov 27 09:16:15 2022 +1100 +commit d213d126a4a343abd3a1eb13687d39c1891fe5c8 +Author: jmc@openbsd.org +Date: Fri Jan 6 08:44:11 2023 +0000 - Remove explicit "default" test config argument. + upstream: tweak previous; ok djm - Not specifying the test config implicitly selects default args. + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 229c493452766d70a78b0f02f6ff9894f9028858 -commit 15a01cf15f396f87c6d221c5a6af98331c818962 -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Wed Nov 23 13:18:54 2022 +1100 +commit 4a5590a5ee47b7dfd49773e9fdba48ad3089fe64 +Author: Damien Miller +Date: Mon Jan 9 16:33:56 2023 +1100 - Add fallback for old platforms w/out MAP_ANON. + try to improve logging for dynamic-forward test + + previously the logs from the ssh used to exercise the forwarding + channel would clobber the logs from the ssh actually doing the + forwarding -commit 6b9bbbfe8b26db6e9a30a7e08c223e85421aed98 +commit 715bc25dcfccf9fb2bee820155fe071d01a618db Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Wed Nov 23 13:09:11 2022 +1100 +Date: Sat Jan 7 23:24:50 2023 +1100 - If we haven't found it yet, recheck for sys/stat.h. + Skip dynamic-forward test on minix3. - On some very old platforms, sys/stat.h needs sys/types.h, however - autoconf 2.71's AC_CHECK_INCLUDES_DEFAULT checks for them in the - opposite order, which in combination with modern autoconf's - "present but cannot be compiled" behaviour causes it to not be - detected. + This test relies on loopback addresses which minix does not have. + Previously the test would not run at all since it also doesn't have + netcat, but now we use our own netcat it tries and fails. -commit 8926956f22639132a9f2433fcd25224e01b900f5 -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Fri Nov 11 11:25:37 2022 +1100 +commit dd1249bd5c45128a908395c61b26996a70f82205 +Author: Damien Miller +Date: Sun Jan 8 12:08:59 2023 +1100 - Add dfly62 test target. + don't test IPv6 addresses if platform lacks support -commit 650de7ecd3567b5a5dbf16dd1eb598bd8c20bca8 +commit d77fc611a62f2dfee0b654c31a50a814b13310dd Author: dtucker@openbsd.org -Date: Thu Nov 10 23:03:10 2022 +0000 +Date: Fri Jan 6 12:33:33 2023 +0000 - upstream: Handle dynamic remote port forwarding in escape commandline's + upstream: When OpenSSL is not available, skip parts of percent test - -R processing. bz#3499, ok djm@ + that require it. Based on github pr#368 from ren mingshuai. - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 194ee4cfe7ed0e2b8ad0727f493c798a50454208 + OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 49a375b2cf61ccb95b52e75e2e025cd10988ebb2 -commit 5372db7e7985ba2c00f20fdff8942145ca99e033 +commit 1cd2aac312af9172f1b5cb06c2e1cd090abb83cf Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Thu Nov 10 12:44:51 2022 +1100 +Date: Sat Jan 7 23:01:11 2023 +1100 - Remove seed passing over reexec. - - This was added for the benefit of platforms using ssh-rand-helper to - prevent a delay on each connection as sshd reseeded itself. + Use our own netcat for dynamic-forward test. - ssh-random-helper is long gone, and since the re-exec happens before the - chroot the re-execed sshd can reseed itself normally. ok djm@ + That way we can be surer about its behaviour rather than trying to + second-guess the behaviour of various netcat implementations. -commit ca98d3f8c64cfc51af81e1b01c36a919d5947ec2 +commit 26cab41c05d7b0859d2a1ea5b6ed253d91848a80 Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Wed Nov 9 20:59:20 2022 +1100 +Date: Sat Jan 7 14:30:43 2023 +1100 - Skip reexec test on OpenSSL 1.1.1 specifically. + Use autoconf to find openssl binary. - OpenSSL 1.1.1 has a bug in its RNG that breaks reexec fallback, so skip - that test. See bz#3483 for details. + It's possible to install an OpenSSL in a path not in the system's + default library search path. OpenSSH can still use this (eg if you + specify an rpath) but the openssl binary there may not work. If one is + available on the system path just use that. -commit 5ec4ebc2548e5f7f1b55b2a5cef5b67bdca8146f -Author: dtucker@openbsd.org -Date: Wed Nov 9 09:04:12 2022 +0000 +commit 5532e010a0eeb6aa264396514f9aed7948471538 +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Sat Jan 7 10:34:18 2023 +1100 - upstream: Fix typo in fatal error message. - - Patch from vapier at chromium.org. - - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 8a0c164a6a25eef0eedfc30df95bfa27644e35cf + Check openssl_bin path is executable before using. -commit e6abafe9a6d809422d3432b95b3f9747b0acaa71 +commit 5d7b16cff48598d5908db970bfdc9ff9326142c8 +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Fri Jan 6 23:19:07 2023 +1100 + + Set OPENSSL_BIN from OpenSSL directory. + +commit 344a0e8240eaf08da5d46a5e3a9ecad6e4f64c35 Author: dtucker@openbsd.org -Date: Wed Nov 9 09:01:52 2022 +0000 +Date: Fri Jan 6 08:50:33 2023 +0000 - upstream: Remove errant colon and simplify format - - string in error messages. Patch from vapier at chromium.org. + upstream: Save debug logs from ssh for debugging purposes. - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: fc28466ebc7b74e0072331947a89bdd239c160d3 + OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 109e40b06de1c006a3b8e0d8745b790b2c5870a0 -commit db2027a687516f87c3fb141e87154bb3d8a7807c +commit e1ef172646f7f49c80807eea90225ef5e0be55a8 Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Wed Nov 9 01:37:44 2022 +0000 +Date: Fri Jan 6 08:07:39 2023 +0000 - upstream: rename client_global_hostkeys_private_confirm() to - - client_global_hostkeys_prove_confirm(), as it handles the - "hostkeys-prove00@openssh.com" message; no functional change + upstream: regression test for ChannelTimeout - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 31e09bd3cca6eed26855b88fb8beed18e9bd026d + OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 280bfbefcfa415428ad744e43f69a8dede8ad685 -commit 1c2be7c2004cf1abcd172fee9fe3eab57cd4c426 +commit 2393ea8daf25853459eb07a528d7577688847777 Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Wed Nov 9 00:15:59 2022 +0000 +Date: Fri Jan 6 07:18:18 2023 +0000 - upstream: typo in comment + upstream: fix typo in verbose logging - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 39c58f41e0f32d1ff31731fa6f5bbbc3ad25084a + OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 0497cdb66e003b2f50ed77291a9104fba2e017e9 -commit cf1a9852d7fc93e4abc4168aed09529a57427cdc -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Wed Nov 9 09:23:47 2022 +1100 +commit 161a5378a3cc2e7aa3f9674cb7f4686ae6ce9586 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Fri Jan 6 02:59:50 2023 +0000 - Defer seed_rng until after closefrom call. + upstream: unit tests for misc.c:ptimeout_* API - seed_rng will initialize OpenSSL, and some engine providers (eg Intel's - QAT) will open descriptors for their own use. bz#3483, patch from - joel.d.schuetze at intel.com, ok djm@ + OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 01f8fb12d08e5aaadd4bd4e71f456b6588be9a94 -commit dffa64480163fbf76af7e4fb62c26bb0dd6642aa -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Wed Nov 9 08:27:47 2022 +1100 +commit 018d671d78145f03d6f07ae9d64d51321da70325 +Author: tb@openbsd.org +Date: Wed Jan 4 22:48:57 2023 +0000 - Fix comment text. From emaste at freebsd.org. + upstream: Copy bytes from the_banana[] rather than banana() + + Fixes test failure due to segfault seen on arm64 with xonly snap. + + ok djm + + OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 86e2aa4bbd1dff1bc4ebb2969c0d6474485be046 -commit d9df5689c29823ab830ec4f54c83c6cc3c0077ad -Author: Pierre Ossman -Date: Wed Jul 6 13:52:10 2022 +0200 +commit ab6bb69e251faa8b24f81b25c72ec0120f20cad4 +Author: Damien Miller +Date: Fri Jan 6 19:13:36 2023 +1100 - Avoid assuming layout of fd_set + unbreak scp on NetBSD 4.x - POSIX doesn't specify the internal layout of the fd_set object, so let's - not assume it is just a bit mask. This increases compatibility with - systems that have a different layout. + e555d5cad5 effectively increased the default copy buffer size for SFTP + transfers. This caused NetBSD 4.x to hang during the "copy local file to + remote file in place" scp.sh regression test. - The assumption is also worthless as we already refuse to use file - descriptors over FD_SETSIZE anyway. Meaning that the default size of - fd_set is quite sufficient. + This puts back the original 32KB copy buffer size until we can properly + figure out why. + + lots of debugging assistance from dtucker@ -commit 419aa8a312e8d8f491933ca3d5933e602cb05aae -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Tue Nov 8 12:42:52 2022 +1100 +commit 2d1ff2b9431393ad99ef496d5e3b9dd0d4f5ac8c +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Fri Jan 6 02:47:18 2023 +0000 - Shutdown any VM before trying to check out repo. + upstream: Implement channel inactivity timeouts - In the case where the previous run did not clean up, the checkout will - fail as it'll leave a stale mount. + This adds a sshd_config ChannelTimeouts directive that allows channels that + have not seen traffic in a configurable interval to be automatically closed. + Different timeouts may be applied to session, X11, agent and TCP forwarding + channels. + + Note: this only affects channels over an opened SSH connection and not + the connection itself. Most clients close the connection when their channels + go away, with a notable exception being ssh(1) in multiplexing mode. + + ok markus dtucker + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: ae8bba3ed9d9f95ff2e2dc8dcadfa36b48e6c0b8 -commit a32c07cbb78f65d8527642b96474a83b413f8108 -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Tue Nov 8 11:33:25 2022 +1100 +commit 0e34348d0bc0b1522f75d6212a53d6d1d1367980 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Fri Jan 6 02:42:34 2023 +0000 - Run vm startup and shutdown from runner temp dir. + upstream: Add channel_set_xtype() - Should work even if the github workspace dir is on a stale sshfs mount. - -commit 2b40a7dfcdb8e616155b9504145aa52b271455aa -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Tue Nov 8 11:03:31 2022 +1100 - - Add valrind-5 test here too. - -commit 2ea03d1f6d0a05ee2b63ed2dc0f2d54f1e4655a1 -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Tue Nov 8 09:21:10 2022 +1100 - - Update checkout and upload actions. + This sets an "extended" channel type after channel creation (e.g. + "session:subsystem:sftp") that will be used for setting channel inactivity + timeouts. - Update actions/checkout and actions/upload-artifact to main branch for - compatibility with node.js v16. - -commit 4e316ff0f18a118232bb9ac6512ee62773a9e8ea -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Tue Nov 8 09:17:04 2022 +1100 - - Split out rekey test since it runs the longest. + ok markus dtucker + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 42564aa92345045b4a74300528f960416a15d4ca -commit 21625a6424258a92a96a3bb73ae6aabc5ed8a6b4 -Author: dtucker@openbsd.org -Date: Mon Nov 7 10:09:28 2022 +0000 +commit ceedf09b2977f3a756c759a6e7eb8f8e9db86a18 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Fri Jan 6 02:41:49 2023 +0000 - upstream: The IdentityFile option in ssh_config can also be used to + upstream: tweak channel ctype names - specify a public key file, as documented in ssh.1 for the -i option. Document - this also for IdentityFile in ssh_config.5, for documentation completeness. - From laalsaas at systemli.org via portable github PR#352, ok jmc@ djm@ + These are now used by sshd_config:ChannelTimeouts to specify timeouts by + channel type, so force them all to use a similar format without whitespace. - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 2f943be9f96e60ef81a9a4faa25b009999f9883b + ok dtucker markus + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 66834765bb4ae14f96d2bb981ac98a7dae361b65 -commit 747691604d3325ed2b62bad85b6fd8563ad32f6c -Author: dtucker@openbsd.org -Date: Mon Nov 7 10:05:38 2022 +0000 +commit c60438158ad4b2f83d8504257aba1be7d0b0bb4b +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Fri Jan 6 02:39:59 2023 +0000 - upstream: Remove some set but otherwise unused variables, spotted + upstream: Add channel_force_close() - in -portable by clang 16's -Wunused-but-set-variable. ok djm@ + This will forcibly close an open channel by simulating read/write errors, + draining the IO buffers and calling the detach function. - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 3d943ddf2369b38fbf89f5f19728e7dc1daf3982 + Previously the detach function was only ever called during channel garbage + collection, but there was no way to signal the user of a channel (e.g. + session.c) that its channel was being closed deliberately (vs. by the + usual state-machine logic). So this adds an extra "force" argument to the + channel cleanup callback to indicate this condition. + + ok markus dtucker + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 23052707a42bdc62fda2508636e624afd466324b -commit 1d78d25653805aefc7a8dd9d86cd7359ada3823c -Author: dtucker@openbsd.org -Date: Mon Nov 7 10:02:59 2022 +0000 +commit d478cdc7ad6edd4b1bcd1e86fb2f23194ff33d5a +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Fri Jan 6 02:38:23 2023 +0000 - upstream: Check for and disallow MaxStartups values less than or + upstream: replace manual poll/ppoll timeout math with ptimeout API - equal to zero during config parsing, rather than faling later at runtime. - bz#3489, ok djm@ + feedback markus / ok markus dtucker - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: d79c2b7a8601eb9be493629a91245d761154308b + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: c5ec4f2d52684cdb788cd9cbc1bcf89464014be2 -commit a00f59a645072e5f5a8d207af15916a7b23e2642 +commit 4adf3817a24efe99b06e62630577d683c7cd8065 Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Mon Nov 7 04:04:40 2022 +0000 +Date: Fri Jan 6 02:37:04 2023 +0000 - upstream: fix parsing of hex cert expiry time; was checking whether the - - start time began with "0x", not the expiry time. + upstream: add ptimeout API for keeping track of poll/ppoll - from Ed Maste + timeouts; ok dtucker markus - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 6269242c3e1a130b47c92cfca4d661df15f05739 + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 3335268ca135b3ec15a947547d7cfbb8ff929ead -commit f58acaf8c7315483f4ac87d46a1aa2142a713cd8 -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Mon Nov 7 15:10:59 2022 +1100 +commit 8c7c69d32375d2f3ce9da0109c9bffc560842316 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Thu Jan 5 05:49:13 2023 +0000 - Fix merge conflict. + upstream: suppress "Connection closed" message when in quiet mode + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 8a3ab7176764da55f60bfacfeae9b82d84e3908f -commit 162e5741020a8d996c0c12b988b118e71ed728e6 -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Mon Nov 7 15:04:33 2022 +1100 +commit 845ceecea2ac311b0c267f9ecbd34862e1876fc6 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Mon Jan 2 07:03:57 2023 +0000 - Branch-specific links for master status badges. + upstream: regression test for PermitRemoteOpen + + OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 8271aafbf5c21950cd5bf966f08e585cebfe630c -commit e4b7c12ab24579312aa3ed38ce7041a439ec2d56 -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Mon Nov 7 14:46:38 2022 +1100 +commit b3daa8dc582348d6ab8150bc1e571b7aa08c5388 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Mon Jan 2 07:03:30 2023 +0000 - Add CIFuzz status badge. + upstream: fix bug in PermitRemoteOpen which caused it to ignore its + + first argument unless it was one of the special keywords "any" or "none". + + Reported by Georges Chaudy in bz3515; ok dtucker@ + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: c5678a39f1ff79993d5ae3cfac5746a4ae148ea5 -commit b496b9f831acd1e5bcd875e26e797488beef494a -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Mon Nov 7 14:45:16 2022 +1100 +commit 0872663a7be0301bcc3d49acdbc9b740a3d972d4 +Author: jmc@openbsd.org +Date: Mon Dec 26 19:16:03 2022 +0000 - Do not run CIFuzz on selfhosted tree. + upstream: spelling fixes; from paul tagliamonte amendments to his - We already run it on the regular tree, no need to double up. + diff are noted on tech + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: d776dd03d0b882ca9c83b84f6b384f6f9bd7de4a -commit 2138b1c4ddb300129a41a5104627b0d561184c7b -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Mon Nov 7 14:41:58 2022 +1100 +commit 797da2812a71785b34890bb6eb44767a7d09cd34 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Fri Dec 16 07:13:22 2022 +0000 - Whitespace change to trigger CIFuzz workflow. + upstream: Mention that scp uses the SFTP protocol and remove + + reference to legacy flag. Spotted by, feedback and ok jmc@ + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 9dfe04966f52e941966b46c7a2972147f95281b3 -commit 4670b97ef87c7b0f21283c9b07c7191be88dda05 -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Mon Nov 7 14:34:04 2022 +1100 +commit 93f2ce8c050a7a2a628646c00b40b9b53fef93ef +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Fri Dec 16 06:56:47 2022 +0000 - Run cifuzz workflow on the actions as regular CI. + upstream: Clear signal mask early in main(); sshd may have been + + started with one or more signals masked (sigprocmask(2) is not cleared + on fork/exec) and this could interfere with various things, e.g. the + login grace timer. + + Execution environments that fail to clear the signal mask before running + sshd are clearly broken, but apparently they do exist. + + Reported by Sreedhar Balasubramanian; ok dtucker@ + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 77078c0b1c53c780269fc0c416f121d05e3010ae -commit 79391e66ce851ace1baf3c6a35e83a23f08ec2ba -Author: David Korczynski -Date: Tue Nov 30 11:45:20 2021 +0000 +commit 4acfaabfae41badb9d334a2ee88c5c6ad041c0d5 +Author: jmc@openbsd.org +Date: Fri Dec 16 06:52:48 2022 +0000 - Add CIFuzz integration + upstream: add -X to usage(); + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 1bdc3df7de11d766587b0428318336dbffe4a9d0 -commit c1893364a0be243270014d7d34362a8101d55112 -Author: dtucker@openbsd.org -Date: Mon Nov 7 02:21:22 2022 +0000 +commit e555d5cad5afae7d5ef2bbc02ca591178fe16fed +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Fri Dec 16 03:40:03 2022 +0000 - upstream: Import regenerated moduli. + upstream: add a -X option to both scp(1) and sftp(1) to allow - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: b0e54ee4d703bd6929bbc624068666a7a42ecb1f + control over some SFTP protocol knobs: the copy buffer length and + the number of inflight requests, both of which are used during + upload/download. + + Previously these could be controlled in sftp(1) using the -b/-R options. + This makes them available in both SFTP protocol clients using the same + option character sequence. + + ok dtucker@ + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 27502bffc589776f5da1f31df8cb51abe9a15f1c -commit 5c3f18fb994ef27e685b205ee2351851b80fdbd1 -Author: dtucker@openbsd.org -Date: Mon Nov 7 01:53:01 2022 +0000 +commit 5a7a7acab2f466dc1d7467b5d05d35268c3137aa +Author: deraadt@openbsd.org +Date: Thu Dec 15 18:20:39 2022 +0000 - upstream: Fix typo. From pablomh via -portable github PR#344. + upstream: The idiomatic way of coping with signed char vs unsigned - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: d056ee2e73691dc3ecdb44a6de68e6b88cd93827 + char (which did not come from stdio read functions) in the presence of + ctype macros, is to always cast to (unsigned char). casting to (int) + for a "macro" which is documented to take int, is weird. And sadly wrong, + because of the sing extension risk.. same diff from florian + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 65b9a49a68e22ff3a0ebd593f363e9f22dd73fea -commit e1c6fcc142066417c9832e634463faa3dd5d116c +commit b0b58222c7cc62efd8212c4fb65a545f58ebb22d Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Mon Nov 7 12:46:58 2022 +1100 +Date: Mon Dec 19 18:49:51 2022 +1100 - Link to branch-specific queries for V_9_1 status. + Simply handling of SSH_CONNECTION PAM env var. + + Prompted by bz#3508: there's no need to cache the value of + sshpam_conninfo so remove the global. While there, add check of + return value from pam_putenv. ok djm@ -commit 4f4a5fad6d8892c3f8ee9cd81ec7de6458210c9f +commit ed8444572ae684fdb892f97bae342c6cb6456f04 Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Sun Nov 6 10:55:59 2022 +1100 +Date: Mon Dec 19 18:42:34 2022 +1100 - Use "prohibit-password" in -portable comments. - - "without-password" is the deprecated alias for "prohibit-password", - so we should reference the latter. From emaste at freebsd.org. + Add tests for LibreSSL 3.7.0 and OpenSSL 1.1.1s. -commit 0f7e1eba55259ec037f515000b4c4afbf446230a +commit abb9a8aaddfcacbd12641f6e4f203da0fa85a287 Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Sun Nov 6 10:50:01 2022 +1100 +Date: Sun Dec 18 21:36:25 2022 +1100 - Fix tracing disable on FreeBSD. - - Some versions of FreeBSD do not support using id 0 to refer to the - current pid for procctl, so pass getpid() explicitly. From - emaste at freebsd.org. + Use sudo when resetting perms on directories. -commit 32fddb982fd61b11a2f218a115975a87ab126d43 +commit 2f5664c5908d84697cbe91302d5d5c4d83cb2121 Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Mon Nov 7 10:39:01 2022 +1100 +Date: Sun Dec 18 21:19:33 2022 +1100 - Fix setres*id checks to work with clang-16. + Set group perms on regress dir. - glibc has the prototypes for setresuid and setresgid behind _GNU_SOURCE, - and clang 16 will error out on implicit function definitions, so add - _GNU_SOURCE and the required headers to the configure checks. From - sam at @gentoo.org via bz#3497. + This ensures that the tests don't fail due to StrictMode checks. -commit 12af712d116f42164bcfa56db901d06e4fa27199 -Author: Sam James -Date: Sun Nov 6 04:52:38 2022 +0000 +commit 137196300fc1540affadde880210f02ba6cb4abf +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Sun Dec 18 21:13:42 2022 +1100 - configure.ac: Fix -Wstrict-prototypes - - Clang 16 now warns on this and it'll be removed in C23, so let's - just be future proof. It also reduces noise when doing general - Clang 16 porting work (which is a big job as it is). github PR#355. - - Signed-off-by: Sam James + Fetch regress logs from obj dir. -commit 40b0a5eb6e3edfa2886b60c09c7803353b0cc7f5 -Author: Sam James -Date: Sun Nov 6 04:47:35 2022 +0000 +commit 5f93c4836527d9fda05de8944a1c7b4a205080c7 +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Tue Dec 13 20:59:54 2022 +1100 - configure.ac: Add include for openpty - - Another Clang 16ish fix (which makes -Wimplicit-function-declaration - an error by default). github PR#355. - - See: 2efd71da49b9cfeab7987058cf5919e473ff466b - See: be197635329feb839865fdc738e34e24afd1fca8 + obsdsnap test VMs runs-on libvirt too. -commit 6b17e128879ec6cc32ca2c28b5d894b4aa72e32d -Author: Rochdi Nassah -Date: Fri Oct 28 01:26:31 2022 +0100 +commit 8386886fb1ab7fda73069fb0db1dbe0e5a52f758 +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Tue Dec 13 20:55:37 2022 +1100 - Fix broken zlib link. + Run upstream obsdsnap tests on ephemeral runners. -commit 99500df246ccb736ddbdd04160dcc82165d81a77 +commit b6e01459b55ece85d7f296b2bc719d1841e1009e Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Fri Nov 4 16:59:26 2022 +1100 +Date: Tue Dec 13 20:48:56 2022 +1100 - Don't run openbsd-compat tests on Cygwin. - - Add "compat-tests" to the default TEST_TARGET so we can override as - necessary. Override TEST_TARGET for Cygwin as the tests don't currently - compile there. + Move obsdsnap test VMs to ephemeral runners. -commit 3cae9f92a31897409666aa1e6f696f779759332b -Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Thu Nov 3 21:59:20 2022 +0000 +commit ea6fdf9a1aa71a411f7db218a986392c4fb55693 +Author: Damien Miller +Date: Fri Dec 9 18:00:21 2022 +1100 - upstream: replace recently-added valid_domain() check for hostnames - - going to known_hosts with a more relaxed check for bad characters; previous - commit broke address literals. Reported by/feedback from florian@ + use calloc for allocating arc4random structs - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 10b86dc6a4b206adaa0c11b58b6d5933898d43e0 + ok dtucker -commit 9655217231c9056200bea7ae2dffcc9c0c3eb265 -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Thu Nov 3 23:07:50 2022 +1100 +commit 4403b62f5548e91389cb3339d26a9d0c4bb07b34 +Author: dtucker@openbsd.org +Date: Fri Dec 9 00:22:29 2022 +0000 - Rerun tests on changes to Makefile.in in any dir. + upstream: Warn if no host keys for hostbased auth can be loaded. + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 2a0a13132000cf8d3593133c1b49768aa3c95977 -commit 3500f0405a3ab16b59a26f3508c4257a3fc3bce6 -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Thu Nov 3 23:04:08 2022 +1100 +commit a6183e25e3f1842e21999fe88bc40bb99b121dc3 +Author: dtucker@openbsd.org +Date: Fri Dec 9 00:17:40 2022 +0000 - Link libssh into compat tests. + upstream: Add server debugging for hostbased auth. - The cygwin compat code uses xmalloc, so add libssh.a so pick up that. + auth_debug_add queues messages about the auth process which is sent to + the client after successful authentication. This also sends those to + the server debug log to aid in debugging. From bz#3507, ok djm@ + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 46ff67518cccf9caf47e06393e2a121ee5aa258a -commit ec59effcf65b8a4c85d47ff5a271123259dd0ab8 -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Thu Nov 3 21:44:23 2022 +1100 +commit b85c3581c16aaf6e83b9a797c80705a56b1f312e +Author: cheloha@openbsd.org +Date: Sun Dec 4 23:50:49 2022 +0000 - Fix compat regress to work with non-GNU make. + upstream: remove '?' from getopt(3) loops + + userspace: remove vestigial '?' cases from top-level getopt(3) loops + + getopt(3) returns '?' when it encounters a flag not present in the in + the optstring or if a flag is missing its option argument. We can + handle this case with the "default" failure case with no loss of + legibility. Hence, remove all the redundant "case '?':" lines. + + Prompted by dlg@. With help from dlg@ and millert@. + + Link: https://marc.info/?l=openbsd-tech&m=167011979726449&w=2 + + ok naddy@ millert@ dlg@ + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: b2f89346538ce4f5b33ab8011a23e0626a67e66e -commit 73550a218e7dfbbd599534cbf856309bc924f6fd -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Thu Nov 3 13:41:16 2022 +1100 +commit 9a067e8d28a2249fd73f004961e30c113ee85e5d +Author: dtucker@openbsd.org +Date: Wed Dec 7 11:45:43 2022 +0000 - Increase selfhosted job timeout. + upstream: Fix comment typo. - The default job timeout of 360 (6h) is not enough to complete the - regress tests for some of the slow VMs depending on the load on the host. - Increase to 600 (10h). + OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 3b04faced6511bb5e74648c6a4ef4bf2c4decf03 -commit db97d8d0b90c6ce52b94b153d6f8f5f7d3b11777 +commit ce3c3e78ce45d68a82c7c8dc89895f297a67f225 Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Thu Nov 3 10:00:43 2022 +1100 +Date: Wed Dec 7 18:58:25 2022 +1100 - Only run opensslver tests if built with OpenSSL. + Add SANDBOX_DEBUG to the kitchensink test build. -commit ba053709638dff2f6603df0c1f340352261d63ea -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Wed Nov 2 14:16:04 2022 +1100 +commit bc234605fa3eb10f56bf0d74c8ecb0d91ada9d05 +Author: Damien Miller +Date: Wed Dec 7 18:38:25 2022 +1100 - Add tests for OpenSSL 3.0.7 and LibreSSL 3.6.1. + disable SANDBOX_SECCOMP_FILTER_DEBUG + + It was mistakenly enabled in 2580916e4872 + + Reported by Peter sec-openssh-com.22.fichtner AT 0sg.net -commit edd24101c7e17d1a8f6576e1aaf62233b47ad6f5 -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Thu Nov 3 08:17:39 2022 +1100 +commit b087c5cfa011b27992e01589314fec830266f99d +Author: Rose <83477269+AtariDreams@users.noreply.github.com> +Date: Tue Nov 29 15:12:54 2022 -0500 - Run compat regress tests too. + Update autotools + + Regenerate config files using latest autotools -commit fe88d67e7599b0bc73f6e4524add28d743e7f977 +commit d63f5494978a185c7421d492b9c2f6f05bb54138 Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Thu Nov 3 08:14:05 2022 +1100 +Date: Tue Dec 6 12:22:36 2022 +1100 - Compat tests need libcrypto. + Fix typo in comment. Spotted by tim@ + +commit 73dcca12115aa12ed0d123b914d473c384e52651 +Author: dtucker@openbsd.org +Date: Sun Dec 4 11:03:11 2022 +0000 + + upstream: Remove duplicate includes. - This was moved to CHANNELLIBS during the libs refactor. Spotted by - rapier at psc.edu. + Patch from AtariDreams via github PR#364. + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: b9186638a05cb8b56ef7c0de521922b6723644ea -commit 96b519726b7944eee3c23a54eee3d5c031ba1533 -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Thu Nov 3 04:24:39 2022 +1100 +commit 3cec15543010bc8d6997d896b1717a650afb7e92 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Fri Dec 2 04:40:27 2022 +0000 - Include time.h when defining timegm. + upstream: make struct sshbuf private - Fixes build on some platforms eg recent AIX. + and remove an unused field; ok dtucker + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: c7a3d77c0b8c153d463398606a8d57569186a0c3 -commit da6038bd5cd55eb212eb2aec1fc8ae79bbf76156 +commit 5796bf8ca9535f9fa7d01829a540d2550e05c860 Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Tue Nov 1 19:10:30 2022 +1100 +Date: Fri Dec 2 11:43:36 2022 +1100 - Always use compat getentropy. + Restore ssh-agent permissions on exit. - Have it call native getentropy and fall back as required. Should fix - issues of platforms where libc has getentropy but it is not implemented - in the kernel. Based on github PR#354 from simsergey. + ...enough that subsequent builds can overwrite ssh-agent if necessary. -commit 5ebe18cab6be3247b44c807ac145164010465b82 -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Wed Nov 2 10:51:48 2022 +1100 +commit ccf5a13868cbb4659107458cac1e017c98abcbda +Author: dtucker@openbsd.org +Date: Thu Dec 1 02:22:13 2022 +0000 - Check for sockaddr_in.sin_len. + upstream: Clean up ssh-add and ssh-agent logs. - If found, set SOCK_HAS_LEN which is used in addr.c. Should fix keyscan - tests on platforms with this (eg old NetBSD). + OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 9eda8e4c3714d7f943ab2e73ed58a233bd29cd2c -commit a1febadf426536612c2734168d409147c392e7cf +commit 7a8b40cf6a5eda80173140cc6750a6db8412fa87 Author: dtucker@openbsd.org -Date: Sun Oct 30 18:42:07 2022 +0000 +Date: Thu Dec 1 02:19:29 2022 +0000 - upstream: Use variable for diff options + upstream: Log output of ssh-agent and ssh-add - instead of unconditionally specifying "-rN". This will make life easier - in -portable where not all diff's understand -N. + This should make debugging easier. - OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 8b8a407115546be1c6d72d350b1e4f1f960d3cd3 + OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 5974b02651f428d7e1079b41304c498ca7e306c8 -commit f6d3ed9a8a9280cbb68d6a499850cfe810e92bd0 -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Mon Oct 31 05:13:02 2022 +1100 +commit 4a1805d532616233dd6072e5cd273b96dd3062e6 +Author: dtucker@openbsd.org +Date: Tue Nov 29 22:41:14 2022 +0000 - OpenSSL dev branch is 302 not 320. + upstream: Add void to client_repledge args to fix compiler warning. ok djm@ - While there, also accept 301 which it shat it was previously. + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 7e964a641ce4a0a0a11f047953b29929d7a4b866 -commit 25c8a2bbcc10c493d27faea57c42a6bf13fa51f2 +commit 815c4704930aa449edf6e812e99d69e9ffd31f01 Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Fri Oct 28 02:47:04 2022 +0000 +Date: Mon Nov 28 01:38:22 2022 +0000 - upstream: put sshkey_check_rsa_length() back in sshkey.c to unbreak + upstream: tighten pledge(2) after session establishment - OPENSSL=no builds + feedback, ok & testing in snaps deraadt@ - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 99eec58abe382ecd14b14043b195ee1babb9cf6e + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: aecf4d49d28586dfbcc74328d9333398fef9eb58 -commit 1192588546c29ceec10775125f396555ea71850f +commit f7cebbbf407d772ed71403d314343766782fe540 Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Fri Oct 28 02:29:34 2022 +0000 +Date: Mon Nov 28 01:37:36 2022 +0000 - upstream: allow ssh-keyscan(1) to accept CIDR address ranges, e.g. - - ssh-keyscan 192.168.0.0/24 + upstream: New EnableEscapeCommandline ssh_config(5) option - If a CIDR range is passed, then it will be expanded to all possible - addresses in the range including the all-0s and all-1s addresses. + This option (default "no") controls whether the ~C escape is available. + Turning it off by default means we will soon be able to use a stricter + default pledge(2) in the client. - bz#976 feedback/ok markus@ + feedback deraadt@ dtucker@; tested in snaps for a while - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: ce6c5211f936ac0053fd4a2ddb415277931e6c4b - -commit 64af4209309461c79c39eda2d13f9d77816c6398 -Author: Damien Miller -Date: Fri Oct 28 12:54:35 2022 +1100 - - fix merge botch + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 7e277595d60acb8263118dcb66554472257b387a -commit 27267642699342412964aa785b98afd69d952c88 -Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Fri Oct 28 00:44:44 2022 +0000 +commit d323f7ecf52e3d4ec1f4939bf31693e02f891dca +Author: mbuhl@openbsd.org +Date: Fri Nov 18 19:47:40 2022 +0000 - upstream: refactor sshkey_private_deserialize + upstream: In channel_request_remote_forwarding the parameters for - feedback/ok markus@ + permission_set_add are leaked as they are also duplicated in the call. Found + by CodeChecker. ok djm - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: f5ca6932fdaf840a5e8250becb38315a29b5fc9f + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 4aef50fa9be7c0b138188814c8fe3dccc196f61e -commit 2519a7077a9332f70935e5242ba91ee670ed6b87 -Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Fri Oct 28 00:44:17 2022 +0000 +commit 62cc33e6eed847aafdc29e34aa69e9bd82a0ee16 +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Wed Nov 30 11:23:11 2022 +1100 - upstream: refactor sshkey_private_serialize_opt() + Use -fzero-call-used-regs=used on clang 15. - feedback/ok markus@ + clang 15 seems to have a problem with -fzero-call-used-reg=all which + causes spurious "incorrect signature" failures with ED25519. On those + versions, use -fzero-call-used-regs=used instead. (We may add exceptions + later if specific versions prove to be OK). Also move the GCC version + check to match. - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 61e0fe989897901294efe7c3b6d670cefaf44cbd + Initial investigation by Daniel Pouzzner (douzzer at mega nu), workaround + suggested by Bill Wendling (morbo at google com). bz#3475, ok djm@ -commit 11a768adf98371fe4e43f3b06014024c033385d5 -Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Fri Oct 28 00:43:30 2022 +0000 +commit f84b9cffd52c9c5c359a54a1929f9948e803ab1d +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Mon Nov 28 21:09:28 2022 +1100 - upstream: refactor certify - - feedback/ok markus@ - - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 35d742992e223eaca3537e6fb3d3002c08eed4f6 + Skip unit tests on slow riscv64 hardware. -commit 3fbc58bb249d967cc43ebdc554f6781bb73d4a58 -Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Fri Oct 28 00:43:08 2022 +0000 +commit 9f2747e0bed3faca92679eae69aef10c95dc82f5 +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Sun Nov 27 15:26:22 2022 +1100 - upstream: refactor sshkey_sign() and sshkey_verify() + Rework how selfhosted tests interact with runners. - feedback/ok markus@ + Previously there was one runner per test target (mostly VMs). This had + a few limitations: + - multiple tests that ran on the same target (eg multiple build + configs) were serialized on availability or that runner. + - it needed manual balancing of VMs over host machines. - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 368e662c128c99d05cc043b1308d2b6c71a4d3cc + To address this, make VMs that use ephemeral disks (ie most of them) + all use a pool of runners with the "libvirt" label. This requires that + we distinguish between "host" and "target" for those. Native runners + and VMs with persistent disks (eg the constantly-updated snapshot ones) + specify the same host and target. + + This should improve test throughput. -commit a1deb6cdbbe6afaab74ecb08fcb62db5739267be -Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Fri Oct 28 00:41:52 2022 +0000 +commit d664ddaec87bdc7385be8ef7f1337793e1679d48 +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Sun Nov 27 12:19:37 2022 +1100 - upstream: refactor sshkey_from_blob_internal() - - feedback/ok markus@ + Run vmstartup from temp dir. - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 1f46c0cbb8060ee9666a02749594ad6658c8e283 + This will allow us to create ephemeral disk images per-runner. -commit 7d00799c935271ce89300494c5677190779f6453 -Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Fri Oct 28 00:41:17 2022 +0000 +commit 0fa16e952b1fc1c4cf65e3dd138b0e87003e2e45 +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Sun Nov 27 12:14:00 2022 +1100 - upstream: refactor sshkey_from_private() - - feedback/ok markus@ + Make "config" in matrix singular and pass in env. - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: e5dbe7a3545930c50f70ee75c867a1e08b382b53 + This will allow the startup scripts to adapt their behaviour based on + the type and config. -commit 262647c2e920492ca57f1b9320d74f4a0f6e482b -Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Fri Oct 28 00:39:29 2022 +0000 +commit e8857043af54809187be1e8b06749db61112899f +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Sun Nov 27 11:42:22 2022 +1100 - upstream: factor out key generation - - feedback/ok markus@ - - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 5b4211bff4de8d9adb84bc72857a8c42c44e7ceb + Add "libvirt" label to dfly30. -commit 401c74e7dc15eab60540653d2f94d9306a927bab -Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Fri Oct 28 00:38:58 2022 +0000 +commit 9775473d84902dc37753686cd10ae71fbe67efda +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Sun Nov 27 09:28:20 2022 +1100 - upstream: refactor and simplify sshkey_read() - - feedback/ok markus@ + Rename "os" in matrix to "target". - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 0d93b7a56e31cd06a8bb0d2191d084ce254b0971 + This is in preparation to distinguish this from the host that the runner + runs on in case where they are separate (eg VMs). -commit 591fed94e66a016acf87f4b7cd416ce812f2abe8 -Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Fri Oct 28 00:37:24 2022 +0000 +commit 04fd00ceff39f4544ced6f5342060abe584835d0 +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Sun Nov 27 09:23:04 2022 +1100 - upstream: factor out public key serialization - - feedback/ok markus@ - - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: a3570c4b97290c5662890aea7328d87f55939033 + Remove unused self-hosted test targets. -commit 1e78844ae2b2dc01ba735d5ae740904c57e13685 -Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Fri Oct 28 00:36:31 2022 +0000 +commit c9d9fcad2a11c1cd1550a541f44091d65f0b5584 +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Sun Nov 27 09:16:15 2022 +1100 - upstream: factor out sshkey_equal_public() - - feedback/ok markus@ + Remove explicit "default" test config argument. - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 1368ba114cb37732fe6ec3d89c7e6d27ea6fdc94 + Not specifying the test config implicitly selects default args. -commit 25de1c01a8b9a2c8ab9b1da22444a03e89c982de -Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Fri Oct 28 00:35:40 2022 +0000 +commit 15a01cf15f396f87c6d221c5a6af98331c818962 +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Wed Nov 23 13:18:54 2022 +1100 - upstream: begin big refactor of sshkey - - Move keytype data and some of the type-specific code (allocation, - cleanup, etc) out into each key type's implementation. Subsequent - commits will move more, with the goal of having each key-*.c file - owning as much of its keytype's implementation as possible. - - lots of feedback + ok markus@ - - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 0f2b4334f73914344e9e5b3d33522d41762a57ec + Add fallback for old platforms w/out MAP_ANON. -commit 445363433ba20b8a3e655b113858c836da46a1cb -Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Mon Oct 24 22:43:36 2022 +0000 +commit 6b9bbbfe8b26db6e9a30a7e08c223e85421aed98 +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Wed Nov 23 13:09:11 2022 +1100 - upstream: Be more paranoid with host/domain names coming from the + If we haven't found it yet, recheck for sys/stat.h. - never write a name with bad characters to a known_hosts file. + On some very old platforms, sys/stat.h needs sys/types.h, however + autoconf 2.71's AC_CHECK_INCLUDES_DEFAULT checks for them in the + opposite order, which in combination with modern autoconf's + "present but cannot be compiled" behaviour causes it to not be + detected. + +commit 8926956f22639132a9f2433fcd25224e01b900f5 +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Fri Nov 11 11:25:37 2022 +1100 + + Add dfly62 test target. + +commit 650de7ecd3567b5a5dbf16dd1eb598bd8c20bca8 +Author: dtucker@openbsd.org +Date: Thu Nov 10 23:03:10 2022 +0000 + + upstream: Handle dynamic remote port forwarding in escape commandline's - reported by David Leadbeater, ok deraadt@ + -R processing. bz#3499, ok djm@ - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: ba9b25fa8b5490b49398471e0c9657b0cbc7a5ad + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 194ee4cfe7ed0e2b8ad0727f493c798a50454208 -commit 7190154de2c9fe135f0cc1ad349cb2fa45152b89 -Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Mon Oct 24 21:52:50 2022 +0000 +commit 5372db7e7985ba2c00f20fdff8942145ca99e033 +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Thu Nov 10 12:44:51 2022 +1100 - upstream: regress test for unmatched glob characters; fails before + Remove seed passing over reexec. - previous commit but passes now. bz3488; prodded by dtucker@ + This was added for the benefit of platforms using ssh-rand-helper to + prevent a delay on each connection as sshd reseeded itself. - OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 0cc5cc9ea4a6fd170dc61b9212f15badaafb3bbd + ssh-random-helper is long gone, and since the re-exec happens before the + chroot the re-execed sshd can reseed itself normally. ok djm@ -commit a4821a592456c3add3cd325db433110cdaaa3e5c -Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Mon Oct 24 21:51:55 2022 +0000 +commit ca98d3f8c64cfc51af81e1b01c36a919d5947ec2 +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Wed Nov 9 20:59:20 2022 +1100 - upstream: when scp(1) is using the SFTP protocol for transport (the - - default), better match scp/rcp's handling of globs that don't match the - globbed characters but do match literally (e.g. trying to transfer - "foo.[1]"). + Skip reexec test on OpenSSL 1.1.1 specifically. - Previously scp(1) in SFTP mode would not match these pathnames but - legacy scp/rcp mode would. + OpenSSL 1.1.1 has a bug in its RNG that breaks reexec fallback, so skip + that test. See bz#3483 for details. + +commit 5ec4ebc2548e5f7f1b55b2a5cef5b67bdca8146f +Author: dtucker@openbsd.org +Date: Wed Nov 9 09:04:12 2022 +0000 + + upstream: Fix typo in fatal error message. - Reported by Michael Yagliyan in bz3488; ok dtucker@ + Patch from vapier at chromium.org. - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: d8a3773f53015ba811fddba7473769a2fd343e11 + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 8a0c164a6a25eef0eedfc30df95bfa27644e35cf -commit 18376847b8043ba967eabbe23692ef74c9a3fddc -Author: jsg@openbsd.org -Date: Thu Oct 13 09:09:28 2022 +0000 +commit e6abafe9a6d809422d3432b95b3f9747b0acaa71 +Author: dtucker@openbsd.org +Date: Wed Nov 9 09:01:52 2022 +0000 - upstream: use correct type with sizeof ok djm@ + upstream: Remove errant colon and simplify format - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: d6c882c2e8a42ff831a5b3cbc2c961ecb2dd6143 + string in error messages. Patch from vapier at chromium.org. + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: fc28466ebc7b74e0072331947a89bdd239c160d3 -commit 4a4883664d6b4e9e4e459a8cdc16bd8d4b735de9 -Author: jmc@openbsd.org -Date: Fri Oct 7 06:00:58 2022 +0000 +commit db2027a687516f87c3fb141e87154bb3d8a7807c +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Wed Nov 9 01:37:44 2022 +0000 - upstream: ssh-agent.1: - use Nm not Xr for self-ref - while here, - - wrap a long line + upstream: rename client_global_hostkeys_private_confirm() to - ssh-agent.c: - - add -O to usage() + client_global_hostkeys_prove_confirm(), as it handles the + "hostkeys-prove00@openssh.com" message; no functional change - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 855dac4695cef22e96d69c53436496bc408ca389 + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 31e09bd3cca6eed26855b88fb8beed18e9bd026d -commit 9fd2441113fce2a83fc7470968c3b27809cc7f10 +commit 1c2be7c2004cf1abcd172fee9fe3eab57cd4c426 Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Fri Oct 7 04:06:26 2022 +0000 +Date: Wed Nov 9 00:15:59 2022 +0000 - upstream: document "-O no-restrict-websafe"; spotted by Ross L - - Richardson + upstream: typo in comment - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: fe9eaa50237693a14ebe5b5614bf32a02145fe8b + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 39c58f41e0f32d1ff31731fa6f5bbbc3ad25084a -commit 614252b05d70f798a0929b1cd3d213030ad4d007 +commit cf1a9852d7fc93e4abc4168aed09529a57427cdc Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Tue Oct 18 06:29:16 2022 +1100 +Date: Wed Nov 9 09:23:47 2022 +1100 - OpenSSL dev branch now identifies as 3.2.0. - -commit 195e5a65fd793a738ea8451ebfdd1919db5aff3e -Author: Damien Miller -Date: Mon Oct 17 09:41:47 2022 +1100 - - revert c64b62338b4 and guard POLL* defines instead + Defer seed_rng until after closefrom call. - c64b62338b4 broke OSX builds, which do have poll.h but lack ppoll(2) - Spotted by dtucker + seed_rng will initialize OpenSSL, and some engine providers (eg Intel's + QAT) will open descriptors for their own use. bz#3483, patch from + joel.d.schuetze at intel.com, ok djm@ -commit bc2e480d99613bd59720edae244d1764636544c4 -Author: Damien Miller -Date: Fri Oct 14 14:52:22 2022 +1100 +commit dffa64480163fbf76af7e4fb62c26bb0dd6642aa +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Wed Nov 9 08:27:47 2022 +1100 - undef _get{short,long} before redefining + Fix comment text. From emaste at freebsd.org. -commit 5eb796a369c64f18d55a6ae9b1fa9b35eea237fb -Author: Harmen Stoppels -Date: Thu Oct 13 16:08:46 2022 +0200 +commit d9df5689c29823ab830ec4f54c83c6cc3c0077ad +Author: Pierre Ossman +Date: Wed Jul 6 13:52:10 2022 +0200 - Fix snprintf configure test for clang 15 + Avoid assuming layout of fd_set - Clang 15 -Wimplicit-int defaults to an error in C99 mode and above. - A handful of tests have "main(..." and not "int main(..." which caused - the tests to produce incorrect results. - -commit c64b62338b46ffa08839f05f21ad69fa6234dc17 -Author: Damien Miller -Date: Mon Oct 10 12:32:43 2022 +1100 - - skip bsd-poll.h if poll.h found; ok dtucker + POSIX doesn't specify the internal layout of the fd_set object, so let's + not assume it is just a bit mask. This increases compatibility with + systems that have a different layout. + + The assumption is also worthless as we already refuse to use file + descriptors over FD_SETSIZE anyway. Meaning that the default size of + fd_set is quite sufficient. -commit 5ee2b8ccfcf4b606f450eb0ff2305e311f68b0be -Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Thu Oct 6 22:42:37 2022 +0000 +commit 419aa8a312e8d8f491933ca3d5933e602cb05aae +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Tue Nov 8 12:42:52 2022 +1100 - upstream: honour user's umask if it is more restrictive then the ssh - - default (022); based on patch from Alex Henrie, ok dtucker@ deraadt@ + Shutdown any VM before trying to check out repo. - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: fe1b9e15fc9a4f49fc338e848ce14d8727abe82d + In the case where the previous run did not clean up, the checkout will + fail as it'll leave a stale mount. -commit a75cffc2700cebd3e2dd9093f7f7388d2be95cb7 +commit a32c07cbb78f65d8527642b96474a83b413f8108 Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Fri Oct 7 03:54:56 2022 +1100 +Date: Tue Nov 8 11:33:25 2022 +1100 - Add LibreSSL 3.6.0 to test suite. + Run vm startup and shutdown from runner temp dir. - While there, bump OpenSSL to latest 1.1.1q release. + Should work even if the github workspace dir is on a stale sshfs mount. -commit fcc0f0c0e96a30076683fea9a7c9eedc72931742 +commit 2b40a7dfcdb8e616155b9504145aa52b271455aa Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Thu Oct 6 21:18:16 2022 +1100 +Date: Tue Nov 8 11:03:31 2022 +1100 - Add 9.1 branch to CI status page. + Add valrind-5 test here too. -commit ef211eee63821d894a8bf81f22bfba9f6899d0fe +commit 2ea03d1f6d0a05ee2b63ed2dc0f2d54f1e4655a1 Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Tue Oct 4 23:20:23 2022 +1100 +Date: Tue Nov 8 09:21:10 2022 +1100 - Test commits to all branches of portable. + Update checkout and upload actions. - Only test OpenBSD upstream on commits to master since that's what it - tracks. - -commit fe646de03cafb6593ff4e4954bca9ec4b4b753a8 -Author: Damien Miller -Date: Wed Oct 5 03:47:26 2022 +1100 - - whitespace at EOL + Update actions/checkout and actions/upload-artifact to main branch for + compatibility with node.js v16. -commit a6e1852d10c63a830196e82168dadd957aaf28ec -Author: Damien Miller -Date: Wed Oct 5 03:40:01 2022 +1100 +commit 4e316ff0f18a118232bb9ac6512ee62773a9e8ea +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Tue Nov 8 09:17:04 2022 +1100 - mention libfido2 autodetection + Split out rekey test since it runs the longest. -commit 7360c2c206f33d309edbaf64036c96fadf74d640 -Author: Damien Miller -Date: Wed Oct 5 03:37:36 2022 +1100 +commit 21625a6424258a92a96a3bb73ae6aabc5ed8a6b4 +Author: dtucker@openbsd.org +Date: Mon Nov 7 10:09:28 2022 +0000 - remove mention of --with-security-key-builtin + upstream: The IdentityFile option in ssh_config can also be used to - it is enabled by default when libfido2 is installed - -commit 0ffb46f2ee2ffcc4daf45ee679e484da8fcf338c -Author: Damien Miller -Date: Tue Oct 4 01:51:42 2022 +1100 - - update .depend - -commit 657e676ff696c7bb787bffb0e249ea1be3b474e1 -Author: Damien Miller -Date: Tue Oct 4 01:45:52 2022 +1100 - - update release notes URL - -commit f059da2b29840c0f048448809c317ce2ae014da7 -Author: Damien Miller -Date: Tue Oct 4 01:45:41 2022 +1100 - - crank versions in RPM spec files + specify a public key file, as documented in ssh.1 for the -i option. Document + this also for IdentityFile in ssh_config.5, for documentation completeness. + From laalsaas at systemli.org via portable github PR#352, ok jmc@ djm@ + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 2f943be9f96e60ef81a9a4faa25b009999f9883b -commit b51f3f172d87cbdb80ca4eb7b2149e56a7647557 -Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Mon Sep 26 22:18:40 2022 +0000 +commit 747691604d3325ed2b62bad85b6fd8563ad32f6c +Author: dtucker@openbsd.org +Date: Mon Nov 7 10:05:38 2022 +0000 - upstream: openssh-9.1 + upstream: Remove some set but otherwise unused variables, spotted - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 5a467b2ee81da01a86adf1ad93b62b1728494e56 + in -portable by clang 16's -Wunused-but-set-variable. ok djm@ + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 3d943ddf2369b38fbf89f5f19728e7dc1daf3982 -commit 4cf8d0c0f3030f594a238bab21a0695735515487 +commit 1d78d25653805aefc7a8dd9d86cd7359ada3823c Author: dtucker@openbsd.org -Date: Wed Sep 21 22:26:50 2022 +0000 +Date: Mon Nov 7 10:02:59 2022 +0000 - upstream: Fix typo. From AlexanderStohr via github PR#343. + upstream: Check for and disallow MaxStartups values less than or - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: a134c9b4039e48803fc6a87f955b0f4a03181497 + equal to zero during config parsing, rather than faling later at runtime. + bz#3489, ok djm@ + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: d79c2b7a8601eb9be493629a91245d761154308b -commit 8179fed3264d5919899900ed8881d5f9bb57ca33 +commit a00f59a645072e5f5a8d207af15916a7b23e2642 Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Mon Sep 19 21:39:16 2022 +0000 +Date: Mon Nov 7 04:04:40 2022 +0000 - upstream: add RequiredRSASize to the list of keywords accepted by + upstream: fix parsing of hex cert expiry time; was checking whether the - -o; spotted by jmc@ + start time began with "0x", not the expiry time. - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: fe871408cf6f9d3699afeda876f8adbac86a035e + from Ed Maste + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 6269242c3e1a130b47c92cfca4d661df15f05739 -commit 5f954929e9f173dd1e279e07d0e8b14fa845814d -Author: Damien Miller -Date: Mon Sep 19 20:59:34 2022 +1000 +commit f58acaf8c7315483f4ac87d46a1aa2142a713cd8 +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Mon Nov 7 15:10:59 2022 +1100 - no need for glob.h here - - it also causes portability problems + Fix merge conflict. -commit 03d94a47207d58b3db37eba4f87eb6ae5a63168a -Author: Damien Miller -Date: Mon Sep 19 20:59:04 2022 +1000 +commit 162e5741020a8d996c0c12b988b118e71ed728e6 +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Mon Nov 7 15:04:33 2022 +1100 - avoid Wuninitialized false positive in gcc-12ish + Branch-specific links for master status badges. -commit 9d952529113831fb3071ab6e408d2726fd72e771 -Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Mon Sep 19 10:46:00 2022 +0000 +commit e4b7c12ab24579312aa3ed38ce7041a439ec2d56 +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Mon Nov 7 14:46:38 2022 +1100 - upstream: use users-groups-by-id@openssh.com sftp-server extension - - (when available) to fill in user/group names for directory listings. - Implement a client-side cache of see uid/gid=>user/group names. ok markus@ - - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: f239aeeadfa925a37ceee36ee8b256b8ccf4466e + Add CIFuzz status badge. -commit 8ff680368b0bccf88ae85d4c99de69387fbad7a6 -Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Mon Sep 19 10:43:12 2022 +0000 +commit b496b9f831acd1e5bcd875e26e797488beef494a +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Mon Nov 7 14:45:16 2022 +1100 - upstream: sftp client library support for - - users-groups-by-id@openssh.com; ok markus@ + Do not run CIFuzz on selfhosted tree. - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: ddb2f33a2da6349a9a89a8b5bcb9ca7c999394de + We already run it on the regular tree, no need to double up. -commit 488f6e1c582212c2374a4bf8cd1b703d2e70fb8b -Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Mon Sep 19 10:41:58 2022 +0000 +commit 2138b1c4ddb300129a41a5104627b0d561184c7b +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Mon Nov 7 14:41:58 2022 +1100 - upstream: extend sftp-common.c:extend ls_file() to support supplied - - user/group names; ok markus@ - - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: c70c70498b1fdcf158531117e405b6245863bfb0 + Whitespace change to trigger CIFuzz workflow. -commit 74b77f7497dba3a58315c8f308883de448078057 -Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Mon Sep 19 10:40:52 2022 +0000 +commit 4670b97ef87c7b0f21283c9b07c7191be88dda05 +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Mon Nov 7 14:34:04 2022 +1100 - upstream: sftp-server(8): add a "users-groups-by-id@openssh.com" - - extension request that allows the client to obtain user/group names that - correspond to a set of uids/gids. - - Will be used to make directory listings more useful and consistent - in sftp(1). - - ok markus@ - - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 7ebabde0bcb95ef949c4840fe89e697e30df47d3 + Run cifuzz workflow on the actions as regular CI. -commit 231a346c0c67cc7ca098360f9a554fa7d4f1eddb -Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Mon Sep 19 08:49:50 2022 +0000 +commit 79391e66ce851ace1baf3c6a35e83a23f08ec2ba +Author: David Korczynski +Date: Tue Nov 30 11:45:20 2021 +0000 - upstream: better debugging for connect_next() - - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: d16a307a0711499c971807f324484ed3a6036640 + Add CIFuzz integration -commit 1875042c52a3b950ae5963c9ca3774a4cc7f0380 -Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Sat Sep 17 10:34:29 2022 +0000 +commit c1893364a0be243270014d7d34362a8101d55112 +Author: dtucker@openbsd.org +Date: Mon Nov 7 02:21:22 2022 +0000 - upstream: Add RequiredRSASize for sshd(8); RSA keys that fall - - beneath this limit will be ignored for user and host-based authentication. + upstream: Import regenerated moduli. - Feedback deraadt@ ok markus@ - - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 187931dfc19d51873df5930a04f2d972adf1f7f1 + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: b0e54ee4d703bd6929bbc624068666a7a42ecb1f -commit 54b333d12e55e6560b328c737d514ff3511f1afd -Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Sat Sep 17 10:33:18 2022 +0000 +commit 5c3f18fb994ef27e685b205ee2351851b80fdbd1 +Author: dtucker@openbsd.org +Date: Mon Nov 7 01:53:01 2022 +0000 - upstream: add a RequiredRSASize for checking RSA key length in - - ssh(1). User authentication keys that fall beneath this limit will be - ignored. If a host presents a host key beneath this limit then the connection - will be terminated (unfortunately there are no fallbacks in the protocol for - host authentication). - - feedback deraadt, Dmitry Belyavskiy; ok markus@ + upstream: Fix typo. From pablomh via -portable github PR#344. - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 430e339b2a79fa9ecc63f2837b06fdd88a7da13a + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: d056ee2e73691dc3ecdb44a6de68e6b88cd93827 -commit 07d8771bacfefbcfb37fa8a6dc6103bcc097e0ab -Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Sat Sep 17 10:30:45 2022 +0000 +commit e1c6fcc142066417c9832e634463faa3dd5d116c +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Mon Nov 7 12:46:58 2022 +1100 - upstream: Add a sshkey_check_rsa_length() call for checking the - - length of an RSA key; ok markus@ - - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: de77cd5b11594297eda82edc594b0d32b8535134 + Link to branch-specific queries for V_9_1 status. -commit 3991a0cf947cf3ae0f0373bcec5a90e86a7152f5 -Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Sat Sep 17 10:11:29 2022 +0000 +commit 4f4a5fad6d8892c3f8ee9cd81ec7de6458210c9f +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Sun Nov 6 10:55:59 2022 +1100 - upstream: actually hook up restrict_websafe; the command-line flag - - was never actually used. Spotted by Matthew Garrett + Use "prohibit-password" in -portable comments. - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 0b363518ac4c2819dbaa3dfad4028633ab9cdff1 + "without-password" is the deprecated alias for "prohibit-password", + so we should reference the latter. From emaste at freebsd.org. -commit 30b2a7e4291fb9e357f80a237931ff008d686d3b -Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Fri Sep 16 06:55:37 2022 +0000 +commit 0f7e1eba55259ec037f515000b4c4afbf446230a +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Sun Nov 6 10:50:01 2022 +1100 - upstream: correct error value + Fix tracing disable on FreeBSD. - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 780efcbad76281f11f14b2a5ff04eb6db3dfdad4 + Some versions of FreeBSD do not support using id 0 to refer to the + current pid for procctl, so pass getpid() explicitly. From + emaste at freebsd.org. -commit ac1ec9545947d9f9657259f55d04cb49d3a94c8a -Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Fri Sep 16 03:33:14 2022 +0000 +commit 32fddb982fd61b11a2f218a115975a87ab126d43 +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Mon Nov 7 10:39:01 2022 +1100 - upstream: sftp: Be a bit more clever about completions - - There are commands (e.g. "get" or "put") that accept two - arguments, a local path and a remote path. However, the way - current completion is written doesn't take this distinction into - account and always completes remote or local paths. - - By expanding CMD struct and "cmds" array this distinction can be - reflected and with small adjustment to completer code the correct - path can be completed. - - By Michal Privoznik, ok dtucker@ + Fix setres*id checks to work with clang-16. - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 1396d921c4eb1befd531f5c4a8ab47e7a74b610b + glibc has the prototypes for setresuid and setresgid behind _GNU_SOURCE, + and clang 16 will error out on implicit function definitions, so add + _GNU_SOURCE and the required headers to the configure checks. From + sam at @gentoo.org via bz#3497. -commit 590db83384f9d99fc51c84505792d26d1ef60df9 -Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Fri Sep 16 03:13:34 2022 +0000 +commit 12af712d116f42164bcfa56db901d06e4fa27199 +Author: Sam James +Date: Sun Nov 6 04:52:38 2022 +0000 - upstream: sftp: Don't attempt to complete arguments for - - non-existent commands - - If user entered a non-existent command (e.g. because they made a - typo) there is no point in trying to complete its arguments. Skip - calling complete_match() if that's the case. + configure.ac: Fix -Wstrict-prototypes - From Michal Privoznik + Clang 16 now warns on this and it'll be removed in C23, so let's + just be future proof. It also reduces noise when doing general + Clang 16 porting work (which is a big job as it is). github PR#355. - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: cf39c811a68cde2aeb98fc85addea4000ef6b07a + Signed-off-by: Sam James -commit ff9809fdfd1d9a91067bb14a77d176002edb153c -Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Wed Sep 14 00:14:37 2022 +0000 +commit 40b0a5eb6e3edfa2886b60c09c7803353b0cc7f5 +Author: Sam James +Date: Sun Nov 6 04:47:35 2022 +0000 - upstream: sk_enroll: never drop SSH_SK_USER_VERIFICATION_REQD flag - - from response - - Now that all FIDO signing calls attempt first without PIN and then - fall back to trying PIN only if that attempt fails, we can remove the - hack^wtrick that removed the UV flag from the keys returned during - enroll. + configure.ac: Add include for openpty - By Corinna Vinschen + Another Clang 16ish fix (which makes -Wimplicit-function-declaration + an error by default). github PR#355. - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 684517608c8491503bf80cd175425f0178d91d7f + See: 2efd71da49b9cfeab7987058cf5919e473ff466b + See: be197635329feb839865fdc738e34e24afd1fca8 -commit 940dc10729cb5a95b7ee82c10184e2b9621c8a1d -Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Wed Sep 14 00:13:13 2022 +0000 +commit 6b17e128879ec6cc32ca2c28b5d894b4aa72e32d +Author: Rochdi Nassah +Date: Fri Oct 28 01:26:31 2022 +0100 - upstream: a little extra debugging + Fix broken zlib link. + +commit 99500df246ccb736ddbdd04160dcc82165d81a77 +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Fri Nov 4 16:59:26 2022 +1100 + + Don't run openbsd-compat tests on Cygwin. - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: edf1601c1d0905f6da4c713f4d9cecc7d1c0295a + Add "compat-tests" to the default TEST_TARGET so we can override as + necessary. Override TEST_TARGET for Cygwin as the tests don't currently + compile there. -commit 4b5f91cb959358141181b934156513fcb8a6c1e3 +commit 3cae9f92a31897409666aa1e6f696f779759332b Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Wed Sep 14 00:02:03 2022 +0000 +Date: Thu Nov 3 21:59:20 2022 +0000 - upstream: ssh-agent: attempt FIDO key signing without PIN and use + upstream: replace recently-added valid_domain() check for hostnames - the error to determine whether a PIN is required and prompt only if - necessary. from Corinna Vinschen + going to known_hosts with a more relaxed check for bad characters; previous + commit broke address literals. Reported by/feedback from florian@ - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: dd6be6a0b7148608e834ee737c3479b3270b00dd + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 10b86dc6a4b206adaa0c11b58b6d5933898d43e0 -commit 113523bf0bc33600b07ebb083572c8c346b6fdf4 -Author: jmc@openbsd.org -Date: Sun Sep 11 06:38:11 2022 +0000 +commit 9655217231c9056200bea7ae2dffcc9c0c3eb265 +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Thu Nov 3 23:07:50 2022 +1100 - upstream: .Li -> .Vt where appropriate; from josiah frentsos, - - tweaked by schwarze - - ok schwarze - - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 565046e3ce68b46c2f440a93d67c2a92726de8ed + Rerun tests on changes to Makefile.in in any dir. -commit 86af013b56cecb5ee58ae0bd9d495cd586fc5918 -Author: jsg@openbsd.org -Date: Sat Sep 10 08:50:53 2022 +0000 +commit 3500f0405a3ab16b59a26f3508c4257a3fc3bce6 +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Thu Nov 3 23:04:08 2022 +1100 - upstream: fix repeated words ok miod@ jmc@ + Link libssh into compat tests. - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 6765daefe26a6b648cc15cadbbe337596af709b7 + The cygwin compat code uses xmalloc, so add libssh.a so pick up that. -commit 0ba39b93b326a7d5dfab776cc9b9d326161a9b16 -Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Fri Sep 9 03:31:42 2022 +0000 +commit ec59effcf65b8a4c85d47ff5a271123259dd0ab8 +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Thu Nov 3 21:44:23 2022 +1100 - upstream: notifier_complete(NULL, ...) is a noop, so no need to test - - that ctx!=NULL; from Corinna Vinschen - - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: ade2f2e9cc519d01a586800c25621d910bce384a + Fix compat regress to work with non-GNU make. -commit be197635329feb839865fdc738e34e24afd1fca8 -Author: Sam James -Date: Thu Sep 8 02:49:29 2022 +0100 +commit 73550a218e7dfbbd599534cbf856309bc924f6fd +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Thu Nov 3 13:41:16 2022 +1100 - openbsd-compat/bsd-asprintf: add include for vsnprintf + Increase selfhosted job timeout. - Fixes the following build failure with Clang 15 on musl: - ``` - bsd-asprintf.c:51:8: error: call to undeclared library function 'vsnprintf' with type 'int (char *, unsigned long, const char *, struct __va_list_tag *)'; ISO C99 and laterclang -O2 -pipe -fdiagnostics-color=always -frecord-gcc-switches -pipe -Wunknown-warning-option -Qunused-arguments -Wall -Wpointer-arith -Wuninitialized -Wsign-compare -Wformat-security -Wsizeof-pointer-memaccess -Wno-pointer-sign -Wno-unused-result -Wmisleading-indentation -Wbitwise-instead-of-logical -fno-strict-aliasing -mretpoline -ftrapv -fzero-call-used-regs=all -fno-builtin-memset -fstack-protector-strong -fPIE -I. -I. -D_XOPEN_SOURCE=600 -D_BSD_SOURCE -D_DEFAULT_SOURCE -DSSHDIR=\"/etc/ssh\" -D_PATH_SSH_PROGRAM=\"/usr/bin/ssh\" -D_PATH_SSH_ASKPASS_DEFAULT=\"/usr/lib/misc/ssh-askpass\" -D_PATH_SFTP_SERVER=\"/usr/lib/misc/sftp-server\" -D_PATH_SSH_KEY_SIGN=\"/usr/lib/misc/ssh-keysign\" -D_PATH_SSH_PKCS11_HELPER=\"/usr/lib/misc/ssh-pkcs11-helper\" -D_PATH_SSH_SK_HELPER=\"/usr/lib/misc/ssh-sk-helper\" -D_PATH_SSH_PIDDIR=\"/run\" -D_PATH_PRIVSEP_CHROOT_DIR=\"/var/empty\" -DHAVE_CONFIG_H -c cipher-aes.c -o cipher-aes.o - do not support - implicit function declarations [-Wimplicit-function-declaration] - ret = vsnprintf(string, INIT_SZ, fmt, ap2); - ^ - bsd-asprintf.c:51:8: note: include the header or explicitly provide a declaration for 'vsnprintf' - 1 error generated. - ``` + The default job timeout of 360 (6h) is not enough to complete the + regress tests for some of the slow VMs depending on the load on the host. + Increase to 600 (10h). -commit 6cb6f660bb35f77a0456dd2581ddf39c29398a5e +commit db97d8d0b90c6ce52b94b153d6f8f5f7d3b11777 Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Fri Sep 2 16:43:27 2022 +1000 +Date: Thu Nov 3 10:00:43 2022 +1100 - Remove DEF_WEAK, it's already in defines.h. + Only run opensslver tests if built with OpenSSL. -commit ce39e7d8b70c4726defde5d3bc4cb7d40d131153 +commit ba053709638dff2f6603df0c1f340352261d63ea Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Fri Sep 2 14:28:14 2022 +1000 +Date: Wed Nov 2 14:16:04 2022 +1100 - Resync arc4random with OpenBSD. - - This brings us up to current, including djm's random-reseeding change, - as prompted by logan at cyberstorm.mu in bz#3467. It brings the - platform-specific hooks from LibreSSL Portable, simplified to match our - use case. ok djm@. + Add tests for OpenSSL 3.0.7 and LibreSSL 3.6.1. -commit beaddde26f30e2195b8aa4f3193970e140e17305 +commit edd24101c7e17d1a8f6576e1aaf62233b47ad6f5 Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Fri Sep 2 14:20:04 2022 +1000 +Date: Thu Nov 3 08:17:39 2022 +1100 - Move OPENBSD ORIGINAL marker. - - Putting this after the copyright statement (which doesn't change) - instead of before the version identifier (which does) prevents merge - conflicts when resyncing changes. + Run compat regress tests too. -commit c83e467ead67a8cb48ef4bec8085d6fb880a2ff4 +commit fe88d67e7599b0bc73f6e4524add28d743e7f977 Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Fri Sep 2 14:17:28 2022 +1000 +Date: Thu Nov 3 08:14:05 2022 +1100 - Remove arc4random_uniform from arc4random.c + Compat tests need libcrypto. - This was previously moved into its own file (matching OpenBSD) which - prematurely committed in commit 73541f2. + This was moved to CHANNELLIBS during the libs refactor. Spotted by + rapier at psc.edu. -commit 5f45c2395c60865e59fa44152ff1d003a128c5bc -Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Fri Sep 2 04:20:02 2022 +0000 +commit 96b519726b7944eee3c23a54eee3d5c031ba1533 +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Thu Nov 3 04:24:39 2022 +1100 - upstream: sk-usbhid: fix key_lookup() on tokens with built-in UV + Include time.h when defining timegm. - explicitly test whether the token performs built-in UV (e.g. biometric - tokens) and enable UV in that case. From Pedro Martelletto via GHPR#388 - - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 007eb7e387d27cf3029ab06b88224e03eca62ccd + Fixes build on some platforms eg recent AIX. -commit 03277a4aa49b80af541a3e691f264c0c0d8f9cec +commit da6038bd5cd55eb212eb2aec1fc8ae79bbf76156 Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Wed Aug 31 20:26:30 2022 +1000 - - Move sftp from valgrind-2 to 3 to rebalance. - -commit fcf5365da69c516817321ba89c3a91df98d098df -Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Wed Aug 31 02:56:40 2022 +0000 - - upstream: whitespace - - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: c2bcbf93610d3d62ed206cdf9bf9ff98c6aaf232 - -commit e60136a3d7a223dd8e84ba8a6895bc3142360993 -Author: Damien Miller -Date: Mon Aug 29 13:27:45 2022 +1000 - - additional keys - -commit 2b02dcb505288c462d1b5dd1ac04e603d01340eb -Author: Damien Miller -Date: Mon Aug 29 13:23:43 2022 +1000 +Date: Tue Nov 1 19:10:30 2022 +1100 - cross-sign allowed_signers with PGP key + Always use compat getentropy. - Provides continuity of trust from legacy PGP release key to - the SSHSIG signing keys that we will use henceforth for git - signing. + Have it call native getentropy and fall back as required. Should fix + issues of platforms where libc has getentropy but it is not implemented + in the kernel. Based on github PR#354 from simsergey. -commit 51b345f177ae981b8755f6bdf8358b1cc5e83d67 +commit 5ebe18cab6be3247b44c807ac145164010465b82 Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Sat Aug 27 21:49:27 2022 +1000 +Date: Wed Nov 2 10:51:48 2022 +1100 - Add libcrypt-devel to cygwin-release deps. + Check for sockaddr_in.sin_len. - Based on feedback from vinschen at redhat.com. + If found, set SOCK_HAS_LEN which is used in addr.c. Should fix keyscan + tests on platforms with this (eg old NetBSD). -commit 9f81736cf16dd8dda1c8942f1973a5f80b8cd78c -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Sat Aug 27 09:37:40 2022 +1000 +commit a1febadf426536612c2734168d409147c392e7cf +Author: dtucker@openbsd.org +Date: Sun Oct 30 18:42:07 2022 +0000 - Add Windows 2022 test targets. + upstream: Use variable for diff options + + instead of unconditionally specifying "-rN". This will make life easier + in -portable where not all diff's understand -N. + + OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 8b8a407115546be1c6d72d350b1e4f1f960d3cd3 -commit 85e1a69243f12be8520438ad6a3cfdc0b7fcbb2d +commit f6d3ed9a8a9280cbb68d6a499850cfe810e92bd0 Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Fri Aug 26 16:26:06 2022 +1000 +Date: Mon Oct 31 05:13:02 2022 +1100 - Add cygwin-release test target. + OpenSSL dev branch is 302 not 320. - This also moves the cygwin package install from the workflow file to - setup_ci.sh so that we can install different sets of Cygwin packages - for different test configs. + While there, also accept 301 which it shat it was previously. -commit 92382dbe8bf9ea1225b16858f9b9b208c15c7e8d +commit 25c8a2bbcc10c493d27faea57c42a6bf13fa51f2 Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Fri Aug 26 08:16:27 2022 +0000 +Date: Fri Oct 28 02:47:04 2022 +0000 - upstream: whitespace + upstream: put sshkey_check_rsa_length() back in sshkey.c to unbreak - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: a5d015efbfd228dc598ffdef612d2da3a579e5d8 + OPENSSL=no builds + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 99eec58abe382ecd14b14043b195ee1babb9cf6e -commit 70a5de0a50e84d7250eb4e4537f765599f64c4af +commit 1192588546c29ceec10775125f396555ea71850f Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Fri Aug 26 08:12:56 2022 +0000 +Date: Fri Oct 28 02:29:34 2022 +0000 - upstream: whitespace + upstream: allow ssh-keyscan(1) to accept CIDR address ranges, e.g. - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: d297e4387935d4aef091c5e9432578c2e513f538 + ssh-keyscan 192.168.0.0/24 + + If a CIDR range is passed, then it will be expanded to all possible + addresses in the range including the all-0s and all-1s addresses. + + bz#976 feedback/ok markus@ + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: ce6c5211f936ac0053fd4a2ddb415277931e6c4b -commit 3a683a19fd116ea15ebf8aa13d02646cceb302a9 +commit 64af4209309461c79c39eda2d13f9d77816c6398 Author: Damien Miller -Date: Fri Aug 26 14:23:55 2022 +1000 - - initial list of allowed signers - -commit 6851f4b8c3fc1b3e1114c56106e4dc31369c8513 -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Fri Aug 19 17:22:18 2022 +1000 +Date: Fri Oct 28 12:54:35 2022 +1100 - Install Cygwin packages based on OS not config. + fix merge botch -commit f96480906893ed93665df8cdf9065865c51c1475 +commit 27267642699342412964aa785b98afd69d952c88 Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Fri Aug 19 06:07:47 2022 +0000 +Date: Fri Oct 28 00:44:44 2022 +0000 - upstream: attemp FIDO key signing without PIN and use the error + upstream: refactor sshkey_private_deserialize - code returned to fall back only if necessary. Avoids PIN prompts for FIDO - tokens that don't require them; part of GHPR#302 + feedback/ok markus@ - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 4f752aaf9f2e7c28bcaaf3d4f8fc290131bd038e + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: f5ca6932fdaf840a5e8250becb38315a29b5fc9f -commit 5453333b5d28e313284cb9aae82899704103f98d +commit 2519a7077a9332f70935e5242ba91ee670ed6b87 Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Fri Aug 19 05:53:28 2022 +0000 +Date: Fri Oct 28 00:44:17 2022 +0000 - upstream: remove incorrect check that can break enrolling a + upstream: refactor sshkey_private_serialize_opt() - resident key (introduced in r1.40) + feedback/ok markus@ - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 4cab364d518470e29e624af3d3f9ffa9c92b6f01 + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 61e0fe989897901294efe7c3b6d670cefaf44cbd -commit ff89b1bed80721295555bd083b173247a9c0484e -Author: dtucker@openbsd.org -Date: Fri Aug 19 04:02:46 2022 +0000 +commit 11a768adf98371fe4e43f3b06014024c033385d5 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Fri Oct 28 00:43:30 2022 +0000 - upstream: Strictly enforce the maximum allowed SSH2 banner size in + upstream: refactor certify - ssh-keyscan and prevent a one-byte buffer overflow. Patch from Qualys, ok - djm@ + feedback/ok markus@ - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 6ae664f9f4db6e8a0589425f74cd0bbf3aeef4e4 - -commit 1b470b9036639cef4f32fb303bb35ea0b711178d -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Fri Aug 19 15:18:09 2022 +1000 - - Fix cygwin conditional steps. - -commit fd6ee741ab16714b7035d60aca924123ba28135a -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Fri Aug 19 15:12:57 2022 +1000 - - Add a bit more debug output. + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 35d742992e223eaca3537e6fb3d3002c08eed4f6 -commit a9305c4c739f4d91a3d3a92c0b6d4949404a36c5 -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Fri Aug 12 15:08:47 2022 +1000 +commit 3fbc58bb249d967cc43ebdc554f6781bb73d4a58 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Fri Oct 28 00:43:08 2022 +0000 - Add Cygwin (on windows-2019) test target. + upstream: refactor sshkey_sign() and sshkey_verify() - In addition to installing the requisite Cygwin packages, we also need to - explicitly invoke "sh" for steps that run other scripts since the runner - environment doesn't understand #! paths. + feedback/ok markus@ + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 368e662c128c99d05cc043b1308d2b6c71a4d3cc -commit 5062ad48814b06162511c4f5924a33d97b6b2566 +commit a1deb6cdbbe6afaab74ecb08fcb62db5739267be Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Fri Aug 19 03:06:30 2022 +0000 +Date: Fri Oct 28 00:41:52 2022 +0000 - upstream: double free() in error path; from Eusgor via GHPR333 + upstream: refactor sshkey_from_blob_internal() - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 39f35e16ba878c8d02b4d01d8826d9b321be26d4 - -commit 5a5c580b48fc6006bdfa731fc2f6d4945c2c0e4e -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Thu Aug 18 21:36:39 2022 +1000 - - Check for perms to run agent-getpeereid test. + feedback/ok markus@ - Ubuntu 22.04 defaults to private home dirs which prevents "nobody" - running ssh-add during the agent-getpeereid test. Check for this and - add the necessary permissions. + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 1f46c0cbb8060ee9666a02749594ad6658c8e283 -commit cd06a76b7ccc706e2bb4f1cc4aa9e9796a28a812 -Author: Damien Miller -Date: Wed Aug 17 16:04:16 2022 +1000 +commit 7d00799c935271ce89300494c5677190779f6453 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Fri Oct 28 00:41:17 2022 +0000 - on Cygwin, prefer WinHello FIDO device + upstream: refactor sshkey_from_private() - If no FIDO device was explictly specified, then prefer the - windows://hello FIDO device. An exception to this is when - probing resident FIDO keys, in which case hardware FIDO - devices are preferred. + feedback/ok markus@ + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: e5dbe7a3545930c50f70ee75c867a1e08b382b53 -commit 47f72f534ac5cc2cd3027675a3df7b00a8f77575 +commit 262647c2e920492ca57f1b9320d74f4a0f6e482b Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Wed Aug 17 06:01:57 2022 +0000 +Date: Fri Oct 28 00:39:29 2022 +0000 - upstream: add an extra flag to sk_probe() to indicate whether we're + upstream: factor out key generation - probing for a FIDO resident key or not. Unused here, but will make like - easier for portable + feedback/ok markus@ - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 432c8ff70e270378df9dbceb9bdeaa5b43b5a832 + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 5b4211bff4de8d9adb84bc72857a8c42c44e7ceb -commit edb0bcb3c79b16031dc87a8e57aecc3c4a3414f0 -Author: jmc@openbsd.org -Date: Tue Aug 16 20:24:08 2022 +0000 +commit 401c74e7dc15eab60540653d2f94d9306a927bab +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Fri Oct 28 00:38:58 2022 +0000 - upstream: use .Cm for "sign"; from josiah frentsos + upstream: refactor and simplify sshkey_read() - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 7f80a53d54857ac6ae49ea6ad93c5bd12231d1e4 + feedback/ok markus@ + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 0d93b7a56e31cd06a8bb0d2191d084ce254b0971 -commit cccb011e130cbbac538b1689d10e4a067298df8b -Author: Corinna Vinschen -Date: Thu Aug 11 20:19:35 2022 +0200 +commit 591fed94e66a016acf87f4b7cd416ce812f2abe8 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Fri Oct 28 00:37:24 2022 +0000 - Revert "check_sk_options: add temporary WinHello workaround" - - Cygwin now comes with libfido2 1.11.0, so this workaround - isn't required anymore. + upstream: factor out public key serialization - This reverts commit 242c044ab111a37aad3b0775727c36a4c5f0102c. + feedback/ok markus@ - Signed-off-by: Corinna Vinschen + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: a3570c4b97290c5662890aea7328d87f55939033 -commit 9468cd7cf9d989dfa2ac20e2a0268ba6e93bfa5a -Author: Corinna Vinschen -Date: Thu Aug 11 20:18:17 2022 +0200 +commit 1e78844ae2b2dc01ba735d5ae740904c57e13685 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Fri Oct 28 00:36:31 2022 +0000 - fido_dev_is_winhello: return 0, not "false" + upstream: factor out sshkey_equal_public() - "false" is not used anywhere in OpenSSH, so return 0 like - everywhere else. + feedback/ok markus@ - Signed-off-by: Corinna Vinschen + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 1368ba114cb37732fe6ec3d89c7e6d27ea6fdc94 -commit 730a80609472ee0451c99482d75c9c41f3ebc42d +commit 25de1c01a8b9a2c8ab9b1da22444a03e89c982de Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Fri Aug 12 05:20:28 2022 +0000 +Date: Fri Oct 28 00:35:40 2022 +0000 - upstream: sftp-server: support home-directory request + upstream: begin big refactor of sshkey - Add support to the sftp-server for the home-directory extension defined - in draft-ietf-secsh-filexfer-extensions-00. This overlaps a bit with the - existing expand-path@openssh.com, but uses a more official protocol name, - and so is a bit more likely to be implemented by non-OpenSSH clients. + Move keytype data and some of the type-specific code (allocation, + cleanup, etc) out into each key type's implementation. Subsequent + commits will move more, with the goal of having each key-*.c file + owning as much of its keytype's implementation as possible. - From Mike Frysinger, ok dtucker@ + lots of feedback + ok markus@ - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: bfc580d05cc0c817831ae7ecbac4a481c23566ab - -commit 5e820bf79ce3ce99ef7e98b0ab642b0a0a4f396c -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Fri Aug 12 14:56:55 2022 +1000 - - Replace deprecated ubuntu-18.04 runners with 22.04 + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 0f2b4334f73914344e9e5b3d33522d41762a57ec -commit 87b0d9c1b789d3ff958ec45df2ac912e24461bae -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Thu Aug 11 22:48:23 2022 +1000 +commit 445363433ba20b8a3e655b113858c836da46a1cb +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Mon Oct 24 22:43:36 2022 +0000 - Add a timegm implementation from Heimdal via Samba. + upstream: Be more paranoid with host/domain names coming from the - Fixes build on (at least Solaris 10). - -commit d0c4fa58594577994921b593f10037c5282597ca -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Thu Aug 11 14:23:58 2022 +1000 - - Rerun tests if any .github config file changes. - -commit 113fe6c77ab43769fc61e953d07cb619fd7ea54b -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Thu Aug 11 13:33:51 2022 +1000 - - Skip hostbased during Valgrind tests. + never write a name with bad characters to a known_hosts file. - Valgrind doesn't let ssh exec ssh-keysign (because it's setuid) so skip - it during the Valgrind based tests. + reported by David Leadbeater, ok deraadt@ - See https://bugs.kde.org/show_bug.cgi?id=119404 for a discussion of this - (ironically there the problematic binary was ssh(1) back when it could - still be setuid). + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: ba9b25fa8b5490b49398471e0c9657b0cbc7a5ad -commit b98a42afb69d60891eb0488935990df6ee571c4d +commit 7190154de2c9fe135f0cc1ad349cb2fa45152b89 Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Thu Aug 11 01:57:50 2022 +0000 +Date: Mon Oct 24 21:52:50 2022 +0000 - upstream: add some tests for parse_absolute_time(), including cases + upstream: regress test for unmatched glob characters; fails before - where it is forced to the UTC timezone. bz3468 ok dtucker + previous commit but passes now. bz3488; prodded by dtucker@ - OpenBSD-Regress-ID: ea07ca31c2f3847a38df028ca632763ae44e8759 + OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 0cc5cc9ea4a6fd170dc61b9212f15badaafb3bbd -commit ec1ddb72a146fd66d18df9cd423517453a5d8044 +commit a4821a592456c3add3cd325db433110cdaaa3e5c Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Thu Aug 11 01:56:51 2022 +0000 +Date: Mon Oct 24 21:51:55 2022 +0000 - upstream: allow certificate validity intervals, sshsig verification + upstream: when scp(1) is using the SFTP protocol for transport (the - times and authorized_keys expiry-time options to accept dates in the UTC time - zone in addition to the default of interpreting them in the system time zone. - YYYYMMDD and YYMMDDHHMM[SS] dates/times will be interpreted as UTC if - suffixed with a 'Z' character. + default), better match scp/rcp's handling of globs that don't match the + globbed characters but do match literally (e.g. trying to transfer + "foo.[1]"). - Also allow certificate validity intervals to be specified in raw - seconds-since-epoch as hex value, e.g. -V 0x1234:0x4567890. This - is intended for use by regress tests and other tools that call - ssh-keygen as part of a CA workflow. + Previously scp(1) in SFTP mode would not match these pathnames but + legacy scp/rcp mode would. - bz3468 ok dtucker + Reported by Michael Yagliyan in bz3488; ok dtucker@ - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 454db1cdffa9fa346aea5211223a2ce0588dfe13 - -commit 4df246ec75751da7eb925e1880498300d8bda187 -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Thu Aug 11 10:23:55 2022 +1000 - - Fix conditional for running hostbased tests. - -commit 2580916e48721802220c61ce9e0df1297c00bc07 -Author: Damien Miller -Date: Thu Aug 11 08:58:28 2022 +1000 - - fix SANDBOX_SECCOMP_FILTER_DEBUG - -commit fdbd5bf507fc271ff813714fab8a72ff2c6cb5ca -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Wed Aug 10 17:35:52 2022 +1000 - - Test hostbased auth on github runners. + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: d8a3773f53015ba811fddba7473769a2fd343e11 -commit 7e2f51940ba48a1c0fae1107801ea643fa83c971 -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Wed Aug 10 17:25:24 2022 +1000 +commit 18376847b8043ba967eabbe23692ef74c9a3fddc +Author: jsg@openbsd.org +Date: Thu Oct 13 09:09:28 2022 +0000 - Rename our getentropy to prevent possible loops. + upstream: use correct type with sizeof ok djm@ - Since arc4random seeds from getentropy, and we use OpenSSL for that - if enabled, there's the possibility that if we build on a system that - does not have getentropy then run on a system that does have it, then - OpenSSL could end up calling our getentropy and getting stuck in a loop. - Pointed out by deraadt@, ok djm@ - -commit 7a01f61be8d0aca0e975e7417f26371495fe7674 -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Mon Aug 8 12:17:04 2022 +1000 - - Actually put HAVE_STDINT_H around the stdint.h. + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: d6c882c2e8a42ff831a5b3cbc2c961ecb2dd6143 -commit 73541f29f0b50480da6c20dceb7a7191bd8ea7d3 -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Mon Aug 8 10:30:34 2022 +1000 +commit 4a4883664d6b4e9e4e459a8cdc16bd8d4b735de9 +Author: jmc@openbsd.org +Date: Fri Oct 7 06:00:58 2022 +0000 - Give unused param a name. + upstream: ssh-agent.1: - use Nm not Xr for self-ref - while here, - Fixes builds on platforms that do have fido2 but don't have - fido_dev_is_winhello. + wrap a long line + + ssh-agent.c: + - add -O to usage() + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 855dac4695cef22e96d69c53436496bc408ca389 -commit 2a108c0ea960381bd9b14ee0d84e818a23df4482 +commit 9fd2441113fce2a83fc7470968c3b27809cc7f10 Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Fri Aug 5 05:01:40 2022 +0000 +Date: Fri Oct 7 04:06:26 2022 +0000 - upstream: don't prompt for FIDO passphrase before attempting to enroll - - the credential, just let the enroll operating fail and we'll attempt to get a - PIN anyway. Might avoid some unneccessary PIN prompts. + upstream: document "-O no-restrict-websafe"; spotted by Ross L - Part of GHPR#302 from Corinna Vinschen; ok dtucker@ + Richardson - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: bd5342ffc353ee37d39617906867c305564d1ce2 + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: fe9eaa50237693a14ebe5b5614bf32a02145fe8b -commit 2886975c0ad9244e60dc5e4be34fde3aa573a4b5 -Author: Corinna Vinschen -Date: Fri Feb 11 14:33:41 2022 +0100 +commit 614252b05d70f798a0929b1cd3d213030ad4d007 +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Tue Oct 18 06:29:16 2022 +1100 - sk_sign: set FIDO2 uv attribute explicitely for WinHello - - WinHello via libfido2 performs user verification by default. - However, if we stick to that, there's no way to differentiate - between keys created with or without "-O verify-required". - Set FIDO2 uv attribute explicitely to FIDO_OPT_FALSE, then check - if user verification has been requested. - - Signed-off-by: Corinna Vinschen + OpenSSL dev branch now identifies as 3.2.0. -commit 242c044ab111a37aad3b0775727c36a4c5f0102c -Author: Corinna Vinschen -Date: Tue Feb 15 11:28:08 2022 +0100 +commit 195e5a65fd793a738ea8451ebfdd1919db5aff3e +Author: Damien Miller +Date: Mon Oct 17 09:41:47 2022 +1100 - check_sk_options: add temporary WinHello workaround - - Up to libfido 1.10.0, WinHello advertises "clientPin" rather - than "uv" capability. This is fixed in 1.11.0. For the time - being, workaround it here. + revert c64b62338b4 and guard POLL* defines instead - Signed-off-by: Corinna Vinschen + c64b62338b4 broke OSX builds, which do have poll.h but lack ppoll(2) + Spotted by dtucker -commit 78774c08cc4b4997382975b0f414a86e06b6780c -Author: Corinna Vinschen -Date: Thu Feb 10 18:19:29 2022 +0100 +commit bc2e480d99613bd59720edae244d1764636544c4 +Author: Damien Miller +Date: Fri Oct 14 14:52:22 2022 +1100 - compat code for fido_dev_is_winhello() - - Signed-off-by: Corinna Vinschen + undef _get{short,long} before redefining -commit 3d3a932a019aedfb891e0779bb4990cd5008a390 -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Fri Aug 5 13:12:27 2022 +1000 +commit 5eb796a369c64f18d55a6ae9b1fa9b35eea237fb +Author: Harmen Stoppels +Date: Thu Oct 13 16:08:46 2022 +0200 - Factor out getrnd() and rename to getentropy(). + Fix snprintf configure test for clang 15 - Factor out the arc4random seeding into its own file and change the - interface to match getentropy. Use native getentropy if available. - This will make it easier to resync OpenBSD changes to arc4random. - Prompted by bz#3467, ok djm@. + Clang 15 -Wimplicit-int defaults to an error in C99 mode and above. + A handful of tests have "main(..." and not "int main(..." which caused + the tests to produce incorrect results. -commit 9385d277b787403be9dfcb229cf372202496d2f3 -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Thu Aug 4 18:55:48 2022 +1000 +commit c64b62338b46ffa08839f05f21ad69fa6234dc17 +Author: Damien Miller +Date: Mon Oct 10 12:32:43 2022 +1100 - Include CHANNEL and FIDO2 libs in configure output + skip bsd-poll.h if poll.h found; ok dtucker -commit 141535b904b6fba01724444f38193a8599201f82 +commit 5ee2b8ccfcf4b606f450eb0ff2305e311f68b0be Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Mon Aug 1 11:09:26 2022 +0000 +Date: Thu Oct 6 22:42:37 2022 +0000 - upstream: avoid double-free in error path introduced in r1.70; report + upstream: honour user's umask if it is more restrictive then the ssh - and fix based on GHPR#332 by v-rzh ok dtucker@ + default (022); based on patch from Alex Henrie, ok dtucker@ deraadt@ - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 3d21aa127b1f37cfc5bdc21461db369a663a951f - -commit dba7099ffcba3ca07b3946f017ba6a4c3158d9b1 -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Wed Jul 27 18:40:12 2022 +1000 - - Remove deprecated MacOS 10.15 runners. + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: fe1b9e15fc9a4f49fc338e848ce14d8727abe82d -commit 722a56439aa5972c830e4a9a724cf52aff4a950a +commit a75cffc2700cebd3e2dd9093f7f7388d2be95cb7 Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Wed Jul 27 18:31:14 2022 +1000 +Date: Fri Oct 7 03:54:56 2022 +1100 - Move stale-configure check as early as possible. + Add LibreSSL 3.6.0 to test suite. - We added a check in Makefile to catch the case where configure needs to - be rebuilt, however this did not happen until a build was attempted in - which case all of the work done by configure was wasted. Move this check - to the start of configure to catch it as early as possible. ok djm@ + While there, bump OpenSSL to latest 1.1.1q release. -commit 099d6b56288b421ba38531d26dc1bd6bb685e311 +commit fcc0f0c0e96a30076683fea9a7c9eedc72931742 Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Fri Jul 22 10:47:19 2022 +1000 +Date: Thu Oct 6 21:18:16 2022 +1100 - Move libcrypto into CHANNELLIBS. - - This will result in sftp, sftp-server and scp no longer being linked - against libcrypto. ok djm@ + Add 9.1 branch to CI status page. -commit 1bdf86725b77733bb5f17c54888b88a10b2f6538 +commit ef211eee63821d894a8bf81f22bfba9f6899d0fe Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Fri Jul 22 10:45:47 2022 +1000 +Date: Tue Oct 4 23:20:23 2022 +1100 - Remove seed_rng calls from scp, sftp, sftp-server. + Test commits to all branches of portable. - These binaries don't use OpenSSL's random functions. The next step - will be to stop linking them against libcrypto. ok djm@ + Only test OpenBSD upstream on commits to master since that's what it + tracks. -commit d73f77b8cb9b422f1ac4facee7890aa10ff2bc21 -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Fri Jul 22 09:51:51 2022 +1000 +commit fe646de03cafb6593ff4e4954bca9ec4b4b753a8 +Author: Damien Miller +Date: Wed Oct 5 03:47:26 2022 +1100 - Group libcrypto and PRNGD checks together. - - They're related more than the libcrypt or libiaf checks which are - currently between them. ok djm@ + whitespace at EOL -commit f117e372b3f42f2fbdb0a578d063b2609ab58e1f -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Fri Jul 22 09:24:45 2022 +1000 +commit a6e1852d10c63a830196e82168dadd957aaf28ec +Author: Damien Miller +Date: Wed Oct 5 03:40:01 2022 +1100 - Do not link scp, sftp and sftp-server w/ zlib. - - Some of our binaries (eg sftp, sftp-server, scp) do not interact with - the channels code and thus do use libraries such as zlib and libcrypto - although they are linked with them. This adds a CHANNELLIBS and starts - by moving zlib into it, which means the aformentioned binaries are no - longer linked against zlib. ok djm@ + mention libfido2 autodetection -commit 800c2483e68db38bd1566ff69677124be974aceb -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Mon Jul 25 21:49:04 2022 +1000 +commit 7360c2c206f33d309edbaf64036c96fadf74d640 +Author: Damien Miller +Date: Wed Oct 5 03:37:36 2022 +1100 - Remove workarounds for OpenSSL missing AES-CTR. + remove mention of --with-security-key-builtin - We have some compatibility hacks that were added to support OpenSSL - versions that do not support AES CTR mode. Since that time, however, - the minimum OpenSSL version that we support has moved to 1.0.1 which - *does* have CTR, so this is no longer needed. ok djm@ + it is enabled by default when libfido2 is installed -commit b7c56b65c12f51fe0dbae798d19c8f58224a5d95 -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Mon Jul 25 21:43:00 2022 +1000 +commit 0ffb46f2ee2ffcc4daf45ee679e484da8fcf338c +Author: Damien Miller +Date: Tue Oct 4 01:51:42 2022 +1100 - Remove workarounds for OpenSSL missing AES-GCM. - - We have some compatibility hacks that were added to support OpenSSL - versions that do not support AES GCM mode. Since that time, however, - the minimum OpenSSL version that we support has moved to 1.0.1 which - *does* have GCM, so this is no longer needed. ok djm@ + update .depend -commit 5a4a9f7a968fbf92cc1eac519c65638e79ae9f1f -Author: dtucker@openbsd.org -Date: Mon Jul 25 07:12:45 2022 +0000 +commit 657e676ff696c7bb787bffb0e249ea1be3b474e1 +Author: Damien Miller +Date: Tue Oct 4 01:45:52 2022 +1100 - upstream: Restore missing "!" in TEST_SSH_ELAPSED_TIMES test. + update release notes URL + +commit f059da2b29840c0f048448809c317ce2ae014da7 +Author: Damien Miller +Date: Tue Oct 4 01:45:41 2022 +1100 + + crank versions in RPM spec files + +commit b51f3f172d87cbdb80ca4eb7b2149e56a7647557 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Mon Sep 26 22:18:40 2022 +0000 + + upstream: openssh-9.1 - OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 38783f9676ec348c5a792caecee9a16e354b37b0 + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 5a467b2ee81da01a86adf1ad93b62b1728494e56 -commit 0ff886be132299386cc29d87c2aa16ff68a1aa08 +commit 4cf8d0c0f3030f594a238bab21a0695735515487 Author: dtucker@openbsd.org -Date: Sun Jul 24 23:29:10 2022 +0000 +Date: Wed Sep 21 22:26:50 2022 +0000 - upstream: Test TEST_SSH_ELAPSED_TIMES for empty string not - - executable. No-op on most platforms but should prevent warnings in -portable - on systems that don't have 'date %s'. + upstream: Fix typo. From AlexanderStohr via github PR#343. - OpenBSD-Regress-ID: e39d79867b8065e33d0c5926fa1a31f85659d2a4 + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: a134c9b4039e48803fc6a87f955b0f4a03181497 -commit f69319ad8ad1dd50f90bbcf5912e11cc8ed3e037 -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Sat Jul 23 14:38:22 2022 +1000 +commit 8179fed3264d5919899900ed8881d5f9bb57ca33 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Mon Sep 19 21:39:16 2022 +0000 - Convert "have_prog" function into "which". + upstream: add RequiredRSASize to the list of keywords accepted by - "which" and its behaviour is not standardized, so convert the existing - have_prog function into "which" so we can rely on it being available - and what its semantics are. Add a have_prog wrapper that maintains the - existing behaviour. + -o; spotted by jmc@ + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: fe871408cf6f9d3699afeda876f8adbac86a035e -commit ea7ecc2c3ae39fdf5c6ad97b7bc0b47a98847f43 -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Sat Jul 23 14:36:38 2022 +1000 +commit 5f954929e9f173dd1e279e07d0e8b14fa845814d +Author: Damien Miller +Date: Mon Sep 19 20:59:34 2022 +1000 - Skip scp3 test if there's no scp on remote path. + no need for glob.h here - scp -3 ends up using the scp that's in the remote path and will fail if - one is not available. Based on a patch from rapier at psc.edu. + it also causes portability problems -commit c46f6fed419167c1671e4227459e108036c760f8 +commit 03d94a47207d58b3db37eba4f87eb6ae5a63168a Author: Damien Miller -Date: Wed Jul 20 13:39:14 2022 +1000 +Date: Mon Sep 19 20:59:04 2022 +1000 - crank SSH_SK_VERSION_MAJOR in sk-dummy.so + avoid Wuninitialized false positive in gcc-12ish -commit f208e3b9ffb5ee76cf9c95df7ff967adc7f51c7d +commit 9d952529113831fb3071ab6e408d2726fd72e771 Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Wed Jul 20 03:33:22 2022 +0000 +Date: Mon Sep 19 10:46:00 2022 +0000 - upstream: ssh-keygen: fix touch prompt, pin retries; + upstream: use users-groups-by-id@openssh.com sftp-server extension - part of GHPR329 from Pedro Martelletto + (when available) to fill in user/group names for directory listings. + Implement a client-side cache of see uid/gid=>user/group names. ok markus@ - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 75d1005bd2ef8f29fa834c90d2684e73556fffe8 + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: f239aeeadfa925a37ceee36ee8b256b8ccf4466e -commit 8638a2ce7e90c8a51d9af3143404282126c524f8 +commit 8ff680368b0bccf88ae85d4c99de69387fbad7a6 Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Wed Jul 20 03:31:42 2022 +0000 +Date: Mon Sep 19 10:43:12 2022 +0000 - upstream: sk-usbhid: preserve error code returned by key_lookup() - - it conveys useful information, such as the supplied pin being wrong. + upstream: sftp client library support for - Part of GHPR329 from Pedro Martelletto + users-groups-by-id@openssh.com; ok markus@ - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: c0647eb9290f793add363d81378439b273756c1b + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: ddb2f33a2da6349a9a89a8b5bcb9ca7c999394de -commit 9ab929ca2d820520327b41929372bcb9e261534c +commit 488f6e1c582212c2374a4bf8cd1b703d2e70fb8b Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Wed Jul 20 03:29:14 2022 +0000 +Date: Mon Sep 19 10:41:58 2022 +0000 - upstream: when enrolling a resident key on a security token, check - - if a credential with matching application and user ID strings already exists. - if so, prompt the user for confirmation before overwriting the credential. - - patch from Pedro Martelletto via GHPR329 + upstream: extend sftp-common.c:extend ls_file() to support supplied - NB. cranks SSH_SK_VERSION_MAJOR, so any third-party FIDO middleware - implementations will need to adjust + user/group names; ok markus@ - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: e45e9f1bf2b2f32d9850669e7a8dbd64acc5fca4 + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: c70c70498b1fdcf158531117e405b6245863bfb0 -commit 5bcfc788b38d5b64e4c347bdc04bd9a01bbc36da +commit 74b77f7497dba3a58315c8f308883de448078057 Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Wed Jul 20 03:13:04 2022 +0000 +Date: Mon Sep 19 10:40:52 2022 +0000 - upstream: pull passphrase reading and confirmation into a separate + upstream: sftp-server(8): add a "users-groups-by-id@openssh.com" - function so it can be used for FIDO2 PINs; no functional change + extension request that allows the client to obtain user/group names that + correspond to a set of uids/gids. - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: bf34f76b8283cc1d3f54633e0d4f13613d87bb2f + Will be used to make directory listings more useful and consistent + in sftp(1). + + ok markus@ + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 7ebabde0bcb95ef949c4840fe89e697e30df47d3 -commit eb679e2959bdb15454eb94751930eb4c9110da94 -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Fri Jul 15 21:31:48 2022 +1000 +commit 231a346c0c67cc7ca098360f9a554fa7d4f1eddb +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Mon Sep 19 08:49:50 2022 +0000 - Move vmshutdown to first step. + upstream: better debugging for connect_next() - If a previous run on a physical runner has failed to clean up, the next - run will fail because it'll try to check out the code to a broken - directory mount. Make cleanup the first step. + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: d16a307a0711499c971807f324484ed3a6036640 -commit 46b91b70ff3cb9c147e2875ef5dc609fd64c0c96 -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Fri Jul 15 20:25:27 2022 +1000 +commit 1875042c52a3b950ae5963c9ca3774a4cc7f0380 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Sat Sep 17 10:34:29 2022 +0000 - Rename bbone test target to ARM. + upstream: Add RequiredRSASize for sshd(8); RSA keys that fall + + beneath this limit will be ignored for user and host-based authentication. + + Feedback deraadt@ ok markus@ + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 187931dfc19d51873df5930a04f2d972adf1f7f1 -commit 751d22cdeffed9fe921db78eedc32a29f9e80510 -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Fri Jul 15 13:37:29 2022 +1000 +commit 54b333d12e55e6560b328c737d514ff3511f1afd +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Sat Sep 17 10:33:18 2022 +0000 - Add AUDIT_ARCH_PPC to supported seccomp arches. + upstream: add a RequiredRSASize for checking RSA key length in - Patch from dries.deschout at dodeco.eu. + ssh(1). User authentication keys that fall beneath this limit will be + ignored. If a host presents a host key beneath this limit then the connection + will be terminated (unfortunately there are no fallbacks in the protocol for + host authentication). + + feedback deraadt, Dmitry Belyavskiy; ok markus@ + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 430e339b2a79fa9ecc63f2837b06fdd88a7da13a -commit a061792a6e8d235fc40a9b5d4c22a1762bb75a7b -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Thu Jul 14 19:20:24 2022 +1000 +commit 07d8771bacfefbcfb37fa8a6dc6103bcc097e0ab +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Sat Sep 17 10:30:45 2022 +0000 - Remove unintended changes. + upstream: Add a sshkey_check_rsa_length() call for checking the - I inadvertently included a couple of local changes with the OpenSSL - 3.0.4 change. Revert, anything that should be there will be committed - separately. + length of an RSA key; ok markus@ + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: de77cd5b11594297eda82edc594b0d32b8535134 -commit 527cb43fa1b4e55df661feabbac51b8e608b6519 -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Thu Jul 14 11:22:08 2022 +1000 +commit 3991a0cf947cf3ae0f0373bcec5a90e86a7152f5 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Sat Sep 17 10:11:29 2022 +0000 - Return ERANGE from getcwd() if buffer size is 1. + upstream: actually hook up restrict_websafe; the command-line flag - If getcwd() is supplied a buffer size of exactly 1 and a path of "/", it - could result in a nul byte being written out of array bounds. POSIX says - it should return ERANGE if the path will not fit in the available buffer - (with terminating nul). 1 byte cannot fit any possible path with its nul, - so immediately return ERANGE in that case. + was never actually used. Spotted by Matthew Garrett - OpenSSH never uses getcwd() with this buffer size, and all current - (and even quite old) platforms that we are currently known to work - on have a native getcwd() so this code is not used on those anyway. - Reported by Qualys, ok djm@ + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 0b363518ac4c2819dbaa3dfad4028633ab9cdff1 -commit 36857fefd8849c4b0e877cfd9d1eb22f79b76650 -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Thu Jul 14 10:02:35 2022 +1000 +commit 30b2a7e4291fb9e357f80a237931ff008d686d3b +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Fri Sep 16 06:55:37 2022 +0000 - Split README.platform into its own line. + upstream: correct error value - README.platform has general platform-specific information, having it - following text about FIDO2 on the same line could imply that it only - has information about FIDO2. + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 780efcbad76281f11f14b2a5ff04eb6db3dfdad4 -commit 00a496c6c14f2d41f2a9365714d494dd5f3aac9f -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Thu Jul 14 09:56:01 2022 +1000 +commit ac1ec9545947d9f9657259f55d04cb49d3a94c8a +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Fri Sep 16 03:33:14 2022 +0000 - Clarify README.md text. + upstream: sftp: Be a bit more clever about completions - Clarify the text about the implications of building without OpenSSL, and - prefix the "configure --help" example command with a "./" so it's likely - to work as-is in more shells. From bz#3461. - -commit f40b52f21fbc52eb513279168a49d3285c65256c -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Tue Jul 12 19:48:44 2022 +1000 - - Remove special casing of crypt(). + There are commands (e.g. "get" or "put") that accept two + arguments, a local path and a remote path. However, the way + current completion is written doesn't take this distinction into + account and always completes remote or local paths. - Configure goes to some lengths to pick crypt() from either libcrypt - or OpenSSL's libcrypto because they can more or less featureful (eg - supporting md5-style passwords). + By expanding CMD struct and "cmds" array this distinction can be + reflected and with small adjustment to completer code the correct + path can be completed. - OpenSSL removed its crypt() interface in 2002: - https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/69deec58 so these hijinks - should no longer be necessary. This also only links sshd with libcrypt - which is the only thing that needs it. ok djm@ - -commit 76f4e48631d7b09fb243b47d7b393d100d3741b7 -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Wed Jul 13 13:17:47 2022 +1000 - - Only refuse to use OpenSSL 3.0.4 on x86_64. + By Michal Privoznik, ok dtucker@ - The potential RCE only impacts x86_64, so only refuse to use it if we're - targetting a potentially impacted architecture. ok djm@ + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 1396d921c4eb1befd531f5c4a8ab47e7a74b610b -commit e75bbc1d88491fa85e61b2cc8783d4bbd00cd131 -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Tue Jul 12 14:37:15 2022 +1000 +commit 590db83384f9d99fc51c84505792d26d1ef60df9 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Fri Sep 16 03:13:34 2022 +0000 - Capture stderr output from configure. + upstream: sftp: Don't attempt to complete arguments for + + non-existent commands + + If user entered a non-existent command (e.g. because they made a + typo) there is no point in trying to complete its arguments. Skip + calling complete_match() if that's the case. + + From Michal Privoznik + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: cf39c811a68cde2aeb98fc85addea4000ef6b07a -commit d9eaea4bea6271bcee6a2b9428f1271faf2d033b -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Tue Jul 12 12:54:49 2022 +1000 +commit ff9809fdfd1d9a91067bb14a77d176002edb153c +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Wed Sep 14 00:14:37 2022 +0000 - Refuse to use OpenSSL 3.0.4 due to potential RCE. + upstream: sk_enroll: never drop SSH_SK_USER_VERIFICATION_REQD flag - OpenSSL has a potential RCE in its RSA implementation (CVE-2022-2274) - so refuse to use that specific version. + from response + + Now that all FIDO signing calls attempt first without PIN and then + fall back to trying PIN only if that attempt fails, we can remove the + hack^wtrick that removed the UV flag from the keys returned during + enroll. + + By Corinna Vinschen + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 684517608c8491503bf80cd175425f0178d91d7f -commit fb2f3a61bf3d28fff285524535f7ffcd177c9235 -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Tue Jul 12 12:54:24 2022 +1000 +commit 940dc10729cb5a95b7ee82c10184e2b9621c8a1d +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Wed Sep 14 00:13:13 2022 +0000 - Move unset to before we set anything. + upstream: a little extra debugging + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: edf1601c1d0905f6da4c713f4d9cecc7d1c0295a -commit c483a5c0fb8e8b8915fad85c5f6113386a4341ca -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Wed Jul 6 11:52:54 2022 +1000 +commit 4b5f91cb959358141181b934156513fcb8a6c1e3 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Wed Sep 14 00:02:03 2022 +0000 - Test against openssl-3.0.5. + upstream: ssh-agent: attempt FIDO key signing without PIN and use + + the error to determine whether a PIN is required and prompt only if + necessary. from Corinna Vinschen + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: dd6be6a0b7148608e834ee737c3479b3270b00dd -commit 669a56bcfe73f8b985f2bba476ba834d55253acf -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Tue Jul 5 18:35:53 2022 +1000 +commit 113523bf0bc33600b07ebb083572c8c346b6fdf4 +Author: jmc@openbsd.org +Date: Sun Sep 11 06:38:11 2022 +0000 - Update sanitizer test targets: + upstream: .Li -> .Vt where appropriate; from josiah frentsos, - - remove clang-sanitize-memory for now. It takes so long that the test - times out. - - add gcc sanitize-address and sanitize-undefined test targets. + tweaked by schwarze + + ok schwarze + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 565046e3ce68b46c2f440a93d67c2a92726de8ed -commit 48cc68b69118b3ce8d07fd4f82e00d58667d5379 -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Tue Jul 5 16:23:28 2022 +1000 +commit 86af013b56cecb5ee58ae0bd9d495cd586fc5918 +Author: jsg@openbsd.org +Date: Sat Sep 10 08:50:53 2022 +0000 - Add GCC address sanitizer build/test. + upstream: fix repeated words ok miod@ jmc@ + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 6765daefe26a6b648cc15cadbbe337596af709b7 -commit 55c60bdd39b82457e92efa77da8d16cfa6a49391 -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Tue Jul 5 12:02:33 2022 +1000 +commit 0ba39b93b326a7d5dfab776cc9b9d326161a9b16 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Fri Sep 9 03:31:42 2022 +0000 - Move sanitizer logs into regress for collection. + upstream: notifier_complete(NULL, ...) is a noop, so no need to test + + that ctx!=NULL; from Corinna Vinschen + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: ade2f2e9cc519d01a586800c25621d910bce384a -commit 35ef2b3b6ef198f8574904a45780487ec2f17858 -Author: dtucker@openbsd.org -Date: Mon Jul 4 09:10:31 2022 +0000 +commit be197635329feb839865fdc738e34e24afd1fca8 +Author: Sam James +Date: Thu Sep 8 02:49:29 2022 +0100 - upstream: Add TEST_REGRESS_CACHE_DIR. - - If set, it is used to cache regress test names that have succeeded and - skip those on a re-run. + openbsd-compat/bsd-asprintf: add include for vsnprintf - OpenBSD-Regress-ID: a7570dd29a58df59f2cca647c3c2ec989b49f247 + Fixes the following build failure with Clang 15 on musl: + ``` + bsd-asprintf.c:51:8: error: call to undeclared library function 'vsnprintf' with type 'int (char *, unsigned long, const char *, struct __va_list_tag *)'; ISO C99 and laterclang -O2 -pipe -fdiagnostics-color=always -frecord-gcc-switches -pipe -Wunknown-warning-option -Qunused-arguments -Wall -Wpointer-arith -Wuninitialized -Wsign-compare -Wformat-security -Wsizeof-pointer-memaccess -Wno-pointer-sign -Wno-unused-result -Wmisleading-indentation -Wbitwise-instead-of-logical -fno-strict-aliasing -mretpoline -ftrapv -fzero-call-used-regs=all -fno-builtin-memset -fstack-protector-strong -fPIE -I. -I. -D_XOPEN_SOURCE=600 -D_BSD_SOURCE -D_DEFAULT_SOURCE -DSSHDIR=\"/etc/ssh\" -D_PATH_SSH_PROGRAM=\"/usr/bin/ssh\" -D_PATH_SSH_ASKPASS_DEFAULT=\"/usr/lib/misc/ssh-askpass\" -D_PATH_SFTP_SERVER=\"/usr/lib/misc/sftp-server\" -D_PATH_SSH_KEY_SIGN=\"/usr/lib/misc/ssh-keysign\" -D_PATH_SSH_PKCS11_HELPER=\"/usr/lib/misc/ssh-pkcs11-helper\" -D_PATH_SSH_SK_HELPER=\"/usr/lib/misc/ssh-sk-helper\" -D_PATH_SSH_PIDDIR=\"/run\" -D_PATH_PRIVSEP_CHROOT_DIR=\"/var/empty\" -DHAVE_CONFIG_H -c cipher-aes.c -o cipher-aes.o + do not support + implicit function declarations [-Wimplicit-function-declaration] + ret = vsnprintf(string, INIT_SZ, fmt, ap2); + ^ + bsd-asprintf.c:51:8: note: include the header or explicitly provide a declaration for 'vsnprintf' + 1 error generated. + ``` -commit 7394ed80c4de8b228a43c8956cf2fa1b9c6b2622 +commit 6cb6f660bb35f77a0456dd2581ddf39c29398a5e Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Sun Jul 3 21:46:44 2022 +1000 +Date: Fri Sep 2 16:43:27 2022 +1000 - Add clang sanitizer tests. + Remove DEF_WEAK, it's already in defines.h. -commit bfce0e66b6017a9bfab450b9dc7d4b16f90de817 +commit ce39e7d8b70c4726defde5d3bc4cb7d40d131153 Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Sun Jul 3 18:14:09 2022 +1000 +Date: Fri Sep 2 14:28:14 2022 +1000 - Skip all rlimit tests when sandboxing disabled. + Resync arc4random with OpenBSD. - The rlimit tests can hang when being run with some compiler sanitizers - so skip all of them if sandbox=no. + This brings us up to current, including djm's random-reseeding change, + as prompted by logan at cyberstorm.mu in bz#3467. It brings the + platform-specific hooks from LibreSSL Portable, simplified to match our + use case. ok djm@. -commit 6208d611520f9ea94d5369f9da404b709930029d +commit beaddde26f30e2195b8aa4f3193970e140e17305 Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Sun Jul 3 17:54:49 2022 +1000 +Date: Fri Sep 2 14:20:04 2022 +1000 - Move checks for pollfd.fd and nfds_t. + Move OPENBSD ORIGINAL marker. - Move the checks for struct pollfd.fd and nfds_t to before the sandboxing - checks. This groups all the sandbox checks together so we can skip them - all when sandboxing is disabled. + Putting this after the copyright statement (which doesn't change) + instead of before the version identifier (which does) prevents merge + conflicts when resyncing changes. -commit 322964f8f2e9c321e77ebae1e4d2cd0ccc5c5a0b -Author: dtucker@openbsd.org -Date: Fri Jul 1 05:08:23 2022 +0000 +commit c83e467ead67a8cb48ef4bec8085d6fb880a2ff4 +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Fri Sep 2 14:17:28 2022 +1000 - upstream: Remove leftover line. - - Remove extra line leftover from merge conflict. ok djm@ + Remove arc4random_uniform from arc4random.c - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 460e2290875d7ae64971a7e669c244b1d1c0ae2e + This was previously moved into its own file (matching OpenBSD) which + prematurely committed in commit 73541f2. -commit 7ec81daad0e03a64e8d91c5590960c48c1a899a3 +commit 5f45c2395c60865e59fa44152ff1d003a128c5bc Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Fri Jul 1 04:45:50 2022 +0000 +Date: Fri Sep 2 04:20:02 2022 +0000 - upstream: use consistent field names (s/char/byte) + upstream: sk-usbhid: fix key_lookup() on tokens with built-in UV - in format description + explicitly test whether the token performs built-in UV (e.g. biometric + tokens) and enable UV in that case. From Pedro Martelletto via GHPR#388 - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 3de33572733ee7fcfd7db33d37db23d2280254f0 + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 007eb7e387d27cf3029ab06b88224e03eca62ccd -commit 32e82a392d9f263485effdd606ff5862d289a4a0 +commit 03277a4aa49b80af541a3e691f264c0c0d8f9cec Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Fri Jul 1 13:55:19 2022 +1000 +Date: Wed Aug 31 20:26:30 2022 +1000 - Skip select+rlimit check if sandboxing is disabled - - It's not needed in that case, and the test can fail when being built - with some compiler memory sanitizer flags. bz#3441 + Move sftp from valgrind-2 to 3 to rebalance. -commit 4be7184ebe2a2ccef175983517a35ee06766e1b4 +commit fcf5365da69c516817321ba89c3a91df98d098df Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Fri Jul 1 03:52:57 2022 +0000 +Date: Wed Aug 31 02:56:40 2022 +0000 - upstream: bump up loglevel from debug to info when unable to open - - authorized keys/principals file for errno != ENOENT; bz2042 ok dtucker + upstream: whitespace - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: e79aa550d91ade6a80f081bda689da24c086d66b + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: c2bcbf93610d3d62ed206cdf9bf9ff98c6aaf232 -commit 6c31ba10e97b6953c4f325f526f3e846dfea647a -Author: dtucker@openbsd.org -Date: Fri Jul 1 03:39:44 2022 +0000 +commit e60136a3d7a223dd8e84ba8a6895bc3142360993 +Author: Damien Miller +Date: Mon Aug 29 13:27:45 2022 +1000 - upstream: Don't leak the strings allocated by order_hostkeyalgs() - - and list_hostkey_types() that are passed to compat_pkalg_proposal(). Part of - github PR#324 from ZoltanFridrich, ok djm@ - - This is a roll-forward of the previous rollback now that the required - changes in compat.c have been done. - - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: c7cd93730b3b9f53cdad3ae32462922834ef73eb + additional keys -commit 486c4dc3b83b4b67d663fb0fa62bc24138ec3946 -Author: dtucker@openbsd.org -Date: Fri Jul 1 03:35:45 2022 +0000 +commit 2b02dcb505288c462d1b5dd1ac04e603d01340eb +Author: Damien Miller +Date: Mon Aug 29 13:23:43 2022 +1000 - upstream: Always return allocated strings from the kex filtering so + cross-sign allowed_signers with PGP key - that we can free them later. Fix one leak in compat_kex_proposal. Based on - github PR#324 from ZoltanFridrich with some simplications by me. ok djm@ + Provides continuity of trust from legacy PGP release key to + the SSHSIG signing keys that we will use henceforth for git + signing. + +commit 51b345f177ae981b8755f6bdf8358b1cc5e83d67 +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Sat Aug 27 21:49:27 2022 +1000 + + Add libcrypt-devel to cygwin-release deps. - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 9171616da3307612d0ede086fd511142f91246e4 + Based on feedback from vinschen at redhat.com. -commit 96faa0de6c673a2ce84736eba37fc9fb723d9e5c -Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Fri Jul 1 00:36:30 2022 +0000 +commit 9f81736cf16dd8dda1c8942f1973a5f80b8cd78c +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Sat Aug 27 09:37:40 2022 +1000 - upstream: ignore SIGPIPE earlier in main(), specifically before + Add Windows 2022 test targets. + +commit 85e1a69243f12be8520438ad6a3cfdc0b7fcbb2d +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Fri Aug 26 16:26:06 2022 +1000 + + Add cygwin-release test target. - muxclient() which performs operations that could cause one; Reported by Noam - Lewis via bz3454, ok dtucker@ + This also moves the cygwin package install from the workflow file to + setup_ci.sh so that we can install different sets of Cygwin packages + for different test configs. + +commit 92382dbe8bf9ea1225b16858f9b9b208c15c7e8d +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Fri Aug 26 08:16:27 2022 +0000 + + upstream: whitespace - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 63d8e13276869eebac6d7a05d5a96307f9026e47 + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: a5d015efbfd228dc598ffdef612d2da3a579e5d8 -commit 33efac790f6b09d54894ba6c3e17dfb08b6fc7e1 -Author: jmc@openbsd.org -Date: Tue Jun 28 06:09:14 2022 +0000 +commit 70a5de0a50e84d7250eb4e4537f765599f64c4af +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Fri Aug 26 08:12:56 2022 +0000 - upstream: reflect the update to -D arg name in usage(); + upstream: whitespace - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: abdcde4f92b1ef094ae44210ee99d3b0155aad9c + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: d297e4387935d4aef091c5e9432578c2e513f538 -commit c71a1442d02f0a3586109dfe2cb366de36dee08e +commit 3a683a19fd116ea15ebf8aa13d02646cceb302a9 +Author: Damien Miller +Date: Fri Aug 26 14:23:55 2022 +1000 + + initial list of allowed signers + +commit 6851f4b8c3fc1b3e1114c56106e4dc31369c8513 Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Wed Jun 29 18:28:47 2022 +1000 +Date: Fri Aug 19 17:22:18 2022 +1000 - Update OpenSSL tests to the most recent releases. + Install Cygwin packages based on OS not config. -commit 2a822f29300b2de7335fbff65f0b187a0c582304 +commit f96480906893ed93665df8cdf9065865c51c1475 Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Mon Jun 27 21:41:55 2022 +0000 +Date: Fri Aug 19 06:07:47 2022 +0000 - upstream: allow arguments to sftp -D option, e.g. sftp -D - - "/usr/libexec/sftp-server -el debug3" + upstream: attemp FIDO key signing without PIN and use the error - ok markus@ + code returned to fall back only if necessary. Avoids PIN prompts for FIDO + tokens that don't require them; part of GHPR#302 - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 5a002b9f3a7aef2731fc0ffa9c921cf15f38ecce + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 4f752aaf9f2e7c28bcaaf3d4f8fc290131bd038e -commit 2369a2810187e08f2af5d58b343956062fb96ee8 -Author: dtucker@openbsd.org -Date: Fri Jun 24 10:45:06 2022 +0000 +commit 5453333b5d28e313284cb9aae82899704103f98d +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Fri Aug 19 05:53:28 2022 +0000 - upstream: Roll back previous KEX changes as they aren't safe until + upstream: remove incorrect check that can break enrolling a - compat_pkalg_proposal and friends always allocate their returned strings. - Reported by Qualys. + resident key (introduced in r1.40) - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 1c7a88a0d5033f42f88ab9bec58ef1cf72c81ad0 + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 4cab364d518470e29e624af3d3f9ffa9c92b6f01 -commit 646686136c34c2dbf6a01296dfaa9ebee029386d +commit ff89b1bed80721295555bd083b173247a9c0484e Author: dtucker@openbsd.org -Date: Fri Jun 24 04:37:00 2022 +0000 +Date: Fri Aug 19 04:02:46 2022 +0000 - upstream: Don't leak the strings allocated by order_hostkeyalgs() + upstream: Strictly enforce the maximum allowed SSH2 banner size in - and list_hostkey_types() that are passed to compat_pkalg_proposal(). Part of - github PR#324 from ZoltanFridrich, ok djm@ + ssh-keyscan and prevent a one-byte buffer overflow. Patch from Qualys, ok + djm@ - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: b2f6e5f60f2bba293b831654328a8a0035ef4a1b + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 6ae664f9f4db6e8a0589425f74cd0bbf3aeef4e4 -commit 193c6d8d905dde836b628fc07a7b9cf2d347e2a3 +commit 1b470b9036639cef4f32fb303bb35ea0b711178d Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Sat Jun 25 12:16:15 2022 +1000 +Date: Fri Aug 19 15:18:09 2022 +1000 - Zero out LIBFIDO2 when SK support not usable. - - Prevents us from trying to link them into ssh-sk-helper and failing to - build. + Fix cygwin conditional steps. -commit 40f5d849d25c60b4ae21261e78484d435f5cfd51 +commit fd6ee741ab16714b7035d60aca924123ba28135a Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Sat Jun 25 11:47:28 2022 +1000 - - Disable SK support if FIDO libs not found. - -commit 5fd922ade1b25880fe8a8249f5c0385e413108f9 -Author: Damien Miller -Date: Fri Jun 24 14:43:54 2022 +1000 +Date: Fri Aug 19 15:12:57 2022 +1000 - fix broken case statement in previous + Add a bit more debug output. -commit f51423bdaf0008d46b6af082bcfd7a22a87375f0 -Author: Damien Miller -Date: Fri Jun 24 14:40:42 2022 +1000 +commit a9305c4c739f4d91a3d3a92c0b6d4949404a36c5 +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Fri Aug 12 15:08:47 2022 +1000 - request 1.1x API compatibility for OpenSSL >=3.x + Add Cygwin (on windows-2019) test target. - idea/patch from Pedro Martelletto via GHPR#322; ok dtucker@ + In addition to installing the requisite Cygwin packages, we also need to + explicitly invoke "sh" for steps that run other scripts since the runner + environment doesn't understand #! paths. -commit 455cee8d6c2e4c48c5af9faead3599c49948411e +commit 5062ad48814b06162511c4f5924a33d97b6b2566 Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Fri Jun 24 04:27:14 2022 +0000 +Date: Fri Aug 19 03:06:30 2022 +0000 - upstream: make it clear that RekeyLimit applies to both transmitted - - and received data. GHPR#328 from Jan Pazdziora + upstream: double free() in error path; from Eusgor via GHPR333 - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: d180a905fec9ff418a75c07bb96ea41c9308c3f9 + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 39f35e16ba878c8d02b4d01d8826d9b321be26d4 -commit 17904f05802988d0bb9ed3c8d1d37411e8f459c3 -Author: tobhe@openbsd.org -Date: Tue Jun 21 14:52:13 2022 +0000 +commit 5a5c580b48fc6006bdfa731fc2f6d4945c2c0e4e +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Thu Aug 18 21:36:39 2022 +1000 - upstream: Make sure not to fclose() the same fd twice in case of an - - error. - - ok dtucker@ + Check for perms to run agent-getpeereid test. - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: e384c4e05d5521e7866b3d53ca59acd2a86eef99 + Ubuntu 22.04 defaults to private home dirs which prevents "nobody" + running ssh-add during the agent-getpeereid test. Check for this and + add the necessary permissions. -commit f29d6cf98c25bf044079032d22c1a57c63ab9d8e -Author: dtucker@openbsd.org -Date: Sat Jun 18 02:17:16 2022 +0000 +commit cd06a76b7ccc706e2bb4f1cc4aa9e9796a28a812 +Author: Damien Miller +Date: Wed Aug 17 16:04:16 2022 +1000 - upstream: Don't attempt to fprintf a null identity comment. From - - Martin Vahlensieck via tech@. + on Cygwin, prefer WinHello FIDO device - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 4c54d20a8e8e4e9912c38a7b4ef5bfc5ca2e05c2 + If no FIDO device was explictly specified, then prefer the + windows://hello FIDO device. An exception to this is when + probing resident FIDO keys, in which case hardware FIDO + devices are preferred. -commit ad1762173bb38716a106e8979806149fd0f2753e -Author: dtucker@openbsd.org -Date: Fri Jun 17 01:00:03 2022 +0000 +commit 47f72f534ac5cc2cd3027675a3df7b00a8f77575 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Wed Aug 17 06:01:57 2022 +0000 - upstream: Log an error if pipe() fails while accepting a + upstream: add an extra flag to sk_probe() to indicate whether we're - connection. bz#3447, from vincent-openssh at vinc17 net, ok djm@ + probing for a FIDO resident key or not. Unused here, but will make like + easier for portable - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 9d59f19872b94900a5c79da2d57850241ac5df94 + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 432c8ff70e270378df9dbceb9bdeaa5b43b5a832 -commit 9c59e7486cc8691401228b43b96a3edbb06e0412 -Author: Damien Miller -Date: Fri Jun 24 14:20:43 2022 +1000 +commit edb0bcb3c79b16031dc87a8e57aecc3c4a3414f0 +Author: jmc@openbsd.org +Date: Tue Aug 16 20:24:08 2022 +0000 - automatically enable built-in FIDO support - - If libfido2 is found and usable, then enable the built-in - security key support unless --without-security-key-builtin - was requested. + upstream: use .Cm for "sign"; from josiah frentsos - ok dtucker@ + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 7f80a53d54857ac6ae49ea6ad93c5bd12231d1e4 -commit 7d25b37fb2a5ff4dadabcbdac6087a97479434f5 -Author: Damien Miller -Date: Fri Jun 24 13:46:39 2022 +1000 +commit cccb011e130cbbac538b1689d10e4a067298df8b +Author: Corinna Vinschen +Date: Thu Aug 11 20:19:35 2022 +0200 - fix possible NULL deref when built without FIDO + Revert "check_sk_options: add temporary WinHello workaround" - Analysis/fix from kircher in bz3443; ok dtucker@ - -commit f5ba85daddfc2da6a8dab6038269e02c0695be44 -Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Wed Jun 15 16:08:25 2022 +0000 - - upstream: make sure that UseDNS hostname lookup happens in the monitor + Cygwin now comes with libfido2 1.11.0, so this workaround + isn't required anymore. - and not in the pledge(2)'d unprivileged process; fixes regression caused by - recent refactoring spotted by henning@ + This reverts commit 242c044ab111a37aad3b0775727c36a4c5f0102c. - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: a089870b95101cd8881a2dff65b2f1627d13e88d + Signed-off-by: Corinna Vinschen -commit acb2059febaddd71ee06c2ebf63dcf211d9ab9f2 -Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Fri Jun 3 04:47:21 2022 +0000 +commit 9468cd7cf9d989dfa2ac20e2a0268ba6e93bfa5a +Author: Corinna Vinschen +Date: Thu Aug 11 20:18:17 2022 +0200 - upstream: move auth_openprincipals() and auth_openkeyfile() over to + fido_dev_is_winhello: return 0, not "false" - auth2-pubkeyfile.c too; they make more sense there. + "false" is not used anywhere in OpenSSH, so return 0 like + everywhere else. - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 9970d99f900e1117fdaab13e9e910a621b7c60ee + Signed-off-by: Corinna Vinschen -commit 3d9b0845f34510111cc693bb99a667662ca50cd8 +commit 730a80609472ee0451c99482d75c9c41f3ebc42d Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Fri Jun 3 04:31:54 2022 +0000 +Date: Fri Aug 12 05:20:28 2022 +0000 - upstream: test setenv in both client and server, test first-match-wins + upstream: sftp-server: support home-directory request - too + Add support to the sftp-server for the home-directory extension defined + in draft-ietf-secsh-filexfer-extensions-00. This overlaps a bit with the + existing expand-path@openssh.com, but uses a more official protocol name, + and so is a bit more likely to be implemented by non-OpenSSH clients. - OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 4c8804f9db38a02db480b9923317457b377fe34b + From Mike Frysinger, ok dtucker@ + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: bfc580d05cc0c817831ae7ecbac4a481c23566ab -commit 22e1a3a71ad6d108ff0c5f07f93c3fcbd30f8b40 -Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Fri Jun 3 04:30:46 2022 +0000 +commit 5e820bf79ce3ce99ef7e98b0ab642b0a0a4f396c +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Fri Aug 12 14:56:55 2022 +1000 - upstream: Make SetEnv directives first-match-wins in both - - sshd_config and sshd_config; previously if the same name was reused then the - last would win (which is the opposite to how the config is supposed to work). - - While there, make the ssh_config parsing more like sshd_config. - - bz3438, ok dtucker - - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 797909c1e0262c0d00e09280459d7ab00f18273b + Replace deprecated ubuntu-18.04 runners with 22.04 -commit 38ed6c57e9e592c08e020fa6e82b45b4e1040970 -Author: dtucker@openbsd.org -Date: Fri Jun 3 04:00:15 2022 +0000 +commit 87b0d9c1b789d3ff958ec45df2ac912e24461bae +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Thu Aug 11 22:48:23 2022 +1000 - upstream: Add missing *-sk types to ssh-keyscan manpage. From - - skazi0 via github PR#294. + Add a timegm implementation from Heimdal via Samba. - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: fda2c869cdb871f3c90a89fb3f985370bb5d25c0 + Fixes build on (at least Solaris 10). -commit ea97ec98c41ec2b755dfab459347db674ff9a5de -Author: dtucker@openbsd.org -Date: Fri Jun 3 03:21:09 2022 +0000 +commit d0c4fa58594577994921b593f10037c5282597ca +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Thu Aug 11 14:23:58 2022 +1000 - upstream: Add period at end of "not known by any other names" + Rerun tests if any .github config file changes. + +commit 113fe6c77ab43769fc61e953d07cb619fd7ea54b +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Thu Aug 11 13:33:51 2022 +1000 + + Skip hostbased during Valgrind tests. - message. github PR#320 from jschauma, ok djm@ + Valgrind doesn't let ssh exec ssh-keysign (because it's setuid) so skip + it during the Valgrind based tests. - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: bd60809803c4bfd3ebb7c5c4d918b10e275266f2 + See https://bugs.kde.org/show_bug.cgi?id=119404 for a discussion of this + (ironically there the problematic binary was ssh(1) back when it could + still be setuid). -commit 88e376fcd67478ad1660d94bc73ab348ac9f4527 -Author: dtucker@openbsd.org -Date: Fri Jun 3 03:17:42 2022 +0000 +commit b98a42afb69d60891eb0488935990df6ee571c4d +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Thu Aug 11 01:57:50 2022 +0000 - upstream: ssh-keygen -A: do not generate DSA keys by default. + upstream: add some tests for parse_absolute_time(), including cases - Based on github PR#303 from jsegitz with man page text from jmc@, ok markus@ - djm@ + where it is forced to the UTC timezone. bz3468 ok dtucker - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 5c4c57bdd7063ff03381cfb6696659dd3f9f5b9f + OpenBSD-Regress-ID: ea07ca31c2f3847a38df028ca632763ae44e8759 -commit 6b3fb624675082a1e5aa615d1b8479873d8b5731 -Author: naddy@openbsd.org -Date: Tue May 31 14:05:12 2022 +0000 +commit ec1ddb72a146fd66d18df9cd423517453a5d8044 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Thu Aug 11 01:56:51 2022 +0000 - upstream: ssh-keygen: implement "verify-required" certificate option. + upstream: allow certificate validity intervals, sshsig verification - This was already documented when support for user-verified FIDO - keys was added, but the ssh-keygen(1) code was missing. + times and authorized_keys expiry-time options to accept dates in the UTC time + zone in addition to the default of interpreting them in the system time zone. + YYYYMMDD and YYMMDDHHMM[SS] dates/times will be interpreted as UTC if + suffixed with a 'Z' character. - ok djm@ + Also allow certificate validity intervals to be specified in raw + seconds-since-epoch as hex value, e.g. -V 0x1234:0x4567890. This + is intended for use by regress tests and other tools that call + ssh-keygen as part of a CA workflow. - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: f660f973391b593fea4b7b25913c9a15c3eb8a06 + bz3468 ok dtucker + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 454db1cdffa9fa346aea5211223a2ce0588dfe13 -commit b7f86ffc301be105bba9a3e0618b6fab3ae379bd -Author: jmc@openbsd.org -Date: Sat May 28 05:57:56 2022 +0000 +commit 4df246ec75751da7eb925e1880498300d8bda187 +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Thu Aug 11 10:23:55 2022 +1000 - upstream: keywords ref ssh_config.5; - - from caspar schutijser - - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: f146a19d7d5c9374c3b9c520da43b2732d7d1a4e + Fix conditional for running hostbased tests. -commit dc7bc52372f2744fa39191577be5306ee57aacd4 +commit 2580916e48721802220c61ce9e0df1297c00bc07 Author: Damien Miller -Date: Mon May 30 09:29:09 2022 +1000 +Date: Thu Aug 11 08:58:28 2022 +1000 - fix some bugs in the fuzzer + fix SANDBOX_SECCOMP_FILTER_DEBUG -commit 1781f507c113667613351c19898efaf1e311a865 +commit fdbd5bf507fc271ff813714fab8a72ff2c6cb5ca Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Fri May 27 18:19:48 2022 +1000 +Date: Wed Aug 10 17:35:52 2022 +1000 - Test against OpenSSL 1.1.1o and 3.0.3. + Test hostbased auth on github runners. -commit c53906e0c59e569691b4095d3e8db79cf78fa058 +commit 7e2f51940ba48a1c0fae1107801ea643fa83c971 Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Fri May 27 18:18:31 2022 +1000 +Date: Wed Aug 10 17:25:24 2022 +1000 - Test against LibreSSL 3.5.3. + Rename our getentropy to prevent possible loops. + + Since arc4random seeds from getentropy, and we use OpenSSL for that + if enabled, there's the possibility that if we build on a system that + does not have getentropy then run on a system that does have it, then + OpenSSL could end up calling our getentropy and getting stuck in a loop. + Pointed out by deraadt@, ok djm@ -commit 9b3ad432ad2f19319bcc089370e356c6315d682f -Author: Damien Miller -Date: Fri May 27 17:00:43 2022 +1000 +commit 7a01f61be8d0aca0e975e7417f26371495fe7674 +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Mon Aug 8 12:17:04 2022 +1000 - fuzzer for authorized_keys parsing - - mostly redundant to authopt_fuzz, but it's sensitive code so IMO it - makes sense to test this layer too + Actually put HAVE_STDINT_H around the stdint.h. -commit c83d8c4d6f3ccceef84d46de107f6b71cda06359 -Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Fri May 27 05:02:46 2022 +0000 +commit 73541f29f0b50480da6c20dceb7a7191bd8ea7d3 +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Mon Aug 8 10:30:34 2022 +1000 - upstream: split the low-level file handling functions out from - - auth2-pubkey.c - - Put them in a new auth2-pubkeyfile.c to make it easier to refer to them - (e.g. in unit/fuzz tests) without having to refer to everything else - pubkey auth brings in. - - ok dtucker@ + Give unused param a name. - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 3fdca2c61ad97dc1b8d4a7346816f83dc4ce2217 + Fixes builds on platforms that do have fido2 but don't have + fido_dev_is_winhello. -commit 3b0b142d2a0767d8cd838e2f3aefde8a0aaa41e1 +commit 2a108c0ea960381bd9b14ee0d84e818a23df4482 Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Fri May 27 05:01:25 2022 +0000 +Date: Fri Aug 5 05:01:40 2022 +0000 - upstream: refactor authorized_keys/principals handling + upstream: don't prompt for FIDO passphrase before attempting to enroll - remove "struct ssh *" from arguments - this was only used to pass the - remote host/address. These can be passed in instead and the resulting - code is less tightly coupled to ssh_api.[ch] + the credential, just let the enroll operating fail and we'll attempt to get a + PIN anyway. Might avoid some unneccessary PIN prompts. - ok dtucker@ + Part of GHPR#302 from Corinna Vinschen; ok dtucker@ - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 9d4373d013edc4cc4b5c21a599e1837ac31dda0d + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: bd5342ffc353ee37d39617906867c305564d1ce2 -commit 2c334fd36f80cb91cc42e4b978b10aa35e0df236 -Author: dtucker@openbsd.org -Date: Fri May 27 04:29:40 2022 +0000 +commit 2886975c0ad9244e60dc5e4be34fde3aa573a4b5 +Author: Corinna Vinschen +Date: Fri Feb 11 14:33:41 2022 +0100 - upstream: f sshpkt functions fail, then password is not cleared - - with freezero. Unconditionally call freezero to guarantee that password is - removed from RAM. + sk_sign: set FIDO2 uv attribute explicitely for WinHello - From tobias@ and c3h2_ctf via github PR#286, ok djm@ + WinHello via libfido2 performs user verification by default. + However, if we stick to that, there's no way to differentiate + between keys created with or without "-O verify-required". + Set FIDO2 uv attribute explicitely to FIDO_OPT_FALSE, then check + if user verification has been requested. - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 6b093619c9515328e25b0f8093779c52402c89cd + Signed-off-by: Corinna Vinschen -commit 5d3a77f4c5ae774c6796387266503f52c7cdc7c2 -Author: dtucker@openbsd.org -Date: Fri May 27 04:27:49 2022 +0000 +commit 242c044ab111a37aad3b0775727c36a4c5f0102c +Author: Corinna Vinschen +Date: Tue Feb 15 11:28:08 2022 +0100 - upstream: Avoid kill with -1 argument. The out_ctx label can be - - reached before fork has been called. If this happens, then kill -1 would be - called, sending SIGTERM to all processes reachable by the current process. + check_sk_options: add temporary WinHello workaround - From tobias@ and c3h2_ctf via github PR#286, ok djm@ + Up to libfido 1.10.0, WinHello advertises "clientPin" rather + than "uv" capability. This is fixed in 1.11.0. For the time + being, workaround it here. - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 6277af1207d81202f5daffdccfeeaed4c763b1a8 + Signed-off-by: Corinna Vinschen -commit 533b31cd08e4b97f455466f91c36915e2924c15a -Author: dtucker@openbsd.org -Date: Fri May 27 04:13:24 2022 +0000 +commit 78774c08cc4b4997382975b0f414a86e06b6780c +Author: Corinna Vinschen +Date: Thu Feb 10 18:19:29 2022 +0100 - upstream: Note that ProxyJump also accepts the same tokens as - - ProxyCommand. From pallxk via github PR#305. + compat code for fido_dev_is_winhello() - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 7115ac351b129205f1f1ffa6bbfd62abd76be7c5 + Signed-off-by: Corinna Vinschen -commit 9d8c80f8a304babe61ca28f2e3fb5eb6dc9c39bf -Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Wed May 25 06:03:44 2022 +0000 +commit 3d3a932a019aedfb891e0779bb4990cd5008a390 +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Fri Aug 5 13:12:27 2022 +1000 - upstream: revert previous; it was broken (spotted by Theo) + Factor out getrnd() and rename to getentropy(). - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 457c79afaca2f89ec2606405c1059b98b30d8b0d + Factor out the arc4random seeding into its own file and change the + interface to match getentropy. Use native getentropy if available. + This will make it easier to resync OpenBSD changes to arc4random. + Prompted by bz#3467, ok djm@. -commit 9e0d02ef7ce88b67643bfb1c2272c9f5f04cc680 +commit 9385d277b787403be9dfcb229cf372202496d2f3 +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Thu Aug 4 18:55:48 2022 +1000 + + Include CHANNEL and FIDO2 libs in configure output + +commit 141535b904b6fba01724444f38193a8599201f82 Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Wed May 25 00:31:13 2022 +0000 +Date: Mon Aug 1 11:09:26 2022 +0000 - upstream: make SSHBUF_DBG/SSHBUF_TELL (off by default and only enabled + upstream: avoid double-free in error path introduced in r1.70; report - via #define) dump to stderr rather than stdout + and fix based on GHPR#332 by v-rzh ok dtucker@ - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 10298513ee32db8390aecb0397d782d68cb14318 + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 3d21aa127b1f37cfc5bdc21461db369a663a951f -commit 2487163630f28be28b7e2396b4bd6511b98f1d3e -Author: Tim Rice -Date: Tue May 24 10:21:25 2022 -0700 +commit dba7099ffcba3ca07b3946f017ba6a4c3158d9b1 +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Wed Jul 27 18:40:12 2022 +1000 - configure.ac: Add missing AC_DEFINE for caph_cache_tzdata test causing - HAVE_CAPH_CACHE_TZDATA to be missing from config.h.in. - Spotted by Bryan Drewery + Remove deprecated MacOS 10.15 runners. -commit bedb93415b60db3dfd704a3d525e82adb14a2481 -Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Sun May 15 23:48:07 2022 +0000 +commit 722a56439aa5972c830e4a9a724cf52aff4a950a +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Wed Jul 27 18:31:14 2022 +1000 - upstream: regress test for in-place transfers and clobbering larger - - files with smaller ones; would have caught last regression in scp(1) + Move stale-configure check as early as possible. - OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 19de4e88dd3a4f7e5c1618c9be3c32415bd93bc2 + We added a check in Makefile to catch the case where configure needs to + be rebuilt, however this did not happen until a build was attempted in + which case all of the work done by configure was wasted. Move this check + to the start of configure to catch it as early as possible. ok djm@ -commit b4f0d719c2548cb74da509fb65f384dada4ebd37 -Author: anton@openbsd.org -Date: Fri Apr 22 05:08:43 2022 +0000 +commit 099d6b56288b421ba38531d26dc1bd6bb685e311 +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Fri Jul 22 10:47:19 2022 +1000 - upstream: Only run agent-ptrace.sh if gdb is available as all - - architectures do not ship with gdb. + Move libcrypto into CHANNELLIBS. - OpenBSD-Regress-ID: ec53e928803e6b87f9ac142d38888ca79a45348d + This will result in sftp, sftp-server and scp no longer being linked + against libcrypto. ok djm@ -commit 9b73345f80255a7f3048026462f2c0c6a241eeac -Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Sun May 15 23:47:21 2022 +0000 +commit 1bdf86725b77733bb5f17c54888b88a10b2f6538 +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Fri Jul 22 10:45:47 2022 +1000 - upstream: fix in-place copies; r1.163 incorrectly skipped truncation in - - all cases, not just at the start of a transfer. This could cause overwrites - of larger files to leave junk at the end. Spotted by tb@ + Remove seed_rng calls from scp, sftp, sftp-server. - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: b189f19cd68119548c8e24e39c79f61e115bf92c + These binaries don't use OpenSSL's random functions. The next step + will be to stop linking them against libcrypto. ok djm@ -commit 56a0697fe079ff3e1ba30a2d5c26b5e45f7b71f8 -Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Fri May 13 06:31:50 2022 +0000 +commit d73f77b8cb9b422f1ac4facee7890aa10ff2bc21 +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Fri Jul 22 09:51:51 2022 +1000 - upstream: arrange for scp, when in sftp mode, to not ftruncate(3) files - - early - - previous behavious of unconditionally truncating the destination file - would cause "scp ~/foo localhost:" and "scp localhost:foo ~/" to - delete all the contents of their destination. - - spotted by solene@ sthen@, also bz3431; ok dtucker@ + Group libcrypto and PRNGD checks together. - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: ca39fdd39e0ec1466b9666f15cbcfddea6aaa179 + They're related more than the libcrypt or libiaf checks which are + currently between them. ok djm@ -commit fbcef70c2832712f027bccea1aa9bc4b4103da93 -Author: dtucker@openbsd.org -Date: Mon May 9 08:25:27 2022 +0000 +commit f117e372b3f42f2fbdb0a578d063b2609ab58e1f +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Fri Jul 22 09:24:45 2022 +1000 - upstream: Remove errant apostrophe. From haruyama at queen-ml org. + Do not link scp, sftp and sftp-server w/ zlib. - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: dc6b294567cb84b384ad6ced9ca469f2bbf0bd10 + Some of our binaries (eg sftp, sftp-server, scp) do not interact with + the channels code and thus do use libraries such as zlib and libcrypto + although they are linked with them. This adds a CHANNELLIBS and starts + by moving zlib into it, which means the aformentioned binaries are no + longer linked against zlib. ok djm@ -commit 0086a286ea6bbd11ca9b664ac3bb12b27443d6eb -Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Mon May 9 03:09:53 2022 +0000 +commit 800c2483e68db38bd1566ff69677124be974aceb +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Mon Jul 25 21:49:04 2022 +1000 - upstream: Allow existing -U (use agent) flag to work with "-Y sign" - - operations, where it will be interpreted to require that the private keys is - hosted in an agent; bz3429, suggested by Adam Szkoda; ok dtucker@ + Remove workarounds for OpenSSL missing AES-CTR. - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: a7bc69873b99c32c42c7628ed9ea91565ba08c2f + We have some compatibility hacks that were added to support OpenSSL + versions that do not support AES CTR mode. Since that time, however, + the minimum OpenSSL version that we support has moved to 1.0.1 which + *does* have CTR, so this is no longer needed. ok djm@ -commit cb010744cc98f651b1029bb09efa986eb54e4ccf -Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Sun May 8 22:58:35 2022 +0000 +commit b7c56b65c12f51fe0dbae798d19c8f58224a5d95 +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Mon Jul 25 21:43:00 2022 +1000 - upstream: improve error message when 'ssh-keygen -Y sign' is unable to - - load a private key; bz3429, reported by Adam Szkoda ok dtucker@ + Remove workarounds for OpenSSL missing AES-GCM. - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: bb57b285e67bea536ef81b1055467be2fc380e74 + We have some compatibility hacks that were added to support OpenSSL + versions that do not support AES GCM mode. Since that time, however, + the minimum OpenSSL version that we support has moved to 1.0.1 which + *does* have GCM, so this is no longer needed. ok djm@ -commit aa61fc82c63d309a90c22ca74fb1da6c6f4372fd -Author: Tobias Heider -Date: Mon May 9 02:00:01 2022 +0200 +commit 5a4a9f7a968fbf92cc1eac519c65638e79ae9f1f +Author: dtucker@openbsd.org +Date: Mon Jul 25 07:12:45 2022 +0000 - Remove duplicate bcrypt_pbkdf.o from Makefile + upstream: Restore missing "!" in TEST_SSH_ELAPSED_TIMES test. - bcrypt_pbkdf.o is duplicated in the openbsd-compat Makefile's object - file list. + OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 38783f9676ec348c5a792caecee9a16e354b37b0 -commit deb506d00da8d11fb04c1e7b9b1e1cc379c1705c -Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Sun May 8 22:32:36 2022 +0000 +commit 0ff886be132299386cc29d87c2aa16ff68a1aa08 +Author: dtucker@openbsd.org +Date: Sun Jul 24 23:29:10 2022 +0000 - upstream: When performing operations that glob(3) a remote path, ensure - - that the implicit working directory used to construct that path escapes - glob(3) characters. - - This prevents glob characters from being processed in places they - shouldn't, e.g. "cd /tmp/a*/", "get *.txt" should have the get operation - treat the path "/tmp/a*" literally and not attempt to expand it. + upstream: Test TEST_SSH_ELAPSED_TIMES for empty string not - Reported by Lusia Kundel; ok markus@ + executable. No-op on most platforms but should prevent warnings in -portable + on systems that don't have 'date %s'. - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 4f647f58482cbad3d58b1eab7f6a1691433deeef - -commit f38cf74f20b5da113cfa823afd5bfb5c6ba65f3d -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Fri May 6 14:50:18 2022 +1000 - - Also retest OpenBSD upstream on .yml changes. + OpenBSD-Regress-ID: e39d79867b8065e33d0c5926fa1a31f85659d2a4 -commit f87a132800ba3710ab130d703448a31ef1128d77 +commit f69319ad8ad1dd50f90bbcf5912e11cc8ed3e037 Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Fri May 6 14:46:09 2022 +1000 +Date: Sat Jul 23 14:38:22 2022 +1000 - Note that, for now, we need variadic macros. + Convert "have_prog" function into "which". + + "which" and its behaviour is not standardized, so convert the existing + have_prog function into "which" so we can rely on it being available + and what its semantics are. Add a have_prog wrapper that maintains the + existing behaviour. -commit 217b518e0f7c52c4b909e935141a55344c61e644 +commit ea7ecc2c3ae39fdf5c6ad97b7bc0b47a98847f43 Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Fri May 6 14:39:34 2022 +1000 +Date: Sat Jul 23 14:36:38 2022 +1000 - Add ubsan minimal testcase on OpenBSD. + Skip scp3 test if there's no scp on remote path. - As suggested by djm@. + scp -3 ends up using the scp that's in the remote path and will fail if + one is not available. Based on a patch from rapier at psc.edu. -commit 457dce2cfef6a48f5442591cd8b21c7e8cba13f8 -Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Thu May 5 01:04:14 2022 +0000 +commit c46f6fed419167c1671e4227459e108036c760f8 +Author: Damien Miller +Date: Wed Jul 20 13:39:14 2022 +1000 - upstream: sshkey_unshield_private() contains a exact duplicate of - - the code in private2_check_padding(). Pull private2_check_padding() up so the - code can be reused. From Martin Vahlensieck, ok deraadt@ - - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 876884c3f0e62e8fd8d1594bab06900f971c9c85 + crank SSH_SK_VERSION_MAJOR in sk-dummy.so -commit 0e44db4d9cb313e68a59a44d27884af66c02356e +commit f208e3b9ffb5ee76cf9c95df7ff967adc7f51c7d Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Thu May 5 00:56:58 2022 +0000 +Date: Wed Jul 20 03:33:22 2022 +0000 - upstream: channel_new no longer frees remote_name. So update the + upstream: ssh-keygen: fix touch prompt, pin retries; - comment accordingly. As remote_name is not modified, it can be const as - well. From Martin Vahlensieck + part of GHPR329 from Pedro Martelletto - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: e4e10dc8dc9f40c166ea5a8e991942bedc75a76a + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 75d1005bd2ef8f29fa834c90d2684e73556fffe8 -commit 37b62fd5caf19c85a48241535277cefff65adace +commit 8638a2ce7e90c8a51d9af3143404282126c524f8 Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Thu May 5 00:55:11 2022 +0000 - - upstream: mux.c: mark argument as const; from Martin Vahlensieck - - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 69a1a93a55986c7c2ad9f733c093b46a47184341 - -commit f4e67c0ad259b4cf10177277a5827fa5545bac53 -Author: markus@openbsd.org -Date: Wed May 4 07:31:22 2022 +0000 - - upstream: make sure stdout is non-blocking; ok djm@ - - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 64940fffbd1b882eda2d7c8c7a43c79368309c0d - -commit e5c036d2092c00bef395e9161dc5ce42d4be9565 -Author: florian@openbsd.org -Date: Tue May 3 07:42:27 2022 +0000 +Date: Wed Jul 20 03:31:42 2022 +0000 - upstream: Add FIDO AUTHENTICATOR section and explain a bit how FIDO + upstream: sk-usbhid: preserve error code returned by key_lookup() - works. The wording came mostly from the 8.2 OpenSSH release notes, addapted - to fit the man page. Then move the -O bits into the new section as is already - done for CERTIFICATES and MODULI GENERATION. Finally we can explain the - trade-offs of resident keys. While here, consistently refer to the FIDO - thingies as "FIDO authenticators", not "FIDO tokens". + it conveys useful information, such as the supplied pin being wrong. - input & OK jmc, naddy + Part of GHPR329 from Pedro Martelletto - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: dd98748d7644df048f78dcf793b3b63db9ab1d25 + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: c0647eb9290f793add363d81378439b273756c1b -commit 575771bf79bef7127be6aaccddc46031ea15529e -Author: jmc@openbsd.org -Date: Mon May 2 05:40:37 2022 +0000 +commit 9ab929ca2d820520327b41929372bcb9e261534c +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Wed Jul 20 03:29:14 2022 +0000 - upstream: remove an obsolete rsa1 format example from an example; + upstream: when enrolling a resident key on a security token, check - from megan batty - ok djm + if a credential with matching application and user ID strings already exists. + if so, prompt the user for confirmation before overwriting the credential. - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: db2c89879c29bf083df996bd830abfb1e70d62bf - -commit 0bc6b4c8f04e292577bdb44d5dc6b630d3448087 -Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Sun May 1 23:20:30 2022 +0000 - - upstream: fix some integer overflows in sieve_large() that show up when + patch from Pedro Martelletto via GHPR329 - trying to generate modp groups > 16k bits. Reported via GHPR#306 by Bertram - Felgenhauer, but fixed in a different way. feedback/ok tb@ + NB. cranks SSH_SK_VERSION_MAJOR, so any third-party FIDO middleware + implementations will need to adjust - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 81cbc6dd3a21c57bd6fadea10e44afe37bca558e + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: e45e9f1bf2b2f32d9850669e7a8dbd64acc5fca4 -commit a45615cb172bc827e21ec76750de39dfb30ecc05 +commit 5bcfc788b38d5b64e4c347bdc04bd9a01bbc36da Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Fri Apr 29 04:55:07 2022 +0000 +Date: Wed Jul 20 03:13:04 2022 +0000 - upstream: be stricter in which characters will be accepted in + upstream: pull passphrase reading and confirmation into a separate - specifying a mask length; allow only 0-9. From khaleesicodes via GHPR#278; ok - dtucker@ + function so it can be used for FIDO2 PINs; no functional change - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: e267746c047ea86665cdeccef795a8a56082eeb2 + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: bf34f76b8283cc1d3f54633e0d4f13613d87bb2f -commit 4835544d2dd31de6ffc7dba59f92093aea98155b +commit eb679e2959bdb15454eb94751930eb4c9110da94 Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Sat Apr 30 10:56:41 2022 +1000 - - Add Mac OS X 12 test target. - -commit 97a6a8b8c1f2da09712d0e72d0ef800e4edd34cd -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Fri Apr 29 18:27:34 2022 +1000 +Date: Fri Jul 15 21:31:48 2022 +1000 - Only run tests when source files change. + Move vmshutdown to first step. - Also run tests on changes to V_9_0 branch. + If a previous run on a physical runner has failed to clean up, the next + run will fail because it'll try to check out the code to a broken + directory mount. Make cleanup the first step. -commit 6d0392b9ff4b50a56ac5685d1b9392e2cd432ca3 +commit 46b91b70ff3cb9c147e2875ef5dc609fd64c0c96 Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Fri Apr 29 18:22:34 2022 +1000 +Date: Fri Jul 15 20:25:27 2022 +1000 - Remove now-empty int32_minmax.inc. + Rename bbone test target to ARM. -commit af59463553b5ad52d3b42c4455ee3c5600158bb7 -Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Fri Apr 29 03:24:30 2022 +0000 +commit 751d22cdeffed9fe921db78eedc32a29f9e80510 +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Fri Jul 15 13:37:29 2022 +1000 - upstream: mention that the helpers are used by ssh(1), ssh-agent(1) - - and ssh-keygen(1). Previously only ssh(1) was mentioned. From Pedro - Martelletto + Add AUDIT_ARCH_PPC to supported seccomp arches. - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 30f880f989d4b329589c1c404315685960a5f153 + Patch from dries.deschout at dodeco.eu. -commit 3e26b3a6eebcee27be177207cc0846fb844b7a56 -Author: dtucker@openbsd.org -Date: Fri Apr 29 03:16:48 2022 +0000 +commit a061792a6e8d235fc40a9b5d4c22a1762bb75a7b +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Thu Jul 14 19:20:24 2022 +1000 - upstream: Don't leak SK device. Patch from Pedro Martelletto via - - github PR#316. ok djm@ + Remove unintended changes. - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 17d11327545022e727d95fd08b213171c5a4585d + I inadvertently included a couple of local changes with the OpenSSL + 3.0.4 change. Revert, anything that should be there will be committed + separately. -commit 247082b5013f0d4fcae8f97453f2a2f01bcda811 -Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Fri Apr 29 03:13:32 2022 +0000 +commit 527cb43fa1b4e55df661feabbac51b8e608b6519 +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Thu Jul 14 11:22:08 2022 +1000 - upstream: fix memleak on session-bind path; from Pedro Martelletto, ok + Return ERANGE from getcwd() if buffer size is 1. - dtucker@ + If getcwd() is supplied a buffer size of exactly 1 and a path of "/", it + could result in a nul byte being written out of array bounds. POSIX says + it should return ERANGE if the path will not fit in the available buffer + (with terminating nul). 1 byte cannot fit any possible path with its nul, + so immediately return ERANGE in that case. - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: e85899a26ba402b4c0717b531317e8fc258f0a7e + OpenSSH never uses getcwd() with this buffer size, and all current + (and even quite old) platforms that we are currently known to work + on have a native getcwd() so this code is not used on those anyway. + Reported by Qualys, ok djm@ -commit e05522008092ceb86a87bdd4ad7878424315db89 -Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Thu Apr 28 02:53:31 2022 +0000 +commit 36857fefd8849c4b0e877cfd9d1eb22f79b76650 +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Thu Jul 14 10:02:35 2022 +1000 - upstream: avoid printing hash algorithm twice; from lucas AT sexy.is + Split README.platform into its own line. - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 9d24671e10a84141b7c504396cabad600e47a941 + README.platform has general platform-specific information, having it + following text about FIDO2 on the same line could imply that it only + has information about FIDO2. -commit 0979e29356915261d69a9517a1e0aaade7c9fc75 -Author: dtucker@openbsd.org -Date: Wed Apr 27 11:08:55 2022 +0000 +commit 00a496c6c14f2d41f2a9365714d494dd5f3aac9f +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Thu Jul 14 09:56:01 2022 +1000 - upstream: Add authfd path to debug output. ok markus@ + Clarify README.md text. - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: f735a17d1a6f2bee63bfc609d76ef8db8c090890 + Clarify the text about the implications of building without OpenSSL, and + prefix the "configure --help" example command with a "./" so it's likely + to work as-is in more shells. From bz#3461. -commit 67b7c784769c74fd4d6b147d91e17e1ac1a8a96d -Author: dtucker@openbsd.org -Date: Tue Apr 26 07:41:44 2022 +0000 +commit f40b52f21fbc52eb513279168a49d3285c65256c +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Tue Jul 12 19:48:44 2022 +1000 - upstream: Check sshauthopt_new() for NULL. bz#3425, from + Remove special casing of crypt(). - tessgauthier at microsoft.com. ok djm@ + Configure goes to some lengths to pick crypt() from either libcrypt + or OpenSSL's libcrypto because they can more or less featureful (eg + supporting md5-style passwords). - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: af0315bc3e44aa406daa7e0ae7c2d719a974483f + OpenSSL removed its crypt() interface in 2002: + https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/69deec58 so these hijinks + should no longer be necessary. This also only links sshd with libcrypt + which is the only thing that needs it. ok djm@ -commit d571314d14b919fbd7c84a61f9bf2065fc0a6841 -Author: millert@openbsd.org -Date: Wed Apr 20 16:00:25 2022 +0000 +commit 76f4e48631d7b09fb243b47d7b393d100d3741b7 +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Wed Jul 13 13:17:47 2022 +1000 - upstream: Remove unnecessary includes: openssl/hmac.h and - - openssl/evp.h. From Martin Vahlensieck. + Only refuse to use OpenSSL 3.0.4 on x86_64. - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: a6debb5fb0c8a44e43e8d5ca7cc70ad2f3ea31c3 + The potential RCE only impacts x86_64, so only refuse to use it if we're + targetting a potentially impacted architecture. ok djm@ -commit da8dddf8cc1f2516ff894b8183e83a7c5ba3ef80 -Author: millert@openbsd.org -Date: Wed Apr 20 15:59:18 2022 +0000 +commit e75bbc1d88491fa85e61b2cc8783d4bbd00cd131 +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Tue Jul 12 14:37:15 2022 +1000 - upstream: Add missing includes of stdlib.h and stdint.h. We need - - stdlib.h for malloc(3) and stdint.h for SIZE_MAX. Unlike the other xmss - files, ssh-xmss.c does not include xmss_commons.h so ssh-xmss.c must include - those headers itself. From Martin Vahlensieck - - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 70e28a9818cee3da1be2ef6503d4b396dd421e6b + Capture stderr output from configure. -commit fe9d87a6800a7a33be08f4d5ab662a758055ced2 -Author: millert@openbsd.org -Date: Wed Apr 20 15:56:49 2022 +0000 +commit d9eaea4bea6271bcee6a2b9428f1271faf2d033b +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Tue Jul 12 12:54:49 2022 +1000 - upstream: Avoid an unnecessary xstrdup in rm_env() when matching - - patterns. Since match_pattern() doesn't modify its arguments (they are - const), there is no need to make an extra copy of the strings in - options->send_env. From Martin Vahlensieck + Refuse to use OpenSSL 3.0.4 due to potential RCE. - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 2c9db31e3f4d3403b49642c64ee048b2a0a39351 + OpenSSL has a potential RCE in its RSA implementation (CVE-2022-2274) + so refuse to use that specific version. -commit 7bf2eb958fbb551e7d61e75c176bb3200383285d +commit fb2f3a61bf3d28fff285524535f7ffcd177c9235 Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Tue Apr 26 23:30:59 2022 +1000 +Date: Tue Jul 12 12:54:24 2022 +1000 - Add debian-riscv64 test target. + Move unset to before we set anything. -commit 3913c935523902482974c4c503bcff20bd850a6a +commit c483a5c0fb8e8b8915fad85c5f6113386a4341ca Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Mon Apr 25 17:20:06 2022 +1000 +Date: Wed Jul 6 11:52:54 2022 +1000 - Update OpenSSL and LibreSSL versions in tests. + Test against openssl-3.0.5. -commit dcd8dca29bcdb193ff6be35b96fc55e6e30d37d9 +commit 669a56bcfe73f8b985f2bba476ba834d55253acf Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Sat Apr 23 20:40:28 2022 +1000 +Date: Tue Jul 5 18:35:53 2022 +1000 - Include stdlib.h for free() prototype. + Update sanitizer test targets: - ... which is used inside the CUSTOM_SYS_AUTH_GET_LASTLOGIN_MSG block. + - remove clang-sanitize-memory for now. It takes so long that the test + times out. + - add gcc sanitize-address and sanitize-undefined test targets. -commit 4cc05de568e1c3edd7834ff3bd9d8214eb34861b +commit 48cc68b69118b3ce8d07fd4f82e00d58667d5379 Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Sat Apr 23 20:17:26 2022 +1000 +Date: Tue Jul 5 16:23:28 2022 +1000 - Cache timezone data in capsicum sandbox. - - From emaste at freebsd.org, originally part of FreeBSD commit r339216 - / fc3c19a9 with autoconf bits added by me. + Add GCC address sanitizer build/test. -commit c31404426d212e2964ff9e5e58e1d0fce3d83f27 -Author: dtucker@openbsd.org -Date: Thu Apr 21 01:36:46 2022 +0000 +commit 55c60bdd39b82457e92efa77da8d16cfa6a49391 +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Tue Jul 5 12:02:33 2022 +1000 - upstream: It looks like we can't completely avoid - - waiting for processes to exit so retrieve the pid via controlmaster and - use that. - - OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 8246f00f22b14e49d2ff1744c94897ead33d457b + Move sanitizer logs into regress for collection. -commit d19b21afab5c8e2f3df6bd8aee9766bdad3d8c58 +commit 35ef2b3b6ef198f8574904a45780487ec2f17858 Author: dtucker@openbsd.org -Date: Wed Apr 20 13:25:55 2022 +0000 +Date: Mon Jul 4 09:10:31 2022 +0000 - upstream: Use ssh -f and ControlPersist .. + upstream: Add TEST_REGRESS_CACHE_DIR. - to start up test forwards and ssh -O stop to shut them down intead of - sleep loops. This speeds up the test by an order of magnitude. + If set, it is used to cache regress test names that have succeeded and + skip those on a re-run. - OpenBSD-Regress-ID: eb3db5f805100919b092a3b2579c611fba3e83e7 + OpenBSD-Regress-ID: a7570dd29a58df59f2cca647c3c2ec989b49f247 -commit 5f76286a126721fa005de6edf3d1c7a265555f19 -Author: dtucker@openbsd.org -Date: Wed Apr 20 05:24:13 2022 +0000 +commit 7394ed80c4de8b228a43c8956cf2fa1b9c6b2622 +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Sun Jul 3 21:46:44 2022 +1000 - upstream: Simplify forward-control test. - - Since we no longer need to support SSH1 we don't need to run shell - commands on the other end of the connection and can use ssh -N instead. - This also makes the test less racy. + Add clang sanitizer tests. + +commit bfce0e66b6017a9bfab450b9dc7d4b16f90de817 +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Sun Jul 3 18:14:09 2022 +1000 + + Skip all rlimit tests when sandboxing disabled. - OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 32e94ce272820cc398f30b848b2b0f080d10302c + The rlimit tests can hang when being run with some compiler sanitizers + so skip all of them if sandbox=no. -commit 687bbf23572d8bdf25cbbcdf8ac583514e1ba710 -Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Thu Mar 31 03:07:33 2022 +0000 +commit 6208d611520f9ea94d5369f9da404b709930029d +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Sun Jul 3 17:54:49 2022 +1000 - upstream: regression test for sftp cp command + Move checks for pollfd.fd and nfds_t. - OpenBSD-Regress-ID: c96bea9edde3a384b254785e7f9b2b24a81cdf82 + Move the checks for struct pollfd.fd and nfds_t to before the sandboxing + checks. This groups all the sandbox checks together so we can skip them + all when sandboxing is disabled. -commit f1233f19a6a9fe58f52946f50df4772f5b136761 +commit 322964f8f2e9c321e77ebae1e4d2cd0ccc5c5a0b Author: dtucker@openbsd.org -Date: Wed Apr 20 01:13:47 2022 +0000 +Date: Fri Jul 1 05:08:23 2022 +0000 - upstream: Import regenerated moduli + upstream: Remove leftover line. - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: f9a0726d957cf10692a231996a1f34e7f9cdfeb0 + Remove extra line leftover from merge conflict. ok djm@ + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 460e2290875d7ae64971a7e669c244b1d1c0ae2e -commit fec014785de198b9a325d1b94e324bb958c5fe7b +commit 7ec81daad0e03a64e8d91c5590960c48c1a899a3 Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Wed Apr 20 04:19:11 2022 +0000 +Date: Fri Jul 1 04:45:50 2022 +0000 - upstream: Try to continue running local I/O for channels in state + upstream: use consistent field names (s/char/byte) - OPEN during SSH transport rekeying. The most visible benefit is that it - should make ~-escapes work in the client (e.g. to exit) if the connection - happened to have stalled during a rekey event. Based work by and ok dtucker@ + in format description - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: a66e8f254e92edd4ce09c9f750883ec8f1ea5f45 + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 3de33572733ee7fcfd7db33d37db23d2280254f0 -commit e68154b0d4f0f5085a050ea896955da1b1be6e30 -Author: dtucker@openbsd.org -Date: Wed Apr 20 01:13:47 2022 +0000 +commit 32e82a392d9f263485effdd606ff5862d289a4a0 +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Fri Jul 1 13:55:19 2022 +1000 - upstream: Import regenerated moduli + Skip select+rlimit check if sandboxing is disabled - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: f9a0726d957cf10692a231996a1f34e7f9cdfeb0 + It's not needed in that case, and the test can fail when being built + with some compiler memory sanitizer flags. bz#3441 -commit 69928b106d8f0fa15b88cf3850d992ed81c44ae0 -Author: tj@openbsd.org -Date: Sat Apr 16 00:22:31 2022 +0000 +commit 4be7184ebe2a2ccef175983517a35ee06766e1b4 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Fri Jul 1 03:52:57 2022 +0000 - upstream: list the correct version number + upstream: bump up loglevel from debug to info when unable to open - for when usage of the sftp protocol became default and fix a typo - from ed maste + authorized keys/principals file for errno != ENOENT; bz2042 ok dtucker - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 24e1795ed2283fdeacf16413c2f07503bcdebb31 + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: e79aa550d91ade6a80f081bda689da24c086d66b -commit 21042a05c0b304c16f655efeec97438249d2e2cc +commit 6c31ba10e97b6953c4f325f526f3e846dfea647a Author: dtucker@openbsd.org -Date: Tue Apr 12 05:09:49 2022 +0000 +Date: Fri Jul 1 03:39:44 2022 +0000 - upstream: Correct path for system known hosts file in description + upstream: Don't leak the strings allocated by order_hostkeyalgs() - of IgnoreUserKnownHosts. Patch from Martin Vahlensieck via tech@ + and list_hostkey_types() that are passed to compat_pkalg_proposal(). Part of + github PR#324 from ZoltanFridrich, ok djm@ - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 9b7784f054fa5aa4d63cb36bd563889477127215 - -commit 53f4aff60a7c1a08a23917bd47496f8901c471f5 -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Sat Apr 16 14:33:20 2022 +1000 - - Resync moduli.5 with upstream. + This is a roll-forward of the previous rollback now that the required + changes in compat.c have been done. - 1.18: remove duplicate publication year; carsten dot kunze at arcor dot de - 1.19: ssh-keygen's -G/-T have been replaced with -M generate/screen. + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: c7cd93730b3b9f53cdad3ae32462922834ef73eb -commit d2b888762b9844eb0d8eb59909cdf5af5159f810 -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Sat Apr 16 14:31:13 2022 +1000 +commit 486c4dc3b83b4b67d663fb0fa62bc24138ec3946 +Author: dtucker@openbsd.org +Date: Fri Jul 1 03:35:45 2022 +0000 - Retire fbsd6 test VM. + upstream: Always return allocated strings from the kex filtering so - It's long since out of support, relatively slow (it's i686) and the - compiler has trouble with PIE. + that we can free them later. Fix one leak in compat_kex_proposal. Based on + github PR#324 from ZoltanFridrich with some simplications by me. ok djm@ + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 9171616da3307612d0ede086fd511142f91246e4 -commit cd1f70009860a154b51230d367c55ea5f9a4504e +commit 96faa0de6c673a2ce84736eba37fc9fb723d9e5c Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Mon Apr 11 22:52:08 2022 +0000 +Date: Fri Jul 1 00:36:30 2022 +0000 - upstream: clear io_want/io_ready flags at start of poll() cycle; + upstream: ignore SIGPIPE earlier in main(), specifically before - avoids plausible spin during rekeying if channel io_want flags are reused - across cycles. ok markus@ deraadt@ + muxclient() which performs operations that could cause one; Reported by Noam + Lewis via bz3454, ok dtucker@ - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 91034f855b7c73cd2591657c49ac30f10322b967 + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 63d8e13276869eebac6d7a05d5a96307f9026e47 -commit aa1920302778273f7f94c2091319aba199068ca0 -Author: dtucker@openbsd.org -Date: Fri Apr 8 05:43:39 2022 +0000 +commit 33efac790f6b09d54894ba6c3e17dfb08b6fc7e1 +Author: jmc@openbsd.org +Date: Tue Jun 28 06:09:14 2022 +0000 - upstream: Note that curve25519-sha256 was later published in - - RFC8731. ok djm@ + upstream: reflect the update to -D arg name in usage(); - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 2ac2b5d642d4cf5918eaec8653cad9a4460b2743 + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: abdcde4f92b1ef094ae44210ee99d3b0155aad9c -commit 4673fa8f2be983f2f88d5afd754adb1a2a39ec9e +commit c71a1442d02f0a3586109dfe2cb366de36dee08e +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Wed Jun 29 18:28:47 2022 +1000 + + Update OpenSSL tests to the most recent releases. + +commit 2a822f29300b2de7335fbff65f0b187a0c582304 Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Fri Apr 8 04:40:40 2022 +0000 +Date: Mon Jun 27 21:41:55 2022 +0000 - upstream: two defensive changes from Tobias Stoeckmann via GHPR287 + upstream: allow arguments to sftp -D option, e.g. sftp -D - enforce stricter invarient for sshbuf_set_parent() - never allow - a buffer to have a previously-set parent changed. + "/usr/libexec/sftp-server -el debug3" - In sshbuf_reset(), if the reallocation fails, then zero the entire - buffer and not the (potentially smaller) default initial alloc size. + ok markus@ - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 14583203aa5d50ad38d2e209ae10abaf8955e6a9 + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 5a002b9f3a7aef2731fc0ffa9c921cf15f38ecce -commit 26eef015e2d2254375e13afaaf753b78932b1bf5 -Author: Damien Miller -Date: Mon Apr 11 16:07:09 2022 +1000 +commit 2369a2810187e08f2af5d58b343956062fb96ee8 +Author: dtucker@openbsd.org +Date: Fri Jun 24 10:45:06 2022 +0000 - Revert "update build-aux files to match autoconf-2.71" + upstream: Roll back previous KEX changes as they aren't safe until - This reverts commit 0a8ca39fac6ad19096b6c263436f8b2dd51606f2. + compat_pkalg_proposal and friends always allocate their returned strings. + Reported by Qualys. - It turns out that the checked-in copies of these files are actually newer - than autoconf-2.71's copies, so this was effectively a downgrade. - Spotted by Bo Anderson via github + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 1c7a88a0d5033f42f88ab9bec58ef1cf72c81ad0 -commit 0a8ca39fac6ad19096b6c263436f8b2dd51606f2 -Author: Damien Miller -Date: Fri Apr 8 14:48:58 2022 +1000 +commit 646686136c34c2dbf6a01296dfaa9ebee029386d +Author: dtucker@openbsd.org +Date: Fri Jun 24 04:37:00 2022 +0000 - update build-aux files to match autoconf-2.71 + upstream: Don't leak the strings allocated by order_hostkeyalgs() - i.e. config.guess, config.sub and install-sh + and list_hostkey_types() that are passed to compat_pkalg_proposal(). Part of + github PR#324 from ZoltanFridrich, ok djm@ + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: b2f6e5f60f2bba293b831654328a8a0035ef4a1b -commit 94eb6858efecc1b4f02d8a6bd35e149f55c814c8 +commit 193c6d8d905dde836b628fc07a7b9cf2d347e2a3 +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Sat Jun 25 12:16:15 2022 +1000 + + Zero out LIBFIDO2 when SK support not usable. + + Prevents us from trying to link them into ssh-sk-helper and failing to + build. + +commit 40f5d849d25c60b4ae21261e78484d435f5cfd51 +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Sat Jun 25 11:47:28 2022 +1000 + + Disable SK support if FIDO libs not found. + +commit 5fd922ade1b25880fe8a8249f5c0385e413108f9 Author: Damien Miller -Date: Wed Apr 6 10:47:48 2022 +1000 +Date: Fri Jun 24 14:43:54 2022 +1000 - update version numbers for release + fix broken case statement in previous -commit 8e4a8eadf4fe74e65e6492f34250f8cf7d67e8da -Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Mon Apr 4 22:45:25 2022 +0000 +commit f51423bdaf0008d46b6af082bcfd7a22a87375f0 +Author: Damien Miller +Date: Fri Jun 24 14:40:42 2022 +1000 - upstream: openssh-9.0 + request 1.1x API compatibility for OpenSSL >=3.x - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 0dfb461188f4513ec024c1534da8c1ce14c20b64 + idea/patch from Pedro Martelletto via GHPR#322; ok dtucker@ -commit a9f23ea2e3227f406880c2634d066f6f50fa5eaa -Author: naddy@openbsd.org -Date: Thu Mar 31 17:58:44 2022 +0000 +commit 455cee8d6c2e4c48c5af9faead3599c49948411e +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Fri Jun 24 04:27:14 2022 +0000 - upstream: ssh: document sntrup761x25519-sha512@openssh.com as + upstream: make it clear that RekeyLimit applies to both transmitted - default KEX + and received data. GHPR#328 from Jan Pazdziora - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 12545bfa10bcbf552d04d9d9520d0f4e98b0e171 + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: d180a905fec9ff418a75c07bb96ea41c9308c3f9 -commit 9ec2713d122af79d66ebb9c1d6d9ae8621a8945f -Author: naddy@openbsd.org -Date: Thu Mar 31 17:27:27 2022 +0000 +commit 17904f05802988d0bb9ed3c8d1d37411e8f459c3 +Author: tobhe@openbsd.org +Date: Tue Jun 21 14:52:13 2022 +0000 - upstream: man pages: add missing commas between subordinate and - - main clauses + upstream: Make sure not to fclose() the same fd twice in case of an - jmc@ dislikes a comma before "then" in a conditional, so leave those - untouched. + error. - ok jmc@ + ok dtucker@ - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 9520801729bebcb3c9fe43ad7f9776ab4dd05ea3 + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: e384c4e05d5521e7866b3d53ca59acd2a86eef99 -commit 3741df98ffaaff92b474ee70d8ef276b5882f85a -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Mon Apr 4 23:52:11 2022 +1000 +commit f29d6cf98c25bf044079032d22c1a57c63ab9d8e +Author: dtucker@openbsd.org +Date: Sat Jun 18 02:17:16 2022 +0000 - Disable security key on fbsd6 test host. + upstream: Don't attempt to fprintf a null identity comment. From + + Martin Vahlensieck via tech@. + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 4c54d20a8e8e4e9912c38a7b4ef5bfc5ca2e05c2 -commit 32c12236f27ae83bfe6d2983b67c9bc67a83a417 -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Mon Apr 4 15:16:51 2022 +1000 +commit ad1762173bb38716a106e8979806149fd0f2753e +Author: dtucker@openbsd.org +Date: Fri Jun 17 01:00:03 2022 +0000 - Specify TEST_SHELL=bash on AIX. + upstream: Log an error if pipe() fails while accepting a - The system shells cause the agent-restrict test to fail due to some - quoting so explicitly specify bash until we can get configure to - autmatically work around that. + connection. bz#3447, from vincent-openssh at vinc17 net, ok djm@ + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 9d59f19872b94900a5c79da2d57850241ac5df94 -commit 90452c8b69d065b7c7c285ff78b81418a75bcd76 -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Fri Apr 1 23:38:44 2022 +1100 +commit 9c59e7486cc8691401228b43b96a3edbb06e0412 +Author: Damien Miller +Date: Fri Jun 24 14:20:43 2022 +1000 - Only return events from ppoll that were requested. + automatically enable built-in FIDO support - If the underlying system's select() returns bits that were not in the - request set, our ppoll() implementation can return revents for events - not requested, which can apparently cause a hang. Only return revents - for activity in the requested event set. bz#3416, analysis and fix by - yaroslav.kuzmin at vmssoftware com, ok djm@ + If libfido2 is found and usable, then enable the built-in + security key support unless --without-security-key-builtin + was requested. + + ok dtucker@ -commit 6c49eb5fabc56f4865164ed818aa5112d09c31a8 -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Fri Apr 1 23:21:40 2022 +1100 +commit 7d25b37fb2a5ff4dadabcbdac6087a97479434f5 +Author: Damien Miller +Date: Fri Jun 24 13:46:39 2022 +1000 - Only run regression tests on slow VMs. + fix possible NULL deref when built without FIDO + + Analysis/fix from kircher in bz3443; ok dtucker@ -commit f67e47903977b42cb6abcd5565a61bd7293e4dc3 -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Fri Apr 1 23:21:06 2022 +1100 +commit f5ba85daddfc2da6a8dab6038269e02c0695be44 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Wed Jun 15 16:08:25 2022 +0000 - Increase test timeout to allow slow VMs to finish - -commit 02488c1b54065ddc4f25835dbd2618b2a2fe21f5 -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Fri Apr 1 16:27:38 2022 +1100 - - Use bash or ksh if available for SH in Makefile. - -commit 34c7018c316af4773e432066de28d0ef9d0888cd -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Fri Apr 1 14:56:54 2022 +1100 - - Set Makefile SHELL as determined by configure. + upstream: make sure that UseDNS hostname lookup happens in the monitor - This should improve compatibility for users with non-POSIX shells. If - using Makefile.in directly (eg make -f Makefile.in distprep) then SHELL - will need to be specified on the command line (along with MANFMT in that - particular case). ok djm@ - -commit 5b054d76402faab38c48377efd112426469553a0 -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Fri Apr 1 13:16:47 2022 +1100 - - Skip slow tests on (very) slow test targets. - -commit b275818065b31a865142c48c2acf6a7c1655c542 -Author: Damien Miller -Date: Thu Mar 31 14:11:36 2022 +1100 - - depend + and not in the pledge(2)'d unprivileged process; fixes regression caused by + recent refactoring spotted by henning@ + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: a089870b95101cd8881a2dff65b2f1627d13e88d -commit 3fa539c3ffaabd6211995512d33e29150f88c5c5 +commit acb2059febaddd71ee06c2ebf63dcf211d9ab9f2 Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Thu Mar 31 03:07:03 2022 +0000 +Date: Fri Jun 3 04:47:21 2022 +0000 - upstream: add a sftp client "cp" command that supports server-side + upstream: move auth_openprincipals() and auth_openkeyfile() over to - copying of files. Useful for this task and for testing the copy-data - extension. Patch from Mike Frysinger; ok dtucker@ + auth2-pubkeyfile.c too; they make more sense there. - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 1bb1b950af0d49f0d5425b1f267e197aa1b57444 + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 9970d99f900e1117fdaab13e9e910a621b7c60ee -commit 7988bfc4b701c4b3fe9b36c8561a3d1c5d4c9a74 +commit 3d9b0845f34510111cc693bb99a667662ca50cd8 Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Thu Mar 31 03:05:49 2022 +0000 +Date: Fri Jun 3 04:31:54 2022 +0000 - upstream: add support for the "corp-data" protocol extension to + upstream: test setenv in both client and server, test first-match-wins - allow server-side copies to be performed without having to go via the client. - Patch by Mike Frysinger, ok dtucker@ + too - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 00aa510940fedd66dab1843b58682de4eb7156d5 + OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 4c8804f9db38a02db480b9923317457b377fe34b -commit 32dc1c29a4ac9c592ddfef0a4895eb36c1f567ba +commit 22e1a3a71ad6d108ff0c5f07f93c3fcbd30f8b40 Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Wed Mar 30 21:13:23 2022 +0000 +Date: Fri Jun 3 04:30:46 2022 +0000 - upstream: select post-quantum KEX + upstream: Make SetEnv directives first-match-wins in both - sntrup761x25519-sha512@openssh.com as the default; ok markus@ + sshd_config and sshd_config; previously if the same name was reused then the + last would win (which is the opposite to how the config is supposed to work). - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: f02d99cbfce22dffec2e2ab1b60905fbddf48fb9 - -commit d6556de1db0822c76ba2745cf5c097d9472adf7c -Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Wed Mar 30 21:10:25 2022 +0000 - - upstream: fix poll() spin when a channel's output fd closes without + While there, make the ssh_config parsing more like sshd_config. - data in the channel buffer. Introduce more exact packing of channel fds into - the pollfd array. fixes bz3405 and bz3411; ok deraadt@ markus@ + bz3438, ok dtucker - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 06740737849c9047785622ad5d472cb6a3907d10 + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 797909c1e0262c0d00e09280459d7ab00f18273b -commit 8a74a96d25ca4d32fbf298f6c0ac5a148501777d -Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Wed Mar 30 04:33:09 2022 +0000 +commit 38ed6c57e9e592c08e020fa6e82b45b4e1040970 +Author: dtucker@openbsd.org +Date: Fri Jun 3 04:00:15 2022 +0000 - upstream: ssh is almost out of getopt() characters; note the + upstream: Add missing *-sk types to ssh-keyscan manpage. From - remaining remaining available ones in a comment + skazi0 via github PR#294. - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 48d38cef59d6bc8e84c6c066f6d601875d3253fd + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: fda2c869cdb871f3c90a89fb3f985370bb5d25c0 -commit 6d4fc51adb9d8a42f67b5474f02f877422379de6 -Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Wed Mar 30 04:27:51 2022 +0000 +commit ea97ec98c41ec2b755dfab459347db674ff9a5de +Author: dtucker@openbsd.org +Date: Fri Jun 3 03:21:09 2022 +0000 - upstream: avoid NULL deref via ssh-keygen -Y find-principals. + upstream: Add period at end of "not known by any other names" - bz3409, reported by Mateusz Adamowski + message. github PR#320 from jschauma, ok djm@ - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: a3b2c02438052ee858e0ee18e5a288586b5df2c5 + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: bd60809803c4bfd3ebb7c5c4d918b10e275266f2 -commit e937514920335b92b543fd9be79cd6481d1eb0b6 -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Mon Mar 28 17:51:03 2022 +1100 +commit 88e376fcd67478ad1660d94bc73ab348ac9f4527 +Author: dtucker@openbsd.org +Date: Fri Jun 3 03:17:42 2022 +0000 - Add AIX 5.1 test target. + upstream: ssh-keygen -A: do not generate DSA keys by default. + + Based on github PR#303 from jsegitz with man page text from jmc@, ok markus@ + djm@ + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 5c4c57bdd7063ff03381cfb6696659dd3f9f5b9f -commit 4bbe815ba974b4fd89cc3fc3e3ef1be847a0befe -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Sat Mar 26 22:01:31 2022 +1100 +commit 6b3fb624675082a1e5aa615d1b8479873d8b5731 +Author: naddy@openbsd.org +Date: Tue May 31 14:05:12 2022 +0000 - Drop leading "v" from release version identifier. + upstream: ssh-keygen: implement "verify-required" certificate option. - It's present in the git tags but not in the release tarball names. - Also drop extra "/" from URL path. + This was already documented when support for user-verified FIDO + keys was added, but the ssh-keygen(1) code was missing. + + ok djm@ + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: f660f973391b593fea4b7b25913c9a15c3eb8a06 -commit f5cdd3b3c275dffaebfca91df782dca29975e9ac -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Sat Mar 26 16:28:04 2022 +1100 +commit b7f86ffc301be105bba9a3e0618b6fab3ae379bd +Author: jmc@openbsd.org +Date: Sat May 28 05:57:56 2022 +0000 - Use tarballs when testing LibreSSL releases. + upstream: keywords ref ssh_config.5; - This means they'll still work when the combination of -portable and - openbsd github repos no longer match. + from caspar schutijser + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: f146a19d7d5c9374c3b9c520da43b2732d7d1a4e -commit 24dc37d198f35a7cf71bf4d5384363c7ef4209d4 -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Sat Mar 26 15:02:45 2022 +1100 +commit dc7bc52372f2744fa39191577be5306ee57aacd4 +Author: Damien Miller +Date: Mon May 30 09:29:09 2022 +1000 - Remove now-unused passwd variable. + fix some bugs in the fuzzer -commit 5b467ceef2c356f0a77f5e8ab4eb0fac367e4d24 +commit 1781f507c113667613351c19898efaf1e311a865 Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Sat Mar 26 13:15:44 2022 +1100 +Date: Fri May 27 18:19:48 2022 +1000 - Missing semicolon. + Test against OpenSSL 1.1.1o and 3.0.3. -commit 2923d026e55998133c0f6e5186dca2a3c0fa5ff5 +commit c53906e0c59e569691b4095d3e8db79cf78fa058 Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Sat Mar 26 12:49:50 2022 +1100 +Date: Fri May 27 18:18:31 2022 +1000 - Factor out platform-specific locked account check. - - Also fixes an incorrect free on platforms with both libiaf and shadow - passwords (probably only Unixware). Prompted by github PR#284, - originally from @c3h2_ctf and stoeckmann@. + Test against LibreSSL 3.5.3. -commit d23efe4b12886ffe416be10bc0a7da6ca8aa72d1 -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Sat Mar 26 08:13:46 2022 +1100 +commit 9b3ad432ad2f19319bcc089370e356c6315d682f +Author: Damien Miller +Date: Fri May 27 17:00:43 2022 +1000 - Add OpenWRT mips and mipsel test targets. + fuzzer for authorized_keys parsing + + mostly redundant to authopt_fuzz, but it's sensitive code so IMO it + makes sense to test this layer too -commit 16ea8b85838dd7a4dbeba4e51ac4f43fd68b1e5b +commit c83d8c4d6f3ccceef84d46de107f6b71cda06359 Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Sun Mar 20 08:52:17 2022 +0000 +Date: Fri May 27 05:02:46 2022 +0000 - upstream: don't leak argument list; bz3404, reported by Balu + upstream: split the low-level file handling functions out from - Gajjala ok dtucker@ + auth2-pubkey.c - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: fddc32d74e5dd5cff1a49ddd6297b0867eae56a6 + Put them in a new auth2-pubkeyfile.c to make it easier to refer to them + (e.g. in unit/fuzz tests) without having to refer to everything else + pubkey auth brings in. + + ok dtucker@ + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 3fdca2c61ad97dc1b8d4a7346816f83dc4ce2217 -commit a72bde294fe0518c9a44ba63864093a1ef2425e3 +commit 3b0b142d2a0767d8cd838e2f3aefde8a0aaa41e1 Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Sun Mar 20 08:51:21 2022 +0000 +Date: Fri May 27 05:01:25 2022 +0000 - upstream: make addargs() and replacearg() a little more robust and - - improve error reporting + upstream: refactor authorized_keys/principals handling - make freeargs(NULL) a noop like the other free functions + remove "struct ssh *" from arguments - this was only used to pass the + remote host/address. These can be passed in instead and the resulting + code is less tightly coupled to ssh_api.[ch] - ok dtucker as part of bz3403 + ok dtucker@ - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 15f86da83176978b4d1d288caa24c766dfa2983d + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 9d4373d013edc4cc4b5c21a599e1837ac31dda0d -commit 731087d2619fa7f01e675b23f57af10d745e8af2 -Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Fri Mar 18 04:04:11 2022 +0000 +commit 2c334fd36f80cb91cc42e4b978b10aa35e0df236 +Author: dtucker@openbsd.org +Date: Fri May 27 04:29:40 2022 +0000 - upstream: don't try to resolve ListenAddress directives in the sshd + upstream: f sshpkt functions fail, then password is not cleared - re-exec path - we're never going to use the result and if the operation fails - then it can prevent connections from being accepted. Reported by Aaron - Poffenberger; with / ok dtucker@ + with freezero. Unconditionally call freezero to guarantee that password is + removed from RAM. - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 44c53a43909a328e2f5ab26070fdef3594eded60 + From tobias@ and c3h2_ctf via github PR#286, ok djm@ + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 6b093619c9515328e25b0f8093779c52402c89cd -commit 1c83c082128694ddd11ac05fdf31d70312ff1763 -Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Fri Mar 18 02:50:21 2022 +0000 +commit 5d3a77f4c5ae774c6796387266503f52c7cdc7c2 +Author: dtucker@openbsd.org +Date: Fri May 27 04:27:49 2022 +0000 - upstream: remove blank line + upstream: Avoid kill with -1 argument. The out_ctx label can be - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: d5e0182965b2fbfb03ad5f256d1a1ce5706bcddf + reached before fork has been called. If this happens, then kill -1 would be + called, sending SIGTERM to all processes reachable by the current process. + + From tobias@ and c3h2_ctf via github PR#286, ok djm@ + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 6277af1207d81202f5daffdccfeeaed4c763b1a8 -commit 807be68684da7a1fe969c399ddce2fafb7997dcb -Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Fri Mar 18 02:32:22 2022 +0000 +commit 533b31cd08e4b97f455466f91c36915e2924c15a +Author: dtucker@openbsd.org +Date: Fri May 27 04:13:24 2022 +0000 - upstream: helpful comment + upstream: Note that ProxyJump also accepts the same tokens as - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: e3315a45cb04e7feeb614d76ec80a9fe4ca0e8c7 + ProxyCommand. From pallxk via github PR#305. + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 7115ac351b129205f1f1ffa6bbfd62abd76be7c5 -commit a0b5816f8f1f645acdf74f7bc11b34455ec30bac +commit 9d8c80f8a304babe61ca28f2e3fb5eb6dc9c39bf Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Fri Mar 18 02:31:25 2022 +0000 +Date: Wed May 25 06:03:44 2022 +0000 - upstream: ssh-keygen -Y check-novalidate requires namespace or SEGV - - will ensue. Patch from Mateusz Adamowski via GHPR#307 + upstream: revert previous; it was broken (spotted by Theo) - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 99e8ec38f9feb38bce6de240335be34aedeba5fd + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 457c79afaca2f89ec2606405c1059b98b30d8b0d -commit 5a252d54a63be30d5ba4be76210942d754a531c0 +commit 9e0d02ef7ce88b67643bfb1c2272c9f5f04cc680 Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Tue Mar 15 05:27:37 2022 +0000 - - upstream: improve DEBUG_CHANNEL_POLL debugging message - - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 2275eb7bc4707d019b1a0194b9c92c0b78da848f - -commit ce324cf58ba2840e31afeb996935800780c8fa4b -Author: cheloha@openbsd.org -Date: Sun Mar 13 23:27:54 2022 +0000 +Date: Wed May 25 00:31:13 2022 +0000 - upstream: ssh: xstrdup(): use memcpy(3) - - Copying the given string into the buffer with strlcpy(3) confers no - benefit in this context because we have already determined the - string's length with strlen(3) in order to allocate that buffer. - - Thread: https://marc.info/?l=openbsd-tech&m=164687525802691&w=2 + upstream: make SSHBUF_DBG/SSHBUF_TELL (off by default and only enabled - ok dtucker@ millert@ + via #define) dump to stderr rather than stdout - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: f8bfc082e36e2d2dc4e1feece02fe274155ca11a + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 10298513ee32db8390aecb0397d782d68cb14318 -commit 2893c5e764557f48f9d6a929e224ed49c59545db -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Fri Mar 11 18:43:58 2022 +1100 +commit 2487163630f28be28b7e2396b4bd6511b98f1d3e +Author: Tim Rice +Date: Tue May 24 10:21:25 2022 -0700 - Resync fmt_scaled. with OpenBSD. - - Fixes underflow reported in bz#3401. + configure.ac: Add missing AC_DEFINE for caph_cache_tzdata test causing + HAVE_CAPH_CACHE_TZDATA to be missing from config.h.in. + Spotted by Bryan Drewery -commit 5ae31a0fdd27855af29f48ff027491629fff5979 -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Wed Mar 9 09:41:56 2022 +1100 +commit bedb93415b60db3dfd704a3d525e82adb14a2481 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Sun May 15 23:48:07 2022 +0000 - Provide killpg implementation. + upstream: regress test for in-place transfers and clobbering larger - Based on github PR#301 for Tandem NonStop. + files with smaller ones; would have caught last regression in scp(1) + + OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 19de4e88dd3a4f7e5c1618c9be3c32415bd93bc2 -commit c41c84b439f4cd74d4fe44298a4b4037ddd7d2ae -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Wed Mar 9 09:29:30 2022 +1100 +commit b4f0d719c2548cb74da509fb65f384dada4ebd37 +Author: anton@openbsd.org +Date: Fri Apr 22 05:08:43 2022 +0000 - Check for missing ftruncate prototype. + upstream: Only run agent-ptrace.sh if gdb is available as all - From github PR#301 in conjunction with rsbeckerca. + architectures do not ship with gdb. + + OpenBSD-Regress-ID: ec53e928803e6b87f9ac142d38888ca79a45348d -commit 8cf5275452a950869cb90eeac7d220b01f77b12e -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Tue Mar 8 20:04:06 2022 +1100 +commit 9b73345f80255a7f3048026462f2c0c6a241eeac +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Sun May 15 23:47:21 2022 +0000 - Default to not using sandbox when cross compiling. + upstream: fix in-place copies; r1.163 incorrectly skipped truncation in - On most systems poll(2) does not work when the number of FDs is reduced - with setrlimit, so assume it doesn't when cross compiling and we can't - run the test. bz#3398. + all cases, not just at the start of a transfer. This could cause overwrites + of larger files to leave junk at the end. Spotted by tb@ + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: b189f19cd68119548c8e24e39c79f61e115bf92c -commit 379b30120da53d7c84aa8299c26b18c51c2a0dac +commit 56a0697fe079ff3e1ba30a2d5c26b5e45f7b71f8 Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Tue Mar 1 01:59:19 2022 +0000 +Date: Fri May 13 06:31:50 2022 +0000 - upstream: pack pollfd array before server_accept_loop() ppoll() + upstream: arrange for scp, when in sftp mode, to not ftruncate(3) files - call, and terminate sshd if ppoll() returns errno==EINVAL + early - avoids spin in ppoll when MaxStartups > RLIMIT_NOFILE, reported by - Daniel Micay + previous behavious of unconditionally truncating the destination file + would cause "scp ~/foo localhost:" and "scp localhost:foo ~/" to + delete all the contents of their destination. - feedback/ok deraadt + spotted by solene@ sthen@, also bz3431; ok dtucker@ - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: dbab1c24993ac977ec24d83283b8b7528f7c2c15 + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: ca39fdd39e0ec1466b9666f15cbcfddea6aaa179 -commit eceafbe0bdbbd9bd2f3cf024ccb350666a9934dd -Author: naddy@openbsd.org -Date: Sun Feb 27 01:33:59 2022 +0000 +commit fbcef70c2832712f027bccea1aa9bc4b4103da93 +Author: dtucker@openbsd.org +Date: Mon May 9 08:25:27 2022 +0000 - upstream: include rejected signature algorithm in error message and - - not the (useless) key type; ok djm@ + upstream: Remove errant apostrophe. From haruyama at queen-ml org. - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: d0c0f552a4d9161203e07e95d58a76eb602a76ff + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: dc6b294567cb84b384ad6ced9ca469f2bbf0bd10 -commit f2f3269423618a83157e18902385e720f9776007 -Author: dtucker@openbsd.org -Date: Fri Feb 25 09:46:24 2022 +0000 +commit 0086a286ea6bbd11ca9b664ac3bb12b27443d6eb +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Mon May 9 03:09:53 2022 +0000 - upstream: Remove the char * casts from arguments to do_lstat, + upstream: Allow existing -U (use agent) flag to work with "-Y sign" - do_readdir and do_stat paths since the underlying functions now take a const - char *. Patch from vapier at gentoo.org. + operations, where it will be interpreted to require that the private keys is + hosted in an agent; bz3429, suggested by Adam Szkoda; ok dtucker@ - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 9e4d964dbfb0ed683a2a2900711b88e7f1c0297b + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: a7bc69873b99c32c42c7628ed9ea91565ba08c2f -commit 4a66dac052c5ff5047161853f36904607649e4f9 +commit cb010744cc98f651b1029bb09efa986eb54e4ccf Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Fri Feb 25 02:09:27 2022 +0000 +Date: Sun May 8 22:58:35 2022 +0000 - upstream: save an unneccessary alloc/free, based on patch from + upstream: improve error message when 'ssh-keygen -Y sign' is unable to - Martin Vahlensieck; ok dtucker@ + load a private key; bz3429, reported by Adam Szkoda ok dtucker@ - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 90ffbf1f837e509742f2c31a1fbf2c0fd376fd5f - -commit 6f117cb151efe138ac57bdd8e26165f350328f5f -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Tue Mar 1 09:02:06 2022 +1100 - - Remove unused ivbits argument from chacha_keysetup - -commit 15974235dd528aeab0ec67fb92a0a1d733f62be2 -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Tue Mar 1 09:00:20 2022 +1100 - - Add OPENBSD ORIGINAL marker. + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: bb57b285e67bea536ef81b1055467be2fc380e74 -commit f2ff669347d320532e7c1b63cdf5c62f46e73150 -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Mon Feb 28 22:21:36 2022 +1100 +commit aa61fc82c63d309a90c22ca74fb1da6c6f4372fd +Author: Tobias Heider +Date: Mon May 9 02:00:01 2022 +0200 - No unused param warnings for clang-12 and gcc-11. + Remove duplicate bcrypt_pbkdf.o from Makefile - These have too many false positives in -Werror tests on the github CI - since we often provide empty stub functions for functionality not needed - for particular configurations. - -commit 96558ecd87adac62efa9a2b5479f686ab86b0be1 -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Sat Feb 26 14:10:41 2022 +1100 - - Add debian-i386 test target. + bcrypt_pbkdf.o is duplicated in the openbsd-compat Makefile's object + file list. -commit 284b6e5394652d519e31782e3b3cdfd7b21d1a81 -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Sat Feb 26 14:06:14 2022 +1100 +commit deb506d00da8d11fb04c1e7b9b1e1cc379c1705c +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Sun May 8 22:32:36 2022 +0000 - Allow ppoll_time64 in seccomp sandbox. + upstream: When performing operations that glob(3) a remote path, ensure - Should fix sandbox violations on (some? at least i386 and armhf) 32bit - Linux platforms. Patch from chutzpahu at gentoo.org and cjwatson at - debian.org via bz#3396. - -commit 0132056efabc5edb85c3c7105d2fb6dee41843c6 -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Fri Feb 25 19:47:48 2022 +1100 - - Improve handling of _getshort and _getlong. + that the implicit working directory used to construct that path escapes + glob(3) characters. - If the system native ones are exactly as required then use them, - otherwise use the local versions mapped to another name to prevent - name collisions. - -commit 8e206e0dd6b9f757b07979e48f53ad5bf9b7b52b -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Fri Feb 25 15:14:22 2022 +1100 - - Constify utimes in compat library to match specs. + This prevents glob characters from being processed in places they + shouldn't, e.g. "cd /tmp/a*/", "get *.txt" should have the get operation + treat the path "/tmp/a*" literally and not attempt to expand it. - Patch from vapier at chromium.org. + Reported by Lusia Kundel; ok markus@ + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 4f647f58482cbad3d58b1eab7f6a1691433deeef -commit 1b2920e3b63db2eddebeec7330ffe8b723055573 +commit f38cf74f20b5da113cfa823afd5bfb5c6ba65f3d Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Fri Feb 25 13:50:56 2022 +1100 +Date: Fri May 6 14:50:18 2022 +1000 - ANSIfy getshort and getlong. - - These functions appear to have come from OpenBSD's lib/libc/net/res_comp.c - which made this change in 2005. + Also retest OpenBSD upstream on .yml changes. -commit 54a86f4f6e1c43a2ca2be23ef799ab8910d4af70 +commit f87a132800ba3710ab130d703448a31ef1128d77 Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Fri Feb 25 13:23:04 2022 +1100 +Date: Fri May 6 14:46:09 2022 +1000 - Use PICFLAG instead of hard coding -fPIC. + Note that, for now, we need variadic macros. -commit 3016ba47035ac3561aabd48e2be70167fe157d6a +commit 217b518e0f7c52c4b909e935141a55344c61e644 Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Fri Feb 25 11:37:11 2022 +1100 +Date: Fri May 6 14:39:34 2022 +1000 - Add tests for latest releases of {Libre,Open}SSL. + Add ubsan minimal testcase on OpenBSD. + + As suggested by djm@. -commit f107467179428a0e3ea9e4aa9738ac12ff02822d -Author: Colin Watson -Date: Thu Feb 24 16:04:18 2022 +0000 +commit 457dce2cfef6a48f5442591cd8b21c7e8cba13f8 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Thu May 5 01:04:14 2022 +0000 - Improve detection of -fzero-call-used-regs=all support + upstream: sshkey_unshield_private() contains a exact duplicate of - GCC doesn't tell us whether this option is supported unless it runs into - the situation where it would need to emit corresponding code. + the code in private2_check_padding(). Pull private2_check_padding() up so the + code can be reused. From Martin Vahlensieck, ok deraadt@ + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 876884c3f0e62e8fd8d1594bab06900f971c9c85 -commit 3383b2cac0e9275bc93c4b4760e6e048f537e1d6 +commit 0e44db4d9cb313e68a59a44d27884af66c02356e Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Wed Feb 23 21:21:49 2022 +0000 +Date: Thu May 5 00:56:58 2022 +0000 - upstream: free(3) wants stdlib.h + upstream: channel_new no longer frees remote_name. So update the - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 227a8c70a95b4428c49e46863c9ef4bd318a3b8a + comment accordingly. As remote_name is not modified, it can be const as + well. From Martin Vahlensieck + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: e4e10dc8dc9f40c166ea5a8e991942bedc75a76a -commit a4537e79ab4ac6db4493c5158744b9ebde5efcb0 +commit 37b62fd5caf19c85a48241535277cefff65adace Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Wed Feb 23 21:21:16 2022 +0000 +Date: Thu May 5 00:55:11 2022 +0000 - upstream: put back the scp manpage changes for SFTP mode too + upstream: mux.c: mark argument as const; from Martin Vahlensieck - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 05dc53921f927e1b5e5694e1f3aa314549f2e768 + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 69a1a93a55986c7c2ad9f733c093b46a47184341 -commit 449bcb8403adfb9724805d02a51aea76046de185 -Author: deraadt@openbsd.org -Date: Wed Feb 23 19:01:00 2022 +0000 +commit f4e67c0ad259b4cf10177277a5827fa5545bac53 +Author: markus@openbsd.org +Date: Wed May 4 07:31:22 2022 +0000 - upstream: and we go back to testing sftp-scp after the 8.9 - - release... + upstream: make sure stdout is non-blocking; ok djm@ - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: a80440168258adca543a4607b871327a279c569c - -commit 166456cedad3962b83b848b1e9caf80794831f0f -Author: Damien Miller -Date: Wed Feb 23 22:31:11 2022 +1100 - - makedepend + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 64940fffbd1b882eda2d7c8c7a43c79368309c0d -commit 32ebaa0dbca5d0bb86e384e72bebc153f48413e4 -Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Wed Feb 23 11:18:13 2022 +0000 +commit e5c036d2092c00bef395e9161dc5ce42d4be9565 +Author: florian@openbsd.org +Date: Tue May 3 07:42:27 2022 +0000 - upstream: avoid integer overflow of auth attempts (harmless, caught + upstream: Add FIDO AUTHENTICATOR section and explain a bit how FIDO - by monitor) + works. The wording came mostly from the 8.2 OpenSSH release notes, addapted + to fit the man page. Then move the -O bits into the new section as is already + done for CERTIFICATES and MODULI GENERATION. Finally we can explain the + trade-offs of resident keys. While here, consistently refer to the FIDO + thingies as "FIDO authenticators", not "FIDO tokens". - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 488ad570b003b21e0cd9e7a00349cfc1003b4d86 - -commit 6e0258c64c901753df695e06498b26f9f4812ea6 -Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Wed Feb 23 11:17:10 2022 +0000 - - upstream: randomise the password used in fakepw + input & OK jmc, naddy - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 34e159f73b1fbf0a924a9c042d8d61edde293947 + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: dd98748d7644df048f78dcf793b3b63db9ab1d25 -commit bf114d6f0a9df0b8369823d9a0daa6c72b0c4cc9 -Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Wed Feb 23 11:15:57 2022 +0000 +commit 575771bf79bef7127be6aaccddc46031ea15529e +Author: jmc@openbsd.org +Date: Mon May 2 05:40:37 2022 +0000 - upstream: use asprintf to construct .rhosts paths + upstream: remove an obsolete rsa1 format example from an example; - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 8286e8d3d2c6ff916ff13d041d1713073f738a8b + from megan batty + ok djm + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: db2c89879c29bf083df996bd830abfb1e70d62bf -commit c07e154fbdc7285e9ec54e78d8a31f7325d43537 +commit 0bc6b4c8f04e292577bdb44d5dc6b630d3448087 Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Wed Feb 23 11:07:09 2022 +0000 +Date: Sun May 1 23:20:30 2022 +0000 - upstream: openssh-8.9 + upstream: fix some integer overflows in sieve_large() that show up when - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 5c5f791c87c483cdab6d9266b43acdd9ca7bde0e + trying to generate modp groups > 16k bits. Reported via GHPR#306 by Bertram + Felgenhauer, but fixed in a different way. feedback/ok tb@ + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 81cbc6dd3a21c57bd6fadea10e44afe37bca558e -commit bc16667b4a1c3cad7029304853c143a32ae04bd4 -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Tue Feb 22 15:29:22 2022 +1100 +commit a45615cb172bc827e21ec76750de39dfb30ecc05 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Fri Apr 29 04:55:07 2022 +0000 - Extend select+rlimit sanbox test to include poll. + upstream: be stricter in which characters will be accepted in - POSIX specifies that poll() shall fail if "nfds argument is greater - than {OPEN_MAX}". The setrlimit sandbox sets this to effectively zero - so this causes poll() to fail in the preauth privsep process. + specifying a mask length; allow only 0-9. From khaleesicodes via GHPR#278; ok + dtucker@ - This is likely the underlying cause for the previously observed similar - behaviour of select() on plaforms where it is implement in userspace on - top of poll(). + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: e267746c047ea86665cdeccef795a8a56082eeb2 -commit 6520c488de95366be031d49287ed243620399e23 +commit 4835544d2dd31de6ffc7dba59f92093aea98155b Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Tue Feb 22 13:08:59 2022 +1100 +Date: Sat Apr 30 10:56:41 2022 +1000 - Add Alpine Linux test VM. + Add Mac OS X 12 test target. -commit a4b325a3fc82d11e0f5d61f62e7fde29415f7afb +commit 97a6a8b8c1f2da09712d0e72d0ef800e4edd34cd Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Tue Feb 22 12:27:07 2022 +1100 +Date: Fri Apr 29 18:27:34 2022 +1000 - Include sys/param.h if present. + Only run tests when source files change. - Needed for howmany() on MUSL systems such as Alpine. + Also run tests on changes to V_9_0 branch. -commit 5a102e9cb287a43bd7dfe594b775a89a8e94697c +commit 6d0392b9ff4b50a56ac5685d1b9392e2cd432ca3 Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Tue Feb 22 12:25:52 2022 +1100 +Date: Fri Apr 29 18:22:34 2022 +1000 - Only include sys/poll.h if we don't have poll.h. - - Prevents warnings on MUSL based systems such as Alpine. + Remove now-empty int32_minmax.inc. -commit 7c0d4ce911d5c58b6166b2db754a4e91f352adf5 -Author: Damien Miller -Date: Tue Feb 22 11:14:51 2022 +1100 +commit af59463553b5ad52d3b42c4455ee3c5600158bb7 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Fri Apr 29 03:24:30 2022 +0000 - disable agent-restrict test on minix3 - - Minix seems to have a platform-wide limit on the number of - select(2) syscalls that can be concurrently issued. This test - seems to exceed this limit. + upstream: mention that the helpers are used by ssh(1), ssh-agent(1) - Refer to: + and ssh-keygen(1). Previously only ssh(1) was mentioned. From Pedro + Martelletto - https://github.com/Stichting-MINIX-Research-Foundation/minix/blob/R3.3.0/minix/servers/vfs/select.c#L114 - https://github.com/Stichting-MINIX-Research-Foundation/minix/blob/R3.3.0/minix/servers/vfs/select.c#L30-L31 - -commit 81d33d8e3cf7ea5ce3a5653c6102b623e019428a -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Mon Feb 21 21:27:20 2022 +1100 - - Skip agent-getpeereid when running as root. + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 30f880f989d4b329589c1c404315685960a5f153 -commit fbd772570a25436a33924d91c164d2b24021f010 +commit 3e26b3a6eebcee27be177207cc0846fb844b7a56 Author: dtucker@openbsd.org -Date: Sun Feb 20 03:47:26 2022 +0000 +Date: Fri Apr 29 03:16:48 2022 +0000 - upstream: Aproximate realpath on the expected output by deduping + upstream: Don't leak SK device. Patch from Pedro Martelletto via - leading slashes. Fixes test failure when user's home dir is / which is - possible in some portable configurations. + github PR#316. ok djm@ - OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 53b8c53734f8893806961475c7106397f98d9f63 + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 17d11327545022e727d95fd08b213171c5a4585d -commit 336685d223a59f893faeedf0a562e053fd84058e -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Sun Feb 20 13:30:52 2022 +1100 +commit 247082b5013f0d4fcae8f97453f2a2f01bcda811 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Fri Apr 29 03:13:32 2022 +0000 - Really move DSA to end of list. + upstream: fix memleak on session-bind path; from Pedro Martelletto, ok - In commit ad16a84e syncing from OpenBSD, RSA was accidentally moved to - the end of the list instead of DSA. Spotted by andrew at fyfe.gb.net. + dtucker@ + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: e85899a26ba402b4c0717b531317e8fc258f0a7e -commit 63bf4f49ed2fdf2da6f97136c9df0c8168546eb3 -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Fri Feb 18 12:12:21 2022 +1100 +commit e05522008092ceb86a87bdd4ad7878424315db89 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Thu Apr 28 02:53:31 2022 +0000 - Add test configs for MUSL C library. + upstream: avoid printing hash algorithm twice; from lucas AT sexy.is + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 9d24671e10a84141b7c504396cabad600e47a941 -commit f7fc6a43f1173e8b2c38770bf6cee485a562d03b -Author: Damien Miller -Date: Thu Feb 17 22:54:19 2022 +1100 +commit 0979e29356915261d69a9517a1e0aaade7c9fc75 +Author: dtucker@openbsd.org +Date: Wed Apr 27 11:08:55 2022 +0000 - minix needs BROKEN_POLL too; chokes on /dev/null + upstream: Add authfd path to debug output. ok markus@ + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: f735a17d1a6f2bee63bfc609d76ef8db8c090890 -commit 667fec5d4fe4406745750a32f69b5d2e1a75e94b -Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Thu Feb 17 10:58:27 2022 +0000 +commit 67b7c784769c74fd4d6b147d91e17e1ac1a8a96d +Author: dtucker@openbsd.org +Date: Tue Apr 26 07:41:44 2022 +0000 - upstream: check for EINTR/EAGAIN failures in the rfd fast-path; caught + upstream: Check sshauthopt_new() for NULL. bz#3425, from - by dtucker's minix3 vm :) ok dtucker@ + tessgauthier at microsoft.com. ok djm@ - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 2e2c895a3e82ef347aa6694394a76a438be91361 - -commit 41417dbda9fb55a0af49a8236e3ef9d50d862644 -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Thu Feb 17 22:05:29 2022 +1100 - - Comment hurd test, the VM is currently broken. + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: af0315bc3e44aa406daa7e0ae7c2d719a974483f -commit b2aee35a1f0dc798339b3fcf96136da71b7e3f6d -Author: Damien Miller -Date: Thu Feb 17 21:15:16 2022 +1100 +commit d571314d14b919fbd7c84a61f9bf2065fc0a6841 +Author: millert@openbsd.org +Date: Wed Apr 20 16:00:25 2022 +0000 - find sk-dummy.so when build_dir != src_dir + upstream: Remove unnecessary includes: openssl/hmac.h and - spotted by Corinna Vinschen; feedback & ok dtucker@ + openssl/evp.h. From Martin Vahlensieck. + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: a6debb5fb0c8a44e43e8d5ca7cc70ad2f3ea31c3 -commit 62a2d4e50b2e89f2ef04576931895d5139a5d037 -Author: Damien Miller -Date: Wed Feb 16 16:26:17 2022 +1100 +commit da8dddf8cc1f2516ff894b8183e83a7c5ba3ef80 +Author: millert@openbsd.org +Date: Wed Apr 20 15:59:18 2022 +0000 - update versions in preparation for 8.9 release + upstream: Add missing includes of stdlib.h and stdint.h. We need + + stdlib.h for malloc(3) and stdint.h for SIZE_MAX. Unlike the other xmss + files, ssh-xmss.c does not include xmss_commons.h so ssh-xmss.c must include + those headers itself. From Martin Vahlensieck + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 70e28a9818cee3da1be2ef6503d4b396dd421e6b -commit dd6d3dded721ac653ea73c017325e5bfeeec837f -Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Tue Feb 15 05:13:36 2022 +0000 +commit fe9d87a6800a7a33be08f4d5ab662a758055ced2 +Author: millert@openbsd.org +Date: Wed Apr 20 15:56:49 2022 +0000 - upstream: document the unbound/host-bound options to + upstream: Avoid an unnecessary xstrdup in rm_env() when matching - PubkeyAuthentication; spotted by HARUYAMA Seigo + patterns. Since match_pattern() doesn't modify its arguments (they are + const), there is no need to make an extra copy of the strings in + options->send_env. From Martin Vahlensieck - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 298f681b66a9ecd498f0700082c7a6c46e948981 + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 2c9db31e3f4d3403b49642c64ee048b2a0a39351 -commit df93529dd727fdf2fb290700cd4f1adb0c3c084b +commit 7bf2eb958fbb551e7d61e75c176bb3200383285d Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Mon Feb 14 14:19:40 2022 +1100 +Date: Tue Apr 26 23:30:59 2022 +1000 - Test if sshd accidentally acquires controlling tty - - When SSHD_ACQUIRES_CTTY is defined, test for the problematic behaviour - in the STREAMS code before activating the workaround. ok djm@ + Add debian-riscv64 test target. -commit 766176cfdbfd7ec38bb6118dde6e4daa0df34888 +commit 3913c935523902482974c4c503bcff20bd850a6a Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Sat Feb 12 10:24:56 2022 +1100 +Date: Mon Apr 25 17:20:06 2022 +1000 - Add cygwin-release test config. - - This tests the flags used to build the cygwin release binaries. + Update OpenSSL and LibreSSL versions in tests. -commit b30698662b862f5397116d23688aac0764e0886e +commit dcd8dca29bcdb193ff6be35b96fc55e6e30d37d9 Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Fri Feb 11 21:00:35 2022 +1100 +Date: Sat Apr 23 20:40:28 2022 +1000 - Move SSHD_ACQUIRES_CTTY workaround into compat. + Include stdlib.h for free() prototype. - On some (most? all?) SysV based systems with STREAMS based ptys, - sshd could acquire a controlling terminal during pty setup when - it pushed the "ptem" module, due to what is probably a bug in - the STREAMS driver that's old enough to vote. Because it was the - privileged sshd's controlling terminal, it was not available for - the user's session, which ended up without one. This is known to - affect at least Solaris <=10, derivatives such as OpenIndiana and - several other SysV systems. See bz#245 for the backstory. - - In the we past worked around that by not calling setsid in the - privileged sshd child, which meant it was not a session or process - group leader. This solved controlling terminal problem because sshd - was not eligble to acquire one, but had other side effects such as - not cleaning up helper subprocesses in the SIGALRM handler since it - was not PG leader. Recent cleanups in the signal handler uncovered - this, resulting in the LoginGraceTime timer not cleaning up privsep - unprivileged processes. - - This change moves the workaround into the STREAMS pty allocation code, - by allocating a sacrificial pty to act as sshd's controlling terminal - before allocating user ptys, so those are still available for users' - sessions. - - On the down side: - - this will waste a pty per ssh connection on affected platforms. - - On the up side: - - it makes the process group behaviour consistent between platforms. - - - it puts the workaround nearest the code that actually causes the - problem and competely out of the mainline code. - - - the workaround is only activated if you use the STREAMS code. If, - say, Solaris 11 has the bug but also a working openpty() it doesn't - matter that we defined SSHD_ACQUIRES_CTTY. - - - the workaround is only activated when the fist pty is allocated, - ie in the post-auth privsep monitor. This means there's no risk - of fd leaks to the unprivileged processes, and there's no effect on - sessions that do not allocate a pty. - - Based on analysis and work by djm@, ok djm@ + ... which is used inside the CUSTOM_SYS_AUTH_GET_LASTLOGIN_MSG block. -commit cd00b48cf10f3565936a418c1e6d7e48b5c36140 +commit 4cc05de568e1c3edd7834ff3bd9d8214eb34861b Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Fri Feb 11 20:09:32 2022 +1100 +Date: Sat Apr 23 20:17:26 2022 +1000 - Simplify handling of --with-ssl-dir. + Cache timezone data in capsicum sandbox. - ok djm@ + From emaste at freebsd.org, originally part of FreeBSD commit r339216 + / fc3c19a9 with autoconf bits added by me. -commit ea13fc830fc0e0dce2459f1fab2ec5099f73bdf0 -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Fri Feb 11 13:39:29 2022 +1100 +commit c31404426d212e2964ff9e5e58e1d0fce3d83f27 +Author: dtucker@openbsd.org +Date: Thu Apr 21 01:36:46 2022 +0000 - Stop testing OpenBSD HEAD on 6.9 and 7.0. + upstream: It looks like we can't completely avoid - HEAD is not guaranteed to work on previous stable branches, and at the - moment is broken due to libfido API changes. + waiting for processes to exit so retrieve the pid via controlmaster and + use that. + + OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 8246f00f22b14e49d2ff1744c94897ead33d457b -commit 50b9e4a4514697ffb9592200e722de6b427cb9ff +commit d19b21afab5c8e2f3df6bd8aee9766bdad3d8c58 Author: dtucker@openbsd.org -Date: Fri Feb 11 00:43:56 2022 +0000 +Date: Wed Apr 20 13:25:55 2022 +0000 - upstream: Always initialize delim before passing to hpdelim2 which + upstream: Use ssh -f and ControlPersist .. - might not set it. Found by the Valgrind tests on github, ok deraadt@ + to start up test forwards and ssh -O stop to shut them down intead of + sleep loops. This speeds up the test by an order of magnitude. - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: c830c0db185ca43beff3f41c19943c724b4f636d + OpenBSD-Regress-ID: eb3db5f805100919b092a3b2579c611fba3e83e7 -commit 6ee53064f476cf163acd5521da45b11b7c57321b -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Fri Feb 11 10:03:06 2022 +1100 +commit 5f76286a126721fa005de6edf3d1c7a265555f19 +Author: dtucker@openbsd.org +Date: Wed Apr 20 05:24:13 2022 +0000 - Fix helper include path and remove excess code. + upstream: Simplify forward-control test. - Looks like test_hpdelim.c was imported twice into the same file. - Spotted by kevin.brott at gmail com and chris at cataclysmal org. - -commit 9fa63a19f68bc87452d3cf5c577cafad2921b7a4 -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Thu Feb 10 23:27:02 2022 +1100 - - Put poll.h inside ifdef. - -commit 3ac00dfeb54b252c15dcbf1971582e9e3b946de6 -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Thu Feb 10 22:17:31 2022 +1100 - - We now support POLLPRI so actually define it. + Since we no longer need to support SSH1 we don't need to run shell + commands on the other end of the connection and can use ssh -N instead. + This also makes the test less racy. + + OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 32e94ce272820cc398f30b848b2b0f080d10302c -commit 25bd659cc72268f2858c5415740c442ee950049f -Author: dtucker@openbsd.org -Date: Sun Feb 6 22:58:33 2022 +0000 +commit 687bbf23572d8bdf25cbbcdf8ac583514e1ba710 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Thu Mar 31 03:07:33 2022 +0000 - upstream: Add test for empty hostname with port. + upstream: regression test for sftp cp command - OpenBSD-Regress-ID: e19e89d3c432b68997667efea44cf015bbe2a7e3 + OpenBSD-Regress-ID: c96bea9edde3a384b254785e7f9b2b24a81cdf82 -commit a29af853cff41c0635f0378c00fe91bf9c91dea4 +commit f1233f19a6a9fe58f52946f50df4772f5b136761 Author: dtucker@openbsd.org -Date: Fri Feb 4 07:53:44 2022 +0000 +Date: Wed Apr 20 01:13:47 2022 +0000 - upstream: Add unit tests for hpdelim. + upstream: Import regenerated moduli - OpenBSD-Regress-ID: be97b85c19895e6a1ce13c639765a3b48fd95018 + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: f9a0726d957cf10692a231996a1f34e7f9cdfeb0 -commit 9699151b039ecc5fad9ac6c6c02e9afdbd26f15f +commit fec014785de198b9a325d1b94e324bb958c5fe7b Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Thu Feb 10 04:12:38 2022 +0000 +Date: Wed Apr 20 04:19:11 2022 +0000 - upstream: revert for imminent OpenSSH release, which wil ship with - - scp in RCP mode. - - > revision 1.106 - > date: 2021/10/15 14:46:46; author: deraadt; state: Exp; lines: +13 -9; commitid: w5n9B2RE38tFfggl; - > openbsd 7.0 release shipped with the (hopefully last) scp that uses RCP - > protocol for copying. Let's get back to testing the SFTP protocol. + upstream: Try to continue running local I/O for channels in state - This will be put back once the OpenSSH release is done. + OPEN during SSH transport rekeying. The most visible benefit is that it + should make ~-escapes work in the client (e.g. to exit) if the connection + happened to have stalled during a rekey event. Based work by and ok dtucker@ - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 0c725481a78210aceecff1537322c0b2df03e768 + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: a66e8f254e92edd4ce09c9f750883ec8f1ea5f45 -commit 45279abceb37c3cbfac8ba36dde8b2c8cdd63d32 +commit e68154b0d4f0f5085a050ea896955da1b1be6e30 Author: dtucker@openbsd.org -Date: Tue Feb 8 08:59:12 2022 +0000 +Date: Wed Apr 20 01:13:47 2022 +0000 - upstream: Switch hpdelim interface to accept only ":" as delimiter. - - Historicallly, hpdelim accepted ":" or "/" as a port delimiter between - hosts (or addresses) and ports. These days most of the uses for "/" - are no longer accepted, so there are several places where it checks the - delimiter to disallow it. Make hpdelim accept only ":" and use hpdelim2 - in the other cases. ok djm@ + upstream: Import regenerated moduli - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 7e6420bd1be87590b6840973f5ad5305804e3102 - -commit a1bcbf04a7c2d81944141db7ecd0ba292d175a66 -Author: pedro martelletto -Date: Mon Feb 7 09:09:59 2022 +0100 - - fix typos in previous - -commit 56192518e329b39f063487bc2dc4d796f791eca0 -Author: Damien Miller -Date: Mon Feb 7 12:53:47 2022 +1100 - - compat code for fido_assert_set_clientdata() + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: f9a0726d957cf10692a231996a1f34e7f9cdfeb0 -commit d6b5aa08fdcf9b527f8b8f932432941d5b76b7ab -Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Mon Feb 7 01:25:12 2022 +0000 +commit 69928b106d8f0fa15b88cf3850d992ed81c44ae0 +Author: tj@openbsd.org +Date: Sat Apr 16 00:22:31 2022 +0000 - upstream: use libfido2 1.8.0+ fido_assert_set_clientdata() instead + upstream: list the correct version number - of manually hashing data outselves. Saves a fair bit of code and makes life - easier for some -portable platforms. + for when usage of the sftp protocol became default and fix a typo + from ed maste - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 351dfaaa5ab1ee928c0e623041fca28078cff0e0 + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 24e1795ed2283fdeacf16413c2f07503bcdebb31 -commit 86cc93fd3c26b2e0c7663c6394995fb04ebfbf3b -Author: jsg@openbsd.org -Date: Sun Feb 6 00:29:03 2022 +0000 +commit 21042a05c0b304c16f655efeec97438249d2e2cc +Author: dtucker@openbsd.org +Date: Tue Apr 12 05:09:49 2022 +0000 - upstream: remove please from manual pages ok jmc@ sthen@ millert@ + upstream: Correct path for system known hosts file in description - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 6543acb00f4f38a23472538e1685c013ca1a99aa + of IgnoreUserKnownHosts. Patch from Martin Vahlensieck via tech@ + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 9b7784f054fa5aa4d63cb36bd563889477127215 -commit ad16a84e64a8cf1c69c63de3fb9008320a37009c -Author: dtucker@openbsd.org -Date: Fri Feb 4 02:49:17 2022 +0000 +commit 53f4aff60a7c1a08a23917bd47496f8901c471f5 +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Sat Apr 16 14:33:20 2022 +1000 - upstream: Since they are deprecated, move DSA to the end of the - - default list of public keys so that they will be tried last. From github - PR#295 from "ProBackup-nl", ok djm@ + Resync moduli.5 with upstream. - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 7e5d575cf4971d4e2de92e0b6d6efaba53598bf0 + 1.18: remove duplicate publication year; carsten dot kunze at arcor dot de + 1.19: ssh-keygen's -G/-T have been replaced with -M generate/screen. -commit 253de42753de85dde266e061b6fec12ca6589f7d -Author: Damien Miller -Date: Wed Feb 2 16:52:07 2022 +1100 +commit d2b888762b9844eb0d8eb59909cdf5af5159f810 +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Sat Apr 16 14:31:13 2022 +1000 - portable-specific string array constification + Retire fbsd6 test VM. - from Mike Frysinger + It's long since out of support, relatively slow (it's i686) and the + compiler has trouble with PIE. -commit dfdcc2220cf359c492d5d34eb723370e8bd8a19e +commit cd1f70009860a154b51230d367c55ea5f9a4504e Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Tue Feb 1 23:37:15 2022 +0000 +Date: Mon Apr 11 22:52:08 2022 +0000 - upstream: test 'ssh-keygen -Y find-principals' with wildcard + upstream: clear io_want/io_ready flags at start of poll() cycle; - principals; from Fabian Stelzer + avoids plausible spin during rekeying if channel io_want flags are reused + across cycles. ok markus@ deraadt@ - OpenBSD-Regress-ID: fbe4da5f0032e7ab496527a5bf0010fd700f8f40 + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 91034f855b7c73cd2591657c49ac30f10322b967 -commit 968e508967ef42480cebad8cf3172465883baa77 +commit aa1920302778273f7f94c2091319aba199068ca0 Author: dtucker@openbsd.org -Date: Fri Jan 21 02:54:41 2022 +0000 +Date: Fri Apr 8 05:43:39 2022 +0000 - upstream: Enable all supported ciphers and macs in the server + upstream: Note that curve25519-sha256 was later published in - before trying to benchmark them. Increase the data file size to get more - signal. + RFC8731. ok djm@ - OpenBSD-Regress-ID: dc3697d9f7defdfc51c608782c8e750128e46eb6 + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 2ac2b5d642d4cf5918eaec8653cad9a4460b2743 -commit 15b7199a1fd37eff4c695e09d573f3db9f4274b7 +commit 4673fa8f2be983f2f88d5afd754adb1a2a39ec9e Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Tue Feb 1 23:34:47 2022 +0000 +Date: Fri Apr 8 04:40:40 2022 +0000 - upstream: allow 'ssh-keygen -Y find-principals' to match wildcard + upstream: two defensive changes from Tobias Stoeckmann via GHPR287 - principals in allowed_signers files; from Fabian Stelzer + enforce stricter invarient for sshbuf_set_parent() - never allow + a buffer to have a previously-set parent changed. - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 1e970b9c025b80717dddff5018fe5e6f470c5098 + In sshbuf_reset(), if the reallocation fails, then zero the entire + buffer and not the (potentially smaller) default initial alloc size. + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 14583203aa5d50ad38d2e209ae10abaf8955e6a9 -commit 541667fe6dc26d7881e55f0bb3a4baa6f3171645 -Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Tue Feb 1 23:32:51 2022 +0000 +commit 26eef015e2d2254375e13afaaf753b78932b1bf5 +Author: Damien Miller +Date: Mon Apr 11 16:07:09 2022 +1000 - upstream: mark const string array contents const too, i.e. static + Revert "update build-aux files to match autoconf-2.71" - const char *array => static const char * const array from Mike Frysinger + This reverts commit 0a8ca39fac6ad19096b6c263436f8b2dd51606f2. - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: a664e31ea6a795d7c81153274a5f47b22bdc9bc1 + It turns out that the checked-in copies of these files are actually newer + than autoconf-2.71's copies, so this was effectively a downgrade. + Spotted by Bo Anderson via github -commit 8cfa73f8a2bde4c98773f33f974c650bdb40dd3c -Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Tue Feb 1 23:11:11 2022 +0000 +commit 0a8ca39fac6ad19096b6c263436f8b2dd51606f2 +Author: Damien Miller +Date: Fri Apr 8 14:48:58 2022 +1000 - upstream: better match legacy scp behaviour: show un-expanded paths - - in error messages. Spotted by and ok tb@ + update build-aux files to match autoconf-2.71 - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 866c8ffac5bd7d38ecbfc3357c8adfa58af637b7 + i.e. config.guess, config.sub and install-sh -commit 4e62c13ab419b4b224c8bc6a761e91fcf048012d -Author: dtucker@openbsd.org -Date: Tue Feb 1 07:57:32 2022 +0000 +commit 94eb6858efecc1b4f02d8a6bd35e149f55c814c8 +Author: Damien Miller +Date: Wed Apr 6 10:47:48 2022 +1000 - upstream: Remove explicit kill of privsep preauth child's PID in - - SIGALRM handler. It's no longer needed since the child will get terminated by - the SIGTERM to the process group that cleans up any auth helpers, it - simplifies the signal handler and removes the risk of a race when updating - the PID. Based on analysis by HerrSpace in github PR#289, ok djm@ - - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 2be1ffa28b4051ad9e33bb4371e2ec8a31d6d663 + update version numbers for release -commit 2a7ccd2ec4022917b745af7186f514f365b7ebe9 -Author: guenther@openbsd.org -Date: Fri Jan 28 06:18:42 2022 +0000 +commit 8e4a8eadf4fe74e65e6492f34250f8cf7d67e8da +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Mon Apr 4 22:45:25 2022 +0000 - upstream: When it's the possessive of 'it', it's spelled "its", - - without the apostrophe. + upstream: openssh-9.0 - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: fb6ab9c65bd31de831da1eb4631ddac018c5fae7 + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 0dfb461188f4513ec024c1534da8c1ce14c20b64 -commit 8a0848cdd3b25c049332cd56034186b7853ae754 -Author: Alex James -Date: Sun Jan 30 16:13:36 2022 -0600 +commit a9f23ea2e3227f406880c2634d066f6f50fa5eaa +Author: naddy@openbsd.org +Date: Thu Mar 31 17:58:44 2022 +0000 - sandbox-seccomp-filter: allow gettid + upstream: ssh: document sntrup761x25519-sha512@openssh.com as - Some allocators (such as Scudo) use gettid while tracing allocations [1]. - Allow gettid in preauth to prevent sshd from crashing with Scudo. + default KEX - [1]: https://github.com/llvm/llvm-project/blob/llvmorg-13.0.0/compiler-rt/lib/gwp_asan/common.cpp#L46 + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 12545bfa10bcbf552d04d9d9520d0f4e98b0e171 -commit b30d32159dc3c7052f4bfdf36357996c905af739 -Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Sat Jan 22 00:49:34 2022 +0000 +commit 9ec2713d122af79d66ebb9c1d6d9ae8621a8945f +Author: naddy@openbsd.org +Date: Thu Mar 31 17:27:27 2022 +0000 - upstream: add a ssh_packet_process_read() function that reads from + upstream: man pages: add missing commas between subordinate and - a fd directly into the transport input buffer. + main clauses - Use this in the client and server mainloops to avoid unnecessary - copying. It also lets us use a more greedy read size without penalty. + jmc@ dislikes a comma before "then" in a conditional, so leave those + untouched. - Yields a 2-3% performance gain on cipher-speed.sh (in a fairly - unscientific test tbf) + ok jmc@ - feedback dtucker@ ok markus@ + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 9520801729bebcb3c9fe43ad7f9776ab4dd05ea3 + +commit 3741df98ffaaff92b474ee70d8ef276b5882f85a +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Mon Apr 4 23:52:11 2022 +1000 + + Disable security key on fbsd6 test host. + +commit 32c12236f27ae83bfe6d2983b67c9bc67a83a417 +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Mon Apr 4 15:16:51 2022 +1000 + + Specify TEST_SHELL=bash on AIX. - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: df4112125bf79d8e38e79a77113e1b373078e632 + The system shells cause the agent-restrict test to fail due to some + quoting so explicitly specify bash until we can get configure to + autmatically work around that. -commit a1a8efeaaa9cccb15cdc0a2bd7c347a149a3a7e3 -Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Sat Jan 22 00:45:31 2022 +0000 +commit 90452c8b69d065b7c7c285ff78b81418a75bcd76 +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Fri Apr 1 23:38:44 2022 +1100 - upstream: Use sshbuf_read() to read directly into the channel input + Only return events from ppoll that were requested. - buffer rather than into a stack buffer that needs to be copied again; - Improves performance by about 1% on cipher-speed.sh feedback dtucker@ ok - markus@ + If the underlying system's select() returns bits that were not in the + request set, our ppoll() implementation can return revents for events + not requested, which can apparently cause a hang. Only return revents + for activity in the requested event set. bz#3416, analysis and fix by + yaroslav.kuzmin at vmssoftware com, ok djm@ + +commit 6c49eb5fabc56f4865164ed818aa5112d09c31a8 +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Fri Apr 1 23:21:40 2022 +1100 + + Only run regression tests on slow VMs. + +commit f67e47903977b42cb6abcd5565a61bd7293e4dc3 +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Fri Apr 1 23:21:06 2022 +1100 + + Increase test timeout to allow slow VMs to finish + +commit 02488c1b54065ddc4f25835dbd2618b2a2fe21f5 +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Fri Apr 1 16:27:38 2022 +1100 + + Use bash or ksh if available for SH in Makefile. + +commit 34c7018c316af4773e432066de28d0ef9d0888cd +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Fri Apr 1 14:56:54 2022 +1100 + + Set Makefile SHELL as determined by configure. - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: bf5e6e3c821ac3546dc8241d8a94e70d47716572 + This should improve compatibility for users with non-POSIX shells. If + using Makefile.in directly (eg make -f Makefile.in distprep) then SHELL + will need to be specified on the command line (along with MANFMT in that + particular case). ok djm@ -commit 29a76994e21623a1f84d68ebb9dc5a3c909fa3a7 +commit 5b054d76402faab38c48377efd112426469553a0 +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Fri Apr 1 13:16:47 2022 +1100 + + Skip slow tests on (very) slow test targets. + +commit b275818065b31a865142c48c2acf6a7c1655c542 Author: Damien Miller -Date: Tue Jan 25 11:52:34 2022 +1100 +Date: Thu Mar 31 14:11:36 2022 +1100 depend -commit 754e0d5c7712296a7a3a83ace863812604c7bc4f +commit 3fa539c3ffaabd6211995512d33e29150f88c5c5 Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Sat Jan 22 00:43:43 2022 +0000 +Date: Thu Mar 31 03:07:03 2022 +0000 - upstream: Add a sshbuf_read() that attempts to read(2) directly in + upstream: add a sftp client "cp" command that supports server-side - to a sshbuf; ok markus@ + copying of files. Useful for this task and for testing the copy-data + extension. Patch from Mike Frysinger; ok dtucker@ - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 2d8f249040a4279f3bc23c018947384de8d4a45b + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 1bb1b950af0d49f0d5425b1f267e197aa1b57444 -commit c7964fb9829d9ae2ece8b51a76e4a02e8449338d +commit 7988bfc4b701c4b3fe9b36c8561a3d1c5d4c9a74 Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Fri Jan 21 07:04:19 2022 +0000 +Date: Thu Mar 31 03:05:49 2022 +0000 - upstream: add a helper for writing an error message to the + upstream: add support for the "corp-data" protocol extension to - stderr_buf and setting quit_pending; no functional change but saves a bunch - of boilerplate + allow server-side copies to be performed without having to go via the client. + Patch by Mike Frysinger, ok dtucker@ - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 0747657cad6b9eabd514a6732adad537568e232d + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 00aa510940fedd66dab1843b58682de4eb7156d5 -commit d23b4f7fdb1bd87e2cd7a9ae7c198ae99d347916 +commit 32dc1c29a4ac9c592ddfef0a4895eb36c1f567ba Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Fri Jan 21 06:58:06 2022 +0000 +Date: Wed Mar 30 21:13:23 2022 +0000 - upstream: correct comment and use local variable instead of long + upstream: select post-quantum KEX - indirection; spotted by dtucker@ + sntrup761x25519-sha512@openssh.com as the default; ok markus@ - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 5f65f5f69db2b7d80a0a81b08f390a63f8845965 + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: f02d99cbfce22dffec2e2ab1b60905fbddf48fb9 -commit d069b020a02b6e3935080204ee44d233e8158ebb -Author: deraadt@openbsd.org -Date: Fri Jan 21 00:53:40 2022 +0000 +commit d6556de1db0822c76ba2745cf5c097d9472adf7c +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Wed Mar 30 21:10:25 2022 +0000 - upstream: When poll(2) returns -1, for some error conditions + upstream: fix poll() spin when a channel's output fd closes without - pfd[].revents is not cleared. There are subtle errors in various programs. - In this particular case, the program should error out. ok djm millert + data in the channel buffer. Introduce more exact packing of channel fds into + the pollfd array. fixes bz3405 and bz3411; ok deraadt@ markus@ - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 00f839b16861f7fb2adcf122e95e8a82fa6a375c + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 06740737849c9047785622ad5d472cb6a3907d10 -commit e204b34337a965feb439826157c191919fd9ecf8 -Author: Damien Miller -Date: Sat Jan 22 11:38:21 2022 +1100 +commit 8a74a96d25ca4d32fbf298f6c0ac5a148501777d +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Wed Mar 30 04:33:09 2022 +0000 - restore tty force-read hack + upstream: ssh is almost out of getopt() characters; note the - This portable-specific hack fixes a hang on exit for ttyful sessions - on Linux and some SysVish Unix variants. It was accidentally disabled - in commit 5c79952dfe1a (a precursor to the mainloop poll(2) conversion). + remaining remaining available ones in a comment - Spotted by John in bz3383 + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 48d38cef59d6bc8e84c6c066f6d601875d3253fd -commit 68085066b6bad43643b43f5957fcc5fd34782ccd -Author: Corinna Vinschen -Date: Fri Jan 21 03:22:56 2022 +1100 +commit 6d4fc51adb9d8a42f67b5474f02f877422379de6 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Wed Mar 30 04:27:51 2022 +0000 - Fix signedness bug in Cygwin code + upstream: avoid NULL deref via ssh-keygen -Y find-principals. - The Cygwin-specific pattern match code has a bug. It checks - the size_t value returned by mbstowcs for being < 0. The right - thing to do is to check against (size_t) -1. Fix that. + bz3409, reported by Mateusz Adamowski - Signed-off-by: Corinna Vinschen + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: a3b2c02438052ee858e0ee18e5a288586b5df2c5 -commit 2e5cfed513e84444483baf1d8b31c40072b05103 +commit e937514920335b92b543fd9be79cd6481d1eb0b6 Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Thu Jan 20 13:26:27 2022 +1100 +Date: Mon Mar 28 17:51:03 2022 +1100 - Improve compatibility of early exit trap handling. - - Dash (as used by the github runners) has some differences in its trap - builtin: - - it doesn't have -p (which is fine, that's not in posix). - - it doesn't work in a subshell (which turns out to be in compliance - with posix, which means bash isn't). - - it doesn't work in a pipeline, ie "trap|cat" produces no output. + Add AIX 5.1 test target. -commit 3fe6800b6027add478e648934cbb29d684e51943 +commit 4bbe815ba974b4fd89cc3fc3e3ef1be847a0befe Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Thu Jan 20 00:49:57 2022 +1100 +Date: Sat Mar 26 22:01:31 2022 +1100 - Move more tests out of valgrind-1 runner. + Drop leading "v" from release version identifier. + + It's present in the git tags but not in the release tarball names. + Also drop extra "/" from URL path. -commit 20da6ed136dd76e6a0b229ca3036ef9c7c7ef798 +commit f5cdd3b3c275dffaebfca91df782dca29975e9ac Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Wed Jan 19 15:37:39 2022 +1100 +Date: Sat Mar 26 16:28:04 2022 +1100 - Invoke EXIT handler early when using Valgrind. + Use tarballs when testing LibreSSL releases. - When using Valgrind, we need to wait for all invoked programs to - complete before checking their valgrind logs. Some tests, notably - agent-restrict, set an EXIT trap handler to clean up things like - ssh-agent, but those do not get invoked until test-exec.sh exits. - This causes the Valgrind wait to deadlock, so if present invoke - the EXIT handler before checking the Valgrind logs. + This means they'll still work when the combination of -portable and + openbsd github repos no longer match. -commit ad2e0580c87b0714cf166bca9d926a95ddeee1c8 +commit 24dc37d198f35a7cf71bf4d5384363c7ef4209d4 Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Tue Jan 18 12:55:21 2022 +1100 +Date: Sat Mar 26 15:02:45 2022 +1100 - Remove line leftover from upstream sync. + Remove now-unused passwd variable. -commit d1051c0f11a6b749027e26bbeb61b07df4b67e15 -Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Mon Jan 17 22:56:04 2022 +0000 +commit 5b467ceef2c356f0a77f5e8ab4eb0fac367e4d24 +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Sat Mar 26 13:15:44 2022 +1100 - upstream: when decompressing zlib compressed packets, use - - Z_SYNC_FLUSH instead of Z_PARTIAL_FLUSH as the latter is not actually - specified as a valid mode for inflate(). There should be no practical change - in behaviour as the compression side ensures a flush that should make all - data available to the receiver in all cases. - - repoted by lamm AT ibm.com via bz3372; ok markus - - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 67cfc1fa8261feae6d2cc0c554711c97867cc81b + Missing semicolon. -commit d5981b1883746b1ae178a46229c26b53af99e37a -Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Mon Jan 17 21:41:04 2022 +0000 +commit 2923d026e55998133c0f6e5186dca2a3c0fa5ff5 +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Sat Mar 26 12:49:50 2022 +1100 - upstream: make most of the sftp errors more idiomatic, following - - the general form of "[local/remote] operation path: error message"; ok markus + Factor out platform-specific locked account check. - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 61364cd5f3a9fecaf8d63b4c38a42c0c91f8b571 + Also fixes an incorrect free on platforms with both libiaf and shadow + passwords (probably only Unixware). Prompted by github PR#284, + originally from @c3h2_ctf and stoeckmann@. -commit ac7c9ec894ed0825d04ef69c55babb49bab1d32e +commit d23efe4b12886ffe416be10bc0a7da6ca8aa72d1 +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Sat Mar 26 08:13:46 2022 +1100 + + Add OpenWRT mips and mipsel test targets. + +commit 16ea8b85838dd7a4dbeba4e51ac4f43fd68b1e5b Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Mon Jan 17 21:39:51 2022 +0000 +Date: Sun Mar 20 08:52:17 2022 +0000 - upstream: when transferring multiple files in SFTP mode, create the + upstream: don't leak argument list; bz3404, reported by Balu - destination directory if it doesn't already exist to match olde-scp(1) - behaviour. noticed by deraadt@ ok markus@ + Gajjala ok dtucker@ - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: cf44dfa231d4112f697c24ff39d7ecf2e6311407 + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: fddc32d74e5dd5cff1a49ddd6297b0867eae56a6 -commit 39d17e189f8e72c34c722579d8d4e701fa5132da +commit a72bde294fe0518c9a44ba63864093a1ef2425e3 Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Fri Jan 14 03:43:48 2022 +0000 +Date: Sun Mar 20 08:51:21 2022 +0000 - upstream: allow pin-required FIDO keys to be added to ssh-agent(1). + upstream: make addargs() and replacearg() a little more robust and - ssh-askpass will be used to request the PIN at authentication time. + improve error reporting - From Pedro Martelletto, ok djm + make freeargs(NULL) a noop like the other free functions - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: de8189fcd35b45f632484864523c1655550e2950 + ok dtucker as part of bz3403 + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 15f86da83176978b4d1d288caa24c766dfa2983d -commit 52423f64e13db2bdc31a51b32e999cb1bfcf1263 +commit 731087d2619fa7f01e675b23f57af10d745e8af2 Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Fri Jan 14 03:35:10 2022 +0000 +Date: Fri Mar 18 04:04:11 2022 +0000 - upstream: ssh-sk: free a resident key's user id + upstream: don't try to resolve ListenAddress directives in the sshd - From Pedro Martelletto; ok dtucker & me + re-exec path - we're never going to use the result and if the operation fails + then it can prevent connections from being accepted. Reported by Aaron + Poffenberger; with / ok dtucker@ - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 47be40d602b7a6458c4c71114df9b53d149fc2e9 + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 44c53a43909a328e2f5ab26070fdef3594eded60 -commit 014e2f147a2788bfb3cc58d1b170dcf2bf2ee493 +commit 1c83c082128694ddd11ac05fdf31d70312ff1763 Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Fri Jan 14 03:34:00 2022 +0000 +Date: Fri Mar 18 02:50:21 2022 +0000 - upstream: sshsk_load_resident: don't preallocate resp - - resp is allocated by client_converse(), at which point we lose - the original pointer. - - From Pedro Martelletto; ok dtucker & me + upstream: remove blank line - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 1f1b5ea3282017d6584dfed4f8370dc1db1f44b1 + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: d5e0182965b2fbfb03ad5f256d1a1ce5706bcddf -commit c88265f207dfe0e8bdbaf9f0eda63ed6b33781cf +commit 807be68684da7a1fe969c399ddce2fafb7997dcb Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Fri Jan 14 03:32:52 2022 +0000 +Date: Fri Mar 18 02:32:22 2022 +0000 - upstream: sshsk_sign: trim call to sshkey_fingerprint() - - the resulting fingerprint doesn't appear to be used for anything, - and we end up leaking it. - - from Pedro Martelletto; ok dtucker & me + upstream: helpful comment - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 5625cf6c68f082bc2cbbd348e69a3ed731d2f9b7 + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: e3315a45cb04e7feeb614d76ec80a9fe4ca0e8c7 -commit 1cd1b2eac39661b849d5a4b4b56363e22bb5f61e +commit a0b5816f8f1f645acdf74f7bc11b34455ec30bac Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Fri Jan 14 03:31:52 2022 +0000 +Date: Fri Mar 18 02:31:25 2022 +0000 - upstream: use status error message to communicate ~user expansion - - failures; provides better experience for scp in sftp mode, where ~user paths - are more likely to be used; spotted jsg, feedback jsg & deraadt ok jsg & - markus + upstream: ssh-keygen -Y check-novalidate requires namespace or SEGV - (forgot to include this file in previous commit) + will ensue. Patch from Mateusz Adamowski via GHPR#307 - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: d37cc4c8c861ce48cd6ea9899e96aaac3476847b + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 99e8ec38f9feb38bce6de240335be34aedeba5fd -commit a1d42a6ce0398da3833bedf374ef2571af7fea50 -Author: Damien Miller -Date: Fri Jan 14 13:49:32 2022 +1100 +commit 5a252d54a63be30d5ba4be76210942d754a531c0 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Tue Mar 15 05:27:37 2022 +0000 - fix edge case in poll(2) wrapper - - Correct handling of select(2) exceptfds. These should only be consulted - for POLLPRI flagged pfds and not unconditionally converted to POLLERR. + upstream: improve DEBUG_CHANNEL_POLL debugging message - with and ok dtucker@ + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 2275eb7bc4707d019b1a0194b9c92c0b78da848f -commit 976b9588b4b5babcaceec4767a241c11a67a5ccb -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Fri Jan 14 13:46:35 2022 +1100 +commit ce324cf58ba2840e31afeb996935800780c8fa4b +Author: cheloha@openbsd.org +Date: Sun Mar 13 23:27:54 2022 +0000 - Wrap OpenSSL includes in unit tests in ifdef. + upstream: ssh: xstrdup(): use memcpy(3) - Fixes unit test on systems that do not have OpenSSL headers installed. - -commit c171879374b2e8b07157503f5639ed0bce59ce89 -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Thu Jan 13 15:53:33 2022 +1100 - - Remove sort wrapper. + Copying the given string into the buffer with strlcpy(3) confers no + benefit in this context because we have already determined the + string's length with strlen(3) in order to allocate that buffer. - agent-restrict now takes care of this itself. - -commit 9cc2654403f1a686bb26c07a6ac790edf334cef5 -Author: dtucker@openbsd.org -Date: Thu Jan 13 04:53:16 2022 +0000 - - upstream: Set LC_ALL in both local and remote shells so that sorted + Thread: https://marc.info/?l=openbsd-tech&m=164687525802691&w=2 - output matches regardless of what the user's shell sets it to. ok djm@ + ok dtucker@ millert@ - OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 4e97dd69a68b05872033175a4c2315345d01837f + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: f8bfc082e36e2d2dc4e1feece02fe274155ca11a -commit 7a75f748cb2dd2f771bf70ea72698aa027996ab1 -Author: dtucker@openbsd.org -Date: Thu Jan 13 04:22:10 2022 +0000 +commit 2893c5e764557f48f9d6a929e224ed49c59545db +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Fri Mar 11 18:43:58 2022 +1100 - upstream: Avoid %'s in commands (not used in OpenBSD, but used in - - -portable's Valgrind test) being interpretted as printf format strings. + Resync fmt_scaled. with OpenBSD. - OpenBSD-Regress-ID: dc8655db27ac4acd2c386c4681bf42a10d80b043 + Fixes underflow reported in bz#3401. -commit 6c435bd4994d71442192001483a1cdb846e5ffcd +commit 5ae31a0fdd27855af29f48ff027491629fff5979 Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Wed Jan 12 16:58:13 2022 +1100 +Date: Wed Mar 9 09:41:56 2022 +1100 - Stop on first test failure to minimize logs. + Provide killpg implementation. + + Based on github PR#301 for Tandem NonStop. -commit 4bc2ba6095620a4484b708ece12842afd8c7685b -Author: dtucker@openbsd.org -Date: Wed Jan 12 07:18:37 2022 +0000 +commit c41c84b439f4cd74d4fe44298a4b4037ddd7d2ae +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Wed Mar 9 09:29:30 2022 +1100 - upstream: Use egrep when searching for an anchored string. + Check for missing ftruncate prototype. - OpenBSD-Regress-ID: dd114a2ac27ac4b06f9e4a586d3f6320c54aeeb4 + From github PR#301 in conjunction with rsbeckerca. -commit 6bf2efa2679da1e8e60731f41677b2081dedae2c +commit 8cf5275452a950869cb90eeac7d220b01f77b12e Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Wed Jan 12 18:25:06 2022 +1100 +Date: Tue Mar 8 20:04:06 2022 +1100 - Add "rev" command replacement if needed. + Default to not using sandbox when cross compiling. + + On most systems poll(2) does not work when the number of FDs is reduced + with setrlimit, so assume it doesn't when cross compiling and we can't + run the test. bz#3398. -commit 72bcd7993dadaf967bb3d8564ee31cbf38132b5d -Author: dtucker@openbsd.org -Date: Wed Jan 12 03:30:32 2022 +0000 +commit 379b30120da53d7c84aa8299c26b18c51c2a0dac +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Tue Mar 1 01:59:19 2022 +0000 - upstream: Don't log NULL hostname in restricted agent code, + upstream: pack pollfd array before server_accept_loop() ppoll() - printf("%s", NULL) is not safe on all platforms. with & ok djm + call, and terminate sshd if ppoll() returns errno==EINVAL - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: faf10cdae4adde00cdd668cd1f6e05d0a0e32a02 + avoids spin in ppoll when MaxStartups > RLIMIT_NOFILE, reported by + Daniel Micay + + feedback/ok deraadt + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: dbab1c24993ac977ec24d83283b8b7528f7c2c15 -commit acabefe3f8fb58c867c99fed9bbf84dfa1771727 -Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Tue Jan 11 22:33:16 2022 +0000 +commit eceafbe0bdbbd9bd2f3cf024ccb350666a9934dd +Author: naddy@openbsd.org +Date: Sun Feb 27 01:33:59 2022 +0000 - upstream: remove hardcoded domain and use window.location.host, so this + upstream: include rejected signature algorithm in error message and - can be run anywhere + not the (useless) key type; ok djm@ - OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 2ac2ade3b6227d9c547351d3ccdfe671e62b7f92 + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: d0c0f552a4d9161203e07e95d58a76eb602a76ff -commit 96da0946e44f34adc0397eb7caa6ec35a3e79891 +commit f2f3269423618a83157e18902385e720f9776007 Author: dtucker@openbsd.org -Date: Tue Jan 11 02:56:19 2022 +0000 +Date: Fri Feb 25 09:46:24 2022 +0000 - upstream: "void" functions should not return anything. From Tim Rice + upstream: Remove the char * casts from arguments to do_lstat, - via -portable. + do_readdir and do_stat paths since the underlying functions now take a const + char *. Patch from vapier at gentoo.org. - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: ce6616304f4c9881b46413e616b226c306830e2a + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 9e4d964dbfb0ed683a2a2900711b88e7f1c0297b -commit a882a09722c9f086c9edb65d0c4022fd965ec1ed +commit 4a66dac052c5ff5047161853f36904607649e4f9 Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Tue Jan 11 01:26:47 2022 +0000 +Date: Fri Feb 25 02:09:27 2022 +0000 - upstream: suppress "Connection to xxx closed" messages at LogLevel >= + upstream: save an unneccessary alloc/free, based on patch from - error bz3378; ok dtucker@ + Martin Vahlensieck; ok dtucker@ - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: d5bf457d5d2eb927b81d0663f45248a31028265c + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 90ffbf1f837e509742f2c31a1fbf2c0fd376fd5f -commit 61a1a6af22e17fc94999a5d1294f27346e6c4668 -Author: Damien Miller -Date: Wed Jan 12 08:57:49 2022 +1100 +commit 6f117cb151efe138ac57bdd8e26165f350328f5f +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Tue Mar 1 09:02:06 2022 +1100 - OS X poll(2) is broken; use compat replacement - - Darwin's poll(2) implementation is broken. For character-special - devices like /dev/null, it returns POLLNVAL when polled with - POLLIN. - - Apparently this is Apple bug 3710161, which is AFAIK not public, - but a websearch will find other OSS projects rediscovering it - periodically since it was first identified in 2005 (!!) + Remove unused ivbits argument from chacha_keysetup -commit 613a6545fc5a9542753b503cbe5906538a640b60 +commit 15974235dd528aeab0ec67fb92a0a1d733f62be2 Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Tue Jan 11 20:56:01 2022 +1100 +Date: Tue Mar 1 09:00:20 2022 +1100 - libhardended_malloc.so moved into out dir. + Add OPENBSD ORIGINAL marker. -commit 61761340be5e11046556623f8f5412b236cefa95 -Author: Tim Rice -Date: Mon Jan 10 11:07:04 2022 -0800 +commit f2ff669347d320532e7c1b63cdf5c62f46e73150 +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Mon Feb 28 22:21:36 2022 +1100 - Make USL compilers happy - UX:acomp: ERROR: "sftp-server.c", line 567: void function cannot return value + No unused param warnings for clang-12 and gcc-11. + + These have too many false positives in -Werror tests on the github CI + since we often provide empty stub functions for functionality not needed + for particular configurations. -commit 3ef403f351e80a59b6f7e9d43cb82c181855483c +commit 96558ecd87adac62efa9a2b5479f686ab86b0be1 Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Mon Jan 10 21:07:38 2022 +1100 +Date: Sat Feb 26 14:10:41 2022 +1100 - Add wrapper for "sort" to set LC_ALL=C. - - Found by djm, this should make sorts stable and reduce test flakiness. + Add debian-i386 test target. -commit bd69e29f5716090181dbe0b8272eb7eab1a383bb -Author: dtucker@openbsd.org -Date: Sat Jan 8 07:55:26 2022 +0000 +commit 284b6e5394652d519e31782e3b3cdfd7b21d1a81 +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Sat Feb 26 14:06:14 2022 +1100 - upstream: Remove errant "set -x" left over from debugging. + Allow ppoll_time64 in seccomp sandbox. - OpenBSD-Regress-ID: cd989268e034264cec5df97be7581549032c87dc + Should fix sandbox violations on (some? at least i386 and armhf) 32bit + Linux platforms. Patch from chutzpahu at gentoo.org and cjwatson at + debian.org via bz#3396. -commit 1a7c88e26fd673813dc5f61c4ac278564845e004 -Author: dtucker@openbsd.org -Date: Sat Jan 8 07:01:13 2022 +0000 +commit 0132056efabc5edb85c3c7105d2fb6dee41843c6 +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Fri Feb 25 19:47:48 2022 +1100 - upstream: Enable all supported hostkey algorithms (but no others). - - Allows hostbased test to pass when built without OpenSSL. + Improve handling of _getshort and _getlong. - OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 5ddd677a68b672517e1e78460dc6ca2ccc0a9562 + If the system native ones are exactly as required then use them, + otherwise use the local versions mapped to another name to prevent + name collisions. -commit 12b457c2a42ff271e7967d9bedd068cebb048db9 -Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Sat Jan 8 07:37:32 2022 +0000 +commit 8e206e0dd6b9f757b07979e48f53ad5bf9b7b52b +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Fri Feb 25 15:14:22 2022 +1100 - upstream: use status error message to communicate ~user expansion - - failures; provides better experience for scp in sftp mode, where ~user paths - are more likely to be used; spotted jsg, feedback jsg & deraadt ok jsg & - markus + Constify utimes in compat library to match specs. - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: fc610ce00ca0cdc2ecdabbd49ce7cb82033f905f + Patch from vapier at chromium.org. -commit 63670d4e9030bcee490d5a9cce561373ac5b3b23 -Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Sat Jan 8 07:36:11 2022 +0000 +commit 1b2920e3b63db2eddebeec7330ffe8b723055573 +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Fri Feb 25 13:50:56 2022 +1100 - upstream: fix some corner-case bugs in scp sftp-mode handling of - - ~-prefixed paths; spotted by jsg; feedback jsg & deraadt, ok jsg & markus + ANSIfy getshort and getlong. - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: d1697dbaaa9f0f5649d69be897eab25c7d37c222 + These functions appear to have come from OpenBSD's lib/libc/net/res_comp.c + which made this change in 2005. -commit e14940bbec57fc7d3ce0644dbefa35f5a8ec97d0 -Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Sat Jan 8 07:34:57 2022 +0000 +commit 54a86f4f6e1c43a2ca2be23ef799ab8910d4af70 +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Fri Feb 25 13:23:04 2022 +1100 - upstream: more idiomatic error messages; spotted by jsg & deraadt - - ok jsg & markus - - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 43618c692f3951747b4151c477c7df22afe2bcc8 + Use PICFLAG instead of hard coding -fPIC. -commit 9acddcd5918c623f7ebf454520ffe946a8f15e90 -Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Sat Jan 8 07:33:54 2022 +0000 +commit 3016ba47035ac3561aabd48e2be70167fe157d6a +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Fri Feb 25 11:37:11 2022 +1100 - upstream: add a variant of send_status() that allows overriding the - - default, generic error message. feedback/ok markus & jsg + Add tests for latest releases of {Libre,Open}SSL. + +commit f107467179428a0e3ea9e4aa9738ac12ff02822d +Author: Colin Watson +Date: Thu Feb 24 16:04:18 2022 +0000 + + Improve detection of -fzero-call-used-regs=all support - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 81f251e975d759994131b717ee7c0b439659c40f + GCC doesn't tell us whether this option is supported unless it runs into + the situation where it would need to emit corresponding code. -commit 961411337719d4cd78f1ab33e4ac549f3fa22f50 +commit 3383b2cac0e9275bc93c4b4760e6e048f537e1d6 Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Sat Jan 8 07:32:45 2022 +0000 +Date: Wed Feb 23 21:21:49 2022 +0000 - upstream: refactor tilde_expand_filename() and make it handle ~user - - paths with no trailing slash; feedback/ok markus and jsg + upstream: free(3) wants stdlib.h - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: a2ab365598a902f0f14ba6a4f8fb2d07a9b5d51d + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 227a8c70a95b4428c49e46863c9ef4bd318a3b8a -commit dc38236ab6827dec575064cac65c8e7035768773 -Author: dtucker@openbsd.org -Date: Thu Jan 6 22:14:25 2022 +0000 +commit a4537e79ab4ac6db4493c5158744b9ebde5efcb0 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Wed Feb 23 21:21:16 2022 +0000 - upstream: Don't explicitly set HostbasedAuthentication in - - sshd_config. It defaults to "no", and not explicitly setting it allows us to - enable it for the (optional) hostbased test. + upstream: put back the scp manpage changes for SFTP mode too - OpenBSD-Regress-ID: aa8e3548eb5793721641d26e56c29f363b767c0c + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 05dc53921f927e1b5e5694e1f3aa314549f2e768 -commit e12d912ddf1c873cb72e5de9a197afbe0b6622d2 -Author: dtucker@openbsd.org -Date: Thu Jan 6 21:46:56 2022 +0000 +commit 449bcb8403adfb9724805d02a51aea76046de185 +Author: deraadt@openbsd.org +Date: Wed Feb 23 19:01:00 2022 +0000 - upstream: Add test for hostbased auth. It requires some external + upstream: and we go back to testing sftp-scp after the 8.9 - setup (see comments at the top) and thus is disabled unless - TEST_SSH_HOSTBASED_AUTH and SUDO are set. + release... - OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 3ec8ba3750c5b595fc63e7845d13483065a4827a + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: a80440168258adca543a4607b871327a279c569c -commit a48533a8da6a0f4f05ecd055dc8048047e53569e +commit 166456cedad3962b83b848b1e9caf80794831f0f Author: Damien Miller -Date: Fri Jan 7 09:24:26 2022 +1100 +Date: Wed Feb 23 22:31:11 2022 +1100 - depend + makedepend -commit d9dbb5d9a0326e252d3c7bc13beb9c2434f59409 +commit 32ebaa0dbca5d0bb86e384e72bebc153f48413e4 Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Thu Jan 6 22:06:51 2022 +0000 +Date: Wed Feb 23 11:18:13 2022 +0000 - upstream: allow hostbased auth to select RSA keys when only + upstream: avoid integer overflow of auth attempts (harmless, caught - RSA/SHA2 are configured (this is the default case); ok markus@ + by monitor) - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 411c18c7bde40c60cc6dfb7017968577b4d4a827 + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 488ad570b003b21e0cd9e7a00349cfc1003b4d86 -commit fdb1d58d0d3888b042e5a500f6ce524486aaf782 +commit 6e0258c64c901753df695e06498b26f9f4812ea6 Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Thu Jan 6 22:05:42 2022 +0000 +Date: Wed Feb 23 11:17:10 2022 +0000 - upstream: add a helper function to match a key type to a list of - - signature algorithms. RSA keys can make signatures with multiple algorithms, - so some special handling is required. ok markus@ + upstream: randomise the password used in fakepw - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 03b41b2bda06fa4cd9c84cef6095033b9e49b6ff + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 34e159f73b1fbf0a924a9c042d8d61edde293947 -commit 11e8c4309a5086a45fbbbc87d0af5323c6152914 +commit bf114d6f0a9df0b8369823d9a0daa6c72b0c4cc9 Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Thu Jan 6 22:04:20 2022 +0000 +Date: Wed Feb 23 11:15:57 2022 +0000 - upstream: log some details on hostkeys that ssh loads for - - hostbased authn ok markus@ + upstream: use asprintf to construct .rhosts paths - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: da17061fa1f0e58cb31b88478a40643e18233e38 + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 8286e8d3d2c6ff916ff13d041d1713073f738a8b -commit c6706f661739514a34125aa3136532a958929510 +commit c07e154fbdc7285e9ec54e78d8a31f7325d43537 Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Thu Jan 6 22:03:59 2022 +0000 +Date: Wed Feb 23 11:07:09 2022 +0000 - upstream: log signature algorithm during verification by monitor; - - ok markus + upstream: openssh-8.9 - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 02b92bb42c4d4bf05a051702a56eb915151d9ecc + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 5c5f791c87c483cdab6d9266b43acdd9ca7bde0e -commit 8832402bd500d1661ccc80a476fd563335ef6cdc -Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Thu Jan 6 22:02:52 2022 +0000 +commit bc16667b4a1c3cad7029304853c143a32ae04bd4 +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Tue Feb 22 15:29:22 2022 +1100 - upstream: piece of UpdateHostkeys client strictification: when + Extend select+rlimit sanbox test to include poll. - updating known_hosts with new keys, ignore NULL keys (forgot to include in - prior commit) + POSIX specifies that poll() shall fail if "nfds argument is greater + than {OPEN_MAX}". The setrlimit sandbox sets this to effectively zero + so this causes poll() to fail in the preauth privsep process. - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 49d2eda6379490e1ceec40c3b670b973f63dea08 + This is likely the underlying cause for the previously observed similar + behaviour of select() on plaforms where it is implement in userspace on + top of poll(). -commit c2d9ced1da0276961d86690b3bd7ebdaca7fdbf7 -Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Thu Jan 6 22:01:14 2022 +0000 +commit 6520c488de95366be031d49287ed243620399e23 +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Tue Feb 22 13:08:59 2022 +1100 - upstream: include rejected signature algorithm in error message - - and not the (useless) key type; ok markus - - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 4180b5ec7ab347b43f84e00b1972515296dab023 + Add Alpine Linux test VM. -commit 7aa7b096cf2bafe2777085abdeed5ce00581f641 -Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Thu Jan 6 22:00:18 2022 +0000 +commit a4b325a3fc82d11e0f5d61f62e7fde29415f7afb +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Tue Feb 22 12:27:07 2022 +1100 - upstream: make ssh-keysign use the requested signature algorithm - - and not the default for the keytype. Part of unbreaking hostbased auth for - RSA/SHA2 keys. ok markus@ + Include sys/param.h if present. - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: b5639a14462948970da3a8020dc06f9a80ecccdc + Needed for howmany() on MUSL systems such as Alpine. -commit 291721bc7c840d113a49518f3fca70e86248b8e8 -Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Thu Jan 6 21:57:28 2022 +0000 +commit 5a102e9cb287a43bd7dfe594b775a89a8e94697c +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Tue Feb 22 12:25:52 2022 +1100 - upstream: stricter UpdateHostkey signature verification logic on - - the client- side. Require RSA/SHA2 signatures for RSA hostkeys except when - RSA/SHA1 was explicitly negotiated during initial KEX; bz3375 - - ok markus@ + Only include sys/poll.h if we don't have poll.h. - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 46e75e8dfa2c813781805b842580dcfbd888cf29 + Prevents warnings on MUSL based systems such as Alpine. -commit 0fa33683223c76289470a954404047bc762be84c -Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Thu Jan 6 21:55:23 2022 +0000 +commit 7c0d4ce911d5c58b6166b2db754a4e91f352adf5 +Author: Damien Miller +Date: Tue Feb 22 11:14:51 2022 +1100 - upstream: Fix signature algorithm selection logic for - - UpdateHostkeys on the server side. The previous code tried to prefer RSA/SHA2 - for hostkey proofs of RSA keys, but missed some cases. This will use RSA/SHA2 - signatures for RSA keys if the client proposed these algorithms in initial - KEX. bz3375 + disable agent-restrict test on minix3 - Mostly by Dmitry Belyavskiy with some tweaks by me. + Minix seems to have a platform-wide limit on the number of + select(2) syscalls that can be concurrently issued. This test + seems to exceed this limit. - ok markus@ + Refer to: - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: c17ba0c3236340d2c6a248158ebed042ac6a8029 + https://github.com/Stichting-MINIX-Research-Foundation/minix/blob/R3.3.0/minix/servers/vfs/select.c#L114 + https://github.com/Stichting-MINIX-Research-Foundation/minix/blob/R3.3.0/minix/servers/vfs/select.c#L30-L31 -commit 17877bc81db3846e6e7d4cfb124d966bb9c9296b -Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Thu Jan 6 21:48:38 2022 +0000 +commit 81d33d8e3cf7ea5ce3a5653c6102b623e019428a +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Mon Feb 21 21:27:20 2022 +1100 - upstream: convert ssh, sshd mainloops from select() to poll(); - - feedback & ok deraadt@ and markus@ has been in snaps for a few months - - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: a77e16a667d5b194dcdb3b76308b8bba7fa7239c + Skip agent-getpeereid when running as root. -commit 5c79952dfe1aa36105c93b3f383ce9be04dee384 -Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Thu Jan 6 21:46:23 2022 +0000 +commit fbd772570a25436a33924d91c164d2b24021f010 +Author: dtucker@openbsd.org +Date: Sun Feb 20 03:47:26 2022 +0000 - upstream: prepare for conversion of ssh, sshd mainloop from + upstream: Aproximate realpath on the expected output by deduping - select() to poll() by moving FD_SET construction out of channel handlers into - separate functions. ok markus + leading slashes. Fixes test failure when user's home dir is / which is + possible in some portable configurations. - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 937fbf2a4de12b19fb9d5168424e206124807027 + OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 53b8c53734f8893806961475c7106397f98d9f63 -commit 24c5187edfef4651a625b7d5d692c8c7e794f71f -Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Wed Jan 5 21:54:37 2022 +0000 +commit 336685d223a59f893faeedf0a562e053fd84058e +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Sun Feb 20 13:30:52 2022 +1100 - upstream: add a comment so I don't make this mistake again + Really move DSA to end of list. - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 69c7f2362f9de913bb29b6318580c5a1b52c921e + In commit ad16a84e syncing from OpenBSD, RSA was accidentally moved to + the end of the list instead of DSA. Spotted by andrew at fyfe.gb.net. -commit 7369900441929058263a17f56aa67e05ff7ec628 -Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Wed Jan 5 21:50:00 2022 +0000 +commit 63bf4f49ed2fdf2da6f97136c9df0c8168546eb3 +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Fri Feb 18 12:12:21 2022 +1100 - upstream: fix cut-and-pasto in error message - - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 4cc5c619e4b456cd2e9bb760d17e3a9c84659198 + Add test configs for MUSL C library. -commit 294c11b1c7d56d3fb61e329603a782315ed70c62 -Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Wed Jan 5 08:25:05 2022 +0000 +commit f7fc6a43f1173e8b2c38770bf6cee485a562d03b +Author: Damien Miller +Date: Thu Feb 17 22:54:19 2022 +1100 - upstream: select all RSA hostkey algorithms for UpdateHostkeys tests, - - not just RSA-SHA1 - - OpenBSD-Regress-ID: b40e62b65863f2702a0c10aca583b2fe76772bd8 + minix needs BROKEN_POLL too; chokes on /dev/null -commit 2ea1108c30e3edb6f872dfc1e6da10b041ddf2c0 +commit 667fec5d4fe4406745750a32f69b5d2e1a75e94b Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Wed Jan 5 04:56:15 2022 +0000 +Date: Thu Feb 17 10:58:27 2022 +0000 - upstream: regress test both sshsig message hash algorithms, possible + upstream: check for EINTR/EAGAIN failures in the rfd fast-path; caught - now because the algorithm is controllable via the CLI + by dtucker's minix3 vm :) ok dtucker@ - OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 0196fa87acc3544b2b4fd98de844a571cb09a39f + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 2e2c895a3e82ef347aa6694394a76a438be91361 -commit 2327c306b5d4a2b7e71178e5a4d139af9902c2b0 -Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Wed Jan 5 04:50:11 2022 +0000 +commit 41417dbda9fb55a0af49a8236e3ef9d50d862644 +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Thu Feb 17 22:05:29 2022 +1100 - upstream: allow selection of hash at sshsig signing time; code - - already supported either sha512 (default) or sha256, but plumbing wasn't - there mostly by Linus Nordberg - - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 1b536404b9da74a84b3a1c8d0b05fd564cdc96cd + Comment hurd test, the VM is currently broken. -commit 56e941d0a00d6d8bae88317717d5e1b7395c9529 -Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Wed Jan 5 04:27:54 2022 +0000 +commit b2aee35a1f0dc798339b3fcf96136da71b7e3f6d +Author: Damien Miller +Date: Thu Feb 17 21:15:16 2022 +1100 - upstream: add missing -O option to usage() for ssh-keygen -Y sign; - - from Linus Nordberg + find sk-dummy.so when build_dir != src_dir - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 4e78feb4aa830727ab76bb2e3d940440ae1d7af0 + spotted by Corinna Vinschen; feedback & ok dtucker@ -commit 141a14ec9b0924709c98df2dd8013bde5d8d12c7 -Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Wed Jan 5 04:27:01 2022 +0000 +commit 62a2d4e50b2e89f2ef04576931895d5139a5d037 +Author: Damien Miller +Date: Wed Feb 16 16:26:17 2022 +1100 - upstream: move sig_process_opts() to before sig_sign(); no - - functional code change - - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: da02d61f5464f72b4e8b299f83e93c3b657932f9 + update versions in preparation for 8.9 release -commit 37a14249ec993599a9051731e4fb0ac5e976aec1 +commit dd6d3dded721ac653ea73c017325e5bfeeec837f Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Wed Jan 5 04:10:39 2022 +0000 +Date: Tue Feb 15 05:13:36 2022 +0000 - upstream: regression test for find-principals NULL deref; from Fabian + upstream: document the unbound/host-bound options to - Stelzer + PubkeyAuthentication; spotted by HARUYAMA Seigo - OpenBSD-Regress-ID: f845a8632a5a7d5ae26978004c93e796270fd3e5 + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 298f681b66a9ecd498f0700082c7a6c46e948981 -commit eb1f042142fdaba93f6c9560cf6c91ae25f6884a -Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Wed Jan 5 04:02:42 2022 +0000 +commit df93529dd727fdf2fb290700cd4f1adb0c3c084b +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Mon Feb 14 14:19:40 2022 +1100 - upstream: NULL deref when using find-principals when matching an + Test if sshd accidentally acquires controlling tty - allowed_signers line that contains a namespace restriction, but no - restriction specified on the command-line; report and fix from Fabian Stelzer + When SSHD_ACQUIRES_CTTY is defined, test for the problematic behaviour + in the STREAMS code before activating the workaround. ok djm@ + +commit 766176cfdbfd7ec38bb6118dde6e4daa0df34888 +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Sat Feb 12 10:24:56 2022 +1100 + + Add cygwin-release test config. - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 4a201b86afb668c908d1a559c6af456a61f4b145 + This tests the flags used to build the cygwin release binaries. -commit 8f3b18030579f395eca2181da31a5f945af12a59 -Author: dtucker@openbsd.org -Date: Tue Jan 4 08:38:53 2022 +0000 +commit b30698662b862f5397116d23688aac0764e0886e +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Fri Feb 11 21:00:35 2022 +1100 - upstream: Log command invocation while debugging. + Move SSHD_ACQUIRES_CTTY workaround into compat. - This will aid in manually reproducing failing commands. + On some (most? all?) SysV based systems with STREAMS based ptys, + sshd could acquire a controlling terminal during pty setup when + it pushed the "ptem" module, due to what is probably a bug in + the STREAMS driver that's old enough to vote. Because it was the + privileged sshd's controlling terminal, it was not available for + the user's session, which ended up without one. This is known to + affect at least Solaris <=10, derivatives such as OpenIndiana and + several other SysV systems. See bz#245 for the backstory. - OpenBSD-Regress-ID: b4aba8d5ac5675ceebeeeefa3261ce344e67333a + In the we past worked around that by not calling setsid in the + privileged sshd child, which meant it was not a session or process + group leader. This solved controlling terminal problem because sshd + was not eligble to acquire one, but had other side effects such as + not cleaning up helper subprocesses in the SIGALRM handler since it + was not PG leader. Recent cleanups in the signal handler uncovered + this, resulting in the LoginGraceTime timer not cleaning up privsep + unprivileged processes. + + This change moves the workaround into the STREAMS pty allocation code, + by allocating a sacrificial pty to act as sshd's controlling terminal + before allocating user ptys, so those are still available for users' + sessions. + + On the down side: + - this will waste a pty per ssh connection on affected platforms. + + On the up side: + - it makes the process group behaviour consistent between platforms. + + - it puts the workaround nearest the code that actually causes the + problem and competely out of the mainline code. + + - the workaround is only activated if you use the STREAMS code. If, + say, Solaris 11 has the bug but also a working openpty() it doesn't + matter that we defined SSHD_ACQUIRES_CTTY. + + - the workaround is only activated when the fist pty is allocated, + ie in the post-auth privsep monitor. This means there's no risk + of fd leaks to the unprivileged processes, and there's no effect on + sessions that do not allocate a pty. + + Based on analysis and work by djm@, ok djm@ -commit bbf285164df535f0d38c36237f007551bbdae27f +commit cd00b48cf10f3565936a418c1e6d7e48b5c36140 Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Sun Dec 26 10:31:15 2021 +1100 +Date: Fri Feb 11 20:09:32 2022 +1100 - Always save config.h as build artifact. + Simplify handling of --with-ssl-dir. - Should allow better comparison between failing and succeeding test - platforms. + ok djm@ -commit 03bd4ed0db699687c5cd83405d26f81d2dc28d22 +commit ea13fc830fc0e0dce2459f1fab2ec5099f73bdf0 Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Sat Dec 25 16:42:51 2021 +1100 +Date: Fri Feb 11 13:39:29 2022 +1100 - Add OpenBSD 7.0 target. Retire 6.8. + Stop testing OpenBSD HEAD on 6.9 and 7.0. + + HEAD is not guaranteed to work on previous stable branches, and at the + moment is broken due to libfido API changes. -commit c45a752f0de611afd87755c2887c8a24816d08ee -Author: jsg@openbsd.org -Date: Sat Jan 1 05:55:06 2022 +0000 +commit 50b9e4a4514697ffb9592200e722de6b427cb9ff +Author: dtucker@openbsd.org +Date: Fri Feb 11 00:43:56 2022 +0000 - upstream: spelling + upstream: Always initialize delim before passing to hpdelim2 which - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: c63e43087a64d0727af13409c708938e05147b62 + might not set it. Found by the Valgrind tests on github, ok deraadt@ + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: c830c0db185ca43beff3f41c19943c724b4f636d -commit c672f83a89a756564db0d3af9934ba0e1cf8fa3e -Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Tue Jan 4 07:20:33 2022 +0000 +commit 6ee53064f476cf163acd5521da45b11b7c57321b +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Fri Feb 11 10:03:06 2022 +1100 - upstream: unbreak test: was picking up system ssh-add instead of the - - one supposedly being tested. Spotted by dtucker and using his VM zoo (which - includes some systems old enough to lack ed25519 key support) + Fix helper include path and remove excess code. - OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 7976eb3df11cc2ca3af91030a6a8c0cef1590bb5 + Looks like test_hpdelim.c was imported twice into the same file. + Spotted by kevin.brott at gmail com and chris at cataclysmal org. -commit a23698c3082ffe661abed14b020eac9b0c25eb9f -Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Sat Jan 1 04:18:06 2022 +0000 +commit 9fa63a19f68bc87452d3cf5c577cafad2921b7a4 +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Thu Feb 10 23:27:02 2022 +1100 - upstream: fix memleak in process_extension(); oss-fuzz issue #42719 + Put poll.h inside ifdef. + +commit 3ac00dfeb54b252c15dcbf1971582e9e3b946de6 +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Thu Feb 10 22:17:31 2022 +1100 + + We now support POLLPRI so actually define it. + +commit 25bd659cc72268f2858c5415740c442ee950049f +Author: dtucker@openbsd.org +Date: Sun Feb 6 22:58:33 2022 +0000 + + upstream: Add test for empty hostname with port. - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: d8d49f840162fb7b8949e3a5adb8107444b6de1e + OpenBSD-Regress-ID: e19e89d3c432b68997667efea44cf015bbe2a7e3 -commit cb885178f36b83d0f14cfe9f345d2068103feed0 -Author: jsg@openbsd.org -Date: Sat Jan 1 01:55:30 2022 +0000 +commit a29af853cff41c0635f0378c00fe91bf9c91dea4 +Author: dtucker@openbsd.org +Date: Fri Feb 4 07:53:44 2022 +0000 - upstream: spelling ok dtucker@ + upstream: Add unit tests for hpdelim. - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: bfc7ba74c22c928de2e257328b3f1274a3dfdf19 + OpenBSD-Regress-ID: be97b85c19895e6a1ce13c639765a3b48fd95018 -commit 6b977f8080a32c5b3cbb9edb634b9d5789fb79be +commit 9699151b039ecc5fad9ac6c6c02e9afdbd26f15f Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Sun Dec 26 23:34:41 2021 +0000 +Date: Thu Feb 10 04:12:38 2022 +0000 - upstream: split method list search functionality from + upstream: revert for imminent OpenSSH release, which wil ship with - authmethod_lookup() into a separate authmethod_byname(), for cases where we - don't need to check whether a method is enabled, etc. + scp in RCP mode. - use this to fix the "none" authentication method regression reported - by Nam Nguyen via bugs@ + > revision 1.106 + > date: 2021/10/15 14:46:46; author: deraadt; state: Exp; lines: +13 -9; commitid: w5n9B2RE38tFfggl; + > openbsd 7.0 release shipped with the (hopefully last) scp that uses RCP + > protocol for copying. Let's get back to testing the SFTP protocol. - ok deraadt@ + This will be put back once the OpenSSH release is done. - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 8cd188dc3a83aa8abe5b7693e762975cd8ea8a17 + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 0c725481a78210aceecff1537322c0b2df03e768 -commit 0074aa2c8d605ee7587279a22cdad4270b4ddd07 -Author: jmc@openbsd.org -Date: Wed Dec 22 06:56:41 2021 +0000 +commit 45279abceb37c3cbfac8ba36dde8b2c8cdd63d32 +Author: dtucker@openbsd.org +Date: Tue Feb 8 08:59:12 2022 +0000 - upstream: sort -H and -h in SYNOPSIS/usage(); tweak the -H text; - - ok djm + upstream: Switch hpdelim interface to accept only ":" as delimiter. - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 90721643e41e9e09deb5b776aaa0443456ab0965 - -commit 1c9853a68b2319f2e5f929179735e8fbb9988a67 -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Wed Dec 22 19:33:10 2021 +1100 - - Use SHA.*_HMAC_BLOCK_SIZE if needed. + Historicallly, hpdelim accepted ":" or "/" as a port delimiter between + hosts (or addresses) and ports. These days most of the uses for "/" + are no longer accepted, so there are several places where it checks the + delimiter to disallow it. Make hpdelim accept only ":" and use hpdelim2 + in the other cases. ok djm@ - If the platform has a native SHA2, does not define SHA.*_BLOCK_LENGTH - but does define SHA.*_HMAC_BLOCK_SIZE (eg Solaris) then use the latter. - Should fix --without-openssl build on Solaris. + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 7e6420bd1be87590b6840973f5ad5305804e3102 -commit 715c892f0a5295b391ae92c26ef4d6a86ea96e8e -Author: Damien Miller -Date: Wed Dec 22 09:02:50 2021 +1100 +commit a1bcbf04a7c2d81944141db7ecd0ba292d175a66 +Author: pedro martelletto +Date: Mon Feb 7 09:09:59 2022 +0100 - remove sys/param.h in -portable, after upstream + fix typos in previous -commit 7a7c69d8b4022b1e5c0afb169c416af8ce70f3e8 +commit 56192518e329b39f063487bc2dc4d796f791eca0 Author: Damien Miller -Date: Mon Dec 20 13:05:20 2021 +1100 +Date: Mon Feb 7 12:53:47 2022 +1100 - add agent-restrict.sh file, missed in last commit + compat code for fido_assert_set_clientdata() -commit f539136ca51a4976644db5d0be8158cc1914c72a +commit d6b5aa08fdcf9b527f8b8f932432941d5b76b7ab Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Sun Dec 19 22:20:12 2021 +0000 +Date: Mon Feb 7 01:25:12 2022 +0000 - upstream: regression test for destination restrictions in ssh-agent + upstream: use libfido2 1.8.0+ fido_assert_set_clientdata() instead - OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 3c799d91e736b1753b4a42d80c42fc40de5ad33d + of manually hashing data outselves. Saves a fair bit of code and makes life + easier for some -portable platforms. + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 351dfaaa5ab1ee928c0e623041fca28078cff0e0 -commit 6e4980eb8ef94c04874a79dd380c3f568e8416d6 -Author: anton@openbsd.org -Date: Sat Dec 18 06:53:59 2021 +0000 +commit 86cc93fd3c26b2e0c7663c6394995fb04ebfbf3b +Author: jsg@openbsd.org +Date: Sun Feb 6 00:29:03 2022 +0000 - upstream: Make use of ntests variable, pointed out by clang 13. + upstream: remove please from manual pages ok jmc@ sthen@ millert@ - OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 4241a3d21bdfa1630ed429b6d4fee51038d1be72 + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 6543acb00f4f38a23472538e1685c013ca1a99aa -commit 3eead8158393b697f663ec4301e3c7b6f24580b1 -Author: deraadt@openbsd.org -Date: Tue Dec 14 21:25:27 2021 +0000 +commit ad16a84e64a8cf1c69c63de3fb9008320a37009c +Author: dtucker@openbsd.org +Date: Fri Feb 4 02:49:17 2022 +0000 - upstream: sys/param.h cleanup, mostly using MINIMUM() and + upstream: Since they are deprecated, move DSA to the end of the - ok dtucker + default list of public keys so that they will be tried last. From github + PR#295 from "ProBackup-nl", ok djm@ - OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 172a4c45d3bcf92fa6cdf6c4b9db3f1b3abe4db0 + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 7e5d575cf4971d4e2de92e0b6d6efaba53598bf0 -commit 266678e19eb0e86fdf865b431b6e172e7a95bf48 -Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Sun Dec 19 22:15:42 2021 +0000 +commit 253de42753de85dde266e061b6fec12ca6589f7d +Author: Damien Miller +Date: Wed Feb 2 16:52:07 2022 +1100 - upstream: document host-bound publickey authentication + portable-specific string array constification - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: ea6ed91779a81f06d961e30ecc49316b3d71961b + from Mike Frysinger -commit 3d00024b3b156aa9bbd05d105f1deb9cb088f6f7 +commit dfdcc2220cf359c492d5d34eb723370e8bd8a19e Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Sun Dec 19 22:15:21 2021 +0000 +Date: Tue Feb 1 23:37:15 2022 +0000 - upstream: document agent protocol extensions + upstream: test 'ssh-keygen -Y find-principals' with wildcard - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 09e8bb391bbaf24c409b75a4af44e0cac65405a7 + principals; from Fabian Stelzer + + OpenBSD-Regress-ID: fbe4da5f0032e7ab496527a5bf0010fd700f8f40 -commit c385abf76511451bcba78568167b1cd9e90587d5 -Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Sun Dec 19 22:14:47 2021 +0000 +commit 968e508967ef42480cebad8cf3172465883baa77 +Author: dtucker@openbsd.org +Date: Fri Jan 21 02:54:41 2022 +0000 - upstream: PubkeyAuthentication=yes|no|unbound|host-bound - - Allow control over which pubkey methods are used. Added out of - concern that some hardware devices may have difficulty signing - the longer pubkey authentication challenges. This provides a - way for them to disable the extension. It's also handy for - testing. + upstream: Enable all supported ciphers and macs in the server - feedback / ok markus@ + before trying to benchmark them. Increase the data file size to get more + signal. - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: ee52580db95c355cf6d563ba89974c210e603b1a + OpenBSD-Regress-ID: dc3697d9f7defdfc51c608782c8e750128e46eb6 -commit 34b1e9cc7654f41cd4c5b1cc290b999dcf6579bb +commit 15b7199a1fd37eff4c695e09d573f3db9f4274b7 Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Sun Dec 19 22:14:12 2021 +0000 +Date: Tue Feb 1 23:34:47 2022 +0000 - upstream: document destination-constrained keys + upstream: allow 'ssh-keygen -Y find-principals' to match wildcard - feedback / ok markus@ + principals in allowed_signers files; from Fabian Stelzer - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: cd8c526c77268f6d91c06adbee66b014d22d672e + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 1e970b9c025b80717dddff5018fe5e6f470c5098 -commit a6d7677c4abcfba268053e5867f2acabe3aa371b +commit 541667fe6dc26d7881e55f0bb3a4baa6f3171645 Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Sun Dec 19 22:13:55 2021 +0000 +Date: Tue Feb 1 23:32:51 2022 +0000 - upstream: Use hostkey parsed from hostbound userauth request - - Require host-bound userauth requests for forwarded SSH connections. - - The hostkey parsed from the host-bound userauth request is now checked - against the most recently bound session ID / hostkey on the agent socket - and the signature refused if they do not match. + upstream: mark const string array contents const too, i.e. static - ok markus@ + const char *array => static const char * const array from Mike Frysinger - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: d69877c9a3bd8d1189a5dbdeceefa432044dae02 + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: a664e31ea6a795d7c81153274a5f47b22bdc9bc1 -commit baaff0ff4357cc5a079621ba6e2d7e247b765061 +commit 8cfa73f8a2bde4c98773f33f974c650bdb40dd3c Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Sun Dec 19 22:13:33 2021 +0000 +Date: Tue Feb 1 23:11:11 2022 +0000 - upstream: agent support for parsing hostkey-bound signatures + upstream: better match legacy scp behaviour: show un-expanded paths - Allow parse_userauth_request() to work with blobs from - publickey-hostbound-v00@openssh.com userauth attempts. + in error messages. Spotted by and ok tb@ - Extract hostkey from these blobs. + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 866c8ffac5bd7d38ecbfc3357c8adfa58af637b7 + +commit 4e62c13ab419b4b224c8bc6a761e91fcf048012d +Author: dtucker@openbsd.org +Date: Tue Feb 1 07:57:32 2022 +0000 + + upstream: Remove explicit kill of privsep preauth child's PID in - ok markus@ + SIGALRM handler. It's no longer needed since the child will get terminated by + the SIGTERM to the process group that cleans up any auth helpers, it + simplifies the signal handler and removes the risk of a race when updating + the PID. Based on analysis by HerrSpace in github PR#289, ok djm@ - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 81c064255634c1109477dc65c3e983581d336df8 + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 2be1ffa28b4051ad9e33bb4371e2ec8a31d6d663 -commit 3e16365a79cdeb2d758cf1da6051b1c5266ceed7 -Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Sun Dec 19 22:13:12 2021 +0000 +commit 2a7ccd2ec4022917b745af7186f514f365b7ebe9 +Author: guenther@openbsd.org +Date: Fri Jan 28 06:18:42 2022 +0000 - upstream: EXT_INFO negotiation of hostbound pubkey auth + upstream: When it's the possessive of 'it', it's spelled "its", - the EXT_INFO packet gets a new publickey-hostbound@openssh.com to - advertise the hostbound public key method. + without the apostrophe. - Client side support to parse this feature flag and set the kex->flags - indicator if the expected version is offered (currently "0"). + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: fb6ab9c65bd31de831da1eb4631ddac018c5fae7 + +commit 8a0848cdd3b25c049332cd56034186b7853ae754 +Author: Alex James +Date: Sun Jan 30 16:13:36 2022 -0600 + + sandbox-seccomp-filter: allow gettid - ok markus@ + Some allocators (such as Scudo) use gettid while tracing allocations [1]. + Allow gettid in preauth to prevent sshd from crashing with Scudo. - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 4cdb2ca5017ec1ed7a9d33bda95c1d6a97b583b0 + [1]: https://github.com/llvm/llvm-project/blob/llvmorg-13.0.0/compiler-rt/lib/gwp_asan/common.cpp#L46 -commit 94ae0c6f0e35903b695e033bf4beacea1d376bb1 +commit b30d32159dc3c7052f4bfdf36357996c905af739 Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Sun Dec 19 22:12:54 2021 +0000 +Date: Sat Jan 22 00:49:34 2022 +0000 - upstream: client side of host-bound pubkey authentication - - Add kex->flags member to enable the publickey-hostbound-v00@openssh.com - authentication method. - - Use the new hostbound method in client if the kex->flags flag was set, - and include the inital KEX hostkey in the userauth request. - - Note: nothing in kex.c actually sets the new flag yet + upstream: add a ssh_packet_process_read() function that reads from - ok markus@ + a fd directly into the transport input buffer. - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 5a6fce8c6c8a77a80ee1526dc467d91036a5910d - -commit 288fd0218dbfdcb05d9fbd1885904bed9b6d42e6 -Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Sun Dec 19 22:12:30 2021 +0000 - - upstream: sshd side of hostbound public key auth + Use this in the client and server mainloops to avoid unnecessary + copying. It also lets us use a more greedy read size without penalty. - This is identical to the standard "publickey" method, but it also includes - the initial server hostkey in the message signed by the client. + Yields a 2-3% performance gain on cipher-speed.sh (in a fairly + unscientific test tbf) - feedback / ok markus@ + feedback dtucker@ ok markus@ - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 7ea01bb7238a560c1bfb426fda0c10a8aac07862 + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: df4112125bf79d8e38e79a77113e1b373078e632 -commit dbb339f015c33d63484261d140c84ad875a9e548 +commit a1a8efeaaa9cccb15cdc0a2bd7c347a149a3a7e3 Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Sun Dec 19 22:12:07 2021 +0000 +Date: Sat Jan 22 00:45:31 2022 +0000 - upstream: prepare for multiple names for authmethods - - allow authentication methods to have one additional name beyond their - primary name. - - allow lookup by this synonym - - Use primary name for authentication decisions, e.g. for - PermitRootLogin=publickey - - Pass actual invoked name to the authmethods, so they can tell whether they - were requested via the their primary name or synonym. + upstream: Use sshbuf_read() to read directly into the channel input - ok markus@ + buffer rather than into a stack buffer that needs to be copied again; + Improves performance by about 1% on cipher-speed.sh feedback dtucker@ ok + markus@ - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 9e613fcb44b8168823195602ed3d09ffd7994559 + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: bf5e6e3c821ac3546dc8241d8a94e70d47716572 -commit 39f00dcf44915f20684160f0a88d3ef8a3278351 -Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Sun Dec 19 22:11:39 2021 +0000 +commit 29a76994e21623a1f84d68ebb9dc5a3c909fa3a7 +Author: Damien Miller +Date: Tue Jan 25 11:52:34 2022 +1100 - upstream: ssh-agent side of destination constraints - - Gives ssh-agent the ability to parse restrict-destination-v00@openssh.com - constraints and to apply them to keys. - - Check constraints against the hostkeys recorded for a SocketEntry when - attempting a signature, adding, listing or deleting keys. Note that - the "delete all keys" request will remove constrained keys regardless of - location. - - feedback Jann Horn & markus@ - ok markus@ - - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 84a7fb81106c2d609a6ac17469436df16d196319 + depend -commit ce943912df812c573a33d00bf9e5435b7fcca3f7 +commit 754e0d5c7712296a7a3a83ace863812604c7bc4f Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Sun Dec 19 22:11:06 2021 +0000 +Date: Sat Jan 22 00:43:43 2022 +0000 - upstream: ssh-add side of destination constraints - - Have ssh-add accept a list of "destination constraints" that allow - restricting where keys may be used in conjunction with a ssh-agent/ssh - that supports session ID/hostkey binding. - - Constraints are specified as either "[user@]host-pattern" or - "host-pattern>[user@]host-pattern". - - The first form permits a key to be used to authenticate as the - specified user to the specified host. - - The second form permits a key that has previously been permitted - for use at a host to be available via a forwarded agent to an - additional host. - - For example, constraining a key with "user1@host_a" and - "host_a>host_b". Would permit authentication as "user1" at - "host_a", and allow the key to be available on an agent forwarded - to "host_a" only for authentication to "host_b". The key would not - be visible on agent forwarded to other hosts or usable for - authentication there. - - Internally, destination constraints use host keys to identify hosts. - The host patterns are used to obtain lists of host keys for that - destination that are communicated to the agent. The user/hostkeys are - encoded using a new restrict-destination-v00@openssh.com key - constraint. - - host keys are looked up in the default client user/system known_hosts - files. It is possible to override this set on the command-line. + upstream: Add a sshbuf_read() that attempts to read(2) directly in - feedback Jann Horn & markus@ - ok markus@ + to a sshbuf; ok markus@ - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 6b52cd2b637f3d29ef543f0ce532a2bce6d86af5 + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 2d8f249040a4279f3bc23c018947384de8d4a45b -commit 5e950d765727ee0b20fc3d2cbb0c790b21ac2425 +commit c7964fb9829d9ae2ece8b51a76e4a02e8449338d Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Sun Dec 19 22:10:24 2021 +0000 +Date: Fri Jan 21 07:04:19 2022 +0000 - upstream: ssh-add side of destination constraints - - Have ssh-add accept a list of "destination constraints" that allow - restricting where keys may be used in conjunction with a ssh-agent/ssh - that supports session ID/hostkey binding. - - Constraints are specified as either "[user@]host-pattern" or - "host-pattern>[user@]host-pattern". - - The first form permits a key to be used to authenticate as the - specified user to the specified host. - - The second form permits a key that has previously been permitted - for use at a host to be available via a forwarded agent to an - additional host. - - For example, constraining a key with "user1@host_a" and - "host_a>host_b". Would permit authentication as "user1" at - "host_a", and allow the key to be available on an agent forwarded - to "host_a" only for authentication to "host_b". The key would not - be visible on agent forwarded to other hosts or usable for - authentication there. - - Internally, destination constraints use host keys to identify hosts. - The host patterns are used to obtain lists of host keys for that - destination that are communicated to the agent. The user/hostkeys are - encoded using a new restrict-destination-v00@openssh.com key - constraint. - - host keys are looked up in the default client user/system known_hosts - files. It is possible to override this set on the command-line. + upstream: add a helper for writing an error message to the - feedback Jann Horn & markus@ - ok markus@ + stderr_buf and setting quit_pending; no functional change but saves a bunch + of boilerplate - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: ef47fa9ec0e3c2a82e30d37ef616e245df73163e + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 0747657cad6b9eabd514a6732adad537568e232d -commit 4c1e3ce85e183a9d0c955c88589fed18e4d6a058 +commit d23b4f7fdb1bd87e2cd7a9ae7c198ae99d347916 Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Sun Dec 19 22:09:23 2021 +0000 +Date: Fri Jan 21 06:58:06 2022 +0000 - upstream: ssh-agent side of binding - - record session ID/hostkey/forwarding status for each active socket. - - Attempt to parse data-to-be-signed at signature request time and extract - session ID from the blob if it is a pubkey userauth request. + upstream: correct comment and use local variable instead of long - ok markus@ + indirection; spotted by dtucker@ - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: a80fd41e292b18b67508362129e9fed549abd318 + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 5f65f5f69db2b7d80a0a81b08f390a63f8845965 -commit e9497ecf73f3c16667288bce48d4e3d7e746fea1 -Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Sun Dec 19 22:08:48 2021 +0000 +commit d069b020a02b6e3935080204ee44d233e8158ebb +Author: deraadt@openbsd.org +Date: Fri Jan 21 00:53:40 2022 +0000 - upstream: ssh client side of binding - - send session ID, hostkey, signature and a flag indicating whether the - agent connection is being forwarded to ssh agent each time a connection - is opened via a new "session-bind@openssh.com" agent extension. + upstream: When poll(2) returns -1, for some error conditions - ok markus@ + pfd[].revents is not cleared. There are subtle errors in various programs. + In this particular case, the program should error out. ok djm millert - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 2f154844fe13167d3ab063f830d7455fcaa99135 + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 00f839b16861f7fb2adcf122e95e8a82fa6a375c -commit b42c61d6840d16ef392ed0f365e8c000734669aa -Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Sun Dec 19 22:08:06 2021 +0000 +commit e204b34337a965feb439826157c191919fd9ecf8 +Author: Damien Miller +Date: Sat Jan 22 11:38:21 2022 +1100 - upstream: Record session ID, host key and sig at intital KEX - - These will be used later for agent session ID / hostkey binding + restore tty force-read hack - ok markus@ + This portable-specific hack fixes a hang on exit for ttyful sessions + on Linux and some SysVish Unix variants. It was accidentally disabled + in commit 5c79952dfe1a (a precursor to the mainloop poll(2) conversion). - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: a9af29e33772b18e3e867c6fa8ab35e1694a81fe + Spotted by John in bz3383 -commit 26ca33d186473d58a32d812e19273ce078b6ffff -Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Tue Dec 7 22:06:45 2021 +0000 +commit 68085066b6bad43643b43f5957fcc5fd34782ccd +Author: Corinna Vinschen +Date: Fri Jan 21 03:22:56 2022 +1100 - upstream: better error message for FIDO keys when we can't match + Fix signedness bug in Cygwin code - them to a token + The Cygwin-specific pattern match code has a bug. It checks + the size_t value returned by mbstowcs for being < 0. The right + thing to do is to check against (size_t) -1. Fix that. - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 58255c2a1980088f4ed144db67d879ada2607650 + Signed-off-by: Corinna Vinschen -commit adb0ea006d7668190f0c42aafe3a2864d352e34a +commit 2e5cfed513e84444483baf1d8b31c40072b05103 Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Wed Dec 15 10:50:33 2021 +1100 +Date: Thu Jan 20 13:26:27 2022 +1100 - Correct value for IPTOS_DSCP_LE. + Improve compatibility of early exit trap handling. - It needs to allow for the preceeding two ECN bits. From daisuke.higashi - at gmail.com via OpenSSH bz#3373, ok claudio@, job@, djm@. + Dash (as used by the github runners) has some differences in its trap + builtin: + - it doesn't have -p (which is fine, that's not in posix). + - it doesn't work in a subshell (which turns out to be in compliance + with posix, which means bash isn't). + - it doesn't work in a pipeline, ie "trap|cat" produces no output. -commit 3dafd3fe220bd9046f11fcf5191a79ec8800819f +commit 3fe6800b6027add478e648934cbb29d684e51943 Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Fri Dec 10 11:57:30 2021 +1100 +Date: Thu Jan 20 00:49:57 2022 +1100 - Increase timeout for test step. + Move more tests out of valgrind-1 runner. -commit 5aefb05cd5b843e975b191d6ebb7ddf8de35c112 +commit 20da6ed136dd76e6a0b229ca3036ef9c7c7ef798 Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Fri Dec 10 10:27:27 2021 +1100 +Date: Wed Jan 19 15:37:39 2022 +1100 - Update the list of tests that don't work on Minix. + Invoke EXIT handler early when using Valgrind. - While there, remove CC (configure will now find clang) and make the test - list easier to update via cut and paste. + When using Valgrind, we need to wait for all invoked programs to + complete before checking their valgrind logs. Some tests, notably + agent-restrict, set an EXIT trap handler to clean up things like + ssh-agent, but those do not get invoked until test-exec.sh exits. + This causes the Valgrind wait to deadlock, so if present invoke + the EXIT handler before checking the Valgrind logs. -commit 1c09bb1b2e207d091cec299c49416c23d24a1b31 +commit ad2e0580c87b0714cf166bca9d926a95ddeee1c8 Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Fri Dec 10 10:12:57 2021 +1100 +Date: Tue Jan 18 12:55:21 2022 +1100 - Add minix host tuple. - - Define SETEUID_BREAKS_SETUID for it which should make privsep work. + Remove line leftover from upstream sync. -commit a2188579032cf080213a78255373263466cb90cc -Author: jsg@openbsd.org -Date: Sun Dec 5 12:28:27 2021 +0000 +commit d1051c0f11a6b749027e26bbeb61b07df4b67e15 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Mon Jan 17 22:56:04 2022 +0000 - upstream: fix unintended sizeof pointer in debug path ok markus@ + upstream: when decompressing zlib compressed packets, use - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: b9c0481ffc0cd801e0840e342e6a282a85aac93c + Z_SYNC_FLUSH instead of Z_PARTIAL_FLUSH as the latter is not actually + specified as a valid mode for inflate(). There should be no practical change + in behaviour as the compression side ensures a flush that should make all + data available to the receiver in all cases. + + repoted by lamm AT ibm.com via bz3372; ok markus + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 67cfc1fa8261feae6d2cc0c554711c97867cc81b -commit da40355234068c82f1a36196f2d18dd2d81aaafd -Author: naddy@openbsd.org -Date: Sat Dec 4 00:05:39 2021 +0000 +commit d5981b1883746b1ae178a46229c26b53af99e37a +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Mon Jan 17 21:41:04 2022 +0000 - upstream: RSA/SHA-1 is not used by default anymore on the server + upstream: make most of the sftp errors more idiomatic, following - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 64abef6cfc3e53088225f6b8a1dcd86d52dc8353 + the general form of "[local/remote] operation path: error message"; ok markus + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 61364cd5f3a9fecaf8d63b4c38a42c0c91f8b571 -commit e9c71498a083a8b502aa831ea931ce294228eda0 +commit ac7c9ec894ed0825d04ef69c55babb49bab1d32e Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Thu Dec 2 23:45:36 2021 +0000 +Date: Mon Jan 17 21:39:51 2022 +0000 - upstream: hash full host:port when asked to hash output, fixes hashes + upstream: when transferring multiple files in SFTP mode, create the - for non- default ports. bz3367 ok dtucker@ + destination directory if it doesn't already exist to match olde-scp(1) + behaviour. noticed by deraadt@ ok markus@ - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 096021cc847da7318ac408742f2d0813ebe9aa73 + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: cf44dfa231d4112f697c24ff39d7ecf2e6311407 -commit b5601202145a03106012c22cb8980bcac2949f0b +commit 39d17e189f8e72c34c722579d8d4e701fa5132da Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Thu Dec 2 23:23:13 2021 +0000 +Date: Fri Jan 14 03:43:48 2022 +0000 - upstream: improve the testing of credentials against inserted FIDO + upstream: allow pin-required FIDO keys to be added to ssh-agent(1). - keys a little more: ask the token whether a particular key belongs to it in - cases where the token support on-token user- verification (e.g. biometrics) - rather than just assuming that it will accept it. + ssh-askpass will be used to request the PIN at authentication time. - Will reduce spurious "Confirm user presence" notifications for key - handles that relate to FIDO keys that are not currently inserted in at - least some cases. + From Pedro Martelletto, ok djm - Motivated by bz3366; by Pedro Martelletto + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: de8189fcd35b45f632484864523c1655550e2950 + +commit 52423f64e13db2bdc31a51b32e999cb1bfcf1263 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Fri Jan 14 03:35:10 2022 +0000 + + upstream: ssh-sk: free a resident key's user id - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: ffac7f3215842397800e1ae2e20229671a55a63d + From Pedro Martelletto; ok dtucker & me + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 47be40d602b7a6458c4c71114df9b53d149fc2e9 -commit ca709e27c41c90f4565b17282c48dca7756e083c +commit 014e2f147a2788bfb3cc58d1b170dcf2bf2ee493 Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Thu Dec 2 22:40:05 2021 +0000 +Date: Fri Jan 14 03:34:00 2022 +0000 - upstream: move check_sk_options() up so we can use it earlier + upstream: sshsk_load_resident: don't preallocate resp - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 67fe98ba1c846d22035279782c4664c1865763b4 + resp is allocated by client_converse(), at which point we lose + the original pointer. + + From Pedro Martelletto; ok dtucker & me + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 1f1b5ea3282017d6584dfed4f8370dc1db1f44b1 -commit b711bc01a7ec76bb6a285730990cbce9b8ca5773 -Author: dtucker@openbsd.org -Date: Thu Dec 2 22:35:05 2021 +0000 +commit c88265f207dfe0e8bdbaf9f0eda63ed6b33781cf +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Fri Jan 14 03:32:52 2022 +0000 - upstream: ssh-rsa is no longer in the default for + upstream: sshsk_sign: trim call to sshkey_fingerprint() - PubkeyAcceptedAlgorithms. + the resulting fingerprint doesn't appear to be used for anything, + and we end up leaking it. - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 34a9e1bc30966fdcc922934ae00f09f2596cd73c + from Pedro Martelletto; ok dtucker & me + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 5625cf6c68f082bc2cbbd348e69a3ed731d2f9b7 -commit dc91ceea33cd4a9f05be953e8d8062f732db5c8a +commit 1cd1b2eac39661b849d5a4b4b56363e22bb5f61e Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Thu Dec 2 02:44:44 2021 +0000 +Date: Fri Jan 14 03:31:52 2022 +0000 - upstream: don't put the tty into raw mode when SessionType=none, avoids + upstream: use status error message to communicate ~user expansion - ^c being unable to kill such a session. bz3360; ok dtucker@ + failures; provides better experience for scp in sftp mode, where ~user paths + are more likely to be used; spotted jsg, feedback jsg & deraadt ok jsg & + markus - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 83960c433052303b643b4c380ae2f799ac896f65 + (forgot to include this file in previous commit) + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: d37cc4c8c861ce48cd6ea9899e96aaac3476847b -commit e6e7d2654a13ba10141da7b42ea683ea4eeb1f38 +commit a1d42a6ce0398da3833bedf374ef2571af7fea50 Author: Damien Miller -Date: Mon Nov 29 14:11:03 2021 +1100 +Date: Fri Jan 14 13:49:32 2022 +1100 - previous commit broke bcrypt_pbkdf() + fix edge case in poll(2) wrapper - Accidentally reverted part of the conversion to use SHA512 from SUPERCOP - instead of OpenBSD-style libc SHA512. + Correct handling of select(2) exceptfds. These should only be consulted + for POLLPRI flagged pfds and not unconditionally converted to POLLERR. + + with and ok dtucker@ -commit c0459588b8d00b73e506c6095958ecfe62a4a7ba +commit 976b9588b4b5babcaceec4767a241c11a67a5ccb Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Mon Nov 29 14:03:19 2021 +1100 - - Fix typo in Neils' name. - -commit 158bf854e2a22cf09064305f4a4e442670562685 -Author: Damien Miller -Date: Mon Nov 29 12:30:22 2021 +1100 +Date: Fri Jan 14 13:46:35 2022 +1100 - sync bcrypt-related files with OpenBSD - - The main change is that Niels Provos kindly agreed to rescind the - BSD license advertising clause, shifting them to the 3-term BSD - license. + Wrap OpenSSL includes in unit tests in ifdef. - This was the last thing in OpenSSH that used the advertising clause. + Fixes unit test on systems that do not have OpenSSL headers installed. -commit e8976d92a42883ff6b8991438f07df60c2c0d82d -Author: Damien Miller -Date: Mon Nov 29 12:29:29 2021 +1100 +commit c171879374b2e8b07157503f5639ed0bce59ce89 +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Thu Jan 13 15:53:33 2022 +1100 - depend + Remove sort wrapper. + + agent-restrict now takes care of this itself. -commit 8249afeec013e557fe7491a72ca3285de03e25b1 -Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Sun Nov 28 07:21:26 2021 +0000 +commit 9cc2654403f1a686bb26c07a6ac790edf334cef5 +Author: dtucker@openbsd.org +Date: Thu Jan 13 04:53:16 2022 +0000 - upstream: sshsig: return "key not found" when searching empty files + upstream: Set LC_ALL in both local and remote shells so that sorted - rather than "internal error" + output matches regardless of what the user's shell sets it to. ok djm@ - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: e2ccae554c78d7a7cd33fc5d217f35be7e2507ed + OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 4e97dd69a68b05872033175a4c2315345d01837f -commit 9e3227d4dbb5ad9c9091b4c14982cab4bba87b4d -Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Sun Nov 28 07:15:10 2021 +0000 +commit 7a75f748cb2dd2f771bf70ea72698aa027996ab1 +Author: dtucker@openbsd.org +Date: Thu Jan 13 04:22:10 2022 +0000 - upstream: ssh-keygen -Y match-principals doesn't accept any -O + upstream: Avoid %'s in commands (not used in OpenBSD, but used in - options at present, so don't say otherwise in SYNOPSIS; spotted jmc@ + -portable's Valgrind test) being interpretted as printf format strings. - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 9cc43a18f4091010741930b48b3db2f2e4f1d35c + OpenBSD-Regress-ID: dc8655db27ac4acd2c386c4681bf42a10d80b043 -commit 56db1f4a4cf5039fc3b42e84c4b16291fdff32b1 -Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Sun Nov 28 07:14:29 2021 +0000 +commit 6c435bd4994d71442192001483a1cdb846e5ffcd +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Wed Jan 12 16:58:13 2022 +1100 - upstream: fix indenting in last commit - - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 8b9ba989815d0dec1fdf5427a4a4b58eb9cac4d2 + Stop on first test failure to minimize logs. -commit 50bea24a9a9bdebad327c76e700def3261f5694e -Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Sun Nov 28 07:10:18 2021 +0000 +commit 4bc2ba6095620a4484b708ece12842afd8c7685b +Author: dtucker@openbsd.org +Date: Wed Jan 12 07:18:37 2022 +0000 - upstream: missing initialisation for oerrno + upstream: Use egrep when searching for an anchored string. - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 05d646bba238080259bec821c831a6f0b48d2a95 + OpenBSD-Regress-ID: dd114a2ac27ac4b06f9e4a586d3f6320c54aeeb4 -commit 5a0f4619041d09cd29f3a08da41db5040372bdd1 +commit 6bf2efa2679da1e8e60731f41677b2081dedae2c Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Sun Nov 28 15:31:37 2021 +1100 +Date: Wed Jan 12 18:25:06 2022 +1100 - Correct ifdef to activate poll() only if needed. + Add "rev" command replacement if needed. -commit d4035c81a71237f690edd7eda32bef7d63fd9528 -Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Sat Nov 27 07:23:35 2021 +0000 +commit 72bcd7993dadaf967bb3d8564ee31cbf38132b5d +Author: dtucker@openbsd.org +Date: Wed Jan 12 03:30:32 2022 +0000 - upstream: whitespac e + upstream: Don't log NULL hostname in restricted agent code, - OpenBSD-Regress-ID: b9511d41568056bda489e13524390167889908f8 + printf("%s", NULL) is not safe on all platforms. with & ok djm + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: faf10cdae4adde00cdd668cd1f6e05d0a0e32a02 -commit a443491e6782ef0f5a8bb87a5536c8ee4ff233a1 +commit acabefe3f8fb58c867c99fed9bbf84dfa1771727 Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Sat Nov 27 07:20:58 2021 +0000 +Date: Tue Jan 11 22:33:16 2022 +0000 - upstream: regression test for match-principals. Mostly by Fabian + upstream: remove hardcoded domain and use window.location.host, so this - Stelzer + can be run anywhere - OpenBSD-Regress-ID: ced0bec89af90935103438986bbbc4ad1df9cfa7 + OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 2ac2ade3b6227d9c547351d3ccdfe671e62b7f92 -commit 78230b3ec8cbabc1e7de68732dc5cbd4837c6675 -Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Sat Nov 27 07:14:46 2021 +0000 +commit 96da0946e44f34adc0397eb7caa6ec35a3e79891 +Author: dtucker@openbsd.org +Date: Tue Jan 11 02:56:19 2022 +0000 - upstream: Add ssh-keygen -Y match-principals operation to perform - - matching of principals names against an allowed signers file. - - Requested by and mostly written by Fabian Stelzer, towards a TOFU - model for SSH signatures in git. Some tweaks by me. + upstream: "void" functions should not return anything. From Tim Rice - "doesn't bother me" deraadt@ + via -portable. - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 8d1b71f5a4127bc5e10a880c8ea6053394465247 + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: ce6616304f4c9881b46413e616b226c306830e2a -commit 15db86611baaafb24c40632784dabf82e3ddb1a7 +commit a882a09722c9f086c9edb65d0c4022fd965ec1ed Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Thu Nov 25 23:02:24 2021 +0000 +Date: Tue Jan 11 01:26:47 2022 +0000 - upstream: debug("func: ...") -> debug_f("...") + upstream: suppress "Connection to xxx closed" messages at LogLevel >= - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: d58494dc05c985326a895adfbe16fbd5bcc54347 - -commit b7ffbb17e37f59249c31f1ff59d6c5d80888f689 -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Fri Nov 19 18:53:46 2021 +1100 - - Allow for fd = -1 in compat ppoll overflow check. + error bz3378; ok dtucker@ - Fixes tests on at least FreeBSD 6, possibly others. + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: d5bf457d5d2eb927b81d0663f45248a31028265c -commit 04b172da5b96a51b0d55c905b423ababff9f4e0b -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Fri Nov 19 16:01:51 2021 +1100 +commit 61a1a6af22e17fc94999a5d1294f27346e6c4668 +Author: Damien Miller +Date: Wed Jan 12 08:57:49 2022 +1100 - Don't auto-enable Capsicum sandbox on FreeBSD 9/10. + OS X poll(2) is broken; use compat replacement - Since we changed from select() to ppoll() tests have been failing. - This seems to be because FreeBSD 10 (and presumably 9) do not allow - ppoll() in the privsep process and sshd will fail with "Not permitted in - capability mode". Setting CAP_EVENT on the FDs doesn't help, but weirdly, - poll() works without that. Those versions are EOL so this situation is - unlikely to change. + Darwin's poll(2) implementation is broken. For character-special + devices like /dev/null, it returns POLLNVAL when polled with + POLLIN. + + Apparently this is Apple bug 3710161, which is AFAIK not public, + but a websearch will find other OSS projects rediscovering it + periodically since it was first identified in 2005 (!!) -commit a823f39986e7b879f26412e64c15630e1cfa0dc5 -Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Thu Nov 18 03:53:48 2021 +0000 +commit 613a6545fc5a9542753b503cbe5906538a640b60 +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Tue Jan 11 20:56:01 2022 +1100 - upstream: regression test for ssh-keygen -Y find-principals fix; from - - Fabian Stelzer ok djm markus + libhardended_malloc.so moved into out dir. + +commit 61761340be5e11046556623f8f5412b236cefa95 +Author: Tim Rice +Date: Mon Jan 10 11:07:04 2022 -0800 + + Make USL compilers happy + UX:acomp: ERROR: "sftp-server.c", line 567: void function cannot return value + +commit 3ef403f351e80a59b6f7e9d43cb82c181855483c +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Mon Jan 10 21:07:38 2022 +1100 + + Add wrapper for "sort" to set LC_ALL=C. - OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 34fe4088854c1a2eb4c0c51cc4676ba24096bac4 + Found by djm, this should make sorts stable and reduce test flakiness. -commit 199c4df66c0e39dd5c3333b162af274678c0501d -Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Thu Nov 18 21:32:11 2021 +0000 +commit bd69e29f5716090181dbe0b8272eb7eab1a383bb +Author: dtucker@openbsd.org +Date: Sat Jan 8 07:55:26 2022 +0000 - upstream: less confusing debug message; bz#3365 + upstream: Remove errant "set -x" left over from debugging. - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 836268d3642c2cdc84d39b98d65837f5241e4a50 + OpenBSD-Regress-ID: cd989268e034264cec5df97be7581549032c87dc -commit 97f9b6e61316c97a32dad94b7a37daa9b5f6b836 -Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Thu Nov 18 21:11:01 2021 +0000 +commit 1a7c88e26fd673813dc5f61c4ac278564845e004 +Author: dtucker@openbsd.org +Date: Sat Jan 8 07:01:13 2022 +0000 - upstream: avoid xmalloc(0) for PKCS#11 keyid for ECDSA keys (we + upstream: Enable all supported hostkey algorithms (but no others). - already did this for RSA keys). Avoids fatal errors for PKCS#11 libraries - that return empty keyid, e.g. Microchip ATECC608B "cryptoauthlib"; bz#3364 + Allows hostbased test to pass when built without OpenSSL. - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 054d4dc1d6a99a2e6f8eebc48207b534057c154d + OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 5ddd677a68b672517e1e78460dc6ca2ccc0a9562 -commit c74aa0eb73bd1edf79947d92d9c618fc3424c4a6 +commit 12b457c2a42ff271e7967d9bedd068cebb048db9 Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Thu Nov 18 03:50:41 2021 +0000 +Date: Sat Jan 8 07:37:32 2022 +0000 - upstream: ssh-keygen -Y find-principals was verifying key validity - - when using ca certs but not with simple key lifetimes within the allowed - signers file. - - Since it returns the first keys principal it finds this could - result in a principal with an expired key even though a valid - one is just below. + upstream: use status error message to communicate ~user expansion - patch from Fabian Stelzer; feedback/ok djm markus + failures; provides better experience for scp in sftp mode, where ~user paths + are more likely to be used; spotted jsg, feedback jsg & deraadt ok jsg & + markus - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: b108ed0a76b813226baf683ab468dc1cc79e0905 - -commit d902d728dfd81622454260e23bc09d5e5a9a795e -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Thu Nov 18 23:44:07 2021 +1100 - - Correct calculation of tv_nsec in poll(). - -commit 21dd5a9a3fb35e8299a1fbcf8d506f1f6b752b85 -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Thu Nov 18 23:11:37 2021 +1100 - - Add compat implementation of ppoll using pselect. - -commit b544ce1ad4afb7ee2b09f714aa63efffc73fa93a -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Thu Nov 18 23:05:34 2021 +1100 - - Put poll.h inside ifdef HAVE_POLL_H. + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: fc610ce00ca0cdc2ecdabbd49ce7cb82033f905f -commit 875408270c5a7dd69ed5449e5d85bd7120c88f70 +commit 63670d4e9030bcee490d5a9cce561373ac5b3b23 Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Thu Nov 18 03:31:44 2021 +0000 +Date: Sat Jan 8 07:36:11 2022 +0000 - upstream: check for POLLHUP wherever we check for POLLIN + upstream: fix some corner-case bugs in scp sftp-mode handling of - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 6aa6f3ec6b17c3bd9bfec672a917f003a76d93e5 + ~-prefixed paths; spotted by jsg; feedback jsg & deraadt, ok jsg & markus + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: d1697dbaaa9f0f5649d69be897eab25c7d37c222 -commit 36b5e37030d35bbaa18ba56825b1af55971d18a0 +commit e14940bbec57fc7d3ce0644dbefa35f5a8ec97d0 Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Thu Nov 18 03:07:59 2021 +0000 +Date: Sat Jan 8 07:34:57 2022 +0000 - upstream: fd leak in sshd listen loop error path; from Gleb + upstream: more idiomatic error messages; spotted by jsg & deraadt - Smirnoff + ok jsg & markus - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: a7a2be27a690a74bf2381bc16cea38e265657412 + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 43618c692f3951747b4151c477c7df22afe2bcc8 -commit b99498d0c93f1edd04857b318308a66b28316bd8 +commit 9acddcd5918c623f7ebf454520ffe946a8f15e90 Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Thu Nov 18 03:07:20 2021 +0000 +Date: Sat Jan 8 07:33:54 2022 +0000 - upstream: check for POLLHUP as well as POLLIN in sshd listen loop; + upstream: add a variant of send_status() that allows overriding the - ok deraadt millert + default, generic error message. feedback/ok markus & jsg - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: a4f1244c5a9c2b08dac4f3b1dc22e9d1dc60c587 + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 81f251e975d759994131b717ee7c0b439659c40f -commit 1f3055d788e8cf80851eb1728b535d57eb0dba6a +commit 961411337719d4cd78f1ab33e4ac549f3fa22f50 Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Thu Nov 18 03:06:03 2021 +0000 +Date: Sat Jan 8 07:32:45 2022 +0000 - upstream: check for POLLHUP as well as POLLIN, handle transient IO + upstream: refactor tilde_expand_filename() and make it handle ~user - errors as well as half-close on the output side; ok deraadt millert + paths with no trailing slash; feedback/ok markus and jsg - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: de5c5b9939a37476d256328cbb96305bdecf511e + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: a2ab365598a902f0f14ba6a4f8fb2d07a9b5d51d -commit 9778a15fa6dbdac6a95bf15865c2688b4bd6944e -Author: Damien Miller -Date: Thu Nov 18 10:16:55 2021 +1100 +commit dc38236ab6827dec575064cac65c8e7035768773 +Author: dtucker@openbsd.org +Date: Thu Jan 6 22:14:25 2022 +0000 - adjust seccomp filter for select->poll conversion + upstream: Don't explicitly set HostbasedAuthentication in - Needed to add ppoll syscall but also to relax the fallback rlimit - sandbox. Linux poll() fails with EINVAL if npfds > RLIMIT_NOFILE, - so we have to allow a single fd in the rlimit. + sshd_config. It defaults to "no", and not explicitly setting it allows us to + enable it for the (optional) hostbased test. + + OpenBSD-Regress-ID: aa8e3548eb5793721641d26e56c29f363b767c0c -commit fcd8d895bbb849c64f0aed934e3303d37f696f5d -Author: Damien Miller -Date: Thu Nov 18 10:16:44 2021 +1100 +commit e12d912ddf1c873cb72e5de9a197afbe0b6622d2 +Author: dtucker@openbsd.org +Date: Thu Jan 6 21:46:56 2022 +0000 - update depends + upstream: Add test for hostbased auth. It requires some external + + setup (see comments at the top) and thus is disabled unless + TEST_SSH_HOSTBASED_AUTH and SUDO are set. + + OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 3ec8ba3750c5b595fc63e7845d13483065a4827a -commit 76292787a1e93e668f10e36b4bf59ce0ae28e156 +commit a48533a8da6a0f4f05ecd055dc8048047e53569e Author: Damien Miller -Date: Thu Nov 18 09:26:20 2021 +1100 +Date: Fri Jan 7 09:24:26 2022 +1100 - compat for timespecsub() and friends + depend -commit fd7e7de4ddb4399c7e929b44f2bbfc118eddfcf8 +commit d9dbb5d9a0326e252d3c7bc13beb9c2434f59409 Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Wed Nov 17 21:06:39 2021 +0000 +Date: Thu Jan 6 22:06:51 2022 +0000 - upstream: set num_listen_socks to 0 on close-all instead of -1, + upstream: allow hostbased auth to select RSA keys when only - which interferes with the new poll()-based listen loop; spotted and debugged - by anton@+deraadt@ + RSA/SHA2 are configured (this is the default case); ok markus@ - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: f7ab8ab124f615a2e0c45fee14c38d2f2abbabbd + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 411c18c7bde40c60cc6dfb7017968577b4d4a827 -commit fd9343579afac30a971f06643a669733d9acb407 -Author: deraadt@openbsd.org -Date: Sun Nov 14 18:47:43 2021 +0000 +commit fdb1d58d0d3888b042e5a500f6ce524486aaf782 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Thu Jan 6 22:05:42 2022 +0000 - upstream: use ppoll() instead of pselect() with djm + upstream: add a helper function to match a key type to a list of - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 980f87c9564d5d2ad55722b7a6f44f21284cd215 + signature algorithms. RSA keys can make signatures with multiple algorithms, + so some special handling is required. ok markus@ + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 03b41b2bda06fa4cd9c84cef6095033b9e49b6ff -commit 092d29b232ef1a19609a5316ed7e4d896bb2e696 -Author: deraadt@openbsd.org -Date: Sun Nov 14 06:15:36 2021 +0000 +commit 11e8c4309a5086a45fbbbc87d0af5323c6152914 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Thu Jan 6 22:04:20 2022 +0000 - upstream: match .events with .fd better + upstream: log some details on hostkeys that ssh loads for - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 77eef212ca0add905949532af390164489c5984b + hostbased authn ok markus@ + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: da17061fa1f0e58cb31b88478a40643e18233e38 -commit 8d642c9a90fa4ed5a3effd785fb3591e14de00cd -Author: deraadt@openbsd.org -Date: Sun Nov 14 03:25:10 2021 +0000 +commit c6706f661739514a34125aa3136532a958929510 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Thu Jan 6 22:03:59 2022 +0000 - upstream: convert select() to poll() ok djm + upstream: log signature algorithm during verification by monitor; - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: b53e4940ff10dd24f8d16e8db8ef1970015d7ead + ok markus + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 02b92bb42c4d4bf05a051702a56eb915151d9ecc -commit 6582a31c388968f4073af2bd8621880735c3d42b -Author: deraadt@openbsd.org -Date: Sat Nov 13 21:14:13 2021 +0000 +commit 8832402bd500d1661ccc80a476fd563335ef6cdc +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Thu Jan 6 22:02:52 2022 +0000 - upstream: replace select() with ppoll(), including converting + upstream: piece of UpdateHostkeys client strictification: when - timeval's to timespec's to make things easier. back and forth and ok; djm + updating known_hosts with new keys, ignore NULL keys (forgot to include in + prior commit) - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 89d3b23c60875da919e7820f9de6213286ffbec9 + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 49d2eda6379490e1ceec40c3b670b973f63dea08 -commit 7c025c005550c86a40200a2bcdd355d09413d61a -Author: deraadt@openbsd.org -Date: Sat Nov 13 17:26:13 2021 +0000 +commit c2d9ced1da0276961d86690b3bd7ebdaca7fdbf7 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Thu Jan 6 22:01:14 2022 +0000 - upstream: It really looks like pledge "stdio dns" is possible + upstream: include rejected signature algorithm in error message - earlier. Discussed with mestre + and not the (useless) key type; ok markus - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 610873de63a593e0ac7bbbcb7a0f2894d36f4c01 + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 4180b5ec7ab347b43f84e00b1972515296dab023 -commit 06acb04c20ee483fe4757bd12aec870cc4bb1076 -Author: deraadt@openbsd.org -Date: Fri Nov 12 05:23:49 2021 +0000 +commit 7aa7b096cf2bafe2777085abdeed5ce00581f641 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Thu Jan 6 22:00:18 2022 +0000 - upstream: aggressively pre-fill the pollfd array with fd=-1 + upstream: make ssh-keysign use the requested signature algorithm - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: c2a525de8f83c1a04405bd79122c424140552a5b + and not the default for the keytype. Part of unbreaking hostbased auth for + RSA/SHA2 keys. ok markus@ + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: b5639a14462948970da3a8020dc06f9a80ecccdc -commit 7eec76793dec06e8f06b6cf71f9473141c69d109 -Author: deraadt@openbsd.org -Date: Thu Nov 11 15:32:32 2021 +0000 +commit 291721bc7c840d113a49518f3fca70e86248b8e8 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Thu Jan 6 21:57:28 2022 +0000 - upstream: Convert from select() to ppoll(). Along the way, I + upstream: stricter UpdateHostkey signature verification logic on - observed that the select() code was using exceptfds incorrectly.. ok millert + the client- side. Require RSA/SHA2 signatures for RSA hostkeys except when + RSA/SHA1 was explicitly negotiated during initial KEX; bz3375 - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 548e05bfc31b2af02319eb3d051286d4128dec96 - -commit e665ed2d0c24fe11d5470ce72fa1e187377d3fc4 -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Fri Nov 12 22:55:27 2021 +1100 - - Switch from LibreSSL 3.4.0 to 3.4.1. + ok markus@ - The LibreSSL 3.4.0 release has an OPENBSD_BRANCH that points to - "master" and that branch no longer has the files LibreSSL expects - and thus it will no longer build, breaking the test. + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 46e75e8dfa2c813781805b842580dcfbd888cf29 -commit 21b6b5a06c8c53c548d25e6074c5240e88e2ef34 +commit 0fa33683223c76289470a954404047bc762be84c Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Wed Nov 10 06:29:25 2021 +0000 +Date: Thu Jan 6 21:55:23 2022 +0000 - upstream: add the sntrup761x25519-sha512@openssh.com hybrid + upstream: Fix signature algorithm selection logic for - ECDH/x25519 + Streamlined NTRU Prime post-quantum KEX to the default - KEXAlgorithms list (after the ECDH methods but before the prime-group DH - ones). + UpdateHostkeys on the server side. The previous code tried to prefer RSA/SHA2 + for hostkey proofs of RSA keys, but missed some cases. This will use RSA/SHA2 + signatures for RSA keys if the client proposed these algorithms in initial + KEX. bz3375 + + Mostly by Dmitry Belyavskiy with some tweaks by me. ok markus@ - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 22b77e27a04e497a10e22f138107579652854210 + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: c17ba0c3236340d2c6a248158ebed042ac6a8029 -commit 239da797cbf07a640d7b1ea02d3f99ace3ef792d +commit 17877bc81db3846e6e7d4cfb124d966bb9c9296b Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Wed Nov 10 06:25:08 2021 +0000 +Date: Thu Jan 6 21:48:38 2022 +0000 - upstream: fix ssh-keysign for KEX algorithms that use SHA384/512 + upstream: convert ssh, sshd mainloops from select() to poll(); - exchange hashes; feedback/ok markus@ + feedback & ok deraadt@ and markus@ has been in snaps for a few months - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 09a8fda1c081f5de1e3128df64f28b7bdadee239 + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: a77e16a667d5b194dcdb3b76308b8bba7fa7239c -commit 6997a592ecb1013df0c6d7f8df3e6517827aef11 +commit 5c79952dfe1aa36105c93b3f383ce9be04dee384 Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Mon Nov 8 21:32:49 2021 +0000 +Date: Thu Jan 6 21:46:23 2022 +0000 - upstream: improve error message when trying to expand a ~user path - - for a user that doesn't exist; better matches what the shell does + upstream: prepare for conversion of ssh, sshd mainloop from - ok deraadt@ + select() to poll() by moving FD_SET construction out of channel handlers into + separate functions. ok markus - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 1ddefa3c3a78b69ce13d1b8f67bc9f2cefd23ad6 + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 937fbf2a4de12b19fb9d5168424e206124807027 -commit 10b899a15c88eb40eb5f73cd0fa84ef0966f79c9 -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Wed Nov 10 12:34:25 2021 +1100 +commit 24c5187edfef4651a625b7d5d692c8c7e794f71f +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Wed Jan 5 21:54:37 2022 +0000 - Don't trust closefrom() on Linux. + upstream: add a comment so I don't make this mistake again - glibc's closefrom implementation does not work in a chroot when the kernel - does not have close_range. It tries to read from /proc/self/fd and when - that fails dies with an assertion of sorts. Instead, call close_range - ourselves from our compat code and fall back if that fails. bz#3349, - with william.wilson at canonical.com and fweimer at redhat.com. + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 69c7f2362f9de913bb29b6318580c5a1b52c921e -commit eb1f63195a9a38b519536a5b398d9939261ec081 -Author: dtucker@openbsd.org -Date: Sat Nov 6 10:13:39 2021 +0000 +commit 7369900441929058263a17f56aa67e05ff7ec628 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Wed Jan 5 21:50:00 2022 +0000 - upstream: Plug a couple of minor mem leaks. From beldmit at - - gmail.com via github PR#283, ok markus@ + upstream: fix cut-and-pasto in error message - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: ec1fa7d305d46226861c3ca6fb9c9beb2ada2892 + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 4cc5c619e4b456cd2e9bb760d17e3a9c84659198 -commit e4f501bf1d3b53f1cc23d9521fd7c5163307b760 +commit 294c11b1c7d56d3fb61e329603a782315ed70c62 Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Fri Nov 5 03:10:58 2021 +0000 +Date: Wed Jan 5 08:25:05 2022 +0000 - upstream: move cert_filter_principals() to earlier in the file for + upstream: select all RSA hostkey algorithms for UpdateHostkeys tests, - reuse; no code change + not just RSA-SHA1 - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 598fa9528b656b2f38bcc3cf5b6f3869a8c115cf + OpenBSD-Regress-ID: b40e62b65863f2702a0c10aca583b2fe76772bd8 -commit 59c60f96fee321c7f38f00372826d37f289534af -Author: deraadt@openbsd.org -Date: Wed Nov 3 22:00:56 2021 +0000 +commit 2ea1108c30e3edb6f872dfc1e6da10b041ddf2c0 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Wed Jan 5 04:56:15 2022 +0000 - upstream: Many downstreams expect ssh to compile as non-C99... + upstream: regress test both sshsig message hash algorithms, possible - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: e6aa3e08bda68e5fb838fc8a49b1d2dfc38ee783 - -commit 7a78fe63b0b28ef7231913dfefe9d08f9bc41c61 -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Sat Nov 6 21:07:03 2021 +1100 - - Skip getline() on HP-UX 10.x. + now because the algorithm is controllable via the CLI - HP-UX 10.x has a getline() implementation in libc that does not behave - as we expect so don't use it. With correction from Thorsten Glaser and - typo fix from Larkin Nickle. - -commit 343ae252ebb35c6ecae26b447bf1551a7666720e -Author: Damien Miller -Date: Wed Nov 3 12:08:21 2021 +1100 - - basic SECURITY.md (refers people to the website) + OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 0196fa87acc3544b2b4fd98de844a571cb09a39f -commit ed45a0168638319e0a710633f6085b96b9cec656 +commit 2327c306b5d4a2b7e71178e5a4d139af9902c2b0 Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Tue Nov 2 22:57:27 2021 +0000 +Date: Wed Jan 5 04:50:11 2022 +0000 - upstream: crank SSH_SK_VERSION_MAJOR to match recent change in + upstream: allow selection of hash at sshsig signing time; code - usr/bin/ssh + already supported either sha512 (default) or sha256, but plumbing wasn't + there mostly by Linus Nordberg - OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 113d181c7e3305e138db9b688cdb8b0a0019e552 + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 1b536404b9da74a84b3a1c8d0b05fd564cdc96cd -commit f3c34df860c4c1ebddacb973954e58167d9dbade +commit 56e941d0a00d6d8bae88317717d5e1b7395c9529 Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Tue Nov 2 22:56:40 2021 +0000 +Date: Wed Jan 5 04:27:54 2022 +0000 - upstream: Better handle FIDO keys on tokens that provide user - - verification (UV) on the device itself, including biometric keys. - - Query the token during key creation to determine whether it supports - on-token UV and, if so, clear the SSH_SK_USER_VERIFICATION_REQD flag - in the key so that ssh(1) doesn't automatically prompty for PIN later. - - When making signatures with the key, query the token's capabilities - again and check whether the token is able (right now) to perform user- - verification without a PIN. If it is then the PIN prompt is bypassed - and user verification delegated to the token. If not (e.g. the token - is biometric capable, but no biometric are enrolled), then fall back - to user verification via the usual PIN prompt. - - Work by Pedro Martelletto; ok myself and markus@ + upstream: add missing -O option to usage() for ssh-keygen -Y sign; - NB. cranks SSH_SK_VERSION_MAJOR + from Linus Nordberg - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: e318a8c258d9833a0b7eb0236cdb68b5143b2f27 + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 4e78feb4aa830727ab76bb2e3d940440ae1d7af0 -commit 0328a081f38c09d2d4d650e94461a47fb5eef536 +commit 141a14ec9b0924709c98df2dd8013bde5d8d12c7 Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Fri Oct 29 03:03:06 2021 +0000 +Date: Wed Jan 5 04:27:01 2022 +0000 - upstream: sshsig: add tests for signing key validity and - - find-principals - - - adds generic find-principals tests (this command had none before) - - tests certs with a timeboxed validity both with and without a - restriced lifetime for the CA - - test for a revoked CA cert + upstream: move sig_process_opts() to before sig_sign(); no - by Fabian Stelzer + functional code change - OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 9704b2c6df5b8ccfbdf2c06c5431f5f8cad280c9 + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: da02d61f5464f72b4e8b299f83e93c3b657932f9 -commit ccd358e1e25e25c13f0825996283cbf7a1647a3b +commit 37a14249ec993599a9051731e4fb0ac5e976aec1 Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Fri Oct 29 02:48:19 2021 +0000 +Date: Wed Jan 5 04:10:39 2022 +0000 - upstream: avoid signedness warning; spotted in -portable + upstream: regression test for find-principals NULL deref; from Fabian - OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 4cacc126086487c0ea7f3d86b42dec458cf0d0c6 + Stelzer + + OpenBSD-Regress-ID: f845a8632a5a7d5ae26978004c93e796270fd3e5 -commit 2741f52beb11490d7033a25e56ed0496f0c78006 +commit eb1f042142fdaba93f6c9560cf6c91ae25f6884a Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Fri Oct 29 03:20:46 2021 +0000 +Date: Wed Jan 5 04:02:42 2022 +0000 - upstream: ssh-keygen: make verify-time argument parsing optional + upstream: NULL deref when using find-principals when matching an - From Fabian Stelzer + allowed_signers line that contains a namespace restriction, but no + restriction specified on the command-line; report and fix from Fabian Stelzer - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 1ff35e4c366a45a073663df90381be6a8ef4d370 + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 4a201b86afb668c908d1a559c6af456a61f4b145 -commit a1217d363b88b32cfe54c4f02c6c1cf4bdefdd23 -Author: Damien Miller -Date: Fri Oct 29 13:48:34 2021 +1100 +commit 8f3b18030579f395eca2181da31a5f945af12a59 +Author: dtucker@openbsd.org +Date: Tue Jan 4 08:38:53 2022 +0000 - unbreak fuzz harness for recent changes + upstream: Log command invocation while debugging. + + This will aid in manually reproducing failing commands. + + OpenBSD-Regress-ID: b4aba8d5ac5675ceebeeeefa3261ce344e67333a -commit 68e522ed8183587c9367fa3842c5b75f64f3d12b +commit bbf285164df535f0d38c36237f007551bbdae27f Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Fri Oct 29 13:32:24 2021 +1100 - - Use -Wbitwise-instead-of-logical if supported. - -commit be28b23012aa3fa323be7ec84863cf238927c078 -Author: Damien Miller -Date: Thu Oct 28 16:24:53 2021 +1100 +Date: Sun Dec 26 10:31:15 2021 +1100 - use -Wmisleading-indentation cflag if available + Always save config.h as build artifact. - ok dtucker@ + Should allow better comparison between failing and succeeding test + platforms. -commit 2e6f5f24dd2f9217f4ab8b737ed428d5d5278f91 -Author: Damien Miller -Date: Thu Oct 28 16:24:44 2021 +1100 +commit 03bd4ed0db699687c5cd83405d26f81d2dc28d22 +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Sat Dec 25 16:42:51 2021 +1100 - depend + Add OpenBSD 7.0 target. Retire 6.8. -commit a5ab4882348d26addc9830a44e053238dfa2cb58 -Author: Damien Miller -Date: Thu May 6 10:08:30 2021 +1000 +commit c45a752f0de611afd87755c2887c8a24816d08ee +Author: jsg@openbsd.org +Date: Sat Jan 1 05:55:06 2022 +0000 - remove built-in support for md5crypt() + upstream: spelling - Users of MD5-hashed password should arrange for ./configure to link - against libxcrypt or similar. Though it would be better to avoid use - of MD5 password hashing entirely, it's arguably worse than DEScrypt. - - feedback and ok dtucker@ + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: c63e43087a64d0727af13409c708938e05147b62 -commit c5de1fffa6328b8246b87da28fa9df05813f76a3 +commit c672f83a89a756564db0d3af9934ba0e1cf8fa3e Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Thu Oct 28 02:55:30 2021 +0000 +Date: Tue Jan 4 07:20:33 2022 +0000 - upstream: increment SSH_SK_VERSION_MAJOR to match last change + upstream: unbreak test: was picking up system ssh-add instead of the - OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 17873814d1cbda97f49c8528d7b5ac9cadf6ddc0 + one supposedly being tested. Spotted by dtucker and using his VM zoo (which + includes some systems old enough to lack ed25519 key support) + + OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 7976eb3df11cc2ca3af91030a6a8c0cef1590bb5 -commit 0001d04e55802d5bd9d6dece1081a99aa4ba2828 +commit a23698c3082ffe661abed14b020eac9b0c25eb9f Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Thu Oct 28 02:54:18 2021 +0000 +Date: Sat Jan 1 04:18:06 2022 +0000 - upstream: When downloading resident keys from a FIDO token, pass + upstream: fix memleak in process_extension(); oss-fuzz issue #42719 - back the user ID that was used when the key was created and append it to the - filename the key is written to (if it is not the default). + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: d8d49f840162fb7b8949e3a5adb8107444b6de1e + +commit cb885178f36b83d0f14cfe9f345d2068103feed0 +Author: jsg@openbsd.org +Date: Sat Jan 1 01:55:30 2022 +0000 + + upstream: spelling ok dtucker@ - Avoids keys being clobbered if the user created multiple - resident keys with the same application string but different - user IDs. + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: bfc7ba74c22c928de2e257328b3f1274a3dfdf19 + +commit 6b977f8080a32c5b3cbb9edb634b9d5789fb79be +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Sun Dec 26 23:34:41 2021 +0000 + + upstream: split method list search functionality from - feedback Pedro Martelletto; ok markus + authmethod_lookup() into a separate authmethod_byname(), for cases where we + don't need to check whether a method is enabled, etc. - NB. increments SSH_SK_VERSION_MAJOR + use this to fix the "none" authentication method regression reported + by Nam Nguyen via bugs@ - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: dbd658b5950f583106d945641a634bc6562dd3a3 + ok deraadt@ + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 8cd188dc3a83aa8abe5b7693e762975cd8ea8a17 -commit d4bed5445646e605c383a4374fa962e23bf9e3a3 -Author: deraadt@openbsd.org -Date: Sun Oct 24 21:24:17 2021 +0000 +commit 0074aa2c8d605ee7587279a22cdad4270b4ddd07 +Author: jmc@openbsd.org +Date: Wed Dec 22 06:56:41 2021 +0000 - upstream: For open/openat, if the flags parameter does not contain + upstream: sort -H and -h in SYNOPSIS/usage(); tweak the -H text; - O_CREAT, the 3rd (variadic) mode_t parameter is irrelevant. Many developers - in the past have passed mode_t (0, 044, 0644, or such), which might lead - future people to copy this broken idiom, and perhaps even believe this - parameter has some meaning or implication or application. Delete them all. - This comes out of a conversation where tb@ noticed that a strange (but - intentional) pledge behaviour is to always knock-out high-bits from mode_t on - a number of system calls as a safety factor, and his bewilderment that this - appeared to be happening against valid modes (at least visually), but no - sorry, they are all irrelevant junk. They could all be 0xdeafbeef. ok - millert + ok djm - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 503d11633497115688c0c6952686524f01f53121 + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 90721643e41e9e09deb5b776aaa0443456ab0965 -commit d575cf44895104e0fcb0629920fb645207218129 +commit 1c9853a68b2319f2e5f929179735e8fbb9988a67 Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Fri Oct 22 23:27:41 2021 +1100 +Date: Wed Dec 22 19:33:10 2021 +1100 - kitchensink test target now needs krb5. + Use SHA.*_HMAC_BLOCK_SIZE if needed. + + If the platform has a native SHA2, does not define SHA.*_BLOCK_LENGTH + but does define SHA.*_HMAC_BLOCK_SIZE (eg Solaris) then use the latter. + Should fix --without-openssl build on Solaris. -commit 4ae39cada214e955bcfd3448ff28f0ed18886706 -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Fri Oct 22 22:54:33 2021 +1100 +commit 715c892f0a5295b391ae92c26ef4d6a86ea96e8e +Author: Damien Miller +Date: Wed Dec 22 09:02:50 2021 +1100 - Test both MIT KRB5 and Heimdal. + remove sys/param.h in -portable, after upstream -commit 22b2681d88619e5247dc53c9f112058a7e248d48 -Author: dtucker@openbsd.org -Date: Fri Oct 22 10:51:57 2021 +0000 +commit 7a7c69d8b4022b1e5c0afb169c416af8ce70f3e8 +Author: Damien Miller +Date: Mon Dec 20 13:05:20 2021 +1100 - upstream: Plug mem addrinfo mem leaks. - - Prevent mem leaks in the (unlikely) event that getaddrinfo returns - no addresses. ALso, remove an unneeded NULL check in addr_ntop. From - khaleesicodes via github PR#281, ok deraadt@ - - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: e8a5afc686376637c355c5f7e122dc4b080b9c1a + add agent-restrict.sh file, missed in last commit -commit 27c8c343b610263f83ac2328735feeb881c6c92f -Author: dtucker@openbsd.org -Date: Fri Oct 22 09:22:04 2021 +0000 +commit f539136ca51a4976644db5d0be8158cc1914c72a +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Sun Dec 19 22:20:12 2021 +0000 - upstream: Remove unnecessary semicolons - - ... in case statements. From khaleesicodes via github PR#280. + upstream: regression test for destination restrictions in ssh-agent - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: e1e89360b65775cff83e77ce040b342015caf4ed + OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 3c799d91e736b1753b4a42d80c42fc40de5ad33d -commit e7eb73b8d1fe1008d92433ea949491ce654bfaba -Author: dtucker@openbsd.org -Date: Fri Oct 22 09:19:34 2021 +0000 +commit 6e4980eb8ef94c04874a79dd380c3f568e8416d6 +Author: anton@openbsd.org +Date: Sat Dec 18 06:53:59 2021 +0000 - upstream: Fix typos in comments. - - From khaleesicodes via github PR#280. + upstream: Make use of ntests variable, pointed out by clang 13. - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 26fdd83652c40f098bf7c685e8ebb9eb72cc45fc + OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 4241a3d21bdfa1630ed429b6d4fee51038d1be72 -commit 052a9d8494175e24312daa6c132665e58c17fe6e +commit 3eead8158393b697f663ec4301e3c7b6f24580b1 Author: deraadt@openbsd.org -Date: Fri Oct 15 14:46:46 2021 +0000 +Date: Tue Dec 14 21:25:27 2021 +0000 - upstream: switch scp(1) back to sftp protocol. + upstream: sys/param.h cleanup, mostly using MINIMUM() and - openbsd 7.0 release shipped with the (hopefully last) scp that uses RCP - protocol for copying. Let's get back to testing the SFTP protocol. + ok dtucker - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 9eaa35d95fd547b78b0a043b3f518e135f151f30 - -commit a07664646bf6d293f5bbd45a5de54f3c36bb85da -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Fri Oct 22 14:00:05 2021 +1100 - - Source configs script so setup_ci can use settings - -commit 34df52c201c6b47e5a46b50c215e4d98a8bf6587 -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Fri Oct 22 09:42:14 2021 +1100 - - Install libedit and pam based on config flags. - -commit 8c626cc563e8d21d844d06f9971a9ee01de6aa2a -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Thu Oct 21 16:53:39 2021 +1100 - - Don't use 'here string", it's not POSIX. - -commit 086a4b5977472aefa3de918b88efad0faf83b2b1 -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Thu Oct 21 15:33:27 2021 +1100 - - Remove -Werror from compiler package to install. + OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 172a4c45d3bcf92fa6cdf6c4b9db3f1b3abe4db0 -commit 5a7a4687507d057f9b5e7497f3d3f82e64753c02 -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Thu Oct 21 15:00:53 2021 +1100 +commit 266678e19eb0e86fdf865b431b6e172e7a95bf48 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Sun Dec 19 22:15:42 2021 +0000 - Build with -Werror on most recent gcc and clang. + upstream: document host-bound publickey authentication + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: ea6ed91779a81f06d961e30ecc49316b3d71961b -commit 4d2cbdb525d673acf941d48a7044fcf03125611a -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Fri Oct 15 12:59:06 2021 +1100 +commit 3d00024b3b156aa9bbd05d105f1deb9cb088f6f7 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Sun Dec 19 22:15:21 2021 +0000 - Include string.h and stdio.h for strerror. + upstream: document agent protocol extensions + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 09e8bb391bbaf24c409b75a4af44e0cac65405a7 -commit fff13aaa262b7b3ec83ed21e29674cbf331780a7 -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Fri Oct 15 12:43:36 2021 +1100 +commit c385abf76511451bcba78568167b1cd9e90587d5 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Sun Dec 19 22:14:47 2021 +0000 - Include error reason if trace disabling fails. + upstream: PubkeyAuthentication=yes|no|unbound|host-bound + + Allow control over which pubkey methods are used. Added out of + concern that some hardware devices may have difficulty signing + the longer pubkey authentication challenges. This provides a + way for them to disable the extension. It's also handy for + testing. + + feedback / ok markus@ + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: ee52580db95c355cf6d563ba89974c210e603b1a -commit d4b38144c02f3faa5271e5fb35df93507e06f1b4 -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Tue Oct 12 22:55:51 2021 +1100 +commit 34b1e9cc7654f41cd4c5b1cc290b999dcf6579bb +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Sun Dec 19 22:14:12 2021 +0000 - Add tcmalloc test target. + upstream: document destination-constrained keys + + feedback / ok markus@ + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: cd8c526c77268f6d91c06adbee66b014d22d672e -commit 002d65b0a30063c6e49bf8a53e709d8d5a0d45c1 -Author: dtucker@openbsd.org -Date: Sat Oct 9 10:52:42 2021 +0000 +commit a6d7677c4abcfba268053e5867f2acabe3aa371b +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Sun Dec 19 22:13:55 2021 +0000 - upstream: Document that CASignatureAlgorithms, ExposeAuthInfo and + upstream: Use hostkey parsed from hostbound userauth request - PubkeyAuthOptions can be used in a Match block. Patch from eehakkin via - github PR#277. + Require host-bound userauth requests for forwarded SSH connections. - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: c0a63f5f52e918645967ac022b28392da4b866aa + The hostkey parsed from the host-bound userauth request is now checked + against the most recently bound session ID / hostkey on the agent socket + and the signature refused if they do not match. + + ok markus@ + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: d69877c9a3bd8d1189a5dbdeceefa432044dae02 -commit 40bd3709dddaae3a1b6113748bec3faa6a607531 -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Thu Oct 7 15:55:49 2021 +1100 +commit baaff0ff4357cc5a079621ba6e2d7e247b765061 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Sun Dec 19 22:13:33 2021 +0000 - Skip SK unit tests when built without security-key + upstream: agent support for parsing hostkey-bound signatures + + Allow parse_userauth_request() to work with blobs from + publickey-hostbound-v00@openssh.com userauth attempts. + + Extract hostkey from these blobs. + + ok markus@ + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 81c064255634c1109477dc65c3e983581d336df8 -commit 482f73be10f10b93f818df19fcc8a912c0c371fc -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Thu Oct 7 15:55:04 2021 +1100 +commit 3e16365a79cdeb2d758cf1da6051b1c5266ceed7 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Sun Dec 19 22:13:12 2021 +0000 - Include relevant env vars on command line. + upstream: EXT_INFO negotiation of hostbound pubkey auth - Makes it easier to reproduce a build by cut/pasting the configure line. + the EXT_INFO packet gets a new publickey-hostbound@openssh.com to + advertise the hostbound public key method. + + Client side support to parse this feature flag and set the kex->flags + indicator if the expected version is offered (currently "0"). + + ok markus@ + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 4cdb2ca5017ec1ed7a9d33bda95c1d6a97b583b0 -commit ef5916b8acd9b1d2f39fad4951dae03b00dbe390 -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Thu Oct 7 14:28:02 2021 +1100 +commit 94ae0c6f0e35903b695e033bf4beacea1d376bb1 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Sun Dec 19 22:12:54 2021 +0000 - Only enable sk-* key types if ENABLE_SK is defined + upstream: client side of host-bound pubkey authentication + + Add kex->flags member to enable the publickey-hostbound-v00@openssh.com + authentication method. + + Use the new hostbound method in client if the kex->flags flag was set, + and include the inital KEX hostkey in the userauth request. + + Note: nothing in kex.c actually sets the new flag yet + + ok markus@ + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 5a6fce8c6c8a77a80ee1526dc467d91036a5910d -commit 52d4232b493a9858fe616e28a8bbcc89afa2ad4d +commit 288fd0218dbfdcb05d9fbd1885904bed9b6d42e6 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Sun Dec 19 22:12:30 2021 +0000 + + upstream: sshd side of hostbound public key auth + + This is identical to the standard "publickey" method, but it also includes + the initial server hostkey in the message signed by the client. + + feedback / ok markus@ + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 7ea01bb7238a560c1bfb426fda0c10a8aac07862 + +commit dbb339f015c33d63484261d140c84ad875a9e548 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Sun Dec 19 22:12:07 2021 +0000 + + upstream: prepare for multiple names for authmethods + + allow authentication methods to have one additional name beyond their + primary name. + + allow lookup by this synonym + + Use primary name for authentication decisions, e.g. for + PermitRootLogin=publickey + + Pass actual invoked name to the authmethods, so they can tell whether they + were requested via the their primary name or synonym. + + ok markus@ + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 9e613fcb44b8168823195602ed3d09ffd7994559 + +commit 39f00dcf44915f20684160f0a88d3ef8a3278351 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Sun Dec 19 22:11:39 2021 +0000 + + upstream: ssh-agent side of destination constraints + + Gives ssh-agent the ability to parse restrict-destination-v00@openssh.com + constraints and to apply them to keys. + + Check constraints against the hostkeys recorded for a SocketEntry when + attempting a signature, adding, listing or deleting keys. Note that + the "delete all keys" request will remove constrained keys regardless of + location. + + feedback Jann Horn & markus@ + ok markus@ + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 84a7fb81106c2d609a6ac17469436df16d196319 + +commit ce943912df812c573a33d00bf9e5435b7fcca3f7 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Sun Dec 19 22:11:06 2021 +0000 + + upstream: ssh-add side of destination constraints + + Have ssh-add accept a list of "destination constraints" that allow + restricting where keys may be used in conjunction with a ssh-agent/ssh + that supports session ID/hostkey binding. + + Constraints are specified as either "[user@]host-pattern" or + "host-pattern>[user@]host-pattern". + + The first form permits a key to be used to authenticate as the + specified user to the specified host. + + The second form permits a key that has previously been permitted + for use at a host to be available via a forwarded agent to an + additional host. + + For example, constraining a key with "user1@host_a" and + "host_a>host_b". Would permit authentication as "user1" at + "host_a", and allow the key to be available on an agent forwarded + to "host_a" only for authentication to "host_b". The key would not + be visible on agent forwarded to other hosts or usable for + authentication there. + + Internally, destination constraints use host keys to identify hosts. + The host patterns are used to obtain lists of host keys for that + destination that are communicated to the agent. The user/hostkeys are + encoded using a new restrict-destination-v00@openssh.com key + constraint. + + host keys are looked up in the default client user/system known_hosts + files. It is possible to override this set on the command-line. + + feedback Jann Horn & markus@ + ok markus@ + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 6b52cd2b637f3d29ef543f0ce532a2bce6d86af5 + +commit 5e950d765727ee0b20fc3d2cbb0c790b21ac2425 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Sun Dec 19 22:10:24 2021 +0000 + + upstream: ssh-add side of destination constraints + + Have ssh-add accept a list of "destination constraints" that allow + restricting where keys may be used in conjunction with a ssh-agent/ssh + that supports session ID/hostkey binding. + + Constraints are specified as either "[user@]host-pattern" or + "host-pattern>[user@]host-pattern". + + The first form permits a key to be used to authenticate as the + specified user to the specified host. + + The second form permits a key that has previously been permitted + for use at a host to be available via a forwarded agent to an + additional host. + + For example, constraining a key with "user1@host_a" and + "host_a>host_b". Would permit authentication as "user1" at + "host_a", and allow the key to be available on an agent forwarded + to "host_a" only for authentication to "host_b". The key would not + be visible on agent forwarded to other hosts or usable for + authentication there. + + Internally, destination constraints use host keys to identify hosts. + The host patterns are used to obtain lists of host keys for that + destination that are communicated to the agent. The user/hostkeys are + encoded using a new restrict-destination-v00@openssh.com key + constraint. + + host keys are looked up in the default client user/system known_hosts + files. It is possible to override this set on the command-line. + + feedback Jann Horn & markus@ + ok markus@ + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: ef47fa9ec0e3c2a82e30d37ef616e245df73163e + +commit 4c1e3ce85e183a9d0c955c88589fed18e4d6a058 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Sun Dec 19 22:09:23 2021 +0000 + + upstream: ssh-agent side of binding + + record session ID/hostkey/forwarding status for each active socket. + + Attempt to parse data-to-be-signed at signature request time and extract + session ID from the blob if it is a pubkey userauth request. + + ok markus@ + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: a80fd41e292b18b67508362129e9fed549abd318 + +commit e9497ecf73f3c16667288bce48d4e3d7e746fea1 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Sun Dec 19 22:08:48 2021 +0000 + + upstream: ssh client side of binding + + send session ID, hostkey, signature and a flag indicating whether the + agent connection is being forwarded to ssh agent each time a connection + is opened via a new "session-bind@openssh.com" agent extension. + + ok markus@ + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 2f154844fe13167d3ab063f830d7455fcaa99135 + +commit b42c61d6840d16ef392ed0f365e8c000734669aa +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Sun Dec 19 22:08:06 2021 +0000 + + upstream: Record session ID, host key and sig at intital KEX + + These will be used later for agent session ID / hostkey binding + + ok markus@ + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: a9af29e33772b18e3e867c6fa8ab35e1694a81fe + +commit 26ca33d186473d58a32d812e19273ce078b6ffff +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Tue Dec 7 22:06:45 2021 +0000 + + upstream: better error message for FIDO keys when we can't match + + them to a token + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 58255c2a1980088f4ed144db67d879ada2607650 + +commit adb0ea006d7668190f0c42aafe3a2864d352e34a Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Wed Oct 6 18:14:37 2021 +1100 +Date: Wed Dec 15 10:50:33 2021 +1100 - Disable security key on minix3. + Correct value for IPTOS_DSCP_LE. - The test doesn't work so disable. + It needs to allow for the preceeding two ECN bits. From daisuke.higashi + at gmail.com via OpenSSH bz#3373, ok claudio@, job@, djm@. -commit 7cd062c3a29669b8d7dc2a97e6575f4dcb7d35a2 +commit 3dafd3fe220bd9046f11fcf5191a79ec8800819f Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Wed Oct 6 17:45:28 2021 +1100 +Date: Fri Dec 10 11:57:30 2021 +1100 - Add USE_LIBC_SHA2 for (at least) NetBSD 9. + Increase timeout for test step. -commit 639c440f6c3c2a8216a5eb9455ef13bf4204089c +commit 5aefb05cd5b843e975b191d6ebb7ddf8de35c112 Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Wed Oct 6 17:09:31 2021 +1100 +Date: Fri Dec 10 10:27:27 2021 +1100 - Define OPENSSL_NO_SHA including OpenSSL from test. + Update the list of tests that don't work on Minix. - We don't use SHA256 from OpenSSL in the sk-dummy module and the - definitions can conflict with system sha2.h (eg on NetBSD) so define - OPENSSL_NO_SHA so we don't attempt to redefine them. + While there, remove CC (configure will now find clang) and make the test + list easier to update via cut and paste. -commit 8f4be526a338d06624f146fa26007bb9dd3a4f7b +commit 1c09bb1b2e207d091cec299c49416c23d24a1b31 Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Wed Oct 6 15:40:58 2021 +1100 +Date: Fri Dec 10 10:12:57 2021 +1100 - Disable security key on NetBSD4 test. + Add minix host tuple. - sk-dummy used for the security key test includes both sha2.h and OpenSSL - causing the definitions conflict so disable security key support on this - platform. + Define SETEUID_BREAKS_SETUID for it which should make privsep work. -commit 3b353ae58aa07a1cbbeb1da3ace21fc0dcccd66a -Author: Damien Miller -Date: Wed Oct 6 15:07:01 2021 +1100 +commit a2188579032cf080213a78255373263466cb90cc +Author: jsg@openbsd.org +Date: Sun Dec 5 12:28:27 2021 +0000 - clean regress/misc/sk-dummy in cleandir target + upstream: fix unintended sizeof pointer in debug path ok markus@ + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: b9c0481ffc0cd801e0840e342e6a282a85aac93c -commit 57680a2ab43518c5ccbd8242c40482106cde6ac1 -Author: dtucker@openbsd.org -Date: Sat Oct 2 03:17:01 2021 +0000 +commit da40355234068c82f1a36196f2d18dd2d81aaafd +Author: naddy@openbsd.org +Date: Sat Dec 4 00:05:39 2021 +0000 - upstream: Dynamically allocate encoded HashKnownHosts and free as - - appropriate. Saves 1k of static storage and prevents snprintf "possible - truncation" warnings from newer compilers (although in this case it's false - positive since the actual sizes are limited by the output size of the SHA1). - ok djm@ + upstream: RSA/SHA-1 is not used by default anymore on the server - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: e254ae723f7e3dce352c7d5abc4b6d87faf61bf4 + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 64abef6cfc3e53088225f6b8a1dcd86d52dc8353 -commit e3e62deb549fde215b777d95276c304f84bf00c6 +commit e9c71498a083a8b502aa831ea931ce294228eda0 Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Wed Oct 6 03:35:13 2021 +0000 +Date: Thu Dec 2 23:45:36 2021 +0000 - upstream: use libc SHA256 functions; make this work when compiled + upstream: hash full host:port when asked to hash output, fixes hashes - !WITH_OPENSSL + for non- default ports. bz3367 ok dtucker@ - OpenBSD-Regress-ID: fda0764c1097cd42f979ace29b07eb3481259890 + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 096021cc847da7318ac408742f2d0813ebe9aa73 -commit 12937d867019469ebce83c2ff614cdc6688fc2d8 -Author: dtucker@openbsd.org -Date: Fri Oct 1 05:20:20 2021 +0000 +commit b5601202145a03106012c22cb8980bcac2949f0b +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Thu Dec 2 23:23:13 2021 +0000 - upstream: Add test for ssh hashed known_hosts handling. + upstream: improve the testing of credentials against inserted FIDO - OpenBSD-Regress-ID: bcef3b3cd5a1ad9899327b4b2183de2541aaf9cf + keys a little more: ask the token whether a particular key belongs to it in + cases where the token support on-token user- verification (e.g. biometrics) + rather than just assuming that it will accept it. + + Will reduce spurious "Confirm user presence" notifications for key + handles that relate to FIDO keys that are not currently inserted in at + least some cases. + + Motivated by bz3366; by Pedro Martelletto + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: ffac7f3215842397800e1ae2e20229671a55a63d -commit 5a37cc118f464416d08cd0291a9b1611d8de9943 -Author: Damien Miller -Date: Wed Oct 6 13:16:21 2021 +1100 +commit ca709e27c41c90f4565b17282c48dca7756e083c +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Thu Dec 2 22:40:05 2021 +0000 - fix broken OPENSSL_HAS_ECC test + upstream: move check_sk_options() up so we can use it earlier - spotted by dtucker + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 67fe98ba1c846d22035279782c4664c1865763b4 -commit 16a25414f303cd6790eb967aeb962040e32c9c7a -Author: Damien Miller -Date: Fri Oct 1 22:40:06 2021 +1000 +commit b711bc01a7ec76bb6a285730990cbce9b8ca5773 +Author: dtucker@openbsd.org +Date: Thu Dec 2 22:35:05 2021 +0000 - make sk-dummy.so work without libcrypto installed + upstream: ssh-rsa is no longer in the default for + + PubkeyAcceptedAlgorithms. + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 34a9e1bc30966fdcc922934ae00f09f2596cd73c -commit dee22129bbc61e25b1003adfa2bc584c5406ef2d -Author: Damien Miller -Date: Fri Oct 1 16:35:49 2021 +1000 +commit dc91ceea33cd4a9f05be953e8d8062f732db5c8a +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Thu Dec 2 02:44:44 2021 +0000 - make OPENSSL_HAS_ECC checks more thorough + upstream: don't put the tty into raw mode when SessionType=none, avoids - ok dtucker + ^c being unable to kill such a session. bz3360; ok dtucker@ + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 83960c433052303b643b4c380ae2f799ac896f65 -commit 872595572b6c9a584ed754165e8b7c4c9e7e1d61 +commit e6e7d2654a13ba10141da7b42ea683ea4eeb1f38 Author: Damien Miller -Date: Fri Oct 1 16:35:05 2021 +1000 +Date: Mon Nov 29 14:11:03 2021 +1100 - fix FIDO key support for !OPENSSL_HAS_ECC case + previous commit broke bcrypt_pbkdf() - ok dtucker + Accidentally reverted part of the conversion to use SHA512 from SUPERCOP + instead of OpenBSD-style libc SHA512. -commit 489741dc68366940d369ac670b210b4834a6c272 +commit c0459588b8d00b73e506c6095958ecfe62a4a7ba +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Mon Nov 29 14:03:19 2021 +1100 + + Fix typo in Neils' name. + +commit 158bf854e2a22cf09064305f4a4e442670562685 Author: Damien Miller -Date: Fri Oct 1 14:51:37 2021 +1000 +Date: Mon Nov 29 12:30:22 2021 +1100 - enable security key support for --without-openssl + sync bcrypt-related files with OpenBSD + + The main change is that Niels Provos kindly agreed to rescind the + BSD license advertising clause, shifting them to the 3-term BSD + license. + + This was the last thing in OpenSSH that used the advertising clause. -commit c978565c8589acfe4ea37ab5099d39c84158c713 +commit e8976d92a42883ff6b8991438f07df60c2c0d82d Author: Damien Miller -Date: Fri Oct 1 13:27:50 2021 +1000 +Date: Mon Nov 29 12:29:29 2021 +1100 - need stdlib.h for free(3) + depend -commit 76a398edfb51951b2d65d522d7b02c72304db300 -Author: dtucker@openbsd.org -Date: Thu Sep 30 05:26:26 2021 +0000 +commit 8249afeec013e557fe7491a72ca3285de03e25b1 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Sun Nov 28 07:21:26 2021 +0000 - upstream: Fix up whitespace left by previous + upstream: sshsig: return "key not found" when searching empty files - change removing privsep. No other changes. + rather than "internal error" - OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 87adec225d8afaee4d6a91b2b71203f52bf14b15 + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: e2ccae554c78d7a7cd33fc5d217f35be7e2507ed -commit ddcb53b7a7b29be65d57562302b2d5f41733e8dd -Author: dtucker@openbsd.org -Date: Thu Sep 30 05:20:08 2021 +0000 +commit 9e3227d4dbb5ad9c9091b4c14982cab4bba87b4d +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Sun Nov 28 07:15:10 2021 +0000 - upstream: Remove references to privsep. + upstream: ssh-keygen -Y match-principals doesn't accept any -O - This removes several do..while loops but does not change the - indentation of the now-shallower loops, which will be done in a separate - whitespace-only commit to keep changes of style and substance separate. + options at present, so don't say otherwise in SYNOPSIS; spotted jmc@ - OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 4bed1a0249df7b4a87c965066ce689e79472a8f7 + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 9cc43a18f4091010741930b48b3db2f2e4f1d35c -commit ece2fbe486164860de8df3f8b943cccca3085eff -Author: dtucker@openbsd.org -Date: Thu Sep 30 04:22:50 2021 +0000 +commit 56db1f4a4cf5039fc3b42e84c4b16291fdff32b1 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Sun Nov 28 07:14:29 2021 +0000 - upstream: Use "skip" instead of "fatal" - - if SUDO isn't set for the *-command tests. This means running "make tests" - without SUDO set will perform all of the tests that it can instead of - failing on the ones it cannot run. + upstream: fix indenting in last commit - OpenBSD-Regress-ID: bd4dbbb02f34b2e8c890558ad4a696248def763a + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 8b9ba989815d0dec1fdf5427a4a4b58eb9cac4d2 -commit bb754b470c360e787a99fb4e88e2668198e97b41 +commit 50bea24a9a9bdebad327c76e700def3261f5694e Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Fri Oct 1 04:50:36 2021 +0000 +Date: Sun Nov 28 07:10:18 2021 +0000 - upstream: unbreak FIDO sk-ed25519 key enrollment for OPENSSL=no builds; - - ok dtucker@ + upstream: missing initialisation for oerrno - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 6323a5241728626cbb2bf0452cf6a5bcbd7ff709 - -commit 207648d7a6415dc915260ca75850404dbf9f0a0b -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Wed Sep 29 20:03:58 2021 +1000 - - Include stdlib.h for arc4random_uniform prototype. + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 05d646bba238080259bec821c831a6f0b48d2a95 -commit 696aadc854582c164d5fc04933d2f3e212dc0e06 +commit 5a0f4619041d09cd29f3a08da41db5040372bdd1 Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Wed Sep 29 20:00:30 2021 +1000 +Date: Sun Nov 28 15:31:37 2021 +1100 - Look for clang after cc and gcc. + Correct ifdef to activate poll() only if needed. -commit a3c6375555026d85dbf811fab566b9f76f196144 -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Wed Sep 29 19:30:59 2021 +1000 +commit d4035c81a71237f690edd7eda32bef7d63fd9528 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Sat Nov 27 07:23:35 2021 +0000 - Use backticks instead of $(..) for portability. + upstream: whitespac e - Older shells (eg /bin/sh on Solaris 10) don't support $() syntax. + OpenBSD-Regress-ID: b9511d41568056bda489e13524390167889908f8 -commit 958aaa0387133d51f84fe9c8f30bca03025f2867 -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Wed Sep 29 18:53:32 2021 +1000 +commit a443491e6782ef0f5a8bb87a5536c8ee4ff233a1 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Sat Nov 27 07:20:58 2021 +0000 - Skip file-based tests by default on Mac OS. + upstream: regression test for match-principals. Mostly by Fabian - The file-based tests need OpenSSL so skip them. - -commit 55c8bdf6e9afb0f9fa8e4f10c25c7f0081b48fd0 -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Wed Sep 29 18:42:47 2021 +1000 - - Build without OpenSSL on Mac OS. + Stelzer - Modern versions don't ship enough libcrypto to build against. + OpenBSD-Regress-ID: ced0bec89af90935103438986bbbc4ad1df9cfa7 -commit c9172193ea975415facf0afb356d87df21535f88 -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Wed Sep 29 18:33:38 2021 +1000 +commit 78230b3ec8cbabc1e7de68732dc5cbd4837c6675 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Sat Nov 27 07:14:46 2021 +0000 - Remove TEST_SSH_ECC. + upstream: Add ssh-keygen -Y match-principals operation to perform - Convert the only remaining user of it to runtime detection using ssh -Q. - -commit 5e6d28b7874b0deae95d2c68947c45212d32e599 -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Wed Sep 29 17:48:09 2021 +1000 - - Split c89 test openssl setting out. + matching of principals names against an allowed signers file. + + Requested by and mostly written by Fabian Stelzer, towards a TOFU + model for SSH signatures in git. Some tweaks by me. + + "doesn't bother me" deraadt@ + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 8d1b71f5a4127bc5e10a880c8ea6053394465247 -commit c4ac7f98e230e83c015678dc958b1ffe828564ad -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Wed Sep 29 17:40:50 2021 +1000 +commit 15db86611baaafb24c40632784dabf82e3ddb1a7 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Thu Nov 25 23:02:24 2021 +0000 - Expand TEST_SHELL consistently with other vars. + upstream: debug("func: ...") -> debug_f("...") + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: d58494dc05c985326a895adfbe16fbd5bcc54347 -commit cfe5f7b0eb7621bfb0a756222de0431315c2ab8b +commit b7ffbb17e37f59249c31f1ff59d6c5d80888f689 Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Wed Sep 29 17:26:50 2021 +1000 +Date: Fri Nov 19 18:53:46 2021 +1100 - Replace `pwd` with make variable in regress cmd. + Allow for fd = -1 in compat ppoll overflow check. + + Fixes tests on at least FreeBSD 6, possibly others. -commit 899be59da5fbc3372444bd0fbe74af48313bed33 +commit 04b172da5b96a51b0d55c905b423ababff9f4e0b Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Wed Sep 29 17:14:33 2021 +1000 +Date: Fri Nov 19 16:01:51 2021 +1100 - Get BUILDDIR from autoconf. + Don't auto-enable Capsicum sandbox on FreeBSD 9/10. - Use this to replace `pwd`s in regress test command line. + Since we changed from select() to ppoll() tests have been failing. + This seems to be because FreeBSD 10 (and presumably 9) do not allow + ppoll() in the privsep process and sshd will fail with "Not permitted in + capability mode". Setting CAP_EVENT on the FDs doesn't help, but weirdly, + poll() works without that. Those versions are EOL so this situation is + unlikely to change. -commit c8d92d3d4f7d560146f2f936156ec4dac3fc5811 -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Wed Sep 29 13:28:56 2021 +1000 +commit a823f39986e7b879f26412e64c15630e1cfa0dc5 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Thu Nov 18 03:53:48 2021 +0000 - Add make clean step to tests. + upstream: regression test for ssh-keygen -Y find-principals fix; from + + Fabian Stelzer ok djm markus + + OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 34fe4088854c1a2eb4c0c51cc4676ba24096bac4 -commit 360fb41ef8359619ab90b0d131c914494e55d3dd -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Wed Sep 29 11:36:13 2021 +1000 +commit 199c4df66c0e39dd5c3333b162af274678c0501d +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Thu Nov 18 21:32:11 2021 +0000 - Test all available clang and gcc versions. + upstream: less confusing debug message; bz#3365 + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 836268d3642c2cdc84d39b98d65837f5241e4a50 -commit 4fb49899d7da22952d35a4bc4c9bdb2311087893 +commit 97f9b6e61316c97a32dad94b7a37daa9b5f6b836 Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Wed Sep 29 01:32:21 2021 +0000 +Date: Thu Nov 18 21:11:01 2021 +0000 - upstream: Test certificate hostkeys held in ssh-agent too. Would have - - caught regression fixed in sshd r1.575 + upstream: avoid xmalloc(0) for PKCS#11 keyid for ECDSA keys (we - ok markus@ + already did this for RSA keys). Avoids fatal errors for PKCS#11 libraries + that return empty keyid, e.g. Microchip ATECC608B "cryptoauthlib"; bz#3364 - OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 1f164d7bd89f83762db823eec4ddf2d2556145ed + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 054d4dc1d6a99a2e6f8eebc48207b534057c154d -commit ce4854e12e749a05646e5775e9deb8cfaf49a755 +commit c74aa0eb73bd1edf79947d92d9c618fc3424c4a6 Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Wed Sep 29 01:33:32 2021 +0000 +Date: Thu Nov 18 03:50:41 2021 +0000 - upstream: add some debug output showing how many key file/command lines + upstream: ssh-keygen -Y find-principals was verifying key validity - were processed. Useful to see whether a file or command actually has keys - present + when using ca certs but not with simple key lifetimes within the allowed + signers file. - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 0bd9ff94e84e03a22df8e6c12f6074a95d27f23c - -commit 15abdd523501c349b703d9a27e2bb4252ad921ef -Author: dtucker@openbsd.org -Date: Tue Sep 28 11:14:50 2021 +0000 - - upstream: Make prototype for rijndaelEncrypt match function + Since it returns the first keys principal it finds this could + result in a principal with an expired key even though a valid + one is just below. - including the bounds. Fixes error in portable where GCC>=11 takes notice of - the bounds. ok deraadt@ + patch from Fabian Stelzer; feedback/ok djm markus - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: cdd2f05fd1549e1786a70871e513cf9e9cf099a6 + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: b108ed0a76b813226baf683ab468dc1cc79e0905 -commit d1d29ea1d1ef1a1a54b209f062ec1dcc8399cf03 -Author: dtucker@openbsd.org -Date: Tue Sep 28 11:10:05 2021 +0000 +commit d902d728dfd81622454260e23bc09d5e5a9a795e +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Thu Nov 18 23:44:07 2021 +1100 - upstream: Import regenerated moduli. - - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 4bec5db13b736b64b06a0fca704cbecc2874c8e1 + Correct calculation of tv_nsec in poll(). -commit 39f2111b1d5f00206446257377dcce58cc72369f +commit 21dd5a9a3fb35e8299a1fbcf8d506f1f6b752b85 Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Wed Sep 29 10:53:55 2021 +1000 +Date: Thu Nov 18 23:11:37 2021 +1100 - Add new compiler hardening flags. + Add compat implementation of ppoll using pselect. + +commit b544ce1ad4afb7ee2b09f714aa63efffc73fa93a +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Thu Nov 18 23:05:34 2021 +1100 + + Put poll.h inside ifdef HAVE_POLL_H. + +commit 875408270c5a7dd69ed5449e5d85bd7120c88f70 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Thu Nov 18 03:31:44 2021 +0000 + + upstream: check for POLLHUP wherever we check for POLLIN - Add -fzero-call-used-regs and -ftrivial-auto-var-init to the list of - compiler hardening flags that configure checks for. These are supported - by clang and gcc, and make ROP gadgets less useful and mitigate - stack-based infoleaks respectively. ok djm@ + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 6aa6f3ec6b17c3bd9bfec672a917f003a76d93e5 -commit bf944e3794eff5413f2df1ef37cddf96918c6bde -Author: Damien Miller -Date: Mon Sep 27 00:03:19 2021 +1000 +commit 36b5e37030d35bbaa18ba56825b1af55971d18a0 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Thu Nov 18 03:07:59 2021 +0000 - initgroups needs grp.h + upstream: fd leak in sshd listen loop error path; from Gleb + + Smirnoff + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: a7a2be27a690a74bf2381bc16cea38e265657412 -commit 8c5b5655149bd76ea21026d7fe73ab387dbc3bc7 +commit b99498d0c93f1edd04857b318308a66b28316bd8 Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Sun Sep 26 14:01:11 2021 +0000 +Date: Thu Nov 18 03:07:20 2021 +0000 - upstream: openssh-8.8 + upstream: check for POLLHUP as well as POLLIN in sshd listen loop; - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 12357794602ac979eb7312a1fb190c453f492ec4 + ok deraadt millert + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: a4f1244c5a9c2b08dac4f3b1dc22e9d1dc60c587 -commit f3cbe43e28fe71427d41cfe3a17125b972710455 +commit 1f3055d788e8cf80851eb1728b535d57eb0dba6a Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Sun Sep 26 14:01:03 2021 +0000 +Date: Thu Nov 18 03:06:03 2021 +0000 - upstream: need initgroups() before setresgid(); reported by anton@, + upstream: check for POLLHUP as well as POLLIN, handle transient IO - ok deraadt@ + errors as well as half-close on the output side; ok deraadt millert - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 6aa003ee658b316960d94078f2a16edbc25087ce + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: de5c5b9939a37476d256328cbb96305bdecf511e -commit 8acaff41f7518be40774c626334157b1b1c5583c +commit 9778a15fa6dbdac6a95bf15865c2688b4bd6944e Author: Damien Miller -Date: Sun Sep 26 22:16:36 2021 +1000 +Date: Thu Nov 18 10:16:55 2021 +1100 - update version numbers for release + adjust seccomp filter for select->poll conversion + + Needed to add ppoll syscall but also to relax the fallback rlimit + sandbox. Linux poll() fails with EINVAL if npfds > RLIMIT_NOFILE, + so we have to allow a single fd in the rlimit. -commit d39039ddc0010baa91c70a0fa0753a2699bbf435 -Author: kn@openbsd.org -Date: Sat Sep 25 09:40:33 2021 +0000 +commit fcd8d895bbb849c64f0aed934e3303d37f696f5d +Author: Damien Miller +Date: Thu Nov 18 10:16:44 2021 +1100 - upstream: RSA/SHA-1 is not used by default anymore + update depends + +commit 76292787a1e93e668f10e36b4bf59ce0ae28e156 +Author: Damien Miller +Date: Thu Nov 18 09:26:20 2021 +1100 + + compat for timespecsub() and friends + +commit fd7e7de4ddb4399c7e929b44f2bbfc118eddfcf8 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Wed Nov 17 21:06:39 2021 +0000 + + upstream: set num_listen_socks to 0 on close-all instead of -1, - OK dtucker deraadt djm + which interferes with the new poll()-based listen loop; spotted and debugged + by anton@+deraadt@ - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 055c51a221c3f099dd75c95362f902da1b8678c6 + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: f7ab8ab124f615a2e0c45fee14c38d2f2abbabbd -commit 9b2ee74e3aa8c461eb5552a6ebf260449bb06f7e -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Fri Sep 24 11:08:03 2021 +1000 +commit fd9343579afac30a971f06643a669733d9acb407 +Author: deraadt@openbsd.org +Date: Sun Nov 14 18:47:43 2021 +0000 - Move the fgrep replacement to hostkey-rotate.sh. + upstream: use ppoll() instead of pselect() with djm - The fgrep replacement for buggy greps doesn't work in the sftp-glob test - so move it to just where we know it's needed. + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 980f87c9564d5d2ad55722b7a6f44f21284cd215 -commit f7039541570d4b66d76e6f574544db176d8d5c02 -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Fri Sep 24 08:04:14 2021 +1000 +commit 092d29b232ef1a19609a5316ed7e4d896bb2e696 +Author: deraadt@openbsd.org +Date: Sun Nov 14 06:15:36 2021 +0000 - Replacement function for buggy fgrep. + upstream: match .events with .fd better - GNU (f)grep <=2.18, as shipped by FreeBSD<=12 and NetBSD<=9 will - occasionally fail to find ssh host keys in the hostkey-rotate test. - If we have those versions, use awk instead. + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 77eef212ca0add905949532af390164489c5984b -commit f6a660e5bf28a01962af87568e118a2d2e79eaa0 -Author: David Manouchehri -Date: Thu Sep 23 17:03:18 2021 -0400 +commit 8d642c9a90fa4ed5a3effd785fb3591e14de00cd +Author: deraadt@openbsd.org +Date: Sun Nov 14 03:25:10 2021 +0000 - Don't prompt for yes/no questions. + upstream: convert select() to poll() ok djm + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: b53e4940ff10dd24f8d16e8db8ef1970015d7ead -commit 7ed1a3117c09f8c3f1add35aad77d3ebe1b85b4d -Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Mon Sep 20 06:53:56 2021 +0000 +commit 6582a31c388968f4073af2bd8621880735c3d42b +Author: deraadt@openbsd.org +Date: Sat Nov 13 21:14:13 2021 +0000 - upstream: fix missing -s in SYNOPSYS and usage() as well as a + upstream: replace select() with ppoll(), including converting - capitalisation mistake; spotted by jmc@ + timeval's to timespec's to make things easier. back and forth and ok; djm - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 0ed8ee085c7503c60578941d8b45f3a61d4c9710 + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 89d3b23c60875da919e7820f9de6213286ffbec9 -commit 8c07170135dde82a26886b600a8bf6fb290b633d -Author: dtucker@openbsd.org -Date: Mon Sep 20 04:02:13 2021 +0000 +commit 7c025c005550c86a40200a2bcdd355d09413d61a +Author: deraadt@openbsd.org +Date: Sat Nov 13 17:26:13 2021 +0000 - upstream: Fix "Allocated port" debug message + upstream: It really looks like pledge "stdio dns" is possible - for unix domain sockets. From peder.stray at gmail.com via github PR#272, - ok deraadt@ + earlier. Discussed with mestre - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 8d5ef3fbdcdd29ebb0792b5022a4942db03f017e + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 610873de63a593e0ac7bbbcb7a0f2894d36f4c01 -commit 277d3c6adfb128b4129db08e3d65195d94b55fe7 -Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Mon Sep 20 01:55:42 2021 +0000 +commit 06acb04c20ee483fe4757bd12aec870cc4bb1076 +Author: deraadt@openbsd.org +Date: Fri Nov 12 05:23:49 2021 +0000 - upstream: Switch scp back to use the old protocol by default, ahead of - - release. We'll wait a little longer for people to pick up sftp-server(8) that - supports the extension that scp needs for ~user paths to continue working in - SFTP protocol mode. Discussed with deraadt@ + upstream: aggressively pre-fill the pollfd array with fd=-1 - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: f281f603a705fba317ff076e7b11bcf2df941871 + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: c2a525de8f83c1a04405bd79122c424140552a5b -commit ace19b34cc15bea3482be90450c1ed0cd0dd0669 -Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Sat Sep 18 02:03:25 2021 +0000 +commit 7eec76793dec06e8f06b6cf71f9473141c69d109 +Author: deraadt@openbsd.org +Date: Thu Nov 11 15:32:32 2021 +0000 - upstream: better error message for ~user failures when the + upstream: Convert from select() to ppoll(). Along the way, I - sftp-server lacks the expand-path extension; ok deraadt@ + observed that the select() code was using exceptfds incorrectly.. ok millert - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 9c1d965d389411f7e86f0a445158bf09b8f9e4bc + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 548e05bfc31b2af02319eb3d051286d4128dec96 -commit 6b1238ba971ee722a310d95037b498ede5539c03 -Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Thu Sep 16 15:22:22 2021 +0000 +commit e665ed2d0c24fe11d5470ce72fa1e187377d3fc4 +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Fri Nov 12 22:55:27 2021 +1100 - upstream: make some more scp-in-SFTP mode better match Unix idioms - - suggested by deraadt@ + Switch from LibreSSL 3.4.0 to 3.4.1. - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 0f2439404ed4cf0b0be8bf49a1ee734836e1ac87 + The LibreSSL 3.4.0 release has an OPENBSD_BRANCH that points to + "master" and that branch no longer has the files LibreSSL expects + and thus it will no longer build, breaking the test. -commit e694f8ac4409931e67d08ac44ed251b20b10a957 +commit 21b6b5a06c8c53c548d25e6074c5240e88e2ef34 Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Thu Sep 16 15:11:19 2021 +0000 +Date: Wed Nov 10 06:29:25 2021 +0000 - upstream: allow log_stderr==2 to prefix log messages with argv[0] + upstream: add the sntrup761x25519-sha512@openssh.com hybrid - use this to make scp's SFTP mode error messages more scp-like + ECDH/x25519 + Streamlined NTRU Prime post-quantum KEX to the default + KEXAlgorithms list (after the ECDH methods but before the prime-group DH + ones). - prompted by and ok deraadt@ + ok markus@ - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 0e821dbde423fc2280e47414bdc22aaa5b4e0733 - -commit 8a7a06ee505cb833e613f74a07392e9296286c30 -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Fri Sep 17 13:03:31 2021 +1000 - - Test against LibreSSL 3.2.6, 3.3.4, 3.4.0. + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 22b77e27a04e497a10e22f138107579652854210 -commit c25c84074a47f700dd6534995b4af4b456927150 +commit 239da797cbf07a640d7b1ea02d3f99ace3ef792d Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Thu Sep 16 05:36:03 2021 +0000 +Date: Wed Nov 10 06:25:08 2021 +0000 - upstream: missing space character in ssh -G output broke the + upstream: fix ssh-keysign for KEX algorithms that use SHA384/512 - t-sshcfgparse regression test; spotted by anton@ + exchange hashes; feedback/ok markus@ - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: bcc36fae2f233caac4baa8e58482da4aa350eed0 + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 09a8fda1c081f5de1e3128df64f28b7bdadee239 -commit a4bee1934bf5e5575fea486628f4123d6a29dff8 +commit 6997a592ecb1013df0c6d7f8df3e6517827aef11 Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Wed Sep 15 06:56:01 2021 +0000 +Date: Mon Nov 8 21:32:49 2021 +0000 - upstream: allow CanonicalizePermittedCNAMEs=none in ssh_config; ok + upstream: improve error message when trying to expand a ~user path - markus@ + for a user that doesn't exist; better matches what the shell does - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 668a82ba8e56d731b26ffc5703213bfe071df623 + ok deraadt@ + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 1ddefa3c3a78b69ce13d1b8f67bc9f2cefd23ad6 -commit d0fffc88c8fe90c1815c6f4097bc8cbcabc0f3dd -Author: mbuhl@openbsd.org -Date: Tue Sep 14 11:04:21 2021 +0000 +commit 10b899a15c88eb40eb5f73cd0fa84ef0966f79c9 +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Wed Nov 10 12:34:25 2021 +1100 - upstream: put back the mux_ctx memleak fix for SSH_CHANNEL_MUX_CLIENT - - OK mfriedl@ + Don't trust closefrom() on Linux. - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 1aba1da828956cacaadb81a637338734697d9798 + glibc's closefrom implementation does not work in a chroot when the kernel + does not have close_range. It tries to read from /proc/self/fd and when + that fails dies with an assertion of sorts. Instead, call close_range + ourselves from our compat code and fall back if that fails. bz#3349, + with william.wilson at canonical.com and fweimer at redhat.com. -commit 19b3d846f06697c85957ab79a63454f57f8e22d6 -Author: schwarze@openbsd.org -Date: Sat Sep 11 09:05:50 2021 +0000 +commit eb1f63195a9a38b519536a5b398d9939261ec081 +Author: dtucker@openbsd.org +Date: Sat Nov 6 10:13:39 2021 +0000 - upstream: Do not ignore SIGINT while waiting for input if editline(3) + upstream: Plug a couple of minor mem leaks. From beldmit at - is not used. Instead, in non-interactive mode, exit sftp(1), like for other - serious errors. As pointed out by dtucker@, when compiled without editline(3) - support in portable OpenSSH, the el == NULL branch is also used for - interactive mode. In that case, discard the input line and provide a fresh - prompt to the user just like in the case where editline(3) is used. OK djm@ + gmail.com via github PR#283, ok markus@ - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 7d06f4d3ebba62115527fafacf38370d09dfb393 + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: ec1fa7d305d46226861c3ca6fb9c9beb2ada2892 -commit ba61123eef9c6356d438c90c1199a57a0d7bcb0a +commit e4f501bf1d3b53f1cc23d9521fd7c5163307b760 Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Sat Sep 11 00:40:24 2021 +0000 +Date: Fri Nov 5 03:10:58 2021 +0000 - upstream: when using SFTP protocol, continue transferring files after a + upstream: move cert_filter_principals() to earlier in the file for - transfer error occurs. This matches original scp/rcp behaviour. ok dtucker@ + reuse; no code change - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: dfe4558d71dd09707e9b5d6e7d2e53b793da69fa + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 598fa9528b656b2f38bcc3cf5b6f3869a8c115cf -commit b0ec59a708b493c6f3940336b1a537bcb64dd2a7 -Author: dtucker@openbsd.org -Date: Fri Sep 10 11:38:38 2021 +0000 +commit 59c60f96fee321c7f38f00372826d37f289534af +Author: deraadt@openbsd.org +Date: Wed Nov 3 22:00:56 2021 +0000 - upstream: Document that non-interactive commands are run via the user's - - shell using the -c flag. ok jmc@ + upstream: Many downstreams expect ssh to compile as non-C99... - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 4f0d912077732eead10423afd1acf4fc0ceec477 + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: e6aa3e08bda68e5fb838fc8a49b1d2dfc38ee783 -commit 66a658b5d9e009ea11f8a0ca6e69c7feb2d851ea -Author: dtucker@openbsd.org -Date: Fri Sep 10 10:26:02 2021 +0000 +commit 7a78fe63b0b28ef7231913dfefe9d08f9bc41c61 +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Sat Nov 6 21:07:03 2021 +1100 - upstream: Document behaviour of arguments following non-interactive - - commands. Prompted by github PR#139 from EvanTheB, feedback & ok djm@ jmc@ + Skip getline() on HP-UX 10.x. - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: fc758d1fe0471dfab4304fcad6cd4ecc3d79162a + HP-UX 10.x has a getline() implementation in libc that does not behave + as we expect so don't use it. With correction from Thorsten Glaser and + typo fix from Larkin Nickle. -commit 1d47e28e407d1f95fdf8f799be23f48dcfa5206b -Author: dtucker@openbsd.org -Date: Fri Sep 10 07:11:11 2021 +0000 +commit 343ae252ebb35c6ecae26b447bf1551a7666720e +Author: Damien Miller +Date: Wed Nov 3 12:08:21 2021 +1100 - upstream: Clarify which file's attributes -p preserves, and that - - it's specifically the file mode bits. bz#3340 from calestyo at scientia.net, - ok djm@ jmc@ - - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: f09e6098ed1c4be00c730873049825f8ee7cb884 + basic SECURITY.md (refers people to the website) -commit b344db7a413478e4c21e4cadba4a970ad3e6128a +commit ed45a0168638319e0a710633f6085b96b9cec656 Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Fri Sep 10 05:46:09 2021 +0000 +Date: Tue Nov 2 22:57:27 2021 +0000 - upstream: openssh-7.4 was incorrectly listed twice; spotted by + upstream: crank SSH_SK_VERSION_MAJOR to match recent change in - Dmitry Belyavskiy, ok dtucker@ + usr/bin/ssh - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 4b823ae448f6e899927ce7b04225ac9e489f58ef + OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 113d181c7e3305e138db9b688cdb8b0a0019e552 -commit 9136d6239ad7a4a293e0418a49b69e70c76d58b8 -Author: jmc@openbsd.org -Date: Thu Sep 9 06:17:39 2021 +0000 +commit f3c34df860c4c1ebddacb973954e58167d9dbade +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Tue Nov 2 22:56:40 2021 +0000 - upstream: - move CAVEATS to its correct order - use the term + upstream: Better handle FIDO keys on tokens that provide user - "legacy" protocol rather than "original", as the latter made the text - misleading - uppercase SCP + verification (UV) on the device itself, including biometric keys. - ok djm + Query the token during key creation to determine whether it supports + on-token UV and, if so, clear the SSH_SK_USER_VERIFICATION_REQD flag + in the key so that ssh(1) doesn't automatically prompty for PIN later. - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 8479255746d5fa76a358ee59e7340fecf4245ff0 - -commit 2d678c5e3bdc2f5c99f7af5122e9d054925d560d -Author: David Carlier -Date: Wed Sep 8 19:49:54 2021 +0100 - - Disable tracing on FreeBSD using procctl. + When making signatures with the key, query the token's capabilities + again and check whether the token is able (right now) to perform user- + verification without a PIN. If it is then the PIN prompt is bypassed + and user verification delegated to the token. If not (e.g. the token + is biometric capable, but no biometric are enrolled), then fall back + to user verification via the usual PIN prompt. - Placed at the start of platform_disable_tracing() to prevent declaration - after code errors from strict C89 compilers (in the unlikely event that - more than one method is enabled). + Work by Pedro Martelletto; ok myself and markus@ + + NB. cranks SSH_SK_VERSION_MAJOR + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: e318a8c258d9833a0b7eb0236cdb68b5143b2f27 -commit 73050fa38fb36ae3326d768b574806352b97002d +commit 0328a081f38c09d2d4d650e94461a47fb5eef536 Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Wed Sep 8 23:31:39 2021 +0000 +Date: Fri Oct 29 03:03:06 2021 +0000 - upstream: Use the SFTP protocol by default. The original scp/rcp - - protocol remains available via the -O flag. + upstream: sshsig: add tests for signing key validity and - Note that ~user/ prefixed paths in SFTP mode require a protocol extension - that was first shipped in OpenSSH 8.7. + find-principals - ok deraadt, after baking in snaps for a while without incident + - adds generic find-principals tests (this command had none before) + - tests certs with a timeboxed validity both with and without a + restriced lifetime for the CA + - test for a revoked CA cert - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 23588976e28c281ff5988da0848cb821fec9213c - -commit c4565e69ffa2485cff715aa842ea7a350296bfb6 -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Wed Sep 8 21:09:49 2021 +1000 - - Really fix test on OpenSSL 1.1.1 stable. - -commit 79f1bb5f56cef3ae9276207316345b8309248478 -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Wed Sep 8 18:51:39 2021 +1000 - - Correct OpenSSL 1.1.1 stable identifier. - -commit b6255593ed5ccbe5e7d3d4b26b2ad31ad4afc232 -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Wed Sep 8 18:39:44 2021 +1000 - - Increment nfds when coming from startup_pipe. + by Fabian Stelzer - If we have to increase nfds because startup_pipe[0] is above any of the - descriptors passed in the fd_sets, we also need to add 1 to nfds since - select takes highest FD number plus one. bz#3345 from yaroslav.kuzmin - at vmssoftware.com. - -commit a3e92a6794817df6012ac8546aea19652cc91b61 -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Wed Sep 8 13:45:10 2021 +1000 - - Tests for OpenSSL 3.0.0 release & 1.1.1 branch. + OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 9704b2c6df5b8ccfbdf2c06c5431f5f8cad280c9 -commit 4afe431da98ec1cf6a2933fe5658f4fd68dee9e2 +commit ccd358e1e25e25c13f0825996283cbf7a1647a3b Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Wed Sep 8 03:23:44 2021 +0000 +Date: Fri Oct 29 02:48:19 2021 +0000 - upstream: correct my mistake in previous fix; spotted by halex + upstream: avoid signedness warning; spotted in -portable - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 3cc62d92e3f70006bf02468fc146bfc36fffa183 + OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 4cacc126086487c0ea7f3d86b42dec458cf0d0c6 -commit ca0e455b9331213ff9505a21b94c38e34faa2bba +commit 2741f52beb11490d7033a25e56ed0496f0c78006 Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Tue Sep 7 06:03:51 2021 +0000 +Date: Fri Oct 29 03:20:46 2021 +0000 - upstream: avoid NULL deref in -Y find-principals. Report and fix + upstream: ssh-keygen: make verify-time argument parsing optional - from Carlo Marcelo Arenas Belón - MIME-Version: 1.0 - Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 - Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit + From Fabian Stelzer - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 6238486f8ecc888d6ccafcd9ad99e621bb41f1e0 + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 1ff35e4c366a45a073663df90381be6a8ef4d370 -commit 37616807f150fb46610bbd5031c31af4857ad1e9 -Author: millert@openbsd.org -Date: Mon Sep 6 00:36:01 2021 +0000 +commit a1217d363b88b32cfe54c4f02c6c1cf4bdefdd23 +Author: Damien Miller +Date: Fri Oct 29 13:48:34 2021 +1100 - upstream: revision 1.381 neglected to remove - - sChallengeResponseAuthentication from the enum. Noticed by - christos@zoulas.com. OK dtucker@ - - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: b533283a4dd6d04a867da411a4c7a8fbc90e34ff + unbreak fuzz harness for recent changes -commit 7acb3578cdfec0b3d34501408071f7a96c1684ea +commit 68e522ed8183587c9367fa3842c5b75f64f3d12b Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Sun Sep 5 20:45:42 2021 +1000 +Date: Fri Oct 29 13:32:24 2021 +1100 - Correct version_num for OpenSSL dev branch. + Use -Wbitwise-instead-of-logical if supported. -commit 65bb01111320dfd0d25e21e1fd4d3f2b77532669 -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Sun Sep 5 19:37:39 2021 +1000 +commit be28b23012aa3fa323be7ec84863cf238927c078 +Author: Damien Miller +Date: Thu Oct 28 16:24:53 2021 +1100 - Test against OpenSSL 3 branch as well as dev. + use -Wmisleading-indentation cflag if available - Now that OpenSSL development has moved to 3.1, test against the most - recent version of the openssl-3.0 branch too. + ok dtucker@ -commit 864ed0d5e04a503b97202c776b7cf3f163f3eeaa -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Sun Sep 5 19:33:22 2021 +1000 +commit 2e6f5f24dd2f9217f4ab8b737ed428d5d5278f91 +Author: Damien Miller +Date: Thu Oct 28 16:24:44 2021 +1100 - OpenSSL development is now 3.1.* + depend -commit a60209a586a928f92ab323bf23bd07f57093342e -Author: dtucker@openbsd.org -Date: Fri Sep 3 07:43:23 2021 +0000 +commit a5ab4882348d26addc9830a44e053238dfa2cb58 +Author: Damien Miller +Date: Thu May 6 10:08:30 2021 +1000 - upstream: Use .Cm instead of .Dq in StrictHostKeyChecking list for + remove built-in support for md5crypt() - consistency. Patch from scop via github PR#257, ok jmc@ + Users of MD5-hashed password should arrange for ./configure to link + against libxcrypt or similar. Though it would be better to avoid use + of MD5 password hashing entirely, it's arguably worse than DEScrypt. - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 3652a91564570779431802c31224fb4a9cf39872 + feedback and ok dtucker@ -commit 8d1d9eb6de37331e872700e9e399a3190cca1242 -Author: dtucker@openbsd.org -Date: Fri Sep 3 07:27:03 2021 +0000 +commit c5de1fffa6328b8246b87da28fa9df05813f76a3 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Thu Oct 28 02:55:30 2021 +0000 - upstream: Mention using ssh -i for specifying the public key file - - in the case where the private key is loaded into ssh-agent but is not present - locally. Based on patch from rafork via github PR#215, ok jmc@ + upstream: increment SSH_SK_VERSION_MAJOR to match last change - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 2282e83b0ff78d2efbe705883b67240745fa5bb2 + OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 17873814d1cbda97f49c8528d7b5ac9cadf6ddc0 -commit eb4362e5e3aa7ac26138b11e44d8c191910aff64 -Author: dtucker@openbsd.org -Date: Fri Sep 3 05:25:50 2021 +0000 +commit 0001d04e55802d5bd9d6dece1081a99aa4ba2828 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Thu Oct 28 02:54:18 2021 +0000 - upstream: Refer to KEX "algorithms" instead of "methods" to match - - other references and improve consistency. Patch from scop via github PR#241, - ok djm@ + upstream: When downloading resident keys from a FIDO token, pass - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 840bc94ff6861b28d8603c8e8c16499bfb65e32c - -commit b3318946ce5725da43c4bf7eeea1b73129c47d2a -Author: dtucker@openbsd.org -Date: Fri Sep 3 05:12:25 2021 +0000 - - upstream: Remove redundant attrib_clear in upload_dir_internal. + back the user ID that was used when the key was created and append it to the + filename the key is written to (if it is not the default). - The subsequent call to stat_to_attrib clears the struct as its first step - anyway. From pmeinhardt via github PR#220, ok djm@ + Avoids keys being clobbered if the user created multiple + resident keys with the same application string but different + user IDs. - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: f5234fc6d7425b607e179acb3383f21716f3029e - -commit 7cc3fe28896e653956a6a2eed0a25d551b83a029 -Author: dtucker@openbsd.org -Date: Fri Sep 3 04:11:13 2021 +0000 - - upstream: Add test for client termination status on signal. + feedback Pedro Martelletto; ok markus - Based on patch from Alexxz via github PR#235 with some tweaks, to - match patch in bz#3281. + NB. increments SSH_SK_VERSION_MAJOR - OpenBSD-Regress-ID: d87c7446fb8b5f8b45894fbbd6875df326e729e2 + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: dbd658b5950f583106d945641a634bc6562dd3a3 -commit 5428b0d239f6b516c81d1dd15aa9fe9e60af75d4 +commit d4bed5445646e605c383a4374fa962e23bf9e3a3 Author: deraadt@openbsd.org -Date: Thu Sep 2 21:03:54 2021 +0000 +Date: Sun Oct 24 21:24:17 2021 +0000 - upstream: sys/param.h is not needed for any visible reason + upstream: For open/openat, if the flags parameter does not contain + + O_CREAT, the 3rd (variadic) mode_t parameter is irrelevant. Many developers + in the past have passed mode_t (0, 044, 0644, or such), which might lead + future people to copy this broken idiom, and perhaps even believe this + parameter has some meaning or implication or application. Delete them all. + This comes out of a conversation where tb@ noticed that a strange (but + intentional) pledge behaviour is to always knock-out high-bits from mode_t on + a number of system calls as a safety factor, and his bewilderment that this + appeared to be happening against valid modes (at least visually), but no + sorry, they are all irrelevant junk. They could all be 0xdeafbeef. ok + millert - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 8bdea2d0c75692e4c5777670ac039d4b01c1f368 + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 503d11633497115688c0c6952686524f01f53121 -commit 1ff38f34b4c4545eb28106629cafa1e0496bc726 -Author: Shchelkunov Artem -Date: Wed Aug 11 18:07:58 2021 +0500 +commit d575cf44895104e0fcb0629920fb645207218129 +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Fri Oct 22 23:27:41 2021 +1100 - Fix memory leak in error path. - - *info is allocated via xstrdup but was leaked in the PAM_AUTH_ERR path. - From github PR#266. + kitchensink test target now needs krb5. -commit cb37e2f0c0ca4fef844ed7edc5d0e3b7d0e83f6a -Author: dtucker@openbsd.org -Date: Wed Sep 1 03:16:06 2021 +0000 +commit 4ae39cada214e955bcfd3448ff28f0ed18886706 +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Fri Oct 22 22:54:33 2021 +1100 - upstream: Fix ssh-rsa fallback for old PuTTY interop tests. - - OpenBSD-Regress-ID: a19ac929da604843a5b5f0f48d2c0eb6e0773d37 + Test both MIT KRB5 and Heimdal. -commit 8b02ef0f28dc24cda8cbcd8b7eb02bda8f8bbe59 +commit 22b2681d88619e5247dc53c9f112058a7e248d48 Author: dtucker@openbsd.org -Date: Wed Sep 1 00:50:27 2021 +0000 +Date: Fri Oct 22 10:51:57 2021 +0000 - upstream: Add a function to skip remaining tests. + upstream: Plug mem addrinfo mem leaks. - Many tests skip tests for various reasons but not in a consistent way and - don't always clean up, so add that and switch the tests that do that over. + Prevent mem leaks in the (unlikely) event that getaddrinfo returns + no addresses. ALso, remove an unneeded NULL check in addr_ntop. From + khaleesicodes via github PR#281, ok deraadt@ - OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 72d2ec90a3ee8849486956a808811734281af735 + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: e8a5afc686376637c355c5f7e122dc4b080b9c1a -commit d486845c07324c04240f1674ac513985bd356f66 +commit 27c8c343b610263f83ac2328735feeb881c6c92f Author: dtucker@openbsd.org -Date: Tue Aug 31 07:13:59 2021 +0000 +Date: Fri Oct 22 09:22:04 2021 +0000 - upstream: Specify path to PuTTY keys. + upstream: Remove unnecessary semicolons - Portable needs this and it makes no difference on OpenBSD, so resync - them. (Id sync only, Portable already had this.) + ... in case statements. From khaleesicodes via github PR#280. - OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 33f6f66744455886d148527af8368811e4264162 + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: e1e89360b65775cff83e77ce040b342015caf4ed -commit d22b299115e27606e846b23490746f69fdd4fb38 +commit e7eb73b8d1fe1008d92433ea949491ce654bfaba Author: dtucker@openbsd.org -Date: Tue Aug 31 06:13:23 2021 +0000 +Date: Fri Oct 22 09:19:34 2021 +0000 - upstream: Better compat tests with old PuTTY. + upstream: Fix typos in comments. - When running PuTTY interop tests and using a PuTTY version older than - 0.76, re-enable the ssh-rsa host key algorithm (the 256 and 512 variants - of RSA were added some time between 0.73 and 0.76). + From khaleesicodes via github PR#280. - OpenBSD-Regress-ID: e6138d6987aa705fa1e4f216db0bb386e1ff38e1 + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 26fdd83652c40f098bf7c685e8ebb9eb72cc45fc -commit 87ad70d605c3e39c9b8aa275db27120d7cc09b77 -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Tue Aug 31 17:04:50 2021 +1000 +commit 052a9d8494175e24312daa6c132665e58c17fe6e +Author: deraadt@openbsd.org +Date: Fri Oct 15 14:46:46 2021 +0000 - Resync PuTTY interop tests. + upstream: switch scp(1) back to sftp protocol. - Resync behaviour when REGRESS_INTEROP_PUTTY is not set with OpenBSD. + openbsd 7.0 release shipped with the (hopefully last) scp that uses RCP + protocol for copying. Let's get back to testing the SFTP protocol. + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 9eaa35d95fd547b78b0a043b3f518e135f151f30 -commit e47b82a7bf51021afac218bf59a3be121827653d -Author: dtucker@openbsd.org -Date: Tue Aug 31 01:25:27 2021 +0000 +commit a07664646bf6d293f5bbd45a5de54f3c36bb85da +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Fri Oct 22 14:00:05 2021 +1100 - upstream: Specify hostkeyalgorithms in SSHFP test. - - Specify host key algorithms in sshd's default set for the SSHFP test, - from djm@. Make the reason for when the test is skipped a bit clearer. - - OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 4f923dfc761480d5411de17ea6f0b30de3e32cea + Source configs script so setup_ci can use settings -commit 7db3e0a9e8477c018757b59ee955f7372c0b55fb -Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Mon Aug 30 01:15:45 2021 +0000 +commit 34df52c201c6b47e5a46b50c215e4d98a8bf6587 +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Fri Oct 22 09:42:14 2021 +1100 - upstream: adapt to RSA/SHA1 deprectation - - OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 952397c39a22722880e4de9d1c50bb1a14f907bb + Install libedit and pam based on config flags. -commit 2344750250247111a6c3c6a4fe84ed583a61cc11 -Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Sun Aug 29 23:53:10 2021 +0000 +commit 8c626cc563e8d21d844d06f9971a9ee01de6aa2a +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Thu Oct 21 16:53:39 2021 +1100 - upstream: After years of forewarning, disable the RSA/SHA-1 - - signature algorithm by default. It is feasible to create colliding SHA1 - hashes, so we need to deprecate its use. - - RSA/SHA-256/512 remains available and will be transparently selected - instead of RSA/SHA1 for most SSH servers released in the last five+ - years. There is no need to regenerate RSA keys. - - The use of RSA/SHA1 can be re-enabled by adding "ssh-rsa" to the - PubkeyAcceptedAlgorithms directives on the client and server. - - ok dtucker deraadt - - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 189bcc4789c7254e09e23734bdd5def8354ff1d5 + Don't use 'here string", it's not POSIX. -commit 56c4455d3b54b7d481c77c82115c830b9c8ce328 -Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Sun Aug 29 23:44:07 2021 +0000 +commit 086a4b5977472aefa3de918b88efad0faf83b2b1 +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Thu Oct 21 15:33:27 2021 +1100 - upstream: wrap at 80 columns - - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 47ca2286d6b52a9747f34da16d742879e1a37bf0 + Remove -Werror from compiler package to install. -commit 95401eea8503943449f712e5f3de52fc0bc612c5 +commit 5a7a4687507d057f9b5e7497f3d3f82e64753c02 Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Fri Aug 20 18:14:13 2021 +1000 +Date: Thu Oct 21 15:00:53 2021 +1100 - Replace shell function with ssh-keygen -A. - - Prevents the init script in the SysV package from trying (and failing) - to generate unsupported key types. Remove now-unused COMMENT_OUT_ECC. - ok tim@ + Build with -Werror on most recent gcc and clang. -commit d83ec9ed995a76ed1d5c65cf10b447222ec86131 +commit 4d2cbdb525d673acf941d48a7044fcf03125611a Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Fri Aug 20 15:39:05 2021 +1000 +Date: Fri Oct 15 12:59:06 2021 +1100 - Remove obsolete Redhat PAM config and init script. + Include string.h and stdio.h for strerror. -commit e1a596186c81e65a34ce13076449712d3bf97eb4 -Author: Damien Miller -Date: Fri Aug 20 14:03:49 2021 +1000 +commit fff13aaa262b7b3ec83ed21e29674cbf331780a7 +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Fri Oct 15 12:43:36 2021 +1100 - depend + Include error reason if trace disabling fails. -commit 5450606c8f7f7a0d70211cea78bc2dab74ab35d1 -Author: Damien Miller -Date: Fri Aug 20 13:59:43 2021 +1000 +commit d4b38144c02f3faa5271e5fb35df93507e06f1b4 +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Tue Oct 12 22:55:51 2021 +1100 - update version numbers + Add tcmalloc test target. -commit feee2384ab8d694c770b7750cfa76a512bdf8246 -Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Fri Aug 20 03:22:55 2021 +0000 +commit 002d65b0a30063c6e49bf8a53e709d8d5a0d45c1 +Author: dtucker@openbsd.org +Date: Sat Oct 9 10:52:42 2021 +0000 - upstream: openssh-8.7 + upstream: Document that CASignatureAlgorithms, ExposeAuthInfo and - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 8769dff0fd76ae3193d77bf83b439adee0f300cd + PubkeyAuthOptions can be used in a Match block. Patch from eehakkin via + github PR#277. + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: c0a63f5f52e918645967ac022b28392da4b866aa -commit 9a2ed62173cc551b2b5f479460bb015b19499de8 +commit 40bd3709dddaae3a1b6113748bec3faa6a607531 Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Fri Aug 20 10:48:13 2021 +1000 +Date: Thu Oct 7 15:55:49 2021 +1100 - Also check pid in pselect_notify_setup. + Skip SK unit tests when built without security-key + +commit 482f73be10f10b93f818df19fcc8a912c0c371fc +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Thu Oct 7 15:55:04 2021 +1100 + + Include relevant env vars on command line. - Spotted by djm@. + Makes it easier to reproduce a build by cut/pasting the configure line. -commit deaadcb93ca15d4f38aa38fb340156077792ce87 +commit ef5916b8acd9b1d2f39fad4951dae03b00dbe390 Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Fri Aug 20 08:39:33 2021 +1000 +Date: Thu Oct 7 14:28:02 2021 +1100 - Prefix pselect functions to clarify debug messages + Only enable sk-* key types if ENABLE_SK is defined -commit 10e45654cff221ca60fd35ee069df67208fcf415 +commit 52d4232b493a9858fe616e28a8bbcc89afa2ad4d Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Fri Aug 20 08:30:42 2021 +1000 +Date: Wed Oct 6 18:14:37 2021 +1100 - Fix race in pselect replacement code. - - On the second and subsequent calls to pselect the notify_pipe was not - added to the select readset, opening up a race that om G. Christensen - discovered on multiprocessor Solaris <=9 systems. + Disable security key on minix3. - Also reinitialize notify_pipe if the pid changes. This will prevent a - parent and child from using the same FD, although this is not an issue - in the current structure it might be in future. + The test doesn't work so disable. -commit 464ba22f1e38d25402e5ec79a9b8d34a32df5a3f +commit 7cd062c3a29669b8d7dc2a97e6575f4dcb7d35a2 Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Wed Aug 18 12:51:30 2021 +1000 +Date: Wed Oct 6 17:45:28 2021 +1100 - Check compiler for c99 declarations after code. - - The sntrup761 reference code contains c99-style declarations after code - so don't try to build that if the compiler doesn't support it. + Add USE_LIBC_SHA2 for (at least) NetBSD 9. -commit 7d878679a4b155a359d32104ff473f789501748d +commit 639c440f6c3c2a8216a5eb9455ef13bf4204089c Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Tue Aug 17 15:12:04 2021 +1000 +Date: Wed Oct 6 17:09:31 2021 +1100 - Remove trailing backslash on regress-unit-binaries + Define OPENSSL_NO_SHA including OpenSSL from test. + + We don't use SHA256 from OpenSSL in the sk-dummy module and the + definitions can conflict with system sha2.h (eg on NetBSD) so define + OPENSSL_NO_SHA so we don't attempt to redefine them. -commit b71b2508f17c68c5d9dbbe537686d81cedb9a781 +commit 8f4be526a338d06624f146fa26007bb9dd3a4f7b Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Tue Aug 17 07:59:27 2021 +1000 +Date: Wed Oct 6 15:40:58 2021 +1100 + + Disable security key on NetBSD4 test. + + sk-dummy used for the security key test includes both sha2.h and OpenSSL + causing the definitions conflict so disable security key support on this + platform. + +commit 3b353ae58aa07a1cbbeb1da3ace21fc0dcccd66a +Author: Damien Miller +Date: Wed Oct 6 15:07:01 2021 +1100 + + clean regress/misc/sk-dummy in cleandir target + +commit 57680a2ab43518c5ccbd8242c40482106cde6ac1 +Author: dtucker@openbsd.org +Date: Sat Oct 2 03:17:01 2021 +0000 + + upstream: Dynamically allocate encoded HashKnownHosts and free as + + appropriate. Saves 1k of static storage and prevents snprintf "possible + truncation" warnings from newer compilers (although in this case it's false + positive since the actual sizes are limited by the output size of the SHA1). + ok djm@ + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: e254ae723f7e3dce352c7d5abc4b6d87faf61bf4 + +commit e3e62deb549fde215b777d95276c304f84bf00c6 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Wed Oct 6 03:35:13 2021 +0000 - Put stdint.h inside HAVE_STDINT_H. + upstream: use libc SHA256 functions; make this work when compiled - From Tom G. Christensen. + !WITH_OPENSSL + + OpenBSD-Regress-ID: fda0764c1097cd42f979ace29b07eb3481259890 -commit 6a24567a29bd7b4ab64e1afad859ea845cbc6b8c -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Mon Aug 16 14:13:02 2021 +1000 +commit 12937d867019469ebce83c2ff614cdc6688fc2d8 +Author: dtucker@openbsd.org +Date: Fri Oct 1 05:20:20 2021 +0000 - Improve github test driver script. + upstream: Add test for ssh hashed known_hosts handling. - - use a trap to always output any failed regress logs (since the script - sets -e, the existing log output is never invoked). - - pass LTESTS and SKIP_LTESTS when re-running with sshd options (eg. - UsePAM). + OpenBSD-Regress-ID: bcef3b3cd5a1ad9899327b4b2183de2541aaf9cf -commit b467cf13705f59ed348b620722ac098fe31879b7 -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Mon Aug 16 11:32:23 2021 +1000 +commit 5a37cc118f464416d08cd0291a9b1611d8de9943 +Author: Damien Miller +Date: Wed Oct 6 13:16:21 2021 +1100 - Remove deprecated ubuntu-16.04 test targets. + fix broken OPENSSL_HAS_ECC test - Github has deprecated ubuntu-16.04 and it will be removed on 20 - September. + spotted by dtucker -commit 20e6eefcdf78394f05e453d456c1212ffaa6b6a4 -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Sun Aug 15 23:25:26 2021 +1000 +commit 16a25414f303cd6790eb967aeb962040e32c9c7a +Author: Damien Miller +Date: Fri Oct 1 22:40:06 2021 +1000 - Skip agent ptrace test on hurd. + make sk-dummy.so work without libcrypto installed -commit 7c9115bbbf958fbf85259a061c1122e2d046aabf -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Sun Aug 15 19:37:22 2021 +1000 +commit dee22129bbc61e25b1003adfa2bc584c5406ef2d +Author: Damien Miller +Date: Fri Oct 1 16:35:49 2021 +1000 - Add hurd test target. + make OPENSSL_HAS_ECC checks more thorough + + ok dtucker -commit 7909a566f6c6a78fcd30708dc49f4e4f9bb80ce3 -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Sun Aug 15 12:45:10 2021 +1000 +commit 872595572b6c9a584ed754165e8b7c4c9e7e1d61 +Author: Damien Miller +Date: Fri Oct 1 16:35:05 2021 +1000 - Skip scp3 tests on all dfly58 and 60 configs. + fix FIDO key support for !OPENSSL_HAS_ECC case + + ok dtucker -commit e65198e52cb03534e8c846d1bca74c310b1526de -Author: Tim Rice -Date: Sat Aug 14 13:08:07 2021 -0700 +commit 489741dc68366940d369ac670b210b4834a6c272 +Author: Damien Miller +Date: Fri Oct 1 14:51:37 2021 +1000 - openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h: put bsd-signal.h before bsd-misc.h - to get sigset_t from signal.h needed for the pselect replacement. + enable security key support for --without-openssl -commit e50635640f79920d9375e0155cb3f4adb870eee5 -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Fri Aug 13 13:21:00 2021 +1000 +commit c978565c8589acfe4ea37ab5099d39c84158c713 +Author: Damien Miller +Date: Fri Oct 1 13:27:50 2021 +1000 - Test OpenSSH from OpenBSD head on 6.8 and 6.9. + need stdlib.h for free(3) -commit e0ba38861c490c680117b7fe0a1d61a181cd00e7 -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Fri Aug 13 13:00:14 2021 +1000 +commit 76a398edfb51951b2d65d522d7b02c72304db300 +Author: dtucker@openbsd.org +Date: Thu Sep 30 05:26:26 2021 +0000 - Skip scp3 test on dragonfly 58 and 60. + upstream: Fix up whitespace left by previous - The tests hang, so skip until we figure them out. + change removing privsep. No other changes. + + OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 87adec225d8afaee4d6a91b2b71203f52bf14b15 -commit dcce2a2bcf007bf817a2fb0dce3db83fa9201e92 -Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Thu Aug 12 23:59:25 2021 +0000 +commit ddcb53b7a7b29be65d57562302b2d5f41733e8dd +Author: dtucker@openbsd.org +Date: Thu Sep 30 05:20:08 2021 +0000 - upstream: mention that CASignatureAlgorithms accepts +/- similarly to + upstream: Remove references to privsep. - the other algorithm list directives; ok jmc bz#3335 + This removes several do..while loops but does not change the + indentation of the now-shallower loops, which will be done in a separate + whitespace-only commit to keep changes of style and substance separate. - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 0d46b53995817052c78e2dce9dbd133963b073d9 + OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 4bed1a0249df7b4a87c965066ce689e79472a8f7 -commit 090a82486e5d7a8f7f16613d67e66a673a40367f -Author: schwarze@openbsd.org -Date: Thu Aug 12 09:59:00 2021 +0000 +commit ece2fbe486164860de8df3f8b943cccca3085eff +Author: dtucker@openbsd.org +Date: Thu Sep 30 04:22:50 2021 +0000 - upstream: In the editline(3) branch of the sftp(1) event loop, - - handle SIGINT rather than ignoring it, such that the user can use Ctrl-C to - discard the currently edited command line and get a fresh prompt, just like - in ftp(1), bc(1), and in shells. - - It is critical to not use ssl_signal() for this particular case - because that function unconditionally sets SA_RESTART, but here we - need the signal to interrupt the read(2) in the el_gets(3) event loop. + upstream: Use "skip" instead of "fatal" - OK dtucker@ deraadt@ + if SUDO isn't set for the *-command tests. This means running "make tests" + without SUDO set will perform all of the tests that it can instead of + failing on the ones it cannot run. - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 8025115a773f52e9bb562eaab37ea2e021cc7299 + OpenBSD-Regress-ID: bd4dbbb02f34b2e8c890558ad4a696248def763a -commit e1371e4f58404d6411d9f95eb774b444cea06a26 -Author: naddy@openbsd.org -Date: Wed Aug 11 14:07:54 2021 +0000 +commit bb754b470c360e787a99fb4e88e2668198e97b41 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Fri Oct 1 04:50:36 2021 +0000 - upstream: scp: tweak man page and error message for -3 by default - - Now that the -3 option is enabled by default, flip the documentation - and error message logic from "requires -3" to "blocked by -R". + upstream: unbreak FIDO sk-ed25519 key enrollment for OPENSSL=no builds; - ok djm@ + ok dtucker@ - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: a872592118444fb3acda5267b2a8c3d4c4252020 + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 6323a5241728626cbb2bf0452cf6a5bcbd7ff709 -commit 49f46f6d77328a3d10a758522b670a3e8c2235e7 -Author: naddy@openbsd.org -Date: Wed Aug 11 14:05:19 2021 +0000 +commit 207648d7a6415dc915260ca75850404dbf9f0a0b +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Wed Sep 29 20:03:58 2021 +1000 - upstream: scp: do not spawn ssh with two -s flags for - - remote-to-remote copies - - Do not add another "-s" to the argument vector every time an SFTP - connection is initiated. Instead, introduce a subsystem flag to - do_cmd() and add "-s" when the flag is set. - - ok djm@ - - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 25df69759f323661d31b2e1e790faa22e27966c1 + Include stdlib.h for arc4random_uniform prototype. -commit 2a2cd00783e1da45ee730b7f453408af1358ef5b -Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Wed Aug 11 08:55:04 2021 +0000 +commit 696aadc854582c164d5fc04933d2f3e212dc0e06 +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Wed Sep 29 20:00:30 2021 +1000 - upstream: test -Oprint-pubkey - - OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 3d51afb6d1f287975fb6fddd7a2c00a3bc5094e0 + Look for clang after cc and gcc. -commit b9f4635ea5bc33ed5ebbacf332d79bae463b0f54 -Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Wed Aug 11 08:54:17 2021 +0000 +commit a3c6375555026d85dbf811fab566b9f76f196144 +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Wed Sep 29 19:30:59 2021 +1000 - upstream: when verifying sshsig signatures, support an option - - (-Oprint-pubkey) to dump the full public key to stdout; based on patch from - Fabian Stelzer; ok markus@ + Use backticks instead of $(..) for portability. - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 0598000e5b9adfb45d42afa76ff80daaa12fc3e2 + Older shells (eg /bin/sh on Solaris 10) don't support $() syntax. -commit 750c1a45ba4e8ad63793d49418a0780e77947b9b -Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Wed Aug 11 05:21:32 2021 +0000 +commit 958aaa0387133d51f84fe9c8f30bca03025f2867 +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Wed Sep 29 18:53:32 2021 +1000 - upstream: oops, missed one more %p + Skip file-based tests by default on Mac OS. - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: e7e62818d1564cc5cd9086eaf7a51cbd1a9701eb + The file-based tests need OpenSSL so skip them. -commit b5aa27b69ab2e1c13ac2b5ad3f8f7d389bad7489 -Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Wed Aug 11 05:20:17 2021 +0000 +commit 55c8bdf6e9afb0f9fa8e4f10c25c7f0081b48fd0 +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Wed Sep 29 18:42:47 2021 +1000 - upstream: remove a bunch of %p in format strings; leftovers of - - debuggings past. prompted by Michael Forney, ok dtucker@ + Build without OpenSSL on Mac OS. - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 4853a0d6c9cecaba9ecfcc19066e52d3a8dcb2ac + Modern versions don't ship enough libcrypto to build against. -commit 419aa01123db5ff5dbc68b2376ef23b222862338 +commit c9172193ea975415facf0afb356d87df21535f88 Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Wed Aug 11 09:21:09 2021 +1000 +Date: Wed Sep 29 18:33:38 2021 +1000 - Add includes.h to compat tests. + Remove TEST_SSH_ECC. - On platforms where closefrom returns void (eg glibc>=2.34) the prototype - for closefrom in its compat tests would cause compile errors. Remove - this and have the tests pull in the compat headers in the same way as - the main code. bz#3336. + Convert the only remaining user of it to runtime detection using ssh -Q. -commit 931f592f26239154eea3eb35a086585897b1a185 -Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Tue Aug 10 03:35:45 2021 +0000 +commit 5e6d28b7874b0deae95d2c68947c45212d32e599 +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Wed Sep 29 17:48:09 2021 +1000 - upstream: adapt to scp -M flag change; make scp3.sh test SFTP mode too - - OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 43fea26704a0f0b962b53c1fabcb68179638f9c0 + Split c89 test openssl setting out. -commit 391ca67fb978252c48d20c910553f803f988bd37 -Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Tue Aug 10 03:33:34 2021 +0000 +commit c4ac7f98e230e83c015678dc958b1ffe828564ad +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Wed Sep 29 17:40:50 2021 +1000 - upstream: Prepare for a future where scp(1) uses the SFTP protocol by - - default. Replace recently added -M option to select the protocol with -O - (olde) and -s (SFTP) flags, and label the -s flag with a clear warning that - it will be removed in the near future (so no, don't use it in scripts!). - - prompted by/feedback from deraadt@ + Expand TEST_SHELL consistently with other vars. + +commit cfe5f7b0eb7621bfb0a756222de0431315c2ab8b +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Wed Sep 29 17:26:50 2021 +1000 + + Replace `pwd` with make variable in regress cmd. + +commit 899be59da5fbc3372444bd0fbe74af48313bed33 +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Wed Sep 29 17:14:33 2021 +1000 + + Get BUILDDIR from autoconf. - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 92ad72cc6f0023c9be9e316d8b30eb6d8d749cfc + Use this to replace `pwd`s in regress test command line. + +commit c8d92d3d4f7d560146f2f936156ec4dac3fc5811 +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Wed Sep 29 13:28:56 2021 +1000 -commit bfdd4b722f124a4fa9173d20dd64dd0fc69856be -Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Mon Aug 9 23:56:36 2021 +0000 + Add make clean step to tests. - upstream: make scp -3 the default for remote-to-remote copies. It - - provides a much better and more intuitive user experience and doesn't require - exposing credentials to the source host. - - thanks naddy@ for catching the missing argument in usage() - - "Yes please!" - markus@ - "makes a lot of sense" - deraadt@ - "the right thing to do" - dtucker@ - - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: d0d2af5f0965c5192ba5b2fa461c9f9b130e5dd9 +commit 360fb41ef8359619ab90b0d131c914494e55d3dd +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Wed Sep 29 11:36:13 2021 +1000 -commit 2f7a3b51cef689ad9e93d0c6c17db5a194eb5555 + Test all available clang and gcc versions. + +commit 4fb49899d7da22952d35a4bc4c9bdb2311087893 Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Mon Aug 9 23:49:31 2021 +0000 +Date: Wed Sep 29 01:32:21 2021 +0000 - upstream: make scp in SFTP mode try to use relative paths as much + upstream: Test certificate hostkeys held in ssh-agent too. Would have - as possible. Previosuly, it would try to make relative and ~/-rooted paths - absolute before requesting transfers. + caught regression fixed in sshd r1.575 - prompted by and much discussion deraadt@ ok markus@ - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 46639d382ea99546a4914b545fa7b00fa1be5566 + OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 1f164d7bd89f83762db823eec4ddf2d2556145ed -commit 2ab864010e0a93c5dd95116fb5ceaf430e2fc23c +commit ce4854e12e749a05646e5775e9deb8cfaf49a755 Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Mon Aug 9 23:47:44 2021 +0000 +Date: Wed Sep 29 01:33:32 2021 +0000 - upstream: SFTP protocol extension to allow the server to expand - - ~-prefixed paths, in particular ~user ones. Allows scp in sftp mode to accept - these paths, like scp in rcp mode does. + upstream: add some debug output showing how many key file/command lines - prompted by and much discussion deraadt@ - ok markus@ + were processed. Useful to see whether a file or command actually has keys + present - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 7d794def9e4de348e1e777f6030fc9bafdfff392 + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 0bd9ff94e84e03a22df8e6c12f6074a95d27f23c -commit 41b019ac067f1d1f7d99914d0ffee4d2a547c3d8 -Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Mon Aug 9 23:44:32 2021 +0000 +commit 15abdd523501c349b703d9a27e2bb4252ad921ef +Author: dtucker@openbsd.org +Date: Tue Sep 28 11:14:50 2021 +0000 - upstream: when scp is in SFTP mode, try to deal better with ~ - - prefixed paths. ~user paths aren't supported, but ~/ paths will be accepted - and prefixed with the SFTP server starting directory (more to come) + upstream: Make prototype for rijndaelEncrypt match function - prompted by and discussed with deraadt@ - ok markus@ + including the bounds. Fixes error in portable where GCC>=11 takes notice of + the bounds. ok deraadt@ - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 263a071f14555c045fd03132a8fb6cbd983df00d + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: cdd2f05fd1549e1786a70871e513cf9e9cf099a6 -commit b4b3f3da6cdceb3fd168b5fab69d11fba73bd0ae -Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Mon Aug 9 07:21:01 2021 +0000 +commit d1d29ea1d1ef1a1a54b209f062ec1dcc8399cf03 +Author: dtucker@openbsd.org +Date: Tue Sep 28 11:10:05 2021 +0000 - upstream: on fatal errors, make scp wait for ssh connection before - - exiting avoids LogLevel=verbose (or greater) messages from ssh appearing - after scp has returned exited and control has returned to the shell; ok - markus@ - - (this was originally committed as r1.223 along with unrelated stuff that - I rolled back in r1.224) + upstream: Import regenerated moduli. - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 1261fd667ad918484889ed3d7aec074f3956a74b + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 4bec5db13b736b64b06a0fca704cbecc2874c8e1 -commit 2ae7771749e0b4cecb107f9d4860bec16c3f4245 -Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Mon Aug 9 07:19:12 2021 +0000 +commit 39f2111b1d5f00206446257377dcce58cc72369f +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Wed Sep 29 10:53:55 2021 +1000 - upstream: rever r1.223 - I accidentally committed unrelated changes + Add new compiler hardening flags. - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: fb73f3865b2647a27dd94db73d6589506a9625f9 + Add -fzero-call-used-regs and -ftrivial-auto-var-init to the list of + compiler hardening flags that configure checks for. These are supported + by clang and gcc, and make ROP gadgets less useful and mitigate + stack-based infoleaks respectively. ok djm@ -commit 986abe94d481a1e82a01747360bd767b96b41eda +commit bf944e3794eff5413f2df1ef37cddf96918c6bde +Author: Damien Miller +Date: Mon Sep 27 00:03:19 2021 +1000 + + initgroups needs grp.h + +commit 8c5b5655149bd76ea21026d7fe73ab387dbc3bc7 Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Mon Aug 9 07:16:09 2021 +0000 +Date: Sun Sep 26 14:01:11 2021 +0000 - upstream: show only the final path component in the progress meter; - - more useful with long paths (that may truncate) and better matches - traditional scp behaviour; spotted by naddy@ ok deraadt@ + upstream: openssh-8.8 - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 26b544d0074f03ebb8a3ebce42317d8d7ee291a3 + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 12357794602ac979eb7312a1fb190c453f492ec4 -commit 2b67932bb3176dee4fd447af4368789e04a82b93 +commit f3cbe43e28fe71427d41cfe3a17125b972710455 Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Mon Aug 9 07:13:54 2021 +0000 +Date: Sun Sep 26 14:01:03 2021 +0000 - upstream: on fatal errors, make scp wait for ssh connection before + upstream: need initgroups() before setresgid(); reported by anton@, - exiting avoids LogLevel=verbose (or greater) messages from ssh appearing - after scp has returned exited and control has returned to the shell; ok - markus@ + ok deraadt@ - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: ef9dab5ef5ae54a6a4c3b15d380568e94263456c + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 6aa003ee658b316960d94078f2a16edbc25087ce -commit 724eb900ace30661d45db2ba01d0f924d95ecccb -Author: dtucker@openbsd.org -Date: Sun Aug 8 08:49:09 2021 +0000 +commit 8acaff41f7518be40774c626334157b1b1c5583c +Author: Damien Miller +Date: Sun Sep 26 22:16:36 2021 +1000 - upstream: xstrdup environment variable used by ForwardAgent. bz#3328 + update version numbers for release + +commit d39039ddc0010baa91c70a0fa0753a2699bbf435 +Author: kn@openbsd.org +Date: Sat Sep 25 09:40:33 2021 +0000 + + upstream: RSA/SHA-1 is not used by default anymore - from goetze at dovetail.com, ok djm@ deraadt@ + OK dtucker deraadt djm - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 760320dac1c3b26904284ba417a7d63fccc5e742 + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 055c51a221c3f099dd75c95362f902da1b8678c6 -commit 86b4cb3a884846b358305aad17a6ef53045fa41f -Author: dtucker@openbsd.org -Date: Sun Aug 8 08:27:28 2021 +0000 +commit 9b2ee74e3aa8c461eb5552a6ebf260449bb06f7e +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Fri Sep 24 11:08:03 2021 +1000 - upstream: Although it's POSIX, not all shells used in Portable support - - the implicit 'in "$@"' after 'for i'. + Move the fgrep replacement to hostkey-rotate.sh. - OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 3c9aec6bca4868f85d2742b6ba5223fce110bdbc + The fgrep replacement for buggy greps doesn't work in the sftp-glob test + so move it to just where we know it's needed. -commit f2ccf6c9f395923695f22345e626dfd691227aaf +commit f7039541570d4b66d76e6f574544db176d8d5c02 Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Sun Aug 8 17:39:56 2021 +1000 +Date: Fri Sep 24 08:04:14 2021 +1000 - Move portable specific settings down. + Replacement function for buggy fgrep. - This brings the top hunk of the file back in sync with OpenBSD - so patches to the CVS Id should apply instead of always being - rejected. + GNU (f)grep <=2.18, as shipped by FreeBSD<=12 and NetBSD<=9 will + occasionally fail to find ssh host keys in the hostkey-rotate test. + If we have those versions, use awk instead. -commit 71b0eb997e220b0fc9331635af409ad84979f2af -Author: dtucker@openbsd.org -Date: Sun Aug 8 07:27:52 2021 +0000 +commit f6a660e5bf28a01962af87568e118a2d2e79eaa0 +Author: David Manouchehri +Date: Thu Sep 23 17:03:18 2021 -0400 - upstream: Move setting of USER further down the startup In portable + Don't prompt for yes/no questions. + +commit 7ed1a3117c09f8c3f1add35aad77d3ebe1b85b4d +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Mon Sep 20 06:53:56 2021 +0000 + + upstream: fix missing -s in SYNOPSYS and usage() as well as a - we have to change this and having it in the same hunk as the CVS Id string - means applying changes fails every. single. time. + capitalisation mistake; spotted by jmc@ - OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 87cd603eb6db58c9b430bf90adacb7f90864429b + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 0ed8ee085c7503c60578941d8b45f3a61d4c9710 -commit f0aca2706c710a0da1a4be705f825a807cd15400 +commit 8c07170135dde82a26886b600a8bf6fb290b633d Author: dtucker@openbsd.org -Date: Sun Aug 8 06:38:33 2021 +0000 +Date: Mon Sep 20 04:02:13 2021 +0000 - upstream: Drop -q in ssh-log-wrapper.sh to preserve logs. + upstream: Fix "Allocated port" debug message - scp and sftp like to add -q to the command line passed to ssh which - overrides the LogLevel we set in the config files and suppresses output - to the debug logs so drop any "-q" from the invoked ssh. In the one - case where we actually want to use -q in the banner test, call the ssh - binary directly bypassing the logging wrapper. + for unix domain sockets. From peder.stray at gmail.com via github PR#272, + ok deraadt@ - OpenBSD-Regress-ID: e2c97d3c964bda33a751374c56f65cdb29755b75 + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 8d5ef3fbdcdd29ebb0792b5022a4942db03f017e -commit cf27810a649c5cfae60f8ce66eeb25caa53b13bc -Author: dtucker@openbsd.org -Date: Sat Aug 7 01:57:08 2021 +0000 +commit 277d3c6adfb128b4129db08e3d65195d94b55fe7 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Mon Sep 20 01:55:42 2021 +0000 - upstream: Fix prototype mismatch for do_cmd. ok djm@ + upstream: Switch scp back to use the old protocol by default, ahead of - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 1c1598bb5237a7ae0be99152f185e0071163714d + release. We'll wait a little longer for people to pick up sftp-server(8) that + supports the extension that scp needs for ~user paths to continue working in + SFTP protocol mode. Discussed with deraadt@ + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: f281f603a705fba317ff076e7b11bcf2df941871 -commit 85de69f64665245786e28c81ab01fe18b0e2a149 +commit ace19b34cc15bea3482be90450c1ed0cd0dd0669 Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Sat Aug 7 01:55:01 2021 +0000 +Date: Sat Sep 18 02:03:25 2021 +0000 - upstream: sftp-client.c needs poll.h + upstream: better error message for ~user failures when the - remove unused variable + sftp-server lacks the expand-path extension; ok deraadt@ - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 233ac6c012cd23af62f237167a661db391055a16 + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 9c1d965d389411f7e86f0a445158bf09b8f9e4bc -commit 397c4d72e50023af5fe3aee5cc2ad407a6eb1073 -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Sat Aug 7 11:30:57 2021 +1000 +commit 6b1238ba971ee722a310d95037b498ede5539c03 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Thu Sep 16 15:22:22 2021 +0000 - Include poll.h and friends for struct pollfd. + upstream: make some more scp-in-SFTP mode better match Unix idioms + + suggested by deraadt@ + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 0f2439404ed4cf0b0be8bf49a1ee734836e1ac87 -commit a9e2c533195f28627f205682482d9da384c4c52e +commit e694f8ac4409931e67d08ac44ed251b20b10a957 Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Sat Aug 7 00:14:17 2021 +0000 +Date: Thu Sep 16 15:11:19 2021 +0000 - upstream: do_upload() used a near-identical structure for + upstream: allow log_stderr==2 to prefix log messages with argv[0] - tracking expected status replies from the server to what do_download() was - using. + use this to make scp's SFTP mode error messages more scp-like - Refactor it to use the same structure and factor out some common - code into helper functions. + prompted by and ok deraadt@ - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 0c167df8ab6df4a5292c32421922b0cf379e9054 + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 0e821dbde423fc2280e47414bdc22aaa5b4e0733 + +commit 8a7a06ee505cb833e613f74a07392e9296286c30 +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Fri Sep 17 13:03:31 2021 +1000 + + Test against LibreSSL 3.2.6, 3.3.4, 3.4.0. -commit 7b1cbcb7599d9f6a3bbad79d412604aa1203b5ee +commit c25c84074a47f700dd6534995b4af4b456927150 Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Sat Aug 7 00:12:09 2021 +0000 +Date: Thu Sep 16 05:36:03 2021 +0000 - upstream: make scp(1) in SFTP mode follow symlinks like + upstream: missing space character in ssh -G output broke the - traditional scp(1) ok markus@ + t-sshcfgparse regression test; spotted by anton@ - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 97255e55be37e8e26605e4ba1e69f9781765d231 + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: bcc36fae2f233caac4baa8e58482da4aa350eed0 -commit 133b44e500422df68c9c25c3b6de35c0263132f1 +commit a4bee1934bf5e5575fea486628f4123d6a29dff8 Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Sat Aug 7 00:10:49 2021 +0000 +Date: Wed Sep 15 06:56:01 2021 +0000 - upstream: fix incorrect directory permissions on scp -3 + upstream: allow CanonicalizePermittedCNAMEs=none in ssh_config; ok - transfers; ok markus@ + markus@ - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 64b2abaa5635a2be65ee2e77688ad9bcebf576c2 + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 668a82ba8e56d731b26ffc5703213bfe071df623 -commit 98b59244ca10e62ff67a420856770cb700164f59 -Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Sat Aug 7 00:09:57 2021 +0000 +commit d0fffc88c8fe90c1815c6f4097bc8cbcabc0f3dd +Author: mbuhl@openbsd.org +Date: Tue Sep 14 11:04:21 2021 +0000 - upstream: a bit more debugging of file attributes being + upstream: put back the mux_ctx memleak fix for SSH_CHANNEL_MUX_CLIENT - sent/received over the wire + OK mfriedl@ - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: f68c4e207b08ef95200a8b2de499d422808e089b + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 1aba1da828956cacaadb81a637338734697d9798 -commit c677e65365d6f460c084e41e0c4807bb8a9cf601 -Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Sat Aug 7 00:08:52 2021 +0000 +commit 19b3d846f06697c85957ab79a63454f57f8e22d6 +Author: schwarze@openbsd.org +Date: Sat Sep 11 09:05:50 2021 +0000 - upstream: make scp(1) in SFTP mode output better match original + upstream: Do not ignore SIGINT while waiting for input if editline(3) - scp(1) by suppressing "Retrieving [path]" lines that were emitted to support - the interactive sftp(1) client. ok markus@ + is not used. Instead, in non-interactive mode, exit sftp(1), like for other + serious errors. As pointed out by dtucker@, when compiled without editline(3) + support in portable OpenSSH, the el == NULL branch is also used for + interactive mode. In that case, discard the input line and provide a fresh + prompt to the user just like in the case where editline(3) is used. OK djm@ - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 06be293df5f156a18f366079be2f33fa68001acc + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 7d06f4d3ebba62115527fafacf38370d09dfb393 -commit 48cd39b7a4e5e7c25101c6d1179f98fe544835cd +commit ba61123eef9c6356d438c90c1199a57a0d7bcb0a Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Sat Aug 7 00:07:18 2021 +0000 +Date: Sat Sep 11 00:40:24 2021 +0000 - upstream: factor out a structure duplicated between downloading + upstream: when using SFTP protocol, continue transferring files after a - and crossloading; ok markus@ + transfer error occurs. This matches original scp/rcp behaviour. ok dtucker@ - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 96eede24d520569232086a129febe342e4765d39 + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: dfe4558d71dd09707e9b5d6e7d2e53b793da69fa -commit 318c06bb04ee21a0cfa6b6022a201eacaa53f388 -Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Sat Aug 7 00:06:30 2021 +0000 +commit b0ec59a708b493c6f3940336b1a537bcb64dd2a7 +Author: dtucker@openbsd.org +Date: Fri Sep 10 11:38:38 2021 +0000 - upstream: use sftp_client crossloading to implement scp -3 + upstream: Document that non-interactive commands are run via the user's - feedback/ok markus@ + shell using the -c flag. ok jmc@ - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 7db4c0086cfc12afc9cfb71d4c2fd3c7e9416ee9 + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 4f0d912077732eead10423afd1acf4fc0ceec477 -commit de7115b373ba0be3861c65de9b606a3e0e9d29a3 -Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Sat Aug 7 00:02:41 2021 +0000 +commit 66a658b5d9e009ea11f8a0ca6e69c7feb2d851ea +Author: dtucker@openbsd.org +Date: Fri Sep 10 10:26:02 2021 +0000 - upstream: support for "cross"-loading files/directories, i.e. - - downloading from one SFTP server while simultaneously uploading to another. + upstream: Document behaviour of arguments following non-interactive - feedback & ok markus@ + commands. Prompted by github PR#139 from EvanTheB, feedback & ok djm@ jmc@ - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 3982878e29d8df0fa4ddc502f5ff6126ac714235 + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: fc758d1fe0471dfab4304fcad6cd4ecc3d79162a -commit a50bd0367ff2063bbc70a387740a2aa6914de094 -Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Sat Aug 7 00:01:29 2021 +0000 +commit 1d47e28e407d1f95fdf8f799be23f48dcfa5206b +Author: dtucker@openbsd.org +Date: Fri Sep 10 07:11:11 2021 +0000 - upstream: factor our SSH2_FXP_OPEN calls into their own function; + upstream: Clarify which file's attributes -p preserves, and that - "looks fine" markus@ + it's specifically the file mode bits. bz#3340 from calestyo at scientia.net, + ok djm@ jmc@ - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: d3dea2153f08855c6d9dacc01973248944adeffb + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: f09e6098ed1c4be00c730873049825f8ee7cb884 -commit e3c0ba05873cf3d3f7d19d595667a251026b2d84 +commit b344db7a413478e4c21e4cadba4a970ad3e6128a Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Sat Aug 7 00:00:33 2021 +0000 +Date: Fri Sep 10 05:46:09 2021 +0000 - upstream: prepare for scp -3 implemented via sftp + upstream: openssh-7.4 was incorrectly listed twice; spotted by - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 194aac0dd87cb175334b71c2a30623a5ad55bb44 + Dmitry Belyavskiy, ok dtucker@ + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 4b823ae448f6e899927ce7b04225ac9e489f58ef -commit 395d8fbdb094497211e1461cf0e2f80af5617e0a -Author: dtucker@openbsd.org -Date: Fri Aug 6 09:00:18 2021 +0000 +commit 9136d6239ad7a4a293e0418a49b69e70c76d58b8 +Author: jmc@openbsd.org +Date: Thu Sep 9 06:17:39 2021 +0000 - upstream: Make diff invocation more portable. + upstream: - move CAVEATS to its correct order - use the term - POSIX does not require diff to have -N, so compare in both directions - with just -r, which should catch missing files in either directory. + "legacy" protocol rather than "original", as the latter made the text + misleading - uppercase SCP - OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 0e2ec8594556a6f369ed5a0a90c6806419b845f7 - -commit d247a73ce27b460138599648d9c637c6f2b77605 -Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Wed Aug 4 21:28:00 2021 +0000 - - upstream: regression test for scp -3 + ok djm - OpenBSD-Regress-ID: b44375d125c827754a1f722ec6b6b75b634de05d + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 8479255746d5fa76a358ee59e7340fecf4245ff0 -commit 35c8e41a6f6d8ad76f8d1cd81ac2ea23d0d993b2 -Author: dtucker@openbsd.org -Date: Fri Aug 6 05:04:42 2021 +0000 +commit 2d678c5e3bdc2f5c99f7af5122e9d054925d560d +Author: David Carlier +Date: Wed Sep 8 19:49:54 2021 +0100 - upstream: Document "ProxyJump none". bz#3334. + Disable tracing on FreeBSD using procctl. - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: f78cc6f55731f2cd35c3a41d5352ac1ee419eba7 + Placed at the start of platform_disable_tracing() to prevent declaration + after code errors from strict C89 compilers (in the unlikely event that + more than one method is enabled). -commit 911ec6411821bda535d09778df7503b92f0eafab -Author: dtucker@openbsd.org -Date: Wed Aug 4 01:34:55 2021 +0000 +commit 73050fa38fb36ae3326d768b574806352b97002d +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Wed Sep 8 23:31:39 2021 +0000 - upstream: Allow for different (but POSIX compliant) behaviour of + upstream: Use the SFTP protocol by default. The original scp/rcp - basename(3) and prevent a use-after-free in that case in the new sftp-compat - code. + protocol remains available via the -O flag. - POSIX allows basename(3) to either return a pointer to static storage - or modify the passed string and return a pointer to that. OpenBSD does - the former and works as is, but on other platforms "filename" points - into "tmp" which was just freed. This makes the freeing of tmp - consistent with the other variable in the loop. + Note that ~user/ prefixed paths in SFTP mode require a protocol extension + that was first shipped in OpenSSH 8.7. - Pinpointed by the -portable Valgrind regress test. ok djm@ deraadt@ + ok deraadt, after baking in snaps for a while without incident - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 750f3c19bd4440e4210e30dd5d7367386e833374 + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 23588976e28c281ff5988da0848cb821fec9213c -commit 6df1fecb5d3e51f3a8027a74885c3a44f6cbfcbd -Author: Damien Miller -Date: Wed Aug 4 11:05:11 2021 +1000 +commit c4565e69ffa2485cff715aa842ea7a350296bfb6 +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Wed Sep 8 21:09:49 2021 +1000 - use openbsd-compat glob.h is required + Really fix test on OpenSSL 1.1.1 stable. -commit 9ebd1828881dfc9014a344587934a5ce7db6fa1b +commit 79f1bb5f56cef3ae9276207316345b8309248478 Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Tue Aug 3 21:03:23 2021 +1000 +Date: Wed Sep 8 18:51:39 2021 +1000 - Missing space between macro arg and punctuation. + Correct OpenSSL 1.1.1 stable identifier. + +commit b6255593ed5ccbe5e7d3d4b26b2ad31ad4afc232 +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Wed Sep 8 18:39:44 2021 +1000 + + Increment nfds when coming from startup_pipe. - From jmc@ + If we have to increase nfds because startup_pipe[0] is above any of the + descriptors passed in the fd_sets, we also need to add 1 to nfds since + select takes highest FD number plus one. bz#3345 from yaroslav.kuzmin + at vmssoftware.com. -commit 0fd3f62eddc7cf54dcc9053be6f58998f3eb926a +commit a3e92a6794817df6012ac8546aea19652cc91b61 Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Tue Aug 3 21:02:33 2021 +1000 +Date: Wed Sep 8 13:45:10 2021 +1000 - Avoid lines >80 chars. From jmc@ + Tests for OpenSSL 3.0.0 release & 1.1.1 branch. -commit af5d8094d8b755e1daaf2e20ff1dc252800b4c9b +commit 4afe431da98ec1cf6a2933fe5658f4fd68dee9e2 Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Tue Aug 3 01:05:24 2021 +0000 +Date: Wed Sep 8 03:23:44 2021 +0000 - upstream: regression tests for scp SFTP protocol support; mostly by - - Jakub Jelen in GHPR#194 ok markus + upstream: correct my mistake in previous fix; spotted by halex - OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 36f1458525bcb111741ec8547eaf58b13cddc715 + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 3cc62d92e3f70006bf02468fc146bfc36fffa183 -commit e4673b7f67ae7740131a4ecea29a846593049a91 -Author: anton@openbsd.org -Date: Thu Jul 29 15:34:09 2021 +0000 +commit ca0e455b9331213ff9505a21b94c38e34faa2bba +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Tue Sep 7 06:03:51 2021 +0000 - upstream: Treat doas with arguments as a valid SUDO variable. - - Allows one to specify SUDO="doas -n" which I do while running make regress. + upstream: avoid NULL deref in -Y find-principals. Report and fix - ok dtucker@ + from Carlo Marcelo Arenas Belón + MIME-Version: 1.0 + Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 + Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit - OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 4fe5814b5010dbf0885500d703bea06048d11005 + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 6238486f8ecc888d6ccafcd9ad99e621bb41f1e0 -commit 197e29f1cca190d767c4b2b63a662f9a9e5da0b3 -Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Mon Aug 2 23:38:27 2021 +0000 +commit 37616807f150fb46610bbd5031c31af4857ad1e9 +Author: millert@openbsd.org +Date: Mon Sep 6 00:36:01 2021 +0000 - upstream: support for using the SFTP protocol for file transfers in - - scp, via a new "-M sftp" option. Marked as experimental for now. + upstream: revision 1.381 neglected to remove - Some corner-cases exist, in particular there is no attempt to - provide bug-compatibility with scp's weird "double shell" quoting - rules. + sChallengeResponseAuthentication from the enum. Noticed by + christos@zoulas.com. OK dtucker@ - Mostly by Jakub Jelen in GHPR#194 with some tweaks by me. ok markus@ - Thanks jmc@ for improving the scp.1 bits. + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: b533283a4dd6d04a867da411a4c7a8fbc90e34ff + +commit 7acb3578cdfec0b3d34501408071f7a96c1684ea +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Sun Sep 5 20:45:42 2021 +1000 + + Correct version_num for OpenSSL dev branch. + +commit 65bb01111320dfd0d25e21e1fd4d3f2b77532669 +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Sun Sep 5 19:37:39 2021 +1000 + + Test against OpenSSL 3 branch as well as dev. - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 6ce4c9157ff17b650ace571c9f7793d92874051c + Now that OpenSSL development has moved to 3.1, test against the most + recent version of the openssl-3.0 branch too. -commit dd533c7ab79d61a7796b77b64bd81b098e0d7f9f -Author: jmc@openbsd.org -Date: Fri Jul 30 14:28:13 2021 +0000 +commit 864ed0d5e04a503b97202c776b7cf3f163f3eeaa +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Sun Sep 5 19:33:22 2021 +1000 - upstream: fix a formatting error and add some Xr; from debian at - - helgefjell de - - removed references to rlogin etc. as no longer relevant; - suggested by djm - - ok djm dtucker - - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 3c431c303068d3aec5bb18573a0bd5e0cd77c5ae + OpenSSL development is now 3.1.* -commit c7cd347a8823819411222c1e10a0d26747d0fd5c -Author: jmc@openbsd.org -Date: Fri Jul 30 14:25:01 2021 +0000 +commit a60209a586a928f92ab323bf23bd07f57093342e +Author: dtucker@openbsd.org +Date: Fri Sep 3 07:43:23 2021 +0000 - upstream: fix a formatting error and mark up known_hosts - - consistently; issues reported by debian at helgefjell de + upstream: Use .Cm instead of .Dq in StrictHostKeyChecking list for - ok djm dtucker + consistency. Patch from scop via github PR#257, ok jmc@ - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: a1fd8d21dc77f507685443832df0c9700481b0ce + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 3652a91564570779431802c31224fb4a9cf39872 -commit 4455aec2e4fc90f64ae4fc47e78ebc9c18721738 -Author: jmc@openbsd.org -Date: Wed Jul 28 05:57:42 2021 +0000 +commit 8d1d9eb6de37331e872700e9e399a3190cca1242 +Author: dtucker@openbsd.org +Date: Fri Sep 3 07:27:03 2021 +0000 - upstream: no need to talk about version 2 with the -Q option, so - - rewrite the text to read better; + upstream: Mention using ssh -i for specifying the public key file - issue reported by debian at helgefjell de - ok djm dtucker + in the case where the private key is loaded into ssh-agent but is not present + locally. Based on patch from rafork via github PR#215, ok jmc@ - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 59fe2e8219c37906740ad062e0fdaea487dbe9cf + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 2282e83b0ff78d2efbe705883b67240745fa5bb2 -commit bec429338e9b30d2c7668060e82608286a8a4777 -Author: jmc@openbsd.org -Date: Tue Jul 27 14:28:46 2021 +0000 +commit eb4362e5e3aa7ac26138b11e44d8c191910aff64 +Author: dtucker@openbsd.org +Date: Fri Sep 3 05:25:50 2021 +0000 - upstream: word fix; reported by debian at helgefjell de + upstream: Refer to KEX "algorithms" instead of "methods" to match - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 0c6fd22142422a25343c5bd1a618f31618f41ece + other references and improve consistency. Patch from scop via github PR#241, + ok djm@ + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 840bc94ff6861b28d8603c8e8c16499bfb65e32c -commit efad4deb5a1f1cf79ebefd63c6625059060bfbe1 -Author: jmc@openbsd.org -Date: Tue Jul 27 14:14:25 2021 +0000 +commit b3318946ce5725da43c4bf7eeea1b73129c47d2a +Author: dtucker@openbsd.org +Date: Fri Sep 3 05:12:25 2021 +0000 - upstream: standardise the grammar in the options list; issue - - reported by debian at helgefjell de + upstream: Remove redundant attrib_clear in upload_dir_internal. - ok dtucker djm + The subsequent call to stat_to_attrib clears the struct as its first step + anyway. From pmeinhardt via github PR#220, ok djm@ - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 7ac15575045d82f4b205a42cc7d5207fe4c3f8e6 - -commit 1e11fb24066f3fc259ee30db3dbb2a3127e05956 -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Mon Aug 2 18:56:29 2021 +1000 - - Check for RLIMIT_NOFILE before trying to use it. + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: f5234fc6d7425b607e179acb3383f21716f3029e -commit 0f494236b49fb48c1ef33669f14822ca4f3ce2f4 -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Tue Jul 27 17:45:34 2021 +1000 +commit 7cc3fe28896e653956a6a2eed0a25d551b83a029 +Author: dtucker@openbsd.org +Date: Fri Sep 3 04:11:13 2021 +0000 - lastenv is only used in setenv. + upstream: Add test for client termination status on signal. - Prevents an unused variable warning on platforms that have setenv but - not unsetenv. + Based on patch from Alexxz via github PR#235 with some tweaks, to + match patch in bz#3281. + + OpenBSD-Regress-ID: d87c7446fb8b5f8b45894fbbd6875df326e729e2 -commit a1f78e08bdb3eaa88603ba3c6e01de7c8671e28a -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Mon Jul 26 12:45:30 2021 +1000 +commit 5428b0d239f6b516c81d1dd15aa9fe9e60af75d4 +Author: deraadt@openbsd.org +Date: Thu Sep 2 21:03:54 2021 +0000 - Move SUDO to "make test" command line. + upstream: sys/param.h is not needed for any visible reason - Environment variables don't get passed by vmrun, so move to command - line. + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 8bdea2d0c75692e4c5777670ac039d4b01c1f368 -commit 02e624273b9c78a49a01239159b8c09b8409b1a0 -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Sun Jul 25 23:26:36 2021 +1000 +commit 1ff38f34b4c4545eb28106629cafa1e0496bc726 +Author: Shchelkunov Artem +Date: Wed Aug 11 18:07:58 2021 +0500 - Set SUDO for tests and cleanup. + Fix memory leak in error path. + + *info is allocated via xstrdup but was leaked in the PAM_AUTH_ERR path. + From github PR#266. -commit 460ae5d93051bab70239ad823dd784822d58baad -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Sun Jul 25 22:37:55 2021 +1000 +commit cb37e2f0c0ca4fef844ed7edc5d0e3b7d0e83f6a +Author: dtucker@openbsd.org +Date: Wed Sep 1 03:16:06 2021 +0000 - Pass OPENSSL=no to make tests too. + upstream: Fix ssh-rsa fallback for old PuTTY interop tests. + + OpenBSD-Regress-ID: a19ac929da604843a5b5f0f48d2c0eb6e0773d37 -commit b398f499c68d74ebe3298b73757cf3f36e14e0cb +commit 8b02ef0f28dc24cda8cbcd8b7eb02bda8f8bbe59 Author: dtucker@openbsd.org -Date: Sun Jul 25 12:27:37 2021 +0000 +Date: Wed Sep 1 00:50:27 2021 +0000 - upstream: Skip unit and makefile-based key conversion tests when + upstream: Add a function to skip remaining tests. - we're building with OPENSSL=no. + Many tests skip tests for various reasons but not in a consistent way and + don't always clean up, so add that and switch the tests that do that over. - OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 20455ed9a977c93f846059d1fcb48e29e2c8d732 + OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 72d2ec90a3ee8849486956a808811734281af735 -commit 727ce36c8c5941bde99216d27109405907caae4f +commit d486845c07324c04240f1674ac513985bd356f66 Author: dtucker@openbsd.org -Date: Sun Jul 25 12:13:03 2021 +0000 +Date: Tue Aug 31 07:13:59 2021 +0000 - upstream: Replace OPENSSL as the variable that points to the + upstream: Specify path to PuTTY keys. - openssl binary with OPENSSL_BIN. This will allow us to use the OPENSSL - variable from mk.conf or the make(1) command line indicating if we're - building with our without OpenSSL, and ultimately get the regress tests - working in the OPENSSL=no configuration. + Portable needs this and it makes no difference on OpenBSD, so resync + them. (Id sync only, Portable already had this.) - OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 2d788fade3264d7803e5b54cae8875963f688c4e + OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 33f6f66744455886d148527af8368811e4264162 -commit 55e17101a9075f6a63af724261c5744809dcb95c +commit d22b299115e27606e846b23490746f69fdd4fb38 Author: dtucker@openbsd.org -Date: Sat Jul 24 02:57:28 2021 +0000 +Date: Tue Aug 31 06:13:23 2021 +0000 - upstream: Skip RFC4716 format import and export tests when built + upstream: Better compat tests with old PuTTY. - without OpenSSL. + When running PuTTY interop tests and using a PuTTY version older than + 0.76, re-enable the ssh-rsa host key algorithm (the 256 and 512 variants + of RSA were added some time between 0.73 and 0.76). - OpenBSD-Regress-ID: d2c2d5d38c1acc2b88cc99cfe00a2eb8bb39dfa4 + OpenBSD-Regress-ID: e6138d6987aa705fa1e4f216db0bb386e1ff38e1 -commit f5ccb5895d39cd627ad9e7b2c671d2587616100d -Author: dtucker@openbsd.org -Date: Sat Jul 24 02:51:14 2021 +0000 +commit 87ad70d605c3e39c9b8aa275db27120d7cc09b77 +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Tue Aug 31 17:04:50 2021 +1000 - upstream: Don't omit ssh-keygen -y from usage when built without - - OpenSSL. It is actually available, albeit only for ed25519 keys. + Resync PuTTY interop tests. - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 7a254c33d0e6a55c30c6b016a8d298d3cb7a7674 + Resync behaviour when REGRESS_INTEROP_PUTTY is not set with OpenBSD. -commit 819d57ac23469f1f03baa8feb38ddefbada90fdc +commit e47b82a7bf51021afac218bf59a3be121827653d Author: dtucker@openbsd.org -Date: Sat Jul 24 02:08:13 2021 +0000 +Date: Tue Aug 31 01:25:27 2021 +0000 - upstream: Exclude key conversion options from usage when built + upstream: Specify hostkeyalgorithms in SSHFP test. - without OpenSSL since those are not available, similar to what we currently - do with the moduli screening options. We can also use this to skip the - conversion regression tests in this case. + Specify host key algorithms in sshd's default set for the SSHFP test, + from djm@. Make the reason for when the test is skipped a bit clearer. - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 3c82caa398cf99cd4518c23bba5a2fc66b16bafe + OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 4f923dfc761480d5411de17ea6f0b30de3e32cea -commit b6673b1d2ee90b4690ee84f634efe40225423c38 -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Sat Jul 24 13:02:51 2021 +1000 +commit 7db3e0a9e8477c018757b59ee955f7372c0b55fb +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Mon Aug 30 01:15:45 2021 +0000 - Test OpenBSD upstream with and without OpenSSL. + upstream: adapt to RSA/SHA1 deprectation + + OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 952397c39a22722880e4de9d1c50bb1a14f907bb -commit 9d38074b5453c1abbdf888e80828c278d3b886ac +commit 2344750250247111a6c3c6a4fe84ed583a61cc11 Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Sat Jul 24 01:54:23 2021 +0000 +Date: Sun Aug 29 23:53:10 2021 +0000 - upstream: test for first-match-wins in authorized_keys environment= + upstream: After years of forewarning, disable the RSA/SHA-1 - options + signature algorithm by default. It is feasible to create colliding SHA1 + hashes, so we need to deprecate its use. - OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 1517c90276fe84b5dc5821c59f88877fcc34c0e8 - -commit 2b76f1dd19787e784711ea297ad8fc938b4484fd -Author: dtucker@openbsd.org -Date: Fri Jul 23 05:53:02 2021 +0000 - - upstream: Simplify keygen-convert by using $SSH_KEYTYPES directly. + RSA/SHA-256/512 remains available and will be transparently selected + instead of RSA/SHA1 for most SSH servers released in the last five+ + years. There is no need to regenerate RSA keys. - OpenBSD-Regress-ID: cdbe408ec3671ea9ee9b55651ee551370d2a4108 + The use of RSA/SHA1 can be re-enabled by adding "ssh-rsa" to the + PubkeyAcceptedAlgorithms directives on the client and server. + + ok dtucker deraadt + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 189bcc4789c7254e09e23734bdd5def8354ff1d5 -commit 7d64a9fb587ba9592f027f7a2264226c713d6579 +commit 56c4455d3b54b7d481c77c82115c830b9c8ce328 Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Sat Jul 24 01:55:19 2021 +0000 +Date: Sun Aug 29 23:44:07 2021 +0000 - upstream: don't leak environment= variable when it is not the first + upstream: wrap at 80 columns - match + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 47ca2286d6b52a9747f34da16d742879e1a37bf0 + +commit 95401eea8503943449f712e5f3de52fc0bc612c5 +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Fri Aug 20 18:14:13 2021 +1000 + + Replace shell function with ssh-keygen -A. - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 7fbdc3dfe0032deaf003fd937eeb4d434ee4efe0 + Prevents the init script in the SysV package from trying (and failing) + to generate unsupported key types. Remove now-unused COMMENT_OUT_ECC. + ok tim@ -commit db2130e2340bf923e41c791aa9cd27b9e926042c -Author: jmc@openbsd.org -Date: Fri Jul 23 06:01:17 2021 +0000 +commit d83ec9ed995a76ed1d5c65cf10b447222ec86131 +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Fri Aug 20 15:39:05 2021 +1000 + + Remove obsolete Redhat PAM config and init script. + +commit e1a596186c81e65a34ce13076449712d3bf97eb4 +Author: Damien Miller +Date: Fri Aug 20 14:03:49 2021 +1000 + + depend - upstream: punctuation; - - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 64be152e378c45975073ab1c07e0db7eddd15806 +commit 5450606c8f7f7a0d70211cea78bc2dab74ab35d1 +Author: Damien Miller +Date: Fri Aug 20 13:59:43 2021 +1000 -commit 03190d10980c6fc9124e988cb2df13101f266507 + update version numbers + +commit feee2384ab8d694c770b7750cfa76a512bdf8246 Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Fri Jul 23 05:56:47 2021 +0000 +Date: Fri Aug 20 03:22:55 2021 +0000 - upstream: mention in comment that read_passphrase(..., RP_ALLOW_STDIN) - - will try to use askpass first. bz3314 - - convert a couple of debug() -> debug_f() while here + upstream: openssh-8.7 - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: c7e812aebc28fcc5db06d4710e0f73613dee545c + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 8769dff0fd76ae3193d77bf83b439adee0f300cd -commit 1653ece6832b2b304d46866b262d5f69880a9ec7 -Author: dtucker@openbsd.org -Date: Fri Jul 23 05:07:16 2021 +0000 +commit 9a2ed62173cc551b2b5f479460bb015b19499de8 +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Fri Aug 20 10:48:13 2021 +1000 - upstream: Test conversion of ed25519 and ecdsa keys too. + Also check pid in pselect_notify_setup. - OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 3676d2d00e58e0d6d37f2878f108cc2b83bbe4bb + Spotted by djm@. -commit 8b7af02dcf9d2b738787efd27da7ffda9859bed2 -Author: dtucker@openbsd.org -Date: Fri Jul 23 04:56:21 2021 +0000 +commit deaadcb93ca15d4f38aa38fb340156077792ce87 +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Fri Aug 20 08:39:33 2021 +1000 - upstream: Add test for exporting pubkey from a passphrase-protected + Prefix pselect functions to clarify debug messages + +commit 10e45654cff221ca60fd35ee069df67208fcf415 +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Fri Aug 20 08:30:42 2021 +1000 + + Fix race in pselect replacement code. - private key. + On the second and subsequent calls to pselect the notify_pipe was not + added to the select readset, opening up a race that om G. Christensen + discovered on multiprocessor Solaris <=9 systems. - OpenBSD-Regress-ID: da99d93e7b235fbd5b5aaa01efc411225e6ba8ac + Also reinitialize notify_pipe if the pid changes. This will prevent a + parent and child from using the same FD, although this is not an issue + in the current structure it might be in future. -commit 441095d4a3e5048fe3c87a6c5db5bc3383d767fb -Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Fri Jul 23 03:54:55 2021 +0000 +commit 464ba22f1e38d25402e5ec79a9b8d34a32df5a3f +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Wed Aug 18 12:51:30 2021 +1000 - upstream: regression test for time-limited signature keys + Check compiler for c99 declarations after code. - OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 2a6f3bd900dbee0a3c96f1ff23e032c93ab392bc + The sntrup761 reference code contains c99-style declarations after code + so don't try to build that if the compiler doesn't support it. -commit 9e1882ef6489a7dd16b6d7794af96629cae61a53 -Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Fri Jul 23 05:24:02 2021 +0000 +commit 7d878679a4b155a359d32104ff473f789501748d +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Tue Aug 17 15:12:04 2021 +1000 - upstream: note successful authentication method in final "Authenticated - - to ..." message and partial auth success messages (all at LogLevel=verbose) - ok dtucker@ - - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 06834b89ceb89f8f16c5321d368a66c08f441984 + Remove trailing backslash on regress-unit-binaries -commit a917e973a1b90b40ff1e950df083364b48fc6c78 -Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Fri Jul 23 04:04:52 2021 +0000 +commit b71b2508f17c68c5d9dbbe537686d81cedb9a781 +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Tue Aug 17 07:59:27 2021 +1000 - upstream: Add a ForkAfterAuthentication ssh_config(5) counterpart - - to the ssh(1) -f flag. Last part of GHPR231 from Volker Diels-Grabsch. ok - dtucker + Put stdint.h inside HAVE_STDINT_H. - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: b18aeda12efdebe2093d55263c90fe4ea0bce0d3 + From Tom G. Christensen. -commit e0c5088f1c96a145eb6ea1dee438010da78f9ef5 -Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Fri Jul 23 04:00:59 2021 +0000 +commit 6a24567a29bd7b4ab64e1afad859ea845cbc6b8c +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Mon Aug 16 14:13:02 2021 +1000 - upstream: Add a StdinNull directive to ssh_config(5) that allows - - the config file to do the same thing as -n does on the ssh(1) commandline. - Patch from Volker Diels-Grabsch via GHPR231; ok dtucker + Improve github test driver script. - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 66ddf3f15c76796d4dcd22ff464aed1edd62468e + - use a trap to always output any failed regress logs (since the script + sets -e, the existing log output is never invoked). + - pass LTESTS and SKIP_LTESTS when re-running with sshd options (eg. + UsePAM). -commit e3957e21ffdc119d6d04c0b1686f8e2fe052f5ea -Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Fri Jul 23 03:57:20 2021 +0000 +commit b467cf13705f59ed348b620722ac098fe31879b7 +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Mon Aug 16 11:32:23 2021 +1000 - upstream: make authorized_keys environment="..." directives - - first-match-wins and more strictly limit their maximum number; prompted by - OOM reported by OSS-fuzz (35470). - - feedback and ok dtucker@ + Remove deprecated ubuntu-16.04 test targets. - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 01f63fc10dcd995e7aed9c378ad879161af83121 + Github has deprecated ubuntu-16.04 and it will be removed on 20 + September. -commit d0bb1ce731762c55acb95817df4d5fab526c7ecd -Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Fri Jul 23 03:37:52 2021 +0000 +commit 20e6eefcdf78394f05e453d456c1212ffaa6b6a4 +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Sun Aug 15 23:25:26 2021 +1000 - upstream: Let allowed signers files used by ssh-keygen(1) - - signatures support key lifetimes, and allow the verification mode to specify - a signature time to check at. This is intended for use by git to support - signing objects using ssh keys. ok dtucker@ - - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 3e2c67b7dcd94f0610194d1e8e4907829a40cf31 + Skip agent ptrace test on hurd. -commit 44142068dc7ef783d135e91ff954e754d2ed432e -Author: dtucker@openbsd.org -Date: Mon Jul 19 08:48:33 2021 +0000 +commit 7c9115bbbf958fbf85259a061c1122e2d046aabf +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Sun Aug 15 19:37:22 2021 +1000 - upstream: Use SUDO when setting up hostkey. - - OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 990cf4481cab8dad62e90818a9b4b36c533851a7 + Add hurd test target. -commit 6b67f3f1d1d187597e54a139cc7785c0acebd9a2 -Author: dtucker@openbsd.org -Date: Mon Jul 19 05:08:54 2021 +0000 +commit 7909a566f6c6a78fcd30708dc49f4e4f9bb80ce3 +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Sun Aug 15 12:45:10 2021 +1000 - upstream: Increase time margin for rekey tests. Should help - - reliability on very heavily loaded hosts. - - OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 4c28a0fce3ea89ebde441d7091464176e9730533 + Skip scp3 tests on all dfly58 and 60 configs. -commit 7953e1bfce9e76bec41c1331a29bc6cff9d416b8 +commit e65198e52cb03534e8c846d1bca74c310b1526de +Author: Tim Rice +Date: Sat Aug 14 13:08:07 2021 -0700 + + openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h: put bsd-signal.h before bsd-misc.h + to get sigset_t from signal.h needed for the pselect replacement. + +commit e50635640f79920d9375e0155cb3f4adb870eee5 Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Mon Jul 19 13:47:51 2021 +1000 +Date: Fri Aug 13 13:21:00 2021 +1000 - Add sshfp-connect.sh file missed in previous. + Test OpenSSH from OpenBSD head on 6.8 and 6.9. -commit b75a80fa8369864916d4c93a50576155cad4df03 -Author: dtucker@openbsd.org -Date: Mon Jul 19 03:13:28 2021 +0000 +commit e0ba38861c490c680117b7fe0a1d61a181cd00e7 +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Fri Aug 13 13:00:14 2021 +1000 - upstream: Ensure that all returned SSHFP records for the specified host - - name and hostkey type match instead of only one. While there, simplify the - code somewhat and add some debugging. Based on discussion in bz#3322, ok - djm@. + Skip scp3 test on dragonfly 58 and 60. - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 0a6a0a476eb7f9dfe8fe2c05a1a395e3e9b22ee4 + The tests hang, so skip until we figure them out. -commit 1cc1fd095393663cd72ddac927d82c6384c622ba -Author: dtucker@openbsd.org -Date: Mon Jul 19 02:21:50 2021 +0000 +commit dcce2a2bcf007bf817a2fb0dce3db83fa9201e92 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Thu Aug 12 23:59:25 2021 +0000 - upstream: Id sync only, -portable already has this. + upstream: mention that CASignatureAlgorithms accepts +/- similarly to - Put dh_set_moduli_file call inside ifdef WITH_OPENSSL. Fixes - build with OPENSSL=no. + the other algorithm list directives; ok jmc bz#3335 - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: af54abbebfb12bcde6219a44d544e18204defb15 + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 0d46b53995817052c78e2dce9dbd133963b073d9 -commit 33abbe2f4153f5ca5c874582f6a7cc91ae167485 -Author: dtucker@openbsd.org -Date: Mon Jul 19 02:46:34 2021 +0000 +commit 090a82486e5d7a8f7f16613d67e66a673a40367f +Author: schwarze@openbsd.org +Date: Thu Aug 12 09:59:00 2021 +0000 - upstream: Add test for host key verification via SSHFP records. This + upstream: In the editline(3) branch of the sftp(1) event loop, - requires some external setup to operate so is disabled by default (see - comments in sshfp-connect.sh). + handle SIGINT rather than ignoring it, such that the user can use Ctrl-C to + discard the currently edited command line and get a fresh prompt, just like + in ftp(1), bc(1), and in shells. - OpenBSD-Regress-ID: c52c461bd1df3a803d17498917d156ef64512fd9 - -commit f0cd000d8e3afeb0416dce1c711c3d7c28d89bdd -Author: dtucker@openbsd.org -Date: Mon Jul 19 02:29:28 2021 +0000 - - upstream: Add ed25519 key and test SSHFP export of it. Only test + It is critical to not use ssl_signal() for this particular case + because that function unconditionally sets SA_RESTART, but here we + need the signal to interrupt the read(2) in the el_gets(3) event loop. - RSA SSHFP export if we have RSA functionality compiled in. + OK dtucker@ deraadt@ - OpenBSD-Regress-ID: b4ff5181b8c9a5862e7f0ecdd96108622333a9af + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 8025115a773f52e9bb562eaab37ea2e021cc7299 -commit 0075511e27e5394faa28edca02bfbf13b9a6693e -Author: dtucker@openbsd.org -Date: Mon Jul 19 00:16:26 2021 +0000 +commit e1371e4f58404d6411d9f95eb774b444cea06a26 +Author: naddy@openbsd.org +Date: Wed Aug 11 14:07:54 2021 +0000 - upstream: Group keygen tests together. + upstream: scp: tweak man page and error message for -3 by default - OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 07e2d25c527bb44f03b7c329d893a1f2d6c5c40c + Now that the -3 option is enabled by default, flip the documentation + and error message logic from "requires -3" to "blocked by -R". + + ok djm@ + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: a872592118444fb3acda5267b2a8c3d4c4252020 -commit 034828820c7e62652e7c48f9ee6b67fb7ba6fa26 -Author: dtucker@openbsd.org -Date: Sun Jul 18 23:10:10 2021 +0000 +commit 49f46f6d77328a3d10a758522b670a3e8c2235e7 +Author: naddy@openbsd.org +Date: Wed Aug 11 14:05:19 2021 +0000 - upstream: Add test for ssh-keygen printing of SSHFP records. + upstream: scp: do not spawn ssh with two -s flags for + + remote-to-remote copies + + Do not add another "-s" to the argument vector every time an SFTP + connection is initiated. Instead, introduce a subsystem flag to + do_cmd() and add "-s" when the flag is set. + + ok djm@ - OpenBSD-Regress-ID: fde9566b56eeb980e149bbe157a884838507c46b + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 25df69759f323661d31b2e1e790faa22e27966c1 -commit 52c3b6985ef1d5dadb4c4fe212f8b3a78ca96812 +commit 2a2cd00783e1da45ee730b7f453408af1358ef5b Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Sat Jul 17 00:38:11 2021 +0000 +Date: Wed Aug 11 08:55:04 2021 +0000 - upstream: wrap some long lines + upstream: test -Oprint-pubkey - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 4f5186b1466656762dae37d3e569438d900c350d + OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 3d51afb6d1f287975fb6fddd7a2c00a3bc5094e0 -commit 43ec991a782791d0b3f42898cd789f99a07bfaa4 +commit b9f4635ea5bc33ed5ebbacf332d79bae463b0f54 Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Sat Jul 17 00:36:53 2021 +0000 +Date: Wed Aug 11 08:54:17 2021 +0000 - upstream: fix sftp on ControlPersist connections, broken by recent + upstream: when verifying sshsig signatures, support an option - SessionType change; spotted by sthen@ + (-Oprint-pubkey) to dump the full public key to stdout; based on patch from + Fabian Stelzer; ok markus@ - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 4c5ddc5698790ae6ff50d2a4f8f832f0eeeaa234 + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 0598000e5b9adfb45d42afa76ff80daaa12fc3e2 -commit 073f45c236550f158c9a94003e4611c07dea5279 +commit 750c1a45ba4e8ad63793d49418a0780e77947b9b Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Fri Jul 16 09:00:23 2021 +0000 +Date: Wed Aug 11 05:21:32 2021 +0000 - upstream: Explicitly check for and start time-based rekeying in the - - client and server mainloops. - - Previously the rekey timeout could expire but rekeying would not start - until a packet was sent or received. This could cause us to spin in - select() on the rekey timeout if the connection was quiet. - - ok markus@ + upstream: oops, missed one more %p - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 4356cf50d7900f3df0a8f2117d9e07c91b9ff987 + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: e7e62818d1564cc5cd9086eaf7a51cbd1a9701eb -commit ef7c4e52d5d840607f9ca3a302a4cbb81053eccf -Author: jmc@openbsd.org -Date: Wed Jul 14 06:46:38 2021 +0000 +commit b5aa27b69ab2e1c13ac2b5ad3f8f7d389bad7489 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Wed Aug 11 05:20:17 2021 +0000 - upstream: reorder SessionType; ok djm + upstream: remove a bunch of %p in format strings; leftovers of - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: c7dd0b39e942b1caf4976a0b1cf0fed33d05418c + debuggings past. prompted by Michael Forney, ok dtucker@ + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 4853a0d6c9cecaba9ecfcc19066e52d3a8dcb2ac -commit 8aa2f9aeb56506dca996d68ab90ab9c0bebd7ec3 +commit 419aa01123db5ff5dbc68b2376ef23b222862338 Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Wed Jul 14 11:26:50 2021 +1000 +Date: Wed Aug 11 09:21:09 2021 +1000 - Make whitespace consistent. + Add includes.h to compat tests. + + On platforms where closefrom returns void (eg glibc>=2.34) the prototype + for closefrom in its compat tests would cause compile errors. Remove + this and have the tests pull in the compat headers in the same way as + the main code. bz#3336. -commit 4f4297ee9b8a39f4dfd243a74c5f51f9e7a05723 -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Wed Jul 14 11:26:12 2021 +1000 +commit 931f592f26239154eea3eb35a086585897b1a185 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Tue Aug 10 03:35:45 2021 +0000 - Add ARM64 Linux self-hosted runner. + upstream: adapt to scp -M flag change; make scp3.sh test SFTP mode too + + OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 43fea26704a0f0b962b53c1fabcb68179638f9c0 -commit eda8909d1b0a85b9c3804a04d03ec6738fd9dc7f +commit 391ca67fb978252c48d20c910553f803f988bd37 Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Tue Jul 13 23:48:36 2021 +0000 +Date: Tue Aug 10 03:33:34 2021 +0000 - upstream: add a SessionType directive to ssh_config, allowing the + upstream: Prepare for a future where scp(1) uses the SFTP protocol by - configuration file to offer equivalent control to the -N (no session) and -s - (subsystem) command-line flags. + default. Replace recently added -M option to select the protocol with -O + (olde) and -s (SFTP) flags, and label the -s flag with a clear warning that + it will be removed in the near future (so no, don't use it in scripts!). - Part of GHPR#231 by Volker Diels-Grabsch with some minor tweaks; - feedback and ok dtucker@ + prompted by/feedback from deraadt@ - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 726ee931dd4c5cc7f1d7a187b26f41257f9a2d12 + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 92ad72cc6f0023c9be9e316d8b30eb6d8d749cfc -commit 7ae69f2628e338ba6e0eae7ee8a63bcf8fea7538 +commit bfdd4b722f124a4fa9173d20dd64dd0fc69856be Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Mon Jul 12 02:12:22 2021 +0000 +Date: Mon Aug 9 23:56:36 2021 +0000 - upstream: fix some broken tests; clean up output + upstream: make scp -3 the default for remote-to-remote copies. It - OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 1d5038edb511dc4ce1622344c1e724626a253566 + provides a much better and more intuitive user experience and doesn't require + exposing credentials to the source host. + + thanks naddy@ for catching the missing argument in usage() + + "Yes please!" - markus@ + "makes a lot of sense" - deraadt@ + "the right thing to do" - dtucker@ + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: d0d2af5f0965c5192ba5b2fa461c9f9b130e5dd9 -commit f5fc6a4c3404bbf65c21ca6361853b33d78aa87e -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Mon Jul 12 18:00:05 2021 +1000 +commit 2f7a3b51cef689ad9e93d0c6c17db5a194eb5555 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Mon Aug 9 23:49:31 2021 +0000 - Add configure-time detection for SSH_TIME_T_MAX. + upstream: make scp in SFTP mode try to use relative paths as much - Should fix printing cert times exceeding INT_MAX (bz#3329) on platforms - were time_t is a long long. The limit used is for the signed type, so if - some system has a 32bit unsigned time_t then the lower limit will still - be imposed and we would need to add some way to detect this. Anyone using - an unsigned 64bit can let us know when it starts being a problem. + as possible. Previosuly, it would try to make relative and ~/-rooted paths + absolute before requesting transfers. + + prompted by and much discussion deraadt@ + ok markus@ + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 46639d382ea99546a4914b545fa7b00fa1be5566 -commit fd2d06ae4442820429d634c0a8bae11c8e40c174 -Author: dtucker@openbsd.org -Date: Mon Jul 12 06:22:57 2021 +0000 +commit 2ab864010e0a93c5dd95116fb5ceaf430e2fc23c +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Mon Aug 9 23:47:44 2021 +0000 - upstream: Make limit for time_t test unconditional in the + upstream: SFTP protocol extension to allow the server to expand - format_absolute_time fix for bz#3329 that allows printing of timestamps past - INT_MAX. This was incorrectly included with the previous commit. Based on - discussion with djm@. + ~-prefixed paths, in particular ~user ones. Allows scp in sftp mode to accept + these paths, like scp in rcp mode does. - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 835936f6837c86504b07cabb596b613600cf0f6e + prompted by and much discussion deraadt@ + ok markus@ + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 7d794def9e4de348e1e777f6030fc9bafdfff392 -commit 6c29b387cd64a57b0ec8ae7d2c8d02789d88fcc3 -Author: dtucker@openbsd.org -Date: Mon Jul 12 06:08:57 2021 +0000 +commit 41b019ac067f1d1f7d99914d0ffee4d2a547c3d8 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Mon Aug 9 23:44:32 2021 +0000 - upstream: Use existing format_absolute_time() function when + upstream: when scp is in SFTP mode, try to deal better with ~ - printing cert validity instead of doing it inline. Part of bz#3329. + prefixed paths. ~user paths aren't supported, but ~/ paths will be accepted + and prefixed with the SFTP server starting directory (more to come) - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: a13d4e3c4f59644c23745eb02a09b2a4e717c00c + prompted by and discussed with deraadt@ + ok markus@ + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 263a071f14555c045fd03132a8fb6cbd983df00d -commit 99981d5f8bfa383791afea03f6bce8454e96e323 +commit b4b3f3da6cdceb3fd168b5fab69d11fba73bd0ae Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Fri Jul 9 09:55:56 2021 +0000 +Date: Mon Aug 9 07:21:01 2021 +0000 - upstream: silence redundant error message; reported by Fabian Stelzer + upstream: on fatal errors, make scp wait for ssh connection before - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 9349a703016579a60557dafd03af2fe1d44e6aa2 + exiting avoids LogLevel=verbose (or greater) messages from ssh appearing + after scp has returned exited and control has returned to the shell; ok + markus@ + + (this was originally committed as r1.223 along with unrelated stuff that + I rolled back in r1.224) + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 1261fd667ad918484889ed3d7aec074f3956a74b -commit e86097813419b49d5bff5c4b51d1c3a5d4d2d804 -Author: John Ericson -Date: Sat Dec 26 11:40:49 2020 -0500 +commit 2ae7771749e0b4cecb107f9d4860bec16c3f4245 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Mon Aug 9 07:19:12 2021 +0000 - Re-indent krb5 section after pkg-config addition. + upstream: rever r1.223 - I accidentally committed unrelated changes + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: fb73f3865b2647a27dd94db73d6589506a9625f9 -commit 32dd2daa56c294e40ff7efea482c9eac536d8cbb -Author: John Ericson -Date: Sat Dec 26 11:40:49 2020 -0500 +commit 986abe94d481a1e82a01747360bd767b96b41eda +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Mon Aug 9 07:16:09 2021 +0000 - Support finding Kerberos via pkg-config + upstream: show only the final path component in the progress meter; - This makes cross compilation easier. + more useful with long paths (that may truncate) and better matches + traditional scp behaviour; spotted by naddy@ ok deraadt@ + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 26b544d0074f03ebb8a3ebce42317d8d7ee291a3 -commit def7a72234d7e4f684d72d33a0f7229f9eee0aa4 -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Fri Jul 9 14:34:06 2021 +1000 +commit 2b67932bb3176dee4fd447af4368789e04a82b93 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Mon Aug 9 07:13:54 2021 +0000 - Update comments about EGD to include prngd. + upstream: on fatal errors, make scp wait for ssh connection before + + exiting avoids LogLevel=verbose (or greater) messages from ssh appearing + after scp has returned exited and control has returned to the shell; ok + markus@ + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: ef9dab5ef5ae54a6a4c3b15d380568e94263456c -commit b5d23150b4e3368f4983fd169d432c07afeee45a +commit 724eb900ace30661d45db2ba01d0f924d95ecccb Author: dtucker@openbsd.org -Date: Mon Jul 5 01:21:07 2021 +0000 +Date: Sun Aug 8 08:49:09 2021 +0000 - upstream: Fix a couple of whitespace things. Portable already has + upstream: xstrdup environment variable used by ForwardAgent. bz#3328 - these so this removes two diffs between the two. + from goetze at dovetail.com, ok djm@ deraadt@ - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 769f017ebafd8e741e337b3e9e89eb5ac73c9c56 + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 760320dac1c3b26904284ba417a7d63fccc5e742 -commit 8f57be9f279b8e905f9883066aa633c7e67b31cf +commit 86b4cb3a884846b358305aad17a6ef53045fa41f Author: dtucker@openbsd.org -Date: Mon Jul 5 01:16:46 2021 +0000 +Date: Sun Aug 8 08:27:28 2021 +0000 - upstream: Order includes as per style(9). Portable already has + upstream: Although it's POSIX, not all shells used in Portable support - these so this removes a handful of diffs between the two. + the implicit 'in "$@"' after 'for i'. - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 8bd7452d809b199c19bfc49511a798f414eb4a77 + OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 3c9aec6bca4868f85d2742b6ba5223fce110bdbc -commit b75624f8733b3ed9e240f86cac5d4a39dae11848 +commit f2ccf6c9f395923695f22345e626dfd691227aaf +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Sun Aug 8 17:39:56 2021 +1000 + + Move portable specific settings down. + + This brings the top hunk of the file back in sync with OpenBSD + so patches to the CVS Id should apply instead of always being + rejected. + +commit 71b0eb997e220b0fc9331635af409ad84979f2af Author: dtucker@openbsd.org -Date: Mon Jul 5 00:50:25 2021 +0000 +Date: Sun Aug 8 07:27:52 2021 +0000 - upstream: Remove comment referencing now-removed + upstream: Move setting of USER further down the startup In portable - RhostsRSAAuthentication. ok djm@ + we have to change this and having it in the same hunk as the CVS Id string + means applying changes fails every. single. time. - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 3d864bfbd99a1d4429a58e301688f3be464827a9 + OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 87cd603eb6db58c9b430bf90adacb7f90864429b -commit b67eb12f013c5441bb4f0893a97533582ad4eb13 -Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Mon Jul 5 00:25:42 2021 +0000 +commit f0aca2706c710a0da1a4be705f825a807cd15400 +Author: dtucker@openbsd.org +Date: Sun Aug 8 06:38:33 2021 +0000 - upstream: allow spaces to appear in usernames for local to remote, + upstream: Drop -q in ssh-log-wrapper.sh to preserve logs. - and scp -3 remote to remote copies. with & ok dtucker bz#1164 + scp and sftp like to add -q to the command line passed to ssh which + overrides the LogLevel we set in the config files and suppresses output + to the debug logs so drop any "-q" from the invoked ssh. In the one + case where we actually want to use -q in the banner test, call the ssh + binary directly bypassing the logging wrapper. - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: e9b550f3a85ffbb079b6720833da31317901d6dd + OpenBSD-Regress-ID: e2c97d3c964bda33a751374c56f65cdb29755b75 -commit 8c4ef0943e574f614fc7c6c7e427fd81ee64ab87 +commit cf27810a649c5cfae60f8ce66eeb25caa53b13bc Author: dtucker@openbsd.org -Date: Fri Jul 2 07:20:44 2021 +0000 +Date: Sat Aug 7 01:57:08 2021 +0000 - upstream: Remove obsolete comments about SSHv1 auth methods. ok - - djm@ + upstream: Fix prototype mismatch for do_cmd. ok djm@ - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 6060f70966f362d8eb4bec3da2f6c4712fbfb98f + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 1c1598bb5237a7ae0be99152f185e0071163714d -commit 88908c9b61bcb99f16e8d398fc41e2b3b4be2003 -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Sat Jul 3 23:00:19 2021 +1000 +commit 85de69f64665245786e28c81ab01fe18b0e2a149 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Sat Aug 7 01:55:01 2021 +0000 - Remove reference to ChallengeResponse. + upstream: sftp-client.c needs poll.h - challenge_response_authentication was removed from the struct, keeping - kbd_interactive_authentication. + remove unused variable + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 233ac6c012cd23af62f237167a661db391055a16 -commit 321874416d610ad2158ce6112f094a4862c2e37f +commit 397c4d72e50023af5fe3aee5cc2ad407a6eb1073 Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Sat Jul 3 20:38:09 2021 +1000 +Date: Sat Aug 7 11:30:57 2021 +1000 - Move signal.h up include order to match upstream. + Include poll.h and friends for struct pollfd. -commit 4fa83e2d0e32c2dd758653e0359984bbf1334f32 -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Sat Jul 3 20:36:06 2021 +1000 +commit a9e2c533195f28627f205682482d9da384c4c52e +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Sat Aug 7 00:14:17 2021 +0000 - Remove old OpenBSD version marker. + upstream: do_upload() used a near-identical structure for - Looks like an accidental leftover from a sync. + tracking expected status replies from the server to what do_download() was + using. + + Refactor it to use the same structure and factor out some common + code into helper functions. + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 0c167df8ab6df4a5292c32421922b0cf379e9054 -commit 9d5e31f55d5f3899b72645bac41a932d298ad73b -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Sat Jul 3 20:34:19 2021 +1000 +commit 7b1cbcb7599d9f6a3bbad79d412604aa1203b5ee +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Sat Aug 7 00:12:09 2021 +0000 - Remove duplicate error on error path. + upstream: make scp(1) in SFTP mode follow symlinks like - There's an extra error() call on the listen error path, it looks like - its removal was missed during an upstream sync. + traditional scp(1) ok markus@ + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 97255e55be37e8e26605e4ba1e69f9781765d231 -commit 888c459925c7478ce22ff206c9ac1fb812a40caf -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Sat Jul 3 20:32:46 2021 +1000 +commit 133b44e500422df68c9c25c3b6de35c0263132f1 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Sat Aug 7 00:10:49 2021 +0000 - Remove some whitespace not in upstream. + upstream: fix incorrect directory permissions on scp -3 - Reduces diff vs OpenBSD by a small amount. + transfers; ok markus@ + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 64b2abaa5635a2be65ee2e77688ad9bcebf576c2 -commit 4d2d4d47a18d93f3e0a91a241a6fdb545bbf7dc2 -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Sat Jul 3 19:27:43 2021 +1000 +commit 98b59244ca10e62ff67a420856770cb700164f59 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Sat Aug 7 00:09:57 2021 +0000 - Replace remaining references to ChallengeResponse. + upstream: a bit more debugging of file attributes being - Portable had a few additional references to ChallengeResponse related to - UsePAM, replaces these with equivalent keyboard-interactive ones. + sent/received over the wire + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: f68c4e207b08ef95200a8b2de499d422808e089b -commit 53237ac789183946dac6dcb8838bc3b6b9b43be1 -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Sat Jul 3 19:23:28 2021 +1000 +commit c677e65365d6f460c084e41e0c4807bb8a9cf601 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Sat Aug 7 00:08:52 2021 +0000 - Sync remaining ChallengeResponse removal. + upstream: make scp(1) in SFTP mode output better match original - These were omitted from commit 88868fd131. + scp(1) by suppressing "Retrieving [path]" lines that were emitted to support + the interactive sftp(1) client. ok markus@ + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 06be293df5f156a18f366079be2f33fa68001acc -commit 2c9e4b319f7e98744b188b0f58859d431def343b -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Sat Jul 3 19:17:31 2021 +1000 +commit 48cd39b7a4e5e7c25101c6d1179f98fe544835cd +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Sat Aug 7 00:07:18 2021 +0000 - Disable rocky84 to figure out why agent test fails + upstream: factor out a structure duplicated between downloading + + and crossloading; ok markus@ + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 96eede24d520569232086a129febe342e4765d39 -commit bfe19197a92b7916f64a121fbd3c179abf15e218 -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Fri Jul 2 15:43:28 2021 +1000 +commit 318c06bb04ee21a0cfa6b6022a201eacaa53f388 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Sat Aug 7 00:06:30 2021 +0000 - Remove now-unused SSHv1 enums. + upstream: use sftp_client crossloading to implement scp -3 - sRhostsRSAAuthentication and sRSAAuthentication are protocol 1 options - and are no longer used. + feedback/ok markus@ + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 7db4c0086cfc12afc9cfb71d4c2fd3c7e9416ee9 -commit c73b02d92d72458a5312bd098f32ce88868fd131 -Author: dtucker@openbsd.org -Date: Fri Jul 2 05:11:20 2021 +0000 +commit de7115b373ba0be3861c65de9b606a3e0e9d29a3 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Sat Aug 7 00:02:41 2021 +0000 - upstream: Remove references to ChallengeResponseAuthentication in + upstream: support for "cross"-loading files/directories, i.e. - favour of KbdInteractiveAuthentication. The former is what was in SSHv1, the - latter is what is in SSHv2 (RFC4256) and they were treated as somewhat but - not entirely equivalent. We retain the old name as deprecated alias so - config files continue to work and a reference in the man page for people - looking for it. + downloading from one SFTP server while simultaneously uploading to another. - Prompted by bz#3303 which pointed out the discrepancy between the two - when used with Match. Man page help & ok jmc@, with & ok djm@ + feedback & ok markus@ - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 2c1bff8e5c9852cfcdab1f3ea94dfef5a22f3b7e + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 3982878e29d8df0fa4ddc502f5ff6126ac714235 -commit f841fc9c8c7568a3b5d84a4cc0cefacb7dbc16b9 -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Fri Jul 2 15:20:32 2021 +1000 +commit a50bd0367ff2063bbc70a387740a2aa6914de094 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Sat Aug 7 00:01:29 2021 +0000 - Fix ifdefs around get_random_bytes_prngd. + upstream: factor our SSH2_FXP_OPEN calls into their own function; - get_random_bytes_prngd() is used if either of PRNGD_PORT or PRNGD_SOCKET - are defined, so adjust ifdef accordingly. + "looks fine" markus@ + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: d3dea2153f08855c6d9dacc01973248944adeffb -commit 0767627cf66574484b9c0834500b42ea04fe528a -Author: Damien Miller -Date: Fri Jul 2 14:30:23 2021 +1000 +commit e3c0ba05873cf3d3f7d19d595667a251026b2d84 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Sat Aug 7 00:00:33 2021 +0000 - wrap get_random_bytes_prngd() in ifdef + upstream: prepare for scp -3 implemented via sftp - avoid unused static function warning + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 194aac0dd87cb175334b71c2a30623a5ad55bb44 -commit f93fdc4de158386efe1116bd44c5b3f4a7a82c25 -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Mon Jun 28 13:06:37 2021 +1000 +commit 395d8fbdb094497211e1461cf0e2f80af5617e0a +Author: dtucker@openbsd.org +Date: Fri Aug 6 09:00:18 2021 +0000 - Add rocky84 test target. + upstream: Make diff invocation more portable. + + POSIX does not require diff to have -N, so compare in both directions + with just -r, which should catch missing files in either directory. + + OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 0e2ec8594556a6f369ed5a0a90c6806419b845f7 -commit d443006c0ddfa7f6a5bd9c0ae92036f3d5f2fa3b +commit d247a73ce27b460138599648d9c637c6f2b77605 Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Fri Jun 25 06:30:22 2021 +0000 +Date: Wed Aug 4 21:28:00 2021 +0000 - upstream: fix decoding of X.509 subject name; from Leif Thuresson - - via bz3327 ok markus@ + upstream: regression test for scp -3 - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 0ea2e28f39750dd388b7e317bc43dd997a217ae8 + OpenBSD-Regress-ID: b44375d125c827754a1f722ec6b6b75b634de05d -commit 2a5704ec142202d387fda2d6872fd4715ab81347 +commit 35c8e41a6f6d8ad76f8d1cd81ac2ea23d0d993b2 Author: dtucker@openbsd.org -Date: Fri Jun 25 06:20:39 2021 +0000 +Date: Fri Aug 6 05:04:42 2021 +0000 - upstream: Use better language to refer to the user. From l1ving - - via github PR#250, ok jmc@ + upstream: Document "ProxyJump none". bz#3334. - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 07ca3526626996613e128aeddf7748c93c4d6bbf + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: f78cc6f55731f2cd35c3a41d5352ac1ee419eba7 -commit 4bdf7a04797a0ea1c431a9d54588417c29177d19 +commit 911ec6411821bda535d09778df7503b92f0eafab Author: dtucker@openbsd.org -Date: Fri Jun 25 03:38:17 2021 +0000 +Date: Wed Aug 4 01:34:55 2021 +0000 - upstream: Replace SIGCHLD/notify_pipe kludge with pselect. - - Previously sshd's SIGCHLD handler would wake up select() by writing a - byte to notify_pipe. We can remove this by blocking SIGCHLD, checking - for child terminations then passing the original signal mask through - to pselect. This ensures that the pselect will immediately wake up if - a child terminates between wait()ing on them and the pselect. - - In -portable, for platforms that do not have pselect the kludge is still - there but is hidden behind a pselect interface. + upstream: Allow for different (but POSIX compliant) behaviour of - Based on other changes for bz#2158, ok djm@ + basename(3) and prevent a use-after-free in that case in the new sftp-compat + code. - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 202c85de0b3bdf1744fe53529a05404c5480d813 - -commit c9f7bba2e6f70b7ac1f5ea190d890cb5162ce127 -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Fri Jun 25 15:08:18 2021 +1000 - - Move closefrom() to before first malloc. + POSIX allows basename(3) to either return a pointer to static storage + or modify the passed string and return a pointer to that. OpenBSD does + the former and works as is, but on other platforms "filename" points + into "tmp" which was just freed. This makes the freeing of tmp + consistent with the other variable in the loop. - When built against tcmalloc, tcmalloc allocates a descriptor for its - internal use, so calling closefrom() afterward causes the descriptor - number to be reused resulting in a corrupted connection. Moving the - closefrom a little earlier should resolve this. From kircherlike at - outlook.com via bz#3321, ok djm@ - -commit 7ebfe4e439853b88997c9cfc2ff703408a1cca92 -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Fri Jun 18 20:41:45 2021 +1000 - - Put second -lssh in link line for sftp-server. + Pinpointed by the -portable Valgrind regress test. ok djm@ deraadt@ - When building --without-openssl the recent port-prngd.c change adds - a dependency on atomicio, but since nothing else in sftp-server uses - it, the linker may not find it. Add a second -lssh similar to other - binaries. + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 750f3c19bd4440e4210e30dd5d7367386e833374 -commit e409d7966785cfd9f5970e66a820685c42169717 -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Fri Jun 18 18:34:08 2021 +1000 +commit 6df1fecb5d3e51f3a8027a74885c3a44f6cbfcbd +Author: Damien Miller +Date: Wed Aug 4 11:05:11 2021 +1000 - Try EGD/PRNGD if random device fails. - - When built --without-openssl, try EGD/PRGGD (if configured) as a last - resort before failing. + use openbsd-compat glob.h is required -commit e43a898043faa3a965dbaa1193cc60e0b479033d +commit 9ebd1828881dfc9014a344587934a5ce7db6fa1b Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Fri Jun 18 18:32:51 2021 +1000 +Date: Tue Aug 3 21:03:23 2021 +1000 - Split EGD/PRNGD interface into its own file. + Missing space between macro arg and punctuation. - This will allow us to use it when building --without-openssl. + From jmc@ -commit acb2887a769a1b1912cfd7067f3ce04fad240260 +commit 0fd3f62eddc7cf54dcc9053be6f58998f3eb926a Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Thu Jun 17 21:03:19 2021 +1000 +Date: Tue Aug 3 21:02:33 2021 +1000 - Handle GIDs > 2^31 in getgrouplist. - - When compiled in 32bit mode, the getgrouplist implementation may fail - for GIDs greater than LONG_MAX. Analysis and change from ralf.winkel - at tui.com. + Avoid lines >80 chars. From jmc@ -commit 31fac20c941126281b527605b73bff30a8f02edd -Author: dtucker@openbsd.org -Date: Thu Jun 10 09:46:28 2021 +0000 +commit af5d8094d8b755e1daaf2e20ff1dc252800b4c9b +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Tue Aug 3 01:05:24 2021 +0000 - upstream: Use $SUDO when reading sshd's pidfile here too. + upstream: regression tests for scp SFTP protocol support; mostly by - OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 6bfb0d455d493f24839034a629c5306f84dbd409 + Jakub Jelen in GHPR#194 ok markus + + OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 36f1458525bcb111741ec8547eaf58b13cddc715 -commit a3a58acffc8cc527f8fc6729486d34e4c3d27643 -Author: dtucker@openbsd.org -Date: Thu Jun 10 09:43:51 2021 +0000 +commit e4673b7f67ae7740131a4ecea29a846593049a91 +Author: anton@openbsd.org +Date: Thu Jul 29 15:34:09 2021 +0000 - upstream: Use $SUDO when reading sshd's pidfile in case it was + upstream: Treat doas with arguments as a valid SUDO variable. - created with a very restrictive umask. This resyncs with -portable. + Allows one to specify SUDO="doas -n" which I do while running make regress. - OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 07fd2af06df759d4f64b82c59094accca1076a5d + ok dtucker@ + + OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 4fe5814b5010dbf0885500d703bea06048d11005 -commit 249ad4ae51cd3bc235e75a4846eccdf8b1416611 -Author: dtucker@openbsd.org -Date: Thu Jun 10 09:37:59 2021 +0000 +commit 197e29f1cca190d767c4b2b63a662f9a9e5da0b3 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Mon Aug 2 23:38:27 2021 +0000 - upstream: Set umask when creating hostkeys to prevent excessive + upstream: support for using the SFTP protocol for file transfers in - permissions warning. + scp, via a new "-M sftp" option. Marked as experimental for now. - OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 382841db0ee28dfef7f7bffbd511803e1b8ab0ef - -commit 9d0892153c005cc65897e9372b01fa66fcbe2842 -Author: dtucker@openbsd.org -Date: Thu Jun 10 03:45:31 2021 +0000 - - upstream: Add regress test for SIGHUP restart + Some corner-cases exist, in particular there is no attempt to + provide bug-compatibility with scp's weird "double shell" quoting + rules. - while handling active and unauthenticated clients. Should catch anything - similar to the pselect bug just fixed in sshd.c. + Mostly by Jakub Jelen in GHPR#194 with some tweaks by me. ok markus@ + Thanks jmc@ for improving the scp.1 bits. - OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 3b3c19b5e75e43af1ebcb9586875b3ae3a4cac73 + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 6ce4c9157ff17b650ace571c9f7793d92874051c -commit 73f6f191f44440ca3049b9d3c8e5401d10b55097 -Author: dtucker@openbsd.org -Date: Thu Jun 10 03:14:14 2021 +0000 +commit dd533c7ab79d61a7796b77b64bd81b098e0d7f9f +Author: jmc@openbsd.org +Date: Fri Jul 30 14:28:13 2021 +0000 - upstream: Continue accept loop when pselect + upstream: fix a formatting error and add some Xr; from debian at - returns -1, eg if it was interrupted by a signal. This should prevent - the hang discovered by sthen@ wherein sshd receives a SIGHUP while it has - an unauthenticated child and goes on to a blocking read on a notify_pipe. - feedback deraadt@, ok djm@ + helgefjell de - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 0243c1c5544fca0974dae92cd4079543a3fceaa0 + removed references to rlogin etc. as no longer relevant; + suggested by djm + + ok djm dtucker + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 3c431c303068d3aec5bb18573a0bd5e0cd77c5ae -commit c785c0ae134a8e8b5c82b2193f64c632a98159e4 -Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Tue Jun 8 22:30:27 2021 +0000 +commit c7cd347a8823819411222c1e10a0d26747d0fd5c +Author: jmc@openbsd.org +Date: Fri Jul 30 14:25:01 2021 +0000 - upstream: test that UserKnownHostsFile correctly accepts multiple + upstream: fix a formatting error and mark up known_hosts - arguments; would have caught readconf.c r1.356 regression + consistently; issues reported by debian at helgefjell de - OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 71ca54e66c2a0211b04999263e56390b1f323a6a + ok djm dtucker + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: a1fd8d21dc77f507685443832df0c9700481b0ce -commit 1a6f6b08e62c78906a3032e8d9a83e721c84574e -Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Tue Jun 8 22:06:12 2021 +0000 +commit 4455aec2e4fc90f64ae4fc47e78ebc9c18721738 +Author: jmc@openbsd.org +Date: Wed Jul 28 05:57:42 2021 +0000 - upstream: fix regression in r1.356: for ssh_config options that + upstream: no need to talk about version 2 with the -Q option, so - accepted multiple string arguments, ssh was only recording the first. - Reported by Lucas via bugs@ + rewrite the text to read better; - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 7cbf182f7449bf1cb7c5b4452667dc2b41170d6d + issue reported by debian at helgefjell de + ok djm dtucker + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 59fe2e8219c37906740ad062e0fdaea487dbe9cf -commit 78e30af3e2b2dd540a341cc827c6b98dd8b0a6de -Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Tue Jun 8 07:40:12 2021 +0000 +commit bec429338e9b30d2c7668060e82608286a8a4777 +Author: jmc@openbsd.org +Date: Tue Jul 27 14:28:46 2021 +0000 - upstream: test argv_split() optional termination on comments + upstream: word fix; reported by debian at helgefjell de - OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 9fd1c4a27a409897437c010cfd79c54b639a059c + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 0c6fd22142422a25343c5bd1a618f31618f41ece -commit a023138957ea2becf1c7f93fcc42b0aaac6f2b03 -Author: dtucker@openbsd.org -Date: Tue Jun 8 07:05:27 2021 +0000 +commit efad4deb5a1f1cf79ebefd63c6625059060bfbe1 +Author: jmc@openbsd.org +Date: Tue Jul 27 14:14:25 2021 +0000 - upstream: Add testcases from bz#3319 for IPQoS and TunnelDevice + upstream: standardise the grammar in the options list; issue - being overridden on the command line. + reported by debian at helgefjell de - OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 801674d5d2d02abd58274a78cab2711f11de14a8 + ok dtucker djm + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 7ac15575045d82f4b205a42cc7d5207fe4c3f8e6 -commit 660cea10b2cdc11f13ba99c89b1bbb368a4d9ff2 -Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Tue Jun 8 06:52:43 2021 +0000 +commit 1e11fb24066f3fc259ee30db3dbb2a3127e05956 +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Mon Aug 2 18:56:29 2021 +1000 - upstream: sprinkle some "# comment" at end of configuration lines - - to test comment handling - - OpenBSD-Regress-ID: cb82fbf40bda5c257a9f742c63b1798e5a8fdda7 + Check for RLIMIT_NOFILE before trying to use it. -commit acc9c32dcb6def6c7d3688bceb4c0e59bd26b411 -Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Tue Jun 8 06:51:47 2021 +0000 +commit 0f494236b49fb48c1ef33669f14822ca4f3ce2f4 +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Tue Jul 27 17:45:34 2021 +1000 - upstream: more descriptive failure message + lastenv is only used in setenv. - OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 5300f6faf1d9e99c0cd10827b51756c5510e3509 + Prevents an unused variable warning on platforms that have setenv but + not unsetenv. -commit ce04dd4eae23d1c9cf7c424a702f48ee78573bc1 -Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Mon Jun 7 01:16:34 2021 +0000 +commit a1f78e08bdb3eaa88603ba3c6e01de7c8671e28a +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Mon Jul 26 12:45:30 2021 +1000 - upstream: test AuthenticationMethods inside a Match block as well - - as in the main config section + Move SUDO to "make test" command line. - OpenBSD-Regress-ID: ebe0a686621b7cb8bb003ac520975279c28747f7 + Environment variables don't get passed by vmrun, so move to command + line. -commit 9018bd821fca17e26e92f7a7e51d9b24cd62f2db -Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Mon Jun 7 00:00:50 2021 +0000 +commit 02e624273b9c78a49a01239159b8c09b8409b1a0 +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Sun Jul 25 23:26:36 2021 +1000 - upstream: prepare for stricter sshd_config parsing that will refuse - - a config that has {Allow,Deny}{Users,Groups} on a line with no subsequent - arguments. Such lines are permitted but are nonsensical noops ATM - - OpenBSD-Regress-ID: ef65463fcbc0bd044e27f3fe400ea56eb4b8f650 + Set SUDO for tests and cleanup. -commit a10f929d1ce80640129fc5b6bc1acd9bf689169e -Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Tue Jun 8 07:09:42 2021 +0000 +commit 460ae5d93051bab70239ad823dd784822d58baad +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Sun Jul 25 22:37:55 2021 +1000 - upstream: switch sshd_config parsing to argv_split() - - similar to the previous commit, this switches sshd_config parsing to - the newer tokeniser. Config parsing will be a little stricter wrt - quote correctness and directives appearing without arguments. - - feedback and ok markus@ - - tested in snaps for the last five or so days - thanks Theo and those who - caught bugs - - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 9c4305631d20c2d194661504ce11e1f68b20d93e + Pass OPENSSL=no to make tests too. -commit ea9e45c89a4822d74a9d97fef8480707d584da4d -Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Tue Jun 8 07:07:15 2021 +0000 +commit b398f499c68d74ebe3298b73757cf3f36e14e0cb +Author: dtucker@openbsd.org +Date: Sun Jul 25 12:27:37 2021 +0000 - upstream: Switch ssh_config parsing to use argv_split() - - This fixes a couple of problems with the previous tokeniser, - strdelim() - - 1. strdelim() is permissive wrt accepting '=' characters. This is - intended to allow it to tokenise "Option=value" but because it - cannot keep state, it will incorrectly split "Opt=val=val2". - 2. strdelim() has rudimentry handling of quoted strings, but it - is incomplete and inconsistent. E.g. it doesn't handle escaped - quotes inside a quoted string. - 3. It has no support for stopping on a (unquoted) comment. Because - of this readconf.c r1.343 added chopping of lines at '#', but - this caused a regression because these characters may legitimately - appear inside quoted strings. - - The new tokeniser is stricter is a number of cases, including #1 above - but previously it was also possible for some directives to appear - without arguments. AFAIK these were nonsensical in all cases, and the - new tokeniser refuses to accept them. - - The new code handles quotes much better, permitting quoted space as - well as escaped closing quotes. Finally, comment handling should be - fixed - the tokeniser will terminate only on unquoted # characters. - - feedback & ok markus@ - - tested in snaps for the last five or so days - thanks Theo and those who - caught bugs + upstream: Skip unit and makefile-based key conversion tests when - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: dc72fd12af9d5398f4d9e159d671f9269c5b14d5 + we're building with OPENSSL=no. + + OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 20455ed9a977c93f846059d1fcb48e29e2c8d732 -commit d786424986c04d1d375f231fda177c8408e05c3e +commit 727ce36c8c5941bde99216d27109405907caae4f Author: dtucker@openbsd.org -Date: Tue Jun 8 07:02:46 2021 +0000 +Date: Sun Jul 25 12:13:03 2021 +0000 - upstream: Check if IPQoS or TunnelDevice are already set before + upstream: Replace OPENSSL as the variable that points to the - overriding. Prevents values in config files from overriding values supplied - on the command line. bz#3319, ok markus. + openssl binary with OPENSSL_BIN. This will allow us to use the OPENSSL + variable from mk.conf or the make(1) command line indicating if we're + building with our without OpenSSL, and ultimately get the regress tests + working in the OPENSSL=no configuration. - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: f3b08b898c324debb9195e6865d8999406938f74 + OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 2d788fade3264d7803e5b54cae8875963f688c4e -commit aae4b4d3585b9f944d7dbd3c9e5ba0006c55e457 -Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Tue Jun 8 06:54:40 2021 +0000 +commit 55e17101a9075f6a63af724261c5744809dcb95c +Author: dtucker@openbsd.org +Date: Sat Jul 24 02:57:28 2021 +0000 - upstream: Allow argv_split() to optionally terminate tokenisation + upstream: Skip RFC4716 format import and export tests when built - when it encounters an unquoted comment. + without OpenSSL. - Add some additional utility function for working with argument - vectors, since we'll be switching to using them to parse - ssh/sshd_config shortly. + OpenBSD-Regress-ID: d2c2d5d38c1acc2b88cc99cfe00a2eb8bb39dfa4 + +commit f5ccb5895d39cd627ad9e7b2c671d2587616100d +Author: dtucker@openbsd.org +Date: Sat Jul 24 02:51:14 2021 +0000 + + upstream: Don't omit ssh-keygen -y from usage when built without - ok markus@ as part of a larger diff; tested in snaps + OpenSSL. It is actually available, albeit only for ed25519 keys. - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: fd9c108cef2f713f24e3bc5848861d221bb3a1ac + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 7a254c33d0e6a55c30c6b016a8d298d3cb7a7674 -commit da9f9acaac5bab95dca642b48e0c8182b246ab69 -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Mon Jun 7 19:19:23 2021 +1000 +commit 819d57ac23469f1f03baa8feb38ddefbada90fdc +Author: dtucker@openbsd.org +Date: Sat Jul 24 02:08:13 2021 +0000 - Save logs on failure for upstream test + upstream: Exclude key conversion options from usage when built + + without OpenSSL since those are not available, similar to what we currently + do with the moduli screening options. We can also use this to skip the + conversion regression tests in this case. + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 3c82caa398cf99cd4518c23bba5a2fc66b16bafe -commit 76883c60161e5f3808787085a27a8c37f8cc4e08 +commit b6673b1d2ee90b4690ee84f634efe40225423c38 Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Mon Jun 7 14:36:32 2021 +1000 +Date: Sat Jul 24 13:02:51 2021 +1000 - Add obsdsnap-i386 upstream test target. + Test OpenBSD upstream with and without OpenSSL. -commit d45b9c63f947ec5ec314696e70281f6afddc0ac3 +commit 9d38074b5453c1abbdf888e80828c278d3b886ac Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Mon Jun 7 03:38:38 2021 +0000 +Date: Sat Jul 24 01:54:23 2021 +0000 - upstream: fix debug message when finding a private key to match a + upstream: test for first-match-wins in authorized_keys environment= - certificate being attempted for user authentication. Previously it would - print the certificate's path, whereas it was supposed to be showing the - private key's path. Patch from Alex Sherwin via GHPR247 + options - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: d5af3be66d0f22c371dc1fe6195e774a18b2327b + OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 1517c90276fe84b5dc5821c59f88877fcc34c0e8 -commit 530739d42f6102668aecd699be0ce59815c1eceb -Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Sun Jun 6 11:34:16 2021 +0000 +commit 2b76f1dd19787e784711ea297ad8fc938b4484fd +Author: dtucker@openbsd.org +Date: Fri Jul 23 05:53:02 2021 +0000 - upstream: Match host certificates against host public keys, not private - - keys. Allows use of certificates with private keys held in a ssh-agent. - Reported by Miles Zhou in bz3524; ok dtucker@ + upstream: Simplify keygen-convert by using $SSH_KEYTYPES directly. - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 25f5bf70003126d19162862d9eb380bf34bac22a + OpenBSD-Regress-ID: cdbe408ec3671ea9ee9b55651ee551370d2a4108 -commit 4265215d7300901fd7097061c7517688ade82f8e +commit 7d64a9fb587ba9592f027f7a2264226c713d6579 Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Sun Jun 6 03:40:39 2021 +0000 +Date: Sat Jul 24 01:55:19 2021 +0000 - upstream: Client-side workaround for a bug in OpenSSH 7.4: this release - - allows RSA/SHA2 signatures for public key authentication but fails to - advertise this correctly via SSH2_MSG_EXT_INFO. This causes clients of these - server to incorrectly match PubkeyAcceptedAlgorithms and potentially refuse - to offer valid keys. + upstream: don't leak environment= variable when it is not the first - Reported by and based on patch from Gordon Messmer via bz3213, thanks - also for additional analysis by Jakub Jelen. ok dtucker + match - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: d6d0b7351d5d44c45f3daaa26efac65847a564f7 + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 7fbdc3dfe0032deaf003fd937eeb4d434ee4efe0 -commit bda270d7fb8522d43c21a79a4b02a052d7c64de8 -Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Sun Jun 6 03:17:02 2021 +0000 +commit db2130e2340bf923e41c791aa9cd27b9e926042c +Author: jmc@openbsd.org +Date: Fri Jul 23 06:01:17 2021 +0000 - upstream: degrade gracefully if a sftp-server offers the - - limits@openssh.com extension but fails when the client tries to invoke it. - Reported by Hector Martin via bz3318 + upstream: punctuation; - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: bd9d1839c41811616ede4da467e25746fcd9b967 + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 64be152e378c45975073ab1c07e0db7eddd15806 -commit d345d5811afdc2d6923019b653cdd93c4cc95f76 +commit 03190d10980c6fc9124e988cb2df13101f266507 Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Sun Jun 6 03:15:39 2021 +0000 - - upstream: the limits@openssh.com extension was incorrectly marked - - as an operation that writes to the filesystem, which made it unavailable in - sftp-server read-only mode. Spotted by Hector Martin via bz3318 - - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: f054465230787e37516c4b57098fc7975e00f067 - -commit 2b71010d9b43d7b8c9ec1bf010beb00d98fa765a -Author: naddy@openbsd.org -Date: Sat Jun 5 13:47:00 2021 +0000 +Date: Fri Jul 23 05:56:47 2021 +0000 - upstream: PROTOCOL.certkeys: update reference from IETF draft to + upstream: mention in comment that read_passphrase(..., RP_ALLOW_STDIN) - RFC + will try to use askpass first. bz3314 - Also fix some typos. - ok djm@ + convert a couple of debug() -> debug_f() while here - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 5e855b6c5a22b5b13f8ffa3897a868e40d349b44 + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: c7e812aebc28fcc5db06d4710e0f73613dee545c -commit aa99b2d9a3e45b943196914e8d8bf086646fdb54 -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Fri Jun 4 23:41:29 2021 +1000 +commit 1653ece6832b2b304d46866b262d5f69880a9ec7 +Author: dtucker@openbsd.org +Date: Fri Jul 23 05:07:16 2021 +0000 - Clear notify_pipe from readset if present. + upstream: Test conversion of ed25519 and ecdsa keys too. - Prevents leaking an implementation detail to the caller. - -commit 6de8dadf6b4d0627d35bca0667ca44b1d61c2c6b -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Fri Jun 4 23:24:25 2021 +1000 - - space->tabs. + OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 3676d2d00e58e0d6d37f2878f108cc2b83bbe4bb -commit c8677065070ee34c05c7582a9c2f58d8642e552d -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Fri Jun 4 18:39:48 2021 +1000 +commit 8b7af02dcf9d2b738787efd27da7ffda9859bed2 +Author: dtucker@openbsd.org +Date: Fri Jul 23 04:56:21 2021 +0000 - Add pselect implementation for platforms without. + upstream: Add test for exporting pubkey from a passphrase-protected - This is basically the existing notify_pipe kludge from serverloop.c - moved behind a pselect interface. It works by installing a signal - handler that writes to a pipe that the select is watching, then calls - the original handler. + private key. - The select call in serverloop will become pselect soon, at which point the - kludge will be removed from thereand will only exist in the compat layer. - Original code by markus, help from djm. + OpenBSD-Regress-ID: da99d93e7b235fbd5b5aaa01efc411225e6ba8ac -commit 7cd7f302d3a072748299f362f9e241d81fcecd26 -Author: Vincent Brillault -Date: Sun May 24 09:15:06 2020 +0200 +commit 441095d4a3e5048fe3c87a6c5db5bc3383d767fb +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Fri Jul 23 03:54:55 2021 +0000 - auth_log: dont log partial successes as failures + upstream: regression test for time-limited signature keys - By design, 'partial' logins are successful logins, so initially with - authenticated set to 1, for which another authentication is required. As - a result, authenticated is always reset to 0 when partial is set to 1. - However, even if authenticated is 0, those are not failed login - attempts, similarly to attempts with authctxt->postponed set to 1. + OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 2a6f3bd900dbee0a3c96f1ff23e032c93ab392bc -commit e7606919180661edc7f698e6a1b4ef2cfb363ebf +commit 9e1882ef6489a7dd16b6d7794af96629cae61a53 Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Fri Jun 4 06:19:07 2021 +0000 +Date: Fri Jul 23 05:24:02 2021 +0000 - upstream: The RB_GENERATE_STATIC(3) macro expands to a series of + upstream: note successful authentication method in final "Authenticated - function definitions and not a statement, so there should be no semicolon - following them. Patch from Michael Forney + to ..." message and partial auth success messages (all at LogLevel=verbose) + ok dtucker@ - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: c975dd180580f0bdc0a4d5b7d41ab1f5e9b7bedd + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 06834b89ceb89f8f16c5321d368a66c08f441984 -commit c298c4da574ab92df2f051561aeb3e106b0ec954 +commit a917e973a1b90b40ff1e950df083364b48fc6c78 Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Fri Jun 4 05:59:18 2021 +0000 +Date: Fri Jul 23 04:04:52 2021 +0000 - upstream: rework authorized_keys example section, removing irrelevant + upstream: Add a ForkAfterAuthentication ssh_config(5) counterpart - stuff, de-wrapping the example lines and better aligning the examples with - common usage and FAQs; ok jmc + to the ssh(1) -f flag. Last part of GHPR231 from Volker Diels-Grabsch. ok + dtucker - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: d59f1c9281f828148e2a2e49eb9629266803b75c + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: b18aeda12efdebe2093d55263c90fe4ea0bce0d3 -commit d9cb35bbec5f623589d7c58fc094817b33030f35 +commit e0c5088f1c96a145eb6ea1dee438010da78f9ef5 Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Fri Jun 4 05:10:03 2021 +0000 - - upstream: adjust SetEnv description to clarify $TERM handling - - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 8b8cc0124856bc1094949d55615e5c44390bcb22 - -commit 771f57a8626709f2ad207058efd68fbf30d31553 -Author: dtucker@openbsd.org -Date: Fri Jun 4 05:09:08 2021 +0000 +Date: Fri Jul 23 04:00:59 2021 +0000 - upstream: Switch the listening select loop from select() to - - pselect() and mask signals while checking signal flags, umasking for pselect - and restoring afterwards. Also restore signals before sighup_restart so they - don't remain blocked after restart. + upstream: Add a StdinNull directive to ssh_config(5) that allows - This prevents a race where a SIGTERM or SIGHUP can arrive between - checking the flag and calling select (eg if sshd is processing a - new connection) resulting in sshd not shutting down until the next - time it receives a new connection. bz#2158, with & ok djm@ + the config file to do the same thing as -n does on the ssh(1) commandline. + Patch from Volker Diels-Grabsch via GHPR231; ok dtucker - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: bf85bf880fd78e00d7478657644fcda97b9a936f + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 66ddf3f15c76796d4dcd22ff464aed1edd62468e -commit f64f8c00d158acc1359b8a096835849b23aa2e86 +commit e3957e21ffdc119d6d04c0b1686f8e2fe052f5ea Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Fri Jun 4 05:02:40 2021 +0000 +Date: Fri Jul 23 03:57:20 2021 +0000 - upstream: allow ssh_config SetEnv to override $TERM, which is otherwise + upstream: make authorized_keys environment="..." directives - handled specially by the protocol. Useful in ~/.ssh/config to set TERM to - something generic (e.g. "xterm" instead of "xterm-256color") for destinations - that lack terminfo entries. feedback and ok dtucker@ + first-match-wins and more strictly limit their maximum number; prompted by + OOM reported by OSS-fuzz (35470). - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 38b1ef4d5bc159c7d9d589d05e3017433e2d5758 + feedback and ok dtucker@ + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 01f63fc10dcd995e7aed9c378ad879161af83121 -commit 60107677dc0ce1e93c61f23c433ad54687fcd9f5 +commit d0bb1ce731762c55acb95817df4d5fab526c7ecd Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Fri Jun 4 04:02:21 2021 +0000 +Date: Fri Jul 23 03:37:52 2021 +0000 - upstream: correct extension name "no-presence-required" => + upstream: Let allowed signers files used by ssh-keygen(1) - "no-touch-required" + signatures support key lifetimes, and allow the verification mode to specify + a signature time to check at. This is intended for use by git to support + signing objects using ssh keys. ok dtucker@ - document "verify-required" option + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 3e2c67b7dcd94f0610194d1e8e4907829a40cf31 + +commit 44142068dc7ef783d135e91ff954e754d2ed432e +Author: dtucker@openbsd.org +Date: Mon Jul 19 08:48:33 2021 +0000 + + upstream: Use SUDO when setting up hostkey. - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 1879ff4062cf61d79b515e433aff0bf49a6c55c5 + OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 990cf4481cab8dad62e90818a9b4b36c533851a7 -commit ecc186e46e3e30f27539b4311366dfda502f0a08 -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Wed Jun 2 13:54:11 2021 +1000 +commit 6b67f3f1d1d187597e54a139cc7785c0acebd9a2 +Author: dtucker@openbsd.org +Date: Mon Jul 19 05:08:54 2021 +0000 - Retire fbsd7 test target. + upstream: Increase time margin for rekey tests. Should help - It's the slowest of the selfhosted targets (since it's 32bit but has - most of the crypto algos). We still have coverage for 32bit i386. + reliability on very heavily loaded hosts. + + OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 4c28a0fce3ea89ebde441d7091464176e9730533 -commit 5de0867b822ec48b5eec9abde0f5f95d1d646546 +commit 7953e1bfce9e76bec41c1331a29bc6cff9d416b8 Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Wed Jun 2 11:21:40 2021 +1000 +Date: Mon Jul 19 13:47:51 2021 +1000 - Check for $OPENSSL in md5 fallback too. + Add sshfp-connect.sh file missed in previous. -commit 1db69d1b6542f8419c04cee7fd523a4a11004be2 -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Wed Jun 2 11:17:54 2021 +1000 +commit b75a80fa8369864916d4c93a50576155cad4df03 +Author: dtucker@openbsd.org +Date: Mon Jul 19 03:13:28 2021 +0000 - Add dfly60 target. + upstream: Ensure that all returned SSHFP records for the specified host + + name and hostkey type match instead of only one. While there, simplify the + code somewhat and add some debugging. Based on discussion in bz#3322, ok + djm@. + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 0a6a0a476eb7f9dfe8fe2c05a1a395e3e9b22ee4 -commit a3f2dd955f1c19cad387a139f0e719af346ca6ef +commit 1cc1fd095393663cd72ddac927d82c6384c622ba Author: dtucker@openbsd.org -Date: Wed Jun 2 00:17:45 2021 +0000 +Date: Mon Jul 19 02:21:50 2021 +0000 - upstream: Merge back shell portability changes + upstream: Id sync only, -portable already has this. - bringing it back in sync with -portable. + Put dh_set_moduli_file call inside ifdef WITH_OPENSSL. Fixes + build with OPENSSL=no. - OpenBSD-Regress-ID: c07905ba931e66ad7d849b87b7d19648007175d1 + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: af54abbebfb12bcde6219a44d544e18204defb15 -commit 9d482295c9f073e84d75af46b720a1c0f7ec2867 +commit 33abbe2f4153f5ca5c874582f6a7cc91ae167485 Author: dtucker@openbsd.org -Date: Tue Jun 1 23:56:20 2021 +0000 +Date: Mon Jul 19 02:46:34 2021 +0000 - upstream: Use a default value for $OPENSSL, + upstream: Add test for host key verification via SSHFP records. This - allowing it to be overridden. Do the same in the PuTTY tests since it's - needed there and not exported by test-exec.sh. + requires some external setup to operate so is disabled by default (see + comments in sshfp-connect.sh). - OpenBSD-Regress-ID: c49dcd6aa7602a8606b7afa192196ca1fa65de16 + OpenBSD-Regress-ID: c52c461bd1df3a803d17498917d156ef64512fd9 -commit 07660b3c99f8ea74ddf4a440e55c16c9f7fb3dd1 +commit f0cd000d8e3afeb0416dce1c711c3d7c28d89bdd Author: dtucker@openbsd.org -Date: Mon May 24 10:25:18 2021 +0000 +Date: Mon Jul 19 02:29:28 2021 +0000 - upstream: Find openssl binary via environment variable. This + upstream: Add ed25519 key and test SSHFP export of it. Only test - allows overriding if necessary (eg in -portable where we're testing against a - specific version of OpenSSL). + RSA SSHFP export if we have RSA functionality compiled in. - OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 491f39cae9e762c71aa4bf045803d077139815c5 + OpenBSD-Regress-ID: b4ff5181b8c9a5862e7f0ecdd96108622333a9af -commit 1a4d1da9188d7c88f646b61f0d6a3b34f47c5439 -Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Fri May 21 04:03:47 2021 +0000 +commit 0075511e27e5394faa28edca02bfbf13b9a6693e +Author: dtucker@openbsd.org +Date: Mon Jul 19 00:16:26 2021 +0000 - upstream: fix memleak in test + upstream: Group keygen tests together. - OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 5e529d0982aa04666604936df43242e97a7a6f81 + OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 07e2d25c527bb44f03b7c329d893a1f2d6c5c40c -commit 60455a5d98065a73ec9a1f303345856bbd49aecc -Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Fri May 21 03:59:01 2021 +0000 +commit 034828820c7e62652e7c48f9ee6b67fb7ba6fa26 +Author: dtucker@openbsd.org +Date: Sun Jul 18 23:10:10 2021 +0000 - upstream: also check contents of remaining string + upstream: Add test for ssh-keygen printing of SSHFP records. - OpenBSD-Regress-ID: d526fa07253f4eebbc7d6205a0ab3d491ec71a28 + OpenBSD-Regress-ID: fde9566b56eeb980e149bbe157a884838507c46b -commit 39f6cd207851d7b67ca46903bfce4a9f615b5b1c +commit 52c3b6985ef1d5dadb4c4fe212f8b3a78ca96812 Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Fri May 21 03:48:07 2021 +0000 +Date: Sat Jul 17 00:38:11 2021 +0000 - upstream: unit test for misc.c:strdelim() that mostly servces to - - highlight its inconsistencies + upstream: wrap some long lines - OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 8d2bf970fcc01ccc6e36a5065f89b9c7fa934195 + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 4f5186b1466656762dae37d3e569438d900c350d -commit 7a3a1dd2c7d4461962acbcc0ebee9445ba892be0 -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Thu May 27 21:23:15 2021 +1000 +commit 43ec991a782791d0b3f42898cd789f99a07bfaa4 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Sat Jul 17 00:36:53 2021 +0000 - Put minix3 config in the host-specific block. + upstream: fix sftp on ControlPersist connections, broken by recent + + SessionType change; spotted by sthen@ + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 4c5ddc5698790ae6ff50d2a4f8f832f0eeeaa234 -commit 59a194825f12fff8a7f75d91bf751ea17645711b +commit 073f45c236550f158c9a94003e4611c07dea5279 Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Mon May 31 06:48:42 2021 +0000 +Date: Fri Jul 16 09:00:23 2021 +0000 - upstream: Hash challenge supplied by client during FIDO key enrollment + upstream: Explicitly check for and start time-based rekeying in the - prior to passing it to libfido2, which does expect a hash. + client and server mainloops. - There is no effect for users who are simply generating FIDO keys using - ssh-keygen - by default we generate a random 256 bit challenge, but - people building attestation workflows around our tools should now have - a more consistent experience (esp. fewer failures when they fail to - guess the magic 32-byte challenge length requirement). + Previously the rekey timeout could expire but rekeying would not start + until a packet was sent or received. This could cause us to spin in + select() on the rekey timeout if the connection was quiet. ok markus@ - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: b8d5363a6a7ca3b23dc28f3ca69470472959f2b5 + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 4356cf50d7900f3df0a8f2117d9e07c91b9ff987 -commit eb68e669bc8ab968d4cca5bf1357baca7136a826 -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Thu May 27 21:14:15 2021 +1000 +commit ef7c4e52d5d840607f9ca3a302a4cbb81053eccf +Author: jmc@openbsd.org +Date: Wed Jul 14 06:46:38 2021 +0000 - Include login_cap.h for login_getpwclass override. + upstream: reorder SessionType; ok djm - On minix3, login_getpwclass is __RENAME'ed to __login_getpwclass50 so - without this the include overriding login_getpwclass causes a compile - error. + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: c7dd0b39e942b1caf4976a0b1cf0fed33d05418c -commit 2063af71422501b65c7a92a5e14c0e6a3799ed89 +commit 8aa2f9aeb56506dca996d68ab90ab9c0bebd7ec3 Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Thu May 27 21:13:38 2021 +1000 +Date: Wed Jul 14 11:26:50 2021 +1000 - Add minix3 test target. + Make whitespace consistent. -commit 2e1efcfd9f94352ca5f4b6958af8a454f8cf48cd -Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Wed May 26 01:47:24 2021 +0000 +commit 4f4297ee9b8a39f4dfd243a74c5f51f9e7a05723 +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Wed Jul 14 11:26:12 2021 +1000 - upstream: fix SEGV in UpdateHostkeys debug() message, triggered - - when the update removed more host keys than remain present. Fix tested by - reporter James Cook, via bugs@ - - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 44f641f6ee02bb957f0c1d150495b60cf7b869d3 + Add ARM64 Linux self-hosted runner. -commit 9acd76e6e4d2b519773e7119c33cf77f09534909 -Author: naddy@openbsd.org -Date: Sun May 23 18:22:57 2021 +0000 +commit eda8909d1b0a85b9c3804a04d03ec6738fd9dc7f +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Tue Jul 13 23:48:36 2021 +0000 - upstream: ssh: The client configuration keyword is + upstream: add a SessionType directive to ssh_config, allowing the - "hostbasedacceptedalgorithms" + configuration file to offer equivalent control to the -N (no session) and -s + (subsystem) command-line flags. - This fixes a mistake that slipped in when "HostbasedKeyTypes" was - renamed to "HostbasedAcceptedAlgorithms". + Part of GHPR#231 by Volker Diels-Grabsch with some minor tweaks; + feedback and ok dtucker@ - Bug report by zack@philomathiclife.com + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 726ee931dd4c5cc7f1d7a187b26f41257f9a2d12 + +commit 7ae69f2628e338ba6e0eae7ee8a63bcf8fea7538 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Mon Jul 12 02:12:22 2021 +0000 + + upstream: fix some broken tests; clean up output - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: d745a7e8e50b2589fc56877f322ea204bc784f38 + OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 1d5038edb511dc4ce1622344c1e724626a253566 -commit 078a0e60c92700da4c536c93c007257828ccd05b +commit f5fc6a4c3404bbf65c21ca6361853b33d78aa87e Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Tue May 25 11:40:47 2021 +1000 +Date: Mon Jul 12 18:00:05 2021 +1000 - Rename README.md to ci-status.md. + Add configure-time detection for SSH_TIME_T_MAX. - The original intent was to provide a status page for the CIs configured - in that directory, but it had the side effect of replacing the top-level - README.md. + Should fix printing cert times exceeding INT_MAX (bz#3329) on platforms + were time_t is a long long. The limit used is for the signed type, so if + some system has a 32bit unsigned time_t then the lower limit will still + be imposed and we would need to add some way to detect this. Anyone using + an unsigned 64bit can let us know when it starts being a problem. -commit 7be4ac813662f68e89f23c50de058a49aa32f7e4 -Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Wed May 19 01:24:05 2021 +0000 +commit fd2d06ae4442820429d634c0a8bae11c8e40c174 +Author: dtucker@openbsd.org +Date: Mon Jul 12 06:22:57 2021 +0000 - upstream: restore blocking status on stdio fds before close - - ssh(1) needs to set file descriptors to non-blocking mode to operate - but it was not restoring the original state on exit. This could cause - problems with fds shared with other programs via the shell, e.g. + upstream: Make limit for time_t test unconditional in the - > $ cat > test.sh << _EOF - > #!/bin/sh - > { - > ssh -Fnone -oLogLevel=verbose ::1 hostname - > cat /usr/share/dict/words - > } | sleep 10 - > _EOF - > $ ./test.sh - > Authenticated to ::1 ([::1]:22). - > Transferred: sent 2352, received 2928 bytes, in 0.1 seconds - > Bytes per second: sent 44338.9, received 55197.4 - > cat: stdout: Resource temporarily unavailable + format_absolute_time fix for bz#3329 that allows printing of timestamps past + INT_MAX. This was incorrectly included with the previous commit. Based on + discussion with djm@. - This restores the blocking status for fds 0,1,2 (stdio) before ssh(1) - abandons/closes them. + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 835936f6837c86504b07cabb596b613600cf0f6e + +commit 6c29b387cd64a57b0ec8ae7d2c8d02789d88fcc3 +Author: dtucker@openbsd.org +Date: Mon Jul 12 06:08:57 2021 +0000 + + upstream: Use existing format_absolute_time() function when - This was reported as bz3280 and GHPR246; ok dtucker@ + printing cert validity instead of doing it inline. Part of bz#3329. - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 8cc67346f05aa85a598bddf2383fcfcc3aae61ce + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: a13d4e3c4f59644c23745eb02a09b2a4e717c00c -commit c4902e1a653c67fea850ec99c7537f358904c0af +commit 99981d5f8bfa383791afea03f6bce8454e96e323 Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Mon May 17 11:43:16 2021 +0000 +Date: Fri Jul 9 09:55:56 2021 +0000 - upstream: fix breakage of -W forwaring introduced in 1.554; reported by + upstream: silence redundant error message; reported by Fabian Stelzer - naddy@ and sthen@, ok sthen@ + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 9349a703016579a60557dafd03af2fe1d44e6aa2 + +commit e86097813419b49d5bff5c4b51d1c3a5d4d2d804 +Author: John Ericson +Date: Sat Dec 26 11:40:49 2020 -0500 + + Re-indent krb5 section after pkg-config addition. + +commit 32dd2daa56c294e40ff7efea482c9eac536d8cbb +Author: John Ericson +Date: Sat Dec 26 11:40:49 2020 -0500 + + Support finding Kerberos via pkg-config - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: f72558e643a26dc4150cff6e5097b5502f6c85fd + This makes cross compilation easier. -commit afea01381ad1fcea1543b133040f75f7542257e6 +commit def7a72234d7e4f684d72d33a0f7229f9eee0aa4 +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Fri Jul 9 14:34:06 2021 +1000 + + Update comments about EGD to include prngd. + +commit b5d23150b4e3368f4983fd169d432c07afeee45a Author: dtucker@openbsd.org -Date: Mon May 17 07:22:45 2021 +0000 +Date: Mon Jul 5 01:21:07 2021 +0000 - upstream: Regenerate moduli. + upstream: Fix a couple of whitespace things. Portable already has - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 83c93a2a07c584c347ac6114d6329b18ce515557 + these so this removes two diffs between the two. + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 769f017ebafd8e741e337b3e9e89eb5ac73c9c56 -commit be2866d6207b090615ff083c9ef212b603816a56 -Author: Damien Miller -Date: Mon May 17 09:40:23 2021 +1000 +commit 8f57be9f279b8e905f9883066aa633c7e67b31cf +Author: dtucker@openbsd.org +Date: Mon Jul 5 01:16:46 2021 +0000 - Handle Android libc returning NULL pw->pw_passwd + upstream: Order includes as per style(9). Portable already has - Reported by Luke Dashjr + these so this removes a handful of diffs between the two. + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 8bd7452d809b199c19bfc49511a798f414eb4a77 -commit 5953c143008259d87342fb5155bd0b8835ba88e5 -Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Fri May 14 05:20:32 2021 +0000 +commit b75624f8733b3ed9e240f86cac5d4a39dae11848 +Author: dtucker@openbsd.org +Date: Mon Jul 5 00:50:25 2021 +0000 - upstream: fix previous: test saved no_shell_flag, not the one that just + upstream: Remove comment referencing now-removed - got clobbered + RhostsRSAAuthentication. ok djm@ - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: b8deace085d9d941b2d02f810243b9c302e5355d + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 3d864bfbd99a1d4429a58e301688f3be464827a9 -commit 1e9fa55f4dc4b334651d569d3448aaa3841f736f +commit b67eb12f013c5441bb4f0893a97533582ad4eb13 Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Fri May 14 03:09:48 2021 +0000 +Date: Mon Jul 5 00:25:42 2021 +0000 - upstream: Fix ssh started with ControlPersist incorrectly executing a + upstream: allow spaces to appear in usernames for local to remote, - shell when the -N (no shell) option was specified. bz3290 reported by Richard - Schwab; patch from markus@ ok me + and scp -3 remote to remote copies. with & ok dtucker bz#1164 - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: ea1ea4af16a95687302f7690bdbe36a6aabf87e1 + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: e9b550f3a85ffbb079b6720833da31317901d6dd -commit d1320c492f655d8f5baef8c93899d79dded217a5 +commit 8c4ef0943e574f614fc7c6c7e427fd81ee64ab87 Author: dtucker@openbsd.org -Date: Wed May 12 11:34:30 2021 +0000 +Date: Fri Jul 2 07:20:44 2021 +0000 - upstream: Clarify language about moduli. While both ends of the + upstream: Remove obsolete comments about SSHv1 auth methods. ok - connection do need to use the same parameters (ie groups), the DH-GEX - protocol takes care of that and both ends do not need the same contents in - the moduli file, which is what the previous text suggested. ok djm@ jmc@ + djm@ - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: f0c18cc8e79c2fbf537a432a9070ed94e96a622a + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 6060f70966f362d8eb4bec3da2f6c4712fbfb98f -commit d3cc4d650ce3e59f3e370b101778b0e8f1c02c4d -Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Fri May 7 04:11:51 2021 +0000 +commit 88908c9b61bcb99f16e8d398fc41e2b3b4be2003 +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Sat Jul 3 23:00:19 2021 +1000 - upstream: include pid in LogVerbose spam + Remove reference to ChallengeResponse. - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: aacb86f96ee90c7cb84ec27452374285f89a7f00 + challenge_response_authentication was removed from the struct, keeping + kbd_interactive_authentication. -commit e3c032333be5fdbbaf2751f6f478e044922b4ec4 -Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Fri May 7 03:09:38 2021 +0000 +commit 321874416d610ad2158ce6112f094a4862c2e37f +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Sat Jul 3 20:38:09 2021 +1000 - upstream: don't sigdie() in signal handler in privsep child process; - - this can end up causing sandbox violations per bz3286; ok dtucker@ - - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: a7f40b2141dca4287920da68ede812bff7ccfdda + Move signal.h up include order to match upstream. -commit a4039724a3f2abac810735fc95cf9114a3856049 -Author: dtucker@openbsd.org -Date: Fri May 7 09:23:40 2021 +0000 +commit 4fa83e2d0e32c2dd758653e0359984bbf1334f32 +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Sat Jul 3 20:36:06 2021 +1000 - upstream: Increase ConnectionAttempts from 4 to 10 as the tests + Remove old OpenBSD version marker. - occasionally time out on heavily loaded hosts. + Looks like an accidental leftover from a sync. + +commit 9d5e31f55d5f3899b72645bac41a932d298ad73b +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Sat Jul 3 20:34:19 2021 +1000 + + Remove duplicate error on error path. - OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 29a8cdef354fc9da471a301f7f65184770434f3a + There's an extra error() call on the listen error path, it looks like + its removal was missed during an upstream sync. -commit c0d7e36e979fa3cdb60f5dcb6ac9ad3fd018543b -Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Fri May 7 02:26:55 2021 +0000 +commit 888c459925c7478ce22ff206c9ac1fb812a40caf +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Sat Jul 3 20:32:46 2021 +1000 - upstream: dump out a usable private key string too; inspired by Tyson + Remove some whitespace not in upstream. - Whitehead + Reduces diff vs OpenBSD by a small amount. + +commit 4d2d4d47a18d93f3e0a91a241a6fdb545bbf7dc2 +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Sat Jul 3 19:27:43 2021 +1000 + + Replace remaining references to ChallengeResponse. - OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 65572d5333801cb2f650ebc778cbdc955e372058 + Portable had a few additional references to ChallengeResponse related to + UsePAM, replaces these with equivalent keyboard-interactive ones. -commit 24fee8973abdf1c521cd2c0047d89e86d9c3fc38 -Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Fri May 7 02:29:40 2021 +0000 +commit 53237ac789183946dac6dcb8838bc3b6b9b43be1 +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Sat Jul 3 19:23:28 2021 +1000 - upstream: correct mistake in spec - the private key blobs are encoded + Sync remaining ChallengeResponse removal. - verbatim and not as strings (i.e. no 4-byte length header) + These were omitted from commit 88868fd131. + +commit 2c9e4b319f7e98744b188b0f58859d431def343b +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Sat Jul 3 19:17:31 2021 +1000 + + Disable rocky84 to figure out why agent test fails + +commit bfe19197a92b7916f64a121fbd3c179abf15e218 +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Fri Jul 2 15:43:28 2021 +1000 + + Remove now-unused SSHv1 enums. - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 3606b5d443d72118c5b76c4af6dd87a5d5a4f837 + sRhostsRSAAuthentication and sRSAAuthentication are protocol 1 options + and are no longer used. -commit f43859159cc62396ad5d080f0b1f2635a67dac02 +commit c73b02d92d72458a5312bd098f32ce88868fd131 Author: dtucker@openbsd.org -Date: Tue May 4 22:53:52 2021 +0000 +Date: Fri Jul 2 05:11:20 2021 +0000 - upstream: Don't pass NULL as a string in debugging as it does not work + upstream: Remove references to ChallengeResponseAuthentication in - on some platforms in -portable. ok djm@ + favour of KbdInteractiveAuthentication. The former is what was in SSHv1, the + latter is what is in SSHv2 (RFC4256) and they were treated as somewhat but + not entirely equivalent. We retain the old name as deprecated alias so + config files continue to work and a reference in the man page for people + looking for it. - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 937c892c99aa3c9c272a8ed78fa7c2aba3a44fc9 + Prompted by bz#3303 which pointed out the discrepancy between the two + when used with Match. Man page help & ok jmc@, with & ok djm@ + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 2c1bff8e5c9852cfcdab1f3ea94dfef5a22f3b7e -commit ac31aa3c6341905935e75f0539cf4a61bbe99779 -Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Mon May 3 00:16:45 2021 +0000 +commit f841fc9c8c7568a3b5d84a4cc0cefacb7dbc16b9 +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Fri Jul 2 15:20:32 2021 +1000 - upstream: more debugging for UpdateHostKeys signature failures + Fix ifdefs around get_random_bytes_prngd. - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 1ee95f03875e1725df15d5e4bea3e73493d57d36 + get_random_bytes_prngd() is used if either of PRNGD_PORT or PRNGD_SOCKET + are defined, so adjust ifdef accordingly. -commit 8e32e97e788e0676ce83018a742203614df6a2b3 +commit 0767627cf66574484b9c0834500b42ea04fe528a +Author: Damien Miller +Date: Fri Jul 2 14:30:23 2021 +1000 + + wrap get_random_bytes_prngd() in ifdef + + avoid unused static function warning + +commit f93fdc4de158386efe1116bd44c5b3f4a7a82c25 Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Sat May 1 20:07:47 2021 +1000 +Date: Mon Jun 28 13:06:37 2021 +1000 - Add obsd69 test target. + Add rocky84 test target. -commit f06893063597c5bb9d9e93f851c4070e77d2fba9 +commit d443006c0ddfa7f6a5bd9c0ae92036f3d5f2fa3b Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Fri Apr 30 04:29:53 2021 +0000 +Date: Fri Jun 25 06:30:22 2021 +0000 - upstream: a little debugging in the main mux process for status + upstream: fix decoding of X.509 subject name; from Leif Thuresson - confirmation failures in multiplexed sessions + via bz3327 ok markus@ - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 6e27b87c95176107597035424e1439c3232bcb49 + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 0ea2e28f39750dd388b7e317bc43dd997a217ae8 -commit e65cf00da6bc31e5f54603b7feb7252dc018c033 +commit 2a5704ec142202d387fda2d6872fd4715ab81347 Author: dtucker@openbsd.org -Date: Fri Apr 30 04:02:52 2021 +0000 +Date: Fri Jun 25 06:20:39 2021 +0000 - upstream: Remove now-unused skey function prototypes leftover from + upstream: Use better language to refer to the user. From l1ving - skey removal. + via github PR#250, ok jmc@ - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 2fc36d519fd37c6f10ce74854c628561555a94c3 + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 07ca3526626996613e128aeddf7748c93c4d6bbf + +commit 4bdf7a04797a0ea1c431a9d54588417c29177d19 +Author: dtucker@openbsd.org +Date: Fri Jun 25 03:38:17 2021 +0000 + + upstream: Replace SIGCHLD/notify_pipe kludge with pselect. + + Previously sshd's SIGCHLD handler would wake up select() by writing a + byte to notify_pipe. We can remove this by blocking SIGCHLD, checking + for child terminations then passing the original signal mask through + to pselect. This ensures that the pselect will immediately wake up if + a child terminates between wait()ing on them and the pselect. + + In -portable, for platforms that do not have pselect the kludge is still + there but is hidden behind a pselect interface. + + Based on other changes for bz#2158, ok djm@ + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 202c85de0b3bdf1744fe53529a05404c5480d813 + +commit c9f7bba2e6f70b7ac1f5ea190d890cb5162ce127 +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Fri Jun 25 15:08:18 2021 +1000 + + Move closefrom() to before first malloc. + + When built against tcmalloc, tcmalloc allocates a descriptor for its + internal use, so calling closefrom() afterward causes the descriptor + number to be reused resulting in a corrupted connection. Moving the + closefrom a little earlier should resolve this. From kircherlike at + outlook.com via bz#3321, ok djm@ -commit ae5f9b0d5c8126214244ee6b35aae29c21028133 +commit 7ebfe4e439853b88997c9cfc2ff703408a1cca92 Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Thu Apr 29 13:01:50 2021 +1000 +Date: Fri Jun 18 20:41:45 2021 +1000 - Wrap sntrup761x25519 inside ifdef. + Put second -lssh in link line for sftp-server. - From balu.gajjala at gmail.com via bz#3306. + When building --without-openssl the recent port-prngd.c change adds + a dependency on atomicio, but since nothing else in sftp-server uses + it, the linker may not find it. Add a second -lssh similar to other + binaries. -commit 70a8dc138a6480f85065cdb239915ad4b7f928cf +commit e409d7966785cfd9f5970e66a820685c42169717 Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Wed Apr 28 14:44:07 2021 +1000 +Date: Fri Jun 18 18:34:08 2021 +1000 - Add status badges for Actions-based tests. + Try EGD/PRNGD if random device fails. + + When built --without-openssl, try EGD/PRGGD (if configured) as a last + resort before failing. -commit 40b59024cc3365815381474cdf4fe423102e391b +commit e43a898043faa3a965dbaa1193cc60e0b479033d Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Wed Apr 28 12:22:11 2021 +1000 +Date: Fri Jun 18 18:32:51 2021 +1000 - Add obsdsnap (OpenBSD snapshot) test target. + Split EGD/PRNGD interface into its own file. + + This will allow us to use it when building --without-openssl. -commit e627067ec8ef9ae8e7a638f4dbac91d52dee3e6d +commit acb2887a769a1b1912cfd7067f3ce04fad240260 Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Wed Apr 28 11:35:28 2021 +1000 +Date: Thu Jun 17 21:03:19 2021 +1000 - Add test building upstream OpenBSD source. + Handle GIDs > 2^31 in getgrouplist. + + When compiled in 32bit mode, the getgrouplist implementation may fail + for GIDs greater than LONG_MAX. Analysis and change from ralf.winkel + at tui.com. -commit 1b8108ebd12fc4ed0fb39ef94c5ba122558ac373 -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Tue Apr 27 14:22:20 2021 +1000 +commit 31fac20c941126281b527605b73bff30a8f02edd +Author: dtucker@openbsd.org +Date: Thu Jun 10 09:46:28 2021 +0000 - Test against OpenSSL 1.1.0h instead of 1.1.0g. + upstream: Use $SUDO when reading sshd's pidfile here too. - 1.1.0g requires a perl glob module that's not installed by default. + OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 6bfb0d455d493f24839034a629c5306f84dbd409 -commit 9bc20efd39ce8525be33df3ee009f5a4564224f1 -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Tue Apr 27 12:37:59 2021 +1000 +commit a3a58acffc8cc527f8fc6729486d34e4c3d27643 +Author: dtucker@openbsd.org +Date: Thu Jun 10 09:43:51 2021 +0000 - Use the default VM type for libcrypto ver tests. + upstream: Use $SUDO when reading sshd's pidfile in case it was + + created with a very restrictive umask. This resyncs with -portable. + + OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 07fd2af06df759d4f64b82c59094accca1076a5d -commit 9f79e80dc40965c2e73164531250b83b176c1eea -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Tue Apr 27 12:24:10 2021 +1000 +commit 249ad4ae51cd3bc235e75a4846eccdf8b1416611 +Author: dtucker@openbsd.org +Date: Thu Jun 10 09:37:59 2021 +0000 - Always build OpenSSL shared. + upstream: Set umask when creating hostkeys to prevent excessive - This is the default for current versions but we need it to test against - earlier versions. + permissions warning. + + OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 382841db0ee28dfef7f7bffbd511803e1b8ab0ef -commit b3cc9fbdff2782eca79e33e02ac22450dc63bce9 -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Tue Apr 27 09:18:02 2021 +1000 +commit 9d0892153c005cc65897e9372b01fa66fcbe2842 +Author: dtucker@openbsd.org +Date: Thu Jun 10 03:45:31 2021 +0000 - Fix custom OpenSSL tests. + upstream: Add regress test for SIGHUP restart - Check out specified OpenSSL version. Install custom libcrypto where - configure expects to find it. Remove unneeded OpenSSL config time - options. Older OpenSSL versions were not make -j safe so remove it. + while handling active and unauthenticated clients. Should catch anything + similar to the pselect bug just fixed in sshd.c. + + OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 3b3c19b5e75e43af1ebcb9586875b3ae3a4cac73 -commit 77532609874a99a19e3e2eb2d1b7fa93aef963bb -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Mon Apr 26 17:18:25 2021 +1000 +commit 73f6f191f44440ca3049b9d3c8e5401d10b55097 +Author: dtucker@openbsd.org +Date: Thu Jun 10 03:14:14 2021 +0000 - Export CC and CFLAGS for c89 test. + upstream: Continue accept loop when pselect + + returns -1, eg if it was interrupted by a signal. This should prevent + the hang discovered by sthen@ wherein sshd receives a SIGHUP while it has + an unauthenticated child and goes on to a blocking read on a notify_pipe. + feedback deraadt@, ok djm@ + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 0243c1c5544fca0974dae92cd4079543a3fceaa0 -commit 33f62dfbe865f4de77980ab88774bf1eb5e4e040 -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Mon Apr 26 17:13:44 2021 +1000 +commit c785c0ae134a8e8b5c82b2193f64c632a98159e4 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Tue Jun 8 22:30:27 2021 +0000 - Add c89 here too. + upstream: test that UserKnownHostsFile correctly accepts multiple + + arguments; would have caught readconf.c r1.356 regression + + OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 71ca54e66c2a0211b04999263e56390b1f323a6a -commit da9d59f526fce58e11cba49cd8eb011dc0bf5677 -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Mon Apr 26 15:34:23 2021 +1000 +commit 1a6f6b08e62c78906a3032e8d9a83e721c84574e +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Tue Jun 8 22:06:12 2021 +0000 - Add test against OpenSSL w/out ECC. + upstream: fix regression in r1.356: for ssh_config options that + + accepted multiple string arguments, ssh was only recording the first. + Reported by Lucas via bugs@ + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 7cbf182f7449bf1cb7c5b4452667dc2b41170d6d -commit 29e194a752359ebf85bf7fce100f23a0477fc4de -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Mon Apr 26 14:49:59 2021 +1000 +commit 78e30af3e2b2dd540a341cc827c6b98dd8b0a6de +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Tue Jun 8 07:40:12 2021 +0000 - Ensure we can still build with C89. + upstream: test argv_split() optional termination on comments + + OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 9fd1c4a27a409897437c010cfd79c54b639a059c -commit a38016d369d21df5d35f761f2b67e175e132ba22 -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Mon Apr 26 14:29:03 2021 +1000 +commit a023138957ea2becf1c7f93fcc42b0aaac6f2b03 +Author: dtucker@openbsd.org +Date: Tue Jun 8 07:05:27 2021 +0000 - Interop test agains PuTTY. + upstream: Add testcases from bz#3319 for IPQoS and TunnelDevice + + being overridden on the command line. + + OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 801674d5d2d02abd58274a78cab2711f11de14a8 -commit 095b0307a77be8803768857cc6c0963fa52ed85b -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Mon Apr 26 14:02:03 2021 +1000 +commit 660cea10b2cdc11f13ba99c89b1bbb368a4d9ff2 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Tue Jun 8 06:52:43 2021 +0000 - Support testing against arbitary libcrytpo vers. + upstream: sprinkle some "# comment" at end of configuration lines - Add tests against various LibreSSL and OpenSSL versions. + to test comment handling + + OpenBSD-Regress-ID: cb82fbf40bda5c257a9f742c63b1798e5a8fdda7 -commit b16082aa110fa7128ece2a9037ff420c4a285317 -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Mon Apr 26 13:35:44 2021 +1000 +commit acc9c32dcb6def6c7d3688bceb4c0e59bd26b411 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Tue Jun 8 06:51:47 2021 +0000 - Add fbsd10 test target. + upstream: more descriptive failure message + + OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 5300f6faf1d9e99c0cd10827b51756c5510e3509 -commit 2c805f16b24ea37cc051c6018fcb05defab6e57a -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Sun Apr 25 14:15:02 2021 +1000 +commit ce04dd4eae23d1c9cf7c424a702f48ee78573bc1 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Mon Jun 7 01:16:34 2021 +0000 - Disable compiler hardening on nbsd4. + upstream: test AuthenticationMethods inside a Match block as well - The system compiler supports -fstack-protector-all, but using it will - result in an internal compiler error on some files. + as in the main config section + + OpenBSD-Regress-ID: ebe0a686621b7cb8bb003ac520975279c28747f7 -commit 6a5d39305649da5dff1934ee54292ee0cebd579d -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Sun Apr 25 13:01:34 2021 +1000 +commit 9018bd821fca17e26e92f7a7e51d9b24cd62f2db +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Mon Jun 7 00:00:50 2021 +0000 - Add nbsd3, nbsd4 and nbsd9 test targets. + upstream: prepare for stricter sshd_config parsing that will refuse + + a config that has {Allow,Deny}{Users,Groups} on a line with no subsequent + arguments. Such lines are permitted but are nonsensical noops ATM + + OpenBSD-Regress-ID: ef65463fcbc0bd044e27f3fe400ea56eb4b8f650 -commit d1aed05bd2e4ae70f359a394dc60a2d96b88f78c -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Sat Apr 24 22:03:46 2021 +1000 +commit a10f929d1ce80640129fc5b6bc1acd9bf689169e +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Tue Jun 8 07:09:42 2021 +0000 - Comment out nbsd2 test target for now. + upstream: switch sshd_config parsing to argv_split() + + similar to the previous commit, this switches sshd_config parsing to + the newer tokeniser. Config parsing will be a little stricter wrt + quote correctness and directives appearing without arguments. + + feedback and ok markus@ + + tested in snaps for the last five or so days - thanks Theo and those who + caught bugs + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 9c4305631d20c2d194661504ce11e1f68b20d93e -commit a6b4ec94e5bd5a8a18cd2c9942d829d2e5698837 -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Sat Apr 24 17:52:24 2021 +1000 +commit ea9e45c89a4822d74a9d97fef8480707d584da4d +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Tue Jun 8 07:07:15 2021 +0000 - Add OPENBSD ORIGINAL marker. + upstream: Switch ssh_config parsing to use argv_split() + + This fixes a couple of problems with the previous tokeniser, + strdelim() + + 1. strdelim() is permissive wrt accepting '=' characters. This is + intended to allow it to tokenise "Option=value" but because it + cannot keep state, it will incorrectly split "Opt=val=val2". + 2. strdelim() has rudimentry handling of quoted strings, but it + is incomplete and inconsistent. E.g. it doesn't handle escaped + quotes inside a quoted string. + 3. It has no support for stopping on a (unquoted) comment. Because + of this readconf.c r1.343 added chopping of lines at '#', but + this caused a regression because these characters may legitimately + appear inside quoted strings. + + The new tokeniser is stricter is a number of cases, including #1 above + but previously it was also possible for some directives to appear + without arguments. AFAIK these were nonsensical in all cases, and the + new tokeniser refuses to accept them. + + The new code handles quotes much better, permitting quoted space as + well as escaped closing quotes. Finally, comment handling should be + fixed - the tokeniser will terminate only on unquoted # characters. + + feedback & ok markus@ + + tested in snaps for the last five or so days - thanks Theo and those who + caught bugs + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: dc72fd12af9d5398f4d9e159d671f9269c5b14d5 -commit 3737c9f66ee590255546c4b637b6d2be669a11eb -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Fri Apr 23 19:49:46 2021 +1000 +commit d786424986c04d1d375f231fda177c8408e05c3e +Author: dtucker@openbsd.org +Date: Tue Jun 8 07:02:46 2021 +0000 - Replace "==" (a bashism) with "=". + upstream: Check if IPQoS or TunnelDevice are already set before + + overriding. Prevents values in config files from overriding values supplied + on the command line. bz#3319, ok markus. + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: f3b08b898c324debb9195e6865d8999406938f74 -commit a116b6f5be17a1dd345b7d54bf8aa3779a28a0df -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Fri Apr 23 16:34:48 2021 +1000 +commit aae4b4d3585b9f944d7dbd3c9e5ba0006c55e457 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Tue Jun 8 06:54:40 2021 +0000 - Add nbsd2 test target. + upstream: Allow argv_split() to optionally terminate tokenisation + + when it encounters an unquoted comment. + + Add some additional utility function for working with argument + vectors, since we'll be switching to using them to parse + ssh/sshd_config shortly. + + ok markus@ as part of a larger diff; tested in snaps + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: fd9c108cef2f713f24e3bc5848861d221bb3a1ac -commit 196bf2a9bb771f45d9b0429cee7d325962233c44 +commit da9f9acaac5bab95dca642b48e0c8182b246ab69 Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Fri Apr 23 14:54:10 2021 +1000 +Date: Mon Jun 7 19:19:23 2021 +1000 - Add obsd68 test target. + Save logs on failure for upstream test -commit e3ba6574ed69e8b7af725cf5e8a9edaac04ff077 +commit 76883c60161e5f3808787085a27a8c37f8cc4e08 Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Fri Apr 23 14:53:32 2021 +1000 +Date: Mon Jun 7 14:36:32 2021 +1000 - Remove dependency on bash. + Add obsdsnap-i386 upstream test target. -commit db1f9ab8feb838aee9f5b99c6fd3f211355dfdcf -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Fri Apr 23 14:41:13 2021 +1000 +commit d45b9c63f947ec5ec314696e70281f6afddc0ac3 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Mon Jun 7 03:38:38 2021 +0000 - Add obsd67 test target. + upstream: fix debug message when finding a private key to match a + + certificate being attempted for user authentication. Previously it would + print the certificate's path, whereas it was supposed to be showing the + private key's path. Patch from Alex Sherwin via GHPR247 + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: d5af3be66d0f22c371dc1fe6195e774a18b2327b -commit c039a6bf79192fe1daa9ddcc7c87dd98e258ae7c -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Fri Apr 23 11:08:23 2021 +1000 +commit 530739d42f6102668aecd699be0ce59815c1eceb +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Sun Jun 6 11:34:16 2021 +0000 - Re-add macos-11.0 test target. + upstream: Match host certificates against host public keys, not private + + keys. Allows use of certificates with private keys held in a ssh-agent. + Reported by Miles Zhou in bz3524; ok dtucker@ + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 25f5bf70003126d19162862d9eb380bf34bac22a -commit a6db3a47b56adb76870d59225ffb90a65bc4daf2 -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Fri Apr 23 10:28:28 2021 +1000 +commit 4265215d7300901fd7097061c7517688ade82f8e +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Sun Jun 6 03:40:39 2021 +0000 - Add openindiana test target. + upstream: Client-side workaround for a bug in OpenSSH 7.4: this release + + allows RSA/SHA2 signatures for public key authentication but fails to + advertise this correctly via SSH2_MSG_EXT_INFO. This causes clients of these + server to incorrectly match PubkeyAcceptedAlgorithms and potentially refuse + to offer valid keys. + + Reported by and based on patch from Gordon Messmer via bz3213, thanks + also for additional analysis by Jakub Jelen. ok dtucker + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: d6d0b7351d5d44c45f3daaa26efac65847a564f7 -commit 3fe7e73b025c07eda46d78049f1da8ed7dfc0c69 -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Fri Apr 23 10:26:35 2021 +1000 +commit bda270d7fb8522d43c21a79a4b02a052d7c64de8 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Sun Jun 6 03:17:02 2021 +0000 - Test krb5 on Solaris 11 too. + upstream: degrade gracefully if a sftp-server offers the + + limits@openssh.com extension but fails when the client tries to invoke it. + Reported by Hector Martin via bz3318 + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: bd9d1839c41811616ede4da467e25746fcd9b967 -commit f57fbfe5eb02df1a91f1a237c4d27165afd87c13 -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Thu Apr 22 22:27:26 2021 +1000 +commit d345d5811afdc2d6923019b653cdd93c4cc95f76 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Sun Jun 6 03:15:39 2021 +0000 - Don't always set SUDO. + upstream: the limits@openssh.com extension was incorrectly marked - Rely on sourcing configs to set as appropriate. + as an operation that writes to the filesystem, which made it unavailable in + sftp-server read-only mode. Spotted by Hector Martin via bz3318 + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: f054465230787e37516c4b57098fc7975e00f067 -commit e428f29402fb6ac140b52f8f12e06ece7bb104a0 -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Thu Apr 22 22:26:08 2021 +1000 +commit 2b71010d9b43d7b8c9ec1bf010beb00d98fa765a +Author: naddy@openbsd.org +Date: Sat Jun 5 13:47:00 2021 +0000 - Remove now-unused 2nd arg to configs. + upstream: PROTOCOL.certkeys: update reference from IETF draft to + + RFC + + Also fix some typos. + ok djm@ + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 5e855b6c5a22b5b13f8ffa3897a868e40d349b44 -commit cb4ff640d79b3c736879582139778f016bbb2cd7 +commit aa99b2d9a3e45b943196914e8d8bf086646fdb54 Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Wed Apr 21 01:08:04 2021 +1000 +Date: Fri Jun 4 23:41:29 2021 +1000 - Add win10 test target. + Clear notify_pipe from readset if present. + + Prevents leaking an implementation detail to the caller. -commit 4457837238072836b2fa3107d603aac809624983 +commit 6de8dadf6b4d0627d35bca0667ca44b1d61c2c6b Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Tue Apr 20 23:31:29 2021 +1000 +Date: Fri Jun 4 23:24:25 2021 +1000 - Add nbsd8 test target. + space->tabs. -commit bd4fba22e14da2fa196009010aabec5a8ba9dd42 +commit c8677065070ee34c05c7582a9c2f58d8642e552d Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Sat Apr 17 09:55:47 2021 +1000 +Date: Fri Jun 4 18:39:48 2021 +1000 - Add obsd51 target. + Add pselect implementation for platforms without. + + This is basically the existing notify_pipe kludge from serverloop.c + moved behind a pselect interface. It works by installing a signal + handler that writes to a pipe that the select is watching, then calls + the original handler. + + The select call in serverloop will become pselect soon, at which point the + kludge will be removed from thereand will only exist in the compat layer. + Original code by markus, help from djm. -commit 9403d0e805c77a5741ea8c3281bbe92558c2f125 -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Fri Apr 16 18:14:25 2021 +1000 +commit 7cd7f302d3a072748299f362f9e241d81fcecd26 +Author: Vincent Brillault +Date: Sun May 24 09:15:06 2020 +0200 - Add fbsd13 target. + auth_log: dont log partial successes as failures + + By design, 'partial' logins are successful logins, so initially with + authenticated set to 1, for which another authentication is required. As + a result, authenticated is always reset to 0 when partial is set to 1. + However, even if authenticated is 0, those are not failed login + attempts, similarly to attempts with authctxt->postponed set to 1. -commit e86968280e358e62649d268d41f698d64d0dc9fa -Author: Damien Miller -Date: Fri Apr 16 13:55:25 2021 +1000 +commit e7606919180661edc7f698e6a1b4ef2cfb363ebf +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Fri Jun 4 06:19:07 2021 +0000 - depend + upstream: The RB_GENERATE_STATIC(3) macro expands to a series of + + function definitions and not a statement, so there should be no semicolon + following them. Patch from Michael Forney + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: c975dd180580f0bdc0a4d5b7d41ab1f5e9b7bedd -commit 2fb25ca11e8b281363a2a2a4dec4c497a1475d9a -Author: Damien Miller -Date: Fri Apr 16 13:53:02 2021 +1000 +commit c298c4da574ab92df2f051561aeb3e106b0ec954 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Fri Jun 4 05:59:18 2021 +0000 - crank version in README and RPM spec files + upstream: rework authorized_keys example section, removing irrelevant + + stuff, de-wrapping the example lines and better aligning the examples with + common usage and FAQs; ok jmc + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: d59f1c9281f828148e2a2e49eb9629266803b75c -commit b2b60ebab0cb77b5bc02d364d72e13db882f33ae +commit d9cb35bbec5f623589d7c58fc094817b33030f35 Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Fri Apr 16 03:42:00 2021 +0000 +Date: Fri Jun 4 05:10:03 2021 +0000 - upstream: openssh-8.6 + upstream: adjust SetEnv description to clarify $TERM handling - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: b5f3e133c846127ec114812248bc17eff07c3e19 + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 8b8cc0124856bc1094949d55615e5c44390bcb22 -commit faf2b86a46c9281d237bcdec18c99e94a4eb820a -Author: markus@openbsd.org -Date: Thu Apr 15 16:24:31 2021 +0000 +commit 771f57a8626709f2ad207058efd68fbf30d31553 +Author: dtucker@openbsd.org +Date: Fri Jun 4 05:09:08 2021 +0000 - upstream: do not pass file/func to monitor; noted by Ilja van Sprundel; + upstream: Switch the listening select loop from select() to - ok djm@ + pselect() and mask signals while checking signal flags, umasking for pselect + and restoring afterwards. Also restore signals before sighup_restart so they + don't remain blocked after restart. - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 85ae5c063845c410283cbdce685515dcd19479fa - -commit 2dc328023f60212cd29504fc05d849133ae47355 -Author: Damien Miller -Date: Wed Apr 14 11:42:55 2021 +1000 - - sshd don't exit on transient read errors + This prevents a race where a SIGTERM or SIGHUP can arrive between + checking the flag and calling select (eg if sshd is processing a + new connection) resulting in sshd not shutting down until the next + time it receives a new connection. bz#2158, with & ok djm@ - openssh-8.5 introduced a regression that would cause sshd to exit - because of transient read errors on the network socket (e.g. EINTR, - EAGAIN). Reported by balu.gajjala AT gmail.com via bz3297 + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: bf85bf880fd78e00d7478657644fcda97b9a936f -commit d5d6b7d76d171a2e6861609dcd92e714ee62ad88 -Author: Damien Miller -Date: Sat Apr 10 18:45:00 2021 +1000 +commit f64f8c00d158acc1359b8a096835849b23aa2e86 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Fri Jun 4 05:02:40 2021 +0000 - perform report_failed_grab() inline + upstream: allow ssh_config SetEnv to override $TERM, which is otherwise + + handled specially by the protocol. Useful in ~/.ssh/config to set TERM to + something generic (e.g. "xterm" instead of "xterm-256color") for destinations + that lack terminfo entries. feedback and ok dtucker@ + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 38b1ef4d5bc159c7d9d589d05e3017433e2d5758 -commit ea996ce2d023aa3c6d31125e2c3ebda1cb42db8c -Author: Damien Miller -Date: Sat Apr 10 18:22:57 2021 +1000 +commit 60107677dc0ce1e93c61f23c433ad54687fcd9f5 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Fri Jun 4 04:02:21 2021 +0000 - dedicated gnome-ssk-askpass3 source + upstream: correct extension name "no-presence-required" => - Compatibility with Wayland requires that we use the gdk_seat_grab() - API for grabbing mouse/keyboard, however these API don't exist in - Gtk+2. + "no-touch-required" - This branches gnome-ssk-askpass2.c => gnome-ssk-askpass3.c and - makes the changes to use the gdk_seat_grab() instead of grabbing - mouse/focus separately via GDK. + document "verify-required" option - In the future, we can also use the branched file to avoid some - API that has been soft-deprecated in GTK+3, e.g. gtk_widget_modify_fg + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 1879ff4062cf61d79b515e433aff0bf49a6c55c5 -commit bfa5405da05d906ffd58216eb77c4375b62d64c2 +commit ecc186e46e3e30f27539b4311366dfda502f0a08 Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Thu Apr 8 15:18:15 2021 +1000 +Date: Wed Jun 2 13:54:11 2021 +1000 - Ensure valgrind-out exists. + Retire fbsd7 test target. - Normally the regress tests would create it, but running the unit tests - on their own would fail because the directory did not exist. + It's the slowest of the selfhosted targets (since it's 32bit but has + most of the crypto algos). We still have coverage for 32bit i386. -commit 1f189181f3ea09a9b08aa866f78843fec800874f +commit 5de0867b822ec48b5eec9abde0f5f95d1d646546 Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Thu Apr 8 15:17:19 2021 +1000 +Date: Wed Jun 2 11:21:40 2021 +1000 - Pass OBJ to unit test make invocation. - - At least the Valgrind unit tests uses $OBJ. + Check for $OPENSSL in md5 fallback too. -commit f42b550c281d28bd19e9dd6ce65069164f3482b0 +commit 1db69d1b6542f8419c04cee7fd523a4a11004be2 Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Thu Apr 8 14:20:12 2021 +1000 +Date: Wed Jun 2 11:17:54 2021 +1000 - Add pattern for valgrind-unit. + Add dfly60 target. -commit 19e534462710e98737478fd9c44768b50c27c4c6 -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Thu Apr 8 13:31:08 2021 +1000 +commit a3f2dd955f1c19cad387a139f0e719af346ca6ef +Author: dtucker@openbsd.org +Date: Wed Jun 2 00:17:45 2021 +0000 - Run unit tests under valgrind. + upstream: Merge back shell portability changes - Run a separate build for the unit tests under Valgrind. They take long - enough that running in parallel with the other Valgrind tests helps. - -commit 80032102d05e866dc2a48a5caf760cf42c2e090e -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Thu Apr 8 13:25:57 2021 +1000 - - ifdef out MIN and MAX. + bringing it back in sync with -portable. - In -portable, defines.h ensures that these are defined, so redefining - potentially causes a warning. We don't just delete it to make any - future code syncs a little but easier. bz#3293. + OpenBSD-Regress-ID: c07905ba931e66ad7d849b87b7d19648007175d1 -commit d1bd184046bc310c405f45da3614a1dc5b3e521a -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Wed Apr 7 10:23:51 2021 +1000 +commit 9d482295c9f073e84d75af46b720a1c0f7ec2867 +Author: dtucker@openbsd.org +Date: Tue Jun 1 23:56:20 2021 +0000 - Remove only use of warn(). + upstream: Use a default value for $OPENSSL, - The warn() function is only used in one place in portable and does not - exist upstream. Upgrade the only instance it's used to fail() - (the privsep/sandbox+proxyconnect, from back when that was new) and - remove the now-unused function. - -commit fea8f4b1aa85026ad5aee5ad8e1599a8d5141fe0 -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Wed Apr 7 10:18:32 2021 +1000 - - Move make_tmpdir() into portable-specific area. + allowing it to be overridden. Do the same in the PuTTY tests since it's + needed there and not exported by test-exec.sh. - Reduces diff vs OpenBSD and makes it more likely diffs will apply - cleanly. + OpenBSD-Regress-ID: c49dcd6aa7602a8606b7afa192196ca1fa65de16 -commit 13e5fa2acffd26e754c6ee1d070d0afd035d4cb7 +commit 07660b3c99f8ea74ddf4a440e55c16c9f7fb3dd1 Author: dtucker@openbsd.org -Date: Tue Apr 6 23:57:56 2021 +0000 +Date: Mon May 24 10:25:18 2021 +0000 - upstream: Add TEST_SSH_ELAPSED_TIMES environment variable to print the + upstream: Find openssl binary via environment variable. This - elapsed time in seconds of each test. This depends on "date +%s" which is - not specified by POSIX but is commonly implemented. + allows overriding if necessary (eg in -portable where we're testing against a + specific version of OpenSSL). - OpenBSD-Regress-ID: ec3c8c19ff49b2192116a0a646ee7c9b944e8a9c + OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 491f39cae9e762c71aa4bf045803d077139815c5 -commit ef4f46ab4387bb863b471bad124d46e8d911a79a -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Wed Apr 7 09:59:15 2021 +1000 +commit 1a4d1da9188d7c88f646b61f0d6a3b34f47c5439 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Fri May 21 04:03:47 2021 +0000 - Move the TEST_SSH_PORT section down a bit. + upstream: fix memleak in test - This groups the portable-specific changes together and makes it a - little more likely that patches will apply cleanly. + OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 5e529d0982aa04666604936df43242e97a7a6f81 -commit 3674e33fa70dfa1fe69b345bf576113af7b7be11 -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Wed Apr 7 10:05:10 2021 +1000 +commit 60455a5d98065a73ec9a1f303345856bbd49aecc +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Fri May 21 03:59:01 2021 +0000 - Further split Valgrind tests. + upstream: also check contents of remaining string - Even split in two, the Valgrind tests take by far the longest to run, - so split them four ways to further increase parallelism. + OpenBSD-Regress-ID: d526fa07253f4eebbc7d6205a0ab3d491ec71a28 -commit 961af266b861e30fce1e26170ee0dbb5bf591f29 +commit 39f6cd207851d7b67ca46903bfce4a9f615b5b1c Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Tue Apr 6 23:24:30 2021 +0000 +Date: Fri May 21 03:48:07 2021 +0000 - upstream: include "ssherr.h" not ; from Balu Gajjala via + upstream: unit test for misc.c:strdelim() that mostly servces to - bz#3292 + highlight its inconsistencies - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: e9535cd9966eb2e69e73d1ede1f44905c30310bd - -commit e7d0a285dbdd65d8df16123ad90f15e91862f959 -Author: Damien Miller -Date: Wed Apr 7 08:50:38 2021 +1000 - - wrap struct rlimit in HAVE_GETRLIMIT too + OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 8d2bf970fcc01ccc6e36a5065f89b9c7fa934195 -commit f283a6c2e0a9bd9369e18462acd00be56fbe5b0d -Author: Damien Miller -Date: Wed Apr 7 08:20:35 2021 +1000 +commit 7a3a1dd2c7d4461962acbcc0ebee9445ba892be0 +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Thu May 27 21:23:15 2021 +1000 - wrap getrlimit call in HAVE_GETRLIMIT; bz3291 + Put minix3 config in the host-specific block. -commit 679bdc4a5c9244f427a7aee9c14b0a0ed086da1f -Author: dtucker@openbsd.org -Date: Tue Apr 6 09:07:33 2021 +0000 +commit 59a194825f12fff8a7f75d91bf751ea17645711b +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Mon May 31 06:48:42 2021 +0000 - upstream: Don't check return value of unsetenv(). It's part of the + upstream: Hash challenge supplied by client during FIDO key enrollment - environment setup and not part of the actual test, and some platforms - -portable runs on declare it as returning void, which prevents the test from - compiling. + prior to passing it to libfido2, which does expect a hash. - OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 24f08543ee3cdebc404f2951f3e388cc82b844a1 - -commit 320af2f3de6333aa123f1b088eca146a245e968a -Author: jmc@openbsd.org -Date: Sun Apr 4 11:36:56 2021 +0000 - - upstream: remove stray inserts; from matthias schmidt + There is no effect for users who are simply generating FIDO keys using + ssh-keygen - by default we generate a random 256 bit challenge, but + people building attestation workflows around our tools should now have + a more consistent experience (esp. fewer failures when they fail to + guess the magic 32-byte challenge length requirement). - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 2c36ebdc54e14bbf1daad70c6a05479a073d5c63 + ok markus@ + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: b8d5363a6a7ca3b23dc28f3ca69470472959f2b5 -commit 801f710953b24dd2f21939171c622eac77c7484d -Author: jmc@openbsd.org -Date: Sun Apr 4 06:11:24 2021 +0000 +commit eb68e669bc8ab968d4cca5bf1357baca7136a826 +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Thu May 27 21:14:15 2021 +1000 - upstream: missing comma; from kawashima james + Include login_cap.h for login_getpwclass override. - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 31cec6bf26c6db4ffefc8a070715ebef274e68ea + On minix3, login_getpwclass is __RENAME'ed to __login_getpwclass50 so + without this the include overriding login_getpwclass causes a compile + error. -commit b3ca08cb174266884d44ec710a84cd64c12414ea +commit 2063af71422501b65c7a92a5e14c0e6a3799ed89 Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Mon Apr 5 23:46:42 2021 +1000 +Date: Thu May 27 21:13:38 2021 +1000 - Install libcbor with libfido2. + Add minix3 test target. -commit f3ca8af87a4c32ada660da12ae95cf03d190c083 -Author: Damien Miller -Date: Sat Apr 3 18:21:08 2021 +1100 +commit 2e1efcfd9f94352ca5f4b6958af8a454f8cf48cd +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Wed May 26 01:47:24 2021 +0000 - enable authopt and misc unit tests + upstream: fix SEGV in UpdateHostkeys debug() message, triggered - Neither were wired into the build, both required some build - adaptations for -portable + when the update removed more host keys than remain present. Fix tested by + reporter James Cook, via bugs@ + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 44f641f6ee02bb957f0c1d150495b60cf7b869d3 -commit dc1b45841fb97e3d7f655ddbcfef3839735cae5f -Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Sat Apr 3 06:58:30 2021 +0000 +commit 9acd76e6e4d2b519773e7119c33cf77f09534909 +Author: naddy@openbsd.org +Date: Sun May 23 18:22:57 2021 +0000 - upstream: typos in comments; GHPR#180 from Vill + upstream: ssh: The client configuration keyword is - =?UTF-8?q?e=20Skytt=C3=A4?= - MIME-Version: 1.0 - Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 - Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit + "hostbasedacceptedalgorithms" - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 93c732381ae0e2b680c79e67c40c1814b7ceed2c + This fixes a mistake that slipped in when "HostbasedKeyTypes" was + renamed to "HostbasedAcceptedAlgorithms". + + Bug report by zack@philomathiclife.com + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: d745a7e8e50b2589fc56877f322ea204bc784f38 -commit 53ea05e09b04fd7b6dea66b42b34d65fe61b9636 +commit 078a0e60c92700da4c536c93c007257828ccd05b +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Tue May 25 11:40:47 2021 +1000 + + Rename README.md to ci-status.md. + + The original intent was to provide a status page for the CIs configured + in that directory, but it had the side effect of replacing the top-level + README.md. + +commit 7be4ac813662f68e89f23c50de058a49aa32f7e4 Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Sat Apr 3 06:55:52 2021 +0000 +Date: Wed May 19 01:24:05 2021 +0000 - upstream: sync CASignatureAlgorithms lists with reality. GHPR#174 from + upstream: restore blocking status on stdio fds before close + + ssh(1) needs to set file descriptors to non-blocking mode to operate + but it was not restoring the original state on exit. This could cause + problems with fds shared with other programs via the shell, e.g. + + > $ cat > test.sh << _EOF + > #!/bin/sh + > { + > ssh -Fnone -oLogLevel=verbose ::1 hostname + > cat /usr/share/dict/words + > } | sleep 10 + > _EOF + > $ ./test.sh + > Authenticated to ::1 ([::1]:22). + > Transferred: sent 2352, received 2928 bytes, in 0.1 seconds + > Bytes per second: sent 44338.9, received 55197.4 + > cat: stdout: Resource temporarily unavailable + + This restores the blocking status for fds 0,1,2 (stdio) before ssh(1) + abandons/closes them. - Matt Hazinski + This was reported as bz3280 and GHPR246; ok dtucker@ - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: f05e4ca54d7e67b90fe58fe1bdb1d2a37e0e2696 - -commit 57ed647ee07bb883a2f2264231bcd1df6a5b9392 -Author: Damien Miller -Date: Sat Apr 3 17:47:37 2021 +1100 - - polish whitespace for portable files + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 8cc67346f05aa85a598bddf2383fcfcc3aae61ce -commit 31d8d231eb9377df474746a822d380c5d68d7ad6 +commit c4902e1a653c67fea850ec99c7537f358904c0af Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Sat Apr 3 06:18:40 2021 +0000 +Date: Mon May 17 11:43:16 2021 +0000 - upstream: highly polished whitespace, mostly fixing spaces-for-tab + upstream: fix breakage of -W forwaring introduced in 1.554; reported by - and bad indentation on continuation lines. Prompted by GHPR#185 + naddy@ and sthen@, ok sthen@ - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: e5c81f0cbdcc6144df1ce468ec1bac366d8ad6e9 + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: f72558e643a26dc4150cff6e5097b5502f6c85fd -commit 34afde5c73b5570d6f8cce9b49993b23b77bfb86 -Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Sat Apr 3 05:54:14 2021 +0000 +commit afea01381ad1fcea1543b133040f75f7542257e6 +Author: dtucker@openbsd.org +Date: Mon May 17 07:22:45 2021 +0000 - upstream: whitespace (tab after space) + upstream: Regenerate moduli. - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 0e2b3f7674e985d3f7c27ff5028e690ba1c2efd4 + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 83c93a2a07c584c347ac6114d6329b18ce515557 -commit 7cd262c1c5a08cc7f4f30e3cab108ef089d0a57b -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Sat Apr 3 16:59:10 2021 +1100 +commit be2866d6207b090615ff083c9ef212b603816a56 +Author: Damien Miller +Date: Mon May 17 09:40:23 2021 +1000 - Save config.h and config.log on failure too. + Handle Android libc returning NULL pw->pw_passwd + + Reported by Luke Dashjr -commit 460aee9298f365357e9fd26851c22e0dca51fd6a +commit 5953c143008259d87342fb5155bd0b8835ba88e5 Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Sat Apr 3 05:46:41 2021 +0000 +Date: Fri May 14 05:20:32 2021 +0000 - upstream: fix incorrect plural; from Ville Skyt + upstream: fix previous: test saved no_shell_flag, not the one that just - =?UTF-8?q?t=C3=A4=20via=20GHPR#181?= - MIME-Version: 1.0 - Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 - Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit + got clobbered - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 92f31754c6296d8f403d7c293e09dc27292d22c9 + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: b8deace085d9d941b2d02f810243b9c302e5355d -commit 082804c14e548cada75c81003a3c68ee098138ee +commit 1e9fa55f4dc4b334651d569d3448aaa3841f736f Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Sat Apr 3 05:40:39 2021 +0000 +Date: Fri May 14 03:09:48 2021 +0000 - upstream: ensure that pkcs11_del_provider() is called before exit - - - some PKCS#11 providers get upset if C_Initialize is not matched with - C_Finalize. + upstream: Fix ssh started with ControlPersist incorrectly executing a - From Adithya Baglody via GHPR#234; ok markus + shell when the -N (no shell) option was specified. bz3290 reported by Richard + Schwab; patch from markus@ ok me - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: f8e770e03b416ee9a58f9762e162add900f832b6 + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: ea1ea4af16a95687302f7690bdbe36a6aabf87e1 -commit 464ebc82aa926dd132ec75a0b064574ef375675e -Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Sat Apr 3 05:28:43 2021 +0000 +commit d1320c492f655d8f5baef8c93899d79dded217a5 +Author: dtucker@openbsd.org +Date: Wed May 12 11:34:30 2021 +0000 - upstream: unused variable + upstream: Clarify language about moduli. While both ends of the - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 85f6a394c8e0f60d15ecddda75176f112007b205 + connection do need to use the same parameters (ie groups), the DH-GEX + protocol takes care of that and both ends do not need the same contents in + the moduli file, which is what the previous text suggested. ok djm@ jmc@ + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: f0c18cc8e79c2fbf537a432a9070ed94e96a622a -commit dc3c0be8208c488e64a8bcb7d9efad98514e0ffb +commit d3cc4d650ce3e59f3e370b101778b0e8f1c02c4d Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Sat Apr 3 05:21:46 2021 +0000 +Date: Fri May 7 04:11:51 2021 +0000 - upstream: Fix two problems in string->argv conversion: 1) multiple - - backslashes were not being dequoted correctly and 2) quoted space in the - middle of a string was being incorrectly split. - MIME-Version: 1.0 - Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 - Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit - - A unit test for these cases has already been committed - - prompted by and based on GHPR#223 by Eero Häkkinen; ok markus@ + upstream: include pid in LogVerbose spam - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: d7ef27abb4eeeaf6e167e9312e4abe9e89faf1e4 - -commit f75bcbba58a08c670727ece5e3f8812125969799 -Author: Damien Miller -Date: Sat Apr 3 16:22:48 2021 +1100 - - missing bits from 259d648e + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: aacb86f96ee90c7cb84ec27452374285f89a7f00 -commit 4cbc4a722873d9b68cb5496304dc050d7168df78 +commit e3c032333be5fdbbaf2751f6f478e044922b4ec4 Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Wed Mar 31 21:59:26 2021 +0000 +Date: Fri May 7 03:09:38 2021 +0000 - upstream: cannot effectively test posix-rename extension after + upstream: don't sigdie() in signal handler in privsep child process; - changes in feature advertisment. + this can end up causing sandbox violations per bz3286; ok dtucker@ - OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 5e390bf88d379162aaa81b60ed86b34cb0c54d29 + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: a7f40b2141dca4287920da68ede812bff7ccfdda -commit 259d648e63e82ade4fe2c2c73c8b67fe57d9d049 -Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Fri Mar 19 04:23:50 2021 +0000 +commit a4039724a3f2abac810735fc95cf9114a3856049 +Author: dtucker@openbsd.org +Date: Fri May 7 09:23:40 2021 +0000 - upstream: add a test for misc.c:argv_split(), currently fails + upstream: Increase ConnectionAttempts from 4 to 10 as the tests - OpenBSD-Regress-ID: ad6b96d6ebeb9643b698b3575bdd6f78bb144200 + occasionally time out on heavily loaded hosts. + + OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 29a8cdef354fc9da471a301f7f65184770434f3a -commit 473ddfc2d6b602cb2d1d897e0e5c204de145cd9a +commit c0d7e36e979fa3cdb60f5dcb6ac9ad3fd018543b Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Fri Mar 19 03:25:01 2021 +0000 +Date: Fri May 7 02:26:55 2021 +0000 - upstream: split + upstream: dump out a usable private key string too; inspired by Tyson - OpenBSD-Regress-ID: f6c03c0e4c58b3b9e04b161757b8c10dc8378c34 + Whitehead + + OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 65572d5333801cb2f650ebc778cbdc955e372058 -commit 1339800fef8d0dfbfeabff71b34670105bcfddd2 +commit 24fee8973abdf1c521cd2c0047d89e86d9c3fc38 Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Wed Mar 31 22:16:34 2021 +0000 +Date: Fri May 7 02:29:40 2021 +0000 - upstream: Use new limits@openssh.com protocol extension to let the + upstream: correct mistake in spec - the private key blobs are encoded - client select good limits based on what the server supports. Split the - download and upload buffer sizes to allow them to be chosen independently. + verbatim and not as strings (i.e. no 4-byte length header) - In practice (and assuming upgraded sftp/sftp-server at each end), this - increases the download buffer 32->64KiB and the upload buffer - 32->255KiB. + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 3606b5d443d72118c5b76c4af6dd87a5d5a4f837 + +commit f43859159cc62396ad5d080f0b1f2635a67dac02 +Author: dtucker@openbsd.org +Date: Tue May 4 22:53:52 2021 +0000 + + upstream: Don't pass NULL as a string in debugging as it does not work - Patches from Mike Frysinger; ok dtucker@ + on some platforms in -portable. ok djm@ - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: ebd61c80d85b951b794164acc4b2f2fd8e88606c + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 937c892c99aa3c9c272a8ed78fa7c2aba3a44fc9 -commit 6653c61202d104e59c8e741329fcc567f7bc36b8 +commit ac31aa3c6341905935e75f0539cf4a61bbe99779 Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Wed Mar 31 21:58:07 2021 +0000 +Date: Mon May 3 00:16:45 2021 +0000 - upstream: do not advertise protocol extensions that have been - - disallowed by the command-line options (e.g. -p/-P/-R); ok dtucker@ + upstream: more debugging for UpdateHostKeys signature failures - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 3a8a76b3f5131741aca4b41bfab8d101c9926205 + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 1ee95f03875e1725df15d5e4bea3e73493d57d36 -commit 71241fc05db4bbb11bb29340b44b92e2575373d8 -Author: Damien Miller -Date: Mon Mar 29 15:14:25 2021 +1100 +commit 8e32e97e788e0676ce83018a742203614df6a2b3 +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Sat May 1 20:07:47 2021 +1000 - gnome-ssh-askpass3 is a valid target here + Add obsd69 test target. -commit 8a9520836e71830f4fccca066dba73fea3d16bda +commit f06893063597c5bb9d9e93f851c4070e77d2fba9 Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Fri Mar 19 02:22:34 2021 +0000 +Date: Fri Apr 30 04:29:53 2021 +0000 - upstream: return non-zero exit status when killed by signal; bz#3281 ok + upstream: a little debugging in the main mux process for status - dtucker@ + confirmation failures in multiplexed sessions - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 117b31cf3c807993077b596bd730c24da9e9b816 + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 6e27b87c95176107597035424e1439c3232bcb49 -commit 1269b8a686bf1254b03cd38af78167a04aa6ec88 -Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Fri Mar 19 02:18:28 2021 +0000 +commit e65cf00da6bc31e5f54603b7feb7252dc018c033 +Author: dtucker@openbsd.org +Date: Fri Apr 30 04:02:52 2021 +0000 - upstream: increase maximum SSH2_FXP_READ to match the maximum - - packet size. Also handle zero-length reads that are borderline nonsensical - but not explicitly banned by the spec. Based on patch from Mike Frysinger, - feedback deraadt@ ok dtucker@ + upstream: Remove now-unused skey function prototypes leftover from - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 4e67d60d81bde7b84a742b4ee5a34001bdf80d9c - -commit 860b67604416640e8db14f365adc3f840aebcb1f -Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Tue Mar 16 06:15:43 2021 +0000 - - upstream: don't let logging clobber errno before use + skey removal. - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: ce6cca370005c270c277c51c111bb6911e1680ec + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 2fc36d519fd37c6f10ce74854c628561555a94c3 -commit 5ca8a9216559349c56e09039c4335636fd85c241 +commit ae5f9b0d5c8126214244ee6b35aae29c21028133 Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Sat Mar 13 14:40:43 2021 +1100 +Date: Thu Apr 29 13:01:50 2021 +1000 - Only call dh_set_moduli_file if using OpenSSL. + Wrap sntrup761x25519 inside ifdef. - Fixes link failure when configuring --without-openssl since dh.c is not - linked in. + From balu.gajjala at gmail.com via bz#3306. -commit 867a7dcf003c51d5a83f83565771a35f0d9530ac +commit 70a8dc138a6480f85065cdb239915ad4b7f928cf Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Sat Mar 13 13:52:53 2021 +1100 +Date: Wed Apr 28 14:44:07 2021 +1000 - Don't install moduli during tests. - - Now that we have TEST_SSH_MODULI_FILE pointing to the moduli in the - soure directory we don't need to install the file to prevent warnings - about it being missing. + Add status badges for Actions-based tests. -commit 0c054538fccf92b4a028008321d3711107bee6d5 +commit 40b59024cc3365815381474cdf4fe423102e391b Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Sat Mar 13 13:51:26 2021 +1100 - - Point TEST_SSH_MODULI_FILE at our own moduli. - - This will allow the test to run without requiring a moduli file - installed at the configured default path. - -commit 4d48219c72ab0c71238806f057f0e9630b7dd25c -Author: jsg@openbsd.org -Date: Fri Mar 12 05:18:01 2021 +0000 - - upstream: spelling - - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 478bc3db04f62f1048ed6e1765400f3ab325e60f - -commit 88057eb6df912abf2678ea5c846d9d9cbc92752c -Author: dtucker@openbsd.org -Date: Fri Mar 12 04:08:19 2021 +0000 +Date: Wed Apr 28 12:22:11 2021 +1000 - upstream: Add ModuliFile keyword to sshd_config to specify the - - location of the "moduli" file containing the groups for DH-GEX. This will - allow us to run tests against arbitrary moduli files without having to - install them. ok djm@ - - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 8df99d60b14ecaaa28f3469d01fc7f56bff49f66 + Add obsdsnap (OpenBSD snapshot) test target. -commit f07519a2af96109325b5a48b1af18b57601074ca -Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Fri Mar 12 03:43:40 2021 +0000 +commit e627067ec8ef9ae8e7a638f4dbac91d52dee3e6d +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Wed Apr 28 11:35:28 2021 +1000 - upstream: pwcopy() struct passwd that we're going to reuse across a - - bunch of library calls; bz3273 ok dtucker@ - - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: b6eafa977b2e44607b1b121f5de855107809b762 + Add test building upstream OpenBSD source. -commit 69d6d4b0c8a88d3d1288415605f36e2df61a2f12 -Author: dtucker@openbsd.org -Date: Wed Mar 10 06:32:27 2021 +0000 +commit 1b8108ebd12fc4ed0fb39ef94c5ba122558ac373 +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Tue Apr 27 14:22:20 2021 +1000 - upstream: Import regenerated moduli file. + Test against OpenSSL 1.1.0h instead of 1.1.0g. - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 7ac6c252d2a5be8fbad4c66d9d35db507c9dac5b + 1.1.0g requires a perl glob module that's not installed by default. -commit e5895e8ecfac65086ea6b34d0d168409a66a15e1 -Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Wed Mar 10 04:58:45 2021 +0000 +commit 9bc20efd39ce8525be33df3ee009f5a4564224f1 +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Tue Apr 27 12:37:59 2021 +1000 - upstream: no need to reset buffer after send_msg() as that is done - - for us; patch from Mike Frysinger - - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 565516495ff8362a38231e0f1a087b8ae66da59c + Use the default VM type for libcrypto ver tests. -commit 721948e67488767df0fa0db71ff2578ee2bb9210 -Author: dtucker@openbsd.org -Date: Sat Mar 13 01:52:16 2021 +0000 +commit 9f79e80dc40965c2e73164531250b83b176c1eea +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Tue Apr 27 12:24:10 2021 +1000 - upstream: Add TEST_SSH_MODULI_FILE variable to allow overriding of the - - moduli file used during the test run. + Always build OpenSSL shared. - OpenBSD-Regress-ID: be10f785263120edb64fc87db0e0d6570a10220a + This is the default for current versions but we need it to test against + earlier versions. -commit 82fef71e20ffef425b932bec26f5bc46aa1ed41c +commit b3cc9fbdff2782eca79e33e02ac22450dc63bce9 Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Fri Mar 12 15:58:57 2021 +1100 +Date: Tue Apr 27 09:18:02 2021 +1000 - Allow (but return EACCES) fstatat64 in sandbox. + Fix custom OpenSSL tests. - This is apparently used in some configurations of OpenSSL when glibc - has getrandom(). bz#3276, patch from Kris Karas, ok djm@ + Check out specified OpenSSL version. Install custom libcrypto where + configure expects to find it. Remove unneeded OpenSSL config time + options. Older OpenSSL versions were not make -j safe so remove it. -commit 1cd67ee15ce3d192ab51be22bc4872a6a7a4b6d9 +commit 77532609874a99a19e3e2eb2d1b7fa93aef963bb Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Fri Mar 12 13:16:10 2021 +1100 +Date: Mon Apr 26 17:18:25 2021 +1000 - Move generic includes outside of ifdef. - - This ensures that the macros in log.h are defined in the case where - either of --with-solaris-projects or --with-solaris-privs are used - without --with-solaris-contracts. bz#3278. + Export CC and CFLAGS for c89 test. -commit 2421a567a8862fe5102a4e7d60003ebffd1313dd +commit 33f62dfbe865f4de77980ab88774bf1eb5e4e040 Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Wed Mar 10 17:41:21 2021 +1100 +Date: Mon Apr 26 17:13:44 2021 +1000 - Import regenerated moduli file. + Add c89 here too. -commit e99080c05d9d48dbbdb022538533d53ae1bd567d -Author: millert@openbsd.org -Date: Sat Mar 6 20:36:31 2021 +0000 +commit da9d59f526fce58e11cba49cd8eb011dc0bf5677 +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Mon Apr 26 15:34:23 2021 +1000 - upstream: Fix PRINT macro, the suffix param to sshlog() was missing. - - Also remove redundant __func__ prefix from PRINT calls as the macro already - adds __FILE__, __func__ and __LINE__. From Christos Zoulas. OK dtucker@ - - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 01fdfa9c5541151b5461d9d7d6ca186a3413d949 + Add test against OpenSSL w/out ECC. -commit 160db17fc678ceb5e3fd4a7e006cc73866f484aa -Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Wed Mar 3 22:41:49 2021 +0000 +commit 29e194a752359ebf85bf7fce100f23a0477fc4de +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Mon Apr 26 14:49:59 2021 +1000 - upstream: don't sshbuf_get_u32() into an enum; reported by goetze - - AT dovetail.com via bz3269 - - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 99a30a8f1df9bd72be54e21eee5c56a0f050921a + Ensure we can still build with C89. -commit cffd033817a5aa388764b6661855dcdaabab0588 -Author: sthen@openbsd.org -Date: Wed Mar 3 21:40:16 2021 +0000 +commit a38016d369d21df5d35f761f2b67e175e132ba22 +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Mon Apr 26 14:29:03 2021 +1000 - upstream: typo in other_hostkeys_message() display output, ok djm - - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 276f58afc97b6f5826e0be58380b737603dbf5f5 + Interop test agains PuTTY. -commit 7fe141b96b13bd7dc67ca985e14d55b9bd8a03fd -Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Wed Mar 3 08:42:52 2021 +0000 +commit 095b0307a77be8803768857cc6c0963fa52ed85b +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Mon Apr 26 14:02:03 2021 +1000 - upstream: needs FILE*; from Mike Frysinger + Support testing against arbitary libcrytpo vers. - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: dddb3aa9cb5792eeeaa37a1af67b5a3f25ded41d - -commit d2afd717e62d76bb41ab5f3ab4ce6f885c8edc98 -Author: Damien Miller -Date: Tue Mar 2 21:31:47 2021 +1100 - - update depend - -commit f0c4eddf7cf224ebcac1f07ac8afdb30c6e9fe0a -Author: Damien Miller -Date: Tue Mar 2 21:30:14 2021 +1100 - - update relnotes URL + Add tests against various LibreSSL and OpenSSL versions. -commit 67a8bb7fe62a381634db4c261720092e7d514a3d -Author: Damien Miller -Date: Tue Mar 2 21:29:54 2021 +1100 +commit b16082aa110fa7128ece2a9037ff420c4a285317 +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Mon Apr 26 13:35:44 2021 +1000 - update RPM spec version numbers + Add fbsd10 test target. -commit 0a4b23b11b9a4e6eec332dd5c6ab2ac6f62aa164 -Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Tue Mar 2 01:48:18 2021 +0000 +commit 2c805f16b24ea37cc051c6018fcb05defab6e57a +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Sun Apr 25 14:15:02 2021 +1000 - upstream: openssh-8.5 + Disable compiler hardening on nbsd4. - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 185e85d60fe042b8f8fa1ef29d4ef637bdf397d6 + The system compiler supports -fstack-protector-all, but using it will + result in an internal compiler error on some files. -commit de3866383b6720ad4cad83be76fe4c8aa111a249 +commit 6a5d39305649da5dff1934ee54292ee0cebd579d Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Mon Mar 1 21:13:24 2021 +1100 +Date: Sun Apr 25 13:01:34 2021 +1000 - Only upload config logs if configure fails. + Add nbsd3, nbsd4 and nbsd9 test targets. -commit 85ff2a564ce838f8690050081176c1de1fb33116 -Author: dtucker@openbsd.org -Date: Sun Feb 28 22:56:30 2021 +0000 +commit d1aed05bd2e4ae70f359a394dc60a2d96b88f78c +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Sat Apr 24 22:03:46 2021 +1000 - upstream: Add %k to list of keywords. From - - =?UTF-8?q?=20Eero=20H=C3=A4kkinenvia=20bz#3267?= - MIME-Version: 1.0 - Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 - Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit - - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 9c87f39a048cee2a7d1c8bab951b2f716256865e + Comment out nbsd2 test target for now. -commit e774bac35933e71f924f4301786e7fb5bbe1422f -Author: dtucker@openbsd.org -Date: Sun Feb 28 01:50:47 2021 +0000 +commit a6b4ec94e5bd5a8a18cd2c9942d829d2e5698837 +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Sat Apr 24 17:52:24 2021 +1000 - upstream: Do not try to reset signal handler for signal 0 in - - subprocess. Prevents spurious debug message. ok djm@ - - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 7f9785e292dcf304457566ad4637effd27ad1d46 + Add OPENBSD ORIGINAL marker. -commit 351c5dbbd74ce300c4f058112f9731c867c6e225 -Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Sat Feb 27 23:42:37 2021 +0000 +commit 3737c9f66ee590255546c4b637b6d2be669a11eb +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Fri Apr 23 19:49:46 2021 +1000 - upstream: fix alphabetic ordering of options; spotted by Iain Morgan - - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: f955fec617d74af0feb5b275831a9fee813d7ad5 + Replace "==" (a bashism) with "=". -commit 0d1c9dbe578597f8d45d3ac7690df10d32d743e5 +commit a116b6f5be17a1dd345b7d54bf8aa3779a28a0df Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Sat Feb 27 12:25:25 2021 +1100 +Date: Fri Apr 23 16:34:48 2021 +1000 - zlib is now optional. + Add nbsd2 test target. -commit b7c6ee7b437d9adfd19ef49d6c0f19f13f26f9b3 -Author: Jeffrey H. Johnson <61629094+johnsonjh@users.noreply.github.com> -Date: Sat Feb 27 01:04:58 2021 +0000 +commit 196bf2a9bb771f45d9b0429cee7d325962233c44 +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Fri Apr 23 14:54:10 2021 +1000 - Fix punctuatio and typo in README.md. - - Some very minor fixes, missing 's' and punctuation. + Add obsd68 test target. -commit 6248b86074804983e8f7a2058856a516dbfe2924 -Author: Damien Miller -Date: Fri Feb 26 16:45:50 2021 +1100 +commit e3ba6574ed69e8b7af725cf5e8a9edaac04ff077 +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Fri Apr 23 14:53:32 2021 +1000 - Revert "ssh: optional bind interface if bind address specified." - - This reverts commit 5a878a71a3528c2626aa1d331934fd964782d41c. - - Apologies - I accidentally pushed this. + Remove dependency on bash. -commit 493339a940b13be6071629c3c2dd5a3b6fc17023 -Author: Damien Miller -Date: Fri Feb 26 15:45:38 2021 +1100 +commit db1f9ab8feb838aee9f5b99c6fd3f211355dfdcf +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Fri Apr 23 14:41:13 2021 +1000 - detech BSD libc hash functions in libbsd / libmd - - Some Linux distributions are shipping the BSD-style hashing functions - (e.g. SHA256Update) in libbsd and/or libmd. Detect this situation to - avoid header/replacement clashes later. ok dtucker@ + Add obsd67 test target. -commit 5a878a71a3528c2626aa1d331934fd964782d41c -Author: Dmitrii Turlupov -Date: Thu Feb 4 16:27:31 2021 +0300 +commit c039a6bf79192fe1daa9ddcc7c87dd98e258ae7c +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Fri Apr 23 11:08:23 2021 +1000 - ssh: optional bind interface if bind address specified. - - Allows the -b and -B options to be used together. - For example, when the interface is in the VRF. + Re-add macos-11.0 test target. -commit 1fe4d70df94d3bcc2b35fd57cad6b5fc4b2d7b16 -Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Fri Feb 26 04:18:42 2021 +0000 +commit a6db3a47b56adb76870d59225ffb90a65bc4daf2 +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Fri Apr 23 10:28:28 2021 +1000 - upstream: remove this KEX fuzzer; it's awkward to use and doesn't play - - nice with popular fuzzing drivers like libfuzzer. AFAIK nobody has used it - but me. - - OpenBSD-Regress-ID: cad919522b3ce90c147c95abaf81b0492ac296c9 + Add openindiana test target. -commit 24a3a67bd7421740d08803b84bd784e764107928 +commit 3fe7e73b025c07eda46d78049f1da8ed7dfc0c69 Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Fri Feb 26 11:49:19 2021 +1100 +Date: Fri Apr 23 10:26:35 2021 +1000 - Remove macos-11.00 PAM test target too. - - These are failing apparently due to some kind of infrastructure problem, - making it look like every commit is busted. + Test krb5 on Solaris 11 too. -commit 473201783f732ca8b0ec528b56aa55fa0d8cf717 -Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Fri Feb 26 00:16:58 2021 +0000 +commit f57fbfe5eb02df1a91f1a237c4d27165afd87c13 +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Thu Apr 22 22:27:26 2021 +1000 - upstream: a bit more debugging behind #ifdef DEBUG_SK + Don't always set SUDO. - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: d9fbce14945721061cb322f0084c2165d33d1993 + Rely on sourcing configs to set as appropriate. -commit fd9fa76a344118fe1ef10b9a6c9e85d39599e9a8 +commit e428f29402fb6ac140b52f8f12e06ece7bb104a0 Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Fri Feb 26 01:15:10 2021 +1100 +Date: Thu Apr 22 22:26:08 2021 +1000 - Remove macos-11.0 from the test target list. - - It has been consistently failing for the past few days with a github - actions internal error. + Remove now-unused 2nd arg to configs. -commit 476ac8e9d33dbf96ef97aab812b8d7089d0cdc24 -Author: Philip Hands -Date: Wed Feb 24 23:43:16 2021 +0100 +commit cb4ff640d79b3c736879582139778f016bbb2cd7 +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Wed Apr 21 01:08:04 2021 +1000 - tidy the $INSTALLKEY_SH code layout a little - - SSH-Copy-ID-Upstream: 78178aa5017222773e4c23d9001391eeaeca8983 + Add win10 test target. -commit 983e05ef3b81329d76d6a802b39ad0d1f637c06c -Author: Jakub Jelen -Date: Tue Sep 29 10:02:45 2020 +0000 +commit 4457837238072836b2fa3107d603aac809624983 +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Tue Apr 20 23:31:29 2021 +1000 - if unable to add a missing newline, fail - - SSH-Copy-ID-Upstream: 76b25e18f55499ea9edb4c4d6dc4a80bebc36d95 + Add nbsd8 test target. -commit 3594b3b015f6014591da88ba71bf6ff010be7411 -Author: Philip Hands -Date: Tue Oct 13 14:12:58 2020 +0200 +commit bd4fba22e14da2fa196009010aabec5a8ba9dd42 +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Sat Apr 17 09:55:47 2021 +1000 - use $AUTH_KEY_DIR, now that we have it - - since that was a change made since jjelen's commit was written - - also, quote the variables - - SSH-Copy-ID-Upstream: 588cd8e5cbf95f3443d92b9ab27c5d73ceaf6616 + Add obsd51 target. -commit 333e25f7bc43cee6e36f766e39dad6f9918b318c -Author: Jakub Jelen -Date: Tue Sep 29 10:00:01 2020 +0000 +commit 9403d0e805c77a5741ea8c3281bbe92558c2f125 +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Fri Apr 16 18:14:25 2021 +1000 - restorecon the correct directory - - if using different path for authorized_keys file - - SSH-Copy-ID-Upstream: 791a3df47b48412c726bff6f7b1d190721e65d51 + Add fbsd13 target. -commit 9beeab8a37a49a9e3ffb1972fff6621ee5bd7a71 -Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Thu Feb 25 03:27:34 2021 +0000 +commit e86968280e358e62649d268d41f698d64d0dc9fa +Author: Damien Miller +Date: Fri Apr 16 13:55:25 2021 +1000 - upstream: s/PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes/PubkeyAcceptedAlgorithms/ - - OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 3dbc005fa29f69dc23d97e433b6dffed6fe7cb69 + depend -commit 2dd9870c16ddbd83740adeead5030d6840288c8f -Author: dtucker@openbsd.org -Date: Wed Feb 24 23:12:35 2021 +0000 +commit 2fb25ca11e8b281363a2a2a4dec4c497a1475d9a +Author: Damien Miller +Date: Fri Apr 16 13:53:02 2021 +1000 - upstream: Rename pubkeyacceptedkeytypes to pubkeyacceptedalgorithms in - - test to match change to config-dump output. - - OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 74c9a4ad50306be873d032819d5e55c24eb74d5d + crank version in README and RPM spec files -commit b9225c3a1c3f5827e31d5d64a71b8e0504a25619 -Author: dtucker@openbsd.org -Date: Wed Feb 24 01:18:08 2021 +0000 +commit b2b60ebab0cb77b5bc02d364d72e13db882f33ae +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Fri Apr 16 03:42:00 2021 +0000 - upstream: Put obsolete aliases for hostbasedalgorithms and - - pubkeyacceptedalgorithms after their current names so that the config-dump - mode finds and uses the current names. Spotted by Phil Pennock. + upstream: openssh-8.6 - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 5dd10e93cccfaff3aaaa09060c917adff04a9b15 + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: b5f3e133c846127ec114812248bc17eff07c3e19 -commit 8b8b60542d6652b2c91e0ef9e9cc81bcb65e6b42 -Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Tue Feb 23 21:55:08 2021 +0000 +commit faf2b86a46c9281d237bcdec18c99e94a4eb820a +Author: markus@openbsd.org +Date: Thu Apr 15 16:24:31 2021 +0000 - upstream: lots more s/key types/signature algorithms/ mostly in + upstream: do not pass file/func to monitor; noted by Ilja van Sprundel; - HostbasedAcceptedAlgorithms and HostKeyAlgorithms; prompted by Jakub Jelen + ok djm@ - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 3f719de4385b1a89e4323b2549c66aae050129cb + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 85ae5c063845c410283cbdce685515dcd19479fa -commit 0aeb508aaabc4818970c90831e3d21843c3c6d09 -Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Tue Feb 23 21:50:18 2021 +0000 +commit 2dc328023f60212cd29504fc05d849133ae47355 +Author: Damien Miller +Date: Wed Apr 14 11:42:55 2021 +1000 - upstream: Correct reference to signature algorithms as keys; from - - Jakub Jelen + sshd don't exit on transient read errors - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 36f7ecee86fc811aa0f8e21e7a872eee044b4be5 + openssh-8.5 introduced a regression that would cause sshd to exit + because of transient read errors on the network socket (e.g. EINTR, + EAGAIN). Reported by balu.gajjala AT gmail.com via bz3297 -commit f186a020f2ba5f9c462a23293750e29ba0a746b1 -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Tue Feb 23 16:05:22 2021 +1100 +commit d5d6b7d76d171a2e6861609dcd92e714ee62ad88 +Author: Damien Miller +Date: Sat Apr 10 18:45:00 2021 +1000 - Add a couple more test VMs. + perform report_failed_grab() inline -commit ffcdd3d90e74176b3bb22937ad1f65a6c1cd3f9d -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Mon Feb 22 08:09:27 2021 +1100 +commit ea996ce2d023aa3c6d31125e2c3ebda1cb42db8c +Author: Damien Miller +Date: Sat Apr 10 18:22:57 2021 +1000 - Valgrind test: split and move up list. + dedicated gnome-ssk-askpass3 source - Since the valgrind test takes so long it approaches the limit allowed by - github, move it to the head of the list so it's the first one started and - split the longest tests out into a second instance that runs concurrently - with the first. - -commit c3b1636770785cc2830dedd0f22ef7d3d3491d6d -Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Tue Feb 23 00:05:31 2021 +0000 - - upstream: warn when the user specifies a ForwardAgent path that does + Compatibility with Wayland requires that we use the gdk_seat_grab() + API for grabbing mouse/keyboard, however these API don't exist in + Gtk+2. - not exist and exit if ExitOnForwardFailure is set; bz3264 + This branches gnome-ssk-askpass2.c => gnome-ssk-askpass3.c and + makes the changes to use the gdk_seat_grab() instead of grabbing + mouse/focus separately via GDK. - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 72f7875865e723e464c71bf8692e83110699bf26 + In the future, we can also use the branched file to avoid some + API that has been soft-deprecated in GTK+3, e.g. gtk_widget_modify_fg -commit 5fcb0514949d61aadaf4a89cf16eb78fb47491ec +commit bfa5405da05d906ffd58216eb77c4375b62d64c2 Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Sat Feb 20 13:34:02 2021 +1100 +Date: Thu Apr 8 15:18:15 2021 +1000 - Disable rlimit sandbox, doesn't work with valgrind + Ensure valgrind-out exists. - Only run regress tests, runing unit tests as well makes it run longer - than allowed y github. - -commit bb0b9bf45396c19486080d3eb0a159f94de7e6ba -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Sat Feb 20 13:06:25 2021 +1100 - - Upload valgrind logs on failure. + Normally the regress tests would create it, but running the unit tests + on their own would fail because the directory did not exist. -commit ebb3b75e974cb241c6b9b9f5881b09c7bd32b651 +commit 1f189181f3ea09a9b08aa866f78843fec800874f Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Fri Feb 19 22:18:50 2021 +1100 +Date: Thu Apr 8 15:17:19 2021 +1000 - Rename "vm" to "os" in selfhosted to match c-cpp. + Pass OBJ to unit test make invocation. - Should make it easier to share code or maybe merge at some point. + At least the Valgrind unit tests uses $OBJ. -commit 76c0be0fe0465cb2b975dbd409f8d38b55e55bcb +commit f42b550c281d28bd19e9dd6ce65069164f3482b0 Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Fri Feb 19 22:15:22 2021 +1100 +Date: Thu Apr 8 14:20:12 2021 +1000 - Upload regress failure logs in c-cpp too. + Add pattern for valgrind-unit. -commit 8751b6c3136f5225c40f41bbf29aa29e15795f6e +commit 19e534462710e98737478fd9c44768b50c27c4c6 Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Fri Feb 19 22:13:36 2021 +1100 +Date: Thu Apr 8 13:31:08 2021 +1000 - Comment out Solaris 64bit PAM build... + Run unit tests under valgrind. - until I can figure out why it's failing. - -commit e9f6d563c06886b277c6b9abafa99fa80726dc48 -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Fri Feb 19 10:20:17 2021 +1100 - - Actually run Valgrind tests. - -commit 41d232e226624f1a81c17091c36b44c9010aae62 -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Fri Feb 19 10:16:56 2021 +1100 - - Add test against Valgrind. - -commit e6528d91f12fba05f0ea64224091c9d0f38bdf1d -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Thu Feb 18 16:30:01 2021 +1100 - - Add fbsd12 test target. + Run a separate build for the unit tests under Valgrind. They take long + enough that running in parallel with the other Valgrind tests helps. -commit 6506cb2798d98ff03a7cc06567c392a81f540680 +commit 80032102d05e866dc2a48a5caf760cf42c2e090e Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Thu Feb 18 15:21:13 2021 +1100 +Date: Thu Apr 8 13:25:57 2021 +1000 - Remove unused arg. + ifdef out MIN and MAX. + + In -portable, defines.h ensures that these are defined, so redefining + potentially causes a warning. We don't just delete it to make any + future code syncs a little but easier. bz#3293. -commit 93c31a623973b0fad508214593aab6ca94b11dcb +commit d1bd184046bc310c405f45da3614a1dc5b3e521a Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Thu Feb 18 14:54:07 2021 +1100 +Date: Wed Apr 7 10:23:51 2021 +1000 - Add DEBUG_SK to kitchensink builds. + Remove only use of warn(). + + The warn() function is only used in one place in portable and does not + exist upstream. Upgrade the only instance it's used to fail() + (the privsep/sandbox+proxyconnect, from back when that was new) and + remove the now-unused function. -commit 65085740d3574eeb3289d592f042df62c2689bb0 +commit fea8f4b1aa85026ad5aee5ad8e1599a8d5141fe0 Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Thu Feb 18 14:53:14 2021 +1100 +Date: Wed Apr 7 10:18:32 2021 +1000 - Add bbone test target (arm32). + Move make_tmpdir() into portable-specific area. + + Reduces diff vs OpenBSD and makes it more likely diffs will apply + cleanly. -commit 63238f5aed66148b8d6ca7bd5fb347d624200155 -Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Thu Feb 18 02:49:35 2021 +0000 +commit 13e5fa2acffd26e754c6ee1d070d0afd035d4cb7 +Author: dtucker@openbsd.org +Date: Tue Apr 6 23:57:56 2021 +0000 - upstream: Fix the hostkeys rotation extension documentation - - The documentation was lacking the needed want-reply field in the initial - global request. + upstream: Add TEST_SSH_ELAPSED_TIMES environment variable to print the - https://github.com/openssh/openssh-portable/pull/218 by dbussink + elapsed time in seconds of each test. This depends on "date +%s" which is + not specified by POSIX but is commonly implemented. - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 051824fd78edf6d647a0b9ac011bf88e28775054 + OpenBSD-Regress-ID: ec3c8c19ff49b2192116a0a646ee7c9b944e8a9c -commit 34c5ef6e2d06d9f0e20cb04a9aebf67a6f96609a -Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Thu Feb 18 02:15:07 2021 +0000 +commit ef4f46ab4387bb863b471bad124d46e8d911a79a +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Wed Apr 7 09:59:15 2021 +1000 - upstream: make names in function prototypes match those in - - definition from https://github.com/openssh/openssh-portable/pull/225 by - ZenithalHourlyRate + Move the TEST_SSH_PORT section down a bit. - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 7c736307bf3f2c7cb24d6f82f244eee959485acd + This groups the portable-specific changes together and makes it a + little more likely that patches will apply cleanly. -commit 88e3d4de31ab4f14cac658e9e0c512043b15b146 -Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Thu Feb 18 02:13:58 2021 +0000 +commit 3674e33fa70dfa1fe69b345bf576113af7b7be11 +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Wed Apr 7 10:05:10 2021 +1000 - upstream: unbreak SK_DEBUG builds - - from https://github.com/openssh/openssh-portable/pull/225 by - ZenithalHourlyRate + Further split Valgrind tests. - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 28d7259ce1b04d025411464decfa2f1a097b43eb + Even split in two, the Valgrind tests take by far the longest to run, + so split them four ways to further increase parallelism. -commit 788cbc5b74a53956ba9fff11e1ca506271a3597f +commit 961af266b861e30fce1e26170ee0dbb5bf591f29 Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Thu Feb 18 00:30:17 2021 +0000 +Date: Tue Apr 6 23:24:30 2021 +0000 - upstream: sftp-server: implement limits@openssh.com extension - - This is a simple extension that allows the server to clearly - communicate transfer limits it is imposing so the client doesn't - have to guess, or force the user to manually tune. This is - particularly useful when an attempt to use too large of a value - causes the server to abort the connection. + upstream: include "ssherr.h" not ; from Balu Gajjala via - Patch from Mike Frysinger; ok dtucker@ + bz#3292 - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: f96293221e5aa24102d9bf30e4f4ef04d5f4fb51 + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: e9535cd9966eb2e69e73d1ede1f44905c30310bd -commit 324449a68d510720d0e4dfcc8e9e5a702fe6a48f +commit e7d0a285dbdd65d8df16123ad90f15e91862f959 Author: Damien Miller -Date: Thu Feb 18 12:06:25 2021 +1100 +Date: Wed Apr 7 08:50:38 2021 +1000 - support OpenSSL 3.x cipher IV API change - - OpenSSL renamed the "get current CIPHER_CTX" IV operation in 3.x. - This uses the new name if available. - - https://github.com/openssl/openssl/issues/13411 - - bz#3238 ok dtucker@ + wrap struct rlimit in HAVE_GETRLIMIT too -commit 845fe9811c047063d935eca89188ed55c993626b +commit f283a6c2e0a9bd9369e18462acd00be56fbe5b0d Author: Damien Miller -Date: Thu Feb 18 11:25:38 2021 +1100 - - prefer login_getpwclass() to login_getclass() - - FreeBSD has login_getpwclass() that does some special magic for - UID=0. Prefer this to login_getclass() as its easier to emulate - the former with the latter. - - Based on FreeBSD PR 37416 via Ed Maste; ok dtucker@ - -commit d0763c8d566119cce84d9806e419badf20444b02 -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Thu Feb 18 10:45:27 2021 +1100 - - Fixing quoting for installing moduli on target guest. - -commit b3afc243bc820f323a09e3218e9ec8a30a3c1933 -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Thu Feb 18 10:27:16 2021 +1100 +Date: Wed Apr 7 08:20:35 2021 +1000 - Install moduli on target not host. + wrap getrlimit call in HAVE_GETRLIMIT; bz3291 -commit f060c2bc85d59d111fa18a12eb3872ee4b9f7e97 -Author: Damien Miller -Date: Thu Feb 18 10:33:58 2021 +1100 +commit 679bdc4a5c9244f427a7aee9c14b0a0ed086da1f +Author: dtucker@openbsd.org +Date: Tue Apr 6 09:07:33 2021 +0000 - don't free string returned by login_getcapstr(3) - - OpenBSD and NetBSD require the caller to free strings returned - bu the login_* functions, but FreeBSD requires that callers don't. + upstream: Don't check return value of unsetenv(). It's part of the - Fortunately in this case, we can harmlessly leak as the process is - about to exec the shell/command. + environment setup and not part of the actual test, and some platforms + -portable runs on declare it as returning void, which prevents the test from + compiling. - From https://reviews.freebsd.org/D28617 via Ed Maste; ok dtucker@ - -commit bc9b0c25703215501da28aa7a6539f96c0fa656f -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Thu Feb 18 10:10:00 2021 +1100 - - Skip unit tests on sol11 to speed things up. + OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 24f08543ee3cdebc404f2951f3e388cc82b844a1 -commit 161873035c12cc22211fc73d07170ade47746bc5 -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Thu Feb 18 10:09:27 2021 +1100 +commit 320af2f3de6333aa123f1b088eca146a245e968a +Author: jmc@openbsd.org +Date: Sun Apr 4 11:36:56 2021 +0000 - Remove SKIP_UNIT as it needs to be a make arg. + upstream: remove stray inserts; from matthias schmidt + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 2c36ebdc54e14bbf1daad70c6a05479a073d5c63 -commit 1c293868e4b4e8e74e3ea15b8dff90f6b089967a -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Thu Feb 18 10:05:03 2021 +1100 +commit 801f710953b24dd2f21939171c622eac77c7484d +Author: jmc@openbsd.org +Date: Sun Apr 4 06:11:24 2021 +0000 - Always intall moduli. + upstream: missing comma; from kawashima james - Allows us to run tests without falling back to a fixed modulus. Ensure that - the directory exists. + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 31cec6bf26c6db4ffefc8a070715ebef274e68ea -commit 5c8f41ad100601ec2fdcbccdfe92890c31f81bbe +commit b3ca08cb174266884d44ec710a84cd64c12414ea Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Thu Feb 18 09:59:09 2021 +1100 +Date: Mon Apr 5 23:46:42 2021 +1000 - Quote SSHD_CONFOPTS in case it contains spaces. + Install libcbor with libfido2. -commit 4653116c1f5384ea7006e6396d9b53c33d218975 -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Thu Feb 18 09:51:18 2021 +1100 +commit f3ca8af87a4c32ada660da12ae95cf03d190c083 +Author: Damien Miller +Date: Sat Apr 3 18:21:08 2021 +1100 - Fix labels on targets (dots vs underscores). + enable authopt and misc unit tests + + Neither were wired into the build, both required some build + adaptations for -portable -commit 4512047f57ca3c6e8cd68f0cc69be59e98b25287 -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Wed Feb 17 21:47:48 2021 +1100 +commit dc1b45841fb97e3d7f655ddbcfef3839735cae5f +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Sat Apr 3 06:58:30 2021 +0000 - More compact representation of config matrix. + upstream: typos in comments; GHPR#180 from Vill + + =?UTF-8?q?e=20Skytt=C3=A4?= + MIME-Version: 1.0 + Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 + Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 93c732381ae0e2b680c79e67c40c1814b7ceed2c -commit 0406cd09f05c2e419b113dd4c0eac8bc34ec915b -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Wed Feb 17 21:19:18 2021 +1100 +commit 53ea05e09b04fd7b6dea66b42b34d65fe61b9636 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Sat Apr 3 06:55:52 2021 +0000 - Skip unit tests on hosted VMs to speed things up. + upstream: sync CASignatureAlgorithms lists with reality. GHPR#174 from + + Matt Hazinski + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: f05e4ca54d7e67b90fe58fe1bdb1d2a37e0e2696 -commit 4582612e6147d766c336198c498740242fb8f1ec -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Wed Feb 17 20:21:29 2021 +1100 +commit 57ed647ee07bb883a2f2264231bcd1df6a5b9392 +Author: Damien Miller +Date: Sat Apr 3 17:47:37 2021 +1100 - Merge macos and ubuntu tests. + polish whitespace for portable files -commit 09f4b84654b71099559492e9aed5e1a38bf24815 -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Wed Feb 17 18:41:30 2021 +1100 +commit 31d8d231eb9377df474746a822d380c5d68d7ad6 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Sat Apr 3 06:18:40 2021 +0000 - Convert most github hosted tests to new config structure. + upstream: highly polished whitespace, mostly fixing spaces-for-tab + + and bad indentation on continuation lines. Prompted by GHPR#185 + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: e5c81f0cbdcc6144df1ce468ec1bac366d8ad6e9 -commit 65380ff7e054be1454e5ab4fd7bb9c66f8fcbaa9 -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Wed Feb 17 18:27:36 2021 +1100 +commit 34afde5c73b5570d6f8cce9b49993b23b77bfb86 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Sat Apr 3 05:54:14 2021 +0000 - Only run selfhosted tests from selfhosted repo. + upstream: whitespace (tab after space) + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 0e2b3f7674e985d3f7c27ff5028e690ba1c2efd4 -commit f031366535650b88248ed7dbf23033afdf466240 +commit 7cd262c1c5a08cc7f4f30e3cab108ef089d0a57b Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Fri Jan 15 14:11:43 2021 +1100 +Date: Sat Apr 3 16:59:10 2021 +1100 - Add self-hosted runners for VMs of other platforms. - - Github only hosts a limited number of platforms, and the runner code - is only supported on slightly wider range of platforms. To increase - our test coverage beyond that, we run the runner natively on a VM host, - where it runs a jobs that boot VMs of other platforms, waits for them - to come up then runs the build and test by ssh'ing into the guest. - This means that the minimum dependencies for the guests are quite low - (basically just sshd, a compiler and make). - - The interface to the VM host is fairly simple (basically 3 scripts: - vmstartup, vmrun and vmshutdown), but those are specific to the VM host - so are not in the public repo. We also mount the working directory on the - host via sshfs, so things like artifact upload by the runner also work. - - As part of this we are moving the per-test-target configs into a single - place (.github/configs) where there will be referenced by a single short - "config" key. I plan to make the github-hosted runners use this too. - - The self-hosted runners are run off a private repo on github since that - prevents third parties from accessing them[0], and since runner quota is - limited on private repos, we avoid running the tests we run on the public - repo. - - [0] https://docs.github.com/en/actions/hosting-your-own-runners/about-self-hosted-runners#self-hosted-runner-security-with-public-repositories + Save config.h and config.log on failure too. -commit 64bbd7444d658ef7ee14a7ea5ccc7f5810279ee7 -Author: dtucker@openbsd.org -Date: Wed Feb 17 03:59:00 2021 +0000 +commit 460aee9298f365357e9fd26851c22e0dca51fd6a +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Sat Apr 3 05:46:41 2021 +0000 - upstream: Make sure puttygen is new enough to successfully run the + upstream: fix incorrect plural; from Ville Skyt - PuTTY interop tests, otherwise skip them. + =?UTF-8?q?t=C3=A4=20via=20GHPR#181?= + MIME-Version: 1.0 + Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 + Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit - OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 34565bb50b8aec58331ed02a5e9e0a9a929bef51 + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 92f31754c6296d8f403d7c293e09dc27292d22c9 -commit da0a9afcc446a30ca49dd216612c41ac3cb1f2d4 -Author: markus@openbsd.org -Date: Mon Feb 15 20:43:15 2021 +0000 +commit 082804c14e548cada75c81003a3c68ee098138ee +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Sat Apr 3 05:40:39 2021 +0000 - upstream: ssh: add PermitRemoteOpen for remote dynamic forwarding + upstream: ensure that pkcs11_del_provider() is called before exit - + + some PKCS#11 providers get upset if C_Initialize is not matched with + C_Finalize. - with SOCKS ok djm@, dtucker@ + From Adithya Baglody via GHPR#234; ok markus - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 64fe7b6360acc4ea56aa61b66498b5ecc0a96a7c + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: f8e770e03b416ee9a58f9762e162add900f832b6 -commit b696858a7f9db72a83d02cb6edaca4b30a91b386 -Author: markus@openbsd.org -Date: Mon Feb 15 20:36:35 2021 +0000 +commit 464ebc82aa926dd132ec75a0b064574ef375675e +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Sat Apr 3 05:28:43 2021 +0000 - upstream: factor out opt_array_append; ok djm@ + upstream: unused variable - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 571bc5dd35f99c5cf9de6aaeac428b168218e74a + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 85f6a394c8e0f60d15ecddda75176f112007b205 -commit ad74fc127cc45567e170e8c6dfa2cfd9767324ec -Author: dlg@openbsd.org -Date: Mon Feb 15 11:09:22 2021 +0000 +commit dc3c0be8208c488e64a8bcb7d9efad98514e0ffb +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Sat Apr 3 05:21:46 2021 +0000 - upstream: ProxyJump takes "none" to disable processing like + upstream: Fix two problems in string->argv conversion: 1) multiple + + backslashes were not being dequoted correctly and 2) quoted space in the + middle of a string was being incorrectly split. + MIME-Version: 1.0 + Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 + Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit - ProxyCommand does + A unit test for these cases has already been committed - ok djm@ jmc@ + prompted by and based on GHPR#223 by Eero Häkkinen; ok markus@ - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 941a2399da2193356bdc30b879d6e1692f18b6d3 + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: d7ef27abb4eeeaf6e167e9312e4abe9e89faf1e4 -commit 16eacdb016ccf38dd9959c78edd3a6282513aa53 -Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Fri Feb 12 03:49:09 2021 +0000 +commit f75bcbba58a08c670727ece5e3f8812125969799 +Author: Damien Miller +Date: Sat Apr 3 16:22:48 2021 +1100 - upstream: sftp: add missing lsetstat@openssh.com documentation - - patch from Mike Frysinger - - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 9c114db88d505864075bfe7888b7c8745549715b + missing bits from 259d648e -commit e04fd6dde16de1cdc5a4d9946397ff60d96568db +commit 4cbc4a722873d9b68cb5496304dc050d7168df78 Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Fri Feb 12 03:14:18 2021 +0000 +Date: Wed Mar 31 21:59:26 2021 +0000 - upstream: factor SSH_AGENT_CONSTRAIN_EXTENSION parsing into its own + upstream: cannot effectively test posix-rename extension after - function and remove an unused variable; ok dtucker@ + changes in feature advertisment. - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: e1a938657fbf7ef0ba5e73b30365734a0cc96559 + OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 5e390bf88d379162aaa81b60ed86b34cb0c54d29 -commit 1bb130ed34721d46452529d094d9bbf045607d79 -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Thu Feb 11 10:18:05 2021 +1100 +commit 259d648e63e82ade4fe2c2c73c8b67fe57d9d049 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Fri Mar 19 04:23:50 2021 +0000 - Add __NR_futex_time64 to seccomp sandbox. + upstream: add a test for misc.c:argv_split(), currently fails - This is apparently needed for (some) 32 bit platforms with glibc 2.33. - Patch from nix at esperi.org.uk and jjelen at redhat.com via bz#3260. + OpenBSD-Regress-ID: ad6b96d6ebeb9643b698b3575bdd6f78bb144200 -commit f88a7a431212a16e572ecabd559e632f369c363e -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Sat Feb 6 09:37:01 2021 +1100 +commit 473ddfc2d6b602cb2d1d897e0e5c204de145cd9a +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Fri Mar 19 03:25:01 2021 +0000 - Add a hostname function for systems that don't have it. + upstream: split - Some systems don't have a hostname command (it's not required by POSIX). - The do have uname -n (which is), but as found by tim@ some others (eg - UnixWare) do not report the FQDN from uname -n. + OpenBSD-Regress-ID: f6c03c0e4c58b3b9e04b161757b8c10dc8378c34 -commit 5e385a71ef2317856f37c91a98658eb12eb5a89c -Author: dtucker@openbsd.org -Date: Fri Feb 5 22:03:40 2021 +0000 +commit 1339800fef8d0dfbfeabff71b34670105bcfddd2 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Wed Mar 31 22:16:34 2021 +0000 - upstream: Roll back the hostname->uname change in rev 1.10. It turns + upstream: Use new limits@openssh.com protocol extension to let the - out uname -n doesn't do what we need for some platforms in portable, so we'll - fix the original problem (that some other platforms don't have hostname at - all) by providing wrapper function to implement it. + client select good limits based on what the server supports. Split the + download and upload buffer sizes to allow them to be chosen independently. - OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 827a707d6201d5a8e196a8c28aec1d2c76c52341 - -commit b446c214279de50ed8388e54897eb1be5281c894 -Author: dtucker@openbsd.org -Date: Fri Feb 5 06:01:58 2021 +0000 - - upstream: hostname is not specified by POSIX but uname -n is, so use + In practice (and assuming upgraded sftp/sftp-server at each end), this + increases the download buffer 32->64KiB and the upload buffer + 32->255KiB. - the latter for portability. Patch from Geert Hendrickx via github PR#208. + Patches from Mike Frysinger; ok dtucker@ - OpenBSD-Regress-ID: d6a79c7c4d141a0d05ade4a042eb57dddbce89f3 + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: ebd61c80d85b951b794164acc4b2f2fd8e88606c -commit 1cb6ce98d658e5fbdae025a3bd65793980e3b5d9 -Author: David Carlier -Date: Sat Nov 21 12:22:23 2020 +0000 +commit 6653c61202d104e59c8e741329fcc567f7bc36b8 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Wed Mar 31 21:58:07 2021 +0000 - Using explicit_memset for the explicit_bzero compatibility layer. + upstream: do not advertise protocol extensions that have been - Favoriting the native implementation in this case. - -commit 2e0beff67def2120f4b051b1016d7fbf84823e78 -Author: Luca Weiss -Date: Sun Nov 8 14:19:23 2020 +0100 - - Deny (non-fatal) statx in preauth privsep child. + disallowed by the command-line options (e.g. -p/-P/-R); ok dtucker@ + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 3a8a76b3f5131741aca4b41bfab8d101c9926205 -commit a35d3e911e193a652bd09eed40907e3e165b0a7b -Author: dtucker@openbsd.org -Date: Fri Feb 5 02:20:23 2021 +0000 +commit 71241fc05db4bbb11bb29340b44b92e2575373d8 +Author: Damien Miller +Date: Mon Mar 29 15:14:25 2021 +1100 - upstream: Remove debug message from sigchld handler. While this - - works on OpenBSD it can cause problems on other platforms. From kircherlike - at outlook.com via bz#3259, ok djm@ - - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 3e241d7ac1ee77e3de3651780b5dc47b283a7668 + gnome-ssh-askpass3 is a valid target here -commit 69338ab46afe9e3dfb7762ad65351d854077c998 +commit 8a9520836e71830f4fccca066dba73fea3d16bda Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Tue Feb 2 22:36:59 2021 +0000 +Date: Fri Mar 19 02:22:34 2021 +0000 - upstream: whitespace + upstream: return non-zero exit status when killed by signal; bz#3281 ok + + dtucker@ - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 544bb092e03fcbecb420196cd0f70af13ea868ad + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 117b31cf3c807993077b596bd730c24da9e9b816 -commit f71219a01d8f71c4b3ed7e456337a84ddba1653e +commit 1269b8a686bf1254b03cd38af78167a04aa6ec88 Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Tue Feb 2 22:36:46 2021 +0000 +Date: Fri Mar 19 02:18:28 2021 +0000 - upstream: fix memleaks in private key deserialisation; enforce more + upstream: increase maximum SSH2_FXP_READ to match the maximum - consistency between redundant fields in private key certificate and private - key body; ok markus@ + packet size. Also handle zero-length reads that are borderline nonsensical + but not explicitly banned by the spec. Based on patch from Mike Frysinger, + feedback deraadt@ ok dtucker@ - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: dec344e414d47f0a7adc13aecf3760fe58101240 + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 4e67d60d81bde7b84a742b4ee5a34001bdf80d9c -commit 3287790e78bf5b53c4a3cafb67bb5aa03e3910f0 +commit 860b67604416640e8db14f365adc3f840aebcb1f Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Tue Feb 2 22:35:14 2021 +0000 +Date: Tue Mar 16 06:15:43 2021 +0000 - upstream: memleak on error path; ok markus@ + upstream: don't let logging clobber errno before use - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 2091a36d6ca3980c81891a6c4bdc544e63cb13a8 + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: ce6cca370005c270c277c51c111bb6911e1680ec diff --git a/crypto/openssh/Makefile.in b/crypto/openssh/Makefile.in index c0ebfa041525..70287f51fb81 100644 --- a/crypto/openssh/Makefile.in +++ b/crypto/openssh/Makefile.in @@ -1,780 +1,785 @@ SHELL=@SH@ AUTORECONF=autoreconf prefix=@prefix@ exec_prefix=@exec_prefix@ bindir=@bindir@ sbindir=@sbindir@ libexecdir=@libexecdir@ datadir=@datadir@ datarootdir=@datarootdir@ mandir=@mandir@ mansubdir=@mansubdir@ sysconfdir=@sysconfdir@ piddir=@piddir@ srcdir=@srcdir@ top_srcdir=@top_srcdir@ abs_top_srcdir=@abs_top_srcdir@ abs_top_builddir=@abs_top_builddir@ DESTDIR= VPATH=@srcdir@ SSH_PROGRAM=@bindir@/ssh ASKPASS_PROGRAM=$(libexecdir)/ssh-askpass SFTP_SERVER=$(libexecdir)/sftp-server SSH_KEYSIGN=$(libexecdir)/ssh-keysign SSH_PKCS11_HELPER=$(libexecdir)/ssh-pkcs11-helper SSH_SK_HELPER=$(libexecdir)/ssh-sk-helper PRIVSEP_PATH=@PRIVSEP_PATH@ SSH_PRIVSEP_USER=@SSH_PRIVSEP_USER@ STRIP_OPT=@STRIP_OPT@ TEST_SHELL=@TEST_SHELL@ BUILDDIR=@abs_top_builddir@ PATHS= -DSSHDIR=\"$(sysconfdir)\" \ -D_PATH_SSH_PROGRAM=\"$(SSH_PROGRAM)\" \ -D_PATH_SSH_ASKPASS_DEFAULT=\"$(ASKPASS_PROGRAM)\" \ -D_PATH_SFTP_SERVER=\"$(SFTP_SERVER)\" \ -D_PATH_SSH_KEY_SIGN=\"$(SSH_KEYSIGN)\" \ -D_PATH_SSH_PKCS11_HELPER=\"$(SSH_PKCS11_HELPER)\" \ -D_PATH_SSH_SK_HELPER=\"$(SSH_SK_HELPER)\" \ -D_PATH_SSH_PIDDIR=\"$(piddir)\" \ -D_PATH_PRIVSEP_CHROOT_DIR=\"$(PRIVSEP_PATH)\" CC=@CC@ LD=@LD@ CFLAGS=@CFLAGS@ CFLAGS_NOPIE=@CFLAGS_NOPIE@ CPPFLAGS=-I. -I$(srcdir) @CPPFLAGS@ $(PATHS) @DEFS@ PICFLAG=@PICFLAG@ LIBS=@LIBS@ CHANNELLIBS=@CHANNELLIBS@ K5LIBS=@K5LIBS@ GSSLIBS=@GSSLIBS@ SSHDLIBS=@SSHDLIBS@ LIBEDIT=@LIBEDIT@ LIBFIDO2=@LIBFIDO2@ AR=@AR@ AWK=@AWK@ RANLIB=@RANLIB@ INSTALL=@INSTALL@ SED=@SED@ XAUTH_PATH=@XAUTH_PATH@ LDFLAGS=-L. -Lopenbsd-compat/ @LDFLAGS@ LDFLAGS_NOPIE=-L. -Lopenbsd-compat/ @LDFLAGS_NOPIE@ EXEEXT=@EXEEXT@ MANFMT=@MANFMT@ MKDIR_P=@MKDIR_P@ .SUFFIXES: .lo TARGETS=ssh$(EXEEXT) sshd$(EXEEXT) ssh-add$(EXEEXT) ssh-keygen$(EXEEXT) ssh-keyscan${EXEEXT} ssh-keysign${EXEEXT} ssh-pkcs11-helper$(EXEEXT) ssh-agent$(EXEEXT) scp$(EXEEXT) sftp-server$(EXEEXT) sftp$(EXEEXT) ssh-sk-helper$(EXEEXT) XMSS_OBJS=\ ssh-xmss.o \ sshkey-xmss.o \ xmss_commons.o \ xmss_fast.o \ xmss_hash.o \ xmss_hash_address.o \ xmss_wots.o LIBOPENSSH_OBJS=\ ssh_api.o \ ssherr.o \ sshbuf.o \ sshkey.o \ sshbuf-getput-basic.o \ sshbuf-misc.o \ sshbuf-getput-crypto.o \ krl.o \ bitmap.o \ ${XMSS_OBJS} LIBSSH_OBJS=${LIBOPENSSH_OBJS} \ authfd.o authfile.o \ canohost.o channels.o cipher.o cipher-aes.o cipher-aesctr.o \ cleanup.o \ compat.o fatal.o hostfile.o \ log.o match.o moduli.o nchan.o packet.o \ readpass.o ttymodes.o xmalloc.o addr.o addrmatch.o \ atomicio.o dispatch.o mac.o misc.o utf8.o \ monitor_fdpass.o rijndael.o ssh-dss.o ssh-ecdsa.o ssh-ecdsa-sk.o \ ssh-ed25519-sk.o ssh-rsa.o dh.o \ msg.o progressmeter.o dns.o entropy.o gss-genr.o umac.o umac128.o \ ssh-pkcs11.o smult_curve25519_ref.o \ poly1305.o chacha.o cipher-chachapoly.o cipher-chachapoly-libcrypto.o \ ssh-ed25519.o digest-openssl.o digest-libc.o \ hmac.o ed25519.o hash.o \ kex.o kexdh.o kexgex.o kexecdh.o kexc25519.o \ kexgexc.o kexgexs.o \ kexsntrup761x25519.o sntrup761.o kexgen.o \ sftp-realpath.o platform-pledge.o platform-tracing.o platform-misc.o \ sshbuf-io.o SKOBJS= ssh-sk-client.o SSHOBJS= ssh.o readconf.o clientloop.o sshtty.o \ sshconnect.o sshconnect2.o mux.o $(SKOBJS) SSHDOBJS=sshd.o auth-rhosts.o auth-passwd.o \ audit.o audit-bsm.o audit-linux.o platform.o \ sshpty.o sshlogin.o servconf.o serverloop.o \ auth.o auth2.o auth-options.o session.o \ auth2-chall.o groupaccess.o \ auth-bsdauth.o auth2-hostbased.o auth2-kbdint.o \ auth2-none.o auth2-passwd.o auth2-pubkey.o auth2-pubkeyfile.o \ monitor.o monitor_wrap.o auth-krb5.o \ auth2-gss.o gss-serv.o gss-serv-krb5.o \ loginrec.o auth-pam.o auth-shadow.o auth-sia.o \ srclimit.o sftp-server.o sftp-common.o \ sandbox-null.o sandbox-rlimit.o sandbox-systrace.o sandbox-darwin.o \ sandbox-seccomp-filter.o sandbox-capsicum.o sandbox-pledge.o \ sandbox-solaris.o uidswap.o $(SKOBJS) SFTP_CLIENT_OBJS=sftp-common.o sftp-client.o sftp-glob.o SCP_OBJS= scp.o progressmeter.o $(SFTP_CLIENT_OBJS) SSHADD_OBJS= ssh-add.o $(SKOBJS) SSHAGENT_OBJS= ssh-agent.o ssh-pkcs11-client.o $(SKOBJS) SSHKEYGEN_OBJS= ssh-keygen.o sshsig.o $(SKOBJS) SSHKEYSIGN_OBJS=ssh-keysign.o readconf.o uidswap.o $(SKOBJS) P11HELPER_OBJS= ssh-pkcs11-helper.o ssh-pkcs11.o $(SKOBJS) SKHELPER_OBJS= ssh-sk-helper.o ssh-sk.o sk-usbhid.o SSHKEYSCAN_OBJS=ssh-keyscan.o $(SKOBJS) SFTPSERVER_OBJS=sftp-common.o sftp-server.o sftp-server-main.o SFTP_OBJS= sftp.o sftp-usergroup.o progressmeter.o $(SFTP_CLIENT_OBJS) MANPAGES = moduli.5.out scp.1.out ssh-add.1.out ssh-agent.1.out ssh-keygen.1.out ssh-keyscan.1.out ssh.1.out sshd.8.out sftp-server.8.out sftp.1.out ssh-keysign.8.out ssh-pkcs11-helper.8.out ssh-sk-helper.8.out sshd_config.5.out ssh_config.5.out MANPAGES_IN = moduli.5 scp.1 ssh-add.1 ssh-agent.1 ssh-keygen.1 ssh-keyscan.1 ssh.1 sshd.8 sftp-server.8 sftp.1 ssh-keysign.8 ssh-pkcs11-helper.8 ssh-sk-helper.8 sshd_config.5 ssh_config.5 MANTYPE = @MANTYPE@ CONFIGFILES=sshd_config.out ssh_config.out moduli.out CONFIGFILES_IN=sshd_config ssh_config moduli PATHSUBS = \ -e 's|/etc/ssh/ssh_config|$(sysconfdir)/ssh_config|g' \ -e 's|/etc/ssh/ssh_known_hosts|$(sysconfdir)/ssh_known_hosts|g' \ -e 's|/etc/ssh/sshd_config|$(sysconfdir)/sshd_config|g' \ -e 's|/usr/libexec|$(libexecdir)|g' \ -e 's|/etc/shosts.equiv|$(sysconfdir)/shosts.equiv|g' \ -e 's|/etc/ssh/ssh_host_key|$(sysconfdir)/ssh_host_key|g' \ -e 's|/etc/ssh/ssh_host_ecdsa_key|$(sysconfdir)/ssh_host_ecdsa_key|g' \ -e 's|/etc/ssh/ssh_host_dsa_key|$(sysconfdir)/ssh_host_dsa_key|g' \ -e 's|/etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key|$(sysconfdir)/ssh_host_rsa_key|g' \ -e 's|/etc/ssh/ssh_host_ed25519_key|$(sysconfdir)/ssh_host_ed25519_key|g' \ -e 's|/var/run/sshd.pid|$(piddir)/sshd.pid|g' \ -e 's|/etc/moduli|$(sysconfdir)/moduli|g' \ -e 's|/etc/ssh/moduli|$(sysconfdir)/moduli|g' \ -e 's|/etc/ssh/sshrc|$(sysconfdir)/sshrc|g' \ -e 's|/usr/X11R6/bin/xauth|$(XAUTH_PATH)|g' \ -e 's|/var/empty|$(PRIVSEP_PATH)|g' \ -e 's|/usr/bin:/bin:/usr/sbin:/sbin|@user_path@|g' FIXPATHSCMD = $(SED) $(PATHSUBS) FIXALGORITHMSCMD= $(SHELL) $(srcdir)/fixalgorithms $(SED) \ @UNSUPPORTED_ALGORITHMS@ all: $(CONFIGFILES) $(MANPAGES) $(TARGETS) $(LIBSSH_OBJS): Makefile.in config.h $(SSHOBJS): Makefile.in config.h $(SSHDOBJS): Makefile.in config.h .c.o: $(CC) $(CFLAGS) $(CPPFLAGS) -c $< -o $@ LIBCOMPAT=openbsd-compat/libopenbsd-compat.a $(LIBCOMPAT): always (cd openbsd-compat && $(MAKE)) always: libssh.a: $(LIBSSH_OBJS) $(AR) rv $@ $(LIBSSH_OBJS) $(RANLIB) $@ ssh$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a $(SSHOBJS) $(LD) -o $@ $(SSHOBJS) $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS) $(GSSLIBS) $(CHANNELLIBS) sshd$(EXEEXT): libssh.a $(LIBCOMPAT) $(SSHDOBJS) $(LD) -o $@ $(SSHDOBJS) $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(SSHDLIBS) $(LIBS) $(GSSLIBS) $(K5LIBS) $(CHANNELLIBS) scp$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a $(SCP_OBJS) $(LD) -o $@ $(SCP_OBJS) $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS) ssh-add$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a $(SSHADD_OBJS) $(LD) -o $@ $(SSHADD_OBJS) $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS) $(CHANNELLIBS) ssh-agent$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a $(SSHAGENT_OBJS) $(LD) -o $@ $(SSHAGENT_OBJS) $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS) $(CHANNELLIBS) ssh-keygen$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a $(SSHKEYGEN_OBJS) $(LD) -o $@ $(SSHKEYGEN_OBJS) $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS) $(CHANNELLIBS) ssh-keysign$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a $(SSHKEYSIGN_OBJS) $(LD) -o $@ $(SSHKEYSIGN_OBJS) $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS) $(CHANNELLIBS) ssh-pkcs11-helper$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a $(P11HELPER_OBJS) $(LD) -o $@ $(P11HELPER_OBJS) $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS) $(CHANNELLIBS) ssh-sk-helper$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a $(SKHELPER_OBJS) $(LD) -o $@ $(SKHELPER_OBJS) $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS) $(LIBFIDO2) $(CHANNELLIBS) ssh-keyscan$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a $(SSHKEYSCAN_OBJS) $(LD) -o $@ $(SSHKEYSCAN_OBJS) $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh $(LIBS) $(CHANNELLIBS) sftp-server$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a $(SFTPSERVER_OBJS) $(LD) -o $@ $(SFTPSERVER_OBJS) $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh $(LIBS) sftp$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a $(SFTP_OBJS) $(LD) -o $@ $(SFTP_OBJS) $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS) $(LIBEDIT) # test driver for the loginrec code - not built by default logintest: logintest.o $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a loginrec.o $(LD) -o $@ logintest.o $(LDFLAGS) loginrec.o -lopenbsd-compat -lssh $(LIBS) $(MANPAGES): $(MANPAGES_IN) if test "$(MANTYPE)" = "cat"; then \ manpage=$(srcdir)/`echo $@ | sed 's/\.[1-9]\.out$$/\.0/'`; \ else \ manpage=$(srcdir)/`echo $@ | sed 's/\.out$$//'`; \ fi; \ if test "$(MANTYPE)" = "man"; then \ $(FIXPATHSCMD) $${manpage} | $(FIXALGORITHMSCMD) | \ $(AWK) -f $(srcdir)/mdoc2man.awk > $@; \ else \ $(FIXPATHSCMD) $${manpage} | $(FIXALGORITHMSCMD) > $@; \ fi $(CONFIGFILES): $(CONFIGFILES_IN) conffile=`echo $@ | sed 's/.out$$//'`; \ $(FIXPATHSCMD) $(srcdir)/$${conffile} > $@ # fake rule to stop make trying to compile moduli.o into a binary "moduli.o" moduli: echo clean: regressclean rm -f *.o *.lo *.a $(TARGETS) logintest config.cache config.log rm -f *.out core survey rm -f regress/check-perm$(EXEEXT) rm -f regress/mkdtemp$(EXEEXT) rm -f regress/unittests/test_helper/*.a rm -f regress/unittests/test_helper/*.o rm -f regress/unittests/authopt/*.o rm -f regress/unittests/authopt/test_authopt$(EXEEXT) rm -f regress/unittests/bitmap/*.o rm -f regress/unittests/bitmap/test_bitmap$(EXEEXT) rm -f regress/unittests/conversion/*.o rm -f regress/unittests/conversion/test_conversion$(EXEEXT) rm -f regress/unittests/hostkeys/*.o rm -f regress/unittests/hostkeys/test_hostkeys$(EXEEXT) rm -f regress/unittests/kex/*.o rm -f regress/unittests/kex/test_kex$(EXEEXT) rm -f regress/unittests/match/*.o rm -f regress/unittests/match/test_match$(EXEEXT) rm -f regress/unittests/misc/*.o rm -f regress/unittests/misc/test_misc$(EXEEXT) rm -f regress/unittests/sshbuf/*.o rm -f regress/unittests/sshbuf/test_sshbuf$(EXEEXT) rm -f regress/unittests/sshkey/*.o rm -f regress/unittests/sshkey/test_sshkey$(EXEEXT) rm -f regress/unittests/sshsig/*.o rm -f regress/unittests/sshsig/test_sshsig$(EXEEXT) rm -f regress/unittests/utf8/*.o rm -f regress/unittests/utf8/test_utf8$(EXEEXT) rm -f regress/misc/sk-dummy/*.o rm -f regress/misc/sk-dummy/*.lo rm -f regress/misc/sk-dummy/sk-dummy.so (cd openbsd-compat && $(MAKE) clean) distclean: regressclean rm -f *.o *.a $(TARGETS) logintest config.cache config.log rm -f *.out core opensshd.init openssh.xml rm -f Makefile buildpkg.sh config.h config.status rm -f survey.sh openbsd-compat/regress/Makefile *~ rm -rf autom4te.cache rm -f regress/check-perm rm -f regress/mkdtemp rm -f regress/unittests/test_helper/*.a rm -f regress/unittests/test_helper/*.o rm -f regress/unittests/authopt/*.o rm -f regress/unittests/authopt/test_authopt rm -f regress/unittests/bitmap/*.o rm -f regress/unittests/bitmap/test_bitmap rm -f regress/unittests/conversion/*.o rm -f regress/unittests/conversion/test_conversion rm -f regress/unittests/hostkeys/*.o rm -f regress/unittests/hostkeys/test_hostkeys rm -f regress/unittests/kex/*.o rm -f regress/unittests/kex/test_kex rm -f regress/unittests/match/*.o rm -f regress/unittests/match/test_match rm -f regress/unittests/misc/*.o rm -f regress/unittests/misc/test_misc rm -f regress/unittests/sshbuf/*.o rm -f regress/unittests/sshbuf/test_sshbuf rm -f regress/unittests/sshkey/*.o rm -f regress/unittests/sshkey/test_sshkey rm -f regress/unittests/sshsig/*.o rm -f regress/unittests/sshsig/test_sshsig rm -f regress/unittests/utf8/*.o rm -f regress/unittests/utf8/test_utf8 rm -f regress/misc/sk-dummy/*.o rm -f regress/misc/sk-dummy/*.lo rm -f regress/misc/sk-dummy/sk-dummy.so (cd openbsd-compat && $(MAKE) distclean) if test -d pkg ; then \ rm -fr pkg ; \ fi veryclean: distclean rm -f configure config.h.in *.0 cleandir: veryclean mrproper: veryclean realclean: veryclean catman-do: @for f in $(MANPAGES_IN) ; do \ base=`echo $$f | sed 's/\..*$$//'` ; \ echo "$$f -> $$base.0" ; \ $(MANFMT) $$f | cat -v | sed -e 's/.\^H//g' \ >$$base.0 ; \ done depend: depend-rebuild rm -f .depend.bak depend-rebuild: mv .depend .depend.old rm -f config.h .depend touch config.h .depend makedepend -w1000 -Y. -f .depend *.c 2>/dev/null (echo '# Automatically generated by makedepend.'; \ echo '# Run "make depend" to rebuild.'; sort .depend ) >.depend.tmp mv .depend.tmp .depend rm -f .depend.bak mv .depend.old .depend.bak rm -f config.h depend-check: depend-rebuild cmp .depend .depend.bak || (echo .depend stale && exit 1) distprep: catman-do depend-check $(AUTORECONF) -rm -rf autom4te.cache .depend.bak install: $(CONFIGFILES) $(MANPAGES) $(TARGETS) install-files install-sysconf host-key check-config install-nokeys: $(CONFIGFILES) $(MANPAGES) $(TARGETS) install-files install-sysconf install-nosysconf: $(CONFIGFILES) $(MANPAGES) $(TARGETS) install-files check-config: -$(DESTDIR)$(sbindir)/sshd -t -f $(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir)/sshd_config install-files: $(MKDIR_P) $(DESTDIR)$(bindir) $(MKDIR_P) $(DESTDIR)$(sbindir) $(MKDIR_P) $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1 $(MKDIR_P) $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)5 $(MKDIR_P) $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)8 $(MKDIR_P) $(DESTDIR)$(libexecdir) $(MKDIR_P) -m 0755 $(DESTDIR)$(PRIVSEP_PATH) $(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) ssh$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/ssh$(EXEEXT) $(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) scp$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/scp$(EXEEXT) $(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) ssh-add$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/ssh-add$(EXEEXT) $(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) ssh-agent$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/ssh-agent$(EXEEXT) $(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) ssh-keygen$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/ssh-keygen$(EXEEXT) $(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) ssh-keyscan$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/ssh-keyscan$(EXEEXT) $(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) sshd$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(sbindir)/sshd$(EXEEXT) $(INSTALL) -m 4711 $(STRIP_OPT) ssh-keysign$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(SSH_KEYSIGN)$(EXEEXT) $(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) ssh-pkcs11-helper$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(SSH_PKCS11_HELPER)$(EXEEXT) $(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) ssh-sk-helper$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(SSH_SK_HELPER)$(EXEEXT) $(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) sftp$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/sftp$(EXEEXT) $(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) sftp-server$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(SFTP_SERVER)$(EXEEXT) $(INSTALL) -m 644 ssh.1.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1/ssh.1 $(INSTALL) -m 644 scp.1.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1/scp.1 $(INSTALL) -m 644 ssh-add.1.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1/ssh-add.1 $(INSTALL) -m 644 ssh-agent.1.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1/ssh-agent.1 $(INSTALL) -m 644 ssh-keygen.1.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1/ssh-keygen.1 $(INSTALL) -m 644 ssh-keyscan.1.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1/ssh-keyscan.1 $(INSTALL) -m 644 moduli.5.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)5/moduli.5 $(INSTALL) -m 644 sshd_config.5.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)5/sshd_config.5 $(INSTALL) -m 644 ssh_config.5.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)5/ssh_config.5 $(INSTALL) -m 644 sshd.8.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)8/sshd.8 $(INSTALL) -m 644 sftp.1.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1/sftp.1 $(INSTALL) -m 644 sftp-server.8.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)8/sftp-server.8 $(INSTALL) -m 644 ssh-keysign.8.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)8/ssh-keysign.8 $(INSTALL) -m 644 ssh-pkcs11-helper.8.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)8/ssh-pkcs11-helper.8 $(INSTALL) -m 644 ssh-sk-helper.8.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)8/ssh-sk-helper.8 install-sysconf: $(MKDIR_P) $(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir) @if [ ! -f $(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir)/ssh_config ]; then \ $(INSTALL) -m 644 ssh_config.out $(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir)/ssh_config; \ else \ echo "$(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir)/ssh_config already exists, install will not overwrite"; \ fi @if [ ! -f $(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir)/sshd_config ]; then \ $(INSTALL) -m 644 sshd_config.out $(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir)/sshd_config; \ else \ echo "$(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir)/sshd_config already exists, install will not overwrite"; \ fi @if [ ! -f $(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir)/moduli ]; then \ if [ -f $(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir)/primes ]; then \ echo "moving $(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir)/primes to $(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir)/moduli"; \ mv "$(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir)/primes" "$(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir)/moduli"; \ else \ $(INSTALL) -m 644 moduli.out $(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir)/moduli; \ fi ; \ else \ echo "$(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir)/moduli already exists, install will not overwrite"; \ fi host-key: ssh-keygen$(EXEEXT) @if [ -z "$(DESTDIR)" ] ; then \ ./ssh-keygen -A; \ fi host-key-force: ssh-keygen$(EXEEXT) ssh$(EXEEXT) ./ssh-keygen -t dsa -f $(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir)/ssh_host_dsa_key -N "" ./ssh-keygen -t rsa -f $(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir)/ssh_host_rsa_key -N "" ./ssh-keygen -t ed25519 -f $(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir)/ssh_host_ed25519_key -N "" if ./ssh -Q key | grep ecdsa >/dev/null ; then \ ./ssh-keygen -t ecdsa -f $(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir)/ssh_host_ecdsa_key -N ""; \ fi uninstallall: uninstall -rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir)/ssh_config -rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir)/sshd_config -rmdir $(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir) -rmdir $(DESTDIR)$(bindir) -rmdir $(DESTDIR)$(sbindir) -rmdir $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1 -rmdir $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)8 -rmdir $(DESTDIR)$(mandir) -rmdir $(DESTDIR)$(libexecdir) uninstall: -rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/ssh$(EXEEXT) -rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/scp$(EXEEXT) -rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/ssh-add$(EXEEXT) -rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/ssh-agent$(EXEEXT) -rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/ssh-keygen$(EXEEXT) -rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/ssh-keyscan$(EXEEXT) -rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/sftp$(EXEEXT) -rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(sbindir)/sshd$(EXEEXT) -rm -r $(DESTDIR)$(SFTP_SERVER)$(EXEEXT) -rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(SSH_KEYSIGN)$(EXEEXT) -rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(SSH_PKCS11_HELPER)$(EXEEXT) -rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(SSH_SK_HELPER)$(EXEEXT) -rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1/ssh.1 -rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1/scp.1 -rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1/ssh-add.1 -rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1/ssh-agent.1 -rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1/ssh-keygen.1 -rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1/sftp.1 -rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1/ssh-keyscan.1 -rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)8/sshd.8 -rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)8/sftp-server.8 -rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)8/ssh-keysign.8 -rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)8/ssh-pkcs11-helper.8 -rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)8/ssh-sk-helper.8 regress-prep: $(MKDIR_P) `pwd`/regress/unittests/test_helper $(MKDIR_P) `pwd`/regress/unittests/authopt $(MKDIR_P) `pwd`/regress/unittests/bitmap $(MKDIR_P) `pwd`/regress/unittests/conversion $(MKDIR_P) `pwd`/regress/unittests/hostkeys $(MKDIR_P) `pwd`/regress/unittests/kex $(MKDIR_P) `pwd`/regress/unittests/match $(MKDIR_P) `pwd`/regress/unittests/misc $(MKDIR_P) `pwd`/regress/unittests/sshbuf $(MKDIR_P) `pwd`/regress/unittests/sshkey $(MKDIR_P) `pwd`/regress/unittests/sshsig $(MKDIR_P) `pwd`/regress/unittests/utf8 $(MKDIR_P) `pwd`/regress/misc/sk-dummy [ -f `pwd`/regress/Makefile ] || \ ln -s `cd $(srcdir) && pwd`/regress/Makefile `pwd`/regress/Makefile REGRESSLIBS=libssh.a $(LIBCOMPAT) TESTLIBS=$(LIBS) $(CHANNELLIBS) regress/modpipe$(EXEEXT): $(srcdir)/regress/modpipe.c $(REGRESSLIBS) $(CC) $(CFLAGS) $(CPPFLAGS) -o $@ $(srcdir)/regress/modpipe.c \ $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(TESTLIBS) +regress/timestamp$(EXEEXT): $(srcdir)/regress/timestamp.c $(REGRESSLIBS) + $(CC) $(CFLAGS) $(CPPFLAGS) -o $@ $(srcdir)/regress/timestamp.c \ + $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(TESTLIBS) + regress/setuid-allowed$(EXEEXT): $(srcdir)/regress/setuid-allowed.c $(REGRESSLIBS) $(CC) $(CFLAGS) $(CPPFLAGS) -o $@ $(srcdir)/regress/setuid-allowed.c \ $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(TESTLIBS) regress/netcat$(EXEEXT): $(srcdir)/regress/netcat.c $(REGRESSLIBS) $(CC) $(CFLAGS) $(CPPFLAGS) -o $@ $(srcdir)/regress/netcat.c \ $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(TESTLIBS) regress/check-perm$(EXEEXT): $(srcdir)/regress/check-perm.c $(REGRESSLIBS) $(CC) $(CFLAGS) $(CPPFLAGS) -o $@ $(srcdir)/regress/check-perm.c \ $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(TESTLIBS) regress/mkdtemp$(EXEEXT): $(srcdir)/regress/mkdtemp.c $(REGRESSLIBS) $(CC) $(CFLAGS) $(CPPFLAGS) -o $@ $(srcdir)/regress/mkdtemp.c \ $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(TESTLIBS) UNITTESTS_TEST_HELPER_OBJS=\ regress/unittests/test_helper/test_helper.o \ regress/unittests/test_helper/fuzz.o regress/unittests/test_helper/libtest_helper.a: ${UNITTESTS_TEST_HELPER_OBJS} $(AR) rv $@ $(UNITTESTS_TEST_HELPER_OBJS) $(RANLIB) $@ UNITTESTS_TEST_SSHBUF_OBJS=\ regress/unittests/sshbuf/tests.o \ regress/unittests/sshbuf/test_sshbuf.o \ regress/unittests/sshbuf/test_sshbuf_getput_basic.o \ regress/unittests/sshbuf/test_sshbuf_getput_crypto.o \ regress/unittests/sshbuf/test_sshbuf_misc.o \ regress/unittests/sshbuf/test_sshbuf_fuzz.o \ regress/unittests/sshbuf/test_sshbuf_getput_fuzz.o \ regress/unittests/sshbuf/test_sshbuf_fixed.o regress/unittests/sshbuf/test_sshbuf$(EXEEXT): ${UNITTESTS_TEST_SSHBUF_OBJS} \ regress/unittests/test_helper/libtest_helper.a libssh.a $(LD) -o $@ $(LDFLAGS) $(UNITTESTS_TEST_SSHBUF_OBJS) \ regress/unittests/test_helper/libtest_helper.a \ -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(TESTLIBS) UNITTESTS_TEST_SSHKEY_OBJS=\ regress/unittests/sshkey/test_fuzz.o \ regress/unittests/sshkey/tests.o \ regress/unittests/sshkey/common.o \ regress/unittests/sshkey/test_file.o \ regress/unittests/sshkey/test_sshkey.o \ $(SKOBJS) regress/unittests/sshkey/test_sshkey$(EXEEXT): ${UNITTESTS_TEST_SSHKEY_OBJS} \ regress/unittests/test_helper/libtest_helper.a libssh.a $(LD) -o $@ $(LDFLAGS) $(UNITTESTS_TEST_SSHKEY_OBJS) \ regress/unittests/test_helper/libtest_helper.a \ -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(TESTLIBS) UNITTESTS_TEST_SSHSIG_OBJS=\ sshsig.o \ regress/unittests/sshsig/tests.o \ $(SKOBJS) regress/unittests/sshsig/test_sshsig$(EXEEXT): ${UNITTESTS_TEST_SSHSIG_OBJS} \ regress/unittests/test_helper/libtest_helper.a libssh.a $(LD) -o $@ $(LDFLAGS) $(UNITTESTS_TEST_SSHSIG_OBJS) \ regress/unittests/test_helper/libtest_helper.a \ -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(TESTLIBS) UNITTESTS_TEST_BITMAP_OBJS=\ regress/unittests/bitmap/tests.o regress/unittests/bitmap/test_bitmap$(EXEEXT): ${UNITTESTS_TEST_BITMAP_OBJS} \ regress/unittests/test_helper/libtest_helper.a libssh.a $(LD) -o $@ $(LDFLAGS) $(UNITTESTS_TEST_BITMAP_OBJS) \ regress/unittests/test_helper/libtest_helper.a \ -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(TESTLIBS) UNITTESTS_TEST_AUTHOPT_OBJS=\ regress/unittests/authopt/tests.o \ auth-options.o \ $(SKOBJS) regress/unittests/authopt/test_authopt$(EXEEXT): \ ${UNITTESTS_TEST_AUTHOPT_OBJS} \ regress/unittests/test_helper/libtest_helper.a libssh.a $(LD) -o $@ $(LDFLAGS) $(UNITTESTS_TEST_AUTHOPT_OBJS) \ regress/unittests/test_helper/libtest_helper.a \ -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(TESTLIBS) UNITTESTS_TEST_CONVERSION_OBJS=\ regress/unittests/conversion/tests.o regress/unittests/conversion/test_conversion$(EXEEXT): \ ${UNITTESTS_TEST_CONVERSION_OBJS} \ regress/unittests/test_helper/libtest_helper.a libssh.a $(LD) -o $@ $(LDFLAGS) $(UNITTESTS_TEST_CONVERSION_OBJS) \ regress/unittests/test_helper/libtest_helper.a \ -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(TESTLIBS) UNITTESTS_TEST_KEX_OBJS=\ regress/unittests/kex/tests.o \ regress/unittests/kex/test_kex.o \ regress/unittests/kex/test_proposal.o \ $(SKOBJS) regress/unittests/kex/test_kex$(EXEEXT): ${UNITTESTS_TEST_KEX_OBJS} \ regress/unittests/test_helper/libtest_helper.a libssh.a $(LD) -o $@ $(LDFLAGS) $(UNITTESTS_TEST_KEX_OBJS) \ regress/unittests/test_helper/libtest_helper.a \ -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(TESTLIBS) UNITTESTS_TEST_HOSTKEYS_OBJS=\ regress/unittests/hostkeys/tests.o \ regress/unittests/hostkeys/test_iterate.o \ $(SKOBJS) regress/unittests/hostkeys/test_hostkeys$(EXEEXT): \ ${UNITTESTS_TEST_HOSTKEYS_OBJS} \ regress/unittests/test_helper/libtest_helper.a libssh.a $(LD) -o $@ $(LDFLAGS) $(UNITTESTS_TEST_HOSTKEYS_OBJS) \ regress/unittests/test_helper/libtest_helper.a \ -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(TESTLIBS) UNITTESTS_TEST_MATCH_OBJS=\ regress/unittests/match/tests.o regress/unittests/match/test_match$(EXEEXT): \ ${UNITTESTS_TEST_MATCH_OBJS} \ regress/unittests/test_helper/libtest_helper.a libssh.a $(LD) -o $@ $(LDFLAGS) $(UNITTESTS_TEST_MATCH_OBJS) \ regress/unittests/test_helper/libtest_helper.a \ -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(TESTLIBS) UNITTESTS_TEST_MISC_OBJS=\ regress/unittests/misc/tests.o \ regress/unittests/misc/test_parse.o \ regress/unittests/misc/test_expand.o \ regress/unittests/misc/test_convtime.o \ regress/unittests/misc/test_argv.o \ regress/unittests/misc/test_strdelim.o \ regress/unittests/misc/test_hpdelim.o \ regress/unittests/misc/test_ptimeout.o regress/unittests/misc/test_misc$(EXEEXT): \ ${UNITTESTS_TEST_MISC_OBJS} \ regress/unittests/test_helper/libtest_helper.a libssh.a $(LD) -o $@ $(LDFLAGS) $(UNITTESTS_TEST_MISC_OBJS) \ regress/unittests/test_helper/libtest_helper.a \ -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(TESTLIBS) UNITTESTS_TEST_UTF8_OBJS=\ regress/unittests/utf8/tests.o regress/unittests/utf8/test_utf8$(EXEEXT): \ ${UNITTESTS_TEST_UTF8_OBJS} \ regress/unittests/test_helper/libtest_helper.a libssh.a $(LD) -o $@ $(LDFLAGS) $(UNITTESTS_TEST_UTF8_OBJS) \ regress/unittests/test_helper/libtest_helper.a \ -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(TESTLIBS) # These all need to be compiled -fPIC, so they are treated differently. SK_DUMMY_OBJS=\ regress/misc/sk-dummy/sk-dummy.lo \ regress/misc/sk-dummy/fatal.lo \ ed25519.lo hash.lo SK_DUMMY_LIBRARY=@SK_DUMMY_LIBRARY@ .c.lo: Makefile.in config.h $(CC) $(CFLAGS_NOPIE) $(PICFLAG) $(CPPFLAGS) -c $< -o $@ regress/misc/sk-dummy/sk-dummy.so: $(SK_DUMMY_OBJS) $(CC) $(CFLAGS) $(CPPFLAGS) $(PICFLAG) -shared -o $@ $(SK_DUMMY_OBJS) \ -L. -Lopenbsd-compat -lopenbsd-compat $(LDFLAGS_NOPIE) $(TESTLIBS) regress-binaries: regress-prep $(LIBCOMPAT) \ regress/modpipe$(EXEEXT) \ + regress/timestamp$(EXEEXT) \ regress/setuid-allowed$(EXEEXT) \ regress/netcat$(EXEEXT) \ regress/check-perm$(EXEEXT) \ regress/mkdtemp$(EXEEXT) \ $(SK_DUMMY_LIBRARY) regress-unit-binaries: regress-prep $(REGRESSLIBS) \ regress/unittests/authopt/test_authopt$(EXEEXT) \ regress/unittests/bitmap/test_bitmap$(EXEEXT) \ regress/unittests/conversion/test_conversion$(EXEEXT) \ regress/unittests/hostkeys/test_hostkeys$(EXEEXT) \ regress/unittests/kex/test_kex$(EXEEXT) \ regress/unittests/match/test_match$(EXEEXT) \ regress/unittests/misc/test_misc$(EXEEXT) \ regress/unittests/sshbuf/test_sshbuf$(EXEEXT) \ regress/unittests/sshkey/test_sshkey$(EXEEXT) \ regress/unittests/sshsig/test_sshsig$(EXEEXT) \ regress/unittests/utf8/test_utf8$(EXEEXT) tests: file-tests t-exec interop-tests unit echo all tests passed unit: regress-unit-binaries cd $(srcdir)/regress || exit $$?; \ $(MAKE) \ .CURDIR="$(abs_top_srcdir)/regress" \ .OBJDIR="$(BUILDDIR)/regress" \ OBJ="$(BUILDDIR)/regress" \ $@ && echo $@ tests passed interop-tests t-exec file-tests: regress-prep regress-binaries $(TARGETS) cd $(srcdir)/regress || exit $$?; \ EGREP='@EGREP@' \ OPENSSL_BIN='@OPENSSL_BIN@' \ $(MAKE) \ .CURDIR="$(abs_top_srcdir)/regress" \ .OBJDIR="$(BUILDDIR)/regress" \ BUILDDIR="$(BUILDDIR)" \ OBJ="$(BUILDDIR)/regress" \ PATH="$(BUILDDIR):$${PATH}" \ TEST_ENV=MALLOC_OPTIONS="@TEST_MALLOC_OPTIONS@" \ TEST_MALLOC_OPTIONS="@TEST_MALLOC_OPTIONS@" \ TEST_SSH_SCP="$(BUILDDIR)/scp" \ TEST_SSH_SSH="$(BUILDDIR)/ssh" \ TEST_SSH_SSHD="$(BUILDDIR)/sshd" \ TEST_SSH_SSHAGENT="$(BUILDDIR)/ssh-agent" \ TEST_SSH_SSHADD="$(BUILDDIR)/ssh-add" \ TEST_SSH_SSHKEYGEN="$(BUILDDIR)/ssh-keygen" \ TEST_SSH_SSHPKCS11HELPER="$(BUILDDIR)/ssh-pkcs11-helper" \ TEST_SSH_SSHKEYSCAN="$(BUILDDIR)/ssh-keyscan" \ TEST_SSH_SFTP="$(BUILDDIR)/sftp" \ TEST_SSH_PKCS11_HELPER="$(BUILDDIR)/ssh-pkcs11-helper" \ TEST_SSH_SK_HELPER="$(BUILDDIR)/ssh-sk-helper" \ TEST_SSH_SFTPSERVER="$(BUILDDIR)/sftp-server" \ TEST_SSH_MODULI_FILE="$(abs_top_srcdir)/moduli" \ TEST_SSH_PLINK="plink" \ TEST_SSH_PUTTYGEN="puttygen" \ TEST_SSH_CONCH="conch" \ TEST_SSH_IPV6="@TEST_SSH_IPV6@" \ TEST_SSH_UTF8="@TEST_SSH_UTF8@" \ TEST_SHELL="$(TEST_SHELL)" \ EXEEXT="$(EXEEXT)" \ $@ && echo all $@ passed compat-tests: $(LIBCOMPAT) (cd openbsd-compat/regress && $(MAKE)) regressclean: if [ -f regress/Makefile ] && [ -r regress/Makefile ]; then \ (cd regress && $(MAKE) clean) \ fi survey: survey.sh ssh @$(SHELL) ./survey.sh > survey @echo 'The survey results have been placed in the file "survey" in the' @echo 'current directory. Please review the file then send with' @echo '"make send-survey".' send-survey: survey mail portable-survey@mindrot.org Miscellania - This version of OpenSSH is based upon code retrieved from the OpenBSD CVS repository which in turn was based on the last free sample implementation released by Tatu Ylonen. References - [0] https://www.openssh.com/ [1] https://man.openbsd.org/style.9 diff --git a/crypto/openssh/README.md b/crypto/openssh/README.md index 3da933817989..9431b0ffdd89 100644 --- a/crypto/openssh/README.md +++ b/crypto/openssh/README.md @@ -1,85 +1,86 @@ # Portable OpenSSH [![C/C++ CI](https://github.com/openssh/openssh-portable/actions/workflows/c-cpp.yml/badge.svg)](https://github.com/openssh/openssh-portable/actions/workflows/c-cpp.yml) [![Fuzzing Status](https://oss-fuzz-build-logs.storage.googleapis.com/badges/openssh.svg)](https://bugs.chromium.org/p/oss-fuzz/issues/list?sort=-opened&can=1&q=proj:openssh) +[![Coverity Status](https://scan.coverity.com/projects/21341/badge.svg)](https://scan.coverity.com/projects/openssh-portable) OpenSSH is a complete implementation of the SSH protocol (version 2) for secure remote login, command execution and file transfer. It includes a client ``ssh`` and server ``sshd``, file transfer utilities ``scp`` and ``sftp`` as well as tools for key generation (``ssh-keygen``), run-time key storage (``ssh-agent``) and a number of supporting programs. This is a port of OpenBSD's [OpenSSH](https://openssh.com) to most Unix-like operating systems, including Linux, OS X and Cygwin. Portable OpenSSH polyfills OpenBSD APIs that are not available elsewhere, adds sshd sandboxing for more operating systems and includes support for OS-native authentication and auditing (e.g. using PAM). ## Documentation The official documentation for OpenSSH are the man pages for each tool: * [ssh(1)](https://man.openbsd.org/ssh.1) * [sshd(8)](https://man.openbsd.org/sshd.8) * [ssh-keygen(1)](https://man.openbsd.org/ssh-keygen.1) * [ssh-agent(1)](https://man.openbsd.org/ssh-agent.1) * [scp(1)](https://man.openbsd.org/scp.1) * [sftp(1)](https://man.openbsd.org/sftp.1) * [ssh-keyscan(8)](https://man.openbsd.org/ssh-keyscan.8) * [sftp-server(8)](https://man.openbsd.org/sftp-server.8) ## Stable Releases Stable release tarballs are available from a number of [download mirrors](https://www.openssh.com/portable.html#downloads). We recommend the use of a stable release for most users. Please read the [release notes](https://www.openssh.com/releasenotes.html) for details of recent changes and potential incompatibilities. ## Building Portable OpenSSH ### Dependencies Portable OpenSSH is built using autoconf and make. It requires a working C compiler, standard library and headers. ``libcrypto`` from either [LibreSSL](https://www.libressl.org/) or [OpenSSL](https://www.openssl.org) may also be used. OpenSSH may be built without either of these, but the resulting binaries will have only a subset of the cryptographic algorithms normally available. [zlib](https://www.zlib.net/) is optional; without it transport compression is not supported. FIDO security token support needs [libfido2](https://github.com/Yubico/libfido2) and its dependencies and will be enabled automatically if they are found. In addition, certain platforms and build-time options may require additional dependencies; see README.platform for details about your platform. ### Building a release Releases include a pre-built copy of the ``configure`` script and may be built using: ``` tar zxvf openssh-X.YpZ.tar.gz cd openssh ./configure # [options] make && make tests ``` See the [Build-time Customisation](#build-time-customisation) section below for configure options. If you plan on installing OpenSSH to your system, then you will usually want to specify destination paths. ### Building from git If building from git, you'll need [autoconf](https://www.gnu.org/software/autoconf/) installed to build the ``configure`` script. The following commands will check out and build portable OpenSSH from git: ``` git clone https://github.com/openssh/openssh-portable # or https://anongit.mindrot.org/openssh.git cd openssh-portable autoreconf ./configure make && make tests ``` ### Build-time Customisation There are many build-time customisation options available. All Autoconf destination path flags (e.g. ``--prefix``) are supported (and are usually required if you want to install OpenSSH). For a full list of available flags, run ``./configure --help`` but a few of the more frequently-used ones are described below. Some of these flags will require additional libraries and/or headers be installed. Flag | Meaning --- | --- ``--with-pam`` | Enable [PAM](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pluggable_authentication_module) support. [OpenPAM](https://www.openpam.org/), [Linux PAM](http://www.linux-pam.org/) and Solaris PAM are supported. ``--with-libedit`` | Enable [libedit](https://www.thrysoee.dk/editline/) support for sftp. ``--with-kerberos5`` | Enable Kerberos/GSSAPI support. Both [Heimdal](https://www.h5l.org/) and [MIT](https://web.mit.edu/kerberos/) Kerberos implementations are supported. ``--with-selinux`` | Enable [SELinux](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Security-Enhanced_Linux) support. ## Development Portable OpenSSH development is discussed on the [openssh-unix-dev mailing list](https://lists.mindrot.org/mailman/listinfo/openssh-unix-dev) ([archive mirror](https://marc.info/?l=openssh-unix-dev)). Bugs and feature requests are tracked on our [Bugzilla](https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/). ## Reporting bugs _Non-security_ bugs may be reported to the developers via [Bugzilla](https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/) or via the mailing list above. Security bugs should be reported to [openssh@openssh.com](mailto:openssh.openssh.com). diff --git a/crypto/openssh/auth-pam.c b/crypto/openssh/auth-pam.c index 008466f7bd82..085ce5feaed7 100644 --- a/crypto/openssh/auth-pam.c +++ b/crypto/openssh/auth-pam.c @@ -1,1406 +1,1411 @@ /*- * Copyright (c) 2002 Networks Associates Technology, Inc. * All rights reserved. * * This software was developed for the FreeBSD Project by ThinkSec AS and * NAI Labs, the Security Research Division of Network Associates, Inc. * under DARPA/SPAWAR contract N66001-01-C-8035 ("CBOSS"), as part of the * DARPA CHATS research program. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF * SUCH DAMAGE. */ /* * Copyright (c) 2003,2004 Damien Miller * Copyright (c) 2003,2004 Darren Tucker * * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. * * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. */ /* Based on FreeBSD: src/crypto/openssh/auth2-pam-freebsd.c,v 1.11 2003/03/31 13:48:18 des */ #include "includes.h" #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #ifdef USE_PAM #if defined(HAVE_SECURITY_PAM_APPL_H) #include #elif defined (HAVE_PAM_PAM_APPL_H) #include #endif #if !defined(SSHD_PAM_SERVICE) extern char *__progname; # define SSHD_PAM_SERVICE __progname #endif /* OpenGroup RFC86.0 and XSSO specify no "const" on arguments */ #ifdef PAM_SUN_CODEBASE # define sshpam_const /* Solaris, HP-UX, SunOS */ #else # define sshpam_const const /* LinuxPAM, OpenPAM, AIX */ #endif /* Ambiguity in spec: is it an array of pointers or a pointer to an array? */ #ifdef PAM_SUN_CODEBASE # define PAM_MSG_MEMBER(msg, n, member) ((*(msg))[(n)].member) #else # define PAM_MSG_MEMBER(msg, n, member) ((msg)[(n)]->member) #endif #include "xmalloc.h" #include "sshbuf.h" #include "ssherr.h" #include "hostfile.h" #include "auth.h" #include "auth-pam.h" #include "canohost.h" #include "log.h" #include "msg.h" #include "packet.h" #include "misc.h" #include "servconf.h" #include "ssh2.h" #include "auth-options.h" #include "misc.h" #ifdef GSSAPI #include "ssh-gss.h" #endif #include "monitor_wrap.h" #include "blacklist_client.h" extern ServerOptions options; extern struct sshbuf *loginmsg; extern u_int utmp_len; /* so we don't silently change behaviour */ #ifdef USE_POSIX_THREADS # error "USE_POSIX_THREADS replaced by UNSUPPORTED_POSIX_THREADS_HACK" #endif /* * Formerly known as USE_POSIX_THREADS, using this is completely unsupported * and generally a bad idea. Use at own risk and do not expect support if * this breaks. */ #ifdef UNSUPPORTED_POSIX_THREADS_HACK #include /* * Avoid namespace clash when *not* using pthreads for systems *with* * pthreads, which unconditionally define pthread_t via sys/types.h * (e.g. Linux) */ typedef pthread_t sp_pthread_t; #else typedef pid_t sp_pthread_t; #define pthread_exit fake_pthread_exit #define pthread_create fake_pthread_create #define pthread_cancel fake_pthread_cancel #define pthread_join fake_pthread_join #endif struct pam_ctxt { sp_pthread_t pam_thread; int pam_psock; int pam_csock; int pam_done; }; static void sshpam_free_ctx(void *); static struct pam_ctxt *cleanup_ctxt; #ifndef UNSUPPORTED_POSIX_THREADS_HACK /* * Simulate threads with processes. */ static int sshpam_thread_status = -1; static sshsig_t sshpam_oldsig; static void sshpam_sigchld_handler(int sig) { ssh_signal(SIGCHLD, SIG_DFL); if (cleanup_ctxt == NULL) return; /* handler called after PAM cleanup, shouldn't happen */ if (waitpid(cleanup_ctxt->pam_thread, &sshpam_thread_status, WNOHANG) <= 0) { /* PAM thread has not exitted, privsep slave must have */ kill(cleanup_ctxt->pam_thread, SIGTERM); while (waitpid(cleanup_ctxt->pam_thread, &sshpam_thread_status, 0) == -1) { if (errno == EINTR) continue; return; } } if (WIFSIGNALED(sshpam_thread_status) && WTERMSIG(sshpam_thread_status) == SIGTERM) return; /* terminated by pthread_cancel */ if (!WIFEXITED(sshpam_thread_status)) sigdie("PAM: authentication thread exited unexpectedly"); if (WEXITSTATUS(sshpam_thread_status) != 0) sigdie("PAM: authentication thread exited uncleanly"); } /* ARGSUSED */ static void pthread_exit(void *value) { _exit(0); } /* ARGSUSED */ static int pthread_create(sp_pthread_t *thread, const void *attr, void *(*thread_start)(void *), void *arg) { pid_t pid; struct pam_ctxt *ctx = arg; sshpam_thread_status = -1; switch ((pid = fork())) { case -1: error("fork(): %s", strerror(errno)); return errno; case 0: close(ctx->pam_psock); ctx->pam_psock = -1; thread_start(arg); _exit(1); default: *thread = pid; close(ctx->pam_csock); ctx->pam_csock = -1; sshpam_oldsig = ssh_signal(SIGCHLD, sshpam_sigchld_handler); return (0); } } static int pthread_cancel(sp_pthread_t thread) { ssh_signal(SIGCHLD, sshpam_oldsig); return (kill(thread, SIGTERM)); } /* ARGSUSED */ static int pthread_join(sp_pthread_t thread, void **value) { int status; if (sshpam_thread_status != -1) return (sshpam_thread_status); ssh_signal(SIGCHLD, sshpam_oldsig); while (waitpid(thread, &status, 0) == -1) { if (errno == EINTR) continue; fatal("%s: waitpid: %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); } return (status); } #endif static pam_handle_t *sshpam_handle = NULL; static int sshpam_err = 0; static int sshpam_authenticated = 0; static int sshpam_session_open = 0; static int sshpam_cred_established = 0; static int sshpam_account_status = -1; static int sshpam_maxtries_reached = 0; static char **sshpam_env = NULL; static Authctxt *sshpam_authctxt = NULL; static const char *sshpam_password = NULL; static char *sshpam_rhost = NULL; static char *sshpam_laddr = NULL; /* Some PAM implementations don't implement this */ #ifndef HAVE_PAM_GETENVLIST static char ** pam_getenvlist(pam_handle_t *pamh) { /* * XXX - If necessary, we can still support environment passing * for platforms without pam_getenvlist by searching for known * env vars (e.g. KRB5CCNAME) from the PAM environment. */ return NULL; } #endif #ifndef HAVE_PAM_PUTENV static int pam_putenv(pam_handle_t *pamh, const char *name_value) { return PAM_SUCCESS; } #endif /* HAVE_PAM_PUTENV */ /* * Some platforms, notably Solaris, do not enforce password complexity * rules during pam_chauthtok() if the real uid of the calling process * is 0, on the assumption that it's being called by "passwd" run by root. * This wraps pam_chauthtok and sets/restore the real uid so PAM will do * the right thing. */ #ifdef SSHPAM_CHAUTHTOK_NEEDS_RUID static int sshpam_chauthtok_ruid(pam_handle_t *pamh, int flags) { int result; if (sshpam_authctxt == NULL) fatal("PAM: sshpam_authctxt not initialized"); if (setreuid(sshpam_authctxt->pw->pw_uid, -1) == -1) fatal("%s: setreuid failed: %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); result = pam_chauthtok(pamh, flags); if (setreuid(0, -1) == -1) fatal("%s: setreuid failed: %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); return result; } # define pam_chauthtok(a,b) (sshpam_chauthtok_ruid((a), (b))) #endif static void sshpam_password_change_required(int reqd) { extern struct sshauthopt *auth_opts; static int saved_port, saved_agent, saved_x11; debug3("%s %d", __func__, reqd); if (sshpam_authctxt == NULL) fatal("%s: PAM authctxt not initialized", __func__); sshpam_authctxt->force_pwchange = reqd; if (reqd) { saved_port = auth_opts->permit_port_forwarding_flag; saved_agent = auth_opts->permit_agent_forwarding_flag; saved_x11 = auth_opts->permit_x11_forwarding_flag; auth_opts->permit_port_forwarding_flag = 0; auth_opts->permit_agent_forwarding_flag = 0; auth_opts->permit_x11_forwarding_flag = 0; } else { if (saved_port) auth_opts->permit_port_forwarding_flag = saved_port; if (saved_agent) auth_opts->permit_agent_forwarding_flag = saved_agent; if (saved_x11) auth_opts->permit_x11_forwarding_flag = saved_x11; } } /* Import regular and PAM environment from subprocess */ static void import_environments(struct sshbuf *b) { char *env; u_int n, i, num_env; int r; debug3("PAM: %s entering", __func__); #ifndef UNSUPPORTED_POSIX_THREADS_HACK /* Import variables set by do_pam_account */ if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(b, &n)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); if (n > INT_MAX) fatal("%s: invalid PAM account status %u", __func__, n); sshpam_account_status = (int)n; if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(b, &n)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); sshpam_password_change_required(n != 0); /* Import environment from subprocess */ if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(b, &num_env)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); - if (num_env > 1024) - fatal("%s: received %u environment variables, expected <= 1024", - __func__, num_env); + if (num_env > 1024) { + fatal_f("received %u environment variables, expected <= 1024", + num_env); + } sshpam_env = xcalloc(num_env + 1, sizeof(*sshpam_env)); - debug3("PAM: num env strings %d", num_env); + debug3("PAM: num env strings %u", num_env); for(i = 0; i < num_env; i++) { if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &(sshpam_env[i]), NULL)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); } sshpam_env[num_env] = NULL; /* Import PAM environment from subprocess */ if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(b, &num_env)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); - debug("PAM: num PAM env strings %d", num_env); + if (num_env > 1024) { + fatal_f("received %u PAM env variables, expected <= 1024", + num_env); + } + debug("PAM: num PAM env strings %u", num_env); for (i = 0; i < num_env; i++) { if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &env, NULL)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); /* Errors are not fatal here */ if ((r = pam_putenv(sshpam_handle, env)) != PAM_SUCCESS) { error("PAM: pam_putenv: %s", pam_strerror(sshpam_handle, r)); } /* * XXX this possibly leaks env because it is not documented * what pam_putenv() does with it. Does it copy it? Does it * take ownweship? We don't know, so it's safest just to leak. */ } #endif } /* * Conversation function for authentication thread. */ static int sshpam_thread_conv(int n, sshpam_const struct pam_message **msg, struct pam_response **resp, void *data) { struct sshbuf *buffer; struct pam_ctxt *ctxt; struct pam_response *reply; int r, i; u_char status; debug3("PAM: %s entering, %d messages", __func__, n); *resp = NULL; if (data == NULL) { error("PAM: conversation function passed a null context"); return (PAM_CONV_ERR); } ctxt = data; if (n <= 0 || n > PAM_MAX_NUM_MSG) return (PAM_CONV_ERR); if ((reply = calloc(n, sizeof(*reply))) == NULL) return PAM_CONV_ERR; if ((buffer = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) { free(reply); return PAM_CONV_ERR; } for (i = 0; i < n; ++i) { switch (PAM_MSG_MEMBER(msg, i, msg_style)) { case PAM_PROMPT_ECHO_OFF: case PAM_PROMPT_ECHO_ON: if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(buffer, PAM_MSG_MEMBER(msg, i, msg))) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); if (ssh_msg_send(ctxt->pam_csock, PAM_MSG_MEMBER(msg, i, msg_style), buffer) == -1) goto fail; if (ssh_msg_recv(ctxt->pam_csock, buffer) == -1) goto fail; if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(buffer, &status)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); if (status != PAM_AUTHTOK) goto fail; if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(buffer, &reply[i].resp, NULL)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); break; case PAM_ERROR_MSG: case PAM_TEXT_INFO: if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(buffer, PAM_MSG_MEMBER(msg, i, msg))) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); if (ssh_msg_send(ctxt->pam_csock, PAM_MSG_MEMBER(msg, i, msg_style), buffer) == -1) goto fail; break; default: goto fail; } sshbuf_reset(buffer); } sshbuf_free(buffer); *resp = reply; return (PAM_SUCCESS); fail: for(i = 0; i < n; i++) { free(reply[i].resp); } free(reply); sshbuf_free(buffer); return (PAM_CONV_ERR); } /* * Authentication thread. */ static void * sshpam_thread(void *ctxtp) { struct pam_ctxt *ctxt = ctxtp; struct sshbuf *buffer = NULL; struct pam_conv sshpam_conv; int r, flags = (options.permit_empty_passwd == 0 ? PAM_DISALLOW_NULL_AUTHTOK : 0); #ifndef UNSUPPORTED_POSIX_THREADS_HACK extern char **environ; char **env_from_pam; u_int i; const char *pam_user; const char **ptr_pam_user = &pam_user; char *tz = getenv("TZ"); sshpam_err = pam_get_item(sshpam_handle, PAM_USER, (sshpam_const void **)ptr_pam_user); if (sshpam_err != PAM_SUCCESS) goto auth_fail; environ[0] = NULL; if (tz != NULL) if (setenv("TZ", tz, 1) == -1) error("PAM: could not set TZ environment: %s", strerror(errno)); if (sshpam_authctxt != NULL) { setproctitle("%s [pam]", sshpam_authctxt->valid ? pam_user : "unknown"); } #endif sshpam_conv.conv = sshpam_thread_conv; sshpam_conv.appdata_ptr = ctxt; if (sshpam_authctxt == NULL) fatal("%s: PAM authctxt not initialized", __func__); if ((buffer = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__); sshpam_err = pam_set_item(sshpam_handle, PAM_CONV, (const void *)&sshpam_conv); if (sshpam_err != PAM_SUCCESS) goto auth_fail; sshpam_err = pam_authenticate(sshpam_handle, flags); if (sshpam_err == PAM_MAXTRIES) sshpam_set_maxtries_reached(1); if (sshpam_err != PAM_SUCCESS) goto auth_fail; if (!do_pam_account()) { sshpam_err = PAM_ACCT_EXPIRED; goto auth_fail; } if (sshpam_authctxt->force_pwchange) { sshpam_err = pam_chauthtok(sshpam_handle, PAM_CHANGE_EXPIRED_AUTHTOK); if (sshpam_err != PAM_SUCCESS) goto auth_fail; sshpam_password_change_required(0); } if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(buffer, "OK")) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); #ifndef UNSUPPORTED_POSIX_THREADS_HACK /* Export variables set by do_pam_account */ if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(buffer, sshpam_account_status)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u32(buffer, sshpam_authctxt->force_pwchange)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); /* Export any environment strings set in child */ for (i = 0; environ[i] != NULL; i++) { /* Count */ if (i > INT_MAX) fatal("%s: too many environment strings", __func__); } if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(buffer, i)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); for (i = 0; environ[i] != NULL; i++) { if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(buffer, environ[i])) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); } /* Export any environment strings set by PAM in child */ env_from_pam = pam_getenvlist(sshpam_handle); for (i = 0; env_from_pam != NULL && env_from_pam[i] != NULL; i++) { /* Count */ if (i > INT_MAX) fatal("%s: too many PAM environment strings", __func__); } if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(buffer, i)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); for (i = 0; env_from_pam != NULL && env_from_pam[i] != NULL; i++) { if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(buffer, env_from_pam[i])) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); } #endif /* UNSUPPORTED_POSIX_THREADS_HACK */ /* XXX - can't do much about an error here */ ssh_msg_send(ctxt->pam_csock, sshpam_err, buffer); sshbuf_free(buffer); pthread_exit(NULL); auth_fail: if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(buffer, pam_strerror(sshpam_handle, sshpam_err))) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); /* XXX - can't do much about an error here */ if (sshpam_err == PAM_ACCT_EXPIRED) ssh_msg_send(ctxt->pam_csock, PAM_ACCT_EXPIRED, buffer); else if (sshpam_maxtries_reached) ssh_msg_send(ctxt->pam_csock, PAM_MAXTRIES, buffer); else ssh_msg_send(ctxt->pam_csock, PAM_AUTH_ERR, buffer); sshbuf_free(buffer); pthread_exit(NULL); return (NULL); /* Avoid warning for non-pthread case */ } void sshpam_thread_cleanup(void) { struct pam_ctxt *ctxt = cleanup_ctxt; debug3("PAM: %s entering", __func__); if (ctxt != NULL && ctxt->pam_thread != 0) { pthread_cancel(ctxt->pam_thread); pthread_join(ctxt->pam_thread, NULL); close(ctxt->pam_psock); close(ctxt->pam_csock); memset(ctxt, 0, sizeof(*ctxt)); cleanup_ctxt = NULL; } } static int sshpam_null_conv(int n, sshpam_const struct pam_message **msg, struct pam_response **resp, void *data) { debug3("PAM: %s entering, %d messages", __func__, n); return (PAM_CONV_ERR); } static struct pam_conv null_conv = { sshpam_null_conv, NULL }; static int sshpam_store_conv(int n, sshpam_const struct pam_message **msg, struct pam_response **resp, void *data) { struct pam_response *reply; int r, i; debug3("PAM: %s called with %d messages", __func__, n); *resp = NULL; if (n <= 0 || n > PAM_MAX_NUM_MSG) return (PAM_CONV_ERR); if ((reply = calloc(n, sizeof(*reply))) == NULL) return (PAM_CONV_ERR); for (i = 0; i < n; ++i) { switch (PAM_MSG_MEMBER(msg, i, msg_style)) { case PAM_ERROR_MSG: case PAM_TEXT_INFO: if ((r = sshbuf_putf(loginmsg, "%s\n", PAM_MSG_MEMBER(msg, i, msg))) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); reply[i].resp_retcode = PAM_SUCCESS; break; default: goto fail; } } *resp = reply; return (PAM_SUCCESS); fail: for(i = 0; i < n; i++) { free(reply[i].resp); } free(reply); return (PAM_CONV_ERR); } static struct pam_conv store_conv = { sshpam_store_conv, NULL }; void sshpam_cleanup(void) { if (sshpam_handle == NULL || (use_privsep && !mm_is_monitor())) return; debug("PAM: cleanup"); pam_set_item(sshpam_handle, PAM_CONV, (const void *)&null_conv); if (sshpam_session_open) { debug("PAM: closing session"); pam_close_session(sshpam_handle, PAM_SILENT); sshpam_session_open = 0; } if (sshpam_cred_established) { debug("PAM: deleting credentials"); pam_setcred(sshpam_handle, PAM_DELETE_CRED); sshpam_cred_established = 0; } sshpam_authenticated = 0; pam_end(sshpam_handle, sshpam_err); sshpam_handle = NULL; } static int sshpam_init(struct ssh *ssh, Authctxt *authctxt) { const char *pam_user, *user = authctxt->user; const char **ptr_pam_user = &pam_user; int r; #if defined(PAM_SUN_CODEBASE) && defined(PAM_MAX_RESP_SIZE) /* Protect buggy PAM implementations from excessively long usernames */ if (strlen(user) >= PAM_MAX_RESP_SIZE) fatal("Username too long from %s port %d", ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), ssh_remote_port(ssh)); #endif if (sshpam_handle == NULL) { if (ssh == NULL) { fatal("%s: called initially with no " "packet context", __func__); } } if (sshpam_handle != NULL) { /* We already have a PAM context; check if the user matches */ sshpam_err = pam_get_item(sshpam_handle, PAM_USER, (sshpam_const void **)ptr_pam_user); if (sshpam_err == PAM_SUCCESS && strcmp(user, pam_user) == 0) return (0); pam_end(sshpam_handle, sshpam_err); sshpam_handle = NULL; } debug("PAM: initializing for \"%s\"", user); sshpam_err = pam_start(SSHD_PAM_SERVICE, user, &store_conv, &sshpam_handle); sshpam_authctxt = authctxt; if (sshpam_err != PAM_SUCCESS) { pam_end(sshpam_handle, sshpam_err); sshpam_handle = NULL; return (-1); } if (ssh != NULL && sshpam_rhost == NULL) { /* * We need to cache these as we don't have packet context * during the kbdint flow. */ sshpam_rhost = xstrdup(auth_get_canonical_hostname(ssh, options.use_dns)); sshpam_laddr = get_local_ipaddr( ssh_packet_get_connection_in(ssh)); } if (sshpam_rhost != NULL) { debug("PAM: setting PAM_RHOST to \"%s\"", sshpam_rhost); sshpam_err = pam_set_item(sshpam_handle, PAM_RHOST, sshpam_rhost); if (sshpam_err != PAM_SUCCESS) { pam_end(sshpam_handle, sshpam_err); sshpam_handle = NULL; return (-1); } } if (ssh != NULL && sshpam_laddr != NULL) { char *conninfo; /* Put SSH_CONNECTION in the PAM environment too */ xasprintf(&conninfo, "SSH_CONNECTION=%.50s %d %.50s %d", ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), ssh_remote_port(ssh), sshpam_laddr, ssh_local_port(ssh)); if ((r = pam_putenv(sshpam_handle, conninfo)) != PAM_SUCCESS) logit("pam_putenv: %s", pam_strerror(sshpam_handle, r)); free(conninfo); } #ifdef PAM_TTY_KLUDGE /* * Some silly PAM modules (e.g. pam_time) require a TTY to operate. * sshd doesn't set the tty until too late in the auth process and * may not even set one (for tty-less connections) */ debug("PAM: setting PAM_TTY to \"ssh\""); sshpam_err = pam_set_item(sshpam_handle, PAM_TTY, "ssh"); if (sshpam_err != PAM_SUCCESS) { pam_end(sshpam_handle, sshpam_err); sshpam_handle = NULL; return (-1); } #endif return (0); } static void expose_authinfo(const char *caller) { char *auth_info; /* * Expose authentication information to PAM. * The environment variable is versioned. Please increment the * version suffix if the format of session_info changes. */ if (sshpam_authctxt->session_info == NULL) auth_info = xstrdup(""); else if ((auth_info = sshbuf_dup_string( sshpam_authctxt->session_info)) == NULL) fatal("%s: sshbuf_dup_string failed", __func__); debug2("%s: auth information in SSH_AUTH_INFO_0", caller); do_pam_putenv("SSH_AUTH_INFO_0", auth_info); free(auth_info); } static void * sshpam_init_ctx(Authctxt *authctxt) { struct pam_ctxt *ctxt; int result, socks[2]; debug3("PAM: %s entering", __func__); /* * Refuse to start if we don't have PAM enabled or do_pam_account * has previously failed. */ if (!options.use_pam || sshpam_account_status == 0) return NULL; /* Initialize PAM */ if (sshpam_init(NULL, authctxt) == -1) { error("PAM: initialization failed"); return (NULL); } expose_authinfo(__func__); ctxt = xcalloc(1, sizeof *ctxt); /* Start the authentication thread */ if (socketpair(AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, PF_UNSPEC, socks) == -1) { error("PAM: failed create sockets: %s", strerror(errno)); free(ctxt); return (NULL); } ctxt->pam_psock = socks[0]; ctxt->pam_csock = socks[1]; result = pthread_create(&ctxt->pam_thread, NULL, sshpam_thread, ctxt); if (result != 0) { error("PAM: failed to start authentication thread: %s", strerror(result)); close(socks[0]); close(socks[1]); free(ctxt); return (NULL); } cleanup_ctxt = ctxt; return (ctxt); } static int sshpam_query(void *ctx, char **name, char **info, u_int *num, char ***prompts, u_int **echo_on) { struct sshbuf *buffer; struct pam_ctxt *ctxt = ctx; size_t plen; u_char type; char *msg; size_t len, mlen; int r; debug3("PAM: %s entering", __func__); if ((buffer = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__); *name = xstrdup(""); *info = xstrdup(""); *prompts = xmalloc(sizeof(char *)); **prompts = NULL; plen = 0; *echo_on = xmalloc(sizeof(u_int)); while (ssh_msg_recv(ctxt->pam_psock, buffer) == 0) { if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(buffer, &type)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(buffer, &msg, &mlen)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); switch (type) { case PAM_PROMPT_ECHO_ON: case PAM_PROMPT_ECHO_OFF: *num = 1; len = plen + mlen + 1; **prompts = xreallocarray(**prompts, 1, len); strlcpy(**prompts + plen, msg, len - plen); plen += mlen; **echo_on = (type == PAM_PROMPT_ECHO_ON); free(msg); sshbuf_free(buffer); return (0); case PAM_ERROR_MSG: case PAM_TEXT_INFO: /* accumulate messages */ len = plen + mlen + 2; **prompts = xreallocarray(**prompts, 1, len); strlcpy(**prompts + plen, msg, len - plen); plen += mlen; strlcat(**prompts + plen, "\n", len - plen); plen++; free(msg); break; case PAM_ACCT_EXPIRED: case PAM_MAXTRIES: if (type == PAM_ACCT_EXPIRED) sshpam_account_status = 0; if (type == PAM_MAXTRIES) sshpam_set_maxtries_reached(1); /* FALLTHROUGH */ case PAM_AUTH_ERR: debug3("PAM: %s", pam_strerror(sshpam_handle, type)); if (**prompts != NULL && strlen(**prompts) != 0) { free(*info); *info = **prompts; **prompts = NULL; *num = 0; **echo_on = 0; ctxt->pam_done = -1; free(msg); sshbuf_free(buffer); return 0; } /* FALLTHROUGH */ case PAM_SUCCESS: if (**prompts != NULL) { /* drain any accumulated messages */ debug("PAM: %s", **prompts); if ((r = sshbuf_put(loginmsg, **prompts, strlen(**prompts))) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); free(**prompts); **prompts = NULL; } if (type == PAM_SUCCESS) { if (!sshpam_authctxt->valid || (sshpam_authctxt->pw->pw_uid == 0 && options.permit_root_login != PERMIT_YES)) fatal("Internal error: PAM auth " "succeeded when it should have " "failed"); import_environments(buffer); *num = 0; **echo_on = 0; ctxt->pam_done = 1; free(msg); sshbuf_free(buffer); return (0); } BLACKLIST_NOTIFY(NULL, BLACKLIST_BAD_USER, sshpam_authctxt->user); error("PAM: %s for %s%.100s from %.100s", msg, sshpam_authctxt->valid ? "" : "illegal user ", sshpam_authctxt->user, sshpam_rhost); /* FALLTHROUGH */ default: *num = 0; **echo_on = 0; free(msg); ctxt->pam_done = -1; sshbuf_free(buffer); return (-1); } } sshbuf_free(buffer); return (-1); } /* * Returns a junk password of identical length to that the user supplied. * Used to mitigate timing attacks against crypt(3)/PAM stacks that * vary processing time in proportion to password length. */ static char * fake_password(const char *wire_password) { const char junk[] = "\b\n\r\177INCORRECT"; char *ret = NULL; size_t i, l = wire_password != NULL ? strlen(wire_password) : 0; if (l >= INT_MAX) fatal("%s: password length too long: %zu", __func__, l); ret = malloc(l + 1); if (ret == NULL) return NULL; for (i = 0; i < l; i++) ret[i] = junk[i % (sizeof(junk) - 1)]; ret[i] = '\0'; return ret; } /* XXX - see also comment in auth-chall.c:verify_response */ static int sshpam_respond(void *ctx, u_int num, char **resp) { struct sshbuf *buffer; struct pam_ctxt *ctxt = ctx; char *fake; int r; debug2("PAM: %s entering, %u responses", __func__, num); switch (ctxt->pam_done) { case 1: sshpam_authenticated = 1; return (0); case 0: break; default: return (-1); } if (num != 1) { error("PAM: expected one response, got %u", num); return (-1); } if ((buffer = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__); if (sshpam_authctxt->valid && (sshpam_authctxt->pw->pw_uid != 0 || options.permit_root_login == PERMIT_YES)) { if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(buffer, *resp)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); } else { fake = fake_password(*resp); if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(buffer, fake)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); free(fake); } if (ssh_msg_send(ctxt->pam_psock, PAM_AUTHTOK, buffer) == -1) { sshbuf_free(buffer); return (-1); } sshbuf_free(buffer); return (1); } static void sshpam_free_ctx(void *ctxtp) { struct pam_ctxt *ctxt = ctxtp; debug3("PAM: %s entering", __func__); sshpam_thread_cleanup(); free(ctxt); /* * We don't call sshpam_cleanup() here because we may need the PAM * handle at a later stage, e.g. when setting up a session. It's * still on the cleanup list, so pam_end() *will* be called before * the server process terminates. */ } KbdintDevice sshpam_device = { "pam", sshpam_init_ctx, sshpam_query, sshpam_respond, sshpam_free_ctx }; KbdintDevice mm_sshpam_device = { "pam", mm_sshpam_init_ctx, mm_sshpam_query, mm_sshpam_respond, mm_sshpam_free_ctx }; /* * This replaces auth-pam.c */ void start_pam(struct ssh *ssh) { Authctxt *authctxt = (Authctxt *)ssh->authctxt; if (!options.use_pam) fatal("PAM: initialisation requested when UsePAM=no"); if (sshpam_init(ssh, authctxt) == -1) fatal("PAM: initialisation failed"); } void finish_pam(void) { sshpam_cleanup(); } u_int do_pam_account(void) { debug("%s: called", __func__); if (sshpam_account_status != -1) return (sshpam_account_status); expose_authinfo(__func__); sshpam_err = pam_acct_mgmt(sshpam_handle, 0); debug3("PAM: %s pam_acct_mgmt = %d (%s)", __func__, sshpam_err, pam_strerror(sshpam_handle, sshpam_err)); if (sshpam_err != PAM_SUCCESS && sshpam_err != PAM_NEW_AUTHTOK_REQD) { sshpam_account_status = 0; return (sshpam_account_status); } if (sshpam_err == PAM_NEW_AUTHTOK_REQD) sshpam_password_change_required(1); sshpam_account_status = 1; return (sshpam_account_status); } void do_pam_setcred(int init) { sshpam_err = pam_set_item(sshpam_handle, PAM_CONV, (const void *)&store_conv); if (sshpam_err != PAM_SUCCESS) fatal("PAM: failed to set PAM_CONV: %s", pam_strerror(sshpam_handle, sshpam_err)); if (init) { debug("PAM: establishing credentials"); sshpam_err = pam_setcred(sshpam_handle, PAM_ESTABLISH_CRED); } else { debug("PAM: reinitializing credentials"); sshpam_err = pam_setcred(sshpam_handle, PAM_REINITIALIZE_CRED); } if (sshpam_err == PAM_SUCCESS) { sshpam_cred_established = 1; return; } if (sshpam_authenticated) fatal("PAM: pam_setcred(): %s", pam_strerror(sshpam_handle, sshpam_err)); else debug("PAM: pam_setcred(): %s", pam_strerror(sshpam_handle, sshpam_err)); } static int sshpam_tty_conv(int n, sshpam_const struct pam_message **msg, struct pam_response **resp, void *data) { char input[PAM_MAX_MSG_SIZE]; struct pam_response *reply; int i; debug3("PAM: %s called with %d messages", __func__, n); *resp = NULL; if (n <= 0 || n > PAM_MAX_NUM_MSG || !isatty(STDIN_FILENO)) return (PAM_CONV_ERR); if ((reply = calloc(n, sizeof(*reply))) == NULL) return (PAM_CONV_ERR); for (i = 0; i < n; ++i) { switch (PAM_MSG_MEMBER(msg, i, msg_style)) { case PAM_PROMPT_ECHO_OFF: reply[i].resp = read_passphrase(PAM_MSG_MEMBER(msg, i, msg), RP_ALLOW_STDIN); reply[i].resp_retcode = PAM_SUCCESS; break; case PAM_PROMPT_ECHO_ON: fprintf(stderr, "%s\n", PAM_MSG_MEMBER(msg, i, msg)); if (fgets(input, sizeof input, stdin) == NULL) input[0] = '\0'; if ((reply[i].resp = strdup(input)) == NULL) goto fail; reply[i].resp_retcode = PAM_SUCCESS; break; case PAM_ERROR_MSG: case PAM_TEXT_INFO: fprintf(stderr, "%s\n", PAM_MSG_MEMBER(msg, i, msg)); reply[i].resp_retcode = PAM_SUCCESS; break; default: goto fail; } } *resp = reply; return (PAM_SUCCESS); fail: for(i = 0; i < n; i++) { free(reply[i].resp); } free(reply); return (PAM_CONV_ERR); } static struct pam_conv tty_conv = { sshpam_tty_conv, NULL }; /* * XXX this should be done in the authentication phase, but ssh1 doesn't * support that */ void do_pam_chauthtok(void) { if (use_privsep) fatal("Password expired (unable to change with privsep)"); sshpam_err = pam_set_item(sshpam_handle, PAM_CONV, (const void *)&tty_conv); if (sshpam_err != PAM_SUCCESS) fatal("PAM: failed to set PAM_CONV: %s", pam_strerror(sshpam_handle, sshpam_err)); debug("PAM: changing password"); sshpam_err = pam_chauthtok(sshpam_handle, PAM_CHANGE_EXPIRED_AUTHTOK); if (sshpam_err != PAM_SUCCESS) fatal("PAM: pam_chauthtok(): %s", pam_strerror(sshpam_handle, sshpam_err)); } void do_pam_session(struct ssh *ssh) { debug3("PAM: opening session"); expose_authinfo(__func__); sshpam_err = pam_set_item(sshpam_handle, PAM_CONV, (const void *)&store_conv); if (sshpam_err != PAM_SUCCESS) fatal("PAM: failed to set PAM_CONV: %s", pam_strerror(sshpam_handle, sshpam_err)); sshpam_err = pam_open_session(sshpam_handle, 0); if (sshpam_err == PAM_SUCCESS) sshpam_session_open = 1; else { sshpam_session_open = 0; auth_restrict_session(ssh); error("PAM: pam_open_session(): %s", pam_strerror(sshpam_handle, sshpam_err)); } } int is_pam_session_open(void) { return sshpam_session_open; } /* * Set a PAM environment string. We need to do this so that the session * modules can handle things like Kerberos/GSI credentials that appear * during the ssh authentication process. */ int do_pam_putenv(char *name, char *value) { int ret = 1; char *compound; size_t len; len = strlen(name) + strlen(value) + 2; compound = xmalloc(len); snprintf(compound, len, "%s=%s", name, value); ret = pam_putenv(sshpam_handle, compound); free(compound); return (ret); } char ** fetch_pam_child_environment(void) { return sshpam_env; } char ** fetch_pam_environment(void) { return (pam_getenvlist(sshpam_handle)); } void free_pam_environment(char **env) { char **envp; if (env == NULL) return; for (envp = env; *envp; envp++) free(*envp); free(env); } /* * "Blind" conversation function for password authentication. Assumes that * echo-off prompts are for the password and stores messages for later * display. */ static int sshpam_passwd_conv(int n, sshpam_const struct pam_message **msg, struct pam_response **resp, void *data) { struct pam_response *reply; int r, i; size_t len; debug3("PAM: %s called with %d messages", __func__, n); *resp = NULL; if (n <= 0 || n > PAM_MAX_NUM_MSG) return (PAM_CONV_ERR); if ((reply = calloc(n, sizeof(*reply))) == NULL) return (PAM_CONV_ERR); for (i = 0; i < n; ++i) { switch (PAM_MSG_MEMBER(msg, i, msg_style)) { case PAM_PROMPT_ECHO_OFF: if (sshpam_password == NULL) goto fail; if ((reply[i].resp = strdup(sshpam_password)) == NULL) goto fail; reply[i].resp_retcode = PAM_SUCCESS; break; case PAM_ERROR_MSG: case PAM_TEXT_INFO: len = strlen(PAM_MSG_MEMBER(msg, i, msg)); if (len > 0) { if ((r = sshbuf_putf(loginmsg, "%s\n", PAM_MSG_MEMBER(msg, i, msg))) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); } if ((reply[i].resp = strdup("")) == NULL) goto fail; reply[i].resp_retcode = PAM_SUCCESS; break; default: goto fail; } } *resp = reply; return (PAM_SUCCESS); fail: for(i = 0; i < n; i++) { free(reply[i].resp); } free(reply); return (PAM_CONV_ERR); } static struct pam_conv passwd_conv = { sshpam_passwd_conv, NULL }; /* * Attempt password authentication via PAM */ int sshpam_auth_passwd(Authctxt *authctxt, const char *password) { int flags = (options.permit_empty_passwd == 0 ? PAM_DISALLOW_NULL_AUTHTOK : 0); char *fake = NULL; if (!options.use_pam || sshpam_handle == NULL) fatal("PAM: %s called when PAM disabled or failed to " "initialise.", __func__); sshpam_password = password; sshpam_authctxt = authctxt; /* * If the user logging in is invalid, or is root but is not permitted * by PermitRootLogin, use an invalid password to prevent leaking * information via timing (eg if the PAM config has a delay on fail). */ if (!authctxt->valid || (authctxt->pw->pw_uid == 0 && options.permit_root_login != PERMIT_YES)) sshpam_password = fake = fake_password(password); sshpam_err = pam_set_item(sshpam_handle, PAM_CONV, (const void *)&passwd_conv); if (sshpam_err != PAM_SUCCESS) fatal("PAM: %s: failed to set PAM_CONV: %s", __func__, pam_strerror(sshpam_handle, sshpam_err)); sshpam_err = pam_authenticate(sshpam_handle, flags); sshpam_password = NULL; free(fake); if (sshpam_err == PAM_MAXTRIES) sshpam_set_maxtries_reached(1); if (sshpam_err == PAM_SUCCESS && authctxt->valid) { debug("PAM: password authentication accepted for %.100s", authctxt->user); return 1; } else { debug("PAM: password authentication failed for %.100s: %s", authctxt->valid ? authctxt->user : "an illegal user", pam_strerror(sshpam_handle, sshpam_err)); return 0; } } int sshpam_get_maxtries_reached(void) { return sshpam_maxtries_reached; } void sshpam_set_maxtries_reached(int reached) { if (reached == 0 || sshpam_maxtries_reached) return; sshpam_maxtries_reached = 1; options.password_authentication = 0; options.kbd_interactive_authentication = 0; } #endif /* USE_PAM */ diff --git a/crypto/openssh/auth-shadow.c b/crypto/openssh/auth-shadow.c index c77ee8da9b48..b1e3aa9fc1b3 100644 --- a/crypto/openssh/auth-shadow.c +++ b/crypto/openssh/auth-shadow.c @@ -1,141 +1,141 @@ /* * Copyright (c) 2004 Darren Tucker. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. */ #include "includes.h" #if defined(USE_SHADOW) && defined(HAS_SHADOW_EXPIRE) #include #include #include #include #include "hostfile.h" #include "auth.h" #include "sshbuf.h" #include "ssherr.h" #include "log.h" #ifdef DAY # undef DAY #endif #define DAY (24L * 60 * 60) /* 1 day in seconds */ extern struct sshbuf *loginmsg; /* * For the account and password expiration functions, we assume the expiry * occurs the day after the day specified. */ /* * Check if specified account is expired. Returns 1 if account is expired, * 0 otherwise. */ int auth_shadow_acctexpired(struct spwd *spw) { time_t today; - int daysleft; + long long daysleft; int r; today = time(NULL) / DAY; daysleft = spw->sp_expire - today; - debug3("%s: today %d sp_expire %d days left %d", __func__, (int)today, - (int)spw->sp_expire, daysleft); + debug3("%s: today %lld sp_expire %lld days left %lld", __func__, + (long long)today, (long long)spw->sp_expire, daysleft); if (spw->sp_expire == -1) { debug3("account expiration disabled"); } else if (daysleft < 0) { logit("Account %.100s has expired", spw->sp_namp); return 1; } else if (daysleft <= spw->sp_warn) { - debug3("account will expire in %d days", daysleft); + debug3("account will expire in %lld days", daysleft); if ((r = sshbuf_putf(loginmsg, - "Your account will expire in %d day%s.\n", daysleft, + "Your account will expire in %lld day%s.\n", daysleft, daysleft == 1 ? "" : "s")) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); } return 0; } /* * Checks password expiry for platforms that use shadow passwd files. * Returns: 1 = password expired, 0 = password not expired */ int auth_shadow_pwexpired(Authctxt *ctxt) { struct spwd *spw = NULL; const char *user = ctxt->pw->pw_name; time_t today; int r, daysleft, disabled = 0; if ((spw = getspnam((char *)user)) == NULL) { error("Could not get shadow information for %.100s", user); return 0; } today = time(NULL) / DAY; - debug3("%s: today %d sp_lstchg %d sp_max %d", __func__, (int)today, - (int)spw->sp_lstchg, (int)spw->sp_max); + debug3_f("today %lld sp_lstchg %lld sp_max %lld", (long long)today, + (long long)spw->sp_lstchg, (long long)spw->sp_max); #if defined(__hpux) && !defined(HAVE_SECUREWARE) if (iscomsec()) { struct pr_passwd *pr; pr = getprpwnam((char *)user); /* Test for Trusted Mode expiry disabled */ if (pr != NULL && pr->ufld.fd_min == 0 && pr->ufld.fd_lifetime == 0 && pr->ufld.fd_expire == 0 && pr->ufld.fd_pw_expire_warning == 0 && pr->ufld.fd_schange != 0) disabled = 1; } #endif /* TODO: check sp_inact */ daysleft = spw->sp_lstchg + spw->sp_max - today; if (disabled) { debug3("password expiration disabled"); } else if (spw->sp_lstchg == 0) { logit("User %.100s password has expired (root forced)", user); return 1; } else if (spw->sp_max == -1) { debug3("password expiration disabled"); } else if (daysleft < 0) { logit("User %.100s password has expired (password aged)", user); return 1; } else if (daysleft <= spw->sp_warn) { debug3("password will expire in %d days", daysleft); if ((r = sshbuf_putf(loginmsg, "Your password will expire in %d day%s.\n", daysleft, daysleft == 1 ? "" : "s")) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); } return 0; } #endif /* USE_SHADOW && HAS_SHADOW_EXPIRE */ diff --git a/crypto/openssh/auth.c b/crypto/openssh/auth.c index 93610963f3b3..f390df839d62 100644 --- a/crypto/openssh/auth.c +++ b/crypto/openssh/auth.c @@ -1,880 +1,879 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: auth.c,v 1.159 2022/12/09 00:17:40 dtucker Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: auth.c,v 1.160 2023/03/05 05:34:09 dtucker Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. */ #include "includes.h" #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H # include #endif #include #ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_H #include #endif #ifdef USE_SHADOW #include #endif #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include "xmalloc.h" #include "match.h" #include "groupaccess.h" #include "log.h" #include "sshbuf.h" #include "misc.h" #include "servconf.h" #include "sshkey.h" #include "hostfile.h" #include "auth.h" #include "auth-options.h" #include "canohost.h" #include "uidswap.h" #include "packet.h" #include "loginrec.h" #ifdef GSSAPI #include "ssh-gss.h" #endif #include "authfile.h" #include "monitor_wrap.h" #include "ssherr.h" -#include "compat.h" #include "channels.h" #include "blacklist_client.h" /* import */ extern ServerOptions options; extern struct include_list includes; extern int use_privsep; extern struct sshbuf *loginmsg; extern struct passwd *privsep_pw; extern struct sshauthopt *auth_opts; /* Debugging messages */ static struct sshbuf *auth_debug; /* * Check if the user is allowed to log in via ssh. If user is listed * in DenyUsers or one of user's groups is listed in DenyGroups, false * will be returned. If AllowUsers isn't empty and user isn't listed * there, or if AllowGroups isn't empty and one of user's groups isn't * listed there, false will be returned. * If the user's shell is not executable, false will be returned. * Otherwise true is returned. */ int allowed_user(struct ssh *ssh, struct passwd * pw) { struct stat st; const char *hostname = NULL, *ipaddr = NULL; u_int i; int r; /* Shouldn't be called if pw is NULL, but better safe than sorry... */ if (!pw || !pw->pw_name) return 0; if (!options.use_pam && platform_locked_account(pw)) { logit("User %.100s not allowed because account is locked", pw->pw_name); return 0; } /* * Deny if shell does not exist or is not executable unless we * are chrooting. */ if (options.chroot_directory == NULL || strcasecmp(options.chroot_directory, "none") == 0) { char *shell = xstrdup((pw->pw_shell[0] == '\0') ? _PATH_BSHELL : pw->pw_shell); /* empty = /bin/sh */ if (stat(shell, &st) == -1) { logit("User %.100s not allowed because shell %.100s " "does not exist", pw->pw_name, shell); free(shell); return 0; } if (S_ISREG(st.st_mode) == 0 || (st.st_mode & (S_IXOTH|S_IXUSR|S_IXGRP)) == 0) { logit("User %.100s not allowed because shell %.100s " "is not executable", pw->pw_name, shell); free(shell); return 0; } free(shell); } if (options.num_deny_users > 0 || options.num_allow_users > 0 || options.num_deny_groups > 0 || options.num_allow_groups > 0) { hostname = auth_get_canonical_hostname(ssh, options.use_dns); ipaddr = ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh); } /* Return false if user is listed in DenyUsers */ if (options.num_deny_users > 0) { for (i = 0; i < options.num_deny_users; i++) { r = match_user(pw->pw_name, hostname, ipaddr, options.deny_users[i]); if (r < 0) { fatal("Invalid DenyUsers pattern \"%.100s\"", options.deny_users[i]); } else if (r != 0) { logit("User %.100s from %.100s not allowed " "because listed in DenyUsers", pw->pw_name, hostname); return 0; } } } /* Return false if AllowUsers isn't empty and user isn't listed there */ if (options.num_allow_users > 0) { for (i = 0; i < options.num_allow_users; i++) { r = match_user(pw->pw_name, hostname, ipaddr, options.allow_users[i]); if (r < 0) { fatal("Invalid AllowUsers pattern \"%.100s\"", options.allow_users[i]); } else if (r == 1) break; } /* i < options.num_allow_users iff we break for loop */ if (i >= options.num_allow_users) { logit("User %.100s from %.100s not allowed because " "not listed in AllowUsers", pw->pw_name, hostname); return 0; } } if (options.num_deny_groups > 0 || options.num_allow_groups > 0) { /* Get the user's group access list (primary and supplementary) */ if (ga_init(pw->pw_name, pw->pw_gid) == 0) { logit("User %.100s from %.100s not allowed because " "not in any group", pw->pw_name, hostname); return 0; } /* Return false if one of user's groups is listed in DenyGroups */ if (options.num_deny_groups > 0) if (ga_match(options.deny_groups, options.num_deny_groups)) { ga_free(); logit("User %.100s from %.100s not allowed " "because a group is listed in DenyGroups", pw->pw_name, hostname); return 0; } /* * Return false if AllowGroups isn't empty and one of user's groups * isn't listed there */ if (options.num_allow_groups > 0) if (!ga_match(options.allow_groups, options.num_allow_groups)) { ga_free(); logit("User %.100s from %.100s not allowed " "because none of user's groups are listed " "in AllowGroups", pw->pw_name, hostname); return 0; } ga_free(); } #ifdef CUSTOM_SYS_AUTH_ALLOWED_USER if (!sys_auth_allowed_user(pw, loginmsg)) return 0; #endif /* We found no reason not to let this user try to log on... */ return 1; } /* * Formats any key left in authctxt->auth_method_key for inclusion in * auth_log()'s message. Also includes authxtct->auth_method_info if present. */ static char * format_method_key(Authctxt *authctxt) { const struct sshkey *key = authctxt->auth_method_key; const char *methinfo = authctxt->auth_method_info; char *fp, *cafp, *ret = NULL; if (key == NULL) return NULL; if (sshkey_is_cert(key)) { fp = sshkey_fingerprint(key, options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_DEFAULT); cafp = sshkey_fingerprint(key->cert->signature_key, options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_DEFAULT); xasprintf(&ret, "%s %s ID %s (serial %llu) CA %s %s%s%s", sshkey_type(key), fp == NULL ? "(null)" : fp, key->cert->key_id, (unsigned long long)key->cert->serial, sshkey_type(key->cert->signature_key), cafp == NULL ? "(null)" : cafp, methinfo == NULL ? "" : ", ", methinfo == NULL ? "" : methinfo); free(fp); free(cafp); } else { fp = sshkey_fingerprint(key, options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_DEFAULT); xasprintf(&ret, "%s %s%s%s", sshkey_type(key), fp == NULL ? "(null)" : fp, methinfo == NULL ? "" : ", ", methinfo == NULL ? "" : methinfo); free(fp); } return ret; } void auth_log(struct ssh *ssh, int authenticated, int partial, const char *method, const char *submethod) { Authctxt *authctxt = (Authctxt *)ssh->authctxt; int level = SYSLOG_LEVEL_VERBOSE; const char *authmsg; char *extra = NULL; if (use_privsep && !mm_is_monitor() && !authctxt->postponed) return; /* Raise logging level */ if (authenticated == 1 || !authctxt->valid || authctxt->failures >= options.max_authtries / 2 || strcmp(method, "password") == 0) level = SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO; if (authctxt->postponed) authmsg = "Postponed"; else if (partial) authmsg = "Partial"; else { authmsg = authenticated ? "Accepted" : "Failed"; if (authenticated) BLACKLIST_NOTIFY(ssh, BLACKLIST_AUTH_OK, "ssh"); } if ((extra = format_method_key(authctxt)) == NULL) { if (authctxt->auth_method_info != NULL) extra = xstrdup(authctxt->auth_method_info); } do_log2(level, "%s %s%s%s for %s%.100s from %.200s port %d ssh2%s%s", authmsg, method, submethod != NULL ? "/" : "", submethod == NULL ? "" : submethod, authctxt->valid ? "" : "invalid user ", authctxt->user, ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), ssh_remote_port(ssh), extra != NULL ? ": " : "", extra != NULL ? extra : ""); free(extra); #if defined(CUSTOM_FAILED_LOGIN) || defined(SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS) if (authenticated == 0 && !(authctxt->postponed || partial)) { /* Log failed login attempt */ # ifdef CUSTOM_FAILED_LOGIN if (strcmp(method, "password") == 0 || strncmp(method, "keyboard-interactive", 20) == 0 || strcmp(method, "challenge-response") == 0) record_failed_login(ssh, authctxt->user, auth_get_canonical_hostname(ssh, options.use_dns), "ssh"); # endif # ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS audit_event(ssh, audit_classify_auth(method)); # endif } #endif #if defined(CUSTOM_FAILED_LOGIN) && defined(WITH_AIXAUTHENTICATE) if (authenticated) sys_auth_record_login(authctxt->user, auth_get_canonical_hostname(ssh, options.use_dns), "ssh", loginmsg); #endif } void auth_maxtries_exceeded(struct ssh *ssh) { Authctxt *authctxt = (Authctxt *)ssh->authctxt; error("maximum authentication attempts exceeded for " "%s%.100s from %.200s port %d ssh2", authctxt->valid ? "" : "invalid user ", authctxt->user, ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), ssh_remote_port(ssh)); ssh_packet_disconnect(ssh, "Too many authentication failures"); /* NOTREACHED */ } /* * Check whether root logins are disallowed. */ int auth_root_allowed(struct ssh *ssh, const char *method) { switch (options.permit_root_login) { case PERMIT_YES: return 1; case PERMIT_NO_PASSWD: if (strcmp(method, "publickey") == 0 || strcmp(method, "hostbased") == 0 || strcmp(method, "gssapi-with-mic") == 0) return 1; break; case PERMIT_FORCED_ONLY: if (auth_opts->force_command != NULL) { logit("Root login accepted for forced command."); return 1; } break; } logit("ROOT LOGIN REFUSED FROM %.200s port %d", ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), ssh_remote_port(ssh)); return 0; } /* * Given a template and a passwd structure, build a filename * by substituting % tokenised options. Currently, %% becomes '%', * %h becomes the home directory and %u the username. * * This returns a buffer allocated by xmalloc. */ char * expand_authorized_keys(const char *filename, struct passwd *pw) { char *file, uidstr[32], ret[PATH_MAX]; int i; snprintf(uidstr, sizeof(uidstr), "%llu", (unsigned long long)pw->pw_uid); file = percent_expand(filename, "h", pw->pw_dir, "u", pw->pw_name, "U", uidstr, (char *)NULL); /* * Ensure that filename starts anchored. If not, be backward * compatible and prepend the '%h/' */ if (path_absolute(file)) return (file); i = snprintf(ret, sizeof(ret), "%s/%s", pw->pw_dir, file); if (i < 0 || (size_t)i >= sizeof(ret)) fatal("expand_authorized_keys: path too long"); free(file); return (xstrdup(ret)); } char * authorized_principals_file(struct passwd *pw) { if (options.authorized_principals_file == NULL) return NULL; return expand_authorized_keys(options.authorized_principals_file, pw); } /* return ok if key exists in sysfile or userfile */ HostStatus check_key_in_hostfiles(struct passwd *pw, struct sshkey *key, const char *host, const char *sysfile, const char *userfile) { char *user_hostfile; struct stat st; HostStatus host_status; struct hostkeys *hostkeys; const struct hostkey_entry *found; hostkeys = init_hostkeys(); load_hostkeys(hostkeys, host, sysfile, 0); if (userfile != NULL) { user_hostfile = tilde_expand_filename(userfile, pw->pw_uid); if (options.strict_modes && (stat(user_hostfile, &st) == 0) && ((st.st_uid != 0 && st.st_uid != pw->pw_uid) || (st.st_mode & 022) != 0)) { logit("Authentication refused for %.100s: " "bad owner or modes for %.200s", pw->pw_name, user_hostfile); auth_debug_add("Ignored %.200s: bad ownership or modes", user_hostfile); } else { temporarily_use_uid(pw); load_hostkeys(hostkeys, host, user_hostfile, 0); restore_uid(); } free(user_hostfile); } host_status = check_key_in_hostkeys(hostkeys, key, &found); if (host_status == HOST_REVOKED) error("WARNING: revoked key for %s attempted authentication", host); else if (host_status == HOST_OK) debug_f("key for %s found at %s:%ld", found->host, found->file, found->line); else debug_f("key for host %s not found", host); free_hostkeys(hostkeys); return host_status; } struct passwd * getpwnamallow(struct ssh *ssh, const char *user) { #ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP extern login_cap_t *lc; #ifdef HAVE_AUTH_HOSTOK const char *from_host, *from_ip; #endif #ifdef BSD_AUTH auth_session_t *as; #endif #endif struct passwd *pw; struct connection_info *ci; u_int i; ci = get_connection_info(ssh, 1, options.use_dns); ci->user = user; parse_server_match_config(&options, &includes, ci); log_change_level(options.log_level); log_verbose_reset(); for (i = 0; i < options.num_log_verbose; i++) log_verbose_add(options.log_verbose[i]); process_permitopen(ssh, &options); #if defined(_AIX) && defined(HAVE_SETAUTHDB) aix_setauthdb(user); #endif pw = getpwnam(user); #if defined(_AIX) && defined(HAVE_SETAUTHDB) aix_restoreauthdb(); #endif if (pw == NULL) { BLACKLIST_NOTIFY(ssh, BLACKLIST_BAD_USER, user); logit("Invalid user %.100s from %.100s port %d", user, ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), ssh_remote_port(ssh)); #ifdef CUSTOM_FAILED_LOGIN record_failed_login(ssh, user, auth_get_canonical_hostname(ssh, options.use_dns), "ssh"); #endif #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS audit_event(ssh, SSH_INVALID_USER); #endif /* SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS */ return (NULL); } if (!allowed_user(ssh, pw)) return (NULL); #ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP if ((lc = login_getpwclass(pw)) == NULL) { debug("unable to get login class: %s", user); return (NULL); } #ifdef HAVE_AUTH_HOSTOK from_host = auth_get_canonical_hostname(ssh, options.use_dns); from_ip = ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh); if (!auth_hostok(lc, from_host, from_ip)) { debug("Denied connection for %.200s from %.200s [%.200s].", pw->pw_name, from_host, from_ip); return (NULL); } #endif /* HAVE_AUTH_HOSTOK */ #ifdef HAVE_AUTH_TIMEOK if (!auth_timeok(lc, time(NULL))) { debug("LOGIN %.200s REFUSED (TIME)", pw->pw_name); return (NULL); } #endif /* HAVE_AUTH_TIMEOK */ #ifdef BSD_AUTH if ((as = auth_open()) == NULL || auth_setpwd(as, pw) != 0 || auth_approval(as, lc, pw->pw_name, "ssh") <= 0) { debug("Approval failure for %s", user); pw = NULL; } if (as != NULL) auth_close(as); #endif #endif if (pw != NULL) return (pwcopy(pw)); return (NULL); } /* Returns 1 if key is revoked by revoked_keys_file, 0 otherwise */ int auth_key_is_revoked(struct sshkey *key) { char *fp = NULL; int r; if (options.revoked_keys_file == NULL) return 0; if ((fp = sshkey_fingerprint(key, options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL) { r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; error_fr(r, "fingerprint key"); goto out; } r = sshkey_check_revoked(key, options.revoked_keys_file); switch (r) { case 0: break; /* not revoked */ case SSH_ERR_KEY_REVOKED: error("Authentication key %s %s revoked by file %s", sshkey_type(key), fp, options.revoked_keys_file); goto out; default: error_r(r, "Error checking authentication key %s %s in " "revoked keys file %s", sshkey_type(key), fp, options.revoked_keys_file); goto out; } /* Success */ r = 0; out: free(fp); return r == 0 ? 0 : 1; } void auth_debug_add(const char *fmt,...) { char buf[1024]; va_list args; int r; va_start(args, fmt); vsnprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), fmt, args); va_end(args); debug3("%s", buf); if (auth_debug != NULL) if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(auth_debug, buf)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "sshbuf_put_cstring"); } void auth_debug_send(struct ssh *ssh) { char *msg; int r; if (auth_debug == NULL) return; while (sshbuf_len(auth_debug) != 0) { if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(auth_debug, &msg, NULL)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "sshbuf_get_cstring"); ssh_packet_send_debug(ssh, "%s", msg); free(msg); } } void auth_debug_reset(void) { if (auth_debug != NULL) sshbuf_reset(auth_debug); else if ((auth_debug = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed"); } struct passwd * fakepw(void) { static int done = 0; static struct passwd fake; const char hashchars[] = "./ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ" "abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz0123456789"; /* from bcrypt.c */ char *cp; if (done) return (&fake); memset(&fake, 0, sizeof(fake)); fake.pw_name = "NOUSER"; fake.pw_passwd = xstrdup("$2a$10$" "xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx"); for (cp = fake.pw_passwd + 7; *cp != '\0'; cp++) *cp = hashchars[arc4random_uniform(sizeof(hashchars) - 1)]; #ifdef HAVE_STRUCT_PASSWD_PW_GECOS fake.pw_gecos = "NOUSER"; #endif fake.pw_uid = privsep_pw == NULL ? (uid_t)-1 : privsep_pw->pw_uid; fake.pw_gid = privsep_pw == NULL ? (gid_t)-1 : privsep_pw->pw_gid; #ifdef HAVE_STRUCT_PASSWD_PW_CLASS fake.pw_class = ""; #endif fake.pw_dir = "/nonexist"; fake.pw_shell = "/nonexist"; done = 1; return (&fake); } /* * Returns the remote DNS hostname as a string. The returned string must not * be freed. NB. this will usually trigger a DNS query the first time it is * called. * This function does additional checks on the hostname to mitigate some * attacks on based on conflation of hostnames and IP addresses. */ static char * remote_hostname(struct ssh *ssh) { struct sockaddr_storage from; socklen_t fromlen; struct addrinfo hints, *ai, *aitop; char name[NI_MAXHOST], ntop2[NI_MAXHOST]; const char *ntop = ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh); /* Get IP address of client. */ fromlen = sizeof(from); memset(&from, 0, sizeof(from)); if (getpeername(ssh_packet_get_connection_in(ssh), (struct sockaddr *)&from, &fromlen) == -1) { debug("getpeername failed: %.100s", strerror(errno)); return xstrdup(ntop); } ipv64_normalise_mapped(&from, &fromlen); if (from.ss_family == AF_INET6) fromlen = sizeof(struct sockaddr_in6); debug3("Trying to reverse map address %.100s.", ntop); /* Map the IP address to a host name. */ if (getnameinfo((struct sockaddr *)&from, fromlen, name, sizeof(name), NULL, 0, NI_NAMEREQD) != 0) { /* Host name not found. Use ip address. */ return xstrdup(ntop); } /* * if reverse lookup result looks like a numeric hostname, * someone is trying to trick us by PTR record like following: * 1.1.1.10.in-addr.arpa. IN PTR 2.3.4.5 */ memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints)); hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_DGRAM; /*dummy*/ hints.ai_flags = AI_NUMERICHOST; if (getaddrinfo(name, NULL, &hints, &ai) == 0) { logit("Nasty PTR record \"%s\" is set up for %s, ignoring", name, ntop); freeaddrinfo(ai); return xstrdup(ntop); } /* Names are stored in lowercase. */ lowercase(name); /* * Map it back to an IP address and check that the given * address actually is an address of this host. This is * necessary because anyone with access to a name server can * define arbitrary names for an IP address. Mapping from * name to IP address can be trusted better (but can still be * fooled if the intruder has access to the name server of * the domain). */ memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints)); hints.ai_family = from.ss_family; hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM; if (getaddrinfo(name, NULL, &hints, &aitop) != 0) { logit("reverse mapping checking getaddrinfo for %.700s " "[%s] failed.", name, ntop); return xstrdup(ntop); } /* Look for the address from the list of addresses. */ for (ai = aitop; ai; ai = ai->ai_next) { if (getnameinfo(ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen, ntop2, sizeof(ntop2), NULL, 0, NI_NUMERICHOST) == 0 && (strcmp(ntop, ntop2) == 0)) break; } freeaddrinfo(aitop); /* If we reached the end of the list, the address was not there. */ if (ai == NULL) { /* Address not found for the host name. */ logit("Address %.100s maps to %.600s, but this does not " "map back to the address.", ntop, name); return xstrdup(ntop); } return xstrdup(name); } /* * Return the canonical name of the host in the other side of the current * connection. The host name is cached, so it is efficient to call this * several times. */ const char * auth_get_canonical_hostname(struct ssh *ssh, int use_dns) { static char *dnsname; if (!use_dns) return ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh); else if (dnsname != NULL) return dnsname; else { dnsname = remote_hostname(ssh); return dnsname; } } /* These functions link key/cert options to the auth framework */ /* Log sshauthopt options locally and (optionally) for remote transmission */ void auth_log_authopts(const char *loc, const struct sshauthopt *opts, int do_remote) { int do_env = options.permit_user_env && opts->nenv > 0; int do_permitopen = opts->npermitopen > 0 && (options.allow_tcp_forwarding & FORWARD_LOCAL) != 0; int do_permitlisten = opts->npermitlisten > 0 && (options.allow_tcp_forwarding & FORWARD_REMOTE) != 0; size_t i; char msg[1024], buf[64]; snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%d", opts->force_tun_device); /* Try to keep this alphabetically sorted */ snprintf(msg, sizeof(msg), "key options:%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s", opts->permit_agent_forwarding_flag ? " agent-forwarding" : "", opts->force_command == NULL ? "" : " command", do_env ? " environment" : "", opts->valid_before == 0 ? "" : "expires", opts->no_require_user_presence ? " no-touch-required" : "", do_permitopen ? " permitopen" : "", do_permitlisten ? " permitlisten" : "", opts->permit_port_forwarding_flag ? " port-forwarding" : "", opts->cert_principals == NULL ? "" : " principals", opts->permit_pty_flag ? " pty" : "", opts->require_verify ? " uv" : "", opts->force_tun_device == -1 ? "" : " tun=", opts->force_tun_device == -1 ? "" : buf, opts->permit_user_rc ? " user-rc" : "", opts->permit_x11_forwarding_flag ? " x11-forwarding" : ""); debug("%s: %s", loc, msg); if (do_remote) auth_debug_add("%s: %s", loc, msg); if (options.permit_user_env) { for (i = 0; i < opts->nenv; i++) { debug("%s: environment: %s", loc, opts->env[i]); if (do_remote) { auth_debug_add("%s: environment: %s", loc, opts->env[i]); } } } /* Go into a little more details for the local logs. */ if (opts->valid_before != 0) { format_absolute_time(opts->valid_before, buf, sizeof(buf)); debug("%s: expires at %s", loc, buf); } if (opts->cert_principals != NULL) { debug("%s: authorized principals: \"%s\"", loc, opts->cert_principals); } if (opts->force_command != NULL) debug("%s: forced command: \"%s\"", loc, opts->force_command); if (do_permitopen) { for (i = 0; i < opts->npermitopen; i++) { debug("%s: permitted open: %s", loc, opts->permitopen[i]); } } if (do_permitlisten) { for (i = 0; i < opts->npermitlisten; i++) { debug("%s: permitted listen: %s", loc, opts->permitlisten[i]); } } } /* Activate a new set of key/cert options; merging with what is there. */ int auth_activate_options(struct ssh *ssh, struct sshauthopt *opts) { struct sshauthopt *old = auth_opts; const char *emsg = NULL; debug_f("setting new authentication options"); if ((auth_opts = sshauthopt_merge(old, opts, &emsg)) == NULL) { error("Inconsistent authentication options: %s", emsg); return -1; } return 0; } /* Disable forwarding, etc for the session */ void auth_restrict_session(struct ssh *ssh) { struct sshauthopt *restricted; debug_f("restricting session"); /* A blank sshauthopt defaults to permitting nothing */ if ((restricted = sshauthopt_new()) == NULL) fatal_f("sshauthopt_new failed"); restricted->permit_pty_flag = 1; restricted->restricted = 1; if (auth_activate_options(ssh, restricted) != 0) fatal_f("failed to restrict session"); sshauthopt_free(restricted); } diff --git a/crypto/openssh/auth2-hostbased.c b/crypto/openssh/auth2-hostbased.c index 6b517db411df..06bb464ffa45 100644 --- a/crypto/openssh/auth2-hostbased.c +++ b/crypto/openssh/auth2-hostbased.c @@ -1,266 +1,259 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: auth2-hostbased.c,v 1.50 2022/09/17 10:34:29 djm Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: auth2-hostbased.c,v 1.52 2023/03/05 05:34:09 dtucker Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. */ #include "includes.h" #include #include #include #include #include #include "xmalloc.h" #include "ssh2.h" #include "packet.h" #include "kex.h" #include "sshbuf.h" #include "log.h" #include "misc.h" #include "servconf.h" -#include "compat.h" #include "sshkey.h" #include "hostfile.h" #include "auth.h" #include "canohost.h" #ifdef GSSAPI #include "ssh-gss.h" #endif #include "monitor_wrap.h" #include "pathnames.h" #include "ssherr.h" #include "match.h" /* import */ extern ServerOptions options; static int userauth_hostbased(struct ssh *ssh, const char *method) { Authctxt *authctxt = ssh->authctxt; struct sshbuf *b; struct sshkey *key = NULL; char *pkalg, *cuser, *chost; u_char *pkblob, *sig; size_t alen, blen, slen; int r, pktype, authenticated = 0; /* XXX use sshkey_froms() */ if ((r = sshpkt_get_cstring(ssh, &pkalg, &alen)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_get_string(ssh, &pkblob, &blen)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_get_cstring(ssh, &chost, NULL)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_get_cstring(ssh, &cuser, NULL)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_get_string(ssh, &sig, &slen)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "parse packet"); debug_f("cuser %s chost %s pkalg %s slen %zu", cuser, chost, pkalg, slen); #ifdef DEBUG_PK debug("signature:"); sshbuf_dump_data(sig, slen, stderr); #endif pktype = sshkey_type_from_name(pkalg); if (pktype == KEY_UNSPEC) { /* this is perfectly legal */ logit_f("unsupported public key algorithm: %s", pkalg); goto done; } if ((r = sshkey_from_blob(pkblob, blen, &key)) != 0) { error_fr(r, "key_from_blob"); goto done; } if (key == NULL) { error_f("cannot decode key: %s", pkalg); goto done; } if (key->type != pktype) { error_f("type mismatch for decoded key " "(received %d, expected %d)", key->type, pktype); goto done; } - if (sshkey_type_plain(key->type) == KEY_RSA && - (ssh->compat & SSH_BUG_RSASIGMD5) != 0) { - error("Refusing RSA key because peer uses unsafe " - "signature format"); - goto done; - } if (match_pattern_list(pkalg, options.hostbased_accepted_algos, 0) != 1) { logit_f("signature algorithm %s not in " "HostbasedAcceptedAlgorithms", pkalg); goto done; } if ((r = sshkey_check_cert_sigtype(key, options.ca_sign_algorithms)) != 0) { logit_fr(r, "certificate signature algorithm %s", (key->cert == NULL || key->cert->signature_type == NULL) ? "(null)" : key->cert->signature_type); goto done; } if ((r = sshkey_check_rsa_length(key, options.required_rsa_size)) != 0) { logit_r(r, "refusing %s key", sshkey_type(key)); goto done; } if (!authctxt->valid || authctxt->user == NULL) { debug2_f("disabled because of invalid user"); goto done; } if ((b = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed"); /* reconstruct packet */ if ((r = sshbuf_put_stringb(b, ssh->kex->session_id)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u8(b, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, authctxt->user)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, authctxt->service)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, method)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_string(b, pkalg, alen)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_string(b, pkblob, blen)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, chost)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, cuser)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "reconstruct packet"); #ifdef DEBUG_PK sshbuf_dump(b, stderr); #endif auth2_record_info(authctxt, "client user \"%.100s\", client host \"%.100s\"", cuser, chost); /* test for allowed key and correct signature */ authenticated = 0; if (PRIVSEP(hostbased_key_allowed(ssh, authctxt->pw, cuser, chost, key)) && PRIVSEP(sshkey_verify(key, sig, slen, sshbuf_ptr(b), sshbuf_len(b), pkalg, ssh->compat, NULL)) == 0) authenticated = 1; auth2_record_key(authctxt, authenticated, key); sshbuf_free(b); done: debug2_f("authenticated %d", authenticated); sshkey_free(key); free(pkalg); free(pkblob); free(cuser); free(chost); free(sig); return authenticated; } /* return 1 if given hostkey is allowed */ int hostbased_key_allowed(struct ssh *ssh, struct passwd *pw, const char *cuser, char *chost, struct sshkey *key) { const char *resolvedname, *ipaddr, *lookup, *reason; HostStatus host_status; int len; char *fp; if (auth_key_is_revoked(key)) return 0; resolvedname = auth_get_canonical_hostname(ssh, options.use_dns); ipaddr = ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh); debug2_f("chost %s resolvedname %s ipaddr %s", chost, resolvedname, ipaddr); if (((len = strlen(chost)) > 0) && chost[len - 1] == '.') { debug2("stripping trailing dot from chost %s", chost); chost[len - 1] = '\0'; } if (options.hostbased_uses_name_from_packet_only) { if (auth_rhosts2(pw, cuser, chost, chost) == 0) { debug2_f("auth_rhosts2 refused user \"%.100s\" " "host \"%.100s\" (from packet)", cuser, chost); return 0; } lookup = chost; } else { if (strcasecmp(resolvedname, chost) != 0) logit("userauth_hostbased mismatch: " "client sends %s, but we resolve %s to %s", chost, ipaddr, resolvedname); if (auth_rhosts2(pw, cuser, resolvedname, ipaddr) == 0) { debug2_f("auth_rhosts2 refused " "user \"%.100s\" host \"%.100s\" addr \"%.100s\"", cuser, resolvedname, ipaddr); return 0; } lookup = resolvedname; } debug2_f("access allowed by auth_rhosts2"); if (sshkey_is_cert(key) && sshkey_cert_check_authority_now(key, 1, 0, 0, lookup, &reason)) { error("%s", reason); auth_debug_add("%s", reason); return 0; } host_status = check_key_in_hostfiles(pw, key, lookup, _PATH_SSH_SYSTEM_HOSTFILE, options.ignore_user_known_hosts ? NULL : _PATH_SSH_USER_HOSTFILE); /* backward compat if no key has been found. */ if (host_status == HOST_NEW) { host_status = check_key_in_hostfiles(pw, key, lookup, _PATH_SSH_SYSTEM_HOSTFILE2, options.ignore_user_known_hosts ? NULL : _PATH_SSH_USER_HOSTFILE2); } if (host_status == HOST_OK) { if (sshkey_is_cert(key)) { if ((fp = sshkey_fingerprint(key->cert->signature_key, options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL) fatal_f("sshkey_fingerprint fail"); verbose("Accepted certificate ID \"%s\" signed by " "%s CA %s from %s@%s", key->cert->key_id, sshkey_type(key->cert->signature_key), fp, cuser, lookup); } else { if ((fp = sshkey_fingerprint(key, options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL) fatal_f("sshkey_fingerprint fail"); verbose("Accepted %s public key %s from %s@%s", sshkey_type(key), fp, cuser, lookup); } free(fp); } return (host_status == HOST_OK); } Authmethod method_hostbased = { "hostbased", NULL, userauth_hostbased, &options.hostbased_authentication }; diff --git a/crypto/openssh/auth2-none.c b/crypto/openssh/auth2-none.c index d9f97223c92a..8966fd082f42 100644 --- a/crypto/openssh/auth2-none.c +++ b/crypto/openssh/auth2-none.c @@ -1,79 +1,78 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: auth2-none.c,v 1.24 2021/12/19 22:12:07 djm Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: auth2-none.c,v 1.25 2023/03/05 05:34:09 dtucker Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. */ #include "includes.h" #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include "atomicio.h" #include "xmalloc.h" #include "sshkey.h" #include "hostfile.h" #include "auth.h" #include "packet.h" #include "log.h" #include "misc.h" #include "servconf.h" -#include "compat.h" #include "ssh2.h" #include "ssherr.h" #ifdef GSSAPI #include "ssh-gss.h" #endif #include "monitor_wrap.h" /* import */ extern ServerOptions options; /* "none" is allowed only one time */ static int none_enabled = 1; static int userauth_none(struct ssh *ssh, const char *method) { int r; none_enabled = 0; if ((r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "parse packet"); if (options.permit_empty_passwd && options.password_authentication) return (PRIVSEP(auth_password(ssh, ""))); return (0); } Authmethod method_none = { "none", NULL, userauth_none, &none_enabled }; diff --git a/crypto/openssh/auth2-pubkey.c b/crypto/openssh/auth2-pubkey.c index 5d59febc3aef..b4f1f6384053 100644 --- a/crypto/openssh/auth2-pubkey.c +++ b/crypto/openssh/auth2-pubkey.c @@ -1,815 +1,809 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: auth2-pubkey.c,v 1.117 2022/09/17 10:34:29 djm Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: auth2-pubkey.c,v 1.118 2023/02/17 04:22:50 dtucker Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. * Copyright (c) 2010 Damien Miller. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. */ #include "includes.h" #include #include #include #ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H # include #endif #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include "xmalloc.h" #include "ssh.h" #include "ssh2.h" #include "packet.h" #include "kex.h" #include "sshbuf.h" #include "log.h" #include "misc.h" #include "servconf.h" #include "compat.h" #include "sshkey.h" #include "hostfile.h" #include "auth.h" #include "pathnames.h" #include "uidswap.h" #include "auth-options.h" #include "canohost.h" #ifdef GSSAPI #include "ssh-gss.h" #endif #include "monitor_wrap.h" #include "authfile.h" #include "match.h" #include "ssherr.h" #include "channels.h" /* XXX for session.h */ #include "session.h" /* XXX for child_set_env(); refactor? */ #include "sk-api.h" /* import */ extern ServerOptions options; static char * format_key(const struct sshkey *key) { char *ret, *fp = sshkey_fingerprint(key, options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_DEFAULT); xasprintf(&ret, "%s %s", sshkey_type(key), fp); free(fp); return ret; } static int userauth_pubkey(struct ssh *ssh, const char *method) { Authctxt *authctxt = ssh->authctxt; struct passwd *pw = authctxt->pw; struct sshbuf *b = NULL; struct sshkey *key = NULL, *hostkey = NULL; char *pkalg = NULL, *userstyle = NULL, *key_s = NULL, *ca_s = NULL; u_char *pkblob = NULL, *sig = NULL, have_sig; size_t blen, slen; int hostbound, r, pktype; int req_presence = 0, req_verify = 0, authenticated = 0; struct sshauthopt *authopts = NULL; struct sshkey_sig_details *sig_details = NULL; hostbound = strcmp(method, "publickey-hostbound-v00@openssh.com") == 0; if ((r = sshpkt_get_u8(ssh, &have_sig)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_get_cstring(ssh, &pkalg, NULL)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_get_string(ssh, &pkblob, &blen)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "parse %s packet", method); /* hostbound auth includes the hostkey offered at initial KEX */ if (hostbound) { if ((r = sshpkt_getb_froms(ssh, &b)) != 0 || (r = sshkey_fromb(b, &hostkey)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "parse %s hostkey", method); if (ssh->kex->initial_hostkey == NULL) fatal_f("internal error: initial hostkey not recorded"); if (!sshkey_equal(hostkey, ssh->kex->initial_hostkey)) fatal_f("%s packet contained wrong host key", method); sshbuf_free(b); b = NULL; } if (log_level_get() >= SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG2) { char *keystring; struct sshbuf *pkbuf; if ((pkbuf = sshbuf_from(pkblob, blen)) == NULL) fatal_f("sshbuf_from failed"); if ((keystring = sshbuf_dtob64_string(pkbuf, 0)) == NULL) fatal_f("sshbuf_dtob64 failed"); debug2_f("%s user %s %s public key %s %s", authctxt->valid ? "valid" : "invalid", authctxt->user, have_sig ? "attempting" : "querying", pkalg, keystring); sshbuf_free(pkbuf); free(keystring); } pktype = sshkey_type_from_name(pkalg); if (pktype == KEY_UNSPEC) { /* this is perfectly legal */ verbose_f("unsupported public key algorithm: %s", pkalg); goto done; } if ((r = sshkey_from_blob(pkblob, blen, &key)) != 0) { error_fr(r, "parse key"); goto done; } if (key == NULL) { error_f("cannot decode key: %s", pkalg); goto done; } if (key->type != pktype) { error_f("type mismatch for decoded key " "(received %d, expected %d)", key->type, pktype); goto done; } - if (sshkey_type_plain(key->type) == KEY_RSA && - (ssh->compat & SSH_BUG_RSASIGMD5) != 0) { - logit("Refusing RSA key because client uses unsafe " - "signature scheme"); - goto done; - } if (auth2_key_already_used(authctxt, key)) { logit("refusing previously-used %s key", sshkey_type(key)); goto done; } if (match_pattern_list(pkalg, options.pubkey_accepted_algos, 0) != 1) { logit_f("signature algorithm %s not in " "PubkeyAcceptedAlgorithms", pkalg); goto done; } if ((r = sshkey_check_cert_sigtype(key, options.ca_sign_algorithms)) != 0) { logit_fr(r, "certificate signature algorithm %s", (key->cert == NULL || key->cert->signature_type == NULL) ? "(null)" : key->cert->signature_type); goto done; } if ((r = sshkey_check_rsa_length(key, options.required_rsa_size)) != 0) { logit_r(r, "refusing %s key", sshkey_type(key)); goto done; } key_s = format_key(key); if (sshkey_is_cert(key)) ca_s = format_key(key->cert->signature_key); if (have_sig) { debug3_f("%s have %s signature for %s%s%s", method, pkalg, key_s, ca_s == NULL ? "" : " CA ", ca_s == NULL ? "" : ca_s); if ((r = sshpkt_get_string(ssh, &sig, &slen)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "parse signature packet"); if ((b = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed"); if (ssh->compat & SSH_OLD_SESSIONID) { if ((r = sshbuf_putb(b, ssh->kex->session_id)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "put old session id"); } else { if ((r = sshbuf_put_stringb(b, ssh->kex->session_id)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "put session id"); } if (!authctxt->valid || authctxt->user == NULL) { debug2_f("disabled because of invalid user"); goto done; } /* reconstruct packet */ xasprintf(&userstyle, "%s%s%s", authctxt->user, authctxt->style ? ":" : "", authctxt->style ? authctxt->style : ""); if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(b, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, userstyle)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, authctxt->service)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, method)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u8(b, have_sig)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, pkalg)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_string(b, pkblob, blen)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "reconstruct %s packet", method); if (hostbound && (r = sshkey_puts(ssh->kex->initial_hostkey, b)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "reconstruct %s packet", method); #ifdef DEBUG_PK sshbuf_dump(b, stderr); #endif /* test for correct signature */ authenticated = 0; if (PRIVSEP(user_key_allowed(ssh, pw, key, 1, &authopts)) && PRIVSEP(sshkey_verify(key, sig, slen, sshbuf_ptr(b), sshbuf_len(b), (ssh->compat & SSH_BUG_SIGTYPE) == 0 ? pkalg : NULL, ssh->compat, &sig_details)) == 0) { authenticated = 1; } if (authenticated == 1 && sig_details != NULL) { auth2_record_info(authctxt, "signature count = %u", sig_details->sk_counter); debug_f("sk_counter = %u, sk_flags = 0x%02x", sig_details->sk_counter, sig_details->sk_flags); req_presence = (options.pubkey_auth_options & PUBKEYAUTH_TOUCH_REQUIRED) || !authopts->no_require_user_presence; if (req_presence && (sig_details->sk_flags & SSH_SK_USER_PRESENCE_REQD) == 0) { error("public key %s signature for %s%s from " "%.128s port %d rejected: user presence " "(authenticator touch) requirement " "not met ", key_s, authctxt->valid ? "" : "invalid user ", authctxt->user, ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), ssh_remote_port(ssh)); authenticated = 0; goto done; } req_verify = (options.pubkey_auth_options & PUBKEYAUTH_VERIFY_REQUIRED) || authopts->require_verify; if (req_verify && (sig_details->sk_flags & SSH_SK_USER_VERIFICATION_REQD) == 0) { error("public key %s signature for %s%s from " "%.128s port %d rejected: user " "verification requirement not met ", key_s, authctxt->valid ? "" : "invalid user ", authctxt->user, ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), ssh_remote_port(ssh)); authenticated = 0; goto done; } } auth2_record_key(authctxt, authenticated, key); } else { debug_f("%s test pkalg %s pkblob %s%s%s", method, pkalg, key_s, ca_s == NULL ? "" : " CA ", ca_s == NULL ? "" : ca_s); if ((r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "parse packet"); if (!authctxt->valid || authctxt->user == NULL) { debug2_f("disabled because of invalid user"); goto done; } /* XXX fake reply and always send PK_OK ? */ /* * XXX this allows testing whether a user is allowed * to login: if you happen to have a valid pubkey this * message is sent. the message is NEVER sent at all * if a user is not allowed to login. is this an * issue? -markus */ if (PRIVSEP(user_key_allowed(ssh, pw, key, 0, NULL))) { if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_PK_OK)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, pkalg)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_string(ssh, pkblob, blen)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0 || (r = ssh_packet_write_wait(ssh)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "send packet"); authctxt->postponed = 1; } } done: if (authenticated == 1 && auth_activate_options(ssh, authopts) != 0) { debug_f("key options inconsistent with existing"); authenticated = 0; } debug2_f("authenticated %d pkalg %s", authenticated, pkalg); sshbuf_free(b); sshauthopt_free(authopts); sshkey_free(key); sshkey_free(hostkey); free(userstyle); free(pkalg); free(pkblob); free(key_s); free(ca_s); free(sig); sshkey_sig_details_free(sig_details); return authenticated; } static int match_principals_file(struct passwd *pw, char *file, struct sshkey_cert *cert, struct sshauthopt **authoptsp) { FILE *f; int success; if (authoptsp != NULL) *authoptsp = NULL; temporarily_use_uid(pw); debug("trying authorized principals file %s", file); if ((f = auth_openprincipals(file, pw, options.strict_modes)) == NULL) { restore_uid(); return 0; } success = auth_process_principals(f, file, cert, authoptsp); fclose(f); restore_uid(); return success; } /* * Checks whether principal is allowed in output of command. * returns 1 if the principal is allowed or 0 otherwise. */ static int match_principals_command(struct passwd *user_pw, const struct sshkey *key, struct sshauthopt **authoptsp) { struct passwd *runas_pw = NULL; const struct sshkey_cert *cert = key->cert; FILE *f = NULL; int r, ok, found_principal = 0; int i, ac = 0, uid_swapped = 0; pid_t pid; char *tmp, *username = NULL, *command = NULL, **av = NULL; char *ca_fp = NULL, *key_fp = NULL, *catext = NULL, *keytext = NULL; char serial_s[32], uidstr[32]; void (*osigchld)(int); if (authoptsp != NULL) *authoptsp = NULL; if (options.authorized_principals_command == NULL) return 0; if (options.authorized_principals_command_user == NULL) { error("No user for AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand specified, " "skipping"); return 0; } /* * NB. all returns later this function should go via "out" to * ensure the original SIGCHLD handler is restored properly. */ osigchld = ssh_signal(SIGCHLD, SIG_DFL); /* Prepare and verify the user for the command */ username = percent_expand(options.authorized_principals_command_user, "u", user_pw->pw_name, (char *)NULL); runas_pw = getpwnam(username); if (runas_pw == NULL) { error("AuthorizedPrincipalsCommandUser \"%s\" not found: %s", username, strerror(errno)); goto out; } /* Turn the command into an argument vector */ if (argv_split(options.authorized_principals_command, &ac, &av, 0) != 0) { error("AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand \"%s\" contains " "invalid quotes", options.authorized_principals_command); goto out; } if (ac == 0) { error("AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand \"%s\" yielded no arguments", options.authorized_principals_command); goto out; } if ((ca_fp = sshkey_fingerprint(cert->signature_key, options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL) { error_f("sshkey_fingerprint failed"); goto out; } if ((key_fp = sshkey_fingerprint(key, options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL) { error_f("sshkey_fingerprint failed"); goto out; } if ((r = sshkey_to_base64(cert->signature_key, &catext)) != 0) { error_fr(r, "sshkey_to_base64 failed"); goto out; } if ((r = sshkey_to_base64(key, &keytext)) != 0) { error_fr(r, "sshkey_to_base64 failed"); goto out; } snprintf(serial_s, sizeof(serial_s), "%llu", (unsigned long long)cert->serial); snprintf(uidstr, sizeof(uidstr), "%llu", (unsigned long long)user_pw->pw_uid); for (i = 1; i < ac; i++) { tmp = percent_expand(av[i], "U", uidstr, "u", user_pw->pw_name, "h", user_pw->pw_dir, "t", sshkey_ssh_name(key), "T", sshkey_ssh_name(cert->signature_key), "f", key_fp, "F", ca_fp, "k", keytext, "K", catext, "i", cert->key_id, "s", serial_s, (char *)NULL); if (tmp == NULL) fatal_f("percent_expand failed"); free(av[i]); av[i] = tmp; } /* Prepare a printable command for logs, etc. */ command = argv_assemble(ac, av); if ((pid = subprocess("AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand", command, ac, av, &f, SSH_SUBPROCESS_STDOUT_CAPTURE|SSH_SUBPROCESS_STDERR_DISCARD, runas_pw, temporarily_use_uid, restore_uid)) == 0) goto out; uid_swapped = 1; temporarily_use_uid(runas_pw); ok = auth_process_principals(f, "(command)", cert, authoptsp); fclose(f); f = NULL; if (exited_cleanly(pid, "AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand", command, 0) != 0) goto out; /* Read completed successfully */ found_principal = ok; out: if (f != NULL) fclose(f); ssh_signal(SIGCHLD, osigchld); for (i = 0; i < ac; i++) free(av[i]); free(av); if (uid_swapped) restore_uid(); free(command); free(username); free(ca_fp); free(key_fp); free(catext); free(keytext); return found_principal; } /* Authenticate a certificate key against TrustedUserCAKeys */ static int user_cert_trusted_ca(struct passwd *pw, struct sshkey *key, const char *remote_ip, const char *remote_host, struct sshauthopt **authoptsp) { char *ca_fp, *principals_file = NULL; const char *reason; struct sshauthopt *principals_opts = NULL, *cert_opts = NULL; struct sshauthopt *final_opts = NULL; int r, ret = 0, found_principal = 0, use_authorized_principals; if (authoptsp != NULL) *authoptsp = NULL; if (!sshkey_is_cert(key) || options.trusted_user_ca_keys == NULL) return 0; if ((ca_fp = sshkey_fingerprint(key->cert->signature_key, options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL) return 0; if ((r = sshkey_in_file(key->cert->signature_key, options.trusted_user_ca_keys, 1, 0)) != 0) { debug2_fr(r, "CA %s %s is not listed in %s", sshkey_type(key->cert->signature_key), ca_fp, options.trusted_user_ca_keys); goto out; } /* * If AuthorizedPrincipals is in use, then compare the certificate * principals against the names in that file rather than matching * against the username. */ if ((principals_file = authorized_principals_file(pw)) != NULL) { if (match_principals_file(pw, principals_file, key->cert, &principals_opts)) found_principal = 1; } /* Try querying command if specified */ if (!found_principal && match_principals_command(pw, key, &principals_opts)) found_principal = 1; /* If principals file or command is specified, then require a match */ use_authorized_principals = principals_file != NULL || options.authorized_principals_command != NULL; if (!found_principal && use_authorized_principals) { reason = "Certificate does not contain an authorized principal"; goto fail_reason; } if (use_authorized_principals && principals_opts == NULL) fatal_f("internal error: missing principals_opts"); if (sshkey_cert_check_authority_now(key, 0, 1, 0, use_authorized_principals ? NULL : pw->pw_name, &reason) != 0) goto fail_reason; /* Check authority from options in key and from principals file/cmd */ if ((cert_opts = sshauthopt_from_cert(key)) == NULL) { reason = "Invalid certificate options"; goto fail_reason; } if (auth_authorise_keyopts(pw, cert_opts, 0, remote_ip, remote_host, "cert") != 0) { reason = "Refused by certificate options"; goto fail_reason; } if (principals_opts == NULL) { final_opts = cert_opts; cert_opts = NULL; } else { if (auth_authorise_keyopts(pw, principals_opts, 0, remote_ip, remote_host, "principals") != 0) { reason = "Refused by certificate principals options"; goto fail_reason; } if ((final_opts = sshauthopt_merge(principals_opts, cert_opts, &reason)) == NULL) { fail_reason: error("%s", reason); auth_debug_add("%s", reason); goto out; } } /* Success */ verbose("Accepted certificate ID \"%s\" (serial %llu) signed by " "%s CA %s via %s", key->cert->key_id, (unsigned long long)key->cert->serial, sshkey_type(key->cert->signature_key), ca_fp, options.trusted_user_ca_keys); if (authoptsp != NULL) { *authoptsp = final_opts; final_opts = NULL; } ret = 1; out: sshauthopt_free(principals_opts); sshauthopt_free(cert_opts); sshauthopt_free(final_opts); free(principals_file); free(ca_fp); return ret; } /* * Checks whether key is allowed in file. * returns 1 if the key is allowed or 0 otherwise. */ static int user_key_allowed2(struct passwd *pw, struct sshkey *key, char *file, const char *remote_ip, const char *remote_host, struct sshauthopt **authoptsp) { FILE *f; int found_key = 0; if (authoptsp != NULL) *authoptsp = NULL; /* Temporarily use the user's uid. */ temporarily_use_uid(pw); debug("trying public key file %s", file); if ((f = auth_openkeyfile(file, pw, options.strict_modes)) != NULL) { found_key = auth_check_authkeys_file(pw, f, file, key, remote_ip, remote_host, authoptsp); fclose(f); } restore_uid(); return found_key; } /* * Checks whether key is allowed in output of command. * returns 1 if the key is allowed or 0 otherwise. */ static int user_key_command_allowed2(struct passwd *user_pw, struct sshkey *key, const char *remote_ip, const char *remote_host, struct sshauthopt **authoptsp) { struct passwd *runas_pw = NULL; FILE *f = NULL; int r, ok, found_key = 0; int i, uid_swapped = 0, ac = 0; pid_t pid; char *username = NULL, *key_fp = NULL, *keytext = NULL; char uidstr[32], *tmp, *command = NULL, **av = NULL; void (*osigchld)(int); if (authoptsp != NULL) *authoptsp = NULL; if (options.authorized_keys_command == NULL) return 0; if (options.authorized_keys_command_user == NULL) { error("No user for AuthorizedKeysCommand specified, skipping"); return 0; } /* * NB. all returns later this function should go via "out" to * ensure the original SIGCHLD handler is restored properly. */ osigchld = ssh_signal(SIGCHLD, SIG_DFL); /* Prepare and verify the user for the command */ username = percent_expand(options.authorized_keys_command_user, "u", user_pw->pw_name, (char *)NULL); runas_pw = getpwnam(username); if (runas_pw == NULL) { error("AuthorizedKeysCommandUser \"%s\" not found: %s", username, strerror(errno)); goto out; } /* Prepare AuthorizedKeysCommand */ if ((key_fp = sshkey_fingerprint(key, options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL) { error_f("sshkey_fingerprint failed"); goto out; } if ((r = sshkey_to_base64(key, &keytext)) != 0) { error_fr(r, "sshkey_to_base64 failed"); goto out; } /* Turn the command into an argument vector */ if (argv_split(options.authorized_keys_command, &ac, &av, 0) != 0) { error("AuthorizedKeysCommand \"%s\" contains invalid quotes", options.authorized_keys_command); goto out; } if (ac == 0) { error("AuthorizedKeysCommand \"%s\" yielded no arguments", options.authorized_keys_command); goto out; } snprintf(uidstr, sizeof(uidstr), "%llu", (unsigned long long)user_pw->pw_uid); for (i = 1; i < ac; i++) { tmp = percent_expand(av[i], "U", uidstr, "u", user_pw->pw_name, "h", user_pw->pw_dir, "t", sshkey_ssh_name(key), "f", key_fp, "k", keytext, (char *)NULL); if (tmp == NULL) fatal_f("percent_expand failed"); free(av[i]); av[i] = tmp; } /* Prepare a printable command for logs, etc. */ command = argv_assemble(ac, av); /* * If AuthorizedKeysCommand was run without arguments * then fall back to the old behaviour of passing the * target username as a single argument. */ if (ac == 1) { av = xreallocarray(av, ac + 2, sizeof(*av)); av[1] = xstrdup(user_pw->pw_name); av[2] = NULL; /* Fix up command too, since it is used in log messages */ free(command); xasprintf(&command, "%s %s", av[0], av[1]); } if ((pid = subprocess("AuthorizedKeysCommand", command, ac, av, &f, SSH_SUBPROCESS_STDOUT_CAPTURE|SSH_SUBPROCESS_STDERR_DISCARD, runas_pw, temporarily_use_uid, restore_uid)) == 0) goto out; uid_swapped = 1; temporarily_use_uid(runas_pw); ok = auth_check_authkeys_file(user_pw, f, options.authorized_keys_command, key, remote_ip, remote_host, authoptsp); fclose(f); f = NULL; if (exited_cleanly(pid, "AuthorizedKeysCommand", command, 0) != 0) goto out; /* Read completed successfully */ found_key = ok; out: if (f != NULL) fclose(f); ssh_signal(SIGCHLD, osigchld); for (i = 0; i < ac; i++) free(av[i]); free(av); if (uid_swapped) restore_uid(); free(command); free(username); free(key_fp); free(keytext); return found_key; } /* * Check whether key authenticates and authorises the user. */ int user_key_allowed(struct ssh *ssh, struct passwd *pw, struct sshkey *key, int auth_attempt, struct sshauthopt **authoptsp) { u_int success = 0, i; char *file; struct sshauthopt *opts = NULL; const char *remote_ip = ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh); const char *remote_host = auth_get_canonical_hostname(ssh, options.use_dns); if (authoptsp != NULL) *authoptsp = NULL; if (auth_key_is_revoked(key)) return 0; if (sshkey_is_cert(key) && auth_key_is_revoked(key->cert->signature_key)) return 0; for (i = 0; !success && i < options.num_authkeys_files; i++) { if (strcasecmp(options.authorized_keys_files[i], "none") == 0) continue; file = expand_authorized_keys( options.authorized_keys_files[i], pw); success = user_key_allowed2(pw, key, file, remote_ip, remote_host, &opts); free(file); if (!success) { sshauthopt_free(opts); opts = NULL; } } if (success) goto out; if ((success = user_cert_trusted_ca(pw, key, remote_ip, remote_host, &opts)) != 0) goto out; sshauthopt_free(opts); opts = NULL; if ((success = user_key_command_allowed2(pw, key, remote_ip, remote_host, &opts)) != 0) goto out; sshauthopt_free(opts); opts = NULL; out: if (success && authoptsp != NULL) { *authoptsp = opts; opts = NULL; } sshauthopt_free(opts); return success; } Authmethod method_pubkey = { "publickey", "publickey-hostbound-v00@openssh.com", userauth_pubkey, &options.pubkey_authentication }; diff --git a/crypto/openssh/auth2-pubkeyfile.c b/crypto/openssh/auth2-pubkeyfile.c index 0cfacac353c0..31e7481fbe55 100644 --- a/crypto/openssh/auth2-pubkeyfile.c +++ b/crypto/openssh/auth2-pubkeyfile.c @@ -1,501 +1,500 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: auth2-pubkeyfile.c,v 1.3 2022/07/01 03:52:57 djm Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: auth2-pubkeyfile.c,v 1.4 2023/03/05 05:34:09 dtucker Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. * Copyright (c) 2010 Damien Miller. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. */ #include "includes.h" #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include "ssh.h" #include "log.h" #include "misc.h" -#include "compat.h" #include "sshkey.h" #include "digest.h" #include "hostfile.h" #include "auth.h" #include "auth-options.h" #include "authfile.h" #include "match.h" #include "ssherr.h" int auth_authorise_keyopts(struct passwd *pw, struct sshauthopt *opts, int allow_cert_authority, const char *remote_ip, const char *remote_host, const char *loc) { time_t now = time(NULL); char buf[64]; /* * Check keys/principals file expiry time. * NB. validity interval in certificate is handled elsewhere. */ if (opts->valid_before && now > 0 && opts->valid_before < (uint64_t)now) { format_absolute_time(opts->valid_before, buf, sizeof(buf)); debug("%s: entry expired at %s", loc, buf); auth_debug_add("%s: entry expired at %s", loc, buf); return -1; } /* Consistency checks */ if (opts->cert_principals != NULL && !opts->cert_authority) { debug("%s: principals on non-CA key", loc); auth_debug_add("%s: principals on non-CA key", loc); /* deny access */ return -1; } /* cert-authority flag isn't valid in authorized_principals files */ if (!allow_cert_authority && opts->cert_authority) { debug("%s: cert-authority flag invalid here", loc); auth_debug_add("%s: cert-authority flag invalid here", loc); /* deny access */ return -1; } /* Perform from= checks */ if (opts->required_from_host_keys != NULL) { switch (match_host_and_ip(remote_host, remote_ip, opts->required_from_host_keys )) { case 1: /* Host name matches. */ break; case -1: default: debug("%s: invalid from criteria", loc); auth_debug_add("%s: invalid from criteria", loc); /* FALLTHROUGH */ case 0: logit("%s: Authentication tried for %.100s with " "correct key but not from a permitted " "host (host=%.200s, ip=%.200s, required=%.200s).", loc, pw->pw_name, remote_host, remote_ip, opts->required_from_host_keys); auth_debug_add("%s: Your host '%.200s' is not " "permitted to use this key for login.", loc, remote_host); /* deny access */ return -1; } } /* Check source-address restriction from certificate */ if (opts->required_from_host_cert != NULL) { switch (addr_match_cidr_list(remote_ip, opts->required_from_host_cert)) { case 1: /* accepted */ break; case -1: default: /* invalid */ error("%s: Certificate source-address invalid", loc); /* FALLTHROUGH */ case 0: logit("%s: Authentication tried for %.100s with valid " "certificate but not from a permitted source " "address (%.200s).", loc, pw->pw_name, remote_ip); auth_debug_add("%s: Your address '%.200s' is not " "permitted to use this certificate for login.", loc, remote_ip); return -1; } } /* * * XXX this is spammy. We should report remotely only for keys * that are successful in actual auth attempts, and not PK_OK * tests. */ auth_log_authopts(loc, opts, 1); return 0; } static int match_principals_option(const char *principal_list, struct sshkey_cert *cert) { char *result; u_int i; /* XXX percent_expand() sequences for authorized_principals? */ for (i = 0; i < cert->nprincipals; i++) { if ((result = match_list(cert->principals[i], principal_list, NULL)) != NULL) { debug3("matched principal from key options \"%.100s\"", result); free(result); return 1; } } return 0; } /* * Process a single authorized_principals format line. Returns 0 and sets * authoptsp is principal is authorised, -1 otherwise. "loc" is used as a * log preamble for file/line information. */ int auth_check_principals_line(char *cp, const struct sshkey_cert *cert, const char *loc, struct sshauthopt **authoptsp) { u_int i, found = 0; char *ep, *line_opts; const char *reason = NULL; struct sshauthopt *opts = NULL; if (authoptsp != NULL) *authoptsp = NULL; /* Trim trailing whitespace. */ ep = cp + strlen(cp) - 1; while (ep > cp && (*ep == '\n' || *ep == ' ' || *ep == '\t')) *ep-- = '\0'; /* * If the line has internal whitespace then assume it has * key options. */ line_opts = NULL; if ((ep = strrchr(cp, ' ')) != NULL || (ep = strrchr(cp, '\t')) != NULL) { for (; *ep == ' ' || *ep == '\t'; ep++) ; line_opts = cp; cp = ep; } if ((opts = sshauthopt_parse(line_opts, &reason)) == NULL) { debug("%s: bad principals options: %s", loc, reason); auth_debug_add("%s: bad principals options: %s", loc, reason); return -1; } /* Check principals in cert against those on line */ for (i = 0; i < cert->nprincipals; i++) { if (strcmp(cp, cert->principals[i]) != 0) continue; debug3("%s: matched principal \"%.100s\"", loc, cert->principals[i]); found = 1; } if (found && authoptsp != NULL) { *authoptsp = opts; opts = NULL; } sshauthopt_free(opts); return found ? 0 : -1; } int auth_process_principals(FILE *f, const char *file, const struct sshkey_cert *cert, struct sshauthopt **authoptsp) { char loc[256], *line = NULL, *cp, *ep; size_t linesize = 0; u_long linenum = 0, nonblank = 0; u_int found_principal = 0; if (authoptsp != NULL) *authoptsp = NULL; while (getline(&line, &linesize, f) != -1) { linenum++; /* Always consume entire input */ if (found_principal) continue; /* Skip leading whitespace. */ for (cp = line; *cp == ' ' || *cp == '\t'; cp++) ; /* Skip blank and comment lines. */ if ((ep = strchr(cp, '#')) != NULL) *ep = '\0'; if (!*cp || *cp == '\n') continue; nonblank++; snprintf(loc, sizeof(loc), "%.200s:%lu", file, linenum); if (auth_check_principals_line(cp, cert, loc, authoptsp) == 0) found_principal = 1; } debug2_f("%s: processed %lu/%lu lines", file, nonblank, linenum); free(line); return found_principal; } /* * Check a single line of an authorized_keys-format file. Returns 0 if key * matches, -1 otherwise. Will return key/cert options via *authoptsp * on success. "loc" is used as file/line location in log messages. */ int auth_check_authkey_line(struct passwd *pw, struct sshkey *key, char *cp, const char *remote_ip, const char *remote_host, const char *loc, struct sshauthopt **authoptsp) { int want_keytype = sshkey_is_cert(key) ? KEY_UNSPEC : key->type; struct sshkey *found = NULL; struct sshauthopt *keyopts = NULL, *certopts = NULL, *finalopts = NULL; char *key_options = NULL, *fp = NULL; const char *reason = NULL; int ret = -1; if (authoptsp != NULL) *authoptsp = NULL; if ((found = sshkey_new(want_keytype)) == NULL) { debug3_f("keytype %d failed", want_keytype); goto out; } /* XXX djm: peek at key type in line and skip if unwanted */ if (sshkey_read(found, &cp) != 0) { /* no key? check for options */ debug2("%s: check options: '%s'", loc, cp); key_options = cp; if (sshkey_advance_past_options(&cp) != 0) { reason = "invalid key option string"; goto fail_reason; } skip_space(&cp); if (sshkey_read(found, &cp) != 0) { /* still no key? advance to next line*/ debug2("%s: advance: '%s'", loc, cp); goto out; } } /* Parse key options now; we need to know if this is a CA key */ if ((keyopts = sshauthopt_parse(key_options, &reason)) == NULL) { debug("%s: bad key options: %s", loc, reason); auth_debug_add("%s: bad key options: %s", loc, reason); goto out; } /* Ignore keys that don't match or incorrectly marked as CAs */ if (sshkey_is_cert(key)) { /* Certificate; check signature key against CA */ if (!sshkey_equal(found, key->cert->signature_key) || !keyopts->cert_authority) goto out; } else { /* Plain key: check it against key found in file */ if (!sshkey_equal(found, key) || keyopts->cert_authority) goto out; } /* We have a candidate key, perform authorisation checks */ if ((fp = sshkey_fingerprint(found, SSH_FP_HASH_DEFAULT, SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL) fatal_f("fingerprint failed"); debug("%s: matching %s found: %s %s", loc, sshkey_is_cert(key) ? "CA" : "key", sshkey_type(found), fp); if (auth_authorise_keyopts(pw, keyopts, sshkey_is_cert(key), remote_ip, remote_host, loc) != 0) { reason = "Refused by key options"; goto fail_reason; } /* That's all we need for plain keys. */ if (!sshkey_is_cert(key)) { verbose("Accepted key %s %s found at %s", sshkey_type(found), fp, loc); finalopts = keyopts; keyopts = NULL; goto success; } /* * Additional authorisation for certificates. */ /* Parse and check options present in certificate */ if ((certopts = sshauthopt_from_cert(key)) == NULL) { reason = "Invalid certificate options"; goto fail_reason; } if (auth_authorise_keyopts(pw, certopts, 0, remote_ip, remote_host, loc) != 0) { reason = "Refused by certificate options"; goto fail_reason; } if ((finalopts = sshauthopt_merge(keyopts, certopts, &reason)) == NULL) goto fail_reason; /* * If the user has specified a list of principals as * a key option, then prefer that list to matching * their username in the certificate principals list. */ if (keyopts->cert_principals != NULL && !match_principals_option(keyopts->cert_principals, key->cert)) { reason = "Certificate does not contain an authorized principal"; goto fail_reason; } if (sshkey_cert_check_authority_now(key, 0, 0, 0, keyopts->cert_principals == NULL ? pw->pw_name : NULL, &reason) != 0) goto fail_reason; verbose("Accepted certificate ID \"%s\" (serial %llu) " "signed by CA %s %s found at %s", key->cert->key_id, (unsigned long long)key->cert->serial, sshkey_type(found), fp, loc); success: if (finalopts == NULL) fatal_f("internal error: missing options"); if (authoptsp != NULL) { *authoptsp = finalopts; finalopts = NULL; } /* success */ ret = 0; goto out; fail_reason: error("%s", reason); auth_debug_add("%s", reason); out: free(fp); sshauthopt_free(keyopts); sshauthopt_free(certopts); sshauthopt_free(finalopts); sshkey_free(found); return ret; } /* * Checks whether key is allowed in authorized_keys-format file, * returns 1 if the key is allowed or 0 otherwise. */ int auth_check_authkeys_file(struct passwd *pw, FILE *f, char *file, struct sshkey *key, const char *remote_ip, const char *remote_host, struct sshauthopt **authoptsp) { char *cp, *line = NULL, loc[256]; size_t linesize = 0; int found_key = 0; u_long linenum = 0, nonblank = 0; if (authoptsp != NULL) *authoptsp = NULL; while (getline(&line, &linesize, f) != -1) { linenum++; /* Always consume entire file */ if (found_key) continue; /* Skip leading whitespace, empty and comment lines. */ cp = line; skip_space(&cp); if (!*cp || *cp == '\n' || *cp == '#') continue; nonblank++; snprintf(loc, sizeof(loc), "%.200s:%lu", file, linenum); if (auth_check_authkey_line(pw, key, cp, remote_ip, remote_host, loc, authoptsp) == 0) found_key = 1; } free(line); debug2_f("%s: processed %lu/%lu lines", file, nonblank, linenum); return found_key; } static FILE * auth_openfile(const char *file, struct passwd *pw, int strict_modes, int log_missing, char *file_type) { char line[1024]; struct stat st; int fd; FILE *f; if ((fd = open(file, O_RDONLY|O_NONBLOCK)) == -1) { if (errno != ENOENT) { logit("Could not open user '%s' %s '%s': %s", pw->pw_name, file_type, file, strerror(errno)); } else if (log_missing) { debug("Could not open user '%s' %s '%s': %s", pw->pw_name, file_type, file, strerror(errno)); } return NULL; } if (fstat(fd, &st) == -1) { close(fd); return NULL; } if (!S_ISREG(st.st_mode)) { logit("User '%s' %s '%s' is not a regular file", pw->pw_name, file_type, file); close(fd); return NULL; } unset_nonblock(fd); if ((f = fdopen(fd, "r")) == NULL) { close(fd); return NULL; } if (strict_modes && safe_path_fd(fileno(f), file, pw, line, sizeof(line)) != 0) { fclose(f); logit("Authentication refused: %s", line); auth_debug_add("Ignored %s: %s", file_type, line); return NULL; } return f; } FILE * auth_openkeyfile(const char *file, struct passwd *pw, int strict_modes) { return auth_openfile(file, pw, strict_modes, 1, "authorized keys"); } FILE * auth_openprincipals(const char *file, struct passwd *pw, int strict_modes) { return auth_openfile(file, pw, strict_modes, 0, "authorized principals"); } diff --git a/crypto/openssh/auth2.c b/crypto/openssh/auth2.c index 6f43c0979f19..84377a906df4 100644 --- a/crypto/openssh/auth2.c +++ b/crypto/openssh/auth2.c @@ -1,850 +1,847 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: auth2.c,v 1.164 2022/02/23 11:18:13 djm Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: auth2.c,v 1.166 2023/03/08 04:43:12 guenther Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. */ #include "includes.h" #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include "stdlib.h" #include "atomicio.h" #include "xmalloc.h" #include "ssh2.h" #include "packet.h" #include "log.h" #include "sshbuf.h" #include "misc.h" #include "servconf.h" -#include "compat.h" #include "sshkey.h" #include "hostfile.h" #include "auth.h" #include "dispatch.h" #include "pathnames.h" #include "ssherr.h" #include "blacklist_client.h" #ifdef GSSAPI #include "ssh-gss.h" #endif #include "monitor_wrap.h" #include "digest.h" /* import */ extern ServerOptions options; extern struct sshbuf *loginmsg; /* methods */ extern Authmethod method_none; extern Authmethod method_pubkey; extern Authmethod method_passwd; extern Authmethod method_kbdint; extern Authmethod method_hostbased; #ifdef GSSAPI extern Authmethod method_gssapi; #endif Authmethod *authmethods[] = { &method_none, &method_pubkey, #ifdef GSSAPI &method_gssapi, #endif &method_passwd, &method_kbdint, &method_hostbased, NULL }; /* protocol */ static int input_service_request(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *); static int input_userauth_request(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *); /* helper */ static Authmethod *authmethod_byname(const char *); static Authmethod *authmethod_lookup(Authctxt *, const char *); static char *authmethods_get(Authctxt *authctxt); #define MATCH_NONE 0 /* method or submethod mismatch */ #define MATCH_METHOD 1 /* method matches (no submethod specified) */ #define MATCH_BOTH 2 /* method and submethod match */ #define MATCH_PARTIAL 3 /* method matches, submethod can't be checked */ static int list_starts_with(const char *, const char *, const char *); char * auth2_read_banner(void) { struct stat st; char *banner = NULL; size_t len, n; int fd; if ((fd = open(options.banner, O_RDONLY)) == -1) return (NULL); if (fstat(fd, &st) == -1) { close(fd); return (NULL); } if (st.st_size <= 0 || st.st_size > 1*1024*1024) { close(fd); return (NULL); } len = (size_t)st.st_size; /* truncate */ banner = xmalloc(len + 1); n = atomicio(read, fd, banner, len); close(fd); if (n != len) { free(banner); return (NULL); } banner[n] = '\0'; return (banner); } static void userauth_send_banner(struct ssh *ssh, const char *msg) { int r; if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_BANNER)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, msg)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, "")) != 0 || /* language, unused */ (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "send packet"); debug("%s: sent", __func__); } static void userauth_banner(struct ssh *ssh) { char *banner = NULL; if (options.banner == NULL) return; if ((banner = PRIVSEP(auth2_read_banner())) == NULL) goto done; userauth_send_banner(ssh, banner); done: free(banner); } /* * loop until authctxt->success == TRUE */ void do_authentication2(struct ssh *ssh) { Authctxt *authctxt = ssh->authctxt; ssh_dispatch_init(ssh, &dispatch_protocol_error); ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_SERVICE_REQUEST, &input_service_request); ssh_dispatch_run_fatal(ssh, DISPATCH_BLOCK, &authctxt->success); ssh->authctxt = NULL; } -/*ARGSUSED*/ static int input_service_request(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh) { Authctxt *authctxt = ssh->authctxt; char *service = NULL; int r, acceptit = 0; if ((r = sshpkt_get_cstring(ssh, &service, NULL)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0) goto out; if (authctxt == NULL) fatal("input_service_request: no authctxt"); if (strcmp(service, "ssh-userauth") == 0) { if (!authctxt->success) { acceptit = 1; /* now we can handle user-auth requests */ ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST, &input_userauth_request); } } /* XXX all other service requests are denied */ if (acceptit) { if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_SERVICE_ACCEPT)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, service)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0 || (r = ssh_packet_write_wait(ssh)) != 0) goto out; } else { debug("bad service request %s", service); ssh_packet_disconnect(ssh, "bad service request %s", service); } r = 0; out: free(service); return r; } #define MIN_FAIL_DELAY_SECONDS 0.005 static double user_specific_delay(const char *user) { char b[512]; size_t len = ssh_digest_bytes(SSH_DIGEST_SHA512); u_char *hash = xmalloc(len); double delay; (void)snprintf(b, sizeof b, "%llu%s", (unsigned long long)options.timing_secret, user); if (ssh_digest_memory(SSH_DIGEST_SHA512, b, strlen(b), hash, len) != 0) fatal_f("ssh_digest_memory"); /* 0-4.2 ms of delay */ delay = (double)PEEK_U32(hash) / 1000 / 1000 / 1000 / 1000; freezero(hash, len); debug3_f("user specific delay %0.3lfms", delay/1000); return MIN_FAIL_DELAY_SECONDS + delay; } static void ensure_minimum_time_since(double start, double seconds) { struct timespec ts; double elapsed = monotime_double() - start, req = seconds, remain; /* if we've already passed the requested time, scale up */ while ((remain = seconds - elapsed) < 0.0) seconds *= 2; ts.tv_sec = remain; ts.tv_nsec = (remain - ts.tv_sec) * 1000000000; debug3_f("elapsed %0.3lfms, delaying %0.3lfms (requested %0.3lfms)", elapsed*1000, remain*1000, req*1000); nanosleep(&ts, NULL); } -/*ARGSUSED*/ static int input_userauth_request(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh) { Authctxt *authctxt = ssh->authctxt; Authmethod *m = NULL; char *user = NULL, *service = NULL, *method = NULL, *style = NULL; int r, authenticated = 0; double tstart = monotime_double(); if (authctxt == NULL) fatal("input_userauth_request: no authctxt"); if ((r = sshpkt_get_cstring(ssh, &user, NULL)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_get_cstring(ssh, &service, NULL)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_get_cstring(ssh, &method, NULL)) != 0) goto out; debug("userauth-request for user %s service %s method %s", user, service, method); debug("attempt %d failures %d", authctxt->attempt, authctxt->failures); if ((style = strchr(user, ':')) != NULL) *style++ = 0; if (authctxt->attempt >= 1024) auth_maxtries_exceeded(ssh); if (authctxt->attempt++ == 0) { /* setup auth context */ authctxt->pw = PRIVSEP(getpwnamallow(ssh, user)); authctxt->user = xstrdup(user); if (authctxt->pw && strcmp(service, "ssh-connection")==0) { authctxt->valid = 1; debug2_f("setting up authctxt for %s", user); } else { authctxt->valid = 0; /* Invalid user, fake password information */ authctxt->pw = fakepw(); #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS PRIVSEP(audit_event(ssh, SSH_INVALID_USER)); #endif } #ifdef USE_PAM if (options.use_pam) PRIVSEP(start_pam(ssh)); #endif ssh_packet_set_log_preamble(ssh, "%suser %s", authctxt->valid ? "authenticating " : "invalid ", user); setproctitle("%s%s", authctxt->valid ? user : "unknown", use_privsep ? " [net]" : ""); authctxt->service = xstrdup(service); authctxt->style = style ? xstrdup(style) : NULL; if (use_privsep) mm_inform_authserv(service, style); userauth_banner(ssh); if (auth2_setup_methods_lists(authctxt) != 0) ssh_packet_disconnect(ssh, "no authentication methods enabled"); } else if (strcmp(user, authctxt->user) != 0 || strcmp(service, authctxt->service) != 0) { ssh_packet_disconnect(ssh, "Change of username or service " "not allowed: (%s,%s) -> (%s,%s)", authctxt->user, authctxt->service, user, service); } /* reset state */ auth2_challenge_stop(ssh); #ifdef GSSAPI /* XXX move to auth2_gssapi_stop() */ ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_TOKEN, NULL); ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_EXCHANGE_COMPLETE, NULL); #endif auth2_authctxt_reset_info(authctxt); authctxt->postponed = 0; authctxt->server_caused_failure = 0; /* try to authenticate user */ m = authmethod_lookup(authctxt, method); if (m != NULL && authctxt->failures < options.max_authtries) { debug2("input_userauth_request: try method %s", method); authenticated = m->userauth(ssh, method); } if (!authctxt->authenticated) ensure_minimum_time_since(tstart, user_specific_delay(authctxt->user)); userauth_finish(ssh, authenticated, method, NULL); r = 0; out: free(service); free(user); free(method); return r; } void userauth_finish(struct ssh *ssh, int authenticated, const char *packet_method, const char *submethod) { Authctxt *authctxt = ssh->authctxt; Authmethod *m = NULL; const char *method = packet_method; char *methods; int r, partial = 0; if (authenticated) { if (!authctxt->valid) { fatal("INTERNAL ERROR: authenticated invalid user %s", authctxt->user); } if (authctxt->postponed) fatal("INTERNAL ERROR: authenticated and postponed"); /* prefer primary authmethod name to possible synonym */ if ((m = authmethod_byname(method)) == NULL) fatal("INTERNAL ERROR: bad method %s", method); method = m->name; } /* Special handling for root */ if (authenticated && authctxt->pw->pw_uid == 0 && !auth_root_allowed(ssh, method)) { authenticated = 0; #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS PRIVSEP(audit_event(ssh, SSH_LOGIN_ROOT_DENIED)); #endif } if (authenticated && options.num_auth_methods != 0) { if (!auth2_update_methods_lists(authctxt, method, submethod)) { authenticated = 0; partial = 1; } } /* Log before sending the reply */ auth_log(ssh, authenticated, partial, method, submethod); /* Update information exposed to session */ if (authenticated || partial) auth2_update_session_info(authctxt, method, submethod); if (authctxt->postponed) return; #ifdef USE_PAM if (options.use_pam && authenticated) { int r, success = PRIVSEP(do_pam_account()); /* If PAM returned a message, send it to the user. */ if (sshbuf_len(loginmsg) > 0) { if ((r = sshbuf_put(loginmsg, "\0", 1)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); userauth_send_banner(ssh, sshbuf_ptr(loginmsg)); if ((r = ssh_packet_write_wait(ssh)) != 0) { sshpkt_fatal(ssh, r, "%s: send PAM banner", __func__); } } if (!success) { fatal("Access denied for user %s by PAM account " "configuration", authctxt->user); } } #endif if (authenticated == 1) { /* turn off userauth */ ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST, &dispatch_protocol_ignore); if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_SUCCESS)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0 || (r = ssh_packet_write_wait(ssh)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "send success packet"); /* now we can break out */ authctxt->success = 1; ssh_packet_set_log_preamble(ssh, "user %s", authctxt->user); } else { /* Allow initial try of "none" auth without failure penalty */ if (!partial && !authctxt->server_caused_failure && (authctxt->attempt > 1 || strcmp(method, "none") != 0)) { authctxt->failures++; BLACKLIST_NOTIFY(ssh, BLACKLIST_AUTH_FAIL, "ssh"); } if (authctxt->failures >= options.max_authtries) { #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS PRIVSEP(audit_event(ssh, SSH_LOGIN_EXCEED_MAXTRIES)); #endif auth_maxtries_exceeded(ssh); } methods = authmethods_get(authctxt); debug3_f("failure partial=%d next methods=\"%s\"", partial, methods); if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_FAILURE)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, methods)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_u8(ssh, partial)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0 || (r = ssh_packet_write_wait(ssh)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "send failure packet"); free(methods); } } /* * Checks whether method is allowed by at least one AuthenticationMethods * methods list. Returns 1 if allowed, or no methods lists configured. * 0 otherwise. */ int auth2_method_allowed(Authctxt *authctxt, const char *method, const char *submethod) { u_int i; /* * NB. authctxt->num_auth_methods might be zero as a result of * auth2_setup_methods_lists(), so check the configuration. */ if (options.num_auth_methods == 0) return 1; for (i = 0; i < authctxt->num_auth_methods; i++) { if (list_starts_with(authctxt->auth_methods[i], method, submethod) != MATCH_NONE) return 1; } return 0; } static char * authmethods_get(Authctxt *authctxt) { struct sshbuf *b; char *list; int i, r; if ((b = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed"); for (i = 0; authmethods[i] != NULL; i++) { if (strcmp(authmethods[i]->name, "none") == 0) continue; if (authmethods[i]->enabled == NULL || *(authmethods[i]->enabled) == 0) continue; if (!auth2_method_allowed(authctxt, authmethods[i]->name, NULL)) continue; if ((r = sshbuf_putf(b, "%s%s", sshbuf_len(b) ? "," : "", authmethods[i]->name)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "buffer error"); } if ((list = sshbuf_dup_string(b)) == NULL) fatal_f("sshbuf_dup_string failed"); sshbuf_free(b); return list; } static Authmethod * authmethod_byname(const char *name) { int i; if (name == NULL) fatal_f("NULL authentication method name"); for (i = 0; authmethods[i] != NULL; i++) { if (strcmp(name, authmethods[i]->name) == 0 || (authmethods[i]->synonym != NULL && strcmp(name, authmethods[i]->synonym) == 0)) return authmethods[i]; } debug_f("unrecognized authentication method name: %s", name); return NULL; } static Authmethod * authmethod_lookup(Authctxt *authctxt, const char *name) { Authmethod *method; if ((method = authmethod_byname(name)) == NULL) return NULL; if (method->enabled == NULL || *(method->enabled) == 0) { debug3_f("method %s not enabled", name); return NULL; } if (!auth2_method_allowed(authctxt, method->name, NULL)) { debug3_f("method %s not allowed " "by AuthenticationMethods", name); return NULL; } return method; } /* * Check a comma-separated list of methods for validity. Is need_enable is * non-zero, then also require that the methods are enabled. * Returns 0 on success or -1 if the methods list is invalid. */ int auth2_methods_valid(const char *_methods, int need_enable) { char *methods, *omethods, *method, *p; u_int i, found; int ret = -1; if (*_methods == '\0') { error("empty authentication method list"); return -1; } omethods = methods = xstrdup(_methods); while ((method = strsep(&methods, ",")) != NULL) { for (found = i = 0; !found && authmethods[i] != NULL; i++) { if ((p = strchr(method, ':')) != NULL) *p = '\0'; if (strcmp(method, authmethods[i]->name) != 0) continue; if (need_enable) { if (authmethods[i]->enabled == NULL || *(authmethods[i]->enabled) == 0) { error("Disabled method \"%s\" in " "AuthenticationMethods list \"%s\"", method, _methods); goto out; } } found = 1; break; } if (!found) { error("Unknown authentication method \"%s\" in list", method); goto out; } } ret = 0; out: free(omethods); return ret; } /* * Prune the AuthenticationMethods supplied in the configuration, removing * any methods lists that include disabled methods. Note that this might * leave authctxt->num_auth_methods == 0, even when multiple required auth * has been requested. For this reason, all tests for whether multiple is * enabled should consult options.num_auth_methods directly. */ int auth2_setup_methods_lists(Authctxt *authctxt) { u_int i; /* First, normalise away the "any" pseudo-method */ if (options.num_auth_methods == 1 && strcmp(options.auth_methods[0], "any") == 0) { free(options.auth_methods[0]); options.auth_methods[0] = NULL; options.num_auth_methods = 0; } if (options.num_auth_methods == 0) return 0; debug3_f("checking methods"); authctxt->auth_methods = xcalloc(options.num_auth_methods, sizeof(*authctxt->auth_methods)); authctxt->num_auth_methods = 0; for (i = 0; i < options.num_auth_methods; i++) { if (auth2_methods_valid(options.auth_methods[i], 1) != 0) { logit("Authentication methods list \"%s\" contains " "disabled method, skipping", options.auth_methods[i]); continue; } debug("authentication methods list %d: %s", authctxt->num_auth_methods, options.auth_methods[i]); authctxt->auth_methods[authctxt->num_auth_methods++] = xstrdup(options.auth_methods[i]); } if (authctxt->num_auth_methods == 0) { error("No AuthenticationMethods left after eliminating " "disabled methods"); return -1; } return 0; } static int list_starts_with(const char *methods, const char *method, const char *submethod) { size_t l = strlen(method); int match; const char *p; if (strncmp(methods, method, l) != 0) return MATCH_NONE; p = methods + l; match = MATCH_METHOD; if (*p == ':') { if (!submethod) return MATCH_PARTIAL; l = strlen(submethod); p += 1; if (strncmp(submethod, p, l)) return MATCH_NONE; p += l; match = MATCH_BOTH; } if (*p != ',' && *p != '\0') return MATCH_NONE; return match; } /* * Remove method from the start of a comma-separated list of methods. * Returns 0 if the list of methods did not start with that method or 1 * if it did. */ static int remove_method(char **methods, const char *method, const char *submethod) { char *omethods = *methods, *p; size_t l = strlen(method); int match; match = list_starts_with(omethods, method, submethod); if (match != MATCH_METHOD && match != MATCH_BOTH) return 0; p = omethods + l; if (submethod && match == MATCH_BOTH) p += 1 + strlen(submethod); /* include colon */ if (*p == ',') p++; *methods = xstrdup(p); free(omethods); return 1; } /* * Called after successful authentication. Will remove the successful method * from the start of each list in which it occurs. If it was the last method * in any list, then authentication is deemed successful. * Returns 1 if the method completed any authentication list or 0 otherwise. */ int auth2_update_methods_lists(Authctxt *authctxt, const char *method, const char *submethod) { u_int i, found = 0; debug3_f("updating methods list after \"%s\"", method); for (i = 0; i < authctxt->num_auth_methods; i++) { if (!remove_method(&(authctxt->auth_methods[i]), method, submethod)) continue; found = 1; if (*authctxt->auth_methods[i] == '\0') { debug2("authentication methods list %d complete", i); return 1; } debug3("authentication methods list %d remaining: \"%s\"", i, authctxt->auth_methods[i]); } /* This should not happen, but would be bad if it did */ if (!found) fatal_f("method not in AuthenticationMethods"); return 0; } /* Reset method-specific information */ void auth2_authctxt_reset_info(Authctxt *authctxt) { sshkey_free(authctxt->auth_method_key); free(authctxt->auth_method_info); authctxt->auth_method_key = NULL; authctxt->auth_method_info = NULL; } /* Record auth method-specific information for logs */ void auth2_record_info(Authctxt *authctxt, const char *fmt, ...) { va_list ap; int i; free(authctxt->auth_method_info); authctxt->auth_method_info = NULL; va_start(ap, fmt); i = vasprintf(&authctxt->auth_method_info, fmt, ap); va_end(ap); if (i == -1) fatal_f("vasprintf failed"); } /* * Records a public key used in authentication. This is used for logging * and to ensure that the same key is not subsequently accepted again for * multiple authentication. */ void auth2_record_key(Authctxt *authctxt, int authenticated, const struct sshkey *key) { struct sshkey **tmp, *dup; int r; if ((r = sshkey_from_private(key, &dup)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "copy key"); sshkey_free(authctxt->auth_method_key); authctxt->auth_method_key = dup; if (!authenticated) return; /* If authenticated, make sure we don't accept this key again */ if ((r = sshkey_from_private(key, &dup)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "copy key"); if (authctxt->nprev_keys >= INT_MAX || (tmp = recallocarray(authctxt->prev_keys, authctxt->nprev_keys, authctxt->nprev_keys + 1, sizeof(*authctxt->prev_keys))) == NULL) fatal_f("reallocarray failed"); authctxt->prev_keys = tmp; authctxt->prev_keys[authctxt->nprev_keys] = dup; authctxt->nprev_keys++; } /* Checks whether a key has already been previously used for authentication */ int auth2_key_already_used(Authctxt *authctxt, const struct sshkey *key) { u_int i; char *fp; for (i = 0; i < authctxt->nprev_keys; i++) { if (sshkey_equal_public(key, authctxt->prev_keys[i])) { fp = sshkey_fingerprint(authctxt->prev_keys[i], options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_DEFAULT); debug3_f("key already used: %s %s", sshkey_type(authctxt->prev_keys[i]), fp == NULL ? "UNKNOWN" : fp); free(fp); return 1; } } return 0; } /* * Updates authctxt->session_info with details of authentication. Should be * whenever an authentication method succeeds. */ void auth2_update_session_info(Authctxt *authctxt, const char *method, const char *submethod) { int r; if (authctxt->session_info == NULL) { if ((authctxt->session_info = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) fatal_f("sshbuf_new"); } /* Append method[/submethod] */ if ((r = sshbuf_putf(authctxt->session_info, "%s%s%s", method, submethod == NULL ? "" : "/", submethod == NULL ? "" : submethod)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "append method"); /* Append key if present */ if (authctxt->auth_method_key != NULL) { if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(authctxt->session_info, ' ')) != 0 || (r = sshkey_format_text(authctxt->auth_method_key, authctxt->session_info)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "append key"); } if (authctxt->auth_method_info != NULL) { /* Ensure no ambiguity here */ if (strchr(authctxt->auth_method_info, '\n') != NULL) fatal_f("auth_method_info contains \\n"); if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(authctxt->session_info, ' ')) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_putf(authctxt->session_info, "%s", authctxt->auth_method_info)) != 0) { fatal_fr(r, "append method info"); } } if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(authctxt->session_info, '\n')) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "append"); } diff --git a/crypto/openssh/authfd.c b/crypto/openssh/authfd.c index b633e35eaf8b..25a363664cd2 100644 --- a/crypto/openssh/authfd.c +++ b/crypto/openssh/authfd.c @@ -1,755 +1,754 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: authfd.c,v 1.130 2022/04/27 11:08:55 dtucker Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: authfd.c,v 1.133 2023/03/09 21:06:24 jcs Exp $ */ /* * Author: Tatu Ylonen * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen , Espoo, Finland * All rights reserved * Functions for connecting the local authentication agent. * * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell". * * SSH2 implementation, * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. */ #include "includes.h" #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include "xmalloc.h" #include "ssh.h" #include "sshbuf.h" #include "sshkey.h" #include "authfd.h" #include "cipher.h" -#include "compat.h" #include "log.h" #include "atomicio.h" #include "misc.h" #include "ssherr.h" #define MAX_AGENT_IDENTITIES 2048 /* Max keys in agent reply */ #define MAX_AGENT_REPLY_LEN (256 * 1024) /* Max bytes in agent reply */ /* macro to check for "agent failure" message */ #define agent_failed(x) \ ((x == SSH_AGENT_FAILURE) || \ (x == SSH_COM_AGENT2_FAILURE) || \ (x == SSH2_AGENT_FAILURE)) /* Convert success/failure response from agent to a err.h status */ static int decode_reply(u_char type) { if (agent_failed(type)) return SSH_ERR_AGENT_FAILURE; else if (type == SSH_AGENT_SUCCESS) return 0; else return SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; } /* * Opens an authentication socket at the provided path and stores the file * descriptor in fdp. Returns 0 on success and an error on failure. */ int ssh_get_authentication_socket_path(const char *authsocket, int *fdp) { int sock, oerrno; struct sockaddr_un sunaddr; debug3_f("path '%s'", authsocket); memset(&sunaddr, 0, sizeof(sunaddr)); sunaddr.sun_family = AF_UNIX; strlcpy(sunaddr.sun_path, authsocket, sizeof(sunaddr.sun_path)); if ((sock = socket(AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0)) == -1) return SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR; /* close on exec */ if (fcntl(sock, F_SETFD, FD_CLOEXEC) == -1 || connect(sock, (struct sockaddr *)&sunaddr, sizeof(sunaddr)) == -1) { oerrno = errno; close(sock); errno = oerrno; return SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR; } if (fdp != NULL) *fdp = sock; else close(sock); return 0; } /* * Opens the default authentication socket and stores the file descriptor in * fdp. Returns 0 on success and an error on failure. */ int ssh_get_authentication_socket(int *fdp) { const char *authsocket; if (fdp != NULL) *fdp = -1; authsocket = getenv(SSH_AUTHSOCKET_ENV_NAME); if (authsocket == NULL || *authsocket == '\0') return SSH_ERR_AGENT_NOT_PRESENT; return ssh_get_authentication_socket_path(authsocket, fdp); } /* Communicate with agent: send request and read reply */ static int ssh_request_reply(int sock, struct sshbuf *request, struct sshbuf *reply) { int r; size_t l, len; char buf[1024]; /* Get the length of the message, and format it in the buffer. */ len = sshbuf_len(request); POKE_U32(buf, len); /* Send the length and then the packet to the agent. */ if (atomicio(vwrite, sock, buf, 4) != 4 || atomicio(vwrite, sock, sshbuf_mutable_ptr(request), sshbuf_len(request)) != sshbuf_len(request)) return SSH_ERR_AGENT_COMMUNICATION; /* * Wait for response from the agent. First read the length of the * response packet. */ if (atomicio(read, sock, buf, 4) != 4) return SSH_ERR_AGENT_COMMUNICATION; /* Extract the length, and check it for sanity. */ len = PEEK_U32(buf); if (len > MAX_AGENT_REPLY_LEN) return SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; /* Read the rest of the response in to the buffer. */ sshbuf_reset(reply); while (len > 0) { l = len; if (l > sizeof(buf)) l = sizeof(buf); if (atomicio(read, sock, buf, l) != l) return SSH_ERR_AGENT_COMMUNICATION; if ((r = sshbuf_put(reply, buf, l)) != 0) return r; len -= l; } return 0; } /* Communicate with agent: sent request, read and decode status reply */ static int ssh_request_reply_decode(int sock, struct sshbuf *request) { struct sshbuf *reply; int r; u_char type; if ((reply = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; if ((r = ssh_request_reply(sock, request, reply)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_u8(reply, &type)) != 0 || (r = decode_reply(type)) != 0) goto out; /* success */ r = 0; out: sshbuf_free(reply); return r; } /* * Closes the agent socket if it should be closed (depends on how it was * obtained). The argument must have been returned by * ssh_get_authentication_socket(). */ void ssh_close_authentication_socket(int sock) { if (getenv(SSH_AUTHSOCKET_ENV_NAME)) close(sock); } /* Lock/unlock agent */ int ssh_lock_agent(int sock, int lock, const char *password) { int r; u_char type = lock ? SSH_AGENTC_LOCK : SSH_AGENTC_UNLOCK; struct sshbuf *msg; if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, type)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(msg, password)) != 0 || (r = ssh_request_reply_decode(sock, msg)) != 0) goto out; /* success */ r = 0; out: sshbuf_free(msg); return r; } static int deserialise_identity2(struct sshbuf *ids, struct sshkey **keyp, char **commentp) { int r; char *comment = NULL; const u_char *blob; size_t blen; if ((r = sshbuf_get_string_direct(ids, &blob, &blen)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(ids, &comment, NULL)) != 0) goto out; if ((r = sshkey_from_blob(blob, blen, keyp)) != 0) goto out; if (commentp != NULL) { *commentp = comment; comment = NULL; } r = 0; out: free(comment); return r; } /* * Fetch list of identities held by the agent. */ int ssh_fetch_identitylist(int sock, struct ssh_identitylist **idlp) { u_char type; u_int32_t num, i; struct sshbuf *msg; struct ssh_identitylist *idl = NULL; int r; /* * Send a message to the agent requesting for a list of the * identities it can represent. */ if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, SSH2_AGENTC_REQUEST_IDENTITIES)) != 0) goto out; if ((r = ssh_request_reply(sock, msg, msg)) != 0) goto out; /* Get message type, and verify that we got a proper answer. */ if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(msg, &type)) != 0) goto out; if (agent_failed(type)) { r = SSH_ERR_AGENT_FAILURE; goto out; } else if (type != SSH2_AGENT_IDENTITIES_ANSWER) { r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; goto out; } /* Get the number of entries in the response and check it for sanity. */ if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(msg, &num)) != 0) goto out; if (num > MAX_AGENT_IDENTITIES) { r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; goto out; } if (num == 0) { r = SSH_ERR_AGENT_NO_IDENTITIES; goto out; } /* Deserialise the response into a list of keys/comments */ if ((idl = calloc(1, sizeof(*idl))) == NULL || (idl->keys = calloc(num, sizeof(*idl->keys))) == NULL || (idl->comments = calloc(num, sizeof(*idl->comments))) == NULL) { r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; goto out; } for (i = 0; i < num;) { if ((r = deserialise_identity2(msg, &(idl->keys[i]), &(idl->comments[i]))) != 0) { if (r == SSH_ERR_KEY_TYPE_UNKNOWN) { /* Gracefully skip unknown key types */ num--; continue; } else goto out; } i++; } idl->nkeys = num; *idlp = idl; idl = NULL; r = 0; out: sshbuf_free(msg); if (idl != NULL) ssh_free_identitylist(idl); return r; } void ssh_free_identitylist(struct ssh_identitylist *idl) { size_t i; if (idl == NULL) return; for (i = 0; i < idl->nkeys; i++) { if (idl->keys != NULL) sshkey_free(idl->keys[i]); if (idl->comments != NULL) free(idl->comments[i]); } free(idl->keys); free(idl->comments); free(idl); } /* * Check if the ssh agent has a given key. * Returns 0 if found, or a negative SSH_ERR_* error code on failure. */ int ssh_agent_has_key(int sock, const struct sshkey *key) { int r, ret = SSH_ERR_KEY_NOT_FOUND; size_t i; struct ssh_identitylist *idlist = NULL; if ((r = ssh_fetch_identitylist(sock, &idlist)) != 0) { return r; } for (i = 0; i < idlist->nkeys; i++) { if (sshkey_equal_public(idlist->keys[i], key)) { ret = 0; break; } } ssh_free_identitylist(idlist); return ret; } /* * Sends a challenge (typically from a server via ssh(1)) to the agent, * and waits for a response from the agent. * Returns true (non-zero) if the agent gave the correct answer, zero * otherwise. */ /* encode signature algorithm in flag bits, so we can keep the msg format */ static u_int agent_encode_alg(const struct sshkey *key, const char *alg) { if (alg != NULL && sshkey_type_plain(key->type) == KEY_RSA) { if (strcmp(alg, "rsa-sha2-256") == 0 || strcmp(alg, "rsa-sha2-256-cert-v01@openssh.com") == 0) return SSH_AGENT_RSA_SHA2_256; if (strcmp(alg, "rsa-sha2-512") == 0 || strcmp(alg, "rsa-sha2-512-cert-v01@openssh.com") == 0) return SSH_AGENT_RSA_SHA2_512; } return 0; } /* ask agent to sign data, returns err.h code on error, 0 on success */ int ssh_agent_sign(int sock, const struct sshkey *key, u_char **sigp, size_t *lenp, const u_char *data, size_t datalen, const char *alg, u_int compat) { struct sshbuf *msg; u_char *sig = NULL, type = 0; size_t len = 0; u_int flags = 0; int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; *sigp = NULL; *lenp = 0; if (datalen > SSH_KEY_MAX_SIGN_DATA_SIZE) return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; flags |= agent_encode_alg(key, alg); if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, SSH2_AGENTC_SIGN_REQUEST)) != 0 || (r = sshkey_puts(key, msg)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_string(msg, data, datalen)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u32(msg, flags)) != 0) goto out; if ((r = ssh_request_reply(sock, msg, msg)) != 0) goto out; if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(msg, &type)) != 0) goto out; if (agent_failed(type)) { r = SSH_ERR_AGENT_FAILURE; goto out; } else if (type != SSH2_AGENT_SIGN_RESPONSE) { r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; goto out; } if ((r = sshbuf_get_string(msg, &sig, &len)) != 0) goto out; /* Check what we actually got back from the agent. */ if ((r = sshkey_check_sigtype(sig, len, alg)) != 0) goto out; /* success */ *sigp = sig; *lenp = len; sig = NULL; len = 0; r = 0; out: freezero(sig, len); sshbuf_free(msg); return r; } /* Encode key for a message to the agent. */ static int encode_dest_constraint_hop(struct sshbuf *m, const struct dest_constraint_hop *dch) { struct sshbuf *b; u_int i; int r; if ((b = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, dch->user)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, dch->hostname)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_string(b, NULL, 0)) != 0) /* reserved */ goto out; for (i = 0; i < dch->nkeys; i++) { if ((r = sshkey_puts(dch->keys[i], b)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u8(b, dch->key_is_ca[i] != 0)) != 0) goto out; } if ((r = sshbuf_put_stringb(m, b)) != 0) goto out; /* success */ r = 0; out: sshbuf_free(b); return r; } static int encode_dest_constraint(struct sshbuf *m, const struct dest_constraint *dc) { struct sshbuf *b; int r; if ((b = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; - if ((r = encode_dest_constraint_hop(b, &dc->from) != 0) || - (r = encode_dest_constraint_hop(b, &dc->to) != 0) || + if ((r = encode_dest_constraint_hop(b, &dc->from)) != 0 || + (r = encode_dest_constraint_hop(b, &dc->to)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_string(b, NULL, 0)) != 0) /* reserved */ goto out; if ((r = sshbuf_put_stringb(m, b)) != 0) goto out; /* success */ r = 0; out: sshbuf_free(b); return r; } static int encode_constraints(struct sshbuf *m, u_int life, u_int confirm, u_int maxsign, const char *provider, struct dest_constraint **dest_constraints, size_t ndest_constraints) { int r; struct sshbuf *b = NULL; size_t i; if (life != 0) { if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(m, SSH_AGENT_CONSTRAIN_LIFETIME)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, life)) != 0) goto out; } if (confirm != 0) { if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(m, SSH_AGENT_CONSTRAIN_CONFIRM)) != 0) goto out; } if (maxsign != 0) { if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(m, SSH_AGENT_CONSTRAIN_MAXSIGN)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, maxsign)) != 0) goto out; } if (provider != NULL) { if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(m, SSH_AGENT_CONSTRAIN_EXTENSION)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, "sk-provider@openssh.com")) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, provider)) != 0) goto out; } if (dest_constraints != NULL && ndest_constraints > 0) { if ((b = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) { r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; goto out; } for (i = 0; i < ndest_constraints; i++) { if ((r = encode_dest_constraint(b, dest_constraints[i])) != 0) goto out; } if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(m, SSH_AGENT_CONSTRAIN_EXTENSION)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, "restrict-destination-v00@openssh.com")) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_stringb(m, b)) != 0) goto out; } r = 0; out: sshbuf_free(b); return r; } /* * Adds an identity to the authentication server. * This call is intended only for use by ssh-add(1) and like applications. */ int ssh_add_identity_constrained(int sock, struct sshkey *key, const char *comment, u_int life, u_int confirm, u_int maxsign, const char *provider, struct dest_constraint **dest_constraints, size_t ndest_constraints) { struct sshbuf *msg; int r, constrained = (life || confirm || maxsign || provider || dest_constraints); u_char type; if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; switch (key->type) { #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL case KEY_RSA: case KEY_RSA_CERT: case KEY_DSA: case KEY_DSA_CERT: case KEY_ECDSA: case KEY_ECDSA_CERT: case KEY_ECDSA_SK: case KEY_ECDSA_SK_CERT: #endif case KEY_ED25519: case KEY_ED25519_CERT: case KEY_ED25519_SK: case KEY_ED25519_SK_CERT: case KEY_XMSS: case KEY_XMSS_CERT: type = constrained ? SSH2_AGENTC_ADD_ID_CONSTRAINED : SSH2_AGENTC_ADD_IDENTITY; if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, type)) != 0 || (r = sshkey_private_serialize_maxsign(key, msg, maxsign, 0)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(msg, comment)) != 0) goto out; break; default: r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; goto out; } if (constrained && (r = encode_constraints(msg, life, confirm, maxsign, provider, dest_constraints, ndest_constraints)) != 0) goto out; if ((r = ssh_request_reply_decode(sock, msg)) != 0) goto out; /* success */ r = 0; out: sshbuf_free(msg); return r; } /* * Removes an identity from the authentication server. * This call is intended only for use by ssh-add(1) and like applications. */ int ssh_remove_identity(int sock, const struct sshkey *key) { struct sshbuf *msg; int r; u_char *blob = NULL; size_t blen; if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; if (key->type != KEY_UNSPEC) { if ((r = sshkey_to_blob(key, &blob, &blen)) != 0) goto out; if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, SSH2_AGENTC_REMOVE_IDENTITY)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_string(msg, blob, blen)) != 0) goto out; } else { r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; goto out; } if ((r = ssh_request_reply_decode(sock, msg)) != 0) goto out; /* success */ r = 0; out: if (blob != NULL) freezero(blob, blen); sshbuf_free(msg); return r; } /* * Add/remove an token-based identity from the authentication server. * This call is intended only for use by ssh-add(1) and like applications. */ int ssh_update_card(int sock, int add, const char *reader_id, const char *pin, u_int life, u_int confirm, struct dest_constraint **dest_constraints, size_t ndest_constraints) { struct sshbuf *msg; - int r, constrained = (life || confirm); + int r, constrained = (life || confirm || dest_constraints); u_char type; if (add) { type = constrained ? SSH_AGENTC_ADD_SMARTCARD_KEY_CONSTRAINED : SSH_AGENTC_ADD_SMARTCARD_KEY; } else type = SSH_AGENTC_REMOVE_SMARTCARD_KEY; if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, type)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(msg, reader_id)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(msg, pin)) != 0) goto out; if (constrained && (r = encode_constraints(msg, life, confirm, 0, NULL, dest_constraints, ndest_constraints)) != 0) goto out; if ((r = ssh_request_reply_decode(sock, msg)) != 0) goto out; /* success */ r = 0; out: sshbuf_free(msg); return r; } /* * Removes all identities from the agent. * This call is intended only for use by ssh-add(1) and like applications. * * This supports the SSH protocol 1 message to because, when clearing all * keys from an agent, we generally want to clear both protocol v1 and v2 * keys. */ int ssh_remove_all_identities(int sock, int version) { struct sshbuf *msg; u_char type = (version == 1) ? SSH_AGENTC_REMOVE_ALL_RSA_IDENTITIES : SSH2_AGENTC_REMOVE_ALL_IDENTITIES; int r; if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, type)) != 0) goto out; if ((r = ssh_request_reply_decode(sock, msg)) != 0) goto out; /* success */ r = 0; out: sshbuf_free(msg); return r; } /* Binds a session ID to a hostkey via the initial KEX signature. */ int ssh_agent_bind_hostkey(int sock, const struct sshkey *key, const struct sshbuf *session_id, const struct sshbuf *signature, int forwarding) { struct sshbuf *msg; int r; if (key == NULL || session_id == NULL || signature == NULL) return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, SSH_AGENTC_EXTENSION)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(msg, "session-bind@openssh.com")) != 0 || (r = sshkey_puts(key, msg)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_stringb(msg, session_id)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_stringb(msg, signature)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, forwarding ? 1 : 0)) != 0) goto out; if ((r = ssh_request_reply_decode(sock, msg)) != 0) goto out; /* success */ r = 0; out: sshbuf_free(msg); return r; } diff --git a/crypto/openssh/authfile.c b/crypto/openssh/authfile.c index 9ed4f4c3a30d..445f2dd54198 100644 --- a/crypto/openssh/authfile.c +++ b/crypto/openssh/authfile.c @@ -1,526 +1,528 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: authfile.c,v 1.143 2022/06/21 14:52:13 tobhe Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: authfile.c,v 1.144 2023/03/14 07:26:25 dtucker Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2000, 2013 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. */ #include "includes.h" #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include "cipher.h" #include "ssh.h" #include "log.h" #include "authfile.h" #include "misc.h" #include "atomicio.h" #include "sshkey.h" #include "sshbuf.h" #include "ssherr.h" #include "krl.h" #define MAX_KEY_FILE_SIZE (1024 * 1024) /* Save a key blob to a file */ static int sshkey_save_private_blob(struct sshbuf *keybuf, const char *filename) { int r; mode_t omask; omask = umask(077); r = sshbuf_write_file(filename, keybuf); umask(omask); return r; } int sshkey_save_private(struct sshkey *key, const char *filename, const char *passphrase, const char *comment, int format, const char *openssh_format_cipher, int openssh_format_rounds) { struct sshbuf *keyblob = NULL; int r; if ((keyblob = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; if ((r = sshkey_private_to_fileblob(key, keyblob, passphrase, comment, format, openssh_format_cipher, openssh_format_rounds)) != 0) goto out; if ((r = sshkey_save_private_blob(keyblob, filename)) != 0) goto out; r = 0; out: sshbuf_free(keyblob); return r; } /* XXX remove error() calls from here? */ int sshkey_perm_ok(int fd, const char *filename) { struct stat st; if (fstat(fd, &st) == -1) return SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR; /* * if a key owned by the user is accessed, then we check the * permissions of the file. if the key owned by a different user, * then we don't care. */ #ifdef HAVE_CYGWIN if (check_ntsec(filename)) #endif if ((st.st_uid == getuid()) && (st.st_mode & 077) != 0) { error("@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@"); error("@ WARNING: UNPROTECTED PRIVATE KEY FILE! @"); error("@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@"); error("Permissions 0%3.3o for '%s' are too open.", (u_int)st.st_mode & 0777, filename); error("It is required that your private key files are NOT accessible by others."); error("This private key will be ignored."); return SSH_ERR_KEY_BAD_PERMISSIONS; } return 0; } int sshkey_load_private_type(int type, const char *filename, const char *passphrase, struct sshkey **keyp, char **commentp) { int fd, r; if (keyp != NULL) *keyp = NULL; if (commentp != NULL) *commentp = NULL; if ((fd = open(filename, O_RDONLY)) == -1) return SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR; r = sshkey_perm_ok(fd, filename); if (r != 0) goto out; r = sshkey_load_private_type_fd(fd, type, passphrase, keyp, commentp); if (r == 0 && keyp && *keyp) r = sshkey_set_filename(*keyp, filename); out: close(fd); return r; } int sshkey_load_private(const char *filename, const char *passphrase, struct sshkey **keyp, char **commentp) { return sshkey_load_private_type(KEY_UNSPEC, filename, passphrase, keyp, commentp); } int sshkey_load_private_type_fd(int fd, int type, const char *passphrase, struct sshkey **keyp, char **commentp) { struct sshbuf *buffer = NULL; int r; if (keyp != NULL) *keyp = NULL; if ((r = sshbuf_load_fd(fd, &buffer)) != 0 || (r = sshkey_parse_private_fileblob_type(buffer, type, passphrase, keyp, commentp)) != 0) goto out; /* success */ r = 0; out: sshbuf_free(buffer); return r; } /* Load a pubkey from the unencrypted envelope of a new-format private key */ static int sshkey_load_pubkey_from_private(const char *filename, struct sshkey **pubkeyp) { struct sshbuf *buffer = NULL; struct sshkey *pubkey = NULL; int r, fd; if (pubkeyp != NULL) *pubkeyp = NULL; if ((fd = open(filename, O_RDONLY)) == -1) return SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR; if ((r = sshbuf_load_fd(fd, &buffer)) != 0 || (r = sshkey_parse_pubkey_from_private_fileblob_type(buffer, KEY_UNSPEC, &pubkey)) != 0) goto out; if ((r = sshkey_set_filename(pubkey, filename)) != 0) goto out; /* success */ if (pubkeyp != NULL) { *pubkeyp = pubkey; pubkey = NULL; } r = 0; out: close(fd); sshbuf_free(buffer); sshkey_free(pubkey); return r; } static int sshkey_try_load_public(struct sshkey **kp, const char *filename, char **commentp) { FILE *f; char *line = NULL, *cp; size_t linesize = 0; int r; struct sshkey *k = NULL; + if (kp == NULL) + return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; *kp = NULL; if (commentp != NULL) *commentp = NULL; if ((f = fopen(filename, "r")) == NULL) return SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR; if ((k = sshkey_new(KEY_UNSPEC)) == NULL) { fclose(f); return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; } while (getline(&line, &linesize, f) != -1) { cp = line; switch (*cp) { case '#': case '\n': case '\0': continue; } /* Abort loading if this looks like a private key */ if (strncmp(cp, "-----BEGIN", 10) == 0 || strcmp(cp, "SSH PRIVATE KEY FILE") == 0) break; /* Skip leading whitespace. */ for (; *cp && (*cp == ' ' || *cp == '\t'); cp++) ; if (*cp) { if ((r = sshkey_read(k, &cp)) == 0) { cp[strcspn(cp, "\r\n")] = '\0'; if (commentp) { *commentp = strdup(*cp ? cp : filename); if (*commentp == NULL) r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; } /* success */ *kp = k; free(line); fclose(f); return r; } } } free(k); free(line); fclose(f); return SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; } /* load public key from any pubkey file */ int sshkey_load_public(const char *filename, struct sshkey **keyp, char **commentp) { char *pubfile = NULL; int r, oerrno; if (keyp != NULL) *keyp = NULL; if (commentp != NULL) *commentp = NULL; if ((r = sshkey_try_load_public(keyp, filename, commentp)) == 0) goto out; /* try .pub suffix */ if (asprintf(&pubfile, "%s.pub", filename) == -1) return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; if ((r = sshkey_try_load_public(keyp, pubfile, commentp)) == 0) goto out; /* finally, try to extract public key from private key file */ if ((r = sshkey_load_pubkey_from_private(filename, keyp)) == 0) goto out; /* Pretend we couldn't find the key */ r = SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR; errno = ENOENT; out: oerrno = errno; free(pubfile); errno = oerrno; return r; } /* Load the certificate associated with the named private key */ int sshkey_load_cert(const char *filename, struct sshkey **keyp) { struct sshkey *pub = NULL; char *file = NULL; int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; if (keyp != NULL) *keyp = NULL; if (asprintf(&file, "%s-cert.pub", filename) == -1) return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; r = sshkey_try_load_public(keyp, file, NULL); free(file); sshkey_free(pub); return r; } /* Load private key and certificate */ int sshkey_load_private_cert(int type, const char *filename, const char *passphrase, struct sshkey **keyp) { struct sshkey *key = NULL, *cert = NULL; int r; if (keyp != NULL) *keyp = NULL; switch (type) { #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL case KEY_RSA: case KEY_DSA: case KEY_ECDSA: #endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */ case KEY_ED25519: case KEY_XMSS: case KEY_UNSPEC: break; default: return SSH_ERR_KEY_TYPE_UNKNOWN; } if ((r = sshkey_load_private_type(type, filename, passphrase, &key, NULL)) != 0 || (r = sshkey_load_cert(filename, &cert)) != 0) goto out; /* Make sure the private key matches the certificate */ if (sshkey_equal_public(key, cert) == 0) { r = SSH_ERR_KEY_CERT_MISMATCH; goto out; } if ((r = sshkey_to_certified(key)) != 0 || (r = sshkey_cert_copy(cert, key)) != 0) goto out; r = 0; if (keyp != NULL) { *keyp = key; key = NULL; } out: sshkey_free(key); sshkey_free(cert); return r; } /* * Returns success if the specified "key" is listed in the file "filename", * SSH_ERR_KEY_NOT_FOUND: if the key is not listed or another error. * If "strict_type" is set then the key type must match exactly, * otherwise a comparison that ignores certificate data is performed. * If "check_ca" is set and "key" is a certificate, then its CA key is * also checked and sshkey_in_file() will return success if either is found. */ int sshkey_in_file(struct sshkey *key, const char *filename, int strict_type, int check_ca) { FILE *f; char *line = NULL, *cp; size_t linesize = 0; int r = 0; struct sshkey *pub = NULL; int (*sshkey_compare)(const struct sshkey *, const struct sshkey *) = strict_type ? sshkey_equal : sshkey_equal_public; if ((f = fopen(filename, "r")) == NULL) return SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR; while (getline(&line, &linesize, f) != -1) { sshkey_free(pub); pub = NULL; cp = line; /* Skip leading whitespace. */ for (; *cp && (*cp == ' ' || *cp == '\t'); cp++) ; /* Skip comments and empty lines */ switch (*cp) { case '#': case '\n': case '\0': continue; } if ((pub = sshkey_new(KEY_UNSPEC)) == NULL) { r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; goto out; } switch (r = sshkey_read(pub, &cp)) { case 0: break; case SSH_ERR_KEY_LENGTH: continue; default: goto out; } if (sshkey_compare(key, pub) || (check_ca && sshkey_is_cert(key) && sshkey_compare(key->cert->signature_key, pub))) { r = 0; goto out; } } r = SSH_ERR_KEY_NOT_FOUND; out: free(line); sshkey_free(pub); fclose(f); return r; } /* * Checks whether the specified key is revoked, returning 0 if not, * SSH_ERR_KEY_REVOKED if it is or another error code if something * unexpected happened. * This will check both the key and, if it is a certificate, its CA key too. * "revoked_keys_file" may be a KRL or a one-per-line list of public keys. */ int sshkey_check_revoked(struct sshkey *key, const char *revoked_keys_file) { int r; r = ssh_krl_file_contains_key(revoked_keys_file, key); /* If this was not a KRL to begin with then continue below */ if (r != SSH_ERR_KRL_BAD_MAGIC) return r; /* * If the file is not a KRL or we can't handle KRLs then attempt to * parse the file as a flat list of keys. */ switch ((r = sshkey_in_file(key, revoked_keys_file, 0, 1))) { case 0: /* Key found => revoked */ return SSH_ERR_KEY_REVOKED; case SSH_ERR_KEY_NOT_FOUND: /* Key not found => not revoked */ return 0; default: /* Some other error occurred */ return r; } } /* * Advanced *cpp past the end of key options, defined as the first unquoted * whitespace character. Returns 0 on success or -1 on failure (e.g. * unterminated quotes). */ int sshkey_advance_past_options(char **cpp) { char *cp = *cpp; int quoted = 0; for (; *cp && (quoted || (*cp != ' ' && *cp != '\t')); cp++) { if (*cp == '\\' && cp[1] == '"') cp++; /* Skip both */ else if (*cp == '"') quoted = !quoted; } *cpp = cp; /* return failure for unterminated quotes */ return (*cp == '\0' && quoted) ? -1 : 0; } /* Save a public key */ int sshkey_save_public(const struct sshkey *key, const char *path, const char *comment) { int fd, oerrno; FILE *f = NULL; int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; if ((fd = open(path, O_WRONLY|O_CREAT|O_TRUNC, 0644)) == -1) return SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR; if ((f = fdopen(fd, "w")) == NULL) { r = SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR; close(fd); goto fail; } if ((r = sshkey_write(key, f)) != 0) goto fail; fprintf(f, " %s\n", comment); if (ferror(f)) { r = SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR; goto fail; } if (fclose(f) != 0) { r = SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR; f = NULL; fail: if (f != NULL) { oerrno = errno; fclose(f); errno = oerrno; } return r; } return 0; } diff --git a/crypto/openssh/canohost.c b/crypto/openssh/canohost.c index a810da0eeb73..457e9097e159 100644 --- a/crypto/openssh/canohost.c +++ b/crypto/openssh/canohost.c @@ -1,204 +1,207 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: canohost.c,v 1.75 2020/10/18 11:32:01 djm Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: canohost.c,v 1.76 2023/03/03 05:00:34 djm Exp $ */ /* * Author: Tatu Ylonen * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen , Espoo, Finland * All rights reserved * Functions for returning the canonical host name of the remote site. * * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell". */ #include "includes.h" #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include "xmalloc.h" #include "packet.h" #include "log.h" #include "canohost.h" #include "misc.h" void ipv64_normalise_mapped(struct sockaddr_storage *addr, socklen_t *len) { struct sockaddr_in6 *a6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)addr; struct sockaddr_in *a4 = (struct sockaddr_in *)addr; struct in_addr inaddr; u_int16_t port; if (addr->ss_family != AF_INET6 || !IN6_IS_ADDR_V4MAPPED(&a6->sin6_addr)) return; debug3("Normalising mapped IPv4 in IPv6 address"); memcpy(&inaddr, ((char *)&a6->sin6_addr) + 12, sizeof(inaddr)); port = a6->sin6_port; memset(a4, 0, sizeof(*a4)); a4->sin_family = AF_INET; *len = sizeof(*a4); memcpy(&a4->sin_addr, &inaddr, sizeof(inaddr)); a4->sin_port = port; } /* * Returns the local/remote IP-address/hostname of socket as a string. * The returned string must be freed. */ static char * get_socket_address(int sock, int remote, int flags) { struct sockaddr_storage addr; socklen_t addrlen; char ntop[NI_MAXHOST]; int r; + if (sock < 0) + return NULL; + /* Get IP address of client. */ addrlen = sizeof(addr); memset(&addr, 0, sizeof(addr)); if (remote) { if (getpeername(sock, (struct sockaddr *)&addr, &addrlen) != 0) return NULL; } else { if (getsockname(sock, (struct sockaddr *)&addr, &addrlen) != 0) return NULL; } /* Work around Linux IPv6 weirdness */ if (addr.ss_family == AF_INET6) { addrlen = sizeof(struct sockaddr_in6); ipv64_normalise_mapped(&addr, &addrlen); } switch (addr.ss_family) { case AF_INET: case AF_INET6: /* Get the address in ascii. */ if ((r = getnameinfo((struct sockaddr *)&addr, addrlen, ntop, sizeof(ntop), NULL, 0, flags)) != 0) { error_f("getnameinfo %d failed: %s", flags, ssh_gai_strerror(r)); return NULL; } return xstrdup(ntop); case AF_UNIX: /* Get the Unix domain socket path. */ return xstrdup(((struct sockaddr_un *)&addr)->sun_path); default: /* We can't look up remote Unix domain sockets. */ return NULL; } } char * get_peer_ipaddr(int sock) { char *p; if ((p = get_socket_address(sock, 1, NI_NUMERICHOST)) != NULL) return p; return xstrdup("UNKNOWN"); } char * get_local_ipaddr(int sock) { char *p; if ((p = get_socket_address(sock, 0, NI_NUMERICHOST)) != NULL) return p; return xstrdup("UNKNOWN"); } char * get_local_name(int fd) { char *host, myname[NI_MAXHOST]; /* Assume we were passed a socket */ if ((host = get_socket_address(fd, 0, NI_NAMEREQD)) != NULL) return host; /* Handle the case where we were passed a pipe */ if (gethostname(myname, sizeof(myname)) == -1) { verbose_f("gethostname: %s", strerror(errno)); host = xstrdup("UNKNOWN"); } else { host = xstrdup(myname); } return host; } /* Returns the local/remote port for the socket. */ static int get_sock_port(int sock, int local) { struct sockaddr_storage from; socklen_t fromlen; char strport[NI_MAXSERV]; int r; /* Get IP address of client. */ fromlen = sizeof(from); memset(&from, 0, sizeof(from)); if (local) { if (getsockname(sock, (struct sockaddr *)&from, &fromlen) == -1) { error("getsockname failed: %.100s", strerror(errno)); return 0; } } else { if (getpeername(sock, (struct sockaddr *)&from, &fromlen) == -1) { debug("getpeername failed: %.100s", strerror(errno)); return -1; } } /* Work around Linux IPv6 weirdness */ if (from.ss_family == AF_INET6) fromlen = sizeof(struct sockaddr_in6); /* Non-inet sockets don't have a port number. */ if (from.ss_family != AF_INET && from.ss_family != AF_INET6) return 0; /* Return port number. */ if ((r = getnameinfo((struct sockaddr *)&from, fromlen, NULL, 0, strport, sizeof(strport), NI_NUMERICSERV)) != 0) fatal_f("getnameinfo NI_NUMERICSERV failed: %s", ssh_gai_strerror(r)); return atoi(strport); } int get_peer_port(int sock) { return get_sock_port(sock, 0); } int get_local_port(int sock) { return get_sock_port(sock, 1); } diff --git a/crypto/openssh/channels.c b/crypto/openssh/channels.c index 0d26358cc65e..d9f59f4666cc 100644 --- a/crypto/openssh/channels.c +++ b/crypto/openssh/channels.c @@ -1,5271 +1,5279 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: channels.c,v 1.427 2023/01/18 02:00:10 djm Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: channels.c,v 1.430 2023/03/10 03:01:51 dtucker Exp $ */ /* * Author: Tatu Ylonen * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen , Espoo, Finland * All rights reserved * This file contains functions for generic socket connection forwarding. * There is also code for initiating connection forwarding for X11 connections, * arbitrary tcp/ip connections, and the authentication agent connection. * * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell". * * SSH2 support added by Markus Friedl. * Copyright (c) 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. * Copyright (c) 1999 Dug Song. All rights reserved. * Copyright (c) 1999 Theo de Raadt. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. */ #include "includes.h" #include #include #include #include #include #ifdef HAVE_SYS_TIME_H # include #endif #include #include #include #include #include #include #ifdef HAVE_POLL_H #include #endif #include #ifdef HAVE_STDINT_H # include #endif #include #include #include #include #include #include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h" #include "xmalloc.h" #include "ssh.h" #include "ssh2.h" #include "ssherr.h" #include "sshbuf.h" #include "packet.h" #include "log.h" #include "misc.h" #include "channels.h" #include "compat.h" #include "canohost.h" #include "sshkey.h" #include "authfd.h" #include "pathnames.h" #include "match.h" /* XXX remove once we're satisfied there's no lurking bugs */ /* #define DEBUG_CHANNEL_POLL 1 */ /* -- agent forwarding */ #define NUM_SOCKS 10 /* -- tcp forwarding */ /* special-case port number meaning allow any port */ #define FWD_PERMIT_ANY_PORT 0 /* special-case wildcard meaning allow any host */ #define FWD_PERMIT_ANY_HOST "*" /* -- X11 forwarding */ /* Maximum number of fake X11 displays to try. */ #define MAX_DISPLAYS 1000 /* Per-channel callback for pre/post IO actions */ typedef void chan_fn(struct ssh *, Channel *c); /* * Data structure for storing which hosts are permitted for forward requests. * The local sides of any remote forwards are stored in this array to prevent * a corrupt remote server from accessing arbitrary TCP/IP ports on our local * network (which might be behind a firewall). */ /* XXX: streamlocal wants a path instead of host:port */ /* Overload host_to_connect; we could just make this match Forward */ /* XXX - can we use listen_host instead of listen_path? */ struct permission { char *host_to_connect; /* Connect to 'host'. */ int port_to_connect; /* Connect to 'port'. */ char *listen_host; /* Remote side should listen address. */ char *listen_path; /* Remote side should listen path. */ int listen_port; /* Remote side should listen port. */ Channel *downstream; /* Downstream mux*/ }; /* * Stores the forwarding permission state for a single direction (local or * remote). */ struct permission_set { /* * List of all local permitted host/port pairs to allow for the * user. */ u_int num_permitted_user; struct permission *permitted_user; /* * List of all permitted host/port pairs to allow for the admin. */ u_int num_permitted_admin; struct permission *permitted_admin; /* * If this is true, all opens/listens are permitted. This is the * case on the server on which we have to trust the client anyway, * and the user could do anything after logging in. */ int all_permitted; }; /* Used to record timeouts per channel type */ struct ssh_channel_timeout { char *type_pattern; u_int timeout_secs; }; /* Master structure for channels state */ struct ssh_channels { /* * Pointer to an array containing all allocated channels. The array * is dynamically extended as needed. */ Channel **channels; /* * Size of the channel array. All slots of the array must always be * initialized (at least the type field); unused slots set to NULL */ u_int channels_alloc; /* * 'channel_pre*' are called just before IO to add any bits * relevant to channels in the c->io_want bitmasks. * * 'channel_post*': perform any appropriate operations for * channels which have c->io_ready events pending. */ chan_fn **channel_pre; chan_fn **channel_post; /* -- tcp forwarding */ struct permission_set local_perms; struct permission_set remote_perms; /* -- X11 forwarding */ /* Saved X11 local (client) display. */ char *x11_saved_display; /* Saved X11 authentication protocol name. */ char *x11_saved_proto; /* Saved X11 authentication data. This is the real data. */ char *x11_saved_data; u_int x11_saved_data_len; /* Deadline after which all X11 connections are refused */ - u_int x11_refuse_time; + time_t x11_refuse_time; /* * Fake X11 authentication data. This is what the server will be * sending us; we should replace any occurrences of this by the * real data. */ u_char *x11_fake_data; u_int x11_fake_data_len; /* AF_UNSPEC or AF_INET or AF_INET6 */ int IPv4or6; /* Channel timeouts by type */ struct ssh_channel_timeout *timeouts; size_t ntimeouts; }; /* helper */ static void port_open_helper(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c, char *rtype); static const char *channel_rfwd_bind_host(const char *listen_host); /* non-blocking connect helpers */ static int connect_next(struct channel_connect *); static void channel_connect_ctx_free(struct channel_connect *); static Channel *rdynamic_connect_prepare(struct ssh *, char *, char *); static int rdynamic_connect_finish(struct ssh *, Channel *); /* Setup helper */ static void channel_handler_init(struct ssh_channels *sc); /* -- channel core */ void channel_init_channels(struct ssh *ssh) { struct ssh_channels *sc; if ((sc = calloc(1, sizeof(*sc))) == NULL) fatal_f("allocation failed"); sc->channels_alloc = 10; sc->channels = xcalloc(sc->channels_alloc, sizeof(*sc->channels)); sc->IPv4or6 = AF_UNSPEC; channel_handler_init(sc); ssh->chanctxt = sc; } Channel * channel_by_id(struct ssh *ssh, int id) { Channel *c; if (id < 0 || (u_int)id >= ssh->chanctxt->channels_alloc) { logit_f("%d: bad id", id); return NULL; } c = ssh->chanctxt->channels[id]; if (c == NULL) { logit_f("%d: bad id: channel free", id); return NULL; } return c; } Channel * channel_by_remote_id(struct ssh *ssh, u_int remote_id) { Channel *c; u_int i; for (i = 0; i < ssh->chanctxt->channels_alloc; i++) { c = ssh->chanctxt->channels[i]; if (c != NULL && c->have_remote_id && c->remote_id == remote_id) return c; } return NULL; } /* * Returns the channel if it is allowed to receive protocol messages. * Private channels, like listening sockets, may not receive messages. */ Channel * channel_lookup(struct ssh *ssh, int id) { Channel *c; if ((c = channel_by_id(ssh, id)) == NULL) return NULL; switch (c->type) { case SSH_CHANNEL_X11_OPEN: case SSH_CHANNEL_LARVAL: case SSH_CHANNEL_CONNECTING: case SSH_CHANNEL_DYNAMIC: case SSH_CHANNEL_RDYNAMIC_OPEN: case SSH_CHANNEL_RDYNAMIC_FINISH: case SSH_CHANNEL_OPENING: case SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN: case SSH_CHANNEL_ABANDONED: case SSH_CHANNEL_MUX_PROXY: return c; } logit("Non-public channel %d, type %d.", id, c->type); return NULL; } /* * Add a timeout for open channels whose c->ctype (or c->xctype if it is set) * match type_pattern. */ void channel_add_timeout(struct ssh *ssh, const char *type_pattern, u_int timeout_secs) { struct ssh_channels *sc = ssh->chanctxt; debug2_f("channel type \"%s\" timeout %u seconds", type_pattern, timeout_secs); sc->timeouts = xrecallocarray(sc->timeouts, sc->ntimeouts, sc->ntimeouts + 1, sizeof(*sc->timeouts)); sc->timeouts[sc->ntimeouts].type_pattern = xstrdup(type_pattern); sc->timeouts[sc->ntimeouts].timeout_secs = timeout_secs; sc->ntimeouts++; } /* Clears all previously-added channel timeouts */ void channel_clear_timeouts(struct ssh *ssh) { struct ssh_channels *sc = ssh->chanctxt; size_t i; debug3_f("clearing"); for (i = 0; i < sc->ntimeouts; i++) free(sc->timeouts[i].type_pattern); free(sc->timeouts); sc->timeouts = NULL; sc->ntimeouts = 0; } static u_int lookup_timeout(struct ssh *ssh, const char *type) { struct ssh_channels *sc = ssh->chanctxt; size_t i; for (i = 0; i < sc->ntimeouts; i++) { if (match_pattern(type, sc->timeouts[i].type_pattern)) return sc->timeouts[i].timeout_secs; } return 0; } /* * Sets "extended type" of a channel; used by session layer to add additional * information about channel types (e.g. shell, login, subsystem) that can then * be used to select timeouts. * Will reset c->inactive_deadline as a side-effect. */ void channel_set_xtype(struct ssh *ssh, int id, const char *xctype) { Channel *c; if ((c = channel_by_id(ssh, id)) == NULL) fatal_f("missing channel %d", id); if (c->xctype != NULL) free(c->xctype); c->xctype = xstrdup(xctype); /* Type has changed, so look up inactivity deadline again */ c->inactive_deadline = lookup_timeout(ssh, c->xctype); debug2_f("labeled channel %d as %s (inactive timeout %u)", id, xctype, c->inactive_deadline); } /* * Register filedescriptors for a channel, used when allocating a channel or * when the channel consumer/producer is ready, e.g. shell exec'd */ static void channel_register_fds(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c, int rfd, int wfd, int efd, int extusage, int nonblock, int is_tty) { int val; if (rfd != -1) - fcntl(rfd, F_SETFD, FD_CLOEXEC); + (void)fcntl(rfd, F_SETFD, FD_CLOEXEC); if (wfd != -1 && wfd != rfd) - fcntl(wfd, F_SETFD, FD_CLOEXEC); + (void)fcntl(wfd, F_SETFD, FD_CLOEXEC); if (efd != -1 && efd != rfd && efd != wfd) - fcntl(efd, F_SETFD, FD_CLOEXEC); + (void)fcntl(efd, F_SETFD, FD_CLOEXEC); c->rfd = rfd; c->wfd = wfd; c->sock = (rfd == wfd) ? rfd : -1; c->efd = efd; c->extended_usage = extusage; if ((c->isatty = is_tty) != 0) debug2("channel %d: rfd %d isatty", c->self, c->rfd); #ifdef _AIX /* XXX: Later AIX versions can't push as much data to tty */ c->wfd_isatty = is_tty || isatty(c->wfd); #endif /* enable nonblocking mode */ c->restore_block = 0; if (nonblock == CHANNEL_NONBLOCK_STDIO) { /* * Special handling for stdio file descriptors: do not set * non-blocking mode if they are TTYs. Otherwise prepare to * restore their blocking state on exit to avoid interfering * with other programs that follow. */ if (rfd != -1 && !isatty(rfd) && (val = fcntl(rfd, F_GETFL)) != -1 && !(val & O_NONBLOCK)) { c->restore_flags[0] = val; c->restore_block |= CHANNEL_RESTORE_RFD; set_nonblock(rfd); } if (wfd != -1 && !isatty(wfd) && (val = fcntl(wfd, F_GETFL)) != -1 && !(val & O_NONBLOCK)) { c->restore_flags[1] = val; c->restore_block |= CHANNEL_RESTORE_WFD; set_nonblock(wfd); } if (efd != -1 && !isatty(efd) && (val = fcntl(efd, F_GETFL)) != -1 && !(val & O_NONBLOCK)) { c->restore_flags[2] = val; c->restore_block |= CHANNEL_RESTORE_EFD; set_nonblock(efd); } } else if (nonblock) { if (rfd != -1) set_nonblock(rfd); if (wfd != -1) set_nonblock(wfd); if (efd != -1) set_nonblock(efd); } } /* * Allocate a new channel object and set its type and socket. */ Channel * channel_new(struct ssh *ssh, char *ctype, int type, int rfd, int wfd, int efd, u_int window, u_int maxpack, int extusage, const char *remote_name, int nonblock) { struct ssh_channels *sc = ssh->chanctxt; u_int i, found = 0; Channel *c; int r; /* Try to find a free slot where to put the new channel. */ for (i = 0; i < sc->channels_alloc; i++) { if (sc->channels[i] == NULL) { /* Found a free slot. */ found = i; break; } } if (i >= sc->channels_alloc) { /* * There are no free slots. Take last+1 slot and expand * the array. */ found = sc->channels_alloc; if (sc->channels_alloc > CHANNELS_MAX_CHANNELS) fatal_f("internal error: channels_alloc %d too big", sc->channels_alloc); sc->channels = xrecallocarray(sc->channels, sc->channels_alloc, sc->channels_alloc + 10, sizeof(*sc->channels)); sc->channels_alloc += 10; debug2("channel: expanding %d", sc->channels_alloc); } /* Initialize and return new channel. */ c = sc->channels[found] = xcalloc(1, sizeof(Channel)); if ((c->input = sshbuf_new()) == NULL || (c->output = sshbuf_new()) == NULL || (c->extended = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed"); if ((r = sshbuf_set_max_size(c->input, CHAN_INPUT_MAX)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "sshbuf_set_max_size"); c->ostate = CHAN_OUTPUT_OPEN; c->istate = CHAN_INPUT_OPEN; channel_register_fds(ssh, c, rfd, wfd, efd, extusage, nonblock, 0); c->self = found; c->type = type; c->ctype = ctype; c->local_window = window; c->local_window_max = window; c->local_maxpacket = maxpack; c->remote_name = xstrdup(remote_name); c->ctl_chan = -1; c->delayed = 1; /* prevent call to channel_post handler */ c->inactive_deadline = lookup_timeout(ssh, c->ctype); TAILQ_INIT(&c->status_confirms); debug("channel %d: new %s [%s] (inactive timeout: %u)", found, c->ctype, remote_name, c->inactive_deadline); return c; } int channel_close_fd(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c, int *fdp) { int ret, fd = *fdp; if (fd == -1) return 0; /* restore blocking */ if (*fdp == c->rfd && (c->restore_block & CHANNEL_RESTORE_RFD) != 0) (void)fcntl(*fdp, F_SETFL, c->restore_flags[0]); else if (*fdp == c->wfd && (c->restore_block & CHANNEL_RESTORE_WFD) != 0) (void)fcntl(*fdp, F_SETFL, c->restore_flags[1]); else if (*fdp == c->efd && (c->restore_block & CHANNEL_RESTORE_EFD) != 0) (void)fcntl(*fdp, F_SETFL, c->restore_flags[2]); if (*fdp == c->rfd) { c->io_want &= ~SSH_CHAN_IO_RFD; c->io_ready &= ~SSH_CHAN_IO_RFD; c->rfd = -1; c->pfds[0] = -1; } if (*fdp == c->wfd) { c->io_want &= ~SSH_CHAN_IO_WFD; c->io_ready &= ~SSH_CHAN_IO_WFD; c->wfd = -1; c->pfds[1] = -1; } if (*fdp == c->efd) { c->io_want &= ~SSH_CHAN_IO_EFD; c->io_ready &= ~SSH_CHAN_IO_EFD; c->efd = -1; c->pfds[2] = -1; } if (*fdp == c->sock) { c->io_want &= ~SSH_CHAN_IO_SOCK; c->io_ready &= ~SSH_CHAN_IO_SOCK; c->sock = -1; c->pfds[3] = -1; } ret = close(fd); *fdp = -1; /* probably redundant */ return ret; } /* Close all channel fd/socket. */ static void channel_close_fds(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c) { int sock = c->sock, rfd = c->rfd, wfd = c->wfd, efd = c->efd; channel_close_fd(ssh, c, &c->sock); if (rfd != sock) channel_close_fd(ssh, c, &c->rfd); if (wfd != sock && wfd != rfd) channel_close_fd(ssh, c, &c->wfd); if (efd != sock && efd != rfd && efd != wfd) channel_close_fd(ssh, c, &c->efd); } static void fwd_perm_clear(struct permission *perm) { free(perm->host_to_connect); free(perm->listen_host); free(perm->listen_path); memset(perm, 0, sizeof(*perm)); } /* Returns an printable name for the specified forwarding permission list */ static const char * fwd_ident(int who, int where) { if (who == FORWARD_ADM) { if (where == FORWARD_LOCAL) return "admin local"; else if (where == FORWARD_REMOTE) return "admin remote"; } else if (who == FORWARD_USER) { if (where == FORWARD_LOCAL) return "user local"; else if (where == FORWARD_REMOTE) return "user remote"; } fatal("Unknown forward permission list %d/%d", who, where); } /* Returns the forwarding permission list for the specified direction */ static struct permission_set * permission_set_get(struct ssh *ssh, int where) { struct ssh_channels *sc = ssh->chanctxt; switch (where) { case FORWARD_LOCAL: return &sc->local_perms; break; case FORWARD_REMOTE: return &sc->remote_perms; break; default: fatal_f("invalid forwarding direction %d", where); } } /* Returns pointers to the specified forwarding list and its element count */ static void permission_set_get_array(struct ssh *ssh, int who, int where, struct permission ***permpp, u_int **npermpp) { struct permission_set *pset = permission_set_get(ssh, where); switch (who) { case FORWARD_USER: *permpp = &pset->permitted_user; *npermpp = &pset->num_permitted_user; break; case FORWARD_ADM: *permpp = &pset->permitted_admin; *npermpp = &pset->num_permitted_admin; break; default: fatal_f("invalid forwarding client %d", who); } } /* Adds an entry to the specified forwarding list */ static int permission_set_add(struct ssh *ssh, int who, int where, const char *host_to_connect, int port_to_connect, const char *listen_host, const char *listen_path, int listen_port, Channel *downstream) { struct permission **permp; u_int n, *npermp; permission_set_get_array(ssh, who, where, &permp, &npermp); if (*npermp >= INT_MAX) fatal_f("%s overflow", fwd_ident(who, where)); *permp = xrecallocarray(*permp, *npermp, *npermp + 1, sizeof(**permp)); n = (*npermp)++; #define MAYBE_DUP(s) ((s == NULL) ? NULL : xstrdup(s)) (*permp)[n].host_to_connect = MAYBE_DUP(host_to_connect); (*permp)[n].port_to_connect = port_to_connect; (*permp)[n].listen_host = MAYBE_DUP(listen_host); (*permp)[n].listen_path = MAYBE_DUP(listen_path); (*permp)[n].listen_port = listen_port; (*permp)[n].downstream = downstream; #undef MAYBE_DUP return (int)n; } static void mux_remove_remote_forwardings(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c) { struct ssh_channels *sc = ssh->chanctxt; struct permission_set *pset = &sc->local_perms; struct permission *perm; int r; u_int i; for (i = 0; i < pset->num_permitted_user; i++) { perm = &pset->permitted_user[i]; if (perm->downstream != c) continue; /* cancel on the server, since mux client is gone */ debug("channel %d: cleanup remote forward for %s:%u", c->self, perm->listen_host, perm->listen_port); if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_GLOBAL_REQUEST)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, "cancel-tcpip-forward")) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_u8(ssh, 0)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, channel_rfwd_bind_host(perm->listen_host))) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, perm->listen_port)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) { fatal_fr(r, "channel %i", c->self); } fwd_perm_clear(perm); /* unregister */ } } /* Free the channel and close its fd/socket. */ void channel_free(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c) { struct ssh_channels *sc = ssh->chanctxt; char *s; u_int i, n; Channel *other; struct channel_confirm *cc; for (n = 0, i = 0; i < sc->channels_alloc; i++) { if ((other = sc->channels[i]) == NULL) continue; n++; /* detach from mux client and prepare for closing */ if (c->type == SSH_CHANNEL_MUX_CLIENT && other->type == SSH_CHANNEL_MUX_PROXY && other->mux_ctx == c) { other->mux_ctx = NULL; other->type = SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN; other->istate = CHAN_INPUT_CLOSED; other->ostate = CHAN_OUTPUT_CLOSED; } } debug("channel %d: free: %s, nchannels %u", c->self, c->remote_name ? c->remote_name : "???", n); if (c->type == SSH_CHANNEL_MUX_CLIENT) { mux_remove_remote_forwardings(ssh, c); free(c->mux_ctx); c->mux_ctx = NULL; } else if (c->type == SSH_CHANNEL_MUX_LISTENER) { free(c->mux_ctx); c->mux_ctx = NULL; } if (log_level_get() >= SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG3) { s = channel_open_message(ssh); debug3("channel %d: status: %s", c->self, s); free(s); } channel_close_fds(ssh, c); sshbuf_free(c->input); sshbuf_free(c->output); sshbuf_free(c->extended); c->input = c->output = c->extended = NULL; free(c->remote_name); c->remote_name = NULL; free(c->path); c->path = NULL; free(c->listening_addr); c->listening_addr = NULL; free(c->xctype); c->xctype = NULL; while ((cc = TAILQ_FIRST(&c->status_confirms)) != NULL) { if (cc->abandon_cb != NULL) cc->abandon_cb(ssh, c, cc->ctx); TAILQ_REMOVE(&c->status_confirms, cc, entry); freezero(cc, sizeof(*cc)); } if (c->filter_cleanup != NULL && c->filter_ctx != NULL) c->filter_cleanup(ssh, c->self, c->filter_ctx); sc->channels[c->self] = NULL; freezero(c, sizeof(*c)); } void channel_free_all(struct ssh *ssh) { u_int i; struct ssh_channels *sc = ssh->chanctxt; for (i = 0; i < sc->channels_alloc; i++) if (sc->channels[i] != NULL) channel_free(ssh, sc->channels[i]); free(sc->channels); sc->channels = NULL; sc->channels_alloc = 0; free(sc->x11_saved_display); sc->x11_saved_display = NULL; free(sc->x11_saved_proto); sc->x11_saved_proto = NULL; free(sc->x11_saved_data); sc->x11_saved_data = NULL; sc->x11_saved_data_len = 0; free(sc->x11_fake_data); sc->x11_fake_data = NULL; sc->x11_fake_data_len = 0; } /* * Closes the sockets/fds of all channels. This is used to close extra file * descriptors after a fork. */ void channel_close_all(struct ssh *ssh) { u_int i; for (i = 0; i < ssh->chanctxt->channels_alloc; i++) if (ssh->chanctxt->channels[i] != NULL) channel_close_fds(ssh, ssh->chanctxt->channels[i]); } /* * Stop listening to channels. */ void channel_stop_listening(struct ssh *ssh) { u_int i; Channel *c; for (i = 0; i < ssh->chanctxt->channels_alloc; i++) { c = ssh->chanctxt->channels[i]; if (c != NULL) { switch (c->type) { case SSH_CHANNEL_AUTH_SOCKET: case SSH_CHANNEL_PORT_LISTENER: case SSH_CHANNEL_RPORT_LISTENER: case SSH_CHANNEL_X11_LISTENER: case SSH_CHANNEL_UNIX_LISTENER: case SSH_CHANNEL_RUNIX_LISTENER: channel_close_fd(ssh, c, &c->sock); channel_free(ssh, c); break; } } } } /* * Returns true if no channel has too much buffered data, and false if one or * more channel is overfull. */ int channel_not_very_much_buffered_data(struct ssh *ssh) { u_int i; u_int maxsize = ssh_packet_get_maxsize(ssh); Channel *c; for (i = 0; i < ssh->chanctxt->channels_alloc; i++) { c = ssh->chanctxt->channels[i]; if (c == NULL || c->type != SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN) continue; if (sshbuf_len(c->output) > maxsize) { debug2("channel %d: big output buffer %zu > %u", c->self, sshbuf_len(c->output), maxsize); return 0; } } return 1; } /* Returns true if any channel is still open. */ int channel_still_open(struct ssh *ssh) { u_int i; Channel *c; for (i = 0; i < ssh->chanctxt->channels_alloc; i++) { c = ssh->chanctxt->channels[i]; if (c == NULL) continue; switch (c->type) { case SSH_CHANNEL_X11_LISTENER: case SSH_CHANNEL_PORT_LISTENER: case SSH_CHANNEL_RPORT_LISTENER: case SSH_CHANNEL_MUX_LISTENER: case SSH_CHANNEL_CLOSED: case SSH_CHANNEL_AUTH_SOCKET: case SSH_CHANNEL_DYNAMIC: case SSH_CHANNEL_RDYNAMIC_OPEN: case SSH_CHANNEL_CONNECTING: case SSH_CHANNEL_ZOMBIE: case SSH_CHANNEL_ABANDONED: case SSH_CHANNEL_UNIX_LISTENER: case SSH_CHANNEL_RUNIX_LISTENER: continue; case SSH_CHANNEL_LARVAL: continue; case SSH_CHANNEL_OPENING: case SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN: case SSH_CHANNEL_RDYNAMIC_FINISH: case SSH_CHANNEL_X11_OPEN: case SSH_CHANNEL_MUX_CLIENT: case SSH_CHANNEL_MUX_PROXY: return 1; default: fatal_f("bad channel type %d", c->type); /* NOTREACHED */ } } return 0; } /* Returns the id of an open channel suitable for keepaliving */ int channel_find_open(struct ssh *ssh) { u_int i; Channel *c; for (i = 0; i < ssh->chanctxt->channels_alloc; i++) { c = ssh->chanctxt->channels[i]; if (c == NULL || !c->have_remote_id) continue; switch (c->type) { case SSH_CHANNEL_CLOSED: case SSH_CHANNEL_DYNAMIC: case SSH_CHANNEL_RDYNAMIC_OPEN: case SSH_CHANNEL_RDYNAMIC_FINISH: case SSH_CHANNEL_X11_LISTENER: case SSH_CHANNEL_PORT_LISTENER: case SSH_CHANNEL_RPORT_LISTENER: case SSH_CHANNEL_MUX_LISTENER: case SSH_CHANNEL_MUX_CLIENT: case SSH_CHANNEL_MUX_PROXY: case SSH_CHANNEL_OPENING: case SSH_CHANNEL_CONNECTING: case SSH_CHANNEL_ZOMBIE: case SSH_CHANNEL_ABANDONED: case SSH_CHANNEL_UNIX_LISTENER: case SSH_CHANNEL_RUNIX_LISTENER: continue; case SSH_CHANNEL_LARVAL: case SSH_CHANNEL_AUTH_SOCKET: case SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN: case SSH_CHANNEL_X11_OPEN: return i; default: fatal_f("bad channel type %d", c->type); /* NOTREACHED */ } } return -1; } /* Returns the state of the channel's extended usage flag */ const char * channel_format_extended_usage(const Channel *c) { if (c->efd == -1) return "closed"; switch (c->extended_usage) { case CHAN_EXTENDED_WRITE: return "write"; case CHAN_EXTENDED_READ: return "read"; case CHAN_EXTENDED_IGNORE: return "ignore"; default: return "UNKNOWN"; } } static char * channel_format_status(const Channel *c) { char *ret = NULL; xasprintf(&ret, "t%d [%s] %s%u i%u/%zu o%u/%zu e[%s]/%zu " "fd %d/%d/%d sock %d cc %d io 0x%02x/0x%02x", c->type, c->xctype != NULL ? c->xctype : c->ctype, c->have_remote_id ? "r" : "nr", c->remote_id, c->istate, sshbuf_len(c->input), c->ostate, sshbuf_len(c->output), channel_format_extended_usage(c), sshbuf_len(c->extended), c->rfd, c->wfd, c->efd, c->sock, c->ctl_chan, c->io_want, c->io_ready); return ret; } /* * Returns a message describing the currently open forwarded connections, * suitable for sending to the client. The message contains crlf pairs for * newlines. */ char * channel_open_message(struct ssh *ssh) { struct sshbuf *buf; Channel *c; u_int i; int r; char *cp, *ret; if ((buf = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) fatal_f("sshbuf_new"); if ((r = sshbuf_putf(buf, "The following connections are open:\r\n")) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "sshbuf_putf"); for (i = 0; i < ssh->chanctxt->channels_alloc; i++) { c = ssh->chanctxt->channels[i]; if (c == NULL) continue; switch (c->type) { case SSH_CHANNEL_X11_LISTENER: case SSH_CHANNEL_PORT_LISTENER: case SSH_CHANNEL_RPORT_LISTENER: case SSH_CHANNEL_CLOSED: case SSH_CHANNEL_AUTH_SOCKET: case SSH_CHANNEL_ZOMBIE: case SSH_CHANNEL_ABANDONED: case SSH_CHANNEL_MUX_LISTENER: case SSH_CHANNEL_UNIX_LISTENER: case SSH_CHANNEL_RUNIX_LISTENER: continue; case SSH_CHANNEL_LARVAL: case SSH_CHANNEL_OPENING: case SSH_CHANNEL_CONNECTING: case SSH_CHANNEL_DYNAMIC: case SSH_CHANNEL_RDYNAMIC_OPEN: case SSH_CHANNEL_RDYNAMIC_FINISH: case SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN: case SSH_CHANNEL_X11_OPEN: case SSH_CHANNEL_MUX_PROXY: case SSH_CHANNEL_MUX_CLIENT: cp = channel_format_status(c); if ((r = sshbuf_putf(buf, " #%d %.300s (%s)\r\n", c->self, c->remote_name, cp)) != 0) { free(cp); fatal_fr(r, "sshbuf_putf"); } free(cp); continue; default: fatal_f("bad channel type %d", c->type); /* NOTREACHED */ } } if ((ret = sshbuf_dup_string(buf)) == NULL) fatal_f("sshbuf_dup_string"); sshbuf_free(buf); return ret; } static void open_preamble(struct ssh *ssh, const char *where, Channel *c, const char *type) { int r; if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, type)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, c->self)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, c->local_window)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, c->local_maxpacket)) != 0) { fatal_r(r, "%s: channel %i: open", where, c->self); } } void channel_send_open(struct ssh *ssh, int id) { Channel *c = channel_lookup(ssh, id); int r; if (c == NULL) { logit("channel_send_open: %d: bad id", id); return; } debug2("channel %d: send open", id); open_preamble(ssh, __func__, c, c->ctype); if ((r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "channel %i", c->self); } void channel_request_start(struct ssh *ssh, int id, char *service, int wantconfirm) { Channel *c = channel_lookup(ssh, id); int r; if (c == NULL) { logit_f("%d: unknown channel id", id); return; } if (!c->have_remote_id) fatal_f("channel %d: no remote id", c->self); debug2("channel %d: request %s confirm %d", id, service, wantconfirm); if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_REQUEST)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, c->remote_id)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, service)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_u8(ssh, wantconfirm)) != 0) { fatal_fr(r, "channel %i", c->self); } } void channel_register_status_confirm(struct ssh *ssh, int id, channel_confirm_cb *cb, channel_confirm_abandon_cb *abandon_cb, void *ctx) { struct channel_confirm *cc; Channel *c; if ((c = channel_lookup(ssh, id)) == NULL) fatal_f("%d: bad id", id); cc = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*cc)); cc->cb = cb; cc->abandon_cb = abandon_cb; cc->ctx = ctx; TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(&c->status_confirms, cc, entry); } void channel_register_open_confirm(struct ssh *ssh, int id, channel_open_fn *fn, void *ctx) { Channel *c = channel_lookup(ssh, id); if (c == NULL) { logit_f("%d: bad id", id); return; } c->open_confirm = fn; c->open_confirm_ctx = ctx; } void channel_register_cleanup(struct ssh *ssh, int id, channel_callback_fn *fn, int do_close) { Channel *c = channel_by_id(ssh, id); if (c == NULL) { logit_f("%d: bad id", id); return; } c->detach_user = fn; c->detach_close = do_close; } void channel_cancel_cleanup(struct ssh *ssh, int id) { Channel *c = channel_by_id(ssh, id); if (c == NULL) { logit_f("%d: bad id", id); return; } c->detach_user = NULL; c->detach_close = 0; } void channel_register_filter(struct ssh *ssh, int id, channel_infilter_fn *ifn, channel_outfilter_fn *ofn, channel_filter_cleanup_fn *cfn, void *ctx) { Channel *c = channel_lookup(ssh, id); if (c == NULL) { logit_f("%d: bad id", id); return; } c->input_filter = ifn; c->output_filter = ofn; c->filter_ctx = ctx; c->filter_cleanup = cfn; } void channel_set_fds(struct ssh *ssh, int id, int rfd, int wfd, int efd, int extusage, int nonblock, int is_tty, u_int window_max) { Channel *c = channel_lookup(ssh, id); int r; if (c == NULL || c->type != SSH_CHANNEL_LARVAL) fatal("channel_activate for non-larval channel %d.", id); if (!c->have_remote_id) fatal_f("channel %d: no remote id", c->self); channel_register_fds(ssh, c, rfd, wfd, efd, extusage, nonblock, is_tty); c->type = SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN; c->lastused = monotime(); c->local_window = c->local_window_max = window_max; if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_WINDOW_ADJUST)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, c->remote_id)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, c->local_window)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "channel %i", c->self); } static void channel_pre_listener(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c) { c->io_want = SSH_CHAN_IO_SOCK_R; } static void channel_pre_connecting(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c) { debug3("channel %d: waiting for connection", c->self); c->io_want = SSH_CHAN_IO_SOCK_W; } static void channel_pre_open(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c) { c->io_want = 0; if (c->istate == CHAN_INPUT_OPEN && c->remote_window > 0 && sshbuf_len(c->input) < c->remote_window && sshbuf_check_reserve(c->input, CHAN_RBUF) == 0) c->io_want |= SSH_CHAN_IO_RFD; if (c->ostate == CHAN_OUTPUT_OPEN || c->ostate == CHAN_OUTPUT_WAIT_DRAIN) { if (sshbuf_len(c->output) > 0) { c->io_want |= SSH_CHAN_IO_WFD; } else if (c->ostate == CHAN_OUTPUT_WAIT_DRAIN) { if (CHANNEL_EFD_OUTPUT_ACTIVE(c)) debug2("channel %d: " "obuf_empty delayed efd %d/(%zu)", c->self, c->efd, sshbuf_len(c->extended)); else chan_obuf_empty(ssh, c); } } /** XXX check close conditions, too */ if (c->efd != -1 && !(c->istate == CHAN_INPUT_CLOSED && c->ostate == CHAN_OUTPUT_CLOSED)) { if (c->extended_usage == CHAN_EXTENDED_WRITE && sshbuf_len(c->extended) > 0) c->io_want |= SSH_CHAN_IO_EFD_W; else if (c->efd != -1 && !(c->flags & CHAN_EOF_SENT) && (c->extended_usage == CHAN_EXTENDED_READ || c->extended_usage == CHAN_EXTENDED_IGNORE) && sshbuf_len(c->extended) < c->remote_window) c->io_want |= SSH_CHAN_IO_EFD_R; } /* XXX: What about efd? races? */ } /* * This is a special state for X11 authentication spoofing. An opened X11 * connection (when authentication spoofing is being done) remains in this * state until the first packet has been completely read. The authentication * data in that packet is then substituted by the real data if it matches the * fake data, and the channel is put into normal mode. * XXX All this happens at the client side. * Returns: 0 = need more data, -1 = wrong cookie, 1 = ok */ static int x11_open_helper(struct ssh *ssh, struct sshbuf *b) { struct ssh_channels *sc = ssh->chanctxt; u_char *ucp; u_int proto_len, data_len; /* Is this being called after the refusal deadline? */ if (sc->x11_refuse_time != 0 && - (u_int)monotime() >= sc->x11_refuse_time) { + monotime() >= sc->x11_refuse_time) { verbose("Rejected X11 connection after ForwardX11Timeout " "expired"); return -1; } /* Check if the fixed size part of the packet is in buffer. */ if (sshbuf_len(b) < 12) return 0; /* Parse the lengths of variable-length fields. */ ucp = sshbuf_mutable_ptr(b); if (ucp[0] == 0x42) { /* Byte order MSB first. */ proto_len = 256 * ucp[6] + ucp[7]; data_len = 256 * ucp[8] + ucp[9]; } else if (ucp[0] == 0x6c) { /* Byte order LSB first. */ proto_len = ucp[6] + 256 * ucp[7]; data_len = ucp[8] + 256 * ucp[9]; } else { debug2("Initial X11 packet contains bad byte order byte: 0x%x", ucp[0]); return -1; } /* Check if the whole packet is in buffer. */ if (sshbuf_len(b) < 12 + ((proto_len + 3) & ~3) + ((data_len + 3) & ~3)) return 0; /* Check if authentication protocol matches. */ if (proto_len != strlen(sc->x11_saved_proto) || memcmp(ucp + 12, sc->x11_saved_proto, proto_len) != 0) { debug2("X11 connection uses different authentication protocol."); return -1; } /* Check if authentication data matches our fake data. */ if (data_len != sc->x11_fake_data_len || timingsafe_bcmp(ucp + 12 + ((proto_len + 3) & ~3), sc->x11_fake_data, sc->x11_fake_data_len) != 0) { debug2("X11 auth data does not match fake data."); return -1; } /* Check fake data length */ if (sc->x11_fake_data_len != sc->x11_saved_data_len) { error("X11 fake_data_len %d != saved_data_len %d", sc->x11_fake_data_len, sc->x11_saved_data_len); return -1; } /* * Received authentication protocol and data match * our fake data. Substitute the fake data with real * data. */ memcpy(ucp + 12 + ((proto_len + 3) & ~3), sc->x11_saved_data, sc->x11_saved_data_len); return 1; } void channel_force_close(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c, int abandon) { debug3_f("channel %d: forcibly closing", c->self); if (c->istate == CHAN_INPUT_OPEN) chan_read_failed(ssh, c); if (c->istate == CHAN_INPUT_WAIT_DRAIN) { sshbuf_reset(c->input); chan_ibuf_empty(ssh, c); } if (c->ostate == CHAN_OUTPUT_OPEN || c->ostate == CHAN_OUTPUT_WAIT_DRAIN) { sshbuf_reset(c->output); chan_write_failed(ssh, c); } if (c->detach_user) c->detach_user(ssh, c->self, 1, NULL); if (c->efd != -1) channel_close_fd(ssh, c, &c->efd); if (abandon) c->type = SSH_CHANNEL_ABANDONED; /* exempt from inactivity timeouts */ c->inactive_deadline = 0; c->lastused = 0; } static void channel_pre_x11_open(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c) { int ret = x11_open_helper(ssh, c->output); /* c->force_drain = 1; */ if (ret == 1) { c->type = SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN; c->lastused = monotime(); channel_pre_open(ssh, c); } else if (ret == -1) { logit("X11 connection rejected because of wrong " "authentication."); debug2("X11 rejected %d i%d/o%d", c->self, c->istate, c->ostate); channel_force_close(ssh, c, 0); } } static void channel_pre_mux_client(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c) { c->io_want = 0; if (c->istate == CHAN_INPUT_OPEN && !c->mux_pause && sshbuf_check_reserve(c->input, CHAN_RBUF) == 0) c->io_want |= SSH_CHAN_IO_RFD; if (c->istate == CHAN_INPUT_WAIT_DRAIN) { /* clear buffer immediately (discard any partial packet) */ sshbuf_reset(c->input); chan_ibuf_empty(ssh, c); /* Start output drain. XXX just kill chan? */ chan_rcvd_oclose(ssh, c); } if (c->ostate == CHAN_OUTPUT_OPEN || c->ostate == CHAN_OUTPUT_WAIT_DRAIN) { if (sshbuf_len(c->output) > 0) c->io_want |= SSH_CHAN_IO_WFD; else if (c->ostate == CHAN_OUTPUT_WAIT_DRAIN) chan_obuf_empty(ssh, c); } } /* try to decode a socks4 header */ static int channel_decode_socks4(Channel *c, struct sshbuf *input, struct sshbuf *output) { const u_char *p; char *host; u_int len, have, i, found, need; char username[256]; struct { u_int8_t version; u_int8_t command; u_int16_t dest_port; struct in_addr dest_addr; } s4_req, s4_rsp; int r; debug2("channel %d: decode socks4", c->self); have = sshbuf_len(input); len = sizeof(s4_req); if (have < len) return 0; p = sshbuf_ptr(input); need = 1; /* SOCKS4A uses an invalid IP address 0.0.0.x */ if (p[4] == 0 && p[5] == 0 && p[6] == 0 && p[7] != 0) { debug2("channel %d: socks4a request", c->self); /* ... and needs an extra string (the hostname) */ need = 2; } /* Check for terminating NUL on the string(s) */ for (found = 0, i = len; i < have; i++) { if (p[i] == '\0') { found++; if (found == need) break; } if (i > 1024) { /* the peer is probably sending garbage */ debug("channel %d: decode socks4: too long", c->self); return -1; } } if (found < need) return 0; if ((r = sshbuf_get(input, &s4_req.version, 1)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get(input, &s4_req.command, 1)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get(input, &s4_req.dest_port, 2)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get(input, &s4_req.dest_addr, 4)) != 0) { debug_r(r, "channels %d: decode socks4", c->self); return -1; } have = sshbuf_len(input); p = sshbuf_ptr(input); if (memchr(p, '\0', have) == NULL) { error("channel %d: decode socks4: unterminated user", c->self); return -1; } len = strlen(p); debug2("channel %d: decode socks4: user %s/%d", c->self, p, len); len++; /* trailing '\0' */ strlcpy(username, p, sizeof(username)); if ((r = sshbuf_consume(input, len)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "channel %d: consume", c->self); free(c->path); c->path = NULL; if (need == 1) { /* SOCKS4: one string */ host = inet_ntoa(s4_req.dest_addr); c->path = xstrdup(host); } else { /* SOCKS4A: two strings */ have = sshbuf_len(input); p = sshbuf_ptr(input); if (memchr(p, '\0', have) == NULL) { error("channel %d: decode socks4a: host not nul " "terminated", c->self); return -1; } len = strlen(p); debug2("channel %d: decode socks4a: host %s/%d", c->self, p, len); len++; /* trailing '\0' */ if (len > NI_MAXHOST) { error("channel %d: hostname \"%.100s\" too long", c->self, p); return -1; } c->path = xstrdup(p); if ((r = sshbuf_consume(input, len)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "channel %d: consume", c->self); } c->host_port = ntohs(s4_req.dest_port); debug2("channel %d: dynamic request: socks4 host %s port %u command %u", c->self, c->path, c->host_port, s4_req.command); if (s4_req.command != 1) { debug("channel %d: cannot handle: %s cn %d", c->self, need == 1 ? "SOCKS4" : "SOCKS4A", s4_req.command); return -1; } s4_rsp.version = 0; /* vn: 0 for reply */ s4_rsp.command = 90; /* cd: req granted */ s4_rsp.dest_port = 0; /* ignored */ s4_rsp.dest_addr.s_addr = INADDR_ANY; /* ignored */ if ((r = sshbuf_put(output, &s4_rsp, sizeof(s4_rsp))) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "channel %d: append reply", c->self); return 1; } /* try to decode a socks5 header */ #define SSH_SOCKS5_AUTHDONE 0x1000 #define SSH_SOCKS5_NOAUTH 0x00 #define SSH_SOCKS5_IPV4 0x01 #define SSH_SOCKS5_DOMAIN 0x03 #define SSH_SOCKS5_IPV6 0x04 #define SSH_SOCKS5_CONNECT 0x01 #define SSH_SOCKS5_SUCCESS 0x00 static int channel_decode_socks5(Channel *c, struct sshbuf *input, struct sshbuf *output) { /* XXX use get/put_u8 instead of trusting struct padding */ struct { u_int8_t version; u_int8_t command; u_int8_t reserved; u_int8_t atyp; } s5_req, s5_rsp; u_int16_t dest_port; char dest_addr[255+1], ntop[INET6_ADDRSTRLEN]; const u_char *p; u_int have, need, i, found, nmethods, addrlen, af; int r; debug2("channel %d: decode socks5", c->self); p = sshbuf_ptr(input); if (p[0] != 0x05) return -1; have = sshbuf_len(input); if (!(c->flags & SSH_SOCKS5_AUTHDONE)) { /* format: ver | nmethods | methods */ if (have < 2) return 0; nmethods = p[1]; if (have < nmethods + 2) return 0; /* look for method: "NO AUTHENTICATION REQUIRED" */ for (found = 0, i = 2; i < nmethods + 2; i++) { if (p[i] == SSH_SOCKS5_NOAUTH) { found = 1; break; } } if (!found) { debug("channel %d: method SSH_SOCKS5_NOAUTH not found", c->self); return -1; } if ((r = sshbuf_consume(input, nmethods + 2)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "channel %d: consume", c->self); /* version, method */ if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(output, 0x05)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u8(output, SSH_SOCKS5_NOAUTH)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "channel %d: append reply", c->self); c->flags |= SSH_SOCKS5_AUTHDONE; debug2("channel %d: socks5 auth done", c->self); return 0; /* need more */ } debug2("channel %d: socks5 post auth", c->self); if (have < sizeof(s5_req)+1) return 0; /* need more */ memcpy(&s5_req, p, sizeof(s5_req)); if (s5_req.version != 0x05 || s5_req.command != SSH_SOCKS5_CONNECT || s5_req.reserved != 0x00) { debug2("channel %d: only socks5 connect supported", c->self); return -1; } switch (s5_req.atyp){ case SSH_SOCKS5_IPV4: addrlen = 4; af = AF_INET; break; case SSH_SOCKS5_DOMAIN: addrlen = p[sizeof(s5_req)]; af = -1; break; case SSH_SOCKS5_IPV6: addrlen = 16; af = AF_INET6; break; default: debug2("channel %d: bad socks5 atyp %d", c->self, s5_req.atyp); return -1; } need = sizeof(s5_req) + addrlen + 2; if (s5_req.atyp == SSH_SOCKS5_DOMAIN) need++; if (have < need) return 0; if ((r = sshbuf_consume(input, sizeof(s5_req))) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "channel %d: consume", c->self); if (s5_req.atyp == SSH_SOCKS5_DOMAIN) { /* host string length */ if ((r = sshbuf_consume(input, 1)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "channel %d: consume", c->self); } if ((r = sshbuf_get(input, &dest_addr, addrlen)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get(input, &dest_port, 2)) != 0) { debug_r(r, "channel %d: parse addr/port", c->self); return -1; } dest_addr[addrlen] = '\0'; free(c->path); c->path = NULL; if (s5_req.atyp == SSH_SOCKS5_DOMAIN) { if (addrlen >= NI_MAXHOST) { error("channel %d: dynamic request: socks5 hostname " "\"%.100s\" too long", c->self, dest_addr); return -1; } c->path = xstrdup(dest_addr); } else { if (inet_ntop(af, dest_addr, ntop, sizeof(ntop)) == NULL) return -1; c->path = xstrdup(ntop); } c->host_port = ntohs(dest_port); debug2("channel %d: dynamic request: socks5 host %s port %u command %u", c->self, c->path, c->host_port, s5_req.command); s5_rsp.version = 0x05; s5_rsp.command = SSH_SOCKS5_SUCCESS; s5_rsp.reserved = 0; /* ignored */ s5_rsp.atyp = SSH_SOCKS5_IPV4; dest_port = 0; /* ignored */ if ((r = sshbuf_put(output, &s5_rsp, sizeof(s5_rsp))) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u32(output, ntohl(INADDR_ANY))) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put(output, &dest_port, sizeof(dest_port))) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "channel %d: append reply", c->self); return 1; } Channel * channel_connect_stdio_fwd(struct ssh *ssh, const char *host_to_connect, u_short port_to_connect, int in, int out, int nonblock) { Channel *c; debug_f("%s:%d", host_to_connect, port_to_connect); c = channel_new(ssh, "stdio-forward", SSH_CHANNEL_OPENING, in, out, -1, CHAN_TCP_WINDOW_DEFAULT, CHAN_TCP_PACKET_DEFAULT, 0, "stdio-forward", nonblock); c->path = xstrdup(host_to_connect); c->host_port = port_to_connect; c->listening_port = 0; c->force_drain = 1; channel_register_fds(ssh, c, in, out, -1, 0, 1, 0); port_open_helper(ssh, c, "direct-tcpip"); return c; } /* dynamic port forwarding */ static void channel_pre_dynamic(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c) { const u_char *p; u_int have; int ret; c->io_want = 0; have = sshbuf_len(c->input); debug2("channel %d: pre_dynamic: have %d", c->self, have); /* sshbuf_dump(c->input, stderr); */ /* check if the fixed size part of the packet is in buffer. */ if (have < 3) { /* need more */ c->io_want |= SSH_CHAN_IO_RFD; return; } /* try to guess the protocol */ p = sshbuf_ptr(c->input); /* XXX sshbuf_peek_u8? */ switch (p[0]) { case 0x04: ret = channel_decode_socks4(c, c->input, c->output); break; case 0x05: ret = channel_decode_socks5(c, c->input, c->output); break; default: ret = -1; break; } if (ret < 0) { chan_mark_dead(ssh, c); } else if (ret == 0) { debug2("channel %d: pre_dynamic: need more", c->self); /* need more */ c->io_want |= SSH_CHAN_IO_RFD; if (sshbuf_len(c->output)) c->io_want |= SSH_CHAN_IO_WFD; } else { /* switch to the next state */ c->type = SSH_CHANNEL_OPENING; port_open_helper(ssh, c, "direct-tcpip"); } } /* simulate read-error */ static void rdynamic_close(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c) { c->type = SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN; channel_force_close(ssh, c, 0); } /* reverse dynamic port forwarding */ static void channel_before_prepare_io_rdynamic(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c) { const u_char *p; u_int have, len; int r, ret; have = sshbuf_len(c->output); debug2("channel %d: pre_rdynamic: have %d", c->self, have); /* sshbuf_dump(c->output, stderr); */ /* EOF received */ if (c->flags & CHAN_EOF_RCVD) { if ((r = sshbuf_consume(c->output, have)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "channel %d: consume", c->self); rdynamic_close(ssh, c); return; } /* check if the fixed size part of the packet is in buffer. */ if (have < 3) return; /* try to guess the protocol */ p = sshbuf_ptr(c->output); switch (p[0]) { case 0x04: /* switch input/output for reverse forwarding */ ret = channel_decode_socks4(c, c->output, c->input); break; case 0x05: ret = channel_decode_socks5(c, c->output, c->input); break; default: ret = -1; break; } if (ret < 0) { rdynamic_close(ssh, c); } else if (ret == 0) { debug2("channel %d: pre_rdynamic: need more", c->self); /* send socks request to peer */ len = sshbuf_len(c->input); if (len > 0 && len < c->remote_window) { if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, c->remote_id)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_stringb(ssh, c->input)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) { fatal_fr(r, "channel %i: rdynamic", c->self); } if ((r = sshbuf_consume(c->input, len)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "channel %d: consume", c->self); c->remote_window -= len; } } else if (rdynamic_connect_finish(ssh, c) < 0) { /* the connect failed */ rdynamic_close(ssh, c); } } /* This is our fake X11 server socket. */ static void channel_post_x11_listener(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c) { Channel *nc; struct sockaddr_storage addr; int r, newsock, oerrno, remote_port; socklen_t addrlen; char buf[16384], *remote_ipaddr; if ((c->io_ready & SSH_CHAN_IO_SOCK_R) == 0) return; debug("X11 connection requested."); addrlen = sizeof(addr); newsock = accept(c->sock, (struct sockaddr *)&addr, &addrlen); if (c->single_connection) { oerrno = errno; debug2("single_connection: closing X11 listener."); channel_close_fd(ssh, c, &c->sock); chan_mark_dead(ssh, c); errno = oerrno; } if (newsock == -1) { if (errno != EINTR && errno != EWOULDBLOCK && errno != ECONNABORTED) error("accept: %.100s", strerror(errno)); if (errno == EMFILE || errno == ENFILE) c->notbefore = monotime() + 1; return; } set_nodelay(newsock); remote_ipaddr = get_peer_ipaddr(newsock); remote_port = get_peer_port(newsock); snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "X11 connection from %.200s port %d", remote_ipaddr, remote_port); nc = channel_new(ssh, "x11-connection", SSH_CHANNEL_OPENING, newsock, newsock, -1, c->local_window_max, c->local_maxpacket, 0, buf, 1); open_preamble(ssh, __func__, nc, "x11"); if ((r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, remote_ipaddr)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, remote_port)) != 0) { fatal_fr(r, "channel %i: reply", c->self); } if ((r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "channel %i: send", c->self); free(remote_ipaddr); } static void port_open_helper(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c, char *rtype) { char *local_ipaddr = get_local_ipaddr(c->sock); int local_port = c->sock == -1 ? 65536 : get_local_port(c->sock); char *remote_ipaddr = get_peer_ipaddr(c->sock); int remote_port = get_peer_port(c->sock); int r; if (remote_port == -1) { /* Fake addr/port to appease peers that validate it (Tectia) */ free(remote_ipaddr); remote_ipaddr = xstrdup("127.0.0.1"); remote_port = 65535; } free(c->remote_name); xasprintf(&c->remote_name, "%s: listening port %d for %.100s port %d, " "connect from %.200s port %d to %.100s port %d", rtype, c->listening_port, c->path, c->host_port, remote_ipaddr, remote_port, local_ipaddr, local_port); open_preamble(ssh, __func__, c, rtype); if (strcmp(rtype, "direct-tcpip") == 0) { /* target host, port */ if ((r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, c->path)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, c->host_port)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "channel %i: reply", c->self); } else if (strcmp(rtype, "direct-streamlocal@openssh.com") == 0) { /* target path */ if ((r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, c->path)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "channel %i: reply", c->self); } else if (strcmp(rtype, "forwarded-streamlocal@openssh.com") == 0) { /* listen path */ if ((r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, c->path)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "channel %i: reply", c->self); } else { /* listen address, port */ if ((r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, c->path)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, local_port)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "channel %i: reply", c->self); } if (strcmp(rtype, "forwarded-streamlocal@openssh.com") == 0) { /* reserved for future owner/mode info */ if ((r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, "")) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "channel %i: reply", c->self); } else { /* originator host and port */ if ((r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, remote_ipaddr)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, (u_int)remote_port)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "channel %i: reply", c->self); } if ((r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "channel %i: send", c->self); free(remote_ipaddr); free(local_ipaddr); } void -channel_set_x11_refuse_time(struct ssh *ssh, u_int refuse_time) +channel_set_x11_refuse_time(struct ssh *ssh, time_t refuse_time) { ssh->chanctxt->x11_refuse_time = refuse_time; } /* * This socket is listening for connections to a forwarded TCP/IP port. */ static void channel_post_port_listener(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c) { Channel *nc; struct sockaddr_storage addr; int newsock, nextstate; socklen_t addrlen; char *rtype; if ((c->io_ready & SSH_CHAN_IO_SOCK_R) == 0) return; debug("Connection to port %d forwarding to %.100s port %d requested.", c->listening_port, c->path, c->host_port); if (c->type == SSH_CHANNEL_RPORT_LISTENER) { nextstate = SSH_CHANNEL_OPENING; rtype = "forwarded-tcpip"; } else if (c->type == SSH_CHANNEL_RUNIX_LISTENER) { nextstate = SSH_CHANNEL_OPENING; rtype = "forwarded-streamlocal@openssh.com"; } else if (c->host_port == PORT_STREAMLOCAL) { nextstate = SSH_CHANNEL_OPENING; rtype = "direct-streamlocal@openssh.com"; } else if (c->host_port == 0) { nextstate = SSH_CHANNEL_DYNAMIC; rtype = "dynamic-tcpip"; } else { nextstate = SSH_CHANNEL_OPENING; rtype = "direct-tcpip"; } addrlen = sizeof(addr); newsock = accept(c->sock, (struct sockaddr *)&addr, &addrlen); if (newsock == -1) { if (errno != EINTR && errno != EWOULDBLOCK && errno != ECONNABORTED) error("accept: %.100s", strerror(errno)); if (errno == EMFILE || errno == ENFILE) c->notbefore = monotime() + 1; return; } if (c->host_port != PORT_STREAMLOCAL) set_nodelay(newsock); nc = channel_new(ssh, rtype, nextstate, newsock, newsock, -1, c->local_window_max, c->local_maxpacket, 0, rtype, 1); nc->listening_port = c->listening_port; nc->host_port = c->host_port; if (c->path != NULL) nc->path = xstrdup(c->path); if (nextstate != SSH_CHANNEL_DYNAMIC) port_open_helper(ssh, nc, rtype); } /* * This is the authentication agent socket listening for connections from * clients. */ static void channel_post_auth_listener(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c) { Channel *nc; int r, newsock; struct sockaddr_storage addr; socklen_t addrlen; if ((c->io_ready & SSH_CHAN_IO_SOCK_R) == 0) return; addrlen = sizeof(addr); newsock = accept(c->sock, (struct sockaddr *)&addr, &addrlen); if (newsock == -1) { error("accept from auth socket: %.100s", strerror(errno)); if (errno == EMFILE || errno == ENFILE) c->notbefore = monotime() + 1; return; } nc = channel_new(ssh, "agent-connection", SSH_CHANNEL_OPENING, newsock, newsock, -1, c->local_window_max, c->local_maxpacket, 0, "accepted auth socket", 1); open_preamble(ssh, __func__, nc, "auth-agent@openssh.com"); if ((r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "channel %i", c->self); } static void channel_post_connecting(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c) { int err = 0, sock, isopen, r; socklen_t sz = sizeof(err); if ((c->io_ready & SSH_CHAN_IO_SOCK_W) == 0) return; if (!c->have_remote_id) fatal_f("channel %d: no remote id", c->self); /* for rdynamic the OPEN_CONFIRMATION has been sent already */ isopen = (c->type == SSH_CHANNEL_RDYNAMIC_FINISH); + if (getsockopt(c->sock, SOL_SOCKET, SO_ERROR, &err, &sz) == -1) { err = errno; error("getsockopt SO_ERROR failed"); } + if (err == 0) { + /* Non-blocking connection completed */ debug("channel %d: connected to %s port %d", c->self, c->connect_ctx.host, c->connect_ctx.port); channel_connect_ctx_free(&c->connect_ctx); c->type = SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN; c->lastused = monotime(); if (isopen) { /* no message necessary */ } else { if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, c->remote_id)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, c->self)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, c->local_window)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, c->local_maxpacket)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "channel %i open confirm", c->self); } - } else { - debug("channel %d: connection failed: %s", - c->self, strerror(err)); - /* Try next address, if any */ - if ((sock = connect_next(&c->connect_ctx)) > 0) { - close(c->sock); - c->sock = c->rfd = c->wfd = sock; - return; - } - /* Exhausted all addresses */ + return; + } + if (err == EINTR || err == EAGAIN || err == EINPROGRESS) + return; + + /* Non-blocking connection failed */ + debug("channel %d: connection failed: %s", c->self, strerror(err)); + + /* Try next address, if any */ + if ((sock = connect_next(&c->connect_ctx)) == -1) { + /* Exhausted all addresses for this destination */ error("connect_to %.100s port %d: failed.", c->connect_ctx.host, c->connect_ctx.port); channel_connect_ctx_free(&c->connect_ctx); if (isopen) { rdynamic_close(ssh, c); } else { if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, c->remote_id)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, SSH2_OPEN_CONNECT_FAILED)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, strerror(err))) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, "")) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "channel %i: failure", c->self); chan_mark_dead(ssh, c); } } + + /* New non-blocking connection in progress */ + close(c->sock); + c->sock = c->rfd = c->wfd = sock; } static int channel_handle_rfd(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c) { char buf[CHAN_RBUF]; ssize_t len; int r, force; size_t nr = 0, have, avail, maxlen = CHANNEL_MAX_READ; int pty_zeroread = 0; #ifdef PTY_ZEROREAD /* Bug on AIX: read(1) can return 0 for a non-closed fd */ pty_zeroread = c->isatty; #endif force = c->isatty && c->detach_close && c->istate != CHAN_INPUT_CLOSED; if (!force && (c->io_ready & SSH_CHAN_IO_RFD) == 0) return 1; if ((avail = sshbuf_avail(c->input)) == 0) return 1; /* Shouldn't happen */ /* * For "simple" channels (i.e. not datagram or filtered), we can * read directly to the channel buffer. */ if (!pty_zeroread && c->input_filter == NULL && !c->datagram) { /* Only OPEN channels have valid rwin */ if (c->type == SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN) { if ((have = sshbuf_len(c->input)) >= c->remote_window) return 1; /* shouldn't happen */ if (maxlen > c->remote_window - have) maxlen = c->remote_window - have; } if (maxlen > avail) maxlen = avail; if ((r = sshbuf_read(c->rfd, c->input, maxlen, &nr)) != 0) { if (errno == EINTR || (!force && (errno == EAGAIN || errno == EWOULDBLOCK))) return 1; debug2("channel %d: read failed rfd %d maxlen %zu: %s", c->self, c->rfd, maxlen, ssh_err(r)); goto rfail; } if (nr != 0) c->lastused = monotime(); return 1; } errno = 0; len = read(c->rfd, buf, sizeof(buf)); /* fixup AIX zero-length read with errno set to look more like errors */ if (pty_zeroread && len == 0 && errno != 0) len = -1; if (len == -1 && (errno == EINTR || ((errno == EAGAIN || errno == EWOULDBLOCK) && !force))) return 1; if (len < 0 || (!pty_zeroread && len == 0)) { debug2("channel %d: read<=0 rfd %d len %zd: %s", c->self, c->rfd, len, len == 0 ? "closed" : strerror(errno)); rfail: if (c->type != SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN) { debug2("channel %d: not open", c->self); chan_mark_dead(ssh, c); return -1; } else { chan_read_failed(ssh, c); } return -1; } c->lastused = monotime(); if (c->input_filter != NULL) { if (c->input_filter(ssh, c, buf, len) == -1) { debug2("channel %d: filter stops", c->self); chan_read_failed(ssh, c); } } else if (c->datagram) { if ((r = sshbuf_put_string(c->input, buf, len)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "channel %i: put datagram", c->self); } else if ((r = sshbuf_put(c->input, buf, len)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "channel %i: put data", c->self); return 1; } static int channel_handle_wfd(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c) { struct termios tio; u_char *data = NULL, *buf; /* XXX const; need filter API change */ size_t dlen, olen = 0; int r, len; if ((c->io_ready & SSH_CHAN_IO_WFD) == 0) return 1; if (sshbuf_len(c->output) == 0) return 1; /* Send buffered output data to the socket. */ olen = sshbuf_len(c->output); if (c->output_filter != NULL) { if ((buf = c->output_filter(ssh, c, &data, &dlen)) == NULL) { debug2("channel %d: filter stops", c->self); if (c->type != SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN) chan_mark_dead(ssh, c); else chan_write_failed(ssh, c); return -1; } } else if (c->datagram) { if ((r = sshbuf_get_string(c->output, &data, &dlen)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "channel %i: get datagram", c->self); buf = data; } else { buf = data = sshbuf_mutable_ptr(c->output); dlen = sshbuf_len(c->output); } if (c->datagram) { /* ignore truncated writes, datagrams might get lost */ len = write(c->wfd, buf, dlen); free(data); if (len == -1 && (errno == EINTR || errno == EAGAIN || errno == EWOULDBLOCK)) return 1; if (len <= 0) goto write_fail; goto out; } #ifdef _AIX /* XXX: Later AIX versions can't push as much data to tty */ if (c->wfd_isatty) dlen = MINIMUM(dlen, 8*1024); #endif len = write(c->wfd, buf, dlen); if (len == -1 && (errno == EINTR || errno == EAGAIN || errno == EWOULDBLOCK)) return 1; if (len <= 0) { write_fail: if (c->type != SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN) { debug2("channel %d: not open", c->self); chan_mark_dead(ssh, c); return -1; } else { chan_write_failed(ssh, c); } return -1; } c->lastused = monotime(); #ifndef BROKEN_TCGETATTR_ICANON if (c->isatty && dlen >= 1 && buf[0] != '\r') { if (tcgetattr(c->wfd, &tio) == 0 && !(tio.c_lflag & ECHO) && (tio.c_lflag & ICANON)) { /* * Simulate echo to reduce the impact of * traffic analysis. We need to match the * size of a SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA message * (4 byte channel id + buf) */ if ((r = sshpkt_msg_ignore(ssh, 4+len)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "channel %i: ignore", c->self); } } #endif /* BROKEN_TCGETATTR_ICANON */ if ((r = sshbuf_consume(c->output, len)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "channel %i: consume", c->self); out: c->local_consumed += olen - sshbuf_len(c->output); return 1; } static int channel_handle_efd_write(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c) { int r; ssize_t len; if ((c->io_ready & SSH_CHAN_IO_EFD_W) == 0) return 1; if (sshbuf_len(c->extended) == 0) return 1; len = write(c->efd, sshbuf_ptr(c->extended), sshbuf_len(c->extended)); debug2("channel %d: written %zd to efd %d", c->self, len, c->efd); if (len == -1 && (errno == EINTR || errno == EAGAIN || errno == EWOULDBLOCK)) return 1; if (len <= 0) { debug2("channel %d: closing write-efd %d", c->self, c->efd); channel_close_fd(ssh, c, &c->efd); } else { if ((r = sshbuf_consume(c->extended, len)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "channel %i: consume", c->self); c->local_consumed += len; c->lastused = monotime(); } return 1; } static int channel_handle_efd_read(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c) { char buf[CHAN_RBUF]; ssize_t len; int r, force; force = c->isatty && c->detach_close && c->istate != CHAN_INPUT_CLOSED; if (!force && (c->io_ready & SSH_CHAN_IO_EFD_R) == 0) return 1; len = read(c->efd, buf, sizeof(buf)); debug2("channel %d: read %zd from efd %d", c->self, len, c->efd); if (len == -1 && (errno == EINTR || ((errno == EAGAIN || errno == EWOULDBLOCK) && !force))) return 1; if (len <= 0) { debug2("channel %d: closing read-efd %d", c->self, c->efd); channel_close_fd(ssh, c, &c->efd); return 1; } c->lastused = monotime(); if (c->extended_usage == CHAN_EXTENDED_IGNORE) debug3("channel %d: discard efd", c->self); else if ((r = sshbuf_put(c->extended, buf, len)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "channel %i: append", c->self); return 1; } static int channel_handle_efd(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c) { if (c->efd == -1) return 1; /** XXX handle drain efd, too */ if (c->extended_usage == CHAN_EXTENDED_WRITE) return channel_handle_efd_write(ssh, c); else if (c->extended_usage == CHAN_EXTENDED_READ || c->extended_usage == CHAN_EXTENDED_IGNORE) return channel_handle_efd_read(ssh, c); return 1; } static int channel_check_window(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c) { int r; if (c->type == SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN && !(c->flags & (CHAN_CLOSE_SENT|CHAN_CLOSE_RCVD)) && ((c->local_window_max - c->local_window > c->local_maxpacket*3) || c->local_window < c->local_window_max/2) && c->local_consumed > 0) { if (!c->have_remote_id) fatal_f("channel %d: no remote id", c->self); if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_WINDOW_ADJUST)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, c->remote_id)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, c->local_consumed)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) { fatal_fr(r, "channel %i", c->self); } debug2("channel %d: window %d sent adjust %d", c->self, c->local_window, c->local_consumed); c->local_window += c->local_consumed; c->local_consumed = 0; } return 1; } static void channel_post_open(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c) { channel_handle_rfd(ssh, c); channel_handle_wfd(ssh, c); channel_handle_efd(ssh, c); channel_check_window(ssh, c); } static u_int read_mux(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c, u_int need) { char buf[CHAN_RBUF]; ssize_t len; u_int rlen; int r; if (sshbuf_len(c->input) < need) { rlen = need - sshbuf_len(c->input); len = read(c->rfd, buf, MINIMUM(rlen, CHAN_RBUF)); if (len == -1 && (errno == EINTR || errno == EAGAIN)) return sshbuf_len(c->input); if (len <= 0) { debug2("channel %d: ctl read<=0 rfd %d len %zd", c->self, c->rfd, len); chan_read_failed(ssh, c); return 0; } else if ((r = sshbuf_put(c->input, buf, len)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "channel %i: append", c->self); } return sshbuf_len(c->input); } static void channel_post_mux_client_read(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c) { u_int need; if ((c->io_ready & SSH_CHAN_IO_RFD) == 0) return; if (c->istate != CHAN_INPUT_OPEN && c->istate != CHAN_INPUT_WAIT_DRAIN) return; if (c->mux_pause) return; /* * Don't not read past the precise end of packets to * avoid disrupting fd passing. */ if (read_mux(ssh, c, 4) < 4) /* read header */ return; /* XXX sshbuf_peek_u32 */ need = PEEK_U32(sshbuf_ptr(c->input)); #define CHANNEL_MUX_MAX_PACKET (256 * 1024) if (need > CHANNEL_MUX_MAX_PACKET) { debug2("channel %d: packet too big %u > %u", c->self, CHANNEL_MUX_MAX_PACKET, need); chan_rcvd_oclose(ssh, c); return; } if (read_mux(ssh, c, need + 4) < need + 4) /* read body */ return; if (c->mux_rcb(ssh, c) != 0) { debug("channel %d: mux_rcb failed", c->self); chan_mark_dead(ssh, c); return; } } static void channel_post_mux_client_write(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c) { ssize_t len; int r; if ((c->io_ready & SSH_CHAN_IO_WFD) == 0) return; if (sshbuf_len(c->output) == 0) return; len = write(c->wfd, sshbuf_ptr(c->output), sshbuf_len(c->output)); if (len == -1 && (errno == EINTR || errno == EAGAIN)) return; if (len <= 0) { chan_mark_dead(ssh, c); return; } if ((r = sshbuf_consume(c->output, len)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "channel %i: consume", c->self); } static void channel_post_mux_client(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c) { channel_post_mux_client_read(ssh, c); channel_post_mux_client_write(ssh, c); } static void channel_post_mux_listener(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c) { Channel *nc; struct sockaddr_storage addr; socklen_t addrlen; int newsock; uid_t euid; gid_t egid; if ((c->io_ready & SSH_CHAN_IO_SOCK_R) == 0) return; debug("multiplexing control connection"); /* * Accept connection on control socket */ memset(&addr, 0, sizeof(addr)); addrlen = sizeof(addr); if ((newsock = accept(c->sock, (struct sockaddr*)&addr, &addrlen)) == -1) { error_f("accept: %s", strerror(errno)); if (errno == EMFILE || errno == ENFILE) c->notbefore = monotime() + 1; return; } if (getpeereid(newsock, &euid, &egid) == -1) { error_f("getpeereid failed: %s", strerror(errno)); close(newsock); return; } if ((euid != 0) && (getuid() != euid)) { error("multiplex uid mismatch: peer euid %u != uid %u", (u_int)euid, (u_int)getuid()); close(newsock); return; } nc = channel_new(ssh, "mux-control", SSH_CHANNEL_MUX_CLIENT, newsock, newsock, -1, c->local_window_max, c->local_maxpacket, 0, "mux-control", 1); nc->mux_rcb = c->mux_rcb; debug3_f("new mux channel %d fd %d", nc->self, nc->sock); /* establish state */ nc->mux_rcb(ssh, nc); /* mux state transitions must not elicit protocol messages */ nc->flags |= CHAN_LOCAL; } static void channel_handler_init(struct ssh_channels *sc) { chan_fn **pre, **post; if ((pre = calloc(SSH_CHANNEL_MAX_TYPE, sizeof(*pre))) == NULL || (post = calloc(SSH_CHANNEL_MAX_TYPE, sizeof(*post))) == NULL) fatal_f("allocation failed"); pre[SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN] = &channel_pre_open; pre[SSH_CHANNEL_X11_OPEN] = &channel_pre_x11_open; pre[SSH_CHANNEL_PORT_LISTENER] = &channel_pre_listener; pre[SSH_CHANNEL_RPORT_LISTENER] = &channel_pre_listener; pre[SSH_CHANNEL_UNIX_LISTENER] = &channel_pre_listener; pre[SSH_CHANNEL_RUNIX_LISTENER] = &channel_pre_listener; pre[SSH_CHANNEL_X11_LISTENER] = &channel_pre_listener; pre[SSH_CHANNEL_AUTH_SOCKET] = &channel_pre_listener; pre[SSH_CHANNEL_CONNECTING] = &channel_pre_connecting; pre[SSH_CHANNEL_DYNAMIC] = &channel_pre_dynamic; pre[SSH_CHANNEL_RDYNAMIC_FINISH] = &channel_pre_connecting; pre[SSH_CHANNEL_MUX_LISTENER] = &channel_pre_listener; pre[SSH_CHANNEL_MUX_CLIENT] = &channel_pre_mux_client; post[SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN] = &channel_post_open; post[SSH_CHANNEL_PORT_LISTENER] = &channel_post_port_listener; post[SSH_CHANNEL_RPORT_LISTENER] = &channel_post_port_listener; post[SSH_CHANNEL_UNIX_LISTENER] = &channel_post_port_listener; post[SSH_CHANNEL_RUNIX_LISTENER] = &channel_post_port_listener; post[SSH_CHANNEL_X11_LISTENER] = &channel_post_x11_listener; post[SSH_CHANNEL_AUTH_SOCKET] = &channel_post_auth_listener; post[SSH_CHANNEL_CONNECTING] = &channel_post_connecting; post[SSH_CHANNEL_DYNAMIC] = &channel_post_open; post[SSH_CHANNEL_RDYNAMIC_FINISH] = &channel_post_connecting; post[SSH_CHANNEL_MUX_LISTENER] = &channel_post_mux_listener; post[SSH_CHANNEL_MUX_CLIENT] = &channel_post_mux_client; sc->channel_pre = pre; sc->channel_post = post; } /* gc dead channels */ static void channel_garbage_collect(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c) { if (c == NULL) return; if (c->detach_user != NULL) { if (!chan_is_dead(ssh, c, c->detach_close)) return; debug2("channel %d: gc: notify user", c->self); c->detach_user(ssh, c->self, 0, NULL); /* if we still have a callback */ if (c->detach_user != NULL) return; debug2("channel %d: gc: user detached", c->self); } if (!chan_is_dead(ssh, c, 1)) return; debug2("channel %d: garbage collecting", c->self); channel_free(ssh, c); } enum channel_table { CHAN_PRE, CHAN_POST }; static void channel_handler(struct ssh *ssh, int table, struct timespec *timeout) { struct ssh_channels *sc = ssh->chanctxt; chan_fn **ftab = table == CHAN_PRE ? sc->channel_pre : sc->channel_post; u_int i, oalloc; Channel *c; time_t now; now = monotime(); for (i = 0, oalloc = sc->channels_alloc; i < oalloc; i++) { c = sc->channels[i]; if (c == NULL) continue; /* Try to keep IO going while rekeying */ if (ssh_packet_is_rekeying(ssh) && c->type != SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN) continue; if (c->delayed) { if (table == CHAN_PRE) c->delayed = 0; else continue; } if (ftab[c->type] != NULL) { if (table == CHAN_PRE && c->type == SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN && c->inactive_deadline != 0 && c->lastused != 0 && now >= c->lastused + c->inactive_deadline) { /* channel closed for inactivity */ verbose("channel %d: closing after %u seconds " "of inactivity", c->self, c->inactive_deadline); channel_force_close(ssh, c, 1); } else if (c->notbefore <= now) { /* Run handlers that are not paused. */ (*ftab[c->type])(ssh, c); /* inactivity timeouts must interrupt poll() */ if (timeout != NULL && c->type == SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN && c->lastused != 0 && c->inactive_deadline != 0) { ptimeout_deadline_monotime(timeout, c->lastused + c->inactive_deadline); } } else if (timeout != NULL) { /* * Arrange for poll() wakeup when channel pause * timer expires. */ ptimeout_deadline_monotime(timeout, c->notbefore); } } channel_garbage_collect(ssh, c); } } /* * Create sockets before preparing IO. * This is necessary for things that need to happen after reading * the network-input but need to be completed before IO event setup, e.g. * because they may create new channels. */ static void channel_before_prepare_io(struct ssh *ssh) { struct ssh_channels *sc = ssh->chanctxt; Channel *c; u_int i, oalloc; for (i = 0, oalloc = sc->channels_alloc; i < oalloc; i++) { c = sc->channels[i]; if (c == NULL) continue; if (c->type == SSH_CHANNEL_RDYNAMIC_OPEN) channel_before_prepare_io_rdynamic(ssh, c); } } static void dump_channel_poll(const char *func, const char *what, Channel *c, u_int pollfd_offset, struct pollfd *pfd) { #ifdef DEBUG_CHANNEL_POLL debug3("%s: channel %d: %s r%d w%d e%d s%d c->pfds [ %d %d %d %d ] " "io_want 0x%02x io_ready 0x%02x pfd[%u].fd=%d " "pfd.ev 0x%02x pfd.rev 0x%02x", func, c->self, what, c->rfd, c->wfd, c->efd, c->sock, c->pfds[0], c->pfds[1], c->pfds[2], c->pfds[3], c->io_want, c->io_ready, pollfd_offset, pfd->fd, pfd->events, pfd->revents); #endif } /* Prepare pollfd entries for a single channel */ static void channel_prepare_pollfd(Channel *c, u_int *next_pollfd, struct pollfd *pfd, u_int npfd) { u_int ev, p = *next_pollfd; if (c == NULL) return; if (p + 4 > npfd) { /* Shouldn't happen */ fatal_f("channel %d: bad pfd offset %u (max %u)", c->self, p, npfd); } c->pfds[0] = c->pfds[1] = c->pfds[2] = c->pfds[3] = -1; /* * prepare c->rfd * * This is a special case, since c->rfd might be the same as * c->wfd, c->efd and/or c->sock. Handle those here if they want * IO too. */ if (c->rfd != -1) { ev = 0; if ((c->io_want & SSH_CHAN_IO_RFD) != 0) ev |= POLLIN; /* rfd == wfd */ if (c->wfd == c->rfd) { if ((c->io_want & SSH_CHAN_IO_WFD) != 0) ev |= POLLOUT; } /* rfd == efd */ if (c->efd == c->rfd) { if ((c->io_want & SSH_CHAN_IO_EFD_R) != 0) ev |= POLLIN; if ((c->io_want & SSH_CHAN_IO_EFD_W) != 0) ev |= POLLOUT; } /* rfd == sock */ if (c->sock == c->rfd) { if ((c->io_want & SSH_CHAN_IO_SOCK_R) != 0) ev |= POLLIN; if ((c->io_want & SSH_CHAN_IO_SOCK_W) != 0) ev |= POLLOUT; } /* Pack a pfd entry if any event armed for this fd */ if (ev != 0) { c->pfds[0] = p; pfd[p].fd = c->rfd; pfd[p].events = ev; dump_channel_poll(__func__, "rfd", c, p, &pfd[p]); p++; } } /* prepare c->wfd if wanting IO and not already handled above */ if (c->wfd != -1 && c->rfd != c->wfd) { ev = 0; if ((c->io_want & SSH_CHAN_IO_WFD)) ev |= POLLOUT; /* Pack a pfd entry if any event armed for this fd */ if (ev != 0) { c->pfds[1] = p; pfd[p].fd = c->wfd; pfd[p].events = ev; dump_channel_poll(__func__, "wfd", c, p, &pfd[p]); p++; } } /* prepare c->efd if wanting IO and not already handled above */ if (c->efd != -1 && c->rfd != c->efd) { ev = 0; if ((c->io_want & SSH_CHAN_IO_EFD_R) != 0) ev |= POLLIN; if ((c->io_want & SSH_CHAN_IO_EFD_W) != 0) ev |= POLLOUT; /* Pack a pfd entry if any event armed for this fd */ if (ev != 0) { c->pfds[2] = p; pfd[p].fd = c->efd; pfd[p].events = ev; dump_channel_poll(__func__, "efd", c, p, &pfd[p]); p++; } } /* prepare c->sock if wanting IO and not already handled above */ if (c->sock != -1 && c->rfd != c->sock) { ev = 0; if ((c->io_want & SSH_CHAN_IO_SOCK_R) != 0) ev |= POLLIN; if ((c->io_want & SSH_CHAN_IO_SOCK_W) != 0) ev |= POLLOUT; /* Pack a pfd entry if any event armed for this fd */ if (ev != 0) { c->pfds[3] = p; pfd[p].fd = c->sock; pfd[p].events = 0; dump_channel_poll(__func__, "sock", c, p, &pfd[p]); p++; } } *next_pollfd = p; } /* * Allocate/prepare poll structure */ void channel_prepare_poll(struct ssh *ssh, struct pollfd **pfdp, u_int *npfd_allocp, u_int *npfd_activep, u_int npfd_reserved, struct timespec *timeout) { struct ssh_channels *sc = ssh->chanctxt; u_int i, oalloc, p, npfd = npfd_reserved; channel_before_prepare_io(ssh); /* might create a new channel */ /* clear out I/O flags from last poll */ for (i = 0; i < sc->channels_alloc; i++) { if (sc->channels[i] == NULL) continue; sc->channels[i]->io_want = sc->channels[i]->io_ready = 0; } /* Allocate 4x pollfd for each channel (rfd, wfd, efd, sock) */ if (sc->channels_alloc >= (INT_MAX / 4) - npfd_reserved) fatal_f("too many channels"); /* shouldn't happen */ npfd += sc->channels_alloc * 4; if (npfd > *npfd_allocp) { *pfdp = xrecallocarray(*pfdp, *npfd_allocp, npfd, sizeof(**pfdp)); *npfd_allocp = npfd; } *npfd_activep = npfd_reserved; oalloc = sc->channels_alloc; channel_handler(ssh, CHAN_PRE, timeout); if (oalloc != sc->channels_alloc) { /* shouldn't happen */ fatal_f("channels_alloc changed during CHAN_PRE " "(was %u, now %u)", oalloc, sc->channels_alloc); } /* Prepare pollfd */ p = npfd_reserved; for (i = 0; i < sc->channels_alloc; i++) channel_prepare_pollfd(sc->channels[i], &p, *pfdp, npfd); *npfd_activep = p; } static void fd_ready(Channel *c, int p, struct pollfd *pfds, u_int npfd, int fd, const char *what, u_int revents_mask, u_int ready) { struct pollfd *pfd = &pfds[p]; if (fd == -1) return; if (p == -1 || (u_int)p >= npfd) fatal_f("channel %d: bad pfd %d (max %u)", c->self, p, npfd); dump_channel_poll(__func__, what, c, p, pfd); if (pfd->fd != fd) { fatal("channel %d: inconsistent %s fd=%d pollfd[%u].fd %d " "r%d w%d e%d s%d", c->self, what, fd, p, pfd->fd, c->rfd, c->wfd, c->efd, c->sock); } if ((pfd->revents & POLLNVAL) != 0) { fatal("channel %d: invalid %s pollfd[%u].fd %d r%d w%d e%d s%d", c->self, what, p, pfd->fd, c->rfd, c->wfd, c->efd, c->sock); } if ((pfd->revents & (revents_mask|POLLHUP|POLLERR)) != 0) c->io_ready |= ready & c->io_want; } /* * After poll, perform any appropriate operations for channels which have * events pending. */ void channel_after_poll(struct ssh *ssh, struct pollfd *pfd, u_int npfd) { struct ssh_channels *sc = ssh->chanctxt; u_int i; int p; Channel *c; #ifdef DEBUG_CHANNEL_POLL for (p = 0; p < (int)npfd; p++) { if (pfd[p].revents == 0) continue; debug_f("pfd[%u].fd %d rev 0x%04x", p, pfd[p].fd, pfd[p].revents); } #endif /* Convert pollfd into c->io_ready */ for (i = 0; i < sc->channels_alloc; i++) { c = sc->channels[i]; if (c == NULL) continue; /* if rfd is shared with efd/sock then wfd should be too */ if (c->rfd != -1 && c->wfd != -1 && c->rfd != c->wfd && (c->rfd == c->efd || c->rfd == c->sock)) { /* Shouldn't happen */ fatal_f("channel %d: unexpected fds r%d w%d e%d s%d", c->self, c->rfd, c->wfd, c->efd, c->sock); } c->io_ready = 0; /* rfd, potentially shared with wfd, efd and sock */ if (c->rfd != -1 && (p = c->pfds[0]) != -1) { fd_ready(c, p, pfd, npfd, c->rfd, "rfd", POLLIN, SSH_CHAN_IO_RFD); if (c->rfd == c->wfd) { fd_ready(c, p, pfd, npfd, c->wfd, "wfd/r", POLLOUT, SSH_CHAN_IO_WFD); } if (c->rfd == c->efd) { fd_ready(c, p, pfd, npfd, c->efd, "efdr/r", POLLIN, SSH_CHAN_IO_EFD_R); fd_ready(c, p, pfd, npfd, c->efd, "efdw/r", POLLOUT, SSH_CHAN_IO_EFD_W); } if (c->rfd == c->sock) { fd_ready(c, p, pfd, npfd, c->sock, "sockr/r", POLLIN, SSH_CHAN_IO_SOCK_R); fd_ready(c, p, pfd, npfd, c->sock, "sockw/r", POLLOUT, SSH_CHAN_IO_SOCK_W); } dump_channel_poll(__func__, "rfd", c, p, pfd); } /* wfd */ if (c->wfd != -1 && c->wfd != c->rfd && (p = c->pfds[1]) != -1) { fd_ready(c, p, pfd, npfd, c->wfd, "wfd", POLLOUT, SSH_CHAN_IO_WFD); dump_channel_poll(__func__, "wfd", c, p, pfd); } /* efd */ if (c->efd != -1 && c->efd != c->rfd && (p = c->pfds[2]) != -1) { fd_ready(c, p, pfd, npfd, c->efd, "efdr", POLLIN, SSH_CHAN_IO_EFD_R); fd_ready(c, p, pfd, npfd, c->efd, "efdw", POLLOUT, SSH_CHAN_IO_EFD_W); dump_channel_poll(__func__, "efd", c, p, pfd); } /* sock */ if (c->sock != -1 && c->sock != c->rfd && (p = c->pfds[3]) != -1) { fd_ready(c, p, pfd, npfd, c->sock, "sockr", POLLIN, SSH_CHAN_IO_SOCK_R); fd_ready(c, p, pfd, npfd, c->sock, "sockw", POLLOUT, SSH_CHAN_IO_SOCK_W); dump_channel_poll(__func__, "sock", c, p, pfd); } } channel_handler(ssh, CHAN_POST, NULL); } /* * Enqueue data for channels with open or draining c->input. */ static void channel_output_poll_input_open(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c) { size_t len, plen; const u_char *pkt; int r; if ((len = sshbuf_len(c->input)) == 0) { if (c->istate == CHAN_INPUT_WAIT_DRAIN) { /* * input-buffer is empty and read-socket shutdown: * tell peer, that we will not send more data: * send IEOF. * hack for extended data: delay EOF if EFD still * in use. */ if (CHANNEL_EFD_INPUT_ACTIVE(c)) debug2("channel %d: " "ibuf_empty delayed efd %d/(%zu)", c->self, c->efd, sshbuf_len(c->extended)); else chan_ibuf_empty(ssh, c); } return; } if (!c->have_remote_id) fatal_f("channel %d: no remote id", c->self); if (c->datagram) { /* Check datagram will fit; drop if not */ if ((r = sshbuf_get_string_direct(c->input, &pkt, &plen)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "channel %i: get datagram", c->self); /* * XXX this does tail-drop on the datagram queue which is * usually suboptimal compared to head-drop. Better to have * backpressure at read time? (i.e. read + discard) */ if (plen > c->remote_window || plen > c->remote_maxpacket) { debug("channel %d: datagram too big", c->self); return; } /* Enqueue it */ if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, c->remote_id)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_string(ssh, pkt, plen)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "channel %i: send datagram", c->self); c->remote_window -= plen; return; } /* Enqueue packet for buffered data. */ if (len > c->remote_window) len = c->remote_window; if (len > c->remote_maxpacket) len = c->remote_maxpacket; if (len == 0) return; if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, c->remote_id)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_string(ssh, sshbuf_ptr(c->input), len)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "channel %i: send data", c->self); if ((r = sshbuf_consume(c->input, len)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "channel %i: consume", c->self); c->remote_window -= len; } /* * Enqueue data for channels with open c->extended in read mode. */ static void channel_output_poll_extended_read(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c) { size_t len; int r; if ((len = sshbuf_len(c->extended)) == 0) return; debug2("channel %d: rwin %u elen %zu euse %d", c->self, c->remote_window, sshbuf_len(c->extended), c->extended_usage); if (len > c->remote_window) len = c->remote_window; if (len > c->remote_maxpacket) len = c->remote_maxpacket; if (len == 0) return; if (!c->have_remote_id) fatal_f("channel %d: no remote id", c->self); if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_EXTENDED_DATA)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, c->remote_id)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, SSH2_EXTENDED_DATA_STDERR)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_string(ssh, sshbuf_ptr(c->extended), len)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "channel %i: data", c->self); if ((r = sshbuf_consume(c->extended, len)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "channel %i: consume", c->self); c->remote_window -= len; debug2("channel %d: sent ext data %zu", c->self, len); } /* If there is data to send to the connection, enqueue some of it now. */ void channel_output_poll(struct ssh *ssh) { struct ssh_channels *sc = ssh->chanctxt; Channel *c; u_int i; for (i = 0; i < sc->channels_alloc; i++) { c = sc->channels[i]; if (c == NULL) continue; /* * We are only interested in channels that can have buffered * incoming data. */ if (c->type != SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN) continue; if ((c->flags & (CHAN_CLOSE_SENT|CHAN_CLOSE_RCVD))) { /* XXX is this true? */ debug3("channel %d: will not send data after close", c->self); continue; } /* Get the amount of buffered data for this channel. */ if (c->istate == CHAN_INPUT_OPEN || c->istate == CHAN_INPUT_WAIT_DRAIN) channel_output_poll_input_open(ssh, c); /* Send extended data, i.e. stderr */ if (!(c->flags & CHAN_EOF_SENT) && c->extended_usage == CHAN_EXTENDED_READ) channel_output_poll_extended_read(ssh, c); } } /* -- mux proxy support */ /* * When multiplexing channel messages for mux clients we have to deal * with downstream messages from the mux client and upstream messages * from the ssh server: * 1) Handling downstream messages is straightforward and happens * in channel_proxy_downstream(): * - We forward all messages (mostly) unmodified to the server. * - However, in order to route messages from upstream to the correct * downstream client, we have to replace the channel IDs used by the * mux clients with a unique channel ID because the mux clients might * use conflicting channel IDs. * - so we inspect and change both SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN and * SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION messages, create a local * SSH_CHANNEL_MUX_PROXY channel and replace the mux clients ID * with the newly allocated channel ID. * 2) Upstream messages are received by matching SSH_CHANNEL_MUX_PROXY * channels and processed by channel_proxy_upstream(). The local channel ID * is then translated back to the original mux client ID. * 3) In both cases we need to keep track of matching SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE * messages so we can clean up SSH_CHANNEL_MUX_PROXY channels. * 4) The SSH_CHANNEL_MUX_PROXY channels also need to closed when the * downstream mux client are removed. * 5) Handling SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN messages from the upstream server * requires more work, because they are not addressed to a specific * channel. E.g. client_request_forwarded_tcpip() needs to figure * out whether the request is addressed to the local client or a * specific downstream client based on the listen-address/port. * 6) Agent and X11-Forwarding have a similar problem and are currently * not supported as the matching session/channel cannot be identified * easily. */ /* * receive packets from downstream mux clients: * channel callback fired on read from mux client, creates * SSH_CHANNEL_MUX_PROXY channels and translates channel IDs * on channel creation. */ int channel_proxy_downstream(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *downstream) { Channel *c = NULL; struct sshbuf *original = NULL, *modified = NULL; const u_char *cp; char *ctype = NULL, *listen_host = NULL; u_char type; size_t have; int ret = -1, r; u_int id, remote_id, listen_port; /* sshbuf_dump(downstream->input, stderr); */ if ((r = sshbuf_get_string_direct(downstream->input, &cp, &have)) != 0) { error_fr(r, "parse"); return -1; } if (have < 2) { error_f("short message"); return -1; } type = cp[1]; /* skip padlen + type */ cp += 2; have -= 2; if (ssh_packet_log_type(type)) debug3_f("channel %u: down->up: type %u", downstream->self, type); switch (type) { case SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN: if ((original = sshbuf_from(cp, have)) == NULL || (modified = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) { error_f("alloc"); goto out; } if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(original, &ctype, NULL)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_u32(original, &id)) != 0) { error_fr(r, "parse"); goto out; } c = channel_new(ssh, "mux-proxy", SSH_CHANNEL_MUX_PROXY, -1, -1, -1, 0, 0, 0, ctype, 1); c->mux_ctx = downstream; /* point to mux client */ c->mux_downstream_id = id; /* original downstream id */ if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(modified, ctype)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u32(modified, c->self)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_putb(modified, original)) != 0) { error_fr(r, "compose"); channel_free(ssh, c); goto out; } break; case SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION: /* * Almost the same as SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN, except then we * need to parse 'remote_id' instead of 'ctype'. */ if ((original = sshbuf_from(cp, have)) == NULL || (modified = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) { error_f("alloc"); goto out; } if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(original, &remote_id)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_u32(original, &id)) != 0) { error_fr(r, "parse"); goto out; } c = channel_new(ssh, "mux-proxy", SSH_CHANNEL_MUX_PROXY, -1, -1, -1, 0, 0, 0, "mux-down-connect", 1); c->mux_ctx = downstream; /* point to mux client */ c->mux_downstream_id = id; c->remote_id = remote_id; c->have_remote_id = 1; if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(modified, remote_id)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u32(modified, c->self)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_putb(modified, original)) != 0) { error_fr(r, "compose"); channel_free(ssh, c); goto out; } break; case SSH2_MSG_GLOBAL_REQUEST: if ((original = sshbuf_from(cp, have)) == NULL) { error_f("alloc"); goto out; } if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(original, &ctype, NULL)) != 0) { error_fr(r, "parse"); goto out; } if (strcmp(ctype, "tcpip-forward") != 0) { error_f("unsupported request %s", ctype); goto out; } if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(original, NULL)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(original, &listen_host, NULL)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_u32(original, &listen_port)) != 0) { error_fr(r, "parse"); goto out; } if (listen_port > 65535) { error_f("tcpip-forward for %s: bad port %u", listen_host, listen_port); goto out; } /* Record that connection to this host/port is permitted. */ permission_set_add(ssh, FORWARD_USER, FORWARD_LOCAL, "", -1, listen_host, NULL, (int)listen_port, downstream); listen_host = NULL; break; case SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE: if (have < 4) break; remote_id = PEEK_U32(cp); if ((c = channel_by_remote_id(ssh, remote_id)) != NULL) { if (c->flags & CHAN_CLOSE_RCVD) channel_free(ssh, c); else c->flags |= CHAN_CLOSE_SENT; } break; } if (modified) { if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, type)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_putb(ssh, modified)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) { error_fr(r, "send"); goto out; } } else { if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, type)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put(ssh, cp, have)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) { error_fr(r, "send"); goto out; } } ret = 0; out: free(ctype); free(listen_host); sshbuf_free(original); sshbuf_free(modified); return ret; } /* * receive packets from upstream server and de-multiplex packets * to correct downstream: * implemented as a helper for channel input handlers, * replaces local (proxy) channel ID with downstream channel ID. */ int channel_proxy_upstream(Channel *c, int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh) { struct sshbuf *b = NULL; Channel *downstream; const u_char *cp = NULL; size_t len; int r; /* * When receiving packets from the peer we need to check whether we * need to forward the packets to the mux client. In this case we * restore the original channel id and keep track of CLOSE messages, * so we can cleanup the channel. */ if (c == NULL || c->type != SSH_CHANNEL_MUX_PROXY) return 0; if ((downstream = c->mux_ctx) == NULL) return 0; switch (type) { case SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE: case SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA: case SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_EOF: case SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_EXTENDED_DATA: case SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION: case SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE: case SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_WINDOW_ADJUST: case SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_SUCCESS: case SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_FAILURE: case SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_REQUEST: break; default: debug2_f("channel %u: unsupported type %u", c->self, type); return 0; } if ((b = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) { error_f("alloc reply"); goto out; } /* get remaining payload (after id) */ cp = sshpkt_ptr(ssh, &len); if (cp == NULL) { error_f("no packet"); goto out; } /* translate id and send to muxclient */ if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(b, 0)) != 0 || /* padlen */ (r = sshbuf_put_u8(b, type)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u32(b, c->mux_downstream_id)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put(b, cp, len)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_stringb(downstream->output, b)) != 0) { error_fr(r, "compose muxclient"); goto out; } /* sshbuf_dump(b, stderr); */ if (ssh_packet_log_type(type)) debug3_f("channel %u: up->down: type %u", c->self, type); out: /* update state */ switch (type) { case SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION: /* record remote_id for SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE */ if (cp && len > 4) { c->remote_id = PEEK_U32(cp); c->have_remote_id = 1; } break; case SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE: if (c->flags & CHAN_CLOSE_SENT) channel_free(ssh, c); else c->flags |= CHAN_CLOSE_RCVD; break; } sshbuf_free(b); return 1; } /* -- protocol input */ /* Parse a channel ID from the current packet */ static int channel_parse_id(struct ssh *ssh, const char *where, const char *what) { u_int32_t id; int r; if ((r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &id)) != 0) { error_r(r, "%s: parse id", where); ssh_packet_disconnect(ssh, "Invalid %s message", what); } if (id > INT_MAX) { error_r(r, "%s: bad channel id %u", where, id); ssh_packet_disconnect(ssh, "Invalid %s channel id", what); } return (int)id; } /* Lookup a channel from an ID in the current packet */ static Channel * channel_from_packet_id(struct ssh *ssh, const char *where, const char *what) { int id = channel_parse_id(ssh, where, what); Channel *c; if ((c = channel_lookup(ssh, id)) == NULL) { ssh_packet_disconnect(ssh, "%s packet referred to nonexistent channel %d", what, id); } return c; } int channel_input_data(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh) { const u_char *data; size_t data_len, win_len; Channel *c = channel_from_packet_id(ssh, __func__, "data"); int r; if (channel_proxy_upstream(c, type, seq, ssh)) return 0; /* Ignore any data for non-open channels (might happen on close) */ if (c->type != SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN && c->type != SSH_CHANNEL_RDYNAMIC_OPEN && c->type != SSH_CHANNEL_RDYNAMIC_FINISH && c->type != SSH_CHANNEL_X11_OPEN) return 0; /* Get the data. */ if ((r = sshpkt_get_string_direct(ssh, &data, &data_len)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "channel %i: get data", c->self); win_len = data_len; if (c->datagram) win_len += 4; /* string length header */ /* * The sending side reduces its window as it sends data, so we * must 'fake' consumption of the data in order to ensure that window * updates are sent back. Otherwise the connection might deadlock. */ if (c->ostate != CHAN_OUTPUT_OPEN) { c->local_window -= win_len; c->local_consumed += win_len; return 0; } if (win_len > c->local_maxpacket) { logit("channel %d: rcvd big packet %zu, maxpack %u", c->self, win_len, c->local_maxpacket); return 0; } if (win_len > c->local_window) { logit("channel %d: rcvd too much data %zu, win %u", c->self, win_len, c->local_window); return 0; } c->local_window -= win_len; if (c->datagram) { if ((r = sshbuf_put_string(c->output, data, data_len)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "channel %i: append datagram", c->self); } else if ((r = sshbuf_put(c->output, data, data_len)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "channel %i: append data", c->self); return 0; } int channel_input_extended_data(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh) { const u_char *data; size_t data_len; u_int32_t tcode; Channel *c = channel_from_packet_id(ssh, __func__, "extended data"); int r; if (channel_proxy_upstream(c, type, seq, ssh)) return 0; if (c->type != SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN) { logit("channel %d: ext data for non open", c->self); return 0; } if (c->flags & CHAN_EOF_RCVD) { if (ssh->compat & SSH_BUG_EXTEOF) debug("channel %d: accepting ext data after eof", c->self); else ssh_packet_disconnect(ssh, "Received extended_data " "after EOF on channel %d.", c->self); } if ((r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &tcode)) != 0) { error_fr(r, "parse tcode"); ssh_packet_disconnect(ssh, "Invalid extended_data message"); } if (c->efd == -1 || c->extended_usage != CHAN_EXTENDED_WRITE || tcode != SSH2_EXTENDED_DATA_STDERR) { logit("channel %d: bad ext data", c->self); return 0; } if ((r = sshpkt_get_string_direct(ssh, &data, &data_len)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0) { error_fr(r, "parse data"); ssh_packet_disconnect(ssh, "Invalid extended_data message"); } if (data_len > c->local_window) { logit("channel %d: rcvd too much extended_data %zu, win %u", c->self, data_len, c->local_window); return 0; } debug2("channel %d: rcvd ext data %zu", c->self, data_len); /* XXX sshpkt_getb? */ if ((r = sshbuf_put(c->extended, data, data_len)) != 0) error_fr(r, "append"); c->local_window -= data_len; return 0; } int channel_input_ieof(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh) { Channel *c = channel_from_packet_id(ssh, __func__, "ieof"); int r; if ((r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0) { error_fr(r, "parse data"); ssh_packet_disconnect(ssh, "Invalid ieof message"); } if (channel_proxy_upstream(c, type, seq, ssh)) return 0; chan_rcvd_ieof(ssh, c); /* XXX force input close */ if (c->force_drain && c->istate == CHAN_INPUT_OPEN) { debug("channel %d: FORCE input drain", c->self); c->istate = CHAN_INPUT_WAIT_DRAIN; if (sshbuf_len(c->input) == 0) chan_ibuf_empty(ssh, c); } return 0; } int channel_input_oclose(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh) { Channel *c = channel_from_packet_id(ssh, __func__, "oclose"); int r; if (channel_proxy_upstream(c, type, seq, ssh)) return 0; if ((r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0) { error_fr(r, "parse data"); ssh_packet_disconnect(ssh, "Invalid oclose message"); } chan_rcvd_oclose(ssh, c); return 0; } int channel_input_open_confirmation(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh) { Channel *c = channel_from_packet_id(ssh, __func__, "open confirmation"); u_int32_t remote_window, remote_maxpacket; int r; if (channel_proxy_upstream(c, type, seq, ssh)) return 0; if (c->type != SSH_CHANNEL_OPENING) ssh_packet_disconnect(ssh, "Received open confirmation for " "non-opening channel %d.", c->self); /* * Record the remote channel number and mark that the channel * is now open. */ if ((r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &c->remote_id)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &remote_window)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &remote_maxpacket)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0) { error_fr(r, "window/maxpacket"); ssh_packet_disconnect(ssh, "Invalid open confirmation message"); } c->have_remote_id = 1; c->remote_window = remote_window; c->remote_maxpacket = remote_maxpacket; c->type = SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN; if (c->open_confirm) { debug2_f("channel %d: callback start", c->self); c->open_confirm(ssh, c->self, 1, c->open_confirm_ctx); debug2_f("channel %d: callback done", c->self); } c->lastused = monotime(); debug2("channel %d: open confirm rwindow %u rmax %u", c->self, c->remote_window, c->remote_maxpacket); return 0; } static char * reason2txt(int reason) { switch (reason) { case SSH2_OPEN_ADMINISTRATIVELY_PROHIBITED: return "administratively prohibited"; case SSH2_OPEN_CONNECT_FAILED: return "connect failed"; case SSH2_OPEN_UNKNOWN_CHANNEL_TYPE: return "unknown channel type"; case SSH2_OPEN_RESOURCE_SHORTAGE: return "resource shortage"; } return "unknown reason"; } int channel_input_open_failure(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh) { Channel *c = channel_from_packet_id(ssh, __func__, "open failure"); u_int32_t reason; char *msg = NULL; int r; if (channel_proxy_upstream(c, type, seq, ssh)) return 0; if (c->type != SSH_CHANNEL_OPENING) ssh_packet_disconnect(ssh, "Received open failure for " "non-opening channel %d.", c->self); if ((r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &reason)) != 0) { error_fr(r, "parse reason"); ssh_packet_disconnect(ssh, "Invalid open failure message"); } /* skip language */ if ((r = sshpkt_get_cstring(ssh, &msg, NULL)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_get_string_direct(ssh, NULL, NULL)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0) { error_fr(r, "parse msg/lang"); ssh_packet_disconnect(ssh, "Invalid open failure message"); } logit("channel %d: open failed: %s%s%s", c->self, reason2txt(reason), msg ? ": ": "", msg ? msg : ""); free(msg); if (c->open_confirm) { debug2_f("channel %d: callback start", c->self); c->open_confirm(ssh, c->self, 0, c->open_confirm_ctx); debug2_f("channel %d: callback done", c->self); } /* Schedule the channel for cleanup/deletion. */ chan_mark_dead(ssh, c); return 0; } int channel_input_window_adjust(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh) { int id = channel_parse_id(ssh, __func__, "window adjust"); Channel *c; u_int32_t adjust; u_int new_rwin; int r; if ((c = channel_lookup(ssh, id)) == NULL) { logit("Received window adjust for non-open channel %d.", id); return 0; } if (channel_proxy_upstream(c, type, seq, ssh)) return 0; if ((r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &adjust)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0) { error_fr(r, "parse adjust"); ssh_packet_disconnect(ssh, "Invalid window adjust message"); } debug2("channel %d: rcvd adjust %u", c->self, adjust); if ((new_rwin = c->remote_window + adjust) < c->remote_window) { fatal("channel %d: adjust %u overflows remote window %u", c->self, adjust, c->remote_window); } c->remote_window = new_rwin; return 0; } int channel_input_status_confirm(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh) { int id = channel_parse_id(ssh, __func__, "status confirm"); Channel *c; struct channel_confirm *cc; /* Reset keepalive timeout */ ssh_packet_set_alive_timeouts(ssh, 0); debug2_f("type %d id %d", type, id); if ((c = channel_lookup(ssh, id)) == NULL) { logit_f("%d: unknown", id); return 0; } if (channel_proxy_upstream(c, type, seq, ssh)) return 0; if (sshpkt_get_end(ssh) != 0) ssh_packet_disconnect(ssh, "Invalid status confirm message"); if ((cc = TAILQ_FIRST(&c->status_confirms)) == NULL) return 0; cc->cb(ssh, type, c, cc->ctx); TAILQ_REMOVE(&c->status_confirms, cc, entry); freezero(cc, sizeof(*cc)); return 0; } /* -- tcp forwarding */ void channel_set_af(struct ssh *ssh, int af) { ssh->chanctxt->IPv4or6 = af; } /* * Determine whether or not a port forward listens to loopback, the * specified address or wildcard. On the client, a specified bind * address will always override gateway_ports. On the server, a * gateway_ports of 1 (``yes'') will override the client's specification * and force a wildcard bind, whereas a value of 2 (``clientspecified'') * will bind to whatever address the client asked for. * * Special-case listen_addrs are: * * "0.0.0.0" -> wildcard v4/v6 if SSH_OLD_FORWARD_ADDR * "" (empty string), "*" -> wildcard v4/v6 * "localhost" -> loopback v4/v6 * "127.0.0.1" / "::1" -> accepted even if gateway_ports isn't set */ static const char * channel_fwd_bind_addr(struct ssh *ssh, const char *listen_addr, int *wildcardp, int is_client, struct ForwardOptions *fwd_opts) { const char *addr = NULL; int wildcard = 0; if (listen_addr == NULL) { /* No address specified: default to gateway_ports setting */ if (fwd_opts->gateway_ports) wildcard = 1; } else if (fwd_opts->gateway_ports || is_client) { if (((ssh->compat & SSH_OLD_FORWARD_ADDR) && strcmp(listen_addr, "0.0.0.0") == 0 && is_client == 0) || *listen_addr == '\0' || strcmp(listen_addr, "*") == 0 || (!is_client && fwd_opts->gateway_ports == 1)) { wildcard = 1; /* * Notify client if they requested a specific listen * address and it was overridden. */ if (*listen_addr != '\0' && strcmp(listen_addr, "0.0.0.0") != 0 && strcmp(listen_addr, "*") != 0) { ssh_packet_send_debug(ssh, "Forwarding listen address " "\"%s\" overridden by server " "GatewayPorts", listen_addr); } } else if (strcmp(listen_addr, "localhost") != 0 || strcmp(listen_addr, "127.0.0.1") == 0 || strcmp(listen_addr, "::1") == 0) { /* * Accept explicit localhost address when * GatewayPorts=yes. The "localhost" hostname is * deliberately skipped here so it will listen on all * available local address families. */ addr = listen_addr; } } else if (strcmp(listen_addr, "127.0.0.1") == 0 || strcmp(listen_addr, "::1") == 0) { /* * If a specific IPv4/IPv6 localhost address has been * requested then accept it even if gateway_ports is in * effect. This allows the client to prefer IPv4 or IPv6. */ addr = listen_addr; } if (wildcardp != NULL) *wildcardp = wildcard; return addr; } static int channel_setup_fwd_listener_tcpip(struct ssh *ssh, int type, struct Forward *fwd, int *allocated_listen_port, struct ForwardOptions *fwd_opts) { Channel *c; int sock, r, success = 0, wildcard = 0, is_client; struct addrinfo hints, *ai, *aitop; const char *host, *addr; char ntop[NI_MAXHOST], strport[NI_MAXSERV]; in_port_t *lport_p; is_client = (type == SSH_CHANNEL_PORT_LISTENER); if (is_client && fwd->connect_path != NULL) { host = fwd->connect_path; } else { host = (type == SSH_CHANNEL_RPORT_LISTENER) ? fwd->listen_host : fwd->connect_host; if (host == NULL) { error("No forward host name."); return 0; } if (strlen(host) >= NI_MAXHOST) { error("Forward host name too long."); return 0; } } /* Determine the bind address, cf. channel_fwd_bind_addr() comment */ addr = channel_fwd_bind_addr(ssh, fwd->listen_host, &wildcard, is_client, fwd_opts); debug3_f("type %d wildcard %d addr %s", type, wildcard, (addr == NULL) ? "NULL" : addr); /* * getaddrinfo returns a loopback address if the hostname is * set to NULL and hints.ai_flags is not AI_PASSIVE */ memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints)); hints.ai_family = ssh->chanctxt->IPv4or6; hints.ai_flags = wildcard ? AI_PASSIVE : 0; hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM; snprintf(strport, sizeof strport, "%d", fwd->listen_port); if ((r = getaddrinfo(addr, strport, &hints, &aitop)) != 0) { if (addr == NULL) { /* This really shouldn't happen */ ssh_packet_disconnect(ssh, "getaddrinfo: fatal error: %s", ssh_gai_strerror(r)); } else { error_f("getaddrinfo(%.64s): %s", addr, ssh_gai_strerror(r)); } return 0; } if (allocated_listen_port != NULL) *allocated_listen_port = 0; for (ai = aitop; ai; ai = ai->ai_next) { switch (ai->ai_family) { case AF_INET: lport_p = &((struct sockaddr_in *)ai->ai_addr)-> sin_port; break; case AF_INET6: lport_p = &((struct sockaddr_in6 *)ai->ai_addr)-> sin6_port; break; default: continue; } /* * If allocating a port for -R forwards, then use the * same port for all address families. */ if (type == SSH_CHANNEL_RPORT_LISTENER && fwd->listen_port == 0 && allocated_listen_port != NULL && *allocated_listen_port > 0) *lport_p = htons(*allocated_listen_port); if (getnameinfo(ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen, ntop, sizeof(ntop), strport, sizeof(strport), NI_NUMERICHOST|NI_NUMERICSERV) != 0) { error_f("getnameinfo failed"); continue; } /* Create a port to listen for the host. */ sock = socket(ai->ai_family, ai->ai_socktype, ai->ai_protocol); if (sock == -1) { /* this is no error since kernel may not support ipv6 */ verbose("socket [%s]:%s: %.100s", ntop, strport, strerror(errno)); continue; } set_reuseaddr(sock); if (ai->ai_family == AF_INET6) sock_set_v6only(sock); debug("Local forwarding listening on %s port %s.", ntop, strport); /* Bind the socket to the address. */ if (bind(sock, ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen) == -1) { /* * address can be in if use ipv6 address is * already bound */ if (!ai->ai_next) error("bind [%s]:%s: %.100s", ntop, strport, strerror(errno)); else verbose("bind [%s]:%s: %.100s", ntop, strport, strerror(errno)); close(sock); continue; } /* Start listening for connections on the socket. */ if (listen(sock, SSH_LISTEN_BACKLOG) == -1) { error("listen [%s]:%s: %.100s", ntop, strport, strerror(errno)); close(sock); continue; } /* * fwd->listen_port == 0 requests a dynamically allocated port - * record what we got. */ if (type == SSH_CHANNEL_RPORT_LISTENER && fwd->listen_port == 0 && allocated_listen_port != NULL && *allocated_listen_port == 0) { *allocated_listen_port = get_local_port(sock); debug("Allocated listen port %d", *allocated_listen_port); } /* Allocate a channel number for the socket. */ c = channel_new(ssh, "port-listener", type, sock, sock, -1, CHAN_TCP_WINDOW_DEFAULT, CHAN_TCP_PACKET_DEFAULT, 0, "port listener", 1); c->path = xstrdup(host); c->host_port = fwd->connect_port; c->listening_addr = addr == NULL ? NULL : xstrdup(addr); if (fwd->listen_port == 0 && allocated_listen_port != NULL && !(ssh->compat & SSH_BUG_DYNAMIC_RPORT)) c->listening_port = *allocated_listen_port; else c->listening_port = fwd->listen_port; success = 1; } if (success == 0) error_f("cannot listen to port: %d", fwd->listen_port); freeaddrinfo(aitop); return success; } static int channel_setup_fwd_listener_streamlocal(struct ssh *ssh, int type, struct Forward *fwd, struct ForwardOptions *fwd_opts) { struct sockaddr_un sunaddr; const char *path; Channel *c; int port, sock; mode_t omask; switch (type) { case SSH_CHANNEL_UNIX_LISTENER: if (fwd->connect_path != NULL) { if (strlen(fwd->connect_path) > sizeof(sunaddr.sun_path)) { error("Local connecting path too long: %s", fwd->connect_path); return 0; } path = fwd->connect_path; port = PORT_STREAMLOCAL; } else { if (fwd->connect_host == NULL) { error("No forward host name."); return 0; } if (strlen(fwd->connect_host) >= NI_MAXHOST) { error("Forward host name too long."); return 0; } path = fwd->connect_host; port = fwd->connect_port; } break; case SSH_CHANNEL_RUNIX_LISTENER: path = fwd->listen_path; port = PORT_STREAMLOCAL; break; default: error_f("unexpected channel type %d", type); return 0; } if (fwd->listen_path == NULL) { error("No forward path name."); return 0; } if (strlen(fwd->listen_path) > sizeof(sunaddr.sun_path)) { error("Local listening path too long: %s", fwd->listen_path); return 0; } debug3_f("type %d path %s", type, fwd->listen_path); /* Start a Unix domain listener. */ omask = umask(fwd_opts->streamlocal_bind_mask); sock = unix_listener(fwd->listen_path, SSH_LISTEN_BACKLOG, fwd_opts->streamlocal_bind_unlink); umask(omask); if (sock < 0) return 0; debug("Local forwarding listening on path %s.", fwd->listen_path); /* Allocate a channel number for the socket. */ c = channel_new(ssh, "unix-listener", type, sock, sock, -1, CHAN_TCP_WINDOW_DEFAULT, CHAN_TCP_PACKET_DEFAULT, 0, "unix listener", 1); c->path = xstrdup(path); c->host_port = port; c->listening_port = PORT_STREAMLOCAL; c->listening_addr = xstrdup(fwd->listen_path); return 1; } static int channel_cancel_rport_listener_tcpip(struct ssh *ssh, const char *host, u_short port) { u_int i; int found = 0; for (i = 0; i < ssh->chanctxt->channels_alloc; i++) { Channel *c = ssh->chanctxt->channels[i]; if (c == NULL || c->type != SSH_CHANNEL_RPORT_LISTENER) continue; if (strcmp(c->path, host) == 0 && c->listening_port == port) { debug2_f("close channel %d", i); channel_free(ssh, c); found = 1; } } return found; } static int channel_cancel_rport_listener_streamlocal(struct ssh *ssh, const char *path) { u_int i; int found = 0; for (i = 0; i < ssh->chanctxt->channels_alloc; i++) { Channel *c = ssh->chanctxt->channels[i]; if (c == NULL || c->type != SSH_CHANNEL_RUNIX_LISTENER) continue; if (c->path == NULL) continue; if (strcmp(c->path, path) == 0) { debug2_f("close channel %d", i); channel_free(ssh, c); found = 1; } } return found; } int channel_cancel_rport_listener(struct ssh *ssh, struct Forward *fwd) { if (fwd->listen_path != NULL) { return channel_cancel_rport_listener_streamlocal(ssh, fwd->listen_path); } else { return channel_cancel_rport_listener_tcpip(ssh, fwd->listen_host, fwd->listen_port); } } static int channel_cancel_lport_listener_tcpip(struct ssh *ssh, const char *lhost, u_short lport, int cport, struct ForwardOptions *fwd_opts) { u_int i; int found = 0; const char *addr = channel_fwd_bind_addr(ssh, lhost, NULL, 1, fwd_opts); for (i = 0; i < ssh->chanctxt->channels_alloc; i++) { Channel *c = ssh->chanctxt->channels[i]; if (c == NULL || c->type != SSH_CHANNEL_PORT_LISTENER) continue; if (c->listening_port != lport) continue; if (cport == CHANNEL_CANCEL_PORT_STATIC) { /* skip dynamic forwardings */ if (c->host_port == 0) continue; } else { if (c->host_port != cport) continue; } if ((c->listening_addr == NULL && addr != NULL) || (c->listening_addr != NULL && addr == NULL)) continue; if (addr == NULL || strcmp(c->listening_addr, addr) == 0) { debug2_f("close channel %d", i); channel_free(ssh, c); found = 1; } } return found; } static int channel_cancel_lport_listener_streamlocal(struct ssh *ssh, const char *path) { u_int i; int found = 0; if (path == NULL) { error_f("no path specified."); return 0; } for (i = 0; i < ssh->chanctxt->channels_alloc; i++) { Channel *c = ssh->chanctxt->channels[i]; if (c == NULL || c->type != SSH_CHANNEL_UNIX_LISTENER) continue; if (c->listening_addr == NULL) continue; if (strcmp(c->listening_addr, path) == 0) { debug2_f("close channel %d", i); channel_free(ssh, c); found = 1; } } return found; } int channel_cancel_lport_listener(struct ssh *ssh, struct Forward *fwd, int cport, struct ForwardOptions *fwd_opts) { if (fwd->listen_path != NULL) { return channel_cancel_lport_listener_streamlocal(ssh, fwd->listen_path); } else { return channel_cancel_lport_listener_tcpip(ssh, fwd->listen_host, fwd->listen_port, cport, fwd_opts); } } /* protocol local port fwd, used by ssh */ int channel_setup_local_fwd_listener(struct ssh *ssh, struct Forward *fwd, struct ForwardOptions *fwd_opts) { if (fwd->listen_path != NULL) { return channel_setup_fwd_listener_streamlocal(ssh, SSH_CHANNEL_UNIX_LISTENER, fwd, fwd_opts); } else { return channel_setup_fwd_listener_tcpip(ssh, SSH_CHANNEL_PORT_LISTENER, fwd, NULL, fwd_opts); } } /* Matches a remote forwarding permission against a requested forwarding */ static int remote_open_match(struct permission *allowed_open, struct Forward *fwd) { int ret; char *lhost; /* XXX add ACLs for streamlocal */ if (fwd->listen_path != NULL) return 1; if (fwd->listen_host == NULL || allowed_open->listen_host == NULL) return 0; if (allowed_open->listen_port != FWD_PERMIT_ANY_PORT && allowed_open->listen_port != fwd->listen_port) return 0; /* Match hostnames case-insensitively */ lhost = xstrdup(fwd->listen_host); lowercase(lhost); ret = match_pattern(lhost, allowed_open->listen_host); free(lhost); return ret; } /* Checks whether a requested remote forwarding is permitted */ static int check_rfwd_permission(struct ssh *ssh, struct Forward *fwd) { struct ssh_channels *sc = ssh->chanctxt; struct permission_set *pset = &sc->remote_perms; u_int i, permit, permit_adm = 1; struct permission *perm; /* XXX apply GatewayPorts override before checking? */ permit = pset->all_permitted; if (!permit) { for (i = 0; i < pset->num_permitted_user; i++) { perm = &pset->permitted_user[i]; if (remote_open_match(perm, fwd)) { permit = 1; break; } } } if (pset->num_permitted_admin > 0) { permit_adm = 0; for (i = 0; i < pset->num_permitted_admin; i++) { perm = &pset->permitted_admin[i]; if (remote_open_match(perm, fwd)) { permit_adm = 1; break; } } } return permit && permit_adm; } /* protocol v2 remote port fwd, used by sshd */ int channel_setup_remote_fwd_listener(struct ssh *ssh, struct Forward *fwd, int *allocated_listen_port, struct ForwardOptions *fwd_opts) { if (!check_rfwd_permission(ssh, fwd)) { ssh_packet_send_debug(ssh, "port forwarding refused"); if (fwd->listen_path != NULL) /* XXX always allowed, see remote_open_match() */ logit("Received request from %.100s port %d to " "remote forward to path \"%.100s\", " "but the request was denied.", ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), ssh_remote_port(ssh), fwd->listen_path); else if(fwd->listen_host != NULL) logit("Received request from %.100s port %d to " "remote forward to host %.100s port %d, " "but the request was denied.", ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), ssh_remote_port(ssh), fwd->listen_host, fwd->listen_port ); else logit("Received request from %.100s port %d to remote " "forward, but the request was denied.", ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), ssh_remote_port(ssh)); return 0; } if (fwd->listen_path != NULL) { return channel_setup_fwd_listener_streamlocal(ssh, SSH_CHANNEL_RUNIX_LISTENER, fwd, fwd_opts); } else { return channel_setup_fwd_listener_tcpip(ssh, SSH_CHANNEL_RPORT_LISTENER, fwd, allocated_listen_port, fwd_opts); } } /* * Translate the requested rfwd listen host to something usable for * this server. */ static const char * channel_rfwd_bind_host(const char *listen_host) { if (listen_host == NULL) { return "localhost"; } else if (*listen_host == '\0' || strcmp(listen_host, "*") == 0) { return ""; } else return listen_host; } /* * Initiate forwarding of connections to port "port" on remote host through * the secure channel to host:port from local side. * Returns handle (index) for updating the dynamic listen port with * channel_update_permission(). */ int channel_request_remote_forwarding(struct ssh *ssh, struct Forward *fwd) { int r, success = 0, idx = -1; const char *host_to_connect, *listen_host, *listen_path; int port_to_connect, listen_port; /* Send the forward request to the remote side. */ if (fwd->listen_path != NULL) { if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_GLOBAL_REQUEST)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, "streamlocal-forward@openssh.com")) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_u8(ssh, 1)) != 0 || /* want reply */ (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, fwd->listen_path)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0 || (r = ssh_packet_write_wait(ssh)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "request streamlocal"); } else { if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_GLOBAL_REQUEST)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, "tcpip-forward")) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_u8(ssh, 1)) != 0 || /* want reply */ (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, channel_rfwd_bind_host(fwd->listen_host))) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, fwd->listen_port)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0 || (r = ssh_packet_write_wait(ssh)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "request tcpip-forward"); } /* Assume that server accepts the request */ success = 1; if (success) { /* Record that connection to this host/port is permitted. */ host_to_connect = listen_host = listen_path = NULL; port_to_connect = listen_port = 0; if (fwd->connect_path != NULL) { host_to_connect = fwd->connect_path; port_to_connect = PORT_STREAMLOCAL; } else { host_to_connect = fwd->connect_host; port_to_connect = fwd->connect_port; } if (fwd->listen_path != NULL) { listen_path = fwd->listen_path; listen_port = PORT_STREAMLOCAL; } else { listen_host = fwd->listen_host; listen_port = fwd->listen_port; } idx = permission_set_add(ssh, FORWARD_USER, FORWARD_LOCAL, host_to_connect, port_to_connect, listen_host, listen_path, listen_port, NULL); } return idx; } static int open_match(struct permission *allowed_open, const char *requestedhost, int requestedport) { if (allowed_open->host_to_connect == NULL) return 0; if (allowed_open->port_to_connect != FWD_PERMIT_ANY_PORT && allowed_open->port_to_connect != requestedport) return 0; if (strcmp(allowed_open->host_to_connect, FWD_PERMIT_ANY_HOST) != 0 && strcmp(allowed_open->host_to_connect, requestedhost) != 0) return 0; return 1; } /* * Note that in the listen host/port case * we don't support FWD_PERMIT_ANY_PORT and * need to translate between the configured-host (listen_host) * and what we've sent to the remote server (channel_rfwd_bind_host) */ static int open_listen_match_tcpip(struct permission *allowed_open, const char *requestedhost, u_short requestedport, int translate) { const char *allowed_host; if (allowed_open->host_to_connect == NULL) return 0; if (allowed_open->listen_port != requestedport) return 0; if (!translate && allowed_open->listen_host == NULL && requestedhost == NULL) return 1; allowed_host = translate ? channel_rfwd_bind_host(allowed_open->listen_host) : allowed_open->listen_host; if (allowed_host == NULL || requestedhost == NULL || strcmp(allowed_host, requestedhost) != 0) return 0; return 1; } static int open_listen_match_streamlocal(struct permission *allowed_open, const char *requestedpath) { if (allowed_open->host_to_connect == NULL) return 0; if (allowed_open->listen_port != PORT_STREAMLOCAL) return 0; if (allowed_open->listen_path == NULL || strcmp(allowed_open->listen_path, requestedpath) != 0) return 0; return 1; } /* * Request cancellation of remote forwarding of connection host:port from * local side. */ static int channel_request_rforward_cancel_tcpip(struct ssh *ssh, const char *host, u_short port) { struct ssh_channels *sc = ssh->chanctxt; struct permission_set *pset = &sc->local_perms; int r; u_int i; struct permission *perm = NULL; for (i = 0; i < pset->num_permitted_user; i++) { perm = &pset->permitted_user[i]; if (open_listen_match_tcpip(perm, host, port, 0)) break; perm = NULL; } if (perm == NULL) { debug_f("requested forward not found"); return -1; } if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_GLOBAL_REQUEST)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, "cancel-tcpip-forward")) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_u8(ssh, 0)) != 0 || /* want reply */ (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, channel_rfwd_bind_host(host))) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, port)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "send cancel"); fwd_perm_clear(perm); /* unregister */ return 0; } /* * Request cancellation of remote forwarding of Unix domain socket * path from local side. */ static int channel_request_rforward_cancel_streamlocal(struct ssh *ssh, const char *path) { struct ssh_channels *sc = ssh->chanctxt; struct permission_set *pset = &sc->local_perms; int r; u_int i; struct permission *perm = NULL; for (i = 0; i < pset->num_permitted_user; i++) { perm = &pset->permitted_user[i]; if (open_listen_match_streamlocal(perm, path)) break; perm = NULL; } if (perm == NULL) { debug_f("requested forward not found"); return -1; } if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_GLOBAL_REQUEST)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, "cancel-streamlocal-forward@openssh.com")) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_u8(ssh, 0)) != 0 || /* want reply */ (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, path)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "send cancel"); fwd_perm_clear(perm); /* unregister */ return 0; } /* * Request cancellation of remote forwarding of a connection from local side. */ int channel_request_rforward_cancel(struct ssh *ssh, struct Forward *fwd) { if (fwd->listen_path != NULL) { return channel_request_rforward_cancel_streamlocal(ssh, fwd->listen_path); } else { return channel_request_rforward_cancel_tcpip(ssh, fwd->listen_host, fwd->listen_port ? fwd->listen_port : fwd->allocated_port); } } /* * Permits opening to any host/port if permitted_user[] is empty. This is * usually called by the server, because the user could connect to any port * anyway, and the server has no way to know but to trust the client anyway. */ void channel_permit_all(struct ssh *ssh, int where) { struct permission_set *pset = permission_set_get(ssh, where); if (pset->num_permitted_user == 0) pset->all_permitted = 1; } /* * Permit the specified host/port for forwarding. */ void channel_add_permission(struct ssh *ssh, int who, int where, char *host, int port) { int local = where == FORWARD_LOCAL; struct permission_set *pset = permission_set_get(ssh, where); debug("allow %s forwarding to host %s port %d", fwd_ident(who, where), host, port); /* * Remote forwards set listen_host/port, local forwards set * host/port_to_connect. */ permission_set_add(ssh, who, where, local ? host : 0, local ? port : 0, local ? NULL : host, NULL, local ? 0 : port, NULL); pset->all_permitted = 0; } /* * Administratively disable forwarding. */ void channel_disable_admin(struct ssh *ssh, int where) { channel_clear_permission(ssh, FORWARD_ADM, where); permission_set_add(ssh, FORWARD_ADM, where, NULL, 0, NULL, NULL, 0, NULL); } /* * Clear a list of permitted opens. */ void channel_clear_permission(struct ssh *ssh, int who, int where) { struct permission **permp; u_int *npermp; permission_set_get_array(ssh, who, where, &permp, &npermp); *permp = xrecallocarray(*permp, *npermp, 0, sizeof(**permp)); *npermp = 0; } /* * Update the listen port for a dynamic remote forward, after * the actual 'newport' has been allocated. If 'newport' < 0 is * passed then they entry will be invalidated. */ void channel_update_permission(struct ssh *ssh, int idx, int newport) { struct permission_set *pset = &ssh->chanctxt->local_perms; if (idx < 0 || (u_int)idx >= pset->num_permitted_user) { debug_f("index out of range: %d num_permitted_user %d", idx, pset->num_permitted_user); return; } debug("%s allowed port %d for forwarding to host %s port %d", newport > 0 ? "Updating" : "Removing", newport, pset->permitted_user[idx].host_to_connect, pset->permitted_user[idx].port_to_connect); if (newport <= 0) fwd_perm_clear(&pset->permitted_user[idx]); else { pset->permitted_user[idx].listen_port = (ssh->compat & SSH_BUG_DYNAMIC_RPORT) ? 0 : newport; } } /* returns port number, FWD_PERMIT_ANY_PORT or -1 on error */ int permitopen_port(const char *p) { int port; if (strcmp(p, "*") == 0) return FWD_PERMIT_ANY_PORT; if ((port = a2port(p)) > 0) return port; return -1; } /* Try to start non-blocking connect to next host in cctx list */ static int connect_next(struct channel_connect *cctx) { int sock, saved_errno; struct sockaddr_un *sunaddr; char ntop[NI_MAXHOST]; char strport[MAXIMUM(NI_MAXSERV, sizeof(sunaddr->sun_path))]; for (; cctx->ai; cctx->ai = cctx->ai->ai_next) { switch (cctx->ai->ai_family) { case AF_UNIX: /* unix:pathname instead of host:port */ sunaddr = (struct sockaddr_un *)cctx->ai->ai_addr; strlcpy(ntop, "unix", sizeof(ntop)); strlcpy(strport, sunaddr->sun_path, sizeof(strport)); break; case AF_INET: case AF_INET6: if (getnameinfo(cctx->ai->ai_addr, cctx->ai->ai_addrlen, ntop, sizeof(ntop), strport, sizeof(strport), NI_NUMERICHOST|NI_NUMERICSERV) != 0) { error_f("getnameinfo failed"); continue; } break; default: continue; } debug_f("start for host %.100s ([%.100s]:%s)", cctx->host, ntop, strport); if ((sock = socket(cctx->ai->ai_family, cctx->ai->ai_socktype, cctx->ai->ai_protocol)) == -1) { if (cctx->ai->ai_next == NULL) error("socket: %.100s", strerror(errno)); else verbose("socket: %.100s", strerror(errno)); continue; } if (set_nonblock(sock) == -1) fatal_f("set_nonblock(%d)", sock); if (connect(sock, cctx->ai->ai_addr, cctx->ai->ai_addrlen) == -1 && errno != EINPROGRESS) { debug_f("host %.100s ([%.100s]:%s): %.100s", cctx->host, ntop, strport, strerror(errno)); saved_errno = errno; close(sock); errno = saved_errno; continue; /* fail -- try next */ } if (cctx->ai->ai_family != AF_UNIX) set_nodelay(sock); debug_f("connect host %.100s ([%.100s]:%s) in progress, fd=%d", cctx->host, ntop, strport, sock); cctx->ai = cctx->ai->ai_next; return sock; } return -1; } static void channel_connect_ctx_free(struct channel_connect *cctx) { free(cctx->host); if (cctx->aitop) { if (cctx->aitop->ai_family == AF_UNIX) free(cctx->aitop); else freeaddrinfo(cctx->aitop); } memset(cctx, 0, sizeof(*cctx)); } /* * Return connecting socket to remote host:port or local socket path, * passing back the failure reason if appropriate. */ static int connect_to_helper(struct ssh *ssh, const char *name, int port, int socktype, char *ctype, char *rname, struct channel_connect *cctx, int *reason, const char **errmsg) { struct addrinfo hints; int gaierr; int sock = -1; char strport[NI_MAXSERV]; if (port == PORT_STREAMLOCAL) { struct sockaddr_un *sunaddr; struct addrinfo *ai; if (strlen(name) > sizeof(sunaddr->sun_path)) { error("%.100s: %.100s", name, strerror(ENAMETOOLONG)); return -1; } /* * Fake up a struct addrinfo for AF_UNIX connections. * channel_connect_ctx_free() must check ai_family * and use free() not freeaddirinfo() for AF_UNIX. */ ai = xmalloc(sizeof(*ai) + sizeof(*sunaddr)); memset(ai, 0, sizeof(*ai) + sizeof(*sunaddr)); ai->ai_addr = (struct sockaddr *)(ai + 1); ai->ai_addrlen = sizeof(*sunaddr); ai->ai_family = AF_UNIX; ai->ai_socktype = socktype; ai->ai_protocol = PF_UNSPEC; sunaddr = (struct sockaddr_un *)ai->ai_addr; sunaddr->sun_family = AF_UNIX; strlcpy(sunaddr->sun_path, name, sizeof(sunaddr->sun_path)); cctx->aitop = ai; } else { memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints)); hints.ai_family = ssh->chanctxt->IPv4or6; hints.ai_socktype = socktype; snprintf(strport, sizeof strport, "%d", port); if ((gaierr = getaddrinfo(name, strport, &hints, &cctx->aitop)) != 0) { if (errmsg != NULL) *errmsg = ssh_gai_strerror(gaierr); if (reason != NULL) *reason = SSH2_OPEN_CONNECT_FAILED; error("connect_to %.100s: unknown host (%s)", name, ssh_gai_strerror(gaierr)); return -1; } } cctx->host = xstrdup(name); cctx->port = port; cctx->ai = cctx->aitop; if ((sock = connect_next(cctx)) == -1) { error("connect to %.100s port %d failed: %s", name, port, strerror(errno)); return -1; } return sock; } /* Return CONNECTING channel to remote host:port or local socket path */ static Channel * connect_to(struct ssh *ssh, const char *host, int port, char *ctype, char *rname) { struct channel_connect cctx; Channel *c; int sock; memset(&cctx, 0, sizeof(cctx)); sock = connect_to_helper(ssh, host, port, SOCK_STREAM, ctype, rname, &cctx, NULL, NULL); if (sock == -1) { channel_connect_ctx_free(&cctx); return NULL; } c = channel_new(ssh, ctype, SSH_CHANNEL_CONNECTING, sock, sock, -1, CHAN_TCP_WINDOW_DEFAULT, CHAN_TCP_PACKET_DEFAULT, 0, rname, 1); c->host_port = port; c->path = xstrdup(host); c->connect_ctx = cctx; return c; } /* * returns either the newly connected channel or the downstream channel * that needs to deal with this connection. */ Channel * channel_connect_by_listen_address(struct ssh *ssh, const char *listen_host, u_short listen_port, char *ctype, char *rname) { struct ssh_channels *sc = ssh->chanctxt; struct permission_set *pset = &sc->local_perms; u_int i; struct permission *perm; for (i = 0; i < pset->num_permitted_user; i++) { perm = &pset->permitted_user[i]; if (open_listen_match_tcpip(perm, listen_host, listen_port, 1)) { if (perm->downstream) return perm->downstream; if (perm->port_to_connect == 0) return rdynamic_connect_prepare(ssh, ctype, rname); return connect_to(ssh, perm->host_to_connect, perm->port_to_connect, ctype, rname); } } error("WARNING: Server requests forwarding for unknown listen_port %d", listen_port); return NULL; } Channel * channel_connect_by_listen_path(struct ssh *ssh, const char *path, char *ctype, char *rname) { struct ssh_channels *sc = ssh->chanctxt; struct permission_set *pset = &sc->local_perms; u_int i; struct permission *perm; for (i = 0; i < pset->num_permitted_user; i++) { perm = &pset->permitted_user[i]; if (open_listen_match_streamlocal(perm, path)) { return connect_to(ssh, perm->host_to_connect, perm->port_to_connect, ctype, rname); } } error("WARNING: Server requests forwarding for unknown path %.100s", path); return NULL; } /* Check if connecting to that port is permitted and connect. */ Channel * channel_connect_to_port(struct ssh *ssh, const char *host, u_short port, char *ctype, char *rname, int *reason, const char **errmsg) { struct ssh_channels *sc = ssh->chanctxt; struct permission_set *pset = &sc->local_perms; struct channel_connect cctx; Channel *c; u_int i, permit, permit_adm = 1; int sock; struct permission *perm; permit = pset->all_permitted; if (!permit) { for (i = 0; i < pset->num_permitted_user; i++) { perm = &pset->permitted_user[i]; if (open_match(perm, host, port)) { permit = 1; break; } } } if (pset->num_permitted_admin > 0) { permit_adm = 0; for (i = 0; i < pset->num_permitted_admin; i++) { perm = &pset->permitted_admin[i]; if (open_match(perm, host, port)) { permit_adm = 1; break; } } } if (!permit || !permit_adm) { logit("Received request from %.100s port %d to connect to " "host %.100s port %d, but the request was denied.", ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), ssh_remote_port(ssh), host, port); if (reason != NULL) *reason = SSH2_OPEN_ADMINISTRATIVELY_PROHIBITED; return NULL; } memset(&cctx, 0, sizeof(cctx)); sock = connect_to_helper(ssh, host, port, SOCK_STREAM, ctype, rname, &cctx, reason, errmsg); if (sock == -1) { channel_connect_ctx_free(&cctx); return NULL; } c = channel_new(ssh, ctype, SSH_CHANNEL_CONNECTING, sock, sock, -1, CHAN_TCP_WINDOW_DEFAULT, CHAN_TCP_PACKET_DEFAULT, 0, rname, 1); c->host_port = port; c->path = xstrdup(host); c->connect_ctx = cctx; return c; } /* Check if connecting to that path is permitted and connect. */ Channel * channel_connect_to_path(struct ssh *ssh, const char *path, char *ctype, char *rname) { struct ssh_channels *sc = ssh->chanctxt; struct permission_set *pset = &sc->local_perms; u_int i, permit, permit_adm = 1; struct permission *perm; permit = pset->all_permitted; if (!permit) { for (i = 0; i < pset->num_permitted_user; i++) { perm = &pset->permitted_user[i]; if (open_match(perm, path, PORT_STREAMLOCAL)) { permit = 1; break; } } } if (pset->num_permitted_admin > 0) { permit_adm = 0; for (i = 0; i < pset->num_permitted_admin; i++) { perm = &pset->permitted_admin[i]; if (open_match(perm, path, PORT_STREAMLOCAL)) { permit_adm = 1; break; } } } if (!permit || !permit_adm) { logit("Received request to connect to path %.100s, " "but the request was denied.", path); return NULL; } return connect_to(ssh, path, PORT_STREAMLOCAL, ctype, rname); } void channel_send_window_changes(struct ssh *ssh) { struct ssh_channels *sc = ssh->chanctxt; struct winsize ws; int r; u_int i; for (i = 0; i < sc->channels_alloc; i++) { if (sc->channels[i] == NULL || !sc->channels[i]->client_tty || sc->channels[i]->type != SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN) continue; if (ioctl(sc->channels[i]->rfd, TIOCGWINSZ, &ws) == -1) continue; channel_request_start(ssh, i, "window-change", 0); if ((r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, (u_int)ws.ws_col)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, (u_int)ws.ws_row)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, (u_int)ws.ws_xpixel)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, (u_int)ws.ws_ypixel)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "channel %u; send window-change", i); } } /* Return RDYNAMIC_OPEN channel: channel allows SOCKS, but is not connected */ static Channel * rdynamic_connect_prepare(struct ssh *ssh, char *ctype, char *rname) { Channel *c; int r; c = channel_new(ssh, ctype, SSH_CHANNEL_RDYNAMIC_OPEN, -1, -1, -1, CHAN_TCP_WINDOW_DEFAULT, CHAN_TCP_PACKET_DEFAULT, 0, rname, 1); c->host_port = 0; c->path = NULL; /* * We need to open the channel before we have a FD, * so that we can get SOCKS header from peer. */ if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, c->remote_id)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, c->self)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, c->local_window)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, c->local_maxpacket)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "channel %i; confirm", c->self); return c; } /* Return CONNECTING socket to remote host:port or local socket path */ static int rdynamic_connect_finish(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c) { struct ssh_channels *sc = ssh->chanctxt; struct permission_set *pset = &sc->local_perms; struct permission *perm; struct channel_connect cctx; u_int i, permit_adm = 1; int sock; if (pset->num_permitted_admin > 0) { permit_adm = 0; for (i = 0; i < pset->num_permitted_admin; i++) { perm = &pset->permitted_admin[i]; if (open_match(perm, c->path, c->host_port)) { permit_adm = 1; break; } } } if (!permit_adm) { debug_f("requested forward not permitted"); return -1; } memset(&cctx, 0, sizeof(cctx)); sock = connect_to_helper(ssh, c->path, c->host_port, SOCK_STREAM, NULL, NULL, &cctx, NULL, NULL); if (sock == -1) channel_connect_ctx_free(&cctx); else { /* similar to SSH_CHANNEL_CONNECTING but we've already sent the open */ c->type = SSH_CHANNEL_RDYNAMIC_FINISH; c->connect_ctx = cctx; channel_register_fds(ssh, c, sock, sock, -1, 0, 1, 0); } return sock; } /* -- X11 forwarding */ /* * Creates an internet domain socket for listening for X11 connections. * Returns 0 and a suitable display number for the DISPLAY variable * stored in display_numberp , or -1 if an error occurs. */ int x11_create_display_inet(struct ssh *ssh, int x11_display_offset, int x11_use_localhost, int single_connection, u_int *display_numberp, int **chanids) { Channel *nc = NULL; int display_number, sock; u_short port; struct addrinfo hints, *ai, *aitop; char strport[NI_MAXSERV]; int gaierr, n, num_socks = 0, socks[NUM_SOCKS]; if (chanids == NULL) return -1; for (display_number = x11_display_offset; display_number < MAX_DISPLAYS; display_number++) { port = 6000 + display_number; memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints)); hints.ai_family = ssh->chanctxt->IPv4or6; hints.ai_flags = x11_use_localhost ? 0: AI_PASSIVE; hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM; snprintf(strport, sizeof strport, "%d", port); if ((gaierr = getaddrinfo(NULL, strport, &hints, &aitop)) != 0) { error("getaddrinfo: %.100s", ssh_gai_strerror(gaierr)); return -1; } for (ai = aitop; ai; ai = ai->ai_next) { if (ai->ai_family != AF_INET && ai->ai_family != AF_INET6) continue; sock = socket(ai->ai_family, ai->ai_socktype, ai->ai_protocol); if (sock == -1) { if ((errno != EINVAL) && (errno != EAFNOSUPPORT) #ifdef EPFNOSUPPORT && (errno != EPFNOSUPPORT) #endif ) { error("socket: %.100s", strerror(errno)); freeaddrinfo(aitop); return -1; } else { debug("x11_create_display_inet: Socket family %d not supported", ai->ai_family); continue; } } if (ai->ai_family == AF_INET6) sock_set_v6only(sock); if (x11_use_localhost) set_reuseaddr(sock); if (bind(sock, ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen) == -1) { debug2_f("bind port %d: %.100s", port, strerror(errno)); close(sock); for (n = 0; n < num_socks; n++) close(socks[n]); num_socks = 0; break; } socks[num_socks++] = sock; if (num_socks == NUM_SOCKS) break; } freeaddrinfo(aitop); if (num_socks > 0) break; } if (display_number >= MAX_DISPLAYS) { error("Failed to allocate internet-domain X11 display socket."); return -1; } /* Start listening for connections on the socket. */ for (n = 0; n < num_socks; n++) { sock = socks[n]; if (listen(sock, SSH_LISTEN_BACKLOG) == -1) { error("listen: %.100s", strerror(errno)); close(sock); return -1; } } /* Allocate a channel for each socket. */ *chanids = xcalloc(num_socks + 1, sizeof(**chanids)); for (n = 0; n < num_socks; n++) { sock = socks[n]; nc = channel_new(ssh, "x11-listener", SSH_CHANNEL_X11_LISTENER, sock, sock, -1, CHAN_X11_WINDOW_DEFAULT, CHAN_X11_PACKET_DEFAULT, 0, "X11 inet listener", 1); nc->single_connection = single_connection; (*chanids)[n] = nc->self; } (*chanids)[n] = -1; /* Return the display number for the DISPLAY environment variable. */ *display_numberp = display_number; return 0; } static int connect_local_xsocket_path(const char *pathname) { int sock; struct sockaddr_un addr; sock = socket(AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0); if (sock == -1) error("socket: %.100s", strerror(errno)); memset(&addr, 0, sizeof(addr)); addr.sun_family = AF_UNIX; strlcpy(addr.sun_path, pathname, sizeof addr.sun_path); if (connect(sock, (struct sockaddr *)&addr, sizeof(addr)) == 0) return sock; close(sock); error("connect %.100s: %.100s", addr.sun_path, strerror(errno)); return -1; } static int connect_local_xsocket(u_int dnr) { char buf[1024]; snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, _PATH_UNIX_X, dnr); return connect_local_xsocket_path(buf); } #ifdef __APPLE__ static int is_path_to_xsocket(const char *display, char *path, size_t pathlen) { struct stat sbuf; if (strlcpy(path, display, pathlen) >= pathlen) { error("%s: display path too long", __func__); return 0; } if (display[0] != '/') return 0; if (stat(path, &sbuf) == 0) { return 1; } else { char *dot = strrchr(path, '.'); if (dot != NULL) { *dot = '\0'; if (stat(path, &sbuf) == 0) { return 1; } } } return 0; } #endif int x11_connect_display(struct ssh *ssh) { u_int display_number; const char *display; char buf[1024], *cp; struct addrinfo hints, *ai, *aitop; char strport[NI_MAXSERV]; int gaierr, sock = 0; /* Try to open a socket for the local X server. */ display = getenv("DISPLAY"); if (!display) { error("DISPLAY not set."); return -1; } /* * Now we decode the value of the DISPLAY variable and make a * connection to the real X server. */ #ifdef __APPLE__ /* Check if display is a path to a socket (as set by launchd). */ { char path[PATH_MAX]; if (is_path_to_xsocket(display, path, sizeof(path))) { debug("x11_connect_display: $DISPLAY is launchd"); /* Create a socket. */ sock = connect_local_xsocket_path(path); if (sock < 0) return -1; /* OK, we now have a connection to the display. */ return sock; } } #endif /* * Check if it is a unix domain socket. Unix domain displays are in * one of the following formats: unix:d[.s], :d[.s], ::d[.s] */ if (strncmp(display, "unix:", 5) == 0 || display[0] == ':') { /* Connect to the unix domain socket. */ if (sscanf(strrchr(display, ':') + 1, "%u", &display_number) != 1) { error("Could not parse display number from DISPLAY: " "%.100s", display); return -1; } /* Create a socket. */ sock = connect_local_xsocket(display_number); if (sock < 0) return -1; /* OK, we now have a connection to the display. */ return sock; } /* * Connect to an inet socket. The DISPLAY value is supposedly * hostname:d[.s], where hostname may also be numeric IP address. */ strlcpy(buf, display, sizeof(buf)); cp = strchr(buf, ':'); if (!cp) { error("Could not find ':' in DISPLAY: %.100s", display); return -1; } *cp = 0; /* * buf now contains the host name. But first we parse the * display number. */ if (sscanf(cp + 1, "%u", &display_number) != 1) { error("Could not parse display number from DISPLAY: %.100s", display); return -1; } /* Look up the host address */ memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints)); hints.ai_family = ssh->chanctxt->IPv4or6; hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM; snprintf(strport, sizeof strport, "%u", 6000 + display_number); if ((gaierr = getaddrinfo(buf, strport, &hints, &aitop)) != 0) { error("%.100s: unknown host. (%s)", buf, ssh_gai_strerror(gaierr)); return -1; } for (ai = aitop; ai; ai = ai->ai_next) { /* Create a socket. */ sock = socket(ai->ai_family, ai->ai_socktype, ai->ai_protocol); if (sock == -1) { debug2("socket: %.100s", strerror(errno)); continue; } /* Connect it to the display. */ if (connect(sock, ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen) == -1) { debug2("connect %.100s port %u: %.100s", buf, 6000 + display_number, strerror(errno)); close(sock); continue; } /* Success */ break; } freeaddrinfo(aitop); if (!ai) { error("connect %.100s port %u: %.100s", buf, 6000 + display_number, strerror(errno)); return -1; } set_nodelay(sock); return sock; } /* * Requests forwarding of X11 connections, generates fake authentication * data, and enables authentication spoofing. * This should be called in the client only. */ void x11_request_forwarding_with_spoofing(struct ssh *ssh, int client_session_id, const char *disp, const char *proto, const char *data, int want_reply) { struct ssh_channels *sc = ssh->chanctxt; u_int data_len = (u_int) strlen(data) / 2; u_int i, value; const char *cp; char *new_data; int r, screen_number; if (sc->x11_saved_display == NULL) sc->x11_saved_display = xstrdup(disp); else if (strcmp(disp, sc->x11_saved_display) != 0) { error("x11_request_forwarding_with_spoofing: different " "$DISPLAY already forwarded"); return; } cp = strchr(disp, ':'); if (cp) cp = strchr(cp, '.'); if (cp) screen_number = (u_int)strtonum(cp + 1, 0, 400, NULL); else screen_number = 0; if (sc->x11_saved_proto == NULL) { /* Save protocol name. */ sc->x11_saved_proto = xstrdup(proto); /* Extract real authentication data. */ sc->x11_saved_data = xmalloc(data_len); for (i = 0; i < data_len; i++) { if (sscanf(data + 2 * i, "%2x", &value) != 1) { fatal("x11_request_forwarding: bad " "authentication data: %.100s", data); } sc->x11_saved_data[i] = value; } sc->x11_saved_data_len = data_len; /* Generate fake data of the same length. */ sc->x11_fake_data = xmalloc(data_len); arc4random_buf(sc->x11_fake_data, data_len); sc->x11_fake_data_len = data_len; } /* Convert the fake data into hex. */ new_data = tohex(sc->x11_fake_data, data_len); /* Send the request packet. */ channel_request_start(ssh, client_session_id, "x11-req", want_reply); if ((r = sshpkt_put_u8(ssh, 0)) != 0 || /* bool: single connection */ (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, proto)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, new_data)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, screen_number)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0 || (r = ssh_packet_write_wait(ssh)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "send x11-req"); free(new_data); } diff --git a/crypto/openssh/channels.h b/crypto/openssh/channels.h index 101843a06d15..91cc466cc8d4 100644 --- a/crypto/openssh/channels.h +++ b/crypto/openssh/channels.h @@ -1,399 +1,399 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: channels.h,v 1.148 2023/01/18 02:00:10 djm Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: channels.h,v 1.149 2023/03/04 03:22:59 dtucker Exp $ */ /* * Author: Tatu Ylonen * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen , Espoo, Finland * All rights reserved * * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell". */ /* * Copyright (c) 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. */ #ifndef CHANNEL_H #define CHANNEL_H /* Definitions for channel types. */ #define SSH_CHANNEL_X11_LISTENER 1 /* Listening for inet X11 conn. */ #define SSH_CHANNEL_PORT_LISTENER 2 /* Listening on a port. */ #define SSH_CHANNEL_OPENING 3 /* waiting for confirmation */ #define SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN 4 /* normal open two-way channel */ #define SSH_CHANNEL_CLOSED 5 /* waiting for close confirmation */ #define SSH_CHANNEL_AUTH_SOCKET 6 /* authentication socket */ #define SSH_CHANNEL_X11_OPEN 7 /* reading first X11 packet */ #define SSH_CHANNEL_LARVAL 10 /* larval session */ #define SSH_CHANNEL_RPORT_LISTENER 11 /* Listening to a R-style port */ #define SSH_CHANNEL_CONNECTING 12 #define SSH_CHANNEL_DYNAMIC 13 #define SSH_CHANNEL_ZOMBIE 14 /* Almost dead. */ #define SSH_CHANNEL_MUX_LISTENER 15 /* Listener for mux conn. */ #define SSH_CHANNEL_MUX_CLIENT 16 /* Conn. to mux client */ #define SSH_CHANNEL_ABANDONED 17 /* Abandoned session, eg mux */ #define SSH_CHANNEL_UNIX_LISTENER 18 /* Listening on a domain socket. */ #define SSH_CHANNEL_RUNIX_LISTENER 19 /* Listening to a R-style domain socket. */ #define SSH_CHANNEL_MUX_PROXY 20 /* proxy channel for mux-client */ #define SSH_CHANNEL_RDYNAMIC_OPEN 21 /* reverse SOCKS, parsing request */ #define SSH_CHANNEL_RDYNAMIC_FINISH 22 /* reverse SOCKS, finishing connect */ #define SSH_CHANNEL_MAX_TYPE 23 #define CHANNEL_CANCEL_PORT_STATIC -1 /* nonblocking flags for channel_new */ #define CHANNEL_NONBLOCK_LEAVE 0 /* don't modify non-blocking state */ #define CHANNEL_NONBLOCK_SET 1 /* set non-blocking state */ #define CHANNEL_NONBLOCK_STDIO 2 /* set non-blocking and restore on close */ /* c->restore_block mask flags */ #define CHANNEL_RESTORE_RFD 0x01 #define CHANNEL_RESTORE_WFD 0x02 #define CHANNEL_RESTORE_EFD 0x04 /* TCP forwarding */ #define FORWARD_DENY 0 #define FORWARD_REMOTE (1) #define FORWARD_LOCAL (1<<1) #define FORWARD_ALLOW (FORWARD_REMOTE|FORWARD_LOCAL) #define FORWARD_ADM 0x100 #define FORWARD_USER 0x101 struct ssh; struct Channel; typedef struct Channel Channel; struct fwd_perm_list; typedef void channel_open_fn(struct ssh *, int, int, void *); typedef void channel_callback_fn(struct ssh *, int, int, void *); typedef int channel_infilter_fn(struct ssh *, struct Channel *, char *, int); typedef void channel_filter_cleanup_fn(struct ssh *, int, void *); typedef u_char *channel_outfilter_fn(struct ssh *, struct Channel *, u_char **, size_t *); /* Channel success/failure callbacks */ typedef void channel_confirm_cb(struct ssh *, int, struct Channel *, void *); typedef void channel_confirm_abandon_cb(struct ssh *, struct Channel *, void *); struct channel_confirm { TAILQ_ENTRY(channel_confirm) entry; channel_confirm_cb *cb; channel_confirm_abandon_cb *abandon_cb; void *ctx; }; TAILQ_HEAD(channel_confirms, channel_confirm); /* Context for non-blocking connects */ struct channel_connect { char *host; int port; struct addrinfo *ai, *aitop; }; /* Callbacks for mux channels back into client-specific code */ typedef int mux_callback_fn(struct ssh *, struct Channel *); /* * NB. channel IDs on the wire and in c->remote_id are uint32, but local * channel IDs (e.g. c->self) only ever use the int32 subset of this range, * because we use local channel ID -1 for housekeeping. Remote channels have * a dedicated "have_remote_id" flag to indicate their validity. */ struct Channel { int type; /* channel type/state */ int self; /* my own channel identifier */ uint32_t remote_id; /* channel identifier for remote peer */ int have_remote_id; /* non-zero if remote_id is valid */ u_int istate; /* input from channel (state of receive half) */ u_int ostate; /* output to channel (state of transmit half) */ int flags; /* close sent/rcvd */ int rfd; /* read fd */ int wfd; /* write fd */ int efd; /* extended fd */ int sock; /* sock fd */ u_int io_want; /* bitmask of SSH_CHAN_IO_* */ u_int io_ready; /* bitmask of SSH_CHAN_IO_* */ int pfds[4]; /* pollfd entries for rfd/wfd/efd/sock */ int ctl_chan; /* control channel (multiplexed connections) */ int isatty; /* rfd is a tty */ #ifdef _AIX int wfd_isatty; /* wfd is a tty */ #endif int client_tty; /* (client) TTY has been requested */ int force_drain; /* force close on iEOF */ time_t notbefore; /* Pause IO until deadline (time_t) */ int delayed; /* post-IO handlers for newly created * channels are delayed until the first call * to a matching pre-IO handler. * this way post-IO handlers are not * accidentally called if a FD gets reused */ int restore_block; /* fd mask to restore blocking status */ int restore_flags[3];/* flags to restore */ struct sshbuf *input; /* data read from socket, to be sent over * encrypted connection */ struct sshbuf *output; /* data received over encrypted connection for * send on socket */ struct sshbuf *extended; char *path; /* path for unix domain sockets, or host name for forwards */ int listening_port; /* port being listened for forwards */ char *listening_addr; /* addr being listened for forwards */ int host_port; /* remote port to connect for forwards */ char *remote_name; /* remote hostname */ u_int remote_window; u_int remote_maxpacket; u_int local_window; u_int local_window_max; u_int local_consumed; u_int local_maxpacket; int extended_usage; int single_connection; char *ctype; /* const type - NB. not freed on channel_free */ char *xctype; /* extended type */ /* callback */ channel_open_fn *open_confirm; void *open_confirm_ctx; channel_callback_fn *detach_user; int detach_close; struct channel_confirms status_confirms; /* filter */ channel_infilter_fn *input_filter; channel_outfilter_fn *output_filter; void *filter_ctx; channel_filter_cleanup_fn *filter_cleanup; /* keep boundaries */ int datagram; /* non-blocking connect */ /* XXX make this a pointer so the structure can be opaque */ struct channel_connect connect_ctx; /* multiplexing protocol hook, called for each packet received */ mux_callback_fn *mux_rcb; void *mux_ctx; int mux_pause; int mux_downstream_id; /* Inactivity timeouts */ /* Last traffic seen for OPEN channels */ time_t lastused; /* Inactivity timeout deadline in seconds (0 = no timeout) */ u_int inactive_deadline; }; #define CHAN_EXTENDED_IGNORE 0 #define CHAN_EXTENDED_READ 1 #define CHAN_EXTENDED_WRITE 2 /* default window/packet sizes for tcp/x11-fwd-channel */ #define CHAN_SES_PACKET_DEFAULT (32*1024) #define CHAN_SES_WINDOW_DEFAULT (64*CHAN_SES_PACKET_DEFAULT) #define CHAN_TCP_PACKET_DEFAULT (32*1024) #define CHAN_TCP_WINDOW_DEFAULT (64*CHAN_TCP_PACKET_DEFAULT) #define CHAN_X11_PACKET_DEFAULT (16*1024) #define CHAN_X11_WINDOW_DEFAULT (4*CHAN_X11_PACKET_DEFAULT) /* possible input states */ #define CHAN_INPUT_OPEN 0 #define CHAN_INPUT_WAIT_DRAIN 1 #define CHAN_INPUT_WAIT_OCLOSE 2 #define CHAN_INPUT_CLOSED 3 /* possible output states */ #define CHAN_OUTPUT_OPEN 0 #define CHAN_OUTPUT_WAIT_DRAIN 1 #define CHAN_OUTPUT_WAIT_IEOF 2 #define CHAN_OUTPUT_CLOSED 3 #define CHAN_CLOSE_SENT 0x01 #define CHAN_CLOSE_RCVD 0x02 #define CHAN_EOF_SENT 0x04 #define CHAN_EOF_RCVD 0x08 #define CHAN_LOCAL 0x10 /* file descriptor events */ #define SSH_CHAN_IO_RFD 0x01 #define SSH_CHAN_IO_WFD 0x02 #define SSH_CHAN_IO_EFD_R 0x04 #define SSH_CHAN_IO_EFD_W 0x08 #define SSH_CHAN_IO_EFD (SSH_CHAN_IO_EFD_R|SSH_CHAN_IO_EFD_W) #define SSH_CHAN_IO_SOCK_R 0x10 #define SSH_CHAN_IO_SOCK_W 0x20 #define SSH_CHAN_IO_SOCK (SSH_CHAN_IO_SOCK_R|SSH_CHAN_IO_SOCK_W) /* Read buffer size */ #define CHAN_RBUF (16*1024) /* Maximum size for direct reads to buffers */ #define CHANNEL_MAX_READ CHAN_SES_PACKET_DEFAULT /* Maximum channel input buffer size */ #define CHAN_INPUT_MAX (16*1024*1024) /* Hard limit on number of channels */ #define CHANNELS_MAX_CHANNELS (16*1024) /* check whether 'efd' is still in use */ #define CHANNEL_EFD_INPUT_ACTIVE(c) \ (c->extended_usage == CHAN_EXTENDED_READ && \ (c->efd != -1 || \ sshbuf_len(c->extended) > 0)) #define CHANNEL_EFD_OUTPUT_ACTIVE(c) \ (c->extended_usage == CHAN_EXTENDED_WRITE && \ c->efd != -1 && (!(c->flags & (CHAN_EOF_RCVD|CHAN_CLOSE_RCVD)) || \ sshbuf_len(c->extended) > 0)) /* Add channel management structures to SSH transport instance */ void channel_init_channels(struct ssh *ssh); /* channel management */ Channel *channel_by_id(struct ssh *, int); Channel *channel_by_remote_id(struct ssh *, u_int); Channel *channel_lookup(struct ssh *, int); Channel *channel_new(struct ssh *, char *, int, int, int, int, u_int, u_int, int, const char *, int); void channel_set_fds(struct ssh *, int, int, int, int, int, int, int, u_int); void channel_free(struct ssh *, Channel *); void channel_free_all(struct ssh *); void channel_stop_listening(struct ssh *); void channel_force_close(struct ssh *, Channel *, int); void channel_set_xtype(struct ssh *, int, const char *); void channel_send_open(struct ssh *, int); void channel_request_start(struct ssh *, int, char *, int); void channel_register_cleanup(struct ssh *, int, channel_callback_fn *, int); void channel_register_open_confirm(struct ssh *, int, channel_open_fn *, void *); void channel_register_filter(struct ssh *, int, channel_infilter_fn *, channel_outfilter_fn *, channel_filter_cleanup_fn *, void *); void channel_register_status_confirm(struct ssh *, int, channel_confirm_cb *, channel_confirm_abandon_cb *, void *); void channel_cancel_cleanup(struct ssh *, int); int channel_close_fd(struct ssh *, Channel *, int *); void channel_send_window_changes(struct ssh *); /* channel inactivity timeouts */ void channel_add_timeout(struct ssh *, const char *, u_int); void channel_clear_timeouts(struct ssh *); /* mux proxy support */ int channel_proxy_downstream(struct ssh *, Channel *mc); int channel_proxy_upstream(Channel *, int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *); /* protocol handler */ int channel_input_data(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *); int channel_input_extended_data(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *); int channel_input_ieof(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *); int channel_input_oclose(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *); int channel_input_open_confirmation(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *); int channel_input_open_failure(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *); int channel_input_port_open(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *); int channel_input_window_adjust(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *); int channel_input_status_confirm(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *); /* file descriptor handling (read/write) */ struct pollfd; struct timespec; void channel_prepare_poll(struct ssh *, struct pollfd **, u_int *, u_int *, u_int, struct timespec *); void channel_after_poll(struct ssh *, struct pollfd *, u_int); void channel_output_poll(struct ssh *); int channel_not_very_much_buffered_data(struct ssh *); void channel_close_all(struct ssh *); int channel_still_open(struct ssh *); const char *channel_format_extended_usage(const Channel *); char *channel_open_message(struct ssh *); int channel_find_open(struct ssh *); /* tcp forwarding */ struct Forward; struct ForwardOptions; void channel_set_af(struct ssh *, int af); void channel_permit_all(struct ssh *, int); void channel_add_permission(struct ssh *, int, int, char *, int); void channel_clear_permission(struct ssh *, int, int); void channel_disable_admin(struct ssh *, int); void channel_update_permission(struct ssh *, int, int); Channel *channel_connect_to_port(struct ssh *, const char *, u_short, char *, char *, int *, const char **); Channel *channel_connect_to_path(struct ssh *, const char *, char *, char *); Channel *channel_connect_stdio_fwd(struct ssh *, const char*, u_short, int, int, int); Channel *channel_connect_by_listen_address(struct ssh *, const char *, u_short, char *, char *); Channel *channel_connect_by_listen_path(struct ssh *, const char *, char *, char *); int channel_request_remote_forwarding(struct ssh *, struct Forward *); int channel_setup_local_fwd_listener(struct ssh *, struct Forward *, struct ForwardOptions *); int channel_request_rforward_cancel(struct ssh *, struct Forward *); int channel_setup_remote_fwd_listener(struct ssh *, struct Forward *, int *, struct ForwardOptions *); int channel_cancel_rport_listener(struct ssh *, struct Forward *); int channel_cancel_lport_listener(struct ssh *, struct Forward *, int, struct ForwardOptions *); int permitopen_port(const char *); /* x11 forwarding */ -void channel_set_x11_refuse_time(struct ssh *, u_int); +void channel_set_x11_refuse_time(struct ssh *, time_t); int x11_connect_display(struct ssh *); int x11_create_display_inet(struct ssh *, int, int, int, u_int *, int **); void x11_request_forwarding_with_spoofing(struct ssh *, int, const char *, const char *, const char *, int); /* channel close */ int chan_is_dead(struct ssh *, Channel *, int); void chan_mark_dead(struct ssh *, Channel *); /* channel events */ void chan_rcvd_oclose(struct ssh *, Channel *); void chan_rcvd_eow(struct ssh *, Channel *); void chan_read_failed(struct ssh *, Channel *); void chan_ibuf_empty(struct ssh *, Channel *); void chan_rcvd_ieof(struct ssh *, Channel *); void chan_write_failed(struct ssh *, Channel *); void chan_obuf_empty(struct ssh *, Channel *); #endif diff --git a/crypto/openssh/clientloop.c b/crypto/openssh/clientloop.c index fef9efc6cc3a..3fb72fb2fd7e 100644 --- a/crypto/openssh/clientloop.c +++ b/crypto/openssh/clientloop.c @@ -1,2698 +1,2696 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: clientloop.c,v 1.387 2023/01/06 02:39:59 djm Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: clientloop.c,v 1.390 2023/03/08 04:43:12 guenther Exp $ */ /* * Author: Tatu Ylonen * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen , Espoo, Finland * All rights reserved * The main loop for the interactive session (client side). * * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell". * * * Copyright (c) 1999 Theo de Raadt. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. * * * SSH2 support added by Markus Friedl. * Copyright (c) 1999, 2000, 2001 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. */ #include "includes.h" #include #include #ifdef HAVE_SYS_STAT_H # include #endif #ifdef HAVE_SYS_TIME_H # include #endif #include #include #include #ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H #include #endif #ifdef HAVE_POLL_H #include #endif #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h" #include "xmalloc.h" #include "ssh.h" #include "ssh2.h" #include "packet.h" #include "sshbuf.h" #include "compat.h" #include "channels.h" #include "dispatch.h" #include "sshkey.h" #include "cipher.h" #include "kex.h" #include "myproposal.h" #include "log.h" #include "misc.h" #include "readconf.h" #include "clientloop.h" #include "sshconnect.h" #include "authfd.h" #include "atomicio.h" #include "sshpty.h" #include "match.h" #include "msg.h" #include "ssherr.h" #include "hostfile.h" /* Permitted RSA signature algorithms for UpdateHostkeys proofs */ #define HOSTKEY_PROOF_RSA_ALGS "rsa-sha2-512,rsa-sha2-256" /* import options */ extern Options options; /* Control socket */ extern int muxserver_sock; /* XXX use mux_client_cleanup() instead */ /* * Name of the host we are connecting to. This is the name given on the * command line, or the Hostname specified for the user-supplied name in a * configuration file. */ extern char *host; /* * If this field is not NULL, the ForwardAgent socket is this path and different * instead of SSH_AUTH_SOCK. */ extern char *forward_agent_sock_path; /* * Flag to indicate that we have received a window change signal which has * not yet been processed. This will cause a message indicating the new * window size to be sent to the server a little later. This is volatile * because this is updated in a signal handler. */ static volatile sig_atomic_t received_window_change_signal = 0; static volatile sig_atomic_t received_signal = 0; /* Time when backgrounded control master using ControlPersist should exit */ static time_t control_persist_exit_time = 0; /* Common data for the client loop code. */ volatile sig_atomic_t quit_pending; /* Set non-zero to quit the loop. */ static int last_was_cr; /* Last character was a newline. */ static int exit_status; /* Used to store the command exit status. */ static struct sshbuf *stderr_buffer; /* Used for final exit message. */ static int connection_in; /* Connection to server (input). */ static int connection_out; /* Connection to server (output). */ static int need_rekeying; /* Set to non-zero if rekeying is requested. */ static int session_closed; /* In SSH2: login session closed. */ -static u_int x11_refuse_time; /* If >0, refuse x11 opens after this time. */ +static time_t x11_refuse_time; /* If >0, refuse x11 opens after this time. */ static time_t server_alive_time; /* Time to do server_alive_check */ static int hostkeys_update_complete; static int session_setup_complete; static void client_init_dispatch(struct ssh *ssh); int session_ident = -1; /* Track escape per proto2 channel */ struct escape_filter_ctx { int escape_pending; int escape_char; }; /* Context for channel confirmation replies */ struct channel_reply_ctx { const char *request_type; int id; enum confirm_action action; }; /* Global request success/failure callbacks */ /* XXX move to struct ssh? */ struct global_confirm { TAILQ_ENTRY(global_confirm) entry; global_confirm_cb *cb; void *ctx; int ref_count; }; TAILQ_HEAD(global_confirms, global_confirm); static struct global_confirms global_confirms = TAILQ_HEAD_INITIALIZER(global_confirms); void ssh_process_session2_setup(int, int, int, struct sshbuf *); static void quit_message(const char *fmt, ...) __attribute__((__format__ (printf, 1, 2))); static void quit_message(const char *fmt, ...) { char *msg; va_list args; int r; va_start(args, fmt); xvasprintf(&msg, fmt, args); va_end(args); if ((r = sshbuf_putf(stderr_buffer, "%s\r\n", msg)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "sshbuf_putf"); quit_pending = 1; } /* * Signal handler for the window change signal (SIGWINCH). This just sets a * flag indicating that the window has changed. */ -/*ARGSUSED */ static void window_change_handler(int sig) { received_window_change_signal = 1; } /* * Signal handler for signals that cause the program to terminate. These * signals must be trapped to restore terminal modes. */ -/*ARGSUSED */ static void signal_handler(int sig) { received_signal = sig; quit_pending = 1; } /* * Sets control_persist_exit_time to the absolute time when the * backgrounded control master should exit due to expiry of the * ControlPersist timeout. Sets it to 0 if we are not a backgrounded * control master process, or if there is no ControlPersist timeout. */ static void set_control_persist_exit_time(struct ssh *ssh) { if (muxserver_sock == -1 || !options.control_persist || options.control_persist_timeout == 0) { /* not using a ControlPersist timeout */ control_persist_exit_time = 0; } else if (channel_still_open(ssh)) { /* some client connections are still open */ if (control_persist_exit_time > 0) debug2_f("cancel scheduled exit"); control_persist_exit_time = 0; } else if (control_persist_exit_time <= 0) { /* a client connection has recently closed */ control_persist_exit_time = monotime() + (time_t)options.control_persist_timeout; debug2_f("schedule exit in %d seconds", options.control_persist_timeout); } /* else we are already counting down to the timeout */ } #define SSH_X11_VALID_DISPLAY_CHARS ":/.-_" static int client_x11_display_valid(const char *display) { size_t i, dlen; if (display == NULL) return 0; dlen = strlen(display); for (i = 0; i < dlen; i++) { if (!isalnum((u_char)display[i]) && strchr(SSH_X11_VALID_DISPLAY_CHARS, display[i]) == NULL) { debug("Invalid character '%c' in DISPLAY", display[i]); return 0; } } return 1; } #define SSH_X11_PROTO "MIT-MAGIC-COOKIE-1" #define X11_TIMEOUT_SLACK 60 int client_x11_get_proto(struct ssh *ssh, const char *display, const char *xauth_path, u_int trusted, u_int timeout, char **_proto, char **_data) { char *cmd, line[512], xdisplay[512]; char xauthfile[PATH_MAX], xauthdir[PATH_MAX]; static char proto[512], data[512]; FILE *f; int got_data = 0, generated = 0, do_unlink = 0, r; struct stat st; u_int now, x11_timeout_real; *_proto = proto; *_data = data; proto[0] = data[0] = xauthfile[0] = xauthdir[0] = '\0'; if (!client_x11_display_valid(display)) { if (display != NULL) logit("DISPLAY \"%s\" invalid; disabling X11 forwarding", display); return -1; } if (xauth_path != NULL && stat(xauth_path, &st) == -1) { debug("No xauth program."); xauth_path = NULL; } if (xauth_path != NULL) { /* * Handle FamilyLocal case where $DISPLAY does * not match an authorization entry. For this we * just try "xauth list unix:displaynum.screennum". * XXX: "localhost" match to determine FamilyLocal * is not perfect. */ if (strncmp(display, "localhost:", 10) == 0) { if ((r = snprintf(xdisplay, sizeof(xdisplay), "unix:%s", display + 10)) < 0 || (size_t)r >= sizeof(xdisplay)) { error_f("display name too long"); return -1; } display = xdisplay; } if (trusted == 0) { /* * Generate an untrusted X11 auth cookie. * * The authentication cookie should briefly outlive * ssh's willingness to forward X11 connections to * avoid nasty fail-open behaviour in the X server. */ mktemp_proto(xauthdir, sizeof(xauthdir)); if (mkdtemp(xauthdir) == NULL) { error_f("mkdtemp: %s", strerror(errno)); return -1; } do_unlink = 1; if ((r = snprintf(xauthfile, sizeof(xauthfile), "%s/xauthfile", xauthdir)) < 0 || (size_t)r >= sizeof(xauthfile)) { error_f("xauthfile path too long"); rmdir(xauthdir); return -1; } if (timeout == 0) { /* auth doesn't time out */ xasprintf(&cmd, "%s -f %s generate %s %s " "untrusted 2>%s", xauth_path, xauthfile, display, SSH_X11_PROTO, _PATH_DEVNULL); } else { /* Add some slack to requested expiry */ if (timeout < UINT_MAX - X11_TIMEOUT_SLACK) x11_timeout_real = timeout + X11_TIMEOUT_SLACK; else { /* Don't overflow on long timeouts */ x11_timeout_real = UINT_MAX; } xasprintf(&cmd, "%s -f %s generate %s %s " "untrusted timeout %u 2>%s", xauth_path, xauthfile, display, SSH_X11_PROTO, x11_timeout_real, _PATH_DEVNULL); } debug2_f("xauth command: %s", cmd); if (timeout != 0 && x11_refuse_time == 0) { now = monotime() + 1; - if (UINT_MAX - timeout < now) - x11_refuse_time = UINT_MAX; + if (SSH_TIME_T_MAX - timeout < now) + x11_refuse_time = SSH_TIME_T_MAX; else x11_refuse_time = now + timeout; channel_set_x11_refuse_time(ssh, x11_refuse_time); } if (system(cmd) == 0) generated = 1; free(cmd); } /* * When in untrusted mode, we read the cookie only if it was * successfully generated as an untrusted one in the step * above. */ if (trusted || generated) { xasprintf(&cmd, "%s %s%s list %s 2>" _PATH_DEVNULL, xauth_path, generated ? "-f " : "" , generated ? xauthfile : "", display); debug2("x11_get_proto: %s", cmd); f = popen(cmd, "r"); if (f && fgets(line, sizeof(line), f) && sscanf(line, "%*s %511s %511s", proto, data) == 2) got_data = 1; if (f) pclose(f); free(cmd); } } if (do_unlink) { unlink(xauthfile); rmdir(xauthdir); } /* Don't fall back to fake X11 data for untrusted forwarding */ if (!trusted && !got_data) { error("Warning: untrusted X11 forwarding setup failed: " "xauth key data not generated"); return -1; } /* * If we didn't get authentication data, just make up some * data. The forwarding code will check the validity of the * response anyway, and substitute this data. The X11 * server, however, will ignore this fake data and use * whatever authentication mechanisms it was using otherwise * for the local connection. */ if (!got_data) { u_int8_t rnd[16]; u_int i; logit("Warning: No xauth data; " "using fake authentication data for X11 forwarding."); strlcpy(proto, SSH_X11_PROTO, sizeof proto); arc4random_buf(rnd, sizeof(rnd)); for (i = 0; i < sizeof(rnd); i++) { snprintf(data + 2 * i, sizeof data - 2 * i, "%02x", rnd[i]); } } return 0; } /* * Checks if the client window has changed, and sends a packet about it to * the server if so. The actual change is detected elsewhere (by a software * interrupt on Unix); this just checks the flag and sends a message if * appropriate. */ static void client_check_window_change(struct ssh *ssh) { if (!received_window_change_signal) return; received_window_change_signal = 0; debug2_f("changed"); channel_send_window_changes(ssh); } static int client_global_request_reply(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh) { struct global_confirm *gc; if ((gc = TAILQ_FIRST(&global_confirms)) == NULL) return 0; if (gc->cb != NULL) gc->cb(ssh, type, seq, gc->ctx); if (--gc->ref_count <= 0) { TAILQ_REMOVE(&global_confirms, gc, entry); freezero(gc, sizeof(*gc)); } ssh_packet_set_alive_timeouts(ssh, 0); return 0; } static void schedule_server_alive_check(void) { if (options.server_alive_interval > 0) server_alive_time = monotime() + options.server_alive_interval; } static void server_alive_check(struct ssh *ssh) { int r; if (ssh_packet_inc_alive_timeouts(ssh) > options.server_alive_count_max) { logit("Timeout, server %s not responding.", host); cleanup_exit(255); } if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_GLOBAL_REQUEST)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, "keepalive@openssh.com")) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_u8(ssh, 1)) != 0 || /* boolean: want reply */ (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "send packet"); /* Insert an empty placeholder to maintain ordering */ client_register_global_confirm(NULL, NULL); schedule_server_alive_check(); } /* * Waits until the client can do something (some data becomes available on * one of the file descriptors). */ static void client_wait_until_can_do_something(struct ssh *ssh, struct pollfd **pfdp, u_int *npfd_allocp, u_int *npfd_activep, int rekeying, int *conn_in_readyp, int *conn_out_readyp) { struct timespec timeout; int ret; u_int p; *conn_in_readyp = *conn_out_readyp = 0; /* Prepare channel poll. First two pollfd entries are reserved */ ptimeout_init(&timeout); channel_prepare_poll(ssh, pfdp, npfd_allocp, npfd_activep, 2, &timeout); if (*npfd_activep < 2) fatal_f("bad npfd %u", *npfd_activep); /* shouldn't happen */ /* channel_prepare_poll could have closed the last channel */ if (session_closed && !channel_still_open(ssh) && !ssh_packet_have_data_to_write(ssh)) { /* clear events since we did not call poll() */ for (p = 0; p < *npfd_activep; p++) (*pfdp)[p].revents = 0; return; } /* Monitor server connection on reserved pollfd entries */ (*pfdp)[0].fd = connection_in; (*pfdp)[0].events = POLLIN; (*pfdp)[1].fd = connection_out; (*pfdp)[1].events = ssh_packet_have_data_to_write(ssh) ? POLLOUT : 0; /* * Wait for something to happen. This will suspend the process until * some polled descriptor can be read, written, or has some other * event pending, or a timeout expires. */ set_control_persist_exit_time(ssh); if (control_persist_exit_time > 0) ptimeout_deadline_monotime(&timeout, control_persist_exit_time); if (options.server_alive_interval > 0) ptimeout_deadline_monotime(&timeout, server_alive_time); if (options.rekey_interval > 0 && !rekeying) { ptimeout_deadline_sec(&timeout, ssh_packet_get_rekey_timeout(ssh)); } ret = poll(*pfdp, *npfd_activep, ptimeout_get_ms(&timeout)); if (ret == -1) { /* * We have to clear the events because we return. * We have to return, because the mainloop checks for the flags * set by the signal handlers. */ for (p = 0; p < *npfd_activep; p++) (*pfdp)[p].revents = 0; if (errno == EINTR) return; /* Note: we might still have data in the buffers. */ quit_message("poll: %s", strerror(errno)); return; } *conn_in_readyp = (*pfdp)[0].revents != 0; *conn_out_readyp = (*pfdp)[1].revents != 0; if (options.server_alive_interval > 0 && !*conn_in_readyp && monotime() >= server_alive_time) { /* * ServerAlive check is needed. We can't rely on the poll * timing out since traffic on the client side such as port * forwards can keep waking it up. */ server_alive_check(ssh); } } static void client_suspend_self(struct sshbuf *bin, struct sshbuf *bout, struct sshbuf *berr) { /* Flush stdout and stderr buffers. */ if (sshbuf_len(bout) > 0) atomicio(vwrite, fileno(stdout), sshbuf_mutable_ptr(bout), sshbuf_len(bout)); if (sshbuf_len(berr) > 0) atomicio(vwrite, fileno(stderr), sshbuf_mutable_ptr(berr), sshbuf_len(berr)); leave_raw_mode(options.request_tty == REQUEST_TTY_FORCE); sshbuf_reset(bin); sshbuf_reset(bout); sshbuf_reset(berr); /* Send the suspend signal to the program itself. */ kill(getpid(), SIGTSTP); /* Reset window sizes in case they have changed */ received_window_change_signal = 1; enter_raw_mode(options.request_tty == REQUEST_TTY_FORCE); } static void client_process_net_input(struct ssh *ssh) { int r; /* * Read input from the server, and add any such data to the buffer of * the packet subsystem. */ schedule_server_alive_check(); if ((r = ssh_packet_process_read(ssh, connection_in)) == 0) return; /* success */ if (r == SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR) { if (errno == EAGAIN || errno == EINTR || errno == EWOULDBLOCK) return; if (errno == EPIPE) { quit_message("Connection to %s closed by remote host.", host); return; } } quit_message("Read from remote host %s: %s", host, ssh_err(r)); } static void client_status_confirm(struct ssh *ssh, int type, Channel *c, void *ctx) { struct channel_reply_ctx *cr = (struct channel_reply_ctx *)ctx; char errmsg[256]; int r, tochan; /* * If a TTY was explicitly requested, then a failure to allocate * one is fatal. */ if (cr->action == CONFIRM_TTY && (options.request_tty == REQUEST_TTY_FORCE || options.request_tty == REQUEST_TTY_YES)) cr->action = CONFIRM_CLOSE; /* XXX suppress on mux _client_ quietmode */ tochan = options.log_level >= SYSLOG_LEVEL_ERROR && c->ctl_chan != -1 && c->extended_usage == CHAN_EXTENDED_WRITE; if (type == SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_SUCCESS) { debug2("%s request accepted on channel %d", cr->request_type, c->self); } else if (type == SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_FAILURE) { if (tochan) { snprintf(errmsg, sizeof(errmsg), "%s request failed\r\n", cr->request_type); } else { snprintf(errmsg, sizeof(errmsg), "%s request failed on channel %d", cr->request_type, c->self); } /* If error occurred on primary session channel, then exit */ if (cr->action == CONFIRM_CLOSE && c->self == session_ident) fatal("%s", errmsg); /* * If error occurred on mux client, append to * their stderr. */ if (tochan) { debug3_f("channel %d: mux request: %s", c->self, cr->request_type); if ((r = sshbuf_put(c->extended, errmsg, strlen(errmsg))) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "sshbuf_put"); } else error("%s", errmsg); if (cr->action == CONFIRM_TTY) { /* * If a TTY allocation error occurred, then arrange * for the correct TTY to leave raw mode. */ if (c->self == session_ident) leave_raw_mode(0); else mux_tty_alloc_failed(ssh, c); } else if (cr->action == CONFIRM_CLOSE) { chan_read_failed(ssh, c); chan_write_failed(ssh, c); } } free(cr); } static void client_abandon_status_confirm(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c, void *ctx) { free(ctx); } void client_expect_confirm(struct ssh *ssh, int id, const char *request, enum confirm_action action) { struct channel_reply_ctx *cr = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*cr)); cr->request_type = request; cr->action = action; channel_register_status_confirm(ssh, id, client_status_confirm, client_abandon_status_confirm, cr); } void client_register_global_confirm(global_confirm_cb *cb, void *ctx) { struct global_confirm *gc, *last_gc; /* Coalesce identical callbacks */ last_gc = TAILQ_LAST(&global_confirms, global_confirms); if (last_gc && last_gc->cb == cb && last_gc->ctx == ctx) { if (++last_gc->ref_count >= INT_MAX) fatal_f("last_gc->ref_count = %d", last_gc->ref_count); return; } gc = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*gc)); gc->cb = cb; gc->ctx = ctx; gc->ref_count = 1; TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(&global_confirms, gc, entry); } /* * Returns non-zero if the client is able to handle a hostkeys-00@openssh.com * hostkey update request. */ static int can_update_hostkeys(void) { if (hostkeys_update_complete) return 0; if (options.update_hostkeys == SSH_UPDATE_HOSTKEYS_ASK && options.batch_mode) return 0; /* won't ask in batchmode, so don't even try */ if (!options.update_hostkeys || options.num_user_hostfiles <= 0) return 0; return 1; } static void client_repledge(void) { debug3_f("enter"); /* Might be able to tighten pledge now that session is established */ if (options.control_master || options.control_path != NULL || options.forward_x11 || options.fork_after_authentication || can_update_hostkeys() || (session_ident != -1 && !session_setup_complete)) { /* Can't tighten */ return; } /* * LocalCommand and UpdateHostkeys have finished, so can get rid of * filesystem. * * XXX protocol allows a server can to change hostkeys during the * connection at rekey time that could trigger a hostkeys update * but AFAIK no implementations support this. Could improve by * forcing known_hosts to be read-only or via unveil(2). */ if (options.num_local_forwards != 0 || options.num_remote_forwards != 0 || options.num_permitted_remote_opens != 0 || options.enable_escape_commandline != 0) { /* rfwd needs inet */ debug("pledge: network"); if (pledge("stdio unix inet dns proc tty", NULL) == -1) fatal_f("pledge(): %s", strerror(errno)); } else if (options.forward_agent != 0) { /* agent forwarding needs to open $SSH_AUTH_SOCK at will */ debug("pledge: agent"); if (pledge("stdio unix proc tty", NULL) == -1) fatal_f("pledge(): %s", strerror(errno)); } else { debug("pledge: fork"); if (pledge("stdio proc tty", NULL) == -1) fatal_f("pledge(): %s", strerror(errno)); } /* XXX further things to do: * * - might be able to get rid of proc if we kill ~^Z * - ssh -N (no session) * - stdio forwarding * - sessions without tty */ } static void process_cmdline(struct ssh *ssh) { void (*handler)(int); char *s, *cmd; int ok, delete = 0, local = 0, remote = 0, dynamic = 0; struct Forward fwd; memset(&fwd, 0, sizeof(fwd)); leave_raw_mode(options.request_tty == REQUEST_TTY_FORCE); handler = ssh_signal(SIGINT, SIG_IGN); cmd = s = read_passphrase("\r\nssh> ", RP_ECHO); if (s == NULL) goto out; while (isspace((u_char)*s)) s++; if (*s == '-') s++; /* Skip cmdline '-', if any */ if (*s == '\0') goto out; if (*s == 'h' || *s == 'H' || *s == '?') { logit("Commands:"); logit(" -L[bind_address:]port:host:hostport " "Request local forward"); logit(" -R[bind_address:]port:host:hostport " "Request remote forward"); logit(" -D[bind_address:]port " "Request dynamic forward"); logit(" -KL[bind_address:]port " "Cancel local forward"); logit(" -KR[bind_address:]port " "Cancel remote forward"); logit(" -KD[bind_address:]port " "Cancel dynamic forward"); if (!options.permit_local_command) goto out; logit(" !args " "Execute local command"); goto out; } if (*s == '!' && options.permit_local_command) { s++; ssh_local_cmd(s); goto out; } if (*s == 'K') { delete = 1; s++; } if (*s == 'L') local = 1; else if (*s == 'R') remote = 1; else if (*s == 'D') dynamic = 1; else { logit("Invalid command."); goto out; } while (isspace((u_char)*++s)) ; /* XXX update list of forwards in options */ if (delete) { /* We pass 1 for dynamicfwd to restrict to 1 or 2 fields. */ if (!parse_forward(&fwd, s, 1, 0)) { logit("Bad forwarding close specification."); goto out; } if (remote) ok = channel_request_rforward_cancel(ssh, &fwd) == 0; else if (dynamic) ok = channel_cancel_lport_listener(ssh, &fwd, 0, &options.fwd_opts) > 0; else ok = channel_cancel_lport_listener(ssh, &fwd, CHANNEL_CANCEL_PORT_STATIC, &options.fwd_opts) > 0; if (!ok) { logit("Unknown port forwarding."); goto out; } logit("Canceled forwarding."); } else { /* -R specs can be both dynamic or not, so check both. */ if (remote) { if (!parse_forward(&fwd, s, 0, remote) && !parse_forward(&fwd, s, 1, remote)) { logit("Bad remote forwarding specification."); goto out; } } else if (!parse_forward(&fwd, s, dynamic, remote)) { logit("Bad local forwarding specification."); goto out; } if (local || dynamic) { if (!channel_setup_local_fwd_listener(ssh, &fwd, &options.fwd_opts)) { logit("Port forwarding failed."); goto out; } } else { if (channel_request_remote_forwarding(ssh, &fwd) < 0) { logit("Port forwarding failed."); goto out; } } logit("Forwarding port."); } out: ssh_signal(SIGINT, handler); enter_raw_mode(options.request_tty == REQUEST_TTY_FORCE); free(cmd); free(fwd.listen_host); free(fwd.listen_path); free(fwd.connect_host); free(fwd.connect_path); } /* reasons to suppress output of an escape command in help output */ #define SUPPRESS_NEVER 0 /* never suppress, always show */ #define SUPPRESS_MUXCLIENT 1 /* don't show in mux client sessions */ #define SUPPRESS_MUXMASTER 2 /* don't show in mux master sessions */ #define SUPPRESS_SYSLOG 4 /* don't show when logging to syslog */ #define SUPPRESS_NOCMDLINE 8 /* don't show when cmdline disabled*/ struct escape_help_text { const char *cmd; const char *text; unsigned int flags; }; static struct escape_help_text esc_txt[] = { {".", "terminate session", SUPPRESS_MUXMASTER}, {".", "terminate connection (and any multiplexed sessions)", SUPPRESS_MUXCLIENT}, {"B", "send a BREAK to the remote system", SUPPRESS_NEVER}, {"C", "open a command line", SUPPRESS_MUXCLIENT|SUPPRESS_NOCMDLINE}, {"R", "request rekey", SUPPRESS_NEVER}, {"V/v", "decrease/increase verbosity (LogLevel)", SUPPRESS_MUXCLIENT}, {"^Z", "suspend ssh", SUPPRESS_MUXCLIENT}, {"#", "list forwarded connections", SUPPRESS_NEVER}, {"&", "background ssh (when waiting for connections to terminate)", SUPPRESS_MUXCLIENT}, {"?", "this message", SUPPRESS_NEVER}, }; static void print_escape_help(struct sshbuf *b, int escape_char, int mux_client, int using_stderr) { unsigned int i, suppress_flags; int r; if ((r = sshbuf_putf(b, "%c?\r\nSupported escape sequences:\r\n", escape_char)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "sshbuf_putf"); suppress_flags = (mux_client ? SUPPRESS_MUXCLIENT : 0) | (mux_client ? 0 : SUPPRESS_MUXMASTER) | (using_stderr ? 0 : SUPPRESS_SYSLOG) | (options.enable_escape_commandline == 0 ? SUPPRESS_NOCMDLINE : 0); for (i = 0; i < sizeof(esc_txt)/sizeof(esc_txt[0]); i++) { if (esc_txt[i].flags & suppress_flags) continue; if ((r = sshbuf_putf(b, " %c%-3s - %s\r\n", escape_char, esc_txt[i].cmd, esc_txt[i].text)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "sshbuf_putf"); } if ((r = sshbuf_putf(b, " %c%c - send the escape character by typing it twice\r\n" "(Note that escapes are only recognized immediately after " "newline.)\r\n", escape_char, escape_char)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "sshbuf_putf"); } /* * Process the characters one by one. */ static int process_escapes(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c, struct sshbuf *bin, struct sshbuf *bout, struct sshbuf *berr, char *buf, int len) { pid_t pid; int r, bytes = 0; u_int i; u_char ch; char *s; struct escape_filter_ctx *efc = c->filter_ctx == NULL ? NULL : (struct escape_filter_ctx *)c->filter_ctx; if (c->filter_ctx == NULL) return 0; if (len <= 0) return (0); for (i = 0; i < (u_int)len; i++) { /* Get one character at a time. */ ch = buf[i]; if (efc->escape_pending) { /* We have previously seen an escape character. */ /* Clear the flag now. */ efc->escape_pending = 0; /* Process the escaped character. */ switch (ch) { case '.': /* Terminate the connection. */ if ((r = sshbuf_putf(berr, "%c.\r\n", efc->escape_char)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "sshbuf_putf"); if (c && c->ctl_chan != -1) { channel_force_close(ssh, c, 1); return 0; } else quit_pending = 1; return -1; case 'Z' - 64: /* XXX support this for mux clients */ if (c && c->ctl_chan != -1) { char b[16]; noescape: if (ch == 'Z' - 64) snprintf(b, sizeof b, "^Z"); else snprintf(b, sizeof b, "%c", ch); if ((r = sshbuf_putf(berr, "%c%s escape not available to " "multiplexed sessions\r\n", efc->escape_char, b)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "sshbuf_putf"); continue; } /* Suspend the program. Inform the user */ if ((r = sshbuf_putf(berr, "%c^Z [suspend ssh]\r\n", efc->escape_char)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "sshbuf_putf"); /* Restore terminal modes and suspend. */ client_suspend_self(bin, bout, berr); /* We have been continued. */ continue; case 'B': if ((r = sshbuf_putf(berr, "%cB\r\n", efc->escape_char)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "sshbuf_putf"); channel_request_start(ssh, c->self, "break", 0); if ((r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, 1000)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "send packet"); continue; case 'R': if (ssh->compat & SSH_BUG_NOREKEY) logit("Server does not " "support re-keying"); else need_rekeying = 1; continue; case 'V': /* FALLTHROUGH */ case 'v': if (c && c->ctl_chan != -1) goto noescape; if (!log_is_on_stderr()) { if ((r = sshbuf_putf(berr, "%c%c [Logging to syslog]\r\n", efc->escape_char, ch)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "sshbuf_putf"); continue; } if (ch == 'V' && options.log_level > SYSLOG_LEVEL_QUIET) log_change_level(--options.log_level); if (ch == 'v' && options.log_level < SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG3) log_change_level(++options.log_level); if ((r = sshbuf_putf(berr, "%c%c [LogLevel %s]\r\n", efc->escape_char, ch, log_level_name(options.log_level))) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "sshbuf_putf"); continue; case '&': if (c && c->ctl_chan != -1) goto noescape; /* * Detach the program (continue to serve * connections, but put in background and no * more new connections). */ /* Restore tty modes. */ leave_raw_mode( options.request_tty == REQUEST_TTY_FORCE); /* Stop listening for new connections. */ channel_stop_listening(ssh); if ((r = sshbuf_putf(berr, "%c& " "[backgrounded]\n", efc->escape_char)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "sshbuf_putf"); /* Fork into background. */ pid = fork(); if (pid == -1) { error("fork: %.100s", strerror(errno)); continue; } if (pid != 0) { /* This is the parent. */ /* The parent just exits. */ exit(0); } /* The child continues serving connections. */ /* fake EOF on stdin */ if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(bin, 4)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "sshbuf_put_u8"); return -1; case '?': print_escape_help(berr, efc->escape_char, (c && c->ctl_chan != -1), log_is_on_stderr()); continue; case '#': if ((r = sshbuf_putf(berr, "%c#\r\n", efc->escape_char)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "sshbuf_putf"); s = channel_open_message(ssh); if ((r = sshbuf_put(berr, s, strlen(s))) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "sshbuf_put"); free(s); continue; case 'C': if (c && c->ctl_chan != -1) goto noescape; if (options.enable_escape_commandline == 0) { if ((r = sshbuf_putf(berr, "commandline disabled\r\n")) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "sshbuf_putf"); continue; } process_cmdline(ssh); continue; default: if (ch != efc->escape_char) { if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(bin, efc->escape_char)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "sshbuf_put_u8"); bytes++; } /* Escaped characters fall through here */ break; } } else { /* * The previous character was not an escape char. * Check if this is an escape. */ if (last_was_cr && ch == efc->escape_char) { /* * It is. Set the flag and continue to * next character. */ efc->escape_pending = 1; continue; } } /* * Normal character. Record whether it was a newline, * and append it to the buffer. */ last_was_cr = (ch == '\r' || ch == '\n'); if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(bin, ch)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "sshbuf_put_u8"); bytes++; } return bytes; } /* * Get packets from the connection input buffer, and process them as long as * there are packets available. * * Any unknown packets received during the actual * session cause the session to terminate. This is * intended to make debugging easier since no * confirmations are sent. Any compatible protocol * extensions must be negotiated during the * preparatory phase. */ static void client_process_buffered_input_packets(struct ssh *ssh) { ssh_dispatch_run_fatal(ssh, DISPATCH_NONBLOCK, &quit_pending); } /* scan buf[] for '~' before sending data to the peer */ /* Helper: allocate a new escape_filter_ctx and fill in its escape char */ void * client_new_escape_filter_ctx(int escape_char) { struct escape_filter_ctx *ret; ret = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*ret)); ret->escape_pending = 0; ret->escape_char = escape_char; return (void *)ret; } /* Free the escape filter context on channel free */ void client_filter_cleanup(struct ssh *ssh, int cid, void *ctx) { free(ctx); } int client_simple_escape_filter(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c, char *buf, int len) { if (c->extended_usage != CHAN_EXTENDED_WRITE) return 0; return process_escapes(ssh, c, c->input, c->output, c->extended, buf, len); } static void client_channel_closed(struct ssh *ssh, int id, int force, void *arg) { channel_cancel_cleanup(ssh, id); session_closed = 1; leave_raw_mode(options.request_tty == REQUEST_TTY_FORCE); } /* * Implements the interactive session with the server. This is called after * the user has been authenticated, and a command has been started on the * remote host. If escape_char != SSH_ESCAPECHAR_NONE, it is the character * used as an escape character for terminating or suspending the session. */ int client_loop(struct ssh *ssh, int have_pty, int escape_char_arg, int ssh2_chan_id) { struct pollfd *pfd = NULL; u_int npfd_alloc = 0, npfd_active = 0; double start_time, total_time; int r, len; u_int64_t ibytes, obytes; int conn_in_ready, conn_out_ready; debug("Entering interactive session."); session_ident = ssh2_chan_id; if (options.control_master && !option_clear_or_none(options.control_path)) { debug("pledge: id"); if (pledge("stdio rpath wpath cpath unix inet dns recvfd sendfd proc exec id tty", NULL) == -1) fatal_f("pledge(): %s", strerror(errno)); } else if (options.forward_x11 || options.permit_local_command) { debug("pledge: exec"); if (pledge("stdio rpath wpath cpath unix inet dns proc exec tty", NULL) == -1) fatal_f("pledge(): %s", strerror(errno)); } else if (options.update_hostkeys) { debug("pledge: filesystem"); if (pledge("stdio rpath wpath cpath unix inet dns proc tty", NULL) == -1) fatal_f("pledge(): %s", strerror(errno)); } else if (!option_clear_or_none(options.proxy_command) || options.fork_after_authentication) { debug("pledge: proc"); if (pledge("stdio cpath unix inet dns proc tty", NULL) == -1) fatal_f("pledge(): %s", strerror(errno)); } else { debug("pledge: network"); if (pledge("stdio unix inet dns proc tty", NULL) == -1) fatal_f("pledge(): %s", strerror(errno)); } /* might be able to tighten now */ client_repledge(); start_time = monotime_double(); /* Initialize variables. */ last_was_cr = 1; exit_status = -1; connection_in = ssh_packet_get_connection_in(ssh); connection_out = ssh_packet_get_connection_out(ssh); quit_pending = 0; /* Initialize buffer. */ if ((stderr_buffer = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed"); client_init_dispatch(ssh); /* * Set signal handlers, (e.g. to restore non-blocking mode) * but don't overwrite SIG_IGN, matches behaviour from rsh(1) */ if (ssh_signal(SIGHUP, SIG_IGN) != SIG_IGN) ssh_signal(SIGHUP, signal_handler); if (ssh_signal(SIGINT, SIG_IGN) != SIG_IGN) ssh_signal(SIGINT, signal_handler); if (ssh_signal(SIGQUIT, SIG_IGN) != SIG_IGN) ssh_signal(SIGQUIT, signal_handler); if (ssh_signal(SIGTERM, SIG_IGN) != SIG_IGN) ssh_signal(SIGTERM, signal_handler); ssh_signal(SIGWINCH, window_change_handler); if (have_pty) enter_raw_mode(options.request_tty == REQUEST_TTY_FORCE); if (session_ident != -1) { if (escape_char_arg != SSH_ESCAPECHAR_NONE) { channel_register_filter(ssh, session_ident, client_simple_escape_filter, NULL, client_filter_cleanup, client_new_escape_filter_ctx( escape_char_arg)); } channel_register_cleanup(ssh, session_ident, client_channel_closed, 0); } schedule_server_alive_check(); /* Main loop of the client for the interactive session mode. */ while (!quit_pending) { /* Process buffered packets sent by the server. */ client_process_buffered_input_packets(ssh); if (session_closed && !channel_still_open(ssh)) break; if (ssh_packet_is_rekeying(ssh)) { debug("rekeying in progress"); } else if (need_rekeying) { /* manual rekey request */ debug("need rekeying"); if ((r = kex_start_rekex(ssh)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "kex_start_rekex"); need_rekeying = 0; } else { /* * Make packets from buffered channel data, and * enqueue them for sending to the server. */ if (ssh_packet_not_very_much_data_to_write(ssh)) channel_output_poll(ssh); /* * Check if the window size has changed, and buffer a * message about it to the server if so. */ client_check_window_change(ssh); if (quit_pending) break; } /* * Wait until we have something to do (something becomes * available on one of the descriptors). */ client_wait_until_can_do_something(ssh, &pfd, &npfd_alloc, &npfd_active, ssh_packet_is_rekeying(ssh), &conn_in_ready, &conn_out_ready); if (quit_pending) break; /* Do channel operations. */ channel_after_poll(ssh, pfd, npfd_active); /* Buffer input from the connection. */ if (conn_in_ready) client_process_net_input(ssh); if (quit_pending) break; /* A timeout may have triggered rekeying */ if ((r = ssh_packet_check_rekey(ssh)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "cannot start rekeying"); /* * Send as much buffered packet data as possible to the * sender. */ if (conn_out_ready) { if ((r = ssh_packet_write_poll(ssh)) != 0) { sshpkt_fatal(ssh, r, "%s: ssh_packet_write_poll", __func__); } } /* * If we are a backgrounded control master, and the * timeout has expired without any active client * connections, then quit. */ if (control_persist_exit_time > 0) { if (monotime() >= control_persist_exit_time) { debug("ControlPersist timeout expired"); break; } } } free(pfd); /* Terminate the session. */ /* Stop watching for window change. */ ssh_signal(SIGWINCH, SIG_DFL); if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_DISCONNECT)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, SSH2_DISCONNECT_BY_APPLICATION)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, "disconnected by user")) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, "")) != 0 || /* language tag */ (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0 || (r = ssh_packet_write_wait(ssh)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "send disconnect"); channel_free_all(ssh); if (have_pty) leave_raw_mode(options.request_tty == REQUEST_TTY_FORCE); /* * If there was no shell or command requested, there will be no remote * exit status to be returned. In that case, clear error code if the * connection was deliberately terminated at this end. */ if (options.session_type == SESSION_TYPE_NONE && received_signal == SIGTERM) { received_signal = 0; exit_status = 0; } if (received_signal) { verbose("Killed by signal %d.", (int) received_signal); cleanup_exit(255); } /* * In interactive mode (with pseudo tty) display a message indicating * that the connection has been closed. */ if (have_pty && options.log_level >= SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO) quit_message("Connection to %s closed.", host); /* Output any buffered data for stderr. */ if (sshbuf_len(stderr_buffer) > 0) { len = atomicio(vwrite, fileno(stderr), (u_char *)sshbuf_ptr(stderr_buffer), sshbuf_len(stderr_buffer)); if (len < 0 || (u_int)len != sshbuf_len(stderr_buffer)) error("Write failed flushing stderr buffer."); else if ((r = sshbuf_consume(stderr_buffer, len)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "sshbuf_consume"); } /* Clear and free any buffers. */ sshbuf_free(stderr_buffer); /* Report bytes transferred, and transfer rates. */ total_time = monotime_double() - start_time; ssh_packet_get_bytes(ssh, &ibytes, &obytes); verbose("Transferred: sent %llu, received %llu bytes, in %.1f seconds", (unsigned long long)obytes, (unsigned long long)ibytes, total_time); if (total_time > 0) verbose("Bytes per second: sent %.1f, received %.1f", obytes / total_time, ibytes / total_time); /* Return the exit status of the program. */ debug("Exit status %d", exit_status); return exit_status; } /*********/ static Channel * client_request_forwarded_tcpip(struct ssh *ssh, const char *request_type, int rchan, u_int rwindow, u_int rmaxpack) { Channel *c = NULL; struct sshbuf *b = NULL; char *listen_address, *originator_address; u_int listen_port, originator_port; int r; /* Get rest of the packet */ if ((r = sshpkt_get_cstring(ssh, &listen_address, NULL)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &listen_port)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_get_cstring(ssh, &originator_address, NULL)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &originator_port)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "parse packet"); debug_f("listen %s port %d, originator %s port %d", listen_address, listen_port, originator_address, originator_port); if (listen_port > 0xffff) error_f("invalid listen port"); else if (originator_port > 0xffff) error_f("invalid originator port"); else { c = channel_connect_by_listen_address(ssh, listen_address, listen_port, "forwarded-tcpip", originator_address); } if (c != NULL && c->type == SSH_CHANNEL_MUX_CLIENT) { if ((b = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) { error_f("alloc reply"); goto out; } /* reconstruct and send to muxclient */ if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(b, 0)) != 0 || /* padlen */ (r = sshbuf_put_u8(b, SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, request_type)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u32(b, rchan)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u32(b, rwindow)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u32(b, rmaxpack)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, listen_address)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u32(b, listen_port)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, originator_address)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u32(b, originator_port)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_stringb(c->output, b)) != 0) { error_fr(r, "compose for muxclient"); goto out; } } out: sshbuf_free(b); free(originator_address); free(listen_address); return c; } static Channel * client_request_forwarded_streamlocal(struct ssh *ssh, const char *request_type, int rchan) { Channel *c = NULL; char *listen_path; int r; /* Get the remote path. */ if ((r = sshpkt_get_cstring(ssh, &listen_path, NULL)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_get_string(ssh, NULL, NULL)) != 0 || /* reserved */ (r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "parse packet"); debug_f("request: %s", listen_path); c = channel_connect_by_listen_path(ssh, listen_path, "forwarded-streamlocal@openssh.com", "forwarded-streamlocal"); free(listen_path); return c; } static Channel * client_request_x11(struct ssh *ssh, const char *request_type, int rchan) { Channel *c = NULL; char *originator; u_int originator_port; int r, sock; if (!options.forward_x11) { error("Warning: ssh server tried X11 forwarding."); error("Warning: this is probably a break-in attempt by a " "malicious server."); return NULL; } - if (x11_refuse_time != 0 && (u_int)monotime() >= x11_refuse_time) { + if (x11_refuse_time != 0 && monotime() >= x11_refuse_time) { verbose("Rejected X11 connection after ForwardX11Timeout " "expired"); return NULL; } if ((r = sshpkt_get_cstring(ssh, &originator, NULL)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &originator_port)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "parse packet"); /* XXX check permission */ /* XXX range check originator port? */ debug("client_request_x11: request from %s %u", originator, originator_port); free(originator); sock = x11_connect_display(ssh); if (sock < 0) return NULL; c = channel_new(ssh, "x11", SSH_CHANNEL_X11_OPEN, sock, sock, -1, CHAN_TCP_WINDOW_DEFAULT, CHAN_X11_PACKET_DEFAULT, 0, "x11", 1); c->force_drain = 1; return c; } static Channel * client_request_agent(struct ssh *ssh, const char *request_type, int rchan) { Channel *c = NULL; int r, sock; if (!options.forward_agent) { error("Warning: ssh server tried agent forwarding."); error("Warning: this is probably a break-in attempt by a " "malicious server."); return NULL; } if (forward_agent_sock_path == NULL) { r = ssh_get_authentication_socket(&sock); } else { r = ssh_get_authentication_socket_path(forward_agent_sock_path, &sock); } if (r != 0) { if (r != SSH_ERR_AGENT_NOT_PRESENT) debug_fr(r, "ssh_get_authentication_socket"); return NULL; } if ((r = ssh_agent_bind_hostkey(sock, ssh->kex->initial_hostkey, ssh->kex->session_id, ssh->kex->initial_sig, 1)) == 0) debug_f("bound agent to hostkey"); else debug2_fr(r, "ssh_agent_bind_hostkey"); c = channel_new(ssh, "authentication agent connection", SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN, sock, sock, -1, CHAN_X11_WINDOW_DEFAULT, CHAN_TCP_PACKET_DEFAULT, 0, "authentication agent connection", 1); c->force_drain = 1; return c; } char * client_request_tun_fwd(struct ssh *ssh, int tun_mode, int local_tun, int remote_tun, channel_open_fn *cb, void *cbctx) { Channel *c; int r, fd; char *ifname = NULL; if (tun_mode == SSH_TUNMODE_NO) return 0; debug("Requesting tun unit %d in mode %d", local_tun, tun_mode); /* Open local tunnel device */ if ((fd = tun_open(local_tun, tun_mode, &ifname)) == -1) { error("Tunnel device open failed."); return NULL; } debug("Tunnel forwarding using interface %s", ifname); c = channel_new(ssh, "tun", SSH_CHANNEL_OPENING, fd, fd, -1, CHAN_TCP_WINDOW_DEFAULT, CHAN_TCP_PACKET_DEFAULT, 0, "tun", 1); c->datagram = 1; #if defined(SSH_TUN_FILTER) if (options.tun_open == SSH_TUNMODE_POINTOPOINT) channel_register_filter(ssh, c->self, sys_tun_infilter, sys_tun_outfilter, NULL, NULL); #endif if (cb != NULL) channel_register_open_confirm(ssh, c->self, cb, cbctx); if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, "tun@openssh.com")) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, c->self)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, c->local_window_max)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, c->local_maxpacket)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, tun_mode)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, remote_tun)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) sshpkt_fatal(ssh, r, "%s: send reply", __func__); return ifname; } /* XXXX move to generic input handler */ static int client_input_channel_open(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh) { Channel *c = NULL; char *ctype = NULL; int r; u_int rchan; size_t len; u_int rmaxpack, rwindow; if ((r = sshpkt_get_cstring(ssh, &ctype, &len)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &rchan)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &rwindow)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &rmaxpack)) != 0) goto out; debug("client_input_channel_open: ctype %s rchan %d win %d max %d", ctype, rchan, rwindow, rmaxpack); if (strcmp(ctype, "forwarded-tcpip") == 0) { c = client_request_forwarded_tcpip(ssh, ctype, rchan, rwindow, rmaxpack); } else if (strcmp(ctype, "forwarded-streamlocal@openssh.com") == 0) { c = client_request_forwarded_streamlocal(ssh, ctype, rchan); } else if (strcmp(ctype, "x11") == 0) { c = client_request_x11(ssh, ctype, rchan); } else if (strcmp(ctype, "auth-agent@openssh.com") == 0) { c = client_request_agent(ssh, ctype, rchan); } if (c != NULL && c->type == SSH_CHANNEL_MUX_CLIENT) { debug3("proxied to downstream: %s", ctype); } else if (c != NULL) { debug("confirm %s", ctype); c->remote_id = rchan; c->have_remote_id = 1; c->remote_window = rwindow; c->remote_maxpacket = rmaxpack; if (c->type != SSH_CHANNEL_CONNECTING) { if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, c->remote_id)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, c->self)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, c->local_window)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, c->local_maxpacket)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) sshpkt_fatal(ssh, r, "%s: send reply", __func__); } } else { debug("failure %s", ctype); if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, rchan)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, SSH2_OPEN_ADMINISTRATIVELY_PROHIBITED)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, "open failed")) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, "")) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) sshpkt_fatal(ssh, r, "%s: send failure", __func__); } r = 0; out: free(ctype); return r; } static int client_input_channel_req(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh) { Channel *c = NULL; char *rtype = NULL; u_char reply; u_int id, exitval; int r, success = 0; if ((r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &id)) != 0) return r; if (id <= INT_MAX) c = channel_lookup(ssh, id); if (channel_proxy_upstream(c, type, seq, ssh)) return 0; if ((r = sshpkt_get_cstring(ssh, &rtype, NULL)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_get_u8(ssh, &reply)) != 0) goto out; debug("client_input_channel_req: channel %u rtype %s reply %d", id, rtype, reply); if (c == NULL) { error("client_input_channel_req: channel %d: " "unknown channel", id); } else if (strcmp(rtype, "eow@openssh.com") == 0) { if ((r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0) goto out; chan_rcvd_eow(ssh, c); } else if (strcmp(rtype, "exit-status") == 0) { if ((r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &exitval)) != 0) goto out; if (c->ctl_chan != -1) { mux_exit_message(ssh, c, exitval); success = 1; } else if ((int)id == session_ident) { /* Record exit value of local session */ success = 1; exit_status = exitval; } else { /* Probably for a mux channel that has already closed */ debug_f("no sink for exit-status on channel %d", id); } if ((r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0) goto out; } if (reply && c != NULL && !(c->flags & CHAN_CLOSE_SENT)) { if (!c->have_remote_id) fatal_f("channel %d: no remote_id", c->self); if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, success ? SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_SUCCESS : SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_FAILURE)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, c->remote_id)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) sshpkt_fatal(ssh, r, "%s: send failure", __func__); } r = 0; out: free(rtype); return r; } struct hostkeys_update_ctx { /* The hostname and (optionally) IP address string for the server */ char *host_str, *ip_str; /* * Keys received from the server and a flag for each indicating * whether they already exist in known_hosts. * keys_match is filled in by hostkeys_find() and later (for new * keys) by client_global_hostkeys_prove_confirm(). */ struct sshkey **keys; u_int *keys_match; /* mask of HKF_MATCH_* from hostfile.h */ int *keys_verified; /* flag for new keys verified by server */ size_t nkeys, nnew, nincomplete; /* total, new keys, incomplete match */ /* * Keys that are in known_hosts, but were not present in the update * from the server (i.e. scheduled to be deleted). * Filled in by hostkeys_find(). */ struct sshkey **old_keys; size_t nold; /* Various special cases. */ int complex_hostspec; /* wildcard or manual pattern-list host name */ int ca_available; /* saw CA key for this host */ int old_key_seen; /* saw old key with other name/addr */ int other_name_seen; /* saw key with other name/addr */ }; static void hostkeys_update_ctx_free(struct hostkeys_update_ctx *ctx) { size_t i; if (ctx == NULL) return; for (i = 0; i < ctx->nkeys; i++) sshkey_free(ctx->keys[i]); free(ctx->keys); free(ctx->keys_match); free(ctx->keys_verified); for (i = 0; i < ctx->nold; i++) sshkey_free(ctx->old_keys[i]); free(ctx->old_keys); free(ctx->host_str); free(ctx->ip_str); free(ctx); } /* * Returns non-zero if a known_hosts hostname list is not of a form that * can be handled by UpdateHostkeys. These include wildcard hostnames and * hostnames lists that do not follow the form host[,ip]. */ static int hostspec_is_complex(const char *hosts) { char *cp; /* wildcard */ if (strchr(hosts, '*') != NULL || strchr(hosts, '?') != NULL) return 1; /* single host/ip = ok */ if ((cp = strchr(hosts, ',')) == NULL) return 0; /* more than two entries on the line */ if (strchr(cp + 1, ',') != NULL) return 1; /* XXX maybe parse cp+1 and ensure it is an IP? */ return 0; } /* callback to search for ctx->keys in known_hosts */ static int hostkeys_find(struct hostkey_foreach_line *l, void *_ctx) { struct hostkeys_update_ctx *ctx = (struct hostkeys_update_ctx *)_ctx; size_t i; struct sshkey **tmp; if (l->key == NULL) return 0; if (l->status != HKF_STATUS_MATCHED) { /* Record if one of the keys appears on a non-matching line */ for (i = 0; i < ctx->nkeys; i++) { if (sshkey_equal(l->key, ctx->keys[i])) { ctx->other_name_seen = 1; debug3_f("found %s key under different " "name/addr at %s:%ld", sshkey_ssh_name(ctx->keys[i]), l->path, l->linenum); return 0; } } return 0; } /* Don't proceed if revocation or CA markers are present */ /* XXX relax this */ if (l->marker != MRK_NONE) { debug3_f("hostkeys file %s:%ld has CA/revocation marker", l->path, l->linenum); ctx->complex_hostspec = 1; return 0; } /* If CheckHostIP is enabled, then check for mismatched hostname/addr */ if (ctx->ip_str != NULL && strchr(l->hosts, ',') != NULL) { if ((l->match & HKF_MATCH_HOST) == 0) { /* Record if address matched a different hostname. */ ctx->other_name_seen = 1; debug3_f("found address %s against different hostname " "at %s:%ld", ctx->ip_str, l->path, l->linenum); return 0; } else if ((l->match & HKF_MATCH_IP) == 0) { /* Record if hostname matched a different address. */ ctx->other_name_seen = 1; debug3_f("found hostname %s against different address " "at %s:%ld", ctx->host_str, l->path, l->linenum); } } /* * UpdateHostkeys is skipped for wildcard host names and hostnames * that contain more than two entries (ssh never writes these). */ if (hostspec_is_complex(l->hosts)) { debug3_f("hostkeys file %s:%ld complex host specification", l->path, l->linenum); ctx->complex_hostspec = 1; return 0; } /* Mark off keys we've already seen for this host */ for (i = 0; i < ctx->nkeys; i++) { if (!sshkey_equal(l->key, ctx->keys[i])) continue; debug3_f("found %s key at %s:%ld", sshkey_ssh_name(ctx->keys[i]), l->path, l->linenum); ctx->keys_match[i] |= l->match; return 0; } /* This line contained a key that not offered by the server */ debug3_f("deprecated %s key at %s:%ld", sshkey_ssh_name(l->key), l->path, l->linenum); if ((tmp = recallocarray(ctx->old_keys, ctx->nold, ctx->nold + 1, sizeof(*ctx->old_keys))) == NULL) fatal_f("recallocarray failed nold = %zu", ctx->nold); ctx->old_keys = tmp; ctx->old_keys[ctx->nold++] = l->key; l->key = NULL; return 0; } /* callback to search for ctx->old_keys in known_hosts under other names */ static int hostkeys_check_old(struct hostkey_foreach_line *l, void *_ctx) { struct hostkeys_update_ctx *ctx = (struct hostkeys_update_ctx *)_ctx; size_t i; int hashed; /* only care about lines that *don't* match the active host spec */ if (l->status == HKF_STATUS_MATCHED || l->key == NULL) return 0; hashed = l->match & (HKF_MATCH_HOST_HASHED|HKF_MATCH_IP_HASHED); for (i = 0; i < ctx->nold; i++) { if (!sshkey_equal(l->key, ctx->old_keys[i])) continue; debug3_f("found deprecated %s key at %s:%ld as %s", sshkey_ssh_name(ctx->old_keys[i]), l->path, l->linenum, hashed ? "[HASHED]" : l->hosts); ctx->old_key_seen = 1; break; } return 0; } /* * Check known_hosts files for deprecated keys under other names. Returns 0 * on success or -1 on failure. Updates ctx->old_key_seen if deprecated keys * exist under names other than the active hostname/IP. */ static int check_old_keys_othernames(struct hostkeys_update_ctx *ctx) { size_t i; int r; debug2_f("checking for %zu deprecated keys", ctx->nold); for (i = 0; i < options.num_user_hostfiles; i++) { debug3_f("searching %s for %s / %s", options.user_hostfiles[i], ctx->host_str, ctx->ip_str ? ctx->ip_str : "(none)"); if ((r = hostkeys_foreach(options.user_hostfiles[i], hostkeys_check_old, ctx, ctx->host_str, ctx->ip_str, HKF_WANT_PARSE_KEY, 0)) != 0) { if (r == SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR && errno == ENOENT) { debug_f("hostkeys file %s does not exist", options.user_hostfiles[i]); continue; } error_fr(r, "hostkeys_foreach failed for %s", options.user_hostfiles[i]); return -1; } } return 0; } static void hostkey_change_preamble(LogLevel loglevel) { do_log2(loglevel, "The server has updated its host keys."); do_log2(loglevel, "These changes were verified by the server's " "existing trusted key."); } static void update_known_hosts(struct hostkeys_update_ctx *ctx) { int r, was_raw = 0, first = 1; int asking = options.update_hostkeys == SSH_UPDATE_HOSTKEYS_ASK; LogLevel loglevel = asking ? SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO : SYSLOG_LEVEL_VERBOSE; char *fp, *response; size_t i; struct stat sb; for (i = 0; i < ctx->nkeys; i++) { if (!ctx->keys_verified[i]) continue; if ((fp = sshkey_fingerprint(ctx->keys[i], options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL) fatal_f("sshkey_fingerprint failed"); if (first && asking) hostkey_change_preamble(loglevel); do_log2(loglevel, "Learned new hostkey: %s %s", sshkey_type(ctx->keys[i]), fp); first = 0; free(fp); } for (i = 0; i < ctx->nold; i++) { if ((fp = sshkey_fingerprint(ctx->old_keys[i], options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL) fatal_f("sshkey_fingerprint failed"); if (first && asking) hostkey_change_preamble(loglevel); do_log2(loglevel, "Deprecating obsolete hostkey: %s %s", sshkey_type(ctx->old_keys[i]), fp); first = 0; free(fp); } if (options.update_hostkeys == SSH_UPDATE_HOSTKEYS_ASK) { if (get_saved_tio() != NULL) { leave_raw_mode(1); was_raw = 1; } response = NULL; for (i = 0; !quit_pending && i < 3; i++) { free(response); response = read_passphrase("Accept updated hostkeys? " "(yes/no): ", RP_ECHO); - if (strcasecmp(response, "yes") == 0) + if (response != NULL && strcasecmp(response, "yes") == 0) break; else if (quit_pending || response == NULL || strcasecmp(response, "no") == 0) { options.update_hostkeys = 0; break; } else { do_log2(loglevel, "Please enter " "\"yes\" or \"no\""); } } if (quit_pending || i >= 3 || response == NULL) options.update_hostkeys = 0; free(response); if (was_raw) enter_raw_mode(1); } if (options.update_hostkeys == 0) return; /* * Now that all the keys are verified, we can go ahead and replace * them in known_hosts (assuming SSH_UPDATE_HOSTKEYS_ASK didn't * cancel the operation). */ for (i = 0; i < options.num_user_hostfiles; i++) { /* * NB. keys are only added to hostfiles[0], for the rest we * just delete the hostname entries. */ if (stat(options.user_hostfiles[i], &sb) != 0) { if (errno == ENOENT) { debug_f("known hosts file %s does not " "exist", options.user_hostfiles[i]); } else { error_f("known hosts file %s " "inaccessible: %s", options.user_hostfiles[i], strerror(errno)); } continue; } if ((r = hostfile_replace_entries(options.user_hostfiles[i], ctx->host_str, ctx->ip_str, i == 0 ? ctx->keys : NULL, i == 0 ? ctx->nkeys : 0, options.hash_known_hosts, 0, options.fingerprint_hash)) != 0) { error_fr(r, "hostfile_replace_entries failed for %s", options.user_hostfiles[i]); } } } static void client_global_hostkeys_prove_confirm(struct ssh *ssh, int type, u_int32_t seq, void *_ctx) { struct hostkeys_update_ctx *ctx = (struct hostkeys_update_ctx *)_ctx; size_t i, ndone; struct sshbuf *signdata; int r, plaintype; const u_char *sig; const char *rsa_kexalg = NULL; char *alg = NULL; size_t siglen; if (ctx->nnew == 0) fatal_f("ctx->nnew == 0"); /* sanity */ if (type != SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_SUCCESS) { error("Server failed to confirm ownership of " "private host keys"); hostkeys_update_ctx_free(ctx); return; } if (sshkey_type_plain(sshkey_type_from_name( ssh->kex->hostkey_alg)) == KEY_RSA) rsa_kexalg = ssh->kex->hostkey_alg; if ((signdata = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed"); /* * Expect a signature for each of the ctx->nnew private keys we * haven't seen before. They will be in the same order as the * ctx->keys where the corresponding ctx->keys_match[i] == 0. */ for (ndone = i = 0; i < ctx->nkeys; i++) { if (ctx->keys_match[i]) continue; plaintype = sshkey_type_plain(ctx->keys[i]->type); /* Prepare data to be signed: session ID, unique string, key */ sshbuf_reset(signdata); if ( (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(signdata, "hostkeys-prove-00@openssh.com")) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_stringb(signdata, ssh->kex->session_id)) != 0 || (r = sshkey_puts(ctx->keys[i], signdata)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "compose signdata"); /* Extract and verify signature */ if ((r = sshpkt_get_string_direct(ssh, &sig, &siglen)) != 0) { error_fr(r, "parse sig"); goto out; } if ((r = sshkey_get_sigtype(sig, siglen, &alg)) != 0) { error_fr(r, "server gave unintelligible signature " "for %s key %zu", sshkey_type(ctx->keys[i]), i); goto out; } /* * Special case for RSA keys: if a RSA hostkey was negotiated, * then use its signature type for verification of RSA hostkey * proofs. Otherwise, accept only RSA-SHA256/512 signatures. */ if (plaintype == KEY_RSA && rsa_kexalg == NULL && match_pattern_list(alg, HOSTKEY_PROOF_RSA_ALGS, 0) != 1) { debug_f("server used untrusted RSA signature algorithm " "%s for key %zu, disregarding", alg, i); free(alg); /* zap the key from the list */ sshkey_free(ctx->keys[i]); ctx->keys[i] = NULL; ndone++; continue; } debug3_f("verify %s key %zu using sigalg %s", sshkey_type(ctx->keys[i]), i, alg); free(alg); if ((r = sshkey_verify(ctx->keys[i], sig, siglen, sshbuf_ptr(signdata), sshbuf_len(signdata), plaintype == KEY_RSA ? rsa_kexalg : NULL, 0, NULL)) != 0) { error_fr(r, "server gave bad signature for %s key %zu", sshkey_type(ctx->keys[i]), i); goto out; } /* Key is good. Mark it as 'seen' */ ctx->keys_verified[i] = 1; ndone++; } /* Shouldn't happen */ if (ndone != ctx->nnew) fatal_f("ndone != ctx->nnew (%zu / %zu)", ndone, ctx->nnew); if ((r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0) { error_f("protocol error"); goto out; } /* Make the edits to known_hosts */ update_known_hosts(ctx); out: hostkeys_update_ctx_free(ctx); hostkeys_update_complete = 1; client_repledge(); } /* * Returns non-zero if the key is accepted by HostkeyAlgorithms. * Made slightly less trivial by the multiple RSA signature algorithm names. */ static int key_accepted_by_hostkeyalgs(const struct sshkey *key) { const char *ktype = sshkey_ssh_name(key); const char *hostkeyalgs = options.hostkeyalgorithms; if (key == NULL || key->type == KEY_UNSPEC) return 0; if (key->type == KEY_RSA && (match_pattern_list("rsa-sha2-256", hostkeyalgs, 0) == 1 || match_pattern_list("rsa-sha2-512", hostkeyalgs, 0) == 1)) return 1; return match_pattern_list(ktype, hostkeyalgs, 0) == 1; } /* * Handle hostkeys-00@openssh.com global request to inform the client of all * the server's hostkeys. The keys are checked against the user's * HostkeyAlgorithms preference before they are accepted. */ static int client_input_hostkeys(struct ssh *ssh) { const u_char *blob = NULL; size_t i, len = 0; struct sshbuf *buf = NULL; struct sshkey *key = NULL, **tmp; int r, prove_sent = 0; char *fp; static int hostkeys_seen = 0; /* XXX use struct ssh */ extern struct sockaddr_storage hostaddr; /* XXX from ssh.c */ struct hostkeys_update_ctx *ctx = NULL; u_int want; if (hostkeys_seen) fatal_f("server already sent hostkeys"); if (!can_update_hostkeys()) return 1; hostkeys_seen = 1; ctx = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*ctx)); while (ssh_packet_remaining(ssh) > 0) { sshkey_free(key); key = NULL; if ((r = sshpkt_get_string_direct(ssh, &blob, &len)) != 0) { error_fr(r, "parse key"); goto out; } if ((r = sshkey_from_blob(blob, len, &key)) != 0) { do_log2_fr(r, r == SSH_ERR_KEY_TYPE_UNKNOWN ? SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG1 : SYSLOG_LEVEL_ERROR, "convert key"); continue; } fp = sshkey_fingerprint(key, options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_DEFAULT); debug3_f("received %s key %s", sshkey_type(key), fp); free(fp); if (!key_accepted_by_hostkeyalgs(key)) { debug3_f("%s key not permitted by " "HostkeyAlgorithms", sshkey_ssh_name(key)); continue; } /* Skip certs */ if (sshkey_is_cert(key)) { debug3_f("%s key is a certificate; skipping", sshkey_ssh_name(key)); continue; } /* Ensure keys are unique */ for (i = 0; i < ctx->nkeys; i++) { if (sshkey_equal(key, ctx->keys[i])) { error_f("received duplicated %s host key", sshkey_ssh_name(key)); goto out; } } /* Key is good, record it */ if ((tmp = recallocarray(ctx->keys, ctx->nkeys, ctx->nkeys + 1, sizeof(*ctx->keys))) == NULL) fatal_f("recallocarray failed nkeys = %zu", ctx->nkeys); ctx->keys = tmp; ctx->keys[ctx->nkeys++] = key; key = NULL; } if (ctx->nkeys == 0) { debug_f("server sent no hostkeys"); goto out; } if ((ctx->keys_match = calloc(ctx->nkeys, sizeof(*ctx->keys_match))) == NULL || (ctx->keys_verified = calloc(ctx->nkeys, sizeof(*ctx->keys_verified))) == NULL) fatal_f("calloc failed"); get_hostfile_hostname_ipaddr(host, options.check_host_ip ? (struct sockaddr *)&hostaddr : NULL, options.port, &ctx->host_str, options.check_host_ip ? &ctx->ip_str : NULL); /* Find which keys we already know about. */ for (i = 0; i < options.num_user_hostfiles; i++) { debug_f("searching %s for %s / %s", options.user_hostfiles[i], ctx->host_str, ctx->ip_str ? ctx->ip_str : "(none)"); if ((r = hostkeys_foreach(options.user_hostfiles[i], hostkeys_find, ctx, ctx->host_str, ctx->ip_str, HKF_WANT_PARSE_KEY, 0)) != 0) { if (r == SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR && errno == ENOENT) { debug_f("hostkeys file %s does not exist", options.user_hostfiles[i]); continue; } error_fr(r, "hostkeys_foreach failed for %s", options.user_hostfiles[i]); goto out; } } /* Figure out if we have any new keys to add */ ctx->nnew = ctx->nincomplete = 0; want = HKF_MATCH_HOST | ( options.check_host_ip ? HKF_MATCH_IP : 0); for (i = 0; i < ctx->nkeys; i++) { if (ctx->keys_match[i] == 0) ctx->nnew++; if ((ctx->keys_match[i] & want) != want) ctx->nincomplete++; } debug3_f("%zu server keys: %zu new, %zu retained, " "%zu incomplete match. %zu to remove", ctx->nkeys, ctx->nnew, ctx->nkeys - ctx->nnew - ctx->nincomplete, ctx->nincomplete, ctx->nold); if (ctx->nnew == 0 && ctx->nold == 0) { debug_f("no new or deprecated keys from server"); goto out; } /* Various reasons why we cannot proceed with the update */ if (ctx->complex_hostspec) { debug_f("CA/revocation marker, manual host list or wildcard " "host pattern found, skipping UserKnownHostsFile update"); goto out; } if (ctx->other_name_seen) { debug_f("host key found matching a different name/address, " "skipping UserKnownHostsFile update"); goto out; } /* * If removing keys, check whether they appear under different * names/addresses and refuse to proceed if they do. This avoids * cases such as hosts with multiple names becoming inconsistent * with regards to CheckHostIP entries. * XXX UpdateHostkeys=force to override this (and other) checks? */ if (ctx->nold != 0) { if (check_old_keys_othernames(ctx) != 0) goto out; /* error already logged */ if (ctx->old_key_seen) { debug_f("key(s) for %s%s%s exist under other names; " "skipping UserKnownHostsFile update", ctx->host_str, ctx->ip_str == NULL ? "" : ",", ctx->ip_str == NULL ? "" : ctx->ip_str); goto out; } } if (ctx->nnew == 0) { /* * We have some keys to remove or fix matching for. * We can proceed to do this without requiring a fresh proof * from the server. */ update_known_hosts(ctx); goto out; } /* * We have received previously-unseen keys from the server. * Ask the server to confirm ownership of the private halves. */ debug3_f("asking server to prove ownership for %zu keys", ctx->nnew); if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_GLOBAL_REQUEST)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, "hostkeys-prove-00@openssh.com")) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_u8(ssh, 1)) != 0) /* bool: want reply */ fatal_fr(r, "prepare hostkeys-prove"); if ((buf = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) fatal_f("sshbuf_new"); for (i = 0; i < ctx->nkeys; i++) { if (ctx->keys_match[i]) continue; sshbuf_reset(buf); if ((r = sshkey_putb(ctx->keys[i], buf)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_stringb(ssh, buf)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "assemble hostkeys-prove"); } if ((r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "send hostkeys-prove"); client_register_global_confirm( client_global_hostkeys_prove_confirm, ctx); ctx = NULL; /* will be freed in callback */ prove_sent = 1; /* Success */ out: hostkeys_update_ctx_free(ctx); sshkey_free(key); sshbuf_free(buf); if (!prove_sent) { /* UpdateHostkeys handling completed */ hostkeys_update_complete = 1; client_repledge(); } /* * NB. Return success for all cases. The server doesn't need to know * what the client does with its hosts file. */ return 1; } static int client_input_global_request(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh) { char *rtype; u_char want_reply; int r, success = 0; if ((r = sshpkt_get_cstring(ssh, &rtype, NULL)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_get_u8(ssh, &want_reply)) != 0) goto out; debug("client_input_global_request: rtype %s want_reply %d", rtype, want_reply); if (strcmp(rtype, "hostkeys-00@openssh.com") == 0) success = client_input_hostkeys(ssh); if (want_reply) { if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, success ? SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_SUCCESS : SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_FAILURE)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0 || (r = ssh_packet_write_wait(ssh)) != 0) goto out; } r = 0; out: free(rtype); return r; } static void client_send_env(struct ssh *ssh, int id, const char *name, const char *val) { int r; debug("channel %d: setting env %s = \"%s\"", id, name, val); channel_request_start(ssh, id, "env", 0); if ((r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, name)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, val)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "send setenv"); } void client_session2_setup(struct ssh *ssh, int id, int want_tty, int want_subsystem, const char *term, struct termios *tiop, int in_fd, struct sshbuf *cmd, char **env) { size_t i, j, len; int matched, r; char *name, *val; Channel *c = NULL; debug2_f("id %d", id); if ((c = channel_lookup(ssh, id)) == NULL) fatal_f("channel %d: unknown channel", id); ssh_packet_set_interactive(ssh, want_tty, options.ip_qos_interactive, options.ip_qos_bulk); if (want_tty) { struct winsize ws; /* Store window size in the packet. */ if (ioctl(in_fd, TIOCGWINSZ, &ws) == -1) memset(&ws, 0, sizeof(ws)); channel_request_start(ssh, id, "pty-req", 1); client_expect_confirm(ssh, id, "PTY allocation", CONFIRM_TTY); if ((r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, term != NULL ? term : "")) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, (u_int)ws.ws_col)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, (u_int)ws.ws_row)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, (u_int)ws.ws_xpixel)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, (u_int)ws.ws_ypixel)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "build pty-req"); if (tiop == NULL) tiop = get_saved_tio(); ssh_tty_make_modes(ssh, -1, tiop); if ((r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "send pty-req"); /* XXX wait for reply */ c->client_tty = 1; } /* Transfer any environment variables from client to server */ if (options.num_send_env != 0 && env != NULL) { debug("Sending environment."); for (i = 0; env[i] != NULL; i++) { /* Split */ name = xstrdup(env[i]); if ((val = strchr(name, '=')) == NULL) { free(name); continue; } *val++ = '\0'; matched = 0; for (j = 0; j < options.num_send_env; j++) { if (match_pattern(name, options.send_env[j])) { matched = 1; break; } } if (!matched) { debug3("Ignored env %s", name); free(name); continue; } client_send_env(ssh, id, name, val); free(name); } } for (i = 0; i < options.num_setenv; i++) { /* Split */ name = xstrdup(options.setenv[i]); if ((val = strchr(name, '=')) == NULL) { free(name); continue; } *val++ = '\0'; client_send_env(ssh, id, name, val); free(name); } len = sshbuf_len(cmd); if (len > 0) { if (len > 900) len = 900; if (want_subsystem) { debug("Sending subsystem: %.*s", (int)len, (const u_char*)sshbuf_ptr(cmd)); channel_request_start(ssh, id, "subsystem", 1); client_expect_confirm(ssh, id, "subsystem", CONFIRM_CLOSE); } else { debug("Sending command: %.*s", (int)len, (const u_char*)sshbuf_ptr(cmd)); channel_request_start(ssh, id, "exec", 1); client_expect_confirm(ssh, id, "exec", CONFIRM_CLOSE); } if ((r = sshpkt_put_stringb(ssh, cmd)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "send command"); } else { channel_request_start(ssh, id, "shell", 1); client_expect_confirm(ssh, id, "shell", CONFIRM_CLOSE); if ((r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "send shell"); } session_setup_complete = 1; client_repledge(); } static void client_init_dispatch(struct ssh *ssh) { ssh_dispatch_init(ssh, &dispatch_protocol_error); ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE, &channel_input_oclose); ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA, &channel_input_data); ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_EOF, &channel_input_ieof); ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_EXTENDED_DATA, &channel_input_extended_data); ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN, &client_input_channel_open); ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION, &channel_input_open_confirmation); ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE, &channel_input_open_failure); ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_REQUEST, &client_input_channel_req); ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_WINDOW_ADJUST, &channel_input_window_adjust); ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_SUCCESS, &channel_input_status_confirm); ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_FAILURE, &channel_input_status_confirm); ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_GLOBAL_REQUEST, &client_input_global_request); /* rekeying */ ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT, &kex_input_kexinit); /* global request reply messages */ ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_FAILURE, &client_global_request_reply); ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_SUCCESS, &client_global_request_reply); } void client_stop_mux(void) { if (options.control_path != NULL && muxserver_sock != -1) unlink(options.control_path); /* * If we are in persist mode, or don't have a shell, signal that we * should close when all active channels are closed. */ if (options.control_persist || options.session_type == SESSION_TYPE_NONE) { session_closed = 1; setproctitle("[stopped mux]"); } } /* client specific fatal cleanup */ void cleanup_exit(int i) { leave_raw_mode(options.request_tty == REQUEST_TTY_FORCE); if (options.control_path != NULL && muxserver_sock != -1) unlink(options.control_path); ssh_kill_proxy_command(); _exit(i); } diff --git a/crypto/openssh/compat.c b/crypto/openssh/compat.c index 478a9403eeaa..b59f0bfc0630 100644 --- a/crypto/openssh/compat.c +++ b/crypto/openssh/compat.c @@ -1,215 +1,166 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: compat.c,v 1.121 2023/02/02 12:10:05 djm Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: compat.c,v 1.126 2023/03/06 12:14:48 dtucker Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. */ #include "includes.h" #include #include #include #include #include "xmalloc.h" #include "packet.h" #include "compat.h" #include "log.h" #include "match.h" -#include "kex.h" /* determine bug flags from SSH protocol banner */ void compat_banner(struct ssh *ssh, const char *version) { int i; static struct { char *pat; int bugs; } check[] = { { "OpenSSH_2.*," "OpenSSH_3.0*," "OpenSSH_3.1*", SSH_BUG_EXTEOF|SSH_OLD_FORWARD_ADDR| SSH_BUG_SIGTYPE}, { "OpenSSH_3.*", SSH_OLD_FORWARD_ADDR|SSH_BUG_SIGTYPE }, { "Sun_SSH_1.0*", SSH_BUG_NOREKEY|SSH_BUG_EXTEOF| SSH_BUG_SIGTYPE}, { "OpenSSH_2*," "OpenSSH_3*," "OpenSSH_4*", SSH_BUG_SIGTYPE }, { "OpenSSH_5*", SSH_NEW_OPENSSH|SSH_BUG_DYNAMIC_RPORT| SSH_BUG_SIGTYPE}, { "OpenSSH_6.6.1*", SSH_NEW_OPENSSH|SSH_BUG_SIGTYPE}, { "OpenSSH_6.5*," "OpenSSH_6.6*", SSH_NEW_OPENSSH|SSH_BUG_CURVE25519PAD| SSH_BUG_SIGTYPE}, { "OpenSSH_7.4*", SSH_NEW_OPENSSH|SSH_BUG_SIGTYPE| SSH_BUG_SIGTYPE74}, { "OpenSSH_7.0*," "OpenSSH_7.1*," "OpenSSH_7.2*," "OpenSSH_7.3*," "OpenSSH_7.5*," "OpenSSH_7.6*," "OpenSSH_7.7*", SSH_NEW_OPENSSH|SSH_BUG_SIGTYPE}, { "OpenSSH*", SSH_NEW_OPENSSH }, { "*MindTerm*", 0 }, { "3.0.*", SSH_BUG_DEBUG }, { "3.0 SecureCRT*", SSH_OLD_SESSIONID }, { "1.7 SecureFX*", SSH_OLD_SESSIONID }, - { "1.2.18*," - "1.2.19*," - "1.2.20*," - "1.2.21*," - "1.2.22*", SSH_BUG_IGNOREMSG }, - { "1.3.2*", /* F-Secure */ - SSH_BUG_IGNOREMSG }, { "Cisco-1.*", SSH_BUG_DHGEX_LARGE| SSH_BUG_HOSTKEYS }, - { "*SSH Compatible Server*", /* Netscreen */ - SSH_BUG_PASSWORDPAD }, - { "*OSU_0*," - "OSU_1.0*," - "OSU_1.1*," - "OSU_1.2*," - "OSU_1.3*," - "OSU_1.4*," - "OSU_1.5alpha1*," - "OSU_1.5alpha2*," - "OSU_1.5alpha3*", SSH_BUG_PASSWORDPAD }, { "*SSH_Version_Mapper*", SSH_BUG_SCANNER }, { "PuTTY_Local:*," /* dev versions < Sep 2014 */ "PuTTY-Release-0.5*," /* 0.50-0.57, DH-GEX in >=0.52 */ "PuTTY_Release_0.5*," /* 0.58-0.59 */ "PuTTY_Release_0.60*," "PuTTY_Release_0.61*," "PuTTY_Release_0.62*," "PuTTY_Release_0.63*," "PuTTY_Release_0.64*", SSH_OLD_DHGEX }, { "FuTTY*", SSH_OLD_DHGEX }, /* Putty Fork */ { "Probe-*", SSH_BUG_PROBE }, { "TeraTerm SSH*," "TTSSH/1.5.*," "TTSSH/2.1*," "TTSSH/2.2*," "TTSSH/2.3*," "TTSSH/2.4*," "TTSSH/2.5*," "TTSSH/2.6*," "TTSSH/2.70*," "TTSSH/2.71*," "TTSSH/2.72*", SSH_BUG_HOSTKEYS }, { "WinSCP_release_4*," "WinSCP_release_5.0*," "WinSCP_release_5.1," "WinSCP_release_5.1.*," "WinSCP_release_5.5," "WinSCP_release_5.5.*," "WinSCP_release_5.6," "WinSCP_release_5.6.*," "WinSCP_release_5.7," "WinSCP_release_5.7.1," "WinSCP_release_5.7.2," "WinSCP_release_5.7.3," "WinSCP_release_5.7.4", SSH_OLD_DHGEX }, { "ConfD-*", SSH_BUG_UTF8TTYMODE }, { "Twisted_*", 0 }, { "Twisted*", SSH_BUG_DEBUG }, { NULL, 0 } }; /* process table, return first match */ ssh->compat = 0; for (i = 0; check[i].pat; i++) { if (match_pattern_list(version, check[i].pat, 0) == 1) { debug_f("match: %s pat %s compat 0x%08x", version, check[i].pat, check[i].bugs); ssh->compat = check[i].bugs; return; } } debug_f("no match: %s", version); } /* Always returns pointer to allocated memory, caller must free. */ char * -compat_cipher_proposal(struct ssh *ssh, char *cipher_prop) -{ - if (!(ssh->compat & SSH_BUG_BIGENDIANAES)) - return xstrdup(cipher_prop); - debug2_f("original cipher proposal: %s", cipher_prop); - if ((cipher_prop = match_filter_denylist(cipher_prop, "aes*")) == NULL) - fatal("match_filter_denylist failed"); - debug2_f("compat cipher proposal: %s", cipher_prop); - if (*cipher_prop == '\0') - fatal("No supported ciphers found"); - return cipher_prop; -} - -/* Always returns pointer to allocated memory, caller must free. */ -char * -compat_pkalg_proposal(struct ssh *ssh, char *pkalg_prop) -{ - if (!(ssh->compat & SSH_BUG_RSASIGMD5)) - return xstrdup(pkalg_prop); - debug2_f("original public key proposal: %s", pkalg_prop); - if ((pkalg_prop = match_filter_denylist(pkalg_prop, "ssh-rsa")) == NULL) - fatal("match_filter_denylist failed"); - debug2_f("compat public key proposal: %s", pkalg_prop); - if (*pkalg_prop == '\0') - fatal("No supported PK algorithms found"); - return pkalg_prop; -} - -/* Always returns pointer to allocated memory, caller must free. */ -char * -compat_kex_proposal(struct ssh *ssh, char *p) +compat_kex_proposal(struct ssh *ssh, const char *p) { char *cp = NULL, *cp2 = NULL; if ((ssh->compat & (SSH_BUG_CURVE25519PAD|SSH_OLD_DHGEX)) == 0) return xstrdup(p); debug2_f("original KEX proposal: %s", p); if ((ssh->compat & SSH_BUG_CURVE25519PAD) != 0) if ((cp = match_filter_denylist(p, "curve25519-sha256@libssh.org")) == NULL) fatal("match_filter_denylist failed"); if ((ssh->compat & SSH_OLD_DHGEX) != 0) { if ((cp2 = match_filter_denylist(cp ? cp : p, "diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha256," "diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha1")) == NULL) fatal("match_filter_denylist failed"); free(cp); cp = cp2; } if (cp == NULL || *cp == '\0') fatal("No supported key exchange algorithms found"); debug2_f("compat KEX proposal: %s", cp); return cp; } diff --git a/crypto/openssh/compat.h b/crypto/openssh/compat.h index 167409b2bd33..1a19060fc14c 100644 --- a/crypto/openssh/compat.h +++ b/crypto/openssh/compat.h @@ -1,67 +1,65 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: compat.h,v 1.57 2021/06/06 03:40:39 djm Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: compat.h,v 1.62 2023/03/06 12:14:48 dtucker Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 1999, 2000, 2001 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. */ #ifndef COMPAT_H #define COMPAT_H #define SSH_BUG_UTF8TTYMODE 0x00000001 #define SSH_BUG_SIGTYPE 0x00000002 #define SSH_BUG_SIGTYPE74 0x00000004 /* #define unused 0x00000008 */ #define SSH_OLD_SESSIONID 0x00000010 /* #define unused 0x00000020 */ #define SSH_BUG_DEBUG 0x00000040 /* #define unused 0x00000080 */ -#define SSH_BUG_IGNOREMSG 0x00000100 +/* #define unused 0x00000100 */ /* #define unused 0x00000200 */ -#define SSH_BUG_PASSWORDPAD 0x00000400 +/* #define unused 0x00000400 */ #define SSH_BUG_SCANNER 0x00000800 -#define SSH_BUG_BIGENDIANAES 0x00001000 -#define SSH_BUG_RSASIGMD5 0x00002000 +/* #define unused 0x00001000 */ +/* #define unused 0x00002000 */ #define SSH_OLD_DHGEX 0x00004000 #define SSH_BUG_NOREKEY 0x00008000 /* #define unused 0x00010000 */ /* #define unused 0x00020000 */ /* #define unused 0x00040000 */ /* #define unused 0x00100000 */ #define SSH_BUG_EXTEOF 0x00200000 #define SSH_BUG_PROBE 0x00400000 /* #define unused 0x00800000 */ #define SSH_OLD_FORWARD_ADDR 0x01000000 /* #define unused 0x02000000 */ #define SSH_NEW_OPENSSH 0x04000000 #define SSH_BUG_DYNAMIC_RPORT 0x08000000 #define SSH_BUG_CURVE25519PAD 0x10000000 #define SSH_BUG_HOSTKEYS 0x20000000 #define SSH_BUG_DHGEX_LARGE 0x40000000 struct ssh; void compat_banner(struct ssh *, const char *); -char *compat_cipher_proposal(struct ssh *, char *); -char *compat_pkalg_proposal(struct ssh *, char *); -char *compat_kex_proposal(struct ssh *, char *); +char *compat_kex_proposal(struct ssh *, const char *); #endif diff --git a/crypto/openssh/contrib/redhat/openssh.spec b/crypto/openssh/contrib/redhat/openssh.spec index 423079a03c78..a665aa20bc1f 100644 --- a/crypto/openssh/contrib/redhat/openssh.spec +++ b/crypto/openssh/contrib/redhat/openssh.spec @@ -1,850 +1,850 @@ -%global ver 9.2p1 +%global ver 9.3p1 %global rel 1%{?dist} # OpenSSH privilege separation requires a user & group ID %global sshd_uid 74 %global sshd_gid 74 # Version of ssh-askpass %global aversion 1.2.4.1 # Do we want to disable building of x11-askpass? (1=yes 0=no) %global no_x11_askpass 0 # Do we want to disable building of gnome-askpass? (1=yes 0=no) %global no_gnome_askpass 0 # Do we want to link against a static libcrypto? (1=yes 0=no) %global static_libcrypto 0 # Do we want smartcard support (1=yes 0=no) %global scard 0 # Use GTK2 instead of GNOME in gnome-ssh-askpass %global gtk2 1 # Use build6x options for older RHEL builds # RHEL 7 not yet supported %if 0%{?rhel} > 6 %global build6x 0 %else %global build6x 1 %endif %if 0%{?fedora} >= 26 %global compat_openssl 1 %else %global compat_openssl 0 %endif # Do we want kerberos5 support (1=yes 0=no) %global kerberos5 1 # Reserve options to override askpass settings with: # rpm -ba|--rebuild --define 'skip_xxx 1' %{?skip_x11_askpass:%global no_x11_askpass 1} %{?skip_gnome_askpass:%global no_gnome_askpass 1} # Add option to build without GTK2 for older platforms with only GTK+. # RedHat <= 7.2 and Red Hat Advanced Server 2.1 are examples. # rpm -ba|--rebuild --define 'no_gtk2 1' %{?no_gtk2:%global gtk2 0} # Is this a build for RHL 6.x or earlier? %{?build_6x:%global build6x 1} # If this is RHL 6.x, the default configuration has sysconfdir in /usr/etc. %if %{build6x} %global _sysconfdir /etc %endif # Options for static OpenSSL link: # rpm -ba|--rebuild --define "static_openssl 1" %{?static_openssl:%global static_libcrypto 1} # Options for Smartcard support: (needs libsectok and openssl-engine) # rpm -ba|--rebuild --define "smartcard 1" %{?smartcard:%global scard 1} # Is this a build for the rescue CD (without PAM)? (1=yes 0=no) %global rescue 0 %{?build_rescue:%global rescue 1} # Turn off some stuff for resuce builds %if %{rescue} %global kerberos5 0 %endif Summary: The OpenSSH implementation of SSH protocol version 2. Name: openssh Version: %{ver} %if %{rescue} Release: %{rel}rescue %else Release: %{rel} %endif URL: https://www.openssh.com/portable.html Source0: https://ftp.openbsd.org/pub/OpenBSD/OpenSSH/portable/openssh-%{version}.tar.gz Source1: http://www.jmknoble.net/software/x11-ssh-askpass/x11-ssh-askpass-%{aversion}.tar.gz License: BSD Group: Applications/Internet BuildRoot: %{_tmppath}/%{name}-%{version}-buildroot Obsoletes: ssh %if %{build6x} PreReq: initscripts >= 5.00 %else Requires: initscripts >= 5.20 %endif BuildRequires: perl %if %{compat_openssl} BuildRequires: compat-openssl10-devel %else BuildRequires: openssl-devel >= 1.0.1 BuildRequires: openssl-devel < 1.1 %endif BuildRequires: /bin/login %if ! %{build6x} BuildRequires: glibc-devel, pam %else BuildRequires: /usr/include/security/pam_appl.h %endif %if ! %{no_x11_askpass} BuildRequires: /usr/include/X11/Xlib.h # Xt development tools BuildRequires: libXt-devel # Provides xmkmf BuildRequires: imake # Rely on relatively recent gtk BuildRequires: gtk2-devel %endif %if ! %{no_gnome_askpass} BuildRequires: pkgconfig %endif %if %{kerberos5} BuildRequires: krb5-devel BuildRequires: krb5-libs %endif %package clients Summary: OpenSSH clients. Requires: openssh = %{version}-%{release} Group: Applications/Internet Obsoletes: ssh-clients %package server Summary: The OpenSSH server daemon. Group: System Environment/Daemons Obsoletes: ssh-server Requires: openssh = %{version}-%{release}, chkconfig >= 0.9 %if ! %{build6x} Requires: /etc/pam.d/system-auth %endif %package askpass Summary: A passphrase dialog for OpenSSH and X. Group: Applications/Internet Requires: openssh = %{version}-%{release} Obsoletes: ssh-extras %package askpass-gnome Summary: A passphrase dialog for OpenSSH, X, and GNOME. Group: Applications/Internet Requires: openssh = %{version}-%{release} Obsoletes: ssh-extras %description SSH (Secure SHell) is a program for logging into and executing commands on a remote machine. SSH is intended to replace rlogin and rsh, and to provide secure encrypted communications between two untrusted hosts over an insecure network. X11 connections and arbitrary TCP/IP ports can also be forwarded over the secure channel. OpenSSH is OpenBSD's version of the last free version of SSH, bringing it up to date in terms of security and features, as well as removing all patented algorithms to separate libraries. This package includes the core files necessary for both the OpenSSH client and server. To make this package useful, you should also install openssh-clients, openssh-server, or both. %description clients OpenSSH is a free version of SSH (Secure SHell), a program for logging into and executing commands on a remote machine. This package includes the clients necessary to make encrypted connections to SSH servers. You'll also need to install the openssh package on OpenSSH clients. %description server OpenSSH is a free version of SSH (Secure SHell), a program for logging into and executing commands on a remote machine. This package contains the secure shell daemon (sshd). The sshd daemon allows SSH clients to securely connect to your SSH server. You also need to have the openssh package installed. %description askpass OpenSSH is a free version of SSH (Secure SHell), a program for logging into and executing commands on a remote machine. This package contains an X11 passphrase dialog for OpenSSH. %description askpass-gnome OpenSSH is a free version of SSH (Secure SHell), a program for logging into and executing commands on a remote machine. This package contains an X11 passphrase dialog for OpenSSH and the GNOME GUI desktop environment. %prep %if ! %{no_x11_askpass} %setup -q -a 1 %else %setup -q %endif %build %if %{rescue} CFLAGS="$RPM_OPT_FLAGS -Os"; export CFLAGS %endif %configure \ --sysconfdir=%{_sysconfdir}/ssh \ --libexecdir=%{_libexecdir}/openssh \ --datadir=%{_datadir}/openssh \ --with-default-path=/usr/local/bin:/bin:/usr/bin \ --with-superuser-path=/usr/local/sbin:/usr/local/bin:/sbin:/bin:/usr/sbin:/usr/bin \ --with-privsep-path=%{_var}/empty/sshd \ --mandir=%{_mandir} \ --with-mantype=man \ --disable-strip \ %if %{scard} --with-smartcard \ %endif %if %{rescue} --without-pam \ %else --with-pam \ %endif %if %{kerberos5} --with-kerberos5=$K5DIR \ %endif %if %{static_libcrypto} perl -pi -e "s|-lcrypto|%{_libdir}/libcrypto.a|g" Makefile %endif make %if ! %{no_x11_askpass} pushd x11-ssh-askpass-%{aversion} %configure --libexecdir=%{_libexecdir}/openssh xmkmf -a make popd %endif # Define a variable to toggle gnome1/gtk2 building. This is necessary # because RPM doesn't handle nested %if statements. %if %{gtk2} gtk2=yes %else gtk2=no %endif %if ! %{no_gnome_askpass} pushd contrib if [ $gtk2 = yes ] ; then make gnome-ssh-askpass2 mv gnome-ssh-askpass2 gnome-ssh-askpass else make gnome-ssh-askpass1 mv gnome-ssh-askpass1 gnome-ssh-askpass fi popd %endif %install rm -rf $RPM_BUILD_ROOT mkdir -p -m755 $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_sysconfdir}/ssh mkdir -p -m755 $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_libexecdir}/openssh mkdir -p -m755 $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_var}/empty/sshd make install DESTDIR=$RPM_BUILD_ROOT install -d $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/etc/pam.d/ install -d $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/etc/rc.d/init.d install -d $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_libexecdir}/openssh %if %{build6x} install -m644 contrib/redhat/sshd.pam.old $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/etc/pam.d/sshd %else install -m644 contrib/redhat/sshd.pam $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/etc/pam.d/sshd %endif install -m755 contrib/redhat/sshd.init $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/etc/rc.d/init.d/sshd %if ! %{no_x11_askpass} install x11-ssh-askpass-%{aversion}/x11-ssh-askpass $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_libexecdir}/openssh/x11-ssh-askpass ln -s x11-ssh-askpass $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_libexecdir}/openssh/ssh-askpass %endif %if ! %{no_gnome_askpass} install contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_libexecdir}/openssh/gnome-ssh-askpass %endif %if ! %{scard} rm -f $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/usr/share/openssh/Ssh.bin %endif %if ! %{no_gnome_askpass} install -m 755 -d $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_sysconfdir}/profile.d/ install -m 755 contrib/redhat/gnome-ssh-askpass.csh $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_sysconfdir}/profile.d/ install -m 755 contrib/redhat/gnome-ssh-askpass.sh $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_sysconfdir}/profile.d/ %endif perl -pi -e "s|$RPM_BUILD_ROOT||g" $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_mandir}/man*/* %clean rm -rf $RPM_BUILD_ROOT %triggerun server -- ssh-server if [ "$1" != 0 -a -r /var/run/sshd.pid ] ; then touch /var/run/sshd.restart fi %triggerun server -- openssh-server < 2.5.0p1 # Count the number of HostKey and HostDsaKey statements we have. gawk 'BEGIN {IGNORECASE=1} /^hostkey/ || /^hostdsakey/ {sawhostkey = sawhostkey + 1} END {exit sawhostkey}' /etc/ssh/sshd_config # And if we only found one, we know the client was relying on the old default # behavior, which loaded the the SSH2 DSA host key when HostDsaKey wasn't # specified. Now that HostKey is used for both SSH1 and SSH2 keys, specifying # one nullifies the default, which would have loaded both. if [ $? -eq 1 ] ; then echo HostKey /etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key >> /etc/ssh/sshd_config echo HostKey /etc/ssh/ssh_host_dsa_key >> /etc/ssh/sshd_config fi %triggerpostun server -- ssh-server if [ "$1" != 0 ] ; then /sbin/chkconfig --add sshd if test -f /var/run/sshd.restart ; then rm -f /var/run/sshd.restart /sbin/service sshd start > /dev/null 2>&1 || : fi fi %pre server %{_sbindir}/groupadd -r -g %{sshd_gid} sshd 2>/dev/null || : %{_sbindir}/useradd -d /var/empty/sshd -s /bin/false -u %{sshd_uid} \ -g sshd -M -r sshd 2>/dev/null || : %post server /sbin/chkconfig --add sshd %postun server /sbin/service sshd condrestart > /dev/null 2>&1 || : %preun server if [ "$1" = 0 ] then /sbin/service sshd stop > /dev/null 2>&1 || : /sbin/chkconfig --del sshd fi %files %defattr(-,root,root) %doc CREDITS ChangeLog INSTALL LICENCE OVERVIEW README* PROTOCOL* TODO %attr(0755,root,root) %{_bindir}/scp %attr(0644,root,root) %{_mandir}/man1/scp.1* %attr(0755,root,root) %dir %{_sysconfdir}/ssh %attr(0600,root,root) %config(noreplace) %{_sysconfdir}/ssh/moduli %if ! %{rescue} %attr(0755,root,root) %{_bindir}/ssh-keygen %attr(0644,root,root) %{_mandir}/man1/ssh-keygen.1* %attr(0755,root,root) %dir %{_libexecdir}/openssh %attr(4711,root,root) %{_libexecdir}/openssh/ssh-keysign %attr(0755,root,root) %{_libexecdir}/openssh/ssh-pkcs11-helper %attr(0755,root,root) %{_libexecdir}/openssh/ssh-sk-helper %attr(0644,root,root) %{_mandir}/man8/ssh-keysign.8* %attr(0644,root,root) %{_mandir}/man8/ssh-pkcs11-helper.8* %attr(0644,root,root) %{_mandir}/man8/ssh-sk-helper.8* %endif %if %{scard} %attr(0755,root,root) %dir %{_datadir}/openssh %attr(0644,root,root) %{_datadir}/openssh/Ssh.bin %endif %files clients %defattr(-,root,root) %attr(0755,root,root) %{_bindir}/ssh %attr(0644,root,root) %{_mandir}/man1/ssh.1* %attr(0644,root,root) %{_mandir}/man5/ssh_config.5* %attr(0644,root,root) %config(noreplace) %{_sysconfdir}/ssh/ssh_config %if ! %{rescue} %attr(2755,root,nobody) %{_bindir}/ssh-agent %attr(0755,root,root) %{_bindir}/ssh-add %attr(0755,root,root) %{_bindir}/ssh-keyscan %attr(0755,root,root) %{_bindir}/sftp %attr(0644,root,root) %{_mandir}/man1/ssh-agent.1* %attr(0644,root,root) %{_mandir}/man1/ssh-add.1* %attr(0644,root,root) %{_mandir}/man1/ssh-keyscan.1* %attr(0644,root,root) %{_mandir}/man1/sftp.1* %endif %if ! %{rescue} %files server %defattr(-,root,root) %dir %attr(0111,root,root) %{_var}/empty/sshd %attr(0755,root,root) %{_sbindir}/sshd %attr(0755,root,root) %{_libexecdir}/openssh/sftp-server %attr(0644,root,root) %{_mandir}/man8/sshd.8* %attr(0644,root,root) %{_mandir}/man5/moduli.5* %attr(0644,root,root) %{_mandir}/man5/sshd_config.5* %attr(0644,root,root) %{_mandir}/man8/sftp-server.8* %attr(0755,root,root) %dir %{_sysconfdir}/ssh %attr(0600,root,root) %config(noreplace) %{_sysconfdir}/ssh/sshd_config %attr(0600,root,root) %config(noreplace) /etc/pam.d/sshd %attr(0755,root,root) %config /etc/rc.d/init.d/sshd %endif %if ! %{no_x11_askpass} %files askpass %defattr(-,root,root) %doc x11-ssh-askpass-%{aversion}/README %doc x11-ssh-askpass-%{aversion}/ChangeLog %doc x11-ssh-askpass-%{aversion}/SshAskpass*.ad %{_libexecdir}/openssh/ssh-askpass %attr(0755,root,root) %{_libexecdir}/openssh/x11-ssh-askpass %endif %if ! %{no_gnome_askpass} %files askpass-gnome %defattr(-,root,root) %attr(0755,root,root) %config %{_sysconfdir}/profile.d/gnome-ssh-askpass.* %attr(0755,root,root) %{_libexecdir}/openssh/gnome-ssh-askpass %endif %changelog * Thu Oct 28 2021 Damien Miller - Remove remaining traces of --with-md5-passwords * Mon Jul 20 2020 Damien Miller - Add ssh-sk-helper and corresponding manual page. * Sat Feb 10 2018 Darren Tucker - Update openssl-devel dependency to match current requirements. - Handle Fedora >=6 openssl 1.0 compat libs. - Remove SSH1 from description. - Don't strip binaries at build time so that debuginfo package can be created. * Sun Nov 16 2014 Nico Kadel-Garcia - Add '--mandir' and '--with-mantype' for RHEL 5 compatibility - Add 'dist' option to 'ver' so package names reflect OS at build time - Always include x11-ssh-askpass tarball in SRPM - Add openssh-x11-aspass BuildRequires for libXT-devel, imake, gtk2-devel - Discard 'K5DIR' reporting, not usable inside 'mock' for RHEL 5 compatibility - Discard obsolete '--with-rsh' configure option - Update openssl-devel dependency to 0.9.8f, as found in autoconf * Wed Jul 14 2010 Tim Rice - test for skip_x11_askpass (line 77) should have been for no_x11_askpass * Mon Jun 2 2003 Damien Miller - Remove noip6 option. This may be controlled at run-time in client config file using new AddressFamily directive * Mon May 12 2003 Damien Miller - Don't install profile.d scripts when not building with GNOME/GTK askpass (patch from bet@rahul.net) * Tue Oct 01 2002 Damien Miller - Install ssh-agent setgid nobody to prevent ptrace() key theft attacks * Mon Sep 30 2002 Damien Miller - Use contrib/ Makefile for building askpass programs * Fri Jun 21 2002 Damien Miller - Merge in spec changes from seba@iq.pl (Sebastian Pachuta) - Add new {ssh,sshd}_config.5 manpages - Add new ssh-keysign program and remove setuid from ssh client * Fri May 10 2002 Damien Miller - Merge in spec changes from RedHat, reorgansie a little - Add Privsep user, group and directory * Thu Mar 7 2002 Nalin Dahyabhai 3.1p1-2 - bump and grind (through the build system) * Thu Mar 7 2002 Nalin Dahyabhai 3.1p1-1 - require sharutils for building (mindrot #137) - require db1-devel only when building for 6.x (#55105), which probably won't work anyway (3.1 requires OpenSSL 0.9.6 to build), but what the heck - require pam-devel by file (not by package name) again - add Markus's patch to compile with OpenSSL 0.9.5a (from http://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=141) and apply it if we're building for 6.x * Thu Mar 7 2002 Nalin Dahyabhai 3.1p1-0 - update to 3.1p1 * Tue Mar 5 2002 Nalin Dahyabhai SNAP-20020305 - update to SNAP-20020305 - drop debug patch, fixed upstream * Wed Feb 20 2002 Nalin Dahyabhai SNAP-20020220 - update to SNAP-20020220 for testing purposes (you've been warned, if there's anything to be warned about, gss patches won't apply, I don't mind) * Wed Feb 13 2002 Nalin Dahyabhai 3.0.2p1-3 - add patches from Simon Wilkinson and Nicolas Williams for GSSAPI key exchange, authentication, and named key support * Wed Jan 23 2002 Nalin Dahyabhai 3.0.2p1-2 - remove dependency on db1-devel, which has just been swallowed up whole by gnome-libs-devel * Sat Dec 29 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai - adjust build dependencies so that build6x actually works right (fix from Hugo van der Kooij) * Tue Dec 4 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai 3.0.2p1-1 - update to 3.0.2p1 * Fri Nov 16 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai 3.0.1p1-1 - update to 3.0.1p1 * Tue Nov 13 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai - update to current CVS (not for use in distribution) * Thu Nov 8 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai 3.0p1-1 - merge some of Damien Miller changes from the upstream 3.0p1 spec file and init script * Wed Nov 7 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai - update to 3.0p1 - update to x11-ssh-askpass 1.2.4.1 - change build dependency on a file from pam-devel to the pam-devel package - replace primes with moduli * Thu Sep 27 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai 2.9p2-9 - incorporate fix from Markus Friedl's advisory for IP-based authorization bugs * Thu Sep 13 2001 Bernhard Rosenkraenzer 2.9p2-8 - Merge changes to rescue build from current sysadmin survival cd * Thu Sep 6 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai 2.9p2-7 - fix scp's server's reporting of file sizes, and build with the proper preprocessor define to get large-file capable open(), stat(), etc. (sftp has been doing this correctly all along) (#51827) - configure without --with-ipv4-default on RHL 7.x and newer (#45987,#52247) - pull cvs patch to fix support for /etc/nologin for non-PAM logins (#47298) - mark profile.d scriptlets as config files (#42337) - refer to Jason Stone's mail for zsh workaround for exit-hanging quasi-bug - change a couple of log() statements to debug() statements (#50751) - pull cvs patch to add -t flag to sshd (#28611) - clear fd_sets correctly (one bit per FD, not one byte per FD) (#43221) * Mon Aug 20 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai 2.9p2-6 - add db1-devel as a BuildPrerequisite (noted by Hans Ecke) * Thu Aug 16 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai - pull cvs patch to fix remote port forwarding with protocol 2 * Thu Aug 9 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai - pull cvs patch to add session initialization to no-pty sessions - pull cvs patch to not cut off challengeresponse auth needlessly - refuse to do X11 forwarding if xauth isn't there, handy if you enable it by default on a system that doesn't have X installed (#49263) * Wed Aug 8 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai - don't apply patches to code we don't intend to build (spotted by Matt Galgoci) * Mon Aug 6 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai - pass OPTIONS correctly to initlog (#50151) * Wed Jul 25 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai - switch to x11-ssh-askpass 1.2.2 * Wed Jul 11 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai - rebuild in new environment * Mon Jun 25 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai - disable the gssapi patch * Mon Jun 18 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai - update to 2.9p2 - refresh to a new version of the gssapi patch * Thu Jun 7 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai - change Copyright: BSD to License: BSD - add Markus Friedl's unverified patch for the cookie file deletion problem so that we can verify it - drop patch to check if xauth is present (was folded into cookie patch) - don't apply gssapi patches for the errata candidate - clear supplemental groups list at startup * Fri May 25 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai - fix an error parsing the new default sshd_config - add a fix from Markus Friedl (via openssh-unix-dev) for ssh-keygen not dealing with comments right * Thu May 24 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai - add in Simon Wilkinson's GSSAPI patch to give it some testing in-house, to be removed before the next beta cycle because it's a big departure from the upstream version * Thu May 3 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai - finish marking strings in the init script for translation - modify init script to source /etc/sysconfig/sshd and pass $OPTIONS to sshd at startup (change merged from openssh.com init script, originally by Pekka Savola) - refuse to do X11 forwarding if xauth isn't there, handy if you enable it by default on a system that doesn't have X installed * Wed May 2 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai - update to 2.9 - drop various patches that came from or went upstream or to or from CVS * Wed Apr 18 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai - only require initscripts 5.00 on 6.2 (reported by Peter Bieringer) * Sun Apr 8 2001 Preston Brown - remove explicit openssl requirement, fixes builddistro issue - make initscript stop() function wait until sshd really dead to avoid races in condrestart * Mon Apr 2 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai - mention that challengereponse supports PAM, so disabling password doesn't limit users to pubkey and rsa auth (#34378) - bypass the daemon() function in the init script and call initlog directly, because daemon() won't start a daemon it detects is already running (like open connections) - require the version of openssl we had when we were built * Fri Mar 23 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai - make do_pam_setcred() smart enough to know when to establish creds and when to reinitialize them - add in a couple of other fixes from Damien for inclusion in the errata * Thu Mar 22 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai - update to 2.5.2p2 - call setcred() again after initgroups, because the "creds" could actually be group memberships * Tue Mar 20 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai - update to 2.5.2p1 (includes endianness fixes in the rijndael implementation) - don't enable challenge-response by default until we find a way to not have too many userauth requests (we may make up to six pubkey and up to three password attempts as it is) - remove build dependency on rsh to match openssh.com's packages more closely * Sat Mar 3 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai - remove dependency on openssl -- would need to be too precise * Fri Mar 2 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai - rebuild in new environment * Mon Feb 26 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai - Revert the patch to move pam_open_session. - Init script and spec file changes from Pekka Savola. (#28750) - Patch sftp to recognize '-o protocol' arguments. (#29540) * Thu Feb 22 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai - Chuck the closing patch. - Add a trigger to add host keys for protocol 2 to the config file, now that configuration file syntax requires us to specify it with HostKey if we specify any other HostKey values, which we do. * Tue Feb 20 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai - Redo patch to move pam_open_session after the server setuid()s to the user. - Rework the nopam patch to use be picked up by autoconf. * Mon Feb 19 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai - Update for 2.5.1p1. - Add init script mods from Pekka Savola. - Tweak the init script to match the CVS contrib script more closely. - Redo patch to ssh-add to try to adding both identity and id_dsa to also try adding id_rsa. * Fri Feb 16 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai - Update for 2.5.0p1. - Use $RPM_OPT_FLAGS instead of -O when building gnome-ssh-askpass - Resync with parts of Damien Miller's openssh.spec from CVS, including update of x11 askpass to 1.2.0. - Only require openssl (don't prereq) because we generate keys in the init script now. * Tue Feb 13 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai - Don't open a PAM session until we've forked and become the user (#25690). - Apply Andrew Bartlett's patch for letting pam_authenticate() know which host the user is attempting a login from. - Resync with parts of Damien Miller's openssh.spec from CVS. - Don't expose KbdInt responses in debug messages (from CVS). - Detect and handle errors in rsa_{public,private}_decrypt (from CVS). * Wed Feb 7 2001 Trond Eivind Glomsrxd - i18n-tweak to initscript. * Tue Jan 23 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai - More gettextizing. - Close all files after going into daemon mode (needs more testing). - Extract patch from CVS to handle auth banners (in the client). - Extract patch from CVS to handle compat weirdness. * Fri Jan 19 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai - Finish with the gettextizing. * Thu Jan 18 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai - Fix a bug in auth2-pam.c (#23877) - Gettextize the init script. * Wed Dec 20 2000 Nalin Dahyabhai - Incorporate a switch for using PAM configs for 6.x, just in case. * Tue Dec 5 2000 Nalin Dahyabhai - Incorporate Bero's changes for a build specifically for rescue CDs. * Wed Nov 29 2000 Nalin Dahyabhai - Don't treat pam_setcred() failure as fatal unless pam_authenticate() has succeeded, to allow public-key authentication after a failure with "none" authentication. (#21268) * Tue Nov 28 2000 Nalin Dahyabhai - Update to x11-askpass 1.1.1. (#21301) - Don't second-guess fixpaths, which causes paths to get fixed twice. (#21290) * Mon Nov 27 2000 Nalin Dahyabhai - Merge multiple PAM text messages into subsequent prompts when possible when doing keyboard-interactive authentication. * Sun Nov 26 2000 Nalin Dahyabhai - Disable the built-in MD5 password support. We're using PAM. - Take a crack at doing keyboard-interactive authentication with PAM, and enable use of it in the default client configuration so that the client will try it when the server disallows password authentication. - Build with debugging flags. Build root policies strip all binaries anyway. * Tue Nov 21 2000 Nalin Dahyabhai - Use DESTDIR instead of %%makeinstall. - Remove /usr/X11R6/bin from the path-fixing patch. * Mon Nov 20 2000 Nalin Dahyabhai - Add the primes file from the latest snapshot to the main package (#20884). - Add the dev package to the prereq list (#19984). - Remove the default path and mimic login's behavior in the server itself. * Fri Nov 17 2000 Nalin Dahyabhai - Resync with conditional options in Damien Miller's .spec file for an errata. - Change libexecdir from %%{_libexecdir}/ssh to %%{_libexecdir}/openssh. * Tue Nov 7 2000 Nalin Dahyabhai - Update to OpenSSH 2.3.0p1. - Update to x11-askpass 1.1.0. - Enable keyboard-interactive authentication. * Mon Oct 30 2000 Nalin Dahyabhai - Update to ssh-askpass-x11 1.0.3. - Change authentication related messages to be private (#19966). * Tue Oct 10 2000 Nalin Dahyabhai - Patch ssh-keygen to be able to list signatures for DSA public key files it generates. * Thu Oct 5 2000 Nalin Dahyabhai - Add BuildRequires on /usr/include/security/pam_appl.h to be sure we always build PAM authentication in. - Try setting SSH_ASKPASS if gnome-ssh-askpass is installed. - Clean out no-longer-used patches. - Patch ssh-add to try to add both identity and id_dsa, and to error only when neither exists. * Mon Oct 2 2000 Nalin Dahyabhai - Update x11-askpass to 1.0.2. (#17835) - Add BuildRequiress for /bin/login and /usr/bin/rsh so that configure will always find them in the right place. (#17909) - Set the default path to be the same as the one supplied by /bin/login, but add /usr/X11R6/bin. (#17909) - Try to handle obsoletion of ssh-server more cleanly. Package names are different, but init script name isn't. (#17865) * Wed Sep 6 2000 Nalin Dahyabhai - Update to 2.2.0p1. (#17835) - Tweak the init script to allow proper restarting. (#18023) * Wed Aug 23 2000 Nalin Dahyabhai - Update to 20000823 snapshot. - Change subpackage requirements from %%{version} to %%{version}-%%{release} - Back out the pipe patch. * Mon Jul 17 2000 Nalin Dahyabhai - Update to 2.1.1p4, which includes fixes for config file parsing problems. - Move the init script back. - Add Damien's quick fix for wackiness. * Wed Jul 12 2000 Nalin Dahyabhai - Update to 2.1.1p3, which includes fixes for X11 forwarding and strtok(). * Thu Jul 6 2000 Nalin Dahyabhai - Move condrestart to server postun. - Move key generation to init script. - Actually use the right patch for moving the key generation to the init script. - Clean up the init script a bit. * Wed Jul 5 2000 Nalin Dahyabhai - Fix X11 forwarding, from mail post by Chan Shih-Ping Richard. * Sun Jul 2 2000 Nalin Dahyabhai - Update to 2.1.1p2. - Use of strtok() considered harmful. * Sat Jul 1 2000 Nalin Dahyabhai - Get the build root out of the man pages. * Thu Jun 29 2000 Nalin Dahyabhai - Add and use condrestart support in the init script. - Add newer initscripts as a prereq. * Tue Jun 27 2000 Nalin Dahyabhai - Build in new environment (release 2) - Move -clients subpackage to Applications/Internet group * Fri Jun 9 2000 Nalin Dahyabhai - Update to 2.2.1p1 * Sat Jun 3 2000 Nalin Dahyabhai - Patch to build with neither RSA nor RSAref. - Miscellaneous FHS-compliance tweaks. - Fix for possibly-compressed man pages. * Wed Mar 15 2000 Damien Miller - Updated for new location - Updated for new gnome-ssh-askpass build * Sun Dec 26 1999 Damien Miller - Added Jim Knoble's askpass * Mon Nov 15 1999 Damien Miller - Split subpackages further based on patch from jim knoble * Sat Nov 13 1999 Damien Miller - Added 'Obsoletes' directives * Tue Nov 09 1999 Damien Miller - Use make install - Subpackages * Mon Nov 08 1999 Damien Miller - Added links for slogin - Fixed perms on manpages * Sat Oct 30 1999 Damien Miller - Renamed init script * Fri Oct 29 1999 Damien Miller - Back to old binary names * Thu Oct 28 1999 Damien Miller - Use autoconf - New binary names * Wed Oct 27 1999 Damien Miller - Initial RPMification, based on Jan "Yenya" Kasprzak's spec. diff --git a/crypto/openssh/contrib/suse/openssh.spec b/crypto/openssh/contrib/suse/openssh.spec index e533ed542ce1..406b7c0b8606 100644 --- a/crypto/openssh/contrib/suse/openssh.spec +++ b/crypto/openssh/contrib/suse/openssh.spec @@ -1,245 +1,245 @@ # Default values for additional components %define build_x11_askpass 1 # Define the UID/GID to use for privilege separation %define sshd_gid 65 %define sshd_uid 71 # The version of x11-ssh-askpass to use %define xversion 1.2.4.1 # Allow the ability to override defaults with -D skip_xxx=1 %{?skip_x11_askpass:%define build_x11_askpass 0} Summary: OpenSSH, a free Secure Shell (SSH) protocol implementation Name: openssh -Version: 9.2p1 +Version: 9.3p1 URL: https://www.openssh.com/ Release: 1 Source0: openssh-%{version}.tar.gz Source1: x11-ssh-askpass-%{xversion}.tar.gz License: BSD Group: Productivity/Networking/SSH BuildRoot: %{_tmppath}/openssh-%{version}-buildroot PreReq: openssl Obsoletes: ssh Provides: ssh # # (Build[ing] Prereq[uisites] only work for RPM 2.95 and newer.) # building prerequisites -- stuff for # OpenSSL (openssl-devel), # and Gnome (glibdev, gtkdev, and gnlibsd) # BuildPrereq: openssl BuildPrereq: zlib-devel #BuildPrereq: glibdev #BuildPrereq: gtkdev #BuildPrereq: gnlibsd %package askpass Summary: A passphrase dialog for OpenSSH and the X window System. Group: Productivity/Networking/SSH Requires: openssh = %{version} Obsoletes: ssh-extras Provides: openssh:${_libdir}/ssh/ssh-askpass %if %{build_x11_askpass} BuildPrereq: XFree86-devel %endif %description Ssh (Secure Shell) is a program for logging into a remote machine and for executing commands in a remote machine. It is intended to replace rlogin and rsh, and provide secure encrypted communications between two untrusted hosts over an insecure network. X11 connections and arbitrary TCP/IP ports can also be forwarded over the secure channel. OpenSSH is OpenBSD's rework of the last free version of SSH, bringing it up to date in terms of security and features, as well as removing all patented algorithms to separate libraries (OpenSSL). This package includes all files necessary for both the OpenSSH client and server. %description askpass Ssh (Secure Shell) is a program for logging into a remote machine and for executing commands in a remote machine. It is intended to replace rlogin and rsh, and provide secure encrypted communications between two untrusted hosts over an insecure network. X11 connections and arbitrary TCP/IP ports can also be forwarded over the secure channel. OpenSSH is OpenBSD's rework of the last free version of SSH, bringing it up to date in terms of security and features, as well as removing all patented algorithms to separate libraries (OpenSSL). This package contains an X Window System passphrase dialog for OpenSSH. %changelog * Mon Jul 20 2020 Damien Miller - Add ssh-sk-helper and corresponding manual page. * Wed Oct 26 2005 Iain Morgan - Removed accidental inclusion of --without-zlib-version-check * Tue Oct 25 2005 Iain Morgan - Overhaul to deal with newer versions of SuSE and OpenSSH * Mon Jun 12 2000 Damien Miller - Glob manpages to catch compressed files * Wed Mar 15 2000 Damien Miller - Updated for new location - Updated for new gnome-ssh-askpass build * Sun Dec 26 1999 Chris Saia - Made symlink to gnome-ssh-askpass called ssh-askpass * Wed Nov 24 1999 Chris Saia - Removed patches that included /etc/pam.d/sshd, /sbin/init.d/rc.sshd, and /var/adm/fillup-templates/rc.config.sshd, since Damien merged these into his released tarfile - Changed permissions on ssh_config in the install procedure to 644 from 600 even though it was correct in the %files section and thus right in the RPMs - Postinstall script for the server now only prints "Generating SSH host key..." if we need to actually do this, in order to eliminate a confusing message if an SSH host key is already in place - Marked all manual pages as %doc(umentation) * Mon Nov 22 1999 Chris Saia - Added flag to configure daemon with TCP Wrappers support - Added building prerequisites (works in RPM 3.0 and newer) * Thu Nov 18 1999 Chris Saia - Made this package correct for SuSE. - Changed instances of pam_pwdb.so to pam_unix.so, since it works more properly with SuSE, and lib_pwdb.so isn't installed by default. * Mon Nov 15 1999 Damien Miller - Split subpackages further based on patch from jim knoble * Sat Nov 13 1999 Damien Miller - Added 'Obsoletes' directives * Tue Nov 09 1999 Damien Miller - Use make install - Subpackages * Mon Nov 08 1999 Damien Miller - Added links for slogin - Fixed perms on manpages * Sat Oct 30 1999 Damien Miller - Renamed init script * Fri Oct 29 1999 Damien Miller - Back to old binary names * Thu Oct 28 1999 Damien Miller - Use autoconf - New binary names * Wed Oct 27 1999 Damien Miller - Initial RPMification, based on Jan "Yenya" Kasprzak's spec. %prep %if %{build_x11_askpass} %setup -q -a 1 %else %setup -q %endif %build CFLAGS="$RPM_OPT_FLAGS" \ %configure --prefix=/usr \ --sysconfdir=%{_sysconfdir}/ssh \ --mandir=%{_mandir} \ --with-privsep-path=/var/lib/empty \ --with-pam \ --libexecdir=%{_libdir}/ssh make %if %{build_x11_askpass} cd x11-ssh-askpass-%{xversion} %configure --mandir=/usr/X11R6/man \ --libexecdir=%{_libdir}/ssh xmkmf -a make cd .. %endif %install rm -rf $RPM_BUILD_ROOT make install DESTDIR=$RPM_BUILD_ROOT/ install -d $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/etc/pam.d/ install -d $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/etc/init.d/ install -d $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/var/adm/fillup-templates install -m644 contrib/sshd.pam.generic $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/etc/pam.d/sshd install -m744 contrib/suse/rc.sshd $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/etc/init.d/sshd install -m744 contrib/suse/sysconfig.ssh \ $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/var/adm/fillup-templates %if %{build_x11_askpass} cd x11-ssh-askpass-%{xversion} make install install.man BINDIR=%{_libdir}/ssh DESTDIR=$RPM_BUILD_ROOT/ rm -f $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/usr/share/Ssh.bin %endif %clean rm -rf $RPM_BUILD_ROOT %pre /usr/sbin/groupadd -g %{sshd_gid} -o -r sshd 2> /dev/null || : /usr/sbin/useradd -r -o -g sshd -u %{sshd_uid} -s /bin/false -c "SSH Privilege Separation User" -d /var/lib/sshd sshd 2> /dev/null || : %post /usr/bin/ssh-keygen -A %{fillup_and_insserv -n -y ssh sshd} %run_permissions %verifyscript %verify_permissions -e /etc/ssh/sshd_config -e /etc/ssh/ssh_config -e /usr/bin/ssh %preun %stop_on_removal sshd %postun %restart_on_update sshd %{insserv_cleanup} %files %defattr(-,root,root) %doc ChangeLog OVERVIEW README* PROTOCOL* %doc TODO CREDITS LICENCE %attr(0755,root,root) %dir %{_sysconfdir}/ssh %attr(0644,root,root) %config(noreplace) %{_sysconfdir}/ssh/ssh_config %attr(0600,root,root) %config(noreplace) %{_sysconfdir}/ssh/sshd_config %attr(0600,root,root) %config(noreplace) %{_sysconfdir}/ssh/moduli %attr(0644,root,root) %config(noreplace) /etc/pam.d/sshd %attr(0755,root,root) %config /etc/init.d/sshd %attr(0755,root,root) %{_bindir}/ssh-keygen %attr(0755,root,root) %{_bindir}/scp %attr(0755,root,root) %{_bindir}/ssh %attr(0755,root,root) %{_bindir}/ssh-agent %attr(0755,root,root) %{_bindir}/ssh-add %attr(0755,root,root) %{_bindir}/ssh-keyscan %attr(0755,root,root) %{_bindir}/sftp %attr(0755,root,root) %{_sbindir}/sshd %attr(0755,root,root) %dir %{_libdir}/ssh %attr(0755,root,root) %{_libdir}/ssh/sftp-server %attr(4711,root,root) %{_libdir}/ssh/ssh-keysign %attr(0755,root,root) %{_libdir}/ssh/ssh-pkcs11-helper %attr(0755,root,root) %{_libdir}/ssh/ssh-sk-helper %attr(0644,root,root) %doc %{_mandir}/man1/scp.1* %attr(0644,root,root) %doc %{_mandir}/man1/sftp.1* %attr(0644,root,root) %doc %{_mandir}/man1/ssh.1* %attr(0644,root,root) %doc %{_mandir}/man1/ssh-add.1* %attr(0644,root,root) %doc %{_mandir}/man1/ssh-agent.1* %attr(0644,root,root) %doc %{_mandir}/man1/ssh-keygen.1* %attr(0644,root,root) %doc %{_mandir}/man1/ssh-keyscan.1* %attr(0644,root,root) %doc %{_mandir}/man5/moduli.5* %attr(0644,root,root) %doc %{_mandir}/man5/ssh_config.5* %attr(0644,root,root) %doc %{_mandir}/man5/sshd_config.5* %attr(0644,root,root) %doc %{_mandir}/man8/sftp-server.8* %attr(0644,root,root) %doc %{_mandir}/man8/ssh-keysign.8* %attr(0644,root,root) %doc %{_mandir}/man8/ssh-pkcs11-helper.8* %attr(0644,root,root) %doc %{_mandir}/man8/ssh-sk-helper.8* %attr(0644,root,root) %doc %{_mandir}/man8/sshd.8* %attr(0644,root,root) /var/adm/fillup-templates/sysconfig.ssh %if %{build_x11_askpass} %files askpass %defattr(-,root,root) %doc x11-ssh-askpass-%{xversion}/README %doc x11-ssh-askpass-%{xversion}/ChangeLog %doc x11-ssh-askpass-%{xversion}/SshAskpass*.ad %attr(0755,root,root) %{_libdir}/ssh/ssh-askpass %attr(0755,root,root) %{_libdir}/ssh/x11-ssh-askpass %attr(0644,root,root) %doc /usr/X11R6/man/man1/ssh-askpass.1x* %attr(0644,root,root) %doc /usr/X11R6/man/man1/x11-ssh-askpass.1x* %attr(0644,root,root) %config /usr/X11R6/lib/X11/app-defaults/SshAskpass %endif diff --git a/crypto/openssh/dispatch.c b/crypto/openssh/dispatch.c index 6e4c501e0573..6118147bf140 100644 --- a/crypto/openssh/dispatch.c +++ b/crypto/openssh/dispatch.c @@ -1,135 +1,134 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: dispatch.c,v 1.32 2019/01/19 21:33:13 djm Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: dispatch.c,v 1.33 2023/03/05 05:34:09 dtucker Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. */ #include "includes.h" #include #include #include #include "ssh2.h" #include "log.h" #include "dispatch.h" #include "packet.h" -#include "compat.h" #include "ssherr.h" int dispatch_protocol_error(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh) { int r; logit("dispatch_protocol_error: type %d seq %u", type, seq); if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_UNIMPLEMENTED)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, seq)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0 || (r = ssh_packet_write_wait(ssh)) != 0) sshpkt_fatal(ssh, r, "%s", __func__); return 0; } int dispatch_protocol_ignore(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh) { logit("dispatch_protocol_ignore: type %d seq %u", type, seq); return 0; } void ssh_dispatch_init(struct ssh *ssh, dispatch_fn *dflt) { u_int i; for (i = 0; i < DISPATCH_MAX; i++) ssh->dispatch[i] = dflt; } void ssh_dispatch_range(struct ssh *ssh, u_int from, u_int to, dispatch_fn *fn) { u_int i; for (i = from; i <= to; i++) { if (i >= DISPATCH_MAX) break; ssh->dispatch[i] = fn; } } void ssh_dispatch_set(struct ssh *ssh, int type, dispatch_fn *fn) { ssh->dispatch[type] = fn; } int ssh_dispatch_run(struct ssh *ssh, int mode, volatile sig_atomic_t *done) { int r; u_char type; u_int32_t seqnr; for (;;) { if (mode == DISPATCH_BLOCK) { r = ssh_packet_read_seqnr(ssh, &type, &seqnr); if (r != 0) return r; } else { r = ssh_packet_read_poll_seqnr(ssh, &type, &seqnr); if (r != 0) return r; if (type == SSH_MSG_NONE) return 0; } if (type > 0 && type < DISPATCH_MAX && ssh->dispatch[type] != NULL) { if (ssh->dispatch_skip_packets) { debug2("skipped packet (type %u)", type); ssh->dispatch_skip_packets--; continue; } r = (*ssh->dispatch[type])(type, seqnr, ssh); if (r != 0) return r; } else { r = sshpkt_disconnect(ssh, "protocol error: rcvd type %d", type); if (r != 0) return r; return SSH_ERR_DISCONNECTED; } if (done != NULL && *done) return 0; } } void ssh_dispatch_run_fatal(struct ssh *ssh, int mode, volatile sig_atomic_t *done) { int r; if ((r = ssh_dispatch_run(ssh, mode, done)) != 0) sshpkt_fatal(ssh, r, "%s", __func__); } diff --git a/crypto/openssh/dns.c b/crypto/openssh/dns.c index f2310bec2b08..939241440777 100644 --- a/crypto/openssh/dns.c +++ b/crypto/openssh/dns.c @@ -1,340 +1,344 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: dns.c,v 1.42 2022/02/01 23:32:51 djm Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: dns.c,v 1.44 2023/03/10 04:06:21 dtucker Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2003 Wesley Griffin. All rights reserved. * Copyright (c) 2003 Jakob Schlyter. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. */ #include "includes.h" #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include "xmalloc.h" #include "sshkey.h" #include "ssherr.h" #include "dns.h" #include "log.h" #include "digest.h" static const char * const errset_text[] = { "success", /* 0 ERRSET_SUCCESS */ "out of memory", /* 1 ERRSET_NOMEMORY */ "general failure", /* 2 ERRSET_FAIL */ "invalid parameter", /* 3 ERRSET_INVAL */ "name does not exist", /* 4 ERRSET_NONAME */ "data does not exist", /* 5 ERRSET_NODATA */ }; static const char * dns_result_totext(unsigned int res) { switch (res) { case ERRSET_SUCCESS: return errset_text[ERRSET_SUCCESS]; case ERRSET_NOMEMORY: return errset_text[ERRSET_NOMEMORY]; case ERRSET_FAIL: return errset_text[ERRSET_FAIL]; case ERRSET_INVAL: return errset_text[ERRSET_INVAL]; case ERRSET_NONAME: return errset_text[ERRSET_NONAME]; case ERRSET_NODATA: return errset_text[ERRSET_NODATA]; default: return "unknown error"; } } /* * Read SSHFP parameters from key buffer. * Caller must free digest which is allocated by sshkey_fingerprint_raw(). */ static int dns_read_key(u_int8_t *algorithm, u_int8_t *digest_type, u_char **digest, size_t *digest_len, struct sshkey *key) { int r, success = 0; int fp_alg = -1; switch (key->type) { case KEY_RSA: *algorithm = SSHFP_KEY_RSA; break; case KEY_DSA: *algorithm = SSHFP_KEY_DSA; break; case KEY_ECDSA: *algorithm = SSHFP_KEY_ECDSA; break; case KEY_ED25519: *algorithm = SSHFP_KEY_ED25519; break; case KEY_XMSS: *algorithm = SSHFP_KEY_XMSS; break; default: *algorithm = SSHFP_KEY_RESERVED; /* 0 */ } switch (*digest_type) { case SSHFP_HASH_SHA1: fp_alg = SSH_DIGEST_SHA1; break; case SSHFP_HASH_SHA256: fp_alg = SSH_DIGEST_SHA256; break; default: *digest_type = SSHFP_HASH_RESERVED; /* 0 */ } if (*algorithm && *digest_type) { if ((r = sshkey_fingerprint_raw(key, fp_alg, digest, digest_len)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "sshkey_fingerprint_raw"); success = 1; } else { *digest = NULL; *digest_len = 0; } return success; } /* * Read SSHFP parameters from rdata buffer. */ static int dns_read_rdata(u_int8_t *algorithm, u_int8_t *digest_type, u_char **digest, size_t *digest_len, u_char *rdata, int rdata_len) { int success = 0; *algorithm = SSHFP_KEY_RESERVED; *digest_type = SSHFP_HASH_RESERVED; if (rdata_len >= 2) { *algorithm = rdata[0]; *digest_type = rdata[1]; *digest_len = rdata_len - 2; if (*digest_len > 0) { *digest = xmalloc(*digest_len); memcpy(*digest, rdata + 2, *digest_len); } else { *digest = (u_char *)xstrdup(""); } success = 1; } return success; } /* * Check if hostname is numerical. * Returns -1 if hostname is numeric, 0 otherwise */ static int is_numeric_hostname(const char *hostname) { struct addrinfo hints, *ai; /* * We shouldn't ever get a null host but if we do then log an error * and return -1 which stops DNS key fingerprint processing. */ if (hostname == NULL) { error("is_numeric_hostname called with NULL hostname"); return -1; } memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints)); hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_DGRAM; hints.ai_flags = AI_NUMERICHOST; if (getaddrinfo(hostname, NULL, &hints, &ai) == 0) { freeaddrinfo(ai); return -1; } return 0; } /* * Verify the given hostname, address and host key using DNS. * Returns 0 if lookup succeeds, -1 otherwise */ int verify_host_key_dns(const char *hostname, struct sockaddr *address, struct sshkey *hostkey, int *flags) { u_int counter; int result; struct rrsetinfo *fingerprints = NULL; u_int8_t hostkey_algorithm; u_char *hostkey_digest; size_t hostkey_digest_len; u_int8_t dnskey_algorithm; u_int8_t dnskey_digest_type; u_char *dnskey_digest; size_t dnskey_digest_len; *flags = 0; debug3("verify_host_key_dns"); if (hostkey == NULL) fatal("No key to look up!"); if (is_numeric_hostname(hostname)) { debug("skipped DNS lookup for numerical hostname"); return -1; } result = getrrsetbyname(hostname, DNS_RDATACLASS_IN, DNS_RDATATYPE_SSHFP, 0, &fingerprints); if (result) { verbose("DNS lookup error: %s", dns_result_totext(result)); return -1; } if (fingerprints->rri_flags & RRSET_VALIDATED) { *flags |= DNS_VERIFY_SECURE; debug("found %d secure fingerprints in DNS", fingerprints->rri_nrdatas); } else { debug("found %d insecure fingerprints in DNS", fingerprints->rri_nrdatas); } if (fingerprints->rri_nrdatas) *flags |= DNS_VERIFY_FOUND; for (counter = 0; counter < fingerprints->rri_nrdatas; counter++) { /* * Extract the key from the answer. Ignore any badly * formatted fingerprints. */ if (!dns_read_rdata(&dnskey_algorithm, &dnskey_digest_type, &dnskey_digest, &dnskey_digest_len, fingerprints->rri_rdatas[counter].rdi_data, fingerprints->rri_rdatas[counter].rdi_length)) { verbose("Error parsing fingerprint from DNS."); continue; } debug3_f("checking SSHFP type %d fptype %d", dnskey_algorithm, dnskey_digest_type); /* Calculate host key fingerprint. */ if (!dns_read_key(&hostkey_algorithm, &dnskey_digest_type, &hostkey_digest, &hostkey_digest_len, hostkey)) { error("Error calculating key fingerprint."); + free(dnskey_digest); freerrset(fingerprints); return -1; } /* Check if the current key is the same as the given key */ if (hostkey_algorithm == dnskey_algorithm && hostkey_digest_len == dnskey_digest_len) { if (timingsafe_bcmp(hostkey_digest, dnskey_digest, hostkey_digest_len) == 0) { debug_f("matched SSHFP type %d fptype %d", dnskey_algorithm, dnskey_digest_type); *flags |= DNS_VERIFY_MATCH; } else { debug_f("failed SSHFP type %d fptype %d", dnskey_algorithm, dnskey_digest_type); *flags |= DNS_VERIFY_FAILED; } } free(dnskey_digest); free(hostkey_digest); /* from sshkey_fingerprint_raw() */ } freerrset(fingerprints); /* If any fingerprint failed to validate, return failure. */ if (*flags & DNS_VERIFY_FAILED) *flags &= ~DNS_VERIFY_MATCH; if (*flags & DNS_VERIFY_FOUND) if (*flags & DNS_VERIFY_MATCH) debug("matching host key fingerprint found in DNS"); else debug("mismatching host key fingerprint found in DNS"); else debug("no host key fingerprint found in DNS"); return 0; } /* * Export the fingerprint of a key as a DNS resource record */ int -export_dns_rr(const char *hostname, struct sshkey *key, FILE *f, int generic) +export_dns_rr(const char *hostname, struct sshkey *key, FILE *f, int generic, + int alg) { u_int8_t rdata_pubkey_algorithm = 0; u_int8_t rdata_digest_type = SSHFP_HASH_RESERVED; u_int8_t dtype; u_char *rdata_digest; size_t i, rdata_digest_len; int success = 0; for (dtype = SSHFP_HASH_SHA1; dtype < SSHFP_HASH_MAX; dtype++) { + if (alg != -1 && dtype != alg) + continue; rdata_digest_type = dtype; if (dns_read_key(&rdata_pubkey_algorithm, &rdata_digest_type, &rdata_digest, &rdata_digest_len, key)) { if (generic) { fprintf(f, "%s IN TYPE%d \\# %zu %02x %02x ", hostname, DNS_RDATATYPE_SSHFP, 2 + rdata_digest_len, rdata_pubkey_algorithm, rdata_digest_type); } else { fprintf(f, "%s IN SSHFP %d %d ", hostname, rdata_pubkey_algorithm, rdata_digest_type); } for (i = 0; i < rdata_digest_len; i++) fprintf(f, "%02x", rdata_digest[i]); fprintf(f, "\n"); free(rdata_digest); /* from sshkey_fingerprint_raw() */ success = 1; } } /* No SSHFP record was generated at all */ if (success == 0) { error_f("unsupported algorithm and/or digest_type"); } return success; } diff --git a/crypto/openssh/dns.h b/crypto/openssh/dns.h index c9b61c4f28f8..864ab7d00ac7 100644 --- a/crypto/openssh/dns.h +++ b/crypto/openssh/dns.h @@ -1,59 +1,59 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: dns.h,v 1.19 2021/07/19 03:13:28 dtucker Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: dns.h,v 1.20 2023/02/10 04:56:30 djm Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2003 Wesley Griffin. All rights reserved. * Copyright (c) 2003 Jakob Schlyter. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. */ #ifndef DNS_H #define DNS_H enum sshfp_types { SSHFP_KEY_RESERVED = 0, SSHFP_KEY_RSA = 1, SSHFP_KEY_DSA = 2, SSHFP_KEY_ECDSA = 3, SSHFP_KEY_ED25519 = 4, SSHFP_KEY_XMSS = 5 }; enum sshfp_hashes { SSHFP_HASH_RESERVED = 0, SSHFP_HASH_SHA1 = 1, SSHFP_HASH_SHA256 = 2, SSHFP_HASH_MAX = 3 }; #define DNS_RDATACLASS_IN 1 #define DNS_RDATATYPE_SSHFP 44 #define DNS_VERIFY_FOUND 0x00000001 #define DNS_VERIFY_MATCH 0x00000002 #define DNS_VERIFY_SECURE 0x00000004 #define DNS_VERIFY_FAILED 0x00000008 int verify_host_key_dns(const char *, struct sockaddr *, struct sshkey *, int *); -int export_dns_rr(const char *, struct sshkey *, FILE *, int); +int export_dns_rr(const char *, struct sshkey *, FILE *, int, int); #endif /* DNS_H */ diff --git a/crypto/openssh/hostfile.c b/crypto/openssh/hostfile.c index bd49e3ac7c48..c5669c703735 100644 --- a/crypto/openssh/hostfile.c +++ b/crypto/openssh/hostfile.c @@ -1,937 +1,946 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: hostfile.c,v 1.93 2022/01/06 22:02:52 djm Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: hostfile.c,v 1.95 2023/02/21 06:48:18 dtucker Exp $ */ /* * Author: Tatu Ylonen * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen , Espoo, Finland * All rights reserved * Functions for manipulating the known hosts files. * * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell". * * * Copyright (c) 1999, 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. * Copyright (c) 1999 Niels Provos. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. */ #include "includes.h" #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include "xmalloc.h" #include "match.h" #include "sshkey.h" #include "hostfile.h" #include "log.h" #include "misc.h" #include "pathnames.h" #include "ssherr.h" #include "digest.h" #include "hmac.h" #include "sshbuf.h" /* XXX hmac is too easy to dictionary attack; use bcrypt? */ static int extract_salt(const char *s, u_int l, u_char *salt, size_t salt_len) { char *p, *b64salt; u_int b64len; int ret; if (l < sizeof(HASH_MAGIC) - 1) { debug2("extract_salt: string too short"); return (-1); } if (strncmp(s, HASH_MAGIC, sizeof(HASH_MAGIC) - 1) != 0) { debug2("extract_salt: invalid magic identifier"); return (-1); } s += sizeof(HASH_MAGIC) - 1; l -= sizeof(HASH_MAGIC) - 1; if ((p = memchr(s, HASH_DELIM, l)) == NULL) { debug2("extract_salt: missing salt termination character"); return (-1); } b64len = p - s; /* Sanity check */ if (b64len == 0 || b64len > 1024) { debug2("extract_salt: bad encoded salt length %u", b64len); return (-1); } b64salt = xmalloc(1 + b64len); memcpy(b64salt, s, b64len); b64salt[b64len] = '\0'; ret = __b64_pton(b64salt, salt, salt_len); free(b64salt); if (ret == -1) { debug2("extract_salt: salt decode error"); return (-1); } if (ret != (int)ssh_hmac_bytes(SSH_DIGEST_SHA1)) { debug2("extract_salt: expected salt len %zd, got %d", ssh_hmac_bytes(SSH_DIGEST_SHA1), ret); return (-1); } return (0); } char * host_hash(const char *host, const char *name_from_hostfile, u_int src_len) { struct ssh_hmac_ctx *ctx; u_char salt[256], result[256]; char uu_salt[512], uu_result[512]; char *encoded = NULL; u_int len; len = ssh_digest_bytes(SSH_DIGEST_SHA1); if (name_from_hostfile == NULL) { /* Create new salt */ arc4random_buf(salt, len); } else { /* Extract salt from known host entry */ if (extract_salt(name_from_hostfile, src_len, salt, sizeof(salt)) == -1) return (NULL); } if ((ctx = ssh_hmac_start(SSH_DIGEST_SHA1)) == NULL || ssh_hmac_init(ctx, salt, len) < 0 || ssh_hmac_update(ctx, host, strlen(host)) < 0 || ssh_hmac_final(ctx, result, sizeof(result))) fatal_f("ssh_hmac failed"); ssh_hmac_free(ctx); if (__b64_ntop(salt, len, uu_salt, sizeof(uu_salt)) == -1 || __b64_ntop(result, len, uu_result, sizeof(uu_result)) == -1) fatal_f("__b64_ntop failed"); xasprintf(&encoded, "%s%s%c%s", HASH_MAGIC, uu_salt, HASH_DELIM, uu_result); return (encoded); } /* * Parses an RSA (number of bits, e, n) or DSA key from a string. Moves the * pointer over the key. Skips any whitespace at the beginning and at end. */ int hostfile_read_key(char **cpp, u_int *bitsp, struct sshkey *ret) { char *cp; /* Skip leading whitespace. */ for (cp = *cpp; *cp == ' ' || *cp == '\t'; cp++) ; if (sshkey_read(ret, &cp) != 0) return 0; /* Skip trailing whitespace. */ for (; *cp == ' ' || *cp == '\t'; cp++) ; /* Return results. */ *cpp = cp; if (bitsp != NULL) *bitsp = sshkey_size(ret); return 1; } static HostkeyMarker check_markers(char **cpp) { char marker[32], *sp, *cp = *cpp; int ret = MRK_NONE; while (*cp == '@') { /* Only one marker is allowed */ if (ret != MRK_NONE) return MRK_ERROR; /* Markers are terminated by whitespace */ if ((sp = strchr(cp, ' ')) == NULL && (sp = strchr(cp, '\t')) == NULL) return MRK_ERROR; /* Extract marker for comparison */ if (sp <= cp + 1 || sp >= cp + sizeof(marker)) return MRK_ERROR; memcpy(marker, cp, sp - cp); marker[sp - cp] = '\0'; if (strcmp(marker, CA_MARKER) == 0) ret = MRK_CA; else if (strcmp(marker, REVOKE_MARKER) == 0) ret = MRK_REVOKE; else return MRK_ERROR; /* Skip past marker and any whitespace that follows it */ cp = sp; for (; *cp == ' ' || *cp == '\t'; cp++) ; } *cpp = cp; return ret; } struct hostkeys * init_hostkeys(void) { struct hostkeys *ret = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*ret)); ret->entries = NULL; return ret; } struct load_callback_ctx { const char *host; u_long num_loaded; struct hostkeys *hostkeys; }; static int record_hostkey(struct hostkey_foreach_line *l, void *_ctx) { struct load_callback_ctx *ctx = (struct load_callback_ctx *)_ctx; struct hostkeys *hostkeys = ctx->hostkeys; struct hostkey_entry *tmp; if (l->status == HKF_STATUS_INVALID) { /* XXX make this verbose() in the future */ debug("%s:%ld: parse error in hostkeys file", l->path, l->linenum); return 0; } debug3_f("found %skey type %s in file %s:%lu", l->marker == MRK_NONE ? "" : (l->marker == MRK_CA ? "ca " : "revoked "), sshkey_type(l->key), l->path, l->linenum); if ((tmp = recallocarray(hostkeys->entries, hostkeys->num_entries, hostkeys->num_entries + 1, sizeof(*hostkeys->entries))) == NULL) return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; hostkeys->entries = tmp; hostkeys->entries[hostkeys->num_entries].host = xstrdup(ctx->host); hostkeys->entries[hostkeys->num_entries].file = xstrdup(l->path); hostkeys->entries[hostkeys->num_entries].line = l->linenum; hostkeys->entries[hostkeys->num_entries].key = l->key; l->key = NULL; /* steal it */ hostkeys->entries[hostkeys->num_entries].marker = l->marker; hostkeys->entries[hostkeys->num_entries].note = l->note; hostkeys->num_entries++; ctx->num_loaded++; return 0; } void load_hostkeys_file(struct hostkeys *hostkeys, const char *host, const char *path, FILE *f, u_int note) { int r; struct load_callback_ctx ctx; ctx.host = host; ctx.num_loaded = 0; ctx.hostkeys = hostkeys; if ((r = hostkeys_foreach_file(path, f, record_hostkey, &ctx, host, NULL, HKF_WANT_MATCH|HKF_WANT_PARSE_KEY, note)) != 0) { if (r != SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR && errno != ENOENT) debug_fr(r, "hostkeys_foreach failed for %s", path); } if (ctx.num_loaded != 0) debug3_f("loaded %lu keys from %s", ctx.num_loaded, host); } void load_hostkeys(struct hostkeys *hostkeys, const char *host, const char *path, u_int note) { FILE *f; if ((f = fopen(path, "r")) == NULL) { debug_f("fopen %s: %s", path, strerror(errno)); return; } load_hostkeys_file(hostkeys, host, path, f, note); fclose(f); } void free_hostkeys(struct hostkeys *hostkeys) { u_int i; for (i = 0; i < hostkeys->num_entries; i++) { free(hostkeys->entries[i].host); free(hostkeys->entries[i].file); sshkey_free(hostkeys->entries[i].key); explicit_bzero(hostkeys->entries + i, sizeof(*hostkeys->entries)); } free(hostkeys->entries); freezero(hostkeys, sizeof(*hostkeys)); } static int check_key_not_revoked(struct hostkeys *hostkeys, struct sshkey *k) { int is_cert = sshkey_is_cert(k); u_int i; for (i = 0; i < hostkeys->num_entries; i++) { if (hostkeys->entries[i].marker != MRK_REVOKE) continue; if (sshkey_equal_public(k, hostkeys->entries[i].key)) return -1; if (is_cert && k != NULL && sshkey_equal_public(k->cert->signature_key, hostkeys->entries[i].key)) return -1; } return 0; } /* * Match keys against a specified key, or look one up by key type. * * If looking for a keytype (key == NULL) and one is found then return * HOST_FOUND, otherwise HOST_NEW. * * If looking for a key (key != NULL): * 1. If the key is a cert and a matching CA is found, return HOST_OK * 2. If the key is not a cert and a matching key is found, return HOST_OK * 3. If no key matches but a key with a different type is found, then * return HOST_CHANGED * 4. If no matching keys are found, then return HOST_NEW. * * Finally, check any found key is not revoked. */ static HostStatus check_hostkeys_by_key_or_type(struct hostkeys *hostkeys, struct sshkey *k, int keytype, int nid, const struct hostkey_entry **found) { u_int i; HostStatus end_return = HOST_NEW; int want_cert = sshkey_is_cert(k); HostkeyMarker want_marker = want_cert ? MRK_CA : MRK_NONE; if (found != NULL) *found = NULL; for (i = 0; i < hostkeys->num_entries; i++) { if (hostkeys->entries[i].marker != want_marker) continue; if (k == NULL) { if (hostkeys->entries[i].key->type != keytype) continue; if (nid != -1 && sshkey_type_plain(keytype) == KEY_ECDSA && hostkeys->entries[i].key->ecdsa_nid != nid) continue; end_return = HOST_FOUND; if (found != NULL) *found = hostkeys->entries + i; k = hostkeys->entries[i].key; break; } if (want_cert) { if (sshkey_equal_public(k->cert->signature_key, hostkeys->entries[i].key)) { /* A matching CA exists */ end_return = HOST_OK; if (found != NULL) *found = hostkeys->entries + i; break; } } else { if (sshkey_equal(k, hostkeys->entries[i].key)) { end_return = HOST_OK; if (found != NULL) *found = hostkeys->entries + i; break; } /* A non-matching key exists */ end_return = HOST_CHANGED; if (found != NULL) *found = hostkeys->entries + i; } } if (check_key_not_revoked(hostkeys, k) != 0) { end_return = HOST_REVOKED; if (found != NULL) *found = NULL; } return end_return; } HostStatus check_key_in_hostkeys(struct hostkeys *hostkeys, struct sshkey *key, const struct hostkey_entry **found) { if (key == NULL) fatal("no key to look up"); return check_hostkeys_by_key_or_type(hostkeys, key, 0, -1, found); } int lookup_key_in_hostkeys_by_type(struct hostkeys *hostkeys, int keytype, int nid, const struct hostkey_entry **found) { return (check_hostkeys_by_key_or_type(hostkeys, NULL, keytype, nid, found) == HOST_FOUND); } int lookup_marker_in_hostkeys(struct hostkeys *hostkeys, int want_marker) { u_int i; for (i = 0; i < hostkeys->num_entries; i++) { if (hostkeys->entries[i].marker == (HostkeyMarker)want_marker) return 1; } return 0; } static int write_host_entry(FILE *f, const char *host, const char *ip, const struct sshkey *key, int store_hash) { int r, success = 0; char *hashed_host = NULL, *lhost; lhost = xstrdup(host); lowercase(lhost); if (store_hash) { if ((hashed_host = host_hash(lhost, NULL, 0)) == NULL) { error_f("host_hash failed"); free(lhost); return 0; } fprintf(f, "%s ", hashed_host); } else if (ip != NULL) fprintf(f, "%s,%s ", lhost, ip); else { fprintf(f, "%s ", lhost); } free(hashed_host); free(lhost); if ((r = sshkey_write(key, f)) == 0) success = 1; else error_fr(r, "sshkey_write"); fputc('\n', f); /* If hashing is enabled, the IP address needs to go on its own line */ if (success && store_hash && ip != NULL) success = write_host_entry(f, ip, NULL, key, 1); return success; } /* * Create user ~/.ssh directory if it doesn't exist and we want to write to it. * If notify is set, a message will be emitted if the directory is created. */ void hostfile_create_user_ssh_dir(const char *filename, int notify) { char *dotsshdir = NULL, *p; size_t len; struct stat st; if ((p = strrchr(filename, '/')) == NULL) return; len = p - filename; dotsshdir = tilde_expand_filename("~/" _PATH_SSH_USER_DIR, getuid()); if (strlen(dotsshdir) > len || strncmp(filename, dotsshdir, len) != 0) goto out; /* not ~/.ssh prefixed */ if (stat(dotsshdir, &st) == 0) goto out; /* dir already exists */ else if (errno != ENOENT) error("Could not stat %s: %s", dotsshdir, strerror(errno)); else { #ifdef WITH_SELINUX ssh_selinux_setfscreatecon(dotsshdir); #endif if (mkdir(dotsshdir, 0700) == -1) error("Could not create directory '%.200s' (%s).", dotsshdir, strerror(errno)); else if (notify) logit("Created directory '%s'.", dotsshdir); #ifdef WITH_SELINUX ssh_selinux_setfscreatecon(NULL); #endif } out: free(dotsshdir); } /* * Appends an entry to the host file. Returns false if the entry could not * be appended. */ int add_host_to_hostfile(const char *filename, const char *host, const struct sshkey *key, int store_hash) { FILE *f; - int success; + int success, addnl = 0; if (key == NULL) return 1; /* XXX ? */ hostfile_create_user_ssh_dir(filename, 0); - f = fopen(filename, "a"); + f = fopen(filename, "a+"); if (!f) return 0; + /* Make sure we have a terminating newline. */ + if (fseek(f, -1L, SEEK_END) == 0 && fgetc(f) != '\n') + addnl = 1; + if (fseek(f, 0L, SEEK_END) != 0 || (addnl && fputc('\n', f) != '\n')) { + error("Failed to add terminating newline to %s: %s", + filename, strerror(errno)); + fclose(f); + return 0; + } success = write_host_entry(f, host, NULL, key, store_hash); fclose(f); return success; } struct host_delete_ctx { FILE *out; int quiet; const char *host, *ip; u_int *match_keys; /* mask of HKF_MATCH_* for this key */ struct sshkey * const *keys; size_t nkeys; int modified; }; static int host_delete(struct hostkey_foreach_line *l, void *_ctx) { struct host_delete_ctx *ctx = (struct host_delete_ctx *)_ctx; int loglevel = ctx->quiet ? SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG1 : SYSLOG_LEVEL_VERBOSE; size_t i; /* Don't remove CA and revocation lines */ if (l->status == HKF_STATUS_MATCHED && l->marker == MRK_NONE) { /* * If this line contains one of the keys that we will be * adding later, then don't change it and mark the key for * skipping. */ for (i = 0; i < ctx->nkeys; i++) { if (!sshkey_equal(ctx->keys[i], l->key)) continue; ctx->match_keys[i] |= l->match; fprintf(ctx->out, "%s\n", l->line); debug3_f("%s key already at %s:%ld", sshkey_type(l->key), l->path, l->linenum); return 0; } /* * Hostname matches and has no CA/revoke marker, delete it * by *not* writing the line to ctx->out. */ do_log2(loglevel, "%s%s%s:%ld: Removed %s key for host %s", ctx->quiet ? __func__ : "", ctx->quiet ? ": " : "", l->path, l->linenum, sshkey_type(l->key), ctx->host); ctx->modified = 1; return 0; } /* Retain non-matching hosts and invalid lines when deleting */ if (l->status == HKF_STATUS_INVALID) { do_log2(loglevel, "%s%s%s:%ld: invalid known_hosts entry", ctx->quiet ? __func__ : "", ctx->quiet ? ": " : "", l->path, l->linenum); } fprintf(ctx->out, "%s\n", l->line); return 0; } int hostfile_replace_entries(const char *filename, const char *host, const char *ip, struct sshkey **keys, size_t nkeys, int store_hash, int quiet, int hash_alg) { int r, fd, oerrno = 0; int loglevel = quiet ? SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG1 : SYSLOG_LEVEL_VERBOSE; struct host_delete_ctx ctx; char *fp, *temp = NULL, *back = NULL; const char *what; mode_t omask; size_t i; u_int want; omask = umask(077); memset(&ctx, 0, sizeof(ctx)); ctx.host = host; ctx.ip = ip; ctx.quiet = quiet; if ((ctx.match_keys = calloc(nkeys, sizeof(*ctx.match_keys))) == NULL) return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; ctx.keys = keys; ctx.nkeys = nkeys; ctx.modified = 0; /* * Prepare temporary file for in-place deletion. */ if ((r = asprintf(&temp, "%s.XXXXXXXXXXX", filename)) == -1 || (r = asprintf(&back, "%s.old", filename)) == -1) { r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; goto fail; } if ((fd = mkstemp(temp)) == -1) { oerrno = errno; error_f("mkstemp: %s", strerror(oerrno)); r = SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR; goto fail; } if ((ctx.out = fdopen(fd, "w")) == NULL) { oerrno = errno; close(fd); error_f("fdopen: %s", strerror(oerrno)); r = SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR; goto fail; } /* Remove stale/mismatching entries for the specified host */ if ((r = hostkeys_foreach(filename, host_delete, &ctx, host, ip, HKF_WANT_PARSE_KEY, 0)) != 0) { oerrno = errno; error_fr(r, "hostkeys_foreach"); goto fail; } /* Re-add the requested keys */ want = HKF_MATCH_HOST | (ip == NULL ? 0 : HKF_MATCH_IP); for (i = 0; i < nkeys; i++) { if (keys[i] == NULL || (want & ctx.match_keys[i]) == want) continue; if ((fp = sshkey_fingerprint(keys[i], hash_alg, SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL) { r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; goto fail; } /* write host/ip */ what = ""; if (ctx.match_keys[i] == 0) { what = "Adding new key"; if (!write_host_entry(ctx.out, host, ip, keys[i], store_hash)) { r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; goto fail; } } else if ((want & ~ctx.match_keys[i]) == HKF_MATCH_HOST) { what = "Fixing match (hostname)"; if (!write_host_entry(ctx.out, host, NULL, keys[i], store_hash)) { r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; goto fail; } } else if ((want & ~ctx.match_keys[i]) == HKF_MATCH_IP) { what = "Fixing match (address)"; if (!write_host_entry(ctx.out, ip, NULL, keys[i], store_hash)) { r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; goto fail; } } do_log2(loglevel, "%s%s%s for %s%s%s to %s: %s %s", quiet ? __func__ : "", quiet ? ": " : "", what, host, ip == NULL ? "" : ",", ip == NULL ? "" : ip, filename, sshkey_ssh_name(keys[i]), fp); free(fp); ctx.modified = 1; } fclose(ctx.out); ctx.out = NULL; if (ctx.modified) { /* Backup the original file and replace it with the temporary */ if (unlink(back) == -1 && errno != ENOENT) { oerrno = errno; error_f("unlink %.100s: %s", back, strerror(errno)); r = SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR; goto fail; } if (link(filename, back) == -1) { oerrno = errno; error_f("link %.100s to %.100s: %s", filename, back, strerror(errno)); r = SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR; goto fail; } if (rename(temp, filename) == -1) { oerrno = errno; error_f("rename \"%s\" to \"%s\": %s", temp, filename, strerror(errno)); r = SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR; goto fail; } } else { /* No changes made; just delete the temporary file */ if (unlink(temp) != 0) error_f("unlink \"%s\": %s", temp, strerror(errno)); } /* success */ r = 0; fail: if (temp != NULL && r != 0) unlink(temp); free(temp); free(back); if (ctx.out != NULL) fclose(ctx.out); free(ctx.match_keys); umask(omask); if (r == SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR) errno = oerrno; return r; } static int match_maybe_hashed(const char *host, const char *names, int *was_hashed) { int hashed = *names == HASH_DELIM, ret; char *hashed_host = NULL; size_t nlen = strlen(names); if (was_hashed != NULL) *was_hashed = hashed; if (hashed) { if ((hashed_host = host_hash(host, names, nlen)) == NULL) return -1; ret = (nlen == strlen(hashed_host) && strncmp(hashed_host, names, nlen) == 0); free(hashed_host); return ret; } return match_hostname(host, names) == 1; } int hostkeys_foreach_file(const char *path, FILE *f, hostkeys_foreach_fn *callback, void *ctx, const char *host, const char *ip, u_int options, u_int note) { char *line = NULL, ktype[128]; u_long linenum = 0; char *cp, *cp2; u_int kbits; int hashed; int s, r = 0; struct hostkey_foreach_line lineinfo; size_t linesize = 0, l; memset(&lineinfo, 0, sizeof(lineinfo)); if (host == NULL && (options & HKF_WANT_MATCH) != 0) return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; while (getline(&line, &linesize, f) != -1) { linenum++; line[strcspn(line, "\n")] = '\0'; free(lineinfo.line); sshkey_free(lineinfo.key); memset(&lineinfo, 0, sizeof(lineinfo)); lineinfo.path = path; lineinfo.linenum = linenum; lineinfo.line = xstrdup(line); lineinfo.marker = MRK_NONE; lineinfo.status = HKF_STATUS_OK; lineinfo.keytype = KEY_UNSPEC; lineinfo.note = note; /* Skip any leading whitespace, comments and empty lines. */ for (cp = line; *cp == ' ' || *cp == '\t'; cp++) ; if (!*cp || *cp == '#' || *cp == '\n') { if ((options & HKF_WANT_MATCH) == 0) { lineinfo.status = HKF_STATUS_COMMENT; if ((r = callback(&lineinfo, ctx)) != 0) break; } continue; } if ((lineinfo.marker = check_markers(&cp)) == MRK_ERROR) { verbose_f("invalid marker at %s:%lu", path, linenum); if ((options & HKF_WANT_MATCH) == 0) goto bad; continue; } /* Find the end of the host name portion. */ for (cp2 = cp; *cp2 && *cp2 != ' ' && *cp2 != '\t'; cp2++) ; lineinfo.hosts = cp; *cp2++ = '\0'; /* Check if the host name matches. */ if (host != NULL) { if ((s = match_maybe_hashed(host, lineinfo.hosts, &hashed)) == -1) { debug2_f("%s:%ld: bad host hash \"%.32s\"", path, linenum, lineinfo.hosts); goto bad; } if (s == 1) { lineinfo.status = HKF_STATUS_MATCHED; lineinfo.match |= HKF_MATCH_HOST | (hashed ? HKF_MATCH_HOST_HASHED : 0); } /* Try matching IP address if supplied */ if (ip != NULL) { if ((s = match_maybe_hashed(ip, lineinfo.hosts, &hashed)) == -1) { debug2_f("%s:%ld: bad ip hash " "\"%.32s\"", path, linenum, lineinfo.hosts); goto bad; } if (s == 1) { lineinfo.status = HKF_STATUS_MATCHED; lineinfo.match |= HKF_MATCH_IP | (hashed ? HKF_MATCH_IP_HASHED : 0); } } /* * Skip this line if host matching requested and * neither host nor address matched. */ if ((options & HKF_WANT_MATCH) != 0 && lineinfo.status != HKF_STATUS_MATCHED) continue; } /* Got a match. Skip host name and any following whitespace */ for (; *cp2 == ' ' || *cp2 == '\t'; cp2++) ; if (*cp2 == '\0' || *cp2 == '#') { debug2("%s:%ld: truncated before key type", path, linenum); goto bad; } lineinfo.rawkey = cp = cp2; if ((options & HKF_WANT_PARSE_KEY) != 0) { /* * Extract the key from the line. This will skip * any leading whitespace. Ignore badly formatted * lines. */ if ((lineinfo.key = sshkey_new(KEY_UNSPEC)) == NULL) { error_f("sshkey_new failed"); r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; break; } if (!hostfile_read_key(&cp, &kbits, lineinfo.key)) { goto bad; } lineinfo.keytype = lineinfo.key->type; lineinfo.comment = cp; } else { /* Extract and parse key type */ l = strcspn(lineinfo.rawkey, " \t"); if (l <= 1 || l >= sizeof(ktype) || lineinfo.rawkey[l] == '\0') goto bad; memcpy(ktype, lineinfo.rawkey, l); ktype[l] = '\0'; lineinfo.keytype = sshkey_type_from_name(ktype); /* * Assume legacy RSA1 if the first component is a short * decimal number. */ if (lineinfo.keytype == KEY_UNSPEC && l < 8 && strspn(ktype, "0123456789") == l) goto bad; /* * Check that something other than whitespace follows * the key type. This won't catch all corruption, but * it does catch trivial truncation. */ cp2 += l; /* Skip past key type */ for (; *cp2 == ' ' || *cp2 == '\t'; cp2++) ; if (*cp2 == '\0' || *cp2 == '#') { debug2("%s:%ld: truncated after key type", path, linenum); lineinfo.keytype = KEY_UNSPEC; } if (lineinfo.keytype == KEY_UNSPEC) { bad: sshkey_free(lineinfo.key); lineinfo.key = NULL; lineinfo.status = HKF_STATUS_INVALID; if ((r = callback(&lineinfo, ctx)) != 0) break; continue; } } if ((r = callback(&lineinfo, ctx)) != 0) break; } sshkey_free(lineinfo.key); free(lineinfo.line); free(line); return r; } int hostkeys_foreach(const char *path, hostkeys_foreach_fn *callback, void *ctx, const char *host, const char *ip, u_int options, u_int note) { FILE *f; int r, oerrno; if ((f = fopen(path, "r")) == NULL) return SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR; debug3_f("reading file \"%s\"", path); r = hostkeys_foreach_file(path, f, callback, ctx, host, ip, options, note); oerrno = errno; fclose(f); errno = oerrno; return r; } diff --git a/crypto/openssh/kex.c b/crypto/openssh/kex.c index 8cdefcf7cbb9..b4e2ab75f541 100644 --- a/crypto/openssh/kex.c +++ b/crypto/openssh/kex.c @@ -1,1421 +1,1477 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: kex.c,v 1.173 2022/11/07 10:05:38 dtucker Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: kex.c,v 1.178 2023/03/12 10:40:39 dtucker Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2000, 2001 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. */ #include "includes.h" #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #ifdef HAVE_POLL_H #include #endif #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL #include #include #endif #include "ssh.h" #include "ssh2.h" #include "atomicio.h" #include "version.h" #include "packet.h" #include "compat.h" #include "cipher.h" #include "sshkey.h" #include "kex.h" #include "log.h" #include "mac.h" #include "match.h" #include "misc.h" #include "dispatch.h" #include "monitor.h" +#include "myproposal.h" #include "ssherr.h" #include "sshbuf.h" #include "digest.h" +#include "xmalloc.h" /* prototype */ static int kex_choose_conf(struct ssh *); static int kex_input_newkeys(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *); static const char * const proposal_names[PROPOSAL_MAX] = { "KEX algorithms", "host key algorithms", "ciphers ctos", "ciphers stoc", "MACs ctos", "MACs stoc", "compression ctos", "compression stoc", "languages ctos", "languages stoc", }; struct kexalg { char *name; u_int type; int ec_nid; int hash_alg; }; static const struct kexalg kexalgs[] = { #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL { KEX_DH1, KEX_DH_GRP1_SHA1, 0, SSH_DIGEST_SHA1 }, { KEX_DH14_SHA1, KEX_DH_GRP14_SHA1, 0, SSH_DIGEST_SHA1 }, { KEX_DH14_SHA256, KEX_DH_GRP14_SHA256, 0, SSH_DIGEST_SHA256 }, { KEX_DH16_SHA512, KEX_DH_GRP16_SHA512, 0, SSH_DIGEST_SHA512 }, { KEX_DH18_SHA512, KEX_DH_GRP18_SHA512, 0, SSH_DIGEST_SHA512 }, { KEX_DHGEX_SHA1, KEX_DH_GEX_SHA1, 0, SSH_DIGEST_SHA1 }, #ifdef HAVE_EVP_SHA256 { KEX_DHGEX_SHA256, KEX_DH_GEX_SHA256, 0, SSH_DIGEST_SHA256 }, #endif /* HAVE_EVP_SHA256 */ #ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC { KEX_ECDH_SHA2_NISTP256, KEX_ECDH_SHA2, NID_X9_62_prime256v1, SSH_DIGEST_SHA256 }, { KEX_ECDH_SHA2_NISTP384, KEX_ECDH_SHA2, NID_secp384r1, SSH_DIGEST_SHA384 }, # ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_NISTP521 { KEX_ECDH_SHA2_NISTP521, KEX_ECDH_SHA2, NID_secp521r1, SSH_DIGEST_SHA512 }, # endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_NISTP521 */ #endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */ #endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */ #if defined(HAVE_EVP_SHA256) || !defined(WITH_OPENSSL) { KEX_CURVE25519_SHA256, KEX_C25519_SHA256, 0, SSH_DIGEST_SHA256 }, { KEX_CURVE25519_SHA256_OLD, KEX_C25519_SHA256, 0, SSH_DIGEST_SHA256 }, #ifdef USE_SNTRUP761X25519 { KEX_SNTRUP761X25519_SHA512, KEX_KEM_SNTRUP761X25519_SHA512, 0, SSH_DIGEST_SHA512 }, #endif #endif /* HAVE_EVP_SHA256 || !WITH_OPENSSL */ { NULL, 0, -1, -1}, }; char * kex_alg_list(char sep) { char *ret = NULL, *tmp; size_t nlen, rlen = 0; const struct kexalg *k; for (k = kexalgs; k->name != NULL; k++) { if (ret != NULL) ret[rlen++] = sep; nlen = strlen(k->name); if ((tmp = realloc(ret, rlen + nlen + 2)) == NULL) { free(ret); return NULL; } ret = tmp; memcpy(ret + rlen, k->name, nlen + 1); rlen += nlen; } return ret; } static const struct kexalg * kex_alg_by_name(const char *name) { const struct kexalg *k; for (k = kexalgs; k->name != NULL; k++) { if (strcmp(k->name, name) == 0) return k; } return NULL; } /* Validate KEX method name list */ int kex_names_valid(const char *names) { char *s, *cp, *p; if (names == NULL || strcmp(names, "") == 0) return 0; if ((s = cp = strdup(names)) == NULL) return 0; for ((p = strsep(&cp, ",")); p && *p != '\0'; (p = strsep(&cp, ","))) { if (kex_alg_by_name(p) == NULL) { error("Unsupported KEX algorithm \"%.100s\"", p); free(s); return 0; } } debug3("kex names ok: [%s]", names); free(s); return 1; } /* * Concatenate algorithm names, avoiding duplicates in the process. * Caller must free returned string. */ char * kex_names_cat(const char *a, const char *b) { char *ret = NULL, *tmp = NULL, *cp, *p, *m; size_t len; if (a == NULL || *a == '\0') return strdup(b); if (b == NULL || *b == '\0') return strdup(a); if (strlen(b) > 1024*1024) return NULL; len = strlen(a) + strlen(b) + 2; if ((tmp = cp = strdup(b)) == NULL || (ret = calloc(1, len)) == NULL) { free(tmp); return NULL; } strlcpy(ret, a, len); for ((p = strsep(&cp, ",")); p && *p != '\0'; (p = strsep(&cp, ","))) { if ((m = match_list(ret, p, NULL)) != NULL) { free(m); continue; /* Algorithm already present */ } if (strlcat(ret, ",", len) >= len || strlcat(ret, p, len) >= len) { free(tmp); free(ret); return NULL; /* Shouldn't happen */ } } free(tmp); return ret; } /* * Assemble a list of algorithms from a default list and a string from a * configuration file. The user-provided string may begin with '+' to * indicate that it should be appended to the default, '-' that the * specified names should be removed, or '^' that they should be placed * at the head. */ int kex_assemble_names(char **listp, const char *def, const char *all) { char *cp, *tmp, *patterns; char *list = NULL, *ret = NULL, *matching = NULL, *opatterns = NULL; int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; if (listp == NULL || def == NULL || all == NULL) return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; if (*listp == NULL || **listp == '\0') { if ((*listp = strdup(def)) == NULL) return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; return 0; } list = *listp; *listp = NULL; if (*list == '+') { /* Append names to default list */ if ((tmp = kex_names_cat(def, list + 1)) == NULL) { r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; goto fail; } free(list); list = tmp; } else if (*list == '-') { /* Remove names from default list */ if ((*listp = match_filter_denylist(def, list + 1)) == NULL) { r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; goto fail; } free(list); /* filtering has already been done */ return 0; } else if (*list == '^') { /* Place names at head of default list */ if ((tmp = kex_names_cat(list + 1, def)) == NULL) { r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; goto fail; } free(list); list = tmp; } else { /* Explicit list, overrides default - just use "list" as is */ } /* * The supplied names may be a pattern-list. For the -list case, * the patterns are applied above. For the +list and explicit list * cases we need to do it now. */ ret = NULL; if ((patterns = opatterns = strdup(list)) == NULL) { r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; goto fail; } /* Apply positive (i.e. non-negated) patterns from the list */ while ((cp = strsep(&patterns, ",")) != NULL) { if (*cp == '!') { /* negated matches are not supported here */ r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; goto fail; } free(matching); if ((matching = match_filter_allowlist(all, cp)) == NULL) { r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; goto fail; } if ((tmp = kex_names_cat(ret, matching)) == NULL) { r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; goto fail; } free(ret); ret = tmp; } if (ret == NULL || *ret == '\0') { /* An empty name-list is an error */ /* XXX better error code? */ r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; goto fail; } /* success */ *listp = ret; ret = NULL; r = 0; fail: free(matching); free(opatterns); free(list); free(ret); return r; } +/* + * Fill out a proposal array with dynamically allocated values, which may + * be modified as required for compatibility reasons. + * Any of the options may be NULL, in which case the default is used. + * Array contents must be freed by calling kex_proposal_free_entries. + */ +void +kex_proposal_populate_entries(struct ssh *ssh, char *prop[PROPOSAL_MAX], + const char *kexalgos, const char *ciphers, const char *macs, + const char *comp, const char *hkalgs) +{ + const char *defpropserver[PROPOSAL_MAX] = { KEX_SERVER }; + const char *defpropclient[PROPOSAL_MAX] = { KEX_CLIENT }; + const char **defprop = ssh->kex->server ? defpropserver : defpropclient; + u_int i; + + if (prop == NULL) + fatal_f("proposal missing"); + + for (i = 0; i < PROPOSAL_MAX; i++) { + switch(i) { + case PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS: + prop[i] = compat_kex_proposal(ssh, + kexalgos ? kexalgos : defprop[i]); + break; + case PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_CTOS: + case PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_STOC: + prop[i] = xstrdup(ciphers ? ciphers : defprop[i]); + break; + case PROPOSAL_MAC_ALGS_CTOS: + case PROPOSAL_MAC_ALGS_STOC: + prop[i] = xstrdup(macs ? macs : defprop[i]); + break; + case PROPOSAL_COMP_ALGS_CTOS: + case PROPOSAL_COMP_ALGS_STOC: + prop[i] = xstrdup(comp ? comp : defprop[i]); + break; + case PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS: + prop[i] = xstrdup(hkalgs ? hkalgs : defprop[i]); + break; + default: + prop[i] = xstrdup(defprop[i]); + } + } +} + +void +kex_proposal_free_entries(char *prop[PROPOSAL_MAX]) +{ + u_int i; + + for (i = 0; i < PROPOSAL_MAX; i++) + free(prop[i]); +} + /* put algorithm proposal into buffer */ int kex_prop2buf(struct sshbuf *b, char *proposal[PROPOSAL_MAX]) { u_int i; int r; sshbuf_reset(b); /* * add a dummy cookie, the cookie will be overwritten by * kex_send_kexinit(), each time a kexinit is set */ for (i = 0; i < KEX_COOKIE_LEN; i++) { if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(b, 0)) != 0) return r; } for (i = 0; i < PROPOSAL_MAX; i++) { if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, proposal[i])) != 0) return r; } if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(b, 0)) != 0 || /* first_kex_packet_follows */ (r = sshbuf_put_u32(b, 0)) != 0) /* uint32 reserved */ return r; return 0; } /* parse buffer and return algorithm proposal */ int kex_buf2prop(struct sshbuf *raw, int *first_kex_follows, char ***propp) { struct sshbuf *b = NULL; u_char v; u_int i; char **proposal = NULL; int r; *propp = NULL; if ((proposal = calloc(PROPOSAL_MAX, sizeof(char *))) == NULL) return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; if ((b = sshbuf_fromb(raw)) == NULL) { r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; goto out; } if ((r = sshbuf_consume(b, KEX_COOKIE_LEN)) != 0) { /* skip cookie */ error_fr(r, "consume cookie"); goto out; } /* extract kex init proposal strings */ for (i = 0; i < PROPOSAL_MAX; i++) { if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &(proposal[i]), NULL)) != 0) { error_fr(r, "parse proposal %u", i); goto out; } debug2("%s: %s", proposal_names[i], proposal[i]); } /* first kex follows / reserved */ if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(b, &v)) != 0 || /* first_kex_follows */ (r = sshbuf_get_u32(b, &i)) != 0) { /* reserved */ error_fr(r, "parse"); goto out; } if (first_kex_follows != NULL) *first_kex_follows = v; debug2("first_kex_follows %d ", v); debug2("reserved %u ", i); r = 0; *propp = proposal; out: if (r != 0 && proposal != NULL) kex_prop_free(proposal); sshbuf_free(b); return r; } void kex_prop_free(char **proposal) { u_int i; if (proposal == NULL) return; for (i = 0; i < PROPOSAL_MAX; i++) free(proposal[i]); free(proposal); } -/* ARGSUSED */ int kex_protocol_error(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh) { int r; error("kex protocol error: type %d seq %u", type, seq); if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_UNIMPLEMENTED)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, seq)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) return r; return 0; } static void kex_reset_dispatch(struct ssh *ssh) { ssh_dispatch_range(ssh, SSH2_MSG_TRANSPORT_MIN, SSH2_MSG_TRANSPORT_MAX, &kex_protocol_error); } static int kex_send_ext_info(struct ssh *ssh) { int r; char *algs; debug("Sending SSH2_MSG_EXT_INFO"); if ((algs = sshkey_alg_list(0, 1, 1, ',')) == NULL) return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; /* XXX filter algs list by allowed pubkey/hostbased types */ if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_EXT_INFO)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, 2)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, "server-sig-algs")) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, algs)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, "publickey-hostbound@openssh.com")) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, "0")) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) { error_fr(r, "compose"); goto out; } /* success */ r = 0; out: free(algs); return r; } int kex_send_newkeys(struct ssh *ssh) { int r; kex_reset_dispatch(ssh); if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) return r; debug("SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS sent"); ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS, &kex_input_newkeys); if (ssh->kex->ext_info_c && (ssh->kex->flags & KEX_INITIAL) != 0) if ((r = kex_send_ext_info(ssh)) != 0) return r; debug("expecting SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS"); return 0; } int kex_input_ext_info(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh) { struct kex *kex = ssh->kex; u_int32_t i, ninfo; char *name; u_char *val; size_t vlen; int r; debug("SSH2_MSG_EXT_INFO received"); ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_EXT_INFO, &kex_protocol_error); if ((r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &ninfo)) != 0) return r; + if (ninfo >= 1024) { + error("SSH2_MSG_EXT_INFO with too many entries, expected " + "<=1024, received %u", ninfo); + return SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; + } for (i = 0; i < ninfo; i++) { if ((r = sshpkt_get_cstring(ssh, &name, NULL)) != 0) return r; if ((r = sshpkt_get_string(ssh, &val, &vlen)) != 0) { free(name); return r; } if (strcmp(name, "server-sig-algs") == 0) { /* Ensure no \0 lurking in value */ if (memchr(val, '\0', vlen) != NULL) { error_f("nul byte in %s", name); return SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; } debug_f("%s=<%s>", name, val); kex->server_sig_algs = val; val = NULL; } else if (strcmp(name, "publickey-hostbound@openssh.com") == 0) { /* XXX refactor */ /* Ensure no \0 lurking in value */ if (memchr(val, '\0', vlen) != NULL) { error_f("nul byte in %s", name); return SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; } debug_f("%s=<%s>", name, val); if (strcmp(val, "0") == 0) kex->flags |= KEX_HAS_PUBKEY_HOSTBOUND; else { debug_f("unsupported version of %s extension", name); } } else debug_f("%s (unrecognised)", name); free(name); free(val); } return sshpkt_get_end(ssh); } static int kex_input_newkeys(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh) { struct kex *kex = ssh->kex; int r; debug("SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS received"); ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS, &kex_protocol_error); ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT, &kex_input_kexinit); if ((r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0) return r; if ((r = ssh_set_newkeys(ssh, MODE_IN)) != 0) return r; kex->done = 1; kex->flags &= ~KEX_INITIAL; sshbuf_reset(kex->peer); /* sshbuf_reset(kex->my); */ kex->flags &= ~KEX_INIT_SENT; free(kex->name); kex->name = NULL; return 0; } int kex_send_kexinit(struct ssh *ssh) { u_char *cookie; struct kex *kex = ssh->kex; int r; if (kex == NULL) { error_f("no kex"); return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; } if (kex->flags & KEX_INIT_SENT) return 0; kex->done = 0; /* generate a random cookie */ if (sshbuf_len(kex->my) < KEX_COOKIE_LEN) { error_f("bad kex length: %zu < %d", sshbuf_len(kex->my), KEX_COOKIE_LEN); return SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; } if ((cookie = sshbuf_mutable_ptr(kex->my)) == NULL) { error_f("buffer error"); return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; } arc4random_buf(cookie, KEX_COOKIE_LEN); if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_putb(ssh, kex->my)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) { error_fr(r, "compose reply"); return r; } debug("SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT sent"); kex->flags |= KEX_INIT_SENT; return 0; } -/* ARGSUSED */ int kex_input_kexinit(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh) { struct kex *kex = ssh->kex; const u_char *ptr; u_int i; size_t dlen; int r; debug("SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT received"); if (kex == NULL) { error_f("no kex"); return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; } ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT, NULL); ptr = sshpkt_ptr(ssh, &dlen); if ((r = sshbuf_put(kex->peer, ptr, dlen)) != 0) return r; /* discard packet */ for (i = 0; i < KEX_COOKIE_LEN; i++) { if ((r = sshpkt_get_u8(ssh, NULL)) != 0) { error_fr(r, "discard cookie"); return r; } } for (i = 0; i < PROPOSAL_MAX; i++) { if ((r = sshpkt_get_string(ssh, NULL, NULL)) != 0) { error_fr(r, "discard proposal"); return r; } } /* * XXX RFC4253 sec 7: "each side MAY guess" - currently no supported * KEX method has the server move first, but a server might be using * a custom method or one that we otherwise don't support. We should * be prepared to remember first_kex_follows here so we can eat a * packet later. * XXX2 - RFC4253 is kind of ambiguous on what first_kex_follows means * for cases where the server *doesn't* go first. I guess we should * ignore it when it is set for these cases, which is what we do now. */ if ((r = sshpkt_get_u8(ssh, NULL)) != 0 || /* first_kex_follows */ (r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, NULL)) != 0 || /* reserved */ (r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0) return r; if (!(kex->flags & KEX_INIT_SENT)) if ((r = kex_send_kexinit(ssh)) != 0) return r; if ((r = kex_choose_conf(ssh)) != 0) return r; if (kex->kex_type < KEX_MAX && kex->kex[kex->kex_type] != NULL) return (kex->kex[kex->kex_type])(ssh); error_f("unknown kex type %u", kex->kex_type); return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; } struct kex * kex_new(void) { struct kex *kex; if ((kex = calloc(1, sizeof(*kex))) == NULL || (kex->peer = sshbuf_new()) == NULL || (kex->my = sshbuf_new()) == NULL || (kex->client_version = sshbuf_new()) == NULL || (kex->server_version = sshbuf_new()) == NULL || (kex->session_id = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) { kex_free(kex); return NULL; } return kex; } void kex_free_newkeys(struct newkeys *newkeys) { if (newkeys == NULL) return; if (newkeys->enc.key) { explicit_bzero(newkeys->enc.key, newkeys->enc.key_len); free(newkeys->enc.key); newkeys->enc.key = NULL; } if (newkeys->enc.iv) { explicit_bzero(newkeys->enc.iv, newkeys->enc.iv_len); free(newkeys->enc.iv); newkeys->enc.iv = NULL; } free(newkeys->enc.name); explicit_bzero(&newkeys->enc, sizeof(newkeys->enc)); free(newkeys->comp.name); explicit_bzero(&newkeys->comp, sizeof(newkeys->comp)); mac_clear(&newkeys->mac); if (newkeys->mac.key) { explicit_bzero(newkeys->mac.key, newkeys->mac.key_len); free(newkeys->mac.key); newkeys->mac.key = NULL; } free(newkeys->mac.name); explicit_bzero(&newkeys->mac, sizeof(newkeys->mac)); freezero(newkeys, sizeof(*newkeys)); } void kex_free(struct kex *kex) { u_int mode; if (kex == NULL) return; #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL DH_free(kex->dh); #ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC EC_KEY_free(kex->ec_client_key); #endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */ #endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */ for (mode = 0; mode < MODE_MAX; mode++) { kex_free_newkeys(kex->newkeys[mode]); kex->newkeys[mode] = NULL; } sshbuf_free(kex->peer); sshbuf_free(kex->my); sshbuf_free(kex->client_version); sshbuf_free(kex->server_version); sshbuf_free(kex->client_pub); sshbuf_free(kex->session_id); sshbuf_free(kex->initial_sig); sshkey_free(kex->initial_hostkey); free(kex->failed_choice); free(kex->hostkey_alg); free(kex->name); free(kex); } int kex_ready(struct ssh *ssh, char *proposal[PROPOSAL_MAX]) { int r; if ((r = kex_prop2buf(ssh->kex->my, proposal)) != 0) return r; ssh->kex->flags = KEX_INITIAL; kex_reset_dispatch(ssh); ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT, &kex_input_kexinit); return 0; } int kex_setup(struct ssh *ssh, char *proposal[PROPOSAL_MAX]) { int r; if ((r = kex_ready(ssh, proposal)) != 0) return r; if ((r = kex_send_kexinit(ssh)) != 0) { /* we start */ kex_free(ssh->kex); ssh->kex = NULL; return r; } return 0; } /* * Request key re-exchange, returns 0 on success or a ssherr.h error * code otherwise. Must not be called if KEX is incomplete or in-progress. */ int kex_start_rekex(struct ssh *ssh) { if (ssh->kex == NULL) { error_f("no kex"); return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; } if (ssh->kex->done == 0) { error_f("requested twice"); return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; } ssh->kex->done = 0; return kex_send_kexinit(ssh); } static int choose_enc(struct sshenc *enc, char *client, char *server) { char *name = match_list(client, server, NULL); if (name == NULL) return SSH_ERR_NO_CIPHER_ALG_MATCH; if ((enc->cipher = cipher_by_name(name)) == NULL) { error_f("unsupported cipher %s", name); free(name); return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; } enc->name = name; enc->enabled = 0; enc->iv = NULL; enc->iv_len = cipher_ivlen(enc->cipher); enc->key = NULL; enc->key_len = cipher_keylen(enc->cipher); enc->block_size = cipher_blocksize(enc->cipher); return 0; } static int choose_mac(struct ssh *ssh, struct sshmac *mac, char *client, char *server) { char *name = match_list(client, server, NULL); if (name == NULL) return SSH_ERR_NO_MAC_ALG_MATCH; if (mac_setup(mac, name) < 0) { error_f("unsupported MAC %s", name); free(name); return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; } mac->name = name; mac->key = NULL; mac->enabled = 0; return 0; } static int choose_comp(struct sshcomp *comp, char *client, char *server) { char *name = match_list(client, server, NULL); if (name == NULL) return SSH_ERR_NO_COMPRESS_ALG_MATCH; #ifdef WITH_ZLIB if (strcmp(name, "zlib@openssh.com") == 0) { comp->type = COMP_DELAYED; } else if (strcmp(name, "zlib") == 0) { comp->type = COMP_ZLIB; } else #endif /* WITH_ZLIB */ if (strcmp(name, "none") == 0) { comp->type = COMP_NONE; } else { error_f("unsupported compression scheme %s", name); free(name); return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; } comp->name = name; return 0; } static int choose_kex(struct kex *k, char *client, char *server) { const struct kexalg *kexalg; k->name = match_list(client, server, NULL); debug("kex: algorithm: %s", k->name ? k->name : "(no match)"); if (k->name == NULL) return SSH_ERR_NO_KEX_ALG_MATCH; if ((kexalg = kex_alg_by_name(k->name)) == NULL) { error_f("unsupported KEX method %s", k->name); return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; } k->kex_type = kexalg->type; k->hash_alg = kexalg->hash_alg; k->ec_nid = kexalg->ec_nid; return 0; } static int choose_hostkeyalg(struct kex *k, char *client, char *server) { free(k->hostkey_alg); k->hostkey_alg = match_list(client, server, NULL); debug("kex: host key algorithm: %s", k->hostkey_alg ? k->hostkey_alg : "(no match)"); if (k->hostkey_alg == NULL) return SSH_ERR_NO_HOSTKEY_ALG_MATCH; k->hostkey_type = sshkey_type_from_name(k->hostkey_alg); if (k->hostkey_type == KEY_UNSPEC) { error_f("unsupported hostkey algorithm %s", k->hostkey_alg); return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; } k->hostkey_nid = sshkey_ecdsa_nid_from_name(k->hostkey_alg); return 0; } static int proposals_match(char *my[PROPOSAL_MAX], char *peer[PROPOSAL_MAX]) { static int check[] = { PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS, PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS, -1 }; int *idx; char *p; for (idx = &check[0]; *idx != -1; idx++) { if ((p = strchr(my[*idx], ',')) != NULL) *p = '\0'; if ((p = strchr(peer[*idx], ',')) != NULL) *p = '\0'; if (strcmp(my[*idx], peer[*idx]) != 0) { debug2("proposal mismatch: my %s peer %s", my[*idx], peer[*idx]); return (0); } } debug2("proposals match"); return (1); } /* returns non-zero if proposal contains any algorithm from algs */ static int has_any_alg(const char *proposal, const char *algs) { char *cp; if ((cp = match_list(proposal, algs, NULL)) == NULL) return 0; free(cp); return 1; } static int kex_choose_conf(struct ssh *ssh) { struct kex *kex = ssh->kex; struct newkeys *newkeys; char **my = NULL, **peer = NULL; char **cprop, **sprop; int nenc, nmac, ncomp; u_int mode, ctos, need, dh_need, authlen; int r, first_kex_follows; debug2("local %s KEXINIT proposal", kex->server ? "server" : "client"); if ((r = kex_buf2prop(kex->my, NULL, &my)) != 0) goto out; debug2("peer %s KEXINIT proposal", kex->server ? "client" : "server"); if ((r = kex_buf2prop(kex->peer, &first_kex_follows, &peer)) != 0) goto out; if (kex->server) { cprop=peer; sprop=my; } else { cprop=my; sprop=peer; } /* Check whether client supports ext_info_c */ if (kex->server && (kex->flags & KEX_INITIAL)) { char *ext; ext = match_list("ext-info-c", peer[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS], NULL); kex->ext_info_c = (ext != NULL); free(ext); } /* Check whether client supports rsa-sha2 algorithms */ if (kex->server && (kex->flags & KEX_INITIAL)) { if (has_any_alg(peer[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS], "rsa-sha2-256,rsa-sha2-256-cert-v01@openssh.com")) kex->flags |= KEX_RSA_SHA2_256_SUPPORTED; if (has_any_alg(peer[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS], "rsa-sha2-512,rsa-sha2-512-cert-v01@openssh.com")) kex->flags |= KEX_RSA_SHA2_512_SUPPORTED; } /* Algorithm Negotiation */ if ((r = choose_kex(kex, cprop[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS], sprop[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS])) != 0) { kex->failed_choice = peer[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS]; peer[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS] = NULL; goto out; } if ((r = choose_hostkeyalg(kex, cprop[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS], sprop[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS])) != 0) { kex->failed_choice = peer[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS]; peer[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS] = NULL; goto out; } for (mode = 0; mode < MODE_MAX; mode++) { if ((newkeys = calloc(1, sizeof(*newkeys))) == NULL) { r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; goto out; } kex->newkeys[mode] = newkeys; ctos = (!kex->server && mode == MODE_OUT) || (kex->server && mode == MODE_IN); nenc = ctos ? PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_CTOS : PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_STOC; nmac = ctos ? PROPOSAL_MAC_ALGS_CTOS : PROPOSAL_MAC_ALGS_STOC; ncomp = ctos ? PROPOSAL_COMP_ALGS_CTOS : PROPOSAL_COMP_ALGS_STOC; if ((r = choose_enc(&newkeys->enc, cprop[nenc], sprop[nenc])) != 0) { kex->failed_choice = peer[nenc]; peer[nenc] = NULL; goto out; } authlen = cipher_authlen(newkeys->enc.cipher); /* ignore mac for authenticated encryption */ if (authlen == 0 && (r = choose_mac(ssh, &newkeys->mac, cprop[nmac], sprop[nmac])) != 0) { kex->failed_choice = peer[nmac]; peer[nmac] = NULL; goto out; } if ((r = choose_comp(&newkeys->comp, cprop[ncomp], sprop[ncomp])) != 0) { kex->failed_choice = peer[ncomp]; peer[ncomp] = NULL; goto out; } debug("kex: %s cipher: %s MAC: %s compression: %s", ctos ? "client->server" : "server->client", newkeys->enc.name, authlen == 0 ? newkeys->mac.name : "", newkeys->comp.name); } need = dh_need = 0; for (mode = 0; mode < MODE_MAX; mode++) { newkeys = kex->newkeys[mode]; need = MAXIMUM(need, newkeys->enc.key_len); need = MAXIMUM(need, newkeys->enc.block_size); need = MAXIMUM(need, newkeys->enc.iv_len); need = MAXIMUM(need, newkeys->mac.key_len); dh_need = MAXIMUM(dh_need, cipher_seclen(newkeys->enc.cipher)); dh_need = MAXIMUM(dh_need, newkeys->enc.block_size); dh_need = MAXIMUM(dh_need, newkeys->enc.iv_len); dh_need = MAXIMUM(dh_need, newkeys->mac.key_len); } /* XXX need runden? */ kex->we_need = need; kex->dh_need = dh_need; /* ignore the next message if the proposals do not match */ if (first_kex_follows && !proposals_match(my, peer)) ssh->dispatch_skip_packets = 1; r = 0; out: kex_prop_free(my); kex_prop_free(peer); return r; } static int derive_key(struct ssh *ssh, int id, u_int need, u_char *hash, u_int hashlen, const struct sshbuf *shared_secret, u_char **keyp) { struct kex *kex = ssh->kex; struct ssh_digest_ctx *hashctx = NULL; char c = id; u_int have; size_t mdsz; u_char *digest; int r; if ((mdsz = ssh_digest_bytes(kex->hash_alg)) == 0) return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; if ((digest = calloc(1, ROUNDUP(need, mdsz))) == NULL) { r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; goto out; } /* K1 = HASH(K || H || "A" || session_id) */ if ((hashctx = ssh_digest_start(kex->hash_alg)) == NULL || ssh_digest_update_buffer(hashctx, shared_secret) != 0 || ssh_digest_update(hashctx, hash, hashlen) != 0 || ssh_digest_update(hashctx, &c, 1) != 0 || ssh_digest_update_buffer(hashctx, kex->session_id) != 0 || ssh_digest_final(hashctx, digest, mdsz) != 0) { r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; error_f("KEX hash failed"); goto out; } ssh_digest_free(hashctx); hashctx = NULL; /* * expand key: * Kn = HASH(K || H || K1 || K2 || ... || Kn-1) * Key = K1 || K2 || ... || Kn */ for (have = mdsz; need > have; have += mdsz) { if ((hashctx = ssh_digest_start(kex->hash_alg)) == NULL || ssh_digest_update_buffer(hashctx, shared_secret) != 0 || ssh_digest_update(hashctx, hash, hashlen) != 0 || ssh_digest_update(hashctx, digest, have) != 0 || ssh_digest_final(hashctx, digest + have, mdsz) != 0) { error_f("KDF failed"); r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; goto out; } ssh_digest_free(hashctx); hashctx = NULL; } #ifdef DEBUG_KEX fprintf(stderr, "key '%c'== ", c); dump_digest("key", digest, need); #endif *keyp = digest; digest = NULL; r = 0; out: free(digest); ssh_digest_free(hashctx); return r; } #define NKEYS 6 int kex_derive_keys(struct ssh *ssh, u_char *hash, u_int hashlen, const struct sshbuf *shared_secret) { struct kex *kex = ssh->kex; u_char *keys[NKEYS]; u_int i, j, mode, ctos; int r; /* save initial hash as session id */ if ((kex->flags & KEX_INITIAL) != 0) { if (sshbuf_len(kex->session_id) != 0) { error_f("already have session ID at kex"); return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; } if ((r = sshbuf_put(kex->session_id, hash, hashlen)) != 0) return r; } else if (sshbuf_len(kex->session_id) == 0) { error_f("no session ID in rekex"); return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; } for (i = 0; i < NKEYS; i++) { if ((r = derive_key(ssh, 'A'+i, kex->we_need, hash, hashlen, shared_secret, &keys[i])) != 0) { for (j = 0; j < i; j++) free(keys[j]); return r; } } for (mode = 0; mode < MODE_MAX; mode++) { ctos = (!kex->server && mode == MODE_OUT) || (kex->server && mode == MODE_IN); kex->newkeys[mode]->enc.iv = keys[ctos ? 0 : 1]; kex->newkeys[mode]->enc.key = keys[ctos ? 2 : 3]; kex->newkeys[mode]->mac.key = keys[ctos ? 4 : 5]; } return 0; } int kex_load_hostkey(struct ssh *ssh, struct sshkey **prvp, struct sshkey **pubp) { struct kex *kex = ssh->kex; *pubp = NULL; *prvp = NULL; if (kex->load_host_public_key == NULL || kex->load_host_private_key == NULL) { error_f("missing hostkey loader"); return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; } *pubp = kex->load_host_public_key(kex->hostkey_type, kex->hostkey_nid, ssh); *prvp = kex->load_host_private_key(kex->hostkey_type, kex->hostkey_nid, ssh); if (*pubp == NULL) return SSH_ERR_NO_HOSTKEY_LOADED; return 0; } int kex_verify_host_key(struct ssh *ssh, struct sshkey *server_host_key) { struct kex *kex = ssh->kex; if (kex->verify_host_key == NULL) { error_f("missing hostkey verifier"); return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; } if (server_host_key->type != kex->hostkey_type || (kex->hostkey_type == KEY_ECDSA && server_host_key->ecdsa_nid != kex->hostkey_nid)) return SSH_ERR_KEY_TYPE_MISMATCH; if (kex->verify_host_key(server_host_key, ssh) == -1) return SSH_ERR_SIGNATURE_INVALID; return 0; } #if defined(DEBUG_KEX) || defined(DEBUG_KEXDH) || defined(DEBUG_KEXECDH) void dump_digest(const char *msg, const u_char *digest, int len) { fprintf(stderr, "%s\n", msg); sshbuf_dump_data(digest, len, stderr); } #endif /* * Send a plaintext error message to the peer, suffixed by \r\n. * Only used during banner exchange, and there only for the server. */ static void send_error(struct ssh *ssh, char *msg) { char *crnl = "\r\n"; if (!ssh->kex->server) return; if (atomicio(vwrite, ssh_packet_get_connection_out(ssh), msg, strlen(msg)) != strlen(msg) || atomicio(vwrite, ssh_packet_get_connection_out(ssh), crnl, strlen(crnl)) != strlen(crnl)) error_f("write: %.100s", strerror(errno)); } /* * Sends our identification string and waits for the peer's. Will block for * up to timeout_ms (or indefinitely if timeout_ms <= 0). * Returns on 0 success or a ssherr.h code on failure. */ int kex_exchange_identification(struct ssh *ssh, int timeout_ms, const char *version_addendum) { int remote_major, remote_minor, mismatch, oerrno = 0; size_t len, n; int r, expect_nl; u_char c; struct sshbuf *our_version = ssh->kex->server ? ssh->kex->server_version : ssh->kex->client_version; struct sshbuf *peer_version = ssh->kex->server ? ssh->kex->client_version : ssh->kex->server_version; char *our_version_string = NULL, *peer_version_string = NULL; char *cp, *remote_version = NULL; /* Prepare and send our banner */ sshbuf_reset(our_version); if (version_addendum != NULL && *version_addendum == '\0') version_addendum = NULL; if ((r = sshbuf_putf(our_version, "SSH-%d.%d-%.100s%s%s\r\n", PROTOCOL_MAJOR_2, PROTOCOL_MINOR_2, SSH_VERSION, version_addendum == NULL ? "" : " ", version_addendum == NULL ? "" : version_addendum)) != 0) { oerrno = errno; error_fr(r, "sshbuf_putf"); goto out; } if (atomicio(vwrite, ssh_packet_get_connection_out(ssh), sshbuf_mutable_ptr(our_version), sshbuf_len(our_version)) != sshbuf_len(our_version)) { oerrno = errno; debug_f("write: %.100s", strerror(errno)); r = SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR; goto out; } if ((r = sshbuf_consume_end(our_version, 2)) != 0) { /* trim \r\n */ oerrno = errno; error_fr(r, "sshbuf_consume_end"); goto out; } our_version_string = sshbuf_dup_string(our_version); if (our_version_string == NULL) { error_f("sshbuf_dup_string failed"); r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; goto out; } debug("Local version string %.100s", our_version_string); /* Read other side's version identification. */ for (n = 0; ; n++) { if (n >= SSH_MAX_PRE_BANNER_LINES) { send_error(ssh, "No SSH identification string " "received."); error_f("No SSH version received in first %u lines " "from server", SSH_MAX_PRE_BANNER_LINES); r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; goto out; } sshbuf_reset(peer_version); expect_nl = 0; for (;;) { if (timeout_ms > 0) { r = waitrfd(ssh_packet_get_connection_in(ssh), &timeout_ms); if (r == -1 && errno == ETIMEDOUT) { send_error(ssh, "Timed out waiting " "for SSH identification string."); error("Connection timed out during " "banner exchange"); r = SSH_ERR_CONN_TIMEOUT; goto out; } else if (r == -1) { oerrno = errno; error_f("%s", strerror(errno)); r = SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR; goto out; } } len = atomicio(read, ssh_packet_get_connection_in(ssh), &c, 1); if (len != 1 && errno == EPIPE) { error_f("Connection closed by remote host"); r = SSH_ERR_CONN_CLOSED; goto out; } else if (len != 1) { oerrno = errno; error_f("read: %.100s", strerror(errno)); r = SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR; goto out; } if (c == '\r') { expect_nl = 1; continue; } if (c == '\n') break; if (c == '\0' || expect_nl) { error_f("banner line contains invalid " "characters"); goto invalid; } if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(peer_version, c)) != 0) { oerrno = errno; error_fr(r, "sshbuf_put"); goto out; } if (sshbuf_len(peer_version) > SSH_MAX_BANNER_LEN) { error_f("banner line too long"); goto invalid; } } /* Is this an actual protocol banner? */ if (sshbuf_len(peer_version) > 4 && memcmp(sshbuf_ptr(peer_version), "SSH-", 4) == 0) break; /* If not, then just log the line and continue */ if ((cp = sshbuf_dup_string(peer_version)) == NULL) { error_f("sshbuf_dup_string failed"); r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; goto out; } /* Do not accept lines before the SSH ident from a client */ if (ssh->kex->server) { error_f("client sent invalid protocol identifier " "\"%.256s\"", cp); free(cp); goto invalid; } debug_f("banner line %zu: %s", n, cp); free(cp); } peer_version_string = sshbuf_dup_string(peer_version); if (peer_version_string == NULL) - error_f("sshbuf_dup_string failed"); + fatal_f("sshbuf_dup_string failed"); /* XXX must be same size for sscanf */ if ((remote_version = calloc(1, sshbuf_len(peer_version))) == NULL) { error_f("calloc failed"); r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; goto out; } /* * Check that the versions match. In future this might accept * several versions and set appropriate flags to handle them. */ if (sscanf(peer_version_string, "SSH-%d.%d-%[^\n]\n", &remote_major, &remote_minor, remote_version) != 3) { error("Bad remote protocol version identification: '%.100s'", peer_version_string); invalid: send_error(ssh, "Invalid SSH identification string."); r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; goto out; } debug("Remote protocol version %d.%d, remote software version %.100s", remote_major, remote_minor, remote_version); compat_banner(ssh, remote_version); mismatch = 0; switch (remote_major) { case 2: break; case 1: if (remote_minor != 99) mismatch = 1; break; default: mismatch = 1; break; } if (mismatch) { error("Protocol major versions differ: %d vs. %d", PROTOCOL_MAJOR_2, remote_major); send_error(ssh, "Protocol major versions differ."); r = SSH_ERR_NO_PROTOCOL_VERSION; goto out; } if (ssh->kex->server && (ssh->compat & SSH_BUG_PROBE) != 0) { logit("probed from %s port %d with %s. Don't panic.", ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), ssh_remote_port(ssh), peer_version_string); r = SSH_ERR_CONN_CLOSED; /* XXX */ goto out; } if (ssh->kex->server && (ssh->compat & SSH_BUG_SCANNER) != 0) { logit("scanned from %s port %d with %s. Don't panic.", ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), ssh_remote_port(ssh), peer_version_string); r = SSH_ERR_CONN_CLOSED; /* XXX */ goto out; } - if ((ssh->compat & SSH_BUG_RSASIGMD5) != 0) { - logit("Remote version \"%.100s\" uses unsafe RSA signature " - "scheme; disabling use of RSA keys", remote_version); - } /* success */ r = 0; out: free(our_version_string); free(peer_version_string); free(remote_version); if (r == SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR) errno = oerrno; return r; } diff --git a/crypto/openssh/kex.h b/crypto/openssh/kex.h index c35329501871..8b54e3f4b912 100644 --- a/crypto/openssh/kex.h +++ b/crypto/openssh/kex.h @@ -1,266 +1,269 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: kex.h,v 1.117 2022/01/06 21:55:23 djm Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: kex.h,v 1.118 2023/03/06 12:14:48 dtucker Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2000, 2001 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. */ #ifndef KEX_H #define KEX_H #include "mac.h" #include "crypto_api.h" #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL # include # include # include # ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC # include # else /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */ # define EC_KEY void # define EC_GROUP void # define EC_POINT void # endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */ #else /* WITH_OPENSSL */ # define DH void # define BIGNUM void # define EC_KEY void # define EC_GROUP void # define EC_POINT void #endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */ #define KEX_COOKIE_LEN 16 #define KEX_DH1 "diffie-hellman-group1-sha1" #define KEX_DH14_SHA1 "diffie-hellman-group14-sha1" #define KEX_DH14_SHA256 "diffie-hellman-group14-sha256" #define KEX_DH16_SHA512 "diffie-hellman-group16-sha512" #define KEX_DH18_SHA512 "diffie-hellman-group18-sha512" #define KEX_DHGEX_SHA1 "diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha1" #define KEX_DHGEX_SHA256 "diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha256" #define KEX_ECDH_SHA2_NISTP256 "ecdh-sha2-nistp256" #define KEX_ECDH_SHA2_NISTP384 "ecdh-sha2-nistp384" #define KEX_ECDH_SHA2_NISTP521 "ecdh-sha2-nistp521" #define KEX_CURVE25519_SHA256 "curve25519-sha256" #define KEX_CURVE25519_SHA256_OLD "curve25519-sha256@libssh.org" #define KEX_SNTRUP761X25519_SHA512 "sntrup761x25519-sha512@openssh.com" #define COMP_NONE 0 /* pre-auth compression (COMP_ZLIB) is only supported in the client */ #define COMP_ZLIB 1 #define COMP_DELAYED 2 #define CURVE25519_SIZE 32 enum kex_init_proposals { PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS, PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS, PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_CTOS, PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_STOC, PROPOSAL_MAC_ALGS_CTOS, PROPOSAL_MAC_ALGS_STOC, PROPOSAL_COMP_ALGS_CTOS, PROPOSAL_COMP_ALGS_STOC, PROPOSAL_LANG_CTOS, PROPOSAL_LANG_STOC, PROPOSAL_MAX }; enum kex_modes { MODE_IN, MODE_OUT, MODE_MAX }; enum kex_exchange { KEX_DH_GRP1_SHA1, KEX_DH_GRP14_SHA1, KEX_DH_GRP14_SHA256, KEX_DH_GRP16_SHA512, KEX_DH_GRP18_SHA512, KEX_DH_GEX_SHA1, KEX_DH_GEX_SHA256, KEX_ECDH_SHA2, KEX_C25519_SHA256, KEX_KEM_SNTRUP761X25519_SHA512, KEX_MAX }; /* kex->flags */ #define KEX_INIT_SENT 0x0001 #define KEX_INITIAL 0x0002 #define KEX_HAS_PUBKEY_HOSTBOUND 0x0004 #define KEX_RSA_SHA2_256_SUPPORTED 0x0008 /* only set in server for now */ #define KEX_RSA_SHA2_512_SUPPORTED 0x0010 /* only set in server for now */ struct sshenc { char *name; const struct sshcipher *cipher; int enabled; u_int key_len; u_int iv_len; u_int block_size; u_char *key; u_char *iv; }; struct sshcomp { u_int type; int enabled; char *name; }; struct newkeys { struct sshenc enc; struct sshmac mac; struct sshcomp comp; }; struct ssh; struct sshbuf; struct kex { struct newkeys *newkeys[MODE_MAX]; u_int we_need; u_int dh_need; int server; char *name; char *hostkey_alg; int hostkey_type; int hostkey_nid; u_int kex_type; char *server_sig_algs; int ext_info_c; struct sshbuf *my; struct sshbuf *peer; struct sshbuf *client_version; struct sshbuf *server_version; struct sshbuf *session_id; struct sshbuf *initial_sig; struct sshkey *initial_hostkey; sig_atomic_t done; u_int flags; int hash_alg; int ec_nid; char *failed_choice; int (*verify_host_key)(struct sshkey *, struct ssh *); struct sshkey *(*load_host_public_key)(int, int, struct ssh *); struct sshkey *(*load_host_private_key)(int, int, struct ssh *); int (*host_key_index)(struct sshkey *, int, struct ssh *); int (*sign)(struct ssh *, struct sshkey *, struct sshkey *, u_char **, size_t *, const u_char *, size_t, const char *); int (*kex[KEX_MAX])(struct ssh *); /* kex specific state */ DH *dh; /* DH */ u_int min, max, nbits; /* GEX */ EC_KEY *ec_client_key; /* ECDH */ const EC_GROUP *ec_group; /* ECDH */ u_char c25519_client_key[CURVE25519_SIZE]; /* 25519 + KEM */ u_char c25519_client_pubkey[CURVE25519_SIZE]; /* 25519 */ u_char sntrup761_client_key[crypto_kem_sntrup761_SECRETKEYBYTES]; /* KEM */ struct sshbuf *client_pub; }; int kex_names_valid(const char *); char *kex_alg_list(char); char *kex_names_cat(const char *, const char *); int kex_assemble_names(char **, const char *, const char *); +void kex_proposal_populate_entries(struct ssh *, char *prop[PROPOSAL_MAX], + const char *, const char *, const char *, const char *, const char *); +void kex_proposal_free_entries(char *prop[PROPOSAL_MAX]); int kex_exchange_identification(struct ssh *, int, const char *); struct kex *kex_new(void); int kex_ready(struct ssh *, char *[PROPOSAL_MAX]); int kex_setup(struct ssh *, char *[PROPOSAL_MAX]); void kex_free_newkeys(struct newkeys *); void kex_free(struct kex *); int kex_buf2prop(struct sshbuf *, int *, char ***); int kex_prop2buf(struct sshbuf *, char *proposal[PROPOSAL_MAX]); void kex_prop_free(char **); int kex_load_hostkey(struct ssh *, struct sshkey **, struct sshkey **); int kex_verify_host_key(struct ssh *, struct sshkey *); int kex_send_kexinit(struct ssh *); int kex_input_kexinit(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *); int kex_input_ext_info(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *); int kex_protocol_error(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *); int kex_derive_keys(struct ssh *, u_char *, u_int, const struct sshbuf *); int kex_send_newkeys(struct ssh *); int kex_start_rekex(struct ssh *); int kexgex_client(struct ssh *); int kexgex_server(struct ssh *); int kex_gen_client(struct ssh *); int kex_gen_server(struct ssh *); int kex_dh_keypair(struct kex *); int kex_dh_enc(struct kex *, const struct sshbuf *, struct sshbuf **, struct sshbuf **); int kex_dh_dec(struct kex *, const struct sshbuf *, struct sshbuf **); int kex_ecdh_keypair(struct kex *); int kex_ecdh_enc(struct kex *, const struct sshbuf *, struct sshbuf **, struct sshbuf **); int kex_ecdh_dec(struct kex *, const struct sshbuf *, struct sshbuf **); int kex_c25519_keypair(struct kex *); int kex_c25519_enc(struct kex *, const struct sshbuf *, struct sshbuf **, struct sshbuf **); int kex_c25519_dec(struct kex *, const struct sshbuf *, struct sshbuf **); int kex_kem_sntrup761x25519_keypair(struct kex *); int kex_kem_sntrup761x25519_enc(struct kex *, const struct sshbuf *, struct sshbuf **, struct sshbuf **); int kex_kem_sntrup761x25519_dec(struct kex *, const struct sshbuf *, struct sshbuf **); int kex_dh_keygen(struct kex *); int kex_dh_compute_key(struct kex *, BIGNUM *, struct sshbuf *); int kexgex_hash(int, const struct sshbuf *, const struct sshbuf *, const struct sshbuf *, const struct sshbuf *, const struct sshbuf *, int, int, int, const BIGNUM *, const BIGNUM *, const BIGNUM *, const BIGNUM *, const u_char *, size_t, u_char *, size_t *); void kexc25519_keygen(u_char key[CURVE25519_SIZE], u_char pub[CURVE25519_SIZE]) __attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__, 1, CURVE25519_SIZE))) __attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__, 2, CURVE25519_SIZE))); int kexc25519_shared_key(const u_char key[CURVE25519_SIZE], const u_char pub[CURVE25519_SIZE], struct sshbuf *out) __attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__, 1, CURVE25519_SIZE))) __attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__, 2, CURVE25519_SIZE))); int kexc25519_shared_key_ext(const u_char key[CURVE25519_SIZE], const u_char pub[CURVE25519_SIZE], struct sshbuf *out, int) __attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__, 1, CURVE25519_SIZE))) __attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__, 2, CURVE25519_SIZE))); #if defined(DEBUG_KEX) || defined(DEBUG_KEXDH) || defined(DEBUG_KEXECDH) void dump_digest(const char *, const u_char *, int); #endif #if !defined(WITH_OPENSSL) || !defined(OPENSSL_HAS_ECC) # undef EC_KEY # undef EC_GROUP # undef EC_POINT #endif #endif diff --git a/crypto/openssh/kexgexs.c b/crypto/openssh/kexgexs.c index 72b444f6906b..676de77ad14e 100644 --- a/crypto/openssh/kexgexs.c +++ b/crypto/openssh/kexgexs.c @@ -1,217 +1,216 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: kexgexs.c,v 1.44 2021/12/19 22:08:06 djm Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: kexgexs.c,v 1.45 2023/03/05 05:34:09 dtucker Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2000 Niels Provos. All rights reserved. * Copyright (c) 2001 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. */ #include "includes.h" #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL #include #include #include #include #include #include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h" #include "sshkey.h" #include "cipher.h" #include "digest.h" #include "kex.h" #include "log.h" #include "packet.h" #include "dh.h" #include "ssh2.h" -#include "compat.h" #ifdef GSSAPI #include "ssh-gss.h" #endif #include "monitor_wrap.h" #include "dispatch.h" #include "ssherr.h" #include "sshbuf.h" #include "misc.h" static int input_kex_dh_gex_request(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *); static int input_kex_dh_gex_init(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *); int kexgex_server(struct ssh *ssh) { ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REQUEST, &input_kex_dh_gex_request); debug("expecting SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REQUEST"); return 0; } static int input_kex_dh_gex_request(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh) { struct kex *kex = ssh->kex; int r; u_int min = 0, max = 0, nbits = 0; const BIGNUM *dh_p, *dh_g; debug("SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REQUEST received"); ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REQUEST, &kex_protocol_error); if ((r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &min)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &nbits)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &max)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0) goto out; kex->nbits = nbits; kex->min = min; kex->max = max; min = MAXIMUM(DH_GRP_MIN, min); max = MINIMUM(DH_GRP_MAX, max); nbits = MAXIMUM(DH_GRP_MIN, nbits); nbits = MINIMUM(DH_GRP_MAX, nbits); if (kex->max < kex->min || kex->nbits < kex->min || kex->max < kex->nbits || kex->max < DH_GRP_MIN) { r = SSH_ERR_DH_GEX_OUT_OF_RANGE; goto out; } /* Contact privileged parent */ kex->dh = PRIVSEP(choose_dh(min, nbits, max)); if (kex->dh == NULL) { sshpkt_disconnect(ssh, "no matching DH grp found"); r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; goto out; } debug("SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_GROUP sent"); DH_get0_pqg(kex->dh, &dh_p, NULL, &dh_g); if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_GROUP)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_bignum2(ssh, dh_p)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_bignum2(ssh, dh_g)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) goto out; /* Compute our exchange value in parallel with the client */ if ((r = dh_gen_key(kex->dh, kex->we_need * 8)) != 0) goto out; debug("expecting SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_INIT"); ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_INIT, &input_kex_dh_gex_init); r = 0; out: return r; } static int input_kex_dh_gex_init(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh) { struct kex *kex = ssh->kex; BIGNUM *dh_client_pub = NULL; const BIGNUM *pub_key, *dh_p, *dh_g; struct sshbuf *shared_secret = NULL; struct sshbuf *server_host_key_blob = NULL; struct sshkey *server_host_public, *server_host_private; u_char *signature = NULL; u_char hash[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH]; size_t slen, hashlen; int r; debug("SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_INIT received"); ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_INIT, &kex_protocol_error); if ((r = kex_load_hostkey(ssh, &server_host_private, &server_host_public)) != 0) goto out; /* key, cert */ if ((r = sshpkt_get_bignum2(ssh, &dh_client_pub)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0) goto out; if ((shared_secret = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) { r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; goto out; } if ((r = kex_dh_compute_key(kex, dh_client_pub, shared_secret)) != 0) goto out; if ((server_host_key_blob = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) { r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; goto out; } if ((r = sshkey_putb(server_host_public, server_host_key_blob)) != 0) goto out; /* calc H */ DH_get0_key(kex->dh, &pub_key, NULL); DH_get0_pqg(kex->dh, &dh_p, NULL, &dh_g); hashlen = sizeof(hash); if ((r = kexgex_hash( kex->hash_alg, kex->client_version, kex->server_version, kex->peer, kex->my, server_host_key_blob, kex->min, kex->nbits, kex->max, dh_p, dh_g, dh_client_pub, pub_key, sshbuf_ptr(shared_secret), sshbuf_len(shared_secret), hash, &hashlen)) != 0) goto out; /* sign H */ if ((r = kex->sign(ssh, server_host_private, server_host_public, &signature, &slen, hash, hashlen, kex->hostkey_alg)) < 0) goto out; /* send server hostkey, DH pubkey 'f' and signed H */ if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REPLY)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_stringb(ssh, server_host_key_blob)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_bignum2(ssh, pub_key)) != 0 || /* f */ (r = sshpkt_put_string(ssh, signature, slen)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) goto out; if ((r = kex_derive_keys(ssh, hash, hashlen, shared_secret)) != 0 || (r = kex_send_newkeys(ssh)) != 0) goto out; /* retain copy of hostkey used at initial KEX */ if (kex->initial_hostkey == NULL && (r = sshkey_from_private(server_host_public, &kex->initial_hostkey)) != 0) goto out; /* success */ out: explicit_bzero(hash, sizeof(hash)); DH_free(kex->dh); kex->dh = NULL; BN_clear_free(dh_client_pub); sshbuf_free(shared_secret); sshbuf_free(server_host_key_blob); free(signature); return r; } #endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */ diff --git a/crypto/openssh/krl.c b/crypto/openssh/krl.c index 473a9d737953..1fed42b2249a 100644 --- a/crypto/openssh/krl.c +++ b/crypto/openssh/krl.c @@ -1,1447 +1,1448 @@ /* * Copyright (c) 2012 Damien Miller * * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. * * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. */ -/* $OpenBSD: krl.c,v 1.54 2022/04/28 02:53:31 djm Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: krl.c,v 1.55 2023/03/14 07:28:47 dtucker Exp $ */ #include "includes.h" #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include "sshbuf.h" #include "ssherr.h" #include "sshkey.h" #include "authfile.h" #include "misc.h" #include "log.h" #include "digest.h" #include "bitmap.h" #include "utf8.h" #include "krl.h" /* #define DEBUG_KRL */ #ifdef DEBUG_KRL # define KRL_DBG(x) debug3_f x #else # define KRL_DBG(x) #endif /* * Trees of revoked serial numbers, key IDs and keys. This allows * quick searching, querying and producing lists in canonical order. */ /* Tree of serial numbers. XXX make smarter: really need a real sparse bitmap */ struct revoked_serial { u_int64_t lo, hi; RB_ENTRY(revoked_serial) tree_entry; }; static int serial_cmp(struct revoked_serial *a, struct revoked_serial *b); RB_HEAD(revoked_serial_tree, revoked_serial); RB_GENERATE_STATIC(revoked_serial_tree, revoked_serial, tree_entry, serial_cmp) /* Tree of key IDs */ struct revoked_key_id { char *key_id; RB_ENTRY(revoked_key_id) tree_entry; }; static int key_id_cmp(struct revoked_key_id *a, struct revoked_key_id *b); RB_HEAD(revoked_key_id_tree, revoked_key_id); RB_GENERATE_STATIC(revoked_key_id_tree, revoked_key_id, tree_entry, key_id_cmp) /* Tree of blobs (used for keys and fingerprints) */ struct revoked_blob { u_char *blob; size_t len; RB_ENTRY(revoked_blob) tree_entry; }; static int blob_cmp(struct revoked_blob *a, struct revoked_blob *b); RB_HEAD(revoked_blob_tree, revoked_blob); RB_GENERATE_STATIC(revoked_blob_tree, revoked_blob, tree_entry, blob_cmp) /* Tracks revoked certs for a single CA */ struct revoked_certs { struct sshkey *ca_key; struct revoked_serial_tree revoked_serials; struct revoked_key_id_tree revoked_key_ids; TAILQ_ENTRY(revoked_certs) entry; }; TAILQ_HEAD(revoked_certs_list, revoked_certs); struct ssh_krl { u_int64_t krl_version; u_int64_t generated_date; u_int64_t flags; char *comment; struct revoked_blob_tree revoked_keys; struct revoked_blob_tree revoked_sha1s; struct revoked_blob_tree revoked_sha256s; struct revoked_certs_list revoked_certs; }; /* Return equal if a and b overlap */ static int serial_cmp(struct revoked_serial *a, struct revoked_serial *b) { if (a->hi >= b->lo && a->lo <= b->hi) return 0; return a->lo < b->lo ? -1 : 1; } static int key_id_cmp(struct revoked_key_id *a, struct revoked_key_id *b) { return strcmp(a->key_id, b->key_id); } static int blob_cmp(struct revoked_blob *a, struct revoked_blob *b) { int r; if (a->len != b->len) { if ((r = memcmp(a->blob, b->blob, MINIMUM(a->len, b->len))) != 0) return r; return a->len > b->len ? 1 : -1; } else return memcmp(a->blob, b->blob, a->len); } struct ssh_krl * ssh_krl_init(void) { struct ssh_krl *krl; if ((krl = calloc(1, sizeof(*krl))) == NULL) return NULL; RB_INIT(&krl->revoked_keys); RB_INIT(&krl->revoked_sha1s); RB_INIT(&krl->revoked_sha256s); TAILQ_INIT(&krl->revoked_certs); return krl; } static void revoked_certs_free(struct revoked_certs *rc) { struct revoked_serial *rs, *trs; struct revoked_key_id *rki, *trki; RB_FOREACH_SAFE(rs, revoked_serial_tree, &rc->revoked_serials, trs) { RB_REMOVE(revoked_serial_tree, &rc->revoked_serials, rs); free(rs); } RB_FOREACH_SAFE(rki, revoked_key_id_tree, &rc->revoked_key_ids, trki) { RB_REMOVE(revoked_key_id_tree, &rc->revoked_key_ids, rki); free(rki->key_id); free(rki); } sshkey_free(rc->ca_key); } void ssh_krl_free(struct ssh_krl *krl) { struct revoked_blob *rb, *trb; struct revoked_certs *rc, *trc; if (krl == NULL) return; free(krl->comment); RB_FOREACH_SAFE(rb, revoked_blob_tree, &krl->revoked_keys, trb) { RB_REMOVE(revoked_blob_tree, &krl->revoked_keys, rb); free(rb->blob); free(rb); } RB_FOREACH_SAFE(rb, revoked_blob_tree, &krl->revoked_sha1s, trb) { RB_REMOVE(revoked_blob_tree, &krl->revoked_sha1s, rb); free(rb->blob); free(rb); } RB_FOREACH_SAFE(rb, revoked_blob_tree, &krl->revoked_sha256s, trb) { RB_REMOVE(revoked_blob_tree, &krl->revoked_sha256s, rb); free(rb->blob); free(rb); } TAILQ_FOREACH_SAFE(rc, &krl->revoked_certs, entry, trc) { TAILQ_REMOVE(&krl->revoked_certs, rc, entry); revoked_certs_free(rc); } + free(krl); } void ssh_krl_set_version(struct ssh_krl *krl, u_int64_t version) { krl->krl_version = version; } int ssh_krl_set_comment(struct ssh_krl *krl, const char *comment) { free(krl->comment); if ((krl->comment = strdup(comment)) == NULL) return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; return 0; } /* * Find the revoked_certs struct for a CA key. If allow_create is set then * create a new one in the tree if one did not exist already. */ static int revoked_certs_for_ca_key(struct ssh_krl *krl, const struct sshkey *ca_key, struct revoked_certs **rcp, int allow_create) { struct revoked_certs *rc; int r; *rcp = NULL; TAILQ_FOREACH(rc, &krl->revoked_certs, entry) { if ((ca_key == NULL && rc->ca_key == NULL) || sshkey_equal(rc->ca_key, ca_key)) { *rcp = rc; return 0; } } if (!allow_create) return 0; /* If this CA doesn't exist in the list then add it now */ if ((rc = calloc(1, sizeof(*rc))) == NULL) return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; if (ca_key == NULL) rc->ca_key = NULL; else if ((r = sshkey_from_private(ca_key, &rc->ca_key)) != 0) { free(rc); return r; } RB_INIT(&rc->revoked_serials); RB_INIT(&rc->revoked_key_ids); TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(&krl->revoked_certs, rc, entry); KRL_DBG(("new CA %s", ca_key == NULL ? "*" : sshkey_type(ca_key))); *rcp = rc; return 0; } static int insert_serial_range(struct revoked_serial_tree *rt, u_int64_t lo, u_int64_t hi) { struct revoked_serial rs, *ers, *crs, *irs; KRL_DBG(("insert %llu:%llu", lo, hi)); memset(&rs, 0, sizeof(rs)); rs.lo = lo; rs.hi = hi; ers = RB_NFIND(revoked_serial_tree, rt, &rs); if (ers == NULL || serial_cmp(ers, &rs) != 0) { /* No entry matches. Just insert */ if ((irs = malloc(sizeof(rs))) == NULL) return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; memcpy(irs, &rs, sizeof(*irs)); ers = RB_INSERT(revoked_serial_tree, rt, irs); if (ers != NULL) { KRL_DBG(("bad: ers != NULL")); /* Shouldn't happen */ free(irs); return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; } ers = irs; } else { KRL_DBG(("overlap found %llu:%llu", ers->lo, ers->hi)); /* * The inserted entry overlaps an existing one. Grow the * existing entry. */ if (ers->lo > lo) ers->lo = lo; if (ers->hi < hi) ers->hi = hi; } /* * The inserted or revised range might overlap or abut adjacent ones; * coalesce as necessary. */ /* Check predecessors */ while ((crs = RB_PREV(revoked_serial_tree, rt, ers)) != NULL) { KRL_DBG(("pred %llu:%llu", crs->lo, crs->hi)); if (ers->lo != 0 && crs->hi < ers->lo - 1) break; /* This entry overlaps. */ if (crs->lo < ers->lo) { ers->lo = crs->lo; KRL_DBG(("pred extend %llu:%llu", ers->lo, ers->hi)); } RB_REMOVE(revoked_serial_tree, rt, crs); free(crs); } /* Check successors */ while ((crs = RB_NEXT(revoked_serial_tree, rt, ers)) != NULL) { KRL_DBG(("succ %llu:%llu", crs->lo, crs->hi)); if (ers->hi != (u_int64_t)-1 && crs->lo > ers->hi + 1) break; /* This entry overlaps. */ if (crs->hi > ers->hi) { ers->hi = crs->hi; KRL_DBG(("succ extend %llu:%llu", ers->lo, ers->hi)); } RB_REMOVE(revoked_serial_tree, rt, crs); free(crs); } KRL_DBG(("done, final %llu:%llu", ers->lo, ers->hi)); return 0; } int ssh_krl_revoke_cert_by_serial(struct ssh_krl *krl, const struct sshkey *ca_key, u_int64_t serial) { return ssh_krl_revoke_cert_by_serial_range(krl, ca_key, serial, serial); } int ssh_krl_revoke_cert_by_serial_range(struct ssh_krl *krl, const struct sshkey *ca_key, u_int64_t lo, u_int64_t hi) { struct revoked_certs *rc; int r; if (lo > hi || lo == 0) return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; if ((r = revoked_certs_for_ca_key(krl, ca_key, &rc, 1)) != 0) return r; return insert_serial_range(&rc->revoked_serials, lo, hi); } int ssh_krl_revoke_cert_by_key_id(struct ssh_krl *krl, const struct sshkey *ca_key, const char *key_id) { struct revoked_key_id *rki, *erki; struct revoked_certs *rc; int r; if ((r = revoked_certs_for_ca_key(krl, ca_key, &rc, 1)) != 0) return r; KRL_DBG(("revoke %s", key_id)); if ((rki = calloc(1, sizeof(*rki))) == NULL || (rki->key_id = strdup(key_id)) == NULL) { free(rki); return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; } erki = RB_INSERT(revoked_key_id_tree, &rc->revoked_key_ids, rki); if (erki != NULL) { free(rki->key_id); free(rki); } return 0; } /* Convert "key" to a public key blob without any certificate information */ static int plain_key_blob(const struct sshkey *key, u_char **blob, size_t *blen) { struct sshkey *kcopy; int r; if ((r = sshkey_from_private(key, &kcopy)) != 0) return r; if (sshkey_is_cert(kcopy)) { if ((r = sshkey_drop_cert(kcopy)) != 0) { sshkey_free(kcopy); return r; } } r = sshkey_to_blob(kcopy, blob, blen); sshkey_free(kcopy); return r; } /* Revoke a key blob. Ownership of blob is transferred to the tree */ static int revoke_blob(struct revoked_blob_tree *rbt, u_char *blob, size_t len) { struct revoked_blob *rb, *erb; if ((rb = calloc(1, sizeof(*rb))) == NULL) return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; rb->blob = blob; rb->len = len; erb = RB_INSERT(revoked_blob_tree, rbt, rb); if (erb != NULL) { free(rb->blob); free(rb); } return 0; } int ssh_krl_revoke_key_explicit(struct ssh_krl *krl, const struct sshkey *key) { u_char *blob; size_t len; int r; debug3_f("revoke type %s", sshkey_type(key)); if ((r = plain_key_blob(key, &blob, &len)) != 0) return r; return revoke_blob(&krl->revoked_keys, blob, len); } static int revoke_by_hash(struct revoked_blob_tree *target, const u_char *p, size_t len) { u_char *blob; int r; /* need to copy hash, as revoke_blob steals ownership */ if ((blob = malloc(len)) == NULL) return SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR; memcpy(blob, p, len); if ((r = revoke_blob(target, blob, len)) != 0) { free(blob); return r; } return 0; } int ssh_krl_revoke_key_sha1(struct ssh_krl *krl, const u_char *p, size_t len) { debug3_f("revoke by sha1"); if (len != 20) return SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; return revoke_by_hash(&krl->revoked_sha1s, p, len); } int ssh_krl_revoke_key_sha256(struct ssh_krl *krl, const u_char *p, size_t len) { debug3_f("revoke by sha256"); if (len != 32) return SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; return revoke_by_hash(&krl->revoked_sha256s, p, len); } int ssh_krl_revoke_key(struct ssh_krl *krl, const struct sshkey *key) { /* XXX replace with SHA256? */ if (!sshkey_is_cert(key)) return ssh_krl_revoke_key_explicit(krl, key); if (key->cert->serial == 0) { return ssh_krl_revoke_cert_by_key_id(krl, key->cert->signature_key, key->cert->key_id); } else { return ssh_krl_revoke_cert_by_serial(krl, key->cert->signature_key, key->cert->serial); } } /* * Select the most compact section type to emit next in a KRL based on * the current section type, the run length of contiguous revoked serial * numbers and the gaps from the last and to the next revoked serial. * Applies a mostly-accurate bit cost model to select the section type * that will minimise the size of the resultant KRL. */ static int choose_next_state(int current_state, u_int64_t contig, int final, u_int64_t last_gap, u_int64_t next_gap, int *force_new_section) { int new_state; u_int64_t cost, cost_list, cost_range, cost_bitmap, cost_bitmap_restart; /* * Avoid unsigned overflows. * The limits are high enough to avoid confusing the calculations. */ contig = MINIMUM(contig, 1ULL<<31); last_gap = MINIMUM(last_gap, 1ULL<<31); next_gap = MINIMUM(next_gap, 1ULL<<31); /* * Calculate the cost to switch from the current state to candidates. * NB. range sections only ever contain a single range, so their * switching cost is independent of the current_state. */ cost_list = cost_bitmap = cost_bitmap_restart = 0; cost_range = 8; switch (current_state) { case KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_LIST: cost_bitmap_restart = cost_bitmap = 8 + 64; break; case KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_BITMAP: cost_list = 8; cost_bitmap_restart = 8 + 64; break; case KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_RANGE: case 0: cost_bitmap_restart = cost_bitmap = 8 + 64; cost_list = 8; } /* Estimate base cost in bits of each section type */ cost_list += 64 * contig + (final ? 0 : 8+64); cost_range += (2 * 64) + (final ? 0 : 8+64); cost_bitmap += last_gap + contig + (final ? 0 : MINIMUM(next_gap, 8+64)); cost_bitmap_restart += contig + (final ? 0 : MINIMUM(next_gap, 8+64)); /* Convert to byte costs for actual comparison */ cost_list = (cost_list + 7) / 8; cost_bitmap = (cost_bitmap + 7) / 8; cost_bitmap_restart = (cost_bitmap_restart + 7) / 8; cost_range = (cost_range + 7) / 8; /* Now pick the best choice */ *force_new_section = 0; new_state = KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_BITMAP; cost = cost_bitmap; if (cost_range < cost) { new_state = KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_RANGE; cost = cost_range; } if (cost_list < cost) { new_state = KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_LIST; cost = cost_list; } if (cost_bitmap_restart < cost) { new_state = KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_BITMAP; *force_new_section = 1; cost = cost_bitmap_restart; } KRL_DBG(("contig %llu last_gap %llu next_gap %llu final %d, costs:" "list %llu range %llu bitmap %llu new bitmap %llu, " "selected 0x%02x%s", (long long unsigned)contig, (long long unsigned)last_gap, (long long unsigned)next_gap, final, (long long unsigned)cost_list, (long long unsigned)cost_range, (long long unsigned)cost_bitmap, (long long unsigned)cost_bitmap_restart, new_state, *force_new_section ? " restart" : "")); return new_state; } static int put_bitmap(struct sshbuf *buf, struct bitmap *bitmap) { size_t len; u_char *blob; int r; len = bitmap_nbytes(bitmap); if ((blob = malloc(len)) == NULL) return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; if (bitmap_to_string(bitmap, blob, len) != 0) { free(blob); return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; } r = sshbuf_put_bignum2_bytes(buf, blob, len); free(blob); return r; } /* Generate a KRL_SECTION_CERTIFICATES KRL section */ static int revoked_certs_generate(struct revoked_certs *rc, struct sshbuf *buf) { int final, force_new_sect, r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; u_int64_t i, contig, gap, last = 0, bitmap_start = 0; struct revoked_serial *rs, *nrs; struct revoked_key_id *rki; int next_state, state = 0; struct sshbuf *sect; struct bitmap *bitmap = NULL; if ((sect = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; /* Store the header: optional CA scope key, reserved */ if (rc->ca_key == NULL) { if ((r = sshbuf_put_string(buf, NULL, 0)) != 0) goto out; } else { if ((r = sshkey_puts(rc->ca_key, buf)) != 0) goto out; } if ((r = sshbuf_put_string(buf, NULL, 0)) != 0) goto out; /* Store the revoked serials. */ for (rs = RB_MIN(revoked_serial_tree, &rc->revoked_serials); rs != NULL; rs = RB_NEXT(revoked_serial_tree, &rc->revoked_serials, rs)) { KRL_DBG(("serial %llu:%llu state 0x%02x", (long long unsigned)rs->lo, (long long unsigned)rs->hi, state)); /* Check contiguous length and gap to next section (if any) */ nrs = RB_NEXT(revoked_serial_tree, &rc->revoked_serials, rs); final = nrs == NULL; gap = nrs == NULL ? 0 : nrs->lo - rs->hi; contig = 1 + (rs->hi - rs->lo); /* Choose next state based on these */ next_state = choose_next_state(state, contig, final, state == 0 ? 0 : rs->lo - last, gap, &force_new_sect); /* * If the current section is a range section or has a different * type to the next section, then finish it off now. */ if (state != 0 && (force_new_sect || next_state != state || state == KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_RANGE)) { KRL_DBG(("finish state 0x%02x", state)); switch (state) { case KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_LIST: case KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_RANGE: break; case KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_BITMAP: if ((r = put_bitmap(sect, bitmap)) != 0) goto out; bitmap_free(bitmap); bitmap = NULL; break; } if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(buf, state)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_stringb(buf, sect)) != 0) goto out; sshbuf_reset(sect); } /* If we are starting a new section then prepare it now */ if (next_state != state || force_new_sect) { KRL_DBG(("start state 0x%02x", next_state)); state = next_state; sshbuf_reset(sect); switch (state) { case KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_LIST: case KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_RANGE: break; case KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_BITMAP: if ((bitmap = bitmap_new()) == NULL) { r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; goto out; } bitmap_start = rs->lo; if ((r = sshbuf_put_u64(sect, bitmap_start)) != 0) goto out; break; } } /* Perform section-specific processing */ switch (state) { case KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_LIST: for (i = 0; i < contig; i++) { if ((r = sshbuf_put_u64(sect, rs->lo + i)) != 0) goto out; } break; case KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_RANGE: if ((r = sshbuf_put_u64(sect, rs->lo)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u64(sect, rs->hi)) != 0) goto out; break; case KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_BITMAP: if (rs->lo - bitmap_start > INT_MAX) { error_f("insane bitmap gap"); goto out; } for (i = 0; i < contig; i++) { if (bitmap_set_bit(bitmap, rs->lo + i - bitmap_start) != 0) { r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; goto out; } } break; } last = rs->hi; } /* Flush the remaining section, if any */ if (state != 0) { KRL_DBG(("serial final flush for state 0x%02x", state)); switch (state) { case KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_LIST: case KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_RANGE: break; case KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_BITMAP: if ((r = put_bitmap(sect, bitmap)) != 0) goto out; bitmap_free(bitmap); bitmap = NULL; break; } if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(buf, state)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_stringb(buf, sect)) != 0) goto out; } KRL_DBG(("serial done ")); /* Now output a section for any revocations by key ID */ sshbuf_reset(sect); RB_FOREACH(rki, revoked_key_id_tree, &rc->revoked_key_ids) { KRL_DBG(("key ID %s", rki->key_id)); if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(sect, rki->key_id)) != 0) goto out; } if (sshbuf_len(sect) != 0) { if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(buf, KRL_SECTION_CERT_KEY_ID)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_stringb(buf, sect)) != 0) goto out; } r = 0; out: bitmap_free(bitmap); sshbuf_free(sect); return r; } int ssh_krl_to_blob(struct ssh_krl *krl, struct sshbuf *buf, struct sshkey **sign_keys, u_int nsign_keys) { int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; struct revoked_certs *rc; struct revoked_blob *rb; struct sshbuf *sect; u_char *sblob = NULL; size_t slen, i; if (krl->generated_date == 0) krl->generated_date = time(NULL); if ((sect = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; /* Store the header */ if ((r = sshbuf_put(buf, KRL_MAGIC, sizeof(KRL_MAGIC) - 1)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u32(buf, KRL_FORMAT_VERSION)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u64(buf, krl->krl_version)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u64(buf, krl->generated_date)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u64(buf, krl->flags)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_string(buf, NULL, 0)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(buf, krl->comment)) != 0) goto out; /* Store sections for revoked certificates */ TAILQ_FOREACH(rc, &krl->revoked_certs, entry) { sshbuf_reset(sect); if ((r = revoked_certs_generate(rc, sect)) != 0) goto out; if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(buf, KRL_SECTION_CERTIFICATES)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_stringb(buf, sect)) != 0) goto out; } /* Finally, output sections for revocations by public key/hash */ sshbuf_reset(sect); RB_FOREACH(rb, revoked_blob_tree, &krl->revoked_keys) { KRL_DBG(("key len %zu ", rb->len)); if ((r = sshbuf_put_string(sect, rb->blob, rb->len)) != 0) goto out; } if (sshbuf_len(sect) != 0) { if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(buf, KRL_SECTION_EXPLICIT_KEY)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_stringb(buf, sect)) != 0) goto out; } sshbuf_reset(sect); RB_FOREACH(rb, revoked_blob_tree, &krl->revoked_sha1s) { KRL_DBG(("hash len %zu ", rb->len)); if ((r = sshbuf_put_string(sect, rb->blob, rb->len)) != 0) goto out; } if (sshbuf_len(sect) != 0) { if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(buf, KRL_SECTION_FINGERPRINT_SHA1)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_stringb(buf, sect)) != 0) goto out; } sshbuf_reset(sect); RB_FOREACH(rb, revoked_blob_tree, &krl->revoked_sha256s) { KRL_DBG(("hash len %zu ", rb->len)); if ((r = sshbuf_put_string(sect, rb->blob, rb->len)) != 0) goto out; } if (sshbuf_len(sect) != 0) { if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(buf, KRL_SECTION_FINGERPRINT_SHA256)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_stringb(buf, sect)) != 0) goto out; } for (i = 0; i < nsign_keys; i++) { KRL_DBG(("sig key %s", sshkey_ssh_name(sign_keys[i]))); if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(buf, KRL_SECTION_SIGNATURE)) != 0 || (r = sshkey_puts(sign_keys[i], buf)) != 0) goto out; /* XXX support sk-* keys */ if ((r = sshkey_sign(sign_keys[i], &sblob, &slen, sshbuf_ptr(buf), sshbuf_len(buf), NULL, NULL, NULL, 0)) != 0) goto out; KRL_DBG(("signature sig len %zu", slen)); if ((r = sshbuf_put_string(buf, sblob, slen)) != 0) goto out; } r = 0; out: free(sblob); sshbuf_free(sect); return r; } static void format_timestamp(u_int64_t timestamp, char *ts, size_t nts) { time_t t; struct tm *tm; t = timestamp; tm = localtime(&t); if (tm == NULL) strlcpy(ts, "", nts); else { *ts = '\0'; strftime(ts, nts, "%Y%m%dT%H%M%S", tm); } } static int parse_revoked_certs(struct sshbuf *buf, struct ssh_krl *krl) { int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; u_char type; const u_char *blob; size_t blen, nbits; struct sshbuf *subsect = NULL; u_int64_t serial, serial_lo, serial_hi; struct bitmap *bitmap = NULL; char *key_id = NULL; struct sshkey *ca_key = NULL; if ((subsect = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; /* Header: key, reserved */ if ((r = sshbuf_get_string_direct(buf, &blob, &blen)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_skip_string(buf)) != 0) goto out; if (blen != 0 && (r = sshkey_from_blob(blob, blen, &ca_key)) != 0) goto out; while (sshbuf_len(buf) > 0) { sshbuf_free(subsect); subsect = NULL; if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(buf, &type)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_froms(buf, &subsect)) != 0) goto out; KRL_DBG(("subsection type 0x%02x", type)); /* sshbuf_dump(subsect, stderr); */ switch (type) { case KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_LIST: while (sshbuf_len(subsect) > 0) { if ((r = sshbuf_get_u64(subsect, &serial)) != 0) goto out; if ((r = ssh_krl_revoke_cert_by_serial(krl, ca_key, serial)) != 0) goto out; } break; case KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_RANGE: if ((r = sshbuf_get_u64(subsect, &serial_lo)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_u64(subsect, &serial_hi)) != 0) goto out; if ((r = ssh_krl_revoke_cert_by_serial_range(krl, ca_key, serial_lo, serial_hi)) != 0) goto out; break; case KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_BITMAP: if ((bitmap = bitmap_new()) == NULL) { r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; goto out; } if ((r = sshbuf_get_u64(subsect, &serial_lo)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_bignum2_bytes_direct(subsect, &blob, &blen)) != 0) goto out; if (bitmap_from_string(bitmap, blob, blen) != 0) { r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; goto out; } nbits = bitmap_nbits(bitmap); for (serial = 0; serial < (u_int64_t)nbits; serial++) { if (serial > 0 && serial_lo + serial == 0) { error_f("bitmap wraps u64"); r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; goto out; } if (!bitmap_test_bit(bitmap, serial)) continue; if ((r = ssh_krl_revoke_cert_by_serial(krl, ca_key, serial_lo + serial)) != 0) goto out; } bitmap_free(bitmap); bitmap = NULL; break; case KRL_SECTION_CERT_KEY_ID: while (sshbuf_len(subsect) > 0) { if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(subsect, &key_id, NULL)) != 0) goto out; if ((r = ssh_krl_revoke_cert_by_key_id(krl, ca_key, key_id)) != 0) goto out; free(key_id); key_id = NULL; } break; default: error("Unsupported KRL certificate section %u", type); r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; goto out; } if (sshbuf_len(subsect) > 0) { error("KRL certificate section contains unparsed data"); r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; goto out; } } r = 0; out: if (bitmap != NULL) bitmap_free(bitmap); free(key_id); sshkey_free(ca_key); sshbuf_free(subsect); return r; } static int blob_section(struct sshbuf *sect, struct revoked_blob_tree *target_tree, size_t expected_len) { u_char *rdata = NULL; size_t rlen = 0; int r; while (sshbuf_len(sect) > 0) { if ((r = sshbuf_get_string(sect, &rdata, &rlen)) != 0) return r; if (expected_len != 0 && rlen != expected_len) { error_f("bad length"); free(rdata); return SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; } if ((r = revoke_blob(target_tree, rdata, rlen)) != 0) { free(rdata); return r; } } return 0; } /* Attempt to parse a KRL, checking its signature (if any) with sign_ca_keys. */ int ssh_krl_from_blob(struct sshbuf *buf, struct ssh_krl **krlp, const struct sshkey **sign_ca_keys, size_t nsign_ca_keys) { struct sshbuf *copy = NULL, *sect = NULL; struct ssh_krl *krl = NULL; char timestamp[64]; int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR, sig_seen; struct sshkey *key = NULL, **ca_used = NULL, **tmp_ca_used; u_char type; const u_char *blob; size_t i, j, sig_off, sects_off, blen, nca_used; u_int format_version; nca_used = 0; *krlp = NULL; if (sshbuf_len(buf) < sizeof(KRL_MAGIC) - 1 || memcmp(sshbuf_ptr(buf), KRL_MAGIC, sizeof(KRL_MAGIC) - 1) != 0) { debug3_f("not a KRL"); return SSH_ERR_KRL_BAD_MAGIC; } /* Take a copy of the KRL buffer so we can verify its signature later */ if ((copy = sshbuf_fromb(buf)) == NULL) { r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; goto out; } if ((r = sshbuf_consume(copy, sizeof(KRL_MAGIC) - 1)) != 0) goto out; if ((krl = ssh_krl_init()) == NULL) { error_f("alloc failed"); goto out; } if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(copy, &format_version)) != 0) goto out; if (format_version != KRL_FORMAT_VERSION) { r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; goto out; } if ((r = sshbuf_get_u64(copy, &krl->krl_version)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_u64(copy, &krl->generated_date)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_u64(copy, &krl->flags)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_skip_string(copy)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(copy, &krl->comment, NULL)) != 0) goto out; format_timestamp(krl->generated_date, timestamp, sizeof(timestamp)); debug("KRL version %llu generated at %s%s%s", (long long unsigned)krl->krl_version, timestamp, *krl->comment ? ": " : "", krl->comment); /* * 1st pass: verify signatures, if any. This is done to avoid * detailed parsing of data whose provenance is unverified. */ sig_seen = 0; if (sshbuf_len(buf) < sshbuf_len(copy)) { /* Shouldn't happen */ r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; goto out; } sects_off = sshbuf_len(buf) - sshbuf_len(copy); while (sshbuf_len(copy) > 0) { if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(copy, &type)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_string_direct(copy, &blob, &blen)) != 0) goto out; KRL_DBG(("first pass, section 0x%02x", type)); if (type != KRL_SECTION_SIGNATURE) { if (sig_seen) { error("KRL contains non-signature section " "after signature"); r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; goto out; } /* Not interested for now. */ continue; } sig_seen = 1; /* First string component is the signing key */ if ((r = sshkey_from_blob(blob, blen, &key)) != 0) { r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; goto out; } if (sshbuf_len(buf) < sshbuf_len(copy)) { /* Shouldn't happen */ r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; goto out; } sig_off = sshbuf_len(buf) - sshbuf_len(copy); /* Second string component is the signature itself */ if ((r = sshbuf_get_string_direct(copy, &blob, &blen)) != 0) { r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; goto out; } /* Check signature over entire KRL up to this point */ if ((r = sshkey_verify(key, blob, blen, sshbuf_ptr(buf), sig_off, NULL, 0, NULL)) != 0) goto out; /* Check if this key has already signed this KRL */ for (i = 0; i < nca_used; i++) { if (sshkey_equal(ca_used[i], key)) { error("KRL signed more than once with " "the same key"); r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; goto out; } } /* Record keys used to sign the KRL */ tmp_ca_used = recallocarray(ca_used, nca_used, nca_used + 1, sizeof(*ca_used)); if (tmp_ca_used == NULL) { r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; goto out; } ca_used = tmp_ca_used; ca_used[nca_used++] = key; key = NULL; } if (sshbuf_len(copy) != 0) { /* Shouldn't happen */ r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; goto out; } /* * 2nd pass: parse and load the KRL, skipping the header to the point * where the section start. */ sshbuf_free(copy); if ((copy = sshbuf_fromb(buf)) == NULL) { r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; goto out; } if ((r = sshbuf_consume(copy, sects_off)) != 0) goto out; while (sshbuf_len(copy) > 0) { sshbuf_free(sect); sect = NULL; if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(copy, &type)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_froms(copy, §)) != 0) goto out; KRL_DBG(("second pass, section 0x%02x", type)); switch (type) { case KRL_SECTION_CERTIFICATES: if ((r = parse_revoked_certs(sect, krl)) != 0) goto out; break; case KRL_SECTION_EXPLICIT_KEY: if ((r = blob_section(sect, &krl->revoked_keys, 0)) != 0) goto out; break; case KRL_SECTION_FINGERPRINT_SHA1: if ((r = blob_section(sect, &krl->revoked_sha1s, 20)) != 0) goto out; break; case KRL_SECTION_FINGERPRINT_SHA256: if ((r = blob_section(sect, &krl->revoked_sha256s, 32)) != 0) goto out; break; case KRL_SECTION_SIGNATURE: /* Handled above, but still need to stay in synch */ sshbuf_free(sect); sect = NULL; if ((r = sshbuf_skip_string(copy)) != 0) goto out; break; default: error("Unsupported KRL section %u", type); r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; goto out; } if (sect != NULL && sshbuf_len(sect) > 0) { error("KRL section contains unparsed data"); r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; goto out; } } /* Check that the key(s) used to sign the KRL weren't revoked */ sig_seen = 0; for (i = 0; i < nca_used; i++) { if (ssh_krl_check_key(krl, ca_used[i]) == 0) sig_seen = 1; else { sshkey_free(ca_used[i]); ca_used[i] = NULL; } } if (nca_used && !sig_seen) { error("All keys used to sign KRL were revoked"); r = SSH_ERR_KEY_REVOKED; goto out; } /* If we have CA keys, then verify that one was used to sign the KRL */ if (sig_seen && nsign_ca_keys != 0) { sig_seen = 0; for (i = 0; !sig_seen && i < nsign_ca_keys; i++) { for (j = 0; j < nca_used; j++) { if (ca_used[j] == NULL) continue; if (sshkey_equal(ca_used[j], sign_ca_keys[i])) { sig_seen = 1; break; } } } if (!sig_seen) { r = SSH_ERR_SIGNATURE_INVALID; error("KRL not signed with any trusted key"); goto out; } } *krlp = krl; r = 0; out: if (r != 0) ssh_krl_free(krl); for (i = 0; i < nca_used; i++) sshkey_free(ca_used[i]); free(ca_used); sshkey_free(key); sshbuf_free(copy); sshbuf_free(sect); return r; } /* Checks certificate serial number and key ID revocation */ static int is_cert_revoked(const struct sshkey *key, struct revoked_certs *rc) { struct revoked_serial rs, *ers; struct revoked_key_id rki, *erki; /* Check revocation by cert key ID */ memset(&rki, 0, sizeof(rki)); rki.key_id = key->cert->key_id; erki = RB_FIND(revoked_key_id_tree, &rc->revoked_key_ids, &rki); if (erki != NULL) { KRL_DBG(("revoked by key ID")); return SSH_ERR_KEY_REVOKED; } /* * Zero serials numbers are ignored (it's the default when the * CA doesn't specify one). */ if (key->cert->serial == 0) return 0; memset(&rs, 0, sizeof(rs)); rs.lo = rs.hi = key->cert->serial; ers = RB_FIND(revoked_serial_tree, &rc->revoked_serials, &rs); if (ers != NULL) { KRL_DBG(("revoked serial %llu matched %llu:%llu", key->cert->serial, ers->lo, ers->hi)); return SSH_ERR_KEY_REVOKED; } return 0; } /* Checks whether a given key/cert is revoked. Does not check its CA */ static int is_key_revoked(struct ssh_krl *krl, const struct sshkey *key) { struct revoked_blob rb, *erb; struct revoked_certs *rc; int r; /* Check explicitly revoked hashes first */ memset(&rb, 0, sizeof(rb)); if ((r = sshkey_fingerprint_raw(key, SSH_DIGEST_SHA1, &rb.blob, &rb.len)) != 0) return r; erb = RB_FIND(revoked_blob_tree, &krl->revoked_sha1s, &rb); free(rb.blob); if (erb != NULL) { KRL_DBG(("revoked by key SHA1")); return SSH_ERR_KEY_REVOKED; } memset(&rb, 0, sizeof(rb)); if ((r = sshkey_fingerprint_raw(key, SSH_DIGEST_SHA256, &rb.blob, &rb.len)) != 0) return r; erb = RB_FIND(revoked_blob_tree, &krl->revoked_sha256s, &rb); free(rb.blob); if (erb != NULL) { KRL_DBG(("revoked by key SHA256")); return SSH_ERR_KEY_REVOKED; } /* Next, explicit keys */ memset(&rb, 0, sizeof(rb)); if ((r = plain_key_blob(key, &rb.blob, &rb.len)) != 0) return r; erb = RB_FIND(revoked_blob_tree, &krl->revoked_keys, &rb); free(rb.blob); if (erb != NULL) { KRL_DBG(("revoked by explicit key")); return SSH_ERR_KEY_REVOKED; } if (!sshkey_is_cert(key)) return 0; /* Check cert revocation for the specified CA */ if ((r = revoked_certs_for_ca_key(krl, key->cert->signature_key, &rc, 0)) != 0) return r; if (rc != NULL) { if ((r = is_cert_revoked(key, rc)) != 0) return r; } /* Check cert revocation for the wildcard CA */ if ((r = revoked_certs_for_ca_key(krl, NULL, &rc, 0)) != 0) return r; if (rc != NULL) { if ((r = is_cert_revoked(key, rc)) != 0) return r; } KRL_DBG(("%llu no match", key->cert->serial)); return 0; } int ssh_krl_check_key(struct ssh_krl *krl, const struct sshkey *key) { int r; KRL_DBG(("checking key")); if ((r = is_key_revoked(krl, key)) != 0) return r; if (sshkey_is_cert(key)) { debug2_f("checking CA key"); if ((r = is_key_revoked(krl, key->cert->signature_key)) != 0) return r; } KRL_DBG(("key okay")); return 0; } int ssh_krl_file_contains_key(const char *path, const struct sshkey *key) { struct sshbuf *krlbuf = NULL; struct ssh_krl *krl = NULL; int oerrno = 0, r; if (path == NULL) return 0; if ((r = sshbuf_load_file(path, &krlbuf)) != 0) { oerrno = errno; goto out; } if ((r = ssh_krl_from_blob(krlbuf, &krl, NULL, 0)) != 0) goto out; debug2_f("checking KRL %s", path); r = ssh_krl_check_key(krl, key); out: sshbuf_free(krlbuf); ssh_krl_free(krl); if (r != 0) errno = oerrno; return r; } int krl_dump(struct ssh_krl *krl, FILE *f) { struct sshkey *key = NULL; struct revoked_blob *rb; struct revoked_certs *rc; struct revoked_serial *rs; struct revoked_key_id *rki; int r, ret = 0; char *fp, timestamp[64]; /* Try to print in a KRL spec-compatible format */ format_timestamp(krl->generated_date, timestamp, sizeof(timestamp)); fprintf(f, "# KRL version %llu\n", (unsigned long long)krl->krl_version); fprintf(f, "# Generated at %s\n", timestamp); if (krl->comment != NULL && *krl->comment != '\0') { r = INT_MAX; asmprintf(&fp, INT_MAX, &r, "%s", krl->comment); fprintf(f, "# Comment: %s\n", fp); free(fp); } fputc('\n', f); RB_FOREACH(rb, revoked_blob_tree, &krl->revoked_keys) { if ((r = sshkey_from_blob(rb->blob, rb->len, &key)) != 0) { ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; error_r(r, "parse KRL key"); continue; } if ((fp = sshkey_fingerprint(key, SSH_FP_HASH_DEFAULT, SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL) { ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; error("sshkey_fingerprint failed"); continue; } fprintf(f, "hash: %s # %s\n", fp, sshkey_ssh_name(key)); free(fp); free(key); } RB_FOREACH(rb, revoked_blob_tree, &krl->revoked_sha256s) { fp = tohex(rb->blob, rb->len); fprintf(f, "hash: SHA256:%s\n", fp); free(fp); } RB_FOREACH(rb, revoked_blob_tree, &krl->revoked_sha1s) { /* * There is not KRL spec keyword for raw SHA1 hashes, so * print them as comments. */ fp = tohex(rb->blob, rb->len); fprintf(f, "# hash SHA1:%s\n", fp); free(fp); } TAILQ_FOREACH(rc, &krl->revoked_certs, entry) { fputc('\n', f); if (rc->ca_key == NULL) fprintf(f, "# Wildcard CA\n"); else { if ((fp = sshkey_fingerprint(rc->ca_key, SSH_FP_HASH_DEFAULT, SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL) { ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; error("sshkey_fingerprint failed"); continue; } fprintf(f, "# CA key %s %s\n", sshkey_ssh_name(rc->ca_key), fp); free(fp); } RB_FOREACH(rs, revoked_serial_tree, &rc->revoked_serials) { if (rs->lo == rs->hi) { fprintf(f, "serial: %llu\n", (unsigned long long)rs->lo); } else { fprintf(f, "serial: %llu-%llu\n", (unsigned long long)rs->lo, (unsigned long long)rs->hi); } } RB_FOREACH(rki, revoked_key_id_tree, &rc->revoked_key_ids) { /* * We don't want key IDs with embedded newlines to * mess up the display. */ r = INT_MAX; asmprintf(&fp, INT_MAX, &r, "%s", rki->key_id); fprintf(f, "id: %s\n", fp); free(fp); } } return ret; } diff --git a/crypto/openssh/misc.c b/crypto/openssh/misc.c index c098dc610b7b..6135b15567a4 100644 --- a/crypto/openssh/misc.c +++ b/crypto/openssh/misc.c @@ -1,2917 +1,2914 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: misc.c,v 1.180 2023/01/06 02:37:04 djm Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: misc.c,v 1.181 2023/03/03 02:37:58 dtucker Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. * Copyright (c) 2005-2020 Damien Miller. All rights reserved. * Copyright (c) 2004 Henning Brauer * * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. * * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. */ #include "includes.h" #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #ifdef HAVE_LIBGEN_H # include #endif #ifdef HAVE_POLL_H #include #endif #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H # include #include #include #endif #ifdef SSH_TUN_OPENBSD #include #endif #include "xmalloc.h" #include "misc.h" #include "log.h" #include "ssh.h" #include "sshbuf.h" #include "ssherr.h" #include "platform.h" /* remove newline at end of string */ char * chop(char *s) { char *t = s; while (*t) { if (*t == '\n' || *t == '\r') { *t = '\0'; return s; } t++; } return s; } /* remove whitespace from end of string */ void rtrim(char *s) { size_t i; if ((i = strlen(s)) == 0) return; for (i--; i > 0; i--) { if (isspace((unsigned char)s[i])) s[i] = '\0'; } } /* set/unset filedescriptor to non-blocking */ int set_nonblock(int fd) { int val; val = fcntl(fd, F_GETFL); if (val == -1) { error("fcntl(%d, F_GETFL): %s", fd, strerror(errno)); return (-1); } if (val & O_NONBLOCK) { debug3("fd %d is O_NONBLOCK", fd); return (0); } debug2("fd %d setting O_NONBLOCK", fd); val |= O_NONBLOCK; if (fcntl(fd, F_SETFL, val) == -1) { debug("fcntl(%d, F_SETFL, O_NONBLOCK): %s", fd, strerror(errno)); return (-1); } return (0); } int unset_nonblock(int fd) { int val; val = fcntl(fd, F_GETFL); if (val == -1) { error("fcntl(%d, F_GETFL): %s", fd, strerror(errno)); return (-1); } if (!(val & O_NONBLOCK)) { debug3("fd %d is not O_NONBLOCK", fd); return (0); } debug("fd %d clearing O_NONBLOCK", fd); val &= ~O_NONBLOCK; if (fcntl(fd, F_SETFL, val) == -1) { debug("fcntl(%d, F_SETFL, ~O_NONBLOCK): %s", fd, strerror(errno)); return (-1); } return (0); } const char * ssh_gai_strerror(int gaierr) { if (gaierr == EAI_SYSTEM && errno != 0) return strerror(errno); return gai_strerror(gaierr); } /* disable nagle on socket */ void set_nodelay(int fd) { int opt; socklen_t optlen; optlen = sizeof opt; if (getsockopt(fd, IPPROTO_TCP, TCP_NODELAY, &opt, &optlen) == -1) { debug("getsockopt TCP_NODELAY: %.100s", strerror(errno)); return; } if (opt == 1) { debug2("fd %d is TCP_NODELAY", fd); return; } opt = 1; debug2("fd %d setting TCP_NODELAY", fd); if (setsockopt(fd, IPPROTO_TCP, TCP_NODELAY, &opt, sizeof opt) == -1) error("setsockopt TCP_NODELAY: %.100s", strerror(errno)); } /* Allow local port reuse in TIME_WAIT */ int set_reuseaddr(int fd) { int on = 1; if (setsockopt(fd, SOL_SOCKET, SO_REUSEADDR, &on, sizeof(on)) == -1) { error("setsockopt SO_REUSEADDR fd %d: %s", fd, strerror(errno)); return -1; } return 0; } /* Get/set routing domain */ char * get_rdomain(int fd) { #if defined(HAVE_SYS_GET_RDOMAIN) return sys_get_rdomain(fd); #elif defined(__OpenBSD__) int rtable; char *ret; socklen_t len = sizeof(rtable); if (getsockopt(fd, SOL_SOCKET, SO_RTABLE, &rtable, &len) == -1) { error("Failed to get routing domain for fd %d: %s", fd, strerror(errno)); return NULL; } xasprintf(&ret, "%d", rtable); return ret; #else /* defined(__OpenBSD__) */ return NULL; #endif } int set_rdomain(int fd, const char *name) { #if defined(HAVE_SYS_SET_RDOMAIN) return sys_set_rdomain(fd, name); #elif defined(__OpenBSD__) int rtable; const char *errstr; if (name == NULL) return 0; /* default table */ rtable = (int)strtonum(name, 0, 255, &errstr); if (errstr != NULL) { /* Shouldn't happen */ error("Invalid routing domain \"%s\": %s", name, errstr); return -1; } if (setsockopt(fd, SOL_SOCKET, SO_RTABLE, &rtable, sizeof(rtable)) == -1) { error("Failed to set routing domain %d on fd %d: %s", rtable, fd, strerror(errno)); return -1; } return 0; #else /* defined(__OpenBSD__) */ error("Setting routing domain is not supported on this platform"); return -1; #endif } int get_sock_af(int fd) { struct sockaddr_storage to; socklen_t tolen = sizeof(to); memset(&to, 0, sizeof(to)); if (getsockname(fd, (struct sockaddr *)&to, &tolen) == -1) return -1; #ifdef IPV4_IN_IPV6 if (to.ss_family == AF_INET6 && IN6_IS_ADDR_V4MAPPED(&((struct sockaddr_in6 *)&to)->sin6_addr)) return AF_INET; #endif return to.ss_family; } void set_sock_tos(int fd, int tos) { #ifndef IP_TOS_IS_BROKEN int af; switch ((af = get_sock_af(fd))) { case -1: /* assume not a socket */ break; case AF_INET: # ifdef IP_TOS debug3_f("set socket %d IP_TOS 0x%02x", fd, tos); if (setsockopt(fd, IPPROTO_IP, IP_TOS, &tos, sizeof(tos)) == -1) { error("setsockopt socket %d IP_TOS %d: %s", fd, tos, strerror(errno)); } # endif /* IP_TOS */ break; case AF_INET6: # ifdef IPV6_TCLASS debug3_f("set socket %d IPV6_TCLASS 0x%02x", fd, tos); if (setsockopt(fd, IPPROTO_IPV6, IPV6_TCLASS, &tos, sizeof(tos)) == -1) { error("setsockopt socket %d IPV6_TCLASS %d: %s", fd, tos, strerror(errno)); } # endif /* IPV6_TCLASS */ break; default: debug2_f("unsupported socket family %d", af); break; } #endif /* IP_TOS_IS_BROKEN */ } /* * Wait up to *timeoutp milliseconds for events on fd. Updates * *timeoutp with time remaining. * Returns 0 if fd ready or -1 on timeout or error (see errno). */ static int waitfd(int fd, int *timeoutp, short events) { struct pollfd pfd; struct timeval t_start; int oerrno, r; pfd.fd = fd; pfd.events = events; for (; *timeoutp >= 0;) { monotime_tv(&t_start); r = poll(&pfd, 1, *timeoutp); oerrno = errno; ms_subtract_diff(&t_start, timeoutp); errno = oerrno; if (r > 0) return 0; else if (r == -1 && errno != EAGAIN && errno != EINTR) return -1; else if (r == 0) break; } /* timeout */ errno = ETIMEDOUT; return -1; } /* * Wait up to *timeoutp milliseconds for fd to be readable. Updates * *timeoutp with time remaining. * Returns 0 if fd ready or -1 on timeout or error (see errno). */ int waitrfd(int fd, int *timeoutp) { return waitfd(fd, timeoutp, POLLIN); } /* * Attempt a non-blocking connect(2) to the specified address, waiting up to * *timeoutp milliseconds for the connection to complete. If the timeout is * <=0, then wait indefinitely. * * Returns 0 on success or -1 on failure. */ int timeout_connect(int sockfd, const struct sockaddr *serv_addr, socklen_t addrlen, int *timeoutp) { int optval = 0; socklen_t optlen = sizeof(optval); /* No timeout: just do a blocking connect() */ if (timeoutp == NULL || *timeoutp <= 0) return connect(sockfd, serv_addr, addrlen); set_nonblock(sockfd); for (;;) { if (connect(sockfd, serv_addr, addrlen) == 0) { /* Succeeded already? */ unset_nonblock(sockfd); return 0; } else if (errno == EINTR) continue; else if (errno != EINPROGRESS) return -1; break; } if (waitfd(sockfd, timeoutp, POLLIN | POLLOUT) == -1) return -1; /* Completed or failed */ if (getsockopt(sockfd, SOL_SOCKET, SO_ERROR, &optval, &optlen) == -1) { debug("getsockopt: %s", strerror(errno)); return -1; } if (optval != 0) { errno = optval; return -1; } unset_nonblock(sockfd); return 0; } /* Characters considered whitespace in strsep calls. */ #define WHITESPACE " \t\r\n" #define QUOTE "\"" /* return next token in configuration line */ static char * strdelim_internal(char **s, int split_equals) { char *old; int wspace = 0; if (*s == NULL) return NULL; old = *s; *s = strpbrk(*s, split_equals ? WHITESPACE QUOTE "=" : WHITESPACE QUOTE); if (*s == NULL) return (old); if (*s[0] == '\"') { memmove(*s, *s + 1, strlen(*s)); /* move nul too */ /* Find matching quote */ if ((*s = strpbrk(*s, QUOTE)) == NULL) { return (NULL); /* no matching quote */ } else { *s[0] = '\0'; *s += strspn(*s + 1, WHITESPACE) + 1; return (old); } } /* Allow only one '=' to be skipped */ if (split_equals && *s[0] == '=') wspace = 1; *s[0] = '\0'; /* Skip any extra whitespace after first token */ *s += strspn(*s + 1, WHITESPACE) + 1; if (split_equals && *s[0] == '=' && !wspace) *s += strspn(*s + 1, WHITESPACE) + 1; return (old); } /* * Return next token in configuration line; splts on whitespace or a * single '=' character. */ char * strdelim(char **s) { return strdelim_internal(s, 1); } /* * Return next token in configuration line; splts on whitespace only. */ char * strdelimw(char **s) { return strdelim_internal(s, 0); } struct passwd * pwcopy(struct passwd *pw) { struct passwd *copy = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*copy)); copy->pw_name = xstrdup(pw->pw_name); copy->pw_passwd = xstrdup(pw->pw_passwd == NULL ? "*" : pw->pw_passwd); #ifdef HAVE_STRUCT_PASSWD_PW_GECOS copy->pw_gecos = xstrdup(pw->pw_gecos); #endif copy->pw_uid = pw->pw_uid; copy->pw_gid = pw->pw_gid; #ifdef HAVE_STRUCT_PASSWD_PW_EXPIRE copy->pw_expire = pw->pw_expire; #endif #ifdef HAVE_STRUCT_PASSWD_PW_CHANGE copy->pw_change = pw->pw_change; #endif #ifdef HAVE_STRUCT_PASSWD_PW_CLASS copy->pw_class = xstrdup(pw->pw_class); #endif copy->pw_dir = xstrdup(pw->pw_dir); copy->pw_shell = xstrdup(pw->pw_shell); return copy; } /* * Convert ASCII string to TCP/IP port number. * Port must be >=0 and <=65535. * Return -1 if invalid. */ int a2port(const char *s) { struct servent *se; long long port; const char *errstr; port = strtonum(s, 0, 65535, &errstr); if (errstr == NULL) return (int)port; if ((se = getservbyname(s, "tcp")) != NULL) return ntohs(se->s_port); return -1; } int a2tun(const char *s, int *remote) { const char *errstr = NULL; char *sp, *ep; int tun; if (remote != NULL) { *remote = SSH_TUNID_ANY; sp = xstrdup(s); if ((ep = strchr(sp, ':')) == NULL) { free(sp); return (a2tun(s, NULL)); } ep[0] = '\0'; ep++; *remote = a2tun(ep, NULL); tun = a2tun(sp, NULL); free(sp); return (*remote == SSH_TUNID_ERR ? *remote : tun); } if (strcasecmp(s, "any") == 0) return (SSH_TUNID_ANY); tun = strtonum(s, 0, SSH_TUNID_MAX, &errstr); if (errstr != NULL) return (SSH_TUNID_ERR); return (tun); } #define SECONDS 1 #define MINUTES (SECONDS * 60) #define HOURS (MINUTES * 60) #define DAYS (HOURS * 24) #define WEEKS (DAYS * 7) /* * Convert a time string into seconds; format is * a sequence of: * time[qualifier] * * Valid time qualifiers are: * seconds * s|S seconds * m|M minutes * h|H hours * d|D days * w|W weeks * * Examples: * 90m 90 minutes * 1h30m 90 minutes * 2d 2 days * 1w 1 week * * Return -1 if time string is invalid. */ int convtime(const char *s) { long total, secs, multiplier; const char *p; char *endp; errno = 0; total = 0; p = s; if (p == NULL || *p == '\0') return -1; while (*p) { secs = strtol(p, &endp, 10); if (p == endp || (errno == ERANGE && (secs == INT_MIN || secs == INT_MAX)) || secs < 0) return -1; multiplier = 1; switch (*endp++) { case '\0': endp--; break; case 's': case 'S': break; case 'm': case 'M': multiplier = MINUTES; break; case 'h': case 'H': multiplier = HOURS; break; case 'd': case 'D': multiplier = DAYS; break; case 'w': case 'W': multiplier = WEEKS; break; default: return -1; } if (secs > INT_MAX / multiplier) return -1; secs *= multiplier; if (total > INT_MAX - secs) return -1; total += secs; if (total < 0) return -1; p = endp; } return total; } #define TF_BUFS 8 #define TF_LEN 9 const char * fmt_timeframe(time_t t) { char *buf; static char tfbuf[TF_BUFS][TF_LEN]; /* ring buffer */ static int idx = 0; unsigned int sec, min, hrs, day; unsigned long long week; buf = tfbuf[idx++]; if (idx == TF_BUFS) idx = 0; week = t; sec = week % 60; week /= 60; min = week % 60; week /= 60; hrs = week % 24; week /= 24; day = week % 7; week /= 7; if (week > 0) snprintf(buf, TF_LEN, "%02lluw%01ud%02uh", week, day, hrs); else if (day > 0) snprintf(buf, TF_LEN, "%01ud%02uh%02um", day, hrs, min); else snprintf(buf, TF_LEN, "%02u:%02u:%02u", hrs, min, sec); return (buf); } /* * Returns a standardized host+port identifier string. * Caller must free returned string. */ char * put_host_port(const char *host, u_short port) { char *hoststr; if (port == 0 || port == SSH_DEFAULT_PORT) return(xstrdup(host)); if (asprintf(&hoststr, "[%s]:%d", host, (int)port) == -1) fatal("put_host_port: asprintf: %s", strerror(errno)); debug3("put_host_port: %s", hoststr); return hoststr; } /* * Search for next delimiter between hostnames/addresses and ports. * Argument may be modified (for termination). * Returns *cp if parsing succeeds. * *cp is set to the start of the next field, if one was found. * The delimiter char, if present, is stored in delim. * If this is the last field, *cp is set to NULL. */ char * hpdelim2(char **cp, char *delim) { char *s, *old; if (cp == NULL || *cp == NULL) return NULL; old = s = *cp; if (*s == '[') { if ((s = strchr(s, ']')) == NULL) return NULL; else s++; } else if ((s = strpbrk(s, ":/")) == NULL) s = *cp + strlen(*cp); /* skip to end (see first case below) */ switch (*s) { case '\0': *cp = NULL; /* no more fields*/ break; case ':': case '/': if (delim != NULL) *delim = *s; *s = '\0'; /* terminate */ *cp = s + 1; break; default: return NULL; } return old; } /* The common case: only accept colon as delimiter. */ char * hpdelim(char **cp) { char *r, delim = '\0'; r = hpdelim2(cp, &delim); if (delim == '/') return NULL; return r; } char * cleanhostname(char *host) { if (*host == '[' && host[strlen(host) - 1] == ']') { host[strlen(host) - 1] = '\0'; return (host + 1); } else return host; } char * colon(char *cp) { int flag = 0; if (*cp == ':') /* Leading colon is part of file name. */ return NULL; if (*cp == '[') flag = 1; for (; *cp; ++cp) { if (*cp == '@' && *(cp+1) == '[') flag = 1; if (*cp == ']' && *(cp+1) == ':' && flag) return (cp+1); if (*cp == ':' && !flag) return (cp); if (*cp == '/') return NULL; } return NULL; } /* * Parse a [user@]host:[path] string. * Caller must free returned user, host and path. * Any of the pointer return arguments may be NULL (useful for syntax checking). * If user was not specified then *userp will be set to NULL. * If host was not specified then *hostp will be set to NULL. * If path was not specified then *pathp will be set to ".". * Returns 0 on success, -1 on failure. */ int parse_user_host_path(const char *s, char **userp, char **hostp, char **pathp) { char *user = NULL, *host = NULL, *path = NULL; char *sdup, *tmp; int ret = -1; if (userp != NULL) *userp = NULL; if (hostp != NULL) *hostp = NULL; if (pathp != NULL) *pathp = NULL; sdup = xstrdup(s); /* Check for remote syntax: [user@]host:[path] */ if ((tmp = colon(sdup)) == NULL) goto out; /* Extract optional path */ *tmp++ = '\0'; if (*tmp == '\0') tmp = "."; path = xstrdup(tmp); /* Extract optional user and mandatory host */ tmp = strrchr(sdup, '@'); if (tmp != NULL) { *tmp++ = '\0'; host = xstrdup(cleanhostname(tmp)); if (*sdup != '\0') user = xstrdup(sdup); } else { host = xstrdup(cleanhostname(sdup)); user = NULL; } /* Success */ if (userp != NULL) { *userp = user; user = NULL; } if (hostp != NULL) { *hostp = host; host = NULL; } if (pathp != NULL) { *pathp = path; path = NULL; } ret = 0; out: free(sdup); free(user); free(host); free(path); return ret; } /* * Parse a [user@]host[:port] string. * Caller must free returned user and host. * Any of the pointer return arguments may be NULL (useful for syntax checking). * If user was not specified then *userp will be set to NULL. * If port was not specified then *portp will be -1. * Returns 0 on success, -1 on failure. */ int parse_user_host_port(const char *s, char **userp, char **hostp, int *portp) { char *sdup, *cp, *tmp; char *user = NULL, *host = NULL; int port = -1, ret = -1; if (userp != NULL) *userp = NULL; if (hostp != NULL) *hostp = NULL; if (portp != NULL) *portp = -1; if ((sdup = tmp = strdup(s)) == NULL) return -1; /* Extract optional username */ if ((cp = strrchr(tmp, '@')) != NULL) { *cp = '\0'; if (*tmp == '\0') goto out; if ((user = strdup(tmp)) == NULL) goto out; tmp = cp + 1; } /* Extract mandatory hostname */ if ((cp = hpdelim(&tmp)) == NULL || *cp == '\0') goto out; host = xstrdup(cleanhostname(cp)); /* Convert and verify optional port */ if (tmp != NULL && *tmp != '\0') { if ((port = a2port(tmp)) <= 0) goto out; } /* Success */ if (userp != NULL) { *userp = user; user = NULL; } if (hostp != NULL) { *hostp = host; host = NULL; } if (portp != NULL) *portp = port; ret = 0; out: free(sdup); free(user); free(host); return ret; } /* * Converts a two-byte hex string to decimal. * Returns the decimal value or -1 for invalid input. */ static int hexchar(const char *s) { unsigned char result[2]; int i; for (i = 0; i < 2; i++) { if (s[i] >= '0' && s[i] <= '9') result[i] = (unsigned char)(s[i] - '0'); else if (s[i] >= 'a' && s[i] <= 'f') result[i] = (unsigned char)(s[i] - 'a') + 10; else if (s[i] >= 'A' && s[i] <= 'F') result[i] = (unsigned char)(s[i] - 'A') + 10; else return -1; } return (result[0] << 4) | result[1]; } /* * Decode an url-encoded string. * Returns a newly allocated string on success or NULL on failure. */ static char * urldecode(const char *src) { char *ret, *dst; int ch; ret = xmalloc(strlen(src) + 1); for (dst = ret; *src != '\0'; src++) { switch (*src) { case '+': *dst++ = ' '; break; case '%': if (!isxdigit((unsigned char)src[1]) || !isxdigit((unsigned char)src[2]) || (ch = hexchar(src + 1)) == -1) { free(ret); return NULL; } *dst++ = ch; src += 2; break; default: *dst++ = *src; break; } } *dst = '\0'; return ret; } /* * Parse an (scp|ssh|sftp)://[user@]host[:port][/path] URI. * See https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-secsh-scp-sftp-ssh-uri-04 * Either user or path may be url-encoded (but not host or port). * Caller must free returned user, host and path. * Any of the pointer return arguments may be NULL (useful for syntax checking) * but the scheme must always be specified. * If user was not specified then *userp will be set to NULL. * If port was not specified then *portp will be -1. * If path was not specified then *pathp will be set to NULL. * Returns 0 on success, 1 if non-uri/wrong scheme, -1 on error/invalid uri. */ int parse_uri(const char *scheme, const char *uri, char **userp, char **hostp, int *portp, char **pathp) { char *uridup, *cp, *tmp, ch; char *user = NULL, *host = NULL, *path = NULL; int port = -1, ret = -1; size_t len; len = strlen(scheme); if (strncmp(uri, scheme, len) != 0 || strncmp(uri + len, "://", 3) != 0) return 1; uri += len + 3; if (userp != NULL) *userp = NULL; if (hostp != NULL) *hostp = NULL; if (portp != NULL) *portp = -1; if (pathp != NULL) *pathp = NULL; uridup = tmp = xstrdup(uri); /* Extract optional ssh-info (username + connection params) */ if ((cp = strchr(tmp, '@')) != NULL) { char *delim; *cp = '\0'; /* Extract username and connection params */ if ((delim = strchr(tmp, ';')) != NULL) { /* Just ignore connection params for now */ *delim = '\0'; } if (*tmp == '\0') { /* Empty username */ goto out; } if ((user = urldecode(tmp)) == NULL) goto out; tmp = cp + 1; } /* Extract mandatory hostname */ if ((cp = hpdelim2(&tmp, &ch)) == NULL || *cp == '\0') goto out; host = xstrdup(cleanhostname(cp)); if (!valid_domain(host, 0, NULL)) goto out; if (tmp != NULL && *tmp != '\0') { if (ch == ':') { /* Convert and verify port. */ if ((cp = strchr(tmp, '/')) != NULL) *cp = '\0'; if ((port = a2port(tmp)) <= 0) goto out; tmp = cp ? cp + 1 : NULL; } if (tmp != NULL && *tmp != '\0') { /* Extract optional path */ if ((path = urldecode(tmp)) == NULL) goto out; } } /* Success */ if (userp != NULL) { *userp = user; user = NULL; } if (hostp != NULL) { *hostp = host; host = NULL; } if (portp != NULL) *portp = port; if (pathp != NULL) { *pathp = path; path = NULL; } ret = 0; out: free(uridup); free(user); free(host); free(path); return ret; } /* function to assist building execv() arguments */ void addargs(arglist *args, char *fmt, ...) { va_list ap; char *cp; u_int nalloc; int r; va_start(ap, fmt); r = vasprintf(&cp, fmt, ap); va_end(ap); if (r == -1) fatal_f("argument too long"); nalloc = args->nalloc; if (args->list == NULL) { nalloc = 32; args->num = 0; } else if (args->num > (256 * 1024)) fatal_f("too many arguments"); else if (args->num >= args->nalloc) fatal_f("arglist corrupt"); else if (args->num+2 >= nalloc) nalloc *= 2; args->list = xrecallocarray(args->list, args->nalloc, nalloc, sizeof(char *)); args->nalloc = nalloc; args->list[args->num++] = cp; args->list[args->num] = NULL; } void replacearg(arglist *args, u_int which, char *fmt, ...) { va_list ap; char *cp; int r; va_start(ap, fmt); r = vasprintf(&cp, fmt, ap); va_end(ap); if (r == -1) fatal_f("argument too long"); if (args->list == NULL || args->num >= args->nalloc) fatal_f("arglist corrupt"); if (which >= args->num) fatal_f("tried to replace invalid arg %d >= %d", which, args->num); free(args->list[which]); args->list[which] = cp; } void freeargs(arglist *args) { u_int i; if (args == NULL) return; if (args->list != NULL && args->num < args->nalloc) { for (i = 0; i < args->num; i++) free(args->list[i]); free(args->list); } args->nalloc = args->num = 0; args->list = NULL; } /* * Expands tildes in the file name. Returns data allocated by xmalloc. * Warning: this calls getpw*. */ int tilde_expand(const char *filename, uid_t uid, char **retp) { char *ocopy = NULL, *copy, *s = NULL; const char *path = NULL, *user = NULL; struct passwd *pw; size_t len; int ret = -1, r, slash; *retp = NULL; if (*filename != '~') { *retp = xstrdup(filename); return 0; } ocopy = copy = xstrdup(filename + 1); if (*copy == '\0') /* ~ */ path = NULL; else if (*copy == '/') { copy += strspn(copy, "/"); if (*copy == '\0') path = NULL; /* ~/ */ else path = copy; /* ~/path */ } else { user = copy; if ((path = strchr(copy, '/')) != NULL) { copy[path - copy] = '\0'; path++; path += strspn(path, "/"); if (*path == '\0') /* ~user/ */ path = NULL; /* else ~user/path */ } /* else ~user */ } if (user != NULL) { if ((pw = getpwnam(user)) == NULL) { error_f("No such user %s", user); goto out; } } else if ((pw = getpwuid(uid)) == NULL) { error_f("No such uid %ld", (long)uid); goto out; } /* Make sure directory has a trailing '/' */ slash = (len = strlen(pw->pw_dir)) == 0 || pw->pw_dir[len - 1] != '/'; if ((r = xasprintf(&s, "%s%s%s", pw->pw_dir, slash ? "/" : "", path != NULL ? path : "")) <= 0) { error_f("xasprintf failed"); goto out; } if (r >= PATH_MAX) { error_f("Path too long"); goto out; } /* success */ ret = 0; *retp = s; s = NULL; out: free(s); free(ocopy); return ret; } char * tilde_expand_filename(const char *filename, uid_t uid) { char *ret; if (tilde_expand(filename, uid, &ret) != 0) cleanup_exit(255); return ret; } /* * Expand a string with a set of %[char] escapes and/or ${ENVIRONMENT} * substitutions. A number of escapes may be specified as * (char *escape_chars, char *replacement) pairs. The list must be terminated * by a NULL escape_char. Returns replaced string in memory allocated by * xmalloc which the caller must free. */ static char * vdollar_percent_expand(int *parseerror, int dollar, int percent, const char *string, va_list ap) { #define EXPAND_MAX_KEYS 16 u_int num_keys = 0, i; struct { const char *key; const char *repl; } keys[EXPAND_MAX_KEYS]; struct sshbuf *buf; int r, missingvar = 0; char *ret = NULL, *var, *varend, *val; size_t len; if ((buf = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed"); if (parseerror == NULL) fatal_f("null parseerror arg"); *parseerror = 1; /* Gather keys if we're doing percent expansion. */ if (percent) { for (num_keys = 0; num_keys < EXPAND_MAX_KEYS; num_keys++) { keys[num_keys].key = va_arg(ap, char *); if (keys[num_keys].key == NULL) break; keys[num_keys].repl = va_arg(ap, char *); if (keys[num_keys].repl == NULL) { fatal_f("NULL replacement for token %s", keys[num_keys].key); } } if (num_keys == EXPAND_MAX_KEYS && va_arg(ap, char *) != NULL) fatal_f("too many keys"); if (num_keys == 0) fatal_f("percent expansion without token list"); } /* Expand string */ for (i = 0; *string != '\0'; string++) { /* Optionally process ${ENVIRONMENT} expansions. */ if (dollar && string[0] == '$' && string[1] == '{') { string += 2; /* skip over '${' */ if ((varend = strchr(string, '}')) == NULL) { error_f("environment variable '%s' missing " "closing '}'", string); goto out; } len = varend - string; if (len == 0) { error_f("zero-length environment variable"); goto out; } var = xmalloc(len + 1); (void)strlcpy(var, string, len + 1); if ((val = getenv(var)) == NULL) { error_f("env var ${%s} has no value", var); missingvar = 1; } else { debug3_f("expand ${%s} -> '%s'", var, val); if ((r = sshbuf_put(buf, val, strlen(val))) !=0) fatal_fr(r, "sshbuf_put ${}"); } free(var); string += len; continue; } /* * Process percent expansions if we have a list of TOKENs. * If we're not doing percent expansion everything just gets * appended here. */ if (*string != '%' || !percent) { append: if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(buf, *string)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "sshbuf_put_u8 %%"); continue; } string++; /* %% case */ if (*string == '%') goto append; if (*string == '\0') { error_f("invalid format"); goto out; } for (i = 0; i < num_keys; i++) { if (strchr(keys[i].key, *string) != NULL) { if ((r = sshbuf_put(buf, keys[i].repl, strlen(keys[i].repl))) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "sshbuf_put %%-repl"); break; } } if (i >= num_keys) { error_f("unknown key %%%c", *string); goto out; } } if (!missingvar && (ret = sshbuf_dup_string(buf)) == NULL) fatal_f("sshbuf_dup_string failed"); *parseerror = 0; out: sshbuf_free(buf); return *parseerror ? NULL : ret; #undef EXPAND_MAX_KEYS } /* * Expand only environment variables. * Note that although this function is variadic like the other similar * functions, any such arguments will be unused. */ char * dollar_expand(int *parseerr, const char *string, ...) { char *ret; int err; va_list ap; va_start(ap, string); ret = vdollar_percent_expand(&err, 1, 0, string, ap); va_end(ap); if (parseerr != NULL) *parseerr = err; return ret; } /* * Returns expanded string or NULL if a specified environment variable is * not defined, or calls fatal if the string is invalid. */ char * percent_expand(const char *string, ...) { char *ret; int err; va_list ap; va_start(ap, string); ret = vdollar_percent_expand(&err, 0, 1, string, ap); va_end(ap); if (err) fatal_f("failed"); return ret; } /* * Returns expanded string or NULL if a specified environment variable is * not defined, or calls fatal if the string is invalid. */ char * percent_dollar_expand(const char *string, ...) { char *ret; int err; va_list ap; va_start(ap, string); ret = vdollar_percent_expand(&err, 1, 1, string, ap); va_end(ap); if (err) fatal_f("failed"); return ret; } int tun_open(int tun, int mode, char **ifname) { #if defined(CUSTOM_SYS_TUN_OPEN) return (sys_tun_open(tun, mode, ifname)); #elif defined(SSH_TUN_OPENBSD) struct ifreq ifr; char name[100]; int fd = -1, sock; const char *tunbase = "tun"; if (ifname != NULL) *ifname = NULL; if (mode == SSH_TUNMODE_ETHERNET) tunbase = "tap"; /* Open the tunnel device */ if (tun <= SSH_TUNID_MAX) { snprintf(name, sizeof(name), "/dev/%s%d", tunbase, tun); fd = open(name, O_RDWR); } else if (tun == SSH_TUNID_ANY) { for (tun = 100; tun >= 0; tun--) { snprintf(name, sizeof(name), "/dev/%s%d", tunbase, tun); if ((fd = open(name, O_RDWR)) >= 0) break; } } else { debug_f("invalid tunnel %u", tun); return -1; } if (fd == -1) { debug_f("%s open: %s", name, strerror(errno)); return -1; } debug_f("%s mode %d fd %d", name, mode, fd); /* Bring interface up if it is not already */ snprintf(ifr.ifr_name, sizeof(ifr.ifr_name), "%s%d", tunbase, tun); if ((sock = socket(PF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0)) == -1) goto failed; if (ioctl(sock, SIOCGIFFLAGS, &ifr) == -1) { debug_f("get interface %s flags: %s", ifr.ifr_name, strerror(errno)); goto failed; } if (!(ifr.ifr_flags & IFF_UP)) { ifr.ifr_flags |= IFF_UP; if (ioctl(sock, SIOCSIFFLAGS, &ifr) == -1) { debug_f("activate interface %s: %s", ifr.ifr_name, strerror(errno)); goto failed; } } if (ifname != NULL) *ifname = xstrdup(ifr.ifr_name); close(sock); return fd; failed: if (fd >= 0) close(fd); if (sock >= 0) close(sock); return -1; #else error("Tunnel interfaces are not supported on this platform"); return (-1); #endif } void sanitise_stdfd(void) { int nullfd, dupfd; if ((nullfd = dupfd = open(_PATH_DEVNULL, O_RDWR)) == -1) { fprintf(stderr, "Couldn't open /dev/null: %s\n", strerror(errno)); exit(1); } while (++dupfd <= STDERR_FILENO) { /* Only populate closed fds. */ if (fcntl(dupfd, F_GETFL) == -1 && errno == EBADF) { if (dup2(nullfd, dupfd) == -1) { fprintf(stderr, "dup2: %s\n", strerror(errno)); exit(1); } } } if (nullfd > STDERR_FILENO) close(nullfd); } char * tohex(const void *vp, size_t l) { const u_char *p = (const u_char *)vp; char b[3], *r; size_t i, hl; if (l > 65536) return xstrdup("tohex: length > 65536"); hl = l * 2 + 1; r = xcalloc(1, hl); for (i = 0; i < l; i++) { snprintf(b, sizeof(b), "%02x", p[i]); strlcat(r, b, hl); } return (r); } /* * Extend string *sp by the specified format. If *sp is not NULL (or empty), * then the separator 'sep' will be prepended before the formatted arguments. * Extended strings are heap allocated. */ void xextendf(char **sp, const char *sep, const char *fmt, ...) { va_list ap; char *tmp1, *tmp2; va_start(ap, fmt); xvasprintf(&tmp1, fmt, ap); va_end(ap); if (*sp == NULL || **sp == '\0') { free(*sp); *sp = tmp1; return; } xasprintf(&tmp2, "%s%s%s", *sp, sep == NULL ? "" : sep, tmp1); free(tmp1); free(*sp); *sp = tmp2; } u_int64_t get_u64(const void *vp) { const u_char *p = (const u_char *)vp; u_int64_t v; v = (u_int64_t)p[0] << 56; v |= (u_int64_t)p[1] << 48; v |= (u_int64_t)p[2] << 40; v |= (u_int64_t)p[3] << 32; v |= (u_int64_t)p[4] << 24; v |= (u_int64_t)p[5] << 16; v |= (u_int64_t)p[6] << 8; v |= (u_int64_t)p[7]; return (v); } u_int32_t get_u32(const void *vp) { const u_char *p = (const u_char *)vp; u_int32_t v; v = (u_int32_t)p[0] << 24; v |= (u_int32_t)p[1] << 16; v |= (u_int32_t)p[2] << 8; v |= (u_int32_t)p[3]; return (v); } u_int32_t get_u32_le(const void *vp) { const u_char *p = (const u_char *)vp; u_int32_t v; v = (u_int32_t)p[0]; v |= (u_int32_t)p[1] << 8; v |= (u_int32_t)p[2] << 16; v |= (u_int32_t)p[3] << 24; return (v); } u_int16_t get_u16(const void *vp) { const u_char *p = (const u_char *)vp; u_int16_t v; v = (u_int16_t)p[0] << 8; v |= (u_int16_t)p[1]; return (v); } void put_u64(void *vp, u_int64_t v) { u_char *p = (u_char *)vp; p[0] = (u_char)(v >> 56) & 0xff; p[1] = (u_char)(v >> 48) & 0xff; p[2] = (u_char)(v >> 40) & 0xff; p[3] = (u_char)(v >> 32) & 0xff; p[4] = (u_char)(v >> 24) & 0xff; p[5] = (u_char)(v >> 16) & 0xff; p[6] = (u_char)(v >> 8) & 0xff; p[7] = (u_char)v & 0xff; } void put_u32(void *vp, u_int32_t v) { u_char *p = (u_char *)vp; p[0] = (u_char)(v >> 24) & 0xff; p[1] = (u_char)(v >> 16) & 0xff; p[2] = (u_char)(v >> 8) & 0xff; p[3] = (u_char)v & 0xff; } void put_u32_le(void *vp, u_int32_t v) { u_char *p = (u_char *)vp; p[0] = (u_char)v & 0xff; p[1] = (u_char)(v >> 8) & 0xff; p[2] = (u_char)(v >> 16) & 0xff; p[3] = (u_char)(v >> 24) & 0xff; } void put_u16(void *vp, u_int16_t v) { u_char *p = (u_char *)vp; p[0] = (u_char)(v >> 8) & 0xff; p[1] = (u_char)v & 0xff; } void ms_subtract_diff(struct timeval *start, int *ms) { struct timeval diff, finish; monotime_tv(&finish); timersub(&finish, start, &diff); *ms -= (diff.tv_sec * 1000) + (diff.tv_usec / 1000); } void ms_to_timespec(struct timespec *ts, int ms) { if (ms < 0) ms = 0; ts->tv_sec = ms / 1000; ts->tv_nsec = (ms % 1000) * 1000 * 1000; } void monotime_ts(struct timespec *ts) { struct timeval tv; #if defined(HAVE_CLOCK_GETTIME) && (defined(CLOCK_BOOTTIME) || \ defined(CLOCK_MONOTONIC) || defined(CLOCK_REALTIME)) static int gettime_failed = 0; if (!gettime_failed) { # ifdef CLOCK_BOOTTIME if (clock_gettime(CLOCK_BOOTTIME, ts) == 0) return; # endif /* CLOCK_BOOTTIME */ # ifdef CLOCK_MONOTONIC if (clock_gettime(CLOCK_MONOTONIC, ts) == 0) return; # endif /* CLOCK_MONOTONIC */ # ifdef CLOCK_REALTIME /* Not monotonic, but we're almost out of options here. */ if (clock_gettime(CLOCK_REALTIME, ts) == 0) return; # endif /* CLOCK_REALTIME */ debug3("clock_gettime: %s", strerror(errno)); gettime_failed = 1; } #endif /* HAVE_CLOCK_GETTIME && (BOOTTIME || MONOTONIC || REALTIME) */ gettimeofday(&tv, NULL); ts->tv_sec = tv.tv_sec; ts->tv_nsec = (long)tv.tv_usec * 1000; } void monotime_tv(struct timeval *tv) { struct timespec ts; monotime_ts(&ts); tv->tv_sec = ts.tv_sec; tv->tv_usec = ts.tv_nsec / 1000; } time_t monotime(void) { struct timespec ts; monotime_ts(&ts); return ts.tv_sec; } double monotime_double(void) { struct timespec ts; monotime_ts(&ts); return ts.tv_sec + ((double)ts.tv_nsec / 1000000000); } void bandwidth_limit_init(struct bwlimit *bw, u_int64_t kbps, size_t buflen) { bw->buflen = buflen; bw->rate = kbps; bw->thresh = buflen; bw->lamt = 0; timerclear(&bw->bwstart); timerclear(&bw->bwend); } /* Callback from read/write loop to insert bandwidth-limiting delays */ void bandwidth_limit(struct bwlimit *bw, size_t read_len) { u_int64_t waitlen; struct timespec ts, rm; bw->lamt += read_len; if (!timerisset(&bw->bwstart)) { monotime_tv(&bw->bwstart); return; } if (bw->lamt < bw->thresh) return; monotime_tv(&bw->bwend); timersub(&bw->bwend, &bw->bwstart, &bw->bwend); if (!timerisset(&bw->bwend)) return; bw->lamt *= 8; waitlen = (double)1000000L * bw->lamt / bw->rate; bw->bwstart.tv_sec = waitlen / 1000000L; bw->bwstart.tv_usec = waitlen % 1000000L; if (timercmp(&bw->bwstart, &bw->bwend, >)) { timersub(&bw->bwstart, &bw->bwend, &bw->bwend); /* Adjust the wait time */ if (bw->bwend.tv_sec) { bw->thresh /= 2; if (bw->thresh < bw->buflen / 4) bw->thresh = bw->buflen / 4; } else if (bw->bwend.tv_usec < 10000) { bw->thresh *= 2; if (bw->thresh > bw->buflen * 8) bw->thresh = bw->buflen * 8; } TIMEVAL_TO_TIMESPEC(&bw->bwend, &ts); while (nanosleep(&ts, &rm) == -1) { if (errno != EINTR) break; ts = rm; } } bw->lamt = 0; monotime_tv(&bw->bwstart); } /* Make a template filename for mk[sd]temp() */ void mktemp_proto(char *s, size_t len) { const char *tmpdir; int r; if ((tmpdir = getenv("TMPDIR")) != NULL) { r = snprintf(s, len, "%s/ssh-XXXXXXXXXXXX", tmpdir); if (r > 0 && (size_t)r < len) return; } r = snprintf(s, len, "/tmp/ssh-XXXXXXXXXXXX"); if (r < 0 || (size_t)r >= len) fatal_f("template string too short"); } static const struct { const char *name; int value; } ipqos[] = { { "none", INT_MAX }, /* can't use 0 here; that's CS0 */ { "af11", IPTOS_DSCP_AF11 }, { "af12", IPTOS_DSCP_AF12 }, { "af13", IPTOS_DSCP_AF13 }, { "af21", IPTOS_DSCP_AF21 }, { "af22", IPTOS_DSCP_AF22 }, { "af23", IPTOS_DSCP_AF23 }, { "af31", IPTOS_DSCP_AF31 }, { "af32", IPTOS_DSCP_AF32 }, { "af33", IPTOS_DSCP_AF33 }, { "af41", IPTOS_DSCP_AF41 }, { "af42", IPTOS_DSCP_AF42 }, { "af43", IPTOS_DSCP_AF43 }, { "cs0", IPTOS_DSCP_CS0 }, { "cs1", IPTOS_DSCP_CS1 }, { "cs2", IPTOS_DSCP_CS2 }, { "cs3", IPTOS_DSCP_CS3 }, { "cs4", IPTOS_DSCP_CS4 }, { "cs5", IPTOS_DSCP_CS5 }, { "cs6", IPTOS_DSCP_CS6 }, { "cs7", IPTOS_DSCP_CS7 }, { "ef", IPTOS_DSCP_EF }, { "le", IPTOS_DSCP_LE }, { "lowdelay", IPTOS_LOWDELAY }, { "throughput", IPTOS_THROUGHPUT }, { "reliability", IPTOS_RELIABILITY }, { NULL, -1 } }; int parse_ipqos(const char *cp) { u_int i; char *ep; long val; if (cp == NULL) return -1; for (i = 0; ipqos[i].name != NULL; i++) { if (strcasecmp(cp, ipqos[i].name) == 0) return ipqos[i].value; } /* Try parsing as an integer */ val = strtol(cp, &ep, 0); if (*cp == '\0' || *ep != '\0' || val < 0 || val > 255) return -1; return val; } const char * iptos2str(int iptos) { int i; static char iptos_str[sizeof "0xff"]; for (i = 0; ipqos[i].name != NULL; i++) { if (ipqos[i].value == iptos) return ipqos[i].name; } snprintf(iptos_str, sizeof iptos_str, "0x%02x", iptos); return iptos_str; } void lowercase(char *s) { for (; *s; s++) *s = tolower((u_char)*s); } int unix_listener(const char *path, int backlog, int unlink_first) { struct sockaddr_un sunaddr; int saved_errno, sock; memset(&sunaddr, 0, sizeof(sunaddr)); sunaddr.sun_family = AF_UNIX; if (strlcpy(sunaddr.sun_path, path, sizeof(sunaddr.sun_path)) >= sizeof(sunaddr.sun_path)) { error_f("path \"%s\" too long for Unix domain socket", path); errno = ENAMETOOLONG; return -1; } sock = socket(PF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0); if (sock == -1) { saved_errno = errno; error_f("socket: %.100s", strerror(errno)); errno = saved_errno; return -1; } if (unlink_first == 1) { if (unlink(path) != 0 && errno != ENOENT) error("unlink(%s): %.100s", path, strerror(errno)); } if (bind(sock, (struct sockaddr *)&sunaddr, sizeof(sunaddr)) == -1) { saved_errno = errno; error_f("cannot bind to path %s: %s", path, strerror(errno)); close(sock); errno = saved_errno; return -1; } if (listen(sock, backlog) == -1) { saved_errno = errno; error_f("cannot listen on path %s: %s", path, strerror(errno)); close(sock); unlink(path); errno = saved_errno; return -1; } return sock; } void sock_set_v6only(int s) { #if defined(IPV6_V6ONLY) && !defined(__OpenBSD__) int on = 1; debug3("%s: set socket %d IPV6_V6ONLY", __func__, s); if (setsockopt(s, IPPROTO_IPV6, IPV6_V6ONLY, &on, sizeof(on)) == -1) error("setsockopt IPV6_V6ONLY: %s", strerror(errno)); #endif } /* * Compares two strings that maybe be NULL. Returns non-zero if strings * are both NULL or are identical, returns zero otherwise. */ static int strcmp_maybe_null(const char *a, const char *b) { if ((a == NULL && b != NULL) || (a != NULL && b == NULL)) return 0; if (a != NULL && strcmp(a, b) != 0) return 0; return 1; } /* * Compare two forwards, returning non-zero if they are identical or * zero otherwise. */ int forward_equals(const struct Forward *a, const struct Forward *b) { if (strcmp_maybe_null(a->listen_host, b->listen_host) == 0) return 0; if (a->listen_port != b->listen_port) return 0; if (strcmp_maybe_null(a->listen_path, b->listen_path) == 0) return 0; if (strcmp_maybe_null(a->connect_host, b->connect_host) == 0) return 0; if (a->connect_port != b->connect_port) return 0; if (strcmp_maybe_null(a->connect_path, b->connect_path) == 0) return 0; /* allocated_port and handle are not checked */ return 1; } /* returns 1 if process is already daemonized, 0 otherwise */ int daemonized(void) { int fd; if ((fd = open(_PATH_TTY, O_RDONLY | O_NOCTTY)) >= 0) { close(fd); return 0; /* have controlling terminal */ } if (getppid() != 1) return 0; /* parent is not init */ if (getsid(0) != getpid()) return 0; /* not session leader */ debug3("already daemonized"); return 1; } /* * Splits 's' into an argument vector. Handles quoted string and basic * escape characters (\\, \", \'). Caller must free the argument vector * and its members. */ int argv_split(const char *s, int *argcp, char ***argvp, int terminate_on_comment) { int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; int argc = 0, quote, i, j; char *arg, **argv = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*argv)); *argvp = NULL; *argcp = 0; for (i = 0; s[i] != '\0'; i++) { /* Skip leading whitespace */ if (s[i] == ' ' || s[i] == '\t') continue; if (terminate_on_comment && s[i] == '#') break; /* Start of a token */ quote = 0; argv = xreallocarray(argv, (argc + 2), sizeof(*argv)); arg = argv[argc++] = xcalloc(1, strlen(s + i) + 1); argv[argc] = NULL; /* Copy the token in, removing escapes */ for (j = 0; s[i] != '\0'; i++) { if (s[i] == '\\') { if (s[i + 1] == '\'' || s[i + 1] == '\"' || s[i + 1] == '\\' || (quote == 0 && s[i + 1] == ' ')) { i++; /* Skip '\' */ arg[j++] = s[i]; } else { /* Unrecognised escape */ arg[j++] = s[i]; } } else if (quote == 0 && (s[i] == ' ' || s[i] == '\t')) break; /* done */ else if (quote == 0 && (s[i] == '\"' || s[i] == '\'')) quote = s[i]; /* quote start */ else if (quote != 0 && s[i] == quote) quote = 0; /* quote end */ else arg[j++] = s[i]; } if (s[i] == '\0') { if (quote != 0) { /* Ran out of string looking for close quote */ r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; goto out; } break; } } /* Success */ *argcp = argc; *argvp = argv; argc = 0; argv = NULL; r = 0; out: if (argc != 0 && argv != NULL) { for (i = 0; i < argc; i++) free(argv[i]); free(argv); } return r; } /* * Reassemble an argument vector into a string, quoting and escaping as * necessary. Caller must free returned string. */ char * argv_assemble(int argc, char **argv) { int i, j, ws, r; char c, *ret; struct sshbuf *buf, *arg; if ((buf = sshbuf_new()) == NULL || (arg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed"); for (i = 0; i < argc; i++) { ws = 0; sshbuf_reset(arg); for (j = 0; argv[i][j] != '\0'; j++) { r = 0; c = argv[i][j]; switch (c) { case ' ': case '\t': ws = 1; r = sshbuf_put_u8(arg, c); break; case '\\': case '\'': case '"': if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(arg, '\\')) != 0) break; /* FALLTHROUGH */ default: r = sshbuf_put_u8(arg, c); break; } if (r != 0) fatal_fr(r, "sshbuf_put_u8"); } if ((i != 0 && (r = sshbuf_put_u8(buf, ' ')) != 0) || (ws != 0 && (r = sshbuf_put_u8(buf, '"')) != 0) || (r = sshbuf_putb(buf, arg)) != 0 || (ws != 0 && (r = sshbuf_put_u8(buf, '"')) != 0)) fatal_fr(r, "assemble"); } if ((ret = malloc(sshbuf_len(buf) + 1)) == NULL) fatal_f("malloc failed"); memcpy(ret, sshbuf_ptr(buf), sshbuf_len(buf)); ret[sshbuf_len(buf)] = '\0'; sshbuf_free(buf); sshbuf_free(arg); return ret; } char * argv_next(int *argcp, char ***argvp) { char *ret = (*argvp)[0]; if (*argcp > 0 && ret != NULL) { (*argcp)--; (*argvp)++; } return ret; } void argv_consume(int *argcp) { *argcp = 0; } void argv_free(char **av, int ac) { int i; if (av == NULL) return; for (i = 0; i < ac; i++) free(av[i]); free(av); } /* Returns 0 if pid exited cleanly, non-zero otherwise */ int exited_cleanly(pid_t pid, const char *tag, const char *cmd, int quiet) { int status; while (waitpid(pid, &status, 0) == -1) { if (errno != EINTR) { error("%s waitpid: %s", tag, strerror(errno)); return -1; } } if (WIFSIGNALED(status)) { error("%s %s exited on signal %d", tag, cmd, WTERMSIG(status)); return -1; } else if (WEXITSTATUS(status) != 0) { do_log2(quiet ? SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG1 : SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO, "%s %s failed, status %d", tag, cmd, WEXITSTATUS(status)); return -1; } return 0; } /* * Check a given path for security. This is defined as all components * of the path to the file must be owned by either the owner of * of the file or root and no directories must be group or world writable. * * XXX Should any specific check be done for sym links ? * * Takes a file name, its stat information (preferably from fstat() to * avoid races), the uid of the expected owner, their home directory and an * error buffer plus max size as arguments. * * Returns 0 on success and -1 on failure */ int safe_path(const char *name, struct stat *stp, const char *pw_dir, uid_t uid, char *err, size_t errlen) { char buf[PATH_MAX], homedir[PATH_MAX]; char *cp; int comparehome = 0; struct stat st; if (realpath(name, buf) == NULL) { snprintf(err, errlen, "realpath %s failed: %s", name, strerror(errno)); return -1; } if (pw_dir != NULL && realpath(pw_dir, homedir) != NULL) comparehome = 1; if (!S_ISREG(stp->st_mode)) { snprintf(err, errlen, "%s is not a regular file", buf); return -1; } if ((!platform_sys_dir_uid(stp->st_uid) && stp->st_uid != uid) || (stp->st_mode & 022) != 0) { snprintf(err, errlen, "bad ownership or modes for file %s", buf); return -1; } /* for each component of the canonical path, walking upwards */ for (;;) { if ((cp = dirname(buf)) == NULL) { snprintf(err, errlen, "dirname() failed"); return -1; } strlcpy(buf, cp, sizeof(buf)); if (stat(buf, &st) == -1 || (!platform_sys_dir_uid(st.st_uid) && st.st_uid != uid) || (st.st_mode & 022) != 0) { snprintf(err, errlen, "bad ownership or modes for directory %s", buf); return -1; } /* If are past the homedir then we can stop */ if (comparehome && strcmp(homedir, buf) == 0) break; /* * dirname should always complete with a "/" path, * but we can be paranoid and check for "." too */ if ((strcmp("/", buf) == 0) || (strcmp(".", buf) == 0)) break; } return 0; } /* * Version of safe_path() that accepts an open file descriptor to * avoid races. * * Returns 0 on success and -1 on failure */ int safe_path_fd(int fd, const char *file, struct passwd *pw, char *err, size_t errlen) { struct stat st; /* check the open file to avoid races */ if (fstat(fd, &st) == -1) { snprintf(err, errlen, "cannot stat file %s: %s", file, strerror(errno)); return -1; } return safe_path(file, &st, pw->pw_dir, pw->pw_uid, err, errlen); } /* * Sets the value of the given variable in the environment. If the variable * already exists, its value is overridden. */ void child_set_env(char ***envp, u_int *envsizep, const char *name, const char *value) { char **env; u_int envsize; u_int i, namelen; if (strchr(name, '=') != NULL) { error("Invalid environment variable \"%.100s\"", name); return; } /* * If we're passed an uninitialized list, allocate a single null * entry before continuing. */ if (*envp == NULL && *envsizep == 0) { *envp = xmalloc(sizeof(char *)); *envp[0] = NULL; *envsizep = 1; } /* * Find the slot where the value should be stored. If the variable * already exists, we reuse the slot; otherwise we append a new slot * at the end of the array, expanding if necessary. */ env = *envp; namelen = strlen(name); for (i = 0; env[i]; i++) if (strncmp(env[i], name, namelen) == 0 && env[i][namelen] == '=') break; if (env[i]) { /* Reuse the slot. */ free(env[i]); } else { /* New variable. Expand if necessary. */ envsize = *envsizep; if (i >= envsize - 1) { if (envsize >= 1000) fatal("child_set_env: too many env vars"); envsize += 50; env = (*envp) = xreallocarray(env, envsize, sizeof(char *)); *envsizep = envsize; } /* Need to set the NULL pointer at end of array beyond the new slot. */ env[i + 1] = NULL; } /* Allocate space and format the variable in the appropriate slot. */ /* XXX xasprintf */ env[i] = xmalloc(strlen(name) + 1 + strlen(value) + 1); snprintf(env[i], strlen(name) + 1 + strlen(value) + 1, "%s=%s", name, value); } /* * Check and optionally lowercase a domain name, also removes trailing '.' * Returns 1 on success and 0 on failure, storing an error message in errstr. */ int valid_domain(char *name, int makelower, const char **errstr) { size_t i, l = strlen(name); u_char c, last = '\0'; static char errbuf[256]; if (l == 0) { strlcpy(errbuf, "empty domain name", sizeof(errbuf)); goto bad; } if (!isalpha((u_char)name[0]) && !isdigit((u_char)name[0])) { snprintf(errbuf, sizeof(errbuf), "domain name \"%.100s\" " "starts with invalid character", name); goto bad; } for (i = 0; i < l; i++) { c = tolower((u_char)name[i]); if (makelower) name[i] = (char)c; if (last == '.' && c == '.') { snprintf(errbuf, sizeof(errbuf), "domain name " "\"%.100s\" contains consecutive separators", name); goto bad; } if (c != '.' && c != '-' && !isalnum(c) && c != '_') /* technically invalid, but common */ { snprintf(errbuf, sizeof(errbuf), "domain name " "\"%.100s\" contains invalid characters", name); goto bad; } last = c; } if (name[l - 1] == '.') name[l - 1] = '\0'; if (errstr != NULL) *errstr = NULL; return 1; bad: if (errstr != NULL) *errstr = errbuf; return 0; } /* * Verify that a environment variable name (not including initial '$') is * valid; consisting of one or more alphanumeric or underscore characters only. * Returns 1 on valid, 0 otherwise. */ int valid_env_name(const char *name) { const char *cp; if (name[0] == '\0') return 0; for (cp = name; *cp != '\0'; cp++) { if (!isalnum((u_char)*cp) && *cp != '_') return 0; } return 1; } const char * atoi_err(const char *nptr, int *val) { const char *errstr = NULL; long long num; if (nptr == NULL || *nptr == '\0') return "missing"; num = strtonum(nptr, 0, INT_MAX, &errstr); if (errstr == NULL) *val = (int)num; return errstr; } int parse_absolute_time(const char *s, uint64_t *tp) { struct tm tm; time_t tt; char buf[32], *fmt; const char *cp; size_t l; int is_utc = 0; *tp = 0; l = strlen(s); if (l > 1 && strcasecmp(s + l - 1, "Z") == 0) { is_utc = 1; l--; } else if (l > 3 && strcasecmp(s + l - 3, "UTC") == 0) { is_utc = 1; l -= 3; } /* * POSIX strptime says "The application shall ensure that there * is white-space or other non-alphanumeric characters between * any two conversion specifications" so arrange things this way. */ switch (l) { case 8: /* YYYYMMDD */ fmt = "%Y-%m-%d"; snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%.4s-%.2s-%.2s", s, s + 4, s + 6); break; case 12: /* YYYYMMDDHHMM */ fmt = "%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M"; snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%.4s-%.2s-%.2sT%.2s:%.2s", s, s + 4, s + 6, s + 8, s + 10); break; case 14: /* YYYYMMDDHHMMSS */ fmt = "%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S"; snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%.4s-%.2s-%.2sT%.2s:%.2s:%.2s", s, s + 4, s + 6, s + 8, s + 10, s + 12); break; default: return SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; } memset(&tm, 0, sizeof(tm)); if ((cp = strptime(buf, fmt, &tm)) == NULL || *cp != '\0') return SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; if (is_utc) { if ((tt = timegm(&tm)) < 0) return SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; } else { if ((tt = mktime(&tm)) < 0) return SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; } /* success */ *tp = (uint64_t)tt; return 0; } -/* On OpenBSD time_t is int64_t which is long long. */ -/* #define SSH_TIME_T_MAX LLONG_MAX */ - void format_absolute_time(uint64_t t, char *buf, size_t len) { time_t tt = t > SSH_TIME_T_MAX ? SSH_TIME_T_MAX : t; struct tm tm; localtime_r(&tt, &tm); strftime(buf, len, "%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S", &tm); } /* check if path is absolute */ int path_absolute(const char *path) { return (*path == '/') ? 1 : 0; } void skip_space(char **cpp) { char *cp; for (cp = *cpp; *cp == ' ' || *cp == '\t'; cp++) ; *cpp = cp; } /* authorized_key-style options parsing helpers */ /* * Match flag 'opt' in *optsp, and if allow_negate is set then also match * 'no-opt'. Returns -1 if option not matched, 1 if option matches or 0 * if negated option matches. * If the option or negated option matches, then *optsp is updated to * point to the first character after the option. */ int opt_flag(const char *opt, int allow_negate, const char **optsp) { size_t opt_len = strlen(opt); const char *opts = *optsp; int negate = 0; if (allow_negate && strncasecmp(opts, "no-", 3) == 0) { opts += 3; negate = 1; } if (strncasecmp(opts, opt, opt_len) == 0) { *optsp = opts + opt_len; return negate ? 0 : 1; } return -1; } char * opt_dequote(const char **sp, const char **errstrp) { const char *s = *sp; char *ret; size_t i; *errstrp = NULL; if (*s != '"') { *errstrp = "missing start quote"; return NULL; } s++; if ((ret = malloc(strlen((s)) + 1)) == NULL) { *errstrp = "memory allocation failed"; return NULL; } for (i = 0; *s != '\0' && *s != '"';) { if (s[0] == '\\' && s[1] == '"') s++; ret[i++] = *s++; } if (*s == '\0') { *errstrp = "missing end quote"; free(ret); return NULL; } ret[i] = '\0'; s++; *sp = s; return ret; } int opt_match(const char **opts, const char *term) { if (strncasecmp((*opts), term, strlen(term)) == 0 && (*opts)[strlen(term)] == '=') { *opts += strlen(term) + 1; return 1; } return 0; } void opt_array_append2(const char *file, const int line, const char *directive, char ***array, int **iarray, u_int *lp, const char *s, int i) { if (*lp >= INT_MAX) fatal("%s line %d: Too many %s entries", file, line, directive); if (iarray != NULL) { *iarray = xrecallocarray(*iarray, *lp, *lp + 1, sizeof(**iarray)); (*iarray)[*lp] = i; } *array = xrecallocarray(*array, *lp, *lp + 1, sizeof(**array)); (*array)[*lp] = xstrdup(s); (*lp)++; } void opt_array_append(const char *file, const int line, const char *directive, char ***array, u_int *lp, const char *s) { opt_array_append2(file, line, directive, array, NULL, lp, s, 0); } sshsig_t ssh_signal(int signum, sshsig_t handler) { struct sigaction sa, osa; /* mask all other signals while in handler */ memset(&sa, 0, sizeof(sa)); sa.sa_handler = handler; sigfillset(&sa.sa_mask); #if defined(SA_RESTART) && !defined(NO_SA_RESTART) if (signum != SIGALRM) sa.sa_flags = SA_RESTART; #endif if (sigaction(signum, &sa, &osa) == -1) { debug3("sigaction(%s): %s", strsignal(signum), strerror(errno)); return SIG_ERR; } return osa.sa_handler; } int stdfd_devnull(int do_stdin, int do_stdout, int do_stderr) { int devnull, ret = 0; if ((devnull = open(_PATH_DEVNULL, O_RDWR)) == -1) { error_f("open %s: %s", _PATH_DEVNULL, strerror(errno)); return -1; } if ((do_stdin && dup2(devnull, STDIN_FILENO) == -1) || (do_stdout && dup2(devnull, STDOUT_FILENO) == -1) || (do_stderr && dup2(devnull, STDERR_FILENO) == -1)) { error_f("dup2: %s", strerror(errno)); ret = -1; } if (devnull > STDERR_FILENO) close(devnull); return ret; } /* * Runs command in a subprocess with a minimal environment. * Returns pid on success, 0 on failure. * The child stdout and stderr maybe captured, left attached or sent to * /dev/null depending on the contents of flags. * "tag" is prepended to log messages. * NB. "command" is only used for logging; the actual command executed is * av[0]. */ pid_t subprocess(const char *tag, const char *command, int ac, char **av, FILE **child, u_int flags, struct passwd *pw, privdrop_fn *drop_privs, privrestore_fn *restore_privs) { FILE *f = NULL; struct stat st; int fd, devnull, p[2], i; pid_t pid; char *cp, errmsg[512]; u_int nenv = 0; char **env = NULL; /* If dropping privs, then must specify user and restore function */ if (drop_privs != NULL && (pw == NULL || restore_privs == NULL)) { error("%s: inconsistent arguments", tag); /* XXX fatal? */ return 0; } if (pw == NULL && (pw = getpwuid(getuid())) == NULL) { error("%s: no user for current uid", tag); return 0; } if (child != NULL) *child = NULL; debug3_f("%s command \"%s\" running as %s (flags 0x%x)", tag, command, pw->pw_name, flags); /* Check consistency */ if ((flags & SSH_SUBPROCESS_STDOUT_DISCARD) != 0 && (flags & SSH_SUBPROCESS_STDOUT_CAPTURE) != 0) { error_f("inconsistent flags"); return 0; } if (((flags & SSH_SUBPROCESS_STDOUT_CAPTURE) == 0) != (child == NULL)) { error_f("inconsistent flags/output"); return 0; } /* * If executing an explicit binary, then verify the it exists * and appears safe-ish to execute */ if (!path_absolute(av[0])) { error("%s path is not absolute", tag); return 0; } if (drop_privs != NULL) drop_privs(pw); if (stat(av[0], &st) == -1) { error("Could not stat %s \"%s\": %s", tag, av[0], strerror(errno)); goto restore_return; } if ((flags & SSH_SUBPROCESS_UNSAFE_PATH) == 0 && safe_path(av[0], &st, NULL, 0, errmsg, sizeof(errmsg)) != 0) { error("Unsafe %s \"%s\": %s", tag, av[0], errmsg); goto restore_return; } /* Prepare to keep the child's stdout if requested */ if (pipe(p) == -1) { error("%s: pipe: %s", tag, strerror(errno)); restore_return: if (restore_privs != NULL) restore_privs(); return 0; } if (restore_privs != NULL) restore_privs(); switch ((pid = fork())) { case -1: /* error */ error("%s: fork: %s", tag, strerror(errno)); close(p[0]); close(p[1]); return 0; case 0: /* child */ /* Prepare a minimal environment for the child. */ if ((flags & SSH_SUBPROCESS_PRESERVE_ENV) == 0) { nenv = 5; env = xcalloc(sizeof(*env), nenv); child_set_env(&env, &nenv, "PATH", _PATH_STDPATH); child_set_env(&env, &nenv, "USER", pw->pw_name); child_set_env(&env, &nenv, "LOGNAME", pw->pw_name); child_set_env(&env, &nenv, "HOME", pw->pw_dir); if ((cp = getenv("LANG")) != NULL) child_set_env(&env, &nenv, "LANG", cp); } for (i = 1; i < NSIG; i++) ssh_signal(i, SIG_DFL); if ((devnull = open(_PATH_DEVNULL, O_RDWR)) == -1) { error("%s: open %s: %s", tag, _PATH_DEVNULL, strerror(errno)); _exit(1); } if (dup2(devnull, STDIN_FILENO) == -1) { error("%s: dup2: %s", tag, strerror(errno)); _exit(1); } /* Set up stdout as requested; leave stderr in place for now. */ fd = -1; if ((flags & SSH_SUBPROCESS_STDOUT_CAPTURE) != 0) fd = p[1]; else if ((flags & SSH_SUBPROCESS_STDOUT_DISCARD) != 0) fd = devnull; if (fd != -1 && dup2(fd, STDOUT_FILENO) == -1) { error("%s: dup2: %s", tag, strerror(errno)); _exit(1); } closefrom(STDERR_FILENO + 1); if (geteuid() == 0 && initgroups(pw->pw_name, pw->pw_gid) == -1) { error("%s: initgroups(%s, %u): %s", tag, pw->pw_name, (u_int)pw->pw_gid, strerror(errno)); _exit(1); } if (setresgid(pw->pw_gid, pw->pw_gid, pw->pw_gid) == -1) { error("%s: setresgid %u: %s", tag, (u_int)pw->pw_gid, strerror(errno)); _exit(1); } if (setresuid(pw->pw_uid, pw->pw_uid, pw->pw_uid) == -1) { error("%s: setresuid %u: %s", tag, (u_int)pw->pw_uid, strerror(errno)); _exit(1); } /* stdin is pointed to /dev/null at this point */ if ((flags & SSH_SUBPROCESS_STDOUT_DISCARD) != 0 && dup2(STDIN_FILENO, STDERR_FILENO) == -1) { error("%s: dup2: %s", tag, strerror(errno)); _exit(1); } if (env != NULL) execve(av[0], av, env); else execv(av[0], av); error("%s %s \"%s\": %s", tag, env == NULL ? "execv" : "execve", command, strerror(errno)); _exit(127); default: /* parent */ break; } close(p[1]); if ((flags & SSH_SUBPROCESS_STDOUT_CAPTURE) == 0) close(p[0]); else if ((f = fdopen(p[0], "r")) == NULL) { error("%s: fdopen: %s", tag, strerror(errno)); close(p[0]); /* Don't leave zombie child */ kill(pid, SIGTERM); while (waitpid(pid, NULL, 0) == -1 && errno == EINTR) ; return 0; } /* Success */ debug3_f("%s pid %ld", tag, (long)pid); if (child != NULL) *child = f; return pid; } const char * lookup_env_in_list(const char *env, char * const *envs, size_t nenvs) { size_t i, envlen; envlen = strlen(env); for (i = 0; i < nenvs; i++) { if (strncmp(envs[i], env, envlen) == 0 && envs[i][envlen] == '=') { return envs[i] + envlen + 1; } } return NULL; } const char * lookup_setenv_in_list(const char *env, char * const *envs, size_t nenvs) { char *name, *cp; const char *ret; name = xstrdup(env); if ((cp = strchr(name, '=')) == NULL) { free(name); return NULL; /* not env=val */ } *cp = '\0'; ret = lookup_env_in_list(name, envs, nenvs); free(name); return ret; } /* * Helpers for managing poll(2)/ppoll(2) timeouts * Will remember the earliest deadline and return it for use in poll/ppoll. */ /* Initialise a poll/ppoll timeout with an indefinite deadline */ void ptimeout_init(struct timespec *pt) { /* * Deliberately invalid for ppoll(2). * Will be converted to NULL in ptimeout_get_tspec() later. */ pt->tv_sec = -1; pt->tv_nsec = 0; } /* Specify a poll/ppoll deadline of at most 'sec' seconds */ void ptimeout_deadline_sec(struct timespec *pt, long sec) { if (pt->tv_sec == -1 || pt->tv_sec >= sec) { pt->tv_sec = sec; pt->tv_nsec = 0; } } /* Specify a poll/ppoll deadline of at most 'p' (timespec) */ static void ptimeout_deadline_tsp(struct timespec *pt, struct timespec *p) { if (pt->tv_sec == -1 || timespeccmp(pt, p, >=)) *pt = *p; } /* Specify a poll/ppoll deadline of at most 'ms' milliseconds */ void ptimeout_deadline_ms(struct timespec *pt, long ms) { struct timespec p; p.tv_sec = ms / 1000; p.tv_nsec = (ms % 1000) * 1000000; ptimeout_deadline_tsp(pt, &p); } /* Specify a poll/ppoll deadline at wall clock monotime 'when' */ void ptimeout_deadline_monotime(struct timespec *pt, time_t when) { struct timespec now, t; t.tv_sec = when; t.tv_nsec = 0; monotime_ts(&now); if (timespeccmp(&now, &t, >=)) ptimeout_deadline_sec(pt, 0); else { timespecsub(&t, &now, &t); ptimeout_deadline_tsp(pt, &t); } } /* Get a poll(2) timeout value in milliseconds */ int ptimeout_get_ms(struct timespec *pt) { if (pt->tv_sec == -1) return -1; if (pt->tv_sec >= (INT_MAX - (pt->tv_nsec / 1000000)) / 1000) return INT_MAX; return (pt->tv_sec * 1000) + (pt->tv_nsec / 1000000); } /* Get a ppoll(2) timeout value as a timespec pointer */ struct timespec * ptimeout_get_tsp(struct timespec *pt) { return pt->tv_sec == -1 ? NULL : pt; } /* Returns non-zero if a timeout has been set (i.e. is not indefinite) */ int ptimeout_isset(struct timespec *pt) { return pt->tv_sec != -1; } diff --git a/crypto/openssh/misc.h b/crypto/openssh/misc.h index 84d93e059ea9..07408ca13c45 100644 --- a/crypto/openssh/misc.h +++ b/crypto/openssh/misc.h @@ -1,243 +1,246 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: misc.h,v 1.101 2023/01/06 02:37:04 djm Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: misc.h,v 1.102 2023/03/03 02:37:58 dtucker Exp $ */ /* * Author: Tatu Ylonen * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen , Espoo, Finland * All rights reserved * * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell". */ #ifndef _MISC_H #define _MISC_H #include #include #include #include /* Data structure for representing a forwarding request. */ struct Forward { char *listen_host; /* Host (address) to listen on. */ int listen_port; /* Port to forward. */ char *listen_path; /* Path to bind domain socket. */ char *connect_host; /* Host to connect. */ int connect_port; /* Port to connect on connect_host. */ char *connect_path; /* Path to connect domain socket. */ int allocated_port; /* Dynamically allocated listen port */ int handle; /* Handle for dynamic listen ports */ }; int forward_equals(const struct Forward *, const struct Forward *); int daemonized(void); /* Common server and client forwarding options. */ struct ForwardOptions { int gateway_ports; /* Allow remote connects to forwarded ports. */ mode_t streamlocal_bind_mask; /* umask for streamlocal binds */ int streamlocal_bind_unlink; /* unlink socket before bind */ }; /* misc.c */ char *chop(char *); void rtrim(char *); void skip_space(char **); char *strdelim(char **); char *strdelimw(char **); int set_nonblock(int); int unset_nonblock(int); void set_nodelay(int); int set_reuseaddr(int); char *get_rdomain(int); int set_rdomain(int, const char *); int get_sock_af(int); void set_sock_tos(int, int); int waitrfd(int, int *); int timeout_connect(int, const struct sockaddr *, socklen_t, int *); int a2port(const char *); int a2tun(const char *, int *); char *put_host_port(const char *, u_short); char *hpdelim2(char **, char *); char *hpdelim(char **); char *cleanhostname(char *); char *colon(char *); int parse_user_host_path(const char *, char **, char **, char **); int parse_user_host_port(const char *, char **, char **, int *); int parse_uri(const char *, const char *, char **, char **, int *, char **); int convtime(const char *); const char *fmt_timeframe(time_t t); int tilde_expand(const char *, uid_t, char **); char *tilde_expand_filename(const char *, uid_t); char *dollar_expand(int *, const char *string, ...); char *percent_expand(const char *, ...) __attribute__((__sentinel__)); char *percent_dollar_expand(const char *, ...) __attribute__((__sentinel__)); char *tohex(const void *, size_t); void xextendf(char **s, const char *sep, const char *fmt, ...) __attribute__((__format__ (printf, 3, 4))) __attribute__((__nonnull__ (3))); void sanitise_stdfd(void); void ms_subtract_diff(struct timeval *, int *); void ms_to_timespec(struct timespec *, int); void monotime_ts(struct timespec *); void monotime_tv(struct timeval *); time_t monotime(void); double monotime_double(void); void lowercase(char *s); int unix_listener(const char *, int, int); int valid_domain(char *, int, const char **); int valid_env_name(const char *); const char *atoi_err(const char *, int *); int parse_absolute_time(const char *, uint64_t *); void format_absolute_time(uint64_t, char *, size_t); int path_absolute(const char *); int stdfd_devnull(int, int, int); void sock_set_v6only(int); struct passwd *pwcopy(struct passwd *); const char *ssh_gai_strerror(int); typedef void privdrop_fn(struct passwd *); typedef void privrestore_fn(void); #define SSH_SUBPROCESS_STDOUT_DISCARD (1) /* Discard stdout */ #define SSH_SUBPROCESS_STDOUT_CAPTURE (1<<1) /* Redirect stdout */ #define SSH_SUBPROCESS_STDERR_DISCARD (1<<2) /* Discard stderr */ #define SSH_SUBPROCESS_UNSAFE_PATH (1<<3) /* Don't check for safe cmd */ #define SSH_SUBPROCESS_PRESERVE_ENV (1<<4) /* Keep parent environment */ pid_t subprocess(const char *, const char *, int, char **, FILE **, u_int, struct passwd *, privdrop_fn *, privrestore_fn *); typedef struct arglist arglist; struct arglist { char **list; u_int num; u_int nalloc; }; void addargs(arglist *, char *, ...) __attribute__((format(printf, 2, 3))); void replacearg(arglist *, u_int, char *, ...) __attribute__((format(printf, 3, 4))); void freeargs(arglist *); int tun_open(int, int, char **); /* Common definitions for ssh tunnel device forwarding */ #define SSH_TUNMODE_NO 0x00 #define SSH_TUNMODE_POINTOPOINT 0x01 #define SSH_TUNMODE_ETHERNET 0x02 #define SSH_TUNMODE_DEFAULT SSH_TUNMODE_POINTOPOINT #define SSH_TUNMODE_YES (SSH_TUNMODE_POINTOPOINT|SSH_TUNMODE_ETHERNET) #define SSH_TUNID_ANY 0x7fffffff #define SSH_TUNID_ERR (SSH_TUNID_ANY - 1) #define SSH_TUNID_MAX (SSH_TUNID_ANY - 2) /* Fake port to indicate that host field is really a path. */ #define PORT_STREAMLOCAL -2 /* Functions to extract or store big-endian words of various sizes */ u_int64_t get_u64(const void *) __attribute__((__bounded__( __minbytes__, 1, 8))); u_int32_t get_u32(const void *) __attribute__((__bounded__( __minbytes__, 1, 4))); u_int16_t get_u16(const void *) __attribute__((__bounded__( __minbytes__, 1, 2))); void put_u64(void *, u_int64_t) __attribute__((__bounded__( __minbytes__, 1, 8))); void put_u32(void *, u_int32_t) __attribute__((__bounded__( __minbytes__, 1, 4))); void put_u16(void *, u_int16_t) __attribute__((__bounded__( __minbytes__, 1, 2))); /* Little-endian store/load, used by umac.c */ u_int32_t get_u32_le(const void *) __attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__, 1, 4))); void put_u32_le(void *, u_int32_t) __attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__, 1, 4))); struct bwlimit { size_t buflen; u_int64_t rate; /* desired rate in kbit/s */ u_int64_t thresh; /* threshold after which we'll check timers */ u_int64_t lamt; /* amount written in last timer interval */ struct timeval bwstart, bwend; }; void bandwidth_limit_init(struct bwlimit *, u_int64_t, size_t); void bandwidth_limit(struct bwlimit *, size_t); int parse_ipqos(const char *); const char *iptos2str(int); void mktemp_proto(char *, size_t); void child_set_env(char ***envp, u_int *envsizep, const char *name, const char *value); const char *lookup_env_in_list(const char *env, char * const *envs, size_t nenvs); const char *lookup_setenv_in_list(const char *env, char * const *envs, size_t nenvs); int argv_split(const char *, int *, char ***, int); char *argv_assemble(int, char **argv); char *argv_next(int *, char ***); void argv_consume(int *); void argv_free(char **, int); int exited_cleanly(pid_t, const char *, const char *, int); struct stat; int safe_path(const char *, struct stat *, const char *, uid_t, char *, size_t); int safe_path_fd(int, const char *, struct passwd *, char *err, size_t errlen); /* authorized_key-style options parsing helpers */ int opt_flag(const char *opt, int allow_negate, const char **optsp); char *opt_dequote(const char **sp, const char **errstrp); int opt_match(const char **opts, const char *term); /* readconf/servconf option lists */ void opt_array_append(const char *file, const int line, const char *directive, char ***array, u_int *lp, const char *s); void opt_array_append2(const char *file, const int line, const char *directive, char ***array, int **iarray, u_int *lp, const char *s, int i); struct timespec; void ptimeout_init(struct timespec *pt); void ptimeout_deadline_sec(struct timespec *pt, long sec); void ptimeout_deadline_ms(struct timespec *pt, long ms); void ptimeout_deadline_monotime(struct timespec *pt, time_t when); int ptimeout_get_ms(struct timespec *pt); struct timespec *ptimeout_get_tsp(struct timespec *pt); int ptimeout_isset(struct timespec *pt); /* readpass.c */ #define RP_ECHO 0x0001 #define RP_ALLOW_STDIN 0x0002 #define RP_ALLOW_EOF 0x0004 #define RP_USE_ASKPASS 0x0008 struct notifier_ctx; char *read_passphrase(const char *, int); int ask_permission(const char *, ...) __attribute__((format(printf, 1, 2))); struct notifier_ctx *notify_start(int, const char *, ...) __attribute__((format(printf, 2, 3))); void notify_complete(struct notifier_ctx *, const char *, ...) __attribute__((format(printf, 2, 3))); #define MINIMUM(a, b) (((a) < (b)) ? (a) : (b)) #define MAXIMUM(a, b) (((a) > (b)) ? (a) : (b)) #define ROUNDUP(x, y) ((((x)+((y)-1))/(y))*(y)) typedef void (*sshsig_t)(int); sshsig_t ssh_signal(int, sshsig_t); +/* On OpenBSD time_t is int64_t which is long long. */ +/* #define SSH_TIME_T_MAX LLONG_MAX */ + #endif /* _MISC_H */ diff --git a/crypto/openssh/moduli.c b/crypto/openssh/moduli.c index 9f660ef267ee..481ca2aa8ffc 100644 --- a/crypto/openssh/moduli.c +++ b/crypto/openssh/moduli.c @@ -1,813 +1,816 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: moduli.c,v 1.38 2022/05/01 23:20:30 djm Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: moduli.c,v 1.39 2023/03/02 06:41:56 dtucker Exp $ */ /* * Copyright 1994 Phil Karn * Copyright 1996-1998, 2003 William Allen Simpson * Copyright 2000 Niels Provos * All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. */ /* * Two-step process to generate safe primes for DHGEX * * Sieve candidates for "safe" primes, * suitable for use as Diffie-Hellman moduli; * that is, where q = (p-1)/2 is also prime. * * First step: generate candidate primes (memory intensive) * Second step: test primes' safety (processor intensive) */ #include "includes.h" #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include "xmalloc.h" #include "dh.h" #include "log.h" #include "misc.h" #include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h" /* * File output defines */ /* need line long enough for largest moduli plus headers */ #define QLINESIZE (100+8192) /* * Size: decimal. * Specifies the number of the most significant bit (0 to M). * WARNING: internally, usually 1 to N. */ #define QSIZE_MINIMUM (511) /* * Prime sieving defines */ /* Constant: assuming 8 bit bytes and 32 bit words */ #define SHIFT_BIT (3) #define SHIFT_BYTE (2) #define SHIFT_WORD (SHIFT_BIT+SHIFT_BYTE) #define SHIFT_MEGABYTE (20) #define SHIFT_MEGAWORD (SHIFT_MEGABYTE-SHIFT_BYTE) /* * Using virtual memory can cause thrashing. This should be the largest * number that is supported without a large amount of disk activity -- * that would increase the run time from hours to days or weeks! */ #define LARGE_MINIMUM (8UL) /* megabytes */ /* * Do not increase this number beyond the unsigned integer bit size. * Due to a multiple of 4, it must be LESS than 128 (yielding 2**30 bits). */ #define LARGE_MAXIMUM (127UL) /* megabytes */ /* * Constant: when used with 32-bit integers, the largest sieve prime * has to be less than 2**32. */ #define SMALL_MAXIMUM (0xffffffffUL) /* Constant: can sieve all primes less than 2**32, as 65537**2 > 2**32-1. */ #define TINY_NUMBER (1UL<<16) /* Ensure enough bit space for testing 2*q. */ #define TEST_MAXIMUM (1UL<<16) #define TEST_MINIMUM (QSIZE_MINIMUM + 1) /* real TEST_MINIMUM (1UL << (SHIFT_WORD - TEST_POWER)) */ #define TEST_POWER (3) /* 2**n, n < SHIFT_WORD */ /* bit operations on 32-bit words */ #define BIT_CLEAR(a,n) ((a)[(n)>>SHIFT_WORD] &= ~(1L << ((n) & 31))) #define BIT_SET(a,n) ((a)[(n)>>SHIFT_WORD] |= (1L << ((n) & 31))) #define BIT_TEST(a,n) ((a)[(n)>>SHIFT_WORD] & (1L << ((n) & 31))) /* * Prime testing defines */ /* Minimum number of primality tests to perform */ #define TRIAL_MINIMUM (4) /* * Sieving data (XXX - move to struct) */ /* sieve 2**16 */ static u_int32_t *TinySieve, tinybits; /* sieve 2**30 in 2**16 parts */ static u_int32_t *SmallSieve, smallbits, smallbase; /* sieve relative to the initial value */ static u_int32_t *LargeSieve, largewords, largetries, largenumbers; static u_int32_t largebits, largememory; /* megabytes */ static BIGNUM *largebase; int gen_candidates(FILE *, u_int32_t, u_int32_t, BIGNUM *); int prime_test(FILE *, FILE *, u_int32_t, u_int32_t, char *, unsigned long, unsigned long); /* * print moduli out in consistent form, */ static int qfileout(FILE * ofile, u_int32_t otype, u_int32_t otests, u_int32_t otries, u_int32_t osize, u_int32_t ogenerator, BIGNUM * omodulus) { struct tm *gtm; time_t time_now; int res; time(&time_now); gtm = gmtime(&time_now); if (gtm == NULL) return -1; res = fprintf(ofile, "%04d%02d%02d%02d%02d%02d %u %u %u %u %x ", gtm->tm_year + 1900, gtm->tm_mon + 1, gtm->tm_mday, gtm->tm_hour, gtm->tm_min, gtm->tm_sec, otype, otests, otries, osize, ogenerator); if (res < 0) return (-1); if (BN_print_fp(ofile, omodulus) < 1) return (-1); res = fprintf(ofile, "\n"); fflush(ofile); return (res > 0 ? 0 : -1); } /* ** Sieve p's and q's with small factors */ static void sieve_large(u_int32_t s32) { u_int64_t r, u, s = s32; debug3("sieve_large %u", s32); largetries++; /* r = largebase mod s */ r = BN_mod_word(largebase, s32); if (r == 0) u = 0; /* s divides into largebase exactly */ else u = s - r; /* largebase+u is first entry divisible by s */ if (u < largebits * 2ULL) { /* * The sieve omits p's and q's divisible by 2, so ensure that * largebase+u is odd. Then, step through the sieve in * increments of 2*s */ if (u & 0x1) u += s; /* Make largebase+u odd, and u even */ /* Mark all multiples of 2*s */ for (u /= 2; u < largebits; u += s) BIT_SET(LargeSieve, u); } /* r = p mod s */ r = (2 * r + 1) % s; if (r == 0) u = 0; /* s divides p exactly */ else u = s - r; /* p+u is first entry divisible by s */ if (u < largebits * 4ULL) { /* * The sieve omits p's divisible by 4, so ensure that * largebase+u is not. Then, step through the sieve in * increments of 4*s */ while (u & 0x3) { if (SMALL_MAXIMUM - u < s) return; u += s; } /* Mark all multiples of 4*s */ for (u /= 4; u < largebits; u += s) BIT_SET(LargeSieve, u); } } /* * list candidates for Sophie-Germain primes (where q = (p-1)/2) * to standard output. * The list is checked against small known primes (less than 2**30). */ int gen_candidates(FILE *out, u_int32_t memory, u_int32_t power, BIGNUM *start) { BIGNUM *q; u_int32_t j, r, s, t; u_int32_t smallwords = TINY_NUMBER >> 6; u_int32_t tinywords = TINY_NUMBER >> 6; time_t time_start, time_stop; u_int32_t i; int ret = 0; largememory = memory; if (memory != 0 && (memory < LARGE_MINIMUM || memory > LARGE_MAXIMUM)) { error("Invalid memory amount (min %ld, max %ld)", LARGE_MINIMUM, LARGE_MAXIMUM); return (-1); } /* * Set power to the length in bits of the prime to be generated. * This is changed to 1 less than the desired safe prime moduli p. */ if (power > TEST_MAXIMUM) { error("Too many bits: %u > %lu", power, TEST_MAXIMUM); return (-1); } else if (power < TEST_MINIMUM) { error("Too few bits: %u < %u", power, TEST_MINIMUM); return (-1); } power--; /* decrement before squaring */ /* * The density of ordinary primes is on the order of 1/bits, so the * density of safe primes should be about (1/bits)**2. Set test range * to something well above bits**2 to be reasonably sure (but not * guaranteed) of catching at least one safe prime. */ largewords = ((power * power) >> (SHIFT_WORD - TEST_POWER)); /* * Need idea of how much memory is available. We don't have to use all * of it. */ if (largememory > LARGE_MAXIMUM) { logit("Limited memory: %u MB; limit %lu MB", largememory, LARGE_MAXIMUM); largememory = LARGE_MAXIMUM; } if (largewords <= (largememory << SHIFT_MEGAWORD)) { logit("Increased memory: %u MB; need %u bytes", largememory, (largewords << SHIFT_BYTE)); largewords = (largememory << SHIFT_MEGAWORD); } else if (largememory > 0) { logit("Decreased memory: %u MB; want %u bytes", largememory, (largewords << SHIFT_BYTE)); largewords = (largememory << SHIFT_MEGAWORD); } TinySieve = xcalloc(tinywords, sizeof(u_int32_t)); tinybits = tinywords << SHIFT_WORD; SmallSieve = xcalloc(smallwords, sizeof(u_int32_t)); smallbits = smallwords << SHIFT_WORD; /* * dynamically determine available memory */ while ((LargeSieve = calloc(largewords, sizeof(u_int32_t))) == NULL) largewords -= (1L << (SHIFT_MEGAWORD - 2)); /* 1/4 MB chunks */ largebits = largewords << SHIFT_WORD; largenumbers = largebits * 2; /* even numbers excluded */ /* validation check: count the number of primes tried */ largetries = 0; if ((q = BN_new()) == NULL) fatal("BN_new failed"); /* * Generate random starting point for subprime search, or use * specified parameter. */ if ((largebase = BN_new()) == NULL) fatal("BN_new failed"); if (start == NULL) { if (BN_rand(largebase, power, 1, 1) == 0) fatal("BN_rand failed"); } else { if (BN_copy(largebase, start) == NULL) fatal("BN_copy: failed"); } /* ensure odd */ if (BN_set_bit(largebase, 0) == 0) fatal("BN_set_bit: failed"); time(&time_start); logit("%.24s Sieve next %u plus %u-bit", ctime(&time_start), largenumbers, power); debug2("start point: 0x%s", BN_bn2hex(largebase)); /* * TinySieve */ for (i = 0; i < tinybits; i++) { if (BIT_TEST(TinySieve, i)) continue; /* 2*i+3 is composite */ /* The next tiny prime */ t = 2 * i + 3; /* Mark all multiples of t */ for (j = i + t; j < tinybits; j += t) BIT_SET(TinySieve, j); sieve_large(t); } /* * Start the small block search at the next possible prime. To avoid * fencepost errors, the last pass is skipped. */ for (smallbase = TINY_NUMBER + 3; smallbase < (SMALL_MAXIMUM - TINY_NUMBER); smallbase += TINY_NUMBER) { for (i = 0; i < tinybits; i++) { if (BIT_TEST(TinySieve, i)) continue; /* 2*i+3 is composite */ /* The next tiny prime */ t = 2 * i + 3; r = smallbase % t; if (r == 0) { s = 0; /* t divides into smallbase exactly */ } else { /* smallbase+s is first entry divisible by t */ s = t - r; } /* * The sieve omits even numbers, so ensure that * smallbase+s is odd. Then, step through the sieve * in increments of 2*t */ if (s & 1) s += t; /* Make smallbase+s odd, and s even */ /* Mark all multiples of 2*t */ for (s /= 2; s < smallbits; s += t) BIT_SET(SmallSieve, s); } /* * SmallSieve */ for (i = 0; i < smallbits; i++) { if (BIT_TEST(SmallSieve, i)) continue; /* 2*i+smallbase is composite */ /* The next small prime */ sieve_large((2 * i) + smallbase); } memset(SmallSieve, 0, smallwords << SHIFT_BYTE); } time(&time_stop); logit("%.24s Sieved with %u small primes in %lld seconds", ctime(&time_stop), largetries, (long long)(time_stop - time_start)); for (j = r = 0; j < largebits; j++) { if (BIT_TEST(LargeSieve, j)) continue; /* Definitely composite, skip */ debug2("test q = largebase+%u", 2 * j); if (BN_set_word(q, 2 * j) == 0) fatal("BN_set_word failed"); if (BN_add(q, q, largebase) == 0) fatal("BN_add failed"); if (qfileout(out, MODULI_TYPE_SOPHIE_GERMAIN, MODULI_TESTS_SIEVE, largetries, (power - 1) /* MSB */, (0), q) == -1) { ret = -1; break; } r++; /* count q */ } time(&time_stop); free(LargeSieve); free(SmallSieve); free(TinySieve); logit("%.24s Found %u candidates", ctime(&time_stop), r); return (ret); } static void write_checkpoint(char *cpfile, u_int32_t lineno) { FILE *fp; char tmp[PATH_MAX]; - int r; + int r, writeok, closeok; r = snprintf(tmp, sizeof(tmp), "%s.XXXXXXXXXX", cpfile); if (r < 0 || r >= PATH_MAX) { logit("write_checkpoint: temp pathname too long"); return; } if ((r = mkstemp(tmp)) == -1) { logit("mkstemp(%s): %s", tmp, strerror(errno)); return; } if ((fp = fdopen(r, "w")) == NULL) { logit("write_checkpoint: fdopen: %s", strerror(errno)); unlink(tmp); close(r); return; } - if (fprintf(fp, "%lu\n", (unsigned long)lineno) > 0 && fclose(fp) == 0 - && rename(tmp, cpfile) == 0) + writeok = (fprintf(fp, "%lu\n", (unsigned long)lineno) > 0); + closeok = (fclose(fp) == 0); + if (writeok && closeok && rename(tmp, cpfile) == 0) { debug3("wrote checkpoint line %lu to '%s'", (unsigned long)lineno, cpfile); - else + } else { logit("failed to write to checkpoint file '%s': %s", cpfile, strerror(errno)); + (void)unlink(tmp); + } } static unsigned long read_checkpoint(char *cpfile) { FILE *fp; unsigned long lineno = 0; if ((fp = fopen(cpfile, "r")) == NULL) return 0; if (fscanf(fp, "%lu\n", &lineno) < 1) logit("Failed to load checkpoint from '%s'", cpfile); else logit("Loaded checkpoint from '%s' line %lu", cpfile, lineno); fclose(fp); return lineno; } static unsigned long count_lines(FILE *f) { unsigned long count = 0; char lp[QLINESIZE + 1]; if (fseek(f, 0, SEEK_SET) != 0) { debug("input file is not seekable"); return ULONG_MAX; } while (fgets(lp, QLINESIZE + 1, f) != NULL) count++; rewind(f); debug("input file has %lu lines", count); return count; } static char * fmt_time(time_t seconds) { int day, hr, min; static char buf[128]; min = (seconds / 60) % 60; hr = (seconds / 60 / 60) % 24; day = seconds / 60 / 60 / 24; if (day > 0) snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "%dd %d:%02d", day, hr, min); else snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "%d:%02d", hr, min); return buf; } static void print_progress(unsigned long start_lineno, unsigned long current_lineno, unsigned long end_lineno) { static time_t time_start, time_prev; time_t time_now, elapsed; unsigned long num_to_process, processed, remaining, percent, eta; double time_per_line; char *eta_str; time_now = monotime(); if (time_start == 0) { time_start = time_prev = time_now; return; } /* print progress after 1m then once per 5m */ if (time_now - time_prev < 5 * 60) return; time_prev = time_now; elapsed = time_now - time_start; processed = current_lineno - start_lineno; remaining = end_lineno - current_lineno; num_to_process = end_lineno - start_lineno; time_per_line = (double)elapsed / processed; /* if we don't know how many we're processing just report count+time */ time(&time_now); if (end_lineno == ULONG_MAX) { logit("%.24s processed %lu in %s", ctime(&time_now), processed, fmt_time(elapsed)); return; } percent = 100 * processed / num_to_process; eta = time_per_line * remaining; eta_str = xstrdup(fmt_time(eta)); logit("%.24s processed %lu of %lu (%lu%%) in %s, ETA %s", ctime(&time_now), processed, num_to_process, percent, fmt_time(elapsed), eta_str); free(eta_str); } /* * perform a Miller-Rabin primality test * on the list of candidates * (checking both q and p) * The result is a list of so-call "safe" primes */ int prime_test(FILE *in, FILE *out, u_int32_t trials, u_int32_t generator_wanted, char *checkpoint_file, unsigned long start_lineno, unsigned long num_lines) { BIGNUM *q, *p, *a; char *cp, *lp; u_int32_t count_in = 0, count_out = 0, count_possible = 0; u_int32_t generator_known, in_tests, in_tries, in_type, in_size; unsigned long last_processed = 0, end_lineno; time_t time_start, time_stop; int res, is_prime; if (trials < TRIAL_MINIMUM) { error("Minimum primality trials is %d", TRIAL_MINIMUM); return (-1); } if (num_lines == 0) end_lineno = count_lines(in); else end_lineno = start_lineno + num_lines; time(&time_start); if ((p = BN_new()) == NULL) fatal("BN_new failed"); if ((q = BN_new()) == NULL) fatal("BN_new failed"); debug2("%.24s Final %u Miller-Rabin trials (%x generator)", ctime(&time_start), trials, generator_wanted); if (checkpoint_file != NULL) last_processed = read_checkpoint(checkpoint_file); last_processed = start_lineno = MAXIMUM(last_processed, start_lineno); if (end_lineno == ULONG_MAX) debug("process from line %lu from pipe", last_processed); else debug("process from line %lu to line %lu", last_processed, end_lineno); res = 0; lp = xmalloc(QLINESIZE + 1); while (fgets(lp, QLINESIZE + 1, in) != NULL && count_in < end_lineno) { count_in++; if (count_in <= last_processed) { debug3("skipping line %u, before checkpoint or " "specified start line", count_in); continue; } if (checkpoint_file != NULL) write_checkpoint(checkpoint_file, count_in); print_progress(start_lineno, count_in, end_lineno); if (strlen(lp) < 14 || *lp == '!' || *lp == '#') { debug2("%10u: comment or short line", count_in); continue; } /* XXX - fragile parser */ /* time */ cp = &lp[14]; /* (skip) */ /* type */ in_type = strtoul(cp, &cp, 10); /* tests */ in_tests = strtoul(cp, &cp, 10); if (in_tests & MODULI_TESTS_COMPOSITE) { debug2("%10u: known composite", count_in); continue; } /* tries */ in_tries = strtoul(cp, &cp, 10); /* size (most significant bit) */ in_size = strtoul(cp, &cp, 10); /* generator (hex) */ generator_known = strtoul(cp, &cp, 16); /* Skip white space */ cp += strspn(cp, " "); /* modulus (hex) */ switch (in_type) { case MODULI_TYPE_SOPHIE_GERMAIN: debug2("%10u: (%u) Sophie-Germain", count_in, in_type); a = q; if (BN_hex2bn(&a, cp) == 0) fatal("BN_hex2bn failed"); /* p = 2*q + 1 */ if (BN_lshift(p, q, 1) == 0) fatal("BN_lshift failed"); if (BN_add_word(p, 1) == 0) fatal("BN_add_word failed"); in_size += 1; generator_known = 0; break; case MODULI_TYPE_UNSTRUCTURED: case MODULI_TYPE_SAFE: case MODULI_TYPE_SCHNORR: case MODULI_TYPE_STRONG: case MODULI_TYPE_UNKNOWN: debug2("%10u: (%u)", count_in, in_type); a = p; if (BN_hex2bn(&a, cp) == 0) fatal("BN_hex2bn failed"); /* q = (p-1) / 2 */ if (BN_rshift(q, p, 1) == 0) fatal("BN_rshift failed"); break; default: debug2("Unknown prime type"); break; } /* * due to earlier inconsistencies in interpretation, check * the proposed bit size. */ if ((u_int32_t)BN_num_bits(p) != (in_size + 1)) { debug2("%10u: bit size %u mismatch", count_in, in_size); continue; } if (in_size < QSIZE_MINIMUM) { debug2("%10u: bit size %u too short", count_in, in_size); continue; } if (in_tests & MODULI_TESTS_MILLER_RABIN) in_tries += trials; else in_tries = trials; /* * guess unknown generator */ if (generator_known == 0) { if (BN_mod_word(p, 24) == 11) generator_known = 2; else { u_int32_t r = BN_mod_word(p, 10); if (r == 3 || r == 7) generator_known = 5; } } /* * skip tests when desired generator doesn't match */ if (generator_wanted > 0 && generator_wanted != generator_known) { debug2("%10u: generator %d != %d", count_in, generator_known, generator_wanted); continue; } /* * Primes with no known generator are useless for DH, so * skip those. */ if (generator_known == 0) { debug2("%10u: no known generator", count_in); continue; } count_possible++; /* * The (1/4)^N performance bound on Miller-Rabin is * extremely pessimistic, so don't spend a lot of time * really verifying that q is prime until after we know * that p is also prime. A single pass will weed out the * vast majority of composite q's. */ is_prime = BN_is_prime_ex(q, 1, NULL, NULL); if (is_prime < 0) fatal("BN_is_prime_ex failed"); if (is_prime == 0) { debug("%10u: q failed first possible prime test", count_in); continue; } /* * q is possibly prime, so go ahead and really make sure * that p is prime. If it is, then we can go back and do * the same for q. If p is composite, chances are that * will show up on the first Rabin-Miller iteration so it * doesn't hurt to specify a high iteration count. */ is_prime = BN_is_prime_ex(p, trials, NULL, NULL); if (is_prime < 0) fatal("BN_is_prime_ex failed"); if (is_prime == 0) { debug("%10u: p is not prime", count_in); continue; } debug("%10u: p is almost certainly prime", count_in); /* recheck q more rigorously */ is_prime = BN_is_prime_ex(q, trials - 1, NULL, NULL); if (is_prime < 0) fatal("BN_is_prime_ex failed"); if (is_prime == 0) { debug("%10u: q is not prime", count_in); continue; } debug("%10u: q is almost certainly prime", count_in); if (qfileout(out, MODULI_TYPE_SAFE, in_tests | MODULI_TESTS_MILLER_RABIN, in_tries, in_size, generator_known, p)) { res = -1; break; } count_out++; } time(&time_stop); free(lp); BN_free(p); BN_free(q); if (checkpoint_file != NULL) unlink(checkpoint_file); logit("%.24s Found %u safe primes of %u candidates in %ld seconds", ctime(&time_stop), count_out, count_possible, (long) (time_stop - time_start)); return (res); } #endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */ diff --git a/crypto/openssh/monitor.c b/crypto/openssh/monitor.c index 91e0e62454b7..fda4a3660be7 100644 --- a/crypto/openssh/monitor.c +++ b/crypto/openssh/monitor.c @@ -1,1955 +1,1954 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: monitor.c,v 1.234 2022/06/15 16:08:25 djm Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: monitor.c,v 1.235 2023/02/17 04:22:50 dtucker Exp $ */ /* * Copyright 2002 Niels Provos * Copyright 2002 Markus Friedl * All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. */ #include "includes.h" #include #include #include #include #include #include #ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H #include #endif #include #include #ifdef HAVE_STDINT_H # include #endif #include #include #include #include #include #ifdef HAVE_POLL_H #include #else # ifdef HAVE_SYS_POLL_H # include # endif #endif #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL #include #endif #include "openbsd-compat/sys-tree.h" #include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h" #include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h" #include "atomicio.h" #include "xmalloc.h" #include "ssh.h" #include "sshkey.h" #include "sshbuf.h" #include "hostfile.h" #include "auth.h" #include "cipher.h" #include "kex.h" #include "dh.h" #include "auth-pam.h" #include "packet.h" #include "auth-options.h" #include "sshpty.h" #include "channels.h" #include "session.h" #include "sshlogin.h" #include "canohost.h" #include "log.h" #include "misc.h" #include "servconf.h" #include "monitor.h" #ifdef GSSAPI #include "ssh-gss.h" #endif #include "monitor_wrap.h" #include "monitor_fdpass.h" #include "compat.h" #include "ssh2.h" #include "authfd.h" #include "match.h" #include "ssherr.h" #include "sk-api.h" #ifdef GSSAPI static Gssctxt *gsscontext = NULL; #endif /* Imports */ extern ServerOptions options; extern u_int utmp_len; extern struct sshbuf *loginmsg; extern struct sshauthopt *auth_opts; /* XXX move to permanent ssh->authctxt? */ /* State exported from the child */ static struct sshbuf *child_state; /* Functions on the monitor that answer unprivileged requests */ int mm_answer_moduli(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *); int mm_answer_sign(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *); int mm_answer_pwnamallow(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *); int mm_answer_auth2_read_banner(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *); int mm_answer_authserv(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *); int mm_answer_authpassword(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *); int mm_answer_bsdauthquery(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *); int mm_answer_bsdauthrespond(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *); int mm_answer_keyallowed(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *); int mm_answer_keyverify(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *); int mm_answer_pty(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *); int mm_answer_pty_cleanup(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *); int mm_answer_term(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *); int mm_answer_rsa_keyallowed(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *); int mm_answer_rsa_challenge(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *); int mm_answer_rsa_response(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *); int mm_answer_sesskey(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *); int mm_answer_sessid(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *); #ifdef USE_PAM int mm_answer_pam_start(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *); int mm_answer_pam_account(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *); int mm_answer_pam_init_ctx(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *); int mm_answer_pam_query(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *); int mm_answer_pam_respond(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *); int mm_answer_pam_free_ctx(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *); #endif #ifdef GSSAPI int mm_answer_gss_setup_ctx(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *); int mm_answer_gss_accept_ctx(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *); int mm_answer_gss_userok(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *); int mm_answer_gss_checkmic(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *); #endif #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS int mm_answer_audit_event(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *); int mm_answer_audit_command(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *); #endif static Authctxt *authctxt; /* local state for key verify */ static u_char *key_blob = NULL; static size_t key_bloblen = 0; static u_int key_blobtype = MM_NOKEY; static struct sshauthopt *key_opts = NULL; static char *hostbased_cuser = NULL; static char *hostbased_chost = NULL; static char *auth_method = "unknown"; static char *auth_submethod = NULL; static u_int session_id2_len = 0; static u_char *session_id2 = NULL; static pid_t monitor_child_pid; struct mon_table { enum monitor_reqtype type; int flags; int (*f)(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *); }; #define MON_ISAUTH 0x0004 /* Required for Authentication */ #define MON_AUTHDECIDE 0x0008 /* Decides Authentication */ #define MON_ONCE 0x0010 /* Disable after calling */ #define MON_ALOG 0x0020 /* Log auth attempt without authenticating */ #define MON_AUTH (MON_ISAUTH|MON_AUTHDECIDE) #define MON_PERMIT 0x1000 /* Request is permitted */ static int monitor_read(struct ssh *, struct monitor *, struct mon_table *, struct mon_table **); static int monitor_read_log(struct monitor *); struct mon_table mon_dispatch_proto20[] = { #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL {MONITOR_REQ_MODULI, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_moduli}, #endif {MONITOR_REQ_SIGN, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_sign}, {MONITOR_REQ_PWNAM, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_pwnamallow}, {MONITOR_REQ_AUTHSERV, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_authserv}, {MONITOR_REQ_AUTH2_READ_BANNER, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_auth2_read_banner}, {MONITOR_REQ_AUTHPASSWORD, MON_AUTH, mm_answer_authpassword}, #ifdef USE_PAM {MONITOR_REQ_PAM_START, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_pam_start}, {MONITOR_REQ_PAM_ACCOUNT, 0, mm_answer_pam_account}, {MONITOR_REQ_PAM_INIT_CTX, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_pam_init_ctx}, {MONITOR_REQ_PAM_QUERY, 0, mm_answer_pam_query}, {MONITOR_REQ_PAM_RESPOND, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_pam_respond}, {MONITOR_REQ_PAM_FREE_CTX, MON_ONCE|MON_AUTHDECIDE, mm_answer_pam_free_ctx}, #endif #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_EVENT, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_event}, #endif #ifdef BSD_AUTH {MONITOR_REQ_BSDAUTHQUERY, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_bsdauthquery}, {MONITOR_REQ_BSDAUTHRESPOND, MON_AUTH, mm_answer_bsdauthrespond}, #endif {MONITOR_REQ_KEYALLOWED, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_keyallowed}, {MONITOR_REQ_KEYVERIFY, MON_AUTH, mm_answer_keyverify}, #ifdef GSSAPI {MONITOR_REQ_GSSSETUP, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_gss_setup_ctx}, {MONITOR_REQ_GSSSTEP, 0, mm_answer_gss_accept_ctx}, {MONITOR_REQ_GSSUSEROK, MON_ONCE|MON_AUTHDECIDE, mm_answer_gss_userok}, {MONITOR_REQ_GSSCHECKMIC, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_gss_checkmic}, #endif {0, 0, NULL} }; struct mon_table mon_dispatch_postauth20[] = { #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL {MONITOR_REQ_MODULI, 0, mm_answer_moduli}, #endif {MONITOR_REQ_SIGN, 0, mm_answer_sign}, {MONITOR_REQ_PTY, 0, mm_answer_pty}, {MONITOR_REQ_PTYCLEANUP, 0, mm_answer_pty_cleanup}, {MONITOR_REQ_TERM, 0, mm_answer_term}, #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_EVENT, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_event}, {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_COMMAND, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_command}, #endif {0, 0, NULL} }; struct mon_table *mon_dispatch; /* Specifies if a certain message is allowed at the moment */ static void monitor_permit(struct mon_table *ent, enum monitor_reqtype type, int permit) { while (ent->f != NULL) { if (ent->type == type) { ent->flags &= ~MON_PERMIT; ent->flags |= permit ? MON_PERMIT : 0; return; } ent++; } } static void monitor_permit_authentications(int permit) { struct mon_table *ent = mon_dispatch; while (ent->f != NULL) { if (ent->flags & MON_AUTH) { ent->flags &= ~MON_PERMIT; ent->flags |= permit ? MON_PERMIT : 0; } ent++; } } void monitor_child_preauth(struct ssh *ssh, struct monitor *pmonitor) { struct mon_table *ent; int authenticated = 0, partial = 0; debug3("preauth child monitor started"); if (pmonitor->m_recvfd >= 0) close(pmonitor->m_recvfd); if (pmonitor->m_log_sendfd >= 0) close(pmonitor->m_log_sendfd); pmonitor->m_log_sendfd = pmonitor->m_recvfd = -1; authctxt = (Authctxt *)ssh->authctxt; memset(authctxt, 0, sizeof(*authctxt)); ssh->authctxt = authctxt; authctxt->loginmsg = loginmsg; mon_dispatch = mon_dispatch_proto20; /* Permit requests for moduli and signatures */ monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_MODULI, 1); monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_SIGN, 1); /* The first few requests do not require asynchronous access */ while (!authenticated) { partial = 0; auth_method = "unknown"; auth_submethod = NULL; auth2_authctxt_reset_info(authctxt); authenticated = (monitor_read(ssh, pmonitor, mon_dispatch, &ent) == 1); /* Special handling for multiple required authentications */ if (options.num_auth_methods != 0) { if (authenticated && !auth2_update_methods_lists(authctxt, auth_method, auth_submethod)) { debug3_f("method %s: partial", auth_method); authenticated = 0; partial = 1; } } if (authenticated) { if (!(ent->flags & MON_AUTHDECIDE)) fatal_f("unexpected authentication from %d", ent->type); if (authctxt->pw->pw_uid == 0 && !auth_root_allowed(ssh, auth_method)) authenticated = 0; #ifdef USE_PAM /* PAM needs to perform account checks after auth */ if (options.use_pam && authenticated) { struct sshbuf *m; if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__); mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_sendfd, MONITOR_REQ_PAM_ACCOUNT, m); authenticated = mm_answer_pam_account( ssh, pmonitor->m_sendfd, m); sshbuf_free(m); } #endif } if (ent->flags & (MON_AUTHDECIDE|MON_ALOG)) { auth_log(ssh, authenticated, partial, auth_method, auth_submethod); if (!partial && !authenticated) authctxt->failures++; if (authenticated || partial) { auth2_update_session_info(authctxt, auth_method, auth_submethod); } } } if (!authctxt->valid) fatal_f("authenticated invalid user"); if (strcmp(auth_method, "unknown") == 0) fatal_f("authentication method name unknown"); debug_f("user %s authenticated by privileged process", authctxt->user); ssh->authctxt = NULL; ssh_packet_set_log_preamble(ssh, "user %s", authctxt->user); mm_get_keystate(ssh, pmonitor); /* Drain any buffered messages from the child */ while (pmonitor->m_log_recvfd != -1 && monitor_read_log(pmonitor) == 0) ; if (pmonitor->m_recvfd >= 0) close(pmonitor->m_recvfd); if (pmonitor->m_log_sendfd >= 0) close(pmonitor->m_log_sendfd); pmonitor->m_sendfd = pmonitor->m_log_recvfd = -1; } static void monitor_set_child_handler(pid_t pid) { monitor_child_pid = pid; } static void monitor_child_handler(int sig) { kill(monitor_child_pid, sig); } void monitor_child_postauth(struct ssh *ssh, struct monitor *pmonitor) { close(pmonitor->m_recvfd); pmonitor->m_recvfd = -1; monitor_set_child_handler(pmonitor->m_pid); ssh_signal(SIGHUP, &monitor_child_handler); ssh_signal(SIGTERM, &monitor_child_handler); ssh_signal(SIGINT, &monitor_child_handler); #ifdef SIGXFSZ ssh_signal(SIGXFSZ, SIG_IGN); #endif mon_dispatch = mon_dispatch_postauth20; /* Permit requests for moduli and signatures */ monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_MODULI, 1); monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_SIGN, 1); monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_TERM, 1); if (auth_opts->permit_pty_flag) { monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_PTY, 1); monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_PTYCLEANUP, 1); } for (;;) monitor_read(ssh, pmonitor, mon_dispatch, NULL); } static int monitor_read_log(struct monitor *pmonitor) { struct sshbuf *logmsg; u_int len, level, forced; char *msg; u_char *p; int r; if ((logmsg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) fatal_f("sshbuf_new"); /* Read length */ if ((r = sshbuf_reserve(logmsg, 4, &p)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "reserve len"); if (atomicio(read, pmonitor->m_log_recvfd, p, 4) != 4) { if (errno == EPIPE) { sshbuf_free(logmsg); debug_f("child log fd closed"); close(pmonitor->m_log_recvfd); pmonitor->m_log_recvfd = -1; return -1; } fatal_f("log fd read: %s", strerror(errno)); } if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(logmsg, &len)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "parse len"); if (len <= 4 || len > 8192) fatal_f("invalid log message length %u", len); /* Read severity, message */ sshbuf_reset(logmsg); if ((r = sshbuf_reserve(logmsg, len, &p)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "reserve msg"); if (atomicio(read, pmonitor->m_log_recvfd, p, len) != len) fatal_f("log fd read: %s", strerror(errno)); if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(logmsg, &level)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_u32(logmsg, &forced)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(logmsg, &msg, NULL)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "parse"); /* Log it */ if (log_level_name(level) == NULL) fatal_f("invalid log level %u (corrupted message?)", level); sshlogdirect(level, forced, "%s [preauth]", msg); sshbuf_free(logmsg); free(msg); return 0; } static int monitor_read(struct ssh *ssh, struct monitor *pmonitor, struct mon_table *ent, struct mon_table **pent) { struct sshbuf *m; int r, ret; u_char type; struct pollfd pfd[2]; for (;;) { memset(&pfd, 0, sizeof(pfd)); pfd[0].fd = pmonitor->m_sendfd; pfd[0].events = POLLIN; pfd[1].fd = pmonitor->m_log_recvfd; pfd[1].events = pfd[1].fd == -1 ? 0 : POLLIN; if (poll(pfd, pfd[1].fd == -1 ? 1 : 2, -1) == -1) { if (errno == EINTR || errno == EAGAIN) continue; fatal_f("poll: %s", strerror(errno)); } if (pfd[1].revents) { /* * Drain all log messages before processing next * monitor request. */ monitor_read_log(pmonitor); continue; } if (pfd[0].revents) break; /* Continues below */ } if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) fatal_f("sshbuf_new"); mm_request_receive(pmonitor->m_sendfd, m); if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(m, &type)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "parse type"); debug3_f("checking request %d", type); while (ent->f != NULL) { if (ent->type == type) break; ent++; } if (ent->f != NULL) { if (!(ent->flags & MON_PERMIT)) fatal_f("unpermitted request %d", type); ret = (*ent->f)(ssh, pmonitor->m_sendfd, m); sshbuf_free(m); /* The child may use this request only once, disable it */ if (ent->flags & MON_ONCE) { debug2_f("%d used once, disabling now", type); ent->flags &= ~MON_PERMIT; } if (pent != NULL) *pent = ent; return ret; } fatal_f("unsupported request: %d", type); /* NOTREACHED */ return (-1); } /* allowed key state */ static int monitor_allowed_key(const u_char *blob, u_int bloblen) { /* make sure key is allowed */ if (key_blob == NULL || key_bloblen != bloblen || timingsafe_bcmp(key_blob, blob, key_bloblen)) return (0); return (1); } static void monitor_reset_key_state(void) { /* reset state */ free(key_blob); free(hostbased_cuser); free(hostbased_chost); sshauthopt_free(key_opts); key_blob = NULL; key_bloblen = 0; key_blobtype = MM_NOKEY; key_opts = NULL; hostbased_cuser = NULL; hostbased_chost = NULL; } #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL int mm_answer_moduli(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m) { DH *dh; const BIGNUM *dh_p, *dh_g; int r; u_int min, want, max; if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &min)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &want)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &max)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "parse"); debug3_f("got parameters: %d %d %d", min, want, max); /* We need to check here, too, in case the child got corrupted */ if (max < min || want < min || max < want) fatal_f("bad parameters: %d %d %d", min, want, max); sshbuf_reset(m); dh = choose_dh(min, want, max); if (dh == NULL) { if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(m, 0)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "assemble empty"); return (0); } else { /* Send first bignum */ DH_get0_pqg(dh, &dh_p, NULL, &dh_g); if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(m, 1)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_bignum2(m, dh_p)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_bignum2(m, dh_g)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "assemble"); DH_free(dh); } mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_MODULI, m); return (0); } #endif int mm_answer_sign(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m) { extern int auth_sock; /* XXX move to state struct? */ struct sshkey *key; struct sshbuf *sigbuf = NULL; u_char *p = NULL, *signature = NULL; char *alg = NULL; size_t datlen, siglen, alglen; int r, is_proof = 0; u_int keyid, compat; const char proof_req[] = "hostkeys-prove-00@openssh.com"; debug3_f("entering"); if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &keyid)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_string(m, &p, &datlen)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &alg, &alglen)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &compat)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "parse"); if (keyid > INT_MAX) fatal_f("invalid key ID"); /* * Supported KEX types use SHA1 (20 bytes), SHA256 (32 bytes), * SHA384 (48 bytes) and SHA512 (64 bytes). * * Otherwise, verify the signature request is for a hostkey * proof. * * XXX perform similar check for KEX signature requests too? * it's not trivial, since what is signed is the hash, rather * than the full kex structure... */ if (datlen != 20 && datlen != 32 && datlen != 48 && datlen != 64) { /* * Construct expected hostkey proof and compare it to what * the client sent us. */ if (session_id2_len == 0) /* hostkeys is never first */ fatal_f("bad data length: %zu", datlen); if ((key = get_hostkey_public_by_index(keyid, ssh)) == NULL) fatal_f("no hostkey for index %d", keyid); if ((sigbuf = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) fatal_f("sshbuf_new"); if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(sigbuf, proof_req)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_string(sigbuf, session_id2, session_id2_len)) != 0 || (r = sshkey_puts(key, sigbuf)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "assemble private key proof"); if (datlen != sshbuf_len(sigbuf) || memcmp(p, sshbuf_ptr(sigbuf), sshbuf_len(sigbuf)) != 0) fatal_f("bad data length: %zu, hostkey proof len %zu", datlen, sshbuf_len(sigbuf)); sshbuf_free(sigbuf); is_proof = 1; } /* save session id, it will be passed on the first call */ if (session_id2_len == 0) { session_id2_len = datlen; session_id2 = xmalloc(session_id2_len); memcpy(session_id2, p, session_id2_len); } if ((key = get_hostkey_by_index(keyid)) != NULL) { if ((r = sshkey_sign(key, &signature, &siglen, p, datlen, alg, options.sk_provider, NULL, compat)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "sign"); } else if ((key = get_hostkey_public_by_index(keyid, ssh)) != NULL && auth_sock > 0) { if ((r = ssh_agent_sign(auth_sock, key, &signature, &siglen, p, datlen, alg, compat)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "agent sign"); } else fatal_f("no hostkey from index %d", keyid); debug3_f("%s %s signature len=%zu", alg, is_proof ? "hostkey proof" : "KEX", siglen); sshbuf_reset(m); if ((r = sshbuf_put_string(m, signature, siglen)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "assemble"); free(alg); free(p); free(signature); mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_SIGN, m); /* Turn on permissions for getpwnam */ monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_PWNAM, 1); return (0); } #define PUTPW(b, id) \ do { \ if ((r = sshbuf_put_string(b, \ &pwent->id, sizeof(pwent->id))) != 0) \ fatal_fr(r, "assemble %s", #id); \ } while (0) /* Retrieves the password entry and also checks if the user is permitted */ int mm_answer_pwnamallow(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m) { struct passwd *pwent; int r, allowed = 0; u_int i; debug3_f("entering"); if (authctxt->attempt++ != 0) fatal_f("multiple attempts for getpwnam"); if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &authctxt->user, NULL)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "parse"); pwent = getpwnamallow(ssh, authctxt->user); setproctitle("%s [priv]", pwent ? authctxt->user : "unknown"); sshbuf_reset(m); if (pwent == NULL) { if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(m, 0)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "assemble fakepw"); authctxt->pw = fakepw(); goto out; } allowed = 1; authctxt->pw = pwent; authctxt->valid = 1; /* XXX send fake class/dir/shell, etc. */ if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(m, 1)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "assemble ok"); PUTPW(m, pw_uid); PUTPW(m, pw_gid); #ifdef HAVE_STRUCT_PASSWD_PW_CHANGE PUTPW(m, pw_change); #endif #ifdef HAVE_STRUCT_PASSWD_PW_EXPIRE PUTPW(m, pw_expire); #endif if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, pwent->pw_name)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, "*")) != 0 || #ifdef HAVE_STRUCT_PASSWD_PW_GECOS (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, pwent->pw_gecos)) != 0 || #endif #ifdef HAVE_STRUCT_PASSWD_PW_CLASS (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, pwent->pw_class)) != 0 || #endif (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, pwent->pw_dir)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, pwent->pw_shell)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "assemble pw"); out: ssh_packet_set_log_preamble(ssh, "%suser %s", authctxt->valid ? "authenticating" : "invalid ", authctxt->user); if ((r = sshbuf_put_string(m, &options, sizeof(options))) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "assemble options"); #define M_CP_STROPT(x) do { \ if (options.x != NULL && \ (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, options.x)) != 0) \ fatal_fr(r, "assemble %s", #x); \ } while (0) #define M_CP_STRARRAYOPT(x, nx) do { \ for (i = 0; i < options.nx; i++) { \ if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, options.x[i])) != 0) \ fatal_fr(r, "assemble %s", #x); \ } \ } while (0) /* See comment in servconf.h */ COPY_MATCH_STRING_OPTS(); #undef M_CP_STROPT #undef M_CP_STRARRAYOPT /* Create valid auth method lists */ if (auth2_setup_methods_lists(authctxt) != 0) { /* * The monitor will continue long enough to let the child * run to its packet_disconnect(), but it must not allow any * authentication to succeed. */ debug_f("no valid authentication method lists"); } debug3_f("sending MONITOR_ANS_PWNAM: %d", allowed); mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_PWNAM, m); /* Allow service/style information on the auth context */ monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_AUTHSERV, 1); monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_AUTH2_READ_BANNER, 1); #ifdef USE_PAM if (options.use_pam) monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_PAM_START, 1); #endif return (0); } int mm_answer_auth2_read_banner(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m) { char *banner; int r; sshbuf_reset(m); banner = auth2_read_banner(); if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, banner != NULL ? banner : "")) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "assemble"); mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_AUTH2_READ_BANNER, m); free(banner); return (0); } int mm_answer_authserv(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m) { int r; monitor_permit_authentications(1); if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &authctxt->service, NULL)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &authctxt->style, NULL)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "parse"); debug3_f("service=%s, style=%s", authctxt->service, authctxt->style); if (strlen(authctxt->style) == 0) { free(authctxt->style); authctxt->style = NULL; } return (0); } /* * Check that the key type appears in the supplied pattern list, ignoring * mismatches in the signature algorithm. (Signature algorithm checks are * performed in the unprivileged authentication code). * Returns 1 on success, 0 otherwise. */ static int key_base_type_match(const char *method, const struct sshkey *key, const char *list) { char *s, *l, *ol = xstrdup(list); int found = 0; l = ol; for ((s = strsep(&l, ",")); s && *s != '\0'; (s = strsep(&l, ","))) { if (sshkey_type_from_name(s) == key->type) { found = 1; break; } } if (!found) { error("%s key type %s is not in permitted list %s", method, sshkey_ssh_name(key), list); } free(ol); return found; } int mm_answer_authpassword(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m) { static int call_count; char *passwd; int r, authenticated; size_t plen; if (!options.password_authentication) fatal_f("password authentication not enabled"); if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &passwd, &plen)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "parse"); /* Only authenticate if the context is valid */ authenticated = options.password_authentication && auth_password(ssh, passwd); freezero(passwd, plen); sshbuf_reset(m); if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, authenticated)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "assemble"); #ifdef USE_PAM if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, sshpam_get_maxtries_reached())) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "assemble PAM"); #endif debug3("%s: sending result %d", __func__, authenticated); debug3_f("sending result %d", authenticated); mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_AUTHPASSWORD, m); call_count++; if (plen == 0 && call_count == 1) auth_method = "none"; else auth_method = "password"; /* Causes monitor loop to terminate if authenticated */ return (authenticated); } #ifdef BSD_AUTH int mm_answer_bsdauthquery(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m) { char *name, *infotxt; u_int numprompts, *echo_on, success; char **prompts; int r; if (!options.kbd_interactive_authentication) fatal_f("kbd-int authentication not enabled"); success = bsdauth_query(authctxt, &name, &infotxt, &numprompts, &prompts, &echo_on) < 0 ? 0 : 1; sshbuf_reset(m); if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, success)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "assemble"); if (success) { if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, prompts[0])) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "assemble prompt"); } debug3_f("sending challenge success: %u", success); mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_BSDAUTHQUERY, m); if (success) { free(name); free(infotxt); free(prompts); free(echo_on); } return (0); } int mm_answer_bsdauthrespond(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m) { char *response; int r, authok; if (!options.kbd_interactive_authentication) fatal_f("kbd-int authentication not enabled"); if (authctxt->as == NULL) fatal_f("no bsd auth session"); if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &response, NULL)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "parse"); authok = options.kbd_interactive_authentication && auth_userresponse(authctxt->as, response, 0); authctxt->as = NULL; debug3_f("<%s> = <%d>", response, authok); free(response); sshbuf_reset(m); if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, authok)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "assemble"); debug3_f("sending authenticated: %d", authok); mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_BSDAUTHRESPOND, m); auth_method = "keyboard-interactive"; auth_submethod = "bsdauth"; return (authok != 0); } #endif #ifdef USE_PAM int mm_answer_pam_start(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m) { if (!options.use_pam) fatal("UsePAM not set, but ended up in %s anyway", __func__); start_pam(ssh); monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_PAM_ACCOUNT, 1); if (options.kbd_interactive_authentication) monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_PAM_INIT_CTX, 1); return (0); } int mm_answer_pam_account(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m) { u_int ret; int r; if (!options.use_pam) fatal("%s: PAM not enabled", __func__); ret = do_pam_account(); if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, ret)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_stringb(m, loginmsg)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_ACCOUNT, m); return (ret); } static void *sshpam_ctxt, *sshpam_authok; extern KbdintDevice sshpam_device; int mm_answer_pam_init_ctx(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m) { u_int ok = 0; int r; debug3("%s", __func__); if (!options.kbd_interactive_authentication) fatal("%s: kbd-int authentication not enabled", __func__); if (sshpam_ctxt != NULL) fatal("%s: already called", __func__); sshpam_ctxt = (sshpam_device.init_ctx)(authctxt); sshpam_authok = NULL; sshbuf_reset(m); if (sshpam_ctxt != NULL) { monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_PAM_FREE_CTX, 1); monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_PAM_QUERY, 1); ok = 1; } if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, ok)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_INIT_CTX, m); return (0); } int mm_answer_pam_query(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m) { char *name = NULL, *info = NULL, **prompts = NULL; u_int i, num = 0, *echo_on = 0; int r, ret; debug3("%s", __func__); sshpam_authok = NULL; if (sshpam_ctxt == NULL) fatal("%s: no context", __func__); ret = (sshpam_device.query)(sshpam_ctxt, &name, &info, &num, &prompts, &echo_on); if (ret == 0 && num == 0) sshpam_authok = sshpam_ctxt; if (num > 1 || name == NULL || info == NULL) fatal("sshpam_device.query failed"); monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_PAM_RESPOND, 1); sshbuf_reset(m); if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, ret)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, name)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, info)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, sshpam_get_maxtries_reached())) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, num)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); free(name); free(info); for (i = 0; i < num; ++i) { if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, prompts[i])) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, echo_on[i])) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); free(prompts[i]); } free(prompts); free(echo_on); auth_method = "keyboard-interactive"; auth_submethod = "pam"; mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_QUERY, m); return (0); } int mm_answer_pam_respond(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m) { char **resp; u_int i, num; int r, ret; debug3("%s", __func__); if (sshpam_ctxt == NULL) fatal("%s: no context", __func__); sshpam_authok = NULL; if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &num)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + if (num > PAM_MAX_NUM_MSG) { + fatal_f("Too many PAM messages, got %u, expected <= %u", + num, (unsigned)PAM_MAX_NUM_MSG); + } if (num > 0) { resp = xcalloc(num, sizeof(char *)); for (i = 0; i < num; ++i) { if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &(resp[i]), NULL)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); } ret = (sshpam_device.respond)(sshpam_ctxt, num, resp); for (i = 0; i < num; ++i) free(resp[i]); free(resp); } else { ret = (sshpam_device.respond)(sshpam_ctxt, num, NULL); } sshbuf_reset(m); if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, ret)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_RESPOND, m); auth_method = "keyboard-interactive"; auth_submethod = "pam"; if (ret == 0) sshpam_authok = sshpam_ctxt; return (0); } int mm_answer_pam_free_ctx(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m) { int r = sshpam_authok != NULL && sshpam_authok == sshpam_ctxt; debug3("%s", __func__); if (sshpam_ctxt == NULL) fatal("%s: no context", __func__); (sshpam_device.free_ctx)(sshpam_ctxt); sshpam_ctxt = sshpam_authok = NULL; sshbuf_reset(m); mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_FREE_CTX, m); /* Allow another attempt */ monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_PAM_INIT_CTX, 1); auth_method = "keyboard-interactive"; auth_submethod = "pam"; return r; } #endif int mm_answer_keyallowed(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m) { struct sshkey *key = NULL; char *cuser, *chost; u_int pubkey_auth_attempt; u_int type = 0; int r, allowed = 0; struct sshauthopt *opts = NULL; debug3_f("entering"); if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &type)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &cuser, NULL)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &chost, NULL)) != 0 || (r = sshkey_froms(m, &key)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &pubkey_auth_attempt)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "parse"); if (key != NULL && authctxt->valid) { - /* These should not make it past the privsep child */ - if (sshkey_type_plain(key->type) == KEY_RSA && - (ssh->compat & SSH_BUG_RSASIGMD5) != 0) - fatal_f("passed a SSH_BUG_RSASIGMD5 key"); - switch (type) { case MM_USERKEY: auth_method = "publickey"; if (!options.pubkey_authentication) break; if (auth2_key_already_used(authctxt, key)) break; if (!key_base_type_match(auth_method, key, options.pubkey_accepted_algos)) break; allowed = user_key_allowed(ssh, authctxt->pw, key, pubkey_auth_attempt, &opts); break; case MM_HOSTKEY: auth_method = "hostbased"; if (!options.hostbased_authentication) break; if (auth2_key_already_used(authctxt, key)) break; if (!key_base_type_match(auth_method, key, options.hostbased_accepted_algos)) break; allowed = hostbased_key_allowed(ssh, authctxt->pw, cuser, chost, key); auth2_record_info(authctxt, "client user \"%.100s\", client host \"%.100s\"", cuser, chost); break; default: fatal_f("unknown key type %u", type); break; } } debug3_f("%s authentication%s: %s key is %s", auth_method, pubkey_auth_attempt ? "" : " test", (key == NULL || !authctxt->valid) ? "invalid" : sshkey_type(key), allowed ? "allowed" : "not allowed"); auth2_record_key(authctxt, 0, key); /* clear temporarily storage (used by verify) */ monitor_reset_key_state(); if (allowed) { /* Save temporarily for comparison in verify */ if ((r = sshkey_to_blob(key, &key_blob, &key_bloblen)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "sshkey_to_blob"); key_blobtype = type; key_opts = opts; hostbased_cuser = cuser; hostbased_chost = chost; } else { /* Log failed attempt */ auth_log(ssh, 0, 0, auth_method, NULL); free(cuser); free(chost); } sshkey_free(key); sshbuf_reset(m); if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, allowed)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "assemble"); if (opts != NULL && (r = sshauthopt_serialise(opts, m, 1)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "sshauthopt_serialise"); mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_KEYALLOWED, m); if (!allowed) sshauthopt_free(opts); return (0); } static int monitor_valid_userblob(struct ssh *ssh, const u_char *data, u_int datalen) { struct sshbuf *b; struct sshkey *hostkey = NULL; const u_char *p; char *userstyle, *cp; size_t len; u_char type; int hostbound = 0, r, fail = 0; if ((b = sshbuf_from(data, datalen)) == NULL) fatal_f("sshbuf_from"); if (ssh->compat & SSH_OLD_SESSIONID) { p = sshbuf_ptr(b); len = sshbuf_len(b); if ((session_id2 == NULL) || (len < session_id2_len) || (timingsafe_bcmp(p, session_id2, session_id2_len) != 0)) fail++; if ((r = sshbuf_consume(b, session_id2_len)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "consume"); } else { if ((r = sshbuf_get_string_direct(b, &p, &len)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "parse sessionid"); if ((session_id2 == NULL) || (len != session_id2_len) || (timingsafe_bcmp(p, session_id2, session_id2_len) != 0)) fail++; } if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(b, &type)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "parse type"); if (type != SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST) fail++; if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &cp, NULL)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "parse userstyle"); xasprintf(&userstyle, "%s%s%s", authctxt->user, authctxt->style ? ":" : "", authctxt->style ? authctxt->style : ""); if (strcmp(userstyle, cp) != 0) { logit("wrong user name passed to monitor: " "expected %s != %.100s", userstyle, cp); fail++; } free(userstyle); free(cp); if ((r = sshbuf_skip_string(b)) != 0 || /* service */ (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &cp, NULL)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "parse method"); if (strcmp("publickey", cp) != 0) { if (strcmp("publickey-hostbound-v00@openssh.com", cp) == 0) hostbound = 1; else fail++; } free(cp); if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(b, &type)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "parse pktype"); if (type == 0) fail++; if ((r = sshbuf_skip_string(b)) != 0 || /* pkalg */ (r = sshbuf_skip_string(b)) != 0 || /* pkblob */ (hostbound && (r = sshkey_froms(b, &hostkey)) != 0)) fatal_fr(r, "parse pk"); if (sshbuf_len(b) != 0) fail++; sshbuf_free(b); if (hostkey != NULL) { /* * Ensure this is actually one of our hostkeys; unfortunately * can't check ssh->kex->initial_hostkey directly at this point * as packet state has not yet been exported to monitor. */ if (get_hostkey_index(hostkey, 1, ssh) == -1) fatal_f("hostbound hostkey does not match"); sshkey_free(hostkey); } return (fail == 0); } static int monitor_valid_hostbasedblob(const u_char *data, u_int datalen, const char *cuser, const char *chost) { struct sshbuf *b; const u_char *p; char *cp, *userstyle; size_t len; int r, fail = 0; u_char type; if ((b = sshbuf_from(data, datalen)) == NULL) fatal_f("sshbuf_new"); if ((r = sshbuf_get_string_direct(b, &p, &len)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "parse sessionid"); if ((session_id2 == NULL) || (len != session_id2_len) || (timingsafe_bcmp(p, session_id2, session_id2_len) != 0)) fail++; if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(b, &type)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "parse type"); if (type != SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST) fail++; if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &cp, NULL)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "parse userstyle"); xasprintf(&userstyle, "%s%s%s", authctxt->user, authctxt->style ? ":" : "", authctxt->style ? authctxt->style : ""); if (strcmp(userstyle, cp) != 0) { logit("wrong user name passed to monitor: " "expected %s != %.100s", userstyle, cp); fail++; } free(userstyle); free(cp); if ((r = sshbuf_skip_string(b)) != 0 || /* service */ (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &cp, NULL)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "parse method"); if (strcmp(cp, "hostbased") != 0) fail++; free(cp); if ((r = sshbuf_skip_string(b)) != 0 || /* pkalg */ (r = sshbuf_skip_string(b)) != 0) /* pkblob */ fatal_fr(r, "parse pk"); /* verify client host, strip trailing dot if necessary */ if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &cp, NULL)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "parse host"); if (((len = strlen(cp)) > 0) && cp[len - 1] == '.') cp[len - 1] = '\0'; if (strcmp(cp, chost) != 0) fail++; free(cp); /* verify client user */ if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &cp, NULL)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "parse ruser"); if (strcmp(cp, cuser) != 0) fail++; free(cp); if (sshbuf_len(b) != 0) fail++; sshbuf_free(b); return (fail == 0); } int mm_answer_keyverify(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m) { struct sshkey *key; const u_char *signature, *data, *blob; char *sigalg = NULL, *fp = NULL; size_t signaturelen, datalen, bloblen; int r, ret, req_presence = 0, req_verify = 0, valid_data = 0; int encoded_ret; struct sshkey_sig_details *sig_details = NULL; if ((r = sshbuf_get_string_direct(m, &blob, &bloblen)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_string_direct(m, &signature, &signaturelen)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_string_direct(m, &data, &datalen)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &sigalg, NULL)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "parse"); if (hostbased_cuser == NULL || hostbased_chost == NULL || !monitor_allowed_key(blob, bloblen)) fatal_f("bad key, not previously allowed"); /* Empty signature algorithm means NULL. */ if (*sigalg == '\0') { free(sigalg); sigalg = NULL; } /* XXX use sshkey_froms here; need to change key_blob, etc. */ if ((r = sshkey_from_blob(blob, bloblen, &key)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "parse key"); switch (key_blobtype) { case MM_USERKEY: valid_data = monitor_valid_userblob(ssh, data, datalen); auth_method = "publickey"; break; case MM_HOSTKEY: valid_data = monitor_valid_hostbasedblob(data, datalen, hostbased_cuser, hostbased_chost); auth_method = "hostbased"; break; default: valid_data = 0; break; } if (!valid_data) fatal_f("bad %s signature data blob", key_blobtype == MM_USERKEY ? "userkey" : (key_blobtype == MM_HOSTKEY ? "hostkey" : "unknown")); if ((fp = sshkey_fingerprint(key, options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL) fatal_f("sshkey_fingerprint failed"); ret = sshkey_verify(key, signature, signaturelen, data, datalen, sigalg, ssh->compat, &sig_details); debug3_f("%s %s signature using %s %s%s%s", auth_method, sshkey_type(key), sigalg == NULL ? "default" : sigalg, (ret == 0) ? "verified" : "unverified", (ret != 0) ? ": " : "", (ret != 0) ? ssh_err(ret) : ""); if (ret == 0 && key_blobtype == MM_USERKEY && sig_details != NULL) { req_presence = (options.pubkey_auth_options & PUBKEYAUTH_TOUCH_REQUIRED) || !key_opts->no_require_user_presence; if (req_presence && (sig_details->sk_flags & SSH_SK_USER_PRESENCE_REQD) == 0) { error("public key %s %s signature for %s%s from %.128s " "port %d rejected: user presence " "(authenticator touch) requirement not met ", sshkey_type(key), fp, authctxt->valid ? "" : "invalid user ", authctxt->user, ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), ssh_remote_port(ssh)); ret = SSH_ERR_SIGNATURE_INVALID; } req_verify = (options.pubkey_auth_options & PUBKEYAUTH_VERIFY_REQUIRED) || key_opts->require_verify; if (req_verify && (sig_details->sk_flags & SSH_SK_USER_VERIFICATION_REQD) == 0) { error("public key %s %s signature for %s%s from %.128s " "port %d rejected: user verification requirement " "not met ", sshkey_type(key), fp, authctxt->valid ? "" : "invalid user ", authctxt->user, ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), ssh_remote_port(ssh)); ret = SSH_ERR_SIGNATURE_INVALID; } } auth2_record_key(authctxt, ret == 0, key); if (key_blobtype == MM_USERKEY) auth_activate_options(ssh, key_opts); monitor_reset_key_state(); sshbuf_reset(m); /* encode ret != 0 as positive integer, since we're sending u32 */ encoded_ret = (ret != 0); if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, encoded_ret)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u8(m, sig_details != NULL)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "assemble"); if (sig_details != NULL) { if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, sig_details->sk_counter)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u8(m, sig_details->sk_flags)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "assemble sk"); } sshkey_sig_details_free(sig_details); mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_KEYVERIFY, m); free(sigalg); free(fp); sshkey_free(key); return ret == 0; } static void mm_record_login(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s, struct passwd *pw) { socklen_t fromlen; struct sockaddr_storage from; /* * Get IP address of client. If the connection is not a socket, let * the address be 0.0.0.0. */ memset(&from, 0, sizeof(from)); fromlen = sizeof(from); if (ssh_packet_connection_is_on_socket(ssh)) { if (getpeername(ssh_packet_get_connection_in(ssh), (struct sockaddr *)&from, &fromlen) == -1) { debug("getpeername: %.100s", strerror(errno)); cleanup_exit(255); } } /* Record that there was a login on that tty from the remote host. */ record_login(s->pid, s->tty, pw->pw_name, pw->pw_uid, session_get_remote_name_or_ip(ssh, utmp_len, options.use_dns), (struct sockaddr *)&from, fromlen); } static void mm_session_close(Session *s) { debug3_f("session %d pid %ld", s->self, (long)s->pid); if (s->ttyfd != -1) { debug3_f("tty %s ptyfd %d", s->tty, s->ptyfd); session_pty_cleanup2(s); } session_unused(s->self); } int mm_answer_pty(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m) { extern struct monitor *pmonitor; Session *s; int r, res, fd0; debug3_f("entering"); sshbuf_reset(m); s = session_new(); if (s == NULL) goto error; s->authctxt = authctxt; s->pw = authctxt->pw; s->pid = pmonitor->m_pid; res = pty_allocate(&s->ptyfd, &s->ttyfd, s->tty, sizeof(s->tty)); if (res == 0) goto error; pty_setowner(authctxt->pw, s->tty); if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, 1)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, s->tty)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "assemble"); /* We need to trick ttyslot */ if (dup2(s->ttyfd, 0) == -1) fatal_f("dup2"); mm_record_login(ssh, s, authctxt->pw); /* Now we can close the file descriptor again */ close(0); /* send messages generated by record_login */ if ((r = sshbuf_put_stringb(m, loginmsg)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "assemble loginmsg"); sshbuf_reset(loginmsg); mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_PTY, m); if (mm_send_fd(sock, s->ptyfd) == -1 || mm_send_fd(sock, s->ttyfd) == -1) fatal_f("send fds failed"); /* make sure nothing uses fd 0 */ if ((fd0 = open(_PATH_DEVNULL, O_RDONLY)) == -1) fatal_f("open(/dev/null): %s", strerror(errno)); if (fd0 != 0) error_f("fd0 %d != 0", fd0); /* slave side of pty is not needed */ close(s->ttyfd); s->ttyfd = s->ptyfd; /* no need to dup() because nobody closes ptyfd */ s->ptymaster = s->ptyfd; debug3_f("tty %s ptyfd %d", s->tty, s->ttyfd); return (0); error: if (s != NULL) mm_session_close(s); if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, 0)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "assemble 0"); mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_PTY, m); return (0); } int mm_answer_pty_cleanup(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m) { Session *s; char *tty; int r; debug3_f("entering"); if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &tty, NULL)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "parse tty"); if ((s = session_by_tty(tty)) != NULL) mm_session_close(s); sshbuf_reset(m); free(tty); return (0); } int mm_answer_term(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *req) { extern struct monitor *pmonitor; int res, status; debug3_f("tearing down sessions"); /* The child is terminating */ session_destroy_all(ssh, &mm_session_close); #ifdef USE_PAM if (options.use_pam) sshpam_cleanup(); #endif while (waitpid(pmonitor->m_pid, &status, 0) == -1) if (errno != EINTR) exit(1); res = WIFEXITED(status) ? WEXITSTATUS(status) : 1; /* Terminate process */ exit(res); } #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS /* Report that an audit event occurred */ int mm_answer_audit_event(struct ssh *ssh, int socket, struct sshbuf *m) { u_int n; ssh_audit_event_t event; int r; debug3("%s entering", __func__); if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &n)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); event = (ssh_audit_event_t)n; switch (event) { case SSH_AUTH_FAIL_PUBKEY: case SSH_AUTH_FAIL_HOSTBASED: case SSH_AUTH_FAIL_GSSAPI: case SSH_LOGIN_EXCEED_MAXTRIES: case SSH_LOGIN_ROOT_DENIED: case SSH_CONNECTION_CLOSE: case SSH_INVALID_USER: audit_event(ssh, event); break; default: fatal("Audit event type %d not permitted", event); } return (0); } int mm_answer_audit_command(struct ssh *ssh, int socket, struct sshbuf *m) { char *cmd; int r; debug3("%s entering", __func__); if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &cmd, NULL)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); /* sanity check command, if so how? */ audit_run_command(cmd); free(cmd); return (0); } #endif /* SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS */ void monitor_clear_keystate(struct ssh *ssh, struct monitor *pmonitor) { ssh_clear_newkeys(ssh, MODE_IN); ssh_clear_newkeys(ssh, MODE_OUT); sshbuf_free(child_state); child_state = NULL; } void monitor_apply_keystate(struct ssh *ssh, struct monitor *pmonitor) { struct kex *kex; int r; debug3_f("packet_set_state"); if ((r = ssh_packet_set_state(ssh, child_state)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "packet_set_state"); sshbuf_free(child_state); child_state = NULL; if ((kex = ssh->kex) == NULL) fatal_f("internal error: ssh->kex == NULL"); if (session_id2_len != sshbuf_len(ssh->kex->session_id)) { fatal_f("incorrect session id length %zu (expected %u)", sshbuf_len(ssh->kex->session_id), session_id2_len); } if (memcmp(sshbuf_ptr(ssh->kex->session_id), session_id2, session_id2_len) != 0) fatal_f("session ID mismatch"); /* XXX set callbacks */ #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP1_SHA1] = kex_gen_server; kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP14_SHA1] = kex_gen_server; kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP14_SHA256] = kex_gen_server; kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP16_SHA512] = kex_gen_server; kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP18_SHA512] = kex_gen_server; kex->kex[KEX_DH_GEX_SHA1] = kexgex_server; kex->kex[KEX_DH_GEX_SHA256] = kexgex_server; # ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC kex->kex[KEX_ECDH_SHA2] = kex_gen_server; # endif #endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */ kex->kex[KEX_C25519_SHA256] = kex_gen_server; kex->kex[KEX_KEM_SNTRUP761X25519_SHA512] = kex_gen_server; kex->load_host_public_key=&get_hostkey_public_by_type; kex->load_host_private_key=&get_hostkey_private_by_type; kex->host_key_index=&get_hostkey_index; kex->sign = sshd_hostkey_sign; } /* This function requires careful sanity checking */ void mm_get_keystate(struct ssh *ssh, struct monitor *pmonitor) { debug3_f("Waiting for new keys"); if ((child_state = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed"); mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_sendfd, MONITOR_REQ_KEYEXPORT, child_state); debug3_f("GOT new keys"); } /* XXX */ #define FD_CLOSEONEXEC(x) do { \ if (fcntl(x, F_SETFD, FD_CLOEXEC) == -1) \ fatal("fcntl(%d, F_SETFD)", x); \ } while (0) static void monitor_openfds(struct monitor *mon, int do_logfds) { int pair[2]; #ifdef SO_ZEROIZE int on = 1; #endif if (socketpair(AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0, pair) == -1) fatal_f("socketpair: %s", strerror(errno)); #ifdef SO_ZEROIZE if (setsockopt(pair[0], SOL_SOCKET, SO_ZEROIZE, &on, sizeof(on)) == -1) error("setsockopt SO_ZEROIZE(0): %.100s", strerror(errno)); if (setsockopt(pair[1], SOL_SOCKET, SO_ZEROIZE, &on, sizeof(on)) == -1) error("setsockopt SO_ZEROIZE(1): %.100s", strerror(errno)); #endif FD_CLOSEONEXEC(pair[0]); FD_CLOSEONEXEC(pair[1]); mon->m_recvfd = pair[0]; mon->m_sendfd = pair[1]; if (do_logfds) { if (pipe(pair) == -1) fatal_f("pipe: %s", strerror(errno)); FD_CLOSEONEXEC(pair[0]); FD_CLOSEONEXEC(pair[1]); mon->m_log_recvfd = pair[0]; mon->m_log_sendfd = pair[1]; } else mon->m_log_recvfd = mon->m_log_sendfd = -1; } #define MM_MEMSIZE 65536 struct monitor * monitor_init(void) { struct monitor *mon; mon = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*mon)); monitor_openfds(mon, 1); return mon; } void monitor_reinit(struct monitor *mon) { monitor_openfds(mon, 0); } #ifdef GSSAPI int mm_answer_gss_setup_ctx(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m) { gss_OID_desc goid; OM_uint32 major; size_t len; u_char *p; int r; if (!options.gss_authentication) fatal_f("GSSAPI authentication not enabled"); if ((r = sshbuf_get_string(m, &p, &len)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "parse"); goid.elements = p; goid.length = len; major = ssh_gssapi_server_ctx(&gsscontext, &goid); free(goid.elements); sshbuf_reset(m); if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, major)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "assemble"); mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_GSSSETUP, m); /* Now we have a context, enable the step */ monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSSTEP, 1); return (0); } int mm_answer_gss_accept_ctx(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m) { gss_buffer_desc in; gss_buffer_desc out = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER; OM_uint32 major, minor; OM_uint32 flags = 0; /* GSI needs this */ int r; if (!options.gss_authentication) fatal_f("GSSAPI authentication not enabled"); if ((r = ssh_gssapi_get_buffer_desc(m, &in)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "ssh_gssapi_get_buffer_desc"); major = ssh_gssapi_accept_ctx(gsscontext, &in, &out, &flags); free(in.value); sshbuf_reset(m); if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, major)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_string(m, out.value, out.length)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, flags)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "assemble"); mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_GSSSTEP, m); gss_release_buffer(&minor, &out); if (major == GSS_S_COMPLETE) { monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSSTEP, 0); monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSUSEROK, 1); monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSCHECKMIC, 1); } return (0); } int mm_answer_gss_checkmic(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m) { gss_buffer_desc gssbuf, mic; OM_uint32 ret; int r; if (!options.gss_authentication) fatal_f("GSSAPI authentication not enabled"); if ((r = ssh_gssapi_get_buffer_desc(m, &gssbuf)) != 0 || (r = ssh_gssapi_get_buffer_desc(m, &mic)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "ssh_gssapi_get_buffer_desc"); ret = ssh_gssapi_checkmic(gsscontext, &gssbuf, &mic); free(gssbuf.value); free(mic.value); sshbuf_reset(m); if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, ret)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "assemble"); mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_GSSCHECKMIC, m); if (!GSS_ERROR(ret)) monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSUSEROK, 1); return (0); } int mm_answer_gss_userok(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m) { int r, authenticated; const char *displayname; if (!options.gss_authentication) fatal_f("GSSAPI authentication not enabled"); authenticated = authctxt->valid && ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user); sshbuf_reset(m); if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, authenticated)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "assemble"); debug3_f("sending result %d", authenticated); mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_GSSUSEROK, m); auth_method = "gssapi-with-mic"; if ((displayname = ssh_gssapi_displayname()) != NULL) auth2_record_info(authctxt, "%s", displayname); /* Monitor loop will terminate if authenticated */ return (authenticated); } #endif /* GSSAPI */ diff --git a/crypto/openssh/mux.c b/crypto/openssh/mux.c index e7580ac742ab..b3ffde9fe162 100644 --- a/crypto/openssh/mux.c +++ b/crypto/openssh/mux.c @@ -1,2344 +1,2342 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: mux.c,v 1.95 2023/01/06 02:39:59 djm Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: mux.c,v 1.96 2023/03/08 04:43:12 guenther Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2002-2008 Damien Miller * * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. * * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. */ /* ssh session multiplexing support */ #include "includes.h" #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H #include #endif #ifdef HAVE_POLL_H #include #else # ifdef HAVE_SYS_POLL_H # include # endif #endif #ifdef HAVE_UTIL_H # include #endif #include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h" #include "xmalloc.h" #include "log.h" #include "ssh.h" #include "ssh2.h" #include "pathnames.h" #include "misc.h" #include "match.h" #include "sshbuf.h" #include "channels.h" #include "msg.h" #include "packet.h" #include "monitor_fdpass.h" #include "sshpty.h" #include "sshkey.h" #include "readconf.h" #include "clientloop.h" #include "ssherr.h" /* from ssh.c */ extern int tty_flag; extern Options options; extern char *host; extern struct sshbuf *command; extern volatile sig_atomic_t quit_pending; /* Context for session open confirmation callback */ struct mux_session_confirm_ctx { u_int want_tty; u_int want_subsys; u_int want_x_fwd; u_int want_agent_fwd; struct sshbuf *cmd; char *term; struct termios tio; char **env; u_int rid; }; /* Context for stdio fwd open confirmation callback */ struct mux_stdio_confirm_ctx { u_int rid; }; /* Context for global channel callback */ struct mux_channel_confirm_ctx { u_int cid; /* channel id */ u_int rid; /* request id */ int fid; /* forward id */ }; /* fd to control socket */ int muxserver_sock = -1; /* client request id */ u_int muxclient_request_id = 0; /* Multiplexing control command */ u_int muxclient_command = 0; /* Set when signalled. */ static volatile sig_atomic_t muxclient_terminate = 0; /* PID of multiplex server */ static u_int muxserver_pid = 0; static Channel *mux_listener_channel = NULL; struct mux_master_state { int hello_rcvd; }; /* mux protocol messages */ #define MUX_MSG_HELLO 0x00000001 #define MUX_C_NEW_SESSION 0x10000002 #define MUX_C_ALIVE_CHECK 0x10000004 #define MUX_C_TERMINATE 0x10000005 #define MUX_C_OPEN_FWD 0x10000006 #define MUX_C_CLOSE_FWD 0x10000007 #define MUX_C_NEW_STDIO_FWD 0x10000008 #define MUX_C_STOP_LISTENING 0x10000009 #define MUX_C_PROXY 0x1000000f #define MUX_S_OK 0x80000001 #define MUX_S_PERMISSION_DENIED 0x80000002 #define MUX_S_FAILURE 0x80000003 #define MUX_S_EXIT_MESSAGE 0x80000004 #define MUX_S_ALIVE 0x80000005 #define MUX_S_SESSION_OPENED 0x80000006 #define MUX_S_REMOTE_PORT 0x80000007 #define MUX_S_TTY_ALLOC_FAIL 0x80000008 #define MUX_S_PROXY 0x8000000f /* type codes for MUX_C_OPEN_FWD and MUX_C_CLOSE_FWD */ #define MUX_FWD_LOCAL 1 #define MUX_FWD_REMOTE 2 #define MUX_FWD_DYNAMIC 3 static void mux_session_confirm(struct ssh *, int, int, void *); static void mux_stdio_confirm(struct ssh *, int, int, void *); static int mux_master_process_hello(struct ssh *, u_int, Channel *, struct sshbuf *, struct sshbuf *); static int mux_master_process_new_session(struct ssh *, u_int, Channel *, struct sshbuf *, struct sshbuf *); static int mux_master_process_alive_check(struct ssh *, u_int, Channel *, struct sshbuf *, struct sshbuf *); static int mux_master_process_terminate(struct ssh *, u_int, Channel *, struct sshbuf *, struct sshbuf *); static int mux_master_process_open_fwd(struct ssh *, u_int, Channel *, struct sshbuf *, struct sshbuf *); static int mux_master_process_close_fwd(struct ssh *, u_int, Channel *, struct sshbuf *, struct sshbuf *); static int mux_master_process_stdio_fwd(struct ssh *, u_int, Channel *, struct sshbuf *, struct sshbuf *); static int mux_master_process_stop_listening(struct ssh *, u_int, Channel *, struct sshbuf *, struct sshbuf *); static int mux_master_process_proxy(struct ssh *, u_int, Channel *, struct sshbuf *, struct sshbuf *); static const struct { u_int type; int (*handler)(struct ssh *, u_int, Channel *, struct sshbuf *, struct sshbuf *); } mux_master_handlers[] = { { MUX_MSG_HELLO, mux_master_process_hello }, { MUX_C_NEW_SESSION, mux_master_process_new_session }, { MUX_C_ALIVE_CHECK, mux_master_process_alive_check }, { MUX_C_TERMINATE, mux_master_process_terminate }, { MUX_C_OPEN_FWD, mux_master_process_open_fwd }, { MUX_C_CLOSE_FWD, mux_master_process_close_fwd }, { MUX_C_NEW_STDIO_FWD, mux_master_process_stdio_fwd }, { MUX_C_STOP_LISTENING, mux_master_process_stop_listening }, { MUX_C_PROXY, mux_master_process_proxy }, { 0, NULL } }; /* Cleanup callback fired on closure of mux client _session_ channel */ -/* ARGSUSED */ static void mux_master_session_cleanup_cb(struct ssh *ssh, int cid, int force, void *unused) { Channel *cc, *c = channel_by_id(ssh, cid); debug3_f("entering for channel %d", cid); if (c == NULL) fatal_f("channel_by_id(%i) == NULL", cid); if (c->ctl_chan != -1) { if ((cc = channel_by_id(ssh, c->ctl_chan)) == NULL) fatal_f("channel %d missing control channel %d", c->self, c->ctl_chan); c->ctl_chan = -1; cc->remote_id = 0; cc->have_remote_id = 0; chan_rcvd_oclose(ssh, cc); } channel_cancel_cleanup(ssh, c->self); } /* Cleanup callback fired on closure of mux client _control_ channel */ -/* ARGSUSED */ static void mux_master_control_cleanup_cb(struct ssh *ssh, int cid, int force, void *unused) { Channel *sc, *c = channel_by_id(ssh, cid); debug3_f("entering for channel %d", cid); if (c == NULL) fatal_f("channel_by_id(%i) == NULL", cid); if (c->have_remote_id) { if ((sc = channel_by_id(ssh, c->remote_id)) == NULL) fatal_f("channel %d missing session channel %u", c->self, c->remote_id); c->remote_id = 0; c->have_remote_id = 0; sc->ctl_chan = -1; if (sc->type != SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN && sc->type != SSH_CHANNEL_OPENING) { debug2_f("channel %d: not open", sc->self); chan_mark_dead(ssh, sc); } else { if (sc->istate == CHAN_INPUT_OPEN) chan_read_failed(ssh, sc); if (sc->ostate == CHAN_OUTPUT_OPEN) chan_write_failed(ssh, sc); } } channel_cancel_cleanup(ssh, c->self); } /* Check mux client environment variables before passing them to mux master. */ static int env_permitted(const char *env) { u_int i; int ret; char name[1024], *cp; if ((cp = strchr(env, '=')) == NULL || cp == env) return 0; ret = snprintf(name, sizeof(name), "%.*s", (int)(cp - env), env); if (ret <= 0 || (size_t)ret >= sizeof(name)) { error_f("name '%.100s...' too long", env); return 0; } for (i = 0; i < options.num_send_env; i++) if (match_pattern(name, options.send_env[i])) return 1; return 0; } /* Mux master protocol message handlers */ static int mux_master_process_hello(struct ssh *ssh, u_int rid, Channel *c, struct sshbuf *m, struct sshbuf *reply) { u_int ver; struct mux_master_state *state = (struct mux_master_state *)c->mux_ctx; int r; if (state == NULL) fatal_f("channel %d: c->mux_ctx == NULL", c->self); if (state->hello_rcvd) { error_f("HELLO received twice"); return -1; } if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &ver)) != 0) { error_fr(r, "parse"); return -1; } if (ver != SSHMUX_VER) { error_f("unsupported multiplexing protocol version %u " "(expected %u)", ver, SSHMUX_VER); return -1; } debug2_f("channel %d client version %u", c->self, ver); /* No extensions are presently defined */ while (sshbuf_len(m) > 0) { char *name = NULL; size_t value_len = 0; if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &name, NULL)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_string_direct(m, NULL, &value_len)) != 0) { error_fr(r, "parse extension"); return -1; } debug2_f("Unrecognised extension \"%s\" length %zu", name, value_len); free(name); } state->hello_rcvd = 1; return 0; } /* Enqueue a "ok" response to the reply buffer */ static void reply_ok(struct sshbuf *reply, u_int rid) { int r; if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(reply, MUX_S_OK)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u32(reply, rid)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "reply"); } /* Enqueue an error response to the reply buffer */ static void reply_error(struct sshbuf *reply, u_int type, u_int rid, const char *msg) { int r; if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(reply, type)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u32(reply, rid)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(reply, msg)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "reply"); } static int mux_master_process_new_session(struct ssh *ssh, u_int rid, Channel *c, struct sshbuf *m, struct sshbuf *reply) { Channel *nc; struct mux_session_confirm_ctx *cctx; char *cmd, *cp; u_int i, j, env_len, escape_char, window, packetmax; int r, new_fd[3]; /* Reply for SSHMUX_COMMAND_OPEN */ cctx = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*cctx)); cctx->term = NULL; cctx->rid = rid; cmd = NULL; cctx->env = NULL; env_len = 0; if ((r = sshbuf_skip_string(m)) != 0 || /* reserved */ (r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &cctx->want_tty)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &cctx->want_x_fwd)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &cctx->want_agent_fwd)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &cctx->want_subsys)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &escape_char)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &cctx->term, NULL)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &cmd, NULL)) != 0) { malf: free(cmd); for (j = 0; j < env_len; j++) free(cctx->env[j]); free(cctx->env); free(cctx->term); free(cctx); error_f("malformed message"); return -1; } #define MUX_MAX_ENV_VARS 4096 while (sshbuf_len(m) > 0) { if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &cp, NULL)) != 0) goto malf; if (!env_permitted(cp)) { free(cp); continue; } cctx->env = xreallocarray(cctx->env, env_len + 2, sizeof(*cctx->env)); cctx->env[env_len++] = cp; cctx->env[env_len] = NULL; if (env_len > MUX_MAX_ENV_VARS) { error_f(">%d environment variables received, " "ignoring additional", MUX_MAX_ENV_VARS); break; } } debug2_f("channel %d: request tty %d, X %d, agent %d, subsys %d, " "term \"%s\", cmd \"%s\", env %u", c->self, cctx->want_tty, cctx->want_x_fwd, cctx->want_agent_fwd, cctx->want_subsys, cctx->term, cmd, env_len); if ((cctx->cmd = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) fatal_f("sshbuf_new"); if ((r = sshbuf_put(cctx->cmd, cmd, strlen(cmd))) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "sshbuf_put"); free(cmd); cmd = NULL; /* Gather fds from client */ for(i = 0; i < 3; i++) { if ((new_fd[i] = mm_receive_fd(c->sock)) == -1) { error_f("failed to receive fd %d from client", i); for (j = 0; j < i; j++) close(new_fd[j]); for (j = 0; j < env_len; j++) free(cctx->env[j]); free(cctx->env); free(cctx->term); sshbuf_free(cctx->cmd); free(cctx); reply_error(reply, MUX_S_FAILURE, rid, "did not receive file descriptors"); return -1; } } debug3_f("got fds stdin %d, stdout %d, stderr %d", new_fd[0], new_fd[1], new_fd[2]); /* XXX support multiple child sessions in future */ if (c->have_remote_id) { debug2_f("session already open"); reply_error(reply, MUX_S_FAILURE, rid, "Multiple sessions not supported"); cleanup: close(new_fd[0]); close(new_fd[1]); close(new_fd[2]); free(cctx->term); if (env_len != 0) { for (i = 0; i < env_len; i++) free(cctx->env[i]); free(cctx->env); } sshbuf_free(cctx->cmd); free(cctx); return 0; } if (options.control_master == SSHCTL_MASTER_ASK || options.control_master == SSHCTL_MASTER_AUTO_ASK) { if (!ask_permission("Allow shared connection to %s? ", host)) { debug2_f("session refused by user"); reply_error(reply, MUX_S_PERMISSION_DENIED, rid, "Permission denied"); goto cleanup; } } /* Try to pick up ttymodes from client before it goes raw */ if (cctx->want_tty && tcgetattr(new_fd[0], &cctx->tio) == -1) error_f("tcgetattr: %s", strerror(errno)); window = CHAN_SES_WINDOW_DEFAULT; packetmax = CHAN_SES_PACKET_DEFAULT; if (cctx->want_tty) { window >>= 1; packetmax >>= 1; } nc = channel_new(ssh, "session", SSH_CHANNEL_OPENING, new_fd[0], new_fd[1], new_fd[2], window, packetmax, CHAN_EXTENDED_WRITE, "client-session", CHANNEL_NONBLOCK_STDIO); nc->ctl_chan = c->self; /* link session -> control channel */ c->remote_id = nc->self; /* link control -> session channel */ c->have_remote_id = 1; if (cctx->want_tty && escape_char != 0xffffffff) { channel_register_filter(ssh, nc->self, client_simple_escape_filter, NULL, client_filter_cleanup, client_new_escape_filter_ctx((int)escape_char)); } debug2_f("channel_new: %d linked to control channel %d", nc->self, nc->ctl_chan); channel_send_open(ssh, nc->self); channel_register_open_confirm(ssh, nc->self, mux_session_confirm, cctx); c->mux_pause = 1; /* stop handling messages until open_confirm done */ channel_register_cleanup(ssh, nc->self, mux_master_session_cleanup_cb, 1); /* reply is deferred, sent by mux_session_confirm */ return 0; } static int mux_master_process_alive_check(struct ssh *ssh, u_int rid, Channel *c, struct sshbuf *m, struct sshbuf *reply) { int r; debug2_f("channel %d: alive check", c->self); /* prepare reply */ if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(reply, MUX_S_ALIVE)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u32(reply, rid)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u32(reply, (u_int)getpid())) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "reply"); return 0; } static int mux_master_process_terminate(struct ssh *ssh, u_int rid, Channel *c, struct sshbuf *m, struct sshbuf *reply) { debug2_f("channel %d: terminate request", c->self); if (options.control_master == SSHCTL_MASTER_ASK || options.control_master == SSHCTL_MASTER_AUTO_ASK) { if (!ask_permission("Terminate shared connection to %s? ", host)) { debug2_f("termination refused by user"); reply_error(reply, MUX_S_PERMISSION_DENIED, rid, "Permission denied"); return 0; } } quit_pending = 1; reply_ok(reply, rid); /* XXX exit happens too soon - message never makes it to client */ return 0; } static char * format_forward(u_int ftype, struct Forward *fwd) { char *ret; switch (ftype) { case MUX_FWD_LOCAL: xasprintf(&ret, "local forward %.200s:%d -> %.200s:%d", (fwd->listen_path != NULL) ? fwd->listen_path : (fwd->listen_host == NULL) ? (options.fwd_opts.gateway_ports ? "*" : "LOCALHOST") : fwd->listen_host, fwd->listen_port, (fwd->connect_path != NULL) ? fwd->connect_path : fwd->connect_host, fwd->connect_port); break; case MUX_FWD_DYNAMIC: xasprintf(&ret, "dynamic forward %.200s:%d -> *", (fwd->listen_host == NULL) ? (options.fwd_opts.gateway_ports ? "*" : "LOCALHOST") : fwd->listen_host, fwd->listen_port); break; case MUX_FWD_REMOTE: xasprintf(&ret, "remote forward %.200s:%d -> %.200s:%d", (fwd->listen_path != NULL) ? fwd->listen_path : (fwd->listen_host == NULL) ? "LOCALHOST" : fwd->listen_host, fwd->listen_port, (fwd->connect_path != NULL) ? fwd->connect_path : fwd->connect_host, fwd->connect_port); break; default: fatal_f("unknown forward type %u", ftype); } return ret; } static int compare_host(const char *a, const char *b) { if (a == NULL && b == NULL) return 1; if (a == NULL || b == NULL) return 0; return strcmp(a, b) == 0; } static int compare_forward(struct Forward *a, struct Forward *b) { if (!compare_host(a->listen_host, b->listen_host)) return 0; if (!compare_host(a->listen_path, b->listen_path)) return 0; if (a->listen_port != b->listen_port) return 0; if (!compare_host(a->connect_host, b->connect_host)) return 0; if (!compare_host(a->connect_path, b->connect_path)) return 0; if (a->connect_port != b->connect_port) return 0; return 1; } static void mux_confirm_remote_forward(struct ssh *ssh, int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt) { struct mux_channel_confirm_ctx *fctx = ctxt; char *failmsg = NULL; struct Forward *rfwd; Channel *c; struct sshbuf *out; u_int port; int r; if ((c = channel_by_id(ssh, fctx->cid)) == NULL) { /* no channel for reply */ error_f("unknown channel"); return; } if ((out = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) fatal_f("sshbuf_new"); if (fctx->fid >= options.num_remote_forwards || (options.remote_forwards[fctx->fid].connect_path == NULL && options.remote_forwards[fctx->fid].connect_host == NULL)) { xasprintf(&failmsg, "unknown forwarding id %d", fctx->fid); goto fail; } rfwd = &options.remote_forwards[fctx->fid]; debug_f("%s for: listen %d, connect %s:%d", type == SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_SUCCESS ? "success" : "failure", rfwd->listen_port, rfwd->connect_path ? rfwd->connect_path : rfwd->connect_host, rfwd->connect_port); if (type == SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_SUCCESS) { if (rfwd->listen_port == 0) { if ((r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &port)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "parse port"); if (port > 65535) { fatal("Invalid allocated port %u for " "mux remote forward to %s:%d", port, rfwd->connect_host, rfwd->connect_port); } rfwd->allocated_port = (int)port; debug("Allocated port %u for mux remote forward" " to %s:%d", rfwd->allocated_port, rfwd->connect_host, rfwd->connect_port); if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(out, MUX_S_REMOTE_PORT)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u32(out, fctx->rid)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u32(out, rfwd->allocated_port)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "reply"); channel_update_permission(ssh, rfwd->handle, rfwd->allocated_port); } else { reply_ok(out, fctx->rid); } goto out; } else { if (rfwd->listen_port == 0) channel_update_permission(ssh, rfwd->handle, -1); if (rfwd->listen_path != NULL) xasprintf(&failmsg, "remote port forwarding failed for " "listen path %s", rfwd->listen_path); else xasprintf(&failmsg, "remote port forwarding failed for " "listen port %d", rfwd->listen_port); debug2_f("clearing registered forwarding for listen %d, " "connect %s:%d", rfwd->listen_port, rfwd->connect_path ? rfwd->connect_path : rfwd->connect_host, rfwd->connect_port); free(rfwd->listen_host); free(rfwd->listen_path); free(rfwd->connect_host); free(rfwd->connect_path); memset(rfwd, 0, sizeof(*rfwd)); } fail: error_f("%s", failmsg); reply_error(out, MUX_S_FAILURE, fctx->rid, failmsg); free(failmsg); out: if ((r = sshbuf_put_stringb(c->output, out)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "enqueue"); sshbuf_free(out); if (c->mux_pause <= 0) fatal_f("mux_pause %d", c->mux_pause); c->mux_pause = 0; /* start processing messages again */ } static int mux_master_process_open_fwd(struct ssh *ssh, u_int rid, Channel *c, struct sshbuf *m, struct sshbuf *reply) { struct Forward fwd; char *fwd_desc = NULL; char *listen_addr, *connect_addr; u_int ftype; u_int lport, cport; int r, i, ret = 0, freefwd = 1; memset(&fwd, 0, sizeof(fwd)); /* XXX - lport/cport check redundant */ if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &ftype)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &listen_addr, NULL)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &lport)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &connect_addr, NULL)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &cport)) != 0 || (lport != (u_int)PORT_STREAMLOCAL && lport > 65535) || (cport != (u_int)PORT_STREAMLOCAL && cport > 65535)) { error_f("malformed message"); ret = -1; goto out; } if (*listen_addr == '\0') { free(listen_addr); listen_addr = NULL; } if (*connect_addr == '\0') { free(connect_addr); connect_addr = NULL; } memset(&fwd, 0, sizeof(fwd)); fwd.listen_port = lport; if (fwd.listen_port == PORT_STREAMLOCAL) fwd.listen_path = listen_addr; else fwd.listen_host = listen_addr; fwd.connect_port = cport; if (fwd.connect_port == PORT_STREAMLOCAL) fwd.connect_path = connect_addr; else fwd.connect_host = connect_addr; debug2_f("channel %d: request %s", c->self, (fwd_desc = format_forward(ftype, &fwd))); if (ftype != MUX_FWD_LOCAL && ftype != MUX_FWD_REMOTE && ftype != MUX_FWD_DYNAMIC) { logit_f("invalid forwarding type %u", ftype); invalid: free(listen_addr); free(connect_addr); reply_error(reply, MUX_S_FAILURE, rid, "Invalid forwarding request"); return 0; } if (ftype == MUX_FWD_DYNAMIC && fwd.listen_path) { logit_f("streamlocal and dynamic forwards " "are mutually exclusive"); goto invalid; } if (fwd.listen_port != PORT_STREAMLOCAL && fwd.listen_port >= 65536) { logit_f("invalid listen port %u", fwd.listen_port); goto invalid; } if ((fwd.connect_port != PORT_STREAMLOCAL && fwd.connect_port >= 65536) || (ftype != MUX_FWD_DYNAMIC && ftype != MUX_FWD_REMOTE && fwd.connect_port == 0)) { logit_f("invalid connect port %u", fwd.connect_port); goto invalid; } if (ftype != MUX_FWD_DYNAMIC && fwd.connect_host == NULL && fwd.connect_path == NULL) { logit_f("missing connect host"); goto invalid; } /* Skip forwards that have already been requested */ switch (ftype) { case MUX_FWD_LOCAL: case MUX_FWD_DYNAMIC: for (i = 0; i < options.num_local_forwards; i++) { if (compare_forward(&fwd, options.local_forwards + i)) { exists: debug2_f("found existing forwarding"); reply_ok(reply, rid); goto out; } } break; case MUX_FWD_REMOTE: for (i = 0; i < options.num_remote_forwards; i++) { if (!compare_forward(&fwd, options.remote_forwards + i)) continue; if (fwd.listen_port != 0) goto exists; debug2_f("found allocated port"); if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(reply, MUX_S_REMOTE_PORT)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u32(reply, rid)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u32(reply, options.remote_forwards[i].allocated_port)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "reply FWD_REMOTE"); goto out; } break; } if (options.control_master == SSHCTL_MASTER_ASK || options.control_master == SSHCTL_MASTER_AUTO_ASK) { if (!ask_permission("Open %s on %s?", fwd_desc, host)) { debug2_f("forwarding refused by user"); reply_error(reply, MUX_S_PERMISSION_DENIED, rid, "Permission denied"); goto out; } } if (ftype == MUX_FWD_LOCAL || ftype == MUX_FWD_DYNAMIC) { if (!channel_setup_local_fwd_listener(ssh, &fwd, &options.fwd_opts)) { fail: logit_f("requested %s failed", fwd_desc); reply_error(reply, MUX_S_FAILURE, rid, "Port forwarding failed"); goto out; } add_local_forward(&options, &fwd); freefwd = 0; } else { struct mux_channel_confirm_ctx *fctx; fwd.handle = channel_request_remote_forwarding(ssh, &fwd); if (fwd.handle < 0) goto fail; add_remote_forward(&options, &fwd); fctx = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*fctx)); fctx->cid = c->self; fctx->rid = rid; fctx->fid = options.num_remote_forwards - 1; client_register_global_confirm(mux_confirm_remote_forward, fctx); freefwd = 0; c->mux_pause = 1; /* wait for mux_confirm_remote_forward */ /* delayed reply in mux_confirm_remote_forward */ goto out; } reply_ok(reply, rid); out: free(fwd_desc); if (freefwd) { free(fwd.listen_host); free(fwd.listen_path); free(fwd.connect_host); free(fwd.connect_path); } return ret; } static int mux_master_process_close_fwd(struct ssh *ssh, u_int rid, Channel *c, struct sshbuf *m, struct sshbuf *reply) { struct Forward fwd, *found_fwd; char *fwd_desc = NULL; const char *error_reason = NULL; char *listen_addr = NULL, *connect_addr = NULL; u_int ftype; int r, i, ret = 0; u_int lport, cport; memset(&fwd, 0, sizeof(fwd)); if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &ftype)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &listen_addr, NULL)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &lport)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &connect_addr, NULL)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &cport)) != 0 || (lport != (u_int)PORT_STREAMLOCAL && lport > 65535) || (cport != (u_int)PORT_STREAMLOCAL && cport > 65535)) { error_f("malformed message"); ret = -1; goto out; } if (*listen_addr == '\0') { free(listen_addr); listen_addr = NULL; } if (*connect_addr == '\0') { free(connect_addr); connect_addr = NULL; } memset(&fwd, 0, sizeof(fwd)); fwd.listen_port = lport; if (fwd.listen_port == PORT_STREAMLOCAL) fwd.listen_path = listen_addr; else fwd.listen_host = listen_addr; fwd.connect_port = cport; if (fwd.connect_port == PORT_STREAMLOCAL) fwd.connect_path = connect_addr; else fwd.connect_host = connect_addr; debug2_f("channel %d: request cancel %s", c->self, (fwd_desc = format_forward(ftype, &fwd))); /* make sure this has been requested */ found_fwd = NULL; switch (ftype) { case MUX_FWD_LOCAL: case MUX_FWD_DYNAMIC: for (i = 0; i < options.num_local_forwards; i++) { if (compare_forward(&fwd, options.local_forwards + i)) { found_fwd = options.local_forwards + i; break; } } break; case MUX_FWD_REMOTE: for (i = 0; i < options.num_remote_forwards; i++) { if (compare_forward(&fwd, options.remote_forwards + i)) { found_fwd = options.remote_forwards + i; break; } } break; } if (found_fwd == NULL) error_reason = "port not forwarded"; else if (ftype == MUX_FWD_REMOTE) { /* * This shouldn't fail unless we confused the host/port * between options.remote_forwards and permitted_opens. * However, for dynamic allocated listen ports we need * to use the actual listen port. */ if (channel_request_rforward_cancel(ssh, found_fwd) == -1) error_reason = "port not in permitted opens"; } else { /* local and dynamic forwards */ /* Ditto */ if (channel_cancel_lport_listener(ssh, &fwd, fwd.connect_port, &options.fwd_opts) == -1) error_reason = "port not found"; } if (error_reason != NULL) reply_error(reply, MUX_S_FAILURE, rid, error_reason); else { reply_ok(reply, rid); free(found_fwd->listen_host); free(found_fwd->listen_path); free(found_fwd->connect_host); free(found_fwd->connect_path); found_fwd->listen_host = found_fwd->connect_host = NULL; found_fwd->listen_path = found_fwd->connect_path = NULL; found_fwd->listen_port = found_fwd->connect_port = 0; } out: free(fwd_desc); free(listen_addr); free(connect_addr); return ret; } static int mux_master_process_stdio_fwd(struct ssh *ssh, u_int rid, Channel *c, struct sshbuf *m, struct sshbuf *reply) { Channel *nc; char *chost = NULL; u_int cport, i, j; int r, new_fd[2]; struct mux_stdio_confirm_ctx *cctx; if ((r = sshbuf_skip_string(m)) != 0 || /* reserved */ (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &chost, NULL)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &cport)) != 0) { free(chost); error_f("malformed message"); return -1; } debug2_f("channel %d: stdio fwd to %s:%u", c->self, chost, cport); /* Gather fds from client */ for(i = 0; i < 2; i++) { if ((new_fd[i] = mm_receive_fd(c->sock)) == -1) { error_f("failed to receive fd %d from client", i); for (j = 0; j < i; j++) close(new_fd[j]); free(chost); /* prepare reply */ reply_error(reply, MUX_S_FAILURE, rid, "did not receive file descriptors"); return -1; } } debug3_f("got fds stdin %d, stdout %d", new_fd[0], new_fd[1]); /* XXX support multiple child sessions in future */ if (c->have_remote_id) { debug2_f("session already open"); reply_error(reply, MUX_S_FAILURE, rid, "Multiple sessions not supported"); cleanup: close(new_fd[0]); close(new_fd[1]); free(chost); return 0; } if (options.control_master == SSHCTL_MASTER_ASK || options.control_master == SSHCTL_MASTER_AUTO_ASK) { if (!ask_permission("Allow forward to %s:%u? ", chost, cport)) { debug2_f("stdio fwd refused by user"); reply_error(reply, MUX_S_PERMISSION_DENIED, rid, "Permission denied"); goto cleanup; } } nc = channel_connect_stdio_fwd(ssh, chost, cport, new_fd[0], new_fd[1], CHANNEL_NONBLOCK_STDIO); free(chost); nc->ctl_chan = c->self; /* link session -> control channel */ c->remote_id = nc->self; /* link control -> session channel */ c->have_remote_id = 1; debug2_f("channel_new: %d control %d", nc->self, nc->ctl_chan); channel_register_cleanup(ssh, nc->self, mux_master_session_cleanup_cb, 1); cctx = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*cctx)); cctx->rid = rid; channel_register_open_confirm(ssh, nc->self, mux_stdio_confirm, cctx); c->mux_pause = 1; /* stop handling messages until open_confirm done */ /* reply is deferred, sent by mux_session_confirm */ return 0; } /* Callback on open confirmation in mux master for a mux stdio fwd session. */ static void mux_stdio_confirm(struct ssh *ssh, int id, int success, void *arg) { struct mux_stdio_confirm_ctx *cctx = arg; Channel *c, *cc; struct sshbuf *reply; int r; if (cctx == NULL) fatal_f("cctx == NULL"); if ((c = channel_by_id(ssh, id)) == NULL) fatal_f("no channel for id %d", id); if ((cc = channel_by_id(ssh, c->ctl_chan)) == NULL) fatal_f("channel %d lacks control channel %d", id, c->ctl_chan); if ((reply = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) fatal_f("sshbuf_new"); if (!success) { debug3_f("sending failure reply"); reply_error(reply, MUX_S_FAILURE, cctx->rid, "Session open refused by peer"); /* prepare reply */ goto done; } debug3_f("sending success reply"); /* prepare reply */ if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(reply, MUX_S_SESSION_OPENED)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u32(reply, cctx->rid)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u32(reply, c->self)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "reply"); done: /* Send reply */ if ((r = sshbuf_put_stringb(cc->output, reply)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "enqueue"); sshbuf_free(reply); if (cc->mux_pause <= 0) fatal_f("mux_pause %d", cc->mux_pause); cc->mux_pause = 0; /* start processing messages again */ c->open_confirm_ctx = NULL; free(cctx); } static int mux_master_process_stop_listening(struct ssh *ssh, u_int rid, Channel *c, struct sshbuf *m, struct sshbuf *reply) { debug_f("channel %d: stop listening", c->self); if (options.control_master == SSHCTL_MASTER_ASK || options.control_master == SSHCTL_MASTER_AUTO_ASK) { if (!ask_permission("Disable further multiplexing on shared " "connection to %s? ", host)) { debug2_f("stop listen refused by user"); reply_error(reply, MUX_S_PERMISSION_DENIED, rid, "Permission denied"); return 0; } } if (mux_listener_channel != NULL) { channel_free(ssh, mux_listener_channel); client_stop_mux(); free(options.control_path); options.control_path = NULL; mux_listener_channel = NULL; muxserver_sock = -1; } reply_ok(reply, rid); return 0; } static int mux_master_process_proxy(struct ssh *ssh, u_int rid, Channel *c, struct sshbuf *m, struct sshbuf *reply) { int r; debug_f("channel %d: proxy request", c->self); c->mux_rcb = channel_proxy_downstream; if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(reply, MUX_S_PROXY)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u32(reply, rid)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "reply"); return 0; } /* Channel callbacks fired on read/write from mux client fd */ static int mux_master_read_cb(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c) { struct mux_master_state *state = (struct mux_master_state *)c->mux_ctx; struct sshbuf *in = NULL, *out = NULL; u_int type, rid, i; int r, ret = -1; if ((out = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) fatal_f("sshbuf_new"); /* Setup ctx and */ if (c->mux_ctx == NULL) { state = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*state)); c->mux_ctx = state; channel_register_cleanup(ssh, c->self, mux_master_control_cleanup_cb, 0); /* Send hello */ if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(out, MUX_MSG_HELLO)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u32(out, SSHMUX_VER)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "reply"); /* no extensions */ if ((r = sshbuf_put_stringb(c->output, out)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "enqueue"); debug3_f("channel %d: hello sent", c->self); ret = 0; goto out; } /* Channel code ensures that we receive whole packets */ if ((r = sshbuf_froms(c->input, &in)) != 0) { malf: error_f("malformed message"); goto out; } if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(in, &type)) != 0) goto malf; debug3_f("channel %d packet type 0x%08x len %zu", c->self, type, sshbuf_len(in)); if (type == MUX_MSG_HELLO) rid = 0; else { if (!state->hello_rcvd) { error_f("expected MUX_MSG_HELLO(0x%08x), " "received 0x%08x", MUX_MSG_HELLO, type); goto out; } if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(in, &rid)) != 0) goto malf; } for (i = 0; mux_master_handlers[i].handler != NULL; i++) { if (type == mux_master_handlers[i].type) { ret = mux_master_handlers[i].handler(ssh, rid, c, in, out); break; } } if (mux_master_handlers[i].handler == NULL) { error_f("unsupported mux message 0x%08x", type); reply_error(out, MUX_S_FAILURE, rid, "unsupported request"); ret = 0; } /* Enqueue reply packet */ if (sshbuf_len(out) != 0 && (r = sshbuf_put_stringb(c->output, out)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "enqueue"); out: sshbuf_free(in); sshbuf_free(out); return ret; } void mux_exit_message(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c, int exitval) { struct sshbuf *m; Channel *mux_chan; int r; debug3_f("channel %d: exit message, exitval %d", c->self, exitval); if ((mux_chan = channel_by_id(ssh, c->ctl_chan)) == NULL) fatal_f("channel %d missing mux %d", c->self, c->ctl_chan); /* Append exit message packet to control socket output queue */ if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) fatal_f("sshbuf_new"); if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, MUX_S_EXIT_MESSAGE)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, c->self)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, exitval)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_stringb(mux_chan->output, m)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "reply"); sshbuf_free(m); } void mux_tty_alloc_failed(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c) { struct sshbuf *m; Channel *mux_chan; int r; debug3_f("channel %d: TTY alloc failed", c->self); if ((mux_chan = channel_by_id(ssh, c->ctl_chan)) == NULL) fatal_f("channel %d missing mux %d", c->self, c->ctl_chan); /* Append exit message packet to control socket output queue */ if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) fatal_f("sshbuf_new"); if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, MUX_S_TTY_ALLOC_FAIL)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, c->self)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_stringb(mux_chan->output, m)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "reply"); sshbuf_free(m); } /* Prepare a mux master to listen on a Unix domain socket. */ void muxserver_listen(struct ssh *ssh) { mode_t old_umask; char *orig_control_path = options.control_path; char rbuf[16+1]; u_int i, r; int oerrno; if (options.control_path == NULL || options.control_master == SSHCTL_MASTER_NO) return; debug("setting up multiplex master socket"); /* * Use a temporary path before listen so we can pseudo-atomically * establish the listening socket in its final location to avoid * other processes racing in between bind() and listen() and hitting * an unready socket. */ for (i = 0; i < sizeof(rbuf) - 1; i++) { r = arc4random_uniform(26+26+10); rbuf[i] = (r < 26) ? 'a' + r : (r < 26*2) ? 'A' + r - 26 : '0' + r - 26 - 26; } rbuf[sizeof(rbuf) - 1] = '\0'; options.control_path = NULL; xasprintf(&options.control_path, "%s.%s", orig_control_path, rbuf); debug3_f("temporary control path %s", options.control_path); old_umask = umask(0177); muxserver_sock = unix_listener(options.control_path, 64, 0); oerrno = errno; umask(old_umask); if (muxserver_sock < 0) { if (oerrno == EINVAL || oerrno == EADDRINUSE) { error("ControlSocket %s already exists, " "disabling multiplexing", options.control_path); disable_mux_master: if (muxserver_sock != -1) { close(muxserver_sock); muxserver_sock = -1; } free(orig_control_path); free(options.control_path); options.control_path = NULL; options.control_master = SSHCTL_MASTER_NO; return; } else { /* unix_listener() logs the error */ cleanup_exit(255); } } /* Now atomically "move" the mux socket into position */ if (link(options.control_path, orig_control_path) != 0) { if (errno != EEXIST) { fatal_f("link mux listener %s => %s: %s", options.control_path, orig_control_path, strerror(errno)); } error("ControlSocket %s already exists, disabling multiplexing", orig_control_path); unlink(options.control_path); goto disable_mux_master; } unlink(options.control_path); free(options.control_path); options.control_path = orig_control_path; set_nonblock(muxserver_sock); mux_listener_channel = channel_new(ssh, "mux listener", SSH_CHANNEL_MUX_LISTENER, muxserver_sock, muxserver_sock, -1, CHAN_TCP_WINDOW_DEFAULT, CHAN_TCP_PACKET_DEFAULT, 0, options.control_path, 1); mux_listener_channel->mux_rcb = mux_master_read_cb; debug3_f("mux listener channel %d fd %d", mux_listener_channel->self, mux_listener_channel->sock); } /* Callback on open confirmation in mux master for a mux client session. */ static void mux_session_confirm(struct ssh *ssh, int id, int success, void *arg) { struct mux_session_confirm_ctx *cctx = arg; const char *display; Channel *c, *cc; int i, r; struct sshbuf *reply; if (cctx == NULL) fatal_f("cctx == NULL"); if ((c = channel_by_id(ssh, id)) == NULL) fatal_f("no channel for id %d", id); if ((cc = channel_by_id(ssh, c->ctl_chan)) == NULL) fatal_f("channel %d lacks control channel %d", id, c->ctl_chan); if ((reply = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) fatal_f("sshbuf_new"); if (!success) { debug3_f("sending failure reply"); reply_error(reply, MUX_S_FAILURE, cctx->rid, "Session open refused by peer"); goto done; } display = getenv("DISPLAY"); if (cctx->want_x_fwd && options.forward_x11 && display != NULL) { char *proto, *data; /* Get reasonable local authentication information. */ if (client_x11_get_proto(ssh, display, options.xauth_location, options.forward_x11_trusted, options.forward_x11_timeout, &proto, &data) == 0) { /* Request forwarding with authentication spoofing. */ debug("Requesting X11 forwarding with authentication " "spoofing."); x11_request_forwarding_with_spoofing(ssh, id, display, proto, data, 1); /* XXX exit_on_forward_failure */ client_expect_confirm(ssh, id, "X11 forwarding", CONFIRM_WARN); } } if (cctx->want_agent_fwd && options.forward_agent) { debug("Requesting authentication agent forwarding."); channel_request_start(ssh, id, "auth-agent-req@openssh.com", 0); if ((r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "send"); } client_session2_setup(ssh, id, cctx->want_tty, cctx->want_subsys, cctx->term, &cctx->tio, c->rfd, cctx->cmd, cctx->env); debug3_f("sending success reply"); /* prepare reply */ if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(reply, MUX_S_SESSION_OPENED)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u32(reply, cctx->rid)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u32(reply, c->self)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "reply"); done: /* Send reply */ if ((r = sshbuf_put_stringb(cc->output, reply)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "enqueue"); sshbuf_free(reply); if (cc->mux_pause <= 0) fatal_f("mux_pause %d", cc->mux_pause); cc->mux_pause = 0; /* start processing messages again */ c->open_confirm_ctx = NULL; sshbuf_free(cctx->cmd); free(cctx->term); if (cctx->env != NULL) { for (i = 0; cctx->env[i] != NULL; i++) free(cctx->env[i]); free(cctx->env); } free(cctx); } /* ** Multiplexing client support */ /* Exit signal handler */ static void control_client_sighandler(int signo) { muxclient_terminate = signo; } /* * Relay signal handler - used to pass some signals from mux client to * mux master. */ static void control_client_sigrelay(int signo) { int save_errno = errno; if (muxserver_pid > 1) kill(muxserver_pid, signo); errno = save_errno; } static int mux_client_read(int fd, struct sshbuf *b, size_t need) { size_t have; ssize_t len; u_char *p; struct pollfd pfd; int r; pfd.fd = fd; pfd.events = POLLIN; if ((r = sshbuf_reserve(b, need, &p)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "reserve"); for (have = 0; have < need; ) { if (muxclient_terminate) { errno = EINTR; return -1; } len = read(fd, p + have, need - have); if (len == -1) { switch (errno) { #if defined(EWOULDBLOCK) && (EWOULDBLOCK != EAGAIN) case EWOULDBLOCK: #endif case EAGAIN: (void)poll(&pfd, 1, -1); /* FALLTHROUGH */ case EINTR: continue; default: return -1; } } if (len == 0) { errno = EPIPE; return -1; } have += (size_t)len; } return 0; } static int mux_client_write_packet(int fd, struct sshbuf *m) { struct sshbuf *queue; u_int have, need; int r, oerrno, len; const u_char *ptr; struct pollfd pfd; pfd.fd = fd; pfd.events = POLLOUT; if ((queue = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) fatal_f("sshbuf_new"); if ((r = sshbuf_put_stringb(queue, m)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "enqueue"); need = sshbuf_len(queue); ptr = sshbuf_ptr(queue); for (have = 0; have < need; ) { if (muxclient_terminate) { sshbuf_free(queue); errno = EINTR; return -1; } len = write(fd, ptr + have, need - have); if (len == -1) { switch (errno) { #if defined(EWOULDBLOCK) && (EWOULDBLOCK != EAGAIN) case EWOULDBLOCK: #endif case EAGAIN: (void)poll(&pfd, 1, -1); /* FALLTHROUGH */ case EINTR: continue; default: oerrno = errno; sshbuf_free(queue); errno = oerrno; return -1; } } if (len == 0) { sshbuf_free(queue); errno = EPIPE; return -1; } have += (u_int)len; } sshbuf_free(queue); return 0; } static int mux_client_read_packet(int fd, struct sshbuf *m) { struct sshbuf *queue; size_t need, have; const u_char *ptr; int r, oerrno; if ((queue = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) fatal_f("sshbuf_new"); if (mux_client_read(fd, queue, 4) != 0) { if ((oerrno = errno) == EPIPE) debug3_f("read header failed: %s", strerror(errno)); sshbuf_free(queue); errno = oerrno; return -1; } need = PEEK_U32(sshbuf_ptr(queue)); if (mux_client_read(fd, queue, need) != 0) { oerrno = errno; debug3_f("read body failed: %s", strerror(errno)); sshbuf_free(queue); errno = oerrno; return -1; } if ((r = sshbuf_get_string_direct(queue, &ptr, &have)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put(m, ptr, have)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "dequeue"); sshbuf_free(queue); return 0; } static int mux_client_hello_exchange(int fd) { struct sshbuf *m; u_int type, ver; int r, ret = -1; if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) fatal_f("sshbuf_new"); if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, MUX_MSG_HELLO)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, SSHMUX_VER)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "assemble hello"); /* no extensions */ if (mux_client_write_packet(fd, m) != 0) { debug_f("write packet: %s", strerror(errno)); goto out; } sshbuf_reset(m); /* Read their HELLO */ if (mux_client_read_packet(fd, m) != 0) { debug_f("read packet failed"); goto out; } if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &type)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "parse type"); if (type != MUX_MSG_HELLO) { error_f("expected HELLO (%u) got %u", MUX_MSG_HELLO, type); goto out; } if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &ver)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "parse version"); if (ver != SSHMUX_VER) { error("Unsupported multiplexing protocol version %d " "(expected %d)", ver, SSHMUX_VER); goto out; } debug2_f("master version %u", ver); /* No extensions are presently defined */ while (sshbuf_len(m) > 0) { char *name = NULL; if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &name, NULL)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_skip_string(m)) != 0) { /* value */ error_fr(r, "parse extension"); goto out; } debug2("Unrecognised master extension \"%s\"", name); free(name); } /* success */ ret = 0; out: sshbuf_free(m); return ret; } static u_int mux_client_request_alive(int fd) { struct sshbuf *m; char *e; u_int pid, type, rid; int r; debug3_f("entering"); if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) fatal_f("sshbuf_new"); if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, MUX_C_ALIVE_CHECK)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, muxclient_request_id)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "assemble"); if (mux_client_write_packet(fd, m) != 0) fatal_f("write packet: %s", strerror(errno)); sshbuf_reset(m); /* Read their reply */ if (mux_client_read_packet(fd, m) != 0) { sshbuf_free(m); return 0; } if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &type)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "parse type"); if (type != MUX_S_ALIVE) { if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &e, NULL)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "parse error message"); fatal_f("master returned error: %s", e); } if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &rid)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "parse remote ID"); if (rid != muxclient_request_id) fatal_f("out of sequence reply: my id %u theirs %u", muxclient_request_id, rid); if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &pid)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "parse PID"); sshbuf_free(m); debug3_f("done pid = %u", pid); muxclient_request_id++; return pid; } static void mux_client_request_terminate(int fd) { struct sshbuf *m; char *e; u_int type, rid; int r; debug3_f("entering"); if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) fatal_f("sshbuf_new"); if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, MUX_C_TERMINATE)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, muxclient_request_id)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "request"); if (mux_client_write_packet(fd, m) != 0) fatal_f("write packet: %s", strerror(errno)); sshbuf_reset(m); /* Read their reply */ if (mux_client_read_packet(fd, m) != 0) { /* Remote end exited already */ if (errno == EPIPE) { sshbuf_free(m); return; } fatal_f("read from master failed: %s", strerror(errno)); } if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &type)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &rid)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "parse"); if (rid != muxclient_request_id) fatal_f("out of sequence reply: my id %u theirs %u", muxclient_request_id, rid); switch (type) { case MUX_S_OK: break; case MUX_S_PERMISSION_DENIED: if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &e, NULL)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "parse error message"); fatal("Master refused termination request: %s", e); case MUX_S_FAILURE: if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &e, NULL)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "parse error message"); fatal_f("termination request failed: %s", e); default: fatal_f("unexpected response from master 0x%08x", type); } sshbuf_free(m); muxclient_request_id++; } static int mux_client_forward(int fd, int cancel_flag, u_int ftype, struct Forward *fwd) { struct sshbuf *m; char *e, *fwd_desc; const char *lhost, *chost; u_int type, rid; int r; fwd_desc = format_forward(ftype, fwd); debug("Requesting %s %s", cancel_flag ? "cancellation of" : "forwarding of", fwd_desc); free(fwd_desc); type = cancel_flag ? MUX_C_CLOSE_FWD : MUX_C_OPEN_FWD; if (fwd->listen_path != NULL) lhost = fwd->listen_path; else if (fwd->listen_host == NULL) lhost = ""; else if (*fwd->listen_host == '\0') lhost = "*"; else lhost = fwd->listen_host; if (fwd->connect_path != NULL) chost = fwd->connect_path; else if (fwd->connect_host == NULL) chost = ""; else chost = fwd->connect_host; if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) fatal_f("sshbuf_new"); if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, type)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, muxclient_request_id)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, ftype)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, lhost)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, fwd->listen_port)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, chost)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, fwd->connect_port)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "request"); if (mux_client_write_packet(fd, m) != 0) fatal_f("write packet: %s", strerror(errno)); sshbuf_reset(m); /* Read their reply */ if (mux_client_read_packet(fd, m) != 0) { sshbuf_free(m); return -1; } if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &type)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &rid)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "parse"); if (rid != muxclient_request_id) fatal_f("out of sequence reply: my id %u theirs %u", muxclient_request_id, rid); switch (type) { case MUX_S_OK: break; case MUX_S_REMOTE_PORT: if (cancel_flag) fatal_f("got MUX_S_REMOTE_PORT for cancel"); if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &fwd->allocated_port)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "parse port"); verbose("Allocated port %u for remote forward to %s:%d", fwd->allocated_port, fwd->connect_host ? fwd->connect_host : "", fwd->connect_port); if (muxclient_command == SSHMUX_COMMAND_FORWARD) fprintf(stdout, "%i\n", fwd->allocated_port); break; case MUX_S_PERMISSION_DENIED: if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &e, NULL)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "parse error message"); sshbuf_free(m); error("Master refused forwarding request: %s", e); return -1; case MUX_S_FAILURE: if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &e, NULL)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "parse error message"); sshbuf_free(m); error_f("forwarding request failed: %s", e); return -1; default: fatal_f("unexpected response from master 0x%08x", type); } sshbuf_free(m); muxclient_request_id++; return 0; } static int mux_client_forwards(int fd, int cancel_flag) { int i, ret = 0; debug3_f("%s forwardings: %d local, %d remote", cancel_flag ? "cancel" : "request", options.num_local_forwards, options.num_remote_forwards); /* XXX ExitOnForwardingFailure */ for (i = 0; i < options.num_local_forwards; i++) { if (mux_client_forward(fd, cancel_flag, options.local_forwards[i].connect_port == 0 ? MUX_FWD_DYNAMIC : MUX_FWD_LOCAL, options.local_forwards + i) != 0) ret = -1; } for (i = 0; i < options.num_remote_forwards; i++) { if (mux_client_forward(fd, cancel_flag, MUX_FWD_REMOTE, options.remote_forwards + i) != 0) ret = -1; } return ret; } static int mux_client_request_session(int fd) { struct sshbuf *m; char *e; const char *term = NULL; u_int i, echar, rid, sid, esid, exitval, type, exitval_seen; extern char **environ; int r, rawmode; debug3_f("entering"); if ((muxserver_pid = mux_client_request_alive(fd)) == 0) { error_f("master alive request failed"); return -1; } ssh_signal(SIGPIPE, SIG_IGN); if (options.stdin_null && stdfd_devnull(1, 0, 0) == -1) fatal_f("stdfd_devnull failed"); if ((term = lookup_env_in_list("TERM", options.setenv, options.num_setenv)) == NULL || *term == '\0') term = getenv("TERM"); echar = 0xffffffff; if (options.escape_char != SSH_ESCAPECHAR_NONE) echar = (u_int)options.escape_char; if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) fatal_f("sshbuf_new"); if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, MUX_C_NEW_SESSION)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, muxclient_request_id)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_string(m, NULL, 0)) != 0 || /* reserved */ (r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, tty_flag)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, options.forward_x11)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, options.forward_agent)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, options.session_type == SESSION_TYPE_SUBSYSTEM)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, echar)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, term == NULL ? "" : term)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_stringb(m, command)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "request"); /* Pass environment */ if (options.num_send_env > 0 && environ != NULL) { for (i = 0; environ[i] != NULL; i++) { if (!env_permitted(environ[i])) continue; if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, environ[i])) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "request sendenv"); } } for (i = 0; i < options.num_setenv; i++) { if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, options.setenv[i])) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "request setenv"); } if (mux_client_write_packet(fd, m) != 0) fatal_f("write packet: %s", strerror(errno)); /* Send the stdio file descriptors */ if (mm_send_fd(fd, STDIN_FILENO) == -1 || mm_send_fd(fd, STDOUT_FILENO) == -1 || mm_send_fd(fd, STDERR_FILENO) == -1) fatal_f("send fds failed"); debug3_f("session request sent"); /* Read their reply */ sshbuf_reset(m); if (mux_client_read_packet(fd, m) != 0) { error_f("read from master failed: %s", strerror(errno)); sshbuf_free(m); return -1; } if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &type)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &rid)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "parse"); if (rid != muxclient_request_id) fatal_f("out of sequence reply: my id %u theirs %u", muxclient_request_id, rid); switch (type) { case MUX_S_SESSION_OPENED: if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &sid)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "parse session ID"); debug_f("master session id: %u", sid); break; case MUX_S_PERMISSION_DENIED: if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &e, NULL)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "parse error message"); error("Master refused session request: %s", e); sshbuf_free(m); return -1; case MUX_S_FAILURE: if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &e, NULL)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "parse error message"); error_f("session request failed: %s", e); sshbuf_free(m); return -1; default: sshbuf_free(m); error_f("unexpected response from master 0x%08x", type); return -1; } muxclient_request_id++; if (pledge("stdio proc tty", NULL) == -1) fatal_f("pledge(): %s", strerror(errno)); platform_pledge_mux(); ssh_signal(SIGHUP, control_client_sighandler); ssh_signal(SIGINT, control_client_sighandler); ssh_signal(SIGTERM, control_client_sighandler); ssh_signal(SIGWINCH, control_client_sigrelay); rawmode = tty_flag; if (tty_flag) enter_raw_mode(options.request_tty == REQUEST_TTY_FORCE); /* * Stick around until the controlee closes the client_fd. * Before it does, it is expected to write an exit message. * This process must read the value and wait for the closure of * the client_fd; if this one closes early, the multiplex master will * terminate early too (possibly losing data). */ for (exitval = 255, exitval_seen = 0;;) { sshbuf_reset(m); if (mux_client_read_packet(fd, m) != 0) break; if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &type)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "parse type"); switch (type) { case MUX_S_TTY_ALLOC_FAIL: if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &esid)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "parse session ID"); if (esid != sid) fatal_f("tty alloc fail on unknown session: " "my id %u theirs %u", sid, esid); leave_raw_mode(options.request_tty == REQUEST_TTY_FORCE); rawmode = 0; continue; case MUX_S_EXIT_MESSAGE: if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &esid)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "parse session ID"); if (esid != sid) fatal_f("exit on unknown session: " "my id %u theirs %u", sid, esid); if (exitval_seen) fatal_f("exitval sent twice"); if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &exitval)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "parse exitval"); exitval_seen = 1; continue; default: if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &e, NULL)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "parse error message"); fatal_f("master returned error: %s", e); } } close(fd); if (rawmode) leave_raw_mode(options.request_tty == REQUEST_TTY_FORCE); if (muxclient_terminate) { debug2("Exiting on signal: %s", strsignal(muxclient_terminate)); exitval = 255; } else if (!exitval_seen) { debug2("Control master terminated unexpectedly"); exitval = 255; } else debug2("Received exit status from master %d", exitval); if (tty_flag && options.log_level >= SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO) fprintf(stderr, "Shared connection to %s closed.\r\n", host); exit(exitval); } static int mux_client_proxy(int fd) { struct sshbuf *m; char *e; u_int type, rid; int r; if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) fatal_f("sshbuf_new"); if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, MUX_C_PROXY)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, muxclient_request_id)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "request"); if (mux_client_write_packet(fd, m) != 0) fatal_f("write packet: %s", strerror(errno)); sshbuf_reset(m); /* Read their reply */ if (mux_client_read_packet(fd, m) != 0) { sshbuf_free(m); return 0; } if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &type)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &rid)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "parse"); if (rid != muxclient_request_id) fatal_f("out of sequence reply: my id %u theirs %u", muxclient_request_id, rid); if (type != MUX_S_PROXY) { if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &e, NULL)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "parse error message"); fatal_f("master returned error: %s", e); } sshbuf_free(m); debug3_f("done"); muxclient_request_id++; return 0; } static int mux_client_request_stdio_fwd(int fd) { struct sshbuf *m; char *e; u_int type, rid, sid; int r; debug3_f("entering"); if ((muxserver_pid = mux_client_request_alive(fd)) == 0) { error_f("master alive request failed"); return -1; } ssh_signal(SIGPIPE, SIG_IGN); if (options.stdin_null && stdfd_devnull(1, 0, 0) == -1) fatal_f("stdfd_devnull failed"); if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) fatal_f("sshbuf_new"); if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, MUX_C_NEW_STDIO_FWD)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, muxclient_request_id)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_string(m, NULL, 0)) != 0 || /* reserved */ (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, options.stdio_forward_host)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, options.stdio_forward_port)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "request"); if (mux_client_write_packet(fd, m) != 0) fatal_f("write packet: %s", strerror(errno)); /* Send the stdio file descriptors */ if (mm_send_fd(fd, STDIN_FILENO) == -1 || mm_send_fd(fd, STDOUT_FILENO) == -1) fatal_f("send fds failed"); if (pledge("stdio proc tty", NULL) == -1) fatal_f("pledge(): %s", strerror(errno)); platform_pledge_mux(); debug3_f("stdio forward request sent"); /* Read their reply */ sshbuf_reset(m); if (mux_client_read_packet(fd, m) != 0) { error_f("read from master failed: %s", strerror(errno)); sshbuf_free(m); return -1; } if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &type)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &rid)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "parse"); if (rid != muxclient_request_id) fatal_f("out of sequence reply: my id %u theirs %u", muxclient_request_id, rid); switch (type) { case MUX_S_SESSION_OPENED: if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &sid)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "parse session ID"); debug_f("master session id: %u", sid); break; case MUX_S_PERMISSION_DENIED: if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &e, NULL)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "parse error message"); sshbuf_free(m); fatal("Master refused stdio forwarding request: %s", e); case MUX_S_FAILURE: if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &e, NULL)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "parse error message"); sshbuf_free(m); fatal("Stdio forwarding request failed: %s", e); default: sshbuf_free(m); error_f("unexpected response from master 0x%08x", type); return -1; } muxclient_request_id++; ssh_signal(SIGHUP, control_client_sighandler); ssh_signal(SIGINT, control_client_sighandler); ssh_signal(SIGTERM, control_client_sighandler); ssh_signal(SIGWINCH, control_client_sigrelay); /* * Stick around until the controlee closes the client_fd. */ sshbuf_reset(m); if (mux_client_read_packet(fd, m) != 0) { if (errno == EPIPE || (errno == EINTR && muxclient_terminate != 0)) return 0; fatal_f("mux_client_read_packet: %s", strerror(errno)); } fatal_f("master returned unexpected message %u", type); } static void mux_client_request_stop_listening(int fd) { struct sshbuf *m; char *e; u_int type, rid; int r; debug3_f("entering"); if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) fatal_f("sshbuf_new"); if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, MUX_C_STOP_LISTENING)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, muxclient_request_id)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "request"); if (mux_client_write_packet(fd, m) != 0) fatal_f("write packet: %s", strerror(errno)); sshbuf_reset(m); /* Read their reply */ if (mux_client_read_packet(fd, m) != 0) fatal_f("read from master failed: %s", strerror(errno)); if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &type)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &rid)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "parse"); if (rid != muxclient_request_id) fatal_f("out of sequence reply: my id %u theirs %u", muxclient_request_id, rid); switch (type) { case MUX_S_OK: break; case MUX_S_PERMISSION_DENIED: if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &e, NULL)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "parse error message"); fatal("Master refused stop listening request: %s", e); case MUX_S_FAILURE: if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &e, NULL)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "parse error message"); fatal_f("stop listening request failed: %s", e); default: fatal_f("unexpected response from master 0x%08x", type); } sshbuf_free(m); muxclient_request_id++; } /* Multiplex client main loop. */ int muxclient(const char *path) { struct sockaddr_un addr; int sock; u_int pid; if (muxclient_command == 0) { if (options.stdio_forward_host != NULL) muxclient_command = SSHMUX_COMMAND_STDIO_FWD; else muxclient_command = SSHMUX_COMMAND_OPEN; } switch (options.control_master) { case SSHCTL_MASTER_AUTO: case SSHCTL_MASTER_AUTO_ASK: debug("auto-mux: Trying existing master"); /* FALLTHROUGH */ case SSHCTL_MASTER_NO: break; default: return -1; } memset(&addr, '\0', sizeof(addr)); addr.sun_family = AF_UNIX; if (strlcpy(addr.sun_path, path, sizeof(addr.sun_path)) >= sizeof(addr.sun_path)) fatal("ControlPath too long ('%s' >= %u bytes)", path, (unsigned int)sizeof(addr.sun_path)); if ((sock = socket(PF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0)) == -1) fatal_f("socket(): %s", strerror(errno)); if (connect(sock, (struct sockaddr *)&addr, sizeof(addr)) == -1) { switch (muxclient_command) { case SSHMUX_COMMAND_OPEN: case SSHMUX_COMMAND_STDIO_FWD: break; default: fatal("Control socket connect(%.100s): %s", path, strerror(errno)); } if (errno == ECONNREFUSED && options.control_master != SSHCTL_MASTER_NO) { debug("Stale control socket %.100s, unlinking", path); unlink(path); } else if (errno == ENOENT) { debug("Control socket \"%.100s\" does not exist", path); } else { error("Control socket connect(%.100s): %s", path, strerror(errno)); } close(sock); return -1; } set_nonblock(sock); if (mux_client_hello_exchange(sock) != 0) { error_f("master hello exchange failed"); close(sock); return -1; } switch (muxclient_command) { case SSHMUX_COMMAND_ALIVE_CHECK: if ((pid = mux_client_request_alive(sock)) == 0) fatal_f("master alive check failed"); fprintf(stderr, "Master running (pid=%u)\r\n", pid); exit(0); case SSHMUX_COMMAND_TERMINATE: mux_client_request_terminate(sock); if (options.log_level != SYSLOG_LEVEL_QUIET) fprintf(stderr, "Exit request sent.\r\n"); exit(0); case SSHMUX_COMMAND_FORWARD: if (mux_client_forwards(sock, 0) != 0) fatal_f("master forward request failed"); exit(0); case SSHMUX_COMMAND_OPEN: if (mux_client_forwards(sock, 0) != 0) { error_f("master forward request failed"); return -1; } mux_client_request_session(sock); return -1; case SSHMUX_COMMAND_STDIO_FWD: mux_client_request_stdio_fwd(sock); exit(0); case SSHMUX_COMMAND_STOP: mux_client_request_stop_listening(sock); if (options.log_level != SYSLOG_LEVEL_QUIET) fprintf(stderr, "Stop listening request sent.\r\n"); exit(0); case SSHMUX_COMMAND_CANCEL_FWD: if (mux_client_forwards(sock, 1) != 0) error_f("master cancel forward request failed"); exit(0); case SSHMUX_COMMAND_PROXY: mux_client_proxy(sock); return (sock); default: fatal("unrecognised muxclient_command %d", muxclient_command); } } diff --git a/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/bsd-getentropy.c b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/bsd-getentropy.c index 554dfad70524..0231e066c5fa 100644 --- a/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/bsd-getentropy.c +++ b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/bsd-getentropy.c @@ -1,83 +1,83 @@ /* * Copyright (c) 1996, David Mazieres * Copyright (c) 2008, Damien Miller * Copyright (c) 2013, Markus Friedl * * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. * * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. */ #include "includes.h" #ifndef SSH_RANDOM_DEV # define SSH_RANDOM_DEV "/dev/urandom" #endif /* SSH_RANDOM_DEV */ #include #ifdef HAVE_SYS_RANDOM_H # include #endif #include #include #include #include #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL #include #include #endif #include "log.h" int _ssh_compat_getentropy(void *s, size_t len) { #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL if (RAND_bytes(s, len) <= 0) fatal("Couldn't obtain random bytes (error 0x%lx)", (unsigned long)ERR_get_error()); #else int fd, save_errno; ssize_t r; size_t o = 0; #ifdef HAVE_GETENTROPY - if (r = getentropy(s, len) == 0) + if ((r = getentropy(s, len)) == 0) return 0; #endif /* HAVE_GETENTROPY */ #ifdef HAVE_GETRANDOM if ((r = getrandom(s, len, 0)) > 0 && (size_t)r == len) return 0; #endif /* HAVE_GETRANDOM */ if ((fd = open(SSH_RANDOM_DEV, O_RDONLY)) == -1) { save_errno = errno; /* Try egd/prngd before giving up. */ if (seed_from_prngd(s, len) == 0) return 0; fatal("Couldn't open %s: %s", SSH_RANDOM_DEV, strerror(save_errno)); } while (o < len) { r = read(fd, (u_char *)s + o, len - o); if (r < 0) { if (errno == EAGAIN || errno == EINTR || errno == EWOULDBLOCK) continue; fatal("read %s: %s", SSH_RANDOM_DEV, strerror(errno)); } o += r; } close(fd); #endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */ return 0; } diff --git a/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/bsd-snprintf.c b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/bsd-snprintf.c index b9eaee14f3c0..bc505b8387ba 100644 --- a/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/bsd-snprintf.c +++ b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/bsd-snprintf.c @@ -1,880 +1,880 @@ /* * Copyright Patrick Powell 1995 * This code is based on code written by Patrick Powell (papowell@astart.com) * It may be used for any purpose as long as this notice remains intact * on all source code distributions */ /************************************************************** * Original: * Patrick Powell Tue Apr 11 09:48:21 PDT 1995 * A bombproof version of doprnt (dopr) included. * Sigh. This sort of thing is always nasty do deal with. Note that * the version here does not include floating point... * * snprintf() is used instead of sprintf() as it does limit checks * for string length. This covers a nasty loophole. * * The other functions are there to prevent NULL pointers from * causing nast effects. * * More Recently: * Brandon Long 9/15/96 for mutt 0.43 * This was ugly. It is still ugly. I opted out of floating point * numbers, but the formatter understands just about everything * from the normal C string format, at least as far as I can tell from * the Solaris 2.5 printf(3S) man page. * * Brandon Long 10/22/97 for mutt 0.87.1 * Ok, added some minimal floating point support, which means this * probably requires libm on most operating systems. Don't yet * support the exponent (e,E) and sigfig (g,G). Also, fmtint() * was pretty badly broken, it just wasn't being exercised in ways * which showed it, so that's been fixed. Also, formatted the code * to mutt conventions, and removed dead code left over from the * original. Also, there is now a builtin-test, just compile with: * gcc -DTEST_SNPRINTF -o snprintf snprintf.c -lm * and run snprintf for results. - * + * * Thomas Roessler 01/27/98 for mutt 0.89i - * The PGP code was using unsigned hexadecimal formats. + * The PGP code was using unsigned hexadecimal formats. * Unfortunately, unsigned formats simply didn't work. * * Michael Elkins 03/05/98 for mutt 0.90.8 * The original code assumed that both snprintf() and vsnprintf() were * missing. Some systems only have snprintf() but not vsnprintf(), so * the code is now broken down under HAVE_SNPRINTF and HAVE_VSNPRINTF. * * Andrew Tridgell (tridge@samba.org) Oct 1998 * fixed handling of %.0f * added test for HAVE_LONG_DOUBLE * * tridge@samba.org, idra@samba.org, April 2001 * got rid of fcvt code (twas buggy and made testing harder) * added C99 semantics * * date: 2002/12/19 19:56:31; author: herb; state: Exp; lines: +2 -0 * actually print args for %g and %e - * + * * date: 2002/06/03 13:37:52; author: jmcd; state: Exp; lines: +8 -0 * Since includes.h isn't included here, VA_COPY has to be defined here. I don't * see any include file that is guaranteed to be here, so I'm defining it * locally. Fixes AIX and Solaris builds. - * + * * date: 2002/06/03 03:07:24; author: tridge; state: Exp; lines: +5 -13 * put the ifdef for HAVE_VA_COPY in one place rather than in lots of * functions - * + * * date: 2002/05/17 14:51:22; author: jmcd; state: Exp; lines: +21 -4 * Fix usage of va_list passed as an arg. Use __va_copy before using it * when it exists. - * + * * date: 2002/04/16 22:38:04; author: idra; state: Exp; lines: +20 -14 * Fix incorrect zpadlen handling in fmtfp. * Thanks to Ollie Oldham for spotting it. * few mods to make it easier to compile the tests. * added the "Ollie" test to the floating point ones. * * Martin Pool (mbp@samba.org) April 2003 * Remove NO_CONFIG_H so that the test case can be built within a source * tree with less trouble. * Remove unnecessary SAFE_FREE() definition. * * Martin Pool (mbp@samba.org) May 2003 * Put in a prototype for dummy_snprintf() to quiet compiler warnings. * * Move #endif to make sure VA_COPY, LDOUBLE, etc are defined even * if the C library has some snprintf functions already. * * Damien Miller (djm@mindrot.org) Jan 2007 * Fix integer overflows in return value. * Make formatting quite a bit faster by inlining dopr_outch() * **************************************************************/ #include "includes.h" #if defined(BROKEN_SNPRINTF) /* For those with broken snprintf() */ # undef HAVE_SNPRINTF # undef HAVE_VSNPRINTF #endif #if !defined(HAVE_SNPRINTF) || !defined(HAVE_VSNPRINTF) #include #include #include #include #include #include #ifdef HAVE_LONG_DOUBLE # define LDOUBLE long double #else # define LDOUBLE double #endif #ifdef HAVE_LONG_LONG # define LLONG long long #else # define LLONG long #endif /* * dopr(): poor man's version of doprintf */ /* format read states */ #define DP_S_DEFAULT 0 #define DP_S_FLAGS 1 #define DP_S_MIN 2 #define DP_S_DOT 3 #define DP_S_MAX 4 #define DP_S_MOD 5 #define DP_S_CONV 6 #define DP_S_DONE 7 /* format flags - Bits */ #define DP_F_MINUS (1 << 0) #define DP_F_PLUS (1 << 1) #define DP_F_SPACE (1 << 2) #define DP_F_NUM (1 << 3) #define DP_F_ZERO (1 << 4) #define DP_F_UP (1 << 5) #define DP_F_UNSIGNED (1 << 6) /* Conversion Flags */ #define DP_C_SHORT 1 #define DP_C_LONG 2 #define DP_C_LDOUBLE 3 #define DP_C_LLONG 4 #define DP_C_SIZE 5 #define DP_C_INTMAX 6 #define char_to_int(p) ((p)- '0') #ifndef MAX # define MAX(p,q) (((p) >= (q)) ? (p) : (q)) #endif #define DOPR_OUTCH(buf, pos, buflen, thechar) \ do { \ if (pos + 1 >= INT_MAX) { \ errno = ERANGE; \ return -1; \ } \ if (pos < buflen) \ buf[pos] = thechar; \ (pos)++; \ } while (0) -static int dopr(char *buffer, size_t maxlen, const char *format, +static int dopr(char *buffer, size_t maxlen, const char *format, va_list args_in); static int fmtstr(char *buffer, size_t *currlen, size_t maxlen, char *value, int flags, int min, int max); static int fmtint(char *buffer, size_t *currlen, size_t maxlen, intmax_t value, int base, int min, int max, int flags); static int fmtfp(char *buffer, size_t *currlen, size_t maxlen, LDOUBLE fvalue, int min, int max, int flags); static int dopr(char *buffer, size_t maxlen, const char *format, va_list args_in) { char ch; intmax_t value; LDOUBLE fvalue; char *strvalue; int min; int max; int state; int flags; int cflags; size_t currlen; va_list args; VA_COPY(args, args_in); - + state = DP_S_DEFAULT; currlen = flags = cflags = min = 0; max = -1; ch = *format++; - + while (state != DP_S_DONE) { - if (ch == '\0') + if (ch == '\0') state = DP_S_DONE; switch(state) { case DP_S_DEFAULT: - if (ch == '%') + if (ch == '%') state = DP_S_FLAGS; else DOPR_OUTCH(buffer, currlen, maxlen, ch); ch = *format++; break; case DP_S_FLAGS: switch (ch) { case '-': flags |= DP_F_MINUS; ch = *format++; break; case '+': flags |= DP_F_PLUS; ch = *format++; break; case ' ': flags |= DP_F_SPACE; ch = *format++; break; case '#': flags |= DP_F_NUM; ch = *format++; break; case '0': flags |= DP_F_ZERO; ch = *format++; break; default: state = DP_S_MIN; break; } break; case DP_S_MIN: if (isdigit((unsigned char)ch)) { min = 10*min + char_to_int (ch); ch = *format++; } else if (ch == '*') { min = va_arg (args, int); ch = *format++; state = DP_S_DOT; } else { state = DP_S_DOT; } break; case DP_S_DOT: if (ch == '.') { state = DP_S_MAX; ch = *format++; - } else { + } else { state = DP_S_MOD; } break; case DP_S_MAX: if (isdigit((unsigned char)ch)) { if (max < 0) max = 0; max = 10*max + char_to_int (ch); ch = *format++; } else if (ch == '*') { max = va_arg (args, int); ch = *format++; state = DP_S_MOD; } else { state = DP_S_MOD; } break; case DP_S_MOD: switch (ch) { case 'h': cflags = DP_C_SHORT; ch = *format++; break; case 'j': cflags = DP_C_INTMAX; ch = *format++; break; case 'l': cflags = DP_C_LONG; ch = *format++; if (ch == 'l') { /* It's a long long */ cflags = DP_C_LLONG; ch = *format++; } break; case 'L': cflags = DP_C_LDOUBLE; ch = *format++; break; case 'z': cflags = DP_C_SIZE; ch = *format++; break; default: break; } state = DP_S_CONV; break; case DP_S_CONV: switch (ch) { case 'd': case 'i': - if (cflags == DP_C_SHORT) + if (cflags == DP_C_SHORT) value = va_arg (args, int); else if (cflags == DP_C_LONG) value = va_arg (args, long int); else if (cflags == DP_C_LLONG) value = va_arg (args, LLONG); else if (cflags == DP_C_SIZE) value = va_arg (args, ssize_t); else if (cflags == DP_C_INTMAX) value = va_arg (args, intmax_t); else value = va_arg (args, int); if (fmtint(buffer, &currlen, maxlen, value, 10, min, max, flags) == -1) return -1; break; case 'o': flags |= DP_F_UNSIGNED; if (cflags == DP_C_SHORT) value = va_arg (args, unsigned int); else if (cflags == DP_C_LONG) value = (long)va_arg (args, unsigned long int); else if (cflags == DP_C_LLONG) value = (long)va_arg (args, unsigned LLONG); else if (cflags == DP_C_SIZE) value = va_arg (args, size_t); #ifdef notyet else if (cflags == DP_C_INTMAX) value = va_arg (args, uintmax_t); #endif else value = (long)va_arg (args, unsigned int); if (fmtint(buffer, &currlen, maxlen, value, 8, min, max, flags) == -1) return -1; break; case 'u': flags |= DP_F_UNSIGNED; if (cflags == DP_C_SHORT) value = va_arg (args, unsigned int); else if (cflags == DP_C_LONG) value = (long)va_arg (args, unsigned long int); else if (cflags == DP_C_LLONG) value = (LLONG)va_arg (args, unsigned LLONG); else if (cflags == DP_C_SIZE) value = va_arg (args, size_t); #ifdef notyet else if (cflags == DP_C_INTMAX) value = va_arg (args, uintmax_t); #endif else value = (long)va_arg (args, unsigned int); if (fmtint(buffer, &currlen, maxlen, value, 10, min, max, flags) == -1) return -1; break; case 'X': flags |= DP_F_UP; case 'x': flags |= DP_F_UNSIGNED; if (cflags == DP_C_SHORT) value = va_arg (args, unsigned int); else if (cflags == DP_C_LONG) value = (long)va_arg (args, unsigned long int); else if (cflags == DP_C_LLONG) value = (LLONG)va_arg (args, unsigned LLONG); else if (cflags == DP_C_SIZE) value = va_arg (args, size_t); #ifdef notyet else if (cflags == DP_C_INTMAX) value = va_arg (args, uintmax_t); #endif else value = (long)va_arg (args, unsigned int); if (fmtint(buffer, &currlen, maxlen, value, 16, min, max, flags) == -1) return -1; break; case 'f': if (cflags == DP_C_LDOUBLE) fvalue = va_arg (args, LDOUBLE); else fvalue = va_arg (args, double); if (fmtfp(buffer, &currlen, maxlen, fvalue, min, max, flags) == -1) return -1; break; case 'E': flags |= DP_F_UP; case 'e': if (cflags == DP_C_LDOUBLE) fvalue = va_arg (args, LDOUBLE); else fvalue = va_arg (args, double); if (fmtfp(buffer, &currlen, maxlen, fvalue, min, max, flags) == -1) return -1; break; case 'G': flags |= DP_F_UP; case 'g': if (cflags == DP_C_LDOUBLE) fvalue = va_arg (args, LDOUBLE); else fvalue = va_arg (args, double); if (fmtfp(buffer, &currlen, maxlen, fvalue, min, max, flags) == -1) return -1; break; case 'c': DOPR_OUTCH(buffer, currlen, maxlen, va_arg (args, int)); break; case 's': strvalue = va_arg (args, char *); if (!strvalue) strvalue = "(NULL)"; if (max == -1) { max = strlen(strvalue); } if (min > 0 && max >= 0 && min > max) max = min; if (fmtstr(buffer, &currlen, maxlen, strvalue, flags, min, max) == -1) return -1; break; case 'p': strvalue = va_arg (args, void *); if (fmtint(buffer, &currlen, maxlen, (long) strvalue, 16, min, max, flags) == -1) return -1; break; #if we_dont_want_this_in_openssh case 'n': if (cflags == DP_C_SHORT) { short int *num; num = va_arg (args, short int *); *num = currlen; } else if (cflags == DP_C_LONG) { long int *num; num = va_arg (args, long int *); *num = (long int)currlen; } else if (cflags == DP_C_LLONG) { LLONG *num; num = va_arg (args, LLONG *); *num = (LLONG)currlen; } else if (cflags == DP_C_SIZE) { ssize_t *num; num = va_arg (args, ssize_t *); *num = (ssize_t)currlen; } else if (cflags == DP_C_INTMAX) { intmax_t *num; num = va_arg (args, intmax_t *); *num = (intmax_t)currlen; } else { int *num; num = va_arg (args, int *); *num = currlen; } break; #endif case '%': DOPR_OUTCH(buffer, currlen, maxlen, ch); break; case 'w': /* not supported yet, treat as next char */ ch = *format++; break; default: /* Unknown, skip */ break; } ch = *format++; state = DP_S_DEFAULT; flags = cflags = min = 0; max = -1; break; case DP_S_DONE: break; default: /* hmm? */ break; /* some picky compilers need this */ } } if (maxlen != 0) { - if (currlen < maxlen - 1) + if (currlen < maxlen - 1) buffer[currlen] = '\0'; - else if (maxlen > 0) + else if (maxlen > 0) buffer[maxlen - 1] = '\0'; } - + return currlen < INT_MAX ? (int)currlen : -1; } static int fmtstr(char *buffer, size_t *currlen, size_t maxlen, char *value, int flags, int min, int max) { int padlen, strln; /* amount to pad */ int cnt = 0; #ifdef DEBUG_SNPRINTF printf("fmtstr min=%d max=%d s=[%s]\n", min, max, value); #endif if (value == 0) { value = ""; } for (strln = 0; strln < max && value[strln]; ++strln); /* strlen */ padlen = min - strln; - if (padlen < 0) + if (padlen < 0) padlen = 0; - if (flags & DP_F_MINUS) + if (flags & DP_F_MINUS) padlen = -padlen; /* Left Justify */ - + while ((padlen > 0) && (cnt < max)) { DOPR_OUTCH(buffer, *currlen, maxlen, ' '); --padlen; ++cnt; } while (*value && (cnt < max)) { DOPR_OUTCH(buffer, *currlen, maxlen, *value); value++; ++cnt; } while ((padlen < 0) && (cnt < max)) { DOPR_OUTCH(buffer, *currlen, maxlen, ' '); ++padlen; ++cnt; } return 0; } /* Have to handle DP_F_NUM (ie 0x and 0 alternates) */ static int fmtint(char *buffer, size_t *currlen, size_t maxlen, intmax_t value, int base, int min, int max, int flags) { int signvalue = 0; unsigned LLONG uvalue; char convert[20]; int place = 0; int spadlen = 0; /* amount to space pad */ int zpadlen = 0; /* amount to zero pad */ int caps = 0; - + if (max < 0) max = 0; - + uvalue = value; - + if(!(flags & DP_F_UNSIGNED)) { if( value < 0 ) { signvalue = '-'; uvalue = -value; } else { if (flags & DP_F_PLUS) /* Do a sign (+/i) */ signvalue = '+'; else if (flags & DP_F_SPACE) signvalue = ' '; } } - + if (flags & DP_F_UP) caps = 1; /* Should characters be upper case? */ do { convert[place++] = (caps? "0123456789ABCDEF":"0123456789abcdef") [uvalue % (unsigned)base ]; uvalue = (uvalue / (unsigned)base ); } while(uvalue && (place < 20)); if (place == 20) place--; convert[place] = 0; zpadlen = max - place; spadlen = min - MAX (max, place) - (signvalue ? 1 : 0); if (zpadlen < 0) zpadlen = 0; if (spadlen < 0) spadlen = 0; if (flags & DP_F_ZERO) { zpadlen = MAX(zpadlen, spadlen); spadlen = 0; } - if (flags & DP_F_MINUS) + if (flags & DP_F_MINUS) spadlen = -spadlen; /* Left Justifty */ #ifdef DEBUG_SNPRINTF printf("zpad: %d, spad: %d, min: %d, max: %d, place: %d\n", zpadlen, spadlen, min, max, place); #endif /* Spaces */ while (spadlen > 0) { DOPR_OUTCH(buffer, *currlen, maxlen, ' '); --spadlen; } /* Sign */ - if (signvalue) + if (signvalue) DOPR_OUTCH(buffer, *currlen, maxlen, signvalue); /* Zeros */ if (zpadlen > 0) { while (zpadlen > 0) { DOPR_OUTCH(buffer, *currlen, maxlen, '0'); --zpadlen; } } /* Digits */ while (place > 0) { --place; DOPR_OUTCH(buffer, *currlen, maxlen, convert[place]); } - + /* Left Justified spaces */ while (spadlen < 0) { DOPR_OUTCH(buffer, *currlen, maxlen, ' '); ++spadlen; } return 0; } static LDOUBLE abs_val(LDOUBLE value) { LDOUBLE result = value; if (value < 0) result = -value; - + return result; } static LDOUBLE POW10(int val) { LDOUBLE result = 1; - + while (val) { result *= 10; val--; } - + return result; } static LLONG ROUND(LDOUBLE value) { LLONG intpart; intpart = (LLONG)value; value = value - intpart; if (value >= 0.5) intpart++; - + return intpart; } /* a replacement for modf that doesn't need the math library. Should be portable, but slow */ static double my_modf(double x0, double *iptr) { int i; long l; double x = x0; double f = 1.0; for (i=0;i<100;i++) { l = (long)x; if (l <= (x+1) && l >= (x-1)) break; x *= 0.1; f *= 10.0; } if (i == 100) { /* * yikes! the number is beyond what we can handle. * What do we do? */ (*iptr) = 0; return 0; } if (i != 0) { double i2; double ret; ret = my_modf(x0-l*f, &i2); (*iptr) = l*f + i2; return ret; - } + } (*iptr) = l; return x - (*iptr); } static int fmtfp (char *buffer, size_t *currlen, size_t maxlen, LDOUBLE fvalue, int min, int max, int flags) { int signvalue = 0; double ufvalue; char iconvert[311]; char fconvert[311]; int iplace = 0; int fplace = 0; int padlen = 0; /* amount to pad */ - int zpadlen = 0; + int zpadlen = 0; int caps = 0; int idx; double intpart; double fracpart; double temp; - - /* + + /* * AIX manpage says the default is 0, but Solaris says the default * is 6, and sprintf on AIX defaults to 6 */ if (max < 0) max = 6; ufvalue = abs_val (fvalue); if (fvalue < 0) { signvalue = '-'; } else { if (flags & DP_F_PLUS) { /* Do a sign (+/i) */ signvalue = '+'; } else { if (flags & DP_F_SPACE) signvalue = ' '; } } #if 0 if (flags & DP_F_UP) caps = 1; /* Should characters be upper case? */ #endif #if 0 if (max == 0) ufvalue += 0.5; /* if max = 0 we must round */ #endif - /* - * Sorry, we only support 16 digits past the decimal because of our + /* + * Sorry, we only support 16 digits past the decimal because of our * conversion method */ if (max > 16) max = 16; /* We "cheat" by converting the fractional part to integer by * multiplying by a factor of 10 */ temp = ufvalue; my_modf(temp, &intpart); fracpart = ROUND((POW10(max)) * (ufvalue - intpart)); - + if (fracpart >= POW10(max)) { intpart++; fracpart -= POW10(max); } /* Convert integer part */ do { temp = intpart*0.1; my_modf(temp, &intpart); idx = (int) ((temp -intpart +0.05)* 10.0); /* idx = (int) (((double)(temp*0.1) -intpart +0.05) *10.0); */ /* printf ("%llf, %f, %x\n", temp, intpart, idx); */ iconvert[iplace++] = (caps? "0123456789ABCDEF":"0123456789abcdef")[idx]; } while (intpart && (iplace < 311)); if (iplace == 311) iplace--; iconvert[iplace] = 0; /* Convert fractional part */ if (fracpart) { do { temp = fracpart*0.1; my_modf(temp, &fracpart); idx = (int) ((temp -fracpart +0.05)* 10.0); /* idx = (int) ((((temp/10) -fracpart) +0.05) *10); */ /* printf ("%lf, %lf, %ld\n", temp, fracpart, idx ); */ fconvert[fplace++] = (caps? "0123456789ABCDEF":"0123456789abcdef")[idx]; } while(fracpart && (fplace < 311)); if (fplace == 311) fplace--; } fconvert[fplace] = 0; - + /* -1 for decimal point, another -1 if we are printing a sign */ - padlen = min - iplace - max - 1 - ((signvalue) ? 1 : 0); + padlen = min - iplace - max - 1 - ((signvalue) ? 1 : 0); zpadlen = max - fplace; if (zpadlen < 0) zpadlen = 0; - if (padlen < 0) + if (padlen < 0) padlen = 0; - if (flags & DP_F_MINUS) + if (flags & DP_F_MINUS) padlen = -padlen; /* Left Justifty */ - + if ((flags & DP_F_ZERO) && (padlen > 0)) { if (signvalue) { DOPR_OUTCH(buffer, *currlen, maxlen, signvalue); --padlen; signvalue = 0; } while (padlen > 0) { DOPR_OUTCH(buffer, *currlen, maxlen, '0'); --padlen; } } while (padlen > 0) { DOPR_OUTCH(buffer, *currlen, maxlen, ' '); --padlen; } - if (signvalue) + if (signvalue) DOPR_OUTCH(buffer, *currlen, maxlen, signvalue); - + while (iplace > 0) { --iplace; DOPR_OUTCH(buffer, *currlen, maxlen, iconvert[iplace]); } #ifdef DEBUG_SNPRINTF printf("fmtfp: fplace=%d zpadlen=%d\n", fplace, zpadlen); #endif /* * Decimal point. This should probably use locale to find the correct * char to print out. */ if (max > 0) { DOPR_OUTCH(buffer, *currlen, maxlen, '.'); - + while (zpadlen > 0) { DOPR_OUTCH(buffer, *currlen, maxlen, '0'); --zpadlen; } while (fplace > 0) { --fplace; DOPR_OUTCH(buffer, *currlen, maxlen, fconvert[fplace]); } } while (padlen < 0) { DOPR_OUTCH(buffer, *currlen, maxlen, ' '); ++padlen; } return 0; } #endif /* !defined(HAVE_SNPRINTF) || !defined(HAVE_VSNPRINTF) */ #if !defined(HAVE_VSNPRINTF) int vsnprintf (char *str, size_t count, const char *fmt, va_list args) { return dopr(str, count, fmt, args); } #endif #if !defined(HAVE_SNPRINTF) int snprintf(char *str, size_t count, SNPRINTF_CONST char *fmt, ...) { size_t ret; va_list ap; va_start(ap, fmt); ret = vsnprintf(str, count, fmt, ap); va_end(ap); return ret; } #endif diff --git a/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/getopt.h b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/getopt.h index 8eb12447ed64..65c8bc7fb60e 100644 --- a/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/getopt.h +++ b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/getopt.h @@ -1,74 +1,77 @@ /* $OpenBSD: getopt.h,v 1.2 2008/06/26 05:42:04 ray Exp $ */ /* $NetBSD: getopt.h,v 1.4 2000/07/07 10:43:54 ad Exp $ */ /*- * Copyright (c) 2000 The NetBSD Foundation, Inc. * All rights reserved. * * This code is derived from software contributed to The NetBSD Foundation * by Dieter Baron and Thomas Klausner. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE NETBSD FOUNDATION, INC. AND CONTRIBUTORS * ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED * TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE FOUNDATION OR CONTRIBUTORS * BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR * CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF * SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE * POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. */ #ifndef _GETOPT_H_ #define _GETOPT_H_ /* * GNU-like getopt_long() and 4.4BSD getsubopt()/optreset extensions */ #define no_argument 0 #define required_argument 1 #define optional_argument 2 +#if 0 struct option { /* name of long option */ const char *name; /* * one of no_argument, required_argument, and optional_argument: * whether option takes an argument */ int has_arg; /* if not NULL, set *flag to val when option found */ int *flag; /* if flag not NULL, value to set *flag to; else return value */ int val; }; int getopt_long(int, char * const *, const char *, const struct option *, int *); int getopt_long_only(int, char * const *, const char *, const struct option *, int *); +#endif + #ifndef _GETOPT_DEFINED_ #define _GETOPT_DEFINED_ int getopt(int, char * const *, const char *); int getsubopt(char **, char * const *, char **); extern char *optarg; /* getopt(3) external variables */ extern int opterr; extern int optind; extern int optopt; extern int optreset; extern char *suboptarg; /* getsubopt(3) external variable */ #endif #endif /* !_GETOPT_H_ */ diff --git a/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/getopt_long.c b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/getopt_long.c index 1a5001f7d98a..c2863a789f6b 100644 --- a/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/getopt_long.c +++ b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/getopt_long.c @@ -1,532 +1,546 @@ /* $OpenBSD: getopt_long.c,v 1.25 2011/03/05 22:10:11 guenther Exp $ */ /* $NetBSD: getopt_long.c,v 1.15 2002/01/31 22:43:40 tv Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2002 Todd C. Miller * * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. * * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. * * Sponsored in part by the Defense Advanced Research Projects * Agency (DARPA) and Air Force Research Laboratory, Air Force * Materiel Command, USAF, under agreement number F39502-99-1-0512. */ /*- * Copyright (c) 2000 The NetBSD Foundation, Inc. * All rights reserved. * * This code is derived from software contributed to The NetBSD Foundation * by Dieter Baron and Thomas Klausner. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE NETBSD FOUNDATION, INC. AND CONTRIBUTORS * ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED * TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE FOUNDATION OR CONTRIBUTORS * BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR * CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF * SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE * POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. */ /* OPENBSD ORIGINAL: lib/libc/stdlib/getopt_long.c */ #include "includes.h" #if !defined(HAVE_GETOPT) || !defined(HAVE_GETOPT_OPTRESET) /* * Some defines to make it easier to keep the code in sync with upstream. * getopt opterr optind optopt optreset optarg are all in defines.h which is * pulled in by includes.h. */ #define warnx logit #if 0 #include #include #endif #include #include #include #include #include "log.h" +struct option { + /* name of long option */ + const char *name; + /* + * one of no_argument, required_argument, and optional_argument: + * whether option takes an argument + */ + int has_arg; + /* if not NULL, set *flag to val when option found */ + int *flag; + /* if flag not NULL, value to set *flag to; else return value */ + int val; +}; + int opterr = 1; /* if error message should be printed */ int optind = 1; /* index into parent argv vector */ int optopt = '?'; /* character checked for validity */ int optreset; /* reset getopt */ char *optarg; /* argument associated with option */ #define PRINT_ERROR ((opterr) && (*options != ':')) #define FLAG_PERMUTE 0x01 /* permute non-options to the end of argv */ #define FLAG_ALLARGS 0x02 /* treat non-options as args to option "-1" */ #define FLAG_LONGONLY 0x04 /* operate as getopt_long_only */ /* return values */ #define BADCH (int)'?' #define BADARG ((*options == ':') ? (int)':' : (int)'?') #define INORDER (int)1 #define EMSG "" static int getopt_internal(int, char * const *, const char *, const struct option *, int *, int); static int parse_long_options(char * const *, const char *, const struct option *, int *, int); static int gcd(int, int); static void permute_args(int, int, int, char * const *); static char *place = EMSG; /* option letter processing */ /* XXX: set optreset to 1 rather than these two */ static int nonopt_start = -1; /* first non option argument (for permute) */ static int nonopt_end = -1; /* first option after non options (for permute) */ /* Error messages */ static const char recargchar[] = "option requires an argument -- %c"; static const char recargstring[] = "option requires an argument -- %s"; static const char ambig[] = "ambiguous option -- %.*s"; static const char noarg[] = "option doesn't take an argument -- %.*s"; static const char illoptchar[] = "unknown option -- %c"; static const char illoptstring[] = "unknown option -- %s"; /* * Compute the greatest common divisor of a and b. */ static int gcd(int a, int b) { int c; c = a % b; while (c != 0) { a = b; b = c; c = a % b; } return (b); } /* * Exchange the block from nonopt_start to nonopt_end with the block * from nonopt_end to opt_end (keeping the same order of arguments * in each block). */ static void permute_args(int panonopt_start, int panonopt_end, int opt_end, char * const *nargv) { int cstart, cyclelen, i, j, ncycle, nnonopts, nopts, pos; char *swap; /* * compute lengths of blocks and number and size of cycles */ nnonopts = panonopt_end - panonopt_start; nopts = opt_end - panonopt_end; ncycle = gcd(nnonopts, nopts); cyclelen = (opt_end - panonopt_start) / ncycle; for (i = 0; i < ncycle; i++) { cstart = panonopt_end+i; pos = cstart; for (j = 0; j < cyclelen; j++) { if (pos >= panonopt_end) pos -= nnonopts; else pos += nopts; swap = nargv[pos]; /* LINTED const cast */ ((char **) nargv)[pos] = nargv[cstart]; /* LINTED const cast */ ((char **)nargv)[cstart] = swap; } } } /* * parse_long_options -- * Parse long options in argc/argv argument vector. * Returns -1 if short_too is set and the option does not match long_options. */ static int parse_long_options(char * const *nargv, const char *options, const struct option *long_options, int *idx, int short_too) { char *current_argv, *has_equal; size_t current_argv_len; int i, match; current_argv = place; match = -1; optind++; if ((has_equal = strchr(current_argv, '=')) != NULL) { /* argument found (--option=arg) */ current_argv_len = has_equal - current_argv; has_equal++; } else current_argv_len = strlen(current_argv); for (i = 0; long_options[i].name; i++) { /* find matching long option */ if (strncmp(current_argv, long_options[i].name, current_argv_len)) continue; if (strlen(long_options[i].name) == current_argv_len) { /* exact match */ match = i; break; } /* * If this is a known short option, don't allow * a partial match of a single character. */ if (short_too && current_argv_len == 1) continue; if (match == -1) /* partial match */ match = i; else { /* ambiguous abbreviation */ if (PRINT_ERROR) warnx(ambig, (int)current_argv_len, current_argv); optopt = 0; return (BADCH); } } if (match != -1) { /* option found */ if (long_options[match].has_arg == no_argument && has_equal) { if (PRINT_ERROR) warnx(noarg, (int)current_argv_len, current_argv); /* * XXX: GNU sets optopt to val regardless of flag */ if (long_options[match].flag == NULL) optopt = long_options[match].val; else optopt = 0; return (BADARG); } if (long_options[match].has_arg == required_argument || long_options[match].has_arg == optional_argument) { if (has_equal) optarg = has_equal; else if (long_options[match].has_arg == required_argument) { /* * optional argument doesn't use next nargv */ optarg = nargv[optind++]; } } if ((long_options[match].has_arg == required_argument) && (optarg == NULL)) { /* * Missing argument; leading ':' indicates no error * should be generated. */ if (PRINT_ERROR) warnx(recargstring, current_argv); /* * XXX: GNU sets optopt to val regardless of flag */ if (long_options[match].flag == NULL) optopt = long_options[match].val; else optopt = 0; --optind; return (BADARG); } } else { /* unknown option */ if (short_too) { --optind; return (-1); } if (PRINT_ERROR) warnx(illoptstring, current_argv); optopt = 0; return (BADCH); } if (idx) *idx = match; if (long_options[match].flag) { *long_options[match].flag = long_options[match].val; return (0); } else return (long_options[match].val); } /* * getopt_internal -- * Parse argc/argv argument vector. Called by user level routines. */ static int getopt_internal(int nargc, char * const *nargv, const char *options, const struct option *long_options, int *idx, int flags) { char *oli; /* option letter list index */ int optchar, short_too; static int posixly_correct = -1; if (options == NULL) return (-1); /* * XXX Some GNU programs (like cvs) set optind to 0 instead of * XXX using optreset. Work around this braindamage. */ if (optind == 0) optind = optreset = 1; /* * Disable GNU extensions if POSIXLY_CORRECT is set or options * string begins with a '+'. */ if (posixly_correct == -1 || optreset) posixly_correct = (getenv("POSIXLY_CORRECT") != NULL); if (*options == '-') flags |= FLAG_ALLARGS; else if (posixly_correct || *options == '+') flags &= ~FLAG_PERMUTE; if (*options == '+' || *options == '-') options++; optarg = NULL; if (optreset) nonopt_start = nonopt_end = -1; start: if (optreset || !*place) { /* update scanning pointer */ optreset = 0; if (optind >= nargc) { /* end of argument vector */ place = EMSG; if (nonopt_end != -1) { /* do permutation, if we have to */ permute_args(nonopt_start, nonopt_end, optind, nargv); optind -= nonopt_end - nonopt_start; } else if (nonopt_start != -1) { /* * If we skipped non-options, set optind * to the first of them. */ optind = nonopt_start; } nonopt_start = nonopt_end = -1; return (-1); } if (*(place = nargv[optind]) != '-' || (place[1] == '\0' && strchr(options, '-') == NULL)) { place = EMSG; /* found non-option */ if (flags & FLAG_ALLARGS) { /* * GNU extension: * return non-option as argument to option 1 */ optarg = nargv[optind++]; return (INORDER); } if (!(flags & FLAG_PERMUTE)) { /* * If no permutation wanted, stop parsing * at first non-option. */ return (-1); } /* do permutation */ if (nonopt_start == -1) nonopt_start = optind; else if (nonopt_end != -1) { permute_args(nonopt_start, nonopt_end, optind, nargv); nonopt_start = optind - (nonopt_end - nonopt_start); nonopt_end = -1; } optind++; /* process next argument */ goto start; } if (nonopt_start != -1 && nonopt_end == -1) nonopt_end = optind; /* * If we have "-" do nothing, if "--" we are done. */ if (place[1] != '\0' && *++place == '-' && place[1] == '\0') { optind++; place = EMSG; /* * We found an option (--), so if we skipped * non-options, we have to permute. */ if (nonopt_end != -1) { permute_args(nonopt_start, nonopt_end, optind, nargv); optind -= nonopt_end - nonopt_start; } nonopt_start = nonopt_end = -1; return (-1); } } /* * Check long options if: * 1) we were passed some * 2) the arg is not just "-" * 3) either the arg starts with -- we are getopt_long_only() */ if (long_options != NULL && place != nargv[optind] && (*place == '-' || (flags & FLAG_LONGONLY))) { short_too = 0; if (*place == '-') place++; /* --foo long option */ else if (*place != ':' && strchr(options, *place) != NULL) short_too = 1; /* could be short option too */ optchar = parse_long_options(nargv, options, long_options, idx, short_too); if (optchar != -1) { place = EMSG; return (optchar); } } if ((optchar = (int)*place++) == (int)':' || (optchar == (int)'-' && *place != '\0') || (oli = strchr(options, optchar)) == NULL) { /* * If the user specified "-" and '-' isn't listed in * options, return -1 (non-option) as per POSIX. * Otherwise, it is an unknown option character (or ':'). */ if (optchar == (int)'-' && *place == '\0') return (-1); if (!*place) ++optind; if (PRINT_ERROR) warnx(illoptchar, optchar); optopt = optchar; return (BADCH); } if (long_options != NULL && optchar == 'W' && oli[1] == ';') { /* -W long-option */ if (*place) /* no space */ /* NOTHING */; else if (++optind >= nargc) { /* no arg */ place = EMSG; if (PRINT_ERROR) warnx(recargchar, optchar); optopt = optchar; return (BADARG); } else /* white space */ place = nargv[optind]; optchar = parse_long_options(nargv, options, long_options, idx, 0); place = EMSG; return (optchar); } if (*++oli != ':') { /* doesn't take argument */ if (!*place) ++optind; } else { /* takes (optional) argument */ optarg = NULL; if (*place) /* no white space */ optarg = place; else if (oli[1] != ':') { /* arg not optional */ if (++optind >= nargc) { /* no arg */ place = EMSG; if (PRINT_ERROR) warnx(recargchar, optchar); optopt = optchar; return (BADARG); } else optarg = nargv[optind]; } place = EMSG; ++optind; } /* dump back option letter */ return (optchar); } /* * getopt -- * Parse argc/argv argument vector. * * [eventually this will replace the BSD getopt] */ int getopt(int nargc, char * const *nargv, const char *options) { /* * We don't pass FLAG_PERMUTE to getopt_internal() since * the BSD getopt(3) (unlike GNU) has never done this. * * Furthermore, since many privileged programs call getopt() * before dropping privileges it makes sense to keep things * as simple (and bug-free) as possible. */ return (getopt_internal(nargc, nargv, options, NULL, NULL, 0)); } #if 0 /* * getopt_long -- * Parse argc/argv argument vector. */ int getopt_long(int nargc, char * const *nargv, const char *options, const struct option *long_options, int *idx) { return (getopt_internal(nargc, nargv, options, long_options, idx, FLAG_PERMUTE)); } /* * getopt_long_only -- * Parse argc/argv argument vector. */ int getopt_long_only(int nargc, char * const *nargv, const char *options, const struct option *long_options, int *idx) { return (getopt_internal(nargc, nargv, options, long_options, idx, FLAG_PERMUTE|FLAG_LONGONLY)); } #endif #endif /* !defined(HAVE_GETOPT) || !defined(HAVE_OPTRESET) */ diff --git a/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.c b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.c index 73de5e9482b8..8f593984066e 100644 --- a/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.c +++ b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.c @@ -1,615 +1,646 @@ /* $OpenBSD: getrrsetbyname.c,v 1.11 2007/10/11 18:36:41 jakob Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2001 Jakob Schlyter. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. */ /* * Portions Copyright (c) 1999-2001 Internet Software Consortium. * * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. * * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND INTERNET SOFTWARE CONSORTIUM * DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL * INTERNET SOFTWARE CONSORTIUM BE LIABLE FOR ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, * INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES WHATSOEVER RESULTING * FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, * NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION * WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. */ /* OPENBSD ORIGINAL: lib/libc/net/getrrsetbyname.c */ #include "includes.h" #if !defined (HAVE_GETRRSETBYNAME) && !defined (HAVE_LDNS) #include #include #include #include #include "getrrsetbyname.h" #if defined(HAVE_DECL_H_ERRNO) && !HAVE_DECL_H_ERRNO extern int h_errno; #endif /* We don't need multithread support here */ #ifdef _THREAD_PRIVATE # undef _THREAD_PRIVATE #endif #define _THREAD_PRIVATE(a,b,c) (c) #ifndef HAVE__RES_EXTERN struct __res_state _res; #endif /* Necessary functions and macros */ /* * Inline versions of get/put short/long. Pointer is advanced. * * These macros demonstrate the property of C whereby it can be * portable or it can be elegant but rarely both. */ #ifndef INT32SZ # define INT32SZ 4 #endif #ifndef INT16SZ # define INT16SZ 2 #endif #ifndef GETSHORT #define GETSHORT(s, cp) { \ u_char *t_cp = (u_char *)(cp); \ (s) = ((u_int16_t)t_cp[0] << 8) \ | ((u_int16_t)t_cp[1]) \ ; \ (cp) += INT16SZ; \ } #endif #ifndef GETLONG #define GETLONG(l, cp) { \ u_char *t_cp = (u_char *)(cp); \ (l) = ((u_int32_t)t_cp[0] << 24) \ | ((u_int32_t)t_cp[1] << 16) \ | ((u_int32_t)t_cp[2] << 8) \ | ((u_int32_t)t_cp[3]) \ ; \ (cp) += INT32SZ; \ } #endif /* * If the system doesn't have _getshort/_getlong or that are not exactly what * we need then use local replacements, avoiding name collisions. */ #if !defined(HAVE__GETSHORT) || !defined(HAVE__GETLONG) || \ !defined(HAVE_DECL__GETSHORT) || HAVE_DECL__GETSHORT == 0 || \ !defined(HAVE_DECL__GETLONG) || HAVE_DECL__GETLONG == 0 # ifdef _getshort # undef _getshort # endif # ifdef _getlong # undef _getlong # endif # define _getshort(x) (_ssh_compat_getshort(x)) # define _getlong(x) (_ssh_compat_getlong(x)) /* * Routines to insert/extract short/long's. */ static u_int16_t _getshort(const u_char *msgp) { u_int16_t u; GETSHORT(u, msgp); return (u); } static u_int32_t _getlong(const u_char *msgp) { u_int32_t u; GETLONG(u, msgp); return (u); } #endif /* missing _getshort/_getlong */ /* ************** */ #define ANSWER_BUFFER_SIZE 0xffff struct dns_query { char *name; u_int16_t type; u_int16_t class; struct dns_query *next; }; struct dns_rr { char *name; u_int16_t type; u_int16_t class; u_int16_t ttl; u_int16_t size; void *rdata; struct dns_rr *next; }; struct dns_response { HEADER header; struct dns_query *query; struct dns_rr *answer; struct dns_rr *authority; struct dns_rr *additional; }; static struct dns_response *parse_dns_response(const u_char *, int); static struct dns_query *parse_dns_qsection(const u_char *, int, const u_char **, int); static struct dns_rr *parse_dns_rrsection(const u_char *, int, const u_char **, int); static void free_dns_query(struct dns_query *); static void free_dns_rr(struct dns_rr *); static void free_dns_response(struct dns_response *); static int count_dns_rr(struct dns_rr *, u_int16_t, u_int16_t); int getrrsetbyname(const char *hostname, unsigned int rdclass, unsigned int rdtype, unsigned int flags, struct rrsetinfo **res) { struct __res_state *_resp = _THREAD_PRIVATE(_res, _res, &_res); int result; struct rrsetinfo *rrset = NULL; struct dns_response *response = NULL; struct dns_rr *rr; struct rdatainfo *rdata; int length; unsigned int index_ans, index_sig; u_char answer[ANSWER_BUFFER_SIZE]; /* check for invalid class and type */ if (rdclass > 0xffff || rdtype > 0xffff) { result = ERRSET_INVAL; goto fail; } /* don't allow queries of class or type ANY */ if (rdclass == 0xff || rdtype == 0xff) { result = ERRSET_INVAL; goto fail; } /* don't allow flags yet, unimplemented */ if (flags) { result = ERRSET_INVAL; goto fail; } /* initialize resolver */ if ((_resp->options & RES_INIT) == 0 && res_init() == -1) { result = ERRSET_FAIL; goto fail; } #ifdef DEBUG _resp->options |= RES_DEBUG; #endif /* DEBUG */ #ifdef RES_USE_DNSSEC /* turn on DNSSEC if EDNS0 is configured */ if (_resp->options & RES_USE_EDNS0) _resp->options |= RES_USE_DNSSEC; #endif /* RES_USE_DNSEC */ /* make query */ length = res_query(hostname, (signed int) rdclass, (signed int) rdtype, answer, sizeof(answer)); if (length < 0) { switch(h_errno) { case HOST_NOT_FOUND: result = ERRSET_NONAME; goto fail; case NO_DATA: result = ERRSET_NODATA; goto fail; default: result = ERRSET_FAIL; goto fail; } } /* parse result */ response = parse_dns_response(answer, length); if (response == NULL) { result = ERRSET_FAIL; goto fail; } if (response->header.qdcount != 1) { result = ERRSET_FAIL; goto fail; } /* initialize rrset */ rrset = calloc(1, sizeof(struct rrsetinfo)); if (rrset == NULL) { result = ERRSET_NOMEMORY; goto fail; } rrset->rri_rdclass = response->query->class; rrset->rri_rdtype = response->query->type; rrset->rri_ttl = response->answer->ttl; rrset->rri_nrdatas = response->header.ancount; #ifdef HAVE_HEADER_AD /* check for authenticated data */ if (response->header.ad == 1) rrset->rri_flags |= RRSET_VALIDATED; #endif /* copy name from answer section */ rrset->rri_name = strdup(response->answer->name); if (rrset->rri_name == NULL) { result = ERRSET_NOMEMORY; goto fail; } /* count answers */ rrset->rri_nrdatas = count_dns_rr(response->answer, rrset->rri_rdclass, rrset->rri_rdtype); rrset->rri_nsigs = count_dns_rr(response->answer, rrset->rri_rdclass, T_RRSIG); /* allocate memory for answers */ rrset->rri_rdatas = calloc(rrset->rri_nrdatas, sizeof(struct rdatainfo)); if (rrset->rri_rdatas == NULL) { result = ERRSET_NOMEMORY; goto fail; } /* allocate memory for signatures */ if (rrset->rri_nsigs > 0) { rrset->rri_sigs = calloc(rrset->rri_nsigs, sizeof(struct rdatainfo)); if (rrset->rri_sigs == NULL) { result = ERRSET_NOMEMORY; goto fail; } } /* copy answers & signatures */ for (rr = response->answer, index_ans = 0, index_sig = 0; rr; rr = rr->next) { rdata = NULL; if (rr->class == rrset->rri_rdclass && rr->type == rrset->rri_rdtype) rdata = &rrset->rri_rdatas[index_ans++]; if (rr->class == rrset->rri_rdclass && rr->type == T_RRSIG) rdata = &rrset->rri_sigs[index_sig++]; if (rdata) { rdata->rdi_length = rr->size; rdata->rdi_data = malloc(rr->size); if (rdata->rdi_data == NULL) { result = ERRSET_NOMEMORY; goto fail; } memcpy(rdata->rdi_data, rr->rdata, rr->size); } } free_dns_response(response); *res = rrset; return (ERRSET_SUCCESS); fail: if (rrset != NULL) freerrset(rrset); if (response != NULL) free_dns_response(response); return (result); } void freerrset(struct rrsetinfo *rrset) { u_int16_t i; if (rrset == NULL) return; if (rrset->rri_rdatas) { for (i = 0; i < rrset->rri_nrdatas; i++) { if (rrset->rri_rdatas[i].rdi_data == NULL) break; free(rrset->rri_rdatas[i].rdi_data); } free(rrset->rri_rdatas); } if (rrset->rri_sigs) { for (i = 0; i < rrset->rri_nsigs; i++) { if (rrset->rri_sigs[i].rdi_data == NULL) break; free(rrset->rri_sigs[i].rdi_data); } free(rrset->rri_sigs); } if (rrset->rri_name) free(rrset->rri_name); free(rrset); } /* * DNS response parsing routines */ static struct dns_response * parse_dns_response(const u_char *answer, int size) { struct dns_response *resp; const u_char *cp; + if (size < HFIXEDSZ) + return (NULL); + /* allocate memory for the response */ resp = calloc(1, sizeof(*resp)); if (resp == NULL) return (NULL); /* initialize current pointer */ cp = answer; /* copy header */ memcpy(&resp->header, cp, HFIXEDSZ); cp += HFIXEDSZ; /* fix header byte order */ resp->header.qdcount = ntohs(resp->header.qdcount); resp->header.ancount = ntohs(resp->header.ancount); resp->header.nscount = ntohs(resp->header.nscount); resp->header.arcount = ntohs(resp->header.arcount); /* there must be at least one query */ if (resp->header.qdcount < 1) { free_dns_response(resp); return (NULL); } /* parse query section */ resp->query = parse_dns_qsection(answer, size, &cp, resp->header.qdcount); if (resp->header.qdcount && resp->query == NULL) { free_dns_response(resp); return (NULL); } /* parse answer section */ resp->answer = parse_dns_rrsection(answer, size, &cp, resp->header.ancount); if (resp->header.ancount && resp->answer == NULL) { free_dns_response(resp); return (NULL); } /* parse authority section */ resp->authority = parse_dns_rrsection(answer, size, &cp, resp->header.nscount); if (resp->header.nscount && resp->authority == NULL) { free_dns_response(resp); return (NULL); } /* parse additional section */ resp->additional = parse_dns_rrsection(answer, size, &cp, resp->header.arcount); if (resp->header.arcount && resp->additional == NULL) { free_dns_response(resp); return (NULL); } return (resp); } static struct dns_query * parse_dns_qsection(const u_char *answer, int size, const u_char **cp, int count) { struct dns_query *head, *curr, *prev; int i, length; char name[MAXDNAME]; - for (i = 1, head = NULL, prev = NULL; i <= count; i++, prev = curr) { +#define NEED(need) \ + do { \ + if (*cp + need > answer + size) \ + goto fail; \ + } while (0) - /* allocate and initialize struct */ - curr = calloc(1, sizeof(struct dns_query)); - if (curr == NULL) { + for (i = 1, head = NULL, prev = NULL; i <= count; i++, prev = curr) { + if (*cp >= answer + size) { + fail: free_dns_query(head); return (NULL); } + /* allocate and initialize struct */ + curr = calloc(1, sizeof(struct dns_query)); + if (curr == NULL) + goto fail; if (head == NULL) head = curr; if (prev != NULL) prev->next = curr; /* name */ length = dn_expand(answer, answer + size, *cp, name, sizeof(name)); if (length < 0) { free_dns_query(head); return (NULL); } curr->name = strdup(name); if (curr->name == NULL) { free_dns_query(head); return (NULL); } + NEED(length); *cp += length; /* type */ + NEED(INT16SZ); curr->type = _getshort(*cp); *cp += INT16SZ; /* class */ + NEED(INT16SZ); curr->class = _getshort(*cp); *cp += INT16SZ; } +#undef NEED return (head); } static struct dns_rr * parse_dns_rrsection(const u_char *answer, int size, const u_char **cp, int count) { struct dns_rr *head, *curr, *prev; int i, length; char name[MAXDNAME]; - for (i = 1, head = NULL, prev = NULL; i <= count; i++, prev = curr) { +#define NEED(need) \ + do { \ + if (*cp + need > answer + size) \ + goto fail; \ + } while (0) - /* allocate and initialize struct */ - curr = calloc(1, sizeof(struct dns_rr)); - if (curr == NULL) { + for (i = 1, head = NULL, prev = NULL; i <= count; i++, prev = curr) { + if (*cp >= answer + size) { + fail: free_dns_rr(head); return (NULL); } + + /* allocate and initialize struct */ + curr = calloc(1, sizeof(struct dns_rr)); + if (curr == NULL) + goto fail; if (head == NULL) head = curr; if (prev != NULL) prev->next = curr; /* name */ length = dn_expand(answer, answer + size, *cp, name, sizeof(name)); if (length < 0) { free_dns_rr(head); return (NULL); } curr->name = strdup(name); if (curr->name == NULL) { free_dns_rr(head); return (NULL); } + NEED(length); *cp += length; /* type */ + NEED(INT16SZ); curr->type = _getshort(*cp); *cp += INT16SZ; /* class */ + NEED(INT16SZ); curr->class = _getshort(*cp); *cp += INT16SZ; /* ttl */ + NEED(INT32SZ); curr->ttl = _getlong(*cp); *cp += INT32SZ; /* rdata size */ + NEED(INT16SZ); curr->size = _getshort(*cp); *cp += INT16SZ; /* rdata itself */ + NEED(curr->size); curr->rdata = malloc(curr->size); if (curr->rdata == NULL) { free_dns_rr(head); return (NULL); } memcpy(curr->rdata, *cp, curr->size); *cp += curr->size; } +#undef NEED return (head); } static void free_dns_query(struct dns_query *p) { if (p == NULL) return; if (p->name) free(p->name); free_dns_query(p->next); free(p); } static void free_dns_rr(struct dns_rr *p) { if (p == NULL) return; if (p->name) free(p->name); if (p->rdata) free(p->rdata); free_dns_rr(p->next); free(p); } static void free_dns_response(struct dns_response *p) { if (p == NULL) return; free_dns_query(p->query); free_dns_rr(p->answer); free_dns_rr(p->authority); free_dns_rr(p->additional); free(p); } static int count_dns_rr(struct dns_rr *p, u_int16_t class, u_int16_t type) { int n = 0; while(p) { if (p->class == class && p->type == type) n++; p = p->next; } return (n); } #endif /* !defined (HAVE_GETRRSETBYNAME) && !defined (HAVE_LDNS) */ diff --git a/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/libressl-api-compat.c b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/libressl-api-compat.c index 801a2e8dd3d9..498180dc894b 100644 --- a/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/libressl-api-compat.c +++ b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/libressl-api-compat.c @@ -1,640 +1,640 @@ /* $OpenBSD: dsa_lib.c,v 1.29 2018/04/14 07:09:21 tb Exp $ */ /* $OpenBSD: rsa_lib.c,v 1.37 2018/04/14 07:09:21 tb Exp $ */ /* $OpenBSD: evp_lib.c,v 1.17 2018/09/12 06:35:38 djm Exp $ */ /* $OpenBSD: dh_lib.c,v 1.32 2018/05/02 15:48:38 tb Exp $ */ /* $OpenBSD: p_lib.c,v 1.24 2018/05/30 15:40:50 tb Exp $ */ /* $OpenBSD: digest.c,v 1.30 2018/04/14 07:09:21 tb Exp $ */ /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com) * All rights reserved. * * This package is an SSL implementation written * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com). * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL. - * + * * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA, * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). - * + * * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in * the code are not to be removed. * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution * as the author of the parts of the library used. * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package. - * + * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software * must display the following acknowledgement: * "This product includes cryptographic software written by * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)" * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library * being used are not cryptographic related :-). - * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from + * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement: * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)" - * + * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF * SUCH DAMAGE. - * + * * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be * copied and put under another distribution licence * [including the GNU Public Licence.] */ /* $OpenBSD: dsa_asn1.c,v 1.22 2018/06/14 17:03:19 jsing Exp $ */ /* $OpenBSD: ecs_asn1.c,v 1.9 2018/03/17 15:24:44 tb Exp $ */ /* $OpenBSD: digest.c,v 1.30 2018/04/14 07:09:21 tb Exp $ */ /* Written by Dr Stephen N Henson (steve@openssl.org) for the OpenSSL * project 2000. */ /* ==================================================================== * Copyright (c) 2000-2005 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright - * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the * distribution. * * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this * software must display the following acknowledgment: * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)" * * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to * endorse or promote products derived from this software without * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact * licensing@OpenSSL.org. * * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL" * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written * permission of the OpenSSL Project. * * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following * acknowledgment: * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)" * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. * ==================================================================== * * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). * */ /* $OpenBSD: rsa_meth.c,v 1.2 2018/09/12 06:35:38 djm Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2018 Theo Buehler * * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. * * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. */ #include "includes.h" #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC #include #endif #include #ifndef HAVE_DSA_GET0_PQG void DSA_get0_pqg(const DSA *d, const BIGNUM **p, const BIGNUM **q, const BIGNUM **g) { if (p != NULL) *p = d->p; if (q != NULL) *q = d->q; if (g != NULL) *g = d->g; } #endif /* HAVE_DSA_GET0_PQG */ #ifndef HAVE_DSA_SET0_PQG int DSA_set0_pqg(DSA *d, BIGNUM *p, BIGNUM *q, BIGNUM *g) { if ((d->p == NULL && p == NULL) || (d->q == NULL && q == NULL) || (d->g == NULL && g == NULL)) return 0; if (p != NULL) { BN_free(d->p); d->p = p; } if (q != NULL) { BN_free(d->q); d->q = q; } if (g != NULL) { BN_free(d->g); d->g = g; } return 1; } #endif /* HAVE_DSA_SET0_PQG */ #ifndef HAVE_DSA_GET0_KEY void DSA_get0_key(const DSA *d, const BIGNUM **pub_key, const BIGNUM **priv_key) { if (pub_key != NULL) *pub_key = d->pub_key; if (priv_key != NULL) *priv_key = d->priv_key; } #endif /* HAVE_DSA_GET0_KEY */ #ifndef HAVE_DSA_SET0_KEY int DSA_set0_key(DSA *d, BIGNUM *pub_key, BIGNUM *priv_key) { if (d->pub_key == NULL && pub_key == NULL) return 0; if (pub_key != NULL) { BN_free(d->pub_key); d->pub_key = pub_key; } if (priv_key != NULL) { BN_free(d->priv_key); d->priv_key = priv_key; } return 1; } #endif /* HAVE_DSA_SET0_KEY */ #ifndef HAVE_RSA_GET0_KEY void RSA_get0_key(const RSA *r, const BIGNUM **n, const BIGNUM **e, const BIGNUM **d) { if (n != NULL) *n = r->n; if (e != NULL) *e = r->e; if (d != NULL) *d = r->d; } #endif /* HAVE_RSA_GET0_KEY */ #ifndef HAVE_RSA_SET0_KEY int RSA_set0_key(RSA *r, BIGNUM *n, BIGNUM *e, BIGNUM *d) { if ((r->n == NULL && n == NULL) || (r->e == NULL && e == NULL)) return 0; if (n != NULL) { BN_free(r->n); r->n = n; } if (e != NULL) { BN_free(r->e); r->e = e; } if (d != NULL) { BN_free(r->d); r->d = d; } return 1; } #endif /* HAVE_RSA_SET0_KEY */ #ifndef HAVE_RSA_GET0_CRT_PARAMS void RSA_get0_crt_params(const RSA *r, const BIGNUM **dmp1, const BIGNUM **dmq1, const BIGNUM **iqmp) { if (dmp1 != NULL) *dmp1 = r->dmp1; if (dmq1 != NULL) *dmq1 = r->dmq1; if (iqmp != NULL) *iqmp = r->iqmp; } #endif /* HAVE_RSA_GET0_CRT_PARAMS */ #ifndef HAVE_RSA_SET0_CRT_PARAMS int RSA_set0_crt_params(RSA *r, BIGNUM *dmp1, BIGNUM *dmq1, BIGNUM *iqmp) { if ((r->dmp1 == NULL && dmp1 == NULL) || (r->dmq1 == NULL && dmq1 == NULL) || (r->iqmp == NULL && iqmp == NULL)) return 0; if (dmp1 != NULL) { BN_free(r->dmp1); r->dmp1 = dmp1; } if (dmq1 != NULL) { BN_free(r->dmq1); r->dmq1 = dmq1; } if (iqmp != NULL) { BN_free(r->iqmp); r->iqmp = iqmp; } return 1; } #endif /* HAVE_RSA_SET0_CRT_PARAMS */ #ifndef HAVE_RSA_GET0_FACTORS void RSA_get0_factors(const RSA *r, const BIGNUM **p, const BIGNUM **q) { if (p != NULL) *p = r->p; if (q != NULL) *q = r->q; } #endif /* HAVE_RSA_GET0_FACTORS */ #ifndef HAVE_RSA_SET0_FACTORS int RSA_set0_factors(RSA *r, BIGNUM *p, BIGNUM *q) { if ((r->p == NULL && p == NULL) || (r->q == NULL && q == NULL)) return 0; if (p != NULL) { BN_free(r->p); r->p = p; } if (q != NULL) { BN_free(r->q); r->q = q; } return 1; } #endif /* HAVE_RSA_SET0_FACTORS */ #ifndef HAVE_EVP_CIPHER_CTX_GET_IV int EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_iv(const EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *iv, size_t len) { if (ctx == NULL) return 0; if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx) < 0) return 0; if (len != (size_t)EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx)) return 0; if (len > EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH) return 0; /* sanity check; shouldn't happen */ /* * Skip the memcpy entirely when the requested IV length is zero, * since the iv pointer may be NULL or invalid. */ if (len != 0) { if (iv == NULL) return 0; # ifdef HAVE_EVP_CIPHER_CTX_IV memcpy(iv, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv(ctx), len); # else memcpy(iv, ctx->iv, len); # endif /* HAVE_EVP_CIPHER_CTX_IV */ } return 1; } #endif /* HAVE_EVP_CIPHER_CTX_GET_IV */ #ifndef HAVE_EVP_CIPHER_CTX_SET_IV int EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_iv(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *iv, size_t len) { if (ctx == NULL) return 0; if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx) < 0) return 0; if (len != (size_t)EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx)) return 0; if (len > EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH) return 0; /* sanity check; shouldn't happen */ /* * Skip the memcpy entirely when the requested IV length is zero, * since the iv pointer may be NULL or invalid. */ if (len != 0) { if (iv == NULL) return 0; # ifdef HAVE_EVP_CIPHER_CTX_IV_NOCONST memcpy(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_noconst(ctx), iv, len); # else memcpy(ctx->iv, iv, len); # endif /* HAVE_EVP_CIPHER_CTX_IV_NOCONST */ } return 1; } #endif /* HAVE_EVP_CIPHER_CTX_SET_IV */ #ifndef HAVE_DSA_SIG_GET0 void DSA_SIG_get0(const DSA_SIG *sig, const BIGNUM **pr, const BIGNUM **ps) { if (pr != NULL) *pr = sig->r; if (ps != NULL) *ps = sig->s; } #endif /* HAVE_DSA_SIG_GET0 */ #ifndef HAVE_DSA_SIG_SET0 int DSA_SIG_set0(DSA_SIG *sig, BIGNUM *r, BIGNUM *s) { if (r == NULL || s == NULL) return 0; BN_clear_free(sig->r); sig->r = r; BN_clear_free(sig->s); sig->s = s; return 1; } #endif /* HAVE_DSA_SIG_SET0 */ #ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC #ifndef HAVE_ECDSA_SIG_GET0 void ECDSA_SIG_get0(const ECDSA_SIG *sig, const BIGNUM **pr, const BIGNUM **ps) { if (pr != NULL) *pr = sig->r; if (ps != NULL) *ps = sig->s; } #endif /* HAVE_ECDSA_SIG_GET0 */ #ifndef HAVE_ECDSA_SIG_SET0 int ECDSA_SIG_set0(ECDSA_SIG *sig, BIGNUM *r, BIGNUM *s) { if (r == NULL || s == NULL) return 0; BN_clear_free(sig->r); BN_clear_free(sig->s); sig->r = r; sig->s = s; return 1; } #endif /* HAVE_ECDSA_SIG_SET0 */ #endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */ #ifndef HAVE_DH_GET0_PQG void DH_get0_pqg(const DH *dh, const BIGNUM **p, const BIGNUM **q, const BIGNUM **g) { if (p != NULL) *p = dh->p; if (q != NULL) *q = dh->q; if (g != NULL) *g = dh->g; } #endif /* HAVE_DH_GET0_PQG */ #ifndef HAVE_DH_SET0_PQG int DH_set0_pqg(DH *dh, BIGNUM *p, BIGNUM *q, BIGNUM *g) { if ((dh->p == NULL && p == NULL) || (dh->g == NULL && g == NULL)) return 0; if (p != NULL) { BN_free(dh->p); dh->p = p; } if (q != NULL) { BN_free(dh->q); dh->q = q; } if (g != NULL) { BN_free(dh->g); dh->g = g; } return 1; } #endif /* HAVE_DH_SET0_PQG */ #ifndef HAVE_DH_GET0_KEY void DH_get0_key(const DH *dh, const BIGNUM **pub_key, const BIGNUM **priv_key) { if (pub_key != NULL) *pub_key = dh->pub_key; if (priv_key != NULL) *priv_key = dh->priv_key; } #endif /* HAVE_DH_GET0_KEY */ #ifndef HAVE_DH_SET0_KEY int DH_set0_key(DH *dh, BIGNUM *pub_key, BIGNUM *priv_key) { if (pub_key != NULL) { BN_free(dh->pub_key); dh->pub_key = pub_key; } if (priv_key != NULL) { BN_free(dh->priv_key); dh->priv_key = priv_key; } return 1; } #endif /* HAVE_DH_SET0_KEY */ #ifndef HAVE_DH_SET_LENGTH int DH_set_length(DH *dh, long length) { if (length < 0 || length > INT_MAX) return 0; dh->length = length; return 1; } #endif /* HAVE_DH_SET_LENGTH */ #ifndef HAVE_RSA_METH_FREE void RSA_meth_free(RSA_METHOD *meth) { if (meth != NULL) { free((char *)meth->name); free(meth); } } #endif /* HAVE_RSA_METH_FREE */ #ifndef HAVE_RSA_METH_DUP RSA_METHOD * RSA_meth_dup(const RSA_METHOD *meth) { RSA_METHOD *copy; if ((copy = calloc(1, sizeof(*copy))) == NULL) return NULL; memcpy(copy, meth, sizeof(*copy)); if ((copy->name = strdup(meth->name)) == NULL) { free(copy); return NULL; } return copy; } #endif /* HAVE_RSA_METH_DUP */ #ifndef HAVE_RSA_METH_SET1_NAME int RSA_meth_set1_name(RSA_METHOD *meth, const char *name) { char *copy; if ((copy = strdup(name)) == NULL) return 0; free((char *)meth->name); meth->name = copy; return 1; } #endif /* HAVE_RSA_METH_SET1_NAME */ #ifndef HAVE_RSA_METH_GET_FINISH int (*RSA_meth_get_finish(const RSA_METHOD *meth))(RSA *rsa) { return meth->finish; } #endif /* HAVE_RSA_METH_GET_FINISH */ #ifndef HAVE_RSA_METH_SET_PRIV_ENC int RSA_meth_set_priv_enc(RSA_METHOD *meth, int (*priv_enc)(int flen, const unsigned char *from, unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding)) { meth->rsa_priv_enc = priv_enc; return 1; } #endif /* HAVE_RSA_METH_SET_PRIV_ENC */ #ifndef HAVE_RSA_METH_SET_PRIV_DEC int RSA_meth_set_priv_dec(RSA_METHOD *meth, int (*priv_dec)(int flen, const unsigned char *from, unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding)) { meth->rsa_priv_dec = priv_dec; return 1; } #endif /* HAVE_RSA_METH_SET_PRIV_DEC */ #ifndef HAVE_RSA_METH_SET_FINISH int RSA_meth_set_finish(RSA_METHOD *meth, int (*finish)(RSA *rsa)) { meth->finish = finish; return 1; } #endif /* HAVE_RSA_METH_SET_FINISH */ #ifndef HAVE_EVP_PKEY_GET0_RSA RSA * EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(EVP_PKEY *pkey) { if (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_RSA) { /* EVPerror(EVP_R_EXPECTING_AN_RSA_KEY); */ return NULL; } return pkey->pkey.rsa; } #endif /* HAVE_EVP_PKEY_GET0_RSA */ #ifndef HAVE_EVP_MD_CTX_NEW EVP_MD_CTX * EVP_MD_CTX_new(void) { return calloc(1, sizeof(EVP_MD_CTX)); } #endif /* HAVE_EVP_MD_CTX_NEW */ #ifndef HAVE_EVP_MD_CTX_FREE void EVP_MD_CTX_free(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx) { if (ctx == NULL) return; EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(ctx); free(ctx); } #endif /* HAVE_EVP_MD_CTX_FREE */ #endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */ diff --git a/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/mktemp.c b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/mktemp.c index ac922c1ecbe5..cca956a51f65 100644 --- a/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/mktemp.c +++ b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/mktemp.c @@ -1,141 +1,164 @@ /* THIS FILE HAS BEEN MODIFIED FROM THE ORIGINAL OPENBSD SOURCE */ /* Changes: Removed mktemp */ /* $OpenBSD: mktemp.c,v 1.30 2010/03/21 23:09:30 schwarze Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 1996-1998, 2008 Theo de Raadt * Copyright (c) 1997, 2008-2009 Todd C. Miller * * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. * * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. */ /* OPENBSD ORIGINAL: lib/libc/stdio/mktemp.c */ #include "includes.h" #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include +#ifdef mkstemp +#undef mkstemp +#endif +int mkstemp(char *); + +/* + * From glibc man page: 'In glibc versions 2.06 and earlier, the file is + * created with permissions 0666, that is, read and write for all users.' + * Provide a wrapper to make sure the mask is reasonable (POSIX requires + * mode 0600, so mask off any other bits). + */ +int +_ssh_mkstemp(char *template) +{ + mode_t mask; + int ret; + + mask = umask(0177); + ret = mkstemp(template); + (void)umask(mask); + return ret; +} + #if !defined(HAVE_MKDTEMP) #define MKTEMP_NAME 0 #define MKTEMP_FILE 1 #define MKTEMP_DIR 2 #define TEMPCHARS "ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZabcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz0123456789" #define NUM_CHARS (sizeof(TEMPCHARS) - 1) static int mktemp_internal(char *path, int slen, int mode) { char *start, *cp, *ep; const char *tempchars = TEMPCHARS; unsigned int r, tries; struct stat sb; size_t len; int fd; len = strlen(path); if (len == 0 || slen < 0 || (size_t)slen >= len) { errno = EINVAL; return(-1); } ep = path + len - slen; tries = 1; for (start = ep; start > path && start[-1] == 'X'; start--) { if (tries < INT_MAX / NUM_CHARS) tries *= NUM_CHARS; } tries *= 2; do { for (cp = start; cp != ep; cp++) { r = arc4random_uniform(NUM_CHARS); *cp = tempchars[r]; } switch (mode) { case MKTEMP_NAME: if (lstat(path, &sb) != 0) return(errno == ENOENT ? 0 : -1); break; case MKTEMP_FILE: fd = open(path, O_CREAT|O_EXCL|O_RDWR, S_IRUSR|S_IWUSR); if (fd != -1 || errno != EEXIST) return(fd); break; case MKTEMP_DIR: if (mkdir(path, S_IRUSR|S_IWUSR|S_IXUSR) == 0) return(0); if (errno != EEXIST) return(-1); break; } } while (--tries); errno = EEXIST; return(-1); } #if 0 char *_mktemp(char *); char * _mktemp(char *path) { if (mktemp_internal(path, 0, MKTEMP_NAME) == -1) return(NULL); return(path); } __warn_references(mktemp, "warning: mktemp() possibly used unsafely; consider using mkstemp()"); char * mktemp(char *path) { return(_mktemp(path)); } #endif int mkstemp(char *path) { return(mktemp_internal(path, 0, MKTEMP_FILE)); } int mkstemps(char *path, int slen) { return(mktemp_internal(path, slen, MKTEMP_FILE)); } char * mkdtemp(char *path) { int error; error = mktemp_internal(path, 0, MKTEMP_DIR); return(error ? NULL : path); } #endif /* !defined(HAVE_MKDTEMP) */ diff --git a/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h index 895ecf9ea111..78faea9629bd 100644 --- a/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h +++ b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h @@ -1,378 +1,381 @@ /* * Copyright (c) 1999-2003 Damien Miller. All rights reserved. * Copyright (c) 2003 Ben Lindstrom. All rights reserved. * Copyright (c) 2002 Tim Rice. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. */ #ifndef _OPENBSD_COMPAT_H #define _OPENBSD_COMPAT_H #include "includes.h" #include #include #include #include /* for wchar_t */ /* OpenBSD function replacements */ #include "base64.h" #include "sigact.h" #include "readpassphrase.h" #include "vis.h" #include "getrrsetbyname.h" #include "sha1.h" #include "sha2.h" #include "md5.h" #include "blf.h" #include "fnmatch.h" #if defined(HAVE_LOGIN_CAP) && !defined(HAVE_LOGIN_GETPWCLASS) # include # define login_getpwclass(pw) login_getclass(pw->pw_class) #endif #ifndef HAVE_BASENAME char *basename(const char *path); #endif #ifndef HAVE_BINDRESVPORT_SA int bindresvport_sa(int sd, struct sockaddr *sa); #endif #ifndef HAVE_CLOSEFROM void closefrom(int); #endif #if defined(HAVE_DECL_FTRUNCATE) && HAVE_DECL_FTRUNCATE == 0 int ftruncate(int filedes, off_t length); #endif #ifndef HAVE_GETLINE #include ssize_t getline(char **, size_t *, FILE *); #endif #ifndef HAVE_GETPAGESIZE int getpagesize(void); #endif #ifndef HAVE_GETCWD char *getcwd(char *pt, size_t size); #endif #ifndef HAVE_KILLPG int killpg(pid_t, int); #endif #if defined(HAVE_DECL_MEMMEM) && HAVE_DECL_MEMMEM == 0 void *memmem(const void *, size_t, const void *, size_t); #endif #ifndef HAVE_REALLOCARRAY void *reallocarray(void *, size_t, size_t); #endif #ifndef HAVE_RECALLOCARRAY void *recallocarray(void *, size_t, size_t, size_t); #endif #ifndef HAVE_RRESVPORT_AF int rresvport_af(int *alport, sa_family_t af); #endif #ifndef HAVE_STRLCPY size_t strlcpy(char *dst, const char *src, size_t siz); #endif #ifndef HAVE_STRLCAT size_t strlcat(char *dst, const char *src, size_t siz); #endif #ifndef HAVE_STRCASESTR char *strcasestr(const char *, const char *); #endif #ifndef HAVE_STRNLEN size_t strnlen(const char *, size_t); #endif #ifndef HAVE_STRNDUP char *strndup(const char *s, size_t n); #endif #ifndef HAVE_SETENV int setenv(register const char *name, register const char *value, int rewrite); #endif #ifndef HAVE_STRMODE void strmode(int mode, char *p); #endif #ifndef HAVE_STRPTIME #include char *strptime(const char *buf, const char *fmt, struct tm *tm); #endif #if !defined(HAVE_MKDTEMP) int mkstemps(char *path, int slen); int mkstemp(char *path); char *mkdtemp(char *path); #endif +#define mkstemp(x) _ssh_mkstemp(x) +int _ssh_mkstemp(char *); + #ifndef HAVE_DAEMON int daemon(int nochdir, int noclose); #endif #ifndef HAVE_DIRNAME char *dirname(const char *path); #endif #ifndef HAVE_FMT_SCALED #define FMT_SCALED_STRSIZE 7 int fmt_scaled(long long number, char *result); #endif #ifndef HAVE_SCAN_SCALED int scan_scaled(char *, long long *); #endif #if defined(BROKEN_INET_NTOA) || !defined(HAVE_INET_NTOA) char *inet_ntoa(struct in_addr in); #endif #ifndef HAVE_INET_NTOP const char *inet_ntop(int af, const void *src, char *dst, socklen_t size); #endif #ifndef HAVE_INET_ATON int inet_aton(const char *cp, struct in_addr *addr); #endif #ifndef HAVE_STRSEP char *strsep(char **stringp, const char *delim); #endif #ifndef HAVE_SETPROCTITLE void setproctitle(const char *fmt, ...); void compat_init_setproctitle(int argc, char *argv[]); #endif #ifndef HAVE_GETGROUPLIST int getgrouplist(const char *, gid_t, gid_t *, int *); #endif #if !defined(HAVE_GETOPT) || !defined(HAVE_GETOPT_OPTRESET) int BSDgetopt(int argc, char * const *argv, const char *opts); #include "openbsd-compat/getopt.h" #endif #if ((defined(HAVE_DECL_READV) && HAVE_DECL_READV == 0) || \ (defined(HAVE_DECL_WRITEV) && HAVE_DECL_WRITEV == 0)) # include # include # if defined(HAVE_DECL_READV) && HAVE_DECL_READV == 0 int readv(int, struct iovec *, int); # endif # if defined(HAVE_DECL_WRITEV) && HAVE_DECL_WRITEV == 0 int writev(int, struct iovec *, int); # endif #endif /* Home grown routines */ #include "bsd-signal.h" #include "bsd-misc.h" #include "bsd-setres_id.h" #include "bsd-statvfs.h" #include "bsd-waitpid.h" #include "bsd-poll.h" #if defined(HAVE_DECL_GETPEEREID) && HAVE_DECL_GETPEEREID == 0 int getpeereid(int , uid_t *, gid_t *); #endif #ifndef HAVE_ARC4RANDOM uint32_t arc4random(void); #endif /* !HAVE_ARC4RANDOM */ #ifndef HAVE_ARC4RANDOM_BUF void arc4random_buf(void *, size_t); #endif #ifndef HAVE_ARC4RANDOM_STIR # define arc4random_stir() #endif #ifndef HAVE_ARC4RANDOM_UNIFORM uint32_t arc4random_uniform(uint32_t); #endif #ifndef HAVE_ASPRINTF int asprintf(char **, const char *, ...); #endif #ifndef HAVE_OPENPTY # include /* for struct winsize */ int openpty(int *, int *, char *, struct termios *, struct winsize *); #endif /* HAVE_OPENPTY */ #ifndef HAVE_SNPRINTF int snprintf(char *, size_t, SNPRINTF_CONST char *, ...); #endif #ifndef HAVE_STRTOLL long long strtoll(const char *, char **, int); #endif #ifndef HAVE_STRTOUL unsigned long strtoul(const char *, char **, int); #endif #ifndef HAVE_STRTOULL unsigned long long strtoull(const char *, char **, int); #endif #ifndef HAVE_STRTONUM long long strtonum(const char *, long long, long long, const char **); #endif /* multibyte character support */ #ifndef HAVE_MBLEN # define mblen(x, y) (1) #endif #ifndef HAVE_WCWIDTH # define wcwidth(x) (((x) >= 0x20 && (x) <= 0x7e) ? 1 : -1) /* force our no-op nl_langinfo and mbtowc */ # undef HAVE_NL_LANGINFO # undef HAVE_MBTOWC # undef HAVE_LANGINFO_H #endif #ifndef HAVE_NL_LANGINFO # define nl_langinfo(x) "" #endif #ifndef HAVE_MBTOWC int mbtowc(wchar_t *, const char*, size_t); #endif #if !defined(HAVE_VASPRINTF) || !defined(HAVE_VSNPRINTF) # include #endif /* * Some platforms unconditionally undefine va_copy() so we define VA_COPY() * instead. This is known to be the case on at least some configurations of * AIX with the xlc compiler. */ #ifndef VA_COPY # ifdef HAVE_VA_COPY # define VA_COPY(dest, src) va_copy(dest, src) # else # ifdef HAVE___VA_COPY # define VA_COPY(dest, src) __va_copy(dest, src) # else # define VA_COPY(dest, src) (dest) = (src) # endif # endif #endif #ifndef HAVE_VASPRINTF int vasprintf(char **, const char *, va_list); #endif #ifndef HAVE_VSNPRINTF int vsnprintf(char *, size_t, const char *, va_list); #endif #ifndef HAVE_USER_FROM_UID char *user_from_uid(uid_t, int); #endif #ifndef HAVE_GROUP_FROM_GID char *group_from_gid(gid_t, int); #endif #ifndef HAVE_TIMINGSAFE_BCMP int timingsafe_bcmp(const void *, const void *, size_t); #endif #ifndef HAVE_BCRYPT_PBKDF int bcrypt_pbkdf(const char *, size_t, const uint8_t *, size_t, uint8_t *, size_t, unsigned int); #endif #ifndef HAVE_EXPLICIT_BZERO void explicit_bzero(void *p, size_t n); #endif #ifndef HAVE_FREEZERO void freezero(void *, size_t); #endif #ifndef HAVE_LOCALTIME_R struct tm *localtime_r(const time_t *, struct tm *); #endif #ifndef HAVE_TIMEGM #include time_t timegm(struct tm *); #endif char *xcrypt(const char *password, const char *salt); char *shadow_pw(struct passwd *pw); /* rfc2553 socket API replacements */ #include "fake-rfc2553.h" /* Routines for a single OS platform */ #include "bsd-cygwin_util.h" #include "port-aix.h" #include "port-irix.h" #include "port-linux.h" #include "port-solaris.h" #include "port-net.h" #include "port-uw.h" /* _FORTIFY_SOURCE breaks FD_ISSET(n)/FD_SET(n) for n > FD_SETSIZE. Avoid. */ #if defined(HAVE_FEATURES_H) && defined(_FORTIFY_SOURCE) # include # if defined(__GNU_LIBRARY__) && defined(__GLIBC_PREREQ) # if __GLIBC_PREREQ(2, 15) && (_FORTIFY_SOURCE > 0) # include /* Ensure include guard is defined */ # undef FD_SET # undef FD_ISSET # define FD_SET(n, set) kludge_FD_SET(n, set) # define FD_ISSET(n, set) kludge_FD_ISSET(n, set) void kludge_FD_SET(int, fd_set *); int kludge_FD_ISSET(int, fd_set *); # endif /* __GLIBC_PREREQ(2, 15) && (_FORTIFY_SOURCE > 0) */ # endif /* __GNU_LIBRARY__ && __GLIBC_PREREQ */ #endif /* HAVE_FEATURES_H && _FORTIFY_SOURCE */ #endif /* _OPENBSD_COMPAT_H */ diff --git a/crypto/openssh/packet.c b/crypto/openssh/packet.c index 740d0b146098..3f885c3d01d1 100644 --- a/crypto/openssh/packet.c +++ b/crypto/openssh/packet.c @@ -1,2721 +1,2721 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: packet.c,v 1.308 2022/08/31 02:56:40 djm Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: packet.c,v 1.309 2023/03/03 10:23:42 dtucker Exp $ */ /* * Author: Tatu Ylonen * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen , Espoo, Finland * All rights reserved * This file contains code implementing the packet protocol and communication * with the other side. This same code is used both on client and server side. * * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell". * * * SSH2 packet format added by Markus Friedl. * Copyright (c) 2000, 2001 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. */ #include "includes.h" #include #include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h" #include #ifdef HAVE_SYS_TIME_H # include #endif #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #ifdef HAVE_POLL_H #include #endif #include #include /* * Explicitly include OpenSSL before zlib as some versions of OpenSSL have * "free_func" in their headers, which zlib typedefs. */ #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL # include # include # ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC # include # endif #endif #ifdef WITH_ZLIB #include #endif #include "xmalloc.h" #include "compat.h" #include "ssh2.h" #include "cipher.h" #include "sshkey.h" #include "kex.h" #include "digest.h" #include "mac.h" #include "log.h" #include "canohost.h" #include "misc.h" #include "channels.h" #include "ssh.h" #include "packet.h" #include "ssherr.h" #include "sshbuf.h" #include "blacklist_client.h" #ifdef PACKET_DEBUG #define DBG(x) x #else #define DBG(x) #endif #define PACKET_MAX_SIZE (256 * 1024) struct packet_state { u_int32_t seqnr; u_int32_t packets; u_int64_t blocks; u_int64_t bytes; }; struct packet { TAILQ_ENTRY(packet) next; u_char type; struct sshbuf *payload; }; struct session_state { /* * This variable contains the file descriptors used for * communicating with the other side. connection_in is used for * reading; connection_out for writing. These can be the same * descriptor, in which case it is assumed to be a socket. */ int connection_in; int connection_out; /* Protocol flags for the remote side. */ u_int remote_protocol_flags; /* Encryption context for receiving data. Only used for decryption. */ struct sshcipher_ctx *receive_context; /* Encryption context for sending data. Only used for encryption. */ struct sshcipher_ctx *send_context; /* Buffer for raw input data from the socket. */ struct sshbuf *input; /* Buffer for raw output data going to the socket. */ struct sshbuf *output; /* Buffer for the partial outgoing packet being constructed. */ struct sshbuf *outgoing_packet; /* Buffer for the incoming packet currently being processed. */ struct sshbuf *incoming_packet; /* Scratch buffer for packet compression/decompression. */ struct sshbuf *compression_buffer; #ifdef WITH_ZLIB /* Incoming/outgoing compression dictionaries */ z_stream compression_in_stream; z_stream compression_out_stream; #endif int compression_in_started; int compression_out_started; int compression_in_failures; int compression_out_failures; /* default maximum packet size */ u_int max_packet_size; /* Flag indicating whether this module has been initialized. */ int initialized; /* Set to true if the connection is interactive. */ int interactive_mode; /* Set to true if we are the server side. */ int server_side; /* Set to true if we are authenticated. */ int after_authentication; int keep_alive_timeouts; /* The maximum time that we will wait to send or receive a packet */ int packet_timeout_ms; /* Session key information for Encryption and MAC */ struct newkeys *newkeys[MODE_MAX]; struct packet_state p_read, p_send; /* Volume-based rekeying */ u_int64_t max_blocks_in, max_blocks_out, rekey_limit; /* Time-based rekeying */ u_int32_t rekey_interval; /* how often in seconds */ time_t rekey_time; /* time of last rekeying */ /* roundup current message to extra_pad bytes */ u_char extra_pad; /* XXX discard incoming data after MAC error */ u_int packet_discard; size_t packet_discard_mac_already; struct sshmac *packet_discard_mac; /* Used in packet_read_poll2() */ u_int packlen; /* Used in packet_send2 */ int rekeying; /* Used in ssh_packet_send_mux() */ int mux; /* Used in packet_set_interactive */ int set_interactive_called; /* Used in packet_set_maxsize */ int set_maxsize_called; /* One-off warning about weak ciphers */ int cipher_warning_done; /* Hook for fuzzing inbound packets */ ssh_packet_hook_fn *hook_in; void *hook_in_ctx; TAILQ_HEAD(, packet) outgoing; }; struct ssh * ssh_alloc_session_state(void) { struct ssh *ssh = NULL; struct session_state *state = NULL; if ((ssh = calloc(1, sizeof(*ssh))) == NULL || (state = calloc(1, sizeof(*state))) == NULL || (ssh->kex = kex_new()) == NULL || (state->input = sshbuf_new()) == NULL || (state->output = sshbuf_new()) == NULL || (state->outgoing_packet = sshbuf_new()) == NULL || (state->incoming_packet = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) goto fail; TAILQ_INIT(&state->outgoing); TAILQ_INIT(&ssh->private_keys); TAILQ_INIT(&ssh->public_keys); state->connection_in = -1; state->connection_out = -1; state->max_packet_size = 32768; state->packet_timeout_ms = -1; state->p_send.packets = state->p_read.packets = 0; state->initialized = 1; /* * ssh_packet_send2() needs to queue packets until * we've done the initial key exchange. */ state->rekeying = 1; ssh->state = state; return ssh; fail: if (ssh) { kex_free(ssh->kex); free(ssh); } if (state) { sshbuf_free(state->input); sshbuf_free(state->output); sshbuf_free(state->incoming_packet); sshbuf_free(state->outgoing_packet); free(state); } return NULL; } void ssh_packet_set_input_hook(struct ssh *ssh, ssh_packet_hook_fn *hook, void *ctx) { ssh->state->hook_in = hook; ssh->state->hook_in_ctx = ctx; } /* Returns nonzero if rekeying is in progress */ int ssh_packet_is_rekeying(struct ssh *ssh) { return ssh->state->rekeying || (ssh->kex != NULL && ssh->kex->done == 0); } /* * Sets the descriptors used for communication. */ struct ssh * ssh_packet_set_connection(struct ssh *ssh, int fd_in, int fd_out) { struct session_state *state; const struct sshcipher *none = cipher_by_name("none"); int r; if (none == NULL) { error_f("cannot load cipher 'none'"); return NULL; } if (ssh == NULL) ssh = ssh_alloc_session_state(); if (ssh == NULL) { error_f("could not allocate state"); return NULL; } state = ssh->state; state->connection_in = fd_in; state->connection_out = fd_out; if ((r = cipher_init(&state->send_context, none, (const u_char *)"", 0, NULL, 0, CIPHER_ENCRYPT)) != 0 || (r = cipher_init(&state->receive_context, none, (const u_char *)"", 0, NULL, 0, CIPHER_DECRYPT)) != 0) { error_fr(r, "cipher_init failed"); free(ssh); /* XXX need ssh_free_session_state? */ return NULL; } state->newkeys[MODE_IN] = state->newkeys[MODE_OUT] = NULL; /* * Cache the IP address of the remote connection for use in error * messages that might be generated after the connection has closed. */ (void)ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh); return ssh; } void ssh_packet_set_timeout(struct ssh *ssh, int timeout, int count) { struct session_state *state = ssh->state; if (timeout <= 0 || count <= 0) { state->packet_timeout_ms = -1; return; } if ((INT_MAX / 1000) / count < timeout) state->packet_timeout_ms = INT_MAX; else state->packet_timeout_ms = timeout * count * 1000; } void ssh_packet_set_mux(struct ssh *ssh) { ssh->state->mux = 1; ssh->state->rekeying = 0; kex_free(ssh->kex); ssh->kex = NULL; } int ssh_packet_get_mux(struct ssh *ssh) { return ssh->state->mux; } int ssh_packet_set_log_preamble(struct ssh *ssh, const char *fmt, ...) { va_list args; int r; free(ssh->log_preamble); if (fmt == NULL) ssh->log_preamble = NULL; else { va_start(args, fmt); r = vasprintf(&ssh->log_preamble, fmt, args); va_end(args); if (r < 0 || ssh->log_preamble == NULL) return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; } return 0; } int ssh_packet_stop_discard(struct ssh *ssh) { struct session_state *state = ssh->state; int r; if (state->packet_discard_mac) { char buf[1024]; size_t dlen = PACKET_MAX_SIZE; if (dlen > state->packet_discard_mac_already) dlen -= state->packet_discard_mac_already; memset(buf, 'a', sizeof(buf)); while (sshbuf_len(state->incoming_packet) < dlen) if ((r = sshbuf_put(state->incoming_packet, buf, sizeof(buf))) != 0) return r; (void) mac_compute(state->packet_discard_mac, state->p_read.seqnr, sshbuf_ptr(state->incoming_packet), dlen, NULL, 0); } logit("Finished discarding for %.200s port %d", ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), ssh_remote_port(ssh)); return SSH_ERR_MAC_INVALID; } static int ssh_packet_start_discard(struct ssh *ssh, struct sshenc *enc, struct sshmac *mac, size_t mac_already, u_int discard) { struct session_state *state = ssh->state; int r; if (enc == NULL || !cipher_is_cbc(enc->cipher) || (mac && mac->etm)) { if ((r = sshpkt_disconnect(ssh, "Packet corrupt")) != 0) return r; return SSH_ERR_MAC_INVALID; } /* * Record number of bytes over which the mac has already * been computed in order to minimize timing attacks. */ if (mac && mac->enabled) { state->packet_discard_mac = mac; state->packet_discard_mac_already = mac_already; } if (sshbuf_len(state->input) >= discard) return ssh_packet_stop_discard(ssh); state->packet_discard = discard - sshbuf_len(state->input); return 0; } /* Returns 1 if remote host is connected via socket, 0 if not. */ int ssh_packet_connection_is_on_socket(struct ssh *ssh) { struct session_state *state; struct sockaddr_storage from, to; socklen_t fromlen, tolen; if (ssh == NULL || ssh->state == NULL) return 0; state = ssh->state; if (state->connection_in == -1 || state->connection_out == -1) return 0; /* filedescriptors in and out are the same, so it's a socket */ if (state->connection_in == state->connection_out) return 1; fromlen = sizeof(from); memset(&from, 0, sizeof(from)); if (getpeername(state->connection_in, (struct sockaddr *)&from, &fromlen) == -1) return 0; tolen = sizeof(to); memset(&to, 0, sizeof(to)); if (getpeername(state->connection_out, (struct sockaddr *)&to, &tolen) == -1) return 0; if (fromlen != tolen || memcmp(&from, &to, fromlen) != 0) return 0; if (from.ss_family != AF_INET && from.ss_family != AF_INET6) return 0; return 1; } void ssh_packet_get_bytes(struct ssh *ssh, u_int64_t *ibytes, u_int64_t *obytes) { if (ibytes) *ibytes = ssh->state->p_read.bytes; if (obytes) *obytes = ssh->state->p_send.bytes; } int ssh_packet_connection_af(struct ssh *ssh) { return get_sock_af(ssh->state->connection_out); } /* Sets the connection into non-blocking mode. */ void ssh_packet_set_nonblocking(struct ssh *ssh) { /* Set the socket into non-blocking mode. */ set_nonblock(ssh->state->connection_in); if (ssh->state->connection_out != ssh->state->connection_in) set_nonblock(ssh->state->connection_out); } /* Returns the socket used for reading. */ int ssh_packet_get_connection_in(struct ssh *ssh) { return ssh->state->connection_in; } /* Returns the descriptor used for writing. */ int ssh_packet_get_connection_out(struct ssh *ssh) { return ssh->state->connection_out; } /* * Returns the IP-address of the remote host as a string. The returned * string must not be freed. */ const char * ssh_remote_ipaddr(struct ssh *ssh) { int sock; /* Check whether we have cached the ipaddr. */ if (ssh->remote_ipaddr == NULL) { if (ssh_packet_connection_is_on_socket(ssh)) { sock = ssh->state->connection_in; ssh->remote_ipaddr = get_peer_ipaddr(sock); ssh->remote_port = get_peer_port(sock); ssh->local_ipaddr = get_local_ipaddr(sock); ssh->local_port = get_local_port(sock); } else { ssh->remote_ipaddr = xstrdup("UNKNOWN"); ssh->remote_port = 65535; ssh->local_ipaddr = xstrdup("UNKNOWN"); ssh->local_port = 65535; } } return ssh->remote_ipaddr; } /* Returns the port number of the remote host. */ int ssh_remote_port(struct ssh *ssh) { (void)ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh); /* Will lookup and cache. */ return ssh->remote_port; } /* * Returns the IP-address of the local host as a string. The returned * string must not be freed. */ const char * ssh_local_ipaddr(struct ssh *ssh) { (void)ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh); /* Will lookup and cache. */ return ssh->local_ipaddr; } /* Returns the port number of the local host. */ int ssh_local_port(struct ssh *ssh) { (void)ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh); /* Will lookup and cache. */ return ssh->local_port; } /* Returns the routing domain of the input socket, or NULL if unavailable */ const char * ssh_packet_rdomain_in(struct ssh *ssh) { if (ssh->rdomain_in != NULL) return ssh->rdomain_in; if (!ssh_packet_connection_is_on_socket(ssh)) return NULL; ssh->rdomain_in = get_rdomain(ssh->state->connection_in); return ssh->rdomain_in; } /* Closes the connection and clears and frees internal data structures. */ static void ssh_packet_close_internal(struct ssh *ssh, int do_close) { struct session_state *state = ssh->state; u_int mode; if (!state->initialized) return; state->initialized = 0; if (do_close) { if (state->connection_in == state->connection_out) { close(state->connection_out); } else { close(state->connection_in); close(state->connection_out); } } sshbuf_free(state->input); sshbuf_free(state->output); sshbuf_free(state->outgoing_packet); sshbuf_free(state->incoming_packet); for (mode = 0; mode < MODE_MAX; mode++) { kex_free_newkeys(state->newkeys[mode]); /* current keys */ state->newkeys[mode] = NULL; ssh_clear_newkeys(ssh, mode); /* next keys */ } #ifdef WITH_ZLIB /* compression state is in shared mem, so we can only release it once */ if (do_close && state->compression_buffer) { sshbuf_free(state->compression_buffer); if (state->compression_out_started) { z_streamp stream = &state->compression_out_stream; debug("compress outgoing: " "raw data %llu, compressed %llu, factor %.2f", (unsigned long long)stream->total_in, (unsigned long long)stream->total_out, stream->total_in == 0 ? 0.0 : (double) stream->total_out / stream->total_in); if (state->compression_out_failures == 0) deflateEnd(stream); } if (state->compression_in_started) { z_streamp stream = &state->compression_in_stream; debug("compress incoming: " "raw data %llu, compressed %llu, factor %.2f", (unsigned long long)stream->total_out, (unsigned long long)stream->total_in, stream->total_out == 0 ? 0.0 : (double) stream->total_in / stream->total_out); if (state->compression_in_failures == 0) inflateEnd(stream); } } #endif /* WITH_ZLIB */ cipher_free(state->send_context); cipher_free(state->receive_context); state->send_context = state->receive_context = NULL; if (do_close) { free(ssh->local_ipaddr); ssh->local_ipaddr = NULL; free(ssh->remote_ipaddr); ssh->remote_ipaddr = NULL; free(ssh->state); ssh->state = NULL; kex_free(ssh->kex); ssh->kex = NULL; } } void ssh_packet_close(struct ssh *ssh) { ssh_packet_close_internal(ssh, 1); } void ssh_packet_clear_keys(struct ssh *ssh) { ssh_packet_close_internal(ssh, 0); } /* Sets remote side protocol flags. */ void ssh_packet_set_protocol_flags(struct ssh *ssh, u_int protocol_flags) { ssh->state->remote_protocol_flags = protocol_flags; } /* Returns the remote protocol flags set earlier by the above function. */ u_int ssh_packet_get_protocol_flags(struct ssh *ssh) { return ssh->state->remote_protocol_flags; } /* * Starts packet compression from the next packet on in both directions. * Level is compression level 1 (fastest) - 9 (slow, best) as in gzip. */ static int ssh_packet_init_compression(struct ssh *ssh) { if (!ssh->state->compression_buffer && ((ssh->state->compression_buffer = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)) return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; return 0; } #ifdef WITH_ZLIB static int start_compression_out(struct ssh *ssh, int level) { if (level < 1 || level > 9) return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; debug("Enabling compression at level %d.", level); if (ssh->state->compression_out_started == 1) deflateEnd(&ssh->state->compression_out_stream); switch (deflateInit(&ssh->state->compression_out_stream, level)) { case Z_OK: ssh->state->compression_out_started = 1; break; case Z_MEM_ERROR: return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; default: return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; } return 0; } static int start_compression_in(struct ssh *ssh) { if (ssh->state->compression_in_started == 1) inflateEnd(&ssh->state->compression_in_stream); switch (inflateInit(&ssh->state->compression_in_stream)) { case Z_OK: ssh->state->compression_in_started = 1; break; case Z_MEM_ERROR: return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; default: return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; } return 0; } /* XXX remove need for separate compression buffer */ static int compress_buffer(struct ssh *ssh, struct sshbuf *in, struct sshbuf *out) { u_char buf[4096]; int r, status; if (ssh->state->compression_out_started != 1) return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; /* This case is not handled below. */ if (sshbuf_len(in) == 0) return 0; /* Input is the contents of the input buffer. */ if ((ssh->state->compression_out_stream.next_in = sshbuf_mutable_ptr(in)) == NULL) return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; ssh->state->compression_out_stream.avail_in = sshbuf_len(in); /* Loop compressing until deflate() returns with avail_out != 0. */ do { /* Set up fixed-size output buffer. */ ssh->state->compression_out_stream.next_out = buf; ssh->state->compression_out_stream.avail_out = sizeof(buf); /* Compress as much data into the buffer as possible. */ status = deflate(&ssh->state->compression_out_stream, Z_PARTIAL_FLUSH); switch (status) { case Z_MEM_ERROR: return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; case Z_OK: /* Append compressed data to output_buffer. */ if ((r = sshbuf_put(out, buf, sizeof(buf) - ssh->state->compression_out_stream.avail_out)) != 0) return r; break; case Z_STREAM_ERROR: default: ssh->state->compression_out_failures++; return SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; } } while (ssh->state->compression_out_stream.avail_out == 0); return 0; } static int uncompress_buffer(struct ssh *ssh, struct sshbuf *in, struct sshbuf *out) { u_char buf[4096]; int r, status; if (ssh->state->compression_in_started != 1) return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; if ((ssh->state->compression_in_stream.next_in = sshbuf_mutable_ptr(in)) == NULL) return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; ssh->state->compression_in_stream.avail_in = sshbuf_len(in); for (;;) { /* Set up fixed-size output buffer. */ ssh->state->compression_in_stream.next_out = buf; ssh->state->compression_in_stream.avail_out = sizeof(buf); status = inflate(&ssh->state->compression_in_stream, Z_SYNC_FLUSH); switch (status) { case Z_OK: if ((r = sshbuf_put(out, buf, sizeof(buf) - ssh->state->compression_in_stream.avail_out)) != 0) return r; break; case Z_BUF_ERROR: /* * Comments in zlib.h say that we should keep calling * inflate() until we get an error. This appears to * be the error that we get. */ return 0; case Z_DATA_ERROR: return SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; case Z_MEM_ERROR: return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; case Z_STREAM_ERROR: default: ssh->state->compression_in_failures++; return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; } } /* NOTREACHED */ } #else /* WITH_ZLIB */ static int start_compression_out(struct ssh *ssh, int level) { return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; } static int start_compression_in(struct ssh *ssh) { return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; } static int compress_buffer(struct ssh *ssh, struct sshbuf *in, struct sshbuf *out) { return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; } static int uncompress_buffer(struct ssh *ssh, struct sshbuf *in, struct sshbuf *out) { return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; } #endif /* WITH_ZLIB */ void ssh_clear_newkeys(struct ssh *ssh, int mode) { if (ssh->kex && ssh->kex->newkeys[mode]) { kex_free_newkeys(ssh->kex->newkeys[mode]); ssh->kex->newkeys[mode] = NULL; } } int ssh_set_newkeys(struct ssh *ssh, int mode) { struct session_state *state = ssh->state; struct sshenc *enc; struct sshmac *mac; struct sshcomp *comp; struct sshcipher_ctx **ccp; struct packet_state *ps; u_int64_t *max_blocks; const char *wmsg; int r, crypt_type; const char *dir = mode == MODE_OUT ? "out" : "in"; debug2_f("mode %d", mode); if (mode == MODE_OUT) { ccp = &state->send_context; crypt_type = CIPHER_ENCRYPT; ps = &state->p_send; max_blocks = &state->max_blocks_out; } else { ccp = &state->receive_context; crypt_type = CIPHER_DECRYPT; ps = &state->p_read; max_blocks = &state->max_blocks_in; } if (state->newkeys[mode] != NULL) { debug_f("rekeying %s, input %llu bytes %llu blocks, " "output %llu bytes %llu blocks", dir, (unsigned long long)state->p_read.bytes, (unsigned long long)state->p_read.blocks, (unsigned long long)state->p_send.bytes, (unsigned long long)state->p_send.blocks); kex_free_newkeys(state->newkeys[mode]); state->newkeys[mode] = NULL; } /* note that both bytes and the seqnr are not reset */ ps->packets = ps->blocks = 0; /* move newkeys from kex to state */ if ((state->newkeys[mode] = ssh->kex->newkeys[mode]) == NULL) return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; ssh->kex->newkeys[mode] = NULL; enc = &state->newkeys[mode]->enc; mac = &state->newkeys[mode]->mac; comp = &state->newkeys[mode]->comp; if (cipher_authlen(enc->cipher) == 0) { if ((r = mac_init(mac)) != 0) return r; } mac->enabled = 1; DBG(debug_f("cipher_init: %s", dir)); cipher_free(*ccp); *ccp = NULL; if ((r = cipher_init(ccp, enc->cipher, enc->key, enc->key_len, enc->iv, enc->iv_len, crypt_type)) != 0) return r; if (!state->cipher_warning_done && (wmsg = cipher_warning_message(*ccp)) != NULL) { error("Warning: %s", wmsg); state->cipher_warning_done = 1; } /* Deleting the keys does not gain extra security */ /* explicit_bzero(enc->iv, enc->block_size); explicit_bzero(enc->key, enc->key_len); explicit_bzero(mac->key, mac->key_len); */ if ((comp->type == COMP_ZLIB || (comp->type == COMP_DELAYED && state->after_authentication)) && comp->enabled == 0) { if ((r = ssh_packet_init_compression(ssh)) < 0) return r; if (mode == MODE_OUT) { if ((r = start_compression_out(ssh, 6)) != 0) return r; } else { if ((r = start_compression_in(ssh)) != 0) return r; } comp->enabled = 1; } /* * The 2^(blocksize*2) limit is too expensive for 3DES, * so enforce a 1GB limit for small blocksizes. * See RFC4344 section 3.2. */ if (enc->block_size >= 16) *max_blocks = (u_int64_t)1 << (enc->block_size*2); else *max_blocks = ((u_int64_t)1 << 30) / enc->block_size; if (state->rekey_limit) *max_blocks = MINIMUM(*max_blocks, state->rekey_limit / enc->block_size); debug("rekey %s after %llu blocks", dir, (unsigned long long)*max_blocks); return 0; } #define MAX_PACKETS (1U<<31) static int ssh_packet_need_rekeying(struct ssh *ssh, u_int outbound_packet_len) { struct session_state *state = ssh->state; u_int32_t out_blocks; /* XXX client can't cope with rekeying pre-auth */ if (!state->after_authentication) return 0; /* Haven't keyed yet or KEX in progress. */ if (ssh_packet_is_rekeying(ssh)) return 0; /* Peer can't rekey */ if (ssh->compat & SSH_BUG_NOREKEY) return 0; /* * Permit one packet in or out per rekey - this allows us to * make progress when rekey limits are very small. */ if (state->p_send.packets == 0 && state->p_read.packets == 0) return 0; /* Time-based rekeying */ if (state->rekey_interval != 0 && (int64_t)state->rekey_time + state->rekey_interval <= monotime()) return 1; /* * Always rekey when MAX_PACKETS sent in either direction * As per RFC4344 section 3.1 we do this after 2^31 packets. */ if (state->p_send.packets > MAX_PACKETS || state->p_read.packets > MAX_PACKETS) return 1; /* Rekey after (cipher-specific) maximum blocks */ out_blocks = ROUNDUP(outbound_packet_len, state->newkeys[MODE_OUT]->enc.block_size); return (state->max_blocks_out && (state->p_send.blocks + out_blocks > state->max_blocks_out)) || (state->max_blocks_in && (state->p_read.blocks > state->max_blocks_in)); } int ssh_packet_check_rekey(struct ssh *ssh) { if (!ssh_packet_need_rekeying(ssh, 0)) return 0; debug3_f("rekex triggered"); return kex_start_rekex(ssh); } /* * Delayed compression for SSH2 is enabled after authentication: * This happens on the server side after a SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_SUCCESS is sent, * and on the client side after a SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_SUCCESS is received. */ static int ssh_packet_enable_delayed_compress(struct ssh *ssh) { struct session_state *state = ssh->state; struct sshcomp *comp = NULL; int r, mode; /* * Remember that we are past the authentication step, so rekeying * with COMP_DELAYED will turn on compression immediately. */ state->after_authentication = 1; for (mode = 0; mode < MODE_MAX; mode++) { /* protocol error: USERAUTH_SUCCESS received before NEWKEYS */ if (state->newkeys[mode] == NULL) continue; comp = &state->newkeys[mode]->comp; if (comp && !comp->enabled && comp->type == COMP_DELAYED) { if ((r = ssh_packet_init_compression(ssh)) != 0) return r; if (mode == MODE_OUT) { if ((r = start_compression_out(ssh, 6)) != 0) return r; } else { if ((r = start_compression_in(ssh)) != 0) return r; } comp->enabled = 1; } } return 0; } /* Used to mute debug logging for noisy packet types */ int ssh_packet_log_type(u_char type) { switch (type) { case SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA: case SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_EXTENDED_DATA: case SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_WINDOW_ADJUST: return 0; default: return 1; } } /* * Finalize packet in SSH2 format (compress, mac, encrypt, enqueue) */ int ssh_packet_send2_wrapped(struct ssh *ssh) { struct session_state *state = ssh->state; u_char type, *cp, macbuf[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH]; u_char tmp, padlen, pad = 0; u_int authlen = 0, aadlen = 0; u_int len; struct sshenc *enc = NULL; struct sshmac *mac = NULL; struct sshcomp *comp = NULL; int r, block_size; if (state->newkeys[MODE_OUT] != NULL) { enc = &state->newkeys[MODE_OUT]->enc; mac = &state->newkeys[MODE_OUT]->mac; comp = &state->newkeys[MODE_OUT]->comp; /* disable mac for authenticated encryption */ if ((authlen = cipher_authlen(enc->cipher)) != 0) mac = NULL; } block_size = enc ? enc->block_size : 8; aadlen = (mac && mac->enabled && mac->etm) || authlen ? 4 : 0; type = (sshbuf_ptr(state->outgoing_packet))[5]; if (ssh_packet_log_type(type)) debug3("send packet: type %u", type); #ifdef PACKET_DEBUG fprintf(stderr, "plain: "); sshbuf_dump(state->outgoing_packet, stderr); #endif if (comp && comp->enabled) { len = sshbuf_len(state->outgoing_packet); /* skip header, compress only payload */ if ((r = sshbuf_consume(state->outgoing_packet, 5)) != 0) goto out; sshbuf_reset(state->compression_buffer); if ((r = compress_buffer(ssh, state->outgoing_packet, state->compression_buffer)) != 0) goto out; sshbuf_reset(state->outgoing_packet); if ((r = sshbuf_put(state->outgoing_packet, "\0\0\0\0\0", 5)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_putb(state->outgoing_packet, state->compression_buffer)) != 0) goto out; DBG(debug("compression: raw %d compressed %zd", len, sshbuf_len(state->outgoing_packet))); } /* sizeof (packet_len + pad_len + payload) */ len = sshbuf_len(state->outgoing_packet); /* * calc size of padding, alloc space, get random data, * minimum padding is 4 bytes */ len -= aadlen; /* packet length is not encrypted for EtM modes */ padlen = block_size - (len % block_size); if (padlen < 4) padlen += block_size; if (state->extra_pad) { tmp = state->extra_pad; state->extra_pad = ROUNDUP(state->extra_pad, block_size); /* check if roundup overflowed */ if (state->extra_pad < tmp) return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; tmp = (len + padlen) % state->extra_pad; /* Check whether pad calculation below will underflow */ if (tmp > state->extra_pad) return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; pad = state->extra_pad - tmp; DBG(debug3_f("adding %d (len %d padlen %d extra_pad %d)", pad, len, padlen, state->extra_pad)); tmp = padlen; padlen += pad; /* Check whether padlen calculation overflowed */ if (padlen < tmp) return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; /* overflow */ state->extra_pad = 0; } if ((r = sshbuf_reserve(state->outgoing_packet, padlen, &cp)) != 0) goto out; if (enc && !cipher_ctx_is_plaintext(state->send_context)) { /* random padding */ arc4random_buf(cp, padlen); } else { /* clear padding */ explicit_bzero(cp, padlen); } /* sizeof (packet_len + pad_len + payload + padding) */ len = sshbuf_len(state->outgoing_packet); cp = sshbuf_mutable_ptr(state->outgoing_packet); if (cp == NULL) { r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; goto out; } /* packet_length includes payload, padding and padding length field */ POKE_U32(cp, len - 4); cp[4] = padlen; DBG(debug("send: len %d (includes padlen %d, aadlen %d)", len, padlen, aadlen)); /* compute MAC over seqnr and packet(length fields, payload, padding) */ if (mac && mac->enabled && !mac->etm) { if ((r = mac_compute(mac, state->p_send.seqnr, sshbuf_ptr(state->outgoing_packet), len, macbuf, sizeof(macbuf))) != 0) goto out; DBG(debug("done calc MAC out #%d", state->p_send.seqnr)); } /* encrypt packet and append to output buffer. */ if ((r = sshbuf_reserve(state->output, sshbuf_len(state->outgoing_packet) + authlen, &cp)) != 0) goto out; if ((r = cipher_crypt(state->send_context, state->p_send.seqnr, cp, sshbuf_ptr(state->outgoing_packet), len - aadlen, aadlen, authlen)) != 0) goto out; /* append unencrypted MAC */ if (mac && mac->enabled) { if (mac->etm) { /* EtM: compute mac over aadlen + cipher text */ if ((r = mac_compute(mac, state->p_send.seqnr, cp, len, macbuf, sizeof(macbuf))) != 0) goto out; DBG(debug("done calc MAC(EtM) out #%d", state->p_send.seqnr)); } if ((r = sshbuf_put(state->output, macbuf, mac->mac_len)) != 0) goto out; } #ifdef PACKET_DEBUG fprintf(stderr, "encrypted: "); sshbuf_dump(state->output, stderr); #endif /* increment sequence number for outgoing packets */ if (++state->p_send.seqnr == 0) logit("outgoing seqnr wraps around"); if (++state->p_send.packets == 0) if (!(ssh->compat & SSH_BUG_NOREKEY)) return SSH_ERR_NEED_REKEY; state->p_send.blocks += len / block_size; state->p_send.bytes += len; sshbuf_reset(state->outgoing_packet); if (type == SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS) r = ssh_set_newkeys(ssh, MODE_OUT); else if (type == SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_SUCCESS && state->server_side) r = ssh_packet_enable_delayed_compress(ssh); else r = 0; out: return r; } /* returns non-zero if the specified packet type is usec by KEX */ static int ssh_packet_type_is_kex(u_char type) { return type >= SSH2_MSG_TRANSPORT_MIN && type <= SSH2_MSG_TRANSPORT_MAX && type != SSH2_MSG_SERVICE_REQUEST && type != SSH2_MSG_SERVICE_ACCEPT && type != SSH2_MSG_EXT_INFO; } int ssh_packet_send2(struct ssh *ssh) { struct session_state *state = ssh->state; struct packet *p; u_char type; int r, need_rekey; if (sshbuf_len(state->outgoing_packet) < 6) return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; type = sshbuf_ptr(state->outgoing_packet)[5]; need_rekey = !ssh_packet_type_is_kex(type) && ssh_packet_need_rekeying(ssh, sshbuf_len(state->outgoing_packet)); /* * During rekeying we can only send key exchange messages. * Queue everything else. */ if ((need_rekey || state->rekeying) && !ssh_packet_type_is_kex(type)) { if (need_rekey) debug3_f("rekex triggered"); debug("enqueue packet: %u", type); p = calloc(1, sizeof(*p)); if (p == NULL) return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; p->type = type; p->payload = state->outgoing_packet; TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(&state->outgoing, p, next); state->outgoing_packet = sshbuf_new(); if (state->outgoing_packet == NULL) return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; if (need_rekey) { /* * This packet triggered a rekey, so send the * KEXINIT now. * NB. reenters this function via kex_start_rekex(). */ return kex_start_rekex(ssh); } return 0; } /* rekeying starts with sending KEXINIT */ if (type == SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT) state->rekeying = 1; if ((r = ssh_packet_send2_wrapped(ssh)) != 0) return r; /* after a NEWKEYS message we can send the complete queue */ if (type == SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS) { state->rekeying = 0; state->rekey_time = monotime(); while ((p = TAILQ_FIRST(&state->outgoing))) { type = p->type; /* * If this packet triggers a rekex, then skip the * remaining packets in the queue for now. * NB. re-enters this function via kex_start_rekex. */ if (ssh_packet_need_rekeying(ssh, sshbuf_len(p->payload))) { debug3_f("queued packet triggered rekex"); return kex_start_rekex(ssh); } debug("dequeue packet: %u", type); sshbuf_free(state->outgoing_packet); state->outgoing_packet = p->payload; TAILQ_REMOVE(&state->outgoing, p, next); memset(p, 0, sizeof(*p)); free(p); if ((r = ssh_packet_send2_wrapped(ssh)) != 0) return r; } } return 0; } /* * Waits until a packet has been received, and returns its type. Note that * no other data is processed until this returns, so this function should not * be used during the interactive session. */ int ssh_packet_read_seqnr(struct ssh *ssh, u_char *typep, u_int32_t *seqnr_p) { struct session_state *state = ssh->state; - int len, r, ms_remain; + int len, r, ms_remain = 0; struct pollfd pfd; char buf[8192]; struct timeval start; struct timespec timespec, *timespecp = NULL; DBG(debug("packet_read()")); /* * Since we are blocking, ensure that all written packets have * been sent. */ if ((r = ssh_packet_write_wait(ssh)) != 0) goto out; /* Stay in the loop until we have received a complete packet. */ for (;;) { /* Try to read a packet from the buffer. */ r = ssh_packet_read_poll_seqnr(ssh, typep, seqnr_p); if (r != 0) break; /* If we got a packet, return it. */ if (*typep != SSH_MSG_NONE) break; /* * Otherwise, wait for some data to arrive, add it to the * buffer, and try again. */ pfd.fd = state->connection_in; pfd.events = POLLIN; if (state->packet_timeout_ms > 0) { ms_remain = state->packet_timeout_ms; timespecp = ×pec; } /* Wait for some data to arrive. */ for (;;) { if (state->packet_timeout_ms > 0) { ms_to_timespec(×pec, ms_remain); monotime_tv(&start); } if ((r = ppoll(&pfd, 1, timespecp, NULL)) >= 0) break; if (errno != EAGAIN && errno != EINTR && errno != EWOULDBLOCK) { r = SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR; goto out; } if (state->packet_timeout_ms <= 0) continue; ms_subtract_diff(&start, &ms_remain); if (ms_remain <= 0) { r = 0; break; } } if (r == 0) { r = SSH_ERR_CONN_TIMEOUT; goto out; } /* Read data from the socket. */ len = read(state->connection_in, buf, sizeof(buf)); if (len == 0) { r = SSH_ERR_CONN_CLOSED; goto out; } if (len == -1) { r = SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR; goto out; } /* Append it to the buffer. */ if ((r = ssh_packet_process_incoming(ssh, buf, len)) != 0) goto out; } out: return r; } int ssh_packet_read(struct ssh *ssh) { u_char type; int r; if ((r = ssh_packet_read_seqnr(ssh, &type, NULL)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "read"); return type; } /* * Waits until a packet has been received, verifies that its type matches * that given, and gives a fatal error and exits if there is a mismatch. */ int ssh_packet_read_expect(struct ssh *ssh, u_int expected_type) { int r; u_char type; if ((r = ssh_packet_read_seqnr(ssh, &type, NULL)) != 0) return r; if (type != expected_type) { if ((r = sshpkt_disconnect(ssh, "Protocol error: expected packet type %d, got %d", expected_type, type)) != 0) return r; return SSH_ERR_PROTOCOL_ERROR; } return 0; } static int ssh_packet_read_poll2_mux(struct ssh *ssh, u_char *typep, u_int32_t *seqnr_p) { struct session_state *state = ssh->state; const u_char *cp; size_t need; int r; if (ssh->kex) return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; *typep = SSH_MSG_NONE; cp = sshbuf_ptr(state->input); if (state->packlen == 0) { if (sshbuf_len(state->input) < 4 + 1) return 0; /* packet is incomplete */ state->packlen = PEEK_U32(cp); if (state->packlen < 4 + 1 || state->packlen > PACKET_MAX_SIZE) return SSH_ERR_MESSAGE_INCOMPLETE; } need = state->packlen + 4; if (sshbuf_len(state->input) < need) return 0; /* packet is incomplete */ sshbuf_reset(state->incoming_packet); if ((r = sshbuf_put(state->incoming_packet, cp + 4, state->packlen)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_consume(state->input, need)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_u8(state->incoming_packet, NULL)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_u8(state->incoming_packet, typep)) != 0) return r; if (ssh_packet_log_type(*typep)) debug3_f("type %u", *typep); /* sshbuf_dump(state->incoming_packet, stderr); */ /* reset for next packet */ state->packlen = 0; return r; } int ssh_packet_read_poll2(struct ssh *ssh, u_char *typep, u_int32_t *seqnr_p) { struct session_state *state = ssh->state; u_int padlen, need; u_char *cp; u_int maclen, aadlen = 0, authlen = 0, block_size; struct sshenc *enc = NULL; struct sshmac *mac = NULL; struct sshcomp *comp = NULL; int r; if (state->mux) return ssh_packet_read_poll2_mux(ssh, typep, seqnr_p); *typep = SSH_MSG_NONE; if (state->packet_discard) return 0; if (state->newkeys[MODE_IN] != NULL) { enc = &state->newkeys[MODE_IN]->enc; mac = &state->newkeys[MODE_IN]->mac; comp = &state->newkeys[MODE_IN]->comp; /* disable mac for authenticated encryption */ if ((authlen = cipher_authlen(enc->cipher)) != 0) mac = NULL; } maclen = mac && mac->enabled ? mac->mac_len : 0; block_size = enc ? enc->block_size : 8; aadlen = (mac && mac->enabled && mac->etm) || authlen ? 4 : 0; if (aadlen && state->packlen == 0) { if (cipher_get_length(state->receive_context, &state->packlen, state->p_read.seqnr, sshbuf_ptr(state->input), sshbuf_len(state->input)) != 0) return 0; if (state->packlen < 1 + 4 || state->packlen > PACKET_MAX_SIZE) { #ifdef PACKET_DEBUG sshbuf_dump(state->input, stderr); #endif logit("Bad packet length %u.", state->packlen); if ((r = sshpkt_disconnect(ssh, "Packet corrupt")) != 0) return r; return SSH_ERR_CONN_CORRUPT; } sshbuf_reset(state->incoming_packet); } else if (state->packlen == 0) { /* * check if input size is less than the cipher block size, * decrypt first block and extract length of incoming packet */ if (sshbuf_len(state->input) < block_size) return 0; sshbuf_reset(state->incoming_packet); if ((r = sshbuf_reserve(state->incoming_packet, block_size, &cp)) != 0) goto out; if ((r = cipher_crypt(state->receive_context, state->p_send.seqnr, cp, sshbuf_ptr(state->input), block_size, 0, 0)) != 0) goto out; state->packlen = PEEK_U32(sshbuf_ptr(state->incoming_packet)); if (state->packlen < 1 + 4 || state->packlen > PACKET_MAX_SIZE) { #ifdef PACKET_DEBUG fprintf(stderr, "input: \n"); sshbuf_dump(state->input, stderr); fprintf(stderr, "incoming_packet: \n"); sshbuf_dump(state->incoming_packet, stderr); #endif logit("Bad packet length %u.", state->packlen); return ssh_packet_start_discard(ssh, enc, mac, 0, PACKET_MAX_SIZE); } if ((r = sshbuf_consume(state->input, block_size)) != 0) goto out; } DBG(debug("input: packet len %u", state->packlen+4)); if (aadlen) { /* only the payload is encrypted */ need = state->packlen; } else { /* * the payload size and the payload are encrypted, but we * have a partial packet of block_size bytes */ need = 4 + state->packlen - block_size; } DBG(debug("partial packet: block %d, need %d, maclen %d, authlen %d," " aadlen %d", block_size, need, maclen, authlen, aadlen)); if (need % block_size != 0) { logit("padding error: need %d block %d mod %d", need, block_size, need % block_size); return ssh_packet_start_discard(ssh, enc, mac, 0, PACKET_MAX_SIZE - block_size); } /* * check if the entire packet has been received and * decrypt into incoming_packet: * 'aadlen' bytes are unencrypted, but authenticated. * 'need' bytes are encrypted, followed by either * 'authlen' bytes of authentication tag or * 'maclen' bytes of message authentication code. */ if (sshbuf_len(state->input) < aadlen + need + authlen + maclen) return 0; /* packet is incomplete */ #ifdef PACKET_DEBUG fprintf(stderr, "read_poll enc/full: "); sshbuf_dump(state->input, stderr); #endif /* EtM: check mac over encrypted input */ if (mac && mac->enabled && mac->etm) { if ((r = mac_check(mac, state->p_read.seqnr, sshbuf_ptr(state->input), aadlen + need, sshbuf_ptr(state->input) + aadlen + need + authlen, maclen)) != 0) { if (r == SSH_ERR_MAC_INVALID) logit("Corrupted MAC on input."); goto out; } } if ((r = sshbuf_reserve(state->incoming_packet, aadlen + need, &cp)) != 0) goto out; if ((r = cipher_crypt(state->receive_context, state->p_read.seqnr, cp, sshbuf_ptr(state->input), need, aadlen, authlen)) != 0) goto out; if ((r = sshbuf_consume(state->input, aadlen + need + authlen)) != 0) goto out; if (mac && mac->enabled) { /* Not EtM: check MAC over cleartext */ if (!mac->etm && (r = mac_check(mac, state->p_read.seqnr, sshbuf_ptr(state->incoming_packet), sshbuf_len(state->incoming_packet), sshbuf_ptr(state->input), maclen)) != 0) { if (r != SSH_ERR_MAC_INVALID) goto out; logit("Corrupted MAC on input."); if (need + block_size > PACKET_MAX_SIZE) return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; return ssh_packet_start_discard(ssh, enc, mac, sshbuf_len(state->incoming_packet), PACKET_MAX_SIZE - need - block_size); } /* Remove MAC from input buffer */ DBG(debug("MAC #%d ok", state->p_read.seqnr)); if ((r = sshbuf_consume(state->input, mac->mac_len)) != 0) goto out; } if (seqnr_p != NULL) *seqnr_p = state->p_read.seqnr; if (++state->p_read.seqnr == 0) logit("incoming seqnr wraps around"); if (++state->p_read.packets == 0) if (!(ssh->compat & SSH_BUG_NOREKEY)) return SSH_ERR_NEED_REKEY; state->p_read.blocks += (state->packlen + 4) / block_size; state->p_read.bytes += state->packlen + 4; /* get padlen */ padlen = sshbuf_ptr(state->incoming_packet)[4]; DBG(debug("input: padlen %d", padlen)); if (padlen < 4) { if ((r = sshpkt_disconnect(ssh, "Corrupted padlen %d on input.", padlen)) != 0 || (r = ssh_packet_write_wait(ssh)) != 0) return r; return SSH_ERR_CONN_CORRUPT; } /* skip packet size + padlen, discard padding */ if ((r = sshbuf_consume(state->incoming_packet, 4 + 1)) != 0 || ((r = sshbuf_consume_end(state->incoming_packet, padlen)) != 0)) goto out; DBG(debug("input: len before de-compress %zd", sshbuf_len(state->incoming_packet))); if (comp && comp->enabled) { sshbuf_reset(state->compression_buffer); if ((r = uncompress_buffer(ssh, state->incoming_packet, state->compression_buffer)) != 0) goto out; sshbuf_reset(state->incoming_packet); if ((r = sshbuf_putb(state->incoming_packet, state->compression_buffer)) != 0) goto out; DBG(debug("input: len after de-compress %zd", sshbuf_len(state->incoming_packet))); } /* * get packet type, implies consume. * return length of payload (without type field) */ if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(state->incoming_packet, typep)) != 0) goto out; if (ssh_packet_log_type(*typep)) debug3("receive packet: type %u", *typep); if (*typep < SSH2_MSG_MIN || *typep >= SSH2_MSG_LOCAL_MIN) { if ((r = sshpkt_disconnect(ssh, "Invalid ssh2 packet type: %d", *typep)) != 0 || (r = ssh_packet_write_wait(ssh)) != 0) return r; return SSH_ERR_PROTOCOL_ERROR; } if (state->hook_in != NULL && (r = state->hook_in(ssh, state->incoming_packet, typep, state->hook_in_ctx)) != 0) return r; if (*typep == SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_SUCCESS && !state->server_side) r = ssh_packet_enable_delayed_compress(ssh); else r = 0; #ifdef PACKET_DEBUG fprintf(stderr, "read/plain[%d]:\r\n", *typep); sshbuf_dump(state->incoming_packet, stderr); #endif /* reset for next packet */ state->packlen = 0; if ((r = ssh_packet_check_rekey(ssh)) != 0) return r; out: return r; } int ssh_packet_read_poll_seqnr(struct ssh *ssh, u_char *typep, u_int32_t *seqnr_p) { struct session_state *state = ssh->state; u_int reason, seqnr; int r; u_char *msg; for (;;) { msg = NULL; r = ssh_packet_read_poll2(ssh, typep, seqnr_p); if (r != 0) return r; if (*typep) { state->keep_alive_timeouts = 0; DBG(debug("received packet type %d", *typep)); } switch (*typep) { case SSH2_MSG_IGNORE: debug3("Received SSH2_MSG_IGNORE"); break; case SSH2_MSG_DEBUG: if ((r = sshpkt_get_u8(ssh, NULL)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_get_string(ssh, &msg, NULL)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_get_string(ssh, NULL, NULL)) != 0) { free(msg); return r; } debug("Remote: %.900s", msg); free(msg); break; case SSH2_MSG_DISCONNECT: if ((r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &reason)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_get_string(ssh, &msg, NULL)) != 0) return r; /* Ignore normal client exit notifications */ do_log2(ssh->state->server_side && reason == SSH2_DISCONNECT_BY_APPLICATION ? SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO : SYSLOG_LEVEL_ERROR, "Received disconnect from %s port %d:" "%u: %.400s", ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), ssh_remote_port(ssh), reason, msg); free(msg); return SSH_ERR_DISCONNECTED; case SSH2_MSG_UNIMPLEMENTED: if ((r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &seqnr)) != 0) return r; debug("Received SSH2_MSG_UNIMPLEMENTED for %u", seqnr); break; default: return 0; } } } /* * Buffers the supplied input data. This is intended to be used together * with packet_read_poll(). */ int ssh_packet_process_incoming(struct ssh *ssh, const char *buf, u_int len) { struct session_state *state = ssh->state; int r; if (state->packet_discard) { state->keep_alive_timeouts = 0; /* ?? */ if (len >= state->packet_discard) { if ((r = ssh_packet_stop_discard(ssh)) != 0) return r; } state->packet_discard -= len; return 0; } if ((r = sshbuf_put(state->input, buf, len)) != 0) return r; return 0; } /* Reads and buffers data from the specified fd */ int ssh_packet_process_read(struct ssh *ssh, int fd) { struct session_state *state = ssh->state; int r; size_t rlen; if ((r = sshbuf_read(fd, state->input, PACKET_MAX_SIZE, &rlen)) != 0) return r; if (state->packet_discard) { if ((r = sshbuf_consume_end(state->input, rlen)) != 0) return r; state->keep_alive_timeouts = 0; /* ?? */ if (rlen >= state->packet_discard) { if ((r = ssh_packet_stop_discard(ssh)) != 0) return r; } state->packet_discard -= rlen; return 0; } return 0; } int ssh_packet_remaining(struct ssh *ssh) { return sshbuf_len(ssh->state->incoming_packet); } /* * Sends a diagnostic message from the server to the client. This message * can be sent at any time (but not while constructing another message). The * message is printed immediately, but only if the client is being executed * in verbose mode. These messages are primarily intended to ease debugging * authentication problems. The length of the formatted message must not * exceed 1024 bytes. This will automatically call ssh_packet_write_wait. */ void ssh_packet_send_debug(struct ssh *ssh, const char *fmt,...) { char buf[1024]; va_list args; int r; if ((ssh->compat & SSH_BUG_DEBUG)) return; va_start(args, fmt); vsnprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), fmt, args); va_end(args); debug3("sending debug message: %s", buf); if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_DEBUG)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_u8(ssh, 0)) != 0 || /* always display */ (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, buf)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, "")) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0 || (r = ssh_packet_write_wait(ssh)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "send DEBUG"); } void sshpkt_fmt_connection_id(struct ssh *ssh, char *s, size_t l) { snprintf(s, l, "%.200s%s%s port %d", ssh->log_preamble ? ssh->log_preamble : "", ssh->log_preamble ? " " : "", ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), ssh_remote_port(ssh)); } /* * Pretty-print connection-terminating errors and exit. */ static void sshpkt_vfatal(struct ssh *ssh, int r, const char *fmt, va_list ap) { char *tag = NULL, remote_id[512]; int oerrno = errno; sshpkt_fmt_connection_id(ssh, remote_id, sizeof(remote_id)); switch (r) { case SSH_ERR_CONN_CLOSED: ssh_packet_clear_keys(ssh); logdie("Connection closed by %s", remote_id); case SSH_ERR_CONN_TIMEOUT: ssh_packet_clear_keys(ssh); logdie("Connection %s %s timed out", ssh->state->server_side ? "from" : "to", remote_id); case SSH_ERR_DISCONNECTED: ssh_packet_clear_keys(ssh); logdie("Disconnected from %s", remote_id); case SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR: if (errno == ECONNRESET) { ssh_packet_clear_keys(ssh); logdie("Connection reset by %s", remote_id); } /* FALLTHROUGH */ case SSH_ERR_NO_CIPHER_ALG_MATCH: case SSH_ERR_NO_MAC_ALG_MATCH: case SSH_ERR_NO_COMPRESS_ALG_MATCH: case SSH_ERR_NO_KEX_ALG_MATCH: case SSH_ERR_NO_HOSTKEY_ALG_MATCH: if (ssh && ssh->kex && ssh->kex->failed_choice) { BLACKLIST_NOTIFY(ssh, BLACKLIST_AUTH_FAIL, "ssh"); ssh_packet_clear_keys(ssh); errno = oerrno; logdie("Unable to negotiate with %s: %s. " "Their offer: %s", remote_id, ssh_err(r), ssh->kex->failed_choice); } /* FALLTHROUGH */ default: if (vasprintf(&tag, fmt, ap) == -1) { ssh_packet_clear_keys(ssh); logdie_f("could not allocate failure message"); } ssh_packet_clear_keys(ssh); errno = oerrno; logdie_r(r, "%s%sConnection %s %s", tag != NULL ? tag : "", tag != NULL ? ": " : "", ssh->state->server_side ? "from" : "to", remote_id); } } void sshpkt_fatal(struct ssh *ssh, int r, const char *fmt, ...) { va_list ap; va_start(ap, fmt); sshpkt_vfatal(ssh, r, fmt, ap); /* NOTREACHED */ va_end(ap); logdie_f("should have exited"); } /* * Logs the error plus constructs and sends a disconnect packet, closes the * connection, and exits. This function never returns. The error message * should not contain a newline. The length of the formatted message must * not exceed 1024 bytes. */ void ssh_packet_disconnect(struct ssh *ssh, const char *fmt,...) { char buf[1024], remote_id[512]; va_list args; static int disconnecting = 0; int r; if (disconnecting) /* Guard against recursive invocations. */ fatal("packet_disconnect called recursively."); disconnecting = 1; /* * Format the message. Note that the caller must make sure the * message is of limited size. */ sshpkt_fmt_connection_id(ssh, remote_id, sizeof(remote_id)); va_start(args, fmt); vsnprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), fmt, args); va_end(args); /* Display the error locally */ logit("Disconnecting %s: %.100s", remote_id, buf); /* * Send the disconnect message to the other side, and wait * for it to get sent. */ if ((r = sshpkt_disconnect(ssh, "%s", buf)) != 0) sshpkt_fatal(ssh, r, "%s", __func__); if ((r = ssh_packet_write_wait(ssh)) != 0) sshpkt_fatal(ssh, r, "%s", __func__); /* Close the connection. */ ssh_packet_close(ssh); cleanup_exit(255); } /* * Checks if there is any buffered output, and tries to write some of * the output. */ int ssh_packet_write_poll(struct ssh *ssh) { struct session_state *state = ssh->state; int len = sshbuf_len(state->output); int r; if (len > 0) { len = write(state->connection_out, sshbuf_ptr(state->output), len); if (len == -1) { if (errno == EINTR || errno == EAGAIN || errno == EWOULDBLOCK) return 0; return SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR; } if (len == 0) return SSH_ERR_CONN_CLOSED; if ((r = sshbuf_consume(state->output, len)) != 0) return r; } return 0; } /* * Calls packet_write_poll repeatedly until all pending output data has been * written. */ int ssh_packet_write_wait(struct ssh *ssh) { int ret, r, ms_remain = 0; struct timeval start; struct timespec timespec, *timespecp = NULL; struct session_state *state = ssh->state; struct pollfd pfd; if ((r = ssh_packet_write_poll(ssh)) != 0) return r; while (ssh_packet_have_data_to_write(ssh)) { pfd.fd = state->connection_out; pfd.events = POLLOUT; if (state->packet_timeout_ms > 0) { ms_remain = state->packet_timeout_ms; timespecp = ×pec; } for (;;) { if (state->packet_timeout_ms > 0) { ms_to_timespec(×pec, ms_remain); monotime_tv(&start); } if ((ret = ppoll(&pfd, 1, timespecp, NULL)) >= 0) break; if (errno != EAGAIN && errno != EINTR && errno != EWOULDBLOCK) break; if (state->packet_timeout_ms <= 0) continue; ms_subtract_diff(&start, &ms_remain); if (ms_remain <= 0) { ret = 0; break; } } if (ret == 0) return SSH_ERR_CONN_TIMEOUT; if ((r = ssh_packet_write_poll(ssh)) != 0) return r; } return 0; } /* Returns true if there is buffered data to write to the connection. */ int ssh_packet_have_data_to_write(struct ssh *ssh) { return sshbuf_len(ssh->state->output) != 0; } /* Returns true if there is not too much data to write to the connection. */ int ssh_packet_not_very_much_data_to_write(struct ssh *ssh) { if (ssh->state->interactive_mode) return sshbuf_len(ssh->state->output) < 16384; else return sshbuf_len(ssh->state->output) < 128 * 1024; } void ssh_packet_set_tos(struct ssh *ssh, int tos) { if (!ssh_packet_connection_is_on_socket(ssh) || tos == INT_MAX) return; set_sock_tos(ssh->state->connection_in, tos); } /* Informs that the current session is interactive. Sets IP flags for that. */ void ssh_packet_set_interactive(struct ssh *ssh, int interactive, int qos_interactive, int qos_bulk) { struct session_state *state = ssh->state; if (state->set_interactive_called) return; state->set_interactive_called = 1; /* Record that we are in interactive mode. */ state->interactive_mode = interactive; /* Only set socket options if using a socket. */ if (!ssh_packet_connection_is_on_socket(ssh)) return; set_nodelay(state->connection_in); ssh_packet_set_tos(ssh, interactive ? qos_interactive : qos_bulk); } /* Returns true if the current connection is interactive. */ int ssh_packet_is_interactive(struct ssh *ssh) { return ssh->state->interactive_mode; } int ssh_packet_set_maxsize(struct ssh *ssh, u_int s) { struct session_state *state = ssh->state; if (state->set_maxsize_called) { logit_f("called twice: old %d new %d", state->max_packet_size, s); return -1; } if (s < 4 * 1024 || s > 1024 * 1024) { logit_f("bad size %d", s); return -1; } state->set_maxsize_called = 1; debug_f("setting to %d", s); state->max_packet_size = s; return s; } int ssh_packet_inc_alive_timeouts(struct ssh *ssh) { return ++ssh->state->keep_alive_timeouts; } void ssh_packet_set_alive_timeouts(struct ssh *ssh, int ka) { ssh->state->keep_alive_timeouts = ka; } u_int ssh_packet_get_maxsize(struct ssh *ssh) { return ssh->state->max_packet_size; } void ssh_packet_set_rekey_limits(struct ssh *ssh, u_int64_t bytes, u_int32_t seconds) { debug3("rekey after %llu bytes, %u seconds", (unsigned long long)bytes, (unsigned int)seconds); ssh->state->rekey_limit = bytes; ssh->state->rekey_interval = seconds; } time_t ssh_packet_get_rekey_timeout(struct ssh *ssh) { time_t seconds; seconds = ssh->state->rekey_time + ssh->state->rekey_interval - monotime(); return (seconds <= 0 ? 1 : seconds); } void ssh_packet_set_server(struct ssh *ssh) { ssh->state->server_side = 1; ssh->kex->server = 1; /* XXX unify? */ } void ssh_packet_set_authenticated(struct ssh *ssh) { ssh->state->after_authentication = 1; } void * ssh_packet_get_input(struct ssh *ssh) { return (void *)ssh->state->input; } void * ssh_packet_get_output(struct ssh *ssh) { return (void *)ssh->state->output; } /* Reset after_authentication and reset compression in post-auth privsep */ static int ssh_packet_set_postauth(struct ssh *ssh) { int r; debug_f("called"); /* This was set in net child, but is not visible in user child */ ssh->state->after_authentication = 1; ssh->state->rekeying = 0; if ((r = ssh_packet_enable_delayed_compress(ssh)) != 0) return r; return 0; } /* Packet state (de-)serialization for privsep */ /* turn kex into a blob for packet state serialization */ static int kex_to_blob(struct sshbuf *m, struct kex *kex) { int r; if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, kex->we_need)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, kex->hostkey_alg)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, kex->hostkey_type)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, kex->hostkey_nid)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, kex->kex_type)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_stringb(m, kex->my)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_stringb(m, kex->peer)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_stringb(m, kex->client_version)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_stringb(m, kex->server_version)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_stringb(m, kex->session_id)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, kex->flags)) != 0) return r; return 0; } /* turn key exchange results into a blob for packet state serialization */ static int newkeys_to_blob(struct sshbuf *m, struct ssh *ssh, int mode) { struct sshbuf *b; struct sshcipher_ctx *cc; struct sshcomp *comp; struct sshenc *enc; struct sshmac *mac; struct newkeys *newkey; int r; if ((newkey = ssh->state->newkeys[mode]) == NULL) return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; enc = &newkey->enc; mac = &newkey->mac; comp = &newkey->comp; cc = (mode == MODE_OUT) ? ssh->state->send_context : ssh->state->receive_context; if ((r = cipher_get_keyiv(cc, enc->iv, enc->iv_len)) != 0) return r; if ((b = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, enc->name)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u32(b, enc->enabled)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u32(b, enc->block_size)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_string(b, enc->key, enc->key_len)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_string(b, enc->iv, enc->iv_len)) != 0) goto out; if (cipher_authlen(enc->cipher) == 0) { if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, mac->name)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u32(b, mac->enabled)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_string(b, mac->key, mac->key_len)) != 0) goto out; } if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(b, comp->type)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, comp->name)) != 0) goto out; r = sshbuf_put_stringb(m, b); out: sshbuf_free(b); return r; } /* serialize packet state into a blob */ int ssh_packet_get_state(struct ssh *ssh, struct sshbuf *m) { struct session_state *state = ssh->state; int r; if ((r = kex_to_blob(m, ssh->kex)) != 0 || (r = newkeys_to_blob(m, ssh, MODE_OUT)) != 0 || (r = newkeys_to_blob(m, ssh, MODE_IN)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u64(m, state->rekey_limit)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, state->rekey_interval)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, state->p_send.seqnr)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u64(m, state->p_send.blocks)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, state->p_send.packets)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u64(m, state->p_send.bytes)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, state->p_read.seqnr)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u64(m, state->p_read.blocks)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, state->p_read.packets)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u64(m, state->p_read.bytes)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_stringb(m, state->input)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_stringb(m, state->output)) != 0) return r; return 0; } /* restore key exchange results from blob for packet state de-serialization */ static int newkeys_from_blob(struct sshbuf *m, struct ssh *ssh, int mode) { struct sshbuf *b = NULL; struct sshcomp *comp; struct sshenc *enc; struct sshmac *mac; struct newkeys *newkey = NULL; size_t keylen, ivlen, maclen; int r; if ((newkey = calloc(1, sizeof(*newkey))) == NULL) { r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; goto out; } if ((r = sshbuf_froms(m, &b)) != 0) goto out; #ifdef DEBUG_PK sshbuf_dump(b, stderr); #endif enc = &newkey->enc; mac = &newkey->mac; comp = &newkey->comp; if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &enc->name, NULL)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_u32(b, (u_int *)&enc->enabled)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_u32(b, &enc->block_size)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_string(b, &enc->key, &keylen)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_string(b, &enc->iv, &ivlen)) != 0) goto out; if ((enc->cipher = cipher_by_name(enc->name)) == NULL) { r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; goto out; } if (cipher_authlen(enc->cipher) == 0) { if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &mac->name, NULL)) != 0) goto out; if ((r = mac_setup(mac, mac->name)) != 0) goto out; if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(b, (u_int *)&mac->enabled)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_string(b, &mac->key, &maclen)) != 0) goto out; if (maclen > mac->key_len) { r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; goto out; } mac->key_len = maclen; } if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(b, &comp->type)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &comp->name, NULL)) != 0) goto out; if (sshbuf_len(b) != 0) { r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; goto out; } enc->key_len = keylen; enc->iv_len = ivlen; ssh->kex->newkeys[mode] = newkey; newkey = NULL; r = 0; out: free(newkey); sshbuf_free(b); return r; } /* restore kex from blob for packet state de-serialization */ static int kex_from_blob(struct sshbuf *m, struct kex **kexp) { struct kex *kex; int r; if ((kex = kex_new()) == NULL) return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &kex->we_need)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &kex->hostkey_alg, NULL)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, (u_int *)&kex->hostkey_type)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, (u_int *)&kex->hostkey_nid)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &kex->kex_type)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_stringb(m, kex->my)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_stringb(m, kex->peer)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_stringb(m, kex->client_version)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_stringb(m, kex->server_version)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_stringb(m, kex->session_id)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &kex->flags)) != 0) goto out; kex->server = 1; kex->done = 1; r = 0; out: if (r != 0 || kexp == NULL) { kex_free(kex); if (kexp != NULL) *kexp = NULL; } else { kex_free(*kexp); *kexp = kex; } return r; } /* * Restore packet state from content of blob 'm' (de-serialization). * Note that 'm' will be partially consumed on parsing or any other errors. */ int ssh_packet_set_state(struct ssh *ssh, struct sshbuf *m) { struct session_state *state = ssh->state; const u_char *input, *output; size_t ilen, olen; int r; if ((r = kex_from_blob(m, &ssh->kex)) != 0 || (r = newkeys_from_blob(m, ssh, MODE_OUT)) != 0 || (r = newkeys_from_blob(m, ssh, MODE_IN)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_u64(m, &state->rekey_limit)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &state->rekey_interval)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &state->p_send.seqnr)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_u64(m, &state->p_send.blocks)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &state->p_send.packets)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_u64(m, &state->p_send.bytes)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &state->p_read.seqnr)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_u64(m, &state->p_read.blocks)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &state->p_read.packets)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_u64(m, &state->p_read.bytes)) != 0) return r; /* * We set the time here so that in post-auth privsep child we * count from the completion of the authentication. */ state->rekey_time = monotime(); /* XXX ssh_set_newkeys overrides p_read.packets? XXX */ if ((r = ssh_set_newkeys(ssh, MODE_IN)) != 0 || (r = ssh_set_newkeys(ssh, MODE_OUT)) != 0) return r; if ((r = ssh_packet_set_postauth(ssh)) != 0) return r; sshbuf_reset(state->input); sshbuf_reset(state->output); if ((r = sshbuf_get_string_direct(m, &input, &ilen)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_string_direct(m, &output, &olen)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put(state->input, input, ilen)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put(state->output, output, olen)) != 0) return r; if (sshbuf_len(m)) return SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; debug3_f("done"); return 0; } /* NEW API */ /* put data to the outgoing packet */ int sshpkt_put(struct ssh *ssh, const void *v, size_t len) { return sshbuf_put(ssh->state->outgoing_packet, v, len); } int sshpkt_putb(struct ssh *ssh, const struct sshbuf *b) { return sshbuf_putb(ssh->state->outgoing_packet, b); } int sshpkt_put_u8(struct ssh *ssh, u_char val) { return sshbuf_put_u8(ssh->state->outgoing_packet, val); } int sshpkt_put_u32(struct ssh *ssh, u_int32_t val) { return sshbuf_put_u32(ssh->state->outgoing_packet, val); } int sshpkt_put_u64(struct ssh *ssh, u_int64_t val) { return sshbuf_put_u64(ssh->state->outgoing_packet, val); } int sshpkt_put_string(struct ssh *ssh, const void *v, size_t len) { return sshbuf_put_string(ssh->state->outgoing_packet, v, len); } int sshpkt_put_cstring(struct ssh *ssh, const void *v) { return sshbuf_put_cstring(ssh->state->outgoing_packet, v); } int sshpkt_put_stringb(struct ssh *ssh, const struct sshbuf *v) { return sshbuf_put_stringb(ssh->state->outgoing_packet, v); } int sshpkt_getb_froms(struct ssh *ssh, struct sshbuf **valp) { return sshbuf_froms(ssh->state->incoming_packet, valp); } #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL #ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC int sshpkt_put_ec(struct ssh *ssh, const EC_POINT *v, const EC_GROUP *g) { return sshbuf_put_ec(ssh->state->outgoing_packet, v, g); } #endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */ int sshpkt_put_bignum2(struct ssh *ssh, const BIGNUM *v) { return sshbuf_put_bignum2(ssh->state->outgoing_packet, v); } #endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */ /* fetch data from the incoming packet */ int sshpkt_get(struct ssh *ssh, void *valp, size_t len) { return sshbuf_get(ssh->state->incoming_packet, valp, len); } int sshpkt_get_u8(struct ssh *ssh, u_char *valp) { return sshbuf_get_u8(ssh->state->incoming_packet, valp); } int sshpkt_get_u32(struct ssh *ssh, u_int32_t *valp) { return sshbuf_get_u32(ssh->state->incoming_packet, valp); } int sshpkt_get_u64(struct ssh *ssh, u_int64_t *valp) { return sshbuf_get_u64(ssh->state->incoming_packet, valp); } int sshpkt_get_string(struct ssh *ssh, u_char **valp, size_t *lenp) { return sshbuf_get_string(ssh->state->incoming_packet, valp, lenp); } int sshpkt_get_string_direct(struct ssh *ssh, const u_char **valp, size_t *lenp) { return sshbuf_get_string_direct(ssh->state->incoming_packet, valp, lenp); } int sshpkt_peek_string_direct(struct ssh *ssh, const u_char **valp, size_t *lenp) { return sshbuf_peek_string_direct(ssh->state->incoming_packet, valp, lenp); } int sshpkt_get_cstring(struct ssh *ssh, char **valp, size_t *lenp) { return sshbuf_get_cstring(ssh->state->incoming_packet, valp, lenp); } #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL #ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC int sshpkt_get_ec(struct ssh *ssh, EC_POINT *v, const EC_GROUP *g) { return sshbuf_get_ec(ssh->state->incoming_packet, v, g); } #endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */ int sshpkt_get_bignum2(struct ssh *ssh, BIGNUM **valp) { return sshbuf_get_bignum2(ssh->state->incoming_packet, valp); } #endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */ int sshpkt_get_end(struct ssh *ssh) { if (sshbuf_len(ssh->state->incoming_packet) > 0) return SSH_ERR_UNEXPECTED_TRAILING_DATA; return 0; } const u_char * sshpkt_ptr(struct ssh *ssh, size_t *lenp) { if (lenp != NULL) *lenp = sshbuf_len(ssh->state->incoming_packet); return sshbuf_ptr(ssh->state->incoming_packet); } /* start a new packet */ int sshpkt_start(struct ssh *ssh, u_char type) { u_char buf[6]; /* u32 packet length, u8 pad len, u8 type */ DBG(debug("packet_start[%d]", type)); memset(buf, 0, sizeof(buf)); buf[sizeof(buf) - 1] = type; sshbuf_reset(ssh->state->outgoing_packet); return sshbuf_put(ssh->state->outgoing_packet, buf, sizeof(buf)); } static int ssh_packet_send_mux(struct ssh *ssh) { struct session_state *state = ssh->state; u_char type, *cp; size_t len; int r; if (ssh->kex) return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; len = sshbuf_len(state->outgoing_packet); if (len < 6) return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; cp = sshbuf_mutable_ptr(state->outgoing_packet); type = cp[5]; if (ssh_packet_log_type(type)) debug3_f("type %u", type); /* drop everything, but the connection protocol */ if (type >= SSH2_MSG_CONNECTION_MIN && type <= SSH2_MSG_CONNECTION_MAX) { POKE_U32(cp, len - 4); if ((r = sshbuf_putb(state->output, state->outgoing_packet)) != 0) return r; /* sshbuf_dump(state->output, stderr); */ } sshbuf_reset(state->outgoing_packet); return 0; } /* * 9.2. Ignored Data Message * * byte SSH_MSG_IGNORE * string data * * All implementations MUST understand (and ignore) this message at any * time (after receiving the protocol version). No implementation is * required to send them. This message can be used as an additional * protection measure against advanced traffic analysis techniques. */ int sshpkt_msg_ignore(struct ssh *ssh, u_int nbytes) { u_int32_t rnd = 0; int r; u_int i; if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_IGNORE)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, nbytes)) != 0) return r; for (i = 0; i < nbytes; i++) { if (i % 4 == 0) rnd = arc4random(); if ((r = sshpkt_put_u8(ssh, (u_char)rnd & 0xff)) != 0) return r; rnd >>= 8; } return 0; } /* send it */ int sshpkt_send(struct ssh *ssh) { if (ssh->state && ssh->state->mux) return ssh_packet_send_mux(ssh); return ssh_packet_send2(ssh); } int sshpkt_disconnect(struct ssh *ssh, const char *fmt,...) { char buf[1024]; va_list args; int r; va_start(args, fmt); vsnprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), fmt, args); va_end(args); if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_DISCONNECT)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, SSH2_DISCONNECT_PROTOCOL_ERROR)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, buf)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, "")) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) return r; return 0; } /* roundup current message to pad bytes */ int sshpkt_add_padding(struct ssh *ssh, u_char pad) { ssh->state->extra_pad = pad; return 0; } diff --git a/crypto/openssh/progressmeter.c b/crypto/openssh/progressmeter.c index 8baf798f1813..25da3b2fab1a 100644 --- a/crypto/openssh/progressmeter.c +++ b/crypto/openssh/progressmeter.c @@ -1,296 +1,303 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: progressmeter.c,v 1.50 2020/01/23 07:10:22 dtucker Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: progressmeter.c,v 1.52 2023/03/08 04:43:12 guenther Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2003 Nils Nordman. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. */ #include "includes.h" #include #include #include #include +#include +#include #include #include +#include #include #include #include #include #include "progressmeter.h" #include "atomicio.h" #include "misc.h" #include "utf8.h" #define DEFAULT_WINSIZE 80 #define MAX_WINSIZE 512 #define PADDING 1 /* padding between the progress indicators */ #define UPDATE_INTERVAL 1 /* update the progress meter every second */ #define STALL_TIME 5 /* we're stalled after this many seconds */ /* determines whether we can output to the terminal */ static int can_output(void); -/* formats and inserts the specified size into the given buffer */ -static void format_size(char *, int, off_t); -static void format_rate(char *, int, off_t); - /* window resizing */ static void sig_winch(int); static void setscreensize(void); /* signal handler for updating the progress meter */ static void sig_alarm(int); static double start; /* start progress */ static double last_update; /* last progress update */ static const char *file; /* name of the file being transferred */ static off_t start_pos; /* initial position of transfer */ static off_t end_pos; /* ending position of transfer */ static off_t cur_pos; /* transfer position as of last refresh */ static volatile off_t *counter; /* progress counter */ static long stalled; /* how long we have been stalled */ static int bytes_per_second; /* current speed in bytes per second */ static int win_size; /* terminal window size */ static volatile sig_atomic_t win_resized; /* for window resizing */ static volatile sig_atomic_t alarm_fired; /* units for format_size */ static const char unit[] = " KMGT"; static int can_output(void) { return (getpgrp() == tcgetpgrp(STDOUT_FILENO)); } -static void -format_rate(char *buf, int size, off_t bytes) +/* size needed to format integer type v, using (nbits(v) * log2(10) / 10) */ +#define STRING_SIZE(v) (((sizeof(v) * 8 * 4) / 10) + 1) + +static const char * +format_rate(off_t bytes) { int i; + static char buf[STRING_SIZE(bytes) * 2 + 16]; bytes *= 100; for (i = 0; bytes >= 100*1000 && unit[i] != 'T'; i++) bytes = (bytes + 512) / 1024; if (i == 0) { i++; bytes = (bytes + 512) / 1024; } - snprintf(buf, size, "%3lld.%1lld%c%s", + snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%3lld.%1lld%c%s", (long long) (bytes + 5) / 100, (long long) (bytes + 5) / 10 % 10, unit[i], i ? "B" : " "); + return buf; } -static void -format_size(char *buf, int size, off_t bytes) +static const char * +format_size(off_t bytes) { int i; + static char buf[STRING_SIZE(bytes) + 16]; for (i = 0; bytes >= 10000 && unit[i] != 'T'; i++) bytes = (bytes + 512) / 1024; - snprintf(buf, size, "%4lld%c%s", + snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%4lld%c%s", (long long) bytes, unit[i], i ? "B" : " "); + return buf; } void refresh_progress_meter(int force_update) { - char buf[MAX_WINSIZE + 1]; + char *buf = NULL, *obuf = NULL; off_t transferred; double elapsed, now; int percent; off_t bytes_left; int cur_speed; int hours, minutes, seconds; - int file_len; + int file_len, cols; if ((!force_update && !alarm_fired && !win_resized) || !can_output()) return; alarm_fired = 0; if (win_resized) { setscreensize(); win_resized = 0; } transferred = *counter - (cur_pos ? cur_pos : start_pos); cur_pos = *counter; now = monotime_double(); bytes_left = end_pos - cur_pos; if (bytes_left > 0) elapsed = now - last_update; else { elapsed = now - start; /* Calculate true total speed when done */ transferred = end_pos - start_pos; bytes_per_second = 0; } /* calculate speed */ if (elapsed != 0) cur_speed = (transferred / elapsed); else cur_speed = transferred; #define AGE_FACTOR 0.9 if (bytes_per_second != 0) { bytes_per_second = (bytes_per_second * AGE_FACTOR) + (cur_speed * (1.0 - AGE_FACTOR)); } else bytes_per_second = cur_speed; + last_update = now; + + /* Don't bother if we can't even display the completion percentage */ + if (win_size < 4) + return; + /* filename */ - buf[0] = '\0'; - file_len = win_size - 36; + file_len = cols = win_size - 36; if (file_len > 0) { - buf[0] = '\r'; - snmprintf(buf+1, sizeof(buf)-1, &file_len, "%-*s", - file_len, file); + asmprintf(&buf, INT_MAX, &cols, "%-*s", file_len, file); + /* If we used fewer columns than expected then pad */ + if (cols < file_len) + xextendf(&buf, NULL, "%*s", file_len - cols, ""); } - /* percent of transfer done */ if (end_pos == 0 || cur_pos == end_pos) percent = 100; else percent = ((float)cur_pos / end_pos) * 100; - snprintf(buf + strlen(buf), win_size - strlen(buf), - " %3d%% ", percent); - - /* amount transferred */ - format_size(buf + strlen(buf), win_size - strlen(buf), - cur_pos); - strlcat(buf, " ", win_size); - /* bandwidth usage */ - format_rate(buf + strlen(buf), win_size - strlen(buf), - (off_t)bytes_per_second); - strlcat(buf, "/s ", win_size); + /* percent / amount transferred / bandwidth usage */ + xextendf(&buf, NULL, " %3d%% %s %s/s ", percent, format_size(cur_pos), + format_rate((off_t)bytes_per_second)); /* ETA */ if (!transferred) stalled += elapsed; else stalled = 0; if (stalled >= STALL_TIME) - strlcat(buf, "- stalled -", win_size); + xextendf(&buf, NULL, "- stalled -"); else if (bytes_per_second == 0 && bytes_left) - strlcat(buf, " --:-- ETA", win_size); + xextendf(&buf, NULL, " --:-- ETA"); else { if (bytes_left > 0) seconds = bytes_left / bytes_per_second; else seconds = elapsed; hours = seconds / 3600; seconds -= hours * 3600; minutes = seconds / 60; seconds -= minutes * 60; - if (hours != 0) - snprintf(buf + strlen(buf), win_size - strlen(buf), - "%d:%02d:%02d", hours, minutes, seconds); - else - snprintf(buf + strlen(buf), win_size - strlen(buf), - " %02d:%02d", minutes, seconds); + if (hours != 0) { + xextendf(&buf, NULL, "%d:%02d:%02d", + hours, minutes, seconds); + } else + xextendf(&buf, NULL, " %02d:%02d", minutes, seconds); if (bytes_left > 0) - strlcat(buf, " ETA", win_size); + xextendf(&buf, NULL, " ETA"); else - strlcat(buf, " ", win_size); + xextendf(&buf, NULL, " "); } - atomicio(vwrite, STDOUT_FILENO, buf, win_size - 1); - last_update = now; + /* Finally, truncate string at window width */ + cols = win_size - 1; + asmprintf(&obuf, INT_MAX, &cols, " %s", buf); + if (obuf != NULL) { + *obuf = '\r'; /* must insert as asmprintf() would escape it */ + atomicio(vwrite, STDOUT_FILENO, obuf, strlen(obuf)); + } + free(buf); + free(obuf); } -/*ARGSUSED*/ static void sig_alarm(int ignore) { alarm_fired = 1; alarm(UPDATE_INTERVAL); } void start_progress_meter(const char *f, off_t filesize, off_t *ctr) { start = last_update = monotime_double(); file = f; start_pos = *ctr; end_pos = filesize; cur_pos = 0; counter = ctr; stalled = 0; bytes_per_second = 0; setscreensize(); refresh_progress_meter(1); ssh_signal(SIGALRM, sig_alarm); ssh_signal(SIGWINCH, sig_winch); alarm(UPDATE_INTERVAL); } void stop_progress_meter(void) { alarm(0); if (!can_output()) return; /* Ensure we complete the progress */ if (cur_pos != end_pos) refresh_progress_meter(1); atomicio(vwrite, STDOUT_FILENO, "\n", 1); } -/*ARGSUSED*/ static void sig_winch(int sig) { win_resized = 1; } static void setscreensize(void) { struct winsize winsize; if (ioctl(STDOUT_FILENO, TIOCGWINSZ, &winsize) != -1 && winsize.ws_col != 0) { if (winsize.ws_col > MAX_WINSIZE) win_size = MAX_WINSIZE; else win_size = winsize.ws_col; } else win_size = DEFAULT_WINSIZE; win_size += 1; /* trailing \0 */ } diff --git a/crypto/openssh/readconf.c b/crypto/openssh/readconf.c index 9ade0ffa0641..2cbbe8d48522 100644 --- a/crypto/openssh/readconf.c +++ b/crypto/openssh/readconf.c @@ -1,3494 +1,3491 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: readconf.c,v 1.372 2023/01/13 02:58:20 dtucker Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: readconf.c,v 1.375 2023/03/10 02:24:56 dtucker Exp $ */ /* * Author: Tatu Ylonen * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen , Espoo, Finland * All rights reserved * Functions for reading the configuration files. * * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell". */ #include "includes.h" #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H # include #endif #include #include #include #include #include #include #ifdef USE_SYSTEM_GLOB # include #else # include "openbsd-compat/glob.h" #endif #ifdef HAVE_UTIL_H #include #endif #if defined(HAVE_STRNVIS) && defined(HAVE_VIS_H) && !defined(BROKEN_STRNVIS) # include #endif #include "xmalloc.h" #include "ssh.h" #include "ssherr.h" -#include "compat.h" #include "cipher.h" #include "pathnames.h" #include "log.h" #include "sshkey.h" #include "misc.h" #include "readconf.h" #include "match.h" #include "kex.h" #include "mac.h" #include "uidswap.h" #include "myproposal.h" #include "digest.h" /* Format of the configuration file: # Configuration data is parsed as follows: # 1. command line options # 2. user-specific file # 3. system-wide file # Any configuration value is only changed the first time it is set. # Thus, host-specific definitions should be at the beginning of the # configuration file, and defaults at the end. # Host-specific declarations. These may override anything above. A single # host may match multiple declarations; these are processed in the order # that they are given in. Host *.ngs.fi ngs.fi User foo Host fake.com Hostname another.host.name.real.org User blaah Port 34289 ForwardX11 no ForwardAgent no Host books.com RemoteForward 9999 shadows.cs.hut.fi:9999 Ciphers 3des-cbc Host fascist.blob.com Port 23123 User tylonen PasswordAuthentication no Host puukko.hut.fi User t35124p ProxyCommand ssh-proxy %h %p Host *.fr PublicKeyAuthentication no Host *.su Ciphers aes128-ctr PasswordAuthentication no Host vpn.fake.com Tunnel yes TunnelDevice 3 # Defaults for various options Host * ForwardAgent no ForwardX11 no PasswordAuthentication yes StrictHostKeyChecking yes TcpKeepAlive no IdentityFile ~/.ssh/identity Port 22 EscapeChar ~ */ static int read_config_file_depth(const char *filename, struct passwd *pw, const char *host, const char *original_host, Options *options, int flags, int *activep, int *want_final_pass, int depth); static int process_config_line_depth(Options *options, struct passwd *pw, const char *host, const char *original_host, char *line, const char *filename, int linenum, int *activep, int flags, int *want_final_pass, int depth); /* Keyword tokens. */ typedef enum { oBadOption, oHost, oMatch, oInclude, oForwardAgent, oForwardX11, oForwardX11Trusted, oForwardX11Timeout, oGatewayPorts, oExitOnForwardFailure, oPasswordAuthentication, oXAuthLocation, oIdentityFile, oHostname, oPort, oRemoteForward, oLocalForward, oPermitRemoteOpen, oCertificateFile, oAddKeysToAgent, oIdentityAgent, oUser, oEscapeChar, oProxyCommand, oGlobalKnownHostsFile, oUserKnownHostsFile, oConnectionAttempts, oBatchMode, oCheckHostIP, oStrictHostKeyChecking, oCompression, oTCPKeepAlive, oNumberOfPasswordPrompts, oLogFacility, oLogLevel, oLogVerbose, oCiphers, oMacs, oPubkeyAuthentication, oKbdInteractiveAuthentication, oKbdInteractiveDevices, oHostKeyAlias, oDynamicForward, oPreferredAuthentications, oHostbasedAuthentication, oHostKeyAlgorithms, oBindAddress, oBindInterface, oPKCS11Provider, oClearAllForwardings, oNoHostAuthenticationForLocalhost, oEnableSSHKeysign, oRekeyLimit, oVerifyHostKeyDNS, oConnectTimeout, oAddressFamily, oGssAuthentication, oGssDelegateCreds, oServerAliveInterval, oServerAliveCountMax, oIdentitiesOnly, oSendEnv, oSetEnv, oControlPath, oControlMaster, oControlPersist, oHashKnownHosts, oTunnel, oTunnelDevice, oLocalCommand, oPermitLocalCommand, oRemoteCommand, oVisualHostKey, oKexAlgorithms, oIPQoS, oRequestTTY, oSessionType, oStdinNull, oForkAfterAuthentication, oIgnoreUnknown, oProxyUseFdpass, oCanonicalDomains, oCanonicalizeHostname, oCanonicalizeMaxDots, oCanonicalizeFallbackLocal, oCanonicalizePermittedCNAMEs, oStreamLocalBindMask, oStreamLocalBindUnlink, oRevokedHostKeys, oFingerprintHash, oUpdateHostkeys, oHostbasedAcceptedAlgorithms, oPubkeyAcceptedAlgorithms, oCASignatureAlgorithms, oProxyJump, oSecurityKeyProvider, oKnownHostsCommand, oRequiredRSASize, oEnableEscapeCommandline, oIgnore, oIgnoredUnknownOption, oDeprecated, oUnsupported } OpCodes; /* Textual representations of the tokens. */ static struct { const char *name; OpCodes opcode; } keywords[] = { /* Deprecated options */ { "protocol", oIgnore }, /* NB. silently ignored */ { "cipher", oDeprecated }, { "fallbacktorsh", oDeprecated }, { "globalknownhostsfile2", oDeprecated }, { "rhostsauthentication", oDeprecated }, { "userknownhostsfile2", oDeprecated }, { "useroaming", oDeprecated }, { "usersh", oDeprecated }, { "useprivilegedport", oDeprecated }, /* Unsupported options */ { "afstokenpassing", oUnsupported }, { "kerberosauthentication", oUnsupported }, { "kerberostgtpassing", oUnsupported }, { "rsaauthentication", oUnsupported }, { "rhostsrsaauthentication", oUnsupported }, { "compressionlevel", oUnsupported }, /* Sometimes-unsupported options */ #if defined(GSSAPI) { "gssapiauthentication", oGssAuthentication }, { "gssapidelegatecredentials", oGssDelegateCreds }, # else { "gssapiauthentication", oUnsupported }, { "gssapidelegatecredentials", oUnsupported }, #endif #ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11 { "pkcs11provider", oPKCS11Provider }, { "smartcarddevice", oPKCS11Provider }, # else { "smartcarddevice", oUnsupported }, { "pkcs11provider", oUnsupported }, #endif { "forwardagent", oForwardAgent }, { "forwardx11", oForwardX11 }, { "forwardx11trusted", oForwardX11Trusted }, { "forwardx11timeout", oForwardX11Timeout }, { "exitonforwardfailure", oExitOnForwardFailure }, { "xauthlocation", oXAuthLocation }, { "gatewayports", oGatewayPorts }, { "passwordauthentication", oPasswordAuthentication }, { "kbdinteractiveauthentication", oKbdInteractiveAuthentication }, { "kbdinteractivedevices", oKbdInteractiveDevices }, { "challengeresponseauthentication", oKbdInteractiveAuthentication }, /* alias */ { "skeyauthentication", oKbdInteractiveAuthentication }, /* alias */ { "tisauthentication", oKbdInteractiveAuthentication }, /* alias */ { "pubkeyauthentication", oPubkeyAuthentication }, { "dsaauthentication", oPubkeyAuthentication }, /* alias */ { "hostbasedauthentication", oHostbasedAuthentication }, { "identityfile", oIdentityFile }, { "identityfile2", oIdentityFile }, /* obsolete */ { "identitiesonly", oIdentitiesOnly }, { "certificatefile", oCertificateFile }, { "addkeystoagent", oAddKeysToAgent }, { "identityagent", oIdentityAgent }, { "hostname", oHostname }, { "hostkeyalias", oHostKeyAlias }, { "proxycommand", oProxyCommand }, { "port", oPort }, { "ciphers", oCiphers }, { "macs", oMacs }, { "remoteforward", oRemoteForward }, { "localforward", oLocalForward }, { "permitremoteopen", oPermitRemoteOpen }, { "user", oUser }, { "host", oHost }, { "match", oMatch }, { "escapechar", oEscapeChar }, { "globalknownhostsfile", oGlobalKnownHostsFile }, { "userknownhostsfile", oUserKnownHostsFile }, { "connectionattempts", oConnectionAttempts }, { "batchmode", oBatchMode }, { "checkhostip", oCheckHostIP }, { "stricthostkeychecking", oStrictHostKeyChecking }, { "compression", oCompression }, { "tcpkeepalive", oTCPKeepAlive }, { "keepalive", oTCPKeepAlive }, /* obsolete */ { "numberofpasswordprompts", oNumberOfPasswordPrompts }, { "syslogfacility", oLogFacility }, { "loglevel", oLogLevel }, { "logverbose", oLogVerbose }, { "dynamicforward", oDynamicForward }, { "preferredauthentications", oPreferredAuthentications }, { "hostkeyalgorithms", oHostKeyAlgorithms }, { "casignaturealgorithms", oCASignatureAlgorithms }, { "bindaddress", oBindAddress }, { "bindinterface", oBindInterface }, { "clearallforwardings", oClearAllForwardings }, { "enablesshkeysign", oEnableSSHKeysign }, { "verifyhostkeydns", oVerifyHostKeyDNS }, { "nohostauthenticationforlocalhost", oNoHostAuthenticationForLocalhost }, { "rekeylimit", oRekeyLimit }, { "connecttimeout", oConnectTimeout }, { "addressfamily", oAddressFamily }, { "serveraliveinterval", oServerAliveInterval }, { "serveralivecountmax", oServerAliveCountMax }, { "sendenv", oSendEnv }, { "setenv", oSetEnv }, { "controlpath", oControlPath }, { "controlmaster", oControlMaster }, { "controlpersist", oControlPersist }, { "hashknownhosts", oHashKnownHosts }, { "include", oInclude }, { "tunnel", oTunnel }, { "tunneldevice", oTunnelDevice }, { "localcommand", oLocalCommand }, { "permitlocalcommand", oPermitLocalCommand }, { "remotecommand", oRemoteCommand }, { "visualhostkey", oVisualHostKey }, { "kexalgorithms", oKexAlgorithms }, { "ipqos", oIPQoS }, { "requesttty", oRequestTTY }, { "sessiontype", oSessionType }, { "stdinnull", oStdinNull }, { "forkafterauthentication", oForkAfterAuthentication }, { "proxyusefdpass", oProxyUseFdpass }, { "canonicaldomains", oCanonicalDomains }, { "canonicalizefallbacklocal", oCanonicalizeFallbackLocal }, { "canonicalizehostname", oCanonicalizeHostname }, { "canonicalizemaxdots", oCanonicalizeMaxDots }, { "canonicalizepermittedcnames", oCanonicalizePermittedCNAMEs }, { "streamlocalbindmask", oStreamLocalBindMask }, { "streamlocalbindunlink", oStreamLocalBindUnlink }, { "revokedhostkeys", oRevokedHostKeys }, { "fingerprinthash", oFingerprintHash }, { "updatehostkeys", oUpdateHostkeys }, { "hostbasedacceptedalgorithms", oHostbasedAcceptedAlgorithms }, { "hostbasedkeytypes", oHostbasedAcceptedAlgorithms }, /* obsolete */ { "pubkeyacceptedalgorithms", oPubkeyAcceptedAlgorithms }, { "pubkeyacceptedkeytypes", oPubkeyAcceptedAlgorithms }, /* obsolete */ { "ignoreunknown", oIgnoreUnknown }, { "proxyjump", oProxyJump }, { "securitykeyprovider", oSecurityKeyProvider }, { "knownhostscommand", oKnownHostsCommand }, { "requiredrsasize", oRequiredRSASize }, { "enableescapecommandline", oEnableEscapeCommandline }, { "hpndisabled", oDeprecated }, { "hpnbuffersize", oDeprecated }, { "tcprcvbufpoll", oDeprecated }, { "tcprcvbuf", oDeprecated }, { "noneenabled", oUnsupported }, { "noneswitch", oUnsupported }, { "versionaddendum", oDeprecated }, { NULL, oBadOption } }; static const char *lookup_opcode_name(OpCodes code); const char * kex_default_pk_alg(void) { static char *pkalgs; if (pkalgs == NULL) { char *all_key; all_key = sshkey_alg_list(0, 0, 1, ','); pkalgs = match_filter_allowlist(KEX_DEFAULT_PK_ALG, all_key); free(all_key); } return pkalgs; } char * ssh_connection_hash(const char *thishost, const char *host, const char *portstr, const char *user) { struct ssh_digest_ctx *md; u_char conn_hash[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH]; if ((md = ssh_digest_start(SSH_DIGEST_SHA1)) == NULL || ssh_digest_update(md, thishost, strlen(thishost)) < 0 || ssh_digest_update(md, host, strlen(host)) < 0 || ssh_digest_update(md, portstr, strlen(portstr)) < 0 || ssh_digest_update(md, user, strlen(user)) < 0 || ssh_digest_final(md, conn_hash, sizeof(conn_hash)) < 0) fatal_f("mux digest failed"); ssh_digest_free(md); return tohex(conn_hash, ssh_digest_bytes(SSH_DIGEST_SHA1)); } /* * Adds a local TCP/IP port forward to options. Never returns if there is an * error. */ void add_local_forward(Options *options, const struct Forward *newfwd) { struct Forward *fwd; int i; /* Don't add duplicates */ for (i = 0; i < options->num_local_forwards; i++) { if (forward_equals(newfwd, options->local_forwards + i)) return; } options->local_forwards = xreallocarray(options->local_forwards, options->num_local_forwards + 1, sizeof(*options->local_forwards)); fwd = &options->local_forwards[options->num_local_forwards++]; fwd->listen_host = newfwd->listen_host; fwd->listen_port = newfwd->listen_port; fwd->listen_path = newfwd->listen_path; fwd->connect_host = newfwd->connect_host; fwd->connect_port = newfwd->connect_port; fwd->connect_path = newfwd->connect_path; } /* * Adds a remote TCP/IP port forward to options. Never returns if there is * an error. */ void add_remote_forward(Options *options, const struct Forward *newfwd) { struct Forward *fwd; int i; /* Don't add duplicates */ for (i = 0; i < options->num_remote_forwards; i++) { if (forward_equals(newfwd, options->remote_forwards + i)) return; } options->remote_forwards = xreallocarray(options->remote_forwards, options->num_remote_forwards + 1, sizeof(*options->remote_forwards)); fwd = &options->remote_forwards[options->num_remote_forwards++]; fwd->listen_host = newfwd->listen_host; fwd->listen_port = newfwd->listen_port; fwd->listen_path = newfwd->listen_path; fwd->connect_host = newfwd->connect_host; fwd->connect_port = newfwd->connect_port; fwd->connect_path = newfwd->connect_path; fwd->handle = newfwd->handle; fwd->allocated_port = 0; } static void clear_forwardings(Options *options) { int i; for (i = 0; i < options->num_local_forwards; i++) { free(options->local_forwards[i].listen_host); free(options->local_forwards[i].listen_path); free(options->local_forwards[i].connect_host); free(options->local_forwards[i].connect_path); } if (options->num_local_forwards > 0) { free(options->local_forwards); options->local_forwards = NULL; } options->num_local_forwards = 0; for (i = 0; i < options->num_remote_forwards; i++) { free(options->remote_forwards[i].listen_host); free(options->remote_forwards[i].listen_path); free(options->remote_forwards[i].connect_host); free(options->remote_forwards[i].connect_path); } if (options->num_remote_forwards > 0) { free(options->remote_forwards); options->remote_forwards = NULL; } options->num_remote_forwards = 0; options->tun_open = SSH_TUNMODE_NO; } void add_certificate_file(Options *options, const char *path, int userprovided) { int i; if (options->num_certificate_files >= SSH_MAX_CERTIFICATE_FILES) fatal("Too many certificate files specified (max %d)", SSH_MAX_CERTIFICATE_FILES); /* Avoid registering duplicates */ for (i = 0; i < options->num_certificate_files; i++) { if (options->certificate_file_userprovided[i] == userprovided && strcmp(options->certificate_files[i], path) == 0) { debug2_f("ignoring duplicate key %s", path); return; } } options->certificate_file_userprovided[options->num_certificate_files] = userprovided; options->certificate_files[options->num_certificate_files++] = xstrdup(path); } void add_identity_file(Options *options, const char *dir, const char *filename, int userprovided) { char *path; int i; if (options->num_identity_files >= SSH_MAX_IDENTITY_FILES) fatal("Too many identity files specified (max %d)", SSH_MAX_IDENTITY_FILES); if (dir == NULL) /* no dir, filename is absolute */ path = xstrdup(filename); else if (xasprintf(&path, "%s%s", dir, filename) >= PATH_MAX) fatal("Identity file path %s too long", path); /* Avoid registering duplicates */ for (i = 0; i < options->num_identity_files; i++) { if (options->identity_file_userprovided[i] == userprovided && strcmp(options->identity_files[i], path) == 0) { debug2_f("ignoring duplicate key %s", path); free(path); return; } } options->identity_file_userprovided[options->num_identity_files] = userprovided; options->identity_files[options->num_identity_files++] = path; } int default_ssh_port(void) { static int port; struct servent *sp; if (port == 0) { sp = getservbyname(SSH_SERVICE_NAME, "tcp"); port = sp ? ntohs(sp->s_port) : SSH_DEFAULT_PORT; } return port; } /* * Execute a command in a shell. * Return its exit status or -1 on abnormal exit. */ static int execute_in_shell(const char *cmd) { char *shell; pid_t pid; int status; if ((shell = getenv("SHELL")) == NULL) shell = _PATH_BSHELL; if (access(shell, X_OK) == -1) { fatal("Shell \"%s\" is not executable: %s", shell, strerror(errno)); } debug("Executing command: '%.500s'", cmd); /* Fork and execute the command. */ if ((pid = fork()) == 0) { char *argv[4]; if (stdfd_devnull(1, 1, 0) == -1) fatal_f("stdfd_devnull failed"); closefrom(STDERR_FILENO + 1); argv[0] = shell; argv[1] = "-c"; argv[2] = xstrdup(cmd); argv[3] = NULL; execv(argv[0], argv); error("Unable to execute '%.100s': %s", cmd, strerror(errno)); /* Die with signal to make this error apparent to parent. */ ssh_signal(SIGTERM, SIG_DFL); kill(getpid(), SIGTERM); _exit(1); } /* Parent. */ if (pid == -1) fatal_f("fork: %.100s", strerror(errno)); while (waitpid(pid, &status, 0) == -1) { if (errno != EINTR && errno != EAGAIN) fatal_f("waitpid: %s", strerror(errno)); } if (!WIFEXITED(status)) { error("command '%.100s' exited abnormally", cmd); return -1; } debug3("command returned status %d", WEXITSTATUS(status)); return WEXITSTATUS(status); } /* * Parse and execute a Match directive. */ static int match_cfg_line(Options *options, char **condition, struct passwd *pw, const char *host_arg, const char *original_host, int final_pass, int *want_final_pass, const char *filename, int linenum) { char *arg, *oattrib, *attrib, *cmd, *cp = *condition, *host, *criteria; const char *ruser; int r, port, this_result, result = 1, attributes = 0, negate; char thishost[NI_MAXHOST], shorthost[NI_MAXHOST], portstr[NI_MAXSERV]; char uidstr[32]; /* * Configuration is likely to be incomplete at this point so we * must be prepared to use default values. */ port = options->port <= 0 ? default_ssh_port() : options->port; ruser = options->user == NULL ? pw->pw_name : options->user; if (final_pass) { host = xstrdup(options->hostname); } else if (options->hostname != NULL) { /* NB. Please keep in sync with ssh.c:main() */ host = percent_expand(options->hostname, "h", host_arg, (char *)NULL); } else { host = xstrdup(host_arg); } debug2("checking match for '%s' host %s originally %s", cp, host, original_host); while ((oattrib = attrib = strdelim(&cp)) && *attrib != '\0') { /* Terminate on comment */ if (*attrib == '#') { cp = NULL; /* mark all arguments consumed */ break; } arg = criteria = NULL; this_result = 1; - if ((negate = attrib[0] == '!')) + if ((negate = (attrib[0] == '!'))) attrib++; /* Criterion "all" has no argument and must appear alone */ if (strcasecmp(attrib, "all") == 0) { if (attributes > 1 || ((arg = strdelim(&cp)) != NULL && *arg != '\0' && *arg != '#')) { error("%.200s line %d: '%s' cannot be combined " "with other Match attributes", filename, linenum, oattrib); result = -1; goto out; } if (arg != NULL && *arg == '#') cp = NULL; /* mark all arguments consumed */ if (result) result = negate ? 0 : 1; goto out; } attributes++; /* criteria "final" and "canonical" have no argument */ if (strcasecmp(attrib, "canonical") == 0 || strcasecmp(attrib, "final") == 0) { /* * If the config requests "Match final" then remember * this so we can perform a second pass later. */ if (strcasecmp(attrib, "final") == 0 && want_final_pass != NULL) *want_final_pass = 1; r = !!final_pass; /* force bitmask member to boolean */ if (r == (negate ? 1 : 0)) this_result = result = 0; debug3("%.200s line %d: %smatched '%s'", filename, linenum, this_result ? "" : "not ", oattrib); continue; } /* All other criteria require an argument */ if ((arg = strdelim(&cp)) == NULL || *arg == '\0' || *arg == '#') { error("Missing Match criteria for %s", attrib); result = -1; goto out; } if (strcasecmp(attrib, "host") == 0) { criteria = xstrdup(host); r = match_hostname(host, arg) == 1; if (r == (negate ? 1 : 0)) this_result = result = 0; } else if (strcasecmp(attrib, "originalhost") == 0) { criteria = xstrdup(original_host); r = match_hostname(original_host, arg) == 1; if (r == (negate ? 1 : 0)) this_result = result = 0; } else if (strcasecmp(attrib, "user") == 0) { criteria = xstrdup(ruser); r = match_pattern_list(ruser, arg, 0) == 1; if (r == (negate ? 1 : 0)) this_result = result = 0; } else if (strcasecmp(attrib, "localuser") == 0) { criteria = xstrdup(pw->pw_name); r = match_pattern_list(pw->pw_name, arg, 0) == 1; if (r == (negate ? 1 : 0)) this_result = result = 0; } else if (strcasecmp(attrib, "exec") == 0) { char *conn_hash_hex, *keyalias; if (gethostname(thishost, sizeof(thishost)) == -1) fatal("gethostname: %s", strerror(errno)); strlcpy(shorthost, thishost, sizeof(shorthost)); shorthost[strcspn(thishost, ".")] = '\0'; snprintf(portstr, sizeof(portstr), "%d", port); snprintf(uidstr, sizeof(uidstr), "%llu", (unsigned long long)pw->pw_uid); conn_hash_hex = ssh_connection_hash(thishost, host, portstr, ruser); keyalias = options->host_key_alias ? options->host_key_alias : host; cmd = percent_expand(arg, "C", conn_hash_hex, "L", shorthost, "d", pw->pw_dir, "h", host, "k", keyalias, "l", thishost, "n", original_host, "p", portstr, "r", ruser, "u", pw->pw_name, "i", uidstr, (char *)NULL); free(conn_hash_hex); if (result != 1) { /* skip execution if prior predicate failed */ debug3("%.200s line %d: skipped exec " "\"%.100s\"", filename, linenum, cmd); free(cmd); continue; } r = execute_in_shell(cmd); if (r == -1) { fatal("%.200s line %d: match exec " "'%.100s' error", filename, linenum, cmd); } criteria = xstrdup(cmd); free(cmd); /* Force exit status to boolean */ r = r == 0; if (r == (negate ? 1 : 0)) this_result = result = 0; } else { error("Unsupported Match attribute %s", attrib); result = -1; goto out; } debug3("%.200s line %d: %smatched '%s \"%.100s\"' ", filename, linenum, this_result ? "": "not ", oattrib, criteria); free(criteria); } if (attributes == 0) { error("One or more attributes required for Match"); result = -1; goto out; } out: if (result != -1) debug2("match %sfound", result ? "" : "not "); *condition = cp; free(host); return result; } /* Remove environment variable by pattern */ static void rm_env(Options *options, const char *arg, const char *filename, int linenum) { u_int i, j, onum_send_env = options->num_send_env; /* Remove an environment variable */ for (i = 0; i < options->num_send_env; ) { if (!match_pattern(options->send_env[i], arg + 1)) { i++; continue; } debug3("%s line %d: removing environment %s", filename, linenum, options->send_env[i]); free(options->send_env[i]); options->send_env[i] = NULL; for (j = i; j < options->num_send_env - 1; j++) { options->send_env[j] = options->send_env[j + 1]; options->send_env[j + 1] = NULL; } options->num_send_env--; /* NB. don't increment i */ } if (onum_send_env != options->num_send_env) { options->send_env = xrecallocarray(options->send_env, onum_send_env, options->num_send_env, sizeof(*options->send_env)); } } /* * Returns the number of the token pointed to by cp or oBadOption. */ static OpCodes parse_token(const char *cp, const char *filename, int linenum, const char *ignored_unknown) { int i; for (i = 0; keywords[i].name; i++) if (strcmp(cp, keywords[i].name) == 0) return keywords[i].opcode; if (ignored_unknown != NULL && match_pattern_list(cp, ignored_unknown, 1) == 1) return oIgnoredUnknownOption; error("%s: line %d: Bad configuration option: %s", filename, linenum, cp); return oBadOption; } /* Multistate option parsing */ struct multistate { char *key; int value; }; static const struct multistate multistate_flag[] = { { "true", 1 }, { "false", 0 }, { "yes", 1 }, { "no", 0 }, { NULL, -1 } }; static const struct multistate multistate_yesnoask[] = { { "true", 1 }, { "false", 0 }, { "yes", 1 }, { "no", 0 }, { "ask", 2 }, { NULL, -1 } }; static const struct multistate multistate_strict_hostkey[] = { { "true", SSH_STRICT_HOSTKEY_YES }, { "false", SSH_STRICT_HOSTKEY_OFF }, { "yes", SSH_STRICT_HOSTKEY_YES }, { "no", SSH_STRICT_HOSTKEY_OFF }, { "ask", SSH_STRICT_HOSTKEY_ASK }, { "off", SSH_STRICT_HOSTKEY_OFF }, { "accept-new", SSH_STRICT_HOSTKEY_NEW }, { NULL, -1 } }; static const struct multistate multistate_yesnoaskconfirm[] = { { "true", 1 }, { "false", 0 }, { "yes", 1 }, { "no", 0 }, { "ask", 2 }, { "confirm", 3 }, { NULL, -1 } }; static const struct multistate multistate_addressfamily[] = { { "inet", AF_INET }, { "inet6", AF_INET6 }, { "any", AF_UNSPEC }, { NULL, -1 } }; static const struct multistate multistate_controlmaster[] = { { "true", SSHCTL_MASTER_YES }, { "yes", SSHCTL_MASTER_YES }, { "false", SSHCTL_MASTER_NO }, { "no", SSHCTL_MASTER_NO }, { "auto", SSHCTL_MASTER_AUTO }, { "ask", SSHCTL_MASTER_ASK }, { "autoask", SSHCTL_MASTER_AUTO_ASK }, { NULL, -1 } }; static const struct multistate multistate_tunnel[] = { { "ethernet", SSH_TUNMODE_ETHERNET }, { "point-to-point", SSH_TUNMODE_POINTOPOINT }, { "true", SSH_TUNMODE_DEFAULT }, { "yes", SSH_TUNMODE_DEFAULT }, { "false", SSH_TUNMODE_NO }, { "no", SSH_TUNMODE_NO }, { NULL, -1 } }; static const struct multistate multistate_requesttty[] = { { "true", REQUEST_TTY_YES }, { "yes", REQUEST_TTY_YES }, { "false", REQUEST_TTY_NO }, { "no", REQUEST_TTY_NO }, { "force", REQUEST_TTY_FORCE }, { "auto", REQUEST_TTY_AUTO }, { NULL, -1 } }; static const struct multistate multistate_sessiontype[] = { { "none", SESSION_TYPE_NONE }, { "subsystem", SESSION_TYPE_SUBSYSTEM }, { "default", SESSION_TYPE_DEFAULT }, { NULL, -1 } }; static const struct multistate multistate_canonicalizehostname[] = { { "true", SSH_CANONICALISE_YES }, { "false", SSH_CANONICALISE_NO }, { "yes", SSH_CANONICALISE_YES }, { "no", SSH_CANONICALISE_NO }, { "always", SSH_CANONICALISE_ALWAYS }, { NULL, -1 } }; static const struct multistate multistate_pubkey_auth[] = { { "true", SSH_PUBKEY_AUTH_ALL }, { "false", SSH_PUBKEY_AUTH_NO }, { "yes", SSH_PUBKEY_AUTH_ALL }, { "no", SSH_PUBKEY_AUTH_NO }, { "unbound", SSH_PUBKEY_AUTH_UNBOUND }, { "host-bound", SSH_PUBKEY_AUTH_HBOUND }, { NULL, -1 } }; static const struct multistate multistate_compression[] = { #ifdef WITH_ZLIB { "yes", COMP_ZLIB }, #endif { "no", COMP_NONE }, { NULL, -1 } }; static int parse_multistate_value(const char *arg, const char *filename, int linenum, const struct multistate *multistate_ptr) { int i; if (!arg || *arg == '\0') { error("%s line %d: missing argument.", filename, linenum); return -1; } for (i = 0; multistate_ptr[i].key != NULL; i++) { if (strcasecmp(arg, multistate_ptr[i].key) == 0) return multistate_ptr[i].value; } return -1; } /* * Processes a single option line as used in the configuration files. This * only sets those values that have not already been set. */ int process_config_line(Options *options, struct passwd *pw, const char *host, const char *original_host, char *line, const char *filename, int linenum, int *activep, int flags) { return process_config_line_depth(options, pw, host, original_host, line, filename, linenum, activep, flags, NULL, 0); } #define WHITESPACE " \t\r\n" static int process_config_line_depth(Options *options, struct passwd *pw, const char *host, const char *original_host, char *line, const char *filename, int linenum, int *activep, int flags, int *want_final_pass, int depth) { char *str, **charptr, *endofnumber, *keyword, *arg, *arg2, *p; char **cpptr, ***cppptr, fwdarg[256]; u_int i, *uintptr, uvalue, max_entries = 0; int r, oactive, negated, opcode, *intptr, value, value2, cmdline = 0; int remotefwd, dynamicfwd; LogLevel *log_level_ptr; SyslogFacility *log_facility_ptr; long long val64; size_t len; struct Forward fwd; const struct multistate *multistate_ptr; struct allowed_cname *cname; glob_t gl; const char *errstr; char **oav = NULL, **av; int oac = 0, ac; int ret = -1; if (activep == NULL) { /* We are processing a command line directive */ cmdline = 1; activep = &cmdline; } /* Strip trailing whitespace. Allow \f (form feed) at EOL only */ if ((len = strlen(line)) == 0) return 0; for (len--; len > 0; len--) { if (strchr(WHITESPACE "\f", line[len]) == NULL) break; line[len] = '\0'; } str = line; /* Get the keyword. (Each line is supposed to begin with a keyword). */ if ((keyword = strdelim(&str)) == NULL) return 0; /* Ignore leading whitespace. */ if (*keyword == '\0') keyword = strdelim(&str); if (keyword == NULL || !*keyword || *keyword == '\n' || *keyword == '#') return 0; /* Match lowercase keyword */ lowercase(keyword); /* Prepare to parse remainder of line */ if (str != NULL) str += strspn(str, WHITESPACE); if (str == NULL || *str == '\0') { error("%s line %d: no argument after keyword \"%s\"", filename, linenum, keyword); return -1; } opcode = parse_token(keyword, filename, linenum, options->ignored_unknown); if (argv_split(str, &oac, &oav, 1) != 0) { error("%s line %d: invalid quotes", filename, linenum); return -1; } ac = oac; av = oav; switch (opcode) { case oBadOption: /* don't panic, but count bad options */ goto out; case oIgnore: argv_consume(&ac); break; case oIgnoredUnknownOption: debug("%s line %d: Ignored unknown option \"%s\"", filename, linenum, keyword); argv_consume(&ac); break; case oConnectTimeout: intptr = &options->connection_timeout; parse_time: arg = argv_next(&ac, &av); if (!arg || *arg == '\0') { error("%s line %d: missing time value.", filename, linenum); goto out; } if (strcmp(arg, "none") == 0) value = -1; else if ((value = convtime(arg)) == -1) { error("%s line %d: invalid time value.", filename, linenum); goto out; } if (*activep && *intptr == -1) *intptr = value; break; case oForwardAgent: intptr = &options->forward_agent; arg = argv_next(&ac, &av); if (!arg || *arg == '\0') { error("%s line %d: missing argument.", filename, linenum); goto out; } value = -1; multistate_ptr = multistate_flag; for (i = 0; multistate_ptr[i].key != NULL; i++) { if (strcasecmp(arg, multistate_ptr[i].key) == 0) { value = multistate_ptr[i].value; break; } } if (value != -1) { if (*activep && *intptr == -1) *intptr = value; break; } /* ForwardAgent wasn't 'yes' or 'no', assume a path */ if (*activep && *intptr == -1) *intptr = 1; charptr = &options->forward_agent_sock_path; goto parse_agent_path; case oForwardX11: intptr = &options->forward_x11; parse_flag: multistate_ptr = multistate_flag; parse_multistate: arg = argv_next(&ac, &av); if ((value = parse_multistate_value(arg, filename, linenum, multistate_ptr)) == -1) { error("%s line %d: unsupported option \"%s\".", filename, linenum, arg); goto out; } if (*activep && *intptr == -1) *intptr = value; break; case oForwardX11Trusted: intptr = &options->forward_x11_trusted; goto parse_flag; case oForwardX11Timeout: intptr = &options->forward_x11_timeout; goto parse_time; case oGatewayPorts: intptr = &options->fwd_opts.gateway_ports; goto parse_flag; case oExitOnForwardFailure: intptr = &options->exit_on_forward_failure; goto parse_flag; case oPasswordAuthentication: intptr = &options->password_authentication; goto parse_flag; case oKbdInteractiveAuthentication: intptr = &options->kbd_interactive_authentication; goto parse_flag; case oKbdInteractiveDevices: charptr = &options->kbd_interactive_devices; goto parse_string; case oPubkeyAuthentication: multistate_ptr = multistate_pubkey_auth; intptr = &options->pubkey_authentication; goto parse_multistate; case oHostbasedAuthentication: intptr = &options->hostbased_authentication; goto parse_flag; case oGssAuthentication: intptr = &options->gss_authentication; goto parse_flag; case oGssDelegateCreds: intptr = &options->gss_deleg_creds; goto parse_flag; case oBatchMode: intptr = &options->batch_mode; goto parse_flag; case oCheckHostIP: intptr = &options->check_host_ip; goto parse_flag; case oVerifyHostKeyDNS: intptr = &options->verify_host_key_dns; multistate_ptr = multistate_yesnoask; goto parse_multistate; case oStrictHostKeyChecking: intptr = &options->strict_host_key_checking; multistate_ptr = multistate_strict_hostkey; goto parse_multistate; case oCompression: intptr = &options->compression; multistate_ptr = multistate_compression; goto parse_multistate; case oTCPKeepAlive: intptr = &options->tcp_keep_alive; goto parse_flag; case oNoHostAuthenticationForLocalhost: intptr = &options->no_host_authentication_for_localhost; goto parse_flag; case oNumberOfPasswordPrompts: intptr = &options->number_of_password_prompts; goto parse_int; case oRekeyLimit: arg = argv_next(&ac, &av); if (!arg || *arg == '\0') { error("%.200s line %d: Missing argument.", filename, linenum); goto out; } if (strcmp(arg, "default") == 0) { val64 = 0; } else { if (scan_scaled(arg, &val64) == -1) { error("%.200s line %d: Bad number '%s': %s", filename, linenum, arg, strerror(errno)); goto out; } if (val64 != 0 && val64 < 16) { error("%.200s line %d: RekeyLimit too small", filename, linenum); goto out; } } if (*activep && options->rekey_limit == -1) options->rekey_limit = val64; if (ac != 0) { /* optional rekey interval present */ if (strcmp(av[0], "none") == 0) { (void)argv_next(&ac, &av); /* discard */ break; } intptr = &options->rekey_interval; goto parse_time; } break; case oIdentityFile: arg = argv_next(&ac, &av); if (!arg || *arg == '\0') { error("%.200s line %d: Missing argument.", filename, linenum); goto out; } if (*activep) { intptr = &options->num_identity_files; if (*intptr >= SSH_MAX_IDENTITY_FILES) { error("%.200s line %d: Too many identity files " "specified (max %d).", filename, linenum, SSH_MAX_IDENTITY_FILES); goto out; } add_identity_file(options, NULL, arg, flags & SSHCONF_USERCONF); } break; case oCertificateFile: arg = argv_next(&ac, &av); if (!arg || *arg == '\0') { error("%.200s line %d: Missing argument.", filename, linenum); goto out; } if (*activep) { intptr = &options->num_certificate_files; if (*intptr >= SSH_MAX_CERTIFICATE_FILES) { error("%.200s line %d: Too many certificate " "files specified (max %d).", filename, linenum, SSH_MAX_CERTIFICATE_FILES); goto out; } add_certificate_file(options, arg, flags & SSHCONF_USERCONF); } break; case oXAuthLocation: charptr=&options->xauth_location; goto parse_string; case oUser: charptr = &options->user; parse_string: arg = argv_next(&ac, &av); if (!arg || *arg == '\0') { error("%.200s line %d: Missing argument.", filename, linenum); goto out; } if (*activep && *charptr == NULL) *charptr = xstrdup(arg); break; case oGlobalKnownHostsFile: cpptr = (char **)&options->system_hostfiles; uintptr = &options->num_system_hostfiles; max_entries = SSH_MAX_HOSTS_FILES; parse_char_array: i = 0; value = *uintptr == 0; /* was array empty when we started? */ while ((arg = argv_next(&ac, &av)) != NULL) { if (*arg == '\0') { error("%s line %d: keyword %s empty argument", filename, linenum, keyword); goto out; } /* Allow "none" only in first position */ if (strcasecmp(arg, "none") == 0) { if (i > 0 || ac > 0) { error("%s line %d: keyword %s \"none\" " "argument must appear alone.", filename, linenum, keyword); goto out; } } i++; if (*activep && value) { if ((*uintptr) >= max_entries) { error("%s line %d: too many %s " "entries.", filename, linenum, keyword); goto out; } cpptr[(*uintptr)++] = xstrdup(arg); } } break; case oUserKnownHostsFile: cpptr = (char **)&options->user_hostfiles; uintptr = &options->num_user_hostfiles; max_entries = SSH_MAX_HOSTS_FILES; goto parse_char_array; case oHostname: charptr = &options->hostname; goto parse_string; case oHostKeyAlias: charptr = &options->host_key_alias; goto parse_string; case oPreferredAuthentications: charptr = &options->preferred_authentications; goto parse_string; case oBindAddress: charptr = &options->bind_address; goto parse_string; case oBindInterface: charptr = &options->bind_interface; goto parse_string; case oPKCS11Provider: charptr = &options->pkcs11_provider; goto parse_string; case oSecurityKeyProvider: charptr = &options->sk_provider; goto parse_string; case oKnownHostsCommand: charptr = &options->known_hosts_command; goto parse_command; case oProxyCommand: charptr = &options->proxy_command; /* Ignore ProxyCommand if ProxyJump already specified */ if (options->jump_host != NULL) charptr = &options->jump_host; /* Skip below */ parse_command: if (str == NULL) { error("%.200s line %d: Missing argument.", filename, linenum); goto out; } len = strspn(str, WHITESPACE "="); if (*activep && *charptr == NULL) *charptr = xstrdup(str + len); argv_consume(&ac); break; case oProxyJump: if (str == NULL) { error("%.200s line %d: Missing argument.", filename, linenum); goto out; } len = strspn(str, WHITESPACE "="); /* XXX use argv? */ if (parse_jump(str + len, options, *activep) == -1) { error("%.200s line %d: Invalid ProxyJump \"%s\"", filename, linenum, str + len); goto out; } argv_consume(&ac); break; case oPort: arg = argv_next(&ac, &av); if (!arg || *arg == '\0') { error("%.200s line %d: Missing argument.", filename, linenum); goto out; } value = a2port(arg); if (value <= 0) { error("%.200s line %d: Bad port '%s'.", filename, linenum, arg); goto out; } if (*activep && options->port == -1) options->port = value; break; case oConnectionAttempts: intptr = &options->connection_attempts; parse_int: arg = argv_next(&ac, &av); if ((errstr = atoi_err(arg, &value)) != NULL) { error("%s line %d: integer value %s.", filename, linenum, errstr); goto out; } if (*activep && *intptr == -1) *intptr = value; break; case oCiphers: arg = argv_next(&ac, &av); if (!arg || *arg == '\0') { error("%.200s line %d: Missing argument.", filename, linenum); goto out; } if (*arg != '-' && !ciphers_valid(*arg == '+' || *arg == '^' ? arg + 1 : arg)){ error("%.200s line %d: Bad SSH2 cipher spec '%s'.", filename, linenum, arg ? arg : ""); goto out; } if (*activep && options->ciphers == NULL) options->ciphers = xstrdup(arg); break; case oMacs: arg = argv_next(&ac, &av); if (!arg || *arg == '\0') { error("%.200s line %d: Missing argument.", filename, linenum); goto out; } if (*arg != '-' && !mac_valid(*arg == '+' || *arg == '^' ? arg + 1 : arg)) { error("%.200s line %d: Bad SSH2 MAC spec '%s'.", filename, linenum, arg ? arg : ""); goto out; } if (*activep && options->macs == NULL) options->macs = xstrdup(arg); break; case oKexAlgorithms: arg = argv_next(&ac, &av); if (!arg || *arg == '\0') { error("%.200s line %d: Missing argument.", filename, linenum); goto out; } if (*arg != '-' && !kex_names_valid(*arg == '+' || *arg == '^' ? arg + 1 : arg)) { error("%.200s line %d: Bad SSH2 KexAlgorithms '%s'.", filename, linenum, arg ? arg : ""); goto out; } if (*activep && options->kex_algorithms == NULL) options->kex_algorithms = xstrdup(arg); break; case oHostKeyAlgorithms: charptr = &options->hostkeyalgorithms; parse_pubkey_algos: arg = argv_next(&ac, &av); if (!arg || *arg == '\0') { error("%.200s line %d: Missing argument.", filename, linenum); goto out; } if (*arg != '-' && !sshkey_names_valid2(*arg == '+' || *arg == '^' ? arg + 1 : arg, 1)) { error("%s line %d: Bad key types '%s'.", filename, linenum, arg ? arg : ""); goto out; } if (*activep && *charptr == NULL) *charptr = xstrdup(arg); break; case oCASignatureAlgorithms: charptr = &options->ca_sign_algorithms; goto parse_pubkey_algos; case oLogLevel: log_level_ptr = &options->log_level; arg = argv_next(&ac, &av); value = log_level_number(arg); if (value == SYSLOG_LEVEL_NOT_SET) { error("%.200s line %d: unsupported log level '%s'", filename, linenum, arg ? arg : ""); goto out; } if (*activep && *log_level_ptr == SYSLOG_LEVEL_NOT_SET) *log_level_ptr = (LogLevel) value; break; case oLogFacility: log_facility_ptr = &options->log_facility; arg = argv_next(&ac, &av); value = log_facility_number(arg); if (value == SYSLOG_FACILITY_NOT_SET) { error("%.200s line %d: unsupported log facility '%s'", filename, linenum, arg ? arg : ""); goto out; } if (*log_facility_ptr == -1) *log_facility_ptr = (SyslogFacility) value; break; case oLogVerbose: cppptr = &options->log_verbose; uintptr = &options->num_log_verbose; i = 0; while ((arg = argv_next(&ac, &av)) != NULL) { if (*arg == '\0') { error("%s line %d: keyword %s empty argument", filename, linenum, keyword); goto out; } /* Allow "none" only in first position */ if (strcasecmp(arg, "none") == 0) { if (i > 0 || ac > 0) { error("%s line %d: keyword %s \"none\" " "argument must appear alone.", filename, linenum, keyword); goto out; } } i++; if (*activep && *uintptr == 0) { *cppptr = xrecallocarray(*cppptr, *uintptr, *uintptr + 1, sizeof(**cppptr)); (*cppptr)[(*uintptr)++] = xstrdup(arg); } } break; case oLocalForward: case oRemoteForward: case oDynamicForward: arg = argv_next(&ac, &av); if (!arg || *arg == '\0') { error("%.200s line %d: Missing argument.", filename, linenum); goto out; } remotefwd = (opcode == oRemoteForward); dynamicfwd = (opcode == oDynamicForward); if (!dynamicfwd) { arg2 = argv_next(&ac, &av); if (arg2 == NULL || *arg2 == '\0') { if (remotefwd) dynamicfwd = 1; else { error("%.200s line %d: Missing target " "argument.", filename, linenum); goto out; } } else { /* construct a string for parse_forward */ snprintf(fwdarg, sizeof(fwdarg), "%s:%s", arg, arg2); } } if (dynamicfwd) strlcpy(fwdarg, arg, sizeof(fwdarg)); if (parse_forward(&fwd, fwdarg, dynamicfwd, remotefwd) == 0) { error("%.200s line %d: Bad forwarding specification.", filename, linenum); goto out; } if (*activep) { if (remotefwd) { add_remote_forward(options, &fwd); } else { add_local_forward(options, &fwd); } } break; case oPermitRemoteOpen: uintptr = &options->num_permitted_remote_opens; cppptr = &options->permitted_remote_opens; uvalue = *uintptr; /* modified later */ i = 0; while ((arg = argv_next(&ac, &av)) != NULL) { arg2 = xstrdup(arg); /* Allow any/none only in first position */ if (strcasecmp(arg, "none") == 0 || strcasecmp(arg, "any") == 0) { if (i > 0 || ac > 0) { error("%s line %d: keyword %s \"%s\" " "argument must appear alone.", filename, linenum, keyword, arg); goto out; } } else { p = hpdelim(&arg); if (p == NULL) { fatal("%s line %d: missing host in %s", filename, linenum, lookup_opcode_name(opcode)); } p = cleanhostname(p); /* * don't want to use permitopen_port to avoid * dependency on channels.[ch] here. */ if (arg == NULL || (strcmp(arg, "*") != 0 && a2port(arg) <= 0)) { fatal("%s line %d: bad port number " "in %s", filename, linenum, lookup_opcode_name(opcode)); } } if (*activep && uvalue == 0) { opt_array_append(filename, linenum, lookup_opcode_name(opcode), cppptr, uintptr, arg2); } free(arg2); i++; } if (i == 0) fatal("%s line %d: missing %s specification", filename, linenum, lookup_opcode_name(opcode)); break; case oClearAllForwardings: intptr = &options->clear_forwardings; goto parse_flag; case oHost: if (cmdline) { error("Host directive not supported as a command-line " "option"); goto out; } *activep = 0; arg2 = NULL; while ((arg = argv_next(&ac, &av)) != NULL) { if (*arg == '\0') { error("%s line %d: keyword %s empty argument", filename, linenum, keyword); goto out; } if ((flags & SSHCONF_NEVERMATCH) != 0) { argv_consume(&ac); break; } negated = *arg == '!'; if (negated) arg++; if (match_pattern(host, arg)) { if (negated) { debug("%.200s line %d: Skipping Host " "block because of negated match " "for %.100s", filename, linenum, arg); *activep = 0; argv_consume(&ac); break; } if (!*activep) arg2 = arg; /* logged below */ *activep = 1; } } if (*activep) debug("%.200s line %d: Applying options for %.100s", filename, linenum, arg2); break; case oMatch: if (cmdline) { error("Host directive not supported as a command-line " "option"); goto out; } value = match_cfg_line(options, &str, pw, host, original_host, flags & SSHCONF_FINAL, want_final_pass, filename, linenum); if (value < 0) { error("%.200s line %d: Bad Match condition", filename, linenum); goto out; } *activep = (flags & SSHCONF_NEVERMATCH) ? 0 : value; /* * If match_cfg_line() didn't consume all its arguments then * arrange for the extra arguments check below to fail. */ if (str == NULL || *str == '\0') argv_consume(&ac); break; case oEscapeChar: intptr = &options->escape_char; arg = argv_next(&ac, &av); if (!arg || *arg == '\0') { error("%.200s line %d: Missing argument.", filename, linenum); goto out; } if (strcmp(arg, "none") == 0) value = SSH_ESCAPECHAR_NONE; else if (arg[1] == '\0') value = (u_char) arg[0]; else if (arg[0] == '^' && arg[2] == 0 && (u_char) arg[1] >= 64 && (u_char) arg[1] < 128) value = (u_char) arg[1] & 31; else { error("%.200s line %d: Bad escape character.", filename, linenum); goto out; } if (*activep && *intptr == -1) *intptr = value; break; case oAddressFamily: intptr = &options->address_family; multistate_ptr = multistate_addressfamily; goto parse_multistate; case oEnableSSHKeysign: intptr = &options->enable_ssh_keysign; goto parse_flag; case oIdentitiesOnly: intptr = &options->identities_only; goto parse_flag; case oServerAliveInterval: intptr = &options->server_alive_interval; goto parse_time; case oServerAliveCountMax: intptr = &options->server_alive_count_max; goto parse_int; case oSendEnv: while ((arg = argv_next(&ac, &av)) != NULL) { if (*arg == '\0' || strchr(arg, '=') != NULL) { error("%s line %d: Invalid environment name.", filename, linenum); goto out; } if (!*activep) continue; if (*arg == '-') { /* Removing an env var */ rm_env(options, arg, filename, linenum); continue; } opt_array_append(filename, linenum, lookup_opcode_name(opcode), &options->send_env, &options->num_send_env, arg); } break; case oSetEnv: value = options->num_setenv; while ((arg = argv_next(&ac, &av)) != NULL) { if (strchr(arg, '=') == NULL) { error("%s line %d: Invalid SetEnv.", filename, linenum); goto out; } if (!*activep || value != 0) continue; if (lookup_setenv_in_list(arg, options->setenv, options->num_setenv) != NULL) { debug2("%s line %d: ignoring duplicate env " "name \"%.64s\"", filename, linenum, arg); continue; } opt_array_append(filename, linenum, lookup_opcode_name(opcode), &options->setenv, &options->num_setenv, arg); } break; case oControlPath: charptr = &options->control_path; goto parse_string; case oControlMaster: intptr = &options->control_master; multistate_ptr = multistate_controlmaster; goto parse_multistate; case oControlPersist: /* no/false/yes/true, or a time spec */ intptr = &options->control_persist; arg = argv_next(&ac, &av); if (!arg || *arg == '\0') { error("%.200s line %d: Missing ControlPersist" " argument.", filename, linenum); goto out; } value = 0; value2 = 0; /* timeout */ if (strcmp(arg, "no") == 0 || strcmp(arg, "false") == 0) value = 0; else if (strcmp(arg, "yes") == 0 || strcmp(arg, "true") == 0) value = 1; else if ((value2 = convtime(arg)) >= 0) value = 1; else { error("%.200s line %d: Bad ControlPersist argument.", filename, linenum); goto out; } if (*activep && *intptr == -1) { *intptr = value; options->control_persist_timeout = value2; } break; case oHashKnownHosts: intptr = &options->hash_known_hosts; goto parse_flag; case oTunnel: intptr = &options->tun_open; multistate_ptr = multistate_tunnel; goto parse_multistate; case oTunnelDevice: arg = argv_next(&ac, &av); if (!arg || *arg == '\0') { error("%.200s line %d: Missing argument.", filename, linenum); goto out; } value = a2tun(arg, &value2); if (value == SSH_TUNID_ERR) { error("%.200s line %d: Bad tun device.", filename, linenum); goto out; } if (*activep && options->tun_local == -1) { options->tun_local = value; options->tun_remote = value2; } break; case oLocalCommand: charptr = &options->local_command; goto parse_command; case oPermitLocalCommand: intptr = &options->permit_local_command; goto parse_flag; case oRemoteCommand: charptr = &options->remote_command; goto parse_command; case oVisualHostKey: intptr = &options->visual_host_key; goto parse_flag; case oInclude: if (cmdline) { error("Include directive not supported as a " "command-line option"); goto out; } value = 0; while ((arg = argv_next(&ac, &av)) != NULL) { if (*arg == '\0') { error("%s line %d: keyword %s empty argument", filename, linenum, keyword); goto out; } /* * Ensure all paths are anchored. User configuration * files may begin with '~/' but system configurations * must not. If the path is relative, then treat it * as living in ~/.ssh for user configurations or * /etc/ssh for system ones. */ if (*arg == '~' && (flags & SSHCONF_USERCONF) == 0) { error("%.200s line %d: bad include path %s.", filename, linenum, arg); goto out; } if (!path_absolute(arg) && *arg != '~') { xasprintf(&arg2, "%s/%s", (flags & SSHCONF_USERCONF) ? "~/" _PATH_SSH_USER_DIR : SSHDIR, arg); } else arg2 = xstrdup(arg); memset(&gl, 0, sizeof(gl)); r = glob(arg2, GLOB_TILDE, NULL, &gl); if (r == GLOB_NOMATCH) { debug("%.200s line %d: include %s matched no " "files",filename, linenum, arg2); free(arg2); continue; } else if (r != 0) { error("%.200s line %d: glob failed for %s.", filename, linenum, arg2); goto out; } free(arg2); oactive = *activep; for (i = 0; i < gl.gl_pathc; i++) { debug3("%.200s line %d: Including file %s " "depth %d%s", filename, linenum, gl.gl_pathv[i], depth, oactive ? "" : " (parse only)"); r = read_config_file_depth(gl.gl_pathv[i], pw, host, original_host, options, flags | SSHCONF_CHECKPERM | (oactive ? 0 : SSHCONF_NEVERMATCH), activep, want_final_pass, depth + 1); if (r != 1 && errno != ENOENT) { error("Can't open user config file " "%.100s: %.100s", gl.gl_pathv[i], strerror(errno)); globfree(&gl); goto out; } /* * don't let Match in includes clobber the * containing file's Match state. */ *activep = oactive; if (r != 1) value = -1; } globfree(&gl); } if (value != 0) ret = value; break; case oIPQoS: arg = argv_next(&ac, &av); if ((value = parse_ipqos(arg)) == -1) { error("%s line %d: Bad IPQoS value: %s", filename, linenum, arg); goto out; } arg = argv_next(&ac, &av); if (arg == NULL) value2 = value; else if ((value2 = parse_ipqos(arg)) == -1) { error("%s line %d: Bad IPQoS value: %s", filename, linenum, arg); goto out; } if (*activep && options->ip_qos_interactive == -1) { options->ip_qos_interactive = value; options->ip_qos_bulk = value2; } break; case oRequestTTY: intptr = &options->request_tty; multistate_ptr = multistate_requesttty; goto parse_multistate; case oSessionType: intptr = &options->session_type; multistate_ptr = multistate_sessiontype; goto parse_multistate; case oStdinNull: intptr = &options->stdin_null; goto parse_flag; case oForkAfterAuthentication: intptr = &options->fork_after_authentication; goto parse_flag; case oIgnoreUnknown: charptr = &options->ignored_unknown; goto parse_string; case oProxyUseFdpass: intptr = &options->proxy_use_fdpass; goto parse_flag; case oCanonicalDomains: value = options->num_canonical_domains != 0; i = 0; while ((arg = argv_next(&ac, &av)) != NULL) { if (*arg == '\0') { error("%s line %d: keyword %s empty argument", filename, linenum, keyword); goto out; } /* Allow "none" only in first position */ if (strcasecmp(arg, "none") == 0) { if (i > 0 || ac > 0) { error("%s line %d: keyword %s \"none\" " "argument must appear alone.", filename, linenum, keyword); goto out; } } i++; if (!valid_domain(arg, 1, &errstr)) { error("%s line %d: %s", filename, linenum, errstr); goto out; } if (!*activep || value) continue; if (options->num_canonical_domains >= MAX_CANON_DOMAINS) { error("%s line %d: too many hostname suffixes.", filename, linenum); goto out; } options->canonical_domains[ options->num_canonical_domains++] = xstrdup(arg); } break; case oCanonicalizePermittedCNAMEs: value = options->num_permitted_cnames != 0; i = 0; while ((arg = argv_next(&ac, &av)) != NULL) { /* * Either 'none' (only in first position), '*' for * everything or 'list:list' */ if (strcasecmp(arg, "none") == 0) { if (i > 0 || ac > 0) { error("%s line %d: keyword %s \"none\" " "argument must appear alone.", filename, linenum, keyword); goto out; } arg2 = ""; } else if (strcmp(arg, "*") == 0) { arg2 = arg; } else { lowercase(arg); if ((arg2 = strchr(arg, ':')) == NULL || arg2[1] == '\0') { error("%s line %d: " "Invalid permitted CNAME \"%s\"", filename, linenum, arg); goto out; } *arg2 = '\0'; arg2++; } i++; if (!*activep || value) continue; if (options->num_permitted_cnames >= MAX_CANON_DOMAINS) { error("%s line %d: too many permitted CNAMEs.", filename, linenum); goto out; } cname = options->permitted_cnames + options->num_permitted_cnames++; cname->source_list = xstrdup(arg); cname->target_list = xstrdup(arg2); } break; case oCanonicalizeHostname: intptr = &options->canonicalize_hostname; multistate_ptr = multistate_canonicalizehostname; goto parse_multistate; case oCanonicalizeMaxDots: intptr = &options->canonicalize_max_dots; goto parse_int; case oCanonicalizeFallbackLocal: intptr = &options->canonicalize_fallback_local; goto parse_flag; case oStreamLocalBindMask: arg = argv_next(&ac, &av); if (!arg || *arg == '\0') { error("%.200s line %d: Missing StreamLocalBindMask " "argument.", filename, linenum); goto out; } /* Parse mode in octal format */ value = strtol(arg, &endofnumber, 8); if (arg == endofnumber || value < 0 || value > 0777) { error("%.200s line %d: Bad mask.", filename, linenum); goto out; } options->fwd_opts.streamlocal_bind_mask = (mode_t)value; break; case oStreamLocalBindUnlink: intptr = &options->fwd_opts.streamlocal_bind_unlink; goto parse_flag; case oRevokedHostKeys: charptr = &options->revoked_host_keys; goto parse_string; case oFingerprintHash: intptr = &options->fingerprint_hash; arg = argv_next(&ac, &av); if (!arg || *arg == '\0') { error("%.200s line %d: Missing argument.", filename, linenum); goto out; } if ((value = ssh_digest_alg_by_name(arg)) == -1) { error("%.200s line %d: Invalid hash algorithm \"%s\".", filename, linenum, arg); goto out; } if (*activep && *intptr == -1) *intptr = value; break; case oUpdateHostkeys: intptr = &options->update_hostkeys; multistate_ptr = multistate_yesnoask; goto parse_multistate; case oHostbasedAcceptedAlgorithms: charptr = &options->hostbased_accepted_algos; goto parse_pubkey_algos; case oPubkeyAcceptedAlgorithms: charptr = &options->pubkey_accepted_algos; goto parse_pubkey_algos; case oAddKeysToAgent: arg = argv_next(&ac, &av); arg2 = argv_next(&ac, &av); value = parse_multistate_value(arg, filename, linenum, multistate_yesnoaskconfirm); value2 = 0; /* unlimited lifespan by default */ if (value == 3 && arg2 != NULL) { /* allow "AddKeysToAgent confirm 5m" */ - if ((value2 = convtime(arg2)) == -1 || - value2 > INT_MAX) { + if ((value2 = convtime(arg2)) == -1) { error("%s line %d: invalid time value.", filename, linenum); goto out; } } else if (value == -1 && arg2 == NULL) { - if ((value2 = convtime(arg)) == -1 || - value2 > INT_MAX) { + if ((value2 = convtime(arg)) == -1) { error("%s line %d: unsupported option", filename, linenum); goto out; } value = 1; /* yes */ } else if (value == -1 || arg2 != NULL) { error("%s line %d: unsupported option", filename, linenum); goto out; } if (*activep && options->add_keys_to_agent == -1) { options->add_keys_to_agent = value; options->add_keys_to_agent_lifespan = value2; } break; case oIdentityAgent: charptr = &options->identity_agent; arg = argv_next(&ac, &av); if (!arg || *arg == '\0') { error("%.200s line %d: Missing argument.", filename, linenum); goto out; } parse_agent_path: /* Extra validation if the string represents an env var. */ if ((arg2 = dollar_expand(&r, arg)) == NULL || r) { error("%.200s line %d: Invalid environment expansion " "%s.", filename, linenum, arg); goto out; } free(arg2); /* check for legacy environment format */ if (arg[0] == '$' && arg[1] != '{' && !valid_env_name(arg + 1)) { error("%.200s line %d: Invalid environment name %s.", filename, linenum, arg); goto out; } if (*activep && *charptr == NULL) *charptr = xstrdup(arg); break; case oEnableEscapeCommandline: intptr = &options->enable_escape_commandline; goto parse_flag; case oRequiredRSASize: intptr = &options->required_rsa_size; goto parse_int; case oDeprecated: debug("%s line %d: Deprecated option \"%s\"", filename, linenum, keyword); argv_consume(&ac); break; case oUnsupported: error("%s line %d: Unsupported option \"%s\"", filename, linenum, keyword); argv_consume(&ac); break; default: error("%s line %d: Unimplemented opcode %d", filename, linenum, opcode); goto out; } /* Check that there is no garbage at end of line. */ if (ac > 0) { error("%.200s line %d: keyword %s extra arguments " "at end of line", filename, linenum, keyword); goto out; } /* success */ ret = 0; out: argv_free(oav, oac); return ret; } /* * Reads the config file and modifies the options accordingly. Options * should already be initialized before this call. This never returns if * there is an error. If the file does not exist, this returns 0. */ int read_config_file(const char *filename, struct passwd *pw, const char *host, const char *original_host, Options *options, int flags, int *want_final_pass) { int active = 1; return read_config_file_depth(filename, pw, host, original_host, options, flags, &active, want_final_pass, 0); } #define READCONF_MAX_DEPTH 16 static int read_config_file_depth(const char *filename, struct passwd *pw, const char *host, const char *original_host, Options *options, int flags, int *activep, int *want_final_pass, int depth) { FILE *f; char *line = NULL; size_t linesize = 0; int linenum; int bad_options = 0; if (depth < 0 || depth > READCONF_MAX_DEPTH) fatal("Too many recursive configuration includes"); if ((f = fopen(filename, "r")) == NULL) return 0; if (flags & SSHCONF_CHECKPERM) { struct stat sb; if (fstat(fileno(f), &sb) == -1) fatal("fstat %s: %s", filename, strerror(errno)); if (((sb.st_uid != 0 && sb.st_uid != getuid()) || (sb.st_mode & 022) != 0)) fatal("Bad owner or permissions on %s", filename); } debug("Reading configuration data %.200s", filename); /* * Mark that we are now processing the options. This flag is turned * on/off by Host specifications. */ linenum = 0; while (getline(&line, &linesize, f) != -1) { /* Update line number counter. */ linenum++; /* * Trim out comments and strip whitespace. * NB - preserve newlines, they are needed to reproduce * line numbers later for error messages. */ if (process_config_line_depth(options, pw, host, original_host, line, filename, linenum, activep, flags, want_final_pass, depth) != 0) bad_options++; } free(line); fclose(f); if (bad_options > 0) fatal("%s: terminating, %d bad configuration options", filename, bad_options); return 1; } /* Returns 1 if a string option is unset or set to "none" or 0 otherwise. */ int option_clear_or_none(const char *o) { return o == NULL || strcasecmp(o, "none") == 0; } /* * Returns 1 if CanonicalizePermittedCNAMEs have been specified, 0 otherwise. * Allowed to be called on non-final configuration. */ int config_has_permitted_cnames(Options *options) { if (options->num_permitted_cnames == 1 && strcasecmp(options->permitted_cnames[0].source_list, "none") == 0 && strcmp(options->permitted_cnames[0].target_list, "") == 0) return 0; return options->num_permitted_cnames > 0; } /* * Initializes options to special values that indicate that they have not yet * been set. Read_config_file will only set options with this value. Options * are processed in the following order: command line, user config file, * system config file. Last, fill_default_options is called. */ void initialize_options(Options * options) { memset(options, 'X', sizeof(*options)); options->host_arg = NULL; options->forward_agent = -1; options->forward_agent_sock_path = NULL; options->forward_x11 = -1; options->forward_x11_trusted = -1; options->forward_x11_timeout = -1; options->stdio_forward_host = NULL; options->stdio_forward_port = 0; options->clear_forwardings = -1; options->exit_on_forward_failure = -1; options->xauth_location = NULL; options->fwd_opts.gateway_ports = -1; options->fwd_opts.streamlocal_bind_mask = (mode_t)-1; options->fwd_opts.streamlocal_bind_unlink = -1; options->pubkey_authentication = -1; options->gss_authentication = -1; options->gss_deleg_creds = -1; options->password_authentication = -1; options->kbd_interactive_authentication = -1; options->kbd_interactive_devices = NULL; options->hostbased_authentication = -1; options->batch_mode = -1; options->check_host_ip = -1; options->strict_host_key_checking = -1; options->compression = -1; options->tcp_keep_alive = -1; options->port = -1; options->address_family = -1; options->connection_attempts = -1; options->connection_timeout = -1; options->number_of_password_prompts = -1; options->ciphers = NULL; options->macs = NULL; options->kex_algorithms = NULL; options->hostkeyalgorithms = NULL; options->ca_sign_algorithms = NULL; options->num_identity_files = 0; memset(options->identity_keys, 0, sizeof(options->identity_keys)); options->num_certificate_files = 0; memset(options->certificates, 0, sizeof(options->certificates)); options->hostname = NULL; options->host_key_alias = NULL; options->proxy_command = NULL; options->jump_user = NULL; options->jump_host = NULL; options->jump_port = -1; options->jump_extra = NULL; options->user = NULL; options->escape_char = -1; options->num_system_hostfiles = 0; options->num_user_hostfiles = 0; options->local_forwards = NULL; options->num_local_forwards = 0; options->remote_forwards = NULL; options->num_remote_forwards = 0; options->permitted_remote_opens = NULL; options->num_permitted_remote_opens = 0; options->log_facility = SYSLOG_FACILITY_NOT_SET; options->log_level = SYSLOG_LEVEL_NOT_SET; options->num_log_verbose = 0; options->log_verbose = NULL; options->preferred_authentications = NULL; options->bind_address = NULL; options->bind_interface = NULL; options->pkcs11_provider = NULL; options->sk_provider = NULL; options->enable_ssh_keysign = - 1; options->no_host_authentication_for_localhost = - 1; options->identities_only = - 1; options->rekey_limit = - 1; options->rekey_interval = -1; options->verify_host_key_dns = -1; options->server_alive_interval = -1; options->server_alive_count_max = -1; options->send_env = NULL; options->num_send_env = 0; options->setenv = NULL; options->num_setenv = 0; options->control_path = NULL; options->control_master = -1; options->control_persist = -1; options->control_persist_timeout = 0; options->hash_known_hosts = -1; options->tun_open = -1; options->tun_local = -1; options->tun_remote = -1; options->local_command = NULL; options->permit_local_command = -1; options->remote_command = NULL; options->add_keys_to_agent = -1; options->add_keys_to_agent_lifespan = -1; options->identity_agent = NULL; options->visual_host_key = -1; options->ip_qos_interactive = -1; options->ip_qos_bulk = -1; options->request_tty = -1; options->session_type = -1; options->stdin_null = -1; options->fork_after_authentication = -1; options->proxy_use_fdpass = -1; options->ignored_unknown = NULL; options->num_canonical_domains = 0; options->num_permitted_cnames = 0; options->canonicalize_max_dots = -1; options->canonicalize_fallback_local = -1; options->canonicalize_hostname = -1; options->revoked_host_keys = NULL; options->fingerprint_hash = -1; options->update_hostkeys = -1; options->hostbased_accepted_algos = NULL; options->pubkey_accepted_algos = NULL; options->known_hosts_command = NULL; options->required_rsa_size = -1; options->enable_escape_commandline = -1; } /* * A petite version of fill_default_options() that just fills the options * needed for hostname canonicalization to proceed. */ void fill_default_options_for_canonicalization(Options *options) { if (options->canonicalize_max_dots == -1) options->canonicalize_max_dots = 1; if (options->canonicalize_fallback_local == -1) options->canonicalize_fallback_local = 1; if (options->canonicalize_hostname == -1) options->canonicalize_hostname = SSH_CANONICALISE_NO; } /* * Called after processing other sources of option data, this fills those * options for which no value has been specified with their default values. */ int fill_default_options(Options * options) { char *all_cipher, *all_mac, *all_kex, *all_key, *all_sig; char *def_cipher, *def_mac, *def_kex, *def_key, *def_sig; int ret = 0, r; if (options->forward_agent == -1) options->forward_agent = 0; if (options->forward_x11 == -1) options->forward_x11 = 0; if (options->forward_x11_trusted == -1) options->forward_x11_trusted = 0; if (options->forward_x11_timeout == -1) options->forward_x11_timeout = 1200; /* * stdio forwarding (-W) changes the default for these but we defer * setting the values so they can be overridden. */ if (options->exit_on_forward_failure == -1) options->exit_on_forward_failure = options->stdio_forward_host != NULL ? 1 : 0; if (options->clear_forwardings == -1) options->clear_forwardings = options->stdio_forward_host != NULL ? 1 : 0; if (options->clear_forwardings == 1) clear_forwardings(options); if (options->xauth_location == NULL) options->xauth_location = xstrdup(_PATH_XAUTH); if (options->fwd_opts.gateway_ports == -1) options->fwd_opts.gateway_ports = 0; if (options->fwd_opts.streamlocal_bind_mask == (mode_t)-1) options->fwd_opts.streamlocal_bind_mask = 0177; if (options->fwd_opts.streamlocal_bind_unlink == -1) options->fwd_opts.streamlocal_bind_unlink = 0; if (options->pubkey_authentication == -1) options->pubkey_authentication = SSH_PUBKEY_AUTH_ALL; if (options->gss_authentication == -1) options->gss_authentication = 0; if (options->gss_deleg_creds == -1) options->gss_deleg_creds = 0; if (options->password_authentication == -1) options->password_authentication = 1; if (options->kbd_interactive_authentication == -1) options->kbd_interactive_authentication = 1; if (options->hostbased_authentication == -1) options->hostbased_authentication = 0; if (options->batch_mode == -1) options->batch_mode = 0; if (options->check_host_ip == -1) options->check_host_ip = 0; if (options->strict_host_key_checking == -1) options->strict_host_key_checking = SSH_STRICT_HOSTKEY_ASK; if (options->compression == -1) options->compression = 0; if (options->tcp_keep_alive == -1) options->tcp_keep_alive = 1; if (options->port == -1) options->port = 0; /* Filled in ssh_connect. */ if (options->address_family == -1) options->address_family = AF_UNSPEC; if (options->connection_attempts == -1) options->connection_attempts = 1; if (options->number_of_password_prompts == -1) options->number_of_password_prompts = 3; /* options->hostkeyalgorithms, default set in myproposals.h */ if (options->add_keys_to_agent == -1) { options->add_keys_to_agent = 0; options->add_keys_to_agent_lifespan = 0; } if (options->num_identity_files == 0) { add_identity_file(options, "~/", _PATH_SSH_CLIENT_ID_RSA, 0); #ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC add_identity_file(options, "~/", _PATH_SSH_CLIENT_ID_ECDSA, 0); add_identity_file(options, "~/", _PATH_SSH_CLIENT_ID_ECDSA_SK, 0); #endif add_identity_file(options, "~/", _PATH_SSH_CLIENT_ID_ED25519, 0); add_identity_file(options, "~/", _PATH_SSH_CLIENT_ID_ED25519_SK, 0); add_identity_file(options, "~/", _PATH_SSH_CLIENT_ID_XMSS, 0); add_identity_file(options, "~/", _PATH_SSH_CLIENT_ID_DSA, 0); } if (options->escape_char == -1) options->escape_char = '~'; if (options->num_system_hostfiles == 0) { options->system_hostfiles[options->num_system_hostfiles++] = xstrdup(_PATH_SSH_SYSTEM_HOSTFILE); options->system_hostfiles[options->num_system_hostfiles++] = xstrdup(_PATH_SSH_SYSTEM_HOSTFILE2); } if (options->update_hostkeys == -1) { if (options->verify_host_key_dns <= 0 && (options->num_user_hostfiles == 0 || (options->num_user_hostfiles == 1 && strcmp(options-> user_hostfiles[0], _PATH_SSH_USER_HOSTFILE) == 0))) options->update_hostkeys = SSH_UPDATE_HOSTKEYS_YES; else options->update_hostkeys = SSH_UPDATE_HOSTKEYS_NO; } if (options->num_user_hostfiles == 0) { options->user_hostfiles[options->num_user_hostfiles++] = xstrdup(_PATH_SSH_USER_HOSTFILE); options->user_hostfiles[options->num_user_hostfiles++] = xstrdup(_PATH_SSH_USER_HOSTFILE2); } if (options->log_level == SYSLOG_LEVEL_NOT_SET) options->log_level = SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO; if (options->log_facility == SYSLOG_FACILITY_NOT_SET) options->log_facility = SYSLOG_FACILITY_USER; if (options->no_host_authentication_for_localhost == - 1) options->no_host_authentication_for_localhost = 0; if (options->identities_only == -1) options->identities_only = 0; if (options->enable_ssh_keysign == -1) options->enable_ssh_keysign = 0; if (options->rekey_limit == -1) options->rekey_limit = 0; if (options->rekey_interval == -1) options->rekey_interval = 0; if (options->verify_host_key_dns == -1) options->verify_host_key_dns = 0; if (options->server_alive_interval == -1) options->server_alive_interval = 0; if (options->server_alive_count_max == -1) options->server_alive_count_max = 3; if (options->control_master == -1) options->control_master = 0; if (options->control_persist == -1) { options->control_persist = 0; options->control_persist_timeout = 0; } if (options->hash_known_hosts == -1) options->hash_known_hosts = 0; if (options->tun_open == -1) options->tun_open = SSH_TUNMODE_NO; if (options->tun_local == -1) options->tun_local = SSH_TUNID_ANY; if (options->tun_remote == -1) options->tun_remote = SSH_TUNID_ANY; if (options->permit_local_command == -1) options->permit_local_command = 0; if (options->visual_host_key == -1) options->visual_host_key = 0; if (options->ip_qos_interactive == -1) options->ip_qos_interactive = IPTOS_DSCP_AF21; if (options->ip_qos_bulk == -1) options->ip_qos_bulk = IPTOS_DSCP_CS1; if (options->request_tty == -1) options->request_tty = REQUEST_TTY_AUTO; if (options->session_type == -1) options->session_type = SESSION_TYPE_DEFAULT; if (options->stdin_null == -1) options->stdin_null = 0; if (options->fork_after_authentication == -1) options->fork_after_authentication = 0; if (options->proxy_use_fdpass == -1) options->proxy_use_fdpass = 0; if (options->canonicalize_max_dots == -1) options->canonicalize_max_dots = 1; if (options->canonicalize_fallback_local == -1) options->canonicalize_fallback_local = 1; if (options->canonicalize_hostname == -1) options->canonicalize_hostname = SSH_CANONICALISE_NO; if (options->fingerprint_hash == -1) options->fingerprint_hash = SSH_FP_HASH_DEFAULT; #ifdef ENABLE_SK_INTERNAL if (options->sk_provider == NULL) options->sk_provider = xstrdup("internal"); #else if (options->sk_provider == NULL) options->sk_provider = xstrdup("$SSH_SK_PROVIDER"); #endif if (options->required_rsa_size == -1) options->required_rsa_size = SSH_RSA_MINIMUM_MODULUS_SIZE; if (options->enable_escape_commandline == -1) options->enable_escape_commandline = 0; /* Expand KEX name lists */ all_cipher = cipher_alg_list(',', 0); all_mac = mac_alg_list(','); all_kex = kex_alg_list(','); all_key = sshkey_alg_list(0, 0, 1, ','); all_sig = sshkey_alg_list(0, 1, 1, ','); /* remove unsupported algos from default lists */ def_cipher = match_filter_allowlist(KEX_CLIENT_ENCRYPT, all_cipher); def_mac = match_filter_allowlist(KEX_CLIENT_MAC, all_mac); def_kex = match_filter_allowlist(KEX_CLIENT_KEX, all_kex); def_key = match_filter_allowlist(KEX_DEFAULT_PK_ALG, all_key); def_sig = match_filter_allowlist(SSH_ALLOWED_CA_SIGALGS, all_sig); #define ASSEMBLE(what, defaults, all) \ do { \ if ((r = kex_assemble_names(&options->what, \ defaults, all)) != 0) { \ error_fr(r, "%s", #what); \ goto fail; \ } \ } while (0) ASSEMBLE(ciphers, def_cipher, all_cipher); ASSEMBLE(macs, def_mac, all_mac); ASSEMBLE(kex_algorithms, def_kex, all_kex); ASSEMBLE(hostbased_accepted_algos, def_key, all_key); ASSEMBLE(pubkey_accepted_algos, def_key, all_key); ASSEMBLE(ca_sign_algorithms, def_sig, all_sig); #undef ASSEMBLE #define CLEAR_ON_NONE(v) \ do { \ if (option_clear_or_none(v)) { \ free(v); \ v = NULL; \ } \ } while(0) CLEAR_ON_NONE(options->local_command); CLEAR_ON_NONE(options->remote_command); CLEAR_ON_NONE(options->proxy_command); CLEAR_ON_NONE(options->control_path); CLEAR_ON_NONE(options->revoked_host_keys); CLEAR_ON_NONE(options->pkcs11_provider); CLEAR_ON_NONE(options->sk_provider); CLEAR_ON_NONE(options->known_hosts_command); if (options->jump_host != NULL && strcmp(options->jump_host, "none") == 0 && options->jump_port == 0 && options->jump_user == NULL) { free(options->jump_host); options->jump_host = NULL; } if (options->num_permitted_cnames == 1 && !config_has_permitted_cnames(options)) { /* clean up CanonicalizePermittedCNAMEs=none */ free(options->permitted_cnames[0].source_list); free(options->permitted_cnames[0].target_list); memset(options->permitted_cnames, '\0', sizeof(*options->permitted_cnames)); options->num_permitted_cnames = 0; } /* options->identity_agent distinguishes NULL from 'none' */ /* options->user will be set in the main program if appropriate */ /* options->hostname will be set in the main program if appropriate */ /* options->host_key_alias should not be set by default */ /* options->preferred_authentications will be set in ssh */ /* success */ ret = 0; fail: free(all_cipher); free(all_mac); free(all_kex); free(all_key); free(all_sig); free(def_cipher); free(def_mac); free(def_kex); free(def_key); free(def_sig); return ret; } void free_options(Options *o) { int i; if (o == NULL) return; #define FREE_ARRAY(type, n, a) \ do { \ type _i; \ for (_i = 0; _i < (n); _i++) \ free((a)[_i]); \ } while (0) free(o->forward_agent_sock_path); free(o->xauth_location); FREE_ARRAY(u_int, o->num_log_verbose, o->log_verbose); free(o->log_verbose); free(o->ciphers); free(o->macs); free(o->hostkeyalgorithms); free(o->kex_algorithms); free(o->ca_sign_algorithms); free(o->hostname); free(o->host_key_alias); free(o->proxy_command); free(o->user); FREE_ARRAY(u_int, o->num_system_hostfiles, o->system_hostfiles); FREE_ARRAY(u_int, o->num_user_hostfiles, o->user_hostfiles); free(o->preferred_authentications); free(o->bind_address); free(o->bind_interface); free(o->pkcs11_provider); free(o->sk_provider); for (i = 0; i < o->num_identity_files; i++) { free(o->identity_files[i]); sshkey_free(o->identity_keys[i]); } for (i = 0; i < o->num_certificate_files; i++) { free(o->certificate_files[i]); sshkey_free(o->certificates[i]); } free(o->identity_agent); for (i = 0; i < o->num_local_forwards; i++) { free(o->local_forwards[i].listen_host); free(o->local_forwards[i].listen_path); free(o->local_forwards[i].connect_host); free(o->local_forwards[i].connect_path); } free(o->local_forwards); for (i = 0; i < o->num_remote_forwards; i++) { free(o->remote_forwards[i].listen_host); free(o->remote_forwards[i].listen_path); free(o->remote_forwards[i].connect_host); free(o->remote_forwards[i].connect_path); } free(o->remote_forwards); free(o->stdio_forward_host); FREE_ARRAY(u_int, o->num_send_env, o->send_env); free(o->send_env); FREE_ARRAY(u_int, o->num_setenv, o->setenv); free(o->setenv); free(o->control_path); free(o->local_command); free(o->remote_command); FREE_ARRAY(int, o->num_canonical_domains, o->canonical_domains); for (i = 0; i < o->num_permitted_cnames; i++) { free(o->permitted_cnames[i].source_list); free(o->permitted_cnames[i].target_list); } free(o->revoked_host_keys); free(o->hostbased_accepted_algos); free(o->pubkey_accepted_algos); free(o->jump_user); free(o->jump_host); free(o->jump_extra); free(o->ignored_unknown); explicit_bzero(o, sizeof(*o)); #undef FREE_ARRAY } struct fwdarg { char *arg; int ispath; }; /* * parse_fwd_field * parses the next field in a port forwarding specification. * sets fwd to the parsed field and advances p past the colon * or sets it to NULL at end of string. * returns 0 on success, else non-zero. */ static int parse_fwd_field(char **p, struct fwdarg *fwd) { char *ep, *cp = *p; int ispath = 0; if (*cp == '\0') { *p = NULL; return -1; /* end of string */ } /* * A field escaped with square brackets is used literally. * XXX - allow ']' to be escaped via backslash? */ if (*cp == '[') { /* find matching ']' */ for (ep = cp + 1; *ep != ']' && *ep != '\0'; ep++) { if (*ep == '/') ispath = 1; } /* no matching ']' or not at end of field. */ if (ep[0] != ']' || (ep[1] != ':' && ep[1] != '\0')) return -1; /* NUL terminate the field and advance p past the colon */ *ep++ = '\0'; if (*ep != '\0') *ep++ = '\0'; fwd->arg = cp + 1; fwd->ispath = ispath; *p = ep; return 0; } for (cp = *p; *cp != '\0'; cp++) { switch (*cp) { case '\\': memmove(cp, cp + 1, strlen(cp + 1) + 1); if (*cp == '\0') return -1; break; case '/': ispath = 1; break; case ':': *cp++ = '\0'; goto done; } } done: fwd->arg = *p; fwd->ispath = ispath; *p = cp; return 0; } /* * parse_forward * parses a string containing a port forwarding specification of the form: * dynamicfwd == 0 * [listenhost:]listenport|listenpath:connecthost:connectport|connectpath * listenpath:connectpath * dynamicfwd == 1 * [listenhost:]listenport * returns number of arguments parsed or zero on error */ int parse_forward(struct Forward *fwd, const char *fwdspec, int dynamicfwd, int remotefwd) { struct fwdarg fwdargs[4]; char *p, *cp; int i, err; memset(fwd, 0, sizeof(*fwd)); memset(fwdargs, 0, sizeof(fwdargs)); /* * We expand environment variables before checking if we think they're * paths so that if ${VAR} expands to a fully qualified path it is * treated as a path. */ cp = p = dollar_expand(&err, fwdspec); if (p == NULL || err) return 0; /* skip leading spaces */ while (isspace((u_char)*cp)) cp++; for (i = 0; i < 4; ++i) { if (parse_fwd_field(&cp, &fwdargs[i]) != 0) break; } /* Check for trailing garbage */ if (cp != NULL && *cp != '\0') { i = 0; /* failure */ } switch (i) { case 1: if (fwdargs[0].ispath) { fwd->listen_path = xstrdup(fwdargs[0].arg); fwd->listen_port = PORT_STREAMLOCAL; } else { fwd->listen_host = NULL; fwd->listen_port = a2port(fwdargs[0].arg); } fwd->connect_host = xstrdup("socks"); break; case 2: if (fwdargs[0].ispath && fwdargs[1].ispath) { fwd->listen_path = xstrdup(fwdargs[0].arg); fwd->listen_port = PORT_STREAMLOCAL; fwd->connect_path = xstrdup(fwdargs[1].arg); fwd->connect_port = PORT_STREAMLOCAL; } else if (fwdargs[1].ispath) { fwd->listen_host = NULL; fwd->listen_port = a2port(fwdargs[0].arg); fwd->connect_path = xstrdup(fwdargs[1].arg); fwd->connect_port = PORT_STREAMLOCAL; } else { fwd->listen_host = xstrdup(fwdargs[0].arg); fwd->listen_port = a2port(fwdargs[1].arg); fwd->connect_host = xstrdup("socks"); } break; case 3: if (fwdargs[0].ispath) { fwd->listen_path = xstrdup(fwdargs[0].arg); fwd->listen_port = PORT_STREAMLOCAL; fwd->connect_host = xstrdup(fwdargs[1].arg); fwd->connect_port = a2port(fwdargs[2].arg); } else if (fwdargs[2].ispath) { fwd->listen_host = xstrdup(fwdargs[0].arg); fwd->listen_port = a2port(fwdargs[1].arg); fwd->connect_path = xstrdup(fwdargs[2].arg); fwd->connect_port = PORT_STREAMLOCAL; } else { fwd->listen_host = NULL; fwd->listen_port = a2port(fwdargs[0].arg); fwd->connect_host = xstrdup(fwdargs[1].arg); fwd->connect_port = a2port(fwdargs[2].arg); } break; case 4: fwd->listen_host = xstrdup(fwdargs[0].arg); fwd->listen_port = a2port(fwdargs[1].arg); fwd->connect_host = xstrdup(fwdargs[2].arg); fwd->connect_port = a2port(fwdargs[3].arg); break; default: i = 0; /* failure */ } free(p); if (dynamicfwd) { if (!(i == 1 || i == 2)) goto fail_free; } else { if (!(i == 3 || i == 4)) { if (fwd->connect_path == NULL && fwd->listen_path == NULL) goto fail_free; } if (fwd->connect_port <= 0 && fwd->connect_path == NULL) goto fail_free; } if ((fwd->listen_port < 0 && fwd->listen_path == NULL) || (!remotefwd && fwd->listen_port == 0)) goto fail_free; if (fwd->connect_host != NULL && strlen(fwd->connect_host) >= NI_MAXHOST) goto fail_free; /* * XXX - if connecting to a remote socket, max sun len may not * match this host */ if (fwd->connect_path != NULL && strlen(fwd->connect_path) >= PATH_MAX_SUN) goto fail_free; if (fwd->listen_host != NULL && strlen(fwd->listen_host) >= NI_MAXHOST) goto fail_free; if (fwd->listen_path != NULL && strlen(fwd->listen_path) >= PATH_MAX_SUN) goto fail_free; return (i); fail_free: free(fwd->connect_host); fwd->connect_host = NULL; free(fwd->connect_path); fwd->connect_path = NULL; free(fwd->listen_host); fwd->listen_host = NULL; free(fwd->listen_path); fwd->listen_path = NULL; return (0); } int parse_jump(const char *s, Options *o, int active) { char *orig, *sdup, *cp; char *host = NULL, *user = NULL; int r, ret = -1, port = -1, first; active &= o->proxy_command == NULL && o->jump_host == NULL; orig = sdup = xstrdup(s); /* Remove comment and trailing whitespace */ if ((cp = strchr(orig, '#')) != NULL) *cp = '\0'; rtrim(orig); first = active; do { if (strcasecmp(s, "none") == 0) break; if ((cp = strrchr(sdup, ',')) == NULL) cp = sdup; /* last */ else *cp++ = '\0'; if (first) { /* First argument and configuration is active */ r = parse_ssh_uri(cp, &user, &host, &port); if (r == -1 || (r == 1 && parse_user_host_port(cp, &user, &host, &port) != 0)) goto out; } else { /* Subsequent argument or inactive configuration */ r = parse_ssh_uri(cp, NULL, NULL, NULL); if (r == -1 || (r == 1 && parse_user_host_port(cp, NULL, NULL, NULL) != 0)) goto out; } first = 0; /* only check syntax for subsequent hosts */ } while (cp != sdup); /* success */ if (active) { if (strcasecmp(s, "none") == 0) { o->jump_host = xstrdup("none"); o->jump_port = 0; } else { o->jump_user = user; o->jump_host = host; o->jump_port = port; o->proxy_command = xstrdup("none"); user = host = NULL; if ((cp = strrchr(s, ',')) != NULL && cp != s) { o->jump_extra = xstrdup(s); o->jump_extra[cp - s] = '\0'; } } } ret = 0; out: free(orig); free(user); free(host); return ret; } int parse_ssh_uri(const char *uri, char **userp, char **hostp, int *portp) { char *user = NULL, *host = NULL, *path = NULL; int r, port; r = parse_uri("ssh", uri, &user, &host, &port, &path); if (r == 0 && path != NULL) r = -1; /* path not allowed */ if (r == 0) { if (userp != NULL) { *userp = user; user = NULL; } if (hostp != NULL) { *hostp = host; host = NULL; } if (portp != NULL) *portp = port; } free(user); free(host); free(path); return r; } /* XXX the following is a near-vebatim copy from servconf.c; refactor */ static const char * fmt_multistate_int(int val, const struct multistate *m) { u_int i; for (i = 0; m[i].key != NULL; i++) { if (m[i].value == val) return m[i].key; } return "UNKNOWN"; } static const char * fmt_intarg(OpCodes code, int val) { if (val == -1) return "unset"; switch (code) { case oAddressFamily: return fmt_multistate_int(val, multistate_addressfamily); case oVerifyHostKeyDNS: case oUpdateHostkeys: return fmt_multistate_int(val, multistate_yesnoask); case oStrictHostKeyChecking: return fmt_multistate_int(val, multistate_strict_hostkey); case oControlMaster: return fmt_multistate_int(val, multistate_controlmaster); case oTunnel: return fmt_multistate_int(val, multistate_tunnel); case oRequestTTY: return fmt_multistate_int(val, multistate_requesttty); case oSessionType: return fmt_multistate_int(val, multistate_sessiontype); case oCanonicalizeHostname: return fmt_multistate_int(val, multistate_canonicalizehostname); case oAddKeysToAgent: return fmt_multistate_int(val, multistate_yesnoaskconfirm); case oPubkeyAuthentication: return fmt_multistate_int(val, multistate_pubkey_auth); case oFingerprintHash: return ssh_digest_alg_name(val); default: switch (val) { case 0: return "no"; case 1: return "yes"; default: return "UNKNOWN"; } } } static const char * lookup_opcode_name(OpCodes code) { u_int i; for (i = 0; keywords[i].name != NULL; i++) if (keywords[i].opcode == code) return(keywords[i].name); return "UNKNOWN"; } static void dump_cfg_int(OpCodes code, int val) { printf("%s %d\n", lookup_opcode_name(code), val); } static void dump_cfg_fmtint(OpCodes code, int val) { printf("%s %s\n", lookup_opcode_name(code), fmt_intarg(code, val)); } static void dump_cfg_string(OpCodes code, const char *val) { if (val == NULL) return; printf("%s %s\n", lookup_opcode_name(code), val); } static void dump_cfg_strarray(OpCodes code, u_int count, char **vals) { u_int i; for (i = 0; i < count; i++) printf("%s %s\n", lookup_opcode_name(code), vals[i]); } static void dump_cfg_strarray_oneline(OpCodes code, u_int count, char **vals) { u_int i; printf("%s", lookup_opcode_name(code)); if (count == 0) printf(" none"); for (i = 0; i < count; i++) printf(" %s", vals[i]); printf("\n"); } static void dump_cfg_forwards(OpCodes code, u_int count, const struct Forward *fwds) { const struct Forward *fwd; u_int i; /* oDynamicForward */ for (i = 0; i < count; i++) { fwd = &fwds[i]; if (code == oDynamicForward && fwd->connect_host != NULL && strcmp(fwd->connect_host, "socks") != 0) continue; if (code == oLocalForward && fwd->connect_host != NULL && strcmp(fwd->connect_host, "socks") == 0) continue; printf("%s", lookup_opcode_name(code)); if (fwd->listen_port == PORT_STREAMLOCAL) printf(" %s", fwd->listen_path); else if (fwd->listen_host == NULL) printf(" %d", fwd->listen_port); else { printf(" [%s]:%d", fwd->listen_host, fwd->listen_port); } if (code != oDynamicForward) { if (fwd->connect_port == PORT_STREAMLOCAL) printf(" %s", fwd->connect_path); else if (fwd->connect_host == NULL) printf(" %d", fwd->connect_port); else { printf(" [%s]:%d", fwd->connect_host, fwd->connect_port); } } printf("\n"); } } void dump_client_config(Options *o, const char *host) { int i, r; char buf[8], *all_key; /* * Expand HostKeyAlgorithms name lists. This isn't handled in * fill_default_options() like the other algorithm lists because * the host key algorithms are by default dynamically chosen based * on the host's keys found in known_hosts. */ all_key = sshkey_alg_list(0, 0, 1, ','); if ((r = kex_assemble_names(&o->hostkeyalgorithms, kex_default_pk_alg(), all_key)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "expand HostKeyAlgorithms"); free(all_key); /* Most interesting options first: user, host, port */ dump_cfg_string(oHost, o->host_arg); dump_cfg_string(oUser, o->user); dump_cfg_string(oHostname, host); dump_cfg_int(oPort, o->port); /* Flag options */ dump_cfg_fmtint(oAddressFamily, o->address_family); dump_cfg_fmtint(oBatchMode, o->batch_mode); dump_cfg_fmtint(oCanonicalizeFallbackLocal, o->canonicalize_fallback_local); dump_cfg_fmtint(oCanonicalizeHostname, o->canonicalize_hostname); dump_cfg_fmtint(oCheckHostIP, o->check_host_ip); dump_cfg_fmtint(oCompression, o->compression); dump_cfg_fmtint(oControlMaster, o->control_master); dump_cfg_fmtint(oEnableSSHKeysign, o->enable_ssh_keysign); dump_cfg_fmtint(oClearAllForwardings, o->clear_forwardings); dump_cfg_fmtint(oExitOnForwardFailure, o->exit_on_forward_failure); dump_cfg_fmtint(oFingerprintHash, o->fingerprint_hash); dump_cfg_fmtint(oForwardX11, o->forward_x11); dump_cfg_fmtint(oForwardX11Trusted, o->forward_x11_trusted); dump_cfg_fmtint(oGatewayPorts, o->fwd_opts.gateway_ports); #ifdef GSSAPI dump_cfg_fmtint(oGssAuthentication, o->gss_authentication); dump_cfg_fmtint(oGssDelegateCreds, o->gss_deleg_creds); #endif /* GSSAPI */ dump_cfg_fmtint(oHashKnownHosts, o->hash_known_hosts); dump_cfg_fmtint(oHostbasedAuthentication, o->hostbased_authentication); dump_cfg_fmtint(oIdentitiesOnly, o->identities_only); dump_cfg_fmtint(oKbdInteractiveAuthentication, o->kbd_interactive_authentication); dump_cfg_fmtint(oNoHostAuthenticationForLocalhost, o->no_host_authentication_for_localhost); dump_cfg_fmtint(oPasswordAuthentication, o->password_authentication); dump_cfg_fmtint(oPermitLocalCommand, o->permit_local_command); dump_cfg_fmtint(oProxyUseFdpass, o->proxy_use_fdpass); dump_cfg_fmtint(oPubkeyAuthentication, o->pubkey_authentication); dump_cfg_fmtint(oRequestTTY, o->request_tty); dump_cfg_fmtint(oSessionType, o->session_type); dump_cfg_fmtint(oStdinNull, o->stdin_null); dump_cfg_fmtint(oForkAfterAuthentication, o->fork_after_authentication); dump_cfg_fmtint(oStreamLocalBindUnlink, o->fwd_opts.streamlocal_bind_unlink); dump_cfg_fmtint(oStrictHostKeyChecking, o->strict_host_key_checking); dump_cfg_fmtint(oTCPKeepAlive, o->tcp_keep_alive); dump_cfg_fmtint(oTunnel, o->tun_open); dump_cfg_fmtint(oVerifyHostKeyDNS, o->verify_host_key_dns); dump_cfg_fmtint(oVisualHostKey, o->visual_host_key); dump_cfg_fmtint(oUpdateHostkeys, o->update_hostkeys); dump_cfg_fmtint(oEnableEscapeCommandline, o->enable_escape_commandline); /* Integer options */ dump_cfg_int(oCanonicalizeMaxDots, o->canonicalize_max_dots); dump_cfg_int(oConnectionAttempts, o->connection_attempts); dump_cfg_int(oForwardX11Timeout, o->forward_x11_timeout); dump_cfg_int(oNumberOfPasswordPrompts, o->number_of_password_prompts); dump_cfg_int(oServerAliveCountMax, o->server_alive_count_max); dump_cfg_int(oServerAliveInterval, o->server_alive_interval); dump_cfg_int(oRequiredRSASize, o->required_rsa_size); /* String options */ dump_cfg_string(oBindAddress, o->bind_address); dump_cfg_string(oBindInterface, o->bind_interface); dump_cfg_string(oCiphers, o->ciphers); dump_cfg_string(oControlPath, o->control_path); dump_cfg_string(oHostKeyAlgorithms, o->hostkeyalgorithms); dump_cfg_string(oHostKeyAlias, o->host_key_alias); dump_cfg_string(oHostbasedAcceptedAlgorithms, o->hostbased_accepted_algos); dump_cfg_string(oIdentityAgent, o->identity_agent); dump_cfg_string(oIgnoreUnknown, o->ignored_unknown); dump_cfg_string(oKbdInteractiveDevices, o->kbd_interactive_devices); dump_cfg_string(oKexAlgorithms, o->kex_algorithms); dump_cfg_string(oCASignatureAlgorithms, o->ca_sign_algorithms); dump_cfg_string(oLocalCommand, o->local_command); dump_cfg_string(oRemoteCommand, o->remote_command); dump_cfg_string(oLogLevel, log_level_name(o->log_level)); dump_cfg_string(oMacs, o->macs); #ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11 dump_cfg_string(oPKCS11Provider, o->pkcs11_provider); #endif dump_cfg_string(oSecurityKeyProvider, o->sk_provider); dump_cfg_string(oPreferredAuthentications, o->preferred_authentications); dump_cfg_string(oPubkeyAcceptedAlgorithms, o->pubkey_accepted_algos); dump_cfg_string(oRevokedHostKeys, o->revoked_host_keys); dump_cfg_string(oXAuthLocation, o->xauth_location); dump_cfg_string(oKnownHostsCommand, o->known_hosts_command); /* Forwards */ dump_cfg_forwards(oDynamicForward, o->num_local_forwards, o->local_forwards); dump_cfg_forwards(oLocalForward, o->num_local_forwards, o->local_forwards); dump_cfg_forwards(oRemoteForward, o->num_remote_forwards, o->remote_forwards); /* String array options */ dump_cfg_strarray(oIdentityFile, o->num_identity_files, o->identity_files); dump_cfg_strarray_oneline(oCanonicalDomains, o->num_canonical_domains, o->canonical_domains); dump_cfg_strarray(oCertificateFile, o->num_certificate_files, o->certificate_files); dump_cfg_strarray_oneline(oGlobalKnownHostsFile, o->num_system_hostfiles, o->system_hostfiles); dump_cfg_strarray_oneline(oUserKnownHostsFile, o->num_user_hostfiles, o->user_hostfiles); dump_cfg_strarray(oSendEnv, o->num_send_env, o->send_env); dump_cfg_strarray(oSetEnv, o->num_setenv, o->setenv); dump_cfg_strarray_oneline(oLogVerbose, o->num_log_verbose, o->log_verbose); /* Special cases */ /* PermitRemoteOpen */ if (o->num_permitted_remote_opens == 0) printf("%s any\n", lookup_opcode_name(oPermitRemoteOpen)); else dump_cfg_strarray_oneline(oPermitRemoteOpen, o->num_permitted_remote_opens, o->permitted_remote_opens); /* AddKeysToAgent */ if (o->add_keys_to_agent_lifespan <= 0) dump_cfg_fmtint(oAddKeysToAgent, o->add_keys_to_agent); else { printf("addkeystoagent%s %d\n", o->add_keys_to_agent == 3 ? " confirm" : "", o->add_keys_to_agent_lifespan); } /* oForwardAgent */ if (o->forward_agent_sock_path == NULL) dump_cfg_fmtint(oForwardAgent, o->forward_agent); else dump_cfg_string(oForwardAgent, o->forward_agent_sock_path); /* oConnectTimeout */ if (o->connection_timeout == -1) printf("connecttimeout none\n"); else dump_cfg_int(oConnectTimeout, o->connection_timeout); /* oTunnelDevice */ printf("tunneldevice"); if (o->tun_local == SSH_TUNID_ANY) printf(" any"); else printf(" %d", o->tun_local); if (o->tun_remote == SSH_TUNID_ANY) printf(":any"); else printf(":%d", o->tun_remote); printf("\n"); /* oCanonicalizePermittedCNAMEs */ printf("canonicalizePermittedcnames"); if (o->num_permitted_cnames == 0) printf(" none"); for (i = 0; i < o->num_permitted_cnames; i++) { printf(" %s:%s", o->permitted_cnames[i].source_list, o->permitted_cnames[i].target_list); } printf("\n"); /* oControlPersist */ if (o->control_persist == 0 || o->control_persist_timeout == 0) dump_cfg_fmtint(oControlPersist, o->control_persist); else dump_cfg_int(oControlPersist, o->control_persist_timeout); /* oEscapeChar */ if (o->escape_char == SSH_ESCAPECHAR_NONE) printf("escapechar none\n"); else { vis(buf, o->escape_char, VIS_WHITE, 0); printf("escapechar %s\n", buf); } /* oIPQoS */ printf("ipqos %s ", iptos2str(o->ip_qos_interactive)); printf("%s\n", iptos2str(o->ip_qos_bulk)); /* oRekeyLimit */ printf("rekeylimit %llu %d\n", (unsigned long long)o->rekey_limit, o->rekey_interval); /* oStreamLocalBindMask */ printf("streamlocalbindmask 0%o\n", o->fwd_opts.streamlocal_bind_mask); /* oLogFacility */ printf("syslogfacility %s\n", log_facility_name(o->log_facility)); /* oProxyCommand / oProxyJump */ if (o->jump_host == NULL) dump_cfg_string(oProxyCommand, o->proxy_command); else { /* Check for numeric addresses */ i = strchr(o->jump_host, ':') != NULL || strspn(o->jump_host, "1234567890.") == strlen(o->jump_host); snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%d", o->jump_port); printf("proxyjump %s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s\n", /* optional additional jump spec */ o->jump_extra == NULL ? "" : o->jump_extra, o->jump_extra == NULL ? "" : ",", /* optional user */ o->jump_user == NULL ? "" : o->jump_user, o->jump_user == NULL ? "" : "@", /* opening [ if hostname is numeric */ i ? "[" : "", /* mandatory hostname */ o->jump_host, /* closing ] if hostname is numeric */ i ? "]" : "", /* optional port number */ o->jump_port <= 0 ? "" : ":", o->jump_port <= 0 ? "" : buf); } } diff --git a/crypto/openssh/regress/Makefile b/crypto/openssh/regress/Makefile index bf1d057aad33..d80bf59fabc2 100644 --- a/crypto/openssh/regress/Makefile +++ b/crypto/openssh/regress/Makefile @@ -1,278 +1,278 @@ -# $OpenBSD: Makefile,v 1.122 2023/01/06 08:07:39 djm Exp $ +# $OpenBSD: Makefile,v 1.124 2023/03/01 09:29:32 dtucker Exp $ tests: prep file-tests t-exec unit REGRESS_TARGETS= t1 t2 t3 t4 t5 t6 t7 t8 t9 t10 t11 t12 # File based tests file-tests: $(REGRESS_TARGETS) # Interop tests are not run by default interop interop-tests: t-exec-interop prep: test "x${USE_VALGRIND}" = "x" || mkdir -p $(OBJ)/valgrind-out clean: for F in $(CLEANFILES); do rm -f $(OBJ)$$F; done rm -rf $(OBJ).putty distclean: clean LTESTS= connect \ proxy-connect \ sshfp-connect \ connect-privsep \ connect-uri \ proto-version \ proto-mismatch \ exit-status \ exit-status-signal \ envpass \ transfer \ banner \ rekey \ dhgex \ stderr-data \ stderr-after-eof \ broken-pipe \ try-ciphers \ yes-head \ login-timeout \ agent \ agent-getpeereid \ agent-timeout \ agent-ptrace \ agent-subprocess \ keyscan \ keygen-change \ keygen-comment \ keygen-convert \ keygen-knownhosts \ keygen-moduli \ keygen-sshfp \ key-options \ scp \ scp3 \ scp-uri \ sftp \ sftp-chroot \ sftp-cmds \ sftp-badcmds \ sftp-batch \ sftp-glob \ sftp-perm \ sftp-uri \ reconfigure \ dynamic-forward \ forwarding \ multiplex \ reexec \ brokenkeys \ sshcfgparse \ cfgparse \ cfgmatch \ cfgmatchlisten \ percent \ addrmatch \ localcommand \ forcecommand \ portnum \ keytype \ kextype \ cert-hostkey \ cert-userkey \ host-expand \ keys-command \ forward-control \ integrity \ krl \ multipubkey \ limit-keytype \ hostkey-agent \ hostkey-rotate \ principals-command \ cert-file \ cfginclude \ servcfginclude \ allow-deny-users \ authinfo \ sshsig \ knownhosts \ knownhosts-command \ agent-restrict \ hostbased \ channel-timeout \ connection-timeout INTEROP_TESTS= putty-transfer putty-ciphers putty-kex conch-ciphers #INTEROP_TESTS+=ssh-com ssh-com-client ssh-com-keygen ssh-com-sftp EXTRA_TESTS= agent-pkcs11 #EXTRA_TESTS+= cipher-speed USERNAME= ${LOGNAME} CLEANFILES= *.core actual agent-key.* authorized_keys_${USERNAME} \ authorized_keys_${USERNAME}.* \ authorized_principals_${USERNAME} \ banner.in banner.out cert_host_key* cert_user_key* \ copy.1 copy.2 data ed25519-agent ed25519-agent* \ ed25519-agent.pub ed25519 ed25519.pub empty.in \ expect failed-regress.log failed-ssh.log failed-sshd.log \ hkr.* host.ecdsa-sha2-nistp256 host.ecdsa-sha2-nistp384 \ host.ecdsa-sha2-nistp521 host.ssh-dss host.ssh-ed25519 \ host.ssh-rsa host_ca_key* host_krl_* host_revoked_* key.* \ key.dsa-* key.ecdsa-* key.ed25519-512 \ key.ed25519-512.pub key.rsa-* keys-command-args kh.* askpass \ known_hosts known_hosts-cert known_hosts.* krl-* ls.copy \ modpipe netcat no_identity_config \ pidfile putty.rsa2 ready regress.log remote_pid \ revoked-* rsa rsa-agent rsa-agent.pub rsa.pub rsa_ssh2_cr.prv \ rsa_ssh2_crnl.prv scp-ssh-wrapper.exe \ scp-ssh-wrapper.scp setuid-allowed sftp-server.log \ sftp-server.sh sftp.log ssh-log-wrapper.sh ssh.log \ ssh-agent.log ssh-add.log slow-sftp-server.sh \ ssh-rsa_oldfmt knownhosts_command \ ssh_config ssh_config.* ssh_proxy ssh_proxy_bak \ ssh_proxy_* sshd.log sshd_config sshd_config.* \ sshd_config.* sshd_proxy sshd_proxy.* sshd_proxy_bak \ sshd_proxy_orig t10.out t10.out.pub t12.out t12.out.pub \ t2.out t3.out t6.out1 t6.out2 t7.out t7.out.pub \ - t8.out t8.out.pub t9.out t9.out.pub testdata \ - user_*key* user_ca* user_key* + t8.out t8.out.pub t9.out t9.out.pub \ + timestamp testdata user_*key* user_ca* user_key* # Enable all malloc(3) randomisations and checks TEST_ENV= "MALLOC_OPTIONS=CFGJRSUX" TEST_SSH_SSHKEYGEN?=ssh-keygen CPPFLAGS=-I.. t1: ${TEST_SSH_SSHKEYGEN} -if ${.CURDIR}/rsa_ssh2.prv | diff - ${.CURDIR}/rsa_openssh.prv tr '\n' '\r' <${.CURDIR}/rsa_ssh2.prv > ${.OBJDIR}/rsa_ssh2_cr.prv ${TEST_SSH_SSHKEYGEN} -if ${.OBJDIR}/rsa_ssh2_cr.prv | diff - ${.CURDIR}/rsa_openssh.prv awk '{print $$0 "\r"}' ${.CURDIR}/rsa_ssh2.prv > ${.OBJDIR}/rsa_ssh2_crnl.prv ${TEST_SSH_SSHKEYGEN} -if ${.OBJDIR}/rsa_ssh2_crnl.prv | diff - ${.CURDIR}/rsa_openssh.prv t2: cat ${.CURDIR}/rsa_openssh.prv > $(OBJ)/t2.out chmod 600 $(OBJ)/t2.out ${TEST_SSH_SSHKEYGEN} -yf $(OBJ)/t2.out | diff - ${.CURDIR}/rsa_openssh.pub t3: ${TEST_SSH_SSHKEYGEN} -ef ${.CURDIR}/rsa_openssh.pub >$(OBJ)/t3.out ${TEST_SSH_SSHKEYGEN} -if $(OBJ)/t3.out | diff - ${.CURDIR}/rsa_openssh.pub t4: ${TEST_SSH_SSHKEYGEN} -E md5 -lf ${.CURDIR}/rsa_openssh.pub |\ awk '{print $$2}' | diff - ${.CURDIR}/t4.ok t5: ${TEST_SSH_SSHKEYGEN} -Bf ${.CURDIR}/rsa_openssh.pub |\ awk '{print $$2}' | diff - ${.CURDIR}/t5.ok t6: ${TEST_SSH_SSHKEYGEN} -if ${.CURDIR}/dsa_ssh2.prv > $(OBJ)/t6.out1 ${TEST_SSH_SSHKEYGEN} -if ${.CURDIR}/dsa_ssh2.pub > $(OBJ)/t6.out2 chmod 600 $(OBJ)/t6.out1 ${TEST_SSH_SSHKEYGEN} -yf $(OBJ)/t6.out1 | diff - $(OBJ)/t6.out2 $(OBJ)/t7.out: ${TEST_SSH_SSHKEYGEN} -q -t rsa -N '' -f $@ t7: $(OBJ)/t7.out ${TEST_SSH_SSHKEYGEN} -lf $(OBJ)/t7.out > /dev/null ${TEST_SSH_SSHKEYGEN} -Bf $(OBJ)/t7.out > /dev/null $(OBJ)/t8.out: ${TEST_SSH_SSHKEYGEN} -q -t dsa -N '' -f $@ t8: $(OBJ)/t8.out ${TEST_SSH_SSHKEYGEN} -lf $(OBJ)/t8.out > /dev/null ${TEST_SSH_SSHKEYGEN} -Bf $(OBJ)/t8.out > /dev/null $(OBJ)/t9.out: ! ${TEST_SSH_SSH} -Q key-plain | grep ecdsa >/dev/null || \ ${TEST_SSH_SSHKEYGEN} -q -t ecdsa -N '' -f $@ t9: $(OBJ)/t9.out ! ${TEST_SSH_SSH} -Q key-plain | grep ecdsa >/dev/null || \ ${TEST_SSH_SSHKEYGEN} -lf $(OBJ)/t9.out > /dev/null ! ${TEST_SSH_SSH} -Q key-plain | grep ecdsa >/dev/null || \ ${TEST_SSH_SSHKEYGEN} -Bf $(OBJ)/t9.out > /dev/null $(OBJ)/t10.out: ${TEST_SSH_SSHKEYGEN} -q -t ed25519 -N '' -f $@ t10: $(OBJ)/t10.out ${TEST_SSH_SSHKEYGEN} -lf $(OBJ)/t10.out > /dev/null ${TEST_SSH_SSHKEYGEN} -Bf $(OBJ)/t10.out > /dev/null t11: ${TEST_SSH_SSHKEYGEN} -E sha256 -lf ${.CURDIR}/rsa_openssh.pub |\ awk '{print $$2}' | diff - ${.CURDIR}/t11.ok $(OBJ)/t12.out: ${TEST_SSH_SSHKEYGEN} -q -t ed25519 -N '' -C 'test-comment-1234' -f $@ t12: $(OBJ)/t12.out ${TEST_SSH_SSHKEYGEN} -lf $(OBJ)/t12.out.pub | grep test-comment-1234 >/dev/null t-exec: ${LTESTS:=.sh} @if [ "x$?" = "x" ]; then exit 0; fi; \ for TEST in ""$?; do \ skip=no; \ for t in ""$${SKIP_LTESTS}; do \ if [ "x$${t}.sh" = "x$${TEST}" ]; then skip=yes; fi; \ done; \ if [ "x$${skip}" = "xno" ]; then \ echo "run test $${TEST}" ... 1>&2; \ (env SUDO="${SUDO}" TEST_ENV=${TEST_ENV} ${TEST_SHELL} ${.CURDIR}/test-exec.sh ${.OBJDIR} ${.CURDIR}/$${TEST}) || exit $$?; \ else \ echo skip test $${TEST} 1>&2; \ fi; \ done t-exec-interop: ${INTEROP_TESTS:=.sh} @if [ "x$?" = "x" ]; then exit 0; fi; \ for TEST in ""$?; do \ echo "run test $${TEST}" ... 1>&2; \ (env SUDO="${SUDO}" TEST_ENV=${TEST_ENV} ${TEST_SHELL} ${.CURDIR}/test-exec.sh ${.OBJDIR} ${.CURDIR}/$${TEST}) || exit $$?; \ done t-extra: ${EXTRA_TESTS:=.sh} @if [ "x$?" = "x" ]; then exit 0; fi; \ for TEST in ""$?; do \ echo "run test $${TEST}" ... 1>&2; \ (env SUDO="${SUDO}" TEST_ENV=${TEST_ENV} ${TEST_SHELL} ${.CURDIR}/test-exec.sh ${.OBJDIR} ${.CURDIR}/$${TEST}) || exit $$?; \ done # Not run by default interop: ${INTEROP_TARGETS} # Unit tests, built by top-level Makefile unit: set -e ; if test -z "${SKIP_UNIT}" ; then \ V="" ; \ test "x${USE_VALGRIND}" = "x" || \ V=${.CURDIR}/valgrind-unit.sh ; \ $$V ${.OBJDIR}/unittests/sshbuf/test_sshbuf ; \ $$V ${.OBJDIR}/unittests/sshkey/test_sshkey \ -d ${.CURDIR}/unittests/sshkey/testdata ; \ $$V ${.OBJDIR}/unittests/sshsig/test_sshsig \ -d ${.CURDIR}/unittests/sshsig/testdata ; \ $$V ${.OBJDIR}/unittests/authopt/test_authopt \ -d ${.CURDIR}/unittests/authopt/testdata ; \ $$V ${.OBJDIR}/unittests/bitmap/test_bitmap ; \ $$V ${.OBJDIR}/unittests/conversion/test_conversion ; \ $$V ${.OBJDIR}/unittests/kex/test_kex ; \ $$V ${.OBJDIR}/unittests/hostkeys/test_hostkeys \ -d ${.CURDIR}/unittests/hostkeys/testdata ; \ $$V ${.OBJDIR}/unittests/match/test_match ; \ $$V ${.OBJDIR}/unittests/misc/test_misc ; \ if test "x${TEST_SSH_UTF8}" = "xyes" ; then \ $$V ${.OBJDIR}/unittests/utf8/test_utf8 ; \ fi \ fi diff --git a/crypto/openssh/regress/agent-getpeereid.sh b/crypto/openssh/regress/agent-getpeereid.sh index 79e9c7d9e1c0..f6532f0e9af9 100644 --- a/crypto/openssh/regress/agent-getpeereid.sh +++ b/crypto/openssh/regress/agent-getpeereid.sh @@ -1,59 +1,60 @@ +# $OpenBSD: agent-getpeereid.sh,v 1.15 2023/02/08 08:06:03 dtucker Exp $ # $OpenBSD: agent-getpeereid.sh,v 1.13 2021/09/01 00:50:27 dtucker Exp $ # Placed in the Public Domain. tid="disallow agent attach from other uid" UNPRIV=nobody ASOCK=${OBJ}/agent SSH_AUTH_SOCK=/nonexistent >$OBJ/ssh-agent.log >$OBJ/ssh-add.log if config_defined HAVE_GETPEEREID HAVE_GETPEERUCRED HAVE_SO_PEERCRED ; then : else skip "skipped (not supported on this platform)" fi if test "x$USER" = "xroot"; then skip "skipped (running as root)" fi case "x$SUDO" in xsudo) sudo=1;; xdoas|xdoas\ *) ;; x) skip "need SUDO to switch to uid $UNPRIV" ;; *) skip "unsupported $SUDO - "doas" and "sudo" are allowed" ;; esac trace "start agent" eval `${SSHAGENT} ${EXTRA_AGENT_ARGS} -s -a ${ASOCK}` >$OBJ/ssh-agent.log 2>&1 r=$? if [ $r -ne 0 ]; then fail "could not start ssh-agent: exit code $r" else chmod 644 ${SSH_AUTH_SOCK} ${SSHADD} -vvv -l >>$OBJ/ssh-add.log 2>&1 r=$? if [ $r -ne 1 ]; then fail "ssh-add failed with $r != 1" fi if test -z "$sudo" ; then # doas ${SUDO} -n -u ${UNPRIV} ${SSHADD} -l 2>/dev/null else # sudo < /dev/null ${SUDO} -S -u ${UNPRIV} ${SSHADD} -vvv -l >>$OBJ/ssh-add.log 2>&1 fi r=$? if [ $r -lt 2 ]; then fail "ssh-add did not fail for ${UNPRIV}: $r < 2" cat $OBJ/ssh-add.log fi trace "kill agent" - ${SSHAGENT} -vvv -k >>$OBJ/ssh-agent.log 2>&1 + ${SSHAGENT} -k >>$OBJ/ssh-agent.log 2>&1 fi rm -f ${OBJ}/agent diff --git a/crypto/openssh/regress/agent-restrict.sh b/crypto/openssh/regress/agent-restrict.sh index a30aed7bf3d5..62cea85225e7 100644 --- a/crypto/openssh/regress/agent-restrict.sh +++ b/crypto/openssh/regress/agent-restrict.sh @@ -1,495 +1,495 @@ -# $OpenBSD: agent-restrict.sh,v 1.5 2022/01/13 04:53:16 dtucker Exp $ +# $OpenBSD: agent-restrict.sh,v 1.6 2023/03/01 09:29:32 dtucker Exp $ # Placed in the Public Domain. tid="agent restrictions" SSH_AUTH_SOCK="$OBJ/agent.sock" export SSH_AUTH_SOCK rm -f $SSH_AUTH_SOCK $OBJ/agent.log $OBJ/host_[abcdex]* $OBJ/user_[abcdex]* rm -f $OBJ/sshd_proxy_host* $OBJ/ssh_output* $OBJ/expect_* rm -f $OBJ/ssh_proxy[._]* $OBJ/command verbose "generate keys" for h in a b c d e x ca ; do $SSHKEYGEN -q -t ed25519 -C host_$h -N '' -f $OBJ/host_$h || \ fatal "ssh-keygen hostkey failed" $SSHKEYGEN -q -t ed25519 -C user_$h -N '' -f $OBJ/user_$h || \ fatal "ssh-keygen userkey failed" done # Make some hostcerts for h in d e ; do id="host_$h" $SSHKEYGEN -q -s $OBJ/host_ca -I $id -n $id -h $OBJ/host_${h}.pub || \ fatal "ssh-keygen certify failed" done verbose "prepare client config" egrep -vi '(identityfile|hostname|hostkeyalias|proxycommand)' \ $OBJ/ssh_proxy > $OBJ/ssh_proxy.bak cat << _EOF > $OBJ/ssh_proxy IdentitiesOnly yes ForwardAgent yes ExitOnForwardFailure yes _EOF cp $OBJ/ssh_proxy $OBJ/ssh_proxy_noid for h in a b c d e ; do cat << _EOF >> $OBJ/ssh_proxy Host host_$h Hostname host_$h HostkeyAlias host_$h IdentityFile $OBJ/user_$h - ProxyCommand ${SUDO} env SSH_SK_HELPER=\"$SSH_SK_HELPER\" sh ${SRC}/sshd-log-wrapper.sh ${TEST_SSHD_LOGFILE} ${SSHD} -i -f $OBJ/sshd_proxy_host_$h + ProxyCommand ${SUDO} env SSH_SK_HELPER=\"$SSH_SK_HELPER\" ${OBJ}/sshd-log-wrapper.sh -i -f $OBJ/sshd_proxy_host_$h _EOF # Variant with no specified keys. cat << _EOF >> $OBJ/ssh_proxy_noid Host host_$h Hostname host_$h HostkeyAlias host_$h - ProxyCommand ${SUDO} env SSH_SK_HELPER=\"$SSH_SK_HELPER\" sh ${SRC}/sshd-log-wrapper.sh ${TEST_SSHD_LOGFILE} ${SSHD} -i -f $OBJ/sshd_proxy_host_$h + ProxyCommand ${SUDO} env SSH_SK_HELPER=\"$SSH_SK_HELPER\" ${OBJ}/sshd-log-wrapper.sh -i -f $OBJ/sshd_proxy_host_$h _EOF done cat $OBJ/ssh_proxy.bak >> $OBJ/ssh_proxy cat $OBJ/ssh_proxy.bak >> $OBJ/ssh_proxy_noid LC_ALL=C export LC_ALL echo "SetEnv LC_ALL=${LC_ALL}" >> sshd_proxy verbose "prepare known_hosts" rm -f $OBJ/known_hosts for h in a b c x ; do (printf "host_$h " ; cat $OBJ/host_${h}.pub) >> $OBJ/known_hosts done (printf "@cert-authority host_* " ; cat $OBJ/host_ca.pub) >> $OBJ/known_hosts verbose "prepare server configs" egrep -vi '(hostkey|pidfile)' $OBJ/sshd_proxy \ > $OBJ/sshd_proxy.bak for h in a b c d e; do cp $OBJ/sshd_proxy.bak $OBJ/sshd_proxy_host_$h cat << _EOF >> $OBJ/sshd_proxy_host_$h ExposeAuthInfo yes PidFile none Hostkey $OBJ/host_$h _EOF done for h in d e ; do echo "HostCertificate $OBJ/host_${h}-cert.pub" \ >> $OBJ/sshd_proxy_host_$h done # Create authorized_keys with canned command. reset_keys() { _whichcmd="$1" _command="" case "$_whichcmd" in authinfo) _command="cat \$SSH_USER_AUTH" ;; keylist) _command="$SSHADD -L | cut -d' ' -f-2 | sort" ;; *) fatal "unsupported command $_whichcmd" ;; esac trace "reset keys" >$OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER for h in e d c b a; do (printf "%s" "restrict,agent-forwarding,command=\"$_command\" "; cat $OBJ/user_$h.pub) >> $OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER done } # Prepare a key for comparison with ExposeAuthInfo/$SSH_USER_AUTH. expect_key() { _key="$OBJ/${1}.pub" _file="$OBJ/$2" (printf "publickey " ; cut -d' ' -f-2 $_key) > $_file } # Prepare expect_* files to compare against authinfo forced command to ensure # keys used for authentication match. reset_expect_keys() { for u in a b c d e; do expect_key user_$u expect_$u done } # ssh to host, expecting success and that output matched expectation for # that host (expect_$h file). expect_succeed() { _id="$1" _case="$2" shift; shift; _extra="$@" _host="host_$_id" trace "connect $_host expect success" rm -f $OBJ/ssh_output ${SSH} $_extra -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy $_host true > $OBJ/ssh_output _s=$? test $_s -eq 0 || fail "host $_host $_case fail, exit status $_s" diff $OBJ/ssh_output $OBJ/expect_${_id} || fail "unexpected ssh output" } # ssh to host using explicit key, expecting success and that the key was # actually used for authentication. expect_succeed_key() { _id="$1" _key="$2" _case="$3" shift; shift; shift; _extra="$@" _host="host_$_id" trace "connect $_host expect success, with key $_key" _keyfile="$OBJ/$_key" rm -f $OBJ/ssh_output ${SSH} $_extra -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy_noid \ -oIdentityFile=$_keyfile $_host true > $OBJ/ssh_output _s=$? test $_s -eq 0 || fail "host $_host $_key $_case fail, exit status $_s" expect_key $_key expect_key diff $OBJ/ssh_output $OBJ/expect_key || fail "incorrect key used for authentication" } # ssh to a host, expecting it to fail. expect_fail() { _host="$1" _case="$2" shift; shift; _extra="$@" trace "connect $_host expect failure" ${SSH} $_extra -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy $_host true >/dev/null && \ fail "host $_host $_case succeeded unexpectedly" } # ssh to a host using an explicit key, expecting it to fail. expect_fail_key() { _id="$1" _key="$2" _case="$3" shift; shift; shift; _extra="$@" _host="host_$_id" trace "connect $_host expect failure, with key $_key" _keyfile="$OBJ/$_key" ${SSH} $_extra -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy_noid -oIdentityFile=$_keyfile \ $_host true > $OBJ/ssh_output && \ fail "host $_host $_key $_case succeeded unexpectedly" } # Move the private key files out of the way to force use of agent-hosted keys. hide_privatekeys() { trace "hide private keys" for u in a b c d e x; do mv $OBJ/user_$u $OBJ/user_x$u || fatal "hide privkey $u" done } # Put the private key files back. restore_privatekeys() { trace "restore private keys" for u in a b c d e x; do mv $OBJ/user_x$u $OBJ/user_$u || fatal "restore privkey $u" done } clear_agent() { ${SSHADD} -D > /dev/null 2>&1 || fatal "clear agent failed" } reset_keys authinfo reset_expect_keys verbose "authentication w/o agent" for h in a b c d e ; do expect_succeed $h "w/o agent" wrongkey=user_e test "$h" = "e" && wrongkey=user_a expect_succeed_key $h $wrongkey "\"wrong\" key w/o agent" done hide_privatekeys for h in a b c d e ; do expect_fail $h "w/o agent" done restore_privatekeys verbose "start agent" ${SSHAGENT} ${EXTRA_AGENT_ARGS} -d -a $SSH_AUTH_SOCK > $OBJ/agent.log 2>&1 & AGENT_PID=$! trap "kill $AGENT_PID" EXIT sleep 4 # Give it a chance to start # Check that it's running. ${SSHADD} -l > /dev/null 2>&1 if [ $? -ne 1 ]; then fail "ssh-add -l did not fail with exit code 1" fi verbose "authentication with agent (no restrict)" for u in a b c d e x; do $SSHADD -q $OBJ/user_$u || fatal "add key $u unrestricted" done hide_privatekeys for h in a b c d e ; do expect_succeed $h "with agent" wrongkey=user_e test "$h" = "e" && wrongkey=user_a expect_succeed_key $h $wrongkey "\"wrong\" key with agent" done verbose "unrestricted keylist" reset_keys keylist rm -f $OBJ/expect_list.pre # List of keys from agent should contain everything. for u in a b c d e x; do cut -d " " -f-2 $OBJ/user_${u}.pub >> $OBJ/expect_list.pre done sort $OBJ/expect_list.pre > $OBJ/expect_list for h in a b c d e; do cp $OBJ/expect_list $OBJ/expect_$h expect_succeed $h "unrestricted keylist" done restore_privatekeys verbose "authentication with agent (basic restrict)" reset_keys authinfo reset_expect_keys for h in a b c d e; do $SSHADD -h host_$h -H $OBJ/known_hosts -q $OBJ/user_$h \ || fatal "add key $u basic restrict" done # One more, unrestricted $SSHADD -q $OBJ/user_x || fatal "add unrestricted key" hide_privatekeys # Authentication to host with expected key should work. for h in a b c d e ; do expect_succeed $h "with agent" done # Authentication to host with incorrect key should fail. verbose "authentication with agent incorrect key (basic restrict)" for h in a b c d e ; do wrongkey=user_e test "$h" = "e" && wrongkey=user_a expect_fail_key $h $wrongkey "wrong key with agent (basic restrict)" done verbose "keylist (basic restrict)" reset_keys keylist # List from forwarded agent should contain only user_x - the unrestricted key. cut -d " " -f-2 $OBJ/user_x.pub > $OBJ/expect_list for h in a b c d e; do cp $OBJ/expect_list $OBJ/expect_$h expect_succeed $h "keylist (basic restrict)" done restore_privatekeys verbose "username" reset_keys authinfo reset_expect_keys for h in a b c d e; do $SSHADD -h "${USER}@host_$h" -H $OBJ/known_hosts -q $OBJ/user_$h \ || fatal "add key $u basic restrict" done hide_privatekeys for h in a b c d e ; do expect_succeed $h "wildcard user" done restore_privatekeys verbose "username wildcard" reset_keys authinfo reset_expect_keys for h in a b c d e; do $SSHADD -h "*@host_$h" -H $OBJ/known_hosts -q $OBJ/user_$h \ || fatal "add key $u basic restrict" done hide_privatekeys for h in a b c d e ; do expect_succeed $h "wildcard user" done restore_privatekeys verbose "username incorrect" reset_keys authinfo reset_expect_keys for h in a b c d e; do $SSHADD -h "--BADUSER@host_$h" -H $OBJ/known_hosts -q $OBJ/user_$h \ || fatal "add key $u basic restrict" done hide_privatekeys for h in a b c d e ; do expect_fail $h "incorrect user" done restore_privatekeys verbose "agent restriction honours certificate principal" reset_keys authinfo reset_expect_keys clear_agent $SSHADD -h host_e -H $OBJ/known_hosts -q $OBJ/user_d || fatal "add key" hide_privatekeys expect_fail d "restricted agent w/ incorrect cert principal" restore_privatekeys # Prepares the script used to drive chained ssh connections for the # multihop tests. Believe me, this is easier than getting the escaping # right for 5 hops on the command-line... prepare_multihop_script() { MULTIHOP_RUN=$OBJ/command cat << _EOF > $MULTIHOP_RUN #!/bin/sh #set -x me="\$1" ; shift next="\$1" if test ! -z "\$me" ; then rm -f $OBJ/done echo "HOSTNAME host_\$me" echo "AUTHINFO" cat \$SSH_USER_AUTH fi echo AGENT $SSHADD -L | egrep "^ssh" | cut -d" " -f-2 | sort if test -z "\$next" ; then touch $OBJ/done echo "FINISH" e=0 else echo NEXT ${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy_noid -oIdentityFile=$OBJ/user_a \ host_\$next $MULTIHOP_RUN "\$@" e=\$? fi echo "COMPLETE \"\$me\"" if test ! -z "\$me" ; then if test ! -f $OBJ/done ; then echo "DONE MARKER MISSING" test \$e -eq 0 && e=63 fi fi exit \$e _EOF chmod u+x $MULTIHOP_RUN } # Prepare expected output for multihop tests at expect_a prepare_multihop_expected() { _keys="$1" _hops="a b c d e" test -z "$2" || _hops="$2" _revhops=$(echo "$_hops" | rev) _lasthop=$(echo "$_hops" | sed 's/.* //') rm -f $OBJ/expect_keys for h in a b c d e; do cut -d" " -f-2 $OBJ/user_${h}.pub >> $OBJ/expect_keys done rm -f $OBJ/expect_a echo "AGENT" >> $OBJ/expect_a test "x$_keys" = "xnone" || sort $OBJ/expect_keys >> $OBJ/expect_a echo "NEXT" >> $OBJ/expect_a for h in $_hops ; do echo "HOSTNAME host_$h" >> $OBJ/expect_a echo "AUTHINFO" >> $OBJ/expect_a (printf "publickey " ; cut -d" " -f-2 $OBJ/user_a.pub) >> $OBJ/expect_a echo "AGENT" >> $OBJ/expect_a if test "x$_keys" = "xall" ; then sort $OBJ/expect_keys >> $OBJ/expect_a fi if test "x$h" != "x$_lasthop" ; then if test "x$_keys" = "xfiltered" ; then cut -d" " -f-2 $OBJ/user_a.pub >> $OBJ/expect_a fi echo "NEXT" >> $OBJ/expect_a fi done echo "FINISH" >> $OBJ/expect_a for h in $_revhops "" ; do echo "COMPLETE \"$h\"" >> $OBJ/expect_a done } prepare_multihop_script cp $OBJ/user_a.pub $OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER # only one key used. verbose "multihop without agent" clear_agent prepare_multihop_expected none $MULTIHOP_RUN "" a b c d e > $OBJ/ssh_output || fail "multihop no agent ssh failed" diff $OBJ/ssh_output $OBJ/expect_a || fail "unexpected ssh output" verbose "multihop agent unrestricted" clear_agent $SSHADD -q $OBJ/user_[abcde] prepare_multihop_expected all $MULTIHOP_RUN "" a b c d e > $OBJ/ssh_output || fail "multihop no agent ssh failed" diff $OBJ/ssh_output $OBJ/expect_a || fail "unexpected ssh output" verbose "multihop restricted" clear_agent prepare_multihop_expected filtered # Add user_a, with permission to connect through the whole chain. $SSHADD -h host_a -h "host_a>host_b" -h "host_b>host_c" \ -h "host_c>host_d" -h "host_d>host_e" \ -H $OBJ/known_hosts -q $OBJ/user_a \ || fatal "add key user_a multihop" # Add the other keys, bound to a unused host. $SSHADD -q -h host_x -H $OBJ/known_hosts $OBJ/user_[bcde] || fail "add keys" hide_privatekeys $MULTIHOP_RUN "" a b c d e > $OBJ/ssh_output || fail "multihop ssh failed" diff $OBJ/ssh_output $OBJ/expect_a || fail "unexpected ssh output" restore_privatekeys verbose "multihop username" $SSHADD -h host_a -h "host_a>${USER}@host_b" -h "host_b>${USER}@host_c" \ -h "host_c>${USER}@host_d" -h "host_d>${USER}@host_e" \ -H $OBJ/known_hosts -q $OBJ/user_a || fatal "add key user_a multihop" hide_privatekeys $MULTIHOP_RUN "" a b c d e > $OBJ/ssh_output || fail "multihop w/ user ssh failed" diff $OBJ/ssh_output $OBJ/expect_a || fail "unexpected ssh output" restore_privatekeys verbose "multihop wildcard username" $SSHADD -h host_a -h "host_a>*@host_b" -h "host_b>*@host_c" \ -h "host_c>*@host_d" -h "host_d>*@host_e" \ -H $OBJ/known_hosts -q $OBJ/user_a || fatal "add key user_a multihop" hide_privatekeys $MULTIHOP_RUN "" a b c d e > $OBJ/ssh_output || fail "multihop w/ user ssh failed" diff $OBJ/ssh_output $OBJ/expect_a || fail "unexpected ssh output" restore_privatekeys verbose "multihop wrong username" $SSHADD -h host_a -h "host_a>*@host_b" -h "host_b>*@host_c" \ -h "host_c>--BADUSER@host_d" -h "host_d>*@host_e" \ -H $OBJ/known_hosts -q $OBJ/user_a || fatal "add key user_a multihop" hide_privatekeys $MULTIHOP_RUN "" a b c d e > $OBJ/ssh_output && \ fail "multihop with wrong user succeeded unexpectedly" restore_privatekeys verbose "multihop cycle no agent" clear_agent prepare_multihop_expected none "a b a a c d e" $MULTIHOP_RUN "" a b a a c d e > $OBJ/ssh_output || \ fail "multihop cycle no-agent fail" diff $OBJ/ssh_output $OBJ/expect_a || fail "unexpected ssh output" verbose "multihop cycle agent unrestricted" clear_agent $SSHADD -q $OBJ/user_[abcde] || fail "add keys" prepare_multihop_expected all "a b a a c d e" $MULTIHOP_RUN "" a b a a c d e > $OBJ/ssh_output || \ fail "multihop cycle agent ssh failed" diff $OBJ/ssh_output $OBJ/expect_a || fail "unexpected ssh output" verbose "multihop cycle restricted deny" clear_agent $SSHADD -q -h host_x -H $OBJ/known_hosts $OBJ/user_[bcde] || fail "add keys" $SSHADD -h host_a -h "host_a>host_b" -h "host_b>host_c" \ -h "host_c>host_d" -h "host_d>host_e" \ -H $OBJ/known_hosts -q $OBJ/user_a \ || fatal "add key user_a multihop" prepare_multihop_expected filtered "a b a a c d e" hide_privatekeys $MULTIHOP_RUN "" a b a a c d e > $OBJ/ssh_output && \ fail "multihop cycle restricted deny succeded unexpectedly" restore_privatekeys verbose "multihop cycle restricted allow" clear_agent $SSHADD -q -h host_x -H $OBJ/known_hosts $OBJ/user_[bcde] || fail "add keys" $SSHADD -h host_a -h "host_a>host_b" -h "host_b>host_c" \ -h "host_c>host_d" -h "host_d>host_e" \ -h "host_b>host_a" -h "host_a>host_a" -h "host_a>host_c" \ -H $OBJ/known_hosts -q $OBJ/user_a \ || fatal "add key user_a multihop" prepare_multihop_expected filtered "a b a a c d e" hide_privatekeys $MULTIHOP_RUN "" a b a a c d e > $OBJ/ssh_output || \ fail "multihop cycle restricted allow failed" diff $OBJ/ssh_output $OBJ/expect_a || fail "unexpected ssh output" restore_privatekeys diff --git a/crypto/openssh/regress/agent.sh b/crypto/openssh/regress/agent.sh index f187b6757201..5f1060608eb5 100644 --- a/crypto/openssh/regress/agent.sh +++ b/crypto/openssh/regress/agent.sh @@ -1,227 +1,227 @@ -# $OpenBSD: agent.sh,v 1.20 2021/02/25 03:27:34 djm Exp $ +# $OpenBSD: agent.sh,v 1.21 2023/03/01 09:29:32 dtucker Exp $ # Placed in the Public Domain. tid="simple agent test" SSH_AUTH_SOCK=/nonexistent ${SSHADD} -l > /dev/null 2>&1 if [ $? -ne 2 ]; then fail "ssh-add -l did not fail with exit code 2" fi trace "start agent, args ${EXTRA_AGENT_ARGS} -s" -eval `${SSHAGENT} ${EXTRA_AGENT_ARGS} -s` > /dev/null +eval `${SSHAGENT} ${EXTRA_AGENT_ARGS} -s` >`ssh_logfile ssh-agent` r=$? if [ $r -ne 0 ]; then fatal "could not start ssh-agent: exit code $r" fi eval `${SSHAGENT} ${EXTRA_AGENT_ARGS} -s | sed 's/SSH_/FW_SSH_/g'` > /dev/null r=$? if [ $r -ne 0 ]; then fatal "could not start second ssh-agent: exit code $r" fi ${SSHADD} -l > /dev/null 2>&1 if [ $? -ne 1 ]; then fail "ssh-add -l did not fail with exit code 1" fi rm -f $OBJ/user_ca_key $OBJ/user_ca_key.pub ${SSHKEYGEN} -q -N '' -t ed25519 -f $OBJ/user_ca_key \ || fatal "ssh-keygen failed" trace "overwrite authorized keys" printf '' > $OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER for t in ${SSH_KEYTYPES}; do # generate user key for agent rm -f $OBJ/$t-agent $OBJ/$t-agent.pub* ${SSHKEYGEN} -q -N '' -t $t -f $OBJ/$t-agent ||\ fatal "ssh-keygen for $t-agent failed" # Make a certificate for each too. ${SSHKEYGEN} -qs $OBJ/user_ca_key -I "$t cert" \ -n estragon $OBJ/$t-agent.pub || fatal "ca sign failed" # add to authorized keys cat $OBJ/$t-agent.pub >> $OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER # add private key to agent ${SSHADD} $OBJ/$t-agent > /dev/null 2>&1 if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then fail "ssh-add failed exit code $?" fi # add private key to second agent SSH_AUTH_SOCK=$FW_SSH_AUTH_SOCK ${SSHADD} $OBJ/$t-agent > /dev/null 2>&1 if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then fail "ssh-add failed exit code $?" fi # Move private key to ensure that we aren't accidentally using it. # Keep the corresponding public keys/certs around for later use. mv -f $OBJ/$t-agent $OBJ/$t-agent-private cp -f $OBJ/$t-agent.pub $OBJ/$t-agent-private.pub cp -f $OBJ/$t-agent-cert.pub $OBJ/$t-agent-private-cert.pub done # Remove explicit identity directives from ssh_proxy mv $OBJ/ssh_proxy $OBJ/ssh_proxy_bak grep -vi identityfile $OBJ/ssh_proxy_bak > $OBJ/ssh_proxy ${SSHADD} -l > /dev/null 2>&1 r=$? if [ $r -ne 0 ]; then fail "ssh-add -l failed: exit code $r" fi # the same for full pubkey output ${SSHADD} -L > /dev/null 2>&1 r=$? if [ $r -ne 0 ]; then fail "ssh-add -L failed: exit code $r" fi trace "simple connect via agent" ${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost exit 52 r=$? if [ $r -ne 52 ]; then fail "ssh connect with failed (exit code $r)" fi for t in ${SSH_KEYTYPES}; do trace "connect via agent using $t key" if [ "$t" = "ssh-dss" ]; then echo "PubkeyAcceptedAlgorithms +ssh-dss" >> $OBJ/ssh_proxy echo "PubkeyAcceptedAlgorithms +ssh-dss" >> $OBJ/sshd_proxy fi ${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy -i $OBJ/$t-agent.pub -oIdentitiesOnly=yes \ somehost exit 52 r=$? if [ $r -ne 52 ]; then fail "ssh connect with failed (exit code $r)" fi done trace "agent forwarding" ${SSH} -A -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost ${SSHADD} -l > /dev/null 2>&1 r=$? if [ $r -ne 0 ]; then fail "ssh-add -l via agent fwd failed (exit code $r)" fi ${SSH} "-oForwardAgent=$SSH_AUTH_SOCK" -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost ${SSHADD} -l > /dev/null 2>&1 r=$? if [ $r -ne 0 ]; then fail "ssh-add -l via agent path fwd failed (exit code $r)" fi ${SSH} -A -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost \ "${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost exit 52" r=$? if [ $r -ne 52 ]; then fail "agent fwd failed (exit code $r)" fi trace "agent forwarding different agent" ${SSH} "-oForwardAgent=$FW_SSH_AUTH_SOCK" -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost ${SSHADD} -l > /dev/null 2>&1 r=$? if [ $r -ne 0 ]; then fail "ssh-add -l via agent path fwd of different agent failed (exit code $r)" fi ${SSH} '-oForwardAgent=$FW_SSH_AUTH_SOCK' -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost ${SSHADD} -l > /dev/null 2>&1 r=$? if [ $r -ne 0 ]; then fail "ssh-add -l via agent path env fwd of different agent failed (exit code $r)" fi # Remove keys from forwarded agent, ssh-add on remote machine should now fail. SSH_AUTH_SOCK=$FW_SSH_AUTH_SOCK ${SSHADD} -D > /dev/null 2>&1 r=$? if [ $r -ne 0 ]; then fail "ssh-add -D failed: exit code $r" fi ${SSH} '-oForwardAgent=$FW_SSH_AUTH_SOCK' -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost ${SSHADD} -l > /dev/null 2>&1 r=$? if [ $r -ne 1 ]; then fail "ssh-add -l with different agent did not fail with exit code 1 (exit code $r)" fi (printf 'cert-authority,principals="estragon" '; cat $OBJ/user_ca_key.pub) \ > $OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER for t in ${SSH_KEYTYPES}; do if [ "$t" != "ssh-dss" ]; then trace "connect via agent using $t key" ${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy -i $OBJ/$t-agent.pub \ -oCertificateFile=$OBJ/$t-agent-cert.pub \ -oIdentitiesOnly=yes somehost exit 52 r=$? if [ $r -ne 52 ]; then fail "ssh connect with failed (exit code $r)" fi fi done ## Deletion tests. trace "delete all agent keys" ${SSHADD} -D > /dev/null 2>&1 r=$? if [ $r -ne 0 ]; then fail "ssh-add -D failed: exit code $r" fi # make sure they're gone ${SSHADD} -l > /dev/null 2>&1 r=$? if [ $r -ne 1 ]; then fail "ssh-add -l returned unexpected exit code: $r" fi trace "readd keys" # re-add keys/certs to agent for t in ${SSH_KEYTYPES}; do ${SSHADD} $OBJ/$t-agent-private >/dev/null 2>&1 || \ fail "ssh-add failed exit code $?" done # make sure they are there ${SSHADD} -l > /dev/null 2>&1 r=$? if [ $r -ne 0 ]; then fail "ssh-add -l failed: exit code $r" fi check_key_absent() { ${SSHADD} -L | grep "^$1 " >/dev/null if [ $? -eq 0 ]; then fail "$1 key unexpectedly present" fi } check_key_present() { ${SSHADD} -L | grep "^$1 " >/dev/null if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then fail "$1 key missing from agent" fi } # delete the ed25519 key trace "delete single key by file" ${SSHADD} -qdk $OBJ/ssh-ed25519-agent || fail "ssh-add -d ed25519 failed" check_key_absent ssh-ed25519 check_key_present ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com # Put key/cert back. ${SSHADD} $OBJ/ssh-ed25519-agent-private >/dev/null 2>&1 || \ fail "ssh-add failed exit code $?" check_key_present ssh-ed25519 # Delete both key and certificate. trace "delete key/cert by file" ${SSHADD} -qd $OBJ/ssh-ed25519-agent || fail "ssh-add -d ed25519 failed" check_key_absent ssh-ed25519 check_key_absent ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com # Put key/cert back. ${SSHADD} $OBJ/ssh-ed25519-agent-private >/dev/null 2>&1 || \ fail "ssh-add failed exit code $?" check_key_present ssh-ed25519 # Delete certificate via stdin ${SSHADD} -qd - < $OBJ/ssh-ed25519-agent-cert.pub || fail "ssh-add -d - failed" check_key_present ssh-ed25519 check_key_absent ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com # Delete key via stdin ${SSHADD} -qd - < $OBJ/ssh-ed25519-agent.pub || fail "ssh-add -d - failed" check_key_absent ssh-ed25519 check_key_absent ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com trace "kill agent" ${SSHAGENT} -k > /dev/null SSH_AGENT_PID=$FW_SSH_AGENT_PID ${SSHAGENT} -k > /dev/null diff --git a/crypto/openssh/regress/dhgex.sh b/crypto/openssh/regress/dhgex.sh index 6dd4cfe3f94a..30064f30a9fe 100644 --- a/crypto/openssh/regress/dhgex.sh +++ b/crypto/openssh/regress/dhgex.sh @@ -1,61 +1,61 @@ -# $OpenBSD: dhgex.sh,v 1.7 2020/12/21 22:48:41 dtucker Exp $ +# $OpenBSD: dhgex.sh,v 1.8 2023/03/02 08:14:52 dtucker Exp $ # Placed in the Public Domain. tid="dhgex" LOG=${TEST_SSH_LOGFILE} rm -f ${LOG} cp $OBJ/sshd_proxy $OBJ/sshd_proxy_bak kexs=`${SSH} -Q kex | grep diffie-hellman-group-exchange` ssh_test_dhgex() { bits="$1"; shift cipher="$1"; shift kex="$1"; shift cp $OBJ/sshd_proxy_bak $OBJ/sshd_proxy echo "KexAlgorithms=$kex" >> $OBJ/sshd_proxy echo "Ciphers=$cipher" >> $OBJ/sshd_proxy rm -f ${LOG} opts="-oKexAlgorithms=$kex -oCiphers=$cipher" min=2048 max=8192 groupsz="$min<$bits<$max" verbose "$tid bits $bits $kex $cipher" ${SSH} ${opts} $@ -vvv -F ${OBJ}/ssh_proxy somehost true if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then fail "ssh failed ($@)" fi # check what we request grep "SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REQUEST($groupsz) sent" ${LOG} >/dev/null if [ $? != 0 ]; then - got=`egrep "SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REQUEST(.*) sent" ${LOG}` - fail "$tid unexpected GEX sizes, expected $groupsz, got $got" + got="`egrep 'SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REQUEST(.*) sent' ${LOG}`" + fail "$tid unexpected GEX sizes, expected $groupsz, got '$got'" fi # check what we got. gotbits="`awk 'BEGIN{FS="/"}/bits set:/{print $2}' ${LOG} | head -1 | tr -d '\r\n'`" trace "expected '$bits' got '$gotbits'" if [ -z "$gotbits" ] || [ "$gotbits" -lt "$bits" ]; then fatal "$tid expected $bits bit group, got $gotbits" fi } check() { bits="$1"; shift for c in $@; do for k in $kexs; do ssh_test_dhgex $bits $c $k done done } check 3072 3des-cbc # 112 bits. check 3072 `${SSH} -Q cipher | grep 128` check 7680 `${SSH} -Q cipher | grep 192` check 8192 `${SSH} -Q cipher | grep 256` check 8192 chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com diff --git a/crypto/openssh/regress/integrity.sh b/crypto/openssh/regress/integrity.sh index bc030cb74f35..202483c75f4f 100644 --- a/crypto/openssh/regress/integrity.sh +++ b/crypto/openssh/regress/integrity.sh @@ -1,76 +1,76 @@ -# $OpenBSD: integrity.sh,v 1.24 2020/01/21 08:06:27 djm Exp $ +# $OpenBSD: integrity.sh,v 1.25 2023/03/01 09:29:32 dtucker Exp $ # Placed in the Public Domain. tid="integrity" cp $OBJ/sshd_proxy $OBJ/sshd_proxy_bak # start at byte 2900 (i.e. after kex) and corrupt at different offsets tries=10 startoffset=2900 macs=`${SSH} -Q mac` # The following are not MACs, but ciphers with integrated integrity. They are # handled specially below. macs="$macs `${SSH} -Q cipher-auth`" # avoid DH group exchange as the extra traffic makes it harder to get the # offset into the stream right. #echo "KexAlgorithms -diffie-hellman-group*" \ # >> $OBJ/ssh_proxy # sshd-command for proxy (see test-exec.sh) -cmd="$SUDO env SSH_SK_HELPER="$SSH_SK_HELPER" sh ${SRC}/sshd-log-wrapper.sh ${TEST_SSHD_LOGFILE} ${SSHD} -i -f $OBJ/sshd_proxy" +cmd="$SUDO env SSH_SK_HELPER="$SSH_SK_HELPER" sh ${OBJ}/sshd-log-wrapper.sh -i -f $OBJ/sshd_proxy" for m in $macs; do trace "test $tid: mac $m" elen=0 epad=0 emac=0 etmo=0 ecnt=0 skip=0 for off in `jot $tries $startoffset`; do skip=`expr $skip - 1` if [ $skip -gt 0 ]; then # avoid modifying the high bytes of the length continue fi cp $OBJ/sshd_proxy_bak $OBJ/sshd_proxy # modify output from sshd at offset $off pxy="proxycommand=$cmd | $OBJ/modpipe -wm xor:$off:1" if ${SSH} -Q cipher-auth | grep "^${m}\$" >/dev/null 2>&1 ; then echo "Ciphers=$m" >> $OBJ/sshd_proxy macopt="-c $m" else echo "Ciphers=aes128-ctr" >> $OBJ/sshd_proxy echo "MACs=$m" >> $OBJ/sshd_proxy macopt="-m $m -c aes128-ctr" fi verbose "test $tid: $m @$off" ${SSH} $macopt -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy -o "$pxy" \ -oServerAliveInterval=1 -oServerAliveCountMax=30 \ 999.999.999.999 'printf "%4096s" " "' >/dev/null if [ $? -eq 0 ]; then fail "ssh -m $m succeeds with bit-flip at $off" fi ecnt=`expr $ecnt + 1` out=$(egrep -v "^debug" $TEST_SSH_LOGFILE | tail -2 | \ tr -s '\r\n' '.') case "$out" in Bad?packet*) elen=`expr $elen + 1`; skip=3;; Corrupted?MAC* | *message?authentication?code?incorrect*) emac=`expr $emac + 1`; skip=0;; padding*) epad=`expr $epad + 1`; skip=0;; *Timeout,?server*) etmo=`expr $etmo + 1`; skip=0;; *) fail "unexpected error mac $m at $off: $out";; esac done verbose "test $tid: $ecnt errors: mac $emac padding $epad length $elen timeout $etmo" if [ $emac -eq 0 ]; then fail "$m: no mac errors" fi expect=`expr $ecnt - $epad - $elen - $etmo` if [ $emac -ne $expect ]; then fail "$m: expected $expect mac errors, got $emac" fi done diff --git a/crypto/openssh/regress/keygen-sshfp.sh b/crypto/openssh/regress/keygen-sshfp.sh index 2abf9adecac7..0f5eb8555449 100644 --- a/crypto/openssh/regress/keygen-sshfp.sh +++ b/crypto/openssh/regress/keygen-sshfp.sh @@ -1,29 +1,49 @@ -# $OpenBSD: keygen-sshfp.sh,v 1.2 2021/07/19 02:29:28 dtucker Exp $ +# $OpenBSD: keygen-sshfp.sh,v 1.3 2023/02/10 05:06:03 djm Exp $ # Placed in the Public Domain. tid="keygen-sshfp" trace "keygen fingerprints" fp=`${SSHKEYGEN} -r test -f ${SRC}/ed25519_openssh.pub | \ awk '$5=="1"{print $6}'` if [ "$fp" != "8a8647a7567e202ce317e62606c799c53d4c121f" ]; then fail "keygen fingerprint sha1" fi fp=`${SSHKEYGEN} -r test -f ${SRC}/ed25519_openssh.pub | \ awk '$5=="2"{print $6}'` if [ "$fp" != \ "54a506fb849aafb9f229cf78a94436c281efcb4ae67c8a430e8c06afcb5ee18f" ]; then fail "keygen fingerprint sha256" fi +# Expect two lines of output without an explicit algorithm +fp=`${SSHKEYGEN} -r test -f ${SRC}/ed25519_openssh.pub | wc -l` +if [ $(($fp + 0)) -ne 2 ] ; then + fail "incorrect number of SSHFP records $fp (expected 2)" +fi + +# Test explicit algorithm selection +exp="test IN SSHFP 4 1 8a8647a7567e202ce317e62606c799c53d4c121f" +fp=`${SSHKEYGEN} -Ohashalg=sha1 -r test -f ${SRC}/ed25519_openssh.pub` +if [ "x$exp" != "x$fp" ] ; then + fail "incorrect SHA1 SSHFP output" +fi + +exp="test IN SSHFP 4 2 54a506fb849aafb9f229cf78a94436c281efcb4ae67c8a430e8c06afcb5ee18f" +fp=`${SSHKEYGEN} -Ohashalg=sha256 -r test -f ${SRC}/ed25519_openssh.pub` +if [ "x$exp" != "x$fp" ] ; then + fail "incorrect SHA256 SSHFP output" +fi + if ${SSH} -Q key-plain | grep ssh-rsa >/dev/null; then fp=`${SSHKEYGEN} -r test -f ${SRC}/rsa_openssh.pub | awk '$5=="1"{print $6}'` if [ "$fp" != "99c79cc09f5f81069cc017cdf9552cfc94b3b929" ]; then fail "keygen fingerprint sha1" fi fp=`${SSHKEYGEN} -r test -f ${SRC}/rsa_openssh.pub | awk '$5=="2"{print $6}'` if [ "$fp" != \ "e30d6b9eb7a4de495324e4d5870b8220577993ea6af417e8e4a4f1c5bf01a9b6" ]; then fail "keygen fingerprint sha256" fi fi + diff --git a/crypto/openssh/regress/knownhosts.sh b/crypto/openssh/regress/knownhosts.sh index dfc768ac9742..7a9da5b1469e 100644 --- a/crypto/openssh/regress/knownhosts.sh +++ b/crypto/openssh/regress/knownhosts.sh @@ -1,17 +1,35 @@ -# $OpenBSD: knownhosts.sh,v 1.1 2021/10/01 05:20:20 dtucker Exp $ +# $OpenBSD: knownhosts.sh,v 1.2 2023/02/09 09:55:33 dtucker Exp $ # Placed in the Public Domain. tid="known hosts" opts="-F $OBJ/ssh_proxy" trace "test initial connection" ${SSH} $opts somehost true || fail "initial connection" trace "learn hashed known host" >$OBJ/known_hosts ${SSH} -ohashknownhosts=yes -o stricthostkeychecking=no $opts somehost true \ || fail "learn hashed known_hosts" trace "test hashed known hosts" ${SSH} $opts somehost true || fail "reconnect with hashed known hosts" + +trace "no newline at end of known_hosts" +printf "something" >$OBJ/known_hosts +${SSH} $opts -ostricthostkeychecking=no somehost true \ + || fail "hostkey update, missing newline, no strict" +${SSH} $opts -ostricthostkeychecking=yes somehost true \ + || fail "reconnect after adding with missing newline" + +trace "newline at end of known_hosts" +printf "something\n" >$OBJ/known_hosts +${SSH} $opts -ostricthostkeychecking=no somehost true \ + || fail "hostkey update, newline, no strict" +${SSH} $opts -ostricthostkeychecking=yes somehost true \ + || fail "reconnect after adding without missing newline" +lines=`wc -l <$OBJ/known_hosts` +if [ $lines -ne 2 ]; then + fail "expected 2 lines in known_hosts, found $lines" +fi diff --git a/crypto/openssh/regress/multiplex.sh b/crypto/openssh/regress/multiplex.sh index f9c8fc10bd14..8282d0d940f5 100644 --- a/crypto/openssh/regress/multiplex.sh +++ b/crypto/openssh/regress/multiplex.sh @@ -1,210 +1,210 @@ -# $OpenBSD: multiplex.sh,v 1.35 2023/01/13 04:47:34 dtucker Exp $ +# $OpenBSD: multiplex.sh,v 1.36 2023/03/01 09:29:32 dtucker Exp $ # Placed in the Public Domain. make_tmpdir CTL=${SSH_REGRESS_TMP}/ctl-sock tid="connection multiplexing" trace "will use ProxyCommand $proxycmd" if config_defined DISABLE_FD_PASSING ; then echo "skipped (not supported on this platform)" exit 0 fi P=3301 # test port wait_for_mux_master_ready() { for i in 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9; do ${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -S $CTL -Ocheck otherhost \ >/dev/null 2>&1 && return 0 sleep $i done fatal "mux master never becomes ready" } maybe_add_scp_path_to_sshd start_sshd start_mux_master() { trace "start master, fork to background" ${SSH} -Nn2 -MS$CTL -F $OBJ/ssh_config -oSendEnv="_XXX_TEST" somehost \ -E $TEST_REGRESS_LOGFILE 2>&1 & # NB. $SSH_PID will be killed by test-exec.sh:cleanup on fatal errors. SSH_PID=$! wait_for_mux_master_ready } start_mux_master verbose "test $tid: setenv" trace "setenv over multiplexed connection" _XXX_TEST=blah ${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -oSendEnv="_XXX_TEST" -S$CTL otherhost sh << 'EOF' test X"$_XXX_TEST" = X"blah" EOF if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then fail "environment not found" fi verbose "test $tid: envpass" trace "env passing over multiplexed connection" ${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -oSetEnv="_XXX_TEST=foo" -S$CTL otherhost sh << 'EOF' test X"$_XXX_TEST" = X"foo" EOF if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then fail "environment not found" fi verbose "test $tid: transfer" rm -f ${COPY} trace "ssh transfer over multiplexed connection and check result" ${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -S$CTL otherhost cat ${DATA} > ${COPY} test -f ${COPY} || fail "ssh -Sctl: failed copy ${DATA}" cmp ${DATA} ${COPY} || fail "ssh -Sctl: corrupted copy of ${DATA}" rm -f ${COPY} trace "ssh transfer over multiplexed connection and check result" ${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -S $CTL otherhost cat ${DATA} > ${COPY} test -f ${COPY} || fail "ssh -S ctl: failed copy ${DATA}" cmp ${DATA} ${COPY} || fail "ssh -S ctl: corrupted copy of ${DATA}" rm -f ${COPY} trace "sftp transfer over multiplexed connection and check result" echo "get ${DATA} ${COPY}" | \ ${SFTP} -S ${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -oControlPath=$CTL otherhost >>$TEST_REGRESS_LOGFILE 2>&1 test -f ${COPY} || fail "sftp: failed copy ${DATA}" cmp ${DATA} ${COPY} || fail "sftp: corrupted copy of ${DATA}" rm -f ${COPY} trace "scp transfer over multiplexed connection and check result" ${SCP} -S ${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -oControlPath=$CTL otherhost:${DATA} ${COPY} >>$TEST_REGRESS_LOGFILE 2>&1 test -f ${COPY} || fail "scp: failed copy ${DATA}" cmp ${DATA} ${COPY} || fail "scp: corrupted copy of ${DATA}" rm -f ${COPY} verbose "test $tid: forward" trace "forward over TCP/IP and check result" -$NC -N -l 127.0.0.1 $((${PORT} + 1)) < ${DATA} > /dev/null & +$NC -N -l 127.0.0.1 $((${PORT} + 1)) < ${DATA} >`ssh_logfile nc` & netcat_pid=$! ${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -S $CTL -Oforward -L127.0.0.1:$((${PORT} + 2)):127.0.0.1:$((${PORT} + 1)) otherhost >>$TEST_SSH_LOGFILE 2>&1 sleep 1 # XXX remove once race fixed $NC 127.0.0.1 $((${PORT} + 2)) < /dev/null > ${COPY} cmp ${DATA} ${COPY} || fail "ssh: corrupted copy of ${DATA}" kill $netcat_pid 2>/dev/null rm -f ${COPY} $OBJ/unix-[123].fwd trace "forward over UNIX and check result" $NC -N -Ul $OBJ/unix-1.fwd < ${DATA} > /dev/null & netcat_pid=$! ${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -S $CTL -Oforward -L$OBJ/unix-2.fwd:$OBJ/unix-1.fwd otherhost >>$TEST_SSH_LOGFILE 2>&1 ${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -S $CTL -Oforward -R$OBJ/unix-3.fwd:$OBJ/unix-2.fwd otherhost >>$TEST_SSH_LOGFILE 2>&1 sleep 1 # XXX remove once race fixed $NC -U $OBJ/unix-3.fwd < /dev/null > ${COPY} cmp ${DATA} ${COPY} || fail "ssh: corrupted copy of ${DATA}" kill $netcat_pid 2>/dev/null rm -f ${COPY} $OBJ/unix-[123].fwd for s in 0 1 4 5 44; do for mode in "" "-Oproxy"; do trace "exit status $s over multiplexed connection ($mode)" verbose "test $tid: status $s ($mode)" ${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -S $CTL $mode otherhost exit $s r=$? if [ $r -ne $s ]; then fail "exit code mismatch: $r != $s" fi # same with early close of stdout/err trace "exit status $s with early close over multiplexed connection ($mode)" ${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -S $CTL -n $mode otherhost \ exec sh -c \'"sleep 2; exec > /dev/null 2>&1; sleep 3; exit $s"\' r=$? if [ $r -ne $s ]; then fail "exit code (with sleep) mismatch: $r != $s" fi done done verbose "test $tid: cmd check" ${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -S $CTL -Ocheck otherhost >>$TEST_REGRESS_LOGFILE 2>&1 \ || fail "check command failed" verbose "test $tid: cmd forward local (TCP)" ${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -S $CTL -Oforward -L $P:localhost:$PORT otherhost \ || fail "request local forward failed" sleep 1 # XXX remove once race fixed ${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -p$P otherhost true \ || fail "connect to local forward port failed" ${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -S $CTL -Ocancel -L $P:localhost:$PORT otherhost \ || fail "cancel local forward failed" ${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -p$P otherhost true \ && fail "local forward port still listening" verbose "test $tid: cmd forward remote (TCP)" ${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -S $CTL -Oforward -R $P:localhost:$PORT otherhost \ || fail "request remote forward failed" sleep 1 # XXX remove once race fixed ${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -p$P otherhost true \ || fail "connect to remote forwarded port failed" ${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -S $CTL -Ocancel -R $P:localhost:$PORT otherhost \ || fail "cancel remote forward failed" ${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -p$P otherhost true \ && fail "remote forward port still listening" verbose "test $tid: cmd forward local (UNIX)" ${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -S $CTL -Oforward -L $OBJ/unix-1.fwd:localhost:$PORT otherhost \ || fail "request local forward failed" sleep 1 # XXX remove once race fixed echo "" | $NC -U $OBJ/unix-1.fwd | \ grep "Invalid SSH identification string" >/dev/null 2>&1 \ || fail "connect to local forward path failed" ${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -S $CTL -Ocancel -L $OBJ/unix-1.fwd:localhost:$PORT otherhost \ || fail "cancel local forward failed" N=$(echo "xyzzy" | $NC -U $OBJ/unix-1.fwd 2>&1 | grep "xyzzy" | wc -l) test ${N} -eq 0 || fail "local forward path still listening" rm -f $OBJ/unix-1.fwd verbose "test $tid: cmd forward remote (UNIX)" ${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -S $CTL -Oforward -R $OBJ/unix-1.fwd:localhost:$PORT otherhost \ || fail "request remote forward failed" sleep 1 # XXX remove once race fixed echo "" | $NC -U $OBJ/unix-1.fwd | \ grep "Invalid SSH identification string" >/dev/null 2>&1 \ || fail "connect to remote forwarded path failed" ${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -S $CTL -Ocancel -R $OBJ/unix-1.fwd:localhost:$PORT otherhost \ || fail "cancel remote forward failed" N=$(echo "xyzzy" | $NC -U $OBJ/unix-1.fwd 2>&1 | grep "xyzzy" | wc -l) test ${N} -eq 0 || fail "remote forward path still listening" rm -f $OBJ/unix-1.fwd verbose "test $tid: cmd exit" ${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -S $CTL -Oexit otherhost >>$TEST_REGRESS_LOGFILE 2>&1 \ || fail "send exit command failed" # Wait for master to exit wait $SSH_PID kill -0 $SSH_PID >/dev/null 2>&1 && fail "exit command failed" # Restart master and test -O stop command with master using -N verbose "test $tid: cmd stop" trace "restart master, fork to background" start_mux_master # start a long-running command then immediately request a stop ${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -S $CTL otherhost "sleep 10; exit 0" \ >>$TEST_REGRESS_LOGFILE 2>&1 & SLEEP_PID=$! ${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -S $CTL -Ostop otherhost >>$TEST_REGRESS_LOGFILE 2>&1 \ || fail "send stop command failed" # wait until both long-running command and master have exited. wait $SLEEP_PID [ $! != 0 ] || fail "waiting for concurrent command" wait $SSH_PID [ $! != 0 ] || fail "waiting for master stop" kill -0 $SSH_PID >/dev/null 2>&1 && fatal "stop command failed" SSH_PID="" # Already gone, so don't kill in cleanup diff --git a/crypto/openssh/regress/sshd-log-wrapper.sh b/crypto/openssh/regress/sshd-log-wrapper.sh deleted file mode 100644 index 4b3c91137990..000000000000 --- a/crypto/openssh/regress/sshd-log-wrapper.sh +++ /dev/null @@ -1,12 +0,0 @@ -#!/bin/sh -# $OpenBSD: sshd-log-wrapper.sh,v 1.5 2022/01/04 08:38:53 dtucker Exp $ -# Placed in the Public Domain. -# -# simple wrapper for sshd proxy mode to catch stderr output -# sh sshd-log-wrapper.sh /path/to/logfile /path/to/sshd [args...] - -log=$1 -shift - -echo "Executing: $@" >>$log -exec "$@" -E$log diff --git a/crypto/openssh/regress/test-exec.sh b/crypto/openssh/regress/test-exec.sh index df43f021404f..eaa12992d18f 100644 --- a/crypto/openssh/regress/test-exec.sh +++ b/crypto/openssh/regress/test-exec.sh @@ -1,816 +1,872 @@ -# $OpenBSD: test-exec.sh,v 1.94 2023/01/13 04:47:34 dtucker Exp $ +# $OpenBSD: test-exec.sh,v 1.98 2023/03/02 11:10:27 dtucker Exp $ # Placed in the Public Domain. #SUDO=sudo if [ ! -z "$TEST_SSH_ELAPSED_TIMES" ]; then STARTTIME=`date '+%s'` fi if [ ! -z "$TEST_SSH_PORT" ]; then PORT="$TEST_SSH_PORT" else PORT=4242 fi OBJ=$1 if [ "x$OBJ" = "x" ]; then echo '$OBJ not defined' exit 2 fi if [ ! -d $OBJ ]; then echo "not a directory: $OBJ" exit 2 fi SCRIPT=$2 if [ "x$SCRIPT" = "x" ]; then echo '$SCRIPT not defined' exit 2 fi if [ ! -f $SCRIPT ]; then echo "not a file: $SCRIPT" exit 2 fi if $TEST_SHELL -n $SCRIPT; then true else echo "syntax error in $SCRIPT" exit 2 fi unset SSH_AUTH_SOCK # Portable-specific settings. if [ -x /usr/ucb/whoami ]; then USER=`/usr/ucb/whoami` elif whoami >/dev/null 2>&1; then USER=`whoami` elif logname >/dev/null 2>&1; then USER=`logname` else USER=`id -un` fi if test -z "$LOGNAME"; then LOGNAME="${USER}" export LOGNAME fi # Unbreak GNU head(1) _POSIX2_VERSION=199209 export _POSIX2_VERSION case `uname -s 2>/dev/null` in OSF1*) BIN_SH=xpg4 export BIN_SH ;; CYGWIN*) os=cygwin ;; esac # If configure tells us to use a different egrep, create a wrapper function # to call it. This means we don't need to change all the tests that depend # on a good implementation. if test "x${EGREP}" != "x"; then egrep () { ${EGREP} "$@" } fi SRC=`dirname ${SCRIPT}` # defaults SSH=ssh SSHD=sshd SSHAGENT=ssh-agent SSHADD=ssh-add SSHKEYGEN=ssh-keygen SSHKEYSCAN=ssh-keyscan SFTP=sftp SFTPSERVER=/usr/libexec/openssh/sftp-server SCP=scp # Set by make_tmpdir() on demand (below). SSH_REGRESS_TMP= # Interop testing PLINK=plink PUTTYGEN=puttygen CONCH=conch # Tools used by multiple tests NC=$OBJ/netcat -OPENSSL_BIN="${OPENSSL_BIN:-openssl}" +# Always use the one configure tells us to, even if that's empty. +#OPENSSL_BIN="${OPENSSL_BIN:-openssl}" if [ "x$TEST_SSH_SSH" != "x" ]; then SSH="${TEST_SSH_SSH}" fi if [ "x$TEST_SSH_SSHD" != "x" ]; then SSHD="${TEST_SSH_SSHD}" fi if [ "x$TEST_SSH_SSHAGENT" != "x" ]; then SSHAGENT="${TEST_SSH_SSHAGENT}" fi if [ "x$TEST_SSH_SSHADD" != "x" ]; then SSHADD="${TEST_SSH_SSHADD}" fi if [ "x$TEST_SSH_SSHKEYGEN" != "x" ]; then SSHKEYGEN="${TEST_SSH_SSHKEYGEN}" fi if [ "x$TEST_SSH_SSHKEYSCAN" != "x" ]; then SSHKEYSCAN="${TEST_SSH_SSHKEYSCAN}" fi if [ "x$TEST_SSH_SFTP" != "x" ]; then SFTP="${TEST_SSH_SFTP}" fi if [ "x$TEST_SSH_SFTPSERVER" != "x" ]; then SFTPSERVER="${TEST_SSH_SFTPSERVER}" fi if [ "x$TEST_SSH_SCP" != "x" ]; then SCP="${TEST_SSH_SCP}" fi if [ "x$TEST_SSH_PLINK" != "x" ]; then # Find real binary, if it exists case "${TEST_SSH_PLINK}" in /*) PLINK="${TEST_SSH_PLINK}" ;; *) PLINK=`which ${TEST_SSH_PLINK} 2>/dev/null` ;; esac fi if [ "x$TEST_SSH_PUTTYGEN" != "x" ]; then # Find real binary, if it exists case "${TEST_SSH_PUTTYGEN}" in /*) PUTTYGEN="${TEST_SSH_PUTTYGEN}" ;; *) PUTTYGEN=`which ${TEST_SSH_PUTTYGEN} 2>/dev/null` ;; esac fi if [ "x$TEST_SSH_CONCH" != "x" ]; then # Find real binary, if it exists case "${TEST_SSH_CONCH}" in /*) CONCH="${TEST_SSH_CONCH}" ;; *) CONCH=`which ${TEST_SSH_CONCH} 2>/dev/null` ;; esac fi if [ "x$TEST_SSH_PKCS11_HELPER" != "x" ]; then SSH_PKCS11_HELPER="${TEST_SSH_PKCS11_HELPER}" fi if [ "x$TEST_SSH_SK_HELPER" != "x" ]; then SSH_SK_HELPER="${TEST_SSH_SK_HELPER}" fi if [ "x$TEST_SSH_OPENSSL" != "x" ]; then OPENSSL_BIN="${TEST_SSH_OPENSSL}" fi # Path to sshd must be absolute for rexec case "$SSHD" in /*) ;; *) SSHD=`which $SSHD` ;; esac case "$SSHAGENT" in /*) ;; *) SSHAGENT=`which $SSHAGENT` ;; esac # Record the actual binaries used. SSH_BIN=${SSH} SSHD_BIN=${SSHD} SSHAGENT_BIN=${SSHAGENT} SSHADD_BIN=${SSHADD} SSHKEYGEN_BIN=${SSHKEYGEN} SSHKEYSCAN_BIN=${SSHKEYSCAN} SFTP_BIN=${SFTP} SFTPSERVER_BIN=${SFTPSERVER} SCP_BIN=${SCP} if [ "x$USE_VALGRIND" != "x" ]; then rm -rf $OBJ/valgrind-out $OBJ/valgrind-vgdb mkdir -p $OBJ/valgrind-out $OBJ/valgrind-vgdb # When using sudo ensure low-priv tests can write pipes and logs. if [ "x$SUDO" != "x" ]; then chmod 777 $OBJ/valgrind-out $OBJ/valgrind-vgdb fi VG_TEST=`basename $SCRIPT .sh` # Some tests are difficult to fix. case "$VG_TEST" in reexec) VG_SKIP=1 ;; sftp-chroot) if [ "x${SUDO}" != "x" ]; then VG_SKIP=1 fi ;; esac if [ x"$VG_SKIP" = "x" ]; then VG_LEAK="--leak-check=no" if [ x"$VALGRIND_CHECK_LEAKS" != "x" ]; then VG_LEAK="--leak-check=full" fi VG_IGNORE="/bin/*,/sbin/*,/usr/*,/var/*" VG_LOG="$OBJ/valgrind-out/${VG_TEST}." VG_OPTS="--track-origins=yes $VG_LEAK" VG_OPTS="$VG_OPTS --trace-children=yes" VG_OPTS="$VG_OPTS --trace-children-skip=${VG_IGNORE}" VG_OPTS="$VG_OPTS --vgdb-prefix=$OBJ/valgrind-vgdb/" VG_PATH="valgrind" if [ "x$VALGRIND_PATH" != "x" ]; then VG_PATH="$VALGRIND_PATH" fi VG="$VG_PATH $VG_OPTS" SSH="$VG --log-file=${VG_LOG}ssh.%p $SSH" SSHD="$VG --log-file=${VG_LOG}sshd.%p $SSHD" SSHAGENT="$VG --log-file=${VG_LOG}ssh-agent.%p $SSHAGENT" SSHADD="$VG --log-file=${VG_LOG}ssh-add.%p $SSHADD" SSHKEYGEN="$VG --log-file=${VG_LOG}ssh-keygen.%p $SSHKEYGEN" SSHKEYSCAN="$VG --log-file=${VG_LOG}ssh-keyscan.%p $SSHKEYSCAN" SFTP="$VG --log-file=${VG_LOG}sftp.%p ${SFTP}" SCP="$VG --log-file=${VG_LOG}scp.%p $SCP" cat > $OBJ/valgrind-sftp-server.sh << EOF #!/bin/sh exec $VG --log-file=${VG_LOG}sftp-server.%p $SFTPSERVER "\$@" EOF chmod a+rx $OBJ/valgrind-sftp-server.sh SFTPSERVER="$OBJ/valgrind-sftp-server.sh" fi fi # Logfiles. # SSH_LOGFILE should be the debug output of ssh(1) only # SSHD_LOGFILE should be the debug output of sshd(8) only -# REGRESS_LOGFILE is the output of the test itself stdout and stderr +# REGRESS_LOGFILE is the log of progress of the regress test itself. +# TEST_SSH_LOGDIR will contain datestamped logs of all binaries run in +# chronological order. +if [ "x$TEST_SSH_LOGDIR" = "x" ]; then + TEST_SSH_LOGDIR=$OBJ/log + mkdir -p $TEST_SSH_LOGDIR +fi if [ "x$TEST_SSH_LOGFILE" = "x" ]; then TEST_SSH_LOGFILE=$OBJ/ssh.log fi if [ "x$TEST_SSHD_LOGFILE" = "x" ]; then TEST_SSHD_LOGFILE=$OBJ/sshd.log fi if [ "x$TEST_REGRESS_LOGFILE" = "x" ]; then TEST_REGRESS_LOGFILE=$OBJ/regress.log fi # If set, keep track of successful tests and skip them them if we've # previously completed that test. if [ "x$TEST_REGRESS_CACHE_DIR" != "x" ]; then if [ ! -d "$TEST_REGRESS_CACHE_DIR" ]; then mkdir -p "$TEST_REGRESS_CACHE_DIR" fi TEST="`basename $SCRIPT .sh`" CACHE="${TEST_REGRESS_CACHE_DIR}/${TEST}.cache" for i in ${SSH} ${SSHD} ${SSHAGENT} ${SSHADD} ${SSHKEYGEN} ${SCP} \ ${SFTP} ${SFTPSERVER} ${SSHKEYSCAN}; do case $i in /*) bin="$i" ;; *) bin="`which $i`" ;; esac if [ "$bin" -nt "$CACHE" ]; then rm -f "$CACHE" fi done if [ -f "$CACHE" ]; then echo ok cached $CACHE exit 0 fi fi # truncate logfiles ->$TEST_SSH_LOGFILE ->$TEST_SSHD_LOGFILE >$TEST_REGRESS_LOGFILE -# Create wrapper ssh with logging. We can't just specify "SSH=ssh -E..." -# because sftp and scp don't handle spaces in arguments. scp and sftp like -# to use -q so we remove those to preserve our debug logging. In the rare -# instance where -q is desirable -qq is equivalent and is not removed. +# Create ssh and sshd wrappers with logging. These create a datestamped +# unique file for every invocation so that we can retain all logs from a +# given test no matter how many times it's invoked. It also leaves a +# symlink with the original name for tests (and people) who look for that. + +# For ssh, e can't just specify "SSH=ssh -E..." because sftp and scp don't +# handle spaces in arguments. scp and sftp like to use -q so we remove those +# to preserve our debug logging. In the rare instance where -q is desirable +# -qq is equivalent and is not removed. SSHLOGWRAP=$OBJ/ssh-log-wrapper.sh cat >$SSHLOGWRAP <>${TEST_SSH_LOGFILE} +timestamp="\`$OBJ/timestamp\`" +logfile="${TEST_SSH_LOGDIR}/\${timestamp}.ssh.\$\$.log" +echo "Executing: ${SSH} \$@" log \${logfile} >>$TEST_REGRESS_LOGFILE +echo "Executing: ${SSH} \$@" >>\${logfile} for i in "\$@";do shift;case "\$i" in -q):;; *) set -- "\$@" "\$i";;esac;done -exec ${SSH} -E${TEST_SSH_LOGFILE} "\$@" +rm -f $TEST_SSH_LOGFILE +ln -f -s \${logfile} $TEST_SSH_LOGFILE +exec ${SSH} -E\${logfile} "\$@" EOD chmod a+rx $OBJ/ssh-log-wrapper.sh REAL_SSH="$SSH" REAL_SSHD="$SSHD" SSH="$SSHLOGWRAP" +SSHDLOGWRAP=$OBJ/sshd-log-wrapper.sh +cat >$SSHDLOGWRAP <>$TEST_REGRESS_LOGFILE +echo "Executing: ${SSHD} \$@" >>\${logfile} +exec ${SSHD} -E\${logfile} "\$@" +EOD +chmod a+rx $OBJ/sshd-log-wrapper.sh + +ssh_logfile () +{ + tool="$1" + timestamp="`$OBJ/timestamp`" + logfile="${TEST_SSH_LOGDIR}/${timestamp}.$tool.$$.log" + echo "Logging $tool to log \${logfile}" >>$TEST_REGRESS_LOGFILE + echo $logfile +} + # Some test data. We make a copy because some tests will overwrite it. # The tests may assume that $DATA exists and is writable and $COPY does # not exist. Tests requiring larger data files can call increase_datafile_size # [kbytes] to ensure the file is at least that large. DATANAME=data DATA=$OBJ/${DATANAME} cat ${SSHAGENT_BIN} >${DATA} chmod u+w ${DATA} COPY=$OBJ/copy rm -f ${COPY} increase_datafile_size() { while [ `du -k ${DATA} | cut -f1` -lt $1 ]; do cat ${SSHAGENT_BIN} >>${DATA} done } # these should be used in tests export SSH SSHD SSHAGENT SSHADD SSHKEYGEN SSHKEYSCAN SFTP SFTPSERVER SCP export SSH_PKCS11_HELPER SSH_SK_HELPER #echo $SSH $SSHD $SSHAGENT $SSHADD $SSHKEYGEN $SSHKEYSCAN $SFTP $SFTPSERVER $SCP # Portable specific functions which() { saved_IFS="$IFS" IFS=":" for i in $PATH do if [ -x $i/$1 ]; then IFS="$saved_IFS" echo "$i/$1" return 0 fi done IFS="$saved_IFS" echo "$i/$1" return 1 } have_prog() { which "$1" >/dev/null 2>&1 return $? } jot() { awk "BEGIN { for (i = $2; i < $2 + $1; i++) { printf \"%d\n\", i } exit }" } if [ ! -x "`which rev`" ]; then rev() { awk '{for (i=length; i>0; i--) printf "%s", substr($0, i, 1); print ""}' } fi # Check whether preprocessor symbols are defined in config.h. config_defined () { str=$1 while test "x$2" != "x" ; do str="$str|$2" shift done egrep "^#define.*($str)" ${BUILDDIR}/config.h >/dev/null 2>&1 } md5 () { if have_prog md5sum; then md5sum elif have_prog openssl; then openssl md5 elif have_prog cksum; then cksum elif have_prog sum; then sum elif [ -x ${OPENSSL_BIN} ]; then ${OPENSSL_BIN} md5 else wc -c fi } # Some platforms don't have hostname at all, but on others uname -n doesn't # provide the fully qualified name we need, so in the former case we create # our own hostname function. if ! have_prog hostname; then hostname() { uname -n } fi make_tmpdir () { SSH_REGRESS_TMP="$($OBJ/mkdtemp openssh-XXXXXXXX)" || \ fatal "failed to create temporary directory" } # End of portable specific functions stop_sshd () { if [ -f $PIDFILE ]; then pid=`$SUDO cat $PIDFILE` if [ "X$pid" = "X" ]; then echo no sshd running else if [ $pid -lt 2 ]; then echo bad pid for sshd: $pid else $SUDO kill $pid trace "wait for sshd to exit" i=0; while [ -f $PIDFILE -a $i -lt 5 ]; do i=`expr $i + 1` sleep $i done if test -f $PIDFILE; then if $SUDO kill -0 $pid; then echo "sshd didn't exit " \ "port $PORT pid $pid" else echo "sshd died without cleanup" fi exit 1 fi fi fi fi } # helper cleanup () { if [ "x$SSH_PID" != "x" ]; then if [ $SSH_PID -lt 2 ]; then echo bad pid for ssh: $SSH_PID else kill $SSH_PID fi fi if [ "x$SSH_REGRESS_TMP" != "x" ]; then rm -rf "$SSH_REGRESS_TMP" fi stop_sshd if [ ! -z "$TEST_SSH_ELAPSED_TIMES" ]; then now=`date '+%s'` elapsed=$(($now - $STARTTIME)) echo elapsed $elapsed `basename $SCRIPT .sh` fi } start_debug_log () { - echo "trace: $@" >$TEST_REGRESS_LOGFILE - echo "trace: $@" >$TEST_SSH_LOGFILE - echo "trace: $@" >$TEST_SSHD_LOGFILE + echo "trace: $@" >>$TEST_REGRESS_LOGFILE + if [ -d "$TEST_SSH_LOGDIR" ]; then + rm -f $TEST_SSH_LOGDIR/* + fi } save_debug_log () { + testname=`echo $tid | tr ' ' _` + tarname="$OBJ/failed-$testname-logs.tar" + echo $@ >>$TEST_REGRESS_LOGFILE echo $@ >>$TEST_SSH_LOGFILE echo $@ >>$TEST_SSHD_LOGFILE + echo "Saving debug logs to $tarname" >>$TEST_REGRESS_LOGFILE (cat $TEST_REGRESS_LOGFILE; echo) >>$OBJ/failed-regress.log (cat $TEST_SSH_LOGFILE; echo) >>$OBJ/failed-ssh.log (cat $TEST_SSHD_LOGFILE; echo) >>$OBJ/failed-sshd.log + + # Save all logfiles in a tarball. + (cd $OBJ && + logfiles="" + for i in $TEST_REGRESS_LOGFILE $TEST_SSH_LOGFILE $TEST_SSHD_LOGFILE \ + $TEST_SSH_LOGDIR; do + if [ -e "`basename $i`" ]; then + logfiles="$logfiles `basename $i`" + else + logfiles="$logfiles $i" + fi + done + tar cf "$tarname" $logfiles) } trace () { start_debug_log $@ if [ "X$TEST_SSH_TRACE" = "Xyes" ]; then echo "$@" fi } verbose () { start_debug_log $@ if [ "X$TEST_SSH_QUIET" != "Xyes" ]; then echo "$@" fi } fail () { save_debug_log "FAIL: $@" RESULT=1 echo "$@" if test "x$TEST_SSH_FAIL_FATAL" != "x" ; then cleanup exit $RESULT fi } fatal () { save_debug_log "FATAL: $@" printf "FATAL: " fail "$@" cleanup exit $RESULT } # Skip remaining tests in script. skip () { echo "SKIPPED: $@" cleanup exit $RESULT } maybe_add_scp_path_to_sshd () { # If we're testing a non-installed scp, add its directory to sshd's # PATH so we can test it. We don't do this for all tests as it # breaks the SetEnv tests. case "$SCP" in /*) PATH_WITH_SCP="`dirname $SCP`:$PATH" echo " SetEnv PATH='$PATH_WITH_SCP'" >>$OBJ/sshd_config echo " SetEnv PATH='$PATH_WITH_SCP'" >>$OBJ/sshd_proxy ;; esac } RESULT=0 PIDFILE=$OBJ/pidfile trap fatal 3 2 # create server config cat << EOF > $OBJ/sshd_config StrictModes no Port $PORT AddressFamily inet ListenAddress 127.0.0.1 #ListenAddress ::1 PidFile $PIDFILE AuthorizedKeysFile $OBJ/authorized_keys_%u LogLevel DEBUG3 AcceptEnv _XXX_TEST_* AcceptEnv _XXX_TEST Subsystem sftp $SFTPSERVER EOF # This may be necessary if /usr/src and/or /usr/obj are group-writable, # but if you aren't careful with permissions then the unit tests could # be abused to locally escalate privileges. if [ ! -z "$TEST_SSH_UNSAFE_PERMISSIONS" ]; then echo " StrictModes no" >> $OBJ/sshd_config else # check and warn if excessive permissions are likely to cause failures. unsafe="" dir="${OBJ}" while test ${dir} != "/"; do if test -d "${dir}" && ! test -h "${dir}"; then perms=`ls -ld ${dir}` case "${perms}" in ?????w????*|????????w?*) unsafe="${unsafe} ${dir}" ;; esac fi dir=`dirname ${dir}` done if ! test -z "${unsafe}"; then cat <> $OBJ/sshd_config fi if [ ! -z "$TEST_SSH_SSHD_CONFOPTS" ]; then trace "adding sshd_config option $TEST_SSH_SSHD_CONFOPTS" echo "$TEST_SSH_SSHD_CONFOPTS" >> $OBJ/sshd_config fi # server config for proxy connects cp $OBJ/sshd_config $OBJ/sshd_proxy # allow group-writable directories in proxy-mode echo 'StrictModes no' >> $OBJ/sshd_proxy # create client config cat << EOF > $OBJ/ssh_config Host * Hostname 127.0.0.1 HostKeyAlias localhost-with-alias Port $PORT User $USER GlobalKnownHostsFile $OBJ/known_hosts UserKnownHostsFile $OBJ/known_hosts PubkeyAuthentication yes ChallengeResponseAuthentication no PasswordAuthentication no BatchMode yes StrictHostKeyChecking yes LogLevel DEBUG3 EOF if [ ! -z "$TEST_SSH_SSH_CONFOPTS" ]; then trace "adding ssh_config option $TEST_SSH_SSH_CONFOPTS" echo "$TEST_SSH_SSH_CONFOPTS" >> $OBJ/ssh_config fi rm -f $OBJ/known_hosts $OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER SSH_SK_PROVIDER= if ! config_defined ENABLE_SK; then trace skipping sk-dummy elif [ -f "${SRC}/misc/sk-dummy/obj/sk-dummy.so" ] ; then SSH_SK_PROVIDER="${SRC}/misc/sk-dummy/obj/sk-dummy.so" elif [ -f "${OBJ}/misc/sk-dummy/sk-dummy.so" ] ; then SSH_SK_PROVIDER="${OBJ}/misc/sk-dummy/sk-dummy.so" elif [ -f "${SRC}/misc/sk-dummy/sk-dummy.so" ] ; then SSH_SK_PROVIDER="${SRC}/misc/sk-dummy/sk-dummy.so" fi export SSH_SK_PROVIDER if ! test -z "$SSH_SK_PROVIDER"; then EXTRA_AGENT_ARGS='-P/*' # XXX want realpath(1)... echo "SecurityKeyProvider $SSH_SK_PROVIDER" >> $OBJ/ssh_config echo "SecurityKeyProvider $SSH_SK_PROVIDER" >> $OBJ/sshd_config echo "SecurityKeyProvider $SSH_SK_PROVIDER" >> $OBJ/sshd_proxy fi export EXTRA_AGENT_ARGS maybe_filter_sk() { if test -z "$SSH_SK_PROVIDER" ; then grep -v ^sk else cat fi } SSH_KEYTYPES=`$SSH -Q key-plain | maybe_filter_sk` SSH_HOSTKEY_TYPES=`$SSH -Q key-plain | maybe_filter_sk` for t in ${SSH_KEYTYPES}; do # generate user key if [ ! -f $OBJ/$t ] || [ ${SSHKEYGEN_BIN} -nt $OBJ/$t ]; then trace "generating key type $t" rm -f $OBJ/$t ${SSHKEYGEN} -q -N '' -t $t -f $OBJ/$t ||\ fail "ssh-keygen for $t failed" else trace "using cached key type $t" fi # setup authorized keys cat $OBJ/$t.pub >> $OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER echo IdentityFile $OBJ/$t >> $OBJ/ssh_config done for t in ${SSH_HOSTKEY_TYPES}; do # known hosts file for client ( printf 'localhost-with-alias,127.0.0.1,::1 ' cat $OBJ/$t.pub ) >> $OBJ/known_hosts # use key as host key, too (umask 077; $SUDO cp $OBJ/$t $OBJ/host.$t) echo HostKey $OBJ/host.$t >> $OBJ/sshd_config # don't use SUDO for proxy connect echo HostKey $OBJ/$t >> $OBJ/sshd_proxy done chmod 644 $OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER # Activate Twisted Conch tests if the binary is present REGRESS_INTEROP_CONCH=no if test -x "$CONCH" ; then REGRESS_INTEROP_CONCH=yes fi # If PuTTY is present, new enough and we are running a PuTTY test, prepare # keys and configuration. REGRESS_INTEROP_PUTTY=no if test -x "$PUTTYGEN" -a -x "$PLINK" && "$PUTTYGEN" --help 2>&1 | grep -- --new-passphrase >/dev/null; then REGRESS_INTEROP_PUTTY=yes fi case "$SCRIPT" in *putty*) ;; *) REGRESS_INTEROP_PUTTY=no ;; esac if test "$REGRESS_INTEROP_PUTTY" = "yes" ; then mkdir -p ${OBJ}/.putty # Add a PuTTY key to authorized_keys rm -f ${OBJ}/putty.rsa2 if ! "$PUTTYGEN" -t rsa -o ${OBJ}/putty.rsa2 \ --random-device=/dev/urandom \ --new-passphrase /dev/null < /dev/null > /dev/null; then echo "Your installed version of PuTTY is too old to support --new-passphrase, skipping test" >&2 exit 1 fi "$PUTTYGEN" -O public-openssh ${OBJ}/putty.rsa2 \ >> $OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER # Convert rsa2 host key to PuTTY format cp $OBJ/ssh-rsa $OBJ/ssh-rsa_oldfmt ${SSHKEYGEN} -p -N '' -m PEM -f $OBJ/ssh-rsa_oldfmt >/dev/null ${SRC}/ssh2putty.sh 127.0.0.1 $PORT $OBJ/ssh-rsa_oldfmt > \ ${OBJ}/.putty/sshhostkeys ${SRC}/ssh2putty.sh 127.0.0.1 22 $OBJ/ssh-rsa_oldfmt >> \ ${OBJ}/.putty/sshhostkeys rm -f $OBJ/ssh-rsa_oldfmt # Setup proxied session mkdir -p ${OBJ}/.putty/sessions rm -f ${OBJ}/.putty/sessions/localhost_proxy echo "Protocol=ssh" >> ${OBJ}/.putty/sessions/localhost_proxy echo "HostName=127.0.0.1" >> ${OBJ}/.putty/sessions/localhost_proxy echo "PortNumber=$PORT" >> ${OBJ}/.putty/sessions/localhost_proxy echo "ProxyMethod=5" >> ${OBJ}/.putty/sessions/localhost_proxy - echo "ProxyTelnetCommand=sh ${SRC}/sshd-log-wrapper.sh ${TEST_SSHD_LOGFILE} ${SSHD} -i -f $OBJ/sshd_proxy" >> ${OBJ}/.putty/sessions/localhost_proxy + echo "ProxyTelnetCommand=${OBJ}/sshd-log-wrapper.sh -i -f $OBJ/sshd_proxy" >> ${OBJ}/.putty/sessions/localhost_proxy echo "ProxyLocalhost=1" >> ${OBJ}/.putty/sessions/localhost_proxy PUTTYDIR=${OBJ}/.putty export PUTTYDIR fi # create a proxy version of the client config ( cat $OBJ/ssh_config - echo proxycommand ${SUDO} env SSH_SK_HELPER=\"$SSH_SK_HELPER\" sh ${SRC}/sshd-log-wrapper.sh ${TEST_SSHD_LOGFILE} ${SSHD} -i -f $OBJ/sshd_proxy + echo proxycommand ${SUDO} env SSH_SK_HELPER=\"$SSH_SK_HELPER\" ${OBJ}/sshd-log-wrapper.sh -i -f $OBJ/sshd_proxy ) > $OBJ/ssh_proxy # check proxy config ${SSHD} -t -f $OBJ/sshd_proxy || fatal "sshd_proxy broken" start_sshd () { # start sshd + logfile="${TEST_SSH_LOGDIR}/sshd.`$OBJ/timestamp`.$$.log" $SUDO ${SSHD} -f $OBJ/sshd_config "$@" -t || fatal "sshd_config broken" $SUDO env SSH_SK_HELPER="$SSH_SK_HELPER" \ ${SSHD} -f $OBJ/sshd_config "$@" -E$TEST_SSHD_LOGFILE trace "wait for sshd" i=0; while [ ! -f $PIDFILE -a $i -lt 10 ]; do i=`expr $i + 1` sleep $i done test -f $PIDFILE || fatal "no sshd running on port $PORT" } # source test body . $SCRIPT # kill sshd cleanup if [ "x$USE_VALGRIND" != "x" ]; then # If there is an EXIT trap handler, invoke it now. # Some tests set these to clean up processes such as ssh-agent. We # need to wait for all valgrind processes to complete so we can check # their logs, but since the EXIT traps are not invoked until # test-exec.sh exits, waiting here will deadlock. # This is not very portable but then neither is valgrind itself. # As a bonus, dash (as used on the runners) has a "trap" that doesn't # work in a pipeline (hence the temp file) or a subshell. exithandler="" trap >/tmp/trap.$$ && exithandler=$(cat /tmp/trap.$$ | \ awk -F "'" '/EXIT$/{print $2}') rm -f /tmp/trap.$$ if [ "x${exithandler}" != "x" ]; then verbose invoking EXIT trap handler early: ${exithandler} eval "${exithandler}" trap '' EXIT fi # wait for any running process to complete wait; sleep 1 VG_RESULTS=$(find $OBJ/valgrind-out -type f -print) VG_RESULT_COUNT=0 VG_FAIL_COUNT=0 for i in $VG_RESULTS; do if grep "ERROR SUMMARY" $i >/dev/null; then VG_RESULT_COUNT=$(($VG_RESULT_COUNT + 1)) if ! grep "ERROR SUMMARY: 0 errors" $i >/dev/null; then VG_FAIL_COUNT=$(($VG_FAIL_COUNT + 1)) RESULT=1 verbose valgrind failure $i cat $i fi fi done if [ x"$VG_SKIP" != "x" ]; then verbose valgrind skipped else verbose valgrind results $VG_RESULT_COUNT failures $VG_FAIL_COUNT fi fi if [ $RESULT -eq 0 ]; then verbose ok $tid if [ "x$CACHE" != "x" ]; then touch "$CACHE" fi else echo failed $tid fi exit $RESULT diff --git a/crypto/openssh/regress/timestamp.c b/crypto/openssh/regress/timestamp.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..77dae457b6ad --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/openssh/regress/timestamp.c @@ -0,0 +1,46 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2023 Darren Tucker + * + * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any + * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above + * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. + * + * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES + * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF + * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR + * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES + * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN + * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF + * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. + */ + +/* $OpenBSD: timestamp.c,v 1.1 2023/03/01 09:29:32 dtucker Exp $ */ + +/* + * Print a microsecond-granularity timestamp to stdout in an ISO8601-ish + * format, which we can then use as the first component of the log file + * so that they'll sort into chronological order. + */ + +#include + +#include +#include +#include + +int +main(void) +{ + struct timeval tv; + struct tm *tm; + char buf[1024]; + + if (gettimeofday(&tv, NULL) != 0) + exit(1); + if ((tm = localtime(&tv.tv_sec)) == NULL) + exit(2); + if (strftime(buf, sizeof buf, "%Y%m%dT%H%M%S", tm) <= 0) + exit(3); + printf("%s.%06d\n", buf, (int)tv.tv_usec); + exit(0); +} diff --git a/crypto/openssh/regress/unittests/kex/test_proposal.c b/crypto/openssh/regress/unittests/kex/test_proposal.c index d6cf0f5da7d7..fa4192bb661c 100644 --- a/crypto/openssh/regress/unittests/kex/test_proposal.c +++ b/crypto/openssh/regress/unittests/kex/test_proposal.c @@ -1,83 +1,124 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: test_proposal.c,v 1.1 2023/02/02 12:12:52 djm Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: test_proposal.c,v 1.2 2023/03/06 12:15:47 dtucker Exp $ */ /* * Regress test KEX * * Placed in the public domain */ #include "includes.h" #include #include #include #ifdef HAVE_STDINT_H #include #endif #include #include #include "../test_helper/test_helper.h" +#include "cipher.h" #include "compat.h" #include "ssherr.h" #include "sshbuf.h" #include "kex.h" +#include "myproposal.h" #include "packet.h" #include "xmalloc.h" -void kex_proposal(void); +void kex_proposal_tests(void); +void kex_proposal_populate_tests(void); #define CURVE25519 "curve25519-sha256@libssh.org" #define DHGEX1 "diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha1" #define DHGEX256 "diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha256" #define KEXALGOS CURVE25519","DHGEX256","DHGEX1 void -kex_proposal(void) +kex_proposal_tests(void) { size_t i; struct ssh ssh; char *result, *out, *in; struct { char *in; /* TODO: make this const */ char *out; int compat; } tests[] = { { KEXALGOS, KEXALGOS, 0}, { KEXALGOS, DHGEX256","DHGEX1, SSH_BUG_CURVE25519PAD }, { KEXALGOS, CURVE25519, SSH_OLD_DHGEX }, { "a,"KEXALGOS, "a", SSH_BUG_CURVE25519PAD|SSH_OLD_DHGEX }, /* TODO: enable once compat_kex_proposal doesn't fatal() */ /* { KEXALGOS, "", SSH_BUG_CURVE25519PAD|SSH_OLD_DHGEX }, */ }; TEST_START("compat_kex_proposal"); for (i = 0; i < sizeof(tests) / sizeof(*tests); i++) { ssh.compat = tests[i].compat; /* match entire string */ result = compat_kex_proposal(&ssh, tests[i].in); ASSERT_STRING_EQ(result, tests[i].out); free(result); /* match at end */ in = kex_names_cat("a", tests[i].in); out = kex_names_cat("a", tests[i].out); result = compat_kex_proposal(&ssh, in); ASSERT_STRING_EQ(result, out); free(result); free(in); free(out); /* match at start */ in = kex_names_cat(tests[i].in, "a"); out = kex_names_cat(tests[i].out, "a"); result = compat_kex_proposal(&ssh, in); ASSERT_STRING_EQ(result, out); free(result); free(in); free(out); /* match in middle */ xasprintf(&in, "a,%s,b", tests[i].in); if (*(tests[i].out) == '\0') out = xstrdup("a,b"); else xasprintf(&out, "a,%s,b", tests[i].out); result = compat_kex_proposal(&ssh, in); ASSERT_STRING_EQ(result, out); free(result); free(in); free(out); } TEST_DONE(); } + +void +kex_proposal_populate_tests(void) +{ + char *prop[PROPOSAL_MAX], *kexalgs, *ciphers, *macs, *hkalgs; + const char *comp = compression_alg_list(0); + int i; + struct ssh ssh; + struct kex kex; + + kexalgs = kex_alg_list(','); + ciphers = cipher_alg_list(',', 0); + macs = mac_alg_list(','); + hkalgs = kex_alg_list(','); + + ssh.kex = &kex; + TEST_START("compat_kex_proposal_populate"); + for (i = 0; i <= 1; i++) { + kex.server = i; + for (ssh.compat = 0; ssh.compat < 0x40000000; ) { + kex_proposal_populate_entries(&ssh, prop, NULL, NULL, + NULL, NULL, NULL); + kex_proposal_free_entries(prop); + kex_proposal_populate_entries(&ssh, prop, kexalgs, + ciphers, macs, hkalgs, comp); + kex_proposal_free_entries(prop); + if (ssh.compat == 0) + ssh.compat = 1; + else + ssh.compat <<= 1; + } + } + + free(kexalgs); + free(ciphers); + free(macs); + free(hkalgs); +} diff --git a/crypto/openssh/regress/unittests/kex/tests.c b/crypto/openssh/regress/unittests/kex/tests.c index 2a83dafbc3ae..d3044f033767 100644 --- a/crypto/openssh/regress/unittests/kex/tests.c +++ b/crypto/openssh/regress/unittests/kex/tests.c @@ -1,16 +1,18 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: tests.c,v 1.2 2023/02/02 12:12:52 djm Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: tests.c,v 1.3 2023/03/06 12:15:47 dtucker Exp $ */ /* * Placed in the public domain */ #include "../test_helper/test_helper.h" void kex_tests(void); -void kex_proposal(void); +void kex_proposal_tests(void); +void kex_proposal_populate_tests(void); void tests(void) { kex_tests(); - kex_proposal(); + kex_proposal_tests(); + kex_proposal_populate_tests(); } diff --git a/crypto/openssh/regress/unittests/misc/test_ptimeout.c b/crypto/openssh/regress/unittests/misc/test_ptimeout.c index 7adc590e98d6..284f0a1eed00 100644 --- a/crypto/openssh/regress/unittests/misc/test_ptimeout.c +++ b/crypto/openssh/regress/unittests/misc/test_ptimeout.c @@ -1,85 +1,89 @@ /* $OpenBSD: test_ptimeout.c,v 1.1 2023/01/06 02:59:50 djm Exp $ */ /* * Regress test for misc poll/ppoll timeout helpers. * * Placed in the public domain. */ +#include "includes.h" + #include #include -#include +#ifdef HAVE_STDINT_H +# include +#endif #include #include #include #include #include "../test_helper/test_helper.h" #include "log.h" #include "misc.h" void test_ptimeout(void); void test_ptimeout(void) { struct timespec pt, *ts; TEST_START("ptimeout_init"); ptimeout_init(&pt); ASSERT_PTR_EQ(ptimeout_get_tsp(&pt), NULL); ASSERT_INT_EQ(ptimeout_get_ms(&pt), -1); TEST_DONE(); TEST_START("ptimeout_deadline_sec"); ptimeout_deadline_sec(&pt, 100); ptimeout_deadline_sec(&pt, 200); ASSERT_INT_EQ(ptimeout_get_ms(&pt), 100 * 1000); ts = ptimeout_get_tsp(&pt); ASSERT_PTR_NE(ts, NULL); ASSERT_LONG_EQ(ts->tv_nsec, 0); ASSERT_LONG_EQ(ts->tv_sec, 100); TEST_DONE(); TEST_START("ptimeout_deadline_ms"); ptimeout_deadline_ms(&pt, 50123); ptimeout_deadline_ms(&pt, 50500); ASSERT_INT_EQ(ptimeout_get_ms(&pt), 50123); ts = ptimeout_get_tsp(&pt); ASSERT_PTR_NE(ts, NULL); ASSERT_LONG_EQ(ts->tv_nsec, 123 * 1000000); ASSERT_LONG_EQ(ts->tv_sec, 50); TEST_DONE(); TEST_START("ptimeout zero"); ptimeout_init(&pt); ptimeout_deadline_ms(&pt, 0); ASSERT_INT_EQ(ptimeout_get_ms(&pt), 0); ts = ptimeout_get_tsp(&pt); ASSERT_PTR_NE(ts, NULL); ASSERT_LONG_EQ(ts->tv_nsec, 0); ASSERT_LONG_EQ(ts->tv_sec, 0); TEST_DONE(); TEST_START("ptimeout_deadline_monotime"); ptimeout_init(&pt); ptimeout_deadline_monotime(&pt, monotime() + 100); ASSERT_INT_GT(ptimeout_get_ms(&pt), 50000); ASSERT_INT_LT(ptimeout_get_ms(&pt), 200000); ts = ptimeout_get_tsp(&pt); ASSERT_PTR_NE(ts, NULL); ASSERT_LONG_GT(ts->tv_sec, 50); ASSERT_LONG_LT(ts->tv_sec, 200); TEST_DONE(); TEST_START("ptimeout_deadline_monotime past"); ptimeout_init(&pt); ptimeout_deadline_monotime(&pt, monotime() + 100); ptimeout_deadline_monotime(&pt, monotime() - 100); ASSERT_INT_EQ(ptimeout_get_ms(&pt), 0); ts = ptimeout_get_tsp(&pt); ASSERT_PTR_NE(ts, NULL); ASSERT_LONG_EQ(ts->tv_nsec, 0); ASSERT_LONG_EQ(ts->tv_sec, 0); TEST_DONE(); } diff --git a/crypto/openssh/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c b/crypto/openssh/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c index 4ab49eb6e4c3..23b40b643567 100644 --- a/crypto/openssh/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c +++ b/crypto/openssh/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c @@ -1,460 +1,543 @@ /* * Copyright (c) 2012 Will Drewry + * Copyright (c) 2015,2017,2019,2020,2023 Damien Miller * * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. * * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. */ /* * Uncomment the SANDBOX_SECCOMP_FILTER_DEBUG macro below to help diagnose * filter breakage during development. *Do not* use this in production, * as it relies on making library calls that are unsafe in signal context. * * Instead, live systems the auditctl(8) may be used to monitor failures. * E.g. * auditctl -a task,always -F uid= */ /* #define SANDBOX_SECCOMP_FILTER_DEBUG 1 */ #if 0 /* * For older toolchains, it may be necessary to use the kernel * headers directly. */ #ifdef SANDBOX_SECCOMP_FILTER_DEBUG # include # define __have_siginfo_t 1 # define __have_sigval_t 1 # define __have_sigevent_t 1 #endif /* SANDBOX_SECCOMP_FILTER_DEBUG */ #endif #include "includes.h" #ifdef SANDBOX_SECCOMP_FILTER #include #include #include #include #include +#include #include #include #include #include #include #include #ifdef __s390__ #include #endif #include #include #include #include /* for offsetof */ #include #include #include #include #include "log.h" #include "ssh-sandbox.h" #include "xmalloc.h" /* Linux seccomp_filter sandbox */ #define SECCOMP_FILTER_FAIL SECCOMP_RET_KILL /* Use a signal handler to emit violations when debugging */ #ifdef SANDBOX_SECCOMP_FILTER_DEBUG # undef SECCOMP_FILTER_FAIL # define SECCOMP_FILTER_FAIL SECCOMP_RET_TRAP #endif /* SANDBOX_SECCOMP_FILTER_DEBUG */ #if __BYTE_ORDER == __LITTLE_ENDIAN # define ARG_LO_OFFSET 0 # define ARG_HI_OFFSET sizeof(uint32_t) #elif __BYTE_ORDER == __BIG_ENDIAN # define ARG_LO_OFFSET sizeof(uint32_t) # define ARG_HI_OFFSET 0 #else #error "Unknown endianness" #endif /* Simple helpers to avoid manual errors (but larger BPF programs). */ #define SC_DENY(_nr, _errno) \ BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP+BPF_JEQ+BPF_K, (_nr), 0, 1), \ BPF_STMT(BPF_RET+BPF_K, SECCOMP_RET_ERRNO|(_errno)) #define SC_ALLOW(_nr) \ BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP+BPF_JEQ+BPF_K, (_nr), 0, 1), \ BPF_STMT(BPF_RET+BPF_K, SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW) #define SC_ALLOW_ARG(_nr, _arg_nr, _arg_val) \ BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP+BPF_JEQ+BPF_K, (_nr), 0, 6), \ /* load and test syscall argument, low word */ \ BPF_STMT(BPF_LD+BPF_W+BPF_ABS, \ offsetof(struct seccomp_data, args[(_arg_nr)]) + ARG_LO_OFFSET), \ BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP+BPF_JEQ+BPF_K, \ ((_arg_val) & 0xFFFFFFFF), 0, 3), \ /* load and test syscall argument, high word */ \ BPF_STMT(BPF_LD+BPF_W+BPF_ABS, \ offsetof(struct seccomp_data, args[(_arg_nr)]) + ARG_HI_OFFSET), \ BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP+BPF_JEQ+BPF_K, \ (((uint32_t)((uint64_t)(_arg_val) >> 32)) & 0xFFFFFFFF), 0, 1), \ BPF_STMT(BPF_RET+BPF_K, SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW), \ /* reload syscall number; all rules expect it in accumulator */ \ BPF_STMT(BPF_LD+BPF_W+BPF_ABS, \ offsetof(struct seccomp_data, nr)) /* Allow if syscall argument contains only values in mask */ #define SC_ALLOW_ARG_MASK(_nr, _arg_nr, _arg_mask) \ BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP+BPF_JEQ+BPF_K, (_nr), 0, 8), \ /* load, mask and test syscall argument, low word */ \ BPF_STMT(BPF_LD+BPF_W+BPF_ABS, \ offsetof(struct seccomp_data, args[(_arg_nr)]) + ARG_LO_OFFSET), \ BPF_STMT(BPF_ALU+BPF_AND+BPF_K, ~((_arg_mask) & 0xFFFFFFFF)), \ BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP+BPF_JEQ+BPF_K, 0, 0, 4), \ /* load, mask and test syscall argument, high word */ \ BPF_STMT(BPF_LD+BPF_W+BPF_ABS, \ offsetof(struct seccomp_data, args[(_arg_nr)]) + ARG_HI_OFFSET), \ BPF_STMT(BPF_ALU+BPF_AND+BPF_K, \ ~(((uint32_t)((uint64_t)(_arg_mask) >> 32)) & 0xFFFFFFFF)), \ BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP+BPF_JEQ+BPF_K, 0, 0, 1), \ BPF_STMT(BPF_RET+BPF_K, SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW), \ /* reload syscall number; all rules expect it in accumulator */ \ BPF_STMT(BPF_LD+BPF_W+BPF_ABS, \ offsetof(struct seccomp_data, nr)) +/* Deny unless syscall argument contains only values in mask */ +#define SC_DENY_UNLESS_ARG_MASK(_nr, _arg_nr, _arg_mask, _errno) \ + BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP+BPF_JEQ+BPF_K, (_nr), 0, 8), \ + /* load, mask and test syscall argument, low word */ \ + BPF_STMT(BPF_LD+BPF_W+BPF_ABS, \ + offsetof(struct seccomp_data, args[(_arg_nr)]) + ARG_LO_OFFSET), \ + BPF_STMT(BPF_ALU+BPF_AND+BPF_K, ~((_arg_mask) & 0xFFFFFFFF)), \ + BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP+BPF_JEQ+BPF_K, 0, 0, 3), \ + /* load, mask and test syscall argument, high word */ \ + BPF_STMT(BPF_LD+BPF_W+BPF_ABS, \ + offsetof(struct seccomp_data, args[(_arg_nr)]) + ARG_HI_OFFSET), \ + BPF_STMT(BPF_ALU+BPF_AND+BPF_K, \ + ~(((uint32_t)((uint64_t)(_arg_mask) >> 32)) & 0xFFFFFFFF)), \ + BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP+BPF_JEQ+BPF_K, 0, 1, 0), \ + BPF_STMT(BPF_RET+BPF_K, SECCOMP_RET_ERRNO|(_errno)), \ + /* reload syscall number; all rules expect it in accumulator */ \ + BPF_STMT(BPF_LD+BPF_W+BPF_ABS, \ + offsetof(struct seccomp_data, nr)) +#define SC_DENY_UNLESS_MASK(_nr, _arg_nr, _arg_val, _errno) \ +/* Special handling for futex(2) that combines a bitmap and operation number */ +#if defined(__NR_futex) || defined(__NR_futex_time64) +#define SC_FUTEX_MASK (FUTEX_PRIVATE_FLAG|FUTEX_CLOCK_REALTIME) +#define SC_ALLOW_FUTEX_OP(_nr, _op) \ + BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP+BPF_JEQ+BPF_K, (_nr), 0, 8), \ + /* load syscall argument, low word */ \ + BPF_STMT(BPF_LD+BPF_W+BPF_ABS, \ + offsetof(struct seccomp_data, args[1]) + ARG_LO_OFFSET), \ + /* mask off allowed bitmap values, low word */ \ + BPF_STMT(BPF_ALU+BPF_AND+BPF_K, ~(SC_FUTEX_MASK & 0xFFFFFFFF)), \ + /* test operation number, low word */ \ + BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP+BPF_JEQ+BPF_K, ((_op) & 0xFFFFFFFF), 0, 4), \ + /* load syscall argument, high word */ \ + BPF_STMT(BPF_LD+BPF_W+BPF_ABS, \ + offsetof(struct seccomp_data, args[1]) + ARG_HI_OFFSET), \ + /* mask off allowed bitmap values, high word */ \ + BPF_STMT(BPF_ALU+BPF_AND+BPF_K, \ + ~(((uint32_t)((uint64_t)SC_FUTEX_MASK >> 32)) & 0xFFFFFFFF)), \ + /* test operation number, high word */ \ + BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP+BPF_JEQ+BPF_K, \ + (((uint32_t)((uint64_t)(_op) >> 32)) & 0xFFFFFFFF), 0, 1), \ + BPF_STMT(BPF_RET+BPF_K, SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW), \ + /* reload syscall number; all rules expect it in accumulator */ \ + BPF_STMT(BPF_LD+BPF_W+BPF_ABS, offsetof(struct seccomp_data, nr)) + +/* Use this for both __NR_futex and __NR_futex_time64 */ +# define SC_FUTEX(_nr) \ + SC_ALLOW_FUTEX_OP(__NR_futex, FUTEX_WAIT), \ + SC_ALLOW_FUTEX_OP(__NR_futex, FUTEX_WAIT_BITSET), \ + SC_ALLOW_FUTEX_OP(__NR_futex, FUTEX_WAKE), \ + SC_ALLOW_FUTEX_OP(__NR_futex, FUTEX_WAKE_BITSET), \ + SC_ALLOW_FUTEX_OP(__NR_futex, FUTEX_REQUEUE), \ + SC_ALLOW_FUTEX_OP(__NR_futex, FUTEX_CMP_REQUEUE) +#endif /* __NR_futex || __NR_futex_time64 */ + +#if defined(__NR_mmap) || defined(__NR_mmap2) +# ifdef MAP_FIXED_NOREPLACE +# define SC_MMAP_FLAGS MAP_PRIVATE|MAP_ANONYMOUS|MAP_FIXED|MAP_FIXED_NOREPLACE +# else +# define SC_MMAP_FLAGS MAP_PRIVATE|MAP_ANONYMOUS|MAP_FIXED +# endif /* MAP_FIXED_NOREPLACE */ +/* Use this for both __NR_mmap and __NR_mmap2 variants */ +# define SC_MMAP(_nr) \ + SC_DENY_UNLESS_ARG_MASK(_nr, 3, SC_MMAP_FLAGS, EINVAL), \ + SC_ALLOW_ARG_MASK(_nr, 2, PROT_READ|PROT_WRITE|PROT_NONE) +#endif /* __NR_mmap || __NR_mmap2 */ /* Syscall filtering set for preauth. */ static const struct sock_filter preauth_insns[] = { /* Ensure the syscall arch convention is as expected. */ BPF_STMT(BPF_LD+BPF_W+BPF_ABS, offsetof(struct seccomp_data, arch)), BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP+BPF_JEQ+BPF_K, SECCOMP_AUDIT_ARCH, 1, 0), BPF_STMT(BPF_RET+BPF_K, SECCOMP_FILTER_FAIL), /* Load the syscall number for checking. */ BPF_STMT(BPF_LD+BPF_W+BPF_ABS, offsetof(struct seccomp_data, nr)), /* Syscalls to non-fatally deny */ #ifdef __NR_lstat SC_DENY(__NR_lstat, EACCES), #endif #ifdef __NR_lstat64 SC_DENY(__NR_lstat64, EACCES), #endif #ifdef __NR_fstat SC_DENY(__NR_fstat, EACCES), #endif #ifdef __NR_fstat64 SC_DENY(__NR_fstat64, EACCES), #endif #ifdef __NR_fstatat64 SC_DENY(__NR_fstatat64, EACCES), #endif #ifdef __NR_open SC_DENY(__NR_open, EACCES), #endif #ifdef __NR_openat SC_DENY(__NR_openat, EACCES), #endif #ifdef __NR_newfstatat SC_DENY(__NR_newfstatat, EACCES), #endif #ifdef __NR_stat SC_DENY(__NR_stat, EACCES), #endif #ifdef __NR_stat64 SC_DENY(__NR_stat64, EACCES), #endif #ifdef __NR_shmget SC_DENY(__NR_shmget, EACCES), #endif #ifdef __NR_shmat SC_DENY(__NR_shmat, EACCES), #endif #ifdef __NR_shmdt SC_DENY(__NR_shmdt, EACCES), #endif #ifdef __NR_ipc SC_DENY(__NR_ipc, EACCES), #endif #ifdef __NR_statx SC_DENY(__NR_statx, EACCES), #endif /* Syscalls to permit */ #ifdef __NR_brk SC_ALLOW(__NR_brk), #endif #ifdef __NR_clock_gettime SC_ALLOW(__NR_clock_gettime), #endif #ifdef __NR_clock_gettime64 SC_ALLOW(__NR_clock_gettime64), #endif #ifdef __NR_close SC_ALLOW(__NR_close), #endif #ifdef __NR_exit SC_ALLOW(__NR_exit), #endif #ifdef __NR_exit_group SC_ALLOW(__NR_exit_group), #endif #ifdef __NR_futex - SC_ALLOW(__NR_futex), + SC_FUTEX(__NR_futex), #endif #ifdef __NR_futex_time64 - SC_ALLOW(__NR_futex_time64), + SC_FUTEX(__NR_futex_time64), #endif #ifdef __NR_geteuid SC_ALLOW(__NR_geteuid), #endif #ifdef __NR_geteuid32 SC_ALLOW(__NR_geteuid32), #endif #ifdef __NR_getpgid SC_ALLOW(__NR_getpgid), #endif #ifdef __NR_getpid SC_ALLOW(__NR_getpid), #endif #ifdef __NR_getrandom SC_ALLOW(__NR_getrandom), #endif #ifdef __NR_gettid SC_ALLOW(__NR_gettid), #endif #ifdef __NR_gettimeofday SC_ALLOW(__NR_gettimeofday), #endif #ifdef __NR_getuid SC_ALLOW(__NR_getuid), #endif #ifdef __NR_getuid32 SC_ALLOW(__NR_getuid32), #endif #ifdef __NR_madvise - SC_ALLOW(__NR_madvise), + SC_ALLOW_ARG(__NR_madvise, 2, MADV_NORMAL), +# ifdef MADV_FREE + SC_ALLOW_ARG(__NR_madvise, 2, MADV_FREE), +# endif +# ifdef MADV_DONTNEED + SC_ALLOW_ARG(__NR_madvise, 2, MADV_DONTNEED), +# endif +# ifdef MADV_DONTFORK + SC_ALLOW_ARG(__NR_madvise, 2, MADV_DONTFORK), +# endif +# ifdef MADV_DONTDUMP + SC_ALLOW_ARG(__NR_madvise, 2, MADV_DONTDUMP), +# endif +# ifdef MADV_WIPEONFORK + SC_ALLOW_ARG(__NR_madvise, 2, MADV_WIPEONFORK), +# endif + SC_DENY(__NR_madvise, EINVAL), #endif #ifdef __NR_mmap - SC_ALLOW_ARG_MASK(__NR_mmap, 2, PROT_READ|PROT_WRITE|PROT_NONE), + SC_MMAP(__NR_mmap), #endif #ifdef __NR_mmap2 - SC_ALLOW_ARG_MASK(__NR_mmap2, 2, PROT_READ|PROT_WRITE|PROT_NONE), + SC_MMAP(__NR_mmap2), #endif #ifdef __NR_mprotect SC_ALLOW_ARG_MASK(__NR_mprotect, 2, PROT_READ|PROT_WRITE|PROT_NONE), #endif #ifdef __NR_mremap SC_ALLOW(__NR_mremap), #endif #ifdef __NR_munmap SC_ALLOW(__NR_munmap), #endif #ifdef __NR_nanosleep SC_ALLOW(__NR_nanosleep), #endif #ifdef __NR_clock_nanosleep SC_ALLOW(__NR_clock_nanosleep), #endif #ifdef __NR_clock_nanosleep_time64 SC_ALLOW(__NR_clock_nanosleep_time64), #endif #ifdef __NR_clock_gettime64 SC_ALLOW(__NR_clock_gettime64), #endif #ifdef __NR__newselect SC_ALLOW(__NR__newselect), #endif #ifdef __NR_ppoll SC_ALLOW(__NR_ppoll), #endif #ifdef __NR_ppoll_time64 SC_ALLOW(__NR_ppoll_time64), #endif #ifdef __NR_poll SC_ALLOW(__NR_poll), #endif #ifdef __NR_pselect6 SC_ALLOW(__NR_pselect6), #endif #ifdef __NR_pselect6_time64 SC_ALLOW(__NR_pselect6_time64), #endif #ifdef __NR_read SC_ALLOW(__NR_read), #endif #ifdef __NR_rt_sigprocmask SC_ALLOW(__NR_rt_sigprocmask), #endif #ifdef __NR_select SC_ALLOW(__NR_select), #endif #ifdef __NR_shutdown SC_ALLOW(__NR_shutdown), #endif #ifdef __NR_sigprocmask SC_ALLOW(__NR_sigprocmask), #endif #ifdef __NR_time SC_ALLOW(__NR_time), #endif #ifdef __NR_write SC_ALLOW(__NR_write), #endif #ifdef __NR_writev SC_ALLOW(__NR_writev), #endif #ifdef __NR_socketcall SC_ALLOW_ARG(__NR_socketcall, 0, SYS_SHUTDOWN), SC_DENY(__NR_socketcall, EACCES), #endif #if defined(__NR_ioctl) && defined(__s390__) /* Allow ioctls for ICA crypto card on s390 */ SC_ALLOW_ARG(__NR_ioctl, 1, Z90STAT_STATUS_MASK), SC_ALLOW_ARG(__NR_ioctl, 1, ICARSAMODEXPO), SC_ALLOW_ARG(__NR_ioctl, 1, ICARSACRT), SC_ALLOW_ARG(__NR_ioctl, 1, ZSECSENDCPRB), /* Allow ioctls for EP11 crypto card on s390 */ SC_ALLOW_ARG(__NR_ioctl, 1, ZSENDEP11CPRB), #endif #if defined(__x86_64__) && defined(__ILP32__) && defined(__X32_SYSCALL_BIT) /* * On Linux x32, the clock_gettime VDSO falls back to the * x86-64 syscall under some circumstances, e.g. * https://bugs.debian.org/849923 */ SC_ALLOW(__NR_clock_gettime & ~__X32_SYSCALL_BIT), #endif /* Default deny */ BPF_STMT(BPF_RET+BPF_K, SECCOMP_FILTER_FAIL), }; static const struct sock_fprog preauth_program = { .len = (unsigned short)(sizeof(preauth_insns)/sizeof(preauth_insns[0])), .filter = (struct sock_filter *)preauth_insns, }; struct ssh_sandbox { pid_t child_pid; }; struct ssh_sandbox * ssh_sandbox_init(struct monitor *monitor) { struct ssh_sandbox *box; /* * Strictly, we don't need to maintain any state here but we need * to return non-NULL to satisfy the API. */ debug3("%s: preparing seccomp filter sandbox", __func__); box = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*box)); box->child_pid = 0; return box; } #ifdef SANDBOX_SECCOMP_FILTER_DEBUG extern struct monitor *pmonitor; void mm_log_handler(LogLevel level, int forced, const char *msg, void *ctx); static void ssh_sandbox_violation(int signum, siginfo_t *info, void *void_context) { char msg[256]; snprintf(msg, sizeof(msg), "%s: unexpected system call (arch:0x%x,syscall:%d @ %p)", __func__, info->si_arch, info->si_syscall, info->si_call_addr); mm_log_handler(SYSLOG_LEVEL_FATAL, 0, msg, pmonitor); _exit(1); } static void ssh_sandbox_child_debugging(void) { struct sigaction act; sigset_t mask; debug3("%s: installing SIGSYS handler", __func__); memset(&act, 0, sizeof(act)); sigemptyset(&mask); sigaddset(&mask, SIGSYS); act.sa_sigaction = &ssh_sandbox_violation; act.sa_flags = SA_SIGINFO; if (sigaction(SIGSYS, &act, NULL) == -1) fatal("%s: sigaction(SIGSYS): %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); if (sigprocmask(SIG_UNBLOCK, &mask, NULL) == -1) fatal("%s: sigprocmask(SIGSYS): %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); } #endif /* SANDBOX_SECCOMP_FILTER_DEBUG */ void ssh_sandbox_child(struct ssh_sandbox *box) { struct rlimit rl_zero, rl_one = {.rlim_cur = 1, .rlim_max = 1}; int nnp_failed = 0; /* Set rlimits for completeness if possible. */ rl_zero.rlim_cur = rl_zero.rlim_max = 0; if (setrlimit(RLIMIT_FSIZE, &rl_zero) == -1) fatal("%s: setrlimit(RLIMIT_FSIZE, { 0, 0 }): %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); /* * Cannot use zero for nfds, because poll(2) will fail with * errno=EINVAL if npfds>RLIMIT_NOFILE. */ if (setrlimit(RLIMIT_NOFILE, &rl_one) == -1) fatal("%s: setrlimit(RLIMIT_NOFILE, { 0, 0 }): %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); if (setrlimit(RLIMIT_NPROC, &rl_zero) == -1) fatal("%s: setrlimit(RLIMIT_NPROC, { 0, 0 }): %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); #ifdef SANDBOX_SECCOMP_FILTER_DEBUG ssh_sandbox_child_debugging(); #endif /* SANDBOX_SECCOMP_FILTER_DEBUG */ debug3("%s: setting PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS", __func__); if (prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, 1, 0, 0, 0) == -1) { debug("%s: prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS): %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); nnp_failed = 1; } debug3("%s: attaching seccomp filter program", __func__); if (prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER, &preauth_program) == -1) debug("%s: prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP): %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); else if (nnp_failed) fatal("%s: SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER activated but " "PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS failed", __func__); } void ssh_sandbox_parent_finish(struct ssh_sandbox *box) { free(box); debug3("%s: finished", __func__); } void ssh_sandbox_parent_preauth(struct ssh_sandbox *box, pid_t child_pid) { box->child_pid = child_pid; } #endif /* SANDBOX_SECCOMP_FILTER */ diff --git a/crypto/openssh/scp.c b/crypto/openssh/scp.c index 1adff5cec222..a893d4a285e9 100644 --- a/crypto/openssh/scp.c +++ b/crypto/openssh/scp.c @@ -1,2254 +1,2256 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: scp.c,v 1.252 2023/01/10 23:22:15 millert Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: scp.c,v 1.253 2023/03/03 03:12:24 dtucker Exp $ */ /* * scp - secure remote copy. This is basically patched BSD rcp which * uses ssh to do the data transfer (instead of using rcmd). * * NOTE: This version should NOT be suid root. (This uses ssh to * do the transfer and ssh has the necessary privileges.) * * 1995 Timo Rinne , Tatu Ylonen * * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell". */ /* * Copyright (c) 1999 Theo de Raadt. All rights reserved. * Copyright (c) 1999 Aaron Campbell. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. */ /* * Parts from: * * Copyright (c) 1983, 1990, 1992, 1993, 1995 * The Regents of the University of California. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * 3. Neither the name of the University nor the names of its contributors * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software * without specific prior written permission. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE REGENTS AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE REGENTS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF * SUCH DAMAGE. * */ #include "includes.h" #include #ifdef HAVE_SYS_STAT_H # include #endif #ifdef HAVE_POLL_H #include #else # ifdef HAVE_SYS_POLL_H # include # endif #endif #ifdef HAVE_SYS_TIME_H # include #endif #include #include #include #include #include #include #ifdef HAVE_FNMATCH_H #include #endif #ifdef USE_SYSTEM_GLOB # include #else # include "openbsd-compat/glob.h" #endif #ifdef HAVE_LIBGEN_H #include #endif #include #ifdef HAVE_UTIL_H # include #endif #include #include #include #include #ifdef HAVE_STDINT_H # include #endif #include #include #include #include #include #if defined(HAVE_STRNVIS) && defined(HAVE_VIS_H) && !defined(BROKEN_STRNVIS) #include #endif #include "xmalloc.h" #include "ssh.h" #include "atomicio.h" #include "pathnames.h" #include "log.h" #include "misc.h" #include "progressmeter.h" #include "utf8.h" #include "sftp.h" #include "sftp-common.h" #include "sftp-client.h" extern char *__progname; #define COPY_BUFLEN 16384 int do_cmd(char *, char *, char *, int, int, char *, int *, int *, pid_t *); int do_cmd2(char *, char *, int, char *, int, int); /* Struct for addargs */ arglist args; arglist remote_remote_args; /* Bandwidth limit */ long long limit_kbps = 0; struct bwlimit bwlimit; /* Name of current file being transferred. */ char *curfile; /* This is set to non-zero to enable verbose mode. */ int verbose_mode = 0; LogLevel log_level = SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO; /* This is set to zero if the progressmeter is not desired. */ int showprogress = 1; /* * This is set to non-zero if remote-remote copy should be piped * through this process. */ int throughlocal = 1; /* Non-standard port to use for the ssh connection or -1. */ int sshport = -1; /* This is the program to execute for the secured connection. ("ssh" or -S) */ char *ssh_program = _PATH_SSH_PROGRAM; /* This is used to store the pid of ssh_program */ pid_t do_cmd_pid = -1; pid_t do_cmd_pid2 = -1; /* SFTP copy parameters */ size_t sftp_copy_buflen; size_t sftp_nrequests; /* Needed for sftp */ volatile sig_atomic_t interrupted = 0; int remote_glob(struct sftp_conn *, const char *, int, int (*)(const char *, int), glob_t *); /* proto for sftp-glob.c */ static void killchild(int signo) { if (do_cmd_pid > 1) { kill(do_cmd_pid, signo ? signo : SIGTERM); waitpid(do_cmd_pid, NULL, 0); } if (do_cmd_pid2 > 1) { kill(do_cmd_pid2, signo ? signo : SIGTERM); waitpid(do_cmd_pid2, NULL, 0); } if (signo) _exit(1); exit(1); } static void suspone(int pid, int signo) { int status; if (pid > 1) { kill(pid, signo); while (waitpid(pid, &status, WUNTRACED) == -1 && errno == EINTR) ; } } static void suspchild(int signo) { suspone(do_cmd_pid, signo); suspone(do_cmd_pid2, signo); kill(getpid(), SIGSTOP); } static int do_local_cmd(arglist *a) { u_int i; int status; pid_t pid; if (a->num == 0) fatal("do_local_cmd: no arguments"); if (verbose_mode) { fprintf(stderr, "Executing:"); for (i = 0; i < a->num; i++) fmprintf(stderr, " %s", a->list[i]); fprintf(stderr, "\n"); } if ((pid = fork()) == -1) fatal("do_local_cmd: fork: %s", strerror(errno)); if (pid == 0) { execvp(a->list[0], a->list); perror(a->list[0]); exit(1); } do_cmd_pid = pid; ssh_signal(SIGTERM, killchild); ssh_signal(SIGINT, killchild); ssh_signal(SIGHUP, killchild); while (waitpid(pid, &status, 0) == -1) if (errno != EINTR) fatal("do_local_cmd: waitpid: %s", strerror(errno)); do_cmd_pid = -1; if (!WIFEXITED(status) || WEXITSTATUS(status) != 0) return (-1); return (0); } /* * This function executes the given command as the specified user on the * given host. This returns < 0 if execution fails, and >= 0 otherwise. This * assigns the input and output file descriptors on success. */ int do_cmd(char *program, char *host, char *remuser, int port, int subsystem, char *cmd, int *fdin, int *fdout, pid_t *pid) { #ifdef USE_PIPES int pin[2], pout[2]; #else int sv[2]; #endif if (verbose_mode) fmprintf(stderr, "Executing: program %s host %s, user %s, command %s\n", program, host, remuser ? remuser : "(unspecified)", cmd); if (port == -1) port = sshport; #ifdef USE_PIPES if (pipe(pin) == -1 || pipe(pout) == -1) fatal("pipe: %s", strerror(errno)); #else /* Create a socket pair for communicating with ssh. */ if (socketpair(AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0, sv) == -1) fatal("socketpair: %s", strerror(errno)); #endif ssh_signal(SIGTSTP, suspchild); ssh_signal(SIGTTIN, suspchild); ssh_signal(SIGTTOU, suspchild); /* Fork a child to execute the command on the remote host using ssh. */ *pid = fork(); switch (*pid) { case -1: fatal("fork: %s", strerror(errno)); case 0: /* Child. */ #ifdef USE_PIPES if (dup2(pin[0], STDIN_FILENO) == -1 || dup2(pout[1], STDOUT_FILENO) == -1) { error("dup2: %s", strerror(errno)); _exit(1); } close(pin[0]); close(pin[1]); close(pout[0]); close(pout[1]); #else if (dup2(sv[0], STDIN_FILENO) == -1 || dup2(sv[0], STDOUT_FILENO) == -1) { error("dup2: %s", strerror(errno)); _exit(1); } close(sv[0]); close(sv[1]); #endif replacearg(&args, 0, "%s", program); if (port != -1) { addargs(&args, "-p"); addargs(&args, "%d", port); } if (remuser != NULL) { addargs(&args, "-l"); addargs(&args, "%s", remuser); } if (subsystem) addargs(&args, "-s"); addargs(&args, "--"); addargs(&args, "%s", host); addargs(&args, "%s", cmd); execvp(program, args.list); perror(program); _exit(1); default: /* Parent. Close the other side, and return the local side. */ #ifdef USE_PIPES close(pin[0]); close(pout[1]); *fdout = pin[1]; *fdin = pout[0]; #else close(sv[0]); *fdin = sv[1]; *fdout = sv[1]; #endif ssh_signal(SIGTERM, killchild); ssh_signal(SIGINT, killchild); ssh_signal(SIGHUP, killchild); return 0; } } /* * This function executes a command similar to do_cmd(), but expects the * input and output descriptors to be setup by a previous call to do_cmd(). * This way the input and output of two commands can be connected. */ int do_cmd2(char *host, char *remuser, int port, char *cmd, int fdin, int fdout) { int status; pid_t pid; if (verbose_mode) fmprintf(stderr, "Executing: 2nd program %s host %s, user %s, command %s\n", ssh_program, host, remuser ? remuser : "(unspecified)", cmd); if (port == -1) port = sshport; /* Fork a child to execute the command on the remote host using ssh. */ pid = fork(); if (pid == 0) { - dup2(fdin, 0); - dup2(fdout, 1); + if (dup2(fdin, 0) == -1) + perror("dup2"); + if (dup2(fdout, 1) == -1) + perror("dup2"); replacearg(&args, 0, "%s", ssh_program); if (port != -1) { addargs(&args, "-p"); addargs(&args, "%d", port); } if (remuser != NULL) { addargs(&args, "-l"); addargs(&args, "%s", remuser); } addargs(&args, "-oBatchMode=yes"); addargs(&args, "--"); addargs(&args, "%s", host); addargs(&args, "%s", cmd); execvp(ssh_program, args.list); perror(ssh_program); exit(1); } else if (pid == -1) { fatal("fork: %s", strerror(errno)); } while (waitpid(pid, &status, 0) == -1) if (errno != EINTR) fatal("do_cmd2: waitpid: %s", strerror(errno)); return 0; } typedef struct { size_t cnt; char *buf; } BUF; BUF *allocbuf(BUF *, int, int); void lostconn(int); int okname(char *); void run_err(const char *,...) __attribute__((__format__ (printf, 1, 2))) __attribute__((__nonnull__ (1))); int note_err(const char *,...) __attribute__((__format__ (printf, 1, 2))); void verifydir(char *); struct passwd *pwd; uid_t userid; int errs, remin, remout, remin2, remout2; int Tflag, pflag, iamremote, iamrecursive, targetshouldbedirectory; #define CMDNEEDS 64 char cmd[CMDNEEDS]; /* must hold "rcp -r -p -d\0" */ enum scp_mode_e { MODE_SCP, MODE_SFTP }; int response(void); void rsource(char *, struct stat *); void sink(int, char *[], const char *); void source(int, char *[]); void tolocal(int, char *[], enum scp_mode_e, char *sftp_direct); void toremote(int, char *[], enum scp_mode_e, char *sftp_direct); void usage(void); void source_sftp(int, char *, char *, struct sftp_conn *); void sink_sftp(int, char *, const char *, struct sftp_conn *); void throughlocal_sftp(struct sftp_conn *, struct sftp_conn *, char *, char *); int main(int argc, char **argv) { int ch, fflag, tflag, status, r, n; char **newargv, *argv0; const char *errstr; extern char *optarg; extern int optind; enum scp_mode_e mode = MODE_SFTP; char *sftp_direct = NULL; long long llv; /* Ensure that fds 0, 1 and 2 are open or directed to /dev/null */ sanitise_stdfd(); msetlocale(); /* Copy argv, because we modify it */ argv0 = argv[0]; newargv = xcalloc(MAXIMUM(argc + 1, 1), sizeof(*newargv)); for (n = 0; n < argc; n++) newargv[n] = xstrdup(argv[n]); argv = newargv; __progname = ssh_get_progname(argv[0]); log_init(argv0, log_level, SYSLOG_FACILITY_USER, 2); memset(&args, '\0', sizeof(args)); memset(&remote_remote_args, '\0', sizeof(remote_remote_args)); args.list = remote_remote_args.list = NULL; addargs(&args, "%s", ssh_program); addargs(&args, "-x"); addargs(&args, "-oPermitLocalCommand=no"); addargs(&args, "-oClearAllForwardings=yes"); addargs(&args, "-oRemoteCommand=none"); addargs(&args, "-oRequestTTY=no"); fflag = Tflag = tflag = 0; while ((ch = getopt(argc, argv, "12346ABCTdfOpqRrstvD:F:J:M:P:S:c:i:l:o:X:")) != -1) { switch (ch) { /* User-visible flags. */ case '1': fatal("SSH protocol v.1 is no longer supported"); break; case '2': /* Ignored */ break; case 'A': case '4': case '6': case 'C': addargs(&args, "-%c", ch); addargs(&remote_remote_args, "-%c", ch); break; case 'D': sftp_direct = optarg; break; case '3': throughlocal = 1; break; case 'R': throughlocal = 0; break; case 'o': case 'c': case 'i': case 'F': case 'J': addargs(&remote_remote_args, "-%c", ch); addargs(&remote_remote_args, "%s", optarg); addargs(&args, "-%c", ch); addargs(&args, "%s", optarg); break; case 'O': mode = MODE_SCP; break; case 's': mode = MODE_SFTP; break; case 'P': sshport = a2port(optarg); if (sshport <= 0) fatal("bad port \"%s\"\n", optarg); break; case 'B': addargs(&remote_remote_args, "-oBatchmode=yes"); addargs(&args, "-oBatchmode=yes"); break; case 'l': limit_kbps = strtonum(optarg, 1, 100 * 1024 * 1024, &errstr); if (errstr != NULL) usage(); limit_kbps *= 1024; /* kbps */ bandwidth_limit_init(&bwlimit, limit_kbps, COPY_BUFLEN); break; case 'p': pflag = 1; break; case 'r': iamrecursive = 1; break; case 'S': ssh_program = xstrdup(optarg); break; case 'v': addargs(&args, "-v"); addargs(&remote_remote_args, "-v"); if (verbose_mode == 0) log_level = SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG1; else if (log_level < SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG3) log_level++; verbose_mode = 1; break; case 'q': addargs(&args, "-q"); addargs(&remote_remote_args, "-q"); showprogress = 0; break; case 'X': /* Please keep in sync with sftp.c -X */ if (strncmp(optarg, "buffer=", 7) == 0) { r = scan_scaled(optarg + 7, &llv); if (r == 0 && (llv <= 0 || llv > 256 * 1024)) { r = -1; errno = EINVAL; } if (r == -1) { fatal("Invalid buffer size \"%s\": %s", optarg + 7, strerror(errno)); } sftp_copy_buflen = (size_t)llv; } else if (strncmp(optarg, "nrequests=", 10) == 0) { llv = strtonum(optarg + 10, 1, 256 * 1024, &errstr); if (errstr != NULL) { fatal("Invalid number of requests " "\"%s\": %s", optarg + 10, errstr); } sftp_nrequests = (size_t)llv; } else { fatal("Invalid -X option"); } break; /* Server options. */ case 'd': targetshouldbedirectory = 1; break; case 'f': /* "from" */ iamremote = 1; fflag = 1; break; case 't': /* "to" */ iamremote = 1; tflag = 1; #ifdef HAVE_CYGWIN setmode(0, O_BINARY); #endif break; case 'T': Tflag = 1; break; default: usage(); } } argc -= optind; argv += optind; log_init(argv0, log_level, SYSLOG_FACILITY_USER, 2); /* Do this last because we want the user to be able to override it */ addargs(&args, "-oForwardAgent=no"); if (iamremote) mode = MODE_SCP; if ((pwd = getpwuid(userid = getuid())) == NULL) fatal("unknown user %u", (u_int) userid); if (!isatty(STDOUT_FILENO)) showprogress = 0; if (pflag) { /* Cannot pledge: -p allows setuid/setgid files... */ } else { if (pledge("stdio rpath wpath cpath fattr tty proc exec", NULL) == -1) { perror("pledge"); exit(1); } } remin = STDIN_FILENO; remout = STDOUT_FILENO; if (fflag) { /* Follow "protocol", send data. */ (void) response(); source(argc, argv); exit(errs != 0); } if (tflag) { /* Receive data. */ sink(argc, argv, NULL); exit(errs != 0); } if (argc < 2) usage(); if (argc > 2) targetshouldbedirectory = 1; remin = remout = -1; do_cmd_pid = -1; /* Command to be executed on remote system using "ssh". */ (void) snprintf(cmd, sizeof cmd, "scp%s%s%s%s", verbose_mode ? " -v" : "", iamrecursive ? " -r" : "", pflag ? " -p" : "", targetshouldbedirectory ? " -d" : ""); (void) ssh_signal(SIGPIPE, lostconn); if (colon(argv[argc - 1])) /* Dest is remote host. */ toremote(argc, argv, mode, sftp_direct); else { if (targetshouldbedirectory) verifydir(argv[argc - 1]); tolocal(argc, argv, mode, sftp_direct); /* Dest is local host. */ } /* * Finally check the exit status of the ssh process, if one was forked * and no error has occurred yet */ if (do_cmd_pid != -1 && (mode == MODE_SFTP || errs == 0)) { if (remin != -1) (void) close(remin); if (remout != -1) (void) close(remout); if (waitpid(do_cmd_pid, &status, 0) == -1) errs = 1; else { if (!WIFEXITED(status) || WEXITSTATUS(status) != 0) errs = 1; } } exit(errs != 0); } /* Callback from atomicio6 to update progress meter and limit bandwidth */ static int scpio(void *_cnt, size_t s) { off_t *cnt = (off_t *)_cnt; *cnt += s; refresh_progress_meter(0); if (limit_kbps > 0) bandwidth_limit(&bwlimit, s); return 0; } static int do_times(int fd, int verb, const struct stat *sb) { /* strlen(2^64) == 20; strlen(10^6) == 7 */ char buf[(20 + 7 + 2) * 2 + 2]; (void)snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "T%llu 0 %llu 0\n", (unsigned long long) (sb->st_mtime < 0 ? 0 : sb->st_mtime), (unsigned long long) (sb->st_atime < 0 ? 0 : sb->st_atime)); if (verb) { fprintf(stderr, "File mtime %lld atime %lld\n", (long long)sb->st_mtime, (long long)sb->st_atime); fprintf(stderr, "Sending file timestamps: %s", buf); } (void) atomicio(vwrite, fd, buf, strlen(buf)); return (response()); } static int parse_scp_uri(const char *uri, char **userp, char **hostp, int *portp, char **pathp) { int r; r = parse_uri("scp", uri, userp, hostp, portp, pathp); if (r == 0 && *pathp == NULL) *pathp = xstrdup("."); return r; } /* Appends a string to an array; returns 0 on success, -1 on alloc failure */ static int append(char *cp, char ***ap, size_t *np) { char **tmp; if ((tmp = reallocarray(*ap, *np + 1, sizeof(*tmp))) == NULL) return -1; tmp[(*np)] = cp; (*np)++; *ap = tmp; return 0; } /* * Finds the start and end of the first brace pair in the pattern. * returns 0 on success or -1 for invalid patterns. */ static int find_brace(const char *pattern, int *startp, int *endp) { int i; int in_bracket, brace_level; *startp = *endp = -1; in_bracket = brace_level = 0; for (i = 0; i < INT_MAX && *endp < 0 && pattern[i] != '\0'; i++) { switch (pattern[i]) { case '\\': /* skip next character */ if (pattern[i + 1] != '\0') i++; break; case '[': in_bracket = 1; break; case ']': in_bracket = 0; break; case '{': if (in_bracket) break; if (pattern[i + 1] == '}') { /* Protect a single {}, for find(1), like csh */ i++; /* skip */ break; } if (*startp == -1) *startp = i; brace_level++; break; case '}': if (in_bracket) break; if (*startp < 0) { /* Unbalanced brace */ return -1; } if (--brace_level <= 0) *endp = i; break; } } /* unbalanced brackets/braces */ if (*endp < 0 && (*startp >= 0 || in_bracket)) return -1; return 0; } /* * Assembles and records a successfully-expanded pattern, returns -1 on * alloc failure. */ static int emit_expansion(const char *pattern, int brace_start, int brace_end, int sel_start, int sel_end, char ***patternsp, size_t *npatternsp) { char *cp; int o = 0, tail_len = strlen(pattern + brace_end + 1); if ((cp = malloc(brace_start + (sel_end - sel_start) + tail_len + 1)) == NULL) return -1; /* Pattern before initial brace */ if (brace_start > 0) { memcpy(cp, pattern, brace_start); o = brace_start; } /* Current braced selection */ if (sel_end - sel_start > 0) { memcpy(cp + o, pattern + sel_start, sel_end - sel_start); o += sel_end - sel_start; } /* Remainder of pattern after closing brace */ if (tail_len > 0) { memcpy(cp + o, pattern + brace_end + 1, tail_len); o += tail_len; } cp[o] = '\0'; if (append(cp, patternsp, npatternsp) != 0) { free(cp); return -1; } return 0; } /* * Expand the first encountered brace in pattern, appending the expanded * patterns it yielded to the *patternsp array. * * Returns 0 on success or -1 on allocation failure. * * Signals whether expansion was performed via *expanded and whether * pattern was invalid via *invalid. */ static int brace_expand_one(const char *pattern, char ***patternsp, size_t *npatternsp, int *expanded, int *invalid) { int i; int in_bracket, brace_start, brace_end, brace_level; int sel_start, sel_end; *invalid = *expanded = 0; if (find_brace(pattern, &brace_start, &brace_end) != 0) { *invalid = 1; return 0; } else if (brace_start == -1) return 0; in_bracket = brace_level = 0; for (i = sel_start = brace_start + 1; i < brace_end; i++) { switch (pattern[i]) { case '{': if (in_bracket) break; brace_level++; break; case '}': if (in_bracket) break; brace_level--; break; case '[': in_bracket = 1; break; case ']': in_bracket = 0; break; case '\\': if (i < brace_end - 1) i++; /* skip */ break; } if (pattern[i] == ',' || i == brace_end - 1) { if (in_bracket || brace_level > 0) continue; /* End of a selection, emit an expanded pattern */ /* Adjust end index for last selection */ sel_end = (i == brace_end - 1) ? brace_end : i; if (emit_expansion(pattern, brace_start, brace_end, sel_start, sel_end, patternsp, npatternsp) != 0) return -1; /* move on to the next selection */ sel_start = i + 1; continue; } } if (in_bracket || brace_level > 0) { *invalid = 1; return 0; } /* success */ *expanded = 1; return 0; } /* Expand braces from pattern. Returns 0 on success, -1 on failure */ static int brace_expand(const char *pattern, char ***patternsp, size_t *npatternsp) { char *cp, *cp2, **active = NULL, **done = NULL; size_t i, nactive = 0, ndone = 0; int ret = -1, invalid = 0, expanded = 0; *patternsp = NULL; *npatternsp = 0; /* Start the worklist with the original pattern */ if ((cp = strdup(pattern)) == NULL) return -1; if (append(cp, &active, &nactive) != 0) { free(cp); return -1; } while (nactive > 0) { cp = active[nactive - 1]; nactive--; if (brace_expand_one(cp, &active, &nactive, &expanded, &invalid) == -1) { free(cp); goto fail; } if (invalid) fatal_f("invalid brace pattern \"%s\"", cp); if (expanded) { /* * Current entry expanded to new entries on the * active list; discard the progenitor pattern. */ free(cp); continue; } /* * Pattern did not expand; append the finename component to * the completed list */ if ((cp2 = strrchr(cp, '/')) != NULL) *cp2++ = '\0'; else cp2 = cp; if (append(xstrdup(cp2), &done, &ndone) != 0) { free(cp); goto fail; } free(cp); } /* success */ *patternsp = done; *npatternsp = ndone; done = NULL; ndone = 0; ret = 0; fail: for (i = 0; i < nactive; i++) free(active[i]); free(active); for (i = 0; i < ndone; i++) free(done[i]); free(done); return ret; } static struct sftp_conn * do_sftp_connect(char *host, char *user, int port, char *sftp_direct, int *reminp, int *remoutp, int *pidp) { if (sftp_direct == NULL) { if (do_cmd(ssh_program, host, user, port, 1, "sftp", reminp, remoutp, pidp) < 0) return NULL; } else { freeargs(&args); addargs(&args, "sftp-server"); if (do_cmd(sftp_direct, host, NULL, -1, 0, "sftp", reminp, remoutp, pidp) < 0) return NULL; } return do_init(*reminp, *remoutp, sftp_copy_buflen, sftp_nrequests, limit_kbps); } void toremote(int argc, char **argv, enum scp_mode_e mode, char *sftp_direct) { char *suser = NULL, *host = NULL, *src = NULL; char *bp, *tuser, *thost, *targ; int sport = -1, tport = -1; struct sftp_conn *conn = NULL, *conn2 = NULL; arglist alist; int i, r, status; u_int j; memset(&alist, '\0', sizeof(alist)); alist.list = NULL; /* Parse target */ r = parse_scp_uri(argv[argc - 1], &tuser, &thost, &tport, &targ); if (r == -1) { fmprintf(stderr, "%s: invalid uri\n", argv[argc - 1]); ++errs; goto out; } if (r != 0) { if (parse_user_host_path(argv[argc - 1], &tuser, &thost, &targ) == -1) { fmprintf(stderr, "%s: invalid target\n", argv[argc - 1]); ++errs; goto out; } } /* Parse source files */ for (i = 0; i < argc - 1; i++) { free(suser); free(host); free(src); r = parse_scp_uri(argv[i], &suser, &host, &sport, &src); if (r == -1) { fmprintf(stderr, "%s: invalid uri\n", argv[i]); ++errs; continue; } if (r != 0) { parse_user_host_path(argv[i], &suser, &host, &src); } if (suser != NULL && !okname(suser)) { ++errs; continue; } if (host && throughlocal) { /* extended remote to remote */ if (mode == MODE_SFTP) { if (remin == -1) { /* Connect to dest now */ conn = do_sftp_connect(thost, tuser, tport, sftp_direct, &remin, &remout, &do_cmd_pid); if (conn == NULL) { fatal("Unable to open " "destination connection"); } debug3_f("origin in %d out %d pid %ld", remin, remout, (long)do_cmd_pid); } /* * XXX remember suser/host/sport and only * reconnect if they change between arguments. * would save reconnections for cases like * scp -3 hosta:/foo hosta:/bar hostb: */ /* Connect to origin now */ conn2 = do_sftp_connect(host, suser, sport, sftp_direct, &remin2, &remout2, &do_cmd_pid2); if (conn2 == NULL) { fatal("Unable to open " "source connection"); } debug3_f("destination in %d out %d pid %ld", remin2, remout2, (long)do_cmd_pid2); throughlocal_sftp(conn2, conn, src, targ); (void) close(remin2); (void) close(remout2); remin2 = remout2 = -1; if (waitpid(do_cmd_pid2, &status, 0) == -1) ++errs; else if (!WIFEXITED(status) || WEXITSTATUS(status) != 0) ++errs; do_cmd_pid2 = -1; continue; } else { xasprintf(&bp, "%s -f %s%s", cmd, *src == '-' ? "-- " : "", src); if (do_cmd(ssh_program, host, suser, sport, 0, bp, &remin, &remout, &do_cmd_pid) < 0) exit(1); free(bp); xasprintf(&bp, "%s -t %s%s", cmd, *targ == '-' ? "-- " : "", targ); if (do_cmd2(thost, tuser, tport, bp, remin, remout) < 0) exit(1); free(bp); (void) close(remin); (void) close(remout); remin = remout = -1; } } else if (host) { /* standard remote to remote */ /* * Second remote user is passed to first remote side * via scp command-line. Ensure it contains no obvious * shell characters. */ if (tuser != NULL && !okname(tuser)) { ++errs; continue; } if (tport != -1 && tport != SSH_DEFAULT_PORT) { /* This would require the remote support URIs */ fatal("target port not supported with two " "remote hosts and the -R option"); } freeargs(&alist); addargs(&alist, "%s", ssh_program); addargs(&alist, "-x"); addargs(&alist, "-oClearAllForwardings=yes"); addargs(&alist, "-n"); for (j = 0; j < remote_remote_args.num; j++) { addargs(&alist, "%s", remote_remote_args.list[j]); } if (sport != -1) { addargs(&alist, "-p"); addargs(&alist, "%d", sport); } if (suser) { addargs(&alist, "-l"); addargs(&alist, "%s", suser); } addargs(&alist, "--"); addargs(&alist, "%s", host); addargs(&alist, "%s", cmd); addargs(&alist, "%s", src); addargs(&alist, "%s%s%s:%s", tuser ? tuser : "", tuser ? "@" : "", thost, targ); if (do_local_cmd(&alist) != 0) errs = 1; } else { /* local to remote */ if (mode == MODE_SFTP) { if (remin == -1) { /* Connect to remote now */ conn = do_sftp_connect(thost, tuser, tport, sftp_direct, &remin, &remout, &do_cmd_pid); if (conn == NULL) { fatal("Unable to open sftp " "connection"); } } /* The protocol */ source_sftp(1, argv[i], targ, conn); continue; } /* SCP */ if (remin == -1) { xasprintf(&bp, "%s -t %s%s", cmd, *targ == '-' ? "-- " : "", targ); if (do_cmd(ssh_program, thost, tuser, tport, 0, bp, &remin, &remout, &do_cmd_pid) < 0) exit(1); if (response() < 0) exit(1); free(bp); } source(1, argv + i); } } out: if (mode == MODE_SFTP) free(conn); free(tuser); free(thost); free(targ); free(suser); free(host); free(src); } void tolocal(int argc, char **argv, enum scp_mode_e mode, char *sftp_direct) { char *bp, *host = NULL, *src = NULL, *suser = NULL; arglist alist; struct sftp_conn *conn = NULL; int i, r, sport = -1; memset(&alist, '\0', sizeof(alist)); alist.list = NULL; for (i = 0; i < argc - 1; i++) { free(suser); free(host); free(src); r = parse_scp_uri(argv[i], &suser, &host, &sport, &src); if (r == -1) { fmprintf(stderr, "%s: invalid uri\n", argv[i]); ++errs; continue; } if (r != 0) parse_user_host_path(argv[i], &suser, &host, &src); if (suser != NULL && !okname(suser)) { ++errs; continue; } if (!host) { /* Local to local. */ freeargs(&alist); addargs(&alist, "%s", _PATH_CP); if (iamrecursive) addargs(&alist, "-r"); if (pflag) addargs(&alist, "-p"); addargs(&alist, "--"); addargs(&alist, "%s", argv[i]); addargs(&alist, "%s", argv[argc-1]); if (do_local_cmd(&alist)) ++errs; continue; } /* Remote to local. */ if (mode == MODE_SFTP) { conn = do_sftp_connect(host, suser, sport, sftp_direct, &remin, &remout, &do_cmd_pid); if (conn == NULL) { error("sftp connection failed"); ++errs; continue; } /* The protocol */ sink_sftp(1, argv[argc - 1], src, conn); free(conn); (void) close(remin); (void) close(remout); remin = remout = -1; continue; } /* SCP */ xasprintf(&bp, "%s -f %s%s", cmd, *src == '-' ? "-- " : "", src); if (do_cmd(ssh_program, host, suser, sport, 0, bp, &remin, &remout, &do_cmd_pid) < 0) { free(bp); ++errs; continue; } free(bp); sink(1, argv + argc - 1, src); (void) close(remin); remin = remout = -1; } free(suser); free(host); free(src); } /* Prepare remote path, handling ~ by assuming cwd is the homedir */ static char * prepare_remote_path(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *path) { size_t nslash; /* Handle ~ prefixed paths */ if (*path == '\0' || strcmp(path, "~") == 0) return xstrdup("."); if (*path != '~') return xstrdup(path); if (strncmp(path, "~/", 2) == 0) { if ((nslash = strspn(path + 2, "/")) == strlen(path + 2)) return xstrdup("."); return xstrdup(path + 2 + nslash); } if (can_expand_path(conn)) return do_expand_path(conn, path); /* No protocol extension */ error("server expand-path extension is required " "for ~user paths in SFTP mode"); return NULL; } void source_sftp(int argc, char *src, char *targ, struct sftp_conn *conn) { char *target = NULL, *filename = NULL, *abs_dst = NULL; int src_is_dir, target_is_dir; Attrib a; struct stat st; memset(&a, '\0', sizeof(a)); if (stat(src, &st) != 0) fatal("stat local \"%s\": %s", src, strerror(errno)); src_is_dir = S_ISDIR(st.st_mode); if ((filename = basename(src)) == NULL) fatal("basename \"%s\": %s", src, strerror(errno)); /* * No need to glob here - the local shell already took care of * the expansions */ if ((target = prepare_remote_path(conn, targ)) == NULL) cleanup_exit(255); target_is_dir = remote_is_dir(conn, target); if (targetshouldbedirectory && !target_is_dir) { debug("target directory \"%s\" does not exist", target); a.flags = SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_PERMISSIONS; a.perm = st.st_mode | 0700; /* ensure writable */ if (do_mkdir(conn, target, &a, 1) != 0) cleanup_exit(255); /* error already logged */ target_is_dir = 1; } if (target_is_dir) abs_dst = path_append(target, filename); else { abs_dst = target; target = NULL; } debug3_f("copying local %s to remote %s", src, abs_dst); if (src_is_dir && iamrecursive) { if (upload_dir(conn, src, abs_dst, pflag, SFTP_PROGRESS_ONLY, 0, 0, 1, 1) != 0) { error("failed to upload directory %s to %s", src, targ); errs = 1; } } else if (do_upload(conn, src, abs_dst, pflag, 0, 0, 1) != 0) { error("failed to upload file %s to %s", src, targ); errs = 1; } free(abs_dst); free(target); } void source(int argc, char **argv) { struct stat stb; static BUF buffer; BUF *bp; off_t i, statbytes; size_t amt, nr; int fd = -1, haderr, indx; char *last, *name, buf[PATH_MAX + 128], encname[PATH_MAX]; int len; for (indx = 0; indx < argc; ++indx) { name = argv[indx]; statbytes = 0; len = strlen(name); while (len > 1 && name[len-1] == '/') name[--len] = '\0'; if ((fd = open(name, O_RDONLY|O_NONBLOCK)) == -1) goto syserr; if (strchr(name, '\n') != NULL) { strnvis(encname, name, sizeof(encname), VIS_NL); name = encname; } if (fstat(fd, &stb) == -1) { syserr: run_err("%s: %s", name, strerror(errno)); goto next; } if (stb.st_size < 0) { run_err("%s: %s", name, "Negative file size"); goto next; } unset_nonblock(fd); switch (stb.st_mode & S_IFMT) { case S_IFREG: break; case S_IFDIR: if (iamrecursive) { rsource(name, &stb); goto next; } /* FALLTHROUGH */ default: run_err("%s: not a regular file", name); goto next; } if ((last = strrchr(name, '/')) == NULL) last = name; else ++last; curfile = last; if (pflag) { if (do_times(remout, verbose_mode, &stb) < 0) goto next; } #define FILEMODEMASK (S_ISUID|S_ISGID|S_IRWXU|S_IRWXG|S_IRWXO) snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "C%04o %lld %s\n", (u_int) (stb.st_mode & FILEMODEMASK), (long long)stb.st_size, last); if (verbose_mode) fmprintf(stderr, "Sending file modes: %s", buf); (void) atomicio(vwrite, remout, buf, strlen(buf)); if (response() < 0) goto next; if ((bp = allocbuf(&buffer, fd, COPY_BUFLEN)) == NULL) { next: if (fd != -1) { (void) close(fd); fd = -1; } continue; } if (showprogress) start_progress_meter(curfile, stb.st_size, &statbytes); set_nonblock(remout); for (haderr = i = 0; i < stb.st_size; i += bp->cnt) { amt = bp->cnt; if (i + (off_t)amt > stb.st_size) amt = stb.st_size - i; if (!haderr) { if ((nr = atomicio(read, fd, bp->buf, amt)) != amt) { haderr = errno; memset(bp->buf + nr, 0, amt - nr); } } /* Keep writing after error to retain sync */ if (haderr) { (void)atomicio(vwrite, remout, bp->buf, amt); memset(bp->buf, 0, amt); continue; } if (atomicio6(vwrite, remout, bp->buf, amt, scpio, &statbytes) != amt) haderr = errno; } unset_nonblock(remout); if (fd != -1) { if (close(fd) == -1 && !haderr) haderr = errno; fd = -1; } if (!haderr) (void) atomicio(vwrite, remout, "", 1); else run_err("%s: %s", name, strerror(haderr)); (void) response(); if (showprogress) stop_progress_meter(); } } void rsource(char *name, struct stat *statp) { DIR *dirp; struct dirent *dp; char *last, *vect[1], path[PATH_MAX]; if (!(dirp = opendir(name))) { run_err("%s: %s", name, strerror(errno)); return; } last = strrchr(name, '/'); if (last == NULL) last = name; else last++; if (pflag) { if (do_times(remout, verbose_mode, statp) < 0) { closedir(dirp); return; } } (void) snprintf(path, sizeof path, "D%04o %d %.1024s\n", (u_int) (statp->st_mode & FILEMODEMASK), 0, last); if (verbose_mode) fmprintf(stderr, "Entering directory: %s", path); (void) atomicio(vwrite, remout, path, strlen(path)); if (response() < 0) { closedir(dirp); return; } while ((dp = readdir(dirp)) != NULL) { if (dp->d_ino == 0) continue; if (!strcmp(dp->d_name, ".") || !strcmp(dp->d_name, "..")) continue; if (strlen(name) + 1 + strlen(dp->d_name) >= sizeof(path) - 1) { run_err("%s/%s: name too long", name, dp->d_name); continue; } (void) snprintf(path, sizeof path, "%s/%s", name, dp->d_name); vect[0] = path; source(1, vect); } (void) closedir(dirp); (void) atomicio(vwrite, remout, "E\n", 2); (void) response(); } void sink_sftp(int argc, char *dst, const char *src, struct sftp_conn *conn) { char *abs_src = NULL; char *abs_dst = NULL; glob_t g; char *filename, *tmp = NULL; int i, r, err = 0, dst_is_dir; struct stat st; memset(&g, 0, sizeof(g)); /* * Here, we need remote glob as SFTP can not depend on remote shell * expansions */ if ((abs_src = prepare_remote_path(conn, src)) == NULL) { err = -1; goto out; } debug3_f("copying remote %s to local %s", abs_src, dst); if ((r = remote_glob(conn, abs_src, GLOB_NOCHECK|GLOB_MARK, NULL, &g)) != 0) { if (r == GLOB_NOSPACE) error("%s: too many glob matches", src); else error("%s: %s", src, strerror(ENOENT)); err = -1; goto out; } /* Did we actually get any matches back from the glob? */ if (g.gl_matchc == 0 && g.gl_pathc == 1 && g.gl_pathv[0] != 0) { /* * If nothing matched but a path returned, then it's probably * a GLOB_NOCHECK result. Check whether the unglobbed path * exists so we can give a nice error message early. */ if (do_stat(conn, g.gl_pathv[0], 1) == NULL) { error("%s: %s", src, strerror(ENOENT)); err = -1; goto out; } } if ((r = stat(dst, &st)) != 0) debug2_f("stat local \"%s\": %s", dst, strerror(errno)); dst_is_dir = r == 0 && S_ISDIR(st.st_mode); if (g.gl_matchc > 1 && !dst_is_dir) { if (r == 0) { error("Multiple files match pattern, but destination " "\"%s\" is not a directory", dst); err = -1; goto out; } debug2_f("creating destination \"%s\"", dst); if (mkdir(dst, 0777) != 0) { error("local mkdir \"%s\": %s", dst, strerror(errno)); err = -1; goto out; } dst_is_dir = 1; } for (i = 0; g.gl_pathv[i] && !interrupted; i++) { tmp = xstrdup(g.gl_pathv[i]); if ((filename = basename(tmp)) == NULL) { error("basename %s: %s", tmp, strerror(errno)); err = -1; goto out; } if (dst_is_dir) abs_dst = path_append(dst, filename); else abs_dst = xstrdup(dst); debug("Fetching %s to %s\n", g.gl_pathv[i], abs_dst); if (globpath_is_dir(g.gl_pathv[i]) && iamrecursive) { if (download_dir(conn, g.gl_pathv[i], abs_dst, NULL, pflag, SFTP_PROGRESS_ONLY, 0, 0, 1, 1) == -1) err = -1; } else { if (do_download(conn, g.gl_pathv[i], abs_dst, NULL, pflag, 0, 0, 1) == -1) err = -1; } free(abs_dst); abs_dst = NULL; free(tmp); tmp = NULL; } out: free(abs_src); free(tmp); globfree(&g); if (err == -1) errs = 1; } #define TYPE_OVERFLOW(type, val) \ ((sizeof(type) == 4 && (val) > INT32_MAX) || \ (sizeof(type) == 8 && (val) > INT64_MAX) || \ (sizeof(type) != 4 && sizeof(type) != 8)) void sink(int argc, char **argv, const char *src) { static BUF buffer; struct stat stb; BUF *bp; off_t i; size_t j, count; int amt, exists, first, ofd; mode_t mode, omode, mask; off_t size, statbytes; unsigned long long ull; int setimes, targisdir, wrerr; char ch, *cp, *np, *targ, *why, *vect[1], buf[2048], visbuf[2048]; char **patterns = NULL; size_t n, npatterns = 0; struct timeval tv[2]; #define atime tv[0] #define mtime tv[1] #define SCREWUP(str) { why = str; goto screwup; } if (TYPE_OVERFLOW(time_t, 0) || TYPE_OVERFLOW(off_t, 0)) SCREWUP("Unexpected off_t/time_t size"); setimes = targisdir = 0; mask = umask(0); if (!pflag) (void) umask(mask); if (argc != 1) { run_err("ambiguous target"); exit(1); } targ = *argv; if (targetshouldbedirectory) verifydir(targ); (void) atomicio(vwrite, remout, "", 1); if (stat(targ, &stb) == 0 && S_ISDIR(stb.st_mode)) targisdir = 1; if (src != NULL && !iamrecursive && !Tflag) { /* * Prepare to try to restrict incoming filenames to match * the requested destination file glob. */ if (brace_expand(src, &patterns, &npatterns) != 0) fatal_f("could not expand pattern"); } for (first = 1;; first = 0) { cp = buf; if (atomicio(read, remin, cp, 1) != 1) goto done; if (*cp++ == '\n') SCREWUP("unexpected "); do { if (atomicio(read, remin, &ch, sizeof(ch)) != sizeof(ch)) SCREWUP("lost connection"); *cp++ = ch; } while (cp < &buf[sizeof(buf) - 1] && ch != '\n'); *cp = 0; if (verbose_mode) fmprintf(stderr, "Sink: %s", buf); if (buf[0] == '\01' || buf[0] == '\02') { if (iamremote == 0) { (void) snmprintf(visbuf, sizeof(visbuf), NULL, "%s", buf + 1); (void) atomicio(vwrite, STDERR_FILENO, visbuf, strlen(visbuf)); } if (buf[0] == '\02') exit(1); ++errs; continue; } if (buf[0] == 'E') { (void) atomicio(vwrite, remout, "", 1); goto done; } if (ch == '\n') *--cp = 0; cp = buf; if (*cp == 'T') { setimes++; cp++; if (!isdigit((unsigned char)*cp)) SCREWUP("mtime.sec not present"); ull = strtoull(cp, &cp, 10); if (!cp || *cp++ != ' ') SCREWUP("mtime.sec not delimited"); if (TYPE_OVERFLOW(time_t, ull)) setimes = 0; /* out of range */ mtime.tv_sec = ull; mtime.tv_usec = strtol(cp, &cp, 10); if (!cp || *cp++ != ' ' || mtime.tv_usec < 0 || mtime.tv_usec > 999999) SCREWUP("mtime.usec not delimited"); if (!isdigit((unsigned char)*cp)) SCREWUP("atime.sec not present"); ull = strtoull(cp, &cp, 10); if (!cp || *cp++ != ' ') SCREWUP("atime.sec not delimited"); if (TYPE_OVERFLOW(time_t, ull)) setimes = 0; /* out of range */ atime.tv_sec = ull; atime.tv_usec = strtol(cp, &cp, 10); if (!cp || *cp++ != '\0' || atime.tv_usec < 0 || atime.tv_usec > 999999) SCREWUP("atime.usec not delimited"); (void) atomicio(vwrite, remout, "", 1); continue; } if (*cp != 'C' && *cp != 'D') { /* * Check for the case "rcp remote:foo\* local:bar". * In this case, the line "No match." can be returned * by the shell before the rcp command on the remote is * executed so the ^Aerror_message convention isn't * followed. */ if (first) { run_err("%s", cp); exit(1); } SCREWUP("expected control record"); } mode = 0; for (++cp; cp < buf + 5; cp++) { if (*cp < '0' || *cp > '7') SCREWUP("bad mode"); mode = (mode << 3) | (*cp - '0'); } if (!pflag) mode &= ~mask; if (*cp++ != ' ') SCREWUP("mode not delimited"); if (!isdigit((unsigned char)*cp)) SCREWUP("size not present"); ull = strtoull(cp, &cp, 10); if (!cp || *cp++ != ' ') SCREWUP("size not delimited"); if (TYPE_OVERFLOW(off_t, ull)) SCREWUP("size out of range"); size = (off_t)ull; if (*cp == '\0' || strchr(cp, '/') != NULL || strcmp(cp, ".") == 0 || strcmp(cp, "..") == 0) { run_err("error: unexpected filename: %s", cp); exit(1); } if (npatterns > 0) { for (n = 0; n < npatterns; n++) { if (strcmp(patterns[n], cp) == 0 || fnmatch(patterns[n], cp, 0) == 0) break; } if (n >= npatterns) SCREWUP("filename does not match request"); } if (targisdir) { static char *namebuf; static size_t cursize; size_t need; need = strlen(targ) + strlen(cp) + 250; if (need > cursize) { free(namebuf); namebuf = xmalloc(need); cursize = need; } (void) snprintf(namebuf, need, "%s%s%s", targ, strcmp(targ, "/") ? "/" : "", cp); np = namebuf; } else np = targ; curfile = cp; exists = stat(np, &stb) == 0; if (buf[0] == 'D') { int mod_flag = pflag; if (!iamrecursive) SCREWUP("received directory without -r"); if (exists) { if (!S_ISDIR(stb.st_mode)) { errno = ENOTDIR; goto bad; } if (pflag) (void) chmod(np, mode); } else { /* Handle copying from a read-only directory */ mod_flag = 1; if (mkdir(np, mode | S_IRWXU) == -1) goto bad; } vect[0] = xstrdup(np); sink(1, vect, src); if (setimes) { setimes = 0; (void) utimes(vect[0], tv); } if (mod_flag) (void) chmod(vect[0], mode); free(vect[0]); continue; } omode = mode; mode |= S_IWUSR; if ((ofd = open(np, O_WRONLY|O_CREAT, mode)) == -1) { bad: run_err("%s: %s", np, strerror(errno)); continue; } (void) atomicio(vwrite, remout, "", 1); if ((bp = allocbuf(&buffer, ofd, COPY_BUFLEN)) == NULL) { (void) close(ofd); continue; } cp = bp->buf; wrerr = 0; /* * NB. do not use run_err() unless immediately followed by * exit() below as it may send a spurious reply that might * desyncronise us from the peer. Use note_err() instead. */ statbytes = 0; if (showprogress) start_progress_meter(curfile, size, &statbytes); set_nonblock(remin); for (count = i = 0; i < size; i += bp->cnt) { amt = bp->cnt; if (i + amt > size) amt = size - i; count += amt; do { j = atomicio6(read, remin, cp, amt, scpio, &statbytes); if (j == 0) { run_err("%s", j != EPIPE ? strerror(errno) : "dropped connection"); exit(1); } amt -= j; cp += j; } while (amt > 0); if (count == bp->cnt) { /* Keep reading so we stay sync'd up. */ if (!wrerr) { if (atomicio(vwrite, ofd, bp->buf, count) != count) { note_err("%s: %s", np, strerror(errno)); wrerr = 1; } } count = 0; cp = bp->buf; } } unset_nonblock(remin); if (count != 0 && !wrerr && atomicio(vwrite, ofd, bp->buf, count) != count) { note_err("%s: %s", np, strerror(errno)); wrerr = 1; } if (!wrerr && (!exists || S_ISREG(stb.st_mode)) && ftruncate(ofd, size) != 0) note_err("%s: truncate: %s", np, strerror(errno)); if (pflag) { if (exists || omode != mode) #ifdef HAVE_FCHMOD if (fchmod(ofd, omode)) { #else /* HAVE_FCHMOD */ if (chmod(np, omode)) { #endif /* HAVE_FCHMOD */ note_err("%s: set mode: %s", np, strerror(errno)); } } else { if (!exists && omode != mode) #ifdef HAVE_FCHMOD if (fchmod(ofd, omode & ~mask)) { #else /* HAVE_FCHMOD */ if (chmod(np, omode & ~mask)) { #endif /* HAVE_FCHMOD */ note_err("%s: set mode: %s", np, strerror(errno)); } } if (close(ofd) == -1) note_err("%s: close: %s", np, strerror(errno)); (void) response(); if (showprogress) stop_progress_meter(); if (setimes && !wrerr) { setimes = 0; if (utimes(np, tv) == -1) { note_err("%s: set times: %s", np, strerror(errno)); } } /* If no error was noted then signal success for this file */ if (note_err(NULL) == 0) (void) atomicio(vwrite, remout, "", 1); } done: for (n = 0; n < npatterns; n++) free(patterns[n]); free(patterns); return; screwup: for (n = 0; n < npatterns; n++) free(patterns[n]); free(patterns); run_err("protocol error: %s", why); exit(1); } void throughlocal_sftp(struct sftp_conn *from, struct sftp_conn *to, char *src, char *targ) { char *target = NULL, *filename = NULL, *abs_dst = NULL; char *abs_src = NULL, *tmp = NULL; glob_t g; int i, r, targetisdir, err = 0; if ((filename = basename(src)) == NULL) fatal("basename %s: %s", src, strerror(errno)); if ((abs_src = prepare_remote_path(from, src)) == NULL || (target = prepare_remote_path(to, targ)) == NULL) cleanup_exit(255); memset(&g, 0, sizeof(g)); targetisdir = remote_is_dir(to, target); if (!targetisdir && targetshouldbedirectory) { error("%s: destination is not a directory", targ); err = -1; goto out; } debug3_f("copying remote %s to remote %s", abs_src, target); if ((r = remote_glob(from, abs_src, GLOB_NOCHECK|GLOB_MARK, NULL, &g)) != 0) { if (r == GLOB_NOSPACE) error("%s: too many glob matches", src); else error("%s: %s", src, strerror(ENOENT)); err = -1; goto out; } /* Did we actually get any matches back from the glob? */ if (g.gl_matchc == 0 && g.gl_pathc == 1 && g.gl_pathv[0] != 0) { /* * If nothing matched but a path returned, then it's probably * a GLOB_NOCHECK result. Check whether the unglobbed path * exists so we can give a nice error message early. */ if (do_stat(from, g.gl_pathv[0], 1) == NULL) { error("%s: %s", src, strerror(ENOENT)); err = -1; goto out; } } for (i = 0; g.gl_pathv[i] && !interrupted; i++) { tmp = xstrdup(g.gl_pathv[i]); if ((filename = basename(tmp)) == NULL) { error("basename %s: %s", tmp, strerror(errno)); err = -1; goto out; } if (targetisdir) abs_dst = path_append(target, filename); else abs_dst = xstrdup(target); debug("Fetching %s to %s\n", g.gl_pathv[i], abs_dst); if (globpath_is_dir(g.gl_pathv[i]) && iamrecursive) { if (crossload_dir(from, to, g.gl_pathv[i], abs_dst, NULL, pflag, SFTP_PROGRESS_ONLY, 1) == -1) err = -1; } else { if (do_crossload(from, to, g.gl_pathv[i], abs_dst, NULL, pflag) == -1) err = -1; } free(abs_dst); abs_dst = NULL; free(tmp); tmp = NULL; } out: free(abs_src); free(abs_dst); free(target); free(tmp); globfree(&g); if (err == -1) errs = 1; } int response(void) { char ch, *cp, resp, rbuf[2048], visbuf[2048]; if (atomicio(read, remin, &resp, sizeof(resp)) != sizeof(resp)) lostconn(0); cp = rbuf; switch (resp) { case 0: /* ok */ return (0); default: *cp++ = resp; /* FALLTHROUGH */ case 1: /* error, followed by error msg */ case 2: /* fatal error, "" */ do { if (atomicio(read, remin, &ch, sizeof(ch)) != sizeof(ch)) lostconn(0); *cp++ = ch; } while (cp < &rbuf[sizeof(rbuf) - 1] && ch != '\n'); if (!iamremote) { cp[-1] = '\0'; (void) snmprintf(visbuf, sizeof(visbuf), NULL, "%s\n", rbuf); (void) atomicio(vwrite, STDERR_FILENO, visbuf, strlen(visbuf)); } ++errs; if (resp == 1) return (-1); exit(1); } /* NOTREACHED */ } void usage(void) { (void) fprintf(stderr, "usage: scp [-346ABCOpqRrsTv] [-c cipher] [-D sftp_server_path] [-F ssh_config]\n" " [-i identity_file] [-J destination] [-l limit] [-o ssh_option]\n" " [-P port] [-S program] [-X sftp_option] source ... target\n"); exit(1); } void run_err(const char *fmt,...) { static FILE *fp; va_list ap; ++errs; if (fp != NULL || (remout != -1 && (fp = fdopen(remout, "w")))) { (void) fprintf(fp, "%c", 0x01); (void) fprintf(fp, "scp: "); va_start(ap, fmt); (void) vfprintf(fp, fmt, ap); va_end(ap); (void) fprintf(fp, "\n"); (void) fflush(fp); } if (!iamremote) { va_start(ap, fmt); vfmprintf(stderr, fmt, ap); va_end(ap); fprintf(stderr, "\n"); } } /* * Notes a sink error for sending at the end of a file transfer. Returns 0 if * no error has been noted or -1 otherwise. Use note_err(NULL) to flush * any active error at the end of the transfer. */ int note_err(const char *fmt, ...) { static char *emsg; va_list ap; /* Replay any previously-noted error */ if (fmt == NULL) { if (emsg == NULL) return 0; run_err("%s", emsg); free(emsg); emsg = NULL; return -1; } errs++; /* Prefer first-noted error */ if (emsg != NULL) return -1; va_start(ap, fmt); vasnmprintf(&emsg, INT_MAX, NULL, fmt, ap); va_end(ap); return -1; } void verifydir(char *cp) { struct stat stb; if (!stat(cp, &stb)) { if (S_ISDIR(stb.st_mode)) return; errno = ENOTDIR; } run_err("%s: %s", cp, strerror(errno)); killchild(0); } int okname(char *cp0) { int c; char *cp; cp = cp0; do { c = (int)*cp; if (c & 0200) goto bad; if (!isalpha(c) && !isdigit((unsigned char)c)) { switch (c) { case '\'': case '"': case '`': case ' ': case '#': goto bad; default: break; } } } while (*++cp); return (1); bad: fmprintf(stderr, "%s: invalid user name\n", cp0); return (0); } BUF * allocbuf(BUF *bp, int fd, int blksize) { size_t size; #ifdef HAVE_STRUCT_STAT_ST_BLKSIZE struct stat stb; if (fstat(fd, &stb) == -1) { run_err("fstat: %s", strerror(errno)); return (0); } size = ROUNDUP(stb.st_blksize, blksize); if (size == 0) size = blksize; #else /* HAVE_STRUCT_STAT_ST_BLKSIZE */ size = blksize; #endif /* HAVE_STRUCT_STAT_ST_BLKSIZE */ if (bp->cnt >= size) return (bp); bp->buf = xrecallocarray(bp->buf, bp->cnt, size, 1); bp->cnt = size; return (bp); } void lostconn(int signo) { if (!iamremote) (void)write(STDERR_FILENO, "lost connection\n", 16); if (signo) _exit(1); else exit(1); } void cleanup_exit(int i) { if (remin > 0) close(remin); if (remout > 0) close(remout); if (remin2 > 0) close(remin2); if (remout2 > 0) close(remout2); if (do_cmd_pid > 0) waitpid(do_cmd_pid, NULL, 0); if (do_cmd_pid2 > 0) waitpid(do_cmd_pid2, NULL, 0); exit(i); } diff --git a/crypto/openssh/servconf.c b/crypto/openssh/servconf.c index d3aa1eaea93b..53c3ee05b9cf 100644 --- a/crypto/openssh/servconf.c +++ b/crypto/openssh/servconf.c @@ -1,3185 +1,3192 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: servconf.c,v 1.390 2023/01/17 09:44:48 djm Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: servconf.c,v 1.392 2023/03/05 05:34:09 dtucker Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen , Espoo, Finland * All rights reserved * * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell". */ #include "includes.h" #include #include #include #ifdef __OpenBSD__ #include #endif #include #include #include #ifdef HAVE_NET_ROUTE_H #include #endif #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #ifdef HAVE_UTIL_H #include #endif #ifdef USE_SYSTEM_GLOB # include #else # include "openbsd-compat/glob.h" #endif #include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h" #include "xmalloc.h" #include "ssh.h" #include "log.h" #include "sshbuf.h" #include "misc.h" #include "servconf.h" -#include "compat.h" #include "pathnames.h" #include "cipher.h" #include "sshkey.h" #include "kex.h" #include "mac.h" #include "match.h" #include "channels.h" #include "groupaccess.h" #include "canohost.h" #include "packet.h" #include "ssherr.h" #include "hostfile.h" #include "auth.h" #include "myproposal.h" #include "digest.h" #include "version.h" static void add_listen_addr(ServerOptions *, const char *, const char *, int); static void add_one_listen_addr(ServerOptions *, const char *, const char *, int); static void parse_server_config_depth(ServerOptions *options, const char *filename, struct sshbuf *conf, struct include_list *includes, struct connection_info *connectinfo, int flags, int *activep, int depth); /* Use of privilege separation or not */ extern int use_privsep; extern struct sshbuf *cfg; /* Initializes the server options to their default values. */ void initialize_server_options(ServerOptions *options) { memset(options, 0, sizeof(*options)); /* Portable-specific options */ options->use_pam = -1; /* Standard Options */ options->num_ports = 0; options->ports_from_cmdline = 0; options->queued_listen_addrs = NULL; options->num_queued_listens = 0; options->listen_addrs = NULL; options->num_listen_addrs = 0; options->address_family = -1; options->routing_domain = NULL; options->num_host_key_files = 0; options->num_host_cert_files = 0; options->host_key_agent = NULL; options->pid_file = NULL; options->login_grace_time = -1; options->permit_root_login = PERMIT_NOT_SET; options->ignore_rhosts = -1; options->ignore_user_known_hosts = -1; options->print_motd = -1; options->print_lastlog = -1; options->x11_forwarding = -1; options->x11_display_offset = -1; options->x11_use_localhost = -1; options->permit_tty = -1; options->permit_user_rc = -1; options->xauth_location = NULL; options->strict_modes = -1; options->tcp_keep_alive = -1; options->log_facility = SYSLOG_FACILITY_NOT_SET; options->log_level = SYSLOG_LEVEL_NOT_SET; options->num_log_verbose = 0; options->log_verbose = NULL; options->hostbased_authentication = -1; options->hostbased_uses_name_from_packet_only = -1; options->hostbased_accepted_algos = NULL; options->hostkeyalgorithms = NULL; options->pubkey_authentication = -1; options->pubkey_auth_options = -1; options->pubkey_accepted_algos = NULL; options->kerberos_authentication = -1; options->kerberos_or_local_passwd = -1; options->kerberos_ticket_cleanup = -1; options->kerberos_get_afs_token = -1; options->gss_authentication=-1; options->gss_cleanup_creds = -1; options->gss_strict_acceptor = -1; options->password_authentication = -1; options->kbd_interactive_authentication = -1; options->permit_empty_passwd = -1; options->permit_user_env = -1; options->permit_user_env_allowlist = NULL; options->compression = -1; options->rekey_limit = -1; options->rekey_interval = -1; options->allow_tcp_forwarding = -1; options->allow_streamlocal_forwarding = -1; options->allow_agent_forwarding = -1; options->num_allow_users = 0; options->num_deny_users = 0; options->num_allow_groups = 0; options->num_deny_groups = 0; options->ciphers = NULL; options->macs = NULL; options->kex_algorithms = NULL; options->ca_sign_algorithms = NULL; options->fwd_opts.gateway_ports = -1; options->fwd_opts.streamlocal_bind_mask = (mode_t)-1; options->fwd_opts.streamlocal_bind_unlink = -1; options->num_subsystems = 0; options->max_startups_begin = -1; options->max_startups_rate = -1; options->max_startups = -1; options->per_source_max_startups = -1; options->per_source_masklen_ipv4 = -1; options->per_source_masklen_ipv6 = -1; options->max_authtries = -1; options->max_sessions = -1; options->banner = NULL; options->use_dns = -1; options->client_alive_interval = -1; options->client_alive_count_max = -1; options->num_authkeys_files = 0; options->num_accept_env = 0; options->num_setenv = 0; options->permit_tun = -1; options->permitted_opens = NULL; options->permitted_listens = NULL; options->adm_forced_command = NULL; options->chroot_directory = NULL; options->authorized_keys_command = NULL; options->authorized_keys_command_user = NULL; options->revoked_keys_file = NULL; options->sk_provider = NULL; options->trusted_user_ca_keys = NULL; options->authorized_principals_file = NULL; options->authorized_principals_command = NULL; options->authorized_principals_command_user = NULL; options->ip_qos_interactive = -1; options->ip_qos_bulk = -1; options->version_addendum = NULL; options->fingerprint_hash = -1; options->disable_forwarding = -1; options->expose_userauth_info = -1; options->required_rsa_size = -1; options->channel_timeouts = NULL; options->num_channel_timeouts = 0; options->unused_connection_timeout = -1; options->use_blacklist = -1; } /* Returns 1 if a string option is unset or set to "none" or 0 otherwise. */ static int option_clear_or_none(const char *o) { return o == NULL || strcasecmp(o, "none") == 0; } static void assemble_algorithms(ServerOptions *o) { char *all_cipher, *all_mac, *all_kex, *all_key, *all_sig; char *def_cipher, *def_mac, *def_kex, *def_key, *def_sig; int r; all_cipher = cipher_alg_list(',', 0); all_mac = mac_alg_list(','); all_kex = kex_alg_list(','); all_key = sshkey_alg_list(0, 0, 1, ','); all_sig = sshkey_alg_list(0, 1, 1, ','); /* remove unsupported algos from default lists */ def_cipher = match_filter_allowlist(KEX_SERVER_ENCRYPT, all_cipher); def_mac = match_filter_allowlist(KEX_SERVER_MAC, all_mac); def_kex = match_filter_allowlist(KEX_SERVER_KEX, all_kex); def_key = match_filter_allowlist(KEX_DEFAULT_PK_ALG, all_key); def_sig = match_filter_allowlist(SSH_ALLOWED_CA_SIGALGS, all_sig); #define ASSEMBLE(what, defaults, all) \ do { \ if ((r = kex_assemble_names(&o->what, defaults, all)) != 0) \ fatal_fr(r, "%s", #what); \ } while (0) ASSEMBLE(ciphers, def_cipher, all_cipher); ASSEMBLE(macs, def_mac, all_mac); ASSEMBLE(kex_algorithms, def_kex, all_kex); ASSEMBLE(hostkeyalgorithms, def_key, all_key); ASSEMBLE(hostbased_accepted_algos, def_key, all_key); ASSEMBLE(pubkey_accepted_algos, def_key, all_key); ASSEMBLE(ca_sign_algorithms, def_sig, all_sig); #undef ASSEMBLE free(all_cipher); free(all_mac); free(all_kex); free(all_key); free(all_sig); free(def_cipher); free(def_mac); free(def_kex); free(def_key); free(def_sig); } static const char *defaultkey = "[default]"; void servconf_add_hostkey(const char *file, const int line, ServerOptions *options, const char *path, int userprovided) { char *apath = derelativise_path(path); if (file == defaultkey && access(path, R_OK) != 0) return; opt_array_append2(file, line, "HostKey", &options->host_key_files, &options->host_key_file_userprovided, &options->num_host_key_files, apath, userprovided); free(apath); } void servconf_add_hostcert(const char *file, const int line, ServerOptions *options, const char *path) { char *apath = derelativise_path(path); opt_array_append(file, line, "HostCertificate", &options->host_cert_files, &options->num_host_cert_files, apath); free(apath); } void fill_default_server_options(ServerOptions *options) { u_int i; /* Portable-specific options */ if (options->use_pam == -1) options->use_pam = 1; /* Standard Options */ if (options->num_host_key_files == 0) { /* fill default hostkeys for protocols */ servconf_add_hostkey(defaultkey, 0, options, _PATH_HOST_RSA_KEY_FILE, 0); #ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC servconf_add_hostkey(defaultkey, 0, options, _PATH_HOST_ECDSA_KEY_FILE, 0); #endif servconf_add_hostkey(defaultkey, 0, options, _PATH_HOST_ED25519_KEY_FILE, 0); #ifdef WITH_XMSS servconf_add_hostkey(defaultkey, 0, options, _PATH_HOST_XMSS_KEY_FILE, 0); #endif /* WITH_XMSS */ } if (options->num_host_key_files == 0) fatal("No host key files found"); /* No certificates by default */ if (options->num_ports == 0) options->ports[options->num_ports++] = SSH_DEFAULT_PORT; if (options->address_family == -1) options->address_family = AF_UNSPEC; if (options->listen_addrs == NULL) add_listen_addr(options, NULL, NULL, 0); if (options->pid_file == NULL) options->pid_file = xstrdup(_PATH_SSH_DAEMON_PID_FILE); if (options->moduli_file == NULL) options->moduli_file = xstrdup(_PATH_DH_MODULI); if (options->login_grace_time == -1) options->login_grace_time = 120; if (options->permit_root_login == PERMIT_NOT_SET) options->permit_root_login = PERMIT_NO; if (options->ignore_rhosts == -1) options->ignore_rhosts = 1; if (options->ignore_user_known_hosts == -1) options->ignore_user_known_hosts = 0; if (options->print_motd == -1) options->print_motd = 1; if (options->print_lastlog == -1) options->print_lastlog = 1; if (options->x11_forwarding == -1) options->x11_forwarding = 0; if (options->x11_display_offset == -1) options->x11_display_offset = 10; if (options->x11_use_localhost == -1) options->x11_use_localhost = 1; if (options->xauth_location == NULL) options->xauth_location = xstrdup(_PATH_XAUTH); if (options->permit_tty == -1) options->permit_tty = 1; if (options->permit_user_rc == -1) options->permit_user_rc = 1; if (options->strict_modes == -1) options->strict_modes = 1; if (options->tcp_keep_alive == -1) options->tcp_keep_alive = 1; if (options->log_facility == SYSLOG_FACILITY_NOT_SET) options->log_facility = SYSLOG_FACILITY_AUTH; if (options->log_level == SYSLOG_LEVEL_NOT_SET) options->log_level = SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO; if (options->hostbased_authentication == -1) options->hostbased_authentication = 0; if (options->hostbased_uses_name_from_packet_only == -1) options->hostbased_uses_name_from_packet_only = 0; if (options->pubkey_authentication == -1) options->pubkey_authentication = 1; if (options->pubkey_auth_options == -1) options->pubkey_auth_options = 0; if (options->kerberos_authentication == -1) options->kerberos_authentication = 0; if (options->kerberos_or_local_passwd == -1) options->kerberos_or_local_passwd = 1; if (options->kerberos_ticket_cleanup == -1) options->kerberos_ticket_cleanup = 1; if (options->kerberos_get_afs_token == -1) options->kerberos_get_afs_token = 0; if (options->gss_authentication == -1) options->gss_authentication = 0; if (options->gss_cleanup_creds == -1) options->gss_cleanup_creds = 1; if (options->gss_strict_acceptor == -1) options->gss_strict_acceptor = 1; if (options->password_authentication == -1) options->password_authentication = 0; if (options->kbd_interactive_authentication == -1) options->kbd_interactive_authentication = 1; if (options->permit_empty_passwd == -1) options->permit_empty_passwd = 0; if (options->permit_user_env == -1) { options->permit_user_env = 0; options->permit_user_env_allowlist = NULL; } if (options->compression == -1) #ifdef WITH_ZLIB options->compression = COMP_DELAYED; #else options->compression = COMP_NONE; #endif if (options->rekey_limit == -1) options->rekey_limit = 0; if (options->rekey_interval == -1) options->rekey_interval = 0; if (options->allow_tcp_forwarding == -1) options->allow_tcp_forwarding = FORWARD_ALLOW; if (options->allow_streamlocal_forwarding == -1) options->allow_streamlocal_forwarding = FORWARD_ALLOW; if (options->allow_agent_forwarding == -1) options->allow_agent_forwarding = 1; if (options->fwd_opts.gateway_ports == -1) options->fwd_opts.gateway_ports = 0; if (options->max_startups == -1) options->max_startups = 100; if (options->max_startups_rate == -1) options->max_startups_rate = 30; /* 30% */ if (options->max_startups_begin == -1) options->max_startups_begin = 10; if (options->per_source_max_startups == -1) options->per_source_max_startups = INT_MAX; if (options->per_source_masklen_ipv4 == -1) options->per_source_masklen_ipv4 = 32; if (options->per_source_masklen_ipv6 == -1) options->per_source_masklen_ipv6 = 128; if (options->max_authtries == -1) options->max_authtries = DEFAULT_AUTH_FAIL_MAX; if (options->max_sessions == -1) options->max_sessions = DEFAULT_SESSIONS_MAX; if (options->use_dns == -1) options->use_dns = 1; if (options->client_alive_interval == -1) options->client_alive_interval = 0; if (options->client_alive_count_max == -1) options->client_alive_count_max = 3; if (options->num_authkeys_files == 0) { opt_array_append(defaultkey, 0, "AuthorizedKeysFiles", &options->authorized_keys_files, &options->num_authkeys_files, _PATH_SSH_USER_PERMITTED_KEYS); opt_array_append(defaultkey, 0, "AuthorizedKeysFiles", &options->authorized_keys_files, &options->num_authkeys_files, _PATH_SSH_USER_PERMITTED_KEYS2); } if (options->permit_tun == -1) options->permit_tun = SSH_TUNMODE_NO; if (options->ip_qos_interactive == -1) options->ip_qos_interactive = IPTOS_DSCP_AF21; if (options->ip_qos_bulk == -1) options->ip_qos_bulk = IPTOS_DSCP_CS1; if (options->version_addendum == NULL) options->version_addendum = xstrdup(SSH_VERSION_FREEBSD); if (options->fwd_opts.streamlocal_bind_mask == (mode_t)-1) options->fwd_opts.streamlocal_bind_mask = 0177; if (options->fwd_opts.streamlocal_bind_unlink == -1) options->fwd_opts.streamlocal_bind_unlink = 0; if (options->fingerprint_hash == -1) options->fingerprint_hash = SSH_FP_HASH_DEFAULT; if (options->disable_forwarding == -1) options->disable_forwarding = 0; if (options->expose_userauth_info == -1) options->expose_userauth_info = 0; if (options->sk_provider == NULL) options->sk_provider = xstrdup("internal"); if (options->required_rsa_size == -1) options->required_rsa_size = SSH_RSA_MINIMUM_MODULUS_SIZE; if (options->unused_connection_timeout == -1) options->unused_connection_timeout = 0; if (options->use_blacklist == -1) options->use_blacklist = 0; assemble_algorithms(options); /* Turn privilege separation and sandboxing on by default */ if (use_privsep == -1) use_privsep = PRIVSEP_ON; #define CLEAR_ON_NONE(v) \ do { \ if (option_clear_or_none(v)) { \ free(v); \ v = NULL; \ } \ } while(0) #define CLEAR_ON_NONE_ARRAY(v, nv, none) \ do { \ if (options->nv == 1 && \ strcasecmp(options->v[0], none) == 0) { \ free(options->v[0]); \ free(options->v); \ options->v = NULL; \ options->nv = 0; \ } \ } while (0) CLEAR_ON_NONE(options->pid_file); CLEAR_ON_NONE(options->xauth_location); CLEAR_ON_NONE(options->banner); CLEAR_ON_NONE(options->trusted_user_ca_keys); CLEAR_ON_NONE(options->revoked_keys_file); CLEAR_ON_NONE(options->sk_provider); CLEAR_ON_NONE(options->authorized_principals_file); CLEAR_ON_NONE(options->adm_forced_command); CLEAR_ON_NONE(options->chroot_directory); CLEAR_ON_NONE(options->routing_domain); CLEAR_ON_NONE(options->host_key_agent); for (i = 0; i < options->num_host_key_files; i++) CLEAR_ON_NONE(options->host_key_files[i]); for (i = 0; i < options->num_host_cert_files; i++) CLEAR_ON_NONE(options->host_cert_files[i]); CLEAR_ON_NONE_ARRAY(channel_timeouts, num_channel_timeouts, "none"); CLEAR_ON_NONE_ARRAY(auth_methods, num_auth_methods, "any"); #undef CLEAR_ON_NONE #undef CLEAR_ON_NONE_ARRAY } /* Keyword tokens. */ typedef enum { sBadOption, /* == unknown option */ /* Portable-specific options */ sUsePAM, /* Standard Options */ sPort, sHostKeyFile, sLoginGraceTime, sPermitRootLogin, sLogFacility, sLogLevel, sLogVerbose, sKerberosAuthentication, sKerberosOrLocalPasswd, sKerberosTicketCleanup, sKerberosGetAFSToken, sPasswordAuthentication, sKbdInteractiveAuthentication, sListenAddress, sAddressFamily, sPrintMotd, sPrintLastLog, sIgnoreRhosts, sX11Forwarding, sX11DisplayOffset, sX11UseLocalhost, sPermitTTY, sStrictModes, sEmptyPasswd, sTCPKeepAlive, sPermitUserEnvironment, sAllowTcpForwarding, sCompression, sRekeyLimit, sAllowUsers, sDenyUsers, sAllowGroups, sDenyGroups, sIgnoreUserKnownHosts, sCiphers, sMacs, sPidFile, sModuliFile, sGatewayPorts, sPubkeyAuthentication, sPubkeyAcceptedAlgorithms, sXAuthLocation, sSubsystem, sMaxStartups, sMaxAuthTries, sMaxSessions, sBanner, sUseDNS, sHostbasedAuthentication, sHostbasedUsesNameFromPacketOnly, sHostbasedAcceptedAlgorithms, sHostKeyAlgorithms, sPerSourceMaxStartups, sPerSourceNetBlockSize, sClientAliveInterval, sClientAliveCountMax, sAuthorizedKeysFile, sGssAuthentication, sGssCleanupCreds, sGssStrictAcceptor, sAcceptEnv, sSetEnv, sPermitTunnel, sMatch, sPermitOpen, sPermitListen, sForceCommand, sChrootDirectory, sUsePrivilegeSeparation, sAllowAgentForwarding, sHostCertificate, sInclude, sRevokedKeys, sTrustedUserCAKeys, sAuthorizedPrincipalsFile, sAuthorizedPrincipalsCommand, sAuthorizedPrincipalsCommandUser, sKexAlgorithms, sCASignatureAlgorithms, sIPQoS, sVersionAddendum, sAuthorizedKeysCommand, sAuthorizedKeysCommandUser, sAuthenticationMethods, sHostKeyAgent, sPermitUserRC, sStreamLocalBindMask, sStreamLocalBindUnlink, sAllowStreamLocalForwarding, sFingerprintHash, sDisableForwarding, sExposeAuthInfo, sRDomain, sPubkeyAuthOptions, sSecurityKeyProvider, sRequiredRSASize, sChannelTimeout, sUnusedConnectionTimeout, sUseBlacklist, sDeprecated, sIgnore, sUnsupported } ServerOpCodes; #define SSHCFG_GLOBAL 0x01 /* allowed in main section of config */ #define SSHCFG_MATCH 0x02 /* allowed inside a Match section */ #define SSHCFG_ALL (SSHCFG_GLOBAL|SSHCFG_MATCH) #define SSHCFG_NEVERMATCH 0x04 /* Match never matches; internal only */ #define SSHCFG_MATCH_ONLY 0x08 /* Match only in conditional blocks; internal only */ /* Textual representation of the tokens. */ static struct { const char *name; ServerOpCodes opcode; u_int flags; } keywords[] = { /* Portable-specific options */ #ifdef USE_PAM { "usepam", sUsePAM, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, #else { "usepam", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, #endif { "pamauthenticationviakbdint", sDeprecated, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, /* Standard Options */ { "port", sPort, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, { "hostkey", sHostKeyFile, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, { "hostdsakey", sHostKeyFile, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, /* alias */ { "hostkeyagent", sHostKeyAgent, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, { "pidfile", sPidFile, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, { "modulifile", sModuliFile, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, { "serverkeybits", sDeprecated, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, { "logingracetime", sLoginGraceTime, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, { "keyregenerationinterval", sDeprecated, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, { "permitrootlogin", sPermitRootLogin, SSHCFG_ALL }, { "syslogfacility", sLogFacility, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, { "loglevel", sLogLevel, SSHCFG_ALL }, { "logverbose", sLogVerbose, SSHCFG_ALL }, { "rhostsauthentication", sDeprecated, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, { "rhostsrsaauthentication", sDeprecated, SSHCFG_ALL }, { "hostbasedauthentication", sHostbasedAuthentication, SSHCFG_ALL }, { "hostbasedusesnamefrompacketonly", sHostbasedUsesNameFromPacketOnly, SSHCFG_ALL }, { "hostbasedacceptedalgorithms", sHostbasedAcceptedAlgorithms, SSHCFG_ALL }, { "hostbasedacceptedkeytypes", sHostbasedAcceptedAlgorithms, SSHCFG_ALL }, /* obsolete */ { "hostkeyalgorithms", sHostKeyAlgorithms, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, { "rsaauthentication", sDeprecated, SSHCFG_ALL }, { "pubkeyauthentication", sPubkeyAuthentication, SSHCFG_ALL }, { "pubkeyacceptedalgorithms", sPubkeyAcceptedAlgorithms, SSHCFG_ALL }, { "pubkeyacceptedkeytypes", sPubkeyAcceptedAlgorithms, SSHCFG_ALL }, /* obsolete */ { "pubkeyauthoptions", sPubkeyAuthOptions, SSHCFG_ALL }, { "dsaauthentication", sPubkeyAuthentication, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, /* alias */ #ifdef KRB5 { "kerberosauthentication", sKerberosAuthentication, SSHCFG_ALL }, { "kerberosorlocalpasswd", sKerberosOrLocalPasswd, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, { "kerberosticketcleanup", sKerberosTicketCleanup, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, #ifdef USE_AFS { "kerberosgetafstoken", sKerberosGetAFSToken, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, #else { "kerberosgetafstoken", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, #endif #else { "kerberosauthentication", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_ALL }, { "kerberosorlocalpasswd", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, { "kerberosticketcleanup", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, { "kerberosgetafstoken", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, #endif { "kerberostgtpassing", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, { "afstokenpassing", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, #ifdef GSSAPI { "gssapiauthentication", sGssAuthentication, SSHCFG_ALL }, { "gssapicleanupcredentials", sGssCleanupCreds, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, { "gssapistrictacceptorcheck", sGssStrictAcceptor, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, #else { "gssapiauthentication", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_ALL }, { "gssapicleanupcredentials", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, { "gssapistrictacceptorcheck", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, #endif { "passwordauthentication", sPasswordAuthentication, SSHCFG_ALL }, { "kbdinteractiveauthentication", sKbdInteractiveAuthentication, SSHCFG_ALL }, { "challengeresponseauthentication", sKbdInteractiveAuthentication, SSHCFG_ALL }, /* alias */ { "skeyauthentication", sKbdInteractiveAuthentication, SSHCFG_ALL }, /* alias */ { "checkmail", sDeprecated, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, { "listenaddress", sListenAddress, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, { "addressfamily", sAddressFamily, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, { "printmotd", sPrintMotd, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, #ifdef DISABLE_LASTLOG { "printlastlog", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, #else { "printlastlog", sPrintLastLog, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, #endif { "ignorerhosts", sIgnoreRhosts, SSHCFG_ALL }, { "ignoreuserknownhosts", sIgnoreUserKnownHosts, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, { "x11forwarding", sX11Forwarding, SSHCFG_ALL }, { "x11displayoffset", sX11DisplayOffset, SSHCFG_ALL }, { "x11uselocalhost", sX11UseLocalhost, SSHCFG_ALL }, { "xauthlocation", sXAuthLocation, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, { "strictmodes", sStrictModes, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, { "permitemptypasswords", sEmptyPasswd, SSHCFG_ALL }, { "permituserenvironment", sPermitUserEnvironment, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, { "uselogin", sDeprecated, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, { "compression", sCompression, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, { "rekeylimit", sRekeyLimit, SSHCFG_ALL }, { "tcpkeepalive", sTCPKeepAlive, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, { "keepalive", sTCPKeepAlive, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, /* obsolete alias */ { "allowtcpforwarding", sAllowTcpForwarding, SSHCFG_ALL }, { "allowagentforwarding", sAllowAgentForwarding, SSHCFG_ALL }, { "allowusers", sAllowUsers, SSHCFG_ALL }, { "denyusers", sDenyUsers, SSHCFG_ALL }, { "allowgroups", sAllowGroups, SSHCFG_ALL }, { "denygroups", sDenyGroups, SSHCFG_ALL }, { "ciphers", sCiphers, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, { "macs", sMacs, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, { "protocol", sIgnore, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, { "gatewayports", sGatewayPorts, SSHCFG_ALL }, { "subsystem", sSubsystem, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, { "maxstartups", sMaxStartups, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, { "persourcemaxstartups", sPerSourceMaxStartups, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, { "persourcenetblocksize", sPerSourceNetBlockSize, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, { "maxauthtries", sMaxAuthTries, SSHCFG_ALL }, { "maxsessions", sMaxSessions, SSHCFG_ALL }, { "banner", sBanner, SSHCFG_ALL }, { "usedns", sUseDNS, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, { "verifyreversemapping", sDeprecated, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, { "reversemappingcheck", sDeprecated, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, { "clientaliveinterval", sClientAliveInterval, SSHCFG_ALL }, { "clientalivecountmax", sClientAliveCountMax, SSHCFG_ALL }, { "authorizedkeysfile", sAuthorizedKeysFile, SSHCFG_ALL }, { "authorizedkeysfile2", sDeprecated, SSHCFG_ALL }, { "useprivilegeseparation", sDeprecated, SSHCFG_GLOBAL}, { "acceptenv", sAcceptEnv, SSHCFG_ALL }, { "setenv", sSetEnv, SSHCFG_ALL }, { "permittunnel", sPermitTunnel, SSHCFG_ALL }, { "permittty", sPermitTTY, SSHCFG_ALL }, { "permituserrc", sPermitUserRC, SSHCFG_ALL }, { "match", sMatch, SSHCFG_ALL }, { "permitopen", sPermitOpen, SSHCFG_ALL }, { "permitlisten", sPermitListen, SSHCFG_ALL }, { "forcecommand", sForceCommand, SSHCFG_ALL }, { "chrootdirectory", sChrootDirectory, SSHCFG_ALL }, { "hostcertificate", sHostCertificate, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, { "revokedkeys", sRevokedKeys, SSHCFG_ALL }, { "trustedusercakeys", sTrustedUserCAKeys, SSHCFG_ALL }, { "authorizedprincipalsfile", sAuthorizedPrincipalsFile, SSHCFG_ALL }, { "kexalgorithms", sKexAlgorithms, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, { "include", sInclude, SSHCFG_ALL }, { "ipqos", sIPQoS, SSHCFG_ALL }, { "authorizedkeyscommand", sAuthorizedKeysCommand, SSHCFG_ALL }, { "authorizedkeyscommanduser", sAuthorizedKeysCommandUser, SSHCFG_ALL }, { "authorizedprincipalscommand", sAuthorizedPrincipalsCommand, SSHCFG_ALL }, { "authorizedprincipalscommanduser", sAuthorizedPrincipalsCommandUser, SSHCFG_ALL }, { "versionaddendum", sVersionAddendum, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, { "authenticationmethods", sAuthenticationMethods, SSHCFG_ALL }, { "streamlocalbindmask", sStreamLocalBindMask, SSHCFG_ALL }, { "streamlocalbindunlink", sStreamLocalBindUnlink, SSHCFG_ALL }, { "allowstreamlocalforwarding", sAllowStreamLocalForwarding, SSHCFG_ALL }, { "fingerprinthash", sFingerprintHash, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, { "disableforwarding", sDisableForwarding, SSHCFG_ALL }, { "exposeauthinfo", sExposeAuthInfo, SSHCFG_ALL }, { "rdomain", sRDomain, SSHCFG_ALL }, { "casignaturealgorithms", sCASignatureAlgorithms, SSHCFG_ALL }, { "securitykeyprovider", sSecurityKeyProvider, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, { "requiredrsasize", sRequiredRSASize, SSHCFG_ALL }, { "channeltimeout", sChannelTimeout, SSHCFG_ALL }, { "unusedconnectiontimeout", sUnusedConnectionTimeout, SSHCFG_ALL }, { "useblacklist", sUseBlacklist, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, { "useblocklist", sUseBlacklist, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, /* alias */ { "noneenabled", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_ALL }, { "hpndisabled", sDeprecated, SSHCFG_ALL }, { "hpnbuffersize", sDeprecated, SSHCFG_ALL }, { "tcprcvbufpoll", sDeprecated, SSHCFG_ALL }, { NULL, sBadOption, 0 } }; static struct { int val; char *text; } tunmode_desc[] = { { SSH_TUNMODE_NO, "no" }, { SSH_TUNMODE_POINTOPOINT, "point-to-point" }, { SSH_TUNMODE_ETHERNET, "ethernet" }, { SSH_TUNMODE_YES, "yes" }, { -1, NULL } }; /* Returns an opcode name from its number */ static const char * lookup_opcode_name(ServerOpCodes code) { u_int i; for (i = 0; keywords[i].name != NULL; i++) if (keywords[i].opcode == code) return(keywords[i].name); return "UNKNOWN"; } /* * Returns the number of the token pointed to by cp or sBadOption. */ static ServerOpCodes parse_token(const char *cp, const char *filename, int linenum, u_int *flags) { u_int i; for (i = 0; keywords[i].name; i++) if (strcasecmp(cp, keywords[i].name) == 0) { *flags = keywords[i].flags; return keywords[i].opcode; } error("%s: line %d: Bad configuration option: %s", filename, linenum, cp); return sBadOption; } char * derelativise_path(const char *path) { char *expanded, *ret, cwd[PATH_MAX]; if (strcasecmp(path, "none") == 0) return xstrdup("none"); expanded = tilde_expand_filename(path, getuid()); if (path_absolute(expanded)) return expanded; if (getcwd(cwd, sizeof(cwd)) == NULL) fatal_f("getcwd: %s", strerror(errno)); xasprintf(&ret, "%s/%s", cwd, expanded); free(expanded); return ret; } static void add_listen_addr(ServerOptions *options, const char *addr, const char *rdomain, int port) { u_int i; if (port > 0) add_one_listen_addr(options, addr, rdomain, port); else { for (i = 0; i < options->num_ports; i++) { add_one_listen_addr(options, addr, rdomain, options->ports[i]); } } } static void add_one_listen_addr(ServerOptions *options, const char *addr, const char *rdomain, int port) { struct addrinfo hints, *ai, *aitop; char strport[NI_MAXSERV]; int gaierr; u_int i; /* Find listen_addrs entry for this rdomain */ for (i = 0; i < options->num_listen_addrs; i++) { if (rdomain == NULL && options->listen_addrs[i].rdomain == NULL) break; if (rdomain == NULL || options->listen_addrs[i].rdomain == NULL) continue; if (strcmp(rdomain, options->listen_addrs[i].rdomain) == 0) break; } if (i >= options->num_listen_addrs) { /* No entry for this rdomain; allocate one */ if (i >= INT_MAX) fatal_f("too many listen addresses"); options->listen_addrs = xrecallocarray(options->listen_addrs, options->num_listen_addrs, options->num_listen_addrs + 1, sizeof(*options->listen_addrs)); i = options->num_listen_addrs++; if (rdomain != NULL) options->listen_addrs[i].rdomain = xstrdup(rdomain); } /* options->listen_addrs[i] points to the addresses for this rdomain */ memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints)); hints.ai_family = options->address_family; hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM; hints.ai_flags = (addr == NULL) ? AI_PASSIVE : 0; snprintf(strport, sizeof strport, "%d", port); if ((gaierr = getaddrinfo(addr, strport, &hints, &aitop)) != 0) fatal("bad addr or host: %s (%s)", addr ? addr : "", ssh_gai_strerror(gaierr)); for (ai = aitop; ai->ai_next; ai = ai->ai_next) ; ai->ai_next = options->listen_addrs[i].addrs; options->listen_addrs[i].addrs = aitop; } /* Returns nonzero if the routing domain name is valid */ static int valid_rdomain(const char *name) { #if defined(HAVE_SYS_VALID_RDOMAIN) return sys_valid_rdomain(name); #elif defined(__OpenBSD__) const char *errstr; long long num; struct rt_tableinfo info; int mib[6]; size_t miblen = sizeof(mib); if (name == NULL) return 1; num = strtonum(name, 0, 255, &errstr); if (errstr != NULL) return 0; /* Check whether the table actually exists */ memset(mib, 0, sizeof(mib)); mib[0] = CTL_NET; mib[1] = PF_ROUTE; mib[4] = NET_RT_TABLE; mib[5] = (int)num; if (sysctl(mib, 6, &info, &miblen, NULL, 0) == -1) return 0; return 1; #else /* defined(__OpenBSD__) */ error("Routing domains are not supported on this platform"); return 0; #endif } /* * Queue a ListenAddress to be processed once we have all of the Ports * and AddressFamily options. */ static void queue_listen_addr(ServerOptions *options, const char *addr, const char *rdomain, int port) { struct queued_listenaddr *qla; options->queued_listen_addrs = xrecallocarray( options->queued_listen_addrs, options->num_queued_listens, options->num_queued_listens + 1, sizeof(*options->queued_listen_addrs)); qla = &options->queued_listen_addrs[options->num_queued_listens++]; qla->addr = xstrdup(addr); qla->port = port; qla->rdomain = rdomain == NULL ? NULL : xstrdup(rdomain); } /* * Process queued (text) ListenAddress entries. */ static void process_queued_listen_addrs(ServerOptions *options) { u_int i; struct queued_listenaddr *qla; if (options->num_ports == 0) options->ports[options->num_ports++] = SSH_DEFAULT_PORT; if (options->address_family == -1) options->address_family = AF_UNSPEC; for (i = 0; i < options->num_queued_listens; i++) { qla = &options->queued_listen_addrs[i]; add_listen_addr(options, qla->addr, qla->rdomain, qla->port); free(qla->addr); free(qla->rdomain); } free(options->queued_listen_addrs); options->queued_listen_addrs = NULL; options->num_queued_listens = 0; } /* * Inform channels layer of permitopen options for a single forwarding * direction (local/remote). */ static void process_permitopen_list(struct ssh *ssh, ServerOpCodes opcode, char **opens, u_int num_opens) { u_int i; int port; char *host, *arg, *oarg; int where = opcode == sPermitOpen ? FORWARD_LOCAL : FORWARD_REMOTE; const char *what = lookup_opcode_name(opcode); channel_clear_permission(ssh, FORWARD_ADM, where); if (num_opens == 0) return; /* permit any */ /* handle keywords: "any" / "none" */ if (num_opens == 1 && strcmp(opens[0], "any") == 0) return; if (num_opens == 1 && strcmp(opens[0], "none") == 0) { channel_disable_admin(ssh, where); return; } /* Otherwise treat it as a list of permitted host:port */ for (i = 0; i < num_opens; i++) { oarg = arg = xstrdup(opens[i]); host = hpdelim(&arg); if (host == NULL) fatal_f("missing host in %s", what); host = cleanhostname(host); if (arg == NULL || ((port = permitopen_port(arg)) < 0)) fatal_f("bad port number in %s", what); /* Send it to channels layer */ channel_add_permission(ssh, FORWARD_ADM, where, host, port); free(oarg); } } /* * Inform channels layer of permitopen options from configuration. */ void process_permitopen(struct ssh *ssh, ServerOptions *options) { process_permitopen_list(ssh, sPermitOpen, options->permitted_opens, options->num_permitted_opens); process_permitopen_list(ssh, sPermitListen, options->permitted_listens, options->num_permitted_listens); } /* Parse a ChannelTimeout clause "pattern=interval" */ static int parse_timeout(const char *s, char **typep, u_int *secsp) { char *cp, *sdup; int secs; if (typep != NULL) *typep = NULL; if (secsp != NULL) *secsp = 0; if (s == NULL) return -1; sdup = xstrdup(s); if ((cp = strchr(sdup, '=')) == NULL || cp == sdup) { free(sdup); return -1; } *cp++ = '\0'; if ((secs = convtime(cp)) < 0) { free(sdup); return -1; } /* success */ if (typep != NULL) *typep = xstrdup(sdup); if (secsp != NULL) *secsp = (u_int)secs; free(sdup); return 0; } void process_channel_timeouts(struct ssh *ssh, ServerOptions *options) { u_int i, secs; char *type; debug3_f("setting %u timeouts", options->num_channel_timeouts); channel_clear_timeouts(ssh); for (i = 0; i < options->num_channel_timeouts; i++) { if (parse_timeout(options->channel_timeouts[i], &type, &secs) != 0) { fatal_f("internal error: bad timeout %s", options->channel_timeouts[i]); } channel_add_timeout(ssh, type, secs); free(type); } } struct connection_info * get_connection_info(struct ssh *ssh, int populate, int use_dns) { static struct connection_info ci; if (ssh == NULL || !populate) return &ci; ci.host = auth_get_canonical_hostname(ssh, use_dns); ci.address = ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh); ci.laddress = ssh_local_ipaddr(ssh); ci.lport = ssh_local_port(ssh); ci.rdomain = ssh_packet_rdomain_in(ssh); return &ci; } /* * The strategy for the Match blocks is that the config file is parsed twice. * * The first time is at startup. activep is initialized to 1 and the * directives in the global context are processed and acted on. Hitting a * Match directive unsets activep and the directives inside the block are * checked for syntax only. * * The second time is after a connection has been established but before * authentication. activep is initialized to 2 and global config directives * are ignored since they have already been processed. If the criteria in a * Match block is met, activep is set and the subsequent directives * processed and actioned until EOF or another Match block unsets it. Any * options set are copied into the main server config. * * Potential additions/improvements: * - Add Match support for pre-kex directives, eg. Ciphers. * * - Add a Tag directive (idea from David Leonard) ala pf, eg: * Match Address 192.168.0.* * Tag trusted * Match Group wheel * Tag trusted * Match Tag trusted * AllowTcpForwarding yes * GatewayPorts clientspecified * [...] * * - Add a PermittedChannelRequests directive * Match Group shell * PermittedChannelRequests session,forwarded-tcpip */ static int match_cfg_line_group(const char *grps, int line, const char *user) { int result = 0; struct passwd *pw; if (user == NULL) goto out; if ((pw = getpwnam(user)) == NULL) { debug("Can't match group at line %d because user %.100s does " "not exist", line, user); } else if (ga_init(pw->pw_name, pw->pw_gid) == 0) { debug("Can't Match group because user %.100s not in any group " "at line %d", user, line); } else if (ga_match_pattern_list(grps) != 1) { debug("user %.100s does not match group list %.100s at line %d", user, grps, line); } else { debug("user %.100s matched group list %.100s at line %d", user, grps, line); result = 1; } out: ga_free(); return result; } static void match_test_missing_fatal(const char *criteria, const char *attrib) { fatal("'Match %s' in configuration but '%s' not in connection " "test specification.", criteria, attrib); } /* * All of the attributes on a single Match line are ANDed together, so we need * to check every attribute and set the result to zero if any attribute does * not match. */ static int match_cfg_line(char **condition, int line, struct connection_info *ci) { int result = 1, attributes = 0, port; char *arg, *attrib, *cp = *condition; if (ci == NULL) debug3("checking syntax for 'Match %s'", cp); else debug3("checking match for '%s' user %s host %s addr %s " "laddr %s lport %d", cp, ci->user ? ci->user : "(null)", ci->host ? ci->host : "(null)", ci->address ? ci->address : "(null)", ci->laddress ? ci->laddress : "(null)", ci->lport); while ((attrib = strdelim(&cp)) && *attrib != '\0') { /* Terminate on comment */ if (*attrib == '#') { cp = NULL; /* mark all arguments consumed */ break; } arg = NULL; attributes++; /* Criterion "all" has no argument and must appear alone */ if (strcasecmp(attrib, "all") == 0) { if (attributes > 1 || ((arg = strdelim(&cp)) != NULL && *arg != '\0' && *arg != '#')) { error("'all' cannot be combined with other " "Match attributes"); return -1; } if (arg != NULL && *arg == '#') cp = NULL; /* mark all arguments consumed */ *condition = cp; return 1; } /* All other criteria require an argument */ if ((arg = strdelim(&cp)) == NULL || *arg == '\0' || *arg == '#') { error("Missing Match criteria for %s", attrib); return -1; } if (strcasecmp(attrib, "user") == 0) { if (ci == NULL || (ci->test && ci->user == NULL)) { result = 0; continue; } if (ci->user == NULL) match_test_missing_fatal("User", "user"); if (match_usergroup_pattern_list(ci->user, arg) != 1) result = 0; else debug("user %.100s matched 'User %.100s' at " "line %d", ci->user, arg, line); } else if (strcasecmp(attrib, "group") == 0) { if (ci == NULL || (ci->test && ci->user == NULL)) { result = 0; continue; } if (ci->user == NULL) match_test_missing_fatal("Group", "user"); switch (match_cfg_line_group(arg, line, ci->user)) { case -1: return -1; case 0: result = 0; } } else if (strcasecmp(attrib, "host") == 0) { if (ci == NULL || (ci->test && ci->host == NULL)) { result = 0; continue; } if (ci->host == NULL) match_test_missing_fatal("Host", "host"); if (match_hostname(ci->host, arg) != 1) result = 0; else debug("connection from %.100s matched 'Host " "%.100s' at line %d", ci->host, arg, line); } else if (strcasecmp(attrib, "address") == 0) { if (ci == NULL || (ci->test && ci->address == NULL)) { if (addr_match_list(NULL, arg) != 0) fatal("Invalid Match address argument " "'%s' at line %d", arg, line); result = 0; continue; } if (ci->address == NULL) match_test_missing_fatal("Address", "addr"); switch (addr_match_list(ci->address, arg)) { case 1: debug("connection from %.100s matched 'Address " "%.100s' at line %d", ci->address, arg, line); break; case 0: case -1: result = 0; break; case -2: return -1; } } else if (strcasecmp(attrib, "localaddress") == 0){ if (ci == NULL || (ci->test && ci->laddress == NULL)) { if (addr_match_list(NULL, arg) != 0) fatal("Invalid Match localaddress " "argument '%s' at line %d", arg, line); result = 0; continue; } if (ci->laddress == NULL) match_test_missing_fatal("LocalAddress", "laddr"); switch (addr_match_list(ci->laddress, arg)) { case 1: debug("connection from %.100s matched " "'LocalAddress %.100s' at line %d", ci->laddress, arg, line); break; case 0: case -1: result = 0; break; case -2: return -1; } } else if (strcasecmp(attrib, "localport") == 0) { if ((port = a2port(arg)) == -1) { error("Invalid LocalPort '%s' on Match line", arg); return -1; } if (ci == NULL || (ci->test && ci->lport == -1)) { result = 0; continue; } if (ci->lport == 0) match_test_missing_fatal("LocalPort", "lport"); /* TODO support port lists */ if (port == ci->lport) debug("connection from %.100s matched " "'LocalPort %d' at line %d", ci->laddress, port, line); else result = 0; } else if (strcasecmp(attrib, "rdomain") == 0) { if (ci == NULL || (ci->test && ci->rdomain == NULL)) { result = 0; continue; } if (ci->rdomain == NULL) match_test_missing_fatal("RDomain", "rdomain"); if (match_pattern_list(ci->rdomain, arg, 0) != 1) result = 0; else debug("user %.100s matched 'RDomain %.100s' at " "line %d", ci->rdomain, arg, line); } else { error("Unsupported Match attribute %s", attrib); return -1; } } if (attributes == 0) { error("One or more attributes required for Match"); return -1; } if (ci != NULL) debug3("match %sfound", result ? "" : "not "); *condition = cp; return result; } #define WHITESPACE " \t\r\n" /* Multistate option parsing */ struct multistate { char *key; int value; }; static const struct multistate multistate_flag[] = { { "yes", 1 }, { "no", 0 }, { NULL, -1 } }; static const struct multistate multistate_ignore_rhosts[] = { { "yes", IGNORE_RHOSTS_YES }, { "no", IGNORE_RHOSTS_NO }, { "shosts-only", IGNORE_RHOSTS_SHOSTS }, { NULL, -1 } }; static const struct multistate multistate_addressfamily[] = { { "inet", AF_INET }, { "inet6", AF_INET6 }, { "any", AF_UNSPEC }, { NULL, -1 } }; static const struct multistate multistate_permitrootlogin[] = { { "without-password", PERMIT_NO_PASSWD }, { "prohibit-password", PERMIT_NO_PASSWD }, { "forced-commands-only", PERMIT_FORCED_ONLY }, { "yes", PERMIT_YES }, { "no", PERMIT_NO }, { NULL, -1 } }; static const struct multistate multistate_compression[] = { #ifdef WITH_ZLIB { "yes", COMP_DELAYED }, { "delayed", COMP_DELAYED }, #endif { "no", COMP_NONE }, { NULL, -1 } }; static const struct multistate multistate_gatewayports[] = { { "clientspecified", 2 }, { "yes", 1 }, { "no", 0 }, { NULL, -1 } }; static const struct multistate multistate_tcpfwd[] = { { "yes", FORWARD_ALLOW }, { "all", FORWARD_ALLOW }, { "no", FORWARD_DENY }, { "remote", FORWARD_REMOTE }, { "local", FORWARD_LOCAL }, { NULL, -1 } }; static int process_server_config_line_depth(ServerOptions *options, char *line, const char *filename, int linenum, int *activep, struct connection_info *connectinfo, int *inc_flags, int depth, struct include_list *includes) { char *str, ***chararrayptr, **charptr, *arg, *arg2, *p, *keyword; int cmdline = 0, *intptr, value, value2, n, port, oactive, r, found; SyslogFacility *log_facility_ptr; LogLevel *log_level_ptr; ServerOpCodes opcode; u_int i, *uintptr, uvalue, flags = 0; size_t len; long long val64; const struct multistate *multistate_ptr; const char *errstr; struct include_item *item; glob_t gbuf; char **oav = NULL, **av; int oac = 0, ac; int ret = -1; /* Strip trailing whitespace. Allow \f (form feed) at EOL only */ if ((len = strlen(line)) == 0) return 0; for (len--; len > 0; len--) { if (strchr(WHITESPACE "\f", line[len]) == NULL) break; line[len] = '\0'; } str = line; if ((keyword = strdelim(&str)) == NULL) return 0; /* Ignore leading whitespace */ if (*keyword == '\0') keyword = strdelim(&str); if (!keyword || !*keyword || *keyword == '#') return 0; if (str == NULL || *str == '\0') { error("%s line %d: no argument after keyword \"%s\"", filename, linenum, keyword); return -1; } intptr = NULL; charptr = NULL; opcode = parse_token(keyword, filename, linenum, &flags); if (argv_split(str, &oac, &oav, 1) != 0) { error("%s line %d: invalid quotes", filename, linenum); return -1; } ac = oac; av = oav; if (activep == NULL) { /* We are processing a command line directive */ cmdline = 1; activep = &cmdline; } if (*activep && opcode != sMatch && opcode != sInclude) debug3("%s:%d setting %s %s", filename, linenum, keyword, str); if (*activep == 0 && !(flags & SSHCFG_MATCH)) { if (connectinfo == NULL) { fatal("%s line %d: Directive '%s' is not allowed " "within a Match block", filename, linenum, keyword); } else { /* this is a directive we have already processed */ ret = 0; goto out; } } switch (opcode) { /* Portable-specific options */ case sUsePAM: intptr = &options->use_pam; goto parse_flag; /* Standard Options */ case sBadOption: goto out; case sPort: /* ignore ports from configfile if cmdline specifies ports */ if (options->ports_from_cmdline) { argv_consume(&ac); break; } if (options->num_ports >= MAX_PORTS) fatal("%s line %d: too many ports.", filename, linenum); arg = argv_next(&ac, &av); if (!arg || *arg == '\0') fatal("%s line %d: missing port number.", filename, linenum); options->ports[options->num_ports++] = a2port(arg); if (options->ports[options->num_ports-1] <= 0) fatal("%s line %d: Badly formatted port number.", filename, linenum); break; case sLoginGraceTime: intptr = &options->login_grace_time; parse_time: arg = argv_next(&ac, &av); if (!arg || *arg == '\0') fatal("%s line %d: missing time value.", filename, linenum); if ((value = convtime(arg)) == -1) fatal("%s line %d: invalid time value.", filename, linenum); if (*activep && *intptr == -1) *intptr = value; break; case sListenAddress: arg = argv_next(&ac, &av); if (arg == NULL || *arg == '\0') fatal("%s line %d: missing address", filename, linenum); /* check for bare IPv6 address: no "[]" and 2 or more ":" */ if (strchr(arg, '[') == NULL && (p = strchr(arg, ':')) != NULL && strchr(p+1, ':') != NULL) { port = 0; p = arg; } else { arg2 = NULL; p = hpdelim(&arg); if (p == NULL) fatal("%s line %d: bad address:port usage", filename, linenum); p = cleanhostname(p); if (arg == NULL) port = 0; else if ((port = a2port(arg)) <= 0) fatal("%s line %d: bad port number", filename, linenum); } /* Optional routing table */ arg2 = NULL; if ((arg = argv_next(&ac, &av)) != NULL) { if (strcmp(arg, "rdomain") != 0 || (arg2 = argv_next(&ac, &av)) == NULL) fatal("%s line %d: bad ListenAddress syntax", filename, linenum); if (!valid_rdomain(arg2)) fatal("%s line %d: bad routing domain", filename, linenum); } queue_listen_addr(options, p, arg2, port); break; case sAddressFamily: intptr = &options->address_family; multistate_ptr = multistate_addressfamily; parse_multistate: arg = argv_next(&ac, &av); if (!arg || *arg == '\0') fatal("%s line %d: missing argument.", filename, linenum); value = -1; for (i = 0; multistate_ptr[i].key != NULL; i++) { if (strcasecmp(arg, multistate_ptr[i].key) == 0) { value = multistate_ptr[i].value; break; } } if (value == -1) fatal("%s line %d: unsupported option \"%s\".", filename, linenum, arg); if (*activep && *intptr == -1) *intptr = value; break; case sHostKeyFile: arg = argv_next(&ac, &av); if (!arg || *arg == '\0') fatal("%s line %d: missing file name.", filename, linenum); if (*activep) { servconf_add_hostkey(filename, linenum, options, arg, 1); } break; case sHostKeyAgent: charptr = &options->host_key_agent; arg = argv_next(&ac, &av); if (!arg || *arg == '\0') fatal("%s line %d: missing socket name.", filename, linenum); if (*activep && *charptr == NULL) *charptr = !strcmp(arg, SSH_AUTHSOCKET_ENV_NAME) ? xstrdup(arg) : derelativise_path(arg); break; case sHostCertificate: arg = argv_next(&ac, &av); if (!arg || *arg == '\0') fatal("%s line %d: missing file name.", filename, linenum); if (*activep) servconf_add_hostcert(filename, linenum, options, arg); break; case sPidFile: charptr = &options->pid_file; parse_filename: arg = argv_next(&ac, &av); if (!arg || *arg == '\0') fatal("%s line %d: missing file name.", filename, linenum); if (*activep && *charptr == NULL) { *charptr = derelativise_path(arg); /* increase optional counter */ if (intptr != NULL) *intptr = *intptr + 1; } break; case sModuliFile: charptr = &options->moduli_file; goto parse_filename; case sPermitRootLogin: intptr = &options->permit_root_login; multistate_ptr = multistate_permitrootlogin; goto parse_multistate; case sIgnoreRhosts: intptr = &options->ignore_rhosts; multistate_ptr = multistate_ignore_rhosts; goto parse_multistate; case sIgnoreUserKnownHosts: intptr = &options->ignore_user_known_hosts; parse_flag: multistate_ptr = multistate_flag; goto parse_multistate; case sHostbasedAuthentication: intptr = &options->hostbased_authentication; goto parse_flag; case sHostbasedUsesNameFromPacketOnly: intptr = &options->hostbased_uses_name_from_packet_only; goto parse_flag; case sHostbasedAcceptedAlgorithms: charptr = &options->hostbased_accepted_algos; parse_pubkey_algos: arg = argv_next(&ac, &av); if (!arg || *arg == '\0') fatal("%s line %d: Missing argument.", filename, linenum); if (*arg != '-' && !sshkey_names_valid2(*arg == '+' || *arg == '^' ? arg + 1 : arg, 1)) fatal("%s line %d: Bad key types '%s'.", filename, linenum, arg ? arg : ""); if (*activep && *charptr == NULL) *charptr = xstrdup(arg); break; case sHostKeyAlgorithms: charptr = &options->hostkeyalgorithms; goto parse_pubkey_algos; case sCASignatureAlgorithms: charptr = &options->ca_sign_algorithms; goto parse_pubkey_algos; case sPubkeyAuthentication: intptr = &options->pubkey_authentication; goto parse_flag; case sPubkeyAcceptedAlgorithms: charptr = &options->pubkey_accepted_algos; goto parse_pubkey_algos; case sPubkeyAuthOptions: intptr = &options->pubkey_auth_options; value = 0; while ((arg = argv_next(&ac, &av)) != NULL) { if (strcasecmp(arg, "none") == 0) continue; if (strcasecmp(arg, "touch-required") == 0) value |= PUBKEYAUTH_TOUCH_REQUIRED; else if (strcasecmp(arg, "verify-required") == 0) value |= PUBKEYAUTH_VERIFY_REQUIRED; else { error("%s line %d: unsupported %s option %s", filename, linenum, keyword, arg); goto out; } } if (*activep && *intptr == -1) *intptr = value; break; case sKerberosAuthentication: intptr = &options->kerberos_authentication; goto parse_flag; case sKerberosOrLocalPasswd: intptr = &options->kerberos_or_local_passwd; goto parse_flag; case sKerberosTicketCleanup: intptr = &options->kerberos_ticket_cleanup; goto parse_flag; case sKerberosGetAFSToken: intptr = &options->kerberos_get_afs_token; goto parse_flag; case sGssAuthentication: intptr = &options->gss_authentication; goto parse_flag; case sGssCleanupCreds: intptr = &options->gss_cleanup_creds; goto parse_flag; case sGssStrictAcceptor: intptr = &options->gss_strict_acceptor; goto parse_flag; case sPasswordAuthentication: intptr = &options->password_authentication; goto parse_flag; case sKbdInteractiveAuthentication: intptr = &options->kbd_interactive_authentication; goto parse_flag; case sPrintMotd: intptr = &options->print_motd; goto parse_flag; case sPrintLastLog: intptr = &options->print_lastlog; goto parse_flag; case sX11Forwarding: intptr = &options->x11_forwarding; goto parse_flag; case sX11DisplayOffset: intptr = &options->x11_display_offset; parse_int: arg = argv_next(&ac, &av); if ((errstr = atoi_err(arg, &value)) != NULL) fatal("%s line %d: %s integer value %s.", filename, linenum, keyword, errstr); if (*activep && *intptr == -1) *intptr = value; break; case sX11UseLocalhost: intptr = &options->x11_use_localhost; goto parse_flag; case sXAuthLocation: charptr = &options->xauth_location; goto parse_filename; case sPermitTTY: intptr = &options->permit_tty; goto parse_flag; case sPermitUserRC: intptr = &options->permit_user_rc; goto parse_flag; case sStrictModes: intptr = &options->strict_modes; goto parse_flag; case sTCPKeepAlive: intptr = &options->tcp_keep_alive; goto parse_flag; case sEmptyPasswd: intptr = &options->permit_empty_passwd; goto parse_flag; case sPermitUserEnvironment: intptr = &options->permit_user_env; charptr = &options->permit_user_env_allowlist; arg = argv_next(&ac, &av); if (!arg || *arg == '\0') fatal("%s line %d: %s missing argument.", filename, linenum, keyword); value = 0; p = NULL; if (strcmp(arg, "yes") == 0) value = 1; else if (strcmp(arg, "no") == 0) value = 0; else { /* Pattern-list specified */ value = 1; p = xstrdup(arg); } if (*activep && *intptr == -1) { *intptr = value; *charptr = p; p = NULL; } free(p); break; case sCompression: intptr = &options->compression; multistate_ptr = multistate_compression; goto parse_multistate; case sRekeyLimit: arg = argv_next(&ac, &av); if (!arg || *arg == '\0') fatal("%s line %d: %s missing argument.", filename, linenum, keyword); if (strcmp(arg, "default") == 0) { val64 = 0; } else { if (scan_scaled(arg, &val64) == -1) fatal("%.200s line %d: Bad %s number '%s': %s", filename, linenum, keyword, arg, strerror(errno)); if (val64 != 0 && val64 < 16) fatal("%.200s line %d: %s too small", filename, linenum, keyword); } if (*activep && options->rekey_limit == -1) options->rekey_limit = val64; if (ac != 0) { /* optional rekey interval present */ if (strcmp(av[0], "none") == 0) { (void)argv_next(&ac, &av); /* discard */ break; } intptr = &options->rekey_interval; goto parse_time; } break; case sGatewayPorts: intptr = &options->fwd_opts.gateway_ports; multistate_ptr = multistate_gatewayports; goto parse_multistate; case sUseDNS: intptr = &options->use_dns; goto parse_flag; case sLogFacility: log_facility_ptr = &options->log_facility; arg = argv_next(&ac, &av); value = log_facility_number(arg); if (value == SYSLOG_FACILITY_NOT_SET) fatal("%.200s line %d: unsupported log facility '%s'", filename, linenum, arg ? arg : ""); if (*log_facility_ptr == -1) *log_facility_ptr = (SyslogFacility) value; break; case sLogLevel: log_level_ptr = &options->log_level; arg = argv_next(&ac, &av); value = log_level_number(arg); if (value == SYSLOG_LEVEL_NOT_SET) fatal("%.200s line %d: unsupported log level '%s'", filename, linenum, arg ? arg : ""); if (*activep && *log_level_ptr == -1) *log_level_ptr = (LogLevel) value; break; case sLogVerbose: found = options->num_log_verbose == 0; i = 0; while ((arg = argv_next(&ac, &av)) != NULL) { if (*arg == '\0') { error("%s line %d: keyword %s empty argument", filename, linenum, keyword); goto out; } /* Allow "none" only in first position */ if (strcasecmp(arg, "none") == 0) { if (i > 0 || ac > 0) { error("%s line %d: keyword %s \"none\" " "argument must appear alone.", filename, linenum, keyword); goto out; } } i++; if (!found || !*activep) continue; opt_array_append(filename, linenum, keyword, &options->log_verbose, &options->num_log_verbose, arg); } break; case sAllowTcpForwarding: intptr = &options->allow_tcp_forwarding; multistate_ptr = multistate_tcpfwd; goto parse_multistate; case sAllowStreamLocalForwarding: intptr = &options->allow_streamlocal_forwarding; multistate_ptr = multistate_tcpfwd; goto parse_multistate; case sAllowAgentForwarding: intptr = &options->allow_agent_forwarding; goto parse_flag; case sDisableForwarding: intptr = &options->disable_forwarding; goto parse_flag; case sAllowUsers: chararrayptr = &options->allow_users; uintptr = &options->num_allow_users; parse_allowdenyusers: while ((arg = argv_next(&ac, &av)) != NULL) { if (*arg == '\0' || match_user(NULL, NULL, NULL, arg) == -1) fatal("%s line %d: invalid %s pattern: \"%s\"", filename, linenum, keyword, arg); if (!*activep) continue; opt_array_append(filename, linenum, keyword, chararrayptr, uintptr, arg); } break; case sDenyUsers: chararrayptr = &options->deny_users; uintptr = &options->num_deny_users; goto parse_allowdenyusers; case sAllowGroups: chararrayptr = &options->allow_groups; uintptr = &options->num_allow_groups; parse_allowdenygroups: while ((arg = argv_next(&ac, &av)) != NULL) { if (*arg == '\0') fatal("%s line %d: empty %s pattern", filename, linenum, keyword); if (!*activep) continue; opt_array_append(filename, linenum, keyword, chararrayptr, uintptr, arg); } break; case sDenyGroups: chararrayptr = &options->deny_groups; uintptr = &options->num_deny_groups; goto parse_allowdenygroups; case sCiphers: arg = argv_next(&ac, &av); if (!arg || *arg == '\0') fatal("%s line %d: %s missing argument.", filename, linenum, keyword); if (*arg != '-' && !ciphers_valid(*arg == '+' || *arg == '^' ? arg + 1 : arg)) fatal("%s line %d: Bad SSH2 cipher spec '%s'.", filename, linenum, arg ? arg : ""); if (options->ciphers == NULL) options->ciphers = xstrdup(arg); break; case sMacs: arg = argv_next(&ac, &av); if (!arg || *arg == '\0') fatal("%s line %d: %s missing argument.", filename, linenum, keyword); if (*arg != '-' && !mac_valid(*arg == '+' || *arg == '^' ? arg + 1 : arg)) fatal("%s line %d: Bad SSH2 mac spec '%s'.", filename, linenum, arg ? arg : ""); if (options->macs == NULL) options->macs = xstrdup(arg); break; case sKexAlgorithms: arg = argv_next(&ac, &av); if (!arg || *arg == '\0') fatal("%s line %d: %s missing argument.", filename, linenum, keyword); if (*arg != '-' && !kex_names_valid(*arg == '+' || *arg == '^' ? arg + 1 : arg)) fatal("%s line %d: Bad SSH2 KexAlgorithms '%s'.", filename, linenum, arg ? arg : ""); if (options->kex_algorithms == NULL) options->kex_algorithms = xstrdup(arg); break; case sSubsystem: if (options->num_subsystems >= MAX_SUBSYSTEMS) { fatal("%s line %d: too many subsystems defined.", filename, linenum); } arg = argv_next(&ac, &av); if (!arg || *arg == '\0') fatal("%s line %d: %s missing argument.", filename, linenum, keyword); if (!*activep) { arg = argv_next(&ac, &av); break; } for (i = 0; i < options->num_subsystems; i++) if (strcmp(arg, options->subsystem_name[i]) == 0) fatal("%s line %d: Subsystem '%s' " "already defined.", filename, linenum, arg); options->subsystem_name[options->num_subsystems] = xstrdup(arg); arg = argv_next(&ac, &av); if (!arg || *arg == '\0') fatal("%s line %d: Missing subsystem command.", filename, linenum); options->subsystem_command[options->num_subsystems] = xstrdup(arg); /* Collect arguments (separate to executable) */ p = xstrdup(arg); len = strlen(p) + 1; while ((arg = argv_next(&ac, &av)) != NULL) { len += 1 + strlen(arg); p = xreallocarray(p, 1, len); strlcat(p, " ", len); strlcat(p, arg, len); } options->subsystem_args[options->num_subsystems] = p; options->num_subsystems++; break; case sMaxStartups: arg = argv_next(&ac, &av); if (!arg || *arg == '\0') fatal("%s line %d: %s missing argument.", filename, linenum, keyword); if ((n = sscanf(arg, "%d:%d:%d", &options->max_startups_begin, &options->max_startups_rate, &options->max_startups)) == 3) { if (options->max_startups_begin > options->max_startups || options->max_startups_rate > 100 || options->max_startups_rate < 1) fatal("%s line %d: Invalid %s spec.", filename, linenum, keyword); } else if (n != 1) fatal("%s line %d: Invalid %s spec.", filename, linenum, keyword); else options->max_startups = options->max_startups_begin; if (options->max_startups <= 0 || options->max_startups_begin <= 0) fatal("%s line %d: Invalid %s spec.", filename, linenum, keyword); break; case sPerSourceNetBlockSize: arg = argv_next(&ac, &av); if (!arg || *arg == '\0') fatal("%s line %d: %s missing argument.", filename, linenum, keyword); switch (n = sscanf(arg, "%d:%d", &value, &value2)) { case 2: if (value2 < 0 || value2 > 128) n = -1; /* FALLTHROUGH */ case 1: if (value < 0 || value > 32) n = -1; } if (n != 1 && n != 2) fatal("%s line %d: Invalid %s spec.", filename, linenum, keyword); if (*activep) { options->per_source_masklen_ipv4 = value; options->per_source_masklen_ipv6 = value2; } break; case sPerSourceMaxStartups: arg = argv_next(&ac, &av); if (!arg || *arg == '\0') fatal("%s line %d: %s missing argument.", filename, linenum, keyword); if (strcmp(arg, "none") == 0) { /* no limit */ value = INT_MAX; } else { if ((errstr = atoi_err(arg, &value)) != NULL) fatal("%s line %d: %s integer value %s.", filename, linenum, keyword, errstr); } if (*activep) options->per_source_max_startups = value; break; case sMaxAuthTries: intptr = &options->max_authtries; goto parse_int; case sMaxSessions: intptr = &options->max_sessions; goto parse_int; case sBanner: charptr = &options->banner; goto parse_filename; /* * These options can contain %X options expanded at * connect time, so that you can specify paths like: * * AuthorizedKeysFile /etc/ssh_keys/%u */ case sAuthorizedKeysFile: uvalue = options->num_authkeys_files; while ((arg = argv_next(&ac, &av)) != NULL) { if (*arg == '\0') { error("%s line %d: keyword %s empty argument", filename, linenum, keyword); goto out; } arg2 = tilde_expand_filename(arg, getuid()); if (*activep && uvalue == 0) { opt_array_append(filename, linenum, keyword, &options->authorized_keys_files, &options->num_authkeys_files, arg2); } free(arg2); } break; case sAuthorizedPrincipalsFile: charptr = &options->authorized_principals_file; arg = argv_next(&ac, &av); if (!arg || *arg == '\0') fatal("%s line %d: %s missing argument.", filename, linenum, keyword); if (*activep && *charptr == NULL) { *charptr = tilde_expand_filename(arg, getuid()); /* increase optional counter */ if (intptr != NULL) *intptr = *intptr + 1; } break; case sClientAliveInterval: intptr = &options->client_alive_interval; goto parse_time; case sClientAliveCountMax: intptr = &options->client_alive_count_max; goto parse_int; case sAcceptEnv: while ((arg = argv_next(&ac, &av)) != NULL) { if (*arg == '\0' || strchr(arg, '=') != NULL) fatal("%s line %d: Invalid environment name.", filename, linenum); if (!*activep) continue; opt_array_append(filename, linenum, keyword, &options->accept_env, &options->num_accept_env, arg); } break; case sSetEnv: uvalue = options->num_setenv; while ((arg = argv_next(&ac, &av)) != NULL) { if (*arg == '\0' || strchr(arg, '=') == NULL) fatal("%s line %d: Invalid environment.", filename, linenum); if (!*activep || uvalue != 0) continue; if (lookup_setenv_in_list(arg, options->setenv, options->num_setenv) != NULL) { debug2("%s line %d: ignoring duplicate env " "name \"%.64s\"", filename, linenum, arg); continue; } opt_array_append(filename, linenum, keyword, &options->setenv, &options->num_setenv, arg); } break; case sPermitTunnel: intptr = &options->permit_tun; arg = argv_next(&ac, &av); if (!arg || *arg == '\0') fatal("%s line %d: %s missing argument.", filename, linenum, keyword); value = -1; for (i = 0; tunmode_desc[i].val != -1; i++) if (strcmp(tunmode_desc[i].text, arg) == 0) { value = tunmode_desc[i].val; break; } if (value == -1) fatal("%s line %d: bad %s argument %s", filename, linenum, keyword, arg); if (*activep && *intptr == -1) *intptr = value; break; case sInclude: if (cmdline) { fatal("Include directive not supported as a " "command-line option"); } value = 0; while ((arg2 = argv_next(&ac, &av)) != NULL) { if (*arg2 == '\0') { error("%s line %d: keyword %s empty argument", filename, linenum, keyword); goto out; } value++; found = 0; if (*arg2 != '/' && *arg2 != '~') { xasprintf(&arg, "%s/%s", SSHDIR, arg2); } else arg = xstrdup(arg2); /* * Don't let included files clobber the containing * file's Match state. */ oactive = *activep; /* consult cache of include files */ TAILQ_FOREACH(item, includes, entry) { if (strcmp(item->selector, arg) != 0) continue; if (item->filename != NULL) { parse_server_config_depth(options, item->filename, item->contents, includes, connectinfo, (*inc_flags & SSHCFG_MATCH_ONLY ? SSHCFG_MATCH_ONLY : (oactive ? 0 : SSHCFG_NEVERMATCH)), activep, depth + 1); } found = 1; *activep = oactive; } if (found != 0) { free(arg); continue; } /* requested glob was not in cache */ debug2("%s line %d: new include %s", filename, linenum, arg); if ((r = glob(arg, 0, NULL, &gbuf)) != 0) { if (r != GLOB_NOMATCH) { fatal("%s line %d: include \"%s\" glob " "failed", filename, linenum, arg); } /* * If no entry matched then record a * placeholder to skip later glob calls. */ debug2("%s line %d: no match for %s", filename, linenum, arg); item = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*item)); item->selector = strdup(arg); TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(includes, item, entry); } if (gbuf.gl_pathc > INT_MAX) fatal_f("too many glob results"); for (n = 0; n < (int)gbuf.gl_pathc; n++) { debug2("%s line %d: including %s", filename, linenum, gbuf.gl_pathv[n]); item = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*item)); item->selector = strdup(arg); item->filename = strdup(gbuf.gl_pathv[n]); if ((item->contents = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed"); load_server_config(item->filename, item->contents); parse_server_config_depth(options, item->filename, item->contents, includes, connectinfo, (*inc_flags & SSHCFG_MATCH_ONLY ? SSHCFG_MATCH_ONLY : (oactive ? 0 : SSHCFG_NEVERMATCH)), activep, depth + 1); *activep = oactive; TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(includes, item, entry); } globfree(&gbuf); free(arg); } if (value == 0) { fatal("%s line %d: %s missing filename argument", filename, linenum, keyword); } break; case sMatch: if (cmdline) fatal("Match directive not supported as a command-line " "option"); value = match_cfg_line(&str, linenum, (*inc_flags & SSHCFG_NEVERMATCH ? NULL : connectinfo)); if (value < 0) fatal("%s line %d: Bad Match condition", filename, linenum); *activep = (*inc_flags & SSHCFG_NEVERMATCH) ? 0 : value; /* * The MATCH_ONLY flag is applicable only until the first * match block. */ *inc_flags &= ~SSHCFG_MATCH_ONLY; /* * If match_cfg_line() didn't consume all its arguments then * arrange for the extra arguments check below to fail. */ if (str == NULL || *str == '\0') argv_consume(&ac); break; case sPermitListen: case sPermitOpen: if (opcode == sPermitListen) { uintptr = &options->num_permitted_listens; chararrayptr = &options->permitted_listens; } else { uintptr = &options->num_permitted_opens; chararrayptr = &options->permitted_opens; } arg = argv_next(&ac, &av); if (!arg || *arg == '\0') fatal("%s line %d: %s missing argument.", filename, linenum, keyword); uvalue = *uintptr; /* modified later */ if (strcmp(arg, "any") == 0 || strcmp(arg, "none") == 0) { if (*activep && uvalue == 0) { *uintptr = 1; *chararrayptr = xcalloc(1, sizeof(**chararrayptr)); (*chararrayptr)[0] = xstrdup(arg); } break; } for (; arg != NULL && *arg != '\0'; arg = argv_next(&ac, &av)) { if (opcode == sPermitListen && strchr(arg, ':') == NULL) { /* * Allow bare port number for PermitListen * to indicate a wildcard listen host. */ xasprintf(&arg2, "*:%s", arg); } else { arg2 = xstrdup(arg); p = hpdelim(&arg); if (p == NULL) { fatal("%s line %d: %s missing host", filename, linenum, keyword); } p = cleanhostname(p); } if (arg == NULL || ((port = permitopen_port(arg)) < 0)) { fatal("%s line %d: %s bad port number", filename, linenum, keyword); } if (*activep && uvalue == 0) { opt_array_append(filename, linenum, keyword, chararrayptr, uintptr, arg2); } free(arg2); } break; case sForceCommand: if (str == NULL || *str == '\0') fatal("%s line %d: %s missing argument.", filename, linenum, keyword); len = strspn(str, WHITESPACE); if (*activep && options->adm_forced_command == NULL) options->adm_forced_command = xstrdup(str + len); argv_consume(&ac); break; case sChrootDirectory: charptr = &options->chroot_directory; arg = argv_next(&ac, &av); if (!arg || *arg == '\0') fatal("%s line %d: %s missing argument.", filename, linenum, keyword); if (*activep && *charptr == NULL) *charptr = xstrdup(arg); break; case sTrustedUserCAKeys: charptr = &options->trusted_user_ca_keys; goto parse_filename; case sRevokedKeys: charptr = &options->revoked_keys_file; goto parse_filename; case sSecurityKeyProvider: charptr = &options->sk_provider; arg = argv_next(&ac, &av); if (!arg || *arg == '\0') fatal("%s line %d: %s missing argument.", filename, linenum, keyword); if (*activep && *charptr == NULL) { *charptr = strcasecmp(arg, "internal") == 0 ? xstrdup(arg) : derelativise_path(arg); /* increase optional counter */ if (intptr != NULL) *intptr = *intptr + 1; } break; case sIPQoS: arg = argv_next(&ac, &av); if (!arg || *arg == '\0') fatal("%s line %d: %s missing argument.", filename, linenum, keyword); if ((value = parse_ipqos(arg)) == -1) fatal("%s line %d: Bad %s value: %s", filename, linenum, keyword, arg); arg = argv_next(&ac, &av); if (arg == NULL) value2 = value; else if ((value2 = parse_ipqos(arg)) == -1) fatal("%s line %d: Bad %s value: %s", filename, linenum, keyword, arg); if (*activep) { options->ip_qos_interactive = value; options->ip_qos_bulk = value2; } break; case sVersionAddendum: if (str == NULL || *str == '\0') fatal("%s line %d: %s missing argument.", filename, linenum, keyword); len = strspn(str, WHITESPACE); if (strchr(str + len, '\r') != NULL) { fatal("%.200s line %d: Invalid %s argument", filename, linenum, keyword); } if ((arg = strchr(line, '#')) != NULL) { *arg = '\0'; rtrim(line); } if (*activep && options->version_addendum == NULL) { if (strcasecmp(str + len, "none") == 0) options->version_addendum = xstrdup(""); else options->version_addendum = xstrdup(str + len); } argv_consume(&ac); break; case sAuthorizedKeysCommand: charptr = &options->authorized_keys_command; parse_command: len = strspn(str, WHITESPACE); if (str[len] != '/' && strcasecmp(str + len, "none") != 0) { fatal("%.200s line %d: %s must be an absolute path", filename, linenum, keyword); } if (*activep && options->authorized_keys_command == NULL) *charptr = xstrdup(str + len); argv_consume(&ac); break; case sAuthorizedKeysCommandUser: charptr = &options->authorized_keys_command_user; parse_localuser: arg = argv_next(&ac, &av); if (!arg || *arg == '\0') { fatal("%s line %d: missing %s argument.", filename, linenum, keyword); } if (*activep && *charptr == NULL) *charptr = xstrdup(arg); break; case sAuthorizedPrincipalsCommand: charptr = &options->authorized_principals_command; goto parse_command; case sAuthorizedPrincipalsCommandUser: charptr = &options->authorized_principals_command_user; goto parse_localuser; case sAuthenticationMethods: found = options->num_auth_methods == 0; value = 0; /* seen "any" pseudo-method */ value2 = 0; /* successfully parsed any method */ while ((arg = argv_next(&ac, &av)) != NULL) { if (strcmp(arg, "any") == 0) { if (options->num_auth_methods > 0) { fatal("%s line %d: \"any\" must " "appear alone in %s", filename, linenum, keyword); } value = 1; } else if (value) { fatal("%s line %d: \"any\" must appear " "alone in %s", filename, linenum, keyword); } else if (auth2_methods_valid(arg, 0) != 0) { fatal("%s line %d: invalid %s method list.", filename, linenum, keyword); } value2 = 1; if (!found || !*activep) continue; opt_array_append(filename, linenum, keyword, &options->auth_methods, &options->num_auth_methods, arg); } if (value2 == 0) { fatal("%s line %d: no %s specified", filename, linenum, keyword); } break; case sStreamLocalBindMask: arg = argv_next(&ac, &av); if (!arg || *arg == '\0') fatal("%s line %d: %s missing argument.", filename, linenum, keyword); /* Parse mode in octal format */ value = strtol(arg, &p, 8); if (arg == p || value < 0 || value > 0777) fatal("%s line %d: Invalid %s.", filename, linenum, keyword); if (*activep) options->fwd_opts.streamlocal_bind_mask = (mode_t)value; break; case sStreamLocalBindUnlink: intptr = &options->fwd_opts.streamlocal_bind_unlink; goto parse_flag; case sFingerprintHash: arg = argv_next(&ac, &av); if (!arg || *arg == '\0') fatal("%s line %d: %s missing argument.", filename, linenum, keyword); if ((value = ssh_digest_alg_by_name(arg)) == -1) fatal("%.200s line %d: Invalid %s algorithm \"%s\".", filename, linenum, keyword, arg); if (*activep) options->fingerprint_hash = value; break; case sExposeAuthInfo: intptr = &options->expose_userauth_info; goto parse_flag; case sRDomain: #if !defined(__OpenBSD__) && !defined(HAVE_SYS_SET_PROCESS_RDOMAIN) fatal("%s line %d: setting RDomain not supported on this " "platform.", filename, linenum); #endif charptr = &options->routing_domain; arg = argv_next(&ac, &av); if (!arg || *arg == '\0') fatal("%s line %d: %s missing argument.", filename, linenum, keyword); if (strcasecmp(arg, "none") != 0 && strcmp(arg, "%D") != 0 && !valid_rdomain(arg)) fatal("%s line %d: invalid routing domain", filename, linenum); if (*activep && *charptr == NULL) *charptr = xstrdup(arg); break; case sRequiredRSASize: intptr = &options->required_rsa_size; goto parse_int; case sChannelTimeout: uvalue = options->num_channel_timeouts; i = 0; while ((arg = argv_next(&ac, &av)) != NULL) { /* Allow "none" only in first position */ if (strcasecmp(arg, "none") == 0) { if (i > 0 || ac > 0) { error("%s line %d: keyword %s \"none\" " "argument must appear alone.", filename, linenum, keyword); goto out; } } else if (parse_timeout(arg, NULL, NULL) != 0) { fatal("%s line %d: invalid channel timeout %s", filename, linenum, arg); } if (!*activep || uvalue != 0) continue; opt_array_append(filename, linenum, keyword, &options->channel_timeouts, &options->num_channel_timeouts, arg); } break; case sUnusedConnectionTimeout: intptr = &options->unused_connection_timeout; /* peek at first arg for "none" so we can reuse parse_time */ if (av[0] != NULL && strcasecmp(av[0], "none") == 0) { (void)argv_next(&ac, &av); /* consume arg */ if (*activep) *intptr = 0; break; } goto parse_time; case sUseBlacklist: intptr = &options->use_blacklist; goto parse_flag; case sDeprecated: case sIgnore: case sUnsupported: do_log2(opcode == sIgnore ? SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG2 : SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO, "%s line %d: %s option %s", filename, linenum, opcode == sUnsupported ? "Unsupported" : "Deprecated", keyword); argv_consume(&ac); break; default: fatal("%s line %d: Missing handler for opcode %s (%d)", filename, linenum, keyword, opcode); } /* Check that there is no garbage at end of line. */ if (ac > 0) { error("%.200s line %d: keyword %s extra arguments " "at end of line", filename, linenum, keyword); goto out; } /* success */ ret = 0; out: argv_free(oav, oac); return ret; } int process_server_config_line(ServerOptions *options, char *line, const char *filename, int linenum, int *activep, struct connection_info *connectinfo, struct include_list *includes) { int inc_flags = 0; return process_server_config_line_depth(options, line, filename, linenum, activep, connectinfo, &inc_flags, 0, includes); } /* Reads the server configuration file. */ void load_server_config(const char *filename, struct sshbuf *conf) { struct stat st; char *line = NULL, *cp; size_t linesize = 0; FILE *f; int r; debug2_f("filename %s", filename); if ((f = fopen(filename, "r")) == NULL) { perror(filename); exit(1); } sshbuf_reset(conf); /* grow buffer, so realloc is avoided for large config files */ if (fstat(fileno(f), &st) == 0 && st.st_size > 0 && (r = sshbuf_allocate(conf, st.st_size)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "allocate"); while (getline(&line, &linesize, f) != -1) { /* * Strip whitespace * NB - preserve newlines, they are needed to reproduce * line numbers later for error messages */ cp = line + strspn(line, " \t\r"); if ((r = sshbuf_put(conf, cp, strlen(cp))) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "sshbuf_put"); } free(line); if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(conf, 0)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "sshbuf_put_u8"); fclose(f); debug2_f("done config len = %zu", sshbuf_len(conf)); } void parse_server_match_config(ServerOptions *options, struct include_list *includes, struct connection_info *connectinfo) { ServerOptions mo; initialize_server_options(&mo); parse_server_config(&mo, "reprocess config", cfg, includes, connectinfo, 0); copy_set_server_options(options, &mo, 0); } int parse_server_match_testspec(struct connection_info *ci, char *spec) { char *p; while ((p = strsep(&spec, ",")) && *p != '\0') { if (strncmp(p, "addr=", 5) == 0) { ci->address = xstrdup(p + 5); } else if (strncmp(p, "host=", 5) == 0) { ci->host = xstrdup(p + 5); } else if (strncmp(p, "user=", 5) == 0) { ci->user = xstrdup(p + 5); } else if (strncmp(p, "laddr=", 6) == 0) { ci->laddress = xstrdup(p + 6); } else if (strncmp(p, "rdomain=", 8) == 0) { ci->rdomain = xstrdup(p + 8); } else if (strncmp(p, "lport=", 6) == 0) { ci->lport = a2port(p + 6); if (ci->lport == -1) { fprintf(stderr, "Invalid port '%s' in test mode" " specification %s\n", p+6, p); return -1; } } else { fprintf(stderr, "Invalid test mode specification %s\n", p); return -1; } } return 0; } /* * Copy any supported values that are set. * * If the preauth flag is set, we do not bother copying the string or * array values that are not used pre-authentication, because any that we * do use must be explicitly sent in mm_getpwnamallow(). */ void copy_set_server_options(ServerOptions *dst, ServerOptions *src, int preauth) { #define M_CP_INTOPT(n) do {\ if (src->n != -1) \ dst->n = src->n; \ } while (0) M_CP_INTOPT(password_authentication); M_CP_INTOPT(gss_authentication); M_CP_INTOPT(pubkey_authentication); M_CP_INTOPT(pubkey_auth_options); M_CP_INTOPT(kerberos_authentication); M_CP_INTOPT(hostbased_authentication); M_CP_INTOPT(hostbased_uses_name_from_packet_only); M_CP_INTOPT(kbd_interactive_authentication); M_CP_INTOPT(permit_root_login); M_CP_INTOPT(permit_empty_passwd); M_CP_INTOPT(ignore_rhosts); M_CP_INTOPT(allow_tcp_forwarding); M_CP_INTOPT(allow_streamlocal_forwarding); M_CP_INTOPT(allow_agent_forwarding); M_CP_INTOPT(disable_forwarding); M_CP_INTOPT(expose_userauth_info); M_CP_INTOPT(permit_tun); M_CP_INTOPT(fwd_opts.gateway_ports); M_CP_INTOPT(fwd_opts.streamlocal_bind_unlink); M_CP_INTOPT(x11_display_offset); M_CP_INTOPT(x11_forwarding); M_CP_INTOPT(x11_use_localhost); M_CP_INTOPT(permit_tty); M_CP_INTOPT(permit_user_rc); M_CP_INTOPT(max_sessions); M_CP_INTOPT(max_authtries); M_CP_INTOPT(client_alive_count_max); M_CP_INTOPT(client_alive_interval); M_CP_INTOPT(ip_qos_interactive); M_CP_INTOPT(ip_qos_bulk); M_CP_INTOPT(rekey_limit); M_CP_INTOPT(rekey_interval); M_CP_INTOPT(log_level); M_CP_INTOPT(required_rsa_size); M_CP_INTOPT(unused_connection_timeout); /* * The bind_mask is a mode_t that may be unsigned, so we can't use * M_CP_INTOPT - it does a signed comparison that causes compiler * warnings. */ if (src->fwd_opts.streamlocal_bind_mask != (mode_t)-1) { dst->fwd_opts.streamlocal_bind_mask = src->fwd_opts.streamlocal_bind_mask; } /* M_CP_STROPT and M_CP_STRARRAYOPT should not appear before here */ #define M_CP_STROPT(n) do {\ if (src->n != NULL && dst->n != src->n) { \ free(dst->n); \ dst->n = src->n; \ } \ } while(0) #define M_CP_STRARRAYOPT(s, num_s) do {\ u_int i; \ if (src->num_s != 0) { \ for (i = 0; i < dst->num_s; i++) \ free(dst->s[i]); \ free(dst->s); \ dst->s = xcalloc(src->num_s, sizeof(*dst->s)); \ for (i = 0; i < src->num_s; i++) \ dst->s[i] = xstrdup(src->s[i]); \ dst->num_s = src->num_s; \ } \ } while(0) /* See comment in servconf.h */ COPY_MATCH_STRING_OPTS(); /* Arguments that accept '+...' need to be expanded */ assemble_algorithms(dst); /* * The only things that should be below this point are string options * which are only used after authentication. */ if (preauth) return; /* These options may be "none" to clear a global setting */ M_CP_STROPT(adm_forced_command); if (option_clear_or_none(dst->adm_forced_command)) { free(dst->adm_forced_command); dst->adm_forced_command = NULL; } M_CP_STROPT(chroot_directory); if (option_clear_or_none(dst->chroot_directory)) { free(dst->chroot_directory); dst->chroot_directory = NULL; } } #undef M_CP_INTOPT #undef M_CP_STROPT #undef M_CP_STRARRAYOPT #define SERVCONF_MAX_DEPTH 16 static void parse_server_config_depth(ServerOptions *options, const char *filename, struct sshbuf *conf, struct include_list *includes, struct connection_info *connectinfo, int flags, int *activep, int depth) { int linenum, bad_options = 0; char *cp, *obuf, *cbuf; if (depth < 0 || depth > SERVCONF_MAX_DEPTH) fatal("Too many recursive configuration includes"); debug2_f("config %s len %zu%s", filename, sshbuf_len(conf), (flags & SSHCFG_NEVERMATCH ? " [checking syntax only]" : "")); if ((obuf = cbuf = sshbuf_dup_string(conf)) == NULL) fatal_f("sshbuf_dup_string failed"); linenum = 1; while ((cp = strsep(&cbuf, "\n")) != NULL) { if (process_server_config_line_depth(options, cp, filename, linenum++, activep, connectinfo, &flags, depth, includes) != 0) bad_options++; } free(obuf); if (bad_options > 0) fatal("%s: terminating, %d bad configuration options", filename, bad_options); } void parse_server_config(ServerOptions *options, const char *filename, struct sshbuf *conf, struct include_list *includes, struct connection_info *connectinfo, int reexec) { int active = connectinfo ? 0 : 1; parse_server_config_depth(options, filename, conf, includes, connectinfo, (connectinfo ? SSHCFG_MATCH_ONLY : 0), &active, 0); if (!reexec) process_queued_listen_addrs(options); } static const char * fmt_multistate_int(int val, const struct multistate *m) { u_int i; for (i = 0; m[i].key != NULL; i++) { if (m[i].value == val) return m[i].key; } return "UNKNOWN"; } static const char * fmt_intarg(ServerOpCodes code, int val) { if (val == -1) return "unset"; switch (code) { case sAddressFamily: return fmt_multistate_int(val, multistate_addressfamily); case sPermitRootLogin: return fmt_multistate_int(val, multistate_permitrootlogin); case sGatewayPorts: return fmt_multistate_int(val, multistate_gatewayports); case sCompression: return fmt_multistate_int(val, multistate_compression); case sAllowTcpForwarding: return fmt_multistate_int(val, multistate_tcpfwd); case sAllowStreamLocalForwarding: return fmt_multistate_int(val, multistate_tcpfwd); case sIgnoreRhosts: return fmt_multistate_int(val, multistate_ignore_rhosts); case sFingerprintHash: return ssh_digest_alg_name(val); default: switch (val) { case 0: return "no"; case 1: return "yes"; default: return "UNKNOWN"; } } } static void dump_cfg_int(ServerOpCodes code, int val) { if (code == sUnusedConnectionTimeout && val == 0) { printf("%s none\n", lookup_opcode_name(code)); return; } printf("%s %d\n", lookup_opcode_name(code), val); } static void dump_cfg_oct(ServerOpCodes code, int val) { printf("%s 0%o\n", lookup_opcode_name(code), val); } static void dump_cfg_fmtint(ServerOpCodes code, int val) { printf("%s %s\n", lookup_opcode_name(code), fmt_intarg(code, val)); } static void dump_cfg_string(ServerOpCodes code, const char *val) { printf("%s %s\n", lookup_opcode_name(code), val == NULL ? "none" : val); } static void dump_cfg_strarray(ServerOpCodes code, u_int count, char **vals) { u_int i; for (i = 0; i < count; i++) printf("%s %s\n", lookup_opcode_name(code), vals[i]); } static void dump_cfg_strarray_oneline(ServerOpCodes code, u_int count, char **vals) { u_int i; - if (count <= 0 && code != sAuthenticationMethods) - return; + switch (code) { + case sAuthenticationMethods: + case sChannelTimeout: + break; + default: + if (count <= 0) + return; + break; + } + printf("%s", lookup_opcode_name(code)); for (i = 0; i < count; i++) printf(" %s", vals[i]); if (code == sAuthenticationMethods && count == 0) printf(" any"); else if (code == sChannelTimeout && count == 0) printf(" none"); printf("\n"); } static char * format_listen_addrs(struct listenaddr *la) { int r; struct addrinfo *ai; char addr[NI_MAXHOST], port[NI_MAXSERV]; char *laddr1 = xstrdup(""), *laddr2 = NULL; /* * ListenAddress must be after Port. add_one_listen_addr pushes * addresses onto a stack, so to maintain ordering we need to * print these in reverse order. */ for (ai = la->addrs; ai; ai = ai->ai_next) { if ((r = getnameinfo(ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen, addr, sizeof(addr), port, sizeof(port), NI_NUMERICHOST|NI_NUMERICSERV)) != 0) { error("getnameinfo: %.100s", ssh_gai_strerror(r)); continue; } laddr2 = laddr1; if (ai->ai_family == AF_INET6) { xasprintf(&laddr1, "listenaddress [%s]:%s%s%s\n%s", addr, port, la->rdomain == NULL ? "" : " rdomain ", la->rdomain == NULL ? "" : la->rdomain, laddr2); } else { xasprintf(&laddr1, "listenaddress %s:%s%s%s\n%s", addr, port, la->rdomain == NULL ? "" : " rdomain ", la->rdomain == NULL ? "" : la->rdomain, laddr2); } free(laddr2); } return laddr1; } void dump_config(ServerOptions *o) { char *s; u_int i; /* these are usually at the top of the config */ for (i = 0; i < o->num_ports; i++) printf("port %d\n", o->ports[i]); dump_cfg_fmtint(sAddressFamily, o->address_family); for (i = 0; i < o->num_listen_addrs; i++) { s = format_listen_addrs(&o->listen_addrs[i]); printf("%s", s); free(s); } /* integer arguments */ #ifdef USE_PAM dump_cfg_fmtint(sUsePAM, o->use_pam); #endif dump_cfg_int(sLoginGraceTime, o->login_grace_time); dump_cfg_int(sX11DisplayOffset, o->x11_display_offset); dump_cfg_int(sMaxAuthTries, o->max_authtries); dump_cfg_int(sMaxSessions, o->max_sessions); dump_cfg_int(sClientAliveInterval, o->client_alive_interval); dump_cfg_int(sClientAliveCountMax, o->client_alive_count_max); dump_cfg_int(sRequiredRSASize, o->required_rsa_size); dump_cfg_oct(sStreamLocalBindMask, o->fwd_opts.streamlocal_bind_mask); dump_cfg_int(sUnusedConnectionTimeout, o->unused_connection_timeout); /* formatted integer arguments */ dump_cfg_fmtint(sPermitRootLogin, o->permit_root_login); dump_cfg_fmtint(sIgnoreRhosts, o->ignore_rhosts); dump_cfg_fmtint(sIgnoreUserKnownHosts, o->ignore_user_known_hosts); dump_cfg_fmtint(sHostbasedAuthentication, o->hostbased_authentication); dump_cfg_fmtint(sHostbasedUsesNameFromPacketOnly, o->hostbased_uses_name_from_packet_only); dump_cfg_fmtint(sPubkeyAuthentication, o->pubkey_authentication); #ifdef KRB5 dump_cfg_fmtint(sKerberosAuthentication, o->kerberos_authentication); dump_cfg_fmtint(sKerberosOrLocalPasswd, o->kerberos_or_local_passwd); dump_cfg_fmtint(sKerberosTicketCleanup, o->kerberos_ticket_cleanup); # ifdef USE_AFS dump_cfg_fmtint(sKerberosGetAFSToken, o->kerberos_get_afs_token); # endif #endif #ifdef GSSAPI dump_cfg_fmtint(sGssAuthentication, o->gss_authentication); dump_cfg_fmtint(sGssCleanupCreds, o->gss_cleanup_creds); #endif dump_cfg_fmtint(sPasswordAuthentication, o->password_authentication); dump_cfg_fmtint(sKbdInteractiveAuthentication, o->kbd_interactive_authentication); dump_cfg_fmtint(sPrintMotd, o->print_motd); #ifndef DISABLE_LASTLOG dump_cfg_fmtint(sPrintLastLog, o->print_lastlog); #endif dump_cfg_fmtint(sX11Forwarding, o->x11_forwarding); dump_cfg_fmtint(sX11UseLocalhost, o->x11_use_localhost); dump_cfg_fmtint(sPermitTTY, o->permit_tty); dump_cfg_fmtint(sPermitUserRC, o->permit_user_rc); dump_cfg_fmtint(sStrictModes, o->strict_modes); dump_cfg_fmtint(sTCPKeepAlive, o->tcp_keep_alive); dump_cfg_fmtint(sEmptyPasswd, o->permit_empty_passwd); dump_cfg_fmtint(sCompression, o->compression); dump_cfg_fmtint(sGatewayPorts, o->fwd_opts.gateway_ports); dump_cfg_fmtint(sUseDNS, o->use_dns); dump_cfg_fmtint(sAllowTcpForwarding, o->allow_tcp_forwarding); dump_cfg_fmtint(sAllowAgentForwarding, o->allow_agent_forwarding); dump_cfg_fmtint(sDisableForwarding, o->disable_forwarding); dump_cfg_fmtint(sAllowStreamLocalForwarding, o->allow_streamlocal_forwarding); dump_cfg_fmtint(sStreamLocalBindUnlink, o->fwd_opts.streamlocal_bind_unlink); dump_cfg_fmtint(sFingerprintHash, o->fingerprint_hash); dump_cfg_fmtint(sExposeAuthInfo, o->expose_userauth_info); dump_cfg_fmtint(sUseBlacklist, o->use_blacklist); /* string arguments */ dump_cfg_string(sPidFile, o->pid_file); dump_cfg_string(sModuliFile, o->moduli_file); dump_cfg_string(sXAuthLocation, o->xauth_location); dump_cfg_string(sCiphers, o->ciphers); dump_cfg_string(sMacs, o->macs); dump_cfg_string(sBanner, o->banner); dump_cfg_string(sForceCommand, o->adm_forced_command); dump_cfg_string(sChrootDirectory, o->chroot_directory); dump_cfg_string(sTrustedUserCAKeys, o->trusted_user_ca_keys); dump_cfg_string(sRevokedKeys, o->revoked_keys_file); dump_cfg_string(sSecurityKeyProvider, o->sk_provider); dump_cfg_string(sAuthorizedPrincipalsFile, o->authorized_principals_file); dump_cfg_string(sVersionAddendum, *o->version_addendum == '\0' ? "none" : o->version_addendum); dump_cfg_string(sAuthorizedKeysCommand, o->authorized_keys_command); dump_cfg_string(sAuthorizedKeysCommandUser, o->authorized_keys_command_user); dump_cfg_string(sAuthorizedPrincipalsCommand, o->authorized_principals_command); dump_cfg_string(sAuthorizedPrincipalsCommandUser, o->authorized_principals_command_user); dump_cfg_string(sHostKeyAgent, o->host_key_agent); dump_cfg_string(sKexAlgorithms, o->kex_algorithms); dump_cfg_string(sCASignatureAlgorithms, o->ca_sign_algorithms); dump_cfg_string(sHostbasedAcceptedAlgorithms, o->hostbased_accepted_algos); dump_cfg_string(sHostKeyAlgorithms, o->hostkeyalgorithms); dump_cfg_string(sPubkeyAcceptedAlgorithms, o->pubkey_accepted_algos); #if defined(__OpenBSD__) || defined(HAVE_SYS_SET_PROCESS_RDOMAIN) dump_cfg_string(sRDomain, o->routing_domain); #endif /* string arguments requiring a lookup */ dump_cfg_string(sLogLevel, log_level_name(o->log_level)); dump_cfg_string(sLogFacility, log_facility_name(o->log_facility)); /* string array arguments */ dump_cfg_strarray_oneline(sAuthorizedKeysFile, o->num_authkeys_files, o->authorized_keys_files); dump_cfg_strarray(sHostKeyFile, o->num_host_key_files, o->host_key_files); dump_cfg_strarray(sHostCertificate, o->num_host_cert_files, o->host_cert_files); dump_cfg_strarray(sAllowUsers, o->num_allow_users, o->allow_users); dump_cfg_strarray(sDenyUsers, o->num_deny_users, o->deny_users); dump_cfg_strarray(sAllowGroups, o->num_allow_groups, o->allow_groups); dump_cfg_strarray(sDenyGroups, o->num_deny_groups, o->deny_groups); dump_cfg_strarray(sAcceptEnv, o->num_accept_env, o->accept_env); dump_cfg_strarray(sSetEnv, o->num_setenv, o->setenv); dump_cfg_strarray_oneline(sAuthenticationMethods, o->num_auth_methods, o->auth_methods); dump_cfg_strarray_oneline(sLogVerbose, o->num_log_verbose, o->log_verbose); dump_cfg_strarray_oneline(sChannelTimeout, o->num_channel_timeouts, o->channel_timeouts); /* other arguments */ for (i = 0; i < o->num_subsystems; i++) printf("subsystem %s %s\n", o->subsystem_name[i], o->subsystem_args[i]); printf("maxstartups %d:%d:%d\n", o->max_startups_begin, o->max_startups_rate, o->max_startups); printf("persourcemaxstartups "); if (o->per_source_max_startups == INT_MAX) printf("none\n"); else printf("%d\n", o->per_source_max_startups); printf("persourcenetblocksize %d:%d\n", o->per_source_masklen_ipv4, o->per_source_masklen_ipv6); s = NULL; for (i = 0; tunmode_desc[i].val != -1; i++) { if (tunmode_desc[i].val == o->permit_tun) { s = tunmode_desc[i].text; break; } } dump_cfg_string(sPermitTunnel, s); printf("ipqos %s ", iptos2str(o->ip_qos_interactive)); printf("%s\n", iptos2str(o->ip_qos_bulk)); printf("rekeylimit %llu %d\n", (unsigned long long)o->rekey_limit, o->rekey_interval); printf("permitopen"); if (o->num_permitted_opens == 0) printf(" any"); else { for (i = 0; i < o->num_permitted_opens; i++) printf(" %s", o->permitted_opens[i]); } printf("\n"); printf("permitlisten"); if (o->num_permitted_listens == 0) printf(" any"); else { for (i = 0; i < o->num_permitted_listens; i++) printf(" %s", o->permitted_listens[i]); } printf("\n"); if (o->permit_user_env_allowlist == NULL) { dump_cfg_fmtint(sPermitUserEnvironment, o->permit_user_env); } else { printf("permituserenvironment %s\n", o->permit_user_env_allowlist); } printf("pubkeyauthoptions"); if (o->pubkey_auth_options == 0) printf(" none"); if (o->pubkey_auth_options & PUBKEYAUTH_TOUCH_REQUIRED) printf(" touch-required"); if (o->pubkey_auth_options & PUBKEYAUTH_VERIFY_REQUIRED) printf(" verify-required"); printf("\n"); } diff --git a/crypto/openssh/serverloop.c b/crypto/openssh/serverloop.c index 6db0916d8220..de5fa2e3c2e8 100644 --- a/crypto/openssh/serverloop.c +++ b/crypto/openssh/serverloop.c @@ -1,935 +1,932 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: serverloop.c,v 1.234 2023/01/17 09:44:48 djm Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: serverloop.c,v 1.236 2023/03/08 04:43:12 guenther Exp $ */ /* * Author: Tatu Ylonen * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen , Espoo, Finland * All rights reserved * Server main loop for handling the interactive session. * * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell". * * SSH2 support by Markus Friedl. * Copyright (c) 2000, 2001 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. */ #include "includes.h" #include #include #include #ifdef HAVE_SYS_TIME_H # include #endif #include #include #include #include #include #ifdef HAVE_POLL_H #include #endif #include #include #include #include #include #include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h" #include "xmalloc.h" #include "packet.h" #include "sshbuf.h" #include "log.h" #include "misc.h" #include "servconf.h" #include "canohost.h" #include "sshpty.h" #include "channels.h" -#include "compat.h" #include "ssh2.h" #include "sshkey.h" #include "cipher.h" #include "kex.h" #include "hostfile.h" #include "auth.h" #include "session.h" #include "dispatch.h" #include "auth-options.h" #include "serverloop.h" #include "ssherr.h" extern ServerOptions options; /* XXX */ extern Authctxt *the_authctxt; extern struct sshauthopt *auth_opts; extern int use_privsep; static int no_more_sessions = 0; /* Disallow further sessions. */ static volatile sig_atomic_t child_terminated = 0; /* The child has terminated. */ /* Cleanup on signals (!use_privsep case only) */ static volatile sig_atomic_t received_sigterm = 0; /* prototypes */ static void server_init_dispatch(struct ssh *); /* requested tunnel forwarding interface(s), shared with session.c */ char *tun_fwd_ifnames = NULL; /* returns 1 if bind to specified port by specified user is permitted */ static int bind_permitted(int port, uid_t uid) { if (use_privsep) return 1; /* allow system to decide */ if (port < IPPORT_RESERVED && uid != 0) return 0; return 1; } -/*ARGSUSED*/ static void sigchld_handler(int sig) { child_terminated = 1; } -/*ARGSUSED*/ static void sigterm_handler(int sig) { received_sigterm = sig; } static void client_alive_check(struct ssh *ssh) { char remote_id[512]; int r, channel_id; /* timeout, check to see how many we have had */ if (options.client_alive_count_max > 0 && ssh_packet_inc_alive_timeouts(ssh) > options.client_alive_count_max) { sshpkt_fmt_connection_id(ssh, remote_id, sizeof(remote_id)); logit("Timeout, client not responding from %s", remote_id); cleanup_exit(255); } /* * send a bogus global/channel request with "wantreply", * we should get back a failure */ if ((channel_id = channel_find_open(ssh)) == -1) { if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_GLOBAL_REQUEST)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, "keepalive@openssh.com")) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_u8(ssh, 1)) != 0) /* boolean: want reply */ fatal_fr(r, "compose"); } else { channel_request_start(ssh, channel_id, "keepalive@openssh.com", 1); } if ((r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "send"); } /* * Sleep in ppoll() until we can do something. * Optionally, a maximum time can be specified for the duration of * the wait (0 = infinite). */ static void wait_until_can_do_something(struct ssh *ssh, int connection_in, int connection_out, struct pollfd **pfdp, u_int *npfd_allocp, u_int *npfd_activep, sigset_t *sigsetp, int *conn_in_readyp, int *conn_out_readyp) { struct timespec timeout; char remote_id[512]; int ret; int client_alive_scheduled = 0; u_int p; time_t now; static time_t last_client_time, unused_connection_expiry; *conn_in_readyp = *conn_out_readyp = 0; /* Prepare channel poll. First two pollfd entries are reserved */ ptimeout_init(&timeout); channel_prepare_poll(ssh, pfdp, npfd_allocp, npfd_activep, 2, &timeout); now = monotime(); if (*npfd_activep < 2) fatal_f("bad npfd %u", *npfd_activep); /* shouldn't happen */ if (options.rekey_interval > 0 && !ssh_packet_is_rekeying(ssh)) { ptimeout_deadline_sec(&timeout, ssh_packet_get_rekey_timeout(ssh)); } /* * If no channels are open and UnusedConnectionTimeout is set, then * start the clock to terminate the connection. */ if (options.unused_connection_timeout != 0) { if (channel_still_open(ssh) || unused_connection_expiry == 0) { unused_connection_expiry = now + options.unused_connection_timeout; } ptimeout_deadline_monotime(&timeout, unused_connection_expiry); } /* * if using client_alive, set the max timeout accordingly, * and indicate that this particular timeout was for client * alive by setting the client_alive_scheduled flag. * * this could be randomized somewhat to make traffic * analysis more difficult, but we're not doing it yet. */ if (options.client_alive_interval) { /* Time we last heard from the client OR sent a keepalive */ if (last_client_time == 0) last_client_time = now; ptimeout_deadline_sec(&timeout, options.client_alive_interval); /* XXX ? deadline_monotime(last_client_time + alive_interval) */ client_alive_scheduled = 1; } #if 0 /* wrong: bad condition XXX */ if (channel_not_very_much_buffered_data()) #endif /* Monitor client connection on reserved pollfd entries */ (*pfdp)[0].fd = connection_in; (*pfdp)[0].events = POLLIN; (*pfdp)[1].fd = connection_out; (*pfdp)[1].events = ssh_packet_have_data_to_write(ssh) ? POLLOUT : 0; /* * If child has terminated and there is enough buffer space to read * from it, then read as much as is available and exit. */ if (child_terminated && ssh_packet_not_very_much_data_to_write(ssh)) ptimeout_deadline_ms(&timeout, 100); /* Wait for something to happen, or the timeout to expire. */ ret = ppoll(*pfdp, *npfd_activep, ptimeout_get_tsp(&timeout), sigsetp); if (ret == -1) { for (p = 0; p < *npfd_activep; p++) (*pfdp)[p].revents = 0; if (errno != EINTR) fatal_f("ppoll: %.100s", strerror(errno)); return; } *conn_in_readyp = (*pfdp)[0].revents != 0; *conn_out_readyp = (*pfdp)[1].revents != 0; now = monotime(); /* need to reset after ppoll() */ /* ClientAliveInterval probing */ if (client_alive_scheduled) { if (ret == 0 && now > last_client_time + options.client_alive_interval) { /* ppoll timed out and we're due to probe */ client_alive_check(ssh); last_client_time = now; } else if (ret != 0 && *conn_in_readyp) { /* Data from peer; reset probe timer. */ last_client_time = now; } } /* UnusedConnectionTimeout handling */ if (unused_connection_expiry != 0 && now > unused_connection_expiry && !channel_still_open(ssh)) { sshpkt_fmt_connection_id(ssh, remote_id, sizeof(remote_id)); logit("terminating inactive connection from %s", remote_id); cleanup_exit(255); } } /* * Processes input from the client and the program. Input data is stored * in buffers and processed later. */ static int process_input(struct ssh *ssh, int connection_in) { int r; if ((r = ssh_packet_process_read(ssh, connection_in)) == 0) return 0; /* success */ if (r == SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR) { if (errno == EAGAIN || errno == EINTR || errno == EWOULDBLOCK) return 0; if (errno == EPIPE) { verbose("Connection closed by %.100s port %d", ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), ssh_remote_port(ssh)); return -1; } verbose("Read error from remote host %s port %d: %s", ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), ssh_remote_port(ssh), strerror(errno)); cleanup_exit(255); } return -1; } /* * Sends data from internal buffers to client program stdin. */ static void process_output(struct ssh *ssh, int connection_out) { int r; /* Send any buffered packet data to the client. */ if ((r = ssh_packet_write_poll(ssh)) != 0) { sshpkt_fatal(ssh, r, "%s: ssh_packet_write_poll", __func__); } } static void process_buffered_input_packets(struct ssh *ssh) { ssh_dispatch_run_fatal(ssh, DISPATCH_NONBLOCK, NULL); } static void collect_children(struct ssh *ssh) { pid_t pid; int status; if (child_terminated) { debug("Received SIGCHLD."); while ((pid = waitpid(-1, &status, WNOHANG)) > 0 || (pid == -1 && errno == EINTR)) if (pid > 0) session_close_by_pid(ssh, pid, status); child_terminated = 0; } } void server_loop2(struct ssh *ssh, Authctxt *authctxt) { struct pollfd *pfd = NULL; u_int npfd_alloc = 0, npfd_active = 0; int r, conn_in_ready, conn_out_ready; u_int connection_in, connection_out; sigset_t bsigset, osigset; debug("Entering interactive session for SSH2."); if (sigemptyset(&bsigset) == -1 || sigaddset(&bsigset, SIGCHLD) == -1) error_f("bsigset setup: %s", strerror(errno)); ssh_signal(SIGCHLD, sigchld_handler); child_terminated = 0; connection_in = ssh_packet_get_connection_in(ssh); connection_out = ssh_packet_get_connection_out(ssh); if (!use_privsep) { ssh_signal(SIGTERM, sigterm_handler); ssh_signal(SIGINT, sigterm_handler); ssh_signal(SIGQUIT, sigterm_handler); } server_init_dispatch(ssh); for (;;) { process_buffered_input_packets(ssh); if (!ssh_packet_is_rekeying(ssh) && ssh_packet_not_very_much_data_to_write(ssh)) channel_output_poll(ssh); /* * Block SIGCHLD while we check for dead children, then pass * the old signal mask through to ppoll() so that it'll wake * up immediately if a child exits after we've called waitpid(). */ if (sigprocmask(SIG_BLOCK, &bsigset, &osigset) == -1) error_f("bsigset sigprocmask: %s", strerror(errno)); collect_children(ssh); wait_until_can_do_something(ssh, connection_in, connection_out, &pfd, &npfd_alloc, &npfd_active, &osigset, &conn_in_ready, &conn_out_ready); if (sigprocmask(SIG_UNBLOCK, &bsigset, &osigset) == -1) error_f("osigset sigprocmask: %s", strerror(errno)); if (received_sigterm) { logit("Exiting on signal %d", (int)received_sigterm); /* Clean up sessions, utmp, etc. */ cleanup_exit(255); } channel_after_poll(ssh, pfd, npfd_active); if (conn_in_ready && process_input(ssh, connection_in) < 0) break; /* A timeout may have triggered rekeying */ if ((r = ssh_packet_check_rekey(ssh)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "cannot start rekeying"); if (conn_out_ready) process_output(ssh, connection_out); } collect_children(ssh); free(pfd); /* free all channels, no more reads and writes */ channel_free_all(ssh); /* free remaining sessions, e.g. remove wtmp entries */ session_destroy_all(ssh, NULL); } static int server_input_keep_alive(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh) { debug("Got %d/%u for keepalive", type, seq); /* * reset timeout, since we got a sane answer from the client. * even if this was generated by something other than * the bogus CHANNEL_REQUEST we send for keepalives. */ ssh_packet_set_alive_timeouts(ssh, 0); return 0; } static Channel * server_request_direct_tcpip(struct ssh *ssh, int *reason, const char **errmsg) { Channel *c = NULL; char *target = NULL, *originator = NULL; u_int target_port = 0, originator_port = 0; int r; if ((r = sshpkt_get_cstring(ssh, &target, NULL)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &target_port)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_get_cstring(ssh, &originator, NULL)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &originator_port)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0) sshpkt_fatal(ssh, r, "%s: parse packet", __func__); if (target_port > 0xFFFF) { error_f("invalid target port"); *reason = SSH2_OPEN_ADMINISTRATIVELY_PROHIBITED; goto out; } if (originator_port > 0xFFFF) { error_f("invalid originator port"); *reason = SSH2_OPEN_ADMINISTRATIVELY_PROHIBITED; goto out; } debug_f("originator %s port %u, target %s port %u", originator, originator_port, target, target_port); /* XXX fine grained permissions */ if ((options.allow_tcp_forwarding & FORWARD_LOCAL) != 0 && auth_opts->permit_port_forwarding_flag && !options.disable_forwarding) { c = channel_connect_to_port(ssh, target, target_port, "direct-tcpip", "direct-tcpip", reason, errmsg); } else { logit("refused local port forward: " "originator %s port %d, target %s port %d", originator, originator_port, target, target_port); if (reason != NULL) *reason = SSH2_OPEN_ADMINISTRATIVELY_PROHIBITED; } out: free(originator); free(target); return c; } static Channel * server_request_direct_streamlocal(struct ssh *ssh) { Channel *c = NULL; char *target = NULL, *originator = NULL; u_int originator_port = 0; struct passwd *pw = the_authctxt->pw; int r; if (pw == NULL || !the_authctxt->valid) fatal_f("no/invalid user"); if ((r = sshpkt_get_cstring(ssh, &target, NULL)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_get_cstring(ssh, &originator, NULL)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &originator_port)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0) sshpkt_fatal(ssh, r, "%s: parse packet", __func__); if (originator_port > 0xFFFF) { error_f("invalid originator port"); goto out; } debug_f("originator %s port %d, target %s", originator, originator_port, target); /* XXX fine grained permissions */ if ((options.allow_streamlocal_forwarding & FORWARD_LOCAL) != 0 && auth_opts->permit_port_forwarding_flag && !options.disable_forwarding && (pw->pw_uid == 0 || use_privsep)) { c = channel_connect_to_path(ssh, target, "direct-streamlocal@openssh.com", "direct-streamlocal"); } else { logit("refused streamlocal port forward: " "originator %s port %d, target %s", originator, originator_port, target); } out: free(originator); free(target); return c; } static Channel * server_request_tun(struct ssh *ssh) { Channel *c = NULL; u_int mode, tun; int r, sock; char *tmp, *ifname = NULL; if ((r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &mode)) != 0) sshpkt_fatal(ssh, r, "%s: parse mode", __func__); switch (mode) { case SSH_TUNMODE_POINTOPOINT: case SSH_TUNMODE_ETHERNET: break; default: ssh_packet_send_debug(ssh, "Unsupported tunnel device mode."); return NULL; } if ((options.permit_tun & mode) == 0) { ssh_packet_send_debug(ssh, "Server has rejected tunnel device " "forwarding"); return NULL; } if ((r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &tun)) != 0) sshpkt_fatal(ssh, r, "%s: parse device", __func__); if (tun > INT_MAX) { debug_f("invalid tun"); goto done; } if (auth_opts->force_tun_device != -1) { if (tun != SSH_TUNID_ANY && auth_opts->force_tun_device != (int)tun) goto done; tun = auth_opts->force_tun_device; } sock = tun_open(tun, mode, &ifname); if (sock < 0) goto done; debug("Tunnel forwarding using interface %s", ifname); c = channel_new(ssh, "tun", SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN, sock, sock, -1, CHAN_TCP_WINDOW_DEFAULT, CHAN_TCP_PACKET_DEFAULT, 0, "tun", 1); c->datagram = 1; #if defined(SSH_TUN_FILTER) if (mode == SSH_TUNMODE_POINTOPOINT) channel_register_filter(ssh, c->self, sys_tun_infilter, sys_tun_outfilter, NULL, NULL); #endif /* * Update the list of names exposed to the session * XXX remove these if the tunnels are closed (won't matter * much if they are already in the environment though) */ tmp = tun_fwd_ifnames; xasprintf(&tun_fwd_ifnames, "%s%s%s", tun_fwd_ifnames == NULL ? "" : tun_fwd_ifnames, tun_fwd_ifnames == NULL ? "" : ",", ifname); free(tmp); free(ifname); done: if (c == NULL) ssh_packet_send_debug(ssh, "Failed to open the tunnel device."); return c; } static Channel * server_request_session(struct ssh *ssh) { Channel *c; int r; debug("input_session_request"); if ((r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0) sshpkt_fatal(ssh, r, "%s: parse packet", __func__); if (no_more_sessions) { ssh_packet_disconnect(ssh, "Possible attack: attempt to open a " "session after additional sessions disabled"); } /* * A server session has no fd to read or write until a * CHANNEL_REQUEST for a shell is made, so we set the type to * SSH_CHANNEL_LARVAL. Additionally, a callback for handling all * CHANNEL_REQUEST messages is registered. */ c = channel_new(ssh, "session", SSH_CHANNEL_LARVAL, -1, -1, -1, /*window size*/0, CHAN_SES_PACKET_DEFAULT, 0, "server-session", 1); if (session_open(the_authctxt, c->self) != 1) { debug("session open failed, free channel %d", c->self); channel_free(ssh, c); return NULL; } channel_register_cleanup(ssh, c->self, session_close_by_channel, 0); return c; } static int server_input_channel_open(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh) { Channel *c = NULL; char *ctype = NULL; const char *errmsg = NULL; int r, reason = SSH2_OPEN_CONNECT_FAILED; u_int rchan = 0, rmaxpack = 0, rwindow = 0; if ((r = sshpkt_get_cstring(ssh, &ctype, NULL)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &rchan)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &rwindow)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &rmaxpack)) != 0) sshpkt_fatal(ssh, r, "%s: parse packet", __func__); debug_f("ctype %s rchan %u win %u max %u", ctype, rchan, rwindow, rmaxpack); if (strcmp(ctype, "session") == 0) { c = server_request_session(ssh); } else if (strcmp(ctype, "direct-tcpip") == 0) { c = server_request_direct_tcpip(ssh, &reason, &errmsg); } else if (strcmp(ctype, "direct-streamlocal@openssh.com") == 0) { c = server_request_direct_streamlocal(ssh); } else if (strcmp(ctype, "tun@openssh.com") == 0) { c = server_request_tun(ssh); } if (c != NULL) { debug_f("confirm %s", ctype); c->remote_id = rchan; c->have_remote_id = 1; c->remote_window = rwindow; c->remote_maxpacket = rmaxpack; if (c->type != SSH_CHANNEL_CONNECTING) { if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, c->remote_id)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, c->self)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, c->local_window)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, c->local_maxpacket)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) { sshpkt_fatal(ssh, r, "%s: send open confirm", __func__); } } } else { debug_f("failure %s", ctype); if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, rchan)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, reason)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, errmsg ? errmsg : "open failed")) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, "")) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) { sshpkt_fatal(ssh, r, "%s: send open failure", __func__); } } free(ctype); return 0; } static int server_input_hostkeys_prove(struct ssh *ssh, struct sshbuf **respp) { struct sshbuf *resp = NULL; struct sshbuf *sigbuf = NULL; struct sshkey *key = NULL, *key_pub = NULL, *key_prv = NULL; int r, ndx, success = 0; const u_char *blob; const char *sigalg, *kex_rsa_sigalg = NULL; u_char *sig = 0; size_t blen, slen; if ((resp = sshbuf_new()) == NULL || (sigbuf = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) fatal_f("sshbuf_new"); if (sshkey_type_plain(sshkey_type_from_name( ssh->kex->hostkey_alg)) == KEY_RSA) kex_rsa_sigalg = ssh->kex->hostkey_alg; while (ssh_packet_remaining(ssh) > 0) { sshkey_free(key); key = NULL; if ((r = sshpkt_get_string_direct(ssh, &blob, &blen)) != 0 || (r = sshkey_from_blob(blob, blen, &key)) != 0) { error_fr(r, "parse key"); goto out; } /* * Better check that this is actually one of our hostkeys * before attempting to sign anything with it. */ if ((ndx = ssh->kex->host_key_index(key, 1, ssh)) == -1) { error_f("unknown host %s key", sshkey_type(key)); goto out; } /* * XXX refactor: make kex->sign just use an index rather * than passing in public and private keys */ if ((key_prv = get_hostkey_by_index(ndx)) == NULL && (key_pub = get_hostkey_public_by_index(ndx, ssh)) == NULL) { error_f("can't retrieve hostkey %d", ndx); goto out; } sshbuf_reset(sigbuf); free(sig); sig = NULL; /* * For RSA keys, prefer to use the signature type negotiated * during KEX to the default (SHA1). */ sigalg = NULL; if (sshkey_type_plain(key->type) == KEY_RSA) { if (kex_rsa_sigalg != NULL) sigalg = kex_rsa_sigalg; else if (ssh->kex->flags & KEX_RSA_SHA2_512_SUPPORTED) sigalg = "rsa-sha2-512"; else if (ssh->kex->flags & KEX_RSA_SHA2_256_SUPPORTED) sigalg = "rsa-sha2-256"; } debug3_f("sign %s key (index %d) using sigalg %s", sshkey_type(key), ndx, sigalg == NULL ? "default" : sigalg); if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(sigbuf, "hostkeys-prove-00@openssh.com")) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_stringb(sigbuf, ssh->kex->session_id)) != 0 || (r = sshkey_puts(key, sigbuf)) != 0 || (r = ssh->kex->sign(ssh, key_prv, key_pub, &sig, &slen, sshbuf_ptr(sigbuf), sshbuf_len(sigbuf), sigalg)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_string(resp, sig, slen)) != 0) { error_fr(r, "assemble signature"); goto out; } } /* Success */ *respp = resp; resp = NULL; /* don't free it */ success = 1; out: free(sig); sshbuf_free(resp); sshbuf_free(sigbuf); sshkey_free(key); return success; } static int server_input_global_request(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh) { char *rtype = NULL; u_char want_reply = 0; int r, success = 0, allocated_listen_port = 0; u_int port = 0; struct sshbuf *resp = NULL; struct passwd *pw = the_authctxt->pw; struct Forward fwd; memset(&fwd, 0, sizeof(fwd)); if (pw == NULL || !the_authctxt->valid) fatal_f("no/invalid user"); if ((r = sshpkt_get_cstring(ssh, &rtype, NULL)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_get_u8(ssh, &want_reply)) != 0) sshpkt_fatal(ssh, r, "%s: parse packet", __func__); debug_f("rtype %s want_reply %d", rtype, want_reply); /* -R style forwarding */ if (strcmp(rtype, "tcpip-forward") == 0) { if ((r = sshpkt_get_cstring(ssh, &fwd.listen_host, NULL)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &port)) != 0) sshpkt_fatal(ssh, r, "%s: parse tcpip-forward", __func__); debug_f("tcpip-forward listen %s port %u", fwd.listen_host, port); if (port <= INT_MAX) fwd.listen_port = (int)port; /* check permissions */ if (port > INT_MAX || (options.allow_tcp_forwarding & FORWARD_REMOTE) == 0 || !auth_opts->permit_port_forwarding_flag || options.disable_forwarding || (!want_reply && fwd.listen_port == 0) || (fwd.listen_port != 0 && !bind_permitted(fwd.listen_port, pw->pw_uid))) { success = 0; ssh_packet_send_debug(ssh, "Server has disabled port forwarding."); } else { /* Start listening on the port */ success = channel_setup_remote_fwd_listener(ssh, &fwd, &allocated_listen_port, &options.fwd_opts); } if ((resp = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) fatal_f("sshbuf_new"); if (allocated_listen_port != 0 && (r = sshbuf_put_u32(resp, allocated_listen_port)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "sshbuf_put_u32"); } else if (strcmp(rtype, "cancel-tcpip-forward") == 0) { if ((r = sshpkt_get_cstring(ssh, &fwd.listen_host, NULL)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &port)) != 0) sshpkt_fatal(ssh, r, "%s: parse cancel-tcpip-forward", __func__); debug_f("cancel-tcpip-forward addr %s port %d", fwd.listen_host, port); if (port <= INT_MAX) { fwd.listen_port = (int)port; success = channel_cancel_rport_listener(ssh, &fwd); } } else if (strcmp(rtype, "streamlocal-forward@openssh.com") == 0) { if ((r = sshpkt_get_cstring(ssh, &fwd.listen_path, NULL)) != 0) sshpkt_fatal(ssh, r, "%s: parse streamlocal-forward@openssh.com", __func__); debug_f("streamlocal-forward listen path %s", fwd.listen_path); /* check permissions */ if ((options.allow_streamlocal_forwarding & FORWARD_REMOTE) == 0 || !auth_opts->permit_port_forwarding_flag || options.disable_forwarding || (pw->pw_uid != 0 && !use_privsep)) { success = 0; ssh_packet_send_debug(ssh, "Server has disabled " "streamlocal forwarding."); } else { /* Start listening on the socket */ success = channel_setup_remote_fwd_listener(ssh, &fwd, NULL, &options.fwd_opts); } } else if (strcmp(rtype, "cancel-streamlocal-forward@openssh.com") == 0) { if ((r = sshpkt_get_cstring(ssh, &fwd.listen_path, NULL)) != 0) sshpkt_fatal(ssh, r, "%s: parse cancel-streamlocal-forward@openssh.com", __func__); debug_f("cancel-streamlocal-forward path %s", fwd.listen_path); success = channel_cancel_rport_listener(ssh, &fwd); } else if (strcmp(rtype, "no-more-sessions@openssh.com") == 0) { no_more_sessions = 1; success = 1; } else if (strcmp(rtype, "hostkeys-prove-00@openssh.com") == 0) { success = server_input_hostkeys_prove(ssh, &resp); } /* XXX sshpkt_get_end() */ if (want_reply) { if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, success ? SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_SUCCESS : SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_FAILURE)) != 0 || (success && resp != NULL && (r = sshpkt_putb(ssh, resp)) != 0) || (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0 || (r = ssh_packet_write_wait(ssh)) != 0) sshpkt_fatal(ssh, r, "%s: send reply", __func__); } free(fwd.listen_host); free(fwd.listen_path); free(rtype); sshbuf_free(resp); return 0; } static int server_input_channel_req(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh) { Channel *c; int r, success = 0; char *rtype = NULL; u_char want_reply = 0; u_int id = 0; if ((r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &id)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_get_cstring(ssh, &rtype, NULL)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_get_u8(ssh, &want_reply)) != 0) sshpkt_fatal(ssh, r, "%s: parse packet", __func__); debug("server_input_channel_req: channel %u request %s reply %d", id, rtype, want_reply); if (id >= INT_MAX || (c = channel_lookup(ssh, (int)id)) == NULL) { ssh_packet_disconnect(ssh, "%s: unknown channel %d", __func__, id); } if (!strcmp(rtype, "eow@openssh.com")) { if ((r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0) sshpkt_fatal(ssh, r, "%s: parse packet", __func__); chan_rcvd_eow(ssh, c); } else if ((c->type == SSH_CHANNEL_LARVAL || c->type == SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN) && strcmp(c->ctype, "session") == 0) success = session_input_channel_req(ssh, c, rtype); if (want_reply && !(c->flags & CHAN_CLOSE_SENT)) { if (!c->have_remote_id) fatal_f("channel %d: no remote_id", c->self); if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, success ? SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_SUCCESS : SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_FAILURE)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, c->remote_id)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) sshpkt_fatal(ssh, r, "%s: send reply", __func__); } free(rtype); return 0; } static void server_init_dispatch(struct ssh *ssh) { debug("server_init_dispatch"); ssh_dispatch_init(ssh, &dispatch_protocol_error); ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE, &channel_input_oclose); ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA, &channel_input_data); ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_EOF, &channel_input_ieof); ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_EXTENDED_DATA, &channel_input_extended_data); ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN, &server_input_channel_open); ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION, &channel_input_open_confirmation); ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE, &channel_input_open_failure); ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_REQUEST, &server_input_channel_req); ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_WINDOW_ADJUST, &channel_input_window_adjust); ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_GLOBAL_REQUEST, &server_input_global_request); /* client_alive */ ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_SUCCESS, &server_input_keep_alive); ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_FAILURE, &server_input_keep_alive); ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_SUCCESS, &server_input_keep_alive); ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_FAILURE, &server_input_keep_alive); /* rekeying */ ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT, &kex_input_kexinit); } diff --git a/crypto/openssh/session.c b/crypto/openssh/session.c index e45f891d4f97..3ccda7ad821d 100644 --- a/crypto/openssh/session.c +++ b/crypto/openssh/session.c @@ -1,2743 +1,2743 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: session.c,v 1.333 2023/01/06 02:42:34 djm Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: session.c,v 1.335 2023/03/07 06:09:14 dtucker Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen , Espoo, Finland * All rights reserved * * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell". * * SSH2 support by Markus Friedl. * Copyright (c) 2000, 2001 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. */ #include "includes.h" #include #ifdef HAVE_SYS_STAT_H # include #endif #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H #include #endif #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h" #include "xmalloc.h" #include "ssh.h" #include "ssh2.h" #include "sshpty.h" #include "packet.h" #include "sshbuf.h" #include "ssherr.h" #include "match.h" #include "uidswap.h" -#include "compat.h" #include "channels.h" #include "sshkey.h" #include "cipher.h" #ifdef GSSAPI #include "ssh-gss.h" #endif #include "hostfile.h" #include "auth.h" #include "auth-options.h" #include "authfd.h" #include "pathnames.h" #include "log.h" #include "misc.h" #include "servconf.h" #include "sshlogin.h" #include "serverloop.h" #include "canohost.h" #include "session.h" #include "kex.h" #include "monitor_wrap.h" #include "sftp.h" #include "atomicio.h" #if defined(KRB5) && defined(USE_AFS) #include #endif #ifdef WITH_SELINUX #include #endif #define IS_INTERNAL_SFTP(c) \ (!strncmp(c, INTERNAL_SFTP_NAME, sizeof(INTERNAL_SFTP_NAME) - 1) && \ (c[sizeof(INTERNAL_SFTP_NAME) - 1] == '\0' || \ c[sizeof(INTERNAL_SFTP_NAME) - 1] == ' ' || \ c[sizeof(INTERNAL_SFTP_NAME) - 1] == '\t')) /* func */ Session *session_new(void); void session_set_fds(struct ssh *, Session *, int, int, int, int, int); void session_pty_cleanup(Session *); void session_proctitle(Session *); int session_setup_x11fwd(struct ssh *, Session *); int do_exec_pty(struct ssh *, Session *, const char *); int do_exec_no_pty(struct ssh *, Session *, const char *); int do_exec(struct ssh *, Session *, const char *); void do_login(struct ssh *, Session *, const char *); void do_child(struct ssh *, Session *, const char *); void do_motd(void); int check_quietlogin(Session *, const char *); static void do_authenticated2(struct ssh *, Authctxt *); static int session_pty_req(struct ssh *, Session *); /* import */ extern ServerOptions options; extern char *__progname; extern int debug_flag; extern u_int utmp_len; extern int startup_pipe; extern void destroy_sensitive_data(void); extern struct sshbuf *loginmsg; extern struct sshauthopt *auth_opts; extern char *tun_fwd_ifnames; /* serverloop.c */ /* original command from peer. */ const char *original_command = NULL; /* data */ static int sessions_first_unused = -1; static int sessions_nalloc = 0; static Session *sessions = NULL; #define SUBSYSTEM_NONE 0 #define SUBSYSTEM_EXT 1 #define SUBSYSTEM_INT_SFTP 2 #define SUBSYSTEM_INT_SFTP_ERROR 3 #ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP login_cap_t *lc; #endif static int is_child = 0; static int in_chroot = 0; /* File containing userauth info, if ExposeAuthInfo set */ static char *auth_info_file = NULL; /* Name and directory of socket for authentication agent forwarding. */ static char *auth_sock_name = NULL; static char *auth_sock_dir = NULL; /* removes the agent forwarding socket */ static void auth_sock_cleanup_proc(struct passwd *pw) { if (auth_sock_name != NULL) { temporarily_use_uid(pw); unlink(auth_sock_name); rmdir(auth_sock_dir); auth_sock_name = NULL; restore_uid(); } } static int auth_input_request_forwarding(struct ssh *ssh, struct passwd * pw) { Channel *nc; int sock = -1; if (auth_sock_name != NULL) { error("authentication forwarding requested twice."); return 0; } /* Temporarily drop privileged uid for mkdir/bind. */ temporarily_use_uid(pw); /* Allocate a buffer for the socket name, and format the name. */ auth_sock_dir = xstrdup("/tmp/ssh-XXXXXXXXXX"); /* Create private directory for socket */ if (mkdtemp(auth_sock_dir) == NULL) { ssh_packet_send_debug(ssh, "Agent forwarding disabled: " "mkdtemp() failed: %.100s", strerror(errno)); restore_uid(); free(auth_sock_dir); auth_sock_dir = NULL; goto authsock_err; } xasprintf(&auth_sock_name, "%s/agent.%ld", auth_sock_dir, (long) getpid()); /* Start a Unix listener on auth_sock_name. */ sock = unix_listener(auth_sock_name, SSH_LISTEN_BACKLOG, 0); /* Restore the privileged uid. */ restore_uid(); /* Check for socket/bind/listen failure. */ if (sock < 0) goto authsock_err; /* Allocate a channel for the authentication agent socket. */ nc = channel_new(ssh, "auth-listener", SSH_CHANNEL_AUTH_SOCKET, sock, sock, -1, CHAN_X11_WINDOW_DEFAULT, CHAN_X11_PACKET_DEFAULT, 0, "auth socket", 1); nc->path = xstrdup(auth_sock_name); return 1; authsock_err: free(auth_sock_name); if (auth_sock_dir != NULL) { temporarily_use_uid(pw); rmdir(auth_sock_dir); restore_uid(); free(auth_sock_dir); } if (sock != -1) close(sock); auth_sock_name = NULL; auth_sock_dir = NULL; return 0; } static void display_loginmsg(void) { int r; if (sshbuf_len(loginmsg) == 0) return; if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(loginmsg, 0)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "sshbuf_put_u8"); printf("%s", (char *)sshbuf_ptr(loginmsg)); sshbuf_reset(loginmsg); } static void prepare_auth_info_file(struct passwd *pw, struct sshbuf *info) { int fd = -1, success = 0; if (!options.expose_userauth_info || info == NULL) return; temporarily_use_uid(pw); auth_info_file = xstrdup("/tmp/sshauth.XXXXXXXXXXXXXXX"); if ((fd = mkstemp(auth_info_file)) == -1) { error_f("mkstemp: %s", strerror(errno)); goto out; } if (atomicio(vwrite, fd, sshbuf_mutable_ptr(info), sshbuf_len(info)) != sshbuf_len(info)) { error_f("write: %s", strerror(errno)); goto out; } if (close(fd) != 0) { error_f("close: %s", strerror(errno)); goto out; } success = 1; out: if (!success) { if (fd != -1) close(fd); free(auth_info_file); auth_info_file = NULL; } restore_uid(); } static void set_fwdpermit_from_authopts(struct ssh *ssh, const struct sshauthopt *opts) { char *tmp, *cp, *host; int port; size_t i; if ((options.allow_tcp_forwarding & FORWARD_LOCAL) != 0) { channel_clear_permission(ssh, FORWARD_USER, FORWARD_LOCAL); for (i = 0; i < auth_opts->npermitopen; i++) { tmp = cp = xstrdup(auth_opts->permitopen[i]); /* This shouldn't fail as it has already been checked */ if ((host = hpdelim2(&cp, NULL)) == NULL) fatal_f("internal error: hpdelim"); host = cleanhostname(host); if (cp == NULL || (port = permitopen_port(cp)) < 0) fatal_f("internal error: permitopen port"); channel_add_permission(ssh, FORWARD_USER, FORWARD_LOCAL, host, port); free(tmp); } } if ((options.allow_tcp_forwarding & FORWARD_REMOTE) != 0) { channel_clear_permission(ssh, FORWARD_USER, FORWARD_REMOTE); for (i = 0; i < auth_opts->npermitlisten; i++) { tmp = cp = xstrdup(auth_opts->permitlisten[i]); /* This shouldn't fail as it has already been checked */ if ((host = hpdelim(&cp)) == NULL) fatal_f("internal error: hpdelim"); host = cleanhostname(host); if (cp == NULL || (port = permitopen_port(cp)) < 0) fatal_f("internal error: permitlisten port"); channel_add_permission(ssh, FORWARD_USER, FORWARD_REMOTE, host, port); free(tmp); } } } void do_authenticated(struct ssh *ssh, Authctxt *authctxt) { setproctitle("%s", authctxt->pw->pw_name); auth_log_authopts("active", auth_opts, 0); /* setup the channel layer */ /* XXX - streamlocal? */ set_fwdpermit_from_authopts(ssh, auth_opts); if (!auth_opts->permit_port_forwarding_flag || options.disable_forwarding) { channel_disable_admin(ssh, FORWARD_LOCAL); channel_disable_admin(ssh, FORWARD_REMOTE); } else { if ((options.allow_tcp_forwarding & FORWARD_LOCAL) == 0) channel_disable_admin(ssh, FORWARD_LOCAL); else channel_permit_all(ssh, FORWARD_LOCAL); if ((options.allow_tcp_forwarding & FORWARD_REMOTE) == 0) channel_disable_admin(ssh, FORWARD_REMOTE); else channel_permit_all(ssh, FORWARD_REMOTE); } auth_debug_send(ssh); prepare_auth_info_file(authctxt->pw, authctxt->session_info); do_authenticated2(ssh, authctxt); do_cleanup(ssh, authctxt); } /* Check untrusted xauth strings for metacharacters */ static int xauth_valid_string(const char *s) { size_t i; for (i = 0; s[i] != '\0'; i++) { if (!isalnum((u_char)s[i]) && s[i] != '.' && s[i] != ':' && s[i] != '/' && s[i] != '-' && s[i] != '_') return 0; } return 1; } #define USE_PIPES 1 /* * This is called to fork and execute a command when we have no tty. This * will call do_child from the child, and server_loop from the parent after * setting up file descriptors and such. */ int do_exec_no_pty(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s, const char *command) { pid_t pid; #ifdef USE_PIPES int pin[2], pout[2], perr[2]; if (s == NULL) fatal("do_exec_no_pty: no session"); /* Allocate pipes for communicating with the program. */ if (pipe(pin) == -1) { error_f("pipe in: %.100s", strerror(errno)); return -1; } if (pipe(pout) == -1) { error_f("pipe out: %.100s", strerror(errno)); close(pin[0]); close(pin[1]); return -1; } if (pipe(perr) == -1) { error_f("pipe err: %.100s", strerror(errno)); close(pin[0]); close(pin[1]); close(pout[0]); close(pout[1]); return -1; } #else int inout[2], err[2]; if (s == NULL) fatal("do_exec_no_pty: no session"); /* Uses socket pairs to communicate with the program. */ if (socketpair(AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0, inout) == -1) { error_f("socketpair #1: %.100s", strerror(errno)); return -1; } if (socketpair(AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0, err) == -1) { error_f("socketpair #2: %.100s", strerror(errno)); close(inout[0]); close(inout[1]); return -1; } #endif session_proctitle(s); /* Fork the child. */ switch ((pid = fork())) { case -1: error_f("fork: %.100s", strerror(errno)); #ifdef USE_PIPES close(pin[0]); close(pin[1]); close(pout[0]); close(pout[1]); close(perr[0]); close(perr[1]); #else close(inout[0]); close(inout[1]); close(err[0]); close(err[1]); #endif return -1; case 0: is_child = 1; /* * Create a new session and process group since the 4.4BSD * setlogin() affects the entire process group. */ if (setsid() == -1) error("setsid failed: %.100s", strerror(errno)); #ifdef USE_PIPES /* * Redirect stdin. We close the parent side of the socket * pair, and make the child side the standard input. */ close(pin[1]); if (dup2(pin[0], 0) == -1) perror("dup2 stdin"); close(pin[0]); /* Redirect stdout. */ close(pout[0]); if (dup2(pout[1], 1) == -1) perror("dup2 stdout"); close(pout[1]); /* Redirect stderr. */ close(perr[0]); if (dup2(perr[1], 2) == -1) perror("dup2 stderr"); close(perr[1]); #else /* * Redirect stdin, stdout, and stderr. Stdin and stdout will * use the same socket, as some programs (particularly rdist) * seem to depend on it. */ close(inout[1]); close(err[1]); if (dup2(inout[0], 0) == -1) /* stdin */ perror("dup2 stdin"); if (dup2(inout[0], 1) == -1) /* stdout (same as stdin) */ perror("dup2 stdout"); close(inout[0]); if (dup2(err[0], 2) == -1) /* stderr */ perror("dup2 stderr"); close(err[0]); #endif /* Do processing for the child (exec command etc). */ do_child(ssh, s, command); /* NOTREACHED */ default: break; } #ifdef HAVE_CYGWIN cygwin_set_impersonation_token(INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE); #endif s->pid = pid; /* Set interactive/non-interactive mode. */ ssh_packet_set_interactive(ssh, s->display != NULL, options.ip_qos_interactive, options.ip_qos_bulk); /* * Clear loginmsg, since it's the child's responsibility to display * it to the user, otherwise multiple sessions may accumulate * multiple copies of the login messages. */ sshbuf_reset(loginmsg); #ifdef USE_PIPES /* We are the parent. Close the child sides of the pipes. */ close(pin[0]); close(pout[1]); close(perr[1]); session_set_fds(ssh, s, pin[1], pout[0], perr[0], s->is_subsystem, 0); #else /* We are the parent. Close the child sides of the socket pairs. */ close(inout[0]); close(err[0]); /* * Enter the interactive session. Note: server_loop must be able to * handle the case that fdin and fdout are the same. */ session_set_fds(ssh, s, inout[1], inout[1], err[1], s->is_subsystem, 0); #endif return 0; } /* * This is called to fork and execute a command when we have a tty. This * will call do_child from the child, and server_loop from the parent after * setting up file descriptors, controlling tty, updating wtmp, utmp, * lastlog, and other such operations. */ int do_exec_pty(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s, const char *command) { int fdout, ptyfd, ttyfd, ptymaster; pid_t pid; if (s == NULL) fatal("do_exec_pty: no session"); ptyfd = s->ptyfd; ttyfd = s->ttyfd; /* * Create another descriptor of the pty master side for use as the * standard input. We could use the original descriptor, but this * simplifies code in server_loop. The descriptor is bidirectional. * Do this before forking (and cleanup in the child) so as to * detect and gracefully fail out-of-fd conditions. */ if ((fdout = dup(ptyfd)) == -1) { error_f("dup #1: %s", strerror(errno)); close(ttyfd); close(ptyfd); return -1; } /* we keep a reference to the pty master */ if ((ptymaster = dup(ptyfd)) == -1) { error_f("dup #2: %s", strerror(errno)); close(ttyfd); close(ptyfd); close(fdout); return -1; } /* Fork the child. */ switch ((pid = fork())) { case -1: error_f("fork: %.100s", strerror(errno)); close(fdout); close(ptymaster); close(ttyfd); close(ptyfd); return -1; case 0: is_child = 1; close(fdout); close(ptymaster); /* Close the master side of the pseudo tty. */ close(ptyfd); /* Make the pseudo tty our controlling tty. */ pty_make_controlling_tty(&ttyfd, s->tty); /* Redirect stdin/stdout/stderr from the pseudo tty. */ if (dup2(ttyfd, 0) == -1) error("dup2 stdin: %s", strerror(errno)); if (dup2(ttyfd, 1) == -1) error("dup2 stdout: %s", strerror(errno)); if (dup2(ttyfd, 2) == -1) error("dup2 stderr: %s", strerror(errno)); /* Close the extra descriptor for the pseudo tty. */ close(ttyfd); /* record login, etc. similar to login(1) */ #ifndef HAVE_OSF_SIA do_login(ssh, s, command); #endif /* * Do common processing for the child, such as execing * the command. */ do_child(ssh, s, command); /* NOTREACHED */ default: break; } #ifdef HAVE_CYGWIN cygwin_set_impersonation_token(INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE); #endif s->pid = pid; /* Parent. Close the slave side of the pseudo tty. */ close(ttyfd); /* Enter interactive session. */ s->ptymaster = ptymaster; ssh_packet_set_interactive(ssh, 1, options.ip_qos_interactive, options.ip_qos_bulk); session_set_fds(ssh, s, ptyfd, fdout, -1, 1, 1); return 0; } /* * This is called to fork and execute a command. If another command is * to be forced, execute that instead. */ int do_exec(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s, const char *command) { int ret; const char *forced = NULL, *tty = NULL; char session_type[1024]; if (options.adm_forced_command) { original_command = command; command = options.adm_forced_command; forced = "(config)"; } else if (auth_opts->force_command != NULL) { original_command = command; command = auth_opts->force_command; forced = "(key-option)"; } s->forced = 0; if (forced != NULL) { s->forced = 1; if (IS_INTERNAL_SFTP(command)) { s->is_subsystem = s->is_subsystem ? SUBSYSTEM_INT_SFTP : SUBSYSTEM_INT_SFTP_ERROR; } else if (s->is_subsystem) s->is_subsystem = SUBSYSTEM_EXT; snprintf(session_type, sizeof(session_type), "forced-command %s '%.900s'", forced, command); } else if (s->is_subsystem) { snprintf(session_type, sizeof(session_type), "subsystem '%.900s'", s->subsys); } else if (command == NULL) { snprintf(session_type, sizeof(session_type), "shell"); } else { /* NB. we don't log unforced commands to preserve privacy */ snprintf(session_type, sizeof(session_type), "command"); } if (s->ttyfd != -1) { tty = s->tty; if (strncmp(tty, "/dev/", 5) == 0) tty += 5; } verbose("Starting session: %s%s%s for %s from %.200s port %d id %d", session_type, tty == NULL ? "" : " on ", tty == NULL ? "" : tty, s->pw->pw_name, ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), ssh_remote_port(ssh), s->self); #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS if (command != NULL) PRIVSEP(audit_run_command(command)); else if (s->ttyfd == -1) { char *shell = s->pw->pw_shell; if (shell[0] == '\0') /* empty shell means /bin/sh */ shell =_PATH_BSHELL; PRIVSEP(audit_run_command(shell)); } #endif if (s->ttyfd != -1) ret = do_exec_pty(ssh, s, command); else ret = do_exec_no_pty(ssh, s, command); original_command = NULL; /* * Clear loginmsg: it's the child's responsibility to display * it to the user, otherwise multiple sessions may accumulate * multiple copies of the login messages. */ sshbuf_reset(loginmsg); return ret; } /* administrative, login(1)-like work */ void do_login(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s, const char *command) { socklen_t fromlen; struct sockaddr_storage from; struct passwd * pw = s->pw; pid_t pid = getpid(); /* * Get IP address of client. If the connection is not a socket, let * the address be 0.0.0.0. */ memset(&from, 0, sizeof(from)); fromlen = sizeof(from); if (ssh_packet_connection_is_on_socket(ssh)) { if (getpeername(ssh_packet_get_connection_in(ssh), (struct sockaddr *)&from, &fromlen) == -1) { debug("getpeername: %.100s", strerror(errno)); cleanup_exit(255); } } /* Record that there was a login on that tty from the remote host. */ if (!use_privsep) record_login(pid, s->tty, pw->pw_name, pw->pw_uid, session_get_remote_name_or_ip(ssh, utmp_len, options.use_dns), (struct sockaddr *)&from, fromlen); #ifdef USE_PAM /* * If password change is needed, do it now. * This needs to occur before the ~/.hushlogin check. */ if (options.use_pam && !use_privsep && s->authctxt->force_pwchange) { display_loginmsg(); do_pam_chauthtok(); s->authctxt->force_pwchange = 0; /* XXX - signal [net] parent to enable forwardings */ } #endif if (check_quietlogin(s, command)) return; display_loginmsg(); do_motd(); } /* * Display the message of the day. */ void do_motd(void) { FILE *f; char buf[256]; if (options.print_motd) { #ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP f = fopen(login_getcapstr(lc, "welcome", "/etc/motd", "/etc/motd"), "r"); #else f = fopen("/etc/motd", "r"); #endif if (f) { while (fgets(buf, sizeof(buf), f)) fputs(buf, stdout); fclose(f); } } } /* * Check for quiet login, either .hushlogin or command given. */ int check_quietlogin(Session *s, const char *command) { char buf[256]; struct passwd *pw = s->pw; struct stat st; /* Return 1 if .hushlogin exists or a command given. */ if (command != NULL) return 1; snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%.200s/.hushlogin", pw->pw_dir); #ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP if (login_getcapbool(lc, "hushlogin", 0) || stat(buf, &st) >= 0) return 1; #else if (stat(buf, &st) >= 0) return 1; #endif return 0; } /* * Reads environment variables from the given file and adds/overrides them * into the environment. If the file does not exist, this does nothing. * Otherwise, it must consist of empty lines, comments (line starts with '#') * and assignments of the form name=value. No other forms are allowed. * If allowlist is not NULL, then it is interpreted as a pattern list and * only variable names that match it will be accepted. */ static void read_environment_file(char ***env, u_int *envsize, const char *filename, const char *allowlist) { FILE *f; char *line = NULL, *cp, *value; size_t linesize = 0; u_int lineno = 0; f = fopen(filename, "r"); if (!f) return; while (getline(&line, &linesize, f) != -1) { if (++lineno > 1000) fatal("Too many lines in environment file %s", filename); for (cp = line; *cp == ' ' || *cp == '\t'; cp++) ; if (!*cp || *cp == '#' || *cp == '\n') continue; cp[strcspn(cp, "\n")] = '\0'; value = strchr(cp, '='); if (value == NULL) { fprintf(stderr, "Bad line %u in %.100s\n", lineno, filename); continue; } /* * Replace the equals sign by nul, and advance value to * the value string. */ *value = '\0'; value++; if (allowlist != NULL && match_pattern_list(cp, allowlist, 0) != 1) continue; child_set_env(env, envsize, cp, value); } free(line); fclose(f); } #ifdef HAVE_ETC_DEFAULT_LOGIN /* * Return named variable from specified environment, or NULL if not present. */ static char * child_get_env(char **env, const char *name) { int i; size_t len; len = strlen(name); for (i=0; env[i] != NULL; i++) if (strncmp(name, env[i], len) == 0 && env[i][len] == '=') return(env[i] + len + 1); return NULL; } /* * Read /etc/default/login. * We pick up the PATH (or SUPATH for root) and UMASK. */ static void read_etc_default_login(char ***env, u_int *envsize, uid_t uid) { char **tmpenv = NULL, *var; u_int i, tmpenvsize = 0; u_long mask; /* * We don't want to copy the whole file to the child's environment, * so we use a temporary environment and copy the variables we're * interested in. */ read_environment_file(&tmpenv, &tmpenvsize, "/etc/default/login", options.permit_user_env_allowlist); if (tmpenv == NULL) return; if (uid == 0) var = child_get_env(tmpenv, "SUPATH"); else var = child_get_env(tmpenv, "PATH"); if (var != NULL) child_set_env(env, envsize, "PATH", var); if ((var = child_get_env(tmpenv, "UMASK")) != NULL) if (sscanf(var, "%5lo", &mask) == 1) umask((mode_t)mask); for (i = 0; tmpenv[i] != NULL; i++) free(tmpenv[i]); free(tmpenv); } #endif /* HAVE_ETC_DEFAULT_LOGIN */ #if defined(USE_PAM) || defined(HAVE_CYGWIN) static void copy_environment_denylist(char **source, char ***env, u_int *envsize, const char *denylist) { char *var_name, *var_val; int i; if (source == NULL) return; for(i = 0; source[i] != NULL; i++) { var_name = xstrdup(source[i]); if ((var_val = strstr(var_name, "=")) == NULL) { free(var_name); continue; } *var_val++ = '\0'; if (denylist == NULL || match_pattern_list(var_name, denylist, 0) != 1) { debug3("Copy environment: %s=%s", var_name, var_val); child_set_env(env, envsize, var_name, var_val); } free(var_name); } } #endif /* defined(USE_PAM) || defined(HAVE_CYGWIN) */ #ifdef HAVE_CYGWIN static void copy_environment(char **source, char ***env, u_int *envsize) { copy_environment_denylist(source, env, envsize, NULL); } #endif static char ** do_setup_env(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s, const char *shell) { char buf[256]; size_t n; u_int i, envsize; char *ocp, *cp, *value, **env, *laddr; struct passwd *pw = s->pw; #if !defined (HAVE_LOGIN_CAP) && !defined (HAVE_CYGWIN) char *path = NULL; #else extern char **environ; char **senv, **var, *val; #endif /* Initialize the environment. */ envsize = 100; env = xcalloc(envsize, sizeof(char *)); env[0] = NULL; #ifdef HAVE_CYGWIN /* * The Windows environment contains some setting which are * important for a running system. They must not be dropped. */ { char **p; p = fetch_windows_environment(); copy_environment(p, &env, &envsize); free_windows_environment(p); } #endif if (getenv("TZ")) child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "TZ", getenv("TZ")); #ifdef GSSAPI /* Allow any GSSAPI methods that we've used to alter * the child's environment as they see fit */ ssh_gssapi_do_child(&env, &envsize); #endif /* Set basic environment. */ for (i = 0; i < s->num_env; i++) child_set_env(&env, &envsize, s->env[i].name, s->env[i].val); child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "USER", pw->pw_name); child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "LOGNAME", pw->pw_name); #ifdef _AIX child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "LOGIN", pw->pw_name); #endif child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "HOME", pw->pw_dir); snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "%.200s/%.50s", _PATH_MAILDIR, pw->pw_name); child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "MAIL", buf); #ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "PATH", _PATH_STDPATH); child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "TERM", "su"); /* * Temporarily swap out our real environment with an empty one, * let setusercontext() apply any environment variables defined * for the user's login class, copy those variables to the child, * free the temporary environment, and restore the original. */ senv = environ; environ = xmalloc(sizeof(*environ)); *environ = NULL; (void)setusercontext(lc, pw, pw->pw_uid, LOGIN_SETENV|LOGIN_SETPATH); for (var = environ; *var != NULL; ++var) { if ((val = strchr(*var, '=')) != NULL) { *val++ = '\0'; child_set_env(&env, &envsize, *var, val); } free(*var); } free(environ); environ = senv; #else /* HAVE_LOGIN_CAP */ # ifndef HAVE_CYGWIN /* * There's no standard path on Windows. The path contains * important components pointing to the system directories, * needed for loading shared libraries. So the path better * remains intact here. */ # ifdef HAVE_ETC_DEFAULT_LOGIN read_etc_default_login(&env, &envsize, pw->pw_uid); path = child_get_env(env, "PATH"); # endif /* HAVE_ETC_DEFAULT_LOGIN */ if (path == NULL || *path == '\0') { child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "PATH", s->pw->pw_uid == 0 ? SUPERUSER_PATH : _PATH_STDPATH); } # endif /* HAVE_CYGWIN */ #endif /* HAVE_LOGIN_CAP */ /* Normal systems set SHELL by default. */ child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "SHELL", shell); if (s->term) child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "TERM", s->term); if (s->display) child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "DISPLAY", s->display); /* * Since we clear KRB5CCNAME at startup, if it's set now then it * must have been set by a native authentication method (eg AIX or * SIA), so copy it to the child. */ { char *cp; if ((cp = getenv("KRB5CCNAME")) != NULL) child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "KRB5CCNAME", cp); } #ifdef _AIX { char *cp; if ((cp = getenv("AUTHSTATE")) != NULL) child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "AUTHSTATE", cp); read_environment_file(&env, &envsize, "/etc/environment", options.permit_user_env_allowlist); } #endif #ifdef KRB5 if (s->authctxt->krb5_ccname) child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "KRB5CCNAME", s->authctxt->krb5_ccname); #endif if (auth_sock_name != NULL) child_set_env(&env, &envsize, SSH_AUTHSOCKET_ENV_NAME, auth_sock_name); /* Set custom environment options from pubkey authentication. */ if (options.permit_user_env) { for (n = 0 ; n < auth_opts->nenv; n++) { ocp = xstrdup(auth_opts->env[n]); cp = strchr(ocp, '='); if (cp != NULL) { *cp = '\0'; /* Apply PermitUserEnvironment allowlist */ if (options.permit_user_env_allowlist == NULL || match_pattern_list(ocp, options.permit_user_env_allowlist, 0) == 1) child_set_env(&env, &envsize, ocp, cp + 1); } free(ocp); } } /* read $HOME/.ssh/environment. */ if (options.permit_user_env) { snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "%.200s/%s/environment", pw->pw_dir, _PATH_SSH_USER_DIR); read_environment_file(&env, &envsize, buf, options.permit_user_env_allowlist); } #ifdef USE_PAM /* * Pull in any environment variables that may have * been set by PAM. */ if (options.use_pam) { char **p; /* * Don't allow PAM-internal env vars to leak * back into the session environment. */ #define PAM_ENV_DENYLIST "SSH_AUTH_INFO*,SSH_CONNECTION*" p = fetch_pam_child_environment(); copy_environment_denylist(p, &env, &envsize, PAM_ENV_DENYLIST); free_pam_environment(p); p = fetch_pam_environment(); copy_environment_denylist(p, &env, &envsize, PAM_ENV_DENYLIST); free_pam_environment(p); } #endif /* USE_PAM */ /* Environment specified by admin */ for (i = 0; i < options.num_setenv; i++) { cp = xstrdup(options.setenv[i]); if ((value = strchr(cp, '=')) == NULL) { /* shouldn't happen; vars are checked in servconf.c */ fatal("Invalid config SetEnv: %s", options.setenv[i]); } *value++ = '\0'; child_set_env(&env, &envsize, cp, value); + free(cp); } /* SSH_CLIENT deprecated */ snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "%.50s %d %d", ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), ssh_remote_port(ssh), ssh_local_port(ssh)); child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "SSH_CLIENT", buf); laddr = get_local_ipaddr(ssh_packet_get_connection_in(ssh)); snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "%.50s %d %.50s %d", ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), ssh_remote_port(ssh), laddr, ssh_local_port(ssh)); free(laddr); child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "SSH_CONNECTION", buf); if (tun_fwd_ifnames != NULL) child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "SSH_TUNNEL", tun_fwd_ifnames); if (auth_info_file != NULL) child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "SSH_USER_AUTH", auth_info_file); if (s->ttyfd != -1) child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "SSH_TTY", s->tty); if (original_command) child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "SSH_ORIGINAL_COMMAND", original_command); if (debug_flag) { /* dump the environment */ fprintf(stderr, "Environment:\n"); for (i = 0; env[i]; i++) fprintf(stderr, " %.200s\n", env[i]); } return env; } /* * Run $HOME/.ssh/rc, /etc/ssh/sshrc, or xauth (whichever is found * first in this order). */ static void do_rc_files(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s, const char *shell) { FILE *f = NULL; char *cmd = NULL, *user_rc = NULL; int do_xauth; struct stat st; do_xauth = s->display != NULL && s->auth_proto != NULL && s->auth_data != NULL; xasprintf(&user_rc, "%s/%s", s->pw->pw_dir, _PATH_SSH_USER_RC); /* ignore _PATH_SSH_USER_RC for subsystems and admin forced commands */ if (!s->is_subsystem && options.adm_forced_command == NULL && auth_opts->permit_user_rc && options.permit_user_rc && stat(user_rc, &st) >= 0) { if (xasprintf(&cmd, "%s -c '%s %s'", shell, _PATH_BSHELL, user_rc) == -1) fatal_f("xasprintf: %s", strerror(errno)); if (debug_flag) fprintf(stderr, "Running %s\n", cmd); f = popen(cmd, "w"); if (f) { if (do_xauth) fprintf(f, "%s %s\n", s->auth_proto, s->auth_data); pclose(f); } else fprintf(stderr, "Could not run %s\n", user_rc); } else if (stat(_PATH_SSH_SYSTEM_RC, &st) >= 0) { if (debug_flag) fprintf(stderr, "Running %s %s\n", _PATH_BSHELL, _PATH_SSH_SYSTEM_RC); f = popen(_PATH_BSHELL " " _PATH_SSH_SYSTEM_RC, "w"); if (f) { if (do_xauth) fprintf(f, "%s %s\n", s->auth_proto, s->auth_data); pclose(f); } else fprintf(stderr, "Could not run %s\n", _PATH_SSH_SYSTEM_RC); } else if (do_xauth && options.xauth_location != NULL) { /* Add authority data to .Xauthority if appropriate. */ if (debug_flag) { fprintf(stderr, "Running %.500s remove %.100s\n", options.xauth_location, s->auth_display); fprintf(stderr, "%.500s add %.100s %.100s %.100s\n", options.xauth_location, s->auth_display, s->auth_proto, s->auth_data); } if (xasprintf(&cmd, "%s -q -", options.xauth_location) == -1) fatal_f("xasprintf: %s", strerror(errno)); f = popen(cmd, "w"); if (f) { fprintf(f, "remove %s\n", s->auth_display); fprintf(f, "add %s %s %s\n", s->auth_display, s->auth_proto, s->auth_data); pclose(f); } else { fprintf(stderr, "Could not run %s\n", cmd); } } free(cmd); free(user_rc); } static void do_nologin(struct passwd *pw) { FILE *f = NULL; const char *nl; char buf[1024], *def_nl = _PATH_NOLOGIN; struct stat sb; #ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP if (login_getcapbool(lc, "ignorenologin", 0) || pw->pw_uid == 0) return; nl = login_getcapstr(lc, "nologin", def_nl, def_nl); #else if (pw->pw_uid == 0) return; nl = def_nl; #endif if (stat(nl, &sb) == -1) return; /* /etc/nologin exists. Print its contents if we can and exit. */ logit("User %.100s not allowed because %s exists", pw->pw_name, nl); if ((f = fopen(nl, "r")) != NULL) { while (fgets(buf, sizeof(buf), f)) fputs(buf, stderr); fclose(f); } exit(254); } /* * Chroot into a directory after checking it for safety: all path components * must be root-owned directories with strict permissions. */ static void safely_chroot(const char *path, uid_t uid) { const char *cp; char component[PATH_MAX]; struct stat st; if (!path_absolute(path)) fatal("chroot path does not begin at root"); if (strlen(path) >= sizeof(component)) fatal("chroot path too long"); /* * Descend the path, checking that each component is a * root-owned directory with strict permissions. */ for (cp = path; cp != NULL;) { if ((cp = strchr(cp, '/')) == NULL) strlcpy(component, path, sizeof(component)); else { cp++; memcpy(component, path, cp - path); component[cp - path] = '\0'; } debug3_f("checking '%s'", component); if (stat(component, &st) != 0) fatal_f("stat(\"%s\"): %s", component, strerror(errno)); if (st.st_uid != 0 || (st.st_mode & 022) != 0) fatal("bad ownership or modes for chroot " "directory %s\"%s\"", cp == NULL ? "" : "component ", component); if (!S_ISDIR(st.st_mode)) fatal("chroot path %s\"%s\" is not a directory", cp == NULL ? "" : "component ", component); } if (chdir(path) == -1) fatal("Unable to chdir to chroot path \"%s\": " "%s", path, strerror(errno)); if (chroot(path) == -1) fatal("chroot(\"%s\"): %s", path, strerror(errno)); if (chdir("/") == -1) fatal_f("chdir(/) after chroot: %s", strerror(errno)); verbose("Changed root directory to \"%s\"", path); } /* Set login name, uid, gid, and groups. */ void do_setusercontext(struct passwd *pw) { char uidstr[32], *chroot_path, *tmp; platform_setusercontext(pw); if (platform_privileged_uidswap()) { #ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP if (setusercontext(lc, pw, pw->pw_uid, (LOGIN_SETALL & ~(LOGIN_SETENV|LOGIN_SETPATH|LOGIN_SETUSER))) < 0) { perror("unable to set user context"); exit(1); } #else if (setlogin(pw->pw_name) < 0) error("setlogin failed: %s", strerror(errno)); if (setgid(pw->pw_gid) < 0) { perror("setgid"); exit(1); } /* Initialize the group list. */ if (initgroups(pw->pw_name, pw->pw_gid) < 0) { perror("initgroups"); exit(1); } endgrent(); #endif platform_setusercontext_post_groups(pw); if (!in_chroot && options.chroot_directory != NULL && strcasecmp(options.chroot_directory, "none") != 0) { tmp = tilde_expand_filename(options.chroot_directory, pw->pw_uid); snprintf(uidstr, sizeof(uidstr), "%llu", (unsigned long long)pw->pw_uid); chroot_path = percent_expand(tmp, "h", pw->pw_dir, "u", pw->pw_name, "U", uidstr, (char *)NULL); safely_chroot(chroot_path, pw->pw_uid); free(tmp); free(chroot_path); /* Make sure we don't attempt to chroot again */ free(options.chroot_directory); options.chroot_directory = NULL; in_chroot = 1; } #ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP if (setusercontext(lc, pw, pw->pw_uid, LOGIN_SETUSER) < 0) { perror("unable to set user context (setuser)"); exit(1); } /* * FreeBSD's setusercontext() will not apply the user's * own umask setting unless running with the user's UID. */ (void) setusercontext(lc, pw, pw->pw_uid, LOGIN_SETUMASK); #else # ifdef USE_LIBIAF /* * In a chroot environment, the set_id() will always fail; * typically because of the lack of necessary authentication * services and runtime such as ./usr/lib/libiaf.so, * ./usr/lib/libpam.so.1, and ./etc/passwd We skip it in the * internal sftp chroot case. We'll lose auditing and ACLs but * permanently_set_uid will take care of the rest. */ if (!in_chroot && set_id(pw->pw_name) != 0) fatal("set_id(%s) Failed", pw->pw_name); # endif /* USE_LIBIAF */ /* Permanently switch to the desired uid. */ permanently_set_uid(pw); #endif } else if (options.chroot_directory != NULL && strcasecmp(options.chroot_directory, "none") != 0) { fatal("server lacks privileges to chroot to ChrootDirectory"); } if (getuid() != pw->pw_uid || geteuid() != pw->pw_uid) fatal("Failed to set uids to %u.", (u_int) pw->pw_uid); } static void do_pwchange(Session *s) { fflush(NULL); fprintf(stderr, "WARNING: Your password has expired.\n"); if (s->ttyfd != -1) { fprintf(stderr, "You must change your password now and login again!\n"); #ifdef WITH_SELINUX setexeccon(NULL); #endif #ifdef PASSWD_NEEDS_USERNAME execl(_PATH_PASSWD_PROG, "passwd", s->pw->pw_name, (char *)NULL); #else execl(_PATH_PASSWD_PROG, "passwd", (char *)NULL); #endif perror("passwd"); } else { fprintf(stderr, "Password change required but no TTY available.\n"); } exit(1); } static void child_close_fds(struct ssh *ssh) { extern int auth_sock; if (auth_sock != -1) { close(auth_sock); auth_sock = -1; } if (ssh_packet_get_connection_in(ssh) == ssh_packet_get_connection_out(ssh)) close(ssh_packet_get_connection_in(ssh)); else { close(ssh_packet_get_connection_in(ssh)); close(ssh_packet_get_connection_out(ssh)); } /* * Close all descriptors related to channels. They will still remain * open in the parent. */ /* XXX better use close-on-exec? -markus */ channel_close_all(ssh); /* * Close any extra file descriptors. Note that there may still be * descriptors left by system functions. They will be closed later. */ endpwent(); /* Stop directing logs to a high-numbered fd before we close it */ log_redirect_stderr_to(NULL); /* * Close any extra open file descriptors so that we don't have them * hanging around in clients. Note that we want to do this after * initgroups, because at least on Solaris 2.3 it leaves file * descriptors open. */ closefrom(STDERR_FILENO + 1); } /* * Performs common processing for the child, such as setting up the * environment, closing extra file descriptors, setting the user and group * ids, and executing the command or shell. */ #define ARGV_MAX 10 void do_child(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s, const char *command) { extern char **environ; char **env, *argv[ARGV_MAX], remote_id[512]; const char *shell, *shell0; struct passwd *pw = s->pw; int r = 0; sshpkt_fmt_connection_id(ssh, remote_id, sizeof(remote_id)); /* remove hostkey from the child's memory */ destroy_sensitive_data(); ssh_packet_clear_keys(ssh); /* Force a password change */ if (s->authctxt->force_pwchange) { do_setusercontext(pw); child_close_fds(ssh); do_pwchange(s); exit(1); } /* * Login(1) does this as well, and it needs uid 0 for the "-h" * switch, so we let login(1) to this for us. */ #ifdef HAVE_OSF_SIA session_setup_sia(pw, s->ttyfd == -1 ? NULL : s->tty); if (!check_quietlogin(s, command)) do_motd(); #else /* HAVE_OSF_SIA */ /* When PAM is enabled we rely on it to do the nologin check */ if (!options.use_pam) do_nologin(pw); do_setusercontext(pw); /* * PAM session modules in do_setusercontext may have * generated messages, so if this in an interactive * login then display them too. */ if (!check_quietlogin(s, command)) display_loginmsg(); #endif /* HAVE_OSF_SIA */ #ifdef USE_PAM if (options.use_pam && !is_pam_session_open()) { debug3("PAM session not opened, exiting"); display_loginmsg(); exit(254); } #endif /* * Get the shell from the password data. An empty shell field is * legal, and means /bin/sh. */ shell = (pw->pw_shell[0] == '\0') ? _PATH_BSHELL : pw->pw_shell; /* * Make sure $SHELL points to the shell from the password file, * even if shell is overridden from login.conf */ env = do_setup_env(ssh, s, shell); #ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP shell = login_getcapstr(lc, "shell", (char *)shell, (char *)shell); #endif /* * Close the connection descriptors; note that this is the child, and * the server will still have the socket open, and it is important * that we do not shutdown it. Note that the descriptors cannot be * closed before building the environment, as we call * ssh_remote_ipaddr there. */ child_close_fds(ssh); /* * Must take new environment into use so that .ssh/rc, * /etc/ssh/sshrc and xauth are run in the proper environment. */ environ = env; #if defined(KRB5) && defined(USE_AFS) /* * At this point, we check to see if AFS is active and if we have * a valid Kerberos 5 TGT. If so, it seems like a good idea to see * if we can (and need to) extend the ticket into an AFS token. If * we don't do this, we run into potential problems if the user's * home directory is in AFS and it's not world-readable. */ if (options.kerberos_get_afs_token && k_hasafs() && (s->authctxt->krb5_ctx != NULL)) { char cell[64]; debug("Getting AFS token"); k_setpag(); if (k_afs_cell_of_file(pw->pw_dir, cell, sizeof(cell)) == 0) krb5_afslog(s->authctxt->krb5_ctx, s->authctxt->krb5_fwd_ccache, cell, NULL); krb5_afslog_home(s->authctxt->krb5_ctx, s->authctxt->krb5_fwd_ccache, NULL, NULL, pw->pw_dir); } #endif /* Change current directory to the user's home directory. */ if (chdir(pw->pw_dir) == -1) { /* Suppress missing homedir warning for chroot case */ #ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP r = login_getcapbool(lc, "requirehome", 0); #endif if (r || !in_chroot) { fprintf(stderr, "Could not chdir to home " "directory %s: %s\n", pw->pw_dir, strerror(errno)); } if (r) exit(1); } closefrom(STDERR_FILENO + 1); do_rc_files(ssh, s, shell); /* restore SIGPIPE for child */ ssh_signal(SIGPIPE, SIG_DFL); if (s->is_subsystem == SUBSYSTEM_INT_SFTP_ERROR) { error("Connection from %s: refusing non-sftp session", remote_id); printf("This service allows sftp connections only.\n"); fflush(NULL); exit(1); } else if (s->is_subsystem == SUBSYSTEM_INT_SFTP) { extern int optind, optreset; int i; char *p, *args; setproctitle("%s@%s", s->pw->pw_name, INTERNAL_SFTP_NAME); args = xstrdup(command ? command : "sftp-server"); for (i = 0, (p = strtok(args, " ")); p; (p = strtok(NULL, " "))) if (i < ARGV_MAX - 1) argv[i++] = p; argv[i] = NULL; optind = optreset = 1; __progname = argv[0]; #ifdef WITH_SELINUX ssh_selinux_change_context("sftpd_t"); #endif exit(sftp_server_main(i, argv, s->pw)); } fflush(NULL); /* Get the last component of the shell name. */ if ((shell0 = strrchr(shell, '/')) != NULL) shell0++; else shell0 = shell; /* * If we have no command, execute the shell. In this case, the shell * name to be passed in argv[0] is preceded by '-' to indicate that * this is a login shell. */ if (!command) { char argv0[256]; /* Start the shell. Set initial character to '-'. */ argv0[0] = '-'; if (strlcpy(argv0 + 1, shell0, sizeof(argv0) - 1) >= sizeof(argv0) - 1) { errno = EINVAL; perror(shell); exit(1); } /* Execute the shell. */ argv[0] = argv0; argv[1] = NULL; execve(shell, argv, env); /* Executing the shell failed. */ perror(shell); exit(1); } /* * Execute the command using the user's shell. This uses the -c * option to execute the command. */ argv[0] = (char *) shell0; argv[1] = "-c"; argv[2] = (char *) command; argv[3] = NULL; execve(shell, argv, env); perror(shell); exit(1); } void session_unused(int id) { debug3_f("session id %d unused", id); if (id >= options.max_sessions || id >= sessions_nalloc) { fatal_f("insane session id %d (max %d nalloc %d)", id, options.max_sessions, sessions_nalloc); } memset(&sessions[id], 0, sizeof(*sessions)); sessions[id].self = id; sessions[id].used = 0; sessions[id].chanid = -1; sessions[id].ptyfd = -1; sessions[id].ttyfd = -1; sessions[id].ptymaster = -1; sessions[id].x11_chanids = NULL; sessions[id].next_unused = sessions_first_unused; sessions_first_unused = id; } Session * session_new(void) { Session *s, *tmp; if (sessions_first_unused == -1) { if (sessions_nalloc >= options.max_sessions) return NULL; debug2_f("allocate (allocated %d max %d)", sessions_nalloc, options.max_sessions); tmp = xrecallocarray(sessions, sessions_nalloc, sessions_nalloc + 1, sizeof(*sessions)); if (tmp == NULL) { error_f("cannot allocate %d sessions", sessions_nalloc + 1); return NULL; } sessions = tmp; session_unused(sessions_nalloc++); } if (sessions_first_unused >= sessions_nalloc || sessions_first_unused < 0) { fatal_f("insane first_unused %d max %d nalloc %d", sessions_first_unused, options.max_sessions, sessions_nalloc); } s = &sessions[sessions_first_unused]; if (s->used) fatal_f("session %d already used", sessions_first_unused); sessions_first_unused = s->next_unused; s->used = 1; s->next_unused = -1; debug("session_new: session %d", s->self); return s; } static void session_dump(void) { int i; for (i = 0; i < sessions_nalloc; i++) { Session *s = &sessions[i]; debug("dump: used %d next_unused %d session %d " "channel %d pid %ld", s->used, s->next_unused, s->self, s->chanid, (long)s->pid); } } int session_open(Authctxt *authctxt, int chanid) { Session *s = session_new(); debug("session_open: channel %d", chanid); if (s == NULL) { error("no more sessions"); return 0; } s->authctxt = authctxt; s->pw = authctxt->pw; if (s->pw == NULL || !authctxt->valid) fatal("no user for session %d", s->self); debug("session_open: session %d: link with channel %d", s->self, chanid); s->chanid = chanid; return 1; } Session * session_by_tty(char *tty) { int i; for (i = 0; i < sessions_nalloc; i++) { Session *s = &sessions[i]; if (s->used && s->ttyfd != -1 && strcmp(s->tty, tty) == 0) { debug("session_by_tty: session %d tty %s", i, tty); return s; } } debug("session_by_tty: unknown tty %.100s", tty); session_dump(); return NULL; } static Session * session_by_channel(int id) { int i; for (i = 0; i < sessions_nalloc; i++) { Session *s = &sessions[i]; if (s->used && s->chanid == id) { debug("session_by_channel: session %d channel %d", i, id); return s; } } debug("session_by_channel: unknown channel %d", id); session_dump(); return NULL; } static Session * session_by_x11_channel(int id) { int i, j; for (i = 0; i < sessions_nalloc; i++) { Session *s = &sessions[i]; if (s->x11_chanids == NULL || !s->used) continue; for (j = 0; s->x11_chanids[j] != -1; j++) { if (s->x11_chanids[j] == id) { debug("session_by_x11_channel: session %d " "channel %d", s->self, id); return s; } } } debug("session_by_x11_channel: unknown channel %d", id); session_dump(); return NULL; } static Session * session_by_pid(pid_t pid) { int i; debug("session_by_pid: pid %ld", (long)pid); for (i = 0; i < sessions_nalloc; i++) { Session *s = &sessions[i]; if (s->used && s->pid == pid) return s; } error("session_by_pid: unknown pid %ld", (long)pid); session_dump(); return NULL; } static int session_window_change_req(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s) { int r; if ((r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &s->col)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &s->row)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &s->xpixel)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &s->ypixel)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0) sshpkt_fatal(ssh, r, "%s: parse packet", __func__); pty_change_window_size(s->ptyfd, s->row, s->col, s->xpixel, s->ypixel); return 1; } static int session_pty_req(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s) { int r; if (!auth_opts->permit_pty_flag || !options.permit_tty) { debug("Allocating a pty not permitted for this connection."); return 0; } if (s->ttyfd != -1) { ssh_packet_disconnect(ssh, "Protocol error: you already have a pty."); return 0; } if ((r = sshpkt_get_cstring(ssh, &s->term, NULL)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &s->col)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &s->row)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &s->xpixel)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &s->ypixel)) != 0) sshpkt_fatal(ssh, r, "%s: parse packet", __func__); if (strcmp(s->term, "") == 0) { free(s->term); s->term = NULL; } /* Allocate a pty and open it. */ debug("Allocating pty."); if (!PRIVSEP(pty_allocate(&s->ptyfd, &s->ttyfd, s->tty, sizeof(s->tty)))) { free(s->term); s->term = NULL; s->ptyfd = -1; s->ttyfd = -1; error("session_pty_req: session %d alloc failed", s->self); return 0; } debug("session_pty_req: session %d alloc %s", s->self, s->tty); ssh_tty_parse_modes(ssh, s->ttyfd); if ((r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0) sshpkt_fatal(ssh, r, "%s: parse packet", __func__); if (!use_privsep) pty_setowner(s->pw, s->tty); /* Set window size from the packet. */ pty_change_window_size(s->ptyfd, s->row, s->col, s->xpixel, s->ypixel); session_proctitle(s); return 1; } static int session_subsystem_req(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s) { struct stat st; int r, success = 0; char *prog, *cmd, *type; u_int i; if ((r = sshpkt_get_cstring(ssh, &s->subsys, NULL)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0) sshpkt_fatal(ssh, r, "%s: parse packet", __func__); debug2("subsystem request for %.100s by user %s", s->subsys, s->pw->pw_name); for (i = 0; i < options.num_subsystems; i++) { if (strcmp(s->subsys, options.subsystem_name[i]) == 0) { prog = options.subsystem_command[i]; cmd = options.subsystem_args[i]; if (strcmp(INTERNAL_SFTP_NAME, prog) == 0) { s->is_subsystem = SUBSYSTEM_INT_SFTP; debug("subsystem: %s", prog); } else { if (stat(prog, &st) == -1) debug("subsystem: cannot stat %s: %s", prog, strerror(errno)); s->is_subsystem = SUBSYSTEM_EXT; debug("subsystem: exec() %s", cmd); } xasprintf(&type, "session:subsystem:%s", options.subsystem_name[i]); channel_set_xtype(ssh, s->chanid, type); free(type); success = do_exec(ssh, s, cmd) == 0; break; } } if (!success) logit("subsystem request for %.100s by user %s failed, " "subsystem not found", s->subsys, s->pw->pw_name); return success; } static int session_x11_req(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s) { int r, success; u_char single_connection = 0; if (s->auth_proto != NULL || s->auth_data != NULL) { error("session_x11_req: session %d: " "x11 forwarding already active", s->self); return 0; } if ((r = sshpkt_get_u8(ssh, &single_connection)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_get_cstring(ssh, &s->auth_proto, NULL)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_get_cstring(ssh, &s->auth_data, NULL)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &s->screen)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0) sshpkt_fatal(ssh, r, "%s: parse packet", __func__); s->single_connection = single_connection; if (xauth_valid_string(s->auth_proto) && xauth_valid_string(s->auth_data)) success = session_setup_x11fwd(ssh, s); else { success = 0; error("Invalid X11 forwarding data"); } if (!success) { free(s->auth_proto); free(s->auth_data); s->auth_proto = NULL; s->auth_data = NULL; } return success; } static int session_shell_req(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s) { int r; if ((r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0) sshpkt_fatal(ssh, r, "%s: parse packet", __func__); channel_set_xtype(ssh, s->chanid, "session:shell"); return do_exec(ssh, s, NULL) == 0; } static int session_exec_req(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s) { u_int success; int r; char *command = NULL; if ((r = sshpkt_get_cstring(ssh, &command, NULL)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0) sshpkt_fatal(ssh, r, "%s: parse packet", __func__); channel_set_xtype(ssh, s->chanid, "session:command"); success = do_exec(ssh, s, command) == 0; free(command); return success; } static int session_break_req(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s) { int r; if ((r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, NULL)) != 0 || /* ignore */ (r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0) sshpkt_fatal(ssh, r, "%s: parse packet", __func__); if (s->ptymaster == -1 || tcsendbreak(s->ptymaster, 0) == -1) return 0; return 1; } static int session_env_req(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s) { char *name, *val; u_int i; int r; if ((r = sshpkt_get_cstring(ssh, &name, NULL)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_get_cstring(ssh, &val, NULL)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0) sshpkt_fatal(ssh, r, "%s: parse packet", __func__); /* Don't set too many environment variables */ if (s->num_env > 128) { debug2("Ignoring env request %s: too many env vars", name); goto fail; } for (i = 0; i < options.num_accept_env; i++) { if (match_pattern(name, options.accept_env[i])) { debug2("Setting env %d: %s=%s", s->num_env, name, val); s->env = xrecallocarray(s->env, s->num_env, s->num_env + 1, sizeof(*s->env)); s->env[s->num_env].name = name; s->env[s->num_env].val = val; s->num_env++; return (1); } } debug2("Ignoring env request %s: disallowed name", name); fail: free(name); free(val); return (0); } /* * Conversion of signals from ssh channel request names. * Subset of signals from RFC 4254 section 6.10C, with SIGINFO as * local extension. */ static int name2sig(char *name) { #define SSH_SIG(x) if (strcmp(name, #x) == 0) return SIG ## x SSH_SIG(HUP); SSH_SIG(INT); SSH_SIG(KILL); SSH_SIG(QUIT); SSH_SIG(TERM); SSH_SIG(USR1); SSH_SIG(USR2); #undef SSH_SIG #ifdef SIGINFO if (strcmp(name, "INFO@openssh.com") == 0) return SIGINFO; #endif return -1; } static int session_signal_req(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s) { char *signame = NULL; int r, sig, success = 0; if ((r = sshpkt_get_cstring(ssh, &signame, NULL)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0) { error_fr(r, "parse"); goto out; } if ((sig = name2sig(signame)) == -1) { error_f("unsupported signal \"%s\"", signame); goto out; } if (s->pid <= 0) { error_f("no pid for session %d", s->self); goto out; } if (s->forced || s->is_subsystem) { error_f("refusing to send signal %s to %s session", signame, s->forced ? "forced-command" : "subsystem"); goto out; } if (!use_privsep || mm_is_monitor()) { error_f("session signalling requires privilege separation"); goto out; } debug_f("signal %s, killpg(%ld, %d)", signame, (long)s->pid, sig); temporarily_use_uid(s->pw); r = killpg(s->pid, sig); restore_uid(); if (r != 0) { error_f("killpg(%ld, %d): %s", (long)s->pid, sig, strerror(errno)); goto out; } /* success */ success = 1; out: free(signame); return success; } static int session_auth_agent_req(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s) { static int called = 0; int r; if ((r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0) sshpkt_fatal(ssh, r, "%s: parse packet", __func__); if (!auth_opts->permit_agent_forwarding_flag || !options.allow_agent_forwarding) { debug_f("agent forwarding disabled"); return 0; } if (called) { return 0; } else { called = 1; return auth_input_request_forwarding(ssh, s->pw); } } int session_input_channel_req(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c, const char *rtype) { int success = 0; Session *s; if ((s = session_by_channel(c->self)) == NULL) { logit_f("no session %d req %.100s", c->self, rtype); return 0; } debug_f("session %d req %s", s->self, rtype); /* * a session is in LARVAL state until a shell, a command * or a subsystem is executed */ if (c->type == SSH_CHANNEL_LARVAL) { if (strcmp(rtype, "shell") == 0) { success = session_shell_req(ssh, s); } else if (strcmp(rtype, "exec") == 0) { success = session_exec_req(ssh, s); } else if (strcmp(rtype, "pty-req") == 0) { success = session_pty_req(ssh, s); } else if (strcmp(rtype, "x11-req") == 0) { success = session_x11_req(ssh, s); } else if (strcmp(rtype, "auth-agent-req@openssh.com") == 0) { success = session_auth_agent_req(ssh, s); } else if (strcmp(rtype, "subsystem") == 0) { success = session_subsystem_req(ssh, s); } else if (strcmp(rtype, "env") == 0) { success = session_env_req(ssh, s); } } if (strcmp(rtype, "window-change") == 0) { success = session_window_change_req(ssh, s); } else if (strcmp(rtype, "break") == 0) { success = session_break_req(ssh, s); } else if (strcmp(rtype, "signal") == 0) { success = session_signal_req(ssh, s); } return success; } void session_set_fds(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s, int fdin, int fdout, int fderr, int ignore_fderr, int is_tty) { /* * now that have a child and a pipe to the child, * we can activate our channel and register the fd's */ if (s->chanid == -1) fatal("no channel for session %d", s->self); channel_set_fds(ssh, s->chanid, fdout, fdin, fderr, ignore_fderr ? CHAN_EXTENDED_IGNORE : CHAN_EXTENDED_READ, 1, is_tty, CHAN_SES_WINDOW_DEFAULT); } /* * Function to perform pty cleanup. Also called if we get aborted abnormally * (e.g., due to a dropped connection). */ void session_pty_cleanup2(Session *s) { if (s == NULL) { error_f("no session"); return; } if (s->ttyfd == -1) return; debug_f("session %d release %s", s->self, s->tty); /* Record that the user has logged out. */ if (s->pid != 0) record_logout(s->pid, s->tty, s->pw->pw_name); /* Release the pseudo-tty. */ if (getuid() == 0) pty_release(s->tty); /* * Close the server side of the socket pairs. We must do this after * the pty cleanup, so that another process doesn't get this pty * while we're still cleaning up. */ if (s->ptymaster != -1 && close(s->ptymaster) == -1) error("close(s->ptymaster/%d): %s", s->ptymaster, strerror(errno)); /* unlink pty from session */ s->ttyfd = -1; } void session_pty_cleanup(Session *s) { PRIVSEP(session_pty_cleanup2(s)); } static char * sig2name(int sig) { #define SSH_SIG(x) if (sig == SIG ## x) return #x SSH_SIG(ABRT); SSH_SIG(ALRM); SSH_SIG(FPE); SSH_SIG(HUP); SSH_SIG(ILL); SSH_SIG(INT); SSH_SIG(KILL); SSH_SIG(PIPE); SSH_SIG(QUIT); SSH_SIG(SEGV); SSH_SIG(TERM); SSH_SIG(USR1); SSH_SIG(USR2); #undef SSH_SIG return "SIG@openssh.com"; } static void session_close_x11(struct ssh *ssh, int id) { Channel *c; if ((c = channel_by_id(ssh, id)) == NULL) { debug_f("x11 channel %d missing", id); } else { /* Detach X11 listener */ debug_f("detach x11 channel %d", id); channel_cancel_cleanup(ssh, id); if (c->ostate != CHAN_OUTPUT_CLOSED) chan_mark_dead(ssh, c); } } static void session_close_single_x11(struct ssh *ssh, int id, int force, void *arg) { Session *s; u_int i; debug3_f("channel %d", id); channel_cancel_cleanup(ssh, id); if ((s = session_by_x11_channel(id)) == NULL) fatal_f("no x11 channel %d", id); for (i = 0; s->x11_chanids[i] != -1; i++) { debug_f("session %d: closing channel %d", s->self, s->x11_chanids[i]); /* * The channel "id" is already closing, but make sure we * close all of its siblings. */ if (s->x11_chanids[i] != id) session_close_x11(ssh, s->x11_chanids[i]); } free(s->x11_chanids); s->x11_chanids = NULL; free(s->display); s->display = NULL; free(s->auth_proto); s->auth_proto = NULL; free(s->auth_data); s->auth_data = NULL; free(s->auth_display); s->auth_display = NULL; } static void session_exit_message(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s, int status) { Channel *c; int r; if ((c = channel_lookup(ssh, s->chanid)) == NULL) fatal_f("session %d: no channel %d", s->self, s->chanid); debug_f("session %d channel %d pid %ld", s->self, s->chanid, (long)s->pid); if (WIFEXITED(status)) { channel_request_start(ssh, s->chanid, "exit-status", 0); if ((r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, WEXITSTATUS(status))) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) sshpkt_fatal(ssh, r, "%s: exit reply", __func__); } else if (WIFSIGNALED(status)) { channel_request_start(ssh, s->chanid, "exit-signal", 0); #ifndef WCOREDUMP # define WCOREDUMP(x) (0) #endif if ((r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, sig2name(WTERMSIG(status)))) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_u8(ssh, WCOREDUMP(status)? 1 : 0)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, "")) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, "")) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) sshpkt_fatal(ssh, r, "%s: exit reply", __func__); } else { /* Some weird exit cause. Just exit. */ ssh_packet_disconnect(ssh, "wait returned status %04x.", status); } /* disconnect channel */ debug_f("release channel %d", s->chanid); /* * Adjust cleanup callback attachment to send close messages when * the channel gets EOF. The session will be then be closed * by session_close_by_channel when the child sessions close their fds. */ channel_register_cleanup(ssh, c->self, session_close_by_channel, 1); /* * emulate a write failure with 'chan_write_failed', nobody will be * interested in data we write. * Note that we must not call 'chan_read_failed', since there could * be some more data waiting in the pipe. */ if (c->ostate != CHAN_OUTPUT_CLOSED) chan_write_failed(ssh, c); } void session_close(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s) { u_int i; verbose("Close session: user %s from %.200s port %d id %d", s->pw->pw_name, ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), ssh_remote_port(ssh), s->self); if (s->ttyfd != -1) session_pty_cleanup(s); free(s->term); free(s->display); free(s->x11_chanids); free(s->auth_display); free(s->auth_data); free(s->auth_proto); free(s->subsys); if (s->env != NULL) { for (i = 0; i < s->num_env; i++) { free(s->env[i].name); free(s->env[i].val); } free(s->env); } session_proctitle(s); session_unused(s->self); } void session_close_by_pid(struct ssh *ssh, pid_t pid, int status) { Session *s = session_by_pid(pid); if (s == NULL) { debug_f("no session for pid %ld", (long)pid); return; } if (s->chanid != -1) session_exit_message(ssh, s, status); if (s->ttyfd != -1) session_pty_cleanup(s); s->pid = 0; } /* * this is called when a channel dies before * the session 'child' itself dies */ void session_close_by_channel(struct ssh *ssh, int id, int force, void *arg) { Session *s = session_by_channel(id); u_int i; if (s == NULL) { debug_f("no session for id %d", id); return; } debug_f("channel %d child %ld", id, (long)s->pid); if (s->pid != 0) { debug_f("channel %d: has child, ttyfd %d", id, s->ttyfd); /* * delay detach of session (unless this is a forced close), * but release pty, since the fd's to the child are already * closed */ if (s->ttyfd != -1) session_pty_cleanup(s); if (!force) return; } /* detach by removing callback */ channel_cancel_cleanup(ssh, s->chanid); /* Close any X11 listeners associated with this session */ if (s->x11_chanids != NULL) { for (i = 0; s->x11_chanids[i] != -1; i++) { session_close_x11(ssh, s->x11_chanids[i]); s->x11_chanids[i] = -1; } } s->chanid = -1; session_close(ssh, s); } void session_destroy_all(struct ssh *ssh, void (*closefunc)(Session *)) { int i; for (i = 0; i < sessions_nalloc; i++) { Session *s = &sessions[i]; if (s->used) { if (closefunc != NULL) closefunc(s); else session_close(ssh, s); } } } static char * session_tty_list(void) { static char buf[1024]; int i; char *cp; buf[0] = '\0'; for (i = 0; i < sessions_nalloc; i++) { Session *s = &sessions[i]; if (s->used && s->ttyfd != -1) { if (strncmp(s->tty, "/dev/", 5) != 0) { cp = strrchr(s->tty, '/'); cp = (cp == NULL) ? s->tty : cp + 1; } else cp = s->tty + 5; if (buf[0] != '\0') strlcat(buf, ",", sizeof buf); strlcat(buf, cp, sizeof buf); } } if (buf[0] == '\0') strlcpy(buf, "notty", sizeof buf); return buf; } void session_proctitle(Session *s) { if (s->pw == NULL) error("no user for session %d", s->self); else setproctitle("%s@%s", s->pw->pw_name, session_tty_list()); } int session_setup_x11fwd(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s) { struct stat st; char display[512], auth_display[512]; char hostname[NI_MAXHOST]; u_int i; if (!auth_opts->permit_x11_forwarding_flag) { ssh_packet_send_debug(ssh, "X11 forwarding disabled by key options."); return 0; } if (!options.x11_forwarding) { debug("X11 forwarding disabled in server configuration file."); return 0; } if (options.xauth_location == NULL || (stat(options.xauth_location, &st) == -1)) { ssh_packet_send_debug(ssh, "No xauth program; cannot forward X11."); return 0; } if (s->display != NULL) { debug("X11 display already set."); return 0; } if (x11_create_display_inet(ssh, options.x11_display_offset, options.x11_use_localhost, s->single_connection, &s->display_number, &s->x11_chanids) == -1) { debug("x11_create_display_inet failed."); return 0; } for (i = 0; s->x11_chanids[i] != -1; i++) { channel_register_cleanup(ssh, s->x11_chanids[i], session_close_single_x11, 0); } /* Set up a suitable value for the DISPLAY variable. */ if (gethostname(hostname, sizeof(hostname)) == -1) fatal("gethostname: %.100s", strerror(errno)); /* * auth_display must be used as the displayname when the * authorization entry is added with xauth(1). This will be * different than the DISPLAY string for localhost displays. */ if (options.x11_use_localhost) { snprintf(display, sizeof display, "localhost:%u.%u", s->display_number, s->screen); snprintf(auth_display, sizeof auth_display, "unix:%u.%u", s->display_number, s->screen); s->display = xstrdup(display); s->auth_display = xstrdup(auth_display); } else { #ifdef IPADDR_IN_DISPLAY struct hostent *he; struct in_addr my_addr; he = gethostbyname(hostname); if (he == NULL) { error("Can't get IP address for X11 DISPLAY."); ssh_packet_send_debug(ssh, "Can't get IP address for X11 DISPLAY."); return 0; } memcpy(&my_addr, he->h_addr_list[0], sizeof(struct in_addr)); snprintf(display, sizeof display, "%.50s:%u.%u", inet_ntoa(my_addr), s->display_number, s->screen); #else snprintf(display, sizeof display, "%.400s:%u.%u", hostname, s->display_number, s->screen); #endif s->display = xstrdup(display); s->auth_display = xstrdup(display); } return 1; } static void do_authenticated2(struct ssh *ssh, Authctxt *authctxt) { server_loop2(ssh, authctxt); } void do_cleanup(struct ssh *ssh, Authctxt *authctxt) { static int called = 0; debug("do_cleanup"); /* no cleanup if we're in the child for login shell */ if (is_child) return; /* avoid double cleanup */ if (called) return; called = 1; if (authctxt == NULL) return; #ifdef USE_PAM if (options.use_pam) { sshpam_cleanup(); sshpam_thread_cleanup(); } #endif if (!authctxt->authenticated) return; #ifdef KRB5 if (options.kerberos_ticket_cleanup && authctxt->krb5_ctx) krb5_cleanup_proc(authctxt); #endif #ifdef GSSAPI if (options.gss_cleanup_creds) ssh_gssapi_cleanup_creds(); #endif /* remove agent socket */ auth_sock_cleanup_proc(authctxt->pw); /* remove userauth info */ if (auth_info_file != NULL) { temporarily_use_uid(authctxt->pw); unlink(auth_info_file); restore_uid(); free(auth_info_file); auth_info_file = NULL; } /* * Cleanup ptys/utmp only if privsep is disabled, * or if running in monitor. */ if (!use_privsep || mm_is_monitor()) session_destroy_all(ssh, session_pty_cleanup2); } /* Return a name for the remote host that fits inside utmp_size */ const char * session_get_remote_name_or_ip(struct ssh *ssh, u_int utmp_size, int use_dns) { const char *remote = ""; if (utmp_size > 0) remote = auth_get_canonical_hostname(ssh, use_dns); if (utmp_size == 0 || strlen(remote) > utmp_size) remote = ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh); return remote; } diff --git a/crypto/openssh/sftp-client.c b/crypto/openssh/sftp-client.c index e01464818064..87b4d142aa74 100644 --- a/crypto/openssh/sftp-client.c +++ b/crypto/openssh/sftp-client.c @@ -1,2947 +1,2946 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: sftp-client.c,v 1.168 2023/01/11 05:39:38 djm Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: sftp-client.c,v 1.169 2023/03/08 04:43:12 guenther Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2001-2004 Damien Miller * * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. * * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. */ /* XXX: memleaks */ /* XXX: signed vs unsigned */ /* XXX: remove all logging, only return status codes */ /* XXX: copy between two remote sites */ #include "includes.h" #include #ifdef HAVE_SYS_STATVFS_H #include #endif #include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h" #ifdef HAVE_SYS_STAT_H # include #endif #ifdef HAVE_SYS_TIME_H # include #endif #include #include #include #ifdef HAVE_POLL_H #include #else # ifdef HAVE_SYS_POLL_H # include # endif #endif #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include "xmalloc.h" #include "ssherr.h" #include "sshbuf.h" #include "log.h" #include "atomicio.h" #include "progressmeter.h" #include "misc.h" #include "utf8.h" #include "sftp.h" #include "sftp-common.h" #include "sftp-client.h" extern volatile sig_atomic_t interrupted; extern int showprogress; /* Default size of buffer for up/download (fix sftp.1 scp.1 if changed) */ #define DEFAULT_COPY_BUFLEN 32768 /* Default number of concurrent xfer requests (fix sftp.1 scp.1 if changed) */ #define DEFAULT_NUM_REQUESTS 64 /* Minimum amount of data to read at a time */ #define MIN_READ_SIZE 512 /* Maximum depth to descend in directory trees */ #define MAX_DIR_DEPTH 64 /* Directory separator characters */ #ifdef HAVE_CYGWIN # define SFTP_DIRECTORY_CHARS "/\\" #else /* HAVE_CYGWIN */ # define SFTP_DIRECTORY_CHARS "/" #endif /* HAVE_CYGWIN */ struct sftp_conn { int fd_in; int fd_out; u_int download_buflen; u_int upload_buflen; u_int num_requests; u_int version; u_int msg_id; #define SFTP_EXT_POSIX_RENAME 0x00000001 #define SFTP_EXT_STATVFS 0x00000002 #define SFTP_EXT_FSTATVFS 0x00000004 #define SFTP_EXT_HARDLINK 0x00000008 #define SFTP_EXT_FSYNC 0x00000010 #define SFTP_EXT_LSETSTAT 0x00000020 #define SFTP_EXT_LIMITS 0x00000040 #define SFTP_EXT_PATH_EXPAND 0x00000080 #define SFTP_EXT_COPY_DATA 0x00000100 #define SFTP_EXT_GETUSERSGROUPS_BY_ID 0x00000200 u_int exts; u_int64_t limit_kbps; struct bwlimit bwlimit_in, bwlimit_out; }; /* Tracks in-progress requests during file transfers */ struct request { u_int id; size_t len; u_int64_t offset; TAILQ_ENTRY(request) tq; }; TAILQ_HEAD(requests, request); static u_char * get_handle(struct sftp_conn *conn, u_int expected_id, size_t *len, const char *errfmt, ...) __attribute__((format(printf, 4, 5))); static struct request * request_enqueue(struct requests *requests, u_int id, size_t len, uint64_t offset) { struct request *req; req = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*req)); req->id = id; req->len = len; req->offset = offset; TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(requests, req, tq); return req; } static struct request * request_find(struct requests *requests, u_int id) { struct request *req; for (req = TAILQ_FIRST(requests); req != NULL && req->id != id; req = TAILQ_NEXT(req, tq)) ; return req; } -/* ARGSUSED */ static int sftpio(void *_bwlimit, size_t amount) { struct bwlimit *bwlimit = (struct bwlimit *)_bwlimit; refresh_progress_meter(0); if (bwlimit != NULL) bandwidth_limit(bwlimit, amount); return 0; } static void send_msg(struct sftp_conn *conn, struct sshbuf *m) { u_char mlen[4]; struct iovec iov[2]; if (sshbuf_len(m) > SFTP_MAX_MSG_LENGTH) fatal("Outbound message too long %zu", sshbuf_len(m)); /* Send length first */ put_u32(mlen, sshbuf_len(m)); iov[0].iov_base = mlen; iov[0].iov_len = sizeof(mlen); iov[1].iov_base = (u_char *)sshbuf_ptr(m); iov[1].iov_len = sshbuf_len(m); if (atomiciov6(writev, conn->fd_out, iov, 2, sftpio, conn->limit_kbps > 0 ? &conn->bwlimit_out : NULL) != sshbuf_len(m) + sizeof(mlen)) fatal("Couldn't send packet: %s", strerror(errno)); sshbuf_reset(m); } static void get_msg_extended(struct sftp_conn *conn, struct sshbuf *m, int initial) { u_int msg_len; u_char *p; int r; sshbuf_reset(m); if ((r = sshbuf_reserve(m, 4, &p)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "reserve"); if (atomicio6(read, conn->fd_in, p, 4, sftpio, conn->limit_kbps > 0 ? &conn->bwlimit_in : NULL) != 4) { if (errno == EPIPE || errno == ECONNRESET) fatal("Connection closed"); else fatal("Couldn't read packet: %s", strerror(errno)); } if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &msg_len)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "sshbuf_get_u32"); if (msg_len > SFTP_MAX_MSG_LENGTH) { do_log2(initial ? SYSLOG_LEVEL_ERROR : SYSLOG_LEVEL_FATAL, "Received message too long %u", msg_len); fatal("Ensure the remote shell produces no output " "for non-interactive sessions."); } if ((r = sshbuf_reserve(m, msg_len, &p)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "reserve"); if (atomicio6(read, conn->fd_in, p, msg_len, sftpio, conn->limit_kbps > 0 ? &conn->bwlimit_in : NULL) != msg_len) { if (errno == EPIPE) fatal("Connection closed"); else fatal("Read packet: %s", strerror(errno)); } } static void get_msg(struct sftp_conn *conn, struct sshbuf *m) { get_msg_extended(conn, m, 0); } static void send_string_request(struct sftp_conn *conn, u_int id, u_int code, const char *s, u_int len) { struct sshbuf *msg; int r; if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed"); if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, code)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u32(msg, id)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_string(msg, s, len)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "compose"); send_msg(conn, msg); debug3("Sent message fd %d T:%u I:%u", conn->fd_out, code, id); sshbuf_free(msg); } static void send_string_attrs_request(struct sftp_conn *conn, u_int id, u_int code, const void *s, u_int len, Attrib *a) { struct sshbuf *msg; int r; if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed"); if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, code)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u32(msg, id)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_string(msg, s, len)) != 0 || (r = encode_attrib(msg, a)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "compose"); send_msg(conn, msg); debug3("Sent message fd %d T:%u I:%u F:0x%04x M:%05o", conn->fd_out, code, id, a->flags, a->perm); sshbuf_free(msg); } static u_int get_status(struct sftp_conn *conn, u_int expected_id) { struct sshbuf *msg; u_char type; u_int id, status; int r; if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed"); get_msg(conn, msg); if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(msg, &type)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_u32(msg, &id)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "compose"); if (id != expected_id) fatal("ID mismatch (%u != %u)", id, expected_id); if (type != SSH2_FXP_STATUS) fatal("Expected SSH2_FXP_STATUS(%u) packet, got %u", SSH2_FXP_STATUS, type); if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(msg, &status)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "parse"); sshbuf_free(msg); debug3("SSH2_FXP_STATUS %u", status); return status; } static u_char * get_handle(struct sftp_conn *conn, u_int expected_id, size_t *len, const char *errfmt, ...) { struct sshbuf *msg; u_int id, status; u_char type; u_char *handle; char errmsg[256]; va_list args; int r; va_start(args, errfmt); if (errfmt != NULL) vsnprintf(errmsg, sizeof(errmsg), errfmt, args); va_end(args); if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed"); get_msg(conn, msg); if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(msg, &type)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_u32(msg, &id)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "parse"); if (id != expected_id) fatal("%s: ID mismatch (%u != %u)", errfmt == NULL ? __func__ : errmsg, id, expected_id); if (type == SSH2_FXP_STATUS) { if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(msg, &status)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "parse status"); if (errfmt != NULL) error("%s: %s", errmsg, fx2txt(status)); sshbuf_free(msg); return(NULL); } else if (type != SSH2_FXP_HANDLE) fatal("%s: Expected SSH2_FXP_HANDLE(%u) packet, got %u", errfmt == NULL ? __func__ : errmsg, SSH2_FXP_HANDLE, type); if ((r = sshbuf_get_string(msg, &handle, len)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "parse handle"); sshbuf_free(msg); return handle; } /* XXX returning &static is error-prone. Refactor to fill *Attrib argument */ static Attrib * get_decode_stat(struct sftp_conn *conn, u_int expected_id, int quiet) { struct sshbuf *msg; u_int id; u_char type; int r; static Attrib a; if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed"); get_msg(conn, msg); if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(msg, &type)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_u32(msg, &id)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "parse"); if (id != expected_id) fatal("ID mismatch (%u != %u)", id, expected_id); if (type == SSH2_FXP_STATUS) { u_int status; if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(msg, &status)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "parse status"); if (quiet) debug("stat remote: %s", fx2txt(status)); else error("stat remote: %s", fx2txt(status)); sshbuf_free(msg); return(NULL); } else if (type != SSH2_FXP_ATTRS) { fatal("Expected SSH2_FXP_ATTRS(%u) packet, got %u", SSH2_FXP_ATTRS, type); } if ((r = decode_attrib(msg, &a)) != 0) { error_fr(r, "decode_attrib"); sshbuf_free(msg); return NULL; } debug3("Received stat reply T:%u I:%u F:0x%04x M:%05o", type, id, a.flags, a.perm); sshbuf_free(msg); return &a; } static int get_decode_statvfs(struct sftp_conn *conn, struct sftp_statvfs *st, u_int expected_id, int quiet) { struct sshbuf *msg; u_char type; u_int id; u_int64_t flag; int r; if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed"); get_msg(conn, msg); if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(msg, &type)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_u32(msg, &id)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "parse"); debug3("Received statvfs reply T:%u I:%u", type, id); if (id != expected_id) fatal("ID mismatch (%u != %u)", id, expected_id); if (type == SSH2_FXP_STATUS) { u_int status; if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(msg, &status)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "parse status"); if (quiet) debug("remote statvfs: %s", fx2txt(status)); else error("remote statvfs: %s", fx2txt(status)); sshbuf_free(msg); return -1; } else if (type != SSH2_FXP_EXTENDED_REPLY) { fatal("Expected SSH2_FXP_EXTENDED_REPLY(%u) packet, got %u", SSH2_FXP_EXTENDED_REPLY, type); } memset(st, 0, sizeof(*st)); if ((r = sshbuf_get_u64(msg, &st->f_bsize)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_u64(msg, &st->f_frsize)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_u64(msg, &st->f_blocks)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_u64(msg, &st->f_bfree)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_u64(msg, &st->f_bavail)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_u64(msg, &st->f_files)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_u64(msg, &st->f_ffree)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_u64(msg, &st->f_favail)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_u64(msg, &st->f_fsid)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_u64(msg, &flag)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_u64(msg, &st->f_namemax)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "parse statvfs"); st->f_flag = (flag & SSH2_FXE_STATVFS_ST_RDONLY) ? ST_RDONLY : 0; st->f_flag |= (flag & SSH2_FXE_STATVFS_ST_NOSUID) ? ST_NOSUID : 0; sshbuf_free(msg); return 0; } struct sftp_conn * do_init(int fd_in, int fd_out, u_int transfer_buflen, u_int num_requests, u_int64_t limit_kbps) { u_char type; struct sshbuf *msg; struct sftp_conn *ret; int r; ret = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*ret)); ret->msg_id = 1; ret->fd_in = fd_in; ret->fd_out = fd_out; ret->download_buflen = ret->upload_buflen = transfer_buflen ? transfer_buflen : DEFAULT_COPY_BUFLEN; ret->num_requests = num_requests ? num_requests : DEFAULT_NUM_REQUESTS; ret->exts = 0; ret->limit_kbps = 0; if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed"); if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, SSH2_FXP_INIT)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u32(msg, SSH2_FILEXFER_VERSION)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "parse"); send_msg(ret, msg); get_msg_extended(ret, msg, 1); /* Expecting a VERSION reply */ if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(msg, &type)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "parse type"); if (type != SSH2_FXP_VERSION) { error("Invalid packet back from SSH2_FXP_INIT (type %u)", type); sshbuf_free(msg); free(ret); return(NULL); } if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(msg, &ret->version)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "parse version"); debug2("Remote version: %u", ret->version); /* Check for extensions */ while (sshbuf_len(msg) > 0) { char *name; u_char *value; size_t vlen; int known = 0; if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(msg, &name, NULL)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_string(msg, &value, &vlen)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "parse extension"); if (strcmp(name, "posix-rename@openssh.com") == 0 && strcmp((char *)value, "1") == 0) { ret->exts |= SFTP_EXT_POSIX_RENAME; known = 1; } else if (strcmp(name, "statvfs@openssh.com") == 0 && strcmp((char *)value, "2") == 0) { ret->exts |= SFTP_EXT_STATVFS; known = 1; } else if (strcmp(name, "fstatvfs@openssh.com") == 0 && strcmp((char *)value, "2") == 0) { ret->exts |= SFTP_EXT_FSTATVFS; known = 1; } else if (strcmp(name, "hardlink@openssh.com") == 0 && strcmp((char *)value, "1") == 0) { ret->exts |= SFTP_EXT_HARDLINK; known = 1; } else if (strcmp(name, "fsync@openssh.com") == 0 && strcmp((char *)value, "1") == 0) { ret->exts |= SFTP_EXT_FSYNC; known = 1; } else if (strcmp(name, "lsetstat@openssh.com") == 0 && strcmp((char *)value, "1") == 0) { ret->exts |= SFTP_EXT_LSETSTAT; known = 1; } else if (strcmp(name, "limits@openssh.com") == 0 && strcmp((char *)value, "1") == 0) { ret->exts |= SFTP_EXT_LIMITS; known = 1; } else if (strcmp(name, "expand-path@openssh.com") == 0 && strcmp((char *)value, "1") == 0) { ret->exts |= SFTP_EXT_PATH_EXPAND; known = 1; } else if (strcmp(name, "copy-data") == 0 && strcmp((char *)value, "1") == 0) { ret->exts |= SFTP_EXT_COPY_DATA; known = 1; } else if (strcmp(name, "users-groups-by-id@openssh.com") == 0 && strcmp((char *)value, "1") == 0) { ret->exts |= SFTP_EXT_GETUSERSGROUPS_BY_ID; known = 1; } if (known) { debug2("Server supports extension \"%s\" revision %s", name, value); } else { debug2("Unrecognised server extension \"%s\"", name); } free(name); free(value); } sshbuf_free(msg); /* Query the server for its limits */ if (ret->exts & SFTP_EXT_LIMITS) { struct sftp_limits limits; if (do_limits(ret, &limits) != 0) fatal_f("limits failed"); /* If the caller did not specify, find a good value */ if (transfer_buflen == 0) { ret->download_buflen = MINIMUM(limits.read_length, SFTP_MAX_MSG_LENGTH - 1024); ret->upload_buflen = MINIMUM(limits.write_length, SFTP_MAX_MSG_LENGTH - 1024); ret->download_buflen = MAXIMUM(ret->download_buflen, 64); ret->upload_buflen = MAXIMUM(ret->upload_buflen, 64); debug3("server upload/download buffer sizes " "%llu / %llu; using %u / %u", (unsigned long long)limits.write_length, (unsigned long long)limits.read_length, ret->upload_buflen, ret->download_buflen); } /* Use the server limit to scale down our value only */ if (num_requests == 0 && limits.open_handles) { ret->num_requests = MINIMUM(DEFAULT_NUM_REQUESTS, limits.open_handles); if (ret->num_requests == 0) ret->num_requests = 1; debug3("server handle limit %llu; using %u", (unsigned long long)limits.open_handles, ret->num_requests); } } /* Some filexfer v.0 servers don't support large packets */ if (ret->version == 0) { ret->download_buflen = MINIMUM(ret->download_buflen, 20480); ret->upload_buflen = MINIMUM(ret->upload_buflen, 20480); } ret->limit_kbps = limit_kbps; if (ret->limit_kbps > 0) { bandwidth_limit_init(&ret->bwlimit_in, ret->limit_kbps, ret->download_buflen); bandwidth_limit_init(&ret->bwlimit_out, ret->limit_kbps, ret->upload_buflen); } return ret; } u_int sftp_proto_version(struct sftp_conn *conn) { return conn->version; } int do_limits(struct sftp_conn *conn, struct sftp_limits *limits) { u_int id, msg_id; u_char type; struct sshbuf *msg; int r; if ((conn->exts & SFTP_EXT_LIMITS) == 0) { error("Server does not support limits@openssh.com extension"); return -1; } if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed"); id = conn->msg_id++; if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, SSH2_FXP_EXTENDED)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u32(msg, id)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(msg, "limits@openssh.com")) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "compose"); send_msg(conn, msg); debug3("Sent message limits@openssh.com I:%u", id); get_msg(conn, msg); if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(msg, &type)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_u32(msg, &msg_id)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "parse"); debug3("Received limits reply T:%u I:%u", type, msg_id); if (id != msg_id) fatal("ID mismatch (%u != %u)", msg_id, id); if (type != SSH2_FXP_EXTENDED_REPLY) { debug_f("expected SSH2_FXP_EXTENDED_REPLY(%u) packet, got %u", SSH2_FXP_EXTENDED_REPLY, type); /* Disable the limits extension */ conn->exts &= ~SFTP_EXT_LIMITS; sshbuf_free(msg); return 0; } memset(limits, 0, sizeof(*limits)); if ((r = sshbuf_get_u64(msg, &limits->packet_length)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_u64(msg, &limits->read_length)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_u64(msg, &limits->write_length)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_u64(msg, &limits->open_handles)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "parse limits"); sshbuf_free(msg); return 0; } int do_close(struct sftp_conn *conn, const u_char *handle, u_int handle_len) { u_int id, status; struct sshbuf *msg; int r; if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed"); id = conn->msg_id++; if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, SSH2_FXP_CLOSE)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u32(msg, id)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_string(msg, handle, handle_len)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "parse"); send_msg(conn, msg); debug3("Sent message SSH2_FXP_CLOSE I:%u", id); status = get_status(conn, id); if (status != SSH2_FX_OK) error("close remote: %s", fx2txt(status)); sshbuf_free(msg); return status == SSH2_FX_OK ? 0 : -1; } static int do_lsreaddir(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *path, int print_flag, SFTP_DIRENT ***dir) { struct sshbuf *msg; u_int count, id, i, expected_id, ents = 0; size_t handle_len; u_char type, *handle; int status = SSH2_FX_FAILURE; int r; if (dir) *dir = NULL; id = conn->msg_id++; if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed"); if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, SSH2_FXP_OPENDIR)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u32(msg, id)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(msg, path)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "compose OPENDIR"); send_msg(conn, msg); handle = get_handle(conn, id, &handle_len, "remote readdir(\"%s\")", path); if (handle == NULL) { sshbuf_free(msg); return -1; } if (dir) { ents = 0; *dir = xcalloc(1, sizeof(**dir)); (*dir)[0] = NULL; } for (; !interrupted;) { id = expected_id = conn->msg_id++; debug3("Sending SSH2_FXP_READDIR I:%u", id); sshbuf_reset(msg); if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, SSH2_FXP_READDIR)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u32(msg, id)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_string(msg, handle, handle_len)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "compose READDIR"); send_msg(conn, msg); sshbuf_reset(msg); get_msg(conn, msg); if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(msg, &type)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_u32(msg, &id)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "parse"); debug3("Received reply T:%u I:%u", type, id); if (id != expected_id) fatal("ID mismatch (%u != %u)", id, expected_id); if (type == SSH2_FXP_STATUS) { u_int rstatus; if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(msg, &rstatus)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "parse status"); debug3("Received SSH2_FXP_STATUS %d", rstatus); if (rstatus == SSH2_FX_EOF) break; error("Couldn't read directory: %s", fx2txt(rstatus)); goto out; } else if (type != SSH2_FXP_NAME) fatal("Expected SSH2_FXP_NAME(%u) packet, got %u", SSH2_FXP_NAME, type); if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(msg, &count)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "parse count"); if (count > SSHBUF_SIZE_MAX) fatal_f("nonsensical number of entries"); if (count == 0) break; debug3("Received %d SSH2_FXP_NAME responses", count); for (i = 0; i < count; i++) { char *filename, *longname; Attrib a; if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(msg, &filename, NULL)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(msg, &longname, NULL)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "parse filenames"); if ((r = decode_attrib(msg, &a)) != 0) { error_fr(r, "couldn't decode attrib"); free(filename); free(longname); goto out; } if (print_flag) mprintf("%s\n", longname); /* * Directory entries should never contain '/' * These can be used to attack recursive ops * (e.g. send '../../../../etc/passwd') */ if (strpbrk(filename, SFTP_DIRECTORY_CHARS) != NULL) { error("Server sent suspect path \"%s\" " "during readdir of \"%s\"", filename, path); } else if (dir) { *dir = xreallocarray(*dir, ents + 2, sizeof(**dir)); (*dir)[ents] = xcalloc(1, sizeof(***dir)); (*dir)[ents]->filename = xstrdup(filename); (*dir)[ents]->longname = xstrdup(longname); memcpy(&(*dir)[ents]->a, &a, sizeof(a)); (*dir)[++ents] = NULL; } free(filename); free(longname); } } status = 0; out: sshbuf_free(msg); do_close(conn, handle, handle_len); free(handle); if (status != 0 && dir != NULL) { /* Don't return results on error */ free_sftp_dirents(*dir); *dir = NULL; } else if (interrupted && dir != NULL && *dir != NULL) { /* Don't return partial matches on interrupt */ free_sftp_dirents(*dir); *dir = xcalloc(1, sizeof(**dir)); **dir = NULL; } return status == SSH2_FX_OK ? 0 : -1; } int do_readdir(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *path, SFTP_DIRENT ***dir) { return(do_lsreaddir(conn, path, 0, dir)); } void free_sftp_dirents(SFTP_DIRENT **s) { int i; if (s == NULL) return; for (i = 0; s[i]; i++) { free(s[i]->filename); free(s[i]->longname); free(s[i]); } free(s); } int do_rm(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *path) { u_int status, id; debug2("Sending SSH2_FXP_REMOVE \"%s\"", path); id = conn->msg_id++; send_string_request(conn, id, SSH2_FXP_REMOVE, path, strlen(path)); status = get_status(conn, id); if (status != SSH2_FX_OK) error("remote delete %s: %s", path, fx2txt(status)); return status == SSH2_FX_OK ? 0 : -1; } int do_mkdir(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *path, Attrib *a, int print_flag) { u_int status, id; debug2("Sending SSH2_FXP_MKDIR \"%s\"", path); id = conn->msg_id++; send_string_attrs_request(conn, id, SSH2_FXP_MKDIR, path, strlen(path), a); status = get_status(conn, id); if (status != SSH2_FX_OK && print_flag) error("remote mkdir \"%s\": %s", path, fx2txt(status)); return status == SSH2_FX_OK ? 0 : -1; } int do_rmdir(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *path) { u_int status, id; debug2("Sending SSH2_FXP_RMDIR \"%s\"", path); id = conn->msg_id++; send_string_request(conn, id, SSH2_FXP_RMDIR, path, strlen(path)); status = get_status(conn, id); if (status != SSH2_FX_OK) error("remote rmdir \"%s\": %s", path, fx2txt(status)); return status == SSH2_FX_OK ? 0 : -1; } Attrib * do_stat(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *path, int quiet) { u_int id; debug2("Sending SSH2_FXP_STAT \"%s\"", path); id = conn->msg_id++; send_string_request(conn, id, conn->version == 0 ? SSH2_FXP_STAT_VERSION_0 : SSH2_FXP_STAT, path, strlen(path)); return(get_decode_stat(conn, id, quiet)); } Attrib * do_lstat(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *path, int quiet) { u_int id; if (conn->version == 0) { if (quiet) debug("Server version does not support lstat operation"); else logit("Server version does not support lstat operation"); return(do_stat(conn, path, quiet)); } id = conn->msg_id++; send_string_request(conn, id, SSH2_FXP_LSTAT, path, strlen(path)); return(get_decode_stat(conn, id, quiet)); } #ifdef notyet Attrib * do_fstat(struct sftp_conn *conn, const u_char *handle, u_int handle_len, int quiet) { u_int id; debug2("Sending SSH2_FXP_FSTAT \"%s\""); id = conn->msg_id++; send_string_request(conn, id, SSH2_FXP_FSTAT, handle, handle_len); return(get_decode_stat(conn, id, quiet)); } #endif int do_setstat(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *path, Attrib *a) { u_int status, id; debug2("Sending SSH2_FXP_SETSTAT \"%s\"", path); id = conn->msg_id++; send_string_attrs_request(conn, id, SSH2_FXP_SETSTAT, path, strlen(path), a); status = get_status(conn, id); if (status != SSH2_FX_OK) error("remote setstat \"%s\": %s", path, fx2txt(status)); return status == SSH2_FX_OK ? 0 : -1; } int do_fsetstat(struct sftp_conn *conn, const u_char *handle, u_int handle_len, Attrib *a) { u_int status, id; debug2("Sending SSH2_FXP_FSETSTAT"); id = conn->msg_id++; send_string_attrs_request(conn, id, SSH2_FXP_FSETSTAT, handle, handle_len, a); status = get_status(conn, id); if (status != SSH2_FX_OK) error("remote fsetstat: %s", fx2txt(status)); return status == SSH2_FX_OK ? 0 : -1; } /* Implements both the realpath and expand-path operations */ static char * do_realpath_expand(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *path, int expand) { struct sshbuf *msg; u_int expected_id, count, id; char *filename, *longname; Attrib a; u_char type; int r; const char *what = "SSH2_FXP_REALPATH"; if (expand) what = "expand-path@openssh.com"; if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed"); expected_id = id = conn->msg_id++; if (expand) { debug2("Sending SSH2_FXP_EXTENDED(expand-path@openssh.com) " "\"%s\"", path); if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, SSH2_FXP_EXTENDED)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u32(msg, id)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(msg, "expand-path@openssh.com")) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(msg, path)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "compose %s", what); send_msg(conn, msg); } else { debug2("Sending SSH2_FXP_REALPATH \"%s\"", path); send_string_request(conn, id, SSH2_FXP_REALPATH, path, strlen(path)); } get_msg(conn, msg); if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(msg, &type)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_u32(msg, &id)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "parse"); if (id != expected_id) fatal("ID mismatch (%u != %u)", id, expected_id); if (type == SSH2_FXP_STATUS) { u_int status; char *errmsg; if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(msg, &status)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(msg, &errmsg, NULL)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "parse status"); error("%s %s: %s", expand ? "expand" : "realpath", path, *errmsg == '\0' ? fx2txt(status) : errmsg); free(errmsg); sshbuf_free(msg); return NULL; } else if (type != SSH2_FXP_NAME) fatal("Expected SSH2_FXP_NAME(%u) packet, got %u", SSH2_FXP_NAME, type); if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(msg, &count)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "parse count"); if (count != 1) fatal("Got multiple names (%d) from %s", count, what); if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(msg, &filename, NULL)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(msg, &longname, NULL)) != 0 || (r = decode_attrib(msg, &a)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "parse filename/attrib"); debug3("%s %s -> %s", what, path, filename); free(longname); sshbuf_free(msg); return(filename); } char * do_realpath(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *path) { return do_realpath_expand(conn, path, 0); } int can_expand_path(struct sftp_conn *conn) { return (conn->exts & SFTP_EXT_PATH_EXPAND) != 0; } char * do_expand_path(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *path) { if (!can_expand_path(conn)) { debug3_f("no server support, fallback to realpath"); return do_realpath_expand(conn, path, 0); } return do_realpath_expand(conn, path, 1); } int do_copy(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *oldpath, const char *newpath) { Attrib junk, *a; struct sshbuf *msg; u_char *old_handle, *new_handle; u_int mode, status, id; size_t old_handle_len, new_handle_len; int r; /* Return if the extension is not supported */ if ((conn->exts & SFTP_EXT_COPY_DATA) == 0) { error("Server does not support copy-data extension"); return -1; } /* Make sure the file exists, and we can copy its perms */ if ((a = do_stat(conn, oldpath, 0)) == NULL) return -1; /* Do not preserve set[ug]id here, as we do not preserve ownership */ if (a->flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_PERMISSIONS) { mode = a->perm & 0777; if (!S_ISREG(a->perm)) { error("Cannot copy non-regular file: %s", oldpath); return -1; } } else { /* NB: The user's umask will apply to this */ mode = 0666; } /* Set up the new perms for the new file */ attrib_clear(a); a->perm = mode; a->flags |= SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_PERMISSIONS; if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__); attrib_clear(&junk); /* Send empty attributes */ /* Open the old file for reading */ id = conn->msg_id++; if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, SSH2_FXP_OPEN)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u32(msg, id)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(msg, oldpath)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u32(msg, SSH2_FXF_READ)) != 0 || (r = encode_attrib(msg, &junk)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); send_msg(conn, msg); debug3("Sent message SSH2_FXP_OPEN I:%u P:%s", id, oldpath); sshbuf_reset(msg); old_handle = get_handle(conn, id, &old_handle_len, "remote open(\"%s\")", oldpath); if (old_handle == NULL) { sshbuf_free(msg); return -1; } /* Open the new file for writing */ id = conn->msg_id++; if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, SSH2_FXP_OPEN)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u32(msg, id)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(msg, newpath)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u32(msg, SSH2_FXF_WRITE|SSH2_FXF_CREAT| SSH2_FXF_TRUNC)) != 0 || (r = encode_attrib(msg, a)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); send_msg(conn, msg); debug3("Sent message SSH2_FXP_OPEN I:%u P:%s", id, newpath); sshbuf_reset(msg); new_handle = get_handle(conn, id, &new_handle_len, "remote open(\"%s\")", newpath); if (new_handle == NULL) { sshbuf_free(msg); free(old_handle); return -1; } /* Copy the file data */ id = conn->msg_id++; if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, SSH2_FXP_EXTENDED)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u32(msg, id)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(msg, "copy-data")) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_string(msg, old_handle, old_handle_len)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u64(msg, 0)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u64(msg, 0)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_string(msg, new_handle, new_handle_len)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u64(msg, 0)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); send_msg(conn, msg); debug3("Sent message copy-data \"%s\" 0 0 -> \"%s\" 0", oldpath, newpath); status = get_status(conn, id); if (status != SSH2_FX_OK) error("Couldn't copy file \"%s\" to \"%s\": %s", oldpath, newpath, fx2txt(status)); /* Clean up everything */ sshbuf_free(msg); do_close(conn, old_handle, old_handle_len); do_close(conn, new_handle, new_handle_len); free(old_handle); free(new_handle); return status == SSH2_FX_OK ? 0 : -1; } int do_rename(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *oldpath, const char *newpath, int force_legacy) { struct sshbuf *msg; u_int status, id; int r, use_ext = (conn->exts & SFTP_EXT_POSIX_RENAME) && !force_legacy; if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed"); /* Send rename request */ id = conn->msg_id++; if (use_ext) { debug2("Sending SSH2_FXP_EXTENDED(posix-rename@openssh.com) " "\"%s\" to \"%s\"", oldpath, newpath); if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, SSH2_FXP_EXTENDED)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u32(msg, id)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(msg, "posix-rename@openssh.com")) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "compose posix-rename"); } else { debug2("Sending SSH2_FXP_RENAME \"%s\" to \"%s\"", oldpath, newpath); if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, SSH2_FXP_RENAME)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u32(msg, id)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "compose rename"); } if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(msg, oldpath)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(msg, newpath)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "compose paths"); send_msg(conn, msg); debug3("Sent message %s \"%s\" -> \"%s\"", use_ext ? "posix-rename@openssh.com" : "SSH2_FXP_RENAME", oldpath, newpath); sshbuf_free(msg); status = get_status(conn, id); if (status != SSH2_FX_OK) error("remote rename \"%s\" to \"%s\": %s", oldpath, newpath, fx2txt(status)); return status == SSH2_FX_OK ? 0 : -1; } int do_hardlink(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *oldpath, const char *newpath) { struct sshbuf *msg; u_int status, id; int r; if ((conn->exts & SFTP_EXT_HARDLINK) == 0) { error("Server does not support hardlink@openssh.com extension"); return -1; } debug2("Sending SSH2_FXP_EXTENDED(hardlink@openssh.com) " "\"%s\" to \"%s\"", oldpath, newpath); if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed"); /* Send link request */ id = conn->msg_id++; if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, SSH2_FXP_EXTENDED)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u32(msg, id)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(msg, "hardlink@openssh.com")) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(msg, oldpath)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(msg, newpath)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "compose"); send_msg(conn, msg); debug3("Sent message hardlink@openssh.com \"%s\" -> \"%s\"", oldpath, newpath); sshbuf_free(msg); status = get_status(conn, id); if (status != SSH2_FX_OK) error("remote link \"%s\" to \"%s\": %s", oldpath, newpath, fx2txt(status)); return status == SSH2_FX_OK ? 0 : -1; } int do_symlink(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *oldpath, const char *newpath) { struct sshbuf *msg; u_int status, id; int r; if (conn->version < 3) { error("This server does not support the symlink operation"); return(SSH2_FX_OP_UNSUPPORTED); } debug2("Sending SSH2_FXP_SYMLINK \"%s\" to \"%s\"", oldpath, newpath); if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed"); /* Send symlink request */ id = conn->msg_id++; if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, SSH2_FXP_SYMLINK)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u32(msg, id)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(msg, oldpath)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(msg, newpath)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "compose"); send_msg(conn, msg); debug3("Sent message SSH2_FXP_SYMLINK \"%s\" -> \"%s\"", oldpath, newpath); sshbuf_free(msg); status = get_status(conn, id); if (status != SSH2_FX_OK) error("remote symlink file \"%s\" to \"%s\": %s", oldpath, newpath, fx2txt(status)); return status == SSH2_FX_OK ? 0 : -1; } int do_fsync(struct sftp_conn *conn, u_char *handle, u_int handle_len) { struct sshbuf *msg; u_int status, id; int r; /* Silently return if the extension is not supported */ if ((conn->exts & SFTP_EXT_FSYNC) == 0) return -1; debug2("Sending SSH2_FXP_EXTENDED(fsync@openssh.com)"); /* Send fsync request */ if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed"); id = conn->msg_id++; if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, SSH2_FXP_EXTENDED)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u32(msg, id)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(msg, "fsync@openssh.com")) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_string(msg, handle, handle_len)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "compose"); send_msg(conn, msg); debug3("Sent message fsync@openssh.com I:%u", id); sshbuf_free(msg); status = get_status(conn, id); if (status != SSH2_FX_OK) error("remote fsync: %s", fx2txt(status)); return status == SSH2_FX_OK ? 0 : -1; } #ifdef notyet char * do_readlink(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *path) { struct sshbuf *msg; u_int expected_id, count, id; char *filename, *longname; Attrib a; u_char type; int r; debug2("Sending SSH2_FXP_READLINK \"%s\"", path); expected_id = id = conn->msg_id++; send_string_request(conn, id, SSH2_FXP_READLINK, path, strlen(path)); if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed"); get_msg(conn, msg); if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(msg, &type)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_u32(msg, &id)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "parse"); if (id != expected_id) fatal("ID mismatch (%u != %u)", id, expected_id); if (type == SSH2_FXP_STATUS) { u_int status; if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(msg, &status)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "parse status"); error("Couldn't readlink: %s", fx2txt(status)); sshbuf_free(msg); return(NULL); } else if (type != SSH2_FXP_NAME) fatal("Expected SSH2_FXP_NAME(%u) packet, got %u", SSH2_FXP_NAME, type); if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(msg, &count)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "parse count"); if (count != 1) fatal("Got multiple names (%d) from SSH_FXP_READLINK", count); if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(msg, &filename, NULL)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(msg, &longname, NULL)) != 0 || (r = decode_attrib(msg, &a)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "parse filenames/attrib"); debug3("SSH_FXP_READLINK %s -> %s", path, filename); free(longname); sshbuf_free(msg); return filename; } #endif int do_statvfs(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *path, struct sftp_statvfs *st, int quiet) { struct sshbuf *msg; u_int id; int r; if ((conn->exts & SFTP_EXT_STATVFS) == 0) { error("Server does not support statvfs@openssh.com extension"); return -1; } debug2("Sending SSH2_FXP_EXTENDED(statvfs@openssh.com) \"%s\"", path); id = conn->msg_id++; if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed"); if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, SSH2_FXP_EXTENDED)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u32(msg, id)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(msg, "statvfs@openssh.com")) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(msg, path)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "compose"); send_msg(conn, msg); sshbuf_free(msg); return get_decode_statvfs(conn, st, id, quiet); } #ifdef notyet int do_fstatvfs(struct sftp_conn *conn, const u_char *handle, u_int handle_len, struct sftp_statvfs *st, int quiet) { struct sshbuf *msg; u_int id; if ((conn->exts & SFTP_EXT_FSTATVFS) == 0) { error("Server does not support fstatvfs@openssh.com extension"); return -1; } debug2("Sending SSH2_FXP_EXTENDED(fstatvfs@openssh.com)"); id = conn->msg_id++; if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed"); if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, SSH2_FXP_EXTENDED)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u32(msg, id)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(msg, "fstatvfs@openssh.com")) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_string(msg, handle, handle_len)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "compose"); send_msg(conn, msg); sshbuf_free(msg); return get_decode_statvfs(conn, st, id, quiet); } #endif int do_lsetstat(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *path, Attrib *a) { struct sshbuf *msg; u_int status, id; int r; if ((conn->exts & SFTP_EXT_LSETSTAT) == 0) { error("Server does not support lsetstat@openssh.com extension"); return -1; } debug2("Sending SSH2_FXP_EXTENDED(lsetstat@openssh.com) \"%s\"", path); id = conn->msg_id++; if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed"); if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, SSH2_FXP_EXTENDED)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u32(msg, id)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(msg, "lsetstat@openssh.com")) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(msg, path)) != 0 || (r = encode_attrib(msg, a)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "compose"); send_msg(conn, msg); sshbuf_free(msg); status = get_status(conn, id); if (status != SSH2_FX_OK) error("remote lsetstat \"%s\": %s", path, fx2txt(status)); return status == SSH2_FX_OK ? 0 : -1; } static void send_read_request(struct sftp_conn *conn, u_int id, u_int64_t offset, u_int len, const u_char *handle, u_int handle_len) { struct sshbuf *msg; int r; if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed"); if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, SSH2_FXP_READ)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u32(msg, id)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_string(msg, handle, handle_len)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u64(msg, offset)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u32(msg, len)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "compose"); send_msg(conn, msg); sshbuf_free(msg); } static int send_open(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *path, const char *tag, u_int openmode, Attrib *a, u_char **handlep, size_t *handle_lenp) { Attrib junk; u_char *handle; size_t handle_len; struct sshbuf *msg; int r; u_int id; debug2("Sending SSH2_FXP_OPEN \"%s\"", path); *handlep = NULL; *handle_lenp = 0; if (a == NULL) { attrib_clear(&junk); /* Send empty attributes */ a = &junk; } /* Send open request */ if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed"); id = conn->msg_id++; if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, SSH2_FXP_OPEN)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u32(msg, id)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(msg, path)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u32(msg, openmode)) != 0 || (r = encode_attrib(msg, a)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "compose %s open", tag); send_msg(conn, msg); sshbuf_free(msg); debug3("Sent %s message SSH2_FXP_OPEN I:%u P:%s M:0x%04x", tag, id, path, openmode); if ((handle = get_handle(conn, id, &handle_len, "%s open \"%s\"", tag, path)) == NULL) return -1; /* success */ *handlep = handle; *handle_lenp = handle_len; return 0; } static const char * progress_meter_path(const char *path) { const char *progresspath; if ((progresspath = strrchr(path, '/')) == NULL) return path; progresspath++; if (*progresspath == '\0') return path; return progresspath; } int do_download(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *remote_path, const char *local_path, Attrib *a, int preserve_flag, int resume_flag, int fsync_flag, int inplace_flag) { struct sshbuf *msg; u_char *handle; int local_fd = -1, write_error; int read_error, write_errno, lmodified = 0, reordered = 0, r; u_int64_t offset = 0, size, highwater; u_int mode, id, buflen, num_req, max_req, status = SSH2_FX_OK; off_t progress_counter; size_t handle_len; struct stat st; struct requests requests; struct request *req; u_char type; debug2_f("download remote \"%s\" to local \"%s\"", remote_path, local_path); TAILQ_INIT(&requests); if (a == NULL && (a = do_stat(conn, remote_path, 0)) == NULL) return -1; /* Do not preserve set[ug]id here, as we do not preserve ownership */ if (a->flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_PERMISSIONS) mode = a->perm & 0777; else mode = 0666; if ((a->flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_PERMISSIONS) && (!S_ISREG(a->perm))) { error("download %s: not a regular file", remote_path); return(-1); } if (a->flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_SIZE) size = a->size; else size = 0; buflen = conn->download_buflen; /* Send open request */ if (send_open(conn, remote_path, "remote", SSH2_FXF_READ, NULL, &handle, &handle_len) != 0) return -1; local_fd = open(local_path, O_WRONLY | O_CREAT | ((resume_flag || inplace_flag) ? 0 : O_TRUNC), mode | S_IWUSR); if (local_fd == -1) { error("open local \"%s\": %s", local_path, strerror(errno)); goto fail; } offset = highwater = 0; if (resume_flag) { if (fstat(local_fd, &st) == -1) { error("stat local \"%s\": %s", local_path, strerror(errno)); goto fail; } if (st.st_size < 0) { error("\"%s\" has negative size", local_path); goto fail; } if ((u_int64_t)st.st_size > size) { error("Unable to resume download of \"%s\": " "local file is larger than remote", local_path); fail: do_close(conn, handle, handle_len); free(handle); if (local_fd != -1) close(local_fd); return -1; } offset = highwater = st.st_size; } /* Read from remote and write to local */ write_error = read_error = write_errno = num_req = 0; max_req = 1; progress_counter = offset; if (showprogress && size != 0) { start_progress_meter(progress_meter_path(remote_path), size, &progress_counter); } if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed"); while (num_req > 0 || max_req > 0) { u_char *data; size_t len; /* * Simulate EOF on interrupt: stop sending new requests and * allow outstanding requests to drain gracefully */ if (interrupted) { if (num_req == 0) /* If we haven't started yet... */ break; max_req = 0; } /* Send some more requests */ while (num_req < max_req) { debug3("Request range %llu -> %llu (%d/%d)", (unsigned long long)offset, (unsigned long long)offset + buflen - 1, num_req, max_req); req = request_enqueue(&requests, conn->msg_id++, buflen, offset); offset += buflen; num_req++; send_read_request(conn, req->id, req->offset, req->len, handle, handle_len); } sshbuf_reset(msg); get_msg(conn, msg); if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(msg, &type)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_u32(msg, &id)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "parse"); debug3("Received reply T:%u I:%u R:%d", type, id, max_req); /* Find the request in our queue */ if ((req = request_find(&requests, id)) == NULL) fatal("Unexpected reply %u", id); switch (type) { case SSH2_FXP_STATUS: if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(msg, &status)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "parse status"); if (status != SSH2_FX_EOF) read_error = 1; max_req = 0; TAILQ_REMOVE(&requests, req, tq); free(req); num_req--; break; case SSH2_FXP_DATA: if ((r = sshbuf_get_string(msg, &data, &len)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "parse data"); debug3("Received data %llu -> %llu", (unsigned long long)req->offset, (unsigned long long)req->offset + len - 1); if (len > req->len) fatal("Received more data than asked for " "%zu > %zu", len, req->len); lmodified = 1; if ((lseek(local_fd, req->offset, SEEK_SET) == -1 || atomicio(vwrite, local_fd, data, len) != len) && !write_error) { write_errno = errno; write_error = 1; max_req = 0; } else if (!reordered && req->offset <= highwater) highwater = req->offset + len; else if (!reordered && req->offset > highwater) reordered = 1; progress_counter += len; free(data); if (len == req->len) { TAILQ_REMOVE(&requests, req, tq); free(req); num_req--; } else { /* Resend the request for the missing data */ debug3("Short data block, re-requesting " "%llu -> %llu (%2d)", (unsigned long long)req->offset + len, (unsigned long long)req->offset + req->len - 1, num_req); req->id = conn->msg_id++; req->len -= len; req->offset += len; send_read_request(conn, req->id, req->offset, req->len, handle, handle_len); /* Reduce the request size */ if (len < buflen) buflen = MAXIMUM(MIN_READ_SIZE, len); } if (max_req > 0) { /* max_req = 0 iff EOF received */ if (size > 0 && offset > size) { /* Only one request at a time * after the expected EOF */ debug3("Finish at %llu (%2d)", (unsigned long long)offset, num_req); max_req = 1; } else if (max_req < conn->num_requests) { ++max_req; } } break; default: fatal("Expected SSH2_FXP_DATA(%u) packet, got %u", SSH2_FXP_DATA, type); } } if (showprogress && size) stop_progress_meter(); /* Sanity check */ if (TAILQ_FIRST(&requests) != NULL) fatal("Transfer complete, but requests still in queue"); /* * Truncate at highest contiguous point to avoid holes on interrupt, * or unconditionally if writing in place. */ if (inplace_flag || read_error || write_error || interrupted) { if (reordered && resume_flag) { error("Unable to resume download of \"%s\": " "server reordered requests", local_path); } debug("truncating at %llu", (unsigned long long)highwater); if (ftruncate(local_fd, highwater) == -1) error("local ftruncate \"%s\": %s", local_path, strerror(errno)); } if (read_error) { error("read remote \"%s\" : %s", remote_path, fx2txt(status)); status = -1; do_close(conn, handle, handle_len); } else if (write_error) { error("write local \"%s\": %s", local_path, strerror(write_errno)); status = SSH2_FX_FAILURE; do_close(conn, handle, handle_len); } else { if (do_close(conn, handle, handle_len) != 0 || interrupted) status = SSH2_FX_FAILURE; else status = SSH2_FX_OK; /* Override umask and utimes if asked */ #ifdef HAVE_FCHMOD if (preserve_flag && fchmod(local_fd, mode) == -1) #else if (preserve_flag && chmod(local_path, mode) == -1) #endif /* HAVE_FCHMOD */ error("local chmod \"%s\": %s", local_path, strerror(errno)); if (preserve_flag && (a->flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_ACMODTIME)) { struct timeval tv[2]; tv[0].tv_sec = a->atime; tv[1].tv_sec = a->mtime; tv[0].tv_usec = tv[1].tv_usec = 0; if (utimes(local_path, tv) == -1) error("local set times \"%s\": %s", local_path, strerror(errno)); } if (resume_flag && !lmodified) logit("File \"%s\" was not modified", local_path); else if (fsync_flag) { debug("syncing \"%s\"", local_path); if (fsync(local_fd) == -1) error("local sync \"%s\": %s", local_path, strerror(errno)); } } close(local_fd); sshbuf_free(msg); free(handle); return status == SSH2_FX_OK ? 0 : -1; } static int download_dir_internal(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *src, const char *dst, int depth, Attrib *dirattrib, int preserve_flag, int print_flag, int resume_flag, int fsync_flag, int follow_link_flag, int inplace_flag) { int i, ret = 0; SFTP_DIRENT **dir_entries; char *filename, *new_src = NULL, *new_dst = NULL; mode_t mode = 0777, tmpmode = mode; if (depth >= MAX_DIR_DEPTH) { error("Maximum directory depth exceeded: %d levels", depth); return -1; } debug2_f("download dir remote \"%s\" to local \"%s\"", src, dst); if (dirattrib == NULL && (dirattrib = do_stat(conn, src, 1)) == NULL) { error("stat remote \"%s\" directory failed", src); return -1; } if (!S_ISDIR(dirattrib->perm)) { error("\"%s\" is not a directory", src); return -1; } if (print_flag && print_flag != SFTP_PROGRESS_ONLY) mprintf("Retrieving %s\n", src); if (dirattrib->flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_PERMISSIONS) { mode = dirattrib->perm & 01777; tmpmode = mode | (S_IWUSR|S_IXUSR); } else { debug("download remote \"%s\": server " "did not send permissions", dst); } if (mkdir(dst, tmpmode) == -1 && errno != EEXIST) { error("mkdir %s: %s", dst, strerror(errno)); return -1; } if (do_readdir(conn, src, &dir_entries) == -1) { error("remote readdir \"%s\" failed", src); return -1; } for (i = 0; dir_entries[i] != NULL && !interrupted; i++) { free(new_dst); free(new_src); filename = dir_entries[i]->filename; new_dst = path_append(dst, filename); new_src = path_append(src, filename); if (S_ISDIR(dir_entries[i]->a.perm)) { if (strcmp(filename, ".") == 0 || strcmp(filename, "..") == 0) continue; if (download_dir_internal(conn, new_src, new_dst, depth + 1, &(dir_entries[i]->a), preserve_flag, print_flag, resume_flag, fsync_flag, follow_link_flag, inplace_flag) == -1) ret = -1; } else if (S_ISREG(dir_entries[i]->a.perm) || (follow_link_flag && S_ISLNK(dir_entries[i]->a.perm))) { /* * If this is a symlink then don't send the link's * Attrib. do_download() will do a FXP_STAT operation * and get the link target's attributes. */ if (do_download(conn, new_src, new_dst, S_ISLNK(dir_entries[i]->a.perm) ? NULL : &(dir_entries[i]->a), preserve_flag, resume_flag, fsync_flag, inplace_flag) == -1) { error("Download of file %s to %s failed", new_src, new_dst); ret = -1; } } else logit("download \"%s\": not a regular file", new_src); } free(new_dst); free(new_src); if (preserve_flag) { if (dirattrib->flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_ACMODTIME) { struct timeval tv[2]; tv[0].tv_sec = dirattrib->atime; tv[1].tv_sec = dirattrib->mtime; tv[0].tv_usec = tv[1].tv_usec = 0; if (utimes(dst, tv) == -1) error("local set times on \"%s\": %s", dst, strerror(errno)); } else debug("Server did not send times for directory " "\"%s\"", dst); } if (mode != tmpmode && chmod(dst, mode) == -1) error("local chmod directory \"%s\": %s", dst, strerror(errno)); free_sftp_dirents(dir_entries); return ret; } int download_dir(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *src, const char *dst, Attrib *dirattrib, int preserve_flag, int print_flag, int resume_flag, int fsync_flag, int follow_link_flag, int inplace_flag) { char *src_canon; int ret; if ((src_canon = do_realpath(conn, src)) == NULL) { error("download \"%s\": path canonicalization failed", src); return -1; } ret = download_dir_internal(conn, src_canon, dst, 0, dirattrib, preserve_flag, print_flag, resume_flag, fsync_flag, follow_link_flag, inplace_flag); free(src_canon); return ret; } int do_upload(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *local_path, const char *remote_path, int preserve_flag, int resume, int fsync_flag, int inplace_flag) { int r, local_fd; u_int openmode, id, status = SSH2_FX_OK, reordered = 0; off_t offset, progress_counter; u_char type, *handle, *data; struct sshbuf *msg; struct stat sb; Attrib a, t, *c = NULL; u_int32_t startid, ackid; u_int64_t highwater = 0; struct request *ack = NULL; struct requests acks; size_t handle_len; debug2_f("upload local \"%s\" to remote \"%s\"", local_path, remote_path); TAILQ_INIT(&acks); if ((local_fd = open(local_path, O_RDONLY)) == -1) { error("open local \"%s\": %s", local_path, strerror(errno)); return(-1); } if (fstat(local_fd, &sb) == -1) { error("fstat local \"%s\": %s", local_path, strerror(errno)); close(local_fd); return(-1); } if (!S_ISREG(sb.st_mode)) { error("local \"%s\" is not a regular file", local_path); close(local_fd); return(-1); } stat_to_attrib(&sb, &a); a.flags &= ~SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_SIZE; a.flags &= ~SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_UIDGID; a.perm &= 0777; if (!preserve_flag) a.flags &= ~SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_ACMODTIME; if (resume) { /* Get remote file size if it exists */ if ((c = do_stat(conn, remote_path, 0)) == NULL) { close(local_fd); return -1; } if ((off_t)c->size >= sb.st_size) { error("resume \"%s\": destination file " "same size or larger", local_path); close(local_fd); return -1; } if (lseek(local_fd, (off_t)c->size, SEEK_SET) == -1) { close(local_fd); return -1; } } openmode = SSH2_FXF_WRITE|SSH2_FXF_CREAT; if (resume) openmode |= SSH2_FXF_APPEND; else if (!inplace_flag) openmode |= SSH2_FXF_TRUNC; /* Send open request */ if (send_open(conn, remote_path, "dest", openmode, &a, &handle, &handle_len) != 0) { close(local_fd); return -1; } id = conn->msg_id; startid = ackid = id + 1; data = xmalloc(conn->upload_buflen); /* Read from local and write to remote */ offset = progress_counter = (resume ? c->size : 0); if (showprogress) { start_progress_meter(progress_meter_path(local_path), sb.st_size, &progress_counter); } if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed"); for (;;) { int len; /* * Can't use atomicio here because it returns 0 on EOF, * thus losing the last block of the file. * Simulate an EOF on interrupt, allowing ACKs from the * server to drain. */ if (interrupted || status != SSH2_FX_OK) len = 0; else do len = read(local_fd, data, conn->upload_buflen); while ((len == -1) && (errno == EINTR || errno == EAGAIN || errno == EWOULDBLOCK)); if (len == -1) { fatal("read local \"%s\": %s", local_path, strerror(errno)); } else if (len != 0) { ack = request_enqueue(&acks, ++id, len, offset); sshbuf_reset(msg); if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, SSH2_FXP_WRITE)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u32(msg, ack->id)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_string(msg, handle, handle_len)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u64(msg, offset)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_string(msg, data, len)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "compose"); send_msg(conn, msg); debug3("Sent message SSH2_FXP_WRITE I:%u O:%llu S:%u", id, (unsigned long long)offset, len); } else if (TAILQ_FIRST(&acks) == NULL) break; if (ack == NULL) fatal("Unexpected ACK %u", id); if (id == startid || len == 0 || id - ackid >= conn->num_requests) { u_int rid; sshbuf_reset(msg); get_msg(conn, msg); if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(msg, &type)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_u32(msg, &rid)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "parse"); if (type != SSH2_FXP_STATUS) fatal("Expected SSH2_FXP_STATUS(%d) packet, " "got %d", SSH2_FXP_STATUS, type); if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(msg, &status)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "parse status"); debug3("SSH2_FXP_STATUS %u", status); /* Find the request in our queue */ if ((ack = request_find(&acks, rid)) == NULL) fatal("Can't find request for ID %u", rid); TAILQ_REMOVE(&acks, ack, tq); debug3("In write loop, ack for %u %zu bytes at %lld", ack->id, ack->len, (unsigned long long)ack->offset); ++ackid; progress_counter += ack->len; if (!reordered && ack->offset <= highwater) highwater = ack->offset + ack->len; else if (!reordered && ack->offset > highwater) { debug3_f("server reordered ACKs"); reordered = 1; } free(ack); } offset += len; if (offset < 0) fatal_f("offset < 0"); } sshbuf_free(msg); if (showprogress) stop_progress_meter(); free(data); if (status != SSH2_FX_OK) { error("write remote \"%s\": %s", remote_path, fx2txt(status)); status = SSH2_FX_FAILURE; } if (inplace_flag || (resume && (status != SSH2_FX_OK || interrupted))) { debug("truncating at %llu", (unsigned long long)highwater); attrib_clear(&t); t.flags = SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_SIZE; t.size = highwater; do_fsetstat(conn, handle, handle_len, &t); } if (close(local_fd) == -1) { error("close local \"%s\": %s", local_path, strerror(errno)); status = SSH2_FX_FAILURE; } /* Override umask and utimes if asked */ if (preserve_flag) do_fsetstat(conn, handle, handle_len, &a); if (fsync_flag) (void)do_fsync(conn, handle, handle_len); if (do_close(conn, handle, handle_len) != 0) status = SSH2_FX_FAILURE; free(handle); return status == SSH2_FX_OK ? 0 : -1; } static int upload_dir_internal(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *src, const char *dst, int depth, int preserve_flag, int print_flag, int resume, int fsync_flag, int follow_link_flag, int inplace_flag) { int ret = 0; DIR *dirp; struct dirent *dp; char *filename, *new_src = NULL, *new_dst = NULL; struct stat sb; Attrib a, *dirattrib; u_int32_t saved_perm; debug2_f("upload local dir \"%s\" to remote \"%s\"", src, dst); if (depth >= MAX_DIR_DEPTH) { error("Maximum directory depth exceeded: %d levels", depth); return -1; } if (stat(src, &sb) == -1) { error("stat local \"%s\": %s", src, strerror(errno)); return -1; } if (!S_ISDIR(sb.st_mode)) { error("\"%s\" is not a directory", src); return -1; } if (print_flag && print_flag != SFTP_PROGRESS_ONLY) mprintf("Entering %s\n", src); stat_to_attrib(&sb, &a); a.flags &= ~SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_SIZE; a.flags &= ~SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_UIDGID; a.perm &= 01777; if (!preserve_flag) a.flags &= ~SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_ACMODTIME; /* * sftp lacks a portable status value to match errno EEXIST, * so if we get a failure back then we must check whether * the path already existed and is a directory. Ensure we can * write to the directory we create for the duration of the transfer. */ saved_perm = a.perm; a.perm |= (S_IWUSR|S_IXUSR); if (do_mkdir(conn, dst, &a, 0) != 0) { if ((dirattrib = do_stat(conn, dst, 0)) == NULL) return -1; if (!S_ISDIR(dirattrib->perm)) { error("\"%s\" exists but is not a directory", dst); return -1; } } a.perm = saved_perm; if ((dirp = opendir(src)) == NULL) { error("local opendir \"%s\": %s", src, strerror(errno)); return -1; } while (((dp = readdir(dirp)) != NULL) && !interrupted) { if (dp->d_ino == 0) continue; free(new_dst); free(new_src); filename = dp->d_name; new_dst = path_append(dst, filename); new_src = path_append(src, filename); if (lstat(new_src, &sb) == -1) { logit("local lstat \"%s\": %s", filename, strerror(errno)); ret = -1; } else if (S_ISDIR(sb.st_mode)) { if (strcmp(filename, ".") == 0 || strcmp(filename, "..") == 0) continue; if (upload_dir_internal(conn, new_src, new_dst, depth + 1, preserve_flag, print_flag, resume, fsync_flag, follow_link_flag, inplace_flag) == -1) ret = -1; } else if (S_ISREG(sb.st_mode) || (follow_link_flag && S_ISLNK(sb.st_mode))) { if (do_upload(conn, new_src, new_dst, preserve_flag, resume, fsync_flag, inplace_flag) == -1) { error("upload \"%s\" to \"%s\" failed", new_src, new_dst); ret = -1; } } else logit("%s: not a regular file", filename); } free(new_dst); free(new_src); do_setstat(conn, dst, &a); (void) closedir(dirp); return ret; } int upload_dir(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *src, const char *dst, int preserve_flag, int print_flag, int resume, int fsync_flag, int follow_link_flag, int inplace_flag) { char *dst_canon; int ret; if ((dst_canon = do_realpath(conn, dst)) == NULL) { error("upload \"%s\": path canonicalization failed", dst); return -1; } ret = upload_dir_internal(conn, src, dst_canon, 0, preserve_flag, print_flag, resume, fsync_flag, follow_link_flag, inplace_flag); free(dst_canon); return ret; } static void handle_dest_replies(struct sftp_conn *to, const char *to_path, int synchronous, u_int *nreqsp, u_int *write_errorp) { struct sshbuf *msg; u_char type; u_int id, status; int r; struct pollfd pfd; if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed"); /* Try to eat replies from the upload side */ while (*nreqsp > 0) { debug3_f("%u outstanding replies", *nreqsp); if (!synchronous) { /* Bail out if no data is ready to be read */ pfd.fd = to->fd_in; pfd.events = POLLIN; if ((r = poll(&pfd, 1, 0)) == -1) { if (errno == EINTR) break; fatal_f("poll: %s", strerror(errno)); } else if (r == 0) break; /* fd not ready */ } sshbuf_reset(msg); get_msg(to, msg); if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(msg, &type)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_u32(msg, &id)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "dest parse"); debug3("Received dest reply T:%u I:%u R:%u", type, id, *nreqsp); if (type != SSH2_FXP_STATUS) { fatal_f("Expected SSH2_FXP_STATUS(%d) packet, got %d", SSH2_FXP_STATUS, type); } if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(msg, &status)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "parse dest status"); debug3("dest SSH2_FXP_STATUS %u", status); if (status != SSH2_FX_OK) { /* record first error */ if (*write_errorp == 0) *write_errorp = status; } /* * XXX this doesn't do full reply matching like do_upload and * so cannot gracefully truncate terminated uploads at a * high-water mark. ATM the only caller of this function (scp) * doesn't support transfer resumption, so this doesn't matter * a whole lot. * * To be safe, do_crossload truncates the destination file to * zero length on upload failure, since we can't trust the * server not to have reordered replies that could have * inserted holes where none existed in the source file. * * XXX we could get a more accutate progress bar if we updated * the counter based on the reply from the destination... */ (*nreqsp)--; } debug3_f("done: %u outstanding replies", *nreqsp); sshbuf_free(msg); } int do_crossload(struct sftp_conn *from, struct sftp_conn *to, const char *from_path, const char *to_path, Attrib *a, int preserve_flag) { struct sshbuf *msg; int write_error, read_error, r; u_int64_t offset = 0, size; u_int id, buflen, num_req, max_req, status = SSH2_FX_OK; u_int num_upload_req; off_t progress_counter; u_char *from_handle, *to_handle; size_t from_handle_len, to_handle_len; struct requests requests; struct request *req; u_char type; debug2_f("crossload src \"%s\" to dst \"%s\"", from_path, to_path); TAILQ_INIT(&requests); if (a == NULL && (a = do_stat(from, from_path, 0)) == NULL) return -1; if ((a->flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_PERMISSIONS) && (!S_ISREG(a->perm))) { error("download \"%s\": not a regular file", from_path); return(-1); } if (a->flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_SIZE) size = a->size; else size = 0; buflen = from->download_buflen; if (buflen > to->upload_buflen) buflen = to->upload_buflen; /* Send open request to read side */ if (send_open(from, from_path, "origin", SSH2_FXF_READ, NULL, &from_handle, &from_handle_len) != 0) return -1; /* Send open request to write side */ a->flags &= ~SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_SIZE; a->flags &= ~SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_UIDGID; a->perm &= 0777; if (!preserve_flag) a->flags &= ~SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_ACMODTIME; if (send_open(to, to_path, "dest", SSH2_FXF_WRITE|SSH2_FXF_CREAT|SSH2_FXF_TRUNC, a, &to_handle, &to_handle_len) != 0) { do_close(from, from_handle, from_handle_len); return -1; } /* Read from remote "from" and write to remote "to" */ offset = 0; write_error = read_error = num_req = num_upload_req = 0; max_req = 1; progress_counter = 0; if (showprogress && size != 0) { start_progress_meter(progress_meter_path(from_path), size, &progress_counter); } if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed"); while (num_req > 0 || max_req > 0) { u_char *data; size_t len; /* * Simulate EOF on interrupt: stop sending new requests and * allow outstanding requests to drain gracefully */ if (interrupted) { if (num_req == 0) /* If we haven't started yet... */ break; max_req = 0; } /* Send some more requests */ while (num_req < max_req) { debug3("Request range %llu -> %llu (%d/%d)", (unsigned long long)offset, (unsigned long long)offset + buflen - 1, num_req, max_req); req = request_enqueue(&requests, from->msg_id++, buflen, offset); offset += buflen; num_req++; send_read_request(from, req->id, req->offset, req->len, from_handle, from_handle_len); } /* Try to eat replies from the upload side (nonblocking) */ handle_dest_replies(to, to_path, 0, &num_upload_req, &write_error); sshbuf_reset(msg); get_msg(from, msg); if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(msg, &type)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_u32(msg, &id)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "parse"); debug3("Received origin reply T:%u I:%u R:%d", type, id, max_req); /* Find the request in our queue */ if ((req = request_find(&requests, id)) == NULL) fatal("Unexpected reply %u", id); switch (type) { case SSH2_FXP_STATUS: if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(msg, &status)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "parse status"); if (status != SSH2_FX_EOF) read_error = 1; max_req = 0; TAILQ_REMOVE(&requests, req, tq); free(req); num_req--; break; case SSH2_FXP_DATA: if ((r = sshbuf_get_string(msg, &data, &len)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "parse data"); debug3("Received data %llu -> %llu", (unsigned long long)req->offset, (unsigned long long)req->offset + len - 1); if (len > req->len) fatal("Received more data than asked for " "%zu > %zu", len, req->len); /* Write this chunk out to the destination */ sshbuf_reset(msg); if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, SSH2_FXP_WRITE)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u32(msg, to->msg_id++)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_string(msg, to_handle, to_handle_len)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u64(msg, req->offset)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_string(msg, data, len)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "compose write"); send_msg(to, msg); debug3("Sent message SSH2_FXP_WRITE I:%u O:%llu S:%zu", id, (unsigned long long)offset, len); num_upload_req++; progress_counter += len; free(data); if (len == req->len) { TAILQ_REMOVE(&requests, req, tq); free(req); num_req--; } else { /* Resend the request for the missing data */ debug3("Short data block, re-requesting " "%llu -> %llu (%2d)", (unsigned long long)req->offset + len, (unsigned long long)req->offset + req->len - 1, num_req); req->id = from->msg_id++; req->len -= len; req->offset += len; send_read_request(from, req->id, req->offset, req->len, from_handle, from_handle_len); /* Reduce the request size */ if (len < buflen) buflen = MAXIMUM(MIN_READ_SIZE, len); } if (max_req > 0) { /* max_req = 0 iff EOF received */ if (size > 0 && offset > size) { /* Only one request at a time * after the expected EOF */ debug3("Finish at %llu (%2d)", (unsigned long long)offset, num_req); max_req = 1; } else if (max_req < from->num_requests) { ++max_req; } } break; default: fatal("Expected SSH2_FXP_DATA(%u) packet, got %u", SSH2_FXP_DATA, type); } } if (showprogress && size) stop_progress_meter(); /* Drain replies from the server (blocking) */ debug3_f("waiting for %u replies from destination", num_upload_req); handle_dest_replies(to, to_path, 1, &num_upload_req, &write_error); /* Sanity check */ if (TAILQ_FIRST(&requests) != NULL) fatal("Transfer complete, but requests still in queue"); /* Truncate at 0 length on interrupt or error to avoid holes at dest */ if (read_error || write_error || interrupted) { debug("truncating \"%s\" at 0", to_path); do_close(to, to_handle, to_handle_len); free(to_handle); if (send_open(to, to_path, "dest", SSH2_FXF_WRITE|SSH2_FXF_CREAT|SSH2_FXF_TRUNC, a, &to_handle, &to_handle_len) != 0) { error("dest truncate \"%s\" failed", to_path); to_handle = NULL; } } if (read_error) { error("read origin \"%s\": %s", from_path, fx2txt(status)); status = -1; do_close(from, from_handle, from_handle_len); if (to_handle != NULL) do_close(to, to_handle, to_handle_len); } else if (write_error) { error("write dest \"%s\": %s", to_path, fx2txt(write_error)); status = SSH2_FX_FAILURE; do_close(from, from_handle, from_handle_len); if (to_handle != NULL) do_close(to, to_handle, to_handle_len); } else { if (do_close(from, from_handle, from_handle_len) != 0 || interrupted) status = -1; else status = SSH2_FX_OK; if (to_handle != NULL) { /* Need to resend utimes after write */ if (preserve_flag) do_fsetstat(to, to_handle, to_handle_len, a); do_close(to, to_handle, to_handle_len); } } sshbuf_free(msg); free(from_handle); free(to_handle); return status == SSH2_FX_OK ? 0 : -1; } static int crossload_dir_internal(struct sftp_conn *from, struct sftp_conn *to, const char *from_path, const char *to_path, int depth, Attrib *dirattrib, int preserve_flag, int print_flag, int follow_link_flag) { int i, ret = 0; SFTP_DIRENT **dir_entries; char *filename, *new_from_path = NULL, *new_to_path = NULL; mode_t mode = 0777; Attrib curdir; debug2_f("crossload dir src \"%s\" to dst \"%s\"", from_path, to_path); if (depth >= MAX_DIR_DEPTH) { error("Maximum directory depth exceeded: %d levels", depth); return -1; } if (dirattrib == NULL && (dirattrib = do_stat(from, from_path, 1)) == NULL) { error("stat remote \"%s\" failed", from_path); return -1; } if (!S_ISDIR(dirattrib->perm)) { error("\"%s\" is not a directory", from_path); return -1; } if (print_flag && print_flag != SFTP_PROGRESS_ONLY) mprintf("Retrieving %s\n", from_path); curdir = *dirattrib; /* dirattrib will be clobbered */ curdir.flags &= ~SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_SIZE; curdir.flags &= ~SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_UIDGID; if ((curdir.flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_PERMISSIONS) == 0) { debug("Origin did not send permissions for " "directory \"%s\"", to_path); curdir.perm = S_IWUSR|S_IXUSR; curdir.flags |= SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_PERMISSIONS; } /* We need to be able to write to the directory while we transfer it */ mode = curdir.perm & 01777; curdir.perm = mode | (S_IWUSR|S_IXUSR); /* * sftp lacks a portable status value to match errno EEXIST, * so if we get a failure back then we must check whether * the path already existed and is a directory. Ensure we can * write to the directory we create for the duration of the transfer. */ if (do_mkdir(to, to_path, &curdir, 0) != 0) { if ((dirattrib = do_stat(to, to_path, 0)) == NULL) return -1; if (!S_ISDIR(dirattrib->perm)) { error("\"%s\" exists but is not a directory", to_path); return -1; } } curdir.perm = mode; if (do_readdir(from, from_path, &dir_entries) == -1) { error("origin readdir \"%s\" failed", from_path); return -1; } for (i = 0; dir_entries[i] != NULL && !interrupted; i++) { free(new_from_path); free(new_to_path); filename = dir_entries[i]->filename; new_from_path = path_append(from_path, filename); new_to_path = path_append(to_path, filename); if (S_ISDIR(dir_entries[i]->a.perm)) { if (strcmp(filename, ".") == 0 || strcmp(filename, "..") == 0) continue; if (crossload_dir_internal(from, to, new_from_path, new_to_path, depth + 1, &(dir_entries[i]->a), preserve_flag, print_flag, follow_link_flag) == -1) ret = -1; } else if (S_ISREG(dir_entries[i]->a.perm) || (follow_link_flag && S_ISLNK(dir_entries[i]->a.perm))) { /* * If this is a symlink then don't send the link's * Attrib. do_download() will do a FXP_STAT operation * and get the link target's attributes. */ if (do_crossload(from, to, new_from_path, new_to_path, S_ISLNK(dir_entries[i]->a.perm) ? NULL : &(dir_entries[i]->a), preserve_flag) == -1) { error("crossload \"%s\" to \"%s\" failed", new_from_path, new_to_path); ret = -1; } } else { logit("origin \"%s\": not a regular file", new_from_path); } } free(new_to_path); free(new_from_path); do_setstat(to, to_path, &curdir); free_sftp_dirents(dir_entries); return ret; } int crossload_dir(struct sftp_conn *from, struct sftp_conn *to, const char *from_path, const char *to_path, Attrib *dirattrib, int preserve_flag, int print_flag, int follow_link_flag) { char *from_path_canon; int ret; if ((from_path_canon = do_realpath(from, from_path)) == NULL) { error("crossload \"%s\": path canonicalization failed", from_path); return -1; } ret = crossload_dir_internal(from, to, from_path_canon, to_path, 0, dirattrib, preserve_flag, print_flag, follow_link_flag); free(from_path_canon); return ret; } int can_get_users_groups_by_id(struct sftp_conn *conn) { return (conn->exts & SFTP_EXT_GETUSERSGROUPS_BY_ID) != 0; } int do_get_users_groups_by_id(struct sftp_conn *conn, const u_int *uids, u_int nuids, const u_int *gids, u_int ngids, char ***usernamesp, char ***groupnamesp) { struct sshbuf *msg, *uidbuf, *gidbuf; u_int i, expected_id, id; char *name, **usernames = NULL, **groupnames = NULL; u_char type; int r; *usernamesp = *groupnamesp = NULL; if (!can_get_users_groups_by_id(conn)) return SSH_ERR_FEATURE_UNSUPPORTED; if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL || (uidbuf = sshbuf_new()) == NULL || (gidbuf = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed"); expected_id = id = conn->msg_id++; debug2("Sending SSH2_FXP_EXTENDED(users-groups-by-id@openssh.com)"); for (i = 0; i < nuids; i++) { if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(uidbuf, uids[i])) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "compose uids"); } for (i = 0; i < ngids; i++) { if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(gidbuf, gids[i])) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "compose gids"); } if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, SSH2_FXP_EXTENDED)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u32(msg, id)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(msg, "users-groups-by-id@openssh.com")) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_stringb(msg, uidbuf)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_stringb(msg, gidbuf)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "compose"); send_msg(conn, msg); get_msg(conn, msg); if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(msg, &type)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_u32(msg, &id)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "parse"); if (id != expected_id) fatal("ID mismatch (%u != %u)", id, expected_id); if (type == SSH2_FXP_STATUS) { u_int status; char *errmsg; if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(msg, &status)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(msg, &errmsg, NULL)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "parse status"); error("users-groups-by-id %s", *errmsg == '\0' ? fx2txt(status) : errmsg); free(errmsg); sshbuf_free(msg); sshbuf_free(uidbuf); sshbuf_free(gidbuf); return -1; } else if (type != SSH2_FXP_EXTENDED_REPLY) fatal("Expected SSH2_FXP_EXTENDED_REPLY(%u) packet, got %u", SSH2_FXP_EXTENDED_REPLY, type); /* reuse */ sshbuf_free(uidbuf); sshbuf_free(gidbuf); uidbuf = gidbuf = NULL; if ((r = sshbuf_froms(msg, &uidbuf)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_froms(msg, &gidbuf)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "parse response"); if (nuids > 0) { usernames = xcalloc(nuids, sizeof(*usernames)); for (i = 0; i < nuids; i++) { if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(uidbuf, &name, NULL)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "parse user name"); /* Handle unresolved names */ if (*name == '\0') { free(name); name = NULL; } usernames[i] = name; } } if (ngids > 0) { groupnames = xcalloc(ngids, sizeof(*groupnames)); for (i = 0; i < ngids; i++) { if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(gidbuf, &name, NULL)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "parse user name"); /* Handle unresolved names */ if (*name == '\0') { free(name); name = NULL; } groupnames[i] = name; } } if (sshbuf_len(uidbuf) != 0) fatal_f("unexpected extra username data"); if (sshbuf_len(gidbuf) != 0) fatal_f("unexpected extra groupname data"); sshbuf_free(uidbuf); sshbuf_free(gidbuf); sshbuf_free(msg); /* success */ *usernamesp = usernames; *groupnamesp = groupnames; return 0; } char * path_append(const char *p1, const char *p2) { char *ret; size_t len = strlen(p1) + strlen(p2) + 2; ret = xmalloc(len); strlcpy(ret, p1, len); if (p1[0] != '\0' && p1[strlen(p1) - 1] != '/') strlcat(ret, "/", len); strlcat(ret, p2, len); return(ret); } char * make_absolute(char *p, const char *pwd) { char *abs_str; /* Derelativise */ if (p && !path_absolute(p)) { abs_str = path_append(pwd, p); free(p); return(abs_str); } else return(p); } int remote_is_dir(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *path) { Attrib *a; /* XXX: report errors? */ if ((a = do_stat(conn, path, 1)) == NULL) return(0); if (!(a->flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_PERMISSIONS)) return(0); return(S_ISDIR(a->perm)); } int local_is_dir(const char *path) { struct stat sb; /* XXX: report errors? */ if (stat(path, &sb) == -1) return(0); return(S_ISDIR(sb.st_mode)); } /* Check whether path returned from glob(..., GLOB_MARK, ...) is a directory */ int globpath_is_dir(const char *pathname) { size_t l = strlen(pathname); return l > 0 && pathname[l - 1] == '/'; } diff --git a/crypto/openssh/sftp-server.c b/crypto/openssh/sftp-server.c index fe61a35159b3..49ca1ca9f700 100644 --- a/crypto/openssh/sftp-server.c +++ b/crypto/openssh/sftp-server.c @@ -1,2108 +1,2108 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: sftp-server.c,v 1.145 2022/11/09 09:04:12 dtucker Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: sftp-server.c,v 1.146 2023/03/07 05:37:26 djm Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2000-2004 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. * * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. * * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. */ #include "includes.h" #include #include #include #ifdef HAVE_SYS_TIME_H # include #endif #ifdef HAVE_SYS_MOUNT_H #include #endif #ifdef HAVE_SYS_STATVFS_H #include #endif #include #include #include #ifdef HAVE_POLL_H #include #endif #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include "atomicio.h" #include "xmalloc.h" #include "sshbuf.h" #include "ssherr.h" #include "log.h" #include "misc.h" #include "match.h" #include "uidswap.h" #include "sftp.h" #include "sftp-common.h" char *sftp_realpath(const char *, char *); /* sftp-realpath.c */ /* Maximum data read that we are willing to accept */ #define SFTP_MAX_READ_LENGTH (SFTP_MAX_MSG_LENGTH - 1024) /* Our verbosity */ static LogLevel log_level = SYSLOG_LEVEL_ERROR; /* Our client */ static struct passwd *pw = NULL; static char *client_addr = NULL; /* input and output queue */ struct sshbuf *iqueue; struct sshbuf *oqueue; /* Version of client */ static u_int version; /* SSH2_FXP_INIT received */ static int init_done; /* Disable writes */ static int readonly; /* Requests that are allowed/denied */ static char *request_allowlist, *request_denylist; /* portable attributes, etc. */ typedef struct Stat Stat; struct Stat { char *name; char *long_name; Attrib attrib; }; /* Packet handlers */ static void process_open(u_int32_t id); static void process_close(u_int32_t id); static void process_read(u_int32_t id); static void process_write(u_int32_t id); static void process_stat(u_int32_t id); static void process_lstat(u_int32_t id); static void process_fstat(u_int32_t id); static void process_setstat(u_int32_t id); static void process_fsetstat(u_int32_t id); static void process_opendir(u_int32_t id); static void process_readdir(u_int32_t id); static void process_remove(u_int32_t id); static void process_mkdir(u_int32_t id); static void process_rmdir(u_int32_t id); static void process_realpath(u_int32_t id); static void process_rename(u_int32_t id); static void process_readlink(u_int32_t id); static void process_symlink(u_int32_t id); static void process_extended_posix_rename(u_int32_t id); static void process_extended_statvfs(u_int32_t id); static void process_extended_fstatvfs(u_int32_t id); static void process_extended_hardlink(u_int32_t id); static void process_extended_fsync(u_int32_t id); static void process_extended_lsetstat(u_int32_t id); static void process_extended_limits(u_int32_t id); static void process_extended_expand(u_int32_t id); static void process_extended_copy_data(u_int32_t id); static void process_extended_home_directory(u_int32_t id); static void process_extended_get_users_groups_by_id(u_int32_t id); static void process_extended(u_int32_t id); struct sftp_handler { const char *name; /* user-visible name for fine-grained perms */ const char *ext_name; /* extended request name */ u_int type; /* packet type, for non extended packets */ void (*handler)(u_int32_t); int does_write; /* if nonzero, banned for readonly mode */ }; static const struct sftp_handler handlers[] = { /* NB. SSH2_FXP_OPEN does the readonly check in the handler itself */ { "open", NULL, SSH2_FXP_OPEN, process_open, 0 }, { "close", NULL, SSH2_FXP_CLOSE, process_close, 0 }, { "read", NULL, SSH2_FXP_READ, process_read, 0 }, { "write", NULL, SSH2_FXP_WRITE, process_write, 1 }, { "lstat", NULL, SSH2_FXP_LSTAT, process_lstat, 0 }, { "fstat", NULL, SSH2_FXP_FSTAT, process_fstat, 0 }, { "setstat", NULL, SSH2_FXP_SETSTAT, process_setstat, 1 }, { "fsetstat", NULL, SSH2_FXP_FSETSTAT, process_fsetstat, 1 }, { "opendir", NULL, SSH2_FXP_OPENDIR, process_opendir, 0 }, { "readdir", NULL, SSH2_FXP_READDIR, process_readdir, 0 }, { "remove", NULL, SSH2_FXP_REMOVE, process_remove, 1 }, { "mkdir", NULL, SSH2_FXP_MKDIR, process_mkdir, 1 }, { "rmdir", NULL, SSH2_FXP_RMDIR, process_rmdir, 1 }, { "realpath", NULL, SSH2_FXP_REALPATH, process_realpath, 0 }, { "stat", NULL, SSH2_FXP_STAT, process_stat, 0 }, { "rename", NULL, SSH2_FXP_RENAME, process_rename, 1 }, { "readlink", NULL, SSH2_FXP_READLINK, process_readlink, 0 }, { "symlink", NULL, SSH2_FXP_SYMLINK, process_symlink, 1 }, { NULL, NULL, 0, NULL, 0 } }; /* SSH2_FXP_EXTENDED submessages */ static const struct sftp_handler extended_handlers[] = { { "posix-rename", "posix-rename@openssh.com", 0, process_extended_posix_rename, 1 }, { "statvfs", "statvfs@openssh.com", 0, process_extended_statvfs, 0 }, { "fstatvfs", "fstatvfs@openssh.com", 0, process_extended_fstatvfs, 0 }, { "hardlink", "hardlink@openssh.com", 0, process_extended_hardlink, 1 }, { "fsync", "fsync@openssh.com", 0, process_extended_fsync, 1 }, { "lsetstat", "lsetstat@openssh.com", 0, process_extended_lsetstat, 1 }, { "limits", "limits@openssh.com", 0, process_extended_limits, 0 }, { "expand-path", "expand-path@openssh.com", 0, process_extended_expand, 0 }, { "copy-data", "copy-data", 0, process_extended_copy_data, 1 }, { "home-directory", "home-directory", 0, process_extended_home_directory, 0 }, { "users-groups-by-id", "users-groups-by-id@openssh.com", 0, process_extended_get_users_groups_by_id, 0 }, { NULL, NULL, 0, NULL, 0 } }; static const struct sftp_handler * extended_handler_byname(const char *name) { int i; for (i = 0; extended_handlers[i].handler != NULL; i++) { if (strcmp(name, extended_handlers[i].ext_name) == 0) return &extended_handlers[i]; } return NULL; } static int request_permitted(const struct sftp_handler *h) { char *result; if (readonly && h->does_write) { verbose("Refusing %s request in read-only mode", h->name); return 0; } if (request_denylist != NULL && ((result = match_list(h->name, request_denylist, NULL))) != NULL) { free(result); verbose("Refusing denylisted %s request", h->name); return 0; } if (request_allowlist != NULL && ((result = match_list(h->name, request_allowlist, NULL))) != NULL) { free(result); debug2("Permitting allowlisted %s request", h->name); return 1; } if (request_allowlist != NULL) { verbose("Refusing non-allowlisted %s request", h->name); return 0; } return 1; } static int errno_to_portable(int unixerrno) { int ret = 0; switch (unixerrno) { case 0: ret = SSH2_FX_OK; break; case ENOENT: case ENOTDIR: case EBADF: case ELOOP: ret = SSH2_FX_NO_SUCH_FILE; break; case EPERM: case EACCES: case EFAULT: ret = SSH2_FX_PERMISSION_DENIED; break; case ENAMETOOLONG: case EINVAL: ret = SSH2_FX_BAD_MESSAGE; break; case ENOSYS: ret = SSH2_FX_OP_UNSUPPORTED; break; default: ret = SSH2_FX_FAILURE; break; } return ret; } static int flags_from_portable(int pflags) { int flags = 0; if ((pflags & SSH2_FXF_READ) && (pflags & SSH2_FXF_WRITE)) { flags = O_RDWR; } else if (pflags & SSH2_FXF_READ) { flags = O_RDONLY; } else if (pflags & SSH2_FXF_WRITE) { flags = O_WRONLY; } if (pflags & SSH2_FXF_APPEND) flags |= O_APPEND; if (pflags & SSH2_FXF_CREAT) flags |= O_CREAT; if (pflags & SSH2_FXF_TRUNC) flags |= O_TRUNC; if (pflags & SSH2_FXF_EXCL) flags |= O_EXCL; return flags; } static const char * string_from_portable(int pflags) { static char ret[128]; *ret = '\0'; #define PAPPEND(str) { \ if (*ret != '\0') \ strlcat(ret, ",", sizeof(ret)); \ strlcat(ret, str, sizeof(ret)); \ } if (pflags & SSH2_FXF_READ) PAPPEND("READ") if (pflags & SSH2_FXF_WRITE) PAPPEND("WRITE") if (pflags & SSH2_FXF_APPEND) PAPPEND("APPEND") if (pflags & SSH2_FXF_CREAT) PAPPEND("CREATE") if (pflags & SSH2_FXF_TRUNC) PAPPEND("TRUNCATE") if (pflags & SSH2_FXF_EXCL) PAPPEND("EXCL") return ret; } /* handle handles */ typedef struct Handle Handle; struct Handle { int use; DIR *dirp; int fd; int flags; char *name; u_int64_t bytes_read, bytes_write; int next_unused; }; enum { HANDLE_UNUSED, HANDLE_DIR, HANDLE_FILE }; static Handle *handles = NULL; static u_int num_handles = 0; static int first_unused_handle = -1; static void handle_unused(int i) { handles[i].use = HANDLE_UNUSED; handles[i].next_unused = first_unused_handle; first_unused_handle = i; } static int handle_new(int use, const char *name, int fd, int flags, DIR *dirp) { int i; if (first_unused_handle == -1) { if (num_handles + 1 <= num_handles) return -1; num_handles++; handles = xreallocarray(handles, num_handles, sizeof(Handle)); handle_unused(num_handles - 1); } i = first_unused_handle; first_unused_handle = handles[i].next_unused; handles[i].use = use; handles[i].dirp = dirp; handles[i].fd = fd; handles[i].flags = flags; handles[i].name = xstrdup(name); handles[i].bytes_read = handles[i].bytes_write = 0; return i; } static int handle_is_ok(int i, int type) { return i >= 0 && (u_int)i < num_handles && handles[i].use == type; } static int handle_to_string(int handle, u_char **stringp, int *hlenp) { if (stringp == NULL || hlenp == NULL) return -1; *stringp = xmalloc(sizeof(int32_t)); put_u32(*stringp, handle); *hlenp = sizeof(int32_t); return 0; } static int handle_from_string(const u_char *handle, u_int hlen) { int val; if (hlen != sizeof(int32_t)) return -1; val = get_u32(handle); if (handle_is_ok(val, HANDLE_FILE) || handle_is_ok(val, HANDLE_DIR)) return val; return -1; } static char * handle_to_name(int handle) { if (handle_is_ok(handle, HANDLE_DIR)|| handle_is_ok(handle, HANDLE_FILE)) return handles[handle].name; return NULL; } static DIR * handle_to_dir(int handle) { if (handle_is_ok(handle, HANDLE_DIR)) return handles[handle].dirp; return NULL; } static int handle_to_fd(int handle) { if (handle_is_ok(handle, HANDLE_FILE)) return handles[handle].fd; return -1; } static int handle_to_flags(int handle) { if (handle_is_ok(handle, HANDLE_FILE)) return handles[handle].flags; return 0; } static void handle_update_read(int handle, ssize_t bytes) { if (handle_is_ok(handle, HANDLE_FILE) && bytes > 0) handles[handle].bytes_read += bytes; } static void handle_update_write(int handle, ssize_t bytes) { if (handle_is_ok(handle, HANDLE_FILE) && bytes > 0) handles[handle].bytes_write += bytes; } static u_int64_t handle_bytes_read(int handle) { if (handle_is_ok(handle, HANDLE_FILE)) return (handles[handle].bytes_read); return 0; } static u_int64_t handle_bytes_write(int handle) { if (handle_is_ok(handle, HANDLE_FILE)) return (handles[handle].bytes_write); return 0; } static int handle_close(int handle) { int ret = -1; if (handle_is_ok(handle, HANDLE_FILE)) { ret = close(handles[handle].fd); free(handles[handle].name); handle_unused(handle); } else if (handle_is_ok(handle, HANDLE_DIR)) { ret = closedir(handles[handle].dirp); free(handles[handle].name); handle_unused(handle); } else { errno = ENOENT; } return ret; } static void handle_log_close(int handle, char *emsg) { if (handle_is_ok(handle, HANDLE_FILE)) { logit("%s%sclose \"%s\" bytes read %llu written %llu", emsg == NULL ? "" : emsg, emsg == NULL ? "" : " ", handle_to_name(handle), (unsigned long long)handle_bytes_read(handle), (unsigned long long)handle_bytes_write(handle)); } else { logit("%s%sclosedir \"%s\"", emsg == NULL ? "" : emsg, emsg == NULL ? "" : " ", handle_to_name(handle)); } } static void handle_log_exit(void) { u_int i; for (i = 0; i < num_handles; i++) if (handles[i].use != HANDLE_UNUSED) handle_log_close(i, "forced"); } static int get_handle(struct sshbuf *queue, int *hp) { u_char *handle; int r; size_t hlen; *hp = -1; if ((r = sshbuf_get_string(queue, &handle, &hlen)) != 0) return r; if (hlen < 256) *hp = handle_from_string(handle, hlen); free(handle); return 0; } /* send replies */ static void send_msg(struct sshbuf *m) { int r; if ((r = sshbuf_put_stringb(oqueue, m)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "enqueue"); sshbuf_reset(m); } static const char * status_to_message(u_int32_t status) { static const char * const status_messages[] = { "Success", /* SSH_FX_OK */ "End of file", /* SSH_FX_EOF */ "No such file", /* SSH_FX_NO_SUCH_FILE */ "Permission denied", /* SSH_FX_PERMISSION_DENIED */ "Failure", /* SSH_FX_FAILURE */ "Bad message", /* SSH_FX_BAD_MESSAGE */ "No connection", /* SSH_FX_NO_CONNECTION */ "Connection lost", /* SSH_FX_CONNECTION_LOST */ "Operation unsupported", /* SSH_FX_OP_UNSUPPORTED */ "Unknown error" /* Others */ }; return (status_messages[MINIMUM(status,SSH2_FX_MAX)]); } static void send_status_errmsg(u_int32_t id, u_int32_t status, const char *errmsg) { struct sshbuf *msg; int r; debug3("request %u: sent status %u", id, status); if (log_level > SYSLOG_LEVEL_VERBOSE || (status != SSH2_FX_OK && status != SSH2_FX_EOF)) logit("sent status %s", status_to_message(status)); if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed"); if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, SSH2_FXP_STATUS)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u32(msg, id)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u32(msg, status)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "compose"); if (version >= 3) { if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(msg, errmsg == NULL ? status_to_message(status) : errmsg)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(msg, "")) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "compose message"); } send_msg(msg); sshbuf_free(msg); } static void send_status(u_int32_t id, u_int32_t status) { send_status_errmsg(id, status, NULL); } static void send_data_or_handle(char type, u_int32_t id, const u_char *data, int dlen) { struct sshbuf *msg; int r; if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed"); if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, type)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u32(msg, id)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_string(msg, data, dlen)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "compose"); send_msg(msg); sshbuf_free(msg); } static void send_data(u_int32_t id, const u_char *data, int dlen) { debug("request %u: sent data len %d", id, dlen); send_data_or_handle(SSH2_FXP_DATA, id, data, dlen); } static void send_handle(u_int32_t id, int handle) { u_char *string; int hlen; handle_to_string(handle, &string, &hlen); debug("request %u: sent handle handle %d", id, handle); send_data_or_handle(SSH2_FXP_HANDLE, id, string, hlen); free(string); } static void send_names(u_int32_t id, int count, const Stat *stats) { struct sshbuf *msg; int i, r; if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed"); if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, SSH2_FXP_NAME)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u32(msg, id)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u32(msg, count)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "compose"); debug("request %u: sent names count %d", id, count); for (i = 0; i < count; i++) { if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(msg, stats[i].name)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(msg, stats[i].long_name)) != 0 || (r = encode_attrib(msg, &stats[i].attrib)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "compose filenames/attrib"); } send_msg(msg); sshbuf_free(msg); } static void send_attrib(u_int32_t id, const Attrib *a) { struct sshbuf *msg; int r; debug("request %u: sent attrib have 0x%x", id, a->flags); if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed"); if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, SSH2_FXP_ATTRS)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u32(msg, id)) != 0 || (r = encode_attrib(msg, a)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "compose"); send_msg(msg); sshbuf_free(msg); } static void send_statvfs(u_int32_t id, struct statvfs *st) { struct sshbuf *msg; u_int64_t flag; int r; flag = (st->f_flag & ST_RDONLY) ? SSH2_FXE_STATVFS_ST_RDONLY : 0; flag |= (st->f_flag & ST_NOSUID) ? SSH2_FXE_STATVFS_ST_NOSUID : 0; if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed"); if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, SSH2_FXP_EXTENDED_REPLY)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u32(msg, id)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u64(msg, st->f_bsize)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u64(msg, st->f_frsize)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u64(msg, st->f_blocks)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u64(msg, st->f_bfree)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u64(msg, st->f_bavail)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u64(msg, st->f_files)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u64(msg, st->f_ffree)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u64(msg, st->f_favail)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u64(msg, FSID_TO_ULONG(st->f_fsid))) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u64(msg, flag)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u64(msg, st->f_namemax)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "compose"); send_msg(msg); sshbuf_free(msg); } /* * Prepare SSH2_FXP_VERSION extension advertisement for a single extension. * The extension is checked for permission prior to advertisement. */ static int compose_extension(struct sshbuf *msg, const char *name, const char *ver) { int r; const struct sftp_handler *exthnd; if ((exthnd = extended_handler_byname(name)) == NULL) fatal_f("internal error: no handler for %s", name); if (!request_permitted(exthnd)) { debug2_f("refusing to advertise disallowed extension %s", name); return 0; } if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(msg, name)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(msg, ver)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "compose %s", name); return 0; } /* parse incoming */ static void process_init(void) { struct sshbuf *msg; int r; if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(iqueue, &version)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "parse"); verbose("received client version %u", version); if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed"); if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, SSH2_FXP_VERSION)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u32(msg, SSH2_FILEXFER_VERSION)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "compose"); /* extension advertisements */ compose_extension(msg, "posix-rename@openssh.com", "1"); compose_extension(msg, "statvfs@openssh.com", "2"); compose_extension(msg, "fstatvfs@openssh.com", "2"); compose_extension(msg, "hardlink@openssh.com", "1"); compose_extension(msg, "fsync@openssh.com", "1"); compose_extension(msg, "lsetstat@openssh.com", "1"); compose_extension(msg, "limits@openssh.com", "1"); compose_extension(msg, "expand-path@openssh.com", "1"); compose_extension(msg, "copy-data", "1"); compose_extension(msg, "home-directory", "1"); compose_extension(msg, "users-groups-by-id@openssh.com", "1"); send_msg(msg); sshbuf_free(msg); } static void process_open(u_int32_t id) { u_int32_t pflags; Attrib a; char *name; int r, handle, fd, flags, mode, status = SSH2_FX_FAILURE; if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(iqueue, &name, NULL)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_u32(iqueue, &pflags)) != 0 || /* portable flags */ (r = decode_attrib(iqueue, &a)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "parse"); debug3("request %u: open flags %d", id, pflags); flags = flags_from_portable(pflags); mode = (a.flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_PERMISSIONS) ? a.perm : 0666; logit("open \"%s\" flags %s mode 0%o", name, string_from_portable(pflags), mode); if (readonly && ((flags & O_ACCMODE) != O_RDONLY || (flags & (O_CREAT|O_TRUNC)) != 0)) { verbose("Refusing open request in read-only mode"); status = SSH2_FX_PERMISSION_DENIED; } else { fd = open(name, flags, mode); if (fd == -1) { status = errno_to_portable(errno); } else { handle = handle_new(HANDLE_FILE, name, fd, flags, NULL); if (handle < 0) { close(fd); } else { send_handle(id, handle); status = SSH2_FX_OK; } } } if (status != SSH2_FX_OK) send_status(id, status); free(name); } static void process_close(u_int32_t id) { int r, handle, ret, status = SSH2_FX_FAILURE; if ((r = get_handle(iqueue, &handle)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "parse"); debug3("request %u: close handle %u", id, handle); handle_log_close(handle, NULL); ret = handle_close(handle); status = (ret == -1) ? errno_to_portable(errno) : SSH2_FX_OK; send_status(id, status); } static void process_read(u_int32_t id) { static u_char *buf; static size_t buflen; u_int32_t len; int r, handle, fd, ret, status = SSH2_FX_FAILURE; u_int64_t off; if ((r = get_handle(iqueue, &handle)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_u64(iqueue, &off)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_u32(iqueue, &len)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "parse"); debug("request %u: read \"%s\" (handle %d) off %llu len %u", id, handle_to_name(handle), handle, (unsigned long long)off, len); if ((fd = handle_to_fd(handle)) == -1) goto out; if (len > SFTP_MAX_READ_LENGTH) { debug2("read change len %u to %u", len, SFTP_MAX_READ_LENGTH); len = SFTP_MAX_READ_LENGTH; } if (len > buflen) { debug3_f("allocate %zu => %u", buflen, len); - if ((buf = realloc(NULL, len)) == NULL) + if ((buf = realloc(buf, len)) == NULL) fatal_f("realloc failed"); buflen = len; } if (lseek(fd, off, SEEK_SET) == -1) { status = errno_to_portable(errno); error_f("seek \"%.100s\": %s", handle_to_name(handle), strerror(errno)); goto out; } if (len == 0) { /* weird, but not strictly disallowed */ ret = 0; } else if ((ret = read(fd, buf, len)) == -1) { status = errno_to_portable(errno); error_f("read \"%.100s\": %s", handle_to_name(handle), strerror(errno)); goto out; } else if (ret == 0) { status = SSH2_FX_EOF; goto out; } send_data(id, buf, ret); handle_update_read(handle, ret); /* success */ status = SSH2_FX_OK; out: if (status != SSH2_FX_OK) send_status(id, status); } static void process_write(u_int32_t id) { u_int64_t off; size_t len; int r, handle, fd, ret, status; u_char *data; if ((r = get_handle(iqueue, &handle)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_u64(iqueue, &off)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_string(iqueue, &data, &len)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "parse"); debug("request %u: write \"%s\" (handle %d) off %llu len %zu", id, handle_to_name(handle), handle, (unsigned long long)off, len); fd = handle_to_fd(handle); if (fd < 0) status = SSH2_FX_FAILURE; else { if (!(handle_to_flags(handle) & O_APPEND) && lseek(fd, off, SEEK_SET) == -1) { status = errno_to_portable(errno); error_f("seek \"%.100s\": %s", handle_to_name(handle), strerror(errno)); } else { /* XXX ATOMICIO ? */ ret = write(fd, data, len); if (ret == -1) { status = errno_to_portable(errno); error_f("write \"%.100s\": %s", handle_to_name(handle), strerror(errno)); } else if ((size_t)ret == len) { status = SSH2_FX_OK; handle_update_write(handle, ret); } else { debug2_f("nothing at all written"); status = SSH2_FX_FAILURE; } } } send_status(id, status); free(data); } static void process_do_stat(u_int32_t id, int do_lstat) { Attrib a; struct stat st; char *name; int r, status = SSH2_FX_FAILURE; if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(iqueue, &name, NULL)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "parse"); debug3("request %u: %sstat", id, do_lstat ? "l" : ""); verbose("%sstat name \"%s\"", do_lstat ? "l" : "", name); r = do_lstat ? lstat(name, &st) : stat(name, &st); if (r == -1) { status = errno_to_portable(errno); } else { stat_to_attrib(&st, &a); send_attrib(id, &a); status = SSH2_FX_OK; } if (status != SSH2_FX_OK) send_status(id, status); free(name); } static void process_stat(u_int32_t id) { process_do_stat(id, 0); } static void process_lstat(u_int32_t id) { process_do_stat(id, 1); } static void process_fstat(u_int32_t id) { Attrib a; struct stat st; int fd, r, handle, status = SSH2_FX_FAILURE; if ((r = get_handle(iqueue, &handle)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "parse"); debug("request %u: fstat \"%s\" (handle %u)", id, handle_to_name(handle), handle); fd = handle_to_fd(handle); if (fd >= 0) { r = fstat(fd, &st); if (r == -1) { status = errno_to_portable(errno); } else { stat_to_attrib(&st, &a); send_attrib(id, &a); status = SSH2_FX_OK; } } if (status != SSH2_FX_OK) send_status(id, status); } static struct timeval * attrib_to_tv(const Attrib *a) { static struct timeval tv[2]; tv[0].tv_sec = a->atime; tv[0].tv_usec = 0; tv[1].tv_sec = a->mtime; tv[1].tv_usec = 0; return tv; } static struct timespec * attrib_to_ts(const Attrib *a) { static struct timespec ts[2]; ts[0].tv_sec = a->atime; ts[0].tv_nsec = 0; ts[1].tv_sec = a->mtime; ts[1].tv_nsec = 0; return ts; } static void process_setstat(u_int32_t id) { Attrib a; char *name; int r, status = SSH2_FX_OK; if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(iqueue, &name, NULL)) != 0 || (r = decode_attrib(iqueue, &a)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "parse"); debug("request %u: setstat name \"%s\"", id, name); if (a.flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_SIZE) { logit("set \"%s\" size %llu", name, (unsigned long long)a.size); r = truncate(name, a.size); if (r == -1) status = errno_to_portable(errno); } if (a.flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_PERMISSIONS) { logit("set \"%s\" mode %04o", name, a.perm); r = chmod(name, a.perm & 07777); if (r == -1) status = errno_to_portable(errno); } if (a.flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_ACMODTIME) { char buf[64]; time_t t = a.mtime; strftime(buf, sizeof(buf), "%Y%m%d-%H:%M:%S", localtime(&t)); logit("set \"%s\" modtime %s", name, buf); r = utimes(name, attrib_to_tv(&a)); if (r == -1) status = errno_to_portable(errno); } if (a.flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_UIDGID) { logit("set \"%s\" owner %lu group %lu", name, (u_long)a.uid, (u_long)a.gid); r = chown(name, a.uid, a.gid); if (r == -1) status = errno_to_portable(errno); } send_status(id, status); free(name); } static void process_fsetstat(u_int32_t id) { Attrib a; int handle, fd, r; int status = SSH2_FX_OK; if ((r = get_handle(iqueue, &handle)) != 0 || (r = decode_attrib(iqueue, &a)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "parse"); debug("request %u: fsetstat handle %d", id, handle); fd = handle_to_fd(handle); if (fd < 0) status = SSH2_FX_FAILURE; else { char *name = handle_to_name(handle); if (a.flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_SIZE) { logit("set \"%s\" size %llu", name, (unsigned long long)a.size); r = ftruncate(fd, a.size); if (r == -1) status = errno_to_portable(errno); } if (a.flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_PERMISSIONS) { logit("set \"%s\" mode %04o", name, a.perm); #ifdef HAVE_FCHMOD r = fchmod(fd, a.perm & 07777); #else r = chmod(name, a.perm & 07777); #endif if (r == -1) status = errno_to_portable(errno); } if (a.flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_ACMODTIME) { char buf[64]; time_t t = a.mtime; strftime(buf, sizeof(buf), "%Y%m%d-%H:%M:%S", localtime(&t)); logit("set \"%s\" modtime %s", name, buf); #ifdef HAVE_FUTIMES r = futimes(fd, attrib_to_tv(&a)); #else r = utimes(name, attrib_to_tv(&a)); #endif if (r == -1) status = errno_to_portable(errno); } if (a.flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_UIDGID) { logit("set \"%s\" owner %lu group %lu", name, (u_long)a.uid, (u_long)a.gid); #ifdef HAVE_FCHOWN r = fchown(fd, a.uid, a.gid); #else r = chown(name, a.uid, a.gid); #endif if (r == -1) status = errno_to_portable(errno); } } send_status(id, status); } static void process_opendir(u_int32_t id) { DIR *dirp = NULL; char *path; int r, handle, status = SSH2_FX_FAILURE; if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(iqueue, &path, NULL)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "parse"); debug3("request %u: opendir", id); logit("opendir \"%s\"", path); dirp = opendir(path); if (dirp == NULL) { status = errno_to_portable(errno); } else { handle = handle_new(HANDLE_DIR, path, 0, 0, dirp); if (handle < 0) { closedir(dirp); } else { send_handle(id, handle); status = SSH2_FX_OK; } } if (status != SSH2_FX_OK) send_status(id, status); free(path); } static void process_readdir(u_int32_t id) { DIR *dirp; struct dirent *dp; char *path; int r, handle; if ((r = get_handle(iqueue, &handle)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "parse"); debug("request %u: readdir \"%s\" (handle %d)", id, handle_to_name(handle), handle); dirp = handle_to_dir(handle); path = handle_to_name(handle); if (dirp == NULL || path == NULL) { send_status(id, SSH2_FX_FAILURE); } else { struct stat st; char pathname[PATH_MAX]; Stat *stats; int nstats = 10, count = 0, i; stats = xcalloc(nstats, sizeof(Stat)); while ((dp = readdir(dirp)) != NULL) { if (count >= nstats) { nstats *= 2; stats = xreallocarray(stats, nstats, sizeof(Stat)); } /* XXX OVERFLOW ? */ snprintf(pathname, sizeof pathname, "%s%s%s", path, strcmp(path, "/") ? "/" : "", dp->d_name); if (lstat(pathname, &st) == -1) continue; stat_to_attrib(&st, &(stats[count].attrib)); stats[count].name = xstrdup(dp->d_name); stats[count].long_name = ls_file(dp->d_name, &st, 0, 0, NULL, NULL); count++; /* send up to 100 entries in one message */ /* XXX check packet size instead */ if (count == 100) break; } if (count > 0) { send_names(id, count, stats); for (i = 0; i < count; i++) { free(stats[i].name); free(stats[i].long_name); } } else { send_status(id, SSH2_FX_EOF); } free(stats); } } static void process_remove(u_int32_t id) { char *name; int r, status = SSH2_FX_FAILURE; if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(iqueue, &name, NULL)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "parse"); debug3("request %u: remove", id); logit("remove name \"%s\"", name); r = unlink(name); status = (r == -1) ? errno_to_portable(errno) : SSH2_FX_OK; send_status(id, status); free(name); } static void process_mkdir(u_int32_t id) { Attrib a; char *name; int r, mode, status = SSH2_FX_FAILURE; if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(iqueue, &name, NULL)) != 0 || (r = decode_attrib(iqueue, &a)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "parse"); mode = (a.flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_PERMISSIONS) ? a.perm & 07777 : 0777; debug3("request %u: mkdir", id); logit("mkdir name \"%s\" mode 0%o", name, mode); r = mkdir(name, mode); status = (r == -1) ? errno_to_portable(errno) : SSH2_FX_OK; send_status(id, status); free(name); } static void process_rmdir(u_int32_t id) { char *name; int r, status; if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(iqueue, &name, NULL)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "parse"); debug3("request %u: rmdir", id); logit("rmdir name \"%s\"", name); r = rmdir(name); status = (r == -1) ? errno_to_portable(errno) : SSH2_FX_OK; send_status(id, status); free(name); } static void process_realpath(u_int32_t id) { char resolvedname[PATH_MAX]; char *path; int r; if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(iqueue, &path, NULL)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "parse"); if (path[0] == '\0') { free(path); path = xstrdup("."); } debug3("request %u: realpath", id); verbose("realpath \"%s\"", path); if (sftp_realpath(path, resolvedname) == NULL) { send_status(id, errno_to_portable(errno)); } else { Stat s; attrib_clear(&s.attrib); s.name = s.long_name = resolvedname; send_names(id, 1, &s); } free(path); } static void process_rename(u_int32_t id) { char *oldpath, *newpath; int r, status; struct stat sb; if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(iqueue, &oldpath, NULL)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(iqueue, &newpath, NULL)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "parse"); debug3("request %u: rename", id); logit("rename old \"%s\" new \"%s\"", oldpath, newpath); status = SSH2_FX_FAILURE; if (lstat(oldpath, &sb) == -1) status = errno_to_portable(errno); else if (S_ISREG(sb.st_mode)) { /* Race-free rename of regular files */ if (link(oldpath, newpath) == -1) { if (errno == EOPNOTSUPP || errno == ENOSYS #ifdef EXDEV || errno == EXDEV #endif #ifdef LINK_OPNOTSUPP_ERRNO || errno == LINK_OPNOTSUPP_ERRNO #endif ) { struct stat st; /* * fs doesn't support links, so fall back to * stat+rename. This is racy. */ if (stat(newpath, &st) == -1) { if (rename(oldpath, newpath) == -1) status = errno_to_portable(errno); else status = SSH2_FX_OK; } } else { status = errno_to_portable(errno); } } else if (unlink(oldpath) == -1) { status = errno_to_portable(errno); /* clean spare link */ unlink(newpath); } else status = SSH2_FX_OK; } else if (stat(newpath, &sb) == -1) { if (rename(oldpath, newpath) == -1) status = errno_to_portable(errno); else status = SSH2_FX_OK; } send_status(id, status); free(oldpath); free(newpath); } static void process_readlink(u_int32_t id) { int r, len; char buf[PATH_MAX]; char *path; if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(iqueue, &path, NULL)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "parse"); debug3("request %u: readlink", id); verbose("readlink \"%s\"", path); if ((len = readlink(path, buf, sizeof(buf) - 1)) == -1) send_status(id, errno_to_portable(errno)); else { Stat s; buf[len] = '\0'; attrib_clear(&s.attrib); s.name = s.long_name = buf; send_names(id, 1, &s); } free(path); } static void process_symlink(u_int32_t id) { char *oldpath, *newpath; int r, status; if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(iqueue, &oldpath, NULL)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(iqueue, &newpath, NULL)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "parse"); debug3("request %u: symlink", id); logit("symlink old \"%s\" new \"%s\"", oldpath, newpath); /* this will fail if 'newpath' exists */ r = symlink(oldpath, newpath); status = (r == -1) ? errno_to_portable(errno) : SSH2_FX_OK; send_status(id, status); free(oldpath); free(newpath); } static void process_extended_posix_rename(u_int32_t id) { char *oldpath, *newpath; int r, status; if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(iqueue, &oldpath, NULL)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(iqueue, &newpath, NULL)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "parse"); debug3("request %u: posix-rename", id); logit("posix-rename old \"%s\" new \"%s\"", oldpath, newpath); r = rename(oldpath, newpath); status = (r == -1) ? errno_to_portable(errno) : SSH2_FX_OK; send_status(id, status); free(oldpath); free(newpath); } static void process_extended_statvfs(u_int32_t id) { char *path; struct statvfs st; int r; if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(iqueue, &path, NULL)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "parse"); debug3("request %u: statvfs", id); logit("statvfs \"%s\"", path); if (statvfs(path, &st) != 0) send_status(id, errno_to_portable(errno)); else send_statvfs(id, &st); free(path); } static void process_extended_fstatvfs(u_int32_t id) { int r, handle, fd; struct statvfs st; if ((r = get_handle(iqueue, &handle)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "parse"); debug("request %u: fstatvfs \"%s\" (handle %u)", id, handle_to_name(handle), handle); if ((fd = handle_to_fd(handle)) < 0) { send_status(id, SSH2_FX_FAILURE); return; } if (fstatvfs(fd, &st) != 0) send_status(id, errno_to_portable(errno)); else send_statvfs(id, &st); } static void process_extended_hardlink(u_int32_t id) { char *oldpath, *newpath; int r, status; if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(iqueue, &oldpath, NULL)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(iqueue, &newpath, NULL)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "parse"); debug3("request %u: hardlink", id); logit("hardlink old \"%s\" new \"%s\"", oldpath, newpath); r = link(oldpath, newpath); status = (r == -1) ? errno_to_portable(errno) : SSH2_FX_OK; send_status(id, status); free(oldpath); free(newpath); } static void process_extended_fsync(u_int32_t id) { int handle, fd, r, status = SSH2_FX_OP_UNSUPPORTED; if ((r = get_handle(iqueue, &handle)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "parse"); debug3("request %u: fsync (handle %u)", id, handle); verbose("fsync \"%s\"", handle_to_name(handle)); if ((fd = handle_to_fd(handle)) < 0) status = SSH2_FX_NO_SUCH_FILE; else if (handle_is_ok(handle, HANDLE_FILE)) { r = fsync(fd); status = (r == -1) ? errno_to_portable(errno) : SSH2_FX_OK; } send_status(id, status); } static void process_extended_lsetstat(u_int32_t id) { Attrib a; char *name; int r, status = SSH2_FX_OK; if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(iqueue, &name, NULL)) != 0 || (r = decode_attrib(iqueue, &a)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "parse"); debug("request %u: lsetstat name \"%s\"", id, name); if (a.flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_SIZE) { /* nonsensical for links */ status = SSH2_FX_BAD_MESSAGE; goto out; } if (a.flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_PERMISSIONS) { logit("set \"%s\" mode %04o", name, a.perm); r = fchmodat(AT_FDCWD, name, a.perm & 07777, AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW); if (r == -1) status = errno_to_portable(errno); } if (a.flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_ACMODTIME) { char buf[64]; time_t t = a.mtime; strftime(buf, sizeof(buf), "%Y%m%d-%H:%M:%S", localtime(&t)); logit("set \"%s\" modtime %s", name, buf); r = utimensat(AT_FDCWD, name, attrib_to_ts(&a), AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW); if (r == -1) status = errno_to_portable(errno); } if (a.flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_UIDGID) { logit("set \"%s\" owner %lu group %lu", name, (u_long)a.uid, (u_long)a.gid); r = fchownat(AT_FDCWD, name, a.uid, a.gid, AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW); if (r == -1) status = errno_to_portable(errno); } out: send_status(id, status); free(name); } static void process_extended_limits(u_int32_t id) { struct sshbuf *msg; int r; uint64_t nfiles = 0; #if defined(HAVE_GETRLIMIT) && defined(RLIMIT_NOFILE) struct rlimit rlim; #endif debug("request %u: limits", id); #if defined(HAVE_GETRLIMIT) && defined(RLIMIT_NOFILE) if (getrlimit(RLIMIT_NOFILE, &rlim) != -1 && rlim.rlim_cur > 5) nfiles = rlim.rlim_cur - 5; /* stdio(3) + syslog + spare */ #endif if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed"); if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, SSH2_FXP_EXTENDED_REPLY)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u32(msg, id)) != 0 || /* max-packet-length */ (r = sshbuf_put_u64(msg, SFTP_MAX_MSG_LENGTH)) != 0 || /* max-read-length */ (r = sshbuf_put_u64(msg, SFTP_MAX_READ_LENGTH)) != 0 || /* max-write-length */ (r = sshbuf_put_u64(msg, SFTP_MAX_MSG_LENGTH - 1024)) != 0 || /* max-open-handles */ (r = sshbuf_put_u64(msg, nfiles)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "compose"); send_msg(msg); sshbuf_free(msg); } static void process_extended_expand(u_int32_t id) { char cwd[PATH_MAX], resolvedname[PATH_MAX]; char *path, *npath; int r; Stat s; if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(iqueue, &path, NULL)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "parse"); if (getcwd(cwd, sizeof(cwd)) == NULL) { send_status(id, errno_to_portable(errno)); goto out; } debug3("request %u: expand, original \"%s\"", id, path); if (path[0] == '\0') { /* empty path */ free(path); path = xstrdup("."); } else if (*path == '~') { /* ~ expand path */ /* Special-case for "~" and "~/" to respect homedir flag */ if (strcmp(path, "~") == 0) { free(path); path = xstrdup(cwd); } else if (strncmp(path, "~/", 2) == 0) { npath = xstrdup(path + 2); free(path); xasprintf(&path, "%s/%s", cwd, npath); free(npath); } else { /* ~user expansions */ if (tilde_expand(path, pw->pw_uid, &npath) != 0) { send_status_errmsg(id, errno_to_portable(ENOENT), "no such user"); goto out; } free(path); path = npath; } } else if (*path != '/') { /* relative path */ xasprintf(&npath, "%s/%s", cwd, path); free(path); path = npath; } verbose("expand \"%s\"", path); if (sftp_realpath(path, resolvedname) == NULL) { send_status(id, errno_to_portable(errno)); goto out; } attrib_clear(&s.attrib); s.name = s.long_name = resolvedname; send_names(id, 1, &s); out: free(path); } static void process_extended_copy_data(u_int32_t id) { u_char buf[64*1024]; int read_handle, read_fd, write_handle, write_fd; u_int64_t len, read_off, read_len, write_off; int r, copy_until_eof, status = SSH2_FX_OP_UNSUPPORTED; size_t ret; if ((r = get_handle(iqueue, &read_handle)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_u64(iqueue, &read_off)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_u64(iqueue, &read_len)) != 0 || (r = get_handle(iqueue, &write_handle)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_u64(iqueue, &write_off)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); debug("request %u: copy-data from \"%s\" (handle %d) off %llu len %llu " "to \"%s\" (handle %d) off %llu", id, handle_to_name(read_handle), read_handle, (unsigned long long)read_off, (unsigned long long)read_len, handle_to_name(write_handle), write_handle, (unsigned long long)write_off); /* For read length of 0, we read until EOF. */ if (read_len == 0) { read_len = (u_int64_t)-1 - read_off; copy_until_eof = 1; } else copy_until_eof = 0; read_fd = handle_to_fd(read_handle); write_fd = handle_to_fd(write_handle); /* Disallow reading & writing to the same handle or same path or dirs */ if (read_handle == write_handle || read_fd < 0 || write_fd < 0 || !strcmp(handle_to_name(read_handle), handle_to_name(write_handle))) { status = SSH2_FX_FAILURE; goto out; } if (lseek(read_fd, read_off, SEEK_SET) < 0) { status = errno_to_portable(errno); error("%s: read_seek failed", __func__); goto out; } if ((handle_to_flags(write_handle) & O_APPEND) == 0 && lseek(write_fd, write_off, SEEK_SET) < 0) { status = errno_to_portable(errno); error("%s: write_seek failed", __func__); goto out; } /* Process the request in chunks. */ while (read_len > 0 || copy_until_eof) { len = MINIMUM(sizeof(buf), read_len); read_len -= len; ret = atomicio(read, read_fd, buf, len); if (ret == 0 && errno == EPIPE) { status = copy_until_eof ? SSH2_FX_OK : SSH2_FX_EOF; break; } else if (ret == 0) { status = errno_to_portable(errno); error("%s: read failed: %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); break; } len = ret; handle_update_read(read_handle, len); ret = atomicio(vwrite, write_fd, buf, len); if (ret != len) { status = errno_to_portable(errno); error("%s: write failed: %llu != %llu: %s", __func__, (unsigned long long)ret, (unsigned long long)len, strerror(errno)); break; } handle_update_write(write_handle, len); } if (read_len == 0) status = SSH2_FX_OK; out: send_status(id, status); } static void process_extended_home_directory(u_int32_t id) { char *username; struct passwd *user_pw; int r; Stat s; if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(iqueue, &username, NULL)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "parse"); debug3("request %u: home-directory \"%s\"", id, username); if ((user_pw = getpwnam(username)) == NULL) { send_status(id, SSH2_FX_FAILURE); goto out; } verbose("home-directory \"%s\"", pw->pw_dir); attrib_clear(&s.attrib); s.name = s.long_name = pw->pw_dir; send_names(id, 1, &s); out: free(username); } static void process_extended_get_users_groups_by_id(u_int32_t id) { struct passwd *user_pw; struct group *gr; struct sshbuf *uids, *gids, *usernames, *groupnames, *msg; int r; u_int n, nusers = 0, ngroups = 0; const char *name; if ((usernames = sshbuf_new()) == NULL || (groupnames = sshbuf_new()) == NULL || (msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed"); if ((r = sshbuf_froms(iqueue, &uids)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_froms(iqueue, &gids)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "parse"); debug_f("uids len = %zu, gids len = %zu", sshbuf_len(uids), sshbuf_len(gids)); while (sshbuf_len(uids) != 0) { if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(uids, &n)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "parse inner uid"); user_pw = getpwuid((uid_t)n); name = user_pw == NULL ? "" : user_pw->pw_name; debug3_f("uid %u => \"%s\"", n, name); if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(usernames, name)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "assemble uid reply"); nusers++; } while (sshbuf_len(gids) != 0) { if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(gids, &n)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "parse inner gid"); gr = getgrgid((gid_t)n); name = gr == NULL ? "" : gr->gr_name; debug3_f("gid %u => \"%s\"", n, name); if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(groupnames, name)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "assemble gid reply"); nusers++; } verbose("users-groups-by-id: %u users, %u groups", nusers, ngroups); if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, SSH2_FXP_EXTENDED_REPLY)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u32(msg, id)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_stringb(msg, usernames)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_stringb(msg, groupnames)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "compose"); send_msg(msg); sshbuf_free(uids); sshbuf_free(gids); sshbuf_free(usernames); sshbuf_free(groupnames); sshbuf_free(msg); } static void process_extended(u_int32_t id) { char *request; int r; const struct sftp_handler *exthand; if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(iqueue, &request, NULL)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "parse"); if ((exthand = extended_handler_byname(request)) == NULL) { error("Unknown extended request \"%.100s\"", request); send_status(id, SSH2_FX_OP_UNSUPPORTED); /* MUST */ } else { if (!request_permitted(exthand)) send_status(id, SSH2_FX_PERMISSION_DENIED); else exthand->handler(id); } free(request); } /* stolen from ssh-agent */ static void process(void) { u_int msg_len; u_int buf_len; u_int consumed; u_char type; const u_char *cp; int i, r; u_int32_t id; buf_len = sshbuf_len(iqueue); if (buf_len < 5) return; /* Incomplete message. */ cp = sshbuf_ptr(iqueue); msg_len = get_u32(cp); if (msg_len > SFTP_MAX_MSG_LENGTH) { error("bad message from %s local user %s", client_addr, pw->pw_name); sftp_server_cleanup_exit(11); } if (buf_len < msg_len + 4) return; if ((r = sshbuf_consume(iqueue, 4)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "consume"); buf_len -= 4; if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(iqueue, &type)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "parse type"); switch (type) { case SSH2_FXP_INIT: process_init(); init_done = 1; break; case SSH2_FXP_EXTENDED: if (!init_done) fatal("Received extended request before init"); if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(iqueue, &id)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "parse extended ID"); process_extended(id); break; default: if (!init_done) fatal("Received %u request before init", type); if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(iqueue, &id)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "parse ID"); for (i = 0; handlers[i].handler != NULL; i++) { if (type == handlers[i].type) { if (!request_permitted(&handlers[i])) { send_status(id, SSH2_FX_PERMISSION_DENIED); } else { handlers[i].handler(id); } break; } } if (handlers[i].handler == NULL) error("Unknown message %u", type); } /* discard the remaining bytes from the current packet */ if (buf_len < sshbuf_len(iqueue)) { error("iqueue grew unexpectedly"); sftp_server_cleanup_exit(255); } consumed = buf_len - sshbuf_len(iqueue); if (msg_len < consumed) { error("msg_len %u < consumed %u", msg_len, consumed); sftp_server_cleanup_exit(255); } if (msg_len > consumed && (r = sshbuf_consume(iqueue, msg_len - consumed)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "consume"); } /* Cleanup handler that logs active handles upon normal exit */ void sftp_server_cleanup_exit(int i) { if (pw != NULL && client_addr != NULL) { handle_log_exit(); logit("session closed for local user %s from [%s]", pw->pw_name, client_addr); } _exit(i); } static void sftp_server_usage(void) { extern char *__progname; fprintf(stderr, "usage: %s [-ehR] [-d start_directory] [-f log_facility] " "[-l log_level]\n\t[-P denied_requests] " "[-p allowed_requests] [-u umask]\n" " %s -Q protocol_feature\n", __progname, __progname); exit(1); } int sftp_server_main(int argc, char **argv, struct passwd *user_pw) { int i, r, in, out, ch, skipargs = 0, log_stderr = 0; ssize_t len, olen; SyslogFacility log_facility = SYSLOG_FACILITY_AUTH; char *cp, *homedir = NULL, uidstr[32], buf[4*4096]; long mask; extern char *optarg; extern char *__progname; __progname = ssh_get_progname(argv[0]); log_init(__progname, log_level, log_facility, log_stderr); pw = pwcopy(user_pw); while (!skipargs && (ch = getopt(argc, argv, "d:f:l:P:p:Q:u:cehR")) != -1) { switch (ch) { case 'Q': if (strcasecmp(optarg, "requests") != 0) { fprintf(stderr, "Invalid query type\n"); exit(1); } for (i = 0; handlers[i].handler != NULL; i++) printf("%s\n", handlers[i].name); for (i = 0; extended_handlers[i].handler != NULL; i++) printf("%s\n", extended_handlers[i].name); exit(0); break; case 'R': readonly = 1; break; case 'c': /* * Ignore all arguments if we are invoked as a * shell using "sftp-server -c command" */ skipargs = 1; break; case 'e': log_stderr = 1; break; case 'l': log_level = log_level_number(optarg); if (log_level == SYSLOG_LEVEL_NOT_SET) error("Invalid log level \"%s\"", optarg); break; case 'f': log_facility = log_facility_number(optarg); if (log_facility == SYSLOG_FACILITY_NOT_SET) error("Invalid log facility \"%s\"", optarg); break; case 'd': cp = tilde_expand_filename(optarg, user_pw->pw_uid); snprintf(uidstr, sizeof(uidstr), "%llu", (unsigned long long)pw->pw_uid); homedir = percent_expand(cp, "d", user_pw->pw_dir, "u", user_pw->pw_name, "U", uidstr, (char *)NULL); free(cp); break; case 'p': if (request_allowlist != NULL) fatal("Permitted requests already set"); request_allowlist = xstrdup(optarg); break; case 'P': if (request_denylist != NULL) fatal("Refused requests already set"); request_denylist = xstrdup(optarg); break; case 'u': errno = 0; mask = strtol(optarg, &cp, 8); if (mask < 0 || mask > 0777 || *cp != '\0' || cp == optarg || (mask == 0 && errno != 0)) fatal("Invalid umask \"%s\"", optarg); (void)umask((mode_t)mask); break; case 'h': default: sftp_server_usage(); } } log_init(__progname, log_level, log_facility, log_stderr); /* * On platforms where we can, avoid making /proc/self/{mem,maps} * available to the user so that sftp access doesn't automatically * imply arbitrary code execution access that will break * restricted configurations. */ platform_disable_tracing(1); /* strict */ /* Drop any fine-grained privileges we don't need */ platform_pledge_sftp_server(); if ((cp = getenv("SSH_CONNECTION")) != NULL) { client_addr = xstrdup(cp); if ((cp = strchr(client_addr, ' ')) == NULL) { error("Malformed SSH_CONNECTION variable: \"%s\"", getenv("SSH_CONNECTION")); sftp_server_cleanup_exit(255); } *cp = '\0'; } else client_addr = xstrdup("UNKNOWN"); logit("session opened for local user %s from [%s]", pw->pw_name, client_addr); in = STDIN_FILENO; out = STDOUT_FILENO; #ifdef HAVE_CYGWIN setmode(in, O_BINARY); setmode(out, O_BINARY); #endif if ((iqueue = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed"); if ((oqueue = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed"); if (homedir != NULL) { if (chdir(homedir) != 0) { error("chdir to \"%s\" failed: %s", homedir, strerror(errno)); } } for (;;) { struct pollfd pfd[2]; memset(pfd, 0, sizeof pfd); pfd[0].fd = pfd[1].fd = -1; /* * Ensure that we can read a full buffer and handle * the worst-case length packet it can generate, * otherwise apply backpressure by stopping reads. */ if ((r = sshbuf_check_reserve(iqueue, sizeof(buf))) == 0 && (r = sshbuf_check_reserve(oqueue, SFTP_MAX_MSG_LENGTH)) == 0) { pfd[0].fd = in; pfd[0].events = POLLIN; } else if (r != SSH_ERR_NO_BUFFER_SPACE) fatal_fr(r, "reserve"); olen = sshbuf_len(oqueue); if (olen > 0) { pfd[1].fd = out; pfd[1].events = POLLOUT; } if (poll(pfd, 2, -1) == -1) { if (errno == EINTR) continue; error("poll: %s", strerror(errno)); sftp_server_cleanup_exit(2); } /* copy stdin to iqueue */ if (pfd[0].revents & (POLLIN|POLLHUP)) { len = read(in, buf, sizeof buf); if (len == 0) { debug("read eof"); sftp_server_cleanup_exit(0); } else if (len == -1) { if (errno != EAGAIN && errno != EINTR) { error("read: %s", strerror(errno)); sftp_server_cleanup_exit(1); } } else if ((r = sshbuf_put(iqueue, buf, len)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "sshbuf_put"); } /* send oqueue to stdout */ if (pfd[1].revents & (POLLOUT|POLLHUP)) { len = write(out, sshbuf_ptr(oqueue), olen); if (len == 0 || (len == -1 && errno == EPIPE)) { debug("write eof"); sftp_server_cleanup_exit(0); } else if (len == -1) { sftp_server_cleanup_exit(1); if (errno != EAGAIN && errno != EINTR) { error("write: %s", strerror(errno)); sftp_server_cleanup_exit(1); } } else if ((r = sshbuf_consume(oqueue, len)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "consume"); } /* * Process requests from client if we can fit the results * into the output buffer, otherwise stop processing input * and let the output queue drain. */ r = sshbuf_check_reserve(oqueue, SFTP_MAX_MSG_LENGTH); if (r == 0) process(); else if (r != SSH_ERR_NO_BUFFER_SPACE) fatal_fr(r, "reserve"); } } diff --git a/crypto/openssh/sftp.c b/crypto/openssh/sftp.c index b3616c15cd09..29081db3d434 100644 --- a/crypto/openssh/sftp.c +++ b/crypto/openssh/sftp.c @@ -1,2682 +1,2680 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: sftp.c,v 1.225 2023/01/05 05:49:13 djm Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: sftp.c,v 1.229 2023/03/12 09:41:18 dtucker Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2001-2004 Damien Miller * * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. * * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. */ #include "includes.h" #include #include #ifdef HAVE_SYS_STAT_H # include #endif #include #include #ifdef HAVE_SYS_STATVFS_H #include #endif #include #include #ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H # include #endif #ifdef HAVE_LIBGEN_H #include #endif #ifdef HAVE_LOCALE_H # include #endif #ifdef USE_LIBEDIT #include #else typedef void EditLine; #endif #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #ifdef HAVE_UTIL_H # include #endif #include "xmalloc.h" #include "log.h" #include "pathnames.h" #include "misc.h" #include "utf8.h" #include "sftp.h" #include "ssherr.h" #include "sshbuf.h" #include "sftp-common.h" #include "sftp-client.h" #include "sftp-usergroup.h" /* File to read commands from */ FILE* infile; /* Are we in batchfile mode? */ int batchmode = 0; /* PID of ssh transport process */ static volatile pid_t sshpid = -1; /* Suppress diagnostic messages */ int quiet = 0; /* This is set to 0 if the progressmeter is not desired. */ int showprogress = 1; /* When this option is set, we always recursively download/upload directories */ int global_rflag = 0; /* When this option is set, we resume download or upload if possible */ int global_aflag = 0; /* When this option is set, the file transfers will always preserve times */ int global_pflag = 0; /* When this option is set, transfers will have fsync() called on each file */ int global_fflag = 0; /* SIGINT received during command processing */ volatile sig_atomic_t interrupted = 0; /* I wish qsort() took a separate ctx for the comparison function...*/ int sort_flag; glob_t *sort_glob; /* Context used for commandline completion */ struct complete_ctx { struct sftp_conn *conn; char **remote_pathp; }; int remote_glob(struct sftp_conn *, const char *, int, int (*)(const char *, int), glob_t *); /* proto for sftp-glob.c */ extern char *__progname; /* Separators for interactive commands */ #define WHITESPACE " \t\r\n" /* ls flags */ #define LS_LONG_VIEW 0x0001 /* Full view ala ls -l */ #define LS_SHORT_VIEW 0x0002 /* Single row view ala ls -1 */ #define LS_NUMERIC_VIEW 0x0004 /* Long view with numeric uid/gid */ #define LS_NAME_SORT 0x0008 /* Sort by name (default) */ #define LS_TIME_SORT 0x0010 /* Sort by mtime */ #define LS_SIZE_SORT 0x0020 /* Sort by file size */ #define LS_REVERSE_SORT 0x0040 /* Reverse sort order */ #define LS_SHOW_ALL 0x0080 /* Don't skip filenames starting with '.' */ #define LS_SI_UNITS 0x0100 /* Display sizes as K, M, G, etc. */ #define VIEW_FLAGS (LS_LONG_VIEW|LS_SHORT_VIEW|LS_NUMERIC_VIEW|LS_SI_UNITS) #define SORT_FLAGS (LS_NAME_SORT|LS_TIME_SORT|LS_SIZE_SORT) /* Commands for interactive mode */ enum sftp_command { I_CHDIR = 1, I_CHGRP, I_CHMOD, I_CHOWN, I_COPY, I_DF, I_GET, I_HELP, I_LCHDIR, I_LINK, I_LLS, I_LMKDIR, I_LPWD, I_LS, I_LUMASK, I_MKDIR, I_PUT, I_PWD, I_QUIT, I_REGET, I_RENAME, I_REPUT, I_RM, I_RMDIR, I_SHELL, I_SYMLINK, I_VERSION, I_PROGRESS, }; struct CMD { const char *c; const int n; const int t; /* Completion type for the first argument */ const int t2; /* completion type for the optional second argument */ }; /* Type of completion */ #define NOARGS 0 #define REMOTE 1 #define LOCAL 2 static const struct CMD cmds[] = { { "bye", I_QUIT, NOARGS, NOARGS }, { "cd", I_CHDIR, REMOTE, NOARGS }, { "chdir", I_CHDIR, REMOTE, NOARGS }, { "chgrp", I_CHGRP, REMOTE, NOARGS }, { "chmod", I_CHMOD, REMOTE, NOARGS }, { "chown", I_CHOWN, REMOTE, NOARGS }, { "copy", I_COPY, REMOTE, LOCAL }, { "cp", I_COPY, REMOTE, LOCAL }, { "df", I_DF, REMOTE, NOARGS }, { "dir", I_LS, REMOTE, NOARGS }, { "exit", I_QUIT, NOARGS, NOARGS }, { "get", I_GET, REMOTE, LOCAL }, { "help", I_HELP, NOARGS, NOARGS }, { "lcd", I_LCHDIR, LOCAL, NOARGS }, { "lchdir", I_LCHDIR, LOCAL, NOARGS }, { "lls", I_LLS, LOCAL, NOARGS }, { "lmkdir", I_LMKDIR, LOCAL, NOARGS }, { "ln", I_LINK, REMOTE, REMOTE }, { "lpwd", I_LPWD, LOCAL, NOARGS }, { "ls", I_LS, REMOTE, NOARGS }, { "lumask", I_LUMASK, NOARGS, NOARGS }, { "mkdir", I_MKDIR, REMOTE, NOARGS }, { "mget", I_GET, REMOTE, LOCAL }, { "mput", I_PUT, LOCAL, REMOTE }, { "progress", I_PROGRESS, NOARGS, NOARGS }, { "put", I_PUT, LOCAL, REMOTE }, { "pwd", I_PWD, REMOTE, NOARGS }, { "quit", I_QUIT, NOARGS, NOARGS }, { "reget", I_REGET, REMOTE, LOCAL }, { "rename", I_RENAME, REMOTE, REMOTE }, { "reput", I_REPUT, LOCAL, REMOTE }, { "rm", I_RM, REMOTE, NOARGS }, { "rmdir", I_RMDIR, REMOTE, NOARGS }, { "symlink", I_SYMLINK, REMOTE, REMOTE }, { "version", I_VERSION, NOARGS, NOARGS }, { "!", I_SHELL, NOARGS, NOARGS }, { "?", I_HELP, NOARGS, NOARGS }, { NULL, -1, -1, -1 } }; -/* ARGSUSED */ static void killchild(int signo) { pid_t pid; pid = sshpid; if (pid > 1) { kill(pid, SIGTERM); waitpid(pid, NULL, 0); } _exit(1); } -/* ARGSUSED */ static void suspchild(int signo) { if (sshpid > 1) { kill(sshpid, signo); while (waitpid(sshpid, NULL, WUNTRACED) == -1 && errno == EINTR) continue; } kill(getpid(), SIGSTOP); } -/* ARGSUSED */ static void cmd_interrupt(int signo) { const char msg[] = "\rInterrupt \n"; int olderrno = errno; (void)write(STDERR_FILENO, msg, sizeof(msg) - 1); interrupted = 1; errno = olderrno; } -/* ARGSUSED */ static void read_interrupt(int signo) { interrupted = 1; } -/*ARGSUSED*/ static void sigchld_handler(int sig) { int save_errno = errno; pid_t pid; const char msg[] = "\rConnection closed. \n"; /* Report if ssh transport process dies. */ while ((pid = waitpid(sshpid, NULL, WNOHANG)) == -1 && errno == EINTR) continue; if (pid == sshpid) { if (!quiet) (void)write(STDERR_FILENO, msg, sizeof(msg) - 1); sshpid = -1; } errno = save_errno; } static void help(void) { printf("Available commands:\n" "bye Quit sftp\n" "cd path Change remote directory to 'path'\n" "chgrp [-h] grp path Change group of file 'path' to 'grp'\n" "chmod [-h] mode path Change permissions of file 'path' to 'mode'\n" "chown [-h] own path Change owner of file 'path' to 'own'\n" "copy oldpath newpath Copy remote file\n" "cp oldpath newpath Copy remote file\n" "df [-hi] [path] Display statistics for current directory or\n" " filesystem containing 'path'\n" "exit Quit sftp\n" "get [-afpR] remote [local] Download file\n" "help Display this help text\n" "lcd path Change local directory to 'path'\n" "lls [ls-options [path]] Display local directory listing\n" "lmkdir path Create local directory\n" "ln [-s] oldpath newpath Link remote file (-s for symlink)\n" "lpwd Print local working directory\n" "ls [-1afhlnrSt] [path] Display remote directory listing\n" "lumask umask Set local umask to 'umask'\n" "mkdir path Create remote directory\n" "progress Toggle display of progress meter\n" "put [-afpR] local [remote] Upload file\n" "pwd Display remote working directory\n" "quit Quit sftp\n" "reget [-fpR] remote [local] Resume download file\n" "rename oldpath newpath Rename remote file\n" "reput [-fpR] local [remote] Resume upload file\n" "rm path Delete remote file\n" "rmdir path Remove remote directory\n" "symlink oldpath newpath Symlink remote file\n" "version Show SFTP version\n" "!command Execute 'command' in local shell\n" "! Escape to local shell\n" "? Synonym for help\n"); } static void local_do_shell(const char *args) { int status; char *shell; pid_t pid; if (!*args) args = NULL; if ((shell = getenv("SHELL")) == NULL || *shell == '\0') shell = _PATH_BSHELL; if ((pid = fork()) == -1) fatal("Couldn't fork: %s", strerror(errno)); if (pid == 0) { /* XXX: child has pipe fds to ssh subproc open - issue? */ if (args) { debug3("Executing %s -c \"%s\"", shell, args); execl(shell, shell, "-c", args, (char *)NULL); } else { debug3("Executing %s", shell); execl(shell, shell, (char *)NULL); } fprintf(stderr, "Couldn't execute \"%s\": %s\n", shell, strerror(errno)); _exit(1); } while (waitpid(pid, &status, 0) == -1) if (errno != EINTR) fatal("Couldn't wait for child: %s", strerror(errno)); if (!WIFEXITED(status)) error("Shell exited abnormally"); else if (WEXITSTATUS(status)) error("Shell exited with status %d", WEXITSTATUS(status)); } static void local_do_ls(const char *args) { if (!args || !*args) local_do_shell(_PATH_LS); else { int len = strlen(_PATH_LS " ") + strlen(args) + 1; char *buf = xmalloc(len); /* XXX: quoting - rip quoting code from ftp? */ snprintf(buf, len, _PATH_LS " %s", args); local_do_shell(buf); free(buf); } } /* Strip one path (usually the pwd) from the start of another */ static char * path_strip(const char *path, const char *strip) { size_t len; if (strip == NULL) return (xstrdup(path)); len = strlen(strip); if (strncmp(path, strip, len) == 0) { if (strip[len - 1] != '/' && path[len] == '/') len++; return (xstrdup(path + len)); } return (xstrdup(path)); } static int parse_getput_flags(const char *cmd, char **argv, int argc, int *aflag, int *fflag, int *pflag, int *rflag) { extern int opterr, optind, optopt, optreset; int ch; optind = optreset = 1; opterr = 0; *aflag = *fflag = *rflag = *pflag = 0; while ((ch = getopt(argc, argv, "afPpRr")) != -1) { switch (ch) { case 'a': *aflag = 1; break; case 'f': *fflag = 1; break; case 'p': case 'P': *pflag = 1; break; case 'r': case 'R': *rflag = 1; break; default: error("%s: Invalid flag -%c", cmd, optopt); return -1; } } return optind; } static int parse_link_flags(const char *cmd, char **argv, int argc, int *sflag) { extern int opterr, optind, optopt, optreset; int ch; optind = optreset = 1; opterr = 0; *sflag = 0; while ((ch = getopt(argc, argv, "s")) != -1) { switch (ch) { case 's': *sflag = 1; break; default: error("%s: Invalid flag -%c", cmd, optopt); return -1; } } return optind; } static int parse_rename_flags(const char *cmd, char **argv, int argc, int *lflag) { extern int opterr, optind, optopt, optreset; int ch; optind = optreset = 1; opterr = 0; *lflag = 0; while ((ch = getopt(argc, argv, "l")) != -1) { switch (ch) { case 'l': *lflag = 1; break; default: error("%s: Invalid flag -%c", cmd, optopt); return -1; } } return optind; } static int parse_ls_flags(char **argv, int argc, int *lflag) { extern int opterr, optind, optopt, optreset; int ch; optind = optreset = 1; opterr = 0; *lflag = LS_NAME_SORT; while ((ch = getopt(argc, argv, "1Safhlnrt")) != -1) { switch (ch) { case '1': *lflag &= ~VIEW_FLAGS; *lflag |= LS_SHORT_VIEW; break; case 'S': *lflag &= ~SORT_FLAGS; *lflag |= LS_SIZE_SORT; break; case 'a': *lflag |= LS_SHOW_ALL; break; case 'f': *lflag &= ~SORT_FLAGS; break; case 'h': *lflag |= LS_SI_UNITS; break; case 'l': *lflag &= ~LS_SHORT_VIEW; *lflag |= LS_LONG_VIEW; break; case 'n': *lflag &= ~LS_SHORT_VIEW; *lflag |= LS_NUMERIC_VIEW|LS_LONG_VIEW; break; case 'r': *lflag |= LS_REVERSE_SORT; break; case 't': *lflag &= ~SORT_FLAGS; *lflag |= LS_TIME_SORT; break; default: error("ls: Invalid flag -%c", optopt); return -1; } } return optind; } static int parse_df_flags(const char *cmd, char **argv, int argc, int *hflag, int *iflag) { extern int opterr, optind, optopt, optreset; int ch; optind = optreset = 1; opterr = 0; *hflag = *iflag = 0; while ((ch = getopt(argc, argv, "hi")) != -1) { switch (ch) { case 'h': *hflag = 1; break; case 'i': *iflag = 1; break; default: error("%s: Invalid flag -%c", cmd, optopt); return -1; } } return optind; } static int parse_ch_flags(const char *cmd, char **argv, int argc, int *hflag) { extern int opterr, optind, optopt, optreset; int ch; optind = optreset = 1; opterr = 0; *hflag = 0; while ((ch = getopt(argc, argv, "h")) != -1) { switch (ch) { case 'h': *hflag = 1; break; default: error("%s: Invalid flag -%c", cmd, optopt); return -1; } } return optind; } static int parse_no_flags(const char *cmd, char **argv, int argc) { extern int opterr, optind, optopt, optreset; int ch; optind = optreset = 1; opterr = 0; while ((ch = getopt(argc, argv, "")) != -1) { switch (ch) { default: error("%s: Invalid flag -%c", cmd, optopt); return -1; } } return optind; } static char * escape_glob(const char *s) { size_t i, o, len; char *ret; len = strlen(s); ret = xcalloc(2, len + 1); for (i = o = 0; i < len; i++) { if (strchr("[]?*\\", s[i]) != NULL) ret[o++] = '\\'; ret[o++] = s[i]; } ret[o++] = '\0'; return ret; } static char * make_absolute_pwd_glob(const char *p, const char *pwd) { char *ret, *escpwd; escpwd = escape_glob(pwd); if (p == NULL) return escpwd; ret = make_absolute(xstrdup(p), escpwd); free(escpwd); return ret; } static int process_get(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *src, const char *dst, const char *pwd, int pflag, int rflag, int resume, int fflag) { char *filename, *abs_src = NULL, *abs_dst = NULL, *tmp = NULL; glob_t g; int i, r, err = 0; abs_src = make_absolute_pwd_glob(src, pwd); memset(&g, 0, sizeof(g)); debug3("Looking up %s", abs_src); if ((r = remote_glob(conn, abs_src, GLOB_MARK, NULL, &g)) != 0) { if (r == GLOB_NOSPACE) { error("Too many matches for \"%s\".", abs_src); } else { error("File \"%s\" not found.", abs_src); } err = -1; goto out; } /* * If multiple matches then dst must be a directory or * unspecified. */ if (g.gl_matchc > 1 && dst != NULL && !local_is_dir(dst)) { error("Multiple source paths, but destination " "\"%s\" is not a directory", dst); err = -1; goto out; } for (i = 0; g.gl_pathv[i] && !interrupted; i++) { tmp = xstrdup(g.gl_pathv[i]); if ((filename = basename(tmp)) == NULL) { error("basename %s: %s", tmp, strerror(errno)); free(tmp); err = -1; goto out; } if (g.gl_matchc == 1 && dst) { if (local_is_dir(dst)) { abs_dst = path_append(dst, filename); } else { abs_dst = xstrdup(dst); } } else if (dst) { abs_dst = path_append(dst, filename); } else { abs_dst = xstrdup(filename); } free(tmp); resume |= global_aflag; if (!quiet && resume) mprintf("Resuming %s to %s\n", g.gl_pathv[i], abs_dst); else if (!quiet && !resume) mprintf("Fetching %s to %s\n", g.gl_pathv[i], abs_dst); /* XXX follow link flag */ if (globpath_is_dir(g.gl_pathv[i]) && (rflag || global_rflag)) { if (download_dir(conn, g.gl_pathv[i], abs_dst, NULL, pflag || global_pflag, 1, resume, fflag || global_fflag, 0, 0) == -1) err = -1; } else { if (do_download(conn, g.gl_pathv[i], abs_dst, NULL, pflag || global_pflag, resume, fflag || global_fflag, 0) == -1) err = -1; } free(abs_dst); abs_dst = NULL; } out: free(abs_src); globfree(&g); return(err); } static int process_put(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *src, const char *dst, const char *pwd, int pflag, int rflag, int resume, int fflag) { char *tmp_dst = NULL; char *abs_dst = NULL; char *tmp = NULL, *filename = NULL; glob_t g; int err = 0; int i, dst_is_dir = 1; struct stat sb; if (dst) { tmp_dst = xstrdup(dst); tmp_dst = make_absolute(tmp_dst, pwd); } memset(&g, 0, sizeof(g)); debug3("Looking up %s", src); if (glob(src, GLOB_NOCHECK | GLOB_MARK, NULL, &g)) { error("File \"%s\" not found.", src); err = -1; goto out; } /* If we aren't fetching to pwd then stash this status for later */ if (tmp_dst != NULL) dst_is_dir = remote_is_dir(conn, tmp_dst); /* If multiple matches, dst may be directory or unspecified */ if (g.gl_matchc > 1 && tmp_dst && !dst_is_dir) { error("Multiple paths match, but destination " "\"%s\" is not a directory", tmp_dst); err = -1; goto out; } for (i = 0; g.gl_pathv[i] && !interrupted; i++) { if (stat(g.gl_pathv[i], &sb) == -1) { err = -1; error("stat %s: %s", g.gl_pathv[i], strerror(errno)); continue; } tmp = xstrdup(g.gl_pathv[i]); if ((filename = basename(tmp)) == NULL) { error("basename %s: %s", tmp, strerror(errno)); free(tmp); err = -1; goto out; } if (g.gl_matchc == 1 && tmp_dst) { /* If directory specified, append filename */ if (dst_is_dir) abs_dst = path_append(tmp_dst, filename); else abs_dst = xstrdup(tmp_dst); } else if (tmp_dst) { abs_dst = path_append(tmp_dst, filename); } else { abs_dst = make_absolute(xstrdup(filename), pwd); } free(tmp); resume |= global_aflag; if (!quiet && resume) mprintf("Resuming upload of %s to %s\n", g.gl_pathv[i], abs_dst); else if (!quiet && !resume) mprintf("Uploading %s to %s\n", g.gl_pathv[i], abs_dst); /* XXX follow_link_flag */ if (globpath_is_dir(g.gl_pathv[i]) && (rflag || global_rflag)) { if (upload_dir(conn, g.gl_pathv[i], abs_dst, pflag || global_pflag, 1, resume, fflag || global_fflag, 0, 0) == -1) err = -1; } else { if (do_upload(conn, g.gl_pathv[i], abs_dst, pflag || global_pflag, resume, fflag || global_fflag, 0) == -1) err = -1; } } out: free(abs_dst); free(tmp_dst); globfree(&g); return(err); } static int sdirent_comp(const void *aa, const void *bb) { SFTP_DIRENT *a = *(SFTP_DIRENT **)aa; SFTP_DIRENT *b = *(SFTP_DIRENT **)bb; int rmul = sort_flag & LS_REVERSE_SORT ? -1 : 1; #define NCMP(a,b) (a == b ? 0 : (a < b ? 1 : -1)) if (sort_flag & LS_NAME_SORT) return (rmul * strcmp(a->filename, b->filename)); else if (sort_flag & LS_TIME_SORT) return (rmul * NCMP(a->a.mtime, b->a.mtime)); else if (sort_flag & LS_SIZE_SORT) return (rmul * NCMP(a->a.size, b->a.size)); fatal("Unknown ls sort type"); } /* sftp ls.1 replacement for directories */ static int do_ls_dir(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *path, const char *strip_path, int lflag) { int n; u_int c = 1, colspace = 0, columns = 1; SFTP_DIRENT **d; if ((n = do_readdir(conn, path, &d)) != 0) return (n); if (!(lflag & LS_SHORT_VIEW)) { u_int m = 0, width = 80; struct winsize ws; char *tmp; /* Count entries for sort and find longest filename */ for (n = 0; d[n] != NULL; n++) { if (d[n]->filename[0] != '.' || (lflag & LS_SHOW_ALL)) m = MAXIMUM(m, strlen(d[n]->filename)); } /* Add any subpath that also needs to be counted */ tmp = path_strip(path, strip_path); m += strlen(tmp); free(tmp); if (ioctl(fileno(stdin), TIOCGWINSZ, &ws) != -1) width = ws.ws_col; columns = width / (m + 2); columns = MAXIMUM(columns, 1); colspace = width / columns; colspace = MINIMUM(colspace, width); } if (lflag & SORT_FLAGS) { for (n = 0; d[n] != NULL; n++) ; /* count entries */ sort_flag = lflag & (SORT_FLAGS|LS_REVERSE_SORT); qsort(d, n, sizeof(*d), sdirent_comp); } get_remote_user_groups_from_dirents(conn, d); for (n = 0; d[n] != NULL && !interrupted; n++) { char *tmp, *fname; if (d[n]->filename[0] == '.' && !(lflag & LS_SHOW_ALL)) continue; tmp = path_append(path, d[n]->filename); fname = path_strip(tmp, strip_path); free(tmp); if (lflag & LS_LONG_VIEW) { if ((lflag & (LS_NUMERIC_VIEW|LS_SI_UNITS)) != 0 || can_get_users_groups_by_id(conn)) { char *lname; struct stat sb; memset(&sb, 0, sizeof(sb)); attrib_to_stat(&d[n]->a, &sb); lname = ls_file(fname, &sb, 1, (lflag & LS_SI_UNITS), ruser_name(sb.st_uid), rgroup_name(sb.st_gid)); mprintf("%s\n", lname); free(lname); } else mprintf("%s\n", d[n]->longname); } else { mprintf("%-*s", colspace, fname); if (c >= columns) { printf("\n"); c = 1; } else c++; } free(fname); } if (!(lflag & LS_LONG_VIEW) && (c != 1)) printf("\n"); free_sftp_dirents(d); return (0); } static int sglob_comp(const void *aa, const void *bb) { u_int a = *(const u_int *)aa; u_int b = *(const u_int *)bb; const char *ap = sort_glob->gl_pathv[a]; const char *bp = sort_glob->gl_pathv[b]; const struct stat *as = sort_glob->gl_statv[a]; const struct stat *bs = sort_glob->gl_statv[b]; int rmul = sort_flag & LS_REVERSE_SORT ? -1 : 1; #define NCMP(a,b) (a == b ? 0 : (a < b ? 1 : -1)) if (sort_flag & LS_NAME_SORT) return (rmul * strcmp(ap, bp)); else if (sort_flag & LS_TIME_SORT) { #if defined(HAVE_STRUCT_STAT_ST_MTIM) if (timespeccmp(&as->st_mtim, &bs->st_mtim, ==)) return 0; return timespeccmp(&as->st_mtim, &bs->st_mtim, <) ? rmul : -rmul; #elif defined(HAVE_STRUCT_STAT_ST_MTIME) return (rmul * NCMP(as->st_mtime, bs->st_mtime)); #else return rmul * 1; #endif } else if (sort_flag & LS_SIZE_SORT) return (rmul * NCMP(as->st_size, bs->st_size)); fatal("Unknown ls sort type"); } /* sftp ls.1 replacement which handles path globs */ static int do_globbed_ls(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *path, const char *strip_path, int lflag) { char *fname, *lname; glob_t g; int err, r; struct winsize ws; u_int i, j, nentries, *indices = NULL, c = 1; u_int colspace = 0, columns = 1, m = 0, width = 80; memset(&g, 0, sizeof(g)); if ((r = remote_glob(conn, path, GLOB_MARK|GLOB_NOCHECK|GLOB_BRACE|GLOB_KEEPSTAT|GLOB_NOSORT, NULL, &g)) != 0 || (g.gl_pathc && !g.gl_matchc)) { if (g.gl_pathc) globfree(&g); if (r == GLOB_NOSPACE) { error("Can't ls: Too many matches for \"%s\"", path); } else { error("Can't ls: \"%s\" not found", path); } return -1; } if (interrupted) goto out; /* * If the glob returns a single match and it is a directory, * then just list its contents. */ if (g.gl_matchc == 1 && g.gl_statv[0] != NULL && S_ISDIR(g.gl_statv[0]->st_mode)) { err = do_ls_dir(conn, g.gl_pathv[0], strip_path, lflag); globfree(&g); return err; } if (ioctl(fileno(stdin), TIOCGWINSZ, &ws) != -1) width = ws.ws_col; if (!(lflag & LS_SHORT_VIEW)) { /* Count entries for sort and find longest filename */ for (i = 0; g.gl_pathv[i]; i++) m = MAXIMUM(m, strlen(g.gl_pathv[i])); columns = width / (m + 2); columns = MAXIMUM(columns, 1); colspace = width / columns; } /* * Sorting: rather than mess with the contents of glob_t, prepare * an array of indices into it and sort that. For the usual * unsorted case, the indices are just the identity 1=1, 2=2, etc. */ for (nentries = 0; g.gl_pathv[nentries] != NULL; nentries++) ; /* count entries */ - indices = calloc(nentries, sizeof(*indices)); + indices = xcalloc(nentries, sizeof(*indices)); for (i = 0; i < nentries; i++) indices[i] = i; if (lflag & SORT_FLAGS) { sort_glob = &g; sort_flag = lflag & (SORT_FLAGS|LS_REVERSE_SORT); qsort(indices, nentries, sizeof(*indices), sglob_comp); sort_glob = NULL; } get_remote_user_groups_from_glob(conn, &g); for (j = 0; j < nentries && !interrupted; j++) { i = indices[j]; fname = path_strip(g.gl_pathv[i], strip_path); if (lflag & LS_LONG_VIEW) { if (g.gl_statv[i] == NULL) { error("no stat information for %s", fname); + free(fname); continue; } lname = ls_file(fname, g.gl_statv[i], 1, (lflag & LS_SI_UNITS), ruser_name(g.gl_statv[i]->st_uid), rgroup_name(g.gl_statv[i]->st_gid)); mprintf("%s\n", lname); free(lname); } else { mprintf("%-*s", colspace, fname); if (c >= columns) { printf("\n"); c = 1; } else c++; } free(fname); } if (!(lflag & LS_LONG_VIEW) && (c != 1)) printf("\n"); out: if (g.gl_pathc) globfree(&g); free(indices); return 0; } static int do_df(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *path, int hflag, int iflag) { struct sftp_statvfs st; char s_used[FMT_SCALED_STRSIZE], s_avail[FMT_SCALED_STRSIZE]; char s_root[FMT_SCALED_STRSIZE], s_total[FMT_SCALED_STRSIZE]; char s_icapacity[16], s_dcapacity[16]; if (do_statvfs(conn, path, &st, 1) == -1) return -1; if (st.f_files == 0) strlcpy(s_icapacity, "ERR", sizeof(s_icapacity)); else { snprintf(s_icapacity, sizeof(s_icapacity), "%3llu%%", (unsigned long long)(100 * (st.f_files - st.f_ffree) / st.f_files)); } if (st.f_blocks == 0) strlcpy(s_dcapacity, "ERR", sizeof(s_dcapacity)); else { snprintf(s_dcapacity, sizeof(s_dcapacity), "%3llu%%", (unsigned long long)(100 * (st.f_blocks - st.f_bfree) / st.f_blocks)); } if (iflag) { printf(" Inodes Used Avail " "(root) %%Capacity\n"); printf("%11llu %11llu %11llu %11llu %s\n", (unsigned long long)st.f_files, (unsigned long long)(st.f_files - st.f_ffree), (unsigned long long)st.f_favail, (unsigned long long)st.f_ffree, s_icapacity); } else if (hflag) { strlcpy(s_used, "error", sizeof(s_used)); strlcpy(s_avail, "error", sizeof(s_avail)); strlcpy(s_root, "error", sizeof(s_root)); strlcpy(s_total, "error", sizeof(s_total)); fmt_scaled((st.f_blocks - st.f_bfree) * st.f_frsize, s_used); fmt_scaled(st.f_bavail * st.f_frsize, s_avail); fmt_scaled(st.f_bfree * st.f_frsize, s_root); fmt_scaled(st.f_blocks * st.f_frsize, s_total); printf(" Size Used Avail (root) %%Capacity\n"); printf("%7sB %7sB %7sB %7sB %s\n", s_total, s_used, s_avail, s_root, s_dcapacity); } else { printf(" Size Used Avail " "(root) %%Capacity\n"); printf("%12llu %12llu %12llu %12llu %s\n", (unsigned long long)(st.f_frsize * st.f_blocks / 1024), (unsigned long long)(st.f_frsize * (st.f_blocks - st.f_bfree) / 1024), (unsigned long long)(st.f_frsize * st.f_bavail / 1024), (unsigned long long)(st.f_frsize * st.f_bfree / 1024), s_dcapacity); } return 0; } /* * Undo escaping of glob sequences in place. Used to undo extra escaping * applied in makeargv() when the string is destined for a function that * does not glob it. */ static void undo_glob_escape(char *s) { size_t i, j; for (i = j = 0;;) { if (s[i] == '\0') { s[j] = '\0'; return; } if (s[i] != '\\') { s[j++] = s[i++]; continue; } /* s[i] == '\\' */ ++i; switch (s[i]) { case '?': case '[': case '*': case '\\': s[j++] = s[i++]; break; case '\0': s[j++] = '\\'; s[j] = '\0'; return; default: s[j++] = '\\'; s[j++] = s[i++]; break; } } } /* * Split a string into an argument vector using sh(1)-style quoting, * comment and escaping rules, but with some tweaks to handle glob(3) * wildcards. * The "sloppy" flag allows for recovery from missing terminating quote, for * use in parsing incomplete commandlines during tab autocompletion. * * Returns NULL on error or a NULL-terminated array of arguments. * * If "lastquote" is not NULL, the quoting character used for the last * argument is placed in *lastquote ("\0", "'" or "\""). * * If "terminated" is not NULL, *terminated will be set to 1 when the * last argument's quote has been properly terminated or 0 otherwise. * This parameter is only of use if "sloppy" is set. */ #define MAXARGS 128 #define MAXARGLEN 8192 static char ** makeargv(const char *arg, int *argcp, int sloppy, char *lastquote, u_int *terminated) { int argc, quot; size_t i, j; static char argvs[MAXARGLEN]; static char *argv[MAXARGS + 1]; enum { MA_START, MA_SQUOTE, MA_DQUOTE, MA_UNQUOTED } state, q; *argcp = argc = 0; if (strlen(arg) > sizeof(argvs) - 1) { args_too_longs: error("string too long"); return NULL; } if (terminated != NULL) *terminated = 1; if (lastquote != NULL) *lastquote = '\0'; state = MA_START; i = j = 0; for (;;) { if ((size_t)argc >= sizeof(argv) / sizeof(*argv)){ error("Too many arguments."); return NULL; } if (isspace((unsigned char)arg[i])) { if (state == MA_UNQUOTED) { /* Terminate current argument */ argvs[j++] = '\0'; argc++; state = MA_START; } else if (state != MA_START) argvs[j++] = arg[i]; } else if (arg[i] == '"' || arg[i] == '\'') { q = arg[i] == '"' ? MA_DQUOTE : MA_SQUOTE; if (state == MA_START) { argv[argc] = argvs + j; state = q; if (lastquote != NULL) *lastquote = arg[i]; } else if (state == MA_UNQUOTED) state = q; else if (state == q) state = MA_UNQUOTED; else argvs[j++] = arg[i]; } else if (arg[i] == '\\') { if (state == MA_SQUOTE || state == MA_DQUOTE) { quot = state == MA_SQUOTE ? '\'' : '"'; /* Unescape quote we are in */ /* XXX support \n and friends? */ if (arg[i + 1] == quot) { i++; argvs[j++] = arg[i]; } else if (arg[i + 1] == '?' || arg[i + 1] == '[' || arg[i + 1] == '*') { /* * Special case for sftp: append * double-escaped glob sequence - * glob will undo one level of * escaping. NB. string can grow here. */ if (j >= sizeof(argvs) - 5) goto args_too_longs; argvs[j++] = '\\'; argvs[j++] = arg[i++]; argvs[j++] = '\\'; argvs[j++] = arg[i]; } else { argvs[j++] = arg[i++]; argvs[j++] = arg[i]; } } else { if (state == MA_START) { argv[argc] = argvs + j; state = MA_UNQUOTED; if (lastquote != NULL) *lastquote = '\0'; } if (arg[i + 1] == '?' || arg[i + 1] == '[' || arg[i + 1] == '*' || arg[i + 1] == '\\') { /* * Special case for sftp: append * escaped glob sequence - * glob will undo one level of * escaping. */ argvs[j++] = arg[i++]; argvs[j++] = arg[i]; } else { /* Unescape everything */ /* XXX support \n and friends? */ i++; argvs[j++] = arg[i]; } } } else if (arg[i] == '#') { if (state == MA_SQUOTE || state == MA_DQUOTE) argvs[j++] = arg[i]; else goto string_done; } else if (arg[i] == '\0') { if (state == MA_SQUOTE || state == MA_DQUOTE) { if (sloppy) { state = MA_UNQUOTED; if (terminated != NULL) *terminated = 0; goto string_done; } error("Unterminated quoted argument"); return NULL; } string_done: if (state == MA_UNQUOTED) { argvs[j++] = '\0'; argc++; } break; } else { if (state == MA_START) { argv[argc] = argvs + j; state = MA_UNQUOTED; if (lastquote != NULL) *lastquote = '\0'; } if ((state == MA_SQUOTE || state == MA_DQUOTE) && (arg[i] == '?' || arg[i] == '[' || arg[i] == '*')) { /* * Special case for sftp: escape quoted * glob(3) wildcards. NB. string can grow * here. */ if (j >= sizeof(argvs) - 3) goto args_too_longs; argvs[j++] = '\\'; argvs[j++] = arg[i]; } else argvs[j++] = arg[i]; } i++; } *argcp = argc; return argv; } static int parse_args(const char **cpp, int *ignore_errors, int *disable_echo, int *aflag, int *fflag, int *hflag, int *iflag, int *lflag, int *pflag, int *rflag, int *sflag, unsigned long *n_arg, char **path1, char **path2) { const char *cmd, *cp = *cpp; char *cp2, **argv; int base = 0; long long ll; int path1_mandatory = 0, i, cmdnum, optidx, argc; /* Skip leading whitespace */ cp = cp + strspn(cp, WHITESPACE); /* * Check for leading '-' (disable error processing) and '@' (suppress * command echo) */ *ignore_errors = 0; *disable_echo = 0; for (;*cp != '\0'; cp++) { if (*cp == '-') { *ignore_errors = 1; } else if (*cp == '@') { *disable_echo = 1; } else { /* all other characters terminate prefix processing */ break; } } cp = cp + strspn(cp, WHITESPACE); /* Ignore blank lines and lines which begin with comment '#' char */ if (*cp == '\0' || *cp == '#') return (0); if ((argv = makeargv(cp, &argc, 0, NULL, NULL)) == NULL) return -1; /* Figure out which command we have */ for (i = 0; cmds[i].c != NULL; i++) { if (argv[0] != NULL && strcasecmp(cmds[i].c, argv[0]) == 0) break; } cmdnum = cmds[i].n; cmd = cmds[i].c; /* Special case */ if (*cp == '!') { cp++; cmdnum = I_SHELL; } else if (cmdnum == -1) { error("Invalid command."); return -1; } /* Get arguments and parse flags */ *aflag = *fflag = *hflag = *iflag = *lflag = *pflag = 0; *rflag = *sflag = 0; *path1 = *path2 = NULL; optidx = 1; switch (cmdnum) { case I_GET: case I_REGET: case I_REPUT: case I_PUT: if ((optidx = parse_getput_flags(cmd, argv, argc, aflag, fflag, pflag, rflag)) == -1) return -1; /* Get first pathname (mandatory) */ if (argc - optidx < 1) { error("You must specify at least one path after a " "%s command.", cmd); return -1; } *path1 = xstrdup(argv[optidx]); /* Get second pathname (optional) */ if (argc - optidx > 1) { *path2 = xstrdup(argv[optidx + 1]); /* Destination is not globbed */ undo_glob_escape(*path2); } break; case I_LINK: if ((optidx = parse_link_flags(cmd, argv, argc, sflag)) == -1) return -1; goto parse_two_paths; case I_COPY: if ((optidx = parse_no_flags(cmd, argv, argc)) == -1) return -1; goto parse_two_paths; case I_RENAME: if ((optidx = parse_rename_flags(cmd, argv, argc, lflag)) == -1) return -1; goto parse_two_paths; case I_SYMLINK: if ((optidx = parse_no_flags(cmd, argv, argc)) == -1) return -1; parse_two_paths: if (argc - optidx < 2) { error("You must specify two paths after a %s " "command.", cmd); return -1; } *path1 = xstrdup(argv[optidx]); *path2 = xstrdup(argv[optidx + 1]); /* Paths are not globbed */ undo_glob_escape(*path1); undo_glob_escape(*path2); break; case I_RM: case I_MKDIR: case I_RMDIR: case I_LMKDIR: path1_mandatory = 1; /* FALLTHROUGH */ case I_CHDIR: case I_LCHDIR: if ((optidx = parse_no_flags(cmd, argv, argc)) == -1) return -1; /* Get pathname (mandatory) */ if (argc - optidx < 1) { if (!path1_mandatory) break; /* return a NULL path1 */ error("You must specify a path after a %s command.", cmd); return -1; } *path1 = xstrdup(argv[optidx]); /* Only "rm" globs */ if (cmdnum != I_RM) undo_glob_escape(*path1); break; case I_DF: if ((optidx = parse_df_flags(cmd, argv, argc, hflag, iflag)) == -1) return -1; /* Default to current directory if no path specified */ if (argc - optidx < 1) *path1 = NULL; else { *path1 = xstrdup(argv[optidx]); undo_glob_escape(*path1); } break; case I_LS: if ((optidx = parse_ls_flags(argv, argc, lflag)) == -1) return(-1); /* Path is optional */ if (argc - optidx > 0) *path1 = xstrdup(argv[optidx]); break; case I_LLS: /* Skip ls command and following whitespace */ cp = cp + strlen(cmd) + strspn(cp, WHITESPACE); case I_SHELL: /* Uses the rest of the line */ break; case I_LUMASK: case I_CHMOD: base = 8; /* FALLTHROUGH */ case I_CHOWN: case I_CHGRP: if ((optidx = parse_ch_flags(cmd, argv, argc, hflag)) == -1) return -1; /* Get numeric arg (mandatory) */ if (argc - optidx < 1) goto need_num_arg; errno = 0; ll = strtoll(argv[optidx], &cp2, base); if (cp2 == argv[optidx] || *cp2 != '\0' || ((ll == LLONG_MIN || ll == LLONG_MAX) && errno == ERANGE) || ll < 0 || ll > UINT32_MAX) { need_num_arg: error("You must supply a numeric argument " "to the %s command.", cmd); return -1; } *n_arg = ll; if (cmdnum == I_LUMASK) break; /* Get pathname (mandatory) */ if (argc - optidx < 2) { error("You must specify a path after a %s command.", cmd); return -1; } *path1 = xstrdup(argv[optidx + 1]); break; case I_QUIT: case I_PWD: case I_LPWD: case I_HELP: case I_VERSION: case I_PROGRESS: if ((optidx = parse_no_flags(cmd, argv, argc)) == -1) return -1; break; default: fatal("Command not implemented"); } *cpp = cp; return(cmdnum); } static int parse_dispatch_command(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *cmd, char **pwd, const char *startdir, int err_abort, int echo_command) { const char *ocmd = cmd; char *path1, *path2, *tmp; int ignore_errors = 0, disable_echo = 1; int aflag = 0, fflag = 0, hflag = 0, iflag = 0; int lflag = 0, pflag = 0, rflag = 0, sflag = 0; int cmdnum, i; unsigned long n_arg = 0; Attrib a, *aa; char path_buf[PATH_MAX]; int err = 0; glob_t g; path1 = path2 = NULL; cmdnum = parse_args(&cmd, &ignore_errors, &disable_echo, &aflag, &fflag, &hflag, &iflag, &lflag, &pflag, &rflag, &sflag, &n_arg, &path1, &path2); if (ignore_errors != 0) err_abort = 0; if (echo_command && !disable_echo) mprintf("sftp> %s\n", ocmd); memset(&g, 0, sizeof(g)); /* Perform command */ switch (cmdnum) { case 0: /* Blank line */ break; case -1: /* Unrecognized command */ err = -1; break; case I_REGET: aflag = 1; /* FALLTHROUGH */ case I_GET: err = process_get(conn, path1, path2, *pwd, pflag, rflag, aflag, fflag); break; case I_REPUT: aflag = 1; /* FALLTHROUGH */ case I_PUT: err = process_put(conn, path1, path2, *pwd, pflag, rflag, aflag, fflag); break; case I_COPY: path1 = make_absolute(path1, *pwd); path2 = make_absolute(path2, *pwd); err = do_copy(conn, path1, path2); break; case I_RENAME: path1 = make_absolute(path1, *pwd); path2 = make_absolute(path2, *pwd); err = do_rename(conn, path1, path2, lflag); break; case I_SYMLINK: sflag = 1; /* FALLTHROUGH */ case I_LINK: if (!sflag) path1 = make_absolute(path1, *pwd); path2 = make_absolute(path2, *pwd); err = (sflag ? do_symlink : do_hardlink)(conn, path1, path2); break; case I_RM: path1 = make_absolute_pwd_glob(path1, *pwd); remote_glob(conn, path1, GLOB_NOCHECK, NULL, &g); for (i = 0; g.gl_pathv[i] && !interrupted; i++) { if (!quiet) mprintf("Removing %s\n", g.gl_pathv[i]); err = do_rm(conn, g.gl_pathv[i]); if (err != 0 && err_abort) break; } break; case I_MKDIR: path1 = make_absolute(path1, *pwd); attrib_clear(&a); a.flags |= SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_PERMISSIONS; a.perm = 0777; err = do_mkdir(conn, path1, &a, 1); break; case I_RMDIR: path1 = make_absolute(path1, *pwd); err = do_rmdir(conn, path1); break; case I_CHDIR: if (path1 == NULL || *path1 == '\0') path1 = xstrdup(startdir); path1 = make_absolute(path1, *pwd); if ((tmp = do_realpath(conn, path1)) == NULL) { err = 1; break; } if ((aa = do_stat(conn, tmp, 0)) == NULL) { free(tmp); err = 1; break; } if (!(aa->flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_PERMISSIONS)) { error("Can't change directory: Can't check target"); free(tmp); err = 1; break; } if (!S_ISDIR(aa->perm)) { error("Can't change directory: \"%s\" is not " "a directory", tmp); free(tmp); err = 1; break; } free(*pwd); *pwd = tmp; break; case I_LS: if (!path1) { do_ls_dir(conn, *pwd, *pwd, lflag); break; } /* Strip pwd off beginning of non-absolute paths */ tmp = NULL; if (!path_absolute(path1)) tmp = *pwd; path1 = make_absolute_pwd_glob(path1, *pwd); err = do_globbed_ls(conn, path1, tmp, lflag); break; case I_DF: /* Default to current directory if no path specified */ if (path1 == NULL) path1 = xstrdup(*pwd); path1 = make_absolute(path1, *pwd); err = do_df(conn, path1, hflag, iflag); break; case I_LCHDIR: if (path1 == NULL || *path1 == '\0') path1 = xstrdup("~"); tmp = tilde_expand_filename(path1, getuid()); free(path1); path1 = tmp; if (chdir(path1) == -1) { error("Couldn't change local directory to " "\"%s\": %s", path1, strerror(errno)); err = 1; } break; case I_LMKDIR: if (mkdir(path1, 0777) == -1) { error("Couldn't create local directory " "\"%s\": %s", path1, strerror(errno)); err = 1; } break; case I_LLS: local_do_ls(cmd); break; case I_SHELL: local_do_shell(cmd); break; case I_LUMASK: umask(n_arg); printf("Local umask: %03lo\n", n_arg); break; case I_CHMOD: path1 = make_absolute_pwd_glob(path1, *pwd); attrib_clear(&a); a.flags |= SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_PERMISSIONS; a.perm = n_arg; remote_glob(conn, path1, GLOB_NOCHECK, NULL, &g); for (i = 0; g.gl_pathv[i] && !interrupted; i++) { if (!quiet) mprintf("Changing mode on %s\n", g.gl_pathv[i]); err = (hflag ? do_lsetstat : do_setstat)(conn, g.gl_pathv[i], &a); if (err != 0 && err_abort) break; } break; case I_CHOWN: case I_CHGRP: path1 = make_absolute_pwd_glob(path1, *pwd); remote_glob(conn, path1, GLOB_NOCHECK, NULL, &g); for (i = 0; g.gl_pathv[i] && !interrupted; i++) { if (!(aa = (hflag ? do_lstat : do_stat)(conn, g.gl_pathv[i], 0))) { if (err_abort) { err = -1; break; } else continue; } if (!(aa->flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_UIDGID)) { error("Can't get current ownership of " "remote file \"%s\"", g.gl_pathv[i]); if (err_abort) { err = -1; break; } else continue; } aa->flags &= SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_UIDGID; if (cmdnum == I_CHOWN) { if (!quiet) mprintf("Changing owner on %s\n", g.gl_pathv[i]); aa->uid = n_arg; } else { if (!quiet) mprintf("Changing group on %s\n", g.gl_pathv[i]); aa->gid = n_arg; } err = (hflag ? do_lsetstat : do_setstat)(conn, g.gl_pathv[i], aa); if (err != 0 && err_abort) break; } break; case I_PWD: mprintf("Remote working directory: %s\n", *pwd); break; case I_LPWD: if (!getcwd(path_buf, sizeof(path_buf))) { error("Couldn't get local cwd: %s", strerror(errno)); err = -1; break; } mprintf("Local working directory: %s\n", path_buf); break; case I_QUIT: /* Processed below */ break; case I_HELP: help(); break; case I_VERSION: printf("SFTP protocol version %u\n", sftp_proto_version(conn)); break; case I_PROGRESS: showprogress = !showprogress; if (showprogress) printf("Progress meter enabled\n"); else printf("Progress meter disabled\n"); break; default: fatal("%d is not implemented", cmdnum); } if (g.gl_pathc) globfree(&g); free(path1); free(path2); /* If an unignored error occurs in batch mode we should abort. */ if (err_abort && err != 0) return (-1); else if (cmdnum == I_QUIT) return (1); return (0); } #ifdef USE_LIBEDIT static char * prompt(EditLine *el) { return ("sftp> "); } /* Display entries in 'list' after skipping the first 'len' chars */ static void complete_display(char **list, u_int len) { u_int y, m = 0, width = 80, columns = 1, colspace = 0, llen; struct winsize ws; char *tmp; /* Count entries for sort and find longest */ for (y = 0; list[y]; y++) m = MAXIMUM(m, strlen(list[y])); if (ioctl(fileno(stdin), TIOCGWINSZ, &ws) != -1) width = ws.ws_col; m = m > len ? m - len : 0; columns = width / (m + 2); columns = MAXIMUM(columns, 1); colspace = width / columns; colspace = MINIMUM(colspace, width); printf("\n"); m = 1; for (y = 0; list[y]; y++) { llen = strlen(list[y]); tmp = llen > len ? list[y] + len : ""; mprintf("%-*s", colspace, tmp); if (m >= columns) { printf("\n"); m = 1; } else m++; } printf("\n"); } /* * Given a "list" of words that begin with a common prefix of "word", * attempt to find an autocompletion to extends "word" by the next * characters common to all entries in "list". */ static char * complete_ambiguous(const char *word, char **list, size_t count) { if (word == NULL) return NULL; if (count > 0) { u_int y, matchlen = strlen(list[0]); /* Find length of common stem */ for (y = 1; list[y]; y++) { u_int x; for (x = 0; x < matchlen; x++) if (list[0][x] != list[y][x]) break; matchlen = x; } if (matchlen > strlen(word)) { char *tmp = xstrdup(list[0]); tmp[matchlen] = '\0'; return tmp; } } return xstrdup(word); } /* Autocomplete a sftp command */ static int complete_cmd_parse(EditLine *el, char *cmd, int lastarg, char quote, int terminated) { u_int y, count = 0, cmdlen, tmplen; char *tmp, **list, argterm[3]; const LineInfo *lf; list = xcalloc((sizeof(cmds) / sizeof(*cmds)) + 1, sizeof(char *)); /* No command specified: display all available commands */ if (cmd == NULL) { for (y = 0; cmds[y].c; y++) list[count++] = xstrdup(cmds[y].c); list[count] = NULL; complete_display(list, 0); for (y = 0; list[y] != NULL; y++) free(list[y]); free(list); return count; } /* Prepare subset of commands that start with "cmd" */ cmdlen = strlen(cmd); for (y = 0; cmds[y].c; y++) { if (!strncasecmp(cmd, cmds[y].c, cmdlen)) list[count++] = xstrdup(cmds[y].c); } list[count] = NULL; if (count == 0) { free(list); return 0; } /* Complete ambiguous command */ tmp = complete_ambiguous(cmd, list, count); if (count > 1) complete_display(list, 0); for (y = 0; list[y]; y++) free(list[y]); free(list); if (tmp != NULL) { tmplen = strlen(tmp); cmdlen = strlen(cmd); /* If cmd may be extended then do so */ if (tmplen > cmdlen) if (el_insertstr(el, tmp + cmdlen) == -1) fatal("el_insertstr failed."); lf = el_line(el); /* Terminate argument cleanly */ if (count == 1) { y = 0; if (!terminated) argterm[y++] = quote; if (lastarg || *(lf->cursor) != ' ') argterm[y++] = ' '; argterm[y] = '\0'; if (y > 0 && el_insertstr(el, argterm) == -1) fatal("el_insertstr failed."); } free(tmp); } return count; } /* * Determine whether a particular sftp command's arguments (if any) represent * local or remote files. The "cmdarg" argument specifies the actual argument * and accepts values 1 or 2. */ static int complete_is_remote(char *cmd, int cmdarg) { int i; if (cmd == NULL) return -1; for (i = 0; cmds[i].c; i++) { if (!strncasecmp(cmd, cmds[i].c, strlen(cmds[i].c))) { if (cmdarg == 1) return cmds[i].t; else if (cmdarg == 2) return cmds[i].t2; break; } } return -1; } /* Autocomplete a filename "file" */ static int complete_match(EditLine *el, struct sftp_conn *conn, char *remote_path, char *file, int remote, int lastarg, char quote, int terminated) { glob_t g; char *tmp, *tmp2, ins[8]; u_int i, hadglob, pwdlen, len, tmplen, filelen, cesc, isesc, isabs; int clen; const LineInfo *lf; /* Glob from "file" location */ if (file == NULL) tmp = xstrdup("*"); else xasprintf(&tmp, "%s*", file); /* Check if the path is absolute. */ isabs = path_absolute(tmp); memset(&g, 0, sizeof(g)); if (remote != LOCAL) { - tmp = make_absolute_pwd_glob(tmp, remote_path); + tmp2 = make_absolute_pwd_glob(tmp, remote_path); + free(tmp); + tmp = tmp2; remote_glob(conn, tmp, GLOB_DOOFFS|GLOB_MARK, NULL, &g); } else glob(tmp, GLOB_DOOFFS|GLOB_MARK, NULL, &g); /* Determine length of pwd so we can trim completion display */ for (hadglob = tmplen = pwdlen = 0; tmp[tmplen] != 0; tmplen++) { /* Terminate counting on first unescaped glob metacharacter */ if (tmp[tmplen] == '*' || tmp[tmplen] == '?') { if (tmp[tmplen] != '*' || tmp[tmplen + 1] != '\0') hadglob = 1; break; } if (tmp[tmplen] == '\\' && tmp[tmplen + 1] != '\0') tmplen++; if (tmp[tmplen] == '/') pwdlen = tmplen + 1; /* track last seen '/' */ } free(tmp); tmp = NULL; if (g.gl_matchc == 0) goto out; if (g.gl_matchc > 1) complete_display(g.gl_pathv, pwdlen); /* Don't try to extend globs */ if (file == NULL || hadglob) goto out; tmp2 = complete_ambiguous(file, g.gl_pathv, g.gl_matchc); tmp = path_strip(tmp2, isabs ? NULL : remote_path); free(tmp2); if (tmp == NULL) goto out; tmplen = strlen(tmp); filelen = strlen(file); /* Count the number of escaped characters in the input string. */ cesc = isesc = 0; for (i = 0; i < filelen; i++) { if (!isesc && file[i] == '\\' && i + 1 < filelen){ isesc = 1; cesc++; } else isesc = 0; } if (tmplen > (filelen - cesc)) { tmp2 = tmp + filelen - cesc; len = strlen(tmp2); /* quote argument on way out */ for (i = 0; i < len; i += clen) { if ((clen = mblen(tmp2 + i, len - i)) < 0 || (size_t)clen > sizeof(ins) - 2) fatal("invalid multibyte character"); ins[0] = '\\'; memcpy(ins + 1, tmp2 + i, clen); ins[clen + 1] = '\0'; switch (tmp2[i]) { case '\'': case '"': case '\\': case '\t': case '[': case ' ': case '#': case '*': if (quote == '\0' || tmp2[i] == quote) { if (el_insertstr(el, ins) == -1) fatal("el_insertstr " "failed."); break; } /* FALLTHROUGH */ default: if (el_insertstr(el, ins + 1) == -1) fatal("el_insertstr failed."); break; } } } lf = el_line(el); if (g.gl_matchc == 1) { i = 0; if (!terminated && quote != '\0') ins[i++] = quote; if (*(lf->cursor - 1) != '/' && (lastarg || *(lf->cursor) != ' ')) ins[i++] = ' '; ins[i] = '\0'; if (i > 0 && el_insertstr(el, ins) == -1) fatal("el_insertstr failed."); } free(tmp); out: globfree(&g); return g.gl_matchc; } /* tab-completion hook function, called via libedit */ static unsigned char complete(EditLine *el, int ch) { char **argv, *line, quote; int argc, carg; u_int cursor, len, terminated, ret = CC_ERROR; const LineInfo *lf; struct complete_ctx *complete_ctx; lf = el_line(el); if (el_get(el, EL_CLIENTDATA, (void**)&complete_ctx) != 0) fatal_f("el_get failed"); /* Figure out which argument the cursor points to */ cursor = lf->cursor - lf->buffer; line = xmalloc(cursor + 1); memcpy(line, lf->buffer, cursor); line[cursor] = '\0'; argv = makeargv(line, &carg, 1, "e, &terminated); free(line); /* Get all the arguments on the line */ len = lf->lastchar - lf->buffer; line = xmalloc(len + 1); memcpy(line, lf->buffer, len); line[len] = '\0'; argv = makeargv(line, &argc, 1, NULL, NULL); /* Ensure cursor is at EOL or a argument boundary */ if (line[cursor] != ' ' && line[cursor] != '\0' && line[cursor] != '\n') { free(line); return ret; } if (carg == 0) { /* Show all available commands */ complete_cmd_parse(el, NULL, argc == carg, '\0', 1); ret = CC_REDISPLAY; } else if (carg == 1 && cursor > 0 && line[cursor - 1] != ' ') { /* Handle the command parsing */ if (complete_cmd_parse(el, argv[0], argc == carg, quote, terminated) != 0) ret = CC_REDISPLAY; } else if (carg >= 1) { /* Handle file parsing */ int remote = 0; int i = 0, cmdarg = 0; char *filematch = NULL; if (carg > 1 && line[cursor-1] != ' ') filematch = argv[carg - 1]; for (i = 1; i < carg; i++) { /* Skip flags */ if (argv[i][0] != '-') cmdarg++; } /* * If previous argument is complete, then offer completion * on the next one. */ if (line[cursor - 1] == ' ') cmdarg++; remote = complete_is_remote(argv[0], cmdarg); if ((remote == REMOTE || remote == LOCAL) && complete_match(el, complete_ctx->conn, *complete_ctx->remote_pathp, filematch, remote, carg == argc, quote, terminated) != 0) ret = CC_REDISPLAY; } free(line); return ret; } #endif /* USE_LIBEDIT */ static int interactive_loop(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *file1, char *file2) { char *remote_path; char *dir = NULL, *startdir = NULL; char cmd[2048]; int err, interactive; EditLine *el = NULL; #ifdef USE_LIBEDIT History *hl = NULL; HistEvent hev; extern char *__progname; struct complete_ctx complete_ctx; if (!batchmode && isatty(STDIN_FILENO)) { if ((el = el_init(__progname, stdin, stdout, stderr)) == NULL) fatal("Couldn't initialise editline"); if ((hl = history_init()) == NULL) fatal("Couldn't initialise editline history"); history(hl, &hev, H_SETSIZE, 100); el_set(el, EL_HIST, history, hl); el_set(el, EL_PROMPT, prompt); el_set(el, EL_EDITOR, "emacs"); el_set(el, EL_TERMINAL, NULL); el_set(el, EL_SIGNAL, 1); el_source(el, NULL); /* Tab Completion */ el_set(el, EL_ADDFN, "ftp-complete", "Context sensitive argument completion", complete); complete_ctx.conn = conn; complete_ctx.remote_pathp = &remote_path; el_set(el, EL_CLIENTDATA, (void*)&complete_ctx); el_set(el, EL_BIND, "^I", "ftp-complete", NULL); /* enable ctrl-left-arrow and ctrl-right-arrow */ el_set(el, EL_BIND, "\\e[1;5C", "em-next-word", NULL); el_set(el, EL_BIND, "\\e\\e[C", "em-next-word", NULL); el_set(el, EL_BIND, "\\e[1;5D", "ed-prev-word", NULL); el_set(el, EL_BIND, "\\e\\e[D", "ed-prev-word", NULL); /* make ^w match ksh behaviour */ el_set(el, EL_BIND, "^w", "ed-delete-prev-word", NULL); } #endif /* USE_LIBEDIT */ remote_path = do_realpath(conn, "."); if (remote_path == NULL) fatal("Need cwd"); startdir = xstrdup(remote_path); if (file1 != NULL) { dir = xstrdup(file1); dir = make_absolute(dir, remote_path); if (remote_is_dir(conn, dir) && file2 == NULL) { if (!quiet) mprintf("Changing to: %s\n", dir); snprintf(cmd, sizeof cmd, "cd \"%s\"", dir); if (parse_dispatch_command(conn, cmd, &remote_path, startdir, 1, 0) != 0) { free(dir); free(startdir); free(remote_path); free(conn); return (-1); } } else { /* XXX this is wrong wrt quoting */ snprintf(cmd, sizeof cmd, "get%s %s%s%s", global_aflag ? " -a" : "", dir, file2 == NULL ? "" : " ", file2 == NULL ? "" : file2); err = parse_dispatch_command(conn, cmd, &remote_path, startdir, 1, 0); free(dir); free(startdir); free(remote_path); free(conn); return (err); } free(dir); } setvbuf(stdout, NULL, _IOLBF, 0); setvbuf(infile, NULL, _IOLBF, 0); interactive = !batchmode && isatty(STDIN_FILENO); err = 0; for (;;) { struct sigaction sa; interrupted = 0; memset(&sa, 0, sizeof(sa)); sa.sa_handler = interactive ? read_interrupt : killchild; if (sigaction(SIGINT, &sa, NULL) == -1) { debug3("sigaction(%s): %s", strsignal(SIGINT), strerror(errno)); break; } if (el == NULL) { if (interactive) printf("sftp> "); if (fgets(cmd, sizeof(cmd), infile) == NULL) { if (interactive) printf("\n"); if (interrupted) continue; break; } } else { #ifdef USE_LIBEDIT const char *line; int count = 0; if ((line = el_gets(el, &count)) == NULL || count <= 0) { printf("\n"); if (interrupted) continue; break; } history(hl, &hev, H_ENTER, line); if (strlcpy(cmd, line, sizeof(cmd)) >= sizeof(cmd)) { fprintf(stderr, "Error: input line too long\n"); continue; } #endif /* USE_LIBEDIT */ } cmd[strcspn(cmd, "\n")] = '\0'; /* Handle user interrupts gracefully during commands */ interrupted = 0; ssh_signal(SIGINT, cmd_interrupt); err = parse_dispatch_command(conn, cmd, &remote_path, startdir, batchmode, !interactive && el == NULL); if (err != 0) break; } ssh_signal(SIGCHLD, SIG_DFL); free(remote_path); free(startdir); free(conn); #ifdef USE_LIBEDIT if (el != NULL) el_end(el); #endif /* USE_LIBEDIT */ /* err == 1 signifies normal "quit" exit */ return (err >= 0 ? 0 : -1); } static void connect_to_server(char *path, char **args, int *in, int *out) { int c_in, c_out; #ifdef USE_PIPES int pin[2], pout[2]; if ((pipe(pin) == -1) || (pipe(pout) == -1)) fatal("pipe: %s", strerror(errno)); *in = pin[0]; *out = pout[1]; c_in = pout[0]; c_out = pin[1]; #else /* USE_PIPES */ int inout[2]; if (socketpair(AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0, inout) == -1) fatal("socketpair: %s", strerror(errno)); *in = *out = inout[0]; c_in = c_out = inout[1]; #endif /* USE_PIPES */ if ((sshpid = fork()) == -1) fatal("fork: %s", strerror(errno)); else if (sshpid == 0) { if ((dup2(c_in, STDIN_FILENO) == -1) || (dup2(c_out, STDOUT_FILENO) == -1)) { fprintf(stderr, "dup2: %s\n", strerror(errno)); _exit(1); } close(*in); close(*out); close(c_in); close(c_out); /* * The underlying ssh is in the same process group, so we must * ignore SIGINT if we want to gracefully abort commands, * otherwise the signal will make it to the ssh process and * kill it too. Contrawise, since sftp sends SIGTERMs to the * underlying ssh, it must *not* ignore that signal. */ ssh_signal(SIGINT, SIG_IGN); ssh_signal(SIGTERM, SIG_DFL); execvp(path, args); fprintf(stderr, "exec: %s: %s\n", path, strerror(errno)); _exit(1); } ssh_signal(SIGTERM, killchild); ssh_signal(SIGINT, killchild); ssh_signal(SIGHUP, killchild); ssh_signal(SIGTSTP, suspchild); ssh_signal(SIGTTIN, suspchild); ssh_signal(SIGTTOU, suspchild); ssh_signal(SIGCHLD, sigchld_handler); close(c_in); close(c_out); } static void usage(void) { extern char *__progname; fprintf(stderr, "usage: %s [-46AaCfNpqrv] [-B buffer_size] [-b batchfile] [-c cipher]\n" " [-D sftp_server_command] [-F ssh_config] [-i identity_file]\n" " [-J destination] [-l limit] [-o ssh_option] [-P port]\n" " [-R num_requests] [-S program] [-s subsystem | sftp_server]\n" " [-X sftp_option] destination\n", __progname); exit(1); } int main(int argc, char **argv) { int r, in, out, ch, err, tmp, port = -1, noisy = 0; char *host = NULL, *user, *cp, **cpp, *file2 = NULL; int debug_level = 0; char *file1 = NULL, *sftp_server = NULL; char *ssh_program = _PATH_SSH_PROGRAM, *sftp_direct = NULL; const char *errstr; LogLevel ll = SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO; arglist args; extern int optind; extern char *optarg; struct sftp_conn *conn; size_t copy_buffer_len = 0; size_t num_requests = 0; long long llv, limit_kbps = 0; /* Ensure that fds 0, 1 and 2 are open or directed to /dev/null */ sanitise_stdfd(); msetlocale(); __progname = ssh_get_progname(argv[0]); memset(&args, '\0', sizeof(args)); args.list = NULL; addargs(&args, "%s", ssh_program); addargs(&args, "-oForwardX11 no"); addargs(&args, "-oPermitLocalCommand no"); addargs(&args, "-oClearAllForwardings yes"); ll = SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO; infile = stdin; while ((ch = getopt(argc, argv, "1246AafhNpqrvCc:D:i:l:o:s:S:b:B:F:J:P:R:X:")) != -1) { switch (ch) { /* Passed through to ssh(1) */ case 'A': case '4': case '6': case 'C': addargs(&args, "-%c", ch); break; /* Passed through to ssh(1) with argument */ case 'F': case 'J': case 'c': case 'i': case 'o': addargs(&args, "-%c", ch); addargs(&args, "%s", optarg); break; case 'q': ll = SYSLOG_LEVEL_ERROR; quiet = 1; showprogress = 0; addargs(&args, "-%c", ch); break; case 'P': port = a2port(optarg); if (port <= 0) fatal("Bad port \"%s\"\n", optarg); break; case 'v': if (debug_level < 3) { addargs(&args, "-v"); ll = SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG1 + debug_level; } debug_level++; break; case '1': fatal("SSH protocol v.1 is no longer supported"); break; case '2': /* accept silently */ break; case 'a': global_aflag = 1; break; case 'B': copy_buffer_len = strtol(optarg, &cp, 10); if (copy_buffer_len == 0 || *cp != '\0') fatal("Invalid buffer size \"%s\"", optarg); break; case 'b': if (batchmode) fatal("Batch file already specified."); /* Allow "-" as stdin */ if (strcmp(optarg, "-") != 0 && (infile = fopen(optarg, "r")) == NULL) fatal("%s (%s).", strerror(errno), optarg); showprogress = 0; quiet = batchmode = 1; addargs(&args, "-obatchmode yes"); break; case 'f': global_fflag = 1; break; case 'N': noisy = 1; /* Used to clear quiet mode after getopt */ break; case 'p': global_pflag = 1; break; case 'D': sftp_direct = optarg; break; case 'l': limit_kbps = strtonum(optarg, 1, 100 * 1024 * 1024, &errstr); if (errstr != NULL) usage(); limit_kbps *= 1024; /* kbps */ break; case 'r': global_rflag = 1; break; case 'R': num_requests = strtol(optarg, &cp, 10); if (num_requests == 0 || *cp != '\0') fatal("Invalid number of requests \"%s\"", optarg); break; case 's': sftp_server = optarg; break; case 'S': ssh_program = optarg; replacearg(&args, 0, "%s", ssh_program); break; case 'X': /* Please keep in sync with ssh.c -X */ if (strncmp(optarg, "buffer=", 7) == 0) { r = scan_scaled(optarg + 7, &llv); if (r == 0 && (llv <= 0 || llv > 256 * 1024)) { r = -1; errno = EINVAL; } if (r == -1) { fatal("Invalid buffer size \"%s\": %s", optarg + 7, strerror(errno)); } copy_buffer_len = (size_t)llv; } else if (strncmp(optarg, "nrequests=", 10) == 0) { llv = strtonum(optarg + 10, 1, 256 * 1024, &errstr); if (errstr != NULL) { fatal("Invalid number of requests " "\"%s\": %s", optarg + 10, errstr); } num_requests = (size_t)llv; } else { fatal("Invalid -X option"); } break; case 'h': default: usage(); } } /* Do this last because we want the user to be able to override it */ addargs(&args, "-oForwardAgent no"); if (!isatty(STDERR_FILENO)) showprogress = 0; if (noisy) quiet = 0; log_init(argv[0], ll, SYSLOG_FACILITY_USER, 1); if (sftp_direct == NULL) { if (optind == argc || argc > (optind + 2)) usage(); argv += optind; switch (parse_uri("sftp", *argv, &user, &host, &tmp, &file1)) { case -1: usage(); break; case 0: if (tmp != -1) port = tmp; break; default: /* Try with user, host and path. */ if (parse_user_host_path(*argv, &user, &host, &file1) == 0) break; /* Try with user and host. */ if (parse_user_host_port(*argv, &user, &host, NULL) == 0) break; /* Treat as a plain hostname. */ host = xstrdup(*argv); host = cleanhostname(host); break; } file2 = *(argv + 1); if (!*host) { fprintf(stderr, "Missing hostname\n"); usage(); } if (port != -1) addargs(&args, "-oPort %d", port); if (user != NULL) { addargs(&args, "-l"); addargs(&args, "%s", user); } /* no subsystem if the server-spec contains a '/' */ if (sftp_server == NULL || strchr(sftp_server, '/') == NULL) addargs(&args, "-s"); addargs(&args, "--"); addargs(&args, "%s", host); addargs(&args, "%s", (sftp_server != NULL ? sftp_server : "sftp")); connect_to_server(ssh_program, args.list, &in, &out); } else { if ((r = argv_split(sftp_direct, &tmp, &cpp, 1)) != 0) fatal_r(r, "Parse -D arguments"); if (cpp[0] == 0) fatal("No sftp server specified via -D"); connect_to_server(cpp[0], cpp, &in, &out); argv_free(cpp, tmp); } freeargs(&args); conn = do_init(in, out, copy_buffer_len, num_requests, limit_kbps); if (conn == NULL) fatal("Couldn't initialise connection to server"); if (!quiet) { if (sftp_direct == NULL) fprintf(stderr, "Connected to %s.\n", host); else fprintf(stderr, "Attached to %s.\n", sftp_direct); } err = interactive_loop(conn, file1, file2); #if !defined(USE_PIPES) shutdown(in, SHUT_RDWR); shutdown(out, SHUT_RDWR); #endif close(in); close(out); if (batchmode) fclose(infile); while (waitpid(sshpid, NULL, 0) == -1 && sshpid > 1) if (errno != EINTR) fatal("Couldn't wait for ssh process: %s", strerror(errno)); exit(err == 0 ? 0 : 1); } diff --git a/crypto/openssh/ssh-add.c b/crypto/openssh/ssh-add.c index 777f21e26b01..752b86dfcd8e 100644 --- a/crypto/openssh/ssh-add.c +++ b/crypto/openssh/ssh-add.c @@ -1,1014 +1,1017 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: ssh-add.c,v 1.166 2022/06/18 02:17:16 dtucker Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: ssh-add.c,v 1.167 2023/03/08 00:05:58 djm Exp $ */ /* * Author: Tatu Ylonen * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen , Espoo, Finland * All rights reserved * Adds an identity to the authentication server, or removes an identity. * * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell". * * SSH2 implementation, * Copyright (c) 2000, 2001 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. */ #include "includes.h" #include #include #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL # include # include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h" #endif #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include "xmalloc.h" #include "ssh.h" #include "log.h" #include "sshkey.h" #include "sshbuf.h" #include "authfd.h" #include "authfile.h" #include "pathnames.h" #include "misc.h" #include "ssherr.h" #include "digest.h" #include "ssh-sk.h" #include "sk-api.h" #include "hostfile.h" /* argv0 */ extern char *__progname; /* Default files to add */ static char *default_files[] = { #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL _PATH_SSH_CLIENT_ID_RSA, #ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC _PATH_SSH_CLIENT_ID_ECDSA, _PATH_SSH_CLIENT_ID_ECDSA_SK, #endif #endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */ _PATH_SSH_CLIENT_ID_ED25519, _PATH_SSH_CLIENT_ID_ED25519_SK, _PATH_SSH_CLIENT_ID_XMSS, _PATH_SSH_CLIENT_ID_DSA, NULL }; static int fingerprint_hash = SSH_FP_HASH_DEFAULT; /* Default lifetime (0 == forever) */ static int lifetime = 0; /* User has to confirm key use */ static int confirm = 0; /* Maximum number of signatures (XMSS) */ static u_int maxsign = 0; static u_int minleft = 0; /* we keep a cache of one passphrase */ static char *pass = NULL; static void clear_pass(void) { if (pass) { freezero(pass, strlen(pass)); pass = NULL; } } static int delete_one(int agent_fd, const struct sshkey *key, const char *comment, const char *path, int qflag) { int r; if ((r = ssh_remove_identity(agent_fd, key)) != 0) { fprintf(stderr, "Could not remove identity \"%s\": %s\n", path, ssh_err(r)); return r; } if (!qflag) { fprintf(stderr, "Identity removed: %s %s (%s)\n", path, sshkey_type(key), comment ? comment : "no comment"); } return 0; } static int delete_stdin(int agent_fd, int qflag) { char *line = NULL, *cp; size_t linesize = 0; struct sshkey *key = NULL; int lnum = 0, r, ret = -1; while (getline(&line, &linesize, stdin) != -1) { lnum++; sshkey_free(key); key = NULL; line[strcspn(line, "\n")] = '\0'; cp = line + strspn(line, " \t"); if (*cp == '#' || *cp == '\0') continue; if ((key = sshkey_new(KEY_UNSPEC)) == NULL) fatal_f("sshkey_new"); if ((r = sshkey_read(key, &cp)) != 0) { error_r(r, "(stdin):%d: invalid key", lnum); continue; } if (delete_one(agent_fd, key, cp, "(stdin)", qflag) == 0) ret = 0; } sshkey_free(key); free(line); return ret; } static int delete_file(int agent_fd, const char *filename, int key_only, int qflag) { struct sshkey *public, *cert = NULL; char *certpath = NULL, *comment = NULL; int r, ret = -1; if (strcmp(filename, "-") == 0) return delete_stdin(agent_fd, qflag); if ((r = sshkey_load_public(filename, &public, &comment)) != 0) { printf("Bad key file %s: %s\n", filename, ssh_err(r)); return -1; } if (delete_one(agent_fd, public, comment, filename, qflag) == 0) ret = 0; if (key_only) goto out; /* Now try to delete the corresponding certificate too */ free(comment); comment = NULL; xasprintf(&certpath, "%s-cert.pub", filename); if ((r = sshkey_load_public(certpath, &cert, &comment)) != 0) { if (r != SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR || errno != ENOENT) error_r(r, "Failed to load certificate \"%s\"", certpath); goto out; } if (!sshkey_equal_public(cert, public)) fatal("Certificate %s does not match private key %s", certpath, filename); if (delete_one(agent_fd, cert, comment, certpath, qflag) == 0) ret = 0; out: sshkey_free(cert); sshkey_free(public); free(certpath); free(comment); return ret; } /* Send a request to remove all identities. */ static int delete_all(int agent_fd, int qflag) { int ret = -1; /* * Since the agent might be forwarded, old or non-OpenSSH, when asked * to remove all keys, attempt to remove both protocol v.1 and v.2 * keys. */ if (ssh_remove_all_identities(agent_fd, 2) == 0) ret = 0; /* ignore error-code for ssh1 */ ssh_remove_all_identities(agent_fd, 1); if (ret != 0) fprintf(stderr, "Failed to remove all identities.\n"); else if (!qflag) fprintf(stderr, "All identities removed.\n"); return ret; } static int add_file(int agent_fd, const char *filename, int key_only, int qflag, const char *skprovider, struct dest_constraint **dest_constraints, size_t ndest_constraints) { struct sshkey *private, *cert; char *comment = NULL; char msg[1024], *certpath = NULL; int r, fd, ret = -1; size_t i; u_int32_t left; struct sshbuf *keyblob; struct ssh_identitylist *idlist; if (strcmp(filename, "-") == 0) { fd = STDIN_FILENO; filename = "(stdin)"; } else if ((fd = open(filename, O_RDONLY)) == -1) { perror(filename); return -1; } /* * Since we'll try to load a keyfile multiple times, permission errors * will occur multiple times, so check perms first and bail if wrong. */ if (fd != STDIN_FILENO) { if (sshkey_perm_ok(fd, filename) != 0) { close(fd); return -1; } } if ((r = sshbuf_load_fd(fd, &keyblob)) != 0) { fprintf(stderr, "Error loading key \"%s\": %s\n", filename, ssh_err(r)); sshbuf_free(keyblob); close(fd); return -1; } close(fd); /* At first, try empty passphrase */ if ((r = sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(keyblob, "", &private, &comment)) != 0 && r != SSH_ERR_KEY_WRONG_PASSPHRASE) { fprintf(stderr, "Error loading key \"%s\": %s\n", filename, ssh_err(r)); goto fail_load; } /* try last */ if (private == NULL && pass != NULL) { if ((r = sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(keyblob, pass, &private, &comment)) != 0 && r != SSH_ERR_KEY_WRONG_PASSPHRASE) { fprintf(stderr, "Error loading key \"%s\": %s\n", filename, ssh_err(r)); goto fail_load; } } if (private == NULL) { /* clear passphrase since it did not work */ clear_pass(); snprintf(msg, sizeof msg, "Enter passphrase for %s%s: ", filename, confirm ? " (will confirm each use)" : ""); for (;;) { pass = read_passphrase(msg, RP_ALLOW_STDIN); if (strcmp(pass, "") == 0) goto fail_load; if ((r = sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(keyblob, pass, &private, &comment)) == 0) break; else if (r != SSH_ERR_KEY_WRONG_PASSPHRASE) { fprintf(stderr, "Error loading key \"%s\": %s\n", filename, ssh_err(r)); fail_load: clear_pass(); sshbuf_free(keyblob); return -1; } clear_pass(); snprintf(msg, sizeof msg, "Bad passphrase, try again for %s%s: ", filename, confirm ? " (will confirm each use)" : ""); } } if (comment == NULL || *comment == '\0') comment = xstrdup(filename); sshbuf_free(keyblob); /* For XMSS */ if ((r = sshkey_set_filename(private, filename)) != 0) { fprintf(stderr, "Could not add filename to private key: %s (%s)\n", filename, comment); goto out; } if (maxsign && minleft && (r = ssh_fetch_identitylist(agent_fd, &idlist)) == 0) { for (i = 0; i < idlist->nkeys; i++) { if (!sshkey_equal_public(idlist->keys[i], private)) continue; left = sshkey_signatures_left(idlist->keys[i]); if (left < minleft) { fprintf(stderr, "Only %d signatures left.\n", left); break; } fprintf(stderr, "Skipping update: "); if (left == minleft) { fprintf(stderr, "required signatures left (%d).\n", left); } else { fprintf(stderr, "more signatures left (%d) than" " required (%d).\n", left, minleft); } ssh_free_identitylist(idlist); goto out; } ssh_free_identitylist(idlist); } if (sshkey_is_sk(private)) { if (skprovider == NULL) { fprintf(stderr, "Cannot load FIDO key %s " "without provider\n", filename); goto out; } } else { /* Don't send provider constraint for other keys */ skprovider = NULL; } if ((r = ssh_add_identity_constrained(agent_fd, private, comment, lifetime, confirm, maxsign, skprovider, dest_constraints, ndest_constraints)) == 0) { ret = 0; if (!qflag) { fprintf(stderr, "Identity added: %s (%s)\n", filename, comment); if (lifetime != 0) { fprintf(stderr, "Lifetime set to %d seconds\n", lifetime); } if (confirm != 0) { fprintf(stderr, "The user must confirm " "each use of the key\n"); } } } else { fprintf(stderr, "Could not add identity \"%s\": %s\n", filename, ssh_err(r)); } /* Skip trying to load the cert if requested */ if (key_only) goto out; /* Now try to add the certificate flavour too */ xasprintf(&certpath, "%s-cert.pub", filename); if ((r = sshkey_load_public(certpath, &cert, NULL)) != 0) { if (r != SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR || errno != ENOENT) error_r(r, "Failed to load certificate \"%s\"", certpath); goto out; } if (!sshkey_equal_public(cert, private)) { error("Certificate %s does not match private key %s", certpath, filename); sshkey_free(cert); goto out; } /* Graft with private bits */ if ((r = sshkey_to_certified(private)) != 0) { error_fr(r, "sshkey_to_certified"); sshkey_free(cert); goto out; } if ((r = sshkey_cert_copy(cert, private)) != 0) { error_fr(r, "sshkey_cert_copy"); sshkey_free(cert); goto out; } sshkey_free(cert); if ((r = ssh_add_identity_constrained(agent_fd, private, comment, lifetime, confirm, maxsign, skprovider, dest_constraints, ndest_constraints)) != 0) { error_r(r, "Certificate %s (%s) add failed", certpath, private->cert->key_id); goto out; } /* success */ if (!qflag) { fprintf(stderr, "Certificate added: %s (%s)\n", certpath, private->cert->key_id); if (lifetime != 0) { fprintf(stderr, "Lifetime set to %d seconds\n", lifetime); } if (confirm != 0) { fprintf(stderr, "The user must confirm each use " "of the key\n"); } } out: free(certpath); free(comment); sshkey_free(private); return ret; } static int update_card(int agent_fd, int add, const char *id, int qflag, struct dest_constraint **dest_constraints, size_t ndest_constraints) { char *pin = NULL; int r, ret = -1; if (add) { if ((pin = read_passphrase("Enter passphrase for PKCS#11: ", RP_ALLOW_STDIN)) == NULL) return -1; } if ((r = ssh_update_card(agent_fd, add, id, pin == NULL ? "" : pin, lifetime, confirm, dest_constraints, ndest_constraints)) == 0) { ret = 0; if (!qflag) { fprintf(stderr, "Card %s: %s\n", add ? "added" : "removed", id); } } else { fprintf(stderr, "Could not %s card \"%s\": %s\n", add ? "add" : "remove", id, ssh_err(r)); ret = -1; } free(pin); return ret; } static int test_key(int agent_fd, const char *filename) { struct sshkey *key = NULL; u_char *sig = NULL; + const char *alg = NULL; size_t slen = 0; int r, ret = -1; char data[1024]; if ((r = sshkey_load_public(filename, &key, NULL)) != 0) { error_r(r, "Couldn't read public key %s", filename); return -1; } + if (sshkey_type_plain(key->type) == KEY_RSA) + alg = "rsa-sha2-256"; arc4random_buf(data, sizeof(data)); if ((r = ssh_agent_sign(agent_fd, key, &sig, &slen, data, sizeof(data), - NULL, 0)) != 0) { + alg, 0)) != 0) { error_r(r, "Agent signature failed for %s", filename); goto done; } if ((r = sshkey_verify(key, sig, slen, data, sizeof(data), - NULL, 0, NULL)) != 0) { + alg, 0, NULL)) != 0) { error_r(r, "Signature verification failed for %s", filename); goto done; } /* success */ ret = 0; done: free(sig); sshkey_free(key); return ret; } static int list_identities(int agent_fd, int do_fp) { char *fp; int r; struct ssh_identitylist *idlist; u_int32_t left; size_t i; if ((r = ssh_fetch_identitylist(agent_fd, &idlist)) != 0) { if (r != SSH_ERR_AGENT_NO_IDENTITIES) fprintf(stderr, "error fetching identities: %s\n", ssh_err(r)); else printf("The agent has no identities.\n"); return -1; } for (i = 0; i < idlist->nkeys; i++) { if (do_fp) { fp = sshkey_fingerprint(idlist->keys[i], fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_DEFAULT); printf("%u %s %s (%s)\n", sshkey_size(idlist->keys[i]), fp == NULL ? "(null)" : fp, idlist->comments[i], sshkey_type(idlist->keys[i])); free(fp); } else { if ((r = sshkey_write(idlist->keys[i], stdout)) != 0) { fprintf(stderr, "sshkey_write: %s\n", ssh_err(r)); continue; } fprintf(stdout, " %s", idlist->comments[i]); left = sshkey_signatures_left(idlist->keys[i]); if (left > 0) fprintf(stdout, " [signatures left %d]", left); fprintf(stdout, "\n"); } } ssh_free_identitylist(idlist); return 0; } static int lock_agent(int agent_fd, int lock) { char prompt[100], *p1, *p2; int r, passok = 1, ret = -1; strlcpy(prompt, "Enter lock password: ", sizeof(prompt)); p1 = read_passphrase(prompt, RP_ALLOW_STDIN); if (lock) { strlcpy(prompt, "Again: ", sizeof prompt); p2 = read_passphrase(prompt, RP_ALLOW_STDIN); if (strcmp(p1, p2) != 0) { fprintf(stderr, "Passwords do not match.\n"); passok = 0; } freezero(p2, strlen(p2)); } if (passok) { if ((r = ssh_lock_agent(agent_fd, lock, p1)) == 0) { fprintf(stderr, "Agent %slocked.\n", lock ? "" : "un"); ret = 0; } else { fprintf(stderr, "Failed to %slock agent: %s\n", lock ? "" : "un", ssh_err(r)); } } freezero(p1, strlen(p1)); return (ret); } static int load_resident_keys(int agent_fd, const char *skprovider, int qflag, struct dest_constraint **dest_constraints, size_t ndest_constraints) { struct sshsk_resident_key **srks; size_t nsrks, i; struct sshkey *key; int r, ok = 0; char *fp; pass = read_passphrase("Enter PIN for authenticator: ", RP_ALLOW_STDIN); if ((r = sshsk_load_resident(skprovider, NULL, pass, 0, &srks, &nsrks)) != 0) { error_r(r, "Unable to load resident keys"); return r; } for (i = 0; i < nsrks; i++) { key = srks[i]->key; if ((fp = sshkey_fingerprint(key, fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL) fatal_f("sshkey_fingerprint failed"); if ((r = ssh_add_identity_constrained(agent_fd, key, "", lifetime, confirm, maxsign, skprovider, dest_constraints, ndest_constraints)) != 0) { error("Unable to add key %s %s", sshkey_type(key), fp); free(fp); ok = r; continue; } if (ok == 0) ok = 1; if (!qflag) { fprintf(stderr, "Resident identity added: %s %s\n", sshkey_type(key), fp); if (lifetime != 0) { fprintf(stderr, "Lifetime set to %d seconds\n", lifetime); } if (confirm != 0) { fprintf(stderr, "The user must confirm " "each use of the key\n"); } } free(fp); } sshsk_free_resident_keys(srks, nsrks); if (nsrks == 0) return SSH_ERR_KEY_NOT_FOUND; return ok == 1 ? 0 : ok; } static int do_file(int agent_fd, int deleting, int key_only, char *file, int qflag, const char *skprovider, struct dest_constraint **dest_constraints, size_t ndest_constraints) { if (deleting) { if (delete_file(agent_fd, file, key_only, qflag) == -1) return -1; } else { if (add_file(agent_fd, file, key_only, qflag, skprovider, dest_constraints, ndest_constraints) == -1) return -1; } return 0; } /* Append string 's' to a NULL-terminated array of strings */ static void stringlist_append(char ***listp, const char *s) { size_t i = 0; if (*listp == NULL) *listp = xcalloc(2, sizeof(**listp)); else { for (i = 0; (*listp)[i] != NULL; i++) ; /* count */ *listp = xrecallocarray(*listp, i + 1, i + 2, sizeof(**listp)); } (*listp)[i] = xstrdup(s); } static void parse_dest_constraint_hop(const char *s, struct dest_constraint_hop *dch, char **hostkey_files) { char *user = NULL, *host, *os, *path; size_t i; struct hostkeys *hostkeys; const struct hostkey_entry *hke; int r, want_ca; memset(dch, '\0', sizeof(*dch)); os = xstrdup(s); if ((host = strchr(os, '@')) == NULL) host = os; else { *host++ = '\0'; user = os; } cleanhostname(host); /* Trivial case: username@ (all hosts) */ if (*host == '\0') { if (user == NULL) { fatal("Invalid key destination constraint \"%s\": " "does not specify user or host", s); } dch->user = xstrdup(user); /* other fields left blank */ free(os); return; } if (hostkey_files == NULL) fatal_f("no hostkey files"); /* Otherwise we need to look up the keys for this hostname */ hostkeys = init_hostkeys(); for (i = 0; hostkey_files[i]; i++) { path = tilde_expand_filename(hostkey_files[i], getuid()); debug2_f("looking up host keys for \"%s\" in %s", host, path); load_hostkeys(hostkeys, host, path, 0); free(path); } dch->user = user == NULL ? NULL : xstrdup(user); dch->hostname = xstrdup(host); for (i = 0; i < hostkeys->num_entries; i++) { hke = hostkeys->entries + i; want_ca = hke->marker == MRK_CA; if (hke->marker != MRK_NONE && !want_ca) continue; debug3_f("%s%s%s: adding %s %skey from %s:%lu as key %u", user == NULL ? "": user, user == NULL ? "" : "@", host, sshkey_type(hke->key), want_ca ? "CA " : "", hke->file, hke->line, dch->nkeys); dch->keys = xrecallocarray(dch->keys, dch->nkeys, dch->nkeys + 1, sizeof(*dch->keys)); dch->key_is_ca = xrecallocarray(dch->key_is_ca, dch->nkeys, dch->nkeys + 1, sizeof(*dch->key_is_ca)); if ((r = sshkey_from_private(hke->key, &(dch->keys[dch->nkeys]))) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "sshkey_from_private"); dch->key_is_ca[dch->nkeys] = want_ca; dch->nkeys++; } if (dch->nkeys == 0) fatal("No host keys found for destination \"%s\"", host); free_hostkeys(hostkeys); free(os); return; } static void parse_dest_constraint(const char *s, struct dest_constraint ***dcp, size_t *ndcp, char **hostkey_files) { struct dest_constraint *dc; char *os, *cp; dc = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*dc)); os = xstrdup(s); if ((cp = strchr(os, '>')) == NULL) { /* initial hop; no 'from' hop specified */ parse_dest_constraint_hop(os, &dc->to, hostkey_files); } else { /* two hops specified */ *(cp++) = '\0'; parse_dest_constraint_hop(os, &dc->from, hostkey_files); parse_dest_constraint_hop(cp, &dc->to, hostkey_files); if (dc->from.user != NULL) { fatal("Invalid key constraint %s: cannot specify " "user on 'from' host", os); } } /* XXX eliminate or error on duplicates */ debug2_f("constraint %zu: %s%s%s (%u keys) > %s%s%s (%u keys)", *ndcp, dc->from.user ? dc->from.user : "", dc->from.user ? "@" : "", dc->from.hostname ? dc->from.hostname : "(ORIGIN)", dc->from.nkeys, dc->to.user ? dc->to.user : "", dc->to.user ? "@" : "", dc->to.hostname ? dc->to.hostname : "(ANY)", dc->to.nkeys); *dcp = xrecallocarray(*dcp, *ndcp, *ndcp + 1, sizeof(**dcp)); (*dcp)[(*ndcp)++] = dc; free(os); } static void usage(void) { fprintf(stderr, "usage: ssh-add [-cDdKkLlqvXx] [-E fingerprint_hash] [-H hostkey_file]\n" " [-h destination_constraint] [-S provider] [-t life]\n" #ifdef WITH_XMSS " [-M maxsign] [-m minleft]\n" #endif " [file ...]\n" " ssh-add -s pkcs11\n" " ssh-add -e pkcs11\n" " ssh-add -T pubkey ...\n" ); } int main(int argc, char **argv) { extern char *optarg; extern int optind; int agent_fd; char *pkcs11provider = NULL, *skprovider = NULL; char **dest_constraint_strings = NULL, **hostkey_files = NULL; int r, i, ch, deleting = 0, ret = 0, key_only = 0, do_download = 0; int xflag = 0, lflag = 0, Dflag = 0, qflag = 0, Tflag = 0; SyslogFacility log_facility = SYSLOG_FACILITY_AUTH; LogLevel log_level = SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO; struct dest_constraint **dest_constraints = NULL; size_t ndest_constraints = 0; /* Ensure that fds 0, 1 and 2 are open or directed to /dev/null */ sanitise_stdfd(); __progname = ssh_get_progname(argv[0]); seed_rng(); log_init(__progname, log_level, log_facility, 1); setvbuf(stdout, NULL, _IOLBF, 0); /* First, get a connection to the authentication agent. */ switch (r = ssh_get_authentication_socket(&agent_fd)) { case 0: break; case SSH_ERR_AGENT_NOT_PRESENT: fprintf(stderr, "Could not open a connection to your " "authentication agent.\n"); exit(2); default: fprintf(stderr, "Error connecting to agent: %s\n", ssh_err(r)); exit(2); } skprovider = getenv("SSH_SK_PROVIDER"); while ((ch = getopt(argc, argv, "vkKlLcdDTxXE:e:h:H:M:m:qs:S:t:")) != -1) { switch (ch) { case 'v': if (log_level == SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO) log_level = SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG1; else if (log_level < SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG3) log_level++; break; case 'E': fingerprint_hash = ssh_digest_alg_by_name(optarg); if (fingerprint_hash == -1) fatal("Invalid hash algorithm \"%s\"", optarg); break; case 'H': stringlist_append(&hostkey_files, optarg); break; case 'h': stringlist_append(&dest_constraint_strings, optarg); break; case 'k': key_only = 1; break; case 'K': do_download = 1; break; case 'l': case 'L': if (lflag != 0) fatal("-%c flag already specified", lflag); lflag = ch; break; case 'x': case 'X': if (xflag != 0) fatal("-%c flag already specified", xflag); xflag = ch; break; case 'c': confirm = 1; break; case 'm': minleft = (int)strtonum(optarg, 1, UINT_MAX, NULL); if (minleft == 0) { usage(); ret = 1; goto done; } break; case 'M': maxsign = (int)strtonum(optarg, 1, UINT_MAX, NULL); if (maxsign == 0) { usage(); ret = 1; goto done; } break; case 'd': deleting = 1; break; case 'D': Dflag = 1; break; case 's': pkcs11provider = optarg; break; case 'S': skprovider = optarg; break; case 'e': deleting = 1; pkcs11provider = optarg; break; case 't': if ((lifetime = convtime(optarg)) == -1 || lifetime < 0 || (u_long)lifetime > UINT32_MAX) { fprintf(stderr, "Invalid lifetime\n"); ret = 1; goto done; } break; case 'q': qflag = 1; break; case 'T': Tflag = 1; break; default: usage(); ret = 1; goto done; } } log_init(__progname, log_level, log_facility, 1); if ((xflag != 0) + (lflag != 0) + (Dflag != 0) > 1) fatal("Invalid combination of actions"); else if (xflag) { if (lock_agent(agent_fd, xflag == 'x' ? 1 : 0) == -1) ret = 1; goto done; } else if (lflag) { if (list_identities(agent_fd, lflag == 'l' ? 1 : 0) == -1) ret = 1; goto done; } else if (Dflag) { if (delete_all(agent_fd, qflag) == -1) ret = 1; goto done; } #ifdef ENABLE_SK_INTERNAL if (skprovider == NULL) skprovider = "internal"; #endif if (hostkey_files == NULL) { /* use defaults from readconf.c */ stringlist_append(&hostkey_files, _PATH_SSH_USER_HOSTFILE); stringlist_append(&hostkey_files, _PATH_SSH_USER_HOSTFILE2); stringlist_append(&hostkey_files, _PATH_SSH_SYSTEM_HOSTFILE); stringlist_append(&hostkey_files, _PATH_SSH_SYSTEM_HOSTFILE2); } if (dest_constraint_strings != NULL) { for (i = 0; dest_constraint_strings[i] != NULL; i++) { parse_dest_constraint(dest_constraint_strings[i], &dest_constraints, &ndest_constraints, hostkey_files); } } argc -= optind; argv += optind; if (Tflag) { if (argc <= 0) fatal("no keys to test"); for (r = i = 0; i < argc; i++) r |= test_key(agent_fd, argv[i]); ret = r == 0 ? 0 : 1; goto done; } if (pkcs11provider != NULL) { if (update_card(agent_fd, !deleting, pkcs11provider, qflag, dest_constraints, ndest_constraints) == -1) ret = 1; goto done; } if (do_download) { if (skprovider == NULL) fatal("Cannot download keys without provider"); if (load_resident_keys(agent_fd, skprovider, qflag, dest_constraints, ndest_constraints) != 0) ret = 1; goto done; } if (argc == 0) { char buf[PATH_MAX]; struct passwd *pw; struct stat st; int count = 0; if ((pw = getpwuid(getuid())) == NULL) { fprintf(stderr, "No user found with uid %u\n", (u_int)getuid()); ret = 1; goto done; } for (i = 0; default_files[i]; i++) { snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%s/%s", pw->pw_dir, default_files[i]); if (stat(buf, &st) == -1) continue; if (do_file(agent_fd, deleting, key_only, buf, qflag, skprovider, dest_constraints, ndest_constraints) == -1) ret = 1; else count++; } if (count == 0) ret = 1; } else { for (i = 0; i < argc; i++) { if (do_file(agent_fd, deleting, key_only, argv[i], qflag, skprovider, dest_constraints, ndest_constraints) == -1) ret = 1; } } done: clear_pass(); ssh_close_authentication_socket(agent_fd); return ret; } diff --git a/crypto/openssh/ssh-agent.c b/crypto/openssh/ssh-agent.c index f1e9247547e6..fa85e204f28d 100644 --- a/crypto/openssh/ssh-agent.c +++ b/crypto/openssh/ssh-agent.c @@ -1,2298 +1,2296 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: ssh-agent.c,v 1.294 2022/12/04 11:03:11 dtucker Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: ssh-agent.c,v 1.297 2023/03/09 21:06:24 jcs Exp $ */ /* * Author: Tatu Ylonen * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen , Espoo, Finland * All rights reserved * The authentication agent program. * * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell". * * Copyright (c) 2000, 2001 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. */ #include "includes.h" #include #include #include #include #include #ifdef HAVE_SYS_TIME_H # include #endif #ifdef HAVE_SYS_UN_H # include #endif #include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h" #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL #include #include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h" #endif #include #include #include #ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H # include #endif #ifdef HAVE_POLL_H # include #endif #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #ifdef HAVE_UTIL_H # include #endif #include "xmalloc.h" #include "ssh.h" #include "ssh2.h" #include "sshbuf.h" #include "sshkey.h" #include "authfd.h" -#include "compat.h" #include "log.h" #include "misc.h" #include "digest.h" #include "ssherr.h" #include "match.h" #include "msg.h" #include "pathnames.h" #include "ssh-pkcs11.h" #include "sk-api.h" #include "myproposal.h" #ifndef DEFAULT_ALLOWED_PROVIDERS # define DEFAULT_ALLOWED_PROVIDERS "/usr/lib*/*,/usr/local/lib*/*" #endif /* Maximum accepted message length */ #define AGENT_MAX_LEN (256*1024) /* Maximum bytes to read from client socket */ #define AGENT_RBUF_LEN (4096) /* Maximum number of recorded session IDs/hostkeys per connection */ #define AGENT_MAX_SESSION_IDS 16 /* Maximum size of session ID */ #define AGENT_MAX_SID_LEN 128 /* Maximum number of destination constraints to accept on a key */ #define AGENT_MAX_DEST_CONSTRAINTS 1024 /* XXX store hostkey_sid in a refcounted tree */ typedef enum { AUTH_UNUSED = 0, AUTH_SOCKET = 1, AUTH_CONNECTION = 2, } sock_type; struct hostkey_sid { struct sshkey *key; struct sshbuf *sid; int forwarded; }; typedef struct socket_entry { int fd; sock_type type; struct sshbuf *input; struct sshbuf *output; struct sshbuf *request; size_t nsession_ids; struct hostkey_sid *session_ids; } SocketEntry; u_int sockets_alloc = 0; SocketEntry *sockets = NULL; typedef struct identity { TAILQ_ENTRY(identity) next; struct sshkey *key; char *comment; char *provider; time_t death; u_int confirm; char *sk_provider; struct dest_constraint *dest_constraints; size_t ndest_constraints; } Identity; struct idtable { int nentries; TAILQ_HEAD(idqueue, identity) idlist; }; /* private key table */ struct idtable *idtab; int max_fd = 0; /* pid of shell == parent of agent */ pid_t parent_pid = -1; time_t parent_alive_interval = 0; /* pid of process for which cleanup_socket is applicable */ pid_t cleanup_pid = 0; /* pathname and directory for AUTH_SOCKET */ char socket_name[PATH_MAX]; char socket_dir[PATH_MAX]; /* Pattern-list of allowed PKCS#11/Security key paths */ static char *allowed_providers; /* locking */ #define LOCK_SIZE 32 #define LOCK_SALT_SIZE 16 #define LOCK_ROUNDS 1 int locked = 0; u_char lock_pwhash[LOCK_SIZE]; u_char lock_salt[LOCK_SALT_SIZE]; extern char *__progname; /* Default lifetime in seconds (0 == forever) */ static int lifetime = 0; static int fingerprint_hash = SSH_FP_HASH_DEFAULT; /* Refuse signing of non-SSH messages for web-origin FIDO keys */ static int restrict_websafe = 1; /* * Client connection count; incremented in new_socket() and decremented in * close_socket(). When it reaches 0, ssh-agent will exit. Since it is * normally initialized to 1, it will never reach 0. However, if the -x * option is specified, it is initialized to 0 in main(); in that case, * ssh-agent will exit as soon as it has had at least one client but no * longer has any. */ static int xcount = 1; static void close_socket(SocketEntry *e) { size_t i; int last = 0; if (e->type == AUTH_CONNECTION) { debug("xcount %d -> %d", xcount, xcount - 1); if (--xcount == 0) last = 1; } close(e->fd); sshbuf_free(e->input); sshbuf_free(e->output); sshbuf_free(e->request); for (i = 0; i < e->nsession_ids; i++) { sshkey_free(e->session_ids[i].key); sshbuf_free(e->session_ids[i].sid); } free(e->session_ids); memset(e, '\0', sizeof(*e)); e->fd = -1; e->type = AUTH_UNUSED; if (last) cleanup_exit(0); } static void idtab_init(void) { idtab = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*idtab)); TAILQ_INIT(&idtab->idlist); idtab->nentries = 0; } static void free_dest_constraint_hop(struct dest_constraint_hop *dch) { u_int i; if (dch == NULL) return; free(dch->user); free(dch->hostname); for (i = 0; i < dch->nkeys; i++) sshkey_free(dch->keys[i]); free(dch->keys); free(dch->key_is_ca); } static void free_dest_constraints(struct dest_constraint *dcs, size_t ndcs) { size_t i; for (i = 0; i < ndcs; i++) { free_dest_constraint_hop(&dcs[i].from); free_dest_constraint_hop(&dcs[i].to); } free(dcs); } static void free_identity(Identity *id) { sshkey_free(id->key); free(id->provider); free(id->comment); free(id->sk_provider); free_dest_constraints(id->dest_constraints, id->ndest_constraints); free(id); } /* * Match 'key' against the key/CA list in a destination constraint hop * Returns 0 on success or -1 otherwise. */ static int match_key_hop(const char *tag, const struct sshkey *key, const struct dest_constraint_hop *dch) { const char *reason = NULL; const char *hostname = dch->hostname ? dch->hostname : "(ORIGIN)"; u_int i; char *fp; if (key == NULL) return -1; /* XXX logspam */ if ((fp = sshkey_fingerprint(key, SSH_FP_HASH_DEFAULT, SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL) fatal_f("fingerprint failed"); debug3_f("%s: entering hostname %s, requested key %s %s, %u keys avail", tag, hostname, sshkey_type(key), fp, dch->nkeys); free(fp); for (i = 0; i < dch->nkeys; i++) { if (dch->keys[i] == NULL) return -1; /* XXX logspam */ if ((fp = sshkey_fingerprint(dch->keys[i], SSH_FP_HASH_DEFAULT, SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL) fatal_f("fingerprint failed"); debug3_f("%s: key %u: %s%s %s", tag, i, dch->key_is_ca[i] ? "CA " : "", sshkey_type(dch->keys[i]), fp); free(fp); if (!sshkey_is_cert(key)) { /* plain key */ if (dch->key_is_ca[i] || !sshkey_equal(key, dch->keys[i])) continue; return 0; } /* certificate */ if (!dch->key_is_ca[i]) continue; if (key->cert == NULL || key->cert->signature_key == NULL) return -1; /* shouldn't happen */ if (!sshkey_equal(key->cert->signature_key, dch->keys[i])) continue; if (sshkey_cert_check_host(key, hostname, 1, SSH_ALLOWED_CA_SIGALGS, &reason) != 0) { debug_f("cert %s / hostname %s rejected: %s", key->cert->key_id, hostname, reason); continue; } return 0; } return -1; } /* Check destination constraints on an identity against the hostkey/user */ static int permitted_by_dest_constraints(const struct sshkey *fromkey, const struct sshkey *tokey, Identity *id, const char *user, const char **hostnamep) { size_t i; struct dest_constraint *d; if (hostnamep != NULL) *hostnamep = NULL; for (i = 0; i < id->ndest_constraints; i++) { d = id->dest_constraints + i; /* XXX remove logspam */ debug2_f("constraint %zu %s%s%s (%u keys) > %s%s%s (%u keys)", i, d->from.user ? d->from.user : "", d->from.user ? "@" : "", d->from.hostname ? d->from.hostname : "(ORIGIN)", d->from.nkeys, d->to.user ? d->to.user : "", d->to.user ? "@" : "", d->to.hostname ? d->to.hostname : "(ANY)", d->to.nkeys); /* Match 'from' key */ if (fromkey == NULL) { /* We are matching the first hop */ if (d->from.hostname != NULL || d->from.nkeys != 0) continue; } else if (match_key_hop("from", fromkey, &d->from) != 0) continue; /* Match 'to' key */ if (tokey != NULL && match_key_hop("to", tokey, &d->to) != 0) continue; /* Match user if specified */ if (d->to.user != NULL && user != NULL && !match_pattern(user, d->to.user)) continue; /* successfully matched this constraint */ if (hostnamep != NULL) *hostnamep = d->to.hostname; debug2_f("allowed for hostname %s", d->to.hostname == NULL ? "*" : d->to.hostname); return 0; } /* no match */ debug2_f("%s identity \"%s\" not permitted for this destination", sshkey_type(id->key), id->comment); return -1; } /* * Check whether hostkeys on a SocketEntry and the optionally specified user * are permitted by the destination constraints on the Identity. * Returns 0 on success or -1 otherwise. */ static int identity_permitted(Identity *id, SocketEntry *e, char *user, const char **forward_hostnamep, const char **last_hostnamep) { size_t i; const char **hp; struct hostkey_sid *hks; const struct sshkey *fromkey = NULL; const char *test_user; char *fp1, *fp2; /* XXX remove logspam */ debug3_f("entering: key %s comment \"%s\", %zu socket bindings, " "%zu constraints", sshkey_type(id->key), id->comment, e->nsession_ids, id->ndest_constraints); if (id->ndest_constraints == 0) return 0; /* unconstrained */ if (e->nsession_ids == 0) return 0; /* local use */ /* * Walk through the hops recorded by session_id and try to find a * constraint that satisfies each. */ for (i = 0; i < e->nsession_ids; i++) { hks = e->session_ids + i; if (hks->key == NULL) fatal_f("internal error: no bound key"); /* XXX remove logspam */ fp1 = fp2 = NULL; if (fromkey != NULL && (fp1 = sshkey_fingerprint(fromkey, SSH_FP_HASH_DEFAULT, SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL) fatal_f("fingerprint failed"); if ((fp2 = sshkey_fingerprint(hks->key, SSH_FP_HASH_DEFAULT, SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL) fatal_f("fingerprint failed"); debug3_f("socketentry fd=%d, entry %zu %s, " "from hostkey %s %s to user %s hostkey %s %s", e->fd, i, hks->forwarded ? "FORWARD" : "AUTH", fromkey ? sshkey_type(fromkey) : "(ORIGIN)", fromkey ? fp1 : "", user ? user : "(ANY)", sshkey_type(hks->key), fp2); free(fp1); free(fp2); /* * Record the hostnames for the initial forwarding and * the final destination. */ hp = NULL; if (i == e->nsession_ids - 1) hp = last_hostnamep; else if (i == 0) hp = forward_hostnamep; /* Special handling for final recorded binding */ test_user = NULL; if (i == e->nsession_ids - 1) { /* Can only check user at final hop */ test_user = user; /* * user is only presented for signature requests. * If this is the case, make sure last binding is not * for a forwarding. */ if (hks->forwarded && user != NULL) { error_f("tried to sign on forwarding hop"); return -1; } } else if (!hks->forwarded) { error_f("tried to forward though signing bind"); return -1; } if (permitted_by_dest_constraints(fromkey, hks->key, id, test_user, hp) != 0) return -1; fromkey = hks->key; } /* * Another special case: if the last bound session ID was for a * forwarding, and this function is not being called to check a sign * request (i.e. no 'user' supplied), then only permit the key if * there is a permission that would allow it to be used at another * destination. This hides keys that are allowed to be used to * authenticate *to* a host but not permitted for *use* beyond it. */ hks = &e->session_ids[e->nsession_ids - 1]; if (hks->forwarded && user == NULL && permitted_by_dest_constraints(hks->key, NULL, id, NULL, NULL) != 0) { debug3_f("key permitted at host but not after"); return -1; } /* success */ return 0; } /* return matching private key for given public key */ static Identity * lookup_identity(struct sshkey *key) { Identity *id; TAILQ_FOREACH(id, &idtab->idlist, next) { if (sshkey_equal(key, id->key)) return (id); } return (NULL); } /* Check confirmation of keysign request */ static int confirm_key(Identity *id, const char *extra) { char *p; int ret = -1; p = sshkey_fingerprint(id->key, fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_DEFAULT); if (p != NULL && ask_permission("Allow use of key %s?\nKey fingerprint %s.%s%s", id->comment, p, extra == NULL ? "" : "\n", extra == NULL ? "" : extra)) ret = 0; free(p); return (ret); } static void send_status(SocketEntry *e, int success) { int r; if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(e->output, 1)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u8(e->output, success ? SSH_AGENT_SUCCESS : SSH_AGENT_FAILURE)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "compose"); } /* send list of supported public keys to 'client' */ static void process_request_identities(SocketEntry *e) { Identity *id; struct sshbuf *msg, *keys; int r; u_int nentries = 0; debug2_f("entering"); if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL || (keys = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed"); TAILQ_FOREACH(id, &idtab->idlist, next) { /* identity not visible, don't include in response */ if (identity_permitted(id, e, NULL, NULL, NULL) != 0) continue; if ((r = sshkey_puts_opts(id->key, keys, SSHKEY_SERIALIZE_INFO)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(keys, id->comment)) != 0) { error_fr(r, "compose key/comment"); continue; } nentries++; } debug2_f("replying with %u allowed of %u available keys", nentries, idtab->nentries); if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, SSH2_AGENT_IDENTITIES_ANSWER)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u32(msg, nentries)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_putb(msg, keys)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "compose"); if ((r = sshbuf_put_stringb(e->output, msg)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "enqueue"); sshbuf_free(msg); sshbuf_free(keys); } static char * agent_decode_alg(struct sshkey *key, u_int flags) { if (key->type == KEY_RSA) { if (flags & SSH_AGENT_RSA_SHA2_256) return "rsa-sha2-256"; else if (flags & SSH_AGENT_RSA_SHA2_512) return "rsa-sha2-512"; } else if (key->type == KEY_RSA_CERT) { if (flags & SSH_AGENT_RSA_SHA2_256) return "rsa-sha2-256-cert-v01@openssh.com"; else if (flags & SSH_AGENT_RSA_SHA2_512) return "rsa-sha2-512-cert-v01@openssh.com"; } return NULL; } /* * Attempt to parse the contents of a buffer as a SSH publickey userauth * request, checking its contents for consistency and matching the embedded * key against the one that is being used for signing. * Note: does not modify msg buffer. * Optionally extract the username, session ID and/or hostkey from the request. */ static int parse_userauth_request(struct sshbuf *msg, const struct sshkey *expected_key, char **userp, struct sshbuf **sess_idp, struct sshkey **hostkeyp) { struct sshbuf *b = NULL, *sess_id = NULL; char *user = NULL, *service = NULL, *method = NULL, *pkalg = NULL; int r; u_char t, sig_follows; struct sshkey *mkey = NULL, *hostkey = NULL; if (userp != NULL) *userp = NULL; if (sess_idp != NULL) *sess_idp = NULL; if (hostkeyp != NULL) *hostkeyp = NULL; if ((b = sshbuf_fromb(msg)) == NULL) fatal_f("sshbuf_fromb"); /* SSH userauth request */ if ((r = sshbuf_froms(b, &sess_id)) != 0) goto out; if (sshbuf_len(sess_id) == 0) { r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; goto out; } if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(b, &t)) != 0 || /* SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST */ (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &user, NULL)) != 0 || /* server user */ (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &service, NULL)) != 0 || /* service */ (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &method, NULL)) != 0 || /* method */ (r = sshbuf_get_u8(b, &sig_follows)) != 0 || /* sig-follows */ (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &pkalg, NULL)) != 0 || /* alg */ (r = sshkey_froms(b, &mkey)) != 0) /* key */ goto out; if (t != SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST || sig_follows != 1 || strcmp(service, "ssh-connection") != 0 || !sshkey_equal(expected_key, mkey) || sshkey_type_from_name(pkalg) != expected_key->type) { r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; goto out; } if (strcmp(method, "publickey-hostbound-v00@openssh.com") == 0) { if ((r = sshkey_froms(b, &hostkey)) != 0) goto out; } else if (strcmp(method, "publickey") != 0) { r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; goto out; } if (sshbuf_len(b) != 0) { r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; goto out; } /* success */ r = 0; debug3_f("well formed userauth"); if (userp != NULL) { *userp = user; user = NULL; } if (sess_idp != NULL) { *sess_idp = sess_id; sess_id = NULL; } if (hostkeyp != NULL) { *hostkeyp = hostkey; hostkey = NULL; } out: sshbuf_free(b); sshbuf_free(sess_id); free(user); free(service); free(method); free(pkalg); sshkey_free(mkey); sshkey_free(hostkey); return r; } /* * Attempt to parse the contents of a buffer as a SSHSIG signature request. * Note: does not modify buffer. */ static int parse_sshsig_request(struct sshbuf *msg) { int r; struct sshbuf *b; if ((b = sshbuf_fromb(msg)) == NULL) fatal_f("sshbuf_fromb"); if ((r = sshbuf_cmp(b, 0, "SSHSIG", 6)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_consume(b, 6)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, NULL, NULL)) != 0 || /* namespace */ (r = sshbuf_get_string_direct(b, NULL, NULL)) != 0 || /* reserved */ (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, NULL, NULL)) != 0 || /* hashalg */ (r = sshbuf_get_string_direct(b, NULL, NULL)) != 0) /* H(msg) */ goto out; if (sshbuf_len(b) != 0) { r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; goto out; } /* success */ r = 0; out: sshbuf_free(b); return r; } /* * This function inspects a message to be signed by a FIDO key that has a * web-like application string (i.e. one that does not begin with "ssh:". * It checks that the message is one of those expected for SSH operations * (pubkey userauth, sshsig, CA key signing) to exclude signing challenges * for the web. */ static int check_websafe_message_contents(struct sshkey *key, struct sshbuf *data) { if (parse_userauth_request(data, key, NULL, NULL, NULL) == 0) { debug_f("signed data matches public key userauth request"); return 1; } if (parse_sshsig_request(data) == 0) { debug_f("signed data matches SSHSIG signature request"); return 1; } /* XXX check CA signature operation */ error("web-origin key attempting to sign non-SSH message"); return 0; } static int buf_equal(const struct sshbuf *a, const struct sshbuf *b) { if (sshbuf_ptr(a) == NULL || sshbuf_ptr(b) == NULL) return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; if (sshbuf_len(a) != sshbuf_len(b)) return SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; if (timingsafe_bcmp(sshbuf_ptr(a), sshbuf_ptr(b), sshbuf_len(a)) != 0) return SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; return 0; } /* ssh2 only */ static void process_sign_request2(SocketEntry *e) { u_char *signature = NULL; size_t slen = 0; u_int compat = 0, flags; int r, ok = -1, retried = 0; char *fp = NULL, *pin = NULL, *prompt = NULL; char *user = NULL, *sig_dest = NULL; const char *fwd_host = NULL, *dest_host = NULL; struct sshbuf *msg = NULL, *data = NULL, *sid = NULL; struct sshkey *key = NULL, *hostkey = NULL; struct identity *id; struct notifier_ctx *notifier = NULL; debug_f("entering"); if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL || (data = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed"); if ((r = sshkey_froms(e->request, &key)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_stringb(e->request, data)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_u32(e->request, &flags)) != 0) { error_fr(r, "parse"); goto send; } if ((id = lookup_identity(key)) == NULL) { verbose_f("%s key not found", sshkey_type(key)); goto send; } if ((fp = sshkey_fingerprint(key, SSH_FP_HASH_DEFAULT, SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL) fatal_f("fingerprint failed"); if (id->ndest_constraints != 0) { if (e->nsession_ids == 0) { logit_f("refusing use of destination-constrained key " "to sign on unbound connection"); goto send; } if (parse_userauth_request(data, key, &user, &sid, &hostkey) != 0) { logit_f("refusing use of destination-constrained key " "to sign an unidentified signature"); goto send; } /* XXX logspam */ debug_f("user=%s", user); if (identity_permitted(id, e, user, &fwd_host, &dest_host) != 0) goto send; /* XXX display fwd_host/dest_host in askpass UI */ /* * Ensure that the session ID is the most recent one * registered on the socket - it should have been bound by * ssh immediately before userauth. */ if (buf_equal(sid, e->session_ids[e->nsession_ids - 1].sid) != 0) { error_f("unexpected session ID (%zu listed) on " "signature request for target user %s with " "key %s %s", e->nsession_ids, user, sshkey_type(id->key), fp); goto send; } /* * Ensure that the hostkey embedded in the signature matches * the one most recently bound to the socket. An exception is * made for the initial forwarding hop. */ if (e->nsession_ids > 1 && hostkey == NULL) { error_f("refusing use of destination-constrained key: " "no hostkey recorded in signature for forwarded " "connection"); goto send; } if (hostkey != NULL && !sshkey_equal(hostkey, e->session_ids[e->nsession_ids - 1].key)) { error_f("refusing use of destination-constrained key: " "mismatch between hostkey in request and most " "recently bound session"); goto send; } xasprintf(&sig_dest, "public key authentication request for " "user \"%s\" to listed host", user); } if (id->confirm && confirm_key(id, sig_dest) != 0) { verbose_f("user refused key"); goto send; } if (sshkey_is_sk(id->key)) { if (restrict_websafe && strncmp(id->key->sk_application, "ssh:", 4) != 0 && !check_websafe_message_contents(key, data)) { /* error already logged */ goto send; } if (id->key->sk_flags & SSH_SK_USER_PRESENCE_REQD) { notifier = notify_start(0, "Confirm user presence for key %s %s%s%s", sshkey_type(id->key), fp, sig_dest == NULL ? "" : "\n", sig_dest == NULL ? "" : sig_dest); } } retry_pin: if ((r = sshkey_sign(id->key, &signature, &slen, sshbuf_ptr(data), sshbuf_len(data), agent_decode_alg(key, flags), id->sk_provider, pin, compat)) != 0) { debug_fr(r, "sshkey_sign"); if (pin == NULL && !retried && sshkey_is_sk(id->key) && r == SSH_ERR_KEY_WRONG_PASSPHRASE) { notify_complete(notifier, NULL); notifier = NULL; /* XXX include sig_dest */ xasprintf(&prompt, "Enter PIN%sfor %s key %s: ", (id->key->sk_flags & SSH_SK_USER_PRESENCE_REQD) ? " and confirm user presence " : " ", sshkey_type(id->key), fp); pin = read_passphrase(prompt, RP_USE_ASKPASS); retried = 1; goto retry_pin; } error_fr(r, "sshkey_sign"); goto send; } /* Success */ ok = 0; send: debug_f("good signature"); notify_complete(notifier, "User presence confirmed"); if (ok == 0) { if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, SSH2_AGENT_SIGN_RESPONSE)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_string(msg, signature, slen)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "compose"); } else if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, SSH_AGENT_FAILURE)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "compose failure"); if ((r = sshbuf_put_stringb(e->output, msg)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "enqueue"); sshbuf_free(sid); sshbuf_free(data); sshbuf_free(msg); sshkey_free(key); sshkey_free(hostkey); free(fp); free(signature); free(sig_dest); free(user); free(prompt); if (pin != NULL) freezero(pin, strlen(pin)); } /* shared */ static void process_remove_identity(SocketEntry *e) { int r, success = 0; struct sshkey *key = NULL; Identity *id; debug2_f("entering"); if ((r = sshkey_froms(e->request, &key)) != 0) { error_fr(r, "parse key"); goto done; } if ((id = lookup_identity(key)) == NULL) { debug_f("key not found"); goto done; } /* identity not visible, cannot be removed */ if (identity_permitted(id, e, NULL, NULL, NULL) != 0) goto done; /* error already logged */ /* We have this key, free it. */ if (idtab->nentries < 1) fatal_f("internal error: nentries %d", idtab->nentries); TAILQ_REMOVE(&idtab->idlist, id, next); free_identity(id); idtab->nentries--; success = 1; done: sshkey_free(key); send_status(e, success); } static void process_remove_all_identities(SocketEntry *e) { Identity *id; debug2_f("entering"); /* Loop over all identities and clear the keys. */ for (id = TAILQ_FIRST(&idtab->idlist); id; id = TAILQ_FIRST(&idtab->idlist)) { TAILQ_REMOVE(&idtab->idlist, id, next); free_identity(id); } /* Mark that there are no identities. */ idtab->nentries = 0; /* Send success. */ send_status(e, 1); } /* removes expired keys and returns number of seconds until the next expiry */ static time_t reaper(void) { time_t deadline = 0, now = monotime(); Identity *id, *nxt; for (id = TAILQ_FIRST(&idtab->idlist); id; id = nxt) { nxt = TAILQ_NEXT(id, next); if (id->death == 0) continue; if (now >= id->death) { debug("expiring key '%s'", id->comment); TAILQ_REMOVE(&idtab->idlist, id, next); free_identity(id); idtab->nentries--; } else deadline = (deadline == 0) ? id->death : MINIMUM(deadline, id->death); } if (deadline == 0 || deadline <= now) return 0; else return (deadline - now); } static int parse_dest_constraint_hop(struct sshbuf *b, struct dest_constraint_hop *dch) { u_char key_is_ca; size_t elen = 0; int r; struct sshkey *k = NULL; char *fp; memset(dch, '\0', sizeof(*dch)); if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &dch->user, NULL)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &dch->hostname, NULL)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_string_direct(b, NULL, &elen)) != 0) { error_fr(r, "parse"); goto out; } if (elen != 0) { error_f("unsupported extensions (len %zu)", elen); r = SSH_ERR_FEATURE_UNSUPPORTED; goto out; } if (*dch->hostname == '\0') { free(dch->hostname); dch->hostname = NULL; } if (*dch->user == '\0') { free(dch->user); dch->user = NULL; } while (sshbuf_len(b) != 0) { dch->keys = xrecallocarray(dch->keys, dch->nkeys, dch->nkeys + 1, sizeof(*dch->keys)); dch->key_is_ca = xrecallocarray(dch->key_is_ca, dch->nkeys, dch->nkeys + 1, sizeof(*dch->key_is_ca)); if ((r = sshkey_froms(b, &k)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_u8(b, &key_is_ca)) != 0) goto out; if ((fp = sshkey_fingerprint(k, SSH_FP_HASH_DEFAULT, SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL) fatal_f("fingerprint failed"); debug3_f("%s%s%s: adding %skey %s %s", dch->user == NULL ? "" : dch->user, dch->user == NULL ? "" : "@", dch->hostname, key_is_ca ? "CA " : "", sshkey_type(k), fp); free(fp); dch->keys[dch->nkeys] = k; dch->key_is_ca[dch->nkeys] = key_is_ca != 0; dch->nkeys++; k = NULL; /* transferred */ } /* success */ r = 0; out: sshkey_free(k); return r; } static int parse_dest_constraint(struct sshbuf *m, struct dest_constraint *dc) { struct sshbuf *b = NULL, *frombuf = NULL, *tobuf = NULL; int r; size_t elen = 0; debug3_f("entering"); memset(dc, '\0', sizeof(*dc)); if ((r = sshbuf_froms(m, &b)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_froms(b, &frombuf)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_froms(b, &tobuf)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_string_direct(b, NULL, &elen)) != 0) { error_fr(r, "parse"); goto out; } - if ((r = parse_dest_constraint_hop(frombuf, &dc->from) != 0) || - (r = parse_dest_constraint_hop(tobuf, &dc->to) != 0)) + if ((r = parse_dest_constraint_hop(frombuf, &dc->from)) != 0 || + (r = parse_dest_constraint_hop(tobuf, &dc->to)) != 0) goto out; /* already logged */ if (elen != 0) { error_f("unsupported extensions (len %zu)", elen); r = SSH_ERR_FEATURE_UNSUPPORTED; goto out; } debug2_f("parsed %s (%u keys) > %s%s%s (%u keys)", dc->from.hostname ? dc->from.hostname : "(ORIGIN)", dc->from.nkeys, dc->to.user ? dc->to.user : "", dc->to.user ? "@" : "", dc->to.hostname ? dc->to.hostname : "(ANY)", dc->to.nkeys); /* check consistency */ if ((dc->from.hostname == NULL) != (dc->from.nkeys == 0) || dc->from.user != NULL) { error_f("inconsistent \"from\" specification"); r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; goto out; } if (dc->to.hostname == NULL || dc->to.nkeys == 0) { error_f("incomplete \"to\" specification"); r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; goto out; } /* success */ r = 0; out: sshbuf_free(b); sshbuf_free(frombuf); sshbuf_free(tobuf); return r; } static int parse_key_constraint_extension(struct sshbuf *m, char **sk_providerp, struct dest_constraint **dcsp, size_t *ndcsp) { char *ext_name = NULL; int r; struct sshbuf *b = NULL; if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &ext_name, NULL)) != 0) { error_fr(r, "parse constraint extension"); goto out; } debug_f("constraint ext %s", ext_name); if (strcmp(ext_name, "sk-provider@openssh.com") == 0) { if (sk_providerp == NULL) { error_f("%s not valid here", ext_name); r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; goto out; } if (*sk_providerp != NULL) { error_f("%s already set", ext_name); r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; goto out; } if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, sk_providerp, NULL)) != 0) { error_fr(r, "parse %s", ext_name); goto out; } } else if (strcmp(ext_name, "restrict-destination-v00@openssh.com") == 0) { if (*dcsp != NULL) { error_f("%s already set", ext_name); goto out; } if ((r = sshbuf_froms(m, &b)) != 0) { error_fr(r, "parse %s outer", ext_name); goto out; } while (sshbuf_len(b) != 0) { if (*ndcsp >= AGENT_MAX_DEST_CONSTRAINTS) { error_f("too many %s constraints", ext_name); goto out; } *dcsp = xrecallocarray(*dcsp, *ndcsp, *ndcsp + 1, sizeof(**dcsp)); if ((r = parse_dest_constraint(b, *dcsp + (*ndcsp)++)) != 0) goto out; /* error already logged */ } } else { error_f("unsupported constraint \"%s\"", ext_name); r = SSH_ERR_FEATURE_UNSUPPORTED; goto out; } /* success */ r = 0; out: free(ext_name); sshbuf_free(b); return r; } static int parse_key_constraints(struct sshbuf *m, struct sshkey *k, time_t *deathp, u_int *secondsp, int *confirmp, char **sk_providerp, struct dest_constraint **dcsp, size_t *ndcsp) { u_char ctype; int r; u_int seconds, maxsign = 0; while (sshbuf_len(m)) { if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(m, &ctype)) != 0) { error_fr(r, "parse constraint type"); goto out; } switch (ctype) { case SSH_AGENT_CONSTRAIN_LIFETIME: if (*deathp != 0) { error_f("lifetime already set"); r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; goto out; } if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &seconds)) != 0) { error_fr(r, "parse lifetime constraint"); goto out; } *deathp = monotime() + seconds; *secondsp = seconds; break; case SSH_AGENT_CONSTRAIN_CONFIRM: if (*confirmp != 0) { error_f("confirm already set"); r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; goto out; } *confirmp = 1; break; case SSH_AGENT_CONSTRAIN_MAXSIGN: if (k == NULL) { error_f("maxsign not valid here"); r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; goto out; } if (maxsign != 0) { error_f("maxsign already set"); r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; goto out; } if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &maxsign)) != 0) { error_fr(r, "parse maxsign constraint"); goto out; } if ((r = sshkey_enable_maxsign(k, maxsign)) != 0) { error_fr(r, "enable maxsign"); goto out; } break; case SSH_AGENT_CONSTRAIN_EXTENSION: if ((r = parse_key_constraint_extension(m, sk_providerp, dcsp, ndcsp)) != 0) goto out; /* error already logged */ break; default: error_f("Unknown constraint %d", ctype); r = SSH_ERR_FEATURE_UNSUPPORTED; goto out; } } /* success */ r = 0; out: return r; } static void process_add_identity(SocketEntry *e) { Identity *id; int success = 0, confirm = 0; char *fp, *comment = NULL, *sk_provider = NULL; char canonical_provider[PATH_MAX]; time_t death = 0; u_int seconds = 0; struct dest_constraint *dest_constraints = NULL; size_t ndest_constraints = 0; struct sshkey *k = NULL; int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; debug2_f("entering"); if ((r = sshkey_private_deserialize(e->request, &k)) != 0 || k == NULL || (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(e->request, &comment, NULL)) != 0) { error_fr(r, "parse"); goto out; } if (parse_key_constraints(e->request, k, &death, &seconds, &confirm, &sk_provider, &dest_constraints, &ndest_constraints) != 0) { error_f("failed to parse constraints"); sshbuf_reset(e->request); goto out; } if (sk_provider != NULL) { if (!sshkey_is_sk(k)) { error("Cannot add provider: %s is not an " "authenticator-hosted key", sshkey_type(k)); goto out; } if (strcasecmp(sk_provider, "internal") == 0) { debug_f("internal provider"); } else { if (realpath(sk_provider, canonical_provider) == NULL) { verbose("failed provider \"%.100s\": " "realpath: %s", sk_provider, strerror(errno)); goto out; } free(sk_provider); sk_provider = xstrdup(canonical_provider); if (match_pattern_list(sk_provider, allowed_providers, 0) != 1) { error("Refusing add key: " "provider %s not allowed", sk_provider); goto out; } } } if ((r = sshkey_shield_private(k)) != 0) { error_fr(r, "shield private"); goto out; } if (lifetime && !death) death = monotime() + lifetime; if ((id = lookup_identity(k)) == NULL) { id = xcalloc(1, sizeof(Identity)); TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(&idtab->idlist, id, next); /* Increment the number of identities. */ idtab->nentries++; } else { /* identity not visible, do not update */ if (identity_permitted(id, e, NULL, NULL, NULL) != 0) goto out; /* error already logged */ /* key state might have been updated */ sshkey_free(id->key); free(id->comment); free(id->sk_provider); free_dest_constraints(id->dest_constraints, id->ndest_constraints); } /* success */ id->key = k; id->comment = comment; id->death = death; id->confirm = confirm; id->sk_provider = sk_provider; id->dest_constraints = dest_constraints; id->ndest_constraints = ndest_constraints; if ((fp = sshkey_fingerprint(k, SSH_FP_HASH_DEFAULT, SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL) fatal_f("sshkey_fingerprint failed"); debug_f("add %s %s \"%.100s\" (life: %u) (confirm: %u) " "(provider: %s) (destination constraints: %zu)", sshkey_ssh_name(k), fp, comment, seconds, confirm, sk_provider == NULL ? "none" : sk_provider, ndest_constraints); free(fp); /* transferred */ k = NULL; comment = NULL; sk_provider = NULL; dest_constraints = NULL; ndest_constraints = 0; success = 1; out: free(sk_provider); free(comment); sshkey_free(k); free_dest_constraints(dest_constraints, ndest_constraints); send_status(e, success); } /* XXX todo: encrypt sensitive data with passphrase */ static void process_lock_agent(SocketEntry *e, int lock) { int r, success = 0, delay; char *passwd; u_char passwdhash[LOCK_SIZE]; static u_int fail_count = 0; size_t pwlen; debug2_f("entering"); /* * This is deliberately fatal: the user has requested that we lock, * but we can't parse their request properly. The only safe thing to * do is abort. */ if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(e->request, &passwd, &pwlen)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "parse"); if (pwlen == 0) { debug("empty password not supported"); } else if (locked && !lock) { if (bcrypt_pbkdf(passwd, pwlen, lock_salt, sizeof(lock_salt), passwdhash, sizeof(passwdhash), LOCK_ROUNDS) < 0) fatal("bcrypt_pbkdf"); if (timingsafe_bcmp(passwdhash, lock_pwhash, LOCK_SIZE) == 0) { debug("agent unlocked"); locked = 0; fail_count = 0; explicit_bzero(lock_pwhash, sizeof(lock_pwhash)); success = 1; } else { /* delay in 0.1s increments up to 10s */ if (fail_count < 100) fail_count++; delay = 100000 * fail_count; debug("unlock failed, delaying %0.1lf seconds", (double)delay/1000000); usleep(delay); } explicit_bzero(passwdhash, sizeof(passwdhash)); } else if (!locked && lock) { debug("agent locked"); locked = 1; arc4random_buf(lock_salt, sizeof(lock_salt)); if (bcrypt_pbkdf(passwd, pwlen, lock_salt, sizeof(lock_salt), lock_pwhash, sizeof(lock_pwhash), LOCK_ROUNDS) < 0) fatal("bcrypt_pbkdf"); success = 1; } freezero(passwd, pwlen); send_status(e, success); } static void no_identities(SocketEntry *e) { struct sshbuf *msg; int r; if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed"); if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, SSH2_AGENT_IDENTITIES_ANSWER)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u32(msg, 0)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_stringb(e->output, msg)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "compose"); sshbuf_free(msg); } #ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11 static void process_add_smartcard_key(SocketEntry *e) { char *provider = NULL, *pin = NULL, canonical_provider[PATH_MAX]; char **comments = NULL; int r, i, count = 0, success = 0, confirm = 0; u_int seconds = 0; time_t death = 0; struct sshkey **keys = NULL, *k; Identity *id; struct dest_constraint *dest_constraints = NULL; size_t ndest_constraints = 0; debug2_f("entering"); if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(e->request, &provider, NULL)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(e->request, &pin, NULL)) != 0) { error_fr(r, "parse"); goto send; } if (parse_key_constraints(e->request, NULL, &death, &seconds, &confirm, NULL, &dest_constraints, &ndest_constraints) != 0) { error_f("failed to parse constraints"); goto send; } if (realpath(provider, canonical_provider) == NULL) { verbose("failed PKCS#11 add of \"%.100s\": realpath: %s", provider, strerror(errno)); goto send; } if (match_pattern_list(canonical_provider, allowed_providers, 0) != 1) { verbose("refusing PKCS#11 add of \"%.100s\": " "provider not allowed", canonical_provider); goto send; } debug_f("add %.100s", canonical_provider); if (lifetime && !death) death = monotime() + lifetime; count = pkcs11_add_provider(canonical_provider, pin, &keys, &comments); for (i = 0; i < count; i++) { k = keys[i]; if (lookup_identity(k) == NULL) { id = xcalloc(1, sizeof(Identity)); id->key = k; keys[i] = NULL; /* transferred */ id->provider = xstrdup(canonical_provider); if (*comments[i] != '\0') { id->comment = comments[i]; comments[i] = NULL; /* transferred */ } else { id->comment = xstrdup(canonical_provider); } id->death = death; id->confirm = confirm; id->dest_constraints = dest_constraints; id->ndest_constraints = ndest_constraints; dest_constraints = NULL; /* transferred */ ndest_constraints = 0; TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(&idtab->idlist, id, next); idtab->nentries++; success = 1; } /* XXX update constraints for existing keys */ sshkey_free(keys[i]); free(comments[i]); } send: free(pin); free(provider); free(keys); free(comments); free_dest_constraints(dest_constraints, ndest_constraints); send_status(e, success); } static void process_remove_smartcard_key(SocketEntry *e) { char *provider = NULL, *pin = NULL, canonical_provider[PATH_MAX]; int r, success = 0; Identity *id, *nxt; debug2_f("entering"); if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(e->request, &provider, NULL)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(e->request, &pin, NULL)) != 0) { error_fr(r, "parse"); goto send; } free(pin); if (realpath(provider, canonical_provider) == NULL) { verbose("failed PKCS#11 add of \"%.100s\": realpath: %s", provider, strerror(errno)); goto send; } debug_f("remove %.100s", canonical_provider); for (id = TAILQ_FIRST(&idtab->idlist); id; id = nxt) { nxt = TAILQ_NEXT(id, next); /* Skip file--based keys */ if (id->provider == NULL) continue; if (!strcmp(canonical_provider, id->provider)) { TAILQ_REMOVE(&idtab->idlist, id, next); free_identity(id); idtab->nentries--; } } if (pkcs11_del_provider(canonical_provider) == 0) success = 1; else error_f("pkcs11_del_provider failed"); send: free(provider); send_status(e, success); } #endif /* ENABLE_PKCS11 */ static int process_ext_session_bind(SocketEntry *e) { int r, sid_match, key_match; struct sshkey *key = NULL; struct sshbuf *sid = NULL, *sig = NULL; char *fp = NULL; size_t i; u_char fwd = 0; debug2_f("entering"); if ((r = sshkey_froms(e->request, &key)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_froms(e->request, &sid)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_froms(e->request, &sig)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_u8(e->request, &fwd)) != 0) { error_fr(r, "parse"); goto out; } if ((fp = sshkey_fingerprint(key, SSH_FP_HASH_DEFAULT, SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL) fatal_f("fingerprint failed"); /* check signature with hostkey on session ID */ if ((r = sshkey_verify(key, sshbuf_ptr(sig), sshbuf_len(sig), sshbuf_ptr(sid), sshbuf_len(sid), NULL, 0, NULL)) != 0) { error_fr(r, "sshkey_verify for %s %s", sshkey_type(key), fp); goto out; } /* check whether sid/key already recorded */ for (i = 0; i < e->nsession_ids; i++) { if (!e->session_ids[i].forwarded) { error_f("attempt to bind session ID to socket " "previously bound for authentication attempt"); r = -1; goto out; } sid_match = buf_equal(sid, e->session_ids[i].sid) == 0; key_match = sshkey_equal(key, e->session_ids[i].key); if (sid_match && key_match) { debug_f("session ID already recorded for %s %s", sshkey_type(key), fp); r = 0; goto out; } else if (sid_match) { error_f("session ID recorded against different key " "for %s %s", sshkey_type(key), fp); r = -1; goto out; } /* * new sid with previously-seen key can happen, e.g. multiple * connections to the same host. */ } /* record new key/sid */ if (e->nsession_ids >= AGENT_MAX_SESSION_IDS) { error_f("too many session IDs recorded"); goto out; } e->session_ids = xrecallocarray(e->session_ids, e->nsession_ids, e->nsession_ids + 1, sizeof(*e->session_ids)); i = e->nsession_ids++; debug_f("recorded %s %s (slot %zu of %d)", sshkey_type(key), fp, i, AGENT_MAX_SESSION_IDS); e->session_ids[i].key = key; e->session_ids[i].forwarded = fwd != 0; key = NULL; /* transferred */ /* can't transfer sid; it's refcounted and scoped to request's life */ if ((e->session_ids[i].sid = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) fatal_f("sshbuf_new"); if ((r = sshbuf_putb(e->session_ids[i].sid, sid)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "sshbuf_putb session ID"); /* success */ r = 0; out: free(fp); sshkey_free(key); sshbuf_free(sid); sshbuf_free(sig); return r == 0 ? 1 : 0; } static void process_extension(SocketEntry *e) { int r, success = 0; char *name; debug2_f("entering"); if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(e->request, &name, NULL)) != 0) { error_fr(r, "parse"); goto send; } if (strcmp(name, "session-bind@openssh.com") == 0) success = process_ext_session_bind(e); else debug_f("unsupported extension \"%s\"", name); free(name); send: send_status(e, success); } /* * dispatch incoming message. * returns 1 on success, 0 for incomplete messages or -1 on error. */ static int process_message(u_int socknum) { u_int msg_len; u_char type; const u_char *cp; int r; SocketEntry *e; if (socknum >= sockets_alloc) fatal_f("sock %u >= allocated %u", socknum, sockets_alloc); e = &sockets[socknum]; if (sshbuf_len(e->input) < 5) return 0; /* Incomplete message header. */ cp = sshbuf_ptr(e->input); msg_len = PEEK_U32(cp); if (msg_len > AGENT_MAX_LEN) { debug_f("socket %u (fd=%d) message too long %u > %u", socknum, e->fd, msg_len, AGENT_MAX_LEN); return -1; } if (sshbuf_len(e->input) < msg_len + 4) return 0; /* Incomplete message body. */ /* move the current input to e->request */ sshbuf_reset(e->request); if ((r = sshbuf_get_stringb(e->input, e->request)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_u8(e->request, &type)) != 0) { if (r == SSH_ERR_MESSAGE_INCOMPLETE || r == SSH_ERR_STRING_TOO_LARGE) { error_fr(r, "parse"); return -1; } fatal_fr(r, "parse"); } debug_f("socket %u (fd=%d) type %d", socknum, e->fd, type); /* check whether agent is locked */ if (locked && type != SSH_AGENTC_UNLOCK) { sshbuf_reset(e->request); switch (type) { case SSH2_AGENTC_REQUEST_IDENTITIES: /* send empty lists */ no_identities(e); break; default: /* send a fail message for all other request types */ send_status(e, 0); } return 1; } switch (type) { case SSH_AGENTC_LOCK: case SSH_AGENTC_UNLOCK: process_lock_agent(e, type == SSH_AGENTC_LOCK); break; case SSH_AGENTC_REMOVE_ALL_RSA_IDENTITIES: process_remove_all_identities(e); /* safe for !WITH_SSH1 */ break; /* ssh2 */ case SSH2_AGENTC_SIGN_REQUEST: process_sign_request2(e); break; case SSH2_AGENTC_REQUEST_IDENTITIES: process_request_identities(e); break; case SSH2_AGENTC_ADD_IDENTITY: case SSH2_AGENTC_ADD_ID_CONSTRAINED: process_add_identity(e); break; case SSH2_AGENTC_REMOVE_IDENTITY: process_remove_identity(e); break; case SSH2_AGENTC_REMOVE_ALL_IDENTITIES: process_remove_all_identities(e); break; #ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11 case SSH_AGENTC_ADD_SMARTCARD_KEY: case SSH_AGENTC_ADD_SMARTCARD_KEY_CONSTRAINED: process_add_smartcard_key(e); break; case SSH_AGENTC_REMOVE_SMARTCARD_KEY: process_remove_smartcard_key(e); break; #endif /* ENABLE_PKCS11 */ case SSH_AGENTC_EXTENSION: process_extension(e); break; default: /* Unknown message. Respond with failure. */ error("Unknown message %d", type); sshbuf_reset(e->request); send_status(e, 0); break; } return 1; } static void new_socket(sock_type type, int fd) { u_int i, old_alloc, new_alloc; debug_f("type = %s", type == AUTH_CONNECTION ? "CONNECTION" : (type == AUTH_SOCKET ? "SOCKET" : "UNKNOWN")); if (type == AUTH_CONNECTION) { debug("xcount %d -> %d", xcount, xcount + 1); ++xcount; } set_nonblock(fd); if (fd > max_fd) max_fd = fd; for (i = 0; i < sockets_alloc; i++) if (sockets[i].type == AUTH_UNUSED) { sockets[i].fd = fd; if ((sockets[i].input = sshbuf_new()) == NULL || (sockets[i].output = sshbuf_new()) == NULL || (sockets[i].request = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed"); sockets[i].type = type; return; } old_alloc = sockets_alloc; new_alloc = sockets_alloc + 10; sockets = xrecallocarray(sockets, old_alloc, new_alloc, sizeof(sockets[0])); for (i = old_alloc; i < new_alloc; i++) sockets[i].type = AUTH_UNUSED; sockets_alloc = new_alloc; sockets[old_alloc].fd = fd; if ((sockets[old_alloc].input = sshbuf_new()) == NULL || (sockets[old_alloc].output = sshbuf_new()) == NULL || (sockets[old_alloc].request = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed"); sockets[old_alloc].type = type; } static int handle_socket_read(u_int socknum) { struct sockaddr_un sunaddr; socklen_t slen; uid_t euid; gid_t egid; int fd; slen = sizeof(sunaddr); fd = accept(sockets[socknum].fd, (struct sockaddr *)&sunaddr, &slen); if (fd == -1) { error("accept from AUTH_SOCKET: %s", strerror(errno)); return -1; } if (getpeereid(fd, &euid, &egid) == -1) { error("getpeereid %d failed: %s", fd, strerror(errno)); close(fd); return -1; } if ((euid != 0) && (getuid() != euid)) { error("uid mismatch: peer euid %u != uid %u", (u_int) euid, (u_int) getuid()); close(fd); return -1; } new_socket(AUTH_CONNECTION, fd); return 0; } static int handle_conn_read(u_int socknum) { char buf[AGENT_RBUF_LEN]; ssize_t len; int r; if ((len = read(sockets[socknum].fd, buf, sizeof(buf))) <= 0) { if (len == -1) { if (errno == EAGAIN || errno == EINTR) return 0; error_f("read error on socket %u (fd %d): %s", socknum, sockets[socknum].fd, strerror(errno)); } return -1; } if ((r = sshbuf_put(sockets[socknum].input, buf, len)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "compose"); explicit_bzero(buf, sizeof(buf)); for (;;) { if ((r = process_message(socknum)) == -1) return -1; else if (r == 0) break; } return 0; } static int handle_conn_write(u_int socknum) { ssize_t len; int r; if (sshbuf_len(sockets[socknum].output) == 0) return 0; /* shouldn't happen */ if ((len = write(sockets[socknum].fd, sshbuf_ptr(sockets[socknum].output), sshbuf_len(sockets[socknum].output))) <= 0) { if (len == -1) { if (errno == EAGAIN || errno == EINTR) return 0; error_f("read error on socket %u (fd %d): %s", socknum, sockets[socknum].fd, strerror(errno)); } return -1; } if ((r = sshbuf_consume(sockets[socknum].output, len)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "consume"); return 0; } static void after_poll(struct pollfd *pfd, size_t npfd, u_int maxfds) { size_t i; u_int socknum, activefds = npfd; for (i = 0; i < npfd; i++) { if (pfd[i].revents == 0) continue; /* Find sockets entry */ for (socknum = 0; socknum < sockets_alloc; socknum++) { if (sockets[socknum].type != AUTH_SOCKET && sockets[socknum].type != AUTH_CONNECTION) continue; if (pfd[i].fd == sockets[socknum].fd) break; } if (socknum >= sockets_alloc) { error_f("no socket for fd %d", pfd[i].fd); continue; } /* Process events */ switch (sockets[socknum].type) { case AUTH_SOCKET: if ((pfd[i].revents & (POLLIN|POLLERR)) == 0) break; if (npfd > maxfds) { debug3("out of fds (active %u >= limit %u); " "skipping accept", activefds, maxfds); break; } if (handle_socket_read(socknum) == 0) activefds++; break; case AUTH_CONNECTION: if ((pfd[i].revents & (POLLIN|POLLHUP|POLLERR)) != 0 && handle_conn_read(socknum) != 0) goto close_sock; if ((pfd[i].revents & (POLLOUT|POLLHUP)) != 0 && handle_conn_write(socknum) != 0) { close_sock: if (activefds == 0) fatal("activefds == 0 at close_sock"); close_socket(&sockets[socknum]); activefds--; break; } break; default: break; } } } static int prepare_poll(struct pollfd **pfdp, size_t *npfdp, int *timeoutp, u_int maxfds) { struct pollfd *pfd = *pfdp; size_t i, j, npfd = 0; time_t deadline; int r; /* Count active sockets */ for (i = 0; i < sockets_alloc; i++) { switch (sockets[i].type) { case AUTH_SOCKET: case AUTH_CONNECTION: npfd++; break; case AUTH_UNUSED: break; default: fatal("Unknown socket type %d", sockets[i].type); break; } } if (npfd != *npfdp && (pfd = recallocarray(pfd, *npfdp, npfd, sizeof(*pfd))) == NULL) fatal_f("recallocarray failed"); *pfdp = pfd; *npfdp = npfd; for (i = j = 0; i < sockets_alloc; i++) { switch (sockets[i].type) { case AUTH_SOCKET: if (npfd > maxfds) { debug3("out of fds (active %zu >= limit %u); " "skipping arming listener", npfd, maxfds); break; } pfd[j].fd = sockets[i].fd; pfd[j].revents = 0; pfd[j].events = POLLIN; j++; break; case AUTH_CONNECTION: pfd[j].fd = sockets[i].fd; pfd[j].revents = 0; /* * Only prepare to read if we can handle a full-size * input read buffer and enqueue a max size reply.. */ if ((r = sshbuf_check_reserve(sockets[i].input, AGENT_RBUF_LEN)) == 0 && (r = sshbuf_check_reserve(sockets[i].output, AGENT_MAX_LEN)) == 0) pfd[j].events = POLLIN; else if (r != SSH_ERR_NO_BUFFER_SPACE) fatal_fr(r, "reserve"); if (sshbuf_len(sockets[i].output) > 0) pfd[j].events |= POLLOUT; j++; break; default: break; } } deadline = reaper(); if (parent_alive_interval != 0) deadline = (deadline == 0) ? parent_alive_interval : MINIMUM(deadline, parent_alive_interval); if (deadline == 0) { *timeoutp = -1; /* INFTIM */ } else { if (deadline > INT_MAX / 1000) *timeoutp = INT_MAX / 1000; else *timeoutp = deadline * 1000; } return (1); } static void cleanup_socket(void) { if (cleanup_pid != 0 && getpid() != cleanup_pid) return; debug_f("cleanup"); if (socket_name[0]) unlink(socket_name); if (socket_dir[0]) rmdir(socket_dir); } void cleanup_exit(int i) { cleanup_socket(); _exit(i); } -/*ARGSUSED*/ static void cleanup_handler(int sig) { cleanup_socket(); #ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11 pkcs11_terminate(); #endif _exit(2); } static void check_parent_exists(void) { /* * If our parent has exited then getppid() will return (pid_t)1, * so testing for that should be safe. */ if (parent_pid != -1 && getppid() != parent_pid) { /* printf("Parent has died - Authentication agent exiting.\n"); */ cleanup_socket(); _exit(2); } } static void usage(void) { fprintf(stderr, "usage: ssh-agent [-c | -s] [-Ddx] [-a bind_address] [-E fingerprint_hash]\n" " [-O option] [-P allowed_providers] [-t life]\n" " ssh-agent [-a bind_address] [-E fingerprint_hash] [-O option]\n" " [-P allowed_providers] [-t life] command [arg ...]\n" " ssh-agent [-c | -s] -k\n"); exit(1); } int main(int ac, char **av) { int c_flag = 0, d_flag = 0, D_flag = 0, k_flag = 0, s_flag = 0; int sock, ch, result, saved_errno; char *shell, *format, *pidstr, *agentsocket = NULL; #ifdef HAVE_SETRLIMIT struct rlimit rlim; #endif extern int optind; extern char *optarg; pid_t pid; char pidstrbuf[1 + 3 * sizeof pid]; size_t len; mode_t prev_mask; int timeout = -1; /* INFTIM */ struct pollfd *pfd = NULL; size_t npfd = 0; u_int maxfds; /* Ensure that fds 0, 1 and 2 are open or directed to /dev/null */ sanitise_stdfd(); /* drop */ setegid(getgid()); setgid(getgid()); setuid(geteuid()); platform_disable_tracing(0); /* strict=no */ #ifdef RLIMIT_NOFILE if (getrlimit(RLIMIT_NOFILE, &rlim) == -1) fatal("%s: getrlimit: %s", __progname, strerror(errno)); #endif __progname = ssh_get_progname(av[0]); seed_rng(); while ((ch = getopt(ac, av, "cDdksE:a:O:P:t:x")) != -1) { switch (ch) { case 'E': fingerprint_hash = ssh_digest_alg_by_name(optarg); if (fingerprint_hash == -1) fatal("Invalid hash algorithm \"%s\"", optarg); break; case 'c': if (s_flag) usage(); c_flag++; break; case 'k': k_flag++; break; case 'O': if (strcmp(optarg, "no-restrict-websafe") == 0) restrict_websafe = 0; else fatal("Unknown -O option"); break; case 'P': if (allowed_providers != NULL) fatal("-P option already specified"); allowed_providers = xstrdup(optarg); break; case 's': if (c_flag) usage(); s_flag++; break; case 'd': if (d_flag || D_flag) usage(); d_flag++; break; case 'D': if (d_flag || D_flag) usage(); D_flag++; break; case 'a': agentsocket = optarg; break; case 't': if ((lifetime = convtime(optarg)) == -1) { fprintf(stderr, "Invalid lifetime\n"); usage(); } break; case 'x': xcount = 0; break; default: usage(); } } ac -= optind; av += optind; if (ac > 0 && (c_flag || k_flag || s_flag || d_flag || D_flag)) usage(); if (allowed_providers == NULL) allowed_providers = xstrdup(DEFAULT_ALLOWED_PROVIDERS); if (ac == 0 && !c_flag && !s_flag) { shell = getenv("SHELL"); if (shell != NULL && (len = strlen(shell)) > 2 && strncmp(shell + len - 3, "csh", 3) == 0) c_flag = 1; } if (k_flag) { const char *errstr = NULL; pidstr = getenv(SSH_AGENTPID_ENV_NAME); if (pidstr == NULL) { fprintf(stderr, "%s not set, cannot kill agent\n", SSH_AGENTPID_ENV_NAME); exit(1); } pid = (int)strtonum(pidstr, 2, INT_MAX, &errstr); if (errstr) { fprintf(stderr, "%s=\"%s\", which is not a good PID: %s\n", SSH_AGENTPID_ENV_NAME, pidstr, errstr); exit(1); } if (kill(pid, SIGTERM) == -1) { perror("kill"); exit(1); } format = c_flag ? "unsetenv %s;\n" : "unset %s;\n"; printf(format, SSH_AUTHSOCKET_ENV_NAME); printf(format, SSH_AGENTPID_ENV_NAME); printf("echo Agent pid %ld killed;\n", (long)pid); exit(0); } /* * Minimum file descriptors: * stdio (3) + listener (1) + syslog (1 maybe) + connection (1) + * a few spare for libc / stack protectors / sanitisers, etc. */ #define SSH_AGENT_MIN_FDS (3+1+1+1+4) if (rlim.rlim_cur < SSH_AGENT_MIN_FDS) fatal("%s: file descriptor rlimit %lld too low (minimum %u)", __progname, (long long)rlim.rlim_cur, SSH_AGENT_MIN_FDS); maxfds = rlim.rlim_cur - SSH_AGENT_MIN_FDS; parent_pid = getpid(); if (agentsocket == NULL) { /* Create private directory for agent socket */ mktemp_proto(socket_dir, sizeof(socket_dir)); if (mkdtemp(socket_dir) == NULL) { perror("mkdtemp: private socket dir"); exit(1); } snprintf(socket_name, sizeof socket_name, "%s/agent.%ld", socket_dir, (long)parent_pid); } else { /* Try to use specified agent socket */ socket_dir[0] = '\0'; strlcpy(socket_name, agentsocket, sizeof socket_name); } /* * Create socket early so it will exist before command gets run from * the parent. */ prev_mask = umask(0177); sock = unix_listener(socket_name, SSH_LISTEN_BACKLOG, 0); if (sock < 0) { /* XXX - unix_listener() calls error() not perror() */ *socket_name = '\0'; /* Don't unlink any existing file */ cleanup_exit(1); } umask(prev_mask); /* * Fork, and have the parent execute the command, if any, or present * the socket data. The child continues as the authentication agent. */ if (D_flag || d_flag) { log_init(__progname, d_flag ? SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG3 : SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO, SYSLOG_FACILITY_AUTH, 1); format = c_flag ? "setenv %s %s;\n" : "%s=%s; export %s;\n"; printf(format, SSH_AUTHSOCKET_ENV_NAME, socket_name, SSH_AUTHSOCKET_ENV_NAME); printf("echo Agent pid %ld;\n", (long)parent_pid); fflush(stdout); goto skip; } pid = fork(); if (pid == -1) { perror("fork"); cleanup_exit(1); } if (pid != 0) { /* Parent - execute the given command. */ close(sock); snprintf(pidstrbuf, sizeof pidstrbuf, "%ld", (long)pid); if (ac == 0) { format = c_flag ? "setenv %s %s;\n" : "%s=%s; export %s;\n"; printf(format, SSH_AUTHSOCKET_ENV_NAME, socket_name, SSH_AUTHSOCKET_ENV_NAME); printf(format, SSH_AGENTPID_ENV_NAME, pidstrbuf, SSH_AGENTPID_ENV_NAME); printf("echo Agent pid %ld;\n", (long)pid); exit(0); } if (setenv(SSH_AUTHSOCKET_ENV_NAME, socket_name, 1) == -1 || setenv(SSH_AGENTPID_ENV_NAME, pidstrbuf, 1) == -1) { perror("setenv"); exit(1); } execvp(av[0], av); perror(av[0]); exit(1); } /* child */ log_init(__progname, SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO, SYSLOG_FACILITY_AUTH, 0); if (setsid() == -1) { error("setsid: %s", strerror(errno)); cleanup_exit(1); } (void)chdir("/"); if (stdfd_devnull(1, 1, 1) == -1) error_f("stdfd_devnull failed"); #ifdef HAVE_SETRLIMIT /* deny core dumps, since memory contains unencrypted private keys */ rlim.rlim_cur = rlim.rlim_max = 0; if (setrlimit(RLIMIT_CORE, &rlim) == -1) { error("setrlimit RLIMIT_CORE: %s", strerror(errno)); cleanup_exit(1); } #endif skip: cleanup_pid = getpid(); #ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11 pkcs11_init(0); #endif new_socket(AUTH_SOCKET, sock); if (ac > 0) parent_alive_interval = 10; idtab_init(); ssh_signal(SIGPIPE, SIG_IGN); ssh_signal(SIGINT, (d_flag | D_flag) ? cleanup_handler : SIG_IGN); ssh_signal(SIGHUP, cleanup_handler); ssh_signal(SIGTERM, cleanup_handler); if (pledge("stdio rpath cpath unix id proc exec", NULL) == -1) fatal("%s: pledge: %s", __progname, strerror(errno)); platform_pledge_agent(); while (1) { prepare_poll(&pfd, &npfd, &timeout, maxfds); result = poll(pfd, npfd, timeout); saved_errno = errno; if (parent_alive_interval != 0) check_parent_exists(); (void) reaper(); /* remove expired keys */ if (result == -1) { if (saved_errno == EINTR) continue; fatal("poll: %s", strerror(saved_errno)); } else if (result > 0) after_poll(pfd, npfd, maxfds); } /* NOTREACHED */ } diff --git a/crypto/openssh/ssh-dss.c b/crypto/openssh/ssh-dss.c index 2ea0c0a55760..3174ef146dc3 100644 --- a/crypto/openssh/ssh-dss.c +++ b/crypto/openssh/ssh-dss.c @@ -1,457 +1,456 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: ssh-dss.c,v 1.48 2022/10/28 00:44:44 djm Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: ssh-dss.c,v 1.49 2023/03/05 05:34:09 dtucker Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. */ #include "includes.h" #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL #include #include #include #include #include #include #include "sshbuf.h" -#include "compat.h" #include "ssherr.h" #include "digest.h" #define SSHKEY_INTERNAL #include "sshkey.h" #include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h" #define INTBLOB_LEN 20 #define SIGBLOB_LEN (2*INTBLOB_LEN) static u_int ssh_dss_size(const struct sshkey *key) { const BIGNUM *dsa_p; if (key->dsa == NULL) return 0; DSA_get0_pqg(key->dsa, &dsa_p, NULL, NULL); return BN_num_bits(dsa_p); } static int ssh_dss_alloc(struct sshkey *k) { if ((k->dsa = DSA_new()) == NULL) return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; return 0; } static void ssh_dss_cleanup(struct sshkey *k) { DSA_free(k->dsa); k->dsa = NULL; } static int ssh_dss_equal(const struct sshkey *a, const struct sshkey *b) { const BIGNUM *dsa_p_a, *dsa_q_a, *dsa_g_a, *dsa_pub_key_a; const BIGNUM *dsa_p_b, *dsa_q_b, *dsa_g_b, *dsa_pub_key_b; if (a->dsa == NULL || b->dsa == NULL) return 0; DSA_get0_pqg(a->dsa, &dsa_p_a, &dsa_q_a, &dsa_g_a); DSA_get0_pqg(b->dsa, &dsa_p_b, &dsa_q_b, &dsa_g_b); DSA_get0_key(a->dsa, &dsa_pub_key_a, NULL); DSA_get0_key(b->dsa, &dsa_pub_key_b, NULL); if (dsa_p_a == NULL || dsa_p_b == NULL || dsa_q_a == NULL || dsa_q_b == NULL || dsa_g_a == NULL || dsa_g_b == NULL || dsa_pub_key_a == NULL || dsa_pub_key_b == NULL) return 0; if (BN_cmp(dsa_p_a, dsa_p_b) != 0) return 0; if (BN_cmp(dsa_q_a, dsa_q_b) != 0) return 0; if (BN_cmp(dsa_g_a, dsa_g_b) != 0) return 0; if (BN_cmp(dsa_pub_key_a, dsa_pub_key_b) != 0) return 0; return 1; } static int ssh_dss_serialize_public(const struct sshkey *key, struct sshbuf *b, enum sshkey_serialize_rep opts) { int r; const BIGNUM *dsa_p, *dsa_q, *dsa_g, *dsa_pub_key; if (key->dsa == NULL) return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; DSA_get0_pqg(key->dsa, &dsa_p, &dsa_q, &dsa_g); DSA_get0_key(key->dsa, &dsa_pub_key, NULL); if (dsa_p == NULL || dsa_q == NULL || dsa_g == NULL || dsa_pub_key == NULL) return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; if ((r = sshbuf_put_bignum2(b, dsa_p)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_bignum2(b, dsa_q)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_bignum2(b, dsa_g)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_bignum2(b, dsa_pub_key)) != 0) return r; return 0; } static int ssh_dss_serialize_private(const struct sshkey *key, struct sshbuf *b, enum sshkey_serialize_rep opts) { int r; const BIGNUM *dsa_priv_key; DSA_get0_key(key->dsa, NULL, &dsa_priv_key); if (!sshkey_is_cert(key)) { if ((r = ssh_dss_serialize_public(key, b, opts)) != 0) return r; } if ((r = sshbuf_put_bignum2(b, dsa_priv_key)) != 0) return r; return 0; } static int ssh_dss_generate(struct sshkey *k, int bits) { DSA *private; if (bits != 1024) return SSH_ERR_KEY_LENGTH; if ((private = DSA_new()) == NULL) return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; if (!DSA_generate_parameters_ex(private, bits, NULL, 0, NULL, NULL, NULL) || !DSA_generate_key(private)) { DSA_free(private); return SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; } k->dsa = private; return 0; } static int ssh_dss_copy_public(const struct sshkey *from, struct sshkey *to) { const BIGNUM *dsa_p, *dsa_q, *dsa_g, *dsa_pub_key; BIGNUM *dsa_p_dup = NULL, *dsa_q_dup = NULL, *dsa_g_dup = NULL; BIGNUM *dsa_pub_key_dup = NULL; int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; DSA_get0_pqg(from->dsa, &dsa_p, &dsa_q, &dsa_g); DSA_get0_key(from->dsa, &dsa_pub_key, NULL); if ((dsa_p_dup = BN_dup(dsa_p)) == NULL || (dsa_q_dup = BN_dup(dsa_q)) == NULL || (dsa_g_dup = BN_dup(dsa_g)) == NULL || (dsa_pub_key_dup = BN_dup(dsa_pub_key)) == NULL) { r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; goto out; } if (!DSA_set0_pqg(to->dsa, dsa_p_dup, dsa_q_dup, dsa_g_dup)) { r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; goto out; } dsa_p_dup = dsa_q_dup = dsa_g_dup = NULL; /* transferred */ if (!DSA_set0_key(to->dsa, dsa_pub_key_dup, NULL)) { r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; goto out; } dsa_pub_key_dup = NULL; /* transferred */ /* success */ r = 0; out: BN_clear_free(dsa_p_dup); BN_clear_free(dsa_q_dup); BN_clear_free(dsa_g_dup); BN_clear_free(dsa_pub_key_dup); return r; } static int ssh_dss_deserialize_public(const char *ktype, struct sshbuf *b, struct sshkey *key) { int ret = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; BIGNUM *dsa_p = NULL, *dsa_q = NULL, *dsa_g = NULL, *dsa_pub_key = NULL; if (sshbuf_get_bignum2(b, &dsa_p) != 0 || sshbuf_get_bignum2(b, &dsa_q) != 0 || sshbuf_get_bignum2(b, &dsa_g) != 0 || sshbuf_get_bignum2(b, &dsa_pub_key) != 0) { ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; goto out; } if (!DSA_set0_pqg(key->dsa, dsa_p, dsa_q, dsa_g)) { ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; goto out; } dsa_p = dsa_q = dsa_g = NULL; /* transferred */ if (!DSA_set0_key(key->dsa, dsa_pub_key, NULL)) { ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; goto out; } dsa_pub_key = NULL; /* transferred */ #ifdef DEBUG_PK DSA_print_fp(stderr, key->dsa, 8); #endif /* success */ ret = 0; out: BN_clear_free(dsa_p); BN_clear_free(dsa_q); BN_clear_free(dsa_g); BN_clear_free(dsa_pub_key); return ret; } static int ssh_dss_deserialize_private(const char *ktype, struct sshbuf *b, struct sshkey *key) { int r; BIGNUM *dsa_priv_key = NULL; if (!sshkey_is_cert(key)) { if ((r = ssh_dss_deserialize_public(ktype, b, key)) != 0) return r; } if ((r = sshbuf_get_bignum2(b, &dsa_priv_key)) != 0) return r; if (!DSA_set0_key(key->dsa, NULL, dsa_priv_key)) { BN_clear_free(dsa_priv_key); return SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; } return 0; } static int ssh_dss_sign(struct sshkey *key, u_char **sigp, size_t *lenp, const u_char *data, size_t datalen, const char *alg, const char *sk_provider, const char *sk_pin, u_int compat) { DSA_SIG *sig = NULL; const BIGNUM *sig_r, *sig_s; u_char digest[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH], sigblob[SIGBLOB_LEN]; size_t rlen, slen, len, dlen = ssh_digest_bytes(SSH_DIGEST_SHA1); struct sshbuf *b = NULL; int ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; if (lenp != NULL) *lenp = 0; if (sigp != NULL) *sigp = NULL; if (key == NULL || key->dsa == NULL || sshkey_type_plain(key->type) != KEY_DSA) return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; if (dlen == 0) return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; if ((ret = ssh_digest_memory(SSH_DIGEST_SHA1, data, datalen, digest, sizeof(digest))) != 0) goto out; if ((sig = DSA_do_sign(digest, dlen, key->dsa)) == NULL) { ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; goto out; } DSA_SIG_get0(sig, &sig_r, &sig_s); rlen = BN_num_bytes(sig_r); slen = BN_num_bytes(sig_s); if (rlen > INTBLOB_LEN || slen > INTBLOB_LEN) { ret = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; goto out; } explicit_bzero(sigblob, SIGBLOB_LEN); BN_bn2bin(sig_r, sigblob + SIGBLOB_LEN - INTBLOB_LEN - rlen); BN_bn2bin(sig_s, sigblob + SIGBLOB_LEN - slen); if ((b = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) { ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; goto out; } if ((ret = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, "ssh-dss")) != 0 || (ret = sshbuf_put_string(b, sigblob, SIGBLOB_LEN)) != 0) goto out; len = sshbuf_len(b); if (sigp != NULL) { if ((*sigp = malloc(len)) == NULL) { ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; goto out; } memcpy(*sigp, sshbuf_ptr(b), len); } if (lenp != NULL) *lenp = len; ret = 0; out: explicit_bzero(digest, sizeof(digest)); DSA_SIG_free(sig); sshbuf_free(b); return ret; } static int ssh_dss_verify(const struct sshkey *key, const u_char *sig, size_t siglen, const u_char *data, size_t dlen, const char *alg, u_int compat, struct sshkey_sig_details **detailsp) { DSA_SIG *dsig = NULL; BIGNUM *sig_r = NULL, *sig_s = NULL; u_char digest[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH], *sigblob = NULL; size_t len, hlen = ssh_digest_bytes(SSH_DIGEST_SHA1); int ret = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; struct sshbuf *b = NULL; char *ktype = NULL; if (key == NULL || key->dsa == NULL || sshkey_type_plain(key->type) != KEY_DSA || sig == NULL || siglen == 0) return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; if (hlen == 0) return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; /* fetch signature */ if ((b = sshbuf_from(sig, siglen)) == NULL) return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; if (sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &ktype, NULL) != 0 || sshbuf_get_string(b, &sigblob, &len) != 0) { ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; goto out; } if (strcmp("ssh-dss", ktype) != 0) { ret = SSH_ERR_KEY_TYPE_MISMATCH; goto out; } if (sshbuf_len(b) != 0) { ret = SSH_ERR_UNEXPECTED_TRAILING_DATA; goto out; } if (len != SIGBLOB_LEN) { ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; goto out; } /* parse signature */ if ((dsig = DSA_SIG_new()) == NULL || (sig_r = BN_new()) == NULL || (sig_s = BN_new()) == NULL) { ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; goto out; } if ((BN_bin2bn(sigblob, INTBLOB_LEN, sig_r) == NULL) || (BN_bin2bn(sigblob + INTBLOB_LEN, INTBLOB_LEN, sig_s) == NULL)) { ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; goto out; } if (!DSA_SIG_set0(dsig, sig_r, sig_s)) { ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; goto out; } sig_r = sig_s = NULL; /* transferred */ /* sha1 the data */ if ((ret = ssh_digest_memory(SSH_DIGEST_SHA1, data, dlen, digest, sizeof(digest))) != 0) goto out; switch (DSA_do_verify(digest, hlen, dsig, key->dsa)) { case 1: ret = 0; break; case 0: ret = SSH_ERR_SIGNATURE_INVALID; goto out; default: ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; goto out; } out: explicit_bzero(digest, sizeof(digest)); DSA_SIG_free(dsig); BN_clear_free(sig_r); BN_clear_free(sig_s); sshbuf_free(b); free(ktype); if (sigblob != NULL) freezero(sigblob, len); return ret; } static const struct sshkey_impl_funcs sshkey_dss_funcs = { /* .size = */ ssh_dss_size, /* .alloc = */ ssh_dss_alloc, /* .cleanup = */ ssh_dss_cleanup, /* .equal = */ ssh_dss_equal, /* .ssh_serialize_public = */ ssh_dss_serialize_public, /* .ssh_deserialize_public = */ ssh_dss_deserialize_public, /* .ssh_serialize_private = */ ssh_dss_serialize_private, /* .ssh_deserialize_private = */ ssh_dss_deserialize_private, /* .generate = */ ssh_dss_generate, /* .copy_public = */ ssh_dss_copy_public, /* .sign = */ ssh_dss_sign, /* .verify = */ ssh_dss_verify, }; const struct sshkey_impl sshkey_dss_impl = { /* .name = */ "ssh-dss", /* .shortname = */ "DSA", /* .sigalg = */ NULL, /* .type = */ KEY_DSA, /* .nid = */ 0, /* .cert = */ 0, /* .sigonly = */ 0, /* .keybits = */ 0, /* .funcs = */ &sshkey_dss_funcs, }; const struct sshkey_impl sshkey_dsa_cert_impl = { /* .name = */ "ssh-dss-cert-v01@openssh.com", /* .shortname = */ "DSA-CERT", /* .sigalg = */ NULL, /* .type = */ KEY_DSA_CERT, /* .nid = */ 0, /* .cert = */ 1, /* .sigonly = */ 0, /* .keybits = */ 0, /* .funcs = */ &sshkey_dss_funcs, }; #endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */ diff --git a/crypto/openssh/ssh-ecdsa-sk.c b/crypto/openssh/ssh-ecdsa-sk.c index 729e5487c9f5..5dcd3c13d345 100644 --- a/crypto/openssh/ssh-ecdsa-sk.c +++ b/crypto/openssh/ssh-ecdsa-sk.c @@ -1,468 +1,467 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: ssh-ecdsa-sk.c,v 1.17 2022/10/28 00:44:44 djm Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: ssh-ecdsa-sk.c,v 1.18 2023/03/08 04:43:12 guenther Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. * Copyright (c) 2010 Damien Miller. All rights reserved. * Copyright (c) 2019 Google Inc. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. */ /* #define DEBUG_SK 1 */ #include "includes.h" #include #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL #include #include #include #include #endif #include #include /* needed for DEBUG_SK only */ #include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h" #include "sshbuf.h" #include "ssherr.h" #include "digest.h" #define SSHKEY_INTERNAL #include "sshkey.h" #ifndef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC /* ARGSUSED */ int ssh_ecdsa_sk_verify(const struct sshkey *key, const u_char *signature, size_t signaturelen, const u_char *data, size_t datalen, u_int compat, struct sshkey_sig_details **detailsp) { return SSH_ERR_FEATURE_UNSUPPORTED; } #else /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */ /* Reuse some ECDSA internals */ extern struct sshkey_impl_funcs sshkey_ecdsa_funcs; static void ssh_ecdsa_sk_cleanup(struct sshkey *k) { sshkey_sk_cleanup(k); sshkey_ecdsa_funcs.cleanup(k); } static int ssh_ecdsa_sk_equal(const struct sshkey *a, const struct sshkey *b) { if (!sshkey_sk_fields_equal(a, b)) return 0; if (!sshkey_ecdsa_funcs.equal(a, b)) return 0; return 1; } static int ssh_ecdsa_sk_serialize_public(const struct sshkey *key, struct sshbuf *b, enum sshkey_serialize_rep opts) { int r; if ((r = sshkey_ecdsa_funcs.serialize_public(key, b, opts)) != 0) return r; if ((r = sshkey_serialize_sk(key, b)) != 0) return r; return 0; } static int ssh_ecdsa_sk_serialize_private(const struct sshkey *key, struct sshbuf *b, enum sshkey_serialize_rep opts) { int r; if (!sshkey_is_cert(key)) { if ((r = sshkey_ecdsa_funcs.serialize_public(key, b, opts)) != 0) return r; } if ((r = sshkey_serialize_private_sk(key, b)) != 0) return r; return 0; } static int ssh_ecdsa_sk_copy_public(const struct sshkey *from, struct sshkey *to) { int r; if ((r = sshkey_ecdsa_funcs.copy_public(from, to)) != 0) return r; if ((r = sshkey_copy_public_sk(from, to)) != 0) return r; return 0; } static int ssh_ecdsa_sk_deserialize_public(const char *ktype, struct sshbuf *b, struct sshkey *key) { int r; if ((r = sshkey_ecdsa_funcs.deserialize_public(ktype, b, key)) != 0) return r; if ((r = sshkey_deserialize_sk(b, key)) != 0) return r; return 0; } static int ssh_ecdsa_sk_deserialize_private(const char *ktype, struct sshbuf *b, struct sshkey *key) { int r; if (!sshkey_is_cert(key)) { if ((r = sshkey_ecdsa_funcs.deserialize_public(ktype, b, key)) != 0) return r; } if ((r = sshkey_private_deserialize_sk(b, key)) != 0) return r; return 0; } /* * Check FIDO/W3C webauthn signatures clientData field against the expected * format and prepare a hash of it for use in signature verification. * * webauthn signatures do not sign the hash of the message directly, but * instead sign a JSON-like "clientData" wrapper structure that contains the * message hash along with a other information. * * Fortunately this structure has a fixed format so it is possible to verify * that the hash of the signed message is present within the clientData * structure without needing to implement any JSON parsing. */ static int webauthn_check_prepare_hash(const u_char *data, size_t datalen, const char *origin, const struct sshbuf *wrapper, uint8_t flags, const struct sshbuf *extensions, u_char *msghash, size_t msghashlen) { int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; struct sshbuf *chall = NULL, *m = NULL; if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL || (chall = sshbuf_from(data, datalen)) == NULL) { r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; goto out; } /* * Ensure origin contains no quote character and that the flags are * consistent with what we received */ if (strchr(origin, '\"') != NULL || (flags & 0x40) != 0 /* AD */ || ((flags & 0x80) == 0 /* ED */) != (sshbuf_len(extensions) == 0)) { r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; goto out; } /* * Prepare the preamble to clientData that we expect, poking the * challenge and origin into their canonical positions in the * structure. The crossOrigin flag and any additional extension * fields present are ignored. */ #define WEBAUTHN_0 "{\"type\":\"webauthn.get\",\"challenge\":\"" #define WEBAUTHN_1 "\",\"origin\":\"" #define WEBAUTHN_2 "\"" if ((r = sshbuf_put(m, WEBAUTHN_0, sizeof(WEBAUTHN_0) - 1)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_dtourlb64(chall, m, 0)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put(m, WEBAUTHN_1, sizeof(WEBAUTHN_1) - 1)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put(m, origin, strlen(origin))) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put(m, WEBAUTHN_2, sizeof(WEBAUTHN_2) - 1)) != 0) goto out; #ifdef DEBUG_SK fprintf(stderr, "%s: received origin: %s\n", __func__, origin); fprintf(stderr, "%s: received clientData:\n", __func__); sshbuf_dump(wrapper, stderr); fprintf(stderr, "%s: expected clientData premable:\n", __func__); sshbuf_dump(m, stderr); #endif /* Check that the supplied clientData has the preamble we expect */ if ((r = sshbuf_cmp(wrapper, 0, sshbuf_ptr(m), sshbuf_len(m))) != 0) goto out; /* Prepare hash of clientData */ if ((r = ssh_digest_buffer(SSH_DIGEST_SHA256, wrapper, msghash, msghashlen)) != 0) goto out; /* success */ r = 0; out: sshbuf_free(chall); sshbuf_free(m); return r; } -/* ARGSUSED */ static int ssh_ecdsa_sk_verify(const struct sshkey *key, const u_char *sig, size_t siglen, const u_char *data, size_t dlen, const char *alg, u_int compat, struct sshkey_sig_details **detailsp) { ECDSA_SIG *esig = NULL; BIGNUM *sig_r = NULL, *sig_s = NULL; u_char sig_flags; u_char msghash[32], apphash[32], sighash[32]; u_int sig_counter; int is_webauthn = 0, ret = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; struct sshbuf *b = NULL, *sigbuf = NULL, *original_signed = NULL; struct sshbuf *webauthn_wrapper = NULL, *webauthn_exts = NULL; char *ktype = NULL, *webauthn_origin = NULL; struct sshkey_sig_details *details = NULL; #ifdef DEBUG_SK char *tmp = NULL; #endif if (detailsp != NULL) *detailsp = NULL; if (key == NULL || key->ecdsa == NULL || sshkey_type_plain(key->type) != KEY_ECDSA_SK || sig == NULL || siglen == 0) return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; if (key->ecdsa_nid != NID_X9_62_prime256v1) return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; /* fetch signature */ if ((b = sshbuf_from(sig, siglen)) == NULL) return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; if ((details = calloc(1, sizeof(*details))) == NULL) { ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; goto out; } if (sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &ktype, NULL) != 0) { ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; goto out; } if (strcmp(ktype, "webauthn-sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256@openssh.com") == 0) is_webauthn = 1; else if (strcmp(ktype, "sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256@openssh.com") != 0) { ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; goto out; } if (sshbuf_froms(b, &sigbuf) != 0 || sshbuf_get_u8(b, &sig_flags) != 0 || sshbuf_get_u32(b, &sig_counter) != 0) { ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; goto out; } if (is_webauthn) { if (sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &webauthn_origin, NULL) != 0 || sshbuf_froms(b, &webauthn_wrapper) != 0 || sshbuf_froms(b, &webauthn_exts) != 0) { ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; goto out; } } if (sshbuf_len(b) != 0) { ret = SSH_ERR_UNEXPECTED_TRAILING_DATA; goto out; } /* parse signature */ if (sshbuf_get_bignum2(sigbuf, &sig_r) != 0 || sshbuf_get_bignum2(sigbuf, &sig_s) != 0) { ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; goto out; } if (sshbuf_len(sigbuf) != 0) { ret = SSH_ERR_UNEXPECTED_TRAILING_DATA; goto out; } #ifdef DEBUG_SK fprintf(stderr, "%s: data: (len %zu)\n", __func__, datalen); /* sshbuf_dump_data(data, datalen, stderr); */ fprintf(stderr, "%s: sig_r: %s\n", __func__, (tmp = BN_bn2hex(sig_r))); free(tmp); fprintf(stderr, "%s: sig_s: %s\n", __func__, (tmp = BN_bn2hex(sig_s))); free(tmp); fprintf(stderr, "%s: sig_flags = 0x%02x, sig_counter = %u\n", __func__, sig_flags, sig_counter); if (is_webauthn) { fprintf(stderr, "%s: webauthn origin: %s\n", __func__, webauthn_origin); fprintf(stderr, "%s: webauthn_wrapper:\n", __func__); sshbuf_dump(webauthn_wrapper, stderr); } #endif if ((esig = ECDSA_SIG_new()) == NULL) { ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; goto out; } if (!ECDSA_SIG_set0(esig, sig_r, sig_s)) { ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; goto out; } sig_r = sig_s = NULL; /* transferred */ /* Reconstruct data that was supposedly signed */ if ((original_signed = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) { ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; goto out; } if (is_webauthn) { if ((ret = webauthn_check_prepare_hash(data, dlen, webauthn_origin, webauthn_wrapper, sig_flags, webauthn_exts, msghash, sizeof(msghash))) != 0) goto out; } else if ((ret = ssh_digest_memory(SSH_DIGEST_SHA256, data, dlen, msghash, sizeof(msghash))) != 0) goto out; /* Application value is hashed before signature */ if ((ret = ssh_digest_memory(SSH_DIGEST_SHA256, key->sk_application, strlen(key->sk_application), apphash, sizeof(apphash))) != 0) goto out; #ifdef DEBUG_SK fprintf(stderr, "%s: hashed application:\n", __func__); sshbuf_dump_data(apphash, sizeof(apphash), stderr); fprintf(stderr, "%s: hashed message:\n", __func__); sshbuf_dump_data(msghash, sizeof(msghash), stderr); #endif if ((ret = sshbuf_put(original_signed, apphash, sizeof(apphash))) != 0 || (ret = sshbuf_put_u8(original_signed, sig_flags)) != 0 || (ret = sshbuf_put_u32(original_signed, sig_counter)) != 0 || (ret = sshbuf_putb(original_signed, webauthn_exts)) != 0 || (ret = sshbuf_put(original_signed, msghash, sizeof(msghash))) != 0) goto out; /* Signature is over H(original_signed) */ if ((ret = ssh_digest_buffer(SSH_DIGEST_SHA256, original_signed, sighash, sizeof(sighash))) != 0) goto out; details->sk_counter = sig_counter; details->sk_flags = sig_flags; #ifdef DEBUG_SK fprintf(stderr, "%s: signed buf:\n", __func__); sshbuf_dump(original_signed, stderr); fprintf(stderr, "%s: signed hash:\n", __func__); sshbuf_dump_data(sighash, sizeof(sighash), stderr); #endif /* Verify it */ switch (ECDSA_do_verify(sighash, sizeof(sighash), esig, key->ecdsa)) { case 1: ret = 0; break; case 0: ret = SSH_ERR_SIGNATURE_INVALID; goto out; default: ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; goto out; } /* success */ if (detailsp != NULL) { *detailsp = details; details = NULL; } out: explicit_bzero(&sig_flags, sizeof(sig_flags)); explicit_bzero(&sig_counter, sizeof(sig_counter)); explicit_bzero(msghash, sizeof(msghash)); explicit_bzero(sighash, sizeof(msghash)); explicit_bzero(apphash, sizeof(apphash)); sshkey_sig_details_free(details); sshbuf_free(webauthn_wrapper); sshbuf_free(webauthn_exts); free(webauthn_origin); sshbuf_free(original_signed); sshbuf_free(sigbuf); sshbuf_free(b); ECDSA_SIG_free(esig); BN_clear_free(sig_r); BN_clear_free(sig_s); free(ktype); return ret; } static const struct sshkey_impl_funcs sshkey_ecdsa_sk_funcs = { /* .size = */ NULL, /* .alloc = */ NULL, /* .cleanup = */ ssh_ecdsa_sk_cleanup, /* .equal = */ ssh_ecdsa_sk_equal, /* .ssh_serialize_public = */ ssh_ecdsa_sk_serialize_public, /* .ssh_deserialize_public = */ ssh_ecdsa_sk_deserialize_public, /* .ssh_serialize_private = */ ssh_ecdsa_sk_serialize_private, /* .ssh_deserialize_private = */ ssh_ecdsa_sk_deserialize_private, /* .generate = */ NULL, /* .copy_public = */ ssh_ecdsa_sk_copy_public, /* .sign = */ NULL, /* .verify = */ ssh_ecdsa_sk_verify, }; const struct sshkey_impl sshkey_ecdsa_sk_impl = { /* .name = */ "sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256@openssh.com", /* .shortname = */ "ECDSA-SK", /* .sigalg = */ NULL, /* .type = */ KEY_ECDSA_SK, /* .nid = */ NID_X9_62_prime256v1, /* .cert = */ 0, /* .sigonly = */ 0, /* .keybits = */ 256, /* .funcs = */ &sshkey_ecdsa_sk_funcs, }; const struct sshkey_impl sshkey_ecdsa_sk_cert_impl = { /* .name = */ "sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com", /* .shortname = */ "ECDSA-SK-CERT", /* .sigalg = */ NULL, /* .type = */ KEY_ECDSA_SK_CERT, /* .nid = */ NID_X9_62_prime256v1, /* .cert = */ 1, /* .sigonly = */ 0, /* .keybits = */ 256, /* .funcs = */ &sshkey_ecdsa_sk_funcs, }; const struct sshkey_impl sshkey_ecdsa_sk_webauthn_impl = { /* .name = */ "webauthn-sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256@openssh.com", /* .shortname = */ "ECDSA-SK", /* .sigalg = */ NULL, /* .type = */ KEY_ECDSA_SK, /* .nid = */ NID_X9_62_prime256v1, /* .cert = */ 0, /* .sigonly = */ 1, /* .keybits = */ 256, /* .funcs = */ &sshkey_ecdsa_sk_funcs, }; #endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */ diff --git a/crypto/openssh/ssh-ecdsa.c b/crypto/openssh/ssh-ecdsa.c index 4bcb89baf517..341c32409bce 100644 --- a/crypto/openssh/ssh-ecdsa.c +++ b/crypto/openssh/ssh-ecdsa.c @@ -1,470 +1,468 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: ssh-ecdsa.c,v 1.25 2022/10/28 00:44:44 djm Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: ssh-ecdsa.c,v 1.26 2023/03/08 04:43:12 guenther Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. * Copyright (c) 2010 Damien Miller. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. */ #include "includes.h" #if defined(WITH_OPENSSL) && defined(OPENSSL_HAS_ECC) #include #include #include #include #include #include #include "sshbuf.h" #include "ssherr.h" #include "digest.h" #define SSHKEY_INTERNAL #include "sshkey.h" #include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h" static u_int ssh_ecdsa_size(const struct sshkey *key) { switch (key->ecdsa_nid) { case NID_X9_62_prime256v1: return 256; case NID_secp384r1: return 384; #ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_NISTP521 case NID_secp521r1: return 521; #endif default: return 0; } } static void ssh_ecdsa_cleanup(struct sshkey *k) { EC_KEY_free(k->ecdsa); k->ecdsa = NULL; } static int ssh_ecdsa_equal(const struct sshkey *a, const struct sshkey *b) { const EC_GROUP *grp_a, *grp_b; const EC_POINT *pub_a, *pub_b; if (a->ecdsa == NULL || b->ecdsa == NULL) return 0; if ((grp_a = EC_KEY_get0_group(a->ecdsa)) == NULL || (grp_b = EC_KEY_get0_group(b->ecdsa)) == NULL) return 0; if ((pub_a = EC_KEY_get0_public_key(a->ecdsa)) == NULL || (pub_b = EC_KEY_get0_public_key(b->ecdsa)) == NULL) return 0; if (EC_GROUP_cmp(grp_a, grp_b, NULL) != 0) return 0; if (EC_POINT_cmp(grp_a, pub_a, pub_b, NULL) != 0) return 0; return 1; } static int ssh_ecdsa_serialize_public(const struct sshkey *key, struct sshbuf *b, enum sshkey_serialize_rep opts) { int r; if (key->ecdsa == NULL) return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, sshkey_curve_nid_to_name(key->ecdsa_nid))) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_eckey(b, key->ecdsa)) != 0) return r; return 0; } static int ssh_ecdsa_serialize_private(const struct sshkey *key, struct sshbuf *b, enum sshkey_serialize_rep opts) { int r; if (!sshkey_is_cert(key)) { if ((r = ssh_ecdsa_serialize_public(key, b, opts)) != 0) return r; } if ((r = sshbuf_put_bignum2(b, EC_KEY_get0_private_key(key->ecdsa))) != 0) return r; return 0; } static int ssh_ecdsa_generate(struct sshkey *k, int bits) { EC_KEY *private; if ((k->ecdsa_nid = sshkey_ecdsa_bits_to_nid(bits)) == -1) return SSH_ERR_KEY_LENGTH; if ((private = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(k->ecdsa_nid)) == NULL) return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; if (EC_KEY_generate_key(private) != 1) { EC_KEY_free(private); return SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; } EC_KEY_set_asn1_flag(private, OPENSSL_EC_NAMED_CURVE); k->ecdsa = private; return 0; } static int ssh_ecdsa_copy_public(const struct sshkey *from, struct sshkey *to) { to->ecdsa_nid = from->ecdsa_nid; if ((to->ecdsa = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(from->ecdsa_nid)) == NULL) return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; if (EC_KEY_set_public_key(to->ecdsa, EC_KEY_get0_public_key(from->ecdsa)) != 1) return SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; /* caller will free k->ecdsa */ return 0; } static int ssh_ecdsa_deserialize_public(const char *ktype, struct sshbuf *b, struct sshkey *key) { int r; char *curve = NULL; if ((key->ecdsa_nid = sshkey_ecdsa_nid_from_name(ktype)) == -1) return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &curve, NULL)) != 0) goto out; if (key->ecdsa_nid != sshkey_curve_name_to_nid(curve)) { r = SSH_ERR_EC_CURVE_MISMATCH; goto out; } EC_KEY_free(key->ecdsa); key->ecdsa = NULL; if ((key->ecdsa = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(key->ecdsa_nid)) == NULL) { r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; goto out; } if ((r = sshbuf_get_eckey(b, key->ecdsa)) != 0) goto out; if (sshkey_ec_validate_public(EC_KEY_get0_group(key->ecdsa), EC_KEY_get0_public_key(key->ecdsa)) != 0) { r = SSH_ERR_KEY_INVALID_EC_VALUE; goto out; } /* success */ r = 0; #ifdef DEBUG_PK sshkey_dump_ec_point(EC_KEY_get0_group(key->ecdsa), EC_KEY_get0_public_key(key->ecdsa)); #endif out: free(curve); if (r != 0) { EC_KEY_free(key->ecdsa); key->ecdsa = NULL; } return r; } static int ssh_ecdsa_deserialize_private(const char *ktype, struct sshbuf *b, struct sshkey *key) { int r; BIGNUM *exponent = NULL; if (!sshkey_is_cert(key)) { if ((r = ssh_ecdsa_deserialize_public(ktype, b, key)) != 0) return r; } if ((r = sshbuf_get_bignum2(b, &exponent)) != 0) goto out; if (EC_KEY_set_private_key(key->ecdsa, exponent) != 1) { r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; goto out; } if ((r = sshkey_ec_validate_private(key->ecdsa)) != 0) goto out; /* success */ r = 0; out: BN_clear_free(exponent); return r; } -/* ARGSUSED */ static int ssh_ecdsa_sign(struct sshkey *key, u_char **sigp, size_t *lenp, const u_char *data, size_t dlen, const char *alg, const char *sk_provider, const char *sk_pin, u_int compat) { ECDSA_SIG *esig = NULL; const BIGNUM *sig_r, *sig_s; int hash_alg; u_char digest[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH]; size_t len, hlen; struct sshbuf *b = NULL, *bb = NULL; int ret = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; if (lenp != NULL) *lenp = 0; if (sigp != NULL) *sigp = NULL; if (key == NULL || key->ecdsa == NULL || sshkey_type_plain(key->type) != KEY_ECDSA) return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; if ((hash_alg = sshkey_ec_nid_to_hash_alg(key->ecdsa_nid)) == -1 || (hlen = ssh_digest_bytes(hash_alg)) == 0) return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; if ((ret = ssh_digest_memory(hash_alg, data, dlen, digest, sizeof(digest))) != 0) goto out; if ((esig = ECDSA_do_sign(digest, hlen, key->ecdsa)) == NULL) { ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; goto out; } if ((bb = sshbuf_new()) == NULL || (b = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) { ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; goto out; } ECDSA_SIG_get0(esig, &sig_r, &sig_s); if ((ret = sshbuf_put_bignum2(bb, sig_r)) != 0 || (ret = sshbuf_put_bignum2(bb, sig_s)) != 0) goto out; if ((ret = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, sshkey_ssh_name_plain(key))) != 0 || (ret = sshbuf_put_stringb(b, bb)) != 0) goto out; len = sshbuf_len(b); if (sigp != NULL) { if ((*sigp = malloc(len)) == NULL) { ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; goto out; } memcpy(*sigp, sshbuf_ptr(b), len); } if (lenp != NULL) *lenp = len; ret = 0; out: explicit_bzero(digest, sizeof(digest)); sshbuf_free(b); sshbuf_free(bb); ECDSA_SIG_free(esig); return ret; } -/* ARGSUSED */ static int ssh_ecdsa_verify(const struct sshkey *key, const u_char *sig, size_t siglen, const u_char *data, size_t dlen, const char *alg, u_int compat, struct sshkey_sig_details **detailsp) { ECDSA_SIG *esig = NULL; BIGNUM *sig_r = NULL, *sig_s = NULL; int hash_alg; u_char digest[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH]; size_t hlen; int ret = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; struct sshbuf *b = NULL, *sigbuf = NULL; char *ktype = NULL; if (key == NULL || key->ecdsa == NULL || sshkey_type_plain(key->type) != KEY_ECDSA || sig == NULL || siglen == 0) return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; if ((hash_alg = sshkey_ec_nid_to_hash_alg(key->ecdsa_nid)) == -1 || (hlen = ssh_digest_bytes(hash_alg)) == 0) return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; /* fetch signature */ if ((b = sshbuf_from(sig, siglen)) == NULL) return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; if (sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &ktype, NULL) != 0 || sshbuf_froms(b, &sigbuf) != 0) { ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; goto out; } if (strcmp(sshkey_ssh_name_plain(key), ktype) != 0) { ret = SSH_ERR_KEY_TYPE_MISMATCH; goto out; } if (sshbuf_len(b) != 0) { ret = SSH_ERR_UNEXPECTED_TRAILING_DATA; goto out; } /* parse signature */ if (sshbuf_get_bignum2(sigbuf, &sig_r) != 0 || sshbuf_get_bignum2(sigbuf, &sig_s) != 0) { ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; goto out; } if ((esig = ECDSA_SIG_new()) == NULL) { ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; goto out; } if (!ECDSA_SIG_set0(esig, sig_r, sig_s)) { ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; goto out; } sig_r = sig_s = NULL; /* transferred */ if (sshbuf_len(sigbuf) != 0) { ret = SSH_ERR_UNEXPECTED_TRAILING_DATA; goto out; } if ((ret = ssh_digest_memory(hash_alg, data, dlen, digest, sizeof(digest))) != 0) goto out; switch (ECDSA_do_verify(digest, hlen, esig, key->ecdsa)) { case 1: ret = 0; break; case 0: ret = SSH_ERR_SIGNATURE_INVALID; goto out; default: ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; goto out; } out: explicit_bzero(digest, sizeof(digest)); sshbuf_free(sigbuf); sshbuf_free(b); ECDSA_SIG_free(esig); BN_clear_free(sig_r); BN_clear_free(sig_s); free(ktype); return ret; } /* NB. not static; used by ECDSA-SK */ const struct sshkey_impl_funcs sshkey_ecdsa_funcs = { /* .size = */ ssh_ecdsa_size, /* .alloc = */ NULL, /* .cleanup = */ ssh_ecdsa_cleanup, /* .equal = */ ssh_ecdsa_equal, /* .ssh_serialize_public = */ ssh_ecdsa_serialize_public, /* .ssh_deserialize_public = */ ssh_ecdsa_deserialize_public, /* .ssh_serialize_private = */ ssh_ecdsa_serialize_private, /* .ssh_deserialize_private = */ ssh_ecdsa_deserialize_private, /* .generate = */ ssh_ecdsa_generate, /* .copy_public = */ ssh_ecdsa_copy_public, /* .sign = */ ssh_ecdsa_sign, /* .verify = */ ssh_ecdsa_verify, }; const struct sshkey_impl sshkey_ecdsa_nistp256_impl = { /* .name = */ "ecdsa-sha2-nistp256", /* .shortname = */ "ECDSA", /* .sigalg = */ NULL, /* .type = */ KEY_ECDSA, /* .nid = */ NID_X9_62_prime256v1, /* .cert = */ 0, /* .sigonly = */ 0, /* .keybits = */ 0, /* .funcs = */ &sshkey_ecdsa_funcs, }; const struct sshkey_impl sshkey_ecdsa_nistp256_cert_impl = { /* .name = */ "ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com", /* .shortname = */ "ECDSA-CERT", /* .sigalg = */ NULL, /* .type = */ KEY_ECDSA_CERT, /* .nid = */ NID_X9_62_prime256v1, /* .cert = */ 1, /* .sigonly = */ 0, /* .keybits = */ 0, /* .funcs = */ &sshkey_ecdsa_funcs, }; const struct sshkey_impl sshkey_ecdsa_nistp384_impl = { /* .name = */ "ecdsa-sha2-nistp384", /* .shortname = */ "ECDSA", /* .sigalg = */ NULL, /* .type = */ KEY_ECDSA, /* .nid = */ NID_secp384r1, /* .cert = */ 0, /* .sigonly = */ 0, /* .keybits = */ 0, /* .funcs = */ &sshkey_ecdsa_funcs, }; const struct sshkey_impl sshkey_ecdsa_nistp384_cert_impl = { /* .name = */ "ecdsa-sha2-nistp384-cert-v01@openssh.com", /* .shortname = */ "ECDSA-CERT", /* .sigalg = */ NULL, /* .type = */ KEY_ECDSA_CERT, /* .nid = */ NID_secp384r1, /* .cert = */ 1, /* .sigonly = */ 0, /* .keybits = */ 0, /* .funcs = */ &sshkey_ecdsa_funcs, }; #ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_NISTP521 const struct sshkey_impl sshkey_ecdsa_nistp521_impl = { /* .name = */ "ecdsa-sha2-nistp521", /* .shortname = */ "ECDSA", /* .sigalg = */ NULL, /* .type = */ KEY_ECDSA, /* .nid = */ NID_secp521r1, /* .cert = */ 0, /* .sigonly = */ 0, /* .keybits = */ 0, /* .funcs = */ &sshkey_ecdsa_funcs, }; const struct sshkey_impl sshkey_ecdsa_nistp521_cert_impl = { /* .name = */ "ecdsa-sha2-nistp521-cert-v01@openssh.com", /* .shortname = */ "ECDSA-CERT", /* .sigalg = */ NULL, /* .type = */ KEY_ECDSA_CERT, /* .nid = */ NID_secp521r1, /* .cert = */ 1, /* .sigonly = */ 0, /* .keybits = */ 0, /* .funcs = */ &sshkey_ecdsa_funcs, }; #endif #endif /* WITH_OPENSSL && OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */ diff --git a/crypto/openssh/ssh-keygen.1 b/crypto/openssh/ssh-keygen.1 index 8b1f617d2377..1be08228237d 100644 --- a/crypto/openssh/ssh-keygen.1 +++ b/crypto/openssh/ssh-keygen.1 @@ -1,1334 +1,1349 @@ -.\" $OpenBSD: ssh-keygen.1,v 1.226 2022/09/10 08:50:53 jsg Exp $ +.\" $OpenBSD: ssh-keygen.1,v 1.228 2023/02/10 06:40:48 jmc Exp $ .\" .\" Author: Tatu Ylonen .\" Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen , Espoo, Finland .\" All rights reserved .\" .\" As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software .\" can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this .\" software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is .\" incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be .\" called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell". .\" .\" .\" Copyright (c) 1999,2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. .\" Copyright (c) 1999 Aaron Campbell. All rights reserved. .\" Copyright (c) 1999 Theo de Raadt. All rights reserved. .\" .\" Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without .\" modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions .\" are met: .\" 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright .\" notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. .\" 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright .\" notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the .\" documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. .\" .\" THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR .\" IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES .\" OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. .\" IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, .\" INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT .\" NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, .\" DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY .\" THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT .\" (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF .\" THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. .\" -.Dd $Mdocdate: September 10 2022 $ +.Dd $Mdocdate: February 10 2023 $ .Dt SSH-KEYGEN 1 .Os .Sh NAME .Nm ssh-keygen .Nd OpenSSH authentication key utility .Sh SYNOPSIS .Nm ssh-keygen .Op Fl q .Op Fl a Ar rounds .Op Fl b Ar bits .Op Fl C Ar comment .Op Fl f Ar output_keyfile .Op Fl m Ar format .Op Fl N Ar new_passphrase .Op Fl O Ar option .Op Fl t Cm dsa | ecdsa | ecdsa-sk | ed25519 | ed25519-sk | rsa .Op Fl w Ar provider .Op Fl Z Ar cipher .Nm ssh-keygen .Fl p .Op Fl a Ar rounds .Op Fl f Ar keyfile .Op Fl m Ar format .Op Fl N Ar new_passphrase .Op Fl P Ar old_passphrase .Op Fl Z Ar cipher .Nm ssh-keygen .Fl i .Op Fl f Ar input_keyfile .Op Fl m Ar key_format .Nm ssh-keygen .Fl e .Op Fl f Ar input_keyfile .Op Fl m Ar key_format .Nm ssh-keygen .Fl y .Op Fl f Ar input_keyfile .Nm ssh-keygen .Fl c .Op Fl a Ar rounds .Op Fl C Ar comment .Op Fl f Ar keyfile .Op Fl P Ar passphrase .Nm ssh-keygen .Fl l .Op Fl v .Op Fl E Ar fingerprint_hash .Op Fl f Ar input_keyfile .Nm ssh-keygen .Fl B .Op Fl f Ar input_keyfile .Nm ssh-keygen .Fl D Ar pkcs11 .Nm ssh-keygen .Fl F Ar hostname .Op Fl lv .Op Fl f Ar known_hosts_file .Nm ssh-keygen .Fl H .Op Fl f Ar known_hosts_file .Nm ssh-keygen .Fl K .Op Fl a Ar rounds .Op Fl w Ar provider .Nm ssh-keygen .Fl R Ar hostname .Op Fl f Ar known_hosts_file .Nm ssh-keygen .Fl r Ar hostname .Op Fl g .Op Fl f Ar input_keyfile .Nm ssh-keygen .Fl M Cm generate .Op Fl O Ar option .Ar output_file .Nm ssh-keygen .Fl M Cm screen .Op Fl f Ar input_file .Op Fl O Ar option .Ar output_file .Nm ssh-keygen .Fl I Ar certificate_identity .Fl s Ar ca_key .Op Fl hU .Op Fl D Ar pkcs11_provider .Op Fl n Ar principals .Op Fl O Ar option .Op Fl V Ar validity_interval .Op Fl z Ar serial_number .Ar .Nm ssh-keygen .Fl L .Op Fl f Ar input_keyfile .Nm ssh-keygen .Fl A .Op Fl a Ar rounds .Op Fl f Ar prefix_path .Nm ssh-keygen .Fl k .Fl f Ar krl_file .Op Fl u .Op Fl s Ar ca_public .Op Fl z Ar version_number .Ar .Nm ssh-keygen .Fl Q .Op Fl l .Fl f Ar krl_file .Ar .Nm ssh-keygen .Fl Y Cm find-principals .Op Fl O Ar option .Fl s Ar signature_file .Fl f Ar allowed_signers_file .Nm ssh-keygen .Fl Y Cm match-principals .Fl I Ar signer_identity .Fl f Ar allowed_signers_file .Nm ssh-keygen .Fl Y Cm check-novalidate .Op Fl O Ar option .Fl n Ar namespace .Fl s Ar signature_file .Nm ssh-keygen .Fl Y Cm sign .Op Fl O Ar option .Fl f Ar key_file .Fl n Ar namespace .Ar .Nm ssh-keygen .Fl Y Cm verify .Op Fl O Ar option .Fl f Ar allowed_signers_file .Fl I Ar signer_identity .Fl n Ar namespace .Fl s Ar signature_file .Op Fl r Ar revocation_file .Sh DESCRIPTION .Nm generates, manages and converts authentication keys for .Xr ssh 1 . .Nm can create keys for use by SSH protocol version 2. .Pp The type of key to be generated is specified with the .Fl t option. If invoked without any arguments, .Nm will generate an RSA key. .Pp .Nm is also used to generate groups for use in Diffie-Hellman group exchange (DH-GEX). See the .Sx MODULI GENERATION section for details. .Pp Finally, .Nm can be used to generate and update Key Revocation Lists, and to test whether given keys have been revoked by one. See the .Sx KEY REVOCATION LISTS section for details. .Pp Normally each user wishing to use SSH with public key authentication runs this once to create the authentication key in .Pa ~/.ssh/id_dsa , .Pa ~/.ssh/id_ecdsa , .Pa ~/.ssh/id_ecdsa_sk , .Pa ~/.ssh/id_ed25519 , .Pa ~/.ssh/id_ed25519_sk or .Pa ~/.ssh/id_rsa . Additionally, the system administrator may use this to generate host keys, as seen in .Pa /etc/rc . .Pp Normally this program generates the key and asks for a file in which to store the private key. The public key is stored in a file with the same name but .Dq .pub appended. The program also asks for a passphrase. The passphrase may be empty to indicate no passphrase (host keys must have an empty passphrase), or it may be a string of arbitrary length. A passphrase is similar to a password, except it can be a phrase with a series of words, punctuation, numbers, whitespace, or any string of characters you want. Good passphrases are 10-30 characters long, are not simple sentences or otherwise easily guessable (English prose has only 1-2 bits of entropy per character, and provides very bad passphrases), and contain a mix of upper and lowercase letters, numbers, and non-alphanumeric characters. The passphrase can be changed later by using the .Fl p option. .Pp There is no way to recover a lost passphrase. If the passphrase is lost or forgotten, a new key must be generated and the corresponding public key copied to other machines. .Pp .Nm will by default write keys in an OpenSSH-specific format. This format is preferred as it offers better protection for keys at rest as well as allowing storage of key comments within the private key file itself. The key comment may be useful to help identify the key. The comment is initialized to .Dq user@host when the key is created, but can be changed using the .Fl c option. .Pp It is still possible for .Nm to write the previously-used PEM format private keys using the .Fl m flag. This may be used when generating new keys, and existing new-format keys may be converted using this option in conjunction with the .Fl p (change passphrase) flag. .Pp After a key is generated, .Nm will ask where the keys should be placed to be activated. .Pp The options are as follows: .Bl -tag -width Ds .It Fl A Generate host keys of all default key types (rsa, ecdsa, and ed25519) if they do not already exist. The host keys are generated with the default key file path, an empty passphrase, default bits for the key type, and default comment. If .Fl f has also been specified, its argument is used as a prefix to the default path for the resulting host key files. This is used by .Pa /etc/rc to generate new host keys. .It Fl a Ar rounds When saving a private key, this option specifies the number of KDF (key derivation function, currently .Xr bcrypt_pbkdf 3 ) rounds used. Higher numbers result in slower passphrase verification and increased resistance to brute-force password cracking (should the keys be stolen). The default is 16 rounds. .It Fl B Show the bubblebabble digest of specified private or public key file. .It Fl b Ar bits Specifies the number of bits in the key to create. For RSA keys, the minimum size is 1024 bits and the default is 3072 bits. Generally, 3072 bits is considered sufficient. DSA keys must be exactly 1024 bits as specified by FIPS 186-2. For ECDSA keys, the .Fl b flag determines the key length by selecting from one of three elliptic curve sizes: 256, 384 or 521 bits. Attempting to use bit lengths other than these three values for ECDSA keys will fail. ECDSA-SK, Ed25519 and Ed25519-SK keys have a fixed length and the .Fl b flag will be ignored. .It Fl C Ar comment Provides a new comment. .It Fl c Requests changing the comment in the private and public key files. The program will prompt for the file containing the private keys, for the passphrase if the key has one, and for the new comment. .It Fl D Ar pkcs11 Download the public keys provided by the PKCS#11 shared library .Ar pkcs11 . When used in combination with .Fl s , this option indicates that a CA key resides in a PKCS#11 token (see the .Sx CERTIFICATES section for details). .It Fl E Ar fingerprint_hash Specifies the hash algorithm used when displaying key fingerprints. Valid options are: .Dq md5 and .Dq sha256 . The default is .Dq sha256 . .It Fl e This option will read a private or public OpenSSH key file and print to stdout a public key in one of the formats specified by the .Fl m option. The default export format is .Dq RFC4716 . This option allows exporting OpenSSH keys for use by other programs, including several commercial SSH implementations. .It Fl F Ar hostname | [hostname]:port Search for the specified .Ar hostname (with optional port number) in a .Pa known_hosts file, listing any occurrences found. This option is useful to find hashed host names or addresses and may also be used in conjunction with the .Fl H option to print found keys in a hashed format. .It Fl f Ar filename Specifies the filename of the key file. .It Fl g Use generic DNS format when printing fingerprint resource records using the .Fl r command. .It Fl H Hash a .Pa known_hosts file. This replaces all hostnames and addresses with hashed representations within the specified file; the original content is moved to a file with a .old suffix. These hashes may be used normally by .Nm ssh and .Nm sshd , but they do not reveal identifying information should the file's contents be disclosed. This option will not modify existing hashed hostnames and is therefore safe to use on files that mix hashed and non-hashed names. .It Fl h When signing a key, create a host certificate instead of a user certificate. See the .Sx CERTIFICATES section for details. .It Fl I Ar certificate_identity Specify the key identity when signing a public key. See the .Sx CERTIFICATES section for details. .It Fl i This option will read an unencrypted private (or public) key file in the format specified by the .Fl m option and print an OpenSSH compatible private (or public) key to stdout. This option allows importing keys from other software, including several commercial SSH implementations. The default import format is .Dq RFC4716 . .It Fl K Download resident keys from a FIDO authenticator. Public and private key files will be written to the current directory for each downloaded key. If multiple FIDO authenticators are attached, keys will be downloaded from the first touched authenticator. See the .Sx FIDO AUTHENTICATOR section for more information. .It Fl k Generate a KRL file. In this mode, .Nm will generate a KRL file at the location specified via the .Fl f flag that revokes every key or certificate presented on the command line. Keys/certificates to be revoked may be specified by public key file or using the format described in the .Sx KEY REVOCATION LISTS section. .It Fl L Prints the contents of one or more certificates. .It Fl l Show fingerprint of specified public key file. For RSA and DSA keys .Nm tries to find the matching public key file and prints its fingerprint. If combined with .Fl v , a visual ASCII art representation of the key is supplied with the fingerprint. .It Fl M Cm generate Generate candidate Diffie-Hellman Group Exchange (DH-GEX) parameters for eventual use by the .Sq diffie-hellman-group-exchange-* key exchange methods. The numbers generated by this operation must be further screened before use. See the .Sx MODULI GENERATION section for more information. .It Fl M Cm screen Screen candidate parameters for Diffie-Hellman Group Exchange. This will accept a list of candidate numbers and test that they are safe (Sophie Germain) primes with acceptable group generators. The results of this operation may be added to the .Pa /etc/moduli file. See the .Sx MODULI GENERATION section for more information. .It Fl m Ar key_format Specify a key format for key generation, the .Fl i (import), .Fl e (export) conversion options, and the .Fl p change passphrase operation. The latter may be used to convert between OpenSSH private key and PEM private key formats. The supported key formats are: .Dq RFC4716 (RFC 4716/SSH2 public or private key), .Dq PKCS8 (PKCS8 public or private key) or .Dq PEM (PEM public key). By default OpenSSH will write newly-generated private keys in its own format, but when converting public keys for export the default format is .Dq RFC4716 . Setting a format of .Dq PEM when generating or updating a supported private key type will cause the key to be stored in the legacy PEM private key format. .It Fl N Ar new_passphrase Provides the new passphrase. .It Fl n Ar principals Specify one or more principals (user or host names) to be included in a certificate when signing a key. Multiple principals may be specified, separated by commas. See the .Sx CERTIFICATES section for details. .It Fl O Ar option Specify a key/value option. These are specific to the operation that .Nm has been requested to perform. .Pp When signing certificates, one of the options listed in the .Sx CERTIFICATES section may be specified here. .Pp When performing moduli generation or screening, one of the options listed in the .Sx MODULI GENERATION section may be specified. .Pp When generating FIDO authenticator-backed keys, the options listed in the .Sx FIDO AUTHENTICATOR section may be specified. .Pp When performing signature-related options using the .Fl Y flag, the following options are accepted: .Bl -tag -width Ds .It Cm hashalg Ns = Ns Ar algorithm Selects the hash algorithm to use for hashing the message to be signed. Valid algorithms are .Dq sha256 and .Dq sha512. The default is .Dq sha512. .It Cm print-pubkey Print the full public key to standard output after signature verification. .It Cm verify-time Ns = Ns Ar timestamp Specifies a time to use when validating signatures instead of the current time. The time may be specified as a date or time in the YYYYMMDD[Z] or in YYYYMMDDHHMM[SS][Z] formats. Dates and times will be interpreted in the current system time zone unless suffixed with a Z character, which causes them to be interpreted in the UTC time zone. .El .Pp +When generating SSHFP DNS records from public keys using the +.Fl r +flag, the following options are accepted: +.Bl -tag -width Ds +.It Cm hashalg Ns = Ns Ar algorithm +Selects a hash algorithm to use when printing SSHFP records using the +.Fl D +flag. +Valid algorithms are +.Dq sha1 +and +.Dq sha256 . +The default is to print both. +.El +.Pp The .Fl O option may be specified multiple times. .It Fl P Ar passphrase Provides the (old) passphrase. .It Fl p Requests changing the passphrase of a private key file instead of creating a new private key. The program will prompt for the file containing the private key, for the old passphrase, and twice for the new passphrase. .It Fl Q Test whether keys have been revoked in a KRL. If the .Fl l option is also specified then the contents of the KRL will be printed. .It Fl q Silence .Nm ssh-keygen . .It Fl R Ar hostname | [hostname]:port Removes all keys belonging to the specified .Ar hostname (with optional port number) from a .Pa known_hosts file. This option is useful to delete hashed hosts (see the .Fl H option above). .It Fl r Ar hostname Print the SSHFP fingerprint resource record named .Ar hostname for the specified public key file. .It Fl s Ar ca_key Certify (sign) a public key using the specified CA key. See the .Sx CERTIFICATES section for details. .Pp When generating a KRL, .Fl s specifies a path to a CA public key file used to revoke certificates directly by key ID or serial number. See the .Sx KEY REVOCATION LISTS section for details. .It Fl t Cm dsa | ecdsa | ecdsa-sk | ed25519 | ed25519-sk | rsa Specifies the type of key to create. The possible values are .Dq dsa , .Dq ecdsa , .Dq ecdsa-sk , .Dq ed25519 , .Dq ed25519-sk , or .Dq rsa . .Pp This flag may also be used to specify the desired signature type when signing certificates using an RSA CA key. The available RSA signature variants are .Dq ssh-rsa (SHA1 signatures, not recommended), .Dq rsa-sha2-256 , and .Dq rsa-sha2-512 (the default). .It Fl U When used in combination with .Fl s or .Fl Y Cm sign , this option indicates that a CA key resides in a .Xr ssh-agent 1 . See the .Sx CERTIFICATES section for more information. .It Fl u Update a KRL. When specified with .Fl k , keys listed via the command line are added to the existing KRL rather than a new KRL being created. .It Fl V Ar validity_interval Specify a validity interval when signing a certificate. A validity interval may consist of a single time, indicating that the certificate is valid beginning now and expiring at that time, or may consist of two times separated by a colon to indicate an explicit time interval. .Pp The start time may be specified as: .Bl -bullet -compact .It The string .Dq always to indicate the certificate has no specified start time. .It A date or time in the system time zone formatted as YYYYMMDD or YYYYMMDDHHMM[SS]. .It A date or time in the UTC time zone as YYYYMMDDZ or YYYYMMDDHHMM[SS]Z. .It A relative time before the current system time consisting of a minus sign followed by an interval in the format described in the TIME FORMATS section of .Xr sshd_config 5 . .It A raw seconds since epoch (Jan 1 1970 00:00:00 UTC) as a hexadecimal number beginning with .Dq 0x . .El .Pp The end time may be specified similarly to the start time: .Bl -bullet -compact .It The string .Dq forever to indicate the certificate has no specified end time. .It A date or time in the system time zone formatted as YYYYMMDD or YYYYMMDDHHMM[SS]. .It A date or time in the UTC time zone as YYYYMMDDZ or YYYYMMDDHHMM[SS]Z. .It A relative time after the current system time consisting of a plus sign followed by an interval in the format described in the TIME FORMATS section of .Xr sshd_config 5 . .It A raw seconds since epoch (Jan 1 1970 00:00:00 UTC) as a hexadecimal number beginning with .Dq 0x . .El .Pp For example: .Bl -tag -width Ds .It +52w1d Valid from now to 52 weeks and one day from now. .It -4w:+4w Valid from four weeks ago to four weeks from now. .It 20100101123000:20110101123000 Valid from 12:30 PM, January 1st, 2010 to 12:30 PM, January 1st, 2011. .It 20100101123000Z:20110101123000Z Similar, but interpreted in the UTC time zone rather than the system time zone. .It -1d:20110101 Valid from yesterday to midnight, January 1st, 2011. .It 0x1:0x2000000000 Valid from roughly early 1970 to May 2033. .It -1m:forever Valid from one minute ago and never expiring. .El .It Fl v Verbose mode. Causes .Nm to print debugging messages about its progress. This is helpful for debugging moduli generation. Multiple .Fl v options increase the verbosity. The maximum is 3. .It Fl w Ar provider Specifies a path to a library that will be used when creating FIDO authenticator-hosted keys, overriding the default of using the internal USB HID support. .It Fl Y Cm find-principals Find the principal(s) associated with the public key of a signature, provided using the .Fl s flag in an authorized signers file provided using the .Fl f flag. The format of the allowed signers file is documented in the .Sx ALLOWED SIGNERS section below. If one or more matching principals are found, they are returned on standard output. .It Fl Y Cm match-principals Find principal matching the principal name provided using the .Fl I flag in the authorized signers file specified using the .Fl f flag. If one or more matching principals are found, they are returned on standard output. .It Fl Y Cm check-novalidate Checks that a signature generated using .Nm .Fl Y Cm sign has a valid structure. This does not validate if a signature comes from an authorized signer. When testing a signature, .Nm accepts a message on standard input and a signature namespace using .Fl n . A file containing the corresponding signature must also be supplied using the .Fl s flag. Successful testing of the signature is signalled by .Nm returning a zero exit status. .It Fl Y Cm sign Cryptographically sign a file or some data using a SSH key. When signing, .Nm accepts zero or more files to sign on the command-line - if no files are specified then .Nm will sign data presented on standard input. Signatures are written to the path of the input file with .Dq .sig appended, or to standard output if the message to be signed was read from standard input. .Pp The key used for signing is specified using the .Fl f option and may refer to either a private key, or a public key with the private half available via .Xr ssh-agent 1 . An additional signature namespace, used to prevent signature confusion across different domains of use (e.g. file signing vs email signing) must be provided via the .Fl n flag. Namespaces are arbitrary strings, and may include: .Dq file for file signing, .Dq email for email signing. For custom uses, it is recommended to use names following a NAMESPACE@YOUR.DOMAIN pattern to generate unambiguous namespaces. .It Fl Y Cm verify Request to verify a signature generated using .Nm .Fl Y Cm sign as described above. When verifying a signature, .Nm accepts a message on standard input and a signature namespace using .Fl n . A file containing the corresponding signature must also be supplied using the .Fl s flag, along with the identity of the signer using .Fl I and a list of allowed signers via the .Fl f flag. The format of the allowed signers file is documented in the .Sx ALLOWED SIGNERS section below. A file containing revoked keys can be passed using the .Fl r flag. The revocation file may be a KRL or a one-per-line list of public keys. Successful verification by an authorized signer is signalled by .Nm returning a zero exit status. .It Fl y This option will read a private OpenSSH format file and print an OpenSSH public key to stdout. .It Fl Z Ar cipher Specifies the cipher to use for encryption when writing an OpenSSH-format private key file. The list of available ciphers may be obtained using .Qq ssh -Q cipher . The default is .Dq aes256-ctr . .It Fl z Ar serial_number Specifies a serial number to be embedded in the certificate to distinguish this certificate from others from the same CA. If the .Ar serial_number is prefixed with a .Sq + character, then the serial number will be incremented for each certificate signed on a single command-line. The default serial number is zero. .Pp When generating a KRL, the .Fl z flag is used to specify a KRL version number. .El .Sh MODULI GENERATION .Nm may be used to generate groups for the Diffie-Hellman Group Exchange (DH-GEX) protocol. Generating these groups is a two-step process: first, candidate primes are generated using a fast, but memory intensive process. These candidate primes are then tested for suitability (a CPU-intensive process). .Pp Generation of primes is performed using the .Fl M Cm generate option. The desired length of the primes may be specified by the .Fl O Cm bits option. For example: .Pp .Dl # ssh-keygen -M generate -O bits=2048 moduli-2048.candidates .Pp By default, the search for primes begins at a random point in the desired length range. This may be overridden using the .Fl O Cm start option, which specifies a different start point (in hex). .Pp Once a set of candidates have been generated, they must be screened for suitability. This may be performed using the .Fl M Cm screen option. In this mode .Nm will read candidates from standard input (or a file specified using the .Fl f option). For example: .Pp .Dl # ssh-keygen -M screen -f moduli-2048.candidates moduli-2048 .Pp By default, each candidate will be subjected to 100 primality tests. This may be overridden using the .Fl O Cm prime-tests option. The DH generator value will be chosen automatically for the prime under consideration. If a specific generator is desired, it may be requested using the .Fl O Cm generator option. Valid generator values are 2, 3, and 5. .Pp Screened DH groups may be installed in .Pa /etc/moduli . It is important that this file contains moduli of a range of bit lengths. .Pp A number of options are available for moduli generation and screening via the .Fl O flag: .Bl -tag -width Ds .It Ic lines Ns = Ns Ar number Exit after screening the specified number of lines while performing DH candidate screening. .It Ic start-line Ns = Ns Ar line-number Start screening at the specified line number while performing DH candidate screening. .It Ic checkpoint Ns = Ns Ar filename Write the last line processed to the specified file while performing DH candidate screening. This will be used to skip lines in the input file that have already been processed if the job is restarted. .It Ic memory Ns = Ns Ar mbytes Specify the amount of memory to use (in megabytes) when generating candidate moduli for DH-GEX. .It Ic start Ns = Ns Ar hex-value Specify start point (in hex) when generating candidate moduli for DH-GEX. .It Ic generator Ns = Ns Ar value Specify desired generator (in decimal) when testing candidate moduli for DH-GEX. .El .Sh CERTIFICATES .Nm supports signing of keys to produce certificates that may be used for user or host authentication. Certificates consist of a public key, some identity information, zero or more principal (user or host) names and a set of options that are signed by a Certification Authority (CA) key. Clients or servers may then trust only the CA key and verify its signature on a certificate rather than trusting many user/host keys. Note that OpenSSH certificates are a different, and much simpler, format to the X.509 certificates used in .Xr ssl 8 . .Pp .Nm supports two types of certificates: user and host. User certificates authenticate users to servers, whereas host certificates authenticate server hosts to users. To generate a user certificate: .Pp .Dl $ ssh-keygen -s /path/to/ca_key -I key_id /path/to/user_key.pub .Pp The resultant certificate will be placed in .Pa /path/to/user_key-cert.pub . A host certificate requires the .Fl h option: .Pp .Dl $ ssh-keygen -s /path/to/ca_key -I key_id -h /path/to/host_key.pub .Pp The host certificate will be output to .Pa /path/to/host_key-cert.pub . .Pp It is possible to sign using a CA key stored in a PKCS#11 token by providing the token library using .Fl D and identifying the CA key by providing its public half as an argument to .Fl s : .Pp .Dl $ ssh-keygen -s ca_key.pub -D libpkcs11.so -I key_id user_key.pub .Pp Similarly, it is possible for the CA key to be hosted in a .Xr ssh-agent 1 . This is indicated by the .Fl U flag and, again, the CA key must be identified by its public half. .Pp .Dl $ ssh-keygen -Us ca_key.pub -I key_id user_key.pub .Pp In all cases, .Ar key_id is a "key identifier" that is logged by the server when the certificate is used for authentication. .Pp Certificates may be limited to be valid for a set of principal (user/host) names. By default, generated certificates are valid for all users or hosts. To generate a certificate for a specified set of principals: .Pp .Dl $ ssh-keygen -s ca_key -I key_id -n user1,user2 user_key.pub .Dl "$ ssh-keygen -s ca_key -I key_id -h -n host.domain host_key.pub" .Pp Additional limitations on the validity and use of user certificates may be specified through certificate options. A certificate option may disable features of the SSH session, may be valid only when presented from particular source addresses or may force the use of a specific command. .Pp The options that are valid for user certificates are: .Pp .Bl -tag -width Ds -compact .It Ic clear Clear all enabled permissions. This is useful for clearing the default set of permissions so permissions may be added individually. .Pp .It Ic critical : Ns Ar name Ns Op Ns = Ns Ar contents .It Ic extension : Ns Ar name Ns Op Ns = Ns Ar contents Includes an arbitrary certificate critical option or extension. The specified .Ar name should include a domain suffix, e.g.\& .Dq name@example.com . If .Ar contents is specified then it is included as the contents of the extension/option encoded as a string, otherwise the extension/option is created with no contents (usually indicating a flag). Extensions may be ignored by a client or server that does not recognise them, whereas unknown critical options will cause the certificate to be refused. .Pp .It Ic force-command Ns = Ns Ar command Forces the execution of .Ar command instead of any shell or command specified by the user when the certificate is used for authentication. .Pp .It Ic no-agent-forwarding Disable .Xr ssh-agent 1 forwarding (permitted by default). .Pp .It Ic no-port-forwarding Disable port forwarding (permitted by default). .Pp .It Ic no-pty Disable PTY allocation (permitted by default). .Pp .It Ic no-user-rc Disable execution of .Pa ~/.ssh/rc by .Xr sshd 8 (permitted by default). .Pp .It Ic no-x11-forwarding Disable X11 forwarding (permitted by default). .Pp .It Ic permit-agent-forwarding Allows .Xr ssh-agent 1 forwarding. .Pp .It Ic permit-port-forwarding Allows port forwarding. .Pp .It Ic permit-pty Allows PTY allocation. .Pp .It Ic permit-user-rc Allows execution of .Pa ~/.ssh/rc by .Xr sshd 8 . .Pp .It Ic permit-X11-forwarding Allows X11 forwarding. .Pp .It Ic no-touch-required Do not require signatures made using this key include demonstration of user presence (e.g. by having the user touch the authenticator). This option only makes sense for the FIDO authenticator algorithms .Cm ecdsa-sk and .Cm ed25519-sk . .Pp .It Ic source-address Ns = Ns Ar address_list Restrict the source addresses from which the certificate is considered valid. The .Ar address_list is a comma-separated list of one or more address/netmask pairs in CIDR format. .Pp .It Ic verify-required Require signatures made using this key indicate that the user was first verified. This option only makes sense for the FIDO authenticator algorithms .Cm ecdsa-sk and .Cm ed25519-sk . Currently PIN authentication is the only supported verification method, but other methods may be supported in the future. .El .Pp At present, no standard options are valid for host keys. .Pp Finally, certificates may be defined with a validity lifetime. The .Fl V option allows specification of certificate start and end times. A certificate that is presented at a time outside this range will not be considered valid. By default, certificates are valid from the .Ux Epoch to the distant future. .Pp For certificates to be used for user or host authentication, the CA public key must be trusted by .Xr sshd 8 or .Xr ssh 1 . Refer to those manual pages for details. .Sh FIDO AUTHENTICATOR .Nm is able to generate FIDO authenticator-backed keys, after which they may be used much like any other key type supported by OpenSSH, so long as the hardware authenticator is attached when the keys are used. FIDO authenticators generally require the user to explicitly authorise operations by touching or tapping them. FIDO keys consist of two parts: a key handle part stored in the private key file on disk, and a per-device private key that is unique to each FIDO authenticator and that cannot be exported from the authenticator hardware. These are combined by the hardware at authentication time to derive the real key that is used to sign authentication challenges. Supported key types are .Cm ecdsa-sk and .Cm ed25519-sk . .Pp The options that are valid for FIDO keys are: .Bl -tag -width Ds .It Cm application Override the default FIDO application/origin string of .Dq ssh: . This may be useful when generating host or domain-specific resident keys. The specified application string must begin with .Dq ssh: . .It Cm challenge Ns = Ns Ar path Specifies a path to a challenge string that will be passed to the FIDO authenticator during key generation. The challenge string may be used as part of an out-of-band protocol for key enrollment (a random challenge is used by default). .It Cm device Explicitly specify a .Xr fido 4 device to use, rather than letting the authenticator middleware select one. .It Cm no-touch-required Indicate that the generated private key should not require touch events (user presence) when making signatures. Note that .Xr sshd 8 will refuse such signatures by default, unless overridden via an authorized_keys option. .It Cm resident Indicate that the key handle should be stored on the FIDO authenticator itself. This makes it easier to use the authenticator on multiple computers. Resident keys may be supported on FIDO2 authenticators and typically require that a PIN be set on the authenticator prior to generation. Resident keys may be loaded off the authenticator using .Xr ssh-add 1 . Storing both parts of a key on a FIDO authenticator increases the likelihood of an attacker being able to use a stolen authenticator device. .It Cm user A username to be associated with a resident key, overriding the empty default username. Specifying a username may be useful when generating multiple resident keys for the same application name. .It Cm verify-required Indicate that this private key should require user verification for each signature. Not all FIDO authenticators support this option. Currently PIN authentication is the only supported verification method, but other methods may be supported in the future. .It Cm write-attestation Ns = Ns Ar path May be used at key generation time to record the attestation data returned from FIDO authenticators during key generation. This information is potentially sensitive. By default, this information is discarded. .El .Sh KEY REVOCATION LISTS .Nm is able to manage OpenSSH format Key Revocation Lists (KRLs). These binary files specify keys or certificates to be revoked using a compact format, taking as little as one bit per certificate if they are being revoked by serial number. .Pp KRLs may be generated using the .Fl k flag. This option reads one or more files from the command line and generates a new KRL. The files may either contain a KRL specification (see below) or public keys, listed one per line. Plain public keys are revoked by listing their hash or contents in the KRL and certificates revoked by serial number or key ID (if the serial is zero or not available). .Pp Revoking keys using a KRL specification offers explicit control over the types of record used to revoke keys and may be used to directly revoke certificates by serial number or key ID without having the complete original certificate on hand. A KRL specification consists of lines containing one of the following directives followed by a colon and some directive-specific information. .Bl -tag -width Ds .It Cm serial : Ar serial_number Ns Op - Ns Ar serial_number Revokes a certificate with the specified serial number. Serial numbers are 64-bit values, not including zero and may be expressed in decimal, hex or octal. If two serial numbers are specified separated by a hyphen, then the range of serial numbers including and between each is revoked. The CA key must have been specified on the .Nm command line using the .Fl s option. .It Cm id : Ar key_id Revokes a certificate with the specified key ID string. The CA key must have been specified on the .Nm command line using the .Fl s option. .It Cm key : Ar public_key Revokes the specified key. If a certificate is listed, then it is revoked as a plain public key. .It Cm sha1 : Ar public_key Revokes the specified key by including its SHA1 hash in the KRL. .It Cm sha256 : Ar public_key Revokes the specified key by including its SHA256 hash in the KRL. KRLs that revoke keys by SHA256 hash are not supported by OpenSSH versions prior to 7.9. .It Cm hash : Ar fingerprint Revokes a key using a fingerprint hash, as obtained from a .Xr sshd 8 authentication log message or the .Nm .Fl l flag. Only SHA256 fingerprints are supported here and resultant KRLs are not supported by OpenSSH versions prior to 7.9. .El .Pp KRLs may be updated using the .Fl u flag in addition to .Fl k . When this option is specified, keys listed via the command line are merged into the KRL, adding to those already there. .Pp It is also possible, given a KRL, to test whether it revokes a particular key (or keys). The .Fl Q flag will query an existing KRL, testing each key specified on the command line. If any key listed on the command line has been revoked (or an error encountered) then .Nm will exit with a non-zero exit status. A zero exit status will only be returned if no key was revoked. .Sh ALLOWED SIGNERS When verifying signatures, .Nm uses a simple list of identities and keys to determine whether a signature comes from an authorized source. This "allowed signers" file uses a format patterned after the AUTHORIZED_KEYS FILE FORMAT described in .Xr sshd 8 . Each line of the file contains the following space-separated fields: principals, options, keytype, base64-encoded key. Empty lines and lines starting with a .Ql # are ignored as comments. .Pp The principals field is a pattern-list (see PATTERNS in .Xr ssh_config 5 ) consisting of one or more comma-separated USER@DOMAIN identity patterns that are accepted for signing. When verifying, the identity presented via the .Fl I option must match a principals pattern in order for the corresponding key to be considered acceptable for verification. .Pp The options (if present) consist of comma-separated option specifications. No spaces are permitted, except within double quotes. The following option specifications are supported (note that option keywords are case-insensitive): .Bl -tag -width Ds .It Cm cert-authority Indicates that this key is accepted as a certificate authority (CA) and that certificates signed by this CA may be accepted for verification. .It Cm namespaces Ns = Ns "namespace-list" Specifies a pattern-list of namespaces that are accepted for this key. If this option is present, the signature namespace embedded in the signature object and presented on the verification command-line must match the specified list before the key will be considered acceptable. .It Cm valid-after Ns = Ns "timestamp" Indicates that the key is valid for use at or after the specified timestamp, which may be a date or time in the YYYYMMDD[Z] or YYYYMMDDHHMM[SS][Z] formats. Dates and times will be interpreted in the current system time zone unless suffixed with a Z character, which causes them to be interpreted in the UTC time zone. .It Cm valid-before Ns = Ns "timestamp" Indicates that the key is valid for use at or before the specified timestamp. .El .Pp When verifying signatures made by certificates, the expected principal name must match both the principals pattern in the allowed signers file and the principals embedded in the certificate itself. .Pp An example allowed signers file: .Bd -literal -offset 3n # Comments allowed at start of line user1@example.com,user2@example.com ssh-rsa AAAAX1... # A certificate authority, trusted for all principals in a domain. *@example.com cert-authority ssh-ed25519 AAAB4... # A key that is accepted only for file signing. user2@example.com namespaces="file" ssh-ed25519 AAA41... .Ed .Sh ENVIRONMENT .Bl -tag -width Ds .It Ev SSH_SK_PROVIDER Specifies a path to a library that will be used when loading any FIDO authenticator-hosted keys, overriding the default of using the built-in USB HID support. .El .Sh FILES .Bl -tag -width Ds -compact .It Pa ~/.ssh/id_dsa .It Pa ~/.ssh/id_ecdsa .It Pa ~/.ssh/id_ecdsa_sk .It Pa ~/.ssh/id_ed25519 .It Pa ~/.ssh/id_ed25519_sk .It Pa ~/.ssh/id_rsa Contains the DSA, ECDSA, authenticator-hosted ECDSA, Ed25519, authenticator-hosted Ed25519 or RSA authentication identity of the user. This file should not be readable by anyone but the user. It is possible to specify a passphrase when generating the key; that passphrase will be used to encrypt the private part of this file using 128-bit AES. This file is not automatically accessed by .Nm but it is offered as the default file for the private key. .Xr ssh 1 will read this file when a login attempt is made. .Pp .It Pa ~/.ssh/id_dsa.pub .It Pa ~/.ssh/id_ecdsa.pub .It Pa ~/.ssh/id_ecdsa_sk.pub .It Pa ~/.ssh/id_ed25519.pub .It Pa ~/.ssh/id_ed25519_sk.pub .It Pa ~/.ssh/id_rsa.pub Contains the DSA, ECDSA, authenticator-hosted ECDSA, Ed25519, authenticator-hosted Ed25519 or RSA public key for authentication. The contents of this file should be added to .Pa ~/.ssh/authorized_keys on all machines where the user wishes to log in using public key authentication. There is no need to keep the contents of this file secret. .Pp .It Pa /etc/moduli Contains Diffie-Hellman groups used for DH-GEX. The file format is described in .Xr moduli 5 . .El .Sh SEE ALSO .Xr ssh 1 , .Xr ssh-add 1 , .Xr ssh-agent 1 , .Xr moduli 5 , .Xr sshd 8 .Rs .%R RFC 4716 .%T "The Secure Shell (SSH) Public Key File Format" .%D 2006 .Re .Sh AUTHORS OpenSSH is a derivative of the original and free ssh 1.2.12 release by Tatu Ylonen. Aaron Campbell, Bob Beck, Markus Friedl, Niels Provos, Theo de Raadt and Dug Song removed many bugs, re-added newer features and created OpenSSH. Markus Friedl contributed the support for SSH protocol versions 1.5 and 2.0. diff --git a/crypto/openssh/ssh-keygen.c b/crypto/openssh/ssh-keygen.c index ae05440f68bf..2c0c9cd35ae2 100644 --- a/crypto/openssh/ssh-keygen.c +++ b/crypto/openssh/ssh-keygen.c @@ -1,3931 +1,3947 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: ssh-keygen.c,v 1.461 2022/12/04 23:50:49 cheloha Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: ssh-keygen.c,v 1.466 2023/03/08 00:05:37 djm Exp $ */ /* * Author: Tatu Ylonen * Copyright (c) 1994 Tatu Ylonen , Espoo, Finland * All rights reserved * Identity and host key generation and maintenance. * * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell". */ #include "includes.h" #include #include #include #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL #include #include #include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h" #endif #ifdef HAVE_STDINT_H # include #endif #include #include #include #ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H # include #endif #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include "xmalloc.h" #include "sshkey.h" #include "authfile.h" #include "sshbuf.h" #include "pathnames.h" #include "log.h" #include "misc.h" #include "match.h" #include "hostfile.h" #include "dns.h" #include "ssh.h" #include "ssh2.h" #include "ssherr.h" #include "ssh-pkcs11.h" #include "atomicio.h" #include "krl.h" #include "digest.h" #include "utf8.h" #include "authfd.h" #include "sshsig.h" #include "ssh-sk.h" #include "sk-api.h" /* XXX for SSH_SK_USER_PRESENCE_REQD; remove */ #include "cipher.h" #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL # define DEFAULT_KEY_TYPE_NAME "rsa" #else # define DEFAULT_KEY_TYPE_NAME "ed25519" #endif /* * Default number of bits in the RSA, DSA and ECDSA keys. These value can be * overridden on the command line. * * These values, with the exception of DSA, provide security equivalent to at * least 128 bits of security according to NIST Special Publication 800-57: * Recommendation for Key Management Part 1 rev 4 section 5.6.1. * For DSA it (and FIPS-186-4 section 4.2) specifies that the only size for * which a 160bit hash is acceptable is 1kbit, and since ssh-dss specifies only * SHA1 we limit the DSA key size 1k bits. */ #define DEFAULT_BITS 3072 #define DEFAULT_BITS_DSA 1024 #define DEFAULT_BITS_ECDSA 256 static int quiet = 0; /* Flag indicating that we just want to see the key fingerprint */ static int print_fingerprint = 0; static int print_bubblebabble = 0; /* Hash algorithm to use for fingerprints. */ static int fingerprint_hash = SSH_FP_HASH_DEFAULT; /* The identity file name, given on the command line or entered by the user. */ static char identity_file[PATH_MAX]; static int have_identity = 0; /* This is set to the passphrase if given on the command line. */ static char *identity_passphrase = NULL; /* This is set to the new passphrase if given on the command line. */ static char *identity_new_passphrase = NULL; /* Key type when certifying */ static u_int cert_key_type = SSH2_CERT_TYPE_USER; /* "key ID" of signed key */ static char *cert_key_id = NULL; /* Comma-separated list of principal names for certifying keys */ static char *cert_principals = NULL; /* Validity period for certificates */ static u_int64_t cert_valid_from = 0; static u_int64_t cert_valid_to = ~0ULL; /* Certificate options */ #define CERTOPT_X_FWD (1) #define CERTOPT_AGENT_FWD (1<<1) #define CERTOPT_PORT_FWD (1<<2) #define CERTOPT_PTY (1<<3) #define CERTOPT_USER_RC (1<<4) #define CERTOPT_NO_REQUIRE_USER_PRESENCE (1<<5) #define CERTOPT_REQUIRE_VERIFY (1<<6) #define CERTOPT_DEFAULT (CERTOPT_X_FWD|CERTOPT_AGENT_FWD| \ CERTOPT_PORT_FWD|CERTOPT_PTY|CERTOPT_USER_RC) static u_int32_t certflags_flags = CERTOPT_DEFAULT; static char *certflags_command = NULL; static char *certflags_src_addr = NULL; /* Arbitrary extensions specified by user */ struct cert_ext { char *key; char *val; int crit; }; static struct cert_ext *cert_ext; static size_t ncert_ext; /* Conversion to/from various formats */ enum { FMT_RFC4716, FMT_PKCS8, FMT_PEM } convert_format = FMT_RFC4716; static char *key_type_name = NULL; /* Load key from this PKCS#11 provider */ static char *pkcs11provider = NULL; /* FIDO/U2F provider to use */ static char *sk_provider = NULL; /* Format for writing private keys */ static int private_key_format = SSHKEY_PRIVATE_OPENSSH; /* Cipher for new-format private keys */ static char *openssh_format_cipher = NULL; /* Number of KDF rounds to derive new format keys. */ static int rounds = 0; /* argv0 */ extern char *__progname; static char hostname[NI_MAXHOST]; #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL /* moduli.c */ int gen_candidates(FILE *, u_int32_t, u_int32_t, BIGNUM *); int prime_test(FILE *, FILE *, u_int32_t, u_int32_t, char *, unsigned long, unsigned long); #endif static void type_bits_valid(int type, const char *name, u_int32_t *bitsp) { if (type == KEY_UNSPEC) fatal("unknown key type %s", key_type_name); if (*bitsp == 0) { #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL int nid; switch(type) { case KEY_DSA: *bitsp = DEFAULT_BITS_DSA; break; case KEY_ECDSA: if (name != NULL && (nid = sshkey_ecdsa_nid_from_name(name)) > 0) *bitsp = sshkey_curve_nid_to_bits(nid); if (*bitsp == 0) *bitsp = DEFAULT_BITS_ECDSA; break; case KEY_RSA: *bitsp = DEFAULT_BITS; break; } #endif } #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL switch (type) { case KEY_DSA: if (*bitsp != 1024) fatal("Invalid DSA key length: must be 1024 bits"); break; case KEY_RSA: if (*bitsp < SSH_RSA_MINIMUM_MODULUS_SIZE) fatal("Invalid RSA key length: minimum is %d bits", SSH_RSA_MINIMUM_MODULUS_SIZE); else if (*bitsp > OPENSSL_RSA_MAX_MODULUS_BITS) fatal("Invalid RSA key length: maximum is %d bits", OPENSSL_RSA_MAX_MODULUS_BITS); break; case KEY_ECDSA: if (sshkey_ecdsa_bits_to_nid(*bitsp) == -1) #ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_NISTP521 fatal("Invalid ECDSA key length: valid lengths are " "256, 384 or 521 bits"); #else fatal("Invalid ECDSA key length: valid lengths are " "256 or 384 bits"); #endif } #endif } /* * Checks whether a file exists and, if so, asks the user whether they wish * to overwrite it. * Returns nonzero if the file does not already exist or if the user agrees to * overwrite, or zero otherwise. */ static int confirm_overwrite(const char *filename) { char yesno[3]; struct stat st; if (stat(filename, &st) != 0) return 1; printf("%s already exists.\n", filename); printf("Overwrite (y/n)? "); fflush(stdout); if (fgets(yesno, sizeof(yesno), stdin) == NULL) return 0; if (yesno[0] != 'y' && yesno[0] != 'Y') return 0; return 1; } static void ask_filename(struct passwd *pw, const char *prompt) { char buf[1024]; char *name = NULL; if (key_type_name == NULL) name = _PATH_SSH_CLIENT_ID_RSA; else { switch (sshkey_type_from_name(key_type_name)) { case KEY_DSA_CERT: case KEY_DSA: name = _PATH_SSH_CLIENT_ID_DSA; break; #ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC case KEY_ECDSA_CERT: case KEY_ECDSA: name = _PATH_SSH_CLIENT_ID_ECDSA; break; case KEY_ECDSA_SK_CERT: case KEY_ECDSA_SK: name = _PATH_SSH_CLIENT_ID_ECDSA_SK; break; #endif case KEY_RSA_CERT: case KEY_RSA: name = _PATH_SSH_CLIENT_ID_RSA; break; case KEY_ED25519: case KEY_ED25519_CERT: name = _PATH_SSH_CLIENT_ID_ED25519; break; case KEY_ED25519_SK: case KEY_ED25519_SK_CERT: name = _PATH_SSH_CLIENT_ID_ED25519_SK; break; case KEY_XMSS: case KEY_XMSS_CERT: name = _PATH_SSH_CLIENT_ID_XMSS; break; default: fatal("bad key type"); } } snprintf(identity_file, sizeof(identity_file), "%s/%s", pw->pw_dir, name); printf("%s (%s): ", prompt, identity_file); fflush(stdout); if (fgets(buf, sizeof(buf), stdin) == NULL) exit(1); buf[strcspn(buf, "\n")] = '\0'; if (strcmp(buf, "") != 0) strlcpy(identity_file, buf, sizeof(identity_file)); have_identity = 1; } static struct sshkey * load_identity(const char *filename, char **commentp) { char *pass; struct sshkey *prv; int r; if (commentp != NULL) *commentp = NULL; if ((r = sshkey_load_private(filename, "", &prv, commentp)) == 0) return prv; if (r != SSH_ERR_KEY_WRONG_PASSPHRASE) fatal_r(r, "Load key \"%s\"", filename); if (identity_passphrase) pass = xstrdup(identity_passphrase); else pass = read_passphrase("Enter passphrase: ", RP_ALLOW_STDIN); r = sshkey_load_private(filename, pass, &prv, commentp); freezero(pass, strlen(pass)); if (r != 0) fatal_r(r, "Load key \"%s\"", filename); return prv; } #define SSH_COM_PUBLIC_BEGIN "---- BEGIN SSH2 PUBLIC KEY ----" #define SSH_COM_PUBLIC_END "---- END SSH2 PUBLIC KEY ----" #define SSH_COM_PRIVATE_BEGIN "---- BEGIN SSH2 ENCRYPTED PRIVATE KEY ----" #define SSH_COM_PRIVATE_KEY_MAGIC 0x3f6ff9eb #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL static void do_convert_to_ssh2(struct passwd *pw, struct sshkey *k) { struct sshbuf *b; char comment[61], *b64; int r; if ((b = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed"); if ((r = sshkey_putb(k, b)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "put key"); if ((b64 = sshbuf_dtob64_string(b, 1)) == NULL) fatal_f("sshbuf_dtob64_string failed"); /* Comment + surrounds must fit into 72 chars (RFC 4716 sec 3.3) */ snprintf(comment, sizeof(comment), "%u-bit %s, converted by %s@%s from OpenSSH", sshkey_size(k), sshkey_type(k), pw->pw_name, hostname); sshkey_free(k); sshbuf_free(b); fprintf(stdout, "%s\n", SSH_COM_PUBLIC_BEGIN); fprintf(stdout, "Comment: \"%s\"\n%s", comment, b64); fprintf(stdout, "%s\n", SSH_COM_PUBLIC_END); free(b64); exit(0); } static void do_convert_to_pkcs8(struct sshkey *k) { switch (sshkey_type_plain(k->type)) { case KEY_RSA: if (!PEM_write_RSA_PUBKEY(stdout, k->rsa)) fatal("PEM_write_RSA_PUBKEY failed"); break; case KEY_DSA: if (!PEM_write_DSA_PUBKEY(stdout, k->dsa)) fatal("PEM_write_DSA_PUBKEY failed"); break; #ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC case KEY_ECDSA: if (!PEM_write_EC_PUBKEY(stdout, k->ecdsa)) fatal("PEM_write_EC_PUBKEY failed"); break; #endif default: fatal_f("unsupported key type %s", sshkey_type(k)); } exit(0); } static void do_convert_to_pem(struct sshkey *k) { switch (sshkey_type_plain(k->type)) { case KEY_RSA: if (!PEM_write_RSAPublicKey(stdout, k->rsa)) fatal("PEM_write_RSAPublicKey failed"); break; case KEY_DSA: if (!PEM_write_DSA_PUBKEY(stdout, k->dsa)) fatal("PEM_write_DSA_PUBKEY failed"); break; #ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC case KEY_ECDSA: if (!PEM_write_EC_PUBKEY(stdout, k->ecdsa)) fatal("PEM_write_EC_PUBKEY failed"); break; #endif default: fatal_f("unsupported key type %s", sshkey_type(k)); } exit(0); } static void do_convert_to(struct passwd *pw) { struct sshkey *k; struct stat st; int r; if (!have_identity) ask_filename(pw, "Enter file in which the key is"); if (stat(identity_file, &st) == -1) fatal("%s: %s: %s", __progname, identity_file, strerror(errno)); if ((r = sshkey_load_public(identity_file, &k, NULL)) != 0) k = load_identity(identity_file, NULL); switch (convert_format) { case FMT_RFC4716: do_convert_to_ssh2(pw, k); break; case FMT_PKCS8: do_convert_to_pkcs8(k); break; case FMT_PEM: do_convert_to_pem(k); break; default: fatal_f("unknown key format %d", convert_format); } exit(0); } /* * This is almost exactly the bignum1 encoding, but with 32 bit for length * instead of 16. */ static void buffer_get_bignum_bits(struct sshbuf *b, BIGNUM *value) { u_int bytes, bignum_bits; int r; if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(b, &bignum_bits)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "parse"); bytes = (bignum_bits + 7) / 8; if (sshbuf_len(b) < bytes) fatal_f("input buffer too small: need %d have %zu", bytes, sshbuf_len(b)); if (BN_bin2bn(sshbuf_ptr(b), bytes, value) == NULL) fatal_f("BN_bin2bn failed"); if ((r = sshbuf_consume(b, bytes)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "consume"); } static struct sshkey * do_convert_private_ssh2(struct sshbuf *b) { struct sshkey *key = NULL; char *type, *cipher; + const char *alg = NULL; u_char e1, e2, e3, *sig = NULL, data[] = "abcde12345"; int r, rlen, ktype; u_int magic, i1, i2, i3, i4; size_t slen; u_long e; BIGNUM *dsa_p = NULL, *dsa_q = NULL, *dsa_g = NULL; BIGNUM *dsa_pub_key = NULL, *dsa_priv_key = NULL; BIGNUM *rsa_n = NULL, *rsa_e = NULL, *rsa_d = NULL; BIGNUM *rsa_p = NULL, *rsa_q = NULL, *rsa_iqmp = NULL; if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(b, &magic)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "parse magic"); if (magic != SSH_COM_PRIVATE_KEY_MAGIC) { error("bad magic 0x%x != 0x%x", magic, SSH_COM_PRIVATE_KEY_MAGIC); return NULL; } if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(b, &i1)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &type, NULL)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &cipher, NULL)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_u32(b, &i2)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_u32(b, &i3)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_u32(b, &i4)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "parse"); debug("ignore (%d %d %d %d)", i1, i2, i3, i4); if (strcmp(cipher, "none") != 0) { error("unsupported cipher %s", cipher); free(cipher); free(type); return NULL; } free(cipher); if (strstr(type, "dsa")) { ktype = KEY_DSA; } else if (strstr(type, "rsa")) { ktype = KEY_RSA; } else { free(type); return NULL; } if ((key = sshkey_new(ktype)) == NULL) fatal("sshkey_new failed"); free(type); switch (key->type) { case KEY_DSA: if ((dsa_p = BN_new()) == NULL || (dsa_q = BN_new()) == NULL || (dsa_g = BN_new()) == NULL || (dsa_pub_key = BN_new()) == NULL || (dsa_priv_key = BN_new()) == NULL) fatal_f("BN_new"); buffer_get_bignum_bits(b, dsa_p); buffer_get_bignum_bits(b, dsa_g); buffer_get_bignum_bits(b, dsa_q); buffer_get_bignum_bits(b, dsa_pub_key); buffer_get_bignum_bits(b, dsa_priv_key); if (!DSA_set0_pqg(key->dsa, dsa_p, dsa_q, dsa_g)) fatal_f("DSA_set0_pqg failed"); dsa_p = dsa_q = dsa_g = NULL; /* transferred */ if (!DSA_set0_key(key->dsa, dsa_pub_key, dsa_priv_key)) fatal_f("DSA_set0_key failed"); dsa_pub_key = dsa_priv_key = NULL; /* transferred */ break; case KEY_RSA: if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(b, &e1)) != 0 || (e1 < 30 && (r = sshbuf_get_u8(b, &e2)) != 0) || (e1 < 30 && (r = sshbuf_get_u8(b, &e3)) != 0)) fatal_fr(r, "parse RSA"); e = e1; debug("e %lx", e); if (e < 30) { e <<= 8; e += e2; debug("e %lx", e); e <<= 8; e += e3; debug("e %lx", e); } if ((rsa_e = BN_new()) == NULL) fatal_f("BN_new"); if (!BN_set_word(rsa_e, e)) { BN_clear_free(rsa_e); sshkey_free(key); return NULL; } if ((rsa_n = BN_new()) == NULL || (rsa_d = BN_new()) == NULL || (rsa_p = BN_new()) == NULL || (rsa_q = BN_new()) == NULL || (rsa_iqmp = BN_new()) == NULL) fatal_f("BN_new"); buffer_get_bignum_bits(b, rsa_d); buffer_get_bignum_bits(b, rsa_n); buffer_get_bignum_bits(b, rsa_iqmp); buffer_get_bignum_bits(b, rsa_q); buffer_get_bignum_bits(b, rsa_p); if (!RSA_set0_key(key->rsa, rsa_n, rsa_e, rsa_d)) fatal_f("RSA_set0_key failed"); rsa_n = rsa_e = rsa_d = NULL; /* transferred */ if (!RSA_set0_factors(key->rsa, rsa_p, rsa_q)) fatal_f("RSA_set0_factors failed"); rsa_p = rsa_q = NULL; /* transferred */ if ((r = ssh_rsa_complete_crt_parameters(key, rsa_iqmp)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "generate RSA parameters"); BN_clear_free(rsa_iqmp); + alg = "rsa-sha2-256"; break; } rlen = sshbuf_len(b); if (rlen != 0) error_f("remaining bytes in key blob %d", rlen); /* try the key */ if ((r = sshkey_sign(key, &sig, &slen, data, sizeof(data), - NULL, NULL, NULL, 0)) != 0) + alg, NULL, NULL, 0)) != 0) error_fr(r, "signing with converted key failed"); else if ((r = sshkey_verify(key, sig, slen, data, sizeof(data), - NULL, 0, NULL)) != 0) + alg, 0, NULL)) != 0) error_fr(r, "verification with converted key failed"); if (r != 0) { sshkey_free(key); free(sig); return NULL; } free(sig); return key; } static int get_line(FILE *fp, char *line, size_t len) { int c; size_t pos = 0; line[0] = '\0'; while ((c = fgetc(fp)) != EOF) { if (pos >= len - 1) fatal("input line too long."); switch (c) { case '\r': c = fgetc(fp); if (c != EOF && c != '\n' && ungetc(c, fp) == EOF) fatal("unget: %s", strerror(errno)); return pos; case '\n': return pos; } line[pos++] = c; line[pos] = '\0'; } /* We reached EOF */ return -1; } static void do_convert_from_ssh2(struct passwd *pw, struct sshkey **k, int *private) { int r, blen, escaped = 0; u_int len; char line[1024]; struct sshbuf *buf; char encoded[8096]; FILE *fp; if ((buf = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) fatal("sshbuf_new failed"); if ((fp = fopen(identity_file, "r")) == NULL) fatal("%s: %s: %s", __progname, identity_file, strerror(errno)); encoded[0] = '\0'; while ((blen = get_line(fp, line, sizeof(line))) != -1) { if (blen > 0 && line[blen - 1] == '\\') escaped++; if (strncmp(line, "----", 4) == 0 || strstr(line, ": ") != NULL) { if (strstr(line, SSH_COM_PRIVATE_BEGIN) != NULL) *private = 1; if (strstr(line, " END ") != NULL) { break; } /* fprintf(stderr, "ignore: %s", line); */ continue; } if (escaped) { escaped--; /* fprintf(stderr, "escaped: %s", line); */ continue; } strlcat(encoded, line, sizeof(encoded)); } len = strlen(encoded); if (((len % 4) == 3) && (encoded[len-1] == '=') && (encoded[len-2] == '=') && (encoded[len-3] == '=')) encoded[len-3] = '\0'; if ((r = sshbuf_b64tod(buf, encoded)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "base64 decode"); if (*private) { if ((*k = do_convert_private_ssh2(buf)) == NULL) fatal_f("private key conversion failed"); } else if ((r = sshkey_fromb(buf, k)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "parse key"); sshbuf_free(buf); fclose(fp); } static void do_convert_from_pkcs8(struct sshkey **k, int *private) { EVP_PKEY *pubkey; FILE *fp; if ((fp = fopen(identity_file, "r")) == NULL) fatal("%s: %s: %s", __progname, identity_file, strerror(errno)); if ((pubkey = PEM_read_PUBKEY(fp, NULL, NULL, NULL)) == NULL) { fatal_f("%s is not a recognised public key format", identity_file); } fclose(fp); switch (EVP_PKEY_base_id(pubkey)) { case EVP_PKEY_RSA: if ((*k = sshkey_new(KEY_UNSPEC)) == NULL) fatal("sshkey_new failed"); (*k)->type = KEY_RSA; (*k)->rsa = EVP_PKEY_get1_RSA(pubkey); break; case EVP_PKEY_DSA: if ((*k = sshkey_new(KEY_UNSPEC)) == NULL) fatal("sshkey_new failed"); (*k)->type = KEY_DSA; (*k)->dsa = EVP_PKEY_get1_DSA(pubkey); break; #ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC case EVP_PKEY_EC: if ((*k = sshkey_new(KEY_UNSPEC)) == NULL) fatal("sshkey_new failed"); (*k)->type = KEY_ECDSA; (*k)->ecdsa = EVP_PKEY_get1_EC_KEY(pubkey); (*k)->ecdsa_nid = sshkey_ecdsa_key_to_nid((*k)->ecdsa); break; #endif default: fatal_f("unsupported pubkey type %d", EVP_PKEY_base_id(pubkey)); } EVP_PKEY_free(pubkey); return; } static void do_convert_from_pem(struct sshkey **k, int *private) { FILE *fp; RSA *rsa; if ((fp = fopen(identity_file, "r")) == NULL) fatal("%s: %s: %s", __progname, identity_file, strerror(errno)); if ((rsa = PEM_read_RSAPublicKey(fp, NULL, NULL, NULL)) != NULL) { if ((*k = sshkey_new(KEY_UNSPEC)) == NULL) fatal("sshkey_new failed"); (*k)->type = KEY_RSA; (*k)->rsa = rsa; fclose(fp); return; } fatal_f("unrecognised raw private key format"); } static void do_convert_from(struct passwd *pw) { struct sshkey *k = NULL; int r, private = 0, ok = 0; struct stat st; if (!have_identity) ask_filename(pw, "Enter file in which the key is"); if (stat(identity_file, &st) == -1) fatal("%s: %s: %s", __progname, identity_file, strerror(errno)); switch (convert_format) { case FMT_RFC4716: do_convert_from_ssh2(pw, &k, &private); break; case FMT_PKCS8: do_convert_from_pkcs8(&k, &private); break; case FMT_PEM: do_convert_from_pem(&k, &private); break; default: fatal_f("unknown key format %d", convert_format); } if (!private) { if ((r = sshkey_write(k, stdout)) == 0) ok = 1; if (ok) fprintf(stdout, "\n"); } else { switch (k->type) { case KEY_DSA: ok = PEM_write_DSAPrivateKey(stdout, k->dsa, NULL, NULL, 0, NULL, NULL); break; #ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC case KEY_ECDSA: ok = PEM_write_ECPrivateKey(stdout, k->ecdsa, NULL, NULL, 0, NULL, NULL); break; #endif case KEY_RSA: ok = PEM_write_RSAPrivateKey(stdout, k->rsa, NULL, NULL, 0, NULL, NULL); break; default: fatal_f("unsupported key type %s", sshkey_type(k)); } } if (!ok) fatal("key write failed"); sshkey_free(k); exit(0); } #endif static void do_print_public(struct passwd *pw) { struct sshkey *prv; struct stat st; int r; char *comment = NULL; if (!have_identity) ask_filename(pw, "Enter file in which the key is"); if (stat(identity_file, &st) == -1) fatal("%s: %s", identity_file, strerror(errno)); prv = load_identity(identity_file, &comment); if ((r = sshkey_write(prv, stdout)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "write key"); if (comment != NULL && *comment != '\0') fprintf(stdout, " %s", comment); fprintf(stdout, "\n"); if (sshkey_is_sk(prv)) { debug("sk_application: \"%s\", sk_flags 0x%02x", prv->sk_application, prv->sk_flags); } sshkey_free(prv); free(comment); exit(0); } static void do_download(struct passwd *pw) { #ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11 struct sshkey **keys = NULL; int i, nkeys; enum sshkey_fp_rep rep; int fptype; char *fp, *ra, **comments = NULL; fptype = print_bubblebabble ? SSH_DIGEST_SHA1 : fingerprint_hash; rep = print_bubblebabble ? SSH_FP_BUBBLEBABBLE : SSH_FP_DEFAULT; pkcs11_init(1); nkeys = pkcs11_add_provider(pkcs11provider, NULL, &keys, &comments); if (nkeys <= 0) fatal("cannot read public key from pkcs11"); for (i = 0; i < nkeys; i++) { if (print_fingerprint) { fp = sshkey_fingerprint(keys[i], fptype, rep); ra = sshkey_fingerprint(keys[i], fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_RANDOMART); if (fp == NULL || ra == NULL) fatal_f("sshkey_fingerprint fail"); printf("%u %s %s (PKCS11 key)\n", sshkey_size(keys[i]), fp, sshkey_type(keys[i])); if (log_level_get() >= SYSLOG_LEVEL_VERBOSE) printf("%s\n", ra); free(ra); free(fp); } else { (void) sshkey_write(keys[i], stdout); /* XXX check */ fprintf(stdout, "%s%s\n", *(comments[i]) == '\0' ? "" : " ", comments[i]); } free(comments[i]); sshkey_free(keys[i]); } free(comments); free(keys); pkcs11_terminate(); exit(0); #else fatal("no pkcs11 support"); #endif /* ENABLE_PKCS11 */ } static struct sshkey * try_read_key(char **cpp) { struct sshkey *ret; int r; if ((ret = sshkey_new(KEY_UNSPEC)) == NULL) fatal("sshkey_new failed"); if ((r = sshkey_read(ret, cpp)) == 0) return ret; /* Not a key */ sshkey_free(ret); return NULL; } static void fingerprint_one_key(const struct sshkey *public, const char *comment) { char *fp = NULL, *ra = NULL; enum sshkey_fp_rep rep; int fptype; fptype = print_bubblebabble ? SSH_DIGEST_SHA1 : fingerprint_hash; rep = print_bubblebabble ? SSH_FP_BUBBLEBABBLE : SSH_FP_DEFAULT; fp = sshkey_fingerprint(public, fptype, rep); ra = sshkey_fingerprint(public, fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_RANDOMART); if (fp == NULL || ra == NULL) fatal_f("sshkey_fingerprint failed"); mprintf("%u %s %s (%s)\n", sshkey_size(public), fp, comment ? comment : "no comment", sshkey_type(public)); if (log_level_get() >= SYSLOG_LEVEL_VERBOSE) printf("%s\n", ra); free(ra); free(fp); } static void fingerprint_private(const char *path) { struct stat st; char *comment = NULL; struct sshkey *privkey = NULL, *pubkey = NULL; int r; if (stat(identity_file, &st) == -1) fatal("%s: %s", path, strerror(errno)); if ((r = sshkey_load_public(path, &pubkey, &comment)) != 0) debug_r(r, "load public \"%s\"", path); if (pubkey == NULL || comment == NULL || *comment == '\0') { free(comment); if ((r = sshkey_load_private(path, NULL, &privkey, &comment)) != 0) debug_r(r, "load private \"%s\"", path); } if (pubkey == NULL && privkey == NULL) fatal("%s is not a key file.", path); fingerprint_one_key(pubkey == NULL ? privkey : pubkey, comment); sshkey_free(pubkey); sshkey_free(privkey); free(comment); } static void do_fingerprint(struct passwd *pw) { FILE *f; struct sshkey *public = NULL; char *comment = NULL, *cp, *ep, *line = NULL; size_t linesize = 0; int i, invalid = 1; const char *path; u_long lnum = 0; if (!have_identity) ask_filename(pw, "Enter file in which the key is"); path = identity_file; if (strcmp(identity_file, "-") == 0) { f = stdin; path = "(stdin)"; } else if ((f = fopen(path, "r")) == NULL) fatal("%s: %s: %s", __progname, path, strerror(errno)); while (getline(&line, &linesize, f) != -1) { lnum++; cp = line; cp[strcspn(cp, "\n")] = '\0'; /* Trim leading space and comments */ cp = line + strspn(line, " \t"); if (*cp == '#' || *cp == '\0') continue; /* * Input may be plain keys, private keys, authorized_keys * or known_hosts. */ /* * Try private keys first. Assume a key is private if * "SSH PRIVATE KEY" appears on the first line and we're * not reading from stdin (XXX support private keys on stdin). */ if (lnum == 1 && strcmp(identity_file, "-") != 0 && strstr(cp, "PRIVATE KEY") != NULL) { free(line); fclose(f); fingerprint_private(path); exit(0); } /* * If it's not a private key, then this must be prepared to * accept a public key prefixed with a hostname or options. * Try a bare key first, otherwise skip the leading stuff. */ if ((public = try_read_key(&cp)) == NULL) { i = strtol(cp, &ep, 10); if (i == 0 || ep == NULL || (*ep != ' ' && *ep != '\t')) { int quoted = 0; comment = cp; for (; *cp && (quoted || (*cp != ' ' && *cp != '\t')); cp++) { if (*cp == '\\' && cp[1] == '"') cp++; /* Skip both */ else if (*cp == '"') quoted = !quoted; } if (!*cp) continue; *cp++ = '\0'; } } /* Retry after parsing leading hostname/key options */ if (public == NULL && (public = try_read_key(&cp)) == NULL) { debug("%s:%lu: not a public key", path, lnum); continue; } /* Find trailing comment, if any */ for (; *cp == ' ' || *cp == '\t'; cp++) ; if (*cp != '\0' && *cp != '#') comment = cp; fingerprint_one_key(public, comment); sshkey_free(public); invalid = 0; /* One good key in the file is sufficient */ } fclose(f); free(line); if (invalid) fatal("%s is not a public key file.", path); exit(0); } static void do_gen_all_hostkeys(struct passwd *pw) { struct { char *key_type; char *key_type_display; char *path; } key_types[] = { #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL { "rsa", "RSA" ,_PATH_HOST_RSA_KEY_FILE }, #ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC { "ecdsa", "ECDSA",_PATH_HOST_ECDSA_KEY_FILE }, #endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */ #endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */ { "ed25519", "ED25519",_PATH_HOST_ED25519_KEY_FILE }, #ifdef WITH_XMSS { "xmss", "XMSS",_PATH_HOST_XMSS_KEY_FILE }, #endif /* WITH_XMSS */ { NULL, NULL, NULL } }; u_int32_t bits = 0; int first = 0; struct stat st; struct sshkey *private, *public; char comment[1024], *prv_tmp, *pub_tmp, *prv_file, *pub_file; int i, type, fd, r; for (i = 0; key_types[i].key_type; i++) { public = private = NULL; prv_tmp = pub_tmp = prv_file = pub_file = NULL; xasprintf(&prv_file, "%s%s", identity_file, key_types[i].path); /* Check whether private key exists and is not zero-length */ if (stat(prv_file, &st) == 0) { if (st.st_size != 0) goto next; } else if (errno != ENOENT) { error("Could not stat %s: %s", key_types[i].path, strerror(errno)); goto failnext; } /* * Private key doesn't exist or is invalid; proceed with * key generation. */ xasprintf(&prv_tmp, "%s%s.XXXXXXXXXX", identity_file, key_types[i].path); xasprintf(&pub_tmp, "%s%s.pub.XXXXXXXXXX", identity_file, key_types[i].path); xasprintf(&pub_file, "%s%s.pub", identity_file, key_types[i].path); if (first == 0) { first = 1; printf("%s: generating new host keys: ", __progname); } printf("%s ", key_types[i].key_type_display); fflush(stdout); type = sshkey_type_from_name(key_types[i].key_type); if ((fd = mkstemp(prv_tmp)) == -1) { error("Could not save your private key in %s: %s", prv_tmp, strerror(errno)); goto failnext; } (void)close(fd); /* just using mkstemp() to reserve a name */ bits = 0; type_bits_valid(type, NULL, &bits); if ((r = sshkey_generate(type, bits, &private)) != 0) { error_r(r, "sshkey_generate failed"); goto failnext; } if ((r = sshkey_from_private(private, &public)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "sshkey_from_private"); snprintf(comment, sizeof comment, "%s@%s", pw->pw_name, hostname); if ((r = sshkey_save_private(private, prv_tmp, "", comment, private_key_format, openssh_format_cipher, rounds)) != 0) { error_r(r, "Saving key \"%s\" failed", prv_tmp); goto failnext; } if ((fd = mkstemp(pub_tmp)) == -1) { error("Could not save your public key in %s: %s", pub_tmp, strerror(errno)); goto failnext; } (void)fchmod(fd, 0644); (void)close(fd); if ((r = sshkey_save_public(public, pub_tmp, comment)) != 0) { error_r(r, "Unable to save public key to %s", identity_file); goto failnext; } /* Rename temporary files to their permanent locations. */ if (rename(pub_tmp, pub_file) != 0) { error("Unable to move %s into position: %s", pub_file, strerror(errno)); goto failnext; } if (rename(prv_tmp, prv_file) != 0) { error("Unable to move %s into position: %s", key_types[i].path, strerror(errno)); failnext: first = 0; goto next; } next: sshkey_free(private); sshkey_free(public); free(prv_tmp); free(pub_tmp); free(prv_file); free(pub_file); } if (first != 0) printf("\n"); } struct known_hosts_ctx { const char *host; /* Hostname searched for in find/delete case */ FILE *out; /* Output file, stdout for find_hosts case */ int has_unhashed; /* When hashing, original had unhashed hosts */ int found_key; /* For find/delete, host was found */ int invalid; /* File contained invalid items; don't delete */ int hash_hosts; /* Hash hostnames as we go */ int find_host; /* Search for specific hostname */ int delete_host; /* Delete host from known_hosts */ }; static int known_hosts_hash(struct hostkey_foreach_line *l, void *_ctx) { struct known_hosts_ctx *ctx = (struct known_hosts_ctx *)_ctx; char *hashed, *cp, *hosts, *ohosts; int has_wild = l->hosts && strcspn(l->hosts, "*?!") != strlen(l->hosts); int was_hashed = l->hosts && l->hosts[0] == HASH_DELIM; switch (l->status) { case HKF_STATUS_OK: case HKF_STATUS_MATCHED: /* * Don't hash hosts already already hashed, with wildcard * characters or a CA/revocation marker. */ if (was_hashed || has_wild || l->marker != MRK_NONE) { fprintf(ctx->out, "%s\n", l->line); if (has_wild && !ctx->find_host) { logit("%s:%lu: ignoring host name " "with wildcard: %.64s", l->path, l->linenum, l->hosts); } return 0; } /* * Split any comma-separated hostnames from the host list, * hash and store separately. */ ohosts = hosts = xstrdup(l->hosts); while ((cp = strsep(&hosts, ",")) != NULL && *cp != '\0') { lowercase(cp); if ((hashed = host_hash(cp, NULL, 0)) == NULL) fatal("hash_host failed"); fprintf(ctx->out, "%s %s\n", hashed, l->rawkey); free(hashed); ctx->has_unhashed = 1; } free(ohosts); return 0; case HKF_STATUS_INVALID: /* Retain invalid lines, but mark file as invalid. */ ctx->invalid = 1; logit("%s:%lu: invalid line", l->path, l->linenum); /* FALLTHROUGH */ default: fprintf(ctx->out, "%s\n", l->line); return 0; } /* NOTREACHED */ return -1; } static int known_hosts_find_delete(struct hostkey_foreach_line *l, void *_ctx) { struct known_hosts_ctx *ctx = (struct known_hosts_ctx *)_ctx; enum sshkey_fp_rep rep; int fptype; char *fp = NULL, *ra = NULL; fptype = print_bubblebabble ? SSH_DIGEST_SHA1 : fingerprint_hash; rep = print_bubblebabble ? SSH_FP_BUBBLEBABBLE : SSH_FP_DEFAULT; if (l->status == HKF_STATUS_MATCHED) { if (ctx->delete_host) { if (l->marker != MRK_NONE) { /* Don't remove CA and revocation lines */ fprintf(ctx->out, "%s\n", l->line); } else { /* * Hostname matches and has no CA/revoke * marker, delete it by *not* writing the * line to ctx->out. */ ctx->found_key = 1; if (!quiet) printf("# Host %s found: line %lu\n", ctx->host, l->linenum); } return 0; } else if (ctx->find_host) { ctx->found_key = 1; if (!quiet) { printf("# Host %s found: line %lu %s\n", ctx->host, l->linenum, l->marker == MRK_CA ? "CA" : (l->marker == MRK_REVOKE ? "REVOKED" : "")); } if (ctx->hash_hosts) known_hosts_hash(l, ctx); else if (print_fingerprint) { fp = sshkey_fingerprint(l->key, fptype, rep); ra = sshkey_fingerprint(l->key, fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_RANDOMART); if (fp == NULL || ra == NULL) fatal_f("sshkey_fingerprint failed"); mprintf("%s %s %s%s%s\n", ctx->host, sshkey_type(l->key), fp, l->comment[0] ? " " : "", l->comment); if (log_level_get() >= SYSLOG_LEVEL_VERBOSE) printf("%s\n", ra); free(ra); free(fp); } else fprintf(ctx->out, "%s\n", l->line); return 0; } } else if (ctx->delete_host) { /* Retain non-matching hosts when deleting */ if (l->status == HKF_STATUS_INVALID) { ctx->invalid = 1; logit("%s:%lu: invalid line", l->path, l->linenum); } fprintf(ctx->out, "%s\n", l->line); } return 0; } static void do_known_hosts(struct passwd *pw, const char *name, int find_host, int delete_host, int hash_hosts) { char *cp, tmp[PATH_MAX], old[PATH_MAX]; int r, fd, oerrno, inplace = 0; struct known_hosts_ctx ctx; u_int foreach_options; struct stat sb; if (!have_identity) { cp = tilde_expand_filename(_PATH_SSH_USER_HOSTFILE, pw->pw_uid); if (strlcpy(identity_file, cp, sizeof(identity_file)) >= sizeof(identity_file)) fatal("Specified known hosts path too long"); free(cp); have_identity = 1; } if (stat(identity_file, &sb) != 0) fatal("Cannot stat %s: %s", identity_file, strerror(errno)); memset(&ctx, 0, sizeof(ctx)); ctx.out = stdout; ctx.host = name; ctx.hash_hosts = hash_hosts; ctx.find_host = find_host; ctx.delete_host = delete_host; /* * Find hosts goes to stdout, hash and deletions happen in-place * A corner case is ssh-keygen -HF foo, which should go to stdout */ if (!find_host && (hash_hosts || delete_host)) { if (strlcpy(tmp, identity_file, sizeof(tmp)) >= sizeof(tmp) || strlcat(tmp, ".XXXXXXXXXX", sizeof(tmp)) >= sizeof(tmp) || strlcpy(old, identity_file, sizeof(old)) >= sizeof(old) || strlcat(old, ".old", sizeof(old)) >= sizeof(old)) fatal("known_hosts path too long"); umask(077); if ((fd = mkstemp(tmp)) == -1) fatal("mkstemp: %s", strerror(errno)); if ((ctx.out = fdopen(fd, "w")) == NULL) { oerrno = errno; unlink(tmp); fatal("fdopen: %s", strerror(oerrno)); } - fchmod(fd, sb.st_mode & 0644); + (void)fchmod(fd, sb.st_mode & 0644); inplace = 1; } /* XXX support identity_file == "-" for stdin */ foreach_options = find_host ? HKF_WANT_MATCH : 0; foreach_options |= print_fingerprint ? HKF_WANT_PARSE_KEY : 0; if ((r = hostkeys_foreach(identity_file, (find_host || !hash_hosts) ? known_hosts_find_delete : known_hosts_hash, &ctx, name, NULL, foreach_options, 0)) != 0) { if (inplace) unlink(tmp); fatal_fr(r, "hostkeys_foreach"); } if (inplace) fclose(ctx.out); if (ctx.invalid) { error("%s is not a valid known_hosts file.", identity_file); if (inplace) { error("Not replacing existing known_hosts " "file because of errors"); unlink(tmp); } exit(1); } else if (delete_host && !ctx.found_key) { logit("Host %s not found in %s", name, identity_file); if (inplace) unlink(tmp); } else if (inplace) { /* Backup existing file */ if (unlink(old) == -1 && errno != ENOENT) fatal("unlink %.100s: %s", old, strerror(errno)); if (link(identity_file, old) == -1) fatal("link %.100s to %.100s: %s", identity_file, old, strerror(errno)); /* Move new one into place */ if (rename(tmp, identity_file) == -1) { error("rename\"%s\" to \"%s\": %s", tmp, identity_file, strerror(errno)); unlink(tmp); unlink(old); exit(1); } printf("%s updated.\n", identity_file); printf("Original contents retained as %s\n", old); if (ctx.has_unhashed) { logit("WARNING: %s contains unhashed entries", old); logit("Delete this file to ensure privacy " "of hostnames"); } } exit (find_host && !ctx.found_key); } /* * Perform changing a passphrase. The argument is the passwd structure * for the current user. */ static void do_change_passphrase(struct passwd *pw) { char *comment; char *old_passphrase, *passphrase1, *passphrase2; struct stat st; struct sshkey *private; int r; if (!have_identity) ask_filename(pw, "Enter file in which the key is"); if (stat(identity_file, &st) == -1) fatal("%s: %s", identity_file, strerror(errno)); /* Try to load the file with empty passphrase. */ r = sshkey_load_private(identity_file, "", &private, &comment); if (r == SSH_ERR_KEY_WRONG_PASSPHRASE) { if (identity_passphrase) old_passphrase = xstrdup(identity_passphrase); else old_passphrase = read_passphrase("Enter old passphrase: ", RP_ALLOW_STDIN); r = sshkey_load_private(identity_file, old_passphrase, &private, &comment); freezero(old_passphrase, strlen(old_passphrase)); if (r != 0) goto badkey; } else if (r != 0) { badkey: fatal_r(r, "Failed to load key %s", identity_file); } if (comment) mprintf("Key has comment '%s'\n", comment); /* Ask the new passphrase (twice). */ if (identity_new_passphrase) { passphrase1 = xstrdup(identity_new_passphrase); passphrase2 = NULL; } else { passphrase1 = read_passphrase("Enter new passphrase (empty for no " "passphrase): ", RP_ALLOW_STDIN); passphrase2 = read_passphrase("Enter same passphrase again: ", RP_ALLOW_STDIN); /* Verify that they are the same. */ if (strcmp(passphrase1, passphrase2) != 0) { explicit_bzero(passphrase1, strlen(passphrase1)); explicit_bzero(passphrase2, strlen(passphrase2)); free(passphrase1); free(passphrase2); printf("Pass phrases do not match. Try again.\n"); exit(1); } /* Destroy the other copy. */ freezero(passphrase2, strlen(passphrase2)); } /* Save the file using the new passphrase. */ if ((r = sshkey_save_private(private, identity_file, passphrase1, comment, private_key_format, openssh_format_cipher, rounds)) != 0) { error_r(r, "Saving key \"%s\" failed", identity_file); freezero(passphrase1, strlen(passphrase1)); sshkey_free(private); free(comment); exit(1); } /* Destroy the passphrase and the copy of the key in memory. */ freezero(passphrase1, strlen(passphrase1)); sshkey_free(private); /* Destroys contents */ free(comment); printf("Your identification has been saved with the new passphrase.\n"); exit(0); } /* * Print the SSHFP RR. */ static int do_print_resource_record(struct passwd *pw, char *fname, char *hname, - int print_generic) + int print_generic, char * const *opts, size_t nopts) { struct sshkey *public; char *comment = NULL; struct stat st; - int r; + int r, hash = -1; + size_t i; + for (i = 0; i < nopts; i++) { + if (strncasecmp(opts[i], "hashalg=", 8) == 0) { + if ((hash = ssh_digest_alg_by_name(opts[i] + 8)) == -1) + fatal("Unsupported hash algorithm"); + } else { + error("Invalid option \"%s\"", opts[i]); + return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + } + } if (fname == NULL) fatal_f("no filename"); if (stat(fname, &st) == -1) { if (errno == ENOENT) return 0; fatal("%s: %s", fname, strerror(errno)); } if ((r = sshkey_load_public(fname, &public, &comment)) != 0) fatal_r(r, "Failed to read v2 public key from \"%s\"", fname); - export_dns_rr(hname, public, stdout, print_generic); + export_dns_rr(hname, public, stdout, print_generic, hash); sshkey_free(public); free(comment); return 1; } /* * Change the comment of a private key file. */ static void do_change_comment(struct passwd *pw, const char *identity_comment) { char new_comment[1024], *comment, *passphrase; struct sshkey *private; struct sshkey *public; struct stat st; int r; if (!have_identity) ask_filename(pw, "Enter file in which the key is"); if (stat(identity_file, &st) == -1) fatal("%s: %s", identity_file, strerror(errno)); if ((r = sshkey_load_private(identity_file, "", &private, &comment)) == 0) passphrase = xstrdup(""); else if (r != SSH_ERR_KEY_WRONG_PASSPHRASE) fatal_r(r, "Cannot load private key \"%s\"", identity_file); else { if (identity_passphrase) passphrase = xstrdup(identity_passphrase); else if (identity_new_passphrase) passphrase = xstrdup(identity_new_passphrase); else passphrase = read_passphrase("Enter passphrase: ", RP_ALLOW_STDIN); /* Try to load using the passphrase. */ if ((r = sshkey_load_private(identity_file, passphrase, &private, &comment)) != 0) { freezero(passphrase, strlen(passphrase)); fatal_r(r, "Cannot load private key \"%s\"", identity_file); } } if (private->type != KEY_ED25519 && private->type != KEY_XMSS && private_key_format != SSHKEY_PRIVATE_OPENSSH) { error("Comments are only supported for keys stored in " "the new format (-o)."); explicit_bzero(passphrase, strlen(passphrase)); sshkey_free(private); exit(1); } if (comment) printf("Old comment: %s\n", comment); else printf("No existing comment\n"); if (identity_comment) { strlcpy(new_comment, identity_comment, sizeof(new_comment)); } else { printf("New comment: "); fflush(stdout); if (!fgets(new_comment, sizeof(new_comment), stdin)) { explicit_bzero(passphrase, strlen(passphrase)); sshkey_free(private); exit(1); } new_comment[strcspn(new_comment, "\n")] = '\0'; } if (comment != NULL && strcmp(comment, new_comment) == 0) { printf("No change to comment\n"); free(passphrase); sshkey_free(private); free(comment); exit(0); } /* Save the file using the new passphrase. */ if ((r = sshkey_save_private(private, identity_file, passphrase, new_comment, private_key_format, openssh_format_cipher, rounds)) != 0) { error_r(r, "Saving key \"%s\" failed", identity_file); freezero(passphrase, strlen(passphrase)); sshkey_free(private); free(comment); exit(1); } freezero(passphrase, strlen(passphrase)); if ((r = sshkey_from_private(private, &public)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "sshkey_from_private"); sshkey_free(private); strlcat(identity_file, ".pub", sizeof(identity_file)); if ((r = sshkey_save_public(public, identity_file, new_comment)) != 0) fatal_r(r, "Unable to save public key to %s", identity_file); sshkey_free(public); free(comment); if (strlen(new_comment) > 0) printf("Comment '%s' applied\n", new_comment); else printf("Comment removed\n"); exit(0); } static void cert_ext_add(const char *key, const char *value, int iscrit) { cert_ext = xreallocarray(cert_ext, ncert_ext + 1, sizeof(*cert_ext)); cert_ext[ncert_ext].key = xstrdup(key); cert_ext[ncert_ext].val = value == NULL ? NULL : xstrdup(value); cert_ext[ncert_ext].crit = iscrit; ncert_ext++; } /* qsort(3) comparison function for certificate extensions */ static int cert_ext_cmp(const void *_a, const void *_b) { const struct cert_ext *a = (const struct cert_ext *)_a; const struct cert_ext *b = (const struct cert_ext *)_b; int r; if (a->crit != b->crit) return (a->crit < b->crit) ? -1 : 1; if ((r = strcmp(a->key, b->key)) != 0) return r; if ((a->val == NULL) != (b->val == NULL)) return (a->val == NULL) ? -1 : 1; if (a->val != NULL && (r = strcmp(a->val, b->val)) != 0) return r; return 0; } #define OPTIONS_CRITICAL 1 #define OPTIONS_EXTENSIONS 2 static void prepare_options_buf(struct sshbuf *c, int which) { struct sshbuf *b; size_t i; int r; const struct cert_ext *ext; if ((b = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed"); sshbuf_reset(c); for (i = 0; i < ncert_ext; i++) { ext = &cert_ext[i]; if ((ext->crit && (which & OPTIONS_EXTENSIONS)) || (!ext->crit && (which & OPTIONS_CRITICAL))) continue; if (ext->val == NULL) { /* flag option */ debug3_f("%s", ext->key); if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(c, ext->key)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_string(c, NULL, 0)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "prepare flag"); } else { /* key/value option */ debug3_f("%s=%s", ext->key, ext->val); sshbuf_reset(b); if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(c, ext->key)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, ext->val)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_stringb(c, b)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "prepare k/v"); } } sshbuf_free(b); } static void finalise_cert_exts(void) { /* critical options */ if (certflags_command != NULL) cert_ext_add("force-command", certflags_command, 1); if (certflags_src_addr != NULL) cert_ext_add("source-address", certflags_src_addr, 1); if ((certflags_flags & CERTOPT_REQUIRE_VERIFY) != 0) cert_ext_add("verify-required", NULL, 1); /* extensions */ if ((certflags_flags & CERTOPT_X_FWD) != 0) cert_ext_add("permit-X11-forwarding", NULL, 0); if ((certflags_flags & CERTOPT_AGENT_FWD) != 0) cert_ext_add("permit-agent-forwarding", NULL, 0); if ((certflags_flags & CERTOPT_PORT_FWD) != 0) cert_ext_add("permit-port-forwarding", NULL, 0); if ((certflags_flags & CERTOPT_PTY) != 0) cert_ext_add("permit-pty", NULL, 0); if ((certflags_flags & CERTOPT_USER_RC) != 0) cert_ext_add("permit-user-rc", NULL, 0); if ((certflags_flags & CERTOPT_NO_REQUIRE_USER_PRESENCE) != 0) cert_ext_add("no-touch-required", NULL, 0); /* order lexically by key */ if (ncert_ext > 0) qsort(cert_ext, ncert_ext, sizeof(*cert_ext), cert_ext_cmp); } static struct sshkey * load_pkcs11_key(char *path) { #ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11 struct sshkey **keys = NULL, *public, *private = NULL; int r, i, nkeys; if ((r = sshkey_load_public(path, &public, NULL)) != 0) fatal_r(r, "Couldn't load CA public key \"%s\"", path); nkeys = pkcs11_add_provider(pkcs11provider, identity_passphrase, &keys, NULL); debug3_f("%d keys", nkeys); if (nkeys <= 0) fatal("cannot read public key from pkcs11"); for (i = 0; i < nkeys; i++) { if (sshkey_equal_public(public, keys[i])) { private = keys[i]; continue; } sshkey_free(keys[i]); } free(keys); sshkey_free(public); return private; #else fatal("no pkcs11 support"); #endif /* ENABLE_PKCS11 */ } /* Signer for sshkey_certify_custom that uses the agent */ static int agent_signer(struct sshkey *key, u_char **sigp, size_t *lenp, const u_char *data, size_t datalen, const char *alg, const char *provider, const char *pin, u_int compat, void *ctx) { int *agent_fdp = (int *)ctx; return ssh_agent_sign(*agent_fdp, key, sigp, lenp, data, datalen, alg, compat); } static void do_ca_sign(struct passwd *pw, const char *ca_key_path, int prefer_agent, unsigned long long cert_serial, int cert_serial_autoinc, int argc, char **argv) { int r, i, found, agent_fd = -1; u_int n; struct sshkey *ca, *public; char valid[64], *otmp, *tmp, *cp, *out, *comment; char *ca_fp = NULL, **plist = NULL, *pin = NULL; struct ssh_identitylist *agent_ids; size_t j; struct notifier_ctx *notifier = NULL; #ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11 pkcs11_init(1); #endif tmp = tilde_expand_filename(ca_key_path, pw->pw_uid); if (pkcs11provider != NULL) { /* If a PKCS#11 token was specified then try to use it */ if ((ca = load_pkcs11_key(tmp)) == NULL) fatal("No PKCS#11 key matching %s found", ca_key_path); } else if (prefer_agent) { /* * Agent signature requested. Try to use agent after making * sure the public key specified is actually present in the * agent. */ if ((r = sshkey_load_public(tmp, &ca, NULL)) != 0) fatal_r(r, "Cannot load CA public key %s", tmp); if ((r = ssh_get_authentication_socket(&agent_fd)) != 0) fatal_r(r, "Cannot use public key for CA signature"); if ((r = ssh_fetch_identitylist(agent_fd, &agent_ids)) != 0) fatal_r(r, "Retrieve agent key list"); found = 0; for (j = 0; j < agent_ids->nkeys; j++) { if (sshkey_equal(ca, agent_ids->keys[j])) { found = 1; break; } } if (!found) fatal("CA key %s not found in agent", tmp); ssh_free_identitylist(agent_ids); ca->flags |= SSHKEY_FLAG_EXT; } else { /* CA key is assumed to be a private key on the filesystem */ ca = load_identity(tmp, NULL); if (sshkey_is_sk(ca) && (ca->sk_flags & SSH_SK_USER_VERIFICATION_REQD)) { if ((pin = read_passphrase("Enter PIN for CA key: ", RP_ALLOW_STDIN)) == NULL) fatal_f("couldn't read PIN"); } } free(tmp); if (key_type_name != NULL) { if (sshkey_type_from_name(key_type_name) != ca->type) { fatal("CA key type %s doesn't match specified %s", sshkey_ssh_name(ca), key_type_name); } } else if (ca->type == KEY_RSA) { /* Default to a good signature algorithm */ key_type_name = "rsa-sha2-512"; } ca_fp = sshkey_fingerprint(ca, fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_DEFAULT); finalise_cert_exts(); for (i = 0; i < argc; i++) { /* Split list of principals */ n = 0; if (cert_principals != NULL) { otmp = tmp = xstrdup(cert_principals); plist = NULL; for (; (cp = strsep(&tmp, ",")) != NULL; n++) { plist = xreallocarray(plist, n + 1, sizeof(*plist)); if (*(plist[n] = xstrdup(cp)) == '\0') fatal("Empty principal name"); } free(otmp); } if (n > SSHKEY_CERT_MAX_PRINCIPALS) fatal("Too many certificate principals specified"); tmp = tilde_expand_filename(argv[i], pw->pw_uid); if ((r = sshkey_load_public(tmp, &public, &comment)) != 0) fatal_r(r, "load pubkey \"%s\"", tmp); if (sshkey_is_cert(public)) fatal_f("key \"%s\" type %s cannot be certified", tmp, sshkey_type(public)); /* Prepare certificate to sign */ if ((r = sshkey_to_certified(public)) != 0) fatal_r(r, "Could not upgrade key %s to certificate", tmp); public->cert->type = cert_key_type; public->cert->serial = (u_int64_t)cert_serial; public->cert->key_id = xstrdup(cert_key_id); public->cert->nprincipals = n; public->cert->principals = plist; public->cert->valid_after = cert_valid_from; public->cert->valid_before = cert_valid_to; prepare_options_buf(public->cert->critical, OPTIONS_CRITICAL); prepare_options_buf(public->cert->extensions, OPTIONS_EXTENSIONS); if ((r = sshkey_from_private(ca, &public->cert->signature_key)) != 0) fatal_r(r, "sshkey_from_private (ca key)"); if (agent_fd != -1 && (ca->flags & SSHKEY_FLAG_EXT) != 0) { if ((r = sshkey_certify_custom(public, ca, key_type_name, sk_provider, NULL, agent_signer, &agent_fd)) != 0) fatal_r(r, "Couldn't certify %s via agent", tmp); } else { if (sshkey_is_sk(ca) && (ca->sk_flags & SSH_SK_USER_PRESENCE_REQD)) { notifier = notify_start(0, "Confirm user presence for key %s %s", sshkey_type(ca), ca_fp); } r = sshkey_certify(public, ca, key_type_name, sk_provider, pin); notify_complete(notifier, "User presence confirmed"); if (r != 0) fatal_r(r, "Couldn't certify key %s", tmp); } if ((cp = strrchr(tmp, '.')) != NULL && strcmp(cp, ".pub") == 0) *cp = '\0'; xasprintf(&out, "%s-cert.pub", tmp); free(tmp); if ((r = sshkey_save_public(public, out, comment)) != 0) { fatal_r(r, "Unable to save public key to %s", identity_file); } if (!quiet) { sshkey_format_cert_validity(public->cert, valid, sizeof(valid)); logit("Signed %s key %s: id \"%s\" serial %llu%s%s " "valid %s", sshkey_cert_type(public), out, public->cert->key_id, (unsigned long long)public->cert->serial, cert_principals != NULL ? " for " : "", cert_principals != NULL ? cert_principals : "", valid); } sshkey_free(public); free(out); if (cert_serial_autoinc) cert_serial++; } if (pin != NULL) freezero(pin, strlen(pin)); free(ca_fp); #ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11 pkcs11_terminate(); #endif exit(0); } static u_int64_t parse_relative_time(const char *s, time_t now) { int64_t mul, secs; mul = *s == '-' ? -1 : 1; if ((secs = convtime(s + 1)) == -1) fatal("Invalid relative certificate time %s", s); if (mul == -1 && secs > now) fatal("Certificate time %s cannot be represented", s); return now + (u_int64_t)(secs * mul); } static void parse_hex_u64(const char *s, uint64_t *up) { char *ep; unsigned long long ull; errno = 0; ull = strtoull(s, &ep, 16); if (*s == '\0' || *ep != '\0') fatal("Invalid certificate time: not a number"); if (errno == ERANGE && ull == ULONG_MAX) fatal_fr(SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR, "Invalid certificate time"); *up = (uint64_t)ull; } static void parse_cert_times(char *timespec) { char *from, *to; time_t now = time(NULL); int64_t secs; /* +timespec relative to now */ if (*timespec == '+' && strchr(timespec, ':') == NULL) { if ((secs = convtime(timespec + 1)) == -1) fatal("Invalid relative certificate life %s", timespec); cert_valid_to = now + secs; /* * Backdate certificate one minute to avoid problems on hosts * with poorly-synchronised clocks. */ cert_valid_from = ((now - 59)/ 60) * 60; return; } /* * from:to, where * from := [+-]timespec | YYYYMMDD | YYYYMMDDHHMMSS | 0x... | "always" * to := [+-]timespec | YYYYMMDD | YYYYMMDDHHMMSS | 0x... | "forever" */ from = xstrdup(timespec); to = strchr(from, ':'); if (to == NULL || from == to || *(to + 1) == '\0') fatal("Invalid certificate life specification %s", timespec); *to++ = '\0'; if (*from == '-' || *from == '+') cert_valid_from = parse_relative_time(from, now); else if (strcmp(from, "always") == 0) cert_valid_from = 0; else if (strncmp(from, "0x", 2) == 0) parse_hex_u64(from, &cert_valid_from); else if (parse_absolute_time(from, &cert_valid_from) != 0) fatal("Invalid from time \"%s\"", from); if (*to == '-' || *to == '+') cert_valid_to = parse_relative_time(to, now); else if (strcmp(to, "forever") == 0) cert_valid_to = ~(u_int64_t)0; else if (strncmp(to, "0x", 2) == 0) parse_hex_u64(to, &cert_valid_to); else if (parse_absolute_time(to, &cert_valid_to) != 0) fatal("Invalid to time \"%s\"", to); if (cert_valid_to <= cert_valid_from) fatal("Empty certificate validity interval"); free(from); } static void add_cert_option(char *opt) { char *val, *cp; int iscrit = 0; if (strcasecmp(opt, "clear") == 0) certflags_flags = 0; else if (strcasecmp(opt, "no-x11-forwarding") == 0) certflags_flags &= ~CERTOPT_X_FWD; else if (strcasecmp(opt, "permit-x11-forwarding") == 0) certflags_flags |= CERTOPT_X_FWD; else if (strcasecmp(opt, "no-agent-forwarding") == 0) certflags_flags &= ~CERTOPT_AGENT_FWD; else if (strcasecmp(opt, "permit-agent-forwarding") == 0) certflags_flags |= CERTOPT_AGENT_FWD; else if (strcasecmp(opt, "no-port-forwarding") == 0) certflags_flags &= ~CERTOPT_PORT_FWD; else if (strcasecmp(opt, "permit-port-forwarding") == 0) certflags_flags |= CERTOPT_PORT_FWD; else if (strcasecmp(opt, "no-pty") == 0) certflags_flags &= ~CERTOPT_PTY; else if (strcasecmp(opt, "permit-pty") == 0) certflags_flags |= CERTOPT_PTY; else if (strcasecmp(opt, "no-user-rc") == 0) certflags_flags &= ~CERTOPT_USER_RC; else if (strcasecmp(opt, "permit-user-rc") == 0) certflags_flags |= CERTOPT_USER_RC; else if (strcasecmp(opt, "touch-required") == 0) certflags_flags &= ~CERTOPT_NO_REQUIRE_USER_PRESENCE; else if (strcasecmp(opt, "no-touch-required") == 0) certflags_flags |= CERTOPT_NO_REQUIRE_USER_PRESENCE; else if (strcasecmp(opt, "no-verify-required") == 0) certflags_flags &= ~CERTOPT_REQUIRE_VERIFY; else if (strcasecmp(opt, "verify-required") == 0) certflags_flags |= CERTOPT_REQUIRE_VERIFY; else if (strncasecmp(opt, "force-command=", 14) == 0) { val = opt + 14; if (*val == '\0') fatal("Empty force-command option"); if (certflags_command != NULL) fatal("force-command already specified"); certflags_command = xstrdup(val); } else if (strncasecmp(opt, "source-address=", 15) == 0) { val = opt + 15; if (*val == '\0') fatal("Empty source-address option"); if (certflags_src_addr != NULL) fatal("source-address already specified"); if (addr_match_cidr_list(NULL, val) != 0) fatal("Invalid source-address list"); certflags_src_addr = xstrdup(val); } else if (strncasecmp(opt, "extension:", 10) == 0 || (iscrit = (strncasecmp(opt, "critical:", 9) == 0))) { val = xstrdup(strchr(opt, ':') + 1); if ((cp = strchr(val, '=')) != NULL) *cp++ = '\0'; cert_ext_add(val, cp, iscrit); free(val); } else fatal("Unsupported certificate option \"%s\"", opt); } static void show_options(struct sshbuf *optbuf, int in_critical) { char *name, *arg, *hex; struct sshbuf *options, *option = NULL; int r; if ((options = sshbuf_fromb(optbuf)) == NULL) fatal_f("sshbuf_fromb failed"); while (sshbuf_len(options) != 0) { sshbuf_free(option); option = NULL; if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(options, &name, NULL)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_froms(options, &option)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "parse option"); printf(" %s", name); if (!in_critical && (strcmp(name, "permit-X11-forwarding") == 0 || strcmp(name, "permit-agent-forwarding") == 0 || strcmp(name, "permit-port-forwarding") == 0 || strcmp(name, "permit-pty") == 0 || strcmp(name, "permit-user-rc") == 0 || strcmp(name, "no-touch-required") == 0)) { printf("\n"); } else if (in_critical && (strcmp(name, "force-command") == 0 || strcmp(name, "source-address") == 0)) { if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(option, &arg, NULL)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "parse critical"); printf(" %s\n", arg); free(arg); } else if (in_critical && strcmp(name, "verify-required") == 0) { printf("\n"); } else if (sshbuf_len(option) > 0) { hex = sshbuf_dtob16(option); printf(" UNKNOWN OPTION: %s (len %zu)\n", hex, sshbuf_len(option)); sshbuf_reset(option); free(hex); } else printf(" UNKNOWN FLAG OPTION\n"); free(name); if (sshbuf_len(option) != 0) fatal("Option corrupt: extra data at end"); } sshbuf_free(option); sshbuf_free(options); } static void print_cert(struct sshkey *key) { char valid[64], *key_fp, *ca_fp; u_int i; key_fp = sshkey_fingerprint(key, fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_DEFAULT); ca_fp = sshkey_fingerprint(key->cert->signature_key, fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_DEFAULT); if (key_fp == NULL || ca_fp == NULL) fatal_f("sshkey_fingerprint fail"); sshkey_format_cert_validity(key->cert, valid, sizeof(valid)); printf(" Type: %s %s certificate\n", sshkey_ssh_name(key), sshkey_cert_type(key)); printf(" Public key: %s %s\n", sshkey_type(key), key_fp); printf(" Signing CA: %s %s (using %s)\n", sshkey_type(key->cert->signature_key), ca_fp, key->cert->signature_type); printf(" Key ID: \"%s\"\n", key->cert->key_id); printf(" Serial: %llu\n", (unsigned long long)key->cert->serial); printf(" Valid: %s\n", valid); printf(" Principals: "); if (key->cert->nprincipals == 0) printf("(none)\n"); else { for (i = 0; i < key->cert->nprincipals; i++) printf("\n %s", key->cert->principals[i]); printf("\n"); } printf(" Critical Options: "); if (sshbuf_len(key->cert->critical) == 0) printf("(none)\n"); else { printf("\n"); show_options(key->cert->critical, 1); } printf(" Extensions: "); if (sshbuf_len(key->cert->extensions) == 0) printf("(none)\n"); else { printf("\n"); show_options(key->cert->extensions, 0); } } static void do_show_cert(struct passwd *pw) { struct sshkey *key = NULL; struct stat st; int r, is_stdin = 0, ok = 0; FILE *f; char *cp, *line = NULL; const char *path; size_t linesize = 0; u_long lnum = 0; if (!have_identity) ask_filename(pw, "Enter file in which the key is"); if (strcmp(identity_file, "-") != 0 && stat(identity_file, &st) == -1) fatal("%s: %s: %s", __progname, identity_file, strerror(errno)); path = identity_file; if (strcmp(path, "-") == 0) { f = stdin; path = "(stdin)"; is_stdin = 1; } else if ((f = fopen(identity_file, "r")) == NULL) fatal("fopen %s: %s", identity_file, strerror(errno)); while (getline(&line, &linesize, f) != -1) { lnum++; sshkey_free(key); key = NULL; /* Trim leading space and comments */ cp = line + strspn(line, " \t"); if (*cp == '#' || *cp == '\0') continue; if ((key = sshkey_new(KEY_UNSPEC)) == NULL) fatal("sshkey_new"); if ((r = sshkey_read(key, &cp)) != 0) { error_r(r, "%s:%lu: invalid key", path, lnum); continue; } if (!sshkey_is_cert(key)) { error("%s:%lu is not a certificate", path, lnum); continue; } ok = 1; if (!is_stdin && lnum == 1) printf("%s:\n", path); else printf("%s:%lu:\n", path, lnum); print_cert(key); } free(line); sshkey_free(key); fclose(f); exit(ok ? 0 : 1); } static void load_krl(const char *path, struct ssh_krl **krlp) { struct sshbuf *krlbuf; int r; if ((r = sshbuf_load_file(path, &krlbuf)) != 0) fatal_r(r, "Unable to load KRL %s", path); /* XXX check sigs */ if ((r = ssh_krl_from_blob(krlbuf, krlp, NULL, 0)) != 0 || *krlp == NULL) fatal_r(r, "Invalid KRL file %s", path); sshbuf_free(krlbuf); } static void hash_to_blob(const char *cp, u_char **blobp, size_t *lenp, const char *file, u_long lnum) { char *tmp; size_t tlen; struct sshbuf *b; int r; if (strncmp(cp, "SHA256:", 7) != 0) fatal("%s:%lu: unsupported hash algorithm", file, lnum); cp += 7; /* * OpenSSH base64 hashes omit trailing '=' * characters; put them back for decode. */ tlen = strlen(cp); tmp = xmalloc(tlen + 4 + 1); strlcpy(tmp, cp, tlen + 1); while ((tlen % 4) != 0) { tmp[tlen++] = '='; tmp[tlen] = '\0'; } if ((b = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed"); if ((r = sshbuf_b64tod(b, tmp)) != 0) fatal_r(r, "%s:%lu: decode hash failed", file, lnum); free(tmp); *lenp = sshbuf_len(b); *blobp = xmalloc(*lenp); memcpy(*blobp, sshbuf_ptr(b), *lenp); sshbuf_free(b); } static void update_krl_from_file(struct passwd *pw, const char *file, int wild_ca, const struct sshkey *ca, struct ssh_krl *krl) { struct sshkey *key = NULL; u_long lnum = 0; char *path, *cp, *ep, *line = NULL; u_char *blob = NULL; size_t blen = 0, linesize = 0; unsigned long long serial, serial2; int i, was_explicit_key, was_sha1, was_sha256, was_hash, r; FILE *krl_spec; path = tilde_expand_filename(file, pw->pw_uid); if (strcmp(path, "-") == 0) { krl_spec = stdin; free(path); path = xstrdup("(standard input)"); } else if ((krl_spec = fopen(path, "r")) == NULL) fatal("fopen %s: %s", path, strerror(errno)); if (!quiet) printf("Revoking from %s\n", path); while (getline(&line, &linesize, krl_spec) != -1) { lnum++; was_explicit_key = was_sha1 = was_sha256 = was_hash = 0; cp = line + strspn(line, " \t"); /* Trim trailing space, comments and strip \n */ for (i = 0, r = -1; cp[i] != '\0'; i++) { if (cp[i] == '#' || cp[i] == '\n') { cp[i] = '\0'; break; } if (cp[i] == ' ' || cp[i] == '\t') { /* Remember the start of a span of whitespace */ if (r == -1) r = i; } else r = -1; } if (r != -1) cp[r] = '\0'; if (*cp == '\0') continue; if (strncasecmp(cp, "serial:", 7) == 0) { if (ca == NULL && !wild_ca) { fatal("revoking certificates by serial number " "requires specification of a CA key"); } cp += 7; cp = cp + strspn(cp, " \t"); errno = 0; serial = strtoull(cp, &ep, 0); if (*cp == '\0' || (*ep != '\0' && *ep != '-')) fatal("%s:%lu: invalid serial \"%s\"", path, lnum, cp); if (errno == ERANGE && serial == ULLONG_MAX) fatal("%s:%lu: serial out of range", path, lnum); serial2 = serial; if (*ep == '-') { cp = ep + 1; errno = 0; serial2 = strtoull(cp, &ep, 0); if (*cp == '\0' || *ep != '\0') fatal("%s:%lu: invalid serial \"%s\"", path, lnum, cp); if (errno == ERANGE && serial2 == ULLONG_MAX) fatal("%s:%lu: serial out of range", path, lnum); if (serial2 <= serial) fatal("%s:%lu: invalid serial range " "%llu:%llu", path, lnum, (unsigned long long)serial, (unsigned long long)serial2); } if (ssh_krl_revoke_cert_by_serial_range(krl, ca, serial, serial2) != 0) { fatal_f("revoke serial failed"); } } else if (strncasecmp(cp, "id:", 3) == 0) { if (ca == NULL && !wild_ca) { fatal("revoking certificates by key ID " "requires specification of a CA key"); } cp += 3; cp = cp + strspn(cp, " \t"); if (ssh_krl_revoke_cert_by_key_id(krl, ca, cp) != 0) fatal_f("revoke key ID failed"); } else if (strncasecmp(cp, "hash:", 5) == 0) { cp += 5; cp = cp + strspn(cp, " \t"); hash_to_blob(cp, &blob, &blen, file, lnum); r = ssh_krl_revoke_key_sha256(krl, blob, blen); if (r != 0) fatal_fr(r, "revoke key failed"); } else { if (strncasecmp(cp, "key:", 4) == 0) { cp += 4; cp = cp + strspn(cp, " \t"); was_explicit_key = 1; } else if (strncasecmp(cp, "sha1:", 5) == 0) { cp += 5; cp = cp + strspn(cp, " \t"); was_sha1 = 1; } else if (strncasecmp(cp, "sha256:", 7) == 0) { cp += 7; cp = cp + strspn(cp, " \t"); was_sha256 = 1; /* * Just try to process the line as a key. * Parsing will fail if it isn't. */ } if ((key = sshkey_new(KEY_UNSPEC)) == NULL) fatal("sshkey_new"); if ((r = sshkey_read(key, &cp)) != 0) fatal_r(r, "%s:%lu: invalid key", path, lnum); if (was_explicit_key) r = ssh_krl_revoke_key_explicit(krl, key); else if (was_sha1) { if (sshkey_fingerprint_raw(key, SSH_DIGEST_SHA1, &blob, &blen) != 0) { fatal("%s:%lu: fingerprint failed", file, lnum); } r = ssh_krl_revoke_key_sha1(krl, blob, blen); } else if (was_sha256) { if (sshkey_fingerprint_raw(key, SSH_DIGEST_SHA256, &blob, &blen) != 0) { fatal("%s:%lu: fingerprint failed", file, lnum); } r = ssh_krl_revoke_key_sha256(krl, blob, blen); } else r = ssh_krl_revoke_key(krl, key); if (r != 0) fatal_fr(r, "revoke key failed"); freezero(blob, blen); blob = NULL; blen = 0; sshkey_free(key); } } if (strcmp(path, "-") != 0) fclose(krl_spec); free(line); free(path); } static void do_gen_krl(struct passwd *pw, int updating, const char *ca_key_path, unsigned long long krl_version, const char *krl_comment, int argc, char **argv) { struct ssh_krl *krl; struct stat sb; struct sshkey *ca = NULL; int i, r, wild_ca = 0; char *tmp; struct sshbuf *kbuf; if (*identity_file == '\0') fatal("KRL generation requires an output file"); if (stat(identity_file, &sb) == -1) { if (errno != ENOENT) fatal("Cannot access KRL \"%s\": %s", identity_file, strerror(errno)); if (updating) fatal("KRL \"%s\" does not exist", identity_file); } if (ca_key_path != NULL) { if (strcasecmp(ca_key_path, "none") == 0) wild_ca = 1; else { tmp = tilde_expand_filename(ca_key_path, pw->pw_uid); if ((r = sshkey_load_public(tmp, &ca, NULL)) != 0) fatal_r(r, "Cannot load CA public key %s", tmp); free(tmp); } } if (updating) load_krl(identity_file, &krl); else if ((krl = ssh_krl_init()) == NULL) fatal("couldn't create KRL"); if (krl_version != 0) ssh_krl_set_version(krl, krl_version); if (krl_comment != NULL) ssh_krl_set_comment(krl, krl_comment); for (i = 0; i < argc; i++) update_krl_from_file(pw, argv[i], wild_ca, ca, krl); if ((kbuf = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) fatal("sshbuf_new failed"); if (ssh_krl_to_blob(krl, kbuf, NULL, 0) != 0) fatal("Couldn't generate KRL"); if ((r = sshbuf_write_file(identity_file, kbuf)) != 0) fatal("write %s: %s", identity_file, strerror(errno)); sshbuf_free(kbuf); ssh_krl_free(krl); sshkey_free(ca); } static void do_check_krl(struct passwd *pw, int print_krl, int argc, char **argv) { int i, r, ret = 0; char *comment; struct ssh_krl *krl; struct sshkey *k; if (*identity_file == '\0') fatal("KRL checking requires an input file"); load_krl(identity_file, &krl); if (print_krl) krl_dump(krl, stdout); for (i = 0; i < argc; i++) { if ((r = sshkey_load_public(argv[i], &k, &comment)) != 0) fatal_r(r, "Cannot load public key %s", argv[i]); r = ssh_krl_check_key(krl, k); printf("%s%s%s%s: %s\n", argv[i], *comment ? " (" : "", comment, *comment ? ")" : "", r == 0 ? "ok" : "REVOKED"); if (r != 0) ret = 1; sshkey_free(k); free(comment); } ssh_krl_free(krl); exit(ret); } static struct sshkey * load_sign_key(const char *keypath, const struct sshkey *pubkey) { size_t i, slen, plen = strlen(keypath); char *privpath = xstrdup(keypath); static const char * const suffixes[] = { "-cert.pub", ".pub", NULL }; struct sshkey *ret = NULL, *privkey = NULL; int r, waspub = 0; struct stat st; /* * If passed a public key filename, then try to locate the corresponding * private key. This lets us specify certificates on the command-line * and have ssh-keygen find the appropriate private key. */ for (i = 0; suffixes[i]; i++) { slen = strlen(suffixes[i]); if (plen <= slen || strcmp(privpath + plen - slen, suffixes[i]) != 0) continue; privpath[plen - slen] = '\0'; debug_f("%s looks like a public key, using private key " "path %s instead", keypath, privpath); waspub = 1; } if (waspub && stat(privpath, &st) != 0 && errno == ENOENT) fatal("No private key found for public key \"%s\"", keypath); if ((r = sshkey_load_private(privpath, "", &privkey, NULL)) != 0 && (r != SSH_ERR_KEY_WRONG_PASSPHRASE)) { debug_fr(r, "load private key \"%s\"", privpath); fatal("No private key found for \"%s\"", privpath); } else if (privkey == NULL) privkey = load_identity(privpath, NULL); if (!sshkey_equal_public(pubkey, privkey)) { error("Public key %s doesn't match private %s", keypath, privpath); goto done; } if (sshkey_is_cert(pubkey) && !sshkey_is_cert(privkey)) { /* * Graft the certificate onto the private key to make * it capable of signing. */ if ((r = sshkey_to_certified(privkey)) != 0) { error_fr(r, "sshkey_to_certified"); goto done; } if ((r = sshkey_cert_copy(pubkey, privkey)) != 0) { error_fr(r, "sshkey_cert_copy"); goto done; } } /* success */ ret = privkey; privkey = NULL; done: sshkey_free(privkey); free(privpath); return ret; } static int sign_one(struct sshkey *signkey, const char *filename, int fd, const char *sig_namespace, const char *hashalg, sshsig_signer *signer, void *signer_ctx) { struct sshbuf *sigbuf = NULL, *abuf = NULL; int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR, wfd = -1, oerrno; char *wfile = NULL, *asig = NULL, *fp = NULL; char *pin = NULL, *prompt = NULL; if (!quiet) { if (fd == STDIN_FILENO) fprintf(stderr, "Signing data on standard input\n"); else fprintf(stderr, "Signing file %s\n", filename); } if (signer == NULL && sshkey_is_sk(signkey)) { if ((signkey->sk_flags & SSH_SK_USER_VERIFICATION_REQD)) { xasprintf(&prompt, "Enter PIN for %s key: ", sshkey_type(signkey)); if ((pin = read_passphrase(prompt, RP_ALLOW_STDIN)) == NULL) fatal_f("couldn't read PIN"); } if ((signkey->sk_flags & SSH_SK_USER_PRESENCE_REQD)) { if ((fp = sshkey_fingerprint(signkey, fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL) fatal_f("fingerprint failed"); fprintf(stderr, "Confirm user presence for key %s %s\n", sshkey_type(signkey), fp); free(fp); } } if ((r = sshsig_sign_fd(signkey, hashalg, sk_provider, pin, fd, sig_namespace, &sigbuf, signer, signer_ctx)) != 0) { error_r(r, "Signing %s failed", filename); goto out; } if ((r = sshsig_armor(sigbuf, &abuf)) != 0) { error_fr(r, "sshsig_armor"); goto out; } if ((asig = sshbuf_dup_string(abuf)) == NULL) { error_f("buffer error"); r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; goto out; } if (fd == STDIN_FILENO) { fputs(asig, stdout); fflush(stdout); } else { xasprintf(&wfile, "%s.sig", filename); if (confirm_overwrite(wfile)) { if ((wfd = open(wfile, O_WRONLY|O_CREAT|O_TRUNC, 0666)) == -1) { oerrno = errno; error("Cannot open %s: %s", wfile, strerror(errno)); errno = oerrno; r = SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR; goto out; } if (atomicio(vwrite, wfd, asig, strlen(asig)) != strlen(asig)) { oerrno = errno; error("Cannot write to %s: %s", wfile, strerror(errno)); errno = oerrno; r = SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR; goto out; } if (!quiet) { fprintf(stderr, "Write signature to %s\n", wfile); } } } /* success */ r = 0; out: free(wfile); free(prompt); free(asig); if (pin != NULL) freezero(pin, strlen(pin)); sshbuf_free(abuf); sshbuf_free(sigbuf); if (wfd != -1) close(wfd); return r; } static int sig_process_opts(char * const *opts, size_t nopts, char **hashalgp, uint64_t *verify_timep, int *print_pubkey) { size_t i; time_t now; if (verify_timep != NULL) *verify_timep = 0; if (print_pubkey != NULL) *print_pubkey = 0; if (hashalgp != NULL) *hashalgp = NULL; for (i = 0; i < nopts; i++) { if (hashalgp != NULL && strncasecmp(opts[i], "hashalg=", 8) == 0) { *hashalgp = xstrdup(opts[i] + 8); } else if (verify_timep && strncasecmp(opts[i], "verify-time=", 12) == 0) { if (parse_absolute_time(opts[i] + 12, verify_timep) != 0 || *verify_timep == 0) { error("Invalid \"verify-time\" option"); return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; } } else if (print_pubkey && strcasecmp(opts[i], "print-pubkey") == 0) { *print_pubkey = 1; } else { error("Invalid option \"%s\"", opts[i]); return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; } } if (verify_timep && *verify_timep == 0) { if ((now = time(NULL)) < 0) { error("Time is before epoch"); return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; } *verify_timep = (uint64_t)now; } return 0; } static int sig_sign(const char *keypath, const char *sig_namespace, int require_agent, int argc, char **argv, char * const *opts, size_t nopts) { int i, fd = -1, r, ret = -1; int agent_fd = -1; struct sshkey *pubkey = NULL, *privkey = NULL, *signkey = NULL; sshsig_signer *signer = NULL; char *hashalg = NULL; /* Check file arguments. */ for (i = 0; i < argc; i++) { if (strcmp(argv[i], "-") != 0) continue; if (i > 0 || argc > 1) fatal("Cannot sign mix of paths and standard input"); } if (sig_process_opts(opts, nopts, &hashalg, NULL, NULL) != 0) goto done; /* error already logged */ if ((r = sshkey_load_public(keypath, &pubkey, NULL)) != 0) { error_r(r, "Couldn't load public key %s", keypath); goto done; } if ((r = ssh_get_authentication_socket(&agent_fd)) != 0) { if (require_agent) fatal("Couldn't get agent socket"); debug_r(r, "Couldn't get agent socket"); } else { if ((r = ssh_agent_has_key(agent_fd, pubkey)) == 0) signer = agent_signer; else { if (require_agent) fatal("Couldn't find key in agent"); debug_r(r, "Couldn't find key in agent"); } } if (signer == NULL) { /* Not using agent - try to load private key */ if ((privkey = load_sign_key(keypath, pubkey)) == NULL) goto done; signkey = privkey; } else { /* Will use key in agent */ signkey = pubkey; } if (argc == 0) { if ((r = sign_one(signkey, "(stdin)", STDIN_FILENO, sig_namespace, hashalg, signer, &agent_fd)) != 0) goto done; } else { for (i = 0; i < argc; i++) { if (strcmp(argv[i], "-") == 0) fd = STDIN_FILENO; else if ((fd = open(argv[i], O_RDONLY)) == -1) { error("Cannot open %s for signing: %s", argv[i], strerror(errno)); goto done; } if ((r = sign_one(signkey, argv[i], fd, sig_namespace, hashalg, signer, &agent_fd)) != 0) goto done; if (fd != STDIN_FILENO) close(fd); fd = -1; } } ret = 0; done: if (fd != -1 && fd != STDIN_FILENO) close(fd); sshkey_free(pubkey); sshkey_free(privkey); free(hashalg); return ret; } static int sig_verify(const char *signature, const char *sig_namespace, const char *principal, const char *allowed_keys, const char *revoked_keys, char * const *opts, size_t nopts) { int r, ret = -1; int print_pubkey = 0; struct sshbuf *sigbuf = NULL, *abuf = NULL; struct sshkey *sign_key = NULL; char *fp = NULL; struct sshkey_sig_details *sig_details = NULL; uint64_t verify_time = 0; if (sig_process_opts(opts, nopts, NULL, &verify_time, &print_pubkey) != 0) goto done; /* error already logged */ memset(&sig_details, 0, sizeof(sig_details)); if ((r = sshbuf_load_file(signature, &abuf)) != 0) { error_r(r, "Couldn't read signature file"); goto done; } if ((r = sshsig_dearmor(abuf, &sigbuf)) != 0) { error_fr(r, "sshsig_armor"); goto done; } if ((r = sshsig_verify_fd(sigbuf, STDIN_FILENO, sig_namespace, &sign_key, &sig_details)) != 0) goto done; /* sshsig_verify() prints error */ if ((fp = sshkey_fingerprint(sign_key, fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL) fatal_f("sshkey_fingerprint failed"); debug("Valid (unverified) signature from key %s", fp); if (sig_details != NULL) { debug2_f("signature details: counter = %u, flags = 0x%02x", sig_details->sk_counter, sig_details->sk_flags); } free(fp); fp = NULL; if (revoked_keys != NULL) { if ((r = sshkey_check_revoked(sign_key, revoked_keys)) != 0) { debug3_fr(r, "sshkey_check_revoked"); goto done; } } if (allowed_keys != NULL && (r = sshsig_check_allowed_keys(allowed_keys, sign_key, principal, sig_namespace, verify_time)) != 0) { debug3_fr(r, "sshsig_check_allowed_keys"); goto done; } /* success */ ret = 0; done: if (!quiet) { if (ret == 0) { if ((fp = sshkey_fingerprint(sign_key, fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL) fatal_f("sshkey_fingerprint failed"); if (principal == NULL) { printf("Good \"%s\" signature with %s key %s\n", sig_namespace, sshkey_type(sign_key), fp); } else { printf("Good \"%s\" signature for %s with %s key %s\n", sig_namespace, principal, sshkey_type(sign_key), fp); } } else { printf("Could not verify signature.\n"); } } /* Print the signature key if requested */ if (ret == 0 && print_pubkey && sign_key != NULL) { if ((r = sshkey_write(sign_key, stdout)) == 0) fputc('\n', stdout); else { error_r(r, "Could not print public key.\n"); ret = -1; } } sshbuf_free(sigbuf); sshbuf_free(abuf); sshkey_free(sign_key); sshkey_sig_details_free(sig_details); free(fp); return ret; } static int sig_find_principals(const char *signature, const char *allowed_keys, char * const *opts, size_t nopts) { int r, ret = -1; struct sshbuf *sigbuf = NULL, *abuf = NULL; struct sshkey *sign_key = NULL; char *principals = NULL, *cp, *tmp; uint64_t verify_time = 0; if (sig_process_opts(opts, nopts, NULL, &verify_time, NULL) != 0) goto done; /* error already logged */ if ((r = sshbuf_load_file(signature, &abuf)) != 0) { error_r(r, "Couldn't read signature file"); goto done; } if ((r = sshsig_dearmor(abuf, &sigbuf)) != 0) { error_fr(r, "sshsig_armor"); goto done; } if ((r = sshsig_get_pubkey(sigbuf, &sign_key)) != 0) { error_fr(r, "sshsig_get_pubkey"); goto done; } if ((r = sshsig_find_principals(allowed_keys, sign_key, verify_time, &principals)) != 0) { if (r != SSH_ERR_KEY_NOT_FOUND) error_fr(r, "sshsig_find_principal"); goto done; } ret = 0; done: if (ret == 0 ) { /* Emit matching principals one per line */ tmp = principals; while ((cp = strsep(&tmp, ",")) != NULL && *cp != '\0') puts(cp); } else { fprintf(stderr, "No principal matched.\n"); } sshbuf_free(sigbuf); sshbuf_free(abuf); sshkey_free(sign_key); free(principals); return ret; } static int sig_match_principals(const char *allowed_keys, char *principal, char * const *opts, size_t nopts) { int r; char **principals = NULL; size_t i, nprincipals = 0; if ((r = sig_process_opts(opts, nopts, NULL, NULL, NULL)) != 0) return r; /* error already logged */ if ((r = sshsig_match_principals(allowed_keys, principal, &principals, &nprincipals)) != 0) { debug_f("match: %s", ssh_err(r)); fprintf(stderr, "No principal matched.\n"); return r; } for (i = 0; i < nprincipals; i++) { printf("%s\n", principals[i]); free(principals[i]); } free(principals); return 0; } static void do_moduli_gen(const char *out_file, char **opts, size_t nopts) { #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL /* Moduli generation/screening */ u_int32_t memory = 0; BIGNUM *start = NULL; int moduli_bits = 0; FILE *out; size_t i; const char *errstr; /* Parse options */ for (i = 0; i < nopts; i++) { if (strncmp(opts[i], "memory=", 7) == 0) { memory = (u_int32_t)strtonum(opts[i]+7, 1, UINT_MAX, &errstr); if (errstr) { fatal("Memory limit is %s: %s", errstr, opts[i]+7); } } else if (strncmp(opts[i], "start=", 6) == 0) { /* XXX - also compare length against bits */ if (BN_hex2bn(&start, opts[i]+6) == 0) fatal("Invalid start point."); } else if (strncmp(opts[i], "bits=", 5) == 0) { moduli_bits = (int)strtonum(opts[i]+5, 1, INT_MAX, &errstr); if (errstr) { fatal("Invalid number: %s (%s)", opts[i]+12, errstr); } } else { fatal("Option \"%s\" is unsupported for moduli " "generation", opts[i]); } } if ((out = fopen(out_file, "w")) == NULL) { fatal("Couldn't open modulus candidate file \"%s\": %s", out_file, strerror(errno)); } setvbuf(out, NULL, _IOLBF, 0); if (moduli_bits == 0) moduli_bits = DEFAULT_BITS; if (gen_candidates(out, memory, moduli_bits, start) != 0) fatal("modulus candidate generation failed"); #else /* WITH_OPENSSL */ fatal("Moduli generation is not supported"); #endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */ } static void do_moduli_screen(const char *out_file, char **opts, size_t nopts) { #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL /* Moduli generation/screening */ char *checkpoint = NULL; u_int32_t generator_wanted = 0; unsigned long start_lineno = 0, lines_to_process = 0; int prime_tests = 0; FILE *out, *in = stdin; size_t i; const char *errstr; /* Parse options */ for (i = 0; i < nopts; i++) { if (strncmp(opts[i], "lines=", 6) == 0) { lines_to_process = strtoul(opts[i]+6, NULL, 10); } else if (strncmp(opts[i], "start-line=", 11) == 0) { start_lineno = strtoul(opts[i]+11, NULL, 10); } else if (strncmp(opts[i], "checkpoint=", 11) == 0) { + free(checkpoint); checkpoint = xstrdup(opts[i]+11); } else if (strncmp(opts[i], "generator=", 10) == 0) { generator_wanted = (u_int32_t)strtonum( opts[i]+10, 1, UINT_MAX, &errstr); if (errstr != NULL) { fatal("Generator invalid: %s (%s)", opts[i]+10, errstr); } } else if (strncmp(opts[i], "prime-tests=", 12) == 0) { prime_tests = (int)strtonum(opts[i]+12, 1, INT_MAX, &errstr); if (errstr) { fatal("Invalid number: %s (%s)", opts[i]+12, errstr); } } else { fatal("Option \"%s\" is unsupported for moduli " "screening", opts[i]); } } if (have_identity && strcmp(identity_file, "-") != 0) { if ((in = fopen(identity_file, "r")) == NULL) { fatal("Couldn't open modulus candidate " "file \"%s\": %s", identity_file, strerror(errno)); } } if ((out = fopen(out_file, "a")) == NULL) { fatal("Couldn't open moduli file \"%s\": %s", out_file, strerror(errno)); } setvbuf(out, NULL, _IOLBF, 0); if (prime_test(in, out, prime_tests == 0 ? 100 : prime_tests, generator_wanted, checkpoint, start_lineno, lines_to_process) != 0) fatal("modulus screening failed"); + if (in != stdin) + (void)fclose(in); + free(checkpoint); #else /* WITH_OPENSSL */ fatal("Moduli screening is not supported"); #endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */ } /* Read and confirm a passphrase */ static char * read_check_passphrase(const char *prompt1, const char *prompt2, const char *retry_prompt) { char *passphrase1, *passphrase2; for (;;) { passphrase1 = read_passphrase(prompt1, RP_ALLOW_STDIN); passphrase2 = read_passphrase(prompt2, RP_ALLOW_STDIN); if (strcmp(passphrase1, passphrase2) == 0) { freezero(passphrase2, strlen(passphrase2)); return passphrase1; } /* The passphrases do not match. Clear them and retry. */ freezero(passphrase1, strlen(passphrase1)); freezero(passphrase2, strlen(passphrase2)); fputs(retry_prompt, stdout); fputc('\n', stdout); fflush(stdout); } /* NOTREACHED */ return NULL; } static char * private_key_passphrase(void) { if (identity_passphrase) return xstrdup(identity_passphrase); if (identity_new_passphrase) return xstrdup(identity_new_passphrase); return read_check_passphrase( "Enter passphrase (empty for no passphrase): ", "Enter same passphrase again: ", "Passphrases do not match. Try again."); } static char * sk_suffix(const char *application, const uint8_t *user, size_t userlen) { char *ret, *cp; size_t slen, i; /* Trim off URL-like preamble */ if (strncmp(application, "ssh://", 6) == 0) ret = xstrdup(application + 6); else if (strncmp(application, "ssh:", 4) == 0) ret = xstrdup(application + 4); else ret = xstrdup(application); /* Count trailing zeros in user */ for (i = 0; i < userlen; i++) { if (user[userlen - i - 1] != 0) break; } if (i >= userlen) return ret; /* user-id was default all-zeros */ /* Append user-id, escaping non-UTF-8 characters */ slen = userlen - i; if (asmprintf(&cp, INT_MAX, NULL, "%.*s", (int)slen, user) == -1) fatal_f("asmprintf failed"); /* Don't emit a user-id that contains path or control characters */ if (strchr(cp, '/') != NULL || strstr(cp, "..") != NULL || strchr(cp, '\\') != NULL) { free(cp); cp = tohex(user, slen); } xextendf(&ret, "_", "%s", cp); free(cp); return ret; } static int do_download_sk(const char *skprovider, const char *device) { struct sshsk_resident_key **srks; size_t nsrks, i; int r, ret = -1; char *fp, *pin = NULL, *pass = NULL, *path, *pubpath; const char *ext; struct sshkey *key; if (skprovider == NULL) fatal("Cannot download keys without provider"); pin = read_passphrase("Enter PIN for authenticator: ", RP_ALLOW_STDIN); if (!quiet) { printf("You may need to touch your authenticator " "to authorize key download.\n"); } if ((r = sshsk_load_resident(skprovider, device, pin, 0, &srks, &nsrks)) != 0) { if (pin != NULL) freezero(pin, strlen(pin)); error_r(r, "Unable to load resident keys"); return -1; } if (nsrks == 0) logit("No keys to download"); if (pin != NULL) freezero(pin, strlen(pin)); for (i = 0; i < nsrks; i++) { key = srks[i]->key; if (key->type != KEY_ECDSA_SK && key->type != KEY_ED25519_SK) { error("Unsupported key type %s (%d)", sshkey_type(key), key->type); continue; } if ((fp = sshkey_fingerprint(key, fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL) fatal_f("sshkey_fingerprint failed"); debug_f("key %zu: %s %s %s (flags 0x%02x)", i, sshkey_type(key), fp, key->sk_application, key->sk_flags); ext = sk_suffix(key->sk_application, srks[i]->user_id, srks[i]->user_id_len); xasprintf(&path, "id_%s_rk%s%s", key->type == KEY_ECDSA_SK ? "ecdsa_sk" : "ed25519_sk", *ext == '\0' ? "" : "_", ext); /* If the file already exists, ask the user to confirm. */ if (!confirm_overwrite(path)) { free(path); break; } /* Save the key with the application string as the comment */ if (pass == NULL) pass = private_key_passphrase(); if ((r = sshkey_save_private(key, path, pass, key->sk_application, private_key_format, openssh_format_cipher, rounds)) != 0) { error_r(r, "Saving key \"%s\" failed", path); free(path); break; } if (!quiet) { printf("Saved %s key%s%s to %s\n", sshkey_type(key), *ext != '\0' ? " " : "", *ext != '\0' ? key->sk_application : "", path); } /* Save public key too */ xasprintf(&pubpath, "%s.pub", path); free(path); if ((r = sshkey_save_public(key, pubpath, key->sk_application)) != 0) { error_r(r, "Saving public key \"%s\" failed", pubpath); free(pubpath); break; } free(pubpath); } if (i >= nsrks) ret = 0; /* success */ if (pass != NULL) freezero(pass, strlen(pass)); sshsk_free_resident_keys(srks, nsrks); return ret; } static void save_attestation(struct sshbuf *attest, const char *path) { mode_t omask; int r; if (path == NULL) return; /* nothing to do */ if (attest == NULL || sshbuf_len(attest) == 0) fatal("Enrollment did not return attestation data"); omask = umask(077); r = sshbuf_write_file(path, attest); umask(omask); if (r != 0) fatal_r(r, "Unable to write attestation data \"%s\"", path); if (!quiet) printf("Your FIDO attestation certificate has been saved in " "%s\n", path); } static int confirm_sk_overwrite(const char *application, const char *user) { char yesno[3]; printf("A resident key scoped to '%s' with user id '%s' already " "exists.\n", application == NULL ? "ssh:" : application, user == NULL ? "null" : user); printf("Overwrite key in token (y/n)? "); fflush(stdout); if (fgets(yesno, sizeof(yesno), stdin) == NULL) return 0; if (yesno[0] != 'y' && yesno[0] != 'Y') return 0; return 1; } static void usage(void) { fprintf(stderr, "usage: ssh-keygen [-q] [-a rounds] [-b bits] [-C comment] [-f output_keyfile]\n" " [-m format] [-N new_passphrase] [-O option]\n" " [-t dsa | ecdsa | ecdsa-sk | ed25519 | ed25519-sk | rsa]\n" " [-w provider] [-Z cipher]\n" " ssh-keygen -p [-a rounds] [-f keyfile] [-m format] [-N new_passphrase]\n" " [-P old_passphrase] [-Z cipher]\n" #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL " ssh-keygen -i [-f input_keyfile] [-m key_format]\n" " ssh-keygen -e [-f input_keyfile] [-m key_format]\n" #endif " ssh-keygen -y [-f input_keyfile]\n" " ssh-keygen -c [-a rounds] [-C comment] [-f keyfile] [-P passphrase]\n" " ssh-keygen -l [-v] [-E fingerprint_hash] [-f input_keyfile]\n" " ssh-keygen -B [-f input_keyfile]\n"); #ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11 fprintf(stderr, " ssh-keygen -D pkcs11\n"); #endif fprintf(stderr, " ssh-keygen -F hostname [-lv] [-f known_hosts_file]\n" " ssh-keygen -H [-f known_hosts_file]\n" " ssh-keygen -K [-a rounds] [-w provider]\n" " ssh-keygen -R hostname [-f known_hosts_file]\n" " ssh-keygen -r hostname [-g] [-f input_keyfile]\n" #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL " ssh-keygen -M generate [-O option] output_file\n" " ssh-keygen -M screen [-f input_file] [-O option] output_file\n" #endif " ssh-keygen -I certificate_identity -s ca_key [-hU] [-D pkcs11_provider]\n" " [-n principals] [-O option] [-V validity_interval]\n" " [-z serial_number] file ...\n" " ssh-keygen -L [-f input_keyfile]\n" " ssh-keygen -A [-a rounds] [-f prefix_path]\n" " ssh-keygen -k -f krl_file [-u] [-s ca_public] [-z version_number]\n" " file ...\n" " ssh-keygen -Q [-l] -f krl_file [file ...]\n" " ssh-keygen -Y find-principals -s signature_file -f allowed_signers_file\n" " ssh-keygen -Y match-principals -I signer_identity -f allowed_signers_file\n" " ssh-keygen -Y check-novalidate -n namespace -s signature_file\n" " ssh-keygen -Y sign -f key_file -n namespace file [-O option] ...\n" " ssh-keygen -Y verify -f allowed_signers_file -I signer_identity\n" " -n namespace -s signature_file [-r krl_file] [-O option]\n"); exit(1); } /* * Main program for key management. */ int main(int argc, char **argv) { char comment[1024], *passphrase = NULL; char *rr_hostname = NULL, *ep, *fp, *ra; struct sshkey *private, *public; struct passwd *pw; int r, opt, type; int change_passphrase = 0, change_comment = 0, show_cert = 0; int find_host = 0, delete_host = 0, hash_hosts = 0; int gen_all_hostkeys = 0, gen_krl = 0, update_krl = 0, check_krl = 0; int prefer_agent = 0, convert_to = 0, convert_from = 0; int print_public = 0, print_generic = 0, cert_serial_autoinc = 0; int do_gen_candidates = 0, do_screen_candidates = 0, download_sk = 0; unsigned long long cert_serial = 0; char *identity_comment = NULL, *ca_key_path = NULL, **opts = NULL; char *sk_application = NULL, *sk_device = NULL, *sk_user = NULL; char *sk_attestation_path = NULL; struct sshbuf *challenge = NULL, *attest = NULL; size_t i, nopts = 0; u_int32_t bits = 0; uint8_t sk_flags = SSH_SK_USER_PRESENCE_REQD; const char *errstr; int log_level = SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO; char *sign_op = NULL; extern int optind; extern char *optarg; /* Ensure that fds 0, 1 and 2 are open or directed to /dev/null */ sanitise_stdfd(); __progname = ssh_get_progname(argv[0]); seed_rng(); log_init(argv[0], SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO, SYSLOG_FACILITY_USER, 1); msetlocale(); /* we need this for the home * directory. */ pw = getpwuid(getuid()); if (!pw) fatal("No user exists for uid %lu", (u_long)getuid()); pw = pwcopy(pw); if (gethostname(hostname, sizeof(hostname)) == -1) fatal("gethostname: %s", strerror(errno)); sk_provider = getenv("SSH_SK_PROVIDER"); /* Remaining characters: dGjJSTWx */ while ((opt = getopt(argc, argv, "ABHKLQUXceghiklopquvy" "C:D:E:F:I:M:N:O:P:R:V:Y:Z:" "a:b:f:g:m:n:r:s:t:w:z:")) != -1) { switch (opt) { case 'A': gen_all_hostkeys = 1; break; case 'b': bits = (u_int32_t)strtonum(optarg, 1, UINT32_MAX, &errstr); if (errstr) fatal("Bits has bad value %s (%s)", optarg, errstr); break; case 'E': fingerprint_hash = ssh_digest_alg_by_name(optarg); if (fingerprint_hash == -1) fatal("Invalid hash algorithm \"%s\"", optarg); break; case 'F': find_host = 1; rr_hostname = optarg; break; case 'H': hash_hosts = 1; break; case 'I': cert_key_id = optarg; break; case 'R': delete_host = 1; rr_hostname = optarg; break; case 'L': show_cert = 1; break; case 'l': print_fingerprint = 1; break; case 'B': print_bubblebabble = 1; break; case 'm': if (strcasecmp(optarg, "RFC4716") == 0 || strcasecmp(optarg, "ssh2") == 0) { convert_format = FMT_RFC4716; break; } if (strcasecmp(optarg, "PKCS8") == 0) { convert_format = FMT_PKCS8; private_key_format = SSHKEY_PRIVATE_PKCS8; break; } if (strcasecmp(optarg, "PEM") == 0) { convert_format = FMT_PEM; private_key_format = SSHKEY_PRIVATE_PEM; break; } fatal("Unsupported conversion format \"%s\"", optarg); case 'n': cert_principals = optarg; break; case 'o': /* no-op; new format is already the default */ break; case 'p': change_passphrase = 1; break; case 'c': change_comment = 1; break; case 'f': if (strlcpy(identity_file, optarg, sizeof(identity_file)) >= sizeof(identity_file)) fatal("Identity filename too long"); have_identity = 1; break; case 'g': print_generic = 1; break; case 'K': download_sk = 1; break; case 'P': identity_passphrase = optarg; break; case 'N': identity_new_passphrase = optarg; break; case 'Q': check_krl = 1; break; case 'O': opts = xrecallocarray(opts, nopts, nopts + 1, sizeof(*opts)); opts[nopts++] = xstrdup(optarg); break; case 'Z': openssh_format_cipher = optarg; if (cipher_by_name(openssh_format_cipher) == NULL) fatal("Invalid OpenSSH-format cipher '%s'", openssh_format_cipher); break; case 'C': identity_comment = optarg; break; case 'q': quiet = 1; break; case 'e': /* export key */ convert_to = 1; break; case 'h': cert_key_type = SSH2_CERT_TYPE_HOST; certflags_flags = 0; break; case 'k': gen_krl = 1; break; case 'i': case 'X': /* import key */ convert_from = 1; break; case 'y': print_public = 1; break; case 's': ca_key_path = optarg; break; case 't': key_type_name = optarg; break; case 'D': pkcs11provider = optarg; break; case 'U': prefer_agent = 1; break; case 'u': update_krl = 1; break; case 'v': if (log_level == SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO) log_level = SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG1; else { if (log_level >= SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG1 && log_level < SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG3) log_level++; } break; case 'r': rr_hostname = optarg; break; case 'a': rounds = (int)strtonum(optarg, 1, INT_MAX, &errstr); if (errstr) fatal("Invalid number: %s (%s)", optarg, errstr); break; case 'V': parse_cert_times(optarg); break; case 'Y': sign_op = optarg; break; case 'w': sk_provider = optarg; break; case 'z': errno = 0; if (*optarg == '+') { cert_serial_autoinc = 1; optarg++; } cert_serial = strtoull(optarg, &ep, 10); if (*optarg < '0' || *optarg > '9' || *ep != '\0' || (errno == ERANGE && cert_serial == ULLONG_MAX)) fatal("Invalid serial number \"%s\"", optarg); break; case 'M': if (strcmp(optarg, "generate") == 0) do_gen_candidates = 1; else if (strcmp(optarg, "screen") == 0) do_screen_candidates = 1; else fatal("Unsupported moduli option %s", optarg); break; default: usage(); } } #ifdef ENABLE_SK_INTERNAL if (sk_provider == NULL) sk_provider = "internal"; #endif /* reinit */ log_init(argv[0], log_level, SYSLOG_FACILITY_USER, 1); argv += optind; argc -= optind; if (sign_op != NULL) { if (strncmp(sign_op, "find-principals", 15) == 0) { if (ca_key_path == NULL) { error("Too few arguments for find-principals:" "missing signature file"); exit(1); } if (!have_identity) { error("Too few arguments for find-principals:" "missing allowed keys file"); exit(1); } return sig_find_principals(ca_key_path, identity_file, opts, nopts); } else if (strncmp(sign_op, "match-principals", 16) == 0) { if (!have_identity) { error("Too few arguments for match-principals:" "missing allowed keys file"); exit(1); } if (cert_key_id == NULL) { error("Too few arguments for match-principals: " "missing principal ID"); exit(1); } return sig_match_principals(identity_file, cert_key_id, opts, nopts); } else if (strncmp(sign_op, "sign", 4) == 0) { /* NB. cert_principals is actually namespace, via -n */ if (cert_principals == NULL || *cert_principals == '\0') { error("Too few arguments for sign: " "missing namespace"); exit(1); } if (!have_identity) { error("Too few arguments for sign: " "missing key"); exit(1); } return sig_sign(identity_file, cert_principals, prefer_agent, argc, argv, opts, nopts); } else if (strncmp(sign_op, "check-novalidate", 16) == 0) { /* NB. cert_principals is actually namespace, via -n */ if (cert_principals == NULL || *cert_principals == '\0') { error("Too few arguments for check-novalidate: " "missing namespace"); exit(1); } if (ca_key_path == NULL) { error("Too few arguments for check-novalidate: " "missing signature file"); exit(1); } return sig_verify(ca_key_path, cert_principals, NULL, NULL, NULL, opts, nopts); } else if (strncmp(sign_op, "verify", 6) == 0) { /* NB. cert_principals is actually namespace, via -n */ if (cert_principals == NULL || *cert_principals == '\0') { error("Too few arguments for verify: " "missing namespace"); exit(1); } if (ca_key_path == NULL) { error("Too few arguments for verify: " "missing signature file"); exit(1); } if (!have_identity) { error("Too few arguments for sign: " "missing allowed keys file"); exit(1); } if (cert_key_id == NULL) { error("Too few arguments for verify: " "missing principal identity"); exit(1); } return sig_verify(ca_key_path, cert_principals, cert_key_id, identity_file, rr_hostname, opts, nopts); } error("Unsupported operation for -Y: \"%s\"", sign_op); usage(); /* NOTREACHED */ } if (ca_key_path != NULL) { if (argc < 1 && !gen_krl) { error("Too few arguments."); usage(); } } else if (argc > 0 && !gen_krl && !check_krl && !do_gen_candidates && !do_screen_candidates) { error("Too many arguments."); usage(); } if (change_passphrase && change_comment) { error("Can only have one of -p and -c."); usage(); } if (print_fingerprint && (delete_host || hash_hosts)) { error("Cannot use -l with -H or -R."); usage(); } if (gen_krl) { do_gen_krl(pw, update_krl, ca_key_path, cert_serial, identity_comment, argc, argv); return (0); } if (check_krl) { do_check_krl(pw, print_fingerprint, argc, argv); return (0); } if (ca_key_path != NULL) { if (cert_key_id == NULL) fatal("Must specify key id (-I) when certifying"); for (i = 0; i < nopts; i++) add_cert_option(opts[i]); do_ca_sign(pw, ca_key_path, prefer_agent, cert_serial, cert_serial_autoinc, argc, argv); } if (show_cert) do_show_cert(pw); if (delete_host || hash_hosts || find_host) { do_known_hosts(pw, rr_hostname, find_host, delete_host, hash_hosts); } if (pkcs11provider != NULL) do_download(pw); if (download_sk) { for (i = 0; i < nopts; i++) { if (strncasecmp(opts[i], "device=", 7) == 0) { sk_device = xstrdup(opts[i] + 7); } else { fatal("Option \"%s\" is unsupported for " "FIDO authenticator download", opts[i]); } } return do_download_sk(sk_provider, sk_device); } if (print_fingerprint || print_bubblebabble) do_fingerprint(pw); if (change_passphrase) do_change_passphrase(pw); if (change_comment) do_change_comment(pw, identity_comment); #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL if (convert_to) do_convert_to(pw); if (convert_from) do_convert_from(pw); #else /* WITH_OPENSSL */ if (convert_to || convert_from) fatal("key conversion disabled at compile time"); #endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */ if (print_public) do_print_public(pw); if (rr_hostname != NULL) { unsigned int n = 0; if (have_identity) { n = do_print_resource_record(pw, identity_file, - rr_hostname, print_generic); + rr_hostname, print_generic, opts, nopts); if (n == 0) fatal("%s: %s", identity_file, strerror(errno)); exit(0); } else { n += do_print_resource_record(pw, _PATH_HOST_RSA_KEY_FILE, rr_hostname, - print_generic); + print_generic, opts, nopts); n += do_print_resource_record(pw, _PATH_HOST_DSA_KEY_FILE, rr_hostname, - print_generic); + print_generic, opts, nopts); n += do_print_resource_record(pw, _PATH_HOST_ECDSA_KEY_FILE, rr_hostname, - print_generic); + print_generic, opts, nopts); n += do_print_resource_record(pw, _PATH_HOST_ED25519_KEY_FILE, rr_hostname, - print_generic); + print_generic, opts, nopts); n += do_print_resource_record(pw, _PATH_HOST_XMSS_KEY_FILE, rr_hostname, - print_generic); + print_generic, opts, nopts); if (n == 0) fatal("no keys found."); exit(0); } } if (do_gen_candidates || do_screen_candidates) { if (argc <= 0) fatal("No output file specified"); else if (argc > 1) fatal("Too many output files specified"); } if (do_gen_candidates) { do_moduli_gen(argv[0], opts, nopts); return 0; } if (do_screen_candidates) { do_moduli_screen(argv[0], opts, nopts); return 0; } if (gen_all_hostkeys) { do_gen_all_hostkeys(pw); return (0); } if (key_type_name == NULL) key_type_name = DEFAULT_KEY_TYPE_NAME; type = sshkey_type_from_name(key_type_name); type_bits_valid(type, key_type_name, &bits); if (!quiet) printf("Generating public/private %s key pair.\n", key_type_name); switch (type) { case KEY_ECDSA_SK: case KEY_ED25519_SK: for (i = 0; i < nopts; i++) { if (strcasecmp(opts[i], "no-touch-required") == 0) { sk_flags &= ~SSH_SK_USER_PRESENCE_REQD; } else if (strcasecmp(opts[i], "verify-required") == 0) { sk_flags |= SSH_SK_USER_VERIFICATION_REQD; } else if (strcasecmp(opts[i], "resident") == 0) { sk_flags |= SSH_SK_RESIDENT_KEY; } else if (strncasecmp(opts[i], "device=", 7) == 0) { sk_device = xstrdup(opts[i] + 7); } else if (strncasecmp(opts[i], "user=", 5) == 0) { sk_user = xstrdup(opts[i] + 5); } else if (strncasecmp(opts[i], "challenge=", 10) == 0) { if ((r = sshbuf_load_file(opts[i] + 10, &challenge)) != 0) { fatal_r(r, "Unable to load FIDO " "enrollment challenge \"%s\"", opts[i] + 10); } } else if (strncasecmp(opts[i], "write-attestation=", 18) == 0) { sk_attestation_path = opts[i] + 18; } else if (strncasecmp(opts[i], "application=", 12) == 0) { sk_application = xstrdup(opts[i] + 12); if (strncmp(sk_application, "ssh:", 4) != 0) { fatal("FIDO application string must " "begin with \"ssh:\""); } } else { fatal("Option \"%s\" is unsupported for " "FIDO authenticator enrollment", opts[i]); } } if ((attest = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) fatal("sshbuf_new failed"); r = 0; for (i = 0 ;;) { if (!quiet) { printf("You may need to touch your " "authenticator%s to authorize key " "generation.\n", r == 0 ? "" : " again"); } fflush(stdout); r = sshsk_enroll(type, sk_provider, sk_device, sk_application == NULL ? "ssh:" : sk_application, sk_user, sk_flags, passphrase, challenge, &private, attest); if (r == 0) break; if (r == SSH_ERR_KEY_BAD_PERMISSIONS && (sk_flags & SSH_SK_RESIDENT_KEY) != 0 && (sk_flags & SSH_SK_FORCE_OPERATION) == 0 && confirm_sk_overwrite(sk_application, sk_user)) { sk_flags |= SSH_SK_FORCE_OPERATION; continue; } if (r != SSH_ERR_KEY_WRONG_PASSPHRASE) fatal_r(r, "Key enrollment failed"); else if (passphrase != NULL) { error("PIN incorrect"); freezero(passphrase, strlen(passphrase)); passphrase = NULL; } if (++i >= 3) fatal("Too many incorrect PINs"); passphrase = read_passphrase("Enter PIN for " "authenticator: ", RP_ALLOW_STDIN); } if (passphrase != NULL) { freezero(passphrase, strlen(passphrase)); passphrase = NULL; } break; default: if ((r = sshkey_generate(type, bits, &private)) != 0) fatal("sshkey_generate failed"); break; } if ((r = sshkey_from_private(private, &public)) != 0) fatal_r(r, "sshkey_from_private"); if (!have_identity) ask_filename(pw, "Enter file in which to save the key"); /* Create ~/.ssh directory if it doesn't already exist. */ hostfile_create_user_ssh_dir(identity_file, !quiet); /* If the file already exists, ask the user to confirm. */ if (!confirm_overwrite(identity_file)) exit(1); /* Determine the passphrase for the private key */ passphrase = private_key_passphrase(); if (identity_comment) { strlcpy(comment, identity_comment, sizeof(comment)); } else { /* Create default comment field for the passphrase. */ snprintf(comment, sizeof comment, "%s@%s", pw->pw_name, hostname); } /* Save the key with the given passphrase and comment. */ if ((r = sshkey_save_private(private, identity_file, passphrase, comment, private_key_format, openssh_format_cipher, rounds)) != 0) { error_r(r, "Saving key \"%s\" failed", identity_file); freezero(passphrase, strlen(passphrase)); exit(1); } freezero(passphrase, strlen(passphrase)); sshkey_free(private); if (!quiet) { printf("Your identification has been saved in %s\n", identity_file); } strlcat(identity_file, ".pub", sizeof(identity_file)); if ((r = sshkey_save_public(public, identity_file, comment)) != 0) fatal_r(r, "Unable to save public key to %s", identity_file); if (!quiet) { fp = sshkey_fingerprint(public, fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_DEFAULT); ra = sshkey_fingerprint(public, fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_RANDOMART); if (fp == NULL || ra == NULL) fatal("sshkey_fingerprint failed"); printf("Your public key has been saved in %s\n", identity_file); printf("The key fingerprint is:\n"); printf("%s %s\n", fp, comment); printf("The key's randomart image is:\n"); printf("%s\n", ra); free(ra); free(fp); } if (sk_attestation_path != NULL) save_attestation(attest, sk_attestation_path); sshbuf_free(attest); sshkey_free(public); exit(0); } diff --git a/crypto/openssh/ssh-keyscan.1 b/crypto/openssh/ssh-keyscan.1 index ca4feea2a9e0..aa6d34f63dc3 100644 --- a/crypto/openssh/ssh-keyscan.1 +++ b/crypto/openssh/ssh-keyscan.1 @@ -1,178 +1,193 @@ -.\" $OpenBSD: ssh-keyscan.1,v 1.47 2022/10/28 02:29:34 djm Exp $ +.\" $OpenBSD: ssh-keyscan.1,v 1.49 2023/02/10 06:41:53 jmc Exp $ .\" .\" Copyright 1995, 1996 by David Mazieres . .\" .\" Modification and redistribution in source and binary forms is .\" permitted provided that due credit is given to the author and the .\" OpenBSD project by leaving this copyright notice intact. .\" -.Dd $Mdocdate: October 28 2022 $ +.Dd $Mdocdate: February 10 2023 $ .Dt SSH-KEYSCAN 1 .Os .Sh NAME .Nm ssh-keyscan .Nd gather SSH public keys from servers .Sh SYNOPSIS .Nm ssh-keyscan .Op Fl 46cDHv .Op Fl f Ar file +.Op Fl O Ar option .Op Fl p Ar port .Op Fl T Ar timeout .Op Fl t Ar type .Op Ar host | addrlist namelist .Sh DESCRIPTION .Nm is a utility for gathering the public SSH host keys of a number of hosts. It was designed to aid in building and verifying .Pa ssh_known_hosts files, the format of which is documented in .Xr sshd 8 . .Nm provides a minimal interface suitable for use by shell and perl scripts. .Pp .Nm uses non-blocking socket I/O to contact as many hosts as possible in parallel, so it is very efficient. The keys from a domain of 1,000 hosts can be collected in tens of seconds, even when some of those hosts are down or do not run .Xr sshd 8 . For scanning, one does not need login access to the machines that are being scanned, nor does the scanning process involve any encryption. .Pp Hosts to be scanned may be specified by hostname, address or by CIDR network range (e.g. 192.168.16/28). If a network range is specified, then all addresses in that range will be scanned. .Pp The options are as follows: .Bl -tag -width Ds .It Fl 4 Force .Nm to use IPv4 addresses only. .It Fl 6 Force .Nm to use IPv6 addresses only. .It Fl c Request certificates from target hosts instead of plain keys. .It Fl D Print keys found as SSHFP DNS records. The default is to print keys in a format usable as a .Xr ssh 1 .Pa known_hosts file. .It Fl f Ar file Read hosts or .Dq addrlist namelist pairs from .Ar file , one per line. If .Sq - is supplied instead of a filename, .Nm will read from the standard input. Names read from a file must start with an address, hostname or CIDR network range to be scanned. Addresses and hostnames may optionally be followed by comma-separated name or address aliases that will be copied to the output. For example: .Bd -literal 192.168.11.0/24 10.20.1.1 happy.example.org 10.0.0.1,sad.example.org .Ed .It Fl H Hash all hostnames and addresses in the output. Hashed names may be used normally by .Xr ssh 1 and .Xr sshd 8 , but they do not reveal identifying information should the file's contents be disclosed. +.It Fl O Ar option +Specify a key/value option. +At present, only a single option is supported: +.Bl -tag -width Ds +.It Cm hashalg Ns = Ns Ar algorithm +Selects a hash algorithm to use when printing SSHFP records using the +.Fl D +flag. +Valid algorithms are +.Dq sha1 +and +.Dq sha256 . +The default is to print both. +.El .It Fl p Ar port Connect to .Ar port on the remote host. .It Fl T Ar timeout Set the timeout for connection attempts. If .Ar timeout seconds have elapsed since a connection was initiated to a host or since the last time anything was read from that host, the connection is closed and the host in question considered unavailable. The default is 5 seconds. .It Fl t Ar type Specify the type of the key to fetch from the scanned hosts. The possible values are .Dq dsa , .Dq ecdsa , .Dq ed25519 , .Dq ecdsa-sk , .Dq ed25519-sk , or .Dq rsa . Multiple values may be specified by separating them with commas. The default is to fetch .Dq rsa , .Dq ecdsa , .Dq ed25519 , .Dq ecdsa-sk , and .Dq ed25519-sk keys. .It Fl v Verbose mode: print debugging messages about progress. .El .Pp If an ssh_known_hosts file is constructed using .Nm without verifying the keys, users will be vulnerable to .Em man in the middle attacks. On the other hand, if the security model allows such a risk, .Nm can help in the detection of tampered keyfiles or man in the middle attacks which have begun after the ssh_known_hosts file was created. .Sh FILES .Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_known_hosts .Sh EXAMPLES Print the RSA host key for machine .Ar hostname : .Pp .Dl $ ssh-keyscan -t rsa hostname .Pp Search a network range, printing all supported key types: .Pp .Dl $ ssh-keyscan 192.168.0.64/25 .Pp Find all hosts from the file .Pa ssh_hosts which have new or different keys from those in the sorted file .Pa ssh_known_hosts : .Bd -literal -offset indent $ ssh-keyscan -t rsa,dsa,ecdsa,ed25519 -f ssh_hosts | \e sort -u - ssh_known_hosts | diff ssh_known_hosts - .Ed .Sh SEE ALSO .Xr ssh 1 , .Xr sshd 8 .Rs .%D 2006 .%R RFC 4255 .%T Using DNS to Securely Publish Secure Shell (SSH) Key Fingerprints .Re .Sh AUTHORS .An -nosplit .An David Mazieres Aq Mt dm@lcs.mit.edu wrote the initial version, and .An Wayne Davison Aq Mt wayned@users.sourceforge.net added support for protocol version 2. diff --git a/crypto/openssh/ssh-keyscan.c b/crypto/openssh/ssh-keyscan.c index 1318c2fa6fb7..3f3092e63d29 100644 --- a/crypto/openssh/ssh-keyscan.c +++ b/crypto/openssh/ssh-keyscan.c @@ -1,872 +1,882 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: ssh-keyscan.c,v 1.149 2022/12/26 19:16:03 jmc Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: ssh-keyscan.c,v 1.151 2023/02/10 06:41:53 jmc Exp $ */ /* * Copyright 1995, 1996 by David Mazieres . * * Modification and redistribution in source and binary forms is * permitted provided that due credit is given to the author and the * OpenBSD project by leaving this copyright notice intact. */ #include "includes.h" #include #include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h" #include #ifdef HAVE_SYS_TIME_H # include #endif #include #include #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL #include #endif #include #include #ifdef HAVE_POLL_H #include #endif #include #include #include #include #include #include #include "xmalloc.h" #include "ssh.h" #include "sshbuf.h" #include "sshkey.h" #include "cipher.h" +#include "digest.h" #include "kex.h" #include "compat.h" #include "myproposal.h" #include "packet.h" #include "dispatch.h" #include "log.h" #include "atomicio.h" #include "misc.h" #include "hostfile.h" #include "ssherr.h" #include "ssh_api.h" #include "dns.h" #include "addr.h" /* Flag indicating whether IPv4 or IPv6. This can be set on the command line. Default value is AF_UNSPEC means both IPv4 and IPv6. */ int IPv4or6 = AF_UNSPEC; int ssh_port = SSH_DEFAULT_PORT; #define KT_DSA (1) #define KT_RSA (1<<1) #define KT_ECDSA (1<<2) #define KT_ED25519 (1<<3) #define KT_XMSS (1<<4) #define KT_ECDSA_SK (1<<5) #define KT_ED25519_SK (1<<6) #define KT_MIN KT_DSA #define KT_MAX KT_ED25519_SK int get_cert = 0; int get_keytypes = KT_RSA|KT_ECDSA|KT_ED25519|KT_ECDSA_SK|KT_ED25519_SK; int hash_hosts = 0; /* Hash hostname on output */ int print_sshfp = 0; /* Print SSHFP records instead of known_hosts */ int found_one = 0; /* Successfully found a key */ +int hashalg = -1; /* Hash for SSHFP records or -1 for all */ + #define MAXMAXFD 256 /* The number of seconds after which to give up on a TCP connection */ int timeout = 5; int maxfd; #define MAXCON (maxfd - 10) extern char *__progname; struct pollfd *read_wait; int ncon; /* * Keep a connection structure for each file descriptor. The state * associated with file descriptor n is held in fdcon[n]. */ typedef struct Connection { u_char c_status; /* State of connection on this file desc. */ #define CS_UNUSED 0 /* File descriptor unused */ #define CS_CON 1 /* Waiting to connect/read greeting */ #define CS_SIZE 2 /* Waiting to read initial packet size */ #define CS_KEYS 3 /* Waiting to read public key packet */ int c_fd; /* Quick lookup: c->c_fd == c - fdcon */ int c_plen; /* Packet length field for ssh packet */ int c_len; /* Total bytes which must be read. */ int c_off; /* Length of data read so far. */ int c_keytype; /* Only one of KT_* */ sig_atomic_t c_done; /* SSH2 done */ char *c_namebase; /* Address to free for c_name and c_namelist */ char *c_name; /* Hostname of connection for errors */ char *c_namelist; /* Pointer to other possible addresses */ char *c_output_name; /* Hostname of connection for output */ char *c_data; /* Data read from this fd */ struct ssh *c_ssh; /* SSH-connection */ struct timespec c_ts; /* Time at which connection gets aborted */ TAILQ_ENTRY(Connection) c_link; /* List of connections in timeout order. */ } con; TAILQ_HEAD(conlist, Connection) tq; /* Timeout Queue */ con *fdcon; static void keyprint(con *c, struct sshkey *key); static int fdlim_get(int hard) { #if defined(HAVE_GETRLIMIT) && defined(RLIMIT_NOFILE) struct rlimit rlfd; if (getrlimit(RLIMIT_NOFILE, &rlfd) == -1) return (-1); if ((hard ? rlfd.rlim_max : rlfd.rlim_cur) == RLIM_INFINITY) return SSH_SYSFDMAX; else return hard ? rlfd.rlim_max : rlfd.rlim_cur; #else return SSH_SYSFDMAX; #endif } static int fdlim_set(int lim) { #if defined(HAVE_SETRLIMIT) && defined(RLIMIT_NOFILE) struct rlimit rlfd; #endif if (lim <= 0) return (-1); #if defined(HAVE_SETRLIMIT) && defined(RLIMIT_NOFILE) if (getrlimit(RLIMIT_NOFILE, &rlfd) == -1) return (-1); rlfd.rlim_cur = lim; if (setrlimit(RLIMIT_NOFILE, &rlfd) == -1) return (-1); #elif defined (HAVE_SETDTABLESIZE) setdtablesize(lim); #endif return (0); } /* * This is an strsep function that returns a null field for adjacent * separators. This is the same as the 4.4BSD strsep, but different from the * one in the GNU libc. */ static char * xstrsep(char **str, const char *delim) { char *s, *e; if (!**str) return (NULL); s = *str; e = s + strcspn(s, delim); if (*e != '\0') *e++ = '\0'; *str = e; return (s); } /* * Get the next non-null token (like GNU strsep). Strsep() will return a * null token for two adjacent separators, so we may have to loop. */ static char * strnnsep(char **stringp, char *delim) { char *tok; do { tok = xstrsep(stringp, delim); } while (tok && *tok == '\0'); return (tok); } static int key_print_wrapper(struct sshkey *hostkey, struct ssh *ssh) { con *c; if ((c = ssh_get_app_data(ssh)) != NULL) keyprint(c, hostkey); /* always abort key exchange */ return -1; } static int ssh2_capable(int remote_major, int remote_minor) { switch (remote_major) { case 1: if (remote_minor == 99) return 1; break; case 2: return 1; default: break; } return 0; } static void keygrab_ssh2(con *c) { char *myproposal[PROPOSAL_MAX] = { KEX_CLIENT }; int r; switch (c->c_keytype) { case KT_DSA: myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS] = get_cert ? "ssh-dss-cert-v01@openssh.com" : "ssh-dss"; break; case KT_RSA: myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS] = get_cert ? "rsa-sha2-512-cert-v01@openssh.com," "rsa-sha2-256-cert-v01@openssh.com," "ssh-rsa-cert-v01@openssh.com" : "rsa-sha2-512," "rsa-sha2-256," "ssh-rsa"; break; case KT_ED25519: myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS] = get_cert ? "ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com" : "ssh-ed25519"; break; case KT_XMSS: myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS] = get_cert ? "ssh-xmss-cert-v01@openssh.com" : "ssh-xmss@openssh.com"; break; case KT_ECDSA: myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS] = get_cert ? "ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com," "ecdsa-sha2-nistp384-cert-v01@openssh.com," "ecdsa-sha2-nistp521-cert-v01@openssh.com" : "ecdsa-sha2-nistp256," "ecdsa-sha2-nistp384," "ecdsa-sha2-nistp521"; break; case KT_ECDSA_SK: myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS] = get_cert ? "sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com" : "sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256@openssh.com"; break; case KT_ED25519_SK: myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS] = get_cert ? "sk-ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com" : "sk-ssh-ed25519@openssh.com"; break; default: fatal("unknown key type %d", c->c_keytype); break; } if ((r = kex_setup(c->c_ssh, myproposal)) != 0) { free(c->c_ssh); fprintf(stderr, "kex_setup: %s\n", ssh_err(r)); exit(1); } #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL c->c_ssh->kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP1_SHA1] = kex_gen_client; c->c_ssh->kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP14_SHA1] = kex_gen_client; c->c_ssh->kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP14_SHA256] = kex_gen_client; c->c_ssh->kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP16_SHA512] = kex_gen_client; c->c_ssh->kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP18_SHA512] = kex_gen_client; c->c_ssh->kex->kex[KEX_DH_GEX_SHA1] = kexgex_client; c->c_ssh->kex->kex[KEX_DH_GEX_SHA256] = kexgex_client; # ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC c->c_ssh->kex->kex[KEX_ECDH_SHA2] = kex_gen_client; # endif #endif c->c_ssh->kex->kex[KEX_C25519_SHA256] = kex_gen_client; c->c_ssh->kex->kex[KEX_KEM_SNTRUP761X25519_SHA512] = kex_gen_client; ssh_set_verify_host_key_callback(c->c_ssh, key_print_wrapper); /* * do the key-exchange until an error occurs or until * the key_print_wrapper() callback sets c_done. */ ssh_dispatch_run(c->c_ssh, DISPATCH_BLOCK, &c->c_done); } static void keyprint_one(const char *host, struct sshkey *key) { char *hostport = NULL, *hashed = NULL; const char *known_host; found_one = 1; if (print_sshfp) { - export_dns_rr(host, key, stdout, 0); + export_dns_rr(host, key, stdout, 0, hashalg); return; } hostport = put_host_port(host, ssh_port); lowercase(hostport); if (hash_hosts && (hashed = host_hash(hostport, NULL, 0)) == NULL) fatal("host_hash failed"); known_host = hash_hosts ? hashed : hostport; if (!get_cert) fprintf(stdout, "%s ", known_host); sshkey_write(key, stdout); fputs("\n", stdout); free(hashed); free(hostport); } static void keyprint(con *c, struct sshkey *key) { char *hosts = c->c_output_name ? c->c_output_name : c->c_name; char *host, *ohosts; if (key == NULL) return; if (get_cert || (!hash_hosts && ssh_port == SSH_DEFAULT_PORT)) { keyprint_one(hosts, key); return; } ohosts = hosts = xstrdup(hosts); while ((host = strsep(&hosts, ",")) != NULL) keyprint_one(host, key); free(ohosts); } static int tcpconnect(char *host) { struct addrinfo hints, *ai, *aitop; char strport[NI_MAXSERV]; int gaierr, s = -1; snprintf(strport, sizeof strport, "%d", ssh_port); memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints)); hints.ai_family = IPv4or6; hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM; if ((gaierr = getaddrinfo(host, strport, &hints, &aitop)) != 0) { error("getaddrinfo %s: %s", host, ssh_gai_strerror(gaierr)); return -1; } for (ai = aitop; ai; ai = ai->ai_next) { s = socket(ai->ai_family, ai->ai_socktype, ai->ai_protocol); if (s == -1) { error("socket: %s", strerror(errno)); continue; } if (set_nonblock(s) == -1) fatal_f("set_nonblock(%d)", s); if (connect(s, ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen) == -1 && errno != EINPROGRESS) error("connect (`%s'): %s", host, strerror(errno)); else break; close(s); s = -1; } freeaddrinfo(aitop); return s; } static int conalloc(const char *iname, const char *oname, int keytype) { char *namebase, *name, *namelist; int s; namebase = namelist = xstrdup(iname); do { name = xstrsep(&namelist, ","); if (!name) { free(namebase); return (-1); } } while ((s = tcpconnect(name)) < 0); if (s >= maxfd) fatal("conalloc: fdno %d too high", s); if (fdcon[s].c_status) fatal("conalloc: attempt to reuse fdno %d", s); debug3_f("oname %s kt %d", oname, keytype); fdcon[s].c_fd = s; fdcon[s].c_status = CS_CON; fdcon[s].c_namebase = namebase; fdcon[s].c_name = name; fdcon[s].c_namelist = namelist; fdcon[s].c_output_name = xstrdup(oname); fdcon[s].c_data = (char *) &fdcon[s].c_plen; fdcon[s].c_len = 4; fdcon[s].c_off = 0; fdcon[s].c_keytype = keytype; monotime_ts(&fdcon[s].c_ts); fdcon[s].c_ts.tv_sec += timeout; TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(&tq, &fdcon[s], c_link); read_wait[s].fd = s; read_wait[s].events = POLLIN; ncon++; return (s); } static void confree(int s) { if (s >= maxfd || fdcon[s].c_status == CS_UNUSED) fatal("confree: attempt to free bad fdno %d", s); free(fdcon[s].c_namebase); free(fdcon[s].c_output_name); if (fdcon[s].c_status == CS_KEYS) free(fdcon[s].c_data); fdcon[s].c_status = CS_UNUSED; fdcon[s].c_keytype = 0; if (fdcon[s].c_ssh) { ssh_packet_close(fdcon[s].c_ssh); free(fdcon[s].c_ssh); fdcon[s].c_ssh = NULL; } else close(s); TAILQ_REMOVE(&tq, &fdcon[s], c_link); read_wait[s].fd = -1; read_wait[s].events = 0; ncon--; } static void contouch(int s) { TAILQ_REMOVE(&tq, &fdcon[s], c_link); monotime_ts(&fdcon[s].c_ts); fdcon[s].c_ts.tv_sec += timeout; TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(&tq, &fdcon[s], c_link); } static int conrecycle(int s) { con *c = &fdcon[s]; int ret; ret = conalloc(c->c_namelist, c->c_output_name, c->c_keytype); confree(s); return (ret); } static void congreet(int s) { int n = 0, remote_major = 0, remote_minor = 0; char buf[256], *cp; char remote_version[sizeof buf]; size_t bufsiz; con *c = &fdcon[s]; /* send client banner */ n = snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "SSH-%d.%d-OpenSSH-keyscan\r\n", PROTOCOL_MAJOR_2, PROTOCOL_MINOR_2); if (n < 0 || (size_t)n >= sizeof(buf)) { error("snprintf: buffer too small"); confree(s); return; } if (atomicio(vwrite, s, buf, n) != (size_t)n) { error("write (%s): %s", c->c_name, strerror(errno)); confree(s); return; } /* * Read the server banner as per RFC4253 section 4.2. The "SSH-" * protocol identification string may be preceeded by an arbitrarily * large banner which we must read and ignore. Loop while reading * newline-terminated lines until we have one starting with "SSH-". * The ID string cannot be longer than 255 characters although the * preceeding banner lines may (in which case they'll be discarded * in multiple iterations of the outer loop). */ for (;;) { memset(buf, '\0', sizeof(buf)); bufsiz = sizeof(buf); cp = buf; while (bufsiz-- && (n = atomicio(read, s, cp, 1)) == 1 && *cp != '\n') { if (*cp == '\r') *cp = '\n'; cp++; } if (n != 1 || strncmp(buf, "SSH-", 4) == 0) break; } if (n == 0) { switch (errno) { case EPIPE: error("%s: Connection closed by remote host", c->c_name); break; case ECONNREFUSED: break; default: error("read (%s): %s", c->c_name, strerror(errno)); break; } conrecycle(s); return; } if (cp >= buf + sizeof(buf)) { error("%s: greeting exceeds allowable length", c->c_name); confree(s); return; } if (*cp != '\n' && *cp != '\r') { error("%s: bad greeting", c->c_name); confree(s); return; } *cp = '\0'; if ((c->c_ssh = ssh_packet_set_connection(NULL, s, s)) == NULL) fatal("ssh_packet_set_connection failed"); ssh_packet_set_timeout(c->c_ssh, timeout, 1); ssh_set_app_data(c->c_ssh, c); /* back link */ c->c_ssh->compat = 0; if (sscanf(buf, "SSH-%d.%d-%[^\n]\n", &remote_major, &remote_minor, remote_version) == 3) compat_banner(c->c_ssh, remote_version); if (!ssh2_capable(remote_major, remote_minor)) { debug("%s doesn't support ssh2", c->c_name); confree(s); return; } fprintf(stderr, "%c %s:%d %s\n", print_sshfp ? ';' : '#', c->c_name, ssh_port, chop(buf)); keygrab_ssh2(c); confree(s); } static void conread(int s) { con *c = &fdcon[s]; size_t n; if (c->c_status == CS_CON) { congreet(s); return; } n = atomicio(read, s, c->c_data + c->c_off, c->c_len - c->c_off); if (n == 0) { error("read (%s): %s", c->c_name, strerror(errno)); confree(s); return; } c->c_off += n; if (c->c_off == c->c_len) switch (c->c_status) { case CS_SIZE: c->c_plen = htonl(c->c_plen); c->c_len = c->c_plen + 8 - (c->c_plen & 7); c->c_off = 0; c->c_data = xmalloc(c->c_len); c->c_status = CS_KEYS; break; default: fatal("conread: invalid status %d", c->c_status); break; } contouch(s); } static void conloop(void) { struct timespec seltime, now; con *c; int i; monotime_ts(&now); c = TAILQ_FIRST(&tq); if (c && timespeccmp(&c->c_ts, &now, >)) timespecsub(&c->c_ts, &now, &seltime); else timespecclear(&seltime); while (ppoll(read_wait, maxfd, &seltime, NULL) == -1) { if (errno == EAGAIN || errno == EINTR || errno == EWOULDBLOCK) continue; error("poll error"); } for (i = 0; i < maxfd; i++) { if (read_wait[i].revents & (POLLHUP|POLLERR|POLLNVAL)) confree(i); else if (read_wait[i].revents & (POLLIN|POLLHUP)) conread(i); } c = TAILQ_FIRST(&tq); while (c && timespeccmp(&c->c_ts, &now, <)) { int s = c->c_fd; c = TAILQ_NEXT(c, c_link); conrecycle(s); } } static void do_one_host(char *host) { char *name = strnnsep(&host, " \t\n"); int j; if (name == NULL) return; for (j = KT_MIN; j <= KT_MAX; j *= 2) { if (get_keytypes & j) { while (ncon >= MAXCON) conloop(); conalloc(name, *host ? host : name, j); } } } static void do_host(char *host) { char daddr[128]; struct xaddr addr, end_addr; u_int masklen; if (host == NULL) return; if (addr_pton_cidr(host, &addr, &masklen) != 0) { /* Assume argument is a hostname */ do_one_host(host); } else { /* Argument is a CIDR range */ debug("CIDR range %s", host); end_addr = addr; if (addr_host_to_all1s(&end_addr, masklen) != 0) goto badaddr; /* * Note: we deliberately include the all-zero/ones addresses. */ for (;;) { if (addr_ntop(&addr, daddr, sizeof(daddr)) != 0) { badaddr: error("Invalid address %s", host); return; } debug("CIDR expand: address %s", daddr); do_one_host(daddr); if (addr_cmp(&addr, &end_addr) == 0) break; addr_increment(&addr); }; } } void sshfatal(const char *file, const char *func, int line, int showfunc, LogLevel level, const char *suffix, const char *fmt, ...) { va_list args; va_start(args, fmt); sshlogv(file, func, line, showfunc, level, suffix, fmt, args); va_end(args); cleanup_exit(255); } static void usage(void) { fprintf(stderr, - "usage: %s [-46cDHv] [-f file] [-p port] [-T timeout] [-t type]\n" - "\t\t [host | addrlist namelist]\n", - __progname); + "usage: ssh-keyscan [-46cDHv] [-f file] [-O option] [-p port] [-T timeout]\n" + " [-t type] [host | addrlist namelist]\n"); exit(1); } int main(int argc, char **argv) { int debug_flag = 0, log_level = SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO; int opt, fopt_count = 0, j; char *tname, *cp, *line = NULL; size_t linesize = 0; FILE *fp; extern int optind; extern char *optarg; __progname = ssh_get_progname(argv[0]); seed_rng(); TAILQ_INIT(&tq); /* Ensure that fds 0, 1 and 2 are open or directed to /dev/null */ sanitise_stdfd(); if (argc <= 1) usage(); - while ((opt = getopt(argc, argv, "cDHv46p:T:t:f:")) != -1) { + while ((opt = getopt(argc, argv, "cDHv46O:p:T:t:f:")) != -1) { switch (opt) { case 'H': hash_hosts = 1; break; case 'c': get_cert = 1; break; case 'D': print_sshfp = 1; break; case 'p': ssh_port = a2port(optarg); if (ssh_port <= 0) { fprintf(stderr, "Bad port '%s'\n", optarg); exit(1); } break; case 'T': timeout = convtime(optarg); if (timeout == -1 || timeout == 0) { fprintf(stderr, "Bad timeout '%s'\n", optarg); usage(); } break; case 'v': if (!debug_flag) { debug_flag = 1; log_level = SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG1; } else if (log_level < SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG3) log_level++; else fatal("Too high debugging level."); break; case 'f': if (strcmp(optarg, "-") == 0) optarg = NULL; argv[fopt_count++] = optarg; break; + case 'O': + /* Maybe other misc options in the future too */ + if (strncmp(optarg, "hashalg=", 8) != 0) + fatal("Unsupported -O option"); + if ((hashalg = ssh_digest_alg_by_name( + optarg + 8)) == -1) + fatal("Unsupported hash algorithm"); + break; case 't': get_keytypes = 0; tname = strtok(optarg, ","); while (tname) { int type = sshkey_type_from_name(tname); switch (type) { case KEY_DSA: get_keytypes |= KT_DSA; break; case KEY_ECDSA: get_keytypes |= KT_ECDSA; break; case KEY_RSA: get_keytypes |= KT_RSA; break; case KEY_ED25519: get_keytypes |= KT_ED25519; break; case KEY_XMSS: get_keytypes |= KT_XMSS; break; case KEY_ED25519_SK: get_keytypes |= KT_ED25519_SK; break; case KEY_ECDSA_SK: get_keytypes |= KT_ECDSA_SK; break; case KEY_UNSPEC: default: fatal("Unknown key type \"%s\"", tname); } tname = strtok(NULL, ","); } break; case '4': IPv4or6 = AF_INET; break; case '6': IPv4or6 = AF_INET6; break; default: usage(); } } if (optind == argc && !fopt_count) usage(); log_init("ssh-keyscan", log_level, SYSLOG_FACILITY_USER, 1); maxfd = fdlim_get(1); if (maxfd < 0) fatal("%s: fdlim_get: bad value", __progname); if (maxfd > MAXMAXFD) maxfd = MAXMAXFD; if (MAXCON <= 0) fatal("%s: not enough file descriptors", __progname); if (maxfd > fdlim_get(0)) fdlim_set(maxfd); fdcon = xcalloc(maxfd, sizeof(con)); read_wait = xcalloc(maxfd, sizeof(struct pollfd)); for (j = 0; j < maxfd; j++) read_wait[j].fd = -1; for (j = 0; j < fopt_count; j++) { if (argv[j] == NULL) fp = stdin; else if ((fp = fopen(argv[j], "r")) == NULL) fatal("%s: %s: %s", __progname, argv[j], strerror(errno)); while (getline(&line, &linesize, fp) != -1) { /* Chomp off trailing whitespace and comments */ if ((cp = strchr(line, '#')) == NULL) cp = line + strlen(line) - 1; while (cp >= line) { if (*cp == ' ' || *cp == '\t' || *cp == '\n' || *cp == '#') *cp-- = '\0'; else break; } /* Skip empty lines */ if (*line == '\0') continue; do_host(line); } if (ferror(fp)) fatal("%s: %s: %s", __progname, argv[j], strerror(errno)); fclose(fp); } free(line); while (optind < argc) do_host(argv[optind++]); while (ncon > 0) conloop(); return found_one ? 0 : 1; } diff --git a/crypto/openssh/ssh-pkcs11.c b/crypto/openssh/ssh-pkcs11.c index b2e2b32a5078..6be647ec443c 100644 --- a/crypto/openssh/ssh-pkcs11.c +++ b/crypto/openssh/ssh-pkcs11.c @@ -1,1887 +1,1887 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: ssh-pkcs11.c,v 1.55 2021/11/18 21:11:01 djm Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: ssh-pkcs11.c,v 1.56 2023/03/08 05:33:53 tb Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2010 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. * Copyright (c) 2014 Pedro Martelletto. All rights reserved. * * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. * * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. */ #include "includes.h" #ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11 #ifdef HAVE_SYS_TIME_H # include #endif #include #include #include #include #include #include #include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h" #include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h" #include #include #include #define CRYPTOKI_COMPAT #include "pkcs11.h" #include "log.h" #include "misc.h" #include "sshkey.h" #include "ssh-pkcs11.h" #include "digest.h" #include "xmalloc.h" struct pkcs11_slotinfo { CK_TOKEN_INFO token; CK_SESSION_HANDLE session; int logged_in; }; struct pkcs11_provider { char *name; void *handle; CK_FUNCTION_LIST *function_list; CK_INFO info; CK_ULONG nslots; CK_SLOT_ID *slotlist; struct pkcs11_slotinfo *slotinfo; int valid; int refcount; TAILQ_ENTRY(pkcs11_provider) next; }; TAILQ_HEAD(, pkcs11_provider) pkcs11_providers; struct pkcs11_key { struct pkcs11_provider *provider; CK_ULONG slotidx; char *keyid; int keyid_len; }; int pkcs11_interactive = 0; #if defined(OPENSSL_HAS_ECC) && defined(HAVE_EC_KEY_METHOD_NEW) static void ossl_error(const char *msg) { unsigned long e; error_f("%s", msg); while ((e = ERR_get_error()) != 0) error_f("libcrypto error: %s", ERR_error_string(e, NULL)); } #endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC && HAVE_EC_KEY_METHOD_NEW */ int pkcs11_init(int interactive) { pkcs11_interactive = interactive; TAILQ_INIT(&pkcs11_providers); return (0); } /* * finalize a provider shared library, it's no longer usable. * however, there might still be keys referencing this provider, * so the actual freeing of memory is handled by pkcs11_provider_unref(). * this is called when a provider gets unregistered. */ static void pkcs11_provider_finalize(struct pkcs11_provider *p) { CK_RV rv; CK_ULONG i; debug_f("provider \"%s\" refcount %d valid %d", p->name, p->refcount, p->valid); if (!p->valid) return; for (i = 0; i < p->nslots; i++) { if (p->slotinfo[i].session && (rv = p->function_list->C_CloseSession( p->slotinfo[i].session)) != CKR_OK) error("C_CloseSession failed: %lu", rv); } if ((rv = p->function_list->C_Finalize(NULL)) != CKR_OK) error("C_Finalize failed: %lu", rv); p->valid = 0; p->function_list = NULL; dlclose(p->handle); } /* * remove a reference to the provider. * called when a key gets destroyed or when the provider is unregistered. */ static void pkcs11_provider_unref(struct pkcs11_provider *p) { debug_f("provider \"%s\" refcount %d", p->name, p->refcount); if (--p->refcount <= 0) { if (p->valid) error_f("provider \"%s\" still valid", p->name); free(p->name); free(p->slotlist); free(p->slotinfo); free(p); } } /* unregister all providers, keys might still point to the providers */ void pkcs11_terminate(void) { struct pkcs11_provider *p; while ((p = TAILQ_FIRST(&pkcs11_providers)) != NULL) { TAILQ_REMOVE(&pkcs11_providers, p, next); pkcs11_provider_finalize(p); pkcs11_provider_unref(p); } } /* lookup provider by name */ static struct pkcs11_provider * pkcs11_provider_lookup(char *provider_id) { struct pkcs11_provider *p; TAILQ_FOREACH(p, &pkcs11_providers, next) { debug("check provider \"%s\"", p->name); if (!strcmp(provider_id, p->name)) return (p); } return (NULL); } /* unregister provider by name */ int pkcs11_del_provider(char *provider_id) { struct pkcs11_provider *p; if ((p = pkcs11_provider_lookup(provider_id)) != NULL) { TAILQ_REMOVE(&pkcs11_providers, p, next); pkcs11_provider_finalize(p); pkcs11_provider_unref(p); return (0); } return (-1); } static RSA_METHOD *rsa_method; static int rsa_idx = 0; #if defined(OPENSSL_HAS_ECC) && defined(HAVE_EC_KEY_METHOD_NEW) static EC_KEY_METHOD *ec_key_method; static int ec_key_idx = 0; #endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC && HAVE_EC_KEY_METHOD_NEW */ /* release a wrapped object */ static void pkcs11_k11_free(void *parent, void *ptr, CRYPTO_EX_DATA *ad, int idx, long argl, void *argp) { struct pkcs11_key *k11 = ptr; debug_f("parent %p ptr %p idx %d", parent, ptr, idx); if (k11 == NULL) return; if (k11->provider) pkcs11_provider_unref(k11->provider); free(k11->keyid); free(k11); } /* find a single 'obj' for given attributes */ static int pkcs11_find(struct pkcs11_provider *p, CK_ULONG slotidx, CK_ATTRIBUTE *attr, CK_ULONG nattr, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE *obj) { CK_FUNCTION_LIST *f; CK_SESSION_HANDLE session; CK_ULONG nfound = 0; CK_RV rv; int ret = -1; f = p->function_list; session = p->slotinfo[slotidx].session; if ((rv = f->C_FindObjectsInit(session, attr, nattr)) != CKR_OK) { error("C_FindObjectsInit failed (nattr %lu): %lu", nattr, rv); return (-1); } if ((rv = f->C_FindObjects(session, obj, 1, &nfound)) != CKR_OK || nfound != 1) { debug("C_FindObjects failed (nfound %lu nattr %lu): %lu", nfound, nattr, rv); } else ret = 0; if ((rv = f->C_FindObjectsFinal(session)) != CKR_OK) error("C_FindObjectsFinal failed: %lu", rv); return (ret); } static int pkcs11_login_slot(struct pkcs11_provider *provider, struct pkcs11_slotinfo *si, CK_USER_TYPE type) { char *pin = NULL, prompt[1024]; CK_RV rv; if (provider == NULL || si == NULL || !provider->valid) { error("no pkcs11 (valid) provider found"); return (-1); } if (!pkcs11_interactive) { error("need pin entry%s", (si->token.flags & CKF_PROTECTED_AUTHENTICATION_PATH) ? " on reader keypad" : ""); return (-1); } if (si->token.flags & CKF_PROTECTED_AUTHENTICATION_PATH) verbose("Deferring PIN entry to reader keypad."); else { snprintf(prompt, sizeof(prompt), "Enter PIN for '%s': ", si->token.label); if ((pin = read_passphrase(prompt, RP_ALLOW_EOF)) == NULL) { debug_f("no pin specified"); return (-1); /* bail out */ } } rv = provider->function_list->C_Login(si->session, type, (u_char *)pin, (pin != NULL) ? strlen(pin) : 0); if (pin != NULL) freezero(pin, strlen(pin)); switch (rv) { case CKR_OK: case CKR_USER_ALREADY_LOGGED_IN: /* success */ break; case CKR_PIN_LEN_RANGE: error("PKCS#11 login failed: PIN length out of range"); return -1; case CKR_PIN_INCORRECT: error("PKCS#11 login failed: PIN incorrect"); return -1; case CKR_PIN_LOCKED: error("PKCS#11 login failed: PIN locked"); return -1; default: error("PKCS#11 login failed: error %lu", rv); return -1; } si->logged_in = 1; return (0); } static int pkcs11_login(struct pkcs11_key *k11, CK_USER_TYPE type) { if (k11 == NULL || k11->provider == NULL || !k11->provider->valid) { error("no pkcs11 (valid) provider found"); return (-1); } return pkcs11_login_slot(k11->provider, &k11->provider->slotinfo[k11->slotidx], type); } static int pkcs11_check_obj_bool_attrib(struct pkcs11_key *k11, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE obj, CK_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE type, int *val) { struct pkcs11_slotinfo *si; CK_FUNCTION_LIST *f; CK_BBOOL flag = 0; CK_ATTRIBUTE attr; CK_RV rv; *val = 0; if (!k11->provider || !k11->provider->valid) { error("no pkcs11 (valid) provider found"); return (-1); } f = k11->provider->function_list; si = &k11->provider->slotinfo[k11->slotidx]; attr.type = type; attr.pValue = &flag; attr.ulValueLen = sizeof(flag); rv = f->C_GetAttributeValue(si->session, obj, &attr, 1); if (rv != CKR_OK) { error("C_GetAttributeValue failed: %lu", rv); return (-1); } *val = flag != 0; debug_f("provider \"%s\" slot %lu object %lu: attrib %lu = %d", k11->provider->name, k11->slotidx, obj, type, *val); return (0); } static int pkcs11_get_key(struct pkcs11_key *k11, CK_MECHANISM_TYPE mech_type) { struct pkcs11_slotinfo *si; CK_FUNCTION_LIST *f; CK_OBJECT_HANDLE obj; CK_RV rv; CK_OBJECT_CLASS private_key_class; CK_BBOOL true_val; CK_MECHANISM mech; CK_ATTRIBUTE key_filter[3]; int always_auth = 0; int did_login = 0; if (!k11->provider || !k11->provider->valid) { error("no pkcs11 (valid) provider found"); return (-1); } f = k11->provider->function_list; si = &k11->provider->slotinfo[k11->slotidx]; if ((si->token.flags & CKF_LOGIN_REQUIRED) && !si->logged_in) { if (pkcs11_login(k11, CKU_USER) < 0) { error("login failed"); return (-1); } did_login = 1; } memset(&key_filter, 0, sizeof(key_filter)); private_key_class = CKO_PRIVATE_KEY; key_filter[0].type = CKA_CLASS; key_filter[0].pValue = &private_key_class; key_filter[0].ulValueLen = sizeof(private_key_class); key_filter[1].type = CKA_ID; key_filter[1].pValue = k11->keyid; key_filter[1].ulValueLen = k11->keyid_len; true_val = CK_TRUE; key_filter[2].type = CKA_SIGN; key_filter[2].pValue = &true_val; key_filter[2].ulValueLen = sizeof(true_val); /* try to find object w/CKA_SIGN first, retry w/o */ if (pkcs11_find(k11->provider, k11->slotidx, key_filter, 3, &obj) < 0 && pkcs11_find(k11->provider, k11->slotidx, key_filter, 2, &obj) < 0) { error("cannot find private key"); return (-1); } memset(&mech, 0, sizeof(mech)); mech.mechanism = mech_type; mech.pParameter = NULL_PTR; mech.ulParameterLen = 0; if ((rv = f->C_SignInit(si->session, &mech, obj)) != CKR_OK) { error("C_SignInit failed: %lu", rv); return (-1); } pkcs11_check_obj_bool_attrib(k11, obj, CKA_ALWAYS_AUTHENTICATE, &always_auth); /* ignore errors here */ if (always_auth && !did_login) { debug_f("always-auth key"); if (pkcs11_login(k11, CKU_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC) < 0) { error("login failed for always-auth key"); return (-1); } } return (0); } /* openssl callback doing the actual signing operation */ static int pkcs11_rsa_private_encrypt(int flen, const u_char *from, u_char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding) { struct pkcs11_key *k11; struct pkcs11_slotinfo *si; CK_FUNCTION_LIST *f; CK_ULONG tlen = 0; CK_RV rv; int rval = -1; if ((k11 = RSA_get_ex_data(rsa, rsa_idx)) == NULL) { error("RSA_get_ex_data failed"); return (-1); } if (pkcs11_get_key(k11, CKM_RSA_PKCS) == -1) { error("pkcs11_get_key failed"); return (-1); } f = k11->provider->function_list; si = &k11->provider->slotinfo[k11->slotidx]; tlen = RSA_size(rsa); /* XXX handle CKR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL */ rv = f->C_Sign(si->session, (CK_BYTE *)from, flen, to, &tlen); if (rv == CKR_OK) rval = tlen; else error("C_Sign failed: %lu", rv); return (rval); } static int pkcs11_rsa_private_decrypt(int flen, const u_char *from, u_char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding) { return (-1); } static int pkcs11_rsa_start_wrapper(void) { if (rsa_method != NULL) return (0); rsa_method = RSA_meth_dup(RSA_get_default_method()); if (rsa_method == NULL) return (-1); rsa_idx = RSA_get_ex_new_index(0, "ssh-pkcs11-rsa", NULL, NULL, pkcs11_k11_free); if (rsa_idx == -1) return (-1); if (!RSA_meth_set1_name(rsa_method, "pkcs11") || !RSA_meth_set_priv_enc(rsa_method, pkcs11_rsa_private_encrypt) || !RSA_meth_set_priv_dec(rsa_method, pkcs11_rsa_private_decrypt)) { error_f("setup pkcs11 method failed"); return (-1); } return (0); } /* redirect private key operations for rsa key to pkcs11 token */ static int pkcs11_rsa_wrap(struct pkcs11_provider *provider, CK_ULONG slotidx, CK_ATTRIBUTE *keyid_attrib, RSA *rsa) { struct pkcs11_key *k11; if (pkcs11_rsa_start_wrapper() == -1) return (-1); k11 = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*k11)); k11->provider = provider; provider->refcount++; /* provider referenced by RSA key */ k11->slotidx = slotidx; /* identify key object on smartcard */ k11->keyid_len = keyid_attrib->ulValueLen; if (k11->keyid_len > 0) { k11->keyid = xmalloc(k11->keyid_len); memcpy(k11->keyid, keyid_attrib->pValue, k11->keyid_len); } RSA_set_method(rsa, rsa_method); RSA_set_ex_data(rsa, rsa_idx, k11); return (0); } #if defined(OPENSSL_HAS_ECC) && defined(HAVE_EC_KEY_METHOD_NEW) /* openssl callback doing the actual signing operation */ static ECDSA_SIG * ecdsa_do_sign(const unsigned char *dgst, int dgst_len, const BIGNUM *inv, const BIGNUM *rp, EC_KEY *ec) { struct pkcs11_key *k11; struct pkcs11_slotinfo *si; CK_FUNCTION_LIST *f; CK_ULONG siglen = 0, bnlen; CK_RV rv; ECDSA_SIG *ret = NULL; u_char *sig; BIGNUM *r = NULL, *s = NULL; if ((k11 = EC_KEY_get_ex_data(ec, ec_key_idx)) == NULL) { - ossl_error("EC_KEY_get_key_method_data failed for ec"); + ossl_error("EC_KEY_get_ex_data failed for ec"); return (NULL); } if (pkcs11_get_key(k11, CKM_ECDSA) == -1) { error("pkcs11_get_key failed"); return (NULL); } f = k11->provider->function_list; si = &k11->provider->slotinfo[k11->slotidx]; siglen = ECDSA_size(ec); sig = xmalloc(siglen); /* XXX handle CKR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL */ rv = f->C_Sign(si->session, (CK_BYTE *)dgst, dgst_len, sig, &siglen); if (rv != CKR_OK) { error("C_Sign failed: %lu", rv); goto done; } if (siglen < 64 || siglen > 132 || siglen % 2) { - ossl_error("d2i_ECDSA_SIG failed"); + error_f("bad signature length: %lu", (u_long)siglen); goto done; } bnlen = siglen/2; if ((ret = ECDSA_SIG_new()) == NULL) { error("ECDSA_SIG_new failed"); goto done; } if ((r = BN_bin2bn(sig, bnlen, NULL)) == NULL || (s = BN_bin2bn(sig+bnlen, bnlen, NULL)) == NULL) { - ossl_error("d2i_ECDSA_SIG failed"); + ossl_error("BN_bin2bn failed"); ECDSA_SIG_free(ret); ret = NULL; goto done; } if (!ECDSA_SIG_set0(ret, r, s)) { error_f("ECDSA_SIG_set0 failed"); ECDSA_SIG_free(ret); ret = NULL; goto done; } r = s = NULL; /* now owned by ret */ /* success */ done: BN_free(r); BN_free(s); free(sig); return (ret); } static int pkcs11_ecdsa_start_wrapper(void) { int (*orig_sign)(int, const unsigned char *, int, unsigned char *, unsigned int *, const BIGNUM *, const BIGNUM *, EC_KEY *) = NULL; if (ec_key_method != NULL) return (0); ec_key_idx = EC_KEY_get_ex_new_index(0, "ssh-pkcs11-ecdsa", NULL, NULL, pkcs11_k11_free); if (ec_key_idx == -1) return (-1); ec_key_method = EC_KEY_METHOD_new(EC_KEY_OpenSSL()); if (ec_key_method == NULL) return (-1); EC_KEY_METHOD_get_sign(ec_key_method, &orig_sign, NULL, NULL); EC_KEY_METHOD_set_sign(ec_key_method, orig_sign, NULL, ecdsa_do_sign); return (0); } static int pkcs11_ecdsa_wrap(struct pkcs11_provider *provider, CK_ULONG slotidx, CK_ATTRIBUTE *keyid_attrib, EC_KEY *ec) { struct pkcs11_key *k11; if (pkcs11_ecdsa_start_wrapper() == -1) return (-1); k11 = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*k11)); k11->provider = provider; provider->refcount++; /* provider referenced by ECDSA key */ k11->slotidx = slotidx; /* identify key object on smartcard */ k11->keyid_len = keyid_attrib->ulValueLen; if (k11->keyid_len > 0) { k11->keyid = xmalloc(k11->keyid_len); memcpy(k11->keyid, keyid_attrib->pValue, k11->keyid_len); } EC_KEY_set_method(ec, ec_key_method); EC_KEY_set_ex_data(ec, ec_key_idx, k11); return (0); } #endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC && HAVE_EC_KEY_METHOD_NEW */ /* remove trailing spaces */ static void rmspace(u_char *buf, size_t len) { size_t i; if (!len) return; for (i = len - 1; i > 0; i--) if (i == len - 1 || buf[i] == ' ') buf[i] = '\0'; else break; } /* * open a pkcs11 session and login if required. * if pin == NULL we delay login until key use */ static int pkcs11_open_session(struct pkcs11_provider *p, CK_ULONG slotidx, char *pin, CK_ULONG user) { struct pkcs11_slotinfo *si; CK_FUNCTION_LIST *f; CK_RV rv; CK_SESSION_HANDLE session; int login_required, ret; f = p->function_list; si = &p->slotinfo[slotidx]; login_required = si->token.flags & CKF_LOGIN_REQUIRED; /* fail early before opening session */ if (login_required && !pkcs11_interactive && (pin == NULL || strlen(pin) == 0)) { error("pin required"); return (-SSH_PKCS11_ERR_PIN_REQUIRED); } if ((rv = f->C_OpenSession(p->slotlist[slotidx], CKF_RW_SESSION| CKF_SERIAL_SESSION, NULL, NULL, &session)) != CKR_OK) { error("C_OpenSession failed: %lu", rv); return (-1); } if (login_required && pin != NULL && strlen(pin) != 0) { rv = f->C_Login(session, user, (u_char *)pin, strlen(pin)); if (rv != CKR_OK && rv != CKR_USER_ALREADY_LOGGED_IN) { error("C_Login failed: %lu", rv); ret = (rv == CKR_PIN_LOCKED) ? -SSH_PKCS11_ERR_PIN_LOCKED : -SSH_PKCS11_ERR_LOGIN_FAIL; if ((rv = f->C_CloseSession(session)) != CKR_OK) error("C_CloseSession failed: %lu", rv); return (ret); } si->logged_in = 1; } si->session = session; return (0); } static int pkcs11_key_included(struct sshkey ***keysp, int *nkeys, struct sshkey *key) { int i; for (i = 0; i < *nkeys; i++) if (sshkey_equal(key, (*keysp)[i])) return (1); return (0); } #if defined(OPENSSL_HAS_ECC) && defined(HAVE_EC_KEY_METHOD_NEW) static struct sshkey * pkcs11_fetch_ecdsa_pubkey(struct pkcs11_provider *p, CK_ULONG slotidx, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE *obj) { CK_ATTRIBUTE key_attr[3]; CK_SESSION_HANDLE session; CK_FUNCTION_LIST *f = NULL; CK_RV rv; ASN1_OCTET_STRING *octet = NULL; EC_KEY *ec = NULL; EC_GROUP *group = NULL; struct sshkey *key = NULL; const unsigned char *attrp = NULL; int i; int nid; memset(&key_attr, 0, sizeof(key_attr)); key_attr[0].type = CKA_ID; key_attr[1].type = CKA_EC_POINT; key_attr[2].type = CKA_EC_PARAMS; session = p->slotinfo[slotidx].session; f = p->function_list; /* figure out size of the attributes */ rv = f->C_GetAttributeValue(session, *obj, key_attr, 3); if (rv != CKR_OK) { error("C_GetAttributeValue failed: %lu", rv); return (NULL); } /* * Allow CKA_ID (always first attribute) to be empty, but * ensure that none of the others are zero length. * XXX assumes CKA_ID is always first. */ if (key_attr[1].ulValueLen == 0 || key_attr[2].ulValueLen == 0) { error("invalid attribute length"); return (NULL); } /* allocate buffers for attributes */ for (i = 0; i < 3; i++) if (key_attr[i].ulValueLen > 0) key_attr[i].pValue = xcalloc(1, key_attr[i].ulValueLen); /* retrieve ID, public point and curve parameters of EC key */ rv = f->C_GetAttributeValue(session, *obj, key_attr, 3); if (rv != CKR_OK) { error("C_GetAttributeValue failed: %lu", rv); goto fail; } ec = EC_KEY_new(); if (ec == NULL) { error("EC_KEY_new failed"); goto fail; } attrp = key_attr[2].pValue; group = d2i_ECPKParameters(NULL, &attrp, key_attr[2].ulValueLen); if (group == NULL) { ossl_error("d2i_ECPKParameters failed"); goto fail; } if (EC_KEY_set_group(ec, group) == 0) { ossl_error("EC_KEY_set_group failed"); goto fail; } if (key_attr[1].ulValueLen <= 2) { error("CKA_EC_POINT too small"); goto fail; } attrp = key_attr[1].pValue; octet = d2i_ASN1_OCTET_STRING(NULL, &attrp, key_attr[1].ulValueLen); if (octet == NULL) { ossl_error("d2i_ASN1_OCTET_STRING failed"); goto fail; } attrp = octet->data; if (o2i_ECPublicKey(&ec, &attrp, octet->length) == NULL) { ossl_error("o2i_ECPublicKey failed"); goto fail; } nid = sshkey_ecdsa_key_to_nid(ec); if (nid < 0) { error("couldn't get curve nid"); goto fail; } if (pkcs11_ecdsa_wrap(p, slotidx, &key_attr[0], ec)) goto fail; key = sshkey_new(KEY_UNSPEC); if (key == NULL) { error("sshkey_new failed"); goto fail; } key->ecdsa = ec; key->ecdsa_nid = nid; key->type = KEY_ECDSA; key->flags |= SSHKEY_FLAG_EXT; ec = NULL; /* now owned by key */ fail: for (i = 0; i < 3; i++) free(key_attr[i].pValue); if (ec) EC_KEY_free(ec); if (group) EC_GROUP_free(group); if (octet) ASN1_OCTET_STRING_free(octet); return (key); } #endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC && HAVE_EC_KEY_METHOD_NEW */ static struct sshkey * pkcs11_fetch_rsa_pubkey(struct pkcs11_provider *p, CK_ULONG slotidx, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE *obj) { CK_ATTRIBUTE key_attr[3]; CK_SESSION_HANDLE session; CK_FUNCTION_LIST *f = NULL; CK_RV rv; RSA *rsa = NULL; BIGNUM *rsa_n, *rsa_e; struct sshkey *key = NULL; int i; memset(&key_attr, 0, sizeof(key_attr)); key_attr[0].type = CKA_ID; key_attr[1].type = CKA_MODULUS; key_attr[2].type = CKA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT; session = p->slotinfo[slotidx].session; f = p->function_list; /* figure out size of the attributes */ rv = f->C_GetAttributeValue(session, *obj, key_attr, 3); if (rv != CKR_OK) { error("C_GetAttributeValue failed: %lu", rv); return (NULL); } /* * Allow CKA_ID (always first attribute) to be empty, but * ensure that none of the others are zero length. * XXX assumes CKA_ID is always first. */ if (key_attr[1].ulValueLen == 0 || key_attr[2].ulValueLen == 0) { error("invalid attribute length"); return (NULL); } /* allocate buffers for attributes */ for (i = 0; i < 3; i++) if (key_attr[i].ulValueLen > 0) key_attr[i].pValue = xcalloc(1, key_attr[i].ulValueLen); /* retrieve ID, modulus and public exponent of RSA key */ rv = f->C_GetAttributeValue(session, *obj, key_attr, 3); if (rv != CKR_OK) { error("C_GetAttributeValue failed: %lu", rv); goto fail; } rsa = RSA_new(); if (rsa == NULL) { error("RSA_new failed"); goto fail; } rsa_n = BN_bin2bn(key_attr[1].pValue, key_attr[1].ulValueLen, NULL); rsa_e = BN_bin2bn(key_attr[2].pValue, key_attr[2].ulValueLen, NULL); if (rsa_n == NULL || rsa_e == NULL) { error("BN_bin2bn failed"); goto fail; } if (!RSA_set0_key(rsa, rsa_n, rsa_e, NULL)) fatal_f("set key"); rsa_n = rsa_e = NULL; /* transferred */ if (pkcs11_rsa_wrap(p, slotidx, &key_attr[0], rsa)) goto fail; key = sshkey_new(KEY_UNSPEC); if (key == NULL) { error("sshkey_new failed"); goto fail; } key->rsa = rsa; key->type = KEY_RSA; key->flags |= SSHKEY_FLAG_EXT; rsa = NULL; /* now owned by key */ fail: for (i = 0; i < 3; i++) free(key_attr[i].pValue); RSA_free(rsa); return (key); } static int pkcs11_fetch_x509_pubkey(struct pkcs11_provider *p, CK_ULONG slotidx, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE *obj, struct sshkey **keyp, char **labelp) { CK_ATTRIBUTE cert_attr[3]; CK_SESSION_HANDLE session; CK_FUNCTION_LIST *f = NULL; CK_RV rv; X509 *x509 = NULL; X509_NAME *x509_name = NULL; EVP_PKEY *evp; RSA *rsa = NULL; #ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC EC_KEY *ec = NULL; #endif struct sshkey *key = NULL; int i; #if defined(OPENSSL_HAS_ECC) && defined(HAVE_EC_KEY_METHOD_NEW) int nid; #endif const u_char *cp; char *subject = NULL; *keyp = NULL; *labelp = NULL; memset(&cert_attr, 0, sizeof(cert_attr)); cert_attr[0].type = CKA_ID; cert_attr[1].type = CKA_SUBJECT; cert_attr[2].type = CKA_VALUE; session = p->slotinfo[slotidx].session; f = p->function_list; /* figure out size of the attributes */ rv = f->C_GetAttributeValue(session, *obj, cert_attr, 3); if (rv != CKR_OK) { error("C_GetAttributeValue failed: %lu", rv); return -1; } /* * Allow CKA_ID (always first attribute) to be empty, but * ensure that none of the others are zero length. * XXX assumes CKA_ID is always first. */ if (cert_attr[1].ulValueLen == 0 || cert_attr[2].ulValueLen == 0) { error("invalid attribute length"); return -1; } /* allocate buffers for attributes */ for (i = 0; i < 3; i++) if (cert_attr[i].ulValueLen > 0) cert_attr[i].pValue = xcalloc(1, cert_attr[i].ulValueLen); /* retrieve ID, subject and value of certificate */ rv = f->C_GetAttributeValue(session, *obj, cert_attr, 3); if (rv != CKR_OK) { error("C_GetAttributeValue failed: %lu", rv); goto out; } /* Decode DER-encoded cert subject */ cp = cert_attr[1].pValue; if ((x509_name = d2i_X509_NAME(NULL, &cp, cert_attr[1].ulValueLen)) == NULL || (subject = X509_NAME_oneline(x509_name, NULL, 0)) == NULL) subject = xstrdup("invalid subject"); X509_NAME_free(x509_name); cp = cert_attr[2].pValue; if ((x509 = d2i_X509(NULL, &cp, cert_attr[2].ulValueLen)) == NULL) { error("d2i_x509 failed"); goto out; } if ((evp = X509_get_pubkey(x509)) == NULL) { error("X509_get_pubkey failed"); goto out; } if (EVP_PKEY_base_id(evp) == EVP_PKEY_RSA) { if (EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(evp) == NULL) { error("invalid x509; no rsa key"); goto out; } if ((rsa = RSAPublicKey_dup(EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(evp))) == NULL) { error("RSAPublicKey_dup failed"); goto out; } if (pkcs11_rsa_wrap(p, slotidx, &cert_attr[0], rsa)) goto out; key = sshkey_new(KEY_UNSPEC); if (key == NULL) { error("sshkey_new failed"); goto out; } key->rsa = rsa; key->type = KEY_RSA; key->flags |= SSHKEY_FLAG_EXT; rsa = NULL; /* now owned by key */ #if defined(OPENSSL_HAS_ECC) && defined(HAVE_EC_KEY_METHOD_NEW) } else if (EVP_PKEY_base_id(evp) == EVP_PKEY_EC) { if (EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(evp) == NULL) { error("invalid x509; no ec key"); goto out; } if ((ec = EC_KEY_dup(EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(evp))) == NULL) { error("EC_KEY_dup failed"); goto out; } nid = sshkey_ecdsa_key_to_nid(ec); if (nid < 0) { error("couldn't get curve nid"); goto out; } if (pkcs11_ecdsa_wrap(p, slotidx, &cert_attr[0], ec)) goto out; key = sshkey_new(KEY_UNSPEC); if (key == NULL) { error("sshkey_new failed"); goto out; } key->ecdsa = ec; key->ecdsa_nid = nid; key->type = KEY_ECDSA; key->flags |= SSHKEY_FLAG_EXT; ec = NULL; /* now owned by key */ #endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC && HAVE_EC_KEY_METHOD_NEW */ } else { error("unknown certificate key type"); goto out; } out: for (i = 0; i < 3; i++) free(cert_attr[i].pValue); X509_free(x509); RSA_free(rsa); #ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC EC_KEY_free(ec); #endif if (key == NULL) { free(subject); return -1; } /* success */ *keyp = key; *labelp = subject; return 0; } #if 0 static int have_rsa_key(const RSA *rsa) { const BIGNUM *rsa_n, *rsa_e; RSA_get0_key(rsa, &rsa_n, &rsa_e, NULL); return rsa_n != NULL && rsa_e != NULL; } #endif static void note_key(struct pkcs11_provider *p, CK_ULONG slotidx, const char *context, struct sshkey *key) { char *fp; if ((fp = sshkey_fingerprint(key, SSH_FP_HASH_DEFAULT, SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL) { error_f("sshkey_fingerprint failed"); return; } debug2("%s: provider %s slot %lu: %s %s", context, p->name, (u_long)slotidx, sshkey_type(key), fp); free(fp); } /* * lookup certificates for token in slot identified by slotidx, * add 'wrapped' public keys to the 'keysp' array and increment nkeys. * keysp points to an (possibly empty) array with *nkeys keys. */ static int pkcs11_fetch_certs(struct pkcs11_provider *p, CK_ULONG slotidx, struct sshkey ***keysp, char ***labelsp, int *nkeys) { struct sshkey *key = NULL; CK_OBJECT_CLASS key_class; CK_ATTRIBUTE key_attr[1]; CK_SESSION_HANDLE session; CK_FUNCTION_LIST *f = NULL; CK_RV rv; CK_OBJECT_HANDLE obj; CK_ULONG n = 0; int ret = -1; char *label; memset(&key_attr, 0, sizeof(key_attr)); memset(&obj, 0, sizeof(obj)); key_class = CKO_CERTIFICATE; key_attr[0].type = CKA_CLASS; key_attr[0].pValue = &key_class; key_attr[0].ulValueLen = sizeof(key_class); session = p->slotinfo[slotidx].session; f = p->function_list; rv = f->C_FindObjectsInit(session, key_attr, 1); if (rv != CKR_OK) { error("C_FindObjectsInit failed: %lu", rv); goto fail; } while (1) { CK_CERTIFICATE_TYPE ck_cert_type; rv = f->C_FindObjects(session, &obj, 1, &n); if (rv != CKR_OK) { error("C_FindObjects failed: %lu", rv); goto fail; } if (n == 0) break; memset(&ck_cert_type, 0, sizeof(ck_cert_type)); memset(&key_attr, 0, sizeof(key_attr)); key_attr[0].type = CKA_CERTIFICATE_TYPE; key_attr[0].pValue = &ck_cert_type; key_attr[0].ulValueLen = sizeof(ck_cert_type); rv = f->C_GetAttributeValue(session, obj, key_attr, 1); if (rv != CKR_OK) { error("C_GetAttributeValue failed: %lu", rv); goto fail; } key = NULL; label = NULL; switch (ck_cert_type) { case CKC_X_509: if (pkcs11_fetch_x509_pubkey(p, slotidx, &obj, &key, &label) != 0) { error("failed to fetch key"); continue; } break; default: error("skipping unsupported certificate type %lu", ck_cert_type); continue; } note_key(p, slotidx, __func__, key); if (pkcs11_key_included(keysp, nkeys, key)) { debug2_f("key already included");; sshkey_free(key); } else { /* expand key array and add key */ *keysp = xrecallocarray(*keysp, *nkeys, *nkeys + 1, sizeof(struct sshkey *)); (*keysp)[*nkeys] = key; if (labelsp != NULL) { *labelsp = xrecallocarray(*labelsp, *nkeys, *nkeys + 1, sizeof(char *)); (*labelsp)[*nkeys] = xstrdup((char *)label); } *nkeys = *nkeys + 1; debug("have %d keys", *nkeys); } } ret = 0; fail: rv = f->C_FindObjectsFinal(session); if (rv != CKR_OK) { error("C_FindObjectsFinal failed: %lu", rv); ret = -1; } return (ret); } /* * lookup public keys for token in slot identified by slotidx, * add 'wrapped' public keys to the 'keysp' array and increment nkeys. * keysp points to an (possibly empty) array with *nkeys keys. */ static int pkcs11_fetch_keys(struct pkcs11_provider *p, CK_ULONG slotidx, struct sshkey ***keysp, char ***labelsp, int *nkeys) { struct sshkey *key = NULL; CK_OBJECT_CLASS key_class; CK_ATTRIBUTE key_attr[2]; CK_SESSION_HANDLE session; CK_FUNCTION_LIST *f = NULL; CK_RV rv; CK_OBJECT_HANDLE obj; CK_ULONG n = 0; int ret = -1; memset(&key_attr, 0, sizeof(key_attr)); memset(&obj, 0, sizeof(obj)); key_class = CKO_PUBLIC_KEY; key_attr[0].type = CKA_CLASS; key_attr[0].pValue = &key_class; key_attr[0].ulValueLen = sizeof(key_class); session = p->slotinfo[slotidx].session; f = p->function_list; rv = f->C_FindObjectsInit(session, key_attr, 1); if (rv != CKR_OK) { error("C_FindObjectsInit failed: %lu", rv); goto fail; } while (1) { CK_KEY_TYPE ck_key_type; CK_UTF8CHAR label[256]; rv = f->C_FindObjects(session, &obj, 1, &n); if (rv != CKR_OK) { error("C_FindObjects failed: %lu", rv); goto fail; } if (n == 0) break; memset(&ck_key_type, 0, sizeof(ck_key_type)); memset(&key_attr, 0, sizeof(key_attr)); key_attr[0].type = CKA_KEY_TYPE; key_attr[0].pValue = &ck_key_type; key_attr[0].ulValueLen = sizeof(ck_key_type); key_attr[1].type = CKA_LABEL; key_attr[1].pValue = &label; key_attr[1].ulValueLen = sizeof(label) - 1; rv = f->C_GetAttributeValue(session, obj, key_attr, 2); if (rv != CKR_OK) { error("C_GetAttributeValue failed: %lu", rv); goto fail; } label[key_attr[1].ulValueLen] = '\0'; switch (ck_key_type) { case CKK_RSA: key = pkcs11_fetch_rsa_pubkey(p, slotidx, &obj); break; #if defined(OPENSSL_HAS_ECC) && defined(HAVE_EC_KEY_METHOD_NEW) case CKK_ECDSA: key = pkcs11_fetch_ecdsa_pubkey(p, slotidx, &obj); break; #endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC && HAVE_EC_KEY_METHOD_NEW */ default: /* XXX print key type? */ key = NULL; error("skipping unsupported key type"); } if (key == NULL) { error("failed to fetch key"); continue; } note_key(p, slotidx, __func__, key); if (pkcs11_key_included(keysp, nkeys, key)) { debug2_f("key already included");; sshkey_free(key); } else { /* expand key array and add key */ *keysp = xrecallocarray(*keysp, *nkeys, *nkeys + 1, sizeof(struct sshkey *)); (*keysp)[*nkeys] = key; if (labelsp != NULL) { *labelsp = xrecallocarray(*labelsp, *nkeys, *nkeys + 1, sizeof(char *)); (*labelsp)[*nkeys] = xstrdup((char *)label); } *nkeys = *nkeys + 1; debug("have %d keys", *nkeys); } } ret = 0; fail: rv = f->C_FindObjectsFinal(session); if (rv != CKR_OK) { error("C_FindObjectsFinal failed: %lu", rv); ret = -1; } return (ret); } #ifdef WITH_PKCS11_KEYGEN #define FILL_ATTR(attr, idx, typ, val, len) \ { (attr[idx]).type=(typ); (attr[idx]).pValue=(val); (attr[idx]).ulValueLen=len; idx++; } static struct sshkey * pkcs11_rsa_generate_private_key(struct pkcs11_provider *p, CK_ULONG slotidx, char *label, CK_ULONG bits, CK_BYTE keyid, u_int32_t *err) { struct pkcs11_slotinfo *si; char *plabel = label ? label : ""; int npub = 0, npriv = 0; CK_RV rv; CK_FUNCTION_LIST *f; CK_SESSION_HANDLE session; CK_BBOOL true_val = CK_TRUE, false_val = CK_FALSE; CK_OBJECT_HANDLE pubKey, privKey; CK_ATTRIBUTE tpub[16], tpriv[16]; CK_MECHANISM mech = { CKM_RSA_PKCS_KEY_PAIR_GEN, NULL_PTR, 0 }; CK_BYTE pubExponent[] = { 0x01, 0x00, 0x01 /* RSA_F4 in bytes */ }; pubkey_filter[0].pValue = &pubkey_class; cert_filter[0].pValue = &cert_class; *err = 0; FILL_ATTR(tpub, npub, CKA_TOKEN, &true_val, sizeof(true_val)); FILL_ATTR(tpub, npub, CKA_LABEL, plabel, strlen(plabel)); FILL_ATTR(tpub, npub, CKA_ENCRYPT, &false_val, sizeof(false_val)); FILL_ATTR(tpub, npub, CKA_VERIFY, &true_val, sizeof(true_val)); FILL_ATTR(tpub, npub, CKA_VERIFY_RECOVER, &false_val, sizeof(false_val)); FILL_ATTR(tpub, npub, CKA_WRAP, &false_val, sizeof(false_val)); FILL_ATTR(tpub, npub, CKA_DERIVE, &false_val, sizeof(false_val)); FILL_ATTR(tpub, npub, CKA_MODULUS_BITS, &bits, sizeof(bits)); FILL_ATTR(tpub, npub, CKA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT, pubExponent, sizeof(pubExponent)); FILL_ATTR(tpub, npub, CKA_ID, &keyid, sizeof(keyid)); FILL_ATTR(tpriv, npriv, CKA_TOKEN, &true_val, sizeof(true_val)); FILL_ATTR(tpriv, npriv, CKA_LABEL, plabel, strlen(plabel)); FILL_ATTR(tpriv, npriv, CKA_PRIVATE, &true_val, sizeof(true_val)); FILL_ATTR(tpriv, npriv, CKA_SENSITIVE, &true_val, sizeof(true_val)); FILL_ATTR(tpriv, npriv, CKA_DECRYPT, &false_val, sizeof(false_val)); FILL_ATTR(tpriv, npriv, CKA_SIGN, &true_val, sizeof(true_val)); FILL_ATTR(tpriv, npriv, CKA_SIGN_RECOVER, &false_val, sizeof(false_val)); FILL_ATTR(tpriv, npriv, CKA_UNWRAP, &false_val, sizeof(false_val)); FILL_ATTR(tpriv, npriv, CKA_DERIVE, &false_val, sizeof(false_val)); FILL_ATTR(tpriv, npriv, CKA_ID, &keyid, sizeof(keyid)); f = p->function_list; si = &p->slotinfo[slotidx]; session = si->session; if ((rv = f->C_GenerateKeyPair(session, &mech, tpub, npub, tpriv, npriv, &pubKey, &privKey)) != CKR_OK) { error_f("key generation failed: error 0x%lx", rv); *err = rv; return NULL; } return pkcs11_fetch_rsa_pubkey(p, slotidx, &pubKey); } static int pkcs11_decode_hex(const char *hex, unsigned char **dest, size_t *rlen) { size_t i, len; char ptr[3]; if (dest) *dest = NULL; if (rlen) *rlen = 0; if ((len = strlen(hex)) % 2) return -1; len /= 2; *dest = xmalloc(len); ptr[2] = '\0'; for (i = 0; i < len; i++) { ptr[0] = hex[2 * i]; ptr[1] = hex[(2 * i) + 1]; if (!isxdigit(ptr[0]) || !isxdigit(ptr[1])) return -1; (*dest)[i] = (unsigned char)strtoul(ptr, NULL, 16); } if (rlen) *rlen = len; return 0; } static struct ec_curve_info { const char *name; const char *oid; const char *oid_encoded; size_t size; } ec_curve_infos[] = { {"prime256v1", "1.2.840.10045.3.1.7", "06082A8648CE3D030107", 256}, {"secp384r1", "1.3.132.0.34", "06052B81040022", 384}, {"secp521r1", "1.3.132.0.35", "06052B81040023", 521}, {NULL, NULL, NULL, 0}, }; static struct sshkey * pkcs11_ecdsa_generate_private_key(struct pkcs11_provider *p, CK_ULONG slotidx, char *label, CK_ULONG bits, CK_BYTE keyid, u_int32_t *err) { struct pkcs11_slotinfo *si; char *plabel = label ? label : ""; int i; size_t ecparams_size; unsigned char *ecparams = NULL; int npub = 0, npriv = 0; CK_RV rv; CK_FUNCTION_LIST *f; CK_SESSION_HANDLE session; CK_BBOOL true_val = CK_TRUE, false_val = CK_FALSE; CK_OBJECT_HANDLE pubKey, privKey; CK_MECHANISM mech = { CKM_EC_KEY_PAIR_GEN, NULL_PTR, 0 }; CK_ATTRIBUTE tpub[16], tpriv[16]; *err = 0; for (i = 0; ec_curve_infos[i].name; i++) { if (ec_curve_infos[i].size == bits) break; } if (!ec_curve_infos[i].name) { error_f("invalid key size %lu", bits); return NULL; } if (pkcs11_decode_hex(ec_curve_infos[i].oid_encoded, &ecparams, &ecparams_size) == -1) { error_f("invalid oid"); return NULL; } FILL_ATTR(tpub, npub, CKA_TOKEN, &true_val, sizeof(true_val)); FILL_ATTR(tpub, npub, CKA_LABEL, plabel, strlen(plabel)); FILL_ATTR(tpub, npub, CKA_ENCRYPT, &false_val, sizeof(false_val)); FILL_ATTR(tpub, npub, CKA_VERIFY, &true_val, sizeof(true_val)); FILL_ATTR(tpub, npub, CKA_VERIFY_RECOVER, &false_val, sizeof(false_val)); FILL_ATTR(tpub, npub, CKA_WRAP, &false_val, sizeof(false_val)); FILL_ATTR(tpub, npub, CKA_DERIVE, &false_val, sizeof(false_val)); FILL_ATTR(tpub, npub, CKA_EC_PARAMS, ecparams, ecparams_size); FILL_ATTR(tpub, npub, CKA_ID, &keyid, sizeof(keyid)); FILL_ATTR(tpriv, npriv, CKA_TOKEN, &true_val, sizeof(true_val)); FILL_ATTR(tpriv, npriv, CKA_LABEL, plabel, strlen(plabel)); FILL_ATTR(tpriv, npriv, CKA_PRIVATE, &true_val, sizeof(true_val)); FILL_ATTR(tpriv, npriv, CKA_SENSITIVE, &true_val, sizeof(true_val)); FILL_ATTR(tpriv, npriv, CKA_DECRYPT, &false_val, sizeof(false_val)); FILL_ATTR(tpriv, npriv, CKA_SIGN, &true_val, sizeof(true_val)); FILL_ATTR(tpriv, npriv, CKA_SIGN_RECOVER, &false_val, sizeof(false_val)); FILL_ATTR(tpriv, npriv, CKA_UNWRAP, &false_val, sizeof(false_val)); FILL_ATTR(tpriv, npriv, CKA_DERIVE, &false_val, sizeof(false_val)); FILL_ATTR(tpriv, npriv, CKA_ID, &keyid, sizeof(keyid)); f = p->function_list; si = &p->slotinfo[slotidx]; session = si->session; if ((rv = f->C_GenerateKeyPair(session, &mech, tpub, npub, tpriv, npriv, &pubKey, &privKey)) != CKR_OK) { error_f("key generation failed: error 0x%lx", rv); *err = rv; return NULL; } return pkcs11_fetch_ecdsa_pubkey(p, slotidx, &pubKey); } #endif /* WITH_PKCS11_KEYGEN */ /* * register a new provider, fails if provider already exists. if * keyp is provided, fetch keys. */ static int pkcs11_register_provider(char *provider_id, char *pin, struct sshkey ***keyp, char ***labelsp, struct pkcs11_provider **providerp, CK_ULONG user) { int nkeys, need_finalize = 0; int ret = -1; struct pkcs11_provider *p = NULL; void *handle = NULL; CK_RV (*getfunctionlist)(CK_FUNCTION_LIST **); CK_RV rv; CK_FUNCTION_LIST *f = NULL; CK_TOKEN_INFO *token; CK_ULONG i; if (providerp == NULL) goto fail; *providerp = NULL; if (keyp != NULL) *keyp = NULL; if (labelsp != NULL) *labelsp = NULL; if (pkcs11_provider_lookup(provider_id) != NULL) { debug_f("provider already registered: %s", provider_id); goto fail; } /* open shared pkcs11-library */ if ((handle = dlopen(provider_id, RTLD_NOW)) == NULL) { error("dlopen %s failed: %s", provider_id, dlerror()); goto fail; } if ((getfunctionlist = dlsym(handle, "C_GetFunctionList")) == NULL) { error("dlsym(C_GetFunctionList) failed: %s", dlerror()); goto fail; } p = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*p)); p->name = xstrdup(provider_id); p->handle = handle; /* setup the pkcs11 callbacks */ if ((rv = (*getfunctionlist)(&f)) != CKR_OK) { error("C_GetFunctionList for provider %s failed: %lu", provider_id, rv); goto fail; } p->function_list = f; if ((rv = f->C_Initialize(NULL)) != CKR_OK) { error("C_Initialize for provider %s failed: %lu", provider_id, rv); goto fail; } need_finalize = 1; if ((rv = f->C_GetInfo(&p->info)) != CKR_OK) { error("C_GetInfo for provider %s failed: %lu", provider_id, rv); goto fail; } rmspace(p->info.manufacturerID, sizeof(p->info.manufacturerID)); rmspace(p->info.libraryDescription, sizeof(p->info.libraryDescription)); debug("provider %s: manufacturerID <%s> cryptokiVersion %d.%d" " libraryDescription <%s> libraryVersion %d.%d", provider_id, p->info.manufacturerID, p->info.cryptokiVersion.major, p->info.cryptokiVersion.minor, p->info.libraryDescription, p->info.libraryVersion.major, p->info.libraryVersion.minor); if ((rv = f->C_GetSlotList(CK_TRUE, NULL, &p->nslots)) != CKR_OK) { error("C_GetSlotList failed: %lu", rv); goto fail; } if (p->nslots == 0) { debug_f("provider %s returned no slots", provider_id); ret = -SSH_PKCS11_ERR_NO_SLOTS; goto fail; } p->slotlist = xcalloc(p->nslots, sizeof(CK_SLOT_ID)); if ((rv = f->C_GetSlotList(CK_TRUE, p->slotlist, &p->nslots)) != CKR_OK) { error("C_GetSlotList for provider %s failed: %lu", provider_id, rv); goto fail; } p->slotinfo = xcalloc(p->nslots, sizeof(struct pkcs11_slotinfo)); p->valid = 1; nkeys = 0; for (i = 0; i < p->nslots; i++) { token = &p->slotinfo[i].token; if ((rv = f->C_GetTokenInfo(p->slotlist[i], token)) != CKR_OK) { error("C_GetTokenInfo for provider %s slot %lu " "failed: %lu", provider_id, (u_long)i, rv); continue; } if ((token->flags & CKF_TOKEN_INITIALIZED) == 0) { debug2_f("ignoring uninitialised token in " "provider %s slot %lu", provider_id, (u_long)i); continue; } rmspace(token->label, sizeof(token->label)); rmspace(token->manufacturerID, sizeof(token->manufacturerID)); rmspace(token->model, sizeof(token->model)); rmspace(token->serialNumber, sizeof(token->serialNumber)); debug("provider %s slot %lu: label <%s> manufacturerID <%s> " "model <%s> serial <%s> flags 0x%lx", provider_id, (unsigned long)i, token->label, token->manufacturerID, token->model, token->serialNumber, token->flags); /* * open session, login with pin and retrieve public * keys (if keyp is provided) */ if ((ret = pkcs11_open_session(p, i, pin, user)) != 0 || keyp == NULL) continue; pkcs11_fetch_keys(p, i, keyp, labelsp, &nkeys); pkcs11_fetch_certs(p, i, keyp, labelsp, &nkeys); if (nkeys == 0 && !p->slotinfo[i].logged_in && pkcs11_interactive) { /* * Some tokens require login before they will * expose keys. */ if (pkcs11_login_slot(p, &p->slotinfo[i], CKU_USER) < 0) { error("login failed"); continue; } pkcs11_fetch_keys(p, i, keyp, labelsp, &nkeys); pkcs11_fetch_certs(p, i, keyp, labelsp, &nkeys); } } /* now owned by caller */ *providerp = p; TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(&pkcs11_providers, p, next); p->refcount++; /* add to provider list */ return (nkeys); fail: if (need_finalize && (rv = f->C_Finalize(NULL)) != CKR_OK) error("C_Finalize for provider %s failed: %lu", provider_id, rv); if (p) { free(p->name); free(p->slotlist); free(p->slotinfo); free(p); } if (handle) dlclose(handle); if (ret > 0) ret = -1; return (ret); } /* * register a new provider and get number of keys hold by the token, * fails if provider already exists */ int pkcs11_add_provider(char *provider_id, char *pin, struct sshkey ***keyp, char ***labelsp) { struct pkcs11_provider *p = NULL; int nkeys; nkeys = pkcs11_register_provider(provider_id, pin, keyp, labelsp, &p, CKU_USER); /* no keys found or some other error, de-register provider */ if (nkeys <= 0 && p != NULL) { TAILQ_REMOVE(&pkcs11_providers, p, next); pkcs11_provider_finalize(p); pkcs11_provider_unref(p); } if (nkeys == 0) debug_f("provider %s returned no keys", provider_id); return (nkeys); } #ifdef WITH_PKCS11_KEYGEN struct sshkey * pkcs11_gakp(char *provider_id, char *pin, unsigned int slotidx, char *label, unsigned int type, unsigned int bits, unsigned char keyid, u_int32_t *err) { struct pkcs11_provider *p = NULL; struct pkcs11_slotinfo *si; CK_FUNCTION_LIST *f; CK_SESSION_HANDLE session; struct sshkey *k = NULL; int ret = -1, reset_pin = 0, reset_provider = 0; CK_RV rv; *err = 0; if ((p = pkcs11_provider_lookup(provider_id)) != NULL) debug_f("provider \"%s\" available", provider_id); else if ((ret = pkcs11_register_provider(provider_id, pin, NULL, NULL, &p, CKU_SO)) < 0) { debug_f("could not register provider %s", provider_id); goto out; } else reset_provider = 1; f = p->function_list; si = &p->slotinfo[slotidx]; session = si->session; if ((rv = f->C_SetOperationState(session , pin, strlen(pin), CK_INVALID_HANDLE, CK_INVALID_HANDLE)) != CKR_OK) { debug_f("could not supply SO pin: %lu", rv); reset_pin = 0; } else reset_pin = 1; switch (type) { case KEY_RSA: if ((k = pkcs11_rsa_generate_private_key(p, slotidx, label, bits, keyid, err)) == NULL) { debug_f("failed to generate RSA key"); goto out; } break; case KEY_ECDSA: if ((k = pkcs11_ecdsa_generate_private_key(p, slotidx, label, bits, keyid, err)) == NULL) { debug_f("failed to generate ECDSA key"); goto out; } break; default: *err = SSH_PKCS11_ERR_GENERIC; debug_f("unknown type %d", type); goto out; } out: if (reset_pin) f->C_SetOperationState(session , NULL, 0, CK_INVALID_HANDLE, CK_INVALID_HANDLE); if (reset_provider) pkcs11_del_provider(provider_id); return (k); } struct sshkey * pkcs11_destroy_keypair(char *provider_id, char *pin, unsigned long slotidx, unsigned char keyid, u_int32_t *err) { struct pkcs11_provider *p = NULL; struct pkcs11_slotinfo *si; struct sshkey *k = NULL; int reset_pin = 0, reset_provider = 0; CK_ULONG nattrs; CK_FUNCTION_LIST *f; CK_SESSION_HANDLE session; CK_ATTRIBUTE attrs[16]; CK_OBJECT_CLASS key_class; CK_KEY_TYPE key_type; CK_OBJECT_HANDLE obj = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; CK_RV rv; *err = 0; if ((p = pkcs11_provider_lookup(provider_id)) != NULL) { debug_f("using provider \"%s\"", provider_id); } else if (pkcs11_register_provider(provider_id, pin, NULL, NULL, &p, CKU_SO) < 0) { debug_f("could not register provider %s", provider_id); goto out; } else reset_provider = 1; f = p->function_list; si = &p->slotinfo[slotidx]; session = si->session; if ((rv = f->C_SetOperationState(session , pin, strlen(pin), CK_INVALID_HANDLE, CK_INVALID_HANDLE)) != CKR_OK) { debug_f("could not supply SO pin: %lu", rv); reset_pin = 0; } else reset_pin = 1; /* private key */ nattrs = 0; key_class = CKO_PRIVATE_KEY; FILL_ATTR(attrs, nattrs, CKA_CLASS, &key_class, sizeof(key_class)); FILL_ATTR(attrs, nattrs, CKA_ID, &keyid, sizeof(keyid)); if (pkcs11_find(p, slotidx, attrs, nattrs, &obj) == 0 && obj != CK_INVALID_HANDLE) { if ((rv = f->C_DestroyObject(session, obj)) != CKR_OK) { debug_f("could not destroy private key 0x%hhx", keyid); *err = rv; goto out; } } /* public key */ nattrs = 0; key_class = CKO_PUBLIC_KEY; FILL_ATTR(attrs, nattrs, CKA_CLASS, &key_class, sizeof(key_class)); FILL_ATTR(attrs, nattrs, CKA_ID, &keyid, sizeof(keyid)); if (pkcs11_find(p, slotidx, attrs, nattrs, &obj) == 0 && obj != CK_INVALID_HANDLE) { /* get key type */ nattrs = 0; FILL_ATTR(attrs, nattrs, CKA_KEY_TYPE, &key_type, sizeof(key_type)); rv = f->C_GetAttributeValue(session, obj, attrs, nattrs); if (rv != CKR_OK) { debug_f("could not get key type of public key 0x%hhx", keyid); *err = rv; key_type = -1; } if (key_type == CKK_RSA) k = pkcs11_fetch_rsa_pubkey(p, slotidx, &obj); else if (key_type == CKK_ECDSA) k = pkcs11_fetch_ecdsa_pubkey(p, slotidx, &obj); if ((rv = f->C_DestroyObject(session, obj)) != CKR_OK) { debug_f("could not destroy public key 0x%hhx", keyid); *err = rv; goto out; } } out: if (reset_pin) f->C_SetOperationState(session , NULL, 0, CK_INVALID_HANDLE, CK_INVALID_HANDLE); if (reset_provider) pkcs11_del_provider(provider_id); return (k); } #endif /* WITH_PKCS11_KEYGEN */ #else /* ENABLE_PKCS11 */ #include #include #include #include "log.h" #include "sshkey.h" int pkcs11_init(int interactive) { error("%s: dlopen() not supported", __func__); return (-1); } int pkcs11_add_provider(char *provider_id, char *pin, struct sshkey ***keyp, char ***labelsp) { error("%s: dlopen() not supported", __func__); return (-1); } void pkcs11_terminate(void) { error("%s: dlopen() not supported", __func__); } #endif /* ENABLE_PKCS11 */ diff --git a/crypto/openssh/ssh-rsa.c b/crypto/openssh/ssh-rsa.c index 6516ddc13acd..be8f51e7576b 100644 --- a/crypto/openssh/ssh-rsa.c +++ b/crypto/openssh/ssh-rsa.c @@ -1,769 +1,768 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: ssh-rsa.c,v 1.78 2022/10/28 02:47:04 djm Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: ssh-rsa.c,v 1.79 2023/03/05 05:34:09 dtucker Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2000, 2003 Markus Friedl * * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. * * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. */ #include "includes.h" #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL #include #include #include #include #include #include "sshbuf.h" -#include "compat.h" #include "ssherr.h" #define SSHKEY_INTERNAL #include "sshkey.h" #include "digest.h" #include "log.h" #include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h" static int openssh_RSA_verify(int, u_char *, size_t, u_char *, size_t, RSA *); static u_int ssh_rsa_size(const struct sshkey *key) { const BIGNUM *rsa_n; if (key->rsa == NULL) return 0; RSA_get0_key(key->rsa, &rsa_n, NULL, NULL); return BN_num_bits(rsa_n); } static int ssh_rsa_alloc(struct sshkey *k) { if ((k->rsa = RSA_new()) == NULL) return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; return 0; } static void ssh_rsa_cleanup(struct sshkey *k) { RSA_free(k->rsa); k->rsa = NULL; } static int ssh_rsa_equal(const struct sshkey *a, const struct sshkey *b) { const BIGNUM *rsa_e_a, *rsa_n_a; const BIGNUM *rsa_e_b, *rsa_n_b; if (a->rsa == NULL || b->rsa == NULL) return 0; RSA_get0_key(a->rsa, &rsa_n_a, &rsa_e_a, NULL); RSA_get0_key(b->rsa, &rsa_n_b, &rsa_e_b, NULL); if (rsa_e_a == NULL || rsa_e_b == NULL) return 0; if (rsa_n_a == NULL || rsa_n_b == NULL) return 0; if (BN_cmp(rsa_e_a, rsa_e_b) != 0) return 0; if (BN_cmp(rsa_n_a, rsa_n_b) != 0) return 0; return 1; } static int ssh_rsa_serialize_public(const struct sshkey *key, struct sshbuf *b, enum sshkey_serialize_rep opts) { int r; const BIGNUM *rsa_n, *rsa_e; if (key->rsa == NULL) return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; RSA_get0_key(key->rsa, &rsa_n, &rsa_e, NULL); if ((r = sshbuf_put_bignum2(b, rsa_e)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_bignum2(b, rsa_n)) != 0) return r; return 0; } static int ssh_rsa_serialize_private(const struct sshkey *key, struct sshbuf *b, enum sshkey_serialize_rep opts) { int r; const BIGNUM *rsa_n, *rsa_e, *rsa_d, *rsa_iqmp, *rsa_p, *rsa_q; RSA_get0_key(key->rsa, &rsa_n, &rsa_e, &rsa_d); RSA_get0_factors(key->rsa, &rsa_p, &rsa_q); RSA_get0_crt_params(key->rsa, NULL, NULL, &rsa_iqmp); if (!sshkey_is_cert(key)) { /* Note: can't reuse ssh_rsa_serialize_public: e, n vs. n, e */ if ((r = sshbuf_put_bignum2(b, rsa_n)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_bignum2(b, rsa_e)) != 0) return r; } if ((r = sshbuf_put_bignum2(b, rsa_d)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_bignum2(b, rsa_iqmp)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_bignum2(b, rsa_p)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_bignum2(b, rsa_q)) != 0) return r; return 0; } static int ssh_rsa_generate(struct sshkey *k, int bits) { RSA *private = NULL; BIGNUM *f4 = NULL; int ret = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; if (bits < SSH_RSA_MINIMUM_MODULUS_SIZE || bits > SSHBUF_MAX_BIGNUM * 8) return SSH_ERR_KEY_LENGTH; if ((private = RSA_new()) == NULL || (f4 = BN_new()) == NULL) { ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; goto out; } if (!BN_set_word(f4, RSA_F4) || !RSA_generate_key_ex(private, bits, f4, NULL)) { ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; goto out; } k->rsa = private; private = NULL; ret = 0; out: RSA_free(private); BN_free(f4); return ret; } static int ssh_rsa_copy_public(const struct sshkey *from, struct sshkey *to) { const BIGNUM *rsa_n, *rsa_e; BIGNUM *rsa_n_dup = NULL, *rsa_e_dup = NULL; int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; RSA_get0_key(from->rsa, &rsa_n, &rsa_e, NULL); if ((rsa_n_dup = BN_dup(rsa_n)) == NULL || (rsa_e_dup = BN_dup(rsa_e)) == NULL) { r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; goto out; } if (!RSA_set0_key(to->rsa, rsa_n_dup, rsa_e_dup, NULL)) { r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; goto out; } rsa_n_dup = rsa_e_dup = NULL; /* transferred */ /* success */ r = 0; out: BN_clear_free(rsa_n_dup); BN_clear_free(rsa_e_dup); return r; } static int ssh_rsa_deserialize_public(const char *ktype, struct sshbuf *b, struct sshkey *key) { int ret = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; BIGNUM *rsa_n = NULL, *rsa_e = NULL; if (sshbuf_get_bignum2(b, &rsa_e) != 0 || sshbuf_get_bignum2(b, &rsa_n) != 0) { ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; goto out; } if (!RSA_set0_key(key->rsa, rsa_n, rsa_e, NULL)) { ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; goto out; } rsa_n = rsa_e = NULL; /* transferred */ if ((ret = sshkey_check_rsa_length(key, 0)) != 0) goto out; #ifdef DEBUG_PK RSA_print_fp(stderr, key->rsa, 8); #endif /* success */ ret = 0; out: BN_clear_free(rsa_n); BN_clear_free(rsa_e); return ret; } static int ssh_rsa_deserialize_private(const char *ktype, struct sshbuf *b, struct sshkey *key) { int r; BIGNUM *rsa_n = NULL, *rsa_e = NULL, *rsa_d = NULL; BIGNUM *rsa_iqmp = NULL, *rsa_p = NULL, *rsa_q = NULL; /* Note: can't reuse ssh_rsa_deserialize_public: e, n vs. n, e */ if (!sshkey_is_cert(key)) { if ((r = sshbuf_get_bignum2(b, &rsa_n)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_bignum2(b, &rsa_e)) != 0) goto out; if (!RSA_set0_key(key->rsa, rsa_n, rsa_e, NULL)) { r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; goto out; } rsa_n = rsa_e = NULL; /* transferred */ } if ((r = sshbuf_get_bignum2(b, &rsa_d)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_bignum2(b, &rsa_iqmp)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_bignum2(b, &rsa_p)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_bignum2(b, &rsa_q)) != 0) goto out; if (!RSA_set0_key(key->rsa, NULL, NULL, rsa_d)) { r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; goto out; } rsa_d = NULL; /* transferred */ if (!RSA_set0_factors(key->rsa, rsa_p, rsa_q)) { r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; goto out; } rsa_p = rsa_q = NULL; /* transferred */ if ((r = sshkey_check_rsa_length(key, 0)) != 0) goto out; if ((r = ssh_rsa_complete_crt_parameters(key, rsa_iqmp)) != 0) goto out; if (RSA_blinding_on(key->rsa, NULL) != 1) { r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; goto out; } /* success */ r = 0; out: BN_clear_free(rsa_n); BN_clear_free(rsa_e); BN_clear_free(rsa_d); BN_clear_free(rsa_p); BN_clear_free(rsa_q); BN_clear_free(rsa_iqmp); return r; } static const char * rsa_hash_alg_ident(int hash_alg) { switch (hash_alg) { case SSH_DIGEST_SHA1: return "ssh-rsa"; case SSH_DIGEST_SHA256: return "rsa-sha2-256"; case SSH_DIGEST_SHA512: return "rsa-sha2-512"; } return NULL; } /* * Returns the hash algorithm ID for a given algorithm identifier as used * inside the signature blob, */ static int rsa_hash_id_from_ident(const char *ident) { if (strcmp(ident, "ssh-rsa") == 0) return SSH_DIGEST_SHA1; if (strcmp(ident, "rsa-sha2-256") == 0) return SSH_DIGEST_SHA256; if (strcmp(ident, "rsa-sha2-512") == 0) return SSH_DIGEST_SHA512; return -1; } /* * Return the hash algorithm ID for the specified key name. This includes * all the cases of rsa_hash_id_from_ident() but also the certificate key * types. */ static int rsa_hash_id_from_keyname(const char *alg) { int r; if ((r = rsa_hash_id_from_ident(alg)) != -1) return r; if (strcmp(alg, "ssh-rsa-cert-v01@openssh.com") == 0) return SSH_DIGEST_SHA1; if (strcmp(alg, "rsa-sha2-256-cert-v01@openssh.com") == 0) return SSH_DIGEST_SHA256; if (strcmp(alg, "rsa-sha2-512-cert-v01@openssh.com") == 0) return SSH_DIGEST_SHA512; return -1; } static int rsa_hash_alg_nid(int type) { switch (type) { case SSH_DIGEST_SHA1: return NID_sha1; case SSH_DIGEST_SHA256: return NID_sha256; case SSH_DIGEST_SHA512: return NID_sha512; default: return -1; } } int ssh_rsa_complete_crt_parameters(struct sshkey *key, const BIGNUM *iqmp) { const BIGNUM *rsa_p, *rsa_q, *rsa_d; BIGNUM *aux = NULL, *d_consttime = NULL; BIGNUM *rsa_dmq1 = NULL, *rsa_dmp1 = NULL, *rsa_iqmp = NULL; BN_CTX *ctx = NULL; int r; if (key == NULL || key->rsa == NULL || sshkey_type_plain(key->type) != KEY_RSA) return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; RSA_get0_key(key->rsa, NULL, NULL, &rsa_d); RSA_get0_factors(key->rsa, &rsa_p, &rsa_q); if ((ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; if ((aux = BN_new()) == NULL || (rsa_dmq1 = BN_new()) == NULL || (rsa_dmp1 = BN_new()) == NULL) return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; if ((d_consttime = BN_dup(rsa_d)) == NULL || (rsa_iqmp = BN_dup(iqmp)) == NULL) { r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; goto out; } BN_set_flags(aux, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); BN_set_flags(d_consttime, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); if ((BN_sub(aux, rsa_q, BN_value_one()) == 0) || (BN_mod(rsa_dmq1, d_consttime, aux, ctx) == 0) || (BN_sub(aux, rsa_p, BN_value_one()) == 0) || (BN_mod(rsa_dmp1, d_consttime, aux, ctx) == 0)) { r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; goto out; } if (!RSA_set0_crt_params(key->rsa, rsa_dmp1, rsa_dmq1, rsa_iqmp)) { r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; goto out; } rsa_dmp1 = rsa_dmq1 = rsa_iqmp = NULL; /* transferred */ /* success */ r = 0; out: BN_clear_free(aux); BN_clear_free(d_consttime); BN_clear_free(rsa_dmp1); BN_clear_free(rsa_dmq1); BN_clear_free(rsa_iqmp); BN_CTX_free(ctx); return r; } /* RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 (PKCS #1 v2.0 signature) with SHA1 */ static int ssh_rsa_sign(struct sshkey *key, u_char **sigp, size_t *lenp, const u_char *data, size_t datalen, const char *alg, const char *sk_provider, const char *sk_pin, u_int compat) { const BIGNUM *rsa_n; u_char digest[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH], *sig = NULL; size_t slen = 0; u_int hlen, len; int nid, hash_alg, ret = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; struct sshbuf *b = NULL; if (lenp != NULL) *lenp = 0; if (sigp != NULL) *sigp = NULL; if (alg == NULL || strlen(alg) == 0) hash_alg = SSH_DIGEST_SHA1; else hash_alg = rsa_hash_id_from_keyname(alg); if (key == NULL || key->rsa == NULL || hash_alg == -1 || sshkey_type_plain(key->type) != KEY_RSA) return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; RSA_get0_key(key->rsa, &rsa_n, NULL, NULL); if (BN_num_bits(rsa_n) < SSH_RSA_MINIMUM_MODULUS_SIZE) return SSH_ERR_KEY_LENGTH; slen = RSA_size(key->rsa); if (slen <= 0 || slen > SSHBUF_MAX_BIGNUM) return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; /* hash the data */ nid = rsa_hash_alg_nid(hash_alg); if ((hlen = ssh_digest_bytes(hash_alg)) == 0) return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; if ((ret = ssh_digest_memory(hash_alg, data, datalen, digest, sizeof(digest))) != 0) goto out; if ((sig = malloc(slen)) == NULL) { ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; goto out; } if (RSA_sign(nid, digest, hlen, sig, &len, key->rsa) != 1) { ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; goto out; } if (len < slen) { size_t diff = slen - len; memmove(sig + diff, sig, len); explicit_bzero(sig, diff); } else if (len > slen) { ret = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; goto out; } /* encode signature */ if ((b = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) { ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; goto out; } if ((ret = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, rsa_hash_alg_ident(hash_alg))) != 0 || (ret = sshbuf_put_string(b, sig, slen)) != 0) goto out; len = sshbuf_len(b); if (sigp != NULL) { if ((*sigp = malloc(len)) == NULL) { ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; goto out; } memcpy(*sigp, sshbuf_ptr(b), len); } if (lenp != NULL) *lenp = len; ret = 0; out: explicit_bzero(digest, sizeof(digest)); freezero(sig, slen); sshbuf_free(b); return ret; } static int ssh_rsa_verify(const struct sshkey *key, const u_char *sig, size_t siglen, const u_char *data, size_t dlen, const char *alg, u_int compat, struct sshkey_sig_details **detailsp) { const BIGNUM *rsa_n; char *sigtype = NULL; int hash_alg, want_alg, ret = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; size_t len = 0, diff, modlen, hlen; struct sshbuf *b = NULL; u_char digest[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH], *osigblob, *sigblob = NULL; if (key == NULL || key->rsa == NULL || sshkey_type_plain(key->type) != KEY_RSA || sig == NULL || siglen == 0) return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; RSA_get0_key(key->rsa, &rsa_n, NULL, NULL); if (BN_num_bits(rsa_n) < SSH_RSA_MINIMUM_MODULUS_SIZE) return SSH_ERR_KEY_LENGTH; if ((b = sshbuf_from(sig, siglen)) == NULL) return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; if (sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &sigtype, NULL) != 0) { ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; goto out; } if ((hash_alg = rsa_hash_id_from_ident(sigtype)) == -1) { ret = SSH_ERR_KEY_TYPE_MISMATCH; goto out; } /* * Allow ssh-rsa-cert-v01 certs to generate SHA2 signatures for * legacy reasons, but otherwise the signature type should match. */ if (alg != NULL && strcmp(alg, "ssh-rsa-cert-v01@openssh.com") != 0) { if ((want_alg = rsa_hash_id_from_keyname(alg)) == -1) { ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; goto out; } if (hash_alg != want_alg) { ret = SSH_ERR_SIGNATURE_INVALID; goto out; } } if (sshbuf_get_string(b, &sigblob, &len) != 0) { ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; goto out; } if (sshbuf_len(b) != 0) { ret = SSH_ERR_UNEXPECTED_TRAILING_DATA; goto out; } /* RSA_verify expects a signature of RSA_size */ modlen = RSA_size(key->rsa); if (len > modlen) { ret = SSH_ERR_KEY_BITS_MISMATCH; goto out; } else if (len < modlen) { diff = modlen - len; osigblob = sigblob; if ((sigblob = realloc(sigblob, modlen)) == NULL) { sigblob = osigblob; /* put it back for clear/free */ ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; goto out; } memmove(sigblob + diff, sigblob, len); explicit_bzero(sigblob, diff); len = modlen; } if ((hlen = ssh_digest_bytes(hash_alg)) == 0) { ret = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; goto out; } if ((ret = ssh_digest_memory(hash_alg, data, dlen, digest, sizeof(digest))) != 0) goto out; ret = openssh_RSA_verify(hash_alg, digest, hlen, sigblob, len, key->rsa); out: freezero(sigblob, len); free(sigtype); sshbuf_free(b); explicit_bzero(digest, sizeof(digest)); return ret; } /* * See: * http://www.rsasecurity.com/rsalabs/pkcs/pkcs-1/ * ftp://ftp.rsasecurity.com/pub/pkcs/pkcs-1/pkcs-1v2-1.asn */ /* * id-sha1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) identified-organization(3) * oiw(14) secsig(3) algorithms(2) 26 } */ static const u_char id_sha1[] = { 0x30, 0x21, /* type Sequence, length 0x21 (33) */ 0x30, 0x09, /* type Sequence, length 0x09 */ 0x06, 0x05, /* type OID, length 0x05 */ 0x2b, 0x0e, 0x03, 0x02, 0x1a, /* id-sha1 OID */ 0x05, 0x00, /* NULL */ 0x04, 0x14 /* Octet string, length 0x14 (20), followed by sha1 hash */ }; /* * See http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/ST/crypto_apps_infra/csor/algorithms.html * id-sha256 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2) country(16) us(840) * organization(1) gov(101) csor(3) nistAlgorithm(4) hashAlgs(2) * id-sha256(1) } */ static const u_char id_sha256[] = { 0x30, 0x31, /* type Sequence, length 0x31 (49) */ 0x30, 0x0d, /* type Sequence, length 0x0d (13) */ 0x06, 0x09, /* type OID, length 0x09 */ 0x60, 0x86, 0x48, 0x01, 0x65, 0x03, 0x04, 0x02, 0x01, /* id-sha256 */ 0x05, 0x00, /* NULL */ 0x04, 0x20 /* Octet string, length 0x20 (32), followed by sha256 hash */ }; /* * See http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/ST/crypto_apps_infra/csor/algorithms.html * id-sha512 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2) country(16) us(840) * organization(1) gov(101) csor(3) nistAlgorithm(4) hashAlgs(2) * id-sha256(3) } */ static const u_char id_sha512[] = { 0x30, 0x51, /* type Sequence, length 0x51 (81) */ 0x30, 0x0d, /* type Sequence, length 0x0d (13) */ 0x06, 0x09, /* type OID, length 0x09 */ 0x60, 0x86, 0x48, 0x01, 0x65, 0x03, 0x04, 0x02, 0x03, /* id-sha512 */ 0x05, 0x00, /* NULL */ 0x04, 0x40 /* Octet string, length 0x40 (64), followed by sha512 hash */ }; static int rsa_hash_alg_oid(int hash_alg, const u_char **oidp, size_t *oidlenp) { switch (hash_alg) { case SSH_DIGEST_SHA1: *oidp = id_sha1; *oidlenp = sizeof(id_sha1); break; case SSH_DIGEST_SHA256: *oidp = id_sha256; *oidlenp = sizeof(id_sha256); break; case SSH_DIGEST_SHA512: *oidp = id_sha512; *oidlenp = sizeof(id_sha512); break; default: return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; } return 0; } static int openssh_RSA_verify(int hash_alg, u_char *hash, size_t hashlen, u_char *sigbuf, size_t siglen, RSA *rsa) { size_t rsasize = 0, oidlen = 0, hlen = 0; int ret, len, oidmatch, hashmatch; const u_char *oid = NULL; u_char *decrypted = NULL; if ((ret = rsa_hash_alg_oid(hash_alg, &oid, &oidlen)) != 0) return ret; ret = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; hlen = ssh_digest_bytes(hash_alg); if (hashlen != hlen) { ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; goto done; } rsasize = RSA_size(rsa); if (rsasize <= 0 || rsasize > SSHBUF_MAX_BIGNUM || siglen == 0 || siglen > rsasize) { ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; goto done; } if ((decrypted = malloc(rsasize)) == NULL) { ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; goto done; } if ((len = RSA_public_decrypt(siglen, sigbuf, decrypted, rsa, RSA_PKCS1_PADDING)) < 0) { ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; goto done; } if (len < 0 || (size_t)len != hlen + oidlen) { ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; goto done; } oidmatch = timingsafe_bcmp(decrypted, oid, oidlen) == 0; hashmatch = timingsafe_bcmp(decrypted + oidlen, hash, hlen) == 0; if (!oidmatch || !hashmatch) { ret = SSH_ERR_SIGNATURE_INVALID; goto done; } ret = 0; done: freezero(decrypted, rsasize); return ret; } static const struct sshkey_impl_funcs sshkey_rsa_funcs = { /* .size = */ ssh_rsa_size, /* .alloc = */ ssh_rsa_alloc, /* .cleanup = */ ssh_rsa_cleanup, /* .equal = */ ssh_rsa_equal, /* .ssh_serialize_public = */ ssh_rsa_serialize_public, /* .ssh_deserialize_public = */ ssh_rsa_deserialize_public, /* .ssh_serialize_private = */ ssh_rsa_serialize_private, /* .ssh_deserialize_private = */ ssh_rsa_deserialize_private, /* .generate = */ ssh_rsa_generate, /* .copy_public = */ ssh_rsa_copy_public, /* .sign = */ ssh_rsa_sign, /* .verify = */ ssh_rsa_verify, }; const struct sshkey_impl sshkey_rsa_impl = { /* .name = */ "ssh-rsa", /* .shortname = */ "RSA", /* .sigalg = */ NULL, /* .type = */ KEY_RSA, /* .nid = */ 0, /* .cert = */ 0, /* .sigonly = */ 0, /* .keybits = */ 0, /* .funcs = */ &sshkey_rsa_funcs, }; const struct sshkey_impl sshkey_rsa_cert_impl = { /* .name = */ "ssh-rsa-cert-v01@openssh.com", /* .shortname = */ "RSA-CERT", /* .sigalg = */ NULL, /* .type = */ KEY_RSA_CERT, /* .nid = */ 0, /* .cert = */ 1, /* .sigonly = */ 0, /* .keybits = */ 0, /* .funcs = */ &sshkey_rsa_funcs, }; /* SHA2 signature algorithms */ const struct sshkey_impl sshkey_rsa_sha256_impl = { /* .name = */ "rsa-sha2-256", /* .shortname = */ "RSA", /* .sigalg = */ NULL, /* .type = */ KEY_RSA, /* .nid = */ 0, /* .cert = */ 0, /* .sigonly = */ 1, /* .keybits = */ 0, /* .funcs = */ &sshkey_rsa_funcs, }; const struct sshkey_impl sshkey_rsa_sha512_impl = { /* .name = */ "rsa-sha2-512", /* .shortname = */ "RSA", /* .sigalg = */ NULL, /* .type = */ KEY_RSA, /* .nid = */ 0, /* .cert = */ 0, /* .sigonly = */ 1, /* .keybits = */ 0, /* .funcs = */ &sshkey_rsa_funcs, }; const struct sshkey_impl sshkey_rsa_sha256_cert_impl = { /* .name = */ "rsa-sha2-256-cert-v01@openssh.com", /* .shortname = */ "RSA-CERT", /* .sigalg = */ "rsa-sha2-256", /* .type = */ KEY_RSA_CERT, /* .nid = */ 0, /* .cert = */ 1, /* .sigonly = */ 1, /* .keybits = */ 0, /* .funcs = */ &sshkey_rsa_funcs, }; const struct sshkey_impl sshkey_rsa_sha512_cert_impl = { /* .name = */ "rsa-sha2-512-cert-v01@openssh.com", /* .shortname = */ "RSA-CERT", /* .sigalg = */ "rsa-sha2-512", /* .type = */ KEY_RSA_CERT, /* .nid = */ 0, /* .cert = */ 1, /* .sigonly = */ 1, /* .keybits = */ 0, /* .funcs = */ &sshkey_rsa_funcs, }; #endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */ diff --git a/crypto/openssh/ssh.c b/crypto/openssh/ssh.c index 7a44744e0029..099dcad82f00 100644 --- a/crypto/openssh/ssh.c +++ b/crypto/openssh/ssh.c @@ -1,2408 +1,2409 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: ssh.c,v 1.584 2023/01/17 18:52:44 millert Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: ssh.c,v 1.585 2023/02/10 04:40:28 djm Exp $ */ /* * Author: Tatu Ylonen * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen , Espoo, Finland * All rights reserved * Ssh client program. This program can be used to log into a remote machine. * The software supports strong authentication, encryption, and forwarding * of X11, TCP/IP, and authentication connections. * * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell". * * Copyright (c) 1999 Niels Provos. All rights reserved. * Copyright (c) 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. * * Modified to work with SSLeay by Niels Provos * in Canada (German citizen). * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. */ #include "includes.h" #include #ifdef HAVE_SYS_STAT_H # include #endif #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H #include #endif #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL #include #include #endif #include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h" #include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h" #include "xmalloc.h" #include "ssh.h" #include "ssh2.h" #include "canohost.h" #include "compat.h" #include "cipher.h" #include "packet.h" #include "sshbuf.h" #include "channels.h" #include "sshkey.h" #include "authfd.h" #include "authfile.h" #include "pathnames.h" #include "dispatch.h" #include "clientloop.h" #include "log.h" #include "misc.h" #include "readconf.h" #include "sshconnect.h" #include "kex.h" #include "mac.h" #include "sshpty.h" #include "match.h" #include "msg.h" #include "version.h" #include "ssherr.h" #include "myproposal.h" #include "utf8.h" #ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11 #include "ssh-pkcs11.h" #endif extern char *__progname; /* Saves a copy of argv for setproctitle emulation */ #ifndef HAVE_SETPROCTITLE static char **saved_av; #endif /* Flag indicating whether debug mode is on. May be set on the command line. */ int debug_flag = 0; /* Flag indicating whether a tty should be requested */ int tty_flag = 0; /* * Flag indicating that the current process should be backgrounded and * a new mux-client launched in the foreground for ControlPersist. */ int need_controlpersist_detach = 0; /* Copies of flags for ControlPersist foreground mux-client */ int ostdin_null_flag, osession_type, otty_flag, orequest_tty; /* * General data structure for command line options and options configurable * in configuration files. See readconf.h. */ Options options; /* optional user configfile */ char *config = NULL; /* * Name of the host we are connecting to. This is the name given on the * command line, or the Hostname specified for the user-supplied name in a * configuration file. */ char *host; /* * A config can specify a path to forward, overriding SSH_AUTH_SOCK. If this is * not NULL, forward the socket at this path instead. */ char *forward_agent_sock_path = NULL; /* socket address the host resolves to */ struct sockaddr_storage hostaddr; /* Private host keys. */ Sensitive sensitive_data; /* command to be executed */ struct sshbuf *command; /* # of replies received for global requests */ static int forward_confirms_pending = -1; /* mux.c */ extern int muxserver_sock; extern u_int muxclient_command; /* Prints a help message to the user. This function never returns. */ static void usage(void) { fprintf(stderr, "usage: ssh [-46AaCfGgKkMNnqsTtVvXxYy] [-B bind_interface]\n" " [-b bind_address] [-c cipher_spec] [-D [bind_address:]port]\n" " [-E log_file] [-e escape_char] [-F configfile] [-I pkcs11]\n" " [-i identity_file] [-J [user@]host[:port]] [-L address]\n" " [-l login_name] [-m mac_spec] [-O ctl_cmd] [-o option] [-p port]\n" " [-Q query_option] [-R address] [-S ctl_path] [-W host:port]\n" " [-w local_tun[:remote_tun]] destination [command [argument ...]]\n" ); exit(255); } static int ssh_session2(struct ssh *, const struct ssh_conn_info *); static void load_public_identity_files(const struct ssh_conn_info *); static void main_sigchld_handler(int); /* ~/ expand a list of paths. NB. assumes path[n] is heap-allocated. */ static void tilde_expand_paths(char **paths, u_int num_paths) { u_int i; char *cp; for (i = 0; i < num_paths; i++) { cp = tilde_expand_filename(paths[i], getuid()); free(paths[i]); paths[i] = cp; } } /* * Expands the set of percent_expand options used by the majority of keywords * in the client that support percent expansion. * Caller must free returned string. */ static char * default_client_percent_expand(const char *str, const struct ssh_conn_info *cinfo) { return percent_expand(str, DEFAULT_CLIENT_PERCENT_EXPAND_ARGS(cinfo), (char *)NULL); } /* * Expands the set of percent_expand options used by the majority of keywords * AND perform environment variable substitution. * Caller must free returned string. */ static char * default_client_percent_dollar_expand(const char *str, const struct ssh_conn_info *cinfo) { char *ret; ret = percent_dollar_expand(str, DEFAULT_CLIENT_PERCENT_EXPAND_ARGS(cinfo), (char *)NULL); if (ret == NULL) fatal("invalid environment variable expansion"); return ret; } /* * Attempt to resolve a host name / port to a set of addresses and * optionally return any CNAMEs encountered along the way. * Returns NULL on failure. * NB. this function must operate with a options having undefined members. */ static struct addrinfo * resolve_host(const char *name, int port, int logerr, char *cname, size_t clen) { char strport[NI_MAXSERV]; const char *errstr = NULL; struct addrinfo hints, *res; int gaierr; LogLevel loglevel = SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG1; if (port <= 0) port = default_ssh_port(); if (cname != NULL) *cname = '\0'; debug3_f("lookup %s:%d", name, port); snprintf(strport, sizeof strport, "%d", port); memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints)); hints.ai_family = options.address_family == -1 ? AF_UNSPEC : options.address_family; hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM; if (cname != NULL) hints.ai_flags = AI_CANONNAME; if ((gaierr = getaddrinfo(name, strport, &hints, &res)) != 0) { if (logerr || (gaierr != EAI_NONAME && gaierr != EAI_NODATA)) loglevel = SYSLOG_LEVEL_ERROR; do_log2(loglevel, "%s: Could not resolve hostname %.100s: %s", __progname, name, ssh_gai_strerror(gaierr)); return NULL; } if (cname != NULL && res->ai_canonname != NULL) { if (!valid_domain(res->ai_canonname, 0, &errstr)) { error("ignoring bad CNAME \"%s\" for host \"%s\": %s", res->ai_canonname, name, errstr); } else if (strlcpy(cname, res->ai_canonname, clen) >= clen) { error_f("host \"%s\" cname \"%s\" too long (max %lu)", name, res->ai_canonname, (u_long)clen); if (clen > 0) *cname = '\0'; } } return res; } /* Returns non-zero if name can only be an address and not a hostname */ static int is_addr_fast(const char *name) { return (strchr(name, '%') != NULL || strchr(name, ':') != NULL || strspn(name, "0123456789.") == strlen(name)); } /* Returns non-zero if name represents a valid, single address */ static int is_addr(const char *name) { char strport[NI_MAXSERV]; struct addrinfo hints, *res; if (is_addr_fast(name)) return 1; snprintf(strport, sizeof strport, "%u", default_ssh_port()); memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints)); hints.ai_family = options.address_family == -1 ? AF_UNSPEC : options.address_family; hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM; hints.ai_flags = AI_NUMERICHOST|AI_NUMERICSERV; if (getaddrinfo(name, strport, &hints, &res) != 0) return 0; if (res == NULL || res->ai_next != NULL) { freeaddrinfo(res); return 0; } freeaddrinfo(res); return 1; } /* * Attempt to resolve a numeric host address / port to a single address. * Returns a canonical address string. * Returns NULL on failure. * NB. this function must operate with a options having undefined members. */ static struct addrinfo * resolve_addr(const char *name, int port, char *caddr, size_t clen) { char addr[NI_MAXHOST], strport[NI_MAXSERV]; struct addrinfo hints, *res; int gaierr; if (port <= 0) port = default_ssh_port(); snprintf(strport, sizeof strport, "%u", port); memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints)); hints.ai_family = options.address_family == -1 ? AF_UNSPEC : options.address_family; hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM; hints.ai_flags = AI_NUMERICHOST|AI_NUMERICSERV; if ((gaierr = getaddrinfo(name, strport, &hints, &res)) != 0) { debug2_f("could not resolve name %.100s as address: %s", name, ssh_gai_strerror(gaierr)); return NULL; } if (res == NULL) { debug_f("getaddrinfo %.100s returned no addresses", name); return NULL; } if (res->ai_next != NULL) { debug_f("getaddrinfo %.100s returned multiple addresses", name); goto fail; } if ((gaierr = getnameinfo(res->ai_addr, res->ai_addrlen, addr, sizeof(addr), NULL, 0, NI_NUMERICHOST)) != 0) { debug_f("Could not format address for name %.100s: %s", name, ssh_gai_strerror(gaierr)); goto fail; } if (strlcpy(caddr, addr, clen) >= clen) { error_f("host \"%s\" addr \"%s\" too long (max %lu)", name, addr, (u_long)clen); if (clen > 0) *caddr = '\0'; fail: freeaddrinfo(res); return NULL; } return res; } /* * Check whether the cname is a permitted replacement for the hostname * and perform the replacement if it is. * NB. this function must operate with a options having undefined members. */ static int check_follow_cname(int direct, char **namep, const char *cname) { int i; struct allowed_cname *rule; if (*cname == '\0' || !config_has_permitted_cnames(&options) || strcmp(*namep, cname) == 0) return 0; if (options.canonicalize_hostname == SSH_CANONICALISE_NO) return 0; /* * Don't attempt to canonicalize names that will be interpreted by * a proxy or jump host unless the user specifically requests so. */ if (!direct && options.canonicalize_hostname != SSH_CANONICALISE_ALWAYS) return 0; debug3_f("check \"%s\" CNAME \"%s\"", *namep, cname); for (i = 0; i < options.num_permitted_cnames; i++) { rule = options.permitted_cnames + i; if (match_pattern_list(*namep, rule->source_list, 1) != 1 || match_pattern_list(cname, rule->target_list, 1) != 1) continue; verbose("Canonicalized DNS aliased hostname " "\"%s\" => \"%s\"", *namep, cname); free(*namep); *namep = xstrdup(cname); return 1; } return 0; } /* * Attempt to resolve the supplied hostname after applying the user's * canonicalization rules. Returns the address list for the host or NULL * if no name was found after canonicalization. * NB. this function must operate with a options having undefined members. */ static struct addrinfo * resolve_canonicalize(char **hostp, int port) { int i, direct, ndots; char *cp, *fullhost, newname[NI_MAXHOST]; struct addrinfo *addrs; /* * Attempt to canonicalise addresses, regardless of * whether hostname canonicalisation was requested */ if ((addrs = resolve_addr(*hostp, port, newname, sizeof(newname))) != NULL) { debug2_f("hostname %.100s is address", *hostp); if (strcasecmp(*hostp, newname) != 0) { debug2_f("canonicalised address \"%s\" => \"%s\"", *hostp, newname); free(*hostp); *hostp = xstrdup(newname); } return addrs; } /* * If this looks like an address but didn't parse as one, it might * be an address with an invalid interface scope. Skip further * attempts at canonicalisation. */ if (is_addr_fast(*hostp)) { debug_f("hostname %.100s is an unrecognised address", *hostp); return NULL; } if (options.canonicalize_hostname == SSH_CANONICALISE_NO) return NULL; /* * Don't attempt to canonicalize names that will be interpreted by * a proxy unless the user specifically requests so. */ direct = option_clear_or_none(options.proxy_command) && options.jump_host == NULL; if (!direct && options.canonicalize_hostname != SSH_CANONICALISE_ALWAYS) return NULL; /* If domain name is anchored, then resolve it now */ if ((*hostp)[strlen(*hostp) - 1] == '.') { debug3_f("name is fully qualified"); fullhost = xstrdup(*hostp); if ((addrs = resolve_host(fullhost, port, 0, newname, sizeof(newname))) != NULL) goto found; free(fullhost); goto notfound; } /* Don't apply canonicalization to sufficiently-qualified hostnames */ ndots = 0; for (cp = *hostp; *cp != '\0'; cp++) { if (*cp == '.') ndots++; } if (ndots > options.canonicalize_max_dots) { debug3_f("not canonicalizing hostname \"%s\" (max dots %d)", *hostp, options.canonicalize_max_dots); return NULL; } /* Attempt each supplied suffix */ for (i = 0; i < options.num_canonical_domains; i++) { if (strcasecmp(options.canonical_domains[i], "none") == 0) break; xasprintf(&fullhost, "%s.%s.", *hostp, options.canonical_domains[i]); debug3_f("attempting \"%s\" => \"%s\"", *hostp, fullhost); if ((addrs = resolve_host(fullhost, port, 0, newname, sizeof(newname))) == NULL) { free(fullhost); continue; } found: /* Remove trailing '.' */ fullhost[strlen(fullhost) - 1] = '\0'; /* Follow CNAME if requested */ if (!check_follow_cname(direct, &fullhost, newname)) { debug("Canonicalized hostname \"%s\" => \"%s\"", *hostp, fullhost); } free(*hostp); *hostp = fullhost; return addrs; } notfound: if (!options.canonicalize_fallback_local) fatal("%s: Could not resolve host \"%s\"", __progname, *hostp); debug2_f("host %s not found in any suffix", *hostp); return NULL; } /* * Check the result of hostkey loading, ignoring some errors and either * discarding the key or fatal()ing for others. */ static void check_load(int r, struct sshkey **k, const char *path, const char *message) { switch (r) { case 0: /* Check RSA keys size and discard if undersized */ if (k != NULL && *k != NULL && (r = sshkey_check_rsa_length(*k, options.required_rsa_size)) != 0) { error_r(r, "load %s \"%s\"", message, path); free(*k); *k = NULL; } break; case SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR: case SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL: fatal_r(r, "load %s \"%s\"", message, path); case SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR: /* Ignore missing files */ if (errno == ENOENT) break; /* FALLTHROUGH */ default: error_r(r, "load %s \"%s\"", message, path); break; } } /* * Read per-user configuration file. Ignore the system wide config * file if the user specifies a config file on the command line. */ static void process_config_files(const char *host_name, struct passwd *pw, int final_pass, int *want_final_pass) { char buf[PATH_MAX]; int r; if (config != NULL) { if (strcasecmp(config, "none") != 0 && !read_config_file(config, pw, host, host_name, &options, SSHCONF_USERCONF | (final_pass ? SSHCONF_FINAL : 0), want_final_pass)) fatal("Can't open user config file %.100s: " "%.100s", config, strerror(errno)); } else { r = snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "%s/%s", pw->pw_dir, _PATH_SSH_USER_CONFFILE); if (r > 0 && (size_t)r < sizeof(buf)) (void)read_config_file(buf, pw, host, host_name, &options, SSHCONF_CHECKPERM | SSHCONF_USERCONF | (final_pass ? SSHCONF_FINAL : 0), want_final_pass); /* Read systemwide configuration file after user config. */ (void)read_config_file(_PATH_HOST_CONFIG_FILE, pw, host, host_name, &options, final_pass ? SSHCONF_FINAL : 0, want_final_pass); } } /* Rewrite the port number in an addrinfo list of addresses */ static void set_addrinfo_port(struct addrinfo *addrs, int port) { struct addrinfo *addr; for (addr = addrs; addr != NULL; addr = addr->ai_next) { switch (addr->ai_family) { case AF_INET: ((struct sockaddr_in *)addr->ai_addr)-> sin_port = htons(port); break; case AF_INET6: ((struct sockaddr_in6 *)addr->ai_addr)-> sin6_port = htons(port); break; } } } static void ssh_conn_info_free(struct ssh_conn_info *cinfo) { if (cinfo == NULL) return; free(cinfo->conn_hash_hex); free(cinfo->shorthost); free(cinfo->uidstr); free(cinfo->keyalias); free(cinfo->thishost); free(cinfo->host_arg); free(cinfo->portstr); free(cinfo->remhost); free(cinfo->remuser); free(cinfo->homedir); free(cinfo->locuser); free(cinfo); } /* * Main program for the ssh client. */ int main(int ac, char **av) { struct ssh *ssh = NULL; int i, r, opt, exit_status, use_syslog, direct, timeout_ms; int was_addr, config_test = 0, opt_terminated = 0, want_final_pass = 0; char *p, *cp, *line, *argv0, *logfile; char cname[NI_MAXHOST], thishost[NI_MAXHOST]; struct stat st; struct passwd *pw; extern int optind, optreset; extern char *optarg; struct Forward fwd; struct addrinfo *addrs = NULL; size_t n, len; u_int j; struct ssh_conn_info *cinfo = NULL; /* Ensure that fds 0, 1 and 2 are open or directed to /dev/null */ sanitise_stdfd(); /* * Discard other fds that are hanging around. These can cause problem * with backgrounded ssh processes started by ControlPersist. */ closefrom(STDERR_FILENO + 1); __progname = ssh_get_progname(av[0]); #ifndef HAVE_SETPROCTITLE /* Prepare for later setproctitle emulation */ /* Save argv so it isn't clobbered by setproctitle() emulation */ saved_av = xcalloc(ac + 1, sizeof(*saved_av)); for (i = 0; i < ac; i++) saved_av[i] = xstrdup(av[i]); saved_av[i] = NULL; compat_init_setproctitle(ac, av); av = saved_av; #endif seed_rng(); /* Get user data. */ pw = getpwuid(getuid()); if (!pw) { logit("No user exists for uid %lu", (u_long)getuid()); exit(255); } /* Take a copy of the returned structure. */ pw = pwcopy(pw); /* * Set our umask to something reasonable, as some files are created * with the default umask. This will make them world-readable but * writable only by the owner, which is ok for all files for which we * don't set the modes explicitly. */ umask(022 | umask(077)); msetlocale(); /* * Initialize option structure to indicate that no values have been * set. */ initialize_options(&options); /* * Prepare main ssh transport/connection structures */ if ((ssh = ssh_alloc_session_state()) == NULL) fatal("Couldn't allocate session state"); channel_init_channels(ssh); /* Parse command-line arguments. */ host = NULL; use_syslog = 0; logfile = NULL; argv0 = av[0]; again: while ((opt = getopt(ac, av, "1246ab:c:e:fgi:kl:m:no:p:qstvx" "AB:CD:E:F:GI:J:KL:MNO:PQ:R:S:TVw:W:XYy")) != -1) { /* HUZdhjruz */ switch (opt) { case '1': fatal("SSH protocol v.1 is no longer supported"); break; case '2': /* Ignored */ break; case '4': options.address_family = AF_INET; break; case '6': options.address_family = AF_INET6; break; case 'n': options.stdin_null = 1; break; case 'f': options.fork_after_authentication = 1; options.stdin_null = 1; break; case 'x': options.forward_x11 = 0; break; case 'X': options.forward_x11 = 1; break; case 'y': use_syslog = 1; break; case 'E': logfile = optarg; break; case 'G': config_test = 1; break; case 'Y': options.forward_x11 = 1; options.forward_x11_trusted = 1; break; case 'g': options.fwd_opts.gateway_ports = 1; break; case 'O': if (options.stdio_forward_host != NULL) fatal("Cannot specify multiplexing " "command with -W"); else if (muxclient_command != 0) fatal("Multiplexing command already specified"); if (strcmp(optarg, "check") == 0) muxclient_command = SSHMUX_COMMAND_ALIVE_CHECK; else if (strcmp(optarg, "forward") == 0) muxclient_command = SSHMUX_COMMAND_FORWARD; else if (strcmp(optarg, "exit") == 0) muxclient_command = SSHMUX_COMMAND_TERMINATE; else if (strcmp(optarg, "stop") == 0) muxclient_command = SSHMUX_COMMAND_STOP; else if (strcmp(optarg, "cancel") == 0) muxclient_command = SSHMUX_COMMAND_CANCEL_FWD; else if (strcmp(optarg, "proxy") == 0) muxclient_command = SSHMUX_COMMAND_PROXY; else fatal("Invalid multiplex command."); break; case 'P': /* deprecated */ break; case 'Q': cp = NULL; if (strcmp(optarg, "cipher") == 0 || strcasecmp(optarg, "Ciphers") == 0) cp = cipher_alg_list('\n', 0); else if (strcmp(optarg, "cipher-auth") == 0) cp = cipher_alg_list('\n', 1); else if (strcmp(optarg, "mac") == 0 || strcasecmp(optarg, "MACs") == 0) cp = mac_alg_list('\n'); else if (strcmp(optarg, "kex") == 0 || strcasecmp(optarg, "KexAlgorithms") == 0) cp = kex_alg_list('\n'); else if (strcmp(optarg, "key") == 0) cp = sshkey_alg_list(0, 0, 0, '\n'); else if (strcmp(optarg, "key-cert") == 0) cp = sshkey_alg_list(1, 0, 0, '\n'); else if (strcmp(optarg, "key-plain") == 0) cp = sshkey_alg_list(0, 1, 0, '\n'); else if (strcmp(optarg, "key-sig") == 0 || + strcasecmp(optarg, "CASignatureAlgorithms") == 0 || strcasecmp(optarg, "PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes") == 0 || /* deprecated name */ strcasecmp(optarg, "PubkeyAcceptedAlgorithms") == 0 || strcasecmp(optarg, "HostKeyAlgorithms") == 0 || strcasecmp(optarg, "HostbasedKeyTypes") == 0 || /* deprecated name */ strcasecmp(optarg, "HostbasedAcceptedKeyTypes") == 0 || /* deprecated name */ strcasecmp(optarg, "HostbasedAcceptedAlgorithms") == 0) cp = sshkey_alg_list(0, 0, 1, '\n'); else if (strcmp(optarg, "sig") == 0) cp = sshkey_alg_list(0, 1, 1, '\n'); else if (strcmp(optarg, "protocol-version") == 0) cp = xstrdup("2"); else if (strcmp(optarg, "compression") == 0) { cp = xstrdup(compression_alg_list(0)); len = strlen(cp); for (n = 0; n < len; n++) if (cp[n] == ',') cp[n] = '\n'; } else if (strcmp(optarg, "help") == 0) { cp = xstrdup( "cipher\ncipher-auth\ncompression\nkex\n" "key\nkey-cert\nkey-plain\nkey-sig\nmac\n" "protocol-version\nsig"); } if (cp == NULL) fatal("Unsupported query \"%s\"", optarg); printf("%s\n", cp); free(cp); exit(0); break; case 'a': options.forward_agent = 0; break; case 'A': options.forward_agent = 1; break; case 'k': options.gss_deleg_creds = 0; break; case 'K': options.gss_authentication = 1; options.gss_deleg_creds = 1; break; case 'i': p = tilde_expand_filename(optarg, getuid()); if (stat(p, &st) == -1) fprintf(stderr, "Warning: Identity file %s " "not accessible: %s.\n", p, strerror(errno)); else add_identity_file(&options, NULL, p, 1); free(p); break; case 'I': #ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11 free(options.pkcs11_provider); options.pkcs11_provider = xstrdup(optarg); #else fprintf(stderr, "no support for PKCS#11.\n"); #endif break; case 'J': if (options.jump_host != NULL) { fatal("Only a single -J option is permitted " "(use commas to separate multiple " "jump hops)"); } if (options.proxy_command != NULL) fatal("Cannot specify -J with ProxyCommand"); if (parse_jump(optarg, &options, 1) == -1) fatal("Invalid -J argument"); options.proxy_command = xstrdup("none"); break; case 't': if (options.request_tty == REQUEST_TTY_YES) options.request_tty = REQUEST_TTY_FORCE; else options.request_tty = REQUEST_TTY_YES; break; case 'v': if (debug_flag == 0) { debug_flag = 1; options.log_level = SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG1; } else { if (options.log_level < SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG3) { debug_flag++; options.log_level++; } } break; case 'V': fprintf(stderr, "%s, %s\n", SSH_RELEASE, SSH_OPENSSL_VERSION); exit(0); break; case 'w': if (options.tun_open == -1) options.tun_open = SSH_TUNMODE_DEFAULT; options.tun_local = a2tun(optarg, &options.tun_remote); if (options.tun_local == SSH_TUNID_ERR) { fprintf(stderr, "Bad tun device '%s'\n", optarg); exit(255); } break; case 'W': if (options.stdio_forward_host != NULL) fatal("stdio forward already specified"); if (muxclient_command != 0) fatal("Cannot specify stdio forward with -O"); if (parse_forward(&fwd, optarg, 1, 0)) { options.stdio_forward_host = fwd.listen_host; options.stdio_forward_port = fwd.listen_port; free(fwd.connect_host); } else { fprintf(stderr, "Bad stdio forwarding specification '%s'\n", optarg); exit(255); } options.request_tty = REQUEST_TTY_NO; options.session_type = SESSION_TYPE_NONE; break; case 'q': options.log_level = SYSLOG_LEVEL_QUIET; break; case 'e': if (optarg[0] == '^' && optarg[2] == 0 && (u_char) optarg[1] >= 64 && (u_char) optarg[1] < 128) options.escape_char = (u_char) optarg[1] & 31; else if (strlen(optarg) == 1) options.escape_char = (u_char) optarg[0]; else if (strcmp(optarg, "none") == 0) options.escape_char = SSH_ESCAPECHAR_NONE; else { fprintf(stderr, "Bad escape character '%s'.\n", optarg); exit(255); } break; case 'c': if (!ciphers_valid(*optarg == '+' || *optarg == '^' ? optarg + 1 : optarg)) { fprintf(stderr, "Unknown cipher type '%s'\n", optarg); exit(255); } free(options.ciphers); options.ciphers = xstrdup(optarg); break; case 'm': if (mac_valid(optarg)) { free(options.macs); options.macs = xstrdup(optarg); } else { fprintf(stderr, "Unknown mac type '%s'\n", optarg); exit(255); } break; case 'M': if (options.control_master == SSHCTL_MASTER_YES) options.control_master = SSHCTL_MASTER_ASK; else options.control_master = SSHCTL_MASTER_YES; break; case 'p': if (options.port == -1) { options.port = a2port(optarg); if (options.port <= 0) { fprintf(stderr, "Bad port '%s'\n", optarg); exit(255); } } break; case 'l': if (options.user == NULL) options.user = optarg; break; case 'L': if (parse_forward(&fwd, optarg, 0, 0)) add_local_forward(&options, &fwd); else { fprintf(stderr, "Bad local forwarding specification '%s'\n", optarg); exit(255); } break; case 'R': if (parse_forward(&fwd, optarg, 0, 1) || parse_forward(&fwd, optarg, 1, 1)) { add_remote_forward(&options, &fwd); } else { fprintf(stderr, "Bad remote forwarding specification " "'%s'\n", optarg); exit(255); } break; case 'D': if (parse_forward(&fwd, optarg, 1, 0)) { add_local_forward(&options, &fwd); } else { fprintf(stderr, "Bad dynamic forwarding specification " "'%s'\n", optarg); exit(255); } break; case 'C': #ifdef WITH_ZLIB options.compression = 1; #else error("Compression not supported, disabling."); #endif break; case 'N': if (options.session_type != -1 && options.session_type != SESSION_TYPE_NONE) fatal("Cannot specify -N with -s/SessionType"); options.session_type = SESSION_TYPE_NONE; options.request_tty = REQUEST_TTY_NO; break; case 'T': options.request_tty = REQUEST_TTY_NO; break; case 'o': line = xstrdup(optarg); if (process_config_line(&options, pw, host ? host : "", host ? host : "", line, "command-line", 0, NULL, SSHCONF_USERCONF) != 0) exit(255); free(line); break; case 's': if (options.session_type != -1 && options.session_type != SESSION_TYPE_SUBSYSTEM) fatal("Cannot specify -s with -N/SessionType"); options.session_type = SESSION_TYPE_SUBSYSTEM; break; case 'S': free(options.control_path); options.control_path = xstrdup(optarg); break; case 'b': options.bind_address = optarg; break; case 'B': options.bind_interface = optarg; break; case 'F': config = optarg; break; default: usage(); } } if (optind > 1 && strcmp(av[optind - 1], "--") == 0) opt_terminated = 1; ac -= optind; av += optind; if (ac > 0 && !host) { int tport; char *tuser; switch (parse_ssh_uri(*av, &tuser, &host, &tport)) { case -1: usage(); break; case 0: if (options.user == NULL) { options.user = tuser; tuser = NULL; } free(tuser); if (options.port == -1 && tport != -1) options.port = tport; break; default: p = xstrdup(*av); cp = strrchr(p, '@'); if (cp != NULL) { if (cp == p) usage(); if (options.user == NULL) { options.user = p; p = NULL; } *cp++ = '\0'; host = xstrdup(cp); free(p); } else host = p; break; } if (ac > 1 && !opt_terminated) { optind = optreset = 1; goto again; } ac--, av++; } /* Check that we got a host name. */ if (!host) usage(); options.host_arg = xstrdup(host); /* Initialize the command to execute on remote host. */ if ((command = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) fatal("sshbuf_new failed"); /* * Save the command to execute on the remote host in a buffer. There * is no limit on the length of the command, except by the maximum * packet size. Also sets the tty flag if there is no command. */ if (!ac) { /* No command specified - execute shell on a tty. */ if (options.session_type == SESSION_TYPE_SUBSYSTEM) { fprintf(stderr, "You must specify a subsystem to invoke.\n"); usage(); } } else { /* A command has been specified. Store it into the buffer. */ for (i = 0; i < ac; i++) { if ((r = sshbuf_putf(command, "%s%s", i ? " " : "", av[i])) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "buffer error"); } } ssh_signal(SIGPIPE, SIG_IGN); /* ignore SIGPIPE early */ /* * Initialize "log" output. Since we are the client all output * goes to stderr unless otherwise specified by -y or -E. */ if (use_syslog && logfile != NULL) fatal("Can't specify both -y and -E"); if (logfile != NULL) log_redirect_stderr_to(logfile); log_init(argv0, options.log_level == SYSLOG_LEVEL_NOT_SET ? SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO : options.log_level, options.log_facility == SYSLOG_FACILITY_NOT_SET ? SYSLOG_FACILITY_USER : options.log_facility, !use_syslog); if (debug_flag) logit("%s, %s", SSH_RELEASE, SSH_OPENSSL_VERSION); /* Parse the configuration files */ process_config_files(options.host_arg, pw, 0, &want_final_pass); if (want_final_pass) debug("configuration requests final Match pass"); /* Hostname canonicalisation needs a few options filled. */ fill_default_options_for_canonicalization(&options); /* If the user has replaced the hostname then take it into use now */ if (options.hostname != NULL) { /* NB. Please keep in sync with readconf.c:match_cfg_line() */ cp = percent_expand(options.hostname, "h", host, (char *)NULL); free(host); host = cp; free(options.hostname); options.hostname = xstrdup(host); } /* Don't lowercase addresses, they will be explicitly canonicalised */ if ((was_addr = is_addr(host)) == 0) lowercase(host); /* * Try to canonicalize if requested by configuration or the * hostname is an address. */ if (options.canonicalize_hostname != SSH_CANONICALISE_NO || was_addr) addrs = resolve_canonicalize(&host, options.port); /* * If CanonicalizePermittedCNAMEs have been specified but * other canonicalization did not happen (by not being requested * or by failing with fallback) then the hostname may still be changed * as a result of CNAME following. * * Try to resolve the bare hostname name using the system resolver's * usual search rules and then apply the CNAME follow rules. * * Skip the lookup if a ProxyCommand is being used unless the user * has specifically requested canonicalisation for this case via * CanonicalizeHostname=always */ direct = option_clear_or_none(options.proxy_command) && options.jump_host == NULL; if (addrs == NULL && config_has_permitted_cnames(&options) && (direct || options.canonicalize_hostname == SSH_CANONICALISE_ALWAYS)) { if ((addrs = resolve_host(host, options.port, direct, cname, sizeof(cname))) == NULL) { /* Don't fatal proxied host names not in the DNS */ if (direct) cleanup_exit(255); /* logged in resolve_host */ } else check_follow_cname(direct, &host, cname); } /* * If canonicalisation is enabled then re-parse the configuration * files as new stanzas may match. */ if (options.canonicalize_hostname != 0 && !want_final_pass) { debug("hostname canonicalisation enabled, " "will re-parse configuration"); want_final_pass = 1; } if (want_final_pass) { debug("re-parsing configuration"); free(options.hostname); options.hostname = xstrdup(host); process_config_files(options.host_arg, pw, 1, NULL); /* * Address resolution happens early with canonicalisation * enabled and the port number may have changed since, so * reset it in address list */ if (addrs != NULL && options.port > 0) set_addrinfo_port(addrs, options.port); } /* Fill configuration defaults. */ if (fill_default_options(&options) != 0) cleanup_exit(255); if (options.user == NULL) options.user = xstrdup(pw->pw_name); /* * If ProxyJump option specified, then construct a ProxyCommand now. */ if (options.jump_host != NULL) { char port_s[8]; const char *jumpuser = options.jump_user, *sshbin = argv0; int port = options.port, jumpport = options.jump_port; if (port <= 0) port = default_ssh_port(); if (jumpport <= 0) jumpport = default_ssh_port(); if (jumpuser == NULL) jumpuser = options.user; if (strcmp(options.jump_host, host) == 0 && port == jumpport && strcmp(options.user, jumpuser) == 0) fatal("jumphost loop via %s", options.jump_host); /* * Try to use SSH indicated by argv[0], but fall back to * "ssh" if it appears unavailable. */ if (strchr(argv0, '/') != NULL && access(argv0, X_OK) != 0) sshbin = "ssh"; /* Consistency check */ if (options.proxy_command != NULL) fatal("inconsistent options: ProxyCommand+ProxyJump"); /* Never use FD passing for ProxyJump */ options.proxy_use_fdpass = 0; snprintf(port_s, sizeof(port_s), "%d", options.jump_port); xasprintf(&options.proxy_command, "%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%.*s -W '[%%h]:%%p' %s", sshbin, /* Optional "-l user" argument if jump_user set */ options.jump_user == NULL ? "" : " -l ", options.jump_user == NULL ? "" : options.jump_user, /* Optional "-p port" argument if jump_port set */ options.jump_port <= 0 ? "" : " -p ", options.jump_port <= 0 ? "" : port_s, /* Optional additional jump hosts ",..." */ options.jump_extra == NULL ? "" : " -J ", options.jump_extra == NULL ? "" : options.jump_extra, /* Optional "-F" argument if -F specified */ config == NULL ? "" : " -F ", config == NULL ? "" : config, /* Optional "-v" arguments if -v set */ debug_flag ? " -" : "", debug_flag, "vvv", /* Mandatory hostname */ options.jump_host); debug("Setting implicit ProxyCommand from ProxyJump: %s", options.proxy_command); } if (options.port == 0) options.port = default_ssh_port(); channel_set_af(ssh, options.address_family); /* Tidy and check options */ if (options.host_key_alias != NULL) lowercase(options.host_key_alias); if (options.proxy_command != NULL && strcmp(options.proxy_command, "-") == 0 && options.proxy_use_fdpass) fatal("ProxyCommand=- and ProxyUseFDPass are incompatible"); if (options.update_hostkeys == SSH_UPDATE_HOSTKEYS_ASK) { if (options.control_persist && options.control_path != NULL) { debug("UpdateHostKeys=ask is incompatible with " "ControlPersist; disabling"); options.update_hostkeys = 0; } else if (sshbuf_len(command) != 0 || options.remote_command != NULL || options.request_tty == REQUEST_TTY_NO) { debug("UpdateHostKeys=ask is incompatible with " "remote command execution; disabling"); options.update_hostkeys = 0; } else if (options.log_level < SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO) { /* no point logging anything; user won't see it */ options.update_hostkeys = 0; } } if (options.connection_attempts <= 0) fatal("Invalid number of ConnectionAttempts"); if (sshbuf_len(command) != 0 && options.remote_command != NULL) fatal("Cannot execute command-line and remote command."); /* Cannot fork to background if no command. */ if (options.fork_after_authentication && sshbuf_len(command) == 0 && options.remote_command == NULL && options.session_type != SESSION_TYPE_NONE) fatal("Cannot fork into background without a command " "to execute."); /* reinit */ log_init(argv0, options.log_level, options.log_facility, !use_syslog); for (j = 0; j < options.num_log_verbose; j++) { if (strcasecmp(options.log_verbose[j], "none") == 0) break; log_verbose_add(options.log_verbose[j]); } if (options.request_tty == REQUEST_TTY_YES || options.request_tty == REQUEST_TTY_FORCE) tty_flag = 1; /* Allocate a tty by default if no command specified. */ if (sshbuf_len(command) == 0 && options.remote_command == NULL) tty_flag = options.request_tty != REQUEST_TTY_NO; /* Force no tty */ if (options.request_tty == REQUEST_TTY_NO || (muxclient_command && muxclient_command != SSHMUX_COMMAND_PROXY) || options.session_type == SESSION_TYPE_NONE) tty_flag = 0; /* Do not allocate a tty if stdin is not a tty. */ if ((!isatty(fileno(stdin)) || options.stdin_null) && options.request_tty != REQUEST_TTY_FORCE) { if (tty_flag) logit("Pseudo-terminal will not be allocated because " "stdin is not a terminal."); tty_flag = 0; } /* Set up strings used to percent_expand() arguments */ cinfo = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*cinfo)); if (gethostname(thishost, sizeof(thishost)) == -1) fatal("gethostname: %s", strerror(errno)); cinfo->thishost = xstrdup(thishost); thishost[strcspn(thishost, ".")] = '\0'; cinfo->shorthost = xstrdup(thishost); xasprintf(&cinfo->portstr, "%d", options.port); xasprintf(&cinfo->uidstr, "%llu", (unsigned long long)pw->pw_uid); cinfo->keyalias = xstrdup(options.host_key_alias ? options.host_key_alias : options.host_arg); cinfo->conn_hash_hex = ssh_connection_hash(cinfo->thishost, host, cinfo->portstr, options.user); cinfo->host_arg = xstrdup(options.host_arg); cinfo->remhost = xstrdup(host); cinfo->remuser = xstrdup(options.user); cinfo->homedir = xstrdup(pw->pw_dir); cinfo->locuser = xstrdup(pw->pw_name); /* Find canonic host name. */ if (strchr(host, '.') == NULL) { struct addrinfo hints; struct addrinfo *ai = NULL; int errgai; memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints)); hints.ai_family = options.address_family; hints.ai_flags = AI_CANONNAME; hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM; errgai = getaddrinfo(host, NULL, &hints, &ai); if (errgai == 0) { if (ai->ai_canonname != NULL) { free(host); host = xstrdup(ai->ai_canonname); } freeaddrinfo(ai); } } /* * Expand tokens in arguments. NB. LocalCommand is expanded later, * after port-forwarding is set up, so it may pick up any local * tunnel interface name allocated. */ if (options.remote_command != NULL) { debug3("expanding RemoteCommand: %s", options.remote_command); cp = options.remote_command; options.remote_command = default_client_percent_expand(cp, cinfo); debug3("expanded RemoteCommand: %s", options.remote_command); free(cp); if ((r = sshbuf_put(command, options.remote_command, strlen(options.remote_command))) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "buffer error"); } if (options.control_path != NULL) { cp = tilde_expand_filename(options.control_path, getuid()); free(options.control_path); options.control_path = default_client_percent_dollar_expand(cp, cinfo); free(cp); } if (options.identity_agent != NULL) { p = tilde_expand_filename(options.identity_agent, getuid()); cp = default_client_percent_dollar_expand(p, cinfo); free(p); free(options.identity_agent); options.identity_agent = cp; } if (options.forward_agent_sock_path != NULL) { p = tilde_expand_filename(options.forward_agent_sock_path, getuid()); cp = default_client_percent_dollar_expand(p, cinfo); free(p); free(options.forward_agent_sock_path); options.forward_agent_sock_path = cp; if (stat(options.forward_agent_sock_path, &st) != 0) { error("Cannot forward agent socket path \"%s\": %s", options.forward_agent_sock_path, strerror(errno)); if (options.exit_on_forward_failure) cleanup_exit(255); } } if (options.num_system_hostfiles > 0 && strcasecmp(options.system_hostfiles[0], "none") == 0) { if (options.num_system_hostfiles > 1) fatal("Invalid GlobalKnownHostsFiles: \"none\" " "appears with other entries"); free(options.system_hostfiles[0]); options.system_hostfiles[0] = NULL; options.num_system_hostfiles = 0; } if (options.num_user_hostfiles > 0 && strcasecmp(options.user_hostfiles[0], "none") == 0) { if (options.num_user_hostfiles > 1) fatal("Invalid UserKnownHostsFiles: \"none\" " "appears with other entries"); free(options.user_hostfiles[0]); options.user_hostfiles[0] = NULL; options.num_user_hostfiles = 0; } for (j = 0; j < options.num_user_hostfiles; j++) { if (options.user_hostfiles[j] == NULL) continue; cp = tilde_expand_filename(options.user_hostfiles[j], getuid()); p = default_client_percent_dollar_expand(cp, cinfo); if (strcmp(options.user_hostfiles[j], p) != 0) debug3("expanded UserKnownHostsFile '%s' -> " "'%s'", options.user_hostfiles[j], p); free(options.user_hostfiles[j]); free(cp); options.user_hostfiles[j] = p; } for (i = 0; i < options.num_local_forwards; i++) { if (options.local_forwards[i].listen_path != NULL) { cp = options.local_forwards[i].listen_path; p = options.local_forwards[i].listen_path = default_client_percent_expand(cp, cinfo); if (strcmp(cp, p) != 0) debug3("expanded LocalForward listen path " "'%s' -> '%s'", cp, p); free(cp); } if (options.local_forwards[i].connect_path != NULL) { cp = options.local_forwards[i].connect_path; p = options.local_forwards[i].connect_path = default_client_percent_expand(cp, cinfo); if (strcmp(cp, p) != 0) debug3("expanded LocalForward connect path " "'%s' -> '%s'", cp, p); free(cp); } } for (i = 0; i < options.num_remote_forwards; i++) { if (options.remote_forwards[i].listen_path != NULL) { cp = options.remote_forwards[i].listen_path; p = options.remote_forwards[i].listen_path = default_client_percent_expand(cp, cinfo); if (strcmp(cp, p) != 0) debug3("expanded RemoteForward listen path " "'%s' -> '%s'", cp, p); free(cp); } if (options.remote_forwards[i].connect_path != NULL) { cp = options.remote_forwards[i].connect_path; p = options.remote_forwards[i].connect_path = default_client_percent_expand(cp, cinfo); if (strcmp(cp, p) != 0) debug3("expanded RemoteForward connect path " "'%s' -> '%s'", cp, p); free(cp); } } if (config_test) { dump_client_config(&options, host); exit(0); } /* Expand SecurityKeyProvider if it refers to an environment variable */ if (options.sk_provider != NULL && *options.sk_provider == '$' && strlen(options.sk_provider) > 1) { if ((cp = getenv(options.sk_provider + 1)) == NULL) { debug("Authenticator provider %s did not resolve; " "disabling", options.sk_provider); free(options.sk_provider); options.sk_provider = NULL; } else { debug2("resolved SecurityKeyProvider %s => %s", options.sk_provider, cp); free(options.sk_provider); options.sk_provider = xstrdup(cp); } } if (muxclient_command != 0 && options.control_path == NULL) fatal("No ControlPath specified for \"-O\" command"); if (options.control_path != NULL) { int sock; if ((sock = muxclient(options.control_path)) >= 0) { ssh_packet_set_connection(ssh, sock, sock); ssh_packet_set_mux(ssh); goto skip_connect; } } /* * If hostname canonicalisation was not enabled, then we may not * have yet resolved the hostname. Do so now. */ if (addrs == NULL && options.proxy_command == NULL) { debug2("resolving \"%s\" port %d", host, options.port); if ((addrs = resolve_host(host, options.port, 1, cname, sizeof(cname))) == NULL) cleanup_exit(255); /* resolve_host logs the error */ } if (options.connection_timeout >= INT_MAX/1000) timeout_ms = INT_MAX; else timeout_ms = options.connection_timeout * 1000; /* Open a connection to the remote host. */ if (ssh_connect(ssh, host, options.host_arg, addrs, &hostaddr, options.port, options.connection_attempts, &timeout_ms, options.tcp_keep_alive) != 0) exit(255); if (addrs != NULL) freeaddrinfo(addrs); ssh_packet_set_timeout(ssh, options.server_alive_interval, options.server_alive_count_max); if (timeout_ms > 0) debug3("timeout: %d ms remain after connect", timeout_ms); /* * If we successfully made the connection and we have hostbased auth * enabled, load the public keys so we can later use the ssh-keysign * helper to sign challenges. */ sensitive_data.nkeys = 0; sensitive_data.keys = NULL; if (options.hostbased_authentication) { int loaded = 0; sensitive_data.nkeys = 10; sensitive_data.keys = xcalloc(sensitive_data.nkeys, sizeof(*sensitive_data.keys)); /* XXX check errors? */ #define L_PUBKEY(p,o) do { \ if ((o) >= sensitive_data.nkeys) \ fatal_f("pubkey out of array bounds"); \ check_load(sshkey_load_public(p, &(sensitive_data.keys[o]), NULL), \ &(sensitive_data.keys[o]), p, "pubkey"); \ if (sensitive_data.keys[o] != NULL) { \ debug2("hostbased key %d: %s key from \"%s\"", o, \ sshkey_ssh_name(sensitive_data.keys[o]), p); \ loaded++; \ } \ } while (0) #define L_CERT(p,o) do { \ if ((o) >= sensitive_data.nkeys) \ fatal_f("cert out of array bounds"); \ check_load(sshkey_load_cert(p, &(sensitive_data.keys[o])), \ &(sensitive_data.keys[o]), p, "cert"); \ if (sensitive_data.keys[o] != NULL) { \ debug2("hostbased key %d: %s cert from \"%s\"", o, \ sshkey_ssh_name(sensitive_data.keys[o]), p); \ loaded++; \ } \ } while (0) if (options.hostbased_authentication == 1) { L_CERT(_PATH_HOST_ECDSA_KEY_FILE, 0); L_CERT(_PATH_HOST_ED25519_KEY_FILE, 1); L_CERT(_PATH_HOST_RSA_KEY_FILE, 2); L_CERT(_PATH_HOST_DSA_KEY_FILE, 3); L_PUBKEY(_PATH_HOST_ECDSA_KEY_FILE, 4); L_PUBKEY(_PATH_HOST_ED25519_KEY_FILE, 5); L_PUBKEY(_PATH_HOST_RSA_KEY_FILE, 6); L_PUBKEY(_PATH_HOST_DSA_KEY_FILE, 7); L_CERT(_PATH_HOST_XMSS_KEY_FILE, 8); L_PUBKEY(_PATH_HOST_XMSS_KEY_FILE, 9); if (loaded == 0) debug("HostbasedAuthentication enabled but no " "local public host keys could be loaded."); } } /* load options.identity_files */ load_public_identity_files(cinfo); /* optionally set the SSH_AUTHSOCKET_ENV_NAME variable */ if (options.identity_agent && strcmp(options.identity_agent, SSH_AUTHSOCKET_ENV_NAME) != 0) { if (strcmp(options.identity_agent, "none") == 0) { unsetenv(SSH_AUTHSOCKET_ENV_NAME); } else { cp = options.identity_agent; /* legacy (limited) format */ if (cp[0] == '$' && cp[1] != '{') { if (!valid_env_name(cp + 1)) { fatal("Invalid IdentityAgent " "environment variable name %s", cp); } if ((p = getenv(cp + 1)) == NULL) unsetenv(SSH_AUTHSOCKET_ENV_NAME); else setenv(SSH_AUTHSOCKET_ENV_NAME, p, 1); } else { /* identity_agent specifies a path directly */ setenv(SSH_AUTHSOCKET_ENV_NAME, cp, 1); } } } if (options.forward_agent && options.forward_agent_sock_path != NULL) { cp = options.forward_agent_sock_path; if (cp[0] == '$') { if (!valid_env_name(cp + 1)) { fatal("Invalid ForwardAgent environment variable name %s", cp); } if ((p = getenv(cp + 1)) != NULL) forward_agent_sock_path = xstrdup(p); else options.forward_agent = 0; free(cp); } else { forward_agent_sock_path = cp; } } /* Expand ~ in known host file names. */ tilde_expand_paths(options.system_hostfiles, options.num_system_hostfiles); tilde_expand_paths(options.user_hostfiles, options.num_user_hostfiles); ssh_signal(SIGCHLD, main_sigchld_handler); /* Log into the remote system. Never returns if the login fails. */ ssh_login(ssh, &sensitive_data, host, (struct sockaddr *)&hostaddr, options.port, pw, timeout_ms, cinfo); /* We no longer need the private host keys. Clear them now. */ if (sensitive_data.nkeys != 0) { for (i = 0; i < sensitive_data.nkeys; i++) { if (sensitive_data.keys[i] != NULL) { /* Destroys contents safely */ debug3("clear hostkey %d", i); sshkey_free(sensitive_data.keys[i]); sensitive_data.keys[i] = NULL; } } free(sensitive_data.keys); } for (i = 0; i < options.num_identity_files; i++) { free(options.identity_files[i]); options.identity_files[i] = NULL; if (options.identity_keys[i]) { sshkey_free(options.identity_keys[i]); options.identity_keys[i] = NULL; } } for (i = 0; i < options.num_certificate_files; i++) { free(options.certificate_files[i]); options.certificate_files[i] = NULL; } #ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11 (void)pkcs11_del_provider(options.pkcs11_provider); #endif skip_connect: exit_status = ssh_session2(ssh, cinfo); ssh_conn_info_free(cinfo); ssh_packet_close(ssh); if (options.control_path != NULL && muxserver_sock != -1) unlink(options.control_path); /* Kill ProxyCommand if it is running. */ ssh_kill_proxy_command(); return exit_status; } static void control_persist_detach(void) { pid_t pid; debug_f("backgrounding master process"); /* * master (current process) into the background, and make the * foreground process a client of the backgrounded master. */ switch ((pid = fork())) { case -1: fatal_f("fork: %s", strerror(errno)); case 0: /* Child: master process continues mainloop */ break; default: /* Parent: set up mux client to connect to backgrounded master */ debug2_f("background process is %ld", (long)pid); options.stdin_null = ostdin_null_flag; options.request_tty = orequest_tty; tty_flag = otty_flag; options.session_type = osession_type; close(muxserver_sock); muxserver_sock = -1; options.control_master = SSHCTL_MASTER_NO; muxclient(options.control_path); /* muxclient() doesn't return on success. */ fatal("Failed to connect to new control master"); } if (stdfd_devnull(1, 1, !(log_is_on_stderr() && debug_flag)) == -1) error_f("stdfd_devnull failed"); daemon(1, 1); setproctitle("%s [mux]", options.control_path); } /* Do fork() after authentication. Used by "ssh -f" */ static void fork_postauth(void) { if (need_controlpersist_detach) control_persist_detach(); debug("forking to background"); options.fork_after_authentication = 0; if (daemon(1, 1) == -1) fatal("daemon() failed: %.200s", strerror(errno)); if (stdfd_devnull(1, 1, !(log_is_on_stderr() && debug_flag)) == -1) error_f("stdfd_devnull failed"); } static void forwarding_success(void) { if (forward_confirms_pending == -1) return; if (--forward_confirms_pending == 0) { debug_f("all expected forwarding replies received"); if (options.fork_after_authentication) fork_postauth(); } else { debug2_f("%d expected forwarding replies remaining", forward_confirms_pending); } } /* Callback for remote forward global requests */ static void ssh_confirm_remote_forward(struct ssh *ssh, int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt) { struct Forward *rfwd = (struct Forward *)ctxt; u_int port; int r; /* XXX verbose() on failure? */ debug("remote forward %s for: listen %s%s%d, connect %s:%d", type == SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_SUCCESS ? "success" : "failure", rfwd->listen_path ? rfwd->listen_path : rfwd->listen_host ? rfwd->listen_host : "", (rfwd->listen_path || rfwd->listen_host) ? ":" : "", rfwd->listen_port, rfwd->connect_path ? rfwd->connect_path : rfwd->connect_host, rfwd->connect_port); if (rfwd->listen_path == NULL && rfwd->listen_port == 0) { if (type == SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_SUCCESS) { if ((r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &port)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "parse packet"); if (port > 65535) { error("Invalid allocated port %u for remote " "forward to %s:%d", port, rfwd->connect_host, rfwd->connect_port); /* Ensure failure processing runs below */ type = SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_FAILURE; channel_update_permission(ssh, rfwd->handle, -1); } else { rfwd->allocated_port = (int)port; logit("Allocated port %u for remote " "forward to %s:%d", rfwd->allocated_port, rfwd->connect_path ? rfwd->connect_path : rfwd->connect_host, rfwd->connect_port); channel_update_permission(ssh, rfwd->handle, rfwd->allocated_port); } } else { channel_update_permission(ssh, rfwd->handle, -1); } } if (type == SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_FAILURE) { if (options.exit_on_forward_failure) { if (rfwd->listen_path != NULL) fatal("Error: remote port forwarding failed " "for listen path %s", rfwd->listen_path); else fatal("Error: remote port forwarding failed " "for listen port %d", rfwd->listen_port); } else { if (rfwd->listen_path != NULL) logit("Warning: remote port forwarding failed " "for listen path %s", rfwd->listen_path); else logit("Warning: remote port forwarding failed " "for listen port %d", rfwd->listen_port); } } forwarding_success(); } static void client_cleanup_stdio_fwd(struct ssh *ssh, int id, int force, void *arg) { debug("stdio forwarding: done"); cleanup_exit(0); } static void ssh_stdio_confirm(struct ssh *ssh, int id, int success, void *arg) { if (!success) fatal("stdio forwarding failed"); } static void ssh_tun_confirm(struct ssh *ssh, int id, int success, void *arg) { if (!success) { error("Tunnel forwarding failed"); if (options.exit_on_forward_failure) cleanup_exit(255); } debug_f("tunnel forward established, id=%d", id); forwarding_success(); } static void ssh_init_stdio_forwarding(struct ssh *ssh) { Channel *c; int in, out; if (options.stdio_forward_host == NULL) return; debug3_f("%s:%d", options.stdio_forward_host, options.stdio_forward_port); if ((in = dup(STDIN_FILENO)) == -1 || (out = dup(STDOUT_FILENO)) == -1) fatal_f("dup() in/out failed"); if ((c = channel_connect_stdio_fwd(ssh, options.stdio_forward_host, options.stdio_forward_port, in, out, CHANNEL_NONBLOCK_STDIO)) == NULL) fatal_f("channel_connect_stdio_fwd failed"); channel_register_cleanup(ssh, c->self, client_cleanup_stdio_fwd, 0); channel_register_open_confirm(ssh, c->self, ssh_stdio_confirm, NULL); } static void ssh_init_forward_permissions(struct ssh *ssh, const char *what, char **opens, u_int num_opens) { u_int i; int port; char *addr, *arg, *oarg; int where = FORWARD_LOCAL; channel_clear_permission(ssh, FORWARD_ADM, where); if (num_opens == 0) return; /* permit any */ /* handle keywords: "any" / "none" */ if (num_opens == 1 && strcmp(opens[0], "any") == 0) return; if (num_opens == 1 && strcmp(opens[0], "none") == 0) { channel_disable_admin(ssh, where); return; } /* Otherwise treat it as a list of permitted host:port */ for (i = 0; i < num_opens; i++) { oarg = arg = xstrdup(opens[i]); addr = hpdelim(&arg); if (addr == NULL) fatal_f("missing host in %s", what); addr = cleanhostname(addr); if (arg == NULL || ((port = permitopen_port(arg)) < 0)) fatal_f("bad port number in %s", what); /* Send it to channels layer */ channel_add_permission(ssh, FORWARD_ADM, where, addr, port); free(oarg); } } static void ssh_init_forwarding(struct ssh *ssh, char **ifname) { int success = 0; int i; ssh_init_forward_permissions(ssh, "permitremoteopen", options.permitted_remote_opens, options.num_permitted_remote_opens); if (options.exit_on_forward_failure) forward_confirms_pending = 0; /* track pending requests */ /* Initiate local TCP/IP port forwardings. */ for (i = 0; i < options.num_local_forwards; i++) { debug("Local connections to %.200s:%d forwarded to remote " "address %.200s:%d", (options.local_forwards[i].listen_path != NULL) ? options.local_forwards[i].listen_path : (options.local_forwards[i].listen_host == NULL) ? (options.fwd_opts.gateway_ports ? "*" : "LOCALHOST") : options.local_forwards[i].listen_host, options.local_forwards[i].listen_port, (options.local_forwards[i].connect_path != NULL) ? options.local_forwards[i].connect_path : options.local_forwards[i].connect_host, options.local_forwards[i].connect_port); success += channel_setup_local_fwd_listener(ssh, &options.local_forwards[i], &options.fwd_opts); } if (i > 0 && success != i && options.exit_on_forward_failure) fatal("Could not request local forwarding."); if (i > 0 && success == 0) error("Could not request local forwarding."); /* Initiate remote TCP/IP port forwardings. */ for (i = 0; i < options.num_remote_forwards; i++) { debug("Remote connections from %.200s:%d forwarded to " "local address %.200s:%d", (options.remote_forwards[i].listen_path != NULL) ? options.remote_forwards[i].listen_path : (options.remote_forwards[i].listen_host == NULL) ? "LOCALHOST" : options.remote_forwards[i].listen_host, options.remote_forwards[i].listen_port, (options.remote_forwards[i].connect_path != NULL) ? options.remote_forwards[i].connect_path : options.remote_forwards[i].connect_host, options.remote_forwards[i].connect_port); if ((options.remote_forwards[i].handle = channel_request_remote_forwarding(ssh, &options.remote_forwards[i])) >= 0) { client_register_global_confirm( ssh_confirm_remote_forward, &options.remote_forwards[i]); forward_confirms_pending++; } else if (options.exit_on_forward_failure) fatal("Could not request remote forwarding."); else logit("Warning: Could not request remote forwarding."); } /* Initiate tunnel forwarding. */ if (options.tun_open != SSH_TUNMODE_NO) { if ((*ifname = client_request_tun_fwd(ssh, options.tun_open, options.tun_local, options.tun_remote, ssh_tun_confirm, NULL)) != NULL) forward_confirms_pending++; else if (options.exit_on_forward_failure) fatal("Could not request tunnel forwarding."); else error("Could not request tunnel forwarding."); } if (forward_confirms_pending > 0) { debug_f("expecting replies for %d forwards", forward_confirms_pending); } } static void check_agent_present(void) { int r; if (options.forward_agent) { /* Clear agent forwarding if we don't have an agent. */ if ((r = ssh_get_authentication_socket(NULL)) != 0) { options.forward_agent = 0; if (r != SSH_ERR_AGENT_NOT_PRESENT) debug_r(r, "ssh_get_authentication_socket"); } } } static void ssh_session2_setup(struct ssh *ssh, int id, int success, void *arg) { extern char **environ; const char *display, *term; int r, interactive = tty_flag; char *proto = NULL, *data = NULL; if (!success) return; /* No need for error message, channels code sends one */ display = getenv("DISPLAY"); if (display == NULL && options.forward_x11) debug("X11 forwarding requested but DISPLAY not set"); if (options.forward_x11 && client_x11_get_proto(ssh, display, options.xauth_location, options.forward_x11_trusted, options.forward_x11_timeout, &proto, &data) == 0) { /* Request forwarding with authentication spoofing. */ debug("Requesting X11 forwarding with authentication " "spoofing."); x11_request_forwarding_with_spoofing(ssh, id, display, proto, data, 1); client_expect_confirm(ssh, id, "X11 forwarding", CONFIRM_WARN); /* XXX exit_on_forward_failure */ interactive = 1; } check_agent_present(); if (options.forward_agent) { debug("Requesting authentication agent forwarding."); channel_request_start(ssh, id, "auth-agent-req@openssh.com", 0); if ((r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "send packet"); } /* Tell the packet module whether this is an interactive session. */ ssh_packet_set_interactive(ssh, interactive, options.ip_qos_interactive, options.ip_qos_bulk); if ((term = lookup_env_in_list("TERM", options.setenv, options.num_setenv)) == NULL || *term == '\0') term = getenv("TERM"); client_session2_setup(ssh, id, tty_flag, options.session_type == SESSION_TYPE_SUBSYSTEM, term, NULL, fileno(stdin), command, environ); } /* open new channel for a session */ static int ssh_session2_open(struct ssh *ssh) { Channel *c; int window, packetmax, in, out, err; if (options.stdin_null) { in = open(_PATH_DEVNULL, O_RDONLY); } else { in = dup(STDIN_FILENO); } out = dup(STDOUT_FILENO); err = dup(STDERR_FILENO); if (in == -1 || out == -1 || err == -1) fatal("dup() in/out/err failed"); window = CHAN_SES_WINDOW_DEFAULT; packetmax = CHAN_SES_PACKET_DEFAULT; if (tty_flag) { window >>= 1; packetmax >>= 1; } c = channel_new(ssh, "session", SSH_CHANNEL_OPENING, in, out, err, window, packetmax, CHAN_EXTENDED_WRITE, "client-session", CHANNEL_NONBLOCK_STDIO); debug3_f("channel_new: %d", c->self); channel_send_open(ssh, c->self); if (options.session_type != SESSION_TYPE_NONE) channel_register_open_confirm(ssh, c->self, ssh_session2_setup, NULL); return c->self; } static int ssh_session2(struct ssh *ssh, const struct ssh_conn_info *cinfo) { int r, id = -1; char *cp, *tun_fwd_ifname = NULL; /* XXX should be pre-session */ if (!options.control_persist) ssh_init_stdio_forwarding(ssh); ssh_init_forwarding(ssh, &tun_fwd_ifname); if (options.local_command != NULL) { debug3("expanding LocalCommand: %s", options.local_command); cp = options.local_command; options.local_command = percent_expand(cp, DEFAULT_CLIENT_PERCENT_EXPAND_ARGS(cinfo), "T", tun_fwd_ifname == NULL ? "NONE" : tun_fwd_ifname, (char *)NULL); debug3("expanded LocalCommand: %s", options.local_command); free(cp); } /* Start listening for multiplex clients */ if (!ssh_packet_get_mux(ssh)) muxserver_listen(ssh); /* * If we are in control persist mode and have a working mux listen * socket, then prepare to background ourselves and have a foreground * client attach as a control client. * NB. we must save copies of the flags that we override for * the backgrounding, since we defer attachment of the client until * after the connection is fully established (in particular, * async rfwd replies have been received for ExitOnForwardFailure). */ if (options.control_persist && muxserver_sock != -1) { ostdin_null_flag = options.stdin_null; osession_type = options.session_type; orequest_tty = options.request_tty; otty_flag = tty_flag; options.stdin_null = 1; options.session_type = SESSION_TYPE_NONE; tty_flag = 0; if (!options.fork_after_authentication && (osession_type != SESSION_TYPE_NONE || options.stdio_forward_host != NULL)) need_controlpersist_detach = 1; options.fork_after_authentication = 1; } /* * ControlPersist mux listen socket setup failed, attempt the * stdio forward setup that we skipped earlier. */ if (options.control_persist && muxserver_sock == -1) ssh_init_stdio_forwarding(ssh); if (options.session_type != SESSION_TYPE_NONE) id = ssh_session2_open(ssh); else { ssh_packet_set_interactive(ssh, options.control_master == SSHCTL_MASTER_NO, options.ip_qos_interactive, options.ip_qos_bulk); } /* If we don't expect to open a new session, then disallow it */ if (options.control_master == SSHCTL_MASTER_NO && (ssh->compat & SSH_NEW_OPENSSH)) { debug("Requesting no-more-sessions@openssh.com"); if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_GLOBAL_REQUEST)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, "no-more-sessions@openssh.com")) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_u8(ssh, 0)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "send packet"); } /* Execute a local command */ if (options.local_command != NULL && options.permit_local_command) ssh_local_cmd(options.local_command); /* * stdout is now owned by the session channel; clobber it here * so future channel closes are propagated to the local fd. * NB. this can only happen after LocalCommand has completed, * as it may want to write to stdout. */ if (!need_controlpersist_detach && stdfd_devnull(0, 1, 0) == -1) error_f("stdfd_devnull failed"); /* * If requested and we are not interested in replies to remote * forwarding requests, then let ssh continue in the background. */ if (options.fork_after_authentication) { if (options.exit_on_forward_failure && options.num_remote_forwards > 0) { debug("deferring postauth fork until remote forward " "confirmation received"); } else fork_postauth(); } return client_loop(ssh, tty_flag, tty_flag ? options.escape_char : SSH_ESCAPECHAR_NONE, id); } /* Loads all IdentityFile and CertificateFile keys */ static void load_public_identity_files(const struct ssh_conn_info *cinfo) { char *filename, *cp; struct sshkey *public; int i; u_int n_ids, n_certs; char *identity_files[SSH_MAX_IDENTITY_FILES]; struct sshkey *identity_keys[SSH_MAX_IDENTITY_FILES]; int identity_file_userprovided[SSH_MAX_IDENTITY_FILES]; char *certificate_files[SSH_MAX_CERTIFICATE_FILES]; struct sshkey *certificates[SSH_MAX_CERTIFICATE_FILES]; int certificate_file_userprovided[SSH_MAX_CERTIFICATE_FILES]; #ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11 struct sshkey **keys = NULL; char **comments = NULL; int nkeys; #endif /* PKCS11 */ n_ids = n_certs = 0; memset(identity_files, 0, sizeof(identity_files)); memset(identity_keys, 0, sizeof(identity_keys)); memset(identity_file_userprovided, 0, sizeof(identity_file_userprovided)); memset(certificate_files, 0, sizeof(certificate_files)); memset(certificates, 0, sizeof(certificates)); memset(certificate_file_userprovided, 0, sizeof(certificate_file_userprovided)); #ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11 if (options.pkcs11_provider != NULL && options.num_identity_files < SSH_MAX_IDENTITY_FILES && (pkcs11_init(!options.batch_mode) == 0) && (nkeys = pkcs11_add_provider(options.pkcs11_provider, NULL, &keys, &comments)) > 0) { for (i = 0; i < nkeys; i++) { if (n_ids >= SSH_MAX_IDENTITY_FILES) { sshkey_free(keys[i]); free(comments[i]); continue; } identity_keys[n_ids] = keys[i]; identity_files[n_ids] = comments[i]; /* transferred */ n_ids++; } free(keys); free(comments); } #endif /* ENABLE_PKCS11 */ for (i = 0; i < options.num_identity_files; i++) { if (n_ids >= SSH_MAX_IDENTITY_FILES || strcasecmp(options.identity_files[i], "none") == 0) { free(options.identity_files[i]); options.identity_files[i] = NULL; continue; } cp = tilde_expand_filename(options.identity_files[i], getuid()); filename = default_client_percent_dollar_expand(cp, cinfo); free(cp); check_load(sshkey_load_public(filename, &public, NULL), &public, filename, "pubkey"); debug("identity file %s type %d", filename, public ? public->type : -1); free(options.identity_files[i]); identity_files[n_ids] = filename; identity_keys[n_ids] = public; identity_file_userprovided[n_ids] = options.identity_file_userprovided[i]; if (++n_ids >= SSH_MAX_IDENTITY_FILES) continue; /* * If no certificates have been explicitly listed then try * to add the default certificate variant too. */ if (options.num_certificate_files != 0) continue; xasprintf(&cp, "%s-cert", filename); check_load(sshkey_load_public(cp, &public, NULL), &public, filename, "pubkey"); debug("identity file %s type %d", cp, public ? public->type : -1); if (public == NULL) { free(cp); continue; } if (!sshkey_is_cert(public)) { debug_f("key %s type %s is not a certificate", cp, sshkey_type(public)); sshkey_free(public); free(cp); continue; } /* NB. leave filename pointing to private key */ identity_files[n_ids] = xstrdup(filename); identity_keys[n_ids] = public; identity_file_userprovided[n_ids] = options.identity_file_userprovided[i]; n_ids++; } if (options.num_certificate_files > SSH_MAX_CERTIFICATE_FILES) fatal_f("too many certificates"); for (i = 0; i < options.num_certificate_files; i++) { cp = tilde_expand_filename(options.certificate_files[i], getuid()); filename = default_client_percent_dollar_expand(cp, cinfo); free(cp); check_load(sshkey_load_public(filename, &public, NULL), &public, filename, "certificate"); debug("certificate file %s type %d", filename, public ? public->type : -1); free(options.certificate_files[i]); options.certificate_files[i] = NULL; if (public == NULL) { free(filename); continue; } if (!sshkey_is_cert(public)) { debug_f("key %s type %s is not a certificate", filename, sshkey_type(public)); sshkey_free(public); free(filename); continue; } certificate_files[n_certs] = filename; certificates[n_certs] = public; certificate_file_userprovided[n_certs] = options.certificate_file_userprovided[i]; ++n_certs; } options.num_identity_files = n_ids; memcpy(options.identity_files, identity_files, sizeof(identity_files)); memcpy(options.identity_keys, identity_keys, sizeof(identity_keys)); memcpy(options.identity_file_userprovided, identity_file_userprovided, sizeof(identity_file_userprovided)); options.num_certificate_files = n_certs; memcpy(options.certificate_files, certificate_files, sizeof(certificate_files)); memcpy(options.certificates, certificates, sizeof(certificates)); memcpy(options.certificate_file_userprovided, certificate_file_userprovided, sizeof(certificate_file_userprovided)); } static void main_sigchld_handler(int sig) { int save_errno = errno; pid_t pid; int status; while ((pid = waitpid(-1, &status, WNOHANG)) > 0 || (pid == -1 && errno == EINTR)) ; errno = save_errno; } diff --git a/crypto/openssh/ssh_config.5 b/crypto/openssh/ssh_config.5 index 7c24e12dfdee..ad4354083469 100644 --- a/crypto/openssh/ssh_config.5 +++ b/crypto/openssh/ssh_config.5 @@ -1,2210 +1,2210 @@ .\" .\" Author: Tatu Ylonen .\" Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen , Espoo, Finland .\" All rights reserved .\" .\" As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software .\" can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this .\" software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is .\" incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be .\" called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell". .\" .\" Copyright (c) 1999,2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. .\" Copyright (c) 1999 Aaron Campbell. All rights reserved. .\" Copyright (c) 1999 Theo de Raadt. All rights reserved. .\" .\" Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without .\" modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions .\" are met: .\" 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright .\" notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. .\" 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright .\" notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the .\" documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. .\" .\" THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR .\" IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES .\" OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. .\" IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, .\" INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT .\" NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, .\" DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY .\" THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT .\" (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF .\" THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. .\" -.\" $OpenBSD: ssh_config.5,v 1.378 2023/01/13 07:13:40 jmc Exp $ -.Dd $Mdocdate: January 13 2023 $ +.\" $OpenBSD: ssh_config.5,v 1.379 2023/03/10 02:32:04 djm Exp $ +.Dd $Mdocdate: March 10 2023 $ .Dt SSH_CONFIG 5 .Os .Sh NAME .Nm ssh_config .Nd OpenSSH client configuration file .Sh DESCRIPTION .Xr ssh 1 obtains configuration data from the following sources in the following order: .Pp .Bl -enum -offset indent -compact .It command-line options .It user's configuration file .Pq Pa ~/.ssh/config .It system-wide configuration file .Pq Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_config .El .Pp -For each parameter, the first obtained value +Unless noted otherwise, for each parameter, the first obtained value will be used. The configuration files contain sections separated by .Cm Host specifications, and that section is only applied for hosts that match one of the patterns given in the specification. The matched host name is usually the one given on the command line (see the .Cm CanonicalizeHostname option for exceptions). .Pp Since the first obtained value for each parameter is used, more host-specific declarations should be given near the beginning of the file, and general defaults at the end. .Pp The file contains keyword-argument pairs, one per line. Lines starting with .Ql # and empty lines are interpreted as comments. Arguments may optionally be enclosed in double quotes .Pq \&" in order to represent arguments containing spaces. Configuration options may be separated by whitespace or optional whitespace and exactly one .Ql = ; the latter format is useful to avoid the need to quote whitespace when specifying configuration options using the .Nm ssh , .Nm scp , and .Nm sftp .Fl o option. .Pp The possible keywords and their meanings are as follows (note that keywords are case-insensitive and arguments are case-sensitive): .Bl -tag -width Ds .It Cm Host Restricts the following declarations (up to the next .Cm Host or .Cm Match keyword) to be only for those hosts that match one of the patterns given after the keyword. If more than one pattern is provided, they should be separated by whitespace. A single .Ql * as a pattern can be used to provide global defaults for all hosts. The host is usually the .Ar hostname argument given on the command line (see the .Cm CanonicalizeHostname keyword for exceptions). .Pp A pattern entry may be negated by prefixing it with an exclamation mark .Pq Sq !\& . If a negated entry is matched, then the .Cm Host entry is ignored, regardless of whether any other patterns on the line match. Negated matches are therefore useful to provide exceptions for wildcard matches. .Pp See .Sx PATTERNS for more information on patterns. .It Cm Match Restricts the following declarations (up to the next .Cm Host or .Cm Match keyword) to be used only when the conditions following the .Cm Match keyword are satisfied. Match conditions are specified using one or more criteria or the single token .Cm all which always matches. The available criteria keywords are: .Cm canonical , .Cm final , .Cm exec , .Cm host , .Cm originalhost , .Cm user , and .Cm localuser . The .Cm all criteria must appear alone or immediately after .Cm canonical or .Cm final . Other criteria may be combined arbitrarily. All criteria but .Cm all , .Cm canonical , and .Cm final require an argument. Criteria may be negated by prepending an exclamation mark .Pq Sq !\& . .Pp The .Cm canonical keyword matches only when the configuration file is being re-parsed after hostname canonicalization (see the .Cm CanonicalizeHostname option). This may be useful to specify conditions that work with canonical host names only. .Pp The .Cm final keyword requests that the configuration be re-parsed (regardless of whether .Cm CanonicalizeHostname is enabled), and matches only during this final pass. If .Cm CanonicalizeHostname is enabled, then .Cm canonical and .Cm final match during the same pass. .Pp The .Cm exec keyword executes the specified command under the user's shell. If the command returns a zero exit status then the condition is considered true. Commands containing whitespace characters must be quoted. Arguments to .Cm exec accept the tokens described in the .Sx TOKENS section. .Pp The other keywords' criteria must be single entries or comma-separated lists and may use the wildcard and negation operators described in the .Sx PATTERNS section. The criteria for the .Cm host keyword are matched against the target hostname, after any substitution by the .Cm Hostname or .Cm CanonicalizeHostname options. The .Cm originalhost keyword matches against the hostname as it was specified on the command-line. The .Cm user keyword matches against the target username on the remote host. The .Cm localuser keyword matches against the name of the local user running .Xr ssh 1 (this keyword may be useful in system-wide .Nm files). .It Cm AddKeysToAgent Specifies whether keys should be automatically added to a running .Xr ssh-agent 1 . If this option is set to .Cm yes and a key is loaded from a file, the key and its passphrase are added to the agent with the default lifetime, as if by .Xr ssh-add 1 . If this option is set to .Cm ask , .Xr ssh 1 will require confirmation using the .Ev SSH_ASKPASS program before adding a key (see .Xr ssh-add 1 for details). If this option is set to .Cm confirm , each use of the key must be confirmed, as if the .Fl c option was specified to .Xr ssh-add 1 . If this option is set to .Cm no , no keys are added to the agent. Alternately, this option may be specified as a time interval using the format described in the .Sx TIME FORMATS section of .Xr sshd_config 5 to specify the key's lifetime in .Xr ssh-agent 1 , after which it will automatically be removed. The argument must be .Cm no (the default), .Cm yes , .Cm confirm (optionally followed by a time interval), .Cm ask or a time interval. .It Cm AddressFamily Specifies which address family to use when connecting. Valid arguments are .Cm any (the default), .Cm inet (use IPv4 only), or .Cm inet6 (use IPv6 only). .It Cm BatchMode If set to .Cm yes , user interaction such as password prompts and host key confirmation requests will be disabled. This option is useful in scripts and other batch jobs where no user is present to interact with .Xr ssh 1 . The argument must be .Cm yes or .Cm no (the default). .It Cm BindAddress Use the specified address on the local machine as the source address of the connection. Only useful on systems with more than one address. .It Cm BindInterface Use the address of the specified interface on the local machine as the source address of the connection. .It Cm CanonicalDomains When .Cm CanonicalizeHostname is enabled, this option specifies the list of domain suffixes in which to search for the specified destination host. .It Cm CanonicalizeFallbackLocal Specifies whether to fail with an error when hostname canonicalization fails. The default, .Cm yes , will attempt to look up the unqualified hostname using the system resolver's search rules. A value of .Cm no will cause .Xr ssh 1 to fail instantly if .Cm CanonicalizeHostname is enabled and the target hostname cannot be found in any of the domains specified by .Cm CanonicalDomains . .It Cm CanonicalizeHostname Controls whether explicit hostname canonicalization is performed. The default, .Cm no , is not to perform any name rewriting and let the system resolver handle all hostname lookups. If set to .Cm yes then, for connections that do not use a .Cm ProxyCommand or .Cm ProxyJump , .Xr ssh 1 will attempt to canonicalize the hostname specified on the command line using the .Cm CanonicalDomains suffixes and .Cm CanonicalizePermittedCNAMEs rules. If .Cm CanonicalizeHostname is set to .Cm always , then canonicalization is applied to proxied connections too. .Pp If this option is enabled, then the configuration files are processed again using the new target name to pick up any new configuration in matching .Cm Host and .Cm Match stanzas. A value of .Cm none disables the use of a .Cm ProxyJump host. .It Cm CanonicalizeMaxDots Specifies the maximum number of dot characters in a hostname before canonicalization is disabled. The default, 1, allows a single dot (i.e. hostname.subdomain). .It Cm CanonicalizePermittedCNAMEs Specifies rules to determine whether CNAMEs should be followed when canonicalizing hostnames. The rules consist of one or more arguments of .Ar source_domain_list : Ns Ar target_domain_list , where .Ar source_domain_list is a pattern-list of domains that may follow CNAMEs in canonicalization, and .Ar target_domain_list is a pattern-list of domains that they may resolve to. .Pp For example, .Qq *.a.example.com:*.b.example.com,*.c.example.com will allow hostnames matching .Qq *.a.example.com to be canonicalized to names in the .Qq *.b.example.com or .Qq *.c.example.com domains. .Pp A single argument of .Qq none causes no CNAMEs to be considered for canonicalization. This is the default behaviour. .It Cm CASignatureAlgorithms Specifies which algorithms are allowed for signing of certificates by certificate authorities (CAs). The default is: .Bd -literal -offset indent ssh-ed25519,ecdsa-sha2-nistp256, ecdsa-sha2-nistp384,ecdsa-sha2-nistp521, sk-ssh-ed25519@openssh.com, sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256@openssh.com, rsa-sha2-512,rsa-sha2-256 .Ed .Pp If the specified list begins with a .Sq + character, then the specified algorithms will be appended to the default set instead of replacing them. If the specified list begins with a .Sq - character, then the specified algorithms (including wildcards) will be removed from the default set instead of replacing them. .Pp .Xr ssh 1 will not accept host certificates signed using algorithms other than those specified. .It Cm CertificateFile Specifies a file from which the user's certificate is read. A corresponding private key must be provided separately in order to use this certificate either from an .Cm IdentityFile directive or .Fl i flag to .Xr ssh 1 , via .Xr ssh-agent 1 , or via a .Cm PKCS11Provider or .Cm SecurityKeyProvider . .Pp Arguments to .Cm CertificateFile may use the tilde syntax to refer to a user's home directory, the tokens described in the .Sx TOKENS section and environment variables as described in the .Sx ENVIRONMENT VARIABLES section. .Pp It is possible to have multiple certificate files specified in configuration files; these certificates will be tried in sequence. Multiple .Cm CertificateFile directives will add to the list of certificates used for authentication. .It Cm CheckHostIP If set to .Cm yes , .Xr ssh 1 will additionally check the host IP address in the .Pa known_hosts file. This allows it to detect if a host key changed due to DNS spoofing and will add addresses of destination hosts to .Pa ~/.ssh/known_hosts in the process, regardless of the setting of .Cm StrictHostKeyChecking . If the option is set to .Cm no (the default), the check will not be executed. The default is .Cm no . .It Cm Ciphers Specifies the ciphers allowed and their order of preference. Multiple ciphers must be comma-separated. If the specified list begins with a .Sq + character, then the specified ciphers will be appended to the default set instead of replacing them. If the specified list begins with a .Sq - character, then the specified ciphers (including wildcards) will be removed from the default set instead of replacing them. If the specified list begins with a .Sq ^ character, then the specified ciphers will be placed at the head of the default set. .Pp The supported ciphers are: .Bd -literal -offset indent 3des-cbc aes128-cbc aes192-cbc aes256-cbc aes128-ctr aes192-ctr aes256-ctr aes128-gcm@openssh.com aes256-gcm@openssh.com chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com .Ed .Pp The default is: .Bd -literal -offset indent chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com, aes128-ctr,aes192-ctr,aes256-ctr, aes128-gcm@openssh.com,aes256-gcm@openssh.com .Ed .Pp The list of available ciphers may also be obtained using .Qq ssh -Q cipher . .It Cm ClearAllForwardings Specifies that all local, remote, and dynamic port forwardings specified in the configuration files or on the command line be cleared. This option is primarily useful when used from the .Xr ssh 1 command line to clear port forwardings set in configuration files, and is automatically set by .Xr scp 1 and .Xr sftp 1 . The argument must be .Cm yes or .Cm no (the default). .It Cm Compression Specifies whether to use compression. The argument must be .Cm yes or .Cm no (the default). .It Cm ConnectionAttempts Specifies the number of tries (one per second) to make before exiting. The argument must be an integer. This may be useful in scripts if the connection sometimes fails. The default is 1. .It Cm ConnectTimeout Specifies the timeout (in seconds) used when connecting to the SSH server, instead of using the default system TCP timeout. This timeout is applied both to establishing the connection and to performing the initial SSH protocol handshake and key exchange. .It Cm ControlMaster Enables the sharing of multiple sessions over a single network connection. When set to .Cm yes , .Xr ssh 1 will listen for connections on a control socket specified using the .Cm ControlPath argument. Additional sessions can connect to this socket using the same .Cm ControlPath with .Cm ControlMaster set to .Cm no (the default). These sessions will try to reuse the master instance's network connection rather than initiating new ones, but will fall back to connecting normally if the control socket does not exist, or is not listening. .Pp Setting this to .Cm ask will cause .Xr ssh 1 to listen for control connections, but require confirmation using .Xr ssh-askpass 1 . If the .Cm ControlPath cannot be opened, .Xr ssh 1 will continue without connecting to a master instance. .Pp X11 and .Xr ssh-agent 1 forwarding is supported over these multiplexed connections, however the display and agent forwarded will be the one belonging to the master connection i.e. it is not possible to forward multiple displays or agents. .Pp Two additional options allow for opportunistic multiplexing: try to use a master connection but fall back to creating a new one if one does not already exist. These options are: .Cm auto and .Cm autoask . The latter requires confirmation like the .Cm ask option. .It Cm ControlPath Specify the path to the control socket used for connection sharing as described in the .Cm ControlMaster section above or the string .Cm none to disable connection sharing. Arguments to .Cm ControlPath may use the tilde syntax to refer to a user's home directory, the tokens described in the .Sx TOKENS section and environment variables as described in the .Sx ENVIRONMENT VARIABLES section. It is recommended that any .Cm ControlPath used for opportunistic connection sharing include at least %h, %p, and %r (or alternatively %C) and be placed in a directory that is not writable by other users. This ensures that shared connections are uniquely identified. .It Cm ControlPersist When used in conjunction with .Cm ControlMaster , specifies that the master connection should remain open in the background (waiting for future client connections) after the initial client connection has been closed. If set to .Cm no (the default), then the master connection will not be placed into the background, and will close as soon as the initial client connection is closed. If set to .Cm yes or 0, then the master connection will remain in the background indefinitely (until killed or closed via a mechanism such as the .Qq ssh -O exit ) . If set to a time in seconds, or a time in any of the formats documented in .Xr sshd_config 5 , then the backgrounded master connection will automatically terminate after it has remained idle (with no client connections) for the specified time. .It Cm DynamicForward Specifies that a TCP port on the local machine be forwarded over the secure channel, and the application protocol is then used to determine where to connect to from the remote machine. .Pp The argument must be .Sm off .Oo Ar bind_address : Oc Ar port . .Sm on IPv6 addresses can be specified by enclosing addresses in square brackets. By default, the local port is bound in accordance with the .Cm GatewayPorts setting. However, an explicit .Ar bind_address may be used to bind the connection to a specific address. The .Ar bind_address of .Cm localhost indicates that the listening port be bound for local use only, while an empty address or .Sq * indicates that the port should be available from all interfaces. .Pp Currently the SOCKS4 and SOCKS5 protocols are supported, and .Xr ssh 1 will act as a SOCKS server. Multiple forwardings may be specified, and additional forwardings can be given on the command line. Only the superuser can forward privileged ports. .It Cm EnableEscapeCommandline Enables the command line option in the .Cm EscapeChar menu for interactive sessions (default .Ql ~C ) . By default, the command line is disabled. .It Cm EnableSSHKeysign Setting this option to .Cm yes in the global client configuration file .Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_config enables the use of the helper program .Xr ssh-keysign 8 during .Cm HostbasedAuthentication . The argument must be .Cm yes or .Cm no (the default). This option should be placed in the non-hostspecific section. See .Xr ssh-keysign 8 for more information. .It Cm EscapeChar Sets the escape character (default: .Ql ~ ) . The escape character can also be set on the command line. The argument should be a single character, .Ql ^ followed by a letter, or .Cm none to disable the escape character entirely (making the connection transparent for binary data). .It Cm ExitOnForwardFailure Specifies whether .Xr ssh 1 should terminate the connection if it cannot set up all requested dynamic, tunnel, local, and remote port forwardings, (e.g.\& if either end is unable to bind and listen on a specified port). Note that .Cm ExitOnForwardFailure does not apply to connections made over port forwardings and will not, for example, cause .Xr ssh 1 to exit if TCP connections to the ultimate forwarding destination fail. The argument must be .Cm yes or .Cm no (the default). .It Cm FingerprintHash Specifies the hash algorithm used when displaying key fingerprints. Valid options are: .Cm md5 and .Cm sha256 (the default). .It Cm ForkAfterAuthentication Requests .Nm ssh to go to background just before command execution. This is useful if .Nm ssh is going to ask for passwords or passphrases, but the user wants it in the background. This implies the .Cm StdinNull configuration option being set to .Dq yes . The recommended way to start X11 programs at a remote site is with something like .Ic ssh -f host xterm , which is the same as .Ic ssh host xterm if the .Cm ForkAfterAuthentication configuration option is set to .Dq yes . .Pp If the .Cm ExitOnForwardFailure configuration option is set to .Dq yes , then a client started with the .Cm ForkAfterAuthentication configuration option being set to .Dq yes will wait for all remote port forwards to be successfully established before placing itself in the background. The argument to this keyword must be .Cm yes (same as the .Fl f option) or .Cm no (the default). .It Cm ForwardAgent Specifies whether the connection to the authentication agent (if any) will be forwarded to the remote machine. The argument may be .Cm yes , .Cm no (the default), an explicit path to an agent socket or the name of an environment variable (beginning with .Sq $ ) in which to find the path. .Pp Agent forwarding should be enabled with caution. Users with the ability to bypass file permissions on the remote host (for the agent's Unix-domain socket) can access the local agent through the forwarded connection. An attacker cannot obtain key material from the agent, however they can perform operations on the keys that enable them to authenticate using the identities loaded into the agent. .It Cm ForwardX11 Specifies whether X11 connections will be automatically redirected over the secure channel and .Ev DISPLAY set. The argument must be .Cm yes or .Cm no (the default). .Pp X11 forwarding should be enabled with caution. Users with the ability to bypass file permissions on the remote host (for the user's X11 authorization database) can access the local X11 display through the forwarded connection. An attacker may then be able to perform activities such as keystroke monitoring if the .Cm ForwardX11Trusted option is also enabled. .It Cm ForwardX11Timeout Specify a timeout for untrusted X11 forwarding using the format described in the .Sx TIME FORMATS section of .Xr sshd_config 5 . X11 connections received by .Xr ssh 1 after this time will be refused. Setting .Cm ForwardX11Timeout to zero will disable the timeout and permit X11 forwarding for the life of the connection. The default is to disable untrusted X11 forwarding after twenty minutes has elapsed. .It Cm ForwardX11Trusted If this option is set to .Cm yes , remote X11 clients will have full access to the original X11 display. .Pp If this option is set to .Cm no (the default), remote X11 clients will be considered untrusted and prevented from stealing or tampering with data belonging to trusted X11 clients. Furthermore, the .Xr xauth 1 token used for the session will be set to expire after 20 minutes. Remote clients will be refused access after this time. .Pp See the X11 SECURITY extension specification for full details on the restrictions imposed on untrusted clients. .It Cm GatewayPorts Specifies whether remote hosts are allowed to connect to local forwarded ports. By default, .Xr ssh 1 binds local port forwardings to the loopback address. This prevents other remote hosts from connecting to forwarded ports. .Cm GatewayPorts can be used to specify that ssh should bind local port forwardings to the wildcard address, thus allowing remote hosts to connect to forwarded ports. The argument must be .Cm yes or .Cm no (the default). .It Cm GlobalKnownHostsFile Specifies one or more files to use for the global host key database, separated by whitespace. The default is .Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_known_hosts , .Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_known_hosts2 . .It Cm GSSAPIAuthentication Specifies whether user authentication based on GSSAPI is allowed. The default is .Cm no . .It Cm GSSAPIDelegateCredentials Forward (delegate) credentials to the server. The default is .Cm no . .It Cm HashKnownHosts Indicates that .Xr ssh 1 should hash host names and addresses when they are added to .Pa ~/.ssh/known_hosts . These hashed names may be used normally by .Xr ssh 1 and .Xr sshd 8 , but they do not visually reveal identifying information if the file's contents are disclosed. The default is .Cm no . Note that existing names and addresses in known hosts files will not be converted automatically, but may be manually hashed using .Xr ssh-keygen 1 . .It Cm HostbasedAcceptedAlgorithms Specifies the signature algorithms that will be used for hostbased authentication as a comma-separated list of patterns. Alternately if the specified list begins with a .Sq + character, then the specified signature algorithms will be appended to the default set instead of replacing them. If the specified list begins with a .Sq - character, then the specified signature algorithms (including wildcards) will be removed from the default set instead of replacing them. If the specified list begins with a .Sq ^ character, then the specified signature algorithms will be placed at the head of the default set. The default for this option is: .Bd -literal -offset 3n ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com, ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com, ecdsa-sha2-nistp384-cert-v01@openssh.com, ecdsa-sha2-nistp521-cert-v01@openssh.com, sk-ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com, sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com, rsa-sha2-512-cert-v01@openssh.com, rsa-sha2-256-cert-v01@openssh.com, ssh-ed25519, ecdsa-sha2-nistp256,ecdsa-sha2-nistp384,ecdsa-sha2-nistp521, sk-ssh-ed25519@openssh.com, sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256@openssh.com, rsa-sha2-512,rsa-sha2-256 .Ed .Pp The .Fl Q option of .Xr ssh 1 may be used to list supported signature algorithms. This was formerly named HostbasedKeyTypes. .It Cm HostbasedAuthentication Specifies whether to try rhosts based authentication with public key authentication. The argument must be .Cm yes or .Cm no (the default). .It Cm HostKeyAlgorithms Specifies the host key signature algorithms that the client wants to use in order of preference. Alternately if the specified list begins with a .Sq + character, then the specified signature algorithms will be appended to the default set instead of replacing them. If the specified list begins with a .Sq - character, then the specified signature algorithms (including wildcards) will be removed from the default set instead of replacing them. If the specified list begins with a .Sq ^ character, then the specified signature algorithms will be placed at the head of the default set. The default for this option is: .Bd -literal -offset 3n ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com, ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com, ecdsa-sha2-nistp384-cert-v01@openssh.com, ecdsa-sha2-nistp521-cert-v01@openssh.com, sk-ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com, sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com, rsa-sha2-512-cert-v01@openssh.com, rsa-sha2-256-cert-v01@openssh.com, ssh-ed25519, ecdsa-sha2-nistp256,ecdsa-sha2-nistp384,ecdsa-sha2-nistp521, sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256@openssh.com, sk-ssh-ed25519@openssh.com, rsa-sha2-512,rsa-sha2-256 .Ed .Pp If hostkeys are known for the destination host then this default is modified to prefer their algorithms. .Pp The list of available signature algorithms may also be obtained using .Qq ssh -Q HostKeyAlgorithms . .It Cm HostKeyAlias Specifies an alias that should be used instead of the real host name when looking up or saving the host key in the host key database files and when validating host certificates. This option is useful for tunneling SSH connections or for multiple servers running on a single host. .It Cm Hostname Specifies the real host name to log into. This can be used to specify nicknames or abbreviations for hosts. Arguments to .Cm Hostname accept the tokens described in the .Sx TOKENS section. Numeric IP addresses are also permitted (both on the command line and in .Cm Hostname specifications). The default is the name given on the command line. .It Cm IdentitiesOnly Specifies that .Xr ssh 1 should only use the configured authentication identity and certificate files (either the default files, or those explicitly configured in the .Nm files or passed on the .Xr ssh 1 command-line), even if .Xr ssh-agent 1 or a .Cm PKCS11Provider or .Cm SecurityKeyProvider offers more identities. The argument to this keyword must be .Cm yes or .Cm no (the default). This option is intended for situations where ssh-agent offers many different identities. .It Cm IdentityAgent Specifies the .Ux Ns -domain socket used to communicate with the authentication agent. .Pp This option overrides the .Ev SSH_AUTH_SOCK environment variable and can be used to select a specific agent. Setting the socket name to .Cm none disables the use of an authentication agent. If the string .Qq SSH_AUTH_SOCK is specified, the location of the socket will be read from the .Ev SSH_AUTH_SOCK environment variable. Otherwise if the specified value begins with a .Sq $ character, then it will be treated as an environment variable containing the location of the socket. .Pp Arguments to .Cm IdentityAgent may use the tilde syntax to refer to a user's home directory, the tokens described in the .Sx TOKENS section and environment variables as described in the .Sx ENVIRONMENT VARIABLES section. .It Cm IdentityFile Specifies a file from which the user's DSA, ECDSA, authenticator-hosted ECDSA, Ed25519, authenticator-hosted Ed25519 or RSA authentication identity is read. You can also specify a public key file to use the corresponding private key that is loaded in .Xr ssh-agent 1 when the private key file is not present locally. The default is .Pa ~/.ssh/id_rsa , .Pa ~/.ssh/id_ecdsa , .Pa ~/.ssh/id_ecdsa_sk , .Pa ~/.ssh/id_ed25519 , .Pa ~/.ssh/id_ed25519_sk and .Pa ~/.ssh/id_dsa . Additionally, any identities represented by the authentication agent will be used for authentication unless .Cm IdentitiesOnly is set. If no certificates have been explicitly specified by .Cm CertificateFile , .Xr ssh 1 will try to load certificate information from the filename obtained by appending .Pa -cert.pub to the path of a specified .Cm IdentityFile . .Pp Arguments to .Cm IdentityFile may use the tilde syntax to refer to a user's home directory or the tokens described in the .Sx TOKENS section. .Pp It is possible to have multiple identity files specified in configuration files; all these identities will be tried in sequence. Multiple .Cm IdentityFile directives will add to the list of identities tried (this behaviour differs from that of other configuration directives). .Pp .Cm IdentityFile may be used in conjunction with .Cm IdentitiesOnly to select which identities in an agent are offered during authentication. .Cm IdentityFile may also be used in conjunction with .Cm CertificateFile in order to provide any certificate also needed for authentication with the identity. .It Cm IgnoreUnknown Specifies a pattern-list of unknown options to be ignored if they are encountered in configuration parsing. This may be used to suppress errors if .Nm contains options that are unrecognised by .Xr ssh 1 . It is recommended that .Cm IgnoreUnknown be listed early in the configuration file as it will not be applied to unknown options that appear before it. .It Cm Include Include the specified configuration file(s). Multiple pathnames may be specified and each pathname may contain .Xr glob 7 wildcards and, for user configurations, shell-like .Sq ~ references to user home directories. Wildcards will be expanded and processed in lexical order. Files without absolute paths are assumed to be in .Pa ~/.ssh if included in a user configuration file or .Pa /etc/ssh if included from the system configuration file. .Cm Include directive may appear inside a .Cm Match or .Cm Host block to perform conditional inclusion. .It Cm IPQoS Specifies the IPv4 type-of-service or DSCP class for connections. Accepted values are .Cm af11 , .Cm af12 , .Cm af13 , .Cm af21 , .Cm af22 , .Cm af23 , .Cm af31 , .Cm af32 , .Cm af33 , .Cm af41 , .Cm af42 , .Cm af43 , .Cm cs0 , .Cm cs1 , .Cm cs2 , .Cm cs3 , .Cm cs4 , .Cm cs5 , .Cm cs6 , .Cm cs7 , .Cm ef , .Cm le , .Cm lowdelay , .Cm throughput , .Cm reliability , a numeric value, or .Cm none to use the operating system default. This option may take one or two arguments, separated by whitespace. If one argument is specified, it is used as the packet class unconditionally. If two values are specified, the first is automatically selected for interactive sessions and the second for non-interactive sessions. The default is .Cm af21 (Low-Latency Data) for interactive sessions and .Cm cs1 (Lower Effort) for non-interactive sessions. .It Cm KbdInteractiveAuthentication Specifies whether to use keyboard-interactive authentication. The argument to this keyword must be .Cm yes (the default) or .Cm no . .Cm ChallengeResponseAuthentication is a deprecated alias for this. .It Cm KbdInteractiveDevices Specifies the list of methods to use in keyboard-interactive authentication. Multiple method names must be comma-separated. The default is to use the server specified list. The methods available vary depending on what the server supports. For an OpenSSH server, it may be zero or more of: .Cm bsdauth and .Cm pam . .It Cm KexAlgorithms Specifies the available KEX (Key Exchange) algorithms. Multiple algorithms must be comma-separated. If the specified list begins with a .Sq + character, then the specified algorithms will be appended to the default set instead of replacing them. If the specified list begins with a .Sq - character, then the specified algorithms (including wildcards) will be removed from the default set instead of replacing them. If the specified list begins with a .Sq ^ character, then the specified algorithms will be placed at the head of the default set. The default is: .Bd -literal -offset indent sntrup761x25519-sha512@openssh.com, curve25519-sha256,curve25519-sha256@libssh.org, ecdh-sha2-nistp256,ecdh-sha2-nistp384,ecdh-sha2-nistp521, diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha256, diffie-hellman-group16-sha512, diffie-hellman-group18-sha512, diffie-hellman-group14-sha256 .Ed .Pp The list of available key exchange algorithms may also be obtained using .Qq ssh -Q kex . .It Cm KnownHostsCommand Specifies a command to use to obtain a list of host keys, in addition to those listed in .Cm UserKnownHostsFile and .Cm GlobalKnownHostsFile . This command is executed after the files have been read. It may write host key lines to standard output in identical format to the usual files (described in the .Sx VERIFYING HOST KEYS section in .Xr ssh 1 ) . Arguments to .Cm KnownHostsCommand accept the tokens described in the .Sx TOKENS section. The command may be invoked multiple times per connection: once when preparing the preference list of host key algorithms to use, again to obtain the host key for the requested host name and, if .Cm CheckHostIP is enabled, one more time to obtain the host key matching the server's address. If the command exits abnormally or returns a non-zero exit status then the connection is terminated. .It Cm LocalCommand Specifies a command to execute on the local machine after successfully connecting to the server. The command string extends to the end of the line, and is executed with the user's shell. Arguments to .Cm LocalCommand accept the tokens described in the .Sx TOKENS section. .Pp The command is run synchronously and does not have access to the session of the .Xr ssh 1 that spawned it. It should not be used for interactive commands. .Pp This directive is ignored unless .Cm PermitLocalCommand has been enabled. .It Cm LocalForward Specifies that a TCP port on the local machine be forwarded over the secure channel to the specified host and port from the remote machine. The first argument specifies the listener and may be .Sm off .Oo Ar bind_address : Oc Ar port .Sm on or a Unix domain socket path. The second argument is the destination and may be .Ar host : Ns Ar hostport or a Unix domain socket path if the remote host supports it. .Pp IPv6 addresses can be specified by enclosing addresses in square brackets. Multiple forwardings may be specified, and additional forwardings can be given on the command line. Only the superuser can forward privileged ports. By default, the local port is bound in accordance with the .Cm GatewayPorts setting. However, an explicit .Ar bind_address may be used to bind the connection to a specific address. The .Ar bind_address of .Cm localhost indicates that the listening port be bound for local use only, while an empty address or .Sq * indicates that the port should be available from all interfaces. Unix domain socket paths may use the tokens described in the .Sx TOKENS section and environment variables as described in the .Sx ENVIRONMENT VARIABLES section. .It Cm LogLevel Gives the verbosity level that is used when logging messages from .Xr ssh 1 . The possible values are: QUIET, FATAL, ERROR, INFO, VERBOSE, DEBUG, DEBUG1, DEBUG2, and DEBUG3. The default is INFO. DEBUG and DEBUG1 are equivalent. DEBUG2 and DEBUG3 each specify higher levels of verbose output. .It Cm LogVerbose Specify one or more overrides to LogLevel. An override consists of a pattern lists that matches the source file, function and line number to force detailed logging for. For example, an override pattern of: .Bd -literal -offset indent kex.c:*:1000,*:kex_exchange_identification():*,packet.c:* .Ed .Pp would enable detailed logging for line 1000 of .Pa kex.c , everything in the .Fn kex_exchange_identification function, and all code in the .Pa packet.c file. This option is intended for debugging and no overrides are enabled by default. .It Cm MACs Specifies the MAC (message authentication code) algorithms in order of preference. The MAC algorithm is used for data integrity protection. Multiple algorithms must be comma-separated. If the specified list begins with a .Sq + character, then the specified algorithms will be appended to the default set instead of replacing them. If the specified list begins with a .Sq - character, then the specified algorithms (including wildcards) will be removed from the default set instead of replacing them. If the specified list begins with a .Sq ^ character, then the specified algorithms will be placed at the head of the default set. .Pp The algorithms that contain .Qq -etm calculate the MAC after encryption (encrypt-then-mac). These are considered safer and their use recommended. .Pp The default is: .Bd -literal -offset indent umac-64-etm@openssh.com,umac-128-etm@openssh.com, hmac-sha2-256-etm@openssh.com,hmac-sha2-512-etm@openssh.com, hmac-sha1-etm@openssh.com, umac-64@openssh.com,umac-128@openssh.com, hmac-sha2-256,hmac-sha2-512,hmac-sha1 .Ed .Pp The list of available MAC algorithms may also be obtained using .Qq ssh -Q mac . .It Cm NoHostAuthenticationForLocalhost Disable host authentication for localhost (loopback addresses). The argument to this keyword must be .Cm yes or .Cm no (the default). .It Cm NumberOfPasswordPrompts Specifies the number of password prompts before giving up. The argument to this keyword must be an integer. The default is 3. .It Cm PasswordAuthentication Specifies whether to use password authentication. The argument to this keyword must be .Cm yes (the default) or .Cm no . .It Cm PermitLocalCommand Allow local command execution via the .Ic LocalCommand option or using the .Ic !\& Ns Ar command escape sequence in .Xr ssh 1 . The argument must be .Cm yes or .Cm no (the default). .It Cm PermitRemoteOpen Specifies the destinations to which remote TCP port forwarding is permitted when .Cm RemoteForward is used as a SOCKS proxy. The forwarding specification must be one of the following forms: .Pp .Bl -item -offset indent -compact .It .Cm PermitRemoteOpen .Sm off .Ar host : port .Sm on .It .Cm PermitRemoteOpen .Sm off .Ar IPv4_addr : port .Sm on .It .Cm PermitRemoteOpen .Sm off .Ar \&[ IPv6_addr \&] : port .Sm on .El .Pp Multiple forwards may be specified by separating them with whitespace. An argument of .Cm any can be used to remove all restrictions and permit any forwarding requests. An argument of .Cm none can be used to prohibit all forwarding requests. The wildcard .Sq * can be used for host or port to allow all hosts or ports respectively. Otherwise, no pattern matching or address lookups are performed on supplied names. .It Cm PKCS11Provider Specifies which PKCS#11 provider to use or .Cm none to indicate that no provider should be used (the default). The argument to this keyword is a path to the PKCS#11 shared library .Xr ssh 1 should use to communicate with a PKCS#11 token providing keys for user authentication. .It Cm Port Specifies the port number to connect on the remote host. The default is 22. .It Cm PreferredAuthentications Specifies the order in which the client should try authentication methods. This allows a client to prefer one method (e.g.\& .Cm keyboard-interactive ) over another method (e.g.\& .Cm password ) . The default is: .Bd -literal -offset indent gssapi-with-mic,hostbased,publickey, keyboard-interactive,password .Ed .It Cm ProxyCommand Specifies the command to use to connect to the server. The command string extends to the end of the line, and is executed using the user's shell .Ql exec directive to avoid a lingering shell process. .Pp Arguments to .Cm ProxyCommand accept the tokens described in the .Sx TOKENS section. The command can be basically anything, and should read from its standard input and write to its standard output. It should eventually connect an .Xr sshd 8 server running on some machine, or execute .Ic sshd -i somewhere. Host key management will be done using the .Cm Hostname of the host being connected (defaulting to the name typed by the user). Setting the command to .Cm none disables this option entirely. Note that .Cm CheckHostIP is not available for connects with a proxy command. .Pp This directive is useful in conjunction with .Xr nc 1 and its proxy support. For example, the following directive would connect via an HTTP proxy at 192.0.2.0: .Bd -literal -offset 3n ProxyCommand /usr/bin/nc -X connect -x 192.0.2.0:8080 %h %p .Ed .It Cm ProxyJump Specifies one or more jump proxies as either .Xo .Sm off .Op Ar user No @ .Ar host .Op : Ns Ar port .Sm on or an ssh URI .Xc . Multiple proxies may be separated by comma characters and will be visited sequentially. Setting this option will cause .Xr ssh 1 to connect to the target host by first making a .Xr ssh 1 connection to the specified .Cm ProxyJump host and then establishing a TCP forwarding to the ultimate target from there. Setting the host to .Cm none disables this option entirely. .Pp Note that this option will compete with the .Cm ProxyCommand option - whichever is specified first will prevent later instances of the other from taking effect. .Pp Note also that the configuration for the destination host (either supplied via the command-line or the configuration file) is not generally applied to jump hosts. .Pa ~/.ssh/config should be used if specific configuration is required for jump hosts. .It Cm ProxyUseFdpass Specifies that .Cm ProxyCommand will pass a connected file descriptor back to .Xr ssh 1 instead of continuing to execute and pass data. The default is .Cm no . .It Cm PubkeyAcceptedAlgorithms Specifies the signature algorithms that will be used for public key authentication as a comma-separated list of patterns. If the specified list begins with a .Sq + character, then the algorithms after it will be appended to the default instead of replacing it. If the specified list begins with a .Sq - character, then the specified algorithms (including wildcards) will be removed from the default set instead of replacing them. If the specified list begins with a .Sq ^ character, then the specified algorithms will be placed at the head of the default set. The default for this option is: .Bd -literal -offset 3n ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com, ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com, ecdsa-sha2-nistp384-cert-v01@openssh.com, ecdsa-sha2-nistp521-cert-v01@openssh.com, sk-ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com, sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com, rsa-sha2-512-cert-v01@openssh.com, rsa-sha2-256-cert-v01@openssh.com, ssh-ed25519, ecdsa-sha2-nistp256,ecdsa-sha2-nistp384,ecdsa-sha2-nistp521, sk-ssh-ed25519@openssh.com, sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256@openssh.com, rsa-sha2-512,rsa-sha2-256 .Ed .Pp The list of available signature algorithms may also be obtained using .Qq ssh -Q PubkeyAcceptedAlgorithms . .It Cm PubkeyAuthentication Specifies whether to try public key authentication. The argument to this keyword must be .Cm yes (the default), .Cm no , .Cm unbound or .Cm host-bound . The final two options enable public key authentication while respectively disabling or enabling the OpenSSH host-bound authentication protocol extension required for restricted .Xr ssh-agent 1 forwarding. .It Cm RekeyLimit Specifies the maximum amount of data that may be transmitted or received before the session key is renegotiated, optionally followed by a maximum amount of time that may pass before the session key is renegotiated. The first argument is specified in bytes and may have a suffix of .Sq K , .Sq M , or .Sq G to indicate Kilobytes, Megabytes, or Gigabytes, respectively. The default is between .Sq 1G and .Sq 4G , depending on the cipher. The optional second value is specified in seconds and may use any of the units documented in the TIME FORMATS section of .Xr sshd_config 5 . The default value for .Cm RekeyLimit is .Cm default none , which means that rekeying is performed after the cipher's default amount of data has been sent or received and no time based rekeying is done. .It Cm RemoteCommand Specifies a command to execute on the remote machine after successfully connecting to the server. The command string extends to the end of the line, and is executed with the user's shell. Arguments to .Cm RemoteCommand accept the tokens described in the .Sx TOKENS section. .It Cm RemoteForward Specifies that a TCP port on the remote machine be forwarded over the secure channel. The remote port may either be forwarded to a specified host and port from the local machine, or may act as a SOCKS 4/5 proxy that allows a remote client to connect to arbitrary destinations from the local machine. The first argument is the listening specification and may be .Sm off .Oo Ar bind_address : Oc Ar port .Sm on or, if the remote host supports it, a Unix domain socket path. If forwarding to a specific destination then the second argument must be .Ar host : Ns Ar hostport or a Unix domain socket path, otherwise if no destination argument is specified then the remote forwarding will be established as a SOCKS proxy. When acting as a SOCKS proxy, the destination of the connection can be restricted by .Cm PermitRemoteOpen . .Pp IPv6 addresses can be specified by enclosing addresses in square brackets. Multiple forwardings may be specified, and additional forwardings can be given on the command line. Privileged ports can be forwarded only when logging in as root on the remote machine. Unix domain socket paths may use the tokens described in the .Sx TOKENS section and environment variables as described in the .Sx ENVIRONMENT VARIABLES section. .Pp If the .Ar port argument is 0, the listen port will be dynamically allocated on the server and reported to the client at run time. .Pp If the .Ar bind_address is not specified, the default is to only bind to loopback addresses. If the .Ar bind_address is .Ql * or an empty string, then the forwarding is requested to listen on all interfaces. Specifying a remote .Ar bind_address will only succeed if the server's .Cm GatewayPorts option is enabled (see .Xr sshd_config 5 ) . .It Cm RequestTTY Specifies whether to request a pseudo-tty for the session. The argument may be one of: .Cm no (never request a TTY), .Cm yes (always request a TTY when standard input is a TTY), .Cm force (always request a TTY) or .Cm auto (request a TTY when opening a login session). This option mirrors the .Fl t and .Fl T flags for .Xr ssh 1 . .It Cm RequiredRSASize Specifies the minimum RSA key size (in bits) that .Xr ssh 1 will accept. User authentication keys smaller than this limit will be ignored. Servers that present host keys smaller than this limit will cause the connection to be terminated. The default is .Cm 1024 bits. Note that this limit may only be raised from the default. .It Cm RevokedHostKeys Specifies revoked host public keys. Keys listed in this file will be refused for host authentication. Note that if this file does not exist or is not readable, then host authentication will be refused for all hosts. Keys may be specified as a text file, listing one public key per line, or as an OpenSSH Key Revocation List (KRL) as generated by .Xr ssh-keygen 1 . For more information on KRLs, see the KEY REVOCATION LISTS section in .Xr ssh-keygen 1 . .It Cm SecurityKeyProvider Specifies a path to a library that will be used when loading any FIDO authenticator-hosted keys, overriding the default of using the built-in USB HID support. .Pp If the specified value begins with a .Sq $ character, then it will be treated as an environment variable containing the path to the library. .It Cm SendEnv Specifies what variables from the local .Xr environ 7 should be sent to the server. The server must also support it, and the server must be configured to accept these environment variables. Note that the .Ev TERM environment variable is always sent whenever a pseudo-terminal is requested as it is required by the protocol. Refer to .Cm AcceptEnv in .Xr sshd_config 5 for how to configure the server. Variables are specified by name, which may contain wildcard characters. Multiple environment variables may be separated by whitespace or spread across multiple .Cm SendEnv directives. .Pp See .Sx PATTERNS for more information on patterns. .Pp It is possible to clear previously set .Cm SendEnv variable names by prefixing patterns with .Pa - . The default is not to send any environment variables. .It Cm ServerAliveCountMax Sets the number of server alive messages (see below) which may be sent without .Xr ssh 1 receiving any messages back from the server. If this threshold is reached while server alive messages are being sent, ssh will disconnect from the server, terminating the session. It is important to note that the use of server alive messages is very different from .Cm TCPKeepAlive (below). The server alive messages are sent through the encrypted channel and therefore will not be spoofable. The TCP keepalive option enabled by .Cm TCPKeepAlive is spoofable. The server alive mechanism is valuable when the client or server depend on knowing when a connection has become unresponsive. .Pp The default value is 3. If, for example, .Cm ServerAliveInterval (see below) is set to 15 and .Cm ServerAliveCountMax is left at the default, if the server becomes unresponsive, ssh will disconnect after approximately 45 seconds. .It Cm ServerAliveInterval Sets a timeout interval in seconds after which if no data has been received from the server, .Xr ssh 1 will send a message through the encrypted channel to request a response from the server. The default is 0, indicating that these messages will not be sent to the server. .It Cm SessionType May be used to either request invocation of a subsystem on the remote system, or to prevent the execution of a remote command at all. The latter is useful for just forwarding ports. The argument to this keyword must be .Cm none (same as the .Fl N option), .Cm subsystem (same as the .Fl s option) or .Cm default (shell or command execution). .It Cm SetEnv Directly specify one or more environment variables and their contents to be sent to the server. Similarly to .Cm SendEnv , with the exception of the .Ev TERM variable, the server must be prepared to accept the environment variable. .It Cm StdinNull Redirects stdin from .Pa /dev/null (actually, prevents reading from stdin). Either this or the equivalent .Fl n option must be used when .Nm ssh is run in the background. The argument to this keyword must be .Cm yes (same as the .Fl n option) or .Cm no (the default). .It Cm StreamLocalBindMask Sets the octal file creation mode mask .Pq umask used when creating a Unix-domain socket file for local or remote port forwarding. This option is only used for port forwarding to a Unix-domain socket file. .Pp The default value is 0177, which creates a Unix-domain socket file that is readable and writable only by the owner. Note that not all operating systems honor the file mode on Unix-domain socket files. .It Cm StreamLocalBindUnlink Specifies whether to remove an existing Unix-domain socket file for local or remote port forwarding before creating a new one. If the socket file already exists and .Cm StreamLocalBindUnlink is not enabled, .Nm ssh will be unable to forward the port to the Unix-domain socket file. This option is only used for port forwarding to a Unix-domain socket file. .Pp The argument must be .Cm yes or .Cm no (the default). .It Cm StrictHostKeyChecking If this flag is set to .Cm yes , .Xr ssh 1 will never automatically add host keys to the .Pa ~/.ssh/known_hosts file, and refuses to connect to hosts whose host key has changed. This provides maximum protection against man-in-the-middle (MITM) attacks, though it can be annoying when the .Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_known_hosts file is poorly maintained or when connections to new hosts are frequently made. This option forces the user to manually add all new hosts. .Pp If this flag is set to .Cm accept-new then ssh will automatically add new host keys to the user's .Pa known_hosts file, but will not permit connections to hosts with changed host keys. If this flag is set to .Cm no or .Cm off , ssh will automatically add new host keys to the user known hosts files and allow connections to hosts with changed hostkeys to proceed, subject to some restrictions. If this flag is set to .Cm ask (the default), new host keys will be added to the user known host files only after the user has confirmed that is what they really want to do, and ssh will refuse to connect to hosts whose host key has changed. The host keys of known hosts will be verified automatically in all cases. .It Cm SyslogFacility Gives the facility code that is used when logging messages from .Xr ssh 1 . The possible values are: DAEMON, USER, AUTH, LOCAL0, LOCAL1, LOCAL2, LOCAL3, LOCAL4, LOCAL5, LOCAL6, LOCAL7. The default is USER. .It Cm TCPKeepAlive Specifies whether the system should send TCP keepalive messages to the other side. If they are sent, death of the connection or crash of one of the machines will be properly noticed. However, this means that connections will die if the route is down temporarily, and some people find it annoying. .Pp The default is .Cm yes (to send TCP keepalive messages), and the client will notice if the network goes down or the remote host dies. This is important in scripts, and many users want it too. .Pp To disable TCP keepalive messages, the value should be set to .Cm no . See also .Cm ServerAliveInterval for protocol-level keepalives. .It Cm Tunnel Request .Xr tun 4 device forwarding between the client and the server. The argument must be .Cm yes , .Cm point-to-point (layer 3), .Cm ethernet (layer 2), or .Cm no (the default). Specifying .Cm yes requests the default tunnel mode, which is .Cm point-to-point . .It Cm TunnelDevice Specifies the .Xr tun 4 devices to open on the client .Pq Ar local_tun and the server .Pq Ar remote_tun . .Pp The argument must be .Sm off .Ar local_tun Op : Ar remote_tun . .Sm on The devices may be specified by numerical ID or the keyword .Cm any , which uses the next available tunnel device. If .Ar remote_tun is not specified, it defaults to .Cm any . The default is .Cm any:any . .It Cm UpdateHostKeys Specifies whether .Xr ssh 1 should accept notifications of additional hostkeys from the server sent after authentication has completed and add them to .Cm UserKnownHostsFile . The argument must be .Cm yes , .Cm no or .Cm ask . This option allows learning alternate hostkeys for a server and supports graceful key rotation by allowing a server to send replacement public keys before old ones are removed. .Pp Additional hostkeys are only accepted if the key used to authenticate the host was already trusted or explicitly accepted by the user, the host was authenticated via .Cm UserKnownHostsFile (i.e. not .Cm GlobalKnownHostsFile ) and the host was authenticated using a plain key and not a certificate. .Pp .Cm UpdateHostKeys is enabled by default if the user has not overridden the default .Cm UserKnownHostsFile setting and has not enabled .Cm VerifyHostKeyDNS , otherwise .Cm UpdateHostKeys will be set to .Cm no . .Pp If .Cm UpdateHostKeys is set to .Cm ask , then the user is asked to confirm the modifications to the known_hosts file. Confirmation is currently incompatible with .Cm ControlPersist , and will be disabled if it is enabled. .Pp Presently, only .Xr sshd 8 from OpenSSH 6.8 and greater support the .Qq hostkeys@openssh.com protocol extension used to inform the client of all the server's hostkeys. .It Cm User Specifies the user to log in as. This can be useful when a different user name is used on different machines. This saves the trouble of having to remember to give the user name on the command line. .It Cm UserKnownHostsFile Specifies one or more files to use for the user host key database, separated by whitespace. Each filename may use tilde notation to refer to the user's home directory, the tokens described in the .Sx TOKENS section and environment variables as described in the .Sx ENVIRONMENT VARIABLES section. A value of .Cm none causes .Xr ssh 1 to ignore any user-specific known hosts files. The default is .Pa ~/.ssh/known_hosts , .Pa ~/.ssh/known_hosts2 . .It Cm VerifyHostKeyDNS Specifies whether to verify the remote key using DNS and SSHFP resource records. If this option is set to .Cm yes , the client will implicitly trust keys that match a secure fingerprint from DNS. Insecure fingerprints will be handled as if this option was set to .Cm ask . If this option is set to .Cm ask , information on fingerprint match will be displayed, but the user will still need to confirm new host keys according to the .Cm StrictHostKeyChecking option. The default is .Cm no . .Pp See also .Sx VERIFYING HOST KEYS in .Xr ssh 1 . .It Cm VisualHostKey If this flag is set to .Cm yes , an ASCII art representation of the remote host key fingerprint is printed in addition to the fingerprint string at login and for unknown host keys. If this flag is set to .Cm no (the default), no fingerprint strings are printed at login and only the fingerprint string will be printed for unknown host keys. .It Cm XAuthLocation Specifies the full pathname of the .Xr xauth 1 program. The default is .Pa /usr/local/bin/xauth . .El .Sh PATTERNS A .Em pattern consists of zero or more non-whitespace characters, .Sq * (a wildcard that matches zero or more characters), or .Sq ?\& (a wildcard that matches exactly one character). For example, to specify a set of declarations for any host in the .Qq .co.uk set of domains, the following pattern could be used: .Pp .Dl Host *.co.uk .Pp The following pattern would match any host in the 192.168.0.[0-9] network range: .Pp .Dl Host 192.168.0.? .Pp A .Em pattern-list is a comma-separated list of patterns. Patterns within pattern-lists may be negated by preceding them with an exclamation mark .Pq Sq !\& . For example, to allow a key to be used from anywhere within an organization except from the .Qq dialup pool, the following entry (in authorized_keys) could be used: .Pp .Dl from=\&"!*.dialup.example.com,*.example.com\&" .Pp Note that a negated match will never produce a positive result by itself. For example, attempting to match .Qq host3 against the following pattern-list will fail: .Pp .Dl from=\&"!host1,!host2\&" .Pp The solution here is to include a term that will yield a positive match, such as a wildcard: .Pp .Dl from=\&"!host1,!host2,*\&" .Sh TOKENS Arguments to some keywords can make use of tokens, which are expanded at runtime: .Pp .Bl -tag -width XXXX -offset indent -compact .It %% A literal .Sq % . .It \&%C Hash of %l%h%p%r. .It %d Local user's home directory. .It %f The fingerprint of the server's host key. .It %H The .Pa known_hosts hostname or address that is being searched for. .It %h The remote hostname. .It \%%I A string describing the reason for a .Cm KnownHostsCommand execution: either .Cm ADDRESS when looking up a host by address (only when .Cm CheckHostIP is enabled), .Cm HOSTNAME when searching by hostname, or .Cm ORDER when preparing the host key algorithm preference list to use for the destination host. .It %i The local user ID. .It %K The base64 encoded host key. .It %k The host key alias if specified, otherwise the original remote hostname given on the command line. .It %L The local hostname. .It %l The local hostname, including the domain name. .It %n The original remote hostname, as given on the command line. .It %p The remote port. .It %r The remote username. .It \&%T The local .Xr tun 4 or .Xr tap 4 network interface assigned if tunnel forwarding was requested, or .Qq NONE otherwise. .It %t The type of the server host key, e.g. .Cm ssh-ed25519 . .It %u The local username. .El .Pp .Cm CertificateFile , .Cm ControlPath , .Cm IdentityAgent , .Cm IdentityFile , .Cm KnownHostsCommand , .Cm LocalForward , .Cm Match exec , .Cm RemoteCommand , .Cm RemoteForward , and .Cm UserKnownHostsFile accept the tokens %%, %C, %d, %h, %i, %k, %L, %l, %n, %p, %r, and %u. .Pp .Cm KnownHostsCommand additionally accepts the tokens %f, %H, %I, %K and %t. .Pp .Cm Hostname accepts the tokens %% and %h. .Pp .Cm LocalCommand accepts all tokens. .Pp .Cm ProxyCommand and .Cm ProxyJump accept the tokens %%, %h, %n, %p, and %r. .Sh ENVIRONMENT VARIABLES Arguments to some keywords can be expanded at runtime from environment variables on the client by enclosing them in .Ic ${} , for example .Ic ${HOME}/.ssh would refer to the user's .ssh directory. If a specified environment variable does not exist then an error will be returned and the setting for that keyword will be ignored. .Pp The keywords .Cm CertificateFile , .Cm ControlPath , .Cm IdentityAgent , .Cm IdentityFile , .Cm KnownHostsCommand , and .Cm UserKnownHostsFile support environment variables. The keywords .Cm LocalForward and .Cm RemoteForward support environment variables only for Unix domain socket paths. .Sh FILES .Bl -tag -width Ds .It Pa ~/.ssh/config This is the per-user configuration file. The format of this file is described above. This file is used by the SSH client. Because of the potential for abuse, this file must have strict permissions: read/write for the user, and not writable by others. .It Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_config Systemwide configuration file. This file provides defaults for those values that are not specified in the user's configuration file, and for those users who do not have a configuration file. This file must be world-readable. .El .Sh SEE ALSO .Xr ssh 1 .Sh AUTHORS .An -nosplit OpenSSH is a derivative of the original and free ssh 1.2.12 release by .An Tatu Ylonen . .An Aaron Campbell , Bob Beck , Markus Friedl , .An Niels Provos , Theo de Raadt and .An Dug Song removed many bugs, re-added newer features and created OpenSSH. .An Markus Friedl contributed the support for SSH protocol versions 1.5 and 2.0. diff --git a/crypto/openssh/ssh_namespace.h b/crypto/openssh/ssh_namespace.h index cfbc9d9fbcba..430019823bc0 100644 --- a/crypto/openssh/ssh_namespace.h +++ b/crypto/openssh/ssh_namespace.h @@ -1,1013 +1,1013 @@ /* * This file was machine-@generated. Do not edit manually. * Run crypto/openssh/freebsd-namespace.sh to regenerate. */ #define Blowfish_decipher Fssh_Blowfish_decipher #define Blowfish_encipher Fssh_Blowfish_encipher #define Blowfish_expand0state Fssh_Blowfish_expand0state #define Blowfish_expandstate Fssh_Blowfish_expandstate #define Blowfish_initstate Fssh_Blowfish_initstate #define Blowfish_stream2word Fssh_Blowfish_stream2word #define Decode Fssh_Decode #define EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_iv Fssh_EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_iv #define EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_iv Fssh_EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_iv #define Encode Fssh_Encode #define Hide Fssh_Hide #define Rq_mult_small Fssh_Rq_mult_small #define Short_random Fssh_Short_random #define _ssh__compat_glob Fssh__ssh__compat_glob #define _ssh__compat_globfree Fssh__ssh__compat_globfree #define _ssh_exchange_banner Fssh__ssh_exchange_banner #define _ssh_host_key_sign Fssh__ssh_host_key_sign #define _ssh_host_private_key Fssh__ssh_host_private_key #define _ssh_host_public_key Fssh__ssh_host_public_key #define _ssh_order_hostkeyalgs Fssh__ssh_order_hostkeyalgs #define _ssh_read_banner Fssh__ssh_read_banner #define _ssh_send_banner Fssh__ssh_send_banner #define _ssh_verify_host_key Fssh__ssh_verify_host_key #define a2port Fssh_a2port #define a2tun Fssh_a2tun #define add_host_to_hostfile Fssh_add_host_to_hostfile #define add_p1p1 Fssh_add_p1p1 #define addargs Fssh_addargs #define addr_and Fssh_addr_and #define addr_cmp Fssh_addr_cmp #define addr_host_is_all0s Fssh_addr_host_is_all0s #define addr_host_to_all1s Fssh_addr_host_to_all1s #define addr_hostmask Fssh_addr_hostmask #define addr_increment Fssh_addr_increment #define addr_invert Fssh_addr_invert #define addr_is_all0s Fssh_addr_is_all0s #define addr_match_cidr_list Fssh_addr_match_cidr_list #define addr_match_list Fssh_addr_match_list #define addr_netmask Fssh_addr_netmask #define addr_netmatch Fssh_addr_netmatch #define addr_ntop Fssh_addr_ntop #define addr_or Fssh_addr_or #define addr_pton Fssh_addr_pton #define addr_pton_cidr Fssh_addr_pton_cidr #define addr_sa_pton Fssh_addr_sa_pton #define addr_sa_to_xaddr Fssh_addr_sa_to_xaddr #define addr_unicast_masklen Fssh_addr_unicast_masklen #define addr_xaddr_to_sa Fssh_addr_xaddr_to_sa #define argv_assemble Fssh_argv_assemble #define argv_consume Fssh_argv_consume #define argv_free Fssh_argv_free #define argv_next Fssh_argv_next #define argv_split Fssh_argv_split #define ask_permission Fssh_ask_permission #define asmprintf Fssh_asmprintf #define atoi_err Fssh_atoi_err #define atomicio Fssh_atomicio #define atomicio6 Fssh_atomicio6 #define atomiciov Fssh_atomiciov #define atomiciov6 Fssh_atomiciov6 #define bandwidth_limit Fssh_bandwidth_limit #define bandwidth_limit_init Fssh_bandwidth_limit_init #define barrett_reduce Fssh_barrett_reduce #define baud_to_speed Fssh_baud_to_speed #define bcrypt_hash Fssh_bcrypt_hash #define bcrypt_pbkdf Fssh_bcrypt_pbkdf #define bitmap_clear_bit Fssh_bitmap_clear_bit #define bitmap_free Fssh_bitmap_free #define bitmap_from_string Fssh_bitmap_from_string #define bitmap_nbits Fssh_bitmap_nbits #define bitmap_nbytes Fssh_bitmap_nbytes #define bitmap_new Fssh_bitmap_new #define bitmap_set_bit Fssh_bitmap_set_bit #define bitmap_test_bit Fssh_bitmap_test_bit #define bitmap_to_string Fssh_bitmap_to_string #define bitmap_zero Fssh_bitmap_zero #define blf_cbc_decrypt Fssh_blf_cbc_decrypt #define blf_cbc_encrypt Fssh_blf_cbc_encrypt #define blf_dec Fssh_blf_dec #define blf_ecb_decrypt Fssh_blf_ecb_decrypt #define blf_ecb_encrypt Fssh_blf_ecb_encrypt #define blf_enc Fssh_blf_enc #define blf_key Fssh_blf_key #define blob_section Fssh_blob_section #define cert_free Fssh_cert_free #define cert_parse Fssh_cert_parse #define chacha_encrypt_bytes Fssh_chacha_encrypt_bytes #define chacha_ivsetup Fssh_chacha_ivsetup #define chacha_keysetup Fssh_chacha_keysetup #define chachapoly_crypt Fssh_chachapoly_crypt #define chachapoly_free Fssh_chachapoly_free #define chachapoly_get_length Fssh_chachapoly_get_length #define chachapoly_new Fssh_chachapoly_new #define chan_ibuf_empty Fssh_chan_ibuf_empty #define chan_is_dead Fssh_chan_is_dead #define chan_mark_dead Fssh_chan_mark_dead #define chan_obuf_empty Fssh_chan_obuf_empty #define chan_rcvd_eow Fssh_chan_rcvd_eow #define chan_rcvd_ieof Fssh_chan_rcvd_ieof #define chan_rcvd_oclose Fssh_chan_rcvd_oclose #define chan_read_failed Fssh_chan_read_failed #define chan_send_close2 Fssh_chan_send_close2 #define chan_send_eof2 Fssh_chan_send_eof2 #define chan_shutdown_extended_read Fssh_chan_shutdown_extended_read #define chan_shutdown_read Fssh_chan_shutdown_read #define chan_shutdown_write Fssh_chan_shutdown_write #define chan_write_failed Fssh_chan_write_failed #define channel_add_permission Fssh_channel_add_permission #define channel_add_timeout Fssh_channel_add_timeout #define channel_after_poll Fssh_channel_after_poll #define channel_by_id Fssh_channel_by_id #define channel_by_remote_id Fssh_channel_by_remote_id #define channel_cancel_cleanup Fssh_channel_cancel_cleanup #define channel_cancel_lport_listener Fssh_channel_cancel_lport_listener #define channel_cancel_rport_listener Fssh_channel_cancel_rport_listener #define channel_clear_permission Fssh_channel_clear_permission #define channel_clear_timeouts Fssh_channel_clear_timeouts #define channel_close_all Fssh_channel_close_all #define channel_close_fd Fssh_channel_close_fd #define channel_connect_by_listen_address Fssh_channel_connect_by_listen_address #define channel_connect_by_listen_path Fssh_channel_connect_by_listen_path #define channel_connect_stdio_fwd Fssh_channel_connect_stdio_fwd #define channel_connect_to_path Fssh_channel_connect_to_path #define channel_connect_to_port Fssh_channel_connect_to_port #define channel_decode_socks4 Fssh_channel_decode_socks4 #define channel_decode_socks5 Fssh_channel_decode_socks5 #define channel_disable_admin Fssh_channel_disable_admin #define channel_find_open Fssh_channel_find_open #define channel_force_close Fssh_channel_force_close #define channel_format_extended_usage Fssh_channel_format_extended_usage #define channel_free Fssh_channel_free #define channel_free_all Fssh_channel_free_all #define channel_fwd_bind_addr Fssh_channel_fwd_bind_addr #define channel_handler Fssh_channel_handler #define channel_init_channels Fssh_channel_init_channels #define channel_input_data Fssh_channel_input_data #define channel_input_extended_data Fssh_channel_input_extended_data #define channel_input_ieof Fssh_channel_input_ieof #define channel_input_oclose Fssh_channel_input_oclose #define channel_input_open_confirmation Fssh_channel_input_open_confirmation #define channel_input_open_failure Fssh_channel_input_open_failure #define channel_input_status_confirm Fssh_channel_input_status_confirm #define channel_input_window_adjust Fssh_channel_input_window_adjust #define channel_lookup Fssh_channel_lookup #define channel_new Fssh_channel_new #define channel_not_very_much_buffered_data Fssh_channel_not_very_much_buffered_data #define channel_open_message Fssh_channel_open_message #define channel_output_poll Fssh_channel_output_poll #define channel_parse_id Fssh_channel_parse_id #define channel_permit_all Fssh_channel_permit_all #define channel_post_auth_listener Fssh_channel_post_auth_listener #define channel_post_connecting Fssh_channel_post_connecting #define channel_post_mux_client Fssh_channel_post_mux_client #define channel_post_mux_listener Fssh_channel_post_mux_listener #define channel_post_open Fssh_channel_post_open #define channel_post_port_listener Fssh_channel_post_port_listener #define channel_post_x11_listener Fssh_channel_post_x11_listener #define channel_pre_connecting Fssh_channel_pre_connecting #define channel_pre_dynamic Fssh_channel_pre_dynamic #define channel_pre_listener Fssh_channel_pre_listener #define channel_pre_mux_client Fssh_channel_pre_mux_client #define channel_pre_open Fssh_channel_pre_open #define channel_pre_x11_open Fssh_channel_pre_x11_open #define channel_prepare_poll Fssh_channel_prepare_poll #define channel_proxy_downstream Fssh_channel_proxy_downstream #define channel_proxy_upstream Fssh_channel_proxy_upstream #define channel_register_cleanup Fssh_channel_register_cleanup #define channel_register_fds Fssh_channel_register_fds #define channel_register_filter Fssh_channel_register_filter #define channel_register_open_confirm Fssh_channel_register_open_confirm #define channel_register_status_confirm Fssh_channel_register_status_confirm #define channel_request_remote_forwarding Fssh_channel_request_remote_forwarding #define channel_request_rforward_cancel Fssh_channel_request_rforward_cancel #define channel_request_start Fssh_channel_request_start #define channel_send_open Fssh_channel_send_open #define channel_send_window_changes Fssh_channel_send_window_changes #define channel_set_af Fssh_channel_set_af #define channel_set_fds Fssh_channel_set_fds #define channel_set_x11_refuse_time Fssh_channel_set_x11_refuse_time #define channel_set_xtype Fssh_channel_set_xtype #define channel_setup_fwd_listener_streamlocal Fssh_channel_setup_fwd_listener_streamlocal #define channel_setup_fwd_listener_tcpip Fssh_channel_setup_fwd_listener_tcpip #define channel_setup_local_fwd_listener Fssh_channel_setup_local_fwd_listener #define channel_setup_remote_fwd_listener Fssh_channel_setup_remote_fwd_listener #define channel_still_open Fssh_channel_still_open #define channel_stop_listening Fssh_channel_stop_listening #define channel_update_permission Fssh_channel_update_permission #define check_hostkeys_by_key_or_type Fssh_check_hostkeys_by_key_or_type #define check_key_in_hostkeys Fssh_check_key_in_hostkeys #define child_set_env Fssh_child_set_env #define choose_dh Fssh_choose_dh #define choose_t Fssh_choose_t #define chop Fssh_chop #define cipher_alg_list Fssh_cipher_alg_list #define cipher_authlen Fssh_cipher_authlen #define cipher_blocksize Fssh_cipher_blocksize #define cipher_by_name Fssh_cipher_by_name #define cipher_crypt Fssh_cipher_crypt #define cipher_ctx_is_plaintext Fssh_cipher_ctx_is_plaintext #define cipher_free Fssh_cipher_free #define cipher_get_keyiv Fssh_cipher_get_keyiv #define cipher_get_keyiv_len Fssh_cipher_get_keyiv_len #define cipher_get_length Fssh_cipher_get_length #define cipher_init Fssh_cipher_init #define cipher_is_cbc Fssh_cipher_is_cbc #define cipher_ivlen Fssh_cipher_ivlen #define cipher_keylen Fssh_cipher_keylen #define cipher_seclen Fssh_cipher_seclen #define cipher_set_keyiv Fssh_cipher_set_keyiv #define cipher_warning_message Fssh_cipher_warning_message #define ciphers_valid Fssh_ciphers_valid #define cleanhostname Fssh_cleanhostname #define cleanup_exit Fssh_cleanup_exit #define client_converse Fssh_client_converse #define colon Fssh_colon #define compare Fssh_compare #define compare_gps Fssh_compare_gps #define compat_banner Fssh_compat_banner -#define compat_cipher_proposal Fssh_compat_cipher_proposal #define compat_kex_proposal Fssh_compat_kex_proposal -#define compat_pkalg_proposal Fssh_compat_pkalg_proposal #define compression_alg_list Fssh_compression_alg_list #define connect_next Fssh_connect_next #define connect_to Fssh_connect_to #define connect_to_helper Fssh_connect_to_helper #define convtime Fssh_convtime #define crypto_hash_sha512 Fssh_crypto_hash_sha512 #define crypto_kem_sntrup761_dec Fssh_crypto_kem_sntrup761_dec #define crypto_kem_sntrup761_enc Fssh_crypto_kem_sntrup761_enc #define crypto_kem_sntrup761_keypair Fssh_crypto_kem_sntrup761_keypair #define crypto_scalarmult_curve25519 Fssh_crypto_scalarmult_curve25519 #define crypto_sign_ed25519 Fssh_crypto_sign_ed25519 #define crypto_sign_ed25519_keypair Fssh_crypto_sign_ed25519_keypair #define crypto_sign_ed25519_open Fssh_crypto_sign_ed25519_open #define crypto_sign_ed25519_ref_fe25519_getparity Fssh_crypto_sign_ed25519_ref_fe25519_getparity #define crypto_sign_ed25519_ref_fe25519_iseq_vartime Fssh_crypto_sign_ed25519_ref_fe25519_iseq_vartime #define crypto_sign_ed25519_ref_fe25519_mul Fssh_crypto_sign_ed25519_ref_fe25519_mul #define crypto_sign_ed25519_ref_isneutral_vartime Fssh_crypto_sign_ed25519_ref_isneutral_vartime #define crypto_sign_ed25519_ref_pack Fssh_crypto_sign_ed25519_ref_pack #define crypto_sign_ed25519_ref_scalarmult_base Fssh_crypto_sign_ed25519_ref_scalarmult_base #define crypto_sign_ed25519_ref_unpackneg_vartime Fssh_crypto_sign_ed25519_ref_unpackneg_vartime #define daemonized Fssh_daemonized #define dangerous_locale Fssh_dangerous_locale #define dbl_p1p1 Fssh_dbl_p1p1 #define default_key_sign Fssh_default_key_sign #define deserialise_identity2 Fssh_deserialise_identity2 #define dh_estimate Fssh_dh_estimate #define dh_gen_key Fssh_dh_gen_key #define dh_new_group Fssh_dh_new_group #define dh_new_group1 Fssh_dh_new_group1 #define dh_new_group14 Fssh_dh_new_group14 #define dh_new_group16 Fssh_dh_new_group16 #define dh_new_group18 Fssh_dh_new_group18 #define dh_new_group_asc Fssh_dh_new_group_asc #define dh_new_group_fallback Fssh_dh_new_group_fallback #define dh_pub_is_valid Fssh_dh_pub_is_valid #define dh_set_moduli_file Fssh_dh_set_moduli_file #define dispatch_protocol_error Fssh_dispatch_protocol_error #define dispatch_protocol_ignore Fssh_dispatch_protocol_ignore #define do_log Fssh_do_log #define dollar_expand Fssh_dollar_expand #define ecdsa_do_sign Fssh_ecdsa_do_sign #define encode_constraints Fssh_encode_constraints #define encode_dest_constraint_hop Fssh_encode_dest_constraint_hop #define exited_cleanly Fssh_exited_cleanly #define export_dns_rr Fssh_export_dns_rr #define fd_ready Fssh_fd_ready #define fe25519_reduce_add_sub Fssh_fe25519_reduce_add_sub #define filter_list Fssh_filter_list #define fingerprint_b64 Fssh_fingerprint_b64 #define fingerprint_hex Fssh_fingerprint_hex #define fmprintf Fssh_fmprintf #define fmt_scaled Fssh_fmt_scaled #define fmt_timeframe Fssh_fmt_timeframe #define format_absolute_time Fssh_format_absolute_time #define format_timestamp Fssh_format_timestamp #define forward_equals Fssh_forward_equals #define free_hostkeys Fssh_free_hostkeys #define freeargs Fssh_freeargs #define freerrset Fssh_freerrset #define freezero Fssh_freezero #define fwd_ident Fssh_fwd_ident #define g_opendir Fssh_g_opendir #define g_stat Fssh_g_stat #define gen_candidates Fssh_gen_candidates #define get_local_ipaddr Fssh_get_local_ipaddr #define get_local_name Fssh_get_local_name #define get_local_port Fssh_get_local_port #define get_peer_ipaddr Fssh_get_peer_ipaddr #define get_peer_port Fssh_get_peer_port #define get_rdomain Fssh_get_rdomain #define get_sock_af Fssh_get_sock_af #define get_sock_port Fssh_get_sock_port #define get_socket_address Fssh_get_socket_address #define get_u16 Fssh_get_u16 #define get_u32 Fssh_get_u32 #define get_u32_le Fssh_get_u32_le #define get_u64 Fssh_get_u64 #define getrrsetbyname Fssh_getrrsetbyname #define glob0 Fssh_glob0 #define glob2 Fssh_glob2 #define globexp1 Fssh_globexp1 #define globextend Fssh_globextend #define host_delete Fssh_host_delete #define host_hash Fssh_host_hash #define hostfile_create_user_ssh_dir Fssh_hostfile_create_user_ssh_dir #define hostfile_read_key Fssh_hostfile_read_key #define hostfile_replace_entries Fssh_hostfile_replace_entries #define hostkeys_foreach Fssh_hostkeys_foreach #define hostkeys_foreach_file Fssh_hostkeys_foreach_file #define hpdelim Fssh_hpdelim #define hpdelim2 Fssh_hpdelim2 #define init_hostkeys Fssh_init_hostkeys #define input_kex_dh_gex_group Fssh_input_kex_dh_gex_group #define input_kex_dh_gex_init Fssh_input_kex_dh_gex_init #define input_kex_dh_gex_reply Fssh_input_kex_dh_gex_reply #define input_kex_dh_gex_request Fssh_input_kex_dh_gex_request #define input_kex_gen_init Fssh_input_kex_gen_init #define input_kex_gen_reply Fssh_input_kex_gen_reply #define iptos2str Fssh_iptos2str #define ipv64_normalise_mapped Fssh_ipv64_normalise_mapped #define is_cert_revoked Fssh_is_cert_revoked #define is_key_revoked Fssh_is_key_revoked #define kex_alg_by_name Fssh_kex_alg_by_name #define kex_alg_list Fssh_kex_alg_list #define kex_assemble_names Fssh_kex_assemble_names #define kex_buf2prop Fssh_kex_buf2prop #define kex_c25519_dec Fssh_kex_c25519_dec #define kex_c25519_enc Fssh_kex_c25519_enc #define kex_c25519_keypair Fssh_kex_c25519_keypair #define kex_choose_conf Fssh_kex_choose_conf #define kex_derive_keys Fssh_kex_derive_keys #define kex_dh_compute_key Fssh_kex_dh_compute_key #define kex_dh_dec Fssh_kex_dh_dec #define kex_dh_enc Fssh_kex_dh_enc #define kex_dh_keygen Fssh_kex_dh_keygen #define kex_dh_keypair Fssh_kex_dh_keypair #define kex_ecdh_dec Fssh_kex_ecdh_dec #define kex_ecdh_dec_key_group Fssh_kex_ecdh_dec_key_group #define kex_ecdh_enc Fssh_kex_ecdh_enc #define kex_ecdh_keypair Fssh_kex_ecdh_keypair #define kex_exchange_identification Fssh_kex_exchange_identification #define kex_free Fssh_kex_free #define kex_free_newkeys Fssh_kex_free_newkeys #define kex_gen_client Fssh_kex_gen_client #define kex_gen_hash Fssh_kex_gen_hash #define kex_gen_server Fssh_kex_gen_server #define kex_input_ext_info Fssh_kex_input_ext_info #define kex_input_kexinit Fssh_kex_input_kexinit #define kex_input_newkeys Fssh_kex_input_newkeys #define kex_kem_sntrup761x25519_dec Fssh_kex_kem_sntrup761x25519_dec #define kex_kem_sntrup761x25519_enc Fssh_kex_kem_sntrup761x25519_enc #define kex_kem_sntrup761x25519_keypair Fssh_kex_kem_sntrup761x25519_keypair #define kex_load_hostkey Fssh_kex_load_hostkey #define kex_names_cat Fssh_kex_names_cat #define kex_names_valid Fssh_kex_names_valid #define kex_new Fssh_kex_new #define kex_prop2buf Fssh_kex_prop2buf #define kex_prop_free Fssh_kex_prop_free +#define kex_proposal_free_entries Fssh_kex_proposal_free_entries +#define kex_proposal_populate_entries Fssh_kex_proposal_populate_entries #define kex_protocol_error Fssh_kex_protocol_error #define kex_ready Fssh_kex_ready #define kex_send_kexinit Fssh_kex_send_kexinit #define kex_send_newkeys Fssh_kex_send_newkeys #define kex_setup Fssh_kex_setup #define kex_start_rekex Fssh_kex_start_rekex #define kex_verify_host_key Fssh_kex_verify_host_key #define kexc25519_keygen Fssh_kexc25519_keygen #define kexc25519_shared_key Fssh_kexc25519_shared_key #define kexc25519_shared_key_ext Fssh_kexc25519_shared_key_ext #define kexgex_client Fssh_kexgex_client #define kexgex_hash Fssh_kexgex_hash #define kexgex_server Fssh_kexgex_server #define krl_dump Fssh_krl_dump #define load_hostkeys Fssh_load_hostkeys #define load_hostkeys_file Fssh_load_hostkeys_file #define log_change_level Fssh_log_change_level #define log_facility_name Fssh_log_facility_name #define log_facility_number Fssh_log_facility_number #define log_init Fssh_log_init #define log_is_on_stderr Fssh_log_is_on_stderr #define log_level_get Fssh_log_level_get #define log_level_name Fssh_log_level_name #define log_level_number Fssh_log_level_number #define log_redirect_stderr_to Fssh_log_redirect_stderr_to #define log_verbose_add Fssh_log_verbose_add #define log_verbose_reset Fssh_log_verbose_reset #define lookup_env_in_list Fssh_lookup_env_in_list #define lookup_key_in_hostkeys_by_type Fssh_lookup_key_in_hostkeys_by_type #define lookup_marker_in_hostkeys Fssh_lookup_marker_in_hostkeys #define lookup_setenv_in_list Fssh_lookup_setenv_in_list #define lowercase Fssh_lowercase #define mac_alg_list Fssh_mac_alg_list #define mac_check Fssh_mac_check #define mac_clear Fssh_mac_clear #define mac_compute Fssh_mac_compute #define mac_init Fssh_mac_init #define mac_setup Fssh_mac_setup #define mac_valid Fssh_mac_valid #define match_filter_allowlist Fssh_match_filter_allowlist #define match_filter_denylist Fssh_match_filter_denylist #define match_host_and_ip Fssh_match_host_and_ip #define match_hostname Fssh_match_hostname #define match_list Fssh_match_list #define match_maybe_hashed Fssh_match_maybe_hashed #define match_pattern Fssh_match_pattern #define match_pattern_list Fssh_match_pattern_list #define match_user Fssh_match_user #define match_usergroup_pattern_list Fssh_match_usergroup_pattern_list #define mktemp_proto Fssh_mktemp_proto #define mm_choose_dh Fssh_mm_choose_dh #define mm_receive_fd Fssh_mm_receive_fd #define mm_send_fd Fssh_mm_send_fd #define mm_sshkey_sign Fssh_mm_sshkey_sign #define monotime Fssh_monotime #define monotime_double Fssh_monotime_double #define monotime_ts Fssh_monotime_ts #define monotime_tv Fssh_monotime_tv #define mprintf Fssh_mprintf #define ms_subtract_diff Fssh_ms_subtract_diff #define ms_to_timespec Fssh_ms_to_timespec #define msetlocale Fssh_msetlocale #define newkeys_from_blob Fssh_newkeys_from_blob #define newkeys_to_blob Fssh_newkeys_to_blob #define nh_aux Fssh_nh_aux #define nh_final Fssh_nh_final #define note_key Fssh_note_key #define notify_complete Fssh_notify_complete #define notify_start Fssh_notify_start #define open_preamble Fssh_open_preamble #define openssh_RSA_verify Fssh_openssh_RSA_verify #define opt_array_append Fssh_opt_array_append #define opt_array_append2 Fssh_opt_array_append2 #define opt_dequote Fssh_opt_dequote #define opt_flag Fssh_opt_flag #define opt_match Fssh_opt_match #define ossl_error Fssh_ossl_error #define parse_absolute_time Fssh_parse_absolute_time #define parse_ipqos Fssh_parse_ipqos #define parse_prime Fssh_parse_prime #define parse_revoked_certs Fssh_parse_revoked_certs #define parse_uri Fssh_parse_uri #define parse_user_host_path Fssh_parse_user_host_path #define parse_user_host_port Fssh_parse_user_host_port #define path_absolute Fssh_path_absolute #define pem_passphrase_cb Fssh_pem_passphrase_cb #define percent_dollar_expand Fssh_percent_dollar_expand #define percent_expand Fssh_percent_expand #define permission_set_add Fssh_permission_set_add #define permitopen_port Fssh_permitopen_port #define pkcs11_add_provider Fssh_pkcs11_add_provider #define pkcs11_del_provider Fssh_pkcs11_del_provider #define pkcs11_ecdsa_wrap Fssh_pkcs11_ecdsa_wrap #define pkcs11_fetch_certs Fssh_pkcs11_fetch_certs #define pkcs11_fetch_keys Fssh_pkcs11_fetch_keys #define pkcs11_find Fssh_pkcs11_find #define pkcs11_get_key Fssh_pkcs11_get_key #define pkcs11_init Fssh_pkcs11_init #define pkcs11_k11_free Fssh_pkcs11_k11_free #define pkcs11_login_slot Fssh_pkcs11_login_slot #define pkcs11_provider_finalize Fssh_pkcs11_provider_finalize #define pkcs11_provider_unref Fssh_pkcs11_provider_unref #define pkcs11_rsa_private_decrypt Fssh_pkcs11_rsa_private_decrypt #define pkcs11_rsa_private_encrypt Fssh_pkcs11_rsa_private_encrypt #define pkcs11_rsa_wrap Fssh_pkcs11_rsa_wrap #define pkcs11_terminate Fssh_pkcs11_terminate #define plain_key_blob Fssh_plain_key_blob #define platform_disable_tracing Fssh_platform_disable_tracing #define platform_pledge_agent Fssh_platform_pledge_agent #define platform_pledge_mux Fssh_platform_pledge_mux #define platform_pledge_sftp_server Fssh_platform_pledge_sftp_server #define platform_sys_dir_uid Fssh_platform_sys_dir_uid #define pledge Fssh_pledge #define poly1305_auth Fssh_poly1305_auth #define poly_hash Fssh_poly_hash #define port_open_helper Fssh_port_open_helper #define prime_test Fssh_prime_test #define private2_check_padding Fssh_private2_check_padding #define private2_uudecode Fssh_private2_uudecode #define proposals_match Fssh_proposals_match #define ptimeout_deadline_monotime Fssh_ptimeout_deadline_monotime #define ptimeout_deadline_ms Fssh_ptimeout_deadline_ms #define ptimeout_deadline_sec Fssh_ptimeout_deadline_sec #define ptimeout_get_ms Fssh_ptimeout_get_ms #define ptimeout_get_tsp Fssh_ptimeout_get_tsp #define ptimeout_init Fssh_ptimeout_init #define ptimeout_isset Fssh_ptimeout_isset #define put_bitmap Fssh_put_bitmap #define put_host_port Fssh_put_host_port #define put_u16 Fssh_put_u16 #define put_u32 Fssh_put_u32 #define put_u32_le Fssh_put_u32_le #define put_u64 Fssh_put_u64 #define pwcopy Fssh_pwcopy #define qfileout Fssh_qfileout #define read_mux Fssh_read_mux #define read_passphrase Fssh_read_passphrase #define recallocarray Fssh_recallocarray #define record_hostkey Fssh_record_hostkey #define refresh_progress_meter Fssh_refresh_progress_meter #define replacearg Fssh_replacearg #define revoke_blob Fssh_revoke_blob #define revoked_blob_tree_RB_FIND Fssh_revoked_blob_tree_RB_FIND #define revoked_blob_tree_RB_NEXT Fssh_revoked_blob_tree_RB_NEXT #define revoked_blob_tree_RB_REMOVE Fssh_revoked_blob_tree_RB_REMOVE #define revoked_certs_for_ca_key Fssh_revoked_certs_for_ca_key #define revoked_certs_generate Fssh_revoked_certs_generate #define revoked_serial_tree_RB_REMOVE Fssh_revoked_serial_tree_RB_REMOVE #define rijndaelEncrypt Fssh_rijndaelEncrypt #define rijndaelKeySetupEnc Fssh_rijndaelKeySetupEnc #define rsa_hash_id_from_keyname Fssh_rsa_hash_id_from_keyname #define rtrim Fssh_rtrim #define safe_path Fssh_safe_path #define safe_path_fd Fssh_safe_path_fd #define sanitise_stdfd Fssh_sanitise_stdfd #define scan_scaled Fssh_scan_scaled #define seed_rng Fssh_seed_rng #define send_error Fssh_send_error #define set_log_handler Fssh_set_log_handler #define set_nodelay Fssh_set_nodelay #define set_nonblock Fssh_set_nonblock #define set_rdomain Fssh_set_rdomain #define set_reuseaddr Fssh_set_reuseaddr #define set_sock_tos Fssh_set_sock_tos #define sftp_realpath Fssh_sftp_realpath #define shadow_pw Fssh_shadow_pw #define sieve_large Fssh_sieve_large #define sig_alarm Fssh_sig_alarm #define sig_winch Fssh_sig_winch #define skip_space Fssh_skip_space #define snmprintf Fssh_snmprintf #define sock_set_v6only Fssh_sock_set_v6only #define speed_to_baud Fssh_speed_to_baud #define square Fssh_square #define ssh_add_hostkey Fssh_ssh_add_hostkey #define ssh_add_identity_constrained Fssh_ssh_add_identity_constrained #define ssh_agent_bind_hostkey Fssh_ssh_agent_bind_hostkey #define ssh_agent_has_key Fssh_ssh_agent_has_key #define ssh_agent_sign Fssh_ssh_agent_sign #define ssh_alloc_session_state Fssh_ssh_alloc_session_state #define ssh_clear_newkeys Fssh_ssh_clear_newkeys #define ssh_close_authentication_socket Fssh_ssh_close_authentication_socket #define ssh_compatible_openssl Fssh_ssh_compatible_openssl #define ssh_digest_alg_by_name Fssh_ssh_digest_alg_by_name #define ssh_digest_alg_name Fssh_ssh_digest_alg_name #define ssh_digest_blocksize Fssh_ssh_digest_blocksize #define ssh_digest_buffer Fssh_ssh_digest_buffer #define ssh_digest_bytes Fssh_ssh_digest_bytes #define ssh_digest_copy_state Fssh_ssh_digest_copy_state #define ssh_digest_final Fssh_ssh_digest_final #define ssh_digest_free Fssh_ssh_digest_free #define ssh_digest_memory Fssh_ssh_digest_memory #define ssh_digest_start Fssh_ssh_digest_start #define ssh_digest_update Fssh_ssh_digest_update #define ssh_digest_update_buffer Fssh_ssh_digest_update_buffer #define ssh_dispatch_init Fssh_ssh_dispatch_init #define ssh_dispatch_range Fssh_ssh_dispatch_range #define ssh_dispatch_run Fssh_ssh_dispatch_run #define ssh_dispatch_run_fatal Fssh_ssh_dispatch_run_fatal #define ssh_dispatch_set Fssh_ssh_dispatch_set #define ssh_dss_alloc Fssh_ssh_dss_alloc #define ssh_dss_cleanup Fssh_ssh_dss_cleanup #define ssh_dss_copy_public Fssh_ssh_dss_copy_public #define ssh_dss_deserialize_private Fssh_ssh_dss_deserialize_private #define ssh_dss_deserialize_public Fssh_ssh_dss_deserialize_public #define ssh_dss_equal Fssh_ssh_dss_equal #define ssh_dss_generate Fssh_ssh_dss_generate #define ssh_dss_serialize_private Fssh_ssh_dss_serialize_private #define ssh_dss_serialize_public Fssh_ssh_dss_serialize_public #define ssh_dss_sign Fssh_ssh_dss_sign #define ssh_dss_size Fssh_ssh_dss_size #define ssh_dss_verify Fssh_ssh_dss_verify #define ssh_ecdsa_cleanup Fssh_ssh_ecdsa_cleanup #define ssh_ecdsa_copy_public Fssh_ssh_ecdsa_copy_public #define ssh_ecdsa_deserialize_private Fssh_ssh_ecdsa_deserialize_private #define ssh_ecdsa_deserialize_public Fssh_ssh_ecdsa_deserialize_public #define ssh_ecdsa_equal Fssh_ssh_ecdsa_equal #define ssh_ecdsa_generate Fssh_ssh_ecdsa_generate #define ssh_ecdsa_serialize_private Fssh_ssh_ecdsa_serialize_private #define ssh_ecdsa_serialize_public Fssh_ssh_ecdsa_serialize_public #define ssh_ecdsa_sign Fssh_ssh_ecdsa_sign #define ssh_ecdsa_size Fssh_ssh_ecdsa_size #define ssh_ecdsa_sk_cleanup Fssh_ssh_ecdsa_sk_cleanup #define ssh_ecdsa_sk_copy_public Fssh_ssh_ecdsa_sk_copy_public #define ssh_ecdsa_sk_deserialize_private Fssh_ssh_ecdsa_sk_deserialize_private #define ssh_ecdsa_sk_deserialize_public Fssh_ssh_ecdsa_sk_deserialize_public #define ssh_ecdsa_sk_equal Fssh_ssh_ecdsa_sk_equal #define ssh_ecdsa_sk_serialize_private Fssh_ssh_ecdsa_sk_serialize_private #define ssh_ecdsa_sk_serialize_public Fssh_ssh_ecdsa_sk_serialize_public #define ssh_ecdsa_sk_verify Fssh_ssh_ecdsa_sk_verify #define ssh_ecdsa_verify Fssh_ssh_ecdsa_verify #define ssh_ed25519_cleanup Fssh_ssh_ed25519_cleanup #define ssh_ed25519_copy_public Fssh_ssh_ed25519_copy_public #define ssh_ed25519_deserialize_private Fssh_ssh_ed25519_deserialize_private #define ssh_ed25519_deserialize_public Fssh_ssh_ed25519_deserialize_public #define ssh_ed25519_equal Fssh_ssh_ed25519_equal #define ssh_ed25519_generate Fssh_ssh_ed25519_generate #define ssh_ed25519_serialize_private Fssh_ssh_ed25519_serialize_private #define ssh_ed25519_serialize_public Fssh_ssh_ed25519_serialize_public #define ssh_ed25519_sign Fssh_ssh_ed25519_sign #define ssh_ed25519_sk_cleanup Fssh_ssh_ed25519_sk_cleanup #define ssh_ed25519_sk_copy_public Fssh_ssh_ed25519_sk_copy_public #define ssh_ed25519_sk_deserialize_private Fssh_ssh_ed25519_sk_deserialize_private #define ssh_ed25519_sk_deserialize_public Fssh_ssh_ed25519_sk_deserialize_public #define ssh_ed25519_sk_equal Fssh_ssh_ed25519_sk_equal #define ssh_ed25519_sk_serialize_private Fssh_ssh_ed25519_sk_serialize_private #define ssh_ed25519_sk_serialize_public Fssh_ssh_ed25519_sk_serialize_public #define ssh_ed25519_sk_verify Fssh_ssh_ed25519_sk_verify #define ssh_ed25519_verify Fssh_ssh_ed25519_verify #define ssh_err Fssh_ssh_err #define ssh_fetch_identitylist Fssh_ssh_fetch_identitylist #define ssh_free Fssh_ssh_free #define ssh_free_identitylist Fssh_ssh_free_identitylist #define ssh_gai_strerror Fssh_ssh_gai_strerror #define ssh_get_app_data Fssh_ssh_get_app_data #define ssh_get_authentication_socket Fssh_ssh_get_authentication_socket #define ssh_get_authentication_socket_path Fssh_ssh_get_authentication_socket_path #define ssh_get_progname Fssh_ssh_get_progname #define ssh_hmac_bytes Fssh_ssh_hmac_bytes #define ssh_hmac_final Fssh_ssh_hmac_final #define ssh_hmac_free Fssh_ssh_hmac_free #define ssh_hmac_init Fssh_ssh_hmac_init #define ssh_hmac_start Fssh_ssh_hmac_start #define ssh_hmac_update Fssh_ssh_hmac_update #define ssh_hmac_update_buffer Fssh_ssh_hmac_update_buffer #define ssh_init Fssh_ssh_init #define ssh_input_append Fssh_ssh_input_append #define ssh_input_space Fssh_ssh_input_space #define ssh_krl_check_key Fssh_ssh_krl_check_key #define ssh_krl_file_contains_key Fssh_ssh_krl_file_contains_key #define ssh_krl_free Fssh_ssh_krl_free #define ssh_krl_from_blob Fssh_ssh_krl_from_blob #define ssh_krl_init Fssh_ssh_krl_init #define ssh_krl_revoke_cert_by_key_id Fssh_ssh_krl_revoke_cert_by_key_id #define ssh_krl_revoke_cert_by_serial Fssh_ssh_krl_revoke_cert_by_serial #define ssh_krl_revoke_cert_by_serial_range Fssh_ssh_krl_revoke_cert_by_serial_range #define ssh_krl_revoke_key Fssh_ssh_krl_revoke_key #define ssh_krl_revoke_key_explicit Fssh_ssh_krl_revoke_key_explicit #define ssh_krl_revoke_key_sha1 Fssh_ssh_krl_revoke_key_sha1 #define ssh_krl_revoke_key_sha256 Fssh_ssh_krl_revoke_key_sha256 #define ssh_krl_set_comment Fssh_ssh_krl_set_comment #define ssh_krl_set_version Fssh_ssh_krl_set_version #define ssh_krl_to_blob Fssh_ssh_krl_to_blob #define ssh_libcrypto_init Fssh_ssh_libcrypto_init #define ssh_local_ipaddr Fssh_ssh_local_ipaddr #define ssh_local_port Fssh_ssh_local_port #define ssh_lock_agent Fssh_ssh_lock_agent #define ssh_msg_recv Fssh_ssh_msg_recv #define ssh_msg_send Fssh_ssh_msg_send #define ssh_output_consume Fssh_ssh_output_consume #define ssh_output_ptr Fssh_ssh_output_ptr #define ssh_output_space Fssh_ssh_output_space #define ssh_packet_check_rekey Fssh_ssh_packet_check_rekey #define ssh_packet_clear_keys Fssh_ssh_packet_clear_keys #define ssh_packet_close Fssh_ssh_packet_close #define ssh_packet_close_internal Fssh_ssh_packet_close_internal #define ssh_packet_connection_af Fssh_ssh_packet_connection_af #define ssh_packet_connection_is_on_socket Fssh_ssh_packet_connection_is_on_socket #define ssh_packet_disconnect Fssh_ssh_packet_disconnect #define ssh_packet_enable_delayed_compress Fssh_ssh_packet_enable_delayed_compress #define ssh_packet_get_bytes Fssh_ssh_packet_get_bytes #define ssh_packet_get_connection_in Fssh_ssh_packet_get_connection_in #define ssh_packet_get_connection_out Fssh_ssh_packet_get_connection_out #define ssh_packet_get_input Fssh_ssh_packet_get_input #define ssh_packet_get_maxsize Fssh_ssh_packet_get_maxsize #define ssh_packet_get_mux Fssh_ssh_packet_get_mux #define ssh_packet_get_output Fssh_ssh_packet_get_output #define ssh_packet_get_protocol_flags Fssh_ssh_packet_get_protocol_flags #define ssh_packet_get_rekey_timeout Fssh_ssh_packet_get_rekey_timeout #define ssh_packet_get_state Fssh_ssh_packet_get_state #define ssh_packet_have_data_to_write Fssh_ssh_packet_have_data_to_write #define ssh_packet_inc_alive_timeouts Fssh_ssh_packet_inc_alive_timeouts #define ssh_packet_is_interactive Fssh_ssh_packet_is_interactive #define ssh_packet_is_rekeying Fssh_ssh_packet_is_rekeying #define ssh_packet_log_type Fssh_ssh_packet_log_type #define ssh_packet_need_rekeying Fssh_ssh_packet_need_rekeying #define ssh_packet_next Fssh_ssh_packet_next #define ssh_packet_not_very_much_data_to_write Fssh_ssh_packet_not_very_much_data_to_write #define ssh_packet_payload Fssh_ssh_packet_payload #define ssh_packet_process_incoming Fssh_ssh_packet_process_incoming #define ssh_packet_process_read Fssh_ssh_packet_process_read #define ssh_packet_put Fssh_ssh_packet_put #define ssh_packet_rdomain_in Fssh_ssh_packet_rdomain_in #define ssh_packet_read Fssh_ssh_packet_read #define ssh_packet_read_expect Fssh_ssh_packet_read_expect #define ssh_packet_read_poll2 Fssh_ssh_packet_read_poll2 #define ssh_packet_read_poll_seqnr Fssh_ssh_packet_read_poll_seqnr #define ssh_packet_read_seqnr Fssh_ssh_packet_read_seqnr #define ssh_packet_remaining Fssh_ssh_packet_remaining #define ssh_packet_send2 Fssh_ssh_packet_send2 #define ssh_packet_send2_wrapped Fssh_ssh_packet_send2_wrapped #define ssh_packet_send_debug Fssh_ssh_packet_send_debug #define ssh_packet_set_alive_timeouts Fssh_ssh_packet_set_alive_timeouts #define ssh_packet_set_authenticated Fssh_ssh_packet_set_authenticated #define ssh_packet_set_connection Fssh_ssh_packet_set_connection #define ssh_packet_set_input_hook Fssh_ssh_packet_set_input_hook #define ssh_packet_set_interactive Fssh_ssh_packet_set_interactive #define ssh_packet_set_log_preamble Fssh_ssh_packet_set_log_preamble #define ssh_packet_set_maxsize Fssh_ssh_packet_set_maxsize #define ssh_packet_set_mux Fssh_ssh_packet_set_mux #define ssh_packet_set_nonblocking Fssh_ssh_packet_set_nonblocking #define ssh_packet_set_postauth Fssh_ssh_packet_set_postauth #define ssh_packet_set_protocol_flags Fssh_ssh_packet_set_protocol_flags #define ssh_packet_set_rekey_limits Fssh_ssh_packet_set_rekey_limits #define ssh_packet_set_server Fssh_ssh_packet_set_server #define ssh_packet_set_state Fssh_ssh_packet_set_state #define ssh_packet_set_timeout Fssh_ssh_packet_set_timeout #define ssh_packet_set_tos Fssh_ssh_packet_set_tos #define ssh_packet_start_discard Fssh_ssh_packet_start_discard #define ssh_packet_stop_discard Fssh_ssh_packet_stop_discard #define ssh_packet_write_poll Fssh_ssh_packet_write_poll #define ssh_packet_write_wait Fssh_ssh_packet_write_wait #define ssh_remote_ipaddr Fssh_ssh_remote_ipaddr #define ssh_remote_port Fssh_ssh_remote_port #define ssh_remove_all_identities Fssh_ssh_remove_all_identities #define ssh_remove_identity Fssh_ssh_remove_identity #define ssh_request_reply Fssh_ssh_request_reply #define ssh_request_reply_decode Fssh_ssh_request_reply_decode #define ssh_rsa_alloc Fssh_ssh_rsa_alloc #define ssh_rsa_cleanup Fssh_ssh_rsa_cleanup #define ssh_rsa_complete_crt_parameters Fssh_ssh_rsa_complete_crt_parameters #define ssh_rsa_copy_public Fssh_ssh_rsa_copy_public #define ssh_rsa_deserialize_private Fssh_ssh_rsa_deserialize_private #define ssh_rsa_deserialize_public Fssh_ssh_rsa_deserialize_public #define ssh_rsa_equal Fssh_ssh_rsa_equal #define ssh_rsa_generate Fssh_ssh_rsa_generate #define ssh_rsa_serialize_private Fssh_ssh_rsa_serialize_private #define ssh_rsa_serialize_public Fssh_ssh_rsa_serialize_public #define ssh_rsa_sign Fssh_ssh_rsa_sign #define ssh_rsa_size Fssh_ssh_rsa_size #define ssh_rsa_verify Fssh_ssh_rsa_verify #define ssh_set_app_data Fssh_ssh_set_app_data #define ssh_set_newkeys Fssh_ssh_set_newkeys #define ssh_set_verify_host_key_callback Fssh_ssh_set_verify_host_key_callback #define ssh_signal Fssh_ssh_signal #define ssh_tty_make_modes Fssh_ssh_tty_make_modes #define ssh_tty_parse_modes Fssh_ssh_tty_parse_modes #define ssh_update_card Fssh_ssh_update_card #define sshbuf_alloc Fssh_sshbuf_alloc #define sshbuf_allocate Fssh_sshbuf_allocate #define sshbuf_avail Fssh_sshbuf_avail #define sshbuf_b64tod Fssh_sshbuf_b64tod #define sshbuf_check_reserve Fssh_sshbuf_check_reserve #define sshbuf_cmp Fssh_sshbuf_cmp #define sshbuf_consume Fssh_sshbuf_consume #define sshbuf_consume_end Fssh_sshbuf_consume_end #define sshbuf_dtob16 Fssh_sshbuf_dtob16 #define sshbuf_dtob64 Fssh_sshbuf_dtob64 #define sshbuf_dtob64_string Fssh_sshbuf_dtob64_string #define sshbuf_dtourlb64 Fssh_sshbuf_dtourlb64 #define sshbuf_dump Fssh_sshbuf_dump #define sshbuf_dump_data Fssh_sshbuf_dump_data #define sshbuf_dup_string Fssh_sshbuf_dup_string #define sshbuf_find Fssh_sshbuf_find #define sshbuf_free Fssh_sshbuf_free #define sshbuf_from Fssh_sshbuf_from #define sshbuf_fromb Fssh_sshbuf_fromb #define sshbuf_froms Fssh_sshbuf_froms #define sshbuf_get Fssh_sshbuf_get #define sshbuf_get_bignum2 Fssh_sshbuf_get_bignum2 #define sshbuf_get_bignum2_bytes_direct Fssh_sshbuf_get_bignum2_bytes_direct #define sshbuf_get_cstring Fssh_sshbuf_get_cstring #define sshbuf_get_ec Fssh_sshbuf_get_ec #define sshbuf_get_eckey Fssh_sshbuf_get_eckey #define sshbuf_get_string Fssh_sshbuf_get_string #define sshbuf_get_string_direct Fssh_sshbuf_get_string_direct #define sshbuf_get_stringb Fssh_sshbuf_get_stringb #define sshbuf_get_u16 Fssh_sshbuf_get_u16 #define sshbuf_get_u32 Fssh_sshbuf_get_u32 #define sshbuf_get_u64 Fssh_sshbuf_get_u64 #define sshbuf_get_u8 Fssh_sshbuf_get_u8 #define sshbuf_len Fssh_sshbuf_len #define sshbuf_load_fd Fssh_sshbuf_load_fd #define sshbuf_load_file Fssh_sshbuf_load_file #define sshbuf_max_size Fssh_sshbuf_max_size #define sshbuf_maybe_pack Fssh_sshbuf_maybe_pack #define sshbuf_mutable_ptr Fssh_sshbuf_mutable_ptr #define sshbuf_new Fssh_sshbuf_new #define sshbuf_parent Fssh_sshbuf_parent #define sshbuf_peek_string_direct Fssh_sshbuf_peek_string_direct #define sshbuf_peek_u16 Fssh_sshbuf_peek_u16 #define sshbuf_peek_u32 Fssh_sshbuf_peek_u32 #define sshbuf_peek_u64 Fssh_sshbuf_peek_u64 #define sshbuf_peek_u8 Fssh_sshbuf_peek_u8 #define sshbuf_poke Fssh_sshbuf_poke #define sshbuf_poke_u16 Fssh_sshbuf_poke_u16 #define sshbuf_poke_u32 Fssh_sshbuf_poke_u32 #define sshbuf_poke_u64 Fssh_sshbuf_poke_u64 #define sshbuf_poke_u8 Fssh_sshbuf_poke_u8 #define sshbuf_ptr Fssh_sshbuf_ptr #define sshbuf_put Fssh_sshbuf_put #define sshbuf_put_bignum2 Fssh_sshbuf_put_bignum2 #define sshbuf_put_bignum2_bytes Fssh_sshbuf_put_bignum2_bytes #define sshbuf_put_cstring Fssh_sshbuf_put_cstring #define sshbuf_put_ec Fssh_sshbuf_put_ec #define sshbuf_put_eckey Fssh_sshbuf_put_eckey #define sshbuf_put_string Fssh_sshbuf_put_string #define sshbuf_put_stringb Fssh_sshbuf_put_stringb #define sshbuf_put_u16 Fssh_sshbuf_put_u16 #define sshbuf_put_u32 Fssh_sshbuf_put_u32 #define sshbuf_put_u64 Fssh_sshbuf_put_u64 #define sshbuf_put_u8 Fssh_sshbuf_put_u8 #define sshbuf_putb Fssh_sshbuf_putb #define sshbuf_putf Fssh_sshbuf_putf #define sshbuf_putfv Fssh_sshbuf_putfv #define sshbuf_read Fssh_sshbuf_read #define sshbuf_refcount Fssh_sshbuf_refcount #define sshbuf_reserve Fssh_sshbuf_reserve #define sshbuf_reset Fssh_sshbuf_reset #define sshbuf_set_max_size Fssh_sshbuf_set_max_size #define sshbuf_set_parent Fssh_sshbuf_set_parent #define sshbuf_write_file Fssh_sshbuf_write_file #define sshfatal Fssh_sshfatal #define sshkey_advance_past_options Fssh_sshkey_advance_past_options #define sshkey_alg_list Fssh_sshkey_alg_list #define sshkey_cert_check_authority Fssh_sshkey_cert_check_authority #define sshkey_cert_check_authority_now Fssh_sshkey_cert_check_authority_now #define sshkey_cert_check_host Fssh_sshkey_cert_check_host #define sshkey_cert_copy Fssh_sshkey_cert_copy #define sshkey_cert_type Fssh_sshkey_cert_type #define sshkey_certify Fssh_sshkey_certify #define sshkey_certify_custom Fssh_sshkey_certify_custom #define sshkey_check_cert_sigtype Fssh_sshkey_check_cert_sigtype #define sshkey_check_revoked Fssh_sshkey_check_revoked #define sshkey_check_rsa_length Fssh_sshkey_check_rsa_length #define sshkey_check_sigtype Fssh_sshkey_check_sigtype #define sshkey_copy_public_sk Fssh_sshkey_copy_public_sk #define sshkey_curve_name_to_nid Fssh_sshkey_curve_name_to_nid #define sshkey_curve_nid_to_bits Fssh_sshkey_curve_nid_to_bits #define sshkey_curve_nid_to_name Fssh_sshkey_curve_nid_to_name #define sshkey_deserialize_sk Fssh_sshkey_deserialize_sk #define sshkey_drop_cert Fssh_sshkey_drop_cert #define sshkey_dump_ec_key Fssh_sshkey_dump_ec_key #define sshkey_dump_ec_point Fssh_sshkey_dump_ec_point #define sshkey_ec_nid_to_hash_alg Fssh_sshkey_ec_nid_to_hash_alg #define sshkey_ec_validate_private Fssh_sshkey_ec_validate_private #define sshkey_ec_validate_public Fssh_sshkey_ec_validate_public #define sshkey_ecdsa_bits_to_nid Fssh_sshkey_ecdsa_bits_to_nid #define sshkey_ecdsa_key_to_nid Fssh_sshkey_ecdsa_key_to_nid #define sshkey_ecdsa_nid_from_name Fssh_sshkey_ecdsa_nid_from_name #define sshkey_enable_maxsign Fssh_sshkey_enable_maxsign #define sshkey_equal Fssh_sshkey_equal #define sshkey_equal_public Fssh_sshkey_equal_public #define sshkey_fingerprint Fssh_sshkey_fingerprint #define sshkey_fingerprint_raw Fssh_sshkey_fingerprint_raw #define sshkey_format_cert_validity Fssh_sshkey_format_cert_validity #define sshkey_format_text Fssh_sshkey_format_text #define sshkey_free Fssh_sshkey_free #define sshkey_free_contents Fssh_sshkey_free_contents #define sshkey_from_blob Fssh_sshkey_from_blob #define sshkey_from_blob_internal Fssh_sshkey_from_blob_internal #define sshkey_from_private Fssh_sshkey_from_private #define sshkey_fromb Fssh_sshkey_fromb #define sshkey_froms Fssh_sshkey_froms #define sshkey_generate Fssh_sshkey_generate #define sshkey_get_sigtype Fssh_sshkey_get_sigtype #define sshkey_impl_from_type Fssh_sshkey_impl_from_type #define sshkey_in_file Fssh_sshkey_in_file #define sshkey_is_cert Fssh_sshkey_is_cert #define sshkey_is_shielded Fssh_sshkey_is_shielded #define sshkey_is_sk Fssh_sshkey_is_sk #define sshkey_load_cert Fssh_sshkey_load_cert #define sshkey_load_private Fssh_sshkey_load_private #define sshkey_load_private_cert Fssh_sshkey_load_private_cert #define sshkey_load_private_type Fssh_sshkey_load_private_type #define sshkey_load_private_type_fd Fssh_sshkey_load_private_type_fd #define sshkey_load_public Fssh_sshkey_load_public #define sshkey_match_keyname_to_sigalgs Fssh_sshkey_match_keyname_to_sigalgs #define sshkey_names_valid2 Fssh_sshkey_names_valid2 #define sshkey_new Fssh_sshkey_new #define sshkey_parse_private2 Fssh_sshkey_parse_private2 #define sshkey_parse_private_fileblob Fssh_sshkey_parse_private_fileblob #define sshkey_parse_private_fileblob_type Fssh_sshkey_parse_private_fileblob_type #define sshkey_parse_pubkey_from_private_fileblob_type Fssh_sshkey_parse_pubkey_from_private_fileblob_type #define sshkey_perm_ok Fssh_sshkey_perm_ok #define sshkey_plain_to_blob Fssh_sshkey_plain_to_blob #define sshkey_private_deserialize Fssh_sshkey_private_deserialize #define sshkey_private_deserialize_sk Fssh_sshkey_private_deserialize_sk #define sshkey_private_serialize Fssh_sshkey_private_serialize #define sshkey_private_serialize_maxsign Fssh_sshkey_private_serialize_maxsign #define sshkey_private_serialize_opt Fssh_sshkey_private_serialize_opt #define sshkey_private_to_blob2 Fssh_sshkey_private_to_blob2 #define sshkey_private_to_fileblob Fssh_sshkey_private_to_fileblob #define sshkey_putb Fssh_sshkey_putb #define sshkey_putb_plain Fssh_sshkey_putb_plain #define sshkey_puts Fssh_sshkey_puts #define sshkey_puts_opts Fssh_sshkey_puts_opts #define sshkey_read Fssh_sshkey_read #define sshkey_save_private Fssh_sshkey_save_private #define sshkey_save_public Fssh_sshkey_save_public #define sshkey_serialize_private_sk Fssh_sshkey_serialize_private_sk #define sshkey_serialize_sk Fssh_sshkey_serialize_sk #define sshkey_set_filename Fssh_sshkey_set_filename #define sshkey_shield_private Fssh_sshkey_shield_private #define sshkey_sig_details_free Fssh_sshkey_sig_details_free #define sshkey_sigalg_by_name Fssh_sshkey_sigalg_by_name #define sshkey_sign Fssh_sshkey_sign #define sshkey_signatures_left Fssh_sshkey_signatures_left #define sshkey_size Fssh_sshkey_size #define sshkey_sk_cleanup Fssh_sshkey_sk_cleanup #define sshkey_sk_fields_equal Fssh_sshkey_sk_fields_equal #define sshkey_ssh_name Fssh_sshkey_ssh_name #define sshkey_ssh_name_plain Fssh_sshkey_ssh_name_plain #define sshkey_to_base64 Fssh_sshkey_to_base64 #define sshkey_to_blob Fssh_sshkey_to_blob #define sshkey_to_certified Fssh_sshkey_to_certified #define sshkey_try_load_public Fssh_sshkey_try_load_public #define sshkey_type Fssh_sshkey_type #define sshkey_type_from_name Fssh_sshkey_type_from_name #define sshkey_type_is_cert Fssh_sshkey_type_is_cert #define sshkey_type_plain Fssh_sshkey_type_plain #define sshkey_unshield_private Fssh_sshkey_unshield_private #define sshkey_verify Fssh_sshkey_verify #define sshkey_write Fssh_sshkey_write #define sshlog Fssh_sshlog #define sshlogdie Fssh_sshlogdie #define sshlogdirect Fssh_sshlogdirect #define sshlogv Fssh_sshlogv #define sshpkt_add_padding Fssh_sshpkt_add_padding #define sshpkt_disconnect Fssh_sshpkt_disconnect #define sshpkt_fatal Fssh_sshpkt_fatal #define sshpkt_fmt_connection_id Fssh_sshpkt_fmt_connection_id #define sshpkt_get Fssh_sshpkt_get #define sshpkt_get_bignum2 Fssh_sshpkt_get_bignum2 #define sshpkt_get_cstring Fssh_sshpkt_get_cstring #define sshpkt_get_ec Fssh_sshpkt_get_ec #define sshpkt_get_end Fssh_sshpkt_get_end #define sshpkt_get_string Fssh_sshpkt_get_string #define sshpkt_get_string_direct Fssh_sshpkt_get_string_direct #define sshpkt_get_u32 Fssh_sshpkt_get_u32 #define sshpkt_get_u64 Fssh_sshpkt_get_u64 #define sshpkt_get_u8 Fssh_sshpkt_get_u8 #define sshpkt_getb_froms Fssh_sshpkt_getb_froms #define sshpkt_msg_ignore Fssh_sshpkt_msg_ignore #define sshpkt_peek_string_direct Fssh_sshpkt_peek_string_direct #define sshpkt_ptr Fssh_sshpkt_ptr #define sshpkt_put Fssh_sshpkt_put #define sshpkt_put_bignum2 Fssh_sshpkt_put_bignum2 #define sshpkt_put_cstring Fssh_sshpkt_put_cstring #define sshpkt_put_ec Fssh_sshpkt_put_ec #define sshpkt_put_string Fssh_sshpkt_put_string #define sshpkt_put_stringb Fssh_sshpkt_put_stringb #define sshpkt_put_u32 Fssh_sshpkt_put_u32 #define sshpkt_put_u64 Fssh_sshpkt_put_u64 #define sshpkt_put_u8 Fssh_sshpkt_put_u8 #define sshpkt_putb Fssh_sshpkt_putb #define sshpkt_send Fssh_sshpkt_send #define sshpkt_start Fssh_sshpkt_start #define sshpkt_vfatal Fssh_sshpkt_vfatal #define sshsigdie Fssh_sshsigdie #define sshsk_enroll Fssh_sshsk_enroll #define sshsk_free_resident_keys Fssh_sshsk_free_resident_keys #define sshsk_load_resident Fssh_sshsk_load_resident #define sshsk_sign Fssh_sshsk_sign #define start_compression_in Fssh_start_compression_in #define start_compression_out Fssh_start_compression_out #define start_progress_meter Fssh_start_progress_meter #define stdfd_devnull Fssh_stdfd_devnull #define stop_progress_meter Fssh_stop_progress_meter #define stravis Fssh_stravis #define strdelim Fssh_strdelim #define strdelim_internal Fssh_strdelim_internal #define strdelimw Fssh_strdelimw #define strnvis Fssh_strnvis #define strvis Fssh_strvis #define strvisx Fssh_strvisx #define subprocess Fssh_subprocess #define sys_tun_open Fssh_sys_tun_open #define tilde_expand Fssh_tilde_expand #define tilde_expand_filename Fssh_tilde_expand_filename #define timeout_connect Fssh_timeout_connect #define to_blob Fssh_to_blob #define to_blob_buf Fssh_to_blob_buf #define tohex Fssh_tohex #define tun_open Fssh_tun_open #define umac128_delete Fssh_umac128_delete #define umac128_final Fssh_umac128_final #define umac128_new Fssh_umac128_new #define umac128_update Fssh_umac128_update #define umac_delete Fssh_umac_delete #define umac_final Fssh_umac_final #define umac_new Fssh_umac_new #define umac_update Fssh_umac_update #define uncompress_buffer Fssh_uncompress_buffer #define unix_listener Fssh_unix_listener #define unset_nonblock Fssh_unset_nonblock #define urldecode Fssh_urldecode #define valid_domain Fssh_valid_domain #define valid_env_name Fssh_valid_env_name #define vasnmprintf Fssh_vasnmprintf #define vdollar_percent_expand Fssh_vdollar_percent_expand #define verify_host_key_dns Fssh_verify_host_key_dns #define vfmprintf Fssh_vfmprintf #define vis Fssh_vis #define waitfd Fssh_waitfd #define waitrfd Fssh_waitrfd #define webauthn_check_prepare_hash Fssh_webauthn_check_prepare_hash #define write_host_entry Fssh_write_host_entry #define x11_connect_display Fssh_x11_connect_display #define x11_create_display_inet Fssh_x11_create_display_inet #define x11_request_forwarding_with_spoofing Fssh_x11_request_forwarding_with_spoofing #define xasprintf Fssh_xasprintf #define xcalloc Fssh_xcalloc #define xcrypt Fssh_xcrypt #define xextendf Fssh_xextendf #define xmalloc Fssh_xmalloc #define xreallocarray Fssh_xreallocarray #define xrecallocarray Fssh_xrecallocarray #define xstrdup Fssh_xstrdup #define xvasprintf Fssh_xvasprintf diff --git a/crypto/openssh/sshconnect.c b/crypto/openssh/sshconnect.c index 792bc34bcb92..e6012f01e4d9 100644 --- a/crypto/openssh/sshconnect.c +++ b/crypto/openssh/sshconnect.c @@ -1,1722 +1,1721 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: sshconnect.c,v 1.361 2023/01/13 02:44:02 djm Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: sshconnect.c,v 1.363 2023/03/10 07:17:08 dtucker Exp $ */ /* * Author: Tatu Ylonen * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen , Espoo, Finland * All rights reserved * Code to connect to a remote host, and to perform the client side of the * login (authentication) dialog. * * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell". */ #include "includes.h" #include #include #include #include #ifdef HAVE_SYS_TIME_H # include #endif #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H #include #endif #include #ifdef HAVE_POLL_H #include #endif #include #include #include #include #include #include #ifdef HAVE_IFADDRS_H # include #endif #include "xmalloc.h" #include "hostfile.h" #include "ssh.h" #include "sshbuf.h" #include "packet.h" -#include "compat.h" #include "sshkey.h" #include "sshconnect.h" #include "log.h" #include "misc.h" #include "readconf.h" #include "atomicio.h" #include "dns.h" #include "monitor_fdpass.h" #include "ssh2.h" #include "version.h" #include "authfile.h" #include "ssherr.h" #include "authfd.h" #include "kex.h" struct sshkey *previous_host_key = NULL; static int matching_host_key_dns = 0; static pid_t proxy_command_pid = 0; /* import */ extern int debug_flag; extern Options options; extern char *__progname; static int show_other_keys(struct hostkeys *, struct sshkey *); static void warn_changed_key(struct sshkey *); /* Expand a proxy command */ static char * expand_proxy_command(const char *proxy_command, const char *user, const char *host, const char *host_arg, int port) { char *tmp, *ret, strport[NI_MAXSERV]; const char *keyalias = options.host_key_alias ? options.host_key_alias : host_arg; snprintf(strport, sizeof strport, "%d", port); xasprintf(&tmp, "exec %s", proxy_command); ret = percent_expand(tmp, "h", host, "k", keyalias, "n", host_arg, "p", strport, "r", options.user, (char *)NULL); free(tmp); return ret; } /* * Connect to the given ssh server using a proxy command that passes a * a connected fd back to us. */ static int ssh_proxy_fdpass_connect(struct ssh *ssh, const char *host, const char *host_arg, u_short port, const char *proxy_command) { char *command_string; int sp[2], sock; pid_t pid; char *shell; if ((shell = getenv("SHELL")) == NULL) shell = _PATH_BSHELL; if (socketpair(AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0, sp) == -1) fatal("Could not create socketpair to communicate with " "proxy dialer: %.100s", strerror(errno)); command_string = expand_proxy_command(proxy_command, options.user, host, host_arg, port); debug("Executing proxy dialer command: %.500s", command_string); /* Fork and execute the proxy command. */ if ((pid = fork()) == 0) { char *argv[10]; close(sp[1]); /* Redirect stdin and stdout. */ if (sp[0] != 0) { if (dup2(sp[0], 0) == -1) perror("dup2 stdin"); } if (sp[0] != 1) { if (dup2(sp[0], 1) == -1) perror("dup2 stdout"); } if (sp[0] >= 2) close(sp[0]); /* * Stderr is left for non-ControlPersist connections is so * error messages may be printed on the user's terminal. */ if (!debug_flag && options.control_path != NULL && options.control_persist && stdfd_devnull(0, 0, 1) == -1) error_f("stdfd_devnull failed"); argv[0] = shell; argv[1] = "-c"; argv[2] = command_string; argv[3] = NULL; /* * Execute the proxy command. * Note that we gave up any extra privileges above. */ execv(argv[0], argv); perror(argv[0]); exit(1); } /* Parent. */ if (pid == -1) fatal("fork failed: %.100s", strerror(errno)); close(sp[0]); free(command_string); if ((sock = mm_receive_fd(sp[1])) == -1) fatal("proxy dialer did not pass back a connection"); close(sp[1]); while (waitpid(pid, NULL, 0) == -1) if (errno != EINTR) fatal("Couldn't wait for child: %s", strerror(errno)); /* Set the connection file descriptors. */ if (ssh_packet_set_connection(ssh, sock, sock) == NULL) return -1; /* ssh_packet_set_connection logs error */ return 0; } /* * Connect to the given ssh server using a proxy command. */ static int ssh_proxy_connect(struct ssh *ssh, const char *host, const char *host_arg, u_short port, const char *proxy_command) { char *command_string; int pin[2], pout[2]; pid_t pid; char *shell; if ((shell = getenv("SHELL")) == NULL || *shell == '\0') shell = _PATH_BSHELL; /* Create pipes for communicating with the proxy. */ if (pipe(pin) == -1 || pipe(pout) == -1) fatal("Could not create pipes to communicate with the proxy: %.100s", strerror(errno)); command_string = expand_proxy_command(proxy_command, options.user, host, host_arg, port); debug("Executing proxy command: %.500s", command_string); /* Fork and execute the proxy command. */ if ((pid = fork()) == 0) { char *argv[10]; /* Redirect stdin and stdout. */ close(pin[1]); if (pin[0] != 0) { if (dup2(pin[0], 0) == -1) perror("dup2 stdin"); close(pin[0]); } close(pout[0]); if (dup2(pout[1], 1) == -1) perror("dup2 stdout"); /* Cannot be 1 because pin allocated two descriptors. */ close(pout[1]); /* * Stderr is left for non-ControlPersist connections is so * error messages may be printed on the user's terminal. */ if (!debug_flag && options.control_path != NULL && options.control_persist && stdfd_devnull(0, 0, 1) == -1) error_f("stdfd_devnull failed"); argv[0] = shell; argv[1] = "-c"; argv[2] = command_string; argv[3] = NULL; /* * Execute the proxy command. Note that we gave up any * extra privileges above. */ ssh_signal(SIGPIPE, SIG_DFL); execv(argv[0], argv); perror(argv[0]); exit(1); } /* Parent. */ if (pid == -1) fatal("fork failed: %.100s", strerror(errno)); else proxy_command_pid = pid; /* save pid to clean up later */ /* Close child side of the descriptors. */ close(pin[0]); close(pout[1]); /* Free the command name. */ free(command_string); /* Set the connection file descriptors. */ if (ssh_packet_set_connection(ssh, pout[0], pin[1]) == NULL) return -1; /* ssh_packet_set_connection logs error */ return 0; } void ssh_kill_proxy_command(void) { /* * Send SIGHUP to proxy command if used. We don't wait() in * case it hangs and instead rely on init to reap the child */ if (proxy_command_pid > 1) kill(proxy_command_pid, SIGHUP); } #ifdef HAVE_IFADDRS_H /* * Search a interface address list (returned from getifaddrs(3)) for an * address that matches the desired address family on the specified interface. * Returns 0 and fills in *resultp and *rlenp on success. Returns -1 on failure. */ static int check_ifaddrs(const char *ifname, int af, const struct ifaddrs *ifaddrs, struct sockaddr_storage *resultp, socklen_t *rlenp) { struct sockaddr_in6 *sa6; struct sockaddr_in *sa; struct in6_addr *v6addr; const struct ifaddrs *ifa; int allow_local; /* * Prefer addresses that are not loopback or linklocal, but use them * if nothing else matches. */ for (allow_local = 0; allow_local < 2; allow_local++) { for (ifa = ifaddrs; ifa != NULL; ifa = ifa->ifa_next) { if (ifa->ifa_addr == NULL || ifa->ifa_name == NULL || (ifa->ifa_flags & IFF_UP) == 0 || ifa->ifa_addr->sa_family != af || strcmp(ifa->ifa_name, options.bind_interface) != 0) continue; switch (ifa->ifa_addr->sa_family) { case AF_INET: sa = (struct sockaddr_in *)ifa->ifa_addr; if (!allow_local && sa->sin_addr.s_addr == htonl(INADDR_LOOPBACK)) continue; if (*rlenp < sizeof(struct sockaddr_in)) { error_f("v4 addr doesn't fit"); return -1; } *rlenp = sizeof(struct sockaddr_in); memcpy(resultp, sa, *rlenp); return 0; case AF_INET6: sa6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)ifa->ifa_addr; v6addr = &sa6->sin6_addr; if (!allow_local && (IN6_IS_ADDR_LINKLOCAL(v6addr) || IN6_IS_ADDR_LOOPBACK(v6addr))) continue; if (*rlenp < sizeof(struct sockaddr_in6)) { error_f("v6 addr doesn't fit"); return -1; } *rlenp = sizeof(struct sockaddr_in6); memcpy(resultp, sa6, *rlenp); return 0; } } } return -1; } #endif /* * Creates a socket for use as the ssh connection. */ static int ssh_create_socket(struct addrinfo *ai) { int sock, r; struct sockaddr_storage bindaddr; socklen_t bindaddrlen = 0; struct addrinfo hints, *res = NULL; #ifdef HAVE_IFADDRS_H struct ifaddrs *ifaddrs = NULL; #endif char ntop[NI_MAXHOST]; sock = socket(ai->ai_family, ai->ai_socktype, ai->ai_protocol); if (sock == -1) { error("socket: %s", strerror(errno)); return -1; } - fcntl(sock, F_SETFD, FD_CLOEXEC); + (void)fcntl(sock, F_SETFD, FD_CLOEXEC); /* Use interactive QOS (if specified) until authentication completed */ if (options.ip_qos_interactive != INT_MAX) set_sock_tos(sock, options.ip_qos_interactive); /* Bind the socket to an alternative local IP address */ if (options.bind_address == NULL && options.bind_interface == NULL) return sock; if (options.bind_address != NULL) { memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints)); hints.ai_family = ai->ai_family; hints.ai_socktype = ai->ai_socktype; hints.ai_protocol = ai->ai_protocol; hints.ai_flags = AI_PASSIVE; if ((r = getaddrinfo(options.bind_address, NULL, &hints, &res)) != 0) { error("getaddrinfo: %s: %s", options.bind_address, ssh_gai_strerror(r)); goto fail; } if (res == NULL) { error("getaddrinfo: no addrs"); goto fail; } memcpy(&bindaddr, res->ai_addr, res->ai_addrlen); bindaddrlen = res->ai_addrlen; } else if (options.bind_interface != NULL) { #ifdef HAVE_IFADDRS_H if ((r = getifaddrs(&ifaddrs)) != 0) { error("getifaddrs: %s: %s", options.bind_interface, strerror(errno)); goto fail; } bindaddrlen = sizeof(bindaddr); if (check_ifaddrs(options.bind_interface, ai->ai_family, ifaddrs, &bindaddr, &bindaddrlen) != 0) { logit("getifaddrs: %s: no suitable addresses", options.bind_interface); goto fail; } #else error("BindInterface not supported on this platform."); #endif } if ((r = getnameinfo((struct sockaddr *)&bindaddr, bindaddrlen, ntop, sizeof(ntop), NULL, 0, NI_NUMERICHOST)) != 0) { error_f("getnameinfo failed: %s", ssh_gai_strerror(r)); goto fail; } if (bind(sock, (struct sockaddr *)&bindaddr, bindaddrlen) != 0) { error("bind %s: %s", ntop, strerror(errno)); goto fail; } debug_f("bound to %s", ntop); /* success */ goto out; fail: close(sock); sock = -1; out: if (res != NULL) freeaddrinfo(res); #ifdef HAVE_IFADDRS_H if (ifaddrs != NULL) freeifaddrs(ifaddrs); #endif return sock; } /* * Opens a TCP/IP connection to the remote server on the given host. * The address of the remote host will be returned in hostaddr. * If port is 0, the default port will be used. * Connection_attempts specifies the maximum number of tries (one per * second). If proxy_command is non-NULL, it specifies the command (with %h * and %p substituted for host and port, respectively) to use to contact * the daemon. */ static int ssh_connect_direct(struct ssh *ssh, const char *host, struct addrinfo *aitop, struct sockaddr_storage *hostaddr, u_short port, int connection_attempts, int *timeout_ms, int want_keepalive) { int on = 1, saved_timeout_ms = *timeout_ms; int oerrno, sock = -1, attempt; char ntop[NI_MAXHOST], strport[NI_MAXSERV]; struct addrinfo *ai; debug3_f("entering"); memset(ntop, 0, sizeof(ntop)); memset(strport, 0, sizeof(strport)); for (attempt = 0; attempt < connection_attempts; attempt++) { if (attempt > 0) { /* Sleep a moment before retrying. */ sleep(1); debug("Trying again..."); } /* * Loop through addresses for this host, and try each one in * sequence until the connection succeeds. */ for (ai = aitop; ai; ai = ai->ai_next) { if (ai->ai_family != AF_INET && ai->ai_family != AF_INET6) { errno = EAFNOSUPPORT; continue; } if (getnameinfo(ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen, ntop, sizeof(ntop), strport, sizeof(strport), NI_NUMERICHOST|NI_NUMERICSERV) != 0) { oerrno = errno; error_f("getnameinfo failed"); errno = oerrno; continue; } debug("Connecting to %.200s [%.100s] port %s.", host, ntop, strport); /* Create a socket for connecting. */ sock = ssh_create_socket(ai); if (sock < 0) { /* Any error is already output */ errno = 0; continue; } *timeout_ms = saved_timeout_ms; if (timeout_connect(sock, ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen, timeout_ms) >= 0) { /* Successful connection. */ memcpy(hostaddr, ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen); break; } else { oerrno = errno; debug("connect to address %s port %s: %s", ntop, strport, strerror(errno)); close(sock); sock = -1; errno = oerrno; } } if (sock != -1) break; /* Successful connection. */ } /* Return failure if we didn't get a successful connection. */ if (sock == -1) { error("ssh: connect to host %s port %s: %s", host, strport, errno == 0 ? "failure" : strerror(errno)); return -1; } debug("Connection established."); /* Set SO_KEEPALIVE if requested. */ if (want_keepalive && setsockopt(sock, SOL_SOCKET, SO_KEEPALIVE, (void *)&on, sizeof(on)) == -1) error("setsockopt SO_KEEPALIVE: %.100s", strerror(errno)); /* Set the connection. */ if (ssh_packet_set_connection(ssh, sock, sock) == NULL) return -1; /* ssh_packet_set_connection logs error */ return 0; } int ssh_connect(struct ssh *ssh, const char *host, const char *host_arg, struct addrinfo *addrs, struct sockaddr_storage *hostaddr, u_short port, int connection_attempts, int *timeout_ms, int want_keepalive) { int in, out; if (options.proxy_command == NULL) { return ssh_connect_direct(ssh, host, addrs, hostaddr, port, connection_attempts, timeout_ms, want_keepalive); } else if (strcmp(options.proxy_command, "-") == 0) { if ((in = dup(STDIN_FILENO)) == -1 || (out = dup(STDOUT_FILENO)) == -1) { if (in >= 0) close(in); error_f("dup() in/out failed"); return -1; /* ssh_packet_set_connection logs error */ } if ((ssh_packet_set_connection(ssh, in, out)) == NULL) return -1; /* ssh_packet_set_connection logs error */ return 0; } else if (options.proxy_use_fdpass) { return ssh_proxy_fdpass_connect(ssh, host, host_arg, port, options.proxy_command); } return ssh_proxy_connect(ssh, host, host_arg, port, options.proxy_command); } /* defaults to 'no' */ static int confirm(const char *prompt, const char *fingerprint) { const char *msg, *again = "Please type 'yes' or 'no': "; const char *again_fp = "Please type 'yes', 'no' or the fingerprint: "; char *p, *cp; int ret = -1; if (options.batch_mode) return 0; for (msg = prompt;;msg = fingerprint ? again_fp : again) { cp = p = read_passphrase(msg, RP_ECHO); if (p == NULL) return 0; p += strspn(p, " \t"); /* skip leading whitespace */ p[strcspn(p, " \t\n")] = '\0'; /* remove trailing whitespace */ if (p[0] == '\0' || strcasecmp(p, "no") == 0) ret = 0; else if (strcasecmp(p, "yes") == 0 || (fingerprint != NULL && strcmp(p, fingerprint) == 0)) ret = 1; free(cp); if (ret != -1) return ret; } } static int sockaddr_is_local(struct sockaddr *hostaddr) { switch (hostaddr->sa_family) { case AF_INET: return (ntohl(((struct sockaddr_in *)hostaddr)-> sin_addr.s_addr) >> 24) == IN_LOOPBACKNET; case AF_INET6: return IN6_IS_ADDR_LOOPBACK( &(((struct sockaddr_in6 *)hostaddr)->sin6_addr)); default: return 0; } } /* * Prepare the hostname and ip address strings that are used to lookup * host keys in known_hosts files. These may have a port number appended. */ void get_hostfile_hostname_ipaddr(char *hostname, struct sockaddr *hostaddr, u_short port, char **hostfile_hostname, char **hostfile_ipaddr) { char ntop[NI_MAXHOST]; socklen_t addrlen; switch (hostaddr == NULL ? -1 : hostaddr->sa_family) { case -1: addrlen = 0; break; case AF_INET: addrlen = sizeof(struct sockaddr_in); break; case AF_INET6: addrlen = sizeof(struct sockaddr_in6); break; default: addrlen = sizeof(struct sockaddr); break; } /* * We don't have the remote ip-address for connections * using a proxy command */ if (hostfile_ipaddr != NULL) { if (options.proxy_command == NULL) { if (getnameinfo(hostaddr, addrlen, ntop, sizeof(ntop), NULL, 0, NI_NUMERICHOST) != 0) fatal_f("getnameinfo failed"); *hostfile_ipaddr = put_host_port(ntop, port); } else { *hostfile_ipaddr = xstrdup(""); } } /* * Allow the user to record the key under a different name or * differentiate a non-standard port. This is useful for ssh * tunneling over forwarded connections or if you run multiple * sshd's on different ports on the same machine. */ if (hostfile_hostname != NULL) { if (options.host_key_alias != NULL) { *hostfile_hostname = xstrdup(options.host_key_alias); debug("using hostkeyalias: %s", *hostfile_hostname); } else { *hostfile_hostname = put_host_port(hostname, port); } } } /* returns non-zero if path appears in hostfiles, or 0 if not. */ static int path_in_hostfiles(const char *path, char **hostfiles, u_int num_hostfiles) { u_int i; for (i = 0; i < num_hostfiles; i++) { if (strcmp(path, hostfiles[i]) == 0) return 1; } return 0; } struct find_by_key_ctx { const char *host, *ip; const struct sshkey *key; char **names; u_int nnames; }; /* Try to replace home directory prefix (per $HOME) with a ~/ sequence */ static char * try_tilde_unexpand(const char *path) { char *home, *ret = NULL; size_t l; if (*path != '/') return xstrdup(path); if ((home = getenv("HOME")) == NULL || (l = strlen(home)) == 0) return xstrdup(path); if (strncmp(path, home, l) != 0) return xstrdup(path); /* * ensure we have matched on a path boundary: either the $HOME that * we just compared ends with a '/' or the next character of the path * must be a '/'. */ if (home[l - 1] != '/' && path[l] != '/') return xstrdup(path); if (path[l] == '/') l++; xasprintf(&ret, "~/%s", path + l); return ret; } static int hostkeys_find_by_key_cb(struct hostkey_foreach_line *l, void *_ctx) { struct find_by_key_ctx *ctx = (struct find_by_key_ctx *)_ctx; char *path; /* we are looking for keys with names that *do not* match */ if ((l->match & HKF_MATCH_HOST) != 0) return 0; /* not interested in marker lines */ if (l->marker != MRK_NONE) return 0; /* we are only interested in exact key matches */ if (l->key == NULL || !sshkey_equal(ctx->key, l->key)) return 0; path = try_tilde_unexpand(l->path); debug_f("found matching key in %s:%lu", path, l->linenum); ctx->names = xrecallocarray(ctx->names, ctx->nnames, ctx->nnames + 1, sizeof(*ctx->names)); xasprintf(&ctx->names[ctx->nnames], "%s:%lu: %s", path, l->linenum, strncmp(l->hosts, HASH_MAGIC, strlen(HASH_MAGIC)) == 0 ? "[hashed name]" : l->hosts); ctx->nnames++; free(path); return 0; } static int hostkeys_find_by_key_hostfile(const char *file, const char *which, struct find_by_key_ctx *ctx) { int r; debug3_f("trying %s hostfile \"%s\"", which, file); if ((r = hostkeys_foreach(file, hostkeys_find_by_key_cb, ctx, ctx->host, ctx->ip, HKF_WANT_PARSE_KEY, 0)) != 0) { if (r == SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR && errno == ENOENT) { debug_f("hostkeys file %s does not exist", file); return 0; } error_fr(r, "hostkeys_foreach failed for %s", file); return r; } return 0; } /* * Find 'key' in known hosts file(s) that do not match host/ip. * Used to display also-known-as information for previously-unseen hostkeys. */ static void hostkeys_find_by_key(const char *host, const char *ip, const struct sshkey *key, char **user_hostfiles, u_int num_user_hostfiles, char **system_hostfiles, u_int num_system_hostfiles, char ***names, u_int *nnames) { struct find_by_key_ctx ctx = {0, 0, 0, 0, 0}; u_int i; *names = NULL; *nnames = 0; if (key == NULL || sshkey_is_cert(key)) return; ctx.host = host; ctx.ip = ip; ctx.key = key; for (i = 0; i < num_user_hostfiles; i++) { if (hostkeys_find_by_key_hostfile(user_hostfiles[i], "user", &ctx) != 0) goto fail; } for (i = 0; i < num_system_hostfiles; i++) { if (hostkeys_find_by_key_hostfile(system_hostfiles[i], "system", &ctx) != 0) goto fail; } /* success */ *names = ctx.names; *nnames = ctx.nnames; ctx.names = NULL; ctx.nnames = 0; return; fail: for (i = 0; i < ctx.nnames; i++) free(ctx.names[i]); free(ctx.names); } #define MAX_OTHER_NAMES 8 /* Maximum number of names to list */ static char * other_hostkeys_message(const char *host, const char *ip, const struct sshkey *key, char **user_hostfiles, u_int num_user_hostfiles, char **system_hostfiles, u_int num_system_hostfiles) { char *ret = NULL, **othernames = NULL; u_int i, n, num_othernames = 0; hostkeys_find_by_key(host, ip, key, user_hostfiles, num_user_hostfiles, system_hostfiles, num_system_hostfiles, &othernames, &num_othernames); if (num_othernames == 0) return xstrdup("This key is not known by any other names."); xasprintf(&ret, "This host key is known by the following other " "names/addresses:"); n = num_othernames; if (n > MAX_OTHER_NAMES) n = MAX_OTHER_NAMES; for (i = 0; i < n; i++) { xextendf(&ret, "\n", " %s", othernames[i]); } if (n < num_othernames) { xextendf(&ret, "\n", " (%d additional names omitted)", num_othernames - n); } for (i = 0; i < num_othernames; i++) free(othernames[i]); free(othernames); return ret; } void load_hostkeys_command(struct hostkeys *hostkeys, const char *command_template, const char *invocation, const struct ssh_conn_info *cinfo, const struct sshkey *host_key, const char *hostfile_hostname) { int r, i, ac = 0; char *key_fp = NULL, *keytext = NULL, *tmp; char *command = NULL, *tag = NULL, **av = NULL; FILE *f = NULL; pid_t pid; void (*osigchld)(int); xasprintf(&tag, "KnownHostsCommand-%s", invocation); if (host_key != NULL) { if ((key_fp = sshkey_fingerprint(host_key, options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL) fatal_f("sshkey_fingerprint failed"); if ((r = sshkey_to_base64(host_key, &keytext)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "sshkey_to_base64 failed"); } /* * NB. all returns later this function should go via "out" to * ensure the original SIGCHLD handler is restored properly. */ osigchld = ssh_signal(SIGCHLD, SIG_DFL); /* Turn the command into an argument vector */ if (argv_split(command_template, &ac, &av, 0) != 0) { error("%s \"%s\" contains invalid quotes", tag, command_template); goto out; } if (ac == 0) { error("%s \"%s\" yielded no arguments", tag, command_template); goto out; } for (i = 1; i < ac; i++) { tmp = percent_dollar_expand(av[i], DEFAULT_CLIENT_PERCENT_EXPAND_ARGS(cinfo), "H", hostfile_hostname, "I", invocation, "t", host_key == NULL ? "NONE" : sshkey_ssh_name(host_key), "f", key_fp == NULL ? "NONE" : key_fp, "K", keytext == NULL ? "NONE" : keytext, (char *)NULL); if (tmp == NULL) fatal_f("percent_expand failed"); free(av[i]); av[i] = tmp; } /* Prepare a printable command for logs, etc. */ command = argv_assemble(ac, av); if ((pid = subprocess(tag, command, ac, av, &f, SSH_SUBPROCESS_STDOUT_CAPTURE|SSH_SUBPROCESS_UNSAFE_PATH| SSH_SUBPROCESS_PRESERVE_ENV, NULL, NULL, NULL)) == 0) goto out; load_hostkeys_file(hostkeys, hostfile_hostname, tag, f, 1); if (exited_cleanly(pid, tag, command, 0) != 0) fatal("KnownHostsCommand failed"); out: if (f != NULL) fclose(f); ssh_signal(SIGCHLD, osigchld); for (i = 0; i < ac; i++) free(av[i]); free(av); free(tag); free(command); free(key_fp); free(keytext); } /* * check whether the supplied host key is valid, return -1 if the key * is not valid. user_hostfile[0] will not be updated if 'readonly' is true. */ #define RDRW 0 #define RDONLY 1 #define ROQUIET 2 static int check_host_key(char *hostname, const struct ssh_conn_info *cinfo, struct sockaddr *hostaddr, u_short port, struct sshkey *host_key, int readonly, int clobber_port, char **user_hostfiles, u_int num_user_hostfiles, char **system_hostfiles, u_int num_system_hostfiles, const char *hostfile_command) { HostStatus host_status = -1, ip_status = -1; struct sshkey *raw_key = NULL; char *ip = NULL, *host = NULL; char hostline[1000], *hostp, *fp, *ra; char msg[1024]; const char *type, *fail_reason = NULL; const struct hostkey_entry *host_found = NULL, *ip_found = NULL; int len, cancelled_forwarding = 0, confirmed; int local = sockaddr_is_local(hostaddr); int r, want_cert = sshkey_is_cert(host_key), host_ip_differ = 0; int hostkey_trusted = 0; /* Known or explicitly accepted by user */ struct hostkeys *host_hostkeys, *ip_hostkeys; u_int i; /* * Force accepting of the host key for loopback/localhost. The * problem is that if the home directory is NFS-mounted to multiple * machines, localhost will refer to a different machine in each of * them, and the user will get bogus HOST_CHANGED warnings. This * essentially disables host authentication for localhost; however, * this is probably not a real problem. */ if (options.no_host_authentication_for_localhost == 1 && local && options.host_key_alias == NULL) { debug("Forcing accepting of host key for " "loopback/localhost."); options.update_hostkeys = 0; return 0; } /* * Don't ever try to write an invalid name to a known hosts file. * Note: do this before get_hostfile_hostname_ipaddr() to catch * '[' or ']' in the name before they are added. */ if (strcspn(hostname, "@?*#[]|'\'\"\\") != strlen(hostname)) { debug_f("invalid hostname \"%s\"; will not record: %s", hostname, fail_reason); readonly = RDONLY; } /* * Prepare the hostname and address strings used for hostkey lookup. * In some cases, these will have a port number appended. */ get_hostfile_hostname_ipaddr(hostname, hostaddr, clobber_port ? 0 : port, &host, &ip); /* * Turn off check_host_ip if the connection is to localhost, via proxy * command or if we don't have a hostname to compare with */ if (options.check_host_ip && (local || strcmp(hostname, ip) == 0 || options.proxy_command != NULL)) options.check_host_ip = 0; host_hostkeys = init_hostkeys(); for (i = 0; i < num_user_hostfiles; i++) load_hostkeys(host_hostkeys, host, user_hostfiles[i], 0); for (i = 0; i < num_system_hostfiles; i++) load_hostkeys(host_hostkeys, host, system_hostfiles[i], 0); if (hostfile_command != NULL && !clobber_port) { load_hostkeys_command(host_hostkeys, hostfile_command, "HOSTNAME", cinfo, host_key, host); } ip_hostkeys = NULL; if (!want_cert && options.check_host_ip) { ip_hostkeys = init_hostkeys(); for (i = 0; i < num_user_hostfiles; i++) load_hostkeys(ip_hostkeys, ip, user_hostfiles[i], 0); for (i = 0; i < num_system_hostfiles; i++) load_hostkeys(ip_hostkeys, ip, system_hostfiles[i], 0); if (hostfile_command != NULL && !clobber_port) { load_hostkeys_command(ip_hostkeys, hostfile_command, "ADDRESS", cinfo, host_key, ip); } } retry: /* Reload these as they may have changed on cert->key downgrade */ want_cert = sshkey_is_cert(host_key); type = sshkey_type(host_key); /* * Check if the host key is present in the user's list of known * hosts or in the systemwide list. */ host_status = check_key_in_hostkeys(host_hostkeys, host_key, &host_found); /* * If there are no hostfiles, or if the hostkey was found via * KnownHostsCommand, then don't try to touch the disk. */ if (!readonly && (num_user_hostfiles == 0 || (host_found != NULL && host_found->note != 0))) readonly = RDONLY; /* * Also perform check for the ip address, skip the check if we are * localhost, looking for a certificate, or the hostname was an ip * address to begin with. */ if (!want_cert && ip_hostkeys != NULL) { ip_status = check_key_in_hostkeys(ip_hostkeys, host_key, &ip_found); if (host_status == HOST_CHANGED && (ip_status != HOST_CHANGED || (ip_found != NULL && !sshkey_equal(ip_found->key, host_found->key)))) host_ip_differ = 1; } else ip_status = host_status; switch (host_status) { case HOST_OK: /* The host is known and the key matches. */ debug("Host '%.200s' is known and matches the %s host %s.", host, type, want_cert ? "certificate" : "key"); debug("Found %s in %s:%lu", want_cert ? "CA key" : "key", host_found->file, host_found->line); if (want_cert) { if (sshkey_cert_check_host(host_key, options.host_key_alias == NULL ? hostname : options.host_key_alias, 0, options.ca_sign_algorithms, &fail_reason) != 0) { error("%s", fail_reason); goto fail; } /* * Do not attempt hostkey update if a certificate was * successfully matched. */ if (options.update_hostkeys != 0) { options.update_hostkeys = 0; debug3_f("certificate host key in use; " "disabling UpdateHostkeys"); } } /* Turn off UpdateHostkeys if key was in system known_hosts */ if (options.update_hostkeys != 0 && (path_in_hostfiles(host_found->file, system_hostfiles, num_system_hostfiles) || (ip_status == HOST_OK && ip_found != NULL && path_in_hostfiles(ip_found->file, system_hostfiles, num_system_hostfiles)))) { options.update_hostkeys = 0; debug3_f("host key found in GlobalKnownHostsFile; " "disabling UpdateHostkeys"); } if (options.update_hostkeys != 0 && host_found->note) { options.update_hostkeys = 0; debug3_f("host key found via KnownHostsCommand; " "disabling UpdateHostkeys"); } if (options.check_host_ip && ip_status == HOST_NEW) { if (readonly || want_cert) logit("%s host key for IP address " "'%.128s' not in list of known hosts.", type, ip); else if (!add_host_to_hostfile(user_hostfiles[0], ip, host_key, options.hash_known_hosts)) logit("Failed to add the %s host key for IP " "address '%.128s' to the list of known " "hosts (%.500s).", type, ip, user_hostfiles[0]); else logit("Warning: Permanently added the %s host " "key for IP address '%.128s' to the list " "of known hosts.", type, ip); } else if (options.visual_host_key) { fp = sshkey_fingerprint(host_key, options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_DEFAULT); ra = sshkey_fingerprint(host_key, options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_RANDOMART); if (fp == NULL || ra == NULL) fatal_f("sshkey_fingerprint failed"); logit("Host key fingerprint is %s\n%s", fp, ra); free(ra); free(fp); } hostkey_trusted = 1; break; case HOST_NEW: if (options.host_key_alias == NULL && port != 0 && port != SSH_DEFAULT_PORT && !clobber_port) { debug("checking without port identifier"); if (check_host_key(hostname, cinfo, hostaddr, 0, host_key, ROQUIET, 1, user_hostfiles, num_user_hostfiles, system_hostfiles, num_system_hostfiles, hostfile_command) == 0) { debug("found matching key w/out port"); break; } } if (readonly || want_cert) goto fail; /* The host is new. */ if (options.strict_host_key_checking == SSH_STRICT_HOSTKEY_YES) { /* * User has requested strict host key checking. We * will not add the host key automatically. The only * alternative left is to abort. */ error("No %s host key is known for %.200s and you " "have requested strict checking.", type, host); goto fail; } else if (options.strict_host_key_checking == SSH_STRICT_HOSTKEY_ASK) { char *msg1 = NULL, *msg2 = NULL; xasprintf(&msg1, "The authenticity of host " "'%.200s (%s)' can't be established", host, ip); if (show_other_keys(host_hostkeys, host_key)) { xextendf(&msg1, "\n", "but keys of different " "type are already known for this host."); } else xextendf(&msg1, "", "."); fp = sshkey_fingerprint(host_key, options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_DEFAULT); ra = sshkey_fingerprint(host_key, options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_RANDOMART); if (fp == NULL || ra == NULL) fatal_f("sshkey_fingerprint failed"); xextendf(&msg1, "\n", "%s key fingerprint is %s.", type, fp); if (options.visual_host_key) xextendf(&msg1, "\n", "%s", ra); if (options.verify_host_key_dns) { xextendf(&msg1, "\n", "%s host key fingerprint found in DNS.", matching_host_key_dns ? "Matching" : "No matching"); } /* msg2 informs for other names matching this key */ if ((msg2 = other_hostkeys_message(host, ip, host_key, user_hostfiles, num_user_hostfiles, system_hostfiles, num_system_hostfiles)) != NULL) xextendf(&msg1, "\n", "%s", msg2); xextendf(&msg1, "\n", "Are you sure you want to continue connecting " "(yes/no/[fingerprint])? "); confirmed = confirm(msg1, fp); free(ra); free(fp); free(msg1); free(msg2); if (!confirmed) goto fail; hostkey_trusted = 1; /* user explicitly confirmed */ } /* * If in "new" or "off" strict mode, add the key automatically * to the local known_hosts file. */ if (options.check_host_ip && ip_status == HOST_NEW) { snprintf(hostline, sizeof(hostline), "%s,%s", host, ip); hostp = hostline; if (options.hash_known_hosts) { /* Add hash of host and IP separately */ r = add_host_to_hostfile(user_hostfiles[0], host, host_key, options.hash_known_hosts) && add_host_to_hostfile(user_hostfiles[0], ip, host_key, options.hash_known_hosts); } else { /* Add unhashed "host,ip" */ r = add_host_to_hostfile(user_hostfiles[0], hostline, host_key, options.hash_known_hosts); } } else { r = add_host_to_hostfile(user_hostfiles[0], host, host_key, options.hash_known_hosts); hostp = host; } if (!r) logit("Failed to add the host to the list of known " "hosts (%.500s).", user_hostfiles[0]); else logit("Warning: Permanently added '%.200s' (%s) to the " "list of known hosts.", hostp, type); break; case HOST_REVOKED: error("@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@"); error("@ WARNING: REVOKED HOST KEY DETECTED! @"); error("@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@"); error("The %s host key for %s is marked as revoked.", type, host); error("This could mean that a stolen key is being used to"); error("impersonate this host."); /* * If strict host key checking is in use, the user will have * to edit the key manually and we can only abort. */ if (options.strict_host_key_checking != SSH_STRICT_HOSTKEY_OFF) { error("%s host key for %.200s was revoked and you have " "requested strict checking.", type, host); goto fail; } goto continue_unsafe; case HOST_CHANGED: if (want_cert) { /* * This is only a debug() since it is valid to have * CAs with wildcard DNS matches that don't match * all hosts that one might visit. */ debug("Host certificate authority does not " "match %s in %s:%lu", CA_MARKER, host_found->file, host_found->line); goto fail; } if (readonly == ROQUIET) goto fail; if (options.check_host_ip && host_ip_differ) { char *key_msg; if (ip_status == HOST_NEW) key_msg = "is unknown"; else if (ip_status == HOST_OK) key_msg = "is unchanged"; else key_msg = "has a different value"; error("@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@"); error("@ WARNING: POSSIBLE DNS SPOOFING DETECTED! @"); error("@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@"); error("The %s host key for %s has changed,", type, host); error("and the key for the corresponding IP address %s", ip); error("%s. This could either mean that", key_msg); error("DNS SPOOFING is happening or the IP address for the host"); error("and its host key have changed at the same time."); if (ip_status != HOST_NEW) error("Offending key for IP in %s:%lu", ip_found->file, ip_found->line); } /* The host key has changed. */ warn_changed_key(host_key); if (num_user_hostfiles > 0 || num_system_hostfiles > 0) { error("Add correct host key in %.100s to get rid " "of this message.", num_user_hostfiles > 0 ? user_hostfiles[0] : system_hostfiles[0]); } error("Offending %s key in %s:%lu", sshkey_type(host_found->key), host_found->file, host_found->line); /* * If strict host key checking is in use, the user will have * to edit the key manually and we can only abort. */ if (options.strict_host_key_checking != SSH_STRICT_HOSTKEY_OFF) { error("Host key for %.200s has changed and you have " "requested strict checking.", host); goto fail; } continue_unsafe: /* * If strict host key checking has not been requested, allow * the connection but without MITM-able authentication or * forwarding. */ if (options.password_authentication) { error("Password authentication is disabled to avoid " "man-in-the-middle attacks."); options.password_authentication = 0; cancelled_forwarding = 1; } if (options.kbd_interactive_authentication) { error("Keyboard-interactive authentication is disabled" " to avoid man-in-the-middle attacks."); options.kbd_interactive_authentication = 0; cancelled_forwarding = 1; } if (options.forward_agent) { error("Agent forwarding is disabled to avoid " "man-in-the-middle attacks."); options.forward_agent = 0; cancelled_forwarding = 1; } if (options.forward_x11) { error("X11 forwarding is disabled to avoid " "man-in-the-middle attacks."); options.forward_x11 = 0; cancelled_forwarding = 1; } if (options.num_local_forwards > 0 || options.num_remote_forwards > 0) { error("Port forwarding is disabled to avoid " "man-in-the-middle attacks."); options.num_local_forwards = options.num_remote_forwards = 0; cancelled_forwarding = 1; } if (options.tun_open != SSH_TUNMODE_NO) { error("Tunnel forwarding is disabled to avoid " "man-in-the-middle attacks."); options.tun_open = SSH_TUNMODE_NO; cancelled_forwarding = 1; } if (options.update_hostkeys != 0) { error("UpdateHostkeys is disabled because the host " "key is not trusted."); options.update_hostkeys = 0; } if (options.exit_on_forward_failure && cancelled_forwarding) fatal("Error: forwarding disabled due to host key " "check failure"); /* * XXX Should permit the user to change to use the new id. * This could be done by converting the host key to an * identifying sentence, tell that the host identifies itself * by that sentence, and ask the user if they wish to * accept the authentication. */ break; case HOST_FOUND: fatal("internal error"); break; } if (options.check_host_ip && host_status != HOST_CHANGED && ip_status == HOST_CHANGED) { snprintf(msg, sizeof(msg), "Warning: the %s host key for '%.200s' " "differs from the key for the IP address '%.128s'" "\nOffending key for IP in %s:%lu", type, host, ip, ip_found->file, ip_found->line); if (host_status == HOST_OK) { len = strlen(msg); snprintf(msg + len, sizeof(msg) - len, "\nMatching host key in %s:%lu", host_found->file, host_found->line); } if (options.strict_host_key_checking == SSH_STRICT_HOSTKEY_ASK) { strlcat(msg, "\nAre you sure you want " "to continue connecting (yes/no)? ", sizeof(msg)); if (!confirm(msg, NULL)) goto fail; } else if (options.strict_host_key_checking != SSH_STRICT_HOSTKEY_OFF) { logit("%s", msg); error("Exiting, you have requested strict checking."); goto fail; } else { logit("%s", msg); } } if (!hostkey_trusted && options.update_hostkeys) { debug_f("hostkey not known or explicitly trusted: " "disabling UpdateHostkeys"); options.update_hostkeys = 0; } free(ip); free(host); if (host_hostkeys != NULL) free_hostkeys(host_hostkeys); if (ip_hostkeys != NULL) free_hostkeys(ip_hostkeys); return 0; fail: if (want_cert && host_status != HOST_REVOKED) { /* * No matching certificate. Downgrade cert to raw key and * search normally. */ debug("No matching CA found. Retry with plain key"); if ((r = sshkey_from_private(host_key, &raw_key)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "decode key"); if ((r = sshkey_drop_cert(raw_key)) != 0) fatal_r(r, "Couldn't drop certificate"); host_key = raw_key; goto retry; } sshkey_free(raw_key); free(ip); free(host); if (host_hostkeys != NULL) free_hostkeys(host_hostkeys); if (ip_hostkeys != NULL) free_hostkeys(ip_hostkeys); return -1; } /* returns 0 if key verifies or -1 if key does NOT verify */ int verify_host_key(char *host, struct sockaddr *hostaddr, struct sshkey *host_key, const struct ssh_conn_info *cinfo) { u_int i; int r = -1, flags = 0; char valid[64], *fp = NULL, *cafp = NULL; struct sshkey *plain = NULL; if ((fp = sshkey_fingerprint(host_key, options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL) { error_fr(r, "fingerprint host key"); r = -1; goto out; } if (sshkey_is_cert(host_key)) { if ((cafp = sshkey_fingerprint(host_key->cert->signature_key, options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL) { error_fr(r, "fingerprint CA key"); r = -1; goto out; } sshkey_format_cert_validity(host_key->cert, valid, sizeof(valid)); debug("Server host certificate: %s %s, serial %llu " "ID \"%s\" CA %s %s valid %s", sshkey_ssh_name(host_key), fp, (unsigned long long)host_key->cert->serial, host_key->cert->key_id, sshkey_ssh_name(host_key->cert->signature_key), cafp, valid); for (i = 0; i < host_key->cert->nprincipals; i++) { debug2("Server host certificate hostname: %s", host_key->cert->principals[i]); } } else { debug("Server host key: %s %s", sshkey_ssh_name(host_key), fp); } if (sshkey_equal(previous_host_key, host_key)) { debug2_f("server host key %s %s matches cached key", sshkey_type(host_key), fp); r = 0; goto out; } /* Check in RevokedHostKeys file if specified */ if (options.revoked_host_keys != NULL) { r = sshkey_check_revoked(host_key, options.revoked_host_keys); switch (r) { case 0: break; /* not revoked */ case SSH_ERR_KEY_REVOKED: error("Host key %s %s revoked by file %s", sshkey_type(host_key), fp, options.revoked_host_keys); r = -1; goto out; default: error_r(r, "Error checking host key %s %s in " "revoked keys file %s", sshkey_type(host_key), fp, options.revoked_host_keys); r = -1; goto out; } } if (options.verify_host_key_dns) { /* * XXX certs are not yet supported for DNS, so downgrade * them and try the plain key. */ if ((r = sshkey_from_private(host_key, &plain)) != 0) goto out; if (sshkey_is_cert(plain)) sshkey_drop_cert(plain); if (verify_host_key_dns(host, hostaddr, plain, &flags) == 0) { if (flags & DNS_VERIFY_FOUND) { if (options.verify_host_key_dns == 1 && flags & DNS_VERIFY_MATCH && flags & DNS_VERIFY_SECURE) { r = 0; goto out; } if (flags & DNS_VERIFY_MATCH) { matching_host_key_dns = 1; } else { warn_changed_key(plain); error("Update the SSHFP RR in DNS " "with the new host key to get rid " "of this message."); } } } } r = check_host_key(host, cinfo, hostaddr, options.port, host_key, RDRW, 0, options.user_hostfiles, options.num_user_hostfiles, options.system_hostfiles, options.num_system_hostfiles, options.known_hosts_command); out: sshkey_free(plain); free(fp); free(cafp); if (r == 0 && host_key != NULL) { sshkey_free(previous_host_key); r = sshkey_from_private(host_key, &previous_host_key); } return r; } /* * Starts a dialog with the server, and authenticates the current user on the * server. This does not need any extra privileges. The basic connection * to the server must already have been established before this is called. * If login fails, this function prints an error and never returns. * This function does not require super-user privileges. */ void ssh_login(struct ssh *ssh, Sensitive *sensitive, const char *orighost, struct sockaddr *hostaddr, u_short port, struct passwd *pw, int timeout_ms, const struct ssh_conn_info *cinfo) { char *host; char *server_user, *local_user; int r; local_user = xstrdup(pw->pw_name); server_user = options.user ? options.user : local_user; /* Convert the user-supplied hostname into all lowercase. */ host = xstrdup(orighost); lowercase(host); /* Exchange protocol version identification strings with the server. */ if ((r = kex_exchange_identification(ssh, timeout_ms, NULL)) != 0) sshpkt_fatal(ssh, r, "banner exchange"); /* Put the connection into non-blocking mode. */ ssh_packet_set_nonblocking(ssh); /* key exchange */ /* authenticate user */ debug("Authenticating to %s:%d as '%s'", host, port, server_user); ssh_kex2(ssh, host, hostaddr, port, cinfo); ssh_userauth2(ssh, local_user, server_user, host, sensitive); free(local_user); free(host); } /* print all known host keys for a given host, but skip keys of given type */ static int show_other_keys(struct hostkeys *hostkeys, struct sshkey *key) { int type[] = { KEY_RSA, KEY_DSA, KEY_ECDSA, KEY_ED25519, KEY_XMSS, -1 }; int i, ret = 0; char *fp, *ra; const struct hostkey_entry *found; for (i = 0; type[i] != -1; i++) { if (type[i] == key->type) continue; if (!lookup_key_in_hostkeys_by_type(hostkeys, type[i], -1, &found)) continue; fp = sshkey_fingerprint(found->key, options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_DEFAULT); ra = sshkey_fingerprint(found->key, options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_RANDOMART); if (fp == NULL || ra == NULL) fatal_f("sshkey_fingerprint fail"); logit("WARNING: %s key found for host %s\n" "in %s:%lu\n" "%s key fingerprint %s.", sshkey_type(found->key), found->host, found->file, found->line, sshkey_type(found->key), fp); if (options.visual_host_key) logit("%s", ra); free(ra); free(fp); ret = 1; } return ret; } static void warn_changed_key(struct sshkey *host_key) { char *fp; fp = sshkey_fingerprint(host_key, options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_DEFAULT); if (fp == NULL) fatal_f("sshkey_fingerprint fail"); error("@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@"); error("@ WARNING: REMOTE HOST IDENTIFICATION HAS CHANGED! @"); error("@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@"); error("IT IS POSSIBLE THAT SOMEONE IS DOING SOMETHING NASTY!"); error("Someone could be eavesdropping on you right now (man-in-the-middle attack)!"); error("It is also possible that a host key has just been changed."); error("The fingerprint for the %s key sent by the remote host is\n%s.", sshkey_type(host_key), fp); error("Please contact your system administrator."); free(fp); } /* * Execute a local command */ int ssh_local_cmd(const char *args) { char *shell; pid_t pid; int status; void (*osighand)(int); if (!options.permit_local_command || args == NULL || !*args) return (1); if ((shell = getenv("SHELL")) == NULL || *shell == '\0') shell = _PATH_BSHELL; osighand = ssh_signal(SIGCHLD, SIG_DFL); pid = fork(); if (pid == 0) { ssh_signal(SIGPIPE, SIG_DFL); debug3("Executing %s -c \"%s\"", shell, args); execl(shell, shell, "-c", args, (char *)NULL); error("Couldn't execute %s -c \"%s\": %s", shell, args, strerror(errno)); _exit(1); } else if (pid == -1) fatal("fork failed: %.100s", strerror(errno)); while (waitpid(pid, &status, 0) == -1) if (errno != EINTR) fatal("Couldn't wait for child: %s", strerror(errno)); ssh_signal(SIGCHLD, osighand); if (!WIFEXITED(status)) return (1); return (WEXITSTATUS(status)); } void maybe_add_key_to_agent(const char *authfile, struct sshkey *private, const char *comment, const char *passphrase) { int auth_sock = -1, r; const char *skprovider = NULL; if (options.add_keys_to_agent == 0) return; if ((r = ssh_get_authentication_socket(&auth_sock)) != 0) { debug3("no authentication agent, not adding key"); return; } if (options.add_keys_to_agent == 2 && !ask_permission("Add key %s (%s) to agent?", authfile, comment)) { debug3("user denied adding this key"); close(auth_sock); return; } if (sshkey_is_sk(private)) skprovider = options.sk_provider; if ((r = ssh_add_identity_constrained(auth_sock, private, comment == NULL ? authfile : comment, options.add_keys_to_agent_lifespan, (options.add_keys_to_agent == 3), 0, skprovider, NULL, 0)) == 0) debug("identity added to agent: %s", authfile); else debug("could not add identity to agent: %s (%d)", authfile, r); close(auth_sock); } diff --git a/crypto/openssh/sshconnect2.c b/crypto/openssh/sshconnect2.c index 58fe98db2200..bc05f02142fd 100644 --- a/crypto/openssh/sshconnect2.c +++ b/crypto/openssh/sshconnect2.c @@ -1,2396 +1,2357 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: sshconnect2.c,v 1.361 2022/09/17 10:33:18 djm Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: sshconnect2.c,v 1.366 2023/03/09 07:11:05 dtucker Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. * Copyright (c) 2008 Damien Miller. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. */ #include "includes.h" #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #if defined(HAVE_STRNVIS) && defined(HAVE_VIS_H) && !defined(BROKEN_STRNVIS) #include #endif #include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h" #include "xmalloc.h" #include "ssh.h" #include "ssh2.h" #include "sshbuf.h" #include "packet.h" #include "compat.h" #include "cipher.h" #include "sshkey.h" #include "kex.h" -#include "myproposal.h" #include "sshconnect.h" #include "authfile.h" #include "dh.h" #include "authfd.h" #include "log.h" #include "misc.h" #include "readconf.h" #include "match.h" #include "dispatch.h" #include "canohost.h" #include "msg.h" #include "pathnames.h" #include "uidswap.h" #include "hostfile.h" #include "ssherr.h" #include "utf8.h" #include "ssh-sk.h" #include "sk-api.h" #ifdef GSSAPI #include "ssh-gss.h" #endif /* import */ extern char *client_version_string; extern char *server_version_string; extern Options options; /* * SSH2 key exchange */ static char *xxx_host; static struct sockaddr *xxx_hostaddr; static const struct ssh_conn_info *xxx_conn_info; static int verify_host_key_callback(struct sshkey *hostkey, struct ssh *ssh) { int r; if ((r = sshkey_check_rsa_length(hostkey, options.required_rsa_size)) != 0) fatal_r(r, "Bad server host key"); if (verify_host_key(xxx_host, xxx_hostaddr, hostkey, xxx_conn_info) == -1) fatal("Host key verification failed."); return 0; } /* Returns the first item from a comma-separated algorithm list */ static char * first_alg(const char *algs) { char *ret, *cp; ret = xstrdup(algs); if ((cp = strchr(ret, ',')) != NULL) *cp = '\0'; return ret; } static char * order_hostkeyalgs(char *host, struct sockaddr *hostaddr, u_short port, const struct ssh_conn_info *cinfo) { char *oavail = NULL, *avail = NULL, *first = NULL, *last = NULL; char *alg = NULL, *hostname = NULL, *ret = NULL, *best = NULL; size_t maxlen; struct hostkeys *hostkeys = NULL; int ktype; u_int i; /* Find all hostkeys for this hostname */ get_hostfile_hostname_ipaddr(host, hostaddr, port, &hostname, NULL); hostkeys = init_hostkeys(); for (i = 0; i < options.num_user_hostfiles; i++) load_hostkeys(hostkeys, hostname, options.user_hostfiles[i], 0); for (i = 0; i < options.num_system_hostfiles; i++) { load_hostkeys(hostkeys, hostname, options.system_hostfiles[i], 0); } if (options.known_hosts_command != NULL) { load_hostkeys_command(hostkeys, options.known_hosts_command, "ORDER", cinfo, NULL, host); } /* * If a plain public key exists that matches the type of the best * preference HostkeyAlgorithms, then use the whole list as is. * Note that we ignore whether the best preference algorithm is a * certificate type, as sshconnect.c will downgrade certs to * plain keys if necessary. */ best = first_alg(options.hostkeyalgorithms); if (lookup_key_in_hostkeys_by_type(hostkeys, sshkey_type_plain(sshkey_type_from_name(best)), sshkey_ecdsa_nid_from_name(best), NULL)) { debug3_f("have matching best-preference key type %s, " "using HostkeyAlgorithms verbatim", best); ret = xstrdup(options.hostkeyalgorithms); goto out; } /* * Otherwise, prefer the host key algorithms that match known keys * while keeping the ordering of HostkeyAlgorithms as much as possible. */ oavail = avail = xstrdup(options.hostkeyalgorithms); maxlen = strlen(avail) + 1; first = xmalloc(maxlen); last = xmalloc(maxlen); *first = *last = '\0'; #define ALG_APPEND(to, from) \ do { \ if (*to != '\0') \ strlcat(to, ",", maxlen); \ strlcat(to, from, maxlen); \ } while (0) while ((alg = strsep(&avail, ",")) && *alg != '\0') { if ((ktype = sshkey_type_from_name(alg)) == KEY_UNSPEC) fatal_f("unknown alg %s", alg); /* * If we have a @cert-authority marker in known_hosts then * prefer all certificate algorithms. */ if (sshkey_type_is_cert(ktype) && lookup_marker_in_hostkeys(hostkeys, MRK_CA)) { ALG_APPEND(first, alg); continue; } /* If the key appears in known_hosts then prefer it */ if (lookup_key_in_hostkeys_by_type(hostkeys, sshkey_type_plain(ktype), sshkey_ecdsa_nid_from_name(alg), NULL)) { ALG_APPEND(first, alg); continue; } /* Otherwise, put it last */ ALG_APPEND(last, alg); } #undef ALG_APPEND xasprintf(&ret, "%s%s%s", first, (*first == '\0' || *last == '\0') ? "" : ",", last); if (*first != '\0') debug3_f("prefer hostkeyalgs: %s", first); else debug3_f("no algorithms matched; accept original"); out: free(best); free(first); free(last); free(hostname); free(oavail); free_hostkeys(hostkeys); return ret; } void ssh_kex2(struct ssh *ssh, char *host, struct sockaddr *hostaddr, u_short port, const struct ssh_conn_info *cinfo) { - char *myproposal[PROPOSAL_MAX] = { KEX_CLIENT }; - char *s, *all_key; - char *prop_kex = NULL, *prop_enc = NULL, *prop_hostkey = NULL; + char *myproposal[PROPOSAL_MAX]; + char *s, *all_key, *hkalgs = NULL; int r, use_known_hosts_order = 0; xxx_host = host; xxx_hostaddr = hostaddr; xxx_conn_info = cinfo; + if (options.rekey_limit || options.rekey_interval) + ssh_packet_set_rekey_limits(ssh, options.rekey_limit, + options.rekey_interval); + /* * If the user has not specified HostkeyAlgorithms, or has only * appended or removed algorithms from that list then prefer algorithms * that are in the list that are supported by known_hosts keys. */ if (options.hostkeyalgorithms == NULL || options.hostkeyalgorithms[0] == '-' || options.hostkeyalgorithms[0] == '+') use_known_hosts_order = 1; /* Expand or fill in HostkeyAlgorithms */ all_key = sshkey_alg_list(0, 0, 1, ','); if ((r = kex_assemble_names(&options.hostkeyalgorithms, kex_default_pk_alg(), all_key)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "kex_assemble_namelist"); free(all_key); if ((s = kex_names_cat(options.kex_algorithms, "ext-info-c")) == NULL) fatal_f("kex_names_cat"); - myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS] = prop_kex = compat_kex_proposal(ssh, s); - myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_CTOS] = - myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_STOC] = prop_enc = - compat_cipher_proposal(ssh, options.ciphers); - myproposal[PROPOSAL_COMP_ALGS_CTOS] = - myproposal[PROPOSAL_COMP_ALGS_STOC] = - (char *)compression_alg_list(options.compression); - myproposal[PROPOSAL_MAC_ALGS_CTOS] = - myproposal[PROPOSAL_MAC_ALGS_STOC] = options.macs; - if (use_known_hosts_order) { - /* Query known_hosts and prefer algorithms that appear there */ - myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS] = prop_hostkey = - compat_pkalg_proposal(ssh, - order_hostkeyalgs(host, hostaddr, port, cinfo)); - } else { - /* Use specified HostkeyAlgorithms exactly */ - myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS] = prop_hostkey = - compat_pkalg_proposal(ssh, options.hostkeyalgorithms); - } - if (options.rekey_limit || options.rekey_interval) - ssh_packet_set_rekey_limits(ssh, options.rekey_limit, - options.rekey_interval); + if (use_known_hosts_order) + hkalgs = order_hostkeyalgs(host, hostaddr, port, cinfo); + + kex_proposal_populate_entries(ssh, myproposal, s, options.ciphers, + options.macs, compression_alg_list(options.compression), + hkalgs ? hkalgs : options.hostkeyalgorithms); + + free(hkalgs); /* start key exchange */ if ((r = kex_setup(ssh, myproposal)) != 0) fatal_r(r, "kex_setup"); #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL ssh->kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP1_SHA1] = kex_gen_client; ssh->kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP14_SHA1] = kex_gen_client; ssh->kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP14_SHA256] = kex_gen_client; ssh->kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP16_SHA512] = kex_gen_client; ssh->kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP18_SHA512] = kex_gen_client; ssh->kex->kex[KEX_DH_GEX_SHA1] = kexgex_client; ssh->kex->kex[KEX_DH_GEX_SHA256] = kexgex_client; # ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC ssh->kex->kex[KEX_ECDH_SHA2] = kex_gen_client; # endif #endif ssh->kex->kex[KEX_C25519_SHA256] = kex_gen_client; ssh->kex->kex[KEX_KEM_SNTRUP761X25519_SHA512] = kex_gen_client; ssh->kex->verify_host_key=&verify_host_key_callback; ssh_dispatch_run_fatal(ssh, DISPATCH_BLOCK, &ssh->kex->done); /* remove ext-info from the KEX proposals for rekeying */ + free(myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS]); myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS] = compat_kex_proposal(ssh, options.kex_algorithms); if ((r = kex_prop2buf(ssh->kex->my, myproposal)) != 0) fatal_r(r, "kex_prop2buf"); #ifdef DEBUG_KEXDH /* send 1st encrypted/maced/compressed message */ if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_IGNORE)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, "markus")) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0 || (r = ssh_packet_write_wait(ssh)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "send packet"); #endif - /* Free only parts of proposal that were dynamically allocated here. */ - free(prop_kex); - free(prop_enc); - free(prop_hostkey); + kex_proposal_free_entries(myproposal); } /* * Authenticate user */ typedef struct cauthctxt Authctxt; typedef struct cauthmethod Authmethod; typedef struct identity Identity; typedef struct idlist Idlist; struct identity { TAILQ_ENTRY(identity) next; int agent_fd; /* >=0 if agent supports key */ struct sshkey *key; /* public/private key */ char *filename; /* comment for agent-only keys */ int tried; int isprivate; /* key points to the private key */ int userprovided; }; TAILQ_HEAD(idlist, identity); struct cauthctxt { const char *server_user; const char *local_user; const char *host; const char *service; struct cauthmethod *method; sig_atomic_t success; char *authlist; #ifdef GSSAPI /* gssapi */ gss_OID_set gss_supported_mechs; u_int mech_tried; #endif /* pubkey */ struct idlist keys; int agent_fd; /* hostbased */ Sensitive *sensitive; char *oktypes, *ktypes; const char *active_ktype; /* kbd-interactive */ int info_req_seen; int attempt_kbdint; /* password */ int attempt_passwd; /* generic */ void *methoddata; }; struct cauthmethod { char *name; /* string to compare against server's list */ int (*userauth)(struct ssh *ssh); void (*cleanup)(struct ssh *ssh); int *enabled; /* flag in option struct that enables method */ int *batch_flag; /* flag in option struct that disables method */ }; static int input_userauth_service_accept(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *); static int input_userauth_ext_info(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *); static int input_userauth_success(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *); static int input_userauth_failure(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *); static int input_userauth_banner(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *); static int input_userauth_error(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *); static int input_userauth_info_req(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *); static int input_userauth_pk_ok(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *); static int input_userauth_passwd_changereq(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *); static int userauth_none(struct ssh *); static int userauth_pubkey(struct ssh *); static int userauth_passwd(struct ssh *); static int userauth_kbdint(struct ssh *); static int userauth_hostbased(struct ssh *); #ifdef GSSAPI static int userauth_gssapi(struct ssh *); static void userauth_gssapi_cleanup(struct ssh *); static int input_gssapi_response(int type, u_int32_t, struct ssh *); static int input_gssapi_token(int type, u_int32_t, struct ssh *); static int input_gssapi_error(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *); static int input_gssapi_errtok(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *); #endif void userauth(struct ssh *, char *); static void pubkey_cleanup(struct ssh *); static int sign_and_send_pubkey(struct ssh *ssh, Identity *); static void pubkey_prepare(struct ssh *, Authctxt *); static void pubkey_reset(Authctxt *); static struct sshkey *load_identity_file(Identity *); static Authmethod *authmethod_get(char *authlist); static Authmethod *authmethod_lookup(const char *name); static char *authmethods_get(void); Authmethod authmethods[] = { #ifdef GSSAPI {"gssapi-with-mic", userauth_gssapi, userauth_gssapi_cleanup, &options.gss_authentication, NULL}, #endif {"hostbased", userauth_hostbased, NULL, &options.hostbased_authentication, NULL}, {"publickey", userauth_pubkey, NULL, &options.pubkey_authentication, NULL}, {"keyboard-interactive", userauth_kbdint, NULL, &options.kbd_interactive_authentication, &options.batch_mode}, {"password", userauth_passwd, NULL, &options.password_authentication, &options.batch_mode}, {"none", userauth_none, NULL, NULL, NULL}, {NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL} }; void ssh_userauth2(struct ssh *ssh, const char *local_user, const char *server_user, char *host, Sensitive *sensitive) { Authctxt authctxt; int r; if (options.preferred_authentications == NULL) options.preferred_authentications = authmethods_get(); /* setup authentication context */ memset(&authctxt, 0, sizeof(authctxt)); authctxt.server_user = server_user; authctxt.local_user = local_user; authctxt.host = host; authctxt.service = "ssh-connection"; /* service name */ authctxt.success = 0; authctxt.method = authmethod_lookup("none"); authctxt.authlist = NULL; authctxt.methoddata = NULL; authctxt.sensitive = sensitive; authctxt.active_ktype = authctxt.oktypes = authctxt.ktypes = NULL; authctxt.info_req_seen = 0; authctxt.attempt_kbdint = 0; authctxt.attempt_passwd = 0; #if GSSAPI authctxt.gss_supported_mechs = NULL; authctxt.mech_tried = 0; #endif authctxt.agent_fd = -1; pubkey_prepare(ssh, &authctxt); if (authctxt.method == NULL) { fatal_f("internal error: cannot send userauth none request"); } if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_SERVICE_REQUEST)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, "ssh-userauth")) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "send packet"); ssh->authctxt = &authctxt; ssh_dispatch_init(ssh, &input_userauth_error); ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_EXT_INFO, &input_userauth_ext_info); ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_SERVICE_ACCEPT, &input_userauth_service_accept); ssh_dispatch_run_fatal(ssh, DISPATCH_BLOCK, &authctxt.success); /* loop until success */ pubkey_cleanup(ssh); ssh->authctxt = NULL; ssh_dispatch_range(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_MIN, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_MAX, NULL); if (!authctxt.success) fatal("Authentication failed."); if (ssh_packet_connection_is_on_socket(ssh)) { verbose("Authenticated to %s ([%s]:%d) using \"%s\".", host, ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), ssh_remote_port(ssh), authctxt.method->name); } else { verbose("Authenticated to %s (via proxy) using \"%s\".", host, authctxt.method->name); } } -/* ARGSUSED */ static int input_userauth_service_accept(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh) { int r; if (ssh_packet_remaining(ssh) > 0) { char *reply; if ((r = sshpkt_get_cstring(ssh, &reply, NULL)) != 0) goto out; debug2("service_accept: %s", reply); free(reply); } else { debug2("buggy server: service_accept w/o service"); } if ((r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0) goto out; debug("SSH2_MSG_SERVICE_ACCEPT received"); /* initial userauth request */ userauth_none(ssh); ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_EXT_INFO, &input_userauth_error); ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_SUCCESS, &input_userauth_success); ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_FAILURE, &input_userauth_failure); ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_BANNER, &input_userauth_banner); r = 0; out: return r; } -/* ARGSUSED */ static int input_userauth_ext_info(int type, u_int32_t seqnr, struct ssh *ssh) { return kex_input_ext_info(type, seqnr, ssh); } void userauth(struct ssh *ssh, char *authlist) { Authctxt *authctxt = (Authctxt *)ssh->authctxt; if (authctxt->method != NULL && authctxt->method->cleanup != NULL) authctxt->method->cleanup(ssh); free(authctxt->methoddata); authctxt->methoddata = NULL; if (authlist == NULL) { authlist = authctxt->authlist; } else { free(authctxt->authlist); authctxt->authlist = authlist; } for (;;) { Authmethod *method = authmethod_get(authlist); if (method == NULL) fatal("%s@%s: Permission denied (%s).", authctxt->server_user, authctxt->host, authlist); authctxt->method = method; /* reset the per method handler */ ssh_dispatch_range(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_PER_METHOD_MIN, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_PER_METHOD_MAX, NULL); /* and try new method */ if (method->userauth(ssh) != 0) { debug2("we sent a %s packet, wait for reply", method->name); break; } else { debug2("we did not send a packet, disable method"); method->enabled = NULL; } } } -/* ARGSUSED */ static int input_userauth_error(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh) { fatal_f("bad message during authentication: type %d", type); return 0; } -/* ARGSUSED */ static int input_userauth_banner(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh) { char *msg = NULL; size_t len; int r; debug3_f("entering"); if ((r = sshpkt_get_cstring(ssh, &msg, &len)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_get_cstring(ssh, NULL, NULL)) != 0) goto out; if (len > 0 && options.log_level >= SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO) fmprintf(stderr, "%s", msg); r = 0; out: free(msg); return r; } -/* ARGSUSED */ static int input_userauth_success(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh) { Authctxt *authctxt = ssh->authctxt; if (authctxt == NULL) fatal_f("no authentication context"); free(authctxt->authlist); authctxt->authlist = NULL; if (authctxt->method != NULL && authctxt->method->cleanup != NULL) authctxt->method->cleanup(ssh); free(authctxt->methoddata); authctxt->methoddata = NULL; authctxt->success = 1; /* break out */ return 0; } #if 0 static int input_userauth_success_unexpected(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh) { Authctxt *authctxt = ssh->authctxt; if (authctxt == NULL) fatal_f("no authentication context"); fatal("Unexpected authentication success during %s.", authctxt->method->name); return 0; } #endif -/* ARGSUSED */ static int input_userauth_failure(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh) { Authctxt *authctxt = ssh->authctxt; char *authlist = NULL; u_char partial; if (authctxt == NULL) fatal("input_userauth_failure: no authentication context"); if (sshpkt_get_cstring(ssh, &authlist, NULL) != 0 || sshpkt_get_u8(ssh, &partial) != 0 || sshpkt_get_end(ssh) != 0) goto out; if (partial != 0) { verbose("Authenticated using \"%s\" with partial success.", authctxt->method->name); /* reset state */ pubkey_reset(authctxt); } debug("Authentications that can continue: %s", authlist); userauth(ssh, authlist); authlist = NULL; out: free(authlist); return 0; } /* * Format an identity for logging including filename, key type, fingerprint * and location (agent, etc.). Caller must free. */ static char * format_identity(Identity *id) { char *fp = NULL, *ret = NULL; const char *note = ""; if (id->key != NULL) { fp = sshkey_fingerprint(id->key, options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_DEFAULT); } if (id->key) { if ((id->key->flags & SSHKEY_FLAG_EXT) != 0) note = " token"; else if (sshkey_is_sk(id->key)) note = " authenticator"; } xasprintf(&ret, "%s %s%s%s%s%s%s", id->filename, id->key ? sshkey_type(id->key) : "", id->key ? " " : "", fp ? fp : "", id->userprovided ? " explicit" : "", note, id->agent_fd != -1 ? " agent" : ""); free(fp); return ret; } -/* ARGSUSED */ static int input_userauth_pk_ok(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh) { Authctxt *authctxt = ssh->authctxt; struct sshkey *key = NULL; Identity *id = NULL; int pktype, found = 0, sent = 0; size_t blen; char *pkalg = NULL, *fp = NULL, *ident = NULL; u_char *pkblob = NULL; int r; if (authctxt == NULL) fatal("input_userauth_pk_ok: no authentication context"); if ((r = sshpkt_get_cstring(ssh, &pkalg, NULL)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_get_string(ssh, &pkblob, &blen)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0) goto done; if ((pktype = sshkey_type_from_name(pkalg)) == KEY_UNSPEC) { debug_f("server sent unknown pkalg %s", pkalg); goto done; } if ((r = sshkey_from_blob(pkblob, blen, &key)) != 0) { debug_r(r, "no key from blob. pkalg %s", pkalg); goto done; } if (key->type != pktype) { error("input_userauth_pk_ok: type mismatch " "for decoded key (received %d, expected %d)", key->type, pktype); goto done; } /* * search keys in the reverse order, because last candidate has been * moved to the end of the queue. this also avoids confusion by * duplicate keys */ TAILQ_FOREACH_REVERSE(id, &authctxt->keys, idlist, next) { if (sshkey_equal(key, id->key)) { found = 1; break; } } if (!found || id == NULL) { fp = sshkey_fingerprint(key, options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_DEFAULT); error_f("server replied with unknown key: %s %s", sshkey_type(key), fp == NULL ? "" : fp); goto done; } ident = format_identity(id); debug("Server accepts key: %s", ident); sent = sign_and_send_pubkey(ssh, id); r = 0; done: sshkey_free(key); free(ident); free(fp); free(pkalg); free(pkblob); /* try another method if we did not send a packet */ if (r == 0 && sent == 0) userauth(ssh, NULL); return r; } #ifdef GSSAPI static int userauth_gssapi(struct ssh *ssh) { Authctxt *authctxt = (Authctxt *)ssh->authctxt; Gssctxt *gssctxt = NULL; OM_uint32 min; int r, ok = 0; gss_OID mech = NULL; /* Try one GSSAPI method at a time, rather than sending them all at * once. */ if (authctxt->gss_supported_mechs == NULL) gss_indicate_mechs(&min, &authctxt->gss_supported_mechs); /* Check to see whether the mechanism is usable before we offer it */ while (authctxt->mech_tried < authctxt->gss_supported_mechs->count && !ok) { mech = &authctxt->gss_supported_mechs-> elements[authctxt->mech_tried]; /* My DER encoding requires length<128 */ if (mech->length < 128 && ssh_gssapi_check_mechanism(&gssctxt, mech, authctxt->host)) { ok = 1; /* Mechanism works */ } else { authctxt->mech_tried++; } } if (!ok || mech == NULL) return 0; authctxt->methoddata=(void *)gssctxt; if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, authctxt->server_user)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, authctxt->service)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, authctxt->method->name)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, 1)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, (mech->length) + 2)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_u8(ssh, SSH_GSS_OIDTYPE)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_u8(ssh, mech->length)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put(ssh, mech->elements, mech->length)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "send packet"); ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_RESPONSE, &input_gssapi_response); ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_TOKEN, &input_gssapi_token); ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_ERROR, &input_gssapi_error); ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_ERRTOK, &input_gssapi_errtok); authctxt->mech_tried++; /* Move along to next candidate */ return 1; } static void userauth_gssapi_cleanup(struct ssh *ssh) { Authctxt *authctxt = (Authctxt *)ssh->authctxt; Gssctxt *gssctxt = (Gssctxt *)authctxt->methoddata; ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(&gssctxt); authctxt->methoddata = NULL; free(authctxt->gss_supported_mechs); authctxt->gss_supported_mechs = NULL; } static OM_uint32 process_gssapi_token(struct ssh *ssh, gss_buffer_t recv_tok) { Authctxt *authctxt = ssh->authctxt; Gssctxt *gssctxt = authctxt->methoddata; gss_buffer_desc send_tok = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER; gss_buffer_desc mic = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER; gss_buffer_desc gssbuf; OM_uint32 status, ms, flags; int r; status = ssh_gssapi_init_ctx(gssctxt, options.gss_deleg_creds, recv_tok, &send_tok, &flags); if (send_tok.length > 0) { u_char type = GSS_ERROR(status) ? SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_ERRTOK : SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_TOKEN; if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, type)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_string(ssh, send_tok.value, send_tok.length)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "send %u packet", type); gss_release_buffer(&ms, &send_tok); } if (status == GSS_S_COMPLETE) { /* send either complete or MIC, depending on mechanism */ if (!(flags & GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG)) { if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_EXCHANGE_COMPLETE)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "send completion"); } else { struct sshbuf *b; if ((b = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed"); ssh_gssapi_buildmic(b, authctxt->server_user, authctxt->service, "gssapi-with-mic", ssh->kex->session_id); if ((gssbuf.value = sshbuf_mutable_ptr(b)) == NULL) fatal_f("sshbuf_mutable_ptr failed"); gssbuf.length = sshbuf_len(b); status = ssh_gssapi_sign(gssctxt, &gssbuf, &mic); if (!GSS_ERROR(status)) { if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_MIC)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_string(ssh, mic.value, mic.length)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "send MIC"); } sshbuf_free(b); gss_release_buffer(&ms, &mic); } } return status; } -/* ARGSUSED */ static int input_gssapi_response(int type, u_int32_t plen, struct ssh *ssh) { Authctxt *authctxt = ssh->authctxt; Gssctxt *gssctxt; size_t oidlen; u_char *oidv = NULL; int r; if (authctxt == NULL) fatal("input_gssapi_response: no authentication context"); gssctxt = authctxt->methoddata; /* Setup our OID */ if ((r = sshpkt_get_string(ssh, &oidv, &oidlen)) != 0) goto done; if (oidlen <= 2 || oidv[0] != SSH_GSS_OIDTYPE || oidv[1] != oidlen - 2) { debug("Badly encoded mechanism OID received"); userauth(ssh, NULL); goto ok; } if (!ssh_gssapi_check_oid(gssctxt, oidv + 2, oidlen - 2)) fatal("Server returned different OID than expected"); if ((r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0) goto done; if (GSS_ERROR(process_gssapi_token(ssh, GSS_C_NO_BUFFER))) { /* Start again with next method on list */ debug("Trying to start again"); userauth(ssh, NULL); goto ok; } ok: r = 0; done: free(oidv); return r; } -/* ARGSUSED */ static int input_gssapi_token(int type, u_int32_t plen, struct ssh *ssh) { Authctxt *authctxt = ssh->authctxt; gss_buffer_desc recv_tok; u_char *p = NULL; size_t len; OM_uint32 status; int r; if (authctxt == NULL) fatal("input_gssapi_response: no authentication context"); if ((r = sshpkt_get_string(ssh, &p, &len)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0) goto out; recv_tok.value = p; recv_tok.length = len; status = process_gssapi_token(ssh, &recv_tok); /* Start again with the next method in the list */ if (GSS_ERROR(status)) { userauth(ssh, NULL); /* ok */ } r = 0; out: free(p); return r; } -/* ARGSUSED */ static int input_gssapi_errtok(int type, u_int32_t plen, struct ssh *ssh) { Authctxt *authctxt = ssh->authctxt; Gssctxt *gssctxt; gss_buffer_desc send_tok = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER; gss_buffer_desc recv_tok; OM_uint32 ms; u_char *p = NULL; size_t len; int r; if (authctxt == NULL) fatal("input_gssapi_response: no authentication context"); gssctxt = authctxt->methoddata; if ((r = sshpkt_get_string(ssh, &p, &len)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0) { free(p); return r; } /* Stick it into GSSAPI and see what it says */ recv_tok.value = p; recv_tok.length = len; (void)ssh_gssapi_init_ctx(gssctxt, options.gss_deleg_creds, &recv_tok, &send_tok, NULL); free(p); gss_release_buffer(&ms, &send_tok); /* Server will be returning a failed packet after this one */ return 0; } -/* ARGSUSED */ static int input_gssapi_error(int type, u_int32_t plen, struct ssh *ssh) { char *msg = NULL; char *lang = NULL; int r; if ((r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, NULL)) != 0 || /* maj */ (r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, NULL)) != 0 || /* min */ (r = sshpkt_get_cstring(ssh, &msg, NULL)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_get_cstring(ssh, &lang, NULL)) != 0) goto out; r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh); debug("Server GSSAPI Error:\n%s", msg); out: free(msg); free(lang); return r; } #endif /* GSSAPI */ static int userauth_none(struct ssh *ssh) { Authctxt *authctxt = (Authctxt *)ssh->authctxt; int r; /* initial userauth request */ if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, authctxt->server_user)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, authctxt->service)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, authctxt->method->name)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "send packet"); return 1; } static int userauth_passwd(struct ssh *ssh) { Authctxt *authctxt = (Authctxt *)ssh->authctxt; char *password, *prompt = NULL; const char *host = options.host_key_alias ? options.host_key_alias : authctxt->host; int r; if (authctxt->attempt_passwd++ >= options.number_of_password_prompts) return 0; if (authctxt->attempt_passwd != 1) error("Permission denied, please try again."); xasprintf(&prompt, "%s@%s's password: ", authctxt->server_user, host); password = read_passphrase(prompt, 0); if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, authctxt->server_user)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, authctxt->service)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, authctxt->method->name)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_u8(ssh, 0)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, password)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_add_padding(ssh, 64)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "send packet"); free(prompt); if (password != NULL) freezero(password, strlen(password)); ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_PASSWD_CHANGEREQ, &input_userauth_passwd_changereq); return 1; } /* * parse PASSWD_CHANGEREQ, prompt user and send SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST */ -/* ARGSUSED */ static int input_userauth_passwd_changereq(int type, u_int32_t seqnr, struct ssh *ssh) { Authctxt *authctxt = ssh->authctxt; char *info = NULL, *lang = NULL, *password = NULL, *retype = NULL; char prompt[256]; const char *host; int r; debug2("input_userauth_passwd_changereq"); if (authctxt == NULL) fatal("input_userauth_passwd_changereq: " "no authentication context"); host = options.host_key_alias ? options.host_key_alias : authctxt->host; if ((r = sshpkt_get_cstring(ssh, &info, NULL)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_get_cstring(ssh, &lang, NULL)) != 0) goto out; if (strlen(info) > 0) logit("%s", info); if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, authctxt->server_user)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, authctxt->service)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, authctxt->method->name)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_u8(ssh, 1)) != 0) /* additional info */ goto out; snprintf(prompt, sizeof(prompt), "Enter %.30s@%.128s's old password: ", authctxt->server_user, host); password = read_passphrase(prompt, 0); if ((r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, password)) != 0) goto out; freezero(password, strlen(password)); password = NULL; while (password == NULL) { snprintf(prompt, sizeof(prompt), "Enter %.30s@%.128s's new password: ", authctxt->server_user, host); password = read_passphrase(prompt, RP_ALLOW_EOF); if (password == NULL) { /* bail out */ r = 0; goto out; } snprintf(prompt, sizeof(prompt), "Retype %.30s@%.128s's new password: ", authctxt->server_user, host); retype = read_passphrase(prompt, 0); if (strcmp(password, retype) != 0) { freezero(password, strlen(password)); logit("Mismatch; try again, EOF to quit."); password = NULL; } freezero(retype, strlen(retype)); } if ((r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, password)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_add_padding(ssh, 64)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) goto out; ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_PASSWD_CHANGEREQ, &input_userauth_passwd_changereq); r = 0; out: if (password) freezero(password, strlen(password)); free(info); free(lang); return r; } /* * Select an algorithm for publickey signatures. * Returns algorithm (caller must free) or NULL if no mutual algorithm found. * * Call with ssh==NULL to ignore server-sig-algs extension list and * only attempt with the key's base signature type. */ static char * key_sig_algorithm(struct ssh *ssh, const struct sshkey *key) { char *allowed, *oallowed, *cp, *tmp, *alg = NULL; const char *server_sig_algs; /* * The signature algorithm will only differ from the key algorithm * for RSA keys/certs and when the server advertises support for * newer (SHA2) algorithms. */ if (ssh == NULL || ssh->kex->server_sig_algs == NULL || (key->type != KEY_RSA && key->type != KEY_RSA_CERT) || (key->type == KEY_RSA_CERT && (ssh->compat & SSH_BUG_SIGTYPE))) { /* Filter base key signature alg against our configuration */ return match_list(sshkey_ssh_name(key), options.pubkey_accepted_algos, NULL); } /* * Workaround OpenSSH 7.4 bug: this version supports RSA/SHA-2 but * fails to advertise it via SSH2_MSG_EXT_INFO. */ server_sig_algs = ssh->kex->server_sig_algs; if (key->type == KEY_RSA && (ssh->compat & SSH_BUG_SIGTYPE74)) server_sig_algs = "rsa-sha2-256,rsa-sha2-512"; /* * For RSA keys/certs, since these might have a different sig type: * find the first entry in PubkeyAcceptedAlgorithms of the right type * that also appears in the supported signature algorithms list from * the server. */ oallowed = allowed = xstrdup(options.pubkey_accepted_algos); while ((cp = strsep(&allowed, ",")) != NULL) { if (sshkey_type_from_name(cp) != key->type) continue; tmp = match_list(sshkey_sigalg_by_name(cp), server_sig_algs, NULL); if (tmp != NULL) alg = xstrdup(cp); free(tmp); if (alg != NULL) break; } free(oallowed); return alg; } static int identity_sign(struct identity *id, u_char **sigp, size_t *lenp, const u_char *data, size_t datalen, u_int compat, const char *alg) { struct sshkey *sign_key = NULL, *prv = NULL; int is_agent = 0, retried = 0, r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; struct notifier_ctx *notifier = NULL; char *fp = NULL, *pin = NULL, *prompt = NULL; *sigp = NULL; *lenp = 0; /* The agent supports this key. */ if (id->key != NULL && id->agent_fd != -1) { return ssh_agent_sign(id->agent_fd, id->key, sigp, lenp, data, datalen, alg, compat); } /* * We have already loaded the private key or the private key is * stored in external hardware. */ if (id->key != NULL && (id->isprivate || (id->key->flags & SSHKEY_FLAG_EXT))) { sign_key = id->key; is_agent = 1; } else { /* Load the private key from the file. */ if ((prv = load_identity_file(id)) == NULL) return SSH_ERR_KEY_NOT_FOUND; if (id->key != NULL && !sshkey_equal_public(prv, id->key)) { error_f("private key %s contents do not match public", id->filename); r = SSH_ERR_KEY_NOT_FOUND; goto out; } sign_key = prv; } retry_pin: /* Prompt for touch for non-agent FIDO keys that request UP */ if (!is_agent && sshkey_is_sk(sign_key) && (sign_key->sk_flags & SSH_SK_USER_PRESENCE_REQD)) { /* XXX should batch mode just skip these? */ if ((fp = sshkey_fingerprint(sign_key, options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL) fatal_f("fingerprint failed"); notifier = notify_start(options.batch_mode, "Confirm user presence for key %s %s", sshkey_type(sign_key), fp); free(fp); } if ((r = sshkey_sign(sign_key, sigp, lenp, data, datalen, alg, options.sk_provider, pin, compat)) != 0) { debug_fr(r, "sshkey_sign"); if (!retried && pin == NULL && !is_agent && sshkey_is_sk(sign_key) && r == SSH_ERR_KEY_WRONG_PASSPHRASE) { notify_complete(notifier, NULL); notifier = NULL; xasprintf(&prompt, "Enter PIN for %s key %s: ", sshkey_type(sign_key), id->filename); pin = read_passphrase(prompt, 0); retried = 1; goto retry_pin; } goto out; } /* * PKCS#11 tokens may not support all signature algorithms, * so check what we get back. */ if ((r = sshkey_check_sigtype(*sigp, *lenp, alg)) != 0) { debug_fr(r, "sshkey_check_sigtype"); goto out; } /* success */ r = 0; out: free(prompt); if (pin != NULL) freezero(pin, strlen(pin)); notify_complete(notifier, r == 0 ? "User presence confirmed" : NULL); sshkey_free(prv); return r; } static int id_filename_matches(Identity *id, Identity *private_id) { static const char * const suffixes[] = { ".pub", "-cert.pub", NULL }; size_t len = strlen(id->filename), plen = strlen(private_id->filename); size_t i, slen; if (strcmp(id->filename, private_id->filename) == 0) return 1; for (i = 0; suffixes[i]; i++) { slen = strlen(suffixes[i]); if (len > slen && plen == len - slen && strcmp(id->filename + (len - slen), suffixes[i]) == 0 && memcmp(id->filename, private_id->filename, plen) == 0) return 1; } return 0; } static int sign_and_send_pubkey(struct ssh *ssh, Identity *id) { Authctxt *authctxt = (Authctxt *)ssh->authctxt; struct sshbuf *b = NULL; Identity *private_id, *sign_id = NULL; u_char *signature = NULL; size_t slen = 0, skip = 0; int r, fallback_sigtype, sent = 0; char *alg = NULL, *fp = NULL; const char *loc = "", *method = "publickey"; int hostbound = 0; /* prefer host-bound pubkey signatures if supported by server */ if ((ssh->kex->flags & KEX_HAS_PUBKEY_HOSTBOUND) != 0 && (options.pubkey_authentication & SSH_PUBKEY_AUTH_HBOUND) != 0) { hostbound = 1; method = "publickey-hostbound-v00@openssh.com"; } if ((fp = sshkey_fingerprint(id->key, options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL) return 0; debug3_f("using %s with %s %s", method, sshkey_type(id->key), fp); /* * If the key is an certificate, try to find a matching private key * and use it to complete the signature. * If no such private key exists, fall back to trying the certificate * key itself in case it has a private half already loaded. * This will try to set sign_id to the private key that will perform * the signature. */ if (sshkey_is_cert(id->key)) { TAILQ_FOREACH(private_id, &authctxt->keys, next) { if (sshkey_equal_public(id->key, private_id->key) && id->key->type != private_id->key->type) { sign_id = private_id; break; } } /* * Exact key matches are preferred, but also allow * filename matches for non-PKCS#11/agent keys that * didn't load public keys. This supports the case * of keeping just a private key file and public * certificate on disk. */ if (sign_id == NULL && !id->isprivate && id->agent_fd == -1 && (id->key->flags & SSHKEY_FLAG_EXT) == 0) { TAILQ_FOREACH(private_id, &authctxt->keys, next) { if (private_id->key == NULL && id_filename_matches(id, private_id)) { sign_id = private_id; break; } } } if (sign_id != NULL) { debug2_f("using private key \"%s\"%s for " "certificate", sign_id->filename, sign_id->agent_fd != -1 ? " from agent" : ""); } else { debug_f("no separate private key for certificate " "\"%s\"", id->filename); } } /* * If the above didn't select another identity to do the signing * then default to the one we started with. */ if (sign_id == NULL) sign_id = id; /* assemble and sign data */ for (fallback_sigtype = 0; fallback_sigtype <= 1; fallback_sigtype++) { free(alg); slen = 0; signature = NULL; if ((alg = key_sig_algorithm(fallback_sigtype ? NULL : ssh, id->key)) == NULL) { error_f("no mutual signature supported"); goto out; } debug3_f("signing using %s %s", alg, fp); sshbuf_free(b); if ((b = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed"); if (ssh->compat & SSH_OLD_SESSIONID) { if ((r = sshbuf_putb(b, ssh->kex->session_id)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "sshbuf_putb"); } else { if ((r = sshbuf_put_stringb(b, ssh->kex->session_id)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "sshbuf_put_stringb"); } skip = sshbuf_len(b); if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(b, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, authctxt->server_user)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, authctxt->service)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, method)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u8(b, 1)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, alg)) != 0 || (r = sshkey_puts(id->key, b)) != 0) { fatal_fr(r, "assemble signed data"); } if (hostbound) { if (ssh->kex->initial_hostkey == NULL) { fatal_f("internal error: initial hostkey " "not recorded"); } if ((r = sshkey_puts(ssh->kex->initial_hostkey, b)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "assemble %s hostkey", method); } /* generate signature */ r = identity_sign(sign_id, &signature, &slen, sshbuf_ptr(b), sshbuf_len(b), ssh->compat, alg); if (r == 0) break; else if (r == SSH_ERR_KEY_NOT_FOUND) goto out; /* soft failure */ else if (r == SSH_ERR_SIGN_ALG_UNSUPPORTED && !fallback_sigtype) { if (sign_id->agent_fd != -1) loc = "agent "; else if ((sign_id->key->flags & SSHKEY_FLAG_EXT) != 0) loc = "token "; logit("%skey %s %s returned incorrect signature type", loc, sshkey_type(id->key), fp); continue; } error_fr(r, "signing failed for %s \"%s\"%s", sshkey_type(sign_id->key), sign_id->filename, id->agent_fd != -1 ? " from agent" : ""); goto out; } if (slen == 0 || signature == NULL) /* shouldn't happen */ fatal_f("no signature"); /* append signature */ if ((r = sshbuf_put_string(b, signature, slen)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "append signature"); #ifdef DEBUG_PK sshbuf_dump(b, stderr); #endif /* skip session id and packet type */ if ((r = sshbuf_consume(b, skip + 1)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "consume"); /* put remaining data from buffer into packet */ if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_putb(ssh, b)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "enqueue request"); /* success */ sent = 1; out: free(fp); free(alg); sshbuf_free(b); freezero(signature, slen); return sent; } static int send_pubkey_test(struct ssh *ssh, Identity *id) { Authctxt *authctxt = (Authctxt *)ssh->authctxt; u_char *blob = NULL; char *alg = NULL; size_t bloblen; u_int have_sig = 0; int sent = 0, r; if ((alg = key_sig_algorithm(ssh, id->key)) == NULL) { debug_f("no mutual signature algorithm"); goto out; } if ((r = sshkey_to_blob(id->key, &blob, &bloblen)) != 0) { /* we cannot handle this key */ debug3_f("cannot handle key"); goto out; } /* register callback for USERAUTH_PK_OK message */ ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_PK_OK, &input_userauth_pk_ok); if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, authctxt->server_user)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, authctxt->service)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, authctxt->method->name)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_u8(ssh, have_sig)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, alg)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_string(ssh, blob, bloblen)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "send packet"); sent = 1; out: free(alg); free(blob); return sent; } static struct sshkey * load_identity_file(Identity *id) { struct sshkey *private = NULL; char prompt[300], *passphrase, *comment; int r, quit = 0, i; struct stat st; if (stat(id->filename, &st) == -1) { do_log2(id->userprovided ? SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO : SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG3, "no such identity: %s: %s", id->filename, strerror(errno)); return NULL; } snprintf(prompt, sizeof prompt, "Enter passphrase for key '%.100s': ", id->filename); for (i = 0; i <= options.number_of_password_prompts; i++) { if (i == 0) passphrase = ""; else { passphrase = read_passphrase(prompt, 0); if (*passphrase == '\0') { debug2("no passphrase given, try next key"); free(passphrase); break; } } switch ((r = sshkey_load_private_type(KEY_UNSPEC, id->filename, passphrase, &private, &comment))) { case 0: break; case SSH_ERR_KEY_WRONG_PASSPHRASE: if (options.batch_mode) { quit = 1; break; } if (i != 0) debug2("bad passphrase given, try again..."); break; case SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR: if (errno == ENOENT) { debug2_r(r, "Load key \"%s\"", id->filename); quit = 1; break; } /* FALLTHROUGH */ default: error_r(r, "Load key \"%s\"", id->filename); quit = 1; break; } if (private != NULL && sshkey_is_sk(private) && options.sk_provider == NULL) { debug("key \"%s\" is an authenticator-hosted key, " "but no provider specified", id->filename); sshkey_free(private); private = NULL; quit = 1; } if (!quit && (r = sshkey_check_rsa_length(private, options.required_rsa_size)) != 0) { debug_fr(r, "Skipping key %s", id->filename); sshkey_free(private); private = NULL; quit = 1; } if (!quit && private != NULL && id->agent_fd == -1 && !(id->key && id->isprivate)) maybe_add_key_to_agent(id->filename, private, comment, passphrase); if (i > 0) freezero(passphrase, strlen(passphrase)); free(comment); if (private != NULL || quit) break; } return private; } static int key_type_allowed_by_config(struct sshkey *key) { if (match_pattern_list(sshkey_ssh_name(key), options.pubkey_accepted_algos, 0) == 1) return 1; /* RSA keys/certs might be allowed by alternate signature types */ switch (key->type) { case KEY_RSA: if (match_pattern_list("rsa-sha2-512", options.pubkey_accepted_algos, 0) == 1) return 1; if (match_pattern_list("rsa-sha2-256", options.pubkey_accepted_algos, 0) == 1) return 1; break; case KEY_RSA_CERT: if (match_pattern_list("rsa-sha2-512-cert-v01@openssh.com", options.pubkey_accepted_algos, 0) == 1) return 1; if (match_pattern_list("rsa-sha2-256-cert-v01@openssh.com", options.pubkey_accepted_algos, 0) == 1) return 1; break; } return 0; } /* obtain a list of keys from the agent */ static int get_agent_identities(struct ssh *ssh, int *agent_fdp, struct ssh_identitylist **idlistp) { int r, agent_fd; struct ssh_identitylist *idlist; if ((r = ssh_get_authentication_socket(&agent_fd)) != 0) { if (r != SSH_ERR_AGENT_NOT_PRESENT) debug_fr(r, "ssh_get_authentication_socket"); return r; } if ((r = ssh_agent_bind_hostkey(agent_fd, ssh->kex->initial_hostkey, ssh->kex->session_id, ssh->kex->initial_sig, 0)) == 0) debug_f("bound agent to hostkey"); else debug2_fr(r, "ssh_agent_bind_hostkey"); if ((r = ssh_fetch_identitylist(agent_fd, &idlist)) != 0) { debug_fr(r, "ssh_fetch_identitylist"); close(agent_fd); return r; } /* success */ *agent_fdp = agent_fd; *idlistp = idlist; debug_f("agent returned %zu keys", idlist->nkeys); return 0; } /* * try keys in the following order: * 1. certificates listed in the config file * 2. other input certificates * 3. agent keys that are found in the config file * 4. other agent keys * 5. keys that are only listed in the config file */ static void pubkey_prepare(struct ssh *ssh, Authctxt *authctxt) { struct identity *id, *id2, *tmp; struct idlist agent, files, *preferred; struct sshkey *key; int agent_fd = -1, i, r, found; size_t j; struct ssh_identitylist *idlist; char *ident; TAILQ_INIT(&agent); /* keys from the agent */ TAILQ_INIT(&files); /* keys from the config file */ preferred = &authctxt->keys; TAILQ_INIT(preferred); /* preferred order of keys */ /* list of keys stored in the filesystem and PKCS#11 */ for (i = 0; i < options.num_identity_files; i++) { key = options.identity_keys[i]; if (key && key->cert && key->cert->type != SSH2_CERT_TYPE_USER) { debug_f("ignoring certificate %s: not a user " "certificate", options.identity_files[i]); continue; } if (key && sshkey_is_sk(key) && options.sk_provider == NULL) { debug_f("ignoring authenticator-hosted key %s as no " "SecurityKeyProvider has been specified", options.identity_files[i]); continue; } options.identity_keys[i] = NULL; id = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*id)); id->agent_fd = -1; id->key = key; id->filename = xstrdup(options.identity_files[i]); id->userprovided = options.identity_file_userprovided[i]; TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(&files, id, next); } /* list of certificates specified by user */ for (i = 0; i < options.num_certificate_files; i++) { key = options.certificates[i]; if (!sshkey_is_cert(key) || key->cert == NULL || key->cert->type != SSH2_CERT_TYPE_USER) { debug_f("ignoring certificate %s: not a user " "certificate", options.identity_files[i]); continue; } if (key && sshkey_is_sk(key) && options.sk_provider == NULL) { debug_f("ignoring authenticator-hosted key " "certificate %s as no " "SecurityKeyProvider has been specified", options.identity_files[i]); continue; } id = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*id)); id->agent_fd = -1; id->key = key; id->filename = xstrdup(options.certificate_files[i]); id->userprovided = options.certificate_file_userprovided[i]; TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(preferred, id, next); } /* list of keys supported by the agent */ if ((r = get_agent_identities(ssh, &agent_fd, &idlist)) == 0) { for (j = 0; j < idlist->nkeys; j++) { if ((r = sshkey_check_rsa_length(idlist->keys[j], options.required_rsa_size)) != 0) { debug_fr(r, "ignoring %s agent key", sshkey_ssh_name(idlist->keys[j])); continue; } found = 0; TAILQ_FOREACH(id, &files, next) { /* * agent keys from the config file are * preferred */ if (sshkey_equal(idlist->keys[j], id->key)) { TAILQ_REMOVE(&files, id, next); TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(preferred, id, next); id->agent_fd = agent_fd; found = 1; break; } } if (!found && !options.identities_only) { id = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*id)); /* XXX "steals" key/comment from idlist */ id->key = idlist->keys[j]; id->filename = idlist->comments[j]; idlist->keys[j] = NULL; idlist->comments[j] = NULL; id->agent_fd = agent_fd; TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(&agent, id, next); } } ssh_free_identitylist(idlist); /* append remaining agent keys */ TAILQ_CONCAT(preferred, &agent, next); authctxt->agent_fd = agent_fd; } /* Prefer PKCS11 keys that are explicitly listed */ TAILQ_FOREACH_SAFE(id, &files, next, tmp) { if (id->key == NULL || (id->key->flags & SSHKEY_FLAG_EXT) == 0) continue; found = 0; TAILQ_FOREACH(id2, &files, next) { if (id2->key == NULL || (id2->key->flags & SSHKEY_FLAG_EXT) != 0) continue; if (sshkey_equal(id->key, id2->key)) { TAILQ_REMOVE(&files, id, next); TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(preferred, id, next); found = 1; break; } } /* If IdentitiesOnly set and key not found then don't use it */ if (!found && options.identities_only) { TAILQ_REMOVE(&files, id, next); freezero(id, sizeof(*id)); } } /* append remaining keys from the config file */ TAILQ_CONCAT(preferred, &files, next); /* finally, filter by PubkeyAcceptedAlgorithms */ TAILQ_FOREACH_SAFE(id, preferred, next, id2) { if (id->key != NULL && !key_type_allowed_by_config(id->key)) { debug("Skipping %s key %s - " "corresponding algo not in PubkeyAcceptedAlgorithms", sshkey_ssh_name(id->key), id->filename); TAILQ_REMOVE(preferred, id, next); sshkey_free(id->key); free(id->filename); memset(id, 0, sizeof(*id)); continue; } } /* List the keys we plan on using */ TAILQ_FOREACH_SAFE(id, preferred, next, id2) { ident = format_identity(id); debug("Will attempt key: %s", ident); free(ident); } debug2_f("done"); } static void pubkey_cleanup(struct ssh *ssh) { Authctxt *authctxt = (Authctxt *)ssh->authctxt; Identity *id; if (authctxt->agent_fd != -1) { ssh_close_authentication_socket(authctxt->agent_fd); authctxt->agent_fd = -1; } for (id = TAILQ_FIRST(&authctxt->keys); id; id = TAILQ_FIRST(&authctxt->keys)) { TAILQ_REMOVE(&authctxt->keys, id, next); sshkey_free(id->key); free(id->filename); free(id); } } static void pubkey_reset(Authctxt *authctxt) { Identity *id; TAILQ_FOREACH(id, &authctxt->keys, next) id->tried = 0; } -static int -try_identity(struct ssh *ssh, Identity *id) -{ - if (!id->key) - return (0); - if (sshkey_type_plain(id->key->type) == KEY_RSA && - (ssh->compat & SSH_BUG_RSASIGMD5) != 0) { - debug("Skipped %s key %s for RSA/MD5 server", - sshkey_type(id->key), id->filename); - return (0); - } - return 1; -} - static int userauth_pubkey(struct ssh *ssh) { Authctxt *authctxt = (Authctxt *)ssh->authctxt; Identity *id; int sent = 0; char *ident; while ((id = TAILQ_FIRST(&authctxt->keys))) { if (id->tried++) return (0); /* move key to the end of the queue */ TAILQ_REMOVE(&authctxt->keys, id, next); TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(&authctxt->keys, id, next); /* * send a test message if we have the public key. for * encrypted keys we cannot do this and have to load the * private key instead */ if (id->key != NULL) { - if (try_identity(ssh, id)) { + if (id->key != NULL) { ident = format_identity(id); debug("Offering public key: %s", ident); free(ident); sent = send_pubkey_test(ssh, id); } } else { debug("Trying private key: %s", id->filename); id->key = load_identity_file(id); if (id->key != NULL) { - if (try_identity(ssh, id)) { + if (id->key != NULL) { id->isprivate = 1; sent = sign_and_send_pubkey(ssh, id); } sshkey_free(id->key); id->key = NULL; id->isprivate = 0; } } if (sent) return (sent); } return (0); } /* * Send userauth request message specifying keyboard-interactive method. */ static int userauth_kbdint(struct ssh *ssh) { Authctxt *authctxt = (Authctxt *)ssh->authctxt; int r; if (authctxt->attempt_kbdint++ >= options.number_of_password_prompts) return 0; /* disable if no SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_INFO_REQUEST has been seen */ if (authctxt->attempt_kbdint > 1 && !authctxt->info_req_seen) { debug3("userauth_kbdint: disable: no info_req_seen"); ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_INFO_REQUEST, NULL); return 0; } debug2("userauth_kbdint"); if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, authctxt->server_user)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, authctxt->service)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, authctxt->method->name)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, "")) != 0 || /* lang */ (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, options.kbd_interactive_devices ? options.kbd_interactive_devices : "")) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "send packet"); ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_INFO_REQUEST, &input_userauth_info_req); return 1; } /* * parse INFO_REQUEST, prompt user and send INFO_RESPONSE */ static int input_userauth_info_req(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh) { Authctxt *authctxt = ssh->authctxt; char *name = NULL, *inst = NULL, *lang = NULL, *prompt = NULL; char *display_prompt = NULL, *response = NULL; u_char echo = 0; u_int num_prompts, i; int r; debug2_f("entering"); if (authctxt == NULL) fatal_f("no authentication context"); authctxt->info_req_seen = 1; if ((r = sshpkt_get_cstring(ssh, &name, NULL)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_get_cstring(ssh, &inst, NULL)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_get_cstring(ssh, &lang, NULL)) != 0) goto out; if (strlen(name) > 0) logit("%s", name); if (strlen(inst) > 0) logit("%s", inst); if ((r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &num_prompts)) != 0) goto out; /* * Begin to build info response packet based on prompts requested. * We commit to providing the correct number of responses, so if * further on we run into a problem that prevents this, we have to * be sure and clean this up and send a correct error response. */ if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_INFO_RESPONSE)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, num_prompts)) != 0) goto out; debug2_f("num_prompts %d", num_prompts); for (i = 0; i < num_prompts; i++) { if ((r = sshpkt_get_cstring(ssh, &prompt, NULL)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_get_u8(ssh, &echo)) != 0) goto out; if (asmprintf(&display_prompt, INT_MAX, NULL, "(%s@%s) %s", authctxt->server_user, options.host_key_alias ? options.host_key_alias : authctxt->host, prompt) == -1) fatal_f("asmprintf failed"); response = read_passphrase(display_prompt, echo ? RP_ECHO : 0); if ((r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, response)) != 0) goto out; freezero(response, strlen(response)); free(prompt); free(display_prompt); display_prompt = response = prompt = NULL; } /* done with parsing incoming message. */ if ((r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_add_padding(ssh, 64)) != 0) goto out; r = sshpkt_send(ssh); out: if (response) freezero(response, strlen(response)); free(prompt); free(display_prompt); free(name); free(inst); free(lang); return r; } static int ssh_keysign(struct ssh *ssh, struct sshkey *key, u_char **sigp, size_t *lenp, const u_char *data, size_t datalen) { struct sshbuf *b; struct stat st; pid_t pid; int r, to[2], from[2], status; int sock = ssh_packet_get_connection_in(ssh); u_char rversion = 0, version = 2; void (*osigchld)(int); *sigp = NULL; *lenp = 0; if (stat(_PATH_SSH_KEY_SIGN, &st) == -1) { error_f("not installed: %s", strerror(errno)); return -1; } if (fflush(stdout) != 0) { error_f("fflush: %s", strerror(errno)); return -1; } if (pipe(to) == -1) { error_f("pipe: %s", strerror(errno)); return -1; } if (pipe(from) == -1) { error_f("pipe: %s", strerror(errno)); return -1; } if ((pid = fork()) == -1) { error_f("fork: %s", strerror(errno)); return -1; } osigchld = ssh_signal(SIGCHLD, SIG_DFL); if (pid == 0) { close(from[0]); if (dup2(from[1], STDOUT_FILENO) == -1) fatal_f("dup2: %s", strerror(errno)); close(to[1]); if (dup2(to[0], STDIN_FILENO) == -1) fatal_f("dup2: %s", strerror(errno)); close(from[1]); close(to[0]); if (dup2(sock, STDERR_FILENO + 1) == -1) fatal_f("dup2: %s", strerror(errno)); sock = STDERR_FILENO + 1; - fcntl(sock, F_SETFD, 0); /* keep the socket on exec */ + if (fcntl(sock, F_SETFD, 0) == -1) /* keep the socket on exec */ + debug3_f("fcntl F_SETFD: %s", strerror(errno)); closefrom(sock + 1); debug3_f("[child] pid=%ld, exec %s", (long)getpid(), _PATH_SSH_KEY_SIGN); execl(_PATH_SSH_KEY_SIGN, _PATH_SSH_KEY_SIGN, (char *)NULL); fatal_f("exec(%s): %s", _PATH_SSH_KEY_SIGN, strerror(errno)); } close(from[1]); close(to[0]); sock = STDERR_FILENO + 1; if ((b = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed"); /* send # of sock, data to be signed */ if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(b, sock)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_string(b, data, datalen)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "buffer error"); if (ssh_msg_send(to[1], version, b) == -1) fatal_f("couldn't send request"); sshbuf_reset(b); r = ssh_msg_recv(from[0], b); close(from[0]); close(to[1]); if (r < 0) { error_f("no reply"); goto fail; } errno = 0; while (waitpid(pid, &status, 0) == -1) { if (errno != EINTR) { error_f("waitpid %ld: %s", (long)pid, strerror(errno)); goto fail; } } if (!WIFEXITED(status)) { error_f("exited abnormally"); goto fail; } if (WEXITSTATUS(status) != 0) { error_f("exited with status %d", WEXITSTATUS(status)); goto fail; } if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(b, &rversion)) != 0) { error_fr(r, "buffer error"); goto fail; } if (rversion != version) { error_f("bad version"); goto fail; } if ((r = sshbuf_get_string(b, sigp, lenp)) != 0) { error_fr(r, "buffer error"); fail: ssh_signal(SIGCHLD, osigchld); sshbuf_free(b); return -1; } ssh_signal(SIGCHLD, osigchld); sshbuf_free(b); return 0; } static int userauth_hostbased(struct ssh *ssh) { Authctxt *authctxt = (Authctxt *)ssh->authctxt; struct sshkey *private = NULL; struct sshbuf *b = NULL; u_char *sig = NULL, *keyblob = NULL; char *fp = NULL, *chost = NULL, *lname = NULL; size_t siglen = 0, keylen = 0; int i, r, success = 0; if (authctxt->ktypes == NULL) { authctxt->oktypes = xstrdup(options.hostbased_accepted_algos); authctxt->ktypes = authctxt->oktypes; } /* * Work through each listed type pattern in HostbasedAcceptedAlgorithms, * trying each hostkey that matches the type in turn. */ for (;;) { if (authctxt->active_ktype == NULL) authctxt->active_ktype = strsep(&authctxt->ktypes, ","); if (authctxt->active_ktype == NULL || *authctxt->active_ktype == '\0') break; debug3_f("trying key type %s", authctxt->active_ktype); /* check for a useful key */ private = NULL; for (i = 0; i < authctxt->sensitive->nkeys; i++) { if (authctxt->sensitive->keys[i] == NULL || authctxt->sensitive->keys[i]->type == KEY_UNSPEC) continue; if (!sshkey_match_keyname_to_sigalgs( sshkey_ssh_name(authctxt->sensitive->keys[i]), authctxt->active_ktype)) continue; /* we take and free the key */ private = authctxt->sensitive->keys[i]; authctxt->sensitive->keys[i] = NULL; break; } /* Found one */ if (private != NULL) break; /* No more keys of this type; advance */ authctxt->active_ktype = NULL; } if (private == NULL) { free(authctxt->oktypes); authctxt->oktypes = authctxt->ktypes = NULL; authctxt->active_ktype = NULL; debug("No more client hostkeys for hostbased authentication."); goto out; } if ((fp = sshkey_fingerprint(private, options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL) { error_f("sshkey_fingerprint failed"); goto out; } debug_f("trying hostkey %s %s using sigalg %s", sshkey_ssh_name(private), fp, authctxt->active_ktype); /* figure out a name for the client host */ lname = get_local_name(ssh_packet_get_connection_in(ssh)); if (lname == NULL) { error_f("cannot get local ipaddr/name"); goto out; } /* XXX sshbuf_put_stringf? */ xasprintf(&chost, "%s.", lname); debug2_f("chost %s", chost); /* construct data */ if ((b = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) { error_f("sshbuf_new failed"); goto out; } if ((r = sshkey_to_blob(private, &keyblob, &keylen)) != 0) { error_fr(r, "sshkey_to_blob"); goto out; } if ((r = sshbuf_put_stringb(b, ssh->kex->session_id)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u8(b, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, authctxt->server_user)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, authctxt->service)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, authctxt->method->name)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, authctxt->active_ktype)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_string(b, keyblob, keylen)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, chost)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, authctxt->local_user)) != 0) { error_fr(r, "buffer error"); goto out; } #ifdef DEBUG_PK sshbuf_dump(b, stderr); #endif if ((r = ssh_keysign(ssh, private, &sig, &siglen, sshbuf_ptr(b), sshbuf_len(b))) != 0) { error("sign using hostkey %s %s failed", sshkey_ssh_name(private), fp); goto out; } if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, authctxt->server_user)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, authctxt->service)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, authctxt->method->name)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, authctxt->active_ktype)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_string(ssh, keyblob, keylen)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, chost)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, authctxt->local_user)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_string(ssh, sig, siglen)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) { error_fr(r, "packet error"); goto out; } success = 1; out: if (sig != NULL) freezero(sig, siglen); free(keyblob); free(lname); free(fp); free(chost); sshkey_free(private); sshbuf_free(b); return success; } /* find auth method */ /* * given auth method name, if configurable options permit this method fill * in auth_ident field and return true, otherwise return false. */ static int authmethod_is_enabled(Authmethod *method) { if (method == NULL) return 0; /* return false if options indicate this method is disabled */ if (method->enabled == NULL || *method->enabled == 0) return 0; /* return false if batch mode is enabled but method needs interactive mode */ if (method->batch_flag != NULL && *method->batch_flag != 0) return 0; return 1; } static Authmethod * authmethod_lookup(const char *name) { Authmethod *method = NULL; if (name != NULL) for (method = authmethods; method->name != NULL; method++) if (strcmp(name, method->name) == 0) return method; debug2("Unrecognized authentication method name: %s", name ? name : "NULL"); return NULL; } /* XXX internal state */ static Authmethod *current = NULL; static char *supported = NULL; static char *preferred = NULL; /* * Given the authentication method list sent by the server, return the * next method we should try. If the server initially sends a nil list, * use a built-in default list. */ static Authmethod * authmethod_get(char *authlist) { char *name = NULL; u_int next; /* Use a suitable default if we're passed a nil list. */ if (authlist == NULL || strlen(authlist) == 0) authlist = options.preferred_authentications; if (supported == NULL || strcmp(authlist, supported) != 0) { debug3("start over, passed a different list %s", authlist); free(supported); supported = xstrdup(authlist); preferred = options.preferred_authentications; debug3("preferred %s", preferred); current = NULL; } else if (current != NULL && authmethod_is_enabled(current)) return current; for (;;) { if ((name = match_list(preferred, supported, &next)) == NULL) { debug("No more authentication methods to try."); current = NULL; return NULL; } preferred += next; debug3("authmethod_lookup %s", name); debug3("remaining preferred: %s", preferred); if ((current = authmethod_lookup(name)) != NULL && authmethod_is_enabled(current)) { debug3("authmethod_is_enabled %s", name); debug("Next authentication method: %s", name); free(name); return current; } free(name); } } static char * authmethods_get(void) { Authmethod *method = NULL; struct sshbuf *b; char *list; int r; if ((b = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed"); for (method = authmethods; method->name != NULL; method++) { if (authmethod_is_enabled(method)) { if ((r = sshbuf_putf(b, "%s%s", sshbuf_len(b) ? "," : "", method->name)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "buffer error"); } } if ((list = sshbuf_dup_string(b)) == NULL) fatal_f("sshbuf_dup_string failed"); sshbuf_free(b); return list; } diff --git a/crypto/openssh/sshd.8 b/crypto/openssh/sshd.8 index 3c37c88f3ea6..d80153102e67 100644 --- a/crypto/openssh/sshd.8 +++ b/crypto/openssh/sshd.8 @@ -1,1038 +1,1052 @@ .\" .\" Author: Tatu Ylonen .\" Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen , Espoo, Finland .\" All rights reserved .\" .\" As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software .\" can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this .\" software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is .\" incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be .\" called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell". .\" .\" Copyright (c) 1999,2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. .\" Copyright (c) 1999 Aaron Campbell. All rights reserved. .\" Copyright (c) 1999 Theo de Raadt. All rights reserved. .\" .\" Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without .\" modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions .\" are met: .\" 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright .\" notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. .\" 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright .\" notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the .\" documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. .\" .\" THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR .\" IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES .\" OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. .\" IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, .\" INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT .\" NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, .\" DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY .\" THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT .\" (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF .\" THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. .\" -.\" $OpenBSD: sshd.8,v 1.322 2023/01/18 01:50:21 millert Exp $ -.Dd $Mdocdate: January 18 2023 $ +.\" $OpenBSD: sshd.8,v 1.324 2023/02/10 06:39:27 jmc Exp $ +.Dd $Mdocdate: February 10 2023 $ .Dt SSHD 8 .Os .Sh NAME .Nm sshd .Nd OpenSSH daemon .Sh SYNOPSIS .Nm sshd .Bk -words -.Op Fl 46DdeiqTtV +.Op Fl 46DdeGiqTtV .Op Fl C Ar connection_spec .Op Fl c Ar host_certificate_file .Op Fl E Ar log_file .Op Fl f Ar config_file .Op Fl g Ar login_grace_time .Op Fl h Ar host_key_file .Op Fl o Ar option .Op Fl p Ar port .Op Fl u Ar len .Ek .Sh DESCRIPTION .Nm (OpenSSH Daemon) is the daemon program for .Xr ssh 1 . It provides secure encrypted communications between two untrusted hosts over an insecure network. .Pp .Nm listens for connections from clients. It is normally started at boot from .Pa /etc/rc.d/sshd . It forks a new daemon for each incoming connection. The forked daemons handle key exchange, encryption, authentication, command execution, and data exchange. .Pp .Nm can be configured using command-line options or a configuration file (by default .Xr sshd_config 5 ) ; command-line options override values specified in the configuration file. .Nm rereads its configuration file when it receives a hangup signal, .Dv SIGHUP , by executing itself with the name and options it was started with, e.g.\& .Pa /usr/sbin/sshd . .Pp The options are as follows: .Bl -tag -width Ds .It Fl 4 Forces .Nm to use IPv4 addresses only. .It Fl 6 Forces .Nm to use IPv6 addresses only. .It Fl C Ar connection_spec Specify the connection parameters to use for the .Fl T extended test mode. If provided, any .Cm Match directives in the configuration file that would apply are applied before the configuration is written to standard output. The connection parameters are supplied as keyword=value pairs and may be supplied in any order, either with multiple .Fl C options or as a comma-separated list. The keywords are .Dq addr , .Dq user , .Dq host , .Dq laddr , .Dq lport , and .Dq rdomain and correspond to source address, user, resolved source host name, local address, local port number and routing domain respectively. .It Fl c Ar host_certificate_file Specifies a path to a certificate file to identify .Nm during key exchange. The certificate file must match a host key file specified using the .Fl h option or the .Cm HostKey configuration directive. .It Fl D When this option is specified, .Nm will not detach and does not become a daemon. This allows easy monitoring of .Nm sshd . .It Fl d Debug mode. The server sends verbose debug output to standard error, and does not put itself in the background. The server also will not .Xr fork 2 and will only process one connection. This option is only intended for debugging for the server. Multiple .Fl d options increase the debugging level. Maximum is 3. .It Fl E Ar log_file Append debug logs to .Ar log_file instead of the system log. .It Fl e Write debug logs to standard error instead of the system log. .It Fl f Ar config_file Specifies the name of the configuration file. The default is .Pa /etc/ssh/sshd_config . .Nm refuses to start if there is no configuration file. +.It Fl G +Parse and print configuration file. +Check the validity of the configuration file, output the effective configuration +to stdout and then exit. +Optionally, +.Cm Match +rules may be applied by specifying the connection parameters using one or more +.Fl C +options. .It Fl g Ar login_grace_time Gives the grace time for clients to authenticate themselves (default 120 seconds). If the client fails to authenticate the user within this many seconds, the server disconnects and exits. A value of zero indicates no limit. .It Fl h Ar host_key_file Specifies a file from which a host key is read. This option must be given if .Nm is not run as root (as the normal host key files are normally not readable by anyone but root). The default is .Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ecdsa_key , .Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ed25519_key and .Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key . It is possible to have multiple host key files for the different host key algorithms. .It Fl i Specifies that .Nm is being run from .Xr inetd 8 . .It Fl o Ar option Can be used to give options in the format used in the configuration file. This is useful for specifying options for which there is no separate command-line flag. For full details of the options, and their values, see .Xr sshd_config 5 . .It Fl p Ar port Specifies the port on which the server listens for connections (default 22). Multiple port options are permitted. Ports specified in the configuration file with the .Cm Port option are ignored when a command-line port is specified. Ports specified using the .Cm ListenAddress option override command-line ports. .It Fl q Quiet mode. Nothing is sent to the system log. Normally the beginning, authentication, and termination of each connection is logged. .It Fl T Extended test mode. Check the validity of the configuration file, output the effective configuration to stdout and then exit. Optionally, .Cm Match rules may be applied by specifying the connection parameters using one or more .Fl C options. +This is similar to the +.Fl G +flag, but it includes the additional testing performed by the +.Fl t +flag. .It Fl t Test mode. Only check the validity of the configuration file and sanity of the keys. This is useful for updating .Nm reliably as configuration options may change. .It Fl u Ar len This option is used to specify the size of the field in the .Vt utmp structure that holds the remote host name. If the resolved host name is longer than .Ar len , the dotted decimal value will be used instead. This allows hosts with very long host names that overflow this field to still be uniquely identified. Specifying .Fl u0 indicates that only dotted decimal addresses should be put into the .Pa utmp file. .Fl u0 may also be used to prevent .Nm from making DNS requests unless the authentication mechanism or configuration requires it. Authentication mechanisms that may require DNS include .Cm HostbasedAuthentication and using a .Cm from="pattern-list" option in a key file. Configuration options that require DNS include using a USER@HOST pattern in .Cm AllowUsers or .Cm DenyUsers . .It Fl V Display the version number and exit. .El .Sh AUTHENTICATION The OpenSSH SSH daemon supports SSH protocol 2 only. Each host has a host-specific key, used to identify the host. Whenever a client connects, the daemon responds with its public host key. The client compares the host key against its own database to verify that it has not changed. Forward secrecy is provided through a Diffie-Hellman key agreement. This key agreement results in a shared session key. The rest of the session is encrypted using a symmetric cipher. The client selects the encryption algorithm to use from those offered by the server. Additionally, session integrity is provided through a cryptographic message authentication code (MAC). .Pp Finally, the server and the client enter an authentication dialog. The client tries to authenticate itself using host-based authentication, public key authentication, challenge-response authentication, or password authentication. .Pp Regardless of the authentication type, the account is checked to ensure that it is accessible. An account is not accessible if it is locked, listed in .Cm DenyUsers or its group is listed in .Cm DenyGroups \&. The definition of a locked account is system dependent. Some platforms have their own account database (eg AIX) and some modify the passwd field ( .Ql \&*LK\&* on Solaris and UnixWare, .Ql \&* on HP-UX, containing .Ql Nologin on Tru64, a leading .Ql \&*LOCKED\&* on FreeBSD and a leading .Ql \&! on most Linuxes). If there is a requirement to disable password authentication for the account while allowing still public-key, then the passwd field should be set to something other than these values (eg .Ql NP or .Ql \&*NP\&* ). .Pp If the client successfully authenticates itself, a dialog for preparing the session is entered. At this time the client may request things like allocating a pseudo-tty, forwarding X11 connections, forwarding TCP connections, or forwarding the authentication agent connection over the secure channel. .Pp After this, the client either requests an interactive shell or execution or a non-interactive command, which .Nm will execute via the user's shell using its .Fl c option. The sides then enter session mode. In this mode, either side may send data at any time, and such data is forwarded to/from the shell or command on the server side, and the user terminal in the client side. .Pp When the user program terminates and all forwarded X11 and other connections have been closed, the server sends command exit status to the client, and both sides exit. .Sh LOGIN PROCESS When a user successfully logs in, .Nm does the following: .Bl -enum -offset indent .It If the login is on a tty, and no command has been specified, prints last login time and .Pa /etc/motd (unless prevented in the configuration file or by .Pa ~/.hushlogin ; see the .Sx FILES section). .It If the login is on a tty, records login time. .It Checks .Pa /etc/nologin and .Pa /var/run/nologin ; if one exists, it prints the contents and quits (unless root). .It Changes to run with normal user privileges. .It Sets up basic environment. .It Reads the file .Pa ~/.ssh/environment , if it exists, and users are allowed to change their environment. See the .Cm PermitUserEnvironment option in .Xr sshd_config 5 . .It Changes to user's home directory. .It If .Pa ~/.ssh/rc exists and the .Xr sshd_config 5 .Cm PermitUserRC option is set, runs it; else if .Pa /etc/ssh/sshrc exists, runs it; otherwise runs .Xr xauth 1 . The .Dq rc files are given the X11 authentication protocol and cookie in standard input. See .Sx SSHRC , below. .It Runs user's shell or command. All commands are run under the user's login shell as specified in the system password database. .El .Sh SSHRC If the file .Pa ~/.ssh/rc exists, .Xr sh 1 runs it after reading the environment files but before starting the user's shell or command. It must not produce any output on stdout; stderr must be used instead. If X11 forwarding is in use, it will receive the "proto cookie" pair in its standard input (and .Ev DISPLAY in its environment). The script must call .Xr xauth 1 because .Nm will not run xauth automatically to add X11 cookies. .Pp The primary purpose of this file is to run any initialization routines which may be needed before the user's home directory becomes accessible; AFS is a particular example of such an environment. .Pp This file will probably contain some initialization code followed by something similar to: .Bd -literal -offset 3n if read proto cookie && [ -n "$DISPLAY" ]; then if [ `echo $DISPLAY | cut -c1-10` = 'localhost:' ]; then # X11UseLocalhost=yes echo add unix:`echo $DISPLAY | cut -c11-` $proto $cookie else # X11UseLocalhost=no echo add $DISPLAY $proto $cookie fi | xauth -q - fi .Ed .Pp If this file does not exist, .Pa /etc/ssh/sshrc is run, and if that does not exist either, xauth is used to add the cookie. .Sh AUTHORIZED_KEYS FILE FORMAT .Cm AuthorizedKeysFile specifies the files containing public keys for public key authentication; if this option is not specified, the default is .Pa ~/.ssh/authorized_keys and .Pa ~/.ssh/authorized_keys2 . Each line of the file contains one key (empty lines and lines starting with a .Ql # are ignored as comments). Public keys consist of the following space-separated fields: options, keytype, base64-encoded key, comment. The options field is optional. The supported key types are: .Pp .Bl -item -compact -offset indent .It sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256@openssh.com .It ecdsa-sha2-nistp256 .It ecdsa-sha2-nistp384 .It ecdsa-sha2-nistp521 .It sk-ssh-ed25519@openssh.com .It ssh-ed25519 .It ssh-dss .It ssh-rsa .El .Pp The comment field is not used for anything (but may be convenient for the user to identify the key). .Pp Note that lines in this file can be several hundred bytes long (because of the size of the public key encoding) up to a limit of 8 kilobytes, which permits RSA keys up to 16 kilobits. You don't want to type them in; instead, copy the .Pa id_dsa.pub , .Pa id_ecdsa.pub , .Pa id_ecdsa_sk.pub , .Pa id_ed25519.pub , .Pa id_ed25519_sk.pub , or the .Pa id_rsa.pub file and edit it. .Pp .Nm enforces a minimum RSA key modulus size of 1024 bits. .Pp The options (if present) consist of comma-separated option specifications. No spaces are permitted, except within double quotes. The following option specifications are supported (note that option keywords are case-insensitive): .Bl -tag -width Ds .It Cm agent-forwarding Enable authentication agent forwarding previously disabled by the .Cm restrict option. .It Cm cert-authority Specifies that the listed key is a certification authority (CA) that is trusted to validate signed certificates for user authentication. .Pp Certificates may encode access restrictions similar to these key options. If both certificate restrictions and key options are present, the most restrictive union of the two is applied. .It Cm command="command" Specifies that the command is executed whenever this key is used for authentication. The command supplied by the user (if any) is ignored. The command is run on a pty if the client requests a pty; otherwise it is run without a tty. If an 8-bit clean channel is required, one must not request a pty or should specify .Cm no-pty . A quote may be included in the command by quoting it with a backslash. .Pp This option might be useful to restrict certain public keys to perform just a specific operation. An example might be a key that permits remote backups but nothing else. Note that the client may specify TCP and/or X11 forwarding unless they are explicitly prohibited, e.g. using the .Cm restrict key option. .Pp The command originally supplied by the client is available in the .Ev SSH_ORIGINAL_COMMAND environment variable. Note that this option applies to shell, command or subsystem execution. Also note that this command may be superseded by a .Xr sshd_config 5 .Cm ForceCommand directive. .Pp If a command is specified and a forced-command is embedded in a certificate used for authentication, then the certificate will be accepted only if the two commands are identical. .It Cm environment="NAME=value" Specifies that the string is to be added to the environment when logging in using this key. Environment variables set this way override other default environment values. Multiple options of this type are permitted. Environment processing is disabled by default and is controlled via the .Cm PermitUserEnvironment option. .It Cm expiry-time="timespec" Specifies a time after which the key will not be accepted. The time may be specified as a YYYYMMDD[Z] date or a YYYYMMDDHHMM[SS][Z] time. Dates and times will be interpreted in the system time zone unless suffixed by a Z character, in which case they will be interpreted in the UTC time zone. .It Cm from="pattern-list" Specifies that in addition to public key authentication, either the canonical name of the remote host or its IP address must be present in the comma-separated list of patterns. See PATTERNS in .Xr ssh_config 5 for more information on patterns. .Pp In addition to the wildcard matching that may be applied to hostnames or addresses, a .Cm from stanza may match IP addresses using CIDR address/masklen notation. .Pp The purpose of this option is to optionally increase security: public key authentication by itself does not trust the network or name servers or anything (but the key); however, if somebody somehow steals the key, the key permits an intruder to log in from anywhere in the world. This additional option makes using a stolen key more difficult (name servers and/or routers would have to be compromised in addition to just the key). .It Cm no-agent-forwarding Forbids authentication agent forwarding when this key is used for authentication. .It Cm no-port-forwarding Forbids TCP forwarding when this key is used for authentication. Any port forward requests by the client will return an error. This might be used, e.g. in connection with the .Cm command option. .It Cm no-pty Prevents tty allocation (a request to allocate a pty will fail). .It Cm no-user-rc Disables execution of .Pa ~/.ssh/rc . .It Cm no-X11-forwarding Forbids X11 forwarding when this key is used for authentication. Any X11 forward requests by the client will return an error. .It Cm permitlisten="[host:]port" Limit remote port forwarding with the .Xr ssh 1 .Fl R option such that it may only listen on the specified host (optional) and port. IPv6 addresses can be specified by enclosing the address in square brackets. Multiple .Cm permitlisten options may be applied separated by commas. Hostnames may include wildcards as described in the PATTERNS section in .Xr ssh_config 5 . A port specification of .Cm * matches any port. Note that the setting of .Cm GatewayPorts may further restrict listen addresses. Note that .Xr ssh 1 will send a hostname of .Dq localhost if a listen host was not specified when the forwarding was requested, and that this name is treated differently to the explicit localhost addresses .Dq 127.0.0.1 and .Dq ::1 . .It Cm permitopen="host:port" Limit local port forwarding with the .Xr ssh 1 .Fl L option such that it may only connect to the specified host and port. IPv6 addresses can be specified by enclosing the address in square brackets. Multiple .Cm permitopen options may be applied separated by commas. No pattern matching or name lookup is performed on the specified hostnames, they must be literal host names and/or addresses. A port specification of .Cm * matches any port. .It Cm port-forwarding Enable port forwarding previously disabled by the .Cm restrict option. .It Cm principals="principals" On a .Cm cert-authority line, specifies allowed principals for certificate authentication as a comma-separated list. At least one name from the list must appear in the certificate's list of principals for the certificate to be accepted. This option is ignored for keys that are not marked as trusted certificate signers using the .Cm cert-authority option. .It Cm pty Permits tty allocation previously disabled by the .Cm restrict option. .It Cm no-touch-required Do not require demonstration of user presence for signatures made using this key. This option only makes sense for the FIDO authenticator algorithms .Cm ecdsa-sk and .Cm ed25519-sk . .It Cm verify-required Require that signatures made using this key attest that they verified the user, e.g. via a PIN. This option only makes sense for the FIDO authenticator algorithms .Cm ecdsa-sk and .Cm ed25519-sk . .It Cm restrict Enable all restrictions, i.e. disable port, agent and X11 forwarding, as well as disabling PTY allocation and execution of .Pa ~/.ssh/rc . If any future restriction capabilities are added to authorized_keys files, they will be included in this set. .It Cm tunnel="n" Force a .Xr tun 4 device on the server. Without this option, the next available device will be used if the client requests a tunnel. .It Cm user-rc Enables execution of .Pa ~/.ssh/rc previously disabled by the .Cm restrict option. .It Cm X11-forwarding Permits X11 forwarding previously disabled by the .Cm restrict option. .El .Pp An example authorized_keys file: .Bd -literal -offset 3n # Comments are allowed at start of line. Blank lines are allowed. # Plain key, no restrictions ssh-rsa ... # Forced command, disable PTY and all forwarding restrict,command="dump /home" ssh-rsa ... # Restriction of ssh -L forwarding destinations permitopen="192.0.2.1:80",permitopen="192.0.2.2:25" ssh-rsa ... # Restriction of ssh -R forwarding listeners permitlisten="localhost:8080",permitlisten="[::1]:22000" ssh-rsa ... # Configuration for tunnel forwarding tunnel="0",command="sh /etc/netstart tun0" ssh-rsa ... # Override of restriction to allow PTY allocation restrict,pty,command="nethack" ssh-rsa ... # Allow FIDO key without requiring touch no-touch-required sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256@openssh.com ... # Require user-verification (e.g. PIN or biometric) for FIDO key verify-required sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256@openssh.com ... # Trust CA key, allow touch-less FIDO if requested in certificate cert-authority,no-touch-required,principals="user_a" ssh-rsa ... .Ed .Sh SSH_KNOWN_HOSTS FILE FORMAT The .Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_known_hosts and .Pa ~/.ssh/known_hosts files contain host public keys for all known hosts. The global file should be prepared by the administrator (optional), and the per-user file is maintained automatically: whenever the user connects to an unknown host, its key is added to the per-user file. .Pp Each line in these files contains the following fields: marker (optional), hostnames, keytype, base64-encoded key, comment. The fields are separated by spaces. .Pp The marker is optional, but if it is present then it must be one of .Dq @cert-authority , to indicate that the line contains a certification authority (CA) key, or .Dq @revoked , to indicate that the key contained on the line is revoked and must not ever be accepted. Only one marker should be used on a key line. .Pp Hostnames is a comma-separated list of patterns .Pf ( Ql * and .Ql \&? act as wildcards); each pattern in turn is matched against the host name. When .Nm sshd is authenticating a client, such as when using .Cm HostbasedAuthentication , this will be the canonical client host name. When .Xr ssh 1 is authenticating a server, this will be the host name given by the user, the value of the .Xr ssh 1 .Cm HostkeyAlias if it was specified, or the canonical server hostname if the .Xr ssh 1 .Cm CanonicalizeHostname option was used. .Pp A pattern may also be preceded by .Ql \&! to indicate negation: if the host name matches a negated pattern, it is not accepted (by that line) even if it matched another pattern on the line. A hostname or address may optionally be enclosed within .Ql \&[ and .Ql \&] brackets then followed by .Ql \&: and a non-standard port number. .Pp Alternately, hostnames may be stored in a hashed form which hides host names and addresses should the file's contents be disclosed. Hashed hostnames start with a .Ql | character. Only one hashed hostname may appear on a single line and none of the above negation or wildcard operators may be applied. .Pp The keytype and base64-encoded key are taken directly from the host key; they can be obtained, for example, from .Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key.pub . The optional comment field continues to the end of the line, and is not used. .Pp Lines starting with .Ql # and empty lines are ignored as comments. .Pp When performing host authentication, authentication is accepted if any matching line has the proper key; either one that matches exactly or, if the server has presented a certificate for authentication, the key of the certification authority that signed the certificate. For a key to be trusted as a certification authority, it must use the .Dq @cert-authority marker described above. .Pp The known hosts file also provides a facility to mark keys as revoked, for example when it is known that the associated private key has been stolen. Revoked keys are specified by including the .Dq @revoked marker at the beginning of the key line, and are never accepted for authentication or as certification authorities, but instead will produce a warning from .Xr ssh 1 when they are encountered. .Pp It is permissible (but not recommended) to have several lines or different host keys for the same names. This will inevitably happen when short forms of host names from different domains are put in the file. It is possible that the files contain conflicting information; authentication is accepted if valid information can be found from either file. .Pp Note that the lines in these files are typically hundreds of characters long, and you definitely don't want to type in the host keys by hand. Rather, generate them by a script, .Xr ssh-keyscan 1 or by taking, for example, .Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key.pub and adding the host names at the front. .Xr ssh-keygen 1 also offers some basic automated editing for .Pa ~/.ssh/known_hosts including removing hosts matching a host name and converting all host names to their hashed representations. .Pp An example ssh_known_hosts file: .Bd -literal -offset 3n # Comments allowed at start of line cvs.example.net,192.0.2.10 ssh-rsa AAAA1234.....= # A hashed hostname |1|JfKTdBh7rNbXkVAQCRp4OQoPfmI=|USECr3SWf1JUPsms5AqfD5QfxkM= ssh-rsa AAAA1234.....= # A revoked key @revoked * ssh-rsa AAAAB5W... # A CA key, accepted for any host in *.mydomain.com or *.mydomain.org @cert-authority *.mydomain.org,*.mydomain.com ssh-rsa AAAAB5W... .Ed .Sh FILES .Bl -tag -width Ds -compact .It Pa ~/.hushlogin This file is used to suppress printing the last login time and .Pa /etc/motd , if .Cm PrintLastLog and .Cm PrintMotd , respectively, are enabled. It does not suppress printing of the banner specified by .Cm Banner . .Pp .It Pa ~/.rhosts This file is used for host-based authentication (see .Xr ssh 1 for more information). On some machines this file may need to be world-readable if the user's home directory is on an NFS partition, because .Nm reads it as root. Additionally, this file must be owned by the user, and must not have write permissions for anyone else. The recommended permission for most machines is read/write for the user, and not accessible by others. .Pp .It Pa ~/.shosts This file is used in exactly the same way as .Pa .rhosts , but allows host-based authentication without permitting login with rlogin/rsh. .Pp .It Pa ~/.ssh/ This directory is the default location for all user-specific configuration and authentication information. There is no general requirement to keep the entire contents of this directory secret, but the recommended permissions are read/write/execute for the user, and not accessible by others. .Pp .It Pa ~/.ssh/authorized_keys Lists the public keys (DSA, ECDSA, Ed25519, RSA) that can be used for logging in as this user. The format of this file is described above. The content of the file is not highly sensitive, but the recommended permissions are read/write for the user, and not accessible by others. .Pp If this file, the .Pa ~/.ssh directory, or the user's home directory are writable by other users, then the file could be modified or replaced by unauthorized users. In this case, .Nm will not allow it to be used unless the .Cm StrictModes option has been set to .Dq no . .Pp .It Pa ~/.ssh/environment This file is read into the environment at login (if it exists). It can only contain empty lines, comment lines (that start with .Ql # ) , and assignment lines of the form name=value. The file should be writable only by the user; it need not be readable by anyone else. Environment processing is disabled by default and is controlled via the .Cm PermitUserEnvironment option. .Pp .It Pa ~/.ssh/known_hosts Contains a list of host keys for all hosts the user has logged into that are not already in the systemwide list of known host keys. The format of this file is described above. This file should be writable only by root/the owner and can, but need not be, world-readable. .Pp .It Pa ~/.ssh/rc Contains initialization routines to be run before the user's home directory becomes accessible. This file should be writable only by the user, and need not be readable by anyone else. .Pp .It Pa /etc/hosts.allow .It Pa /etc/hosts.deny Access controls that should be enforced by tcp-wrappers are defined here. Further details are described in .Xr hosts_access 5 . .Pp .It Pa /etc/hosts.equiv This file is for host-based authentication (see .Xr ssh 1 ) . It should only be writable by root. .Pp .It Pa /etc/moduli Contains Diffie-Hellman groups used for the "Diffie-Hellman Group Exchange" key exchange method. The file format is described in .Xr moduli 5 . If no usable groups are found in this file then fixed internal groups will be used. .Pp .It Pa /etc/motd See .Xr motd 5 . .Pp .It Pa /etc/nologin If this file exists, .Nm refuses to let anyone except root log in. The contents of the file are displayed to anyone trying to log in, and non-root connections are refused. The file should be world-readable. .Pp .It Pa /etc/shosts.equiv This file is used in exactly the same way as .Pa hosts.equiv , but allows host-based authentication without permitting login with rlogin/rsh. .Pp .It Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ecdsa_key .It Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ed25519_key .It Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key These files contain the private parts of the host keys. These files should only be owned by root, readable only by root, and not accessible to others. Note that .Nm does not start if these files are group/world-accessible. .Pp .It Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ecdsa_key.pub .It Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ed25519_key.pub .It Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key.pub These files contain the public parts of the host keys. These files should be world-readable but writable only by root. Their contents should match the respective private parts. These files are not really used for anything; they are provided for the convenience of the user so their contents can be copied to known hosts files. These files are created using .Xr ssh-keygen 1 . .Pp .It Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_known_hosts Systemwide list of known host keys. This file should be prepared by the system administrator to contain the public host keys of all machines in the organization. The format of this file is described above. This file should be writable only by root/the owner and should be world-readable. .Pp .It Pa /etc/ssh/sshd_config Contains configuration data for .Nm sshd . The file format and configuration options are described in .Xr sshd_config 5 . .Pp .It Pa /etc/ssh/sshrc Similar to .Pa ~/.ssh/rc , it can be used to specify machine-specific login-time initializations globally. This file should be writable only by root, and should be world-readable. .Pp .It Pa /var/empty .Xr chroot 2 directory used by .Nm during privilege separation in the pre-authentication phase. The directory should not contain any files and must be owned by root and not group or world-writable. .Pp .It Pa /var/run/sshd.pid Contains the process ID of the .Nm listening for connections (if there are several daemons running concurrently for different ports, this contains the process ID of the one started last). The content of this file is not sensitive; it can be world-readable. .El .Sh SEE ALSO .Xr scp 1 , .Xr sftp 1 , .Xr ssh 1 , .Xr ssh-add 1 , .Xr ssh-agent 1 , .Xr ssh-keygen 1 , .Xr ssh-keyscan 1 , .Xr chroot 2 , .Xr hosts_access 5 , .Xr login.conf 5 , .Xr moduli 5 , .Xr sshd_config 5 , .Xr inetd 8 , .Xr sftp-server 8 .Sh AUTHORS OpenSSH is a derivative of the original and free ssh 1.2.12 release by Tatu Ylonen. Aaron Campbell, Bob Beck, Markus Friedl, Niels Provos, Theo de Raadt and Dug Song removed many bugs, re-added newer features and created OpenSSH. Markus Friedl contributed the support for SSH protocol versions 1.5 and 2.0. Niels Provos and Markus Friedl contributed support for privilege separation. diff --git a/crypto/openssh/sshd.c b/crypto/openssh/sshd.c index b8ef1664d70d..620a7efe7797 100644 --- a/crypto/openssh/sshd.c +++ b/crypto/openssh/sshd.c @@ -1,2561 +1,2563 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: sshd.c,v 1.596 2023/01/18 01:50:21 millert Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: sshd.c,v 1.600 2023/03/08 04:43:12 guenther Exp $ */ /* * Author: Tatu Ylonen * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen , Espoo, Finland * All rights reserved * This program is the ssh daemon. It listens for connections from clients, * and performs authentication, executes use commands or shell, and forwards * information to/from the application to the user client over an encrypted * connection. This can also handle forwarding of X11, TCP/IP, and * authentication agent connections. * * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell". * * SSH2 implementation: * Privilege Separation: * * Copyright (c) 2000, 2001, 2002 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. * Copyright (c) 2002 Niels Provos. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. */ #include "includes.h" #include #include #include #include #ifdef HAVE_SYS_STAT_H # include #endif #ifdef HAVE_SYS_TIME_H # include #endif #include "openbsd-compat/sys-tree.h" #include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h" #include #include #include #include #ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H #include #endif #include #ifdef HAVE_POLL_H #include #endif #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL #include #include #include #include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h" #endif #ifdef HAVE_SECUREWARE #include #include #endif #ifdef __FreeBSD__ #include #if defined(GSSAPI) && defined(HAVE_GSSAPI_GSSAPI_H) #include #elif defined(GSSAPI) && defined(HAVE_GSSAPI_H) #include #endif #endif #include "xmalloc.h" #include "ssh.h" #include "ssh2.h" #include "sshpty.h" #include "packet.h" #include "log.h" #include "sshbuf.h" #include "misc.h" #include "match.h" #include "servconf.h" #include "uidswap.h" #include "compat.h" #include "cipher.h" #include "digest.h" #include "sshkey.h" #include "kex.h" -#include "myproposal.h" #include "authfile.h" #include "pathnames.h" #include "atomicio.h" #include "canohost.h" #include "hostfile.h" #include "auth.h" #include "authfd.h" #include "msg.h" #include "dispatch.h" #include "channels.h" #include "session.h" #include "monitor.h" #ifdef GSSAPI #include "ssh-gss.h" #endif #include "monitor_wrap.h" #include "ssh-sandbox.h" #include "auth-options.h" #include "version.h" #include "ssherr.h" #include "sk-api.h" #include "srclimit.h" #include "dh.h" #include "blacklist_client.h" #ifdef LIBWRAP #include #include extern int allow_severity; extern int deny_severity; #endif /* LIBWRAP */ /* Re-exec fds */ #define REEXEC_DEVCRYPTO_RESERVED_FD (STDERR_FILENO + 1) #define REEXEC_STARTUP_PIPE_FD (STDERR_FILENO + 2) #define REEXEC_CONFIG_PASS_FD (STDERR_FILENO + 3) #define REEXEC_MIN_FREE_FD (STDERR_FILENO + 4) extern char *__progname; /* Server configuration options. */ ServerOptions options; /* Name of the server configuration file. */ char *config_file_name = _PATH_SERVER_CONFIG_FILE; /* * Debug mode flag. This can be set on the command line. If debug * mode is enabled, extra debugging output will be sent to the system * log, the daemon will not go to background, and will exit after processing * the first connection. */ int debug_flag = 0; /* * Indicating that the daemon should only test the configuration and keys. * If test_flag > 1 ("-T" flag), then sshd will also dump the effective * configuration, optionally using connection information provided by the * "-C" flag. */ static int test_flag = 0; /* Flag indicating that the daemon is being started from inetd. */ static int inetd_flag = 0; /* Flag indicating that sshd should not detach and become a daemon. */ static int no_daemon_flag = 0; /* debug goes to stderr unless inetd_flag is set */ static int log_stderr = 0; /* Saved arguments to main(). */ static char **saved_argv; static int saved_argc; /* re-exec */ static int rexeced_flag = 0; static int rexec_flag = 1; static int rexec_argc = 0; static char **rexec_argv; /* * The sockets that the server is listening; this is used in the SIGHUP * signal handler. */ #define MAX_LISTEN_SOCKS 16 static int listen_socks[MAX_LISTEN_SOCKS]; static int num_listen_socks = 0; /* Daemon's agent connection */ int auth_sock = -1; static int have_agent = 0; /* * Any really sensitive data in the application is contained in this * structure. The idea is that this structure could be locked into memory so * that the pages do not get written into swap. However, there are some * problems. The private key contains BIGNUMs, and we do not (in principle) * have access to the internals of them, and locking just the structure is * not very useful. Currently, memory locking is not implemented. */ struct { struct sshkey **host_keys; /* all private host keys */ struct sshkey **host_pubkeys; /* all public host keys */ struct sshkey **host_certificates; /* all public host certificates */ int have_ssh2_key; } sensitive_data; /* This is set to true when a signal is received. */ static volatile sig_atomic_t received_sighup = 0; static volatile sig_atomic_t received_sigterm = 0; /* record remote hostname or ip */ u_int utmp_len = HOST_NAME_MAX+1; /* * startup_pipes/flags are used for tracking children of the listening sshd * process early in their lifespans. This tracking is needed for three things: * * 1) Implementing the MaxStartups limit of concurrent unauthenticated * connections. * 2) Avoiding a race condition for SIGHUP processing, where child processes * may have listen_socks open that could collide with main listener process * after it restarts. * 3) Ensuring that rexec'd sshd processes have received their initial state * from the parent listen process before handling SIGHUP. * * Child processes signal that they have completed closure of the listen_socks * and (if applicable) received their rexec state by sending a char over their * sock. Child processes signal that authentication has completed by closing * the sock (or by exiting). */ static int *startup_pipes = NULL; static int *startup_flags = NULL; /* Indicates child closed listener */ static int startup_pipe = -1; /* in child */ /* variables used for privilege separation */ int use_privsep = -1; struct monitor *pmonitor = NULL; int privsep_is_preauth = 1; static int privsep_chroot = 1; /* global connection state and authentication contexts */ Authctxt *the_authctxt = NULL; struct ssh *the_active_state; /* global key/cert auth options. XXX move to permanent ssh->authctxt? */ struct sshauthopt *auth_opts = NULL; /* sshd_config buffer */ struct sshbuf *cfg; /* Included files from the configuration file */ struct include_list includes = TAILQ_HEAD_INITIALIZER(includes); /* message to be displayed after login */ struct sshbuf *loginmsg; /* Unprivileged user */ struct passwd *privsep_pw = NULL; /* Prototypes for various functions defined later in this file. */ void destroy_sensitive_data(void); void demote_sensitive_data(void); static void do_ssh2_kex(struct ssh *); static char *listener_proctitle; /* * Close all listening sockets */ static void close_listen_socks(void) { int i; for (i = 0; i < num_listen_socks; i++) close(listen_socks[i]); num_listen_socks = 0; } static void close_startup_pipes(void) { int i; if (startup_pipes) for (i = 0; i < options.max_startups; i++) if (startup_pipes[i] != -1) close(startup_pipes[i]); } /* * Signal handler for SIGHUP. Sshd execs itself when it receives SIGHUP; * the effect is to reread the configuration file (and to regenerate * the server key). */ -/*ARGSUSED*/ static void sighup_handler(int sig) { received_sighup = 1; } /* * Called from the main program after receiving SIGHUP. * Restarts the server. */ static void sighup_restart(void) { logit("Received SIGHUP; restarting."); if (options.pid_file != NULL) unlink(options.pid_file); platform_pre_restart(); close_listen_socks(); close_startup_pipes(); ssh_signal(SIGHUP, SIG_IGN); /* will be restored after exec */ execv(saved_argv[0], saved_argv); logit("RESTART FAILED: av[0]='%.100s', error: %.100s.", saved_argv[0], strerror(errno)); exit(1); } /* * Generic signal handler for terminating signals in the master daemon. */ -/*ARGSUSED*/ static void sigterm_handler(int sig) { received_sigterm = sig; } /* * SIGCHLD handler. This is called whenever a child dies. This will then * reap any zombies left by exited children. */ -/*ARGSUSED*/ static void main_sigchld_handler(int sig) { int save_errno = errno; pid_t pid; int status; while ((pid = waitpid(-1, &status, WNOHANG)) > 0 || (pid == -1 && errno == EINTR)) ; errno = save_errno; } /* * Signal handler for the alarm after the login grace period has expired. */ -/*ARGSUSED*/ static void grace_alarm_handler(int sig) { /* * Try to kill any processes that we have spawned, E.g. authorized * keys command helpers or privsep children. */ if (getpgid(0) == getpid()) { ssh_signal(SIGTERM, SIG_IGN); kill(0, SIGTERM); } BLACKLIST_NOTIFY(the_active_state, BLACKLIST_AUTH_FAIL, "ssh"); /* Log error and exit. */ sigdie("Timeout before authentication for %s port %d", ssh_remote_ipaddr(the_active_state), ssh_remote_port(the_active_state)); } /* Destroy the host and server keys. They will no longer be needed. */ void destroy_sensitive_data(void) { u_int i; for (i = 0; i < options.num_host_key_files; i++) { if (sensitive_data.host_keys[i]) { sshkey_free(sensitive_data.host_keys[i]); sensitive_data.host_keys[i] = NULL; } if (sensitive_data.host_certificates[i]) { sshkey_free(sensitive_data.host_certificates[i]); sensitive_data.host_certificates[i] = NULL; } } } /* Demote private to public keys for network child */ void demote_sensitive_data(void) { struct sshkey *tmp; u_int i; int r; for (i = 0; i < options.num_host_key_files; i++) { if (sensitive_data.host_keys[i]) { if ((r = sshkey_from_private( sensitive_data.host_keys[i], &tmp)) != 0) fatal_r(r, "could not demote host %s key", sshkey_type(sensitive_data.host_keys[i])); sshkey_free(sensitive_data.host_keys[i]); sensitive_data.host_keys[i] = tmp; } /* Certs do not need demotion */ } } static void reseed_prngs(void) { u_int32_t rnd[256]; #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL RAND_poll(); #endif arc4random_stir(); /* noop on recent arc4random() implementations */ arc4random_buf(rnd, sizeof(rnd)); /* let arc4random notice PID change */ #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL RAND_seed(rnd, sizeof(rnd)); /* give libcrypto a chance to notice the PID change */ if ((RAND_bytes((u_char *)rnd, 1)) != 1) fatal("%s: RAND_bytes failed", __func__); #endif explicit_bzero(rnd, sizeof(rnd)); } static void privsep_preauth_child(void) { gid_t gidset[1]; /* Enable challenge-response authentication for privilege separation */ privsep_challenge_enable(); #ifdef GSSAPI /* Cache supported mechanism OIDs for later use */ ssh_gssapi_prepare_supported_oids(); #endif reseed_prngs(); /* Demote the private keys to public keys. */ demote_sensitive_data(); /* Demote the child */ if (privsep_chroot) { /* Change our root directory */ if (chroot(_PATH_PRIVSEP_CHROOT_DIR) == -1) fatal("chroot(\"%s\"): %s", _PATH_PRIVSEP_CHROOT_DIR, strerror(errno)); if (chdir("/") == -1) fatal("chdir(\"/\"): %s", strerror(errno)); /* Drop our privileges */ debug3("privsep user:group %u:%u", (u_int)privsep_pw->pw_uid, (u_int)privsep_pw->pw_gid); gidset[0] = privsep_pw->pw_gid; if (setgroups(1, gidset) == -1) fatal("setgroups: %.100s", strerror(errno)); permanently_set_uid(privsep_pw); } } static int privsep_preauth(struct ssh *ssh) { int status, r; pid_t pid; struct ssh_sandbox *box = NULL; /* Set up unprivileged child process to deal with network data */ pmonitor = monitor_init(); /* Store a pointer to the kex for later rekeying */ pmonitor->m_pkex = &ssh->kex; if (use_privsep == PRIVSEP_ON) box = ssh_sandbox_init(pmonitor); pid = fork(); if (pid == -1) { fatal("fork of unprivileged child failed"); } else if (pid != 0) { debug2("Network child is on pid %ld", (long)pid); pmonitor->m_pid = pid; if (have_agent) { r = ssh_get_authentication_socket(&auth_sock); if (r != 0) { error_r(r, "Could not get agent socket"); have_agent = 0; } } if (box != NULL) ssh_sandbox_parent_preauth(box, pid); monitor_child_preauth(ssh, pmonitor); /* Wait for the child's exit status */ while (waitpid(pid, &status, 0) == -1) { if (errno == EINTR) continue; pmonitor->m_pid = -1; fatal_f("waitpid: %s", strerror(errno)); } privsep_is_preauth = 0; pmonitor->m_pid = -1; if (WIFEXITED(status)) { if (WEXITSTATUS(status) != 0) fatal_f("preauth child exited with status %d", WEXITSTATUS(status)); } else if (WIFSIGNALED(status)) fatal_f("preauth child terminated by signal %d", WTERMSIG(status)); if (box != NULL) ssh_sandbox_parent_finish(box); return 1; } else { /* child */ close(pmonitor->m_sendfd); close(pmonitor->m_log_recvfd); /* Arrange for logging to be sent to the monitor */ set_log_handler(mm_log_handler, pmonitor); privsep_preauth_child(); setproctitle("%s", "[net]"); if (box != NULL) ssh_sandbox_child(box); return 0; } } static void privsep_postauth(struct ssh *ssh, Authctxt *authctxt) { #ifdef DISABLE_FD_PASSING if (1) { #else if (authctxt->pw->pw_uid == 0) { #endif /* File descriptor passing is broken or root login */ use_privsep = 0; goto skip; } /* New socket pair */ monitor_reinit(pmonitor); pmonitor->m_pid = fork(); if (pmonitor->m_pid == -1) fatal("fork of unprivileged child failed"); else if (pmonitor->m_pid != 0) { verbose("User child is on pid %ld", (long)pmonitor->m_pid); sshbuf_reset(loginmsg); monitor_clear_keystate(ssh, pmonitor); monitor_child_postauth(ssh, pmonitor); /* NEVERREACHED */ exit(0); } /* child */ close(pmonitor->m_sendfd); pmonitor->m_sendfd = -1; /* Demote the private keys to public keys. */ demote_sensitive_data(); reseed_prngs(); /* Drop privileges */ do_setusercontext(authctxt->pw); skip: /* It is safe now to apply the key state */ monitor_apply_keystate(ssh, pmonitor); /* * Tell the packet layer that authentication was successful, since * this information is not part of the key state. */ ssh_packet_set_authenticated(ssh); } static void append_hostkey_type(struct sshbuf *b, const char *s) { int r; if (match_pattern_list(s, options.hostkeyalgorithms, 0) != 1) { debug3_f("%s key not permitted by HostkeyAlgorithms", s); return; } if ((r = sshbuf_putf(b, "%s%s", sshbuf_len(b) > 0 ? "," : "", s)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "sshbuf_putf"); } static char * list_hostkey_types(void) { struct sshbuf *b; struct sshkey *key; char *ret; u_int i; if ((b = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed"); for (i = 0; i < options.num_host_key_files; i++) { key = sensitive_data.host_keys[i]; if (key == NULL) key = sensitive_data.host_pubkeys[i]; if (key == NULL) continue; switch (key->type) { case KEY_RSA: /* for RSA we also support SHA2 signatures */ append_hostkey_type(b, "rsa-sha2-512"); append_hostkey_type(b, "rsa-sha2-256"); /* FALLTHROUGH */ case KEY_DSA: case KEY_ECDSA: case KEY_ED25519: case KEY_ECDSA_SK: case KEY_ED25519_SK: case KEY_XMSS: append_hostkey_type(b, sshkey_ssh_name(key)); break; } /* If the private key has a cert peer, then list that too */ key = sensitive_data.host_certificates[i]; if (key == NULL) continue; switch (key->type) { case KEY_RSA_CERT: /* for RSA we also support SHA2 signatures */ append_hostkey_type(b, "rsa-sha2-512-cert-v01@openssh.com"); append_hostkey_type(b, "rsa-sha2-256-cert-v01@openssh.com"); /* FALLTHROUGH */ case KEY_DSA_CERT: case KEY_ECDSA_CERT: case KEY_ED25519_CERT: case KEY_ECDSA_SK_CERT: case KEY_ED25519_SK_CERT: case KEY_XMSS_CERT: append_hostkey_type(b, sshkey_ssh_name(key)); break; } } if ((ret = sshbuf_dup_string(b)) == NULL) fatal_f("sshbuf_dup_string failed"); sshbuf_free(b); debug_f("%s", ret); return ret; } static struct sshkey * get_hostkey_by_type(int type, int nid, int need_private, struct ssh *ssh) { u_int i; struct sshkey *key; for (i = 0; i < options.num_host_key_files; i++) { switch (type) { case KEY_RSA_CERT: case KEY_DSA_CERT: case KEY_ECDSA_CERT: case KEY_ED25519_CERT: case KEY_ECDSA_SK_CERT: case KEY_ED25519_SK_CERT: case KEY_XMSS_CERT: key = sensitive_data.host_certificates[i]; break; default: key = sensitive_data.host_keys[i]; if (key == NULL && !need_private) key = sensitive_data.host_pubkeys[i]; break; } if (key == NULL || key->type != type) continue; switch (type) { case KEY_ECDSA: case KEY_ECDSA_SK: case KEY_ECDSA_CERT: case KEY_ECDSA_SK_CERT: if (key->ecdsa_nid != nid) continue; /* FALLTHROUGH */ default: return need_private ? sensitive_data.host_keys[i] : key; } } return NULL; } struct sshkey * get_hostkey_public_by_type(int type, int nid, struct ssh *ssh) { return get_hostkey_by_type(type, nid, 0, ssh); } struct sshkey * get_hostkey_private_by_type(int type, int nid, struct ssh *ssh) { return get_hostkey_by_type(type, nid, 1, ssh); } struct sshkey * get_hostkey_by_index(int ind) { if (ind < 0 || (u_int)ind >= options.num_host_key_files) return (NULL); return (sensitive_data.host_keys[ind]); } struct sshkey * get_hostkey_public_by_index(int ind, struct ssh *ssh) { if (ind < 0 || (u_int)ind >= options.num_host_key_files) return (NULL); return (sensitive_data.host_pubkeys[ind]); } int get_hostkey_index(struct sshkey *key, int compare, struct ssh *ssh) { u_int i; for (i = 0; i < options.num_host_key_files; i++) { if (sshkey_is_cert(key)) { if (key == sensitive_data.host_certificates[i] || (compare && sensitive_data.host_certificates[i] && sshkey_equal(key, sensitive_data.host_certificates[i]))) return (i); } else { if (key == sensitive_data.host_keys[i] || (compare && sensitive_data.host_keys[i] && sshkey_equal(key, sensitive_data.host_keys[i]))) return (i); if (key == sensitive_data.host_pubkeys[i] || (compare && sensitive_data.host_pubkeys[i] && sshkey_equal(key, sensitive_data.host_pubkeys[i]))) return (i); } } return (-1); } /* Inform the client of all hostkeys */ static void notify_hostkeys(struct ssh *ssh) { struct sshbuf *buf; struct sshkey *key; u_int i, nkeys; int r; char *fp; /* Some clients cannot cope with the hostkeys message, skip those. */ if (ssh->compat & SSH_BUG_HOSTKEYS) return; if ((buf = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) fatal_f("sshbuf_new"); for (i = nkeys = 0; i < options.num_host_key_files; i++) { key = get_hostkey_public_by_index(i, ssh); if (key == NULL || key->type == KEY_UNSPEC || sshkey_is_cert(key)) continue; fp = sshkey_fingerprint(key, options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_DEFAULT); debug3_f("key %d: %s %s", i, sshkey_ssh_name(key), fp); free(fp); if (nkeys == 0) { /* * Start building the request when we find the * first usable key. */ if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_GLOBAL_REQUEST)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, "hostkeys-00@openssh.com")) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_u8(ssh, 0)) != 0) /* want reply */ sshpkt_fatal(ssh, r, "%s: start request", __func__); } /* Append the key to the request */ sshbuf_reset(buf); if ((r = sshkey_putb(key, buf)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "couldn't put hostkey %d", i); if ((r = sshpkt_put_stringb(ssh, buf)) != 0) sshpkt_fatal(ssh, r, "%s: append key", __func__); nkeys++; } debug3_f("sent %u hostkeys", nkeys); if (nkeys == 0) fatal_f("no hostkeys"); if ((r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) sshpkt_fatal(ssh, r, "%s: send", __func__); sshbuf_free(buf); } /* * returns 1 if connection should be dropped, 0 otherwise. * dropping starts at connection #max_startups_begin with a probability * of (max_startups_rate/100). the probability increases linearly until * all connections are dropped for startups > max_startups */ static int should_drop_connection(int startups) { int p, r; if (startups < options.max_startups_begin) return 0; if (startups >= options.max_startups) return 1; if (options.max_startups_rate == 100) return 1; p = 100 - options.max_startups_rate; p *= startups - options.max_startups_begin; p /= options.max_startups - options.max_startups_begin; p += options.max_startups_rate; r = arc4random_uniform(100); debug_f("p %d, r %d", p, r); return (r < p) ? 1 : 0; } /* * Check whether connection should be accepted by MaxStartups. * Returns 0 if the connection is accepted. If the connection is refused, * returns 1 and attempts to send notification to client. * Logs when the MaxStartups condition is entered or exited, and periodically * while in that state. */ static int drop_connection(int sock, int startups, int notify_pipe) { char *laddr, *raddr; const char msg[] = "Exceeded MaxStartups\r\n"; static time_t last_drop, first_drop; static u_int ndropped; LogLevel drop_level = SYSLOG_LEVEL_VERBOSE; time_t now; now = monotime(); if (!should_drop_connection(startups) && srclimit_check_allow(sock, notify_pipe) == 1) { if (last_drop != 0 && startups < options.max_startups_begin - 1) { /* XXX maybe need better hysteresis here */ logit("exited MaxStartups throttling after %s, " "%u connections dropped", fmt_timeframe(now - first_drop), ndropped); last_drop = 0; } return 0; } #define SSHD_MAXSTARTUPS_LOG_INTERVAL (5 * 60) if (last_drop == 0) { error("beginning MaxStartups throttling"); drop_level = SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO; first_drop = now; ndropped = 0; } else if (last_drop + SSHD_MAXSTARTUPS_LOG_INTERVAL < now) { /* Periodic logs */ error("in MaxStartups throttling for %s, " "%u connections dropped", fmt_timeframe(now - first_drop), ndropped + 1); drop_level = SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO; } last_drop = now; ndropped++; laddr = get_local_ipaddr(sock); raddr = get_peer_ipaddr(sock); do_log2(drop_level, "drop connection #%d from [%s]:%d on [%s]:%d " "past MaxStartups", startups, raddr, get_peer_port(sock), laddr, get_local_port(sock)); free(laddr); free(raddr); /* best-effort notification to client */ (void)write(sock, msg, sizeof(msg) - 1); return 1; } static void usage(void) { if (options.version_addendum != NULL && *options.version_addendum != '\0') fprintf(stderr, "%s %s, %s\n", SSH_RELEASE, options.version_addendum, SSH_OPENSSL_VERSION); else fprintf(stderr, "%s, %s\n", SSH_RELEASE, SSH_OPENSSL_VERSION); fprintf(stderr, -"usage: sshd [-46DdeiqTtV] [-C connection_spec] [-c host_cert_file]\n" +"usage: sshd [-46DdeGiqTtV] [-C connection_spec] [-c host_cert_file]\n" " [-E log_file] [-f config_file] [-g login_grace_time]\n" " [-h host_key_file] [-o option] [-p port] [-u len]\n" ); exit(1); } static void send_rexec_state(int fd, struct sshbuf *conf) { struct sshbuf *m = NULL, *inc = NULL; struct include_item *item = NULL; int r; debug3_f("entering fd = %d config len %zu", fd, sshbuf_len(conf)); if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL || (inc = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed"); /* pack includes into a string */ TAILQ_FOREACH(item, &includes, entry) { if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(inc, item->selector)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(inc, item->filename)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_stringb(inc, item->contents)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "compose includes"); } /* * Protocol from reexec master to child: * string configuration * string included_files[] { * string selector * string filename * string contents * } */ if ((r = sshbuf_put_stringb(m, conf)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_stringb(m, inc)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "compose config"); if (ssh_msg_send(fd, 0, m) == -1) error_f("ssh_msg_send failed"); sshbuf_free(m); sshbuf_free(inc); debug3_f("done"); } static void recv_rexec_state(int fd, struct sshbuf *conf) { struct sshbuf *m, *inc; u_char *cp, ver; size_t len; int r; struct include_item *item; debug3_f("entering fd = %d", fd); if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL || (inc = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed"); if (ssh_msg_recv(fd, m) == -1) fatal_f("ssh_msg_recv failed"); if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(m, &ver)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "parse version"); if (ver != 0) fatal_f("rexec version mismatch"); if ((r = sshbuf_get_string(m, &cp, &len)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_stringb(m, inc)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "parse config"); if (conf != NULL && (r = sshbuf_put(conf, cp, len))) fatal_fr(r, "sshbuf_put"); while (sshbuf_len(inc) != 0) { item = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*item)); if ((item->contents = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed"); if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(inc, &item->selector, NULL)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(inc, &item->filename, NULL)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_stringb(inc, item->contents)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "parse includes"); TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(&includes, item, entry); } free(cp); sshbuf_free(m); debug3_f("done"); } /* Accept a connection from inetd */ static void server_accept_inetd(int *sock_in, int *sock_out) { if (rexeced_flag) { close(REEXEC_CONFIG_PASS_FD); *sock_in = *sock_out = dup(STDIN_FILENO); } else { *sock_in = dup(STDIN_FILENO); *sock_out = dup(STDOUT_FILENO); } /* * We intentionally do not close the descriptors 0, 1, and 2 * as our code for setting the descriptors won't work if * ttyfd happens to be one of those. */ if (stdfd_devnull(1, 1, !log_stderr) == -1) error_f("stdfd_devnull failed"); debug("inetd sockets after dupping: %d, %d", *sock_in, *sock_out); } /* * Listen for TCP connections */ static void listen_on_addrs(struct listenaddr *la) { int ret, listen_sock; struct addrinfo *ai; char ntop[NI_MAXHOST], strport[NI_MAXSERV]; for (ai = la->addrs; ai; ai = ai->ai_next) { if (ai->ai_family != AF_INET && ai->ai_family != AF_INET6) continue; if (num_listen_socks >= MAX_LISTEN_SOCKS) fatal("Too many listen sockets. " "Enlarge MAX_LISTEN_SOCKS"); if ((ret = getnameinfo(ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen, ntop, sizeof(ntop), strport, sizeof(strport), NI_NUMERICHOST|NI_NUMERICSERV)) != 0) { error("getnameinfo failed: %.100s", ssh_gai_strerror(ret)); continue; } /* Create socket for listening. */ listen_sock = socket(ai->ai_family, ai->ai_socktype, ai->ai_protocol); if (listen_sock == -1) { /* kernel may not support ipv6 */ verbose("socket: %.100s", strerror(errno)); continue; } if (set_nonblock(listen_sock) == -1) { close(listen_sock); continue; } if (fcntl(listen_sock, F_SETFD, FD_CLOEXEC) == -1) { verbose("socket: CLOEXEC: %s", strerror(errno)); close(listen_sock); continue; } /* Socket options */ set_reuseaddr(listen_sock); if (la->rdomain != NULL && set_rdomain(listen_sock, la->rdomain) == -1) { close(listen_sock); continue; } /* Only communicate in IPv6 over AF_INET6 sockets. */ if (ai->ai_family == AF_INET6) sock_set_v6only(listen_sock); debug("Bind to port %s on %s.", strport, ntop); /* Bind the socket to the desired port. */ if (bind(listen_sock, ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen) == -1) { error("Bind to port %s on %s failed: %.200s.", strport, ntop, strerror(errno)); close(listen_sock); continue; } listen_socks[num_listen_socks] = listen_sock; num_listen_socks++; /* Start listening on the port. */ if (listen(listen_sock, SSH_LISTEN_BACKLOG) == -1) fatal("listen on [%s]:%s: %.100s", ntop, strport, strerror(errno)); logit("Server listening on %s port %s%s%s.", ntop, strport, la->rdomain == NULL ? "" : " rdomain ", la->rdomain == NULL ? "" : la->rdomain); } } static void server_listen(void) { u_int i; /* Initialise per-source limit tracking. */ srclimit_init(options.max_startups, options.per_source_max_startups, options.per_source_masklen_ipv4, options.per_source_masklen_ipv6); for (i = 0; i < options.num_listen_addrs; i++) { listen_on_addrs(&options.listen_addrs[i]); freeaddrinfo(options.listen_addrs[i].addrs); free(options.listen_addrs[i].rdomain); memset(&options.listen_addrs[i], 0, sizeof(options.listen_addrs[i])); } free(options.listen_addrs); options.listen_addrs = NULL; options.num_listen_addrs = 0; if (!num_listen_socks) fatal("Cannot bind any address."); } /* * The main TCP accept loop. Note that, for the non-debug case, returns * from this function are in a forked subprocess. */ static void server_accept_loop(int *sock_in, int *sock_out, int *newsock, int *config_s) { struct pollfd *pfd = NULL; int i, j, ret, npfd; int ostartups = -1, startups = 0, listening = 0, lameduck = 0; int startup_p[2] = { -1 , -1 }, *startup_pollfd; char c = 0; struct sockaddr_storage from; socklen_t fromlen; pid_t pid; u_char rnd[256]; sigset_t nsigset, osigset; #ifdef LIBWRAP struct request_info req; request_init(&req, RQ_DAEMON, __progname, 0); #endif /* pipes connected to unauthenticated child sshd processes */ startup_pipes = xcalloc(options.max_startups, sizeof(int)); startup_flags = xcalloc(options.max_startups, sizeof(int)); startup_pollfd = xcalloc(options.max_startups, sizeof(int)); for (i = 0; i < options.max_startups; i++) startup_pipes[i] = -1; /* * Prepare signal mask that we use to block signals that might set * received_sigterm or received_sighup, so that we are guaranteed * to immediately wake up the ppoll if a signal is received after * the flag is checked. */ sigemptyset(&nsigset); sigaddset(&nsigset, SIGHUP); sigaddset(&nsigset, SIGCHLD); sigaddset(&nsigset, SIGTERM); sigaddset(&nsigset, SIGQUIT); /* sized for worst-case */ pfd = xcalloc(num_listen_socks + options.max_startups, sizeof(struct pollfd)); /* * Stay listening for connections until the system crashes or * the daemon is killed with a signal. */ for (;;) { sigprocmask(SIG_BLOCK, &nsigset, &osigset); if (received_sigterm) { logit("Received signal %d; terminating.", (int) received_sigterm); close_listen_socks(); if (options.pid_file != NULL) unlink(options.pid_file); exit(received_sigterm == SIGTERM ? 0 : 255); } if (ostartups != startups) { setproctitle("%s [listener] %d of %d-%d startups", listener_proctitle, startups, options.max_startups_begin, options.max_startups); ostartups = startups; } if (received_sighup) { if (!lameduck) { debug("Received SIGHUP; waiting for children"); close_listen_socks(); lameduck = 1; } if (listening <= 0) { sigprocmask(SIG_SETMASK, &osigset, NULL); sighup_restart(); } } for (i = 0; i < num_listen_socks; i++) { pfd[i].fd = listen_socks[i]; pfd[i].events = POLLIN; } npfd = num_listen_socks; for (i = 0; i < options.max_startups; i++) { startup_pollfd[i] = -1; if (startup_pipes[i] != -1) { pfd[npfd].fd = startup_pipes[i]; pfd[npfd].events = POLLIN; startup_pollfd[i] = npfd++; } } /* Wait until a connection arrives or a child exits. */ ret = ppoll(pfd, npfd, NULL, &osigset); if (ret == -1 && errno != EINTR) { error("ppoll: %.100s", strerror(errno)); if (errno == EINVAL) cleanup_exit(1); /* can't recover */ } sigprocmask(SIG_SETMASK, &osigset, NULL); if (ret == -1) continue; for (i = 0; i < options.max_startups; i++) { if (startup_pipes[i] == -1 || startup_pollfd[i] == -1 || !(pfd[startup_pollfd[i]].revents & (POLLIN|POLLHUP))) continue; switch (read(startup_pipes[i], &c, sizeof(c))) { case -1: if (errno == EINTR || errno == EAGAIN) continue; if (errno != EPIPE) { error_f("startup pipe %d (fd=%d): " "read %s", i, startup_pipes[i], strerror(errno)); } /* FALLTHROUGH */ case 0: /* child exited or completed auth */ close(startup_pipes[i]); srclimit_done(startup_pipes[i]); startup_pipes[i] = -1; startups--; if (startup_flags[i]) listening--; break; case 1: /* child has finished preliminaries */ if (startup_flags[i]) { listening--; startup_flags[i] = 0; } break; } } for (i = 0; i < num_listen_socks; i++) { if (!(pfd[i].revents & POLLIN)) continue; fromlen = sizeof(from); *newsock = accept(listen_socks[i], (struct sockaddr *)&from, &fromlen); if (*newsock == -1) { if (errno != EINTR && errno != EWOULDBLOCK && errno != ECONNABORTED && errno != EAGAIN) error("accept: %.100s", strerror(errno)); if (errno == EMFILE || errno == ENFILE) usleep(100 * 1000); continue; } #ifdef LIBWRAP /* Check whether logins are denied from this host. */ request_set(&req, RQ_FILE, *newsock, RQ_CLIENT_NAME, "", RQ_CLIENT_ADDR, "", 0); sock_host(&req); if (!hosts_access(&req)) { const struct linger l = { .l_onoff = 1, .l_linger = 0 }; (void )setsockopt(*newsock, SOL_SOCKET, SO_LINGER, &l, sizeof(l)); (void )close(*newsock); /* * Mimic message from libwrap's refuse() * exactly. sshguard, and supposedly lots * of custom made scripts rely on it. */ syslog(deny_severity, "refused connect from %s (%s)", eval_client(&req), eval_hostaddr(req.client)); debug("Connection refused by tcp wrapper"); continue; } #endif /* LIBWRAP */ if (unset_nonblock(*newsock) == -1) { close(*newsock); continue; } if (pipe(startup_p) == -1) { error_f("pipe(startup_p): %s", strerror(errno)); close(*newsock); continue; } if (drop_connection(*newsock, startups, startup_p[0])) { close(*newsock); close(startup_p[0]); close(startup_p[1]); continue; } if (rexec_flag && socketpair(AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0, config_s) == -1) { error("reexec socketpair: %s", strerror(errno)); close(*newsock); close(startup_p[0]); close(startup_p[1]); continue; } for (j = 0; j < options.max_startups; j++) if (startup_pipes[j] == -1) { startup_pipes[j] = startup_p[0]; startups++; startup_flags[j] = 1; break; } /* * Got connection. Fork a child to handle it, unless * we are in debugging mode. */ if (debug_flag) { /* * In debugging mode. Close the listening * socket, and start processing the * connection without forking. */ debug("Server will not fork when running in debugging mode."); close_listen_socks(); *sock_in = *newsock; *sock_out = *newsock; close(startup_p[0]); close(startup_p[1]); startup_pipe = -1; pid = getpid(); if (rexec_flag) { send_rexec_state(config_s[0], cfg); close(config_s[0]); } free(pfd); return; } /* * Normal production daemon. Fork, and have * the child process the connection. The * parent continues listening. */ platform_pre_fork(); listening++; if ((pid = fork()) == 0) { /* * Child. Close the listening and * max_startup sockets. Start using * the accepted socket. Reinitialize * logging (since our pid has changed). * We return from this function to handle * the connection. */ platform_post_fork_child(); startup_pipe = startup_p[1]; close_startup_pipes(); close_listen_socks(); *sock_in = *newsock; *sock_out = *newsock; log_init(__progname, options.log_level, options.log_facility, log_stderr); if (rexec_flag) close(config_s[0]); else { /* * Signal parent that the preliminaries * for this child are complete. For the * re-exec case, this happens after the * child has received the rexec state * from the server. */ (void)atomicio(vwrite, startup_pipe, "\0", 1); } free(pfd); return; } /* Parent. Stay in the loop. */ platform_post_fork_parent(pid); if (pid == -1) error("fork: %.100s", strerror(errno)); else debug("Forked child %ld.", (long)pid); close(startup_p[1]); if (rexec_flag) { close(config_s[1]); send_rexec_state(config_s[0], cfg); close(config_s[0]); } close(*newsock); /* * Ensure that our random state differs * from that of the child */ arc4random_stir(); arc4random_buf(rnd, sizeof(rnd)); #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL RAND_seed(rnd, sizeof(rnd)); if ((RAND_bytes((u_char *)rnd, 1)) != 1) fatal("%s: RAND_bytes failed", __func__); #endif explicit_bzero(rnd, sizeof(rnd)); } } } /* * If IP options are supported, make sure there are none (log and * return an error if any are found). Basically we are worried about * source routing; it can be used to pretend you are somebody * (ip-address) you are not. That itself may be "almost acceptable" * under certain circumstances, but rhosts authentication is useless * if source routing is accepted. Notice also that if we just dropped * source routing here, the other side could use IP spoofing to do * rest of the interaction and could still bypass security. So we * exit here if we detect any IP options. */ static void check_ip_options(struct ssh *ssh) { #ifdef IP_OPTIONS int sock_in = ssh_packet_get_connection_in(ssh); struct sockaddr_storage from; u_char opts[200]; socklen_t i, option_size = sizeof(opts), fromlen = sizeof(from); char text[sizeof(opts) * 3 + 1]; memset(&from, 0, sizeof(from)); if (getpeername(sock_in, (struct sockaddr *)&from, &fromlen) == -1) return; if (from.ss_family != AF_INET) return; /* XXX IPv6 options? */ if (getsockopt(sock_in, IPPROTO_IP, IP_OPTIONS, opts, &option_size) >= 0 && option_size != 0) { text[0] = '\0'; for (i = 0; i < option_size; i++) snprintf(text + i*3, sizeof(text) - i*3, " %2.2x", opts[i]); fatal("Connection from %.100s port %d with IP opts: %.800s", ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), ssh_remote_port(ssh), text); } return; #endif /* IP_OPTIONS */ } /* Set the routing domain for this process */ static void set_process_rdomain(struct ssh *ssh, const char *name) { #if defined(HAVE_SYS_SET_PROCESS_RDOMAIN) if (name == NULL) return; /* default */ if (strcmp(name, "%D") == 0) { /* "expands" to routing domain of connection */ if ((name = ssh_packet_rdomain_in(ssh)) == NULL) return; } /* NB. We don't pass 'ssh' to sys_set_process_rdomain() */ return sys_set_process_rdomain(name); #elif defined(__OpenBSD__) int rtable, ortable = getrtable(); const char *errstr; if (name == NULL) return; /* default */ if (strcmp(name, "%D") == 0) { /* "expands" to routing domain of connection */ if ((name = ssh_packet_rdomain_in(ssh)) == NULL) return; } rtable = (int)strtonum(name, 0, 255, &errstr); if (errstr != NULL) /* Shouldn't happen */ fatal("Invalid routing domain \"%s\": %s", name, errstr); if (rtable != ortable && setrtable(rtable) != 0) fatal("Unable to set routing domain %d: %s", rtable, strerror(errno)); debug_f("set routing domain %d (was %d)", rtable, ortable); #else /* defined(__OpenBSD__) */ fatal("Unable to set routing domain: not supported in this platform"); #endif } static void accumulate_host_timing_secret(struct sshbuf *server_cfg, struct sshkey *key) { static struct ssh_digest_ctx *ctx; u_char *hash; size_t len; struct sshbuf *buf; int r; if (ctx == NULL && (ctx = ssh_digest_start(SSH_DIGEST_SHA512)) == NULL) fatal_f("ssh_digest_start"); if (key == NULL) { /* finalize */ /* add server config in case we are using agent for host keys */ if (ssh_digest_update(ctx, sshbuf_ptr(server_cfg), sshbuf_len(server_cfg)) != 0) fatal_f("ssh_digest_update"); len = ssh_digest_bytes(SSH_DIGEST_SHA512); hash = xmalloc(len); if (ssh_digest_final(ctx, hash, len) != 0) fatal_f("ssh_digest_final"); options.timing_secret = PEEK_U64(hash); freezero(hash, len); ssh_digest_free(ctx); ctx = NULL; return; } if ((buf = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) fatal_f("could not allocate buffer"); if ((r = sshkey_private_serialize(key, buf)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "encode %s key", sshkey_ssh_name(key)); if (ssh_digest_update(ctx, sshbuf_ptr(buf), sshbuf_len(buf)) != 0) fatal_f("ssh_digest_update"); sshbuf_reset(buf); sshbuf_free(buf); } static char * prepare_proctitle(int ac, char **av) { char *ret = NULL; int i; for (i = 0; i < ac; i++) xextendf(&ret, " ", "%s", av[i]); return ret; } +static void +print_config(struct ssh *ssh, struct connection_info *connection_info) +{ + /* + * If no connection info was provided by -C then use + * use a blank one that will cause no predicate to match. + */ + if (connection_info == NULL) + connection_info = get_connection_info(ssh, 0, 0); + connection_info->test = 1; + parse_server_match_config(&options, &includes, connection_info); + dump_config(&options); + exit(0); +} + /* * Main program for the daemon. */ int main(int ac, char **av) { struct ssh *ssh = NULL; extern char *optarg; extern int optind; - int r, opt, on = 1, already_daemon, remote_port; + int r, opt, on = 1, do_dump_cfg = 0, already_daemon, remote_port; int sock_in = -1, sock_out = -1, newsock = -1; const char *remote_ip, *rdomain; char *fp, *line, *laddr, *logfile = NULL; int config_s[2] = { -1 , -1 }; u_int i, j; u_int64_t ibytes, obytes; mode_t new_umask; struct sshkey *key; struct sshkey *pubkey; int keytype; Authctxt *authctxt; struct connection_info *connection_info = NULL; sigset_t sigmask; #ifdef HAVE_SECUREWARE (void)set_auth_parameters(ac, av); #endif __progname = ssh_get_progname(av[0]); sigemptyset(&sigmask); sigprocmask(SIG_SETMASK, &sigmask, NULL); /* Save argv. Duplicate so setproctitle emulation doesn't clobber it */ saved_argc = ac; rexec_argc = ac; saved_argv = xcalloc(ac + 1, sizeof(*saved_argv)); for (i = 0; (int)i < ac; i++) saved_argv[i] = xstrdup(av[i]); saved_argv[i] = NULL; #ifndef HAVE_SETPROCTITLE /* Prepare for later setproctitle emulation */ compat_init_setproctitle(ac, av); av = saved_argv; #endif if (geteuid() == 0 && setgroups(0, NULL) == -1) debug("setgroups(): %.200s", strerror(errno)); /* Ensure that fds 0, 1 and 2 are open or directed to /dev/null */ sanitise_stdfd(); /* Initialize configuration options to their default values. */ initialize_server_options(&options); /* Parse command-line arguments. */ while ((opt = getopt(ac, av, - "C:E:b:c:f:g:h:k:o:p:u:46DQRTdeiqrtV")) != -1) { + "C:E:b:c:f:g:h:k:o:p:u:46DGQRTdeiqrtV")) != -1) { switch (opt) { case '4': options.address_family = AF_INET; break; case '6': options.address_family = AF_INET6; break; case 'f': config_file_name = optarg; break; case 'c': servconf_add_hostcert("[command-line]", 0, &options, optarg); break; case 'd': if (debug_flag == 0) { debug_flag = 1; options.log_level = SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG1; } else if (options.log_level < SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG3) options.log_level++; break; case 'D': no_daemon_flag = 1; break; + case 'G': + do_dump_cfg = 1; + break; case 'E': logfile = optarg; /* FALLTHROUGH */ case 'e': log_stderr = 1; break; case 'i': inetd_flag = 1; break; case 'r': rexec_flag = 0; break; case 'R': rexeced_flag = 1; inetd_flag = 1; break; case 'Q': /* ignored */ break; case 'q': options.log_level = SYSLOG_LEVEL_QUIET; break; case 'b': /* protocol 1, ignored */ break; case 'p': options.ports_from_cmdline = 1; if (options.num_ports >= MAX_PORTS) { fprintf(stderr, "too many ports.\n"); exit(1); } options.ports[options.num_ports++] = a2port(optarg); if (options.ports[options.num_ports-1] <= 0) { fprintf(stderr, "Bad port number.\n"); exit(1); } break; case 'g': if ((options.login_grace_time = convtime(optarg)) == -1) { fprintf(stderr, "Invalid login grace time.\n"); exit(1); } break; case 'k': /* protocol 1, ignored */ break; case 'h': servconf_add_hostkey("[command-line]", 0, &options, optarg, 1); break; case 't': test_flag = 1; break; case 'T': test_flag = 2; break; case 'C': connection_info = get_connection_info(ssh, 0, 0); if (parse_server_match_testspec(connection_info, optarg) == -1) exit(1); break; case 'u': utmp_len = (u_int)strtonum(optarg, 0, HOST_NAME_MAX+1+1, NULL); if (utmp_len > HOST_NAME_MAX+1) { fprintf(stderr, "Invalid utmp length.\n"); exit(1); } break; case 'o': line = xstrdup(optarg); if (process_server_config_line(&options, line, "command-line", 0, NULL, NULL, &includes) != 0) exit(1); free(line); break; case 'V': fprintf(stderr, "%s, %s\n", SSH_VERSION, SSH_OPENSSL_VERSION); exit(0); default: usage(); break; } } if (rexeced_flag || inetd_flag) rexec_flag = 0; - if (!test_flag && rexec_flag && !path_absolute(av[0])) + if (!test_flag && !do_dump_cfg && rexec_flag && !path_absolute(av[0])) fatal("sshd re-exec requires execution with an absolute path"); if (rexeced_flag) closefrom(REEXEC_MIN_FREE_FD); else closefrom(REEXEC_DEVCRYPTO_RESERVED_FD); seed_rng(); /* If requested, redirect the logs to the specified logfile. */ if (logfile != NULL) log_redirect_stderr_to(logfile); /* * Force logging to stderr until we have loaded the private host * key (unless started from inetd) */ log_init(__progname, options.log_level == SYSLOG_LEVEL_NOT_SET ? SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO : options.log_level, options.log_facility == SYSLOG_FACILITY_NOT_SET ? SYSLOG_FACILITY_AUTH : options.log_facility, log_stderr || !inetd_flag || debug_flag); /* * Unset KRB5CCNAME, otherwise the user's session may inherit it from * root's environment */ if (getenv("KRB5CCNAME") != NULL) (void) unsetenv("KRB5CCNAME"); sensitive_data.have_ssh2_key = 0; /* * If we're not doing an extended test do not silently ignore connection * test params. */ if (test_flag < 2 && connection_info != NULL) fatal("Config test connection parameter (-C) provided without " "test mode (-T)"); /* Fetch our configuration */ if ((cfg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed"); if (rexeced_flag) { setproctitle("%s", "[rexeced]"); recv_rexec_state(REEXEC_CONFIG_PASS_FD, cfg); if (!debug_flag) { startup_pipe = dup(REEXEC_STARTUP_PIPE_FD); close(REEXEC_STARTUP_PIPE_FD); /* * Signal parent that this child is at a point where * they can go away if they have a SIGHUP pending. */ (void)atomicio(vwrite, startup_pipe, "\0", 1); } } else if (strcasecmp(config_file_name, "none") != 0) load_server_config(config_file_name, cfg); parse_server_config(&options, rexeced_flag ? "rexec" : config_file_name, cfg, &includes, NULL, rexeced_flag); #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL if (options.moduli_file != NULL) dh_set_moduli_file(options.moduli_file); #endif /* Fill in default values for those options not explicitly set. */ fill_default_server_options(&options); /* Check that options are sensible */ if (options.authorized_keys_command_user == NULL && (options.authorized_keys_command != NULL && strcasecmp(options.authorized_keys_command, "none") != 0)) fatal("AuthorizedKeysCommand set without " "AuthorizedKeysCommandUser"); if (options.authorized_principals_command_user == NULL && (options.authorized_principals_command != NULL && strcasecmp(options.authorized_principals_command, "none") != 0)) fatal("AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand set without " "AuthorizedPrincipalsCommandUser"); /* * Check whether there is any path through configured auth methods. * Unfortunately it is not possible to verify this generally before * daemonisation in the presence of Match block, but this catches * and warns for trivial misconfigurations that could break login. */ if (options.num_auth_methods != 0) { for (i = 0; i < options.num_auth_methods; i++) { if (auth2_methods_valid(options.auth_methods[i], 1) == 0) break; } if (i >= options.num_auth_methods) fatal("AuthenticationMethods cannot be satisfied by " "enabled authentication methods"); } /* Check that there are no remaining arguments. */ if (optind < ac) { fprintf(stderr, "Extra argument %s.\n", av[optind]); exit(1); } debug("sshd version %s, %s", SSH_VERSION, SSH_OPENSSL_VERSION); + if (do_dump_cfg) + print_config(ssh, connection_info); + /* Store privilege separation user for later use if required. */ privsep_chroot = use_privsep && (getuid() == 0 || geteuid() == 0); if ((privsep_pw = getpwnam(SSH_PRIVSEP_USER)) == NULL) { if (privsep_chroot || options.kerberos_authentication) fatal("Privilege separation user %s does not exist", SSH_PRIVSEP_USER); } else { privsep_pw = pwcopy(privsep_pw); freezero(privsep_pw->pw_passwd, strlen(privsep_pw->pw_passwd)); privsep_pw->pw_passwd = xstrdup("*"); } endpwent(); /* load host keys */ sensitive_data.host_keys = xcalloc(options.num_host_key_files, sizeof(struct sshkey *)); sensitive_data.host_pubkeys = xcalloc(options.num_host_key_files, sizeof(struct sshkey *)); if (options.host_key_agent) { if (strcmp(options.host_key_agent, SSH_AUTHSOCKET_ENV_NAME)) setenv(SSH_AUTHSOCKET_ENV_NAME, options.host_key_agent, 1); if ((r = ssh_get_authentication_socket(NULL)) == 0) have_agent = 1; else error_r(r, "Could not connect to agent \"%s\"", options.host_key_agent); } for (i = 0; i < options.num_host_key_files; i++) { int ll = options.host_key_file_userprovided[i] ? SYSLOG_LEVEL_ERROR : SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG1; if (options.host_key_files[i] == NULL) continue; if ((r = sshkey_load_private(options.host_key_files[i], "", &key, NULL)) != 0 && r != SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR) do_log2_r(r, ll, "Unable to load host key \"%s\"", options.host_key_files[i]); if (sshkey_is_sk(key) && key->sk_flags & SSH_SK_USER_PRESENCE_REQD) { debug("host key %s requires user presence, ignoring", options.host_key_files[i]); key->sk_flags &= ~SSH_SK_USER_PRESENCE_REQD; } if (r == 0 && key != NULL && (r = sshkey_shield_private(key)) != 0) { do_log2_r(r, ll, "Unable to shield host key \"%s\"", options.host_key_files[i]); sshkey_free(key); key = NULL; } if ((r = sshkey_load_public(options.host_key_files[i], &pubkey, NULL)) != 0 && r != SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR) do_log2_r(r, ll, "Unable to load host key \"%s\"", options.host_key_files[i]); if (pubkey != NULL && key != NULL) { if (!sshkey_equal(pubkey, key)) { error("Public key for %s does not match " "private key", options.host_key_files[i]); sshkey_free(pubkey); pubkey = NULL; } } if (pubkey == NULL && key != NULL) { if ((r = sshkey_from_private(key, &pubkey)) != 0) fatal_r(r, "Could not demote key: \"%s\"", options.host_key_files[i]); } if (pubkey != NULL && (r = sshkey_check_rsa_length(pubkey, options.required_rsa_size)) != 0) { error_fr(r, "Host key %s", options.host_key_files[i]); sshkey_free(pubkey); sshkey_free(key); continue; } sensitive_data.host_keys[i] = key; sensitive_data.host_pubkeys[i] = pubkey; if (key == NULL && pubkey != NULL && have_agent) { debug("will rely on agent for hostkey %s", options.host_key_files[i]); keytype = pubkey->type; } else if (key != NULL) { keytype = key->type; accumulate_host_timing_secret(cfg, key); } else { do_log2(ll, "Unable to load host key: %s", options.host_key_files[i]); sensitive_data.host_keys[i] = NULL; sensitive_data.host_pubkeys[i] = NULL; continue; } switch (keytype) { case KEY_RSA: case KEY_DSA: case KEY_ECDSA: case KEY_ED25519: case KEY_ECDSA_SK: case KEY_ED25519_SK: case KEY_XMSS: if (have_agent || key != NULL) sensitive_data.have_ssh2_key = 1; break; } if ((fp = sshkey_fingerprint(pubkey, options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL) fatal("sshkey_fingerprint failed"); debug("%s host key #%d: %s %s", key ? "private" : "agent", i, sshkey_ssh_name(pubkey), fp); free(fp); } accumulate_host_timing_secret(cfg, NULL); if (!sensitive_data.have_ssh2_key) { logit("sshd: no hostkeys available -- exiting."); exit(1); } /* * Load certificates. They are stored in an array at identical * indices to the public keys that they relate to. */ sensitive_data.host_certificates = xcalloc(options.num_host_key_files, sizeof(struct sshkey *)); for (i = 0; i < options.num_host_key_files; i++) sensitive_data.host_certificates[i] = NULL; for (i = 0; i < options.num_host_cert_files; i++) { if (options.host_cert_files[i] == NULL) continue; if ((r = sshkey_load_public(options.host_cert_files[i], &key, NULL)) != 0) { error_r(r, "Could not load host certificate \"%s\"", options.host_cert_files[i]); continue; } if (!sshkey_is_cert(key)) { error("Certificate file is not a certificate: %s", options.host_cert_files[i]); sshkey_free(key); continue; } /* Find matching private key */ for (j = 0; j < options.num_host_key_files; j++) { if (sshkey_equal_public(key, sensitive_data.host_pubkeys[j])) { sensitive_data.host_certificates[j] = key; break; } } if (j >= options.num_host_key_files) { error("No matching private key for certificate: %s", options.host_cert_files[i]); sshkey_free(key); continue; } sensitive_data.host_certificates[j] = key; debug("host certificate: #%u type %d %s", j, key->type, sshkey_type(key)); } if (privsep_chroot) { struct stat st; if ((stat(_PATH_PRIVSEP_CHROOT_DIR, &st) == -1) || (S_ISDIR(st.st_mode) == 0)) fatal("Missing privilege separation directory: %s", _PATH_PRIVSEP_CHROOT_DIR); #ifdef HAVE_CYGWIN if (check_ntsec(_PATH_PRIVSEP_CHROOT_DIR) && (st.st_uid != getuid () || (st.st_mode & (S_IWGRP|S_IWOTH)) != 0)) #else if (st.st_uid != 0 || (st.st_mode & (S_IWGRP|S_IWOTH)) != 0) #endif fatal("%s must be owned by root and not group or " "world-writable.", _PATH_PRIVSEP_CHROOT_DIR); } - if (test_flag > 1) { - /* - * If no connection info was provided by -C then use - * use a blank one that will cause no predicate to match. - */ - if (connection_info == NULL) - connection_info = get_connection_info(ssh, 0, 0); - connection_info->test = 1; - parse_server_match_config(&options, &includes, connection_info); - dump_config(&options); - } + if (test_flag > 1) + print_config(ssh, connection_info); /* Configuration looks good, so exit if in test mode. */ if (test_flag) exit(0); /* * Clear out any supplemental groups we may have inherited. This * prevents inadvertent creation of files with bad modes (in the * portable version at least, it's certainly possible for PAM * to create a file, and we can't control the code in every * module which might be used). */ if (setgroups(0, NULL) < 0) debug("setgroups() failed: %.200s", strerror(errno)); if (rexec_flag) { if (rexec_argc < 0) fatal("rexec_argc %d < 0", rexec_argc); rexec_argv = xcalloc(rexec_argc + 2, sizeof(char *)); for (i = 0; i < (u_int)rexec_argc; i++) { debug("rexec_argv[%d]='%s'", i, saved_argv[i]); rexec_argv[i] = saved_argv[i]; } rexec_argv[rexec_argc] = "-R"; rexec_argv[rexec_argc + 1] = NULL; } listener_proctitle = prepare_proctitle(ac, av); /* Ensure that umask disallows at least group and world write */ new_umask = umask(0077) | 0022; (void) umask(new_umask); /* Initialize the log (it is reinitialized below in case we forked). */ if (debug_flag && (!inetd_flag || rexeced_flag)) log_stderr = 1; log_init(__progname, options.log_level, options.log_facility, log_stderr); for (i = 0; i < options.num_log_verbose; i++) log_verbose_add(options.log_verbose[i]); /* * If not in debugging mode, not started from inetd and not already * daemonized (eg re-exec via SIGHUP), disconnect from the controlling * terminal, and fork. The original process exits. */ already_daemon = daemonized(); if (!(debug_flag || inetd_flag || no_daemon_flag || already_daemon)) { if (daemon(0, 0) == -1) fatal("daemon() failed: %.200s", strerror(errno)); disconnect_controlling_tty(); } /* Reinitialize the log (because of the fork above). */ log_init(__progname, options.log_level, options.log_facility, log_stderr); #ifdef LIBWRAP /* * We log refusals ourselves. However, libwrap will report * syntax errors in hosts.allow via syslog(3). */ allow_severity = options.log_facility|LOG_INFO; deny_severity = options.log_facility|LOG_WARNING; #endif /* Avoid killing the process in high-pressure swapping environments. */ if (!inetd_flag && madvise(NULL, 0, MADV_PROTECT) != 0) debug("madvise(): %.200s", strerror(errno)); /* * Chdir to the root directory so that the current disk can be * unmounted if desired. */ if (chdir("/") == -1) error("chdir(\"/\"): %s", strerror(errno)); /* ignore SIGPIPE */ ssh_signal(SIGPIPE, SIG_IGN); /* Get a connection, either from inetd or a listening TCP socket */ if (inetd_flag) { server_accept_inetd(&sock_in, &sock_out); } else { platform_pre_listen(); server_listen(); ssh_signal(SIGHUP, sighup_handler); ssh_signal(SIGCHLD, main_sigchld_handler); ssh_signal(SIGTERM, sigterm_handler); ssh_signal(SIGQUIT, sigterm_handler); /* * Write out the pid file after the sigterm handler * is setup and the listen sockets are bound */ if (options.pid_file != NULL && !debug_flag) { FILE *f = fopen(options.pid_file, "w"); if (f == NULL) { error("Couldn't create pid file \"%s\": %s", options.pid_file, strerror(errno)); } else { fprintf(f, "%ld\n", (long) getpid()); fclose(f); } } /* Accept a connection and return in a forked child */ server_accept_loop(&sock_in, &sock_out, &newsock, config_s); } /* This is the child processing a new connection. */ setproctitle("%s", "[accepted]"); /* * Create a new session and process group since the 4.4BSD * setlogin() affects the entire process group. We don't * want the child to be able to affect the parent. */ if (!debug_flag && !inetd_flag && setsid() == -1) error("setsid: %.100s", strerror(errno)); if (rexec_flag) { debug("rexec start in %d out %d newsock %d pipe %d sock %d", sock_in, sock_out, newsock, startup_pipe, config_s[0]); - dup2(newsock, STDIN_FILENO); - dup2(STDIN_FILENO, STDOUT_FILENO); + if (dup2(newsock, STDIN_FILENO) == -1) + debug3_f("dup2 stdin: %s", strerror(errno)); + if (dup2(STDIN_FILENO, STDOUT_FILENO) == -1) + debug3_f("dup2 stdout: %s", strerror(errno)); if (startup_pipe == -1) close(REEXEC_STARTUP_PIPE_FD); else if (startup_pipe != REEXEC_STARTUP_PIPE_FD) { - dup2(startup_pipe, REEXEC_STARTUP_PIPE_FD); + if (dup2(startup_pipe, REEXEC_STARTUP_PIPE_FD) == -1) + debug3_f("dup2 startup_p: %s", strerror(errno)); close(startup_pipe); startup_pipe = REEXEC_STARTUP_PIPE_FD; } - dup2(config_s[1], REEXEC_CONFIG_PASS_FD); + if (dup2(config_s[1], REEXEC_CONFIG_PASS_FD) == -1) + debug3_f("dup2 config_s: %s", strerror(errno)); close(config_s[1]); ssh_signal(SIGHUP, SIG_IGN); /* avoid reset to SIG_DFL */ execv(rexec_argv[0], rexec_argv); /* Reexec has failed, fall back and continue */ error("rexec of %s failed: %s", rexec_argv[0], strerror(errno)); recv_rexec_state(REEXEC_CONFIG_PASS_FD, NULL); log_init(__progname, options.log_level, options.log_facility, log_stderr); /* Clean up fds */ close(REEXEC_CONFIG_PASS_FD); newsock = sock_out = sock_in = dup(STDIN_FILENO); if (stdfd_devnull(1, 1, 0) == -1) error_f("stdfd_devnull failed"); debug("rexec cleanup in %d out %d newsock %d pipe %d sock %d", sock_in, sock_out, newsock, startup_pipe, config_s[0]); } /* Executed child processes don't need these. */ fcntl(sock_out, F_SETFD, FD_CLOEXEC); fcntl(sock_in, F_SETFD, FD_CLOEXEC); /* We will not restart on SIGHUP since it no longer makes sense. */ ssh_signal(SIGALRM, SIG_DFL); ssh_signal(SIGHUP, SIG_DFL); ssh_signal(SIGTERM, SIG_DFL); ssh_signal(SIGQUIT, SIG_DFL); ssh_signal(SIGCHLD, SIG_DFL); ssh_signal(SIGINT, SIG_DFL); #ifdef __FreeBSD__ /* * Initialize the resolver. This may not happen automatically * before privsep chroot(). */ if ((_res.options & RES_INIT) == 0) { debug("res_init()"); res_init(); } #ifdef GSSAPI /* * Force GSS-API to parse its configuration and load any * mechanism plugins. */ { gss_OID_set mechs; OM_uint32 minor_status; gss_indicate_mechs(&minor_status, &mechs); gss_release_oid_set(&minor_status, &mechs); } #endif #endif /* * Register our connection. This turns encryption off because we do * not have a key. */ if ((ssh = ssh_packet_set_connection(NULL, sock_in, sock_out)) == NULL) fatal("Unable to create connection"); the_active_state = ssh; ssh_packet_set_server(ssh); check_ip_options(ssh); /* Prepare the channels layer */ channel_init_channels(ssh); channel_set_af(ssh, options.address_family); process_channel_timeouts(ssh, &options); process_permitopen(ssh, &options); /* Set SO_KEEPALIVE if requested. */ if (options.tcp_keep_alive && ssh_packet_connection_is_on_socket(ssh) && setsockopt(sock_in, SOL_SOCKET, SO_KEEPALIVE, &on, sizeof(on)) == -1) error("setsockopt SO_KEEPALIVE: %.100s", strerror(errno)); if ((remote_port = ssh_remote_port(ssh)) < 0) { debug("ssh_remote_port failed"); cleanup_exit(255); } if (options.routing_domain != NULL) set_process_rdomain(ssh, options.routing_domain); /* * The rest of the code depends on the fact that * ssh_remote_ipaddr() caches the remote ip, even if * the socket goes away. */ remote_ip = ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh); #ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP /* Also caches remote hostname for sandboxed child. */ auth_get_canonical_hostname(ssh, options.use_dns); #endif #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS audit_connection_from(remote_ip, remote_port); #endif rdomain = ssh_packet_rdomain_in(ssh); /* Log the connection. */ laddr = get_local_ipaddr(sock_in); verbose("Connection from %s port %d on %s port %d%s%s%s", remote_ip, remote_port, laddr, ssh_local_port(ssh), rdomain == NULL ? "" : " rdomain \"", rdomain == NULL ? "" : rdomain, rdomain == NULL ? "" : "\""); free(laddr); /* * We don't want to listen forever unless the other side * successfully authenticates itself. So we set up an alarm which is * cleared after successful authentication. A limit of zero * indicates no limit. Note that we don't set the alarm in debugging * mode; it is just annoying to have the server exit just when you * are about to discover the bug. */ ssh_signal(SIGALRM, grace_alarm_handler); if (!debug_flag) alarm(options.login_grace_time); if ((r = kex_exchange_identification(ssh, -1, options.version_addendum)) != 0) sshpkt_fatal(ssh, r, "banner exchange"); ssh_packet_set_nonblocking(ssh); /* allocate authentication context */ authctxt = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*authctxt)); ssh->authctxt = authctxt; authctxt->loginmsg = loginmsg; /* XXX global for cleanup, access from other modules */ the_authctxt = authctxt; /* Set default key authentication options */ if ((auth_opts = sshauthopt_new_with_keys_defaults()) == NULL) fatal("allocation failed"); /* prepare buffer to collect messages to display to user after login */ if ((loginmsg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed"); auth_debug_reset(); BLACKLIST_INIT(); if (use_privsep) { if (privsep_preauth(ssh) == 1) goto authenticated; } else if (have_agent) { if ((r = ssh_get_authentication_socket(&auth_sock)) != 0) { error_r(r, "Unable to get agent socket"); have_agent = 0; } } /* perform the key exchange */ /* authenticate user and start session */ do_ssh2_kex(ssh); do_authentication2(ssh); /* * If we use privilege separation, the unprivileged child transfers * the current keystate and exits */ if (use_privsep) { mm_send_keystate(ssh, pmonitor); ssh_packet_clear_keys(ssh); exit(0); } authenticated: /* * Cancel the alarm we set to limit the time taken for * authentication. */ alarm(0); ssh_signal(SIGALRM, SIG_DFL); authctxt->authenticated = 1; if (startup_pipe != -1) { close(startup_pipe); startup_pipe = -1; } #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS audit_event(ssh, SSH_AUTH_SUCCESS); #endif #ifdef GSSAPI if (options.gss_authentication) { temporarily_use_uid(authctxt->pw); ssh_gssapi_storecreds(); restore_uid(); } #endif #ifdef USE_PAM if (options.use_pam) { do_pam_setcred(1); do_pam_session(ssh); } #endif /* * In privilege separation, we fork another child and prepare * file descriptor passing. */ if (use_privsep) { privsep_postauth(ssh, authctxt); /* the monitor process [priv] will not return */ } ssh_packet_set_timeout(ssh, options.client_alive_interval, options.client_alive_count_max); /* Try to send all our hostkeys to the client */ notify_hostkeys(ssh); /* Start session. */ do_authenticated(ssh, authctxt); /* The connection has been terminated. */ ssh_packet_get_bytes(ssh, &ibytes, &obytes); verbose("Transferred: sent %llu, received %llu bytes", (unsigned long long)obytes, (unsigned long long)ibytes); verbose("Closing connection to %.500s port %d", remote_ip, remote_port); #ifdef USE_PAM if (options.use_pam) finish_pam(); #endif /* USE_PAM */ #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS PRIVSEP(audit_event(ssh, SSH_CONNECTION_CLOSE)); #endif ssh_packet_close(ssh); if (use_privsep) mm_terminate(); exit(0); } int sshd_hostkey_sign(struct ssh *ssh, struct sshkey *privkey, struct sshkey *pubkey, u_char **signature, size_t *slenp, const u_char *data, size_t dlen, const char *alg) { int r; if (use_privsep) { if (privkey) { if (mm_sshkey_sign(ssh, privkey, signature, slenp, data, dlen, alg, options.sk_provider, NULL, ssh->compat) < 0) fatal_f("privkey sign failed"); } else { if (mm_sshkey_sign(ssh, pubkey, signature, slenp, data, dlen, alg, options.sk_provider, NULL, ssh->compat) < 0) fatal_f("pubkey sign failed"); } } else { if (privkey) { if (sshkey_sign(privkey, signature, slenp, data, dlen, alg, options.sk_provider, NULL, ssh->compat) < 0) fatal_f("privkey sign failed"); } else { if ((r = ssh_agent_sign(auth_sock, pubkey, signature, slenp, data, dlen, alg, ssh->compat)) != 0) { fatal_fr(r, "agent sign failed"); } } } return 0; } /* SSH2 key exchange */ static void do_ssh2_kex(struct ssh *ssh) { - char *myproposal[PROPOSAL_MAX] = { KEX_SERVER }; + char *hkalgs = NULL, *myproposal[PROPOSAL_MAX]; + const char *compression = NULL; struct kex *kex; - char *prop_kex = NULL, *prop_enc = NULL, *prop_hostkey = NULL; int r; - myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS] = prop_kex = compat_kex_proposal(ssh, - options.kex_algorithms); - myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_CTOS] = - myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_STOC] = prop_enc = - compat_cipher_proposal(ssh, options.ciphers); - myproposal[PROPOSAL_MAC_ALGS_CTOS] = - myproposal[PROPOSAL_MAC_ALGS_STOC] = options.macs; - - if (options.compression == COMP_NONE) { - myproposal[PROPOSAL_COMP_ALGS_CTOS] = - myproposal[PROPOSAL_COMP_ALGS_STOC] = "none"; - } - if (options.rekey_limit || options.rekey_interval) ssh_packet_set_rekey_limits(ssh, options.rekey_limit, options.rekey_interval); - myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS] = prop_hostkey = - compat_pkalg_proposal(ssh, list_hostkey_types()); + if (options.compression == COMP_NONE) + compression = "none"; + hkalgs = list_hostkey_types(); + + kex_proposal_populate_entries(ssh, myproposal, options.kex_algorithms, + options.ciphers, options.macs, compression, hkalgs); + + free(hkalgs); /* start key exchange */ if ((r = kex_setup(ssh, myproposal)) != 0) fatal_r(r, "kex_setup"); kex = ssh->kex; #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP1_SHA1] = kex_gen_server; kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP14_SHA1] = kex_gen_server; kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP14_SHA256] = kex_gen_server; kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP16_SHA512] = kex_gen_server; kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP18_SHA512] = kex_gen_server; kex->kex[KEX_DH_GEX_SHA1] = kexgex_server; kex->kex[KEX_DH_GEX_SHA256] = kexgex_server; # ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC kex->kex[KEX_ECDH_SHA2] = kex_gen_server; # endif #endif kex->kex[KEX_C25519_SHA256] = kex_gen_server; kex->kex[KEX_KEM_SNTRUP761X25519_SHA512] = kex_gen_server; kex->load_host_public_key=&get_hostkey_public_by_type; kex->load_host_private_key=&get_hostkey_private_by_type; kex->host_key_index=&get_hostkey_index; kex->sign = sshd_hostkey_sign; ssh_dispatch_run_fatal(ssh, DISPATCH_BLOCK, &kex->done); #ifdef DEBUG_KEXDH /* send 1st encrypted/maced/compressed message */ if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_IGNORE)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, "markus")) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0 || (r = ssh_packet_write_wait(ssh)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "send test"); #endif - free(prop_kex); - free(prop_enc); - free(prop_hostkey); + kex_proposal_free_entries(myproposal); debug("KEX done"); } /* server specific fatal cleanup */ void cleanup_exit(int i) { if (the_active_state != NULL && the_authctxt != NULL) { do_cleanup(the_active_state, the_authctxt); if (use_privsep && privsep_is_preauth && pmonitor != NULL && pmonitor->m_pid > 1) { debug("Killing privsep child %d", pmonitor->m_pid); if (kill(pmonitor->m_pid, SIGKILL) != 0 && errno != ESRCH) { error_f("kill(%d): %s", pmonitor->m_pid, strerror(errno)); } } } #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS /* done after do_cleanup so it can cancel the PAM auth 'thread' */ if (the_active_state != NULL && (!use_privsep || mm_is_monitor())) audit_event(the_active_state, SSH_CONNECTION_ABANDON); #endif _exit(i); } diff --git a/crypto/openssh/sshd_config b/crypto/openssh/sshd_config index 581aa9e73d48..e3228f94f94a 100644 --- a/crypto/openssh/sshd_config +++ b/crypto/openssh/sshd_config @@ -1,121 +1,121 @@ # $OpenBSD: sshd_config,v 1.104 2021/07/02 05:11:21 dtucker Exp $ # This is the sshd server system-wide configuration file. See # sshd_config(5) for more information. # This sshd was compiled with PATH=/usr/bin:/bin:/usr/sbin:/sbin # The strategy used for options in the default sshd_config shipped with # OpenSSH is to specify options with their default value where # possible, but leave them commented. Uncommented options override the # default value. # Note that some of FreeBSD's defaults differ from OpenBSD's, and # FreeBSD has a few additional options. #Port 22 #AddressFamily any #ListenAddress 0.0.0.0 #ListenAddress :: #HostKey /etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key #HostKey /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ecdsa_key #HostKey /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ed25519_key # Ciphers and keying #RekeyLimit default none # Logging #SyslogFacility AUTH #LogLevel INFO # Authentication: #LoginGraceTime 2m #PermitRootLogin no #StrictModes yes #MaxAuthTries 6 #MaxSessions 10 #PubkeyAuthentication yes # The default is to check both .ssh/authorized_keys and .ssh/authorized_keys2 # but this is overridden so installations will only check .ssh/authorized_keys AuthorizedKeysFile .ssh/authorized_keys #AuthorizedPrincipalsFile none #AuthorizedKeysCommand none #AuthorizedKeysCommandUser nobody # For this to work you will also need host keys in /etc/ssh/ssh_known_hosts #HostbasedAuthentication no # Change to yes if you don't trust ~/.ssh/known_hosts for # HostbasedAuthentication #IgnoreUserKnownHosts no # Don't read the user's ~/.rhosts and ~/.shosts files #IgnoreRhosts yes # Change to yes to enable built-in password authentication. # Note that passwords may also be accepted via KbdInteractiveAuthentication. #PasswordAuthentication no #PermitEmptyPasswords no # Change to no to disable PAM authentication #KbdInteractiveAuthentication yes # Kerberos options #KerberosAuthentication no #KerberosOrLocalPasswd yes #KerberosTicketCleanup yes #KerberosGetAFSToken no # GSSAPI options #GSSAPIAuthentication no #GSSAPICleanupCredentials yes # Set this to 'no' to disable PAM authentication, account processing, # and session processing. If this is enabled, PAM authentication will # be allowed through the KbdInteractiveAuthentication and # PasswordAuthentication. Depending on your PAM configuration, # PAM authentication via KbdInteractiveAuthentication may bypass # the setting of "PermitRootLogin prohibit-password". # If you just want the PAM account and session checks to run without # PAM authentication, then enable this but set PasswordAuthentication # and KbdInteractiveAuthentication to 'no'. #UsePAM yes #AllowAgentForwarding yes #AllowTcpForwarding yes #GatewayPorts no #X11Forwarding no #X11DisplayOffset 10 #X11UseLocalhost yes #PermitTTY yes #PrintMotd yes #PrintLastLog yes #TCPKeepAlive yes #PermitUserEnvironment no #Compression delayed #ClientAliveInterval 0 #ClientAliveCountMax 3 #UseDNS yes #PidFile /var/run/sshd.pid #MaxStartups 10:30:100 #PermitTunnel no #ChrootDirectory none #UseBlacklist no -#VersionAddendum FreeBSD-20230205 +#VersionAddendum FreeBSD-20230316 # no default banner path #Banner none # override default of no subsystems Subsystem sftp /usr/libexec/sftp-server # Example of overriding settings on a per-user basis #Match User anoncvs # X11Forwarding no # AllowTcpForwarding no # PermitTTY no # ForceCommand cvs server diff --git a/crypto/openssh/sshd_config.5 b/crypto/openssh/sshd_config.5 index 3a25e048889b..9bd447e47863 100644 --- a/crypto/openssh/sshd_config.5 +++ b/crypto/openssh/sshd_config.5 @@ -1,2112 +1,2124 @@ .\" .\" Author: Tatu Ylonen .\" Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen , Espoo, Finland .\" All rights reserved .\" .\" As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software .\" can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this .\" software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is .\" incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be .\" called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell". .\" .\" Copyright (c) 1999,2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. .\" Copyright (c) 1999 Aaron Campbell. All rights reserved. .\" Copyright (c) 1999 Theo de Raadt. All rights reserved. .\" .\" Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without .\" modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions .\" are met: .\" 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright .\" notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. .\" 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright .\" notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the .\" documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. .\" .\" THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR .\" IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES .\" OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. .\" IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, .\" INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT .\" NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, .\" DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY .\" THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT .\" (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF .\" THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. .\" -.\" $OpenBSD: sshd_config.5,v 1.347 2023/01/18 06:55:32 jmc Exp $ -.Dd $Mdocdate: January 18 2023 $ +.\" $OpenBSD: sshd_config.5,v 1.348 2023/03/03 04:36:20 djm Exp $ +.Dd $Mdocdate: March 3 2023 $ .Dt SSHD_CONFIG 5 .Os .Sh NAME .Nm sshd_config .Nd OpenSSH daemon configuration file .Sh DESCRIPTION .Xr sshd 8 reads configuration data from .Pa /etc/ssh/sshd_config (or the file specified with .Fl f on the command line). The file contains keyword-argument pairs, one per line. -For each keyword, the first obtained value will be used. +Unless noted otherwise, for each keyword, the first obtained value will be used. Lines starting with .Ql # and empty lines are interpreted as comments. Arguments may optionally be enclosed in double quotes .Pq \&" in order to represent arguments containing spaces. .Pp The possible keywords and their meanings are as follows (note that keywords are case-insensitive and arguments are case-sensitive): .Bl -tag -width Ds .It Cm AcceptEnv Specifies what environment variables sent by the client will be copied into the session's .Xr environ 7 . See .Cm SendEnv and .Cm SetEnv in .Xr ssh_config 5 for how to configure the client. The .Ev TERM environment variable is always accepted whenever the client requests a pseudo-terminal as it is required by the protocol. Variables are specified by name, which may contain the wildcard characters .Ql * and .Ql \&? . Multiple environment variables may be separated by whitespace or spread across multiple .Cm AcceptEnv directives. Be warned that some environment variables could be used to bypass restricted user environments. For this reason, care should be taken in the use of this directive. The default is not to accept any environment variables. .It Cm AddressFamily Specifies which address family should be used by .Xr sshd 8 . Valid arguments are .Cm any (the default), .Cm inet (use IPv4 only), or .Cm inet6 (use IPv6 only). .It Cm AllowAgentForwarding Specifies whether .Xr ssh-agent 1 forwarding is permitted. The default is .Cm yes . Note that disabling agent forwarding does not improve security unless users are also denied shell access, as they can always install their own forwarders. .It Cm AllowGroups This keyword can be followed by a list of group name patterns, separated by spaces. If specified, login is allowed only for users whose primary group or supplementary group list matches one of the patterns. Only group names are valid; a numerical group ID is not recognized. By default, login is allowed for all groups. The allow/deny groups directives are processed in the following order: .Cm DenyGroups , .Cm AllowGroups . .Pp See PATTERNS in .Xr ssh_config 5 for more information on patterns. +This keyword may appear multiple times in +.Nm +with each instance appending to the list. .It Cm AllowStreamLocalForwarding Specifies whether StreamLocal (Unix-domain socket) forwarding is permitted. The available options are .Cm yes (the default) or .Cm all to allow StreamLocal forwarding, .Cm no to prevent all StreamLocal forwarding, .Cm local to allow local (from the perspective of .Xr ssh 1 ) forwarding only or .Cm remote to allow remote forwarding only. Note that disabling StreamLocal forwarding does not improve security unless users are also denied shell access, as they can always install their own forwarders. .It Cm AllowTcpForwarding Specifies whether TCP forwarding is permitted. The available options are .Cm yes (the default) or .Cm all to allow TCP forwarding, .Cm no to prevent all TCP forwarding, .Cm local to allow local (from the perspective of .Xr ssh 1 ) forwarding only or .Cm remote to allow remote forwarding only. Note that disabling TCP forwarding does not improve security unless users are also denied shell access, as they can always install their own forwarders. .It Cm AllowUsers This keyword can be followed by a list of user name patterns, separated by spaces. If specified, login is allowed only for user names that match one of the patterns. Only user names are valid; a numerical user ID is not recognized. By default, login is allowed for all users. If the pattern takes the form USER@HOST then USER and HOST are separately checked, restricting logins to particular users from particular hosts. HOST criteria may additionally contain addresses to match in CIDR address/masklen format. The allow/deny users directives are processed in the following order: .Cm DenyUsers , .Cm AllowUsers . .Pp See PATTERNS in .Xr ssh_config 5 for more information on patterns. +This keyword may appear multiple times in +.Nm +with each instance appending to the list. .It Cm AuthenticationMethods Specifies the authentication methods that must be successfully completed for a user to be granted access. This option must be followed by one or more lists of comma-separated authentication method names, or by the single string .Cm any to indicate the default behaviour of accepting any single authentication method. If the default is overridden, then successful authentication requires completion of every method in at least one of these lists. .Pp For example, .Qq publickey,password publickey,keyboard-interactive would require the user to complete public key authentication, followed by either password or keyboard interactive authentication. Only methods that are next in one or more lists are offered at each stage, so for this example it would not be possible to attempt password or keyboard-interactive authentication before public key. .Pp For keyboard interactive authentication it is also possible to restrict authentication to a specific device by appending a colon followed by the device identifier .Cm bsdauth or .Cm pam . depending on the server configuration. For example, .Qq keyboard-interactive:bsdauth would restrict keyboard interactive authentication to the .Cm bsdauth device. .Pp If the publickey method is listed more than once, .Xr sshd 8 verifies that keys that have been used successfully are not reused for subsequent authentications. For example, .Qq publickey,publickey requires successful authentication using two different public keys. .Pp Note that each authentication method listed should also be explicitly enabled in the configuration. .Pp The available authentication methods are: .Qq gssapi-with-mic , .Qq hostbased , .Qq keyboard-interactive , .Qq none (used for access to password-less accounts when .Cm PermitEmptyPasswords is enabled), .Qq password and .Qq publickey . .It Cm AuthorizedKeysCommand Specifies a program to be used to look up the user's public keys. The program must be owned by root, not writable by group or others and specified by an absolute path. Arguments to .Cm AuthorizedKeysCommand accept the tokens described in the .Sx TOKENS section. If no arguments are specified then the username of the target user is used. .Pp The program should produce on standard output zero or more lines of authorized_keys output (see .Sx AUTHORIZED_KEYS in .Xr sshd 8 ) . .Cm AuthorizedKeysCommand is tried after the usual .Cm AuthorizedKeysFile files and will not be executed if a matching key is found there. By default, no .Cm AuthorizedKeysCommand is run. .It Cm AuthorizedKeysCommandUser Specifies the user under whose account the .Cm AuthorizedKeysCommand is run. It is recommended to use a dedicated user that has no other role on the host than running authorized keys commands. If .Cm AuthorizedKeysCommand is specified but .Cm AuthorizedKeysCommandUser is not, then .Xr sshd 8 will refuse to start. .It Cm AuthorizedKeysFile Specifies the file that contains the public keys used for user authentication. The format is described in the AUTHORIZED_KEYS FILE FORMAT section of .Xr sshd 8 . Arguments to .Cm AuthorizedKeysFile accept the tokens described in the .Sx TOKENS section. After expansion, .Cm AuthorizedKeysFile is taken to be an absolute path or one relative to the user's home directory. Multiple files may be listed, separated by whitespace. Alternately this option may be set to .Cm none to skip checking for user keys in files. The default is .Qq .ssh/authorized_keys .ssh/authorized_keys2 . .It Cm AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand Specifies a program to be used to generate the list of allowed certificate principals as per .Cm AuthorizedPrincipalsFile . The program must be owned by root, not writable by group or others and specified by an absolute path. Arguments to .Cm AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand accept the tokens described in the .Sx TOKENS section. If no arguments are specified then the username of the target user is used. .Pp The program should produce on standard output zero or more lines of .Cm AuthorizedPrincipalsFile output. If either .Cm AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand or .Cm AuthorizedPrincipalsFile is specified, then certificates offered by the client for authentication must contain a principal that is listed. By default, no .Cm AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand is run. .It Cm AuthorizedPrincipalsCommandUser Specifies the user under whose account the .Cm AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand is run. It is recommended to use a dedicated user that has no other role on the host than running authorized principals commands. If .Cm AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand is specified but .Cm AuthorizedPrincipalsCommandUser is not, then .Xr sshd 8 will refuse to start. .It Cm AuthorizedPrincipalsFile Specifies a file that lists principal names that are accepted for certificate authentication. When using certificates signed by a key listed in .Cm TrustedUserCAKeys , this file lists names, one of which must appear in the certificate for it to be accepted for authentication. Names are listed one per line preceded by key options (as described in .Sx AUTHORIZED_KEYS FILE FORMAT in .Xr sshd 8 ) . Empty lines and comments starting with .Ql # are ignored. .Pp Arguments to .Cm AuthorizedPrincipalsFile accept the tokens described in the .Sx TOKENS section. After expansion, .Cm AuthorizedPrincipalsFile is taken to be an absolute path or one relative to the user's home directory. The default is .Cm none , i.e. not to use a principals file \(en in this case, the username of the user must appear in a certificate's principals list for it to be accepted. .Pp Note that .Cm AuthorizedPrincipalsFile is only used when authentication proceeds using a CA listed in .Cm TrustedUserCAKeys and is not consulted for certification authorities trusted via .Pa ~/.ssh/authorized_keys , though the .Cm principals= key option offers a similar facility (see .Xr sshd 8 for details). .It Cm Banner The contents of the specified file are sent to the remote user before authentication is allowed. If the argument is .Cm none then no banner is displayed. By default, no banner is displayed. .It Cm CASignatureAlgorithms Specifies which algorithms are allowed for signing of certificates by certificate authorities (CAs). The default is: .Bd -literal -offset indent ssh-ed25519,ecdsa-sha2-nistp256, ecdsa-sha2-nistp384,ecdsa-sha2-nistp521, sk-ssh-ed25519@openssh.com, sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256@openssh.com, rsa-sha2-512,rsa-sha2-256 .Ed .Pp If the specified list begins with a .Sq + character, then the specified algorithms will be appended to the default set instead of replacing them. If the specified list begins with a .Sq - character, then the specified algorithms (including wildcards) will be removed from the default set instead of replacing them. .Pp Certificates signed using other algorithms will not be accepted for public key or host-based authentication. .It Cm ChannelTimeout Specifies whether and how quickly .Xr sshd 8 should close inactive channels. Timeouts are specified as one or more .Dq type=interval pairs separated by whitespace, where the .Dq type must be a channel type name (as described in the table below), optionally containing wildcard characters. .Pp The timeout value .Dq interval is specified in seconds or may use any of the units documented in the .Sx TIME FORMATS section. For example, .Dq session:*=5m would cause all sessions to terminate after five minutes of inactivity. Specifying a zero value disables the inactivity timeout. .Pp The available channel types include: .Bl -tag -width Ds .It Cm agent-connection Open connections to .Xr ssh-agent 1 . .It Cm direct-tcpip , Cm direct-streamlocal@openssh.com Open TCP or Unix socket (respectively) connections that have been established from a .Xr ssh 1 local forwarding, i.e.\& .Cm LocalForward or .Cm DynamicForward . .It Cm forwarded-tcpip , Cm forwarded-streamlocal@openssh.com Open TCP or Unix socket (respectively) connections that have been established to a .Xr sshd 8 listening on behalf of a .Xr ssh 1 remote forwarding, i.e.\& .Cm RemoteForward . .It Cm session:command Command execution sessions. .It Cm session:shell Interactive shell sessions. .It Cm session:subsystem:... Subsystem sessions, e.g. for .Xr sftp 1 , which could be identified as .Cm session:subsystem:sftp . .It Cm x11-connection Open X11 forwarding sessions. .El .Pp Note that in all the above cases, terminating an inactive session does not guarantee to remove all resources associated with the session, e.g. shell processes or X11 clients relating to the session may continue to execute. .Pp Moreover, terminating an inactive channel or session does not necessarily close the SSH connection, nor does it prevent a client from requesting another channel of the same type. In particular, expiring an inactive forwarding session does not prevent another identical forwarding from being subsequently created. See also .Cm UnusedConnectionTimeout , which may be used in conjunction with this option. .Pp The default is not to expire channels of any type for inactivity. .It Cm ChrootDirectory Specifies the pathname of a directory to .Xr chroot 2 to after authentication. At session startup .Xr sshd 8 checks that all components of the pathname are root-owned directories which are not writable by any other user or group. After the chroot, .Xr sshd 8 changes the working directory to the user's home directory. Arguments to .Cm ChrootDirectory accept the tokens described in the .Sx TOKENS section. .Pp The .Cm ChrootDirectory must contain the necessary files and directories to support the user's session. For an interactive session this requires at least a shell, typically .Xr sh 1 , and basic .Pa /dev nodes such as .Xr null 4 , .Xr zero 4 , .Xr stdin 4 , .Xr stdout 4 , .Xr stderr 4 , and .Xr tty 4 devices. For file transfer sessions using SFTP no additional configuration of the environment is necessary if the in-process sftp-server is used, though sessions which use logging may require .Pa /dev/log inside the chroot directory on some operating systems (see .Xr sftp-server 8 for details). .Pp For safety, it is very important that the directory hierarchy be prevented from modification by other processes on the system (especially those outside the jail). Misconfiguration can lead to unsafe environments which .Xr sshd 8 cannot detect. .Pp The default is .Cm none , indicating not to .Xr chroot 2 . .It Cm Ciphers Specifies the ciphers allowed. Multiple ciphers must be comma-separated. If the specified list begins with a .Sq + character, then the specified ciphers will be appended to the default set instead of replacing them. If the specified list begins with a .Sq - character, then the specified ciphers (including wildcards) will be removed from the default set instead of replacing them. If the specified list begins with a .Sq ^ character, then the specified ciphers will be placed at the head of the default set. .Pp The supported ciphers are: .Pp .Bl -item -compact -offset indent .It 3des-cbc .It aes128-cbc .It aes192-cbc .It aes256-cbc .It aes128-ctr .It aes192-ctr .It aes256-ctr .It aes128-gcm@openssh.com .It aes256-gcm@openssh.com .It chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com .El .Pp The default is: .Bd -literal -offset indent chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com, aes128-ctr,aes192-ctr,aes256-ctr, aes128-gcm@openssh.com,aes256-gcm@openssh.com .Ed .Pp The list of available ciphers may also be obtained using .Qq ssh -Q cipher . .It Cm ClientAliveCountMax Sets the number of client alive messages which may be sent without .Xr sshd 8 receiving any messages back from the client. If this threshold is reached while client alive messages are being sent, sshd will disconnect the client, terminating the session. It is important to note that the use of client alive messages is very different from .Cm TCPKeepAlive . The client alive messages are sent through the encrypted channel and therefore will not be spoofable. The TCP keepalive option enabled by .Cm TCPKeepAlive is spoofable. The client alive mechanism is valuable when the client or server depend on knowing when a connection has become unresponsive. .Pp The default value is 3. If .Cm ClientAliveInterval is set to 15, and .Cm ClientAliveCountMax is left at the default, unresponsive SSH clients will be disconnected after approximately 45 seconds. Setting a zero .Cm ClientAliveCountMax disables connection termination. .It Cm ClientAliveInterval Sets a timeout interval in seconds after which if no data has been received from the client, .Xr sshd 8 will send a message through the encrypted channel to request a response from the client. The default is 0, indicating that these messages will not be sent to the client. .It Cm Compression Specifies whether compression is enabled after the user has authenticated successfully. The argument must be .Cm yes , .Cm delayed (a legacy synonym for .Cm yes ) or .Cm no . The default is .Cm yes . .It Cm DenyGroups This keyword can be followed by a list of group name patterns, separated by spaces. Login is disallowed for users whose primary group or supplementary group list matches one of the patterns. Only group names are valid; a numerical group ID is not recognized. By default, login is allowed for all groups. The allow/deny groups directives are processed in the following order: .Cm DenyGroups , .Cm AllowGroups . .Pp See PATTERNS in .Xr ssh_config 5 for more information on patterns. +This keyword may appear multiple times in +.Nm +with each instance appending to the list. .It Cm DenyUsers This keyword can be followed by a list of user name patterns, separated by spaces. Login is disallowed for user names that match one of the patterns. Only user names are valid; a numerical user ID is not recognized. By default, login is allowed for all users. If the pattern takes the form USER@HOST then USER and HOST are separately checked, restricting logins to particular users from particular hosts. HOST criteria may additionally contain addresses to match in CIDR address/masklen format. The allow/deny users directives are processed in the following order: .Cm DenyUsers , .Cm AllowUsers . .Pp See PATTERNS in .Xr ssh_config 5 for more information on patterns. +This keyword may appear multiple times in +.Nm +with each instance appending to the list. .It Cm DisableForwarding Disables all forwarding features, including X11, .Xr ssh-agent 1 , TCP and StreamLocal. This option overrides all other forwarding-related options and may simplify restricted configurations. .It Cm ExposeAuthInfo Writes a temporary file containing a list of authentication methods and public credentials (e.g. keys) used to authenticate the user. The location of the file is exposed to the user session through the .Ev SSH_USER_AUTH environment variable. The default is .Cm no . .It Cm FingerprintHash Specifies the hash algorithm used when logging key fingerprints. Valid options are: .Cm md5 and .Cm sha256 . The default is .Cm sha256 . .It Cm ForceCommand Forces the execution of the command specified by .Cm ForceCommand , ignoring any command supplied by the client and .Pa ~/.ssh/rc if present. The command is invoked by using the user's login shell with the -c option. This applies to shell, command, or subsystem execution. It is most useful inside a .Cm Match block. The command originally supplied by the client is available in the .Ev SSH_ORIGINAL_COMMAND environment variable. Specifying a command of .Cm internal-sftp will force the use of an in-process SFTP server that requires no support files when used with .Cm ChrootDirectory . The default is .Cm none . .It Cm GatewayPorts Specifies whether remote hosts are allowed to connect to ports forwarded for the client. By default, .Xr sshd 8 binds remote port forwardings to the loopback address. This prevents other remote hosts from connecting to forwarded ports. .Cm GatewayPorts can be used to specify that sshd should allow remote port forwardings to bind to non-loopback addresses, thus allowing other hosts to connect. The argument may be .Cm no to force remote port forwardings to be available to the local host only, .Cm yes to force remote port forwardings to bind to the wildcard address, or .Cm clientspecified to allow the client to select the address to which the forwarding is bound. The default is .Cm no . .It Cm GSSAPIAuthentication Specifies whether user authentication based on GSSAPI is allowed. The default is .Cm no . .It Cm GSSAPICleanupCredentials Specifies whether to automatically destroy the user's credentials cache on logout. The default is .Cm yes . .It Cm GSSAPIStrictAcceptorCheck Determines whether to be strict about the identity of the GSSAPI acceptor a client authenticates against. If set to .Cm yes then the client must authenticate against the host service on the current hostname. If set to .Cm no then the client may authenticate against any service key stored in the machine's default store. This facility is provided to assist with operation on multi homed machines. The default is .Cm yes . .It Cm HostbasedAcceptedAlgorithms Specifies the signature algorithms that will be accepted for hostbased authentication as a list of comma-separated patterns. Alternately if the specified list begins with a .Sq + character, then the specified signature algorithms will be appended to the default set instead of replacing them. If the specified list begins with a .Sq - character, then the specified signature algorithms (including wildcards) will be removed from the default set instead of replacing them. If the specified list begins with a .Sq ^ character, then the specified signature algorithms will be placed at the head of the default set. The default for this option is: .Bd -literal -offset 3n ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com, ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com, ecdsa-sha2-nistp384-cert-v01@openssh.com, ecdsa-sha2-nistp521-cert-v01@openssh.com, sk-ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com, sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com, rsa-sha2-512-cert-v01@openssh.com, rsa-sha2-256-cert-v01@openssh.com, ssh-ed25519, ecdsa-sha2-nistp256,ecdsa-sha2-nistp384,ecdsa-sha2-nistp521, sk-ssh-ed25519@openssh.com, sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256@openssh.com, rsa-sha2-512,rsa-sha2-256 .Ed .Pp The list of available signature algorithms may also be obtained using .Qq ssh -Q HostbasedAcceptedAlgorithms . This was formerly named HostbasedAcceptedKeyTypes. .It Cm HostbasedAuthentication Specifies whether rhosts or /etc/hosts.equiv authentication together with successful public key client host authentication is allowed (host-based authentication). The default is .Cm no . .It Cm HostbasedUsesNameFromPacketOnly Specifies whether or not the server will attempt to perform a reverse name lookup when matching the name in the .Pa ~/.shosts , .Pa ~/.rhosts , and .Pa /etc/hosts.equiv files during .Cm HostbasedAuthentication . A setting of .Cm yes means that .Xr sshd 8 uses the name supplied by the client rather than attempting to resolve the name from the TCP connection itself. The default is .Cm no . .It Cm HostCertificate Specifies a file containing a public host certificate. The certificate's public key must match a private host key already specified by .Cm HostKey . The default behaviour of .Xr sshd 8 is not to load any certificates. .It Cm HostKey Specifies a file containing a private host key used by SSH. The defaults are .Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ecdsa_key , .Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ed25519_key and .Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key . .Pp Note that .Xr sshd 8 will refuse to use a file if it is group/world-accessible and that the .Cm HostKeyAlgorithms option restricts which of the keys are actually used by .Xr sshd 8 . .Pp It is possible to have multiple host key files. It is also possible to specify public host key files instead. In this case operations on the private key will be delegated to an .Xr ssh-agent 1 . .It Cm HostKeyAgent Identifies the UNIX-domain socket used to communicate with an agent that has access to the private host keys. If the string .Qq SSH_AUTH_SOCK is specified, the location of the socket will be read from the .Ev SSH_AUTH_SOCK environment variable. .It Cm HostKeyAlgorithms Specifies the host key signature algorithms that the server offers. The default for this option is: .Bd -literal -offset 3n ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com, ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com, ecdsa-sha2-nistp384-cert-v01@openssh.com, ecdsa-sha2-nistp521-cert-v01@openssh.com, sk-ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com, sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com, rsa-sha2-512-cert-v01@openssh.com, rsa-sha2-256-cert-v01@openssh.com, ssh-ed25519, ecdsa-sha2-nistp256,ecdsa-sha2-nistp384,ecdsa-sha2-nistp521, sk-ssh-ed25519@openssh.com, sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256@openssh.com, rsa-sha2-512,rsa-sha2-256 .Ed .Pp The list of available signature algorithms may also be obtained using .Qq ssh -Q HostKeyAlgorithms . .It Cm IgnoreRhosts Specifies whether to ignore per-user .Pa .rhosts and .Pa .shosts files during .Cm HostbasedAuthentication . The system-wide .Pa /etc/hosts.equiv and .Pa /etc/ssh/shosts.equiv are still used regardless of this setting. .Pp Accepted values are .Cm yes (the default) to ignore all per-user files, .Cm shosts-only to allow the use of .Pa .shosts but to ignore .Pa .rhosts or .Cm no to allow both .Pa .shosts and .Pa rhosts . .It Cm IgnoreUserKnownHosts Specifies whether .Xr sshd 8 should ignore the user's .Pa ~/.ssh/known_hosts during .Cm HostbasedAuthentication and use only the system-wide known hosts file .Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_known_hosts . The default is .Dq no . .It Cm Include Include the specified configuration file(s). Multiple pathnames may be specified and each pathname may contain .Xr glob 7 wildcards that will be expanded and processed in lexical order. Files without absolute paths are assumed to be in .Pa /etc/ssh . An .Cm Include directive may appear inside a .Cm Match block to perform conditional inclusion. .It Cm IPQoS Specifies the IPv4 type-of-service or DSCP class for the connection. Accepted values are .Cm af11 , .Cm af12 , .Cm af13 , .Cm af21 , .Cm af22 , .Cm af23 , .Cm af31 , .Cm af32 , .Cm af33 , .Cm af41 , .Cm af42 , .Cm af43 , .Cm cs0 , .Cm cs1 , .Cm cs2 , .Cm cs3 , .Cm cs4 , .Cm cs5 , .Cm cs6 , .Cm cs7 , .Cm ef , .Cm le , .Cm lowdelay , .Cm throughput , .Cm reliability , a numeric value, or .Cm none to use the operating system default. This option may take one or two arguments, separated by whitespace. If one argument is specified, it is used as the packet class unconditionally. If two values are specified, the first is automatically selected for interactive sessions and the second for non-interactive sessions. The default is .Cm af21 (Low-Latency Data) for interactive sessions and .Cm cs1 (Lower Effort) for non-interactive sessions. .It Cm KbdInteractiveAuthentication Specifies whether to allow keyboard-interactive authentication. All authentication styles from .Xr login.conf 5 are supported. The default is .Cm yes . The argument to this keyword must be .Cm yes or .Cm no . .Cm ChallengeResponseAuthentication is a deprecated alias for this. .It Cm KerberosAuthentication Specifies whether the password provided by the user for .Cm PasswordAuthentication will be validated through the Kerberos KDC. To use this option, the server needs a Kerberos servtab which allows the verification of the KDC's identity. The default is .Cm no . .It Cm KerberosGetAFSToken If AFS is active and the user has a Kerberos 5 TGT, attempt to acquire an AFS token before accessing the user's home directory. The default is .Cm no . .It Cm KerberosOrLocalPasswd If password authentication through Kerberos fails then the password will be validated via any additional local mechanism such as .Pa /etc/passwd . The default is .Cm yes . .It Cm KerberosTicketCleanup Specifies whether to automatically destroy the user's ticket cache file on logout. The default is .Cm yes . .It Cm KexAlgorithms Specifies the available KEX (Key Exchange) algorithms. Multiple algorithms must be comma-separated. Alternately if the specified list begins with a .Sq + character, then the specified algorithms will be appended to the default set instead of replacing them. If the specified list begins with a .Sq - character, then the specified algorithms (including wildcards) will be removed from the default set instead of replacing them. If the specified list begins with a .Sq ^ character, then the specified algorithms will be placed at the head of the default set. The supported algorithms are: .Pp .Bl -item -compact -offset indent .It curve25519-sha256 .It curve25519-sha256@libssh.org .It diffie-hellman-group1-sha1 .It diffie-hellman-group14-sha1 .It diffie-hellman-group14-sha256 .It diffie-hellman-group16-sha512 .It diffie-hellman-group18-sha512 .It diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha1 .It diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha256 .It ecdh-sha2-nistp256 .It ecdh-sha2-nistp384 .It ecdh-sha2-nistp521 .It sntrup761x25519-sha512@openssh.com .El .Pp The default is: .Bd -literal -offset indent sntrup761x25519-sha512@openssh.com, curve25519-sha256,curve25519-sha256@libssh.org, ecdh-sha2-nistp256,ecdh-sha2-nistp384,ecdh-sha2-nistp521, diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha256, diffie-hellman-group16-sha512,diffie-hellman-group18-sha512, diffie-hellman-group14-sha256 .Ed .Pp The list of available key exchange algorithms may also be obtained using .Qq ssh -Q KexAlgorithms . .It Cm ListenAddress Specifies the local addresses .Xr sshd 8 should listen on. The following forms may be used: .Pp .Bl -item -offset indent -compact .It .Cm ListenAddress .Sm off .Ar hostname | address .Sm on .Op Cm rdomain Ar domain .It .Cm ListenAddress .Sm off .Ar hostname : port .Sm on .Op Cm rdomain Ar domain .It .Cm ListenAddress .Sm off .Ar IPv4_address : port .Sm on .Op Cm rdomain Ar domain .It .Cm ListenAddress .Sm off .Oo Ar hostname | address Oc : Ar port .Sm on .Op Cm rdomain Ar domain .El .Pp The optional .Cm rdomain qualifier requests .Xr sshd 8 listen in an explicit routing domain. If .Ar port is not specified, sshd will listen on the address and all .Cm Port options specified. The default is to listen on all local addresses on the current default routing domain. Multiple .Cm ListenAddress options are permitted. For more information on routing domains, see .Xr rdomain 4 . .It Cm LoginGraceTime The server disconnects after this time if the user has not successfully logged in. If the value is 0, there is no time limit. The default is 120 seconds. .It Cm LogLevel Gives the verbosity level that is used when logging messages from .Xr sshd 8 . The possible values are: QUIET, FATAL, ERROR, INFO, VERBOSE, DEBUG, DEBUG1, DEBUG2, and DEBUG3. The default is INFO. DEBUG and DEBUG1 are equivalent. DEBUG2 and DEBUG3 each specify higher levels of debugging output. Logging with a DEBUG level violates the privacy of users and is not recommended. .It Cm LogVerbose Specify one or more overrides to LogLevel. An override consists of a pattern lists that matches the source file, function and line number to force detailed logging for. For example, an override pattern of: .Bd -literal -offset indent kex.c:*:1000,*:kex_exchange_identification():*,packet.c:* .Ed .Pp would enable detailed logging for line 1000 of .Pa kex.c , everything in the .Fn kex_exchange_identification function, and all code in the .Pa packet.c file. This option is intended for debugging and no overrides are enabled by default. .It Cm MACs Specifies the available MAC (message authentication code) algorithms. The MAC algorithm is used for data integrity protection. Multiple algorithms must be comma-separated. If the specified list begins with a .Sq + character, then the specified algorithms will be appended to the default set instead of replacing them. If the specified list begins with a .Sq - character, then the specified algorithms (including wildcards) will be removed from the default set instead of replacing them. If the specified list begins with a .Sq ^ character, then the specified algorithms will be placed at the head of the default set. .Pp The algorithms that contain .Qq -etm calculate the MAC after encryption (encrypt-then-mac). These are considered safer and their use recommended. The supported MACs are: .Pp .Bl -item -compact -offset indent .It hmac-md5 .It hmac-md5-96 .It hmac-sha1 .It hmac-sha1-96 .It hmac-sha2-256 .It hmac-sha2-512 .It umac-64@openssh.com .It umac-128@openssh.com .It hmac-md5-etm@openssh.com .It hmac-md5-96-etm@openssh.com .It hmac-sha1-etm@openssh.com .It hmac-sha1-96-etm@openssh.com .It hmac-sha2-256-etm@openssh.com .It hmac-sha2-512-etm@openssh.com .It umac-64-etm@openssh.com .It umac-128-etm@openssh.com .El .Pp The default is: .Bd -literal -offset indent umac-64-etm@openssh.com,umac-128-etm@openssh.com, hmac-sha2-256-etm@openssh.com,hmac-sha2-512-etm@openssh.com, hmac-sha1-etm@openssh.com, umac-64@openssh.com,umac-128@openssh.com, hmac-sha2-256,hmac-sha2-512,hmac-sha1 .Ed .Pp The list of available MAC algorithms may also be obtained using .Qq ssh -Q mac . .It Cm Match Introduces a conditional block. If all of the criteria on the .Cm Match line are satisfied, the keywords on the following lines override those set in the global section of the config file, until either another .Cm Match line or the end of the file. If a keyword appears in multiple .Cm Match blocks that are satisfied, only the first instance of the keyword is applied. .Pp The arguments to .Cm Match are one or more criteria-pattern pairs or the single token .Cm All which matches all criteria. The available criteria are .Cm User , .Cm Group , .Cm Host , .Cm LocalAddress , .Cm LocalPort , .Cm RDomain , and .Cm Address (with .Cm RDomain representing the .Xr rdomain 4 on which the connection was received). .Pp The match patterns may consist of single entries or comma-separated lists and may use the wildcard and negation operators described in the .Sx PATTERNS section of .Xr ssh_config 5 . .Pp The patterns in an .Cm Address criteria may additionally contain addresses to match in CIDR address/masklen format, such as 192.0.2.0/24 or 2001:db8::/32. Note that the mask length provided must be consistent with the address - it is an error to specify a mask length that is too long for the address or one with bits set in this host portion of the address. For example, 192.0.2.0/33 and 192.0.2.0/8, respectively. .Pp Only a subset of keywords may be used on the lines following a .Cm Match keyword. Available keywords are .Cm AcceptEnv , .Cm AllowAgentForwarding , .Cm AllowGroups , .Cm AllowStreamLocalForwarding , .Cm AllowTcpForwarding , .Cm AllowUsers , .Cm AuthenticationMethods , .Cm AuthorizedKeysCommand , .Cm AuthorizedKeysCommandUser , .Cm AuthorizedKeysFile , .Cm AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand , .Cm AuthorizedPrincipalsCommandUser , .Cm AuthorizedPrincipalsFile , .Cm Banner , .Cm CASignatureAlgorithms , .Cm ChannelTimeout , .Cm ChrootDirectory , .Cm ClientAliveCountMax , .Cm ClientAliveInterval , .Cm DenyGroups , .Cm DenyUsers , .Cm DisableForwarding , .Cm ExposeAuthInfo , .Cm ForceCommand , .Cm GatewayPorts , .Cm GSSAPIAuthentication , .Cm HostbasedAcceptedAlgorithms , .Cm HostbasedAuthentication , .Cm HostbasedUsesNameFromPacketOnly , .Cm IgnoreRhosts , .Cm Include , .Cm IPQoS , .Cm KbdInteractiveAuthentication , .Cm KerberosAuthentication , .Cm LogLevel , .Cm MaxAuthTries , .Cm MaxSessions , .Cm PasswordAuthentication , .Cm PermitEmptyPasswords , .Cm PermitListen , .Cm PermitOpen , .Cm PermitRootLogin , .Cm PermitTTY , .Cm PermitTunnel , .Cm PermitUserRC , .Cm PubkeyAcceptedAlgorithms , .Cm PubkeyAuthentication , .Cm PubkeyAuthOptions , .Cm RekeyLimit , .Cm RevokedKeys , .Cm RDomain , .Cm SetEnv , .Cm StreamLocalBindMask , .Cm StreamLocalBindUnlink , .Cm TrustedUserCAKeys , .Cm UnusedConnectionTimeout , .Cm X11DisplayOffset , .Cm X11Forwarding and .Cm X11UseLocalhost . .It Cm MaxAuthTries Specifies the maximum number of authentication attempts permitted per connection. Once the number of failures reaches half this value, additional failures are logged. The default is 6. .It Cm MaxSessions Specifies the maximum number of open shell, login or subsystem (e.g. sftp) sessions permitted per network connection. Multiple sessions may be established by clients that support connection multiplexing. Setting .Cm MaxSessions to 1 will effectively disable session multiplexing, whereas setting it to 0 will prevent all shell, login and subsystem sessions while still permitting forwarding. The default is 10. .It Cm MaxStartups Specifies the maximum number of concurrent unauthenticated connections to the SSH daemon. Additional connections will be dropped until authentication succeeds or the .Cm LoginGraceTime expires for a connection. The default is 10:30:100. .Pp Alternatively, random early drop can be enabled by specifying the three colon separated values start:rate:full (e.g. "10:30:60"). .Xr sshd 8 will refuse connection attempts with a probability of rate/100 (30%) if there are currently start (10) unauthenticated connections. The probability increases linearly and all connection attempts are refused if the number of unauthenticated connections reaches full (60). .It Cm ModuliFile Specifies the .Xr moduli 5 file that contains the Diffie-Hellman groups used for the .Dq diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha1 and .Dq diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha256 key exchange methods. The default is .Pa /etc/moduli . .It Cm PasswordAuthentication Specifies whether password authentication is allowed. Note that passwords may also be accepted via .Cm KbdInteractiveAuthentication . See also .Cm UsePAM . The default is .Cm no . .It Cm PermitEmptyPasswords When password authentication is allowed, it specifies whether the server allows login to accounts with empty password strings. The default is .Cm no . .It Cm PermitListen Specifies the addresses/ports on which a remote TCP port forwarding may listen. The listen specification must be one of the following forms: .Pp .Bl -item -offset indent -compact .It .Cm PermitListen .Sm off .Ar port .Sm on .It .Cm PermitListen .Sm off .Ar host : port .Sm on .El .Pp Multiple permissions may be specified by separating them with whitespace. An argument of .Cm any can be used to remove all restrictions and permit any listen requests. An argument of .Cm none can be used to prohibit all listen requests. The host name may contain wildcards as described in the PATTERNS section in .Xr ssh_config 5 . The wildcard .Sq * can also be used in place of a port number to allow all ports. By default all port forwarding listen requests are permitted. Note that the .Cm GatewayPorts option may further restrict which addresses may be listened on. Note also that .Xr ssh 1 will request a listen host of .Dq localhost if no listen host was specifically requested, and this name is treated differently to explicit localhost addresses of .Dq 127.0.0.1 and .Dq ::1 . .It Cm PermitOpen Specifies the destinations to which TCP port forwarding is permitted. The forwarding specification must be one of the following forms: .Pp .Bl -item -offset indent -compact .It .Cm PermitOpen .Sm off .Ar host : port .Sm on .It .Cm PermitOpen .Sm off .Ar IPv4_addr : port .Sm on .It .Cm PermitOpen .Sm off .Ar \&[ IPv6_addr \&] : port .Sm on .El .Pp Multiple forwards may be specified by separating them with whitespace. An argument of .Cm any can be used to remove all restrictions and permit any forwarding requests. An argument of .Cm none can be used to prohibit all forwarding requests. The wildcard .Sq * can be used for host or port to allow all hosts or ports respectively. Otherwise, no pattern matching or address lookups are performed on supplied names. By default all port forwarding requests are permitted. .It Cm PermitRootLogin Specifies whether root can log in using .Xr ssh 1 . The argument must be .Cm yes , .Cm prohibit-password , .Cm forced-commands-only , or .Cm no . The default is .Cm no . Note that if .Cm ChallengeResponseAuthentication and .Cm UsePAM are both .Cm yes , this setting may be overridden by the PAM policy. .Pp If this option is set to .Cm prohibit-password (or its deprecated alias, .Cm without-password ) , password and keyboard-interactive authentication are disabled for root. .Pp If this option is set to .Cm forced-commands-only , root login with public key authentication will be allowed, but only if the .Ar command option has been specified (which may be useful for taking remote backups even if root login is normally not allowed). All other authentication methods are disabled for root. .Pp If this option is set to .Cm no , root is not allowed to log in. .It Cm PermitTTY Specifies whether .Xr pty 4 allocation is permitted. The default is .Cm yes . .It Cm PermitTunnel Specifies whether .Xr tun 4 device forwarding is allowed. The argument must be .Cm yes , .Cm point-to-point (layer 3), .Cm ethernet (layer 2), or .Cm no . Specifying .Cm yes permits both .Cm point-to-point and .Cm ethernet . The default is .Cm no . .Pp Independent of this setting, the permissions of the selected .Xr tun 4 device must allow access to the user. .It Cm PermitUserEnvironment Specifies whether .Pa ~/.ssh/environment and .Cm environment= options in .Pa ~/.ssh/authorized_keys are processed by .Xr sshd 8 . Valid options are .Cm yes , .Cm no or a pattern-list specifying which environment variable names to accept (for example .Qq LANG,LC_* ) . The default is .Cm no . Enabling environment processing may enable users to bypass access restrictions in some configurations using mechanisms such as .Ev LD_PRELOAD . .It Cm PermitUserRC Specifies whether any .Pa ~/.ssh/rc file is executed. The default is .Cm yes . .It Cm PerSourceMaxStartups Specifies the number of unauthenticated connections allowed from a given source address, or .Dq none if there is no limit. This limit is applied in addition to .Cm MaxStartups , whichever is lower. The default is .Cm none . .It Cm PerSourceNetBlockSize Specifies the number of bits of source address that are grouped together for the purposes of applying PerSourceMaxStartups limits. Values for IPv4 and optionally IPv6 may be specified, separated by a colon. The default is .Cm 32:128 , which means each address is considered individually. .It Cm PidFile Specifies the file that contains the process ID of the SSH daemon, or .Cm none to not write one. The default is .Pa /var/run/sshd.pid . .It Cm Port Specifies the port number that .Xr sshd 8 listens on. The default is 22. Multiple options of this type are permitted. See also .Cm ListenAddress . .It Cm PrintLastLog Specifies whether .Xr sshd 8 should print the date and time of the last user login when a user logs in interactively. The default is .Cm yes . .It Cm PrintMotd Specifies whether .Xr sshd 8 should print .Pa /etc/motd when a user logs in interactively. (On some systems it is also printed by the shell, .Pa /etc/profile , or equivalent.) The default is .Cm yes . .It Cm PubkeyAcceptedAlgorithms Specifies the signature algorithms that will be accepted for public key authentication as a list of comma-separated patterns. Alternately if the specified list begins with a .Sq + character, then the specified algorithms will be appended to the default set instead of replacing them. If the specified list begins with a .Sq - character, then the specified algorithms (including wildcards) will be removed from the default set instead of replacing them. If the specified list begins with a .Sq ^ character, then the specified algorithms will be placed at the head of the default set. The default for this option is: .Bd -literal -offset 3n ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com, ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com, ecdsa-sha2-nistp384-cert-v01@openssh.com, ecdsa-sha2-nistp521-cert-v01@openssh.com, sk-ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com, sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com, rsa-sha2-512-cert-v01@openssh.com, rsa-sha2-256-cert-v01@openssh.com, ssh-ed25519, ecdsa-sha2-nistp256,ecdsa-sha2-nistp384,ecdsa-sha2-nistp521, sk-ssh-ed25519@openssh.com, sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256@openssh.com, rsa-sha2-512,rsa-sha2-256 .Ed .Pp The list of available signature algorithms may also be obtained using .Qq ssh -Q PubkeyAcceptedAlgorithms . .It Cm PubkeyAuthOptions Sets one or more public key authentication options. The supported keywords are: .Cm none (the default; indicating no additional options are enabled), .Cm touch-required and .Cm verify-required . .Pp The .Cm touch-required option causes public key authentication using a FIDO authenticator algorithm (i.e.\& .Cm ecdsa-sk or .Cm ed25519-sk ) to always require the signature to attest that a physically present user explicitly confirmed the authentication (usually by touching the authenticator). By default, .Xr sshd 8 requires user presence unless overridden with an authorized_keys option. The .Cm touch-required flag disables this override. .Pp The .Cm verify-required option requires a FIDO key signature attest that the user was verified, e.g. via a PIN. .Pp Neither the .Cm touch-required or .Cm verify-required options have any effect for other, non-FIDO, public key types. .It Cm PubkeyAuthentication Specifies whether public key authentication is allowed. The default is .Cm yes . .It Cm RekeyLimit Specifies the maximum amount of data that may be transmitted or received before the session key is renegotiated, optionally followed by a maximum amount of time that may pass before the session key is renegotiated. The first argument is specified in bytes and may have a suffix of .Sq K , .Sq M , or .Sq G to indicate Kilobytes, Megabytes, or Gigabytes, respectively. The default is between .Sq 1G and .Sq 4G , depending on the cipher. The optional second value is specified in seconds and may use any of the units documented in the .Sx TIME FORMATS section. The default value for .Cm RekeyLimit is .Cm default none , which means that rekeying is performed after the cipher's default amount of data has been sent or received and no time based rekeying is done. .It Cm RequiredRSASize Specifies the minimum RSA key size (in bits) that .Xr sshd 8 will accept. User and host-based authentication keys smaller than this limit will be refused. The default is .Cm 1024 bits. Note that this limit may only be raised from the default. .It Cm RevokedKeys Specifies revoked public keys file, or .Cm none to not use one. Keys listed in this file will be refused for public key authentication. Note that if this file is not readable, then public key authentication will be refused for all users. Keys may be specified as a text file, listing one public key per line, or as an OpenSSH Key Revocation List (KRL) as generated by .Xr ssh-keygen 1 . For more information on KRLs, see the KEY REVOCATION LISTS section in .Xr ssh-keygen 1 . .It Cm RDomain Specifies an explicit routing domain that is applied after authentication has completed. The user session, as well as any forwarded or listening IP sockets, will be bound to this .Xr rdomain 4 . If the routing domain is set to .Cm \&%D , then the domain in which the incoming connection was received will be applied. .It Cm SecurityKeyProvider Specifies a path to a library that will be used when loading FIDO authenticator-hosted keys, overriding the default of using the built-in USB HID support. .It Cm SetEnv Specifies one or more environment variables to set in child sessions started by .Xr sshd 8 as .Dq NAME=VALUE . The environment value may be quoted (e.g. if it contains whitespace characters). Environment variables set by .Cm SetEnv override the default environment and any variables specified by the user via .Cm AcceptEnv or .Cm PermitUserEnvironment . .It Cm StreamLocalBindMask Sets the octal file creation mode mask .Pq umask used when creating a Unix-domain socket file for local or remote port forwarding. This option is only used for port forwarding to a Unix-domain socket file. .Pp The default value is 0177, which creates a Unix-domain socket file that is readable and writable only by the owner. Note that not all operating systems honor the file mode on Unix-domain socket files. .It Cm StreamLocalBindUnlink Specifies whether to remove an existing Unix-domain socket file for local or remote port forwarding before creating a new one. If the socket file already exists and .Cm StreamLocalBindUnlink is not enabled, .Nm sshd will be unable to forward the port to the Unix-domain socket file. This option is only used for port forwarding to a Unix-domain socket file. .Pp The argument must be .Cm yes or .Cm no . The default is .Cm no . .It Cm StrictModes Specifies whether .Xr sshd 8 should check file modes and ownership of the user's files and home directory before accepting login. This is normally desirable because novices sometimes accidentally leave their directory or files world-writable. The default is .Cm yes . Note that this does not apply to .Cm ChrootDirectory , whose permissions and ownership are checked unconditionally. .It Cm Subsystem Configures an external subsystem (e.g. file transfer daemon). Arguments should be a subsystem name and a command (with optional arguments) to execute upon subsystem request. .Pp The command .Cm sftp-server implements the SFTP file transfer subsystem. .Pp Alternately the name .Cm internal-sftp implements an in-process SFTP server. This may simplify configurations using .Cm ChrootDirectory to force a different filesystem root on clients. .Pp By default no subsystems are defined. .It Cm SyslogFacility Gives the facility code that is used when logging messages from .Xr sshd 8 . The possible values are: DAEMON, USER, AUTH, LOCAL0, LOCAL1, LOCAL2, LOCAL3, LOCAL4, LOCAL5, LOCAL6, LOCAL7. The default is AUTH. .It Cm TCPKeepAlive Specifies whether the system should send TCP keepalive messages to the other side. If they are sent, death of the connection or crash of one of the machines will be properly noticed. However, this means that connections will die if the route is down temporarily, and some people find it annoying. On the other hand, if TCP keepalives are not sent, sessions may hang indefinitely on the server, leaving .Qq ghost users and consuming server resources. .Pp The default is .Cm yes (to send TCP keepalive messages), and the server will notice if the network goes down or the client host crashes. This avoids infinitely hanging sessions. .Pp To disable TCP keepalive messages, the value should be set to .Cm no . .It Cm TrustedUserCAKeys Specifies a file containing public keys of certificate authorities that are trusted to sign user certificates for authentication, or .Cm none to not use one. Keys are listed one per line; empty lines and comments starting with .Ql # are allowed. If a certificate is presented for authentication and has its signing CA key listed in this file, then it may be used for authentication for any user listed in the certificate's principals list. Note that certificates that lack a list of principals will not be permitted for authentication using .Cm TrustedUserCAKeys . For more details on certificates, see the CERTIFICATES section in .Xr ssh-keygen 1 . .It Cm UnusedConnectionTimeout Specifies whether and how quickly .Xr sshd 8 should close client connections with no open channels. Open channels include active shell, command execution or subsystem sessions, connected network, socket, agent or X11 forwardings. Forwarding listeners, such as those from the .Xr ssh 1 .Fl R flag, are not considered as open channels and do not prevent the timeout. The timeout value is specified in seconds or may use any of the units documented in the .Sx TIME FORMATS section. .Pp Note that this timeout starts when the client connection completes user authentication but before the client has an opportunity to open any channels. Caution should be used when using short timeout values, as they may not provide sufficient time for the client to request and open its channels before terminating the connection. .Pp The default .Cm none is to never expire connections for having no open channels. This option may be useful in conjunction with .Cm ChannelTimeout . .It Cm UseBlacklist Specifies whether .Xr sshd 8 attempts to send authentication success and failure messages to the .Xr blacklistd 8 daemon. The default is .Cm no . For forward compatibility with an upcoming .Xr blacklistd rename, the .Cm UseBlocklist alias can be used instead. .It Cm UseDNS Specifies whether .Xr sshd 8 should look up the remote host name, and to check that the resolved host name for the remote IP address maps back to the very same IP address. .Pp If this option is set to .Cm no , then only addresses and not host names may be used in .Pa ~/.ssh/authorized_keys .Cm from and .Nm .Cm Match .Cm Host directives. The default is .Dq yes . .It Cm UsePAM Enables the Pluggable Authentication Module interface. If set to .Cm yes this will enable PAM authentication using .Cm KbdInteractiveAuthentication and .Cm PasswordAuthentication in addition to PAM account and session module processing for all authentication types. .Pp Because PAM keyboard-interactive authentication usually serves an equivalent role to password authentication, you should disable either .Cm PasswordAuthentication or .Cm KbdInteractiveAuthentication . .Pp If .Cm UsePAM is enabled, you will not be able to run .Xr sshd 8 as a non-root user. The default is .Cm yes . .It Cm VersionAddendum Optionally specifies additional text to append to the SSH protocol banner sent by the server upon connection. The default is -.Qq FreeBSD-20230205 . +.Qq FreeBSD-20230316 . The value .Cm none may be used to disable this. .It Cm X11DisplayOffset Specifies the first display number available for .Xr sshd 8 Ns 's X11 forwarding. This prevents sshd from interfering with real X11 servers. The default is 10. .It Cm X11Forwarding Specifies whether X11 forwarding is permitted. The argument must be .Cm yes or .Cm no . The default is .Cm no . .Pp When X11 forwarding is enabled, there may be additional exposure to the server and to client displays if the .Xr sshd 8 proxy display is configured to listen on the wildcard address (see .Cm X11UseLocalhost ) , though this is not the default. Additionally, the authentication spoofing and authentication data verification and substitution occur on the client side. The security risk of using X11 forwarding is that the client's X11 display server may be exposed to attack when the SSH client requests forwarding (see the warnings for .Cm ForwardX11 in .Xr ssh_config 5 ) . A system administrator may have a stance in which they want to protect clients that may expose themselves to attack by unwittingly requesting X11 forwarding, which can warrant a .Cm no setting. .Pp Note that disabling X11 forwarding does not prevent users from forwarding X11 traffic, as users can always install their own forwarders. .It Cm X11UseLocalhost Specifies whether .Xr sshd 8 should bind the X11 forwarding server to the loopback address or to the wildcard address. By default, sshd binds the forwarding server to the loopback address and sets the hostname part of the .Ev DISPLAY environment variable to .Cm localhost . This prevents remote hosts from connecting to the proxy display. However, some older X11 clients may not function with this configuration. .Cm X11UseLocalhost may be set to .Cm no to specify that the forwarding server should be bound to the wildcard address. The argument must be .Cm yes or .Cm no . The default is .Cm yes . .It Cm XAuthLocation Specifies the full pathname of the .Xr xauth 1 program, or .Cm none to not use one. The default is .Pa /usr/local/bin/xauth . .El .Sh TIME FORMATS .Xr sshd 8 command-line arguments and configuration file options that specify time may be expressed using a sequence of the form: .Sm off .Ar time Op Ar qualifier , .Sm on where .Ar time is a positive integer value and .Ar qualifier is one of the following: .Pp .Bl -tag -width Ds -compact -offset indent .It Aq Cm none seconds .It Cm s | Cm S seconds .It Cm m | Cm M minutes .It Cm h | Cm H hours .It Cm d | Cm D days .It Cm w | Cm W weeks .El .Pp Each member of the sequence is added together to calculate the total time value. .Pp Time format examples: .Pp .Bl -tag -width Ds -compact -offset indent .It 600 600 seconds (10 minutes) .It 10m 10 minutes .It 1h30m 1 hour 30 minutes (90 minutes) .El .Sh TOKENS Arguments to some keywords can make use of tokens, which are expanded at runtime: .Pp .Bl -tag -width XXXX -offset indent -compact .It %% A literal .Sq % . .It \&%D The routing domain in which the incoming connection was received. .It %F The fingerprint of the CA key. .It %f The fingerprint of the key or certificate. .It %h The home directory of the user. .It %i The key ID in the certificate. .It %K The base64-encoded CA key. .It %k The base64-encoded key or certificate for authentication. .It %s The serial number of the certificate. .It \&%T The type of the CA key. .It %t The key or certificate type. .It \&%U The numeric user ID of the target user. .It %u The username. .El .Pp .Cm AuthorizedKeysCommand accepts the tokens %%, %f, %h, %k, %t, %U, and %u. .Pp .Cm AuthorizedKeysFile accepts the tokens %%, %h, %U, and %u. .Pp .Cm AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand accepts the tokens %%, %F, %f, %h, %i, %K, %k, %s, %T, %t, %U, and %u. .Pp .Cm AuthorizedPrincipalsFile accepts the tokens %%, %h, %U, and %u. .Pp .Cm ChrootDirectory accepts the tokens %%, %h, %U, and %u. .Pp .Cm RoutingDomain accepts the token %D. .Sh FILES .Bl -tag -width Ds .It Pa /etc/ssh/sshd_config Contains configuration data for .Xr sshd 8 . This file should be writable by root only, but it is recommended (though not necessary) that it be world-readable. .El .Sh SEE ALSO .Xr sftp-server 8 , .Xr sshd 8 .Sh AUTHORS .An -nosplit OpenSSH is a derivative of the original and free ssh 1.2.12 release by .An Tatu Ylonen . .An Aaron Campbell , Bob Beck , Markus Friedl , Niels Provos , .An Theo de Raadt and .An Dug Song removed many bugs, re-added newer features and created OpenSSH. .An Markus Friedl contributed the support for SSH protocol versions 1.5 and 2.0. .An Niels Provos and .An Markus Friedl contributed support for privilege separation. diff --git a/crypto/openssh/umac.c b/crypto/openssh/umac.c index a710424ce0fd..d5958babfd34 100644 --- a/crypto/openssh/umac.c +++ b/crypto/openssh/umac.c @@ -1,1282 +1,1283 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: umac.c,v 1.22 2022/01/01 05:55:06 jsg Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: umac.c,v 1.23 2023/03/07 01:30:52 djm Exp $ */ /* ----------------------------------------------------------------------- * * umac.c -- C Implementation UMAC Message Authentication * * Version 0.93b of rfc4418.txt -- 2006 July 18 * * For a full description of UMAC message authentication see the UMAC * world-wide-web page at http://www.cs.ucdavis.edu/~rogaway/umac * Please report bugs and suggestions to the UMAC webpage. * * Copyright (c) 1999-2006 Ted Krovetz * * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software and * its documentation for any purpose and with or without fee, is hereby * granted provided that the above copyright notice appears in all copies * and in supporting documentation, and that the name of the copyright * holder not be used in advertising or publicity pertaining to * distribution of the software without specific, written prior permission. * * Comments should be directed to Ted Krovetz (tdk@acm.org) * * ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */ /* ////////////////////// IMPORTANT NOTES ///////////////////////////////// * * 1) This version does not work properly on messages larger than 16MB * * 2) If you set the switch to use SSE2, then all data must be 16-byte * aligned * * 3) When calling the function umac(), it is assumed that msg is in * a writable buffer of length divisible by 32 bytes. The message itself * does not have to fill the entire buffer, but bytes beyond msg may be * zeroed. * * 4) Three free AES implementations are supported by this implementation of * UMAC. Paulo Barreto's version is in the public domain and can be found * at http://www.esat.kuleuven.ac.be/~rijmen/rijndael/ (search for * "Barreto"). The only two files needed are rijndael-alg-fst.c and * rijndael-alg-fst.h. Brian Gladman's version is distributed with the GNU * Public license at http://fp.gladman.plus.com/AES/index.htm. It * includes a fast IA-32 assembly version. The OpenSSL crypo library is * the third. * * 5) With FORCE_C_ONLY flags set to 0, incorrect results are sometimes * produced under gcc with optimizations set -O3 or higher. Dunno why. * /////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////// */ /* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */ /* --- User Switches ---------------------------------------------------- */ /* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */ #ifndef UMAC_OUTPUT_LEN #define UMAC_OUTPUT_LEN 8 /* Alowable: 4, 8, 12, 16 */ #endif #if UMAC_OUTPUT_LEN != 4 && UMAC_OUTPUT_LEN != 8 && \ UMAC_OUTPUT_LEN != 12 && UMAC_OUTPUT_LEN != 16 # error UMAC_OUTPUT_LEN must be defined to 4, 8, 12 or 16 #endif /* #define FORCE_C_ONLY 1 ANSI C and 64-bit integers req'd */ /* #define AES_IMPLEMENTAION 1 1 = OpenSSL, 2 = Barreto, 3 = Gladman */ /* #define SSE2 0 Is SSE2 is available? */ /* #define RUN_TESTS 0 Run basic correctness/speed tests */ /* #define UMAC_AE_SUPPORT 0 Enable authenticated encryption */ /* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */ /* -- Global Includes --------------------------------------------------- */ /* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */ #include "includes.h" #include #include #include #include #include #include #include "xmalloc.h" #include "umac.h" #include "misc.h" /* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */ /* --- Primitive Data Types --- */ /* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */ /* The following assumptions may need change on your system */ typedef u_int8_t UINT8; /* 1 byte */ typedef u_int16_t UINT16; /* 2 byte */ typedef u_int32_t UINT32; /* 4 byte */ typedef u_int64_t UINT64; /* 8 bytes */ typedef unsigned int UWORD; /* Register */ /* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */ /* --- Constants -------------------------------------------------------- */ /* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */ #define UMAC_KEY_LEN 16 /* UMAC takes 16 bytes of external key */ /* Message "words" are read from memory in an endian-specific manner. */ /* For this implementation to behave correctly, __LITTLE_ENDIAN__ must */ /* be set true if the host computer is little-endian. */ #if BYTE_ORDER == LITTLE_ENDIAN #define __LITTLE_ENDIAN__ 1 #else #define __LITTLE_ENDIAN__ 0 #endif /* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */ /* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */ /* ----- Architecture Specific ------------------------------------------ */ /* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */ /* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */ /* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */ /* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */ /* ----- Primitive Routines --------------------------------------------- */ /* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */ /* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */ /* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */ /* --- 32-bit by 32-bit to 64-bit Multiplication ------------------------ */ /* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */ #define MUL64(a,b) ((UINT64)((UINT64)(UINT32)(a) * (UINT64)(UINT32)(b))) /* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */ /* --- Endian Conversion --- Forcing assembly on some platforms */ /* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */ #if (__LITTLE_ENDIAN__) #define LOAD_UINT32_REVERSED(p) get_u32(p) #define STORE_UINT32_REVERSED(p,v) put_u32(p,v) #else #define LOAD_UINT32_REVERSED(p) get_u32_le(p) #define STORE_UINT32_REVERSED(p,v) put_u32_le(p,v) #endif #define LOAD_UINT32_LITTLE(p) (get_u32_le(p)) #define STORE_UINT32_BIG(p,v) put_u32(p, v) /* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */ /* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */ /* ----- Begin KDF & PDF Section ---------------------------------------- */ /* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */ /* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */ /* UMAC uses AES with 16 byte block and key lengths */ #define AES_BLOCK_LEN 16 /* OpenSSL's AES */ #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL #include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h" #ifndef USE_BUILTIN_RIJNDAEL # include #endif typedef AES_KEY aes_int_key[1]; #define aes_encryption(in,out,int_key) \ AES_encrypt((u_char *)(in),(u_char *)(out),(AES_KEY *)int_key) #define aes_key_setup(key,int_key) \ AES_set_encrypt_key((const u_char *)(key),UMAC_KEY_LEN*8,int_key) #else #include "rijndael.h" #define AES_ROUNDS ((UMAC_KEY_LEN / 4) + 6) typedef UINT8 aes_int_key[AES_ROUNDS+1][4][4]; /* AES internal */ #define aes_encryption(in,out,int_key) \ rijndaelEncrypt((u32 *)(int_key), AES_ROUNDS, (u8 *)(in), (u8 *)(out)) #define aes_key_setup(key,int_key) \ rijndaelKeySetupEnc((u32 *)(int_key), (const unsigned char *)(key), \ UMAC_KEY_LEN*8) #endif /* The user-supplied UMAC key is stretched using AES in a counter * mode to supply all random bits needed by UMAC. The kdf function takes * an AES internal key representation 'key' and writes a stream of * 'nbytes' bytes to the memory pointed at by 'bufp'. Each distinct * 'ndx' causes a distinct byte stream. */ static void kdf(void *bufp, aes_int_key key, UINT8 ndx, int nbytes) { UINT8 in_buf[AES_BLOCK_LEN] = {0}; UINT8 out_buf[AES_BLOCK_LEN]; UINT8 *dst_buf = (UINT8 *)bufp; int i; /* Setup the initial value */ in_buf[AES_BLOCK_LEN-9] = ndx; in_buf[AES_BLOCK_LEN-1] = i = 1; while (nbytes >= AES_BLOCK_LEN) { aes_encryption(in_buf, out_buf, key); memcpy(dst_buf,out_buf,AES_BLOCK_LEN); in_buf[AES_BLOCK_LEN-1] = ++i; nbytes -= AES_BLOCK_LEN; dst_buf += AES_BLOCK_LEN; } if (nbytes) { aes_encryption(in_buf, out_buf, key); memcpy(dst_buf,out_buf,nbytes); } explicit_bzero(in_buf, sizeof(in_buf)); explicit_bzero(out_buf, sizeof(out_buf)); } /* The final UHASH result is XOR'd with the output of a pseudorandom * function. Here, we use AES to generate random output and * xor the appropriate bytes depending on the last bits of nonce. * This scheme is optimized for sequential, increasing big-endian nonces. */ typedef struct { UINT8 cache[AES_BLOCK_LEN]; /* Previous AES output is saved */ UINT8 nonce[AES_BLOCK_LEN]; /* The AES input making above cache */ aes_int_key prf_key; /* Expanded AES key for PDF */ } pdf_ctx; static void pdf_init(pdf_ctx *pc, aes_int_key prf_key) { UINT8 buf[UMAC_KEY_LEN]; kdf(buf, prf_key, 0, UMAC_KEY_LEN); aes_key_setup(buf, pc->prf_key); /* Initialize pdf and cache */ memset(pc->nonce, 0, sizeof(pc->nonce)); aes_encryption(pc->nonce, pc->cache, pc->prf_key); explicit_bzero(buf, sizeof(buf)); } -static void pdf_gen_xor(pdf_ctx *pc, const UINT8 nonce[8], UINT8 buf[8]) +static void pdf_gen_xor(pdf_ctx *pc, const UINT8 nonce[8], + UINT8 buf[UMAC_OUTPUT_LEN]) { /* 'ndx' indicates that we'll be using the 0th or 1st eight bytes * of the AES output. If last time around we returned the ndx-1st * element, then we may have the result in the cache already. */ #if (UMAC_OUTPUT_LEN == 4) #define LOW_BIT_MASK 3 #elif (UMAC_OUTPUT_LEN == 8) #define LOW_BIT_MASK 1 #elif (UMAC_OUTPUT_LEN > 8) #define LOW_BIT_MASK 0 #endif union { UINT8 tmp_nonce_lo[4]; UINT32 align; } t; #if LOW_BIT_MASK != 0 int ndx = nonce[7] & LOW_BIT_MASK; #endif *(UINT32 *)t.tmp_nonce_lo = ((const UINT32 *)nonce)[1]; t.tmp_nonce_lo[3] &= ~LOW_BIT_MASK; /* zero last bit */ if ( (((UINT32 *)t.tmp_nonce_lo)[0] != ((UINT32 *)pc->nonce)[1]) || (((const UINT32 *)nonce)[0] != ((UINT32 *)pc->nonce)[0]) ) { ((UINT32 *)pc->nonce)[0] = ((const UINT32 *)nonce)[0]; ((UINT32 *)pc->nonce)[1] = ((UINT32 *)t.tmp_nonce_lo)[0]; aes_encryption(pc->nonce, pc->cache, pc->prf_key); } #if (UMAC_OUTPUT_LEN == 4) *((UINT32 *)buf) ^= ((UINT32 *)pc->cache)[ndx]; #elif (UMAC_OUTPUT_LEN == 8) *((UINT64 *)buf) ^= ((UINT64 *)pc->cache)[ndx]; #elif (UMAC_OUTPUT_LEN == 12) ((UINT64 *)buf)[0] ^= ((UINT64 *)pc->cache)[0]; ((UINT32 *)buf)[2] ^= ((UINT32 *)pc->cache)[2]; #elif (UMAC_OUTPUT_LEN == 16) ((UINT64 *)buf)[0] ^= ((UINT64 *)pc->cache)[0]; ((UINT64 *)buf)[1] ^= ((UINT64 *)pc->cache)[1]; #endif } /* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */ /* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */ /* ----- Begin NH Hash Section ------------------------------------------ */ /* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */ /* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */ /* The NH-based hash functions used in UMAC are described in the UMAC paper * and specification, both of which can be found at the UMAC website. * The interface to this implementation has two * versions, one expects the entire message being hashed to be passed * in a single buffer and returns the hash result immediately. The second * allows the message to be passed in a sequence of buffers. In the * multiple-buffer interface, the client calls the routine nh_update() as * many times as necessary. When there is no more data to be fed to the * hash, the client calls nh_final() which calculates the hash output. * Before beginning another hash calculation the nh_reset() routine * must be called. The single-buffer routine, nh(), is equivalent to * the sequence of calls nh_update() and nh_final(); however it is * optimized and should be preferred whenever the multiple-buffer interface * is not necessary. When using either interface, it is the client's * responsibility to pass no more than L1_KEY_LEN bytes per hash result. * * The routine nh_init() initializes the nh_ctx data structure and * must be called once, before any other PDF routine. */ /* The "nh_aux" routines do the actual NH hashing work. They * expect buffers to be multiples of L1_PAD_BOUNDARY. These routines * produce output for all STREAMS NH iterations in one call, * allowing the parallel implementation of the streams. */ #define STREAMS (UMAC_OUTPUT_LEN / 4) /* Number of times hash is applied */ #define L1_KEY_LEN 1024 /* Internal key bytes */ #define L1_KEY_SHIFT 16 /* Toeplitz key shift between streams */ #define L1_PAD_BOUNDARY 32 /* pad message to boundary multiple */ #define ALLOC_BOUNDARY 16 /* Keep buffers aligned to this */ #define HASH_BUF_BYTES 64 /* nh_aux_hb buffer multiple */ typedef struct { UINT8 nh_key [L1_KEY_LEN + L1_KEY_SHIFT * (STREAMS - 1)]; /* NH Key */ UINT8 data [HASH_BUF_BYTES]; /* Incoming data buffer */ int next_data_empty; /* Bookkeeping variable for data buffer. */ int bytes_hashed; /* Bytes (out of L1_KEY_LEN) incorporated. */ UINT64 state[STREAMS]; /* on-line state */ } nh_ctx; #if (UMAC_OUTPUT_LEN == 4) static void nh_aux(void *kp, const void *dp, void *hp, UINT32 dlen) /* NH hashing primitive. Previous (partial) hash result is loaded and * then stored via hp pointer. The length of the data pointed at by "dp", * "dlen", is guaranteed to be divisible by L1_PAD_BOUNDARY (32). Key * is expected to be endian compensated in memory at key setup. */ { UINT64 h; UWORD c = dlen / 32; UINT32 *k = (UINT32 *)kp; const UINT32 *d = (const UINT32 *)dp; UINT32 d0,d1,d2,d3,d4,d5,d6,d7; UINT32 k0,k1,k2,k3,k4,k5,k6,k7; h = *((UINT64 *)hp); do { d0 = LOAD_UINT32_LITTLE(d+0); d1 = LOAD_UINT32_LITTLE(d+1); d2 = LOAD_UINT32_LITTLE(d+2); d3 = LOAD_UINT32_LITTLE(d+3); d4 = LOAD_UINT32_LITTLE(d+4); d5 = LOAD_UINT32_LITTLE(d+5); d6 = LOAD_UINT32_LITTLE(d+6); d7 = LOAD_UINT32_LITTLE(d+7); k0 = *(k+0); k1 = *(k+1); k2 = *(k+2); k3 = *(k+3); k4 = *(k+4); k5 = *(k+5); k6 = *(k+6); k7 = *(k+7); h += MUL64((k0 + d0), (k4 + d4)); h += MUL64((k1 + d1), (k5 + d5)); h += MUL64((k2 + d2), (k6 + d6)); h += MUL64((k3 + d3), (k7 + d7)); d += 8; k += 8; } while (--c); *((UINT64 *)hp) = h; } #elif (UMAC_OUTPUT_LEN == 8) static void nh_aux(void *kp, const void *dp, void *hp, UINT32 dlen) /* Same as previous nh_aux, but two streams are handled in one pass, * reading and writing 16 bytes of hash-state per call. */ { UINT64 h1,h2; UWORD c = dlen / 32; UINT32 *k = (UINT32 *)kp; const UINT32 *d = (const UINT32 *)dp; UINT32 d0,d1,d2,d3,d4,d5,d6,d7; UINT32 k0,k1,k2,k3,k4,k5,k6,k7, k8,k9,k10,k11; h1 = *((UINT64 *)hp); h2 = *((UINT64 *)hp + 1); k0 = *(k+0); k1 = *(k+1); k2 = *(k+2); k3 = *(k+3); do { d0 = LOAD_UINT32_LITTLE(d+0); d1 = LOAD_UINT32_LITTLE(d+1); d2 = LOAD_UINT32_LITTLE(d+2); d3 = LOAD_UINT32_LITTLE(d+3); d4 = LOAD_UINT32_LITTLE(d+4); d5 = LOAD_UINT32_LITTLE(d+5); d6 = LOAD_UINT32_LITTLE(d+6); d7 = LOAD_UINT32_LITTLE(d+7); k4 = *(k+4); k5 = *(k+5); k6 = *(k+6); k7 = *(k+7); k8 = *(k+8); k9 = *(k+9); k10 = *(k+10); k11 = *(k+11); h1 += MUL64((k0 + d0), (k4 + d4)); h2 += MUL64((k4 + d0), (k8 + d4)); h1 += MUL64((k1 + d1), (k5 + d5)); h2 += MUL64((k5 + d1), (k9 + d5)); h1 += MUL64((k2 + d2), (k6 + d6)); h2 += MUL64((k6 + d2), (k10 + d6)); h1 += MUL64((k3 + d3), (k7 + d7)); h2 += MUL64((k7 + d3), (k11 + d7)); k0 = k8; k1 = k9; k2 = k10; k3 = k11; d += 8; k += 8; } while (--c); ((UINT64 *)hp)[0] = h1; ((UINT64 *)hp)[1] = h2; } #elif (UMAC_OUTPUT_LEN == 12) static void nh_aux(void *kp, const void *dp, void *hp, UINT32 dlen) /* Same as previous nh_aux, but two streams are handled in one pass, * reading and writing 24 bytes of hash-state per call. */ { UINT64 h1,h2,h3; UWORD c = dlen / 32; UINT32 *k = (UINT32 *)kp; const UINT32 *d = (const UINT32 *)dp; UINT32 d0,d1,d2,d3,d4,d5,d6,d7; UINT32 k0,k1,k2,k3,k4,k5,k6,k7, k8,k9,k10,k11,k12,k13,k14,k15; h1 = *((UINT64 *)hp); h2 = *((UINT64 *)hp + 1); h3 = *((UINT64 *)hp + 2); k0 = *(k+0); k1 = *(k+1); k2 = *(k+2); k3 = *(k+3); k4 = *(k+4); k5 = *(k+5); k6 = *(k+6); k7 = *(k+7); do { d0 = LOAD_UINT32_LITTLE(d+0); d1 = LOAD_UINT32_LITTLE(d+1); d2 = LOAD_UINT32_LITTLE(d+2); d3 = LOAD_UINT32_LITTLE(d+3); d4 = LOAD_UINT32_LITTLE(d+4); d5 = LOAD_UINT32_LITTLE(d+5); d6 = LOAD_UINT32_LITTLE(d+6); d7 = LOAD_UINT32_LITTLE(d+7); k8 = *(k+8); k9 = *(k+9); k10 = *(k+10); k11 = *(k+11); k12 = *(k+12); k13 = *(k+13); k14 = *(k+14); k15 = *(k+15); h1 += MUL64((k0 + d0), (k4 + d4)); h2 += MUL64((k4 + d0), (k8 + d4)); h3 += MUL64((k8 + d0), (k12 + d4)); h1 += MUL64((k1 + d1), (k5 + d5)); h2 += MUL64((k5 + d1), (k9 + d5)); h3 += MUL64((k9 + d1), (k13 + d5)); h1 += MUL64((k2 + d2), (k6 + d6)); h2 += MUL64((k6 + d2), (k10 + d6)); h3 += MUL64((k10 + d2), (k14 + d6)); h1 += MUL64((k3 + d3), (k7 + d7)); h2 += MUL64((k7 + d3), (k11 + d7)); h3 += MUL64((k11 + d3), (k15 + d7)); k0 = k8; k1 = k9; k2 = k10; k3 = k11; k4 = k12; k5 = k13; k6 = k14; k7 = k15; d += 8; k += 8; } while (--c); ((UINT64 *)hp)[0] = h1; ((UINT64 *)hp)[1] = h2; ((UINT64 *)hp)[2] = h3; } #elif (UMAC_OUTPUT_LEN == 16) static void nh_aux(void *kp, const void *dp, void *hp, UINT32 dlen) /* Same as previous nh_aux, but two streams are handled in one pass, * reading and writing 24 bytes of hash-state per call. */ { UINT64 h1,h2,h3,h4; UWORD c = dlen / 32; UINT32 *k = (UINT32 *)kp; const UINT32 *d = (const UINT32 *)dp; UINT32 d0,d1,d2,d3,d4,d5,d6,d7; UINT32 k0,k1,k2,k3,k4,k5,k6,k7, k8,k9,k10,k11,k12,k13,k14,k15, k16,k17,k18,k19; h1 = *((UINT64 *)hp); h2 = *((UINT64 *)hp + 1); h3 = *((UINT64 *)hp + 2); h4 = *((UINT64 *)hp + 3); k0 = *(k+0); k1 = *(k+1); k2 = *(k+2); k3 = *(k+3); k4 = *(k+4); k5 = *(k+5); k6 = *(k+6); k7 = *(k+7); do { d0 = LOAD_UINT32_LITTLE(d+0); d1 = LOAD_UINT32_LITTLE(d+1); d2 = LOAD_UINT32_LITTLE(d+2); d3 = LOAD_UINT32_LITTLE(d+3); d4 = LOAD_UINT32_LITTLE(d+4); d5 = LOAD_UINT32_LITTLE(d+5); d6 = LOAD_UINT32_LITTLE(d+6); d7 = LOAD_UINT32_LITTLE(d+7); k8 = *(k+8); k9 = *(k+9); k10 = *(k+10); k11 = *(k+11); k12 = *(k+12); k13 = *(k+13); k14 = *(k+14); k15 = *(k+15); k16 = *(k+16); k17 = *(k+17); k18 = *(k+18); k19 = *(k+19); h1 += MUL64((k0 + d0), (k4 + d4)); h2 += MUL64((k4 + d0), (k8 + d4)); h3 += MUL64((k8 + d0), (k12 + d4)); h4 += MUL64((k12 + d0), (k16 + d4)); h1 += MUL64((k1 + d1), (k5 + d5)); h2 += MUL64((k5 + d1), (k9 + d5)); h3 += MUL64((k9 + d1), (k13 + d5)); h4 += MUL64((k13 + d1), (k17 + d5)); h1 += MUL64((k2 + d2), (k6 + d6)); h2 += MUL64((k6 + d2), (k10 + d6)); h3 += MUL64((k10 + d2), (k14 + d6)); h4 += MUL64((k14 + d2), (k18 + d6)); h1 += MUL64((k3 + d3), (k7 + d7)); h2 += MUL64((k7 + d3), (k11 + d7)); h3 += MUL64((k11 + d3), (k15 + d7)); h4 += MUL64((k15 + d3), (k19 + d7)); k0 = k8; k1 = k9; k2 = k10; k3 = k11; k4 = k12; k5 = k13; k6 = k14; k7 = k15; k8 = k16; k9 = k17; k10 = k18; k11 = k19; d += 8; k += 8; } while (--c); ((UINT64 *)hp)[0] = h1; ((UINT64 *)hp)[1] = h2; ((UINT64 *)hp)[2] = h3; ((UINT64 *)hp)[3] = h4; } /* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */ #endif /* UMAC_OUTPUT_LENGTH */ /* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */ /* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */ static void nh_transform(nh_ctx *hc, const UINT8 *buf, UINT32 nbytes) /* This function is a wrapper for the primitive NH hash functions. It takes * as argument "hc" the current hash context and a buffer which must be a * multiple of L1_PAD_BOUNDARY. The key passed to nh_aux is offset * appropriately according to how much message has been hashed already. */ { UINT8 *key; key = hc->nh_key + hc->bytes_hashed; nh_aux(key, buf, hc->state, nbytes); } /* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */ #if (__LITTLE_ENDIAN__) static void endian_convert(void *buf, UWORD bpw, UINT32 num_bytes) /* We endian convert the keys on little-endian computers to */ /* compensate for the lack of big-endian memory reads during hashing. */ { UWORD iters = num_bytes / bpw; if (bpw == 4) { UINT32 *p = (UINT32 *)buf; do { *p = LOAD_UINT32_REVERSED(p); p++; } while (--iters); } else if (bpw == 8) { UINT32 *p = (UINT32 *)buf; UINT32 t; do { t = LOAD_UINT32_REVERSED(p+1); p[1] = LOAD_UINT32_REVERSED(p); p[0] = t; p += 2; } while (--iters); } } #define endian_convert_if_le(x,y,z) endian_convert((x),(y),(z)) #else #define endian_convert_if_le(x,y,z) do{}while(0) /* Do nothing */ #endif /* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */ static void nh_reset(nh_ctx *hc) /* Reset nh_ctx to ready for hashing of new data */ { hc->bytes_hashed = 0; hc->next_data_empty = 0; hc->state[0] = 0; #if (UMAC_OUTPUT_LEN >= 8) hc->state[1] = 0; #endif #if (UMAC_OUTPUT_LEN >= 12) hc->state[2] = 0; #endif #if (UMAC_OUTPUT_LEN == 16) hc->state[3] = 0; #endif } /* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */ static void nh_init(nh_ctx *hc, aes_int_key prf_key) /* Generate nh_key, endian convert and reset to be ready for hashing. */ { kdf(hc->nh_key, prf_key, 1, sizeof(hc->nh_key)); endian_convert_if_le(hc->nh_key, 4, sizeof(hc->nh_key)); nh_reset(hc); } /* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */ static void nh_update(nh_ctx *hc, const UINT8 *buf, UINT32 nbytes) /* Incorporate nbytes of data into a nh_ctx, buffer whatever is not an */ /* even multiple of HASH_BUF_BYTES. */ { UINT32 i,j; j = hc->next_data_empty; if ((j + nbytes) >= HASH_BUF_BYTES) { if (j) { i = HASH_BUF_BYTES - j; memcpy(hc->data+j, buf, i); nh_transform(hc,hc->data,HASH_BUF_BYTES); nbytes -= i; buf += i; hc->bytes_hashed += HASH_BUF_BYTES; } if (nbytes >= HASH_BUF_BYTES) { i = nbytes & ~(HASH_BUF_BYTES - 1); nh_transform(hc, buf, i); nbytes -= i; buf += i; hc->bytes_hashed += i; } j = 0; } memcpy(hc->data + j, buf, nbytes); hc->next_data_empty = j + nbytes; } /* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */ static void zero_pad(UINT8 *p, int nbytes) { /* Write "nbytes" of zeroes, beginning at "p" */ if (nbytes >= (int)sizeof(UWORD)) { while ((ptrdiff_t)p % sizeof(UWORD)) { *p = 0; nbytes--; p++; } while (nbytes >= (int)sizeof(UWORD)) { *(UWORD *)p = 0; nbytes -= sizeof(UWORD); p += sizeof(UWORD); } } while (nbytes) { *p = 0; nbytes--; p++; } } /* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */ static void nh_final(nh_ctx *hc, UINT8 *result) /* After passing some number of data buffers to nh_update() for integration * into an NH context, nh_final is called to produce a hash result. If any * bytes are in the buffer hc->data, incorporate them into the * NH context. Finally, add into the NH accumulation "state" the total number * of bits hashed. The resulting numbers are written to the buffer "result". * If nh_update was never called, L1_PAD_BOUNDARY zeroes are incorporated. */ { int nh_len, nbits; if (hc->next_data_empty != 0) { nh_len = ((hc->next_data_empty + (L1_PAD_BOUNDARY - 1)) & ~(L1_PAD_BOUNDARY - 1)); zero_pad(hc->data + hc->next_data_empty, nh_len - hc->next_data_empty); nh_transform(hc, hc->data, nh_len); hc->bytes_hashed += hc->next_data_empty; } else if (hc->bytes_hashed == 0) { nh_len = L1_PAD_BOUNDARY; zero_pad(hc->data, L1_PAD_BOUNDARY); nh_transform(hc, hc->data, nh_len); } nbits = (hc->bytes_hashed << 3); ((UINT64 *)result)[0] = ((UINT64 *)hc->state)[0] + nbits; #if (UMAC_OUTPUT_LEN >= 8) ((UINT64 *)result)[1] = ((UINT64 *)hc->state)[1] + nbits; #endif #if (UMAC_OUTPUT_LEN >= 12) ((UINT64 *)result)[2] = ((UINT64 *)hc->state)[2] + nbits; #endif #if (UMAC_OUTPUT_LEN == 16) ((UINT64 *)result)[3] = ((UINT64 *)hc->state)[3] + nbits; #endif nh_reset(hc); } /* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */ static void nh(nh_ctx *hc, const UINT8 *buf, UINT32 padded_len, UINT32 unpadded_len, UINT8 *result) /* All-in-one nh_update() and nh_final() equivalent. * Assumes that padded_len is divisible by L1_PAD_BOUNDARY and result is * well aligned */ { UINT32 nbits; /* Initialize the hash state */ nbits = (unpadded_len << 3); ((UINT64 *)result)[0] = nbits; #if (UMAC_OUTPUT_LEN >= 8) ((UINT64 *)result)[1] = nbits; #endif #if (UMAC_OUTPUT_LEN >= 12) ((UINT64 *)result)[2] = nbits; #endif #if (UMAC_OUTPUT_LEN == 16) ((UINT64 *)result)[3] = nbits; #endif nh_aux(hc->nh_key, buf, result, padded_len); } /* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */ /* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */ /* ----- Begin UHASH Section -------------------------------------------- */ /* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */ /* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */ /* UHASH is a multi-layered algorithm. Data presented to UHASH is first * hashed by NH. The NH output is then hashed by a polynomial-hash layer * unless the initial data to be hashed is short. After the polynomial- * layer, an inner-product hash is used to produce the final UHASH output. * * UHASH provides two interfaces, one all-at-once and another where data * buffers are presented sequentially. In the sequential interface, the * UHASH client calls the routine uhash_update() as many times as necessary. * When there is no more data to be fed to UHASH, the client calls * uhash_final() which * calculates the UHASH output. Before beginning another UHASH calculation * the uhash_reset() routine must be called. The all-at-once UHASH routine, * uhash(), is equivalent to the sequence of calls uhash_update() and * uhash_final(); however it is optimized and should be * used whenever the sequential interface is not necessary. * * The routine uhash_init() initializes the uhash_ctx data structure and * must be called once, before any other UHASH routine. */ /* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */ /* ----- Constants and uhash_ctx ---------------------------------------- */ /* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */ /* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */ /* ----- Poly hash and Inner-Product hash Constants --------------------- */ /* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */ /* Primes and masks */ #define p36 ((UINT64)0x0000000FFFFFFFFBull) /* 2^36 - 5 */ #define p64 ((UINT64)0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFC5ull) /* 2^64 - 59 */ #define m36 ((UINT64)0x0000000FFFFFFFFFull) /* The low 36 of 64 bits */ /* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */ typedef struct uhash_ctx { nh_ctx hash; /* Hash context for L1 NH hash */ UINT64 poly_key_8[STREAMS]; /* p64 poly keys */ UINT64 poly_accum[STREAMS]; /* poly hash result */ UINT64 ip_keys[STREAMS*4]; /* Inner-product keys */ UINT32 ip_trans[STREAMS]; /* Inner-product translation */ UINT32 msg_len; /* Total length of data passed */ /* to uhash */ } uhash_ctx; typedef struct uhash_ctx *uhash_ctx_t; /* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */ /* The polynomial hashes use Horner's rule to evaluate a polynomial one * word at a time. As described in the specification, poly32 and poly64 * require keys from special domains. The following implementations exploit * the special domains to avoid overflow. The results are not guaranteed to * be within Z_p32 and Z_p64, but the Inner-Product hash implementation * patches any errant values. */ static UINT64 poly64(UINT64 cur, UINT64 key, UINT64 data) { UINT32 key_hi = (UINT32)(key >> 32), key_lo = (UINT32)key, cur_hi = (UINT32)(cur >> 32), cur_lo = (UINT32)cur, x_lo, x_hi; UINT64 X,T,res; X = MUL64(key_hi, cur_lo) + MUL64(cur_hi, key_lo); x_lo = (UINT32)X; x_hi = (UINT32)(X >> 32); res = (MUL64(key_hi, cur_hi) + x_hi) * 59 + MUL64(key_lo, cur_lo); T = ((UINT64)x_lo << 32); res += T; if (res < T) res += 59; res += data; if (res < data) res += 59; return res; } /* Although UMAC is specified to use a ramped polynomial hash scheme, this * implementation does not handle all ramp levels. Because we don't handle * the ramp up to p128 modulus in this implementation, we are limited to * 2^14 poly_hash() invocations per stream (for a total capacity of 2^24 * bytes input to UMAC per tag, ie. 16MB). */ static void poly_hash(uhash_ctx_t hc, UINT32 data_in[]) { int i; UINT64 *data=(UINT64*)data_in; for (i = 0; i < STREAMS; i++) { if ((UINT32)(data[i] >> 32) == 0xfffffffful) { hc->poly_accum[i] = poly64(hc->poly_accum[i], hc->poly_key_8[i], p64 - 1); hc->poly_accum[i] = poly64(hc->poly_accum[i], hc->poly_key_8[i], (data[i] - 59)); } else { hc->poly_accum[i] = poly64(hc->poly_accum[i], hc->poly_key_8[i], data[i]); } } } /* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */ /* The final step in UHASH is an inner-product hash. The poly hash * produces a result not necessarily WORD_LEN bytes long. The inner- * product hash breaks the polyhash output into 16-bit chunks and * multiplies each with a 36 bit key. */ static UINT64 ip_aux(UINT64 t, UINT64 *ipkp, UINT64 data) { t = t + ipkp[0] * (UINT64)(UINT16)(data >> 48); t = t + ipkp[1] * (UINT64)(UINT16)(data >> 32); t = t + ipkp[2] * (UINT64)(UINT16)(data >> 16); t = t + ipkp[3] * (UINT64)(UINT16)(data); return t; } static UINT32 ip_reduce_p36(UINT64 t) { /* Divisionless modular reduction */ UINT64 ret; ret = (t & m36) + 5 * (t >> 36); if (ret >= p36) ret -= p36; /* return least significant 32 bits */ return (UINT32)(ret); } /* If the data being hashed by UHASH is no longer than L1_KEY_LEN, then * the polyhash stage is skipped and ip_short is applied directly to the * NH output. */ static void ip_short(uhash_ctx_t ahc, UINT8 *nh_res, u_char *res) { UINT64 t; UINT64 *nhp = (UINT64 *)nh_res; t = ip_aux(0,ahc->ip_keys, nhp[0]); STORE_UINT32_BIG((UINT32 *)res+0, ip_reduce_p36(t) ^ ahc->ip_trans[0]); #if (UMAC_OUTPUT_LEN >= 8) t = ip_aux(0,ahc->ip_keys+4, nhp[1]); STORE_UINT32_BIG((UINT32 *)res+1, ip_reduce_p36(t) ^ ahc->ip_trans[1]); #endif #if (UMAC_OUTPUT_LEN >= 12) t = ip_aux(0,ahc->ip_keys+8, nhp[2]); STORE_UINT32_BIG((UINT32 *)res+2, ip_reduce_p36(t) ^ ahc->ip_trans[2]); #endif #if (UMAC_OUTPUT_LEN == 16) t = ip_aux(0,ahc->ip_keys+12, nhp[3]); STORE_UINT32_BIG((UINT32 *)res+3, ip_reduce_p36(t) ^ ahc->ip_trans[3]); #endif } /* If the data being hashed by UHASH is longer than L1_KEY_LEN, then * the polyhash stage is not skipped and ip_long is applied to the * polyhash output. */ static void ip_long(uhash_ctx_t ahc, u_char *res) { int i; UINT64 t; for (i = 0; i < STREAMS; i++) { /* fix polyhash output not in Z_p64 */ if (ahc->poly_accum[i] >= p64) ahc->poly_accum[i] -= p64; t = ip_aux(0,ahc->ip_keys+(i*4), ahc->poly_accum[i]); STORE_UINT32_BIG((UINT32 *)res+i, ip_reduce_p36(t) ^ ahc->ip_trans[i]); } } /* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */ /* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */ /* Reset uhash context for next hash session */ static int uhash_reset(uhash_ctx_t pc) { nh_reset(&pc->hash); pc->msg_len = 0; pc->poly_accum[0] = 1; #if (UMAC_OUTPUT_LEN >= 8) pc->poly_accum[1] = 1; #endif #if (UMAC_OUTPUT_LEN >= 12) pc->poly_accum[2] = 1; #endif #if (UMAC_OUTPUT_LEN == 16) pc->poly_accum[3] = 1; #endif return 1; } /* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */ /* Given a pointer to the internal key needed by kdf() and a uhash context, * initialize the NH context and generate keys needed for poly and inner- * product hashing. All keys are endian adjusted in memory so that native * loads cause correct keys to be in registers during calculation. */ static void uhash_init(uhash_ctx_t ahc, aes_int_key prf_key) { int i; UINT8 buf[(8*STREAMS+4)*sizeof(UINT64)]; /* Zero the entire uhash context */ memset(ahc, 0, sizeof(uhash_ctx)); /* Initialize the L1 hash */ nh_init(&ahc->hash, prf_key); /* Setup L2 hash variables */ kdf(buf, prf_key, 2, sizeof(buf)); /* Fill buffer with index 1 key */ for (i = 0; i < STREAMS; i++) { /* Fill keys from the buffer, skipping bytes in the buffer not * used by this implementation. Endian reverse the keys if on a * little-endian computer. */ memcpy(ahc->poly_key_8+i, buf+24*i, 8); endian_convert_if_le(ahc->poly_key_8+i, 8, 8); /* Mask the 64-bit keys to their special domain */ ahc->poly_key_8[i] &= ((UINT64)0x01ffffffu << 32) + 0x01ffffffu; ahc->poly_accum[i] = 1; /* Our polyhash prepends a non-zero word */ } /* Setup L3-1 hash variables */ kdf(buf, prf_key, 3, sizeof(buf)); /* Fill buffer with index 2 key */ for (i = 0; i < STREAMS; i++) memcpy(ahc->ip_keys+4*i, buf+(8*i+4)*sizeof(UINT64), 4*sizeof(UINT64)); endian_convert_if_le(ahc->ip_keys, sizeof(UINT64), sizeof(ahc->ip_keys)); for (i = 0; i < STREAMS*4; i++) ahc->ip_keys[i] %= p36; /* Bring into Z_p36 */ /* Setup L3-2 hash variables */ /* Fill buffer with index 4 key */ kdf(ahc->ip_trans, prf_key, 4, STREAMS * sizeof(UINT32)); endian_convert_if_le(ahc->ip_trans, sizeof(UINT32), STREAMS * sizeof(UINT32)); explicit_bzero(buf, sizeof(buf)); } /* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */ #if 0 static uhash_ctx_t uhash_alloc(u_char key[]) { /* Allocate memory and force to a 16-byte boundary. */ uhash_ctx_t ctx; u_char bytes_to_add; aes_int_key prf_key; ctx = (uhash_ctx_t)malloc(sizeof(uhash_ctx)+ALLOC_BOUNDARY); if (ctx) { if (ALLOC_BOUNDARY) { bytes_to_add = ALLOC_BOUNDARY - ((ptrdiff_t)ctx & (ALLOC_BOUNDARY -1)); ctx = (uhash_ctx_t)((u_char *)ctx + bytes_to_add); *((u_char *)ctx - 1) = bytes_to_add; } aes_key_setup(key,prf_key); uhash_init(ctx, prf_key); } return (ctx); } #endif /* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */ #if 0 static int uhash_free(uhash_ctx_t ctx) { /* Free memory allocated by uhash_alloc */ u_char bytes_to_sub; if (ctx) { if (ALLOC_BOUNDARY) { bytes_to_sub = *((u_char *)ctx - 1); ctx = (uhash_ctx_t)((u_char *)ctx - bytes_to_sub); } free(ctx); } return (1); } #endif /* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */ static int uhash_update(uhash_ctx_t ctx, const u_char *input, long len) /* Given len bytes of data, we parse it into L1_KEY_LEN chunks and * hash each one with NH, calling the polyhash on each NH output. */ { UWORD bytes_hashed, bytes_remaining; UINT64 result_buf[STREAMS]; UINT8 *nh_result = (UINT8 *)&result_buf; if (ctx->msg_len + len <= L1_KEY_LEN) { nh_update(&ctx->hash, (const UINT8 *)input, len); ctx->msg_len += len; } else { bytes_hashed = ctx->msg_len % L1_KEY_LEN; if (ctx->msg_len == L1_KEY_LEN) bytes_hashed = L1_KEY_LEN; if (bytes_hashed + len >= L1_KEY_LEN) { /* If some bytes have been passed to the hash function */ /* then we want to pass at most (L1_KEY_LEN - bytes_hashed) */ /* bytes to complete the current nh_block. */ if (bytes_hashed) { bytes_remaining = (L1_KEY_LEN - bytes_hashed); nh_update(&ctx->hash, (const UINT8 *)input, bytes_remaining); nh_final(&ctx->hash, nh_result); ctx->msg_len += bytes_remaining; poly_hash(ctx,(UINT32 *)nh_result); len -= bytes_remaining; input += bytes_remaining; } /* Hash directly from input stream if enough bytes */ while (len >= L1_KEY_LEN) { nh(&ctx->hash, (const UINT8 *)input, L1_KEY_LEN, L1_KEY_LEN, nh_result); ctx->msg_len += L1_KEY_LEN; len -= L1_KEY_LEN; input += L1_KEY_LEN; poly_hash(ctx,(UINT32 *)nh_result); } } /* pass remaining < L1_KEY_LEN bytes of input data to NH */ if (len) { nh_update(&ctx->hash, (const UINT8 *)input, len); ctx->msg_len += len; } } return (1); } /* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */ static int uhash_final(uhash_ctx_t ctx, u_char *res) /* Incorporate any pending data, pad, and generate tag */ { UINT64 result_buf[STREAMS]; UINT8 *nh_result = (UINT8 *)&result_buf; if (ctx->msg_len > L1_KEY_LEN) { if (ctx->msg_len % L1_KEY_LEN) { nh_final(&ctx->hash, nh_result); poly_hash(ctx,(UINT32 *)nh_result); } ip_long(ctx, res); } else { nh_final(&ctx->hash, nh_result); ip_short(ctx,nh_result, res); } uhash_reset(ctx); return (1); } /* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */ #if 0 static int uhash(uhash_ctx_t ahc, u_char *msg, long len, u_char *res) /* assumes that msg is in a writable buffer of length divisible by */ /* L1_PAD_BOUNDARY. Bytes beyond msg[len] may be zeroed. */ { UINT8 nh_result[STREAMS*sizeof(UINT64)]; UINT32 nh_len; int extra_zeroes_needed; /* If the message to be hashed is no longer than L1_HASH_LEN, we skip * the polyhash. */ if (len <= L1_KEY_LEN) { if (len == 0) /* If zero length messages will not */ nh_len = L1_PAD_BOUNDARY; /* be seen, comment out this case */ else nh_len = ((len + (L1_PAD_BOUNDARY - 1)) & ~(L1_PAD_BOUNDARY - 1)); extra_zeroes_needed = nh_len - len; zero_pad((UINT8 *)msg + len, extra_zeroes_needed); nh(&ahc->hash, (UINT8 *)msg, nh_len, len, nh_result); ip_short(ahc,nh_result, res); } else { /* Otherwise, we hash each L1_KEY_LEN chunk with NH, passing the NH * output to poly_hash(). */ do { nh(&ahc->hash, (UINT8 *)msg, L1_KEY_LEN, L1_KEY_LEN, nh_result); poly_hash(ahc,(UINT32 *)nh_result); len -= L1_KEY_LEN; msg += L1_KEY_LEN; } while (len >= L1_KEY_LEN); if (len) { nh_len = ((len + (L1_PAD_BOUNDARY - 1)) & ~(L1_PAD_BOUNDARY - 1)); extra_zeroes_needed = nh_len - len; zero_pad((UINT8 *)msg + len, extra_zeroes_needed); nh(&ahc->hash, (UINT8 *)msg, nh_len, len, nh_result); poly_hash(ahc,(UINT32 *)nh_result); } ip_long(ahc, res); } uhash_reset(ahc); return 1; } #endif /* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */ /* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */ /* ----- Begin UMAC Section --------------------------------------------- */ /* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */ /* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */ /* The UMAC interface has two interfaces, an all-at-once interface where * the entire message to be authenticated is passed to UMAC in one buffer, * and a sequential interface where the message is presented a little at a * time. The all-at-once is more optimized than the sequential version and * should be preferred when the sequential interface is not required. */ struct umac_ctx { uhash_ctx hash; /* Hash function for message compression */ pdf_ctx pdf; /* PDF for hashed output */ void *free_ptr; /* Address to free this struct via */ } umac_ctx; /* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */ #if 0 int umac_reset(struct umac_ctx *ctx) /* Reset the hash function to begin a new authentication. */ { uhash_reset(&ctx->hash); return (1); } #endif /* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */ int umac_delete(struct umac_ctx *ctx) /* Deallocate the ctx structure */ { if (ctx) { if (ALLOC_BOUNDARY) ctx = (struct umac_ctx *)ctx->free_ptr; freezero(ctx, sizeof(*ctx) + ALLOC_BOUNDARY); } return (1); } /* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */ struct umac_ctx *umac_new(const u_char key[]) /* Dynamically allocate a umac_ctx struct, initialize variables, * generate subkeys from key. Align to 16-byte boundary. */ { struct umac_ctx *ctx, *octx; size_t bytes_to_add; aes_int_key prf_key; octx = ctx = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*ctx) + ALLOC_BOUNDARY); if (ctx) { if (ALLOC_BOUNDARY) { bytes_to_add = ALLOC_BOUNDARY - ((ptrdiff_t)ctx & (ALLOC_BOUNDARY - 1)); ctx = (struct umac_ctx *)((u_char *)ctx + bytes_to_add); } ctx->free_ptr = octx; aes_key_setup(key, prf_key); pdf_init(&ctx->pdf, prf_key); uhash_init(&ctx->hash, prf_key); explicit_bzero(prf_key, sizeof(prf_key)); } return (ctx); } /* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */ int umac_final(struct umac_ctx *ctx, u_char tag[], const u_char nonce[8]) /* Incorporate any pending data, pad, and generate tag */ { uhash_final(&ctx->hash, (u_char *)tag); pdf_gen_xor(&ctx->pdf, (const UINT8 *)nonce, (UINT8 *)tag); return (1); } /* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */ int umac_update(struct umac_ctx *ctx, const u_char *input, long len) /* Given len bytes of data, we parse it into L1_KEY_LEN chunks and */ /* hash each one, calling the PDF on the hashed output whenever the hash- */ /* output buffer is full. */ { uhash_update(&ctx->hash, input, len); return (1); } /* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */ #if 0 int umac(struct umac_ctx *ctx, u_char *input, long len, u_char tag[], u_char nonce[8]) /* All-in-one version simply calls umac_update() and umac_final(). */ { uhash(&ctx->hash, input, len, (u_char *)tag); pdf_gen_xor(&ctx->pdf, (UINT8 *)nonce, (UINT8 *)tag); return (1); } #endif /* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */ /* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */ /* ----- End UMAC Section ----------------------------------------------- */ /* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */ /* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */ diff --git a/crypto/openssh/version.h b/crypto/openssh/version.h index 1a3fc7bc82e6..24c778283020 100644 --- a/crypto/openssh/version.h +++ b/crypto/openssh/version.h @@ -1,8 +1,8 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: version.h,v 1.96 2023/02/02 12:10:22 djm Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: version.h,v 1.97 2023/03/15 21:19:57 djm Exp $ */ -#define SSH_VERSION "OpenSSH_9.2" +#define SSH_VERSION "OpenSSH_9.3" #define SSH_PORTABLE "p1" #define SSH_RELEASE SSH_VERSION SSH_PORTABLE -#define SSH_VERSION_FREEBSD "FreeBSD-20230205" +#define SSH_VERSION_FREEBSD "FreeBSD-20230316" diff --git a/secure/lib/libssh/Makefile b/secure/lib/libssh/Makefile index 2b1a76f185f8..83afda7a8e43 100644 --- a/secure/lib/libssh/Makefile +++ b/secure/lib/libssh/Makefile @@ -1,69 +1,70 @@ # $FreeBSD$ .include .include "${SRCTOP}/secure/ssh.mk" LIB= ssh PRIVATELIB= true SHLIB_MAJOR= 5 SRCS= ssh_api.c ssherr.c \ sshbuf.c sshkey.c sshbuf-getput-basic.c \ sshbuf-misc.c sshbuf-getput-crypto.c krl.c bitmap.c SRCS+= authfd.c authfile.c \ canohost.c channels.c cipher.c cipher-aes.c cipher-aesctr.c \ cleanup.c \ compat.c fatal.c hostfile.c \ log.c match.c moduli.c nchan.c packet.c \ readpass.c ttymodes.c xmalloc.c addr.c addrmatch.c \ atomicio.c dispatch.c mac.c misc.c utf8.c \ monitor_fdpass.c rijndael.c ssh-dss.c ssh-ecdsa.c ssh-ecdsa-sk.c \ ssh-ed25519-sk.c ssh-rsa.c dh.c \ msg.c progressmeter.c dns.c entropy.c umac.c umac128.c \ ssh-pkcs11.c smult_curve25519_ref.c \ poly1305.c chacha.c cipher-chachapoly.c cipher-chachapoly-libcrypto.c \ ssh-ed25519.c digest-openssl.c digest-libc.c \ hmac.c ed25519.c hash.c \ kex.c kexdh.c kexgex.c kexecdh.c kexc25519.c \ kexgexc.c kexgexs.c \ kexsntrup761x25519.c sntrup761.c kexgen.c \ sftp-realpath.c platform-pledge.c platform-tracing.c platform-misc.c \ sshbuf-io.c SRCS+= ssh-sk-client.c PACKAGE= ssh # gss-genr.c should be in $SRCS but causes linking problems, so it is # compiled directly into sshd instead. # Portability layer SRCS+= bcrypt_pbkdf.c blowfish.c bsd-misc.c bsd-signal.c explicit_bzero.c \ fmt_scaled.c freezero.c glob.c \ libressl-api-compat.c \ + mktemp.c \ openssl-compat.c port-net.c \ recallocarray.c strtonum.c timingsafe_bcmp.c vis.c xcrypt.c .if ${MK_LDNS} == "no" SRCS+= getrrsetbyname.c .else LDNSDIR= ${SRCTOP}/contrib/ldns CFLAGS+= -DHAVE_LDNS=1 -I${LDNSDIR} SRCS+= getrrsetbyname-ldns.c LIBADD+= ldns .endif .if ${MK_GSSAPI} != "no" && ${MK_KERBEROS_SUPPORT} != "no" CFLAGS+= -include krb5_config.h SRCS+= krb5_config.h .endif .if defined(LOCALBASE) CFLAGS+= -D_PATH_SSH_ASKPASS_DEFAULT='"${LOCALBASE}/bin/ssh-askpass"' .endif NO_LINT= LIBADD+= crypto crypt z .include .PATH: ${SSHDIR} ${SSHDIR}/openbsd-compat