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diff --git a/.depend b/.depend
index 1ccc1dcc75c2..f05bd9d7483c 100644
--- a/.depend
+++ b/.depend
@@ -1,180 +1,180 @@
# Automatically generated by makedepend.
# Run "make depend" to rebuild.
# DO NOT DELETE
addrmatch.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h match.h log.h
atomicio.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h atomicio.h
audit-bsm.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h
audit-linux.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h
audit.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h
auth-bsdauth.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h
auth-krb5.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h xmalloc.h ssh.h packet.h openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h dispatch.h log.h sshbuf.h sshkey.h misc.h servconf.h uidswap.h hostfile.h auth.h auth-pam.h audit.h loginrec.h
auth-options.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h xmalloc.h ssherr.h log.h sshbuf.h misc.h sshkey.h match.h ssh2.h auth-options.h
auth-pam.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h
auth-passwd.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h packet.h openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h dispatch.h sshbuf.h ssherr.h log.h misc.h servconf.h sshkey.h hostfile.h auth.h auth-pam.h audit.h loginrec.h auth-options.h
auth-rhosts.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h packet.h openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h dispatch.h uidswap.h pathnames.h log.h misc.h sshbuf.h sshkey.h servconf.h canohost.h hostfile.h auth.h auth-pam.h audit.h loginrec.h
auth-shadow.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h
auth-sia.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h
auth.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h xmalloc.h match.h groupaccess.h log.h sshbuf.h misc.h servconf.h openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h sshkey.h hostfile.h auth.h auth-pam.h audit.h loginrec.h auth-options.h canohost.h uidswap.h packet.h dispatch.h authfile.h
auth.o: monitor_wrap.h ssherr.h compat.h channels.h
auth2-chall.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h xmalloc.h ssh2.h sshkey.h hostfile.h auth.h auth-pam.h audit.h loginrec.h sshbuf.h packet.h openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h dispatch.h ssherr.h log.h misc.h servconf.h
auth2-gss.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h
auth2-hostbased.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h xmalloc.h ssh2.h packet.h openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h dispatch.h sshbuf.h log.h misc.h servconf.h compat.h sshkey.h hostfile.h auth.h auth-pam.h audit.h loginrec.h canohost.h monitor_wrap.h pathnames.h
auth2-hostbased.o: ssherr.h match.h
auth2-kbdint.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h xmalloc.h packet.h openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h dispatch.h hostfile.h auth.h auth-pam.h audit.h loginrec.h log.h misc.h servconf.h ssherr.h
auth2-none.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h atomicio.h xmalloc.h sshkey.h hostfile.h auth.h auth-pam.h audit.h loginrec.h packet.h openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h dispatch.h log.h misc.h servconf.h compat.h ssh2.h ssherr.h monitor_wrap.h
auth2-passwd.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h packet.h openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h dispatch.h ssherr.h log.h sshkey.h hostfile.h auth.h auth-pam.h audit.h loginrec.h monitor_wrap.h misc.h servconf.h
auth2-pubkey.o: canohost.h monitor_wrap.h authfile.h match.h ssherr.h channels.h session.h sk-api.h
auth2-pubkey.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h xmalloc.h ssh.h ssh2.h packet.h openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h dispatch.h sshbuf.h log.h misc.h servconf.h compat.h sshkey.h hostfile.h auth.h auth-pam.h audit.h loginrec.h pathnames.h uidswap.h auth-options.h
auth2.o: digest.h
auth2.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h atomicio.h xmalloc.h ssh2.h packet.h openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h dispatch.h log.h sshbuf.h misc.h servconf.h compat.h sshkey.h hostfile.h auth.h auth-pam.h audit.h loginrec.h pathnames.h ssherr.h monitor_wrap.h
authfd.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h xmalloc.h ssh.h sshbuf.h sshkey.h authfd.h cipher.h cipher-chachapoly.h chacha.h poly1305.h cipher-aesctr.h rijndael.h compat.h log.h atomicio.h misc.h ssherr.h
authfile.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h cipher.h cipher-chachapoly.h chacha.h poly1305.h cipher-aesctr.h rijndael.h ssh.h log.h authfile.h misc.h atomicio.h sshkey.h sshbuf.h ssherr.h krl.h
bitmap.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h bitmap.h
canohost.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h xmalloc.h packet.h openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h dispatch.h log.h canohost.h misc.h
chacha.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h chacha.h
channels.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h xmalloc.h ssh.h ssh2.h ssherr.h sshbuf.h packet.h dispatch.h log.h misc.h channels.h compat.h canohost.h sshkey.h authfd.h pathnames.h match.h
cipher-aes.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h
cipher-aesctr.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h cipher-aesctr.h rijndael.h
cipher-chachapoly-libcrypto.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h
cipher-chachapoly.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h log.h sshbuf.h ssherr.h cipher-chachapoly.h chacha.h poly1305.h
cipher-ctr.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h
cipher.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h cipher.h cipher-chachapoly.h chacha.h poly1305.h cipher-aesctr.h rijndael.h misc.h sshbuf.h ssherr.h digest.h openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h
cleanup.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h log.h
clientloop.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h xmalloc.h ssh.h ssh2.h packet.h dispatch.h sshbuf.h compat.h channels.h sshkey.h cipher.h cipher-chachapoly.h chacha.h poly1305.h cipher-aesctr.h rijndael.h kex.h mac.h crypto_api.h
clientloop.o: myproposal.h log.h misc.h readconf.h clientloop.h sshconnect.h authfd.h atomicio.h sshpty.h match.h msg.h ssherr.h hostfile.h
compat.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h xmalloc.h packet.h openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h dispatch.h compat.h log.h match.h kex.h mac.h crypto_api.h
dh.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h
digest-libc.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h ssherr.h sshbuf.h digest.h
digest-openssl.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h
dispatch.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h ssh2.h log.h dispatch.h packet.h openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h compat.h ssherr.h
dns.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h xmalloc.h sshkey.h ssherr.h dns.h log.h digest.h
ed25519.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h crypto_api.h ge25519.h fe25519.h sc25519.h
entropy.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h
fatal.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h log.h
fe25519.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h fe25519.h crypto_api.h
ge25519.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h fe25519.h crypto_api.h sc25519.h ge25519.h ge25519_base.data
groupaccess.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h xmalloc.h groupaccess.h match.h log.h
gss-genr.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h
gss-serv-krb5.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h
gss-serv.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h
hash.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h crypto_api.h
hmac.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h sshbuf.h digest.h hmac.h
-hostfile.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h xmalloc.h match.h sshkey.h hostfile.h log.h misc.h ssherr.h digest.h hmac.h
+hostfile.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h xmalloc.h match.h sshkey.h hostfile.h log.h misc.h pathnames.h ssherr.h digest.h hmac.h
kex.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h ssh.h ssh2.h atomicio.h version.h packet.h openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h dispatch.h compat.h cipher.h cipher-chachapoly.h chacha.h poly1305.h cipher-aesctr.h rijndael.h sshkey.h kex.h mac.h crypto_api.h log.h match.h
kex.o: misc.h monitor.h ssherr.h sshbuf.h digest.h
kexc25519.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h sshkey.h kex.h mac.h crypto_api.h sshbuf.h digest.h ssherr.h ssh2.h
kexdh.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h
kexecdh.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h ssherr.h
kexgen.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h sshkey.h kex.h mac.h crypto_api.h log.h packet.h openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h dispatch.h ssh2.h sshbuf.h digest.h ssherr.h
kexgex.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h
kexgexc.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h
kexgexs.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h
kexsntrup4591761x25519.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h sshkey.h kex.h mac.h crypto_api.h sshbuf.h digest.h ssherr.h
krl.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h ./openbsd-compat/sys-tree.h openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h sshbuf.h ssherr.h sshkey.h authfile.h misc.h log.h digest.h bitmap.h utf8.h krl.h
log.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h log.h
loginrec.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h xmalloc.h sshkey.h hostfile.h ssh.h loginrec.h log.h atomicio.h packet.h openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h dispatch.h canohost.h auth.h auth-pam.h audit.h sshbuf.h ssherr.h
logintest.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h loginrec.h
mac.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h digest.h hmac.h umac.h mac.h misc.h ssherr.h sshbuf.h openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h
match.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h xmalloc.h match.h misc.h
md5crypt.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h
misc.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h xmalloc.h misc.h log.h ssh.h sshbuf.h ssherr.h
moduli.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h
monitor.o: chacha.h poly1305.h cipher-aesctr.h rijndael.h kex.h mac.h crypto_api.h dh.h packet.h dispatch.h auth-options.h sshpty.h channels.h session.h sshlogin.h canohost.h log.h misc.h servconf.h monitor.h monitor_wrap.h monitor_fdpass.h compat.h ssh2.h authfd.h match.h ssherr.h sk-api.h
monitor.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h ./openbsd-compat/sys-tree.h openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h atomicio.h xmalloc.h ssh.h sshkey.h sshbuf.h hostfile.h auth.h auth-pam.h audit.h loginrec.h cipher.h cipher-chachapoly.h
monitor_fdpass.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h log.h monitor_fdpass.h
monitor_wrap.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h xmalloc.h ssh.h sshbuf.h sshkey.h cipher.h cipher-chachapoly.h chacha.h poly1305.h cipher-aesctr.h rijndael.h kex.h mac.h crypto_api.h hostfile.h auth.h auth-pam.h audit.h
monitor_wrap.o: loginrec.h auth-options.h packet.h dispatch.h log.h monitor.h monitor_wrap.h atomicio.h monitor_fdpass.h misc.h channels.h session.h servconf.h ssherr.h
msg.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h sshbuf.h ssherr.h log.h atomicio.h msg.h misc.h
mux.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h xmalloc.h log.h ssh.h ssh2.h pathnames.h misc.h match.h sshbuf.h channels.h msg.h packet.h dispatch.h monitor_fdpass.h sshpty.h sshkey.h readconf.h clientloop.h ssherr.h
nchan.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h ssh2.h sshbuf.h ssherr.h packet.h dispatch.h channels.h compat.h log.h
packet.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h xmalloc.h compat.h ssh2.h cipher.h cipher-chachapoly.h chacha.h poly1305.h cipher-aesctr.h rijndael.h sshkey.h kex.h mac.h crypto_api.h digest.h log.h canohost.h misc.h channels.h ssh.h
packet.o: packet.h dispatch.h ssherr.h sshbuf.h
platform-misc.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h
platform-pledge.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h
platform-tracing.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h log.h
platform.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h log.h misc.h servconf.h openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h sshkey.h hostfile.h auth.h auth-pam.h audit.h loginrec.h
poly1305.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h poly1305.h
progressmeter.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h progressmeter.h atomicio.h misc.h utf8.h
readconf.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h openbsd-compat/glob.h xmalloc.h ssh.h ssherr.h compat.h cipher.h cipher-chachapoly.h chacha.h poly1305.h cipher-aesctr.h rijndael.h pathnames.h log.h sshkey.h misc.h readconf.h match.h kex.h mac.h crypto_api.h
readconf.o: uidswap.h myproposal.h digest.h
readpass.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h xmalloc.h misc.h pathnames.h log.h ssh.h uidswap.h
rijndael.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h rijndael.h
sandbox-capsicum.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h
sandbox-darwin.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h
sandbox-null.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h
sandbox-pledge.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h
sandbox-rlimit.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h
sandbox-seccomp-filter.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h
sandbox-solaris.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h
sandbox-systrace.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h
sc25519.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h sc25519.h crypto_api.h
scp.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h xmalloc.h ssh.h atomicio.h pathnames.h log.h misc.h progressmeter.h utf8.h
servconf.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h openbsd-compat/glob.h openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h xmalloc.h ssh.h log.h sshbuf.h misc.h servconf.h compat.h pathnames.h cipher.h cipher-chachapoly.h chacha.h poly1305.h cipher-aesctr.h rijndael.h sshkey.h kex.h
servconf.o: mac.h crypto_api.h match.h channels.h groupaccess.h canohost.h packet.h dispatch.h ssherr.h hostfile.h auth.h auth-pam.h audit.h loginrec.h myproposal.h digest.h
serverloop.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h xmalloc.h packet.h dispatch.h sshbuf.h log.h misc.h servconf.h canohost.h sshpty.h channels.h compat.h ssh2.h sshkey.h cipher.h cipher-chachapoly.h chacha.h poly1305.h cipher-aesctr.h
serverloop.o: rijndael.h kex.h mac.h crypto_api.h hostfile.h auth.h auth-pam.h audit.h loginrec.h session.h auth-options.h serverloop.h ssherr.h
session.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h xmalloc.h ssh.h ssh2.h sshpty.h packet.h dispatch.h sshbuf.h ssherr.h match.h uidswap.h compat.h channels.h sshkey.h cipher.h cipher-chachapoly.h chacha.h poly1305.h cipher-aesctr.h
session.o: rijndael.h hostfile.h auth.h auth-pam.h audit.h loginrec.h auth-options.h authfd.h pathnames.h log.h misc.h servconf.h sshlogin.h serverloop.h canohost.h session.h kex.h mac.h crypto_api.h monitor_wrap.h sftp.h atomicio.h
sftp-client.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h xmalloc.h ssherr.h sshbuf.h log.h atomicio.h progressmeter.h misc.h utf8.h sftp.h sftp-common.h sftp-client.h openbsd-compat/glob.h
sftp-common.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h xmalloc.h ssherr.h sshbuf.h log.h misc.h sftp.h sftp-common.h
sftp-glob.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h xmalloc.h sftp.h sftp-common.h sftp-client.h openbsd-compat/glob.h
sftp-realpath.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h
sftp-server-main.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h log.h sftp.h misc.h xmalloc.h
sftp-server.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h xmalloc.h sshbuf.h ssherr.h log.h misc.h match.h uidswap.h sftp.h sftp-common.h
sftp.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h xmalloc.h log.h pathnames.h misc.h utf8.h sftp.h ssherr.h sshbuf.h sftp-common.h sftp-client.h openbsd-compat/glob.h
sk-usbhid.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h
sntrup4591761.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h crypto_api.h
-ssh-add.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h xmalloc.h ssh.h log.h sshkey.h sshbuf.h authfd.h authfile.h pathnames.h misc.h ssherr.h digest.h ssh-sk.h
-ssh-agent.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h xmalloc.h ssh.h sshbuf.h sshkey.h authfd.h compat.h log.h misc.h digest.h ssherr.h match.h msg.h pathnames.h ssh-pkcs11.h sk-api.h
+ssh-add.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h xmalloc.h ssh.h log.h sshkey.h sshbuf.h authfd.h authfile.h pathnames.h misc.h ssherr.h digest.h ssh-sk.h sk-api.h
+ssh-agent.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h xmalloc.h ssh.h ssh2.h sshbuf.h sshkey.h authfd.h compat.h log.h misc.h digest.h ssherr.h match.h msg.h pathnames.h ssh-pkcs11.h sk-api.h
ssh-dss.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h
ssh-ecdsa-sk.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h sshbuf.h ssherr.h digest.h sshkey.h
ssh-ecdsa.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h
ssh-ed25519-sk.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h crypto_api.h log.h sshbuf.h sshkey.h ssherr.h ssh.h digest.h
ssh-ed25519.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h crypto_api.h log.h sshbuf.h sshkey.h ssherr.h ssh.h
ssh-keygen.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h xmalloc.h sshkey.h authfile.h sshbuf.h pathnames.h log.h misc.h match.h hostfile.h dns.h ssh.h ssh2.h ssherr.h ssh-pkcs11.h atomicio.h krl.h digest.h utf8.h authfd.h sshsig.h ssh-sk.h sk-api.h
ssh-keyscan.o: atomicio.h misc.h hostfile.h ssherr.h ssh_api.h ssh2.h dns.h
ssh-keyscan.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h xmalloc.h ssh.h sshbuf.h sshkey.h cipher.h cipher-chachapoly.h chacha.h poly1305.h cipher-aesctr.h rijndael.h kex.h mac.h crypto_api.h compat.h myproposal.h packet.h dispatch.h log.h
ssh-keysign.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h xmalloc.h log.h sshkey.h ssh.h ssh2.h misc.h sshbuf.h authfile.h msg.h canohost.h pathnames.h readconf.h uidswap.h ssherr.h
ssh-pkcs11-client.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h
ssh-pkcs11-helper.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h xmalloc.h sshbuf.h log.h misc.h sshkey.h authfd.h ssh-pkcs11.h ssherr.h
ssh-pkcs11.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h log.h sshkey.h
ssh-rsa.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h
ssh-sk-client.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h log.h ssherr.h sshbuf.h sshkey.h msg.h digest.h pathnames.h ssh-sk.h misc.h
ssh-sk-helper.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h xmalloc.h log.h sshkey.h authfd.h misc.h sshbuf.h msg.h uidswap.h ssherr.h ssh-sk.h
ssh-sk.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h
ssh-xmss.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h
ssh.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h xmalloc.h ssh.h ssh2.h canohost.h compat.h cipher.h cipher-chachapoly.h chacha.h poly1305.h cipher-aesctr.h rijndael.h packet.h dispatch.h sshbuf.h channels.h
ssh.o: sshkey.h authfd.h authfile.h pathnames.h clientloop.h log.h misc.h readconf.h sshconnect.h kex.h mac.h crypto_api.h sshpty.h match.h msg.h version.h ssherr.h myproposal.h utf8.h
ssh_api.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h ssh_api.h openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h cipher.h cipher-chachapoly.h chacha.h poly1305.h cipher-aesctr.h rijndael.h sshkey.h kex.h mac.h crypto_api.h ssh.h ssh2.h packet.h dispatch.h compat.h log.h authfile.h misc.h
ssh_api.o: version.h myproposal.h ssherr.h sshbuf.h openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h
sshbuf-getput-basic.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h ssherr.h sshbuf.h
sshbuf-getput-crypto.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h
sshbuf-io.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h ssherr.h sshbuf.h atomicio.h
sshbuf-misc.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h ssherr.h sshbuf.h
sshbuf.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h ssherr.h sshbuf.h misc.h
sshconnect.o: authfd.h kex.h mac.h crypto_api.h
sshconnect.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h xmalloc.h hostfile.h ssh.h sshbuf.h packet.h openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h dispatch.h compat.h sshkey.h sshconnect.h log.h misc.h readconf.h atomicio.h dns.h monitor_fdpass.h ssh2.h version.h authfile.h ssherr.h
sshconnect2.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h xmalloc.h ssh.h ssh2.h sshbuf.h packet.h dispatch.h compat.h cipher.h cipher-chachapoly.h chacha.h poly1305.h cipher-aesctr.h rijndael.h sshkey.h kex.h mac.h crypto_api.h
sshconnect2.o: myproposal.h sshconnect.h authfile.h dh.h authfd.h log.h misc.h readconf.h match.h canohost.h msg.h pathnames.h uidswap.h hostfile.h ssherr.h utf8.h ssh-sk.h sk-api.h
sshd.o: cipher-aesctr.h rijndael.h digest.h sshkey.h kex.h mac.h crypto_api.h myproposal.h authfile.h pathnames.h atomicio.h canohost.h hostfile.h auth.h auth-pam.h audit.h loginrec.h authfd.h msg.h channels.h session.h monitor.h monitor_wrap.h ssh-sandbox.h auth-options.h version.h ssherr.h sk-api.h
sshd.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h ./openbsd-compat/sys-tree.h openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h xmalloc.h ssh.h ssh2.h sshpty.h packet.h dispatch.h log.h sshbuf.h misc.h match.h servconf.h uidswap.h compat.h cipher.h cipher-chachapoly.h chacha.h poly1305.h
ssherr.o: ssherr.h
sshkey-xmss.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h
sshkey.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h crypto_api.h ssh2.h ssherr.h misc.h sshbuf.h cipher.h cipher-chachapoly.h chacha.h poly1305.h cipher-aesctr.h rijndael.h digest.h sshkey.h match.h ssh-sk.h openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h
sshlogin.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h sshlogin.h ssherr.h loginrec.h log.h sshbuf.h misc.h servconf.h openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h
sshpty.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h sshpty.h log.h misc.h
sshsig.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h authfd.h authfile.h log.h misc.h sshbuf.h sshsig.h ssherr.h sshkey.h match.h digest.h
sshtty.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h sshpty.h
ttymodes.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h packet.h openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h dispatch.h log.h compat.h sshbuf.h ssherr.h ttymodes.h
uidswap.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h log.h uidswap.h xmalloc.h
umac.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h xmalloc.h umac.h misc.h rijndael.h
umac128.o: umac.c includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h xmalloc.h umac.h misc.h rijndael.h
utf8.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h utf8.h
verify.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h crypto_api.h
xmalloc.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h xmalloc.h log.h
xmss_commons.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h
xmss_fast.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h
xmss_hash.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h
xmss_hash_address.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h
xmss_wots.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h
diff --git a/.github/run_test.sh b/.github/run_test.sh
new file mode 100755
index 000000000000..93c3a5e9ed9d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/.github/run_test.sh
@@ -0,0 +1,34 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env bash
+
+TARGETS=$@
+
+TEST_TARGET="tests"
+LTESTS="" # all tests by default
+
+set -ex
+
+for TARGET in $TARGETS; do
+ case $TARGET in
+ --without-openssl)
+ # When built without OpenSSL we can't do the file-based RSA key tests.
+ TEST_TARGET=t-exec
+ ;;
+ esac
+done
+
+if [ -z "$LTESTS" ]; then
+ make $TEST_TARGET
+ result=$?
+else
+ make $TEST_TARGET LTESTS="$LTESTS"
+ result=$?
+fi
+
+if [ "$result" -ne "0" ]; then
+ for i in regress/failed*; do
+ echo -------------------------------------------------------------------------
+ echo LOGFILE $i
+ cat $i
+ echo -------------------------------------------------------------------------
+ done
+fi
diff --git a/.github/setup_ci.sh b/.github/setup_ci.sh
new file mode 100755
index 000000000000..e2474ccd7460
--- /dev/null
+++ b/.github/setup_ci.sh
@@ -0,0 +1,51 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env bash
+
+TARGETS=$@
+
+PACKAGES=""
+INSTALL_FIDO_PPA="no"
+
+#echo "Setting up for '$TARGETS'"
+
+set -ex
+
+lsb_release -a
+
+for TARGET in $TARGETS; do
+ case $TARGET in
+ ""|--without-openssl|--without-zlib)
+ # nothing to do
+ ;;
+ "--with-kerberos5")
+ PACKAGES="$PACKAGES heimdal-dev"
+ #PACKAGES="$PACKAGES libkrb5-dev"
+ ;;
+ "--with-libedit")
+ PACKAGES="$PACKAGES libedit-dev"
+ ;;
+ "--with-pam")
+ PACKAGES="$PACKAGES libpam0g-dev"
+ ;;
+ "--with-security-key-builtin")
+ INSTALL_FIDO_PPA="yes"
+ PACKAGES="$PACKAGES libfido2-dev libu2f-host-dev"
+ ;;
+ "--with-selinux")
+ PACKAGES="$PACKAGES libselinux1-dev selinux-policy-dev"
+ ;;
+ *) echo "Invalid option"
+ exit 1
+ ;;
+ esac
+done
+
+if [ "yes" == "$INSTALL_FIDO_PPA" ]; then
+ sudo apt update -qq
+ sudo apt install software-properties-common
+ sudo apt-add-repository ppa:yubico/stable
+fi
+
+if [ "x" != "x$PACKAGES" ]; then
+ sudo apt update -qq
+ sudo apt install -qy $PACKAGES
+fi
diff --git a/.github/workflows/c-cpp.yml b/.github/workflows/c-cpp.yml
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..2189756bbf8f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/.github/workflows/c-cpp.yml
@@ -0,0 +1,39 @@
+name: C/C++ CI
+
+on:
+ push:
+ branches: [ master, ci ]
+ pull_request:
+ branches: [ master ]
+
+jobs:
+ build:
+
+ runs-on: ubuntu-latest
+
+ strategy:
+ matrix:
+ configs:
+ - ""
+ - "--with-kerberos5"
+ - "--with-libedit"
+ - "--with-pam"
+ - "--with-security-key-builtin"
+ - "--with-selinux"
+ - "--with-kerberos5 --with-libedit --with-pam --with-security-key-builtin --with-selinux"
+ - "--without-openssl --without-zlib"
+
+ steps:
+ - uses: actions/checkout@v2
+ - name: setup CI system
+ run: ./.github/setup_ci.sh ${{ matrix.configs }}
+ - name: autoreconf
+ run: autoreconf
+ - name: configure
+ run: ./configure ${{ matrix.configs }}
+ - name: make
+ run: make
+ - name: make tests
+ run: ./.github/run_test.sh ${{ matrix.configs }}
+ env:
+ TEST_SSH_UNSAFE_PERMISSIONS: 1
diff --git a/.gitignore b/.gitignore
index 34a95721dc66..5e4ae5a60d06 100644
--- a/.gitignore
+++ b/.gitignore
@@ -1,33 +1,36 @@
Makefile
buildpkg.sh
config.h
config.h.in
+config.h.in~
config.log
config.status
configure
+aclocal.m4
openbsd-compat/Makefile
openbsd-compat/regress/Makefile
openssh.xml
opensshd.init
survey.sh
**/*.0
**/*.o
**/*.lo
**/*.so
**/*.out
**/*.a
autom4te.cache/
scp
sftp
sftp-server
ssh
ssh-add
ssh-agent
ssh-keygen
ssh-keyscan
ssh-keysign
ssh-pkcs11-helper
ssh-sk-helper
sshd
!regress/misc/fuzz-harness/Makefile
+!regress/unittests/sshsig/Makefile
tags
diff --git a/.skipped-commit-ids b/.skipped-commit-ids
index 611d1093d1b8..6abbb99bca55 100644
--- a/.skipped-commit-ids
+++ b/.skipped-commit-ids
@@ -1,47 +1,49 @@
5317f294d63a876bfc861e19773b1575f96f027d remove libssh from makefiles
a337e886a49f96701ccbc4832bed086a68abfa85 Makefile changes
f2c9feb26963615c4fece921906cf72e248b61ee more Makefile
fa728823ba21c4b45212750e1d3a4b2086fd1a62 more Makefile refactoring
1de0e85522051eb2ffa00437e1885e9d7b3e0c2e moduli update
814b2f670df75759e1581ecef530980b2b3d7e0f remove redundant make defs
04431e8e7872f49a2129bf080a6b73c19d576d40 moduli update
c07772f58028fda683ee6abd41c73da3ff70d403 moduli update
db6375fc302e3bdf07d96430c63c991b2c2bd3ff moduli update
5ea3d63ab972691f43e9087ab5fd8376d48e898f uuencode.c Makefile accident
99dd10e72c04e93849981d43d64c946619efa474 include sshbuf-misc.c
9e1c23476bb845f3cf3d15d9032da3ed0cb2fcf5 sshbuf-misc.c in regress
569f08445c27124ec7c7f6c0268d844ec56ac061 Makefile tweaks for !openssl
58ec755be4e51978ecfee73539090eb68652a987 moduli update
4bd5551b306df55379afe17d841207990eb773bf Makefile.inc
14806a59353152f843eb349e618abbf6f4dd3ada Makefile.inc
8ea4455a2d9364a0a04f9e4a2cbfa4c9fcefe77e Makefile.inc
d9b910e412d139141b072a905e66714870c38ac0 Makefile.inc
7b7b619c1452a459310b0cf4391c5757c6bdbc0f moduli update
5010ff08f7ad92082e87dde098b20f5c24921a8f moduli regen script update
3bcae7a754db3fc5ad3cab63dd46774edb35b8ae moduli regen script update
+52ff0e3205036147b2499889353ac082e505ea54 moduli update
+07b5031e9f49f2b69ac5e85b8da4fc9e393992a0 Makefile.inc
Old upstream tree:
321065a95a7ccebdd5fd08482a1e19afbf524e35 Update DH groups
d4f699a421504df35254cf1c6f1a7c304fb907ca Remove 1k bit groups
aafe246655b53b52bc32c8a24002bc262f4230f7 Remove intermediate moduli
8fa9cd1dee3c3339ae329cf20fb591db6d605120 put back SSH1 for 6.9
f31327a48dd4103333cc53315ec53fe65ed8a17a Generate new moduli
edbfde98c40007b7752a4ac106095e060c25c1ef Regen moduli
052fd565e3ff2d8cec3bc957d1788f50c827f8e2 Switch to tame-based sandbox
7cf73737f357492776223da1c09179fa6ba74660 Remove moduli <2k
180d84674be1344e45a63990d60349988187c1ae Update moduli
f6ae971186ba68d066cd102e57d5b0b2c211a5ee systrace is dead.
96c5054e3e1f170c6276902d5bc65bb3b87a2603 remove DEBUGLIBS from Makefile
6da9a37f74aef9f9cc639004345ad893cad582d8 Update moduli file
77bcb50e47b68c7209c7f0a5a020d73761e5143b unset REGRESS_FAIL_EARLY
38c2133817cbcae75c88c63599ac54228f0fa384 Change COMPILER_VERSION tests
30c20180c87cbc99fa1020489fe7fd8245b6420c resync integrity.sh shell
1e6b51ddf767cbad0a4e63eb08026c127e654308 integrity.sh reliability
fe5b31f69a60d47171836911f144acff77810217 Makefile.inc bits
5781670c0578fe89663c9085ed3ba477cf7e7913 Delete sshconnect1.c
ea80f445e819719ccdcb237022cacfac990fdc5c Makefile.inc warning flags
b92c93266d8234d493857bb822260dacf4366157 moduli-gen.sh tweak
b25bf747544265b39af74fe0716dc8d9f5b63b95 Updated moduli
1bd41cba06a7752de4df304305a8153ebfb6b0ac rsa.[ch] already removed
e39b3902fe1d6c4a7ba6a3c58e072219f3c1e604 Makefile changes
diff --git a/ChangeLog b/ChangeLog
index f283a8b3f455..bcaa38f94386 100644
--- a/ChangeLog
+++ b/ChangeLog
@@ -1,12677 +1,12492 @@
-commit 9ca7e9c861775dd6c6312bc8aaab687403d24676
+commit 279261e1ea8150c7c64ab5fe7cb4a4ea17acbb29
Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
-Date: Wed May 27 10:38:00 2020 +1000
+Date: Sun Sep 27 17:25:01 2020 +1000
- depend
+ update version numbers
-commit b6d251ed9af90e16c08a72c4aac2cb8ace8f94b1
+commit 58ca6ab6ff035ed12b5078e3e9c7199fe72c8587
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Mon May 18 04:29:35 2020 +0000
+Date: Sun Sep 27 07:22:05 2020 +0000
- upstream: avoid possible NULL deref; from Pedro Martelletto
+ upstream: openssh 8.4
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: e6099c3fbb70aa67eb106e84d8b43f1fa919b721
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: a29e5b372d2c00e297da8a35a3b87c9beb3b4a58
-commit 3ab6fccc3935e9b778ff52f9c8d40f215d58e01d
+commit 9bb8a303ce05ff13fb421de991b495930be103c3
Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
-Date: Thu May 14 12:22:09 2020 +1000
+Date: Tue Sep 22 10:07:43 2020 +1000
- prefer ln to cp for temporary copy of sshd
-
- I saw failures on the reexec fallback test on Darwin 19.4 where
- fork()ed children of a process that had it's executable removed
- would instantly fail. Using ln to preserve the inode avoids this.
+ sync with upstream ssh-copy-id rev f0da1a1b7
-commit f700d316c6b15a9cfbe87230d2dca81a5d916279
-Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Wed May 13 15:24:51 2020 +1000
+commit 0a4a5571ada76b1b012bec9cf6ad1203fc19ec8d
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Mon Sep 21 07:29:09 2020 +0000
- Actually skip pty tests when needed.
+ upstream: close stdin when forking after authentication too; ok markus
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 43db17e4abc3e6b4a7b033aa8cdab326a7cb6c24
-commit 08ce6b2210f46f795e7db747809f8e587429dfd2
-Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Wed May 13 13:56:45 2020 +1000
+commit d14fe25e6c3b89f8af17e2894046164ac3b45688
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Sun Sep 20 23:31:46 2020 +0000
- Skip building sk-dummy library if no SK support.
+ upstream: close stdout/stderr after "ssh -f ..." forking
+
+ bz#3137, ok markus
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: e2d83cc4dea1665651a7aa924ad1ed6bcaaab3e2
-commit 102d106bc2e50347d0e545fad6ff5ce408d67247
+commit 53a33a0d745179c02108589e1722457ca8ae4372
Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
-Date: Wed May 13 12:08:34 2020 +1000
+Date: Sun Sep 20 15:57:09 2020 +1000
- explicitly manage .depend and .depend.bak
+ .depend
+
+commit 107eb3eeafcd390e1fa7cc7672a05e994d14013e
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Sun Sep 20 05:47:25 2020 +0000
+
+ upstream: cap channel input buffer size at 16MB; avoids high memory use
- Bring back removal of .depend to give the file a known state before
- running makedepend, but manually move aside the current .depend file
- and restore it as .depend.bak afterwards so the stale .depend check
- works as expected.
+ when peer advertises a large window but is slow to consume the data we send
+ (e.g. because of a slow network)
+
+ reported by Pierre-Yves David
+
+ fix with & ok markus@
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 1452771f5e5e768876d3bfe2544e3866d6ade216
-commit 83a6dc6ba1e03b3fa39d12a8522b8b0e68dd6390
+commit acfe2ac5fe033e227ad3a56624fbbe4af8b5da04
Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
-Date: Wed May 13 12:03:42 2020 +1000
+Date: Fri Sep 18 22:02:53 2020 +1000
- make depend
+ libfido2 1.5.0 is recommended
-commit 7c0bbed967abed6301a63e0267cc64144357a99a
-Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
-Date: Wed May 13 12:01:10 2020 +1000
+commit 52a03e9fca2d74eef953ddd4709250f365ca3975
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Sep 18 08:16:38 2020 +0000
- revert removal of .depend before makedepend
+ upstream: handle multiple messages in a single read()
- Commit 83657eac4 started removing .depend before running makedepend
- to reset the contents of .depend to a known state. Unfortunately
- this broke the depend-check step as now .depend.bak would only ever
- be created as an empty file.
+ PR#183 by Dennis Kaarsemaker; feedback and ok markus@
- ok dtucker
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 8570bb4d02d00cf70b98590716ea6a7d1cce68d1
-commit 58ad004acdcabf3b9f40bc3aaa206b25d998db8c
-Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
-Date: Tue May 12 12:58:46 2020 +1000
+commit dc098405b2939146e17567a25b08fc6122893cdf
+Author: pedro martelletto <pedro@ambientworks.net>
+Date: Fri Sep 18 08:57:29 2020 +0200
- prepare for 8.3 release
+ configure.ac: add missing includes
+
+ when testing, make sure to include the relevant header files that
+ declare the types of the functions used by the test:
+
+ - stdio.h for printf();
+ - stdlib.h for exit();
+ - string.h for strcmp();
+ - unistd.h for unlink(), _exit(), fork(), getppid(), sleep().
-commit 4fa9e048c2af26beb7dc2ee9479ff3323e92a7b5
-Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Fri May 8 21:50:43 2020 +1000
+commit b3855ff053f5078ec3d3c653cdaedefaa5fc362d
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Sep 18 05:23:03 2020 +0000
- Ensure SA_SIGNAL test only signals itself.
+ upstream: tweak the client hostkey preference ordering algorithm to
- When the test's child signals its parent and it exits the result of
- getppid changes. On Ubuntu 20.04 this results in the ppid being that
- of the GDM session, causing it to exit. Analysis and testing from pedro
- at ambientworks.net
+ prefer the default ordering if the user has a key that matches the
+ best-preference default algorithm.
+
+ feedback and ok markus@
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: a92dd7d7520ddd95c0a16786a7519e6d0167d35f
-commit dc2da29aae76e170d22f38bb36f1f5d1edd5ec2b
+commit f93b187ab900c7d12875952cc63350fe4de8a0a8
Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
-Date: Fri May 8 13:31:53 2020 +1000
+Date: Fri Sep 18 14:55:48 2020 +1000
- sync config.guess/config.sub with latest versions
+ control over the colours in gnome-ssh-askpass[23]
- ok dtucker@
+ Optionally set the textarea colours via $GNOME_SSH_ASKPASS_FG_COLOR and
+ $GNOME_SSH_ASKPASS_BG_COLOR. These accept the usual three or six digit
+ hex colours.
-commit a8265bd64c14881fc7f4fa592f46dfc66b911f17
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Wed May 6 20:58:01 2020 +0000
+commit 9d3d36bdb10b66abd1af42e8655502487b6ba1fa
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date: Fri Sep 18 14:50:38 2020 +1000
- upstream: openssh-8.3; ok deraadt@
+ focus improvement for gnome-ssh-askpass[23]
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: c8831ec88b9c750f5816aed9051031fb535d22c1
+ When serving a SSH_ASKPASS_PROMPT=none information dialog, ensure
+ then <enter> doesn't immediately close the dialog. Instead, require an
+ explicit <tab> to reach the close button, or <esc>.
-commit 955854cafca88e0cdcd3d09ca1ad4ada465364a1
+commit d6f507f37e6c75a899db0ef8224e72797c5563b6
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date: Wed Sep 16 03:07:31 2020 +0000
+
+ upstream: Remove unused buf, last user was removed when switching
+
+ to the sshbuf API. Patch from Sebastian Andrzej Siewior.
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 250fa17f0cec01039cc4abd95917d9746e24c889
+
+commit c3c786c3a0973331ee0922b2c51832a3b8d7f20f
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Wed May 6 20:57:38 2020 +0000
+Date: Wed Sep 9 21:57:27 2020 +0000
- upstream: another case where a utimes() failure could make scp send
+ upstream: For the hostkey confirmation message:
- a desynchronising error; reminded by Aymeric Vincent ok deraadt markus
+ > Are you sure you want to continue connecting (yes/no/[fingerprint])?
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 2ea611d34d8ff6d703a7a8bf858aa5dbfbfa7381
+ compare the fingerprint case sensitively; spotted Patrik Lundin
+ ok dtucker
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 73097afee1b3a5929324e345ba4a4a42347409f2
-commit 59d531553fd90196946743da391f3a27cf472f4e
+commit f2950baf0bafe6aa20dfe2e8d1ca4b23528df617
Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Thu May 7 15:34:12 2020 +1000
+Date: Fri Sep 11 14:45:23 2020 +1000
- Check if -D_REENTRANT is needed for localtime_r.
-
- On at least HP-UX 11.11, the localtime_r declararation is behind
- ifdef _REENTRANT. Check for and add if needed.
+ New config-build-time dependency on automake.
-commit c13403e55de8cdbb9da628ed95017b1d4c0f205f
+commit 600c1c27abd496372bd0cf83d21a1c119dfdf9a5
Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Tue May 5 11:32:43 2020 +1000
+Date: Sun Sep 6 21:56:36 2020 +1000
- Skip security key tests if ENABLE_SK not set.
+ Add aclocal.m4 and config.h.in~ to .gitignore.
+
+ aclocal.m4 is now generated by autoreconf.
-commit 4da393f87cd52d788c84112ee3f2191c9bcaaf30
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri May 1 04:03:14 2020 +0000
+commit 4bf7e1d00b1dcd3a6b3239f77465c019e61c6715
+Author: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <sebastian@breakpoint.cc>
+Date: Sat Sep 5 17:50:03 2020 +0200
- upstream: sure enough, some of the test data that we though were in
+ Quote the definition of OSSH_CHECK_HEADER_FOR_FIELD
- new format were actually in the old format; fix from Michael Forney
+ autoreconf complains about underquoted definition of
+ OSSH_CHECK_HEADER_FOR_FIELD after aclocal.m4 has been and now is beeing
+ recreated.
- OpenBSD-Regress-ID: a41a5c43a61b0f0b1691994dbf16dfb88e8af933
+ Quote OSSH_CHECK_HEADER_FOR_FIELD as suggested.
+
+ Signed-off-by: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <sebastian@breakpoint.cc>
-commit 15bfafc1db4c8792265ada9623a96f387990f732
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri May 1 04:00:29 2020 +0000
+commit a2f3ae386b5f7938ed3c565ad71f30c4f7f010f1
+Author: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <sebastian@breakpoint.cc>
+Date: Sat Sep 5 17:50:02 2020 +0200
- upstream: make mktestdata.sh generate old/new format keys that we
+ Move the local m4 macros
- expect. This script was written before OpenSSH switched to new-format private
- keys by default and was never updated to the change (until now) From Michael
- Forney
+ The `aclocal' step is skipped during `autoreconf' because aclocal.m4 is
+ present.
+ Move the current aclocal.m4 which contains local macros into the m4/
+ folder. With this change the aclocal.m4 will be re-created during
+ changes to the m4/ macro.
+ This is needed so the `aclocal' can fetch m4 macros from the system if
+ they are references in the configure script. This is a prerequisite to
+ use PKG_CHECK_MODULES.
- OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 38cf354715c96852e5b71c2393fb6e7ad28b7ca7
+ Signed-off-by: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <sebastian@breakpoint.cc>
-commit 7882d2eda6ad3eb82220a85294de545d20ef82db
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri May 1 03:58:02 2020 +0000
+commit 8372bff3a895b84fd78a81dc39da10928b662f5a
+Author: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <sebastian@breakpoint.cc>
+Date: Sat Sep 5 17:50:01 2020 +0200
- upstream: portability fix for sed that always emil a newline even
+ Remove HAVE_MMAP and BROKEN_MMAP
- if the input does not contain one; from Michael Forney
+ BROKEN_MMAP is no longer defined since commit
+ 1cfd5c06efb12 ("Remove portability support for mmap")
- OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 9190c3ddf0d2562ccc02c4a95fce0e392196bfc7
+ this commit also removed other HAVE_MMAP user. I didn't find anything
+ that defines HAVE_MMAP. The check does not trigger because compression
+ on server side is by default COMP_DELAYED (2) so it never triggers.
+
+ Remove remaining HAVE_MMAP and BROKEN_MMAP bits.
+
+ Signed-off-by: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <sebastian@breakpoint.cc>
-commit 8074f9499e454df0acdacea33598858a1453a357
+commit bbf20ac8065905f9cb9aeb8f1df57fcab52ee2fb
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri May 1 03:36:25 2020 +0000
+Date: Wed Sep 9 03:10:21 2020 +0000
- upstream: remove obsolete RSA1 test keys; spotted by Michael Forney
+ upstream: adapt to SSH_SK_VERSION_MAJOR crank
- OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 6384ba889594e217d166908ed8253718ab0866da
+ OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 0f3e76bdc8f9dbd9d22707c7bdd86051d5112ab8
-commit c697e46c314aa94574af0d393d80f23e0ebc9748
-Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Sat May 2 18:34:47 2020 +1000
-
- Update .depend.
-
-commit 83657eac42941f270c4b02b2c46d9a21f616ef99
-Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Sat May 2 18:29:40 2020 +1000
+commit 9afe2a150893b20bdf9eab764978d817b9a7b783
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Aug 28 03:17:13 2020 +0000
- Remove use of tail for 'make depend'.
+ upstream: Ensure that address/mask mismatches are flagged at
- Not every tail supports +N and we can do with out it so just remove it.
- Prompted by mforney at mforney.org.
+ config-check time. ok djm@
+
+ OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 8f5f4c2c0bf00e6ceae7a1755a444666de0ea5c2
-commit d25d630d24c5a1c64d4e646510e79dc22d6d7b88
+commit c76773524179cb654ff838dd43ba1ddb155bafaa
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Sat May 2 07:19:43 2020 +0000
+Date: Wed Sep 9 03:08:01 2020 +0000
- upstream: we have a sshkey_save_public() function to save public keys;
+ upstream: when writing an attestation blob for a FIDO key, record all
- use it and save a bunch of redundant code.
+ the data needed to verify the attestation. Previously we were missing the
+ "authenticator data" that is included in the signature.
- Patch from loic AT venez.fr; ok markus@ djm@
+ spotted by Ian Haken
+ feedback Pedro Martelletto and Ian Haken; ok markus@
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: f93e030a0ebcd0fd9054ab30db501ec63454ea5f
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 8439896e63792b2db99c6065dd9a45eabbdb7e0a
-commit e9dc9863723e111ae05e353d69df857f0169544a
-Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Fri May 1 18:32:25 2020 +1000
+commit c1c44eeecddf093a7983bd91e70b446de789b363
+Author: pedro martelletto <pedro@ambientworks.net>
+Date: Tue Sep 1 17:01:55 2020 +0200
- Use LONG_LONG_MAX and friends if available.
+ configure.ac: fix libfido2 back-compat
- If we don't have LLONG_{MIN,MAX} but do have LONG_LONG_{MIN,MAX}
- then use those instead. We do calculate these values in configure,
- but it turns out that at least one compiler (old HP ANSI C) can't
- parse "-9223372036854775808LL" without mangling it. (It can parse
- "-9223372036854775807LL" which is presumably why its limits.h defines
- LONG_LONG_MIN as the latter minus 1.)
-
- Fixes rekey test when compiled with the aforementioned compiler.
+ - HAVE_FIDO_CRED_PROD -> HAVE_FIDO_CRED_PROT;
+ - check for fido_dev_get_touch_begin(), so that
+ HAVE_FIDO_DEV_GET_TOUCH_BEGIN gets defined.
-commit aad87b88fc2536b1ea023213729aaf4eaabe1894
+commit 785f0f315bf7ac5909e988bb1ac3e019fb5e1594
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri May 1 06:31:42 2020 +0000
+Date: Mon Aug 31 04:33:17 2020 +0000
- upstream: when receving a file in sink(), be careful to send at
-
- most a single error response after the file has been opened. Otherwise the
- source() and sink() can become desyncronised. Reported by Daniel Goujot,
- Georges-Axel Jaloyan, Ryan Lahfa, and David Naccache.
+ upstream: refuse to add verify-required (PINful) FIDO keys to
- ok deraadt@ markus@
+ ssh-agent until the agent supports them properly
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 6c14d233c97349cb811a8f7921ded3ae7d9e0035
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 125bd55a8df32c87c3ec33c6ebe437673a3d037e
-commit 31909696c4620c431dd55f6cd15db65c4e9b98da
+commit 39e88aeff9c7cb6862b37ad1a87a03ebbb38c233
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri May 1 06:28:52 2020 +0000
+Date: Mon Aug 31 00:17:41 2020 +0000
- upstream: expose vasnmprintf(); ok (as part of other commit) markus
+ upstream: Add RCS IDs to the few files that are missing them; from
- deraadt
+ Pedro Martelletto
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 2e80cea441c599631a870fd40307d2ade5a7f9b5
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 39aa37a43d0c75ec87f1659f573d3b5867e4a3b3
-commit 99ce9cefbe532ae979744c6d956b49f4b02aff82
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri May 1 04:23:11 2020 +0000
+commit 72730249b38a676da94a1366b54a6e96e6928bcb
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Aug 28 03:15:52 2020 +0000
- upstream: avoid NULL dereference when attempting to convert invalid
+ upstream: Check that the addresses supplied to Match Address and
- ssh.com private keys using "ssh-keygen -i"; spotted by Michael Forney
+ Match LocalAddress are valid when parsing in config-test mode. This will
+ catch address/mask mismatches before they cause problems at runtime. Found by
+ Daniel Stocker, ok djm@
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 2e56e6d26973967d11d13f56ea67145f435bf298
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 2d0b10c69fad5d8fda4c703e7c6804935289378b
-commit 6c6072ba8b079e6f5caa38b011a6f4570c14ed38
-Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Fri May 1 15:09:26 2020 +1000
+commit 2a3a9822311a565a9df48ed3b6a3c972f462bd7d
+Author: jmc@openbsd.org <jmc@openbsd.org>
+Date: Thu Aug 27 12:34:00 2020 +0000
- See if SA_RESTART signals will interrupt select().
-
- On some platforms (at least older HP-UXes such as 11.11, possibly others)
- setting SA_RESTART on signal handers will cause it to not interrupt
- select(), at least for calls that do not specify a timeout. Try to
- detect this and if found, don't use SA_RESTART.
+ upstream: sentence fix; from pedro martelletto
- POSIX says "If SA_RESTART has been set for the interrupting signal, it
- is implementation-dependent whether select() restarts or returns with
- [EINTR]" so this behaviour is within spec.
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: f95b84a1e94e9913173229f3787448eea2f8a575
-commit 90a0b434ed41f9c505662dba8782591818599cb3
+commit ce178be0d954b210c958bc2b9e998cd6a7aa73a9
Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
-Date: Fri May 1 13:55:03 2020 +1000
+Date: Thu Aug 27 20:01:52 2020 +1000
- fix reversed test
+ tweak back-compat for older libfido2
-commit c0dfd18dd1c2107c73d18f70cd164f7ebd434b08
-Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
-Date: Fri May 1 13:29:16 2020 +1000
+commit d6f45cdde031acdf434bbb27235a1055621915f4
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Thu Aug 27 09:46:04 2020 +0000
- wrap sha2.h inclusion in #ifdef HAVE_SHA2_H
+ upstream: debug()-print a little info about FIDO-specific key
+
+ fields via "ssh-keygen -vyf /path/key"
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: cf315c4fe77db43947d111b00155165cb6b577cf
-commit a01817a9f63dbcbbc6293aacc4019993a4cdc7e3
+commit b969072cc3d62d05cb41bc6d6f3c22c764ed932f
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Tue Apr 28 04:59:29 2020 +0000
+Date: Thu Aug 27 09:43:28 2020 +0000
- upstream: adapt dummy FIDO middleware to API change; ok markus@
+ upstream: skip a bit more FIDO token selection logic when only a
- OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 8bb84ee500c2eaa5616044314dd0247709a1790f
+ single token is attached.
+
+ with Pedro Martelletto
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: e4a324bd9814227ec1faa8cb619580e661cca9ac
-commit 261571ddf02ea38fdb5e4a97c69ee53f847ca5b7
+commit 744df42a129d7d7db26947b7561be32edac89f88
Author: jmc@openbsd.org <jmc@openbsd.org>
-Date: Thu Apr 30 18:28:37 2020 +0000
+Date: Thu Aug 27 06:15:22 2020 +0000
- upstream: tweak previous; ok markus
+ upstream: tweak previous;
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 41895450ce2294ec44a5713134491cc31f0c09fd
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 92714b6531e244e4da401b2defaa376374e24be7
-commit 5de21c82e1d806d3e401b5338371e354b2e0a66f
-Author: markus@openbsd.org <markus@openbsd.org>
-Date: Thu Apr 30 17:12:20 2020 +0000
+commit e32479645ce649b444ba5c6e7151304306a09654
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Thu Aug 27 03:55:22 2020 +0000
- upstream: bring back debug() removed in rev 1.74; noted by pradeep
+ upstream: adapt to API changes
- kumar
-
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 8d134d22ab25979078a3b48d058557d49c402e65
+ OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 5f147990cb67094fe554333782ab268a572bb2dd
-commit ea14103ce9a5e13492e805f7e9277516ff5a4273
-Author: markus@openbsd.org <markus@openbsd.org>
-Date: Thu Apr 30 17:07:10 2020 +0000
+commit bbcc858ded3fbc46abfa7760e40389e3ca93884c
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date: Thu Aug 27 12:37:12 2020 +1000
- upstream: run the 2nd ssh with BatchMode for scp -3
-
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 77994fc8c7ca02d88e6d0d06d0f0fe842a935748
+ degrade semi-gracefully when libfido2 is too old
-commit 59d2de956ed29aa5565ed5e5947a7abdb27ac013
+commit 9cbbdc12cb6a2ab1e9ffe9974cca91d213c185c2
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Tue Apr 28 04:02:29 2020 +0000
+Date: Thu Aug 27 01:15:36 2020 +0000
- upstream: when signing a challenge using a FIDO toke, perform the
+ upstream: dummy firmware needs to match API version numner crank (for
- hashing in the middleware layer rather than in ssh code. This allows
- middlewares that call APIs that perform the hashing implicitly (including
- Microsoft's AFAIK). ok markus@
+ verify-required resident keys) even though it doesn't implement this feature
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: c9fc8630aba26c75d5016884932f08a5a237f37d
+ OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 86579ea2891e18e822e204413d011b2ae0e59657
-commit c9d10dbc0ccfb1c7568bbb784f7aeb7a0b5ded12
-Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
-Date: Sun Apr 26 09:38:14 2020 +0000
+commit c1e76c64956b424ba260fd4eec9970e5b5859039
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Thu Aug 27 02:11:09 2020 +0000
- upstream: Fix comment typo. Patch from mforney at mforney.org.
+ upstream: remove unreachable code I forgot to delete in r1.334
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 3565f056003707a5e678e60e03f7a3efd0464a2b
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 9ed6078251a0959ee8deda443b9ae42484fd8b18
-commit 4d2c87b4d1bde019cdd0f00552fcf97dd8b39940
-Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
-Date: Sat Apr 25 06:59:36 2020 +0000
+commit 0caff05350bd5fc635674c9e051a0322faba5ae3
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Thu Aug 27 01:08:45 2020 +0000
- upstream: We've standardized on memset over bzero, replace a couple
+ upstream: Request PIN ahead of time for certain FIDO actions
- that had slipped in. ok deraadt markus djm.
+ When we know that a particular action will require a PIN, such as
+ downloading resident keys or generating a verify-required key, request
+ the PIN before attempting it.
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: f5be055554ee93e6cc66b0053b590bef3728dbd6
+ joint work with Pedro Martelletto; ok markus@
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 863182d38ef075bad1f7d20ca485752a05edb727
-commit 7f23f42123d64272a7b00754afa6b0841d676691
-Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Fri May 1 12:21:58 2020 +1000
+commit b649b3daa6d4b8ebe1bd6de69b3db5d2c03c9af0
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Thu Aug 27 01:08:19 2020 +0000
- Include sys/byteorder.h for htons and friends.
+ upstream: preserve verify-required for resident FIDO keys
- These are usually in netinet/in.h but on HP-UX they are not defined if
- _XOPEN_SOURCE_EXTENDED is set. Only needed for netcat in the regression
- tests.
+ When downloading a resident, verify-required key from a FIDO token,
+ preserve the verify-required in the private key that is written to
+ disk. Previously we weren't doing that because of lack of support
+ in the middleware API.
+
+ from Pedro Martelletto; ok markus@ and myself
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 201c46ccdd227cddba3d64e1bdbd082afa956517
-commit d27cba58c972d101a5de976777e518f34ac779cb
-Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Fri May 1 09:21:52 2020 +1000
+commit 642e06d0df983fa2af85126cf4b23440bb2985bf
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Thu Aug 27 01:07:51 2020 +0000
- Fix conditional for openssl-based chacha20.
+ upstream: major rework of FIDO token selection logic
- Fixes warnings or link errors when building against older OpenSSLs.
- ok djm
+ When PINs are in use and multiple FIDO tokens are attached to a host, we
+ cannot just blast requests at all attached tokens with the PIN specified
+ as this will cause the per-token PIN failure counter to increment. If
+ this retry counter hits the token's limit (usually 3 attempts), then the
+ token will lock itself and render all (web and SSH) of its keys invalid.
+ We don't want this.
+
+ So this reworks the key selection logic for the specific case of
+ multiple keys being attached. When multiple keys are attached and the
+ operation requires a PIN, then the user must touch the key that they
+ wish to use first in order to identify it.
+
+ This may require multiple touches, but only if there are multiple keys
+ attached AND (usually) the operation requires a PIN. The usual case of a
+ single key attached should be unaffected.
+
+ Work by Pedro Martelletto; ok myself and markus@
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 637d3049ced61b7a9ee796914bbc4843d999a864
-commit 20819b962dc1467cd6fad5486a7020c850efdbee
-Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Fri Apr 24 15:07:55 2020 +1000
+commit 801c9f095e6d8b7b91aefd98f5001c652ea13488
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Thu Aug 27 01:07:09 2020 +0000
- Error out if given RDomain if unsupported.
+ upstream: support for requiring user verified FIDO keys in sshd
- If the config contained 'RDomain %D' on a platform that did not support
- it, the error would not be detected until runtime resulting in a broken
- sshd. Detect this earlier and error out if found. bz#3126, based on a
- patch from jjelen at redhat.com, tweaks and ok djm@
+ This adds a "verify-required" authorized_keys flag and a corresponding
+ sshd_config option that tells sshd to require that FIDO keys verify the
+ user identity before completing the signing/authentication attempt.
+ Whether or not user verification was performed is already baked into the
+ signature made on the FIDO token, so this is just plumbing that flag
+ through and adding ways to require it.
+
+ feedback and ok markus@
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 3a2313aae153e043d57763d766bb6d55c4e276e6
-commit 2c1690115a585c624eed2435075a93a463a894e2
-Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Apr 24 03:33:21 2020 +0000
+commit 9b8ad93824c682ce841f53f3b5762cef4e7cc4dc
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Thu Aug 27 01:06:18 2020 +0000
- upstream: Fix incorrect error message for "too many known hosts files."
+ upstream: support for user-verified FIDO keys
- bz#3149, patch from jjelen at redhat.com.
+ FIDO2 supports a notion of "user verification" where the user is
+ required to demonstrate their identity to the token before particular
+ operations (e.g. signing). Typically this is done by authenticating
+ themselves using a PIN that has been set on the token.
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: e0fcb07ed5cf7fd54ce340471a747c24454235e5
+ This adds support for generating and using user verified keys where
+ the verification happens via PIN (other options might be added in the
+ future, but none are in common use now). Practically, this adds
+ another key generation option "verify-required" that yields a key that
+ requires a PIN before each authentication.
+
+ feedback markus@ and Pedro Martelletto; ok markus@
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 57fd461e4366f87c47502c5614ec08573e6d6a15
-commit 3beb7276e7a8aedd3d4a49f9c03b97f643448c92
-Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Apr 24 02:19:40 2020 +0000
+commit 1196d7f49d4fbc90f37e550de3056561613b0960
+Author: cheloha@openbsd.org <cheloha@openbsd.org>
+Date: Wed Aug 12 01:23:45 2020 +0000
- upstream: Remove leave_non_blocking() which is now dead code
+ upstream: ssh-keyscan(1): simplify conloop() with timercmp(3),
- because nothing sets in_non_blocking_mode any more. Patch from
- michaael.meeks at collabora.com, ok djm@
+ timersub(3); ok djm@
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: c403cefe97a5a99eca816e19cc849cdf926bd09c
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: a102acb544f840d33ad73d40088adab4a687fa27
-commit 8654e3561772f0656e7663a0bd6a1a8cb6d43300
-Author: jmc@openbsd.org <jmc@openbsd.org>
-Date: Thu Apr 23 21:28:09 2020 +0000
+commit d0a195c89e26766d3eb8f3e4e2a00ebc98b57795
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Tue Aug 11 09:49:57 2020 +0000
- upstream: ce examples of "Ar arg Ar arg" with "Ar arg arg" and
+ upstream: let ssh_config(5)'s AddKeysToAgent keyword accept a time
- stop the spread;
+ limit for keys in addition to its current flag options. Time-limited keys
+ will automatically be removed from ssh-agent after their expiry time has
+ passed; ok markus@
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: af0e952ea0f5e2019c2ce953ed1796eca47f0705
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 792e71cacbbc25faab5424cf80bee4a006119f94
-commit 67697e4a8246dd8423e44b8785f3ee31fee72d07
-Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Fri Apr 24 11:10:18 2020 +1000
+commit e9c2002891a7b8e66f4140557a982978f372e5a3
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Tue Aug 11 09:45:54 2020 +0000
- Update .depend.
+ upstream: let the "Confirm user presence for key ..." ssh-askpass
+
+ notification respect $SSH_ASKPASS_REQUIRE; ok markus@
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 7c1a616b348779bda3b9ad46bf592741f8e206c1
-commit d6cc76176216fe3fac16cd20d148d75cb9c50876
+commit eaf8672b1b52db2815a229745f4e4b08681bed6d
Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Wed Apr 22 14:07:00 2020 +1000
+Date: Fri Aug 21 00:04:13 2020 +1000
- Mailing list is now closed to non-subscribers.
+ Remove check for 'ent' command.
- While there, add a reference to the bugzilla. ok djm@
+ It was added in 8d1fd57a9 for measuring entropy of ssh_prng_cmds which
+ has long since been removed and there are no other references to it.
-commit cecde6a41689d0ae585ec903b190755613a6de79
+commit 05c215de8d224e094a872d97d45f37f60c06206b
Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Wed Apr 22 12:09:40 2020 +1000
+Date: Mon Aug 17 21:34:32 2020 +1000
- Put the values from env vars back.
-
- This merges the values from the recently removed environment into make's
- command line arguments since we actually need those.
+ Wrap stdint.h include in ifdef HAVE_STDINT_H.
-commit 300c4322b92e98d3346efa0aec1c094c94d0f964
+commit eaf2765efe8bc74feba85c34295d067637fc6635
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date: Mon Aug 10 13:24:09 2020 +1000
+
+ sync memmem.c with OpenBSD
+
+commit ed6bef77f5bb5b8f9ca2914478949e29f2f0a780
Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Wed Apr 22 11:33:15 2020 +1000
+Date: Fri Aug 7 17:12:16 2020 +1000
- Pass configure's egrep through to test-exec.sh.
+ Always send any PAM account messages.
- Use it to create a wrapper function to call it from tests. Fixes the
- keygen-comment test on platforms with impoverished default egrep (eg
- Solaris).
+ If the PAM account stack reaturns any messages, send them to the user
+ not just if the check succeeds. bz#2049, ok djm@
-commit c8d9796cfe046f00eb8b2096d2b7028d6a523a84
+commit a09e98dcae1e26f026029b7142b0e0d10130056f
Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Wed Apr 22 10:56:44 2020 +1000
+Date: Fri Aug 7 15:37:37 2020 +1000
- Remove unneeded env vars from t-exec invocation.
+ Output test debug logs on failure.
-commit 01d4cdcd4514e99a4b6eb9523cd832bbf008d1d7
-Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
-Date: Tue Apr 21 23:14:58 2020 +0000
+commit eb122b1eebe58b29a83a507ee814cbcf8aeded1b
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Fri Aug 7 15:11:42 2020 +1000
- upstream: Backslash '$' at then end of string. Prevents warning on
-
- some shells.
-
- OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 5dc27ab624c09d34078fd326b10e38c1ce9c741f
+ Add ability to specify exact test target.
-commit 8854724ccefc1fa16f10b37eda2e759c98148caa
+commit c2ec7a07f8caabb4d8e00c66e7cd46bf2cd1e922
Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Tue Apr 21 18:27:23 2020 +1000
+Date: Fri Aug 7 14:21:15 2020 +1000
- Sync rev 1.49.
+ Document --without-openssl and --without-zlib.
+
+commit 651bb3a31949bbdc3a78b2ede95a77bce0c72984
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Fri Aug 7 14:15:11 2020 +1000
+
+ Add without-openssl without-zlib test target.
+
+commit 9499f2bb01dc1032ae155999b2d7764b9491341f
+Author: Stefan Schindler <dns2utf8@estada.ch>
+Date: Wed Aug 5 19:00:52 2020 +0200
+
+ Add CI with prepare script
- Prevent infinite for loop since i went from ssize_t to size_t. Patch from
- eagleoflqj via OpenSSH github PR#178, ok djm@, feedback & ok millert@
+ * Only use heimdal kerberos implementation
+ * Fetch yubico/libfido2 (see: https://github.com/Yubico/libfido2)
+ * Add one target for
+ * all features
+ * each feature alone
+ * no features
-commit d00d07b6744d3b4bb7aca46c734ecd670148da23
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Mon Apr 20 04:44:47 2020 +0000
+commit ea1f649046546a860f68b97ddc3015b7e44346ca
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date: Wed Aug 5 08:58:57 2020 +1000
- upstream: regression test for printing of private key fingerprints and
+ support NetBSD's utmpx.ut_ss address field
- key comments, mostly by loic AT venez.fr (slightly tweaked for portability)
- ok dtucker@
+ bz#960, ok dtucker
+
+commit 32c63e75a70a0ed9d6887a55fcb0e4531a6ad617
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date: Tue Aug 4 14:59:21 2020 +1000
+
+ wrap a declaration in the same ifdefs as its use
- OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 8dc6c4feaf4fe58b6d634cd89afac9a13fd19004
+ avoids warnings on NetBSD
-commit a98d5ba31e5e7e01317352f85fa63b846a960f8c
+commit c9e3be9f4b41fda32a2a0138d54c7a6b563bc94d
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date: Tue Aug 4 14:58:46 2020 +1000
+
+ undef TAILQ_CONCAT and friends
+
+ Needed for NetBSD. etc that supply these macros
+
+commit 2d8a3b7e8b0408dfeb933ac5cfd3a58f5bac49af
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Mon Apr 20 04:43:57 2020 +0000
+Date: Mon Aug 3 02:53:51 2020 +0000
- upstream: fix a bug I introduced in r1.406: when printing private key
+ upstream: ensure that certificate extensions are lexically sorted.
- fingerprint of old-format key, key comments were not being displayed. Spotted
- by loic AT venez.fr, ok dtucker
+ Previously if the user specified a custom extension then the everything would
+ be in order except the custom ones. bz3198 ok dtucker markus
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 2d98e4f9eb168eea733d17e141e1ead9fe26e533
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: d97deb90587b06cb227c66ffebb2d9667bf886f0
-commit 32f2d0aad42c15e19bd3b07496076ca891573a58
+commit a8732d74cb8e72f0c6366015687f1e649f60be87
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Apr 17 07:16:07 2020 +0000
+Date: Mon Aug 3 02:43:41 2020 +0000
- upstream: repair private key fingerprint printing to also print
+ upstream: allow -A to explicitly enable agent forwarding in scp and
- comment after regression caused by my recent pubkey loading refactor.
- Reported by loic AT venez.fr, ok dtucker@
+ sftp. The default remains to not forward an agent, even when ssh_config
+ enables it. ok jmc dtucker markus
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: f8db49acbee6a6ccb2a4259135693b3cceedb89e
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 36cc526aa3b0f94e4704b8d7b969dd63e8576822
-commit 094dd513f4b42e6a3cebefd18d1837eb709b4d99
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Apr 17 07:15:11 2020 +0000
+commit ab9105470a83ed5d8197959a1b1f367399958ba1
+Author: deraadt@openbsd.org <deraadt@openbsd.org>
+Date: Mon Aug 3 02:42:49 2020 +0000
- upstream: refactor out some duplicate private key loading code;
+ upstream: clang -Wimplicit-fallthrough does not recognise /*
- based on patch from loic AT venez.fr, ok dtucker@
+ FALLTHROUGH */ comments, which is the style we currently use, and gives too
+ many boring warnings. ok djm
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 5eff2476b0d8d0614924c55e350fb7bb9c84f45e
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 07b5031e9f49f2b69ac5e85b8da4fc9e393992a0
-commit 4e04f46f248f1708e39b900b76c9693c820eff68
-Author: jmc@openbsd.org <jmc@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Apr 17 06:12:41 2020 +0000
+commit ced327b9fb78c94d143879ef4b2a02cbc5d38690
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Jul 31 04:19:37 2020 +0000
- upstream: add space beteen macro arg and punctuation;
+ upstream: Also compare username when checking for JumpHost loops.
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: c93a6cbb4bf9468fc4c13e64bc1fd4efee201a44
+ bz#3057, ok djm@
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 9bbc1d138adb34c54f3c03a15a91f75dbf418782
-commit 44ae009a0112081d0d541aeaa90088bedb6f21ce
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Apr 17 04:27:03 2020 +0000
+commit ae7527010c44b3376b85d036a498f136597b2099
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Fri Jul 31 15:19:04 2020 +1000
- upstream: auth2-pubkey r1.89 changed the order of operations to
+ Remove AC_REVISION.
- checking AuthorizedKeysFile first and falling back to AuthorizedKeysCommand
- if no key was found in a file. Document this order here; bz3134
+ It hasn't been useful since we switched to git in 2014. ok djm@
+
+commit 89fc3f414be0ce4e8008332a9739a7d721269e50
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Tue Jul 28 19:40:30 2020 +1000
+
+ Use argv in OSSH_CHECK_CFLAG_COMPILE test.
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: afce0872cbfcfc1d4910ad7722e50f792a1dce12
+ configure.ac is not detecting -Wextra in compilers that implement the
+ option. The problem is that -Wextra implies -Wunused-parameter, and the
+ C excerpt used by aclocal.m4 does not use argv. Patch from pedro at
+ ambientworks.net, ok djm@
-commit f96f17f920f38ceea6f3c5cb0b075c46b8929fdc
+commit 62c81ef531b0cc7ff655455dd34f5f0c94f48e82
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Mon Jul 20 22:12:07 2020 +1000
+
+ Skip ECDSA-SK webauthn test when built w/out ECC
+
+commit 3ec9a6d7317236a9994887d8bd5d246af403a00d
Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
-Date: Fri Apr 17 14:07:15 2020 +1000
+Date: Mon Jul 20 13:09:25 2020 +1000
- sys/sysctl.h is only used on OpenBSD
+ Add ssh-sk-helper and manpage to RPM spec file
- so change the preprocessor test used to include it to check
- __OpenBSD__, matching the code that uses the symbols it declares.
+ Based on patch from Fabio Pedretti
-commit 54688e937a69c7aebef8a3d50cbd4c6345bab2ca
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Apr 17 03:38:47 2020 +0000
+commit a2855c048b3f4b17d8787bd3f24232ec0cd79abe
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Jul 17 07:09:24 2020 +0000
- upstream: fix reversed test that caused IdentitiesOnly=yes to not
+ upstream: Add %k to the TOKENs for Match Exec for consistency with
- apply to keys loaded from a PKCS11Provider; bz3141, ok dtucker@
+ the other keywords that recently got %k.
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: e3dd6424b94685671fe84c9b9dbe352fb659f677
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 1857d1c40f270cbc254fca91e66110641dddcfdb
-commit 267cbc87b5b6e78973ac4d3c7a6f807ed226928c
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Apr 17 03:34:42 2020 +0000
+commit 69860769fa9f4529d8612ec055ae11912f7344cf
+Author: jmc@openbsd.org <jmc@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Jul 17 05:59:05 2020 +0000
- upstream: mention that /etc/hosts.equiv and /etc/shosts.equiv are
-
- not considered for HostbasedAuthentication when the target user is root;
- bz3148
+ upstream: fix macro slip in previous;
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: fe4c1256929e53f23af17068fbef47852f4bd752
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 624e47ab209450ad9ad5c69f54fa69244de5ed9a
-commit c90f72d29e84b4a2709078bf5546a72c29a65177
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Apr 17 03:30:05 2020 +0000
+commit 40649bd0822883b684183854b16d0b8461d5697b
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Jul 17 07:10:24 2020 +0000
- upstream: make IgnoreRhosts a tri-state option: "yes" ignore
+ upstream: Add test for '%k' (HostKeyAlias) TOKEN.
- rhosts/shosts, "no" allow rhosts/shosts or (new) "shosts-only" to allow
- .shosts files but not .rhosts. ok dtucker@
+ OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 8ed1ba1a811790031aad3fcea860a34ad7910456
+
+commit 6736fe680704a3518cb4f3f8f6723b00433bd3dd
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Jul 17 03:26:58 2020 +0000
+
+ upstream: Add tests for expansions on UserKnownHostsFile.
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: d08d6930ed06377a80cf53923c1955e9589342e9
+ OpenBSD-Regress-ID: bccf8060306c841bbcceb1392644f906a4d6ca51
-commit 321c7147079270f3a154f91b59e66219aac3d514
+commit 287dc6396e0f9cb2393f901816dbd7f2a7dfbb5f
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Apr 17 03:23:13 2020 +0000
+Date: Fri Jul 17 03:51:32 2020 +0000
- upstream: allow the IgnoreRhosts directive to appear anywhere in a
-
- sshd_config, not just before any Match blocks; bz3148, ok dtucker@
+ upstream: log error message for process_write() write failures
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: e042467d703bce640b1f42c5d1a62bf3825736e8
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: f733d7b3b05e3c68967dc18dfe39b9e8fad29851
-commit ca5403b085a735055ec7b7cdcd5b91f2662df94c
-Author: jmc@openbsd.org <jmc@openbsd.org>
-Date: Sat Apr 11 20:20:09 2020 +0000
+commit 8df5774a42d2eaffe057bd7f293fc6a4b1aa411c
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Jul 17 03:43:42 2020 +0000
- upstream: add space between macro arg and punctuation;
+ upstream: Add a '%k' TOKEN that expands to the effective HostKey of
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: e579e4d95eef13059c30931ea1f09ed8296b819c
+ the destination. This allows, eg, keeping host keys in individual files
+ using "UserKnownHostsFile ~/.ssh/known_hosts.d/%k". bz#1654, ok djm@, jmc@
+ (man page bits)
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 7084d723c9cc987a5c47194219efd099af5beadc
-commit 8af0244d7b4a65eed2e62f9c89141c7c8e63f09d
-Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Wed Apr 15 10:58:02 2020 +1000
+commit c4f239944a4351810fd317edf408bdcd5c0102d9
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Jul 17 03:23:10 2020 +0000
- Add sys/syscall.h for syscall numbers.
+ upstream: Add %-TOKEN, environment variable and tilde expansion to
- In some architecture/libc configurations we need to explicitly include
- sys/syscall.h for the syscall number (__NR_xxx) definitions. bz#3085,
- patch from blowfist at xroutine.net.
+ UserKnownHostsFile, allowing the file to be automagically split up in the
+ configuration (eg bz#1654). ok djm@, man page parts jmc@
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 7e1b406caf147638bb51558836a72d6cc0bd1b18
-commit 3779b50ee952078018a5d9e1df20977f4355df17
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Sat Apr 11 10:16:11 2020 +0000
+commit dbaaa01daedb423c38124a72c471982fb08a16fb
+Author: solene@openbsd.org <solene@openbsd.org>
+Date: Wed Jul 15 07:50:46 2020 +0000
- upstream: Refactor private key parsing. Eliminates a fair bit of
+ upstream: - Add [-a rounds] in ssh-keygen man page and usage() -
- duplicated code and fixes oss-fuzz#20074 (NULL deref) caused by a missing key
- type check in the ECDSA_CERT parsing path.
+ Reorder parameters list in the first usage() case - Sentence rewording
- feedback and ok markus@
+ ok dtucker@
+ jmc@ noticed usage() missed -a flag too
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 4711981d88afb7196d228f7baad9be1d3b20f9c9
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: f06b9afe91cc96f260b929a56e9930caecbde246
-commit b6a4013647db67ec622c144a9e05dd768f1966b3
-Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Apr 10 00:54:03 2020 +0000
+commit 69924a92c3af7b99a7541aa544a2334ec0fb092c
+Author: jmc@openbsd.org <jmc@openbsd.org>
+Date: Wed Jul 15 05:40:05 2020 +0000
- upstream: Add tests for TOKEN expansion of LocalForward and
+ upstream: start sentence with capital letter;
- RemoteForward.
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: ab06581d51b2b4cc1b4aab781f7f3cfa56cad973
+
+commit 5b56bd0affea7b02b540bdbc4d1d271b0e4fc885
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date: Fri Jul 17 13:15:50 2020 +1000
+
+ detect Linux/X32 systems
- OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 90fcbc60d510eb114a2b6eaf4a06ff87ecd80a89
+ This is a frankenstein monster of AMD64 instructions/calling conventions
+ but with a 4GB address space. Allegedly deprecated but people still run
+ into it causing weird sandbox failures, e.g. bz#3085
-commit abc3e0a5179c13c0469a1b11fe17d832abc39999
+commit 9c9ddc1391d6af8d09580a2424ab467d0a5df3c7
Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
-Date: Mon Apr 6 09:43:55 2020 +0000
+Date: Wed Jul 15 06:43:16 2020 +0000
- upstream: Add utf8.c for asmprintf used by krl.c
+ upstream: Fix previous by calling the correct function.
- OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 433708d11165afdb189fe635151d21659dd37a37
+ OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 821cdd1dff9c502cceff4518b6afcb81767cad5a
-commit 990687a0336098566c3a854d23cce74a31ec6fe2
+commit f1a4798941b4372bfe5e46f1c0f8672fe692d9e4
Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Apr 10 00:52:07 2020 +0000
+Date: Wed Jul 15 05:36:50 2020 +0000
- upstream: Add TOKEN percent expansion to LocalFoward and RemoteForward
+ upstream: Update test to match recent change in match.c
- when used for Unix domain socket forwarding. Factor out the code for the
- config keywords that use the most common subset of TOKENS into its own
- function. bz#3014, ok jmc@ (man page bits) djm@
+ OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 965bda1f95f09a765050707340c73ad755f41167
+
+commit d7e71be4fd57b7c7e620d733cdf2333b27bfa924
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Wed Jul 15 15:30:43 2020 +1000
+
+ Adjust portable code to match changes in 939d787d,
+
+commit fec89f32a84fd0aa1afc81deec80a460cbaf451a
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date: Wed Jul 15 04:27:34 2020 +0000
+
+ upstream: Add default for number of rounds (-a). ok djm@
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: bffc9f7e7b5cf420309a057408bef55171fd0b97
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: cb7e9aa04ace01a98e63e4bd77f34a42ab169b15
-commit 2b13d3934d5803703c04803ca3a93078ecb5b715
+commit aaa8b609a7b332be836cd9a3b782422254972777
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Wed Apr 8 00:10:37 2020 +0000
+Date: Tue Jul 14 23:57:01 2020 +0000
- upstream: let sshkey_try_load_public() load public keys from the
+ upstream: allow some additional control over the use of ssh-askpass
- unencrypted envelope of private key files if not sidecar public key file is
- present.
+ via $SSH_ASKPASS_REQUIRE, including force-enable/disable. bz#69 ok markus@
- ok markus@
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 3a1e6cbbf6241ddc4405c4246caa2c249f149eb2
+
+commit 6368022cd4dd508671c4999a59ec5826df098530
+Author: deraadt@openbsd.org <deraadt@openbsd.org>
+Date: Tue Jul 7 02:47:21 2020 +0000
+
+ upstream: correct recently broken comments
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 252a0a580e10b9a6311632530d63b5ac76592040
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 964d9a88f7de1d0eedd3f8070b43fb6e426351f1
-commit d01f39304eaab0352793b490a25e1ab5f59a5366
+commit 6d755706a0059eb9e2d63517f288b75cbc3b4701
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Wed Apr 8 00:09:24 2020 +0000
+Date: Sun Jul 5 23:59:45 2020 +0000
- upstream: simplify sshkey_try_load_public()
+ upstream: some language improvements; ok markus
- ok markus@
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 939d787d571b4d5da50b3b721fd0b2ac236acaa8
+
+commit b0c1e8384d5e136ebdf895d1434aea7dd8661a1c
+Author: markus@openbsd.org <markus@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Jul 3 10:12:26 2020 +0000
+
+ upstream: update setproctitle after re-exec; ok djm
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 05a5d46562aafcd70736c792208b1856064f40ad
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: bc92d122f9184ec2a9471ade754b80edd034ce8b
-commit f290ab0833e44355fc006e4e67b92446c14673ef
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Wed Apr 8 00:08:46 2020 +0000
+commit cd119a5ec2bf0ed5df4daff3bd14f8f7566dafd3
+Author: markus@openbsd.org <markus@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Jul 3 10:11:33 2020 +0000
- upstream: add sshkey_parse_pubkey_from_private_fileblob_type()
+ upstream: keep ignoring HUP after fork+exec; ok djm
- Extracts a public key from the unencrypted envelope of a new-style
- OpenSSH private key.
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 7679985a84ee5ceb09839905bb6f3ddd568749a2
+
+commit 8af4a743693ccbea3e15fc9e93edbeb610fa94f4
+Author: markus@openbsd.org <markus@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Jul 3 10:10:17 2020 +0000
+
+ upstream: don't exit the listener on send_rexec_state errors; ok
- ok markus@
+ djm
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 44d7ab446e5e8c686aee96d5897b26b3939939aa
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 57cbd757d130d3f45b7d41310b3a15eeec137d5c
-commit 8d514eea4ae089626a55e11c7bc1745c8d9683e4
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Wed Apr 8 00:07:19 2020 +0000
+commit 03da4c2b70468f04ed1c08518ea0a70e67232739
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date: Wed Jul 15 04:55:47 2020 +0000
- upstream: simplify sshkey_parse_private_fileblob_type()
+ upstream: Use $OBJ to find key files. Fixes test when run on an obj
- Try new format parser for all key types first, fall back to PEM
- parser only for invalid format errors.
-
- ok markus@
+ directory (on OpenBSD) or out of tree (in Portable).
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 0173bbb3a5cface77b0679d4dca0e15eb5600b77
+ OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 938fa8ac86adaa527d64a305bd2135cfbb1c0a17
-commit 421169d0e758351b105eabfcebf42378ebf17217
+commit 73f20f195ad18f1cf633eb7d8be95dc1b6111eea
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Sat Jul 4 23:11:23 2020 +1000
+
+ Wrap stdint.h in ifdef HAVE_STDINT_H.
+
+commit aa6fa4bf3023fa0e5761cd8f4b2cd015d2de74dd
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Wed Apr 8 00:05:59 2020 +0000
+Date: Fri Jul 3 07:25:18 2020 +0000
- upstream: check private key type against requested key type in
+ upstream: put back the mux_ctx memleak fix, but only for channels of
- new-style private decoding; ok markus@
+ type SSH_CHANNEL_MUX_LISTENER; Specifically SSH_CHANNEL_MUX_PROXY channels
+ should not have this structure freed.
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 04d44b3a34ce12ce5187fb6f6e441a88c8c51662
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: f3b213ae60405f77439e2b06262f054760c9d325
-commit 6aabfb6d22b36d07f584cba97f4cdc4363a829da
+commit d8195914eb43b20b13381f4e5a74f9f8a14f0ded
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Wed Apr 8 00:04:32 2020 +0000
+Date: Fri Jul 3 07:17:35 2020 +0000
- upstream: check that pubkey in private key envelope matches actual
+ upstream: revert r1.399 - the lifetime of c->mux_ctx is more complex;
- private key
+ simply freeing it here causes other problems
- (this public key is currently unusued)
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: c6fee8ca94e2485faa783839541962be2834c5ed
+
+commit 20b5fab9f773b3d3c7f06cb15b8f69a2c081ee80
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Jul 3 07:02:37 2020 +0000
+
+ upstream: avoid tilde_expand_filename() in expanding ~/.ssh/rc - if
- ok markus@
+ sshd is in chroot mode, the likely absence of a password database will cause
+ tilde_expand_filename() to fatal; ok dtucker@
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 634a60b5e135d75f48249ccdf042f3555112049c
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: e20aee6159e8b79190d18dba1513fc1b7c8b7ee1
-commit c0f5b2294796451001fd328c44f0d00f1114eddf
+commit c8935081db35d73ee6355999142fa0776a2af912
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Wed Apr 8 00:01:52 2020 +0000
+Date: Fri Jul 3 06:46:41 2020 +0000
- upstream: refactor private key parsing a little
-
- Split out the base64 decoding and private section decryption steps in
- to separate functions. This will make the decryption step easier to fuzz
- as well as making it easier to write a "load public key from new-format
- private key" function.
+ upstream: when redirecting sshd's log output to a file, undo this
- ok markus@
+ redirection after the session child process is forked(); ok dtucker@
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 7de31d80fb9062aa01901ddf040c286b64ff904e
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 6df86dd653c91f5bc8ac1916e7680d9d24690865
-commit 8461a5b3db34ed0b5a4a18d82f64fd5ac8693ea8
-Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Mon Apr 6 20:54:34 2020 +1000
+commit 183c4aaef944af3a1a909ffa01058c65bac55748
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Jul 3 06:29:57 2020 +0000
- Include openssl-compat.h before checking ifdefs.
+ upstream: start ClientAliveInterval bookkeeping before first pass
- Fixes problem where unsuitable chacha20 code in libressl would be used
- unintentionally.
+ through select() loop; fixed theoretical case where busy sshd may ignore
+ timeouts from client; inspired by and ok dtucker
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 96bfc4b1f86c7da313882a84755b2b47eb31957f
-commit 931c50c5883a9910ea1ae9a371e4e815ec56b035
+commit 6fcfd303d67f16695198cf23d109a988e40eefb6
Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
-Date: Mon Apr 6 10:04:56 2020 +1000
+Date: Fri Jul 3 15:28:27 2020 +1000
- fix inverted test for LibreSSL version
+ add check for fido_cred_set_prot() to configure
-commit d1d5f728511e2338b7c994968d301d8723012264
+commit f11b23346309e4d5138e733a49321aedd6eeaa2f
Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
-Date: Sat Apr 4 23:04:41 2020 +0000
+Date: Fri Jul 3 05:09:06 2020 +0000
- upstream: Indicate if we're using a cached key in trace output.
+ upstream: Only reset the serveralive check when we receive traffic from
- OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 409a7b0e59d1272890fda507651c0c3d2d3c0d89
+ the server and ignore traffic from a port forwarding client, preventing a
+ client from keeping a connection alive when it should be terminated. Based
+ on a patch from jxraynor at gmail.com via openssh-unix-dev and bz#2265, ok
+ djm@
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: a941a575a5cbc244c0ef5d7abd0422bbf02c2dcd
-commit a398251a4627367c78bc483c70c2ec973223f82c
-Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Sun Apr 5 08:43:57 2020 +1000
+commit adfdbf1211914b631c038f0867a447db7b519937
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date: Fri Jul 3 15:15:15 2020 +1000
- Use /usr/bin/xp4g/id if necessary.
+ sync sys-queue.h with OpenBSD upstream
- Solaris' native "id" doesn't support the options we use but the one
- in /usr/bin/xp4g does, so use that instead.
+ needed for TAILQ_CONCAT
-commit db0fdd48335b5b01114f78c1a73a195235910f81
-Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
-Date: Sat Apr 4 22:14:26 2020 +0000
+commit 1b90ddde49e2ff377204082b6eb130a096411dc1
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Jul 3 05:08:41 2020 +0000
- upstream: Some platforms don't have "hostname -s", so use cut to trim
+ upstream: fix memory leak of mux_ctx; patch from Sergiy Lozovsky
- short hostname instead.
+ via bz3189 ok dtucker
- OpenBSD-Regress-ID: ebcf36a6fdf287c9336b0d4f6fc9f793c05307a7
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: db249bd4526fd42d0f4f43f72f7b8b7705253bde
-commit e7e59a9cc8eb7fd5944ded28f4d7e3ae0a5fdecd
-Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Apr 3 07:53:10 2020 +0000
+commit 55ef3e9cbd5b336bd0f89205716924886fcf86de
+Author: markus@openbsd.org <markus@openbsd.org>
+Date: Wed Jul 1 16:28:31 2020 +0000
- upstream: Compute hash locally and re-enable %C tests.
+ upstream: free kex in ssh_packet_close; ok djm semarie
- OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 94d1366e8105274858b88a1f9ad2e62801e49770
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: dbc181e90d3d32fd97b10d75e68e374270e070a2
-commit abe2b245b3ac6c4801e99bc0f13289cd28211e22
-Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
-Date: Fri Apr 3 17:25:46 2020 +1100
+commit e1c401109b61f7dbc199b5099933d579e7fc5dc9
+Author: bket@openbsd.org <bket@openbsd.org>
+Date: Sat Jun 27 13:39:09 2020 +0000
- prefer libcrypto chacha20-poly1305 where possible
+ upstream: Replace TAILQ concatenation loops with TAILQ_CONCAT
+
+ OK djm@
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 454b40e09a117ddb833794358970a65b14c431ef
-commit bc5c5d01ad668981f9e554e62195383bc12e8528
-Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Apr 3 05:43:11 2020 +0000
+commit 14beca57ac92d62830c42444c26ba861812dc837
+Author: semarie@openbsd.org <semarie@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Jun 26 11:26:01 2020 +0000
- upstream: Temporarily remove tests for '%C' since the hash contains the
+ upstream: backout 1.293 fix kex mem-leak in ssh_packet_close at markus
- local hostname and it doesn't work on any machine except mine... spotted by
- djm@
+ request
- OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 2d4c3585b9fcbbff14f4a5a5fde51dbd0d690401
+ the change introduced a NULL deref in sshpkt_vfatal() (uses of ssh->kex after
+ calling ssh_packet_clear_keys())
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 9c9a6721411461b0b1c28dc00930d7251a798484
-commit 81624026989654955a657ebf2a1fe8b9994f3c87
+commit 598c3a5e3885080ced0d7c40fde00f1d5cdbb32b
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date: Fri Jun 26 16:07:12 2020 +1000
+
+ document a PAM spec problem in a frustrated comment
+
+commit 976c4f86286d52a0cb2aadf4a095d379c0da752e
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Apr 3 06:07:57 2020 +0000
+Date: Fri Jun 26 05:42:16 2020 +0000
- upstream: r1.522 deleted one too many lines; repair
+ upstream: avoid spurious error message when ssh-keygen creates files
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 1af8851fd7a99e4a887b19aa8f4c41a6b3d25477
+ outside ~/.ssh; with dtucker@
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: ac0c662d44607e00ec78c266ee60752beb1c7e08
-commit 668cb3585ce829bd6e34d4a962c489bda1d16370
-Author: jmc@openbsd.org <jmc@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Apr 3 05:53:52 2020 +0000
+commit 32b2502a9dfdfded1ccdc1fd6dc2b3fe41bfc205
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date: Fri Jun 26 15:30:06 2020 +1000
- upstream: sort -N and add it to usage();
-
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 5b00e8db37c2b0a54c7831fed9e5f4db53ada332
+ missing ifdef SELINUX; spotted by dtucker
-commit 338ccee1e7fefa47f3d128c2541e94c5270abe0c
+commit e073106f370cdd2679e41f6f55a37b491f0e82fe
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Apr 3 05:48:57 2020 +0000
+Date: Fri Jun 26 05:12:21 2020 +0000
- upstream: avoid another compiler warning spotted in -portable
+ upstream: regress test for ssh-add -d; ok dtucker@
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 1d29c51ac844b287c4c8bcaf04c63c7d9ba3b8c7
+ OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 3a2e044be616afc7dd4f56c100179e83b33d8abf
-commit 9f8a42340bd9af86a99cf554dc39ecdf89287544
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Apr 3 04:07:48 2020 +0000
+commit c809daaa1bad6b1c305b0e0b5440360f32546c84
+Author: markus@openbsd.org <markus@openbsd.org>
+Date: Wed Jun 24 15:16:23 2020 +0000
- upstream: this needs utf8.c too
+ upstream: add test for mux w/-Oproxy; ok djm
- OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 445040036cec714d28069a20da25553a04a28451
+ OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 764d5c696e2a259f1316a056e225e50023abb027
-commit 92115ea7c3a834374720c350841fc729e7d5c8b2
-Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Apr 3 03:14:03 2020 +0000
+commit 3d06ff4bbd3dca8054c238d2a94c0da563ef7eee
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Jun 26 05:16:38 2020 +0000
- upstream: Add percent_expand test for 'Match Exec'.
+ upstream: handle EINTR in waitfd() and timeout_connect() helpers;
- OpenBSD-Regress-ID: a41c14fd6a0b54d66aa1e9eebfb9ec962b41232f
+ bz#3071; ok dtucker@
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 08fa87be50070bd8b754d9b1ebb1138d7bc9d8ee
-commit de34a440276ae855c38deb20f926d46752c62c9d
+commit fe2ec0b9c19adeab0cd9f04b8152dc17f31c31e5
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Apr 3 04:43:24 2020 +0000
+Date: Fri Jun 26 05:04:07 2020 +0000
- upstream: fix format string (use %llu for uint64, not %lld). spotted by
+ upstream: allow "ssh-add -d -" to read keys to be deleted from
- Darren and his tinderbox tests
+ stdin bz#3180; ok dtucker@
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 3b4587c3d9d46a7be9bdf028704201943fba96c2
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 15c7f10289511eb19fce7905c9cae8954e3857ff
-commit 9cd40b829a5295cc81fbea8c7d632b2478db6274
+commit a3e0c376ffc11862fa3568b28188bd12965973e1
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Apr 3 04:34:15 2020 +0000
+Date: Fri Jun 26 05:03:36 2020 +0000
- upstream: Add a flag to re-enable verbose output when in batch
+ upstream: constify a few things; ok dtucker (as part of another
- mode; requested in bz3135; ok dtucker
+ diff)
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 5ad2ed0e6440562ba9c84b666a5bbddc1afe2e2b
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 7c17fc987085994d752304bd20b1ae267a9bcdf6
-commit 6ce51a5da5d333a44e7c74c027f3571f70c39b24
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Apr 3 04:32:21 2020 +0000
+commit 74344c3ca42c3f53b00b025daf09ae7f6aa38076
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Jun 26 05:02:03 2020 +0000
- upstream: chacha20-poly1305 AEAD using libcrypto EVP_chacha20
+ upstream: Defer creation of ~/.ssh by ssh(1) until we attempt to
- Based on patch from Yuriy M. Kaminskiy. ok + lots of assistance along the
- way at a2k20 tb@
+ write to it so we don't leave an empty .ssh directory when it's not needed.
+ Use the same function to replace the code in ssh-keygen that does the same
+ thing. bz#3156, ok djm@
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 5e08754c13d31258bae6c5e318cc96219d6b10f0
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 59c073b569be1a60f4de36f491a4339bc4ae870f
-commit eba523f0a130f1cce829e6aecdcefa841f526a1a
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Apr 3 04:27:03 2020 +0000
+commit c9e24daac6324fcbdba171392c325bf9ccc3c768
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Jun 26 04:45:11 2020 +0000
- upstream: make Chacha20-POLY1305 context struct opaque; ok tb@ as
+ upstream: Expand path to ~/.ssh/rc rather than relying on it
- part of a larger diff at a2k20
+ being relative to the current directory, so that it'll still be found if the
+ shell startup changes its directory. Since the path is potentially longer,
+ make the cmd buffer that uses it dynamically sized. bz#3185, with & ok djm@
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: a4609b7263284f95c9417ef60ed7cdbb7bf52cfd
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 36e33ff01497af3dc8226d0c4c1526fc3a1e46bf
-commit ebd29e90129cf18fedfcfe1de86e324228669295
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Apr 3 04:06:26 2020 +0000
+commit 07f5f369a25e228a7357ef6c57205f191f073d99
+Author: markus@openbsd.org <markus@openbsd.org>
+Date: Wed Jun 24 15:12:09 2020 +0000
- upstream: fix debug statement
+ upstream: fix kex mem-leak in ssh_packet_close; ok djm
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 42c6edeeda5ce88b51a20d88c93be3729ce6b916
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: e2e9533f393620383afd0b68ef435de8d5e8abe4
-commit 7b4d8999f2e1a0cb7b065e3efa83e6edccfc7d82
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Apr 3 04:03:51 2020 +0000
+commit e35995088cd6691a712bfd586bae8084a3a922ba
+Author: markus@openbsd.org <markus@openbsd.org>
+Date: Wed Jun 24 15:10:38 2020 +0000
- upstream: the tunnel-forwarding vs ExitOnForwardFailure fix that I
+ upstream: fix ssh -O proxy w/mux which got broken by no longer
- committed earlier had an off-by-one. Fix this and add some debugging that
- would have made it apparent sooner.
+ making ssh->kex optional in packet.c revision 1.278 ok djm@
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 082f8f72b1423bd81bbdad750925b906e5ac6910
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 2b65df04a064c2c6277359921d2320c90ab7d917
-commit eece243666d44ceb710d004624c5c7bdc05454bc
-Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Apr 3 03:12:11 2020 +0000
+commit 250246fef22b87a54a63211c60a2def9be431fbd
+Author: markus@openbsd.org <markus@openbsd.org>
+Date: Wed Jun 24 15:09:53 2020 +0000
- upstream: %C expansion just added to Match Exec should include
+ upstream: support loading big sshd_config files w/o realloc; ok
- remote user not local user.
+ djm
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 80f1d976938f2a55ee350c11d8b796836c8397e2
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: ba9238e810074ac907f0cf8cee1737ac04983171
-commit d5318a784d016478fc8da90a38d9062c51c10432
-Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Apr 3 02:33:31 2020 +0000
+commit 89b54900ac61986760452f132bbe3fb7249cfdac
+Author: markus@openbsd.org <markus@openbsd.org>
+Date: Wed Jun 24 15:08:53 2020 +0000
- upstream: Add regression test for percent expansions where possible.
+ upstream: allow sshd_config longer than 256k; ok djm
- OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 7283be8b2733ac1cbefea3048a23d02594485288
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 83f40dd5457a64c1d3928eb4364461b22766beb3
-commit 663e84bb53de2a60e56a44d538d25b8152b5c1cc
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Apr 3 02:40:32 2020 +0000
+commit e3fa6249e6d9ceb57c14b04dd4c0cfab12fa7cd5
+Author: markus@openbsd.org <markus@openbsd.org>
+Date: Wed Jun 24 15:07:33 2020 +0000
- upstream: make failures when establishing "Tunnel" forwarding terminate
+ upstream: only call sshkey_xmss_init() once for KEY_XMSS_CERT; ok
- the connection when ExitOnForwardFailure is enabled; bz3116; ok dtucker
+ djm
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: ef4b4808de0a419c17579b1081da768625c1d735
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: d0002ffb7f20f538b014d1d0735facd5a81ff096
-commit ed833da176611a39d3376d62154eb88eb440d31c
-Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Apr 3 02:27:12 2020 +0000
+commit 37f2da069c0619f2947fb92785051d82882876d7
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Mon Jun 22 23:44:27 2020 +0000
- upstream: Make with config keywords support which
+ upstream: some clarifying comments
- percent_expansions more consistent. - %C is moved into its own function and
- added to Match Exec. - move the common (global) options into a macro. This
- is ugly but it's the least-ugly way I could come up with. - move
- IdentityAgent and ForwardAgent percent expansion to before the config dump
- to make it regression-testable. - document all of the above
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 5268479000fd97bfa30ab819f3517139daa054a2
+
+commit b659319a5bc9e8adf3c4facc51f37b670d2a7426
+Author: jmc@openbsd.org <jmc@openbsd.org>
+Date: Mon Jun 22 06:37:38 2020 +0000
+
+ upstream: updated argument name for -P in first synopsis was
- ok jmc@ for man page bits, "makes things less terrible" djm@ for the rest.
+ missed in previous;
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 4b65664bd6d8ae2a9afaf1a2438ddd1b614b1d75
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 8d84dc3050469884ea91e29ee06a371713f2d0b7
-commit 6ec7457171468da2bbd908b8cd63d298b0e049ea
+commit 02a9222cbce7131d639984c2f6c71d1551fc3333
+Author: jmc@openbsd.org <jmc@openbsd.org>
+Date: Mon Jun 22 06:36:40 2020 +0000
+
+ upstream: supply word missing in previous;
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 16a38b049f216108f66c8b699aa046063381bd23
+
+commit 5098b3b6230852a80ac6cef5d53a785c789a5a56
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date: Mon Jun 22 16:54:02 2020 +1000
+
+ missing files for webauthn/sshsig unit test
+
+commit 354535ff79380237924ac8fdc98f8cdf83e67da6
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Apr 3 02:26:56 2020 +0000
+Date: Mon Jun 22 06:00:06 2020 +0000
- upstream: give ssh-keygen the ability to dump the contents of a
+ upstream: add support for verification of webauthn sshsig signature,
- binary key revocation list: ssh-keygen -lQf /path bz#3132; ok dtucker
+ and example HTML/JS to generate webauthn signatures in SSH formats (also used
+ to generate the testdata/* for the test).
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: b76afc4e3b74ab735dbde4e5f0cfa1f02356033b
+ OpenBSD-Regress-ID: dc575be5bb1796fdf4b8aaee0ef52a6671a0f6fb
-commit af628b8a6c3ef403644d83d205c80ff188c97f0c
+commit bb52e70fa5330070ec9a23069c311d9e277bbd6f
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Apr 3 02:25:21 2020 +0000
+Date: Mon Jun 22 05:58:35 2020 +0000
- upstream: add allocating variant of the safe utf8 printer; ok
+ upstream: Add support for FIDO webauthn (verification only).
- dtucker as part of a larger diff
+ webauthn is a standard for using FIDO keys in web browsers. webauthn
+ signatures are a slightly different format to plain FIDO signatures - this
+ support allows verification of these. Feedback and ok markus@
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 037e2965bd50eacc2ffb49889ecae41552744fa0
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: ab7e3a9fb5782d99d574f408614d833379e564ad
-commit d8ac9af645f5519ac5211e9e1e4dc1ed00e9cced
-Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
-Date: Mon Mar 16 02:17:02 2020 +0000
+commit 64bc121097f377142f1387ffb2df7592c49935af
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Mon Jun 22 05:56:23 2020 +0000
- upstream: Cast lifetime to u_long for comparison to prevent unsigned
+ upstream: refactor ECDSA-SK verification a little ahead of adding
- comparison warning on 32bit arches. Spotted by deraadt, ok djm.
+ support for FIDO webauthn signature verification support; ok markus@
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 7a75b2540bff5ab4fa00b4d595db1df13bb0515a
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: c9f478fd8e0c1bd17e511ce8694f010d8e32043e
-commit 0eaca933ae08b0a515edfccd5cc4a6b667034813
-Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Sat Mar 14 20:58:46 2020 +1100
+commit 12848191f8fe725af4485d3600e0842d92f8637f
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Mon Jun 22 05:54:10 2020 +0000
- Include fido.h when checking for fido/credman.h.
+ upstream: support for RFC4648 base64url encoding; ok markus
- It's required for fido_dev_t, otherwise configure fails with
- when given --with-security-key-builtin.
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 0ef22c55e772dda05c112c88412c0797fec66eb4
-commit c7c099060f82ffe6a36d8785ecf6052e12fd92f0
+commit 473b4af43db12127137c7fc1a10928313f5a16d2
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Mar 13 03:18:45 2020 +0000
+Date: Mon Jun 22 05:53:26 2020 +0000
- upstream: some more speeling mistakes from
+ upstream: better terminology for permissions; feedback & ok markus@
- OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 02471c079805471c546b7a69d9ab1d34e9a57443
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: ff2a71803b5ea57b83cc3fa9b3be42b70e462fb9
-commit 1d89232a4aa97fe935cd60b8d24d75c2f70d56c5
+commit fc270baf264248c3ee3050b13a6c8c0919e6559f
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Mar 13 04:16:27 2020 +0000
+Date: Mon Jun 22 05:52:05 2020 +0000
- upstream: improve error messages for some common PKCS#11 C_Login
+ upstream: better terminology for permissions; feedback & ok markus@
- failure cases; based on patch from Jacob Hoffman-Andrews in bz3130; ok
- dtucker
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: ffb220b435610741dcb4de0e7fc68cbbdc876d2c
+
+commit 00531bb42f1af17ddabea59c3d9c4b0629000d27
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Jun 19 07:21:42 2020 +0000
+
+ upstream: Correct synopsis and usage for the options accepted when
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: b8b849621b4a98e468942efd0a1c519c12ce089e
+ passing a command to ssh-agent. ok jmc@
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: b36f0679cb0cac0e33b361051b3406ade82ea846
-commit 5becbec023f2037394987f85ed7f74b9a28699e0
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Mar 13 04:01:56 2020 +0000
+commit b4556c8ad7177e379f0b60305a0cd70f12180e7c
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Fri Jun 19 19:22:00 2020 +1000
- upstream: use sshpkt_fatal() for kex_exchange_identification()
+ Add OPENBSD ORIGINAL marker to bcrypt_pbkdf.
+
+commit 1babb8bb14c423011ca34c2f563bb1c51c8fbf1d
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Fri Jun 19 19:10:47 2020 +1000
+
+ Extra brackets around sizeof() in bcrypt.
- errors. This ensures that the logged errors are consistent with other
- transport- layer errors and that the relevant IP addresses are logged. bz3129
- ok dtucker@
+ Prevents following warning from clang 10:
+ bcrypt_pbkdf.c:94:40: error: expression does not compute the number of
+ elements in this array; element type is ´uint32_tÂ[...]
+ place parentheses around the ´sizeof(uint64_t)´ expression to
+ silence this warning
+
+commit 9e065729592633290e5ddb6852792913b2286545
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Fri Jun 19 18:47:56 2020 +1000
+
+ Add includes.h to new test.
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 2c22891f0b9e1a6cd46771cedbb26ac96ec2e6ab
+ Fixes warnings eg "´bounded´ attribute directive ignor" from gcc.
-commit eef88418f9e5e51910af3c5b23b5606ebc17af55
+commit e684b1ea365e070433f282a3c1dabc3e2311ce49
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Fri Jun 19 18:38:39 2020 +1000
+
+ Skip OpenSSL specific tests w/out OpenSSL.
+
+ Allows unit tests to pass when configure'ed --without-openssl.
+
+commit 80610e97a76407ca982e62fd051c9be03622fe7b
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Fri Jun 19 17:15:27 2020 +1000
+
+ Hook sshsig tests up to Portable Makefiles.
+
+commit 5dba1fcabacaab46693338ec829b42a1293d1f52
Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Mar 13 03:24:49 2020 +0000
+Date: Fri Jun 19 05:07:09 2020 +0000
- upstream: Don't clear alarm timers in listening sshd. Previously
+ upstream: Test that ssh-agent exits when running as as subprocess
- these timers were used for regenerating the SSH1 ephemeral host keys but
- those are now gone so there's no need to clear the timers either. ok
- deraadt@
+ of a specified command (ie "ssh-agent command"). Would have caught bz#3181.
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 280d2b885e4a1ce404632e8cc38fcb17be7dafc0
+ OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 895b4765ba5153eefaea3160a7fe08ac0b6db8b3
-commit d081f017c20a3564255873ed99fd7d024cac540f
+commit 68e8294f6b04f9590ea227e63d3e129398a49e27
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Mar 13 03:17:07 2020 +0000
+Date: Fri Jun 19 04:34:21 2020 +0000
- upstream: spelling errors in comments; no code change from
+ upstream: run sshsig unit tests
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 166ea64f6d84f7bac5636dbd38968592cb5eb924
+ OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 706ef17e2b545b64873626e0e35553da7c06052a
-commit c084a2d040f160bc2b83f13297e3e3ca3f5dbac6
+commit 5edfa1690e9a75048971fd8775f7c16d153779db
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Mar 13 03:12:17 2020 +0000
+Date: Fri Jun 19 04:32:09 2020 +0000
- upstream: when downloading FIDO2 resident keys from a token, don't
+ upstream: basic unit test for sshsig.[ch], including FIDO keys
- prompt for a PIN until the token has told us that it needs one. Avoids
- double-prompting on devices that implement on-device authentication (e.g. a
- touchscreen PIN pad on the Trezor Model T). ok dtucker@
+ verification only so far
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 38b78903dd4422d7d3204095a31692fb69130817
+ OpenBSD-Regress-ID: fb1f946c8fc59206bc6a6666e577b5d5d7e45896
-commit 955c4cf4c6a1417c28d4e1040702c4d9bf63645b
-Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
-Date: Fri Mar 13 14:30:16 2020 +1100
+commit e95c0a0e964827722d29b4bc00d5c0ff4afe0ed2
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Jun 19 03:48:49 2020 +0000
- sync fnmatch.c with upstream to fix another typo
+ upstream: basic unit test for FIDO kep parsing
+
+ OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 8089b88393dd916d7c95422b442a6fd4cfe00c82
-commit 397f217e8640e75bb719a8e87111b4bd848fb3df
-Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
-Date: Fri Mar 13 14:24:23 2020 +1100
+commit 7775819c6de3e9547ac57b87c7dd2bfd28cefcc5
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Thu Jun 18 23:34:19 2020 +0000
- another spelling error in comment
+ upstream: check public host key matches private; ok markus@ (as
+
+ part of previous diff)
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 65a4f66436028748b59fb88b264cb8c94ce2ba63
-commit def31bc5427579ec3f7f2ce99f2da1338fdc0c9f
-Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
-Date: Fri Mar 13 14:23:07 2020 +1100
+commit c514f3c0522855b4d548286eaa113e209051a6d2
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Thu Jun 18 23:33:38 2020 +0000
- spelling mistakes
+ upstream: avoid spurious "Unable to load host key" message when
- from https://fossies.org/linux/misc/openssh-8.2p1.tar.gz/codespell.html
+ sshd can load a private key but no public counterpart; with & ok markus@
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 0713cbdf9aa1ff8ac7b1f78b09ac911af510f81b
-commit 8bdc3bb7cf4c82c3344cfcb82495a43406e87e83
-Author: markus@openbsd.org <markus@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Mar 6 18:29:54 2020 +0000
+commit 7fafaeb5da365f4a408fec355dac04a774f27193
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Jun 12 05:26:37 2020 +0000
- upstream: fix relative includes in sshd_config; ok djm
+ upstream: correct RFC number; from HARUYAMA Seigo via GH PR191
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: fa29b0da3c93cbc3a1d4c6bcd58af43c00ffeb5b
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 8d03b6c96ca98bfbc23d3754c3c33e1fe0852e10
-commit e32ef97a56ae03febfe307688858badae3a70e5a
-Author: markus@openbsd.org <markus@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Mar 6 18:29:14 2020 +0000
+commit 3a7f654d5bcb20df24a134b6581b0d235da4564a
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Jun 5 06:18:07 2020 +0000
- upstream: fix use-after-free in do_download_sk; ok djm
+ upstream: unbreak "sshd -ddd" - close of config passing fd happened too
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 96b49623d297797d4fc069f1f09e13c8811f8863
+ early. ok markus@
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 49346e945c6447aca3e904e65fc400128d2f8ed0
-commit 5732d58020309364bf31fa125354e399361006db
-Author: markus@openbsd.org <markus@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Mar 6 18:28:50 2020 +0000
+commit 3de02be39e5c0c2208d9682a3844991651620fcc
+Author: Andreas Schwab <schwab@suse.de>
+Date: Mon May 25 11:10:44 2020 +0200
- upstream: do not leak oprincipals; ok djm
+ Add support for AUDIT_ARCH_RISCV64
+
+commit ea547eb0329c2f8da77a4ac05f6c330bd49bdaab
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Jun 5 03:25:35 2020 +0000
+
+ upstream: make sshbuf_putb(b, NULL) a no-op
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 4691d9387eab36f8fda48f5d8009756ed13a7c4c
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 976fdc99b500e347023d430df372f31c1dd128f7
-commit 8fae395f34c2c52cdaf9919aa261d1848b4bb00b
-Author: markus@openbsd.org <markus@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Mar 6 18:28:27 2020 +0000
+commit 69796297c812640415c6cea074ea61afc899cbaa
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Jun 5 03:24:36 2020 +0000
- upstream: initialize seconds for debug message; ok djm
+ upstream: make sshbuf_dump() args const
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 293fbefe6d00b4812a180ba02e26170e4c855b81
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: b4a5accae750875d665b862504169769bcf663bd
-commit 46e5c4c8ffcd1569bcd5d04803abaa2ecf3e4cff
-Author: markus@openbsd.org <markus@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Mar 6 18:27:50 2020 +0000
+commit 670428895739d1f79894bdb2457891c3afa60a59
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Jun 5 03:24:16 2020 +0000
- upstream: correct return code; ok djm
+ upstream: wrap long line
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 319d09e3b7f4b2bc920c67244d9ff6426b744810
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: ed405a12bd27bdc9c52e169bc5ff3529b4ebbbb2
-commit 31c39e7840893f1bfdcbe4f813b20d1d7e69ec3e
-Author: markus@openbsd.org <markus@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Mar 6 18:27:15 2020 +0000
+commit 2f648cf222882719040906722b3593b01df4ad1a
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Jun 5 03:15:26 2020 +0000
- upstream: principalsp is optional, pubkey required; ok djm
+ upstream: Correct historical comment: provos@ modified OpenSSH to
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 2cc3ea5018c28ed97edaccd7f17d2cc796f01024
+ work with SSLeay (very quickly replaced by OpenSSL) not SSL in general. ok
+ deraadt, historical context markus@
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 7209e07a2984b50411ed8ca5a4932da5030d2b90
-commit e26a31757c5df2f58687cb9a4853d1418f39728e
-Author: markus@openbsd.org <markus@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Mar 6 18:26:21 2020 +0000
+commit 56548e4efcc3e3e8093c2eba30c75b23e561b172
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date: Wed Jun 3 08:23:18 2020 +0000
- upstream: remove unused variables in ssh-pkcs11-helper; ok djm
+ upstream: Import regenerated moduli file.
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 13e572846d0d1b28f1251ddd2165e9cf18135ae1
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 52ff0e3205036147b2499889353ac082e505ea54
-commit 1b378c0d982d6ab522eda634b0e88cf1fca5e352
-Author: markus@openbsd.org <markus@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Mar 6 18:25:48 2020 +0000
+commit 8da801f585dd9c534c0cbe487a3b1648036bf2fb
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Fri Jun 5 13:20:10 2020 +1000
- upstream: return correct error in sshsk_ed25519_sig; ok djm
+ Test fallthrough in OSSH_CHECK_CFLAG_COMPILE.
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 52bf733df220303c260fee4f165ec64b4a977625
+ clang 10's -Wimplicit-fallthrough does not understand /* FALLTHROUGH */
+ comments and we don't use the __attribute__((fallthrough)) that it's
+ looking for. This has the effect of turning off -Wimplicit-fallthrough
+ where it does not currently help (particularly with -Werror). ok djm@
-commit fbff605e637b068061ab6784ff03e3874890c092
-Author: markus@openbsd.org <markus@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Mar 6 18:25:12 2020 +0000
+commit 049297de975b92adcc2db77e3fb7046c0e3c695d
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date: Wed Jun 3 08:23:18 2020 +0000
- upstream: fix possible null-deref in check_key_not_revoked; ok
+ upstream: Import regenerated moduli file.
- djm
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 52ff0e3205036147b2499889353ac082e505ea54
+
+commit b458423a38a3140ac022ffcffcb332609faccfe3
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date: Mon Jun 1 07:11:38 2020 +0000
+
+ upstream: Remove now-unused proto_spec and associated definitions.
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 80855e9d7af42bb6fcc16c074ba69876bfe5e3bf
+ ok djm@
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 2e2b18e3aa6ee22a7b69c39f2d3bd679ec35c362
-commit bc30b446841fc16e50ed6e75c56ccfbd37b9f281
-Author: markus@openbsd.org <markus@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Mar 6 18:24:39 2020 +0000
+commit 5ad3c3a33ef038b55a14ebd31faeeec46073db2c
+Author: millert@openbsd.org <millert@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri May 29 21:22:02 2020 +0000
- upstream: ssh_fetch_identitylist() returns the return value from
+ upstream: Fix error message on close(2) and add printf format
- ssh_request_reply() so we should also check against != 0 ok djm
+ attributes. From Christos Zoulas, OK markus@
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 28d0028769d03e665688c61bb5fd943e18614952
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 41523c999a9e3561fcc7082fd38ea2e0629ee07e
-commit 7b4f70ddeb59f35283d77d8d9c834ca58f8cf436
-Author: markus@openbsd.org <markus@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Mar 6 18:23:17 2020 +0000
+commit 712ac1efb687a945a89db6aa3e998c1a17b38653
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri May 29 11:17:56 2020 +0000
- upstream: sshkey_cert_check_authority requires reason to be set;
+ upstream: Make dollar_expand variadic and pass a real va_list to
- ok djm
+ vdollar_percent_expand. Fixes build error on arm64 spotted by otto@.
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 6f7a6f19540ed5749763c2f9530c0897c94aa552
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 181910d7ae489f40ad609b4cf4a20f3d068a7279
-commit 05efe270df1e925db0af56a806d18b5063db4b6d
-Author: markus@openbsd.org <markus@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Mar 6 18:21:28 2020 +0000
+commit 837ffa9699a9cba47ae7921d2876afaccc027133
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Fri May 29 20:39:00 2020 +1000
- upstream: passphrase depends on kdfname, not ciphername (possible
+ Omit ToS setting if we don't have IPV6_TCLASS too.
- null-deref); ok djm
+ Fixes tests on old BSDs.
+
+commit f85b118d2150847cc333895296bc230e367be6b5
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri May 29 09:02:44 2020 +0000
+
+ upstream: Pass a NULL instead of zeroed out va_list from
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 0d39668edf5e790b5837df4926ee1141cec5471c
+ dollar_expand. The original intent was in case there's some platform where
+ va_list is not a pointer equivalent, but on i386 this chokes on the memset.
+ This unbreaks that build, but will require further consideration.
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 7b90afcd8e1137a1d863204060052aef415baaf7
-commit 1ddf5682f3992bdacd29164891abb71a19c2cf61
-Author: markus@openbsd.org <markus@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Mar 6 18:20:44 2020 +0000
+commit ec1d50b01c84ff667240ed525f669454c4ebc8e9
+Author: jmc@openbsd.org <jmc@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri May 29 05:48:39 2020 +0000
- upstream: consistently check packet_timeout_ms against 0; ok djm
+ upstream: remove a stray .El;
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: e8fb8cb2c96c980f075069302534eaf830929928
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 58ddfe6f8a15fe10209db6664ecbe7896f1d167c
-commit 31f1ee54968ad84eb32375e4412e0318766b586b
-Author: markus@openbsd.org <markus@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Mar 6 18:20:02 2020 +0000
+commit 058674a62ffe33f01d871d46e624bc2a2c22d91f
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri May 29 04:32:26 2020 +0000
- upstream: initialize cname in case ai_canonname is NULL or too
+ upstream: Add regression and unit tests for ${ENV} style
- long; ok djm
+ environment variable expansion in various keywords (bz#3140). ok djm@
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: c27984636fdb1035d1642283664193e91aab6e37
+ OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 4d9ceb95d89365b7b674bc26cf064c15a5bbb197
-commit a6134b02b5264b2611c8beae98bb392329452bba
-Author: markus@openbsd.org <markus@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Mar 6 18:19:21 2020 +0000
+commit 0b15892fc47d6840eba1291a6be9be1a70bc8972
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri May 29 01:21:35 2020 +0000
- upstream: fix uninitialized pointers for forward_cancel; ok djm
+ upstream: Unit test for convtime. ok djm@
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 612778e6d87ee865d0ba97d0a335f141cee1aa37
+ OpenBSD-Regress-ID: cec4239efa2fc4c7062064f07a847e1cbdbcd5dd
-commit 16d4f9961c75680aab374dee762a5baa0ad507af
-Author: markus@openbsd.org <markus@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Mar 6 18:16:21 2020 +0000
+commit 188e332d1c8f9f24e5b6659e9680bf083f837df9
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri May 29 05:37:03 2020 +0000
- upstream: exit on parse failures in input_service_request; ok djm
+ upstream: mention that wildcards are processed in lexical order;
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 6a7e1bfded26051d5aa893c030229b1ee6a0d5d2
+ bz#3165
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 8856f3d1612bd42e9ee606d89386cae456dd165c
-commit 5f25afe5216ba7f8921e04f79aa4ca0624eca820
-Author: markus@openbsd.org <markus@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Mar 6 18:15:38 2020 +0000
+commit 4a1b46e6d032608b7ec00ae51c4e25b82f460b05
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri May 29 04:25:40 2020 +0000
- upstream: fix null-deref on calloc failure; ok djm
+ upstream: Allow some keywords to expand shell-style ${ENV}
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: a313519579b392076b7831ec022dfdefbec8724a
+ environment variables on the client side. The supported keywords are
+ CertificateFile, ControlPath, IdentityAgent and IdentityFile, plus
+ LocalForward and RemoteForward when used for Unix domain socket paths. This
+ would for example allow forwarding of Unix domain socket paths that change at
+ runtime. bz#3140, ok djm@
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: a4a2e801fc2d4df2fe0e58f50d9c81b03822dffa
-commit ff2acca039aef16a15fce409163df404858f7aa5
-Author: markus@openbsd.org <markus@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Mar 6 18:15:04 2020 +0000
+commit c9bab1d3a9e183cef3a3412f57880a0374cc8cb2
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date: Fri May 29 14:49:16 2020 +1000
- upstream: exit if ssh_krl_revoke_key_sha256 fails; ok djm
+ depend
+
+commit 0b0d219313bf9239ca043f20b1a095db0245588f
+Author: sobrado <sobrado@openbsd.org>
+Date: Thu Sep 3 23:06:28 2015 +0000
+
+ partial sync of regress/netcat.c with upstream
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 0864ad4fe8bf28ab21fd1df766e0365c11bbc0dc
+ synchronize synopsis and usage.
-commit 31c860a0212af2d5b6a129e3e8fcead51392ee1d
-Author: markus@openbsd.org <markus@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Mar 6 18:14:13 2020 +0000
+commit 0f04c8467f589f85a523e19fd684c4f6c4ed9482
+Author: chl <chl@openbsd.org>
+Date: Sun Jul 26 19:12:28 2015 +0000
- upstream: pkcs11_register_provider: return < 0 on error; ok djm
+ partial sync of regress/netcat.c with upstream
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: cfc8321315b787e4d40da4bdb2cbabd4154b0d97
+ remove unused variable
+
+ ok tedu@
-commit 15be29e1e3318737b0768ca37d5b4a3fbe868ef0
-Author: markus@openbsd.org <markus@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Mar 6 18:13:29 2020 +0000
+commit d6a81050ace2630b06c3c6dd39bb4eef5d1043f8
+Author: tobias <tobias@openbsd.org>
+Date: Thu Mar 26 21:22:50 2015 +0000
- upstream: sshsig: return correct error, fix null-deref; ok djm
+ partial sync of regress/netcat.c with upstream
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 1d1af7cd538b8b23e621cf7ab84f11e7a923edcd
+ The code in socks.c writes multiple times in a row to a socket. If the socket becomes invalid between these calls (e.g. connection closed), write will throw SIGPIPE. With this patch, SIGPIPE is ignored so we can handle write's -1 return value (errno will be EPIPE). Ultimately, it leads to program exit, too -- but with nicer error message. :)
+
+ with input by and ok djm
-commit 6fb6f186cb62a6370fba476b6a03478a1e95c30d
-Author: markus@openbsd.org <markus@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Mar 6 18:12:55 2020 +0000
+commit bf3893dddd35e16def04bf48ed2ee1ad695b8f82
+Author: tobias <tobias@openbsd.org>
+Date: Thu Mar 26 10:36:03 2015 +0000
- upstream: vasnmprintf allocates str and returns -1; ok djm
+ partial sync of regress/netcat.c with upstream
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: dae4c9e83d88471bf3b3f89e3da7a107b44df11c
+ Check for short writes in fdpass(). Clean up while at it.
+
+ ok djm
-commit 714e1cbca17daa13f4f98978cf9e0695d4b2e0a4
-Author: markus@openbsd.org <markus@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Mar 6 18:11:10 2020 +0000
+commit e18435fec124b4c08eb6bbbbee9693dc04f4befb
+Author: jca <jca@openbsd.org>
+Date: Sat Feb 14 22:40:22 2015 +0000
- upstream: sshpkt_fatal() does not return; ok djm
+ partial sync of regress/netcat.c with upstream
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 7dfe847e28bd78208eb227b37f29f4a2a0929929
+ Support for nc -T on IPv6 addresses.
+
+ ok sthen@
-commit 9b47bd7b09d191991ad9e0506bb66b74bbc93d34
+commit 4c607244054a036ad3b2449a6cb4c15feb846a76
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Feb 28 01:07:28 2020 +0000
+Date: Fri May 29 03:14:02 2020 +0000
- upstream: no-touch-required certificate option should be an
+ upstream: fix compilation on !HAVE_DLOPEN platforms; stub function
- extension, not a critical option.
+ was not updated to match API change. From Dale Rahn via beck@ ok markus@
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 626b22c5feb7be8a645e4b9a9bef89893b88600d
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 2b8d054afe34c9ac85e417dae702ef981917b836
-commit dd992520bed35387fc010239abe1bdc0c2665e38
+commit 224418cf55611869a4ace1b8b07bba0dff77a9c3
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Feb 28 01:06:05 2020 +0000
+Date: Fri May 29 03:11:54 2020 +0000
- upstream: better error message when trying to use a FIDO key
+ upstream: fix exit status for downloading of FIDO resident keys;
- function and SecurityKeyProvider is empty
+ from Pedro Martelletto, ok markus@
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: e56602c2ee8c82f835d30e4dc8ee2e4a7896be24
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 0da77dc24a1084798eedd83c39a002a9d231faef
-commit b81e66dbe0345aef4717911abcb4f589fff33a0a
+commit 1001dd148ed7c57bccf56afb40cb77482ea343a6
Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
-Date: Thu Feb 27 02:32:37 2020 +0000
+Date: Fri May 29 01:20:46 2020 +0000
- upstream: Drop leading space from line count that was confusing
+ upstream: Fix multiplier in convtime when handling seconds after
- ssh-keygen's screen mode.
+ other units. bz#3171, spotted by ronf at timeheart.net, ok djm@.
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 3bcae7a754db3fc5ad3cab63dd46774edb35b8ae
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 95b7a848e1083974a65fbb6ccb381d438e1dd5be
-commit d5ba1c03278eb079438bb038266d80d7477d49cb
-Author: jsg@openbsd.org <jsg@openbsd.org>
-Date: Wed Feb 26 13:40:09 2020 +0000
+commit 7af1e92cd289b7eaa9a683e9a6f2fddd98f37a01
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Wed May 27 22:37:53 2020 +0000
- upstream: change explicit_bzero();free() to freezero()
-
- While freezero() returns early if the pointer is NULL the tests for
- NULL in callers are left to avoid warnings about passing an
- uninitialised size argument across a function boundry.
+ upstream: fix Include before Match in sshd_config; bz#3122 patch
- ok deraadt@ djm@
+ from Jakub Jelen
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 2660fa334fcc7cd05ec74dd99cb036f9ade6384a
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 1b0aaf135fe6732b5d326946042665dd3beba5f4
-commit 9e3220b585c5be19a7431ea4ff8884c137b3a81c
-Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
-Date: Wed Feb 26 11:46:51 2020 +0000
+commit 0a9a611619b0a1fecd0195ec86a9885f5d681c84
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Wed May 27 21:59:11 2020 +0000
- upstream: Have sftp reject "-1" in the same way as ssh(1) and
+ upstream: Do not call process_queued_listen_addrs() for every
- scp(1) do instead of accepting and silently ignoring it since protocol 1
- support has been removed. Spotted by shivakumar2696 at gmail.com, ok
- deraadt@
+ included file from sshd_config; patch from Jakub Jelen
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: b79f95559a1c993214f4ec9ae3c34caa87e9d5de
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 0ff603d6f06a7fab4881f12503b53024799d0a49
-commit ade8e67bb0f07b12e5e47e7baeafbdc898de639f
-Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
-Date: Wed Feb 26 01:31:47 2020 +0000
+commit 16ea1fdbe736648f79a827219134331f8d9844fb
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Wed May 27 21:25:18 2020 +0000
- upstream: Remove obsolete XXX comment. ok deraadt@
+ upstream: fix crash in recallocarray when deleting SendEnv
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: bc462cc843947feea26a2e21c750b3a7469ff01b
+ variables; spotted by & ok sthen@
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: b881e8e849edeec5082b5c0a87d8d7cff091a8fd
-commit 7eb903f51eba051d7f65790bab92a28970ac1ccc
-Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
-Date: Mon Feb 24 04:27:58 2020 +0000
+commit 47adfdc07f4f8ea0064a1495500244de08d311ed
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Wed May 27 22:35:19 2020 +0000
- upstream: Fix typo. Patch from itoama at live.jp via github PR#173.
+ upstream: two new tests for Include in sshd_config, checking whether
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 5cdaafab38bbdea0d07e24777d00bfe6f972568a
+ Port directives are processed correctly and handling of Include directives
+ that appear before Match. Both tests currently fail. bz#3122 and bz#3169 -
+ patch from Jakub Jelen
+
+ OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 8ad5a4a385a63f0a1c59c59c763ff029b45715df
-commit b2491c289dd1b557a18a2aca04eeff5c157fc5ef
-Author: Nico Kadel-Garcia <nkadel@gmail.com>
-Date: Sat Oct 12 17:51:01 2019 -0400
+commit 47faad8f794516c33864d866aa1b55d88416f94c
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Wed May 27 23:26:23 2020 +1000
- Switch %define to %global for redhat/openssh.spec
+ Document that libfido2 >= 1.4.0 is needed.
-commit b18dcf6cca7c7aba1cc22e668e04492090ef0255
-Author: mkontani <itoama@live.jp>
-Date: Fri Feb 21 00:54:49 2020 +0900
+commit 4be563994c0cbe9856e7dd3078909f41beae4a9c
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Tue May 26 01:59:46 2020 +0000
- fix some typos and sentence
+ upstream: fix memleak of signature; from Pedro Martelletto
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: d0a6eb07e77c001427d738b220dd024ddc64b2bb
-commit 0001576a096f788d40c2c0a39121cff51bf961ad
-Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Feb 21 00:04:43 2020 +0000
+commit 0c111eb84efba7c2a38b2cc3278901a0123161b9
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Tue May 26 01:26:58 2020 +0000
- upstream: Fix some typos and an incorrect word in docs. Patch from
+ upstream: Restrict ssh-agent from signing web challenges for FIDO
- itoama at live.jp via github PR#172.
+ keys.
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 166ee8f93a7201fef431b9001725ab8b269d5874
+ When signing messages in ssh-agent using a FIDO key that has an
+ application string that does not start with "ssh:", ensure that the
+ message being signed is one of the forms expected for the SSH protocol
+ (currently pubkey authentication and sshsig signatures).
+
+ This prevents ssh-agent forwarding on a host that has FIDO keys
+ attached granting the ability for the remote side to sign challenges
+ for web authentication using those keys too.
+
+ Note that the converse case of web browsers signing SSH challenges is
+ already precluded because no web RP can have the "ssh:" prefix in the
+ application string that we require.
+
+ ok markus@
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 9ab6012574ed0352d2f097d307f4a988222d1b19
-commit 99ff8fefe4b2763a53778d06b5f74443c8701615
-Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
-Date: Thu Feb 20 05:58:08 2020 +0000
+commit 9c5f64b6cb3a68b99915202d318b842c6c76cf14
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Tue May 26 01:09:05 2020 +0000
- upstream: Update moduli generation script to new ssh-keygen
+ upstream: improve logging for MaxStartups connection throttling:
- generation and screening command line flags.
+ have sshd log when it starts and stops throttling and periodically while in
+ this state. bz#3055 ok markus@
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 5010ff08f7ad92082e87dde098b20f5c24921a8f
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 2e07a09a62ab45d790d3d2d714f8cc09a9ac7ab9
-commit 700d16f5e534d6de5a3b7105a74a7a6f4487b681
-Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
-Date: Thu Feb 20 05:41:51 2020 +0000
+commit 756c6f66aee83a5862a6f936a316f761532f3320
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Tue May 26 01:06:52 2020 +0000
- upstream: Import regenerated moduli.
+ upstream: add fmt_timeframe() (from bgpd) to format a time
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 7b7b619c1452a459310b0cf4391c5757c6bdbc0f
+ interval in a human- friendly format. Switch copyright for this file from BSD
+ to MIT to make it easier to add Henning's copyright for this function. ok
+ markus@
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 414a831c662df7e68893e5233e86f2cac081ccf9
-commit 4753b74ba0f09e4aacdaab5e184cd540352004d5
-Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Thu Feb 20 16:42:50 2020 +1100
+commit 2a63ce5cd6d0e782783bf721462239b03757dd49
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Mon May 18 04:29:35 2020 +0000
- Import regenerated moduli.
+ upstream: avoid possible NULL deref; from Pedro Martelletto
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: e6099c3fbb70aa67eb106e84d8b43f1fa919b721
-commit 11d427162778c18fa42917893a75d178679a2389
-Author: HARUYAMA Seigo <haruyama@unixuser.org>
-Date: Fri Feb 14 16:14:23 2020 +0900
+commit 4b307faf2fb0e63e51a550b37652f7f972df9676
+Author: markus@openbsd.org <markus@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri May 15 08:34:03 2020 +0000
- Fix typos in INSTALL: s/avilable/available/ s/suppports/supports/
+ upstream: sshd listener must not block if reexecd sshd exits
+
+ in write(2) on config_s[0] if the forked child exits early before finishing
+ recv_rexec_state (e.g. with fatal()) because config_s[1] stays open in the
+ parent. this prevents the parent from accepting new connections. ok djm,
+ deraadt
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 92ccfeb939ccd55bda914dc3fe84582158c4a9ef
-commit 264a966216137c9f4f8220fd9142242d784ba059
-Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
-Date: Tue Feb 18 08:58:33 2020 +0000
+commit af8b16fb2cce880341c0ee570ceb0d84104bdcc0
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri May 15 03:57:33 2020 +0000
- upstream: Ensure that the key lifetime provided fits within the
+ upstream: fix off-by-one error that caused sftp downloads to make
- values allowed by the wire format (u32). Prevents integer wraparound of the
- timeout values. bz#3119, ok markus@ djm@
+ one more concurrent request that desired. This prevented using sftp(1) in
+ unpipelined request/response mode, which is useful when debugging. Patch from
+ Stephen Goetze in bz#3054
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 8afe6038b5cdfcf63360788f012a7ad81acc46a2
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 41b394ebe57037dbc43bdd0eef21ff0511191f28
-commit de1f3564cd85915b3002859873a37cb8d31ac9ce
-Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
-Date: Tue Feb 18 08:49:49 2020 +0000
+commit d7d753e2979f2d3c904b03a08d30856cd2a6e892
+Author: deraadt@openbsd.org <deraadt@openbsd.org>
+Date: Wed May 13 22:38:41 2020 +0000
- upstream: Detect and prevent simple configuration loops when using
-
- ProxyJump. bz#3057, ok djm@
+ upstream: we are still aiming for pre-C99 ...
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 077d21c564c886c98309d871ed6f8ef267b9f037
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: a240fc9cbe60bc4e6c3d24d022eb4ab01fe1cb38
-commit 30144865bfa06b12239cfabc37c45e5ddc369d97
-Author: naddy@openbsd.org <naddy@openbsd.org>
-Date: Sun Feb 16 21:15:43 2020 +0000
+commit 2ad7b7e46408dbebf2a4efc4efd75a9544197d57
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Wed May 13 10:08:02 2020 +0000
- upstream: document -F none; with jmc@
+ upstream: Enable credProtect extension when generating a resident
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 0eb93b75473d2267aae9200e02588e57778c84f2
+ key.
+
+ The FIDO 2.1 Client to Authenticator Protocol introduced a "credProtect"
+ feature to better protect resident keys. This option allows (amone other
+ possibilities) requiring a PIN prior to all operations that may retrieve
+ the key handle.
+
+ Patch by Pedro Martelletto; ok djm and markus
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 013bc06a577dcaa66be3913b7f183eb8cad87e73
-commit 011052de73f3dbc53f50927ccf677266a9ade4f6
-Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Mon Feb 17 22:55:51 2020 +1100
+commit 1e70dc3285fc9b4f6454975acb81e8702c23dd89
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Wed May 13 09:57:17 2020 +0000
- Remove unused variable warning.
+ upstream: always call fido_init(); previous behaviour only called
+
+ fido_init() when SK_DEBUG was defined. Harmless with current libfido2, but
+ this isn't guaranteed in the future.
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: c7ea20ff2bcd98dd12015d748d3672d4f01f0864
-commit 31c9348c5e4e94e9913ec64b3ca6e15f68ba19e5
-Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Mon Feb 17 22:53:24 2020 +1100
+commit f2d84f1b3fa68d77c99238d4c645d0266fae2a74
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Wed May 13 09:55:57 2020 +0000
- Constify aix_krb5_get_principal_name.
+ upstream: preserve group/world read permission on known_hosts
- Prevents warning about discarding type qualifiers on AIX.
+ file across runs of "ssh-keygen -Rf /path". The old behaviour was to remove
+ all rights for group/other. bz#3146 ok dtucker@
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: dc369d0e0b5dd826430c63fd5f4b269953448a8a
-commit 290c994336a2cfe03c5496bebb6580863f94b232
-Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Mon Feb 17 22:51:36 2020 +1100
+commit 05a651400da6fbe12296c34e3d3bcf09f034fbbf
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Wed May 13 09:52:41 2020 +0000
- Check if TILDE is already defined and undef.
+ upstream: when ordering the hostkey algorithms to request from a
- Prevents redefinition warning on AIX.
+ server, prefer certificate types if the known_hosts files contain a key
+ marked as a @cert-authority; bz#3157 ok markus@
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 8f194573e5bb7c01b69bbfaabc68f27c9fa5e0db
-commit 41a2e64ae480eda73ee0e809bbe743d203890938
-Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Mon Feb 17 22:51:00 2020 +1100
+commit 829451815ec207e14bd54ff5cf7e22046816f042
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Tue May 12 01:41:32 2020 +0000
- Prevent unused variable warning.
+ upstream: fix non-ASCII quote that snuck in; spotted by Gabriel
+
+ Kihlman
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 04bcde311de2325d9e45730c744c8de079b49800
-commit d4860ec4efd25ba194337082736797fce0bda016
-Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Mon Feb 17 22:48:50 2020 +1100
+commit 5a442cec92c0efd6fffb4af84bf99c70af248ef3
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Mon May 11 02:11:29 2020 +0000
- Check if getpeereid is actually declared.
+ upstream: clarify role of FIDO tokens in multi-factor
- Check in sys/socket.h (AIX) and unistd.h (FreeBSD, DragonFLy and OS X).
- Prevents undeclared function warning on at least some versions of AIX.
+ authentictation; mostly from Pedro Martelletto
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: fbe05685a1f99c74b1baca7130c5a03c2df7c0ac
-commit 8aa3455b16fddea4c0144a7c4a1edb10ec67dcc8
+commit ecb2c02d994b3e21994f31a70ff911667c262f1f
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Feb 14 00:39:20 2020 +0000
+Date: Fri May 8 05:13:14 2020 +0000
- upstream: openssh-8.2
+ upstream: fix compilation with DEBUG_KEXDH; bz#3160 ok dtucker@
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 0a1340ff65fad0d84b997ac58dd1b393dec7c19b
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 832e771948fb45f2270e8b8895aac36d176ba17a
-commit 72f0ce33f0d5a37f31bad5800d1eb2fbdb732de6
+commit 3ab6fccc3935e9b778ff52f9c8d40f215d58e01d
Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
-Date: Wed Feb 12 09:28:35 2020 +1100
+Date: Thu May 14 12:22:09 2020 +1000
- crank version numbers
+ prefer ln to cp for temporary copy of sshd
+
+ I saw failures on the reexec fallback test on Darwin 19.4 where
+ fork()ed children of a process that had it's executable removed
+ would instantly fail. Using ln to preserve the inode avoids this.
-commit b763ed05bd1f1f15ae1727c86a4498546bc36ca8
+commit f700d316c6b15a9cfbe87230d2dca81a5d916279
Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Tue Feb 11 12:51:24 2020 +1100
+Date: Wed May 13 15:24:51 2020 +1000
- Minor documentation update:
-
- - remove duplication of dependency information (it's all in INSTALL).
- - SSHFP is now an RFC.
+ Actually skip pty tests when needed.
-commit 14ccfdb7248e33b1dc8bbac1425ace4598e094cb
+commit 08ce6b2210f46f795e7db747809f8e587429dfd2
Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Sun Feb 9 11:23:35 2020 +1100
+Date: Wed May 13 13:56:45 2020 +1000
- Check if UINT32_MAX is defined before redefining.
+ Skip building sk-dummy library if no SK support.
-commit be075110c735a451fd9d79a864e01e2e0d9f19d2
+commit 102d106bc2e50347d0e545fad6ff5ce408d67247
Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
-Date: Fri Feb 7 15:07:27 2020 +1100
+Date: Wed May 13 12:08:34 2020 +1000
- typo; reported by Phil Pennock
+ explicitly manage .depend and .depend.bak
+
+ Bring back removal of .depend to give the file a known state before
+ running makedepend, but manually move aside the current .depend file
+ and restore it as .depend.bak afterwards so the stale .depend check
+ works as expected.
-commit 963d71851e727ffdd2a97fe0898fad61d4a70ba1
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Feb 7 03:57:31 2020 +0000
+commit 83a6dc6ba1e03b3fa39d12a8522b8b0e68dd6390
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date: Wed May 13 12:03:42 2020 +1000
- upstream: sync the description of the $SSH_SK_PROVIDER environment
-
- variable with that of the SecurityKeyProvider ssh/sshd_config(5) directive,
- as the latter was more descriptive.
-
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 0488f09530524a7e53afca6b6e1780598022552f
+ make depend
-commit d4d9e1d40514e2746f9e05335d646512ea1020c6
-Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Feb 7 03:54:44 2020 +0000
+commit 7c0bbed967abed6301a63e0267cc64144357a99a
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date: Wed May 13 12:01:10 2020 +1000
- upstream: Add ssh -Q key-sig for all key and signature types.
+ revert removal of .depend before makedepend
- Teach ssh -Q to accept ssh_config(5) and sshd_config(5) algorithm keywords as
- an alias for the corresponding query. Man page help jmc@, ok djm@.
+ Commit 83657eac4 started removing .depend before running makedepend
+ to reset the contents of .depend to a known state. Unfortunately
+ this broke the depend-check step as now .depend.bak would only ever
+ be created as an empty file.
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 1e110aee3db2fc4bc5bee2d893b7128fd622e0f8
+ ok dtucker
-commit fd68dc27864b099b552a6d9d507ca4b83afd6a76
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Feb 7 03:27:54 2020 +0000
+commit 58ad004acdcabf3b9f40bc3aaa206b25d998db8c
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date: Tue May 12 12:58:46 2020 +1000
- upstream: fix two PIN entry bugs on FIDO keygen: 1) it would allow more
+ prepare for 8.3 release
+
+commit 4fa9e048c2af26beb7dc2ee9479ff3323e92a7b5
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Fri May 8 21:50:43 2020 +1000
+
+ Ensure SA_SIGNAL test only signals itself.
- than the intended number of prompts (3) and 2) it would SEGV too many
- incorrect PINs were entered; based on patch by Gabriel Kihlman
+ When the test's child signals its parent and it exits the result of
+ getppid changes. On Ubuntu 20.04 this results in the ppid being that
+ of the GDM session, causing it to exit. Analysis and testing from pedro
+ at ambientworks.net
+
+commit dc2da29aae76e170d22f38bb36f1f5d1edd5ec2b
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date: Fri May 8 13:31:53 2020 +1000
+
+ sync config.guess/config.sub with latest versions
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 9c0011f28ba8bd8adf2014424b64960333da1718
+ ok dtucker@
-commit 96bd895a0a0b3a36f81c14db8c91513578fc5563
+commit a8265bd64c14881fc7f4fa592f46dfc66b911f17
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Thu Feb 6 22:48:23 2020 +0000
+Date: Wed May 6 20:58:01 2020 +0000
- upstream: When using HostkeyAlgorithms to merely append or remove
-
- algorithms from the default set (i.e. HostkeyAlgorithms=+/-...), retain the
- default behaviour of preferring those algorithms that have existing keys in
- known_hosts; ok markus
+ upstream: openssh-8.3; ok deraadt@
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 040e7fcc38ea00146b5d224ce31ce7a1795ee6ed
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: c8831ec88b9c750f5816aed9051031fb535d22c1
-commit c7288486731734a864b58d024b1395029b55bbc5
+commit 955854cafca88e0cdcd3d09ca1ad4ada465364a1
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Thu Feb 6 22:46:31 2020 +0000
+Date: Wed May 6 20:57:38 2020 +0000
- upstream: expand HostkeyAlgorithms prior to config dump, matching
+ upstream: another case where a utimes() failure could make scp send
- other algorithm lists; ok markus@
+ a desynchronising error; reminded by Aymeric Vincent ok deraadt markus
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: a66f0fca8cc5ce30405a2867bc115fff600671d0
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 2ea611d34d8ff6d703a7a8bf858aa5dbfbfa7381
-commit a6ac5d36efc072b15690c65039754f8e44247bdf
-Author: naddy@openbsd.org <naddy@openbsd.org>
-Date: Thu Feb 6 22:34:58 2020 +0000
+commit 59d531553fd90196946743da391f3a27cf472f4e
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Thu May 7 15:34:12 2020 +1000
- upstream: Add Include to the list of permitted keywords after a
+ Check if -D_REENTRANT is needed for localtime_r.
- Match keyword. ok markus@
+ On at least HP-UX 11.11, the localtime_r declararation is behind
+ ifdef _REENTRANT. Check for and add if needed.
+
+commit c13403e55de8cdbb9da628ed95017b1d4c0f205f
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Tue May 5 11:32:43 2020 +1000
+
+ Skip security key tests if ENABLE_SK not set.
+
+commit 4da393f87cd52d788c84112ee3f2191c9bcaaf30
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri May 1 04:03:14 2020 +0000
+
+ upstream: sure enough, some of the test data that we though were in
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 342e940538b13dd41e0fa167dc9ab192b9f6e2eb
+ new format were actually in the old format; fix from Michael Forney
+
+ OpenBSD-Regress-ID: a41a5c43a61b0f0b1691994dbf16dfb88e8af933
-commit a47f6a6c0e06628eed0c2a08dc31a8923bcc37ba
-Author: naddy@openbsd.org <naddy@openbsd.org>
-Date: Thu Feb 6 22:30:54 2020 +0000
+commit 15bfafc1db4c8792265ada9623a96f387990f732
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri May 1 04:00:29 2020 +0000
- upstream: Replace "security key" with "authenticator" in program
+ upstream: make mktestdata.sh generate old/new format keys that we
- messages.
+ expect. This script was written before OpenSSH switched to new-format private
+ keys by default and was never updated to the change (until now) From Michael
+ Forney
- This replaces "security key" in error/usage/verbose messages and
- distinguishes between "authenticator" and "authenticator-hosted key".
+ OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 38cf354715c96852e5b71c2393fb6e7ad28b7ca7
+
+commit 7882d2eda6ad3eb82220a85294de545d20ef82db
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri May 1 03:58:02 2020 +0000
+
+ upstream: portability fix for sed that always emil a newline even
- ok djm@
+ if the input does not contain one; from Michael Forney
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 7c63800e9c340c59440a054cde9790a78f18592e
+ OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 9190c3ddf0d2562ccc02c4a95fce0e392196bfc7
-commit 849a9b87144f8a5b1771de6c85e44bfeb86be9a9
-Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Thu Feb 6 11:28:14 2020 +1100
+commit 8074f9499e454df0acdacea33598858a1453a357
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri May 1 03:36:25 2020 +0000
- Don't look for UINT32_MAX in inttypes.h
+ upstream: remove obsolete RSA1 test keys; spotted by Michael Forney
- ... unless we are actually going to use it. Fixes build on HP-UX
- without the potential impact to other platforms of a header change
- shortly before release.
+ OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 6384ba889594e217d166908ed8253718ab0866da
-commit a2437f8ed0c3be54ddd21630a93c68ebd168286f
-Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
-Date: Thu Feb 6 12:02:22 2020 +1100
+commit c697e46c314aa94574af0d393d80f23e0ebc9748
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Sat May 2 18:34:47 2020 +1000
- depend
+ Update .depend.
-commit 9716e8c4956acdd7b223d1642bfa376e07e7503d
-Author: Michael Forney <mforney@mforney.org>
-Date: Wed Nov 27 19:17:26 2019 -0800
+commit 83657eac42941f270c4b02b2c46d9a21f616ef99
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Sat May 2 18:29:40 2020 +1000
- Fix sha2 MAKE_CLONE no-op definition
+ Remove use of tail for 'make depend'.
- The point of the dummy declaration is so that MAKE_CLONE(...) can have
- a trailing semicolon without introducing an empty declaration. So,
- the macro replacement text should *not* have a trailing semicolon,
- just like DEF_WEAK.
+ Not every tail supports +N and we can do with out it so just remove it.
+ Prompted by mforney at mforney.org.
-commit d596b1d30dc158915a3979fa409d21ff2465b6ee
+commit d25d630d24c5a1c64d4e646510e79dc22d6d7b88
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Tue Feb 4 09:58:04 2020 +0000
+Date: Sat May 2 07:19:43 2020 +0000
- upstream: require FIDO application strings to start with "ssh:"; ok
+ upstream: we have a sshkey_save_public() function to save public keys;
- markus@
+ use it and save a bunch of redundant code.
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 94e9c1c066d42b76f035a3d58250a32b14000afb
+ Patch from loic AT venez.fr; ok markus@ djm@
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: f93e030a0ebcd0fd9054ab30db501ec63454ea5f
-commit 501f3582438cb2cb1cb92be0f17be490ae96fb23
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Mon Feb 3 23:47:57 2020 +0000
+commit e9dc9863723e111ae05e353d69df857f0169544a
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Fri May 1 18:32:25 2020 +1000
- upstream: revert enabling UpdateHostKeys by default - there are still
+ Use LONG_LONG_MAX and friends if available.
- corner cases we need to address; ok markus
+ If we don't have LLONG_{MIN,MAX} but do have LONG_LONG_{MIN,MAX}
+ then use those instead. We do calculate these values in configure,
+ but it turns out that at least one compiler (old HP ANSI C) can't
+ parse "-9223372036854775808LL" without mangling it. (It can parse
+ "-9223372036854775807LL" which is presumably why its limits.h defines
+ LONG_LONG_MIN as the latter minus 1.)
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: ff7ad941bfdc49fb1d8baa95fd0717a61adcad57
+ Fixes rekey test when compiled with the aforementioned compiler.
-commit 072f3b832d2a4db8d9880effcb6c4d0dad676504
-Author: jmc@openbsd.org <jmc@openbsd.org>
-Date: Mon Feb 3 08:15:37 2020 +0000
+commit aad87b88fc2536b1ea023213729aaf4eaabe1894
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri May 1 06:31:42 2020 +0000
- upstream: use better markup for challenge and write-attestation, and
+ upstream: when receving a file in sink(), be careful to send at
- rejig the challenge text a little;
+ most a single error response after the file has been opened. Otherwise the
+ source() and sink() can become desyncronised. Reported by Daniel Goujot,
+ Georges-Axel Jaloyan, Ryan Lahfa, and David Naccache.
- ok djm
+ ok deraadt@ markus@
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 9f351e6da9edfdc907d5c3fdaf2e9ff3ab0a7a6f
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 6c14d233c97349cb811a8f7921ded3ae7d9e0035
-commit 262eb05a22cb1fabc3bc1746c220566490b80229
-Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
-Date: Mon Feb 3 21:22:15 2020 +1100
+commit 31909696c4620c431dd55f6cd15db65c4e9b98da
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri May 1 06:28:52 2020 +0000
- mention libfido2 in dependencies section
+ upstream: expose vasnmprintf(); ok (as part of other commit) markus
+
+ deraadt
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 2e80cea441c599631a870fd40307d2ade5a7f9b5
-commit ccd3b247d59d3bde16c3bef0ea888213fbd6da86
-Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
-Date: Mon Feb 3 19:40:12 2020 +1100
+commit 99ce9cefbe532ae979744c6d956b49f4b02aff82
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri May 1 04:23:11 2020 +0000
- add clock_gettime64(2) to sandbox allowed syscalls
+ upstream: avoid NULL dereference when attempting to convert invalid
- bz3093
+ ssh.com private keys using "ssh-keygen -i"; spotted by Michael Forney
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 2e56e6d26973967d11d13f56ea67145f435bf298
-commit adffbe1c645ad2887ba0b6d24c194aa7a40c5735
-Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
-Date: Sun Feb 2 09:45:34 2020 +0000
+commit 6c6072ba8b079e6f5caa38b011a6f4570c14ed38
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Fri May 1 15:09:26 2020 +1000
- upstream: Output (none) in debug in the case in the CheckHostIP=no case
+ See if SA_RESTART signals will interrupt select().
- as suggested by markus@
+ On some platforms (at least older HP-UXes such as 11.11, possibly others)
+ setting SA_RESTART on signal handers will cause it to not interrupt
+ select(), at least for calls that do not specify a timeout. Try to
+ detect this and if found, don't use SA_RESTART.
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 4ab9117ee5261cbbd1868717fcc3142eea6385cf
+ POSIX says "If SA_RESTART has been set for the interrupting signal, it
+ is implementation-dependent whether select() restarts or returns with
+ [EINTR]" so this behaviour is within spec.
-commit 58c819096a2167983e55ae686486ce317b69b2d1
-Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
-Date: Sun Feb 2 09:22:22 2020 +0000
+commit 90a0b434ed41f9c505662dba8782591818599cb3
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date: Fri May 1 13:55:03 2020 +1000
- upstream: Prevent possible null pointer deref of ip_str in debug.
-
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 37b252e2e6f690efed6682437ef75734dbc8addf
+ fix reversed test
-commit 0facae7bc8d3f8f9d02d0f6bed3d163ff7f39806
-Author: jmc@openbsd.org <jmc@openbsd.org>
-Date: Sun Feb 2 07:36:50 2020 +0000
+commit c0dfd18dd1c2107c73d18f70cd164f7ebd434b08
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date: Fri May 1 13:29:16 2020 +1000
- upstream: shuffle the challenge keyword to keep the -O list sorted;
-
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 08efad608b790949a9a048d65578fae9ed5845fe
+ wrap sha2.h inclusion in #ifdef HAVE_SHA2_H
-commit 6fb3dd0ccda1c26b06223b87bcd1cab9ec8ec3cc
-Author: jmc@openbsd.org <jmc@openbsd.org>
-Date: Sat Feb 1 06:53:12 2020 +0000
+commit a01817a9f63dbcbbc6293aacc4019993a4cdc7e3
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Tue Apr 28 04:59:29 2020 +0000
- upstream: tweak previous;
+ upstream: adapt dummy FIDO middleware to API change; ok markus@
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 0c42851cdc88583402b4ab2b110a6348563626d3
+ OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 8bb84ee500c2eaa5616044314dd0247709a1790f
-commit 92725d4d3fde675acc0ca040b48f3d0c7be73b7f
-Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Sat Feb 1 17:25:09 2020 +1100
+commit 261571ddf02ea38fdb5e4a97c69ee53f847ca5b7
+Author: jmc@openbsd.org <jmc@openbsd.org>
+Date: Thu Apr 30 18:28:37 2020 +0000
- Use sys-queue.h from compat library.
+ upstream: tweak previous; ok markus
- Fixes build on platforms that don't have sys/queue.h (eg MUSL).
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 41895450ce2294ec44a5713134491cc31f0c09fd
-commit 677d0ece67634262b3b96c3cd6410b19f3a603b7
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Jan 31 23:25:08 2020 +0000
+commit 5de21c82e1d806d3e401b5338371e354b2e0a66f
+Author: markus@openbsd.org <markus@openbsd.org>
+Date: Thu Apr 30 17:12:20 2020 +0000
- upstream: regress test for sshd_config Include directive; from Jakub
+ upstream: bring back debug() removed in rev 1.74; noted by pradeep
- Jelen
+ kumar
- OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 0d9224de3297c7a5f51ba68d6e3725a2a9345fa4
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 8d134d22ab25979078a3b48d058557d49c402e65
-commit d4f4cdd681ab6408a98419f398b75a55497ed324
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Jan 31 23:13:04 2020 +0000
+commit ea14103ce9a5e13492e805f7e9277516ff5a4273
+Author: markus@openbsd.org <markus@openbsd.org>
+Date: Thu Apr 30 17:07:10 2020 +0000
- upstream: whitespace
+ upstream: run the 2nd ssh with BatchMode for scp -3
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 564cf7a5407ecf5da2d94ec15474e07427986772
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 77994fc8c7ca02d88e6d0d06d0f0fe842a935748
-commit 245399dfb3ecebc6abfc2ef4ee2e650fa9f6942b
+commit 59d2de956ed29aa5565ed5e5947a7abdb27ac013
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Jan 31 23:11:25 2020 +0000
+Date: Tue Apr 28 04:02:29 2020 +0000
- upstream: force early logging to stderr if debug_flag (-d) is set;
+ upstream: when signing a challenge using a FIDO toke, perform the
- avoids missing messages from re-exec config passing
+ hashing in the middleware layer rather than in ssh code. This allows
+ middlewares that call APIs that perform the hashing implicitly (including
+ Microsoft's AFAIK). ok markus@
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 02484b8241c1f49010e7a543a7098e6910a8c9ff
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: c9fc8630aba26c75d5016884932f08a5a237f37d
-commit 7365f28a66d1c443723fbe6f4a2612ea6002901e
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Jan 31 23:08:08 2020 +0000
+commit c9d10dbc0ccfb1c7568bbb784f7aeb7a0b5ded12
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date: Sun Apr 26 09:38:14 2020 +0000
- upstream: mistake in previous: filling the incorrect buffer
+ upstream: Fix comment typo. Patch from mforney at mforney.org.
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 862ee84bd4b97b529f64aec5d800c3dcde952e3a
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 3565f056003707a5e678e60e03f7a3efd0464a2b
-commit c2bd7f74b0e0f3a3ee9d19ac549e6ba89013abaf
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Jan 31 22:42:45 2020 +0000
+commit 4d2c87b4d1bde019cdd0f00552fcf97dd8b39940
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date: Sat Apr 25 06:59:36 2020 +0000
- upstream: Add a sshd_config "Include" directive to allow inclusion
+ upstream: We've standardized on memset over bzero, replace a couple
- of files. This has sensible semantics wrt Match blocks and accepts glob(3)
- patterns to specify the included files. Based on patch by Jakub Jelen in
- bz2468; feedback and ok markus@
+ that had slipped in. ok deraadt markus djm.
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 36ed0e845b872e33f03355b936a4fff02d5794ff
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: f5be055554ee93e6cc66b0053b590bef3728dbd6
-commit ba261a1dd33266168ead4f8f40446dcece4d1600
-Author: jmc@openbsd.org <jmc@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Jan 31 22:25:59 2020 +0000
+commit 7f23f42123d64272a7b00754afa6b0841d676691
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Fri May 1 12:21:58 2020 +1000
- upstream: spelling fix;
+ Include sys/byteorder.h for htons and friends.
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 3c079523c4b161725a4b15dd06348186da912402
+ These are usually in netinet/in.h but on HP-UX they are not defined if
+ _XOPEN_SOURCE_EXTENDED is set. Only needed for netcat in the regression
+ tests.
-commit 771891a044f763be0711493eca14b6b0082e030f
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Thu Jan 30 22:25:34 2020 +0000
+commit d27cba58c972d101a5de976777e518f34ac779cb
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Fri May 1 09:21:52 2020 +1000
- upstream: document changed default for UpdateHostKeys
+ Fix conditional for openssl-based chacha20.
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 25c390b21d142f78ac0106241d13441c4265fd2c
+ Fixes warnings or link errors when building against older OpenSSLs.
+ ok djm
-commit d53a518536c552672c00e8892e2aea28f664148c
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Thu Jan 30 22:19:32 2020 +0000
+commit 20819b962dc1467cd6fad5486a7020c850efdbee
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Fri Apr 24 15:07:55 2020 +1000
- upstream: enable UpdateKnownHosts=yes if the configuration
+ Error out if given RDomain if unsupported.
- specifies only the default known_hosts files, otherwise select
- UpdateKnownHosts=ask; ok markus@
+ If the config contained 'RDomain %D' on a platform that did not support
+ it, the error would not be detected until runtime resulting in a broken
+ sshd. Detect this earlier and error out if found. bz#3126, based on a
+ patch from jjelen at redhat.com, tweaks and ok djm@
+
+commit 2c1690115a585c624eed2435075a93a463a894e2
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Apr 24 03:33:21 2020 +0000
+
+ upstream: Fix incorrect error message for "too many known hosts files."
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: ab401a5ec4a33d2e1a9449eae6202e4b6d427df7
+ bz#3149, patch from jjelen at redhat.com.
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: e0fcb07ed5cf7fd54ce340471a747c24454235e5
-commit bb63ff844e818d188da4fed3c016e0a4eecbbf25
-Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Thu Jan 30 18:54:42 2020 +1100
+commit 3beb7276e7a8aedd3d4a49f9c03b97f643448c92
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Apr 24 02:19:40 2020 +0000
- Look in inttypes.h for UINT32_MAX.
+ upstream: Remove leave_non_blocking() which is now dead code
- Should prevent warnings on at least some AIX versions.
+ because nothing sets in_non_blocking_mode any more. Patch from
+ michaael.meeks at collabora.com, ok djm@
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: c403cefe97a5a99eca816e19cc849cdf926bd09c
-commit afeb6a960da23f0a5cbc4b80cca107c7504e932a
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Thu Jan 30 07:21:38 2020 +0000
+commit 8654e3561772f0656e7663a0bd6a1a8cb6d43300
+Author: jmc@openbsd.org <jmc@openbsd.org>
+Date: Thu Apr 23 21:28:09 2020 +0000
- upstream: use sshpkt_fatal() instead of plain fatal() for
+ upstream: ce examples of "Ar arg Ar arg" with "Ar arg arg" and
- ssh_packet_write_poll() failures here too as the former yields better error
- messages; ok dtucker@
+ stop the spread;
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 1f7a6ca95bc2b716c2e948fc1370753be772d8e3
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: af0e952ea0f5e2019c2ce953ed1796eca47f0705
-commit 65d6fd0a8a6f31c3ddf0c1192429a176575cf701
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Thu Jan 30 07:20:57 2020 +0000
+commit 67697e4a8246dd8423e44b8785f3ee31fee72d07
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Fri Apr 24 11:10:18 2020 +1000
- upstream: check the return value of ssh_packet_write_poll() and
+ Update .depend.
+
+commit d6cc76176216fe3fac16cd20d148d75cb9c50876
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Wed Apr 22 14:07:00 2020 +1000
+
+ Mailing list is now closed to non-subscribers.
- call sshpkt_fatal() if it fails; avoid potential busy-loop under some
- circumstances. Based on patch by Mike Frysinger; ok dtucker@
+ While there, add a reference to the bugzilla. ok djm@
+
+commit cecde6a41689d0ae585ec903b190755613a6de79
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Wed Apr 22 12:09:40 2020 +1000
+
+ Put the values from env vars back.
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: c79fe5cf4f0cd8074cb6db257c1394d5139408ec
+ This merges the values from the recently removed environment into make's
+ command line arguments since we actually need those.
-commit dce74eab0c0f9010dc84c62500a17771d0131ff3
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Thu Jan 30 07:20:05 2020 +0000
+commit 300c4322b92e98d3346efa0aec1c094c94d0f964
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Wed Apr 22 11:33:15 2020 +1000
- upstream: have sshpkt_fatal() save/restore errno before we
+ Pass configure's egrep through to test-exec.sh.
- potentially call strerror() (via ssh_err()); ok dtucker
+ Use it to create a wrapper function to call it from tests. Fixes the
+ keygen-comment test on platforms with impoverished default egrep (eg
+ Solaris).
+
+commit c8d9796cfe046f00eb8b2096d2b7028d6a523a84
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Wed Apr 22 10:56:44 2020 +1000
+
+ Remove unneeded env vars from t-exec invocation.
+
+commit 01d4cdcd4514e99a4b6eb9523cd832bbf008d1d7
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date: Tue Apr 21 23:14:58 2020 +0000
+
+ upstream: Backslash '$' at then end of string. Prevents warning on
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 5590df31d21405498c848245b85c24acb84ad787
+ some shells.
+
+ OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 5dc27ab624c09d34078fd326b10e38c1ce9c741f
-commit 14ef4efe2bf4180e085ea6738fdbebc199458b0c
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Wed Jan 29 08:17:49 2020 +0000
+commit 8854724ccefc1fa16f10b37eda2e759c98148caa
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Tue Apr 21 18:27:23 2020 +1000
- upstream: markus suggests a simplification to previous
+ Sync rev 1.49.
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 10bbfb6607ebbb9a018dcd163f0964941adf58de
+ Prevent infinite for loop since i went from ssize_t to size_t. Patch from
+ eagleoflqj via OpenSSH github PR#178, ok djm@, feedback & ok millert@
-commit 101ebc3a8cfa78d2e615afffbef9861bbbabf1ff
+commit d00d07b6744d3b4bb7aca46c734ecd670148da23
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Wed Jan 29 07:51:30 2020 +0000
+Date: Mon Apr 20 04:44:47 2020 +0000
- upstream: give more context to UpdateHostKeys messages, mentioning
+ upstream: regression test for printing of private key fingerprints and
- that the changes are validated by the existing trusted host key. Prompted by
- espie@ feedback and ok markus@
+ key comments, mostly by loic AT venez.fr (slightly tweaked for portability)
+ ok dtucker@
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: b3d95f4a45f2692f4143b9e77bb241184dbb8dc5
+ OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 8dc6c4feaf4fe58b6d634cd89afac9a13fd19004
-commit 24c0f752adf9021277a7b0a84931bb5fe48ea379
+commit a98d5ba31e5e7e01317352f85fa63b846a960f8c
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Tue Jan 28 08:01:34 2020 +0000
+Date: Mon Apr 20 04:43:57 2020 +0000
- upstream: changes to support FIDO attestation
+ upstream: fix a bug I introduced in r1.406: when printing private key
- Allow writing to disk the attestation certificate that is generated by
- the FIDO token at key enrollment time. These certificates may be used
- by an out-of-band workflow to prove that a particular key is held in
- trustworthy hardware.
+ fingerprint of old-format key, key comments were not being displayed. Spotted
+ by loic AT venez.fr, ok dtucker
- Allow passing in a challenge that will be sent to the card during
- key enrollment. These are needed to build an attestation workflow
- that resists replay attacks.
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 2d98e4f9eb168eea733d17e141e1ead9fe26e533
+
+commit 32f2d0aad42c15e19bd3b07496076ca891573a58
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Apr 17 07:16:07 2020 +0000
+
+ upstream: repair private key fingerprint printing to also print
- ok markus@
+ comment after regression caused by my recent pubkey loading refactor.
+ Reported by loic AT venez.fr, ok dtucker@
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 457dc3c3d689ba39eed328f0817ed9b91a5f78f6
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: f8db49acbee6a6ccb2a4259135693b3cceedb89e
-commit 156bef36f93a48212383235bb8e3d71eaf2b2777
+commit 094dd513f4b42e6a3cebefd18d1837eb709b4d99
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Tue Jan 28 07:24:15 2020 +0000
+Date: Fri Apr 17 07:15:11 2020 +0000
- upstream: disable UpdateHostKeys=ask when in quiet mode; "work for
+ upstream: refactor out some duplicate private key loading code;
- me" matthieu@
+ based on patch from loic AT venez.fr, ok dtucker@
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 60d7b5eb91accf935ed9852650a826d86db2ddc7
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 5eff2476b0d8d0614924c55e350fb7bb9c84f45e
-commit ec8a759b4045e54d6b38e690ffee4cbffc53c7b7
-Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
-Date: Tue Jan 28 12:57:25 2020 +1100
+commit 4e04f46f248f1708e39b900b76c9693c820eff68
+Author: jmc@openbsd.org <jmc@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Apr 17 06:12:41 2020 +0000
- compat for missing IPTOS_DSCP_LE in system headers
+ upstream: add space beteen macro arg and punctuation;
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: c93a6cbb4bf9468fc4c13e64bc1fd4efee201a44
-commit 4594c7627680c4f41c2ad5fe412e55b7cc79b10c
+commit 44ae009a0112081d0d541aeaa90088bedb6f21ce
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Tue Jan 28 01:49:36 2020 +0000
+Date: Fri Apr 17 04:27:03 2020 +0000
- upstream: make IPTOS_DSCP_LE available via IPQoS directive; bz2986,
+ upstream: auth2-pubkey r1.89 changed the order of operations to
- based on patch by veegish AT cyberstorm.mu
+ checking AuthorizedKeysFile first and falling back to AuthorizedKeysCommand
+ if no key was found in a file. Document this order here; bz3134
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 9902bf4fbb4ea51de2193ac2b1d965bc5d99c425
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: afce0872cbfcfc1d4910ad7722e50f792a1dce12
-commit da22216b5db3613325aa7b639f40dc017e4c6f69
-Author: markus@openbsd.org <markus@openbsd.org>
-Date: Mon Jan 27 20:51:32 2020 +0000
+commit f96f17f920f38ceea6f3c5cb0b075c46b8929fdc
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date: Fri Apr 17 14:07:15 2020 +1000
- upstream: disable UpdateHostKeys=ask if command is specified; ok
-
- djm@ sthen@
+ sys/sysctl.h is only used on OpenBSD
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: e5bcc45eadb78896637d4143d289f1e42c2ef5d7
+ so change the preprocessor test used to include it to check
+ __OpenBSD__, matching the code that uses the symbols it declares.
-commit 1e1db0544fdd788e2e3fc21d972a7ccb7de6b4ae
+commit 54688e937a69c7aebef8a3d50cbd4c6345bab2ca
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Sun Jan 26 00:09:50 2020 +0000
+Date: Fri Apr 17 03:38:47 2020 +0000
- upstream: unbreak unittests for recent API / source file changes
+ upstream: fix reversed test that caused IdentitiesOnly=yes to not
- OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 075a899a01bbf7781d38bf0b33d8366faaf6d3c0
-
-commit 0d1144769151edf65f74aee9a4c8545c37861695
-Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Sun Jan 26 15:09:15 2020 +1100
-
- Move definition of UINT32_MAX.
+ apply to keys loaded from a PKCS11Provider; bz3141, ok dtucker@
- This allows us to always define it if needed not just if we also
- define the type ourself.
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: e3dd6424b94685671fe84c9b9dbe352fb659f677
-commit f73ab8a811bc874c2fb403012aa8e4bfdcaf5ec7
+commit 267cbc87b5b6e78973ac4d3c7a6f807ed226928c
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Sun Jan 26 00:09:50 2020 +0000
+Date: Fri Apr 17 03:34:42 2020 +0000
- upstream: unbreak unittests for recent API / source file changes
+ upstream: mention that /etc/hosts.equiv and /etc/shosts.equiv are
- OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 075a899a01bbf7781d38bf0b33d8366faaf6d3c0
-
-commit 0373f9eba2b63455dceedbd3ac3d5dca306789ff
-Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Sun Jan 26 14:09:17 2020 +1100
-
- Include signal.h to prevent redefintion of _NSIG.
-
-commit 638a45b5c1e20a8539100ca44166caad8abf26f8
-Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Sun Jan 26 13:40:51 2020 +1100
-
- Wrap stdint.h in tests inside HAVE_STDINT_H.
-
-commit 74dfc2c859c906eaab1f88a27fd883115ffb928f
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Sun Jan 26 00:14:45 2020 +0000
-
- upstream: for UpdateHostKeys, don't report errors for unsupported
-
- key types - just ignore them. spotted by and ok dtucker@
+ not considered for HostbasedAuthentication when the target user is root;
+ bz3148
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 91769e443f6197c983932fc8ae9d39948727d473
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: fe4c1256929e53f23af17068fbef47852f4bd752
-commit b59618246c332e251160be0f1e0e88a7d4e2b0ae
+commit c90f72d29e84b4a2709078bf5546a72c29a65177
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Sun Jan 26 00:13:20 2020 +0000
+Date: Fri Apr 17 03:30:05 2020 +0000
- upstream: downgrade error() for missing subsequent known_hosts
+ upstream: make IgnoreRhosts a tri-state option: "yes" ignore
- files to debug() as it was intended to be; spotted by dtucker@
+ rhosts/shosts, "no" allow rhosts/shosts or (new) "shosts-only" to allow
+ .shosts files but not .rhosts. ok dtucker@
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 18cfea382cb52f2da761be524e309cc3d5354ef9
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: d08d6930ed06377a80cf53923c1955e9589342e9
-commit 469df611f778eec5950d556aabfe1d4efc227915
+commit 321c7147079270f3a154f91b59e66219aac3d514
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Sat Jan 25 23:33:27 2020 +0000
+Date: Fri Apr 17 03:23:13 2020 +0000
- upstream: clarify that BatchMode applies to all interactive prompts
+ upstream: allow the IgnoreRhosts directive to appear anywhere in a
- (e.g. host key confirmation) and not just password prompts.
+ sshd_config, not just before any Match blocks; bz3148, ok dtucker@
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 97b001883d89d3fb1620d2e6b747c14a26aa9818
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: e042467d703bce640b1f42c5d1a62bf3825736e8
-commit de40876c4a5d7c519d3d7253557572fdfc13db76
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Sat Jan 25 23:28:06 2020 +0000
+commit ca5403b085a735055ec7b7cdcd5b91f2662df94c
+Author: jmc@openbsd.org <jmc@openbsd.org>
+Date: Sat Apr 11 20:20:09 2020 +0000
- upstream: tidy headers; some junk snuck into sshbuf-misc.c and
-
- sshbuf-io.c doesn't need SSHBUF_INTERNAL set
+ upstream: add space between macro arg and punctuation;
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 27a724d2e0b2619c1a1490f44093bbd73580d9e6
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: e579e4d95eef13059c30931ea1f09ed8296b819c
-commit 6a107606355fa9547884cad6740e6144a7a7955b
-Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
-Date: Sun Jan 26 10:28:21 2020 +1100
+commit 8af0244d7b4a65eed2e62f9c89141c7c8e63f09d
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Wed Apr 15 10:58:02 2020 +1000
- depend
+ Add sys/syscall.h for syscall numbers.
+
+ In some architecture/libc configurations we need to explicitly include
+ sys/syscall.h for the syscall number (__NR_xxx) definitions. bz#3085,
+ patch from blowfist at xroutine.net.
-commit 59d01f1d720ebede4da42882f592d1093dac7adc
+commit 3779b50ee952078018a5d9e1df20977f4355df17
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Sat Jan 25 23:13:09 2020 +0000
+Date: Sat Apr 11 10:16:11 2020 +0000
- upstream: improve the error message for u2f enrollment errors by
-
- making ssh-keygen be solely responsible for printing the error message and
- convertint some more common error responses from the middleware to a useful
- ssherr.h status code. more detail remains visible via -v of course.
+ upstream: Refactor private key parsing. Eliminates a fair bit of
- also remove indepedent copy of sk-api.h declarations in sk-usbhid.c
- and just include it.
+ duplicated code and fixes oss-fuzz#20074 (NULL deref) caused by a missing key
+ type check in the ECDSA_CERT parsing path.
- feedback & ok markus@
+ feedback and ok markus@
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: a4a8ffa870d9a3e0cfd76544bcdeef5c9fb1f1bb
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 4711981d88afb7196d228f7baad9be1d3b20f9c9
-commit 99aa8035554ddb976348d2a9253ab3653019728d
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Sat Jan 25 23:02:13 2020 +0000
+commit b6a4013647db67ec622c144a9e05dd768f1966b3
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Apr 10 00:54:03 2020 +0000
- upstream: factor out reading/writing sshbufs to dedicated
+ upstream: Add tests for TOKEN expansion of LocalForward and
- functions; feedback and ok markus@
+ RemoteForward.
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: dc09e5f1950b7acc91b8fdf8015347782d2ecd3d
+ OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 90fcbc60d510eb114a2b6eaf4a06ff87ecd80a89
-commit 065064fcf455778b0918f783033b374d4ba37a92
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Sat Jan 25 22:49:38 2020 +0000
+commit abc3e0a5179c13c0469a1b11fe17d832abc39999
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date: Mon Apr 6 09:43:55 2020 +0000
- upstream: add a comment describing the ranges of channel IDs that
-
- we use; requested by markus@
+ upstream: Add utf8.c for asmprintf used by krl.c
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 83a1f09810ffa3a96a55fbe32675b34ba739e56b
+ OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 433708d11165afdb189fe635151d21659dd37a37
-commit 69334996ae203c51c70bf01d414c918a44618f8e
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Sat Jan 25 22:41:01 2020 +0000
+commit 990687a0336098566c3a854d23cce74a31ec6fe2
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Apr 10 00:52:07 2020 +0000
- upstream: make sshd_config:ClientAliveCountMax=0 disable the
+ upstream: Add TOKEN percent expansion to LocalFoward and RemoteForward
- connection killing behaviour, rather than killing the connection after
- sending the first liveness test probe (regardless of whether the client was
- responsive) bz2627; ok markus
+ when used for Unix domain socket forwarding. Factor out the code for the
+ config keywords that use the most common subset of TOKENS into its own
+ function. bz#3014, ok jmc@ (man page bits) djm@
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 5af79c35f4c9fa280643b6852f524bfcd9bccdaf
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: bffc9f7e7b5cf420309a057408bef55171fd0b97
-commit bf986a9e2792555e0879a3145fa18d2b49436c74
+commit 2b13d3934d5803703c04803ca3a93078ecb5b715
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Sat Jan 25 22:36:22 2020 +0000
+Date: Wed Apr 8 00:10:37 2020 +0000
- upstream: clarify order of AllowUsers/DenyUsers vs
+ upstream: let sshkey_try_load_public() load public keys from the
- AllowGroups/DenyGroups; bz1690, ok markus@
+ unencrypted envelope of private key files if not sidecar public key file is
+ present.
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 5637584ec30db9cf64822460f41b3e42c8f9facd
+ ok markus@
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 252a0a580e10b9a6311632530d63b5ac76592040
-commit 022ce92fa0daa9d78830baeb2bd2dc3f83c724ba
+commit d01f39304eaab0352793b490a25e1ab5f59a5366
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Sat Jan 25 07:17:18 2020 +0000
+Date: Wed Apr 8 00:09:24 2020 +0000
- upstream: when AddKeysToAgent=yes is set and the key contains no
+ upstream: simplify sshkey_try_load_public()
- comment, add the key to the agent with the key's path as the comment. bz2564
+ ok markus@
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 8dd8ca9340d7017631a27f4ed5358a4cfddec16f
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 05a5d46562aafcd70736c792208b1856064f40ad
-commit 0b813436bbf6546638b10c1fa71f54691bcf5e63
-Author: tedu@openbsd.org <tedu@openbsd.org>
-Date: Sat Jan 25 07:09:14 2020 +0000
+commit f290ab0833e44355fc006e4e67b92446c14673ef
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Wed Apr 8 00:08:46 2020 +0000
- upstream: group14-sha1 is no longer a default algorithm
+ upstream: add sshkey_parse_pubkey_from_private_fileblob_type()
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: a96f04d5e9c2ff760c6799579dc44f69b4ff431d
+ Extracts a public key from the unencrypted envelope of a new-style
+ OpenSSH private key.
+
+ ok markus@
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 44d7ab446e5e8c686aee96d5897b26b3939939aa
-commit 3432b6e05d5c583c91c566c5708fed487cec79ac
+commit 8d514eea4ae089626a55e11c7bc1745c8d9683e4
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Sat Jan 25 07:02:51 2020 +0000
+Date: Wed Apr 8 00:07:19 2020 +0000
- upstream: reword HashKnownHosts description a little more; some
+ upstream: simplify sshkey_parse_private_fileblob_type()
- people found the wording confusing (bz#2560)
+ Try new format parser for all key types first, fall back to PEM
+ parser only for invalid format errors.
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: ac30896598694f07d498828690aecd424c496988
+ ok markus@
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 0173bbb3a5cface77b0679d4dca0e15eb5600b77
-commit f80d7d6aa98d6eddc5df02412efee6db75673d4c
+commit 421169d0e758351b105eabfcebf42378ebf17217
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Sat Jan 25 07:01:00 2020 +0000
+Date: Wed Apr 8 00:05:59 2020 +0000
- upstream: weaken the language for what HashKnownHosts provides with
+ upstream: check private key type against requested key type in
- regards to known_hosts name privacy, it's not practical for this option to
- offer any guarantee that hostnames cannot be recovered from a disclosed
- known_hosts file (e.g. by brute force).
+ new-style private decoding; ok markus@
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 13f1e3285f8acf7244e9770074296bcf446c6972
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 04d44b3a34ce12ce5187fb6f6e441a88c8c51662
-commit 846446bf3e7421e6671a4afd074bdf15eecd7832
+commit 6aabfb6d22b36d07f584cba97f4cdc4363a829da
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Sat Jan 25 06:40:20 2020 +0000
+Date: Wed Apr 8 00:04:32 2020 +0000
- upstream: the GatewayPorts vs -R listen address selection logic is
+ upstream: check that pubkey in private key envelope matches actual
- still confusing people, so add another comment explaining the special
- handling of "localhost"; bz#3258
+ private key
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: e6bf0f0fbf1c7092bf0dbd9c6eab105970b5b53a
+ (this public key is currently unusued)
+
+ ok markus@
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 634a60b5e135d75f48249ccdf042f3555112049c
-commit 734f2f83f5ff86f2967a99d67be9ce22dd0394dd
+commit c0f5b2294796451001fd328c44f0d00f1114eddf
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Sat Jan 25 06:03:10 2020 +0000
+Date: Wed Apr 8 00:01:52 2020 +0000
- upstream: mention that permitopen=/PermitOpen do no name to address
+ upstream: refactor private key parsing a little
- translation; prompted by bz3099
+ Split out the base64 decoding and private section decryption steps in
+ to separate functions. This will make the decryption step easier to fuzz
+ as well as making it easier to write a "load public key from new-format
+ private key" function.
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 0dda8e54d566b29855e76bebf9cfecce573f5c23
+ ok markus@
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 7de31d80fb9062aa01901ddf040c286b64ff904e
-commit e1e97cae19ff07b7a7f7e82556bc048c3c54af63
-Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
-Date: Sat Jan 25 16:30:22 2020 +1100
+commit 8461a5b3db34ed0b5a4a18d82f64fd5ac8693ea8
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Mon Apr 6 20:54:34 2020 +1000
- include tunnel device path in error message
+ Include openssl-compat.h before checking ifdefs.
+
+ Fixes problem where unsuitable chacha20 code in libressl would be used
+ unintentionally.
-commit 0ecd20bc9f0b9c7c697c9eb014613516c8f65834
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Sat Jan 25 04:48:26 2020 +0000
+commit 931c50c5883a9910ea1ae9a371e4e815ec56b035
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date: Mon Apr 6 10:04:56 2020 +1000
- upstream: unrevert this:
-
- > revision 1.217
- > date: 2019/11/27 03:34:04; author: dtucker; state: Exp; lines: +5 -7; commitid: wkiMn49XJyjzoJIs;
- > Make channel_id u_int32_t and remove unnecessary check and cast that were
- > left over from the type conversion. Noted by t-hashida@amiya.co.jp in
- > bz#3098, ok markus@ djm@
-
- Darren was right the first time; ok dtucker@ "agreed" markus@
-
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 641dd1b99a6bbd85b7160da462ae1be83432c7c8
+ fix inverted test for LibreSSL version
-commit a0c81d2402eedc514b9c9f25ef9604eb0576b86a
+commit d1d5f728511e2338b7c994968d301d8723012264
Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
-Date: Sat Jan 25 02:57:53 2020 +0000
+Date: Sat Apr 4 23:04:41 2020 +0000
- upstream: Move setting $NC into test-exec since it's now used by
+ upstream: Indicate if we're using a cached key in trace output.
- multiple tests, and in -portable we use our own local copy to avoid
- portability problems.
-
- OpenBSD-Regress-ID: ceb78445fcaac317bec2fc51b3f0d9589048c114
+ OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 409a7b0e59d1272890fda507651c0c3d2d3c0d89
-commit e16dfa94f86358033531c4a97dcb51508ef84d49
+commit a398251a4627367c78bc483c70c2ec973223f82c
Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Sat Jan 25 13:05:42 2020 +1100
+Date: Sun Apr 5 08:43:57 2020 +1000
- Put EC key export inside OPENSSL_HAS_ECC.
+ Use /usr/bin/xp4g/id if necessary.
- Fixes link error when building against an OpenSSL that does not have
- ECC.
+ Solaris' native "id" doesn't support the options we use but the one
+ in /usr/bin/xp4g does, so use that instead.
-commit 94a2e5951b374e1a89761ceaff72e66eb1946807
+commit db0fdd48335b5b01114f78c1a73a195235910f81
Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
-Date: Sat Jan 25 00:27:56 2020 +0000
+Date: Sat Apr 4 22:14:26 2020 +0000
- upstream: Wait a bit longer for the multiplex master to become ready
+ upstream: Some platforms don't have "hostname -s", so use cut to trim
- since on very slow hosts the current delay is not sufficient and the test
- will fail.
+ short hostname instead.
- OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 6d90c7475d67ac3a95610b64af700629ece51a48
+ OpenBSD-Regress-ID: ebcf36a6fdf287c9336b0d4f6fc9f793c05307a7
-commit b2df804f571d77b07059f087b90955ffbc2f67d4
+commit e7e59a9cc8eb7fd5944ded28f4d7e3ae0a5fdecd
Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Jan 24 10:08:17 2020 +0000
+Date: Fri Apr 3 07:53:10 2020 +0000
- upstream: Add a connection test for proxycommand. This would have
-
- caught the problem caused by ssh.c rev 1.507 wherein Host and Hostname were
- swapped. Prompted by beck@
+ upstream: Compute hash locally and re-enable %C tests.
- OpenBSD-Regress-ID: d218500ae6aca4c479c27318fb5b09ebc00f7aae
+ OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 94d1366e8105274858b88a1f9ad2e62801e49770
-commit c6f06fd38a257b9fcc7d6760f8fb6d505dccb628
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Sat Jan 25 00:22:31 2020 +0000
+commit abe2b245b3ac6c4801e99bc0f13289cd28211e22
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date: Fri Apr 3 17:25:46 2020 +1100
- upstream: set UpdateKnownHosts=ask by default; bz#2894; ok
-
- markus@
-
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: f09cb3177f3a14c96428e14f347e976a8a531fee
+ prefer libcrypto chacha20-poly1305 where possible
-commit 7955633a554397bc24913cec9fd7285002935f7e
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Sat Jan 25 00:21:08 2020 +0000
+commit bc5c5d01ad668981f9e554e62195383bc12e8528
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Apr 3 05:43:11 2020 +0000
- upstream: allow UpdateKnownHosts=yes to function when multiple
-
- known_hosts files are in use. When updating host keys, ssh will now search
- subsequent known_hosts files, but will add new/changed host keys to the first
- specified file only. bz#2738
+ upstream: Temporarily remove tests for '%C' since the hash contains the
- ok markus@
+ local hostname and it doesn't work on any machine except mine... spotted by
+ djm@
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 6ded6d878a03e57d5aa20bab9c31f92e929dbc6c
+ OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 2d4c3585b9fcbbff14f4a5a5fde51dbd0d690401
-commit e5a278a62ab49dffe96929fa8d8506c6928dba90
+commit 81624026989654955a657ebf2a1fe8b9994f3c87
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Sat Jan 25 00:06:48 2020 +0000
+Date: Fri Apr 3 06:07:57 2020 +0000
- upstream: process security key provider via realpath() in agent,
-
- avoids malicious client from being able to cause agent to load arbitrary
- libraries into ssh-sk-helper.
+ upstream: r1.522 deleted one too many lines; repair
- reported by puck AT puckipedia.com; ok markus
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 1af8851fd7a99e4a887b19aa8f4c41a6b3d25477
+
+commit 668cb3585ce829bd6e34d4a962c489bda1d16370
+Author: jmc@openbsd.org <jmc@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Apr 3 05:53:52 2020 +0000
+
+ upstream: sort -N and add it to usage();
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 1086643df1b7eee4870825c687cf0c26a6145d1c
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 5b00e8db37c2b0a54c7831fed9e5f4db53ada332
-commit 89a8d4525e8edd9958ed3df60cf683551142eae0
+commit 338ccee1e7fefa47f3d128c2541e94c5270abe0c
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Sat Jan 25 00:03:36 2020 +0000
+Date: Fri Apr 3 05:48:57 2020 +0000
- upstream: expose PKCS#11 key labels/X.509 subjects as comments
-
- Extract the key label or X.509 subject string when PKCS#11 keys
- are retrieved from the token and plumb this through to places where
- it may be used as a comment.
-
- based on https://github.com/openssh/openssh-portable/pull/138
- by Danielle Church
-
- feedback and ok markus@
+ upstream: avoid another compiler warning spotted in -portable
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: cae1fda10d9e10971dea29520916e27cfec7ca35
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 1d29c51ac844b287c4c8bcaf04c63c7d9ba3b8c7
-commit a8c05c640873621681ab64d2e47a314592d5efa2
+commit 9f8a42340bd9af86a99cf554dc39ecdf89287544
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Jan 24 23:56:01 2020 +0000
+Date: Fri Apr 3 04:07:48 2020 +0000
- upstream: tweak proctitle to include sshd arguments, as these are
-
- frequently used to distinguish between multiple independent instances of the
- server. New proctitle looks like this:
-
- $ pgrep -lf sshd
- 12844 sshd: /usr/sbin/sshd -f /etc/ssh/sshd_config [listener] 0 of 10-100 startups
+ upstream: this needs utf8.c too
- requested by sthen@ and aja@; ok aja@
+ OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 445040036cec714d28069a20da25553a04a28451
+
+commit 92115ea7c3a834374720c350841fc729e7d5c8b2
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Apr 3 03:14:03 2020 +0000
+
+ upstream: Add percent_expand test for 'Match Exec'.
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: cf235a561c655a3524a82003cf7244ecb48ccc1e
+ OpenBSD-Regress-ID: a41c14fd6a0b54d66aa1e9eebfb9ec962b41232f
-commit 8075fccbd4f70a4371acabcfb47562471ff0de6f
+commit de34a440276ae855c38deb20f926d46752c62c9d
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Jan 24 23:54:40 2020 +0000
+Date: Fri Apr 3 04:43:24 2020 +0000
- upstream: add xextendf() to extend a string with a format
+ upstream: fix format string (use %llu for uint64, not %lld). spotted by
- (reallocating as necessary). ok aja@ as part of a larger diff
+ Darren and his tinderbox tests
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 30796b50d330b3e0e201747fe40cdf9aa70a77f9
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 3b4587c3d9d46a7be9bdf028704201943fba96c2
-commit d15c8adf2c6f1a6b4845131074383eb9c3d05c3d
+commit 9cd40b829a5295cc81fbea8c7d632b2478db6274
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Jan 24 05:33:01 2020 +0000
+Date: Fri Apr 3 04:34:15 2020 +0000
- upstream: minor tweaks to ssh-keygen -Y find-principals:
-
- emit matched principals one per line to stdout rather than as comma-
- separated and with a free-text preamble (easy confusion opportunity)
-
- emit "not found" error to stderr
+ upstream: Add a flag to re-enable verbose output when in batch
- fix up argument testing for -Y operations and improve error message for
- unsupported operations
+ mode; requested in bz3135; ok dtucker
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 3d9c9a671ab07fc04a48f543edfa85eae77da69c
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 5ad2ed0e6440562ba9c84b666a5bbddc1afe2e2b
-commit c3368a5d5ec368ef6bdf9971d6330ca0e3bdca06
+commit 6ce51a5da5d333a44e7c74c027f3571f70c39b24
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Jan 24 00:28:57 2020 +0000
+Date: Fri Apr 3 04:32:21 2020 +0000
- upstream: remove ssh-rsa (SHA1) from the list of allowed CA
+ upstream: chacha20-poly1305 AEAD using libcrypto EVP_chacha20
- signature algorithms ok markus
+ Based on patch from Yuriy M. Kaminskiy. ok + lots of assistance along the
+ way at a2k20 tb@
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: da3481fca8c81e6951f319a86b7be67502237f57
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 5e08754c13d31258bae6c5e318cc96219d6b10f0
-commit 4a41d245d6b13bd3882c8dc058dbd2e2b39a9f67
+commit eba523f0a130f1cce829e6aecdcefa841f526a1a
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Jan 24 00:27:04 2020 +0000
+Date: Fri Apr 3 04:27:03 2020 +0000
- upstream: when signing a certificate with an RSA key, default to
+ upstream: make Chacha20-POLY1305 context struct opaque; ok tb@ as
- a safe signature algorithm (rsa-sha-512) if not is explicitly specified by
- the user; ok markus@
+ part of a larger diff at a2k20
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: e05f638f0be6c0266e1d3d799716b461011e83a9
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: a4609b7263284f95c9417ef60ed7cdbb7bf52cfd
-commit 8dfb6a202c96cdf037c8ce05e53e32e0e0b7b454
+commit ebd29e90129cf18fedfcfe1de86e324228669295
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Jan 24 00:00:31 2020 +0000
+Date: Fri Apr 3 04:06:26 2020 +0000
- upstream: allow PEM export of DSA and ECDSA keys; bz3091, patch
-
- from Jakub Jelen ok markus@
+ upstream: fix debug statement
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: a58edec8b9f07acab4b962a71a5125830d321b51
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 42c6edeeda5ce88b51a20d88c93be3729ce6b916
-commit 72a8bea2d748c8bd7f076a8b39a52082c79ae95f
+commit 7b4d8999f2e1a0cb7b065e3efa83e6edccfc7d82
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Thu Jan 23 23:31:52 2020 +0000
+Date: Fri Apr 3 04:03:51 2020 +0000
- upstream: ssh-keygen -Y find-principals fixes based on feedback
-
- from Markus:
-
- use "principals" instead of principal, as allowed_signers lines may list
- multiple.
+ upstream: the tunnel-forwarding vs ExitOnForwardFailure fix that I
- When the signing key is a certificate, emit only principals that match
- the certificate principal list.
+ committed earlier had an off-by-one. Fix this and add some debugging that
+ would have made it apparent sooner.
- NB. the command -Y name changes: "find-principal" => "find-principals"
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 082f8f72b1423bd81bbdad750925b906e5ac6910
+
+commit eece243666d44ceb710d004624c5c7bdc05454bc
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Apr 3 03:12:11 2020 +0000
+
+ upstream: %C expansion just added to Match Exec should include
- ok markus@
+ remote user not local user.
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: ab575946ff9a55624cd4e811bfd338bf3b1d0faf
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 80f1d976938f2a55ee350c11d8b796836c8397e2
-commit 0585b5697201f5d8b32e6f1b0fee7e188268d30d
+commit d5318a784d016478fc8da90a38d9062c51c10432
Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Jan 24 01:29:23 2020 +0000
+Date: Fri Apr 3 02:33:31 2020 +0000
- upstream: Do not warn about permissions on symlinks.
+ upstream: Add regression test for percent expansions where possible.
- OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 339d4cbae224bd8743ffad9c3afb0cf3cb66c357
+ OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 7283be8b2733ac1cbefea3048a23d02594485288
-commit 415192348a5737a960f6d1b292a17b64d55b542c
-Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
-Date: Thu Jan 23 11:19:12 2020 +0000
+commit 663e84bb53de2a60e56a44d538d25b8152b5c1cc
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Apr 3 02:40:32 2020 +0000
- upstream: Handle zlib compression being disabled now that it's
+ upstream: make failures when establishing "Tunnel" forwarding terminate
- optional.
+ the connection when ExitOnForwardFailure is enabled; bz3116; ok dtucker
- OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 0af4fbc5168e62f89d0350de524bff1cb00e707a
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: ef4b4808de0a419c17579b1081da768625c1d735
-commit fbce7c1a898ae75286349822950682cf46346121
+commit ed833da176611a39d3376d62154eb88eb440d31c
Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
-Date: Thu Jan 23 10:53:04 2020 +0000
+Date: Fri Apr 3 02:27:12 2020 +0000
- upstream: Fix typo in comment.
+ upstream: Make with config keywords support which
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: d1d7a6553208bf439378fd1cf686a828aceb353a
+ percent_expansions more consistent. - %C is moved into its own function and
+ added to Match Exec. - move the common (global) options into a macro. This
+ is ugly but it's the least-ugly way I could come up with. - move
+ IdentityAgent and ForwardAgent percent expansion to before the config dump
+ to make it regression-testable. - document all of the above
+
+ ok jmc@ for man page bits, "makes things less terrible" djm@ for the rest.
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 4b65664bd6d8ae2a9afaf1a2438ddd1b614b1d75
-commit ba247af8e9e302910e22881ef9d307a8afeef036
-Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
-Date: Thu Jan 23 10:19:59 2020 +0000
+commit 6ec7457171468da2bbd908b8cd63d298b0e049ea
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Apr 3 02:26:56 2020 +0000
- upstream: When checking for unsafe directories, ignore non-directories
+ upstream: give ssh-keygen the ability to dump the contents of a
- (ie symlinks, where permissions are not relevant).
+ binary key revocation list: ssh-keygen -lQf /path bz#3132; ok dtucker
- OpenBSD-Regress-ID: fb6cfc8b022becb62b2dcb99ed3f072b3326e501
-
-commit 74deb7029be4c00810443114aac9308875a81dae
-Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Thu Jan 23 22:17:24 2020 +1100
-
- zlib is now optional.
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: b76afc4e3b74ab735dbde4e5f0cfa1f02356033b
-commit 633a2af47ee90291aaf93969aeee1e5046074c7c
-Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Thu Jan 23 22:16:51 2020 +1100
+commit af628b8a6c3ef403644d83d205c80ff188c97f0c
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Apr 3 02:25:21 2020 +0000
- Plumb WITH_ZLIB into configure.
+ upstream: add allocating variant of the safe utf8 printer; ok
- This allows zlib support to be disabled by ./configure --without-zlib.
+ dtucker as part of a larger diff
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 037e2965bd50eacc2ffb49889ecae41552744fa0
-commit 7f8e66fea8c4e2a910df9067cb7638999b7764d5
+commit d8ac9af645f5519ac5211e9e1e4dc1ed00e9cced
Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
-Date: Thu Jan 23 10:24:29 2020 +0000
+Date: Mon Mar 16 02:17:02 2020 +0000
- upstream: Make zlib optional. This adds a "ZLIB" build time option
+ upstream: Cast lifetime to u_long for comparison to prevent unsigned
- that allows building without zlib compression and associated options. With
- feedback from markus@, ok djm@
+ comparison warning on 32bit arches. Spotted by deraadt, ok djm.
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 44c6e1133a90fd15a3aa865bdedc53bab28b7910
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 7a75b2540bff5ab4fa00b4d595db1df13bb0515a
-commit 69ac4e33023b379e9a8e9b4b6aeeffa6d1fcf6fa
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Thu Jan 23 07:54:04 2020 +0000
+commit 0eaca933ae08b0a515edfccd5cc4a6b667034813
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Sat Mar 14 20:58:46 2020 +1100
- upstream: remove trailing period characters from pub/priv key
-
- pathnames - they make them needlessly more difficult to cut and paste without
- error; ok markus@ & dtucker@
+ Include fido.h when checking for fido/credman.h.
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: abdcfd1a5723fcac0711feee7665edc66ae2335a
+ It's required for fido_dev_t, otherwise configure fails with
+ when given --with-security-key-builtin.
-commit 945bf52c3c815d95b1e842ebf6c910c3524bd5bb
-Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Thu Jan 23 21:06:45 2020 +1100
+commit c7c099060f82ffe6a36d8785ecf6052e12fd92f0
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Mar 13 03:18:45 2020 +0000
- Fix a couple of mysig_t leftovers.
+ upstream: some more speeling mistakes from
+
+ OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 02471c079805471c546b7a69d9ab1d34e9a57443
-commit 84226b447d45fe4542613de68c2ca59a890d7c01
-Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Thu Jan 23 18:55:24 2020 +1100
+commit 1d89232a4aa97fe935cd60b8d24d75c2f70d56c5
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Mar 13 04:16:27 2020 +0000
- Remove mysignal wrapper.
+ upstream: improve error messages for some common PKCS#11 C_Login
- We switched the main code to use sigaction(), so the wrapper is no
- longer used.
+ failure cases; based on patch from Jacob Hoffman-Andrews in bz3130; ok
+ dtucker
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: b8b849621b4a98e468942efd0a1c519c12ce089e
-commit 5533c2fb7ef21172fa3708d66b03faa2c6b3d93f
-Author: jmc@openbsd.org <jmc@openbsd.org>
-Date: Thu Jan 23 07:16:38 2020 +0000
+commit 5becbec023f2037394987f85ed7f74b9a28699e0
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Mar 13 04:01:56 2020 +0000
- upstream: new sentence, new line;
+ upstream: use sshpkt_fatal() for kex_exchange_identification()
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: b6c3f2f36ec77e99198619b38a9f146655281925
+ errors. This ensures that the logged errors are consistent with other
+ transport- layer errors and that the relevant IP addresses are logged. bz3129
+ ok dtucker@
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 2c22891f0b9e1a6cd46771cedbb26ac96ec2e6ab
-commit 3bf2a6ac791d64046a537335a0f1d5e43579c5ad
+commit eef88418f9e5e51910af3c5b23b5606ebc17af55
Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
-Date: Thu Jan 23 07:10:22 2020 +0000
+Date: Fri Mar 13 03:24:49 2020 +0000
- upstream: Replace all calls to signal(2) with a wrapper around
+ upstream: Don't clear alarm timers in listening sshd. Previously
- sigaction(2). This wrapper blocks all other signals during the handler
- preventing races between handlers, and sets SA_RESTART which should reduce
- the potential for short read/write operations.
+ these timers were used for regenerating the SSH1 ephemeral host keys but
+ those are now gone so there's no need to clear the timers either. ok
+ deraadt@
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 5e047663fd77a40d7b07bdabe68529df51fd2519
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 280d2b885e4a1ce404632e8cc38fcb17be7dafc0
-commit e027c044c796f3a01081a91bee55741204283f28
+commit d081f017c20a3564255873ed99fd7d024cac540f
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Thu Jan 23 04:54:34 2020 +0000
+Date: Fri Mar 13 03:17:07 2020 +0000
- upstream: missing header change from previous; spotted by dtucker@
+ upstream: spelling errors in comments; no code change from
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 321ce74c0a5bbd0f02fa3f20cb5cf2a952c6b96f
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 166ea64f6d84f7bac5636dbd38968592cb5eb924
-commit 7e1323102b1b04eef391b01e180710a2d408a7ab
-Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
-Date: Thu Jan 23 03:42:41 2020 +0000
+commit c084a2d040f160bc2b83f13297e3e3ca3f5dbac6
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Mar 13 03:12:17 2020 +0000
- upstream: Check for and warn about StrictModes permission problems. ok tb@
+ upstream: when downloading FIDO2 resident keys from a token, don't
- OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 4841704ccdee50ee7efc6035bc686695c6ac2991
+ prompt for a PIN until the token has told us that it needs one. Avoids
+ double-prompting on devices that implement on-device authentication (e.g. a
+ touchscreen PIN pad on the Trezor Model T). ok dtucker@
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 38b78903dd4422d7d3204095a31692fb69130817
-commit 84de1c27f845d15c859db44e7070a46f45504b66
-Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
-Date: Thu Jan 23 03:35:07 2020 +0000
+commit 955c4cf4c6a1417c28d4e1040702c4d9bf63645b
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date: Fri Mar 13 14:30:16 2020 +1100
- upstream: Also test PuTTY chacha20.
-
- OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 7af6a0e8763b05f1f8eee6bca5f31fcb16151040
+ sync fnmatch.c with upstream to fix another typo
-commit c7ed15a39695ecd5f1f21842d8d9cd22246d4ee2
-Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
-Date: Thu Jan 23 03:24:38 2020 +0000
+commit 397f217e8640e75bb719a8e87111b4bd848fb3df
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date: Fri Mar 13 14:24:23 2020 +1100
- upstream: Also test PuTTY ecdh kex methods.
-
- OpenBSD-Regress-ID: ec4017dce612131842398a03e93007a869c2c133
+ another spelling error in comment
-commit c4b3a128954ee1b7fbcbda167baf8aca1a3d1c84
-Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
-Date: Thu Jan 23 02:46:49 2020 +0000
+commit def31bc5427579ec3f7f2ce99f2da1338fdc0c9f
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date: Fri Mar 13 14:23:07 2020 +1100
- upstream: Remove unsupported algorithms from list of defaults at run
-
- time and remove ifdef and distinct settings for OPENSSL=no case.
-
- This will make things much simpler for -portable where the exact set
- of algos depends on the configuration of both OpenSSH and the libcrypto
- it's linked against (if any). ok djm@
+ spelling mistakes
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: e0116d0183dcafc7a9c40ba5fe9127805c5dfdd2
+ from https://fossies.org/linux/misc/openssh-8.2p1.tar.gz/codespell.html
-commit 56cffcc09f8a2e661d2ba02e61364ae6f998b2b1
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Thu Jan 23 02:43:48 2020 +0000
+commit 8bdc3bb7cf4c82c3344cfcb82495a43406e87e83
+Author: markus@openbsd.org <markus@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Mar 6 18:29:54 2020 +0000
- upstream: add a new signature operations "find-principal" to look
-
- up the principal associated with a signature from an allowed-signers file.
- Work by Sebastian Kinne; ok dtucker@
+ upstream: fix relative includes in sshd_config; ok djm
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 6f782cc7e18e38fcfafa62af53246a1dcfe74e5d
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: fa29b0da3c93cbc3a1d4c6bcd58af43c00ffeb5b
-commit 65cf8730de6876a56595eef296e07a86c52534a6
-Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
-Date: Wed Jan 22 07:38:30 2020 +0000
+commit e32ef97a56ae03febfe307688858badae3a70e5a
+Author: markus@openbsd.org <markus@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Mar 6 18:29:14 2020 +0000
- upstream: Ignore whitespace when checking explict fingerprint.
-
- When confirming a host key using the fingerprint itself, ignore leading and
- trailing whitespace. ok deraadt@ djm@
+ upstream: fix use-after-free in do_download_sk; ok djm
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: cafd7f803bbdcd40c3a8f8f1a77747e6b6d8c011
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 96b49623d297797d4fc069f1f09e13c8811f8863
-commit 8d3af6ebdf524b34087a0a3ae415b5141ba10572
-Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
-Date: Wed Jan 22 07:31:27 2020 +0000
+commit 5732d58020309364bf31fa125354e399361006db
+Author: markus@openbsd.org <markus@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Mar 6 18:28:50 2020 +0000
- upstream: Increase keyscan timeout from default. On slow hosts 3
-
- concurrent keyscans can hit the default 5 second timeout, so increase to 15
- seconds.
+ upstream: do not leak oprincipals; ok djm
- OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 16383dec166af369b7fb9948572856f5d544c93f
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 4691d9387eab36f8fda48f5d8009756ed13a7c4c
-commit 6c30c9adbeeed09a8a9e7a69974cfa1f1ddd1e9e
-Author: tedu@openbsd.org <tedu@openbsd.org>
-Date: Wed Jan 22 04:58:23 2020 +0000
+commit 8fae395f34c2c52cdaf9919aa261d1848b4bb00b
+Author: markus@openbsd.org <markus@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Mar 6 18:28:27 2020 +0000
- upstream: remove diffie-hellman-group14-sha1 from default kex to
-
- see what happens. general mostly ok
+ upstream: initialize seconds for debug message; ok djm
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 216b7b8462d2ef5f4531f26cb2cb839b2153dad9
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 293fbefe6d00b4812a180ba02e26170e4c855b81
-commit 4a32c0ca44a2dc2a358f69b5d43c08e528b44b39
-Author: claudio@openbsd.org <claudio@openbsd.org>
-Date: Wed Jan 22 04:51:51 2020 +0000
+commit 46e5c4c8ffcd1569bcd5d04803abaa2ecf3e4cff
+Author: markus@openbsd.org <markus@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Mar 6 18:27:50 2020 +0000
- upstream: For ssh-keygen -lF only add a space after key fingerprint
-
- when there is a comment. This makes copy-paste of fingerprints into ssh
- easier. OK djm@
+ upstream: correct return code; ok djm
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: fa01d95624f65c1eb4dc7c575d20d77c78010dfd
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 319d09e3b7f4b2bc920c67244d9ff6426b744810
-commit 37d3b736506760e4ebc7fe56255f7b8ea823a00c
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Wed Jan 22 04:49:16 2020 +0000
+commit 31c39e7840893f1bfdcbe4f813b20d1d7e69ec3e
+Author: markus@openbsd.org <markus@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Mar 6 18:27:15 2020 +0000
- upstream: some __func__ and strerror(errno) here; no functional
-
- change
+ upstream: principalsp is optional, pubkey required; ok djm
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 6c3ddd5f848b99ea560b31d3fba99ceed66cef37
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 2cc3ea5018c28ed97edaccd7f17d2cc796f01024
-commit e2031b05c74c98b141179ceab13a323cf17d01e5
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Wed Jan 22 02:25:21 2020 +0000
+commit e26a31757c5df2f58687cb9a4853d1418f39728e
+Author: markus@openbsd.org <markus@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Mar 6 18:26:21 2020 +0000
- upstream: factor out parsing of allowed-signers lines
+ upstream: remove unused variables in ssh-pkcs11-helper; ok djm
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 85ee6aeff608371826019ea85e55bfa87f79d06e
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 13e572846d0d1b28f1251ddd2165e9cf18135ae1
-commit 47160e1de8c2f638f0ef41cef42c976417b61778
-Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
-Date: Wed Jan 22 10:30:13 2020 +1100
+commit 1b378c0d982d6ab522eda634b0e88cf1fca5e352
+Author: markus@openbsd.org <markus@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Mar 6 18:25:48 2020 +0000
- unbreak fuzzer support for recent ssh-sk.h changes
+ upstream: return correct error in sshsk_ed25519_sig; ok djm
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 52bf733df220303c260fee4f165ec64b4a977625
-commit 70d38c3cfd4550e8ee66cc3bf1b91aa339c91df5
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Tue Jan 21 22:39:57 2020 +0000
+commit fbff605e637b068061ab6784ff03e3874890c092
+Author: markus@openbsd.org <markus@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Mar 6 18:25:12 2020 +0000
- upstream: expose the number of currently-authenticating connections
+ upstream: fix possible null-deref in check_key_not_revoked; ok
- along with the MaxStartups limit in the proctitle; suggestion from Philipp
- Marek, w/ feedback from Craig Miskell ok dtucker@
+ djm
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: a4a6db2dc1641a5df8eddf7d6652176e359dffb3
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 80855e9d7af42bb6fcc16c074ba69876bfe5e3bf
-commit a78c66d5d2144bd49779bc80a647346bd3d7233d
-Author: naddy@openbsd.org <naddy@openbsd.org>
-Date: Tue Jan 21 12:40:04 2020 +0000
+commit bc30b446841fc16e50ed6e75c56ccfbd37b9f281
+Author: markus@openbsd.org <markus@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Mar 6 18:24:39 2020 +0000
- upstream: document the default value of the ControlPersist option;
+ upstream: ssh_fetch_identitylist() returns the return value from
- ok dtucker@ djm@
+ ssh_request_reply() so we should also check against != 0 ok djm
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 0788e7f2b5a9d4e36d3d2ab378f73329320fef66
-
-commit b46a6325849e40aa2e4b0d962a6f00f708f6576a
-Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
-Date: Wed Jan 22 09:28:32 2020 +1100
-
- remove accidental change in f8c11461
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 28d0028769d03e665688c61bb5fd943e18614952
-commit 80d3bebcab96fe1d177e45906e10db16895da01d
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Tue Jan 21 11:06:09 2020 +0000
+commit 7b4f70ddeb59f35283d77d8d9c834ca58f8cf436
+Author: markus@openbsd.org <markus@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Mar 6 18:23:17 2020 +0000
- upstream: don't #ifdef out the KRL code when compiling without
+ upstream: sshkey_cert_check_authority requires reason to be set;
- libcrypto support; it works just fine and disabling it breaks a few tests. ok
- dtucker@
+ ok djm
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 65f6272c4241eb4b04de78b012fe98b2b555ad44
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 6f7a6f19540ed5749763c2f9530c0897c94aa552
-commit f8c11461aa6db168fc5e7eeae448b4cbbf59642a
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Tue Jan 21 08:06:27 2020 +0000
+commit 05efe270df1e925db0af56a806d18b5063db4b6d
+Author: markus@openbsd.org <markus@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Mar 6 18:21:28 2020 +0000
- upstream: pass SSH_SK_HELPER explicitly past $SUDO to avoid it getting
+ upstream: passphrase depends on kdfname, not ciphername (possible
- cleared; with dtucker@
+ null-deref); ok djm
- OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 03178a0580324bf0dff28f7eac6c3edbc5407f8e
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 0d39668edf5e790b5837df4926ee1141cec5471c
-commit b5fcb0ac1cc0ef01aeec1c089146298654ab3ae0
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Tue Jan 21 07:07:31 2020 +0000
+commit 1ddf5682f3992bdacd29164891abb71a19c2cf61
+Author: markus@openbsd.org <markus@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Mar 6 18:20:44 2020 +0000
- upstream: check access(ssh-sk-helper, X_OK) to provide friendly
-
- error message for misconfigured helper paths
+ upstream: consistently check packet_timeout_ms against 0; ok djm
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 061bcc262155d12e726305c91394ac0aaf1f8341
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: e8fb8cb2c96c980f075069302534eaf830929928
-commit 56bced43c14dc6fa2bfa1816007e441644105609
-Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
-Date: Tue Jan 21 06:09:56 2020 +0000
+commit 31f1ee54968ad84eb32375e4412e0318766b586b
+Author: markus@openbsd.org <markus@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Mar 6 18:20:02 2020 +0000
- upstream: Document sntrup4591761x25519-sha512@tinyssh.org. Patch
+ upstream: initialize cname in case ai_canonname is NULL or too
- from jtesta@positronsecurity.com via github PR#151.
+ long; ok djm
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: f3d48168623045c258245c340a5a2af7dbb74edc
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: c27984636fdb1035d1642283664193e91aab6e37
-commit 4a05d789b86314fef7303824f69defbc6b96ed60
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Tue Jan 21 05:56:56 2020 +0000
+commit a6134b02b5264b2611c8beae98bb392329452bba
+Author: markus@openbsd.org <markus@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Mar 6 18:19:21 2020 +0000
- upstream: fix ssh-keygen not displaying authenticator touch
+ upstream: fix uninitialized pointers for forward_cancel; ok djm
- prompt; reported by jmc@
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 612778e6d87ee865d0ba97d0a335f141cee1aa37
+
+commit 16d4f9961c75680aab374dee762a5baa0ad507af
+Author: markus@openbsd.org <markus@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Mar 6 18:16:21 2020 +0000
+
+ upstream: exit on parse failures in input_service_request; ok djm
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 04d4f582fc194eb3897ebcbfe286c49958ba2859
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 6a7e1bfded26051d5aa893c030229b1ee6a0d5d2
-commit 881aded0389d999375f926051491a944c6d8752b
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Tue Jan 21 05:56:27 2020 +0000
+commit 5f25afe5216ba7f8921e04f79aa4ca0624eca820
+Author: markus@openbsd.org <markus@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Mar 6 18:15:38 2020 +0000
- upstream: a little more verbosity in sign_and_send_pubkey() debug
+ upstream: fix null-deref on calloc failure; ok djm
- messages
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: a313519579b392076b7831ec022dfdefbec8724a
+
+commit ff2acca039aef16a15fce409163df404858f7aa5
+Author: markus@openbsd.org <markus@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Mar 6 18:15:04 2020 +0000
+
+ upstream: exit if ssh_krl_revoke_key_sha256 fails; ok djm
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 6da47a0e6373f6683006f49bc2a516d197655508
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 0864ad4fe8bf28ab21fd1df766e0365c11bbc0dc
-commit b715fdc71bbd009d0caff691ab3fc04903c4aee8
-Author: naddy@openbsd.org <naddy@openbsd.org>
-Date: Sat Jan 18 21:16:43 2020 +0000
+commit 31c860a0212af2d5b6a129e3e8fcead51392ee1d
+Author: markus@openbsd.org <markus@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Mar 6 18:14:13 2020 +0000
- upstream: one more replacement "(security) key" -> "(FIDO)
+ upstream: pkcs11_register_provider: return < 0 on error; ok djm
- authenticator"
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: cfc8321315b787e4d40da4bdb2cbabd4154b0d97
+
+commit 15be29e1e3318737b0768ca37d5b4a3fbe868ef0
+Author: markus@openbsd.org <markus@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Mar 6 18:13:29 2020 +0000
+
+ upstream: sshsig: return correct error, fix null-deref; ok djm
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 031bca03c1d1f878ab929facd561911f1bc68dfd
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 1d1af7cd538b8b23e621cf7ab84f11e7a923edcd
-commit 84911da1beeb6ed258a43468efb316cd39fb6855
-Author: naddy@openbsd.org <naddy@openbsd.org>
-Date: Sat Jan 18 15:45:41 2020 +0000
+commit 6fb6f186cb62a6370fba476b6a03478a1e95c30d
+Author: markus@openbsd.org <markus@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Mar 6 18:12:55 2020 +0000
- upstream: undo merge error and replace the term "security key"
+ upstream: vasnmprintf allocates str and returns -1; ok djm
- again
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: dae4c9e83d88471bf3b3f89e3da7a107b44df11c
+
+commit 714e1cbca17daa13f4f98978cf9e0695d4b2e0a4
+Author: markus@openbsd.org <markus@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Mar 6 18:11:10 2020 +0000
+
+ upstream: sshpkt_fatal() does not return; ok djm
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 341749062c089cc360a7877e9ee3a887aecde395
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 7dfe847e28bd78208eb227b37f29f4a2a0929929
-commit e8c06c4ee708720efec12cd1a6f78a3c6d76b7f0
-Author: naddy@openbsd.org <naddy@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Jan 17 20:13:47 2020 +0000
+commit 9b47bd7b09d191991ad9e0506bb66b74bbc93d34
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Feb 28 01:07:28 2020 +0000
- upstream: Document loading of resident keys from a FIDO
+ upstream: no-touch-required certificate option should be an
- authenticator.
+ extension, not a critical option.
- * Rename -O to -K to keep "-O option" available.
- * Document -K.
- * Trim usage() message down to synopsis, like all other commands.
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 626b22c5feb7be8a645e4b9a9bef89893b88600d
+
+commit dd992520bed35387fc010239abe1bdc0c2665e38
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Feb 28 01:06:05 2020 +0000
+
+ upstream: better error message when trying to use a FIDO key
- ok markus@
+ function and SecurityKeyProvider is empty
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 015c2c4b28f8e19107adc80351b44b23bca4c78a
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: e56602c2ee8c82f835d30e4dc8ee2e4a7896be24
-commit 0d005d6372a067b59123dec8fc6dc905f2c09e1e
-Author: naddy@openbsd.org <naddy@openbsd.org>
-Date: Tue Jan 14 15:07:30 2020 +0000
+commit b81e66dbe0345aef4717911abcb4f589fff33a0a
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date: Thu Feb 27 02:32:37 2020 +0000
- upstream: sync ssh-keygen.1 and ssh-keygen's usage() with each
+ upstream: Drop leading space from line count that was confusing
- other and reality ok markus@
+ ssh-keygen's screen mode.
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: cdf64454f2c3604c25977c944e5b6262a3bcce92
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 3bcae7a754db3fc5ad3cab63dd46774edb35b8ae
-commit b8a4ca2ebfddab862f7eb1ea2a07fb9f70330429
-Author: naddy@openbsd.org <naddy@openbsd.org>
-Date: Sat Jan 11 16:23:10 2020 +0000
+commit d5ba1c03278eb079438bb038266d80d7477d49cb
+Author: jsg@openbsd.org <jsg@openbsd.org>
+Date: Wed Feb 26 13:40:09 2020 +0000
- upstream: revise the fix for reversed arguments on
+ upstream: change explicit_bzero();free() to freezero()
- expand_proxy_command()
+ While freezero() returns early if the pointer is NULL the tests for
+ NULL in callers are left to avoid warnings about passing an
+ uninitialised size argument across a function boundry.
- Always put 'host' before 'host_arg' for consistency. ok markus@ djm@
+ ok deraadt@ djm@
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 1ba5b25472779f1b1957295fcc6907bb961472a3
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 2660fa334fcc7cd05ec74dd99cb036f9ade6384a
-commit 57b181eaf2d34fd0a1b51ab30cb6983df784de5a
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Jan 10 23:43:26 2020 +0000
+commit 9e3220b585c5be19a7431ea4ff8884c137b3a81c
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date: Wed Feb 26 11:46:51 2020 +0000
- upstream: pass the log-on-stderr flag and log level through to
+ upstream: Have sftp reject "-1" in the same way as ssh(1) and
- ssh-sk-helper, making debugging a bit easier. ok markus@
+ scp(1) do instead of accepting and silently ignoring it since protocol 1
+ support has been removed. Spotted by shivakumar2696 at gmail.com, ok
+ deraadt@
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 2e7aea6bf5770d3f38b7c7bba891069256c5a49a
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: b79f95559a1c993214f4ec9ae3c34caa87e9d5de
-commit a8bd5fdbdb7581afc7123a042a7cd6ca25357388
-Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
-Date: Tue Jan 21 12:32:16 2020 +1100
+commit ade8e67bb0f07b12e5e47e7baeafbdc898de639f
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date: Wed Feb 26 01:31:47 2020 +0000
- Wrap copy_environment_blacklist() in #ifdef
+ upstream: Remove obsolete XXX comment. ok deraadt@
- It's only needed for USE_PAM or HAVE_CYGWIN cases and will cause compiler
- warnings otherwise.
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: bc462cc843947feea26a2e21c750b3a7469ff01b
-commit 10ecc647fc1db8d2dde9f6b9b826b201dfc48b62
-Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
-Date: Tue Jan 21 12:20:05 2020 +1100
+commit 7eb903f51eba051d7f65790bab92a28970ac1ccc
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date: Mon Feb 24 04:27:58 2020 +0000
- depend
+ upstream: Fix typo. Patch from itoama at live.jp via github PR#173.
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 5cdaafab38bbdea0d07e24777d00bfe6f972568a
-commit b3f7009c9ffa5891283ed96e043001e09934a8d4
-Author: Ruben Kerkhof <ruben@rubenkerkhof.com>
-Date: Mon Jan 20 11:56:48 2020 +0100
+commit b2491c289dd1b557a18a2aca04eeff5c157fc5ef
+Author: Nico Kadel-Garcia <nkadel@gmail.com>
+Date: Sat Oct 12 17:51:01 2019 -0400
- Fix missing prototype warning for copy_environment
-
- This function is only used in this file, and only on Cygwin, so make
- it static and hide it behind HAVE_CYGWIN. Prevents missing prototype
- warning.
+ Switch %define to %global for redhat/openssh.spec
-commit 0c428c0e991e2c4fabc48cf5d9b8f84c9412e0c3
-Author: Ruben Kerkhof <ruben@rubenkerkhof.com>
-Date: Mon Jan 20 13:58:11 2020 +0100
+commit b18dcf6cca7c7aba1cc22e668e04492090ef0255
+Author: mkontani <itoama@live.jp>
+Date: Fri Feb 21 00:54:49 2020 +0900
- configure.ac: fix ldns test
-
- When running ./configure --with-ldns, if ldns-config cannot be found, we
- add -Iyes/include to CPPFLAGS and -Lyes/lib to LDFLAGS. Fix that.
+ fix some typos and sentence
-commit 6089abf715e2784751c9f62697e09bb103295b93
-Author: Ruben Kerkhof <ruben@rubenkerkhof.com>
-Date: Mon Jan 20 12:13:26 2020 +0100
+commit 0001576a096f788d40c2c0a39121cff51bf961ad
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Feb 21 00:04:43 2020 +0000
- Make sshpam_password_change_required static.
+ upstream: Fix some typos and an incorrect word in docs. Patch from
- sshpam_password_change_required is only used in auth-pam.c, so make it
- static to prevent a mising prototype warning.
+ itoama at live.jp via github PR#172.
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 166ee8f93a7201fef431b9001725ab8b269d5874
-commit 5a9b9c82851b7bc219dc3a65962a80803c76c102
-Author: Ruben Kerkhof <ruben@rubenkerkhof.com>
-Date: Mon Jan 20 12:24:51 2020 +0100
+commit 99ff8fefe4b2763a53778d06b5f74443c8701615
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date: Thu Feb 20 05:58:08 2020 +0000
- sandbox-darwin.c: fix missing prototypes.
+ upstream: Update moduli generation script to new ssh-keygen
- Include the right header just like the other sandbox files.
- Fixes missing prototype warnings for ssh_sandbox_* functions.
+ generation and screening command line flags.
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 5010ff08f7ad92082e87dde098b20f5c24921a8f
-commit 335dc93526942a650f6c69666b3f6ca44d0a2910
-Author: Ruben Kerkhof <ruben@rubenkerkhof.com>
-Date: Mon Jan 20 11:09:27 2020 +0100
+commit 700d16f5e534d6de5a3b7105a74a7a6f4487b681
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date: Thu Feb 20 05:41:51 2020 +0000
- Fix a few warnings when on Mac OS X.
+ upstream: Import regenerated moduli.
- Include stdlib.h for calloc, malloc, free and setenv.
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 7b7b619c1452a459310b0cf4391c5757c6bdbc0f
-commit 0488dc2d3050ea1a99ef5cf44afc50ffbf3f1315
-Author: Ruben Kerkhof <ruben@rubenkerkhof.com>
-Date: Mon Jan 20 10:32:23 2020 +0100
+commit 4753b74ba0f09e4aacdaab5e184cd540352004d5
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Thu Feb 20 16:42:50 2020 +1100
- Fix building without openssl.
-
- This fixes the following when there are no openssl headers on the system:
- ssh-ecdsa-sk.c:34:10: fatal error: 'openssl/bn.h' file not found
+ Import regenerated moduli.
-commit e6b7157b4ef29c83ec3a2d1d7c927e4b8898f9bb
-Author: Ruben Kerkhof <ruben@rubenkerkhof.com>
-Date: Wed Jan 15 16:08:55 2020 +0100
+commit 11d427162778c18fa42917893a75d178679a2389
+Author: HARUYAMA Seigo <haruyama@unixuser.org>
+Date: Fri Feb 14 16:14:23 2020 +0900
- Add config.log to .gitignore
+ Fix typos in INSTALL: s/avilable/available/ s/suppports/supports/
-commit 515e10ddf9644010b88cfd7ecf601f4306d42232
-Author: Ruben Kerkhof <ruben@rubenkerkhof.com>
-Date: Wed Jan 15 16:16:31 2020 +0100
+commit 264a966216137c9f4f8220fd9142242d784ba059
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date: Tue Feb 18 08:58:33 2020 +0000
- Fix typo in README.md, s/crytpo/crypto/
+ upstream: Ensure that the key lifetime provided fits within the
+
+ values allowed by the wire format (u32). Prevents integer wraparound of the
+ timeout values. bz#3119, ok markus@ djm@
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 8afe6038b5cdfcf63360788f012a7ad81acc46a2
-commit 1af3354aea3c4bfa5b5ecfb5d1ff3ad231c2073c
-Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Wed Jan 15 16:22:36 2020 +1100
+commit de1f3564cd85915b3002859873a37cb8d31ac9ce
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date: Tue Feb 18 08:49:49 2020 +0000
- Wrap stdint.h in ifdef HAVE_STDINT_H.
+ upstream: Detect and prevent simple configuration loops when using
+
+ ProxyJump. bz#3057, ok djm@
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 077d21c564c886c98309d871ed6f8ef267b9f037
-commit 429170f273ce1b0140f8111a45ba69390d98de3a
+commit 30144865bfa06b12239cfabc37c45e5ddc369d97
+Author: naddy@openbsd.org <naddy@openbsd.org>
+Date: Sun Feb 16 21:15:43 2020 +0000
+
+ upstream: document -F none; with jmc@
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 0eb93b75473d2267aae9200e02588e57778c84f2
+
+commit 011052de73f3dbc53f50927ccf677266a9ade4f6
Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Tue Jan 14 14:41:47 2020 +1100
+Date: Mon Feb 17 22:55:51 2020 +1100
- Wrap stdint.h inside HAVE_STDINT_H.
+ Remove unused variable warning.
-commit a0989b60211b6f1c2313e1397c526d883a23a075
+commit 31c9348c5e4e94e9913ec64b3ca6e15f68ba19e5
Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Tue Jan 14 14:26:41 2020 +1100
+Date: Mon Feb 17 22:53:24 2020 +1100
- Include compat header for definitions.
+ Constify aix_krb5_get_principal_name.
+
+ Prevents warning about discarding type qualifiers on AIX.
-commit e0cedcad51fe02683943bf4f1ad2961aa3f35313
+commit 290c994336a2cfe03c5496bebb6580863f94b232
Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Tue Jan 14 09:42:52 2020 +1100
+Date: Mon Feb 17 22:51:36 2020 +1100
- Improve search for 'struct timespec'.
+ Check if TILDE is already defined and undef.
- Make struct timespec test consistent with existing timeval test.
- Include time.h for timespec in compat header where required.
+ Prevents redefinition warning on AIX.
-commit acaf9e058594310001ce64468ed2923dc6323e81
+commit 41a2e64ae480eda73ee0e809bbe743d203890938
Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Tue Jan 14 12:43:03 2020 +1100
+Date: Mon Feb 17 22:51:00 2020 +1100
- Update depend to remove rmd160.h.
+ Prevent unused variable warning.
-commit 26b2675b0c3e3efea11a52609073aec01736ec84
+commit d4860ec4efd25ba194337082736797fce0bda016
Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Tue Jan 14 07:24:46 2020 +1100
+Date: Mon Feb 17 22:48:50 2020 +1100
- Remove configure test & compat code for ripemd160.
+ Check if getpeereid is actually declared.
- RIPEMD160 support was removed upstream in 2017, however we still had
- a configure test and compat code for it, so clean those up now.
+ Check in sys/socket.h (AIX) and unistd.h (FreeBSD, DragonFLy and OS X).
+ Prevents undeclared function warning on at least some versions of AIX.
-commit ed3ad71b17adcd1fb4431d145f53cee1c6a1135e
+commit 8aa3455b16fddea4c0144a7c4a1edb10ec67dcc8
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Thu Jan 9 03:28:38 2020 +0000
+Date: Fri Feb 14 00:39:20 2020 +0000
- upstream: fix reversed arguments on expand_proxy_command(); spotted
-
- by anton@
+ upstream: openssh-8.2
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: db1c32478a01dfbc9c4db171de0f25907bea5775
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 0a1340ff65fad0d84b997ac58dd1b393dec7c19b
-commit cd53476383f0cf475f40ba8ac8deb6b76dd5ce4e
-Author: jmc@openbsd.org <jmc@openbsd.org>
-Date: Mon Jan 6 07:43:28 2020 +0000
+commit 72f0ce33f0d5a37f31bad5800d1eb2fbdb732de6
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date: Wed Feb 12 09:28:35 2020 +1100
- upstream: put the fido options in a list, and tidy up the text a
-
- little; ok djm
-
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 491ce15ae52a88b7a6a2b3b6708a14b4aacdeebb
+ crank version numbers
-commit 30f704ebc0e9e32b3d12f5d9e8c1b705fdde2c89
-Author: Jeremy Drake <github@jdrake.com>
-Date: Fri Oct 11 18:31:05 2019 -0700
+commit b763ed05bd1f1f15ae1727c86a4498546bc36ca8
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Tue Feb 11 12:51:24 2020 +1100
- Deny (non-fatal) ipc in preauth privsep child.
+ Minor documentation update:
- As noted in openssh/openssh-portable#149, i386 does not have have
- _NR_shmget etc. Instead, it has a single ipc syscall (see man 2 ipc,
- https://linux.die.net/man/2/ipc). Add this syscall, if present, to the
- list of syscalls that seccomp will deny non-fatally.
+ - remove duplication of dependency information (it's all in INSTALL).
+ - SSHFP is now an RFC.
-commit b110cefdfbf5a20f49b774a55062d6ded2fb6e22
-Author: Khem Raj <raj.khem@gmail.com>
-Date: Tue Jan 7 16:26:45 2020 -0800
+commit 14ccfdb7248e33b1dc8bbac1425ace4598e094cb
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Sun Feb 9 11:23:35 2020 +1100
- seccomp: Allow clock_gettime64() in sandbox.
-
- This helps sshd accept connections on mips platforms with
- upcoming glibc ( 2.31 )
+ Check if UINT32_MAX is defined before redefining.
-commit 3cc60c899a92a469e5118310ba6b74cb57215618
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Mon Jan 6 02:39:30 2020 +0000
+commit be075110c735a451fd9d79a864e01e2e0d9f19d2
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date: Fri Feb 7 15:07:27 2020 +1100
- upstream: missing else in check_enroll_options()
-
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: e058fb918fda56ddbbf0bee910101004cec421d4
+ typo; reported by Phil Pennock
-commit ff5784e2698d6c41e9f39ce4df24968c1beeb2bb
+commit 963d71851e727ffdd2a97fe0898fad61d4a70ba1
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Mon Jan 6 02:24:28 2020 +0000
+Date: Fri Feb 7 03:57:31 2020 +0000
- upstream: fix error message
+ upstream: sync the description of the $SSH_SK_PROVIDER environment
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 1eb52025658eb78ea6223181e552862198d3d505
+ variable with that of the SecurityKeyProvider ssh/sshd_config(5) directive,
+ as the latter was more descriptive.
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 0488f09530524a7e53afca6b6e1780598022552f
-commit dd2acc8b862c09751621995fba2d5fa6f4e24cc9
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Mon Jan 6 02:07:50 2020 +0000
+commit d4d9e1d40514e2746f9e05335d646512ea1020c6
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Feb 7 03:54:44 2020 +0000
- upstream: adapt sk-dummy to SK API changes
+ upstream: Add ssh -Q key-sig for all key and signature types.
- also, make it pull prototypes directly from sk-api.c and #error
- if the expected version changes. This will make any future regress
- test breakage because of SK API changes much more apparent
+ Teach ssh -Q to accept ssh_config(5) and sshd_config(5) algorithm keywords as
+ an alias for the corresponding query. Man page help jmc@, ok djm@.
- OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 79b07055de4feb988e31da71a89051ad5969829d
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 1e110aee3db2fc4bc5bee2d893b7128fd622e0f8
-commit c312ca077cd2a6c15545cd6b4d34ee2f69289174
+commit fd68dc27864b099b552a6d9d507ca4b83afd6a76
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Mon Jan 6 02:00:46 2020 +0000
+Date: Fri Feb 7 03:27:54 2020 +0000
- upstream: Extends the SK API to accept a set of key/value options
-
- for all operations. These are intended to future-proof the API a little by
- making it easier to specify additional fields for without having to change
- the API version for each.
+ upstream: fix two PIN entry bugs on FIDO keygen: 1) it would allow more
- At present, only two options are defined: one to explicitly specify
- the device for an operation (rather than accepting the middleware's
- autoselection) and another to specify the FIDO2 username that may
- be used when generating a resident key. These new options may be
- invoked at key generation time via ssh-keygen -O
+ than the intended number of prompts (3) and 2) it would SEGV too many
+ incorrect PINs were entered; based on patch by Gabriel Kihlman
- This also implements a suggestion from Markus to avoid "int" in favour
- of uint32_t for the algorithm argument in the API, to make implementation
- of ssh-sk-client/helper a little easier.
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 9c0011f28ba8bd8adf2014424b64960333da1718
+
+commit 96bd895a0a0b3a36f81c14db8c91513578fc5563
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Thu Feb 6 22:48:23 2020 +0000
+
+ upstream: When using HostkeyAlgorithms to merely append or remove
- feedback, fixes and ok markus@
+ algorithms from the default set (i.e. HostkeyAlgorithms=+/-...), retain the
+ default behaviour of preferring those algorithms that have existing keys in
+ known_hosts; ok markus
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 973ce11704609022ab36abbdeb6bc23c8001eabc
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 040e7fcc38ea00146b5d224ce31ce7a1795ee6ed
-commit 2ab335712d084d9ccaf3f53afc3fa9535329da87
-Author: beck@openbsd.org <beck@openbsd.org>
-Date: Sun Jan 5 16:28:22 2020 +0000
+commit c7288486731734a864b58d024b1395029b55bbc5
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Thu Feb 6 22:46:31 2020 +0000
- upstream: fix CanonicalizeHostname, broken by rev 1.507
+ upstream: expand HostkeyAlgorithms prior to config dump, matching
- Issue noticed and reported by Pierre-Olivier Martel <pom@apple.com>
- ok dtucker@ markus@ djm@
+ other algorithm lists; ok markus@
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 749f3168ec520609c35b0c4e1984e5fa47f16094
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: a66f0fca8cc5ce30405a2867bc115fff600671d0
-commit 69e44ba701b90b0f530d64c3fe4363ea86e50cd3
-Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Mon Jan 6 09:02:53 2020 +1100
+commit a6ac5d36efc072b15690c65039754f8e44247bdf
+Author: naddy@openbsd.org <naddy@openbsd.org>
+Date: Thu Feb 6 22:34:58 2020 +0000
- Fix typo: 'you' -> 'your'.
+ upstream: Add Include to the list of permitted keywords after a
- bz#3108 from jmckitrick@gmail.com.
-
-commit 7652a57662969bd5c61448b3843ec6d407ad12be
-Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Mon Jan 6 08:56:46 2020 +1100
-
- Remove auth-skey.c.
+ Match keyword. ok markus@
- S/Key support was removed in OpenSSH 7.8 but this file was missed.
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 342e940538b13dd41e0fa167dc9ab192b9f6e2eb
-commit c593cc5e826c9f4ec506e22b629d37cabfaacff9
-Author: jmc@openbsd.org <jmc@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Jan 3 07:33:33 2020 +0000
+commit a47f6a6c0e06628eed0c2a08dc31a8923bcc37ba
+Author: naddy@openbsd.org <naddy@openbsd.org>
+Date: Thu Feb 6 22:30:54 2020 +0000
- upstream: the download resident keys option is -K (upper) not -k
+ upstream: Replace "security key" with "authenticator" in program
- (lower); ok djm
+ messages.
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 71dc28a3e1fa7c553844abc508845bcf5766e091
-
-commit ff31f15773ee173502eec4d7861ec56f26bba381
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Jan 3 03:02:26 2020 +0000
-
- upstream: what bozo decided to use 2020 as a future date in a regress
+ This replaces "security key" in error/usage/verbose messages and
+ distinguishes between "authenticator" and "authenticator-hosted key".
- test?
+ ok djm@
- OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 3b953df5a7e14081ff6cf495d4e8d40e153cbc3a
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 7c63800e9c340c59440a054cde9790a78f18592e
-commit 680eb7749a39d0e4d046e66cac4e51e8e3640b75
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Jan 3 02:46:19 2020 +0000
+commit 849a9b87144f8a5b1771de6c85e44bfeb86be9a9
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Thu Feb 6 11:28:14 2020 +1100
- upstream: implement recent SK API change to support resident keys
-
- and PIN prompting in the dummy middleware that we use for the tests. Should
- fix breakage spotted by dtucker@
+ Don't look for UINT32_MAX in inttypes.h
- OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 379cf9eabfea57aaf7f3f59dafde59889566c484
+ ... unless we are actually going to use it. Fixes build on HP-UX
+ without the potential impact to other platforms of a header change
+ shortly before release.
-commit 86834fe6b54ac57b8528c30cf0b27e5cac5b7af7
-Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
-Date: Thu Jan 2 13:25:38 2020 +0000
+commit a2437f8ed0c3be54ddd21630a93c68ebd168286f
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date: Thu Feb 6 12:02:22 2020 +1100
- upstream: Update keygen moduli screen test to match recent command
-
- line option change to ssh-keygen(1).
+ depend
+
+commit 9716e8c4956acdd7b223d1642bfa376e07e7503d
+Author: Michael Forney <mforney@mforney.org>
+Date: Wed Nov 27 19:17:26 2019 -0800
+
+ Fix sha2 MAKE_CLONE no-op definition
- OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 744a72755004377e9669b662c13c6aa9ead8a0c3
+ The point of the dummy declaration is so that MAKE_CLONE(...) can have
+ a trailing semicolon without introducing an empty declaration. So,
+ the macro replacement text should *not* have a trailing semicolon,
+ just like DEF_WEAK.
-commit 9039971887cccd95b209c479296f772a3a93e8e7
+commit d596b1d30dc158915a3979fa409d21ff2465b6ee
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Thu Jan 2 22:40:09 2020 +0000
+Date: Tue Feb 4 09:58:04 2020 +0000
- upstream: ability to download FIDO2 resident keys from a token via
-
- "ssh-keygen -K". This will save public/private keys into the current
- directory.
-
- This is handy if you move a token between hosts.
+ upstream: require FIDO application strings to start with "ssh:"; ok
- feedback & ok markus@
+ markus@
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: d57c1f9802f7850f00a117a1d36682a6c6d10da6
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 94e9c1c066d42b76f035a3d58250a32b14000afb
-commit 878ba4350d57e905d6bb1865d8ff31bdfe5deab4
+commit 501f3582438cb2cb1cb92be0f17be490ae96fb23
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Thu Jan 2 22:38:33 2020 +0000
+Date: Mon Feb 3 23:47:57 2020 +0000
- upstream: add sshkey_save_public(), to save a public key; ok
+ upstream: revert enabling UpdateHostKeys by default - there are still
- markus@
+ corner cases we need to address; ok markus
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 5d6f96a966d10d7fa689ff9aa9e1d6767ad5a076
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: ff7ad941bfdc49fb1d8baa95fd0717a61adcad57
-commit 3b1382ffd5e71eff78db8cef0f3cada22ff29409
+commit 072f3b832d2a4db8d9880effcb6c4d0dad676504
Author: jmc@openbsd.org <jmc@openbsd.org>
-Date: Mon Dec 30 16:10:00 2019 +0000
+Date: Mon Feb 3 08:15:37 2020 +0000
- upstream: simplify the list for moduli options - no need for
+ upstream: use better markup for challenge and write-attestation, and
- -compact;
+ rejig the challenge text a little;
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 6492c72280482c6d072be46236b365cb359fc280
-
-commit 0248ec7c763dee9ff730a589e3d166eac5c74d7c
-Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
-Date: Thu Jan 2 13:41:31 2020 +1100
-
- ssh-sk-null.cc needs extern "C" {}
+ ok djm
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 9f351e6da9edfdc907d5c3fdaf2e9ff3ab0a7a6f
-commit 5ca4b414effe4b56f0cfe3058c92391aa8a43871
+commit 262eb05a22cb1fabc3bc1746c220566490b80229
Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
-Date: Thu Jan 2 10:56:29 2020 +1100
+Date: Mon Feb 3 21:22:15 2020 +1100
- add dummy ssh-sk API for linking with fuzzers
+ mention libfido2 in dependencies section
-commit c4b2664be7ba25e4c233315b25212dec29b727ab
+commit ccd3b247d59d3bde16c3bef0ea888213fbd6da86
Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
-Date: Mon Dec 30 21:04:09 2019 +1100
+Date: Mon Feb 3 19:40:12 2020 +1100
- refresh depend
+ add clock_gettime64(2) to sandbox allowed syscalls
+
+ bz3093
-commit 3093d12ff80927cf45da08d9f262a26680fb14ee
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Mon Dec 30 09:49:52 2019 +0000
+commit adffbe1c645ad2887ba0b6d24c194aa7a40c5735
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date: Sun Feb 2 09:45:34 2020 +0000
- upstream: Remove the -x option currently used for
-
- FIDO/U2F-specific key flags. Instead these flags may be specified via -O.
+ upstream: Output (none) in debug in the case in the CheckHostIP=no case
- ok markus@
+ as suggested by markus@
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: f23ebde2a8a7e1bf860a51055a711cffb8c328c1
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 4ab9117ee5261cbbd1868717fcc3142eea6385cf
-commit ef65e7dbaa8fac3245aa2bfc9f7e09be7cba0d9d
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Mon Dec 30 09:25:29 2019 +0000
+commit 58c819096a2167983e55ae686486ce317b69b2d1
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date: Sun Feb 2 09:22:22 2020 +0000
- upstream: document SK API changes in PROTOCOL.u2f
-
- ok markus@
+ upstream: Prevent possible null pointer deref of ip_str in debug.
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 52622363c103a3c4d3d546050480ffe978a32186
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 37b252e2e6f690efed6682437ef75734dbc8addf
-commit 43ce96427b76c4918e39af654e2fc9ee18d5d478
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Mon Dec 30 09:24:45 2019 +0000
+commit 0facae7bc8d3f8f9d02d0f6bed3d163ff7f39806
+Author: jmc@openbsd.org <jmc@openbsd.org>
+Date: Sun Feb 2 07:36:50 2020 +0000
- upstream: translate and return error codes; retry on bad PIN
-
- Define some well-known error codes in the SK API and pass
- them back via ssh-sk-helper.
-
- Use the new "wrong PIN" error code to retry PIN prompting during
- ssh-keygen of resident keys.
+ upstream: shuffle the challenge keyword to keep the -O list sorted;
- feedback and ok markus@
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 08efad608b790949a9a048d65578fae9ed5845fe
+
+commit 6fb3dd0ccda1c26b06223b87bcd1cab9ec8ec3cc
+Author: jmc@openbsd.org <jmc@openbsd.org>
+Date: Sat Feb 1 06:53:12 2020 +0000
+
+ upstream: tweak previous;
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 9663c6a2bb7a0bc8deaccc6c30d9a2983b481620
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 0c42851cdc88583402b4ab2b110a6348563626d3
-commit d433596736a2cd4818f538be11fc94783f5c5236
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Mon Dec 30 09:24:03 2019 +0000
+commit 92725d4d3fde675acc0ca040b48f3d0c7be73b7f
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Sat Feb 1 17:25:09 2020 +1100
- upstream: improve some error messages; ok markus@
+ Use sys-queue.h from compat library.
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 4ccd8ddabb8df4f995107dd3b7ea58220e93cb81
+ Fixes build on platforms that don't have sys/queue.h (eg MUSL).
-commit c54cd1892c3e7f268b21e1f07ada9f0d9816ffc0
+commit 677d0ece67634262b3b96c3cd6410b19f3a603b7
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Mon Dec 30 09:23:28 2019 +0000
+Date: Fri Jan 31 23:25:08 2020 +0000
- upstream: SK API and sk-helper error/PIN passing
-
- Allow passing a PIN via the SK API (API major crank) and let the
- ssh-sk-helper API follow.
-
- Also enhance the ssh-sk-helper API to support passing back an error
- code instead of a complete reply. Will be used to signal "wrong PIN",
- etc.
+ upstream: regress test for sshd_config Include directive; from Jakub
- feedback and ok markus@
+ Jelen
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: a1bd6b0a2421646919a0c139b8183ad76d28fb71
+ OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 0d9224de3297c7a5f51ba68d6e3725a2a9345fa4
-commit 79fe22d9bc2868c5118f032ec1200ac9c2e3aaef
+commit d4f4cdd681ab6408a98419f398b75a55497ed324
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Mon Dec 30 09:22:49 2019 +0000
+Date: Fri Jan 31 23:13:04 2020 +0000
- upstream: implement loading resident keys in ssh-add
-
- "ssh-add -O" will load resident keys from a FIDO2 token and add them
- to a ssh-agent.
-
- feedback and ok markus@
+ upstream: whitespace
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 608104ae957a7d65cb84e0a3a26c8f60e0df3290
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 564cf7a5407ecf5da2d94ec15474e07427986772
-commit 27753a8e21887d47fe6b5c78a4aed0efe558a850
+commit 245399dfb3ecebc6abfc2ef4ee2e650fa9f6942b
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Mon Dec 30 09:21:59 2019 +0000
+Date: Fri Jan 31 23:11:25 2020 +0000
- upstream: implement loading of resident keys in ssh-sk-helper
+ upstream: force early logging to stderr if debug_flag (-d) is set;
- feedback and ok markus@
+ avoids missing messages from re-exec config passing
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: b273c23769ea182c55c4a7b8f9cbd9181722011a
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 02484b8241c1f49010e7a543a7098e6910a8c9ff
-commit 14cea36df397677b8f8568204300ef654114fd76
+commit 7365f28a66d1c443723fbe6f4a2612ea6002901e
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Mon Dec 30 09:21:16 2019 +0000
+Date: Fri Jan 31 23:08:08 2020 +0000
- upstream: resident keys support in SK API
-
- Adds a sk_load_resident_keys() function to the security key
- API that accepts a security key provider and a PIN and returns
- a list of keys.
-
- Implement support for this in the usbhid middleware.
-
- feedback and ok markus@
+ upstream: mistake in previous: filling the incorrect buffer
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 67e984e4e87f4999ce447a6178c4249a9174eff0
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 862ee84bd4b97b529f64aec5d800c3dcde952e3a
-commit 2fe05fcb4a2695f190b4fcf27770b655586ab349
+commit c2bd7f74b0e0f3a3ee9d19ac549e6ba89013abaf
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Mon Dec 30 09:20:36 2019 +0000
+Date: Fri Jan 31 22:42:45 2020 +0000
- upstream: Factor out parsing of struct sk_enroll_response
+ upstream: Add a sshd_config "Include" directive to allow inclusion
- We'll reuse this for extracting resident keys from a device.
-
- feedback and ok markus@
+ of files. This has sensible semantics wrt Match blocks and accepts glob(3)
+ patterns to specify the included files. Based on patch by Jakub Jelen in
+ bz2468; feedback and ok markus@
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 9bc1efd9c6897eac4df0983746cf6578c1542273
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 36ed0e845b872e33f03355b936a4fff02d5794ff
-commit 4532bd01d57ee13c3ca881eceac1bf9da96a4d7e
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Mon Dec 30 09:19:52 2019 +0000
+commit ba261a1dd33266168ead4f8f40446dcece4d1600
+Author: jmc@openbsd.org <jmc@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Jan 31 22:25:59 2020 +0000
- upstream: basic support for generating FIDO2 resident keys
-
- "ssh-keygen -t ecdsa-sk|ed25519-sk -x resident" will generate a
- device-resident key.
-
- feedback and ok markus@
+ upstream: spelling fix;
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 8e1b3c56a4b11d85047bd6c6c705b7eef4d58431
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 3c079523c4b161725a4b15dd06348186da912402
-commit 3e60d18fba1b502c21d64fc7e81d80bcd08a2092
+commit 771891a044f763be0711493eca14b6b0082e030f
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Mon Dec 30 03:30:09 2019 +0000
+Date: Thu Jan 30 22:25:34 2020 +0000
- upstream: remove single-letter flags for moduli options
-
- Move all moduli generation options to live under the -O flag.
-
- Frees up seven single-letter flags.
-
- NB. this change break existing ssh-keygen commandline syntax for moduli-
- related operations. Very few people use these fortunately.
-
- feedback and ok markus@
+ upstream: document changed default for UpdateHostKeys
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: d498f3eaf28128484826a4fcb343612764927935
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 25c390b21d142f78ac0106241d13441c4265fd2c
-commit 1e645fe767f27725dc7fd7864526de34683f7daf
+commit d53a518536c552672c00e8892e2aea28f664148c
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Mon Dec 30 03:28:41 2019 +0000
+Date: Thu Jan 30 22:19:32 2020 +0000
- upstream: prepare for use of ssh-keygen -O flag beyond certs
-
- Move list of available certificate options in ssh-keygen.1 to the
- CERTIFICATES section.
-
- Collect options specified by -O but delay parsing/validation of
- certificate options until we're sure that we're acting as a CA.
+ upstream: enable UpdateKnownHosts=yes if the configuration
- ok markus@
+ specifies only the default known_hosts files, otherwise select
+ UpdateKnownHosts=ask; ok markus@
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 33e6bcc29cfca43606f6fa09bd84b955ee3a4106
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: ab401a5ec4a33d2e1a9449eae6202e4b6d427df7
-commit 20ccd854245c598e2b47cc9f8d4955d645195055
-Author: jmc@openbsd.org <jmc@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Dec 27 08:28:44 2019 +0000
+commit bb63ff844e818d188da4fed3c016e0a4eecbbf25
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Thu Jan 30 18:54:42 2020 +1100
- upstream: sort -Y internally in the options list, as is already
-
- done in synopsis;
+ Look in inttypes.h for UINT32_MAX.
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 86d033c5764404057616690d7be992e445b42274
+ Should prevent warnings on at least some AIX versions.
-commit 5b6c954751dd3677466cda7adb92e4f05446c96c
-Author: jmc@openbsd.org <jmc@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Dec 27 08:25:07 2019 +0000
+commit afeb6a960da23f0a5cbc4b80cca107c7504e932a
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Thu Jan 30 07:21:38 2020 +0000
- upstream: in the options list, sort -Y and -y;
+ upstream: use sshpkt_fatal() instead of plain fatal() for
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 24c2e6a3aeab6e050a0271ffc73fdff91c10dcaa
+ ssh_packet_write_poll() failures here too as the former yields better error
+ messages; ok dtucker@
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 1f7a6ca95bc2b716c2e948fc1370753be772d8e3
-commit 141df487ba699cfd1ec3dcd98186e7c956e99024
-Author: naddy@openbsd.org <naddy@openbsd.org>
-Date: Sat Dec 21 20:22:34 2019 +0000
+commit 65d6fd0a8a6f31c3ddf0c1192429a176575cf701
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Thu Jan 30 07:20:57 2020 +0000
- upstream: Replace the term "security key" with "(FIDO)
-
- authenticator".
+ upstream: check the return value of ssh_packet_write_poll() and
- The polysemous use of "key" was too confusing. Input from markus@.
- ok jmc@
+ call sshpkt_fatal() if it fails; avoid potential busy-loop under some
+ circumstances. Based on patch by Mike Frysinger; ok dtucker@
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 12eea973a44c8232af89f86e4269d71ae900ca8f
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: c79fe5cf4f0cd8074cb6db257c1394d5139408ec
-commit fbd9729d4eadf2f7097b6017156387ac64302453
+commit dce74eab0c0f9010dc84c62500a17771d0131ff3
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Sat Dec 21 02:33:07 2019 +0000
+Date: Thu Jan 30 07:20:05 2020 +0000
- upstream: unit tests for ForwardAgent=/path; from Eric Chiang
+ upstream: have sshpkt_fatal() save/restore errno before we
- OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 24f693f78290b2c17725dab2c614dffe4a88c8da
+ potentially call strerror() (via ssh_err()); ok dtucker
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 5590df31d21405498c848245b85c24acb84ad787
-commit e5b7cf8edca7e843adc125621e1dab14507f430a
+commit 14ef4efe2bf4180e085ea6738fdbebc199458b0c
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Mon Dec 16 02:39:05 2019 +0000
+Date: Wed Jan 29 08:17:49 2020 +0000
- upstream: test security key host keys in addition to user keys
+ upstream: markus suggests a simplification to previous
- OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 9fb45326106669a27e4bf150575c321806e275b1
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 10bbfb6607ebbb9a018dcd163f0964941adf58de
-commit 40be78f503277bd91c958fa25ea9ef918a2ffd3d
+commit 101ebc3a8cfa78d2e615afffbef9861bbbabf1ff
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Sat Dec 21 02:19:13 2019 +0000
+Date: Wed Jan 29 07:51:30 2020 +0000
- upstream: Allow forwarding a different agent socket to the path
-
- specified by $SSH_AUTH_SOCK, by extending the existing ForwardAgent option to
- accepting an explicit path or the name of an environment variable in addition
- to yes/no.
+ upstream: give more context to UpdateHostKeys messages, mentioning
- Patch by Eric Chiang, manpage by me; ok markus@
+ that the changes are validated by the existing trusted host key. Prompted by
+ espie@ feedback and ok markus@
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 98f2ed80bf34ea54d8b2ddd19ac14ebbf40e9265
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: b3d95f4a45f2692f4143b9e77bb241184dbb8dc5
-commit 416f15372bfb5be1709a0ad1d00ef5d8ebfb9e0e
-Author: naddy@openbsd.org <naddy@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Dec 20 20:28:55 2019 +0000
+commit 24c0f752adf9021277a7b0a84931bb5fe48ea379
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Tue Jan 28 08:01:34 2020 +0000
- upstream: SSH U2F keys can now be used as host keys. Fix a garden
+ upstream: changes to support FIDO attestation
- path sentence. ok markus@
+ Allow writing to disk the attestation certificate that is generated by
+ the FIDO token at key enrollment time. These certificates may be used
+ by an out-of-band workflow to prove that a particular key is held in
+ trustworthy hardware.
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 67d7971ca1a020acd6c151426c54bd29d784bd6b
-
-commit 68010acbcfe36167b3eece3115f3a502535f80df
-Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Dec 20 02:42:42 2019 +0000
-
- upstream: Move always unsupported keywords to be grouped with the other
+ Allow passing in a challenge that will be sent to the card during
+ key enrollment. These are needed to build an attestation workflow
+ that resists replay attacks.
- ones. Move oSecurityProvider to match the order in the OpCodes enum. Patch
- from openbsd@academicsolutions.ch, ok djm@
+ ok markus@
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 061e4505861ec1e02ba3a63e3d1b3be3cad458ec
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 457dc3c3d689ba39eed328f0817ed9b91a5f78f6
-commit 8784b02dc49e1c98df4e7aca466be2f652ed4ad1
-Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Dec 20 02:29:21 2019 +0000
+commit 156bef36f93a48212383235bb8e3d71eaf2b2777
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Tue Jan 28 07:24:15 2020 +0000
- upstream: Remove obsolete opcodes from the configuation enum.
+ upstream: disable UpdateHostKeys=ask when in quiet mode; "work for
- Patch from openbsd@academicsolutions.ch, ok djm@
+ me" matthieu@
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 395c202228872ce8d9044cc08552ac969f51e01b
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 60d7b5eb91accf935ed9852650a826d86db2ddc7
-commit 345be6091bdc9be09c90a937d1320f97c01fab2a
-Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Dec 20 02:11:38 2019 +0000
+commit ec8a759b4045e54d6b38e690ffee4cbffc53c7b7
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date: Tue Jan 28 12:57:25 2020 +1100
- upstream: Remove now-obsolete config options from example in
-
- comment. Patch from openbsd@academicsolutions.ch, ok djm@
-
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 35862beb0927b1cb0af476ec23cc07f6e3006101
+ compat for missing IPTOS_DSCP_LE in system headers
-commit ae024b22c4fd68e7f39681d605585889f9511108
-Author: naddy@openbsd.org <naddy@openbsd.org>
-Date: Thu Dec 19 15:09:30 2019 +0000
+commit 4594c7627680c4f41c2ad5fe412e55b7cc79b10c
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Tue Jan 28 01:49:36 2020 +0000
- upstream: Document that security key-hosted keys can act as host
-
- keys.
-
- Update the list of default host key algorithms in ssh_config.5 and
- sshd_config.5. Copy the description of the SecurityKeyProvider
- option to sshd_config.5.
+ upstream: make IPTOS_DSCP_LE available via IPQoS directive; bz2986,
- ok jmc@
+ based on patch by veegish AT cyberstorm.mu
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: edadf3566ab5e94582df4377fee3b8b702c7eca0
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 9902bf4fbb4ea51de2193ac2b1d965bc5d99c425
-commit bc2dc091e0ac4ff6245c43a61ebe12c7e9ea0b7f
-Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
-Date: Thu Dec 19 03:50:01 2019 +0000
+commit da22216b5db3613325aa7b639f40dc017e4c6f69
+Author: markus@openbsd.org <markus@openbsd.org>
+Date: Mon Jan 27 20:51:32 2020 +0000
- upstream: "Forward security" -> "Forward secrecy" since that's the
+ upstream: disable UpdateHostKeys=ask if command is specified; ok
- correct term. Add "MAC" since we use that acronym in other man pages. ok
- naddy@
+ djm@ sthen@
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: c35529e511788586725fb63bda3459e10738c5f5
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: e5bcc45eadb78896637d4143d289f1e42c2ef5d7
-commit e905f7260d72bc0e33ef5f10a0db737ff6e77ba7
-Author: naddy@openbsd.org <naddy@openbsd.org>
-Date: Tue Dec 17 16:21:07 2019 +0000
+commit 1e1db0544fdd788e2e3fc21d972a7ccb7de6b4ae
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Sun Jan 26 00:09:50 2020 +0000
- upstream: cut obsolete lists of crypto algorithms from outline of
-
- how SSH works ok markus@ jmc@
+ upstream: unbreak unittests for recent API / source file changes
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 8e34973f232ab48c4d4f5d07df48d501708b9160
+ OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 075a899a01bbf7781d38bf0b33d8366faaf6d3c0
-commit f65cf1163ff01531ae02f3f9210391d0d692f699
-Author: tobhe@openbsd.org <tobhe@openbsd.org>
-Date: Mon Dec 16 13:58:53 2019 +0000
+commit 0d1144769151edf65f74aee9a4c8545c37861695
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Sun Jan 26 15:09:15 2020 +1100
- upstream: strdup may return NULL if memory allocation fails. Use
-
- the safer xstrdup which fatals on allocation failures.
-
- ok markus@
+ Move definition of UINT32_MAX.
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 8b608d387120630753cbcb8110e0b019c0c9a0d0
+ This allows us to always define it if needed not just if we also
+ define the type ourself.
-commit 57634bfc5708477826c0be265ddc59b9d83e4886
+commit f73ab8a811bc874c2fb403012aa8e4bfdcaf5ec7
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Mon Dec 16 03:16:58 2019 +0000
+Date: Sun Jan 26 00:09:50 2020 +0000
- upstream: sort sk-* methods behind their plain key methods cousins
-
- for now
+ upstream: unbreak unittests for recent API / source file changes
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: c97e22c2b28c0d12ee389b8b4ef5f2ada7908828
+ OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 075a899a01bbf7781d38bf0b33d8366faaf6d3c0
-commit b8df8fe920e697edcc69c520390b78c3b7ad9d84
+commit 0373f9eba2b63455dceedbd3ac3d5dca306789ff
Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Tue Dec 17 19:46:15 2019 +1100
+Date: Sun Jan 26 14:09:17 2020 +1100
- Mac OS X has PAM too.
-
-commit bf8de8b8251af69b5ce96a8faa69145af156af4d
-Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Tue Dec 17 19:37:06 2019 +1100
-
- Show portable tarball pattern in example.
+ Include signal.h to prevent redefintion of _NSIG.
-commit a19ef613e98141cc37c8acdeebe285b9dbe2531e
+commit 638a45b5c1e20a8539100ca44166caad8abf26f8
Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Tue Dec 17 19:35:59 2019 +1100
+Date: Sun Jan 26 13:40:51 2020 +1100
- OpenSSL is now optional.
+ Wrap stdint.h in tests inside HAVE_STDINT_H.
-commit 1a7217ac063e48cf0082895aeee81ed2b8a57191
+commit 74dfc2c859c906eaab1f88a27fd883115ffb928f
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Sun Dec 15 18:58:33 2019 +0000
+Date: Sun Jan 26 00:14:45 2020 +0000
- upstream: adapt to ssh-sk-client change
+ upstream: for UpdateHostKeys, don't report errors for unsupported
- OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 40481999a5928d635ab2e5b029e8239c112005ea
+ key types - just ignore them. spotted by and ok dtucker@
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 91769e443f6197c983932fc8ae9d39948727d473
-commit a7fc1df246e80bfdabd09b069b91c72f9c578ca8
+commit b59618246c332e251160be0f1e0e88a7d4e2b0ae
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Wed Dec 11 18:47:14 2019 +0000
+Date: Sun Jan 26 00:13:20 2020 +0000
- upstream: it's no longer possible to disable privilege separation
+ upstream: downgrade error() for missing subsequent known_hosts
- in sshd, so don't double the tests' work by trying both off/on
+ files to debug() as it was intended to be; spotted by dtucker@
- OpenBSD-Regress-ID: d366665466dbd09e9b707305da884be3e7619c68
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 18cfea382cb52f2da761be524e309cc3d5354ef9
-commit 3145d38ea06820a66c0f5e068f49af14fd2b7ac1
+commit 469df611f778eec5950d556aabfe1d4efc227915
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Sun Dec 15 20:59:23 2019 +0000
+Date: Sat Jan 25 23:33:27 2020 +0000
- upstream: don't treat HostKeyAgent=none as a path either; avoids
+ upstream: clarify that BatchMode applies to all interactive prompts
- spurious warnings from the cfgparse regress test
+ (e.g. host key confirmation) and not just password prompts.
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: ba49ea7a5c92b8a16cb9c2e975dbb163853afc54
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 97b001883d89d3fb1620d2e6b747c14a26aa9818
-commit 747e25192f436e71dd39e15d65aa32bca967533a
+commit de40876c4a5d7c519d3d7253557572fdfc13db76
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Sun Dec 15 20:57:15 2019 +0000
+Date: Sat Jan 25 23:28:06 2020 +0000
- upstream: do not attempt to find an absolute path for sshd_config
+ upstream: tidy headers; some junk snuck into sshbuf-misc.c and
- SecurityKeyProvider=internal - unbreaks cfgparse regress test
+ sshbuf-io.c doesn't need SSHBUF_INTERNAL set
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: d2ddcf525c0dc3c8339522360c10b3c70f1fd641
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 27a724d2e0b2619c1a1490f44093bbd73580d9e6
-commit 9b6e30b96b094ad787511a5b989253e3b8fe1789
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Sun Dec 15 19:47:10 2019 +0000
+commit 6a107606355fa9547884cad6740e6144a7a7955b
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date: Sun Jan 26 10:28:21 2020 +1100
- upstream: allow ssh-keyscan to find security key hostkeys
-
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 1fe822a7f714df19a7e7184e3a3bbfbf546811d3
+ depend
-commit 56584cce75f3d20aaa30befc7cbd331d922927f3
+commit 59d01f1d720ebede4da42882f592d1093dac7adc
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Sun Dec 15 18:57:30 2019 +0000
+Date: Sat Jan 25 23:13:09 2020 +0000
- upstream: allow security keys to act as host keys as well as user
+ upstream: improve the error message for u2f enrollment errors by
- keys.
+ making ssh-keygen be solely responsible for printing the error message and
+ convertint some more common error responses from the middleware to a useful
+ ssherr.h status code. more detail remains visible via -v of course.
- Previously we didn't do this because we didn't want to expose
- the attack surface presented by USB and FIDO protocol handling,
- but now that this is insulated behind ssh-sk-helper there is
- less risk.
+ also remove indepedent copy of sk-api.h declarations in sk-usbhid.c
+ and just include it.
- ok markus@
+ feedback & ok markus@
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 77b068dd133b8d87e0f010987bd5131e640ee64c
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: a4a8ffa870d9a3e0cfd76544bcdeef5c9fb1f1bb
-commit 5af6fd5461bb709304e6979c8b7856c7af921c9e
-Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Mon Dec 16 13:55:56 2019 +1100
+commit 99aa8035554ddb976348d2a9253ab3653019728d
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Sat Jan 25 23:02:13 2020 +0000
- Allow clock_nanosleep_time64 in seccomp sandbox.
+ upstream: factor out reading/writing sshbufs to dedicated
- Needed on Linux ARM. bz#3100, patch from jjelen@redhat.com.
-
-commit fff8ff6dd580e1a72ba09a6775d185175cdc8d13
-Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Sun Dec 15 18:27:02 2019 +1100
-
- Put SK ECDSA bits inside ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC.
+ functions; feedback and ok markus@
- Fixes build when linking against OpenSSLs built with no-ec.
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: dc09e5f1950b7acc91b8fdf8015347782d2ecd3d
-commit 9244990ecdcfa36bb9371058111685b05f201c1e
-Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
-Date: Sat Dec 14 09:21:46 2019 +1100
+commit 065064fcf455778b0918f783033b374d4ba37a92
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Sat Jan 25 22:49:38 2020 +0000
- remove a bunch of ENABLE_SK #ifdefs
+ upstream: add a comment describing the ranges of channel IDs that
- The ssh-sk-helper client API gives us a nice place to disable
- security key support when it is wasn't enabled at compile time,
- so we don't need to check everywere.
+ we use; requested by markus@
- Also, verification of security key signatures can remain enabled
- all the time - it has no additional dependencies. So sshd can
- accept security key pubkeys in authorized_keys, etc regardless of
- the host's support for dlopen, etc.
-
-commit a33ab1688b5c460a7e2a301418241ce1b13b2638
-Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
-Date: Sat Dec 14 09:15:06 2019 +1100
-
- ssh-sk-client.c needs includes.h
-
-commit 633778d567ad50b63d2a3bca5e1b97d279d236d9
-Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
-Date: Sat Dec 14 08:40:33 2019 +1100
-
- only link ssh-sk-helper against libfido2
-
-commit 7b47b40b170db4d6f41da0479575f6d99dd7228a
-Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
-Date: Sat Dec 14 08:20:52 2019 +1100
-
- adapt Makefile to ssh-sk-client everywhere
-
-commit f45f3a8a12e2bee601046b916e6c5cd6eae08048
-Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
-Date: Sat Dec 14 07:53:11 2019 +1100
-
- fixup
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 83a1f09810ffa3a96a55fbe32675b34ba739e56b
-commit d21434766764d5babf99fc3937c19b625c0f6334
+commit 69334996ae203c51c70bf01d414c918a44618f8e
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Dec 13 20:16:56 2019 +0000
+Date: Sat Jan 25 22:41:01 2020 +0000
- upstream: actually commit the ssh-sk-helper client code; ok markus
+ upstream: make sshd_config:ClientAliveCountMax=0 disable the
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: fd2ea776a5bbbf4d452989d3c3054cf25a5e0589
+ connection killing behaviour, rather than killing the connection after
+ sending the first liveness test probe (regardless of whether the client was
+ responsive) bz2627; ok markus
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 5af79c35f4c9fa280643b6852f524bfcd9bccdaf
-commit 611073fb40ecaf4ac65094e403edea3a08deb700
+commit bf986a9e2792555e0879a3145fa18d2b49436c74
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Dec 13 19:11:14 2019 +0000
+Date: Sat Jan 25 22:36:22 2020 +0000
- upstream: perform security key enrollment via ssh-sk-helper too.
-
- This means that ssh-keygen no longer needs to link against ssh-sk-helper, and
- only ssh-sk-helper needs libfido2 and /dev/uhid* access;
+ upstream: clarify order of AllowUsers/DenyUsers vs
- feedback & ok markus@
+ AllowGroups/DenyGroups; bz1690, ok markus@
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 9464233fab95708d2ff059f8bee29c0d1f270800
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 5637584ec30db9cf64822460f41b3e42c8f9facd
-commit 612b1dd1ec91ffb1e01f58cca0c6eb1d47bf4423
+commit 022ce92fa0daa9d78830baeb2bd2dc3f83c724ba
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Dec 13 19:09:37 2019 +0000
+Date: Sat Jan 25 07:17:18 2020 +0000
- upstream: allow sshbuf_put_stringb(buf, NULL); ok markus@
+ upstream: when AddKeysToAgent=yes is set and the key contains no
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 91482c1ada9adb283165d48dafbb88ae91c657bd
+ comment, add the key to the agent with the key's path as the comment. bz2564
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 8dd8ca9340d7017631a27f4ed5358a4cfddec16f
-commit b52ec0ba3983859514aa7b57d6100fa9759fe696
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Dec 13 19:09:10 2019 +0000
+commit 0b813436bbf6546638b10c1fa71f54691bcf5e63
+Author: tedu@openbsd.org <tedu@openbsd.org>
+Date: Sat Jan 25 07:09:14 2020 +0000
- upstream: use ssh-sk-helper for all security key signing operations
-
- This extracts and refactors the client interface for ssh-sk-helper
- from ssh-agent and generalises it for use by the other programs.
- This means that most OpenSSH tools no longer need to link against
- libfido2 or directly interact with /dev/uhid*
-
- requested by, feedback and ok markus@
+ upstream: group14-sha1 is no longer a default algorithm
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 1abcd3aea9a7460eccfbf8ca154cdfa62f1dc93f
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: a96f04d5e9c2ff760c6799579dc44f69b4ff431d
-commit c33d46868c3d88e04a92610cdb429094aeeb5847
+commit 3432b6e05d5c583c91c566c5708fed487cec79ac
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Wed Dec 11 22:19:47 2019 +0000
+Date: Sat Jan 25 07:02:51 2020 +0000
- upstream: add a note about the 'extensions' field in the signed
+ upstream: reword HashKnownHosts description a little more; some
- object
+ people found the wording confusing (bz#2560)
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 67c01e0565b258e0818c1ccfe1f1aeaf9a0d4c7b
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: ac30896598694f07d498828690aecd424c496988
-commit a62f4e1960691f3aeb1f972e009788b29e2ae464
+commit f80d7d6aa98d6eddc5df02412efee6db75673d4c
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Tue Dec 10 23:37:31 2019 +0000
+Date: Sat Jan 25 07:01:00 2020 +0000
- upstream: some more corrections for documentation problems spotted
-
- by Ron Frederick
+ upstream: weaken the language for what HashKnownHosts provides with
- document certifiate private key format
- correct flags type for sk-ssh-ed25519@openssh.com keys
+ regards to known_hosts name privacy, it's not practical for this option to
+ offer any guarantee that hostnames cannot be recovered from a disclosed
+ known_hosts file (e.g. by brute force).
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: fc4e9a1ed7f9f7f9dd83e2e2c59327912e933e74
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 13f1e3285f8acf7244e9770074296bcf446c6972
-commit 22d4beb79622fc82d7111ac941269861fc7aef8d
+commit 846446bf3e7421e6671a4afd074bdf15eecd7832
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Tue Dec 10 23:21:56 2019 +0000
+Date: Sat Jan 25 06:40:20 2020 +0000
- upstream: loading security keys into ssh-agent used the extension
+ upstream: the GatewayPorts vs -R listen address selection logic is
- constraint "sk-provider@openssh.com", not "sk@openssh.com"; spotted by Ron
- Frederick
+ still confusing people, so add another comment explaining the special
+ handling of "localhost"; bz#3258
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: dbfba09edbe023abadd5f59c1492df9073b0e51d
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: e6bf0f0fbf1c7092bf0dbd9c6eab105970b5b53a
-commit 75f7f22a43799f6d25dffd9d6683de1601da05a3
+commit 734f2f83f5ff86f2967a99d67be9ce22dd0394dd
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Tue Dec 10 22:43:19 2019 +0000
+Date: Sat Jan 25 06:03:10 2020 +0000
- upstream: add security key types to list of keys allowed to act as
+ upstream: mention that permitopen=/PermitOpen do no name to address
- CAs; spotted by Ron Frederick
+ translation; prompted by bz3099
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 9bb0dfff927b4f7aa70679f983f84c69d45656c3
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 0dda8e54d566b29855e76bebf9cfecce573f5c23
-commit 516605f2d596884cedc2beed6b262716ec76f63d
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Tue Dec 10 22:37:20 2019 +0000
+commit e1e97cae19ff07b7a7f7e82556bc048c3c54af63
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date: Sat Jan 25 16:30:22 2020 +1100
- upstream: when acting as a CA and using a security key as the CA
-
- key, remind the user to touch they key to authorise the signature.
-
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: fe58733edd367362f9766b526a8b56827cc439c1
+ include tunnel device path in error message
-commit c4036fe75ea5a4d03a2a40be1f3660dcbbfa01b2
+commit 0ecd20bc9f0b9c7c697c9eb014613516c8f65834
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Tue Dec 10 22:36:08 2019 +0000
+Date: Sat Jan 25 04:48:26 2020 +0000
- upstream: chop some unnecessary and confusing verbiage from the
-
- security key protocol description; feedback from Ron Frederick
+ upstream: unrevert this:
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 048c9483027fbf9c995e5a51b3ac502989085a42
-
-commit 59175a350fe1091af7528b2971e3273aa7ca7295
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Dec 6 03:06:08 2019 +0000
-
- upstream: fix setting of $SSH_ASKPASS_PROMPT - it shouldn't be set
+ > revision 1.217
+ > date: 2019/11/27 03:34:04; author: dtucker; state: Exp; lines: +5 -7; commitid: wkiMn49XJyjzoJIs;
+ > Make channel_id u_int32_t and remove unnecessary check and cast that were
+ > left over from the type conversion. Noted by t-hashida@amiya.co.jp in
+ > bz#3098, ok markus@ djm@
- when asking passphrases, only when confirming the use of a key (i.e. for
- ssh-agent keys added with "ssh-add -c keyfile")
+ Darren was right the first time; ok dtucker@ "agreed" markus@
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 6643c82960d9427d5972eb702c917b3b838ecf89
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 641dd1b99a6bbd85b7160da462ae1be83432c7c8
-commit 36eaa356d391a23a2d4e3a8aaa0223abc70b9822
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Dec 6 02:55:21 2019 +0000
+commit a0c81d2402eedc514b9c9f25ef9604eb0576b86a
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date: Sat Jan 25 02:57:53 2020 +0000
- upstream: bring the __func__
+ upstream: Move setting $NC into test-exec since it's now used by
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 71a3a45b0fe1b8f680ff95cf264aa81f7abbff67
-
-commit 483cc723d1ff3b7fdafc6239348040a608ebc78d
-Author: jmc@openbsd.org <jmc@openbsd.org>
-Date: Sat Nov 30 07:07:59 2019 +0000
-
- upstream: tweak the Nd lines for a bit of consistency; ok markus
+ multiple tests, and in -portable we use our own local copy to avoid
+ portability problems.
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 876651bdde06bc1e72dd4bd7ad599f42a6ce5a16
+ OpenBSD-Regress-ID: ceb78445fcaac317bec2fc51b3f0d9589048c114
-commit afffd310360b155df2133d1f5f1ab2f4e939b570
+commit e16dfa94f86358033531c4a97dcb51508ef84d49
Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Wed Dec 11 13:22:06 2019 +1100
+Date: Sat Jan 25 13:05:42 2020 +1100
- Check if memmem is declared in system headers.
+ Put EC key export inside OPENSSL_HAS_ECC.
- If the system (or one of the dependencies) implements memmem but does
- not define the header, we would not declare it either resulting in
- compiler warnings. Check for declaration explicitly. bz#3102.
-
-commit ad8cd420797695f3b580aea1034b9de60bede9b9
-Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Wed Dec 11 13:12:01 2019 +1100
-
- Sort depends.
+ Fixes link error when building against an OpenSSL that does not have
+ ECC.
-commit 5e3abff39e01817f6866494416f2ada25c316018
-Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Wed Dec 11 13:09:34 2019 +1100
+commit 94a2e5951b374e1a89761ceaff72e66eb1946807
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date: Sat Jan 25 00:27:56 2020 +0000
- Sort .depend when rebuilding.
+ upstream: Wait a bit longer for the multiplex master to become ready
- This makes diffs more stable between makedepend implementations.
-
-commit 5df9d1f5c0943367d9b68435f4c82224ce11a73f
-Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Wed Dec 11 13:06:43 2019 +1100
-
- Update depend to include sk files.
-
-commit 9a967c5bbfca35835165f7d8a6165009f5b21872
-Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Mon Dec 9 20:25:26 2019 +1100
-
- Describe how to build libcrypto as PIC.
+ since on very slow hosts the current delay is not sufficient and the test
+ will fail.
- While there, move the OpenSSL 1.1.0g caveat closer to the other version
- information.
-
-commit b66fa5da25c4b5b67cf9f0ce7af513f5a6a6a686
-Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Mon Dec 9 17:23:22 2019 +1100
-
- Recommend running LibreSSL or OpenSSL self-tests.
+ OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 6d90c7475d67ac3a95610b64af700629ece51a48
-commit fa7924008e838cded7e8a561356ffe5e06e0ed64
-Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Fri Dec 6 14:17:26 2019 +1100
+commit b2df804f571d77b07059f087b90955ffbc2f67d4
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Jan 24 10:08:17 2020 +0000
- Wrap ECC specific bits in ifdef.
+ upstream: Add a connection test for proxycommand. This would have
- Fixes tests when built against an OpenSSL configured with no-ec.
-
-commit 2ff822eabd7d4461743f22d3b9ba35ab76069df5
-Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Fri Nov 29 20:21:36 2019 +1100
-
- Wrap sha2.h include in ifdef.
+ caught the problem caused by ssh.c rev 1.507 wherein Host and Hostname were
+ swapped. Prompted by beck@
- Fixes build --without-openssl on at least Fedora.
+ OpenBSD-Regress-ID: d218500ae6aca4c479c27318fb5b09ebc00f7aae
-commit 443848155ffcda65a6077aac118c861b503a093f
-Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
-Date: Fri Nov 29 15:10:21 2019 +1100
+commit c6f06fd38a257b9fcc7d6760f8fb6d505dccb628
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Sat Jan 25 00:22:31 2020 +0000
- compile sk-dummy.so with no-PIE version of LDFLAGS
+ upstream: set UpdateKnownHosts=ask by default; bz#2894; ok
- This lets it pick up the -L path to libcrypto for example.
-
-commit 37f5b5346e4cc6a894245aa89d2930649bb7045b
-Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
-Date: Fri Nov 29 14:48:46 2019 +1100
-
- includes.h for sk-dummy.c, dummy
+ markus@
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: f09cb3177f3a14c96428e14f347e976a8a531fee
-commit b218055e59a7c1a1816f7a55ca18e3f3c05d63a4
-Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
-Date: Fri Nov 29 12:32:23 2019 +1100
+commit 7955633a554397bc24913cec9fd7285002935f7e
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Sat Jan 25 00:21:08 2020 +0000
- (yet) another x-platform fix for sk-dummy.so
+ upstream: allow UpdateKnownHosts=yes to function when multiple
- Check for -fPIC support from compiler
+ known_hosts files are in use. When updating host keys, ssh will now search
+ subsequent known_hosts files, but will add new/changed host keys to the first
+ specified file only. bz#2738
- Compile libopenbsd-compat -fPIC
+ ok markus@
- Don't mix -fPIE and -fPIC when compiling
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 6ded6d878a03e57d5aa20bab9c31f92e929dbc6c
-commit 0dedb703adcd98d0dbc4479f5f312a2bd3df2850
-Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
-Date: Fri Nov 29 11:53:57 2019 +1100
+commit e5a278a62ab49dffe96929fa8d8506c6928dba90
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Sat Jan 25 00:06:48 2020 +0000
- needs includes.h for WITH_OPENSSL
+ upstream: process security key provider via realpath() in agent,
+
+ avoids malicious client from being able to cause agent to load arbitrary
+ libraries into ssh-sk-helper.
+
+ reported by puck AT puckipedia.com; ok markus
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 1086643df1b7eee4870825c687cf0c26a6145d1c
-commit ef3853bb94c2c72e7eda0de6cec0bcb1da62058f
-Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
-Date: Fri Nov 29 11:52:23 2019 +1100
+commit 89a8d4525e8edd9958ed3df60cf683551142eae0
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Sat Jan 25 00:03:36 2020 +0000
- another attempt at sk-dummy.so working x-platform
+ upstream: expose PKCS#11 key labels/X.509 subjects as comments
- include a fatal() implementation to satisfy libopenbsd-compat
+ Extract the key label or X.509 subject string when PKCS#11 keys
+ are retrieved from the token and plumb this through to places where
+ it may be used as a comment.
- clean up .lo and .so files
+ based on https://github.com/openssh/openssh-portable/pull/138
+ by Danielle Church
- .gitignore .lo and .so files
+ feedback and ok markus@
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: cae1fda10d9e10971dea29520916e27cfec7ca35
-commit d46ac56f1cbd5a855a2d5e7309f90d383dcf6431
+commit a8c05c640873621681ab64d2e47a314592d5efa2
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Nov 29 00:13:29 2019 +0000
+Date: Fri Jan 24 23:56:01 2020 +0000
- upstream: lots of dependencies go away here with ed25519 no longer
+ upstream: tweak proctitle to include sshd arguments, as these are
- needing the ssh_digest API.
+ frequently used to distinguish between multiple independent instances of the
+ server. New proctitle looks like this:
- OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 785847ec78cb580d141e29abce351a436d6b5d49
+ $ pgrep -lf sshd
+ 12844 sshd: /usr/sbin/sshd -f /etc/ssh/sshd_config [listener] 0 of 10-100 startups
+
+ requested by sthen@ and aja@; ok aja@
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: cf235a561c655a3524a82003cf7244ecb48ccc1e
-commit 7404b81f25a4a7847380c0f0cf7f1bea5f0a5cd3
+commit 8075fccbd4f70a4371acabcfb47562471ff0de6f
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Nov 29 00:11:21 2019 +0000
+Date: Fri Jan 24 23:54:40 2020 +0000
- upstream: perform hashing directly in crypto_hash_sha512() using
+ upstream: add xextendf() to extend a string with a format
- libcrypto or libc SHA512 functions rather than calling ssh_digest_memory();
- avoids many dependencies on ssh code that complicate standalone use of
- ed25519, as we want to do in sk-dummy.so
+ (reallocating as necessary). ok aja@ as part of a larger diff
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 5a3c37593d3ba7add037b587cec44aaea088496d
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 30796b50d330b3e0e201747fe40cdf9aa70a77f9
-commit d39a865b7af93a7a9b5a64cf7cf0ef4396c80ba3
-Author: jmc@openbsd.org <jmc@openbsd.org>
-Date: Thu Nov 28 12:24:31 2019 +0000
+commit d15c8adf2c6f1a6b4845131074383eb9c3d05c3d
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Jan 24 05:33:01 2020 +0000
- upstream: improve the text for -A a little; input from naddy and
+ upstream: minor tweaks to ssh-keygen -Y find-principals:
- djm
+ emit matched principals one per line to stdout rather than as comma-
+ separated and with a free-text preamble (easy confusion opportunity)
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: f9cdfb1d6dbb9887c4bf3bb25f9c7a94294c988d
+ emit "not found" error to stderr
+
+ fix up argument testing for -Y operations and improve error message for
+ unsupported operations
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 3d9c9a671ab07fc04a48f543edfa85eae77da69c
-commit 9a0e01bd0c61f553ead96b5af84abd73865847b8
-Author: jmc@openbsd.org <jmc@openbsd.org>
-Date: Thu Nov 28 12:23:25 2019 +0000
+commit c3368a5d5ec368ef6bdf9971d6330ca0e3bdca06
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Jan 24 00:28:57 2020 +0000
- upstream: reshuffle the text to read better; input from naddy,
+ upstream: remove ssh-rsa (SHA1) from the list of allowed CA
- djmc, and dtucker
+ signature algorithms ok markus
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: a0b2aca2b67614dda3d6618ea097bf0610c35013
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: da3481fca8c81e6951f319a86b7be67502237f57
-commit 5ca52c0f2e5e7f7d01d8d557b994b5c2087bed00
-Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
-Date: Thu Nov 28 18:09:07 2019 +1100
+commit 4a41d245d6b13bd3882c8dc058dbd2e2b39a9f67
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Jan 24 00:27:04 2020 +0000
- $< doesn't work as` I thought; explicily list objs
+ upstream: when signing a certificate with an RSA key, default to
+
+ a safe signature algorithm (rsa-sha-512) if not is explicitly specified by
+ the user; ok markus@
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: e05f638f0be6c0266e1d3d799716b461011e83a9
-commit 18e84bfdc5906a73405c3b42d7f840013bbffe34
+commit 8dfb6a202c96cdf037c8ce05e53e32e0e0b7b454
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Thu Nov 28 05:20:54 2019 +0000
+Date: Fri Jan 24 00:00:31 2020 +0000
- upstream: tweak wording
+ upstream: allow PEM export of DSA and ECDSA keys; bz3091, patch
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: bd002ca1599b71331faca735ff5f6de29e32222e
-
-commit 8ef5bf9d03aa0f047711cff47f5ffbe3b33ff8c9
-Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
-Date: Thu Nov 28 13:12:30 2019 +1100
-
- missing .SUFFIXES line makes make sad
-
-commit 323da82b8ea993b7f2c5793fd53b4f5ca105d19d
-Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
-Date: Thu Nov 28 09:53:42 2019 +1100
-
- (hopefully) fix out of tree builds of sk-dummy.so
+ from Jakub Jelen ok markus@
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: a58edec8b9f07acab4b962a71a5125830d321b51
-commit d8b2838c5d19bf409d44ede4d32df8ee47aeb4cd
+commit 72a8bea2d748c8bd7f076a8b39a52082c79ae95f
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Wed Nov 27 22:32:11 2019 +0000
+Date: Thu Jan 23 23:31:52 2020 +0000
- upstream: remove stray semicolon after closing brace of function;
+ upstream: ssh-keygen -Y find-principals fixes based on feedback
- from Michael Forney
+ from Markus:
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: fda95acb799bb160d15e205ee126117cf33da3a7
+ use "principals" instead of principal, as allowed_signers lines may list
+ multiple.
+
+ When the signing key is a certificate, emit only principals that match
+ the certificate principal list.
+
+ NB. the command -Y name changes: "find-principal" => "find-principals"
+
+ ok markus@
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: ab575946ff9a55624cd4e811bfd338bf3b1d0faf
-commit 6e1d1bbf5a3eca875005e0c87f341a0a03799809
+commit 0585b5697201f5d8b32e6f1b0fee7e188268d30d
Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
-Date: Wed Nov 27 05:38:43 2019 +0000
+Date: Fri Jan 24 01:29:23 2020 +0000
- upstream: Revert previous commit. The channels code still uses int
-
- in many places for channel ids so the INT_MAX check still makes sense.
+ upstream: Do not warn about permissions on symlinks.
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 532e4b644791b826956c3c61d6ac6da39bac84bf
+ OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 339d4cbae224bd8743ffad9c3afb0cf3cb66c357
-commit 48989244658b9748b6801034ff4ffbdfc6b1520f
-Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
-Date: Wed Nov 27 16:03:12 2019 +1100
+commit 415192348a5737a960f6d1b292a17b64d55b542c
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date: Thu Jan 23 11:19:12 2020 +0000
- wire sk-dummy.so into test suite
+ upstream: Handle zlib compression being disabled now that it's
+
+ optional.
+
+ OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 0af4fbc5168e62f89d0350de524bff1cb00e707a
-commit f79364bacaebde4f1c260318ab460fceacace02f
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Wed Nov 27 05:00:17 2019 +0000
+commit fbce7c1a898ae75286349822950682cf46346121
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date: Thu Jan 23 10:53:04 2020 +0000
- upstream: use error()+_exit() instead of fatal() to avoid running
-
- cleanup handlers in child process; spotted via weird regress failures in
- portable
+ upstream: Fix typo in comment.
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 6902a9bb3987c7d347774444f7979b8a9ba7f412
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: d1d7a6553208bf439378fd1cf686a828aceb353a
-commit 70ec5e5e2681bcd409a9df94a2fec6f57a750945
+commit ba247af8e9e302910e22881ef9d307a8afeef036
Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
-Date: Wed Nov 27 03:34:04 2019 +0000
+Date: Thu Jan 23 10:19:59 2020 +0000
- upstream: Make channel_id u_int32_t and remove unnecessary check
+ upstream: When checking for unsafe directories, ignore non-directories
- and cast that were left over from the type conversion. Noted by
- t-hashida@amiya.co.jp in bz#3098, ok markus@ djm@
+ (ie symlinks, where permissions are not relevant).
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 3ad105b6a905284e780b1fd7ff118e1c346e90b5
+ OpenBSD-Regress-ID: fb6cfc8b022becb62b2dcb99ed3f072b3326e501
-commit ad44ca81bea83657d558aaef5a1d789a9032bac3
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Tue Nov 26 23:43:10 2019 +0000
+commit 74deb7029be4c00810443114aac9308875a81dae
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Thu Jan 23 22:17:24 2020 +1100
- upstream: test FIDO2/U2F key types; ok markus@
-
- OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 367e06d5a260407619b4b113ea0bd7004a435474
+ zlib is now optional.
-commit c6efa8a91af1d4fdb43909a23a0a4ffa012155ad
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Tue Nov 26 23:41:23 2019 +0000
+commit 633a2af47ee90291aaf93969aeee1e5046074c7c
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Thu Jan 23 22:16:51 2020 +1100
- upstream: add dummy security key middleware based on work by
-
- markus@
-
- This will allow us to test U2F/FIDO2 support in OpenSSH without
- requiring real hardware.
-
- ok markus@
+ Plumb WITH_ZLIB into configure.
- OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 88b309464b8850c320cf7513f26d97ee1fdf9aae
+ This allows zlib support to be disabled by ./configure --without-zlib.
-commit 8635afa1cdc21366d61730d943f3cf61861899c8
-Author: jmc@openbsd.org <jmc@openbsd.org>
-Date: Tue Nov 26 22:42:26 2019 +0000
+commit 7f8e66fea8c4e2a910df9067cb7638999b7764d5
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date: Thu Jan 23 10:24:29 2020 +0000
- upstream: tweak previous;
+ upstream: Make zlib optional. This adds a "ZLIB" build time option
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: a4c097364c75da320f1b291568db830fb1ee4883
+ that allows building without zlib compression and associated options. With
+ feedback from markus@, ok djm@
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 44c6e1133a90fd15a3aa865bdedc53bab28b7910
-commit e0d38ae9bc8c0de421605b9021d8144e4d8ff22b
+commit 69ac4e33023b379e9a8e9b4b6aeeffa6d1fcf6fa
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Tue Nov 26 03:04:27 2019 +0000
+Date: Thu Jan 23 07:54:04 2020 +0000
- upstream: more debugging; behind DEBUG_SK
+ upstream: remove trailing period characters from pub/priv key
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: a978896227118557505999ddefc1f4c839818b60
+ pathnames - they make them needlessly more difficult to cut and paste without
+ error; ok markus@ & dtucker@
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: abdcfd1a5723fcac0711feee7665edc66ae2335a
-commit 9281d4311b8abc63b88259f354944c53f9b0b3c7
-Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
-Date: Mon Nov 25 21:47:49 2019 +1100
+commit 945bf52c3c815d95b1e842ebf6c910c3524bd5bb
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Thu Jan 23 21:06:45 2020 +1100
- unbreak fuzzers for recent security key changes
+ Fix a couple of mysig_t leftovers.
-commit c5f1cc993597fed0a9013743556b1567f476c677
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Mon Nov 25 10:32:35 2019 +0000
+commit 84226b447d45fe4542613de68c2ca59a890d7c01
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Thu Jan 23 18:55:24 2020 +1100
- upstream: unbreak tests for recent security key changes
+ Remove mysignal wrapper.
- OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 2cdf2fcae9962ca4d711338f3ceec3c1391bdf95
+ We switched the main code to use sigaction(), so the wrapper is no
+ longer used.
-commit 64988266820cc90a45a21672be9d762cbde8d34d
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Mon Nov 25 06:53:04 2019 +0000
+commit 5533c2fb7ef21172fa3708d66b03faa2c6b3d93f
+Author: jmc@openbsd.org <jmc@openbsd.org>
+Date: Thu Jan 23 07:16:38 2020 +0000
- upstream: unbreak after security key support landed
+ upstream: new sentence, new line;
- OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 3ab578b0dbeb2aa6d9969b54a9c1bad329c0dcba
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: b6c3f2f36ec77e99198619b38a9f146655281925
-commit e65e25c81e22ea622e89a142a303726a3882384f
-Author: tb@openbsd.org <tb@openbsd.org>
-Date: Thu Nov 21 05:18:47 2019 +0000
+commit 3bf2a6ac791d64046a537335a0f1d5e43579c5ad
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date: Thu Jan 23 07:10:22 2020 +0000
- upstream: Remove workaround for broken 'openssl rsa -text' output
-
- that was fixed in libcrypto/rsa/rsa_ameth.c r1.24.
+ upstream: Replace all calls to signal(2) with a wrapper around
- ok dtucker inoguchi
+ sigaction(2). This wrapper blocks all other signals during the handler
+ preventing races between handlers, and sets SA_RESTART which should reduce
+ the potential for short read/write operations.
- OpenBSD-Regress-ID: c260edfac177daa8fcce90141587cf04a95c4f5f
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 5e047663fd77a40d7b07bdabe68529df51fd2519
-commit 21377ec2a9378579ba4b44a681af7bbca77581f4
+commit e027c044c796f3a01081a91bee55741204283f28
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Mon Nov 25 10:23:36 2019 +0000
+Date: Thu Jan 23 04:54:34 2020 +0000
- upstream: redundant test
+ upstream: missing header change from previous; spotted by dtucker@
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 38fa7806c528a590d91ae560e67bd8b246c2d7a3
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 321ce74c0a5bbd0f02fa3f20cb5cf2a952c6b96f
-commit 664deef95a2e770812533439b8bdd3f3c291ae59
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Mon Nov 25 00:57:51 2019 +0000
+commit 7e1323102b1b04eef391b01e180710a2d408a7ab
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date: Thu Jan 23 03:42:41 2020 +0000
- upstream: document the "no-touch-required" certificate extension;
-
- ok markus, feedback deraadt
+ upstream: Check for and warn about StrictModes permission problems. ok tb@
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 47640122b13f825e9c404ea99803b2372246579d
+ OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 4841704ccdee50ee7efc6035bc686695c6ac2991
-commit 26cb128b31efdd5395153f4943f5be3eddc07033
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Mon Nov 25 00:57:27 2019 +0000
+commit 84de1c27f845d15c859db44e7070a46f45504b66
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date: Thu Jan 23 03:35:07 2020 +0000
- upstream: Print a key touch reminder when generating a security
+ upstream: Also test PuTTY chacha20.
- key. Most keys require a touch to authorize the operation.
+ OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 7af6a0e8763b05f1f8eee6bca5f31fcb16151040
+
+commit c7ed15a39695ecd5f1f21842d8d9cd22246d4ee2
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date: Thu Jan 23 03:24:38 2020 +0000
+
+ upstream: Also test PuTTY ecdh kex methods.
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 7fe8b23edbf33e1bb81741b9f25e9a63be5f6b68
+ OpenBSD-Regress-ID: ec4017dce612131842398a03e93007a869c2c133
-commit daeaf4136927c2a82af1399022103d67ff03f74a
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Mon Nov 25 00:55:58 2019 +0000
+commit c4b3a128954ee1b7fbcbda167baf8aca1a3d1c84
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date: Thu Jan 23 02:46:49 2020 +0000
- upstream: allow "ssh-keygen -x no-touch-required" when generating a
+ upstream: Remove unsupported algorithms from list of defaults at run
- security key keypair to request one that does not require a touch for each
- authentication attempt. The default remains to require touch.
+ time and remove ifdef and distinct settings for OPENSSL=no case.
- feedback deraadt; ok markus@
+ This will make things much simpler for -portable where the exact set
+ of algos depends on the configuration of both OpenSSH and the libcrypto
+ it's linked against (if any). ok djm@
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 887e7084b2e89c0c62d1598ac378aad8e434bcbd
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: e0116d0183dcafc7a9c40ba5fe9127805c5dfdd2
-commit 2e71263b80fec7ad977e098004fef7d122169d40
+commit 56cffcc09f8a2e661d2ba02e61364ae6f998b2b1
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Mon Nov 25 00:54:23 2019 +0000
+Date: Thu Jan 23 02:43:48 2020 +0000
- upstream: add a "no-touch-required" option for authorized_keys and
-
- a similar extension for certificates. This option disables the default
- requirement that security key signatures attest that the user touched their
- key to authorize them.
+ upstream: add a new signature operations "find-principal" to look
- feedback deraadt, ok markus
+ up the principal associated with a signature from an allowed-signers file.
+ Work by Sebastian Kinne; ok dtucker@
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: f1fb56151ba68d55d554d0f6d3d4dba0cf1a452e
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 6f782cc7e18e38fcfafa62af53246a1dcfe74e5d
-commit 0fddf2967ac51d518e300408a0d7e6adf4cd2634
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Mon Nov 25 00:52:46 2019 +0000
+commit 65cf8730de6876a56595eef296e07a86c52534a6
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date: Wed Jan 22 07:38:30 2020 +0000
- upstream: Add a sshd_config PubkeyAuthOptions directive
+ upstream: Ignore whitespace when checking explict fingerprint.
- This directive has a single valid option "no-touch-required" that
- causes sshd to skip checking whether user presence was tested before
- a security key signature was made (usually by the user touching the
- key).
-
- ok markus@
+ When confirming a host key using the fingerprint itself, ignore leading and
+ trailing whitespace. ok deraadt@ djm@
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 46e434a49802d4ed82bc0aa38cb985c198c407de
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: cafd7f803bbdcd40c3a8f8f1a77747e6b6d8c011
-commit b7e74ea072919b31391bc0f5ff653f80b9f5e84f
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Mon Nov 25 00:51:37 2019 +0000
+commit 8d3af6ebdf524b34087a0a3ae415b5141ba10572
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date: Wed Jan 22 07:31:27 2020 +0000
- upstream: Add new structure for signature options
-
- This is populated during signature verification with additional fields
- that are present in and covered by the signature. At the moment, it is
- only used to record security key-specific options, especially the flags
- field.
-
- with and ok markus@
+ upstream: Increase keyscan timeout from default. On slow hosts 3
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 338a1f0e04904008836130bedb9ece4faafd4e49
-
-commit d2b0f88178ec9e3f11b606bf1004ac2fe541a2c3
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Mon Nov 25 00:38:17 2019 +0000
-
- upstream: memleak in error path
+ concurrent keyscans can hit the default 5 second timeout, so increase to 15
+ seconds.
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 93488431bf02dde85a854429362695d2d43d9112
+ OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 16383dec166af369b7fb9948572856f5d544c93f
-commit e2c0a21ade5e0bd7f0aab08d7eb9457f086681e9
-Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Nov 22 06:50:30 2019 +0000
+commit 6c30c9adbeeed09a8a9e7a69974cfa1f1ddd1e9e
+Author: tedu@openbsd.org <tedu@openbsd.org>
+Date: Wed Jan 22 04:58:23 2020 +0000
- upstream: Wait for FD to be readable or writeable during a nonblocking
+ upstream: remove diffie-hellman-group14-sha1 from default kex to
- connect, not just readable. Prevents a timeout when the server doesn't
- immediately send a banner (eg multiplexers like sslh) but is also slightly
- quicker for other connections since, unlike ssh1, ssh2 doesn't specify
- that the client should parse the server banner before sending its own.
- Patch from mnissler@chromium.org, ok djm@
+ see what happens. general mostly ok
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: aba9cd8480d1d9dd31d0ca0422ea155c26c5df1d
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 216b7b8462d2ef5f4531f26cb2cb839b2153dad9
-commit 2f95d43dc222ce194622b706682e8de07c9cfb42
-Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Wed Nov 20 16:34:11 2019 +1100
+commit 4a32c0ca44a2dc2a358f69b5d43c08e528b44b39
+Author: claudio@openbsd.org <claudio@openbsd.org>
+Date: Wed Jan 22 04:51:51 2020 +0000
- Include openssl compat header.
+ upstream: For ssh-keygen -lF only add a space after key fingerprint
- Fixes warning for ECDSA_SIG_set0 on OpenSSL versions prior to 1.1.
+ when there is a comment. This makes copy-paste of fingerprints into ssh
+ easier. OK djm@
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: fa01d95624f65c1eb4dc7c575d20d77c78010dfd
-commit a70d92f236576c032a45c39e68ca0d71e958d19d
+commit 37d3b736506760e4ebc7fe56255f7b8ea823a00c
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Tue Nov 19 22:23:19 2019 +0000
+Date: Wed Jan 22 04:49:16 2020 +0000
- upstream: adjust on-wire signature encoding for ecdsa-sk keys to
-
- better match ec25519-sk keys. Discussed with markus@ and Sebastian Kinne
+ upstream: some __func__ and strerror(errno) here; no functional
- NB. if you are depending on security keys (already?) then make sure you
- update both your clients and servers.
+ change
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 53d88d8211f0dd02a7954d3af72017b1a79c0679
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 6c3ddd5f848b99ea560b31d3fba99ceed66cef37
-commit 26369a5f7d9c4e4ef44a3e04910126e1bcea43d8
+commit e2031b05c74c98b141179ceab13a323cf17d01e5
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Tue Nov 19 22:21:15 2019 +0000
+Date: Wed Jan 22 02:25:21 2020 +0000
- upstream: a little more information from the monitor when signature
-
- verification fails.
+ upstream: factor out parsing of allowed-signers lines
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: e6a30071e0518cac512f9e10be3dc3500e2003f3
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 85ee6aeff608371826019ea85e55bfa87f79d06e
-commit 4402d6c9b5bf128dcfae2429f1d41cdaa8849b6b
-Author: jmc@openbsd.org <jmc@openbsd.org>
-Date: Tue Nov 19 16:02:32 2019 +0000
+commit 47160e1de8c2f638f0ef41cef42c976417b61778
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date: Wed Jan 22 10:30:13 2020 +1100
- upstream: revert previous: naddy pointed out what's meant to
-
- happen. rethink needed...
-
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: fb0fede8123ea7f725fd65e00d49241c40bd3421
+ unbreak fuzzer support for recent ssh-sk.h changes
-commit 88056f881315233e990e4e04a815f8f96b4674e1
-Author: jmc@openbsd.org <jmc@openbsd.org>
-Date: Tue Nov 19 14:54:47 2019 +0000
+commit 70d38c3cfd4550e8ee66cc3bf1b91aa339c91df5
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Tue Jan 21 22:39:57 2020 +0000
- upstream: -c and -s do not make sense with -k; reshuffle -k into
+ upstream: expose the number of currently-authenticating connections
- the main synopsis/usage; ok djm
+ along with the MaxStartups limit in the proctitle; suggestion from Philipp
+ Marek, w/ feedback from Craig Miskell ok dtucker@
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: f881ba253da015398ae8758d973e3390754869bc
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: a4a6db2dc1641a5df8eddf7d6652176e359dffb3
-commit 2cf262c21f35296c2ff718cfdb52e0473a1c3983
+commit a78c66d5d2144bd49779bc80a647346bd3d7233d
Author: naddy@openbsd.org <naddy@openbsd.org>
-Date: Mon Nov 18 23:17:48 2019 +0000
+Date: Tue Jan 21 12:40:04 2020 +0000
- upstream: document '$' environment variable expansion for
+ upstream: document the default value of the ControlPersist option;
- SecurityKeyProvider; ok djm@
+ ok dtucker@ djm@
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 76db507ebd336a573e1cd4146cc40019332c5799
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 0788e7f2b5a9d4e36d3d2ab378f73329320fef66
-commit f0edda81c5ebccffcce52b182c3033531a1aab71
-Author: naddy@openbsd.org <naddy@openbsd.org>
-Date: Mon Nov 18 23:16:49 2019 +0000
+commit b46a6325849e40aa2e4b0d962a6f00f708f6576a
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date: Wed Jan 22 09:28:32 2020 +1100
- upstream: more missing mentions of ed25519-sk; ok djm@
-
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: f242e53366f61697dffd53af881bc5daf78230ff
+ remove accidental change in f8c11461
-commit 189550f5bc85148e85f4caa1f6b2fc623149a4ee
-Author: naddy@openbsd.org <naddy@openbsd.org>
-Date: Mon Nov 18 16:10:05 2019 +0000
+commit 80d3bebcab96fe1d177e45906e10db16895da01d
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Tue Jan 21 11:06:09 2020 +0000
- upstream: additional missing stdarg.h includes when built without
+ upstream: don't #ifdef out the KRL code when compiling without
- WITH_OPENSSL; ok djm@
+ libcrypto support; it works just fine and disabling it breaks a few tests. ok
+ dtucker@
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 881f9a2c4e2239849cee8bbf4faec9bab128f55b
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 65f6272c4241eb4b04de78b012fe98b2b555ad44
-commit 723a5369864b338c48d22854bc2bb4ee5c083deb
-Author: naddy@openbsd.org <naddy@openbsd.org>
-Date: Mon Nov 18 16:08:57 2019 +0000
+commit f8c11461aa6db168fc5e7eeae448b4cbbf59642a
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Tue Jan 21 08:06:27 2020 +0000
- upstream: add the missing WITH_OPENSSL ifdefs after the ED25519-SK
+ upstream: pass SSH_SK_HELPER explicitly past $SUDO to avoid it getting
- addition; ok djm@
+ cleared; with dtucker@
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: a9545e1c273e506cf70e328cbb9d0129b6d62474
+ OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 03178a0580324bf0dff28f7eac6c3edbc5407f8e
-commit 478f4f98e4e93ae4ed1a8911dec4e5b75ea10f30
-Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
-Date: Tue Nov 19 08:52:24 2019 +1100
+commit b5fcb0ac1cc0ef01aeec1c089146298654ab3ae0
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Tue Jan 21 07:07:31 2020 +0000
- remove all EC algs from proposals, no just sk ones
+ upstream: check access(ssh-sk-helper, X_OK) to provide friendly
- ok dtucker@
-
-commit 6a7ef310da100f876a257b7367e3b0766dac3994
-Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
-Date: Mon Nov 18 22:22:04 2019 +1100
-
- filter PUBKEY_DEFAULT_PK_ALG for ECC algorithms
+ error message for misconfigured helper paths
- Remove ECC algorithms from the PUBKEY_DEFAULT_PK_ALG list when
- compiling without ECC support in libcrypto.
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 061bcc262155d12e726305c91394ac0aaf1f8341
-commit 64f56f1d1af3947a71a4c391f2c08747d19ee591
+commit 56bced43c14dc6fa2bfa1816007e441644105609
Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
-Date: Mon Nov 18 09:15:17 2019 +0000
+Date: Tue Jan 21 06:09:56 2020 +0000
- upstream: LibreSSL change the format for openssl rsa -text output from
+ upstream: Document sntrup4591761x25519-sha512@tinyssh.org. Patch
- "publicExponent" to "Exponent" so accept either. with djm.
+ from jtesta@positronsecurity.com via github PR#151.
- OpenBSD-Regress-ID: b7e6c4bf700029a31c98be14600d4472fe0467e6
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: f3d48168623045c258245c340a5a2af7dbb74edc
-commit 4bfc0503ad94a2a7190686a89649567c20b8534f
+commit 4a05d789b86314fef7303824f69defbc6b96ed60
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Mon Nov 18 06:58:00 2019 +0000
+Date: Tue Jan 21 05:56:56 2020 +0000
- upstream: fix a bug that prevented serialisation of ed25519-sk keys
+ upstream: fix ssh-keygen not displaying authenticator touch
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 066682b79333159cac04fcbe03ebd9c8dcc152a9
-
-commit d88205417084f523107fbe1bc92061635cd57fd2
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Mon Nov 18 06:39:36 2019 +0000
-
- upstream: Fix incorrect error message when key certification fails
+ prompt; reported by jmc@
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 7771bd77ee73f7116df37c734c41192943a73cee
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 04d4f582fc194eb3897ebcbfe286c49958ba2859
-commit 740c4bc9875cbb4b9fc03fd5eac19df080f20df5
+commit 881aded0389d999375f926051491a944c6d8752b
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Mon Nov 18 06:39:02 2019 +0000
+Date: Tue Jan 21 05:56:27 2020 +0000
- upstream: fix bug that prevented certification of ed25519-sk keys
+ upstream: a little more verbosity in sign_and_send_pubkey() debug
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 64c8cc6f5de2cdd0ee3a81c3a9dee8d862645996
-
-commit 85409cbb505d8c463ab6e2284b4039764c7243de
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Mon Nov 18 06:24:17 2019 +0000
-
- upstream: allow *-sk key types to be turned into certificates
+ messages
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: cd365ee343934862286d0b011aa77fa739d2a945
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 6da47a0e6373f6683006f49bc2a516d197655508
-commit e2e1283404e06a22ac6135d057199e70dcadb8dd
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Mon Nov 18 04:55:02 2019 +0000
+commit b715fdc71bbd009d0caff691ab3fc04903c4aee8
+Author: naddy@openbsd.org <naddy@openbsd.org>
+Date: Sat Jan 18 21:16:43 2020 +0000
- upstream: mention ed25519-sk key/cert types here too; prompted by
+ upstream: one more replacement "(security) key" -> "(FIDO)
- jmc@
+ authenticator"
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: e281977e4a4f121f3470517cbd5e483eee37b818
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 031bca03c1d1f878ab929facd561911f1bc68dfd
-commit 97dc5d1d82865a7d20f1eb193b5c62ce684024e5
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Mon Nov 18 04:50:45 2019 +0000
+commit 84911da1beeb6ed258a43468efb316cd39fb6855
+Author: naddy@openbsd.org <naddy@openbsd.org>
+Date: Sat Jan 18 15:45:41 2020 +0000
- upstream: mention ed25519-sk in places where it is accepted;
+ upstream: undo merge error and replace the term "security key"
- prompted by jmc@
+ again
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 076d386739ebe7336c2137e583bc7a5c9538a442
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 341749062c089cc360a7877e9ee3a887aecde395
-commit 130664344862a8c7afd3e24d8d36ce40af41a99f
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Mon Nov 18 04:34:47 2019 +0000
+commit e8c06c4ee708720efec12cd1a6f78a3c6d76b7f0
+Author: naddy@openbsd.org <naddy@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Jan 17 20:13:47 2020 +0000
- upstream: document ed25519-sk pubkey, private key and certificate
+ upstream: Document loading of resident keys from a FIDO
- formats
+ authenticator.
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 795a7c1c80315412e701bef90e31e376ea2f3c88
-
-commit 71856e1142fc01628ce53098f8cfc74765464b35
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Mon Nov 18 04:29:50 2019 +0000
-
- upstream: correct order or ecdsa-sk private key fields
+ * Rename -O to -K to keep "-O option" available.
+ * Document -K.
+ * Trim usage() message down to synopsis, like all other commands.
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 4d4a0c13226a79f0080ce6cbe74f73b03ed8092e
+ ok markus@
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 015c2c4b28f8e19107adc80351b44b23bca4c78a
-commit 93fa2a6649ae3e0626cbff25c985a4573d63e3f2
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Mon Nov 18 04:16:53 2019 +0000
+commit 0d005d6372a067b59123dec8fc6dc905f2c09e1e
+Author: naddy@openbsd.org <naddy@openbsd.org>
+Date: Tue Jan 14 15:07:30 2020 +0000
- upstream: correct description of fields in pub/private keys (was
+ upstream: sync ssh-keygen.1 and ssh-keygen's usage() with each
- missing curve name); spotted by Sebastian Kinne
+ other and reality ok markus@
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 2a11340dc7ed16200342d384fb45ecd4fcce26e7
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: cdf64454f2c3604c25977c944e5b6262a3bcce92
-commit b497e920b409250309c4abe64229237b8f2730ba
-Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
-Date: Mon Nov 18 15:05:04 2019 +1100
+commit b8a4ca2ebfddab862f7eb1ea2a07fb9f70330429
+Author: naddy@openbsd.org <naddy@openbsd.org>
+Date: Sat Jan 11 16:23:10 2020 +0000
- Teach the GTK2/3 ssh-askpass the new prompt hints
+ upstream: revise the fix for reversed arguments on
- ssh/ssh-agent now sets a hint environment variable $SSH_ASKPASS_PROMPT
- when running the askpass program. This is intended to allow the
- askpass to vary its UI across the three cases it supports: asking for
- a passphrase, confirming the use of a key and (recently) reminding
- a user to touch their security key.
+ expand_proxy_command()
- This adapts the gnome-ssh-askpass[23] to use these hints. Specifically,
- for SSH_ASKPASS_PROMPT=confirm it will skip the text input box and show
- only "yes"/"no" buttons. For SSH_ASKPASS_PROMPT=none (used to remind
- users to tap their security key), it shows only a "close" button.
+ Always put 'host' before 'host_arg' for consistency. ok markus@ djm@
- Help wanted: adapt the other askpass programs in active use, including
- x11-ssh-askpass, lxqt-openssh-askpass, etc.
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 1ba5b25472779f1b1957295fcc6907bb961472a3
-commit 857f49e91eeae6feb781ef5f5e26c38ca3d953ec
-Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Mon Nov 18 14:15:26 2019 +1100
+commit 57b181eaf2d34fd0a1b51ab30cb6983df784de5a
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Jan 10 23:43:26 2020 +0000
- Move ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC.
+ upstream: pass the log-on-stderr flag and log level through to
- Found by -Wimplicit-fallthrough: one ECC case was not inside the ifdef.
- ok djm@
+ ssh-sk-helper, making debugging a bit easier. ok markus@
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 2e7aea6bf5770d3f38b7c7bba891069256c5a49a
-commit 6cf1c40096a79e5eedcf897c7cdb46bb32d4a3ee
-Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Mon Nov 18 14:14:18 2019 +1100
+commit a8bd5fdbdb7581afc7123a042a7cd6ca25357388
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date: Tue Jan 21 12:32:16 2020 +1100
- Enable -Wimplicit-fallthrough if supported
+ Wrap copy_environment_blacklist() in #ifdef
- Suggested by djm.
+ It's only needed for USE_PAM or HAVE_CYGWIN cases and will cause compiler
+ warnings otherwise.
-commit 103c51fd5f5ddc01cd6b5c1132e711765b921bf5
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Mon Nov 18 01:59:48 2019 +0000
+commit 10ecc647fc1db8d2dde9f6b9b826b201dfc48b62
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date: Tue Jan 21 12:20:05 2020 +1100
- upstream: missing break in getopt switch; spotted by Sebastian Kinne
-
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: f002dbf14dba5586e8407e90f0141148ade8e8fc
+ depend
-commit 9a1225e8ca2ce1fe809910874935302234399a6d
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Sat Nov 16 23:17:20 2019 +0000
+commit b3f7009c9ffa5891283ed96e043001e09934a8d4
+Author: Ruben Kerkhof <ruben@rubenkerkhof.com>
+Date: Mon Jan 20 11:56:48 2020 +0100
- upstream: tweak debug message
+ Fix missing prototype warning for copy_environment
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 2bf336d3be0b7e3dd97920d7e7471146a281d2b9
+ This function is only used in this file, and only on Cygwin, so make
+ it static and hide it behind HAVE_CYGWIN. Prevents missing prototype
+ warning.
-commit 4103a3ec7c68493dbc4f0994a229507e943a86d3
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Sat Nov 16 22:42:30 2019 +0000
+commit 0c428c0e991e2c4fabc48cf5d9b8f84c9412e0c3
+Author: Ruben Kerkhof <ruben@rubenkerkhof.com>
+Date: Mon Jan 20 13:58:11 2020 +0100
- upstream: a little debug() in the security key interface
+ configure.ac: fix ldns test
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 4c70300609a5c8b19707207bb7ad4109e963b0e8
+ When running ./configure --with-ldns, if ldns-config cannot be found, we
+ add -Iyes/include to CPPFLAGS and -Lyes/lib to LDFLAGS. Fix that.
-commit 05daa211de926f66f50b7380d637f84dc6341574
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Sat Nov 16 22:36:48 2019 +0000
+commit 6089abf715e2784751c9f62697e09bb103295b93
+Author: Ruben Kerkhof <ruben@rubenkerkhof.com>
+Date: Mon Jan 20 12:13:26 2020 +0100
- upstream: always use ssh-sk-helper, even for the internal USB HID
-
- support. This avoid the need for a wpath pledge in ssh-agent.
-
- reported by jmc@
+ Make sshpam_password_change_required static.
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 19f799c4d020b870741d221335dbfa5e76691c23
+ sshpam_password_change_required is only used in auth-pam.c, so make it
+ static to prevent a mising prototype warning.
-commit d431778a561d90131814f986b646299f9af33c8c
-Author: markus@openbsd.org <markus@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Nov 15 15:41:01 2019 +0000
+commit 5a9b9c82851b7bc219dc3a65962a80803c76c102
+Author: Ruben Kerkhof <ruben@rubenkerkhof.com>
+Date: Mon Jan 20 12:24:51 2020 +0100
- upstream: fix typos in sk_enroll
+ sandbox-darwin.c: fix missing prototypes.
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: faa9bf779e008b3e64e2eb1344d9b7d83b3c4487
+ Include the right header just like the other sandbox files.
+ Fixes missing prototype warnings for ssh_sandbox_* functions.
-commit af90aec0443ec51e6b2d804cb91771d3905f8a6f
-Author: jmc@openbsd.org <jmc@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Nov 15 11:16:28 2019 +0000
+commit 335dc93526942a650f6c69666b3f6ca44d0a2910
+Author: Ruben Kerkhof <ruben@rubenkerkhof.com>
+Date: Mon Jan 20 11:09:27 2020 +0100
- upstream: double word;
+ Fix a few warnings when on Mac OS X.
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 43d09bafa4ea9002078cb30ca9adc3dcc0b9c2b9
+ Include stdlib.h for calloc, malloc, free and setenv.
-commit fd1a96490cef7f945a1b3b5df4e90c8a1070f425
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Nov 15 06:00:20 2019 +0000
+commit 0488dc2d3050ea1a99ef5cf44afc50ffbf3f1315
+Author: Ruben Kerkhof <ruben@rubenkerkhof.com>
+Date: Mon Jan 20 10:32:23 2020 +0100
- upstream: remove most uses of BN_CTX
-
- We weren't following the rules re BN_CTX_start/BN_CTX_end and the places
- we were using it didn't benefit from its use anyway. ok dtucker@
+ Fix building without openssl.
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: ea9ba6c0d2e6f6adfe00b309a8f41842fe12fc7a
+ This fixes the following when there are no openssl headers on the system:
+ ssh-ecdsa-sk.c:34:10: fatal error: 'openssl/bn.h' file not found
-commit 39b87104cdd47baf79ef77dc81de62cea07d119f
+commit e6b7157b4ef29c83ec3a2d1d7c927e4b8898f9bb
+Author: Ruben Kerkhof <ruben@rubenkerkhof.com>
+Date: Wed Jan 15 16:08:55 2020 +0100
+
+ Add config.log to .gitignore
+
+commit 515e10ddf9644010b88cfd7ecf601f4306d42232
+Author: Ruben Kerkhof <ruben@rubenkerkhof.com>
+Date: Wed Jan 15 16:16:31 2020 +0100
+
+ Fix typo in README.md, s/crytpo/crypto/
+
+commit 1af3354aea3c4bfa5b5ecfb5d1ff3ad231c2073c
Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Fri Nov 15 18:56:54 2019 +1100
+Date: Wed Jan 15 16:22:36 2020 +1100
- Add wrappers for other ultrix headers.
-
- Wrappers protect against multiple inclusions for headers that don't do
- it themselves.
+ Wrap stdint.h in ifdef HAVE_STDINT_H.
-commit 134a74f4e0cf750931f1125beb2a3f40c54c8809
+commit 429170f273ce1b0140f8111a45ba69390d98de3a
Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Fri Nov 15 18:55:13 2019 +1100
+Date: Tue Jan 14 14:41:47 2020 +1100
- Add SSIZE_MAX when we define ssize_t.
+ Wrap stdint.h inside HAVE_STDINT_H.
-commit 9c6d0a3a1ed77989d8c5436d8c3cc6c7045c0197
+commit a0989b60211b6f1c2313e1397c526d883a23a075
Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Fri Nov 15 17:13:19 2019 +1100
+Date: Tue Jan 14 14:26:41 2020 +1100
- Remove ultrix realpath hack.
+ Include compat header for definitions.
-commit c63fba5e3472307167850bbd84187186af7fa9f0
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Nov 15 05:37:27 2019 +0000
+commit e0cedcad51fe02683943bf4f1ad2961aa3f35313
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Tue Jan 14 09:42:52 2020 +1100
- upstream: unshield security key privkey before attempting signature
-
- in agent. spotted by dtucker@
+ Improve search for 'struct timespec'.
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: fb67d451665385b8a0a55371231c50aac67b91d2
+ Make struct timespec test consistent with existing timeval test.
+ Include time.h for timespec in compat header where required.
-commit d165bb5396e3f718480e6039ca2cf77f5a2c2885
-Author: deraadt@openbsd.org <deraadt@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Nov 15 05:26:56 2019 +0000
+commit acaf9e058594310001ce64468ed2923dc6323e81
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Tue Jan 14 12:43:03 2020 +1100
- upstream: rewrite c99-ism
-
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: d0c70cca29cfa7e6d9f7ec1d6d5dabea112499b3
+ Update depend to remove rmd160.h.
-commit 03e06dd0e6e1c0a9f4b4b9de7def8a44dcbf93a7
-Author: deraadt@openbsd.org <deraadt@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Nov 15 05:25:52 2019 +0000
+commit 26b2675b0c3e3efea11a52609073aec01736ec84
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Tue Jan 14 07:24:46 2020 +1100
- upstream: only clang understands those new -W options
+ Remove configure test & compat code for ripemd160.
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: d9b910e412d139141b072a905e66714870c38ac0
+ RIPEMD160 support was removed upstream in 2017, however we still had
+ a configure test and compat code for it, so clean those up now.
-commit 5c0bc273cba53f822b7d777bbb6c35d160d3b505
-Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
-Date: Fri Nov 15 16:08:00 2019 +1100
+commit ed3ad71b17adcd1fb4431d145f53cee1c6a1135e
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Thu Jan 9 03:28:38 2020 +0000
- configure flag to built-in security key support
+ upstream: fix reversed arguments on expand_proxy_command(); spotted
- Require --with-security-key-builtin before enabling the built-in
- security key support (and consequent dependency on libfido2).
+ by anton@
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: db1c32478a01dfbc9c4db171de0f25907bea5775
-commit fbcb9a7fa55300b8bd4c18bee024c6104c5a25d7
-Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
-Date: Fri Nov 15 16:06:30 2019 +1100
+commit cd53476383f0cf475f40ba8ac8deb6b76dd5ce4e
+Author: jmc@openbsd.org <jmc@openbsd.org>
+Date: Mon Jan 6 07:43:28 2020 +0000
- upstream commit
+ upstream: put the fido options in a list, and tidy up the text a
- revision 1.48
- date: 2019/02/04 16:45:40; author: millert; state: Exp; lines: +16 -17; commitid: cpNtVC7erojNyctw;
- Make gl_pathc, gl_matchc and gl_offs size_t in glob_t to match POSIX.
- This requires a libc major version bump. OK deraadt@
+ little; ok djm
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 491ce15ae52a88b7a6a2b3b6708a14b4aacdeebb
-commit 2cfb11abac85885de0cb888bbeb9a3e4303105ea
-Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
-Date: Fri Nov 15 16:05:07 2019 +1100
+commit 30f704ebc0e9e32b3d12f5d9e8c1b705fdde2c89
+Author: Jeremy Drake <github@jdrake.com>
+Date: Fri Oct 11 18:31:05 2019 -0700
- upstream commit
+ Deny (non-fatal) ipc in preauth privsep child.
- revision 1.47
- date: 2017/05/08 14:53:27; author: millert; state: Exp; lines: +34 -21; commitid: sYfxfyUHAfarP8sE;
- Fix exponential CPU use with repeated '*' operators by changing '*'
- handling to be interative instead of recursive.
- Fix by Yves Orton, ported to OpenBSD glob.c by Ray Lai. OK tb@
+ As noted in openssh/openssh-portable#149, i386 does not have have
+ _NR_shmget etc. Instead, it has a single ipc syscall (see man 2 ipc,
+ https://linux.die.net/man/2/ipc). Add this syscall, if present, to the
+ list of syscalls that seccomp will deny non-fatally.
-commit 228dd595c7882bb9b161dbb7d4dca15c8a5f03f5
-Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
-Date: Fri Nov 15 16:04:28 2019 +1100
+commit b110cefdfbf5a20f49b774a55062d6ded2fb6e22
+Author: Khem Raj <raj.khem@gmail.com>
+Date: Tue Jan 7 16:26:45 2020 -0800
- upstream commit
-
- revision 1.46
- date: 2015/12/28 22:08:18; author: mmcc; state: Exp; lines: +5 -9; commitid: 0uXuF2O13NH9q2e1;
- Remove NULL-checks before free() and a few related dead assignments.
+ seccomp: Allow clock_gettime64() in sandbox.
- ok and valuable input from millert@
+ This helps sshd accept connections on mips platforms with
+ upcoming glibc ( 2.31 )
-commit a16f748690139b9f452485d97511ad5e578f59b2
-Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
-Date: Fri Nov 15 16:02:43 2019 +1100
+commit 3cc60c899a92a469e5118310ba6b74cb57215618
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Mon Jan 6 02:39:30 2020 +0000
- upstream commit
+ upstream: missing else in check_enroll_options()
- revision 1.44
- date: 2015/09/14 16:09:13; author: tedu; state: Exp; lines: +3 -5; commitid: iWfSX2BIn0sLw62l;
- remove null check before free. from Michael McConville
- ok semarie
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: e058fb918fda56ddbbf0bee910101004cec421d4
-commit fd37cdeafe25adfcdc752280f535d28de7997ff1
-Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
-Date: Fri Nov 15 16:02:27 2019 +1100
+commit ff5784e2698d6c41e9f39ce4df24968c1beeb2bb
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Mon Jan 6 02:24:28 2020 +0000
- upstream commit
+ upstream: fix error message
- revision 1.43
- date: 2015/06/13 16:57:04; author: deraadt; state: Exp; lines: +4 -4; commitid: zOUKuqWBdOPOz1SZ;
- in glob() initialize the glob_t before the first failure check.
- from j@pureftpd.org
- ok millert stsp
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 1eb52025658eb78ea6223181e552862198d3d505
-commit fd62769c3882adea118dccaff80a06009874a2d1
-Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
-Date: Fri Nov 15 16:01:20 2019 +1100
+commit dd2acc8b862c09751621995fba2d5fa6f4e24cc9
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Mon Jan 6 02:07:50 2020 +0000
- upstream commit
+ upstream: adapt sk-dummy to SK API changes
- revision 1.42
- date: 2015/02/05 12:59:57; author: millert; state: Exp; lines: +2 -1; commitid: DTQbfd4poqBW8iSJ;
- Include stdint.h, not limits.h to get SIZE_MAX. OK guenther@
-
-commit 2b6cba7ee2b8b36f393be739c860a9d2e5d8eb48
-Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
-Date: Fri Nov 15 16:00:07 2019 +1100
-
- upstream commit
+ also, make it pull prototypes directly from sk-api.c and #error
+ if the expected version changes. This will make any future regress
+ test breakage because of SK API changes much more apparent
- revision 1.41
- date: 2014/10/08 05:35:27; author: deraadt; state: Exp; lines: +3 -3; commitid: JwTGarRLHQKDgPh2;
- obvious realloc -> reallocarray conversion
+ OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 79b07055de4feb988e31da71a89051ad5969829d
-commit ab3600665387ae34785498558c4409e27f495b0b
+commit c312ca077cd2a6c15545cd6b4d34ee2f69289174
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Nov 15 04:12:32 2019 +0000
+Date: Mon Jan 6 02:00:46 2020 +0000
- upstream: don't consult dlopen whitelist for internal security key
+ upstream: Extends the SK API to accept a set of key/value options
- provider; spotted by dtucker@
+ for all operations. These are intended to future-proof the API a little by
+ making it easier to specify additional fields for without having to change
+ the API version for each.
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: bfe5fbd17e4ff95dd85b9212181652b54444192e
-
-commit 19f8ec428db835f68c1cfd63587e9880ccd6486c
-Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
-Date: Fri Nov 15 15:08:28 2019 +1100
-
- upstream commit
+ At present, only two options are defined: one to explicitly specify
+ the device for an operation (rather than accepting the middleware's
+ autoselection) and another to specify the FIDO2 username that may
+ be used when generating a resident key. These new options may be
+ invoked at key generation time via ssh-keygen -O
- revision 1.40
- date: 2013/09/30 12:02:34; author: millert; state: Exp; lines: +14 -15;
- Use PATH_MAX, NAME_MAX and LOGIN_NAME_MAX not MAXPATHNAMELEN,
- MAXNAMLEN or MAXLOGNAME where possible. OK deraadt@
-
-commit bb7413db98e418d4af791244660abf6c829783f5
-Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
-Date: Fri Nov 15 15:07:30 2019 +1100
-
- upstream commit
+ This also implements a suggestion from Markus to avoid "int" in favour
+ of uint32_t for the algorithm argument in the API, to make implementation
+ of ssh-sk-client/helper a little easier.
- revision 1.39
- date: 2012/01/20 07:09:42; author: tedu; state: Exp; lines: +4 -4;
- the glob stat limit is way too low. bump to 2048.
- while here, failed stats should count against the limit too.
- ok deraadt sthen stsp
+ feedback, fixes and ok markus@
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 973ce11704609022ab36abbdeb6bc23c8001eabc
-commit 01362cf7cb979525c014714e2bccf799a46e772e
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Nov 15 03:41:57 2019 +0000
+commit 2ab335712d084d9ccaf3f53afc3fa9535329da87
+Author: beck@openbsd.org <beck@openbsd.org>
+Date: Sun Jan 5 16:28:22 2020 +0000
- upstream: U2F tokens may return FIDO_ERR_USER_PRESENCE_REQUIRED when
+ upstream: fix CanonicalizeHostname, broken by rev 1.507
- probed to see if they own a key handle. Handle this case so the find_device()
- look can work for them. Reported by Michael Forney
+ Issue noticed and reported by Pierre-Olivier Martel <pom@apple.com>
+ ok dtucker@ markus@ djm@
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 2ccd5b30a6ddfe4dba228b7159bf168601bd9166
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 749f3168ec520609c35b0c4e1984e5fa47f16094
-commit cf62307bc9758105913dcb91b418e4968ac2244d
+commit 69e44ba701b90b0f530d64c3fe4363ea86e50cd3
Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Fri Nov 15 14:01:00 2019 +1100
+Date: Mon Jan 6 09:02:53 2020 +1100
- Add libfido2 to INSTALL.
+ Fix typo: 'you' -> 'your'.
+
+ bz#3108 from jmckitrick@gmail.com.
-commit 69fbda1894349d1f420c842dfcbcc883239d1aa7
+commit 7652a57662969bd5c61448b3843ec6d407ad12be
Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Fri Nov 15 13:42:15 2019 +1100
+Date: Mon Jan 6 08:56:46 2020 +1100
- libcrypto is now optional.
+ Remove auth-skey.c.
+
+ S/Key support was removed in OpenSSH 7.8 but this file was missed.
-commit 45ffa369886e37930776d7c15dd8b973242d6ecc
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Nov 15 02:38:07 2019 +0000
+commit c593cc5e826c9f4ec506e22b629d37cabfaacff9
+Author: jmc@openbsd.org <jmc@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Jan 3 07:33:33 2020 +0000
- upstream: show the "please touch your security key" notifier when
+ upstream: the download resident keys option is -K (upper) not -k
- using the (default) build-in security key support.
+ (lower); ok djm
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 4707643aaa7124501d14e92d1364b20f312a6428
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 71dc28a3e1fa7c553844abc508845bcf5766e091
-commit 49dc9fa928d77807c53bdc2898db7fb515fe5eb3
+commit ff31f15773ee173502eec4d7861ec56f26bba381
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Nov 15 02:37:24 2019 +0000
+Date: Fri Jan 3 03:02:26 2020 +0000
- upstream: close the "touch your security key" notifier on the error
+ upstream: what bozo decided to use 2020 as a future date in a regress
- path too
+ test?
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: c7628bf80505c1aefbb1de7abc8bb5ee51826829
+ OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 3b953df5a7e14081ff6cf495d4e8d40e153cbc3a
-commit 22a82712e89bf17c27427aeba15795fb4011a0c2
+commit 680eb7749a39d0e4d046e66cac4e51e8e3640b75
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Nov 15 02:20:06 2019 +0000
+Date: Fri Jan 3 02:46:19 2020 +0000
- upstream: correct function name in debug message
+ upstream: implement recent SK API change to support resident keys
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 2482c99d2ce448f39282493050f8a01e3ffc39ab
+ and PIN prompting in the dummy middleware that we use for the tests. Should
+ fix breakage spotted by dtucker@
+
+ OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 379cf9eabfea57aaf7f3f59dafde59889566c484
-commit 018e2902a65c22faded215a7c588492c948f108c
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Nov 15 00:32:40 2019 +0000
+commit 86834fe6b54ac57b8528c30cf0b27e5cac5b7af7
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date: Thu Jan 2 13:25:38 2020 +0000
- upstream: follow existing askpass logic for security key notifier:
+ upstream: Update keygen moduli screen test to match recent command
- fall back to _PATH_SSH_ASKPASS_DEFAULT if no $SSH_ASKPASS environment
- variable is set.
+ line option change to ssh-keygen(1).
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: cda753726b13fb797bf7a9f7a0b3022d9ade4520
+ OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 744a72755004377e9669b662c13c6aa9ead8a0c3
-commit 575d0042a94997c1eeb86a6dcfb30b3c7bdbcba3
+commit 9039971887cccd95b209c479296f772a3a93e8e7
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Thu Nov 14 21:56:52 2019 +0000
+Date: Thu Jan 2 22:40:09 2020 +0000
- upstream: remove debugging goop that snuck in to last commit
+ upstream: ability to download FIDO2 resident keys from a token via
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 8ea4455a2d9364a0a04f9e4a2cbfa4c9fcefe77e
-
-commit 63a5b24f2dbdc9a4bf2182ac3db26731ddc617e8
-Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
-Date: Fri Nov 15 11:21:26 2019 +1100
-
- don't fatal if libfido2 not found
+ "ssh-keygen -K". This will save public/private keys into the current
+ directory.
- spotted by dtucker@
-
-commit 129952a81c00c332721b4ba3ede868c720ad7f4e
-Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
-Date: Fri Nov 15 11:17:12 2019 +1100
-
- correct object dependency
+ This is handy if you move a token between hosts.
+
+ feedback & ok markus@
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: d57c1f9802f7850f00a117a1d36682a6c6d10da6
-commit 6bff9521ab9a9f7396d635755c342b72373bb4f9
+commit 878ba4350d57e905d6bb1865d8ff31bdfe5deab4
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Thu Nov 14 21:27:29 2019 +0000
+Date: Thu Jan 2 22:38:33 2020 +0000
- upstream: directly support U2F/FIDO2 security keys in OpenSSH by
+ upstream: add sshkey_save_public(), to save a public key; ok
- linking against the (previously external) USB HID middleware. The dlopen()
- capability still exists for alternate middlewares, e.g. for Bluetooth, NFC
- and test/debugging.
+ markus@
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 14446cf170ac0351f0d4792ba0bca53024930069
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 5d6f96a966d10d7fa689ff9aa9e1d6767ad5a076
-commit 4f5e331cb8e11face3025aa6578662dde489c3ad
-Author: markus@openbsd.org <markus@openbsd.org>
-Date: Wed Nov 13 22:00:21 2019 +0000
+commit 3b1382ffd5e71eff78db8cef0f3cada22ff29409
+Author: jmc@openbsd.org <jmc@openbsd.org>
+Date: Mon Dec 30 16:10:00 2019 +0000
- upstream: in order to be able to figure out the number of
+ upstream: simplify the list for moduli options - no need for
- signatures left on a shielded key, we need to transfer the number of
- signatures left from the private to the public key. ok djm@
+ -compact;
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 8a5d0d260aeace47d372695fdae383ce9b962574
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 6492c72280482c6d072be46236b365cb359fc280
-commit dffd02e297e6c2a4e86775f293eb1b0ff01fb3df
-Author: markus@openbsd.org <markus@openbsd.org>
-Date: Wed Nov 13 20:25:45 2019 +0000
+commit 0248ec7c763dee9ff730a589e3d166eac5c74d7c
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date: Thu Jan 2 13:41:31 2020 +1100
- upstream: fix check for sig_s; noted by qsa at qualys.com
-
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 34198084e4afb424a859f52c04bb2c9668a52867
+ ssh-sk-null.cc needs extern "C" {}
-commit fc173aeb1526d4268db89ec5dfebaf8750dd26cd
-Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
-Date: Wed Nov 13 11:25:11 2019 +0000
+commit 5ca4b414effe4b56f0cfe3058c92391aa8a43871
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date: Thu Jan 2 10:56:29 2020 +1100
- upstream: When clients get denied by MaxStartups, send a
-
- noification prior to the SSH2 protocol banner according to RFC4253 section
- 4.2. ok djm@ deraadt@ markus@
-
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: e5dabcb722d54dea18eafb336d50b733af4f9c63
+ add dummy ssh-sk API for linking with fuzzers
-commit bf219920b70cafbf29ebc9890ef67d0efa54e738
-Author: markus@openbsd.org <markus@openbsd.org>
-Date: Wed Nov 13 07:53:10 2019 +0000
+commit c4b2664be7ba25e4c233315b25212dec29b727ab
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date: Mon Dec 30 21:04:09 2019 +1100
- upstream: fix shield/unshield for xmss keys: - in ssh-agent we need
-
- to delay the call to shield until we have received key specific options. -
- when serializing xmss keys for shield we need to deal with all optional
- components (e.g. state might not be loaded). ok djm@
-
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: cc2db82524b209468eb176d6b4d6b9486422f41f
+ refresh depend
-commit 40598b85d72a509566b7b2a6d57676c7231fed34
-Author: deraadt@openbsd.org <deraadt@openbsd.org>
-Date: Wed Nov 13 05:42:26 2019 +0000
+commit 3093d12ff80927cf45da08d9f262a26680fb14ee
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Mon Dec 30 09:49:52 2019 +0000
- upstream: remove size_t gl_pathc < 0 test, it is invalid. the
+ upstream: Remove the -x option currently used for
- return value from glob() is sufficient. discussed with djm
+ FIDO/U2F-specific key flags. Instead these flags may be specified via -O.
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: c91203322db9caaf7efaf5ae90c794a91070be3c
-
-commit 72687c8e7c38736e3e64e833ee7aa8f9cd9efed1
-Author: deraadt@openbsd.org <deraadt@openbsd.org>
-Date: Wed Nov 13 04:47:52 2019 +0000
-
- upstream: stdarg.h required more broadly; ok djm
+ ok markus@
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: b5b15674cde1b54d6dbbae8faf30d47e6e5d6513
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: f23ebde2a8a7e1bf860a51055a711cffb8c328c1
-commit 1e0b248d47c96be944868a735553af8482300a07
-Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Thu Nov 14 16:08:17 2019 +1100
+commit ef65e7dbaa8fac3245aa2bfc9f7e09be7cba0d9d
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Mon Dec 30 09:25:29 2019 +0000
- Put sshsk_sign call inside ifdef ENABLE_SK.
+ upstream: document SK API changes in PROTOCOL.u2f
- Fixes build against OpenSSL configured without ECC.
+ ok markus@
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 52622363c103a3c4d3d546050480ffe978a32186
-commit 546274a6f89489d2e6be8a8b62f2bb63c87a61fd
-Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Wed Nov 13 23:27:31 2019 +1100
+commit 43ce96427b76c4918e39af654e2fc9ee18d5d478
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Mon Dec 30 09:24:45 2019 +0000
- Remove duplicate __NR_clock_nanosleep
+ upstream: translate and return error codes; retry on bad PIN
+
+ Define some well-known error codes in the SK API and pass
+ them back via ssh-sk-helper.
+
+ Use the new "wrong PIN" error code to retry PIN prompting during
+ ssh-keygen of resident keys.
+
+ feedback and ok markus@
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 9663c6a2bb7a0bc8deaccc6c30d9a2983b481620
-commit b1c82f4b8adf3f42476d8a1f292df33fb7aa1a56
-Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Wed Nov 13 23:19:35 2019 +1100
+commit d433596736a2cd4818f538be11fc94783f5c5236
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Mon Dec 30 09:24:03 2019 +0000
- seccomp: Allow clock_nanosleep() in sandbox.
+ upstream: improve some error messages; ok markus@
- seccomp: Allow clock_nanosleep() to make OpenSSH working with latest
- glibc. Patch from Jakub Jelen <jjelen@redhat.com> via bz #3093.
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 4ccd8ddabb8df4f995107dd3b7ea58220e93cb81
-commit 2b523d23804c13cb68db135b919fcf312c42b580
-Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Wed Nov 13 11:56:56 2019 +1100
+commit c54cd1892c3e7f268b21e1f07ada9f0d9816ffc0
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Mon Dec 30 09:23:28 2019 +0000
- Include stdarg.h for va_list in xmalloc.h.
+ upstream: SK API and sk-helper error/PIN passing
+
+ Allow passing a PIN via the SK API (API major crank) and let the
+ ssh-sk-helper API follow.
+
+ Also enhance the ssh-sk-helper API to support passing back an error
+ code instead of a complete reply. Will be used to signal "wrong PIN",
+ etc.
+
+ feedback and ok markus@
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: a1bd6b0a2421646919a0c139b8183ad76d28fb71
-commit 245dcbdca5374296bdb9c48be6e24bdf6b1c0af7
-Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Wed Nov 13 11:19:26 2019 +1100
+commit 79fe22d9bc2868c5118f032ec1200ac9c2e3aaef
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Mon Dec 30 09:22:49 2019 +0000
- Put headers inside ifdef _AIX.
+ upstream: implement loading resident keys in ssh-add
- Prevents compile errors due to missing definitions (eg va_list) on
- non-AIX platforms.
+ "ssh-add -O" will load resident keys from a FIDO2 token and add them
+ to a ssh-agent.
+
+ feedback and ok markus@
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 608104ae957a7d65cb84e0a3a26c8f60e0df3290
-commit a4cc579c6ad2b2e54bdd6cc0d5e12c2288113a56
-Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Wed Nov 13 10:41:41 2019 +1100
+commit 27753a8e21887d47fe6b5c78a4aed0efe558a850
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Mon Dec 30 09:21:59 2019 +0000
- Fix comment in match_usergroup_pattern_list.
+ upstream: implement loading of resident keys in ssh-sk-helper
- Spotted by balu.gajjala@gmail.com via bz#3092.
+ feedback and ok markus@
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: b273c23769ea182c55c4a7b8f9cbd9181722011a
-commit fccff339cab5aa66f2554e0188b83f980683490b
+commit 14cea36df397677b8f8568204300ef654114fd76
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Tue Nov 12 22:38:19 2019 +0000
+Date: Mon Dec 30 09:21:16 2019 +0000
- upstream: allow an empty attestation certificate returned by a
+ upstream: resident keys support in SK API
- security key enrollment - these are possible for tokens that only offer self-
- attestation. This also needs support from the middleware.
+ Adds a sk_load_resident_keys() function to the security key
+ API that accepts a security key provider and a PIN and returns
+ a list of keys.
- ok markus@
+ Implement support for this in the usbhid middleware.
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 135eeeb937088ef6830a25ca0bbe678dfd2c57cc
+ feedback and ok markus@
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 67e984e4e87f4999ce447a6178c4249a9174eff0
-commit e44bb61824e36d0d181a08489c16c378c486a974
+commit 2fe05fcb4a2695f190b4fcf27770b655586ab349
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Tue Nov 12 22:36:44 2019 +0000
+Date: Mon Dec 30 09:20:36 2019 +0000
- upstream: security keys typically need to be tapped/touched in
+ upstream: Factor out parsing of struct sk_enroll_response
- order to perform a signature operation. Notify the user when this is expected
- via the TTY (if available) or $SSH_ASKPASS if we can.
+ We'll reuse this for extracting resident keys from a device.
- ok markus@
+ feedback and ok markus@
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 0ef90a99a85d4a2a07217a58efb4df8444818609
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 9bc1efd9c6897eac4df0983746cf6578c1542273
-commit 4671211068441519011ac0e38c588317f4157ba1
+commit 4532bd01d57ee13c3ca881eceac1bf9da96a4d7e
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Tue Nov 12 22:35:02 2019 +0000
+Date: Mon Dec 30 09:19:52 2019 +0000
- upstream: pass SSH_ASKPASS_PROMPT hint to y/n key confirm too
+ upstream: basic support for generating FIDO2 resident keys
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 08d46712e5e5f1bad0aea68e7717b7bec1ab8959
+ "ssh-keygen -t ecdsa-sk|ed25519-sk -x resident" will generate a
+ device-resident key.
+
+ feedback and ok markus@
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 8e1b3c56a4b11d85047bd6c6c705b7eef4d58431
-commit 5d1c1590d736694f41b03e686045f08fcae20d62
+commit 3e60d18fba1b502c21d64fc7e81d80bcd08a2092
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Tue Nov 12 22:34:20 2019 +0000
+Date: Mon Dec 30 03:30:09 2019 +0000
- upstream: dd API for performing one-shot notifications via tty or
+ upstream: remove single-letter flags for moduli options
- SSH_ASKPASS
+ Move all moduli generation options to live under the -O flag.
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 9484aea33aff5b62ce3642bf259546c7639f23f3
+ Frees up seven single-letter flags.
+
+ NB. this change break existing ssh-keygen commandline syntax for moduli-
+ related operations. Very few people use these fortunately.
+
+ feedback and ok markus@
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: d498f3eaf28128484826a4fcb343612764927935
-commit 166927fd410823eec8a7b2472463db51e0e6fef5
+commit 1e645fe767f27725dc7fd7864526de34683f7daf
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Tue Nov 12 22:32:48 2019 +0000
+Date: Mon Dec 30 03:28:41 2019 +0000
- upstream: add xvasprintf()
+ upstream: prepare for use of ssh-keygen -O flag beyond certs
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: e5e3671c05c121993b034db935bce1a7aa372247
+ Move list of available certificate options in ssh-keygen.1 to the
+ CERTIFICATES section.
+
+ Collect options specified by -O but delay parsing/validation of
+ certificate options until we're sure that we're acting as a CA.
+
+ ok markus@
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 33e6bcc29cfca43606f6fa09bd84b955ee3a4106
-commit 782093ec6cf64cc6c4078410093359869ea9329f
-Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Wed Nov 13 09:08:55 2019 +1100
+commit 20ccd854245c598e2b47cc9f8d4955d645195055
+Author: jmc@openbsd.org <jmc@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Dec 27 08:28:44 2019 +0000
- Remove leftover if statement from sync.
+ upstream: sort -Y internally in the options list, as is already
+
+ done in synopsis;
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 86d033c5764404057616690d7be992e445b42274
-commit b556cc3cbf0c43f073bb41bba4e92ca709a1ec13
-Author: markus@openbsd.org <markus@openbsd.org>
-Date: Tue Nov 12 19:34:40 2019 +0000
+commit 5b6c954751dd3677466cda7adb92e4f05446c96c
+Author: jmc@openbsd.org <jmc@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Dec 27 08:25:07 2019 +0000
- upstream: remove extra layer for ed25519 signature; ok djm@
+ upstream: in the options list, sort -Y and -y;
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 7672d9d0278b4bf656a12d3aab0c0bfe92a8ae47
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 24c2e6a3aeab6e050a0271ffc73fdff91c10dcaa
-commit 3fcf69ace19e75cf9dcd7206f396adfcb29611a8
-Author: markus@openbsd.org <markus@openbsd.org>
-Date: Tue Nov 12 19:34:00 2019 +0000
+commit 141df487ba699cfd1ec3dcd98186e7c956e99024
+Author: naddy@openbsd.org <naddy@openbsd.org>
+Date: Sat Dec 21 20:22:34 2019 +0000
- upstream: check sig_r and sig_s for ssh-sk keys; ok djm
+ upstream: Replace the term "security key" with "(FIDO)
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 1a1e6a85b5f465d447a3800f739e35c5b74e0abc
+ authenticator".
+
+ The polysemous use of "key" was too confusing. Input from markus@.
+ ok jmc@
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 12eea973a44c8232af89f86e4269d71ae900ca8f
-commit 2c55744a56de0ffc81fe445a1e7fc5cd308712b3
-Author: markus@openbsd.org <markus@openbsd.org>
-Date: Tue Nov 12 19:33:08 2019 +0000
+commit fbd9729d4eadf2f7097b6017156387ac64302453
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Sat Dec 21 02:33:07 2019 +0000
- upstream: enable ed25519 support; ok djm
+ upstream: unit tests for ForwardAgent=/path; from Eric Chiang
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 1a399c5b3ef15bd8efb916110cf5a9e0b554ab7e
+ OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 24f693f78290b2c17725dab2c614dffe4a88c8da
-commit fd1a3b5e38721b1d69aae2d9de1a1d9155dfa5c7
-Author: markus@openbsd.org <markus@openbsd.org>
-Date: Tue Nov 12 19:32:30 2019 +0000
+commit e5b7cf8edca7e843adc125621e1dab14507f430a
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Mon Dec 16 02:39:05 2019 +0000
- upstream: update sk-api to version 2 for ed25519 support; ok djm
+ upstream: test security key host keys in addition to user keys
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 77aa4d5b6ab17987d8a600907b49573940a0044a
+ OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 9fb45326106669a27e4bf150575c321806e275b1
-commit 7c32b51edbed5bd57870249c0a45dffd06be0002
-Author: markus@openbsd.org <markus@openbsd.org>
-Date: Tue Nov 12 19:31:45 2019 +0000
+commit 40be78f503277bd91c958fa25ea9ef918a2ffd3d
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Sat Dec 21 02:19:13 2019 +0000
- upstream: implement sshsk_ed25519_assemble(); ok djm
+ upstream: Allow forwarding a different agent socket to the path
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: af9ec838b9bc643786310b5caefc4ca4754e68c6
-
-commit fe05a36dc0ea884c8c2395d53d804fe4f4202b26
-Author: markus@openbsd.org <markus@openbsd.org>
-Date: Tue Nov 12 19:31:18 2019 +0000
-
- upstream: implement sshsk_ed25519_inner_sig(); ok djm
+ specified by $SSH_AUTH_SOCK, by extending the existing ForwardAgent option to
+ accepting an explicit path or the name of an environment variable in addition
+ to yes/no.
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: f422d0052c6d948fe0e4b04bc961f37fdffa0910
-
-commit e03a29e6554cd0c9cdbac0dae53dd79e6eb4ea47
-Author: markus@openbsd.org <markus@openbsd.org>
-Date: Tue Nov 12 19:30:50 2019 +0000
-
- upstream: rename sshsk_ecdsa_sign() to sshsk_sign(); ok djm
+ Patch by Eric Chiang, manpage by me; ok markus@
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 1524042e09d81e54c4470d7bfcc0194c5b46fe19
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 98f2ed80bf34ea54d8b2ddd19ac14ebbf40e9265
-commit bc7b5d6187de625c086b5f639b25bbad17bbabfc
-Author: markus@openbsd.org <markus@openbsd.org>
-Date: Tue Nov 12 19:30:21 2019 +0000
+commit 416f15372bfb5be1709a0ad1d00ef5d8ebfb9e0e
+Author: naddy@openbsd.org <naddy@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Dec 20 20:28:55 2019 +0000
- upstream: factor out sshsk_ecdsa_inner_sig(); ok djm@
+ upstream: SSH U2F keys can now be used as host keys. Fix a garden
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 07e41997b542f670a15d7e2807143fe01efef584
-
-commit cef84a062db8cfeece26f067235dc440f6992c17
-Author: markus@openbsd.org <markus@openbsd.org>
-Date: Tue Nov 12 19:29:54 2019 +0000
-
- upstream: factor out sshsk_ecdsa_assemble(); ok djm@
+ path sentence. ok markus@
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 2313761a3a84ccfe032874d638d3c363e0f14026
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 67d7971ca1a020acd6c151426c54bd29d784bd6b
-commit 7c096c456f33f3d2682736d4735cc10e790276e9
-Author: markus@openbsd.org <markus@openbsd.org>
-Date: Tue Nov 12 19:29:24 2019 +0000
+commit 68010acbcfe36167b3eece3115f3a502535f80df
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Dec 20 02:42:42 2019 +0000
- upstream: implement ssh-ed25519-sk verification; ok djm@
+ upstream: Move always unsupported keywords to be grouped with the other
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 37906d93948a1e3d237c20e713d6ca8fbf7d13f6
-
-commit ba5fb02bed1e556d0ce7b1740ae8a5f87b737491
-Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
-Date: Wed Nov 13 08:48:30 2019 +1100
-
- ignore ssh-sk-helper
+ ones. Move oSecurityProvider to match the order in the OpCodes enum. Patch
+ from openbsd@academicsolutions.ch, ok djm@
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 061e4505861ec1e02ba3a63e3d1b3be3cad458ec
-commit 78c96498947f711141f493a40d202c482cc59438
-Author: deraadt@openbsd.org <deraadt@openbsd.org>
-Date: Mon Nov 11 19:53:37 2019 +0000
+commit 8784b02dc49e1c98df4e7aca466be2f652ed4ad1
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Dec 20 02:29:21 2019 +0000
- upstream: skip demanding -fstack-protector-all on hppa. we never
+ upstream: Remove obsolete opcodes from the configuation enum.
- wrote a stack protector for reverse-stack architectures, and i don't think
- anyone else did either. a warning per compiled file is just annoying.
+ Patch from openbsd@academicsolutions.ch, ok djm@
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 14806a59353152f843eb349e618abbf6f4dd3ada
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 395c202228872ce8d9044cc08552ac969f51e01b
-commit aa1c9e37789f999979fe59df74ce5c8424861ac8
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Nov 8 03:54:02 2019 +0000
+commit 345be6091bdc9be09c90a937d1320f97c01fab2a
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Dec 20 02:11:38 2019 +0000
- upstream: duplicate 'x' character in getopt(3) optstring
+ upstream: Remove now-obsolete config options from example in
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 64c81caa0cb5798de3621eca16b7dd22e5d0d8a7
+ comment. Patch from openbsd@academicsolutions.ch, ok djm@
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 35862beb0927b1cb0af476ec23cc07f6e3006101
-commit aa4c640dc362816d63584a16e786d5e314e24390
+commit ae024b22c4fd68e7f39681d605585889f9511108
Author: naddy@openbsd.org <naddy@openbsd.org>
-Date: Thu Nov 7 08:38:38 2019 +0000
+Date: Thu Dec 19 15:09:30 2019 +0000
- upstream: Fill in missing man page bits for U2F security key support:
+ upstream: Document that security key-hosted keys can act as host
- Mention the new key types, the ~/.ssh/id_ecdsa_sk file, ssh's
- SecurityKeyProvider keyword, the SSH_SK_PROVIDER environment variable,
- and ssh-keygen's new -w and -x options.
+ keys.
- Copy the ssh-sk-helper man page from ssh-pkcs11-helper with minimal
- substitutions.
+ Update the list of default host key algorithms in ssh_config.5 and
+ sshd_config.5. Copy the description of the SecurityKeyProvider
+ option to sshd_config.5.
- ok djm@
+ ok jmc@
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: ef2e8f83d0c0ce11ad9b8c28945747e5ca337ac4
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: edadf3566ab5e94582df4377fee3b8b702c7eca0
-commit b236b27d6dada7f0542214003632b4e9b7aa1380
-Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Sun Nov 3 00:10:43 2019 +1100
+commit bc2dc091e0ac4ff6245c43a61ebe12c7e9ea0b7f
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date: Thu Dec 19 03:50:01 2019 +0000
- Put sftp-realpath in libssh.a
+ upstream: "Forward security" -> "Forward secrecy" since that's the
- and remove it from the specific binary targets.
-
-commit 382c18c20cdcec45b5d21ff25b4a5e0df91a68c4
-Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Sun Nov 3 00:09:21 2019 +1100
-
- statfs might be defined in sys/mount.h.
+ correct term. Add "MAC" since we use that acronym in other man pages. ok
+ naddy@
- eg on old NetBSDs.
-
-commit 03ffc0951c305c8e3b5fdc260d65312a57f8f7ea
-Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Sat Nov 2 23:25:01 2019 +1100
-
- Put stdint.h inside ifdef HAVE_STDINT_H.
-
-commit 19cb64c4b42d4312ce12091fd9436dbd6898998c
-Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Sat Nov 2 22:45:44 2019 +1100
-
- Rebuild .depend.
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: c35529e511788586725fb63bda3459e10738c5f5
-commit 3611bfe89b92ada5914526d8ff0919aeb967cfa7
-Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Sat Nov 2 22:42:05 2019 +1100
+commit e905f7260d72bc0e33ef5f10a0db737ff6e77ba7
+Author: naddy@openbsd.org <naddy@openbsd.org>
+Date: Tue Dec 17 16:21:07 2019 +0000
- Define __BSD_VISIBLE in fnmatch.h.
+ upstream: cut obsolete lists of crypto algorithms from outline of
- .. since we use symbols defined only when it is when using the compat
- fnmatch.
-
-commit f5cc5816aaddb8eca3cba193f53e99d6a0b37d05
-Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Sat Nov 2 16:39:38 2019 +1100
-
- Only enable U2F if OpenSSL supports ECC.
+ how SSH works ok markus@ jmc@
- This requires moving the U2F bits to below the OpenSSL parts so we have
- the required information. ok djm@
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 8e34973f232ab48c4d4f5d07df48d501708b9160
-commit ad38406fc95fa223b0ef2edf8ff50508f8ab1cb6
-Author: naddy@openbsd.org <naddy@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Nov 1 12:10:43 2019 +0000
+commit f65cf1163ff01531ae02f3f9210391d0d692f699
+Author: tobhe@openbsd.org <tobhe@openbsd.org>
+Date: Mon Dec 16 13:58:53 2019 +0000
- upstream: fix miscellaneous text problems; ok djm@
+ upstream: strdup may return NULL if memory allocation fails. Use
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 0cbf411a14d8fa0b269b69cbb1b4fc0ca699fe9f
+ the safer xstrdup which fatals on allocation failures.
+
+ ok markus@
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 8b608d387120630753cbcb8110e0b019c0c9a0d0
-commit 9cac151c2dc76b8e5b727b2fa216f572e372170f
-Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Fri Nov 1 18:26:07 2019 +1100
+commit 57634bfc5708477826c0be265ddc59b9d83e4886
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Mon Dec 16 03:16:58 2019 +0000
- Add flags needed to build and work on Ultrix.
+ upstream: sort sk-* methods behind their plain key methods cousins
+
+ for now
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: c97e22c2b28c0d12ee389b8b4ef5f2ada7908828
-commit 0e3c5bc50907d2058407641b5a3581b7eda91b7e
+commit b8df8fe920e697edcc69c520390b78c3b7ad9d84
Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Fri Nov 1 18:24:29 2019 +1100
+Date: Tue Dec 17 19:46:15 2019 +1100
- Hook up fnmatch for platforms that don't have it.
+ Mac OS X has PAM too.
-commit b56dbfd9d967e5b6ce7be9f81f206112e19e1030
+commit bf8de8b8251af69b5ce96a8faa69145af156af4d
Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Fri Nov 1 18:17:42 2019 +1100
+Date: Tue Dec 17 19:37:06 2019 +1100
- Add missing bracket in realpath macro.
+ Show portable tarball pattern in example.
-commit 59ccb56f15e5e530e7c1b5a0b361749d8c6217d5
+commit a19ef613e98141cc37c8acdeebe285b9dbe2531e
Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Fri Nov 1 17:32:47 2019 +1100
+Date: Tue Dec 17 19:35:59 2019 +1100
- Import fnmatch.c from OpenBSD.
+ OpenSSL is now optional.
-commit 79d46de9fbea0f3c0e8ae7cf84effaba089071b0
-Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Fri Nov 1 15:22:32 2019 +1100
+commit 1a7217ac063e48cf0082895aeee81ed2b8a57191
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Sun Dec 15 18:58:33 2019 +0000
- Use sftp_realpath if no native realpath.
+ upstream: adapt to ssh-sk-client change
+
+ OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 40481999a5928d635ab2e5b029e8239c112005ea
-commit bb4f003ed8c5f61ec74a66bcedc8ab19bf5b35c4
-Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Fri Nov 1 15:06:16 2019 +1100
+commit a7fc1df246e80bfdabd09b069b91c72f9c578ca8
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Wed Dec 11 18:47:14 2019 +0000
- Configure flags for haiku from haikuports.
+ upstream: it's no longer possible to disable privilege separation
- Should build with the default flags with ./configure
+ in sshd, so don't double the tests' work by trying both off/on
+
+ OpenBSD-Regress-ID: d366665466dbd09e9b707305da884be3e7619c68
-commit 4332b4fe49360679647a8705bc08f4e81323f6b4
+commit 3145d38ea06820a66c0f5e068f49af14fd2b7ac1
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Nov 1 03:54:33 2019 +0000
+Date: Sun Dec 15 20:59:23 2019 +0000
- upstream: fix a race condition in the SIGCHILD handler that could turn
+ upstream: don't treat HostKeyAgent=none as a path either; avoids
- in to a kill(-1); bz3084, reported by Gao Rui, ok dtucker@
+ spurious warnings from the cfgparse regress test
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: ac2742e04a69d4c34223505b6a32f6d686e18896
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: ba49ea7a5c92b8a16cb9c2e975dbb163853afc54
-commit 03f9205f0fb49ea2507eacc143737a8511ae5a4e
-Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
-Date: Fri Nov 1 14:49:25 2019 +1100
+commit 747e25192f436e71dd39e15d65aa32bca967533a
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Sun Dec 15 20:57:15 2019 +0000
- conditionalise SK sign/verify on ENABLE_SK
+ upstream: do not attempt to find an absolute path for sshd_config
- Spotted by Darren and his faux-Vax
-
-commit 5eb7b9563ff818e17de24231bf2d347d9db302c5
-Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Fri Nov 1 14:41:07 2019 +1100
-
- Add prototype for localtime_r if needed.
-
-commit d500b59a825f6a58f2abf7b04eb1992d81e45d58
-Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Fri Nov 1 13:42:12 2019 +1100
-
- Check if IP_TOS is defined before using.
-
-commit 764d51e04460ec0da12e05e4777bc90c116accb9
-Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
-Date: Fri Nov 1 13:34:49 2019 +1100
-
- autoconf pieces for U2F support
+ SecurityKeyProvider=internal - unbreaks cfgparse regress test
- Mostly following existing logic for PKCS#11 - turning off support
- when either libcrypto or dlopen(3) are unavailable.
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: d2ddcf525c0dc3c8339522360c10b3c70f1fd641
-commit 45f17a159acfc5a8e450bfbcc2cffe72950ed7a3
+commit 9b6e30b96b094ad787511a5b989253e3b8fe1789
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Nov 1 02:32:05 2019 +0000
+Date: Sun Dec 15 19:47:10 2019 +0000
- upstream: remove duplicate PUBKEY_DEFAULT_PK_ALG on !WITH_OPENSSL path
+ upstream: allow ssh-keyscan to find security key hostkeys
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 95a7cafad2a4665d57cabacc28031fabc0bea9fc
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 1fe822a7f714df19a7e7184e3a3bbfbf546811d3
-commit db8d13f7925da7337df87248995c533e111637ec
+commit 56584cce75f3d20aaa30befc7cbd331d922927f3
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Nov 1 02:06:52 2019 +0000
+Date: Sun Dec 15 18:57:30 2019 +0000
- upstream: more additional source files
+ upstream: allow security keys to act as host keys as well as user
- OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 8eaa25fb901594aee23b76eda99dca5b8db94c6f
+ keys.
+
+ Previously we didn't do this because we didn't want to expose
+ the attack surface presented by USB and FIDO protocol handling,
+ but now that this is insulated behind ssh-sk-helper there is
+ less risk.
+
+ ok markus@
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 77b068dd133b8d87e0f010987bd5131e640ee64c
-commit f89c5df65dd307739ff22319c2cf847d3b0c5ab4
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Nov 1 02:04:25 2019 +0000
+commit 5af6fd5461bb709304e6979c8b7856c7af921c9e
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Mon Dec 16 13:55:56 2019 +1100
- upstream: additional source files here too
+ Allow clock_nanosleep_time64 in seccomp sandbox.
- OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 8809f8e1c8f7459e7096ab6b58d8e56cb2f483fd
+ Needed on Linux ARM. bz#3100, patch from jjelen@redhat.com.
-commit 02275afa1ecbfbd39f27d34c97090e76bec232ec
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Nov 1 02:03:27 2019 +0000
+commit fff8ff6dd580e1a72ba09a6775d185175cdc8d13
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Sun Dec 15 18:27:02 2019 +1100
- upstream: additional source files here too
+ Put SK ECDSA bits inside ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC.
- OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 09297e484327f911fd353489518cceaa0c1b95ce
+ Fixes build when linking against OpenSSLs built with no-ec.
-commit dfc8f01b9886c7999e6e20acf3f7492cb8c80796
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Nov 1 01:57:59 2019 +0000
+commit 9244990ecdcfa36bb9371058111685b05f201c1e
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date: Sat Dec 14 09:21:46 2019 +1100
- upstream: adapt to extra sshkey_sign() argument and additional
+ remove a bunch of ENABLE_SK #ifdefs
- dependencies
+ The ssh-sk-helper client API gives us a nice place to disable
+ security key support when it is wasn't enabled at compile time,
+ so we don't need to check everywere.
- OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 7a25604968486c4d6f81d06e8fbc7d17519de50e
+ Also, verification of security key signatures can remain enabled
+ all the time - it has no additional dependencies. So sshd can
+ accept security key pubkeys in authorized_keys, etc regardless of
+ the host's support for dlopen, etc.
-commit afa59e26eeb44a93f36f043f60b936eaddae77c4
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Nov 1 01:55:41 2019 +0000
+commit a33ab1688b5c460a7e2a301418241ce1b13b2638
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date: Sat Dec 14 09:15:06 2019 +1100
- upstream: skip security-key key types for tests until we have a
-
- dummy U2F middleware to use.
-
- OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 37200462b44334a4ad45e6a1f7ad1bd717521a95
+ ssh-sk-client.c needs includes.h
-commit de871e4daf346a712c78fa4ab8f18b231a47cb85
-Author: jmc@openbsd.org <jmc@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Nov 1 00:52:35 2019 +0000
+commit 633778d567ad50b63d2a3bca5e1b97d279d236d9
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date: Sat Dec 14 08:40:33 2019 +1100
- upstream: sort;
-
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 8264b0be01ec5a60602bd50fd49cc3c81162ea16
+ only link ssh-sk-helper against libfido2
-commit 2aae149a34b1b5dfbef423d3b7999a96818969bb
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Thu Oct 31 21:37:33 2019 +0000
+commit 7b47b40b170db4d6f41da0479575f6d99dd7228a
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date: Sat Dec 14 08:20:52 2019 +1100
- upstream: undo debugging bits that shouldn't have been committed
-
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 4bd5551b306df55379afe17d841207990eb773bf
+ adapt Makefile to ssh-sk-client everywhere
-commit 3420e0464bd0e8fedcfa5fd20ad37bdc740ad5b4
+commit f45f3a8a12e2bee601046b916e6c5cd6eae08048
Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
-Date: Fri Nov 1 09:24:58 2019 +1100
+Date: Sat Dec 14 07:53:11 2019 +1100
- depend
+ fixup
-commit b923a90abc7bccb11a513dc8b5c0f13a0ea9682c
+commit d21434766764d5babf99fc3937c19b625c0f6334
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Thu Oct 31 21:28:27 2019 +0000
+Date: Fri Dec 13 20:16:56 2019 +0000
- upstream: fix -Wshadow warning
+ upstream: actually commit the ssh-sk-helper client code; ok markus
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 3441eb04f872a00c2483c11a5f1570dfe775103c
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: fd2ea776a5bbbf4d452989d3c3054cf25a5e0589
-commit 9a14c64c38fc14d0029f1c7bc70cf62cc7f0fdf9
+commit 611073fb40ecaf4ac65094e403edea3a08deb700
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Thu Oct 31 21:23:19 2019 +0000
+Date: Fri Dec 13 19:11:14 2019 +0000
- upstream: Refactor signing - use sshkey_sign for everything,
-
- including the new U2F signatures.
+ upstream: perform security key enrollment via ssh-sk-helper too.
- Don't use sshsk_ecdsa_sign() directly, instead make it reachable via
- sshkey_sign() like all other signature operations. This means that
- we need to add a provider argument to sshkey_sign(), so most of this
- change is mechanically adding that.
+ This means that ssh-keygen no longer needs to link against ssh-sk-helper, and
+ only ssh-sk-helper needs libfido2 and /dev/uhid* access;
- Suggested by / ok markus@
+ feedback & ok markus@
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: d5193a03fcfa895085d91b2b83d984a9fde76c8c
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 9464233fab95708d2ff059f8bee29c0d1f270800
-commit 07da39f71d36fb547749a5b16aa8892e621a7e4a
+commit 612b1dd1ec91ffb1e01f58cca0c6eb1d47bf4423
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Thu Oct 31 21:22:01 2019 +0000
+Date: Fri Dec 13 19:09:37 2019 +0000
- upstream: ssh-agent support for U2F/FIDO keys
-
- feedback & ok markus@
+ upstream: allow sshbuf_put_stringb(buf, NULL); ok markus@
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: bb544a44bc32e45d2ec8bf652db2046f38360acb
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 91482c1ada9adb283165d48dafbb88ae91c657bd
-commit eebec620c9519c4839d781c4d5b6082152998f82
+commit b52ec0ba3983859514aa7b57d6100fa9759fe696
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Thu Oct 31 21:20:38 2019 +0000
+Date: Fri Dec 13 19:09:10 2019 +0000
- upstream: ssh AddKeysToAgent support for U2F/FIDO keys
+ upstream: use ssh-sk-helper for all security key signing operations
- feedback & ok markus@
+ This extracts and refactors the client interface for ssh-sk-helper
+ from ssh-agent and generalises it for use by the other programs.
+ This means that most OpenSSH tools no longer need to link against
+ libfido2 or directly interact with /dev/uhid*
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: ac08e45c7f995fa71f8d661b3f582e38cc0a2f91
+ requested by, feedback and ok markus@
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 1abcd3aea9a7460eccfbf8ca154cdfa62f1dc93f
-commit 486164d060314a7f8bca2a00f53be9e900c5e74d
+commit c33d46868c3d88e04a92610cdb429094aeeb5847
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Thu Oct 31 21:19:56 2019 +0000
+Date: Wed Dec 11 22:19:47 2019 +0000
- upstream: ssh-add support for U2F/FIDO keys
+ upstream: add a note about the 'extensions' field in the signed
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 7f88a5181c982687afedf3130c6ab2bba60f7644
+ object
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 67c01e0565b258e0818c1ccfe1f1aeaf9a0d4c7b
-commit b9dd14d3091e31fb836f69873d3aa622eb7b4a1c
+commit a62f4e1960691f3aeb1f972e009788b29e2ae464
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Thu Oct 31 21:19:14 2019 +0000
+Date: Tue Dec 10 23:37:31 2019 +0000
- upstream: add new agent key constraint for U2F/FIDO provider
+ upstream: some more corrections for documentation problems spotted
- feedback & ok markus@
+ by Ron Frederick
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: d880c380170704280b4003860a1744d286c7a172
+ document certifiate private key format
+ correct flags type for sk-ssh-ed25519@openssh.com keys
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: fc4e9a1ed7f9f7f9dd83e2e2c59327912e933e74
-commit 884416bdb10468f1252e4d7c13d51b43dccba7f6
+commit 22d4beb79622fc82d7111ac941269861fc7aef8d
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Thu Oct 31 21:18:28 2019 +0000
+Date: Tue Dec 10 23:21:56 2019 +0000
- upstream: ssh client support for U2F/FIDO keys
+ upstream: loading security keys into ssh-agent used the extension
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: eb2cfa6cf7419a1895e06e398ea6d41516c5b0bc
+ constraint "sk-provider@openssh.com", not "sk@openssh.com"; spotted by Ron
+ Frederick
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: dbfba09edbe023abadd5f59c1492df9073b0e51d
-commit 01a0670f69c5b86e471e033b92145d6c7cc77c58
+commit 75f7f22a43799f6d25dffd9d6683de1601da05a3
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Thu Oct 31 21:17:49 2019 +0000
+Date: Tue Dec 10 22:43:19 2019 +0000
- upstream: Separate myproposal.h userauth pubkey types
-
- U2F/FIDO keys are not supported for host authentication, so we need
- a separate list for user keys.
+ upstream: add security key types to list of keys allowed to act as
- feedback & ok markus@
+ CAs; spotted by Ron Frederick
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 7fe2e6ab85f9f2338866e5af8ca2d312abbf0429
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 9bb0dfff927b4f7aa70679f983f84c69d45656c3
-commit 23f38c2d8cda3fad24e214e1f0133c42435b54ee
+commit 516605f2d596884cedc2beed6b262716ec76f63d
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Thu Oct 31 21:17:09 2019 +0000
+Date: Tue Dec 10 22:37:20 2019 +0000
- upstream: ssh-keygen support for generating U2F/FIDO keys
+ upstream: when acting as a CA and using a security key as the CA
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 6ce04f2b497ac9dd8c327f76f1e6c724fb1d1b37
+ key, remind the user to touch they key to authorise the signature.
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: fe58733edd367362f9766b526a8b56827cc439c1
-commit ed3467c1e16b7396ff7fcf12d2769261512935ec
+commit c4036fe75ea5a4d03a2a40be1f3660dcbbfa01b2
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Thu Oct 31 21:16:20 2019 +0000
+Date: Tue Dec 10 22:36:08 2019 +0000
- upstream: U2F/FIDO middleware interface
-
- Supports enrolling (generating) keys and signatures.
+ upstream: chop some unnecessary and confusing verbiage from the
- feedback & ok markus@
+ security key protocol description; feedback from Ron Frederick
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 73d1dd5939454f9c7bd840f48236cba41e8ad592
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 048c9483027fbf9c995e5a51b3ac502989085a42
-commit 02bb0768a937e50bbb236efc2bbdddb1991b1c85
+commit 59175a350fe1091af7528b2971e3273aa7ca7295
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Thu Oct 31 21:15:14 2019 +0000
+Date: Fri Dec 6 03:06:08 2019 +0000
- upstream: Initial infrastructure for U2F/FIDO support
-
- Key library support: including allocation, marshalling public/private
- keys and certificates, signature validation.
+ upstream: fix setting of $SSH_ASKPASS_PROMPT - it shouldn't be set
- feedback & ok markus@
+ when asking passphrases, only when confirming the use of a key (i.e. for
+ ssh-agent keys added with "ssh-add -c keyfile")
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: a17615ba15e0f7932ac4360cb18fc9a9544e68c7
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 6643c82960d9427d5972eb702c917b3b838ecf89
-commit 57ecc10628b04c384cbba2fbc87d38b74cd1199d
+commit 36eaa356d391a23a2d4e3a8aaa0223abc70b9822
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Thu Oct 31 21:14:17 2019 +0000
+Date: Fri Dec 6 02:55:21 2019 +0000
- upstream: Protocol documentation for U2F/FIDO keys in OpenSSH
+ upstream: bring the __func__
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 8f3247317c2909870593aeb306dff848bc427915
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 71a3a45b0fe1b8f680ff95cf264aa81f7abbff67
-commit f4fdcd2b7a2bbf5d8770d44565173ca5158d4dcb
-Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
-Date: Fri Nov 1 08:36:16 2019 +1100
+commit 483cc723d1ff3b7fdafc6239348040a608ebc78d
+Author: jmc@openbsd.org <jmc@openbsd.org>
+Date: Sat Nov 30 07:07:59 2019 +0000
- Missing unit test files
+ upstream: tweak the Nd lines for a bit of consistency; ok markus
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 876651bdde06bc1e72dd4bd7ad599f42a6ce5a16
-commit 1bcd1169c5221688418fa38606e9c69055b72451
+commit afffd310360b155df2133d1f5f1ab2f4e939b570
Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Tue Oct 29 19:45:03 2019 +1100
-
- Add implementation of localtime_r.
-
-commit 2046ed16c1202431b0307674c33a123a113e8297
-Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
-Date: Tue Oct 29 07:47:27 2019 +0000
+Date: Wed Dec 11 13:22:06 2019 +1100
- upstream: Signal handler cleanup: remove leftover support for
-
- unreliable signals and now-unneeded save and restore of errno. ok deraadt@
- markus@
+ Check if memmem is declared in system headers.
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 01dd8a1ebdd991c8629ba1f5237283341a93cd88
+ If the system (or one of the dependencies) implements memmem but does
+ not define the header, we would not declare it either resulting in
+ compiler warnings. Check for declaration explicitly. bz#3102.
-commit 70fc9a6ca4dd33cb2dd400a4dad5db9683a3d284
-Author: jmc@openbsd.org <jmc@openbsd.org>
-Date: Tue Oct 22 08:50:35 2019 +0000
+commit ad8cd420797695f3b580aea1034b9de60bede9b9
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Wed Dec 11 13:12:01 2019 +1100
- upstream: fixes from lucas;
-
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 4c4bfd2806c5bbc753788ffe19c5ee13aaf418b2
+ Sort depends.
-commit 702368aa4381c3b482368257ac574a87b5a80938
-Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
-Date: Tue Oct 22 07:06:35 2019 +0000
+commit 5e3abff39e01817f6866494416f2ada25c316018
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Wed Dec 11 13:09:34 2019 +1100
- upstream: Import regenerated moduli file.
+ Sort .depend when rebuilding.
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 58ec755be4e51978ecfee73539090eb68652a987
+ This makes diffs more stable between makedepend implementations.
-commit 5fe81da22652f8caa63e9e3a1af519a85d36337e
+commit 5df9d1f5c0943367d9b68435f4c82224ce11a73f
Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Mon Oct 28 21:19:47 2019 +1100
+Date: Wed Dec 11 13:06:43 2019 +1100
- Fix ifdefs to not mask needed bits.
+ Update depend to include sk files.
-commit 7694e9d2fb5785bbdd0920dce7a160bd79feaf00
+commit 9a967c5bbfca35835165f7d8a6165009f5b21872
Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Mon Oct 28 17:05:36 2019 +1100
+Date: Mon Dec 9 20:25:26 2019 +1100
- Only use RLIMIT_NOFILE if it's defined.
+ Describe how to build libcrypto as PIC.
+
+ While there, move the OpenSSL 1.1.0g caveat closer to the other version
+ information.
-commit d561b0b2fa2531b4cc3bc70a7d657c6485c9fd0b
+commit b66fa5da25c4b5b67cf9f0ce7af513f5a6a6a686
Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Mon Oct 28 16:09:04 2019 +1100
+Date: Mon Dec 9 17:23:22 2019 +1100
- Make sure we have struct statfs before using.
+ Recommend running LibreSSL or OpenSSL self-tests.
-commit 2912596aecfcf48e5115c7a906d1e664f7717a4b
+commit fa7924008e838cded7e8a561356ffe5e06e0ed64
Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Mon Oct 28 16:06:59 2019 +1100
+Date: Fri Dec 6 14:17:26 2019 +1100
- Define UINT32_MAX if needed.
+ Wrap ECC specific bits in ifdef.
+
+ Fixes tests when built against an OpenSSL configured with no-ec.
-commit 7169e31121e8c8cc729b55154deb722ae495b316
+commit 2ff822eabd7d4461743f22d3b9ba35ab76069df5
Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Mon Oct 28 16:00:45 2019 +1100
+Date: Fri Nov 29 20:21:36 2019 +1100
- Move utimensat definition into timespec section.
+ Wrap sha2.h include in ifdef.
- Since utimensat uses struct timespec, move it to the section where we
- define struct timespec when needed.
+ Fixes build --without-openssl on at least Fedora.
-commit 850ec1773d656cbff44d78a79e369dc262ce5853
-Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Mon Oct 28 15:57:22 2019 +1100
+commit 443848155ffcda65a6077aac118c861b503a093f
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date: Fri Nov 29 15:10:21 2019 +1100
- Wrap OpenSSL bits in WITH_OPENSSL.
+ compile sk-dummy.so with no-PIE version of LDFLAGS
+
+ This lets it pick up the -L path to libcrypto for example.
-commit 6fc7e1c6fec3ba589869ae98e968c0e5e2e4695b
-Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Mon Oct 28 15:53:25 2019 +1100
+commit 37f5b5346e4cc6a894245aa89d2930649bb7045b
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date: Fri Nov 29 14:48:46 2019 +1100
- Wrap poll.h includes in HAVE_POLL_H.
+ includes.h for sk-dummy.c, dummy
-commit 9239a18f96905cc1a353e861e33af093652f24e7
-Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Thu Oct 24 14:39:49 2019 +1100
+commit b218055e59a7c1a1816f7a55ca18e3f3c05d63a4
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date: Fri Nov 29 12:32:23 2019 +1100
- Add a function call stackprotector tests.
+ (yet) another x-platform fix for sk-dummy.so
- Including a function call in the test programs for the gcc stack
- protector flag tests exercises more of the compiler and makes it more
- likely it'll detect problems.
+ Check for -fPIC support from compiler
+
+ Compile libopenbsd-compat -fPIC
+
+ Don't mix -fPIE and -fPIC when compiling
-commit b9705393be4612fd5e29d0cd8e7cf2b66ed19eb7
-Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Tue Oct 22 18:09:22 2019 +1100
+commit 0dedb703adcd98d0dbc4479f5f312a2bd3df2850
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date: Fri Nov 29 11:53:57 2019 +1100
- Import regenerated moduli file.
+ needs includes.h for WITH_OPENSSL
-commit 76ed2199491397e0f9902ade80d5271e4a9b2630
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Wed Oct 16 06:05:39 2019 +0000
+commit ef3853bb94c2c72e7eda0de6cec0bcb1da62058f
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date: Fri Nov 29 11:52:23 2019 +1100
- upstream: potential NULL dereference for revoked hostkeys; reported
+ another attempt at sk-dummy.so working x-platform
- by krishnaiah bommu
+ include a fatal() implementation to satisfy libopenbsd-compat
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 35ff685e7cc9dd2e3fe2e3dfcdcb9bc5c79f6506
+ clean up .lo and .so files
+
+ .gitignore .lo and .so files
-commit 6500c3bc71bf4fe14972c1177e6b93f1164d07a4
+commit d46ac56f1cbd5a855a2d5e7309f90d383dcf6431
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Wed Oct 16 06:03:30 2019 +0000
+Date: Fri Nov 29 00:13:29 2019 +0000
- upstream: free buf before return; reported by krishnaiah bommu
+ upstream: lots of dependencies go away here with ed25519 no longer
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 091bb23a6e913af5d4f72c50030b53ce1cef4de1
+ needing the ssh_digest API.
+
+ OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 785847ec78cb580d141e29abce351a436d6b5d49
-commit d7d116b6d9e6cb79cc235e9801caa683d3db3181
+commit 7404b81f25a4a7847380c0f0cf7f1bea5f0a5cd3
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Mon Oct 14 06:00:02 2019 +0000
+Date: Fri Nov 29 00:11:21 2019 +0000
- upstream: memleak in error path; spotted by oss-fuzz, ok markus@
+ upstream: perform hashing directly in crypto_hash_sha512() using
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: d6ed260cbbc297ab157ad63931802fb1ef7a4266
+ libcrypto or libc SHA512 functions rather than calling ssh_digest_memory();
+ avoids many dependencies on ssh code that complicate standalone use of
+ ed25519, as we want to do in sk-dummy.so
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 5a3c37593d3ba7add037b587cec44aaea088496d
-commit 9b9e3ca6945351eefb821ff783a4a8e6d9b98b9a
-Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Fri Oct 11 14:12:16 2019 +1100
+commit d39a865b7af93a7a9b5a64cf7cf0ef4396c80ba3
+Author: jmc@openbsd.org <jmc@openbsd.org>
+Date: Thu Nov 28 12:24:31 2019 +0000
- Re-add SA_RESTART to mysignal.
+ upstream: improve the text for -A a little; input from naddy and
- This makes mysignal implement reliable BSD semantics according to
- Stevens' APUE. This was first attempted in 2001 but was reverted
- due to problems with HP-UX 10.20 and select() and possibly grantpt().
- Modern systems should be fine with it, but if any current platforms have
- a problem with it now we can disable it just for those. ok djm@
+ djm
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: f9cdfb1d6dbb9887c4bf3bb25f9c7a94294c988d
-commit 0bd312a362168c1eae3cd6b3889395a78e6fd0f8
-Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Thu Oct 10 09:42:03 2019 +1100
+commit 9a0e01bd0c61f553ead96b5af84abd73865847b8
+Author: jmc@openbsd.org <jmc@openbsd.org>
+Date: Thu Nov 28 12:23:25 2019 +0000
- Fix ifdef typo for declaration of memmem.
+ upstream: reshuffle the text to read better; input from naddy,
- Fixes build on IRIX. bz#3081.
+ djmc, and dtucker
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: a0b2aca2b67614dda3d6618ea097bf0610c35013
-commit 01ce1cd402d5eecde2bba35b67e08f5b266b37fd
-Author: Abhishek Arya <inferno@chromium.org>
-Date: Tue Oct 8 20:19:18 2019 -0700
+commit 5ca52c0f2e5e7f7d01d8d557b994b5c2087bed00
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date: Thu Nov 28 18:09:07 2019 +1100
- Update README.md
+ $< doesn't work as` I thought; explicily list objs
-commit 1ba130ac8fb2884307f658126f04578f8aef409e
-Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
-Date: Wed Oct 9 13:49:35 2019 +1100
+commit 18e84bfdc5906a73405c3b42d7f840013bbffe34
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Thu Nov 28 05:20:54 2019 +0000
- add a fuzzer for private key parsing
+ upstream: tweak wording
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: bd002ca1599b71331faca735ff5f6de29e32222e
-commit cdf1d0a9f5d18535e0a18ff34860e81a6d83aa5c
+commit 8ef5bf9d03aa0f047711cff47f5ffbe3b33ff8c9
Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
-Date: Wed Oct 9 11:31:03 2019 +1100
+Date: Thu Nov 28 13:12:30 2019 +1100
- prepare for 8.1 release
+ missing .SUFFIXES line makes make sad
-commit 3b4e56d740b74324e2d7542957cad5a11518f455
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Wed Oct 9 00:04:57 2019 +0000
+commit 323da82b8ea993b7f2c5793fd53b4f5ca105d19d
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date: Thu Nov 28 09:53:42 2019 +1100
- upstream: openssh-8.1
-
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 3356bb34e2aa287f0e6d6773c9ae659dc680147d
+ (hopefully) fix out of tree builds of sk-dummy.so
-commit 29e0ecd9b4eb3b9f305e2240351f0c59cad9ef81
+commit d8b2838c5d19bf409d44ede4d32df8ee47aeb4cd
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Wed Oct 9 00:04:42 2019 +0000
+Date: Wed Nov 27 22:32:11 2019 +0000
- upstream: fix an unreachable integer overflow similar to the XMSS
-
- case, and some other NULL dereferences found by fuzzing.
+ upstream: remove stray semicolon after closing brace of function;
- fix with and ok markus@
+ from Michael Forney
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 0f81adbb95ef887ce586953e1cb225fa45c7a47b
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: fda95acb799bb160d15e205ee126117cf33da3a7
-commit a546b17bbaeb12beac4c9aeed56f74a42b18a93a
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Wed Oct 9 00:02:57 2019 +0000
+commit 6e1d1bbf5a3eca875005e0c87f341a0a03799809
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date: Wed Nov 27 05:38:43 2019 +0000
- upstream: fix integer overflow in XMSS private key parsing.
+ upstream: Revert previous commit. The channels code still uses int
- Reported by Adam Zabrocki via SecuriTeam's SSH program.
+ in many places for channel ids so the INT_MAX check still makes sense.
- Note that this code is experimental and not compiled by default.
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 532e4b644791b826956c3c61d6ac6da39bac84bf
+
+commit 48989244658b9748b6801034ff4ffbdfc6b1520f
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date: Wed Nov 27 16:03:12 2019 +1100
+
+ wire sk-dummy.so into test suite
+
+commit f79364bacaebde4f1c260318ab460fceacace02f
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Wed Nov 27 05:00:17 2019 +0000
+
+ upstream: use error()+_exit() instead of fatal() to avoid running
- ok markus@
+ cleanup handlers in child process; spotted via weird regress failures in
+ portable
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: cd0361896d15e8a1bac495ac583ff065ffca2be1
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 6902a9bb3987c7d347774444f7979b8a9ba7f412
-commit c2cc25480ba36ab48c1a577bebb12493865aad87
+commit 70ec5e5e2681bcd409a9df94a2fec6f57a750945
Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
-Date: Tue Oct 8 22:40:39 2019 +0000
+Date: Wed Nov 27 03:34:04 2019 +0000
- upstream: Correct type for end-of-list sentinel; fixes initializer
+ upstream: Make channel_id u_int32_t and remove unnecessary check
- warnings on some platforms. ok deraadt.
+ and cast that were left over from the type conversion. Noted by
+ t-hashida@amiya.co.jp in bz#3098, ok markus@ djm@
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: a990dbc2dac25bdfa07e79321349c73fd991efa2
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 3ad105b6a905284e780b1fd7ff118e1c346e90b5
-commit e827aedf8818e75c0016b47ed8fc231427457c43
+commit ad44ca81bea83657d558aaef5a1d789a9032bac3
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Mon Oct 7 23:10:38 2019 +0000
+Date: Tue Nov 26 23:43:10 2019 +0000
- upstream: reversed test yielded incorrect debug message
+ upstream: test FIDO2/U2F key types; ok markus@
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 78bb512d04cfc238adb2c5b7504ac93eecf523b3
+ OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 367e06d5a260407619b4b113ea0bd7004a435474
-commit 8ca491d29fbe26e5909ce22b344c0a848dc28d55
-Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
-Date: Tue Oct 8 17:05:57 2019 +1100
+commit c6efa8a91af1d4fdb43909a23a0a4ffa012155ad
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Tue Nov 26 23:41:23 2019 +0000
- depend
+ upstream: add dummy security key middleware based on work by
+
+ markus@
+
+ This will allow us to test U2F/FIDO2 support in OpenSSH without
+ requiring real hardware.
+
+ ok markus@
+
+ OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 88b309464b8850c320cf7513f26d97ee1fdf9aae
-commit 86a0323374cbd404629e75bb320b3fa1c16aaa6b
-Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Wed Oct 9 09:36:06 2019 +1100
+commit 8635afa1cdc21366d61730d943f3cf61861899c8
+Author: jmc@openbsd.org <jmc@openbsd.org>
+Date: Tue Nov 26 22:42:26 2019 +0000
- Make MAKE_CLONE no-op macro more correct.
+ upstream: tweak previous;
- Similar to the previous change to DEF_WEAK, some compilers don't like
- the empty statement, so convert into a no-op function prototype.
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: a4c097364c75da320f1b291568db830fb1ee4883
-commit cfc1897a2002ec6c4dc879b24e8b3153c87ea2cf
-Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
-Date: Wed Oct 9 09:06:35 2019 +1100
+commit e0d38ae9bc8c0de421605b9021d8144e4d8ff22b
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Tue Nov 26 03:04:27 2019 +0000
- wrap stdint.h include in HAVE_STDINT_H
-
- make the indenting a little more consistent too..
+ upstream: more debugging; behind DEBUG_SK
- Fixes Solaris 2.6; reported by Tom G. Christensen
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: a978896227118557505999ddefc1f4c839818b60
-commit 13b3369830a43b89a503915216a23816d1b25744
+commit 9281d4311b8abc63b88259f354944c53f9b0b3c7
Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
-Date: Tue Oct 8 15:32:02 2019 +1100
+Date: Mon Nov 25 21:47:49 2019 +1100
- avoid "return (value)" in void-declared function
+ unbreak fuzzers for recent security key changes
+
+commit c5f1cc993597fed0a9013743556b1567f476c677
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Mon Nov 25 10:32:35 2019 +0000
+
+ upstream: unbreak tests for recent security key changes
- spotted by Tim Rice; ok dtucker
+ OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 2cdf2fcae9962ca4d711338f3ceec3c1391bdf95
-commit 0c7f8d2326d812b371f7afd63aff846973ec80a4
-Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Tue Oct 8 14:44:50 2019 +1100
+commit 64988266820cc90a45a21672be9d762cbde8d34d
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Mon Nov 25 06:53:04 2019 +0000
- Make DEF_WEAK more likely to be correct.
+ upstream: unbreak after security key support landed
- Completely nop-ing out DEF_WEAK leaves an empty statemment which some
- compilers don't like. Replace with a no-op function template. ok djm@
+ OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 3ab578b0dbeb2aa6d9969b54a9c1bad329c0dcba
-commit b1e79ea8fae9c252399677a28707661d85c7d00c
-Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
-Date: Sun Oct 6 11:49:50 2019 +0000
+commit e65e25c81e22ea622e89a142a303726a3882384f
+Author: tb@openbsd.org <tb@openbsd.org>
+Date: Thu Nov 21 05:18:47 2019 +0000
- upstream: Instead of running sed over the whole log to remove CRs,
+ upstream: Remove workaround for broken 'openssl rsa -text' output
- remove them only where it's needed (and confuses test(1) on at least OS X in
- portable).
+ that was fixed in libcrypto/rsa/rsa_ameth.c r1.24.
- OpenBSD-Regress-ID: a6ab9b4bd1d33770feaf01b2dfb96f9e4189d2d0
+ ok dtucker inoguchi
+
+ OpenBSD-Regress-ID: c260edfac177daa8fcce90141587cf04a95c4f5f
-commit 8dc7d6b75a7f746fdd056acd41dffc0a13557a4c
-Author: Eduardo Barretto <ebarretto@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
-Date: Tue May 9 13:33:30 2017 -0300
+commit 21377ec2a9378579ba4b44a681af7bbca77581f4
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Mon Nov 25 10:23:36 2019 +0000
- Enable specific ioctl call for EP11 crypto card (s390)
-
- The EP11 crypto card needs to make an ioctl call, which receives an
- specific argument. This crypto card is for s390 only.
+ upstream: redundant test
- Signed-off-by: Eduardo Barretto <ebarretto@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 38fa7806c528a590d91ae560e67bd8b246c2d7a3
-commit 07f2c7f34951c04d2cd796ac6c80e47c56c4969e
+commit 664deef95a2e770812533439b8bdd3f3c291ae59
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Oct 4 04:31:59 2019 +0000
+Date: Mon Nov 25 00:57:51 2019 +0000
- upstream: fix memory leak in error path; bz#3074 patch from
+ upstream: document the "no-touch-required" certificate extension;
- krishnaiah.bommu@intel.com, ok dtucker
+ ok markus, feedback deraadt
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: d031853f3ecf47b35a0669588f4d9d8e3b307b3c
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 47640122b13f825e9c404ea99803b2372246579d
-commit b7fbc75e119170f4d15c94a7fda4a1050e0871d6
+commit 26cb128b31efdd5395153f4943f5be3eddc07033
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Oct 4 04:13:39 2019 +0000
+Date: Mon Nov 25 00:57:27 2019 +0000
- upstream: space
+ upstream: Print a key touch reminder when generating a security
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 350648bcf00a2454e7ef998b7d88e42552b348ac
+ key. Most keys require a touch to authorize the operation.
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 7fe8b23edbf33e1bb81741b9f25e9a63be5f6b68
-commit 643ab68c79ac1644f4a31e36928c2bfc8a51db3c
+commit daeaf4136927c2a82af1399022103d67ff03f74a
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Oct 4 03:39:19 2019 +0000
+Date: Mon Nov 25 00:55:58 2019 +0000
- upstream: more sshsig regress tests: check key revocation, the
+ upstream: allow "ssh-keygen -x no-touch-required" when generating a
- check-novalidate signature test mode and signing keys in ssh-agent.
+ security key keypair to request one that does not require a touch for each
+ authentication attempt. The default remains to require touch.
- From Sebastian Kinne (slightly tweaked)
+ feedback deraadt; ok markus@
- OpenBSD-Regress-ID: b39566f5cec70140674658cdcedf38752a52e2e2
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 887e7084b2e89c0c62d1598ac378aad8e434bcbd
-commit 714031a10bbe378a395a93cf1040f4ee1451f45f
-Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Oct 4 03:26:58 2019 +0000
+commit 2e71263b80fec7ad977e098004fef7d122169d40
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Mon Nov 25 00:54:23 2019 +0000
- upstream: Check for gmtime failure in moduli generation. Based on
+ upstream: add a "no-touch-required" option for authorized_keys and
- patch from krishnaiah.bommu@intel.com, ok djm@
+ a similar extension for certificates. This option disables the default
+ requirement that security key signatures attest that the user touched their
+ key to authorize them.
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 4c6a4cde0022188ac83737de08da0e875704eeaa
+ feedback deraadt, ok markus
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: f1fb56151ba68d55d554d0f6d3d4dba0cf1a452e
-commit 6918974405cc28ed977f802fd97a9c9a9b2e141b
-Author: jmc@openbsd.org <jmc@openbsd.org>
-Date: Thu Oct 3 17:07:50 2019 +0000
+commit 0fddf2967ac51d518e300408a0d7e6adf4cd2634
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Mon Nov 25 00:52:46 2019 +0000
- upstream: use a more common options order in SYNOPSIS and sync
+ upstream: Add a sshd_config PubkeyAuthOptions directive
- usage(); while here, no need for Bk/Ek;
+ This directive has a single valid option "no-touch-required" that
+ causes sshd to skip checking whether user presence was tested before
+ a security key signature was made (usually by the user touching the
+ key).
- ok dtucker
+ ok markus@
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 38715c3f10b166f599a2283eb7bc14860211bb90
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 46e434a49802d4ed82bc0aa38cb985c198c407de
-commit feff96b7d4c0b99307f0459cbff128aede4a8984
+commit b7e74ea072919b31391bc0f5ff653f80b9f5e84f
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Wed Oct 2 09:50:50 2019 +0000
+Date: Mon Nov 25 00:51:37 2019 +0000
- upstream: thinko in previous; spotted by Mantas
+ upstream: Add new structure for signature options
- =?UTF-8?q?=20Mikul=C4=97nas?=
- MIME-Version: 1.0
- Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
- Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
+ This is populated during signature verification with additional fields
+ that are present in and covered by the signature. At the moment, it is
+ only used to record security key-specific options, especially the flags
+ field.
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: ffa3f5a45e09752fc47d9041e2203ee2ec15b24d
+ with and ok markus@
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 338a1f0e04904008836130bedb9ece4faafd4e49
-commit b5a89eec410967d6b712665f8cf0cb632928d74b
+commit d2b0f88178ec9e3f11b606bf1004ac2fe541a2c3
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Wed Oct 2 08:07:13 2019 +0000
+Date: Mon Nov 25 00:38:17 2019 +0000
- upstream: make signature format match PROTOCO
-
- =?UTF-8?q?=20as=20a=20string,=20not=20raw=20bytes.=20Spotted=20by=20Manta?=
- =?UTF-8?q?s=20Mikul=C4=97nas?=
- MIME-Version: 1.0
- Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
- Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
+ upstream: memleak in error path
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 80fcc6d52893f80c6de2bedd65353cebfebcfa8f
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 93488431bf02dde85a854429362695d2d43d9112
-commit dc6f81ee94995deb11bbf7e19801022c5f6fd90a
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Wed Oct 2 08:05:50 2019 +0000
+commit e2c0a21ade5e0bd7f0aab08d7eb9457f086681e9
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Nov 22 06:50:30 2019 +0000
- upstream: ban empty namespace strings for s
+ upstream: Wait for FD to be readable or writeable during a nonblocking
- =?UTF-8?q?shsig;=20spotted=20by=20Mantas=20Mikul=C4=97nas?=
- MIME-Version: 1.0
- Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
- Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
+ connect, not just readable. Prevents a timeout when the server doesn't
+ immediately send a banner (eg multiplexers like sslh) but is also slightly
+ quicker for other connections since, unlike ssh1, ssh2 doesn't specify
+ that the client should parse the server banner before sending its own.
+ Patch from mnissler@chromium.org, ok djm@
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 7c5bcf40bed8f4e826230176f4aa353c52aeb698
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: aba9cd8480d1d9dd31d0ca0422ea155c26c5df1d
-commit fa5bd8107e0e2b3e1e184f55d0f9320c119f65f0
+commit 2f95d43dc222ce194622b706682e8de07c9cfb42
Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Wed Oct 2 14:30:55 2019 +1000
+Date: Wed Nov 20 16:34:11 2019 +1100
- Put ssherr.h back as it's actually needed.
+ Include openssl compat header.
+
+ Fixes warning for ECDSA_SIG_set0 on OpenSSL versions prior to 1.1.
-commit 3ef92a657444f172b61f92d5da66d94fa8265602
-Author: Lonnie Abelbeck <lonnie@abelbeck.com>
-Date: Tue Oct 1 09:05:09 2019 -0500
+commit a70d92f236576c032a45c39e68ca0d71e958d19d
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Tue Nov 19 22:23:19 2019 +0000
- Deny (non-fatal) shmget/shmat/shmdt in preauth privsep child.
+ upstream: adjust on-wire signature encoding for ecdsa-sk keys to
- New wait_random_seeded() function on OpenSSL 1.1.1d uses shmget, shmat, and shmdt
- in the preauth codepath, deny (non-fatal) in seccomp_filter sandbox.
-
-commit edd1d3a6261aecbf9a55944fd7be1db83571b46e
-Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
-Date: Wed Oct 2 10:54:28 2019 +1000
-
- remove duplicate #includes
+ better match ec25519-sk keys. Discussed with markus@ and Sebastian Kinne
- Prompted by Jakub Jelen
-
-commit 13c508dfed9f25e6e54c984ad00a74ef08539e70
-Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
-Date: Wed Oct 2 10:51:15 2019 +1000
-
- typo in comment
-
-commit d0c3ac427f6c52b872d6617421421dd791664445
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Wed Oct 2 00:42:30 2019 +0000
-
- upstream: remove some duplicate #includes
+ NB. if you are depending on security keys (already?) then make sure you
+ update both your clients and servers.
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: ed6827ab921eff8027669848ef4f70dc1da4098c
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 53d88d8211f0dd02a7954d3af72017b1a79c0679
-commit 084682786d9275552ee93857cb36e43c446ce92c
+commit 26369a5f7d9c4e4ef44a3e04910126e1bcea43d8
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Tue Oct 1 10:22:53 2019 +0000
+Date: Tue Nov 19 22:21:15 2019 +0000
- upstream: revert unconditional forced login implemented in r1.41 of
-
- ssh-pkcs11.c; r1.45 added a forced login as a fallback for cases where the
- token returns no objects and this is less disruptive for users of tokens
- directly in ssh (rather than via ssh-agent) and in ssh-keygen
+ upstream: a little more information from the monitor when signature
- bz3006, patch from Jakub Jelen; ok markus
+ verification fails.
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 33d6df589b072094384631ff93b1030103b3d02e
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: e6a30071e0518cac512f9e10be3dc3500e2003f3
-commit 6c91d42cce3f055917dc3fd2c305dfc5b3b584b3
+commit 4402d6c9b5bf128dcfae2429f1d41cdaa8849b6b
Author: jmc@openbsd.org <jmc@openbsd.org>
-Date: Sun Sep 29 16:31:57 2019 +0000
+Date: Tue Nov 19 16:02:32 2019 +0000
- upstream: group and sort single letter options; ok deraadt
+ upstream: revert previous: naddy pointed out what's meant to
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: e1480e760a2b582f79696cdcff70098e23fc603f
+ happen. rethink needed...
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: fb0fede8123ea7f725fd65e00d49241c40bd3421
-commit 3b44bf39ff4d7ef5d50861e2e9dda62d2926d2fe
+commit 88056f881315233e990e4e04a815f8f96b4674e1
Author: jmc@openbsd.org <jmc@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Sep 27 20:03:24 2019 +0000
+Date: Tue Nov 19 14:54:47 2019 +0000
- upstream: fix the DH-GEX text in -a; because this required a comma,
+ upstream: -c and -s do not make sense with -k; reshuffle -k into
- i added a comma to the first part, for balance...
+ the main synopsis/usage; ok djm
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 2c3464e9e82a41e8cdfe8f0a16d94266e43dbb58
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: f881ba253da015398ae8758d973e3390754869bc
-commit 3e53ef28fab53094e3b19622ba0e9c3d5fe71273
-Author: deraadt@openbsd.org <deraadt@openbsd.org>
-Date: Tue Sep 24 12:50:46 2019 +0000
+commit 2cf262c21f35296c2ff718cfdb52e0473a1c3983
+Author: naddy@openbsd.org <naddy@openbsd.org>
+Date: Mon Nov 18 23:17:48 2019 +0000
- upstream: identity_file[] should be PATH_MAX, not the arbitrary
+ upstream: document '$' environment variable expansion for
- number 1024
+ SecurityKeyProvider; ok djm@
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: e775f94ad47ce9ab37bd1410d7cf3b7ea98b11b7
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 76db507ebd336a573e1cd4146cc40019332c5799
-commit 90d4b2541e8c907793233d9cbd4963f7624f4174
-Author: jmc@openbsd.org <jmc@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Sep 20 18:50:58 2019 +0000
+commit f0edda81c5ebccffcce52b182c3033531a1aab71
+Author: naddy@openbsd.org <naddy@openbsd.org>
+Date: Mon Nov 18 23:16:49 2019 +0000
- upstream: new sentence, new line;
+ upstream: more missing mentions of ed25519-sk; ok djm@
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: c35ca5ec07be460e95e7406af12eee04a77b6698
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: f242e53366f61697dffd53af881bc5daf78230ff
-commit fbec7dba01b70b49ac47f56031310865dff86200
-Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Mon Sep 30 18:01:12 2019 +1000
+commit 189550f5bc85148e85f4caa1f6b2fc623149a4ee
+Author: naddy@openbsd.org <naddy@openbsd.org>
+Date: Mon Nov 18 16:10:05 2019 +0000
- Include stdio.h for snprintf.
+ upstream: additional missing stdarg.h includes when built without
- Patch from vapier@gentoo.org.
-
-commit 0a403bfde71c4b82147473298d3a60b4171468bd
-Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Mon Sep 30 14:11:42 2019 +1000
-
- Add SKIP_LTESTS for skipping specific tests.
+ WITH_OPENSSL; ok djm@
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 881f9a2c4e2239849cee8bbf4faec9bab128f55b
-commit 4d59f7a5169c451ebf559aedec031ac9da2bf80c
-Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Sep 27 05:25:12 2019 +0000
+commit 723a5369864b338c48d22854bc2bb4ee5c083deb
+Author: naddy@openbsd.org <naddy@openbsd.org>
+Date: Mon Nov 18 16:08:57 2019 +0000
- upstream: Test for empty result in expected bits. Remove CRs from log
+ upstream: add the missing WITH_OPENSSL ifdefs after the ED25519-SK
- as they confuse tools on some platforms. Re-enable the 3des-cbc test.
+ addition; ok djm@
- OpenBSD-Regress-ID: edf536d4f29fc1ba412889b37247a47f1b49d250
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: a9545e1c273e506cf70e328cbb9d0129b6d62474
-commit 7c817d129e2d48fc8a6f7965339313023ec45765
-Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Fri Sep 27 15:26:22 2019 +1000
+commit 478f4f98e4e93ae4ed1a8911dec4e5b75ea10f30
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date: Tue Nov 19 08:52:24 2019 +1100
- Re-enable dhgex test.
+ remove all EC algs from proposals, no just sk ones
- Since we've added larger fallback groups to dh.c this test will pass
- even if there is no moduli file installed on the system.
+ ok dtucker@
-commit c1e0a32fa852de6d1c82ece4f76add0ab0ca0eae
-Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Tue Sep 24 21:17:20 2019 +1000
+commit 6a7ef310da100f876a257b7367e3b0766dac3994
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date: Mon Nov 18 22:22:04 2019 +1100
- Add more ToS bits, currently only used by netcat.
+ filter PUBKEY_DEFAULT_PK_ALG for ECC algorithms
+
+ Remove ECC algorithms from the PUBKEY_DEFAULT_PK_ALG list when
+ compiling without ECC support in libcrypto.
-commit 5a273a33ca1410351cb484af7db7c13e8b4e8e4e
-Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Thu Sep 19 15:41:23 2019 +1000
+commit 64f56f1d1af3947a71a4c391f2c08747d19ee591
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date: Mon Nov 18 09:15:17 2019 +0000
- Privsep is now required.
+ upstream: LibreSSL change the format for openssl rsa -text output from
+
+ "publicExponent" to "Exponent" so accept either. with djm.
+
+ OpenBSD-Regress-ID: b7e6c4bf700029a31c98be14600d4472fe0467e6
-commit 8aa2aa3cd4d27d14e74b247c773696349472ef20
+commit 4bfc0503ad94a2a7190686a89649567c20b8534f
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Mon Sep 16 03:23:02 2019 +0000
+Date: Mon Nov 18 06:58:00 2019 +0000
- upstream: Allow testing signature syntax and validity without verifying
-
- that a signature came from a trusted signer. To discourage accidental or
- unintentional use, this is invoked by the deliberately ugly option name
- "check-novalidate"
-
- from Sebastian Kinne
+ upstream: fix a bug that prevented serialisation of ed25519-sk keys
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: cea42c36ab7d6b70890e2d8635c1b5b943adcc0b
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 066682b79333159cac04fcbe03ebd9c8dcc152a9
-commit 7047d5afe3103f0f07966c05b810682d92add359
+commit d88205417084f523107fbe1bc92061635cd57fd2
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Sep 13 04:52:34 2019 +0000
+Date: Mon Nov 18 06:39:36 2019 +0000
- upstream: clarify that IdentitiesOnly also applies to the default
-
- ~/.ssh/id_* keys; bz#3062
+ upstream: Fix incorrect error message when key certification fails
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 604be570e04646f0f4a17026f8b2aada6a585dfa
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 7771bd77ee73f7116df37c734c41192943a73cee
-commit b36ee3fcb2f1601693b1b7fd60dd6bd96006ea75
-Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Sep 13 04:36:43 2019 +0000
+commit 740c4bc9875cbb4b9fc03fd5eac19df080f20df5
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Mon Nov 18 06:39:02 2019 +0000
- upstream: Plug mem leaks on error paths, based in part on github
+ upstream: fix bug that prevented certification of ed25519-sk keys
- pr#120 from David Carlier. ok djm@.
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 64c8cc6f5de2cdd0ee3a81c3a9dee8d862645996
+
+commit 85409cbb505d8c463ab6e2284b4039764c7243de
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Mon Nov 18 06:24:17 2019 +0000
+
+ upstream: allow *-sk key types to be turned into certificates
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: c57adeb1022a8148fc86e5a88837b3b156dbdb7e
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: cd365ee343934862286d0b011aa77fa739d2a945
-commit 2aefdf1aef906cf7548a2e5927d35aacb55948d4
+commit e2e1283404e06a22ac6135d057199e70dcadb8dd
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Sep 13 04:31:19 2019 +0000
+Date: Mon Nov 18 04:55:02 2019 +0000
- upstream: whitespace
+ upstream: mention ed25519-sk key/cert types here too; prompted by
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 57a71dd5f4cae8d61e0ac631a862589fb2bfd700
+ jmc@
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: e281977e4a4f121f3470517cbd5e483eee37b818
-commit fbe24b142915331ceb2a3a76be3dc5b6d204fddf
+commit 97dc5d1d82865a7d20f1eb193b5c62ce684024e5
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Sep 13 04:27:35 2019 +0000
+Date: Mon Nov 18 04:50:45 2019 +0000
- upstream: allow %n to be expanded in ProxyCommand strings
+ upstream: mention ed25519-sk in places where it is accepted;
- From Zachary Harmany via github.com/openssh/openssh-portable/pull/118
- ok dtucker@
+ prompted by jmc@
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 7eebf1b7695f50c66d42053d352a4db9e8fb84b6
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 076d386739ebe7336c2137e583bc7a5c9538a442
-commit 2ce1d11600e13bee0667d6b717ffcc18a057b821
+commit 130664344862a8c7afd3e24d8d36ce40af41a99f
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Sep 13 04:07:42 2019 +0000
+Date: Mon Nov 18 04:34:47 2019 +0000
- upstream: clarify that ConnectTimeout applies both to the TCP
+ upstream: document ed25519-sk pubkey, private key and certificate
- connection and to the protocol handshake/KEX. From Jean-Charles Longuet via
- Github PR140
+ formats
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: ce1766abc6da080f0d88c09c2c5585a32b2256bf
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 795a7c1c80315412e701bef90e31e376ea2f3c88
-commit df780114278f406ef7cb2278802a2660092fff09
-Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
-Date: Mon Sep 9 02:31:19 2019 +0000
+commit 71856e1142fc01628ce53098f8cfc74765464b35
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Mon Nov 18 04:29:50 2019 +0000
- upstream: Fix potential truncation warning. ok deraadt.
+ upstream: correct order or ecdsa-sk private key fields
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: d87b7e3a94ec935e8194e7fce41815e22804c3ff
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 4d4a0c13226a79f0080ce6cbe74f73b03ed8092e
-commit ec0e6243660bf2df30c620a6a0d83eded376c9c6
-Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
-Date: Fri Sep 13 13:14:39 2019 +1000
+commit 93fa2a6649ae3e0626cbff25c985a4573d63e3f2
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Mon Nov 18 04:16:53 2019 +0000
- memleak of buffer in sshpam_query
+ upstream: correct description of fields in pub/private keys (was
- coverity report via Ed Maste; ok dtucker@
+ missing curve name); spotted by Sebastian Kinne
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 2a11340dc7ed16200342d384fb45ecd4fcce26e7
-commit c17e4638e5592688264fc0349f61bfc7b4425aa5
+commit b497e920b409250309c4abe64229237b8f2730ba
Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
-Date: Fri Sep 13 13:12:42 2019 +1000
+Date: Mon Nov 18 15:05:04 2019 +1100
- explicitly test set[ug]id() return values
+ Teach the GTK2/3 ssh-askpass the new prompt hints
- Legacy !_POSIX_SAVED_IDS path only; coverity report via Ed Maste
- ok dtucker@
-
-commit 91a2135f32acdd6378476c5bae475a6e7811a6a2
-Author: naddy@openbsd.org <naddy@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Sep 6 14:45:34 2019 +0000
-
- upstream: Allow prepending a list of algorithms to the default set
-
- by starting the list with the '^' character, e.g.
-
- HostKeyAlgorithms ^ssh-ed25519
- Ciphers ^aes128-gcm@openssh.com,aes256-gcm@openssh.com
+ ssh/ssh-agent now sets a hint environment variable $SSH_ASKPASS_PROMPT
+ when running the askpass program. This is intended to allow the
+ askpass to vary its UI across the three cases it supports: asking for
+ a passphrase, confirming the use of a key and (recently) reminding
+ a user to touch their security key.
- ok djm@ dtucker@
+ This adapts the gnome-ssh-askpass[23] to use these hints. Specifically,
+ for SSH_ASKPASS_PROMPT=confirm it will skip the text input box and show
+ only "yes"/"no" buttons. For SSH_ASKPASS_PROMPT=none (used to remind
+ users to tap their security key), it shows only a "close" button.
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 1e1996fac0dc8a4b0d0ff58395135848287f6f97
+ Help wanted: adapt the other askpass programs in active use, including
+ x11-ssh-askpass, lxqt-openssh-askpass, etc.
-commit c8bdd2db77ac2369d5cdee237656f266c8f41552
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Sep 6 07:53:40 2019 +0000
+commit 857f49e91eeae6feb781ef5f5e26c38ca3d953ec
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Mon Nov 18 14:15:26 2019 +1100
- upstream: key conversion should fail for !openssl builds, not fall
-
- through to the key generation code
+ Move ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC.
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: b957436adc43c4941e61d61958a193a708bc83c9
+ Found by -Wimplicit-fallthrough: one ECC case was not inside the ifdef.
+ ok djm@
-commit 823f6c37eb2d8191d45539f7b6fa877a4cb4ed3d
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Sep 6 06:08:11 2019 +0000
+commit 6cf1c40096a79e5eedcf897c7cdb46bb32d4a3ee
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Mon Nov 18 14:14:18 2019 +1100
- upstream: typo in previous
+ Enable -Wimplicit-fallthrough if supported
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 7c3b94110864771a6b80a0d8acaca34037c3c96e
-
-commit 6a710d3e06fd375e2c2ae02546b9541c488a2cdb
-Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
-Date: Sun Sep 8 14:48:11 2019 +1000
-
- needs time.h for --without-openssl
-
-commit f61f29afda6c71eda26effa54d3c2e5306fd0833
-Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
-Date: Sat Sep 7 19:25:00 2019 +1000
-
- make unittests pass for no-openssl case
+ Suggested by djm.
-commit 105e1c9218940eb53473f55a9177652d889ddbad
+commit 103c51fd5f5ddc01cd6b5c1132e711765b921bf5
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Sep 6 05:59:41 2019 +0000
+Date: Mon Nov 18 01:59:48 2019 +0000
- upstream: avoid compiling certain files that deeply depend on
-
- libcrypto when WITH_OPENSSL isn't set
+ upstream: missing break in getopt switch; spotted by Sebastian Kinne
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 569f08445c27124ec7c7f6c0268d844ec56ac061
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: f002dbf14dba5586e8407e90f0141148ade8e8fc
-commit 670104b923dd97b1c06c0659aef7c3e52af571b2
+commit 9a1225e8ca2ce1fe809910874935302234399a6d
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Sep 6 05:23:55 2019 +0000
+Date: Sat Nov 16 23:17:20 2019 +0000
- upstream: fixes for !WITH_OPENSSL compilation; ok dtucker@
+ upstream: tweak debug message
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 7fd68eaa9e0f7482b5d4c7e8d740aed4770a839f
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 2bf336d3be0b7e3dd97920d7e7471146a281d2b9
-commit be02d7cbde3d211ec2ed2320a1f7d86b2339d758
+commit 4103a3ec7c68493dbc4f0994a229507e943a86d3
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Sep 6 04:53:27 2019 +0000
+Date: Sat Nov 16 22:42:30 2019 +0000
- upstream: lots of things were relying on libcrypto headers to
-
- transitively include various system headers (mostly stdlib.h); include them
- explicitly
+ upstream: a little debug() in the security key interface
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 5b522f4f2d844f78bf1cc4f3f4cc392e177b2080
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 4c70300609a5c8b19707207bb7ad4109e963b0e8
-commit d05aaaaadcad592abfaa44540928e0c61ef72ebb
+commit 05daa211de926f66f50b7380d637f84dc6341574
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Sep 6 03:30:42 2019 +0000
+Date: Sat Nov 16 22:36:48 2019 +0000
- upstream: remove leakmalloc reference; we used this early when
+ upstream: always use ssh-sk-helper, even for the internal USB HID
- refactoring but not since
+ support. This avoid the need for a wpath pledge in ssh-agent.
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: bb28ebda8f7c490b87b37954044a6cdd43a7eb2c
+ reported by jmc@
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 19f799c4d020b870741d221335dbfa5e76691c23
-commit 1268f0bcd8fc844ac6c27167888443c8350005eb
-Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Sep 6 04:24:06 2019 +0000
+commit d431778a561d90131814f986b646299f9af33c8c
+Author: markus@openbsd.org <markus@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Nov 15 15:41:01 2019 +0000
- upstream: Check for RSA support before using it for the user key,
-
- otherwise use ed25519 which is supported when built without OpenSSL.
+ upstream: fix typos in sk_enroll
- OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 3d23ddfe83c5062f00ac845d463f19a2ec78c0f7
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: faa9bf779e008b3e64e2eb1344d9b7d83b3c4487
-commit fd7a2dec652b9efc8e97f03f118f935dce732c60
-Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Fri Sep 6 14:07:10 2019 +1000
+commit af90aec0443ec51e6b2d804cb91771d3905f8a6f
+Author: jmc@openbsd.org <jmc@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Nov 15 11:16:28 2019 +0000
- Provide explicit path to configure-check.
+ upstream: double word;
- On some platforms (at least OpenBSD) make won't search VPATH for target
- files, so building out-of-tree will fail at configure-check. Provide
- explicit path. ok djm@
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 43d09bafa4ea9002078cb30ca9adc3dcc0b9c2b9
-commit 00865c29690003b4523cc09a0e104724b9f911a4
+commit fd1a96490cef7f945a1b3b5df4e90c8a1070f425
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Sep 6 01:58:50 2019 +0000
+Date: Fri Nov 15 06:00:20 2019 +0000
- upstream: better error code for bad arguments; inspired by
+ upstream: remove most uses of BN_CTX
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: dfc263b6041de7f0ed921a1de0b81ddebfab1e0a
-
-commit afdf27f5aceb4973b9f5308f4310c6e3fd8db1fb
-Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
-Date: Thu Sep 5 21:38:40 2019 +1000
-
- revert config.h/config.h.in freshness checks
+ We weren't following the rules re BN_CTX_start/BN_CTX_end and the places
+ we were using it didn't benefit from its use anyway. ok dtucker@
- turns out autoreconf and configure don't touch some files if their content
- doesn't change, so the mtime can't be relied upon in a makefile rule
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: ea9ba6c0d2e6f6adfe00b309a8f41842fe12fc7a
-commit a97609e850c57bd2cc2fe7e175fc35cb865bc834
-Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
-Date: Thu Sep 5 20:54:39 2019 +1000
+commit 39b87104cdd47baf79ef77dc81de62cea07d119f
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Fri Nov 15 18:56:54 2019 +1100
- extend autoconf freshness test
+ Add wrappers for other ultrix headers.
- make it cover config.h.in and config.h separately
+ Wrappers protect against multiple inclusions for headers that don't do
+ it themselves.
-commit 182297c10edb21c4856c6a38326fd04d81de41a5
-Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
-Date: Thu Sep 5 20:34:54 2019 +1000
+commit 134a74f4e0cf750931f1125beb2a3f40c54c8809
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Fri Nov 15 18:55:13 2019 +1100
- check that configure/config.h is up to date
-
- Ensure they are newer than the configure.ac / aclocal.m4 source
+ Add SSIZE_MAX when we define ssize_t.
-commit 7d6034bd020248e9fc0f8c39c71c858debd0d0c1
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Thu Sep 5 10:05:51 2019 +0000
+commit 9c6d0a3a1ed77989d8c5436d8c3cc6c7045c0197
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Fri Nov 15 17:13:19 2019 +1100
- upstream: if a PKCS#11 token returns no keys then try to login and
-
- refetch them. Based on patch from Jakub Jelen; bz#2430 ok markus@
-
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: ab53bd6ddd54dd09e54a8bfbed1a984496f08b43
+ Remove ultrix realpath hack.
-commit 76f09bd95917862101b740afb19f4db5ccc752bf
+commit c63fba5e3472307167850bbd84187186af7fa9f0
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Thu Sep 5 09:35:19 2019 +0000
+Date: Fri Nov 15 05:37:27 2019 +0000
- upstream: sprinkle in some explicit errors here, otherwise the
-
- percolate all the way up to dispatch_run_fatal() and lose all meaninful
- context
+ upstream: unshield security key privkey before attempting signature
- to help with bz#3063; ok dtucker@
+ in agent. spotted by dtucker@
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 5b2da83bb1c4a3471444b7910b2120ae36438a0a
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: fb67d451665385b8a0a55371231c50aac67b91d2
-commit 0ea332497b2b2fc3995f72f6bafe9d664c0195b3
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Thu Sep 5 09:25:13 2019 +0000
+commit d165bb5396e3f718480e6039ca2cf77f5a2c2885
+Author: deraadt@openbsd.org <deraadt@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Nov 15 05:26:56 2019 +0000
- upstream: only send ext_info for KEX_INITIAL; bz#2929 ok dtucker
+ upstream: rewrite c99-ism
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 00f5c6062f6863769f5447c6346f78c05d2e4a63
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: d0c70cca29cfa7e6d9f7ec1d6d5dabea112499b3
-commit f23d91f9fa7f6f42e70404e000fac88aebfe3076
-Author: jmc@openbsd.org <jmc@openbsd.org>
-Date: Thu Sep 5 05:47:23 2019 +0000
+commit 03e06dd0e6e1c0a9f4b4b9de7def8a44dcbf93a7
+Author: deraadt@openbsd.org <deraadt@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Nov 15 05:25:52 2019 +0000
- upstream: macro fix; ok djm
+ upstream: only clang understands those new -W options
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: e891dd6c7996114cb32f0924cb7898ab55efde6e
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: d9b910e412d139141b072a905e66714870c38ac0
-commit 8b57337c1c1506df2bb9f039d0628a6de618566b
+commit 5c0bc273cba53f822b7d777bbb6c35d160d3b505
Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
-Date: Thu Sep 5 15:46:39 2019 +1000
+Date: Fri Nov 15 16:08:00 2019 +1100
- update fuzzing makefile to more recent clang
+ configure flag to built-in security key support
+
+ Require --with-security-key-builtin before enabling the built-in
+ security key support (and consequent dependency on libfido2).
-commit ae631ad77daf8fd39723d15a687cd4b1482cbae8
+commit fbcb9a7fa55300b8bd4c18bee024c6104c5a25d7
Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
-Date: Thu Sep 5 15:45:32 2019 +1000
+Date: Fri Nov 15 16:06:30 2019 +1100
- fuzzer for sshsig allowed_signers option parsing
+ upstream commit
+
+ revision 1.48
+ date: 2019/02/04 16:45:40; author: millert; state: Exp; lines: +16 -17; commitid: cpNtVC7erojNyctw;
+ Make gl_pathc, gl_matchc and gl_offs size_t in glob_t to match POSIX.
+ This requires a libc major version bump. OK deraadt@
-commit 69159afe24120c97e5ebaf81016c85968afb903e
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Thu Sep 5 05:42:59 2019 +0000
+commit 2cfb11abac85885de0cb888bbeb9a3e4303105ea
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date: Fri Nov 15 16:05:07 2019 +1100
- upstream: memleak on error path; found by libfuzzer
+ upstream commit
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 34d44cb0fb5bdb5fcbc6b02b804e71b20a7a5fc7
+ revision 1.47
+ date: 2017/05/08 14:53:27; author: millert; state: Exp; lines: +34 -21; commitid: sYfxfyUHAfarP8sE;
+ Fix exponential CPU use with repeated '*' operators by changing '*'
+ handling to be interative instead of recursive.
+ Fix by Yves Orton, ported to OpenBSD glob.c by Ray Lai. OK tb@
-commit bab6feb01f9924758ca7129dba708298a53dde5f
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Thu Sep 5 04:55:32 2019 +0000
+commit 228dd595c7882bb9b161dbb7d4dca15c8a5f03f5
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date: Fri Nov 15 16:04:28 2019 +1100
- upstream: expose allowed_signers options parsing code in header for
+ upstream commit
- fuzzing
+ revision 1.46
+ date: 2015/12/28 22:08:18; author: mmcc; state: Exp; lines: +5 -9; commitid: 0uXuF2O13NH9q2e1;
+ Remove NULL-checks before free() and a few related dead assignments.
- rename to make more consistent with philosophically-similar auth
- options parsing API.
-
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 0c67600ef04187f98e2912ca57b60c22a8025b7c
+ ok and valuable input from millert@
-commit 4f9d75fbafde83d428e291516f8ce98e6b3a7c4b
-Author: naddy@openbsd.org <naddy@openbsd.org>
-Date: Wed Sep 4 20:31:15 2019 +0000
+commit a16f748690139b9f452485d97511ad5e578f59b2
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date: Fri Nov 15 16:02:43 2019 +1100
- upstream: Call comma-separated lists as such to clarify semantics.
-
- Options such as Ciphers take values that may be a list of ciphers; the
- complete list, not indiviual elements, may be prefixed with a dash or plus
- character to remove from or append to the default list, respectively.
-
- Users might read the current text as if each elment took an optional prefix,
- so tweak the wording from "values" to "list" to prevent such ambiguity for
- all options supporting these semantics.
-
- Fix instances missed in first commit. ok jmc@ kn@
+ upstream commit
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 7112522430a54fb9f15a7a26d26190ed84d5e417
+ revision 1.44
+ date: 2015/09/14 16:09:13; author: tedu; state: Exp; lines: +3 -5; commitid: iWfSX2BIn0sLw62l;
+ remove null check before free. from Michael McConville
+ ok semarie
-commit db1e6f60f03641b2d17e0ab062242609f4ed4598
-Author: jmc@openbsd.org <jmc@openbsd.org>
-Date: Wed Sep 4 05:56:54 2019 +0000
+commit fd37cdeafe25adfcdc752280f535d28de7997ff1
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date: Fri Nov 15 16:02:27 2019 +1100
- upstream: tweak previous;
+ upstream commit
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 0abd728aef6b5b35f6db43176aa83b7e3bf3ce27
+ revision 1.43
+ date: 2015/06/13 16:57:04; author: deraadt; state: Exp; lines: +4 -4; commitid: zOUKuqWBdOPOz1SZ;
+ in glob() initialize the glob_t before the first failure check.
+ from j@pureftpd.org
+ ok millert stsp
-commit 0f44e5956c7c816f6600f2a47be4d7bb5a8d711d
-Author: naddy@openbsd.org <naddy@openbsd.org>
-Date: Tue Sep 3 20:51:49 2019 +0000
+commit fd62769c3882adea118dccaff80a06009874a2d1
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date: Fri Nov 15 16:01:20 2019 +1100
- upstream: repair typo and editing mishap
+ upstream commit
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: d125ab720ca71ccf9baf83e08ddc8c12a328597e
+ revision 1.42
+ date: 2015/02/05 12:59:57; author: millert; state: Exp; lines: +2 -1; commitid: DTQbfd4poqBW8iSJ;
+ Include stdint.h, not limits.h to get SIZE_MAX. OK guenther@
-commit f4846dfc6a79f84bbc6356ae3184f142bacedc24
+commit 2b6cba7ee2b8b36f393be739c860a9d2e5d8eb48
Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
-Date: Thu Sep 5 11:09:28 2019 +1000
+Date: Fri Nov 15 16:00:07 2019 +1100
- Fuzzer harness for sshsig
+ upstream commit
+
+ revision 1.41
+ date: 2014/10/08 05:35:27; author: deraadt; state: Exp; lines: +3 -3; commitid: JwTGarRLHQKDgPh2;
+ obvious realloc -> reallocarray conversion
-commit b08a6bc1cc7750c6f8a425d1cdbd86552fffc637
-Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
-Date: Tue Sep 3 18:45:42 2019 +1000
+commit ab3600665387ae34785498558c4409e27f495b0b
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Nov 15 04:12:32 2019 +0000
- oops; missed including the actual file
+ upstream: don't consult dlopen whitelist for internal security key
+
+ provider; spotted by dtucker@
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: bfe5fbd17e4ff95dd85b9212181652b54444192e
-commit 1a72c0dd89f09754df443c9576dde624a17d7dd0
+commit 19f8ec428db835f68c1cfd63587e9880ccd6486c
Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
-Date: Tue Sep 3 18:44:10 2019 +1000
-
- portability fixes for sshsig
-
-commit 6d6427d01304d967e58544cf1c71d2b4394c0522
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Tue Sep 3 08:37:45 2019 +0000
+Date: Fri Nov 15 15:08:28 2019 +1100
- upstream: regress test for sshsig; feedback and ok markus@
+ upstream commit
- OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 74c0974f2cdae8d9599b9d76a09680bae55d8a8b
+ revision 1.40
+ date: 2013/09/30 12:02:34; author: millert; state: Exp; lines: +14 -15;
+ Use PATH_MAX, NAME_MAX and LOGIN_NAME_MAX not MAXPATHNAMELEN,
+ MAXNAMLEN or MAXLOGNAME where possible. OK deraadt@
-commit 59650f0eaf65115afe04c39abfb93a4fc994ec55
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Tue Sep 3 08:37:06 2019 +0000
+commit bb7413db98e418d4af791244660abf6c829783f5
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date: Fri Nov 15 15:07:30 2019 +1100
- upstream: only add plain keys to prevent any certs laying around
-
- from confusing the test.
+ upstream commit
- OpenBSD-Regress-ID: b8f1508f822bc560b98dea910e61ecd76f34100f
+ revision 1.39
+ date: 2012/01/20 07:09:42; author: tedu; state: Exp; lines: +4 -4;
+ the glob stat limit is way too low. bump to 2048.
+ while here, failed stats should count against the limit too.
+ ok deraadt sthen stsp
-commit d637c4aee6f9b5280c13c020d7653444ac1fcaa5
+commit 01362cf7cb979525c014714e2bccf799a46e772e
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Tue Sep 3 08:35:27 2019 +0000
+Date: Fri Nov 15 03:41:57 2019 +0000
- upstream: sshsig tweaks and improvements from and suggested by
-
- Markus
+ upstream: U2F tokens may return FIDO_ERR_USER_PRESENCE_REQUIRED when
- ok markus/me
+ probed to see if they own a key handle. Handle this case so the find_device()
+ look can work for them. Reported by Michael Forney
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: ea4f46ad5a16b27af96e08c4877423918c4253e9
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 2ccd5b30a6ddfe4dba228b7159bf168601bd9166
-commit 2a9c9f7272c1e8665155118fe6536bebdafb6166
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Tue Sep 3 08:34:19 2019 +0000
+commit cf62307bc9758105913dcb91b418e4968ac2244d
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Fri Nov 15 14:01:00 2019 +1100
- upstream: sshsig: lightweight signature and verification ability
-
- for OpenSSH
-
- This adds a simple manual signature scheme to OpenSSH.
- Signatures can be made and verified using ssh-keygen -Y sign|verify
-
- Signatures embed the key used to make them. At verification time, this
- is matched via principal name against an authorized_keys-like list
- of allowed signers.
-
- Mostly by Sebastian Kinne w/ some tweaks by me
-
- ok markus@
-
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 2ab568e7114c933346616392579d72be65a4b8fb
+ Add libfido2 to INSTALL.
-commit 5485f8d50a5bc46aeed829075ebf5d9c617027ea
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Tue Sep 3 08:32:11 2019 +0000
+commit 69fbda1894349d1f420c842dfcbcc883239d1aa7
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Fri Nov 15 13:42:15 2019 +1100
- upstream: move authorized_keys option parsing helpsers to misc.c
-
- and make them public; ok markus@
-
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: c18bcb2a687227b3478377c981c2d56af2638ea2
+ libcrypto is now optional.
-commit f8df0413f0a057b6a3d3dd7bd8bc7c5d80911d3a
+commit 45ffa369886e37930776d7c15dd8b973242d6ecc
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Tue Sep 3 08:31:20 2019 +0000
+Date: Fri Nov 15 02:38:07 2019 +0000
- upstream: make get_sigtype public as sshkey_get_sigtype(); ok
+ upstream: show the "please touch your security key" notifier when
- markus@
+ using the (default) build-in security key support.
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 01f8cdbec63350490d2249f41112c5780d1cfbb8
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 4707643aaa7124501d14e92d1364b20f312a6428
-commit dd8002fbe63d903ffea5be7b7f5fc2714acab4a0
+commit 49dc9fa928d77807c53bdc2898db7fb515fe5eb3
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Tue Sep 3 08:30:47 2019 +0000
+Date: Fri Nov 15 02:37:24 2019 +0000
- upstream: move advance_past_options to authfile.c and make it
+ upstream: close the "touch your security key" notifier on the error
- public; ok markus@
+ path too
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: edda2fbba2c5b1f48e60f857a2010479e80c5f3c
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: c7628bf80505c1aefbb1de7abc8bb5ee51826829
-commit c72d78ccbe642e08591a626e5de18381489716e0
+commit 22a82712e89bf17c27427aeba15795fb4011a0c2
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Tue Sep 3 08:29:58 2019 +0000
+Date: Fri Nov 15 02:20:06 2019 +0000
- upstream: move skip_space() to misc.c and make it public; ok
-
- markus@
+ upstream: correct function name in debug message
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: caa77e8a3b210948e29ad3e28c5db00852961eae
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 2482c99d2ce448f39282493050f8a01e3ffc39ab
-commit 06af3583f46e2c327fdd44d8a95b8b4e8dfd8db5
+commit 018e2902a65c22faded215a7c588492c948f108c
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Tue Sep 3 08:29:15 2019 +0000
+Date: Fri Nov 15 00:32:40 2019 +0000
- upstream: authfd: add function to check if key is in agent
-
- This commit adds a helper function which allows the caller to
- check if a given public key is present in ssh-agent.
+ upstream: follow existing askpass logic for security key notifier:
- work by Sebastian Kinne; ok markus@
+ fall back to _PATH_SSH_ASKPASS_DEFAULT if no $SSH_ASKPASS environment
+ variable is set.
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: d43c5826353e1fdc1af71eb42961b30782c7bd13
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: cda753726b13fb797bf7a9f7a0b3022d9ade4520
-commit 2ab5a8464870cc4b29ddbe849bbbc255729437bf
+commit 575d0042a94997c1eeb86a6dcfb30b3c7bdbcba3
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Tue Sep 3 08:28:30 2019 +0000
+Date: Thu Nov 14 21:56:52 2019 +0000
- upstream: fix memleak in ssh_free_identitylist(); ok markus@
+ upstream: remove debugging goop that snuck in to last commit
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: aa51f77ae2c5330a1f61b2d22933f24a443f9abf
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 8ea4455a2d9364a0a04f9e4a2cbfa4c9fcefe77e
-commit 85443f165b4169b2a448b3e24bc1d4dc5b3156a4
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Tue Sep 3 08:27:52 2019 +0000
+commit 63a5b24f2dbdc9a4bf2182ac3db26731ddc617e8
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date: Fri Nov 15 11:21:26 2019 +1100
- upstream: factor out confirm_overwrite(); ok markus@
+ don't fatal if libfido2 not found
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 304e95381b39c774c8fced7e5328b106a3ff0400
+ spotted by dtucker@
-commit 9a396e33685633581c67d5ad9664570ef95281f2
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Mon Sep 2 23:46:46 2019 +0000
+commit 129952a81c00c332721b4ba3ede868c720ad7f4e
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date: Fri Nov 15 11:17:12 2019 +1100
- upstream: constify an argument
-
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 724bafc9f993746ad4303e95bede2c030de6233b
+ correct object dependency
-commit b52c0c2e64988277a35a955a474d944967059aeb
+commit 6bff9521ab9a9f7396d635755c342b72373bb4f9
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Mon Sep 2 00:19:25 2019 +0000
+Date: Thu Nov 14 21:27:29 2019 +0000
- upstream: downgrade PKCS#11 "provider returned no slots" warning
+ upstream: directly support U2F/FIDO2 security keys in OpenSSH by
- from log level error to debug. This is common when attempting to enumerate
- keys on smartcard readers with no cards plugged in. bz#3058 ok dtucker@
+ linking against the (previously external) USB HID middleware. The dlopen()
+ capability still exists for alternate middlewares, e.g. for Bluetooth, NFC
+ and test/debugging.
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: bb8839ddeb77c271390488af1b771041d43e49c6
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 14446cf170ac0351f0d4792ba0bca53024930069
-commit 0713322e18162463c5ab5ddfb9f935055ca775d8
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Sun Sep 1 23:47:32 2019 +0000
+commit 4f5e331cb8e11face3025aa6578662dde489c3ad
+Author: markus@openbsd.org <markus@openbsd.org>
+Date: Wed Nov 13 22:00:21 2019 +0000
- upstream: print comment when printing pubkey from private
+ upstream: in order to be able to figure out the number of
- bz#3052; ok dtucker
+ signatures left on a shielded key, we need to transfer the number of
+ signatures left from the private to the public key. ok djm@
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: a91b2a8d5f1053d34d7fce44523c53fb534ba914
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 8a5d0d260aeace47d372695fdae383ce9b962574
-commit 368f1cc2fbd6ad10c66bc1b67c2c04aebf8a04a8
-Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
-Date: Mon Sep 2 10:28:42 2019 +1000
+commit dffd02e297e6c2a4e86775f293eb1b0ff01fb3df
+Author: markus@openbsd.org <markus@openbsd.org>
+Date: Wed Nov 13 20:25:45 2019 +0000
- fixed test in OSX closefrom() replacement
+ upstream: fix check for sig_s; noted by qsa at qualys.com
- from likan_999.student AT sina.com
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 34198084e4afb424a859f52c04bb2c9668a52867
-commit 6b7c53498def19a14dd9587bf521ab6dbee8988f
-Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
-Date: Mon Sep 2 10:22:02 2019 +1000
+commit fc173aeb1526d4268db89ec5dfebaf8750dd26cd
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date: Wed Nov 13 11:25:11 2019 +0000
- retain Solaris PRIV_FILE_LINK_ANY in sftp-server
+ upstream: When clients get denied by MaxStartups, send a
- Dropping this privilege removes the ability to create hard links to
- files owned by other users. This is required for the legacy sftp rename
- operation.
+ noification prior to the SSH2 protocol banner according to RFC4253 section
+ 4.2. ok djm@ deraadt@ markus@
- bz#3036; approach ok Alex Wilson (the original author of the Solaris
- sandbox/pledge replacement code)
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: e5dabcb722d54dea18eafb336d50b733af4f9c63
-commit e50f808712393e86d69e42e9847cdf8d473412d7
-Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Aug 30 05:08:28 2019 +0000
+commit bf219920b70cafbf29ebc9890ef67d0efa54e738
+Author: markus@openbsd.org <markus@openbsd.org>
+Date: Wed Nov 13 07:53:10 2019 +0000
- upstream: Use ed25519 for most hostkey rotation tests since it's
+ upstream: fix shield/unshield for xmss keys: - in ssh-agent we need
- supported even when built without OpenSSL. Use RSA for the secondary type
- test if supported, otherwise skip it. Fixes this test for !OpenSSL builds.
+ to delay the call to shield until we have received key specific options. -
+ when serializing xmss keys for shield we need to deal with all optional
+ components (e.g. state might not be loaded). ok djm@
- OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 101cb34a84fd974c623bdb2e496f25a6e91be109
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: cc2db82524b209468eb176d6b4d6b9486422f41f
-commit 5e4796c47dd8d6c38fb2ff0b3e817525fed6040d
-Author: bluhm@openbsd.org <bluhm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Thu Aug 22 21:47:27 2019 +0000
+commit 40598b85d72a509566b7b2a6d57676c7231fed34
+Author: deraadt@openbsd.org <deraadt@openbsd.org>
+Date: Wed Nov 13 05:42:26 2019 +0000
- upstream: Test did not compile due to missing symbols. Add source
+ upstream: remove size_t gl_pathc < 0 test, it is invalid. the
- sshbuf-misc.c to regress as it was done in ssh make file. from Moritz Buhl
+ return value from glob() is sufficient. discussed with djm
- OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 9e1c23476bb845f3cf3d15d9032da3ed0cb2fcf5
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: c91203322db9caaf7efaf5ae90c794a91070be3c
-commit e0e7e3d0e26f2c30697e6d0cfc293414908963c7
-Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
-Date: Fri Aug 30 14:26:19 2019 +1000
+commit 72687c8e7c38736e3e64e833ee7aa8f9cd9efed1
+Author: deraadt@openbsd.org <deraadt@openbsd.org>
+Date: Wed Nov 13 04:47:52 2019 +0000
- tweak warning flags
-
- Enable -Wextra if compiler supports it
+ upstream: stdarg.h required more broadly; ok djm
- Set -Wno-error=format-truncation if available to prevent expected
- string truncations in openbsd-compat from breaking -Werror builds
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: b5b15674cde1b54d6dbbae8faf30d47e6e5d6513
-commit 28744182cf90e0073b76a9e98de58a47e688b2c4
-Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
-Date: Fri Aug 30 13:21:38 2019 +1000
+commit 1e0b248d47c96be944868a735553af8482300a07
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Thu Nov 14 16:08:17 2019 +1100
- proc_pidinfo()-based closefrom() for OS X
-
- Refactor closefrom() to use a single brute-force close() loop fallback.
+ Put sshsk_sign call inside ifdef ENABLE_SK.
- Based on patch from likan_999.student@sina.com in bz#3049. ok dtucker@
+ Fixes build against OpenSSL configured without ECC.
-commit dc2ca588144f088a54febebfde3414568dc73d5f
-Author: kn@openbsd.org <kn@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Aug 16 11:16:32 2019 +0000
+commit 546274a6f89489d2e6be8a8b62f2bb63c87a61fd
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Wed Nov 13 23:27:31 2019 +1100
- upstream: Call comma-separated lists as such to clarify semantics
-
- Options such as Ciphers take values that may be a list of ciphers; the
- complete list, not indiviual elements, may be prefixed with a dash or plus
- character to remove from or append to the default list respectively.
-
- Users might read the current text as if each elment took an optional prefix,
- so tweak the wording from "values" to "list" to prevent such ambiguity for
- all options supporting this semantics (those that provide a list of
- available elements via "ssh -Q ...").
-
- Input and OK jmc
-
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 4fdd175b0e5f5cb10ab3f26ccc38a93bb6515d57
+ Remove duplicate __NR_clock_nanosleep
-commit c4736f39e66729ce2bf5b06ee6b391e092b48f47
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Aug 16 06:35:27 2019 +0000
+commit b1c82f4b8adf3f42476d8a1f292df33fb7aa1a56
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Wed Nov 13 23:19:35 2019 +1100
- upstream: include sshbuf-misc.c in SRCS_BASE
+ seccomp: Allow clock_nanosleep() in sandbox.
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 99dd10e72c04e93849981d43d64c946619efa474
+ seccomp: Allow clock_nanosleep() to make OpenSSH working with latest
+ glibc. Patch from Jakub Jelen <jjelen@redhat.com> via bz #3093.
-commit d0e51810f332fe44ebdba41113aacf319d35f5a5
+commit 2b523d23804c13cb68db135b919fcf312c42b580
Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Sat Aug 24 15:12:11 2019 +1000
+Date: Wed Nov 13 11:56:56 2019 +1100
- Fix pasto in fallback code.
-
- There is no parameter called "pathname", it should simply be "path".
- bz#3059, patch from samuel at cendio.se.
+ Include stdarg.h for va_list in xmalloc.h.
-commit e83c989bfd9fc9838b7dfb711d1dc6da81814045
-Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
-Date: Fri Aug 23 10:19:30 2019 +1000
+commit 245dcbdca5374296bdb9c48be6e24bdf6b1c0af7
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Wed Nov 13 11:19:26 2019 +1100
- use SC_ALLOW_ARG_MASK to limit mmap protections
+ Put headers inside ifdef _AIX.
- Restrict to PROT_(READ|WRITE|NONE), i.e. exclude PROT_EXEC
+ Prevents compile errors due to missing definitions (eg va_list) on
+ non-AIX platforms.
-commit f6906f9bf12c968debec3671bbf19926ff8a235b
-Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
-Date: Fri Aug 23 10:08:48 2019 +1000
+commit a4cc579c6ad2b2e54bdd6cc0d5e12c2288113a56
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Wed Nov 13 10:41:41 2019 +1100
- allow mprotect(2) with PROT_(READ|WRITE|NONE) only
+ Fix comment in match_usergroup_pattern_list.
- Used by some hardened heap allocators. Requested by Yegor
- Timoshenko in https://github.com/openssh/openssh-portable/pull/142
+ Spotted by balu.gajjala@gmail.com via bz#3092.
-commit e3b6c966b79c3ea5d51b923c3bbdc41e13b96ea0
+commit fccff339cab5aa66f2554e0188b83f980683490b
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Aug 16 06:13:15 2019 +0000
+Date: Tue Nov 12 22:38:19 2019 +0000
- upstream: switch percent_expand() to use sshbuf instead of a limited
+ upstream: allow an empty attestation certificate returned by a
- fixed buffer; ok markus@
+ security key enrollment - these are possible for tokens that only offer self-
+ attestation. This also needs support from the middleware.
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 3f9ef20bca5ef5058b48c1cac67c53b9a1d15711
+ ok markus@
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 135eeeb937088ef6830a25ca0bbe678dfd2c57cc
-commit 9ab5b9474779ac4f581d402ae397f871ed16b383
+commit e44bb61824e36d0d181a08489c16c378c486a974
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Aug 9 05:05:54 2019 +0000
+Date: Tue Nov 12 22:36:44 2019 +0000
- upstream: produce a useful error message if the user's shell is set
-
- incorrectly during "match exec" processing. bz#2791 reported by Dario
- Bertini; ok dtucker
+ upstream: security keys typically need to be tapped/touched in
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: cf9eddd6a6be726cb73bd9c3936f3888cd85c03d
-
-commit 8fdbc7247f432578abaaca1b72a0dbf5058d67e5
-Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Aug 9 04:24:03 2019 +0000
-
- upstream: Change description of TCPKeepAlive from "inactive" to
+ order to perform a signature operation. Notify the user when this is expected
+ via the TTY (if available) or $SSH_ASKPASS if we can.
- "unresponsive" to clarify what it checks for. Patch from jblaine at
- kickflop.net via github pr#129, ok djm@.
+ ok markus@
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 3682f8ec7227f5697945daa25d11ce2d933899e9
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 0ef90a99a85d4a2a07217a58efb4df8444818609
-commit 7afc45c3ed72672690014dc432edc223b23ae288
-Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
-Date: Thu Aug 8 08:02:57 2019 +0000
+commit 4671211068441519011ac0e38c588317f4157ba1
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Tue Nov 12 22:35:02 2019 +0000
- upstream: Allow the maximimum uint32 value for the argument passed to
-
- -b which allows better error messages from later validation. bz#3050, ok
- djm@
+ upstream: pass SSH_ASKPASS_PROMPT hint to y/n key confirm too
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 10adf6876b2401b3dc02da580ebf67af05861673
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 08d46712e5e5f1bad0aea68e7717b7bec1ab8959
-commit c31e4f5fb3915c040061981a67224de7650ab34b
-Author: naddy@openbsd.org <naddy@openbsd.org>
-Date: Mon Aug 5 21:45:27 2019 +0000
+commit 5d1c1590d736694f41b03e686045f08fcae20d62
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Tue Nov 12 22:34:20 2019 +0000
- upstream: Many key types are supported now, so take care to check
+ upstream: dd API for performing one-shot notifications via tty or
- the size restrictions and apply the default size only to the matching key
- type. tweak and ok dtucker@
+ SSH_ASKPASS
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: b825de92d79cc4cba19b298c61e99909488ff57e
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 9484aea33aff5b62ce3642bf259546c7639f23f3
-commit 6b39a7b49ebacec4e70e24bfc8ea2f11057aac22
-Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
-Date: Mon Aug 5 11:50:33 2019 +0000
+commit 166927fd410823eec8a7b2472463db51e0e6fef5
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Tue Nov 12 22:32:48 2019 +0000
- upstream: Remove now-redundant perm_ok arg since
-
- sshkey_load_private_type will now return SSH_ERR_KEY_BAD_PERMISSIONS in that
- case. Patch from jitendra.sharma at intel.com, ok djm@
+ upstream: add xvasprintf()
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 07916a17ed0a252591b71e7fb4be2599cb5b0c77
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: e5e3671c05c121993b034db935bce1a7aa372247
-commit d46075b923bf25e6f25959a3f5b458852161cb3e
+commit 782093ec6cf64cc6c4078410093359869ea9329f
Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Mon Aug 5 21:36:48 2019 +1000
+Date: Wed Nov 13 09:08:55 2019 +1100
- Fix mem leak in unit test.
-
- Patch from jitendra.sharma at intel.com.
+ Remove leftover if statement from sync.
-commit c4ffb72593c08921cf9291bc05a5ef1d0aaa6891
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Aug 2 01:41:24 2019 +0000
+commit b556cc3cbf0c43f073bb41bba4e92ca709a1ec13
+Author: markus@openbsd.org <markus@openbsd.org>
+Date: Tue Nov 12 19:34:40 2019 +0000
- upstream: fix some memleaks in test_helper code
-
- bz#3037 from Jitendra Sharma
+ upstream: remove extra layer for ed25519 signature; ok djm@
- OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 71440fa9186f5842a65ce9a27159385c6cb6f751
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 7672d9d0278b4bf656a12d3aab0c0bfe92a8ae47
-commit 6e76e69dc0c7712e9ac599af34bd091b0e7dcdb5
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Aug 2 01:23:19 2019 +0000
+commit 3fcf69ace19e75cf9dcd7206f396adfcb29611a8
+Author: markus@openbsd.org <markus@openbsd.org>
+Date: Tue Nov 12 19:34:00 2019 +0000
- upstream: typo; from Christian Hesse
+ upstream: check sig_r and sig_s for ssh-sk keys; ok djm
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 82f6de7438ea7ee5a14f44fdf5058ed57688fdc3
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 1a1e6a85b5f465d447a3800f739e35c5b74e0abc
-commit 49fa065a1bfaeb88a59abdfa4432d3b9c35b0655
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Tue Jul 30 05:04:49 2019 +0000
+commit 2c55744a56de0ffc81fe445a1e7fc5cd308712b3
+Author: markus@openbsd.org <markus@openbsd.org>
+Date: Tue Nov 12 19:33:08 2019 +0000
- upstream: let sshbuf_find/cmp take a void* for the
-
- search/comparison argument, instead of a u_char*. Saves callers needing to
- cast.
+ upstream: enable ed25519 support; ok djm
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: d63b69b7c5dd570963e682f758f5a47b825605ed
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 1a399c5b3ef15bd8efb916110cf5a9e0b554ab7e
-commit 7adf6c430d6fc17901e167bc0789d31638f5c2f8
-Author: mestre@openbsd.org <mestre@openbsd.org>
-Date: Wed Jul 24 08:57:00 2019 +0000
+commit fd1a3b5e38721b1d69aae2d9de1a1d9155dfa5c7
+Author: markus@openbsd.org <markus@openbsd.org>
+Date: Tue Nov 12 19:32:30 2019 +0000
- upstream: When using a combination of a Yubikey+GnuPG+remote
-
- forwarding the gpg-agent (and options ControlMaster+RemoteForward in
- ssh_config(5)) then the codepath taken will call mux_client_request_session
- -> mm_send_fd -> sendmsg(2). Since sendmsg(2) is not allowed in that codepath
- then pledge(2) kills the process.
-
- The solution is to add "sendfd" to pledge(2), which is not too bad considering
- a little bit later we reduce pledge(2) to only "stdio proc tty" in that
- codepath.
-
- Problem reported and diff provided by Timothy Brown <tbrown at freeshell.org>
-
- OK deraadt@
+ upstream: update sk-api to version 2 for ed25519 support; ok djm
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 7ce38b6542bbec00e441595d0a178e970a9472ac
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 77aa4d5b6ab17987d8a600907b49573940a0044a
-commit 0e2fe18acc1da853a9120c2e9af68e8d05e6503e
-Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
-Date: Tue Jul 23 23:06:57 2019 +0000
+commit 7c32b51edbed5bd57870249c0a45dffd06be0002
+Author: markus@openbsd.org <markus@openbsd.org>
+Date: Tue Nov 12 19:31:45 2019 +0000
- upstream: Fix typo in CASignatureAlgorithms wherein what should be
-
- a comma is a dot. Patch from hnj2 via github pr#141.
+ upstream: implement sshsk_ed25519_assemble(); ok djm
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 01f5a460438ff1af09aab483c0a70065309445f0
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: af9ec838b9bc643786310b5caefc4ca4754e68c6
-commit e93ffd1a19fc47c49d68ae2fb332433690ecd389
-Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Mon Jul 29 16:04:01 2019 +1000
+commit fe05a36dc0ea884c8c2395d53d804fe4f4202b26
+Author: markus@openbsd.org <markus@openbsd.org>
+Date: Tue Nov 12 19:31:18 2019 +0000
- Report success of individual tests as well as all.
+ upstream: implement sshsk_ed25519_inner_sig(); ok djm
- This puts the "all tests passed" message back at the end where the
- test harnesses can find it.
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: f422d0052c6d948fe0e4b04bc961f37fdffa0910
-commit 2ad5b36b18bddf2965fe60384c29b3f1d451b4ed
-Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
-Date: Mon Jul 29 09:49:23 2019 +1000
+commit e03a29e6554cd0c9cdbac0dae53dd79e6eb4ea47
+Author: markus@openbsd.org <markus@openbsd.org>
+Date: Tue Nov 12 19:30:50 2019 +0000
- convert to UTF-8; from Mike Frysinger
+ upstream: rename sshsk_ecdsa_sign() to sshsk_sign(); ok djm
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 1524042e09d81e54c4470d7bfcc0194c5b46fe19
-commit d31e7c937ba0b97534f373cf5dea34675bcec602
-Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Jul 26 04:22:21 2019 +0000
+commit bc7b5d6187de625c086b5f639b25bbad17bbabfc
+Author: markus@openbsd.org <markus@openbsd.org>
+Date: Tue Nov 12 19:30:21 2019 +0000
- upstream: Restrict limit-keytype to types supported by build. This
-
- means we have to skip a couple tests when only one key type is supported.
+ upstream: factor out sshsk_ecdsa_inner_sig(); ok djm@
- OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 22d05befb9c7ce21ce8dc22acf1ffe9e2ef2e95e
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 07e41997b542f670a15d7e2807143fe01efef584
-commit 0967a233b8a28907ae8a4a6773c89f21d2ace11b
-Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Thu Jul 25 18:36:28 2019 +1000
+commit cef84a062db8cfeece26f067235dc440f6992c17
+Author: markus@openbsd.org <markus@openbsd.org>
+Date: Tue Nov 12 19:29:54 2019 +0000
- Remove override disabling DH-GEX.
+ upstream: factor out sshsk_ecdsa_assemble(); ok djm@
- The DH-GEX override doesn't work when build without OpenSSL, and
- we'll prefer curve25519 these days, removing the need for it.
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 2313761a3a84ccfe032874d638d3c363e0f14026
-commit 061407efc19b41ab4a7485e5adcff2a12befacdb
-Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
-Date: Thu Jul 25 09:17:35 2019 +0000
+commit 7c096c456f33f3d2682736d4735cc10e790276e9
+Author: markus@openbsd.org <markus@openbsd.org>
+Date: Tue Nov 12 19:29:24 2019 +0000
- upstream: Only use supported key types during KRL test, preferring
-
- ed25519 since it's supported by both OpenSSL and non-OpenSSL builds.
+ upstream: implement ssh-ed25519-sk verification; ok djm@
- OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 9f2bb3eadd50fcc8245b1bd8fd6f0e53602f71aa
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 37906d93948a1e3d237c20e713d6ca8fbf7d13f6
-commit 47f8ff1fa5b76790c1d785815fd13ee6009f8012
-Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
-Date: Thu Jul 25 08:48:11 2019 +0000
+commit ba5fb02bed1e556d0ce7b1740ae8a5f87b737491
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date: Wed Nov 13 08:48:30 2019 +1100
- upstream: Switch keys-command test from rsa to ed25519 since it's
-
- supported for both OpenSSL and non-OpenSSL builds.
-
- OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 174be4be876edd493e4a5c851e5bc579885e7a0a
+ ignore ssh-sk-helper
-commit 1e94afdfa8df774ab7dd3bad52912b636dc31bbd
-Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
-Date: Thu Jul 25 08:28:15 2019 +0000
+commit 78c96498947f711141f493a40d202c482cc59438
+Author: deraadt@openbsd.org <deraadt@openbsd.org>
+Date: Mon Nov 11 19:53:37 2019 +0000
- upstream: Make certificate tests work with the supported key
+ upstream: skip demanding -fstack-protector-all on hppa. we never
- algorithms. Allows tests to pass when built without OpenSSL.
+ wrote a stack protector for reverse-stack architectures, and i don't think
+ anyone else did either. a warning per compiled file is just annoying.
- OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 617169a6dd9d06db3697a449d9a26c284eca20fc
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 14806a59353152f843eb349e618abbf6f4dd3ada
-commit 26bf693661a48b97b6023f702b2af643676ac21a
-Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
-Date: Tue Jul 23 13:49:14 2019 +0000
+commit aa1c9e37789f999979fe59df74ce5c8424861ac8
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Nov 8 03:54:02 2019 +0000
- upstream: Construct list of key types to test based on the types
-
- supported by the binaries.
+ upstream: duplicate 'x' character in getopt(3) optstring
- OpenBSD-Regress-ID: fcbd115efacec8ab0ecbdb3faef79ac696cb1d62
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 64c81caa0cb5798de3621eca16b7dd22e5d0d8a7
-commit 773c55b3d1230e8f7714a1b33873c37b85049c74
-Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
-Date: Tue Jul 23 13:32:48 2019 +0000
+commit aa4c640dc362816d63584a16e786d5e314e24390
+Author: naddy@openbsd.org <naddy@openbsd.org>
+Date: Thu Nov 7 08:38:38 2019 +0000
- upstream: Only use DSA key type in tests if binaries support it.
+ upstream: Fill in missing man page bits for U2F security key support:
- OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 770e31fe61dc33ed8eea9c04ce839b33ddb4dc96
+ Mention the new key types, the ~/.ssh/id_ecdsa_sk file, ssh's
+ SecurityKeyProvider keyword, the SSH_SK_PROVIDER environment variable,
+ and ssh-keygen's new -w and -x options.
+
+ Copy the ssh-sk-helper man page from ssh-pkcs11-helper with minimal
+ substitutions.
+
+ ok djm@
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: ef2e8f83d0c0ce11ad9b8c28945747e5ca337ac4
-commit 159e987a54d92ccd73875e7581ffc64e8927a715
+commit b236b27d6dada7f0542214003632b4e9b7aa1380
Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Wed Jul 24 14:21:19 2019 +1000
+Date: Sun Nov 3 00:10:43 2019 +1100
- Split test targets further.
+ Put sftp-realpath in libssh.a
- Splits test into file-tests, t-exec, unit and interop-tests and their
- respective dependencies. Should allow running any set individually
- without having to build the other dependencies that are not needed
- for that specific test.
+ and remove it from the specific binary targets.
-commit 520d4550a2470106d63e30079bb05ce82f3a4f7d
+commit 382c18c20cdcec45b5d21ff25b4a5e0df91a68c4
Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Wed Jul 24 11:20:18 2019 +1000
+Date: Sun Nov 3 00:09:21 2019 +1100
- Add lib dependencies for regress binary targets.
+ statfs might be defined in sys/mount.h.
+
+ eg on old NetBSDs.
-commit 4e8d0dd78d5f6142841a07dc8b8c6b4730eaf587
+commit 03ffc0951c305c8e3b5fdc260d65312a57f8f7ea
Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Wed Jul 24 00:12:51 2019 +1000
+Date: Sat Nov 2 23:25:01 2019 +1100
- Make "unit" a dependency of "test".
+ Put stdint.h inside ifdef HAVE_STDINT_H.
-commit 4317b2a0480e293e58ba115e47b49d3a384b6568
+commit 19cb64c4b42d4312ce12091fd9436dbd6898998c
Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Tue Jul 23 23:24:47 2019 +1000
+Date: Sat Nov 2 22:45:44 2019 +1100
- upstream rev 1.28: fix comment typo.
+ Rebuild .depend.
-commit e0055af2bd39fdb44566ff6594147664e1fac8b8
+commit 3611bfe89b92ada5914526d8ff0919aeb967cfa7
Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Tue Jul 23 23:06:22 2019 +1000
+Date: Sat Nov 2 22:42:05 2019 +1100
- Split regress-binaries into two targets.
-
- Split the binaries for the unit tests out into a regress-unit-binaries
- target, and add a dependency on it for only the unit tests. This allows
- us to run the integration tests only ("make t-exec") without building
- the unit tests, which allows us to run a subset of the tests when
- building --without-openssl without trying (and failing) to build the
- unit tests.
+ Define __BSD_VISIBLE in fnmatch.h.
- This means there are two targets for "unit" which I *think* is valid
- (it works in testing, and makedepend will generate Makefiles of this
- form)a but I could be wrong.
+ .. since we use symbols defined only when it is when using the compat
+ fnmatch.
-commit 7cdf9fdcf11aaaa98c2bd22c92882ea559e772ad
-Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
-Date: Tue Jul 23 08:19:29 2019 +0000
+commit f5cc5816aaddb8eca3cba193f53e99d6a0b37d05
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Sat Nov 2 16:39:38 2019 +1100
- upstream: Skip DH group generation test if binaries don't support
-
- DH-GEX.
+ Only enable U2F if OpenSSL supports ECC.
- OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 7c918230d969ecf7656babd6191a74526bffbffd
+ This requires moving the U2F bits to below the OpenSSL parts so we have
+ the required information. ok djm@
-commit 3a3eab8bb0da3d2f0f32cb85a1a268bcca6e4d69
-Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
-Date: Tue Jul 23 07:55:29 2019 +0000
+commit ad38406fc95fa223b0ef2edf8ff50508f8ab1cb6
+Author: naddy@openbsd.org <naddy@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Nov 1 12:10:43 2019 +0000
- upstream: Only test conversion of key types supported by the
-
- binaries.
+ upstream: fix miscellaneous text problems; ok djm@
- OpenBSD-Regress-ID: e3f0938a0a7407e2dfbb90abc3ec979ab6e8eeea
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 0cbf411a14d8fa0b269b69cbb1b4fc0ca699fe9f
-commit 7e66b7d98c6e3f48a1918c3e1940c9b11b10ec63
-Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
-Date: Tue Jul 23 07:39:43 2019 +0000
+commit 9cac151c2dc76b8e5b727b2fa216f572e372170f
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Fri Nov 1 18:26:07 2019 +1100
- upstream: Only add ssh-dss to allowed key types if it's supported
-
- by the binary.
-
- OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 395a54cab16e9e4ece9aec047ab257954eebd413
+ Add flags needed to build and work on Ultrix.
-commit fd0684b319e664d8821dc4ca3026126dfea3ccf4
+commit 0e3c5bc50907d2058407641b5a3581b7eda91b7e
Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Tue Jul 23 22:36:39 2019 +1000
+Date: Fri Nov 1 18:24:29 2019 +1100
- Remove sys/cdefs.h include.
-
- It's not needed on -portable (that's handled by includes.h) and not all
- platforms have it.
+ Hook up fnmatch for platforms that don't have it.
-commit 9634ffbf29b3c2493e69d10b37077b09a8cbf5ff
+commit b56dbfd9d967e5b6ce7be9f81f206112e19e1030
Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Tue Jul 23 22:25:44 2019 +1000
+Date: Fri Nov 1 18:17:42 2019 +1100
- Add headers to prevent warnings w/out OpenSSL.
+ Add missing bracket in realpath macro.
-commit 2ea60312e1c08dea88982fec68244f89a40912ff
+commit 59ccb56f15e5e530e7c1b5a0b361749d8c6217d5
Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Tue Jul 23 22:11:50 2019 +1000
+Date: Fri Nov 1 17:32:47 2019 +1100
- Include stdlib.h for free() and calloc().
+ Import fnmatch.c from OpenBSD.
-commit 11cba2a4523fda447e2554ea457484655bedc831
+commit 79d46de9fbea0f3c0e8ae7cf84effaba089071b0
Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Tue Jul 23 21:51:22 2019 +1000
+Date: Fri Nov 1 15:22:32 2019 +1100
- Re-apply portability changes to current sha2.{c,h}.
-
- Rather than attempt to apply 14 years' worth of changes to OpenBSD's sha2
- I imported the current versions directly then re-applied the portability
- changes. This also allowed re-syncing digest-libc.c against upstream.
+ Use sftp_realpath if no native realpath.
-commit 09159594a3bbd363429ee6fafde57ce77986dd7c
+commit bb4f003ed8c5f61ec74a66bcedc8ab19bf5b35c4
Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Tue Jul 23 20:27:51 2019 +1000
+Date: Fri Nov 1 15:06:16 2019 +1100
- Import current sha2.c and sha2.h from OpenBSD.
+ Configure flags for haiku from haikuports.
- These are not changed from their original state, the next commit will
- re-apply the portable changes.
+ Should build with the default flags with ./configure
-commit 2e6035b900cc9d7432d95084e03993d1b426f812
-Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Tue Jul 23 08:11:22 2019 +1000
+commit 4332b4fe49360679647a8705bc08f4e81323f6b4
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Nov 1 03:54:33 2019 +0000
- Rename valgrind "errors" to "failures".
+ upstream: fix a race condition in the SIGCHILD handler that could turn
- When valgrind is enabled, test-exec.sh counts the number of invocations
- that valgrind detects failures in, not the total number of errors detected.
- This makes the name to be more accurate.
+ in to a kill(-1); bz3084, reported by Gao Rui, ok dtucker@
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: ac2742e04a69d4c34223505b6a32f6d686e18896
-commit e82c9bb9ffa65725cc2e03ea81cb79ce3387f66b
-Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Fri Jul 19 18:51:18 2019 +1000
+commit 03f9205f0fb49ea2507eacc143737a8511ae5a4e
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date: Fri Nov 1 14:49:25 2019 +1100
- Skip running sftp-chroot under Valgrind.
+ conditionalise SK sign/verify on ENABLE_SK
+
+ Spotted by Darren and his faux-Vax
-commit 41e22c2e05cb950b704945ac9408f6109c9b7848
-Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
-Date: Sat Jul 20 09:50:58 2019 +0000
+commit 5eb7b9563ff818e17de24231bf2d347d9db302c5
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Fri Nov 1 14:41:07 2019 +1100
- upstream: Remove the sleeps and thus races from the forwarding
-
- test. They were originally required to work with Protocol 1, but now we can
- use ssh -N and the control socket without the sleeps. While there, suppress
- output fro the control exit commands.
-
- OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 4c51a1d651242f12c90074c18c61008a74c1c790
+ Add prototype for localtime_r if needed.
-commit 0423043c5e54293f4dd56041304fd0046c317be9
-Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
-Date: Sat Jul 20 09:37:31 2019 +0000
+commit d500b59a825f6a58f2abf7b04eb1992d81e45d58
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Fri Nov 1 13:42:12 2019 +1100
- upstream: Allow SLEEPTIME to be overridden.
-
- OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 1596ab168729954be3d219933b2d01cc93687e76
+ Check if IP_TOS is defined before using.
-commit d466b6a5cfba17a83c7aae9f584ab164e2ece0a1
-Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
-Date: Sat Jul 20 09:14:40 2019 +0000
+commit 764d51e04460ec0da12e05e4777bc90c116accb9
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date: Fri Nov 1 13:34:49 2019 +1100
- upstream: Move sleep time into a variable so that we can increase
-
- it for platforms or configurations that are much slower then usual.
+ autoconf pieces for U2F support
- OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 88586cabc800062c260d0b876bdcd4ca3f58a872
+ Mostly following existing logic for PKCS#11 - turning off support
+ when either libcrypto or dlopen(3) are unavailable.
-commit b4a7c9d2b5f928e0b902b580d35dc8b244a3aae0
+commit 45f17a159acfc5a8e450bfbcc2cffe72950ed7a3
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Jul 19 03:45:44 2019 +0000
+Date: Fri Nov 1 02:32:05 2019 +0000
- upstream: add regression tests for scp for out-of-destination path file
-
- creation by Harry Sintonen via Jakub Jelen in bz3007
+ upstream: remove duplicate PUBKEY_DEFAULT_PK_ALG on !WITH_OPENSSL path
- OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 01ae5fbc6ce400b2df5a84dc3152a9e31f354c07
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 95a7cafad2a4665d57cabacc28031fabc0bea9fc
-commit bca0582063f148c7ddf409ec51435a5a726bee4c
+commit db8d13f7925da7337df87248995c533e111637ec
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Jul 19 03:38:01 2019 +0000
+Date: Fri Nov 1 02:06:52 2019 +0000
- upstream: Accept the verbose flag when searching for host keys in known
-
- hosts (i.e. "ssh-keygen -vF host") to print the matching host's random- art
- signature too. bz#3003 "amusing, pretty" deraadt@
+ upstream: more additional source files
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 686221a5447d6507f40a2ffba5393984d889891f
+ OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 8eaa25fb901594aee23b76eda99dca5b8db94c6f
-commit 5299a09fa2879a068af200c91028fcfa9283c0f0
-Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Fri Jul 19 13:50:25 2019 +1000
+commit f89c5df65dd307739ff22319c2cf847d3b0c5ab4
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Nov 1 02:04:25 2019 +0000
- Revert one dependency per line change.
+ upstream: additional source files here too
- It turns out that having such a large number of lines in the .depend
- file will cause the memory usage of awk during AC_SUBST to blow up on at
- least NetBSD's awk, causing configure to fail.
+ OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 8809f8e1c8f7459e7096ab6b58d8e56cb2f483fd
-commit 01dddb231f23b4a7b616f9d33a0b9d937f9eaf0e
-Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
-Date: Fri Jul 19 13:19:19 2019 +1000
+commit 02275afa1ecbfbd39f27d34c97090e76bec232ec
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Nov 1 02:03:27 2019 +0000
- fix SIGWINCH delivery of Solaris for mux sessions
+ upstream: additional source files here too
- Remove PRIV_PROC_SESSION which was limiting ability to send SIGWINCH
- signals to other sessions. bz#3030; report and fix from Darren Moffat
+ OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 09297e484327f911fd353489518cceaa0c1b95ce
-commit 05500af21d27c1a3ddac232b018cc23da7b1ee95
-Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Fri Jul 19 13:20:03 2019 +1000
+commit dfc8f01b9886c7999e6e20acf3f7492cb8c80796
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Nov 1 01:57:59 2019 +0000
- Force dependencies one per line.
+ upstream: adapt to extra sshkey_sign() argument and additional
- Force makedepend to output one dependency per line, which will make
- reading diffs against it much easier. ok djm@
+ dependencies
+
+ OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 7a25604968486c4d6f81d06e8fbc7d17519de50e
-commit b5bc5d016bbb83eb7f8e685390044e78b1ea1427
-Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Fri Jul 19 13:18:07 2019 +1000
+commit afa59e26eeb44a93f36f043f60b936eaddae77c4
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Nov 1 01:55:41 2019 +0000
- make depend.
+ upstream: skip security-key key types for tests until we have a
+
+ dummy U2F middleware to use.
+
+ OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 37200462b44334a4ad45e6a1f7ad1bd717521a95
-commit 65333f7454365fe40f7367630e7dd10903b9d99e
-Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Fri Jul 19 13:16:11 2019 +1000
+commit de871e4daf346a712c78fa4ab8f18b231a47cb85
+Author: jmc@openbsd.org <jmc@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Nov 1 00:52:35 2019 +0000
- Show when skipping valgrind for a test.
+ upstream: sort;
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 8264b0be01ec5a60602bd50fd49cc3c81162ea16
-commit fccb7eb3436da8ef3dcd22e5936ba1abc7ae6730
-Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Fri Jul 19 10:41:56 2019 +1000
+commit 2aae149a34b1b5dfbef423d3b7999a96818969bb
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Thu Oct 31 21:37:33 2019 +0000
- Enable connect-privsep test with valgrind.
+ upstream: undo debugging bits that shouldn't have been committed
- connect-privsep seems to work OK with valgrind now so don't skip
- valgrind on it.
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 4bd5551b306df55379afe17d841207990eb773bf
-commit d7423017265c5ae6d0be39340feb6c9f016b1f71
-Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Fri Jul 19 07:43:07 2019 +1000
+commit 3420e0464bd0e8fedcfa5fd20ad37bdc740ad5b4
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date: Fri Nov 1 09:24:58 2019 +1100
- Show valgrind results and error counts.
+ depend
-commit 22b9b3e944880db906c6ac5527c4228bd92b293a
-Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Thu Jul 18 13:40:12 2019 +1000
+commit b923a90abc7bccb11a513dc8b5c0f13a0ea9682c
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Thu Oct 31 21:28:27 2019 +0000
- Fix format string integer type in error message.
+ upstream: fix -Wshadow warning
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 3441eb04f872a00c2483c11a5f1570dfe775103c
-commit ed46a0c0705895834d3f47a46faa89c2a71b760a
+commit 9a14c64c38fc14d0029f1c7bc70cf62cc7f0fdf9
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Thu Jul 18 13:26:00 2019 +0000
+Date: Thu Oct 31 21:23:19 2019 +0000
- upstream: fix off-by-one in sshbuf_dtob64() base64 wrapping that could
+ upstream: Refactor signing - use sshkey_sign for everything,
- cause extra newlines to be appended at the end of the base64 text (ugly, but
- harmless). Found and fixed by Sebastian Kinne
+ including the new U2F signatures.
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 9fe290bd68f706ed8f986a7704ca5a2bd32d7b68
-
-commit a192021fedead23c375077f92346336d531f8cad
-Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Thu Jul 18 11:09:38 2019 +1000
-
- Fail tests if Valgrind enabled and reports errors.
+ Don't use sshsk_ecdsa_sign() directly, instead make it reachable via
+ sshkey_sign() like all other signature operations. This means that
+ we need to add a provider argument to sshkey_sign(), so most of this
+ change is mechanically adding that.
- Also dump the failing valgrind report to stdout (not the cleanest
- solution, but better than nothing).
+ Suggested by / ok markus@
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: d5193a03fcfa895085d91b2b83d984a9fde76c8c
-commit d1c491ecb939ee10b341fa7bb6205dff19d297e5
-Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Thu Jul 18 10:17:54 2019 +1000
+commit 07da39f71d36fb547749a5b16aa8892e621a7e4a
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Thu Oct 31 21:22:01 2019 +0000
- Allow low-priv tests to write to pipe dir.
+ upstream: ssh-agent support for U2F/FIDO keys
- When running regression tests with Valgrind and SUDO, the low-priv agent
- tests need to be able to create pipes in the appropriate directory.
+ feedback & ok markus@
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: bb544a44bc32e45d2ec8bf652db2046f38360acb
-commit 8a5bb3e78191cc206f970c26d2a26c949971e91a
-Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Wed Jul 17 21:24:55 2019 +1000
+commit eebec620c9519c4839d781c4d5b6082152998f82
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Thu Oct 31 21:20:38 2019 +0000
- Put valgrind vgdb files to a specific directory.
+ upstream: ssh AddKeysToAgent support for U2F/FIDO keys
- Valgrind by default puts vgdb files and pipes under /tmp, however it
- is not always able to clean them up, which can cause test failures when
- there's a pid/file collision. Using a specific directory ensures that
- we can clean up and start clean.
+ feedback & ok markus@
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: ac08e45c7f995fa71f8d661b3f582e38cc0a2f91
-commit f8829fe57fb0479d6103cfe1190095da3c032c6d
+commit 486164d060314a7f8bca2a00f53be9e900c5e74d
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Tue Jul 16 22:16:49 2019 +0000
+Date: Thu Oct 31 21:19:56 2019 +0000
- upstream: adapt to sshbuf_dtob64() change
+ upstream: ssh-add support for U2F/FIDO keys
- OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 82374a83edf0955fd1477169eee3f5d6467405a6
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 7f88a5181c982687afedf3130c6ab2bba60f7644
-commit 1254fcbb2f005f745f2265016ee9fa52e16d37b0
-Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
-Date: Tue Jul 16 03:21:54 2019 +0000
+commit b9dd14d3091e31fb836f69873d3aa622eb7b4a1c
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Thu Oct 31 21:19:14 2019 +0000
- upstream: Remove ssh1 files from CLEANFILES since ssh1 no longer
+ upstream: add new agent key constraint for U2F/FIDO provider
- supported.
+ feedback & ok markus@
- OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 5b9ae869dc669bac05939b4a2fdf44ee067acfa0
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: d880c380170704280b4003860a1744d286c7a172
-commit 9dc81a5adabc9a7d611ed2e63fbf4c85d43b15c6
-Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
-Date: Tue Jul 16 02:09:29 2019 +0000
+commit 884416bdb10468f1252e4d7c13d51b43dccba7f6
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Thu Oct 31 21:18:28 2019 +0000
- upstream: Update names of host key files in CLEANFILES to match
-
- recent changes to the tests.
+ upstream: ssh client support for U2F/FIDO keys
- OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 28743052de3acf70b06f18333561497cd47c4ecf
-
-commit e44e4ad1190db22ed407a79f32a8cff5bcd2b815
-Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
-Date: Tue Jul 16 23:26:53 2019 +1000
-
- depend
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: eb2cfa6cf7419a1895e06e398ea6d41516c5b0bc
-commit 16dd8b2c78a0de106c7429e2a294d203f6bda3c7
+commit 01a0670f69c5b86e471e033b92145d6c7cc77c58
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Tue Jul 16 13:18:39 2019 +0000
+Date: Thu Oct 31 21:17:49 2019 +0000
- upstream: remove mostly vestigal uuencode.[ch]; moving the only unique
+ upstream: Separate myproposal.h userauth pubkey types
- functionality there (wrapping of base64-encoded data) to sshbuf functions;
- feedback and ok markus@
+ U2F/FIDO keys are not supported for host authentication, so we need
+ a separate list for user keys.
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 4dba6735d88c57232f6fccec8a08bdcfea44ac4c
-
-commit 45478898f9590b5cc8bc7104e573b84be67443b0
-Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Tue Jul 16 09:20:23 2019 +1000
-
- Hook memmem compat code into build.
+ feedback & ok markus@
- This fixes builds on platforms that don't have it (at least old DragonFly,
- probably others).
-
-commit c7bd4617293a903bd3fac3394a7e72d439af49a5
-Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Tue Jul 16 09:07:18 2019 +1000
-
- Import memmem.c from OpenBSD.
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 7fe2e6ab85f9f2338866e5af8ca2d312abbf0429
-commit 477e2a3be8b10df76e8d76f0427b043280d73d68
+commit 23f38c2d8cda3fad24e214e1f0133c42435b54ee
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Mon Jul 15 13:12:02 2019 +0000
+Date: Thu Oct 31 21:17:09 2019 +0000
- upstream: unit tests for sshbuf_cmp() and sshbuf_find(); ok markus
+ upstream: ssh-keygen support for generating U2F/FIDO keys
- OpenBSD-Regress-ID: b52d36bc3ab6dc158c1e59a9a4735f821cf9e1fd
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 6ce04f2b497ac9dd8c327f76f1e6c724fb1d1b37
-commit eb0d8e708a1f958aecd2d6e2ff2450af488d4c2a
+commit ed3467c1e16b7396ff7fcf12d2769261512935ec
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Mon Jul 15 13:16:29 2019 +0000
+Date: Thu Oct 31 21:16:20 2019 +0000
- upstream: support PKCS8 as an optional format for storage of
-
- private keys, enabled via "ssh-keygen -m PKCS8" on operations that save
- private keys to disk.
+ upstream: U2F/FIDO middleware interface
- The OpenSSH native key format remains the default, but PKCS8 is a
- superior format to PEM if interoperability with non-OpenSSH software
- is required, as it may use a less terrible KDF (IIRC PEM uses a single
- round of MD5 as a KDF).
+ Supports enrolling (generating) keys and signatures.
- adapted from patch by Jakub Jelen via bz3013; ok markus
+ feedback & ok markus@
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 027824e3bc0b1c243dc5188504526d73a55accb1
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 73d1dd5939454f9c7bd840f48236cba41e8ad592
-commit e18a27eedccb024acb3cd9820b650a5dff323f01
+commit 02bb0768a937e50bbb236efc2bbdddb1991b1c85
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Mon Jul 15 13:11:38 2019 +0000
+Date: Thu Oct 31 21:15:14 2019 +0000
- upstream: two more bounds-checking sshbuf counterparts to common
+ upstream: Initial infrastructure for U2F/FIDO support
- string operations: sshbuf_cmp() (bcmp-like) and sshbuf_find() (memmem like)
+ Key library support: including allocation, marshalling public/private
+ keys and certificates, signature validation.
- feedback and ok markus@
+ feedback & ok markus@
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: fd071ec2485c7198074a168ff363a0d6052a706a
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: a17615ba15e0f7932ac4360cb18fc9a9544e68c7
-commit bc551dfebb55845537b1095cf3ccd01640a147b7
-Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Mon Jul 15 12:52:45 2019 +1000
+commit 57ecc10628b04c384cbba2fbc87d38b74cd1199d
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Thu Oct 31 21:14:17 2019 +0000
- Clear valgrind-out dir to prevent collisions.
+ upstream: Protocol documentation for U2F/FIDO keys in OpenSSH
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 8f3247317c2909870593aeb306dff848bc427915
-commit 5db9ba718e983661a9114ae1418f6e412d1f52d5
-Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Mon Jul 15 12:02:27 2019 +1000
+commit f4fdcd2b7a2bbf5d8770d44565173ca5158d4dcb
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date: Fri Nov 1 08:36:16 2019 +1100
- Allow agent tests to write to valgrind dir.
+ Missing unit test files
-commit 121e48fa5305f41f0477d9908e3d862987a68a84
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Sun Jul 14 23:33:19 2019 +0000
+commit 1bcd1169c5221688418fa38606e9c69055b72451
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Tue Oct 29 19:45:03 2019 +1100
- upstream: unit tests for sshbuf_peek/poke bounds-checked random access
-
- functions. ok markus@
-
- OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 034c4284b1da6b12e25c762a6b958efacdafbaef
+ Add implementation of localtime_r.
-commit 101d164723ffbc38f8036b6f3ea3bfef771ba250
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Sun Jul 14 23:32:27 2019 +0000
+commit 2046ed16c1202431b0307674c33a123a113e8297
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date: Tue Oct 29 07:47:27 2019 +0000
- upstream: add some functions to perform random-access read/write
-
- operations inside buffers with bounds checking. Intended to replace manual
- pointer arithmetic wherever possible.
+ upstream: Signal handler cleanup: remove leftover support for
- feedback and ok markus@
+ unreliable signals and now-unneeded save and restore of errno. ok deraadt@
+ markus@
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 91771fde7732738f1ffed078aa5d3bee6d198409
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 01dd8a1ebdd991c8629ba1f5237283341a93cd88
-commit 7250879c72d28275a53f2f220e49646c3e42ef18
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Jul 12 04:08:39 2019 +0000
+commit 70fc9a6ca4dd33cb2dd400a4dad5db9683a3d284
+Author: jmc@openbsd.org <jmc@openbsd.org>
+Date: Tue Oct 22 08:50:35 2019 +0000
- upstream: include SHA2-variant RSA key algorithms in KEX proposal;
-
- allows ssh-keyscan to harvest keys from servers that disable olde SHA1
- ssh-rsa. bz#3029 from Jakub Jelen
+ upstream: fixes from lucas;
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 9f95ebf76a150c2f727ca4780fb2599d50bbab7a
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 4c4bfd2806c5bbc753788ffe19c5ee13aaf418b2
-commit a0876bd994cab9ba6e47ba2a163a4417c7597487
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Jul 12 03:56:21 2019 +0000
+commit 702368aa4381c3b482368257ac574a87b5a80938
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date: Tue Oct 22 07:06:35 2019 +0000
- upstream: print explicit "not modified" message if a file was
-
- requested for resumed download but was considered already complete.
-
- bz#2978 ok dtucker
+ upstream: Import regenerated moduli file.
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: f32084b26a662f16215ee4ca4a403d67e49ab986
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 58ec755be4e51978ecfee73539090eb68652a987
-commit b9b0f2ac9625933db53a35b1c1ce423876630558
-Author: tb@openbsd.org <tb@openbsd.org>
-Date: Wed Jul 10 07:04:27 2019 +0000
+commit 5fe81da22652f8caa63e9e3a1af519a85d36337e
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Mon Oct 28 21:19:47 2019 +1100
- upstream: Fix a typo and make <esc><right> move right to the
-
- closest end of a word just like <esc><left> moves left to the closest
- beginning of a word.
-
- ok djm
-
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 6afe01b05ed52d8b12eb1fda6e9af5afb5e198ee
+ Fix ifdefs to not mask needed bits.
-commit 8729498a5d239980a91d32f031b34e8c58c52f62
-Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
-Date: Wed Jul 10 09:43:19 2019 +1000
+commit 7694e9d2fb5785bbdd0920dce7a160bd79feaf00
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Mon Oct 28 17:05:36 2019 +1100
- fix typo that prevented detection of Linux VRF
-
- Reported by hexiaowen AT huawei.com
+ Only use RLIMIT_NOFILE if it's defined.
-commit 5b2b79ff7c057ee101518545727ed3023372891d
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Tue Jul 9 04:15:00 2019 +0000
+commit d561b0b2fa2531b4cc3bc70a7d657c6485c9fd0b
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Mon Oct 28 16:09:04 2019 +1100
- upstream: cap the number of permiopen/permitlisten directives we're
-
- willing to parse on a single authorized_keys line; ok deraadt@
-
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: a43a752c2555d26aa3fc754805a476f6e3e30f46
+ Make sure we have struct statfs before using.
-commit eb0b51dac408fadd1fd13fa6d726ab8fdfcc4152
+commit 2912596aecfcf48e5115c7a906d1e664f7717a4b
Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Mon Jul 8 17:27:26 2019 +1000
+Date: Mon Oct 28 16:06:59 2019 +1100
- Move log.h include inside ifdefs.
-
- Fixes build on some other platforms that don't have va_list immediately
- available (eg NetBSD).
+ Define UINT32_MAX if needed.
-commit 43702f8e6fa22a258e25c4dd950baaae0bc656b7
+commit 7169e31121e8c8cc729b55154deb722ae495b316
Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Sat Jul 6 23:07:04 2019 +1000
+Date: Mon Oct 28 16:00:45 2019 +1100
- Include log.h for debug() and friends.
+ Move utimensat definition into timespec section.
- Should fix some compiler warnings on IRIX (bz#3032).
+ Since utimensat uses struct timespec, move it to the section where we
+ define struct timespec when needed.
-commit 53a6ebf1445a857f5e487b18ee5e5830a9575149
-Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
-Date: Mon Jul 8 13:44:32 2019 +1000
+commit 850ec1773d656cbff44d78a79e369dc262ce5853
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Mon Oct 28 15:57:22 2019 +1100
- sftp-realpath.c needs includes.h
+ Wrap OpenSSL bits in WITH_OPENSSL.
-commit 4efe1adf05ee5d3fce44320fcff68735891f4ee6
-Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
-Date: Mon Jul 8 13:38:39 2019 +1000
+commit 6fc7e1c6fec3ba589869ae98e968c0e5e2e4695b
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Mon Oct 28 15:53:25 2019 +1100
- remove realpath() compat replacement
-
- We shipped a BSD implementation of realpath() because sftp-server
- depended on its behaviour.
-
- OpenBSD is now moving to a more strictly POSIX-compliant realpath(2),
- so sftp-server now unconditionally requires its own BSD-style realpath
- implementation. As such, there is no need to carry another independant
- implementation in openbsd-compat.
-
- ok dtucker@
+ Wrap poll.h includes in HAVE_POLL_H.
-commit 696fb4298e80f2ebcd188986a91b49af3b7ca14c
-Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
-Date: Sun Jul 7 01:05:00 2019 +0000
+commit 9239a18f96905cc1a353e861e33af093652f24e7
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Thu Oct 24 14:39:49 2019 +1100
- upstream: Remove some set but never used variables. ok daraadt@
+ Add a function call stackprotector tests.
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 824baf9c59afc66a4637017e397b9b74a41684e7
+ Including a function call in the test programs for the gcc stack
+ protector flag tests exercises more of the compiler and makes it more
+ likely it'll detect problems.
-commit 156e9e85e92b46ca90226605d9eff49e8ec31b22
-Author: deraadt@openbsd.org <deraadt@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Jul 5 12:35:40 2019 +0000
+commit b9705393be4612fd5e29d0cd8e7cf2b66ed19eb7
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Tue Oct 22 18:09:22 2019 +1100
- upstream: still compile uuencode.c, unbreaks build
-
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 5ea3d63ab972691f43e9087ab5fd8376d48e898f
+ Import regenerated moduli file.
-commit cec9ee527a12b1f6c2e0a1c155fec64a38d71cf6
+commit 76ed2199491397e0f9902ade80d5271e4a9b2630
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Jul 5 07:32:01 2019 +0000
+Date: Wed Oct 16 06:05:39 2019 +0000
- upstream: revert header removal that snuck into previous
+ upstream: potential NULL dereference for revoked hostkeys; reported
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 3919cdd58989786660b8269b325646ef8856428e
+ by krishnaiah bommu
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 35ff685e7cc9dd2e3fe2e3dfcdcb9bc5c79f6506
-commit 569b650f93b561c09c655f83f128e1dfffe74101
+commit 6500c3bc71bf4fe14972c1177e6b93f1164d07a4
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Jul 5 04:55:40 2019 +0000
+Date: Wed Oct 16 06:03:30 2019 +0000
- upstream: add a local implementation of BSD realpath() for
-
- sftp-server use ahead of OpenBSD's realpath changing to match POSIX;
+ upstream: free buf before return; reported by krishnaiah bommu
- ok deraadt@ (thanks for snaps testing)
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 091bb23a6e913af5d4f72c50030b53ce1cef4de1
+
+commit d7d116b6d9e6cb79cc235e9801caa683d3db3181
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Mon Oct 14 06:00:02 2019 +0000
+
+ upstream: memleak in error path; spotted by oss-fuzz, ok markus@
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 4f8cbf7ed8679f6237264301d104ecec64885d55
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: d6ed260cbbc297ab157ad63931802fb1ef7a4266
-commit b8e2b797362526437e0642a6c2f2970d794f2561
+commit 9b9e3ca6945351eefb821ff783a4a8e6d9b98b9a
Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Sat Jul 6 13:13:57 2019 +1000
+Date: Fri Oct 11 14:12:16 2019 +1100
- Add prototype for strnlen to prevent warnings.
+ Re-add SA_RESTART to mysignal.
+
+ This makes mysignal implement reliable BSD semantics according to
+ Stevens' APUE. This was first attempted in 2001 but was reverted
+ due to problems with HP-UX 10.20 and select() and possibly grantpt().
+ Modern systems should be fine with it, but if any current platforms have
+ a problem with it now we can disable it just for those. ok djm@
-commit 4c3e00b1ed7e596610f34590eb5d54ee50d77878
+commit 0bd312a362168c1eae3cd6b3889395a78e6fd0f8
Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Sat Jul 6 13:02:34 2019 +1000
+Date: Thu Oct 10 09:42:03 2019 +1100
- Cast *ID types to unsigned long when printing.
+ Fix ifdef typo for declaration of memmem.
- UID and GID types vary by platform so cast to u_long and use %lu when
- printing them to prevent warnings.
+ Fixes build on IRIX. bz#3081.
-commit 2753521e899f30d1d58b5da0b4e68fde6fcf341e
-Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Sat Jul 6 12:54:43 2019 +1000
+commit 01ce1cd402d5eecde2bba35b67e08f5b266b37fd
+Author: Abhishek Arya <inferno@chromium.org>
+Date: Tue Oct 8 20:19:18 2019 -0700
- Add prototype for compat strndup.(bz#3032).
+ Update README.md
-commit 01a1e21cd55d99293c8ff8ed7c590f2ee440da43
-Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Sat Jul 6 12:00:41 2019 +1000
+commit 1ba130ac8fb2884307f658126f04578f8aef409e
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date: Wed Oct 9 13:49:35 2019 +1100
- Add missing bracket in EGD seeding code.
+ add a fuzzer for private key parsing
+
+commit cdf1d0a9f5d18535e0a18ff34860e81a6d83aa5c
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date: Wed Oct 9 11:31:03 2019 +1100
+
+ prepare for 8.1 release
+
+commit 3b4e56d740b74324e2d7542957cad5a11518f455
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Wed Oct 9 00:04:57 2019 +0000
+
+ upstream: openssh-8.1
- When configured --with-prngd-socket the code had a missing bracket after
- an API change. Fix that and a couple of warnings. bz#3032 , from
- ole.weidner at protonmail.ch
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 3356bb34e2aa287f0e6d6773c9ae659dc680147d
-commit e187b1d4607392cf2c19243afe0d0311a4ff3591
-Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Jul 5 04:19:39 2019 +0000
+commit 29e0ecd9b4eb3b9f305e2240351f0c59cad9ef81
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Wed Oct 9 00:04:42 2019 +0000
- upstream: Add (recently added) rsa_oldfmt to CLEANFILES.
+ upstream: fix an unreachable integer overflow similar to the XMSS
- OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 405beda94e32aa6cc9c80969152fab91f7c54bd3
+ case, and some other NULL dereferences found by fuzzing.
+
+ fix with and ok markus@
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 0f81adbb95ef887ce586953e1cb225fa45c7a47b
-commit 74b541bfabdcb57c1683cd9b3f1d1f4d5e41563e
-Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Jul 5 04:12:46 2019 +0000
+commit a546b17bbaeb12beac4c9aeed56f74a42b18a93a
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Wed Oct 9 00:02:57 2019 +0000
- upstream: Adapt the PuTTY/Conch tests to new key names.
+ upstream: fix integer overflow in XMSS private key parsing.
- A recent regress change (2a9b3a2ce411d16cda9c79ab713c55f65b0ec257 in
- portable) broke the PuTTY and Twisted Conch interop tests, because the
- key they want to use is now called ssh-rsa rather than rsa. Adapt the
- tests to the new file names. bz#3020, patch from cjwatson at debian.org.
+ Reported by Adam Zabrocki via SecuriTeam's SSH program.
- OpenBSD-Regress-ID: fd342a37db4d55aa4ec85316f73082c8eb96e64e
+ Note that this code is experimental and not compiled by default.
+
+ ok markus@
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: cd0361896d15e8a1bac495ac583ff065ffca2be1
-commit de08335a4cfaa9b7081e94ea4a8b7153c230546d
+commit c2cc25480ba36ab48c1a577bebb12493865aad87
Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Jul 5 04:03:13 2019 +0000
+Date: Tue Oct 8 22:40:39 2019 +0000
- upstream: Add a sleep to allow forwards to come up.
+ upstream: Correct type for end-of-list sentinel; fixes initializer
- Currently when the multiplex client requests a forward it returns
- once the request has been sent but not necessarily when the forward
- is up. This causes intermittent text failures due to this race,
- so add some sleeps to mitigate this until we can fix it properly.
+ warnings on some platforms. ok deraadt.
- OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 384c7d209d2443d25ea941d7f677e932621fb253
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: a990dbc2dac25bdfa07e79321349c73fd991efa2
-commit 4d249284729f864faa2e8f3e015f9a41b674544a
-Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Fri Jul 5 14:58:57 2019 +1000
+commit e827aedf8818e75c0016b47ed8fc231427457c43
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Mon Oct 7 23:10:38 2019 +0000
- Remove nc stderr redirection to resync w/OpenBSD.
+ upstream: reversed test yielded incorrect debug message
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 78bb512d04cfc238adb2c5b7504ac93eecf523b3
-commit c5cfa90e03432181ffcc7ad3f9f815179bd0c626
+commit 8ca491d29fbe26e5909ce22b344c0a848dc28d55
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date: Tue Oct 8 17:05:57 2019 +1100
+
+ depend
+
+commit 86a0323374cbd404629e75bb320b3fa1c16aaa6b
Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Fri Jul 5 13:21:45 2019 +1000
+Date: Wed Oct 9 09:36:06 2019 +1100
- Do not fatal on failed lookup of group "tty".
+ Make MAKE_CLONE no-op macro more correct.
- Some platforms (eg AIX and Cygwin) do not have a "tty" group. In those
- cases we will fall back to making the tty device the user's primary
- group, so do not fatal if the group lookup fails. ok djm@
+ Similar to the previous change to DEF_WEAK, some compilers don't like
+ the empty statement, so convert into a no-op function prototype.
-commit 8b4cc4bdc8a70bf209a274fa2b2a49c1e3c8d8a2
-Author: deraadt@openbsd.org <deraadt@openbsd.org>
-Date: Thu Jul 4 16:20:10 2019 +0000
+commit cfc1897a2002ec6c4dc879b24e8b3153c87ea2cf
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date: Wed Oct 9 09:06:35 2019 +1100
- upstream: fatal() if getgrnam() cannot find "tty"
+ wrap stdint.h include in HAVE_STDINT_H
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: d148c1c052fa0ed7d105b5428b5c1bab91630048
+ make the indenting a little more consistent too..
+
+ Fixes Solaris 2.6; reported by Tom G. Christensen
-commit 48cccc275c6a1e91d3f80fdb0dc0d5baf529aeca
-Author: deraadt@openbsd.org <deraadt@openbsd.org>
-Date: Thu Jul 4 16:16:51 2019 +0000
+commit 13b3369830a43b89a503915216a23816d1b25744
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date: Tue Oct 8 15:32:02 2019 +1100
- upstream: stat() returns precisely -1 to indicate error
+ avoid "return (value)" in void-declared function
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 668e8d022ed4ab847747214f64119e5865365fa1
+ spotted by Tim Rice; ok dtucker
-commit 8142fcaf9ed8ff66252deecbfd29fc59d5f2df4f
-Author: deraadt@openbsd.org <deraadt@openbsd.org>
-Date: Wed Jul 3 03:24:02 2019 +0000
+commit 0c7f8d2326d812b371f7afd63aff846973ec80a4
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Tue Oct 8 14:44:50 2019 +1100
- upstream: snprintf/vsnprintf return < 0 on error, rather than -1.
+ Make DEF_WEAK more likely to be correct.
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: a261c421140a0639bb2b66bbceca72bf8239749d
+ Completely nop-ing out DEF_WEAK leaves an empty statemment which some
+ compilers don't like. Replace with a no-op function template. ok djm@
-commit 4d28fa78abce2890e136281950633fae2066cc29
-Author: deraadt@openbsd.org <deraadt@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Jun 28 13:35:04 2019 +0000
+commit b1e79ea8fae9c252399677a28707661d85c7d00c
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date: Sun Oct 6 11:49:50 2019 +0000
- upstream: When system calls indicate an error they return -1, not
+ upstream: Instead of running sed over the whole log to remove CRs,
- some arbitrary value < 0. errno is only updated in this case. Change all
- (most?) callers of syscalls to follow this better, and let's see if this
- strictness helps us in the future.
+ remove them only where it's needed (and confuses test(1) on at least OS X in
+ portable).
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 48081f00db7518e3b712a49dca06efc2a5428075
+ OpenBSD-Regress-ID: a6ab9b4bd1d33770feaf01b2dfb96f9e4189d2d0
-commit e8c974043c1648eab0ad67a7ba6a3e444fe79d2d
-Author: deraadt@openbsd.org <deraadt@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Jun 28 05:44:09 2019 +0000
+commit 8dc7d6b75a7f746fdd056acd41dffc0a13557a4c
+Author: Eduardo Barretto <ebarretto@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
+Date: Tue May 9 13:33:30 2017 -0300
- upstream: asprintf returns -1, not an arbitrary value < 0. Also
+ Enable specific ioctl call for EP11 crypto card (s390)
- upon error the (very sloppy specification) leaves an undefined value in *ret,
- so it is wrong to inspect it, the error condition is enough. discussed a
- little with nicm, and then much more with millert until we were exasperated
+ The EP11 crypto card needs to make an ioctl call, which receives an
+ specific argument. This crypto card is for s390 only.
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 29258fa51edf8115d244b9d4b84028487bf8923e
+ Signed-off-by: Eduardo Barretto <ebarretto@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
-commit 1b2d55d15c6240c15a1e1cf4203b82e54a766272
-Author: deraadt@openbsd.org <deraadt@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Jun 28 01:23:50 2019 +0000
+commit 07f2c7f34951c04d2cd796ac6c80e47c56c4969e
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Oct 4 04:31:59 2019 +0000
- upstream: oops, from asou
+ upstream: fix memory leak in error path; bz#3074 patch from
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 702e765d1639b732370d8f003bb84a1c71c4d0c6
+ krishnaiah.bommu@intel.com, ok dtucker
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: d031853f3ecf47b35a0669588f4d9d8e3b307b3c
-commit 5cdbaa78fcb718c39af4522d98016ad89d065427
-Author: deraadt@openbsd.org <deraadt@openbsd.org>
-Date: Thu Jun 27 18:03:37 2019 +0000
+commit b7fbc75e119170f4d15c94a7fda4a1050e0871d6
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Oct 4 04:13:39 2019 +0000
- upstream: Some asprintf() calls were checked < 0, rather than the
-
- precise == -1. ok millert nicm tb, etc
+ upstream: space
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: caecf8f57938685c04f125515b9f2806ad408d53
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 350648bcf00a2454e7ef998b7d88e42552b348ac
-commit b2e3e57be4a933d9464bccbe592573725765486f
+commit 643ab68c79ac1644f4a31e36928c2bfc8a51db3c
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Thu Jun 27 06:29:35 2019 +0000
+Date: Fri Oct 4 03:39:19 2019 +0000
- upstream: fix NULL deference (bzero) on err
+ upstream: more sshsig regress tests: check key revocation, the
- =?UTF-8?q?or=20path=20added=20in=20last=20commit;=20spotted=20by=20Reynir?=
- =?UTF-8?q?=20Bj=C3=B6rnsson?=
- MIME-Version: 1.0
- Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
- Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
+ check-novalidate signature test mode and signing keys in ssh-agent.
- ok deraadt@ markus@ tb@
+ From Sebastian Kinne (slightly tweaked)
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: b11b084bcc551b2c630560eb08618dd501027bbd
+ OpenBSD-Regress-ID: b39566f5cec70140674658cdcedf38752a52e2e2
-commit 58ceacdcbaebefc77d120712de55c6fc6aa32bb1
-Author: Jitendra Sharma <jitendra.sharma@intel.com>
-Date: Fri Jun 21 09:54:17 2019 +0530
+commit 714031a10bbe378a395a93cf1040f4ee1451f45f
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Oct 4 03:26:58 2019 +0000
- Update README doc to include missing test cases
+ upstream: Check for gmtime failure in moduli generation. Based on
- Readme regress document is missing various individual tests,
- which are supported currently. Update README to
- include those test cases.
+ patch from krishnaiah.bommu@intel.com, ok djm@
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 4c6a4cde0022188ac83737de08da0e875704eeaa
-commit 7959330a554051b5587f8af3fec0c2c0d5820f64
-Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
-Date: Wed Jun 26 22:29:43 2019 +0000
+commit 6918974405cc28ed977f802fd97a9c9a9b2e141b
+Author: jmc@openbsd.org <jmc@openbsd.org>
+Date: Thu Oct 3 17:07:50 2019 +0000
- upstream: Remove unneeded unlink of xauthfile o
+ upstream: use a more common options order in SYNOPSIS and sync
- =?UTF-8?q?n=20error=20path.=20=20From=20Erik=20Sj=C3=B6lund=20via=20githu?=
- =?UTF-8?q?b,=20ok=20djm@=20deraadt@?=
- MIME-Version: 1.0
- Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
- Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
+ usage(); while here, no need for Bk/Ek;
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 62a4893cf83b29a4bbfedc40e7067c25c203e632
+ ok dtucker
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 38715c3f10b166f599a2283eb7bc14860211bb90
-commit 8de52eb224143783a49f9bddd9ab7800022a8276
+commit feff96b7d4c0b99307f0459cbff128aede4a8984
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Sun Jun 23 12:21:46 2019 +0000
+Date: Wed Oct 2 09:50:50 2019 +0000
- upstream: fix mismatch proto/decl from key shielding change; spotted
+ upstream: thinko in previous; spotted by Mantas
- via oss-fuzz
+ =?UTF-8?q?=20Mikul=C4=97nas?=
+ MIME-Version: 1.0
+ Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
+ Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 1ea0ba05ded2c5557507bd844cd446e5c8b5b3b7
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: ffa3f5a45e09752fc47d9041e2203ee2ec15b24d
-commit 1dfadb9b57c2985c95838a0292d1c2f6a501896e
+commit b5a89eec410967d6b712665f8cf0cb632928d74b
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Jun 21 04:21:45 2019 +0000
+Date: Wed Oct 2 08:07:13 2019 +0000
- upstream: adapt for key shielding API changes (const removal)
+ upstream: make signature format match PROTOCO
- OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 298890bc52f0cd09dba76dc1022fabe89bc0ded6
+ =?UTF-8?q?=20as=20a=20string,=20not=20raw=20bytes.=20Spotted=20by=20Manta?=
+ =?UTF-8?q?s=20Mikul=C4=97nas?=
+ MIME-Version: 1.0
+ Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
+ Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 80fcc6d52893f80c6de2bedd65353cebfebcfa8f
-commit 4f7a56d5e02e3d04ab69eac1213817a7536d0562
+commit dc6f81ee94995deb11bbf7e19801022c5f6fd90a
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Jun 21 04:21:04 2019 +0000
+Date: Wed Oct 2 08:05:50 2019 +0000
- upstream: Add protection for private keys at rest in RAM against
-
- speculation and memory sidechannel attacks like Spectre, Meltdown, Rowhammer
- and Rambleed. This change encrypts private keys when they are not in use with
- a symmetic key that is derived from a relatively large "prekey" consisting of
- random data (currently 16KB).
-
- Attackers must recover the entire prekey with high accuracy before
- they can attempt to decrypt the shielded private key, but the current
- generation of attacks have bit error rates that, when applied
- cumulatively to the entire prekey, make this unlikely.
-
- Implementation-wise, keys are encrypted "shielded" when loaded and then
- automatically and transparently unshielded when used for signatures or
- when being saved/serialised.
+ upstream: ban empty namespace strings for s
- Hopefully we can remove this in a few years time when computer
- architecture has become less unsafe.
+ =?UTF-8?q?shsig;=20spotted=20by=20Mantas=20Mikul=C4=97nas?=
+ MIME-Version: 1.0
+ Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
+ Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
- been in snaps for a bit already; thanks deraadt@
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 7c5bcf40bed8f4e826230176f4aa353c52aeb698
+
+commit fa5bd8107e0e2b3e1e184f55d0f9320c119f65f0
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Wed Oct 2 14:30:55 2019 +1000
+
+ Put ssherr.h back as it's actually needed.
+
+commit 3ef92a657444f172b61f92d5da66d94fa8265602
+Author: Lonnie Abelbeck <lonnie@abelbeck.com>
+Date: Tue Oct 1 09:05:09 2019 -0500
+
+ Deny (non-fatal) shmget/shmat/shmdt in preauth privsep child.
- ok dtucker@ deraadt@
+ New wait_random_seeded() function on OpenSSL 1.1.1d uses shmget, shmat, and shmdt
+ in the preauth codepath, deny (non-fatal) in seccomp_filter sandbox.
+
+commit edd1d3a6261aecbf9a55944fd7be1db83571b46e
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date: Wed Oct 2 10:54:28 2019 +1000
+
+ remove duplicate #includes
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 19767213c312e46f94b303a512ef8e9218a39bd4
+ Prompted by Jakub Jelen
-commit 4cd6b12cc9c10bf59c8b425041f3ea5091285a0f
+commit 13c508dfed9f25e6e54c984ad00a74ef08539e70
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date: Wed Oct 2 10:51:15 2019 +1000
+
+ typo in comment
+
+commit d0c3ac427f6c52b872d6617421421dd791664445
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Jun 21 03:19:59 2019 +0000
+Date: Wed Oct 2 00:42:30 2019 +0000
- upstream: print the correct AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand rather than
-
- an uninitialised variable; spotted by dtucker@
+ upstream: remove some duplicate #includes
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 02802018784250f68202f01c8561de82e17b0638
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: ed6827ab921eff8027669848ef4f70dc1da4098c
-commit 5f68ab436b0e01751d564e9a9041e6ac3673e45a
-Author: jmc@openbsd.org <jmc@openbsd.org>
-Date: Wed Jun 19 20:12:44 2019 +0000
+commit 084682786d9275552ee93857cb36e43c446ce92c
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Tue Oct 1 10:22:53 2019 +0000
- upstream: from tim: - for reput, it is remote-path which is
-
- optional, not local-path - sync help
-
- from deraadt:
- - prefer -R and undocument -r (but add a comment for future editors)
+ upstream: revert unconditional forced login implemented in r1.41 of
- from schwarze:
- - prefer -p and undocument -P (as above. the comment was schwarze's too)
+ ssh-pkcs11.c; r1.45 added a forced login as a fallback for cases where the
+ token returns no objects and this is less disruptive for users of tokens
+ directly in ssh (rather than via ssh-agent) and in ssh-keygen
- more:
- - add the -f flag to reput and reget
- - sort help (i can;t remember who suggested this originally)
+ bz3006, patch from Jakub Jelen; ok markus
- djm and deraadt were ok with earlier versions of this;
- tim and schwarze ok
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 33d6df589b072094384631ff93b1030103b3d02e
+
+commit 6c91d42cce3f055917dc3fd2c305dfc5b3b584b3
+Author: jmc@openbsd.org <jmc@openbsd.org>
+Date: Sun Sep 29 16:31:57 2019 +0000
+
+ upstream: group and sort single letter options; ok deraadt
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 3c699b53b46111f5c57eed4533f132e7e58bacdd
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: e1480e760a2b582f79696cdcff70098e23fc603f
-commit 99bcbbc77fbd5a5027031f42a5931b21b07c947e
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Jun 14 04:03:48 2019 +0000
+commit 3b44bf39ff4d7ef5d50861e2e9dda62d2926d2fe
+Author: jmc@openbsd.org <jmc@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Sep 27 20:03:24 2019 +0000
- upstream: check for convtime() refusing to accept times that
+ upstream: fix the DH-GEX text in -a; because this required a comma,
- resolve to LONG_MAX Reported by Kirk Wolf bz2977; ok dtucker
+ i added a comma to the first part, for balance...
- OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 15c9fe87be1ec241d24707006a31123d3a3117e0
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 2c3464e9e82a41e8cdfe8f0a16d94266e43dbb58
-commit e5cccb2410247c9b8151b9510a876abdf5424b24
-Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
-Date: Sun Apr 28 22:53:26 2019 +0000
+commit 3e53ef28fab53094e3b19622ba0e9c3d5fe71273
+Author: deraadt@openbsd.org <deraadt@openbsd.org>
+Date: Tue Sep 24 12:50:46 2019 +0000
- upstream: Add unit tests for user@host and URI parsing.
+ upstream: identity_file[] should be PATH_MAX, not the arbitrary
- OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 69d5b6f278e04ed32377046f7692c714c2d07a68
+ number 1024
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: e775f94ad47ce9ab37bd1410d7cf3b7ea98b11b7
-commit 0bb7e38834e3f9886302bbaea630a6b0f8cfb520
-Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
-Date: Thu Apr 18 18:57:16 2019 +0000
+commit 90d4b2541e8c907793233d9cbd4963f7624f4174
+Author: jmc@openbsd.org <jmc@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Sep 20 18:50:58 2019 +0000
- upstream: Add tests for sshd -T -C with Match.
+ upstream: new sentence, new line;
- OpenBSD-Regress-ID: d4c34916fe20d717692f10ef50b5ae5a271c12c7
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: c35ca5ec07be460e95e7406af12eee04a77b6698
-commit 73eb6cef41daba0359c1888e4756108d41b4e819
+commit fbec7dba01b70b49ac47f56031310865dff86200
Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Sun Jun 16 12:55:27 2019 +1000
+Date: Mon Sep 30 18:01:12 2019 +1000
- Include stdio.h for vsnprintf.
+ Include stdio.h for snprintf.
- Patch from mforney at mforney.org.
+ Patch from vapier@gentoo.org.
-commit adcaf40fd0a180e6cb5798317fdf479b52e3c09a
+commit 0a403bfde71c4b82147473298d3a60b4171468bd
Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Sat Jun 8 09:07:04 2019 +1000
+Date: Mon Sep 30 14:11:42 2019 +1000
- upstream rev 1.27: fix integer overflow.
+ Add SKIP_LTESTS for skipping specific tests.
+
+commit 4d59f7a5169c451ebf559aedec031ac9da2bf80c
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Sep 27 05:25:12 2019 +0000
+
+ upstream: Test for empty result in expected bits. Remove CRs from log
- Cast bitcount to u_in64_t before bit shifting to prevent integer overflow
- on 32bit platforms which cause incorrect results when adding a block
- >=512M in size. sha1 patch from ante84 at gmail.com via openssh github,
- sha2 with djm@, ok tedu@
+ as they confuse tools on some platforms. Re-enable the 3des-cbc test.
+
+ OpenBSD-Regress-ID: edf536d4f29fc1ba412889b37247a47f1b49d250
-commit 7689048e6103d3c34cba24ac5aeea7bf8405d19a
+commit 7c817d129e2d48fc8a6f7965339313023ec45765
Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Sat Jun 8 09:06:06 2019 +1000
+Date: Fri Sep 27 15:26:22 2019 +1000
- upstream rev 1.25: add DEF_WEAK.
+ Re-enable dhgex test.
- Wrap blowfish, sha*, md5, and rmd160 so that internal calls go direct
- ok deraadt@
+ Since we've added larger fallback groups to dh.c this test will pass
+ even if there is no moduli file installed on the system.
-commit 55f3153393ac7e072a4b4b21b194864460d8f44a
+commit c1e0a32fa852de6d1c82ece4f76add0ab0ca0eae
Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Sat Jun 8 09:02:24 2019 +1000
+Date: Tue Sep 24 21:17:20 2019 +1000
- upstream rev 1.25: add sys/types.h
+ Add more ToS bits, currently only used by netcat.
-commit 10974f986fa842a3a3a693e3d5761072540002b4
+commit 5a273a33ca1410351cb484af7db7c13e8b4e8e4e
Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Sat Jun 8 09:01:14 2019 +1000
+Date: Thu Sep 19 15:41:23 2019 +1000
- upstream: Use explicit_bzero instead of memset
-
- in hash Final and End functions. OK deraadt@ djm@
+ Privsep is now required.
-commit cb8f56570f70b00abae4267d4bcce2bfae7dfff6
+commit 8aa2aa3cd4d27d14e74b247c773696349472ef20
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Jun 14 04:13:58 2019 +0000
+Date: Mon Sep 16 03:23:02 2019 +0000
- upstream: slightly more instructive error message when the user
+ upstream: Allow testing signature syntax and validity without verifying
- specifies multiple -J options on the commandline. bz3015 ok dtucker@
+ that a signature came from a trusted signer. To discourage accidental or
+ unintentional use, this is invoked by the deliberately ugly option name
+ "check-novalidate"
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 181c15a65cac3b575819bc8d9a56212c3c748179
+ from Sebastian Kinne
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: cea42c36ab7d6b70890e2d8635c1b5b943adcc0b
-commit 2317ce4b0ed7d8c4b0c684e2d47bff5006bd1178
+commit 7047d5afe3103f0f07966c05b810682d92add359
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Jun 14 03:51:47 2019 +0000
+Date: Fri Sep 13 04:52:34 2019 +0000
- upstream: process agent requests for RSA certificate private keys using
+ upstream: clarify that IdentitiesOnly also applies to the default
- correct signature algorithm when requested. Patch from Jakub Jelen in bz3016
- ok dtucker markus
+ ~/.ssh/id_* keys; bz#3062
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 61f86efbeb4a1857a3e91298c1ccc6cf49b79624
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 604be570e04646f0f4a17026f8b2aada6a585dfa
-commit c95b90d40170473825904be561b1eafba354f376
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Jun 14 03:39:59 2019 +0000
+commit b36ee3fcb2f1601693b1b7fd60dd6bd96006ea75
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Sep 13 04:36:43 2019 +0000
- upstream: for public key authentication, check AuthorizedKeysFiles
+ upstream: Plug mem leaks on error paths, based in part on github
- files before consulting AuthorizedKeysCommand; ok dtucker markus
+ pr#120 from David Carlier. ok djm@.
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 13652998bea5cb93668999c39c3c48e8429db8b3
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: c57adeb1022a8148fc86e5a88837b3b156dbdb7e
-commit a5a53914989ddd3521b6edc452bc3291784a4f4f
+commit 2aefdf1aef906cf7548a2e5927d35aacb55948d4
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Jun 14 03:28:19 2019 +0000
+Date: Fri Sep 13 04:31:19 2019 +0000
- upstream: if passed a bad fd, log what it was
+ upstream: whitespace
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 582e2bd05854e49365195b58989b68ac67f09140
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 57a71dd5f4cae8d61e0ac631a862589fb2bfd700
-commit 7349149da1074d82b71722338e05b6a282f126cc
-Author: jmc@openbsd.org <jmc@openbsd.org>
-Date: Wed Jun 12 11:31:50 2019 +0000
+commit fbe24b142915331ceb2a3a76be3dc5b6d204fddf
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Sep 13 04:27:35 2019 +0000
- upstream: Hostname->HostName cleanup; from lauri tirkkonen ok
+ upstream: allow %n to be expanded in ProxyCommand strings
- dtucker
+ From Zachary Harmany via github.com/openssh/openssh-portable/pull/118
+ ok dtucker@
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 4ade73629ede63b691f36f9a929f943d4e7a44e4
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 7eebf1b7695f50c66d42053d352a4db9e8fb84b6
-commit 76af9c57387243556d38935555c227d0b34062c5
-Author: jmc@openbsd.org <jmc@openbsd.org>
-Date: Wed Jun 12 05:53:21 2019 +0000
+commit 2ce1d11600e13bee0667d6b717ffcc18a057b821
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Sep 13 04:07:42 2019 +0000
- upstream: deraadt noticed some inconsistency in the way we denote
-
- the "Hostname" and "X11UseLocalhost" keywords; this makes things consistent
- (effectively reversing my commit of yesterday);
+ upstream: clarify that ConnectTimeout applies both to the TCP
- ok deraadt markus djm
+ connection and to the protocol handshake/KEX. From Jean-Charles Longuet via
+ Github PR140
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 255c02adb29186ac91dcf47dfad7adb1b1e54667
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: ce1766abc6da080f0d88c09c2c5585a32b2256bf
-commit d1bbfdd932db9b9b799db865ee1ff50060dfc895
-Author: jmc@openbsd.org <jmc@openbsd.org>
-Date: Tue Jun 11 13:39:40 2019 +0000
+commit df780114278f406ef7cb2278802a2660092fff09
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date: Mon Sep 9 02:31:19 2019 +0000
- upstream: consistent lettering for "HostName" keyword; from lauri
+ upstream: Fix potential truncation warning. ok deraadt.
- tirkkonen
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: d87b7e3a94ec935e8194e7fce41815e22804c3ff
+
+commit ec0e6243660bf2df30c620a6a0d83eded376c9c6
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date: Fri Sep 13 13:14:39 2019 +1000
+
+ memleak of buffer in sshpam_query
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 0c267a1257ed7482b13ef550837b6496e657d563
+ coverity report via Ed Maste; ok dtucker@
-commit fc0340f7c4ee29bfb12bd1de9f99defa797e16b4
-Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Sat Jun 8 00:10:59 2019 +1000
+commit c17e4638e5592688264fc0349f61bfc7b4425aa5
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date: Fri Sep 13 13:12:42 2019 +1000
- Typo fixes in error messages.
+ explicitly test set[ug]id() return values
- Patch from knweiss at gmail.com via github pull req #97 (portable-
- specific parts).
+ Legacy !_POSIX_SAVED_IDS path only; coverity report via Ed Maste
+ ok dtucker@
-commit 4b7dd22b02b64b1ededd3c0e98a6e7ae21e31d38
-Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Jun 7 14:18:48 2019 +0000
+commit 91a2135f32acdd6378476c5bae475a6e7811a6a2
+Author: naddy@openbsd.org <naddy@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Sep 6 14:45:34 2019 +0000
- upstream: Typo and spelling fixes in comments and error messages.
+ upstream: Allow prepending a list of algorithms to the default set
- Patch from knweiss at gmail.com via -portable.
+ by starting the list with the '^' character, e.g.
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 2577465442f761a39703762c4f87a8dfcb918b4b
+ HostKeyAlgorithms ^ssh-ed25519
+ Ciphers ^aes128-gcm@openssh.com,aes256-gcm@openssh.com
+
+ ok djm@ dtucker@
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 1e1996fac0dc8a4b0d0ff58395135848287f6f97
-commit 130ef0695e1731392ca33831939fe89e8b70cc17
-Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Sat Jun 8 00:47:07 2019 +1000
+commit c8bdd2db77ac2369d5cdee237656f266c8f41552
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Sep 6 07:53:40 2019 +0000
- Include missed bits from previous sync.
+ upstream: key conversion should fail for !openssl builds, not fall
+
+ through to the key generation code
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: b957436adc43c4941e61d61958a193a708bc83c9
-commit 25e3bccbaa63d27b9d5e09c123f1eb28594d2bd6
-Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Jun 7 03:47:12 2019 +0000
+commit 823f6c37eb2d8191d45539f7b6fa877a4cb4ed3d
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Sep 6 06:08:11 2019 +0000
- upstream: Check for user@host when parsing sftp target. This
-
- allows user@[1.2.3.4] to work without a path in addition to with one.
- bz#2999, ok djm@
+ upstream: typo in previous
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: d989217110932490ba8ce92127a9a6838878928b
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 7c3b94110864771a6b80a0d8acaca34037c3c96e
-commit 0323d9b619d512f80c57575b810a05791891f657
-Author: otto@openbsd.org <otto@openbsd.org>
-Date: Thu Jun 6 05:13:13 2019 +0000
+commit 6a710d3e06fd375e2c2ae02546b9541c488a2cdb
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date: Sun Sep 8 14:48:11 2019 +1000
- upstream: Replace calls to ssh_malloc_init() by a static init of
+ needs time.h for --without-openssl
+
+commit f61f29afda6c71eda26effa54d3c2e5306fd0833
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date: Sat Sep 7 19:25:00 2019 +1000
+
+ make unittests pass for no-openssl case
+
+commit 105e1c9218940eb53473f55a9177652d889ddbad
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Sep 6 05:59:41 2019 +0000
+
+ upstream: avoid compiling certain files that deeply depend on
- malloc_options. Prepares for changes in the way malloc is initialized. ok
- guenther@ dtucker@
+ libcrypto when WITH_OPENSSL isn't set
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 154f4e3e174f614b09f792d4d06575e08de58a6b
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 569f08445c27124ec7c7f6c0268d844ec56ac061
-commit c586d2d3129265ea64b12960c379d634bccb6535
+commit 670104b923dd97b1c06c0659aef7c3e52af571b2
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri May 31 03:20:07 2019 +0000
+Date: Fri Sep 6 05:23:55 2019 +0000
- upstream: fix ssh-keysign fd handling problem introduced in r1.304
-
- caused by a typo (STDIN_FILENO vs STDERR_FILENO)
+ upstream: fixes for !WITH_OPENSSL compilation; ok dtucker@
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 57a0b4be7bef23963afe24150e24bf014fdd9cb0
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 7fd68eaa9e0f7482b5d4c7e8d740aed4770a839f
-commit 410b231aa41ff830b2f5b09b5aaf5e5cdc1ab86b
-Author: lum@openbsd.org <lum@openbsd.org>
-Date: Wed May 29 08:30:26 2019 +0000
+commit be02d7cbde3d211ec2ed2320a1f7d86b2339d758
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Sep 6 04:53:27 2019 +0000
- upstream: Make the standard output messages of both methods of
+ upstream: lots of things were relying on libcrypto headers to
- changing a key pair's comments (using -c and -C) more applicable to both
- methods. ok and suggestions djm@ dtucker@
+ transitively include various system headers (mostly stdlib.h); include them
+ explicitly
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: b379338118109eb36e14a65bc0a12735205b3de6
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 5b522f4f2d844f78bf1cc4f3f4cc392e177b2080
-commit 2b3402dc9f1d9b0df70291b424f36e436cdfa7e0
-Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Sat Jun 8 00:03:07 2019 +1000
+commit d05aaaaadcad592abfaa44540928e0c61ef72ebb
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Sep 6 03:30:42 2019 +0000
- Always clean up before and after utimensat test.
+ upstream: remove leakmalloc reference; we used this early when
+
+ refactoring but not since
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: bb28ebda8f7c490b87b37954044a6cdd43a7eb2c
-commit 182898192d4b720e4faeafd5b39c2cfb3b92aa21
-Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Fri Jun 7 23:47:37 2019 +1000
+commit 1268f0bcd8fc844ac6c27167888443c8350005eb
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Sep 6 04:24:06 2019 +0000
- Update utimensat test.
+ upstream: Check for RSA support before using it for the user key,
- POSIX specifies that when given a symlink, AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW should
- update the symlink and not the destination. The compat code doesn't
- have a way to do this, so where possible it fails instead of following a
- symlink when explicitly asked not to. Instead of checking for an explicit
- failure, check that it does not update the destination, which both the
- real and compat implmentations should honour.
+ otherwise use ed25519 which is supported when built without OpenSSL.
- Inspired by github pull req #125 from chutzpah at gentoo.org.
+ OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 3d23ddfe83c5062f00ac845d463f19a2ec78c0f7
-commit d220b675205185e0b4d6b6524acc2e5c599ef0e2
+commit fd7a2dec652b9efc8e97f03f118f935dce732c60
Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Fri Jun 7 14:26:54 2019 +1000
+Date: Fri Sep 6 14:07:10 2019 +1000
- Have pthread_create return errno on failure.
+ Provide explicit path to configure-check.
- According to POSIX, pthread_create returns the failure reason in
- the non-zero function return code so make the fork wrapper do that.
- Matches previous change.
+ On some platforms (at least OpenBSD) make won't search VPATH for target
+ files, so building out-of-tree will fail at configure-check. Provide
+ explicit path. ok djm@
-commit 1bd4f7f25f653e0cadb2e6f25d79bc3c35c6aa4d
-Author: Elliott Hughes <enh@google.com>
-Date: Thu Apr 25 13:36:27 2019 -0700
+commit 00865c29690003b4523cc09a0e104724b9f911a4
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Sep 6 01:58:50 2019 +0000
- pthread_create(3) returns positive values on failure.
+ upstream: better error code for bad arguments; inspired by
- Found by inspection after finding similar bugs in other code used by
- Android.
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: dfc263b6041de7f0ed921a1de0b81ddebfab1e0a
-commit b3a77b25e5f7880222b179431a74fad76d2cf60c
-Author: Harald Freudenberger <freude@linux.ibm.com>
-Date: Fri May 24 10:11:15 2019 +0200
+commit afdf27f5aceb4973b9f5308f4310c6e3fd8db1fb
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date: Thu Sep 5 21:38:40 2019 +1000
- allow s390 specific ioctl for ecc hardware support
-
- Adding another s390 specific ioctl to be able to support ECC hardware
- acceleration to the sandbox seccomp filter rules.
+ revert config.h/config.h.in freshness checks
- Now the ibmca openssl engine provides elliptic curve cryptography
- support with the help of libica and CCA crypto cards. This is done via
- jet another ioctl call to the zcrypt device driver and so there is a
- need to enable this on the openssl sandbox.
-
- Code is s390 specific and has been tested, verified and reviewed.
-
- Please note that I am also the originator of the previous changes in
- that area. I posted these changes to Eduardo and he forwarded the
- patches to the openssl community.
-
- Signed-off-by: Harald Freudenberger <freude@linux.ibm.com>
- Reviewed-by: Joerg Schmidbauer <jschmidb@de.ibm.com>
+ turns out autoreconf and configure don't touch some files if their content
+ doesn't change, so the mtime can't be relied upon in a makefile rule
-commit 2459df9aa11820f8092a8651aeb381af7ebbccb1
-Author: Sorin Adrian Savu <sorin25@users.noreply.github.com>
-Date: Sun May 26 21:50:08 2019 +0300
+commit a97609e850c57bd2cc2fe7e175fc35cb865bc834
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date: Thu Sep 5 20:54:39 2019 +1000
- openssl-devel is obsoleted by libssl-devel
+ extend autoconf freshness test
- openssl-devel is no longer installable via the cygwin setup and
- it's hidden by default, so you can't see the replacement very easy.
+ make it cover config.h.in and config.h separately
-commit 85ceb0e64bff672558fc87958cd548f135c83cdd
-Author: jmc@openbsd.org <jmc@openbsd.org>
-Date: Mon May 20 06:01:59 2019 +0000
+commit 182297c10edb21c4856c6a38326fd04d81de41a5
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date: Thu Sep 5 20:34:54 2019 +1000
- upstream: tweak previous;
+ check that configure/config.h is up to date
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 42f39f22f53cfcb913bce401ae0f1bb93e08dd6c
+ Ensure they are newer than the configure.ac / aclocal.m4 source
-commit 30615295609f5c57b3137b3021fe63bfa45c1985
+commit 7d6034bd020248e9fc0f8c39c71c858debd0d0c1
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Mon May 20 00:25:55 2019 +0000
+Date: Thu Sep 5 10:05:51 2019 +0000
- upstream: embiggen format buffer size for certificate serial number so
+ upstream: if a PKCS#11 token returns no keys then try to login and
- that it will fit a full 64 bit integer. bz#3012 from Manoel Domingues Junior
+ refetch them. Based on patch from Jakub Jelen; bz#2430 ok markus@
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: a51f3013056d05b976e5af6b978dcb9e27bbc12b
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: ab53bd6ddd54dd09e54a8bfbed1a984496f08b43
-commit 476e3551b2952ef73acc43d995e832539bf9bc4d
+commit 76f09bd95917862101b740afb19f4db5ccc752bf
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Mon May 20 00:20:35 2019 +0000
+Date: Thu Sep 5 09:35:19 2019 +0000
- upstream: When signing certificates with an RSA key, default to
-
- using the rsa-sha2-512 signature algorithm. Certificates signed by RSA keys
- will therefore be incompatible with OpenSSH < 7.2 unless the default is
- overridden.
+ upstream: sprinkle in some explicit errors here, otherwise the
- Document the ability of the ssh-keygen -t flag to override the
- signature algorithm when signing certificates, and the new default.
+ percolate all the way up to dispatch_run_fatal() and lose all meaninful
+ context
- ok deraadt@
+ to help with bz#3063; ok dtucker@
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 400c9c15013978204c2cb80f294b03ae4cfc8b95
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 5b2da83bb1c4a3471444b7910b2120ae36438a0a
-commit 606077ee1e77af5908431d003fb28461ef7be092
-Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Fri May 17 13:14:12 2019 +1000
+commit 0ea332497b2b2fc3995f72f6bafe9d664c0195b3
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Thu Sep 5 09:25:13 2019 +0000
- Add no-op implementation of pam_putenv.
+ upstream: only send ext_info for KEX_INITIAL; bz#2929 ok dtucker
- Some platforms such as HP-UX do not have pam_putenv. Currently the
- calls are ifdef'ed out, but a new one was recently added. Remove the
- ifdefs and add a no-op implementation. bz#3008, ok djm.
-
-commit 1ac98be8724c9789d770ddb8e7f0dbf1b55e05a0
-Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Fri May 17 12:42:17 2019 +1000
-
- Use the correct macro for SSH_ALLOWED_CA_SIGALGS.
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 00f5c6062f6863769f5447c6346f78c05d2e4a63
-commit 97370f6c2c3b825f8c577b7e6c00b1a98d30a6cf
-Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Fri May 17 10:54:51 2019 +1000
+commit f23d91f9fa7f6f42e70404e000fac88aebfe3076
+Author: jmc@openbsd.org <jmc@openbsd.org>
+Date: Thu Sep 5 05:47:23 2019 +0000
- Fix building w/out ECC.
+ upstream: macro fix; ok djm
- Ifdef out ECC specific code so that that it'll build against an OpenSSL
- configured w/out ECC. With & ok djm@
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: e891dd6c7996114cb32f0924cb7898ab55efde6e
-commit 633703babf8d9a88da85f23b800e1b88dec7cdbd
-Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Fri May 17 10:50:29 2019 +1000
+commit 8b57337c1c1506df2bb9f039d0628a6de618566b
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date: Thu Sep 5 15:46:39 2019 +1000
- Conditionalize ECDH methods in CA algos.
-
- When building against an OpenSSL configured without ECC, don't include
- those algos in CASignatureAlgorithms. ok djm@
+ update fuzzing makefile to more recent clang
-commit 5c8d14c512f5d413095b22bdba08a6bb990f1e97
-Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
-Date: Thu May 16 08:47:27 2019 +0000
+commit ae631ad77daf8fd39723d15a687cd4b1482cbae8
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date: Thu Sep 5 15:45:32 2019 +1000
- upstream: Move a variable declaration to the block where it's used
-
- to make things a little tidier for -portable.
-
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 616379861be95619e5358768b7dee4793e2f3a75
+ fuzzer for sshsig allowed_signers option parsing
-commit a1d29cc36a5e6eeabc935065a8780e1ba5b67014
-Author: deraadt@openbsd.org <deraadt@openbsd.org>
-Date: Wed May 15 04:43:31 2019 +0000
+commit 69159afe24120c97e5ebaf81016c85968afb903e
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Thu Sep 5 05:42:59 2019 +0000
- upstream: When doing the fork+exec'ing for ssh-keysign, rearrange
-
- the socket into fd3, so as to not mistakenly leak other fd forward
- accidentally. ok djm
+ upstream: memleak on error path; found by libfuzzer
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 24cc753f5aa2c6a7d0fbf62766adbc75cd785296
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 34d44cb0fb5bdb5fcbc6b02b804e71b20a7a5fc7
-commit db7606d4a62fee67b0cb2f32dfcbd7b3642bfef5
-Author: schwarze@openbsd.org <schwarze@openbsd.org>
-Date: Tue May 14 12:47:17 2019 +0000
+commit bab6feb01f9924758ca7129dba708298a53dde5f
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Thu Sep 5 04:55:32 2019 +0000
- upstream: Delete some .Sx macros that were used in a wrong way.
+ upstream: expose allowed_signers options parsing code in header for
- Part of a patch from Stephen Gregoratto <dev at sgregoratto dot me>.
+ fuzzing
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 15501ed13c595f135e7610b1a5d8345ccdb513b7
+ rename to make more consistent with philosophically-similar auth
+ options parsing API.
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 0c67600ef04187f98e2912ca57b60c22a8025b7c
-commit cb4accb1233865d9151f8a50cc5f0c61a3fd4077
-Author: florian@openbsd.org <florian@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri May 10 18:55:17 2019 +0000
+commit 4f9d75fbafde83d428e291516f8ce98e6b3a7c4b
+Author: naddy@openbsd.org <naddy@openbsd.org>
+Date: Wed Sep 4 20:31:15 2019 +0000
- upstream: For PermitOpen violations add the remote host and port to
+ upstream: Call comma-separated lists as such to clarify semantics.
- be able to find out from where the request was comming.
+ Options such as Ciphers take values that may be a list of ciphers; the
+ complete list, not indiviual elements, may be prefixed with a dash or plus
+ character to remove from or append to the default list, respectively.
- Add the same logging for PermitListen violations which where not
- logged at all.
+ Users might read the current text as if each elment took an optional prefix,
+ so tweak the wording from "values" to "list" to prevent such ambiguity for
+ all options supporting these semantics.
- Pointed out by Robert Kisteleki (robert AT ripe.net)
+ Fix instances missed in first commit. ok jmc@ kn@
- input markus
- OK deraadt
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 7112522430a54fb9f15a7a26d26190ed84d5e417
+
+commit db1e6f60f03641b2d17e0ab062242609f4ed4598
+Author: jmc@openbsd.org <jmc@openbsd.org>
+Date: Wed Sep 4 05:56:54 2019 +0000
+
+ upstream: tweak previous;
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 8a7d0f1b7175504c0d1dca8d9aca1588b66448c8
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 0abd728aef6b5b35f6db43176aa83b7e3bf3ce27
-commit cd16aceec148d55088fc8df6be88335578d85258
-Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Thu May 16 07:53:20 2019 +1000
+commit 0f44e5956c7c816f6600f2a47be4d7bb5a8d711d
+Author: naddy@openbsd.org <naddy@openbsd.org>
+Date: Tue Sep 3 20:51:49 2019 +0000
- Add OpenSSL 1.1.1 to the supported list.
+ upstream: repair typo and editing mishap
- Clarify the language around prngd and egd.
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: d125ab720ca71ccf9baf83e08ddc8c12a328597e
-commit 6fd4aa2aafbce90acb11a328ca0aa0696cb01c6b
-Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Wed May 15 16:19:14 2019 +1000
+commit f4846dfc6a79f84bbc6356ae3184f142bacedc24
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date: Thu Sep 5 11:09:28 2019 +1000
- Fix typo in man page formatter selector.
+ Fuzzer harness for sshsig
-commit 285546b73e2c172565c992a695927ac8cf3b4cc6
-Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Fri May 10 15:04:42 2019 +1000
+commit b08a6bc1cc7750c6f8a425d1cdbd86552fffc637
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date: Tue Sep 3 18:45:42 2019 +1000
- Use "doc" man page format if mandoc present.
-
- Previously configure would not select the "doc" man page format if
- mandoc was present but nroff was not. This checks for mandoc first
- and removes a now-superflous AC_PATH_PROG. Based on a patch from
- vehk at vehk.de and feedback from schwarze at usta.de.
+ oops; missed including the actual file
-commit 62dd70613b77b229f53db3cc1c3e8a206fa2b582
-Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri May 3 06:06:30 2019 +0000
+commit 1a72c0dd89f09754df443c9576dde624a17d7dd0
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date: Tue Sep 3 18:44:10 2019 +1000
- upstream: Use the correct (according to POSIX) format for
-
- left-justification in snmprintf. bz#3002, patch from velemas at gmail.com, ok
- markus@.
-
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 65d252b799be0cc8f68b6c47cece0a57bb00fea7
+ portability fixes for sshsig
-commit 62be1ffe5ffc68cfaac183320503c00a8c72e0b1
-Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri May 3 04:11:00 2019 +0000
+commit 6d6427d01304d967e58544cf1c71d2b4394c0522
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Tue Sep 3 08:37:45 2019 +0000
- upstream: Free channel objects on exit path. Patch from markus at
-
- blueflash.cc, ok deraadt
+ upstream: regress test for sshsig; feedback and ok markus@
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: dbe4db381603909482211ffdd2b48abd72169117
+ OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 74c0974f2cdae8d9599b9d76a09680bae55d8a8b
-commit 1c554a5d94b9de6bd5374e2992a5662746cc39ba
-Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri May 3 03:27:38 2019 +0000
+commit 59650f0eaf65115afe04c39abfb93a4fc994ec55
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Tue Sep 3 08:37:06 2019 +0000
- upstream: Free host on exit path. Patch from markus at
+ upstream: only add plain keys to prevent any certs laying around
- blueflash.cc, ok djm@
+ from confusing the test.
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: c54e9945d93c4ce28350d8b9fa8b71f744ef2b5a
+ OpenBSD-Regress-ID: b8f1508f822bc560b98dea910e61ecd76f34100f
-commit 99043bd64e5e0f427173f4fa83ef25a4676624a3
-Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri May 3 03:25:18 2019 +0000
+commit d637c4aee6f9b5280c13c020d7653444ac1fcaa5
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Tue Sep 3 08:35:27 2019 +0000
- upstream: Wrap XMSS including in ifdef. Patch from markus at
+ upstream: sshsig tweaks and improvements from and suggested by
- blueflash.cc, ok djm
+ Markus
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: e3b34fc35cf12d33bde91ac03633210a3bc0f8b5
+ ok markus/me
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: ea4f46ad5a16b27af96e08c4877423918c4253e9
-commit 8fcfb7789c43a19d24162a7a4055cd09ee951b34
-Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Apr 26 08:37:17 2019 +0000
+commit 2a9c9f7272c1e8665155118fe6536bebdafb6166
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Tue Sep 3 08:34:19 2019 +0000
- upstream: Import regenerated moduli.
+ upstream: sshsig: lightweight signature and verification ability
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: db6375fc302e3bdf07d96430c63c991b2c2bd3ff
+ for OpenSSH
+
+ This adds a simple manual signature scheme to OpenSSH.
+ Signatures can be made and verified using ssh-keygen -Y sign|verify
+
+ Signatures embed the key used to make them. At verification time, this
+ is matched via principal name against an authorized_keys-like list
+ of allowed signers.
+
+ Mostly by Sebastian Kinne w/ some tweaks by me
+
+ ok markus@
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 2ab568e7114c933346616392579d72be65a4b8fb
-commit 3a7db919d5dd09f797971b3cf8ee301767459774
-Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
-Date: Tue Apr 23 11:56:41 2019 +0000
+commit 5485f8d50a5bc46aeed829075ebf5d9c617027ea
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Tue Sep 3 08:32:11 2019 +0000
- upstream: Use the LogLevel typdef instead of int where appropriate. Patch from Markus Schmidt via openssh-unix-dev, ok markus@
+ upstream: move authorized_keys option parsing helpsers to misc.c
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 4c0f0f458e3da7807806b35e3eb5c1e8403c968a
+ and make them public; ok markus@
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: c18bcb2a687227b3478377c981c2d56af2638ea2
-commit d7c6e38b87efab1f140745fd8b1106b82e6e4a68
-Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Apr 19 05:47:44 2019 +0000
+commit f8df0413f0a057b6a3d3dd7bd8bc7c5d80911d3a
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Tue Sep 3 08:31:20 2019 +0000
- upstream: Document new default RSA key size. From
+ upstream: make get_sigtype public as sshkey_get_sigtype(); ok
- sebastiaanlokhorst at gmail.com via bz#2997.
+ markus@
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: bdd62ff5d4d649d2147904e91bf7cefa82fe11e1
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 01f8cdbec63350490d2249f41112c5780d1cfbb8
-commit e826bbcafe26dac349a8593da5569e82faa45ab8
-Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
-Date: Thu Apr 18 18:56:16 2019 +0000
+commit dd8002fbe63d903ffea5be7b7f5fc2714acab4a0
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Tue Sep 3 08:30:47 2019 +0000
- upstream: When running sshd -T, assume any attibute not provided by
+ upstream: move advance_past_options to authfile.c and make it
- -C does not match, which allows it to work when sshd_config contains a Match
- directive with or without -C. bz#2858, ok djm@
+ public; ok markus@
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 1a701f0a33e3bc96753cfda2fe0b0378520b82eb
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: edda2fbba2c5b1f48e60f857a2010479e80c5f3c
-commit 5696512d7ad57e85e89f8011ce8dec617be686aa
-Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
-Date: Thu Apr 18 07:32:56 2019 +0000
+commit c72d78ccbe642e08591a626e5de18381489716e0
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Tue Sep 3 08:29:58 2019 +0000
- upstream: Remove crc32.{c,h} which were only used by the now-gone
+ upstream: move skip_space() to misc.c and make it public; ok
- SSH1 protocol. Patch from yumkam at gmail.com, ok deraadt.
+ markus@
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: cceda5876c5ba6b4d8abcd52335329198cee3240
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: caa77e8a3b210948e29ad3e28c5db00852961eae
-commit 34e87fb5d9ce607f5701ab4c31d837ad8133e2d1
-Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Tue Apr 30 12:27:57 2019 +1000
+commit 06af3583f46e2c327fdd44d8a95b8b4e8dfd8db5
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Tue Sep 3 08:29:15 2019 +0000
- Remove unused variables from RLIMIT_NOFILE test.
+ upstream: authfd: add function to check if key is in agent
+
+ This commit adds a helper function which allows the caller to
+ check if a given public key is present in ssh-agent.
+
+ work by Sebastian Kinne; ok markus@
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: d43c5826353e1fdc1af71eb42961b30782c7bd13
-commit 35e82e62c1ef53cfa457473a4c4d957d6197371a
-Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Fri Apr 26 18:38:27 2019 +1000
+commit 2ab5a8464870cc4b29ddbe849bbbc255729437bf
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Tue Sep 3 08:28:30 2019 +0000
- Import regenerated moduli.
+ upstream: fix memleak in ssh_free_identitylist(); ok markus@
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: aa51f77ae2c5330a1f61b2d22933f24a443f9abf
-commit 5590f53f99219e95dc23b0ebd220f19a6f46b101
-Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Fri Apr 26 18:22:10 2019 +1000
+commit 85443f165b4169b2a448b3e24bc1d4dc5b3156a4
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Tue Sep 3 08:27:52 2019 +0000
- Whitespace resync w/OpenBSD.
+ upstream: factor out confirm_overwrite(); ok markus@
- Patch from markus at blueflash.cc via openssh-unix-dev.
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 304e95381b39c774c8fced7e5328b106a3ff0400
-commit b7b8334914fb9397a6725f3b5d2de999b0bb69ac
-Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Fri Apr 26 18:06:34 2019 +1000
+commit 9a396e33685633581c67d5ad9664570ef95281f2
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Mon Sep 2 23:46:46 2019 +0000
- Don't install duplicate STREAMS modules on Solaris
+ upstream: constify an argument
- Check if STREAMS modules are already installed on pty before installing
- since when compiling with XPG>=4 they will likely be installed already.
- Prevents hangs and duplicate lines on the terminal. bz#2945 and bz#2998,
- patch from djm@
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 724bafc9f993746ad4303e95bede2c030de6233b
-commit fd0fa130ecf06d7d092932adcd5d77f1549bfc8d
-Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
-Date: Thu Apr 18 08:52:57 2019 +1000
+commit b52c0c2e64988277a35a955a474d944967059aeb
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Mon Sep 2 00:19:25 2019 +0000
- makedepend
+ upstream: downgrade PKCS#11 "provider returned no slots" warning
+
+ from log level error to debug. This is common when attempting to enumerate
+ keys on smartcard readers with no cards plugged in. bz#3058 ok dtucker@
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: bb8839ddeb77c271390488af1b771041d43e49c6
-commit 5de397a876b587ba05a9169237deffdc71f273b0
-Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
-Date: Fri Apr 5 11:29:51 2019 -0700
+commit 0713322e18162463c5ab5ddfb9f935055ca775d8
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Sun Sep 1 23:47:32 2019 +0000
- second thoughts: leave README in place
+ upstream: print comment when printing pubkey from private
- A number of contrib/* files refer to the existing README so let's leave
- it in place for release and add the new markdown version in parallel.
+ bz#3052; ok dtucker
- I'll get rid of README after release.
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: a91b2a8d5f1053d34d7fce44523c53fb534ba914
-commit 5d3127d9274519b25ed10e320f45045ba8d7f3be
+commit 368f1cc2fbd6ad10c66bc1b67c2c04aebf8a04a8
Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
-Date: Fri Apr 5 11:29:31 2019 -0700
+Date: Mon Sep 2 10:28:42 2019 +1000
- Revert "rewrite README"
+ fixed test in OSX closefrom() replacement
- This reverts commit 9444d82678cb7781820da4d1c23b3c2b9fb1e12f.
+ from likan_999.student AT sina.com
-commit 9444d82678cb7781820da4d1c23b3c2b9fb1e12f
+commit 6b7c53498def19a14dd9587bf521ab6dbee8988f
Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
-Date: Fri Apr 5 11:21:48 2019 -0700
+Date: Mon Sep 2 10:22:02 2019 +1000
- rewrite README
+ retain Solaris PRIV_FILE_LINK_ANY in sftp-server
- Include basic build instructions and comments on commonly-used build-
- time flags, links to the manual pages and other resources.
+ Dropping this privilege removes the ability to create hard links to
+ files owned by other users. This is required for the legacy sftp rename
+ operation.
- Now in Markdown format for better viewing on github, etc.
+ bz#3036; approach ok Alex Wilson (the original author of the Solaris
+ sandbox/pledge replacement code)
-commit a924de0c4908902433813ba205bee1446bd1a157
-Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
-Date: Fri Apr 5 03:41:52 2019 +1100
+commit e50f808712393e86d69e42e9847cdf8d473412d7
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Aug 30 05:08:28 2019 +0000
- update versions
+ upstream: Use ed25519 for most hostkey rotation tests since it's
+
+ supported even when built without OpenSSL. Use RSA for the secondary type
+ test if supported, otherwise skip it. Fixes this test for !OpenSSL builds.
+
+ OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 101cb34a84fd974c623bdb2e496f25a6e91be109
-commit 312dcee739bca5d6878c536537b2a8a497314b75
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Wed Apr 3 15:48:45 2019 +0000
+commit 5e4796c47dd8d6c38fb2ff0b3e817525fed6040d
+Author: bluhm@openbsd.org <bluhm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Thu Aug 22 21:47:27 2019 +0000
- upstream: openssh-8.0
+ upstream: Test did not compile due to missing symbols. Add source
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 5aafdf218679dab982fea20771afd643be9a127b
+ sshbuf-misc.c to regress as it was done in ssh make file. from Moritz Buhl
+
+ OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 9e1c23476bb845f3cf3d15d9032da3ed0cb2fcf5
-commit 885bc114692046d55e2a170b932bdc0092fa3456
+commit e0e7e3d0e26f2c30697e6d0cfc293414908963c7
Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
-Date: Thu Apr 4 02:47:40 2019 +1100
+Date: Fri Aug 30 14:26:19 2019 +1000
- session: Do not use removed API
+ tweak warning flags
- from Jakub Jelen
+ Enable -Wextra if compiler supports it
+
+ Set -Wno-error=format-truncation if available to prevent expected
+ string truncations in openbsd-compat from breaking -Werror builds
-commit 9d7b2882b0c9a5e9bf8312ce4075bf178e2b98be
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Mar 29 11:31:40 2019 +0000
+commit 28744182cf90e0073b76a9e98de58a47e688b2c4
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date: Fri Aug 30 13:21:38 2019 +1000
- upstream: when logging/fataling on error, include a bit more detail
+ proc_pidinfo()-based closefrom() for OS X
- than just the function name and the error message
+ Refactor closefrom() to use a single brute-force close() loop fallback.
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: dd72d7eba2215fcb89be516c378f633ea5bcca9f
+ Based on patch from likan_999.student@sina.com in bz#3049. ok dtucker@
-commit 79a87d32783d6c9db40af8f35e091d9d30365ae7
-Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Wed Apr 3 06:27:45 2019 +1100
+commit dc2ca588144f088a54febebfde3414568dc73d5f
+Author: kn@openbsd.org <kn@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Aug 16 11:16:32 2019 +0000
- Remove "struct ssh" from sys_auth_record_login.
+ upstream: Call comma-separated lists as such to clarify semantics
- It's not needed, and is not available from the call site in loginrec.c
- Should only affect AIX, spotted by Kevin Brott.
+ Options such as Ciphers take values that may be a list of ciphers; the
+ complete list, not indiviual elements, may be prefixed with a dash or plus
+ character to remove from or append to the default list respectively.
+
+ Users might read the current text as if each elment took an optional prefix,
+ so tweak the wording from "values" to "list" to prevent such ambiguity for
+ all options supporting this semantics (those that provide a list of
+ available elements via "ssh -Q ...").
+
+ Input and OK jmc
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 4fdd175b0e5f5cb10ab3f26ccc38a93bb6515d57
-commit 138c0d52cdc90f9895333b82fc57d81cce7a3d90
-Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Tue Apr 2 18:21:35 2019 +1100
+commit c4736f39e66729ce2bf5b06ee6b391e092b48f47
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Aug 16 06:35:27 2019 +0000
- Adapt custom_failed_login to new prototype.
+ upstream: include sshbuf-misc.c in SRCS_BASE
- Spotted by Kevin Brott.
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 99dd10e72c04e93849981d43d64c946619efa474
-commit a0ca4009ab2f0b1007ec8ab6864dbf9b760a8ed5
+commit d0e51810f332fe44ebdba41113aacf319d35f5a5
Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Mon Apr 1 20:07:23 2019 +1100
+Date: Sat Aug 24 15:12:11 2019 +1000
- Add includes.h for compat layer.
+ Fix pasto in fallback code.
- Should fix build on AIX 7.2.
+ There is no parameter called "pathname", it should simply be "path".
+ bz#3059, patch from samuel at cendio.se.
-commit 00991151786ce9b1d577bdad1f83a81d19c8236d
-Author: Tim Rice <tim@multitalents.net>
-Date: Sun Mar 31 22:14:22 2019 -0700
-
- Stop USL compilers for erroring with "integral constant expression expected"
-
-commit 43f47ebbdd4037b569c23b8f4f7981f53b567f1d
-Author: Tim Rice <tim@multitalents.net>
-Date: Sun Mar 31 19:22:19 2019 -0700
-
- Only use O_NOFOLLOW in fchownat and fchmodat if defined
-
-commit 342d6e51589b184c337cccfc4c788b60ff8b3765
-Author: Jakub Jelen <jjelen@redhat.com>
-Date: Fri Mar 29 12:29:41 2019 +0100
+commit e83c989bfd9fc9838b7dfb711d1dc6da81814045
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date: Fri Aug 23 10:19:30 2019 +1000
- Adjust softhsm2 path on Fedora Linux for regress
+ use SC_ALLOW_ARG_MASK to limit mmap protections
- The SoftHSM lives in Fedora in /usr/lib64/pkcs11/libsofthsm2.so
+ Restrict to PROT_(READ|WRITE|NONE), i.e. exclude PROT_EXEC
-commit f5abb05f8c7358dacdcb866fe2813f6d8efd5830
-Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Thu Mar 28 09:26:14 2019 +1100
+commit f6906f9bf12c968debec3671bbf19926ff8a235b
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date: Fri Aug 23 10:08:48 2019 +1000
- Only use O_NOFOLLOW in utimensat if defined.
+ allow mprotect(2) with PROT_(READ|WRITE|NONE) only
- Fixes build on systems that don't have it (Solaris <=9) Found by
- Tom G. Christensen.
+ Used by some hardened heap allocators. Requested by Yegor
+ Timoshenko in https://github.com/openssh/openssh-portable/pull/142
-commit 786cd4c1837fdc3fe7b4befe54a3f37db7df8715
-Author: Corinna Vinschen <vinschen@redhat.com>
-Date: Wed Mar 27 18:18:21 2019 +0100
+commit e3b6c966b79c3ea5d51b923c3bbdc41e13b96ea0
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Aug 16 06:13:15 2019 +0000
- drop old Cygwin considerations
+ upstream: switch percent_expand() to use sshbuf instead of a limited
- - Cygwin supports non-DOS characters in filenames
- - Cygwin does not support Windows XP anymore
+ fixed buffer; ok markus@
- Signed-off-by: Corinna Vinschen <vinschen@redhat.com>
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 3f9ef20bca5ef5058b48c1cac67c53b9a1d15711
-commit 21da87f439b48a85b951ef1518fe85ac0273e719
+commit 9ab5b9474779ac4f581d402ae397f871ed16b383
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Wed Mar 27 09:29:14 2019 +0000
+Date: Fri Aug 9 05:05:54 2019 +0000
- upstream: fix interaction between ClientAliveInterval and RekeyLimit
+ upstream: produce a useful error message if the user's shell is set
- that could cause connection to close incorrectly; Report and patch from Jakub
- Jelen in bz#2757; ok dtucker@ markus@
+ incorrectly during "match exec" processing. bz#2791 reported by Dario
+ Bertini; ok dtucker
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 17229a8a65bd8e6c2080318ec2b7a61e1aede3fb
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: cf9eddd6a6be726cb73bd9c3936f3888cd85c03d
-commit 4f0019a9afdb4a94d83b75e82dbbbe0cbe826c56
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Mon Mar 25 22:34:52 2019 +0000
+commit 8fdbc7247f432578abaaca1b72a0dbf5058d67e5
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Aug 9 04:24:03 2019 +0000
- upstream: Fix authentication failures when "AuthenticationMethods
-
- any" in a Match block overrides a more restrictive global default.
+ upstream: Change description of TCPKeepAlive from "inactive" to
- Spotted by jmc@, ok markus@
+ "unresponsive" to clarify what it checks for. Patch from jblaine at
+ kickflop.net via github pr#129, ok djm@.
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: a90a4fe2ab81d0eeeb8fdfc21af81f7eabda6666
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 3682f8ec7227f5697945daa25d11ce2d933899e9
-commit d6e5def308610f194c0ec3ef97a34a3e9630e190
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Mon Mar 25 22:33:44 2019 +0000
+commit 7afc45c3ed72672690014dc432edc223b23ae288
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date: Thu Aug 8 08:02:57 2019 +0000
- upstream: whitespace
+ upstream: Allow the maximimum uint32 value for the argument passed to
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 106e853ae8a477e8385bc53824d3884a8159db07
+ -b which allows better error messages from later validation. bz#3050, ok
+ djm@
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 10adf6876b2401b3dc02da580ebf67af05861673
-commit 26e0cef07b04479537c971dec898741df1290fe5
-Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
-Date: Mon Mar 25 16:19:44 2019 +0000
+commit c31e4f5fb3915c040061981a67224de7650ab34b
+Author: naddy@openbsd.org <naddy@openbsd.org>
+Date: Mon Aug 5 21:45:27 2019 +0000
- upstream: Expand comment to document rationale for default key
+ upstream: Many key types are supported now, so take care to check
- sizes. "seems worthwhile" deraadt.
+ the size restrictions and apply the default size only to the matching key
+ type. tweak and ok dtucker@
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 72e5c0983d7da1fb72f191870f36cb58263a2456
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: b825de92d79cc4cba19b298c61e99909488ff57e
-commit f47269ea67eb4ff87454bf0d2a03e55532786482
+commit 6b39a7b49ebacec4e70e24bfc8ea2f11057aac22
Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
-Date: Mon Mar 25 15:49:00 2019 +0000
+Date: Mon Aug 5 11:50:33 2019 +0000
- upstream: Increase the default RSA key size to 3072 bits. Based on
+ upstream: Remove now-redundant perm_ok arg since
- the estimates from NIST Special Publication 800-57, 3k bits provides security
- equivalent to 128 bits which is the smallest symmetric cipher we enable by
- default. ok markus@ deraadt@
+ sshkey_load_private_type will now return SSH_ERR_KEY_BAD_PERMISSIONS in that
+ case. Patch from jitendra.sharma at intel.com, ok djm@
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 461dd32ebe808f88f4fc3ec74749b0e6bef2276b
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 07916a17ed0a252591b71e7fb4be2599cb5b0c77
-commit 62949c5b37af28d8490d94866e314a76be683a5e
-Author: jmc@openbsd.org <jmc@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Mar 22 20:58:34 2019 +0000
+commit d46075b923bf25e6f25959a3f5b458852161cb3e
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Mon Aug 5 21:36:48 2019 +1000
- upstream: full stop in the wrong place;
+ Fix mem leak in unit test.
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 478a0567c83553a2aebf95d0f1bd67ac1b1253e4
+ Patch from jitendra.sharma at intel.com.
-commit 1b1332b5bb975d759a50b37f0e8bc8cfb07a0bb0
-Author: jmc@openbsd.org <jmc@openbsd.org>
-Date: Sat Mar 16 19:14:21 2019 +0000
+commit c4ffb72593c08921cf9291bc05a5ef1d0aaa6891
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Aug 2 01:41:24 2019 +0000
- upstream: benno helped me clean up the tcp forwarding section;
+ upstream: fix some memleaks in test_helper code
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: d4bec27edefde636fb632b7f0b7c656b9c7b7f08
+ bz#3037 from Jitendra Sharma
+
+ OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 71440fa9186f5842a65ce9a27159385c6cb6f751
-commit 2aee9a49f668092ac5c9d34e904ef7a9722e541d
-Author: markus@openbsd.org <markus@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Mar 8 17:24:43 2019 +0000
+commit 6e76e69dc0c7712e9ac599af34bd091b0e7dcdb5
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Aug 2 01:23:19 2019 +0000
- upstream: fix use-after-free in ssh-pkcs11; found by hshoexer w/AFL
+ upstream: typo; from Christian Hesse
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: febce81cca72b71f70513fbee4ff52ca050f675c
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 82f6de7438ea7ee5a14f44fdf5058ed57688fdc3
-commit 9edbd7821e6837e98e7e95546cede804dac96754
-Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Thu Mar 14 10:17:28 2019 +1100
+commit 49fa065a1bfaeb88a59abdfa4432d3b9c35b0655
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Tue Jul 30 05:04:49 2019 +0000
- Fix build when configured --without-openssl.
+ upstream: let sshbuf_find/cmp take a void* for the
- ok djm@
+ search/comparison argument, instead of a u_char*. Saves callers needing to
+ cast.
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: d63b69b7c5dd570963e682f758f5a47b825605ed
-commit 825ab32f0d04a791e9d19d743c61ff8ed9b4d8e5
-Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Thu Mar 14 08:51:17 2019 +1100
+commit 7adf6c430d6fc17901e167bc0789d31638f5c2f8
+Author: mestre@openbsd.org <mestre@openbsd.org>
+Date: Wed Jul 24 08:57:00 2019 +0000
- On Cygwin run sshd as SYSTEM where possible.
+ upstream: When using a combination of a Yubikey+GnuPG+remote
- Seteuid now creates user token using S4U. We don't create a token
- from scratch anymore, so we don't need the "Create a process token"
- privilege. The service can run under SYSTEM again...
+ forwarding the gpg-agent (and options ControlMaster+RemoteForward in
+ ssh_config(5)) then the codepath taken will call mux_client_request_session
+ -> mm_send_fd -> sendmsg(2). Since sendmsg(2) is not allowed in that codepath
+ then pledge(2) kills the process.
- ...unless Cygwin is running on Windows Vista or Windows 7 in the
- WOW64 32 bit emulation layer. It turns out that WOW64 on these systems
- didn't implement MsV1_0 S4U Logon so we still need the fallback
- to NtCreateToken for these systems.
+ The solution is to add "sendfd" to pledge(2), which is not too bad considering
+ a little bit later we reduce pledge(2) to only "stdio proc tty" in that
+ codepath.
- Signed-off-by: Corinna Vinschen <vinschen@redhat.com>
+ Problem reported and diff provided by Timothy Brown <tbrown at freeshell.org>
+
+ OK deraadt@
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 7ce38b6542bbec00e441595d0a178e970a9472ac
-commit a212107bfdf4d3e870ab7a443e4d906e5b9578c3
-Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Wed Mar 13 10:49:16 2019 +1100
+commit 0e2fe18acc1da853a9120c2e9af68e8d05e6503e
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date: Tue Jul 23 23:06:57 2019 +0000
- Replace alloca with xcalloc.
+ upstream: Fix typo in CASignatureAlgorithms wherein what should be
- The latter checks for memory exhaustion and integer overflow and may be
- at a less predictable place. Sanity check by vinschen at redhat.com, ok
- djm@
+ a comma is a dot. Patch from hnj2 via github pr#141.
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 01f5a460438ff1af09aab483c0a70065309445f0
-commit daa7505aadca68ba1a2c70cbdfce423208eb91ee
+commit e93ffd1a19fc47c49d68ae2fb332433690ecd389
Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Tue Mar 12 09:19:19 2019 +1100
+Date: Mon Jul 29 16:04:01 2019 +1000
- Use Cygwin-specific matching only for users+groups.
+ Report success of individual tests as well as all.
- Patch from vinschen at redhat.com, updated a little by me.
+ This puts the "all tests passed" message back at the end where the
+ test harnesses can find it.
-commit fd10cf027b56f9aaa80c9e3844626a05066589a4
-Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
-Date: Wed Mar 6 22:14:23 2019 +0000
+commit 2ad5b36b18bddf2965fe60384c29b3f1d451b4ed
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date: Mon Jul 29 09:49:23 2019 +1000
- upstream: Move checks for lists of users or groups into their own
-
- function. This is a no-op on OpenBSD but will make things easier in
- -portable, eg on systems where these checks should be case-insensitive. ok
- djm@
-
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 8bc9c8d98670e23f8eaaaefe29c1f98e7ba0487e
+ convert to UTF-8; from Mike Frysinger
-commit ab5fee8eb6a011002fd9e32b1597f02aa8804a25
+commit d31e7c937ba0b97534f373cf5dea34675bcec602
Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
-Date: Wed Mar 6 21:06:59 2019 +0000
+Date: Fri Jul 26 04:22:21 2019 +0000
- upstream: Reset last-seen time when sending a keepalive. Prevents
+ upstream: Restrict limit-keytype to types supported by build. This
- sending two keepalives successively and prematurely terminating connection
- when ClientAliveCount=1. While there, collapse two similar tests into one.
- ok markus@
+ means we have to skip a couple tests when only one key type is supported.
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 043670d201dfe222537a2a4bed16ce1087de5ddd
+ OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 22d05befb9c7ce21ce8dc22acf1ffe9e2ef2e95e
-commit c13b74530f9f1d9df7aeae012004b31b2de4438e
-Author: naddy@openbsd.org <naddy@openbsd.org>
-Date: Tue Mar 5 16:17:12 2019 +0000
+commit 0967a233b8a28907ae8a4a6773c89f21d2ace11b
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Thu Jul 25 18:36:28 2019 +1000
- upstream: PKCS#11 support is no longer limited to RSA; ok benno@
-
- kn@
+ Remove override disabling DH-GEX.
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 1a9bec64d530aed5f434a960e7515a3e80cbc826
+ The DH-GEX override doesn't work when build without OpenSSL, and
+ we'll prefer curve25519 these days, removing the need for it.
-commit e9552d6043db7cd170ac6ba1b4d2c7a5eb2c3201
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Mar 1 03:29:32 2019 +0000
+commit 061407efc19b41ab4a7485e5adcff2a12befacdb
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date: Thu Jul 25 09:17:35 2019 +0000
- upstream: in ssh_set_newkeys(), mention the direction that we're
+ upstream: Only use supported key types during KRL test, preferring
- keying in debug messages. Previously it would be difficult to tell which
- direction it was talking about
+ ed25519 since it's supported by both OpenSSL and non-OpenSSL builds.
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: c2b71bfcceb2a7389b9d0b497fb2122a406a522d
+ OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 9f2bb3eadd50fcc8245b1bd8fd6f0e53602f71aa
-commit 76a24b3fa193a9ca3e47a8779d497cb06500798b
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Mar 1 02:32:39 2019 +0000
+commit 47f8ff1fa5b76790c1d785815fd13ee6009f8012
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date: Thu Jul 25 08:48:11 2019 +0000
- upstream: Fix two race conditions in sshd relating to SIGHUP:
-
- 1. Recently-forked child processes will briefly remain listening to
- listen_socks. If the main server sshd process completes its restart
- via execv() before these sockets are closed by the child processes
- then it can fail to listen at the desired addresses/ports and/or
- fail to restart.
-
- 2. When a SIGHUP is received, there may be forked child processes that
- are awaiting their reexecution state. If the main server sshd
- process restarts before passing this state, these child processes
- will yield errors and use a fallback path of reading the current
- sshd_config from the filesystem rather than use the one that sshd
- was started with.
-
- To fix both of these cases, we reuse the startup_pipes that are shared
- between the main server sshd and forked children. Previously this was
- used solely to implement tracking of pre-auth child processes for
- MaxStartups, but this extends the messaging over these pipes to include
- a child->parent message that the parent process is safe to restart. This
- message is sent from the child after it has completed its preliminaries:
- closing listen_socks and receiving its reexec state.
+ upstream: Switch keys-command test from rsa to ed25519 since it's
- bz#2953, reported by Michal Koutný; ok markus@ dtucker@
+ supported for both OpenSSL and non-OpenSSL builds.
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 7df09eacfa3ce13e9a7b1e9f17276ecc924d65ab
+ OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 174be4be876edd493e4a5c851e5bc579885e7a0a
-commit de817e9dfab99473017d28cdf69e60397d00ea21
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Mar 1 02:16:47 2019 +0000
+commit 1e94afdfa8df774ab7dd3bad52912b636dc31bbd
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date: Thu Jul 25 08:28:15 2019 +0000
- upstream: mention PKCS11Provide=none, reword a little and remove
+ upstream: Make certificate tests work with the supported key
- mention of RSA keys only (since we support ECDSA now and might support others
- in the future). Inspired by Jakub Jelen via bz#2974
+ algorithms. Allows tests to pass when built without OpenSSL.
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: a92e3686561bf624ccc64ab320c96c9e9a263aa5
+ OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 617169a6dd9d06db3697a449d9a26c284eca20fc
-commit 95a8058c1a90a27acbb91392ba206854abc85226
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Mar 1 02:08:50 2019 +0000
+commit 26bf693661a48b97b6023f702b2af643676ac21a
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date: Tue Jul 23 13:49:14 2019 +0000
- upstream: let PKCS11Provider=none do what users expect
-
- print PKCS11Provider instead of obsolete SmartcardDevice in config dump.
+ upstream: Construct list of key types to test based on the types
- bz#2974 ok dtucker@
+ supported by the binaries.
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: c303d6f0230a33aa2dd92dc9b68843d56a64f846
+ OpenBSD-Regress-ID: fcbd115efacec8ab0ecbdb3faef79ac696cb1d62
-commit 8e7bac35aa576d2fd7560836da83733e864ce649
-Author: markus@openbsd.org <markus@openbsd.org>
-Date: Wed Feb 27 19:37:01 2019 +0000
+commit 773c55b3d1230e8f7714a1b33873c37b85049c74
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date: Tue Jul 23 13:32:48 2019 +0000
- upstream: dup stdout/in for proxycommand=-, otherwise stdout might
-
- be redirected to /dev/null; ok djm@
+ upstream: Only use DSA key type in tests if binaries support it.
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 97dfce4c47ed4055042de8ebde85b7d88793e595
+ OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 770e31fe61dc33ed8eea9c04ce839b33ddb4dc96
-commit 9b61130fbd95d196bce81ebeca94a4cb7c0d5ba0
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Sat Feb 23 08:20:43 2019 +0000
+commit 159e987a54d92ccd73875e7581ffc64e8927a715
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Wed Jul 24 14:21:19 2019 +1000
- upstream: openssh-7.9 accidentally reused the server's algorithm lists
-
- in the client for KEX, ciphers and MACs. The ciphers and MACs were identical
- between the client and server, but the error accidentially disabled the
- diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha1 KEX method.
-
- This fixes the client code to use the correct method list, but
- because nobody complained, it also disables the
- diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha1 KEX method.
-
- Reported by nuxi AT vault24.org via bz#2697; ok dtucker
+ Split test targets further.
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: e30c33a23c10fd536fefa120e86af1842e33fd57
+ Splits test into file-tests, t-exec, unit and interop-tests and their
+ respective dependencies. Should allow running any set individually
+ without having to build the other dependencies that are not needed
+ for that specific test.
-commit 37638c752041d591371900df820f070037878a2d
-Author: Corinna Vinschen <vinschen@redhat.com>
-Date: Wed Feb 20 13:41:25 2019 +0100
+commit 520d4550a2470106d63e30079bb05ce82f3a4f7d
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Wed Jul 24 11:20:18 2019 +1000
- Cygwin: implement case-insensitive Unicode user and group name matching
-
- The previous revert enabled case-insensitive user names again. This
- patch implements the case-insensitive user and group name matching.
- To allow Unicode chars, implement the matcher using wchar_t chars in
- Cygwin-specific code. Keep the generic code changes as small as possible.
- Cygwin: implement case-insensitive Unicode user and group name matching
-
- Signed-off-by: Corinna Vinschen <vinschen@redhat.com>
+ Add lib dependencies for regress binary targets.
-commit bed1d43698807a07bb4ddb93a46b0bd84b9970b3
+commit 4e8d0dd78d5f6142841a07dc8b8c6b4730eaf587
Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Fri Feb 22 15:21:21 2019 +1100
+Date: Wed Jul 24 00:12:51 2019 +1000
- Revert unintended parts of previous commit.
+ Make "unit" a dependency of "test".
-commit f02afa350afac1b2f2d1413259a27a4ba1e2ca24
-Author: Corinna Vinschen <vinschen@redhat.com>
-Date: Wed Feb 20 13:41:24 2019 +0100
+commit 4317b2a0480e293e58ba115e47b49d3a384b6568
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Tue Jul 23 23:24:47 2019 +1000
- Revert "[auth.c] On Cygwin, refuse usernames that have differences in case"
-
- This reverts commit acc9b29486dfd649dfda474e5c1a03b317449f1c.
-
- Signed-off-by: Corinna Vinschen <vinschen@redhat.com>
+ upstream rev 1.28: fix comment typo.
-commit 4c55b674835478eb80a1a7aeae588aa654e2a433
-Author: Corinna Vinschen <vinschen@redhat.com>
-Date: Sat Feb 16 14:13:43 2019 +0100
+commit e0055af2bd39fdb44566ff6594147664e1fac8b8
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Tue Jul 23 23:06:22 2019 +1000
- Add tags to .gitignore
+ Split regress-binaries into two targets.
- Signed-off-by: Corinna Vinschen <vinschen@redhat.com>
+ Split the binaries for the unit tests out into a regress-unit-binaries
+ target, and add a dependency on it for only the unit tests. This allows
+ us to run the integration tests only ("make t-exec") without building
+ the unit tests, which allows us to run a subset of the tests when
+ building --without-openssl without trying (and failing) to build the
+ unit tests.
+
+ This means there are two targets for "unit" which I *think* is valid
+ (it works in testing, and makedepend will generate Makefiles of this
+ form)a but I could be wrong.
-commit 625b62634c33eaef4b80d07529954fe5c6435fe5
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Feb 22 03:37:11 2019 +0000
+commit 7cdf9fdcf11aaaa98c2bd22c92882ea559e772ad
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date: Tue Jul 23 08:19:29 2019 +0000
- upstream: perform removal of agent-forwarding directory in forward
-
- setup error path with user's privileged. This is a no-op as this code always
- runs with user privilege now that we no longer support running sshd with
- privilege separation disabled, but as long as the privsep skeleton is there
- we should follow the rules.
- MIME-Version: 1.0
- Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
- Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
+ upstream: Skip DH group generation test if binaries don't support
- bz#2969 with patch from Erik Sjölund
+ DH-GEX.
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 2b708401a5a8d6133c865d7698d9852210dca846
+ OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 7c918230d969ecf7656babd6191a74526bffbffd
-commit d9ecfaba0b2f1887d20e4368230632e709ca83be
-Author: jmc@openbsd.org <jmc@openbsd.org>
-Date: Mon Feb 18 07:02:34 2019 +0000
+commit 3a3eab8bb0da3d2f0f32cb85a1a268bcca6e4d69
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date: Tue Jul 23 07:55:29 2019 +0000
- upstream: sync the description of ~/.ssh/config with djm's updated
-
- description in ssh.1; issue pointed out by andreas kahari
+ upstream: Only test conversion of key types supported by the
- ok dtucker djm
+ binaries.
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 1b01ef0ae2c6328165150badae317ec92e52b01c
+ OpenBSD-Regress-ID: e3f0938a0a7407e2dfbb90abc3ec979ab6e8eeea
-commit 38e83e4f219c752ebb1560633b73f06f0392018b
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Tue Feb 12 23:53:10 2019 +0000
+commit 7e66b7d98c6e3f48a1918c3e1940c9b11b10ec63
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date: Tue Jul 23 07:39:43 2019 +0000
- upstream: fix regression in r1.302 reported by naddy@ - only the first
+ upstream: Only add ssh-dss to allowed key types if it's supported
- public key from the agent was being attempted for use.
+ by the binary.
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 07116aea521a04888718b2157f1ca723b2f46c8d
+ OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 395a54cab16e9e4ece9aec047ab257954eebd413
-commit 5c68ea8da790d711e6dd5f4c30d089c54032c59a
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Mon Feb 11 09:44:42 2019 +0000
+commit fd0684b319e664d8821dc4ca3026126dfea3ccf4
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Tue Jul 23 22:36:39 2019 +1000
- upstream: cleanup GSSAPI authentication context after completion of the
-
- authmethod. Move function-static GSSAPI state to the client Authctxt
- structure. Make static a bunch of functions that aren't used outside this
- file.
-
- Based on patch from Markus Schmidt <markus@blueflash.cc>; ok markus@
+ Remove sys/cdefs.h include.
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 497fb792c0ddb4f1ba631b6eed526861f115dbe5
+ It's not needed on -portable (that's handled by includes.h) and not all
+ platforms have it.
-commit a8c807f1956f81a92a758d3d0237d0ff06d0be5d
-Author: benno@openbsd.org <benno@openbsd.org>
-Date: Sun Feb 10 16:35:41 2019 +0000
+commit 9634ffbf29b3c2493e69d10b37077b09a8cbf5ff
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Tue Jul 23 22:25:44 2019 +1000
- upstream: ssh-keygen -D pkcs11.so needs to initialize pkcs11
-
- interactive, so it can ask for the smartcards PIN. ok markus@
-
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 1be7ccf88f1876e0fc4d7c9b3f96019ac5655bab
+ Add headers to prevent warnings w/out OpenSSL.
-commit 3d896c157c722bc47adca51a58dca859225b5874
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Sun Feb 10 11:15:52 2019 +0000
+commit 2ea60312e1c08dea88982fec68244f89a40912ff
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Tue Jul 23 22:11:50 2019 +1000
- upstream: when checking that filenames sent by the server side
-
- match what the client requested, be prepared to handle shell-style brace
- alternations, e.g. "{foo,bar}".
-
- "looks good to me" millert@ + in snaps for the last week courtesy
- deraadt@
-
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 3b1ce7639b0b25b2248e3a30f561a548f6815f3e
+ Include stdlib.h for free() and calloc().
-commit 318e4f8548a4f5c0c913f61e27d4fc21ffb1eaae
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Sun Feb 10 11:10:57 2019 +0000
+commit 11cba2a4523fda447e2554ea457484655bedc831
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Tue Jul 23 21:51:22 2019 +1000
- upstream: syslog when connection is dropped for attempting to run a
-
- command when ForceCommand=internal-sftp is in effect; bz2960; ok dtucker@
+ Re-apply portability changes to current sha2.{c,h}.
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 8c87fa66d7fc6c0fffa3a3c28e8ab5e8dde234b8
-
-commit 2ff2e19653b8c0798b8b8eff209651bdb1be2761
-Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
-Date: Fri Feb 8 14:53:35 2019 +1100
+ Rather than attempt to apply 14 years' worth of changes to OpenBSD's sha2
+ I imported the current versions directly then re-applied the portability
+ changes. This also allowed re-syncing digest-libc.c against upstream.
- don't set $MAIL if UsePam=yes
+commit 09159594a3bbd363429ee6fafde57ce77986dd7c
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Tue Jul 23 20:27:51 2019 +1000
+
+ Import current sha2.c and sha2.h from OpenBSD.
- PAM typically specifies the user environment if it's enabled, so don't
- second guess. bz#2937; ok dtucker@
+ These are not changed from their original state, the next commit will
+ re-apply the portable changes.
-commit 03e92dd27d491fe6d1a54e7b2f44ef1b0a916e52
-Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
-Date: Fri Feb 8 14:50:36 2019 +1100
+commit 2e6035b900cc9d7432d95084e03993d1b426f812
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Tue Jul 23 08:11:22 2019 +1000
- use same close logic for stderr as stdout
-
- Avoids sending SIGPIPE to child processes after their parent exits
- if they attempt to write to stderr.
+ Rename valgrind "errors" to "failures".
- Analysis and patch from JD Paul; patch reworked by Jakub Jelen and
- myself. bz#2071; ok dtucker@
+ When valgrind is enabled, test-exec.sh counts the number of invocations
+ that valgrind detects failures in, not the total number of errors detected.
+ This makes the name to be more accurate.
-commit 8c53d409baeeaf652c0c125a9b164edc9dbeb6de
+commit e82c9bb9ffa65725cc2e03ea81cb79ce3387f66b
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Fri Jul 19 18:51:18 2019 +1000
+
+ Skip running sftp-chroot under Valgrind.
+
+commit 41e22c2e05cb950b704945ac9408f6109c9b7848
Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
-Date: Tue Feb 5 11:35:56 2019 +0000
+Date: Sat Jul 20 09:50:58 2019 +0000
- upstream: Adapt code in the non-USE_PIPES codepath to the new packet
+ upstream: Remove the sleeps and thus races from the forwarding
- API. This code is not normally reachable since USE_PIPES is always defined.
- bz#2961, patch from adrian.fita at gmail com.
+ test. They were originally required to work with Protocol 1, but now we can
+ use ssh -N and the control socket without the sleeps. While there, suppress
+ output fro the control exit commands.
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 8d8428d678d1d5eb4bb21921df34e8173e6d238a
+ OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 4c51a1d651242f12c90074c18c61008a74c1c790
-commit 7a7fdca78de4b4774950be056099e579ef595414
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Mon Feb 4 23:37:54 2019 +0000
+commit 0423043c5e54293f4dd56041304fd0046c317be9
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date: Sat Jul 20 09:37:31 2019 +0000
- upstream: fix NULL-deref crash in PKCS#11 code when attempting
-
- login to a token requiring a PIN; reported by benno@ fix mostly by markus@
+ upstream: Allow SLEEPTIME to be overridden.
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 438d0b114b1b4ba25a9869733db1921209aa9a31
+ OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 1596ab168729954be3d219933b2d01cc93687e76
-commit cac302a4b42a988e54d32eb254b29b79b648dbf5
+commit d466b6a5cfba17a83c7aae9f584ab164e2ece0a1
Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
-Date: Mon Feb 4 02:39:42 2019 +0000
+Date: Sat Jul 20 09:14:40 2019 +0000
- upstream: Remove obsolete "Protocol" from commented out examples. Patch
+ upstream: Move sleep time into a variable so that we can increase
- from samy.mahmoudi at gmail com.
+ it for platforms or configurations that are much slower then usual.
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 16aede33dae299725a03abdac5dcb4d73f5d0cbf
+ OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 88586cabc800062c260d0b876bdcd4ca3f58a872
-commit 483b3b638500fd498b4b529356e5a0e18cf76891
-Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Feb 1 03:52:23 2019 +0000
+commit b4a7c9d2b5f928e0b902b580d35dc8b244a3aae0
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Jul 19 03:45:44 2019 +0000
- upstream: Save connection timeout and restore for 2nd and
+ upstream: add regression tests for scp for out-of-destination path file
- subsequent attempts, preventing them from having no timeout. bz#2918, ok
- djm@
+ creation by Harry Sintonen via Jakub Jelen in bz3007
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 4977f1d0521d9b6bba0c9a20d3d226cefac48292
+ OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 01ae5fbc6ce400b2df5a84dc3152a9e31f354c07
-commit 5f004620fdc1b2108139300ee12f4014530fb559
-Author: markus@openbsd.org <markus@openbsd.org>
-Date: Wed Jan 30 19:51:15 2019 +0000
+commit bca0582063f148c7ddf409ec51435a5a726bee4c
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Jul 19 03:38:01 2019 +0000
- upstream: Add authors for public domain sntrup4591761 code;
+ upstream: Accept the verbose flag when searching for host keys in known
- confirmed by Daniel J. Bernstein
+ hosts (i.e. "ssh-keygen -vF host") to print the matching host's random- art
+ signature too. bz#3003 "amusing, pretty" deraadt@
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: b4621f22b8b8ef13e063c852af5e54dbbfa413c1
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 686221a5447d6507f40a2ffba5393984d889891f
-commit 2c21b75a7be6ebdcbceaebb43157c48dbb36f3d8
-Author: jmc@openbsd.org <jmc@openbsd.org>
-Date: Sun Jan 27 07:14:11 2019 +0000
+commit 5299a09fa2879a068af200c91028fcfa9283c0f0
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Fri Jul 19 13:50:25 2019 +1000
- upstream: add -T to usage();
+ Revert one dependency per line change.
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: a7ae14d9436c64e1bd05022329187ea3a0ce1899
+ It turns out that having such a large number of lines in the .depend
+ file will cause the memory usage of awk during AC_SUBST to blow up on at
+ least NetBSD's awk, causing configure to fail.
-commit 19a0f0529d3df04118da829528cac7ceff380b24
-Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
-Date: Mon Jan 28 03:50:39 2019 +0000
+commit 01dddb231f23b4a7b616f9d33a0b9d937f9eaf0e
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date: Fri Jul 19 13:19:19 2019 +1000
- upstream: The test sshd_config in in $OBJ.
+ fix SIGWINCH delivery of Solaris for mux sessions
- OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 1e5d908a286d8e7de3a15a0020c8857f3a7c9172
+ Remove PRIV_PROC_SESSION which was limiting ability to send SIGWINCH
+ signals to other sessions. bz#3030; report and fix from Darren Moffat
-commit 8fe25440206319d15b52d12b948a5dfdec14dca3
-Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
-Date: Mon Jan 28 03:28:10 2019 +0000
+commit 05500af21d27c1a3ddac232b018cc23da7b1ee95
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Fri Jul 19 13:20:03 2019 +1000
- upstream: Remove leftover debugging.
+ Force dependencies one per line.
- OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 3d86c3d4867e46b35af3fd2ac8c96df0ffdcfeb9
+ Force makedepend to output one dependency per line, which will make
+ reading diffs against it much easier. ok djm@
-commit e30d32364d12c351eec9e14be6c61116f9d6cc90
-Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
-Date: Mon Jan 28 00:12:36 2019 +0000
+commit b5bc5d016bbb83eb7f8e685390044e78b1ea1427
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Fri Jul 19 13:18:07 2019 +1000
- upstream: Enable ssh-dss for the agent test. Disable it for the
-
- certificate test.
-
- OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 388c1e03e1def539d350f139b37d69f12334668d
+ make depend.
-commit ffdde469ed56249f5dc8af98da468dde35531398
-Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
-Date: Mon Jan 28 00:08:26 2019 +0000
+commit 65333f7454365fe40f7367630e7dd10903b9d99e
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Fri Jul 19 13:16:11 2019 +1000
- upstream: Count the number of key types instead of assuming there
-
- are only two.
-
- OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 0998702c41235782cf0beee396ec49b5056eaed9
+ Show when skipping valgrind for a test.
-commit 1d05b4adcba08ab068466e5c08dee2f5417ec53a
-Author: Corinna Vinschen <vinschen@redhat.com>
-Date: Sat Jan 26 23:42:40 2019 +0100
+commit fccb7eb3436da8ef3dcd22e5936ba1abc7ae6730
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Fri Jul 19 10:41:56 2019 +1000
- Cygwin: only tweak sshd_config file if it's new, drop creating sshd user
+ Enable connect-privsep test with valgrind.
- The sshd_config tweaks were executed even if the old file was
- still in place. Fix that. Also disable sshd user creation.
- It's not used on Cygwin.
+ connect-privsep seems to work OK with valgrind now so don't skip
+ valgrind on it.
-commit 89843de0c4c733501f6b4f988098e6e06963df37
-Author: Corinna Vinschen <vinschen@redhat.com>
-Date: Sat Jan 26 23:03:12 2019 +0100
+commit d7423017265c5ae6d0be39340feb6c9f016b1f71
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Fri Jul 19 07:43:07 2019 +1000
- Cygwin: Change service name to cygsshd
-
- Microsoft hijacked the sshd service name without asking.
+ Show valgrind results and error counts.
-commit 2a9b3a2ce411d16cda9c79ab713c55f65b0ec257
-Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
-Date: Sun Jan 27 06:30:53 2019 +0000
+commit 22b9b3e944880db906c6ac5527c4228bd92b293a
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Thu Jul 18 13:40:12 2019 +1000
- upstream: Generate all key supported key types and enable for keyscan
-
- test.
-
- OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 72f72ff49946c61bc949e1692dd9e3d71370891b
+ Fix format string integer type in error message.
-commit 391ffc4b9d31fa1f4ad566499fef9176ff8a07dc
+commit ed46a0c0705895834d3f47a46faa89c2a71b760a
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Sat Jan 26 22:41:28 2019 +0000
+Date: Thu Jul 18 13:26:00 2019 +0000
- upstream: check in scp client that filenames sent during
+ upstream: fix off-by-one in sshbuf_dtob64() base64 wrapping that could
- remote->local directory copies satisfy the wildcard specified by the user.
+ cause extra newlines to be appended at the end of the base64 text (ugly, but
+ harmless). Found and fixed by Sebastian Kinne
- This checking provides some protection against a malicious server
- sending unexpected filenames, but it comes at a risk of rejecting wanted
- files due to differences between client and server wildcard expansion rules.
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 9fe290bd68f706ed8f986a7704ca5a2bd32d7b68
+
+commit a192021fedead23c375077f92346336d531f8cad
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Thu Jul 18 11:09:38 2019 +1000
+
+ Fail tests if Valgrind enabled and reports errors.
- For this reason, this also adds a new -T flag to disable the check.
+ Also dump the failing valgrind report to stdout (not the cleanest
+ solution, but better than nothing).
+
+commit d1c491ecb939ee10b341fa7bb6205dff19d297e5
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Thu Jul 18 10:17:54 2019 +1000
+
+ Allow low-priv tests to write to pipe dir.
- reported by Harry Sintonen
- fix approach suggested by markus@;
- has been in snaps for ~1wk courtesy deraadt@
+ When running regression tests with Valgrind and SUDO, the low-priv agent
+ tests need to be able to create pipes in the appropriate directory.
+
+commit 8a5bb3e78191cc206f970c26d2a26c949971e91a
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Wed Jul 17 21:24:55 2019 +1000
+
+ Put valgrind vgdb files to a specific directory.
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 00f44b50d2be8e321973f3c6d014260f8f7a8eda
+ Valgrind by default puts vgdb files and pipes under /tmp, however it
+ is not always able to clean them up, which can cause test failures when
+ there's a pid/file collision. Using a specific directory ensures that
+ we can clean up and start clean.
-commit c2c18a39683db382a15b438632afab3f551d50ce
+commit f8829fe57fb0479d6103cfe1190095da3c032c6d
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Sat Jan 26 22:35:01 2019 +0000
+Date: Tue Jul 16 22:16:49 2019 +0000
- upstream: make ssh-keyscan return a non-zero exit status if it
-
- finds no keys. bz#2903
+ upstream: adapt to sshbuf_dtob64() change
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 89f1081fb81d950ebb48e6e73d21807b2723d488
+ OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 82374a83edf0955fd1477169eee3f5d6467405a6
-commit 05b9a466700b44d49492edc2aa415fc2e8913dfe
+commit 1254fcbb2f005f745f2265016ee9fa52e16d37b0
Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
-Date: Thu Jan 24 17:00:29 2019 +0000
+Date: Tue Jul 16 03:21:54 2019 +0000
- upstream: Accept the host key fingerprint as a synonym for "yes"
+ upstream: Remove ssh1 files from CLEANFILES since ssh1 no longer
- when accepting an unknown host key. This allows you to paste a fingerprint
- obtained out of band into the yes/no prompt and have the client do the
- comparison for you. ok markus@ djm@
+ supported.
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 3c47d10b9f43d3d345e044fd9ec09709583a2767
+ OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 5b9ae869dc669bac05939b4a2fdf44ee067acfa0
-commit bdc6c63c80b55bcbaa66b5fde31c1cb1d09a41eb
+commit 9dc81a5adabc9a7d611ed2e63fbf4c85d43b15c6
Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
-Date: Thu Jan 24 16:52:17 2019 +0000
+Date: Tue Jul 16 02:09:29 2019 +0000
- upstream: Have progressmeter force an update at the beginning and
+ upstream: Update names of host key files in CLEANFILES to match
- end of each transfer. Fixes the problem recently introduces where very quick
- transfers do not display the progressmeter at all. Spotted by naddy@
+ recent changes to the tests.
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 68dc46c259e8fdd4f5db3ec2a130f8e4590a7a9a
+ OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 28743052de3acf70b06f18333561497cd47c4ecf
-commit 258e6ca003e47f944688ad8b8de087b58a7d966c
-Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
-Date: Thu Jan 24 02:42:23 2019 +0000
+commit e44e4ad1190db22ed407a79f32a8cff5bcd2b815
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date: Tue Jul 16 23:26:53 2019 +1000
- upstream: Check for both EAGAIN and EWOULDBLOCK. This is a no-op
-
- in OpenBSD (they are the same value) but makes things easier in -portable
- where they may be distinct values. "sigh ok" deraadt@
-
- (ID sync only, portable already had this change).
-
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 91f2bc7c0ecec905915ed59fa37feb9cc90e17d7
+ depend
-commit 281ce042579b834cdc1e74314f1fb2eeb75d2612
-Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
-Date: Thu Jan 24 02:34:52 2019 +0000
+commit 16dd8b2c78a0de106c7429e2a294d203f6bda3c7
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Tue Jul 16 13:18:39 2019 +0000
- upstream: Always initialize 2nd arg to hpdelim2. It populates that
+ upstream: remove mostly vestigal uuencode.[ch]; moving the only unique
- *ONLY IF* there's a delimiter. If there's not (the common case) it checked
- uninitialized memory, which usually passed, but if not would cause spurious
- failures when the uninitialized memory happens to contain "/". ok deraadt.
+ functionality there (wrapping of base64-encoded data) to sshbuf functions;
+ feedback and ok markus@
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 4291611eaf2a53d4c92f4a57c7f267c9f944e0d3
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 4dba6735d88c57232f6fccec8a08bdcfea44ac4c
-commit d05ea255678d9402beda4416cd0360f3e5dfe938
-Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
-Date: Wed Jan 23 21:50:56 2019 +0000
+commit 45478898f9590b5cc8bc7104e573b84be67443b0
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Tue Jul 16 09:20:23 2019 +1000
- upstream: Remove support for obsolete host/port syntax.
-
- host/port was added in 2001 as an alternative to host:port syntax for
- the benefit of IPv6 users. These days there are establised standards
- for this like [::1]:22 and the slash syntax is easily mistaken for CIDR
- notation, which OpenSSH now supports for some things. Remove the slash
- notation from ListenAddress and PermitOpen. bz#2335, patch from jjelen
- at redhat.com, ok markus@
+ Hook memmem compat code into build.
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: fae5f4e23c51a368d6b2d98376069ac2b10ad4b7
+ This fixes builds on platforms that don't have it (at least old DragonFly,
+ probably others).
-commit 177d6c80c557a5e060cd343a0c116a2f1a7f43db
-Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
-Date: Wed Jan 23 20:48:52 2019 +0000
+commit c7bd4617293a903bd3fac3394a7e72d439af49a5
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Tue Jul 16 09:07:18 2019 +1000
- upstream: Remove duplicate word. bz#2958, patch from jjelen at
-
- redhat.com
-
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: cca3965a8333f2b6aae48b79ec1d72f7a830dd2c
+ Import memmem.c from OpenBSD.
-commit be3e6cba95dffe5fcf190c713525b48c837e7875
-Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
-Date: Wed Jan 23 09:49:00 2019 +0000
+commit 477e2a3be8b10df76e8d76f0427b043280d73d68
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Mon Jul 15 13:12:02 2019 +0000
- upstream: Remove 3 as a guess for possible generator during moduli
-
- generation. It's not mentioned in RFC4419 and it's not possible for
- Sophie-Germain primes greater than 5. bz#2330, from Christian Wittenhorst ,
- ok djm@ tb@
+ upstream: unit tests for sshbuf_cmp() and sshbuf_find(); ok markus
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 1467652e6802ad3333b0959282d8d49dfe22c8cd
+ OpenBSD-Regress-ID: b52d36bc3ab6dc158c1e59a9a4735f821cf9e1fd
-commit 8976f1c4b2721c26e878151f52bdf346dfe2d54c
-Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
-Date: Wed Jan 23 08:01:46 2019 +0000
+commit eb0d8e708a1f958aecd2d6e2ff2450af488d4c2a
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Mon Jul 15 13:16:29 2019 +0000
- upstream: Sanitize scp filenames via snmprintf. To do this we move
+ upstream: support PKCS8 as an optional format for storage of
- the progressmeter formatting outside of signal handler context and have the
- atomicio callback called for EINTR too. bz#2434 with contributions from djm
- and jjelen at redhat.com, ok djm@
+ private keys, enabled via "ssh-keygen -m PKCS8" on operations that save
+ private keys to disk.
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 1af61c1f70e4f3bd8ab140b9f1fa699481db57d8
+ The OpenSSH native key format remains the default, but PKCS8 is a
+ superior format to PEM if interoperability with non-OpenSSH software
+ is required, as it may use a less terrible KDF (IIRC PEM uses a single
+ round of MD5 as a KDF).
+
+ adapted from patch by Jakub Jelen via bz3013; ok markus
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 027824e3bc0b1c243dc5188504526d73a55accb1
-commit 6249451f381755f792c6b9e2c2f80cdc699c14e2
-Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Thu Jan 24 10:00:20 2019 +1100
+commit e18a27eedccb024acb3cd9820b650a5dff323f01
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Mon Jul 15 13:11:38 2019 +0000
- For broken read/readv comparisons, poll(RW).
+ upstream: two more bounds-checking sshbuf counterparts to common
- In the cases where we can't compare to read or readv function pointers
- for some reason we currently ifdef out the poll() used to block while
- waiting for reads or writes, falling back to busy waiting. This restores
- the poll() in this case, but has it always check for read or write,
- removing an inline ifdef in the process.
+ string operations: sshbuf_cmp() (bcmp-like) and sshbuf_find() (memmem like)
+
+ feedback and ok markus@
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: fd071ec2485c7198074a168ff363a0d6052a706a
-commit 5cb503dff4db251520e8bf7d23b9c97c06eee031
+commit bc551dfebb55845537b1095cf3ccd01640a147b7
Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Thu Jan 24 09:55:16 2019 +1100
+Date: Mon Jul 15 12:52:45 2019 +1000
- Include unistd.h for strmode().
+ Clear valgrind-out dir to prevent collisions.
-commit f236ca2741f29b5c443c0b2db3aa9afb9ad9befe
+commit 5db9ba718e983661a9114ae1418f6e412d1f52d5
Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Thu Jan 24 09:50:58 2019 +1100
+Date: Mon Jul 15 12:02:27 2019 +1000
- Also undef SIMPLEQ_FOREACH_SAFE.
-
- Prevents macro redefinition warning on at least NetBSD 6.1.
+ Allow agent tests to write to valgrind dir.
-commit be063945e4e7d46b1734d973bf244c350fae172a
+commit 121e48fa5305f41f0477d9908e3d862987a68a84
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Wed Jan 23 04:51:02 2019 +0000
+Date: Sun Jul 14 23:33:19 2019 +0000
- upstream: allow auto-incrementing certificate serial number for certs
+ upstream: unit tests for sshbuf_peek/poke bounds-checked random access
- signed in a single commandline.
+ functions. ok markus@
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 39881087641efb8cd83c7ec13b9c98280633f45b
+ OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 034c4284b1da6b12e25c762a6b958efacdafbaef
-commit 851f80328931975fe68f71af363c4537cb896da2
+commit 101d164723ffbc38f8036b6f3ea3bfef771ba250
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Wed Jan 23 04:16:22 2019 +0000
+Date: Sun Jul 14 23:32:27 2019 +0000
- upstream: move a bunch of global flag variables to main(); make the
+ upstream: add some functions to perform random-access read/write
- rest static
+ operations inside buffers with bounds checking. Intended to replace manual
+ pointer arithmetic wherever possible.
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: fa431d92584e81fe99f95882f4c56b43fe3242dc
-
-commit 2265402dc7d701a9aca9f8a7b7b0fd45b65c479f
-Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
-Date: Wed Jan 23 13:03:16 2019 +1100
-
- depend
-
-commit 2c223878e53cc46def760add459f5f7c4fb43e35
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Wed Jan 23 02:01:10 2019 +0000
-
- upstream: switch mainloop from select(2) to poll(2); ok deraadt@
+ feedback and ok markus@
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 37645419a330037d297f6f0adc3b3663e7ae7b2e
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 91771fde7732738f1ffed078aa5d3bee6d198409
-commit bb956eaa94757ad058ff43631c3a7d6c94d38c2f
+commit 7250879c72d28275a53f2f220e49646c3e42ef18
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Wed Jan 23 00:30:41 2019 +0000
+Date: Fri Jul 12 04:08:39 2019 +0000
- upstream: pass most arguments to the KEX hash functions as sshbuf
+ upstream: include SHA2-variant RSA key algorithms in KEX proposal;
- rather than pointer+length; ok markus@
+ allows ssh-keyscan to harvest keys from servers that disable olde SHA1
+ ssh-rsa. bz#3029 from Jakub Jelen
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: ef0c89c52ccc89817a13a5205725148a28492bf7
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 9f95ebf76a150c2f727ca4780fb2599d50bbab7a
-commit d691588b8e29622c66abf8932362b522cf7f4051
+commit a0876bd994cab9ba6e47ba2a163a4417c7597487
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Tue Jan 22 22:58:50 2019 +0000
+Date: Fri Jul 12 03:56:21 2019 +0000
- upstream: backoff reading messages from active connections when the
+ upstream: print explicit "not modified" message if a file was
- input buffer is too full to read one, or if the output buffer is too full to
- enqueue a response; feedback & ok dtucker@
+ requested for resumed download but was considered already complete.
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: df3c5b6d57c968975875de40d8955cbfed05a6c8
-
-commit f99ef8de967949a1fc25a5c28263ea32736e5943
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Tue Jan 22 20:48:01 2019 +0000
-
- upstream: add -m to usage(); reminded by jmc@
+ bz#2978 ok dtucker
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: bca476a5236e8f94210290b3e6a507af0434613e
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: f32084b26a662f16215ee4ca4a403d67e49ab986
-commit 41923ce06ac149453debe472238e0cca7d5a2e5f
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Tue Jan 22 12:03:58 2019 +0000
+commit b9b0f2ac9625933db53a35b1c1ce423876630558
+Author: tb@openbsd.org <tb@openbsd.org>
+Date: Wed Jul 10 07:04:27 2019 +0000
- upstream: Correct some bugs in PKCS#11 token PIN handling at
+ upstream: Fix a typo and make <esc><right> move right to the
- initial login, the attempt at reading the PIN could be skipped in some cases
- especially on devices with integrated PIN readers.
+ closest end of a word just like <esc><left> moves left to the closest
+ beginning of a word.
- based on patch from Daniel Kucera in bz#2652; ok markus@
+ ok djm
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: fad70a61c60610afe8bb0db538c90e343e75e58e
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 6afe01b05ed52d8b12eb1fda6e9af5afb5e198ee
-commit 2162171ad517501ba511fa9f8191945d01857bb4
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Tue Jan 22 12:00:50 2019 +0000
+commit 8729498a5d239980a91d32f031b34e8c58c52f62
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date: Wed Jul 10 09:43:19 2019 +1000
- upstream: Support keys that set the CKA_ALWAYS_AUTHENTICATE by
-
- requring a fresh login after the C_SignInit operation.
-
- based on patch from Jakub Jelen in bz#2638; ok markus
+ fix typo that prevented detection of Linux VRF
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: a76e66996ba7c0923b46b74d46d499b811786661
+ Reported by hexiaowen AT huawei.com
-commit 7a2cb18a215b2cb335da3dc99489c52a91f4925b
+commit 5b2b79ff7c057ee101518545727ed3023372891d
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Tue Jan 22 11:51:25 2019 +0000
+Date: Tue Jul 9 04:15:00 2019 +0000
- upstream: Mention that configuration for the destination host is
+ upstream: cap the number of permiopen/permitlisten directives we're
- not applied to any ProxyJump/-J hosts. This has confused a few people...
+ willing to parse on a single authorized_keys line; ok deraadt@
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 03f4f641df6ca236c1bfc69836a256b873db868b
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: a43a752c2555d26aa3fc754805a476f6e3e30f46
-commit ecd2f33cb772db4fa76776543599f1c1ab6f9fa0
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Tue Jan 22 11:40:42 2019 +0000
+commit eb0b51dac408fadd1fd13fa6d726ab8fdfcc4152
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Mon Jul 8 17:27:26 2019 +1000
- upstream: Include -m in the synopsis for a few more commands that
-
- support it
+ Move log.h include inside ifdefs.
- Be more explicit in the description of -m about where it may be used
-
- Prompted by Jakub Jelen in bz2904
-
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 3b398ac5e05d8a6356710d0ff114536c9d71046c
+ Fixes build on some other platforms that don't have va_list immediately
+ available (eg NetBSD).
-commit ff5d2cf4ca373bb4002eef395ed2cbe2ff0826c1
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Tue Jan 22 11:26:16 2019 +0000
+commit 43702f8e6fa22a258e25c4dd950baaae0bc656b7
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Sat Jul 6 23:07:04 2019 +1000
- upstream: print the full pubkey being attempted at loglevel >=
-
- debug2; bz2939
+ Include log.h for debug() and friends.
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: ac0fe5ca1429ebf4d460bad602adc96de0d7e290
+ Should fix some compiler warnings on IRIX (bz#3032).
-commit 180b520e2bab33b566b4b0cbac7d5f9940935011
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Tue Jan 22 11:19:42 2019 +0000
+commit 53a6ebf1445a857f5e487b18ee5e5830a9575149
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date: Mon Jul 8 13:44:32 2019 +1000
- upstream: clarify: ssh-keygen -e only writes public keys, never
+ sftp-realpath.c needs includes.h
+
+commit 4efe1adf05ee5d3fce44320fcff68735891f4ee6
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date: Mon Jul 8 13:38:39 2019 +1000
+
+ remove realpath() compat replacement
- private
+ We shipped a BSD implementation of realpath() because sftp-server
+ depended on its behaviour.
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 7de7ff6d274d82febf9feb641e2415ffd6a30bfb
+ OpenBSD is now moving to a more strictly POSIX-compliant realpath(2),
+ so sftp-server now unconditionally requires its own BSD-style realpath
+ implementation. As such, there is no need to carry another independant
+ implementation in openbsd-compat.
+
+ ok dtucker@
-commit c45616a199c322ca674315de88e788f1d2596e26
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Tue Jan 22 11:00:15 2019 +0000
+commit 696fb4298e80f2ebcd188986a91b49af3b7ca14c
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date: Sun Jul 7 01:05:00 2019 +0000
- upstream: mention the new vs. old key formats in the introduction
-
- and give some hints on how keys may be converted or written in the old
- format.
+ upstream: Remove some set but never used variables. ok daraadt@
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 9c90a9f92eddc249e07fad1204d0e15c8aa13823
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 824baf9c59afc66a4637017e397b9b74a41684e7
-commit fd8eb1383a34c986a00ef13d745ae9bd3ea21760
-Author: jmc@openbsd.org <jmc@openbsd.org>
-Date: Tue Jan 22 06:58:31 2019 +0000
+commit 156e9e85e92b46ca90226605d9eff49e8ec31b22
+Author: deraadt@openbsd.org <deraadt@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Jul 5 12:35:40 2019 +0000
- upstream: tweak previous;
+ upstream: still compile uuencode.c, unbreaks build
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: d2a80e389da8e7ed71978643d8cbaa8605b597a8
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 5ea3d63ab972691f43e9087ab5fd8376d48e898f
-commit 68e924d5473c00057f8532af57741d258c478223
-Author: tb@openbsd.org <tb@openbsd.org>
-Date: Mon Jan 21 23:55:12 2019 +0000
+commit cec9ee527a12b1f6c2e0a1c155fec64a38d71cf6
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Jul 5 07:32:01 2019 +0000
- upstream: Forgot to add -J to the synopsis.
+ upstream: revert header removal that snuck into previous
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 26d95e409a0b72526526fc56ca1caca5cc3d3c5e
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 3919cdd58989786660b8269b325646ef8856428e
-commit 622dedf1a884f2927a9121e672bd9955e12ba108
-Author: tb@openbsd.org <tb@openbsd.org>
-Date: Mon Jan 21 22:50:42 2019 +0000
+commit 569b650f93b561c09c655f83f128e1dfffe74101
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Jul 5 04:55:40 2019 +0000
- upstream: Add a -J option as a shortcut for -o Proxyjump= to scp(1)
+ upstream: add a local implementation of BSD realpath() for
- and sftp(1) to match ssh(1)'s interface.
+ sftp-server use ahead of OpenBSD's realpath changing to match POSIX;
- ok djm
+ ok deraadt@ (thanks for snaps testing)
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: a75bc2d5f329caa7229a7e9fe346c4f41c2663fc
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 4f8cbf7ed8679f6237264301d104ecec64885d55
-commit c882d74652800150d538e22c80dd2bd3cdd5fae2
+commit b8e2b797362526437e0642a6c2f2970d794f2561
Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Tue Jan 22 20:38:40 2019 +1100
+Date: Sat Jul 6 13:13:57 2019 +1000
- Allow building against OpenSSL dev (3.x) version.
+ Add prototype for strnlen to prevent warnings.
-commit d5520393572eb24aa0e001a1c61f49b104396e45
-Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
-Date: Tue Jan 22 10:50:40 2019 +1100
+commit 4c3e00b1ed7e596610f34590eb5d54ee50d77878
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Sat Jul 6 13:02:34 2019 +1000
- typo
+ Cast *ID types to unsigned long when printing.
+
+ UID and GID types vary by platform so cast to u_long and use %lu when
+ printing them to prevent warnings.
-commit 2de9cec54230998ab10161576f77860a2559ccb7
-Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
-Date: Tue Jan 22 10:49:52 2019 +1100
+commit 2753521e899f30d1d58b5da0b4e68fde6fcf341e
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Sat Jul 6 12:54:43 2019 +1000
- add missing header
+ Add prototype for compat strndup.(bz#3032).
-commit 533cfb01e49a2a30354e191669dc3159e03e99a7
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Mon Jan 21 22:18:24 2019 +0000
+commit 01a1e21cd55d99293c8ff8ed7c590f2ee440da43
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Sat Jul 6 12:00:41 2019 +1000
- upstream: switch sntrup implementation source from supercop to
-
- libpqcrypto; the latter is almost identical but doesn't rely on signed
- underflow to implement an optimised integer sort; from markus@
+ Add missing bracket in EGD seeding code.
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: cd09bbf0e0fcef1bedca69fdf7990dc360567cf8
+ When configured --with-prngd-socket the code had a missing bracket after
+ an API change. Fix that and a couple of warnings. bz#3032 , from
+ ole.weidner at protonmail.ch
-commit d50ab3cd6fb859888a26b4d4e333239b4f6bf573
-Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
-Date: Tue Jan 22 00:02:23 2019 +1100
+commit e187b1d4607392cf2c19243afe0d0311a4ff3591
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Jul 5 04:19:39 2019 +0000
- new files need includes.h
+ upstream: Add (recently added) rsa_oldfmt to CLEANFILES.
+
+ OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 405beda94e32aa6cc9c80969152fab91f7c54bd3
-commit c7670b091a7174760d619ef6738b4f26b2093301
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Mon Jan 21 12:53:35 2019 +0000
+commit 74b541bfabdcb57c1683cd9b3f1d1f4d5e41563e
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Jul 5 04:12:46 2019 +0000
- upstream: add "-v" flags to ssh-add and ssh-pkcs11-helper to turn up
+ upstream: Adapt the PuTTY/Conch tests to new key names.
- debug verbosity.
+ A recent regress change (2a9b3a2ce411d16cda9c79ab713c55f65b0ec257 in
+ portable) broke the PuTTY and Twisted Conch interop tests, because the
+ key they want to use is now called ssh-rsa rather than rsa. Adapt the
+ tests to the new file names. bz#3020, patch from cjwatson at debian.org.
- Make ssh-agent turn on ssh-pkcs11-helper's verbosity when it is run
- in debug mode ("ssh-agent -d"), so we get to see errors from the
- PKCS#11 code.
+ OpenBSD-Regress-ID: fd342a37db4d55aa4ec85316f73082c8eb96e64e
+
+commit de08335a4cfaa9b7081e94ea4a8b7153c230546d
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Jul 5 04:03:13 2019 +0000
+
+ upstream: Add a sleep to allow forwards to come up.
- ok markus@
+ Currently when the multiplex client requests a forward it returns
+ once the request has been sent but not necessarily when the forward
+ is up. This causes intermittent text failures due to this race,
+ so add some sleeps to mitigate this until we can fix it properly.
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 0a798643c6a92a508df6bd121253ba1c8bee659d
+ OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 384c7d209d2443d25ea941d7f677e932621fb253
-commit 49d8c8e214d39acf752903566b105d06c565442a
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Mon Jan 21 12:50:12 2019 +0000
+commit 4d249284729f864faa2e8f3e015f9a41b674544a
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Fri Jul 5 14:58:57 2019 +1000
- upstream: adapt to changes in KEX APIs and file removals
-
- OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 54d6857e7c58999c7a6d40942ab0fed3529f43ca
+ Remove nc stderr redirection to resync w/OpenBSD.
-commit 35ecc53a83f8e8baab2e37549addfd05c73c30f1
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Mon Jan 21 12:35:20 2019 +0000
+commit c5cfa90e03432181ffcc7ad3f9f815179bd0c626
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Fri Jul 5 13:21:45 2019 +1000
- upstream: adapt to changes in KEX API and file removals
+ Do not fatal on failed lookup of group "tty".
- OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 92cad022d3b0d11e08f3e0055d6a14b8f994c0d7
+ Some platforms (eg AIX and Cygwin) do not have a "tty" group. In those
+ cases we will fall back to making the tty device the user's primary
+ group, so do not fatal if the group lookup fails. ok djm@
-commit 7d69aae64c35868cc4f644583ab973113a79480e
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Mon Jan 21 12:29:35 2019 +0000
+commit 8b4cc4bdc8a70bf209a274fa2b2a49c1e3c8d8a2
+Author: deraadt@openbsd.org <deraadt@openbsd.org>
+Date: Thu Jul 4 16:20:10 2019 +0000
- upstream: adapt to bignum1 API removal and bignum2 API change
+ upstream: fatal() if getgrnam() cannot find "tty"
- OpenBSD-Regress-ID: cea6ff270f3d560de86b355a87a2c95b55a5ca63
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: d148c1c052fa0ed7d105b5428b5c1bab91630048
-commit beab553f0a9578ef9bffe28b2c779725e77b39ec
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Mon Jan 21 09:13:41 2019 +0000
+commit 48cccc275c6a1e91d3f80fdb0dc0d5baf529aeca
+Author: deraadt@openbsd.org <deraadt@openbsd.org>
+Date: Thu Jul 4 16:16:51 2019 +0000
- upstream: remove hack to use non-system libcrypto
+ upstream: stat() returns precisely -1 to indicate error
- OpenBSD-Regress-ID: ce72487327eee4dfae1ab0212a1f33871fe0809f
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 668e8d022ed4ab847747214f64119e5865365fa1
-commit 4dc06bd57996f1a46b4c3bababe0d09bc89098f7
-Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
-Date: Mon Jan 21 23:14:04 2019 +1100
+commit 8142fcaf9ed8ff66252deecbfd29fc59d5f2df4f
+Author: deraadt@openbsd.org <deraadt@openbsd.org>
+Date: Wed Jul 3 03:24:02 2019 +0000
- depend
+ upstream: snprintf/vsnprintf return < 0 on error, rather than -1.
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: a261c421140a0639bb2b66bbceca72bf8239749d
-commit 70edd73edc4df54e5eee50cd27c25427b34612f8
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Mon Jan 21 12:08:13 2019 +0000
+commit 4d28fa78abce2890e136281950633fae2066cc29
+Author: deraadt@openbsd.org <deraadt@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Jun 28 13:35:04 2019 +0000
- upstream: fix reversed arguments to kex_load_hostkey(); manifested as
+ upstream: When system calls indicate an error they return -1, not
- errors in cert-hostkey.sh regress failures.
+ some arbitrary value < 0. errno is only updated in this case. Change all
+ (most?) callers of syscalls to follow this better, and let's see if this
+ strictness helps us in the future.
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 12dab63850b844f84d5a67e86d9e21a42fba93ba
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 48081f00db7518e3b712a49dca06efc2a5428075
-commit f1185abbf0c9108e639297addc77f8757ee00eb3
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Mon Jan 21 11:22:00 2019 +0000
+commit e8c974043c1648eab0ad67a7ba6a3e444fe79d2d
+Author: deraadt@openbsd.org <deraadt@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Jun 28 05:44:09 2019 +0000
- upstream: forgot to cvs add this file in previous series of commits;
+ upstream: asprintf returns -1, not an arbitrary value < 0. Also
- grrr
+ upon error the (very sloppy specification) leaves an undefined value in *ret,
+ so it is wrong to inspect it, the error condition is enough. discussed a
+ little with nicm, and then much more with millert until we were exasperated
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: bcff316c3e7da8fd15333e05d244442c3aaa66b0
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 29258fa51edf8115d244b9d4b84028487bf8923e
-commit 7bef390b625bdc080f0fd4499ef03cef60fca4fa
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Mon Jan 21 10:44:21 2019 +0000
+commit 1b2d55d15c6240c15a1e1cf4203b82e54a766272
+Author: deraadt@openbsd.org <deraadt@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Jun 28 01:23:50 2019 +0000
- upstream: nothing shall escape this purge
-
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 4795b0ff142b45448f7e15f3c2f77a947191b217
-
-commit aaca72d6f1279b842066e07bff797019efeb2c23
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Mon Jan 21 10:40:11 2019 +0000
-
- upstream: rename kex->kem_client_pub -> kex->client_pub now that
-
- KEM has been renamed to kexgen
-
- from markus@ ok djm@
+ upstream: oops, from asou
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: fac6da5dc63530ad0da537db022a9a4cfbe8bed8
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 702e765d1639b732370d8f003bb84a1c71c4d0c6
-commit 70867e1ca2eb08bbd494fe9c568df4fd3b35b867
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Mon Jan 21 10:38:54 2019 +0000
+commit 5cdbaa78fcb718c39af4522d98016ad89d065427
+Author: deraadt@openbsd.org <deraadt@openbsd.org>
+Date: Thu Jun 27 18:03:37 2019 +0000
- upstream: merge kexkem[cs] into kexgen
+ upstream: Some asprintf() calls were checked < 0, rather than the
- from markus@ ok djm@
+ precise == -1. ok millert nicm tb, etc
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 87d886b7f1812ff9355fda1435f6ea9b71a0ac89
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: caecf8f57938685c04f125515b9f2806ad408d53
-commit 71e67fff946396caa110a7964da23480757258ff
+commit b2e3e57be4a933d9464bccbe592573725765486f
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Mon Jan 21 10:35:09 2019 +0000
+Date: Thu Jun 27 06:29:35 2019 +0000
- upstream: pass values used in KEX hash computation as sshbuf
+ upstream: fix NULL deference (bzero) on err
- rather than pointer+len
+ =?UTF-8?q?or=20path=20added=20in=20last=20commit;=20spotted=20by=20Reynir?=
+ =?UTF-8?q?=20Bj=C3=B6rnsson?=
+ MIME-Version: 1.0
+ Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
+ Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
- suggested by me; implemented by markus@ ok me
+ ok deraadt@ markus@ tb@
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 994f33c464f4a9e0f1d21909fa3e379f5a0910f0
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: b11b084bcc551b2c630560eb08618dd501027bbd
-commit 4b83e2a2cc0c12e671a77eaba1c1245894f4e884
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Mon Jan 21 10:33:49 2019 +0000
+commit 58ceacdcbaebefc77d120712de55c6fc6aa32bb1
+Author: Jitendra Sharma <jitendra.sharma@intel.com>
+Date: Fri Jun 21 09:54:17 2019 +0530
- upstream: remove kex_derive_keys_bn wrapper; no unused since the
-
- DH-like KEX methods have moved to KEM
-
- from markus@ ok djm@
+ Update README doc to include missing test cases
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: bde9809103832f349545e4f5bb733d316db9a060
+ Readme regress document is missing various individual tests,
+ which are supported currently. Update README to
+ include those test cases.
-commit 92dda34e373832f34a1944e5d9ebbebb184dedc1
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Mon Jan 21 10:29:56 2019 +0000
+commit 7959330a554051b5587f8af3fec0c2c0d5820f64
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date: Wed Jun 26 22:29:43 2019 +0000
- upstream: use KEM API for vanilla ECDH
+ upstream: Remove unneeded unlink of xauthfile o
- from markus@ ok djm@
+ =?UTF-8?q?n=20error=20path.=20=20From=20Erik=20Sj=C3=B6lund=20via=20githu?=
+ =?UTF-8?q?b,=20ok=20djm@=20deraadt@?=
+ MIME-Version: 1.0
+ Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
+ Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 6fbff96339a929835536b5730585d1d6057a352c
-
-commit b72357217cbe510a3ae155307a7be6b9181f1d1b
-Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
-Date: Mon Jan 21 23:11:21 2019 +1100
-
- fixup missing ssherr.h
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 62a4893cf83b29a4bbfedc40e7067c25c203e632
-commit 9c9c97e14fe190931f341876ad98213e1e1dc19f
+commit 8de52eb224143783a49f9bddd9ab7800022a8276
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Mon Jan 21 10:28:01 2019 +0000
+Date: Sun Jun 23 12:21:46 2019 +0000
- upstream: use KEM API for vanilla DH KEX
+ upstream: fix mismatch proto/decl from key shielding change; spotted
- from markus@ ok djm@
+ via oss-fuzz
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: af56466426b08a8be275412ae2743319e3d277c9
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 1ea0ba05ded2c5557507bd844cd446e5c8b5b3b7
-commit 2f6a9ddbbf6ca8623c53c323ff17fb6d68d66970
+commit 1dfadb9b57c2985c95838a0292d1c2f6a501896e
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Mon Jan 21 10:24:09 2019 +0000
+Date: Fri Jun 21 04:21:45 2019 +0000
- upstream: use KEM API for vanilla c25519 KEX
+ upstream: adapt for key shielding API changes (const removal)
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 38d937b85ff770886379dd66a8f32ab0c1c35c1f
+ OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 298890bc52f0cd09dba76dc1022fabe89bc0ded6
-commit dfd591618cdf2c96727ac0eb65f89cf54af0d97e
+commit 4f7a56d5e02e3d04ab69eac1213817a7536d0562
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Mon Jan 21 10:20:12 2019 +0000
+Date: Fri Jun 21 04:21:04 2019 +0000
- upstream: Add support for a PQC KEX/KEM:
+ upstream: Add protection for private keys at rest in RAM against
- sntrup4591761x25519-sha512@tinyssh.org using the Streamlined NTRU Prime
- 4591^761 implementation from SUPERCOP coupled with X25519 as a stop-loss. Not
- enabled by default.
+ speculation and memory sidechannel attacks like Spectre, Meltdown, Rowhammer
+ and Rambleed. This change encrypts private keys when they are not in use with
+ a symmetic key that is derived from a relatively large "prekey" consisting of
+ random data (currently 16KB).
- introduce KEM API; a simplified framework for DH-ish KEX methods.
+ Attackers must recover the entire prekey with high accuracy before
+ they can attempt to decrypt the shielded private key, but the current
+ generation of attacks have bit error rates that, when applied
+ cumulatively to the entire prekey, make this unlikely.
- from markus@ feedback & ok djm@
+ Implementation-wise, keys are encrypted "shielded" when loaded and then
+ automatically and transparently unshielded when used for signatures or
+ when being saved/serialised.
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: d687f76cffd3561dd73eb302d17a1c3bf321d1a7
-
-commit b1b2ff4ed559051d1035419f8f236275fa66d5d6
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Mon Jan 21 10:07:22 2019 +0000
-
- upstream: factor out kex_verify_hostkey() - again, duplicated
+ Hopefully we can remove this in a few years time when computer
+ architecture has become less unsafe.
- almost exactly across client and server for several KEX methods.
+ been in snaps for a bit already; thanks deraadt@
- from markus@ ok djm@
+ ok dtucker@ deraadt@
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 4e4a16d949dadde002a0aacf6d280a684e20829c
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 19767213c312e46f94b303a512ef8e9218a39bd4
-commit bb39bafb6dc520cc097780f4611a52da7f19c3e2
+commit 4cd6b12cc9c10bf59c8b425041f3ea5091285a0f
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Mon Jan 21 10:05:09 2019 +0000
+Date: Fri Jun 21 03:19:59 2019 +0000
- upstream: factor out kex_load_hostkey() - this is duplicated in
-
- both the client and server implementations for most KEX methods.
+ upstream: print the correct AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand rather than
- from markus@ ok djm@
+ an uninitialised variable; spotted by dtucker@
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 8232fa7c21fbfbcaf838313b0c166dc6c8762f3c
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 02802018784250f68202f01c8561de82e17b0638
-commit dec5e9d33891e3bc3f1395d7db0e56fdc7f86dfc
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Mon Jan 21 10:03:37 2019 +0000
+commit 5f68ab436b0e01751d564e9a9041e6ac3673e45a
+Author: jmc@openbsd.org <jmc@openbsd.org>
+Date: Wed Jun 19 20:12:44 2019 +0000
- upstream: factor out kex_dh_compute_key() - it's shared between
+ upstream: from tim: - for reput, it is remote-path which is
- plain DH KEX and DH GEX in both the client and server implementations
+ optional, not local-path - sync help
- from markus@ ok djm@
+ from deraadt:
+ - prefer -R and undocument -r (but add a comment for future editors)
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 12186e18791fffcd4642c82e7e0cfdd7ea37e2ec
-
-commit e93bd98eab79b9a78f64ee8dd4dffc4d3979c7ae
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Mon Jan 21 10:00:23 2019 +0000
-
- upstream: factor out DH keygen; it's identical between the client
+ from schwarze:
+ - prefer -p and undocument -P (as above. the comment was schwarze's too)
- and the server
+ more:
+ - add the -f flag to reput and reget
+ - sort help (i can;t remember who suggested this originally)
- from markus@ ok djm@
+ djm and deraadt were ok with earlier versions of this;
+ tim and schwarze ok
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 2be57f6a0d44f1ab2c8de2b1b5d6f530c387fae9
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 3c699b53b46111f5c57eed4533f132e7e58bacdd
-commit 5ae3f6d314465026d028af82609c1d49ad197655
+commit 99bcbbc77fbd5a5027031f42a5931b21b07c947e
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Mon Jan 21 09:55:52 2019 +0000
+Date: Fri Jun 14 04:03:48 2019 +0000
- upstream: save the derived session id in kex_derive_keys() rather
-
- than making each kex method implementation do it.
+ upstream: check for convtime() refusing to accept times that
- from markus@ ok djm@
+ resolve to LONG_MAX Reported by Kirk Wolf bz2977; ok dtucker
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: d61ade9c8d1e13f665f8663c552abff8c8a30673
+ OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 15c9fe87be1ec241d24707006a31123d3a3117e0
-commit 7be8572b32a15d5c3dba897f252e2e04e991c307
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Mon Jan 21 09:54:11 2019 +0000
+commit e5cccb2410247c9b8151b9510a876abdf5424b24
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date: Sun Apr 28 22:53:26 2019 +0000
- upstream: Make sshpkt_get_bignum2() allocate the bignum it is
-
- parsing rather than make the caller do it. Saves a lot of boilerplate code.
-
- from markus@ ok djm@
+ upstream: Add unit tests for user@host and URI parsing.
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 576bf784f9a240f5a1401f7005364e59aed3bce9
+ OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 69d5b6f278e04ed32377046f7692c714c2d07a68
-commit 803178bd5da7e72be94ba5b4c4c196d4b542da4d
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Mon Jan 21 09:52:25 2019 +0000
+commit 0bb7e38834e3f9886302bbaea630a6b0f8cfb520
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date: Thu Apr 18 18:57:16 2019 +0000
- upstream: remove obsolete (SSH v.1) sshbuf_get/put_bignum1
-
- functions
-
- from markus@ ok djm@
+ upstream: Add tests for sshd -T -C with Match.
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 0380b1b2d9de063de3c5a097481a622e6a04943e
+ OpenBSD-Regress-ID: d4c34916fe20d717692f10ef50b5ae5a271c12c7
-commit f3ebaffd8714be31d4345f90af64992de4b3bba2
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Mon Jan 21 09:49:37 2019 +0000
+commit 73eb6cef41daba0359c1888e4756108d41b4e819
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Sun Jun 16 12:55:27 2019 +1000
- upstream: fix all-zero check in kexc25519_shared_key
-
- from markus@ ok djm@
+ Include stdio.h for vsnprintf.
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 60b1d364e0d9d34d1d1ef1620cb92e36cf06712d
+ Patch from mforney at mforney.org.
-commit 9d1a9771d0ad3a83af733bf3d2650b53f43c269f
-Author: jmc@openbsd.org <jmc@openbsd.org>
-Date: Mon Jan 21 07:09:10 2019 +0000
+commit adcaf40fd0a180e6cb5798317fdf479b52e3c09a
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Sat Jun 8 09:07:04 2019 +1000
- upstream: - -T was added to the first synopsis by mistake - since
-
- "..." denotes optional, no need to surround it in []
-
- ok djm
+ upstream rev 1.27: fix integer overflow.
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 918f6d8eed4e0d8d9ef5eadae1b8983d796f0e25
+ Cast bitcount to u_in64_t before bit shifting to prevent integer overflow
+ on 32bit platforms which cause incorrect results when adding a block
+ >=512M in size. sha1 patch from ante84 at gmail.com via openssh github,
+ sha2 with djm@, ok tedu@
-commit 2f0bad2bf85391dbb41315ab55032ec522660617
+commit 7689048e6103d3c34cba24ac5aeea7bf8405d19a
Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Mon Jan 21 21:28:27 2019 +1100
+Date: Sat Jun 8 09:06:06 2019 +1000
- Make --with-rpath take a flag instead of yes/no.
+ upstream rev 1.25: add DEF_WEAK.
- Linkers need various flags for -rpath and similar, so make --with-rpath
- take an optional flag argument which is passed to the linker. ok djm@
-
-commit 23490a6c970ea1d03581a3b4208f2eb7a675f453
-Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
-Date: Mon Jan 21 15:05:43 2019 +1100
-
- fix previous test
+ Wrap blowfish, sha*, md5, and rmd160 so that internal calls go direct
+ ok deraadt@
-commit b6dd3277f2c49f9584a2097bc792e8f480397e87
+commit 55f3153393ac7e072a4b4b21b194864460d8f44a
Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Mon Jan 21 13:50:17 2019 +1100
-
- Wrap ECC static globals in EC_KEY_METHOD_NEW too.
-
-commit b2eb9db35b7191613f2f4b934d57b25938bb34b3
-Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
-Date: Mon Jan 21 12:53:40 2019 +1100
-
- pass TEST_SSH_SSHPKCS11HELPER to regress tests
-
-commit ba58a529f45b3dae2db68607d8c54ae96e90e705
-Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
-Date: Mon Jan 21 12:31:29 2019 +1100
+Date: Sat Jun 8 09:02:24 2019 +1000
- make agent-pkcs11 search harder for softhsm2.so
+ upstream rev 1.25: add sys/types.h
-commit 662be40c62339ab645113c930ce689466f028938
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Mon Jan 21 02:05:38 2019 +0000
+commit 10974f986fa842a3a3a693e3d5761072540002b4
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Sat Jun 8 09:01:14 2019 +1000
- upstream: always print the caller's error message in ossl_error(),
-
- even when there are no libcrypto errors to report.
+ upstream: Use explicit_bzero instead of memset
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 09ebaa8f706e0eccedd209775baa1eee2ada806a
+ in hash Final and End functions. OK deraadt@ djm@
-commit ce46c3a077dfb4c531ccffcfff03f37775725b75
+commit cb8f56570f70b00abae4267d4bcce2bfae7dfff6
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Mon Jan 21 02:01:03 2019 +0000
+Date: Fri Jun 14 04:13:58 2019 +0000
- upstream: get the ex_data (pkcs11_key object) back from the keys at
+ upstream: slightly more instructive error message when the user
- the index at which it was inserted, rather than assuming index 0
+ specifies multiple -J options on the commandline. bz3015 ok dtucker@
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 1f3a6ce0346c8014e895e50423bef16401510aa8
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 181c15a65cac3b575819bc8d9a56212c3c748179
-commit 0a5f2ea35626022299ece3c8817a1abe8cf37b3e
+commit 2317ce4b0ed7d8c4b0c684e2d47bff5006bd1178
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Mon Jan 21 01:05:00 2019 +0000
+Date: Fri Jun 14 03:51:47 2019 +0000
- upstream: GSSAPI code got missed when converting to new packet API
+ upstream: process agent requests for RSA certificate private keys using
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 37e4f06ab4a0f4214430ff462ba91acba28b7851
-
-commit 2efcf812b4c1555ca3aff744820a3b3bccd68298
-Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
-Date: Mon Jan 21 11:57:21 2019 +1100
-
- Fix -Wunused when compiling PKCS#11 without ECDSA
+ correct signature algorithm when requested. Patch from Jakub Jelen in bz3016
+ ok dtucker markus
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 61f86efbeb4a1857a3e91298c1ccc6cf49b79624
-commit 3c0c657ed7cd335fc05c0852d88232ca7e92a5d9
+commit c95b90d40170473825904be561b1eafba354f376
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Sun Jan 20 23:26:44 2019 +0000
+Date: Fri Jun 14 03:39:59 2019 +0000
- upstream: allow override of ssh-pkcs11-helper binary via
+ upstream: for public key authentication, check AuthorizedKeysFiles
- $TEST_SSH_SSHPKCS11HELPER from markus@
+ files before consulting AuthorizedKeysCommand; ok dtucker markus
- OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 7382a3d76746f5a792d106912a5819fd5e49e469
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 13652998bea5cb93668999c39c3c48e8429db8b3
-commit 760ae37b4505453c6fa4faf1aa39a8671ab053af
+commit a5a53914989ddd3521b6edc452bc3291784a4f4f
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Sun Jan 20 23:25:25 2019 +0000
+Date: Fri Jun 14 03:28:19 2019 +0000
- upstream: adapt agent-pkcs11.sh test to softhsm2 and add support
-
- for ECDSA keys
-
- work by markus@, ok djm@
+ upstream: if passed a bad fd, log what it was
- OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 1ebc2be0e88eff1b6d8be2f9c00cdc60723509fe
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 582e2bd05854e49365195b58989b68ac67f09140
-commit b2ce8b31a1f974a13e6d12e0a0c132b50bc45115
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Sun Jan 20 23:24:19 2019 +0000
+commit 7349149da1074d82b71722338e05b6a282f126cc
+Author: jmc@openbsd.org <jmc@openbsd.org>
+Date: Wed Jun 12 11:31:50 2019 +0000
- upstream: add "extra:" target to run some extra tests that are not
+ upstream: Hostname->HostName cleanup; from lauri tirkkonen ok
- enabled by default (currently includes agent-pkcs11.sh); from markus@
+ dtucker
- OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 9a969e1adcd117fea174d368dcb9c61eb50a2a3c
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 4ade73629ede63b691f36f9a929f943d4e7a44e4
-commit 632976418d60b7193597bbc6ac7ca33981a41aab
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Mon Jan 21 00:47:34 2019 +0000
+commit 76af9c57387243556d38935555c227d0b34062c5
+Author: jmc@openbsd.org <jmc@openbsd.org>
+Date: Wed Jun 12 05:53:21 2019 +0000
- upstream: use ECDSA_SIG_set0() instead of poking signature values into
+ upstream: deraadt noticed some inconsistency in the way we denote
- structure directly; the latter works on LibreSSL but not on OpenSSL. From
- portable.
+ the "Hostname" and "X11UseLocalhost" keywords; this makes things consistent
+ (effectively reversing my commit of yesterday);
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 5b22a1919d9cee907d3f8a029167f70a481891c6
+ ok deraadt markus djm
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 255c02adb29186ac91dcf47dfad7adb1b1e54667
-commit 5de6ac2bad11175135d9b819b3546db0ca0b4878
-Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
-Date: Mon Jan 21 11:44:19 2019 +1100
+commit d1bbfdd932db9b9b799db865ee1ff50060dfc895
+Author: jmc@openbsd.org <jmc@openbsd.org>
+Date: Tue Jun 11 13:39:40 2019 +0000
- remove HAVE_DLOPEN that snuck in
+ upstream: consistent lettering for "HostName" keyword; from lauri
- portable doesn't use this
+ tirkkonen
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 0c267a1257ed7482b13ef550837b6496e657d563
-commit e2cb445d786f7572da2af93e3433308eaed1093a
-Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
-Date: Mon Jan 21 11:32:28 2019 +1100
+commit fc0340f7c4ee29bfb12bd1de9f99defa797e16b4
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Sat Jun 8 00:10:59 2019 +1000
- conditionalise ECDSA PKCS#11 support
+ Typo fixes in error messages.
- Require EC_KEY_METHOD support in libcrypto, evidenced by presence
- of EC_KEY_METHOD_new() function.
+ Patch from knweiss at gmail.com via github pull req #97 (portable-
+ specific parts).
-commit fcb1b0937182d0137a3c357c89735d0dc5869d54
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Sun Jan 20 23:12:35 2019 +0000
+commit 4b7dd22b02b64b1ededd3c0e98a6e7ae21e31d38
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Jun 7 14:18:48 2019 +0000
- upstream: we use singleton pkcs#11 RSA_METHOD and EC_KEY_METHOD
-
- now, so there is no need to keep a copy of each in the pkcs11_key object.
+ upstream: Typo and spelling fixes in comments and error messages.
- work by markus@, ok djm@
+ Patch from knweiss at gmail.com via -portable.
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 43b4856516e45c0595f17a8e95b2daee05f12faa
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 2577465442f761a39703762c4f87a8dfcb918b4b
-commit 6529409e85890cd6df7e5e81d04e393b1d2e4b0b
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Sun Jan 20 23:11:11 2019 +0000
+commit 130ef0695e1731392ca33831939fe89e8b70cc17
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Sat Jun 8 00:47:07 2019 +1000
- upstream: KNF previous; from markus@
-
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 3dfe35e25b310c3968b1e4e53a0cb1d03bda5395
+ Include missed bits from previous sync.
-commit 58622a8c82f4e2aad630580543f51ba537c1f39e
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Sun Jan 20 23:10:33 2019 +0000
+commit 25e3bccbaa63d27b9d5e09c123f1eb28594d2bd6
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Jun 7 03:47:12 2019 +0000
- upstream: use OpenSSL's RSA reference counting hooks to
-
- implicitly clean up pkcs11_key objects when their owning RSA object's
- reference count drops to zero. Simplifies the cleanup path and makes it more
- like ECDSA's
+ upstream: Check for user@host when parsing sftp target. This
- work by markus@, ok djm@
+ allows user@[1.2.3.4] to work without a path in addition to with one.
+ bz#2999, ok djm@
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 74b9c98f405cd78f7148e9e4a4982336cd3df25c
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: d989217110932490ba8ce92127a9a6838878928b
-commit f118542fc82a3b3ab0360955b33bc5a271ea709f
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Sun Jan 20 23:08:24 2019 +0000
+commit 0323d9b619d512f80c57575b810a05791891f657
+Author: otto@openbsd.org <otto@openbsd.org>
+Date: Thu Jun 6 05:13:13 2019 +0000
- upstream: make the PKCS#11 RSA code more like the new PKCS#11
-
- ECDSA code: use a single custom RSA_METHOD instead of a method per key
+ upstream: Replace calls to ssh_malloc_init() by a static init of
- suggested by me, but markus@ did all the work.
- ok djm@
+ malloc_options. Prepares for changes in the way malloc is initialized. ok
+ guenther@ dtucker@
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 8aafcebe923dc742fc5537a995cee549d07e4b2e
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 154f4e3e174f614b09f792d4d06575e08de58a6b
-commit 445cfce49dfc904c6b8ab25afa2f43130296c1a5
+commit c586d2d3129265ea64b12960c379d634bccb6535
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Sun Jan 20 23:05:52 2019 +0000
+Date: Fri May 31 03:20:07 2019 +0000
- upstream: fix leak of ECDSA pkcs11_key objects
+ upstream: fix ssh-keysign fd handling problem introduced in r1.304
- work by markus, ok djm@
+ caused by a typo (STDIN_FILENO vs STDERR_FILENO)
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 9fc0c4f1d640aaa5f19b8d70f37ea19b8ad284a1
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 57a0b4be7bef23963afe24150e24bf014fdd9cb0
-commit 8a2467583f0b5760787273796ec929190c3f16ee
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Sun Jan 20 23:03:26 2019 +0000
+commit 410b231aa41ff830b2f5b09b5aaf5e5cdc1ab86b
+Author: lum@openbsd.org <lum@openbsd.org>
+Date: Wed May 29 08:30:26 2019 +0000
- upstream: use EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY() instead of direct access of
-
- EC_KEY internals as that won't work on OpenSSL
+ upstream: Make the standard output messages of both methods of
- work by markus@, feedback and ok djm@
+ changing a key pair's comments (using -c and -C) more applicable to both
+ methods. ok and suggestions djm@ dtucker@
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 4a99cdb89fbd6f5155ef8c521c99dc66e2612700
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: b379338118109eb36e14a65bc0a12735205b3de6
-commit 24757c1ae309324e98d50e5935478655be04e549
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Sun Jan 20 23:01:59 2019 +0000
+commit 2b3402dc9f1d9b0df70291b424f36e436cdfa7e0
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Sat Jun 8 00:03:07 2019 +1000
- upstream: cleanup PKCS#11 ECDSA pubkey loading: the returned
-
- object should never have a DER header
-
- work by markus; feedback and ok djm@
-
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: b617fa585eddbbf0b1245b58b7a3c4b8d613db17
+ Always clean up before and after utimensat test.
-commit 749aef30321595435ddacef2f31d7a8f2b289309
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Sun Jan 20 23:00:12 2019 +0000
+commit 182898192d4b720e4faeafd5b39c2cfb3b92aa21
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Fri Jun 7 23:47:37 2019 +1000
- upstream: cleanup unnecessary code in ECDSA pkcs#11 signature
+ Update utimensat test.
- work by markus@, feedback and ok djm@
+ POSIX specifies that when given a symlink, AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW should
+ update the symlink and not the destination. The compat code doesn't
+ have a way to do this, so where possible it fails instead of following a
+ symlink when explicitly asked not to. Instead of checking for an explicit
+ failure, check that it does not update the destination, which both the
+ real and compat implmentations should honour.
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: affa5ca7d58d59fbd16169f77771dcdbd2b0306d
+ Inspired by github pull req #125 from chutzpah at gentoo.org.
-commit 0c50992af49b562970dd0ba3f8f151f1119e260e
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Sun Jan 20 22:57:45 2019 +0000
+commit d220b675205185e0b4d6b6524acc2e5c599ef0e2
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Fri Jun 7 14:26:54 2019 +1000
- upstream: cleanup pkcs#11 client code: use sshkey_new in instead
-
- of stack- allocating a sshkey
+ Have pthread_create return errno on failure.
- work by markus@, ok djm@
+ According to POSIX, pthread_create returns the failure reason in
+ the non-zero function return code so make the fork wrapper do that.
+ Matches previous change.
+
+commit 1bd4f7f25f653e0cadb2e6f25d79bc3c35c6aa4d
+Author: Elliott Hughes <enh@google.com>
+Date: Thu Apr 25 13:36:27 2019 -0700
+
+ pthread_create(3) returns positive values on failure.
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: a048eb6ec8aa7fa97330af927022c0da77521f91
+ Found by inspection after finding similar bugs in other code used by
+ Android.
-commit 854bd8674ee5074a239f7cadf757d55454802e41
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Sun Jan 20 22:54:30 2019 +0000
+commit b3a77b25e5f7880222b179431a74fad76d2cf60c
+Author: Harald Freudenberger <freude@linux.ibm.com>
+Date: Fri May 24 10:11:15 2019 +0200
- upstream: allow override of the pkcs#11 helper binary via
+ allow s390 specific ioctl for ecc hardware support
- $SSH_PKCS11_HELPER; needed for regress tests.
+ Adding another s390 specific ioctl to be able to support ECC hardware
+ acceleration to the sandbox seccomp filter rules.
- work by markus@, ok me
+ Now the ibmca openssl engine provides elliptic curve cryptography
+ support with the help of libica and CCA crypto cards. This is done via
+ jet another ioctl call to the zcrypt device driver and so there is a
+ need to enable this on the openssl sandbox.
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: f78d8185500bd7c37aeaf7bd27336db62f0f7a83
+ Code is s390 specific and has been tested, verified and reviewed.
+
+ Please note that I am also the originator of the previous changes in
+ that area. I posted these changes to Eduardo and he forwarded the
+ patches to the openssl community.
+
+ Signed-off-by: Harald Freudenberger <freude@linux.ibm.com>
+ Reviewed-by: Joerg Schmidbauer <jschmidb@de.ibm.com>
-commit 93f02107f44d63a016d8c23ebd2ca9205c495c48
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Sun Jan 20 22:51:37 2019 +0000
+commit 2459df9aa11820f8092a8651aeb381af7ebbccb1
+Author: Sorin Adrian Savu <sorin25@users.noreply.github.com>
+Date: Sun May 26 21:50:08 2019 +0300
- upstream: add support for ECDSA keys in PKCS#11 tokens
+ openssl-devel is obsoleted by libssl-devel
- Work by markus@ and Pedro Martelletto, feedback and ok me@
+ openssl-devel is no longer installable via the cygwin setup and
+ it's hidden by default, so you can't see the replacement very easy.
+
+commit 85ceb0e64bff672558fc87958cd548f135c83cdd
+Author: jmc@openbsd.org <jmc@openbsd.org>
+Date: Mon May 20 06:01:59 2019 +0000
+
+ upstream: tweak previous;
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: a37d651e221341376636056512bddfc16efb4424
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 42f39f22f53cfcb913bce401ae0f1bb93e08dd6c
-commit aa22c20e0c36c2fc610cfcc793b0d14079c38814
+commit 30615295609f5c57b3137b3021fe63bfa45c1985
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Sun Jan 20 22:03:29 2019 +0000
+Date: Mon May 20 00:25:55 2019 +0000
- upstream: add option to test whether keys in an agent are usable,
-
- by performing a signature and a verification using each key "ssh-add -T
- pubkey [...]"
+ upstream: embiggen format buffer size for certificate serial number so
- work by markus@, ok djm@
+ that it will fit a full 64 bit integer. bz#3012 from Manoel Domingues Junior
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 931b888a600b6a883f65375bd5f73a4776c6d19b
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: a51f3013056d05b976e5af6b978dcb9e27bbc12b
-commit a36b0b14a12971086034d53c0c3dfbad07665abe
-Author: tb@openbsd.org <tb@openbsd.org>
-Date: Sun Jan 20 02:01:59 2019 +0000
+commit 476e3551b2952ef73acc43d995e832539bf9bc4d
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Mon May 20 00:20:35 2019 +0000
- upstream: Fix BN_is_prime_* calls in SSH, the API returns -1 on
-
- error.
+ upstream: When signing certificates with an RSA key, default to
- Found thanks to BoringSSL's commit 53409ee3d7595ed37da472bc73b010cd2c8a5ffd
- by David Benjamin.
+ using the rsa-sha2-512 signature algorithm. Certificates signed by RSA keys
+ will therefore be incompatible with OpenSSH < 7.2 unless the default is
+ overridden.
- ok djm, dtucker
+ Document the ability of the ssh-keygen -t flag to override the
+ signature algorithm when signing certificates, and the new default.
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 1ee832be3c44b1337f76b8562ec6d203f3b072f8
-
-commit ec4776bb01dd8d61fddc7d2a31ab10bf3d3d829a
-Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
-Date: Sun Jan 20 01:12:40 2019 +0000
-
- upstream: DH-GEX min value is now specified in RFC8270. ok djm@
+ ok deraadt@
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 1229d0feb1d0ecefe05bf67a17578b263e991acc
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 400c9c15013978204c2cb80f294b03ae4cfc8b95
-commit c90a7928c4191303e76a8c58b9008d464287ae1b
+commit 606077ee1e77af5908431d003fb28461ef7be092
Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Mon Jan 21 09:22:36 2019 +1100
+Date: Fri May 17 13:14:12 2019 +1000
- Check for cc before gcc.
+ Add no-op implementation of pam_putenv.
- If cc is something other than gcc and is the system compiler prefer using
- that, unless otherwise told via $CC. ok djm@
+ Some platforms such as HP-UX do not have pam_putenv. Currently the
+ calls are ifdef'ed out, but a new one was recently added. Remove the
+ ifdefs and add a no-op implementation. bz#3008, ok djm.
-commit 9b655dc9c9a353f0a527f0c6c43a5e35653c9503
-Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
-Date: Sun Jan 20 14:55:27 2019 +1100
+commit 1ac98be8724c9789d770ddb8e7f0dbf1b55e05a0
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Fri May 17 12:42:17 2019 +1000
- last bits of old packet API / active_state global
+ Use the correct macro for SSH_ALLOWED_CA_SIGALGS.
-commit 3f0786bbe73609ac96e5a0d91425ee21129f8e04
-Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
-Date: Sun Jan 20 10:22:18 2019 +1100
+commit 97370f6c2c3b825f8c577b7e6c00b1a98d30a6cf
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Fri May 17 10:54:51 2019 +1000
- remove PAM dependencies on old packet API
+ Fix building w/out ECC.
- Requires some caching of values, because the PAM code isn't
- always called with packet context.
-
-commit 08f66d9f17e12c1140d1f1cf5c4dce67e915d3cc
-Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
-Date: Sun Jan 20 09:58:45 2019 +1100
-
- remove vestiges of old packet API from loginrec.c
+ Ifdef out ECC specific code so that that it'll build against an OpenSSL
+ configured w/out ECC. With & ok djm@
-commit c327813ea1d740e3e367109c17873815aba1328e
-Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
-Date: Sun Jan 20 09:45:38 2019 +1100
+commit 633703babf8d9a88da85f23b800e1b88dec7cdbd
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Fri May 17 10:50:29 2019 +1000
- depend
+ Conditionalize ECDH methods in CA algos.
+
+ When building against an OpenSSL configured without ECC, don't include
+ those algos in CASignatureAlgorithms. ok djm@
-commit 135e302cfdbe91817294317c337cc38c3ff01cba
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Sat Jan 19 22:30:52 2019 +0000
+commit 5c8d14c512f5d413095b22bdba08a6bb990f1e97
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date: Thu May 16 08:47:27 2019 +0000
- upstream: fix error in refactor: use ssh_packet_disconnect() instead of
+ upstream: Move a variable declaration to the block where it's used
- sshpkt_error(). The first one logs the error and exits (what we want) instead
- of just logging and blundering on.
+ to make things a little tidier for -portable.
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 39f51b43641dce9ce0f408ea6c0e6e077e2e91ae
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 616379861be95619e5358768b7dee4793e2f3a75
-commit 245c6a0b220b58686ee35bc5fc1c359e9be2faaa
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Sat Jan 19 21:45:31 2019 +0000
+commit a1d29cc36a5e6eeabc935065a8780e1ba5b67014
+Author: deraadt@openbsd.org <deraadt@openbsd.org>
+Date: Wed May 15 04:43:31 2019 +0000
- upstream: remove last traces of old packet API!
+ upstream: When doing the fork+exec'ing for ssh-keysign, rearrange
- with & ok markus@
+ the socket into fd3, so as to not mistakenly leak other fd forward
+ accidentally. ok djm
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 9bd10437026423eb8245636ad34797a20fbafd7d
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 24cc753f5aa2c6a7d0fbf62766adbc75cd785296
-commit 04c091fc199f17dacf8921df0a06634b454e2722
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Sat Jan 19 21:43:56 2019 +0000
+commit db7606d4a62fee67b0cb2f32dfcbd7b3642bfef5
+Author: schwarze@openbsd.org <schwarze@openbsd.org>
+Date: Tue May 14 12:47:17 2019 +0000
- upstream: remove last references to active_state
+ upstream: Delete some .Sx macros that were used in a wrong way.
- with & ok markus@
+ Part of a patch from Stephen Gregoratto <dev at sgregoratto dot me>.
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 78619a50ea7e4ca2f3b54d4658b3227277490ba2
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 15501ed13c595f135e7610b1a5d8345ccdb513b7
-commit ec00f918b8ad90295044266c433340a8adc93452
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Sat Jan 19 21:43:07 2019 +0000
+commit cb4accb1233865d9151f8a50cc5f0c61a3fd4077
+Author: florian@openbsd.org <florian@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri May 10 18:55:17 2019 +0000
- upstream: convert monitor.c to new packet API
+ upstream: For PermitOpen violations add the remote host and port to
- with & ok markus@
+ be able to find out from where the request was comming.
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 61ecd154bd9804461a0cf5f495a29d919e0014d5
-
-commit 6350e0316981489d4205952d6904d6fedba5bfe0
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Sat Jan 19 21:42:30 2019 +0000
-
- upstream: convert sshd.c to new packet API
+ Add the same logging for PermitListen violations which where not
+ logged at all.
- with & ok markus@
+ Pointed out by Robert Kisteleki (robert AT ripe.net)
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: ea569d3eaf9b5cf1bad52779fbfa5fa0b28af891
+ input markus
+ OK deraadt
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 8a7d0f1b7175504c0d1dca8d9aca1588b66448c8
-commit a5e2ad88acff2b7d131ee6d5dc5d339b0f8c6a6d
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Sat Jan 19 21:41:53 2019 +0000
+commit cd16aceec148d55088fc8df6be88335578d85258
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Thu May 16 07:53:20 2019 +1000
- upstream: convert session.c to new packet API
-
- with & ok markus@
+ Add OpenSSL 1.1.1 to the supported list.
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: fae817207e23099ddd248960c984f7b7f26ea68e
+ Clarify the language around prngd and egd.
-commit 3a00a921590d4c4b7e96df11bb10e6f9253ad45e
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Sat Jan 19 21:41:18 2019 +0000
+commit 6fd4aa2aafbce90acb11a328ca0aa0696cb01c6b
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Wed May 15 16:19:14 2019 +1000
- upstream: convert auth.c to new packet API
-
- with & ok markus@
-
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 7e10359f614ff522b52a3f05eec576257794e8e4
+ Fix typo in man page formatter selector.
-commit 7ec5cb4d15ed2f2c5c9f5d00e6b361d136fc1e2d
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Sat Jan 19 21:40:48 2019 +0000
+commit 285546b73e2c172565c992a695927ac8cf3b4cc6
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Fri May 10 15:04:42 2019 +1000
- upstream: convert serverloop.c to new packet API
-
- with & ok markus@
+ Use "doc" man page format if mandoc present.
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: c92dd19b55457541478f95c0d6b318426d86d885
+ Previously configure would not select the "doc" man page format if
+ mandoc was present but nroff was not. This checks for mandoc first
+ and removes a now-superflous AC_PATH_PROG. Based on a patch from
+ vehk at vehk.de and feedback from schwarze at usta.de.
-commit 64c9598ac05332d1327cbf55334dee4172d216c4
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Sat Jan 19 21:40:21 2019 +0000
+commit 62dd70613b77b229f53db3cc1c3e8a206fa2b582
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri May 3 06:06:30 2019 +0000
- upstream: convert the remainder of sshconnect2.c to new packet
-
- API
+ upstream: Use the correct (according to POSIX) format for
- with & ok markus@
+ left-justification in snmprintf. bz#3002, patch from velemas at gmail.com, ok
+ markus@.
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 0986d324f2ceb5e8a12ac21c1bb10b3b4b1e0f71
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 65d252b799be0cc8f68b6c47cece0a57bb00fea7
-commit bc5e1169d101d16e3a5962a928db2bc49a8ef5a3
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Sat Jan 19 21:39:12 2019 +0000
+commit 62be1ffe5ffc68cfaac183320503c00a8c72e0b1
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri May 3 04:11:00 2019 +0000
- upstream: convert the remainder of clientloop.c to new packet API
-
- with & ok markus@
+ upstream: Free channel objects on exit path. Patch from markus at
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: ce2fbbacb86a290f31da1e7bf04cddf2bdae3d1e
-
-commit 5ebce136a6105f084db8f0d7ee41981d42daec40
-Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
-Date: Sun Jan 20 09:44:53 2019 +1100
-
- upstream: convert auth2.c to new packet API
+ blueflash.cc, ok deraadt
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: ed831bb95ad228c6791bc18b60ce7a2edef2c999
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: dbe4db381603909482211ffdd2b48abd72169117
-commit 172a592a53ebe8649c4ac0d7946e6c08eb151af6
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Sat Jan 19 21:37:48 2019 +0000
+commit 1c554a5d94b9de6bd5374e2992a5662746cc39ba
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri May 3 03:27:38 2019 +0000
- upstream: convert servconf.c to new packet API
+ upstream: Free host on exit path. Patch from markus at
- with & ok markus@
+ blueflash.cc, ok djm@
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 126553aecca302c9e02fd77e333b9cb217e623b4
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: c54e9945d93c4ce28350d8b9fa8b71f744ef2b5a
-commit 8cc7a679d29cf6ecccfa08191e688c7f81ef95c2
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Sat Jan 19 21:37:13 2019 +0000
+commit 99043bd64e5e0f427173f4fa83ef25a4676624a3
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri May 3 03:25:18 2019 +0000
- upstream: convert channels.c to new packet API
+ upstream: Wrap XMSS including in ifdef. Patch from markus at
- with & ok markus@
+ blueflash.cc, ok djm
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 0b8279b56113cbd4011fc91315c0796b63dc862c
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: e3b34fc35cf12d33bde91ac03633210a3bc0f8b5
-commit 06232038c794c7dfcb087be0ab0b3e65b09fd396
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Sat Jan 19 21:36:38 2019 +0000
+commit 8fcfb7789c43a19d24162a7a4055cd09ee951b34
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Apr 26 08:37:17 2019 +0000
- upstream: convert sshconnect.c to new packet API
-
- with & ok markus@
+ upstream: Import regenerated moduli.
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 222337cf6c96c347f1022d976fac74b4257c061f
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: db6375fc302e3bdf07d96430c63c991b2c2bd3ff
-commit 25b2ed667216314471bb66752442c55b95792dc3
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Sat Jan 19 21:36:06 2019 +0000
+commit 3a7db919d5dd09f797971b3cf8ee301767459774
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date: Tue Apr 23 11:56:41 2019 +0000
- upstream: convert ssh.c to new packet API
-
- with & ok markus@
+ upstream: Use the LogLevel typdef instead of int where appropriate. Patch from Markus Schmidt via openssh-unix-dev, ok markus@
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: eb146878b24e85c2a09ee171afa6797c166a2e21
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 4c0f0f458e3da7807806b35e3eb5c1e8403c968a
-commit e3128b38623eef2fa8d6e7ae934d3bd08c7e973e
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Sat Jan 19 21:35:25 2019 +0000
+commit d7c6e38b87efab1f140745fd8b1106b82e6e4a68
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Apr 19 05:47:44 2019 +0000
- upstream: convert mux.c to new packet API
+ upstream: Document new default RSA key size. From
- with & ok markus@
+ sebastiaanlokhorst at gmail.com via bz#2997.
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 4e3893937bae66416e984b282d8f0f800aafd802
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: bdd62ff5d4d649d2147904e91bf7cefa82fe11e1
-commit ed1df7226caf3a943a36d580d4d4e9275f8a61ee
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Sat Jan 19 21:34:45 2019 +0000
+commit e826bbcafe26dac349a8593da5569e82faa45ab8
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date: Thu Apr 18 18:56:16 2019 +0000
- upstream: convert sshconnect2.c to new packet API
+ upstream: When running sshd -T, assume any attibute not provided by
- with & ok markus@
+ -C does not match, which allows it to work when sshd_config contains a Match
+ directive with or without -C. bz#2858, ok djm@
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 1cb869e0d6e03539f943235641ea070cae2ebc58
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 1a701f0a33e3bc96753cfda2fe0b0378520b82eb
-commit 23f22a4aaa923c61ec49a99ebaa383656e87fa40
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Sat Jan 19 21:33:57 2019 +0000
+commit 5696512d7ad57e85e89f8011ce8dec617be686aa
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date: Thu Apr 18 07:32:56 2019 +0000
- upstream: convert clientloop.c to new packet API
+ upstream: Remove crc32.{c,h} which were only used by the now-gone
- with & ok markus@
+ SSH1 protocol. Patch from yumkam at gmail.com, ok deraadt.
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 497b36500191f452a22abf283aa8d4a9abaee7fa
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: cceda5876c5ba6b4d8abcd52335329198cee3240
-commit ad60b1179c9682ca5aef0b346f99ef68cbbbc4e5
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Sat Jan 19 21:33:13 2019 +0000
+commit 34e87fb5d9ce607f5701ab4c31d837ad8133e2d1
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Tue Apr 30 12:27:57 2019 +1000
- upstream: allow sshpkt_fatal() to take a varargs format; we'll
-
- use this to give packet-related fatal error messages more context (esp. the
- remote endpoint) ok markus@
-
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: de57211f9543426b515a8a10a4f481666b2b2a50
+ Remove unused variables from RLIMIT_NOFILE test.
-commit 0fa174ebe129f3d0aeaf4e2d1dd8de745870d0ff
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Sat Jan 19 21:31:32 2019 +0000
+commit 35e82e62c1ef53cfa457473a4c4d957d6197371a
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Fri Apr 26 18:38:27 2019 +1000
- upstream: begin landing remaining refactoring of packet parsing
-
- API, started almost exactly six years ago.
-
- This change stops including the old packet_* API by default and makes
- each file that requires the old API include it explicitly. We will
- commit file-by-file refactoring to remove the old API in consistent
- steps.
-
- with & ok markus@
-
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 93c98a6b38f6911fd1ae025a1ec57807fb4d4ef4
+ Import regenerated moduli.
-commit 4ae7f80dfd02f2bde912a67c9f338f61e90fa79f
-Author: tb@openbsd.org <tb@openbsd.org>
-Date: Sat Jan 19 04:15:56 2019 +0000
+commit 5590f53f99219e95dc23b0ebd220f19a6f46b101
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Fri Apr 26 18:22:10 2019 +1000
- upstream: Print an \r in front of the password prompt so parts of
-
- a password that was entered too early are likely clobbered by the prompt.
- Idea from doas.
-
- from and ok djm
- "i like it" deraadt
+ Whitespace resync w/OpenBSD.
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 5fb97c68df6d8b09ab37f77bca1d84d799c4084e
+ Patch from markus at blueflash.cc via openssh-unix-dev.
-commit a6258e5dc314c7d504ac9f0fbc3be96475581dbe
+commit b7b8334914fb9397a6725f3b5d2de999b0bb69ac
Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Fri Jan 18 11:09:01 2019 +1100
+Date: Fri Apr 26 18:06:34 2019 +1000
- Add minimal fchownat and fchmodat implementations.
+ Don't install duplicate STREAMS modules on Solaris
- Fixes builds on at least OS X Lion, NetBSD 6 and Solaris 10.
+ Check if STREAMS modules are already installed on pty before installing
+ since when compiling with XPG>=4 they will likely be installed already.
+ Prevents hangs and duplicate lines on the terminal. bz#2945 and bz#2998,
+ patch from djm@
-commit 091093d25802b87d3b2b09f2c88d9f33e1ae5562
-Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Fri Jan 18 12:11:42 2019 +1300
+commit fd0fa130ecf06d7d092932adcd5d77f1549bfc8d
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date: Thu Apr 18 08:52:57 2019 +1000
- Add a minimal implementation of utimensat().
-
- Some systems (eg older OS X) do not have utimensat, so provide minimal
- implementation in compat layer. Fixes build on at least El Capitan.
+ makedepend
-commit 609644027dde1f82213699cb6599e584c7efcb75
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Tue Jan 1 22:20:16 2019 +0000
+commit 5de397a876b587ba05a9169237deffdc71f273b0
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date: Fri Apr 5 11:29:51 2019 -0700
- upstream: regress bits for banner processing refactor (this test was
+ second thoughts: leave README in place
- depending on ssh returning a particular error message for banner parsing
- failure)
+ A number of contrib/* files refer to the existing README so let's leave
+ it in place for release and add the new markdown version in parallel.
- reminded by bluhm@
+ I'll get rid of README after release.
+
+commit 5d3127d9274519b25ed10e320f45045ba8d7f3be
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date: Fri Apr 5 11:29:31 2019 -0700
+
+ Revert "rewrite README"
- OpenBSD-Regress-ID: f24fc303d40931157431df589b386abf5e1be575
+ This reverts commit 9444d82678cb7781820da4d1c23b3c2b9fb1e12f.
-commit f47d72ddad75b93d3cbc781718b0fa9046c03df8
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Thu Jan 17 04:45:09 2019 +0000
+commit 9444d82678cb7781820da4d1c23b3c2b9fb1e12f
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date: Fri Apr 5 11:21:48 2019 -0700
- upstream: tun_fwd_ifnames variable should b
+ rewrite README
- =?UTF-8?q?e=20extern;=20from=20Hanno=20B=C3=B6ck?=
- MIME-Version: 1.0
- Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
- Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
+ Include basic build instructions and comments on commonly-used build-
+ time flags, links to the manual pages and other resources.
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: d53dede6e521161bf04d39d09947db6253a38271
+ Now in Markdown format for better viewing on github, etc.
-commit 943d0965263cae1c080ce5a9d0b5aa341885e55d
+commit a924de0c4908902433813ba205bee1446bd1a157
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date: Fri Apr 5 03:41:52 2019 +1100
+
+ update versions
+
+commit 312dcee739bca5d6878c536537b2a8a497314b75
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Thu Jan 17 04:20:53 2019 +0000
+Date: Wed Apr 3 15:48:45 2019 +0000
- upstream: include time.h for time(3)/nanosleep(2); from Ian
+ upstream: openssh-8.0
- McKellar
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 5aafdf218679dab982fea20771afd643be9a127b
+
+commit 885bc114692046d55e2a170b932bdc0092fa3456
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date: Thu Apr 4 02:47:40 2019 +1100
+
+ session: Do not use removed API
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 6412ccd06a88f65b207a1089345f51fa1244ea51
+ from Jakub Jelen
-commit dbb4dec6d5d671b5e9d67ef02162a610ad052068
+commit 9d7b2882b0c9a5e9bf8312ce4075bf178e2b98be
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Thu Jan 17 01:50:24 2019 +0000
+Date: Fri Mar 29 11:31:40 2019 +0000
- upstream: many of the global variables in this file can be made static;
+ upstream: when logging/fataling on error, include a bit more detail
- patch from Markus Schmidt
+ than just the function name and the error message
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: f3db619f67beb53257b21bac0e92b4fb7d5d5737
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: dd72d7eba2215fcb89be516c378f633ea5bcca9f
-commit 60d8c84e0887514c99c9ce071965fafaa1c3d34a
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Wed Jan 16 23:23:45 2019 +0000
+commit 79a87d32783d6c9db40af8f35e091d9d30365ae7
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Wed Apr 3 06:27:45 2019 +1100
- upstream: Add "-h" flag to sftp chown/chgrp/chmod commands to
-
- request they do not follow symlinks. Requires recently-committed
- lsetstat@openssh.com extension on the server side.
-
- ok markus@ dtucker@
+ Remove "struct ssh" from sys_auth_record_login.
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: f93bb3f6f7eb2fb7ef1e59126e72714f1626d604
+ It's not needed, and is not available from the call site in loginrec.c
+ Should only affect AIX, spotted by Kevin Brott.
-commit dbbc7e0eab7262f34b8e0cd6efecd1c77b905ed0
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Wed Jan 16 23:22:10 2019 +0000
+commit 138c0d52cdc90f9895333b82fc57d81cce7a3d90
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Tue Apr 2 18:21:35 2019 +1100
- upstream: add support for a "lsetstat@openssh.com" extension. This
-
- replicates the functionality of the existing SSH2_FXP_SETSTAT operation but
- does not follow symlinks. Based on a patch from Bert Haverkamp in bz#2067 but
- with more attribute modifications supported.
-
- ok markus@ dtucker@
+ Adapt custom_failed_login to new prototype.
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: f7234f6e90db19655d55d936a115ee4ccb6aaf80
+ Spotted by Kevin Brott.
-commit 4a526941d328fc3d97068c6a4cbd9b71b70fe5e1
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Jan 4 03:27:50 2019 +0000
+commit a0ca4009ab2f0b1007ec8ab6864dbf9b760a8ed5
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Mon Apr 1 20:07:23 2019 +1100
- upstream: eliminate function-static attempt counters for
-
- passwd/kbdint authmethods by moving them to the client authctxt; Patch from
- Markus Schmidt, ok markus@
+ Add includes.h for compat layer.
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 4df4404a5d5416eb056f68e0e2f4fa91ba3b3f7f
+ Should fix build on AIX 7.2.
-commit 8a8183474c41bd6cebaa917346b549af2239ba2f
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Jan 4 03:23:00 2019 +0000
+commit 00991151786ce9b1d577bdad1f83a81d19c8236d
+Author: Tim Rice <tim@multitalents.net>
+Date: Sun Mar 31 22:14:22 2019 -0700
- upstream: fix memory leak of ciphercontext when rekeying; bz#2942
+ Stop USL compilers for erroring with "integral constant expression expected"
+
+commit 43f47ebbdd4037b569c23b8f4f7981f53b567f1d
+Author: Tim Rice <tim@multitalents.net>
+Date: Sun Mar 31 19:22:19 2019 -0700
+
+ Only use O_NOFOLLOW in fchownat and fchmodat if defined
+
+commit 342d6e51589b184c337cccfc4c788b60ff8b3765
+Author: Jakub Jelen <jjelen@redhat.com>
+Date: Fri Mar 29 12:29:41 2019 +0100
+
+ Adjust softhsm2 path on Fedora Linux for regress
- Patch from Markus Schmidt; ok markus@
+ The SoftHSM lives in Fedora in /usr/lib64/pkcs11/libsofthsm2.so
+
+commit f5abb05f8c7358dacdcb866fe2813f6d8efd5830
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Thu Mar 28 09:26:14 2019 +1100
+
+ Only use O_NOFOLLOW in utimensat if defined.
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 7877f1b82e249986f1ef98d0ae76ce987d332bdd
+ Fixes build on systems that don't have it (Solaris <=9) Found by
+ Tom G. Christensen.
-commit 5bed70afce0907b6217418d0655724c99b683d93
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Tue Jan 1 23:10:53 2019 +0000
+commit 786cd4c1837fdc3fe7b4befe54a3f37db7df8715
+Author: Corinna Vinschen <vinschen@redhat.com>
+Date: Wed Mar 27 18:18:21 2019 +0100
- upstream: static on global vars, const on handler tables that contain
+ drop old Cygwin considerations
- function pointers; from Mike Frysinger
+ - Cygwin supports non-DOS characters in filenames
+ - Cygwin does not support Windows XP anymore
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 7ef2305e50d3caa6326286db43cf2cfaf03960e0
+ Signed-off-by: Corinna Vinschen <vinschen@redhat.com>
-commit 007a88b48c97d092ed2f501bbdcb70d9925277be
+commit 21da87f439b48a85b951ef1518fe85ac0273e719
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Thu Dec 27 23:02:11 2018 +0000
+Date: Wed Mar 27 09:29:14 2019 +0000
- upstream: Request RSA-SHA2 signatures for
+ upstream: fix interaction between ClientAliveInterval and RekeyLimit
- rsa-sha2-{256|512}-cert-v01@openssh.com cert algorithms; ok markus@
+ that could cause connection to close incorrectly; Report and patch from Jakub
+ Jelen in bz#2757; ok dtucker@ markus@
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: afc6f7ca216ccd821656d1c911d2a3deed685033
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 17229a8a65bd8e6c2080318ec2b7a61e1aede3fb
-commit eb347d086c35428c47fe52b34588cbbc9b49d9a6
+commit 4f0019a9afdb4a94d83b75e82dbbbe0cbe826c56
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Thu Dec 27 03:37:49 2018 +0000
+Date: Mon Mar 25 22:34:52 2019 +0000
- upstream: ssh_packet_set_state() now frees ssh->kex implicitly, so
+ upstream: Fix authentication failures when "AuthenticationMethods
- don't do explicit kex_free() beforehand
+ any" in a Match block overrides a more restrictive global default.
- OpenBSD-Regress-ID: f2f73bad47f62a2040ccba0a72cadcb12eda49cf
-
-commit bb542f0cf6f7511a22a08c492861e256a82376a9
-Author: tedu@openbsd.org <tedu@openbsd.org>
-Date: Sat Dec 15 00:50:21 2018 +0000
-
- upstream: remove unused and problematic sudo clean. ok espie
+ Spotted by jmc@, ok markus@
- OpenBSD-Regress-ID: ca90c20a15a85b661e13e98b80c10e65cd662f7b
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: a90a4fe2ab81d0eeeb8fdfc21af81f7eabda6666
-commit 0a843d9a0e805f14653a555f5c7a8ba99d62c12d
+commit d6e5def308610f194c0ec3ef97a34a3e9630e190
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Thu Dec 27 03:25:24 2018 +0000
+Date: Mon Mar 25 22:33:44 2019 +0000
- upstream: move client/server SSH-* banners to buffers under
-
- ssh->kex and factor out the banner exchange. This eliminates some common code
- from the client and server.
-
- Also be more strict about handling \r characters - these should only
- be accepted immediately before \n (pointed out by Jann Horn).
-
- Inspired by a patch from Markus Schmidt.
- (lots of) feedback and ok markus@
+ upstream: whitespace
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 1cc7885487a6754f63641d7d3279b0941890275b
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 106e853ae8a477e8385bc53824d3884a8159db07
-commit 434b587afe41c19391821e7392005068fda76248
+commit 26e0cef07b04479537c971dec898741df1290fe5
Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Dec 7 04:36:09 2018 +0000
+Date: Mon Mar 25 16:19:44 2019 +0000
- upstream: Fix calculation of initial bandwidth limits. Account for
+ upstream: Expand comment to document rationale for default key
- written bytes before the initial timer check so that the first buffer written
- is accounted. Set the threshold after which the timer is checked such that
- the limit starts being computed as soon as possible, ie after the second
- buffer is written. This prevents an initial burst of traffic and provides a
- more accurate bandwidth limit. bz#2927, ok djm.
+ sizes. "seems worthwhile" deraadt.
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: ff3ef76e4e43040ec198c2718d5682c36b255cb6
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 72e5c0983d7da1fb72f191870f36cb58263a2456
-commit a6a0788cbbe8dfce2819ee43b09c80725742e21c
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Dec 7 03:39:40 2018 +0000
+commit f47269ea67eb4ff87454bf0d2a03e55532786482
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date: Mon Mar 25 15:49:00 2019 +0000
- upstream: only consider the ext-info-c extension during the initial
-
- KEX. It shouldn't be sent in subsequent ones, but if it is present we should
- ignore it.
+ upstream: Increase the default RSA key size to 3072 bits. Based on
- This prevents sshd from sending a SSH_MSG_EXT_INFO for REKEX for buggy
- these clients. Reported by Jakub Jelen via bz2929; ok dtucker@
+ the estimates from NIST Special Publication 800-57, 3k bits provides security
+ equivalent to 128 bits which is the smallest symmetric cipher we enable by
+ default. ok markus@ deraadt@
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 91564118547f7807030ec537480303e2371902f9
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 461dd32ebe808f88f4fc3ec74749b0e6bef2276b
-commit 63bba57a32c5bb6158d57cf4c47022daf89c14a0
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Dec 7 03:33:18 2018 +0000
+commit 62949c5b37af28d8490d94866e314a76be683a5e
+Author: jmc@openbsd.org <jmc@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Mar 22 20:58:34 2019 +0000
- upstream: fix option letter pasto in previous
+ upstream: full stop in the wrong place;
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: e26c8bf2f2a808f3c47960e1e490d2990167ec39
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 478a0567c83553a2aebf95d0f1bd67ac1b1253e4
-commit 737e4edd82406595815efadc28ed5161b8b0c01a
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Dec 7 03:32:26 2018 +0000
+commit 1b1332b5bb975d759a50b37f0e8bc8cfb07a0bb0
+Author: jmc@openbsd.org <jmc@openbsd.org>
+Date: Sat Mar 16 19:14:21 2019 +0000
- upstream: mention that the ssh-keygen -F (find host in
-
- authorized_keys) and -R (remove host from authorized_keys) options may accept
- either a bare hostname or a [hostname]:port combo. bz#2935
+ upstream: benno helped me clean up the tcp forwarding section;
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 5535cf4ce78375968b0d2cd7aa316fa3eb176780
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: d4bec27edefde636fb632b7f0b7c656b9c7b7f08
-commit 8a22ffaa13391cfe5b40316d938fe0fb931e9296
-Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
-Date: Fri Dec 7 15:41:16 2018 +1100
+commit 2aee9a49f668092ac5c9d34e904ef7a9722e541d
+Author: markus@openbsd.org <markus@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Mar 8 17:24:43 2019 +0000
- expose $SSH_CONNECTION in the PAM environment
+ upstream: fix use-after-free in ssh-pkcs11; found by hshoexer w/AFL
- This makes the connection 4-tuple available to PAM modules that
- wish to use it in decision-making. bz#2741
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: febce81cca72b71f70513fbee4ff52ca050f675c
-commit a784fa8c7a7b084d63bae82ccfea902131bb45c5
-Author: Kevin Adler <kadler@us.ibm.com>
-Date: Wed Dec 12 22:12:45 2018 -0600
+commit 9edbd7821e6837e98e7e95546cede804dac96754
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Thu Mar 14 10:17:28 2019 +1100
- Don't pass loginmsg by address now that it's an sshbuf*
-
- In 120a1ec74, loginmsg was changed from the legacy Buffer type
- to struct sshbuf*, but it missed changing calls to
- sys_auth_allowed_user and sys_auth_record_login which passed
- loginmsg by address. Now that it's a pointer, just pass it directly.
+ Fix build when configured --without-openssl.
- This only affects AIX, unless there are out of tree users.
+ ok djm@
-commit 285310b897969a63ef224d39e7cc2b7316d86940
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Dec 7 02:31:20 2018 +0000
+commit 825ab32f0d04a791e9d19d743c61ff8ed9b4d8e5
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Thu Mar 14 08:51:17 2019 +1100
- upstream: no need to allocate channels_pre/channels_post in
+ On Cygwin run sshd as SYSTEM where possible.
- channel_init_channels() as we do it anyway in channel_handler_init() that we
- call at the end of the function. Fix from Markus Schmidt via bz#2938
+ Seteuid now creates user token using S4U. We don't create a token
+ from scratch anymore, so we don't need the "Create a process token"
+ privilege. The service can run under SYSTEM again...
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 74893638af49e3734f1e33a54af1b7ea533373ed
-
-commit 87d6cf1cbc91df6815db8fe0acc7c910bc3d18e4
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Nov 30 02:24:52 2018 +0000
-
- upstream: don't attempt to connect to empty SSH_AUTH_SOCK; bz#293
+ ...unless Cygwin is running on Windows Vista or Windows 7 in the
+ WOW64 32 bit emulation layer. It turns out that WOW64 on these systems
+ didn't implement MsV1_0 S4U Logon so we still need the fallback
+ to NtCreateToken for these systems.
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 0e8fc8f19f14b21adef7109e0faa583d87c0e929
+ Signed-off-by: Corinna Vinschen <vinschen@redhat.com>
-commit 91b19198c3f604f5eef2c56dbe36f29478243141
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Wed Nov 28 06:00:38 2018 +0000
+commit a212107bfdf4d3e870ab7a443e4d906e5b9578c3
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Wed Mar 13 10:49:16 2019 +1100
- upstream: don't truncate user or host name in "user@host's
+ Replace alloca with xcalloc.
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: e6ca01a8d58004b7f2cac0b1b7ce8f87e425e360
-
-commit dd0cf6318d9b4b3533bda1e3bc021b2cd7246b7a
-Author: jmc@openbsd.org <jmc@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Nov 23 06:58:28 2018 +0000
-
- upstream: tweak previous;
-
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 08f096922eb00c98251501c193ff9e83fbb5de4f
-
-commit 8a85f5458d1c802471ca899c97f89946f6666e61
-Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Sun Nov 25 21:44:05 2018 +1100
-
- Include stdio.h for FILE if needed.
+ The latter checks for memory exhaustion and integer overflow and may be
+ at a less predictable place. Sanity check by vinschen at redhat.com, ok
+ djm@
-commit 16fb23f25454991272bfe4598cc05d20fcd25116
+commit daa7505aadca68ba1a2c70cbdfce423208eb91ee
Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Sun Nov 25 14:05:57 2018 +1100
+Date: Tue Mar 12 09:19:19 2019 +1100
- Reverse order of OpenSSL init functions.
+ Use Cygwin-specific matching only for users+groups.
- Try the new init function (OPENSSL_init_crypto) before falling back to
- the old one (OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms).
+ Patch from vinschen at redhat.com, updated a little by me.
-commit 98f878d2272bf8dff21f2a0265d963c29e33fed2
-Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Sun Nov 25 14:05:08 2018 +1100
+commit fd10cf027b56f9aaa80c9e3844626a05066589a4
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date: Wed Mar 6 22:14:23 2019 +0000
- Improve OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms check.
+ upstream: Move checks for lists of users or groups into their own
- OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms() may be a macro so check for that too.
+ function. This is a no-op on OpenBSD but will make things easier in
+ -portable, eg on systems where these checks should be case-insensitive. ok
+ djm@
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 8bc9c8d98670e23f8eaaaefe29c1f98e7ba0487e
-commit 9e34e0c59ab04514f9de9934a772283f7f372afe
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Nov 23 05:08:07 2018 +0000
+commit ab5fee8eb6a011002fd9e32b1597f02aa8804a25
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date: Wed Mar 6 21:06:59 2019 +0000
- upstream: add a ssh_config "Match final" predicate
+ upstream: Reset last-seen time when sending a keepalive. Prevents
- Matches in same pass as "Match canonical" but doesn't require
- hostname canonicalisation be enabled. bz#2906 ok markus
+ sending two keepalives successively and prematurely terminating connection
+ when ClientAliveCount=1. While there, collapse two similar tests into one.
+ ok markus@
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: fba1dfe9f6e0cabcd0e2b3be13f7a434199beffa
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 043670d201dfe222537a2a4bed16ce1087de5ddd
-commit 4da58d58736b065b1182b563d10ad6765d811c6d
-Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Nov 23 02:53:57 2018 +0000
+commit c13b74530f9f1d9df7aeae012004b31b2de4438e
+Author: naddy@openbsd.org <naddy@openbsd.org>
+Date: Tue Mar 5 16:17:12 2019 +0000
- upstream: Remove now-unneeded ifdef SIGINFO around handler since it is
+ upstream: PKCS#11 support is no longer limited to RSA; ok benno@
- now always used for SIGUSR1 even when SIGINFO is not defined. This will make
- things simpler in -portable.
+ kn@
- OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 4ff0265b335820b0646d37beb93f036ded0dc43f
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 1a9bec64d530aed5f434a960e7515a3e80cbc826
-commit c721d5877509875c8515df0215fa1dab862013bc
-Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Fri Nov 23 14:11:20 2018 +1100
+commit e9552d6043db7cd170ac6ba1b4d2c7a5eb2c3201
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Mar 1 03:29:32 2019 +0000
- Move RANDOM_SEED_SIZE outside ifdef.
+ upstream: in ssh_set_newkeys(), mention the direction that we're
- RANDOM_SEED_SIZE is used by both the OpenSSL and non-OpenSSL code
- This fixes the build with configureed --without-openssl.
+ keying in debug messages. Previously it would be difficult to tell which
+ direction it was talking about
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: c2b71bfcceb2a7389b9d0b497fb2122a406a522d
-commit deb51552c3ce7ce72c8d0232e4f36f2e7c118c7d
-Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Thu Nov 22 19:59:28 2018 +1100
+commit 76a24b3fa193a9ca3e47a8779d497cb06500798b
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Mar 1 02:32:39 2019 +0000
- Resync with OpenBSD by pulling in an ifdef SIGINFO.
+ upstream: Fix two race conditions in sshd relating to SIGHUP:
+
+ 1. Recently-forked child processes will briefly remain listening to
+ listen_socks. If the main server sshd process completes its restart
+ via execv() before these sockets are closed by the child processes
+ then it can fail to listen at the desired addresses/ports and/or
+ fail to restart.
+
+ 2. When a SIGHUP is received, there may be forked child processes that
+ are awaiting their reexecution state. If the main server sshd
+ process restarts before passing this state, these child processes
+ will yield errors and use a fallback path of reading the current
+ sshd_config from the filesystem rather than use the one that sshd
+ was started with.
+
+ To fix both of these cases, we reuse the startup_pipes that are shared
+ between the main server sshd and forked children. Previously this was
+ used solely to implement tracking of pre-auth child processes for
+ MaxStartups, but this extends the messaging over these pipes to include
+ a child->parent message that the parent process is safe to restart. This
+ message is sent from the child after it has completed its preliminaries:
+ closing listen_socks and receiving its reexec state.
+
+ bz#2953, reported by Michal Koutný; ok markus@ dtucker@
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 7df09eacfa3ce13e9a7b1e9f17276ecc924d65ab
-commit 28c7b2cd050f4416bfcf3869a20e3ea138aa52fe
-Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
-Date: Fri Nov 23 10:45:20 2018 +1100
+commit de817e9dfab99473017d28cdf69e60397d00ea21
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Mar 1 02:16:47 2019 +0000
- fix configure test for OpenSSL version
+ upstream: mention PKCS11Provide=none, reword a little and remove
- square brackets in case statements may be eaten by autoconf.
+ mention of RSA keys only (since we support ECDSA now and might support others
+ in the future). Inspired by Jakub Jelen via bz#2974
- Report and fix from Filipp Gunbin; tweaked by naddy@
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: a92e3686561bf624ccc64ab320c96c9e9a263aa5
-commit 42c5ec4b97b6a1bae70f323952d0646af16ce710
-Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
-Date: Fri Nov 23 10:40:06 2018 +1100
+commit 95a8058c1a90a27acbb91392ba206854abc85226
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Mar 1 02:08:50 2019 +0000
- refactor libcrypto initialisation
+ upstream: let PKCS11Provider=none do what users expect
- Don't call OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms() unless OpenSSL actually
- supports it.
+ print PKCS11Provider instead of obsolete SmartcardDevice in config dump.
- Move all libcrypto initialisation to a single function, and call that
- from seed_rng() that is called early in each tool's main().
+ bz#2974 ok dtucker@
- Prompted by patch from Rosen Penev
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: c303d6f0230a33aa2dd92dc9b68843d56a64f846
-commit 5b60b6c02009547a3e2a99d4886965de2a4719da
-Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
-Date: Thu Nov 22 08:59:11 2018 +0000
+commit 8e7bac35aa576d2fd7560836da83733e864ce649
+Author: markus@openbsd.org <markus@openbsd.org>
+Date: Wed Feb 27 19:37:01 2019 +0000
- upstream: Output info on SIGUSR1 as well as
+ upstream: dup stdout/in for proxycommand=-, otherwise stdout might
- SIGINFO to resync with portable. (ID sync only).
+ be redirected to /dev/null; ok djm@
- OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 699d153e2de22dce51a1b270c40a98472d1a1b16
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 97dfce4c47ed4055042de8ebde85b7d88793e595
-commit e4ae345dc75b34fd870c2e8690d831d2c1088eb7
-Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
-Date: Thu Nov 22 08:48:32 2018 +0000
+commit 9b61130fbd95d196bce81ebeca94a4cb7c0d5ba0
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Sat Feb 23 08:20:43 2019 +0000
- upstream: Append pid to temp files in /var/run and set a cleanup
+ upstream: openssh-7.9 accidentally reused the server's algorithm lists
- trap for them. This allows multiple instances of tests to run without
- colliding.
+ in the client for KEX, ciphers and MACs. The ciphers and MACs were identical
+ between the client and server, but the error accidentially disabled the
+ diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha1 KEX method.
- OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 57add105ecdfc54752d8003acdd99eb68c3e0b4c
+ This fixes the client code to use the correct method list, but
+ because nobody complained, it also disables the
+ diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha1 KEX method.
+
+ Reported by nuxi AT vault24.org via bz#2697; ok dtucker
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: e30c33a23c10fd536fefa120e86af1842e33fd57
-commit f72d0f52effca5aa20a193217346615ecd3eed53
-Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
-Date: Wed Oct 31 11:09:27 2018 +0000
+commit 37638c752041d591371900df820f070037878a2d
+Author: Corinna Vinschen <vinschen@redhat.com>
+Date: Wed Feb 20 13:41:25 2019 +0100
- upstream: UsePrivilegeSeparation no is deprecated
+ Cygwin: implement case-insensitive Unicode user and group name matching
- test "yes" and "sandbox".
+ The previous revert enabled case-insensitive user names again. This
+ patch implements the case-insensitive user and group name matching.
+ To allow Unicode chars, implement the matcher using wchar_t chars in
+ Cygwin-specific code. Keep the generic code changes as small as possible.
+ Cygwin: implement case-insensitive Unicode user and group name matching
- OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 80e685ed8990766527dc629b1affc09a75bfe2da
+ Signed-off-by: Corinna Vinschen <vinschen@redhat.com>
-commit 35d0e5fefc419bddcbe09d7fc163d8cd3417125b
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Wed Oct 17 23:28:05 2018 +0000
+commit bed1d43698807a07bb4ddb93a46b0bd84b9970b3
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Fri Feb 22 15:21:21 2019 +1100
- upstream: add some knobs:
-
- UNITTEST_FAST?= no # Skip slow tests (e.g. less intensive fuzzing).
- UNITTEST_SLOW?= no # Include slower tests (e.g. more intensive fuzzing).
- UNITTEST_VERBOSE?= no # Verbose test output (inc. per-test names).
+ Revert unintended parts of previous commit.
+
+commit f02afa350afac1b2f2d1413259a27a4ba1e2ca24
+Author: Corinna Vinschen <vinschen@redhat.com>
+Date: Wed Feb 20 13:41:24 2019 +0100
+
+ Revert "[auth.c] On Cygwin, refuse usernames that have differences in case"
- useful if you want to run the tests as a smoke test to exercise the
- functionality without waiting for all the fuzzers to run.
+ This reverts commit acc9b29486dfd649dfda474e5c1a03b317449f1c.
- OpenBSD-Regress-ID: e04d82ebec86068198cd903acf1c67563c57315e
+ Signed-off-by: Corinna Vinschen <vinschen@redhat.com>
-commit c1941293d9422a14dda372b4c21895e72aa7a063
-Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Thu Nov 22 15:52:26 2018 +1100
+commit 4c55b674835478eb80a1a7aeae588aa654e2a433
+Author: Corinna Vinschen <vinschen@redhat.com>
+Date: Sat Feb 16 14:13:43 2019 +0100
- Resync Makefile.inc with upstream.
+ Add tags to .gitignore
- It's unused in -portable, but having it out of sync makes other syncs
- fail to apply.
+ Signed-off-by: Corinna Vinschen <vinschen@redhat.com>
-commit 928f1231f65f88cd4c73e6e0edd63d2cf6295d77
+commit 625b62634c33eaef4b80d07529954fe5c6435fe5
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Mon Nov 19 04:12:32 2018 +0000
+Date: Fri Feb 22 03:37:11 2019 +0000
- upstream: silence (to log level debug2) failure messages when
+ upstream: perform removal of agent-forwarding directory in forward
- loading the default hostkeys. Hostkeys explicitly specified in the
- configuration or on the command-line are still reported as errors, and
- failure to load at least one host key remains a fatal error.
+ setup error path with user's privileged. This is a no-op as this code always
+ runs with user privilege now that we no longer support running sshd with
+ privilege separation disabled, but as long as the privsep skeleton is there
+ we should follow the rules.
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
- Based on patch from Dag-Erling Smørgrav via
- https://github.com/openssh/openssh-portable/pull/103
-
- ok markus@
+ bz#2969 with patch from Erik Sjölund
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: ffc2e35a75d1008effaf05a5e27425041c27b684
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 2b708401a5a8d6133c865d7698d9852210dca846
-commit 7fca94edbe8ca9f879da9fdd2afd959c4180f4c7
-Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
-Date: Sun Nov 18 22:43:29 2018 +0000
+commit d9ecfaba0b2f1887d20e4368230632e709ca83be
+Author: jmc@openbsd.org <jmc@openbsd.org>
+Date: Mon Feb 18 07:02:34 2019 +0000
- upstream: Fix inverted logic for redirecting ProxyCommand stderr to
+ upstream: sync the description of ~/.ssh/config with djm's updated
- /dev/null. Fixes mosh in proxycommand mode that was broken by the previous
- ProxyCommand change that was reported by matthieu@. ok djm@ danj@
+ description in ssh.1; issue pointed out by andreas kahari
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: c6fc9641bc250221a0a81c6beb2e72d603f8add6
+ ok dtucker djm
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 1b01ef0ae2c6328165150badae317ec92e52b01c
-commit ccef7c4faf914993b53035cd2b25ce02ab039c9d
+commit 38e83e4f219c752ebb1560633b73f06f0392018b
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Nov 16 06:17:38 2018 +0000
+Date: Tue Feb 12 23:53:10 2019 +0000
- upstream: redirect stderr of ProxyCommands to /dev/null when ssh is
+ upstream: fix regression in r1.302 reported by naddy@ - only the first
- started with ControlPersist; based on patch from Steffen Prohaska
+ public key from the agent was being attempted for use.
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 1bcaa14a03ae80369d31021271ec75dce2597957
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 07116aea521a04888718b2157f1ca723b2f46c8d
-commit 15182fd96845a03216d7ac5a2cf31c4e77e406e3
+commit 5c68ea8da790d711e6dd5f4c30d089c54032c59a
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Nov 16 06:10:29 2018 +0000
+Date: Mon Feb 11 09:44:42 2019 +0000
- upstream: make grandparent-parent-child sshbuf chains robust to
+ upstream: cleanup GSSAPI authentication context after completion of the
- use-after-free faults if the ancestors are freed before the descendents.
- Nothing in OpenSSH uses this deallocation pattern. Reported by Jann Horn
+ authmethod. Move function-static GSSAPI state to the client Authctxt
+ structure. Make static a bunch of functions that aren't used outside this
+ file.
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: d93501d1d2734245aac802a252b9bb2eccdba0f2
-
-commit 2a35862e664afde774d4a72497d394fe7306ccb5
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Nov 16 03:26:01 2018 +0000
-
- upstream: use path_absolute() for pathname checks; from Manoj Ampalam
+ Based on patch from Markus Schmidt <markus@blueflash.cc>; ok markus@
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 482ce71a5ea5c5f3bc4d00fd719481a6a584d925
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 497fb792c0ddb4f1ba631b6eed526861f115dbe5
-commit d0d1dfa55be1c5c0d77ab3096b198a64235f936d
-Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Fri Nov 16 14:11:44 2018 +1100
+commit a8c807f1956f81a92a758d3d0237d0ff06d0be5d
+Author: benno@openbsd.org <benno@openbsd.org>
+Date: Sun Feb 10 16:35:41 2019 +0000
- Test for OPENSSL_init_crypto before using.
+ upstream: ssh-keygen -D pkcs11.so needs to initialize pkcs11
- Check for the presence of OPENSSL_init_crypto and all the flags we want
- before trying to use it (bz#2931).
+ interactive, so it can ask for the smartcards PIN. ok markus@
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 1be7ccf88f1876e0fc4d7c9b3f96019ac5655bab
-commit 6010c0303a422a9c5fa8860c061bf7105eb7f8b2
+commit 3d896c157c722bc47adca51a58dca859225b5874
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Nov 16 03:03:10 2018 +0000
+Date: Sun Feb 10 11:15:52 2019 +0000
- upstream: disallow empty incoming filename or ones that refer to the
+ upstream: when checking that filenames sent by the server side
- current directory; based on report/patch from Harry Sintonen
+ match what the client requested, be prepared to handle shell-style brace
+ alternations, e.g. "{foo,bar}".
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: f27651b30eaee2df49540ab68d030865c04f6de9
+ "looks good to me" millert@ + in snaps for the last week courtesy
+ deraadt@
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 3b1ce7639b0b25b2248e3a30f561a548f6815f3e
-commit aaed635e3a401cfcc4cc97f33788179c458901c3
+commit 318e4f8548a4f5c0c913f61e27d4fc21ffb1eaae
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Nov 16 02:46:20 2018 +0000
+Date: Sun Feb 10 11:10:57 2019 +0000
- upstream: fix bug in client that was keeping a redundant ssh-agent
+ upstream: syslog when connection is dropped for attempting to run a
- socket around for the life of the connection; bz#2912; reported by Simon
- Tatham; ok dtucker@
+ command when ForceCommand=internal-sftp is in effect; bz2960; ok dtucker@
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 4ded588301183d343dce3e8c5fc1398e35058478
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 8c87fa66d7fc6c0fffa3a3c28e8ab5e8dde234b8
-commit e76135e3007f1564427b2956c628923d8dc2f75a
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Nov 16 02:43:56 2018 +0000
+commit 2ff2e19653b8c0798b8b8eff209651bdb1be2761
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date: Fri Feb 8 14:53:35 2019 +1100
- upstream: fix bug in HostbasedAcceptedKeyTypes and
-
- PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes options. If only RSA-SHA2 siganture types were
- specified, then authentication would always fail for RSA keys as the monitor
- checks only the base key (not the signature algorithm) type against
- *AcceptedKeyTypes. bz#2746; reported by Jakub Jelen; ok dtucker
+ don't set $MAIL if UsePam=yes
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 117bc3dc54578dbdb515a1d3732988cb5b00461b
+ PAM typically specifies the user environment if it's enabled, so don't
+ second guess. bz#2937; ok dtucker@
-commit 5c1a63562cac0574c226224075b0829a50b48c9d
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Nov 16 02:30:20 2018 +0000
+commit 03e92dd27d491fe6d1a54e7b2f44ef1b0a916e52
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date: Fri Feb 8 14:50:36 2019 +1100
- upstream: support a prefix of '@' to suppress echo of sftp batch
+ use same close logic for stderr as stdout
- commands; bz#2926; ok dtucker@
+ Avoids sending SIGPIPE to child processes after their parent exits
+ if they attempt to write to stderr.
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 9d635636bc84aeae796467e059f7634de990a79d
+ Analysis and patch from JD Paul; patch reworked by Jakub Jelen and
+ myself. bz#2071; ok dtucker@
-commit 90ef45f7aac33eaf55ec344e101548a01e570f29
-Author: schwarze@openbsd.org <schwarze@openbsd.org>
-Date: Tue Nov 13 07:22:45 2018 +0000
+commit 8c53d409baeeaf652c0c125a9b164edc9dbeb6de
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date: Tue Feb 5 11:35:56 2019 +0000
- upstream: fix markup error (missing blank before delimiter); from
+ upstream: Adapt code in the non-USE_PIPES codepath to the new packet
- Mike Frysinger <vapier at gentoo dot org>
+ API. This code is not normally reachable since USE_PIPES is always defined.
+ bz#2961, patch from adrian.fita at gmail com.
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 1bc5392f795ca86318d695e0947eaf71a5a4f6d9
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 8d8428d678d1d5eb4bb21921df34e8173e6d238a
-commit 960e7c672dc106f3b759c081de3edb4d1138b36e
+commit 7a7fdca78de4b4774950be056099e579ef595414
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Nov 9 02:57:58 2018 +0000
+Date: Mon Feb 4 23:37:54 2019 +0000
- upstream: typo in error message; caught by Debian lintian, via
+ upstream: fix NULL-deref crash in PKCS#11 code when attempting
- Colin Watson
+ login to a token requiring a PIN; reported by benno@ fix mostly by markus@
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: bff614c7bd1f4ca491a84e9b5999f848d0d66758
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 438d0b114b1b4ba25a9869733db1921209aa9a31
-commit 81f1620c836e6c79c0823ba44acca605226a80f1
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Nov 9 02:56:22 2018 +0000
+commit cac302a4b42a988e54d32eb254b29b79b648dbf5
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date: Mon Feb 4 02:39:42 2019 +0000
- upstream: correct local variable name; from yawang AT microsoft.com
+ upstream: Remove obsolete "Protocol" from commented out examples. Patch
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: a0c228390856a215bb66319c89cb3959d3af8c87
+ from samy.mahmoudi at gmail com.
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 16aede33dae299725a03abdac5dcb4d73f5d0cbf
-commit 1293740e800fa2e5ccd38842a2e4970c6f3b9831
+commit 483b3b638500fd498b4b529356e5a0e18cf76891
Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
-Date: Wed Oct 31 11:20:05 2018 +0000
+Date: Fri Feb 1 03:52:23 2019 +0000
- upstream: Import new moduli.
+ upstream: Save connection timeout and restore for 2nd and
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: c07772f58028fda683ee6abd41c73da3ff70d403
+ subsequent attempts, preventing them from having no timeout. bz#2918, ok
+ djm@
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 4977f1d0521d9b6bba0c9a20d3d226cefac48292
-commit 46925ae28e53fc9add336a4fcdb7ed4b86c3591c
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Oct 26 01:23:03 2018 +0000
+commit 5f004620fdc1b2108139300ee12f4014530fb559
+Author: markus@openbsd.org <markus@openbsd.org>
+Date: Wed Jan 30 19:51:15 2019 +0000
- upstream: mention ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com in list of cert
+ upstream: Add authors for public domain sntrup4591761 code;
- key type at start of doc
+ confirmed by Daniel J. Bernstein
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: b46b0149256d67f05f2d5d01e160634ed1a67324
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: b4621f22b8b8ef13e063c852af5e54dbbfa413c1
-commit 8d8340e2c215155637fe19cb1a837f71b2d55f7b
-Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Fri Nov 16 13:32:13 2018 +1100
+commit 2c21b75a7be6ebdcbceaebb43157c48dbb36f3d8
+Author: jmc@openbsd.org <jmc@openbsd.org>
+Date: Sun Jan 27 07:14:11 2019 +0000
- Remove fallback check for /usr/local/ssl.
+ upstream: add -T to usage();
- If configure could not find a working OpenSSL installation it would
- fall back to checking in /usr/local/ssl. This made sense back when
- systems did not ship with OpenSSL, but most do and OpenSSL 1.1 doesn't
- use that as a default any more. The fallback behaviour also meant
- that if you pointed --with-ssl-dir at a specific directory and it
- didn't work, it would silently use either the system libs or the ones
- in /usr/local/ssl. If you want to use /usr/local/ssl you'll need to
- pass configure --with-ssl-dir=/usr/local/ssl. ok djm@
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: a7ae14d9436c64e1bd05022329187ea3a0ce1899
-commit ce93472134fb22eff73edbcd173a21ae38889331
-Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Fri Nov 16 12:44:01 2018 +1100
+commit 19a0f0529d3df04118da829528cac7ceff380b24
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date: Mon Jan 28 03:50:39 2019 +0000
- Fix check for OpenSSL 1.0.1 exactly.
+ upstream: The test sshd_config in in $OBJ.
- Both INSTALL and configure.ac claim OpenSSL >= 1.0.1 is supported; fix
- compile-time check for 1.0.1 to match.
+ OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 1e5d908a286d8e7de3a15a0020c8857f3a7c9172
-commit f2970868f86161a22b2c377057fa3891863a692a
-Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Sun Nov 11 15:58:20 2018 +1100
+commit 8fe25440206319d15b52d12b948a5dfdec14dca3
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date: Mon Jan 28 03:28:10 2019 +0000
- Improve warnings in cygwin service setup.
+ upstream: Remove leftover debugging.
- bz#2922, patch from vinschen at redhat.com.
+ OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 3d86c3d4867e46b35af3fd2ac8c96df0ffdcfeb9
-commit bd2d54fc1eee84bf87158a1277a50e6c8a303339
-Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Sun Nov 11 15:54:54 2018 +1100
+commit e30d32364d12c351eec9e14be6c61116f9d6cc90
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date: Mon Jan 28 00:12:36 2019 +0000
- Remove hardcoded service name in cygwin setup.
+ upstream: Enable ssh-dss for the agent test. Disable it for the
- bz#2922, patch from Christian.Lupien at USherbrooke.ca, sanity check
- by vinschen at redhat.com.
+ certificate test.
+
+ OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 388c1e03e1def539d350f139b37d69f12334668d
-commit d0153c77bf7964e694f1d26c56c41a571b8e9466
-Author: Dag-Erling Smørgrav <des@des.no>
-Date: Tue Oct 9 23:03:40 2018 +0200
+commit ffdde469ed56249f5dc8af98da468dde35531398
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date: Mon Jan 28 00:08:26 2019 +0000
- AC_CHECK_SIZEOF() no longer needs a second argument.
+ upstream: Count the number of key types instead of assuming there
+
+ are only two.
+
+ OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 0998702c41235782cf0beee396ec49b5056eaed9
-commit 9b47b083ca9d866249ada9f02dbd57c87b13806e
-Author: Manoj Ampalam <manojamp@microsoft.com>
-Date: Thu Nov 8 22:41:59 2018 -0800
+commit 1d05b4adcba08ab068466e5c08dee2f5417ec53a
+Author: Corinna Vinschen <vinschen@redhat.com>
+Date: Sat Jan 26 23:42:40 2019 +0100
- Fix error message w/out nistp521.
+ Cygwin: only tweak sshd_config file if it's new, drop creating sshd user
- Correct error message when OpenSSL doesn't support certain ECDSA key
- lengths.
+ The sshd_config tweaks were executed even if the old file was
+ still in place. Fix that. Also disable sshd user creation.
+ It's not used on Cygwin.
-commit 624d19ac2d56fa86a22417c35536caceb3be346f
-Author: Eneas U de Queiroz <cote2004-github@yahoo.com>
-Date: Tue Oct 9 16:17:42 2018 -0300
+commit 89843de0c4c733501f6b4f988098e6e06963df37
+Author: Corinna Vinschen <vinschen@redhat.com>
+Date: Sat Jan 26 23:03:12 2019 +0100
- fix compilation with openssl built without ECC
-
- ECDSA code in openssh-compat.h and libressl-api-compat.c needs to be
- guarded by OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
+ Cygwin: Change service name to cygsshd
- Signed-off-by: Eneas U de Queiroz <cote2004-github@yahoo.com>
+ Microsoft hijacked the sshd service name without asking.
-commit 1801cd11d99d05a66ab5248c0555f55909a355ce
-Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Thu Nov 8 15:03:11 2018 +1100
+commit 2a9b3a2ce411d16cda9c79ab713c55f65b0ec257
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date: Sun Jan 27 06:30:53 2019 +0000
- Simplify OpenSSL 1.1 function checks.
+ upstream: Generate all key supported key types and enable for keyscan
- Replace AC_SEARCH_LIBS checks for OpenSSL 1.1 functions with a single
- AC_CHECK_FUNCS. ok djm@
+ test.
+
+ OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 72f72ff49946c61bc949e1692dd9e3d71370891b
-commit bc32f118d484e4d71d2a0828fd4eab7e4176c9af
-Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Mon Nov 5 17:31:24 2018 +1100
+commit 391ffc4b9d31fa1f4ad566499fef9176ff8a07dc
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Sat Jan 26 22:41:28 2019 +0000
- Fix pasto for HAVE_EVP_CIPHER_CTX_SET_IV.
+ upstream: check in scp client that filenames sent during
- Prevents unnecessary redefinition. Patch from mforney at mforney.org.
+ remote->local directory copies satisfy the wildcard specified by the user.
+
+ This checking provides some protection against a malicious server
+ sending unexpected filenames, but it comes at a risk of rejecting wanted
+ files due to differences between client and server wildcard expansion rules.
+
+ For this reason, this also adds a new -T flag to disable the check.
+
+ reported by Harry Sintonen
+ fix approach suggested by markus@;
+ has been in snaps for ~1wk courtesy deraadt@
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 00f44b50d2be8e321973f3c6d014260f8f7a8eda
-commit 3719df60c66abc4b47200d41f571d67772f293ba
-Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Wed Oct 31 22:21:03 2018 +1100
+commit c2c18a39683db382a15b438632afab3f551d50ce
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Sat Jan 26 22:35:01 2019 +0000
- Import new moduli.
+ upstream: make ssh-keyscan return a non-zero exit status if it
+
+ finds no keys. bz#2903
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 89f1081fb81d950ebb48e6e73d21807b2723d488
-commit 595605d4abede475339d6a1f07a8cc674c11d1c3
-Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Sun Oct 28 15:18:13 2018 +1100
+commit 05b9a466700b44d49492edc2aa415fc2e8913dfe
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date: Thu Jan 24 17:00:29 2019 +0000
- Update check for minimum OpenSSL version.
+ upstream: Accept the host key fingerprint as a synonym for "yes"
+
+ when accepting an unknown host key. This allows you to paste a fingerprint
+ obtained out of band into the yes/no prompt and have the client do the
+ comparison for you. ok markus@ djm@
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 3c47d10b9f43d3d345e044fd9ec09709583a2767
-commit 6ab75aba340d827140d7ba719787aabaf39a0355
-Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Sun Oct 28 15:16:31 2018 +1100
+commit bdc6c63c80b55bcbaa66b5fde31c1cb1d09a41eb
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date: Thu Jan 24 16:52:17 2019 +0000
- Update required OpenSSL versions to match current.
+ upstream: Have progressmeter force an update at the beginning and
+
+ end of each transfer. Fixes the problem recently introduces where very quick
+ transfers do not display the progressmeter at all. Spotted by naddy@
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 68dc46c259e8fdd4f5db3ec2a130f8e4590a7a9a
-commit c801b0e38eae99427f37869370151b78f8e15c5d
-Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Sun Oct 28 14:34:12 2018 +1100
+commit 258e6ca003e47f944688ad8b8de087b58a7d966c
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date: Thu Jan 24 02:42:23 2019 +0000
- Use detected version functions in openssl compat.
+ upstream: Check for both EAGAIN and EWOULDBLOCK. This is a no-op
- Use detected functions in compat layer instead of guessing based on
- versions. Really fixes builds with LibreSSL, not just configure.
+ in OpenBSD (they are the same value) but makes things easier in -portable
+ where they may be distinct values. "sigh ok" deraadt@
+
+ (ID sync only, portable already had this change).
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 91f2bc7c0ecec905915ed59fa37feb9cc90e17d7
-commit 262d81a259d4aa1507c709ec9d5caa21c7740722
-Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Sat Oct 27 16:45:59 2018 +1100
+commit 281ce042579b834cdc1e74314f1fb2eeb75d2612
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date: Thu Jan 24 02:34:52 2019 +0000
- Check for the existence of openssl version funcs.
+ upstream: Always initialize 2nd arg to hpdelim2. It populates that
- Check for the existence of openssl version functions and use the ones
- detected instead of trying to guess based on the int32 version
- identifier. Fixes builds with LibreSSL.
+ *ONLY IF* there's a delimiter. If there's not (the common case) it checked
+ uninitialized memory, which usually passed, but if not would cause spurious
+ failures when the uninitialized memory happens to contain "/". ok deraadt.
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 4291611eaf2a53d4c92f4a57c7f267c9f944e0d3
-commit 406a24b25d6a2bdd70cacd16de7e899dcb2a8829
-Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
-Date: Fri Oct 26 13:43:28 2018 +1100
+commit d05ea255678d9402beda4416cd0360f3e5dfe938
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date: Wed Jan 23 21:50:56 2019 +0000
- fix builds on OpenSSL <= 1.0.x
+ upstream: Remove support for obsolete host/port syntax.
- I thought OpenSSL 1.0.x offered the new-style OpenSSL_version_num() API
- to obtain version number, but they don't.
+ host/port was added in 2001 as an alternative to host:port syntax for
+ the benefit of IPv6 users. These days there are establised standards
+ for this like [::1]:22 and the slash syntax is easily mistaken for CIDR
+ notation, which OpenSSH now supports for some things. Remove the slash
+ notation from ListenAddress and PermitOpen. bz#2335, patch from jjelen
+ at redhat.com, ok markus@
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: fae5f4e23c51a368d6b2d98376069ac2b10ad4b7
-commit 859754bdeb41373d372e36b5dc89c547453addb3
-Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
-Date: Tue Oct 23 17:10:41 2018 +1100
+commit 177d6c80c557a5e060cd343a0c116a2f1a7f43db
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date: Wed Jan 23 20:48:52 2019 +0000
- remove remaining references to SSLeay
+ upstream: Remove duplicate word. bz#2958, patch from jjelen at
- Prompted by Rosen Penev
+ redhat.com
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: cca3965a8333f2b6aae48b79ec1d72f7a830dd2c
-commit b9fea45a68946c8dfeace72ad1f6657c18f2a98a
-Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
-Date: Tue Oct 23 17:10:35 2018 +1100
+commit be3e6cba95dffe5fcf190c713525b48c837e7875
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date: Wed Jan 23 09:49:00 2019 +0000
- regen depend
+ upstream: Remove 3 as a guess for possible generator during moduli
+
+ generation. It's not mentioned in RFC4419 and it's not possible for
+ Sophie-Germain primes greater than 5. bz#2330, from Christian Wittenhorst ,
+ ok djm@ tb@
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 1467652e6802ad3333b0959282d8d49dfe22c8cd
-commit a65784c9f9c5d00cf1a0e235090170abc8d07c73
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Tue Oct 23 05:56:35 2018 +0000
+commit 8976f1c4b2721c26e878151f52bdf346dfe2d54c
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date: Wed Jan 23 08:01:46 2019 +0000
- upstream: refer to OpenSSL not SSLeay;
+ upstream: Sanitize scp filenames via snmprintf. To do this we move
- we're old, but we don't have to act it
+ the progressmeter formatting outside of signal handler context and have the
+ atomicio callback called for EINTR too. bz#2434 with contributions from djm
+ and jjelen at redhat.com, ok djm@
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 9ca38d11f8ed19e61a55108d1e892d696cee08ec
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 1af61c1f70e4f3bd8ab140b9f1fa699481db57d8
-commit c0a35265907533be10ca151ac797f34ae0d68969
-Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
-Date: Mon Oct 22 11:22:50 2018 +1100
+commit 6249451f381755f792c6b9e2c2f80cdc699c14e2
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Thu Jan 24 10:00:20 2019 +1100
+
+ For broken read/readv comparisons, poll(RW).
+
+ In the cases where we can't compare to read or readv function pointers
+ for some reason we currently ifdef out the poll() used to block while
+ waiting for reads or writes, falling back to busy waiting. This restores
+ the poll() in this case, but has it always check for read or write,
+ removing an inline ifdef in the process.
- fix compile for openssl 1.0.x w/ --with-ssl-engine
-
- bz#2921, patch from cotequeiroz
+commit 5cb503dff4db251520e8bf7d23b9c97c06eee031
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Thu Jan 24 09:55:16 2019 +1100
-commit 31b49525168245abe16ad49d7b7f519786b53a38
+ Include unistd.h for strmode().
+
+commit f236ca2741f29b5c443c0b2db3aa9afb9ad9befe
Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Mon Oct 22 20:05:18 2018 +1100
+Date: Thu Jan 24 09:50:58 2019 +1100
- Include openssl compatibility.
+ Also undef SIMPLEQ_FOREACH_SAFE.
- Patch from rosenp at gmail.com via openssh-unix-dev.
+ Prevents macro redefinition warning on at least NetBSD 6.1.
-commit a4fc253f5f44f0e4c47aafe2a17d2c46481d3c04
+commit be063945e4e7d46b1734d973bf244c350fae172a
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Oct 19 03:12:42 2018 +0000
+Date: Wed Jan 23 04:51:02 2019 +0000
- upstream: when printing certificate contents "ssh-keygen -Lf
+ upstream: allow auto-incrementing certificate serial number for certs
- /path/certificate", include the algorithm that the CA used to sign the cert.
+ signed in a single commandline.
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 1ea20b5048a851a7a0758dcb9777a211a2c0dddd
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 39881087641efb8cd83c7ec13b9c98280633f45b
-commit 83b3d99d2b47321b7ebb8db6f6ea04f3808bc069
-Author: florian@openbsd.org <florian@openbsd.org>
-Date: Mon Oct 15 11:28:50 2018 +0000
+commit 851f80328931975fe68f71af363c4537cb896da2
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Wed Jan 23 04:16:22 2019 +0000
- upstream: struct sockaddr_storage is guaranteed to be large enough,
+ upstream: move a bunch of global flag variables to main(); make the
- no need to check the size. OK kn, deraadt
+ rest static
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 0aa56e92eb49c79f495b31a5093109ec5841f439
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: fa431d92584e81fe99f95882f4c56b43fe3242dc
-commit aede1c34243a6f7feae2fb2cb686ade5f9be6f3d
+commit 2265402dc7d701a9aca9f8a7b7b0fd45b65c479f
Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
-Date: Wed Oct 17 11:01:20 2018 +1100
+Date: Wed Jan 23 13:03:16 2019 +1100
- Require OpenSSL 1.1.x series 1.1.0g or greater
-
- Previous versions have a bug with EVP_CipherInit() when passed a
- NULL EVP_CIPHER, per https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4613
-
- ok dtucker@
+ depend
-commit 08300c211409c212e010fe2e2f2883e573a04ce2
-Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
-Date: Wed Oct 17 08:12:02 2018 +1100
+commit 2c223878e53cc46def760add459f5f7c4fb43e35
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Wed Jan 23 02:01:10 2019 +0000
- unbreak compilation with --with-ssl-engine
+ upstream: switch mainloop from select(2) to poll(2); ok deraadt@
- Missing last argument to OPENSSL_init_crypto()
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 37645419a330037d297f6f0adc3b3663e7ae7b2e
-commit 1673274aee67ce0eb6f00578b6f3d2bcbd58f937
-Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Tue Oct 16 14:45:57 2018 +1100
+commit bb956eaa94757ad058ff43631c3a7d6c94d38c2f
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Wed Jan 23 00:30:41 2019 +0000
- Remove gcc spectre mitigation flags.
+ upstream: pass most arguments to the KEX hash functions as sshbuf
- Current impementions of the gcc spectre mitigation flags cause
- miscompilations when combined with other flags and do not provide much
- protection. Found by fweimer at redhat.com, ok djm@
-
-commit 4e23deefd7959ef83c73ed9cce574423438f6133
-Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
-Date: Tue Oct 16 10:51:52 2018 +1100
-
- Avoid deprecated OPENSSL_config when using 1.1.x
+ rather than pointer+length; ok markus@
- OpenSSL 1.1.x soft-deprecated OPENSSL_config in favour of
- OPENSSL_init_crypto; pointed out by Jakub Jelen
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: ef0c89c52ccc89817a13a5205725148a28492bf7
-commit 797cdd9c8468ed1125ce60d590ae3f1397866af4
-Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Fri Oct 12 16:58:47 2018 +1100
+commit d691588b8e29622c66abf8932362b522cf7f4051
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Tue Jan 22 22:58:50 2019 +0000
- Don't avoid our *sprintf replacements.
+ upstream: backoff reading messages from active connections when the
- Don't let systems with broken printf(3) avoid our replacements
- via asprintf(3)/vasprintf(3) calling libc internally. From djm@
+ input buffer is too full to read one, or if the output buffer is too full to
+ enqueue a response; feedback & ok dtucker@
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: df3c5b6d57c968975875de40d8955cbfed05a6c8
-commit e526127cbd2f8ad88fb41229df0c9b850c722830
-Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Fri Oct 12 16:43:35 2018 +1100
+commit f99ef8de967949a1fc25a5c28263ea32736e5943
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Tue Jan 22 20:48:01 2019 +0000
- Check if snprintf understands %zu.
+ upstream: add -m to usage(); reminded by jmc@
- If the platforms snprintf and friends don't understand %zu, use the
- compat replacement. Prevents segfaults on those platforms.
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: bca476a5236e8f94210290b3e6a507af0434613e
-commit cf39f875191708c5f2f1a3c1c9019f106e74aea3
-Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
-Date: Fri Oct 12 09:48:05 2018 +1100
+commit 41923ce06ac149453debe472238e0cca7d5a2e5f
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Tue Jan 22 12:03:58 2019 +0000
- remove stale link, tweak
+ upstream: Correct some bugs in PKCS#11 token PIN handling at
+
+ initial login, the attempt at reading the PIN could be skipped in some cases
+ especially on devices with integrated PIN readers.
+
+ based on patch from Daniel Kucera in bz#2652; ok markus@
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: fad70a61c60610afe8bb0db538c90e343e75e58e
-commit a7205e68decf7de2005810853b4ce6b222b65e2a
-Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
-Date: Fri Oct 12 09:47:20 2018 +1100
+commit 2162171ad517501ba511fa9f8191945d01857bb4
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Tue Jan 22 12:00:50 2019 +0000
- update version numbers ahead of release
+ upstream: Support keys that set the CKA_ALWAYS_AUTHENTICATE by
+
+ requring a fresh login after the C_SignInit operation.
+
+ based on patch from Jakub Jelen in bz#2638; ok markus
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: a76e66996ba7c0923b46b74d46d499b811786661
-commit 1a4a9cf80f5b92b9d1dadd0bfa8867c04d195391
+commit 7a2cb18a215b2cb335da3dc99489c52a91f4925b
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Thu Oct 11 03:48:04 2018 +0000
+Date: Tue Jan 22 11:51:25 2019 +0000
- upstream: don't send new-style rsa-sha2-*-cert-v01@openssh.com names to
+ upstream: Mention that configuration for the destination host is
- older OpenSSH that can't handle them. spotted by Adam Eijdenberg; ok dtucker
+ not applied to any ProxyJump/-J hosts. This has confused a few people...
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 662bbc402e3d7c9b6c322806269698106a6ae631
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 03f4f641df6ca236c1bfc69836a256b873db868b
-commit dc8ddcdf1a95e011c263486c25869bb5bf4e30ec
-Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
-Date: Thu Oct 11 13:08:59 2018 +1100
+commit ecd2f33cb772db4fa76776543599f1c1ab6f9fa0
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Tue Jan 22 11:40:42 2019 +0000
- update depends
+ upstream: Include -m in the synopsis for a few more commands that
+
+ support it
+
+ Be more explicit in the description of -m about where it may be used
+
+ Prompted by Jakub Jelen in bz2904
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 3b398ac5e05d8a6356710d0ff114536c9d71046c
-commit 26841ac265603fd2253e6832e03602823dbb4022
-Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
-Date: Thu Oct 11 13:02:11 2018 +1100
+commit ff5d2cf4ca373bb4002eef395ed2cbe2ff0826c1
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Tue Jan 22 11:26:16 2019 +0000
- some more duplicated key algorithm lines
+ upstream: print the full pubkey being attempted at loglevel >=
- From Adam Eijdenberg
+ debug2; bz2939
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: ac0fe5ca1429ebf4d460bad602adc96de0d7e290
-commit 5d9d17603bfbb620195a4581025052832b4c4adc
-Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
-Date: Thu Oct 11 11:56:36 2018 +1100
+commit 180b520e2bab33b566b4b0cbac7d5f9940935011
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Tue Jan 22 11:19:42 2019 +0000
- fix duplicated algorithm specification lines
+ upstream: clarify: ssh-keygen -e only writes public keys, never
- Spotted by Adam Eijdenberg
+ private
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 7de7ff6d274d82febf9feb641e2415ffd6a30bfb
-commit ebfafd9c7a5b2a7fb515ee95dbe0e44e11d0a663
+commit c45616a199c322ca674315de88e788f1d2596e26
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Thu Oct 11 00:52:46 2018 +0000
+Date: Tue Jan 22 11:00:15 2019 +0000
- upstream: typo in plain RSA algorithm counterpart names for
+ upstream: mention the new vs. old key formats in the introduction
- certificates; spotted by Adam Eijdenberg; ok dtucker@
+ and give some hints on how keys may be converted or written in the old
+ format.
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: bfcdeb6f4fc9e7607f5096574c8f118f2e709e00
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 9c90a9f92eddc249e07fad1204d0e15c8aa13823
-commit c29b111e7d87c2324ff71c80653dd8da168c13b9
-Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
-Date: Thu Oct 11 11:29:35 2018 +1100
+commit fd8eb1383a34c986a00ef13d745ae9bd3ea21760
+Author: jmc@openbsd.org <jmc@openbsd.org>
+Date: Tue Jan 22 06:58:31 2019 +0000
- check pw_passwd != NULL here too
-
- Again, for systems with broken NIS implementations.
+ upstream: tweak previous;
- Prompted by coolbugcheckers AT gmail.com
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: d2a80e389da8e7ed71978643d8cbaa8605b597a8
-commit fe8e8f349a553ef4c567acd418aac769a82b7729
-Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
-Date: Thu Oct 11 11:03:15 2018 +1100
+commit 68e924d5473c00057f8532af57741d258c478223
+Author: tb@openbsd.org <tb@openbsd.org>
+Date: Mon Jan 21 23:55:12 2019 +0000
- check for NULL return from shadow_pw()
+ upstream: Forgot to add -J to the synopsis.
- probably unreachable on this platform; pointed out by
- coolbugcheckers AT gmail.com
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 26d95e409a0b72526526fc56ca1caca5cc3d3c5e
-commit acc59cbe7a1fb169e1c3caba65a39bd74d6e030d
-Author: deraadt@openbsd.org <deraadt@openbsd.org>
-Date: Wed Oct 10 16:43:49 2018 +0000
+commit 622dedf1a884f2927a9121e672bd9955e12ba108
+Author: tb@openbsd.org <tb@openbsd.org>
+Date: Mon Jan 21 22:50:42 2019 +0000
- upstream: introducing openssh 7.9
+ upstream: Add a -J option as a shortcut for -o Proxyjump= to scp(1)
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 42d526a9fe01a40dd299ac58014d3349adf40e25
+ and sftp(1) to match ssh(1)'s interface.
+
+ ok djm
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: a75bc2d5f329caa7229a7e9fe346c4f41c2663fc
-commit 12731158c75c8760a8bea06350eeb3e763fe1a07
+commit c882d74652800150d538e22c80dd2bd3cdd5fae2
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Tue Jan 22 20:38:40 2019 +1100
+
+ Allow building against OpenSSL dev (3.x) version.
+
+commit d5520393572eb24aa0e001a1c61f49b104396e45
Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
-Date: Thu Oct 11 10:29:29 2018 +1100
+Date: Tue Jan 22 10:50:40 2019 +1100
- supply callback to PEM_read_bio_PrivateKey
-
- OpenSSL 1.1.0i has changed the behaviour of their PEM APIs,
- so that empty passphrases are interpreted differently. This
- probabalistically breaks loading some keys, because the PEM format
- is terrible and doesn't include a proper MAC.
+ typo
+
+commit 2de9cec54230998ab10161576f77860a2559ccb7
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date: Tue Jan 22 10:49:52 2019 +1100
+
+ add missing header
+
+commit 533cfb01e49a2a30354e191669dc3159e03e99a7
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Mon Jan 21 22:18:24 2019 +0000
+
+ upstream: switch sntrup implementation source from supercop to
- Avoid this by providing a basic callback to avoid passing empty
- passphrases to OpenSSL in cases where one is required.
+ libpqcrypto; the latter is almost identical but doesn't rely on signed
+ underflow to implement an optimised integer sort; from markus@
- Based on patch from Jakub Jelen in bz#2913; ok dtucker@
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: cd09bbf0e0fcef1bedca69fdf7990dc360567cf8
-commit d1d301a1dd5d6cc3a9ed93ab7ab09dda4cb456e0
+commit d50ab3cd6fb859888a26b4d4e333239b4f6bf573
Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
-Date: Wed Oct 10 14:57:00 2018 +1100
+Date: Tue Jan 22 00:02:23 2019 +1100
- in pick_salt() avoid dereference of NULL passwords
-
- Apparently some NIS implementations can leave pw->pw_passwd (or the
- shadow equivalent) NULL.
-
- bz#2909; based on patch from Todd Eigenschink
+ new files need includes.h
-commit edbb6febccee084d212fdc0cb05b40cb1c646ab1
+commit c7670b091a7174760d619ef6738b4f26b2093301
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Tue Oct 9 05:42:23 2018 +0000
+Date: Mon Jan 21 12:53:35 2019 +0000
- upstream: Treat all PEM_read_bio_PrivateKey() errors when a passphrase
-
- is specified as "incorrect passphrase" instead of trying to choose between
- that and "invalid format".
+ upstream: add "-v" flags to ssh-add and ssh-pkcs11-helper to turn up
- libcrypto can return ASN1 parsing errors rather than the expected
- decrypt error in certain infrequent cases when trying to decrypt/parse
- PEM private keys when supplied with an invalid passphrase.
+ debug verbosity.
- Report and repro recipe from Thomas Deutschmann in bz#2901
+ Make ssh-agent turn on ssh-pkcs11-helper's verbosity when it is run
+ in debug mode ("ssh-agent -d"), so we get to see errors from the
+ PKCS#11 code.
ok markus@
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: b1d4cd92395f9743f81c0d23aab2524109580870
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 0a798643c6a92a508df6bd121253ba1c8bee659d
-commit 2581333d564d8697837729b3d07d45738eaf5a54
-Author: naddy@openbsd.org <naddy@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Oct 5 14:26:09 2018 +0000
+commit 49d8c8e214d39acf752903566b105d06c565442a
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Mon Jan 21 12:50:12 2019 +0000
- upstream: Support using service names for port numbers.
-
- * Try to resolve a port specification with getservbyname(3) if a
- numeric conversion fails.
- * Make the "Port" option in ssh_config handle its argument as a
- port rather than a plain integer.
-
- ok dtucker@ deraadt@
+ upstream: adapt to changes in KEX APIs and file removals
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: e7f03633133205ab3dfbc67f9df7475fabae660d
+ OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 54d6857e7c58999c7a6d40942ab0fed3529f43ca
-commit e0d6501e86734c48c8c503f81e1c0926e98c5c4c
+commit 35ecc53a83f8e8baab2e37549addfd05c73c30f1
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Thu Oct 4 07:47:35 2018 +0000
+Date: Mon Jan 21 12:35:20 2019 +0000
- upstream: when the peer sends a channel-close message, make sure we
-
- close the local extended read fd (stderr) along with the regular read fd
- (stdout). Avoids weird stuck processed in multiplexing mode.
-
- Report and analysis by Nelson Elhage and Geoffrey Thomas in bz#2863
-
- ok dtucker@ markus@
+ upstream: adapt to changes in KEX API and file removals
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: a48a2467fe938de4de69d2e7193d5fa701f12ae9
+ OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 92cad022d3b0d11e08f3e0055d6a14b8f994c0d7
-commit 6f1aabb128246f445e33b8844fad3de9cb1d18cb
+commit 7d69aae64c35868cc4f644583ab973113a79480e
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Thu Oct 4 01:04:52 2018 +0000
+Date: Mon Jan 21 12:29:35 2019 +0000
- upstream: factor out channel status formatting from
-
- channel_open_message() so we can use it in other debug messages
+ upstream: adapt to bignum1 API removal and bignum2 API change
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 9c3903ca28fcabad57f566c9d0045b41ab7d52ba
+ OpenBSD-Regress-ID: cea6ff270f3d560de86b355a87a2c95b55a5ca63
-commit f1dd179e122bdfdb7ca3072d9603607740efda05
+commit beab553f0a9578ef9bffe28b2c779725e77b39ec
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Thu Oct 4 00:10:11 2018 +0000
+Date: Mon Jan 21 09:13:41 2019 +0000
- upstream: include a little more information about the status and
-
- disposition of channel's extended (stderr) fd; makes debugging some things a
- bit easier. No behaviour change.
+ upstream: remove hack to use non-system libcrypto
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 483eb6467dc7d5dbca8eb109c453e7a43075f7ce
+ OpenBSD-Regress-ID: ce72487327eee4dfae1ab0212a1f33871fe0809f
-commit 2d1428b11c8b6f616f070f2ecedce12328526944
+commit 4dc06bd57996f1a46b4c3bababe0d09bc89098f7
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date: Mon Jan 21 23:14:04 2019 +1100
+
+ depend
+
+commit 70edd73edc4df54e5eee50cd27c25427b34612f8
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Thu Oct 4 00:04:41 2018 +0000
+Date: Mon Jan 21 12:08:13 2019 +0000
- upstream: explicit_bzero here to be consistent with other kex*.c;
+ upstream: fix reversed arguments to kex_load_hostkey(); manifested as
- report from coolbugcheckers AT gmail.com
+ errors in cert-hostkey.sh regress failures.
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: a90f146c5b5f5b1408700395e394f70b440856cb
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 12dab63850b844f84d5a67e86d9e21a42fba93ba
-commit 5eff5b858e717e901e6af6596306a114de9f79f2
+commit f1185abbf0c9108e639297addc77f8757ee00eb3
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Wed Oct 3 06:38:35 2018 +0000
+Date: Mon Jan 21 11:22:00 2019 +0000
- upstream: Allow ssh_config IdentityAgent directive to accept
+ upstream: forgot to cvs add this file in previous series of commits;
- environment variable names as well as explicit paths. ok dtucker@
+ grrr
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 2f0996e103876c53d8c9dd51dcce9889d700767b
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: bcff316c3e7da8fd15333e05d244442c3aaa66b0
-commit a46ac4d86b25414d78b632e8173578b37e5f8a83
+commit 7bef390b625bdc080f0fd4499ef03cef60fca4fa
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Tue Oct 2 12:51:58 2018 +0000
+Date: Mon Jan 21 10:44:21 2019 +0000
- upstream: mention INFO@openssh.com for sending SIGINFO
+ upstream: nothing shall escape this purge
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 132471eeb0df658210afd27852fe65131b26e900
-
-commit ff3a411cae0b484274b7900ef52ff4dad3e12876
-Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
-Date: Tue Oct 2 22:49:40 2018 +1000
-
- only support SIGINFO on systems with SIGINFO
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 4795b0ff142b45448f7e15f3c2f77a947191b217
-commit cd98925c6405e972dc9f211afc7e75e838abe81c
+commit aaca72d6f1279b842066e07bff797019efeb2c23
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Tue Oct 2 12:40:07 2018 +0000
+Date: Mon Jan 21 10:40:11 2019 +0000
- upstream: Add server support for signalling sessions via the SSH
-
- channel/ session protocol. Signalling is only supported to sesssions that are
- not subsystems and were not started with a forced command.
+ upstream: rename kex->kem_client_pub -> kex->client_pub now that
- Long requested in bz#1424
+ KEM has been renamed to kexgen
- Based on a patch from markus@ and reworked by dtucker@;
- ok markus@ dtucker@
+ from markus@ ok djm@
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 4bea826f575862eaac569c4bedd1056a268be1c3
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: fac6da5dc63530ad0da537db022a9a4cfbe8bed8
-commit dba50258333f2604a87848762af07ba2cc40407a
+commit 70867e1ca2eb08bbd494fe9c568df4fd3b35b867
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Wed Sep 26 07:32:44 2018 +0000
+Date: Mon Jan 21 10:38:54 2019 +0000
- upstream: remove big ugly TODO comment from start of file. Some of
+ upstream: merge kexkem[cs] into kexgen
- the mentioned tasks are obsolete and, of the remainder, most are already
- captured in PROTOCOL.mux where they better belong
+ from markus@ ok djm@
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 16d9d76dee42a5bb651c9d6740f7f0ef68aeb407
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 87d886b7f1812ff9355fda1435f6ea9b71a0ac89
-commit 92b61a38ee9b765f5049f03cd1143e13f3878905
+commit 71e67fff946396caa110a7964da23480757258ff
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Wed Sep 26 07:30:05 2018 +0000
+Date: Mon Jan 21 10:35:09 2019 +0000
- upstream: Document mux proxy mode; added by Markus in openssh-7.4
+ upstream: pass values used in KEX hash computation as sshbuf
+
+ rather than pointer+len
- Also add a little bit of information about the overall packet format
+ suggested by me; implemented by markus@ ok me
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: bdb6f6ea8580ef96792e270cae7857786ad84a95
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 994f33c464f4a9e0f1d21909fa3e379f5a0910f0
-commit 9d883a1ce4f89b175fd77405ff32674620703fb2
+commit 4b83e2a2cc0c12e671a77eaba1c1245894f4e884
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Wed Sep 26 01:48:57 2018 +0000
+Date: Mon Jan 21 10:33:49 2019 +0000
- upstream: s/process_mux_master/mux_master_process/ in mux master
-
- function names,
+ upstream: remove kex_derive_keys_bn wrapper; no unused since the
- Gives better symmetry with the existing mux_client_*() names and makes
- it more obvious when a message comes from the master vs client (they
- are interleved in ControlMaster=auto mode).
+ DH-like KEX methods have moved to KEM
- no functional change beyond prefixing a could of log messages with
- __func__ where they were previously lacking.
+ from markus@ ok djm@
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: b01f7c3fdf92692e1713a822a89dc499333daf75
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: bde9809103832f349545e4f5bb733d316db9a060
-commit c2fa53cd6462da82d3a851dc3a4a3f6b920337c8
-Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Sat Sep 22 14:41:24 2018 +1000
+commit 92dda34e373832f34a1944e5d9ebbebb184dedc1
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Mon Jan 21 10:29:56 2019 +0000
- Remove unused variable in _ssh_compat_fflush.
+ upstream: use KEM API for vanilla ECDH
+
+ from markus@ ok djm@
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 6fbff96339a929835536b5730585d1d6057a352c
-commit d1b3540c21212624af907488960d703c7d987b42
-Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Thu Sep 20 18:08:43 2018 +1000
+commit b72357217cbe510a3ae155307a7be6b9181f1d1b
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date: Mon Jan 21 23:11:21 2019 +1100
- Import updated moduli.
+ fixup missing ssherr.h
-commit b5e412a8993ad17b9e1141c78408df15d3d987e1
+commit 9c9c97e14fe190931f341876ad98213e1e1dc19f
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Sep 21 12:46:22 2018 +0000
+Date: Mon Jan 21 10:28:01 2019 +0000
- upstream: Allow ssh_config ForwardX11Timeout=0 to disable the
+ upstream: use KEM API for vanilla DH KEX
- timeout and allow X11 connections in untrusted mode indefinitely. ok dtucker@
+ from markus@ ok djm@
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: ea1ceed3f540b48e5803f933e59a03b20db10c69
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: af56466426b08a8be275412ae2743319e3d277c9
-commit cb24d9fcc901429d77211f274031653476864ec6
+commit 2f6a9ddbbf6ca8623c53c323ff17fb6d68d66970
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Sep 21 12:23:17 2018 +0000
+Date: Mon Jan 21 10:24:09 2019 +0000
- upstream: when compiled with GSSAPI support, cache supported method
+ upstream: use KEM API for vanilla c25519 KEX
- OIDs by calling ssh_gssapi_prepare_supported_oids() regardless of whether
- GSSAPI authentication is enabled in the main config.
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 38d937b85ff770886379dd66a8f32ab0c1c35c1f
+
+commit dfd591618cdf2c96727ac0eb65f89cf54af0d97e
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Mon Jan 21 10:20:12 2019 +0000
+
+ upstream: Add support for a PQC KEX/KEM:
- This avoids sandbox violations for configurations that enable GSSAPI
- auth later, e.g.
+ sntrup4591761x25519-sha512@tinyssh.org using the Streamlined NTRU Prime
+ 4591^761 implementation from SUPERCOP coupled with X25519 as a stop-loss. Not
+ enabled by default.
- Match user djm
- GSSAPIAuthentication yes
+ introduce KEM API; a simplified framework for DH-ish KEX methods.
- bz#2107; ok dtucker@
+ from markus@ feedback & ok djm@
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: a5dd42d87c74e27cfb712b15b0f97ab20e0afd1d
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: d687f76cffd3561dd73eb302d17a1c3bf321d1a7
-commit bbc8af72ba68da014d4de6e21a85eb5123384226
+commit b1b2ff4ed559051d1035419f8f236275fa66d5d6
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Sep 21 12:20:12 2018 +0000
+Date: Mon Jan 21 10:07:22 2019 +0000
- upstream: In sshkey_in_file(), ignore keys that are considered for
+ upstream: factor out kex_verify_hostkey() - again, duplicated
- being too short (i.e. SSH_ERR_KEY_LENGTH). These keys will not be considered
- to be "in the file". This allows key revocation lists to contain short keys
- without the entire revocation list being considered invalid.
+ almost exactly across client and server for several KEX methods.
- bz#2897; ok dtucker
+ from markus@ ok djm@
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: d9f3d857d07194a42ad7e62889a74dc3f9d9924b
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 4e4a16d949dadde002a0aacf6d280a684e20829c
-commit 383a33d160cefbfd1b40fef81f72eadbf9303a66
+commit bb39bafb6dc520cc097780f4611a52da7f19c3e2
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Sep 21 03:11:36 2018 +0000
+Date: Mon Jan 21 10:05:09 2019 +0000
- upstream: Treat connections with ProxyJump specified the same as ones
+ upstream: factor out kex_load_hostkey() - this is duplicated in
- with a ProxyCommand set with regards to hostname canonicalisation (i.e. don't
- try to canonicalise the hostname unless CanonicalizeHostname is set to
- 'always').
+ both the client and server implementations for most KEX methods.
- Patch from Sven Wegener via bz#2896
+ from markus@ ok djm@
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 527ff501cf98bf65fb4b29ed0cb847dda10f4d37
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 8232fa7c21fbfbcaf838313b0c166dc6c8762f3c
-commit 0cbed248ed81584129b67c348dbb801660f25a6a
+commit dec5e9d33891e3bc3f1395d7db0e56fdc7f86dfc
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Thu Sep 20 23:40:16 2018 +0000
+Date: Mon Jan 21 10:03:37 2019 +0000
- upstream: actually make CASignatureAlgorithms available as a config
+ upstream: factor out kex_dh_compute_key() - it's shared between
- option
+ plain DH KEX and DH GEX in both the client and server implementations
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 93fa7ff58314ed7b1ab7744090a6a91232e6ae52
-
-commit 62528870c0ec48cd86a37dd7320fb85886c3e6ee
-Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
-Date: Thu Sep 20 08:07:03 2018 +0000
-
- upstream: Import updated moduli.
+ from markus@ ok djm@
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 04431e8e7872f49a2129bf080a6b73c19d576d40
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 12186e18791fffcd4642c82e7e0cfdd7ea37e2ec
-commit e6933a2ffa0659d57f3c7b7c457b2c62b2a84613
-Author: jmc@openbsd.org <jmc@openbsd.org>
-Date: Thu Sep 20 06:58:48 2018 +0000
+commit e93bd98eab79b9a78f64ee8dd4dffc4d3979c7ae
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Mon Jan 21 10:00:23 2019 +0000
- upstream: reorder CASignatureAlgorithms, and add them to the
+ upstream: factor out DH keygen; it's identical between the client
+
+ and the server
- various -o lists; ok djm
+ from markus@ ok djm@
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: ecb88baecc3c54988b4d1654446ea033da359288
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 2be57f6a0d44f1ab2c8de2b1b5d6f530c387fae9
-commit aa083aa9624ea7b764d5a81c4c676719a1a3e42b
+commit 5ae3f6d314465026d028af82609c1d49ad197655
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Thu Sep 20 03:31:49 2018 +0000
+Date: Mon Jan 21 09:55:52 2019 +0000
- upstream: fix "ssh -Q sig" to show correct signature algorithm list
+ upstream: save the derived session id in kex_derive_keys() rather
+
+ than making each kex method implementation do it.
- (it was erroneously showing certificate algorithms); prompted by markus@
+ from markus@ ok djm@
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 1cdee002f2f0c21456979deeb887fc889afb154d
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: d61ade9c8d1e13f665f8663c552abff8c8a30673
-commit ecac7e1f7add6b28874959a11f2238d149dc2c07
+commit 7be8572b32a15d5c3dba897f252e2e04e991c307
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Thu Sep 20 03:30:44 2018 +0000
+Date: Mon Jan 21 09:54:11 2019 +0000
- upstream: add CASignatureAlgorithms option for the client, allowing
+ upstream: Make sshpkt_get_bignum2() allocate the bignum it is
+
+ parsing rather than make the caller do it. Saves a lot of boilerplate code.
- it to specify which signature algorithms may be used by CAs when signing
- certificates. Useful if you want to ban RSA/SHA1; ok markus@
+ from markus@ ok djm@
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 9159e5e9f67504829bf53ff222057307a6e3230f
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 576bf784f9a240f5a1401f7005364e59aed3bce9
-commit 86e5737c39153af134158f24d0cab5827cbd5852
+commit 803178bd5da7e72be94ba5b4c4c196d4b542da4d
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Thu Sep 20 03:28:06 2018 +0000
+Date: Mon Jan 21 09:52:25 2019 +0000
- upstream: Add sshd_config CASignatureAlgorithms option to allow
+ upstream: remove obsolete (SSH v.1) sshbuf_get/put_bignum1
- control over which signature algorithms a CA may use when signing
- certificates. In particular, this allows a sshd to ban certificates signed
- with RSA/SHA1.
+ functions
- ok markus@
+ from markus@ ok djm@
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: b05c86ef8b52b913ed48d54a9b9c1a7714d96bac
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 0380b1b2d9de063de3c5a097481a622e6a04943e
-commit f80e68ea7d62e2dfafc12f1a60ab544ae4033a0f
+commit f3ebaffd8714be31d4345f90af64992de4b3bba2
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Wed Sep 19 02:03:02 2018 +0000
+Date: Mon Jan 21 09:49:37 2019 +0000
- upstream: Make "ssh-add -q" do what it says on the tin: silence
-
- output from successful operations.
+ upstream: fix all-zero check in kexc25519_shared_key
- Based on patch from Thijs van Dijk; ok dtucker@ deraadt@
+ from markus@ ok djm@
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: c4f754ecc055c10af166116ce7515104aa8522e1
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 60b1d364e0d9d34d1d1ef1620cb92e36cf06712d
-commit 5e532320e9e51de720d5f3cc2596e95d29f6e98f
-Author: millert@openbsd.org <millert@openbsd.org>
-Date: Mon Sep 17 15:40:14 2018 +0000
+commit 9d1a9771d0ad3a83af733bf3d2650b53f43c269f
+Author: jmc@openbsd.org <jmc@openbsd.org>
+Date: Mon Jan 21 07:09:10 2019 +0000
- upstream: When choosing a prime from the moduli file, avoid
+ upstream: - -T was added to the first synopsis by mistake - since
+
+ "..." denotes optional, no need to surround it in []
- re-using the linenum variable for something that is not a line number to
- avoid the confusion that resulted in the bug in rev. 1.64. This also lets us
- pass the actual linenum to parse_prime() so the error messages include the
- correct line number. OK markus@ some time ago.
+ ok djm
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 4d8e5d3e924d6e8eb70053e3defa23c151a00084
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 918f6d8eed4e0d8d9ef5eadae1b8983d796f0e25
-commit cce8cbe0ed7d1ba3a575310e0b63c193326ae616
+commit 2f0bad2bf85391dbb41315ab55032ec522660617
Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Sat Sep 15 19:44:06 2018 +1000
+Date: Mon Jan 21 21:28:27 2019 +1100
- Fix openssl-1.1 fallout for --without-openssl.
+ Make --with-rpath take a flag instead of yes/no.
- ok djm@
+ Linkers need various flags for -rpath and similar, so make --with-rpath
+ take an optional flag argument which is passed to the linker. ok djm@
-commit 149519b9f201dac755f3cba4789f4d76fecf0ee1
+commit 23490a6c970ea1d03581a3b4208f2eb7a675f453
Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
-Date: Sat Sep 15 19:37:48 2018 +1000
+Date: Mon Jan 21 15:05:43 2019 +1100
- add futex(2) syscall to seccomp sandbox
-
- Apparently needed for some glibc/openssl combinations.
-
- Patch from Arkadiusz Miśkiewicz
+ fix previous test
+
+commit b6dd3277f2c49f9584a2097bc792e8f480397e87
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Mon Jan 21 13:50:17 2019 +1100
+
+ Wrap ECC static globals in EC_KEY_METHOD_NEW too.
-commit 4488ae1a6940af704c4dbf70f55bf2f756a16536
+commit b2eb9db35b7191613f2f4b934d57b25938bb34b3
Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
-Date: Sat Sep 15 19:36:55 2018 +1000
+Date: Mon Jan 21 12:53:40 2019 +1100
- really add source for authopt_fuzz this time
+ pass TEST_SSH_SSHPKCS11HELPER to regress tests
-commit 9201784b4a257c8345fbd740bcbdd70054885707
+commit ba58a529f45b3dae2db68607d8c54ae96e90e705
Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
-Date: Sat Sep 15 19:35:40 2018 +1000
+Date: Mon Jan 21 12:31:29 2019 +1100
- remove accidentally checked-in authopt_fuzz binary
+ make agent-pkcs11 search harder for softhsm2.so
-commit beb9e522dc7717df08179f9e59f36b361bfa14ab
+commit 662be40c62339ab645113c930ce689466f028938
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Sep 14 05:26:27 2018 +0000
+Date: Mon Jan 21 02:05:38 2019 +0000
- upstream: second try, deals properly with missing and private-only
-
- Use consistent format in debug log for keys readied, offered and
- received during public key authentication.
+ upstream: always print the caller's error message in ossl_error(),
- This makes it a little easier to see what is going on, as each message
- now contains (where available) the key filename, its type and fingerprint,
- and whether the key is hosted in an agent or a token.
+ even when there are no libcrypto errors to report.
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: f1c6a8e9cfc4e108c359db77f24f9a40e1e25ea7
-
-commit 6bc5a24ac867bfdc3ed615589d69ac640f51674b
-Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
-Date: Fri Sep 14 15:16:34 2018 +1000
-
- fuzzer harness for authorized_keys option parsing
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 09ebaa8f706e0eccedd209775baa1eee2ada806a
-commit 6c8b82fc6929b6a9a3f645151b6ec26c5507d9ef
+commit ce46c3a077dfb4c531ccffcfff03f37775725b75
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Sep 14 04:44:04 2018 +0000
+Date: Mon Jan 21 02:01:03 2019 +0000
- upstream: revert following; deals badly with agent keys
-
- revision 1.285
- date: 2018/09/14 04:17:12; author: djm; state: Exp; lines: +47 -26; commitid: lflGFcNb2X2HebaK;
- Use consistent format in debug log for keys readied, offered and
- received during public key authentication.
+ upstream: get the ex_data (pkcs11_key object) back from the keys at
- This makes it a little easier to see what is going on, as each message
- now contains the key filename, its type and fingerprint, and whether
- the key is hosted in an agent or a token.
+ the index at which it was inserted, rather than assuming index 0
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: e496bd004e452d4b051f33ed9ae6a54ab918f56d
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 1f3a6ce0346c8014e895e50423bef16401510aa8
-commit 6da046f9c3374ce7e269ded15d8ff8bc45017301
+commit 0a5f2ea35626022299ece3c8817a1abe8cf37b3e
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Sep 14 04:17:44 2018 +0000
+Date: Mon Jan 21 01:05:00 2019 +0000
- upstream: garbage-collect moribund ssh_new_private() API.
+ upstream: GSSAPI code got missed when converting to new packet API
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 7c05bf13b094093dfa01848a9306c82eb6e95f6c
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 37e4f06ab4a0f4214430ff462ba91acba28b7851
+
+commit 2efcf812b4c1555ca3aff744820a3b3bccd68298
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date: Mon Jan 21 11:57:21 2019 +1100
+
+ Fix -Wunused when compiling PKCS#11 without ECDSA
-commit 1f24ac5fc05252ceb1c1d0e8cab6a283b883c780
+commit 3c0c657ed7cd335fc05c0852d88232ca7e92a5d9
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Sep 14 04:17:12 2018 +0000
+Date: Sun Jan 20 23:26:44 2019 +0000
- upstream: Use consistent format in debug log for keys readied,
-
- offered and received during public key authentication.
+ upstream: allow override of ssh-pkcs11-helper binary via
- This makes it a little easier to see what is going on, as each message
- now contains the key filename, its type and fingerprint, and whether
- the key is hosted in an agent or a token.
+ $TEST_SSH_SSHPKCS11HELPER from markus@
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 2a01d59285a8a7e01185bb0a43316084b4f06a1f
+ OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 7382a3d76746f5a792d106912a5819fd5e49e469
-commit 488c9325bb7233e975dbfbf89fa055edc3d3eddc
-Author: millert@openbsd.org <millert@openbsd.org>
-Date: Thu Sep 13 15:23:32 2018 +0000
+commit 760ae37b4505453c6fa4faf1aa39a8671ab053af
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Sun Jan 20 23:25:25 2019 +0000
- upstream: Fix warnings caused by user_from_uid() and group_from_gid()
+ upstream: adapt agent-pkcs11.sh test to softhsm2 and add support
- now returning const char *.
+ for ECDSA keys
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: b5fe571ea77cfa7b9035062829ab05eb87d7cc6f
-
-commit 0aa1f230846ebce698e52051a107f3127024a05a
-Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
-Date: Fri Sep 14 10:31:47 2018 +1000
-
- allow SIGUSR1 as synonym for SIGINFO
+ work by markus@, ok djm@
- Lets users on those unfortunate operating systems that lack SIGINFO
- still be able to obtain progress information from unit tests :)
-
-commit d64e78526596f098096113fcf148216798c327ff
-Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
-Date: Thu Sep 13 19:05:48 2018 +1000
-
- add compat header
+ OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 1ebc2be0e88eff1b6d8be2f9c00cdc60723509fe
-commit a3fd8074e2e2f06602e25618721f9556c731312c
+commit b2ce8b31a1f974a13e6d12e0a0c132b50bc45115
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Thu Sep 13 09:03:20 2018 +0000
+Date: Sun Jan 20 23:24:19 2019 +0000
- upstream: missed a bit of openssl-1.0.x API in this unittest
+ upstream: add "extra:" target to run some extra tests that are not
+
+ enabled by default (currently includes agent-pkcs11.sh); from markus@
- OpenBSD-Regress-ID: a73a54d7f7381856a3f3a2d25947bee7a9a5dbc9
+ OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 9a969e1adcd117fea174d368dcb9c61eb50a2a3c
-commit 86e0a9f3d249d5580390daf58e015e68b01cef10
+commit 632976418d60b7193597bbc6ac7ca33981a41aab
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Thu Sep 13 05:06:51 2018 +0000
+Date: Mon Jan 21 00:47:34 2019 +0000
- upstream: use only openssl-1.1.x API here too
+ upstream: use ECDSA_SIG_set0() instead of poking signature values into
- OpenBSD-Regress-ID: ae877064597c349954b1b443769723563cecbc8f
+ structure directly; the latter works on LibreSSL but not on OpenSSL. From
+ portable.
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 5b22a1919d9cee907d3f8a029167f70a481891c6
-commit 48f54b9d12c1c79fba333bc86d455d8f4cda8cfc
+commit 5de6ac2bad11175135d9b819b3546db0ca0b4878
Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
-Date: Thu Sep 13 12:13:50 2018 +1000
+Date: Mon Jan 21 11:44:19 2019 +1100
- adapt -portable to OpenSSL 1.1x API
+ remove HAVE_DLOPEN that snuck in
- Polyfill missing API with replacement functions extracted from LibreSSL
+ portable doesn't use this
-commit 86112951d63d48839f035b5795be62635a463f99
+commit e2cb445d786f7572da2af93e3433308eaed1093a
Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
-Date: Thu Sep 13 12:12:42 2018 +1000
-
- forgot to stage these test files in commit d70d061
-
-commit 482d23bcacdd3664f21cc82a5135f66fc598275f
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Thu Sep 13 02:08:33 2018 +0000
+Date: Mon Jan 21 11:32:28 2019 +1100
- upstream: hold our collective noses and use the openssl-1.1.x API in
-
- OpenSSH; feedback and ok tb@ jsing@ markus@
+ conditionalise ECDSA PKCS#11 support
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: cacbcac87ce5da0d3ca7ef1b38a6f7fb349e4417
+ Require EC_KEY_METHOD support in libcrypto, evidenced by presence
+ of EC_KEY_METHOD_new() function.
-commit d70d061828730a56636ab6f1f24fe4a8ccefcfc1
+commit fcb1b0937182d0137a3c357c89735d0dc5869d54
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Wed Sep 12 01:36:45 2018 +0000
+Date: Sun Jan 20 23:12:35 2019 +0000
- upstream: Include certs with multiple RSA signature variants in
+ upstream: we use singleton pkcs#11 RSA_METHOD and EC_KEY_METHOD
- test data Ensure that cert->signature_key is populated correctly
+ now, so there is no need to keep a copy of each in the pkcs11_key object.
+
+ work by markus@, ok djm@
- OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 56e68f70fe46cb3a193ca207385bdb301fd6603a
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 43b4856516e45c0595f17a8e95b2daee05f12faa
-commit f803b2682992cfededd40c91818b653b5d923ef5
+commit 6529409e85890cd6df7e5e81d04e393b1d2e4b0b
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Wed Sep 12 01:23:48 2018 +0000
+Date: Sun Jan 20 23:11:11 2019 +0000
- upstream: test revocation by explicit hash and by fingerprint
+ upstream: KNF previous; from markus@
- OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 079c18a9ab9663f4af419327c759fc1e2bc78fd8
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 3dfe35e25b310c3968b1e4e53a0cb1d03bda5395
-commit 2de78bc7da70e1338b32feeefcc6045cf49efcd4
+commit 58622a8c82f4e2aad630580543f51ba537c1f39e
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Wed Sep 12 01:22:43 2018 +0000
+Date: Sun Jan 20 23:10:33 2019 +0000
- upstream: s/sshkey_demote/sshkey_from_private/g
+ upstream: use OpenSSL's RSA reference counting hooks to
- OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 782bde7407d94a87aa8d1db7c23750e09d4443c4
-
-commit 41c115a5ea1cb79a6a3182773c58a23f760e8076
-Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
-Date: Wed Sep 12 16:50:01 2018 +1000
-
- delete the correct thing; kexfuzz binary
+ implicitly clean up pkcs11_key objects when their owning RSA object's
+ reference count drops to zero. Simplifies the cleanup path and makes it more
+ like ECDSA's
+
+ work by markus@, ok djm@
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 74b9c98f405cd78f7148e9e4a4982336cd3df25c
-commit f0fcd7e65087db8c2496f13ed39d772f8e38b088
+commit f118542fc82a3b3ab0360955b33bc5a271ea709f
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Wed Sep 12 06:18:59 2018 +0000
+Date: Sun Jan 20 23:08:24 2019 +0000
- upstream: fix edit mistake; spotted by jmc@
+ upstream: make the PKCS#11 RSA code more like the new PKCS#11
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: dd724e1c52c9d6084f4cd260ec7e1b2b138261c6
+ ECDSA code: use a single custom RSA_METHOD instead of a method per key
+
+ suggested by me, but markus@ did all the work.
+ ok djm@
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 8aafcebe923dc742fc5537a995cee549d07e4b2e
-commit 4cc259bac699f4d2a5c52b92230f9e488c88a223
+commit 445cfce49dfc904c6b8ab25afa2f43130296c1a5
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Wed Sep 12 01:34:02 2018 +0000
+Date: Sun Jan 20 23:05:52 2019 +0000
- upstream: add SSH_ALLOWED_CA_SIGALGS - the default list of
-
- signature algorithms that are allowed for CA signatures. Notably excludes
- ssh-dsa.
+ upstream: fix leak of ECDSA pkcs11_key objects
- ok markus@
+ work by markus, ok djm@
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 1628e4181dc8ab71909378eafe5d06159a22deb4
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 9fc0c4f1d640aaa5f19b8d70f37ea19b8ad284a1
-commit ba9e788315b1f6a350f910cb2a9e95b2ce584e89
+commit 8a2467583f0b5760787273796ec929190c3f16ee
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Wed Sep 12 01:32:54 2018 +0000
+Date: Sun Jan 20 23:03:26 2019 +0000
- upstream: add sshkey_check_cert_sigtype() that checks a
+ upstream: use EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY() instead of direct access of
- cert->signature_type against a supplied whitelist; ok markus
+ EC_KEY internals as that won't work on OpenSSL
+
+ work by markus@, feedback and ok djm@
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: caadb8073292ed7a9535e5adc067d11d356d9302
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 4a99cdb89fbd6f5155ef8c521c99dc66e2612700
-commit a70fd4ad7bd9f2ed223ff635a3d41e483057f23b
+commit 24757c1ae309324e98d50e5935478655be04e549
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Wed Sep 12 01:31:30 2018 +0000
+Date: Sun Jan 20 23:01:59 2019 +0000
- upstream: add cert->signature_type field and keep it in sync with
+ upstream: cleanup PKCS#11 ECDSA pubkey loading: the returned
+
+ object should never have a DER header
- certificate signature wrt loading and certification operations; ok markus@
+ work by markus; feedback and ok djm@
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: e8b8b9f76b66707a0cd926109c4383db8f664df3
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: b617fa585eddbbf0b1245b58b7a3c4b8d613db17
-commit 357128ac48630a9970e3af0e6ff820300a28da47
+commit 749aef30321595435ddacef2f31d7a8f2b289309
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Wed Sep 12 01:30:10 2018 +0000
+Date: Sun Jan 20 23:00:12 2019 +0000
- upstream: Add "ssh -Q sig" to allow listing supported signature
+ upstream: cleanup unnecessary code in ECDSA pkcs#11 signature
- algorithms ok markus@
+ work by markus@, feedback and ok djm@
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 7a8c6eb6c249dc37823ba5081fce64876d10fe2b
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: affa5ca7d58d59fbd16169f77771dcdbd2b0306d
-commit 9405c6214f667be604a820c6823b27d0ea77937d
+commit 0c50992af49b562970dd0ba3f8f151f1119e260e
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Wed Sep 12 01:21:34 2018 +0000
+Date: Sun Jan 20 22:57:45 2019 +0000
- upstream: allow key revocation by SHA256 hash and allow ssh-keygen
+ upstream: cleanup pkcs#11 client code: use sshkey_new in instead
+
+ of stack- allocating a sshkey
- to create KRLs using SHA256/base64 key fingerprints; ok markus@
+ work by markus@, ok djm@
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: a0590fd34e7f1141f2873ab3acc57442560e6a94
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: a048eb6ec8aa7fa97330af927022c0da77521f91
-commit 50e2687ee0941c0ea216d6ffea370ffd2c1f14b9
+commit 854bd8674ee5074a239f7cadf757d55454802e41
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Wed Sep 12 01:19:12 2018 +0000
+Date: Sun Jan 20 22:54:30 2019 +0000
- upstream: log certificate fingerprint in authentication
+ upstream: allow override of the pkcs#11 helper binary via
- success/failure message (previously we logged only key ID and CA key
- fingerprint).
+ $SSH_PKCS11_HELPER; needed for regress tests.
- ok markus@
+ work by markus@, ok me
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: a8ef2d172b7f1ddbcce26d6434b2de6d94f6c05d
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: f78d8185500bd7c37aeaf7bd27336db62f0f7a83
-commit de37ca909487d23e5844aca289b3f5e75d3f1e1f
-Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Sep 7 04:26:56 2018 +0000
+commit 93f02107f44d63a016d8c23ebd2ca9205c495c48
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Sun Jan 20 22:51:37 2019 +0000
- upstream: Add FALLTHROUGH comments where appropriate. Patch from
+ upstream: add support for ECDSA keys in PKCS#11 tokens
- jjelen at redhat via bz#2687.
+ Work by markus@ and Pedro Martelletto, feedback and ok me@
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: c48eb457be697a19d6d2950c6d0879f3ccc851d3
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: a37d651e221341376636056512bddfc16efb4424
-commit 247766cd3111d5d8c6ea39833a3257ca8fb820f2
+commit aa22c20e0c36c2fc610cfcc793b0d14079c38814
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Sep 7 01:42:54 2018 +0000
+Date: Sun Jan 20 22:03:29 2019 +0000
- upstream: ssh -MM requires confirmation for all operations that
+ upstream: add option to test whether keys in an agent are usable,
- change the multiplexing state, not just new sessions.
+ by performing a signature and a verification using each key "ssh-add -T
+ pubkey [...]"
- mention that confirmation is checked via ssh-askpass
+ work by markus@, ok djm@
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 0f1b45551ebb9cc5c9a4fe54ad3b23ce90f1f5c2
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 931b888a600b6a883f65375bd5f73a4776c6d19b
-commit db8bb80e3ac1bcb3e1305d846cd98c6b869bf03f
-Author: mestre@openbsd.org <mestre@openbsd.org>
-Date: Tue Aug 28 12:25:53 2018 +0000
+commit a36b0b14a12971086034d53c0c3dfbad07665abe
+Author: tb@openbsd.org <tb@openbsd.org>
+Date: Sun Jan 20 02:01:59 2019 +0000
- upstream: fix misplaced parenthesis inside if-clause. it's harmless
+ upstream: Fix BN_is_prime_* calls in SSH, the API returns -1 on
+
+ error.
- and the only issue is showing an unknown error (since it's not defined)
- during fatal(), if it ever an error occurs inside that condition.
+ Found thanks to BoringSSL's commit 53409ee3d7595ed37da472bc73b010cd2c8a5ffd
+ by David Benjamin.
- OK deraadt@ markus@ djm@
+ ok djm, dtucker
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: acb0a8e6936bfbe590504752d01d1d251a7101d8
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 1ee832be3c44b1337f76b8562ec6d203f3b072f8
-commit 086cc614f550b7d4f100c95e472a6b6b823938ab
-Author: mestre@openbsd.org <mestre@openbsd.org>
-Date: Tue Aug 28 12:17:45 2018 +0000
+commit ec4776bb01dd8d61fddc7d2a31ab10bf3d3d829a
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date: Sun Jan 20 01:12:40 2019 +0000
- upstream: fix build with DEBUG_PK enabled
-
- OK dtucker@
+ upstream: DH-GEX min value is now specified in RFC8270. ok djm@
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: ec1568cf27726e9638a0415481c20c406e7b441c
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 1229d0feb1d0ecefe05bf67a17578b263e991acc
-commit 2678833013e97f8b18f09779b7f70bcbf5eb2ab2
+commit c90a7928c4191303e76a8c58b9008d464287ae1b
Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Fri Sep 7 14:41:53 2018 +1000
+Date: Mon Jan 21 09:22:36 2019 +1100
- Handle ngroups>_SC_NGROUPS_MAX.
+ Check for cc before gcc.
- Based on github pull request #99 from Darren Maffat at Oracle: Solaris'
- getgrouplist considers _SC_NGROUPS_MAX more of a guideline and can return
- a larger number of groups. In this case, retry getgrouplist with a
- larger array and defer allocating groups_byname. ok djm@
+ If cc is something other than gcc and is the system compiler prefer using
+ that, unless otherwise told via $CC. ok djm@
-commit 039bf2a81797b8f3af6058d34005a4896a363221
-Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Fri Sep 7 14:06:57 2018 +1000
+commit 9b655dc9c9a353f0a527f0c6c43a5e35653c9503
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date: Sun Jan 20 14:55:27 2019 +1100
- Initial len for the fmt=NULL case.
-
- Patch from jjelen at redhat via bz#2687. (OpenSSH never calls
- setproctitle with a null format so len is always initialized).
+ last bits of old packet API / active_state global
-commit ea9c06e11d2e8fb2f4d5e02f8a41e23d2bd31ca9
-Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Fri Sep 7 14:01:39 2018 +1000
+commit 3f0786bbe73609ac96e5a0d91425ee21129f8e04
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date: Sun Jan 20 10:22:18 2019 +1100
- Include stdlib.h.
+ remove PAM dependencies on old packet API
- Patch from jjelen at redhat via bz#2687.
+ Requires some caching of values, because the PAM code isn't
+ always called with packet context.
-commit 9617816dbe73ec4d65075f4d897443f63a97c87f
+commit 08f66d9f17e12c1140d1f1cf5c4dce67e915d3cc
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date: Sun Jan 20 09:58:45 2019 +1100
+
+ remove vestiges of old packet API from loginrec.c
+
+commit c327813ea1d740e3e367109c17873815aba1328e
Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
-Date: Mon Aug 27 13:08:01 2018 +1000
+Date: Sun Jan 20 09:45:38 2019 +1100
+
+ depend
+
+commit 135e302cfdbe91817294317c337cc38c3ff01cba
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Sat Jan 19 22:30:52 2019 +0000
+
+ upstream: fix error in refactor: use ssh_packet_disconnect() instead of
+
+ sshpkt_error(). The first one logs the error and exits (what we want) instead
+ of just logging and blundering on.
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 39f51b43641dce9ce0f408ea6c0e6e077e2e91ae
+
+commit 245c6a0b220b58686ee35bc5fc1c359e9be2faaa
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Sat Jan 19 21:45:31 2019 +0000
- document some more regress control env variables
+ upstream: remove last traces of old packet API!
- Specifically SKIP_UNIT, USE_VALGRING and LTESTS. Sort the list of
- environment variables.
+ with & ok markus@
- Based on patch from Jakub Jelen
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 9bd10437026423eb8245636ad34797a20fbafd7d
-commit 71508e06fab14bc415a79a08f5535ad7bffa93d9
-Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
-Date: Thu Aug 23 15:41:42 2018 +1000
+commit 04c091fc199f17dacf8921df0a06634b454e2722
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Sat Jan 19 21:43:56 2019 +0000
- shorten temporary SSH_REGRESS_TMP path
+ upstream: remove last references to active_state
- Previous path was exceeding max socket length on at least one platform (OSX)
-
-commit 26739cf5bdc9030a583b41ae5261dedd862060f0
-Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
-Date: Thu Aug 23 13:06:02 2018 +1000
-
- rebuild dependencies
-
-commit ff729025c7463cf5d0a8d1ca1823306e48c6d4cf
-Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
-Date: Thu Aug 23 13:03:32 2018 +1000
-
- fix path in distclean target
+ with & ok markus@
- Patch from Jakub Jelen
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 78619a50ea7e4ca2f3b54d4658b3227277490ba2
-commit 7fef173c28f7462dcd8ee017fdf12b5073f54c02
+commit ec00f918b8ad90295044266c433340a8adc93452
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Thu Aug 23 03:01:08 2018 +0000
+Date: Sat Jan 19 21:43:07 2019 +0000
- upstream: memleak introduced in r1.83; from Colin Watson
+ upstream: convert monitor.c to new packet API
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 5c019104c280cbd549a264a7217b67665e5732dc
+ with & ok markus@
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 61ecd154bd9804461a0cf5f495a29d919e0014d5
-commit b8ae02a2896778b8984c7f51566c7f0f56fa8b56
-Author: schwarze@openbsd.org <schwarze@openbsd.org>
-Date: Tue Aug 21 13:56:27 2018 +0000
+commit 6350e0316981489d4205952d6904d6fedba5bfe0
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Sat Jan 19 21:42:30 2019 +0000
- upstream: AIX reports the CODESET as "ISO8859-1" in the POSIX locale.
-
- Treating that as a safe encoding is OK because even when other systems return
- that string for real ISO8859-1, it is still safe in the sense that it is
- ASCII-compatible and stateless.
+ upstream: convert sshd.c to new packet API
- Issue reported by Val dot Baranov at duke dot edu. Additional
- information provided by Michael dot Felt at felt dot demon dot nl.
- Tested by Michael Felt on AIX 6.1 and by Val Baranov on AIX 7.1.
- Tweak and OK djm@.
+ with & ok markus@
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 36f1210e0b229817d10eb490d6038f507b8256a7
-
-commit bc44ee088ad269d232e514f037c87ada4c2fd3f0
-Author: Tim Rice <tim@multitalents.net>
-Date: Tue Aug 21 08:57:24 2018 -0700
-
- modified: openbsd-compat/port-uw.c
- remove obsolete and un-needed include
-
-commit 829fc28a9c54e3f812ee7248c7a3e31eeb4f0b3a
-Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
-Date: Mon Aug 20 15:57:29 2018 +1000
-
- Missing unistd.h for regress/mkdtemp.c
-
-commit c8313e492355a368a91799131520d92743d8d16c
-Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
-Date: Fri Aug 17 05:45:20 2018 +1000
-
- update version numbers in anticipation of release
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: ea569d3eaf9b5cf1bad52779fbfa5fa0b28af891
-commit 477b49a34b89f506f4794b35e3c70b3e2e83cd38
-Author: Corinna Vinschen <vinschen@redhat.com>
-Date: Mon Aug 13 17:08:51 2018 +0200
+commit a5e2ad88acff2b7d131ee6d5dc5d339b0f8c6a6d
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Sat Jan 19 21:41:53 2019 +0000
- configure: work around GCC shortcoming on Cygwin
+ upstream: convert session.c to new packet API
- Cygwin's latest 7.x GCC allows to specify -mfunction-return=thunk
- as well as -mindirect-branch=thunk on the command line, albeit
- producing invalid code, leading to an error at link stage.
+ with & ok markus@
- The check in configure.ac only checks if the option is present,
- but not if it produces valid code.
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: fae817207e23099ddd248960c984f7b7f26ea68e
+
+commit 3a00a921590d4c4b7e96df11bb10e6f9253ad45e
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Sat Jan 19 21:41:18 2019 +0000
+
+ upstream: convert auth.c to new packet API
- This patch fixes it by special-casing Cygwin. Another solution
- may be to change these to linker checks.
+ with & ok markus@
- Signed-off-by: Corinna Vinschen <vinschen@redhat.com>
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 7e10359f614ff522b52a3f05eec576257794e8e4
-commit b0917945efa374be7648d67dbbaaff323ab39edc
-Author: Corinna Vinschen <vinschen@redhat.com>
-Date: Mon Aug 13 17:05:05 2018 +0200
+commit 7ec5cb4d15ed2f2c5c9f5d00e6b361d136fc1e2d
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Sat Jan 19 21:40:48 2019 +0000
- cygwin: add missing stdarg.h include
+ upstream: convert serverloop.c to new packet API
- Further header file standarization in Cygwin uncovered a lazy
- indirect include in bsd-cygwin_util.c
+ with & ok markus@
- Signed-off-by: Corinna Vinschen <vinschen@redhat.com>
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: c92dd19b55457541478f95c0d6b318426d86d885
-commit c3903c38b0fd168ab3d925c2b129d1a599593426
+commit 64c9598ac05332d1327cbf55334dee4172d216c4
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Mon Aug 13 02:41:05 2018 +0000
+Date: Sat Jan 19 21:40:21 2019 +0000
- upstream: revert compat.[ch] section of the following change. It
-
- causes double-free under some circumstances.
+ upstream: convert the remainder of sshconnect2.c to new packet
- --
+ API
- date: 2018/07/31 03:07:24; author: djm; state: Exp; lines: +33 -18; commitid: f7g4UI8eeOXReTPh;
- fix some memory leaks spotted by Coverity via Jakub Jelen in bz#2366
- feedback and ok dtucker@
+ with & ok markus@
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 1e77547f60fdb5e2ffe23e2e4733c54d8d2d1137
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 0986d324f2ceb5e8a12ac21c1bb10b3b4b1e0f71
-commit 1b9dd4aa15208100fbc3650f33ea052255578282
+commit bc5e1169d101d16e3a5962a928db2bc49a8ef5a3
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Sun Aug 12 20:19:13 2018 +0000
+Date: Sat Jan 19 21:39:12 2019 +0000
- upstream: better diagnosics on alg list assembly errors; ok
+ upstream: convert the remainder of clientloop.c to new packet API
- deraadt@ markus@
+ with & ok markus@
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 5a557e74b839daf13cc105924d2af06a1560faee
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: ce2fbbacb86a290f31da1e7bf04cddf2bdae3d1e
-commit e36a5f61b0f5bebf6d49c215d228cd99dfe86e28
+commit 5ebce136a6105f084db8f0d7ee41981d42daec40
Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
-Date: Sat Aug 11 18:08:45 2018 -0700
+Date: Sun Jan 20 09:44:53 2019 +1100
- Some AIX fixes; report from Michael Felt
+ upstream: convert auth2.c to new packet API
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: ed831bb95ad228c6791bc18b60ce7a2edef2c999
-commit 2f4766ceefe6657c5ad5fe92d13c411872acae0e
-Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Aug 10 01:35:49 2018 +0000
+commit 172a592a53ebe8649c4ac0d7946e6c08eb151af6
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Sat Jan 19 21:37:48 2019 +0000
- upstream: The script that cooks up PuTTY format host keys does not
+ upstream: convert servconf.c to new packet API
- understand the new key format so convert back to old format to create the
- PuTTY key and remove it once done.
+ with & ok markus@
- OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 2a449a18846c3a144bc645135b551ba6177e38d3
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 126553aecca302c9e02fd77e333b9cb217e623b4
-commit e1b26ce504662a5d5b991091228984ccfd25f280
+commit 8cc7a679d29cf6ecccfa08191e688c7f81ef95c2
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Aug 10 00:44:01 2018 +0000
+Date: Sat Jan 19 21:37:13 2019 +0000
- upstream: improve
+ upstream: convert channels.c to new packet API
+
+ with & ok markus@
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 40d839db0977b4e7ac8b647b16d5411d4faf2f60
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 0b8279b56113cbd4011fc91315c0796b63dc862c
-commit 7c712966a3139622f7fb55045368d05de4e6782c
+commit 06232038c794c7dfcb087be0ab0b3e65b09fd396
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Aug 10 00:42:29 2018 +0000
+Date: Sat Jan 19 21:36:38 2019 +0000
- upstream: Describe pubkey format, prompted by bz#2853
+ upstream: convert sshconnect.c to new packet API
- While I'm here, describe and link to the remaining local PROTOCOL.*
- docs that weren't already mentioned (PROTOCOL.key, PROTOCOL.krl and
- PROTOCOL.mux)
+ with & ok markus@
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 2a900f9b994ba4d53e7aeb467d44d75829fd1231
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 222337cf6c96c347f1022d976fac74b4257c061f
-commit ef100a2c5a8ed83afac0b8f36520815803da227a
+commit 25b2ed667216314471bb66752442c55b95792dc3
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Aug 10 00:27:15 2018 +0000
+Date: Sat Jan 19 21:36:06 2019 +0000
- upstream: fix numbering
+ upstream: convert ssh.c to new packet API
+
+ with & ok markus@
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: bc7a1764dff23fa4c5ff0e3379c9c4d5b63c9596
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: eb146878b24e85c2a09ee171afa6797c166a2e21
-commit ed7bd5d93fe14c7bd90febd29b858ea985d14d45
+commit e3128b38623eef2fa8d6e7ae934d3bd08c7e973e
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Wed Aug 8 01:16:01 2018 +0000
+Date: Sat Jan 19 21:35:25 2019 +0000
- upstream: Use new private key format by default. This format is
+ upstream: convert mux.c to new packet API
- suported by OpenSSH >= 6.5 (released January 2014), so it should be supported
- by most OpenSSH versions in active use.
+ with & ok markus@
- It is possible to convert new-format private keys to the older
- format using "ssh-keygen -f /path/key -pm PEM".
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 4e3893937bae66416e984b282d8f0f800aafd802
+
+commit ed1df7226caf3a943a36d580d4d4e9275f8a61ee
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Sat Jan 19 21:34:45 2019 +0000
+
+ upstream: convert sshconnect2.c to new packet API
- ok deraadt dtucker
+ with & ok markus@
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: e3bd4f2509a2103bfa2f710733426af3ad6d8ab8
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 1cb869e0d6e03539f943235641ea070cae2ebc58
-commit 967226a1bdde59ea137e8f0df871854ff7b91366
+commit 23f22a4aaa923c61ec49a99ebaa383656e87fa40
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Sat Aug 4 00:55:06 2018 +0000
+Date: Sat Jan 19 21:33:57 2019 +0000
- upstream: invalidate dh->priv_key after freeing it in error path;
+ upstream: convert clientloop.c to new packet API
- avoids unlikely double-free later. Reported by Viktor Dukhovni via
- https://github.com/openssh/openssh-portable/pull/96 feedback jsing@ tb@
+ with & ok markus@
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: e317eb17c3e05500ae851f279ef6486f0457c805
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 497b36500191f452a22abf283aa8d4a9abaee7fa
-commit 74287f5df9966a0648b4a68417451dd18f079ab8
+commit ad60b1179c9682ca5aef0b346f99ef68cbbbc4e5
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Tue Jul 31 03:10:27 2018 +0000
+Date: Sat Jan 19 21:33:13 2019 +0000
- upstream: delay bailout for invalid authentic
+ upstream: allow sshpkt_fatal() to take a varargs format; we'll
- =?UTF-8?q?ating=20user=20until=20after=20the=20packet=20containing=20the?=
- =?UTF-8?q?=20request=20has=20been=20fully=20parsed.=20Reported=20by=20Dar?=
- =?UTF-8?q?iusz=20Tytko=20and=20Micha=C5=82=20Sajdak;=20ok=20deraadt?=
- MIME-Version: 1.0
- Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
- Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
+ use this to give packet-related fatal error messages more context (esp. the
+ remote endpoint) ok markus@
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: b4891882fbe413f230fe8ac8a37349b03bd0b70d
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: de57211f9543426b515a8a10a4f481666b2b2a50
-commit 1a66079c0669813306cc69e5776a4acd9fb49015
+commit 0fa174ebe129f3d0aeaf4e2d1dd8de745870d0ff
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Tue Jul 31 03:07:24 2018 +0000
+Date: Sat Jan 19 21:31:32 2019 +0000
- upstream: fix some memory leaks spotted by Coverity via Jakub Jelen
+ upstream: begin landing remaining refactoring of packet parsing
+
+ API, started almost exactly six years ago.
+
+ This change stops including the old packet_* API by default and makes
+ each file that requires the old API include it explicitly. We will
+ commit file-by-file refactoring to remove the old API in consistent
+ steps.
- in bz#2366 feedback and ok dtucker@
+ with & ok markus@
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 8402bbae67d578bedbadb0ce68ff7c5a136ef563
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 93c98a6b38f6911fd1ae025a1ec57807fb4d4ef4
-commit 87f08be054b7eeadbb9cdeb3fb4872be79ccf218
-Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
-Date: Fri Jul 20 13:18:28 2018 +1000
+commit 4ae7f80dfd02f2bde912a67c9f338f61e90fa79f
+Author: tb@openbsd.org <tb@openbsd.org>
+Date: Sat Jan 19 04:15:56 2019 +0000
- Remove support for S/Key
+ upstream: Print an \r in front of the password prompt so parts of
+
+ a password that was entered too early are likely clobbered by the prompt.
+ Idea from doas.
- Most people will 1) be using modern multi-factor authentication methods
- like TOTP/OATH etc and 2) be getting support for multi-factor
- authentication via PAM or BSD Auth.
+ from and ok djm
+ "i like it" deraadt
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 5fb97c68df6d8b09ab37f77bca1d84d799c4084e
-commit 5d14019ba2ff54acbfd20a6b9b96bb860a8c7c31
-Author: markus@openbsd.org <markus@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Jul 27 12:03:17 2018 +0000
+commit a6258e5dc314c7d504ac9f0fbc3be96475581dbe
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Fri Jan 18 11:09:01 2019 +1100
- upstream: avoid expensive channel_open_message() calls; ok djm@
+ Add minimal fchownat and fchmodat implementations.
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: aea3b5512ad681cd8710367d743e8a753d4425d9
+ Fixes builds on at least OS X Lion, NetBSD 6 and Solaris 10.
-commit e655ee04a3cb7999dbf9641b25192353e2b69418
-Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Jul 27 05:34:42 2018 +0000
+commit 091093d25802b87d3b2b09f2c88d9f33e1ae5562
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Fri Jan 18 12:11:42 2019 +1300
- upstream: Now that ssh can't be setuid, remove the
-
- original_real_uid and original_effective_uid globals and replace with calls
- to plain getuid(). ok djm@
+ Add a minimal implementation of utimensat().
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 92561c0cd418d34e6841e20ba09160583e27b68c
+ Some systems (eg older OS X) do not have utimensat, so provide minimal
+ implementation in compat layer. Fixes build on at least El Capitan.
-commit 73ddb25bae4c33a0db361ac13f2e3a60d7c6c4a5
-Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Jul 27 05:13:02 2018 +0000
+commit 609644027dde1f82213699cb6599e584c7efcb75
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Tue Jan 1 22:20:16 2019 +0000
- upstream: Remove uid checks from low port binds. Now that ssh
+ upstream: regress bits for banner processing refactor (this test was
- cannot be setuid and sshd always has privsep on, we can remove the uid checks
- for low port binds and just let the system do the check. We leave a sanity
- check for the !privsep case so long as the code is stil there. with & ok
- djm@
+ depending on ssh returning a particular error message for banner parsing
+ failure)
+
+ reminded by bluhm@
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 9535cfdbd1cd54486fdbedfaee44ce4367ec7ca0
+ OpenBSD-Regress-ID: f24fc303d40931157431df589b386abf5e1be575
-commit c12033e102760d043bc5c98e6c8180e4d331b0df
-Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Jul 27 03:55:22 2018 +0000
+commit f47d72ddad75b93d3cbc781718b0fa9046c03df8
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Thu Jan 17 04:45:09 2019 +0000
- upstream: ssh(1) no longer supports being setuid root. Remove reference
+ upstream: tun_fwd_ifnames variable should b
- to crc32 which went with protocol 1. Pointed out by deraadt@.
+ =?UTF-8?q?e=20extern;=20from=20Hanno=20B=C3=B6ck?=
+ MIME-Version: 1.0
+ Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
+ Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: f8763c25fd96ed91dd1abdab5667fd2e27e377b6
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: d53dede6e521161bf04d39d09947db6253a38271
-commit 4492e2ec4e1956a277ef507f51d66e5c2aafaaf8
-Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
-Date: Fri Jul 27 14:15:28 2018 +1000
+commit 943d0965263cae1c080ce5a9d0b5aa341885e55d
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Thu Jan 17 04:20:53 2019 +0000
- correct snprintf truncation check in closefrom()
+ upstream: include time.h for time(3)/nanosleep(2); from Ian
- Truncation cannot happen unless the system has set PATH_MAX to some
- nonsensically low value.
+ McKellar
- bz#2862, patch from Daniel Le
-
-commit 149cab325a8599a003364ed833f878449c15f259
-Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Fri Jul 27 13:46:06 2018 +1000
-
- Include stdarg.h in mkdtemp for va_list.
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 6412ccd06a88f65b207a1089345f51fa1244ea51
-commit 6728f31bdfdc864d192773c32465b1860e23f556
-Author: deraadt@openbsd.org <deraadt@openbsd.org>
-Date: Wed Jul 25 17:12:35 2018 +0000
+commit dbb4dec6d5d671b5e9d67ef02162a610ad052068
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Thu Jan 17 01:50:24 2019 +0000
- upstream: Don't redefine Makefile choices which come correct from
+ upstream: many of the global variables in this file can be made static;
- bsd.*.mk ok markus
+ patch from Markus Schmidt
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 814b2f670df75759e1581ecef530980b2b3d7e0f
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: f3db619f67beb53257b21bac0e92b4fb7d5d5737
-commit 21fd477a855753c1a8e450963669e28e39c3b5d2
-Author: deraadt@openbsd.org <deraadt@openbsd.org>
-Date: Wed Jul 25 13:56:23 2018 +0000
+commit 60d8c84e0887514c99c9ce071965fafaa1c3d34a
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Wed Jan 16 23:23:45 2019 +0000
- upstream: fix indent; Clemens Goessnitzer
+ upstream: Add "-h" flag to sftp chown/chgrp/chmod commands to
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: b5149a6d92b264d35f879d24608087b254857a83
-
-commit 8e433c2083db8664c41499ee146448ea7ebe7dbf
-Author: beck@openbsd.org <beck@openbsd.org>
-Date: Wed Jul 25 13:10:56 2018 +0000
-
- upstream: Use the caller provided (copied) pwent struct in
+ request they do not follow symlinks. Requires recently-committed
+ lsetstat@openssh.com extension on the server side.
- load_public_identity_files instead of calling getpwuid() again and discarding
- the argument. This prevents a client crash where tilde_expand_filename calls
- getpwuid() again before the pwent pointer is used. Issue noticed and reported
- by Pierre-Olivier Martel <pom@apple.com> ok djm@ deraadt@
+ ok markus@ dtucker@
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: a067d74b5b098763736c94cc1368de8ea3f0b157
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: f93bb3f6f7eb2fb7ef1e59126e72714f1626d604
-commit e2127abb105ae72b6fda64fff150e6b24b3f1317
-Author: jmc@openbsd.org <jmc@openbsd.org>
-Date: Mon Jul 23 19:53:55 2018 +0000
+commit dbbc7e0eab7262f34b8e0cd6efecd1c77b905ed0
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Wed Jan 16 23:22:10 2019 +0000
- upstream: oops, failed to notice that SEE ALSO got messed up;
+ upstream: add support for a "lsetstat@openssh.com" extension. This
+
+ replicates the functionality of the existing SSH2_FXP_SETSTAT operation but
+ does not follow symlinks. Based on a patch from Bert Haverkamp in bz#2067 but
+ with more attribute modifications supported.
+
+ ok markus@ dtucker@
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 61c1306542cefdc6e59ac331751afe961557427d
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: f7234f6e90db19655d55d936a115ee4ccb6aaf80
-commit ddf1b797c2d26bbbc9d410aa4f484cbe94673587
-Author: kn@openbsd.org <kn@openbsd.org>
-Date: Mon Jul 23 19:02:49 2018 +0000
+commit 4a526941d328fc3d97068c6a4cbd9b71b70fe5e1
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Jan 4 03:27:50 2019 +0000
- upstream: Point to glob in section 7 for the actual list of special
-
- characters instead the C API in section 3.
+ upstream: eliminate function-static attempt counters for
- OK millert jmc nicm, "the right idea" deraadt
+ passwd/kbdint authmethods by moving them to the client authctxt; Patch from
+ Markus Schmidt, ok markus@
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: a74fd215488c382809e4d041613aeba4a4b1ffc6
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 4df4404a5d5416eb056f68e0e2f4fa91ba3b3f7f
-commit 01c98d9661d0ed6156e8602b650f72eed9fc4d12
-Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
-Date: Sun Jul 22 12:16:59 2018 +0000
+commit 8a8183474c41bd6cebaa917346b549af2239ba2f
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Jan 4 03:23:00 2019 +0000
- upstream: Switch authorized_keys example from ssh-dss to ssh-rsa
+ upstream: fix memory leak of ciphercontext when rekeying; bz#2942
- since the former is no longer enabled by default. Pointed out by Daniel A.
- Maierhofer, ok jmc
+ Patch from Markus Schmidt; ok markus@
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 6a196cef53d7524e0c9b58cdbc1b5609debaf8c7
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 7877f1b82e249986f1ef98d0ae76ce987d332bdd
-commit 472269f8fe19343971c2d08f504ab5cbb8234b33
+commit 5bed70afce0907b6217418d0655724c99b683d93
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Jul 20 05:01:10 2018 +0000
+Date: Tue Jan 1 23:10:53 2019 +0000
- upstream: slightly-clearer description for AuthenticationMethods - the
+ upstream: static on global vars, const on handler tables that contain
- lists have comma-separated elements; bz#2663 from Hans Meier
+ function pointers; from Mike Frysinger
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 931c983d0fde4764d0942fb2c2b5017635993b5a
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 7ef2305e50d3caa6326286db43cf2cfaf03960e0
-commit c59aca8adbdf7f5597084ad360a19bedb3f80970
-Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
-Date: Fri Jul 20 14:53:42 2018 +1000
+commit 007a88b48c97d092ed2f501bbdcb70d9925277be
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Thu Dec 27 23:02:11 2018 +0000
- Create control sockets in clean temp directories
+ upstream: Request RSA-SHA2 signatures for
- Adds a regress/mkdtemp tool and uses it to create empty temp
- directories for tests needing control sockets.
+ rsa-sha2-{256|512}-cert-v01@openssh.com cert algorithms; ok markus@
- Patch from Colin Watson via bz#2660; ok dtucker
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: afc6f7ca216ccd821656d1c911d2a3deed685033
-commit 6ad8648e83e4f4ace37b742a05c2a6b6b872514e
+commit eb347d086c35428c47fe52b34588cbbc9b49d9a6
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Jul 20 03:46:34 2018 +0000
+Date: Thu Dec 27 03:37:49 2018 +0000
- upstream: remove unused zlib.h
+ upstream: ssh_packet_set_state() now frees ssh->kex implicitly, so
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 8d274a9b467c7958df12668b49144056819f79f1
-
-commit 3ba6e6883527fe517b6e4a824876e2fe62af22fc
-Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
-Date: Thu Jul 19 23:03:16 2018 +0000
-
- upstream: Fix typo in comment. From Alexandru Iacob via github.
+ don't do explicit kex_free() beforehand
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: eff4ec07c6c8c5483533da43a4dda37d72ef7f1d
+ OpenBSD-Regress-ID: f2f73bad47f62a2040ccba0a72cadcb12eda49cf
-commit c77bc73c91bc656e343a1961756e09dd1b170820
-Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Fri Jul 20 13:48:51 2018 +1000
+commit bb542f0cf6f7511a22a08c492861e256a82376a9
+Author: tedu@openbsd.org <tedu@openbsd.org>
+Date: Sat Dec 15 00:50:21 2018 +0000
- Explicitly include openssl before zlib.
+ upstream: remove unused and problematic sudo clean. ok espie
- Some versions of OpenSSL have "free_func" in their headers, which zlib
- typedefs. Including openssl after zlib (eg via sshkey.h) results in
- "syntax error before `free_func'", which this fixes.
+ OpenBSD-Regress-ID: ca90c20a15a85b661e13e98b80c10e65cd662f7b
-commit 95d41e90eafcd1286a901e8e361e4a37b98aeb52
-Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
-Date: Thu Jul 19 10:28:47 2018 +0000
+commit 0a843d9a0e805f14653a555f5c7a8ba99d62c12d
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Thu Dec 27 03:25:24 2018 +0000
- upstream: Deprecate UsePrivilegedPort now that support for running
+ upstream: move client/server SSH-* banners to buffers under
- ssh(1) setuid has been removed, remove supporting code and clean up
- references to it in the man pages
+ ssh->kex and factor out the banner exchange. This eliminates some common code
+ from the client and server.
- We have not shipped ssh(1) the setuid bit since 2002. If ayone
- really needs to make connections from a low port number this can
- be implemented via a small setuid ProxyCommand.
+ Also be more strict about handling \r characters - these should only
+ be accepted immediately before \n (pointed out by Jann Horn).
- ok markus@ jmc@ djm@
+ Inspired by a patch from Markus Schmidt.
+ (lots of) feedback and ok markus@
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: d03364610b7123ae4c6792f5274bd147b6de717e
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 1cc7885487a6754f63641d7d3279b0941890275b
-commit 258dc8bb07dfb35a46e52b0822a2c5b7027df60a
+commit 434b587afe41c19391821e7392005068fda76248
Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
-Date: Wed Jul 18 11:34:04 2018 +0000
+Date: Fri Dec 7 04:36:09 2018 +0000
- upstream: Remove support for running ssh(1) setuid and fatal if
+ upstream: Fix calculation of initial bandwidth limits. Account for
- attempted. Do not link uidwap.c into ssh any more. Neuters
- UsePrivilegedPort, which will be marked as deprecated shortly. ok markus@
- djm@
+ written bytes before the initial timer check so that the first buffer written
+ is accounted. Set the threshold after which the timer is checked such that
+ the limit starts being computed as soon as possible, ie after the second
+ buffer is written. This prevents an initial burst of traffic and provides a
+ more accurate bandwidth limit. bz#2927, ok djm.
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: c4ba5bf9c096f57a6ed15b713a1d7e9e2e373c42
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: ff3ef76e4e43040ec198c2718d5682c36b255cb6
-commit ac590760b251506b0a152551abbf8e8d6dc2f527
-Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
-Date: Mon Jul 16 22:25:01 2018 +0000
+commit a6a0788cbbe8dfce2819ee43b09c80725742e21c
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Dec 7 03:39:40 2018 +0000
- upstream: Slot 0 in the hostbased key array was previously RSA1,
-
- but that is now gone and the slot is unused so remove it. Remove two
- now-unused macros, and add an array bounds check to the two remaining ones
- (array is statically sized, so mostly a safety check on future changes). ok
- markus@
+ upstream: only consider the ext-info-c extension during the initial
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 2e4c0ca6cc1d8daeccead2aa56192a3f9d5e1e7a
-
-commit 26efc2f5df0e3bcf6a6bbdd0506fd682d60c2145
-Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
-Date: Mon Jul 16 11:05:41 2018 +0000
-
- upstream: Remove support for loading HostBasedAuthentication keys
+ KEX. It shouldn't be sent in subsequent ones, but if it is present we should
+ ignore it.
- directly in ssh(1) and always use ssh-keysign. This removes one of the few
- remaining reasons why ssh(1) might be setuid. ok markus@
+ This prevents sshd from sending a SSH_MSG_EXT_INFO for REKEX for buggy
+ these clients. Reported by Jakub Jelen via bz2929; ok dtucker@
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 97f01e1448707129a20d75f86bad5d27c3cf0b7d
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 91564118547f7807030ec537480303e2371902f9
-commit 3eb7f1038d17af7aea3c2c62d1e30cd545607640
+commit 63bba57a32c5bb6158d57cf4c47022daf89c14a0
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Mon Jul 16 07:06:50 2018 +0000
+Date: Fri Dec 7 03:33:18 2018 +0000
- upstream: keep options.identity_file_userprovided array in sync when we
-
- load keys, fixing some spurious error messages; ok markus
+ upstream: fix option letter pasto in previous
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: c63e3d5200ee2cf9e35bda98de847302566c6a00
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: e26c8bf2f2a808f3c47960e1e490d2990167ec39
-commit 2f131e1b34502aa19f345e89cabf6fa3fc097f09
+commit 737e4edd82406595815efadc28ed5161b8b0c01a
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Mon Jul 16 03:09:59 2018 +0000
+Date: Fri Dec 7 03:32:26 2018 +0000
- upstream: memleak in unittest; found by valgrind
+ upstream: mention that the ssh-keygen -F (find host in
- OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 168c23b0fb09fc3d0b438628990d3fd9260a8a5e
-
-commit de2997a4cf22ca0a524f0e5b451693c583e2fd89
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Mon Jul 16 03:09:13 2018 +0000
-
- upstream: memleaks; found by valgrind
+ authorized_keys) and -R (remove host from authorized_keys) options may accept
+ either a bare hostname or a [hostname]:port combo. bz#2935
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 6c3ba22be53e753c899545f771e8399fc93cd844
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 5535cf4ce78375968b0d2cd7aa316fa3eb176780
-commit 61cc0003eb37fa07603c969c12b7c795caa498f3
-Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Sat Jul 14 16:49:01 2018 +1000
+commit 8a22ffaa13391cfe5b40316d938fe0fb931e9296
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date: Fri Dec 7 15:41:16 2018 +1100
- Undef a few new macros in sys-queue.h.
+ expose $SSH_CONNECTION in the PAM environment
- Prevents macro redefinition warnings on OSX.
-
-commit 30a2c213877a54a44dfdffb6ca8db70be5b457e0
-Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Fri Jul 13 13:40:20 2018 +1000
-
- Include unistd.h for geteuid declaration.
+ This makes the connection 4-tuple available to PAM modules that
+ wish to use it in decision-making. bz#2741
-commit 1dd32c23f2a85714dfafe2a9cc516971d187caa4
-Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Fri Jul 13 13:38:10 2018 +1000
+commit a784fa8c7a7b084d63bae82ccfea902131bb45c5
+Author: Kevin Adler <kadler@us.ibm.com>
+Date: Wed Dec 12 22:12:45 2018 -0600
- Fallout from buffer conversion in AUDIT_EVENTS.
+ Don't pass loginmsg by address now that it's an sshbuf*
+
+ In 120a1ec74, loginmsg was changed from the legacy Buffer type
+ to struct sshbuf*, but it missed changing calls to
+ sys_auth_allowed_user and sys_auth_record_login which passed
+ loginmsg by address. Now that it's a pointer, just pass it directly.
- Supply missing "int r" and fix error path for sshbuf_new().
+ This only affects AIX, unless there are out of tree users.
-commit 7449c178e943e5c4f6c8416a4e41d93b70c11c9e
+commit 285310b897969a63ef224d39e7cc2b7316d86940
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Jul 13 02:13:50 2018 +0000
+Date: Fri Dec 7 02:31:20 2018 +0000
- upstream: make this use ssh_proxy rather than starting/stopping a
+ upstream: no need to allocate channels_pre/channels_post in
- daemon for each testcase
+ channel_init_channels() as we do it anyway in channel_handler_init() that we
+ call at the end of the function. Fix from Markus Schmidt via bz#2938
- OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 608b7655ea65b1ba8fff5a13ce9caa60ef0c8166
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 74893638af49e3734f1e33a54af1b7ea533373ed
-commit dbab02f9208d9baa134cec1d007054ec82b96ca9
+commit 87d6cf1cbc91df6815db8fe0acc7c910bc3d18e4
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Jul 13 02:13:19 2018 +0000
+Date: Fri Nov 30 02:24:52 2018 +0000
- upstream: fix leaks in unit test; with this, all unit tests are
-
- leak free (as far as valgrind can spot anyway)
+ upstream: don't attempt to connect to empty SSH_AUTH_SOCK; bz#293
- OpenBSD-Regress-ID: b824d8b27998365379963440e5d18b95ca03aa17
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 0e8fc8f19f14b21adef7109e0faa583d87c0e929
-commit 2f6accff5085eb79b0dbe262d8b85ed017d1a51c
-Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
-Date: Fri Jul 13 11:39:25 2018 +1000
+commit 91b19198c3f604f5eef2c56dbe36f29478243141
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Wed Nov 28 06:00:38 2018 +0000
- Enable leak checks for unit tests with valgrind
+ upstream: don't truncate user or host name in "user@host's
- Leave the leak checking on unconditionally when running with valgrind.
- The unit tests are leak-free and I want them to stay that way.
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: e6ca01a8d58004b7f2cac0b1b7ce8f87e425e360
-commit e46cfbd9db5e907b821bf4fd0184d4dab99815ee
-Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
-Date: Fri Jul 13 11:38:59 2018 +1000
+commit dd0cf6318d9b4b3533bda1e3bc021b2cd7246b7a
+Author: jmc@openbsd.org <jmc@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Nov 23 06:58:28 2018 +0000
- increase timeout to match cfgmatch.sh
+ upstream: tweak previous;
- lets test pass under valgrind (on my workstation at least)
-
-commit 6aa1bf475cf3e7a2149acc5a1e80e904749f064c
-Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
-Date: Thu Jul 12 14:54:18 2018 +1000
-
- rm regress/misc/kexfuzz/*.o in distclean target
-
-commit eef1447ddb559c03725a23d4aa6d03f40e8b0049
-Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
-Date: Thu Jul 12 14:49:26 2018 +1000
-
- repair !WITH_OPENSSL build
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 08f096922eb00c98251501c193ff9e83fbb5de4f
-commit 4d3b2f36fd831941d1627ac587faae37b6d3570f
-Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
-Date: Thu Jul 12 14:49:14 2018 +1000
+commit 8a85f5458d1c802471ca899c97f89946f6666e61
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Sun Nov 25 21:44:05 2018 +1100
- missing headers
+ Include stdio.h for FILE if needed.
-commit 3f420a692b293921216549c1099c2e46ff284eae
+commit 16fb23f25454991272bfe4598cc05d20fcd25116
Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Thu Jul 12 14:57:46 2018 +1000
+Date: Sun Nov 25 14:05:57 2018 +1100
- Remove key.h from portable files too.
+ Reverse order of OpenSSL init functions.
- Commit 5467fbcb removed key.h so stop including it in portable files
- too. Fixes builds on lots of platforms.
+ Try the new init function (OPENSSL_init_crypto) before falling back to
+ the old one (OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms).
-commit e2c4af311543093f16005c10044f7e06af0426f0
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Thu Jul 12 04:35:25 2018 +0000
+commit 98f878d2272bf8dff21f2a0265d963c29e33fed2
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Sun Nov 25 14:05:08 2018 +1100
- upstream: remove prototype to long-gone function
+ Improve OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms check.
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 0414642ac7ce01d176b9f359091a66a8bbb640bd
+ OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms() may be a macro so check for that too.
-commit 394a842e60674bf8ee5130b9f15b01452a0b0285
-Author: markus@openbsd.org <markus@openbsd.org>
-Date: Wed Jul 11 18:55:11 2018 +0000
+commit 9e34e0c59ab04514f9de9934a772283f7f372afe
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Nov 23 05:08:07 2018 +0000
- upstream: treat ssh_packet_write_wait() errors as fatal; ok djm@
+ upstream: add a ssh_config "Match final" predicate
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: f88ba43c9d54ed2d911218aa8d3f6285430629c3
-
-commit 5467fbcb09528ecdcb914f4f2452216c24796790
-Author: markus@openbsd.org <markus@openbsd.org>
-Date: Wed Jul 11 18:53:29 2018 +0000
-
- upstream: remove legacy key emulation layer; ok djm@
+ Matches in same pass as "Match canonical" but doesn't require
+ hostname canonicalisation be enabled. bz#2906 ok markus
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 2b1f9619259e222bbd4fe9a8d3a0973eafb9dd8d
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: fba1dfe9f6e0cabcd0e2b3be13f7a434199beffa
-commit 5dc4c59d5441a19c99e7945779f7ec9051126c25
-Author: martijn@openbsd.org <martijn@openbsd.org>
-Date: Wed Jul 11 08:19:35 2018 +0000
+commit 4da58d58736b065b1182b563d10ad6765d811c6d
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Nov 23 02:53:57 2018 +0000
- upstream: s/wuth/with/ in comment
+ upstream: Remove now-unneeded ifdef SIGINFO around handler since it is
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 9de41468afd75f54a7f47809d2ad664aa577902c
-
-commit 1c688801e9dd7f9889fb2a29bc2b6fbfbc35a11f
-Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Wed Jul 11 12:12:38 2018 +1000
-
- Include stdlib.h for declaration of free.
+ now always used for SIGUSR1 even when SIGINFO is not defined. This will make
+ things simpler in -portable.
- Fixes build with -Werror on at least Fedora and probably others.
-
-commit fccfa239def497615f92ed28acc57cfe63da3666
-Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
-Date: Wed Jul 11 10:19:56 2018 +1000
-
- VALGRIND_CHECK_LEAKS logic was backwards :(
-
-commit 416287d45fcde0a8e66eee8b99aa73bd58607588
-Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Wed Jul 11 10:10:26 2018 +1000
-
- Fix sshbuf_new error path in skey.
+ OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 4ff0265b335820b0646d37beb93f036ded0dc43f
-commit 7aab109b8b90a353c1af780524f1ac0d3af47bab
+commit c721d5877509875c8515df0215fa1dab862013bc
Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Wed Jul 11 10:06:18 2018 +1000
+Date: Fri Nov 23 14:11:20 2018 +1100
- Supply missing third arg in skey.
+ Move RANDOM_SEED_SIZE outside ifdef.
- During the change to the new buffer api the third arg to
- sshbuf_get_cstring was ommitted. Fixes build when configured with skey.
+ RANDOM_SEED_SIZE is used by both the OpenSSL and non-OpenSSL code
+ This fixes the build with configureed --without-openssl.
-commit 380320bb72cc353a901790ab04b6287fd335dc4a
+commit deb51552c3ce7ce72c8d0232e4f36f2e7c118c7d
Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Wed Jul 11 10:03:34 2018 +1000
+Date: Thu Nov 22 19:59:28 2018 +1100
- Supply some more missing "int r" in skey
+ Resync with OpenBSD by pulling in an ifdef SIGINFO.
-commit d20720d373d8563ee737d1a45dc5e0804d622dbc
+commit 28c7b2cd050f4416bfcf3869a20e3ea138aa52fe
Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
-Date: Wed Jul 11 09:56:36 2018 +1000
-
- disable valgrind memleak checking by default
-
- Add VALGRIND_CHECK_LEAKS knob to turn it back on.
-
-commit 79c9d35018f3a5e30ae437880b669aa8636cd3cd
-Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Wed Jul 11 09:54:00 2018 +1000
-
- Supply missing "int r" in skey code.
-
-commit 984bacfaacbbe31c35191b828fb5b5b2f0362c36
-Author: sf@openbsd.org <sf@openbsd.org>
-Date: Tue Jul 10 09:36:58 2018 +0000
+Date: Fri Nov 23 10:45:20 2018 +1100
- upstream: re-remove some pre-auth compression bits
-
- This time, make sure to not remove things that are necessary for
- pre-auth compression on the client. Add a comment that pre-auth
- compression is still supported in the client.
+ fix configure test for OpenSSL version
- ok markus@
+ square brackets in case statements may be eaten by autoconf.
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 282c6fec7201f18a5c333bbb68d9339734d2f784
+ Report and fix from Filipp Gunbin; tweaked by naddy@
-commit 120a1ec74e8d9d29f4eb9a27972ddd22351ddef9
+commit 42c5ec4b97b6a1bae70f323952d0646af16ce710
Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
-Date: Tue Jul 10 19:39:52 2018 +1000
-
- Adapt portable to legacy buffer API removal
-
-commit 0f3958c1e6ffb8ea4ba27e2a97a00326fce23246
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Tue Jul 10 09:13:30 2018 +0000
-
- upstream: kerberos/gssapi fixes for buffer removal
-
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 1cdf56fec95801e4563c47f21696f04cd8b60c4c
-
-commit c74ae8e7c45f325f3387abd48fa7dfef07a08069
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Tue Jul 10 06:45:29 2018 +0000
-
- upstream: buffer.[ch] and bufaux.c are no more
-
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: d1a1852284e554f39525eb4d4891b207cfb3d3a0
-
-commit a881e5a133d661eca923fb0633a03152ab2b70b2
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Tue Jul 10 06:43:52 2018 +0000
+Date: Fri Nov 23 10:40:06 2018 +1100
- upstream: one mention of Buffer that almost got away :)
+ refactor libcrypto initialisation
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 30d7c27a90b4544ad5dfacf654595710cd499f02
-
-commit 49f47e656b60bcd1d1db98d88105295f4b4e600d
-Author: markus@openbsd.org <markus@openbsd.org>
-Date: Mon Jul 9 21:59:10 2018 +0000
-
- upstream: replace cast with call to sshbuf_mutable_ptr(); ok djm@
+ Don't call OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms() unless OpenSSL actually
+ supports it.
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 4dfe9d29fa93d9231645c89084f7217304f7ba29
-
-commit cb30cd47041edb03476be1c8ef7bc1f4b69d1555
-Author: markus@openbsd.org <markus@openbsd.org>
-Date: Mon Jul 9 21:56:06 2018 +0000
-
- upstream: remove legacy buffer API emulation layer; ok djm@
+ Move all libcrypto initialisation to a single function, and call that
+ from seed_rng() that is called early in each tool's main().
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 2dd5dc17cbc23195be4299fa93be2707a0e08ad9
+ Prompted by patch from Rosen Penev
-commit 235c7c4e3bf046982c2d8242f30aacffa01073d1
-Author: markus@openbsd.org <markus@openbsd.org>
-Date: Mon Jul 9 21:53:45 2018 +0000
+commit 5b60b6c02009547a3e2a99d4886965de2a4719da
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date: Thu Nov 22 08:59:11 2018 +0000
- upstream: sshd: switch monitor to sshbuf API; lots of help & ok
+ upstream: Output info on SIGUSR1 as well as
- djm@
+ SIGINFO to resync with portable. (ID sync only).
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: d89bd02d33974fd35ca0b8940d88572227b34a48
+ OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 699d153e2de22dce51a1b270c40a98472d1a1b16
-commit b8d9214d969775e409e1408ecdf0d58fad99b344
-Author: markus@openbsd.org <markus@openbsd.org>
-Date: Mon Jul 9 21:37:55 2018 +0000
+commit e4ae345dc75b34fd870c2e8690d831d2c1088eb7
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date: Thu Nov 22 08:48:32 2018 +0000
- upstream: sshd: switch GSSAPI to sshbuf API; ok djm@
+ upstream: Append pid to temp files in /var/run and set a cleanup
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: e48449ab4be3f006f7ba33c66241b7d652973e30
-
-commit c7d39ac8dc3587c5f05bdd5bcd098eb5c201c0c8
-Author: markus@openbsd.org <markus@openbsd.org>
-Date: Mon Jul 9 21:35:50 2018 +0000
-
- upstream: sshd: switch authentication to sshbuf API; ok djm@
+ trap for them. This allows multiple instances of tests to run without
+ colliding.
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 880aa06bce4b140781e836bb56bec34873290641
+ OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 57add105ecdfc54752d8003acdd99eb68c3e0b4c
-commit c3cb7790e9efb14ba74b2d9f543ad593b3d55b31
-Author: markus@openbsd.org <markus@openbsd.org>
-Date: Mon Jul 9 21:29:36 2018 +0000
+commit f72d0f52effca5aa20a193217346615ecd3eed53
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date: Wed Oct 31 11:09:27 2018 +0000
- upstream: sshd: switch config to sshbuf API; ok djm@
+ upstream: UsePrivilegeSeparation no is deprecated
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 72b02017bac7feac48c9dceff8355056bea300bd
-
-commit 2808d18ca47ad3d251836c555f0e22aaca03d15c
-Author: markus@openbsd.org <markus@openbsd.org>
-Date: Mon Jul 9 21:26:02 2018 +0000
-
- upstream: sshd: switch loginmsg to sshbuf API; ok djm@
+ test "yes" and "sandbox".
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: f3cb4e54bff15c593602d95cc43e32ee1a4bac42
+ OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 80e685ed8990766527dc629b1affc09a75bfe2da
-commit 89dd615b8b531979be63f05f9d5624367c9b28e6
-Author: markus@openbsd.org <markus@openbsd.org>
-Date: Mon Jul 9 21:20:26 2018 +0000
+commit 35d0e5fefc419bddcbe09d7fc163d8cd3417125b
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Wed Oct 17 23:28:05 2018 +0000
- upstream: ttymodes: switch to sshbuf API; ok djm@
+ upstream: add some knobs:
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 5df340c5965e822c9da21e19579d08dea3cbe429
-
-commit f4608a7065480516ab46214f554e5f853fb7870f
-Author: markus@openbsd.org <markus@openbsd.org>
-Date: Mon Jul 9 21:18:10 2018 +0000
-
- upstream: client: switch mux to sshbuf API; with & ok djm@
+ UNITTEST_FAST?= no # Skip slow tests (e.g. less intensive fuzzing).
+ UNITTEST_SLOW?= no # Include slower tests (e.g. more intensive fuzzing).
+ UNITTEST_VERBOSE?= no # Verbose test output (inc. per-test names).
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 5948fb98d704f9c4e075b92edda64e0290b5feb2
-
-commit cecee2d607099a7bba0a84803e2325d15be4277b
-Author: markus@openbsd.org <markus@openbsd.org>
-Date: Mon Jul 9 21:03:30 2018 +0000
-
- upstream: client: switch to sshbuf API; ok djm@
+ useful if you want to run the tests as a smoke test to exercise the
+ functionality without waiting for all the fuzzers to run.
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 60cb0356114acc7625ab85105f6f6a7cd44a8d05
+ OpenBSD-Regress-ID: e04d82ebec86068198cd903acf1c67563c57315e
-commit ff55f4ad898137d4703e7a2bcc81167dfe8e9324
-Author: markus@openbsd.org <markus@openbsd.org>
-Date: Mon Jul 9 20:39:28 2018 +0000
+commit c1941293d9422a14dda372b4c21895e72aa7a063
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Thu Nov 22 15:52:26 2018 +1100
- upstream: pkcs11: switch to sshbuf API; ok djm@
+ Resync Makefile.inc with upstream.
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 98cc4e800f1617c51caf59a6cb3006f14492db79
+ It's unused in -portable, but having it out of sync makes other syncs
+ fail to apply.
-commit 168b46f405d6736960ba7930389eecb9b6710b7e
-Author: sf@openbsd.org <sf@openbsd.org>
-Date: Mon Jul 9 13:37:10 2018 +0000
+commit 928f1231f65f88cd4c73e6e0edd63d2cf6295d77
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Mon Nov 19 04:12:32 2018 +0000
- upstream: Revert previous two commits
-
- It turns out we still support pre-auth compression on the client.
- Therefore revert the previous two commits:
-
- date: 2018/07/06 09:06:14; author: sf; commitid: yZVYKIRtUZWD9CmE;
- Rename COMP_DELAYED to COMP_ZLIB
-
- Only delayed compression is supported nowadays.
-
- ok markus@
+ upstream: silence (to log level debug2) failure messages when
- date: 2018/07/06 09:05:01; author: sf; commitid: rEGuT5UgI9f6kddP;
- Remove leftovers from pre-authentication compression
+ loading the default hostkeys. Hostkeys explicitly specified in the
+ configuration or on the command-line are still reported as errors, and
+ failure to load at least one host key remains a fatal error.
+ MIME-Version: 1.0
+ Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
+ Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
- Support for this has been removed in 2016.
- COMP_DELAYED will be renamed in a later commit.
+ Based on patch from Dag-Erling Smørgrav via
+ https://github.com/openssh/openssh-portable/pull/103
- ok markus@
+ ok markus@
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: cdfef526357e4e1483c86cf599491b2dafb77772
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: ffc2e35a75d1008effaf05a5e27425041c27b684
-commit ab39267fa1243d02b6c330615539fc4b21e17dc4
-Author: sf@openbsd.org <sf@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Jul 6 09:06:14 2018 +0000
+commit 7fca94edbe8ca9f879da9fdd2afd959c4180f4c7
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date: Sun Nov 18 22:43:29 2018 +0000
- upstream: Rename COMP_DELAYED to COMP_ZLIB
-
- Only delayed compression is supported nowadays.
+ upstream: Fix inverted logic for redirecting ProxyCommand stderr to
- ok markus@
+ /dev/null. Fixes mosh in proxycommand mode that was broken by the previous
+ ProxyCommand change that was reported by matthieu@. ok djm@ danj@
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 5b1dbaf3d9a4085aaa10fec0b7a4364396561821
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: c6fc9641bc250221a0a81c6beb2e72d603f8add6
-commit 95db395d2e56a6f868193aead6cadb2493f036c6
-Author: sf@openbsd.org <sf@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Jul 6 09:05:01 2018 +0000
+commit ccef7c4faf914993b53035cd2b25ce02ab039c9d
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Nov 16 06:17:38 2018 +0000
- upstream: Remove leftovers from pre-authentication compression
-
- Support for this has been removed in 2016.
- COMP_DELAYED will be renamed in a later commit.
+ upstream: redirect stderr of ProxyCommands to /dev/null when ssh is
- ok markus@
+ started with ControlPersist; based on patch from Steffen Prohaska
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 6a99616c832627157113fcb0cf5a752daf2e6b58
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 1bcaa14a03ae80369d31021271ec75dce2597957
-commit f28a4d5cd24c4aa177e96b4f96957991e552cb70
-Author: sf@openbsd.org <sf@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Jul 6 09:03:02 2018 +0000
+commit 15182fd96845a03216d7ac5a2cf31c4e77e406e3
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Nov 16 06:10:29 2018 +0000
- upstream: Remove unused ssh_packet_start_compression()
+ upstream: make grandparent-parent-child sshbuf chains robust to
- ok markus@
+ use-after-free faults if the ancestors are freed before the descendents.
+ Nothing in OpenSSH uses this deallocation pattern. Reported by Jann Horn
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 9d34cf2f59aca5422021ae2857190578187dc2b4
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: d93501d1d2734245aac802a252b9bb2eccdba0f2
-commit 872517ddbb72deaff31d4760f28f2b0a1c16358f
-Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Fri Jul 6 13:32:02 2018 +1000
+commit 2a35862e664afde774d4a72497d394fe7306ccb5
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Nov 16 03:26:01 2018 +0000
- Defer setting bufsiz in getdelim.
+ upstream: use path_absolute() for pathname checks; from Manoj Ampalam
- Do not write to bufsiz until we are sure the malloc has succeeded,
- in case any callers rely on it (which they shouldn't). ok djm@
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 482ce71a5ea5c5f3bc4d00fd719481a6a584d925
-commit 3deb56f7190a414dc264e21e087a934fa1847283
+commit d0d1dfa55be1c5c0d77ab3096b198a64235f936d
Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Thu Jul 5 13:32:01 2018 +1000
+Date: Fri Nov 16 14:11:44 2018 +1100
- Fix other callers of read_environment_file.
+ Test for OPENSSL_init_crypto before using.
- read_environment_file recently gained an extra argument Some platform
- specific code also calls it so add the argument to those too. Fixes
- build on Solaris and AIX.
+ Check for the presence of OPENSSL_init_crypto and all the flags we want
+ before trying to use it (bz#2931).
-commit 314908f451e6b2d4ccf6212ad246fa4619c721d3
+commit 6010c0303a422a9c5fa8860c061bf7105eb7f8b2
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Wed Jul 4 13:51:45 2018 +0000
+Date: Fri Nov 16 03:03:10 2018 +0000
- upstream: deal with API rename: match_filter_list() =>
+ upstream: disallow empty incoming filename or ones that refer to the
- match_filter_blacklist()
+ current directory; based on report/patch from Harry Sintonen
- OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 2da342be913efeb51806351af906fab01ba4367f
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: f27651b30eaee2df49540ab68d030865c04f6de9
-commit 89f54cdf6b9cf1cf5528fd33897f1443913ddfb4
+commit aaed635e3a401cfcc4cc97f33788179c458901c3
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Wed Jul 4 13:51:12 2018 +0000
+Date: Fri Nov 16 02:46:20 2018 +0000
- upstream: exercise new expansion behaviour of
-
- PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes and, by proxy, test kex_assemble_names()
+ upstream: fix bug in client that was keeping a redundant ssh-agent
- ok markus@
+ socket around for the life of the connection; bz#2912; reported by Simon
+ Tatham; ok dtucker@
- OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 292978902e14d5729aa87e492dd166c842f72736
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 4ded588301183d343dce3e8c5fc1398e35058478
-commit 187633f24c71564e970681c8906df5a6017dcccf
+commit e76135e3007f1564427b2956c628923d8dc2f75a
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Tue Jul 3 13:53:26 2018 +0000
+Date: Fri Nov 16 02:43:56 2018 +0000
- upstream: add a comment that could have saved me 45 minutes of wild
+ upstream: fix bug in HostbasedAcceptedKeyTypes and
- goose chasing
+ PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes options. If only RSA-SHA2 siganture types were
+ specified, then authentication would always fail for RSA keys as the monitor
+ checks only the base key (not the signature algorithm) type against
+ *AcceptedKeyTypes. bz#2746; reported by Jakub Jelen; ok dtucker
- OpenBSD-Regress-ID: d469b29ffadd3402c090e21b792d627d46fa5297
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 117bc3dc54578dbdb515a1d3732988cb5b00461b
-commit 312d2f2861a2598ed08587cb6c45c0e98a85408f
+commit 5c1a63562cac0574c226224075b0829a50b48c9d
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Wed Jul 4 13:49:31 2018 +0000
+Date: Fri Nov 16 02:30:20 2018 +0000
- upstream: repair PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes (and friends) after RSA
-
- signature work - returns ability to add/remove/specify algorithms by
- wildcard.
-
- Algorithm lists are now fully expanded when the server/client configs
- are finalised, so errors are reported early and the config dumps
- (e.g. "ssh -G ...") now list the actual algorithms selected.
-
- Clarify that, while wildcards are accepted in algorithm lists, they
- aren't full pattern-lists that support negation.
+ upstream: support a prefix of '@' to suppress echo of sftp batch
- (lots of) feedback, ok markus@
+ commands; bz#2926; ok dtucker@
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: a8894c5c81f399a002f02ff4fe6b4fa46b1f3207
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 9d635636bc84aeae796467e059f7634de990a79d
-commit 303af5803bd74bf05d375c04e1a83b40c30b2be5
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Tue Jul 3 11:43:49 2018 +0000
+commit 90ef45f7aac33eaf55ec344e101548a01e570f29
+Author: schwarze@openbsd.org <schwarze@openbsd.org>
+Date: Tue Nov 13 07:22:45 2018 +0000
- upstream: some magic for RSA-SHA2 checks
+ upstream: fix markup error (missing blank before delimiter); from
- OpenBSD-Regress-ID: e5a9b11368ff6d86e7b25ad10ebe43359b471cd4
-
-commit 7d68e262944c1fff1574600fe0e5e92ec8b398f5
-Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
-Date: Tue Jul 3 23:27:11 2018 +1000
-
- depend
+ Mike Frysinger <vapier at gentoo dot org>
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 1bc5392f795ca86318d695e0947eaf71a5a4f6d9
-commit b4d4eda633af433d20232cbf7e855ceac8b83fe5
+commit 960e7c672dc106f3b759c081de3edb4d1138b36e
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Tue Jul 3 13:20:25 2018 +0000
+Date: Fri Nov 9 02:57:58 2018 +0000
- upstream: some finesse to fix RSA-SHA2 certificate authentication
+ upstream: typo in error message; caught by Debian lintian, via
- for certs hosted in ssh-agent
+ Colin Watson
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: e5fd5edd726137dda2d020e1cdebc464110a010f
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: bff614c7bd1f4ca491a84e9b5999f848d0d66758
-commit d78b75df4a57e0f92295f24298e5f2930e71c172
+commit 81f1620c836e6c79c0823ba44acca605226a80f1
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Tue Jul 3 13:07:58 2018 +0000
+Date: Fri Nov 9 02:56:22 2018 +0000
- upstream: check correct variable; unbreak agent keys
+ upstream: correct local variable name; from yawang AT microsoft.com
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: c36981fdf1f3ce04966d3310826a3e1e6233d93e
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: a0c228390856a215bb66319c89cb3959d3af8c87
-commit 2f30300c5e15929d0e34013f38d73e857f445e12
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Tue Jul 3 11:42:12 2018 +0000
+commit 1293740e800fa2e5ccd38842a2e4970c6f3b9831
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date: Wed Oct 31 11:20:05 2018 +0000
- upstream: crank version number to 7.8; needed for new compat flag
-
- for prior version; part of RSA-SHA2 strictification, ok markus@
+ upstream: Import new moduli.
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 84a11fc0efd2674c050712336b5093f5d408e32b
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: c07772f58028fda683ee6abd41c73da3ff70d403
-commit 4ba0d54794814ec0de1ec87987d0c3b89379b436
+commit 46925ae28e53fc9add336a4fcdb7ed4b86c3591c
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Tue Jul 3 11:39:54 2018 +0000
+Date: Fri Oct 26 01:23:03 2018 +0000
- upstream: Improve strictness and control over RSA-SHA2 signature
-
- In ssh, when an agent fails to return a RSA-SHA2 signature when
- requested and falls back to RSA-SHA1 instead, retry the signature to
- ensure that the public key algorithm sent in the SSH_MSG_USERAUTH
- matches the one in the signature itself.
-
- In sshd, strictly enforce that the public key algorithm sent in the
- SSH_MSG_USERAUTH message matches what appears in the signature.
-
- Make the sshd_config PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes and
- HostbasedAcceptedKeyTypes options control accepted signature algorithms
- (previously they selected supported key types). This allows these
- options to ban RSA-SHA1 in favour of RSA-SHA2.
-
- Add new signature algorithms "rsa-sha2-256-cert-v01@openssh.com" and
- "rsa-sha2-512-cert-v01@openssh.com" to force use of RSA-SHA2 signatures
- with certificate keys.
+ upstream: mention ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com in list of cert
- feedback and ok markus@
+ key type at start of doc
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: c6e9f6d45eed8962ad502d315d7eaef32c419dde
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: b46b0149256d67f05f2d5d01e160634ed1a67324
-commit 95344c257412b51199ead18d54eaed5bafb75617
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Tue Jul 3 10:59:35 2018 +0000
+commit 8d8340e2c215155637fe19cb1a837f71b2d55f7b
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Fri Nov 16 13:32:13 2018 +1100
- upstream: allow sshd_config PermitUserEnvironment to accept a
+ Remove fallback check for /usr/local/ssl.
- pattern-list of whitelisted environment variable names in addition to yes|no.
+ If configure could not find a working OpenSSL installation it would
+ fall back to checking in /usr/local/ssl. This made sense back when
+ systems did not ship with OpenSSL, but most do and OpenSSL 1.1 doesn't
+ use that as a default any more. The fallback behaviour also meant
+ that if you pointed --with-ssl-dir at a specific directory and it
+ didn't work, it would silently use either the system libs or the ones
+ in /usr/local/ssl. If you want to use /usr/local/ssl you'll need to
+ pass configure --with-ssl-dir=/usr/local/ssl. ok djm@
+
+commit ce93472134fb22eff73edbcd173a21ae38889331
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Fri Nov 16 12:44:01 2018 +1100
+
+ Fix check for OpenSSL 1.0.1 exactly.
- bz#1800, feedback and ok markus@
+ Both INSTALL and configure.ac claim OpenSSL >= 1.0.1 is supported; fix
+ compile-time check for 1.0.1 to match.
+
+commit f2970868f86161a22b2c377057fa3891863a692a
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Sun Nov 11 15:58:20 2018 +1100
+
+ Improve warnings in cygwin service setup.
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 77dc2b468e0bf04b53f333434ba257008a1fdf24
+ bz#2922, patch from vinschen at redhat.com.
-commit 6f56fe4b9578b0627667f8bce69d4d938a88324c
-Author: millert@openbsd.org <millert@openbsd.org>
-Date: Tue Jun 26 11:23:59 2018 +0000
+commit bd2d54fc1eee84bf87158a1277a50e6c8a303339
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Sun Nov 11 15:54:54 2018 +1100
- upstream: Fix "WARNING: line 6 disappeared in /etc/moduli, giving up"
+ Remove hardcoded service name in cygwin setup.
- when choosing a prime. An extra increment of linenum snuck in as part of the
- conversion to getline(). OK djm@ markus@
+ bz#2922, patch from Christian.Lupien at USherbrooke.ca, sanity check
+ by vinschen at redhat.com.
+
+commit d0153c77bf7964e694f1d26c56c41a571b8e9466
+Author: Dag-Erling Smørgrav <des@des.no>
+Date: Tue Oct 9 23:03:40 2018 +0200
+
+ AC_CHECK_SIZEOF() no longer needs a second argument.
+
+commit 9b47b083ca9d866249ada9f02dbd57c87b13806e
+Author: Manoj Ampalam <manojamp@microsoft.com>
+Date: Thu Nov 8 22:41:59 2018 -0800
+
+ Fix error message w/out nistp521.
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 0019225cb52ed621b71cd9f19ee2e78e57e3dd38
+ Correct error message when OpenSSL doesn't support certain ECDSA key
+ lengths.
-commit 1eee79a11c1b3594f055b01e387c49c9a6e80005
-Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
-Date: Mon Jul 2 14:13:30 2018 +0000
+commit 624d19ac2d56fa86a22417c35536caceb3be346f
+Author: Eneas U de Queiroz <cote2004-github@yahoo.com>
+Date: Tue Oct 9 16:17:42 2018 -0300
- upstream: One ampersand is enough to backgroud an process. OpenBSD
+ fix compilation with openssl built without ECC
- doesn't seem to mind, but some platforms in -portable object to the second.
+ ECDSA code in openssh-compat.h and libressl-api-compat.c needs to be
+ guarded by OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
- OpenBSD-Regress-ID: d6c3e404871764343761dc25c3bbe29c2621ff74
+ Signed-off-by: Eneas U de Queiroz <cote2004-github@yahoo.com>
-commit 6301e6c787d4e26bfae1119ab4f747bbcaa94e44
+commit 1801cd11d99d05a66ab5248c0555f55909a355ce
Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Mon Jul 2 21:16:58 2018 +1000
+Date: Thu Nov 8 15:03:11 2018 +1100
- Add implementation of getline.
+ Simplify OpenSSL 1.1 function checks.
- Add getline for the benefit of platforms that don't have it. Sourced
- from NetBSD (OpenBSD's implementation is a little too chummy with the
- internals of FILE).
+ Replace AC_SEARCH_LIBS checks for OpenSSL 1.1 functions with a single
+ AC_CHECK_FUNCS. ok djm@
-commit 84623e0037628f9992839063151f7a9f5f13099a
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Tue Jun 26 02:02:36 2018 +0000
+commit bc32f118d484e4d71d2a0828fd4eab7e4176c9af
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Mon Nov 5 17:31:24 2018 +1100
- upstream: whitespace
+ Fix pasto for HAVE_EVP_CIPHER_CTX_SET_IV.
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 9276951caf4daf555f6d262e95720e7f79244572
+ Prevents unnecessary redefinition. Patch from mforney at mforney.org.
-commit 90e51d672711c19a36573be1785caf35019ae7a8
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Mon Jun 25 22:28:33 2018 +0000
+commit 3719df60c66abc4b47200d41f571d67772f293ba
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Wed Oct 31 22:21:03 2018 +1100
- upstream: fix NULL dereference in open_listen_match_tcpip()
-
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: c968c1d29e392352383c0f9681fcc1e93620c4a9
+ Import new moduli.
-commit f535ff922a67d9fcc5ee69d060d1b21c8bb01d14
-Author: jmc@openbsd.org <jmc@openbsd.org>
-Date: Tue Jun 19 05:36:57 2018 +0000
+commit 595605d4abede475339d6a1f07a8cc674c11d1c3
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Sun Oct 28 15:18:13 2018 +1100
- upstream: spelling;
-
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: db542918185243bea17202383a581851736553cc
+ Update check for minimum OpenSSL version.
-commit 80e199d6175904152aafc5c297096c3e18297691
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Tue Jun 19 03:02:17 2018 +0000
+commit 6ab75aba340d827140d7ba719787aabaf39a0355
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Sun Oct 28 15:16:31 2018 +1100
- upstream: test PermitListen with bare port numbers
-
- OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 4b50a02dfb0ccaca08247f3877c444126ba901b3
+ Update required OpenSSL versions to match current.
-commit 87ddd676da0f3abd08b778b12b53b91b670dc93c
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Tue Jun 19 02:59:41 2018 +0000
+commit c801b0e38eae99427f37869370151b78f8e15c5d
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Sun Oct 28 14:34:12 2018 +1100
- upstream: allow bare port numbers to appear in PermitListen directives,
-
- e.g.
-
- PermitListen 2222 8080
-
- is equivalent to:
+ Use detected version functions in openssl compat.
- PermitListen *:2222 *:8080
+ Use detected functions in compat layer instead of guessing based on
+ versions. Really fixes builds with LibreSSL, not just configure.
+
+commit 262d81a259d4aa1507c709ec9d5caa21c7740722
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Sat Oct 27 16:45:59 2018 +1100
+
+ Check for the existence of openssl version funcs.
- Some bonus manpage improvements, mostly from markus@
+ Check for the existence of openssl version functions and use the ones
+ detected instead of trying to guess based on the int32 version
+ identifier. Fixes builds with LibreSSL.
+
+commit 406a24b25d6a2bdd70cacd16de7e899dcb2a8829
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date: Fri Oct 26 13:43:28 2018 +1100
+
+ fix builds on OpenSSL <= 1.0.x
- "looks fine" markus@
+ I thought OpenSSL 1.0.x offered the new-style OpenSSL_version_num() API
+ to obtain version number, but they don't.
+
+commit 859754bdeb41373d372e36b5dc89c547453addb3
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date: Tue Oct 23 17:10:41 2018 +1100
+
+ remove remaining references to SSLeay
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 6546b0cc5aab7f53d65ad0a348ca0ae591d6dd24
+ Prompted by Rosen Penev
+
+commit b9fea45a68946c8dfeace72ad1f6657c18f2a98a
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date: Tue Oct 23 17:10:35 2018 +1100
+
+ regen depend
-commit 26f96ca10ad0ec5da9b05b99de1e1ccea15a11be
+commit a65784c9f9c5d00cf1a0e235090170abc8d07c73
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Jun 15 07:01:11 2018 +0000
+Date: Tue Oct 23 05:56:35 2018 +0000
- upstream: invalidate supplemental group cache used by
+ upstream: refer to OpenSSL not SSLeay;
- temporarily_use_uid() when the target uid differs; could cause failure to
- read authorized_keys under some configurations. patch by Jakub Jelen via
- bz2873; ok dtucker, markus
+ we're old, but we don't have to act it
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 48a345f0ee90f6c465a078eb5e89566b23abd8a1
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 9ca38d11f8ed19e61a55108d1e892d696cee08ec
-commit 89a85d724765b6b82e0135ee5a1181fdcccea9c6
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Sun Jun 10 23:45:41 2018 +0000
+commit c0a35265907533be10ca151ac797f34ae0d68969
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date: Mon Oct 22 11:22:50 2018 +1100
- upstream: unbreak SendEnv; patch from tb@
+ fix compile for openssl 1.0.x w/ --with-ssl-engine
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: fc808daced813242563b80976e1478de95940056
+ bz#2921, patch from cotequeiroz
-commit acf4260f0951f89c64e1ebbc4c92f451768871ad
-Author: jmc@openbsd.org <jmc@openbsd.org>
-Date: Sat Jun 9 06:36:31 2018 +0000
+commit 31b49525168245abe16ad49d7b7f519786b53a38
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Mon Oct 22 20:05:18 2018 +1100
- upstream: sort previous;
+ Include openssl compatibility.
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 27d80d8b8ca99bc33971dee905e8ffd0053ec411
+ Patch from rosenp at gmail.com via openssh-unix-dev.
-commit 1678d4236451060b735cb242d2e26e1ac99f0947
+commit a4fc253f5f44f0e4c47aafe2a17d2c46481d3c04
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Sat Jun 9 03:18:11 2018 +0000
+Date: Fri Oct 19 03:12:42 2018 +0000
- upstream: slightly better wording re handing of $TERM, from Jakub
+ upstream: when printing certificate contents "ssh-keygen -Lf
- Jelen via bz2386
+ /path/certificate", include the algorithm that the CA used to sign the cert.
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 14bea3f069a93c8be66a7b97794255a91fece964
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 1ea20b5048a851a7a0758dcb9777a211a2c0dddd
-commit 28013759f09ed3ebf7e8335e83a62936bd7a7f47
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Sat Jun 9 03:03:10 2018 +0000
+commit 83b3d99d2b47321b7ebb8db6f6ea04f3808bc069
+Author: florian@openbsd.org <florian@openbsd.org>
+Date: Mon Oct 15 11:28:50 2018 +0000
- upstream: add a SetEnv directive for sshd_config to allow an
-
- administrator to explicitly specify environment variables set in sessions
- started by sshd. These override the default environment and any variables set
- by user configuration (PermitUserEnvironment, etc), but not the SSH_*
- variables set by sshd itself.
+ upstream: struct sockaddr_storage is guaranteed to be large enough,
- ok markus@
+ no need to check the size. OK kn, deraadt
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: b6a96c0001ccd7dd211df6cae9e961c20fd718c0
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 0aa56e92eb49c79f495b31a5093109ec5841f439
-commit 7082bb58a2eb878d23ec674587c742e5e9673c36
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Sat Jun 9 03:01:12 2018 +0000
+commit aede1c34243a6f7feae2fb2cb686ade5f9be6f3d
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date: Wed Oct 17 11:01:20 2018 +1100
- upstream: add a SetEnv directive to ssh_config that allows setting
-
- environment variables for the remote session (subject to the server accepting
- them)
-
- refactor SendEnv to remove the arbitrary limit of variable names.
+ Require OpenSSL 1.1.x series 1.1.0g or greater
- ok markus@
+ Previous versions have a bug with EVP_CipherInit() when passed a
+ NULL EVP_CIPHER, per https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4613
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: cfbb00d9b0e10c1ffff1d83424351fd961d1f2be
+ ok dtucker@
-commit 3b9798bda15bd3f598f5ef07595d64e23504da91
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Sat Jun 9 02:58:02 2018 +0000
+commit 08300c211409c212e010fe2e2f2883e573a04ce2
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date: Wed Oct 17 08:12:02 2018 +1100
- upstream: reorder child environment preparation so that variables
-
- read from ~/.ssh/environment (if enabled) do not override SSH_* variables set
- by the server.
+ unbreak compilation with --with-ssl-engine
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 59f9d4c213cdcef2ef21f4b4ae006594dcf2aa7a
+ Missing last argument to OPENSSL_init_crypto()
-commit 0368889f82f63c82ff8db9f8c944d89e7c657db4
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Jun 8 03:35:36 2018 +0000
+commit 1673274aee67ce0eb6f00578b6f3d2bcbd58f937
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Tue Oct 16 14:45:57 2018 +1100
- upstream: fix incorrect expansion of %i in
-
- load_public_identity_files(); reported by Roumen Petrov
+ Remove gcc spectre mitigation flags.
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: a827289e77149b5e0850d72a350c8b0300e7ef25
+ Current impementions of the gcc spectre mitigation flags cause
+ miscompilations when combined with other flags and do not provide much
+ protection. Found by fweimer at redhat.com, ok djm@
-commit 027607fc2db6a0475a3380f8d95c635482714cb0
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Jun 8 01:55:40 2018 +0000
+commit 4e23deefd7959ef83c73ed9cce574423438f6133
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date: Tue Oct 16 10:51:52 2018 +1100
- upstream: fix some over-long lines and __func__ up some debug
-
- messages
+ Avoid deprecated OPENSSL_config when using 1.1.x
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: c70a60b4c8207d9f242fc2351941ba50916bb267
+ OpenSSL 1.1.x soft-deprecated OPENSSL_config in favour of
+ OPENSSL_init_crypto; pointed out by Jakub Jelen
-commit 6ff6fda705bc204456a5fa12518dde6e8790bb02
-Author: jmc@openbsd.org <jmc@openbsd.org>
-Date: Thu Jun 7 11:26:14 2018 +0000
+commit 797cdd9c8468ed1125ce60d590ae3f1397866af4
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Fri Oct 12 16:58:47 2018 +1100
- upstream: tweak previous;
+ Don't avoid our *sprintf replacements.
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: f98f16af10b28e24bcecb806cb71ea994b648fd6
+ Don't let systems with broken printf(3) avoid our replacements
+ via asprintf(3)/vasprintf(3) calling libc internally. From djm@
-commit f2c06ab8dd90582030991f631a2715216bf45e5a
+commit e526127cbd2f8ad88fb41229df0c9b850c722830
Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Fri Jun 8 17:43:36 2018 +1000
+Date: Fri Oct 12 16:43:35 2018 +1100
- Remove ability to override $LD.
+ Check if snprintf understands %zu.
- Since autoconf always uses $CC to link C programs, allowing users to
- override LD caused mismatches between what LD_LINK_IFELSE thought worked
- and what ld thought worked. If you do need to do this kind of thing you
- need to set a compiler flag such as gcc's -fuse-ld in LDFLAGS.
+ If the platforms snprintf and friends don't understand %zu, use the
+ compat replacement. Prevents segfaults on those platforms.
-commit e1542a80797b4ea40a91d2896efdcc76a57056d2
-Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Fri Jun 8 13:55:59 2018 +1000
+commit cf39f875191708c5f2f1a3c1c9019f106e74aea3
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date: Fri Oct 12 09:48:05 2018 +1100
- Better detection of unsupported compiler options.
-
- Should prevent "unsupported -Wl,-z,retpoline" warnings during linking.
- ok djm@
+ remove stale link, tweak
-commit 57379dbd013ad32ee3f9989bf5f5741065428360
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Thu Jun 7 14:29:43 2018 +0000
+commit a7205e68decf7de2005810853b4ce6b222b65e2a
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date: Fri Oct 12 09:47:20 2018 +1100
- upstream: test the correct configuration option name
-
- OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 492279ea9f65657f97a970e0e7c7fd0b339fee23
+ update version numbers ahead of release
-commit 6d41815e202fbd6182c79780b6cc90e1ec1c9981
+commit 1a4a9cf80f5b92b9d1dadd0bfa8867c04d195391
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Thu Jun 7 09:26:42 2018 +0000
+Date: Thu Oct 11 03:48:04 2018 +0000
- upstream: some permitlisten fixes from markus@ that I missed in my
+ upstream: don't send new-style rsa-sha2-*-cert-v01@openssh.com names to
- insomnia-fueled commits last night
+ older OpenSSH that can't handle them. spotted by Adam Eijdenberg; ok dtucker
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 26f23622e928996086e85b1419cc1c0f136e359c
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 662bbc402e3d7c9b6c322806269698106a6ae631
-commit 4319f7a868d86d435fa07112fcb6153895d03a7f
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Thu Jun 7 04:46:34 2018 +0000
+commit dc8ddcdf1a95e011c263486c25869bb5bf4e30ec
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date: Thu Oct 11 13:08:59 2018 +1100
- upstream: permitlisten/PermitListen unit test from Markus
-
- OpenBSD-Regress-ID: ab12eb42f0e14926980441cf7c058a6d1d832ea5
+ update depends
-commit fa09076410ffc2d34d454145af23c790d728921e
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Thu Jun 7 04:31:51 2018 +0000
+commit 26841ac265603fd2253e6832e03602823dbb4022
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date: Thu Oct 11 13:02:11 2018 +1100
- upstream: fix regression caused by recent permitlisten option commit:
-
- authorized_keys lines that contained permitopen/permitlisten were being
- treated as invalid.
+ some more duplicated key algorithm lines
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 7ef41d63a5a477b405d142dc925b67d9e7aaa31b
+ From Adam Eijdenberg
-commit 7f90635216851f6cb4bf3999e98b825f85d604f8
-Author: markus@openbsd.org <markus@openbsd.org>
-Date: Wed Jun 6 18:29:18 2018 +0000
+commit 5d9d17603bfbb620195a4581025052832b4c4adc
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date: Thu Oct 11 11:56:36 2018 +1100
- upstream: switch config file parsing to getline(3) as this avoids
-
- static limits noted by gerhard@; ok dtucker@, djm@
+ fix duplicated algorithm specification lines
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 6d702eabef0fa12e5a1d75c334a8c8b325298b5c
+ Spotted by Adam Eijdenberg
-commit 392db2bc83215986a91c0b65feb0e40e7619ce7e
+commit ebfafd9c7a5b2a7fb515ee95dbe0e44e11d0a663
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Wed Jun 6 18:25:33 2018 +0000
+Date: Thu Oct 11 00:52:46 2018 +0000
- upstream: regress test for PermitOpen
+ upstream: typo in plain RSA algorithm counterpart names for
+
+ certificates; spotted by Adam Eijdenberg; ok dtucker@
- OpenBSD-Regress-ID: ce8b5f28fc039f09bb297fc4a92319e65982ddaf
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: bfcdeb6f4fc9e7607f5096574c8f118f2e709e00
-commit 803d896ef30758135e2f438bdd1a0be27989e018
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Wed Jun 6 18:24:15 2018 +0000
+commit c29b111e7d87c2324ff71c80653dd8da168c13b9
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date: Thu Oct 11 11:29:35 2018 +1100
- upstream: man bits for permitlisten authorized_keys option
+ check pw_passwd != NULL here too
+
+ Again, for systems with broken NIS implementations.
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 86910af8f781a4ac5980fea125442eb25466dd78
+ Prompted by coolbugcheckers AT gmail.com
-commit 04df43208b5b460d7360e1598f876b92a32f5922
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Wed Jun 6 18:24:00 2018 +0000
+commit fe8e8f349a553ef4c567acd418aac769a82b7729
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date: Thu Oct 11 11:03:15 2018 +1100
- upstream: man bits for PermitListen
+ check for NULL return from shadow_pw()
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 35b200cba4e46a16a4db6a80ef11838ab0fad67c
+ probably unreachable on this platform; pointed out by
+ coolbugcheckers AT gmail.com
-commit 93c06ab6b77514e0447fe4f1d822afcbb2a9be08
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Wed Jun 6 18:23:32 2018 +0000
+commit acc59cbe7a1fb169e1c3caba65a39bd74d6e030d
+Author: deraadt@openbsd.org <deraadt@openbsd.org>
+Date: Wed Oct 10 16:43:49 2018 +0000
- upstream: permitlisten option for authorized_keys; ok markus@
+ upstream: introducing openssh 7.9
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 8650883018d7aa893173d703379e4456a222c672
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 42d526a9fe01a40dd299ac58014d3349adf40e25
-commit 115063a6647007286cc8ca70abfd2a7585f26ccc
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Wed Jun 6 18:22:41 2018 +0000
+commit 12731158c75c8760a8bea06350eeb3e763fe1a07
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date: Thu Oct 11 10:29:29 2018 +1100
- upstream: Add a PermitListen directive to control which server-side
-
- addresses may be listened on when the client requests remote forwarding (ssh
- -R).
+ supply callback to PEM_read_bio_PrivateKey
- This is the converse of the existing PermitOpen directive and this
- includes some refactoring to share much of its implementation.
+ OpenSSL 1.1.0i has changed the behaviour of their PEM APIs,
+ so that empty passphrases are interpreted differently. This
+ probabalistically breaks loading some keys, because the PEM format
+ is terrible and doesn't include a proper MAC.
- feedback and ok markus@
+ Avoid this by providing a basic callback to avoid passing empty
+ passphrases to OpenSSL in cases where one is required.
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 15a931238c61a3f2ac74ea18a98c933e358e277f
+ Based on patch from Jakub Jelen in bz#2913; ok dtucker@
-commit 7703ae5f5d42eb302ded51705166ff6e19c92892
-Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Wed Jun 6 16:04:29 2018 +1000
+commit d1d301a1dd5d6cc3a9ed93ab7ab09dda4cb456e0
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date: Wed Oct 10 14:57:00 2018 +1100
- Use ssh-keygen -A to generate missing host keys.
+ in pick_salt() avoid dereference of NULL passwords
+
+ Apparently some NIS implementations can leave pw->pw_passwd (or the
+ shadow equivalent) NULL.
- Instead of testing for each specific key type, use ssh-keygen -A to
- generate any missing host key types.
+ bz#2909; based on patch from Todd Eigenschink
-commit e8d59fef1098e24f408248dc64e5c8efa5d01f3c
-Author: jmc@openbsd.org <jmc@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Jun 1 06:23:10 2018 +0000
+commit edbb6febccee084d212fdc0cb05b40cb1c646ab1
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Tue Oct 9 05:42:23 2018 +0000
- upstream: add missing punctuation after %i in ssh_config.5, and
+ upstream: Treat all PEM_read_bio_PrivateKey() errors when a passphrase
- make the grammatical format in sshd_config.5 match that in ssh_config.5;
+ is specified as "incorrect passphrase" instead of trying to choose between
+ that and "invalid format".
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: e325663b9342f3d556e223e5306e0d5fa1a74fa0
-
-commit a1f737d6a99314e291a87856122cb4dbaf64c641
-Author: jmc@openbsd.org <jmc@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Jun 1 05:52:26 2018 +0000
-
- upstream: oops - further adjustment to text neccessary;
+ libcrypto can return ASN1 parsing errors rather than the expected
+ decrypt error in certain infrequent cases when trying to decrypt/parse
+ PEM private keys when supplied with an invalid passphrase.
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 23585576c807743112ab956be0fb3c786bdef025
-
-commit 294028493471e0bd0c7ffe55dc0c0a67cba6ec41
-Author: jmc@openbsd.org <jmc@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Jun 1 05:50:18 2018 +0000
-
- upstream: %U needs to be escaped; tweak text;
+ Report and repro recipe from Thomas Deutschmann in bz#2901
+
+ ok markus@
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 30887b73ece257273fb619ab6f4e86dc92ddc15e
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: b1d4cd92395f9743f81c0d23aab2524109580870
-commit e5019da3c5a31e6e729a565f2b886a80c4be96cc
-Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Jun 1 04:31:48 2018 +0000
+commit 2581333d564d8697837729b3d07d45738eaf5a54
+Author: naddy@openbsd.org <naddy@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Oct 5 14:26:09 2018 +0000
- upstream: Apply umask to all incoming files and directories not
+ upstream: Support using service names for port numbers.
+
+ * Try to resolve a port specification with getservbyname(3) if a
+ numeric conversion fails.
+ * Make the "Port" option in ssh_config handle its argument as a
+ port rather than a plain integer.
- just files. This makes sure it gets applied to directories too, and prevents
- a race where files get chmodded after creation. bz#2839, ok djm@
+ ok dtucker@ deraadt@
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 3168ee6c7c39093adac4fd71039600cfa296203b
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: e7f03633133205ab3dfbc67f9df7475fabae660d
-commit a1dcafc41c376332493b9385ee39f9754dc145ec
+commit e0d6501e86734c48c8c503f81e1c0926e98c5c4c
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Jun 1 03:52:37 2018 +0000
+Date: Thu Oct 4 07:47:35 2018 +0000
- upstream: Adapt to extra default verboisity from ssh-keygen when
+ upstream: when the peer sends a channel-close message, make sure we
- searching for and hashing known_hosts entries in a single operation
- (ssh-keygen -HF ...) Patch from Anton Kremenetsky
+ close the local extended read fd (stderr) along with the regular read fd
+ (stdout). Avoids weird stuck processed in multiplexing mode.
- OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 519585a4de35c4611285bd6a7272766c229b19dd
-
-commit 76f314c75dffd4a55839d50ee23622edad52c168
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Tue May 22 00:22:49 2018 +0000
-
- upstream: Add TEST_SSH_FAIL_FATAL variable, to force all failures
+ Report and analysis by Nelson Elhage and Geoffrey Thomas in bz#2863
- to instantly abort the test. Useful in capturing clean logs for individual
- failure cases.
+ ok dtucker@ markus@
- OpenBSD-Regress-ID: feba18cf338c2328b9601bd4093cabdd9baa3af1
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: a48a2467fe938de4de69d2e7193d5fa701f12ae9
-commit 065c8c055df8d83ae7c92e5e524a579d87668aab
-Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri May 11 03:51:06 2018 +0000
+commit 6f1aabb128246f445e33b8844fad3de9cb1d18cb
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Thu Oct 4 01:04:52 2018 +0000
- upstream: Clean up comment.
+ upstream: factor out channel status formatting from
+
+ channel_open_message() so we can use it in other debug messages
- OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 6adb35f384d447e7dcb9f170d4f0d546d3973e10
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 9c3903ca28fcabad57f566c9d0045b41ab7d52ba
-commit 01b048c8eba3b021701bd0ab26257fc82903cba8
+commit f1dd179e122bdfdb7ca3072d9603607740efda05
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Jun 1 04:21:29 2018 +0000
+Date: Thu Oct 4 00:10:11 2018 +0000
- upstream: whitespace
+ upstream: include a little more information about the status and
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: e5edb5e843ddc9b73a8e46518899be41d5709add
+ disposition of channel's extended (stderr) fd; makes debugging some things a
+ bit easier. No behaviour change.
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 483eb6467dc7d5dbca8eb109c453e7a43075f7ce
-commit 854ae209f992465a276de0b5f10ef770510c2418
+commit 2d1428b11c8b6f616f070f2ecedce12328526944
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Jun 1 04:05:29 2018 +0000
+Date: Thu Oct 4 00:04:41 2018 +0000
- upstream: make ssh_remote_ipaddr() capable of being called after
+ upstream: explicit_bzero here to be consistent with other kex*.c;
- the ssh->state has been torn down; bz#2773
+ report from coolbugcheckers AT gmail.com
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 167f12523613ca3d16d7716a690e7afa307dc7eb
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: a90f146c5b5f5b1408700395e394f70b440856cb
-commit 3e088aaf236ef35beeef3c9be93fd53700df5861
+commit 5eff5b858e717e901e6af6596306a114de9f79f2
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Jun 1 03:51:34 2018 +0000
+Date: Wed Oct 3 06:38:35 2018 +0000
- upstream: return correct exit code when searching for and hashing
+ upstream: Allow ssh_config IdentityAgent directive to accept
- known_hosts entries in a single operation (ssh-keygen -HF hostname); bz2772
- Report and fix from Anton Kremenetsky
+ environment variable names as well as explicit paths. ok dtucker@
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: ac10ca13eb9bb0bc50fcd42ad11c56c317437b58
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 2f0996e103876c53d8c9dd51dcce9889d700767b
-commit 9c935dd9bf05628826ad2495d3e8bdf3d3271c21
+commit a46ac4d86b25414d78b632e8173578b37e5f8a83
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Jun 1 03:33:53 2018 +0000
+Date: Tue Oct 2 12:51:58 2018 +0000
- upstream: make UID available as a %-expansion everywhere that the
-
- username is available currently. In the client this is via %i, in the server
- %U (since %i was already used in the client in some places for this, but used
- for something different in the server); bz#2870, ok dtucker@
+ upstream: mention INFO@openssh.com for sending SIGINFO
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: c7e912b0213713316cb55db194b3a6415b3d4b95
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 132471eeb0df658210afd27852fe65131b26e900
+
+commit ff3a411cae0b484274b7900ef52ff4dad3e12876
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date: Tue Oct 2 22:49:40 2018 +1000
+
+ only support SIGINFO on systems with SIGINFO
-commit d8748b91d1d6c108c0c260ed41fa55f37b9ef34b
+commit cd98925c6405e972dc9f211afc7e75e838abe81c
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Jun 1 03:11:49 2018 +0000
+Date: Tue Oct 2 12:40:07 2018 +0000
- upstream: prefer argv0 to "ssh" when re-executing ssh for ProxyJump
+ upstream: Add server support for signalling sessions via the SSH
- directive; bz2831, feedback and ok dtucker@
+ channel/ session protocol. Signalling is only supported to sesssions that are
+ not subsystems and were not started with a forced command.
+
+ Long requested in bz#1424
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 3cec709a131499fbb0c1ea8a0a9e0b0915ce769e
+ Based on a patch from markus@ and reworked by dtucker@;
+ ok markus@ dtucker@
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 4bea826f575862eaac569c4bedd1056a268be1c3
diff --git a/INSTALL b/INSTALL
index 443ff9f3f0bb..ee621da43580 100644
--- a/INSTALL
+++ b/INSTALL
@@ -1,282 +1,288 @@
-1. Prerequisites
----------------
A C compiler. Any C89 or better compiler should work. Where supported,
configure will attempt to enable the compiler's run-time integrity checking
options. Some notes about specific compilers:
- clang: -ftrapv and -sanitize=integer require the compiler-rt runtime
(CC=clang LDFLAGS=--rtlib=compiler-rt ./configure)
To support Privilege Separation (which is now required) you will need
to create the user, group and directory used by sshd for privilege
separation. See README.privsep for details.
The remaining items are optional.
A working installation of zlib:
Zlib 1.1.4 or 1.2.1.2 or greater (earlier 1.2.x versions have problems):
http://www.gzip.org/zlib/
libcrypto from either of LibreSSL or OpenSSL. Building without libcrypto
is supported but severely restricts the available ciphers and algorithms.
- LibreSSL (https://www.libressl.org/)
- OpenSSL (https://www.openssl.org) with any of the following versions:
- 1.0.x >= 1.0.1 or 1.1.0 >= 1.1.0g or any 1.1.1
Note that due to a bug in EVP_CipherInit OpenSSL 1.1 versions prior to
1.1.0g can't be used.
LibreSSL/OpenSSL should be compiled as a position-independent library
(i.e. -fPIC, eg by configuring OpenSSL as "./config [options] -fPIC"
or LibreSSL as "CFLAGS=-fPIC ./configure") otherwise OpenSSH will not
be able to link with it. If you must use a non-position-independent
libcrypto, then you may need to configure OpenSSH --without-pie.
If you build either from source, running the OpenSSL self-test ("make
tests") or the LibreSSL equivalent ("make check") and ensuring that all
tests pass is strongly recommended.
NB. If you operating system supports /dev/random, you should configure
libcrypto (LibreSSL/OpenSSL) to use it. OpenSSH relies on libcrypto's
direct support of /dev/random, or failing that, either prngd or egd.
PRNGD:
If your system lacks kernel-based random collection, the use of Lutz
Jaenicke's PRNGd is recommended. It requires that libcrypto be configured
to support it.
http://prngd.sourceforge.net/
EGD:
The Entropy Gathering Daemon (EGD) supports the same interface as prngd.
It also supported only if libcrypto is configured to support it.
http://egd.sourceforge.net/
PAM:
OpenSSH can utilise Pluggable Authentication Modules (PAM) if your
system supports it. PAM is standard most Linux distributions, Solaris,
HP-UX 11, AIX >= 5.2, FreeBSD, NetBSD and Mac OS X.
Information about the various PAM implementations are available:
Solaris PAM: http://www.sun.com/software/solaris/pam/
Linux PAM: http://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/libs/pam/
OpenPAM: http://www.openpam.org/
If you wish to build the GNOME passphrase requester, you will need the GNOME
libraries and headers.
GNOME:
http://www.gnome.org/
Alternatively, Jim Knoble <jmknoble@pobox.com> has written an excellent X11
passphrase requester. This is maintained separately at:
http://www.jmknoble.net/software/x11-ssh-askpass/
LibEdit:
sftp supports command-line editing via NetBSD's libedit. If your platform
has it available natively you can use that, alternatively you might try
these multi-platform ports:
http://www.thrysoee.dk/editline/
http://sourceforge.net/projects/libedit/
LDNS:
LDNS is a DNS BSD-licensed resolver library which supports DNSSEC.
http://nlnetlabs.nl/projects/ldns/
Autoconf:
If you modify configure.ac or configure doesn't exist (eg if you checked
-the code out of git yourself) then you will need autoconf-2.69 to rebuild
-the automatically generated files by running "autoreconf". Earlier
-versions may also work but this is not guaranteed.
+the code out of git yourself) then you will need autoconf-2.69 and
+automake-1.16.1 to rebuild the automatically generated files by running
+"autoreconf". Earlier versions may also work but this is not guaranteed.
http://www.gnu.org/software/autoconf/
+http://www.gnu.org/software/automake/
Basic Security Module (BSM):
Native BSM support is known to exist in Solaris from at least 2.5.1,
FreeBSD 6.1 and OS X. Alternatively, you may use the OpenBSM
implementation (http://www.openbsm.org).
makedepend:
https://www.x.org/archive/individual/util/
If you are making significant changes to the code you may need to rebuild
the dependency (.depend) file using "make depend", which requires the
"makedepend" tool from the X11 distribution.
libfido2:
libfido2 allows the use of hardware security keys over USB. libfido2
-in turn depends on libcbor.
+in turn depends on libcbor. libfido2 >= 1.5.0 is strongly recommended.
+Limited functionality is possible with earlier libfido2 versions.
https://github.com/Yubico/libfido2
https://github.com/pjk/libcbor
2. Building / Installation
--------------------------
To install OpenSSH with default options:
./configure
make
make install
This will install the OpenSSH binaries in /usr/local/bin, configuration files
in /usr/local/etc, the server in /usr/local/sbin, etc. To specify a different
installation prefix, use the --prefix option to configure:
./configure --prefix=/opt
make
make install
Will install OpenSSH in /opt/{bin,etc,lib,sbin}. You can also override
specific paths, for example:
./configure --prefix=/opt --sysconfdir=/etc/ssh
make
make install
This will install the binaries in /opt/{bin,lib,sbin}, but will place the
configuration files in /etc/ssh.
If you are using PAM, you may need to manually install a PAM control
file as "/etc/pam.d/sshd" (or wherever your system prefers to keep
them). Note that the service name used to start PAM is __progname,
which is the basename of the path of your sshd (e.g., the service name
for /usr/sbin/osshd will be osshd). If you have renamed your sshd
executable, your PAM configuration may need to be modified.
A generic PAM configuration is included as "contrib/sshd.pam.generic",
you may need to edit it before using it on your system. If you are
using a recent version of Red Hat Linux, the config file in
contrib/redhat/sshd.pam should be more useful. Failure to install a
valid PAM file may result in an inability to use password
authentication. On HP-UX 11 and Solaris, the standard /etc/pam.conf
configuration will work with sshd (sshd will match the other service
name).
There are a few other options to the configure script:
--with-audit=[module] enable additional auditing via the specified module.
Currently, drivers for "debug" (additional info via syslog) and "bsm"
(Sun's Basic Security Module) are supported.
--with-pam enables PAM support. If PAM support is compiled in, it must
also be enabled in sshd_config (refer to the UsePAM directive).
--with-prngd-socket=/some/file allows you to enable EGD or PRNGD
support and to specify a PRNGd socket. Use this if your Unix lacks
/dev/random.
--with-prngd-port=portnum allows you to enable EGD or PRNGD support
and to specify a EGD localhost TCP port. Use this if your Unix lacks
/dev/random.
--with-lastlog=FILE will specify the location of the lastlog file.
./configure searches a few locations for lastlog, but may not find
it if lastlog is installed in a different place.
--without-lastlog will disable lastlog support entirely.
--with-osfsia, --without-osfsia will enable or disable OSF1's Security
Integration Architecture. The default for OSF1 machines is enable.
--with-md5-passwords will enable the use of MD5 passwords. Enable this
if your operating system uses MD5 passwords and the system crypt() does
not support them directly (see the crypt(3/3c) man page). If enabled, the
resulting binary will support both MD5 and traditional crypt passwords.
--with-utmpx enables utmpx support. utmpx support is automatic for
some platforms.
--without-shadow disables shadow password support.
--with-ipaddr-display forces the use of a numeric IP address in the
$DISPLAY environment variable. Some broken systems need this.
--with-default-path=PATH allows you to specify a default $PATH for sessions
started by sshd. This replaces the standard path entirely.
--with-pid-dir=PATH specifies the directory in which the sshd.pid file is
created.
--with-xauth=PATH specifies the location of the xauth binary
--with-ssl-dir=DIR allows you to specify where your Libre/OpenSSL
libraries are installed.
--with-ssl-engine enables Libre/OpenSSL's (hardware) ENGINE support
+--without-openssl builds without using OpenSSL. Only a subset of ciphers
+and algorithms are supported in this configuration.
+
+--without-zlib builds without zlib. This disables the Compression option.
+
--with-4in6 Check for IPv4 in IPv6 mapped addresses and convert them to
real (AF_INET) IPv4 addresses. Works around some quirks on Linux.
If you need to pass special options to the compiler or linker, you
can specify these as environment variables before running ./configure.
For example:
CC="/usr/foo/cc" CFLAGS="-O" LDFLAGS="-s" LIBS="-lrubbish" ./configure
3. Configuration
----------------
The runtime configuration files are installed by in ${prefix}/etc or
whatever you specified as your --sysconfdir (/usr/local/etc by default).
The default configuration should be instantly usable, though you should
review it to ensure that it matches your security requirements.
To generate a host key, run "make host-key". Alternately you can do so
manually using the following commands:
ssh-keygen -t [type] -f /etc/ssh/ssh_host_key -N ""
for each of the types you wish to generate (rsa, dsa or ecdsa) or
ssh-keygen -A
to generate keys for all supported types.
Replacing /etc/ssh with the correct path to the configuration directory.
(${prefix}/etc or whatever you specified with --sysconfdir during
configuration).
If you have configured OpenSSH with EGD support, ensure that EGD is
running and has collected some Entropy.
For more information on configuration, please refer to the manual pages
for sshd, ssh and ssh-agent.
4. (Optional) Send survey
-------------------------
$ make survey
[check the contents of the file "survey" to ensure there's no information
that you consider sensitive]
$ make send-survey
This will send configuration information for the currently configured
host to a survey address. This will help determine which configurations
are actually in use, and what valid combinations of configure options
exist. The raw data is available only to the OpenSSH developers, however
summary data may be published.
5. Problems?
------------
If you experience problems compiling, installing or running OpenSSH,
please refer to the "reporting bugs" section of the webpage at
https://www.openssh.com/
diff --git a/Makefile.in b/Makefile.in
index c9e4294d3cfb..acfb919da83c 100644
--- a/Makefile.in
+++ b/Makefile.in
@@ -1,733 +1,748 @@
# uncomment if you run a non bourne compatible shell. Ie. csh
#SHELL = @SH@
AUTORECONF=autoreconf
prefix=@prefix@
exec_prefix=@exec_prefix@
bindir=@bindir@
sbindir=@sbindir@
libexecdir=@libexecdir@
datadir=@datadir@
datarootdir=@datarootdir@
mandir=@mandir@
mansubdir=@mansubdir@
sysconfdir=@sysconfdir@
piddir=@piddir@
srcdir=@srcdir@
top_srcdir=@top_srcdir@
DESTDIR=
VPATH=@srcdir@
SSH_PROGRAM=@bindir@/ssh
ASKPASS_PROGRAM=$(libexecdir)/ssh-askpass
SFTP_SERVER=$(libexecdir)/sftp-server
SSH_KEYSIGN=$(libexecdir)/ssh-keysign
SSH_PKCS11_HELPER=$(libexecdir)/ssh-pkcs11-helper
SSH_SK_HELPER=$(libexecdir)/ssh-sk-helper
PRIVSEP_PATH=@PRIVSEP_PATH@
SSH_PRIVSEP_USER=@SSH_PRIVSEP_USER@
STRIP_OPT=@STRIP_OPT@
TEST_SHELL=@TEST_SHELL@
PATHS= -DSSHDIR=\"$(sysconfdir)\" \
-D_PATH_SSH_PROGRAM=\"$(SSH_PROGRAM)\" \
-D_PATH_SSH_ASKPASS_DEFAULT=\"$(ASKPASS_PROGRAM)\" \
-D_PATH_SFTP_SERVER=\"$(SFTP_SERVER)\" \
-D_PATH_SSH_KEY_SIGN=\"$(SSH_KEYSIGN)\" \
-D_PATH_SSH_PKCS11_HELPER=\"$(SSH_PKCS11_HELPER)\" \
-D_PATH_SSH_SK_HELPER=\"$(SSH_SK_HELPER)\" \
-D_PATH_SSH_PIDDIR=\"$(piddir)\" \
-D_PATH_PRIVSEP_CHROOT_DIR=\"$(PRIVSEP_PATH)\"
CC=@CC@
LD=@LD@
CFLAGS=@CFLAGS@
CFLAGS_NOPIE=@CFLAGS_NOPIE@
CPPFLAGS=-I. -I$(srcdir) @CPPFLAGS@ $(PATHS) @DEFS@
PICFLAG=@PICFLAG@
LIBS=@LIBS@
K5LIBS=@K5LIBS@
GSSLIBS=@GSSLIBS@
-SSHLIBS=@SSHLIBS@
SSHDLIBS=@SSHDLIBS@
LIBEDIT=@LIBEDIT@
LIBFIDO2=@LIBFIDO2@
AR=@AR@
AWK=@AWK@
RANLIB=@RANLIB@
INSTALL=@INSTALL@
SED=@SED@
-ENT=@ENT@
XAUTH_PATH=@XAUTH_PATH@
LDFLAGS=-L. -Lopenbsd-compat/ @LDFLAGS@
LDFLAGS_NOPIE=-L. -Lopenbsd-compat/ @LDFLAGS_NOPIE@
EXEEXT=@EXEEXT@
MANFMT=@MANFMT@
MKDIR_P=@MKDIR_P@
.SUFFIXES: .lo
TARGETS=ssh$(EXEEXT) sshd$(EXEEXT) ssh-add$(EXEEXT) ssh-keygen$(EXEEXT) ssh-keyscan${EXEEXT} ssh-keysign${EXEEXT} ssh-pkcs11-helper$(EXEEXT) ssh-agent$(EXEEXT) scp$(EXEEXT) sftp-server$(EXEEXT) sftp$(EXEEXT) ssh-sk-helper$(EXEEXT)
XMSS_OBJS=\
ssh-xmss.o \
sshkey-xmss.o \
xmss_commons.o \
xmss_fast.o \
xmss_hash.o \
xmss_hash_address.o \
xmss_wots.o
LIBOPENSSH_OBJS=\
ssh_api.o \
ssherr.o \
sshbuf.o \
sshkey.o \
sshbuf-getput-basic.o \
sshbuf-misc.o \
sshbuf-getput-crypto.o \
krl.o \
bitmap.o \
${XMSS_OBJS}
LIBSSH_OBJS=${LIBOPENSSH_OBJS} \
authfd.o authfile.o \
canohost.o channels.o cipher.o cipher-aes.o cipher-aesctr.o \
cipher-ctr.o cleanup.o \
compat.o fatal.o hostfile.o \
log.o match.o moduli.o nchan.o packet.o \
readpass.o ttymodes.o xmalloc.o addrmatch.o \
atomicio.o dispatch.o mac.o misc.o utf8.o \
monitor_fdpass.o rijndael.o ssh-dss.o ssh-ecdsa.o ssh-ecdsa-sk.o \
ssh-ed25519-sk.o ssh-rsa.o dh.o \
msg.o progressmeter.o dns.o entropy.o gss-genr.o umac.o umac128.o \
ssh-pkcs11.o smult_curve25519_ref.o \
poly1305.o chacha.o cipher-chachapoly.o cipher-chachapoly-libcrypto.o \
ssh-ed25519.o digest-openssl.o digest-libc.o \
hmac.o sc25519.o ge25519.o fe25519.o ed25519.o verify.o hash.o \
kex.o kexdh.o kexgex.o kexecdh.o kexc25519.o \
kexgexc.o kexgexs.o \
sntrup4591761.o kexsntrup4591761x25519.o kexgen.o \
sftp-realpath.o platform-pledge.o platform-tracing.o platform-misc.o \
sshbuf-io.o
SKOBJS= ssh-sk-client.o
SSHOBJS= ssh.o readconf.o clientloop.o sshtty.o \
sshconnect.o sshconnect2.o mux.o $(SKOBJS)
SSHDOBJS=sshd.o auth-rhosts.o auth-passwd.o \
audit.o audit-bsm.o audit-linux.o platform.o \
sshpty.o sshlogin.o servconf.o serverloop.o \
auth.o auth2.o auth-options.o session.o \
auth2-chall.o groupaccess.o \
auth-bsdauth.o auth2-hostbased.o auth2-kbdint.o \
auth2-none.o auth2-passwd.o auth2-pubkey.o \
monitor.o monitor_wrap.o auth-krb5.o \
auth2-gss.o gss-serv.o gss-serv-krb5.o \
loginrec.o auth-pam.o auth-shadow.o auth-sia.o md5crypt.o \
sftp-server.o sftp-common.o \
sandbox-null.o sandbox-rlimit.o sandbox-systrace.o sandbox-darwin.o \
sandbox-seccomp-filter.o sandbox-capsicum.o sandbox-pledge.o \
sandbox-solaris.o uidswap.o $(SKOBJS)
SCP_OBJS= scp.o progressmeter.o
SSHADD_OBJS= ssh-add.o $(SKOBJS)
SSHAGENT_OBJS= ssh-agent.o ssh-pkcs11-client.o $(SKOBJS)
SSHKEYGEN_OBJS= ssh-keygen.o sshsig.o $(SKOBJS)
SSHKEYSIGN_OBJS=ssh-keysign.o readconf.o uidswap.o $(SKOBJS)
P11HELPER_OBJS= ssh-pkcs11-helper.o ssh-pkcs11.o $(SKOBJS)
SKHELPER_OBJS= ssh-sk-helper.o ssh-sk.o sk-usbhid.o
SSHKEYSCAN_OBJS=ssh-keyscan.o $(SKOBJS)
SFTPSERVER_OBJS=sftp-common.o sftp-server.o sftp-server-main.o
SFTP_OBJS= sftp.o sftp-client.o sftp-common.o sftp-glob.o progressmeter.o
MANPAGES = moduli.5.out scp.1.out ssh-add.1.out ssh-agent.1.out ssh-keygen.1.out ssh-keyscan.1.out ssh.1.out sshd.8.out sftp-server.8.out sftp.1.out ssh-keysign.8.out ssh-pkcs11-helper.8.out ssh-sk-helper.8.out sshd_config.5.out ssh_config.5.out
MANPAGES_IN = moduli.5 scp.1 ssh-add.1 ssh-agent.1 ssh-keygen.1 ssh-keyscan.1 ssh.1 sshd.8 sftp-server.8 sftp.1 ssh-keysign.8 ssh-pkcs11-helper.8 ssh-sk-helper.8 sshd_config.5 ssh_config.5
MANTYPE = @MANTYPE@
CONFIGFILES=sshd_config.out ssh_config.out moduli.out
CONFIGFILES_IN=sshd_config ssh_config moduli
PATHSUBS = \
-e 's|/etc/ssh/ssh_config|$(sysconfdir)/ssh_config|g' \
-e 's|/etc/ssh/ssh_known_hosts|$(sysconfdir)/ssh_known_hosts|g' \
-e 's|/etc/ssh/sshd_config|$(sysconfdir)/sshd_config|g' \
-e 's|/usr/libexec|$(libexecdir)|g' \
-e 's|/etc/shosts.equiv|$(sysconfdir)/shosts.equiv|g' \
-e 's|/etc/ssh/ssh_host_key|$(sysconfdir)/ssh_host_key|g' \
-e 's|/etc/ssh/ssh_host_ecdsa_key|$(sysconfdir)/ssh_host_ecdsa_key|g' \
-e 's|/etc/ssh/ssh_host_dsa_key|$(sysconfdir)/ssh_host_dsa_key|g' \
-e 's|/etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key|$(sysconfdir)/ssh_host_rsa_key|g' \
-e 's|/etc/ssh/ssh_host_ed25519_key|$(sysconfdir)/ssh_host_ed25519_key|g' \
-e 's|/var/run/sshd.pid|$(piddir)/sshd.pid|g' \
-e 's|/etc/moduli|$(sysconfdir)/moduli|g' \
-e 's|/etc/ssh/moduli|$(sysconfdir)/moduli|g' \
-e 's|/etc/ssh/sshrc|$(sysconfdir)/sshrc|g' \
-e 's|/usr/X11R6/bin/xauth|$(XAUTH_PATH)|g' \
-e 's|/var/empty|$(PRIVSEP_PATH)|g' \
-e 's|/usr/bin:/bin:/usr/sbin:/sbin|@user_path@|g'
FIXPATHSCMD = $(SED) $(PATHSUBS)
FIXALGORITHMSCMD= $(SHELL) $(srcdir)/fixalgorithms $(SED) \
@UNSUPPORTED_ALGORITHMS@
all: configure-check $(CONFIGFILES) $(MANPAGES) $(TARGETS)
$(LIBSSH_OBJS): Makefile.in config.h
$(SSHOBJS): Makefile.in config.h
$(SSHDOBJS): Makefile.in config.h
configure-check: $(srcdir)/configure
-$(srcdir)/configure: configure.ac aclocal.m4
+$(srcdir)/configure: configure.ac $(srcdir)/m4/*.m4
@echo "ERROR: configure is out of date; please run ${AUTORECONF} (and configure)" 1>&2
@exit 1
.c.o:
$(CC) $(CFLAGS) $(CPPFLAGS) -c $< -o $@
LIBCOMPAT=openbsd-compat/libopenbsd-compat.a
$(LIBCOMPAT): always
(cd openbsd-compat && $(MAKE))
always:
libssh.a: $(LIBSSH_OBJS)
$(AR) rv $@ $(LIBSSH_OBJS)
$(RANLIB) $@
ssh$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a $(SSHOBJS)
- $(LD) -o $@ $(SSHOBJS) $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(SSHLIBS) $(LIBS) $(GSSLIBS)
+ $(LD) -o $@ $(SSHOBJS) $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS) $(GSSLIBS)
sshd$(EXEEXT): libssh.a $(LIBCOMPAT) $(SSHDOBJS)
$(LD) -o $@ $(SSHDOBJS) $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(SSHDLIBS) $(LIBS) $(GSSLIBS) $(K5LIBS)
scp$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a $(SCP_OBJS)
$(LD) -o $@ $(SCP_OBJS) $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS)
ssh-add$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a $(SSHADD_OBJS)
$(LD) -o $@ $(SSHADD_OBJS) $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS)
ssh-agent$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a $(SSHAGENT_OBJS)
$(LD) -o $@ $(SSHAGENT_OBJS) $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS)
ssh-keygen$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a $(SSHKEYGEN_OBJS)
$(LD) -o $@ $(SSHKEYGEN_OBJS) $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS)
ssh-keysign$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a $(SSHKEYSIGN_OBJS)
$(LD) -o $@ $(SSHKEYSIGN_OBJS) $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS)
ssh-pkcs11-helper$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a $(P11HELPER_OBJS)
$(LD) -o $@ $(P11HELPER_OBJS) $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS)
ssh-sk-helper$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a $(SKHELPER_OBJS)
$(LD) -o $@ $(SKHELPER_OBJS) $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS) $(LIBFIDO2)
ssh-keyscan$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a $(SSHKEYSCAN_OBJS)
$(LD) -o $@ $(SSHKEYSCAN_OBJS) $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh $(LIBS)
sftp-server$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a $(SFTPSERVER_OBJS)
$(LD) -o $@ $(SFTPSERVER_OBJS) $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS)
sftp$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a $(SFTP_OBJS)
$(LD) -o $@ $(SFTP_OBJS) $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS) $(LIBEDIT)
# test driver for the loginrec code - not built by default
logintest: logintest.o $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a loginrec.o
$(LD) -o $@ logintest.o $(LDFLAGS) loginrec.o -lopenbsd-compat -lssh $(LIBS)
$(MANPAGES): $(MANPAGES_IN)
if test "$(MANTYPE)" = "cat"; then \
manpage=$(srcdir)/`echo $@ | sed 's/\.[1-9]\.out$$/\.0/'`; \
else \
manpage=$(srcdir)/`echo $@ | sed 's/\.out$$//'`; \
fi; \
if test "$(MANTYPE)" = "man"; then \
$(FIXPATHSCMD) $${manpage} | $(FIXALGORITHMSCMD) | \
$(AWK) -f $(srcdir)/mdoc2man.awk > $@; \
else \
$(FIXPATHSCMD) $${manpage} | $(FIXALGORITHMSCMD) > $@; \
fi
$(CONFIGFILES): $(CONFIGFILES_IN)
conffile=`echo $@ | sed 's/.out$$//'`; \
$(FIXPATHSCMD) $(srcdir)/$${conffile} > $@
# fake rule to stop make trying to compile moduli.o into a binary "moduli.o"
moduli:
echo
clean: regressclean
rm -f *.o *.lo *.a $(TARGETS) logintest config.cache config.log
rm -f *.out core survey
rm -f regress/check-perm$(EXEEXT)
rm -f regress/mkdtemp$(EXEEXT)
rm -f regress/unittests/test_helper/*.a
rm -f regress/unittests/test_helper/*.o
rm -f regress/unittests/sshbuf/*.o
rm -f regress/unittests/sshbuf/test_sshbuf$(EXEEXT)
rm -f regress/unittests/sshkey/*.o
rm -f regress/unittests/sshkey/test_sshkey$(EXEEXT)
+ rm -f regress/unittests/sshsig/*.o
+ rm -f regress/unittests/sshsig/test_sshsig$(EXEEXT)
rm -f regress/unittests/bitmap/*.o
rm -f regress/unittests/bitmap/test_bitmap$(EXEEXT)
rm -f regress/unittests/conversion/*.o
rm -f regress/unittests/conversion/test_conversion$(EXEEXT)
rm -f regress/unittests/hostkeys/*.o
rm -f regress/unittests/hostkeys/test_hostkeys$(EXEEXT)
rm -f regress/unittests/kex/*.o
rm -f regress/unittests/kex/test_kex$(EXEEXT)
rm -f regress/unittests/match/*.o
rm -f regress/unittests/match/test_match$(EXEEXT)
rm -f regress/unittests/utf8/*.o
rm -f regress/unittests/utf8/test_utf8$(EXEEXT)
rm -f regress/misc/kexfuzz/*.o
rm -f regress/misc/kexfuzz/kexfuzz$(EXEEXT)
rm -f regress/misc/sk-dummy/*.o
rm -f regress/misc/sk-dummy/*.lo
rm -f regress/misc/sk-dummy/sk-dummy.so
(cd openbsd-compat && $(MAKE) clean)
distclean: regressclean
rm -f *.o *.a $(TARGETS) logintest config.cache config.log
rm -f *.out core opensshd.init openssh.xml
rm -f Makefile buildpkg.sh config.h config.status
rm -f survey.sh openbsd-compat/regress/Makefile *~
rm -rf autom4te.cache
rm -f regress/check-perm
rm -f regress/mkdtemp
rm -f regress/unittests/test_helper/*.a
rm -f regress/unittests/test_helper/*.o
rm -f regress/unittests/sshbuf/*.o
rm -f regress/unittests/sshbuf/test_sshbuf
rm -f regress/unittests/sshkey/*.o
rm -f regress/unittests/sshkey/test_sshkey
+ rm -f regress/unittests/sshsig/*.o
+ rm -f regress/unittests/sshsig/test_sshsig
rm -f regress/unittests/bitmap/*.o
rm -f regress/unittests/bitmap/test_bitmap
rm -f regress/unittests/conversion/*.o
rm -f regress/unittests/conversion/test_conversion
rm -f regress/unittests/hostkeys/*.o
rm -f regress/unittests/hostkeys/test_hostkeys
rm -f regress/unittests/kex/*.o
rm -f regress/unittests/kex/test_kex
rm -f regress/unittests/match/*.o
rm -f regress/unittests/match/test_match
rm -f regress/unittests/utf8/*.o
rm -f regress/unittests/utf8/test_utf8
rm -f regress/misc/kexfuzz/*.o
rm -f regress/misc/kexfuzz/kexfuzz$(EXEEXT)
(cd openbsd-compat && $(MAKE) distclean)
if test -d pkg ; then \
rm -fr pkg ; \
fi
veryclean: distclean
rm -f configure config.h.in *.0
cleandir: veryclean
mrproper: veryclean
realclean: veryclean
catman-do:
@for f in $(MANPAGES_IN) ; do \
base=`echo $$f | sed 's/\..*$$//'` ; \
echo "$$f -> $$base.0" ; \
$(MANFMT) $$f | cat -v | sed -e 's/.\^H//g' \
>$$base.0 ; \
done
depend: depend-rebuild
rm -f .depend.bak
depend-rebuild:
mv .depend .depend.old
rm -f config.h .depend
touch config.h .depend
makedepend -w1000 -Y. -f .depend *.c 2>/dev/null
(echo '# Automatically generated by makedepend.'; \
echo '# Run "make depend" to rebuild.'; sort .depend ) >.depend.tmp
mv .depend.tmp .depend
rm -f .depend.bak
mv .depend.old .depend.bak
rm -f config.h
depend-check: depend-rebuild
cmp .depend .depend.bak || (echo .depend stale && exit 1)
distprep: catman-do depend-check
$(AUTORECONF)
-rm -rf autom4te.cache .depend.bak
install: $(CONFIGFILES) $(MANPAGES) $(TARGETS) install-files install-sysconf host-key check-config
install-nokeys: $(CONFIGFILES) $(MANPAGES) $(TARGETS) install-files install-sysconf
install-nosysconf: $(CONFIGFILES) $(MANPAGES) $(TARGETS) install-files
check-config:
-$(DESTDIR)$(sbindir)/sshd -t -f $(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir)/sshd_config
install-files:
$(MKDIR_P) $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)
$(MKDIR_P) $(DESTDIR)$(sbindir)
$(MKDIR_P) $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1
$(MKDIR_P) $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)5
$(MKDIR_P) $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)8
$(MKDIR_P) $(DESTDIR)$(libexecdir)
$(MKDIR_P) -m 0755 $(DESTDIR)$(PRIVSEP_PATH)
$(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) ssh$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/ssh$(EXEEXT)
$(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) scp$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/scp$(EXEEXT)
$(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) ssh-add$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/ssh-add$(EXEEXT)
$(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) ssh-agent$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/ssh-agent$(EXEEXT)
$(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) ssh-keygen$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/ssh-keygen$(EXEEXT)
$(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) ssh-keyscan$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/ssh-keyscan$(EXEEXT)
$(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) sshd$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(sbindir)/sshd$(EXEEXT)
$(INSTALL) -m 4711 $(STRIP_OPT) ssh-keysign$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(SSH_KEYSIGN)$(EXEEXT)
$(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) ssh-pkcs11-helper$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(SSH_PKCS11_HELPER)$(EXEEXT)
$(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) ssh-sk-helper$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(SSH_SK_HELPER)$(EXEEXT)
$(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) sftp$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/sftp$(EXEEXT)
$(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) sftp-server$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(SFTP_SERVER)$(EXEEXT)
$(INSTALL) -m 644 ssh.1.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1/ssh.1
$(INSTALL) -m 644 scp.1.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1/scp.1
$(INSTALL) -m 644 ssh-add.1.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1/ssh-add.1
$(INSTALL) -m 644 ssh-agent.1.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1/ssh-agent.1
$(INSTALL) -m 644 ssh-keygen.1.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1/ssh-keygen.1
$(INSTALL) -m 644 ssh-keyscan.1.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1/ssh-keyscan.1
$(INSTALL) -m 644 moduli.5.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)5/moduli.5
$(INSTALL) -m 644 sshd_config.5.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)5/sshd_config.5
$(INSTALL) -m 644 ssh_config.5.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)5/ssh_config.5
$(INSTALL) -m 644 sshd.8.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)8/sshd.8
$(INSTALL) -m 644 sftp.1.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1/sftp.1
$(INSTALL) -m 644 sftp-server.8.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)8/sftp-server.8
$(INSTALL) -m 644 ssh-keysign.8.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)8/ssh-keysign.8
$(INSTALL) -m 644 ssh-pkcs11-helper.8.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)8/ssh-pkcs11-helper.8
$(INSTALL) -m 644 ssh-sk-helper.8.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)8/ssh-sk-helper.8
install-sysconf:
$(MKDIR_P) $(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir)
@if [ ! -f $(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir)/ssh_config ]; then \
$(INSTALL) -m 644 ssh_config.out $(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir)/ssh_config; \
else \
echo "$(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir)/ssh_config already exists, install will not overwrite"; \
fi
@if [ ! -f $(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir)/sshd_config ]; then \
$(INSTALL) -m 644 sshd_config.out $(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir)/sshd_config; \
else \
echo "$(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir)/sshd_config already exists, install will not overwrite"; \
fi
@if [ ! -f $(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir)/moduli ]; then \
if [ -f $(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir)/primes ]; then \
echo "moving $(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir)/primes to $(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir)/moduli"; \
mv "$(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir)/primes" "$(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir)/moduli"; \
else \
$(INSTALL) -m 644 moduli.out $(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir)/moduli; \
fi ; \
else \
echo "$(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir)/moduli already exists, install will not overwrite"; \
fi
host-key: ssh-keygen$(EXEEXT)
@if [ -z "$(DESTDIR)" ] ; then \
./ssh-keygen -A; \
fi
host-key-force: ssh-keygen$(EXEEXT) ssh$(EXEEXT)
./ssh-keygen -t dsa -f $(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir)/ssh_host_dsa_key -N ""
./ssh-keygen -t rsa -f $(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir)/ssh_host_rsa_key -N ""
./ssh-keygen -t ed25519 -f $(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir)/ssh_host_ed25519_key -N ""
if ./ssh -Q key | grep ecdsa >/dev/null ; then \
./ssh-keygen -t ecdsa -f $(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir)/ssh_host_ecdsa_key -N ""; \
fi
uninstallall: uninstall
-rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir)/ssh_config
-rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir)/sshd_config
-rmdir $(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir)
-rmdir $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)
-rmdir $(DESTDIR)$(sbindir)
-rmdir $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1
-rmdir $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)8
-rmdir $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)
-rmdir $(DESTDIR)$(libexecdir)
uninstall:
-rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/ssh$(EXEEXT)
-rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/scp$(EXEEXT)
-rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/ssh-add$(EXEEXT)
-rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/ssh-agent$(EXEEXT)
-rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/ssh-keygen$(EXEEXT)
-rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/ssh-keyscan$(EXEEXT)
-rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/sftp$(EXEEXT)
-rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(sbindir)/sshd$(EXEEXT)
-rm -r $(DESTDIR)$(SFTP_SERVER)$(EXEEXT)
-rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(SSH_KEYSIGN)$(EXEEXT)
-rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(SSH_PKCS11_HELPER)$(EXEEXT)
-rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(SSH_SK_HELPER)$(EXEEXT)
-rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1/ssh.1
-rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1/scp.1
-rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1/ssh-add.1
-rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1/ssh-agent.1
-rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1/ssh-keygen.1
-rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1/sftp.1
-rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1/ssh-keyscan.1
-rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)8/sshd.8
-rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)8/sftp-server.8
-rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)8/ssh-keysign.8
-rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)8/ssh-pkcs11-helper.8
-rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)8/ssh-sk-helper.8
regress-prep:
$(MKDIR_P) `pwd`/regress/unittests/test_helper
$(MKDIR_P) `pwd`/regress/unittests/sshbuf
$(MKDIR_P) `pwd`/regress/unittests/sshkey
+ $(MKDIR_P) `pwd`/regress/unittests/sshsig
$(MKDIR_P) `pwd`/regress/unittests/bitmap
$(MKDIR_P) `pwd`/regress/unittests/conversion
$(MKDIR_P) `pwd`/regress/unittests/hostkeys
$(MKDIR_P) `pwd`/regress/unittests/kex
$(MKDIR_P) `pwd`/regress/unittests/match
$(MKDIR_P) `pwd`/regress/unittests/utf8
$(MKDIR_P) `pwd`/regress/misc/kexfuzz
$(MKDIR_P) `pwd`/regress/misc/sk-dummy
[ -f `pwd`/regress/Makefile ] || \
ln -s `cd $(srcdir) && pwd`/regress/Makefile `pwd`/regress/Makefile
REGRESSLIBS=libssh.a $(LIBCOMPAT)
regress/modpipe$(EXEEXT): $(srcdir)/regress/modpipe.c $(REGRESSLIBS)
$(CC) $(CFLAGS) $(CPPFLAGS) -o $@ $(srcdir)/regress/modpipe.c \
$(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS)
regress/setuid-allowed$(EXEEXT): $(srcdir)/regress/setuid-allowed.c $(REGRESSLIBS)
$(CC) $(CFLAGS) $(CPPFLAGS) -o $@ $(srcdir)/regress/setuid-allowed.c \
$(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS)
regress/netcat$(EXEEXT): $(srcdir)/regress/netcat.c $(REGRESSLIBS)
$(CC) $(CFLAGS) $(CPPFLAGS) -o $@ $(srcdir)/regress/netcat.c \
$(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS)
regress/check-perm$(EXEEXT): $(srcdir)/regress/check-perm.c $(REGRESSLIBS)
$(CC) $(CFLAGS) $(CPPFLAGS) -o $@ $(srcdir)/regress/check-perm.c \
$(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS)
regress/mkdtemp$(EXEEXT): $(srcdir)/regress/mkdtemp.c $(REGRESSLIBS)
$(CC) $(CFLAGS) $(CPPFLAGS) -o $@ $(srcdir)/regress/mkdtemp.c \
$(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS)
UNITTESTS_TEST_HELPER_OBJS=\
regress/unittests/test_helper/test_helper.o \
regress/unittests/test_helper/fuzz.o
regress/unittests/test_helper/libtest_helper.a: ${UNITTESTS_TEST_HELPER_OBJS}
$(AR) rv $@ $(UNITTESTS_TEST_HELPER_OBJS)
$(RANLIB) $@
UNITTESTS_TEST_SSHBUF_OBJS=\
regress/unittests/sshbuf/tests.o \
regress/unittests/sshbuf/test_sshbuf.o \
regress/unittests/sshbuf/test_sshbuf_getput_basic.o \
regress/unittests/sshbuf/test_sshbuf_getput_crypto.o \
regress/unittests/sshbuf/test_sshbuf_misc.o \
regress/unittests/sshbuf/test_sshbuf_fuzz.o \
regress/unittests/sshbuf/test_sshbuf_getput_fuzz.o \
regress/unittests/sshbuf/test_sshbuf_fixed.o
regress/unittests/sshbuf/test_sshbuf$(EXEEXT): ${UNITTESTS_TEST_SSHBUF_OBJS} \
regress/unittests/test_helper/libtest_helper.a libssh.a
$(LD) -o $@ $(LDFLAGS) $(UNITTESTS_TEST_SSHBUF_OBJS) \
regress/unittests/test_helper/libtest_helper.a \
-lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS)
UNITTESTS_TEST_SSHKEY_OBJS=\
regress/unittests/sshkey/test_fuzz.o \
regress/unittests/sshkey/tests.o \
regress/unittests/sshkey/common.o \
regress/unittests/sshkey/test_file.o \
regress/unittests/sshkey/test_sshkey.o \
$(SKOBJS)
regress/unittests/sshkey/test_sshkey$(EXEEXT): ${UNITTESTS_TEST_SSHKEY_OBJS} \
regress/unittests/test_helper/libtest_helper.a libssh.a
$(LD) -o $@ $(LDFLAGS) $(UNITTESTS_TEST_SSHKEY_OBJS) \
regress/unittests/test_helper/libtest_helper.a \
-lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS)
+UNITTESTS_TEST_SSHSIG_OBJS=\
+ sshsig.o \
+ regress/unittests/sshsig/tests.o \
+ $(SKOBJS)
+
+regress/unittests/sshsig/test_sshsig$(EXEEXT): ${UNITTESTS_TEST_SSHSIG_OBJS} \
+ regress/unittests/test_helper/libtest_helper.a libssh.a
+ $(LD) -o $@ $(LDFLAGS) $(UNITTESTS_TEST_SSHSIG_OBJS) \
+ regress/unittests/test_helper/libtest_helper.a \
+ -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS)
+
UNITTESTS_TEST_BITMAP_OBJS=\
regress/unittests/bitmap/tests.o
regress/unittests/bitmap/test_bitmap$(EXEEXT): ${UNITTESTS_TEST_BITMAP_OBJS} \
regress/unittests/test_helper/libtest_helper.a libssh.a
$(LD) -o $@ $(LDFLAGS) $(UNITTESTS_TEST_BITMAP_OBJS) \
regress/unittests/test_helper/libtest_helper.a \
-lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS)
UNITTESTS_TEST_CONVERSION_OBJS=\
regress/unittests/conversion/tests.o
regress/unittests/conversion/test_conversion$(EXEEXT): \
${UNITTESTS_TEST_CONVERSION_OBJS} \
regress/unittests/test_helper/libtest_helper.a libssh.a
$(LD) -o $@ $(LDFLAGS) $(UNITTESTS_TEST_CONVERSION_OBJS) \
regress/unittests/test_helper/libtest_helper.a \
-lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS)
UNITTESTS_TEST_KEX_OBJS=\
regress/unittests/kex/tests.o \
regress/unittests/kex/test_kex.o \
$(SKOBJS)
regress/unittests/kex/test_kex$(EXEEXT): ${UNITTESTS_TEST_KEX_OBJS} \
regress/unittests/test_helper/libtest_helper.a libssh.a
$(LD) -o $@ $(LDFLAGS) $(UNITTESTS_TEST_KEX_OBJS) \
regress/unittests/test_helper/libtest_helper.a \
-lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS)
UNITTESTS_TEST_HOSTKEYS_OBJS=\
regress/unittests/hostkeys/tests.o \
regress/unittests/hostkeys/test_iterate.o \
$(SKOBJS)
regress/unittests/hostkeys/test_hostkeys$(EXEEXT): \
${UNITTESTS_TEST_HOSTKEYS_OBJS} \
regress/unittests/test_helper/libtest_helper.a libssh.a
$(LD) -o $@ $(LDFLAGS) $(UNITTESTS_TEST_HOSTKEYS_OBJS) \
regress/unittests/test_helper/libtest_helper.a \
-lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS)
UNITTESTS_TEST_MATCH_OBJS=\
regress/unittests/match/tests.o
regress/unittests/match/test_match$(EXEEXT): \
${UNITTESTS_TEST_MATCH_OBJS} \
regress/unittests/test_helper/libtest_helper.a libssh.a
$(LD) -o $@ $(LDFLAGS) $(UNITTESTS_TEST_MATCH_OBJS) \
regress/unittests/test_helper/libtest_helper.a \
-lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS)
UNITTESTS_TEST_UTF8_OBJS=\
regress/unittests/utf8/tests.o
regress/unittests/utf8/test_utf8$(EXEEXT): \
${UNITTESTS_TEST_UTF8_OBJS} \
regress/unittests/test_helper/libtest_helper.a libssh.a
$(LD) -o $@ $(LDFLAGS) $(UNITTESTS_TEST_UTF8_OBJS) \
regress/unittests/test_helper/libtest_helper.a \
-lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS)
MISC_KEX_FUZZ_OBJS=\
regress/misc/kexfuzz/kexfuzz.o \
$(SKOBJS)
regress/misc/kexfuzz/kexfuzz$(EXEEXT): ${MISC_KEX_FUZZ_OBJS} libssh.a
$(LD) -o $@ $(LDFLAGS) $(MISC_KEX_FUZZ_OBJS) \
-lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS)
# These all need to be compiled -fPIC, so they are treated differently.
SK_DUMMY_OBJS=\
regress/misc/sk-dummy/sk-dummy.lo \
regress/misc/sk-dummy/fatal.lo \
ed25519.lo hash.lo ge25519.lo fe25519.lo sc25519.lo verify.lo
SK_DUMMY_LIBRARY=@SK_DUMMY_LIBRARY@
.c.lo: Makefile.in config.h
$(CC) $(CFLAGS_NOPIE) $(PICFLAG) $(CPPFLAGS) -c $< -o $@
regress/misc/sk-dummy/sk-dummy.so: $(SK_DUMMY_OBJS)
$(CC) $(CFLAGS) $(CPPFLAGS) -fPIC -shared -o $@ $(SK_DUMMY_OBJS) \
-L. -Lopenbsd-compat -lopenbsd-compat $(LDFLAGS_NOPIE) $(LIBS)
regress-binaries: regress-prep $(LIBCOMPAT) \
regress/modpipe$(EXEEXT) \
regress/setuid-allowed$(EXEEXT) \
regress/netcat$(EXEEXT) \
regress/check-perm$(EXEEXT) \
regress/mkdtemp$(EXEEXT) \
$(SK_DUMMY_LIBRARY)
regress-unit-binaries: regress-prep $(REGRESSLIBS) \
regress/unittests/sshbuf/test_sshbuf$(EXEEXT) \
regress/unittests/sshkey/test_sshkey$(EXEEXT) \
+ regress/unittests/sshsig/test_sshsig$(EXEEXT) \
regress/unittests/bitmap/test_bitmap$(EXEEXT) \
regress/unittests/conversion/test_conversion$(EXEEXT) \
regress/unittests/hostkeys/test_hostkeys$(EXEEXT) \
regress/unittests/kex/test_kex$(EXEEXT) \
regress/unittests/match/test_match$(EXEEXT) \
regress/unittests/utf8/test_utf8$(EXEEXT) \
regress/misc/kexfuzz/kexfuzz$(EXEEXT)
tests: file-tests t-exec interop-tests unit
echo all tests passed
unit: regress-unit-binaries
BUILDDIR=`pwd`; \
cd $(srcdir)/regress || exit $$?; \
$(MAKE) \
.OBJDIR="$${BUILDDIR}/regress" \
.CURDIR="`pwd`" \
$@ && echo $@ tests passed
interop-tests t-exec file-tests: regress-prep regress-binaries $(TARGETS)
BUILDDIR=`pwd`; \
cd $(srcdir)/regress || exit $$?; \
EGREP='@EGREP@' \
$(MAKE) \
.OBJDIR="$${BUILDDIR}/regress" \
.CURDIR="`pwd`" \
BUILDDIR="$${BUILDDIR}" \
OBJ="$${BUILDDIR}/regress/" \
PATH="$${BUILDDIR}:$${PATH}" \
TEST_ENV=MALLOC_OPTIONS="@TEST_MALLOC_OPTIONS@" \
TEST_MALLOC_OPTIONS="@TEST_MALLOC_OPTIONS@" \
TEST_SSH_SCP="$${BUILDDIR}/scp" \
TEST_SSH_SSH="$${BUILDDIR}/ssh" \
TEST_SSH_SSHD="$${BUILDDIR}/sshd" \
TEST_SSH_SSHAGENT="$${BUILDDIR}/ssh-agent" \
TEST_SSH_SSHADD="$${BUILDDIR}/ssh-add" \
TEST_SSH_SSHKEYGEN="$${BUILDDIR}/ssh-keygen" \
TEST_SSH_SSHPKCS11HELPER="$${BUILDDIR}/ssh-pkcs11-helper" \
TEST_SSH_SSHKEYSCAN="$${BUILDDIR}/ssh-keyscan" \
TEST_SSH_SFTP="$${BUILDDIR}/sftp" \
TEST_SSH_PKCS11_HELPER="$${BUILDDIR}/ssh-pkcs11-helper" \
TEST_SSH_SK_HELPER="$${BUILDDIR}/ssh-sk-helper" \
TEST_SSH_SFTPSERVER="$${BUILDDIR}/sftp-server" \
TEST_SSH_PLINK="plink" \
TEST_SSH_PUTTYGEN="puttygen" \
TEST_SSH_CONCH="conch" \
TEST_SSH_IPV6="@TEST_SSH_IPV6@" \
TEST_SSH_UTF8="@TEST_SSH_UTF8@" \
TEST_SSH_ECC="@TEST_SSH_ECC@" \
TEST_SHELL="${TEST_SHELL}" \
EXEEXT="$(EXEEXT)" \
$@ && echo all $@ passed
compat-tests: $(LIBCOMPAT)
(cd openbsd-compat/regress && $(MAKE))
regressclean:
if [ -f regress/Makefile ] && [ -r regress/Makefile ]; then \
(cd regress && $(MAKE) clean) \
fi
survey: survey.sh ssh
@$(SHELL) ./survey.sh > survey
@echo 'The survey results have been placed in the file "survey" in the'
@echo 'current directory. Please review the file then send with'
@echo '"make send-survey".'
send-survey: survey
mail portable-survey@mindrot.org <survey
package: $(CONFIGFILES) $(MANPAGES) $(TARGETS)
if [ "@MAKE_PACKAGE_SUPPORTED@" = yes ]; then \
sh buildpkg.sh; \
fi
# @DEPEND@
diff --git a/PROTOCOL b/PROTOCOL
index c702fca45a46..ecdacb9dc75e 100644
--- a/PROTOCOL
+++ b/PROTOCOL
@@ -1,499 +1,499 @@
This documents OpenSSH's deviations and extensions to the published SSH
protocol.
Note that OpenSSH's sftp and sftp-server implement revision 3 of the SSH
filexfer protocol described in:
https://www.openssh.com/txt/draft-ietf-secsh-filexfer-02.txt
Newer versions of the draft will not be supported, though some features
are individually implemented as extensions described below.
The protocol used by OpenSSH's ssh-agent is described in the file
PROTOCOL.agent
1. Transport protocol changes
1.1. transport: Protocol 2 MAC algorithm "umac-64@openssh.com"
This is a new transport-layer MAC method using the UMAC algorithm
(rfc4418). This method is identical to the "umac-64" method documented
in:
https://www.openssh.com/txt/draft-miller-secsh-umac-01.txt
1.2. transport: Protocol 2 compression algorithm "zlib@openssh.com"
This transport-layer compression method uses the zlib compression
algorithm (identical to the "zlib" method in rfc4253), but delays the
start of compression until after authentication has completed. This
avoids exposing compression code to attacks from unauthenticated users.
The method is documented in:
https://www.openssh.com/txt/draft-miller-secsh-compression-delayed-00.txt
1.3. transport: New public key algorithms "ssh-rsa-cert-v01@openssh.com",
"ssh-dsa-cert-v01@openssh.com",
"ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com",
"ecdsa-sha2-nistp384-cert-v01@openssh.com" and
"ecdsa-sha2-nistp521-cert-v01@openssh.com"
OpenSSH introduces new public key algorithms to support certificate
authentication for users and host keys. These methods are documented
in the file PROTOCOL.certkeys
1.4. transport: Elliptic Curve cryptography
OpenSSH supports ECC key exchange and public key authentication as
specified in RFC5656. Only the ecdsa-sha2-nistp256, ecdsa-sha2-nistp384
and ecdsa-sha2-nistp521 curves over GF(p) are supported. Elliptic
curve points encoded using point compression are NOT accepted or
generated.
1.5 transport: Protocol 2 Encrypt-then-MAC MAC algorithms
OpenSSH supports MAC algorithms, whose names contain "-etm", that
perform the calculations in a different order to that defined in RFC
4253. These variants use the so-called "encrypt then MAC" ordering,
calculating the MAC over the packet ciphertext rather than the
plaintext. This ordering closes a security flaw in the SSH transport
protocol, where decryption of unauthenticated ciphertext provided a
"decryption oracle" that could, in conjunction with cipher flaws, reveal
session plaintext.
Specifically, the "-etm" MAC algorithms modify the transport protocol
to calculate the MAC over the packet ciphertext and to send the packet
length unencrypted. This is necessary for the transport to obtain the
length of the packet and location of the MAC tag so that it may be
verified without decrypting unauthenticated data.
As such, the MAC covers:
mac = MAC(key, sequence_number || packet_length || encrypted_packet)
where "packet_length" is encoded as a uint32 and "encrypted_packet"
contains:
byte padding_length
byte[n1] payload; n1 = packet_length - padding_length - 1
byte[n2] random padding; n2 = padding_length
1.6 transport: AES-GCM
OpenSSH supports the AES-GCM algorithm as specified in RFC 5647.
Because of problems with the specification of the key exchange
the behaviour of OpenSSH differs from the RFC as follows:
AES-GCM is only negotiated as the cipher algorithms
"aes128-gcm@openssh.com" or "aes256-gcm@openssh.com" and never as
an MAC algorithm. Additionally, if AES-GCM is selected as the cipher
the exchanged MAC algorithms are ignored and there doesn't have to be
a matching MAC.
1.7 transport: chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com authenticated encryption
OpenSSH supports authenticated encryption using ChaCha20 and Poly1305
as described in PROTOCOL.chacha20poly1305.
1.8 transport: curve25519-sha256@libssh.org key exchange algorithm
OpenSSH supports the use of ECDH in Curve25519 for key exchange as
described at:
http://git.libssh.org/users/aris/libssh.git/plain/doc/curve25519-sha256@libssh.org.txt?h=curve25519
2. Connection protocol changes
2.1. connection: Channel write close extension "eow@openssh.com"
The SSH connection protocol (rfc4254) provides the SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_EOF
message to allow an endpoint to signal its peer that it will send no
more data over a channel. Unfortunately, there is no symmetric way for
an endpoint to request that its peer should cease sending data to it
while still keeping the channel open for the endpoint to send data to
the peer.
This is desirable, since it saves the transmission of data that would
otherwise need to be discarded and it allows an endpoint to signal local
processes of the condition, e.g. by closing the corresponding file
descriptor.
OpenSSH implements a channel extension message to perform this
signalling: "eow@openssh.com" (End Of Write). This message is sent by
an endpoint when the local output of a session channel is closed or
experiences a write error. The message is formatted as follows:
byte SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_REQUEST
uint32 recipient channel
string "eow@openssh.com"
boolean FALSE
On receiving this message, the peer SHOULD cease sending data of
the channel and MAY signal the process from which the channel data
originates (e.g. by closing its read file descriptor).
As with the symmetric SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_EOF message, the channel does
remain open after a "eow@openssh.com" has been sent and more data may
still be sent in the other direction. This message does not consume
window space and may be sent even if no window space is available.
NB. due to certain broken SSH implementations aborting upon receipt
of this message (in contravention of RFC4254 section 5.4), this
message is only sent to OpenSSH peers (identified by banner).
-Other SSH implementations may be whitelisted to receive this message
+Other SSH implementations may be listed to receive this message
upon request.
2.2. connection: disallow additional sessions extension
"no-more-sessions@openssh.com"
Most SSH connections will only ever request a single session, but a
attacker may abuse a running ssh client to surreptitiously open
additional sessions under their control. OpenSSH provides a global
request "no-more-sessions@openssh.com" to mitigate this attack.
When an OpenSSH client expects that it will never open another session
(i.e. it has been started with connection multiplexing disabled), it
will send the following global request:
byte SSH_MSG_GLOBAL_REQUEST
string "no-more-sessions@openssh.com"
char want-reply
On receipt of such a message, an OpenSSH server will refuse to open
future channels of type "session" and instead immediately abort the
connection.
Note that this is not a general defence against compromised clients
(that is impossible), but it thwarts a simple attack.
NB. due to certain broken SSH implementations aborting upon receipt
of this message, the no-more-sessions request is only sent to OpenSSH
servers (identified by banner). Other SSH implementations may be
-whitelisted to receive this message upon request.
+listed to receive this message upon request.
2.3. connection: Tunnel forward extension "tun@openssh.com"
OpenSSH supports layer 2 and layer 3 tunnelling via the "tun@openssh.com"
channel type. This channel type supports forwarding of network packets
with datagram boundaries intact between endpoints equipped with
interfaces like the BSD tun(4) device. Tunnel forwarding channels are
requested by the client with the following packet:
byte SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN
string "tun@openssh.com"
uint32 sender channel
uint32 initial window size
uint32 maximum packet size
uint32 tunnel mode
uint32 remote unit number
The "tunnel mode" parameter specifies whether the tunnel should forward
layer 2 frames or layer 3 packets. It may take one of the following values:
SSH_TUNMODE_POINTOPOINT 1 /* layer 3 packets */
SSH_TUNMODE_ETHERNET 2 /* layer 2 frames */
The "tunnel unit number" specifies the remote interface number, or may
be 0x7fffffff to allow the server to automatically choose an interface. A
server that is not willing to open a client-specified unit should refuse
the request with a SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE error. On successful
open, the server should reply with SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_SUCCESS.
Once established the client and server may exchange packet or frames
over the tunnel channel by encapsulating them in SSH protocol strings
and sending them as channel data. This ensures that packet boundaries
are kept intact. Specifically, packets are transmitted using normal
SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA packets:
byte SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA
uint32 recipient channel
string data
The contents of the "data" field for layer 3 packets is:
uint32 packet length
uint32 address family
byte[packet length - 4] packet data
The "address family" field identifies the type of packet in the message.
It may be one of:
SSH_TUN_AF_INET 2 /* IPv4 */
SSH_TUN_AF_INET6 24 /* IPv6 */
The "packet data" field consists of the IPv4/IPv6 datagram itself
without any link layer header.
The contents of the "data" field for layer 2 packets is:
uint32 packet length
byte[packet length] frame
The "frame" field contains an IEEE 802.3 Ethernet frame, including
header.
2.4. connection: Unix domain socket forwarding
OpenSSH supports local and remote Unix domain socket forwarding
using the "streamlocal" extension. Forwarding is initiated as per
TCP sockets but with a single path instead of a host and port.
Similar to direct-tcpip, direct-streamlocal is sent by the client
to request that the server make a connection to a Unix domain socket.
byte SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN
string "direct-streamlocal@openssh.com"
uint32 sender channel
uint32 initial window size
uint32 maximum packet size
string socket path
string reserved
uint32 reserved
Similar to forwarded-tcpip, forwarded-streamlocal is sent by the
server when the client has previously send the server a streamlocal-forward
GLOBAL_REQUEST.
byte SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN
string "forwarded-streamlocal@openssh.com"
uint32 sender channel
uint32 initial window size
uint32 maximum packet size
string socket path
string reserved for future use
The reserved field is not currently defined and is ignored on the
remote end. It is intended to be used in the future to pass
information about the socket file, such as ownership and mode.
The client currently sends the empty string for this field.
Similar to tcpip-forward, streamlocal-forward is sent by the client
to request remote forwarding of a Unix domain socket.
byte SSH2_MSG_GLOBAL_REQUEST
string "streamlocal-forward@openssh.com"
boolean TRUE
string socket path
Similar to cancel-tcpip-forward, cancel-streamlocal-forward is sent
by the client cancel the forwarding of a Unix domain socket.
byte SSH2_MSG_GLOBAL_REQUEST
string "cancel-streamlocal-forward@openssh.com"
boolean FALSE
string socket path
2.5. connection: hostkey update and rotation "hostkeys-00@openssh.com"
and "hostkeys-prove-00@openssh.com"
OpenSSH supports a protocol extension allowing a server to inform
a client of all its protocol v.2 host keys after user-authentication
has completed.
byte SSH_MSG_GLOBAL_REQUEST
string "hostkeys-00@openssh.com"
string[] hostkeys
Upon receiving this message, a client should check which of the
supplied host keys are present in known_hosts.
Note that the server may send key types that the client does not
support. The client should disregard such keys if they are received.
If the client identifies any keys that are not present for the host,
it should send a "hostkeys-prove@openssh.com" message to request the
server prove ownership of the private half of the key.
byte SSH_MSG_GLOBAL_REQUEST
string "hostkeys-prove-00@openssh.com"
char 1 /* want-reply */
string[] hostkeys
When a server receives this message, it should generate a signature
using each requested key over the following:
string "hostkeys-prove-00@openssh.com"
string session identifier
string hostkey
These signatures should be included in the reply, in the order matching
the hostkeys in the request:
byte SSH_MSG_REQUEST_SUCCESS
string[] signatures
When the client receives this reply (and not a failure), it should
validate the signatures and may update its known_hosts file, adding keys
that it has not seen before and deleting keys for the server host that
are no longer offered.
These extensions let a client learn key types that it had not previously
encountered, thereby allowing it to potentially upgrade from weaker
key algorithms to better ones. It also supports graceful key rotation:
a server may offer multiple keys of the same type for a period (to
give clients an opportunity to learn them using this extension) before
removing the deprecated key from those offered.
2.6. connection: SIGINFO support for "signal" channel request
The SSH channels protocol (RFC4254 section 6.9) supports sending a
signal to a session attached to a channel. OpenSSH supports one
extension signal "INFO@openssh.com" that allows sending SIGINFO on
BSD-derived systems.
3. SFTP protocol changes
3.1. sftp: Reversal of arguments to SSH_FXP_SYMLINK
When OpenSSH's sftp-server was implemented, the order of the arguments
to the SSH_FXP_SYMLINK method was inadvertently reversed. Unfortunately,
the reversal was not noticed until the server was widely deployed. Since
fixing this to follow the specification would cause incompatibility, the
current order was retained. For correct operation, clients should send
SSH_FXP_SYMLINK as follows:
uint32 id
string targetpath
string linkpath
3.2. sftp: Server extension announcement in SSH_FXP_VERSION
OpenSSH's sftp-server lists the extensions it supports using the
standard extension announcement mechanism in the SSH_FXP_VERSION server
hello packet:
uint32 3 /* protocol version */
string ext1-name
string ext1-version
string ext2-name
string ext2-version
...
string extN-name
string extN-version
Each extension reports its integer version number as an ASCII encoded
string, e.g. "1". The version will be incremented if the extension is
ever changed in an incompatible way. The server MAY advertise the same
extension with multiple versions (though this is unlikely). Clients MUST
check the version number before attempting to use the extension.
3.3. sftp: Extension request "posix-rename@openssh.com"
This operation provides a rename operation with POSIX semantics, which
are different to those provided by the standard SSH_FXP_RENAME in
draft-ietf-secsh-filexfer-02.txt. This request is implemented as a
SSH_FXP_EXTENDED request with the following format:
uint32 id
string "posix-rename@openssh.com"
string oldpath
string newpath
On receiving this request the server will perform the POSIX operation
rename(oldpath, newpath) and will respond with a SSH_FXP_STATUS message.
This extension is advertised in the SSH_FXP_VERSION hello with version
"1".
3.4. sftp: Extension requests "statvfs@openssh.com" and
"fstatvfs@openssh.com"
These requests correspond to the statvfs and fstatvfs POSIX system
interfaces. The "statvfs@openssh.com" request operates on an explicit
pathname, and is formatted as follows:
uint32 id
string "statvfs@openssh.com"
string path
The "fstatvfs@openssh.com" operates on an open file handle:
uint32 id
string "fstatvfs@openssh.com"
string handle
These requests return a SSH_FXP_STATUS reply on failure. On success they
return the following SSH_FXP_EXTENDED_REPLY reply:
uint32 id
uint64 f_bsize /* file system block size */
uint64 f_frsize /* fundamental fs block size */
uint64 f_blocks /* number of blocks (unit f_frsize) */
uint64 f_bfree /* free blocks in file system */
uint64 f_bavail /* free blocks for non-root */
uint64 f_files /* total file inodes */
uint64 f_ffree /* free file inodes */
uint64 f_favail /* free file inodes for to non-root */
uint64 f_fsid /* file system id */
uint64 f_flag /* bit mask of f_flag values */
uint64 f_namemax /* maximum filename length */
The values of the f_flag bitmask are as follows:
#define SSH_FXE_STATVFS_ST_RDONLY 0x1 /* read-only */
#define SSH_FXE_STATVFS_ST_NOSUID 0x2 /* no setuid */
Both the "statvfs@openssh.com" and "fstatvfs@openssh.com" extensions are
advertised in the SSH_FXP_VERSION hello with version "2".
3.5. sftp: Extension request "hardlink@openssh.com"
This request is for creating a hard link to a regular file. This
request is implemented as a SSH_FXP_EXTENDED request with the
following format:
uint32 id
string "hardlink@openssh.com"
string oldpath
string newpath
On receiving this request the server will perform the operation
link(oldpath, newpath) and will respond with a SSH_FXP_STATUS message.
This extension is advertised in the SSH_FXP_VERSION hello with version
"1".
3.6. sftp: Extension request "fsync@openssh.com"
This request asks the server to call fsync(2) on an open file handle.
uint32 id
string "fsync@openssh.com"
string handle
One receiving this request, a server will call fsync(handle_fd) and will
respond with a SSH_FXP_STATUS message.
This extension is advertised in the SSH_FXP_VERSION hello with version
"1".
4. Miscellaneous changes
4.1 Public key format
OpenSSH public keys, as generated by ssh-keygen(1) and appearing in
authorized_keys files, are formatted as a single line of text consisting
of the public key algorithm name followed by a base64-encoded key blob.
The public key blob (before base64 encoding) is the same format used for
the encoding of public keys sent on the wire: as described in RFC4253
section 6.6 for RSA and DSA keys, RFC5656 section 3.1 for ECDSA keys
and the "New public key formats" section of PROTOCOL.certkeys for the
OpenSSH certificate formats.
4.2 Private key format
OpenSSH private keys, as generated by ssh-keygen(1) use the format
described in PROTOCOL.key by default. As a legacy option, PEM format
(RFC7468) private keys are also supported for RSA, DSA and ECDSA keys
and were the default format before OpenSSH 7.8.
4.3 KRL format
OpenSSH supports a compact format for Key Revocation Lists (KRLs). This
format is described in the PROTOCOL.krl file.
4.4 Connection multiplexing
OpenSSH's connection multiplexing uses messages as described in
PROTOCOL.mux over a Unix domain socket for communications between a
master instance and later clients.
-$OpenBSD: PROTOCOL,v 1.37 2020/02/21 00:04:43 dtucker Exp $
+$OpenBSD: PROTOCOL,v 1.38 2020/07/05 23:59:45 djm Exp $
diff --git a/PROTOCOL.agent b/PROTOCOL.agent
index da3381942e08..6947b46cd361 100644
--- a/PROTOCOL.agent
+++ b/PROTOCOL.agent
@@ -1,5 +1,7 @@
This file used to contain a description of the SSH agent protocol
implemented by OpenSSH. It has since been superseded by an Internet-
draft that is available from:
+$OpenBSD: PROTOCOL.agent,v 1.13 2020/08/31 00:17:41 djm Exp $
+
https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-miller-ssh-agent-02
diff --git a/PROTOCOL.sshsig b/PROTOCOL.sshsig
index 720e1f18a25e..78457ddfc653 100644
--- a/PROTOCOL.sshsig
+++ b/PROTOCOL.sshsig
@@ -1,99 +1,100 @@
This document describes a lightweight SSH Signature format
that is compatible with SSH keys and wire formats.
At present, only detached and armored signatures are supported.
1. Armored format
The Armored SSH signatures consist of a header, a base64
encoded blob, and a footer.
The header is the string "-----BEGIN SSH SIGNATURE-----"
followed by a newline. The footer is the string
"-----END SSH SIGNATURE-----" immediately after a newline.
The header MUST be present at the start of every signature.
Files containing the signature MUST start with the header.
Likewise, the footer MUST be present at the end of every
signature.
The base64 encoded blob SHOULD be broken up by newlines
every 76 characters.
Example:
-----BEGIN SSH SIGNATURE-----
U1NIU0lHAAAAAQAAADMAAAALc3NoLWVkMjU1MTkAAAAgJKxoLBJBivUPNTUJUSslQTt2hD
jozKvHarKeN8uYFqgAAAADZm9vAAAAAAAAAFMAAAALc3NoLWVkMjU1MTkAAABAKNC4IEbt
Tq0Fb56xhtuE1/lK9H9RZJfON4o6hE9R4ZGFX98gy0+fFJ/1d2/RxnZky0Y7GojwrZkrHT
FgCqVWAQ==
-----END SSH SIGNATURE-----
2. Blob format
#define MAGIC_PREAMBLE "SSHSIG"
#define SIG_VERSION 0x01
byte[6] MAGIC_PREAMBLE
uint32 SIG_VERSION
string publickey
string namespace
string reserved
string hash_algorithm
string signature
The publickey field MUST contain the serialisation of the
public key used to make the signature using the usual SSH
encoding rules, i.e RFC4253, RFC5656,
draft-ietf-curdle-ssh-ed25519-ed448, etc.
Verifiers MUST reject signatures with versions greater than those
they support.
The purpose of the namespace value is to specify a unambiguous
interpretation domain for the signature, e.g. file signing.
This prevents cross-protocol attacks caused by signatures
intended for one intended domain being accepted in another.
The namespace value MUST NOT be the empty string.
The reserved value is present to encode future information
(e.g. tags) into the signature. Implementations should ignore
the reserved field if it is not empty.
Data to be signed is first hashed with the specified hash_algorithm.
This is done to limit the amount of data presented to the signature
operation, which may be of concern if the signing key is held in limited
or slow hardware or on a remote ssh-agent. The supported hash algorithms
are "sha256" and "sha512".
The signature itself is made using the SSH signature algorithm and
encoding rules for the chosen key type. For RSA signatures, the
signature algorithm must be "rsa-sha2-512" or "rsa-sha2-256" (i.e.
not the legacy RSA-SHA1 "ssh-rsa").
-This blob is encoded as a string using the RFC4243 encoding
+This blob is encoded as a string using the RFC4253 encoding
rules and base64 encoded to form the middle part of the
armored signature.
3. Signed Data, of which the signature goes into the blob above
#define MAGIC_PREAMBLE "SSHSIG"
byte[6] MAGIC_PREAMBLE
string namespace
string reserved
string hash_algorithm
string H(message)
The preamble is the six-byte sequence "SSHSIG". It is included to
ensure that manual signatures can never be confused with any message
signed during SSH user or host authentication.
The reserved value is present to encode future information
(e.g. tags) into the signature. Implementations should ignore
the reserved field if it is not empty.
The data is concatenated and passed to the SSH signing
function.
+$OpenBSD: PROTOCOL.sshsig,v 1.4 2020/08/31 00:17:41 djm Exp $
diff --git a/PROTOCOL.u2f b/PROTOCOL.u2f
index 917e669cddaa..f8ca56b11c8c 100644
--- a/PROTOCOL.u2f
+++ b/PROTOCOL.u2f
@@ -1,337 +1,309 @@
This document describes OpenSSH's support for U2F/FIDO security keys.
Background
----------
U2F is an open standard for two-factor authentication hardware, widely
used for user authentication to websites. U2F tokens are ubiquitous,
available from a number of manufacturers and are currently by far the
cheapest way for users to achieve hardware-backed credential storage.
The U2F protocol however cannot be trivially used as an SSH protocol key
type as both the inputs to the signature operation and the resultant
signature differ from those specified for SSH. For similar reasons,
integration of U2F devices cannot be achieved via the PKCS#11 API.
U2F also offers a number of features that are attractive in the context
of SSH authentication. They can be configured to require indication
of "user presence" for each signature operation (typically achieved
by requiring the user touch the key). They also offer an attestation
mechanism at key enrollment time that can be used to prove that a
given key is backed by hardware. Finally the signature format includes
a monotonic signature counter that can be used (at scale) to detect
concurrent use of a private key, should it be extracted from hardware.
U2F private keys are generated through an enrollment operation,
which takes an application ID - a URL-like string, typically "ssh:"
in this case, but a HTTP origin for the case of web authentication,
and a challenge string (typically randomly generated). The enrollment
operation returns a public key, a key handle that must be used to invoke
the hardware-backed private key, some flags and signed attestation
information that may be used to verify that a private key is hosted on a
particular hardware instance.
It is common for U2F hardware to derive private keys from the key handle
in conjunction with a small per-device secret that is unique to the
hardware, thus requiring little on-device storage for an effectively
unlimited number of supported keys. This drives the requirement that
the key handle be supplied for each signature operation. U2F tokens
primarily use ECDSA signatures in the NIST-P256 field, though the FIDO2
standard specifies additional key types, including one based on Ed25519.
+Use of U2F security keys does not automatically imply multi-factor
+authentication. From sshd's perspective, a security key constitutes a
+single factor of authentication, even if protected by a PIN or biometric
+authentication. To enable multi-factor authentication in ssh, please
+refer to the AuthenticationMethods option in sshd_config(5).
+
+
SSH U2F Key formats
-------------------
OpenSSH integrates U2F as new key and corresponding certificate types:
sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256@openssh.com
sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com
sk-ssh-ed25519@openssh.com
sk-ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com
While each uses ecdsa-sha256-nistp256 as the underlying signature primitive,
keys require extra information in the public and private keys, and in
the signature object itself. As such they cannot be made compatible with
the existing ecdsa-sha2-nistp* key types.
The format of a sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256@openssh.com public key is:
string "sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256@openssh.com"
string curve name
ec_point Q
string application (user-specified, but typically "ssh:")
The corresponding private key contains:
string "sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256@openssh.com"
string curve name
ec_point Q
string application (user-specified, but typically "ssh:")
uint8 flags
string key_handle
string reserved
The format of a sk-ssh-ed25519@openssh.com public key is:
string "sk-ssh-ed25519@openssh.com"
string public key
string application (user-specified, but typically "ssh:")
With a private half consisting of:
string "sk-ssh-ed25519@openssh.com"
string public key
string application (user-specified, but typically "ssh:")
uint8 flags
string key_handle
string reserved
The certificate form for SSH U2F keys appends the usual certificate
information to the public key:
string "sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com"
string nonce
string curve name
ec_point Q
string application
uint64 serial
uint32 type
string key id
string valid principals
uint64 valid after
uint64 valid before
string critical options
string extensions
string reserved
string signature key
string signature
and for security key ed25519 certificates:
string "sk-ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com"
string nonce
string public key
string application
uint64 serial
uint32 type
string key id
string valid principals
uint64 valid after
uint64 valid before
string critical options
string extensions
string reserved
string signature key
string signature
Both security key certificates use the following encoding for private keys:
string type (e.g. "sk-ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com")
string pubkey (the above key/cert structure)
string application
uint8 flags
string key_handle
string reserved
During key generation, the hardware also returns attestation information
that may be used to cryptographically prove that a given key is
hardware-backed. Unfortunately, the protocol required for this proof is
not privacy-preserving and may be used to identify U2F tokens with at
least manufacturer and batch number granularity. For this reason, we
choose not to include this information in the public key or save it by
default.
Attestation information is useful for out-of-band key and certificate
registration workflows, e.g. proving to a CA that a key is backed
by trusted hardware before it will issue a certificate. To support this
case, OpenSSH optionally allows retaining the attestation information
at the time of key generation. It will take the following format:
+ string "ssh-sk-attest-v01"
+ string attestation certificate
+ string enrollment signature
+ string authenticator data (CBOR encoded)
+ uint32 reserved flags
+ string reserved string
+
+A previous version of this format, emitted prior to OpenSSH 8.4 omitted
+the authenticator data.
+
string "ssh-sk-attest-v00"
string attestation certificate
string enrollment signature
uint32 reserved flags
string reserved string
OpenSSH treats the attestation certificate and enrollment signatures as
opaque objects and does no interpretation of them itself.
SSH U2F signatures
------------------
In addition to the message to be signed, the U2F signature operation
requires the key handle and a few additional parameters. The signature
is signed over a blob that consists of:
byte[32] SHA256(application)
byte flags (including "user present", extensions present)
uint32 counter
byte[] extensions
byte[32] SHA256(message)
No extensions are yet defined for SSH use. If any are defined in the future,
it will be possible to infer their presence from the contents of the "flags"
value.
The signature returned from U2F hardware takes the following format:
byte flags (including "user present")
uint32 counter
byte[] ecdsa_signature (in X9.62 format).
For use in the SSH protocol, we wish to avoid server-side parsing of ASN.1
format data in the pre-authentication attack surface. Therefore, the
signature format used on the wire in SSH2_USERAUTH_REQUEST packets will
be reformatted to better match the existing signature encoding:
string "sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256@openssh.com"
string ecdsa_signature
byte flags
uint32 counter
Where the "ecdsa_signature" field follows the RFC5656 ECDSA signature
encoding:
mpint r
mpint s
For Ed25519 keys the signature is encoded as:
string "sk-ssh-ed25519@openssh.com"
string signature
byte flags
uint32 counter
+webauthn signatures
+-------------------
+
+The W3C/FIDO webauthn[1] standard defines a mechanism for a web browser to
+interact with FIDO authentication tokens. This standard builds upon the
+FIDO standards, but requires different signature contents to raw FIDO
+messages. OpenSSH supports ECDSA/p256 webauthn signatures through the
+"webauthn-sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256@openssh.com" signature algorithm.
+
+The wire encoding for a webauthn-sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256@openssh.com
+signature is similar to the sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256@openssh.com format:
+
+ string "webauthn-sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256@openssh.com"
+ string ecdsa_signature
+ byte flags
+ uint32 counter
+ string origin
+ string clientData
+ string extensions
+
+Where "origin" is the HTTP origin making the signature, "clientData" is
+the JSON-like structure signed by the browser and "extensions" are any
+extensions used in making the signature.
+
+[1] https://www.w3.org/TR/webauthn-2/
+
ssh-agent protocol extensions
-----------------------------
ssh-agent requires a protocol extension to support U2F keys. At
present the closest analogue to Security Keys in ssh-agent are PKCS#11
tokens, insofar as they require a middleware library to communicate with
the device that holds the keys. Unfortunately, the protocol message used
to add PKCS#11 keys to ssh-agent does not include any way to send the
key handle to the agent as U2F keys require.
To avoid this, without having to add wholly new messages to the agent
protocol, we will use the existing SSH2_AGENTC_ADD_ID_CONSTRAINED message
with a new key constraint extension to encode a path to the middleware
library for the key. The format of this constraint extension would be:
byte SSH_AGENT_CONSTRAIN_EXTENSION
string sk-provider@openssh.com
string middleware path
This constraint-based approach does not present any compatibility
problems.
OpenSSH integration
-------------------
U2F tokens may be attached via a number of means, including USB and NFC.
The USB interface is standardised around a HID protocol, but we want to
be able to support other transports as well as dummy implementations for
regress testing. For this reason, OpenSSH shall support a dynamically-
loaded middleware libraries to communicate with security keys, but offer
support for the common case of USB HID security keys internally.
-The middleware library need only expose a handful of functions:
-
- #define SSH_SK_VERSION_MAJOR 0x00050000 /* API version */
- #define SSH_SK_VERSION_MAJOR_MASK 0xffff0000
-
- /* Flags */
- #define SSH_SK_USER_PRESENCE_REQD 0x01
- #define SSH_SK_USER_VERIFICATION_REQD 0x04
- #define SSH_SK_RESIDENT_KEY 0x20
-
- /* Algs */
- #define SSH_SK_ECDSA 0x00
- #define SSH_SK_ED25519 0x01
-
- /* Error codes */
- #define SSH_SK_ERR_GENERAL -1
- #define SSH_SK_ERR_UNSUPPORTED -2
- #define SSH_SK_ERR_PIN_REQUIRED -3
- #define SSH_SK_ERR_DEVICE_NOT_FOUND -4
-
- struct sk_enroll_response {
- uint8_t *public_key;
- size_t public_key_len;
- uint8_t *key_handle;
- size_t key_handle_len;
- uint8_t *signature;
- size_t signature_len;
- uint8_t *attestation_cert;
- size_t attestation_cert_len;
- };
-
- struct sk_sign_response {
- uint8_t flags;
- uint32_t counter;
- uint8_t *sig_r;
- size_t sig_r_len;
- uint8_t *sig_s;
- size_t sig_s_len;
- };
-
- struct sk_resident_key {
- uint32_t alg;
- size_t slot;
- char *application;
- struct sk_enroll_response key;
- };
-
- struct sk_option {
- char *name;
- char *value;
- uint8_t important;
- };
-
- /* Return the version of the middleware API */
- uint32_t sk_api_version(void);
-
- /* Enroll a U2F key (private key generation) */
- int sk_enroll(uint32_t alg,
- const uint8_t *challenge, size_t challenge_len,
- const char *application, uint8_t flags, const char *pin,
- struct sk_option **options,
- struct sk_enroll_response **enroll_response);
-
- /* Sign a challenge */
- int sk_sign(uint32_t alg, const uint8_t *message, size_t message_len,
- const char *application,
- const uint8_t *key_handle, size_t key_handle_len,
- uint8_t flags, const char *pin, struct sk_option **options,
- struct sk_sign_response **sign_response);
-
- /* Enumerate all resident keys */
- int sk_load_resident_keys(const char *pin, struct sk_option **options,
- struct sk_resident_key ***rks, size_t *nrks);
-
-The SSH_SK_VERSION_MAJOR should be incremented for each incompatible
+The middleware library need only expose a handful of functions and
+numbers listed in sk-api.h. Included in the defined numbers is a
+SSH_SK_VERSION_MAJOR that should be incremented for each incompatible
API change.
-The options may be used to pass miscellaneous options to the middleware
-as a NULL-terminated array of pointers to struct sk_option. The middleware
-may ignore unsupported or unknown options unless the "important" flag is
-set, in which case it should return failure if an unsupported option is
+miscellaneous options may be passed to the middleware as a NULL-
+terminated array of pointers to struct sk_option. The middleware may
+ignore unsupported or unknown options unless the "required" flag is set,
+in which case it should return failure if an unsupported option is
requested.
At present the following options names are supported:
"device"
Specifies a specific FIDO device on which to perform the
operation. The value in this field is interpreted by the
middleware but it would be typical to specify a path to
a /dev node for the device in question.
"user"
Specifies the FIDO2 username used when enrolling a key,
overriding OpenSSH's default of using an all-zero username.
In OpenSSH, the middleware will be invoked by using a similar mechanism to
ssh-pkcs11-helper to provide address-space containment of the
middleware from ssh-agent.
+$OpenBSD: PROTOCOL.u2f,v 1.26 2020/09/09 03:08:01 djm Exp $
diff --git a/README b/README
index cae4c28c723f..f69b441b5a5d 100644
--- a/README
+++ b/README
@@ -1,52 +1,52 @@
-See https://www.openssh.com/releasenotes.html#8.3p1 for the release notes.
+See https://www.openssh.com/releasenotes.html#8.4p1 for the release notes.
Please read https://www.openssh.com/report.html for bug reporting
instructions and note that we do not use Github for bug reporting or
patch/pull-request management.
This is the port of OpenBSD's excellent OpenSSH[0] to Linux and other
Unices.
OpenSSH is based on the last free version of Tatu Ylonen's sample
implementation with all patent-encumbered algorithms removed (to
external libraries), all known security bugs fixed, new features
reintroduced and many other clean-ups. OpenSSH has been created by
Aaron Campbell, Bob Beck, Markus Friedl, Niels Provos, Theo de Raadt,
and Dug Song. It has a homepage at https://www.openssh.com/
This port consists of the re-introduction of autoconf support, PAM
support, EGD/PRNGD support and replacements for OpenBSD library
functions that are (regrettably) absent from other unices. This port
has been best tested on AIX, Cygwin, HP-UX, Linux, MacOS/X,
FreeBSD, NetBSD, OpenBSD, OpenServer, Solaris and UnixWare.
This version actively tracks changes in the OpenBSD CVS repository.
The PAM support is now more functional than the popular packages of
commercial ssh-1.2.x. It checks "account" and "session" modules for
all logins, not just when using password authentication.
There is now several mailing lists for this port of OpenSSH. Please
refer to https://www.openssh.com/list.html for details on how to join.
Please send bug reports and patches to https://bugzilla.mindrot.org or
the mailing list openssh-unix-dev@mindrot.org. To mitigate spam, the
list only allows posting from subscribed addresses. Code contribution
are welcomed, but please follow the OpenBSD style guidelines[1].
Please refer to the INSTALL document for information on dependencies and
how to install OpenSSH on your system.
Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
Miscellania -
This version of OpenSSH is based upon code retrieved from the OpenBSD CVS
repository which in turn was based on the last free sample implementation
released by Tatu Ylonen.
References -
[0] https://www.openssh.com/
[1] https://man.openbsd.org/style.9
diff --git a/aclocal.m4 b/aclocal.m4
index 25ecc49a2203..c1b774884b5c 100644
--- a/aclocal.m4
+++ b/aclocal.m4
@@ -1,186 +1,15 @@
-dnl OpenSSH-specific autoconf macros
-dnl
+# generated automatically by aclocal 1.16.2 -*- Autoconf -*-
-dnl OSSH_CHECK_CFLAG_COMPILE(check_flag[, define_flag])
-dnl Check that $CC accepts a flag 'check_flag'. If it is supported append
-dnl 'define_flag' to $CFLAGS. If 'define_flag' is not specified, then append
-dnl 'check_flag'.
-AC_DEFUN([OSSH_CHECK_CFLAG_COMPILE], [{
- AC_MSG_CHECKING([if $CC supports compile flag $1])
- saved_CFLAGS="$CFLAGS"
- CFLAGS="$CFLAGS $WERROR $1"
- _define_flag="$2"
- test "x$_define_flag" = "x" && _define_flag="$1"
- AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_SOURCE([[
-#include <stdlib.h>
-#include <stdio.h>
-int main(int argc, char **argv) {
- /* Some math to catch -ftrapv problems in the toolchain */
- int i = 123 * argc, j = 456 + argc, k = 789 - argc;
- float l = i * 2.1;
- double m = l / 0.5;
- long long int n = argc * 12345LL, o = 12345LL * (long long int)argc;
- printf("%d %d %d %f %f %lld %lld\n", i, j, k, l, m, n, o);
- exit(0);
-}
- ]])],
- [
-if $ac_cv_path_EGREP -i "unrecognized option|warning.*ignored" conftest.err >/dev/null
-then
- AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
- CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS"
-else
- AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])
- CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS $_define_flag"
-fi],
- [ AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
- CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS" ]
- )
-}])
+# Copyright (C) 1996-2020 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
-dnl OSSH_CHECK_CFLAG_LINK(check_flag[, define_flag])
-dnl Check that $CC accepts a flag 'check_flag'. If it is supported append
-dnl 'define_flag' to $CFLAGS. If 'define_flag' is not specified, then append
-dnl 'check_flag'.
-AC_DEFUN([OSSH_CHECK_CFLAG_LINK], [{
- AC_MSG_CHECKING([if $CC supports compile flag $1 and linking succeeds])
- saved_CFLAGS="$CFLAGS"
- CFLAGS="$CFLAGS $WERROR $1"
- _define_flag="$2"
- test "x$_define_flag" = "x" && _define_flag="$1"
- AC_LINK_IFELSE([AC_LANG_SOURCE([[
-#include <stdlib.h>
-#include <stdio.h>
-int main(int argc, char **argv) {
- /* Some math to catch -ftrapv problems in the toolchain */
- int i = 123 * argc, j = 456 + argc, k = 789 - argc;
- float l = i * 2.1;
- double m = l / 0.5;
- long long int n = argc * 12345LL, o = 12345LL * (long long int)argc;
- long long int p = n * o;
- printf("%d %d %d %f %f %lld %lld %lld\n", i, j, k, l, m, n, o, p);
- exit(0);
-}
- ]])],
- [
-if $ac_cv_path_EGREP -i "unrecognized option|warning.*ignored" conftest.err >/dev/null
-then
- AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
- CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS"
-else
- AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])
- CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS $_define_flag"
-fi],
- [ AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
- CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS" ]
- )
-}])
+# This file is free software; the Free Software Foundation
+# gives unlimited permission to copy and/or distribute it,
+# with or without modifications, as long as this notice is preserved.
-dnl OSSH_CHECK_LDFLAG_LINK(check_flag[, define_flag])
-dnl Check that $LD accepts a flag 'check_flag'. If it is supported append
-dnl 'define_flag' to $LDFLAGS. If 'define_flag' is not specified, then append
-dnl 'check_flag'.
-AC_DEFUN([OSSH_CHECK_LDFLAG_LINK], [{
- AC_MSG_CHECKING([if $LD supports link flag $1])
- saved_LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS"
- LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS $WERROR $1"
- _define_flag="$2"
- test "x$_define_flag" = "x" && _define_flag="$1"
- AC_LINK_IFELSE([AC_LANG_SOURCE([[
-#include <stdlib.h>
-#include <stdio.h>
-int main(int argc, char **argv) {
- /* Some math to catch -ftrapv problems in the toolchain */
- int i = 123 * argc, j = 456 + argc, k = 789 - argc;
- float l = i * 2.1;
- double m = l / 0.5;
- long long int n = argc * 12345LL, o = 12345LL * (long long int)argc;
- long long p = n * o;
- printf("%d %d %d %f %f %lld %lld %lld\n", i, j, k, l, m, n, o, p);
- exit(0);
-}
- ]])],
- [
-if $ac_cv_path_EGREP -i "unrecognized option|warning.*ignored" conftest.err >/dev/null
-then
- AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
- LDFLAGS="$saved_LDFLAGS"
-else
- AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])
- LDFLAGS="$saved_LDFLAGS $_define_flag"
-fi ],
- [ AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
- LDFLAGS="$saved_LDFLAGS" ]
- )
-}])
-
-dnl OSSH_CHECK_HEADER_FOR_FIELD(field, header, symbol)
-dnl Does AC_EGREP_HEADER on 'header' for the string 'field'
-dnl If found, set 'symbol' to be defined. Cache the result.
-dnl TODO: This is not foolproof, better to compile and read from there
-AC_DEFUN(OSSH_CHECK_HEADER_FOR_FIELD, [
-# look for field '$1' in header '$2'
- dnl This strips characters illegal to m4 from the header filename
- ossh_safe=`echo "$2" | sed 'y%./+-%__p_%'`
- dnl
- ossh_varname="ossh_cv_$ossh_safe""_has_"$1
- AC_MSG_CHECKING(for $1 field in $2)
- AC_CACHE_VAL($ossh_varname, [
- AC_EGREP_HEADER($1, $2, [ dnl
- eval "$ossh_varname=yes" dnl
- ], [ dnl
- eval "$ossh_varname=no" dnl
- ]) dnl
- ])
- ossh_result=`eval 'echo $'"$ossh_varname"`
- if test -n "`echo $ossh_varname`"; then
- AC_MSG_RESULT($ossh_result)
- if test "x$ossh_result" = "xyes"; then
- AC_DEFINE($3, 1, [Define if you have $1 in $2])
- fi
- else
- AC_MSG_RESULT(no)
- fi
-])
-
-dnl Check for socklen_t: historically on BSD it is an int, and in
-dnl POSIX 1g it is a type of its own, but some platforms use different
-dnl types for the argument to getsockopt, getpeername, etc. So we
-dnl have to test to find something that will work.
-AC_DEFUN([TYPE_SOCKLEN_T],
-[
- AC_CHECK_TYPE([socklen_t], ,[
- AC_MSG_CHECKING([for socklen_t equivalent])
- AC_CACHE_VAL([curl_cv_socklen_t_equiv],
- [
- # Systems have either "struct sockaddr *" or
- # "void *" as the second argument to getpeername
- curl_cv_socklen_t_equiv=
- for arg2 in "struct sockaddr" void; do
- for t in int size_t unsigned long "unsigned long"; do
- AC_TRY_COMPILE([
- #include <sys/types.h>
- #include <sys/socket.h>
-
- int getpeername (int, $arg2 *, $t *);
- ],[
- $t len;
- getpeername(0,0,&len);
- ],[
- curl_cv_socklen_t_equiv="$t"
- break
- ])
- done
- done
-
- if test "x$curl_cv_socklen_t_equiv" = x; then
- AC_MSG_ERROR([Cannot find a type to use in place of socklen_t])
- fi
- ])
- AC_MSG_RESULT($curl_cv_socklen_t_equiv)
- AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED(socklen_t, $curl_cv_socklen_t_equiv,
- [type to use in place of socklen_t if not defined])],
- [#include <sys/types.h>
-#include <sys/socket.h>])
-])
+# This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+# but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY, to the extent permitted by law; without
+# even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A
+# PARTICULAR PURPOSE.
+m4_ifndef([AC_CONFIG_MACRO_DIRS], [m4_defun([_AM_CONFIG_MACRO_DIRS], [])m4_defun([AC_CONFIG_MACRO_DIRS], [_AM_CONFIG_MACRO_DIRS($@)])])
+m4_include([m4/openssh.m4])
diff --git a/auth-options.c b/auth-options.c
index 696ba6ac6162..98afdf5fe701 100644
--- a/auth-options.c
+++ b/auth-options.c
@@ -1,883 +1,893 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: auth-options.c,v 1.92 2020/03/06 18:15:38 markus Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: auth-options.c,v 1.93 2020/08/27 01:07:09 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 2018 Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
*
* Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
* purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
* copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
*
* THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
* WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
* MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
* ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
* WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
* ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
* OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
*/
#include "includes.h"
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <netdb.h>
#include <pwd.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdarg.h>
#include <ctype.h>
#include <limits.h>
#include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h"
#include "xmalloc.h"
#include "ssherr.h"
#include "log.h"
#include "sshbuf.h"
#include "misc.h"
#include "sshkey.h"
#include "match.h"
#include "ssh2.h"
#include "auth-options.h"
static int
dup_strings(char ***dstp, size_t *ndstp, char **src, size_t nsrc)
{
char **dst;
size_t i, j;
*dstp = NULL;
*ndstp = 0;
if (nsrc == 0)
return 0;
if ((dst = calloc(nsrc, sizeof(*src))) == NULL)
return -1;
for (i = 0; i < nsrc; i++) {
if ((dst[i] = strdup(src[i])) == NULL) {
for (j = 0; j < i; j++)
free(dst[j]);
free(dst);
return -1;
}
}
/* success */
*dstp = dst;
*ndstp = nsrc;
return 0;
}
#define OPTIONS_CRITICAL 1
#define OPTIONS_EXTENSIONS 2
static int
cert_option_list(struct sshauthopt *opts, struct sshbuf *oblob,
u_int which, int crit)
{
char *command, *allowed;
char *name = NULL;
struct sshbuf *c = NULL, *data = NULL;
int r, ret = -1, found;
if ((c = sshbuf_fromb(oblob)) == NULL) {
error("%s: sshbuf_fromb failed", __func__);
goto out;
}
while (sshbuf_len(c) > 0) {
sshbuf_free(data);
data = NULL;
if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(c, &name, NULL)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_froms(c, &data)) != 0) {
error("Unable to parse certificate options: %s",
ssh_err(r));
goto out;
}
debug3("found certificate option \"%.100s\" len %zu",
name, sshbuf_len(data));
found = 0;
if ((which & OPTIONS_EXTENSIONS) != 0) {
if (strcmp(name, "no-touch-required") == 0) {
opts->no_require_user_presence = 1;
found = 1;
} else if (strcmp(name, "permit-X11-forwarding") == 0) {
opts->permit_x11_forwarding_flag = 1;
found = 1;
} else if (strcmp(name,
"permit-agent-forwarding") == 0) {
opts->permit_agent_forwarding_flag = 1;
found = 1;
} else if (strcmp(name,
"permit-port-forwarding") == 0) {
opts->permit_port_forwarding_flag = 1;
found = 1;
} else if (strcmp(name, "permit-pty") == 0) {
opts->permit_pty_flag = 1;
found = 1;
} else if (strcmp(name, "permit-user-rc") == 0) {
opts->permit_user_rc = 1;
found = 1;
}
}
if (!found && (which & OPTIONS_CRITICAL) != 0) {
- if (strcmp(name, "force-command") == 0) {
+ if (strcmp(name, "verify-required") == 0) {
+ opts->require_verify = 1;
+ found = 1;
+ } else if (strcmp(name, "force-command") == 0) {
if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(data, &command,
NULL)) != 0) {
error("Unable to parse \"%s\" "
"section: %s", name, ssh_err(r));
goto out;
}
if (opts->force_command != NULL) {
error("Certificate has multiple "
"force-command options");
free(command);
goto out;
}
opts->force_command = command;
found = 1;
- }
- if (strcmp(name, "source-address") == 0) {
+ } else if (strcmp(name, "source-address") == 0) {
if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(data, &allowed,
NULL)) != 0) {
error("Unable to parse \"%s\" "
"section: %s", name, ssh_err(r));
goto out;
}
if (opts->required_from_host_cert != NULL) {
error("Certificate has multiple "
"source-address options");
free(allowed);
goto out;
}
/* Check syntax */
if (addr_match_cidr_list(NULL, allowed) == -1) {
error("Certificate source-address "
"contents invalid");
goto out;
}
opts->required_from_host_cert = allowed;
found = 1;
}
}
if (!found) {
if (crit) {
error("Certificate critical option \"%s\" "
"is not supported", name);
goto out;
} else {
logit("Certificate extension \"%s\" "
"is not supported", name);
}
} else if (sshbuf_len(data) != 0) {
error("Certificate option \"%s\" corrupt "
"(extra data)", name);
goto out;
}
free(name);
name = NULL;
}
/* successfully parsed all options */
ret = 0;
out:
free(name);
sshbuf_free(data);
sshbuf_free(c);
return ret;
}
struct sshauthopt *
sshauthopt_new(void)
{
struct sshauthopt *ret;
if ((ret = calloc(1, sizeof(*ret))) == NULL)
return NULL;
ret->force_tun_device = -1;
return ret;
}
void
sshauthopt_free(struct sshauthopt *opts)
{
size_t i;
if (opts == NULL)
return;
free(opts->cert_principals);
free(opts->force_command);
free(opts->required_from_host_cert);
free(opts->required_from_host_keys);
for (i = 0; i < opts->nenv; i++)
free(opts->env[i]);
free(opts->env);
for (i = 0; i < opts->npermitopen; i++)
free(opts->permitopen[i]);
free(opts->permitopen);
for (i = 0; i < opts->npermitlisten; i++)
free(opts->permitlisten[i]);
free(opts->permitlisten);
freezero(opts, sizeof(*opts));
}
struct sshauthopt *
sshauthopt_new_with_keys_defaults(void)
{
struct sshauthopt *ret = NULL;
if ((ret = sshauthopt_new()) == NULL)
return NULL;
/* Defaults for authorized_keys flags */
ret->permit_port_forwarding_flag = 1;
ret->permit_agent_forwarding_flag = 1;
ret->permit_x11_forwarding_flag = 1;
ret->permit_pty_flag = 1;
ret->permit_user_rc = 1;
return ret;
}
/*
* Parse and record a permitopen/permitlisten directive.
* Return 0 on success. Return -1 on failure and sets *errstrp to error reason.
*/
static int
handle_permit(const char **optsp, int allow_bare_port,
char ***permitsp, size_t *npermitsp, const char **errstrp)
{
char *opt, *tmp, *cp, *host, **permits = *permitsp;
size_t npermits = *npermitsp;
const char *errstr = "unknown error";
if (npermits > SSH_AUTHOPT_PERMIT_MAX) {
*errstrp = "too many permission directives";
return -1;
}
if ((opt = opt_dequote(optsp, &errstr)) == NULL) {
return -1;
}
if (allow_bare_port && strchr(opt, ':') == NULL) {
/*
* Allow a bare port number in permitlisten to indicate a
* listen_host wildcard.
*/
if (asprintf(&tmp, "*:%s", opt) == -1) {
free(opt);
*errstrp = "memory allocation failed";
return -1;
}
free(opt);
opt = tmp;
}
if ((tmp = strdup(opt)) == NULL) {
free(opt);
*errstrp = "memory allocation failed";
return -1;
}
cp = tmp;
/* validate syntax before recording it. */
host = hpdelim(&cp);
if (host == NULL || strlen(host) >= NI_MAXHOST) {
free(tmp);
free(opt);
*errstrp = "invalid permission hostname";
return -1;
}
/*
* don't want to use permitopen_port to avoid
* dependency on channels.[ch] here.
*/
if (cp == NULL ||
(strcmp(cp, "*") != 0 && a2port(cp) <= 0)) {
free(tmp);
free(opt);
*errstrp = "invalid permission port";
return -1;
}
/* XXX - add streamlocal support */
free(tmp);
/* Record it */
if ((permits = recallocarray(permits, npermits, npermits + 1,
sizeof(*permits))) == NULL) {
free(opt);
/* NB. don't update *permitsp if alloc fails */
*errstrp = "memory allocation failed";
return -1;
}
permits[npermits++] = opt;
*permitsp = permits;
*npermitsp = npermits;
return 0;
}
struct sshauthopt *
sshauthopt_parse(const char *opts, const char **errstrp)
{
char **oarray, *opt, *cp, *tmp;
int r;
struct sshauthopt *ret = NULL;
const char *errstr = "unknown error";
uint64_t valid_before;
if (errstrp != NULL)
*errstrp = NULL;
if ((ret = sshauthopt_new_with_keys_defaults()) == NULL)
goto alloc_fail;
if (opts == NULL)
return ret;
while (*opts && *opts != ' ' && *opts != '\t') {
/* flag options */
if ((r = opt_flag("restrict", 0, &opts)) != -1) {
ret->restricted = 1;
ret->permit_port_forwarding_flag = 0;
ret->permit_agent_forwarding_flag = 0;
ret->permit_x11_forwarding_flag = 0;
ret->permit_pty_flag = 0;
ret->permit_user_rc = 0;
} else if ((r = opt_flag("cert-authority", 0, &opts)) != -1) {
ret->cert_authority = r;
} else if ((r = opt_flag("port-forwarding", 1, &opts)) != -1) {
ret->permit_port_forwarding_flag = r == 1;
} else if ((r = opt_flag("agent-forwarding", 1, &opts)) != -1) {
ret->permit_agent_forwarding_flag = r == 1;
} else if ((r = opt_flag("x11-forwarding", 1, &opts)) != -1) {
ret->permit_x11_forwarding_flag = r == 1;
} else if ((r = opt_flag("touch-required", 1, &opts)) != -1) {
ret->no_require_user_presence = r != 1; /* NB. flip */
+ } else if ((r = opt_flag("verify-required", 1, &opts)) != -1) {
+ ret->require_verify = r == 1;
} else if ((r = opt_flag("pty", 1, &opts)) != -1) {
ret->permit_pty_flag = r == 1;
} else if ((r = opt_flag("user-rc", 1, &opts)) != -1) {
ret->permit_user_rc = r == 1;
} else if (opt_match(&opts, "command")) {
if (ret->force_command != NULL) {
errstr = "multiple \"command\" clauses";
goto fail;
}
ret->force_command = opt_dequote(&opts, &errstr);
if (ret->force_command == NULL)
goto fail;
} else if (opt_match(&opts, "principals")) {
if (ret->cert_principals != NULL) {
errstr = "multiple \"principals\" clauses";
goto fail;
}
ret->cert_principals = opt_dequote(&opts, &errstr);
if (ret->cert_principals == NULL)
goto fail;
} else if (opt_match(&opts, "from")) {
if (ret->required_from_host_keys != NULL) {
errstr = "multiple \"from\" clauses";
goto fail;
}
ret->required_from_host_keys = opt_dequote(&opts,
&errstr);
if (ret->required_from_host_keys == NULL)
goto fail;
} else if (opt_match(&opts, "expiry-time")) {
if ((opt = opt_dequote(&opts, &errstr)) == NULL)
goto fail;
if (parse_absolute_time(opt, &valid_before) != 0 ||
valid_before == 0) {
free(opt);
errstr = "invalid expires time";
goto fail;
}
free(opt);
if (ret->valid_before == 0 ||
valid_before < ret->valid_before)
ret->valid_before = valid_before;
} else if (opt_match(&opts, "environment")) {
if (ret->nenv > INT_MAX) {
errstr = "too many environment strings";
goto fail;
}
if ((opt = opt_dequote(&opts, &errstr)) == NULL)
goto fail;
/* env name must be alphanumeric and followed by '=' */
if ((tmp = strchr(opt, '=')) == NULL) {
free(opt);
errstr = "invalid environment string";
goto fail;
}
if ((cp = strdup(opt)) == NULL)
goto alloc_fail;
cp[tmp - opt] = '\0'; /* truncate at '=' */
if (!valid_env_name(cp)) {
free(cp);
free(opt);
errstr = "invalid environment string";
goto fail;
}
free(cp);
/* Append it. */
oarray = ret->env;
if ((ret->env = recallocarray(ret->env, ret->nenv,
ret->nenv + 1, sizeof(*ret->env))) == NULL) {
free(opt);
ret->env = oarray; /* put it back for cleanup */
goto alloc_fail;
}
ret->env[ret->nenv++] = opt;
} else if (opt_match(&opts, "permitopen")) {
if (handle_permit(&opts, 0, &ret->permitopen,
&ret->npermitopen, &errstr) != 0)
goto fail;
} else if (opt_match(&opts, "permitlisten")) {
if (handle_permit(&opts, 1, &ret->permitlisten,
&ret->npermitlisten, &errstr) != 0)
goto fail;
} else if (opt_match(&opts, "tunnel")) {
if ((opt = opt_dequote(&opts, &errstr)) == NULL)
goto fail;
ret->force_tun_device = a2tun(opt, NULL);
free(opt);
if (ret->force_tun_device == SSH_TUNID_ERR) {
errstr = "invalid tun device";
goto fail;
}
}
/*
* Skip the comma, and move to the next option
* (or break out if there are no more).
*/
if (*opts == '\0' || *opts == ' ' || *opts == '\t')
break; /* End of options. */
/* Anything other than a comma is an unknown option */
if (*opts != ',') {
errstr = "unknown key option";
goto fail;
}
opts++;
if (*opts == '\0') {
errstr = "unexpected end-of-options";
goto fail;
}
}
/* success */
if (errstrp != NULL)
*errstrp = NULL;
return ret;
alloc_fail:
errstr = "memory allocation failed";
fail:
sshauthopt_free(ret);
if (errstrp != NULL)
*errstrp = errstr;
return NULL;
}
struct sshauthopt *
sshauthopt_from_cert(struct sshkey *k)
{
struct sshauthopt *ret;
if (k == NULL || !sshkey_type_is_cert(k->type) || k->cert == NULL ||
k->cert->type != SSH2_CERT_TYPE_USER)
return NULL;
if ((ret = sshauthopt_new()) == NULL)
return NULL;
/* Handle options and critical extensions separately */
if (cert_option_list(ret, k->cert->critical,
OPTIONS_CRITICAL, 1) == -1) {
sshauthopt_free(ret);
return NULL;
}
if (cert_option_list(ret, k->cert->extensions,
OPTIONS_EXTENSIONS, 0) == -1) {
sshauthopt_free(ret);
return NULL;
}
/* success */
return ret;
}
/*
* Merges "additional" options to "primary" and returns the result.
* NB. Some options from primary have primacy.
*/
struct sshauthopt *
sshauthopt_merge(const struct sshauthopt *primary,
const struct sshauthopt *additional, const char **errstrp)
{
struct sshauthopt *ret;
const char *errstr = "internal error";
const char *tmp;
if (errstrp != NULL)
*errstrp = NULL;
if ((ret = sshauthopt_new()) == NULL)
goto alloc_fail;
/* cert_authority and cert_principals are cleared in result */
/* Prefer access lists from primary. */
/* XXX err is both set and mismatch? */
tmp = primary->required_from_host_cert;
if (tmp == NULL)
tmp = additional->required_from_host_cert;
if (tmp != NULL && (ret->required_from_host_cert = strdup(tmp)) == NULL)
goto alloc_fail;
tmp = primary->required_from_host_keys;
if (tmp == NULL)
tmp = additional->required_from_host_keys;
if (tmp != NULL && (ret->required_from_host_keys = strdup(tmp)) == NULL)
goto alloc_fail;
/*
* force_tun_device, permitopen/permitlisten and environment all
* prefer the primary.
*/
ret->force_tun_device = primary->force_tun_device;
if (ret->force_tun_device == -1)
ret->force_tun_device = additional->force_tun_device;
if (primary->nenv > 0) {
if (dup_strings(&ret->env, &ret->nenv,
primary->env, primary->nenv) != 0)
goto alloc_fail;
} else if (additional->nenv) {
if (dup_strings(&ret->env, &ret->nenv,
additional->env, additional->nenv) != 0)
goto alloc_fail;
}
if (primary->npermitopen > 0) {
if (dup_strings(&ret->permitopen, &ret->npermitopen,
primary->permitopen, primary->npermitopen) != 0)
goto alloc_fail;
} else if (additional->npermitopen > 0) {
if (dup_strings(&ret->permitopen, &ret->npermitopen,
additional->permitopen, additional->npermitopen) != 0)
goto alloc_fail;
}
if (primary->npermitlisten > 0) {
if (dup_strings(&ret->permitlisten, &ret->npermitlisten,
primary->permitlisten, primary->npermitlisten) != 0)
goto alloc_fail;
} else if (additional->npermitlisten > 0) {
if (dup_strings(&ret->permitlisten, &ret->npermitlisten,
additional->permitlisten, additional->npermitlisten) != 0)
goto alloc_fail;
}
#define OPTFLAG_AND(x) ret->x = (primary->x == 1) && (additional->x == 1)
+#define OPTFLAG_OR(x) ret->x = (primary->x == 1) || (additional->x == 1)
/* Permissive flags are logical-AND (i.e. must be set in both) */
OPTFLAG_AND(permit_port_forwarding_flag);
OPTFLAG_AND(permit_agent_forwarding_flag);
OPTFLAG_AND(permit_x11_forwarding_flag);
OPTFLAG_AND(permit_pty_flag);
OPTFLAG_AND(permit_user_rc);
OPTFLAG_AND(no_require_user_presence);
+ /* Restrictive flags are logical-OR (i.e. must be set in either) */
+ OPTFLAG_OR(require_verify);
#undef OPTFLAG_AND
/* Earliest expiry time should win */
if (primary->valid_before != 0)
ret->valid_before = primary->valid_before;
if (additional->valid_before != 0 &&
additional->valid_before < ret->valid_before)
ret->valid_before = additional->valid_before;
/*
* When both multiple forced-command are specified, only
* proceed if they are identical, otherwise fail.
*/
if (primary->force_command != NULL &&
additional->force_command != NULL) {
if (strcmp(primary->force_command,
additional->force_command) == 0) {
/* ok */
ret->force_command = strdup(primary->force_command);
if (ret->force_command == NULL)
goto alloc_fail;
} else {
errstr = "forced command options do not match";
goto fail;
}
} else if (primary->force_command != NULL) {
if ((ret->force_command = strdup(
primary->force_command)) == NULL)
goto alloc_fail;
} else if (additional->force_command != NULL) {
if ((ret->force_command = strdup(
additional->force_command)) == NULL)
goto alloc_fail;
}
/* success */
if (errstrp != NULL)
*errstrp = NULL;
return ret;
alloc_fail:
errstr = "memory allocation failed";
fail:
if (errstrp != NULL)
*errstrp = errstr;
sshauthopt_free(ret);
return NULL;
}
/*
* Copy options
*/
struct sshauthopt *
sshauthopt_copy(const struct sshauthopt *orig)
{
struct sshauthopt *ret;
if ((ret = sshauthopt_new()) == NULL)
return NULL;
#define OPTSCALAR(x) ret->x = orig->x
OPTSCALAR(permit_port_forwarding_flag);
OPTSCALAR(permit_agent_forwarding_flag);
OPTSCALAR(permit_x11_forwarding_flag);
OPTSCALAR(permit_pty_flag);
OPTSCALAR(permit_user_rc);
OPTSCALAR(restricted);
OPTSCALAR(cert_authority);
OPTSCALAR(force_tun_device);
OPTSCALAR(valid_before);
OPTSCALAR(no_require_user_presence);
+ OPTSCALAR(require_verify);
#undef OPTSCALAR
#define OPTSTRING(x) \
do { \
if (orig->x != NULL && (ret->x = strdup(orig->x)) == NULL) { \
sshauthopt_free(ret); \
return NULL; \
} \
} while (0)
OPTSTRING(cert_principals);
OPTSTRING(force_command);
OPTSTRING(required_from_host_cert);
OPTSTRING(required_from_host_keys);
#undef OPTSTRING
if (dup_strings(&ret->env, &ret->nenv, orig->env, orig->nenv) != 0 ||
dup_strings(&ret->permitopen, &ret->npermitopen,
orig->permitopen, orig->npermitopen) != 0 ||
dup_strings(&ret->permitlisten, &ret->npermitlisten,
orig->permitlisten, orig->npermitlisten) != 0) {
sshauthopt_free(ret);
return NULL;
}
return ret;
}
static int
serialise_array(struct sshbuf *m, char **a, size_t n)
{
struct sshbuf *b;
size_t i;
int r;
if (n > INT_MAX)
return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
if ((b = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) {
return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
}
for (i = 0; i < n; i++) {
if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, a[i])) != 0) {
sshbuf_free(b);
return r;
}
}
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, n)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_stringb(m, b)) != 0) {
sshbuf_free(b);
return r;
}
/* success */
return 0;
}
static int
deserialise_array(struct sshbuf *m, char ***ap, size_t *np)
{
char **a = NULL;
size_t i, n = 0;
struct sshbuf *b = NULL;
u_int tmp;
int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &tmp)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_froms(m, &b)) != 0)
goto out;
if (tmp > INT_MAX) {
r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
goto out;
}
n = tmp;
if (n > 0 && (a = calloc(n, sizeof(*a))) == NULL) {
r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
goto out;
}
for (i = 0; i < n; i++) {
if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &a[i], NULL)) != 0)
goto out;
}
/* success */
r = 0;
*ap = a;
a = NULL;
*np = n;
n = 0;
out:
if (a != NULL) {
for (i = 0; i < n; i++)
free(a[i]);
free(a);
}
sshbuf_free(b);
return r;
}
static int
serialise_nullable_string(struct sshbuf *m, const char *s)
{
int r;
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(m, s == NULL)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, s)) != 0)
return r;
return 0;
}
static int
deserialise_nullable_string(struct sshbuf *m, char **sp)
{
int r;
u_char flag;
*sp = NULL;
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(m, &flag)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, flag ? NULL : sp, NULL)) != 0)
return r;
return 0;
}
int
sshauthopt_serialise(const struct sshauthopt *opts, struct sshbuf *m,
int untrusted)
{
int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
/* Flag options */
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(m, opts->permit_port_forwarding_flag)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u8(m, opts->permit_agent_forwarding_flag)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u8(m, opts->permit_x11_forwarding_flag)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u8(m, opts->permit_pty_flag)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u8(m, opts->permit_user_rc)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u8(m, opts->restricted)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u8(m, opts->cert_authority)) != 0 ||
- (r = sshbuf_put_u8(m, opts->no_require_user_presence)) != 0)
+ (r = sshbuf_put_u8(m, opts->no_require_user_presence)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_u8(m, opts->require_verify)) != 0)
return r;
/* Simple integer options */
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u64(m, opts->valid_before)) != 0)
return r;
/* tunnel number can be negative to indicate "unset" */
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(m, opts->force_tun_device == -1)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, (opts->force_tun_device < 0) ?
0 : (u_int)opts->force_tun_device)) != 0)
return r;
/* String options; these may be NULL */
if ((r = serialise_nullable_string(m,
untrusted ? "yes" : opts->cert_principals)) != 0 ||
(r = serialise_nullable_string(m,
untrusted ? "true" : opts->force_command)) != 0 ||
(r = serialise_nullable_string(m,
untrusted ? NULL : opts->required_from_host_cert)) != 0 ||
(r = serialise_nullable_string(m,
untrusted ? NULL : opts->required_from_host_keys)) != 0)
return r;
/* Array options */
if ((r = serialise_array(m, opts->env,
untrusted ? 0 : opts->nenv)) != 0 ||
(r = serialise_array(m, opts->permitopen,
untrusted ? 0 : opts->npermitopen)) != 0 ||
(r = serialise_array(m, opts->permitlisten,
untrusted ? 0 : opts->npermitlisten)) != 0)
return r;
/* success */
return 0;
}
int
sshauthopt_deserialise(struct sshbuf *m, struct sshauthopt **optsp)
{
struct sshauthopt *opts = NULL;
int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
u_char f;
u_int tmp;
if ((opts = calloc(1, sizeof(*opts))) == NULL)
return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
/* Flag options */
#define OPT_FLAG(x) \
do { \
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(m, &f)) != 0) \
goto out; \
opts->x = f; \
} while (0)
OPT_FLAG(permit_port_forwarding_flag);
OPT_FLAG(permit_agent_forwarding_flag);
OPT_FLAG(permit_x11_forwarding_flag);
OPT_FLAG(permit_pty_flag);
OPT_FLAG(permit_user_rc);
OPT_FLAG(restricted);
OPT_FLAG(cert_authority);
OPT_FLAG(no_require_user_presence);
+ OPT_FLAG(require_verify);
#undef OPT_FLAG
/* Simple integer options */
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u64(m, &opts->valid_before)) != 0)
goto out;
/* tunnel number can be negative to indicate "unset" */
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(m, &f)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &tmp)) != 0)
goto out;
opts->force_tun_device = f ? -1 : (int)tmp;
/* String options may be NULL */
if ((r = deserialise_nullable_string(m, &opts->cert_principals)) != 0 ||
(r = deserialise_nullable_string(m, &opts->force_command)) != 0 ||
(r = deserialise_nullable_string(m,
&opts->required_from_host_cert)) != 0 ||
(r = deserialise_nullable_string(m,
&opts->required_from_host_keys)) != 0)
goto out;
/* Array options */
if ((r = deserialise_array(m, &opts->env, &opts->nenv)) != 0 ||
(r = deserialise_array(m,
&opts->permitopen, &opts->npermitopen)) != 0 ||
(r = deserialise_array(m,
&opts->permitlisten, &opts->npermitlisten)) != 0)
goto out;
/* success */
r = 0;
*optsp = opts;
opts = NULL;
out:
sshauthopt_free(opts);
return r;
}
diff --git a/auth-options.h b/auth-options.h
index d96ffedee8b1..118a32087a8b 100644
--- a/auth-options.h
+++ b/auth-options.h
@@ -1,101 +1,103 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: auth-options.h,v 1.29 2019/11/25 00:54:23 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: auth-options.h,v 1.30 2020/08/27 01:07:09 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 2018 Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
*
* Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
* purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
* copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
*
* THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
* WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
* MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
* ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
* WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
* ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
* OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
*/
#ifndef AUTH_OPTIONS_H
#define AUTH_OPTIONS_H
struct passwd;
struct sshkey;
/* Maximum number of permitopen/permitlisten directives to accept */
#define SSH_AUTHOPT_PERMIT_MAX 4096
/*
* sshauthopt represents key options parsed from authorized_keys or
* from certificate extensions/options.
*/
struct sshauthopt {
/* Feature flags */
int permit_port_forwarding_flag;
int permit_agent_forwarding_flag;
int permit_x11_forwarding_flag;
int permit_pty_flag;
int permit_user_rc;
/* "restrict" keyword was invoked */
int restricted;
/* key/principal expiry date */
uint64_t valid_before;
/* Certificate-related options */
int cert_authority;
char *cert_principals;
int force_tun_device;
char *force_command;
/* Custom environment */
size_t nenv;
char **env;
/* Permitted port forwardings */
size_t npermitopen;
char **permitopen;
/* Permitted listens (remote forwarding) */
size_t npermitlisten;
char **permitlisten;
/*
* Permitted host/addresses (comma-separated)
* Caller must check source address matches both lists (if present).
*/
char *required_from_host_cert;
char *required_from_host_keys;
/* Key requires user presence asserted */
int no_require_user_presence;
+ /* Key requires user verification (e.g. PIN) */
+ int require_verify;
};
struct sshauthopt *sshauthopt_new(void);
struct sshauthopt *sshauthopt_new_with_keys_defaults(void);
void sshauthopt_free(struct sshauthopt *opts);
struct sshauthopt *sshauthopt_copy(const struct sshauthopt *orig);
int sshauthopt_serialise(const struct sshauthopt *opts, struct sshbuf *m, int);
int sshauthopt_deserialise(struct sshbuf *m, struct sshauthopt **opts);
/*
* Parse authorized_keys options. Returns an options structure on success
* or NULL on failure. Will set errstr on failure.
*/
struct sshauthopt *sshauthopt_parse(const char *s, const char **errstr);
/*
* Parse certification options to a struct sshauthopt.
* Returns options on success or NULL on failure.
*/
struct sshauthopt *sshauthopt_from_cert(struct sshkey *k);
/*
* Merge key options.
*/
struct sshauthopt *sshauthopt_merge(const struct sshauthopt *primary,
const struct sshauthopt *additional, const char **errstrp);
#endif
diff --git a/auth-pam.c b/auth-pam.c
index 5a3ba09b43d3..832382151274 100644
--- a/auth-pam.c
+++ b/auth-pam.c
@@ -1,1387 +1,1391 @@
/*-
* Copyright (c) 2002 Networks Associates Technology, Inc.
* All rights reserved.
*
* This software was developed for the FreeBSD Project by ThinkSec AS and
* NAI Labs, the Security Research Division of Network Associates, Inc.
* under DARPA/SPAWAR contract N66001-01-C-8035 ("CBOSS"), as part of the
* DARPA CHATS research program.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
* ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
* ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
* FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
* DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
* OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
* LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
* OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
* SUCH DAMAGE.
*/
/*
* Copyright (c) 2003,2004 Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
* Copyright (c) 2003,2004 Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au>
*
* Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
* purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
* copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
*
* THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
* WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
* MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
* ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
* WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
* ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
* OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
*/
/* Based on FreeBSD: src/crypto/openssh/auth2-pam-freebsd.c,v 1.11 2003/03/31 13:48:18 des */
#include "includes.h"
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/stat.h>
#include <sys/wait.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include <signal.h>
#include <stdarg.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#ifdef USE_PAM
#if defined(HAVE_SECURITY_PAM_APPL_H)
#include <security/pam_appl.h>
#elif defined (HAVE_PAM_PAM_APPL_H)
#include <pam/pam_appl.h>
#endif
#if !defined(SSHD_PAM_SERVICE)
extern char *__progname;
# define SSHD_PAM_SERVICE __progname
#endif
/* OpenGroup RFC86.0 and XSSO specify no "const" on arguments */
#ifdef PAM_SUN_CODEBASE
# define sshpam_const /* Solaris, HP-UX, SunOS */
#else
# define sshpam_const const /* LinuxPAM, OpenPAM, AIX */
#endif
/* Ambiguity in spec: is it an array of pointers or a pointer to an array? */
#ifdef PAM_SUN_CODEBASE
# define PAM_MSG_MEMBER(msg, n, member) ((*(msg))[(n)].member)
#else
# define PAM_MSG_MEMBER(msg, n, member) ((msg)[(n)]->member)
#endif
#include "xmalloc.h"
#include "sshbuf.h"
#include "ssherr.h"
#include "hostfile.h"
#include "auth.h"
#include "auth-pam.h"
#include "canohost.h"
#include "log.h"
#include "msg.h"
#include "packet.h"
#include "misc.h"
#include "servconf.h"
#include "ssh2.h"
#include "auth-options.h"
#include "misc.h"
#ifdef GSSAPI
#include "ssh-gss.h"
#endif
#include "monitor_wrap.h"
extern ServerOptions options;
extern struct sshbuf *loginmsg;
extern u_int utmp_len;
/* so we don't silently change behaviour */
#ifdef USE_POSIX_THREADS
# error "USE_POSIX_THREADS replaced by UNSUPPORTED_POSIX_THREADS_HACK"
#endif
/*
* Formerly known as USE_POSIX_THREADS, using this is completely unsupported
* and generally a bad idea. Use at own risk and do not expect support if
* this breaks.
*/
#ifdef UNSUPPORTED_POSIX_THREADS_HACK
#include <pthread.h>
/*
* Avoid namespace clash when *not* using pthreads for systems *with*
* pthreads, which unconditionally define pthread_t via sys/types.h
* (e.g. Linux)
*/
typedef pthread_t sp_pthread_t;
#else
typedef pid_t sp_pthread_t;
#define pthread_exit fake_pthread_exit
#define pthread_create fake_pthread_create
#define pthread_cancel fake_pthread_cancel
#define pthread_join fake_pthread_join
#endif
struct pam_ctxt {
sp_pthread_t pam_thread;
int pam_psock;
int pam_csock;
int pam_done;
};
static void sshpam_free_ctx(void *);
static struct pam_ctxt *cleanup_ctxt;
#ifndef UNSUPPORTED_POSIX_THREADS_HACK
/*
* Simulate threads with processes.
*/
static int sshpam_thread_status = -1;
static sshsig_t sshpam_oldsig;
static void
sshpam_sigchld_handler(int sig)
{
ssh_signal(SIGCHLD, SIG_DFL);
if (cleanup_ctxt == NULL)
return; /* handler called after PAM cleanup, shouldn't happen */
if (waitpid(cleanup_ctxt->pam_thread, &sshpam_thread_status, WNOHANG)
<= 0) {
/* PAM thread has not exitted, privsep slave must have */
kill(cleanup_ctxt->pam_thread, SIGTERM);
while (waitpid(cleanup_ctxt->pam_thread,
&sshpam_thread_status, 0) == -1) {
if (errno == EINTR)
continue;
return;
}
}
if (WIFSIGNALED(sshpam_thread_status) &&
WTERMSIG(sshpam_thread_status) == SIGTERM)
return; /* terminated by pthread_cancel */
if (!WIFEXITED(sshpam_thread_status))
sigdie("PAM: authentication thread exited unexpectedly");
if (WEXITSTATUS(sshpam_thread_status) != 0)
sigdie("PAM: authentication thread exited uncleanly");
}
/* ARGSUSED */
static void
pthread_exit(void *value)
{
_exit(0);
}
/* ARGSUSED */
static int
pthread_create(sp_pthread_t *thread, const void *attr,
void *(*thread_start)(void *), void *arg)
{
pid_t pid;
struct pam_ctxt *ctx = arg;
sshpam_thread_status = -1;
switch ((pid = fork())) {
case -1:
error("fork(): %s", strerror(errno));
return errno;
case 0:
close(ctx->pam_psock);
ctx->pam_psock = -1;
thread_start(arg);
_exit(1);
default:
*thread = pid;
close(ctx->pam_csock);
ctx->pam_csock = -1;
sshpam_oldsig = ssh_signal(SIGCHLD, sshpam_sigchld_handler);
return (0);
}
}
static int
pthread_cancel(sp_pthread_t thread)
{
ssh_signal(SIGCHLD, sshpam_oldsig);
return (kill(thread, SIGTERM));
}
/* ARGSUSED */
static int
pthread_join(sp_pthread_t thread, void **value)
{
int status;
if (sshpam_thread_status != -1)
return (sshpam_thread_status);
ssh_signal(SIGCHLD, sshpam_oldsig);
while (waitpid(thread, &status, 0) == -1) {
if (errno == EINTR)
continue;
fatal("%s: waitpid: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
}
return (status);
}
#endif
static pam_handle_t *sshpam_handle = NULL;
static int sshpam_err = 0;
static int sshpam_authenticated = 0;
static int sshpam_session_open = 0;
static int sshpam_cred_established = 0;
static int sshpam_account_status = -1;
static int sshpam_maxtries_reached = 0;
static char **sshpam_env = NULL;
static Authctxt *sshpam_authctxt = NULL;
static const char *sshpam_password = NULL;
static char *sshpam_rhost = NULL;
static char *sshpam_laddr = NULL;
static char *sshpam_conninfo = NULL;
/* Some PAM implementations don't implement this */
#ifndef HAVE_PAM_GETENVLIST
static char **
pam_getenvlist(pam_handle_t *pamh)
{
/*
* XXX - If necessary, we can still support environment passing
* for platforms without pam_getenvlist by searching for known
* env vars (e.g. KRB5CCNAME) from the PAM environment.
*/
return NULL;
}
#endif
#ifndef HAVE_PAM_PUTENV
static int
pam_putenv(pam_handle_t *pamh, const char *name_value)
{
return PAM_SUCCESS;
}
#endif /* HAVE_PAM_PUTENV */
/*
* Some platforms, notably Solaris, do not enforce password complexity
* rules during pam_chauthtok() if the real uid of the calling process
* is 0, on the assumption that it's being called by "passwd" run by root.
* This wraps pam_chauthtok and sets/restore the real uid so PAM will do
* the right thing.
*/
#ifdef SSHPAM_CHAUTHTOK_NEEDS_RUID
static int
sshpam_chauthtok_ruid(pam_handle_t *pamh, int flags)
{
int result;
if (sshpam_authctxt == NULL)
fatal("PAM: sshpam_authctxt not initialized");
if (setreuid(sshpam_authctxt->pw->pw_uid, -1) == -1)
fatal("%s: setreuid failed: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
result = pam_chauthtok(pamh, flags);
if (setreuid(0, -1) == -1)
fatal("%s: setreuid failed: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
return result;
}
# define pam_chauthtok(a,b) (sshpam_chauthtok_ruid((a), (b)))
#endif
static void
sshpam_password_change_required(int reqd)
{
extern struct sshauthopt *auth_opts;
static int saved_port, saved_agent, saved_x11;
debug3("%s %d", __func__, reqd);
if (sshpam_authctxt == NULL)
fatal("%s: PAM authctxt not initialized", __func__);
sshpam_authctxt->force_pwchange = reqd;
if (reqd) {
saved_port = auth_opts->permit_port_forwarding_flag;
saved_agent = auth_opts->permit_agent_forwarding_flag;
saved_x11 = auth_opts->permit_x11_forwarding_flag;
auth_opts->permit_port_forwarding_flag = 0;
auth_opts->permit_agent_forwarding_flag = 0;
auth_opts->permit_x11_forwarding_flag = 0;
} else {
if (saved_port)
auth_opts->permit_port_forwarding_flag = saved_port;
if (saved_agent)
auth_opts->permit_agent_forwarding_flag = saved_agent;
if (saved_x11)
auth_opts->permit_x11_forwarding_flag = saved_x11;
}
}
/* Import regular and PAM environment from subprocess */
static void
import_environments(struct sshbuf *b)
{
char *env;
u_int n, i, num_env;
int r;
debug3("PAM: %s entering", __func__);
#ifndef UNSUPPORTED_POSIX_THREADS_HACK
/* Import variables set by do_pam_account */
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(b, &n)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
if (n > INT_MAX)
fatal("%s: invalid PAM account status %u", __func__, n);
sshpam_account_status = (int)n;
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(b, &n)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
sshpam_password_change_required(n != 0);
/* Import environment from subprocess */
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(b, &num_env)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
if (num_env > 1024)
fatal("%s: received %u environment variables, expected <= 1024",
__func__, num_env);
sshpam_env = xcalloc(num_env + 1, sizeof(*sshpam_env));
debug3("PAM: num env strings %d", num_env);
for(i = 0; i < num_env; i++) {
if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &(sshpam_env[i]), NULL)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
}
sshpam_env[num_env] = NULL;
/* Import PAM environment from subprocess */
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(b, &num_env)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
debug("PAM: num PAM env strings %d", num_env);
for (i = 0; i < num_env; i++) {
if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &env, NULL)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
/* Errors are not fatal here */
if ((r = pam_putenv(sshpam_handle, env)) != PAM_SUCCESS) {
error("PAM: pam_putenv: %s",
pam_strerror(sshpam_handle, r));
}
- /* XXX leak env? */
+ /*
+ * XXX this possibly leaks env because it is not documented
+ * what pam_putenv() does with it. Does it copy it? Does it
+ * take ownweship? We don't know, so it's safest just to leak.
+ */
}
#endif
}
/*
* Conversation function for authentication thread.
*/
static int
sshpam_thread_conv(int n, sshpam_const struct pam_message **msg,
struct pam_response **resp, void *data)
{
struct sshbuf *buffer;
struct pam_ctxt *ctxt;
struct pam_response *reply;
int r, i;
u_char status;
debug3("PAM: %s entering, %d messages", __func__, n);
*resp = NULL;
if (data == NULL) {
error("PAM: conversation function passed a null context");
return (PAM_CONV_ERR);
}
ctxt = data;
if (n <= 0 || n > PAM_MAX_NUM_MSG)
return (PAM_CONV_ERR);
if ((reply = calloc(n, sizeof(*reply))) == NULL)
return PAM_CONV_ERR;
if ((buffer = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) {
free(reply);
return PAM_CONV_ERR;
}
for (i = 0; i < n; ++i) {
switch (PAM_MSG_MEMBER(msg, i, msg_style)) {
case PAM_PROMPT_ECHO_OFF:
case PAM_PROMPT_ECHO_ON:
if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(buffer,
PAM_MSG_MEMBER(msg, i, msg))) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s",
__func__, ssh_err(r));
if (ssh_msg_send(ctxt->pam_csock,
PAM_MSG_MEMBER(msg, i, msg_style), buffer) == -1)
goto fail;
if (ssh_msg_recv(ctxt->pam_csock, buffer) == -1)
goto fail;
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(buffer, &status)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s",
__func__, ssh_err(r));
if (status != PAM_AUTHTOK)
goto fail;
if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(buffer,
&reply[i].resp, NULL)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s",
__func__, ssh_err(r));
break;
case PAM_ERROR_MSG:
case PAM_TEXT_INFO:
if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(buffer,
PAM_MSG_MEMBER(msg, i, msg))) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s",
__func__, ssh_err(r));
if (ssh_msg_send(ctxt->pam_csock,
PAM_MSG_MEMBER(msg, i, msg_style), buffer) == -1)
goto fail;
break;
default:
goto fail;
}
sshbuf_reset(buffer);
}
sshbuf_free(buffer);
*resp = reply;
return (PAM_SUCCESS);
fail:
for(i = 0; i < n; i++) {
free(reply[i].resp);
}
free(reply);
sshbuf_free(buffer);
return (PAM_CONV_ERR);
}
/*
* Authentication thread.
*/
static void *
sshpam_thread(void *ctxtp)
{
struct pam_ctxt *ctxt = ctxtp;
struct sshbuf *buffer = NULL;
struct pam_conv sshpam_conv;
int r, flags = (options.permit_empty_passwd == 0 ?
PAM_DISALLOW_NULL_AUTHTOK : 0);
#ifndef UNSUPPORTED_POSIX_THREADS_HACK
extern char **environ;
char **env_from_pam;
u_int i;
const char *pam_user;
const char **ptr_pam_user = &pam_user;
char *tz = getenv("TZ");
sshpam_err = pam_get_item(sshpam_handle, PAM_USER,
(sshpam_const void **)ptr_pam_user);
if (sshpam_err != PAM_SUCCESS)
goto auth_fail;
environ[0] = NULL;
if (tz != NULL)
if (setenv("TZ", tz, 1) == -1)
error("PAM: could not set TZ environment: %s",
strerror(errno));
if (sshpam_authctxt != NULL) {
setproctitle("%s [pam]",
sshpam_authctxt->valid ? pam_user : "unknown");
}
#endif
sshpam_conv.conv = sshpam_thread_conv;
sshpam_conv.appdata_ptr = ctxt;
if (sshpam_authctxt == NULL)
fatal("%s: PAM authctxt not initialized", __func__);
if ((buffer = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
sshpam_err = pam_set_item(sshpam_handle, PAM_CONV,
(const void *)&sshpam_conv);
if (sshpam_err != PAM_SUCCESS)
goto auth_fail;
sshpam_err = pam_authenticate(sshpam_handle, flags);
if (sshpam_err == PAM_MAXTRIES)
sshpam_set_maxtries_reached(1);
if (sshpam_err != PAM_SUCCESS)
goto auth_fail;
if (!do_pam_account()) {
sshpam_err = PAM_ACCT_EXPIRED;
goto auth_fail;
}
if (sshpam_authctxt->force_pwchange) {
sshpam_err = pam_chauthtok(sshpam_handle,
PAM_CHANGE_EXPIRED_AUTHTOK);
if (sshpam_err != PAM_SUCCESS)
goto auth_fail;
sshpam_password_change_required(0);
}
if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(buffer, "OK")) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
#ifndef UNSUPPORTED_POSIX_THREADS_HACK
/* Export variables set by do_pam_account */
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(buffer, sshpam_account_status)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u32(buffer, sshpam_authctxt->force_pwchange)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
/* Export any environment strings set in child */
for (i = 0; environ[i] != NULL; i++) {
/* Count */
if (i > INT_MAX)
fatal("%s: too many environment strings", __func__);
}
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(buffer, i)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
for (i = 0; environ[i] != NULL; i++) {
if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(buffer, environ[i])) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
}
/* Export any environment strings set by PAM in child */
env_from_pam = pam_getenvlist(sshpam_handle);
for (i = 0; env_from_pam != NULL && env_from_pam[i] != NULL; i++) {
/* Count */
if (i > INT_MAX)
fatal("%s: too many PAM environment strings", __func__);
}
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(buffer, i)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
for (i = 0; env_from_pam != NULL && env_from_pam[i] != NULL; i++) {
if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(buffer, env_from_pam[i])) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
}
#endif /* UNSUPPORTED_POSIX_THREADS_HACK */
/* XXX - can't do much about an error here */
ssh_msg_send(ctxt->pam_csock, sshpam_err, buffer);
sshbuf_free(buffer);
pthread_exit(NULL);
auth_fail:
if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(buffer,
pam_strerror(sshpam_handle, sshpam_err))) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
/* XXX - can't do much about an error here */
if (sshpam_err == PAM_ACCT_EXPIRED)
ssh_msg_send(ctxt->pam_csock, PAM_ACCT_EXPIRED, buffer);
else if (sshpam_maxtries_reached)
ssh_msg_send(ctxt->pam_csock, PAM_MAXTRIES, buffer);
else
ssh_msg_send(ctxt->pam_csock, PAM_AUTH_ERR, buffer);
sshbuf_free(buffer);
pthread_exit(NULL);
return (NULL); /* Avoid warning for non-pthread case */
}
void
sshpam_thread_cleanup(void)
{
struct pam_ctxt *ctxt = cleanup_ctxt;
debug3("PAM: %s entering", __func__);
if (ctxt != NULL && ctxt->pam_thread != 0) {
pthread_cancel(ctxt->pam_thread);
pthread_join(ctxt->pam_thread, NULL);
close(ctxt->pam_psock);
close(ctxt->pam_csock);
memset(ctxt, 0, sizeof(*ctxt));
cleanup_ctxt = NULL;
}
}
static int
sshpam_null_conv(int n, sshpam_const struct pam_message **msg,
struct pam_response **resp, void *data)
{
debug3("PAM: %s entering, %d messages", __func__, n);
return (PAM_CONV_ERR);
}
static struct pam_conv null_conv = { sshpam_null_conv, NULL };
static int
sshpam_store_conv(int n, sshpam_const struct pam_message **msg,
struct pam_response **resp, void *data)
{
struct pam_response *reply;
int r, i;
debug3("PAM: %s called with %d messages", __func__, n);
*resp = NULL;
if (n <= 0 || n > PAM_MAX_NUM_MSG)
return (PAM_CONV_ERR);
if ((reply = calloc(n, sizeof(*reply))) == NULL)
return (PAM_CONV_ERR);
for (i = 0; i < n; ++i) {
switch (PAM_MSG_MEMBER(msg, i, msg_style)) {
case PAM_ERROR_MSG:
case PAM_TEXT_INFO:
if ((r = sshbuf_putf(loginmsg, "%s\n",
PAM_MSG_MEMBER(msg, i, msg))) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s",
__func__, ssh_err(r));
reply[i].resp_retcode = PAM_SUCCESS;
break;
default:
goto fail;
}
}
*resp = reply;
return (PAM_SUCCESS);
fail:
for(i = 0; i < n; i++) {
free(reply[i].resp);
}
free(reply);
return (PAM_CONV_ERR);
}
static struct pam_conv store_conv = { sshpam_store_conv, NULL };
void
sshpam_cleanup(void)
{
if (sshpam_handle == NULL || (use_privsep && !mm_is_monitor()))
return;
debug("PAM: cleanup");
pam_set_item(sshpam_handle, PAM_CONV, (const void *)&null_conv);
if (sshpam_session_open) {
debug("PAM: closing session");
pam_close_session(sshpam_handle, PAM_SILENT);
sshpam_session_open = 0;
}
if (sshpam_cred_established) {
debug("PAM: deleting credentials");
pam_setcred(sshpam_handle, PAM_DELETE_CRED);
sshpam_cred_established = 0;
}
sshpam_authenticated = 0;
pam_end(sshpam_handle, sshpam_err);
sshpam_handle = NULL;
}
static int
sshpam_init(struct ssh *ssh, Authctxt *authctxt)
{
const char *pam_user, *user = authctxt->user;
const char **ptr_pam_user = &pam_user;
if (sshpam_handle == NULL) {
if (ssh == NULL) {
fatal("%s: called initially with no "
"packet context", __func__);
}
} if (sshpam_handle != NULL) {
/* We already have a PAM context; check if the user matches */
sshpam_err = pam_get_item(sshpam_handle,
PAM_USER, (sshpam_const void **)ptr_pam_user);
if (sshpam_err == PAM_SUCCESS && strcmp(user, pam_user) == 0)
return (0);
pam_end(sshpam_handle, sshpam_err);
sshpam_handle = NULL;
}
debug("PAM: initializing for \"%s\"", user);
sshpam_err =
pam_start(SSHD_PAM_SERVICE, user, &store_conv, &sshpam_handle);
sshpam_authctxt = authctxt;
if (sshpam_err != PAM_SUCCESS) {
pam_end(sshpam_handle, sshpam_err);
sshpam_handle = NULL;
return (-1);
}
if (ssh != NULL && sshpam_rhost == NULL) {
/*
* We need to cache these as we don't have packet context
* during the kbdint flow.
*/
sshpam_rhost = xstrdup(auth_get_canonical_hostname(ssh,
options.use_dns));
sshpam_laddr = get_local_ipaddr(
ssh_packet_get_connection_in(ssh));
xasprintf(&sshpam_conninfo, "SSH_CONNECTION=%.50s %d %.50s %d",
ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), ssh_remote_port(ssh),
sshpam_laddr, ssh_local_port(ssh));
}
if (sshpam_rhost != NULL) {
debug("PAM: setting PAM_RHOST to \"%s\"", sshpam_rhost);
sshpam_err = pam_set_item(sshpam_handle, PAM_RHOST,
sshpam_rhost);
if (sshpam_err != PAM_SUCCESS) {
pam_end(sshpam_handle, sshpam_err);
sshpam_handle = NULL;
return (-1);
}
/* Put SSH_CONNECTION in the PAM environment too */
pam_putenv(sshpam_handle, sshpam_conninfo);
}
#ifdef PAM_TTY_KLUDGE
/*
* Some silly PAM modules (e.g. pam_time) require a TTY to operate.
* sshd doesn't set the tty until too late in the auth process and
* may not even set one (for tty-less connections)
*/
debug("PAM: setting PAM_TTY to \"ssh\"");
sshpam_err = pam_set_item(sshpam_handle, PAM_TTY, "ssh");
if (sshpam_err != PAM_SUCCESS) {
pam_end(sshpam_handle, sshpam_err);
sshpam_handle = NULL;
return (-1);
}
#endif
return (0);
}
static void
expose_authinfo(const char *caller)
{
char *auth_info;
/*
* Expose authentication information to PAM.
* The environment variable is versioned. Please increment the
* version suffix if the format of session_info changes.
*/
if (sshpam_authctxt->session_info == NULL)
auth_info = xstrdup("");
else if ((auth_info = sshbuf_dup_string(
sshpam_authctxt->session_info)) == NULL)
fatal("%s: sshbuf_dup_string failed", __func__);
debug2("%s: auth information in SSH_AUTH_INFO_0", caller);
do_pam_putenv("SSH_AUTH_INFO_0", auth_info);
free(auth_info);
}
static void *
sshpam_init_ctx(Authctxt *authctxt)
{
struct pam_ctxt *ctxt;
int result, socks[2];
debug3("PAM: %s entering", __func__);
/*
* Refuse to start if we don't have PAM enabled or do_pam_account
* has previously failed.
*/
if (!options.use_pam || sshpam_account_status == 0)
return NULL;
/* Initialize PAM */
if (sshpam_init(NULL, authctxt) == -1) {
error("PAM: initialization failed");
return (NULL);
}
expose_authinfo(__func__);
ctxt = xcalloc(1, sizeof *ctxt);
/* Start the authentication thread */
if (socketpair(AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, PF_UNSPEC, socks) == -1) {
error("PAM: failed create sockets: %s", strerror(errno));
free(ctxt);
return (NULL);
}
ctxt->pam_psock = socks[0];
ctxt->pam_csock = socks[1];
result = pthread_create(&ctxt->pam_thread, NULL, sshpam_thread, ctxt);
if (result != 0) {
error("PAM: failed to start authentication thread: %s",
strerror(result));
close(socks[0]);
close(socks[1]);
free(ctxt);
return (NULL);
}
cleanup_ctxt = ctxt;
return (ctxt);
}
static int
sshpam_query(void *ctx, char **name, char **info,
u_int *num, char ***prompts, u_int **echo_on)
{
struct sshbuf *buffer;
struct pam_ctxt *ctxt = ctx;
size_t plen;
u_char type;
char *msg;
size_t len, mlen;
int r;
debug3("PAM: %s entering", __func__);
if ((buffer = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
*name = xstrdup("");
*info = xstrdup("");
*prompts = xmalloc(sizeof(char *));
**prompts = NULL;
plen = 0;
*echo_on = xmalloc(sizeof(u_int));
while (ssh_msg_recv(ctxt->pam_psock, buffer) == 0) {
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(buffer, &type)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_cstring(buffer, &msg, &mlen)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
switch (type) {
case PAM_PROMPT_ECHO_ON:
case PAM_PROMPT_ECHO_OFF:
*num = 1;
len = plen + mlen + 1;
**prompts = xreallocarray(**prompts, 1, len);
strlcpy(**prompts + plen, msg, len - plen);
plen += mlen;
**echo_on = (type == PAM_PROMPT_ECHO_ON);
free(msg);
sshbuf_free(buffer);
return (0);
case PAM_ERROR_MSG:
case PAM_TEXT_INFO:
/* accumulate messages */
len = plen + mlen + 2;
**prompts = xreallocarray(**prompts, 1, len);
strlcpy(**prompts + plen, msg, len - plen);
plen += mlen;
strlcat(**prompts + plen, "\n", len - plen);
plen++;
free(msg);
break;
case PAM_ACCT_EXPIRED:
case PAM_MAXTRIES:
if (type == PAM_ACCT_EXPIRED)
sshpam_account_status = 0;
if (type == PAM_MAXTRIES)
sshpam_set_maxtries_reached(1);
/* FALLTHROUGH */
case PAM_AUTH_ERR:
debug3("PAM: %s", pam_strerror(sshpam_handle, type));
if (**prompts != NULL && strlen(**prompts) != 0) {
*info = **prompts;
**prompts = NULL;
*num = 0;
**echo_on = 0;
ctxt->pam_done = -1;
free(msg);
sshbuf_free(buffer);
return 0;
}
/* FALLTHROUGH */
case PAM_SUCCESS:
if (**prompts != NULL) {
/* drain any accumulated messages */
debug("PAM: %s", **prompts);
if ((r = sshbuf_put(loginmsg, **prompts,
strlen(**prompts))) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s",
__func__, ssh_err(r));
free(**prompts);
**prompts = NULL;
}
if (type == PAM_SUCCESS) {
if (!sshpam_authctxt->valid ||
(sshpam_authctxt->pw->pw_uid == 0 &&
options.permit_root_login != PERMIT_YES))
fatal("Internal error: PAM auth "
"succeeded when it should have "
"failed");
import_environments(buffer);
*num = 0;
**echo_on = 0;
ctxt->pam_done = 1;
free(msg);
sshbuf_free(buffer);
return (0);
}
error("PAM: %s for %s%.100s from %.100s", msg,
sshpam_authctxt->valid ? "" : "illegal user ",
sshpam_authctxt->user, sshpam_rhost);
/* FALLTHROUGH */
default:
*num = 0;
**echo_on = 0;
free(msg);
ctxt->pam_done = -1;
sshbuf_free(buffer);
return (-1);
}
}
sshbuf_free(buffer);
return (-1);
}
/*
* Returns a junk password of identical length to that the user supplied.
* Used to mitigate timing attacks against crypt(3)/PAM stacks that
* vary processing time in proportion to password length.
*/
static char *
fake_password(const char *wire_password)
{
const char junk[] = "\b\n\r\177INCORRECT";
char *ret = NULL;
size_t i, l = wire_password != NULL ? strlen(wire_password) : 0;
if (l >= INT_MAX)
fatal("%s: password length too long: %zu", __func__, l);
ret = malloc(l + 1);
if (ret == NULL)
return NULL;
for (i = 0; i < l; i++)
ret[i] = junk[i % (sizeof(junk) - 1)];
ret[i] = '\0';
return ret;
}
/* XXX - see also comment in auth-chall.c:verify_response */
static int
sshpam_respond(void *ctx, u_int num, char **resp)
{
struct sshbuf *buffer;
struct pam_ctxt *ctxt = ctx;
char *fake;
int r;
debug2("PAM: %s entering, %u responses", __func__, num);
switch (ctxt->pam_done) {
case 1:
sshpam_authenticated = 1;
return (0);
case 0:
break;
default:
return (-1);
}
if (num != 1) {
error("PAM: expected one response, got %u", num);
return (-1);
}
if ((buffer = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
if (sshpam_authctxt->valid &&
(sshpam_authctxt->pw->pw_uid != 0 ||
options.permit_root_login == PERMIT_YES)) {
if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(buffer, *resp)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
} else {
fake = fake_password(*resp);
if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(buffer, fake)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
free(fake);
}
if (ssh_msg_send(ctxt->pam_psock, PAM_AUTHTOK, buffer) == -1) {
sshbuf_free(buffer);
return (-1);
}
sshbuf_free(buffer);
return (1);
}
static void
sshpam_free_ctx(void *ctxtp)
{
struct pam_ctxt *ctxt = ctxtp;
debug3("PAM: %s entering", __func__);
sshpam_thread_cleanup();
free(ctxt);
/*
* We don't call sshpam_cleanup() here because we may need the PAM
* handle at a later stage, e.g. when setting up a session. It's
* still on the cleanup list, so pam_end() *will* be called before
* the server process terminates.
*/
}
KbdintDevice sshpam_device = {
"pam",
sshpam_init_ctx,
sshpam_query,
sshpam_respond,
sshpam_free_ctx
};
KbdintDevice mm_sshpam_device = {
"pam",
mm_sshpam_init_ctx,
mm_sshpam_query,
mm_sshpam_respond,
mm_sshpam_free_ctx
};
/*
* This replaces auth-pam.c
*/
void
start_pam(struct ssh *ssh)
{
Authctxt *authctxt = (Authctxt *)ssh->authctxt;
if (!options.use_pam)
fatal("PAM: initialisation requested when UsePAM=no");
if (sshpam_init(ssh, authctxt) == -1)
fatal("PAM: initialisation failed");
}
void
finish_pam(void)
{
sshpam_cleanup();
}
u_int
do_pam_account(void)
{
debug("%s: called", __func__);
if (sshpam_account_status != -1)
return (sshpam_account_status);
expose_authinfo(__func__);
sshpam_err = pam_acct_mgmt(sshpam_handle, 0);
debug3("PAM: %s pam_acct_mgmt = %d (%s)", __func__, sshpam_err,
pam_strerror(sshpam_handle, sshpam_err));
if (sshpam_err != PAM_SUCCESS && sshpam_err != PAM_NEW_AUTHTOK_REQD) {
sshpam_account_status = 0;
return (sshpam_account_status);
}
if (sshpam_err == PAM_NEW_AUTHTOK_REQD)
sshpam_password_change_required(1);
sshpam_account_status = 1;
return (sshpam_account_status);
}
void
do_pam_setcred(int init)
{
sshpam_err = pam_set_item(sshpam_handle, PAM_CONV,
(const void *)&store_conv);
if (sshpam_err != PAM_SUCCESS)
fatal("PAM: failed to set PAM_CONV: %s",
pam_strerror(sshpam_handle, sshpam_err));
if (init) {
debug("PAM: establishing credentials");
sshpam_err = pam_setcred(sshpam_handle, PAM_ESTABLISH_CRED);
} else {
debug("PAM: reinitializing credentials");
sshpam_err = pam_setcred(sshpam_handle, PAM_REINITIALIZE_CRED);
}
if (sshpam_err == PAM_SUCCESS) {
sshpam_cred_established = 1;
return;
}
if (sshpam_authenticated)
fatal("PAM: pam_setcred(): %s",
pam_strerror(sshpam_handle, sshpam_err));
else
debug("PAM: pam_setcred(): %s",
pam_strerror(sshpam_handle, sshpam_err));
}
static int
sshpam_tty_conv(int n, sshpam_const struct pam_message **msg,
struct pam_response **resp, void *data)
{
char input[PAM_MAX_MSG_SIZE];
struct pam_response *reply;
int i;
debug3("PAM: %s called with %d messages", __func__, n);
*resp = NULL;
if (n <= 0 || n > PAM_MAX_NUM_MSG || !isatty(STDIN_FILENO))
return (PAM_CONV_ERR);
if ((reply = calloc(n, sizeof(*reply))) == NULL)
return (PAM_CONV_ERR);
for (i = 0; i < n; ++i) {
switch (PAM_MSG_MEMBER(msg, i, msg_style)) {
case PAM_PROMPT_ECHO_OFF:
reply[i].resp =
read_passphrase(PAM_MSG_MEMBER(msg, i, msg),
RP_ALLOW_STDIN);
reply[i].resp_retcode = PAM_SUCCESS;
break;
case PAM_PROMPT_ECHO_ON:
fprintf(stderr, "%s\n", PAM_MSG_MEMBER(msg, i, msg));
if (fgets(input, sizeof input, stdin) == NULL)
input[0] = '\0';
if ((reply[i].resp = strdup(input)) == NULL)
goto fail;
reply[i].resp_retcode = PAM_SUCCESS;
break;
case PAM_ERROR_MSG:
case PAM_TEXT_INFO:
fprintf(stderr, "%s\n", PAM_MSG_MEMBER(msg, i, msg));
reply[i].resp_retcode = PAM_SUCCESS;
break;
default:
goto fail;
}
}
*resp = reply;
return (PAM_SUCCESS);
fail:
for(i = 0; i < n; i++) {
free(reply[i].resp);
}
free(reply);
return (PAM_CONV_ERR);
}
static struct pam_conv tty_conv = { sshpam_tty_conv, NULL };
/*
* XXX this should be done in the authentication phase, but ssh1 doesn't
* support that
*/
void
do_pam_chauthtok(void)
{
if (use_privsep)
fatal("Password expired (unable to change with privsep)");
sshpam_err = pam_set_item(sshpam_handle, PAM_CONV,
(const void *)&tty_conv);
if (sshpam_err != PAM_SUCCESS)
fatal("PAM: failed to set PAM_CONV: %s",
pam_strerror(sshpam_handle, sshpam_err));
debug("PAM: changing password");
sshpam_err = pam_chauthtok(sshpam_handle, PAM_CHANGE_EXPIRED_AUTHTOK);
if (sshpam_err != PAM_SUCCESS)
fatal("PAM: pam_chauthtok(): %s",
pam_strerror(sshpam_handle, sshpam_err));
}
void
do_pam_session(struct ssh *ssh)
{
debug3("PAM: opening session");
expose_authinfo(__func__);
sshpam_err = pam_set_item(sshpam_handle, PAM_CONV,
(const void *)&store_conv);
if (sshpam_err != PAM_SUCCESS)
fatal("PAM: failed to set PAM_CONV: %s",
pam_strerror(sshpam_handle, sshpam_err));
sshpam_err = pam_open_session(sshpam_handle, 0);
if (sshpam_err == PAM_SUCCESS)
sshpam_session_open = 1;
else {
sshpam_session_open = 0;
auth_restrict_session(ssh);
error("PAM: pam_open_session(): %s",
pam_strerror(sshpam_handle, sshpam_err));
}
}
int
is_pam_session_open(void)
{
return sshpam_session_open;
}
/*
* Set a PAM environment string. We need to do this so that the session
* modules can handle things like Kerberos/GSI credentials that appear
* during the ssh authentication process.
*/
int
do_pam_putenv(char *name, char *value)
{
int ret = 1;
char *compound;
size_t len;
len = strlen(name) + strlen(value) + 2;
compound = xmalloc(len);
snprintf(compound, len, "%s=%s", name, value);
ret = pam_putenv(sshpam_handle, compound);
free(compound);
return (ret);
}
char **
fetch_pam_child_environment(void)
{
return sshpam_env;
}
char **
fetch_pam_environment(void)
{
return (pam_getenvlist(sshpam_handle));
}
void
free_pam_environment(char **env)
{
char **envp;
if (env == NULL)
return;
for (envp = env; *envp; envp++)
free(*envp);
free(env);
}
/*
* "Blind" conversation function for password authentication. Assumes that
* echo-off prompts are for the password and stores messages for later
* display.
*/
static int
sshpam_passwd_conv(int n, sshpam_const struct pam_message **msg,
struct pam_response **resp, void *data)
{
struct pam_response *reply;
int r, i;
size_t len;
debug3("PAM: %s called with %d messages", __func__, n);
*resp = NULL;
if (n <= 0 || n > PAM_MAX_NUM_MSG)
return (PAM_CONV_ERR);
if ((reply = calloc(n, sizeof(*reply))) == NULL)
return (PAM_CONV_ERR);
for (i = 0; i < n; ++i) {
switch (PAM_MSG_MEMBER(msg, i, msg_style)) {
case PAM_PROMPT_ECHO_OFF:
if (sshpam_password == NULL)
goto fail;
if ((reply[i].resp = strdup(sshpam_password)) == NULL)
goto fail;
reply[i].resp_retcode = PAM_SUCCESS;
break;
case PAM_ERROR_MSG:
case PAM_TEXT_INFO:
len = strlen(PAM_MSG_MEMBER(msg, i, msg));
if (len > 0) {
if ((r = sshbuf_putf(loginmsg, "%s\n",
PAM_MSG_MEMBER(msg, i, msg))) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s",
__func__, ssh_err(r));
}
if ((reply[i].resp = strdup("")) == NULL)
goto fail;
reply[i].resp_retcode = PAM_SUCCESS;
break;
default:
goto fail;
}
}
*resp = reply;
return (PAM_SUCCESS);
fail:
for(i = 0; i < n; i++) {
free(reply[i].resp);
}
free(reply);
return (PAM_CONV_ERR);
}
static struct pam_conv passwd_conv = { sshpam_passwd_conv, NULL };
/*
* Attempt password authentication via PAM
*/
int
sshpam_auth_passwd(Authctxt *authctxt, const char *password)
{
int flags = (options.permit_empty_passwd == 0 ?
PAM_DISALLOW_NULL_AUTHTOK : 0);
char *fake = NULL;
if (!options.use_pam || sshpam_handle == NULL)
fatal("PAM: %s called when PAM disabled or failed to "
"initialise.", __func__);
sshpam_password = password;
sshpam_authctxt = authctxt;
/*
* If the user logging in is invalid, or is root but is not permitted
* by PermitRootLogin, use an invalid password to prevent leaking
* information via timing (eg if the PAM config has a delay on fail).
*/
if (!authctxt->valid || (authctxt->pw->pw_uid == 0 &&
options.permit_root_login != PERMIT_YES))
sshpam_password = fake = fake_password(password);
sshpam_err = pam_set_item(sshpam_handle, PAM_CONV,
(const void *)&passwd_conv);
if (sshpam_err != PAM_SUCCESS)
fatal("PAM: %s: failed to set PAM_CONV: %s", __func__,
pam_strerror(sshpam_handle, sshpam_err));
sshpam_err = pam_authenticate(sshpam_handle, flags);
sshpam_password = NULL;
free(fake);
if (sshpam_err == PAM_MAXTRIES)
sshpam_set_maxtries_reached(1);
if (sshpam_err == PAM_SUCCESS && authctxt->valid) {
debug("PAM: password authentication accepted for %.100s",
authctxt->user);
return 1;
} else {
debug("PAM: password authentication failed for %.100s: %s",
authctxt->valid ? authctxt->user : "an illegal user",
pam_strerror(sshpam_handle, sshpam_err));
return 0;
}
}
int
sshpam_get_maxtries_reached(void)
{
return sshpam_maxtries_reached;
}
void
sshpam_set_maxtries_reached(int reached)
{
if (reached == 0 || sshpam_maxtries_reached)
return;
sshpam_maxtries_reached = 1;
options.password_authentication = 0;
options.kbd_interactive_authentication = 0;
options.challenge_response_authentication = 0;
}
#endif /* USE_PAM */
diff --git a/auth.c b/auth.c
index 086b8ebb1626..9a5498b66d50 100644
--- a/auth.c
+++ b/auth.c
@@ -1,1190 +1,1191 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: auth.c,v 1.146 2020/01/31 22:42:45 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: auth.c,v 1.147 2020/08/27 01:07:09 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
* OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
* IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
* INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
* NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
* DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
* THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
* (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
* THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
*/
#include "includes.h"
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/stat.h>
#include <sys/socket.h>
#include <sys/wait.h>
#include <netinet/in.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
#ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H
# include <paths.h>
#endif
#include <pwd.h>
#ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_H
#include <login.h>
#endif
#ifdef USE_SHADOW
#include <shadow.h>
#endif
#include <stdarg.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <limits.h>
#include <netdb.h>
#include <time.h>
#include "xmalloc.h"
#include "match.h"
#include "groupaccess.h"
#include "log.h"
#include "sshbuf.h"
#include "misc.h"
#include "servconf.h"
#include "sshkey.h"
#include "hostfile.h"
#include "auth.h"
#include "auth-options.h"
#include "canohost.h"
#include "uidswap.h"
#include "packet.h"
#include "loginrec.h"
#ifdef GSSAPI
#include "ssh-gss.h"
#endif
#include "authfile.h"
#include "monitor_wrap.h"
#include "ssherr.h"
#include "compat.h"
#include "channels.h"
/* import */
extern ServerOptions options;
extern struct include_list includes;
extern int use_privsep;
extern struct sshbuf *loginmsg;
extern struct passwd *privsep_pw;
extern struct sshauthopt *auth_opts;
/* Debugging messages */
static struct sshbuf *auth_debug;
/*
* Check if the user is allowed to log in via ssh. If user is listed
* in DenyUsers or one of user's groups is listed in DenyGroups, false
* will be returned. If AllowUsers isn't empty and user isn't listed
* there, or if AllowGroups isn't empty and one of user's groups isn't
* listed there, false will be returned.
* If the user's shell is not executable, false will be returned.
* Otherwise true is returned.
*/
int
allowed_user(struct ssh *ssh, struct passwd * pw)
{
struct stat st;
const char *hostname = NULL, *ipaddr = NULL, *passwd = NULL;
u_int i;
int r;
#ifdef USE_SHADOW
struct spwd *spw = NULL;
#endif
/* Shouldn't be called if pw is NULL, but better safe than sorry... */
if (!pw || !pw->pw_name)
return 0;
#ifdef USE_SHADOW
if (!options.use_pam)
spw = getspnam(pw->pw_name);
#ifdef HAS_SHADOW_EXPIRE
if (!options.use_pam && spw != NULL && auth_shadow_acctexpired(spw))
return 0;
#endif /* HAS_SHADOW_EXPIRE */
#endif /* USE_SHADOW */
/* grab passwd field for locked account check */
passwd = pw->pw_passwd;
#ifdef USE_SHADOW
if (spw != NULL)
#ifdef USE_LIBIAF
passwd = get_iaf_password(pw);
#else
passwd = spw->sp_pwdp;
#endif /* USE_LIBIAF */
#endif
/* check for locked account */
if (!options.use_pam && passwd && *passwd) {
int locked = 0;
#ifdef LOCKED_PASSWD_STRING
if (strcmp(passwd, LOCKED_PASSWD_STRING) == 0)
locked = 1;
#endif
#ifdef LOCKED_PASSWD_PREFIX
if (strncmp(passwd, LOCKED_PASSWD_PREFIX,
strlen(LOCKED_PASSWD_PREFIX)) == 0)
locked = 1;
#endif
#ifdef LOCKED_PASSWD_SUBSTR
if (strstr(passwd, LOCKED_PASSWD_SUBSTR))
locked = 1;
#endif
#ifdef USE_LIBIAF
free((void *) passwd);
#endif /* USE_LIBIAF */
if (locked) {
logit("User %.100s not allowed because account is locked",
pw->pw_name);
return 0;
}
}
/*
* Deny if shell does not exist or is not executable unless we
* are chrooting.
*/
if (options.chroot_directory == NULL ||
strcasecmp(options.chroot_directory, "none") == 0) {
char *shell = xstrdup((pw->pw_shell[0] == '\0') ?
_PATH_BSHELL : pw->pw_shell); /* empty = /bin/sh */
if (stat(shell, &st) == -1) {
logit("User %.100s not allowed because shell %.100s "
"does not exist", pw->pw_name, shell);
free(shell);
return 0;
}
if (S_ISREG(st.st_mode) == 0 ||
(st.st_mode & (S_IXOTH|S_IXUSR|S_IXGRP)) == 0) {
logit("User %.100s not allowed because shell %.100s "
"is not executable", pw->pw_name, shell);
free(shell);
return 0;
}
free(shell);
}
if (options.num_deny_users > 0 || options.num_allow_users > 0 ||
options.num_deny_groups > 0 || options.num_allow_groups > 0) {
hostname = auth_get_canonical_hostname(ssh, options.use_dns);
ipaddr = ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh);
}
/* Return false if user is listed in DenyUsers */
if (options.num_deny_users > 0) {
for (i = 0; i < options.num_deny_users; i++) {
r = match_user(pw->pw_name, hostname, ipaddr,
options.deny_users[i]);
if (r < 0) {
fatal("Invalid DenyUsers pattern \"%.100s\"",
options.deny_users[i]);
} else if (r != 0) {
logit("User %.100s from %.100s not allowed "
"because listed in DenyUsers",
pw->pw_name, hostname);
return 0;
}
}
}
/* Return false if AllowUsers isn't empty and user isn't listed there */
if (options.num_allow_users > 0) {
for (i = 0; i < options.num_allow_users; i++) {
r = match_user(pw->pw_name, hostname, ipaddr,
options.allow_users[i]);
if (r < 0) {
fatal("Invalid AllowUsers pattern \"%.100s\"",
options.allow_users[i]);
} else if (r == 1)
break;
}
/* i < options.num_allow_users iff we break for loop */
if (i >= options.num_allow_users) {
logit("User %.100s from %.100s not allowed because "
"not listed in AllowUsers", pw->pw_name, hostname);
return 0;
}
}
if (options.num_deny_groups > 0 || options.num_allow_groups > 0) {
/* Get the user's group access list (primary and supplementary) */
if (ga_init(pw->pw_name, pw->pw_gid) == 0) {
logit("User %.100s from %.100s not allowed because "
"not in any group", pw->pw_name, hostname);
return 0;
}
/* Return false if one of user's groups is listed in DenyGroups */
if (options.num_deny_groups > 0)
if (ga_match(options.deny_groups,
options.num_deny_groups)) {
ga_free();
logit("User %.100s from %.100s not allowed "
"because a group is listed in DenyGroups",
pw->pw_name, hostname);
return 0;
}
/*
* Return false if AllowGroups isn't empty and one of user's groups
* isn't listed there
*/
if (options.num_allow_groups > 0)
if (!ga_match(options.allow_groups,
options.num_allow_groups)) {
ga_free();
logit("User %.100s from %.100s not allowed "
"because none of user's groups are listed "
"in AllowGroups", pw->pw_name, hostname);
return 0;
}
ga_free();
}
#ifdef CUSTOM_SYS_AUTH_ALLOWED_USER
if (!sys_auth_allowed_user(pw, loginmsg))
return 0;
#endif
/* We found no reason not to let this user try to log on... */
return 1;
}
/*
* Formats any key left in authctxt->auth_method_key for inclusion in
* auth_log()'s message. Also includes authxtct->auth_method_info if present.
*/
static char *
format_method_key(Authctxt *authctxt)
{
const struct sshkey *key = authctxt->auth_method_key;
const char *methinfo = authctxt->auth_method_info;
char *fp, *cafp, *ret = NULL;
if (key == NULL)
return NULL;
if (sshkey_is_cert(key)) {
fp = sshkey_fingerprint(key,
options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_DEFAULT);
cafp = sshkey_fingerprint(key->cert->signature_key,
options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_DEFAULT);
xasprintf(&ret, "%s %s ID %s (serial %llu) CA %s %s%s%s",
sshkey_type(key), fp == NULL ? "(null)" : fp,
key->cert->key_id,
(unsigned long long)key->cert->serial,
sshkey_type(key->cert->signature_key),
cafp == NULL ? "(null)" : cafp,
methinfo == NULL ? "" : ", ",
methinfo == NULL ? "" : methinfo);
free(fp);
free(cafp);
} else {
fp = sshkey_fingerprint(key, options.fingerprint_hash,
SSH_FP_DEFAULT);
xasprintf(&ret, "%s %s%s%s", sshkey_type(key),
fp == NULL ? "(null)" : fp,
methinfo == NULL ? "" : ", ",
methinfo == NULL ? "" : methinfo);
free(fp);
}
return ret;
}
void
auth_log(struct ssh *ssh, int authenticated, int partial,
const char *method, const char *submethod)
{
Authctxt *authctxt = (Authctxt *)ssh->authctxt;
int level = SYSLOG_LEVEL_VERBOSE;
const char *authmsg;
char *extra = NULL;
if (use_privsep && !mm_is_monitor() && !authctxt->postponed)
return;
/* Raise logging level */
if (authenticated == 1 ||
!authctxt->valid ||
authctxt->failures >= options.max_authtries / 2 ||
strcmp(method, "password") == 0)
level = SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO;
if (authctxt->postponed)
authmsg = "Postponed";
else if (partial)
authmsg = "Partial";
else
authmsg = authenticated ? "Accepted" : "Failed";
if ((extra = format_method_key(authctxt)) == NULL) {
if (authctxt->auth_method_info != NULL)
extra = xstrdup(authctxt->auth_method_info);
}
do_log2(level, "%s %s%s%s for %s%.100s from %.200s port %d ssh2%s%s",
authmsg,
method,
submethod != NULL ? "/" : "", submethod == NULL ? "" : submethod,
authctxt->valid ? "" : "invalid user ",
authctxt->user,
ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh),
ssh_remote_port(ssh),
extra != NULL ? ": " : "",
extra != NULL ? extra : "");
free(extra);
#ifdef CUSTOM_FAILED_LOGIN
if (authenticated == 0 && !authctxt->postponed &&
(strcmp(method, "password") == 0 ||
strncmp(method, "keyboard-interactive", 20) == 0 ||
strcmp(method, "challenge-response") == 0))
record_failed_login(ssh, authctxt->user,
auth_get_canonical_hostname(ssh, options.use_dns), "ssh");
# ifdef WITH_AIXAUTHENTICATE
if (authenticated)
sys_auth_record_login(authctxt->user,
auth_get_canonical_hostname(ssh, options.use_dns), "ssh",
loginmsg);
# endif
#endif
#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
if (authenticated == 0 && !authctxt->postponed)
audit_event(ssh, audit_classify_auth(method));
#endif
}
void
auth_maxtries_exceeded(struct ssh *ssh)
{
Authctxt *authctxt = (Authctxt *)ssh->authctxt;
error("maximum authentication attempts exceeded for "
"%s%.100s from %.200s port %d ssh2",
authctxt->valid ? "" : "invalid user ",
authctxt->user,
ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh),
ssh_remote_port(ssh));
ssh_packet_disconnect(ssh, "Too many authentication failures");
/* NOTREACHED */
}
/*
* Check whether root logins are disallowed.
*/
int
auth_root_allowed(struct ssh *ssh, const char *method)
{
switch (options.permit_root_login) {
case PERMIT_YES:
return 1;
case PERMIT_NO_PASSWD:
if (strcmp(method, "publickey") == 0 ||
strcmp(method, "hostbased") == 0 ||
strcmp(method, "gssapi-with-mic") == 0)
return 1;
break;
case PERMIT_FORCED_ONLY:
if (auth_opts->force_command != NULL) {
logit("Root login accepted for forced command.");
return 1;
}
break;
}
logit("ROOT LOGIN REFUSED FROM %.200s port %d",
ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), ssh_remote_port(ssh));
return 0;
}
/*
* Given a template and a passwd structure, build a filename
* by substituting % tokenised options. Currently, %% becomes '%',
* %h becomes the home directory and %u the username.
*
* This returns a buffer allocated by xmalloc.
*/
char *
expand_authorized_keys(const char *filename, struct passwd *pw)
{
char *file, uidstr[32], ret[PATH_MAX];
int i;
snprintf(uidstr, sizeof(uidstr), "%llu",
(unsigned long long)pw->pw_uid);
file = percent_expand(filename, "h", pw->pw_dir,
"u", pw->pw_name, "U", uidstr, (char *)NULL);
/*
* Ensure that filename starts anchored. If not, be backward
* compatible and prepend the '%h/'
*/
if (path_absolute(file))
return (file);
i = snprintf(ret, sizeof(ret), "%s/%s", pw->pw_dir, file);
if (i < 0 || (size_t)i >= sizeof(ret))
fatal("expand_authorized_keys: path too long");
free(file);
return (xstrdup(ret));
}
char *
authorized_principals_file(struct passwd *pw)
{
if (options.authorized_principals_file == NULL)
return NULL;
return expand_authorized_keys(options.authorized_principals_file, pw);
}
/* return ok if key exists in sysfile or userfile */
HostStatus
check_key_in_hostfiles(struct passwd *pw, struct sshkey *key, const char *host,
const char *sysfile, const char *userfile)
{
char *user_hostfile;
struct stat st;
HostStatus host_status;
struct hostkeys *hostkeys;
const struct hostkey_entry *found;
hostkeys = init_hostkeys();
load_hostkeys(hostkeys, host, sysfile);
if (userfile != NULL) {
user_hostfile = tilde_expand_filename(userfile, pw->pw_uid);
if (options.strict_modes &&
(stat(user_hostfile, &st) == 0) &&
((st.st_uid != 0 && st.st_uid != pw->pw_uid) ||
(st.st_mode & 022) != 0)) {
logit("Authentication refused for %.100s: "
"bad owner or modes for %.200s",
pw->pw_name, user_hostfile);
auth_debug_add("Ignored %.200s: bad ownership or modes",
user_hostfile);
} else {
temporarily_use_uid(pw);
load_hostkeys(hostkeys, host, user_hostfile);
restore_uid();
}
free(user_hostfile);
}
host_status = check_key_in_hostkeys(hostkeys, key, &found);
if (host_status == HOST_REVOKED)
error("WARNING: revoked key for %s attempted authentication",
host);
else if (host_status == HOST_OK)
debug("%s: key for %s found at %s:%ld", __func__,
found->host, found->file, found->line);
else
debug("%s: key for host %s not found", __func__, host);
free_hostkeys(hostkeys);
return host_status;
}
static FILE *
auth_openfile(const char *file, struct passwd *pw, int strict_modes,
int log_missing, char *file_type)
{
char line[1024];
struct stat st;
int fd;
FILE *f;
if ((fd = open(file, O_RDONLY|O_NONBLOCK)) == -1) {
if (log_missing || errno != ENOENT)
debug("Could not open %s '%s': %s", file_type, file,
strerror(errno));
return NULL;
}
if (fstat(fd, &st) == -1) {
close(fd);
return NULL;
}
if (!S_ISREG(st.st_mode)) {
logit("User %s %s %s is not a regular file",
pw->pw_name, file_type, file);
close(fd);
return NULL;
}
unset_nonblock(fd);
if ((f = fdopen(fd, "r")) == NULL) {
close(fd);
return NULL;
}
if (strict_modes &&
safe_path_fd(fileno(f), file, pw, line, sizeof(line)) != 0) {
fclose(f);
logit("Authentication refused: %s", line);
auth_debug_add("Ignored %s: %s", file_type, line);
return NULL;
}
return f;
}
FILE *
auth_openkeyfile(const char *file, struct passwd *pw, int strict_modes)
{
return auth_openfile(file, pw, strict_modes, 1, "authorized keys");
}
FILE *
auth_openprincipals(const char *file, struct passwd *pw, int strict_modes)
{
return auth_openfile(file, pw, strict_modes, 0,
"authorized principals");
}
struct passwd *
getpwnamallow(struct ssh *ssh, const char *user)
{
#ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP
extern login_cap_t *lc;
#ifdef BSD_AUTH
auth_session_t *as;
#endif
#endif
struct passwd *pw;
struct connection_info *ci;
ci = get_connection_info(ssh, 1, options.use_dns);
ci->user = user;
parse_server_match_config(&options, &includes, ci);
log_change_level(options.log_level);
process_permitopen(ssh, &options);
#if defined(_AIX) && defined(HAVE_SETAUTHDB)
aix_setauthdb(user);
#endif
pw = getpwnam(user);
#if defined(_AIX) && defined(HAVE_SETAUTHDB)
aix_restoreauthdb();
#endif
if (pw == NULL) {
logit("Invalid user %.100s from %.100s port %d",
user, ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), ssh_remote_port(ssh));
#ifdef CUSTOM_FAILED_LOGIN
record_failed_login(ssh, user,
auth_get_canonical_hostname(ssh, options.use_dns), "ssh");
#endif
#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
audit_event(ssh, SSH_INVALID_USER);
#endif /* SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS */
return (NULL);
}
if (!allowed_user(ssh, pw))
return (NULL);
#ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP
if ((lc = login_getclass(pw->pw_class)) == NULL) {
debug("unable to get login class: %s", user);
return (NULL);
}
#ifdef BSD_AUTH
if ((as = auth_open()) == NULL || auth_setpwd(as, pw) != 0 ||
auth_approval(as, lc, pw->pw_name, "ssh") <= 0) {
debug("Approval failure for %s", user);
pw = NULL;
}
if (as != NULL)
auth_close(as);
#endif
#endif
if (pw != NULL)
return (pwcopy(pw));
return (NULL);
}
/* Returns 1 if key is revoked by revoked_keys_file, 0 otherwise */
int
auth_key_is_revoked(struct sshkey *key)
{
char *fp = NULL;
int r;
if (options.revoked_keys_file == NULL)
return 0;
if ((fp = sshkey_fingerprint(key, options.fingerprint_hash,
SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL) {
r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
error("%s: fingerprint key: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
goto out;
}
r = sshkey_check_revoked(key, options.revoked_keys_file);
switch (r) {
case 0:
break; /* not revoked */
case SSH_ERR_KEY_REVOKED:
error("Authentication key %s %s revoked by file %s",
sshkey_type(key), fp, options.revoked_keys_file);
goto out;
default:
error("Error checking authentication key %s %s in "
"revoked keys file %s: %s", sshkey_type(key), fp,
options.revoked_keys_file, ssh_err(r));
goto out;
}
/* Success */
r = 0;
out:
free(fp);
return r == 0 ? 0 : 1;
}
void
auth_debug_add(const char *fmt,...)
{
char buf[1024];
va_list args;
int r;
if (auth_debug == NULL)
return;
va_start(args, fmt);
vsnprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), fmt, args);
va_end(args);
if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(auth_debug, buf)) != 0)
fatal("%s: sshbuf_put_cstring: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
}
void
auth_debug_send(struct ssh *ssh)
{
char *msg;
int r;
if (auth_debug == NULL)
return;
while (sshbuf_len(auth_debug) != 0) {
if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(auth_debug, &msg, NULL)) != 0)
fatal("%s: sshbuf_get_cstring: %s",
__func__, ssh_err(r));
ssh_packet_send_debug(ssh, "%s", msg);
free(msg);
}
}
void
auth_debug_reset(void)
{
if (auth_debug != NULL)
sshbuf_reset(auth_debug);
else if ((auth_debug = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
}
struct passwd *
fakepw(void)
{
static struct passwd fake;
memset(&fake, 0, sizeof(fake));
fake.pw_name = "NOUSER";
fake.pw_passwd =
"$2a$06$r3.juUaHZDlIbQaO2dS9FuYxL1W9M81R1Tc92PoSNmzvpEqLkLGrK";
#ifdef HAVE_STRUCT_PASSWD_PW_GECOS
fake.pw_gecos = "NOUSER";
#endif
fake.pw_uid = privsep_pw == NULL ? (uid_t)-1 : privsep_pw->pw_uid;
fake.pw_gid = privsep_pw == NULL ? (gid_t)-1 : privsep_pw->pw_gid;
#ifdef HAVE_STRUCT_PASSWD_PW_CLASS
fake.pw_class = "";
#endif
fake.pw_dir = "/nonexist";
fake.pw_shell = "/nonexist";
return (&fake);
}
/*
* Returns the remote DNS hostname as a string. The returned string must not
* be freed. NB. this will usually trigger a DNS query the first time it is
* called.
* This function does additional checks on the hostname to mitigate some
* attacks on legacy rhosts-style authentication.
* XXX is RhostsRSAAuthentication vulnerable to these?
* XXX Can we remove these checks? (or if not, remove RhostsRSAAuthentication?)
*/
static char *
remote_hostname(struct ssh *ssh)
{
struct sockaddr_storage from;
socklen_t fromlen;
struct addrinfo hints, *ai, *aitop;
char name[NI_MAXHOST], ntop2[NI_MAXHOST];
const char *ntop = ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh);
/* Get IP address of client. */
fromlen = sizeof(from);
memset(&from, 0, sizeof(from));
if (getpeername(ssh_packet_get_connection_in(ssh),
(struct sockaddr *)&from, &fromlen) == -1) {
debug("getpeername failed: %.100s", strerror(errno));
return xstrdup(ntop);
}
ipv64_normalise_mapped(&from, &fromlen);
if (from.ss_family == AF_INET6)
fromlen = sizeof(struct sockaddr_in6);
debug3("Trying to reverse map address %.100s.", ntop);
/* Map the IP address to a host name. */
if (getnameinfo((struct sockaddr *)&from, fromlen, name, sizeof(name),
NULL, 0, NI_NAMEREQD) != 0) {
/* Host name not found. Use ip address. */
return xstrdup(ntop);
}
/*
* if reverse lookup result looks like a numeric hostname,
* someone is trying to trick us by PTR record like following:
* 1.1.1.10.in-addr.arpa. IN PTR 2.3.4.5
*/
memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints));
hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_DGRAM; /*dummy*/
hints.ai_flags = AI_NUMERICHOST;
if (getaddrinfo(name, NULL, &hints, &ai) == 0) {
logit("Nasty PTR record \"%s\" is set up for %s, ignoring",
name, ntop);
freeaddrinfo(ai);
return xstrdup(ntop);
}
/* Names are stored in lowercase. */
lowercase(name);
/*
* Map it back to an IP address and check that the given
* address actually is an address of this host. This is
* necessary because anyone with access to a name server can
* define arbitrary names for an IP address. Mapping from
* name to IP address can be trusted better (but can still be
* fooled if the intruder has access to the name server of
* the domain).
*/
memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints));
hints.ai_family = from.ss_family;
hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM;
if (getaddrinfo(name, NULL, &hints, &aitop) != 0) {
logit("reverse mapping checking getaddrinfo for %.700s "
"[%s] failed.", name, ntop);
return xstrdup(ntop);
}
/* Look for the address from the list of addresses. */
for (ai = aitop; ai; ai = ai->ai_next) {
if (getnameinfo(ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen, ntop2,
sizeof(ntop2), NULL, 0, NI_NUMERICHOST) == 0 &&
(strcmp(ntop, ntop2) == 0))
break;
}
freeaddrinfo(aitop);
/* If we reached the end of the list, the address was not there. */
if (ai == NULL) {
/* Address not found for the host name. */
logit("Address %.100s maps to %.600s, but this does not "
"map back to the address.", ntop, name);
return xstrdup(ntop);
}
return xstrdup(name);
}
/*
* Return the canonical name of the host in the other side of the current
* connection. The host name is cached, so it is efficient to call this
* several times.
*/
const char *
auth_get_canonical_hostname(struct ssh *ssh, int use_dns)
{
static char *dnsname;
if (!use_dns)
return ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh);
else if (dnsname != NULL)
return dnsname;
else {
dnsname = remote_hostname(ssh);
return dnsname;
}
}
/*
* Runs command in a subprocess with a minimal environment.
* Returns pid on success, 0 on failure.
* The child stdout and stderr maybe captured, left attached or sent to
* /dev/null depending on the contents of flags.
* "tag" is prepended to log messages.
* NB. "command" is only used for logging; the actual command executed is
* av[0].
*/
pid_t
subprocess(const char *tag, struct passwd *pw, const char *command,
int ac, char **av, FILE **child, u_int flags)
{
FILE *f = NULL;
struct stat st;
int fd, devnull, p[2], i;
pid_t pid;
char *cp, errmsg[512];
u_int envsize;
char **child_env;
if (child != NULL)
*child = NULL;
debug3("%s: %s command \"%s\" running as %s (flags 0x%x)", __func__,
tag, command, pw->pw_name, flags);
/* Check consistency */
if ((flags & SSH_SUBPROCESS_STDOUT_DISCARD) != 0 &&
(flags & SSH_SUBPROCESS_STDOUT_CAPTURE) != 0) {
error("%s: inconsistent flags", __func__);
return 0;
}
if (((flags & SSH_SUBPROCESS_STDOUT_CAPTURE) == 0) != (child == NULL)) {
error("%s: inconsistent flags/output", __func__);
return 0;
}
/*
* If executing an explicit binary, then verify the it exists
* and appears safe-ish to execute
*/
if (!path_absolute(av[0])) {
error("%s path is not absolute", tag);
return 0;
}
temporarily_use_uid(pw);
if (stat(av[0], &st) == -1) {
error("Could not stat %s \"%s\": %s", tag,
av[0], strerror(errno));
restore_uid();
return 0;
}
if (safe_path(av[0], &st, NULL, 0, errmsg, sizeof(errmsg)) != 0) {
error("Unsafe %s \"%s\": %s", tag, av[0], errmsg);
restore_uid();
return 0;
}
/* Prepare to keep the child's stdout if requested */
if (pipe(p) == -1) {
error("%s: pipe: %s", tag, strerror(errno));
restore_uid();
return 0;
}
restore_uid();
switch ((pid = fork())) {
case -1: /* error */
error("%s: fork: %s", tag, strerror(errno));
close(p[0]);
close(p[1]);
return 0;
case 0: /* child */
/* Prepare a minimal environment for the child. */
envsize = 5;
child_env = xcalloc(sizeof(*child_env), envsize);
child_set_env(&child_env, &envsize, "PATH", _PATH_STDPATH);
child_set_env(&child_env, &envsize, "USER", pw->pw_name);
child_set_env(&child_env, &envsize, "LOGNAME", pw->pw_name);
child_set_env(&child_env, &envsize, "HOME", pw->pw_dir);
if ((cp = getenv("LANG")) != NULL)
child_set_env(&child_env, &envsize, "LANG", cp);
for (i = 0; i < NSIG; i++)
ssh_signal(i, SIG_DFL);
if ((devnull = open(_PATH_DEVNULL, O_RDWR)) == -1) {
error("%s: open %s: %s", tag, _PATH_DEVNULL,
strerror(errno));
_exit(1);
}
if (dup2(devnull, STDIN_FILENO) == -1) {
error("%s: dup2: %s", tag, strerror(errno));
_exit(1);
}
/* Set up stdout as requested; leave stderr in place for now. */
fd = -1;
if ((flags & SSH_SUBPROCESS_STDOUT_CAPTURE) != 0)
fd = p[1];
else if ((flags & SSH_SUBPROCESS_STDOUT_DISCARD) != 0)
fd = devnull;
if (fd != -1 && dup2(fd, STDOUT_FILENO) == -1) {
error("%s: dup2: %s", tag, strerror(errno));
_exit(1);
}
closefrom(STDERR_FILENO + 1);
/* Don't use permanently_set_uid() here to avoid fatal() */
if (setresgid(pw->pw_gid, pw->pw_gid, pw->pw_gid) == -1) {
error("%s: setresgid %u: %s", tag, (u_int)pw->pw_gid,
strerror(errno));
_exit(1);
}
if (setresuid(pw->pw_uid, pw->pw_uid, pw->pw_uid) == -1) {
error("%s: setresuid %u: %s", tag, (u_int)pw->pw_uid,
strerror(errno));
_exit(1);
}
/* stdin is pointed to /dev/null at this point */
if ((flags & SSH_SUBPROCESS_STDOUT_DISCARD) != 0 &&
dup2(STDIN_FILENO, STDERR_FILENO) == -1) {
error("%s: dup2: %s", tag, strerror(errno));
_exit(1);
}
execve(av[0], av, child_env);
error("%s exec \"%s\": %s", tag, command, strerror(errno));
_exit(127);
default: /* parent */
break;
}
close(p[1]);
if ((flags & SSH_SUBPROCESS_STDOUT_CAPTURE) == 0)
close(p[0]);
else if ((f = fdopen(p[0], "r")) == NULL) {
error("%s: fdopen: %s", tag, strerror(errno));
close(p[0]);
/* Don't leave zombie child */
kill(pid, SIGTERM);
while (waitpid(pid, NULL, 0) == -1 && errno == EINTR)
;
return 0;
}
/* Success */
debug3("%s: %s pid %ld", __func__, tag, (long)pid);
if (child != NULL)
*child = f;
return pid;
}
/* These functions link key/cert options to the auth framework */
/* Log sshauthopt options locally and (optionally) for remote transmission */
void
auth_log_authopts(const char *loc, const struct sshauthopt *opts, int do_remote)
{
int do_env = options.permit_user_env && opts->nenv > 0;
int do_permitopen = opts->npermitopen > 0 &&
(options.allow_tcp_forwarding & FORWARD_LOCAL) != 0;
int do_permitlisten = opts->npermitlisten > 0 &&
(options.allow_tcp_forwarding & FORWARD_REMOTE) != 0;
size_t i;
char msg[1024], buf[64];
snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%d", opts->force_tun_device);
/* Try to keep this alphabetically sorted */
- snprintf(msg, sizeof(msg), "key options:%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s",
+ snprintf(msg, sizeof(msg), "key options:%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s",
opts->permit_agent_forwarding_flag ? " agent-forwarding" : "",
opts->force_command == NULL ? "" : " command",
do_env ? " environment" : "",
opts->valid_before == 0 ? "" : "expires",
+ opts->no_require_user_presence ? " no-touch-required" : "",
do_permitopen ? " permitopen" : "",
do_permitlisten ? " permitlisten" : "",
opts->permit_port_forwarding_flag ? " port-forwarding" : "",
opts->cert_principals == NULL ? "" : " principals",
opts->permit_pty_flag ? " pty" : "",
+ opts->require_verify ? " uv" : "",
opts->force_tun_device == -1 ? "" : " tun=",
opts->force_tun_device == -1 ? "" : buf,
opts->permit_user_rc ? " user-rc" : "",
- opts->permit_x11_forwarding_flag ? " x11-forwarding" : "",
- opts->no_require_user_presence ? " no-touch-required" : "");
+ opts->permit_x11_forwarding_flag ? " x11-forwarding" : "");
debug("%s: %s", loc, msg);
if (do_remote)
auth_debug_add("%s: %s", loc, msg);
if (options.permit_user_env) {
for (i = 0; i < opts->nenv; i++) {
debug("%s: environment: %s", loc, opts->env[i]);
if (do_remote) {
auth_debug_add("%s: environment: %s",
loc, opts->env[i]);
}
}
}
/* Go into a little more details for the local logs. */
if (opts->valid_before != 0) {
format_absolute_time(opts->valid_before, buf, sizeof(buf));
debug("%s: expires at %s", loc, buf);
}
if (opts->cert_principals != NULL) {
debug("%s: authorized principals: \"%s\"",
loc, opts->cert_principals);
}
if (opts->force_command != NULL)
debug("%s: forced command: \"%s\"", loc, opts->force_command);
if (do_permitopen) {
for (i = 0; i < opts->npermitopen; i++) {
debug("%s: permitted open: %s",
loc, opts->permitopen[i]);
}
}
if (do_permitlisten) {
for (i = 0; i < opts->npermitlisten; i++) {
debug("%s: permitted listen: %s",
loc, opts->permitlisten[i]);
}
}
}
/* Activate a new set of key/cert options; merging with what is there. */
int
auth_activate_options(struct ssh *ssh, struct sshauthopt *opts)
{
struct sshauthopt *old = auth_opts;
const char *emsg = NULL;
debug("%s: setting new authentication options", __func__);
if ((auth_opts = sshauthopt_merge(old, opts, &emsg)) == NULL) {
error("Inconsistent authentication options: %s", emsg);
return -1;
}
return 0;
}
/* Disable forwarding, etc for the session */
void
auth_restrict_session(struct ssh *ssh)
{
struct sshauthopt *restricted;
debug("%s: restricting session", __func__);
/* A blank sshauthopt defaults to permitting nothing */
restricted = sshauthopt_new();
restricted->permit_pty_flag = 1;
restricted->restricted = 1;
if (auth_activate_options(ssh, restricted) != 0)
fatal("%s: failed to restrict session", __func__);
sshauthopt_free(restricted);
}
int
auth_authorise_keyopts(struct ssh *ssh, struct passwd *pw,
struct sshauthopt *opts, int allow_cert_authority, const char *loc)
{
const char *remote_ip = ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh);
const char *remote_host = auth_get_canonical_hostname(ssh,
options.use_dns);
time_t now = time(NULL);
char buf[64];
/*
* Check keys/principals file expiry time.
* NB. validity interval in certificate is handled elsewhere.
*/
if (opts->valid_before && now > 0 &&
opts->valid_before < (uint64_t)now) {
format_absolute_time(opts->valid_before, buf, sizeof(buf));
debug("%s: entry expired at %s", loc, buf);
auth_debug_add("%s: entry expired at %s", loc, buf);
return -1;
}
/* Consistency checks */
if (opts->cert_principals != NULL && !opts->cert_authority) {
debug("%s: principals on non-CA key", loc);
auth_debug_add("%s: principals on non-CA key", loc);
/* deny access */
return -1;
}
/* cert-authority flag isn't valid in authorized_principals files */
if (!allow_cert_authority && opts->cert_authority) {
debug("%s: cert-authority flag invalid here", loc);
auth_debug_add("%s: cert-authority flag invalid here", loc);
/* deny access */
return -1;
}
/* Perform from= checks */
if (opts->required_from_host_keys != NULL) {
switch (match_host_and_ip(remote_host, remote_ip,
opts->required_from_host_keys )) {
case 1:
/* Host name matches. */
break;
case -1:
default:
debug("%s: invalid from criteria", loc);
auth_debug_add("%s: invalid from criteria", loc);
/* FALLTHROUGH */
case 0:
logit("%s: Authentication tried for %.100s with "
"correct key but not from a permitted "
"host (host=%.200s, ip=%.200s, required=%.200s).",
loc, pw->pw_name, remote_host, remote_ip,
opts->required_from_host_keys);
auth_debug_add("%s: Your host '%.200s' is not "
"permitted to use this key for login.",
loc, remote_host);
/* deny access */
return -1;
}
}
/* Check source-address restriction from certificate */
if (opts->required_from_host_cert != NULL) {
switch (addr_match_cidr_list(remote_ip,
opts->required_from_host_cert)) {
case 1:
/* accepted */
break;
case -1:
default:
/* invalid */
error("%s: Certificate source-address invalid",
loc);
/* FALLTHROUGH */
case 0:
logit("%s: Authentication tried for %.100s with valid "
"certificate but not from a permitted source "
"address (%.200s).", loc, pw->pw_name, remote_ip);
auth_debug_add("%s: Your address '%.200s' is not "
"permitted to use this certificate for login.",
loc, remote_ip);
return -1;
}
}
/*
*
* XXX this is spammy. We should report remotely only for keys
* that are successful in actual auth attempts, and not PK_OK
* tests.
*/
auth_log_authopts(loc, opts, 1);
return 0;
}
diff --git a/auth2-pubkey.c b/auth2-pubkey.c
index 815ea0f25ebb..c3ecd9afc3aa 100644
--- a/auth2-pubkey.c
+++ b/auth2-pubkey.c
@@ -1,1062 +1,1076 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: auth2-pubkey.c,v 1.99 2020/02/06 22:30:54 naddy Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: auth2-pubkey.c,v 1.100 2020/08/27 01:07:09 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
* OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
* IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
* INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
* NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
* DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
* THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
* (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
* THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
*/
#include "includes.h"
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/stat.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
#ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H
# include <paths.h>
#endif
#include <pwd.h>
#include <signal.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdarg.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <time.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <limits.h>
#include "xmalloc.h"
#include "ssh.h"
#include "ssh2.h"
#include "packet.h"
#include "sshbuf.h"
#include "log.h"
#include "misc.h"
#include "servconf.h"
#include "compat.h"
#include "sshkey.h"
#include "hostfile.h"
#include "auth.h"
#include "pathnames.h"
#include "uidswap.h"
#include "auth-options.h"
#include "canohost.h"
#ifdef GSSAPI
#include "ssh-gss.h"
#endif
#include "monitor_wrap.h"
#include "authfile.h"
#include "match.h"
#include "ssherr.h"
#include "channels.h" /* XXX for session.h */
#include "session.h" /* XXX for child_set_env(); refactor? */
#include "sk-api.h"
/* import */
extern ServerOptions options;
extern u_char *session_id2;
extern u_int session_id2_len;
static char *
format_key(const struct sshkey *key)
{
char *ret, *fp = sshkey_fingerprint(key,
options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_DEFAULT);
xasprintf(&ret, "%s %s", sshkey_type(key), fp);
free(fp);
return ret;
}
static int
userauth_pubkey(struct ssh *ssh)
{
Authctxt *authctxt = ssh->authctxt;
struct passwd *pw = authctxt->pw;
struct sshbuf *b = NULL;
struct sshkey *key = NULL;
char *pkalg = NULL, *userstyle = NULL, *key_s = NULL, *ca_s = NULL;
u_char *pkblob = NULL, *sig = NULL, have_sig;
size_t blen, slen;
int r, pktype;
- int req_presence = 0, authenticated = 0;
+ int req_presence = 0, req_verify = 0, authenticated = 0;
struct sshauthopt *authopts = NULL;
struct sshkey_sig_details *sig_details = NULL;
if ((r = sshpkt_get_u8(ssh, &have_sig)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_get_cstring(ssh, &pkalg, NULL)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_get_string(ssh, &pkblob, &blen)) != 0)
fatal("%s: parse request failed: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
if (log_level_get() >= SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG2) {
char *keystring;
struct sshbuf *pkbuf;
if ((pkbuf = sshbuf_from(pkblob, blen)) == NULL)
fatal("%s: sshbuf_from failed", __func__);
if ((keystring = sshbuf_dtob64_string(pkbuf, 0)) == NULL)
fatal("%s: sshbuf_dtob64 failed", __func__);
debug2("%s: %s user %s %s public key %s %s", __func__,
authctxt->valid ? "valid" : "invalid", authctxt->user,
have_sig ? "attempting" : "querying", pkalg, keystring);
sshbuf_free(pkbuf);
free(keystring);
}
pktype = sshkey_type_from_name(pkalg);
if (pktype == KEY_UNSPEC) {
/* this is perfectly legal */
verbose("%s: unsupported public key algorithm: %s",
__func__, pkalg);
goto done;
}
if ((r = sshkey_from_blob(pkblob, blen, &key)) != 0) {
error("%s: could not parse key: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
goto done;
}
if (key == NULL) {
error("%s: cannot decode key: %s", __func__, pkalg);
goto done;
}
if (key->type != pktype) {
error("%s: type mismatch for decoded key "
"(received %d, expected %d)", __func__, key->type, pktype);
goto done;
}
if (sshkey_type_plain(key->type) == KEY_RSA &&
(ssh->compat & SSH_BUG_RSASIGMD5) != 0) {
logit("Refusing RSA key because client uses unsafe "
"signature scheme");
goto done;
}
if (auth2_key_already_used(authctxt, key)) {
logit("refusing previously-used %s key", sshkey_type(key));
goto done;
}
if (match_pattern_list(pkalg, options.pubkey_key_types, 0) != 1) {
logit("%s: key type %s not in PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes",
__func__, sshkey_ssh_name(key));
goto done;
}
if ((r = sshkey_check_cert_sigtype(key,
options.ca_sign_algorithms)) != 0) {
logit("%s: certificate signature algorithm %s: %s", __func__,
(key->cert == NULL || key->cert->signature_type == NULL) ?
"(null)" : key->cert->signature_type, ssh_err(r));
goto done;
}
key_s = format_key(key);
if (sshkey_is_cert(key))
ca_s = format_key(key->cert->signature_key);
if (have_sig) {
debug3("%s: have %s signature for %s%s%s",
__func__, pkalg, key_s,
ca_s == NULL ? "" : " CA ",
ca_s == NULL ? "" : ca_s);
if ((r = sshpkt_get_string(ssh, &sig, &slen)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0)
fatal("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
if ((b = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
if (ssh->compat & SSH_OLD_SESSIONID) {
if ((r = sshbuf_put(b, session_id2,
session_id2_len)) != 0)
fatal("%s: sshbuf_put session id: %s",
__func__, ssh_err(r));
} else {
if ((r = sshbuf_put_string(b, session_id2,
session_id2_len)) != 0)
fatal("%s: sshbuf_put_string session id: %s",
__func__, ssh_err(r));
}
if (!authctxt->valid || authctxt->user == NULL) {
debug2("%s: disabled because of invalid user",
__func__);
goto done;
}
/* reconstruct packet */
xasprintf(&userstyle, "%s%s%s", authctxt->user,
authctxt->style ? ":" : "",
authctxt->style ? authctxt->style : "");
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(b, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, userstyle)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, authctxt->service)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, "publickey")) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u8(b, have_sig)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, pkalg)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_string(b, pkblob, blen)) != 0)
fatal("%s: build packet failed: %s",
__func__, ssh_err(r));
#ifdef DEBUG_PK
sshbuf_dump(b, stderr);
#endif
/* test for correct signature */
authenticated = 0;
if (PRIVSEP(user_key_allowed(ssh, pw, key, 1, &authopts)) &&
PRIVSEP(sshkey_verify(key, sig, slen,
sshbuf_ptr(b), sshbuf_len(b),
(ssh->compat & SSH_BUG_SIGTYPE) == 0 ? pkalg : NULL,
ssh->compat, &sig_details)) == 0) {
authenticated = 1;
}
if (authenticated == 1 && sig_details != NULL) {
auth2_record_info(authctxt, "signature count = %u",
sig_details->sk_counter);
debug("%s: sk_counter = %u, sk_flags = 0x%02x",
__func__, sig_details->sk_counter,
sig_details->sk_flags);
req_presence = (options.pubkey_auth_options &
PUBKEYAUTH_TOUCH_REQUIRED) ||
!authopts->no_require_user_presence;
if (req_presence && (sig_details->sk_flags &
SSH_SK_USER_PRESENCE_REQD) == 0) {
error("public key %s signature for %s%s from "
"%.128s port %d rejected: user presence "
"(authenticator touch) requirement "
"not met ", key_s,
authctxt->valid ? "" : "invalid user ",
authctxt->user, ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh),
ssh_remote_port(ssh));
authenticated = 0;
goto done;
}
+ req_verify = (options.pubkey_auth_options &
+ PUBKEYAUTH_VERIFY_REQUIRED) ||
+ authopts->require_verify;
+ if (req_verify && (sig_details->sk_flags &
+ SSH_SK_USER_VERIFICATION_REQD) == 0) {
+ error("public key %s signature for %s%s from "
+ "%.128s port %d rejected: user "
+ "verification requirement not met ", key_s,
+ authctxt->valid ? "" : "invalid user ",
+ authctxt->user, ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh),
+ ssh_remote_port(ssh));
+ authenticated = 0;
+ goto done;
+ }
}
auth2_record_key(authctxt, authenticated, key);
} else {
debug("%s: test pkalg %s pkblob %s%s%s",
__func__, pkalg, key_s,
ca_s == NULL ? "" : " CA ",
ca_s == NULL ? "" : ca_s);
if ((r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0)
fatal("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
if (!authctxt->valid || authctxt->user == NULL) {
debug2("%s: disabled because of invalid user",
__func__);
goto done;
}
/* XXX fake reply and always send PK_OK ? */
/*
* XXX this allows testing whether a user is allowed
* to login: if you happen to have a valid pubkey this
* message is sent. the message is NEVER sent at all
* if a user is not allowed to login. is this an
* issue? -markus
*/
if (PRIVSEP(user_key_allowed(ssh, pw, key, 0, NULL))) {
if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_PK_OK))
!= 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, pkalg)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_string(ssh, pkblob, blen)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0 ||
(r = ssh_packet_write_wait(ssh)) != 0)
fatal("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
authctxt->postponed = 1;
}
}
done:
if (authenticated == 1 && auth_activate_options(ssh, authopts) != 0) {
debug("%s: key options inconsistent with existing", __func__);
authenticated = 0;
}
debug2("%s: authenticated %d pkalg %s", __func__, authenticated, pkalg);
sshbuf_free(b);
sshauthopt_free(authopts);
sshkey_free(key);
free(userstyle);
free(pkalg);
free(pkblob);
free(key_s);
free(ca_s);
free(sig);
sshkey_sig_details_free(sig_details);
return authenticated;
}
static int
match_principals_option(const char *principal_list, struct sshkey_cert *cert)
{
char *result;
u_int i;
/* XXX percent_expand() sequences for authorized_principals? */
for (i = 0; i < cert->nprincipals; i++) {
if ((result = match_list(cert->principals[i],
principal_list, NULL)) != NULL) {
debug3("matched principal from key options \"%.100s\"",
result);
free(result);
return 1;
}
}
return 0;
}
/*
* Process a single authorized_principals format line. Returns 0 and sets
* authoptsp is principal is authorised, -1 otherwise. "loc" is used as a
* log preamble for file/line information.
*/
static int
check_principals_line(struct ssh *ssh, char *cp, const struct sshkey_cert *cert,
const char *loc, struct sshauthopt **authoptsp)
{
u_int i, found = 0;
char *ep, *line_opts;
const char *reason = NULL;
struct sshauthopt *opts = NULL;
if (authoptsp != NULL)
*authoptsp = NULL;
/* Trim trailing whitespace. */
ep = cp + strlen(cp) - 1;
while (ep > cp && (*ep == '\n' || *ep == ' ' || *ep == '\t'))
*ep-- = '\0';
/*
* If the line has internal whitespace then assume it has
* key options.
*/
line_opts = NULL;
if ((ep = strrchr(cp, ' ')) != NULL ||
(ep = strrchr(cp, '\t')) != NULL) {
for (; *ep == ' ' || *ep == '\t'; ep++)
;
line_opts = cp;
cp = ep;
}
if ((opts = sshauthopt_parse(line_opts, &reason)) == NULL) {
debug("%s: bad principals options: %s", loc, reason);
auth_debug_add("%s: bad principals options: %s", loc, reason);
return -1;
}
/* Check principals in cert against those on line */
for (i = 0; i < cert->nprincipals; i++) {
if (strcmp(cp, cert->principals[i]) != 0)
continue;
debug3("%s: matched principal \"%.100s\"",
loc, cert->principals[i]);
found = 1;
}
if (found && authoptsp != NULL) {
*authoptsp = opts;
opts = NULL;
}
sshauthopt_free(opts);
return found ? 0 : -1;
}
static int
process_principals(struct ssh *ssh, FILE *f, const char *file,
const struct sshkey_cert *cert, struct sshauthopt **authoptsp)
{
char loc[256], *line = NULL, *cp, *ep;
size_t linesize = 0;
u_long linenum = 0;
u_int found_principal = 0;
if (authoptsp != NULL)
*authoptsp = NULL;
while (getline(&line, &linesize, f) != -1) {
linenum++;
/* Always consume entire input */
if (found_principal)
continue;
/* Skip leading whitespace. */
for (cp = line; *cp == ' ' || *cp == '\t'; cp++)
;
/* Skip blank and comment lines. */
if ((ep = strchr(cp, '#')) != NULL)
*ep = '\0';
if (!*cp || *cp == '\n')
continue;
snprintf(loc, sizeof(loc), "%.200s:%lu", file, linenum);
if (check_principals_line(ssh, cp, cert, loc, authoptsp) == 0)
found_principal = 1;
}
free(line);
return found_principal;
}
/* XXX remove pw args here and elsewhere once ssh->authctxt is guaranteed */
static int
match_principals_file(struct ssh *ssh, struct passwd *pw, char *file,
struct sshkey_cert *cert, struct sshauthopt **authoptsp)
{
FILE *f;
int success;
if (authoptsp != NULL)
*authoptsp = NULL;
temporarily_use_uid(pw);
debug("trying authorized principals file %s", file);
if ((f = auth_openprincipals(file, pw, options.strict_modes)) == NULL) {
restore_uid();
return 0;
}
success = process_principals(ssh, f, file, cert, authoptsp);
fclose(f);
restore_uid();
return success;
}
/*
* Checks whether principal is allowed in output of command.
* returns 1 if the principal is allowed or 0 otherwise.
*/
static int
match_principals_command(struct ssh *ssh, struct passwd *user_pw,
const struct sshkey *key, struct sshauthopt **authoptsp)
{
struct passwd *runas_pw = NULL;
const struct sshkey_cert *cert = key->cert;
FILE *f = NULL;
int r, ok, found_principal = 0;
int i, ac = 0, uid_swapped = 0;
pid_t pid;
char *tmp, *username = NULL, *command = NULL, **av = NULL;
char *ca_fp = NULL, *key_fp = NULL, *catext = NULL, *keytext = NULL;
char serial_s[32], uidstr[32];
void (*osigchld)(int);
if (authoptsp != NULL)
*authoptsp = NULL;
if (options.authorized_principals_command == NULL)
return 0;
if (options.authorized_principals_command_user == NULL) {
error("No user for AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand specified, "
"skipping");
return 0;
}
/*
* NB. all returns later this function should go via "out" to
* ensure the original SIGCHLD handler is restored properly.
*/
osigchld = ssh_signal(SIGCHLD, SIG_DFL);
/* Prepare and verify the user for the command */
username = percent_expand(options.authorized_principals_command_user,
"u", user_pw->pw_name, (char *)NULL);
runas_pw = getpwnam(username);
if (runas_pw == NULL) {
error("AuthorizedPrincipalsCommandUser \"%s\" not found: %s",
username, strerror(errno));
goto out;
}
/* Turn the command into an argument vector */
if (argv_split(options.authorized_principals_command, &ac, &av) != 0) {
error("AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand \"%s\" contains "
"invalid quotes", options.authorized_principals_command);
goto out;
}
if (ac == 0) {
error("AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand \"%s\" yielded no arguments",
options.authorized_principals_command);
goto out;
}
if ((ca_fp = sshkey_fingerprint(cert->signature_key,
options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL) {
error("%s: sshkey_fingerprint failed", __func__);
goto out;
}
if ((key_fp = sshkey_fingerprint(key,
options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL) {
error("%s: sshkey_fingerprint failed", __func__);
goto out;
}
if ((r = sshkey_to_base64(cert->signature_key, &catext)) != 0) {
error("%s: sshkey_to_base64 failed: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
goto out;
}
if ((r = sshkey_to_base64(key, &keytext)) != 0) {
error("%s: sshkey_to_base64 failed: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
goto out;
}
snprintf(serial_s, sizeof(serial_s), "%llu",
(unsigned long long)cert->serial);
snprintf(uidstr, sizeof(uidstr), "%llu",
(unsigned long long)user_pw->pw_uid);
for (i = 1; i < ac; i++) {
tmp = percent_expand(av[i],
"U", uidstr,
"u", user_pw->pw_name,
"h", user_pw->pw_dir,
"t", sshkey_ssh_name(key),
"T", sshkey_ssh_name(cert->signature_key),
"f", key_fp,
"F", ca_fp,
"k", keytext,
"K", catext,
"i", cert->key_id,
"s", serial_s,
(char *)NULL);
if (tmp == NULL)
fatal("%s: percent_expand failed", __func__);
free(av[i]);
av[i] = tmp;
}
/* Prepare a printable command for logs, etc. */
command = argv_assemble(ac, av);
if ((pid = subprocess("AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand", runas_pw, command,
ac, av, &f,
SSH_SUBPROCESS_STDOUT_CAPTURE|SSH_SUBPROCESS_STDERR_DISCARD)) == 0)
goto out;
uid_swapped = 1;
temporarily_use_uid(runas_pw);
ok = process_principals(ssh, f, "(command)", cert, authoptsp);
fclose(f);
f = NULL;
if (exited_cleanly(pid, "AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand", command, 0) != 0)
goto out;
/* Read completed successfully */
found_principal = ok;
out:
if (f != NULL)
fclose(f);
ssh_signal(SIGCHLD, osigchld);
for (i = 0; i < ac; i++)
free(av[i]);
free(av);
if (uid_swapped)
restore_uid();
free(command);
free(username);
free(ca_fp);
free(key_fp);
free(catext);
free(keytext);
return found_principal;
}
/*
* Check a single line of an authorized_keys-format file. Returns 0 if key
* matches, -1 otherwise. Will return key/cert options via *authoptsp
* on success. "loc" is used as file/line location in log messages.
*/
static int
check_authkey_line(struct ssh *ssh, struct passwd *pw, struct sshkey *key,
char *cp, const char *loc, struct sshauthopt **authoptsp)
{
int want_keytype = sshkey_is_cert(key) ? KEY_UNSPEC : key->type;
struct sshkey *found = NULL;
struct sshauthopt *keyopts = NULL, *certopts = NULL, *finalopts = NULL;
char *key_options = NULL, *fp = NULL;
const char *reason = NULL;
int ret = -1;
if (authoptsp != NULL)
*authoptsp = NULL;
if ((found = sshkey_new(want_keytype)) == NULL) {
debug3("%s: keytype %d failed", __func__, want_keytype);
goto out;
}
/* XXX djm: peek at key type in line and skip if unwanted */
if (sshkey_read(found, &cp) != 0) {
/* no key? check for options */
debug2("%s: check options: '%s'", loc, cp);
key_options = cp;
if (sshkey_advance_past_options(&cp) != 0) {
reason = "invalid key option string";
goto fail_reason;
}
skip_space(&cp);
if (sshkey_read(found, &cp) != 0) {
/* still no key? advance to next line*/
debug2("%s: advance: '%s'", loc, cp);
goto out;
}
}
/* Parse key options now; we need to know if this is a CA key */
if ((keyopts = sshauthopt_parse(key_options, &reason)) == NULL) {
debug("%s: bad key options: %s", loc, reason);
auth_debug_add("%s: bad key options: %s", loc, reason);
goto out;
}
/* Ignore keys that don't match or incorrectly marked as CAs */
if (sshkey_is_cert(key)) {
/* Certificate; check signature key against CA */
if (!sshkey_equal(found, key->cert->signature_key) ||
!keyopts->cert_authority)
goto out;
} else {
/* Plain key: check it against key found in file */
if (!sshkey_equal(found, key) || keyopts->cert_authority)
goto out;
}
/* We have a candidate key, perform authorisation checks */
if ((fp = sshkey_fingerprint(found,
options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL)
fatal("%s: fingerprint failed", __func__);
debug("%s: matching %s found: %s %s", loc,
sshkey_is_cert(key) ? "CA" : "key", sshkey_type(found), fp);
if (auth_authorise_keyopts(ssh, pw, keyopts,
sshkey_is_cert(key), loc) != 0) {
reason = "Refused by key options";
goto fail_reason;
}
/* That's all we need for plain keys. */
if (!sshkey_is_cert(key)) {
verbose("Accepted key %s %s found at %s",
sshkey_type(found), fp, loc);
finalopts = keyopts;
keyopts = NULL;
goto success;
}
/*
* Additional authorisation for certificates.
*/
/* Parse and check options present in certificate */
if ((certopts = sshauthopt_from_cert(key)) == NULL) {
reason = "Invalid certificate options";
goto fail_reason;
}
if (auth_authorise_keyopts(ssh, pw, certopts, 0, loc) != 0) {
reason = "Refused by certificate options";
goto fail_reason;
}
if ((finalopts = sshauthopt_merge(keyopts, certopts, &reason)) == NULL)
goto fail_reason;
/*
* If the user has specified a list of principals as
* a key option, then prefer that list to matching
* their username in the certificate principals list.
*/
if (keyopts->cert_principals != NULL &&
!match_principals_option(keyopts->cert_principals, key->cert)) {
reason = "Certificate does not contain an authorized principal";
goto fail_reason;
}
if (sshkey_cert_check_authority(key, 0, 0,
keyopts->cert_principals == NULL ? pw->pw_name : NULL, &reason) != 0)
goto fail_reason;
verbose("Accepted certificate ID \"%s\" (serial %llu) "
"signed by CA %s %s found at %s",
key->cert->key_id,
(unsigned long long)key->cert->serial,
sshkey_type(found), fp, loc);
success:
if (finalopts == NULL)
fatal("%s: internal error: missing options", __func__);
if (authoptsp != NULL) {
*authoptsp = finalopts;
finalopts = NULL;
}
/* success */
ret = 0;
goto out;
fail_reason:
error("%s", reason);
auth_debug_add("%s", reason);
out:
free(fp);
sshauthopt_free(keyopts);
sshauthopt_free(certopts);
sshauthopt_free(finalopts);
sshkey_free(found);
return ret;
}
/*
* Checks whether key is allowed in authorized_keys-format file,
* returns 1 if the key is allowed or 0 otherwise.
*/
static int
check_authkeys_file(struct ssh *ssh, struct passwd *pw, FILE *f,
char *file, struct sshkey *key, struct sshauthopt **authoptsp)
{
char *cp, *line = NULL, loc[256];
size_t linesize = 0;
int found_key = 0;
u_long linenum = 0;
if (authoptsp != NULL)
*authoptsp = NULL;
while (getline(&line, &linesize, f) != -1) {
linenum++;
/* Always consume entire file */
if (found_key)
continue;
/* Skip leading whitespace, empty and comment lines. */
cp = line;
skip_space(&cp);
if (!*cp || *cp == '\n' || *cp == '#')
continue;
snprintf(loc, sizeof(loc), "%.200s:%lu", file, linenum);
if (check_authkey_line(ssh, pw, key, cp, loc, authoptsp) == 0)
found_key = 1;
}
free(line);
return found_key;
}
/* Authenticate a certificate key against TrustedUserCAKeys */
static int
user_cert_trusted_ca(struct ssh *ssh, struct passwd *pw, struct sshkey *key,
struct sshauthopt **authoptsp)
{
char *ca_fp, *principals_file = NULL;
const char *reason;
struct sshauthopt *principals_opts = NULL, *cert_opts = NULL;
struct sshauthopt *final_opts = NULL;
int r, ret = 0, found_principal = 0, use_authorized_principals;
if (authoptsp != NULL)
*authoptsp = NULL;
if (!sshkey_is_cert(key) || options.trusted_user_ca_keys == NULL)
return 0;
if ((ca_fp = sshkey_fingerprint(key->cert->signature_key,
options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL)
return 0;
if ((r = sshkey_in_file(key->cert->signature_key,
options.trusted_user_ca_keys, 1, 0)) != 0) {
debug2("%s: CA %s %s is not listed in %s: %s", __func__,
sshkey_type(key->cert->signature_key), ca_fp,
options.trusted_user_ca_keys, ssh_err(r));
goto out;
}
/*
* If AuthorizedPrincipals is in use, then compare the certificate
* principals against the names in that file rather than matching
* against the username.
*/
if ((principals_file = authorized_principals_file(pw)) != NULL) {
if (match_principals_file(ssh, pw, principals_file,
key->cert, &principals_opts))
found_principal = 1;
}
/* Try querying command if specified */
if (!found_principal && match_principals_command(ssh, pw, key,
&principals_opts))
found_principal = 1;
/* If principals file or command is specified, then require a match */
use_authorized_principals = principals_file != NULL ||
options.authorized_principals_command != NULL;
if (!found_principal && use_authorized_principals) {
reason = "Certificate does not contain an authorized principal";
goto fail_reason;
}
if (use_authorized_principals && principals_opts == NULL)
fatal("%s: internal error: missing principals_opts", __func__);
if (sshkey_cert_check_authority(key, 0, 1,
use_authorized_principals ? NULL : pw->pw_name, &reason) != 0)
goto fail_reason;
/* Check authority from options in key and from principals file/cmd */
if ((cert_opts = sshauthopt_from_cert(key)) == NULL) {
reason = "Invalid certificate options";
goto fail_reason;
}
if (auth_authorise_keyopts(ssh, pw, cert_opts, 0, "cert") != 0) {
reason = "Refused by certificate options";
goto fail_reason;
}
if (principals_opts == NULL) {
final_opts = cert_opts;
cert_opts = NULL;
} else {
if (auth_authorise_keyopts(ssh, pw, principals_opts, 0,
"principals") != 0) {
reason = "Refused by certificate principals options";
goto fail_reason;
}
if ((final_opts = sshauthopt_merge(principals_opts,
cert_opts, &reason)) == NULL) {
fail_reason:
error("%s", reason);
auth_debug_add("%s", reason);
goto out;
}
}
/* Success */
verbose("Accepted certificate ID \"%s\" (serial %llu) signed by "
"%s CA %s via %s", key->cert->key_id,
(unsigned long long)key->cert->serial,
sshkey_type(key->cert->signature_key), ca_fp,
options.trusted_user_ca_keys);
if (authoptsp != NULL) {
*authoptsp = final_opts;
final_opts = NULL;
}
ret = 1;
out:
sshauthopt_free(principals_opts);
sshauthopt_free(cert_opts);
sshauthopt_free(final_opts);
free(principals_file);
free(ca_fp);
return ret;
}
/*
* Checks whether key is allowed in file.
* returns 1 if the key is allowed or 0 otherwise.
*/
static int
user_key_allowed2(struct ssh *ssh, struct passwd *pw, struct sshkey *key,
char *file, struct sshauthopt **authoptsp)
{
FILE *f;
int found_key = 0;
if (authoptsp != NULL)
*authoptsp = NULL;
/* Temporarily use the user's uid. */
temporarily_use_uid(pw);
debug("trying public key file %s", file);
if ((f = auth_openkeyfile(file, pw, options.strict_modes)) != NULL) {
found_key = check_authkeys_file(ssh, pw, f, file,
key, authoptsp);
fclose(f);
}
restore_uid();
return found_key;
}
/*
* Checks whether key is allowed in output of command.
* returns 1 if the key is allowed or 0 otherwise.
*/
static int
user_key_command_allowed2(struct ssh *ssh, struct passwd *user_pw,
struct sshkey *key, struct sshauthopt **authoptsp)
{
struct passwd *runas_pw = NULL;
FILE *f = NULL;
int r, ok, found_key = 0;
int i, uid_swapped = 0, ac = 0;
pid_t pid;
char *username = NULL, *key_fp = NULL, *keytext = NULL;
char uidstr[32], *tmp, *command = NULL, **av = NULL;
void (*osigchld)(int);
if (authoptsp != NULL)
*authoptsp = NULL;
if (options.authorized_keys_command == NULL)
return 0;
if (options.authorized_keys_command_user == NULL) {
error("No user for AuthorizedKeysCommand specified, skipping");
return 0;
}
/*
* NB. all returns later this function should go via "out" to
* ensure the original SIGCHLD handler is restored properly.
*/
osigchld = ssh_signal(SIGCHLD, SIG_DFL);
/* Prepare and verify the user for the command */
username = percent_expand(options.authorized_keys_command_user,
"u", user_pw->pw_name, (char *)NULL);
runas_pw = getpwnam(username);
if (runas_pw == NULL) {
error("AuthorizedKeysCommandUser \"%s\" not found: %s",
username, strerror(errno));
goto out;
}
/* Prepare AuthorizedKeysCommand */
if ((key_fp = sshkey_fingerprint(key, options.fingerprint_hash,
SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL) {
error("%s: sshkey_fingerprint failed", __func__);
goto out;
}
if ((r = sshkey_to_base64(key, &keytext)) != 0) {
error("%s: sshkey_to_base64 failed: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
goto out;
}
/* Turn the command into an argument vector */
if (argv_split(options.authorized_keys_command, &ac, &av) != 0) {
error("AuthorizedKeysCommand \"%s\" contains invalid quotes",
command);
goto out;
}
if (ac == 0) {
error("AuthorizedKeysCommand \"%s\" yielded no arguments",
command);
goto out;
}
snprintf(uidstr, sizeof(uidstr), "%llu",
(unsigned long long)user_pw->pw_uid);
for (i = 1; i < ac; i++) {
tmp = percent_expand(av[i],
"U", uidstr,
"u", user_pw->pw_name,
"h", user_pw->pw_dir,
"t", sshkey_ssh_name(key),
"f", key_fp,
"k", keytext,
(char *)NULL);
if (tmp == NULL)
fatal("%s: percent_expand failed", __func__);
free(av[i]);
av[i] = tmp;
}
/* Prepare a printable command for logs, etc. */
command = argv_assemble(ac, av);
/*
* If AuthorizedKeysCommand was run without arguments
* then fall back to the old behaviour of passing the
* target username as a single argument.
*/
if (ac == 1) {
av = xreallocarray(av, ac + 2, sizeof(*av));
av[1] = xstrdup(user_pw->pw_name);
av[2] = NULL;
/* Fix up command too, since it is used in log messages */
free(command);
xasprintf(&command, "%s %s", av[0], av[1]);
}
if ((pid = subprocess("AuthorizedKeysCommand", runas_pw, command,
ac, av, &f,
SSH_SUBPROCESS_STDOUT_CAPTURE|SSH_SUBPROCESS_STDERR_DISCARD)) == 0)
goto out;
uid_swapped = 1;
temporarily_use_uid(runas_pw);
ok = check_authkeys_file(ssh, user_pw, f,
options.authorized_keys_command, key, authoptsp);
fclose(f);
f = NULL;
if (exited_cleanly(pid, "AuthorizedKeysCommand", command, 0) != 0)
goto out;
/* Read completed successfully */
found_key = ok;
out:
if (f != NULL)
fclose(f);
ssh_signal(SIGCHLD, osigchld);
for (i = 0; i < ac; i++)
free(av[i]);
free(av);
if (uid_swapped)
restore_uid();
free(command);
free(username);
free(key_fp);
free(keytext);
return found_key;
}
/*
* Check whether key authenticates and authorises the user.
*/
int
user_key_allowed(struct ssh *ssh, struct passwd *pw, struct sshkey *key,
int auth_attempt, struct sshauthopt **authoptsp)
{
u_int success = 0, i;
char *file;
struct sshauthopt *opts = NULL;
if (authoptsp != NULL)
*authoptsp = NULL;
if (auth_key_is_revoked(key))
return 0;
if (sshkey_is_cert(key) &&
auth_key_is_revoked(key->cert->signature_key))
return 0;
for (i = 0; !success && i < options.num_authkeys_files; i++) {
if (strcasecmp(options.authorized_keys_files[i], "none") == 0)
continue;
file = expand_authorized_keys(
options.authorized_keys_files[i], pw);
success = user_key_allowed2(ssh, pw, key, file, &opts);
free(file);
if (!success) {
sshauthopt_free(opts);
opts = NULL;
}
}
if (success)
goto out;
if ((success = user_cert_trusted_ca(ssh, pw, key, &opts)) != 0)
goto out;
sshauthopt_free(opts);
opts = NULL;
if ((success = user_key_command_allowed2(ssh, pw, key, &opts)) != 0)
goto out;
sshauthopt_free(opts);
opts = NULL;
out:
if (success && authoptsp != NULL) {
*authoptsp = opts;
opts = NULL;
}
sshauthopt_free(opts);
return success;
}
Authmethod method_pubkey = {
"publickey",
userauth_pubkey,
&options.pubkey_authentication
};
diff --git a/auth2.c b/auth2.c
index 91aaf34a642d..242a7adbefe5 100644
--- a/auth2.c
+++ b/auth2.c
@@ -1,819 +1,819 @@
/* $OpenBSD: auth2.c,v 1.158 2020/03/06 18:16:21 markus Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
* OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
* IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
* INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
* NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
* DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
* THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
* (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
* THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
*/
#include "includes.h"
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/stat.h>
#include <sys/uio.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <limits.h>
#include <pwd.h>
#include <stdarg.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <time.h>
#include "stdlib.h"
#include "atomicio.h"
#include "xmalloc.h"
#include "ssh2.h"
#include "packet.h"
#include "log.h"
#include "sshbuf.h"
#include "misc.h"
#include "servconf.h"
#include "compat.h"
#include "sshkey.h"
#include "hostfile.h"
#include "auth.h"
#include "dispatch.h"
#include "pathnames.h"
#include "ssherr.h"
#ifdef GSSAPI
#include "ssh-gss.h"
#endif
#include "monitor_wrap.h"
#include "digest.h"
/* import */
extern ServerOptions options;
extern u_char *session_id2;
extern u_int session_id2_len;
extern struct sshbuf *loginmsg;
/* methods */
extern Authmethod method_none;
extern Authmethod method_pubkey;
extern Authmethod method_passwd;
extern Authmethod method_kbdint;
extern Authmethod method_hostbased;
#ifdef GSSAPI
extern Authmethod method_gssapi;
#endif
Authmethod *authmethods[] = {
&method_none,
&method_pubkey,
#ifdef GSSAPI
&method_gssapi,
#endif
&method_passwd,
&method_kbdint,
&method_hostbased,
NULL
};
/* protocol */
static int input_service_request(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *);
static int input_userauth_request(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *);
/* helper */
static Authmethod *authmethod_lookup(Authctxt *, const char *);
static char *authmethods_get(Authctxt *authctxt);
#define MATCH_NONE 0 /* method or submethod mismatch */
#define MATCH_METHOD 1 /* method matches (no submethod specified) */
#define MATCH_BOTH 2 /* method and submethod match */
#define MATCH_PARTIAL 3 /* method matches, submethod can't be checked */
static int list_starts_with(const char *, const char *, const char *);
char *
auth2_read_banner(void)
{
struct stat st;
char *banner = NULL;
size_t len, n;
int fd;
if ((fd = open(options.banner, O_RDONLY)) == -1)
return (NULL);
if (fstat(fd, &st) == -1) {
close(fd);
return (NULL);
}
if (st.st_size <= 0 || st.st_size > 1*1024*1024) {
close(fd);
return (NULL);
}
len = (size_t)st.st_size; /* truncate */
banner = xmalloc(len + 1);
n = atomicio(read, fd, banner, len);
close(fd);
if (n != len) {
free(banner);
return (NULL);
}
banner[n] = '\0';
return (banner);
}
static void
userauth_send_banner(struct ssh *ssh, const char *msg)
{
int r;
if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_BANNER)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, msg)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, "")) != 0 || /* language, unused */
(r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0)
fatal("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
debug("%s: sent", __func__);
}
static void
userauth_banner(struct ssh *ssh)
{
char *banner = NULL;
if (options.banner == NULL)
return;
if ((banner = PRIVSEP(auth2_read_banner())) == NULL)
goto done;
userauth_send_banner(ssh, banner);
done:
free(banner);
}
/*
* loop until authctxt->success == TRUE
*/
void
do_authentication2(struct ssh *ssh)
{
Authctxt *authctxt = ssh->authctxt;
ssh_dispatch_init(ssh, &dispatch_protocol_error);
ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_SERVICE_REQUEST, &input_service_request);
ssh_dispatch_run_fatal(ssh, DISPATCH_BLOCK, &authctxt->success);
ssh->authctxt = NULL;
}
/*ARGSUSED*/
static int
input_service_request(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh)
{
Authctxt *authctxt = ssh->authctxt;
char *service = NULL;
int r, acceptit = 0;
if ((r = sshpkt_get_cstring(ssh, &service, NULL)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0)
goto out;
if (authctxt == NULL)
fatal("input_service_request: no authctxt");
if (strcmp(service, "ssh-userauth") == 0) {
if (!authctxt->success) {
acceptit = 1;
/* now we can handle user-auth requests */
ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST,
&input_userauth_request);
}
}
/* XXX all other service requests are denied */
if (acceptit) {
if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_SERVICE_ACCEPT)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, service)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0 ||
(r = ssh_packet_write_wait(ssh)) != 0)
goto out;
} else {
debug("bad service request %s", service);
ssh_packet_disconnect(ssh, "bad service request %s", service);
}
r = 0;
out:
free(service);
return r;
}
#define MIN_FAIL_DELAY_SECONDS 0.005
static double
user_specific_delay(const char *user)
{
char b[512];
size_t len = ssh_digest_bytes(SSH_DIGEST_SHA512);
u_char *hash = xmalloc(len);
double delay;
(void)snprintf(b, sizeof b, "%llu%s",
(unsigned long long)options.timing_secret, user);
if (ssh_digest_memory(SSH_DIGEST_SHA512, b, strlen(b), hash, len) != 0)
fatal("%s: ssh_digest_memory", __func__);
/* 0-4.2 ms of delay */
delay = (double)PEEK_U32(hash) / 1000 / 1000 / 1000 / 1000;
freezero(hash, len);
debug3("%s: user specific delay %0.3lfms", __func__, delay/1000);
return MIN_FAIL_DELAY_SECONDS + delay;
}
static void
ensure_minimum_time_since(double start, double seconds)
{
struct timespec ts;
double elapsed = monotime_double() - start, req = seconds, remain;
/* if we've already passed the requested time, scale up */
while ((remain = seconds - elapsed) < 0.0)
seconds *= 2;
ts.tv_sec = remain;
ts.tv_nsec = (remain - ts.tv_sec) * 1000000000;
debug3("%s: elapsed %0.3lfms, delaying %0.3lfms (requested %0.3lfms)",
__func__, elapsed*1000, remain*1000, req*1000);
nanosleep(&ts, NULL);
}
/*ARGSUSED*/
static int
input_userauth_request(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh)
{
Authctxt *authctxt = ssh->authctxt;
Authmethod *m = NULL;
char *user = NULL, *service = NULL, *method = NULL, *style = NULL;
int r, authenticated = 0;
double tstart = monotime_double();
if (authctxt == NULL)
fatal("input_userauth_request: no authctxt");
if ((r = sshpkt_get_cstring(ssh, &user, NULL)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_get_cstring(ssh, &service, NULL)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_get_cstring(ssh, &method, NULL)) != 0)
goto out;
debug("userauth-request for user %s service %s method %s", user, service, method);
debug("attempt %d failures %d", authctxt->attempt, authctxt->failures);
if ((style = strchr(user, ':')) != NULL)
*style++ = 0;
if (authctxt->attempt++ == 0) {
/* setup auth context */
authctxt->pw = PRIVSEP(getpwnamallow(ssh, user));
authctxt->user = xstrdup(user);
if (authctxt->pw && strcmp(service, "ssh-connection")==0) {
authctxt->valid = 1;
debug2("%s: setting up authctxt for %s",
__func__, user);
} else {
/* Invalid user, fake password information */
authctxt->pw = fakepw();
#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
PRIVSEP(audit_event(ssh, SSH_INVALID_USER));
#endif
}
#ifdef USE_PAM
if (options.use_pam)
PRIVSEP(start_pam(ssh));
#endif
ssh_packet_set_log_preamble(ssh, "%suser %s",
authctxt->valid ? "authenticating " : "invalid ", user);
setproctitle("%s%s", authctxt->valid ? user : "unknown",
use_privsep ? " [net]" : "");
authctxt->service = xstrdup(service);
authctxt->style = style ? xstrdup(style) : NULL;
if (use_privsep)
mm_inform_authserv(service, style);
userauth_banner(ssh);
if (auth2_setup_methods_lists(authctxt) != 0)
ssh_packet_disconnect(ssh,
"no authentication methods enabled");
} else if (strcmp(user, authctxt->user) != 0 ||
strcmp(service, authctxt->service) != 0) {
ssh_packet_disconnect(ssh, "Change of username or service "
"not allowed: (%s,%s) -> (%s,%s)",
authctxt->user, authctxt->service, user, service);
}
/* reset state */
auth2_challenge_stop(ssh);
#ifdef GSSAPI
/* XXX move to auth2_gssapi_stop() */
ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_TOKEN, NULL);
ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_EXCHANGE_COMPLETE, NULL);
#endif
auth2_authctxt_reset_info(authctxt);
authctxt->postponed = 0;
authctxt->server_caused_failure = 0;
/* try to authenticate user */
m = authmethod_lookup(authctxt, method);
if (m != NULL && authctxt->failures < options.max_authtries) {
debug2("input_userauth_request: try method %s", method);
authenticated = m->userauth(ssh);
}
if (!authctxt->authenticated)
ensure_minimum_time_since(tstart,
user_specific_delay(authctxt->user));
userauth_finish(ssh, authenticated, method, NULL);
r = 0;
out:
free(service);
free(user);
free(method);
return r;
}
void
userauth_finish(struct ssh *ssh, int authenticated, const char *method,
const char *submethod)
{
Authctxt *authctxt = ssh->authctxt;
char *methods;
int r, partial = 0;
if (!authctxt->valid && authenticated)
fatal("INTERNAL ERROR: authenticated invalid user %s",
authctxt->user);
if (authenticated && authctxt->postponed)
fatal("INTERNAL ERROR: authenticated and postponed");
/* Special handling for root */
if (authenticated && authctxt->pw->pw_uid == 0 &&
!auth_root_allowed(ssh, method)) {
authenticated = 0;
#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
PRIVSEP(audit_event(ssh, SSH_LOGIN_ROOT_DENIED));
#endif
}
if (authenticated && options.num_auth_methods != 0) {
if (!auth2_update_methods_lists(authctxt, method, submethod)) {
authenticated = 0;
partial = 1;
}
}
/* Log before sending the reply */
auth_log(ssh, authenticated, partial, method, submethod);
/* Update information exposed to session */
if (authenticated || partial)
auth2_update_session_info(authctxt, method, submethod);
if (authctxt->postponed)
return;
#ifdef USE_PAM
if (options.use_pam && authenticated) {
- int r;
-
- if (!PRIVSEP(do_pam_account())) {
- /* if PAM returned a message, send it to the user */
- if (sshbuf_len(loginmsg) > 0) {
- if ((r = sshbuf_put(loginmsg, "\0", 1)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: buffer error: %s",
- __func__, ssh_err(r));
- userauth_send_banner(ssh, sshbuf_ptr(loginmsg));
- if ((r = ssh_packet_write_wait(ssh)) != 0) {
- sshpkt_fatal(ssh, r,
- "%s: send PAM banner", __func__);
- }
+ int r, success = PRIVSEP(do_pam_account());
+
+ /* If PAM returned a message, send it to the user. */
+ if (sshbuf_len(loginmsg) > 0) {
+ if ((r = sshbuf_put(loginmsg, "\0", 1)) != 0)
+ fatal("%s: buffer error: %s",
+ __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ userauth_send_banner(ssh, sshbuf_ptr(loginmsg));
+ if ((r = ssh_packet_write_wait(ssh)) != 0) {
+ sshpkt_fatal(ssh, r,
+ "%s: send PAM banner", __func__);
}
+ }
+ if (!success) {
fatal("Access denied for user %s by PAM account "
"configuration", authctxt->user);
}
}
#endif
if (authenticated == 1) {
/* turn off userauth */
ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST,
&dispatch_protocol_ignore);
if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_SUCCESS)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0 ||
(r = ssh_packet_write_wait(ssh)) != 0)
fatal("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
/* now we can break out */
authctxt->success = 1;
ssh_packet_set_log_preamble(ssh, "user %s", authctxt->user);
} else {
/* Allow initial try of "none" auth without failure penalty */
if (!partial && !authctxt->server_caused_failure &&
(authctxt->attempt > 1 || strcmp(method, "none") != 0))
authctxt->failures++;
if (authctxt->failures >= options.max_authtries) {
#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
PRIVSEP(audit_event(ssh, SSH_LOGIN_EXCEED_MAXTRIES));
#endif
auth_maxtries_exceeded(ssh);
}
methods = authmethods_get(authctxt);
debug3("%s: failure partial=%d next methods=\"%s\"", __func__,
partial, methods);
if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_FAILURE)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, methods)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_u8(ssh, partial)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0 ||
(r = ssh_packet_write_wait(ssh)) != 0)
fatal("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
free(methods);
}
}
/*
* Checks whether method is allowed by at least one AuthenticationMethods
* methods list. Returns 1 if allowed, or no methods lists configured.
* 0 otherwise.
*/
int
auth2_method_allowed(Authctxt *authctxt, const char *method,
const char *submethod)
{
u_int i;
/*
* NB. authctxt->num_auth_methods might be zero as a result of
* auth2_setup_methods_lists(), so check the configuration.
*/
if (options.num_auth_methods == 0)
return 1;
for (i = 0; i < authctxt->num_auth_methods; i++) {
if (list_starts_with(authctxt->auth_methods[i], method,
submethod) != MATCH_NONE)
return 1;
}
return 0;
}
static char *
authmethods_get(Authctxt *authctxt)
{
struct sshbuf *b;
char *list;
int i, r;
if ((b = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
for (i = 0; authmethods[i] != NULL; i++) {
if (strcmp(authmethods[i]->name, "none") == 0)
continue;
if (authmethods[i]->enabled == NULL ||
*(authmethods[i]->enabled) == 0)
continue;
if (!auth2_method_allowed(authctxt, authmethods[i]->name,
NULL))
continue;
if ((r = sshbuf_putf(b, "%s%s", sshbuf_len(b) ? "," : "",
authmethods[i]->name)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
}
if ((list = sshbuf_dup_string(b)) == NULL)
fatal("%s: sshbuf_dup_string failed", __func__);
sshbuf_free(b);
return list;
}
static Authmethod *
authmethod_lookup(Authctxt *authctxt, const char *name)
{
int i;
if (name != NULL)
for (i = 0; authmethods[i] != NULL; i++)
if (authmethods[i]->enabled != NULL &&
*(authmethods[i]->enabled) != 0 &&
strcmp(name, authmethods[i]->name) == 0 &&
auth2_method_allowed(authctxt,
authmethods[i]->name, NULL))
return authmethods[i];
debug2("Unrecognized authentication method name: %s",
name ? name : "NULL");
return NULL;
}
/*
* Check a comma-separated list of methods for validity. Is need_enable is
* non-zero, then also require that the methods are enabled.
* Returns 0 on success or -1 if the methods list is invalid.
*/
int
auth2_methods_valid(const char *_methods, int need_enable)
{
char *methods, *omethods, *method, *p;
u_int i, found;
int ret = -1;
if (*_methods == '\0') {
error("empty authentication method list");
return -1;
}
omethods = methods = xstrdup(_methods);
while ((method = strsep(&methods, ",")) != NULL) {
for (found = i = 0; !found && authmethods[i] != NULL; i++) {
if ((p = strchr(method, ':')) != NULL)
*p = '\0';
if (strcmp(method, authmethods[i]->name) != 0)
continue;
if (need_enable) {
if (authmethods[i]->enabled == NULL ||
*(authmethods[i]->enabled) == 0) {
error("Disabled method \"%s\" in "
"AuthenticationMethods list \"%s\"",
method, _methods);
goto out;
}
}
found = 1;
break;
}
if (!found) {
error("Unknown authentication method \"%s\" in list",
method);
goto out;
}
}
ret = 0;
out:
free(omethods);
return ret;
}
/*
* Prune the AuthenticationMethods supplied in the configuration, removing
* any methods lists that include disabled methods. Note that this might
* leave authctxt->num_auth_methods == 0, even when multiple required auth
* has been requested. For this reason, all tests for whether multiple is
* enabled should consult options.num_auth_methods directly.
*/
int
auth2_setup_methods_lists(Authctxt *authctxt)
{
u_int i;
/* First, normalise away the "any" pseudo-method */
if (options.num_auth_methods == 1 &&
strcmp(options.auth_methods[0], "any") == 0) {
free(options.auth_methods[0]);
options.auth_methods[0] = NULL;
options.num_auth_methods = 0;
}
if (options.num_auth_methods == 0)
return 0;
debug3("%s: checking methods", __func__);
authctxt->auth_methods = xcalloc(options.num_auth_methods,
sizeof(*authctxt->auth_methods));
authctxt->num_auth_methods = 0;
for (i = 0; i < options.num_auth_methods; i++) {
if (auth2_methods_valid(options.auth_methods[i], 1) != 0) {
logit("Authentication methods list \"%s\" contains "
"disabled method, skipping",
options.auth_methods[i]);
continue;
}
debug("authentication methods list %d: %s",
authctxt->num_auth_methods, options.auth_methods[i]);
authctxt->auth_methods[authctxt->num_auth_methods++] =
xstrdup(options.auth_methods[i]);
}
if (authctxt->num_auth_methods == 0) {
error("No AuthenticationMethods left after eliminating "
"disabled methods");
return -1;
}
return 0;
}
static int
list_starts_with(const char *methods, const char *method,
const char *submethod)
{
size_t l = strlen(method);
int match;
const char *p;
if (strncmp(methods, method, l) != 0)
return MATCH_NONE;
p = methods + l;
match = MATCH_METHOD;
if (*p == ':') {
if (!submethod)
return MATCH_PARTIAL;
l = strlen(submethod);
p += 1;
if (strncmp(submethod, p, l))
return MATCH_NONE;
p += l;
match = MATCH_BOTH;
}
if (*p != ',' && *p != '\0')
return MATCH_NONE;
return match;
}
/*
* Remove method from the start of a comma-separated list of methods.
* Returns 0 if the list of methods did not start with that method or 1
* if it did.
*/
static int
remove_method(char **methods, const char *method, const char *submethod)
{
char *omethods = *methods, *p;
size_t l = strlen(method);
int match;
match = list_starts_with(omethods, method, submethod);
if (match != MATCH_METHOD && match != MATCH_BOTH)
return 0;
p = omethods + l;
if (submethod && match == MATCH_BOTH)
p += 1 + strlen(submethod); /* include colon */
if (*p == ',')
p++;
*methods = xstrdup(p);
free(omethods);
return 1;
}
/*
* Called after successful authentication. Will remove the successful method
* from the start of each list in which it occurs. If it was the last method
* in any list, then authentication is deemed successful.
* Returns 1 if the method completed any authentication list or 0 otherwise.
*/
int
auth2_update_methods_lists(Authctxt *authctxt, const char *method,
const char *submethod)
{
u_int i, found = 0;
debug3("%s: updating methods list after \"%s\"", __func__, method);
for (i = 0; i < authctxt->num_auth_methods; i++) {
if (!remove_method(&(authctxt->auth_methods[i]), method,
submethod))
continue;
found = 1;
if (*authctxt->auth_methods[i] == '\0') {
debug2("authentication methods list %d complete", i);
return 1;
}
debug3("authentication methods list %d remaining: \"%s\"",
i, authctxt->auth_methods[i]);
}
/* This should not happen, but would be bad if it did */
if (!found)
fatal("%s: method not in AuthenticationMethods", __func__);
return 0;
}
/* Reset method-specific information */
void auth2_authctxt_reset_info(Authctxt *authctxt)
{
sshkey_free(authctxt->auth_method_key);
free(authctxt->auth_method_info);
authctxt->auth_method_key = NULL;
authctxt->auth_method_info = NULL;
}
/* Record auth method-specific information for logs */
void
auth2_record_info(Authctxt *authctxt, const char *fmt, ...)
{
va_list ap;
int i;
free(authctxt->auth_method_info);
authctxt->auth_method_info = NULL;
va_start(ap, fmt);
i = vasprintf(&authctxt->auth_method_info, fmt, ap);
va_end(ap);
if (i == -1)
fatal("%s: vasprintf failed", __func__);
}
/*
* Records a public key used in authentication. This is used for logging
* and to ensure that the same key is not subsequently accepted again for
* multiple authentication.
*/
void
auth2_record_key(Authctxt *authctxt, int authenticated,
const struct sshkey *key)
{
struct sshkey **tmp, *dup;
int r;
if ((r = sshkey_from_private(key, &dup)) != 0)
fatal("%s: copy key: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
sshkey_free(authctxt->auth_method_key);
authctxt->auth_method_key = dup;
if (!authenticated)
return;
/* If authenticated, make sure we don't accept this key again */
if ((r = sshkey_from_private(key, &dup)) != 0)
fatal("%s: copy key: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
if (authctxt->nprev_keys >= INT_MAX ||
(tmp = recallocarray(authctxt->prev_keys, authctxt->nprev_keys,
authctxt->nprev_keys + 1, sizeof(*authctxt->prev_keys))) == NULL)
fatal("%s: reallocarray failed", __func__);
authctxt->prev_keys = tmp;
authctxt->prev_keys[authctxt->nprev_keys] = dup;
authctxt->nprev_keys++;
}
/* Checks whether a key has already been previously used for authentication */
int
auth2_key_already_used(Authctxt *authctxt, const struct sshkey *key)
{
u_int i;
char *fp;
for (i = 0; i < authctxt->nprev_keys; i++) {
if (sshkey_equal_public(key, authctxt->prev_keys[i])) {
fp = sshkey_fingerprint(authctxt->prev_keys[i],
options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_DEFAULT);
debug3("%s: key already used: %s %s", __func__,
sshkey_type(authctxt->prev_keys[i]),
fp == NULL ? "UNKNOWN" : fp);
free(fp);
return 1;
}
}
return 0;
}
/*
* Updates authctxt->session_info with details of authentication. Should be
* whenever an authentication method succeeds.
*/
void
auth2_update_session_info(Authctxt *authctxt, const char *method,
const char *submethod)
{
int r;
if (authctxt->session_info == NULL) {
if ((authctxt->session_info = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
fatal("%s: sshbuf_new", __func__);
}
/* Append method[/submethod] */
if ((r = sshbuf_putf(authctxt->session_info, "%s%s%s",
method, submethod == NULL ? "" : "/",
submethod == NULL ? "" : submethod)) != 0)
fatal("%s: append method: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
/* Append key if present */
if (authctxt->auth_method_key != NULL) {
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(authctxt->session_info, ' ')) != 0 ||
(r = sshkey_format_text(authctxt->auth_method_key,
authctxt->session_info)) != 0)
fatal("%s: append key: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
}
if (authctxt->auth_method_info != NULL) {
/* Ensure no ambiguity here */
if (strchr(authctxt->auth_method_info, '\n') != NULL)
fatal("%s: auth_method_info contains \\n", __func__);
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(authctxt->session_info, ' ')) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_putf(authctxt->session_info, "%s",
authctxt->auth_method_info)) != 0) {
fatal("%s: append method info: %s",
__func__, ssh_err(r));
}
}
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(authctxt->session_info, '\n')) != 0)
fatal("%s: append: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
}
diff --git a/authfd.c b/authfd.c
index 4b647a62833c..8288ef215e46 100644
--- a/authfd.c
+++ b/authfd.c
@@ -1,637 +1,637 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: authfd.c,v 1.123 2020/03/06 18:24:39 markus Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: authfd.c,v 1.124 2020/06/26 05:03:36 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
* Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
* All rights reserved
* Functions for connecting the local authentication agent.
*
* As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
* can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this
* software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
* incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
* called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
*
* SSH2 implementation,
* Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
* OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
* IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
* INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
* NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
* DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
* THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
* (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
* THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
*/
#include "includes.h"
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/un.h>
#include <sys/socket.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <signal.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <stdarg.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include "xmalloc.h"
#include "ssh.h"
#include "sshbuf.h"
#include "sshkey.h"
#include "authfd.h"
#include "cipher.h"
#include "compat.h"
#include "log.h"
#include "atomicio.h"
#include "misc.h"
#include "ssherr.h"
#define MAX_AGENT_IDENTITIES 2048 /* Max keys in agent reply */
#define MAX_AGENT_REPLY_LEN (256 * 1024) /* Max bytes in agent reply */
/* macro to check for "agent failure" message */
#define agent_failed(x) \
((x == SSH_AGENT_FAILURE) || \
(x == SSH_COM_AGENT2_FAILURE) || \
(x == SSH2_AGENT_FAILURE))
/* Convert success/failure response from agent to a err.h status */
static int
decode_reply(u_char type)
{
if (agent_failed(type))
return SSH_ERR_AGENT_FAILURE;
else if (type == SSH_AGENT_SUCCESS)
return 0;
else
return SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
}
/*
* Opens an authentication socket at the provided path and stores the file
* descriptor in fdp. Returns 0 on success and an error on failure.
*/
int
ssh_get_authentication_socket_path(const char *authsocket, int *fdp)
{
int sock, oerrno;
struct sockaddr_un sunaddr;
memset(&sunaddr, 0, sizeof(sunaddr));
sunaddr.sun_family = AF_UNIX;
strlcpy(sunaddr.sun_path, authsocket, sizeof(sunaddr.sun_path));
if ((sock = socket(AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0)) == -1)
return SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR;
/* close on exec */
if (fcntl(sock, F_SETFD, FD_CLOEXEC) == -1 ||
connect(sock, (struct sockaddr *)&sunaddr, sizeof(sunaddr)) == -1) {
oerrno = errno;
close(sock);
errno = oerrno;
return SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR;
}
if (fdp != NULL)
*fdp = sock;
else
close(sock);
return 0;
}
/*
* Opens the default authentication socket and stores the file descriptor in
* fdp. Returns 0 on success and an error on failure.
*/
int
ssh_get_authentication_socket(int *fdp)
{
const char *authsocket;
if (fdp != NULL)
*fdp = -1;
authsocket = getenv(SSH_AUTHSOCKET_ENV_NAME);
if (authsocket == NULL || *authsocket == '\0')
return SSH_ERR_AGENT_NOT_PRESENT;
return ssh_get_authentication_socket_path(authsocket, fdp);
}
/* Communicate with agent: send request and read reply */
static int
ssh_request_reply(int sock, struct sshbuf *request, struct sshbuf *reply)
{
int r;
size_t l, len;
char buf[1024];
/* Get the length of the message, and format it in the buffer. */
len = sshbuf_len(request);
POKE_U32(buf, len);
/* Send the length and then the packet to the agent. */
if (atomicio(vwrite, sock, buf, 4) != 4 ||
atomicio(vwrite, sock, sshbuf_mutable_ptr(request),
sshbuf_len(request)) != sshbuf_len(request))
return SSH_ERR_AGENT_COMMUNICATION;
/*
* Wait for response from the agent. First read the length of the
* response packet.
*/
if (atomicio(read, sock, buf, 4) != 4)
return SSH_ERR_AGENT_COMMUNICATION;
/* Extract the length, and check it for sanity. */
len = PEEK_U32(buf);
if (len > MAX_AGENT_REPLY_LEN)
return SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
/* Read the rest of the response in to the buffer. */
sshbuf_reset(reply);
while (len > 0) {
l = len;
if (l > sizeof(buf))
l = sizeof(buf);
if (atomicio(read, sock, buf, l) != l)
return SSH_ERR_AGENT_COMMUNICATION;
if ((r = sshbuf_put(reply, buf, l)) != 0)
return r;
len -= l;
}
return 0;
}
/*
* Closes the agent socket if it should be closed (depends on how it was
* obtained). The argument must have been returned by
* ssh_get_authentication_socket().
*/
void
ssh_close_authentication_socket(int sock)
{
if (getenv(SSH_AUTHSOCKET_ENV_NAME))
close(sock);
}
/* Lock/unlock agent */
int
ssh_lock_agent(int sock, int lock, const char *password)
{
int r;
u_char type = lock ? SSH_AGENTC_LOCK : SSH_AGENTC_UNLOCK;
struct sshbuf *msg;
if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, type)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_cstring(msg, password)) != 0)
goto out;
if ((r = ssh_request_reply(sock, msg, msg)) != 0)
goto out;
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(msg, &type)) != 0)
goto out;
r = decode_reply(type);
out:
sshbuf_free(msg);
return r;
}
static int
deserialise_identity2(struct sshbuf *ids, struct sshkey **keyp, char **commentp)
{
int r;
char *comment = NULL;
const u_char *blob;
size_t blen;
if ((r = sshbuf_get_string_direct(ids, &blob, &blen)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_cstring(ids, &comment, NULL)) != 0)
goto out;
if ((r = sshkey_from_blob(blob, blen, keyp)) != 0)
goto out;
if (commentp != NULL) {
*commentp = comment;
comment = NULL;
}
r = 0;
out:
free(comment);
return r;
}
/*
* Fetch list of identities held by the agent.
*/
int
ssh_fetch_identitylist(int sock, struct ssh_identitylist **idlp)
{
u_char type;
u_int32_t num, i;
struct sshbuf *msg;
struct ssh_identitylist *idl = NULL;
int r;
/*
* Send a message to the agent requesting for a list of the
* identities it can represent.
*/
if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, SSH2_AGENTC_REQUEST_IDENTITIES)) != 0)
goto out;
if ((r = ssh_request_reply(sock, msg, msg)) != 0)
goto out;
/* Get message type, and verify that we got a proper answer. */
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(msg, &type)) != 0)
goto out;
if (agent_failed(type)) {
r = SSH_ERR_AGENT_FAILURE;
goto out;
} else if (type != SSH2_AGENT_IDENTITIES_ANSWER) {
r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
goto out;
}
/* Get the number of entries in the response and check it for sanity. */
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(msg, &num)) != 0)
goto out;
if (num > MAX_AGENT_IDENTITIES) {
r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
goto out;
}
if (num == 0) {
r = SSH_ERR_AGENT_NO_IDENTITIES;
goto out;
}
/* Deserialise the response into a list of keys/comments */
if ((idl = calloc(1, sizeof(*idl))) == NULL ||
(idl->keys = calloc(num, sizeof(*idl->keys))) == NULL ||
(idl->comments = calloc(num, sizeof(*idl->comments))) == NULL) {
r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
goto out;
}
for (i = 0; i < num;) {
if ((r = deserialise_identity2(msg, &(idl->keys[i]),
&(idl->comments[i]))) != 0) {
if (r == SSH_ERR_KEY_TYPE_UNKNOWN) {
/* Gracefully skip unknown key types */
num--;
continue;
} else
goto out;
}
i++;
}
idl->nkeys = num;
*idlp = idl;
idl = NULL;
r = 0;
out:
sshbuf_free(msg);
if (idl != NULL)
ssh_free_identitylist(idl);
return r;
}
void
ssh_free_identitylist(struct ssh_identitylist *idl)
{
size_t i;
if (idl == NULL)
return;
for (i = 0; i < idl->nkeys; i++) {
if (idl->keys != NULL)
sshkey_free(idl->keys[i]);
if (idl->comments != NULL)
free(idl->comments[i]);
}
free(idl->keys);
free(idl->comments);
free(idl);
}
/*
* Check if the ssh agent has a given key.
* Returns 0 if found, or a negative SSH_ERR_* error code on failure.
*/
int
-ssh_agent_has_key(int sock, struct sshkey *key)
+ssh_agent_has_key(int sock, const struct sshkey *key)
{
int r, ret = SSH_ERR_KEY_NOT_FOUND;
size_t i;
struct ssh_identitylist *idlist = NULL;
if ((r = ssh_fetch_identitylist(sock, &idlist)) != 0) {
return r;
}
for (i = 0; i < idlist->nkeys; i++) {
if (sshkey_equal_public(idlist->keys[i], key)) {
ret = 0;
break;
}
}
ssh_free_identitylist(idlist);
return ret;
}
/*
* Sends a challenge (typically from a server via ssh(1)) to the agent,
* and waits for a response from the agent.
* Returns true (non-zero) if the agent gave the correct answer, zero
* otherwise.
*/
/* encode signature algorithm in flag bits, so we can keep the msg format */
static u_int
agent_encode_alg(const struct sshkey *key, const char *alg)
{
if (alg != NULL && sshkey_type_plain(key->type) == KEY_RSA) {
if (strcmp(alg, "rsa-sha2-256") == 0 ||
strcmp(alg, "rsa-sha2-256-cert-v01@openssh.com") == 0)
return SSH_AGENT_RSA_SHA2_256;
if (strcmp(alg, "rsa-sha2-512") == 0 ||
strcmp(alg, "rsa-sha2-512-cert-v01@openssh.com") == 0)
return SSH_AGENT_RSA_SHA2_512;
}
return 0;
}
/* ask agent to sign data, returns err.h code on error, 0 on success */
int
ssh_agent_sign(int sock, const struct sshkey *key,
u_char **sigp, size_t *lenp,
const u_char *data, size_t datalen, const char *alg, u_int compat)
{
struct sshbuf *msg;
u_char *sig = NULL, type = 0;
size_t len = 0;
u_int flags = 0;
int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
*sigp = NULL;
*lenp = 0;
if (datalen > SSH_KEY_MAX_SIGN_DATA_SIZE)
return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
flags |= agent_encode_alg(key, alg);
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, SSH2_AGENTC_SIGN_REQUEST)) != 0 ||
(r = sshkey_puts(key, msg)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_string(msg, data, datalen)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u32(msg, flags)) != 0)
goto out;
if ((r = ssh_request_reply(sock, msg, msg)) != 0)
goto out;
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(msg, &type)) != 0)
goto out;
if (agent_failed(type)) {
r = SSH_ERR_AGENT_FAILURE;
goto out;
} else if (type != SSH2_AGENT_SIGN_RESPONSE) {
r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
goto out;
}
if ((r = sshbuf_get_string(msg, &sig, &len)) != 0)
goto out;
/* Check what we actually got back from the agent. */
if ((r = sshkey_check_sigtype(sig, len, alg)) != 0)
goto out;
/* success */
*sigp = sig;
*lenp = len;
sig = NULL;
len = 0;
r = 0;
out:
freezero(sig, len);
sshbuf_free(msg);
return r;
}
/* Encode key for a message to the agent. */
static int
encode_constraints(struct sshbuf *m, u_int life, u_int confirm, u_int maxsign,
const char *provider)
{
int r;
if (life != 0) {
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(m, SSH_AGENT_CONSTRAIN_LIFETIME)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, life)) != 0)
goto out;
}
if (confirm != 0) {
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(m, SSH_AGENT_CONSTRAIN_CONFIRM)) != 0)
goto out;
}
if (maxsign != 0) {
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(m, SSH_AGENT_CONSTRAIN_MAXSIGN)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, maxsign)) != 0)
goto out;
}
if (provider != NULL) {
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(m,
SSH_AGENT_CONSTRAIN_EXTENSION)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m,
"sk-provider@openssh.com")) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, provider)) != 0)
goto out;
}
r = 0;
out:
return r;
}
/*
* Adds an identity to the authentication server.
* This call is intended only for use by ssh-add(1) and like applications.
*/
int
ssh_add_identity_constrained(int sock, struct sshkey *key,
const char *comment, u_int life, u_int confirm, u_int maxsign,
const char *provider)
{
struct sshbuf *msg;
int r, constrained = (life || confirm || maxsign || provider);
u_char type;
if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
switch (key->type) {
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
case KEY_RSA:
case KEY_RSA_CERT:
case KEY_DSA:
case KEY_DSA_CERT:
case KEY_ECDSA:
case KEY_ECDSA_CERT:
case KEY_ECDSA_SK:
case KEY_ECDSA_SK_CERT:
#endif
case KEY_ED25519:
case KEY_ED25519_CERT:
case KEY_ED25519_SK:
case KEY_ED25519_SK_CERT:
case KEY_XMSS:
case KEY_XMSS_CERT:
type = constrained ?
SSH2_AGENTC_ADD_ID_CONSTRAINED :
SSH2_AGENTC_ADD_IDENTITY;
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, type)) != 0 ||
(r = sshkey_private_serialize_maxsign(key, msg, maxsign,
NULL)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_cstring(msg, comment)) != 0)
goto out;
break;
default:
r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
goto out;
}
if (constrained &&
(r = encode_constraints(msg, life, confirm, maxsign,
provider)) != 0)
goto out;
if ((r = ssh_request_reply(sock, msg, msg)) != 0)
goto out;
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(msg, &type)) != 0)
goto out;
r = decode_reply(type);
out:
sshbuf_free(msg);
return r;
}
/*
* Removes an identity from the authentication server.
* This call is intended only for use by ssh-add(1) and like applications.
*/
int
-ssh_remove_identity(int sock, struct sshkey *key)
+ssh_remove_identity(int sock, const struct sshkey *key)
{
struct sshbuf *msg;
int r;
u_char type, *blob = NULL;
size_t blen;
if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
if (key->type != KEY_UNSPEC) {
if ((r = sshkey_to_blob(key, &blob, &blen)) != 0)
goto out;
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg,
SSH2_AGENTC_REMOVE_IDENTITY)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_string(msg, blob, blen)) != 0)
goto out;
} else {
r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
goto out;
}
if ((r = ssh_request_reply(sock, msg, msg)) != 0)
goto out;
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(msg, &type)) != 0)
goto out;
r = decode_reply(type);
out:
if (blob != NULL)
freezero(blob, blen);
sshbuf_free(msg);
return r;
}
/*
* Add/remove an token-based identity from the authentication server.
* This call is intended only for use by ssh-add(1) and like applications.
*/
int
ssh_update_card(int sock, int add, const char *reader_id, const char *pin,
u_int life, u_int confirm)
{
struct sshbuf *msg;
int r, constrained = (life || confirm);
u_char type;
if (add) {
type = constrained ?
SSH_AGENTC_ADD_SMARTCARD_KEY_CONSTRAINED :
SSH_AGENTC_ADD_SMARTCARD_KEY;
} else
type = SSH_AGENTC_REMOVE_SMARTCARD_KEY;
if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, type)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_cstring(msg, reader_id)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_cstring(msg, pin)) != 0)
goto out;
if (constrained &&
(r = encode_constraints(msg, life, confirm, 0, NULL)) != 0)
goto out;
if ((r = ssh_request_reply(sock, msg, msg)) != 0)
goto out;
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(msg, &type)) != 0)
goto out;
r = decode_reply(type);
out:
sshbuf_free(msg);
return r;
}
/*
* Removes all identities from the agent.
* This call is intended only for use by ssh-add(1) and like applications.
*
* This supports the SSH protocol 1 message to because, when clearing all
* keys from an agent, we generally want to clear both protocol v1 and v2
* keys.
*/
int
ssh_remove_all_identities(int sock, int version)
{
struct sshbuf *msg;
u_char type = (version == 1) ?
SSH_AGENTC_REMOVE_ALL_RSA_IDENTITIES :
SSH2_AGENTC_REMOVE_ALL_IDENTITIES;
int r;
if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, type)) != 0)
goto out;
if ((r = ssh_request_reply(sock, msg, msg)) != 0)
goto out;
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(msg, &type)) != 0)
goto out;
r = decode_reply(type);
out:
sshbuf_free(msg);
return r;
}
diff --git a/authfd.h b/authfd.h
index c3bf6259aa9d..4fbf82f8c008 100644
--- a/authfd.h
+++ b/authfd.h
@@ -1,94 +1,94 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: authfd.h,v 1.48 2019/12/21 02:19:13 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: authfd.h,v 1.49 2020/06/26 05:03:36 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
* Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
* All rights reserved
* Functions to interface with the SSH_AUTHENTICATION_FD socket.
*
* As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
* can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this
* software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
* incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
* called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
*/
#ifndef AUTHFD_H
#define AUTHFD_H
/* List of identities returned by ssh_fetch_identitylist() */
struct ssh_identitylist {
size_t nkeys;
struct sshkey **keys;
char **comments;
};
int ssh_get_authentication_socket(int *fdp);
int ssh_get_authentication_socket_path(const char *authsocket, int *fdp);
void ssh_close_authentication_socket(int sock);
int ssh_lock_agent(int sock, int lock, const char *password);
int ssh_fetch_identitylist(int sock, struct ssh_identitylist **idlp);
void ssh_free_identitylist(struct ssh_identitylist *idl);
int ssh_add_identity_constrained(int sock, struct sshkey *key,
const char *comment, u_int life, u_int confirm, u_int maxsign,
const char *provider);
-int ssh_agent_has_key(int sock, struct sshkey *key);
-int ssh_remove_identity(int sock, struct sshkey *key);
+int ssh_agent_has_key(int sock, const struct sshkey *key);
+int ssh_remove_identity(int sock, const struct sshkey *key);
int ssh_update_card(int sock, int add, const char *reader_id,
const char *pin, u_int life, u_int confirm);
int ssh_remove_all_identities(int sock, int version);
int ssh_agent_sign(int sock, const struct sshkey *key,
u_char **sigp, size_t *lenp,
const u_char *data, size_t datalen, const char *alg, u_int compat);
/* Messages for the authentication agent connection. */
#define SSH_AGENTC_REQUEST_RSA_IDENTITIES 1
#define SSH_AGENT_RSA_IDENTITIES_ANSWER 2
#define SSH_AGENTC_RSA_CHALLENGE 3
#define SSH_AGENT_RSA_RESPONSE 4
#define SSH_AGENT_FAILURE 5
#define SSH_AGENT_SUCCESS 6
#define SSH_AGENTC_ADD_RSA_IDENTITY 7
#define SSH_AGENTC_REMOVE_RSA_IDENTITY 8
#define SSH_AGENTC_REMOVE_ALL_RSA_IDENTITIES 9
/* private OpenSSH extensions for SSH2 */
#define SSH2_AGENTC_REQUEST_IDENTITIES 11
#define SSH2_AGENT_IDENTITIES_ANSWER 12
#define SSH2_AGENTC_SIGN_REQUEST 13
#define SSH2_AGENT_SIGN_RESPONSE 14
#define SSH2_AGENTC_ADD_IDENTITY 17
#define SSH2_AGENTC_REMOVE_IDENTITY 18
#define SSH2_AGENTC_REMOVE_ALL_IDENTITIES 19
/* smartcard */
#define SSH_AGENTC_ADD_SMARTCARD_KEY 20
#define SSH_AGENTC_REMOVE_SMARTCARD_KEY 21
/* lock/unlock the agent */
#define SSH_AGENTC_LOCK 22
#define SSH_AGENTC_UNLOCK 23
/* add key with constraints */
#define SSH_AGENTC_ADD_RSA_ID_CONSTRAINED 24
#define SSH2_AGENTC_ADD_ID_CONSTRAINED 25
#define SSH_AGENTC_ADD_SMARTCARD_KEY_CONSTRAINED 26
#define SSH_AGENT_CONSTRAIN_LIFETIME 1
#define SSH_AGENT_CONSTRAIN_CONFIRM 2
#define SSH_AGENT_CONSTRAIN_MAXSIGN 3
#define SSH_AGENT_CONSTRAIN_EXTENSION 255
/* extended failure messages */
#define SSH2_AGENT_FAILURE 30
/* additional error code for ssh.com's ssh-agent2 */
#define SSH_COM_AGENT2_FAILURE 102
#define SSH_AGENT_OLD_SIGNATURE 0x01
#define SSH_AGENT_RSA_SHA2_256 0x02
#define SSH_AGENT_RSA_SHA2_512 0x04
#endif /* AUTHFD_H */
diff --git a/authfile.c b/authfile.c
index 35ccf576c2b5..946f50ca8114 100644
--- a/authfile.c
+++ b/authfile.c
@@ -1,515 +1,521 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: authfile.c,v 1.140 2020/04/17 07:15:11 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: authfile.c,v 1.141 2020/06/18 23:33:38 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 2000, 2013 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
* OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
* IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
* INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
* NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
* DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
* THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
* (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
* THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
*/
#include "includes.h"
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/stat.h>
#include <sys/uio.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdarg.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <limits.h>
#include "cipher.h"
#include "ssh.h"
#include "log.h"
#include "authfile.h"
#include "misc.h"
#include "atomicio.h"
#include "sshkey.h"
#include "sshbuf.h"
#include "ssherr.h"
#include "krl.h"
#define MAX_KEY_FILE_SIZE (1024 * 1024)
/* Save a key blob to a file */
static int
sshkey_save_private_blob(struct sshbuf *keybuf, const char *filename)
{
int r;
mode_t omask;
omask = umask(077);
r = sshbuf_write_file(filename, keybuf);
umask(omask);
return r;
}
int
sshkey_save_private(struct sshkey *key, const char *filename,
const char *passphrase, const char *comment,
int format, const char *openssh_format_cipher, int openssh_format_rounds)
{
struct sshbuf *keyblob = NULL;
int r;
if ((keyblob = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
if ((r = sshkey_private_to_fileblob(key, keyblob, passphrase, comment,
format, openssh_format_cipher, openssh_format_rounds)) != 0)
goto out;
if ((r = sshkey_save_private_blob(keyblob, filename)) != 0)
goto out;
r = 0;
out:
sshbuf_free(keyblob);
return r;
}
/* XXX remove error() calls from here? */
int
sshkey_perm_ok(int fd, const char *filename)
{
struct stat st;
if (fstat(fd, &st) == -1)
return SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR;
/*
* if a key owned by the user is accessed, then we check the
* permissions of the file. if the key owned by a different user,
* then we don't care.
*/
#ifdef HAVE_CYGWIN
if (check_ntsec(filename))
#endif
if ((st.st_uid == getuid()) && (st.st_mode & 077) != 0) {
error("@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@");
error("@ WARNING: UNPROTECTED PRIVATE KEY FILE! @");
error("@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@");
error("Permissions 0%3.3o for '%s' are too open.",
(u_int)st.st_mode & 0777, filename);
error("It is required that your private key files are NOT accessible by others.");
error("This private key will be ignored.");
return SSH_ERR_KEY_BAD_PERMISSIONS;
}
return 0;
}
int
sshkey_load_private_type(int type, const char *filename, const char *passphrase,
struct sshkey **keyp, char **commentp)
{
int fd, r;
if (keyp != NULL)
*keyp = NULL;
if (commentp != NULL)
*commentp = NULL;
if ((fd = open(filename, O_RDONLY)) == -1)
return SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR;
r = sshkey_perm_ok(fd, filename);
if (r != 0)
goto out;
r = sshkey_load_private_type_fd(fd, type, passphrase, keyp, commentp);
if (r == 0 && keyp && *keyp)
r = sshkey_set_filename(*keyp, filename);
out:
close(fd);
return r;
}
int
sshkey_load_private(const char *filename, const char *passphrase,
struct sshkey **keyp, char **commentp)
{
return sshkey_load_private_type(KEY_UNSPEC, filename, passphrase,
keyp, commentp);
}
int
sshkey_load_private_type_fd(int fd, int type, const char *passphrase,
struct sshkey **keyp, char **commentp)
{
struct sshbuf *buffer = NULL;
int r;
if (keyp != NULL)
*keyp = NULL;
if ((r = sshbuf_load_fd(fd, &buffer)) != 0 ||
(r = sshkey_parse_private_fileblob_type(buffer, type,
passphrase, keyp, commentp)) != 0)
goto out;
/* success */
r = 0;
out:
sshbuf_free(buffer);
return r;
}
/* Load a pubkey from the unencrypted envelope of a new-format private key */
static int
sshkey_load_pubkey_from_private(const char *filename, struct sshkey **pubkeyp)
{
struct sshbuf *buffer = NULL;
struct sshkey *pubkey = NULL;
int r, fd;
if (pubkeyp != NULL)
*pubkeyp = NULL;
if ((fd = open(filename, O_RDONLY)) == -1)
return SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR;
if ((r = sshbuf_load_fd(fd, &buffer)) != 0 ||
(r = sshkey_parse_pubkey_from_private_fileblob_type(buffer,
KEY_UNSPEC, &pubkey)) != 0)
goto out;
if ((r = sshkey_set_filename(pubkey, filename)) != 0)
goto out;
/* success */
if (pubkeyp != NULL) {
*pubkeyp = pubkey;
pubkey = NULL;
}
r = 0;
out:
close(fd);
sshbuf_free(buffer);
sshkey_free(pubkey);
return r;
}
static int
sshkey_try_load_public(struct sshkey **kp, const char *filename,
char **commentp)
{
FILE *f;
char *line = NULL, *cp;
size_t linesize = 0;
int r;
struct sshkey *k = NULL;
*kp = NULL;
if (commentp != NULL)
*commentp = NULL;
if ((f = fopen(filename, "r")) == NULL)
return SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR;
if ((k = sshkey_new(KEY_UNSPEC)) == NULL) {
fclose(f);
return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
}
while (getline(&line, &linesize, f) != -1) {
cp = line;
switch (*cp) {
case '#':
case '\n':
case '\0':
continue;
}
/* Abort loading if this looks like a private key */
if (strncmp(cp, "-----BEGIN", 10) == 0 ||
strcmp(cp, "SSH PRIVATE KEY FILE") == 0)
break;
/* Skip leading whitespace. */
for (; *cp && (*cp == ' ' || *cp == '\t'); cp++)
;
if (*cp) {
if ((r = sshkey_read(k, &cp)) == 0) {
cp[strcspn(cp, "\r\n")] = '\0';
if (commentp) {
*commentp = strdup(*cp ?
cp : filename);
if (*commentp == NULL)
r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
}
/* success */
*kp = k;
free(line);
fclose(f);
return r;
}
}
}
free(k);
free(line);
fclose(f);
return SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
}
/* load public key from any pubkey file */
int
sshkey_load_public(const char *filename, struct sshkey **keyp, char **commentp)
{
char *pubfile = NULL;
- int r;
+ int r, oerrno;
if (keyp != NULL)
*keyp = NULL;
if (commentp != NULL)
*commentp = NULL;
if ((r = sshkey_try_load_public(keyp, filename, commentp)) == 0)
goto out;
/* try .pub suffix */
if (asprintf(&pubfile, "%s.pub", filename) == -1)
return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
if ((r = sshkey_try_load_public(keyp, pubfile, commentp)) == 0)
goto out;
/* finally, try to extract public key from private key file */
if ((r = sshkey_load_pubkey_from_private(filename, keyp)) == 0)
goto out;
+ /* Pretend we couldn't find the key */
+ r = SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR;
+ errno = ENOENT;
+
out:
+ oerrno = errno;
free(pubfile);
+ errno = oerrno;
return r;
}
/* Load the certificate associated with the named private key */
int
sshkey_load_cert(const char *filename, struct sshkey **keyp)
{
struct sshkey *pub = NULL;
char *file = NULL;
int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
if (keyp != NULL)
*keyp = NULL;
if (asprintf(&file, "%s-cert.pub", filename) == -1)
return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
r = sshkey_try_load_public(keyp, file, NULL);
free(file);
sshkey_free(pub);
return r;
}
/* Load private key and certificate */
int
sshkey_load_private_cert(int type, const char *filename, const char *passphrase,
struct sshkey **keyp)
{
struct sshkey *key = NULL, *cert = NULL;
int r;
if (keyp != NULL)
*keyp = NULL;
switch (type) {
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
case KEY_RSA:
case KEY_DSA:
case KEY_ECDSA:
#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
case KEY_ED25519:
case KEY_XMSS:
case KEY_UNSPEC:
break;
default:
return SSH_ERR_KEY_TYPE_UNKNOWN;
}
if ((r = sshkey_load_private_type(type, filename,
passphrase, &key, NULL)) != 0 ||
(r = sshkey_load_cert(filename, &cert)) != 0)
goto out;
/* Make sure the private key matches the certificate */
if (sshkey_equal_public(key, cert) == 0) {
r = SSH_ERR_KEY_CERT_MISMATCH;
goto out;
}
if ((r = sshkey_to_certified(key)) != 0 ||
(r = sshkey_cert_copy(cert, key)) != 0)
goto out;
r = 0;
if (keyp != NULL) {
*keyp = key;
key = NULL;
}
out:
sshkey_free(key);
sshkey_free(cert);
return r;
}
/*
* Returns success if the specified "key" is listed in the file "filename",
* SSH_ERR_KEY_NOT_FOUND: if the key is not listed or another error.
* If "strict_type" is set then the key type must match exactly,
* otherwise a comparison that ignores certficiate data is performed.
* If "check_ca" is set and "key" is a certificate, then its CA key is
* also checked and sshkey_in_file() will return success if either is found.
*/
int
sshkey_in_file(struct sshkey *key, const char *filename, int strict_type,
int check_ca)
{
FILE *f;
char *line = NULL, *cp;
size_t linesize = 0;
int r = 0;
struct sshkey *pub = NULL;
int (*sshkey_compare)(const struct sshkey *, const struct sshkey *) =
strict_type ? sshkey_equal : sshkey_equal_public;
if ((f = fopen(filename, "r")) == NULL)
return SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR;
while (getline(&line, &linesize, f) != -1) {
sshkey_free(pub);
pub = NULL;
cp = line;
/* Skip leading whitespace. */
for (; *cp && (*cp == ' ' || *cp == '\t'); cp++)
;
/* Skip comments and empty lines */
switch (*cp) {
case '#':
case '\n':
case '\0':
continue;
}
if ((pub = sshkey_new(KEY_UNSPEC)) == NULL) {
r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
goto out;
}
switch (r = sshkey_read(pub, &cp)) {
case 0:
break;
case SSH_ERR_KEY_LENGTH:
continue;
default:
goto out;
}
if (sshkey_compare(key, pub) ||
(check_ca && sshkey_is_cert(key) &&
sshkey_compare(key->cert->signature_key, pub))) {
r = 0;
goto out;
}
}
r = SSH_ERR_KEY_NOT_FOUND;
out:
free(line);
sshkey_free(pub);
fclose(f);
return r;
}
/*
* Checks whether the specified key is revoked, returning 0 if not,
* SSH_ERR_KEY_REVOKED if it is or another error code if something
* unexpected happened.
* This will check both the key and, if it is a certificate, its CA key too.
* "revoked_keys_file" may be a KRL or a one-per-line list of public keys.
*/
int
sshkey_check_revoked(struct sshkey *key, const char *revoked_keys_file)
{
int r;
r = ssh_krl_file_contains_key(revoked_keys_file, key);
/* If this was not a KRL to begin with then continue below */
if (r != SSH_ERR_KRL_BAD_MAGIC)
return r;
/*
* If the file is not a KRL or we can't handle KRLs then attempt to
* parse the file as a flat list of keys.
*/
switch ((r = sshkey_in_file(key, revoked_keys_file, 0, 1))) {
case 0:
/* Key found => revoked */
return SSH_ERR_KEY_REVOKED;
case SSH_ERR_KEY_NOT_FOUND:
/* Key not found => not revoked */
return 0;
default:
/* Some other error occurred */
return r;
}
}
/*
* Advanced *cpp past the end of key options, defined as the first unquoted
* whitespace character. Returns 0 on success or -1 on failure (e.g.
* unterminated quotes).
*/
int
sshkey_advance_past_options(char **cpp)
{
char *cp = *cpp;
int quoted = 0;
for (; *cp && (quoted || (*cp != ' ' && *cp != '\t')); cp++) {
if (*cp == '\\' && cp[1] == '"')
cp++; /* Skip both */
else if (*cp == '"')
quoted = !quoted;
}
*cpp = cp;
/* return failure for unterminated quotes */
return (*cp == '\0' && quoted) ? -1 : 0;
}
/* Save a public key */
int
sshkey_save_public(const struct sshkey *key, const char *path,
const char *comment)
{
int fd, oerrno;
FILE *f = NULL;
int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
if ((fd = open(path, O_WRONLY|O_CREAT|O_TRUNC, 0644)) == -1)
return SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR;
if ((f = fdopen(fd, "w")) == NULL) {
r = SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR;
goto fail;
}
if ((r = sshkey_write(key, f)) != 0)
goto fail;
fprintf(f, " %s\n", comment);
if (ferror(f) || fclose(f) != 0) {
r = SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR;
fail:
oerrno = errno;
if (f != NULL)
fclose(f);
else
close(fd);
errno = oerrno;
return r;
}
return 0;
}
diff --git a/channels.c b/channels.c
index 95a51e21b271..e4917f3c92a8 100644
--- a/channels.c
+++ b/channels.c
@@ -1,4924 +1,4931 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: channels.c,v 1.398 2020/04/25 06:59:36 dtucker Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: channels.c,v 1.402 2020/09/20 05:47:25 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
* Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
* All rights reserved
* This file contains functions for generic socket connection forwarding.
* There is also code for initiating connection forwarding for X11 connections,
* arbitrary tcp/ip connections, and the authentication agent connection.
*
* As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
* can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this
* software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
* incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
* called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
*
* SSH2 support added by Markus Friedl.
* Copyright (c) 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
* Copyright (c) 1999 Dug Song. All rights reserved.
* Copyright (c) 1999 Theo de Raadt. All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
* OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
* IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
* INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
* NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
* DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
* THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
* (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
* THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
*/
#include "includes.h"
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/stat.h>
#include <sys/ioctl.h>
#include <sys/un.h>
#include <sys/socket.h>
#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TIME_H
# include <sys/time.h>
#endif
#include <netinet/in.h>
#include <arpa/inet.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <limits.h>
#include <netdb.h>
#include <stdarg.h>
#ifdef HAVE_STDINT_H
# include <stdint.h>
#endif
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <termios.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h"
#include "xmalloc.h"
#include "ssh.h"
#include "ssh2.h"
#include "ssherr.h"
#include "sshbuf.h"
#include "packet.h"
#include "log.h"
#include "misc.h"
#include "channels.h"
#include "compat.h"
#include "canohost.h"
#include "sshkey.h"
#include "authfd.h"
#include "pathnames.h"
#include "match.h"
/* -- agent forwarding */
#define NUM_SOCKS 10
/* -- tcp forwarding */
/* special-case port number meaning allow any port */
#define FWD_PERMIT_ANY_PORT 0
/* special-case wildcard meaning allow any host */
#define FWD_PERMIT_ANY_HOST "*"
/* -- X11 forwarding */
/* Maximum number of fake X11 displays to try. */
#define MAX_DISPLAYS 1000
/* Per-channel callback for pre/post select() actions */
typedef void chan_fn(struct ssh *, Channel *c,
fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset);
/*
* Data structure for storing which hosts are permitted for forward requests.
* The local sides of any remote forwards are stored in this array to prevent
* a corrupt remote server from accessing arbitrary TCP/IP ports on our local
* network (which might be behind a firewall).
*/
/* XXX: streamlocal wants a path instead of host:port */
/* Overload host_to_connect; we could just make this match Forward */
/* XXX - can we use listen_host instead of listen_path? */
struct permission {
char *host_to_connect; /* Connect to 'host'. */
int port_to_connect; /* Connect to 'port'. */
char *listen_host; /* Remote side should listen address. */
char *listen_path; /* Remote side should listen path. */
int listen_port; /* Remote side should listen port. */
Channel *downstream; /* Downstream mux*/
};
/*
* Stores the forwarding permission state for a single direction (local or
* remote).
*/
struct permission_set {
/*
* List of all local permitted host/port pairs to allow for the
* user.
*/
u_int num_permitted_user;
struct permission *permitted_user;
/*
* List of all permitted host/port pairs to allow for the admin.
*/
u_int num_permitted_admin;
struct permission *permitted_admin;
/*
* If this is true, all opens/listens are permitted. This is the
* case on the server on which we have to trust the client anyway,
* and the user could do anything after logging in.
*/
int all_permitted;
};
/* Master structure for channels state */
struct ssh_channels {
/*
* Pointer to an array containing all allocated channels. The array
* is dynamically extended as needed.
*/
Channel **channels;
/*
* Size of the channel array. All slots of the array must always be
* initialized (at least the type field); unused slots set to NULL
*/
u_int channels_alloc;
/*
* Maximum file descriptor value used in any of the channels. This is
* updated in channel_new.
*/
int channel_max_fd;
/*
* 'channel_pre*' are called just before select() to add any bits
* relevant to channels in the select bitmasks.
*
* 'channel_post*': perform any appropriate operations for
* channels which have events pending.
*/
chan_fn **channel_pre;
chan_fn **channel_post;
/* -- tcp forwarding */
struct permission_set local_perms;
struct permission_set remote_perms;
/* -- X11 forwarding */
/* Saved X11 local (client) display. */
char *x11_saved_display;
/* Saved X11 authentication protocol name. */
char *x11_saved_proto;
/* Saved X11 authentication data. This is the real data. */
char *x11_saved_data;
u_int x11_saved_data_len;
/* Deadline after which all X11 connections are refused */
u_int x11_refuse_time;
/*
* Fake X11 authentication data. This is what the server will be
* sending us; we should replace any occurrences of this by the
* real data.
*/
u_char *x11_fake_data;
u_int x11_fake_data_len;
/* AF_UNSPEC or AF_INET or AF_INET6 */
int IPv4or6;
};
/* helper */
static void port_open_helper(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c, char *rtype);
static const char *channel_rfwd_bind_host(const char *listen_host);
/* non-blocking connect helpers */
static int connect_next(struct channel_connect *);
static void channel_connect_ctx_free(struct channel_connect *);
static Channel *rdynamic_connect_prepare(struct ssh *, char *, char *);
static int rdynamic_connect_finish(struct ssh *, Channel *);
/* Setup helper */
static void channel_handler_init(struct ssh_channels *sc);
/* -- channel core */
void
channel_init_channels(struct ssh *ssh)
{
struct ssh_channels *sc;
if ((sc = calloc(1, sizeof(*sc))) == NULL)
fatal("%s: allocation failed", __func__);
sc->channels_alloc = 10;
sc->channels = xcalloc(sc->channels_alloc, sizeof(*sc->channels));
sc->IPv4or6 = AF_UNSPEC;
channel_handler_init(sc);
ssh->chanctxt = sc;
}
Channel *
channel_by_id(struct ssh *ssh, int id)
{
Channel *c;
if (id < 0 || (u_int)id >= ssh->chanctxt->channels_alloc) {
logit("%s: %d: bad id", __func__, id);
return NULL;
}
c = ssh->chanctxt->channels[id];
if (c == NULL) {
logit("%s: %d: bad id: channel free", __func__, id);
return NULL;
}
return c;
}
Channel *
channel_by_remote_id(struct ssh *ssh, u_int remote_id)
{
Channel *c;
u_int i;
for (i = 0; i < ssh->chanctxt->channels_alloc; i++) {
c = ssh->chanctxt->channels[i];
if (c != NULL && c->have_remote_id && c->remote_id == remote_id)
return c;
}
return NULL;
}
/*
* Returns the channel if it is allowed to receive protocol messages.
* Private channels, like listening sockets, may not receive messages.
*/
Channel *
channel_lookup(struct ssh *ssh, int id)
{
Channel *c;
if ((c = channel_by_id(ssh, id)) == NULL)
return NULL;
switch (c->type) {
case SSH_CHANNEL_X11_OPEN:
case SSH_CHANNEL_LARVAL:
case SSH_CHANNEL_CONNECTING:
case SSH_CHANNEL_DYNAMIC:
case SSH_CHANNEL_RDYNAMIC_OPEN:
case SSH_CHANNEL_RDYNAMIC_FINISH:
case SSH_CHANNEL_OPENING:
case SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN:
case SSH_CHANNEL_ABANDONED:
case SSH_CHANNEL_MUX_PROXY:
return c;
}
logit("Non-public channel %d, type %d.", id, c->type);
return NULL;
}
/*
* Register filedescriptors for a channel, used when allocating a channel or
* when the channel consumer/producer is ready, e.g. shell exec'd
*/
static void
channel_register_fds(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c, int rfd, int wfd, int efd,
int extusage, int nonblock, int is_tty)
{
struct ssh_channels *sc = ssh->chanctxt;
/* Update the maximum file descriptor value. */
sc->channel_max_fd = MAXIMUM(sc->channel_max_fd, rfd);
sc->channel_max_fd = MAXIMUM(sc->channel_max_fd, wfd);
sc->channel_max_fd = MAXIMUM(sc->channel_max_fd, efd);
if (rfd != -1)
fcntl(rfd, F_SETFD, FD_CLOEXEC);
if (wfd != -1 && wfd != rfd)
fcntl(wfd, F_SETFD, FD_CLOEXEC);
if (efd != -1 && efd != rfd && efd != wfd)
fcntl(efd, F_SETFD, FD_CLOEXEC);
c->rfd = rfd;
c->wfd = wfd;
c->sock = (rfd == wfd) ? rfd : -1;
c->efd = efd;
c->extended_usage = extusage;
if ((c->isatty = is_tty) != 0)
debug2("channel %d: rfd %d isatty", c->self, c->rfd);
#ifdef _AIX
/* XXX: Later AIX versions can't push as much data to tty */
c->wfd_isatty = is_tty || isatty(c->wfd);
#endif
/* enable nonblocking mode */
if (nonblock) {
if (rfd != -1)
set_nonblock(rfd);
if (wfd != -1)
set_nonblock(wfd);
if (efd != -1)
set_nonblock(efd);
}
}
/*
* Allocate a new channel object and set its type and socket. This will cause
* remote_name to be freed.
*/
Channel *
channel_new(struct ssh *ssh, char *ctype, int type, int rfd, int wfd, int efd,
u_int window, u_int maxpack, int extusage, char *remote_name, int nonblock)
{
struct ssh_channels *sc = ssh->chanctxt;
u_int i, found;
Channel *c;
+ int r;
/* Try to find a free slot where to put the new channel. */
for (i = 0; i < sc->channels_alloc; i++) {
if (sc->channels[i] == NULL) {
/* Found a free slot. */
found = i;
break;
}
}
if (i >= sc->channels_alloc) {
/*
* There are no free slots. Take last+1 slot and expand
* the array.
*/
found = sc->channels_alloc;
if (sc->channels_alloc > CHANNELS_MAX_CHANNELS)
fatal("%s: internal error: channels_alloc %d too big",
__func__, sc->channels_alloc);
sc->channels = xrecallocarray(sc->channels, sc->channels_alloc,
sc->channels_alloc + 10, sizeof(*sc->channels));
sc->channels_alloc += 10;
debug2("channel: expanding %d", sc->channels_alloc);
}
/* Initialize and return new channel. */
c = sc->channels[found] = xcalloc(1, sizeof(Channel));
if ((c->input = sshbuf_new()) == NULL ||
(c->output = sshbuf_new()) == NULL ||
(c->extended = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
+ if ((r = sshbuf_set_max_size(c->input, CHAN_INPUT_MAX)) != 0)
+ fatal("%s: sshbuf_set_max_size: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
c->ostate = CHAN_OUTPUT_OPEN;
c->istate = CHAN_INPUT_OPEN;
channel_register_fds(ssh, c, rfd, wfd, efd, extusage, nonblock, 0);
c->self = found;
c->type = type;
c->ctype = ctype;
c->local_window = window;
c->local_window_max = window;
c->local_maxpacket = maxpack;
c->remote_name = xstrdup(remote_name);
c->ctl_chan = -1;
c->delayed = 1; /* prevent call to channel_post handler */
TAILQ_INIT(&c->status_confirms);
debug("channel %d: new [%s]", found, remote_name);
return c;
}
static void
channel_find_maxfd(struct ssh_channels *sc)
{
u_int i;
int max = 0;
Channel *c;
for (i = 0; i < sc->channels_alloc; i++) {
c = sc->channels[i];
if (c != NULL) {
max = MAXIMUM(max, c->rfd);
max = MAXIMUM(max, c->wfd);
max = MAXIMUM(max, c->efd);
}
}
sc->channel_max_fd = max;
}
int
channel_close_fd(struct ssh *ssh, int *fdp)
{
struct ssh_channels *sc = ssh->chanctxt;
int ret = 0, fd = *fdp;
if (fd != -1) {
ret = close(fd);
*fdp = -1;
if (fd == sc->channel_max_fd)
channel_find_maxfd(sc);
}
return ret;
}
/* Close all channel fd/socket. */
static void
channel_close_fds(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c)
{
int sock = c->sock, rfd = c->rfd, wfd = c->wfd, efd = c->efd;
channel_close_fd(ssh, &c->sock);
if (rfd != sock)
channel_close_fd(ssh, &c->rfd);
if (wfd != sock && wfd != rfd)
channel_close_fd(ssh, &c->wfd);
if (efd != sock && efd != rfd && efd != wfd)
channel_close_fd(ssh, &c->efd);
}
static void
fwd_perm_clear(struct permission *perm)
{
free(perm->host_to_connect);
free(perm->listen_host);
free(perm->listen_path);
memset(perm, 0, sizeof(*perm));
}
/* Returns an printable name for the specified forwarding permission list */
static const char *
fwd_ident(int who, int where)
{
if (who == FORWARD_ADM) {
if (where == FORWARD_LOCAL)
return "admin local";
else if (where == FORWARD_REMOTE)
return "admin remote";
} else if (who == FORWARD_USER) {
if (where == FORWARD_LOCAL)
return "user local";
else if (where == FORWARD_REMOTE)
return "user remote";
}
fatal("Unknown forward permission list %d/%d", who, where);
}
/* Returns the forwarding permission list for the specified direction */
static struct permission_set *
permission_set_get(struct ssh *ssh, int where)
{
struct ssh_channels *sc = ssh->chanctxt;
switch (where) {
case FORWARD_LOCAL:
return &sc->local_perms;
break;
case FORWARD_REMOTE:
return &sc->remote_perms;
break;
default:
fatal("%s: invalid forwarding direction %d", __func__, where);
}
}
/* Returns pointers to the specified forwarding list and its element count */
static void
permission_set_get_array(struct ssh *ssh, int who, int where,
struct permission ***permpp, u_int **npermpp)
{
struct permission_set *pset = permission_set_get(ssh, where);
switch (who) {
case FORWARD_USER:
*permpp = &pset->permitted_user;
*npermpp = &pset->num_permitted_user;
break;
case FORWARD_ADM:
*permpp = &pset->permitted_admin;
*npermpp = &pset->num_permitted_admin;
break;
default:
fatal("%s: invalid forwarding client %d", __func__, who);
}
}
/* Adds an entry to the spcified forwarding list */
static int
permission_set_add(struct ssh *ssh, int who, int where,
const char *host_to_connect, int port_to_connect,
const char *listen_host, const char *listen_path, int listen_port,
Channel *downstream)
{
struct permission **permp;
u_int n, *npermp;
permission_set_get_array(ssh, who, where, &permp, &npermp);
if (*npermp >= INT_MAX)
fatal("%s: %s overflow", __func__, fwd_ident(who, where));
*permp = xrecallocarray(*permp, *npermp, *npermp + 1, sizeof(**permp));
n = (*npermp)++;
#define MAYBE_DUP(s) ((s == NULL) ? NULL : xstrdup(s))
(*permp)[n].host_to_connect = MAYBE_DUP(host_to_connect);
(*permp)[n].port_to_connect = port_to_connect;
(*permp)[n].listen_host = MAYBE_DUP(listen_host);
(*permp)[n].listen_path = MAYBE_DUP(listen_path);
(*permp)[n].listen_port = listen_port;
(*permp)[n].downstream = downstream;
#undef MAYBE_DUP
return (int)n;
}
static void
mux_remove_remote_forwardings(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c)
{
struct ssh_channels *sc = ssh->chanctxt;
struct permission_set *pset = &sc->local_perms;
struct permission *perm;
int r;
u_int i;
for (i = 0; i < pset->num_permitted_user; i++) {
perm = &pset->permitted_user[i];
if (perm->downstream != c)
continue;
/* cancel on the server, since mux client is gone */
debug("channel %d: cleanup remote forward for %s:%u",
c->self, perm->listen_host, perm->listen_port);
if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_GLOBAL_REQUEST)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh,
"cancel-tcpip-forward")) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_u8(ssh, 0)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh,
channel_rfwd_bind_host(perm->listen_host))) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, perm->listen_port)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) {
fatal("%s: channel %i: %s", __func__,
c->self, ssh_err(r));
}
fwd_perm_clear(perm); /* unregister */
}
}
/* Free the channel and close its fd/socket. */
void
channel_free(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c)
{
struct ssh_channels *sc = ssh->chanctxt;
char *s;
u_int i, n;
Channel *other;
struct channel_confirm *cc;
for (n = 0, i = 0; i < sc->channels_alloc; i++) {
if ((other = sc->channels[i]) == NULL)
continue;
n++;
/* detach from mux client and prepare for closing */
if (c->type == SSH_CHANNEL_MUX_CLIENT &&
other->type == SSH_CHANNEL_MUX_PROXY &&
other->mux_ctx == c) {
other->mux_ctx = NULL;
other->type = SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN;
other->istate = CHAN_INPUT_CLOSED;
other->ostate = CHAN_OUTPUT_CLOSED;
}
}
debug("channel %d: free: %s, nchannels %u", c->self,
c->remote_name ? c->remote_name : "???", n);
if (c->type == SSH_CHANNEL_MUX_CLIENT)
mux_remove_remote_forwardings(ssh, c);
+ else if (c->type == SSH_CHANNEL_MUX_LISTENER) {
+ free(c->mux_ctx);
+ c->mux_ctx = NULL;
+ }
if (log_level_get() >= SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG3) {
s = channel_open_message(ssh);
debug3("channel %d: status: %s", c->self, s);
free(s);
}
channel_close_fds(ssh, c);
sshbuf_free(c->input);
sshbuf_free(c->output);
sshbuf_free(c->extended);
c->input = c->output = c->extended = NULL;
free(c->remote_name);
c->remote_name = NULL;
free(c->path);
c->path = NULL;
free(c->listening_addr);
c->listening_addr = NULL;
while ((cc = TAILQ_FIRST(&c->status_confirms)) != NULL) {
if (cc->abandon_cb != NULL)
cc->abandon_cb(ssh, c, cc->ctx);
TAILQ_REMOVE(&c->status_confirms, cc, entry);
freezero(cc, sizeof(*cc));
}
if (c->filter_cleanup != NULL && c->filter_ctx != NULL)
c->filter_cleanup(ssh, c->self, c->filter_ctx);
sc->channels[c->self] = NULL;
freezero(c, sizeof(*c));
}
void
channel_free_all(struct ssh *ssh)
{
u_int i;
struct ssh_channels *sc = ssh->chanctxt;
for (i = 0; i < sc->channels_alloc; i++)
if (sc->channels[i] != NULL)
channel_free(ssh, sc->channels[i]);
free(sc->channels);
sc->channels = NULL;
sc->channels_alloc = 0;
sc->channel_max_fd = 0;
free(sc->x11_saved_display);
sc->x11_saved_display = NULL;
free(sc->x11_saved_proto);
sc->x11_saved_proto = NULL;
free(sc->x11_saved_data);
sc->x11_saved_data = NULL;
sc->x11_saved_data_len = 0;
free(sc->x11_fake_data);
sc->x11_fake_data = NULL;
sc->x11_fake_data_len = 0;
}
/*
* Closes the sockets/fds of all channels. This is used to close extra file
* descriptors after a fork.
*/
void
channel_close_all(struct ssh *ssh)
{
u_int i;
for (i = 0; i < ssh->chanctxt->channels_alloc; i++)
if (ssh->chanctxt->channels[i] != NULL)
channel_close_fds(ssh, ssh->chanctxt->channels[i]);
}
/*
* Stop listening to channels.
*/
void
channel_stop_listening(struct ssh *ssh)
{
u_int i;
Channel *c;
for (i = 0; i < ssh->chanctxt->channels_alloc; i++) {
c = ssh->chanctxt->channels[i];
if (c != NULL) {
switch (c->type) {
case SSH_CHANNEL_AUTH_SOCKET:
case SSH_CHANNEL_PORT_LISTENER:
case SSH_CHANNEL_RPORT_LISTENER:
case SSH_CHANNEL_X11_LISTENER:
case SSH_CHANNEL_UNIX_LISTENER:
case SSH_CHANNEL_RUNIX_LISTENER:
channel_close_fd(ssh, &c->sock);
channel_free(ssh, c);
break;
}
}
}
}
/*
* Returns true if no channel has too much buffered data, and false if one or
* more channel is overfull.
*/
int
channel_not_very_much_buffered_data(struct ssh *ssh)
{
u_int i;
u_int maxsize = ssh_packet_get_maxsize(ssh);
Channel *c;
for (i = 0; i < ssh->chanctxt->channels_alloc; i++) {
c = ssh->chanctxt->channels[i];
if (c == NULL || c->type != SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN)
continue;
if (sshbuf_len(c->output) > maxsize) {
debug2("channel %d: big output buffer %zu > %u",
c->self, sshbuf_len(c->output), maxsize);
return 0;
}
}
return 1;
}
/* Returns true if any channel is still open. */
int
channel_still_open(struct ssh *ssh)
{
u_int i;
Channel *c;
for (i = 0; i < ssh->chanctxt->channels_alloc; i++) {
c = ssh->chanctxt->channels[i];
if (c == NULL)
continue;
switch (c->type) {
case SSH_CHANNEL_X11_LISTENER:
case SSH_CHANNEL_PORT_LISTENER:
case SSH_CHANNEL_RPORT_LISTENER:
case SSH_CHANNEL_MUX_LISTENER:
case SSH_CHANNEL_CLOSED:
case SSH_CHANNEL_AUTH_SOCKET:
case SSH_CHANNEL_DYNAMIC:
case SSH_CHANNEL_RDYNAMIC_OPEN:
case SSH_CHANNEL_CONNECTING:
case SSH_CHANNEL_ZOMBIE:
case SSH_CHANNEL_ABANDONED:
case SSH_CHANNEL_UNIX_LISTENER:
case SSH_CHANNEL_RUNIX_LISTENER:
continue;
case SSH_CHANNEL_LARVAL:
continue;
case SSH_CHANNEL_OPENING:
case SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN:
case SSH_CHANNEL_RDYNAMIC_FINISH:
case SSH_CHANNEL_X11_OPEN:
case SSH_CHANNEL_MUX_CLIENT:
case SSH_CHANNEL_MUX_PROXY:
return 1;
default:
fatal("%s: bad channel type %d", __func__, c->type);
/* NOTREACHED */
}
}
return 0;
}
/* Returns the id of an open channel suitable for keepaliving */
int
channel_find_open(struct ssh *ssh)
{
u_int i;
Channel *c;
for (i = 0; i < ssh->chanctxt->channels_alloc; i++) {
c = ssh->chanctxt->channels[i];
if (c == NULL || !c->have_remote_id)
continue;
switch (c->type) {
case SSH_CHANNEL_CLOSED:
case SSH_CHANNEL_DYNAMIC:
case SSH_CHANNEL_RDYNAMIC_OPEN:
case SSH_CHANNEL_RDYNAMIC_FINISH:
case SSH_CHANNEL_X11_LISTENER:
case SSH_CHANNEL_PORT_LISTENER:
case SSH_CHANNEL_RPORT_LISTENER:
case SSH_CHANNEL_MUX_LISTENER:
case SSH_CHANNEL_MUX_CLIENT:
case SSH_CHANNEL_MUX_PROXY:
case SSH_CHANNEL_OPENING:
case SSH_CHANNEL_CONNECTING:
case SSH_CHANNEL_ZOMBIE:
case SSH_CHANNEL_ABANDONED:
case SSH_CHANNEL_UNIX_LISTENER:
case SSH_CHANNEL_RUNIX_LISTENER:
continue;
case SSH_CHANNEL_LARVAL:
case SSH_CHANNEL_AUTH_SOCKET:
case SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN:
case SSH_CHANNEL_X11_OPEN:
return i;
default:
fatal("%s: bad channel type %d", __func__, c->type);
/* NOTREACHED */
}
}
return -1;
}
/* Returns the state of the channel's extended usage flag */
const char *
channel_format_extended_usage(const Channel *c)
{
if (c->efd == -1)
return "closed";
switch (c->extended_usage) {
case CHAN_EXTENDED_WRITE:
return "write";
case CHAN_EXTENDED_READ:
return "read";
case CHAN_EXTENDED_IGNORE:
return "ignore";
default:
return "UNKNOWN";
}
}
static char *
channel_format_status(const Channel *c)
{
char *ret = NULL;
xasprintf(&ret, "t%d %s%u i%u/%zu o%u/%zu e[%s]/%zu "
"fd %d/%d/%d sock %d cc %d",
c->type,
c->have_remote_id ? "r" : "nr", c->remote_id,
c->istate, sshbuf_len(c->input),
c->ostate, sshbuf_len(c->output),
channel_format_extended_usage(c), sshbuf_len(c->extended),
c->rfd, c->wfd, c->efd, c->sock, c->ctl_chan);
return ret;
}
/*
* Returns a message describing the currently open forwarded connections,
* suitable for sending to the client. The message contains crlf pairs for
* newlines.
*/
char *
channel_open_message(struct ssh *ssh)
{
struct sshbuf *buf;
Channel *c;
u_int i;
int r;
char *cp, *ret;
if ((buf = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
fatal("%s: sshbuf_new", __func__);
if ((r = sshbuf_putf(buf,
"The following connections are open:\r\n")) != 0)
fatal("%s: sshbuf_putf: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
for (i = 0; i < ssh->chanctxt->channels_alloc; i++) {
c = ssh->chanctxt->channels[i];
if (c == NULL)
continue;
switch (c->type) {
case SSH_CHANNEL_X11_LISTENER:
case SSH_CHANNEL_PORT_LISTENER:
case SSH_CHANNEL_RPORT_LISTENER:
case SSH_CHANNEL_CLOSED:
case SSH_CHANNEL_AUTH_SOCKET:
case SSH_CHANNEL_ZOMBIE:
case SSH_CHANNEL_ABANDONED:
case SSH_CHANNEL_MUX_LISTENER:
case SSH_CHANNEL_UNIX_LISTENER:
case SSH_CHANNEL_RUNIX_LISTENER:
continue;
case SSH_CHANNEL_LARVAL:
case SSH_CHANNEL_OPENING:
case SSH_CHANNEL_CONNECTING:
case SSH_CHANNEL_DYNAMIC:
case SSH_CHANNEL_RDYNAMIC_OPEN:
case SSH_CHANNEL_RDYNAMIC_FINISH:
case SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN:
case SSH_CHANNEL_X11_OPEN:
case SSH_CHANNEL_MUX_PROXY:
case SSH_CHANNEL_MUX_CLIENT:
cp = channel_format_status(c);
if ((r = sshbuf_putf(buf, " #%d %.300s (%s)\r\n",
c->self, c->remote_name, cp)) != 0) {
free(cp);
fatal("%s: sshbuf_putf: %s",
__func__, ssh_err(r));
}
free(cp);
continue;
default:
fatal("%s: bad channel type %d", __func__, c->type);
/* NOTREACHED */
}
}
if ((ret = sshbuf_dup_string(buf)) == NULL)
fatal("%s: sshbuf_dup_string", __func__);
sshbuf_free(buf);
return ret;
}
static void
open_preamble(struct ssh *ssh, const char *where, Channel *c, const char *type)
{
int r;
if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, type)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, c->self)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, c->local_window)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, c->local_maxpacket)) != 0) {
fatal("%s: channel %i: open: %s", where, c->self, ssh_err(r));
}
}
void
channel_send_open(struct ssh *ssh, int id)
{
Channel *c = channel_lookup(ssh, id);
int r;
if (c == NULL) {
logit("channel_send_open: %d: bad id", id);
return;
}
debug2("channel %d: send open", id);
open_preamble(ssh, __func__, c, c->ctype);
if ((r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0)
fatal("%s: channel %i: %s", __func__, c->self, ssh_err(r));
}
void
channel_request_start(struct ssh *ssh, int id, char *service, int wantconfirm)
{
Channel *c = channel_lookup(ssh, id);
int r;
if (c == NULL) {
logit("%s: %d: unknown channel id", __func__, id);
return;
}
if (!c->have_remote_id)
fatal(":%s: channel %d: no remote id", __func__, c->self);
debug2("channel %d: request %s confirm %d", id, service, wantconfirm);
if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_REQUEST)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, c->remote_id)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, service)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_u8(ssh, wantconfirm)) != 0) {
fatal("%s: channel %i: %s", __func__, c->self, ssh_err(r));
}
}
void
channel_register_status_confirm(struct ssh *ssh, int id,
channel_confirm_cb *cb, channel_confirm_abandon_cb *abandon_cb, void *ctx)
{
struct channel_confirm *cc;
Channel *c;
if ((c = channel_lookup(ssh, id)) == NULL)
fatal("%s: %d: bad id", __func__, id);
cc = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*cc));
cc->cb = cb;
cc->abandon_cb = abandon_cb;
cc->ctx = ctx;
TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(&c->status_confirms, cc, entry);
}
void
channel_register_open_confirm(struct ssh *ssh, int id,
channel_open_fn *fn, void *ctx)
{
Channel *c = channel_lookup(ssh, id);
if (c == NULL) {
logit("%s: %d: bad id", __func__, id);
return;
}
c->open_confirm = fn;
c->open_confirm_ctx = ctx;
}
void
channel_register_cleanup(struct ssh *ssh, int id,
channel_callback_fn *fn, int do_close)
{
Channel *c = channel_by_id(ssh, id);
if (c == NULL) {
logit("%s: %d: bad id", __func__, id);
return;
}
c->detach_user = fn;
c->detach_close = do_close;
}
void
channel_cancel_cleanup(struct ssh *ssh, int id)
{
Channel *c = channel_by_id(ssh, id);
if (c == NULL) {
logit("%s: %d: bad id", __func__, id);
return;
}
c->detach_user = NULL;
c->detach_close = 0;
}
void
channel_register_filter(struct ssh *ssh, int id, channel_infilter_fn *ifn,
channel_outfilter_fn *ofn, channel_filter_cleanup_fn *cfn, void *ctx)
{
Channel *c = channel_lookup(ssh, id);
if (c == NULL) {
logit("%s: %d: bad id", __func__, id);
return;
}
c->input_filter = ifn;
c->output_filter = ofn;
c->filter_ctx = ctx;
c->filter_cleanup = cfn;
}
void
channel_set_fds(struct ssh *ssh, int id, int rfd, int wfd, int efd,
int extusage, int nonblock, int is_tty, u_int window_max)
{
Channel *c = channel_lookup(ssh, id);
int r;
if (c == NULL || c->type != SSH_CHANNEL_LARVAL)
fatal("channel_activate for non-larval channel %d.", id);
if (!c->have_remote_id)
fatal(":%s: channel %d: no remote id", __func__, c->self);
channel_register_fds(ssh, c, rfd, wfd, efd, extusage, nonblock, is_tty);
c->type = SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN;
c->local_window = c->local_window_max = window_max;
if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_WINDOW_ADJUST)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, c->remote_id)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, c->local_window)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0)
fatal("%s: channel %i: %s", __func__, c->self, ssh_err(r));
}
static void
channel_pre_listener(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c,
fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset)
{
FD_SET(c->sock, readset);
}
static void
channel_pre_connecting(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c,
fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset)
{
debug3("channel %d: waiting for connection", c->self);
FD_SET(c->sock, writeset);
}
static void
channel_pre_open(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c,
fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset)
{
if (c->istate == CHAN_INPUT_OPEN &&
c->remote_window > 0 &&
sshbuf_len(c->input) < c->remote_window &&
sshbuf_check_reserve(c->input, CHAN_RBUF) == 0)
FD_SET(c->rfd, readset);
if (c->ostate == CHAN_OUTPUT_OPEN ||
c->ostate == CHAN_OUTPUT_WAIT_DRAIN) {
if (sshbuf_len(c->output) > 0) {
FD_SET(c->wfd, writeset);
} else if (c->ostate == CHAN_OUTPUT_WAIT_DRAIN) {
if (CHANNEL_EFD_OUTPUT_ACTIVE(c))
debug2("channel %d: "
"obuf_empty delayed efd %d/(%zu)", c->self,
c->efd, sshbuf_len(c->extended));
else
chan_obuf_empty(ssh, c);
}
}
/** XXX check close conditions, too */
if (c->efd != -1 && !(c->istate == CHAN_INPUT_CLOSED &&
c->ostate == CHAN_OUTPUT_CLOSED)) {
if (c->extended_usage == CHAN_EXTENDED_WRITE &&
sshbuf_len(c->extended) > 0)
FD_SET(c->efd, writeset);
else if (c->efd != -1 && !(c->flags & CHAN_EOF_SENT) &&
(c->extended_usage == CHAN_EXTENDED_READ ||
c->extended_usage == CHAN_EXTENDED_IGNORE) &&
sshbuf_len(c->extended) < c->remote_window)
FD_SET(c->efd, readset);
}
/* XXX: What about efd? races? */
}
/*
* This is a special state for X11 authentication spoofing. An opened X11
* connection (when authentication spoofing is being done) remains in this
* state until the first packet has been completely read. The authentication
* data in that packet is then substituted by the real data if it matches the
* fake data, and the channel is put into normal mode.
* XXX All this happens at the client side.
* Returns: 0 = need more data, -1 = wrong cookie, 1 = ok
*/
static int
x11_open_helper(struct ssh *ssh, struct sshbuf *b)
{
struct ssh_channels *sc = ssh->chanctxt;
u_char *ucp;
u_int proto_len, data_len;
/* Is this being called after the refusal deadline? */
if (sc->x11_refuse_time != 0 &&
(u_int)monotime() >= sc->x11_refuse_time) {
verbose("Rejected X11 connection after ForwardX11Timeout "
"expired");
return -1;
}
/* Check if the fixed size part of the packet is in buffer. */
if (sshbuf_len(b) < 12)
return 0;
/* Parse the lengths of variable-length fields. */
ucp = sshbuf_mutable_ptr(b);
if (ucp[0] == 0x42) { /* Byte order MSB first. */
proto_len = 256 * ucp[6] + ucp[7];
data_len = 256 * ucp[8] + ucp[9];
} else if (ucp[0] == 0x6c) { /* Byte order LSB first. */
proto_len = ucp[6] + 256 * ucp[7];
data_len = ucp[8] + 256 * ucp[9];
} else {
debug2("Initial X11 packet contains bad byte order byte: 0x%x",
ucp[0]);
return -1;
}
/* Check if the whole packet is in buffer. */
if (sshbuf_len(b) <
12 + ((proto_len + 3) & ~3) + ((data_len + 3) & ~3))
return 0;
/* Check if authentication protocol matches. */
if (proto_len != strlen(sc->x11_saved_proto) ||
memcmp(ucp + 12, sc->x11_saved_proto, proto_len) != 0) {
debug2("X11 connection uses different authentication protocol.");
return -1;
}
/* Check if authentication data matches our fake data. */
if (data_len != sc->x11_fake_data_len ||
timingsafe_bcmp(ucp + 12 + ((proto_len + 3) & ~3),
sc->x11_fake_data, sc->x11_fake_data_len) != 0) {
debug2("X11 auth data does not match fake data.");
return -1;
}
/* Check fake data length */
if (sc->x11_fake_data_len != sc->x11_saved_data_len) {
error("X11 fake_data_len %d != saved_data_len %d",
sc->x11_fake_data_len, sc->x11_saved_data_len);
return -1;
}
/*
* Received authentication protocol and data match
* our fake data. Substitute the fake data with real
* data.
*/
memcpy(ucp + 12 + ((proto_len + 3) & ~3),
sc->x11_saved_data, sc->x11_saved_data_len);
return 1;
}
static void
channel_pre_x11_open(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c,
fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset)
{
int ret = x11_open_helper(ssh, c->output);
/* c->force_drain = 1; */
if (ret == 1) {
c->type = SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN;
channel_pre_open(ssh, c, readset, writeset);
} else if (ret == -1) {
logit("X11 connection rejected because of wrong authentication.");
debug2("X11 rejected %d i%d/o%d",
c->self, c->istate, c->ostate);
chan_read_failed(ssh, c);
sshbuf_reset(c->input);
chan_ibuf_empty(ssh, c);
sshbuf_reset(c->output);
chan_write_failed(ssh, c);
debug2("X11 closed %d i%d/o%d", c->self, c->istate, c->ostate);
}
}
static void
channel_pre_mux_client(struct ssh *ssh,
Channel *c, fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset)
{
if (c->istate == CHAN_INPUT_OPEN && !c->mux_pause &&
sshbuf_check_reserve(c->input, CHAN_RBUF) == 0)
FD_SET(c->rfd, readset);
if (c->istate == CHAN_INPUT_WAIT_DRAIN) {
/* clear buffer immediately (discard any partial packet) */
sshbuf_reset(c->input);
chan_ibuf_empty(ssh, c);
/* Start output drain. XXX just kill chan? */
chan_rcvd_oclose(ssh, c);
}
if (c->ostate == CHAN_OUTPUT_OPEN ||
c->ostate == CHAN_OUTPUT_WAIT_DRAIN) {
if (sshbuf_len(c->output) > 0)
FD_SET(c->wfd, writeset);
else if (c->ostate == CHAN_OUTPUT_WAIT_DRAIN)
chan_obuf_empty(ssh, c);
}
}
/* try to decode a socks4 header */
static int
channel_decode_socks4(Channel *c, struct sshbuf *input, struct sshbuf *output)
{
const u_char *p;
char *host;
u_int len, have, i, found, need;
char username[256];
struct {
u_int8_t version;
u_int8_t command;
u_int16_t dest_port;
struct in_addr dest_addr;
} s4_req, s4_rsp;
int r;
debug2("channel %d: decode socks4", c->self);
have = sshbuf_len(input);
len = sizeof(s4_req);
if (have < len)
return 0;
p = sshbuf_ptr(input);
need = 1;
/* SOCKS4A uses an invalid IP address 0.0.0.x */
if (p[4] == 0 && p[5] == 0 && p[6] == 0 && p[7] != 0) {
debug2("channel %d: socks4a request", c->self);
/* ... and needs an extra string (the hostname) */
need = 2;
}
/* Check for terminating NUL on the string(s) */
for (found = 0, i = len; i < have; i++) {
if (p[i] == '\0') {
found++;
if (found == need)
break;
}
if (i > 1024) {
/* the peer is probably sending garbage */
debug("channel %d: decode socks4: too long",
c->self);
return -1;
}
}
if (found < need)
return 0;
if ((r = sshbuf_get(input, &s4_req.version, 1)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get(input, &s4_req.command, 1)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get(input, &s4_req.dest_port, 2)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get(input, &s4_req.dest_addr, 4)) != 0) {
debug("channels %d: decode socks4: %s", c->self, ssh_err(r));
return -1;
}
have = sshbuf_len(input);
p = sshbuf_ptr(input);
if (memchr(p, '\0', have) == NULL) {
error("channel %d: decode socks4: user not nul terminated",
c->self);
return -1;
}
len = strlen(p);
debug2("channel %d: decode socks4: user %s/%d", c->self, p, len);
len++; /* trailing '\0' */
strlcpy(username, p, sizeof(username));
if ((r = sshbuf_consume(input, len)) != 0) {
fatal("%s: channel %d: consume: %s", __func__,
c->self, ssh_err(r));
}
free(c->path);
c->path = NULL;
if (need == 1) { /* SOCKS4: one string */
host = inet_ntoa(s4_req.dest_addr);
c->path = xstrdup(host);
} else { /* SOCKS4A: two strings */
have = sshbuf_len(input);
p = sshbuf_ptr(input);
if (memchr(p, '\0', have) == NULL) {
error("channel %d: decode socks4a: host not nul "
"terminated", c->self);
return -1;
}
len = strlen(p);
debug2("channel %d: decode socks4a: host %s/%d",
c->self, p, len);
len++; /* trailing '\0' */
if (len > NI_MAXHOST) {
error("channel %d: hostname \"%.100s\" too long",
c->self, p);
return -1;
}
c->path = xstrdup(p);
if ((r = sshbuf_consume(input, len)) != 0) {
fatal("%s: channel %d: consume: %s", __func__,
c->self, ssh_err(r));
}
}
c->host_port = ntohs(s4_req.dest_port);
debug2("channel %d: dynamic request: socks4 host %s port %u command %u",
c->self, c->path, c->host_port, s4_req.command);
if (s4_req.command != 1) {
debug("channel %d: cannot handle: %s cn %d",
c->self, need == 1 ? "SOCKS4" : "SOCKS4A", s4_req.command);
return -1;
}
s4_rsp.version = 0; /* vn: 0 for reply */
s4_rsp.command = 90; /* cd: req granted */
s4_rsp.dest_port = 0; /* ignored */
s4_rsp.dest_addr.s_addr = INADDR_ANY; /* ignored */
if ((r = sshbuf_put(output, &s4_rsp, sizeof(s4_rsp))) != 0) {
fatal("%s: channel %d: append reply: %s", __func__,
c->self, ssh_err(r));
}
return 1;
}
/* try to decode a socks5 header */
#define SSH_SOCKS5_AUTHDONE 0x1000
#define SSH_SOCKS5_NOAUTH 0x00
#define SSH_SOCKS5_IPV4 0x01
#define SSH_SOCKS5_DOMAIN 0x03
#define SSH_SOCKS5_IPV6 0x04
#define SSH_SOCKS5_CONNECT 0x01
#define SSH_SOCKS5_SUCCESS 0x00
static int
channel_decode_socks5(Channel *c, struct sshbuf *input, struct sshbuf *output)
{
/* XXX use get/put_u8 instead of trusting struct padding */
struct {
u_int8_t version;
u_int8_t command;
u_int8_t reserved;
u_int8_t atyp;
} s5_req, s5_rsp;
u_int16_t dest_port;
char dest_addr[255+1], ntop[INET6_ADDRSTRLEN];
const u_char *p;
u_int have, need, i, found, nmethods, addrlen, af;
int r;
debug2("channel %d: decode socks5", c->self);
p = sshbuf_ptr(input);
if (p[0] != 0x05)
return -1;
have = sshbuf_len(input);
if (!(c->flags & SSH_SOCKS5_AUTHDONE)) {
/* format: ver | nmethods | methods */
if (have < 2)
return 0;
nmethods = p[1];
if (have < nmethods + 2)
return 0;
/* look for method: "NO AUTHENTICATION REQUIRED" */
for (found = 0, i = 2; i < nmethods + 2; i++) {
if (p[i] == SSH_SOCKS5_NOAUTH) {
found = 1;
break;
}
}
if (!found) {
debug("channel %d: method SSH_SOCKS5_NOAUTH not found",
c->self);
return -1;
}
if ((r = sshbuf_consume(input, nmethods + 2)) != 0) {
fatal("%s: channel %d: consume: %s", __func__,
c->self, ssh_err(r));
}
/* version, method */
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(output, 0x05)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u8(output, SSH_SOCKS5_NOAUTH)) != 0) {
fatal("%s: channel %d: append reply: %s", __func__,
c->self, ssh_err(r));
}
c->flags |= SSH_SOCKS5_AUTHDONE;
debug2("channel %d: socks5 auth done", c->self);
return 0; /* need more */
}
debug2("channel %d: socks5 post auth", c->self);
if (have < sizeof(s5_req)+1)
return 0; /* need more */
memcpy(&s5_req, p, sizeof(s5_req));
if (s5_req.version != 0x05 ||
s5_req.command != SSH_SOCKS5_CONNECT ||
s5_req.reserved != 0x00) {
debug2("channel %d: only socks5 connect supported", c->self);
return -1;
}
switch (s5_req.atyp){
case SSH_SOCKS5_IPV4:
addrlen = 4;
af = AF_INET;
break;
case SSH_SOCKS5_DOMAIN:
addrlen = p[sizeof(s5_req)];
af = -1;
break;
case SSH_SOCKS5_IPV6:
addrlen = 16;
af = AF_INET6;
break;
default:
debug2("channel %d: bad socks5 atyp %d", c->self, s5_req.atyp);
return -1;
}
need = sizeof(s5_req) + addrlen + 2;
if (s5_req.atyp == SSH_SOCKS5_DOMAIN)
need++;
if (have < need)
return 0;
if ((r = sshbuf_consume(input, sizeof(s5_req))) != 0) {
fatal("%s: channel %d: consume: %s", __func__,
c->self, ssh_err(r));
}
if (s5_req.atyp == SSH_SOCKS5_DOMAIN) {
/* host string length */
if ((r = sshbuf_consume(input, 1)) != 0) {
fatal("%s: channel %d: consume: %s", __func__,
c->self, ssh_err(r));
}
}
if ((r = sshbuf_get(input, &dest_addr, addrlen)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get(input, &dest_port, 2)) != 0) {
debug("channel %d: parse addr/port: %s", c->self, ssh_err(r));
return -1;
}
dest_addr[addrlen] = '\0';
free(c->path);
c->path = NULL;
if (s5_req.atyp == SSH_SOCKS5_DOMAIN) {
if (addrlen >= NI_MAXHOST) {
error("channel %d: dynamic request: socks5 hostname "
"\"%.100s\" too long", c->self, dest_addr);
return -1;
}
c->path = xstrdup(dest_addr);
} else {
if (inet_ntop(af, dest_addr, ntop, sizeof(ntop)) == NULL)
return -1;
c->path = xstrdup(ntop);
}
c->host_port = ntohs(dest_port);
debug2("channel %d: dynamic request: socks5 host %s port %u command %u",
c->self, c->path, c->host_port, s5_req.command);
s5_rsp.version = 0x05;
s5_rsp.command = SSH_SOCKS5_SUCCESS;
s5_rsp.reserved = 0; /* ignored */
s5_rsp.atyp = SSH_SOCKS5_IPV4;
dest_port = 0; /* ignored */
if ((r = sshbuf_put(output, &s5_rsp, sizeof(s5_rsp))) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u32(output, ntohl(INADDR_ANY))) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put(output, &dest_port, sizeof(dest_port))) != 0)
fatal("%s: channel %d: append reply: %s", __func__,
c->self, ssh_err(r));
return 1;
}
Channel *
channel_connect_stdio_fwd(struct ssh *ssh,
const char *host_to_connect, u_short port_to_connect, int in, int out)
{
Channel *c;
debug("%s %s:%d", __func__, host_to_connect, port_to_connect);
c = channel_new(ssh, "stdio-forward", SSH_CHANNEL_OPENING, in, out,
-1, CHAN_TCP_WINDOW_DEFAULT, CHAN_TCP_PACKET_DEFAULT,
0, "stdio-forward", /*nonblock*/0);
c->path = xstrdup(host_to_connect);
c->host_port = port_to_connect;
c->listening_port = 0;
c->force_drain = 1;
channel_register_fds(ssh, c, in, out, -1, 0, 1, 0);
port_open_helper(ssh, c, "direct-tcpip");
return c;
}
/* dynamic port forwarding */
static void
channel_pre_dynamic(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c,
fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset)
{
const u_char *p;
u_int have;
int ret;
have = sshbuf_len(c->input);
debug2("channel %d: pre_dynamic: have %d", c->self, have);
/* sshbuf_dump(c->input, stderr); */
/* check if the fixed size part of the packet is in buffer. */
if (have < 3) {
/* need more */
FD_SET(c->sock, readset);
return;
}
/* try to guess the protocol */
p = sshbuf_ptr(c->input);
/* XXX sshbuf_peek_u8? */
switch (p[0]) {
case 0x04:
ret = channel_decode_socks4(c, c->input, c->output);
break;
case 0x05:
ret = channel_decode_socks5(c, c->input, c->output);
break;
default:
ret = -1;
break;
}
if (ret < 0) {
chan_mark_dead(ssh, c);
} else if (ret == 0) {
debug2("channel %d: pre_dynamic: need more", c->self);
/* need more */
FD_SET(c->sock, readset);
if (sshbuf_len(c->output))
FD_SET(c->sock, writeset);
} else {
/* switch to the next state */
c->type = SSH_CHANNEL_OPENING;
port_open_helper(ssh, c, "direct-tcpip");
}
}
/* simulate read-error */
static void
rdynamic_close(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c)
{
c->type = SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN;
chan_read_failed(ssh, c);
sshbuf_reset(c->input);
chan_ibuf_empty(ssh, c);
sshbuf_reset(c->output);
chan_write_failed(ssh, c);
}
/* reverse dynamic port forwarding */
static void
channel_before_prepare_select_rdynamic(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c)
{
const u_char *p;
u_int have, len;
int r, ret;
have = sshbuf_len(c->output);
debug2("channel %d: pre_rdynamic: have %d", c->self, have);
/* sshbuf_dump(c->output, stderr); */
/* EOF received */
if (c->flags & CHAN_EOF_RCVD) {
if ((r = sshbuf_consume(c->output, have)) != 0) {
fatal("%s: channel %d: consume: %s",
__func__, c->self, ssh_err(r));
}
rdynamic_close(ssh, c);
return;
}
/* check if the fixed size part of the packet is in buffer. */
if (have < 3)
return;
/* try to guess the protocol */
p = sshbuf_ptr(c->output);
switch (p[0]) {
case 0x04:
/* switch input/output for reverse forwarding */
ret = channel_decode_socks4(c, c->output, c->input);
break;
case 0x05:
ret = channel_decode_socks5(c, c->output, c->input);
break;
default:
ret = -1;
break;
}
if (ret < 0) {
rdynamic_close(ssh, c);
} else if (ret == 0) {
debug2("channel %d: pre_rdynamic: need more", c->self);
/* send socks request to peer */
len = sshbuf_len(c->input);
if (len > 0 && len < c->remote_window) {
if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, c->remote_id)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_stringb(ssh, c->input)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) {
fatal("%s: channel %i: rdynamic: %s", __func__,
c->self, ssh_err(r));
}
if ((r = sshbuf_consume(c->input, len)) != 0) {
fatal("%s: channel %d: consume: %s",
__func__, c->self, ssh_err(r));
}
c->remote_window -= len;
}
} else if (rdynamic_connect_finish(ssh, c) < 0) {
/* the connect failed */
rdynamic_close(ssh, c);
}
}
/* This is our fake X11 server socket. */
static void
channel_post_x11_listener(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c,
fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset)
{
Channel *nc;
struct sockaddr_storage addr;
int r, newsock, oerrno, remote_port;
socklen_t addrlen;
char buf[16384], *remote_ipaddr;
if (!FD_ISSET(c->sock, readset))
return;
debug("X11 connection requested.");
addrlen = sizeof(addr);
newsock = accept(c->sock, (struct sockaddr *)&addr, &addrlen);
if (c->single_connection) {
oerrno = errno;
debug2("single_connection: closing X11 listener.");
channel_close_fd(ssh, &c->sock);
chan_mark_dead(ssh, c);
errno = oerrno;
}
if (newsock == -1) {
if (errno != EINTR && errno != EWOULDBLOCK &&
errno != ECONNABORTED)
error("accept: %.100s", strerror(errno));
if (errno == EMFILE || errno == ENFILE)
c->notbefore = monotime() + 1;
return;
}
set_nodelay(newsock);
remote_ipaddr = get_peer_ipaddr(newsock);
remote_port = get_peer_port(newsock);
snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "X11 connection from %.200s port %d",
remote_ipaddr, remote_port);
nc = channel_new(ssh, "accepted x11 socket",
SSH_CHANNEL_OPENING, newsock, newsock, -1,
c->local_window_max, c->local_maxpacket, 0, buf, 1);
open_preamble(ssh, __func__, nc, "x11");
if ((r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, remote_ipaddr)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, remote_port)) != 0) {
fatal("%s: channel %i: reply %s", __func__,
c->self, ssh_err(r));
}
if ((r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0)
fatal("%s: channel %i: send %s", __func__, c->self, ssh_err(r));
free(remote_ipaddr);
}
static void
port_open_helper(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c, char *rtype)
{
char *local_ipaddr = get_local_ipaddr(c->sock);
int local_port = c->sock == -1 ? 65536 : get_local_port(c->sock);
char *remote_ipaddr = get_peer_ipaddr(c->sock);
int remote_port = get_peer_port(c->sock);
int r;
if (remote_port == -1) {
/* Fake addr/port to appease peers that validate it (Tectia) */
free(remote_ipaddr);
remote_ipaddr = xstrdup("127.0.0.1");
remote_port = 65535;
}
free(c->remote_name);
xasprintf(&c->remote_name,
"%s: listening port %d for %.100s port %d, "
"connect from %.200s port %d to %.100s port %d",
rtype, c->listening_port, c->path, c->host_port,
remote_ipaddr, remote_port, local_ipaddr, local_port);
open_preamble(ssh, __func__, c, rtype);
if (strcmp(rtype, "direct-tcpip") == 0) {
/* target host, port */
if ((r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, c->path)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, c->host_port)) != 0) {
fatal("%s: channel %i: reply %s", __func__,
c->self, ssh_err(r));
}
} else if (strcmp(rtype, "direct-streamlocal@openssh.com") == 0) {
/* target path */
if ((r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, c->path)) != 0) {
fatal("%s: channel %i: reply %s", __func__,
c->self, ssh_err(r));
}
} else if (strcmp(rtype, "forwarded-streamlocal@openssh.com") == 0) {
/* listen path */
if ((r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, c->path)) != 0) {
fatal("%s: channel %i: reply %s", __func__,
c->self, ssh_err(r));
}
} else {
/* listen address, port */
if ((r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, c->path)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, local_port)) != 0) {
fatal("%s: channel %i: reply %s", __func__,
c->self, ssh_err(r));
}
}
if (strcmp(rtype, "forwarded-streamlocal@openssh.com") == 0) {
/* reserved for future owner/mode info */
if ((r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, "")) != 0) {
fatal("%s: channel %i: reply %s", __func__,
c->self, ssh_err(r));
}
} else {
/* originator host and port */
if ((r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, remote_ipaddr)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, (u_int)remote_port)) != 0) {
fatal("%s: channel %i: reply %s", __func__,
c->self, ssh_err(r));
}
}
if ((r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0)
fatal("%s: channel %i: send %s", __func__, c->self, ssh_err(r));
free(remote_ipaddr);
free(local_ipaddr);
}
void
channel_set_x11_refuse_time(struct ssh *ssh, u_int refuse_time)
{
ssh->chanctxt->x11_refuse_time = refuse_time;
}
/*
* This socket is listening for connections to a forwarded TCP/IP port.
*/
static void
channel_post_port_listener(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c,
fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset)
{
Channel *nc;
struct sockaddr_storage addr;
int newsock, nextstate;
socklen_t addrlen;
char *rtype;
if (!FD_ISSET(c->sock, readset))
return;
debug("Connection to port %d forwarding to %.100s port %d requested.",
c->listening_port, c->path, c->host_port);
if (c->type == SSH_CHANNEL_RPORT_LISTENER) {
nextstate = SSH_CHANNEL_OPENING;
rtype = "forwarded-tcpip";
} else if (c->type == SSH_CHANNEL_RUNIX_LISTENER) {
nextstate = SSH_CHANNEL_OPENING;
rtype = "forwarded-streamlocal@openssh.com";
} else if (c->host_port == PORT_STREAMLOCAL) {
nextstate = SSH_CHANNEL_OPENING;
rtype = "direct-streamlocal@openssh.com";
} else if (c->host_port == 0) {
nextstate = SSH_CHANNEL_DYNAMIC;
rtype = "dynamic-tcpip";
} else {
nextstate = SSH_CHANNEL_OPENING;
rtype = "direct-tcpip";
}
addrlen = sizeof(addr);
newsock = accept(c->sock, (struct sockaddr *)&addr, &addrlen);
if (newsock == -1) {
if (errno != EINTR && errno != EWOULDBLOCK &&
errno != ECONNABORTED)
error("accept: %.100s", strerror(errno));
if (errno == EMFILE || errno == ENFILE)
c->notbefore = monotime() + 1;
return;
}
if (c->host_port != PORT_STREAMLOCAL)
set_nodelay(newsock);
nc = channel_new(ssh, rtype, nextstate, newsock, newsock, -1,
c->local_window_max, c->local_maxpacket, 0, rtype, 1);
nc->listening_port = c->listening_port;
nc->host_port = c->host_port;
if (c->path != NULL)
nc->path = xstrdup(c->path);
if (nextstate != SSH_CHANNEL_DYNAMIC)
port_open_helper(ssh, nc, rtype);
}
/*
* This is the authentication agent socket listening for connections from
* clients.
*/
static void
channel_post_auth_listener(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c,
fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset)
{
Channel *nc;
int r, newsock;
struct sockaddr_storage addr;
socklen_t addrlen;
if (!FD_ISSET(c->sock, readset))
return;
addrlen = sizeof(addr);
newsock = accept(c->sock, (struct sockaddr *)&addr, &addrlen);
if (newsock == -1) {
error("accept from auth socket: %.100s", strerror(errno));
if (errno == EMFILE || errno == ENFILE)
c->notbefore = monotime() + 1;
return;
}
nc = channel_new(ssh, "accepted auth socket",
SSH_CHANNEL_OPENING, newsock, newsock, -1,
c->local_window_max, c->local_maxpacket,
0, "accepted auth socket", 1);
open_preamble(ssh, __func__, nc, "auth-agent@openssh.com");
if ((r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0)
fatal("%s: channel %i: %s", __func__, c->self, ssh_err(r));
}
static void
channel_post_connecting(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c,
fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset)
{
int err = 0, sock, isopen, r;
socklen_t sz = sizeof(err);
if (!FD_ISSET(c->sock, writeset))
return;
if (!c->have_remote_id)
fatal(":%s: channel %d: no remote id", __func__, c->self);
/* for rdynamic the OPEN_CONFIRMATION has been sent already */
isopen = (c->type == SSH_CHANNEL_RDYNAMIC_FINISH);
if (getsockopt(c->sock, SOL_SOCKET, SO_ERROR, &err, &sz) == -1) {
err = errno;
error("getsockopt SO_ERROR failed");
}
if (err == 0) {
debug("channel %d: connected to %s port %d",
c->self, c->connect_ctx.host, c->connect_ctx.port);
channel_connect_ctx_free(&c->connect_ctx);
c->type = SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN;
if (isopen) {
/* no message necessary */
} else {
if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh,
SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, c->remote_id)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, c->self)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, c->local_window)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, c->local_maxpacket))
!= 0)
fatal("%s: channel %i: confirm: %s", __func__,
c->self, ssh_err(r));
if ((r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0)
fatal("%s: channel %i: %s", __func__, c->self,
ssh_err(r));
}
} else {
debug("channel %d: connection failed: %s",
c->self, strerror(err));
/* Try next address, if any */
if ((sock = connect_next(&c->connect_ctx)) > 0) {
close(c->sock);
c->sock = c->rfd = c->wfd = sock;
channel_find_maxfd(ssh->chanctxt);
return;
}
/* Exhausted all addresses */
error("connect_to %.100s port %d: failed.",
c->connect_ctx.host, c->connect_ctx.port);
channel_connect_ctx_free(&c->connect_ctx);
if (isopen) {
rdynamic_close(ssh, c);
} else {
if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh,
SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, c->remote_id)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh,
SSH2_OPEN_CONNECT_FAILED)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, strerror(err))) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, "")) != 0) {
fatal("%s: channel %i: failure: %s", __func__,
c->self, ssh_err(r));
}
if ((r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0)
fatal("%s: channel %i: %s", __func__, c->self,
ssh_err(r));
chan_mark_dead(ssh, c);
}
}
}
static int
channel_handle_rfd(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c,
fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset)
{
char buf[CHAN_RBUF];
ssize_t len;
int r, force;
force = c->isatty && c->detach_close && c->istate != CHAN_INPUT_CLOSED;
if (c->rfd == -1 || (!force && !FD_ISSET(c->rfd, readset)))
return 1;
errno = 0;
len = read(c->rfd, buf, sizeof(buf));
if (len == -1 && (errno == EINTR ||
((errno == EAGAIN || errno == EWOULDBLOCK) && !force)))
return 1;
#ifndef PTY_ZEROREAD
if (len <= 0) {
#else
if ((!c->isatty && len <= 0) ||
(c->isatty && (len < 0 || (len == 0 && errno != 0)))) {
#endif
debug2("channel %d: read<=0 rfd %d len %zd",
c->self, c->rfd, len);
if (c->type != SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN) {
debug2("channel %d: not open", c->self);
chan_mark_dead(ssh, c);
return -1;
} else {
chan_read_failed(ssh, c);
}
return -1;
}
if (c->input_filter != NULL) {
if (c->input_filter(ssh, c, buf, len) == -1) {
debug2("channel %d: filter stops", c->self);
chan_read_failed(ssh, c);
}
} else if (c->datagram) {
if ((r = sshbuf_put_string(c->input, buf, len)) != 0)
fatal("%s: channel %d: put datagram: %s", __func__,
c->self, ssh_err(r));
} else if ((r = sshbuf_put(c->input, buf, len)) != 0) {
fatal("%s: channel %d: put data: %s", __func__,
c->self, ssh_err(r));
}
return 1;
}
static int
channel_handle_wfd(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c,
fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset)
{
struct termios tio;
u_char *data = NULL, *buf; /* XXX const; need filter API change */
size_t dlen, olen = 0;
int r, len;
if (c->wfd == -1 || !FD_ISSET(c->wfd, writeset) ||
sshbuf_len(c->output) == 0)
return 1;
/* Send buffered output data to the socket. */
olen = sshbuf_len(c->output);
if (c->output_filter != NULL) {
if ((buf = c->output_filter(ssh, c, &data, &dlen)) == NULL) {
debug2("channel %d: filter stops", c->self);
if (c->type != SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN)
chan_mark_dead(ssh, c);
else
chan_write_failed(ssh, c);
return -1;
}
} else if (c->datagram) {
if ((r = sshbuf_get_string(c->output, &data, &dlen)) != 0)
fatal("%s: channel %d: get datagram: %s", __func__,
c->self, ssh_err(r));
buf = data;
} else {
buf = data = sshbuf_mutable_ptr(c->output);
dlen = sshbuf_len(c->output);
}
if (c->datagram) {
/* ignore truncated writes, datagrams might get lost */
len = write(c->wfd, buf, dlen);
free(data);
if (len == -1 && (errno == EINTR || errno == EAGAIN ||
errno == EWOULDBLOCK))
return 1;
if (len <= 0)
goto write_fail;
goto out;
}
#ifdef _AIX
/* XXX: Later AIX versions can't push as much data to tty */
if (c->wfd_isatty)
dlen = MIN(dlen, 8*1024);
#endif
len = write(c->wfd, buf, dlen);
if (len == -1 &&
(errno == EINTR || errno == EAGAIN || errno == EWOULDBLOCK))
return 1;
if (len <= 0) {
write_fail:
if (c->type != SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN) {
debug2("channel %d: not open", c->self);
chan_mark_dead(ssh, c);
return -1;
} else {
chan_write_failed(ssh, c);
}
return -1;
}
#ifndef BROKEN_TCGETATTR_ICANON
if (c->isatty && dlen >= 1 && buf[0] != '\r') {
if (tcgetattr(c->wfd, &tio) == 0 &&
!(tio.c_lflag & ECHO) && (tio.c_lflag & ICANON)) {
/*
* Simulate echo to reduce the impact of
* traffic analysis. We need to match the
* size of a SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA message
* (4 byte channel id + buf)
*/
if ((r = sshpkt_msg_ignore(ssh, 4+len)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0)
fatal("%s: channel %d: ignore: %s",
__func__, c->self, ssh_err(r));
}
}
#endif /* BROKEN_TCGETATTR_ICANON */
if ((r = sshbuf_consume(c->output, len)) != 0) {
fatal("%s: channel %d: consume: %s",
__func__, c->self, ssh_err(r));
}
out:
c->local_consumed += olen - sshbuf_len(c->output);
return 1;
}
static int
channel_handle_efd_write(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c,
fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset)
{
int r;
ssize_t len;
if (!FD_ISSET(c->efd, writeset) || sshbuf_len(c->extended) == 0)
return 1;
len = write(c->efd, sshbuf_ptr(c->extended),
sshbuf_len(c->extended));
debug2("channel %d: written %zd to efd %d", c->self, len, c->efd);
if (len == -1 && (errno == EINTR || errno == EAGAIN ||
errno == EWOULDBLOCK))
return 1;
if (len <= 0) {
debug2("channel %d: closing write-efd %d", c->self, c->efd);
channel_close_fd(ssh, &c->efd);
} else {
if ((r = sshbuf_consume(c->extended, len)) != 0) {
fatal("%s: channel %d: consume: %s",
__func__, c->self, ssh_err(r));
}
c->local_consumed += len;
}
return 1;
}
static int
channel_handle_efd_read(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c,
fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset)
{
char buf[CHAN_RBUF];
ssize_t len;
int r, force;
force = c->isatty && c->detach_close && c->istate != CHAN_INPUT_CLOSED;
if (c->efd == -1 || (!force && !FD_ISSET(c->efd, readset)))
return 1;
len = read(c->efd, buf, sizeof(buf));
debug2("channel %d: read %zd from efd %d", c->self, len, c->efd);
if (len == -1 && (errno == EINTR || ((errno == EAGAIN ||
errno == EWOULDBLOCK) && !force)))
return 1;
if (len <= 0) {
debug2("channel %d: closing read-efd %d",
c->self, c->efd);
channel_close_fd(ssh, &c->efd);
} else {
if (c->extended_usage == CHAN_EXTENDED_IGNORE) {
debug3("channel %d: discard efd",
c->self);
} else if ((r = sshbuf_put(c->extended, buf, len)) != 0) {
fatal("%s: channel %d: append: %s",
__func__, c->self, ssh_err(r));
}
}
return 1;
}
static int
channel_handle_efd(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c,
fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset)
{
if (c->efd == -1)
return 1;
/** XXX handle drain efd, too */
if (c->extended_usage == CHAN_EXTENDED_WRITE)
return channel_handle_efd_write(ssh, c, readset, writeset);
else if (c->extended_usage == CHAN_EXTENDED_READ ||
c->extended_usage == CHAN_EXTENDED_IGNORE)
return channel_handle_efd_read(ssh, c, readset, writeset);
return 1;
}
static int
channel_check_window(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c)
{
int r;
if (c->type == SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN &&
!(c->flags & (CHAN_CLOSE_SENT|CHAN_CLOSE_RCVD)) &&
((c->local_window_max - c->local_window >
c->local_maxpacket*3) ||
c->local_window < c->local_window_max/2) &&
c->local_consumed > 0) {
if (!c->have_remote_id)
fatal(":%s: channel %d: no remote id",
__func__, c->self);
if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh,
SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_WINDOW_ADJUST)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, c->remote_id)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, c->local_consumed)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) {
fatal("%s: channel %i: %s", __func__,
c->self, ssh_err(r));
}
debug2("channel %d: window %d sent adjust %d",
c->self, c->local_window,
c->local_consumed);
c->local_window += c->local_consumed;
c->local_consumed = 0;
}
return 1;
}
static void
channel_post_open(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c,
fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset)
{
channel_handle_rfd(ssh, c, readset, writeset);
channel_handle_wfd(ssh, c, readset, writeset);
channel_handle_efd(ssh, c, readset, writeset);
channel_check_window(ssh, c);
}
static u_int
read_mux(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c, u_int need)
{
char buf[CHAN_RBUF];
ssize_t len;
u_int rlen;
int r;
if (sshbuf_len(c->input) < need) {
rlen = need - sshbuf_len(c->input);
len = read(c->rfd, buf, MINIMUM(rlen, CHAN_RBUF));
if (len == -1 && (errno == EINTR || errno == EAGAIN))
return sshbuf_len(c->input);
if (len <= 0) {
debug2("channel %d: ctl read<=0 rfd %d len %zd",
c->self, c->rfd, len);
chan_read_failed(ssh, c);
return 0;
} else if ((r = sshbuf_put(c->input, buf, len)) != 0) {
fatal("%s: channel %d: append: %s",
__func__, c->self, ssh_err(r));
}
}
return sshbuf_len(c->input);
}
static void
channel_post_mux_client_read(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c,
fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset)
{
u_int need;
if (c->rfd == -1 || !FD_ISSET(c->rfd, readset))
return;
if (c->istate != CHAN_INPUT_OPEN && c->istate != CHAN_INPUT_WAIT_DRAIN)
return;
if (c->mux_pause)
return;
/*
* Don't not read past the precise end of packets to
* avoid disrupting fd passing.
*/
if (read_mux(ssh, c, 4) < 4) /* read header */
return;
/* XXX sshbuf_peek_u32 */
need = PEEK_U32(sshbuf_ptr(c->input));
#define CHANNEL_MUX_MAX_PACKET (256 * 1024)
if (need > CHANNEL_MUX_MAX_PACKET) {
debug2("channel %d: packet too big %u > %u",
c->self, CHANNEL_MUX_MAX_PACKET, need);
chan_rcvd_oclose(ssh, c);
return;
}
if (read_mux(ssh, c, need + 4) < need + 4) /* read body */
return;
if (c->mux_rcb(ssh, c) != 0) {
debug("channel %d: mux_rcb failed", c->self);
chan_mark_dead(ssh, c);
return;
}
}
static void
channel_post_mux_client_write(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c,
fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset)
{
ssize_t len;
int r;
if (c->wfd == -1 || !FD_ISSET(c->wfd, writeset) ||
sshbuf_len(c->output) == 0)
return;
len = write(c->wfd, sshbuf_ptr(c->output), sshbuf_len(c->output));
if (len == -1 && (errno == EINTR || errno == EAGAIN))
return;
if (len <= 0) {
chan_mark_dead(ssh, c);
return;
}
if ((r = sshbuf_consume(c->output, len)) != 0)
fatal("%s: channel %d: consume: %s", __func__,
c->self, ssh_err(r));
}
static void
channel_post_mux_client(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c,
fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset)
{
channel_post_mux_client_read(ssh, c, readset, writeset);
channel_post_mux_client_write(ssh, c, readset, writeset);
}
static void
channel_post_mux_listener(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c,
fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset)
{
Channel *nc;
struct sockaddr_storage addr;
socklen_t addrlen;
int newsock;
uid_t euid;
gid_t egid;
if (!FD_ISSET(c->sock, readset))
return;
debug("multiplexing control connection");
/*
* Accept connection on control socket
*/
memset(&addr, 0, sizeof(addr));
addrlen = sizeof(addr);
if ((newsock = accept(c->sock, (struct sockaddr*)&addr,
&addrlen)) == -1) {
error("%s accept: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
if (errno == EMFILE || errno == ENFILE)
c->notbefore = monotime() + 1;
return;
}
if (getpeereid(newsock, &euid, &egid) == -1) {
error("%s getpeereid failed: %s", __func__,
strerror(errno));
close(newsock);
return;
}
if ((euid != 0) && (getuid() != euid)) {
error("multiplex uid mismatch: peer euid %u != uid %u",
(u_int)euid, (u_int)getuid());
close(newsock);
return;
}
nc = channel_new(ssh, "multiplex client", SSH_CHANNEL_MUX_CLIENT,
newsock, newsock, -1, c->local_window_max,
c->local_maxpacket, 0, "mux-control", 1);
nc->mux_rcb = c->mux_rcb;
debug3("%s: new mux channel %d fd %d", __func__, nc->self, nc->sock);
/* establish state */
nc->mux_rcb(ssh, nc);
/* mux state transitions must not elicit protocol messages */
nc->flags |= CHAN_LOCAL;
}
static void
channel_handler_init(struct ssh_channels *sc)
{
chan_fn **pre, **post;
if ((pre = calloc(SSH_CHANNEL_MAX_TYPE, sizeof(*pre))) == NULL ||
(post = calloc(SSH_CHANNEL_MAX_TYPE, sizeof(*post))) == NULL)
fatal("%s: allocation failed", __func__);
pre[SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN] = &channel_pre_open;
pre[SSH_CHANNEL_X11_OPEN] = &channel_pre_x11_open;
pre[SSH_CHANNEL_PORT_LISTENER] = &channel_pre_listener;
pre[SSH_CHANNEL_RPORT_LISTENER] = &channel_pre_listener;
pre[SSH_CHANNEL_UNIX_LISTENER] = &channel_pre_listener;
pre[SSH_CHANNEL_RUNIX_LISTENER] = &channel_pre_listener;
pre[SSH_CHANNEL_X11_LISTENER] = &channel_pre_listener;
pre[SSH_CHANNEL_AUTH_SOCKET] = &channel_pre_listener;
pre[SSH_CHANNEL_CONNECTING] = &channel_pre_connecting;
pre[SSH_CHANNEL_DYNAMIC] = &channel_pre_dynamic;
pre[SSH_CHANNEL_RDYNAMIC_FINISH] = &channel_pre_connecting;
pre[SSH_CHANNEL_MUX_LISTENER] = &channel_pre_listener;
pre[SSH_CHANNEL_MUX_CLIENT] = &channel_pre_mux_client;
post[SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN] = &channel_post_open;
post[SSH_CHANNEL_PORT_LISTENER] = &channel_post_port_listener;
post[SSH_CHANNEL_RPORT_LISTENER] = &channel_post_port_listener;
post[SSH_CHANNEL_UNIX_LISTENER] = &channel_post_port_listener;
post[SSH_CHANNEL_RUNIX_LISTENER] = &channel_post_port_listener;
post[SSH_CHANNEL_X11_LISTENER] = &channel_post_x11_listener;
post[SSH_CHANNEL_AUTH_SOCKET] = &channel_post_auth_listener;
post[SSH_CHANNEL_CONNECTING] = &channel_post_connecting;
post[SSH_CHANNEL_DYNAMIC] = &channel_post_open;
post[SSH_CHANNEL_RDYNAMIC_FINISH] = &channel_post_connecting;
post[SSH_CHANNEL_MUX_LISTENER] = &channel_post_mux_listener;
post[SSH_CHANNEL_MUX_CLIENT] = &channel_post_mux_client;
sc->channel_pre = pre;
sc->channel_post = post;
}
/* gc dead channels */
static void
channel_garbage_collect(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c)
{
if (c == NULL)
return;
if (c->detach_user != NULL) {
if (!chan_is_dead(ssh, c, c->detach_close))
return;
debug2("channel %d: gc: notify user", c->self);
c->detach_user(ssh, c->self, NULL);
/* if we still have a callback */
if (c->detach_user != NULL)
return;
debug2("channel %d: gc: user detached", c->self);
}
if (!chan_is_dead(ssh, c, 1))
return;
debug2("channel %d: garbage collecting", c->self);
channel_free(ssh, c);
}
enum channel_table { CHAN_PRE, CHAN_POST };
static void
channel_handler(struct ssh *ssh, int table,
fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset, time_t *unpause_secs)
{
struct ssh_channels *sc = ssh->chanctxt;
chan_fn **ftab = table == CHAN_PRE ? sc->channel_pre : sc->channel_post;
u_int i, oalloc;
Channel *c;
time_t now;
now = monotime();
if (unpause_secs != NULL)
*unpause_secs = 0;
for (i = 0, oalloc = sc->channels_alloc; i < oalloc; i++) {
c = sc->channels[i];
if (c == NULL)
continue;
if (c->delayed) {
if (table == CHAN_PRE)
c->delayed = 0;
else
continue;
}
if (ftab[c->type] != NULL) {
/*
* Run handlers that are not paused.
*/
if (c->notbefore <= now)
(*ftab[c->type])(ssh, c, readset, writeset);
else if (unpause_secs != NULL) {
/*
* Collect the time that the earliest
* channel comes off pause.
*/
debug3("%s: chan %d: skip for %d more seconds",
__func__, c->self,
(int)(c->notbefore - now));
if (*unpause_secs == 0 ||
(c->notbefore - now) < *unpause_secs)
*unpause_secs = c->notbefore - now;
}
}
channel_garbage_collect(ssh, c);
}
if (unpause_secs != NULL && *unpause_secs != 0)
debug3("%s: first channel unpauses in %d seconds",
__func__, (int)*unpause_secs);
}
/*
* Create sockets before allocating the select bitmasks.
* This is necessary for things that need to happen after reading
* the network-input but before channel_prepare_select().
*/
static void
channel_before_prepare_select(struct ssh *ssh)
{
struct ssh_channels *sc = ssh->chanctxt;
Channel *c;
u_int i, oalloc;
for (i = 0, oalloc = sc->channels_alloc; i < oalloc; i++) {
c = sc->channels[i];
if (c == NULL)
continue;
if (c->type == SSH_CHANNEL_RDYNAMIC_OPEN)
channel_before_prepare_select_rdynamic(ssh, c);
}
}
/*
* Allocate/update select bitmasks and add any bits relevant to channels in
* select bitmasks.
*/
void
channel_prepare_select(struct ssh *ssh, fd_set **readsetp, fd_set **writesetp,
int *maxfdp, u_int *nallocp, time_t *minwait_secs)
{
u_int n, sz, nfdset;
channel_before_prepare_select(ssh); /* might update channel_max_fd */
n = MAXIMUM(*maxfdp, ssh->chanctxt->channel_max_fd);
nfdset = howmany(n+1, NFDBITS);
/* Explicitly test here, because xrealloc isn't always called */
if (nfdset && SIZE_MAX / nfdset < sizeof(fd_mask))
fatal("channel_prepare_select: max_fd (%d) is too large", n);
sz = nfdset * sizeof(fd_mask);
/* perhaps check sz < nalloc/2 and shrink? */
if (*readsetp == NULL || sz > *nallocp) {
*readsetp = xreallocarray(*readsetp, nfdset, sizeof(fd_mask));
*writesetp = xreallocarray(*writesetp, nfdset, sizeof(fd_mask));
*nallocp = sz;
}
*maxfdp = n;
memset(*readsetp, 0, sz);
memset(*writesetp, 0, sz);
if (!ssh_packet_is_rekeying(ssh))
channel_handler(ssh, CHAN_PRE, *readsetp, *writesetp,
minwait_secs);
}
/*
* After select, perform any appropriate operations for channels which have
* events pending.
*/
void
channel_after_select(struct ssh *ssh, fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset)
{
channel_handler(ssh, CHAN_POST, readset, writeset, NULL);
}
/*
* Enqueue data for channels with open or draining c->input.
*/
static void
channel_output_poll_input_open(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c)
{
size_t len, plen;
const u_char *pkt;
int r;
if ((len = sshbuf_len(c->input)) == 0) {
if (c->istate == CHAN_INPUT_WAIT_DRAIN) {
/*
* input-buffer is empty and read-socket shutdown:
* tell peer, that we will not send more data:
* send IEOF.
* hack for extended data: delay EOF if EFD still
* in use.
*/
if (CHANNEL_EFD_INPUT_ACTIVE(c))
debug2("channel %d: "
"ibuf_empty delayed efd %d/(%zu)",
c->self, c->efd, sshbuf_len(c->extended));
else
chan_ibuf_empty(ssh, c);
}
return;
}
if (!c->have_remote_id)
fatal(":%s: channel %d: no remote id", __func__, c->self);
if (c->datagram) {
/* Check datagram will fit; drop if not */
if ((r = sshbuf_get_string_direct(c->input, &pkt, &plen)) != 0)
fatal("%s: channel %d: get datagram: %s", __func__,
c->self, ssh_err(r));
/*
* XXX this does tail-drop on the datagram queue which is
* usually suboptimal compared to head-drop. Better to have
* backpressure at read time? (i.e. read + discard)
*/
if (plen > c->remote_window || plen > c->remote_maxpacket) {
debug("channel %d: datagram too big", c->self);
return;
}
/* Enqueue it */
if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, c->remote_id)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_string(ssh, pkt, plen)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) {
fatal("%s: channel %i: datagram: %s", __func__,
c->self, ssh_err(r));
}
c->remote_window -= plen;
return;
}
/* Enqueue packet for buffered data. */
if (len > c->remote_window)
len = c->remote_window;
if (len > c->remote_maxpacket)
len = c->remote_maxpacket;
if (len == 0)
return;
if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, c->remote_id)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_string(ssh, sshbuf_ptr(c->input), len)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) {
fatal("%s: channel %i: data: %s", __func__,
c->self, ssh_err(r));
}
if ((r = sshbuf_consume(c->input, len)) != 0)
fatal("%s: channel %i: consume: %s", __func__,
c->self, ssh_err(r));
c->remote_window -= len;
}
/*
* Enqueue data for channels with open c->extended in read mode.
*/
static void
channel_output_poll_extended_read(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c)
{
size_t len;
int r;
if ((len = sshbuf_len(c->extended)) == 0)
return;
debug2("channel %d: rwin %u elen %zu euse %d", c->self,
c->remote_window, sshbuf_len(c->extended), c->extended_usage);
if (len > c->remote_window)
len = c->remote_window;
if (len > c->remote_maxpacket)
len = c->remote_maxpacket;
if (len == 0)
return;
if (!c->have_remote_id)
fatal(":%s: channel %d: no remote id", __func__, c->self);
if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_EXTENDED_DATA)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, c->remote_id)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, SSH2_EXTENDED_DATA_STDERR)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_string(ssh, sshbuf_ptr(c->extended), len)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) {
fatal("%s: channel %i: data: %s", __func__,
c->self, ssh_err(r));
}
if ((r = sshbuf_consume(c->extended, len)) != 0)
fatal("%s: channel %i: consume: %s", __func__,
c->self, ssh_err(r));
c->remote_window -= len;
debug2("channel %d: sent ext data %zu", c->self, len);
}
/* If there is data to send to the connection, enqueue some of it now. */
void
channel_output_poll(struct ssh *ssh)
{
struct ssh_channels *sc = ssh->chanctxt;
Channel *c;
u_int i;
for (i = 0; i < sc->channels_alloc; i++) {
c = sc->channels[i];
if (c == NULL)
continue;
/*
* We are only interested in channels that can have buffered
* incoming data.
*/
if (c->type != SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN)
continue;
if ((c->flags & (CHAN_CLOSE_SENT|CHAN_CLOSE_RCVD))) {
/* XXX is this true? */
debug3("channel %d: will not send data after close",
c->self);
continue;
}
/* Get the amount of buffered data for this channel. */
if (c->istate == CHAN_INPUT_OPEN ||
c->istate == CHAN_INPUT_WAIT_DRAIN)
channel_output_poll_input_open(ssh, c);
/* Send extended data, i.e. stderr */
if (!(c->flags & CHAN_EOF_SENT) &&
c->extended_usage == CHAN_EXTENDED_READ)
channel_output_poll_extended_read(ssh, c);
}
}
/* -- mux proxy support */
/*
* When multiplexing channel messages for mux clients we have to deal
* with downstream messages from the mux client and upstream messages
* from the ssh server:
* 1) Handling downstream messages is straightforward and happens
* in channel_proxy_downstream():
* - We forward all messages (mostly) unmodified to the server.
* - However, in order to route messages from upstream to the correct
* downstream client, we have to replace the channel IDs used by the
* mux clients with a unique channel ID because the mux clients might
* use conflicting channel IDs.
* - so we inspect and change both SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN and
* SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION messages, create a local
* SSH_CHANNEL_MUX_PROXY channel and replace the mux clients ID
* with the newly allocated channel ID.
* 2) Upstream messages are received by matching SSH_CHANNEL_MUX_PROXY
* channels and processed by channel_proxy_upstream(). The local channel ID
* is then translated back to the original mux client ID.
* 3) In both cases we need to keep track of matching SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE
* messages so we can clean up SSH_CHANNEL_MUX_PROXY channels.
* 4) The SSH_CHANNEL_MUX_PROXY channels also need to closed when the
* downstream mux client are removed.
* 5) Handling SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN messages from the upstream server
* requires more work, because they are not addressed to a specific
* channel. E.g. client_request_forwarded_tcpip() needs to figure
* out whether the request is addressed to the local client or a
* specific downstream client based on the listen-address/port.
* 6) Agent and X11-Forwarding have a similar problem and are currently
* not supported as the matching session/channel cannot be identified
* easily.
*/
/*
* receive packets from downstream mux clients:
* channel callback fired on read from mux client, creates
* SSH_CHANNEL_MUX_PROXY channels and translates channel IDs
* on channel creation.
*/
int
channel_proxy_downstream(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *downstream)
{
Channel *c = NULL;
struct sshbuf *original = NULL, *modified = NULL;
const u_char *cp;
char *ctype = NULL, *listen_host = NULL;
u_char type;
size_t have;
int ret = -1, r;
u_int id, remote_id, listen_port;
/* sshbuf_dump(downstream->input, stderr); */
if ((r = sshbuf_get_string_direct(downstream->input, &cp, &have))
!= 0) {
error("%s: malformed message: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
return -1;
}
if (have < 2) {
error("%s: short message", __func__);
return -1;
}
type = cp[1];
/* skip padlen + type */
cp += 2;
have -= 2;
if (ssh_packet_log_type(type))
debug3("%s: channel %u: down->up: type %u", __func__,
downstream->self, type);
switch (type) {
case SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN:
if ((original = sshbuf_from(cp, have)) == NULL ||
(modified = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) {
error("%s: alloc", __func__);
goto out;
}
if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(original, &ctype, NULL)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_u32(original, &id)) != 0) {
error("%s: parse error %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
goto out;
}
c = channel_new(ssh, "mux proxy", SSH_CHANNEL_MUX_PROXY,
-1, -1, -1, 0, 0, 0, ctype, 1);
c->mux_ctx = downstream; /* point to mux client */
c->mux_downstream_id = id; /* original downstream id */
if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(modified, ctype)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u32(modified, c->self)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_putb(modified, original)) != 0) {
error("%s: compose error %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
channel_free(ssh, c);
goto out;
}
break;
case SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION:
/*
* Almost the same as SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN, except then we
* need to parse 'remote_id' instead of 'ctype'.
*/
if ((original = sshbuf_from(cp, have)) == NULL ||
(modified = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) {
error("%s: alloc", __func__);
goto out;
}
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(original, &remote_id)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_u32(original, &id)) != 0) {
error("%s: parse error %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
goto out;
}
c = channel_new(ssh, "mux proxy", SSH_CHANNEL_MUX_PROXY,
-1, -1, -1, 0, 0, 0, "mux-down-connect", 1);
c->mux_ctx = downstream; /* point to mux client */
c->mux_downstream_id = id;
c->remote_id = remote_id;
c->have_remote_id = 1;
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(modified, remote_id)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u32(modified, c->self)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_putb(modified, original)) != 0) {
error("%s: compose error %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
channel_free(ssh, c);
goto out;
}
break;
case SSH2_MSG_GLOBAL_REQUEST:
if ((original = sshbuf_from(cp, have)) == NULL) {
error("%s: alloc", __func__);
goto out;
}
if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(original, &ctype, NULL)) != 0) {
error("%s: parse error %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
goto out;
}
if (strcmp(ctype, "tcpip-forward") != 0) {
error("%s: unsupported request %s", __func__, ctype);
goto out;
}
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(original, NULL)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_cstring(original, &listen_host, NULL)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_u32(original, &listen_port)) != 0) {
error("%s: parse error %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
goto out;
}
if (listen_port > 65535) {
error("%s: tcpip-forward for %s: bad port %u",
__func__, listen_host, listen_port);
goto out;
}
/* Record that connection to this host/port is permitted. */
permission_set_add(ssh, FORWARD_USER, FORWARD_LOCAL, "<mux>", -1,
listen_host, NULL, (int)listen_port, downstream);
listen_host = NULL;
break;
case SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE:
if (have < 4)
break;
remote_id = PEEK_U32(cp);
if ((c = channel_by_remote_id(ssh, remote_id)) != NULL) {
if (c->flags & CHAN_CLOSE_RCVD)
channel_free(ssh, c);
else
c->flags |= CHAN_CLOSE_SENT;
}
break;
}
if (modified) {
if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, type)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_putb(ssh, modified)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) {
error("%s: send %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
goto out;
}
} else {
if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, type)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put(ssh, cp, have)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) {
error("%s: send %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
goto out;
}
}
ret = 0;
out:
free(ctype);
free(listen_host);
sshbuf_free(original);
sshbuf_free(modified);
return ret;
}
/*
* receive packets from upstream server and de-multiplex packets
* to correct downstream:
* implemented as a helper for channel input handlers,
* replaces local (proxy) channel ID with downstream channel ID.
*/
int
channel_proxy_upstream(Channel *c, int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh)
{
struct sshbuf *b = NULL;
Channel *downstream;
const u_char *cp = NULL;
size_t len;
int r;
/*
* When receiving packets from the peer we need to check whether we
* need to forward the packets to the mux client. In this case we
* restore the original channel id and keep track of CLOSE messages,
* so we can cleanup the channel.
*/
if (c == NULL || c->type != SSH_CHANNEL_MUX_PROXY)
return 0;
if ((downstream = c->mux_ctx) == NULL)
return 0;
switch (type) {
case SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE:
case SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA:
case SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_EOF:
case SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_EXTENDED_DATA:
case SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION:
case SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE:
case SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_WINDOW_ADJUST:
case SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_SUCCESS:
case SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_FAILURE:
case SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_REQUEST:
break;
default:
debug2("%s: channel %u: unsupported type %u", __func__,
c->self, type);
return 0;
}
if ((b = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) {
error("%s: alloc reply", __func__);
goto out;
}
/* get remaining payload (after id) */
cp = sshpkt_ptr(ssh, &len);
if (cp == NULL) {
error("%s: no packet", __func__);
goto out;
}
/* translate id and send to muxclient */
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(b, 0)) != 0 || /* padlen */
(r = sshbuf_put_u8(b, type)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u32(b, c->mux_downstream_id)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put(b, cp, len)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_stringb(downstream->output, b)) != 0) {
error("%s: compose for muxclient %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
goto out;
}
/* sshbuf_dump(b, stderr); */
if (ssh_packet_log_type(type))
debug3("%s: channel %u: up->down: type %u", __func__, c->self,
type);
out:
/* update state */
switch (type) {
case SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION:
/* record remote_id for SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE */
if (cp && len > 4) {
c->remote_id = PEEK_U32(cp);
c->have_remote_id = 1;
}
break;
case SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE:
if (c->flags & CHAN_CLOSE_SENT)
channel_free(ssh, c);
else
c->flags |= CHAN_CLOSE_RCVD;
break;
}
sshbuf_free(b);
return 1;
}
/* -- protocol input */
/* Parse a channel ID from the current packet */
static int
channel_parse_id(struct ssh *ssh, const char *where, const char *what)
{
u_int32_t id;
int r;
if ((r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &id)) != 0) {
error("%s: parse id: %s", where, ssh_err(r));
ssh_packet_disconnect(ssh, "Invalid %s message", what);
}
if (id > INT_MAX) {
error("%s: bad channel id %u: %s", where, id, ssh_err(r));
ssh_packet_disconnect(ssh, "Invalid %s channel id", what);
}
return (int)id;
}
/* Lookup a channel from an ID in the current packet */
static Channel *
channel_from_packet_id(struct ssh *ssh, const char *where, const char *what)
{
int id = channel_parse_id(ssh, where, what);
Channel *c;
if ((c = channel_lookup(ssh, id)) == NULL) {
ssh_packet_disconnect(ssh,
"%s packet referred to nonexistent channel %d", what, id);
}
return c;
}
int
channel_input_data(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh)
{
const u_char *data;
size_t data_len, win_len;
Channel *c = channel_from_packet_id(ssh, __func__, "data");
int r;
if (channel_proxy_upstream(c, type, seq, ssh))
return 0;
/* Ignore any data for non-open channels (might happen on close) */
if (c->type != SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN &&
c->type != SSH_CHANNEL_RDYNAMIC_OPEN &&
c->type != SSH_CHANNEL_RDYNAMIC_FINISH &&
c->type != SSH_CHANNEL_X11_OPEN)
return 0;
/* Get the data. */
if ((r = sshpkt_get_string_direct(ssh, &data, &data_len)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0)
fatal("%s: channel %d: get data: %s", __func__,
c->self, ssh_err(r));
win_len = data_len;
if (c->datagram)
win_len += 4; /* string length header */
/*
* The sending side reduces its window as it sends data, so we
* must 'fake' consumption of the data in order to ensure that window
* updates are sent back. Otherwise the connection might deadlock.
*/
if (c->ostate != CHAN_OUTPUT_OPEN) {
c->local_window -= win_len;
c->local_consumed += win_len;
return 0;
}
if (win_len > c->local_maxpacket) {
logit("channel %d: rcvd big packet %zu, maxpack %u",
c->self, win_len, c->local_maxpacket);
return 0;
}
if (win_len > c->local_window) {
logit("channel %d: rcvd too much data %zu, win %u",
c->self, win_len, c->local_window);
return 0;
}
c->local_window -= win_len;
if (c->datagram) {
if ((r = sshbuf_put_string(c->output, data, data_len)) != 0)
fatal("%s: channel %d: append datagram: %s",
__func__, c->self, ssh_err(r));
} else if ((r = sshbuf_put(c->output, data, data_len)) != 0)
fatal("%s: channel %d: append data: %s",
__func__, c->self, ssh_err(r));
return 0;
}
int
channel_input_extended_data(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh)
{
const u_char *data;
size_t data_len;
u_int32_t tcode;
Channel *c = channel_from_packet_id(ssh, __func__, "extended data");
int r;
if (channel_proxy_upstream(c, type, seq, ssh))
return 0;
if (c->type != SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN) {
logit("channel %d: ext data for non open", c->self);
return 0;
}
if (c->flags & CHAN_EOF_RCVD) {
if (datafellows & SSH_BUG_EXTEOF)
debug("channel %d: accepting ext data after eof",
c->self);
else
ssh_packet_disconnect(ssh, "Received extended_data "
"after EOF on channel %d.", c->self);
}
if ((r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &tcode)) != 0) {
error("%s: parse tcode: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
ssh_packet_disconnect(ssh, "Invalid extended_data message");
}
if (c->efd == -1 ||
c->extended_usage != CHAN_EXTENDED_WRITE ||
tcode != SSH2_EXTENDED_DATA_STDERR) {
logit("channel %d: bad ext data", c->self);
return 0;
}
if ((r = sshpkt_get_string_direct(ssh, &data, &data_len)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0) {
error("%s: parse data: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
ssh_packet_disconnect(ssh, "Invalid extended_data message");
}
if (data_len > c->local_window) {
logit("channel %d: rcvd too much extended_data %zu, win %u",
c->self, data_len, c->local_window);
return 0;
}
debug2("channel %d: rcvd ext data %zu", c->self, data_len);
/* XXX sshpkt_getb? */
if ((r = sshbuf_put(c->extended, data, data_len)) != 0)
error("%s: append: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
c->local_window -= data_len;
return 0;
}
int
channel_input_ieof(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh)
{
Channel *c = channel_from_packet_id(ssh, __func__, "ieof");
int r;
if ((r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0) {
error("%s: parse data: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
ssh_packet_disconnect(ssh, "Invalid ieof message");
}
if (channel_proxy_upstream(c, type, seq, ssh))
return 0;
chan_rcvd_ieof(ssh, c);
/* XXX force input close */
if (c->force_drain && c->istate == CHAN_INPUT_OPEN) {
debug("channel %d: FORCE input drain", c->self);
c->istate = CHAN_INPUT_WAIT_DRAIN;
if (sshbuf_len(c->input) == 0)
chan_ibuf_empty(ssh, c);
}
return 0;
}
int
channel_input_oclose(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh)
{
Channel *c = channel_from_packet_id(ssh, __func__, "oclose");
int r;
if (channel_proxy_upstream(c, type, seq, ssh))
return 0;
if ((r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0) {
error("%s: parse data: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
ssh_packet_disconnect(ssh, "Invalid oclose message");
}
chan_rcvd_oclose(ssh, c);
return 0;
}
int
channel_input_open_confirmation(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh)
{
Channel *c = channel_from_packet_id(ssh, __func__, "open confirmation");
u_int32_t remote_window, remote_maxpacket;
int r;
if (channel_proxy_upstream(c, type, seq, ssh))
return 0;
if (c->type != SSH_CHANNEL_OPENING)
ssh_packet_disconnect(ssh, "Received open confirmation for "
"non-opening channel %d.", c->self);
/*
* Record the remote channel number and mark that the channel
* is now open.
*/
if ((r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &c->remote_id)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &remote_window)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &remote_maxpacket)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0) {
error("%s: window/maxpacket: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
ssh_packet_disconnect(ssh, "Invalid open confirmation message");
}
c->have_remote_id = 1;
c->remote_window = remote_window;
c->remote_maxpacket = remote_maxpacket;
c->type = SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN;
if (c->open_confirm) {
debug2("%s: channel %d: callback start", __func__, c->self);
c->open_confirm(ssh, c->self, 1, c->open_confirm_ctx);
debug2("%s: channel %d: callback done", __func__, c->self);
}
debug2("channel %d: open confirm rwindow %u rmax %u", c->self,
c->remote_window, c->remote_maxpacket);
return 0;
}
static char *
reason2txt(int reason)
{
switch (reason) {
case SSH2_OPEN_ADMINISTRATIVELY_PROHIBITED:
return "administratively prohibited";
case SSH2_OPEN_CONNECT_FAILED:
return "connect failed";
case SSH2_OPEN_UNKNOWN_CHANNEL_TYPE:
return "unknown channel type";
case SSH2_OPEN_RESOURCE_SHORTAGE:
return "resource shortage";
}
return "unknown reason";
}
int
channel_input_open_failure(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh)
{
Channel *c = channel_from_packet_id(ssh, __func__, "open failure");
u_int32_t reason;
char *msg = NULL;
int r;
if (channel_proxy_upstream(c, type, seq, ssh))
return 0;
if (c->type != SSH_CHANNEL_OPENING)
ssh_packet_disconnect(ssh, "Received open failure for "
"non-opening channel %d.", c->self);
if ((r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &reason)) != 0) {
error("%s: reason: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
ssh_packet_disconnect(ssh, "Invalid open failure message");
}
/* skip language */
if ((r = sshpkt_get_cstring(ssh, &msg, NULL)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_get_string_direct(ssh, NULL, NULL)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0) {
error("%s: message/lang: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
ssh_packet_disconnect(ssh, "Invalid open failure message");
}
logit("channel %d: open failed: %s%s%s", c->self,
reason2txt(reason), msg ? ": ": "", msg ? msg : "");
free(msg);
if (c->open_confirm) {
debug2("%s: channel %d: callback start", __func__, c->self);
c->open_confirm(ssh, c->self, 0, c->open_confirm_ctx);
debug2("%s: channel %d: callback done", __func__, c->self);
}
/* Schedule the channel for cleanup/deletion. */
chan_mark_dead(ssh, c);
return 0;
}
int
channel_input_window_adjust(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh)
{
int id = channel_parse_id(ssh, __func__, "window adjust");
Channel *c;
u_int32_t adjust;
u_int new_rwin;
int r;
if ((c = channel_lookup(ssh, id)) == NULL) {
logit("Received window adjust for non-open channel %d.", id);
return 0;
}
if (channel_proxy_upstream(c, type, seq, ssh))
return 0;
if ((r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &adjust)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0) {
error("%s: adjust: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
ssh_packet_disconnect(ssh, "Invalid window adjust message");
}
debug2("channel %d: rcvd adjust %u", c->self, adjust);
if ((new_rwin = c->remote_window + adjust) < c->remote_window) {
fatal("channel %d: adjust %u overflows remote window %u",
c->self, adjust, c->remote_window);
}
c->remote_window = new_rwin;
return 0;
}
int
channel_input_status_confirm(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh)
{
int id = channel_parse_id(ssh, __func__, "status confirm");
Channel *c;
struct channel_confirm *cc;
/* Reset keepalive timeout */
ssh_packet_set_alive_timeouts(ssh, 0);
debug2("%s: type %d id %d", __func__, type, id);
if ((c = channel_lookup(ssh, id)) == NULL) {
logit("%s: %d: unknown", __func__, id);
return 0;
}
if (channel_proxy_upstream(c, type, seq, ssh))
return 0;
if (sshpkt_get_end(ssh) != 0)
ssh_packet_disconnect(ssh, "Invalid status confirm message");
if ((cc = TAILQ_FIRST(&c->status_confirms)) == NULL)
return 0;
cc->cb(ssh, type, c, cc->ctx);
TAILQ_REMOVE(&c->status_confirms, cc, entry);
freezero(cc, sizeof(*cc));
return 0;
}
/* -- tcp forwarding */
void
channel_set_af(struct ssh *ssh, int af)
{
ssh->chanctxt->IPv4or6 = af;
}
/*
* Determine whether or not a port forward listens to loopback, the
* specified address or wildcard. On the client, a specified bind
* address will always override gateway_ports. On the server, a
* gateway_ports of 1 (``yes'') will override the client's specification
* and force a wildcard bind, whereas a value of 2 (``clientspecified'')
* will bind to whatever address the client asked for.
*
* Special-case listen_addrs are:
*
* "0.0.0.0" -> wildcard v4/v6 if SSH_OLD_FORWARD_ADDR
* "" (empty string), "*" -> wildcard v4/v6
* "localhost" -> loopback v4/v6
* "127.0.0.1" / "::1" -> accepted even if gateway_ports isn't set
*/
static const char *
channel_fwd_bind_addr(struct ssh *ssh, const char *listen_addr, int *wildcardp,
int is_client, struct ForwardOptions *fwd_opts)
{
const char *addr = NULL;
int wildcard = 0;
if (listen_addr == NULL) {
/* No address specified: default to gateway_ports setting */
if (fwd_opts->gateway_ports)
wildcard = 1;
} else if (fwd_opts->gateway_ports || is_client) {
if (((datafellows & SSH_OLD_FORWARD_ADDR) &&
strcmp(listen_addr, "0.0.0.0") == 0 && is_client == 0) ||
*listen_addr == '\0' || strcmp(listen_addr, "*") == 0 ||
(!is_client && fwd_opts->gateway_ports == 1)) {
wildcard = 1;
/*
* Notify client if they requested a specific listen
* address and it was overridden.
*/
if (*listen_addr != '\0' &&
strcmp(listen_addr, "0.0.0.0") != 0 &&
strcmp(listen_addr, "*") != 0) {
ssh_packet_send_debug(ssh,
"Forwarding listen address "
"\"%s\" overridden by server "
"GatewayPorts", listen_addr);
}
} else if (strcmp(listen_addr, "localhost") != 0 ||
strcmp(listen_addr, "127.0.0.1") == 0 ||
strcmp(listen_addr, "::1") == 0) {
/*
* Accept explicit localhost address when
* GatewayPorts=yes. The "localhost" hostname is
* deliberately skipped here so it will listen on all
* available local address families.
*/
addr = listen_addr;
}
} else if (strcmp(listen_addr, "127.0.0.1") == 0 ||
strcmp(listen_addr, "::1") == 0) {
/*
* If a specific IPv4/IPv6 localhost address has been
* requested then accept it even if gateway_ports is in
* effect. This allows the client to prefer IPv4 or IPv6.
*/
addr = listen_addr;
}
if (wildcardp != NULL)
*wildcardp = wildcard;
return addr;
}
static int
channel_setup_fwd_listener_tcpip(struct ssh *ssh, int type,
struct Forward *fwd, int *allocated_listen_port,
struct ForwardOptions *fwd_opts)
{
Channel *c;
int sock, r, success = 0, wildcard = 0, is_client;
struct addrinfo hints, *ai, *aitop;
const char *host, *addr;
char ntop[NI_MAXHOST], strport[NI_MAXSERV];
in_port_t *lport_p;
is_client = (type == SSH_CHANNEL_PORT_LISTENER);
if (is_client && fwd->connect_path != NULL) {
host = fwd->connect_path;
} else {
host = (type == SSH_CHANNEL_RPORT_LISTENER) ?
fwd->listen_host : fwd->connect_host;
if (host == NULL) {
error("No forward host name.");
return 0;
}
if (strlen(host) >= NI_MAXHOST) {
error("Forward host name too long.");
return 0;
}
}
/* Determine the bind address, cf. channel_fwd_bind_addr() comment */
addr = channel_fwd_bind_addr(ssh, fwd->listen_host, &wildcard,
is_client, fwd_opts);
debug3("%s: type %d wildcard %d addr %s", __func__,
type, wildcard, (addr == NULL) ? "NULL" : addr);
/*
* getaddrinfo returns a loopback address if the hostname is
* set to NULL and hints.ai_flags is not AI_PASSIVE
*/
memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints));
hints.ai_family = ssh->chanctxt->IPv4or6;
hints.ai_flags = wildcard ? AI_PASSIVE : 0;
hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM;
snprintf(strport, sizeof strport, "%d", fwd->listen_port);
if ((r = getaddrinfo(addr, strport, &hints, &aitop)) != 0) {
if (addr == NULL) {
/* This really shouldn't happen */
ssh_packet_disconnect(ssh, "getaddrinfo: fatal error: %s",
ssh_gai_strerror(r));
} else {
error("%s: getaddrinfo(%.64s): %s", __func__, addr,
ssh_gai_strerror(r));
}
return 0;
}
if (allocated_listen_port != NULL)
*allocated_listen_port = 0;
for (ai = aitop; ai; ai = ai->ai_next) {
switch (ai->ai_family) {
case AF_INET:
lport_p = &((struct sockaddr_in *)ai->ai_addr)->
sin_port;
break;
case AF_INET6:
lport_p = &((struct sockaddr_in6 *)ai->ai_addr)->
sin6_port;
break;
default:
continue;
}
/*
* If allocating a port for -R forwards, then use the
* same port for all address families.
*/
if (type == SSH_CHANNEL_RPORT_LISTENER &&
fwd->listen_port == 0 && allocated_listen_port != NULL &&
*allocated_listen_port > 0)
*lport_p = htons(*allocated_listen_port);
if (getnameinfo(ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen, ntop, sizeof(ntop),
strport, sizeof(strport),
NI_NUMERICHOST|NI_NUMERICSERV) != 0) {
error("%s: getnameinfo failed", __func__);
continue;
}
/* Create a port to listen for the host. */
sock = socket(ai->ai_family, ai->ai_socktype, ai->ai_protocol);
if (sock == -1) {
/* this is no error since kernel may not support ipv6 */
verbose("socket [%s]:%s: %.100s", ntop, strport,
strerror(errno));
continue;
}
set_reuseaddr(sock);
if (ai->ai_family == AF_INET6)
sock_set_v6only(sock);
debug("Local forwarding listening on %s port %s.",
ntop, strport);
/* Bind the socket to the address. */
if (bind(sock, ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen) == -1) {
/*
* address can be in if use ipv6 address is
* already bound
*/
if (!ai->ai_next)
error("bind [%s]:%s: %.100s",
ntop, strport, strerror(errno));
else
verbose("bind [%s]:%s: %.100s",
ntop, strport, strerror(errno));
close(sock);
continue;
}
/* Start listening for connections on the socket. */
if (listen(sock, SSH_LISTEN_BACKLOG) == -1) {
error("listen: %.100s", strerror(errno));
error("listen [%s]:%s: %.100s", ntop, strport,
strerror(errno));
close(sock);
continue;
}
/*
* fwd->listen_port == 0 requests a dynamically allocated port -
* record what we got.
*/
if (type == SSH_CHANNEL_RPORT_LISTENER &&
fwd->listen_port == 0 &&
allocated_listen_port != NULL &&
*allocated_listen_port == 0) {
*allocated_listen_port = get_local_port(sock);
debug("Allocated listen port %d",
*allocated_listen_port);
}
/* Allocate a channel number for the socket. */
c = channel_new(ssh, "port listener", type, sock, sock, -1,
CHAN_TCP_WINDOW_DEFAULT, CHAN_TCP_PACKET_DEFAULT,
0, "port listener", 1);
c->path = xstrdup(host);
c->host_port = fwd->connect_port;
c->listening_addr = addr == NULL ? NULL : xstrdup(addr);
if (fwd->listen_port == 0 && allocated_listen_port != NULL &&
!(datafellows & SSH_BUG_DYNAMIC_RPORT))
c->listening_port = *allocated_listen_port;
else
c->listening_port = fwd->listen_port;
success = 1;
}
if (success == 0)
error("%s: cannot listen to port: %d", __func__,
fwd->listen_port);
freeaddrinfo(aitop);
return success;
}
static int
channel_setup_fwd_listener_streamlocal(struct ssh *ssh, int type,
struct Forward *fwd, struct ForwardOptions *fwd_opts)
{
struct sockaddr_un sunaddr;
const char *path;
Channel *c;
int port, sock;
mode_t omask;
switch (type) {
case SSH_CHANNEL_UNIX_LISTENER:
if (fwd->connect_path != NULL) {
if (strlen(fwd->connect_path) > sizeof(sunaddr.sun_path)) {
error("Local connecting path too long: %s",
fwd->connect_path);
return 0;
}
path = fwd->connect_path;
port = PORT_STREAMLOCAL;
} else {
if (fwd->connect_host == NULL) {
error("No forward host name.");
return 0;
}
if (strlen(fwd->connect_host) >= NI_MAXHOST) {
error("Forward host name too long.");
return 0;
}
path = fwd->connect_host;
port = fwd->connect_port;
}
break;
case SSH_CHANNEL_RUNIX_LISTENER:
path = fwd->listen_path;
port = PORT_STREAMLOCAL;
break;
default:
error("%s: unexpected channel type %d", __func__, type);
return 0;
}
if (fwd->listen_path == NULL) {
error("No forward path name.");
return 0;
}
if (strlen(fwd->listen_path) > sizeof(sunaddr.sun_path)) {
error("Local listening path too long: %s", fwd->listen_path);
return 0;
}
debug3("%s: type %d path %s", __func__, type, fwd->listen_path);
/* Start a Unix domain listener. */
omask = umask(fwd_opts->streamlocal_bind_mask);
sock = unix_listener(fwd->listen_path, SSH_LISTEN_BACKLOG,
fwd_opts->streamlocal_bind_unlink);
umask(omask);
if (sock < 0)
return 0;
debug("Local forwarding listening on path %s.", fwd->listen_path);
/* Allocate a channel number for the socket. */
c = channel_new(ssh, "unix listener", type, sock, sock, -1,
CHAN_TCP_WINDOW_DEFAULT, CHAN_TCP_PACKET_DEFAULT,
0, "unix listener", 1);
c->path = xstrdup(path);
c->host_port = port;
c->listening_port = PORT_STREAMLOCAL;
c->listening_addr = xstrdup(fwd->listen_path);
return 1;
}
static int
channel_cancel_rport_listener_tcpip(struct ssh *ssh,
const char *host, u_short port)
{
u_int i;
int found = 0;
for (i = 0; i < ssh->chanctxt->channels_alloc; i++) {
Channel *c = ssh->chanctxt->channels[i];
if (c == NULL || c->type != SSH_CHANNEL_RPORT_LISTENER)
continue;
if (strcmp(c->path, host) == 0 && c->listening_port == port) {
debug2("%s: close channel %d", __func__, i);
channel_free(ssh, c);
found = 1;
}
}
return found;
}
static int
channel_cancel_rport_listener_streamlocal(struct ssh *ssh, const char *path)
{
u_int i;
int found = 0;
for (i = 0; i < ssh->chanctxt->channels_alloc; i++) {
Channel *c = ssh->chanctxt->channels[i];
if (c == NULL || c->type != SSH_CHANNEL_RUNIX_LISTENER)
continue;
if (c->path == NULL)
continue;
if (strcmp(c->path, path) == 0) {
debug2("%s: close channel %d", __func__, i);
channel_free(ssh, c);
found = 1;
}
}
return found;
}
int
channel_cancel_rport_listener(struct ssh *ssh, struct Forward *fwd)
{
if (fwd->listen_path != NULL) {
return channel_cancel_rport_listener_streamlocal(ssh,
fwd->listen_path);
} else {
return channel_cancel_rport_listener_tcpip(ssh,
fwd->listen_host, fwd->listen_port);
}
}
static int
channel_cancel_lport_listener_tcpip(struct ssh *ssh,
const char *lhost, u_short lport, int cport,
struct ForwardOptions *fwd_opts)
{
u_int i;
int found = 0;
const char *addr = channel_fwd_bind_addr(ssh, lhost, NULL, 1, fwd_opts);
for (i = 0; i < ssh->chanctxt->channels_alloc; i++) {
Channel *c = ssh->chanctxt->channels[i];
if (c == NULL || c->type != SSH_CHANNEL_PORT_LISTENER)
continue;
if (c->listening_port != lport)
continue;
if (cport == CHANNEL_CANCEL_PORT_STATIC) {
/* skip dynamic forwardings */
if (c->host_port == 0)
continue;
} else {
if (c->host_port != cport)
continue;
}
if ((c->listening_addr == NULL && addr != NULL) ||
(c->listening_addr != NULL && addr == NULL))
continue;
if (addr == NULL || strcmp(c->listening_addr, addr) == 0) {
debug2("%s: close channel %d", __func__, i);
channel_free(ssh, c);
found = 1;
}
}
return found;
}
static int
channel_cancel_lport_listener_streamlocal(struct ssh *ssh, const char *path)
{
u_int i;
int found = 0;
if (path == NULL) {
error("%s: no path specified.", __func__);
return 0;
}
for (i = 0; i < ssh->chanctxt->channels_alloc; i++) {
Channel *c = ssh->chanctxt->channels[i];
if (c == NULL || c->type != SSH_CHANNEL_UNIX_LISTENER)
continue;
if (c->listening_addr == NULL)
continue;
if (strcmp(c->listening_addr, path) == 0) {
debug2("%s: close channel %d", __func__, i);
channel_free(ssh, c);
found = 1;
}
}
return found;
}
int
channel_cancel_lport_listener(struct ssh *ssh,
struct Forward *fwd, int cport, struct ForwardOptions *fwd_opts)
{
if (fwd->listen_path != NULL) {
return channel_cancel_lport_listener_streamlocal(ssh,
fwd->listen_path);
} else {
return channel_cancel_lport_listener_tcpip(ssh,
fwd->listen_host, fwd->listen_port, cport, fwd_opts);
}
}
/* protocol local port fwd, used by ssh */
int
channel_setup_local_fwd_listener(struct ssh *ssh,
struct Forward *fwd, struct ForwardOptions *fwd_opts)
{
if (fwd->listen_path != NULL) {
return channel_setup_fwd_listener_streamlocal(ssh,
SSH_CHANNEL_UNIX_LISTENER, fwd, fwd_opts);
} else {
return channel_setup_fwd_listener_tcpip(ssh,
SSH_CHANNEL_PORT_LISTENER, fwd, NULL, fwd_opts);
}
}
/* Matches a remote forwarding permission against a requested forwarding */
static int
remote_open_match(struct permission *allowed_open, struct Forward *fwd)
{
int ret;
char *lhost;
/* XXX add ACLs for streamlocal */
if (fwd->listen_path != NULL)
return 1;
if (fwd->listen_host == NULL || allowed_open->listen_host == NULL)
return 0;
if (allowed_open->listen_port != FWD_PERMIT_ANY_PORT &&
allowed_open->listen_port != fwd->listen_port)
return 0;
/* Match hostnames case-insensitively */
lhost = xstrdup(fwd->listen_host);
lowercase(lhost);
ret = match_pattern(lhost, allowed_open->listen_host);
free(lhost);
return ret;
}
/* Checks whether a requested remote forwarding is permitted */
static int
check_rfwd_permission(struct ssh *ssh, struct Forward *fwd)
{
struct ssh_channels *sc = ssh->chanctxt;
struct permission_set *pset = &sc->remote_perms;
u_int i, permit, permit_adm = 1;
struct permission *perm;
/* XXX apply GatewayPorts override before checking? */
permit = pset->all_permitted;
if (!permit) {
for (i = 0; i < pset->num_permitted_user; i++) {
perm = &pset->permitted_user[i];
if (remote_open_match(perm, fwd)) {
permit = 1;
break;
}
}
}
if (pset->num_permitted_admin > 0) {
permit_adm = 0;
for (i = 0; i < pset->num_permitted_admin; i++) {
perm = &pset->permitted_admin[i];
if (remote_open_match(perm, fwd)) {
permit_adm = 1;
break;
}
}
}
return permit && permit_adm;
}
/* protocol v2 remote port fwd, used by sshd */
int
channel_setup_remote_fwd_listener(struct ssh *ssh, struct Forward *fwd,
int *allocated_listen_port, struct ForwardOptions *fwd_opts)
{
if (!check_rfwd_permission(ssh, fwd)) {
ssh_packet_send_debug(ssh, "port forwarding refused");
if (fwd->listen_path != NULL)
/* XXX always allowed, see remote_open_match() */
logit("Received request from %.100s port %d to "
"remote forward to path \"%.100s\", "
"but the request was denied.",
ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), ssh_remote_port(ssh),
fwd->listen_path);
else if(fwd->listen_host != NULL)
logit("Received request from %.100s port %d to "
"remote forward to host %.100s port %d, "
"but the request was denied.",
ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), ssh_remote_port(ssh),
fwd->listen_host, fwd->listen_port );
else
logit("Received request from %.100s port %d to remote "
"forward, but the request was denied.",
ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), ssh_remote_port(ssh));
return 0;
}
if (fwd->listen_path != NULL) {
return channel_setup_fwd_listener_streamlocal(ssh,
SSH_CHANNEL_RUNIX_LISTENER, fwd, fwd_opts);
} else {
return channel_setup_fwd_listener_tcpip(ssh,
SSH_CHANNEL_RPORT_LISTENER, fwd, allocated_listen_port,
fwd_opts);
}
}
/*
* Translate the requested rfwd listen host to something usable for
* this server.
*/
static const char *
channel_rfwd_bind_host(const char *listen_host)
{
if (listen_host == NULL) {
return "localhost";
} else if (*listen_host == '\0' || strcmp(listen_host, "*") == 0) {
return "";
} else
return listen_host;
}
/*
* Initiate forwarding of connections to port "port" on remote host through
* the secure channel to host:port from local side.
* Returns handle (index) for updating the dynamic listen port with
* channel_update_permission().
*/
int
channel_request_remote_forwarding(struct ssh *ssh, struct Forward *fwd)
{
int r, success = 0, idx = -1;
char *host_to_connect, *listen_host, *listen_path;
int port_to_connect, listen_port;
/* Send the forward request to the remote side. */
if (fwd->listen_path != NULL) {
if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_GLOBAL_REQUEST)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh,
"streamlocal-forward@openssh.com")) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_u8(ssh, 1)) != 0 || /* want reply */
(r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, fwd->listen_path)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0 ||
(r = ssh_packet_write_wait(ssh)) != 0)
fatal("%s: request streamlocal: %s",
__func__, ssh_err(r));
} else {
if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_GLOBAL_REQUEST)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, "tcpip-forward")) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_u8(ssh, 1)) != 0 || /* want reply */
(r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh,
channel_rfwd_bind_host(fwd->listen_host))) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, fwd->listen_port)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0 ||
(r = ssh_packet_write_wait(ssh)) != 0)
fatal("%s: request tcpip-forward: %s",
__func__, ssh_err(r));
}
/* Assume that server accepts the request */
success = 1;
if (success) {
/* Record that connection to this host/port is permitted. */
host_to_connect = listen_host = listen_path = NULL;
port_to_connect = listen_port = 0;
if (fwd->connect_path != NULL) {
host_to_connect = xstrdup(fwd->connect_path);
port_to_connect = PORT_STREAMLOCAL;
} else {
host_to_connect = xstrdup(fwd->connect_host);
port_to_connect = fwd->connect_port;
}
if (fwd->listen_path != NULL) {
listen_path = xstrdup(fwd->listen_path);
listen_port = PORT_STREAMLOCAL;
} else {
if (fwd->listen_host != NULL)
listen_host = xstrdup(fwd->listen_host);
listen_port = fwd->listen_port;
}
idx = permission_set_add(ssh, FORWARD_USER, FORWARD_LOCAL,
host_to_connect, port_to_connect,
listen_host, listen_path, listen_port, NULL);
}
return idx;
}
static int
open_match(struct permission *allowed_open, const char *requestedhost,
int requestedport)
{
if (allowed_open->host_to_connect == NULL)
return 0;
if (allowed_open->port_to_connect != FWD_PERMIT_ANY_PORT &&
allowed_open->port_to_connect != requestedport)
return 0;
if (strcmp(allowed_open->host_to_connect, FWD_PERMIT_ANY_HOST) != 0 &&
strcmp(allowed_open->host_to_connect, requestedhost) != 0)
return 0;
return 1;
}
/*
* Note that in the listen host/port case
* we don't support FWD_PERMIT_ANY_PORT and
* need to translate between the configured-host (listen_host)
* and what we've sent to the remote server (channel_rfwd_bind_host)
*/
static int
open_listen_match_tcpip(struct permission *allowed_open,
const char *requestedhost, u_short requestedport, int translate)
{
const char *allowed_host;
if (allowed_open->host_to_connect == NULL)
return 0;
if (allowed_open->listen_port != requestedport)
return 0;
if (!translate && allowed_open->listen_host == NULL &&
requestedhost == NULL)
return 1;
allowed_host = translate ?
channel_rfwd_bind_host(allowed_open->listen_host) :
allowed_open->listen_host;
if (allowed_host == NULL || requestedhost == NULL ||
strcmp(allowed_host, requestedhost) != 0)
return 0;
return 1;
}
static int
open_listen_match_streamlocal(struct permission *allowed_open,
const char *requestedpath)
{
if (allowed_open->host_to_connect == NULL)
return 0;
if (allowed_open->listen_port != PORT_STREAMLOCAL)
return 0;
if (allowed_open->listen_path == NULL ||
strcmp(allowed_open->listen_path, requestedpath) != 0)
return 0;
return 1;
}
/*
* Request cancellation of remote forwarding of connection host:port from
* local side.
*/
static int
channel_request_rforward_cancel_tcpip(struct ssh *ssh,
const char *host, u_short port)
{
struct ssh_channels *sc = ssh->chanctxt;
struct permission_set *pset = &sc->local_perms;
int r;
u_int i;
struct permission *perm = NULL;
for (i = 0; i < pset->num_permitted_user; i++) {
perm = &pset->permitted_user[i];
if (open_listen_match_tcpip(perm, host, port, 0))
break;
perm = NULL;
}
if (perm == NULL) {
debug("%s: requested forward not found", __func__);
return -1;
}
if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_GLOBAL_REQUEST)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, "cancel-tcpip-forward")) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_u8(ssh, 0)) != 0 || /* want reply */
(r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, channel_rfwd_bind_host(host))) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, port)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0)
fatal("%s: send cancel: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
fwd_perm_clear(perm); /* unregister */
return 0;
}
/*
* Request cancellation of remote forwarding of Unix domain socket
* path from local side.
*/
static int
channel_request_rforward_cancel_streamlocal(struct ssh *ssh, const char *path)
{
struct ssh_channels *sc = ssh->chanctxt;
struct permission_set *pset = &sc->local_perms;
int r;
u_int i;
struct permission *perm = NULL;
for (i = 0; i < pset->num_permitted_user; i++) {
perm = &pset->permitted_user[i];
if (open_listen_match_streamlocal(perm, path))
break;
perm = NULL;
}
if (perm == NULL) {
debug("%s: requested forward not found", __func__);
return -1;
}
if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_GLOBAL_REQUEST)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh,
"cancel-streamlocal-forward@openssh.com")) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_u8(ssh, 0)) != 0 || /* want reply */
(r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, path)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0)
fatal("%s: send cancel: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
fwd_perm_clear(perm); /* unregister */
return 0;
}
/*
* Request cancellation of remote forwarding of a connection from local side.
*/
int
channel_request_rforward_cancel(struct ssh *ssh, struct Forward *fwd)
{
if (fwd->listen_path != NULL) {
return channel_request_rforward_cancel_streamlocal(ssh,
fwd->listen_path);
} else {
return channel_request_rforward_cancel_tcpip(ssh,
fwd->listen_host,
fwd->listen_port ? fwd->listen_port : fwd->allocated_port);
}
}
/*
* Permits opening to any host/port if permitted_user[] is empty. This is
* usually called by the server, because the user could connect to any port
* anyway, and the server has no way to know but to trust the client anyway.
*/
void
channel_permit_all(struct ssh *ssh, int where)
{
struct permission_set *pset = permission_set_get(ssh, where);
if (pset->num_permitted_user == 0)
pset->all_permitted = 1;
}
/*
* Permit the specified host/port for forwarding.
*/
void
channel_add_permission(struct ssh *ssh, int who, int where,
char *host, int port)
{
int local = where == FORWARD_LOCAL;
struct permission_set *pset = permission_set_get(ssh, where);
debug("allow %s forwarding to host %s port %d",
fwd_ident(who, where), host, port);
/*
* Remote forwards set listen_host/port, local forwards set
* host/port_to_connect.
*/
permission_set_add(ssh, who, where,
local ? host : 0, local ? port : 0,
local ? NULL : host, NULL, local ? 0 : port, NULL);
pset->all_permitted = 0;
}
/*
* Administratively disable forwarding.
*/
void
channel_disable_admin(struct ssh *ssh, int where)
{
channel_clear_permission(ssh, FORWARD_ADM, where);
permission_set_add(ssh, FORWARD_ADM, where,
NULL, 0, NULL, NULL, 0, NULL);
}
/*
* Clear a list of permitted opens.
*/
void
channel_clear_permission(struct ssh *ssh, int who, int where)
{
struct permission **permp;
u_int *npermp;
permission_set_get_array(ssh, who, where, &permp, &npermp);
*permp = xrecallocarray(*permp, *npermp, 0, sizeof(**permp));
*npermp = 0;
}
/*
* Update the listen port for a dynamic remote forward, after
* the actual 'newport' has been allocated. If 'newport' < 0 is
* passed then they entry will be invalidated.
*/
void
channel_update_permission(struct ssh *ssh, int idx, int newport)
{
struct permission_set *pset = &ssh->chanctxt->local_perms;
if (idx < 0 || (u_int)idx >= pset->num_permitted_user) {
debug("%s: index out of range: %d num_permitted_user %d",
__func__, idx, pset->num_permitted_user);
return;
}
debug("%s allowed port %d for forwarding to host %s port %d",
newport > 0 ? "Updating" : "Removing",
newport,
pset->permitted_user[idx].host_to_connect,
pset->permitted_user[idx].port_to_connect);
if (newport <= 0)
fwd_perm_clear(&pset->permitted_user[idx]);
else {
pset->permitted_user[idx].listen_port =
(datafellows & SSH_BUG_DYNAMIC_RPORT) ? 0 : newport;
}
}
/* returns port number, FWD_PERMIT_ANY_PORT or -1 on error */
int
permitopen_port(const char *p)
{
int port;
if (strcmp(p, "*") == 0)
return FWD_PERMIT_ANY_PORT;
if ((port = a2port(p)) > 0)
return port;
return -1;
}
/* Try to start non-blocking connect to next host in cctx list */
static int
connect_next(struct channel_connect *cctx)
{
int sock, saved_errno;
struct sockaddr_un *sunaddr;
char ntop[NI_MAXHOST];
char strport[MAXIMUM(NI_MAXSERV, sizeof(sunaddr->sun_path))];
for (; cctx->ai; cctx->ai = cctx->ai->ai_next) {
switch (cctx->ai->ai_family) {
case AF_UNIX:
/* unix:pathname instead of host:port */
sunaddr = (struct sockaddr_un *)cctx->ai->ai_addr;
strlcpy(ntop, "unix", sizeof(ntop));
strlcpy(strport, sunaddr->sun_path, sizeof(strport));
break;
case AF_INET:
case AF_INET6:
if (getnameinfo(cctx->ai->ai_addr, cctx->ai->ai_addrlen,
ntop, sizeof(ntop), strport, sizeof(strport),
NI_NUMERICHOST|NI_NUMERICSERV) != 0) {
error("connect_next: getnameinfo failed");
continue;
}
break;
default:
continue;
}
if ((sock = socket(cctx->ai->ai_family, cctx->ai->ai_socktype,
cctx->ai->ai_protocol)) == -1) {
if (cctx->ai->ai_next == NULL)
error("socket: %.100s", strerror(errno));
else
verbose("socket: %.100s", strerror(errno));
continue;
}
if (set_nonblock(sock) == -1)
fatal("%s: set_nonblock(%d)", __func__, sock);
if (connect(sock, cctx->ai->ai_addr,
cctx->ai->ai_addrlen) == -1 && errno != EINPROGRESS) {
debug("connect_next: host %.100s ([%.100s]:%s): "
"%.100s", cctx->host, ntop, strport,
strerror(errno));
saved_errno = errno;
close(sock);
errno = saved_errno;
continue; /* fail -- try next */
}
if (cctx->ai->ai_family != AF_UNIX)
set_nodelay(sock);
debug("connect_next: host %.100s ([%.100s]:%s) "
"in progress, fd=%d", cctx->host, ntop, strport, sock);
cctx->ai = cctx->ai->ai_next;
return sock;
}
return -1;
}
static void
channel_connect_ctx_free(struct channel_connect *cctx)
{
free(cctx->host);
if (cctx->aitop) {
if (cctx->aitop->ai_family == AF_UNIX)
free(cctx->aitop);
else
freeaddrinfo(cctx->aitop);
}
memset(cctx, 0, sizeof(*cctx));
}
/*
* Return connecting socket to remote host:port or local socket path,
* passing back the failure reason if appropriate.
*/
static int
connect_to_helper(struct ssh *ssh, const char *name, int port, int socktype,
char *ctype, char *rname, struct channel_connect *cctx,
int *reason, const char **errmsg)
{
struct addrinfo hints;
int gaierr;
int sock = -1;
char strport[NI_MAXSERV];
if (port == PORT_STREAMLOCAL) {
struct sockaddr_un *sunaddr;
struct addrinfo *ai;
if (strlen(name) > sizeof(sunaddr->sun_path)) {
error("%.100s: %.100s", name, strerror(ENAMETOOLONG));
return -1;
}
/*
* Fake up a struct addrinfo for AF_UNIX connections.
* channel_connect_ctx_free() must check ai_family
* and use free() not freeaddirinfo() for AF_UNIX.
*/
ai = xmalloc(sizeof(*ai) + sizeof(*sunaddr));
memset(ai, 0, sizeof(*ai) + sizeof(*sunaddr));
ai->ai_addr = (struct sockaddr *)(ai + 1);
ai->ai_addrlen = sizeof(*sunaddr);
ai->ai_family = AF_UNIX;
ai->ai_socktype = socktype;
ai->ai_protocol = PF_UNSPEC;
sunaddr = (struct sockaddr_un *)ai->ai_addr;
sunaddr->sun_family = AF_UNIX;
strlcpy(sunaddr->sun_path, name, sizeof(sunaddr->sun_path));
cctx->aitop = ai;
} else {
memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints));
hints.ai_family = ssh->chanctxt->IPv4or6;
hints.ai_socktype = socktype;
snprintf(strport, sizeof strport, "%d", port);
if ((gaierr = getaddrinfo(name, strport, &hints, &cctx->aitop))
!= 0) {
if (errmsg != NULL)
*errmsg = ssh_gai_strerror(gaierr);
if (reason != NULL)
*reason = SSH2_OPEN_CONNECT_FAILED;
error("connect_to %.100s: unknown host (%s)", name,
ssh_gai_strerror(gaierr));
return -1;
}
}
cctx->host = xstrdup(name);
cctx->port = port;
cctx->ai = cctx->aitop;
if ((sock = connect_next(cctx)) == -1) {
error("connect to %.100s port %d failed: %s",
name, port, strerror(errno));
return -1;
}
return sock;
}
/* Return CONNECTING channel to remote host:port or local socket path */
static Channel *
connect_to(struct ssh *ssh, const char *host, int port,
char *ctype, char *rname)
{
struct channel_connect cctx;
Channel *c;
int sock;
memset(&cctx, 0, sizeof(cctx));
sock = connect_to_helper(ssh, host, port, SOCK_STREAM, ctype, rname,
&cctx, NULL, NULL);
if (sock == -1) {
channel_connect_ctx_free(&cctx);
return NULL;
}
c = channel_new(ssh, ctype, SSH_CHANNEL_CONNECTING, sock, sock, -1,
CHAN_TCP_WINDOW_DEFAULT, CHAN_TCP_PACKET_DEFAULT, 0, rname, 1);
c->host_port = port;
c->path = xstrdup(host);
c->connect_ctx = cctx;
return c;
}
/*
* returns either the newly connected channel or the downstream channel
* that needs to deal with this connection.
*/
Channel *
channel_connect_by_listen_address(struct ssh *ssh, const char *listen_host,
u_short listen_port, char *ctype, char *rname)
{
struct ssh_channels *sc = ssh->chanctxt;
struct permission_set *pset = &sc->local_perms;
u_int i;
struct permission *perm;
for (i = 0; i < pset->num_permitted_user; i++) {
perm = &pset->permitted_user[i];
if (open_listen_match_tcpip(perm,
listen_host, listen_port, 1)) {
if (perm->downstream)
return perm->downstream;
if (perm->port_to_connect == 0)
return rdynamic_connect_prepare(ssh,
ctype, rname);
return connect_to(ssh,
perm->host_to_connect, perm->port_to_connect,
ctype, rname);
}
}
error("WARNING: Server requests forwarding for unknown listen_port %d",
listen_port);
return NULL;
}
Channel *
channel_connect_by_listen_path(struct ssh *ssh, const char *path,
char *ctype, char *rname)
{
struct ssh_channels *sc = ssh->chanctxt;
struct permission_set *pset = &sc->local_perms;
u_int i;
struct permission *perm;
for (i = 0; i < pset->num_permitted_user; i++) {
perm = &pset->permitted_user[i];
if (open_listen_match_streamlocal(perm, path)) {
return connect_to(ssh,
perm->host_to_connect, perm->port_to_connect,
ctype, rname);
}
}
error("WARNING: Server requests forwarding for unknown path %.100s",
path);
return NULL;
}
/* Check if connecting to that port is permitted and connect. */
Channel *
channel_connect_to_port(struct ssh *ssh, const char *host, u_short port,
char *ctype, char *rname, int *reason, const char **errmsg)
{
struct ssh_channels *sc = ssh->chanctxt;
struct permission_set *pset = &sc->local_perms;
struct channel_connect cctx;
Channel *c;
u_int i, permit, permit_adm = 1;
int sock;
struct permission *perm;
permit = pset->all_permitted;
if (!permit) {
for (i = 0; i < pset->num_permitted_user; i++) {
perm = &pset->permitted_user[i];
if (open_match(perm, host, port)) {
permit = 1;
break;
}
}
}
if (pset->num_permitted_admin > 0) {
permit_adm = 0;
for (i = 0; i < pset->num_permitted_admin; i++) {
perm = &pset->permitted_admin[i];
if (open_match(perm, host, port)) {
permit_adm = 1;
break;
}
}
}
if (!permit || !permit_adm) {
logit("Received request from %.100s port %d to connect to "
"host %.100s port %d, but the request was denied.",
ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), ssh_remote_port(ssh), host, port);
if (reason != NULL)
*reason = SSH2_OPEN_ADMINISTRATIVELY_PROHIBITED;
return NULL;
}
memset(&cctx, 0, sizeof(cctx));
sock = connect_to_helper(ssh, host, port, SOCK_STREAM, ctype, rname,
&cctx, reason, errmsg);
if (sock == -1) {
channel_connect_ctx_free(&cctx);
return NULL;
}
c = channel_new(ssh, ctype, SSH_CHANNEL_CONNECTING, sock, sock, -1,
CHAN_TCP_WINDOW_DEFAULT, CHAN_TCP_PACKET_DEFAULT, 0, rname, 1);
c->host_port = port;
c->path = xstrdup(host);
c->connect_ctx = cctx;
return c;
}
/* Check if connecting to that path is permitted and connect. */
Channel *
channel_connect_to_path(struct ssh *ssh, const char *path,
char *ctype, char *rname)
{
struct ssh_channels *sc = ssh->chanctxt;
struct permission_set *pset = &sc->local_perms;
u_int i, permit, permit_adm = 1;
struct permission *perm;
permit = pset->all_permitted;
if (!permit) {
for (i = 0; i < pset->num_permitted_user; i++) {
perm = &pset->permitted_user[i];
if (open_match(perm, path, PORT_STREAMLOCAL)) {
permit = 1;
break;
}
}
}
if (pset->num_permitted_admin > 0) {
permit_adm = 0;
for (i = 0; i < pset->num_permitted_admin; i++) {
perm = &pset->permitted_admin[i];
if (open_match(perm, path, PORT_STREAMLOCAL)) {
permit_adm = 1;
break;
}
}
}
if (!permit || !permit_adm) {
logit("Received request to connect to path %.100s, "
"but the request was denied.", path);
return NULL;
}
return connect_to(ssh, path, PORT_STREAMLOCAL, ctype, rname);
}
void
channel_send_window_changes(struct ssh *ssh)
{
struct ssh_channels *sc = ssh->chanctxt;
struct winsize ws;
int r;
u_int i;
for (i = 0; i < sc->channels_alloc; i++) {
if (sc->channels[i] == NULL || !sc->channels[i]->client_tty ||
sc->channels[i]->type != SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN)
continue;
if (ioctl(sc->channels[i]->rfd, TIOCGWINSZ, &ws) == -1)
continue;
channel_request_start(ssh, i, "window-change", 0);
if ((r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, (u_int)ws.ws_col)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, (u_int)ws.ws_row)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, (u_int)ws.ws_xpixel)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, (u_int)ws.ws_ypixel)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0)
fatal("%s: channel %u: send window-change: %s",
__func__, i, ssh_err(r));
}
}
/* Return RDYNAMIC_OPEN channel: channel allows SOCKS, but is not connected */
static Channel *
rdynamic_connect_prepare(struct ssh *ssh, char *ctype, char *rname)
{
Channel *c;
int r;
c = channel_new(ssh, ctype, SSH_CHANNEL_RDYNAMIC_OPEN, -1, -1, -1,
CHAN_TCP_WINDOW_DEFAULT, CHAN_TCP_PACKET_DEFAULT, 0, rname, 1);
c->host_port = 0;
c->path = NULL;
/*
* We need to open the channel before we have a FD,
* so that we can get SOCKS header from peer.
*/
if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, c->remote_id)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, c->self)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, c->local_window)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, c->local_maxpacket)) != 0) {
fatal("%s: channel %i: confirm: %s", __func__,
c->self, ssh_err(r));
}
return c;
}
/* Return CONNECTING socket to remote host:port or local socket path */
static int
rdynamic_connect_finish(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c)
{
struct channel_connect cctx;
int sock;
memset(&cctx, 0, sizeof(cctx));
sock = connect_to_helper(ssh, c->path, c->host_port, SOCK_STREAM, NULL,
NULL, &cctx, NULL, NULL);
if (sock == -1)
channel_connect_ctx_free(&cctx);
else {
/* similar to SSH_CHANNEL_CONNECTING but we've already sent the open */
c->type = SSH_CHANNEL_RDYNAMIC_FINISH;
c->connect_ctx = cctx;
channel_register_fds(ssh, c, sock, sock, -1, 0, 1, 0);
}
return sock;
}
/* -- X11 forwarding */
/*
* Creates an internet domain socket for listening for X11 connections.
* Returns 0 and a suitable display number for the DISPLAY variable
* stored in display_numberp , or -1 if an error occurs.
*/
int
x11_create_display_inet(struct ssh *ssh, int x11_display_offset,
int x11_use_localhost, int single_connection,
u_int *display_numberp, int **chanids)
{
Channel *nc = NULL;
int display_number, sock;
u_short port;
struct addrinfo hints, *ai, *aitop;
char strport[NI_MAXSERV];
int gaierr, n, num_socks = 0, socks[NUM_SOCKS];
if (chanids == NULL)
return -1;
for (display_number = x11_display_offset;
display_number < MAX_DISPLAYS;
display_number++) {
port = 6000 + display_number;
memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints));
hints.ai_family = ssh->chanctxt->IPv4or6;
hints.ai_flags = x11_use_localhost ? 0: AI_PASSIVE;
hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM;
snprintf(strport, sizeof strport, "%d", port);
if ((gaierr = getaddrinfo(NULL, strport,
&hints, &aitop)) != 0) {
error("getaddrinfo: %.100s", ssh_gai_strerror(gaierr));
return -1;
}
for (ai = aitop; ai; ai = ai->ai_next) {
if (ai->ai_family != AF_INET &&
ai->ai_family != AF_INET6)
continue;
sock = socket(ai->ai_family, ai->ai_socktype,
ai->ai_protocol);
if (sock == -1) {
if ((errno != EINVAL) && (errno != EAFNOSUPPORT)
#ifdef EPFNOSUPPORT
&& (errno != EPFNOSUPPORT)
#endif
) {
error("socket: %.100s", strerror(errno));
freeaddrinfo(aitop);
return -1;
} else {
debug("x11_create_display_inet: Socket family %d not supported",
ai->ai_family);
continue;
}
}
if (ai->ai_family == AF_INET6)
sock_set_v6only(sock);
if (x11_use_localhost)
set_reuseaddr(sock);
if (bind(sock, ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen) == -1) {
debug2("%s: bind port %d: %.100s", __func__,
port, strerror(errno));
close(sock);
for (n = 0; n < num_socks; n++)
close(socks[n]);
num_socks = 0;
break;
}
socks[num_socks++] = sock;
if (num_socks == NUM_SOCKS)
break;
}
freeaddrinfo(aitop);
if (num_socks > 0)
break;
}
if (display_number >= MAX_DISPLAYS) {
error("Failed to allocate internet-domain X11 display socket.");
return -1;
}
/* Start listening for connections on the socket. */
for (n = 0; n < num_socks; n++) {
sock = socks[n];
if (listen(sock, SSH_LISTEN_BACKLOG) == -1) {
error("listen: %.100s", strerror(errno));
close(sock);
return -1;
}
}
/* Allocate a channel for each socket. */
*chanids = xcalloc(num_socks + 1, sizeof(**chanids));
for (n = 0; n < num_socks; n++) {
sock = socks[n];
nc = channel_new(ssh, "x11 listener",
SSH_CHANNEL_X11_LISTENER, sock, sock, -1,
CHAN_X11_WINDOW_DEFAULT, CHAN_X11_PACKET_DEFAULT,
0, "X11 inet listener", 1);
nc->single_connection = single_connection;
(*chanids)[n] = nc->self;
}
(*chanids)[n] = -1;
/* Return the display number for the DISPLAY environment variable. */
*display_numberp = display_number;
return 0;
}
static int
connect_local_xsocket_path(const char *pathname)
{
int sock;
struct sockaddr_un addr;
sock = socket(AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0);
if (sock == -1)
error("socket: %.100s", strerror(errno));
memset(&addr, 0, sizeof(addr));
addr.sun_family = AF_UNIX;
strlcpy(addr.sun_path, pathname, sizeof addr.sun_path);
if (connect(sock, (struct sockaddr *)&addr, sizeof(addr)) == 0)
return sock;
close(sock);
error("connect %.100s: %.100s", addr.sun_path, strerror(errno));
return -1;
}
static int
connect_local_xsocket(u_int dnr)
{
char buf[1024];
snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, _PATH_UNIX_X, dnr);
return connect_local_xsocket_path(buf);
}
#ifdef __APPLE__
static int
is_path_to_xsocket(const char *display, char *path, size_t pathlen)
{
struct stat sbuf;
if (strlcpy(path, display, pathlen) >= pathlen) {
error("%s: display path too long", __func__);
return 0;
}
if (display[0] != '/')
return 0;
if (stat(path, &sbuf) == 0) {
return 1;
} else {
char *dot = strrchr(path, '.');
if (dot != NULL) {
*dot = '\0';
if (stat(path, &sbuf) == 0) {
return 1;
}
}
}
return 0;
}
#endif
int
x11_connect_display(struct ssh *ssh)
{
u_int display_number;
const char *display;
char buf[1024], *cp;
struct addrinfo hints, *ai, *aitop;
char strport[NI_MAXSERV];
int gaierr, sock = 0;
/* Try to open a socket for the local X server. */
display = getenv("DISPLAY");
if (!display) {
error("DISPLAY not set.");
return -1;
}
/*
* Now we decode the value of the DISPLAY variable and make a
* connection to the real X server.
*/
#ifdef __APPLE__
/* Check if display is a path to a socket (as set by launchd). */
{
char path[PATH_MAX];
if (is_path_to_xsocket(display, path, sizeof(path))) {
debug("x11_connect_display: $DISPLAY is launchd");
/* Create a socket. */
sock = connect_local_xsocket_path(path);
if (sock < 0)
return -1;
/* OK, we now have a connection to the display. */
return sock;
}
}
#endif
/*
* Check if it is a unix domain socket. Unix domain displays are in
* one of the following formats: unix:d[.s], :d[.s], ::d[.s]
*/
if (strncmp(display, "unix:", 5) == 0 ||
display[0] == ':') {
/* Connect to the unix domain socket. */
if (sscanf(strrchr(display, ':') + 1, "%u",
&display_number) != 1) {
error("Could not parse display number from DISPLAY: "
"%.100s", display);
return -1;
}
/* Create a socket. */
sock = connect_local_xsocket(display_number);
if (sock < 0)
return -1;
/* OK, we now have a connection to the display. */
return sock;
}
/*
* Connect to an inet socket. The DISPLAY value is supposedly
* hostname:d[.s], where hostname may also be numeric IP address.
*/
strlcpy(buf, display, sizeof(buf));
cp = strchr(buf, ':');
if (!cp) {
error("Could not find ':' in DISPLAY: %.100s", display);
return -1;
}
*cp = 0;
/*
* buf now contains the host name. But first we parse the
* display number.
*/
if (sscanf(cp + 1, "%u", &display_number) != 1) {
error("Could not parse display number from DISPLAY: %.100s",
display);
return -1;
}
/* Look up the host address */
memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints));
hints.ai_family = ssh->chanctxt->IPv4or6;
hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM;
snprintf(strport, sizeof strport, "%u", 6000 + display_number);
if ((gaierr = getaddrinfo(buf, strport, &hints, &aitop)) != 0) {
error("%.100s: unknown host. (%s)", buf,
ssh_gai_strerror(gaierr));
return -1;
}
for (ai = aitop; ai; ai = ai->ai_next) {
/* Create a socket. */
sock = socket(ai->ai_family, ai->ai_socktype, ai->ai_protocol);
if (sock == -1) {
debug2("socket: %.100s", strerror(errno));
continue;
}
/* Connect it to the display. */
if (connect(sock, ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen) == -1) {
debug2("connect %.100s port %u: %.100s", buf,
6000 + display_number, strerror(errno));
close(sock);
continue;
}
/* Success */
break;
}
freeaddrinfo(aitop);
if (!ai) {
error("connect %.100s port %u: %.100s", buf,
6000 + display_number, strerror(errno));
return -1;
}
set_nodelay(sock);
return sock;
}
/*
* Requests forwarding of X11 connections, generates fake authentication
* data, and enables authentication spoofing.
* This should be called in the client only.
*/
void
x11_request_forwarding_with_spoofing(struct ssh *ssh, int client_session_id,
const char *disp, const char *proto, const char *data, int want_reply)
{
struct ssh_channels *sc = ssh->chanctxt;
u_int data_len = (u_int) strlen(data) / 2;
u_int i, value;
const char *cp;
char *new_data;
int r, screen_number;
if (sc->x11_saved_display == NULL)
sc->x11_saved_display = xstrdup(disp);
else if (strcmp(disp, sc->x11_saved_display) != 0) {
error("x11_request_forwarding_with_spoofing: different "
"$DISPLAY already forwarded");
return;
}
cp = strchr(disp, ':');
if (cp)
cp = strchr(cp, '.');
if (cp)
screen_number = (u_int)strtonum(cp + 1, 0, 400, NULL);
else
screen_number = 0;
if (sc->x11_saved_proto == NULL) {
/* Save protocol name. */
sc->x11_saved_proto = xstrdup(proto);
/* Extract real authentication data. */
sc->x11_saved_data = xmalloc(data_len);
for (i = 0; i < data_len; i++) {
if (sscanf(data + 2 * i, "%2x", &value) != 1)
fatal("x11_request_forwarding: bad "
"authentication data: %.100s", data);
sc->x11_saved_data[i] = value;
}
sc->x11_saved_data_len = data_len;
/* Generate fake data of the same length. */
sc->x11_fake_data = xmalloc(data_len);
arc4random_buf(sc->x11_fake_data, data_len);
sc->x11_fake_data_len = data_len;
}
/* Convert the fake data into hex. */
new_data = tohex(sc->x11_fake_data, data_len);
/* Send the request packet. */
channel_request_start(ssh, client_session_id, "x11-req", want_reply);
if ((r = sshpkt_put_u8(ssh, 0)) != 0 || /* bool: single connection */
(r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, proto)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, new_data)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, screen_number)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0 ||
(r = ssh_packet_write_wait(ssh)) != 0)
fatal("%s: send x11-req: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
free(new_data);
}
diff --git a/channels.h b/channels.h
index c8ae0d90464a..74e9b3f87110 100644
--- a/channels.h
+++ b/channels.h
@@ -1,352 +1,355 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: channels.h,v 1.133 2020/01/25 22:49:38 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: channels.h,v 1.135 2020/09/20 05:47:25 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
* Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
* All rights reserved
*
* As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
* can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this
* software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
* incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
* called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
*/
/*
* Copyright (c) 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
* OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
* IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
* INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
* NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
* DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
* THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
* (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
* THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
*/
#ifndef CHANNEL_H
#define CHANNEL_H
/* Definitions for channel types. */
#define SSH_CHANNEL_X11_LISTENER 1 /* Listening for inet X11 conn. */
#define SSH_CHANNEL_PORT_LISTENER 2 /* Listening on a port. */
#define SSH_CHANNEL_OPENING 3 /* waiting for confirmation */
#define SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN 4 /* normal open two-way channel */
#define SSH_CHANNEL_CLOSED 5 /* waiting for close confirmation */
#define SSH_CHANNEL_AUTH_SOCKET 6 /* authentication socket */
#define SSH_CHANNEL_X11_OPEN 7 /* reading first X11 packet */
#define SSH_CHANNEL_LARVAL 10 /* larval session */
#define SSH_CHANNEL_RPORT_LISTENER 11 /* Listening to a R-style port */
#define SSH_CHANNEL_CONNECTING 12
#define SSH_CHANNEL_DYNAMIC 13
#define SSH_CHANNEL_ZOMBIE 14 /* Almost dead. */
#define SSH_CHANNEL_MUX_LISTENER 15 /* Listener for mux conn. */
-#define SSH_CHANNEL_MUX_CLIENT 16 /* Conn. to mux slave */
+#define SSH_CHANNEL_MUX_CLIENT 16 /* Conn. to mux client */
#define SSH_CHANNEL_ABANDONED 17 /* Abandoned session, eg mux */
#define SSH_CHANNEL_UNIX_LISTENER 18 /* Listening on a domain socket. */
#define SSH_CHANNEL_RUNIX_LISTENER 19 /* Listening to a R-style domain socket. */
-#define SSH_CHANNEL_MUX_PROXY 20 /* proxy channel for mux-slave */
+#define SSH_CHANNEL_MUX_PROXY 20 /* proxy channel for mux-client */
#define SSH_CHANNEL_RDYNAMIC_OPEN 21 /* reverse SOCKS, parsing request */
#define SSH_CHANNEL_RDYNAMIC_FINISH 22 /* reverse SOCKS, finishing connect */
#define SSH_CHANNEL_MAX_TYPE 23
#define CHANNEL_CANCEL_PORT_STATIC -1
/* TCP forwarding */
#define FORWARD_DENY 0
#define FORWARD_REMOTE (1)
#define FORWARD_LOCAL (1<<1)
#define FORWARD_ALLOW (FORWARD_REMOTE|FORWARD_LOCAL)
#define FORWARD_ADM 0x100
#define FORWARD_USER 0x101
struct ssh;
struct Channel;
typedef struct Channel Channel;
struct fwd_perm_list;
typedef void channel_open_fn(struct ssh *, int, int, void *);
typedef void channel_callback_fn(struct ssh *, int, void *);
typedef int channel_infilter_fn(struct ssh *, struct Channel *, char *, int);
typedef void channel_filter_cleanup_fn(struct ssh *, int, void *);
typedef u_char *channel_outfilter_fn(struct ssh *, struct Channel *,
u_char **, size_t *);
/* Channel success/failure callbacks */
typedef void channel_confirm_cb(struct ssh *, int, struct Channel *, void *);
typedef void channel_confirm_abandon_cb(struct ssh *, struct Channel *, void *);
struct channel_confirm {
TAILQ_ENTRY(channel_confirm) entry;
channel_confirm_cb *cb;
channel_confirm_abandon_cb *abandon_cb;
void *ctx;
};
TAILQ_HEAD(channel_confirms, channel_confirm);
/* Context for non-blocking connects */
struct channel_connect {
char *host;
int port;
struct addrinfo *ai, *aitop;
};
/* Callbacks for mux channels back into client-specific code */
typedef int mux_callback_fn(struct ssh *, struct Channel *);
/*
* NB. channel IDs on the wire and in c->remote_id are uint32, but local
* channel IDs (e.g. c->self) only ever use the int32 subset of this range,
* because we use local channel ID -1 for housekeeping. Remote channels have
* a dedicated "have_remote_id" flag to indicate their validity.
*/
struct Channel {
int type; /* channel type/state */
int self; /* my own channel identifier */
uint32_t remote_id; /* channel identifier for remote peer */
int have_remote_id; /* non-zero if remote_id is valid */
u_int istate; /* input from channel (state of receive half) */
u_int ostate; /* output to channel (state of transmit half) */
int flags; /* close sent/rcvd */
int rfd; /* read fd */
int wfd; /* write fd */
int efd; /* extended fd */
int sock; /* sock fd */
int ctl_chan; /* control channel (multiplexed connections) */
int isatty; /* rfd is a tty */
#ifdef _AIX
int wfd_isatty; /* wfd is a tty */
#endif
int client_tty; /* (client) TTY has been requested */
int force_drain; /* force close on iEOF */
time_t notbefore; /* Pause IO until deadline (time_t) */
int delayed; /* post-select handlers for newly created
* channels are delayed until the first call
* to a matching pre-select handler.
* this way post-select handlers are not
* accidentally called if a FD gets reused */
struct sshbuf *input; /* data read from socket, to be sent over
* encrypted connection */
struct sshbuf *output; /* data received over encrypted connection for
* send on socket */
struct sshbuf *extended;
char *path;
/* path for unix domain sockets, or host name for forwards */
int listening_port; /* port being listened for forwards */
char *listening_addr; /* addr being listened for forwards */
int host_port; /* remote port to connect for forwards */
char *remote_name; /* remote hostname */
u_int remote_window;
u_int remote_maxpacket;
u_int local_window;
u_int local_window_max;
u_int local_consumed;
u_int local_maxpacket;
int extended_usage;
int single_connection;
char *ctype; /* type */
/* callback */
channel_open_fn *open_confirm;
void *open_confirm_ctx;
channel_callback_fn *detach_user;
int detach_close;
struct channel_confirms status_confirms;
/* filter */
channel_infilter_fn *input_filter;
channel_outfilter_fn *output_filter;
void *filter_ctx;
channel_filter_cleanup_fn *filter_cleanup;
/* keep boundaries */
int datagram;
/* non-blocking connect */
/* XXX make this a pointer so the structure can be opaque */
struct channel_connect connect_ctx;
/* multiplexing protocol hook, called for each packet received */
mux_callback_fn *mux_rcb;
void *mux_ctx;
int mux_pause;
int mux_downstream_id;
};
#define CHAN_EXTENDED_IGNORE 0
#define CHAN_EXTENDED_READ 1
#define CHAN_EXTENDED_WRITE 2
/* default window/packet sizes for tcp/x11-fwd-channel */
#define CHAN_SES_PACKET_DEFAULT (32*1024)
#define CHAN_SES_WINDOW_DEFAULT (64*CHAN_SES_PACKET_DEFAULT)
#define CHAN_TCP_PACKET_DEFAULT (32*1024)
#define CHAN_TCP_WINDOW_DEFAULT (64*CHAN_TCP_PACKET_DEFAULT)
#define CHAN_X11_PACKET_DEFAULT (16*1024)
#define CHAN_X11_WINDOW_DEFAULT (4*CHAN_X11_PACKET_DEFAULT)
/* possible input states */
#define CHAN_INPUT_OPEN 0
#define CHAN_INPUT_WAIT_DRAIN 1
#define CHAN_INPUT_WAIT_OCLOSE 2
#define CHAN_INPUT_CLOSED 3
/* possible output states */
#define CHAN_OUTPUT_OPEN 0
#define CHAN_OUTPUT_WAIT_DRAIN 1
#define CHAN_OUTPUT_WAIT_IEOF 2
#define CHAN_OUTPUT_CLOSED 3
#define CHAN_CLOSE_SENT 0x01
#define CHAN_CLOSE_RCVD 0x02
#define CHAN_EOF_SENT 0x04
#define CHAN_EOF_RCVD 0x08
#define CHAN_LOCAL 0x10
/* Read buffer size */
#define CHAN_RBUF (16*1024)
+/* Maximum channel input buffer size */
+#define CHAN_INPUT_MAX (16*1024*1024)
+
/* Hard limit on number of channels */
#define CHANNELS_MAX_CHANNELS (16*1024)
/* check whether 'efd' is still in use */
#define CHANNEL_EFD_INPUT_ACTIVE(c) \
(c->extended_usage == CHAN_EXTENDED_READ && \
(c->efd != -1 || \
sshbuf_len(c->extended) > 0))
#define CHANNEL_EFD_OUTPUT_ACTIVE(c) \
(c->extended_usage == CHAN_EXTENDED_WRITE && \
c->efd != -1 && (!(c->flags & (CHAN_EOF_RCVD|CHAN_CLOSE_RCVD)) || \
sshbuf_len(c->extended) > 0))
/* Add channel management structures to SSH transport instance */
void channel_init_channels(struct ssh *ssh);
/* channel management */
Channel *channel_by_id(struct ssh *, int);
Channel *channel_by_remote_id(struct ssh *, u_int);
Channel *channel_lookup(struct ssh *, int);
Channel *channel_new(struct ssh *, char *, int, int, int, int,
u_int, u_int, int, char *, int);
void channel_set_fds(struct ssh *, int, int, int, int, int,
int, int, u_int);
void channel_free(struct ssh *, Channel *);
void channel_free_all(struct ssh *);
void channel_stop_listening(struct ssh *);
void channel_send_open(struct ssh *, int);
void channel_request_start(struct ssh *, int, char *, int);
void channel_register_cleanup(struct ssh *, int,
channel_callback_fn *, int);
void channel_register_open_confirm(struct ssh *, int,
channel_open_fn *, void *);
void channel_register_filter(struct ssh *, int, channel_infilter_fn *,
channel_outfilter_fn *, channel_filter_cleanup_fn *, void *);
void channel_register_status_confirm(struct ssh *, int,
channel_confirm_cb *, channel_confirm_abandon_cb *, void *);
void channel_cancel_cleanup(struct ssh *, int);
int channel_close_fd(struct ssh *, int *);
void channel_send_window_changes(struct ssh *);
/* mux proxy support */
int channel_proxy_downstream(struct ssh *, Channel *mc);
int channel_proxy_upstream(Channel *, int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *);
/* protocol handler */
int channel_input_data(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *);
int channel_input_extended_data(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *);
int channel_input_ieof(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *);
int channel_input_oclose(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *);
int channel_input_open_confirmation(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *);
int channel_input_open_failure(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *);
int channel_input_port_open(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *);
int channel_input_window_adjust(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *);
int channel_input_status_confirm(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *);
/* file descriptor handling (read/write) */
void channel_prepare_select(struct ssh *, fd_set **, fd_set **, int *,
u_int*, time_t*);
void channel_after_select(struct ssh *, fd_set *, fd_set *);
void channel_output_poll(struct ssh *);
int channel_not_very_much_buffered_data(struct ssh *);
void channel_close_all(struct ssh *);
int channel_still_open(struct ssh *);
const char *channel_format_extended_usage(const Channel *);
char *channel_open_message(struct ssh *);
int channel_find_open(struct ssh *);
/* tcp forwarding */
struct Forward;
struct ForwardOptions;
void channel_set_af(struct ssh *, int af);
void channel_permit_all(struct ssh *, int);
void channel_add_permission(struct ssh *, int, int, char *, int);
void channel_clear_permission(struct ssh *, int, int);
void channel_disable_admin(struct ssh *, int);
void channel_update_permission(struct ssh *, int, int);
Channel *channel_connect_to_port(struct ssh *, const char *, u_short,
char *, char *, int *, const char **);
Channel *channel_connect_to_path(struct ssh *, const char *, char *, char *);
Channel *channel_connect_stdio_fwd(struct ssh *, const char*,
u_short, int, int);
Channel *channel_connect_by_listen_address(struct ssh *, const char *,
u_short, char *, char *);
Channel *channel_connect_by_listen_path(struct ssh *, const char *,
char *, char *);
int channel_request_remote_forwarding(struct ssh *, struct Forward *);
int channel_setup_local_fwd_listener(struct ssh *, struct Forward *,
struct ForwardOptions *);
int channel_request_rforward_cancel(struct ssh *, struct Forward *);
int channel_setup_remote_fwd_listener(struct ssh *, struct Forward *,
int *, struct ForwardOptions *);
int channel_cancel_rport_listener(struct ssh *, struct Forward *);
int channel_cancel_lport_listener(struct ssh *, struct Forward *,
int, struct ForwardOptions *);
int permitopen_port(const char *);
/* x11 forwarding */
void channel_set_x11_refuse_time(struct ssh *, u_int);
int x11_connect_display(struct ssh *);
int x11_create_display_inet(struct ssh *, int, int, int, u_int *, int **);
void x11_request_forwarding_with_spoofing(struct ssh *, int,
const char *, const char *, const char *, int);
/* channel close */
int chan_is_dead(struct ssh *, Channel *, int);
void chan_mark_dead(struct ssh *, Channel *);
/* channel events */
void chan_rcvd_oclose(struct ssh *, Channel *);
void chan_rcvd_eow(struct ssh *, Channel *);
void chan_read_failed(struct ssh *, Channel *);
void chan_ibuf_empty(struct ssh *, Channel *);
void chan_rcvd_ieof(struct ssh *, Channel *);
void chan_write_failed(struct ssh *, Channel *);
void chan_obuf_empty(struct ssh *, Channel *);
#endif
diff --git a/clientloop.c b/clientloop.c
index da396c72aa20..60b46d1616c8 100644
--- a/clientloop.c
+++ b/clientloop.c
@@ -1,2451 +1,2457 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: clientloop.c,v 1.344 2020/04/24 02:19:40 dtucker Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: clientloop.c,v 1.346 2020/09/16 03:07:31 dtucker Exp $ */
/*
* Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
* Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
* All rights reserved
* The main loop for the interactive session (client side).
*
* As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
* can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this
* software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
* incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
* called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
*
*
* Copyright (c) 1999 Theo de Raadt. All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
* OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
* IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
* INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
* NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
* DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
* THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
* (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
* THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
*
*
* SSH2 support added by Markus Friedl.
* Copyright (c) 1999, 2000, 2001 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
* OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
* IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
* INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
* NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
* DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
* THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
* (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
* THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
*/
#include "includes.h"
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/ioctl.h>
#ifdef HAVE_SYS_STAT_H
# include <sys/stat.h>
#endif
#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TIME_H
# include <sys/time.h>
#endif
#include <sys/socket.h>
#include <ctype.h>
#include <errno.h>
#ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H
#include <paths.h>
#endif
#include <signal.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <stdarg.h>
#include <termios.h>
#include <pwd.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <limits.h>
#include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h"
#include "xmalloc.h"
#include "ssh.h"
#include "ssh2.h"
#include "packet.h"
#include "sshbuf.h"
#include "compat.h"
#include "channels.h"
#include "dispatch.h"
#include "sshkey.h"
#include "cipher.h"
#include "kex.h"
#include "myproposal.h"
#include "log.h"
#include "misc.h"
#include "readconf.h"
#include "clientloop.h"
#include "sshconnect.h"
#include "authfd.h"
#include "atomicio.h"
#include "sshpty.h"
#include "match.h"
#include "msg.h"
#include "ssherr.h"
#include "hostfile.h"
/* import options */
extern Options options;
/* Flag indicating that stdin should be redirected from /dev/null. */
extern int stdin_null_flag;
/* Flag indicating that no shell has been requested */
extern int no_shell_flag;
/* Flag indicating that ssh should daemonise after authentication is complete */
extern int fork_after_authentication_flag;
/* Control socket */
extern int muxserver_sock; /* XXX use mux_client_cleanup() instead */
/*
* Name of the host we are connecting to. This is the name given on the
* command line, or the Hostname specified for the user-supplied name in a
* configuration file.
*/
extern char *host;
/*
* If this field is not NULL, the ForwardAgent socket is this path and different
* instead of SSH_AUTH_SOCK.
*/
extern char *forward_agent_sock_path;
/*
* Flag to indicate that we have received a window change signal which has
* not yet been processed. This will cause a message indicating the new
* window size to be sent to the server a little later. This is volatile
* because this is updated in a signal handler.
*/
static volatile sig_atomic_t received_window_change_signal = 0;
static volatile sig_atomic_t received_signal = 0;
/* Time when backgrounded control master using ControlPersist should exit */
static time_t control_persist_exit_time = 0;
/* Common data for the client loop code. */
volatile sig_atomic_t quit_pending; /* Set non-zero to quit the loop. */
static int last_was_cr; /* Last character was a newline. */
static int exit_status; /* Used to store the command exit status. */
static struct sshbuf *stderr_buffer; /* Used for final exit message. */
static int connection_in; /* Connection to server (input). */
static int connection_out; /* Connection to server (output). */
static int need_rekeying; /* Set to non-zero if rekeying is requested. */
static int session_closed; /* In SSH2: login session closed. */
static u_int x11_refuse_time; /* If >0, refuse x11 opens after this time. */
+static time_t server_alive_time; /* Time to do server_alive_check */
static void client_init_dispatch(struct ssh *ssh);
int session_ident = -1;
/* Track escape per proto2 channel */
struct escape_filter_ctx {
int escape_pending;
int escape_char;
};
/* Context for channel confirmation replies */
struct channel_reply_ctx {
const char *request_type;
int id;
enum confirm_action action;
};
/* Global request success/failure callbacks */
/* XXX move to struct ssh? */
struct global_confirm {
TAILQ_ENTRY(global_confirm) entry;
global_confirm_cb *cb;
void *ctx;
int ref_count;
};
TAILQ_HEAD(global_confirms, global_confirm);
static struct global_confirms global_confirms =
TAILQ_HEAD_INITIALIZER(global_confirms);
void ssh_process_session2_setup(int, int, int, struct sshbuf *);
/*
* Signal handler for the window change signal (SIGWINCH). This just sets a
* flag indicating that the window has changed.
*/
/*ARGSUSED */
static void
window_change_handler(int sig)
{
received_window_change_signal = 1;
}
/*
* Signal handler for signals that cause the program to terminate. These
* signals must be trapped to restore terminal modes.
*/
/*ARGSUSED */
static void
signal_handler(int sig)
{
received_signal = sig;
quit_pending = 1;
}
/*
* Sets control_persist_exit_time to the absolute time when the
* backgrounded control master should exit due to expiry of the
* ControlPersist timeout. Sets it to 0 if we are not a backgrounded
* control master process, or if there is no ControlPersist timeout.
*/
static void
set_control_persist_exit_time(struct ssh *ssh)
{
if (muxserver_sock == -1 || !options.control_persist
|| options.control_persist_timeout == 0) {
/* not using a ControlPersist timeout */
control_persist_exit_time = 0;
} else if (channel_still_open(ssh)) {
/* some client connections are still open */
if (control_persist_exit_time > 0)
debug2("%s: cancel scheduled exit", __func__);
control_persist_exit_time = 0;
} else if (control_persist_exit_time <= 0) {
/* a client connection has recently closed */
control_persist_exit_time = monotime() +
(time_t)options.control_persist_timeout;
debug2("%s: schedule exit in %d seconds", __func__,
options.control_persist_timeout);
}
/* else we are already counting down to the timeout */
}
#define SSH_X11_VALID_DISPLAY_CHARS ":/.-_"
static int
client_x11_display_valid(const char *display)
{
size_t i, dlen;
if (display == NULL)
return 0;
dlen = strlen(display);
for (i = 0; i < dlen; i++) {
if (!isalnum((u_char)display[i]) &&
strchr(SSH_X11_VALID_DISPLAY_CHARS, display[i]) == NULL) {
debug("Invalid character '%c' in DISPLAY", display[i]);
return 0;
}
}
return 1;
}
#define SSH_X11_PROTO "MIT-MAGIC-COOKIE-1"
#define X11_TIMEOUT_SLACK 60
int
client_x11_get_proto(struct ssh *ssh, const char *display,
const char *xauth_path, u_int trusted, u_int timeout,
char **_proto, char **_data)
{
char *cmd, line[512], xdisplay[512];
char xauthfile[PATH_MAX], xauthdir[PATH_MAX];
static char proto[512], data[512];
FILE *f;
int got_data = 0, generated = 0, do_unlink = 0, r;
struct stat st;
u_int now, x11_timeout_real;
*_proto = proto;
*_data = data;
proto[0] = data[0] = xauthfile[0] = xauthdir[0] = '\0';
if (!client_x11_display_valid(display)) {
if (display != NULL)
logit("DISPLAY \"%s\" invalid; disabling X11 forwarding",
display);
return -1;
}
if (xauth_path != NULL && stat(xauth_path, &st) == -1) {
debug("No xauth program.");
xauth_path = NULL;
}
if (xauth_path != NULL) {
/*
* Handle FamilyLocal case where $DISPLAY does
* not match an authorization entry. For this we
* just try "xauth list unix:displaynum.screennum".
* XXX: "localhost" match to determine FamilyLocal
* is not perfect.
*/
if (strncmp(display, "localhost:", 10) == 0) {
if ((r = snprintf(xdisplay, sizeof(xdisplay), "unix:%s",
display + 10)) < 0 ||
(size_t)r >= sizeof(xdisplay)) {
error("%s: display name too long", __func__);
return -1;
}
display = xdisplay;
}
if (trusted == 0) {
/*
* Generate an untrusted X11 auth cookie.
*
* The authentication cookie should briefly outlive
* ssh's willingness to forward X11 connections to
* avoid nasty fail-open behaviour in the X server.
*/
mktemp_proto(xauthdir, sizeof(xauthdir));
if (mkdtemp(xauthdir) == NULL) {
error("%s: mkdtemp: %s",
__func__, strerror(errno));
return -1;
}
do_unlink = 1;
if ((r = snprintf(xauthfile, sizeof(xauthfile),
"%s/xauthfile", xauthdir)) < 0 ||
(size_t)r >= sizeof(xauthfile)) {
error("%s: xauthfile path too long", __func__);
rmdir(xauthdir);
return -1;
}
if (timeout == 0) {
/* auth doesn't time out */
xasprintf(&cmd, "%s -f %s generate %s %s "
"untrusted 2>%s",
xauth_path, xauthfile, display,
SSH_X11_PROTO, _PATH_DEVNULL);
} else {
/* Add some slack to requested expiry */
if (timeout < UINT_MAX - X11_TIMEOUT_SLACK)
x11_timeout_real = timeout +
X11_TIMEOUT_SLACK;
else {
/* Don't overflow on long timeouts */
x11_timeout_real = UINT_MAX;
}
xasprintf(&cmd, "%s -f %s generate %s %s "
"untrusted timeout %u 2>%s",
xauth_path, xauthfile, display,
SSH_X11_PROTO, x11_timeout_real,
_PATH_DEVNULL);
}
debug2("%s: xauth command: %s", __func__, cmd);
if (timeout != 0 && x11_refuse_time == 0) {
now = monotime() + 1;
if (UINT_MAX - timeout < now)
x11_refuse_time = UINT_MAX;
else
x11_refuse_time = now + timeout;
channel_set_x11_refuse_time(ssh,
x11_refuse_time);
}
if (system(cmd) == 0)
generated = 1;
free(cmd);
}
/*
* When in untrusted mode, we read the cookie only if it was
* successfully generated as an untrusted one in the step
* above.
*/
if (trusted || generated) {
xasprintf(&cmd,
"%s %s%s list %s 2>" _PATH_DEVNULL,
xauth_path,
generated ? "-f " : "" ,
generated ? xauthfile : "",
display);
debug2("x11_get_proto: %s", cmd);
f = popen(cmd, "r");
if (f && fgets(line, sizeof(line), f) &&
sscanf(line, "%*s %511s %511s", proto, data) == 2)
got_data = 1;
if (f)
pclose(f);
free(cmd);
}
}
if (do_unlink) {
unlink(xauthfile);
rmdir(xauthdir);
}
/* Don't fall back to fake X11 data for untrusted forwarding */
if (!trusted && !got_data) {
error("Warning: untrusted X11 forwarding setup failed: "
"xauth key data not generated");
return -1;
}
/*
* If we didn't get authentication data, just make up some
* data. The forwarding code will check the validity of the
* response anyway, and substitute this data. The X11
* server, however, will ignore this fake data and use
* whatever authentication mechanisms it was using otherwise
* for the local connection.
*/
if (!got_data) {
u_int8_t rnd[16];
u_int i;
logit("Warning: No xauth data; "
"using fake authentication data for X11 forwarding.");
strlcpy(proto, SSH_X11_PROTO, sizeof proto);
arc4random_buf(rnd, sizeof(rnd));
for (i = 0; i < sizeof(rnd); i++) {
snprintf(data + 2 * i, sizeof data - 2 * i, "%02x",
rnd[i]);
}
}
return 0;
}
/*
* Checks if the client window has changed, and sends a packet about it to
* the server if so. The actual change is detected elsewhere (by a software
* interrupt on Unix); this just checks the flag and sends a message if
* appropriate.
*/
static void
client_check_window_change(struct ssh *ssh)
{
if (!received_window_change_signal)
return;
received_window_change_signal = 0;
debug2("%s: changed", __func__);
channel_send_window_changes(ssh);
}
static int
client_global_request_reply(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh)
{
struct global_confirm *gc;
if ((gc = TAILQ_FIRST(&global_confirms)) == NULL)
return 0;
if (gc->cb != NULL)
gc->cb(ssh, type, seq, gc->ctx);
if (--gc->ref_count <= 0) {
TAILQ_REMOVE(&global_confirms, gc, entry);
freezero(gc, sizeof(*gc));
}
ssh_packet_set_alive_timeouts(ssh, 0);
return 0;
}
+static void
+schedule_server_alive_check(void)
+{
+ if (options.server_alive_interval > 0)
+ server_alive_time = monotime() + options.server_alive_interval;
+}
+
static void
server_alive_check(struct ssh *ssh)
{
int r;
if (ssh_packet_inc_alive_timeouts(ssh) > options.server_alive_count_max) {
logit("Timeout, server %s not responding.", host);
cleanup_exit(255);
}
if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_GLOBAL_REQUEST)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, "keepalive@openssh.com")) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_u8(ssh, 1)) != 0 || /* boolean: want reply */
(r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0)
fatal("%s: send packet: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
/* Insert an empty placeholder to maintain ordering */
client_register_global_confirm(NULL, NULL);
+ schedule_server_alive_check();
}
/*
* Waits until the client can do something (some data becomes available on
* one of the file descriptors).
*/
static void
client_wait_until_can_do_something(struct ssh *ssh,
fd_set **readsetp, fd_set **writesetp,
int *maxfdp, u_int *nallocp, int rekeying)
{
struct timeval tv, *tvp;
int timeout_secs;
- time_t minwait_secs = 0, server_alive_time = 0, now = monotime();
+ time_t minwait_secs = 0, now = monotime();
int r, ret;
/* Add any selections by the channel mechanism. */
channel_prepare_select(ssh, readsetp, writesetp, maxfdp,
nallocp, &minwait_secs);
/* channel_prepare_select could have closed the last channel */
if (session_closed && !channel_still_open(ssh) &&
!ssh_packet_have_data_to_write(ssh)) {
/* clear mask since we did not call select() */
memset(*readsetp, 0, *nallocp);
memset(*writesetp, 0, *nallocp);
return;
}
FD_SET(connection_in, *readsetp);
/* Select server connection if have data to write to the server. */
if (ssh_packet_have_data_to_write(ssh))
FD_SET(connection_out, *writesetp);
/*
* Wait for something to happen. This will suspend the process until
* some selected descriptor can be read, written, or has some other
* event pending, or a timeout expires.
*/
timeout_secs = INT_MAX; /* we use INT_MAX to mean no timeout */
- if (options.server_alive_interval > 0) {
- timeout_secs = options.server_alive_interval;
- server_alive_time = now + options.server_alive_interval;
- }
+ if (options.server_alive_interval > 0)
+ timeout_secs = MAXIMUM(server_alive_time - now, 0);
if (options.rekey_interval > 0 && !rekeying)
timeout_secs = MINIMUM(timeout_secs,
ssh_packet_get_rekey_timeout(ssh));
set_control_persist_exit_time(ssh);
if (control_persist_exit_time > 0) {
timeout_secs = MINIMUM(timeout_secs,
control_persist_exit_time - now);
if (timeout_secs < 0)
timeout_secs = 0;
}
if (minwait_secs != 0)
timeout_secs = MINIMUM(timeout_secs, (int)minwait_secs);
if (timeout_secs == INT_MAX)
tvp = NULL;
else {
tv.tv_sec = timeout_secs;
tv.tv_usec = 0;
tvp = &tv;
}
ret = select((*maxfdp)+1, *readsetp, *writesetp, NULL, tvp);
if (ret == -1) {
/*
* We have to clear the select masks, because we return.
* We have to return, because the mainloop checks for the flags
* set by the signal handlers.
*/
memset(*readsetp, 0, *nallocp);
memset(*writesetp, 0, *nallocp);
-
if (errno == EINTR)
return;
/* Note: we might still have data in the buffers. */
if ((r = sshbuf_putf(stderr_buffer,
"select: %s\r\n", strerror(errno))) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
quit_pending = 1;
- } else if (ret == 0) {
+ } else if (options.server_alive_interval > 0 && !FD_ISSET(connection_in,
+ *readsetp) && monotime() >= server_alive_time)
/*
- * Timeout. Could have been either keepalive or rekeying.
- * Keepalive we check here, rekeying is checked in clientloop.
+ * ServerAlive check is needed. We can't rely on the select
+ * timing out since traffic on the client side such as port
+ * forwards can keep waking it up.
*/
- if (server_alive_time != 0 && server_alive_time <= monotime())
- server_alive_check(ssh);
- }
-
+ server_alive_check(ssh);
}
static void
client_suspend_self(struct sshbuf *bin, struct sshbuf *bout, struct sshbuf *berr)
{
/* Flush stdout and stderr buffers. */
if (sshbuf_len(bout) > 0)
atomicio(vwrite, fileno(stdout), sshbuf_mutable_ptr(bout),
sshbuf_len(bout));
if (sshbuf_len(berr) > 0)
atomicio(vwrite, fileno(stderr), sshbuf_mutable_ptr(berr),
sshbuf_len(berr));
leave_raw_mode(options.request_tty == REQUEST_TTY_FORCE);
sshbuf_reset(bin);
sshbuf_reset(bout);
sshbuf_reset(berr);
/* Send the suspend signal to the program itself. */
kill(getpid(), SIGTSTP);
/* Reset window sizes in case they have changed */
received_window_change_signal = 1;
enter_raw_mode(options.request_tty == REQUEST_TTY_FORCE);
}
static void
client_process_net_input(struct ssh *ssh, fd_set *readset)
{
char buf[SSH_IOBUFSZ];
int r, len;
/*
* Read input from the server, and add any such data to the buffer of
* the packet subsystem.
*/
if (FD_ISSET(connection_in, readset)) {
+ schedule_server_alive_check();
/* Read as much as possible. */
len = read(connection_in, buf, sizeof(buf));
if (len == 0) {
/*
* Received EOF. The remote host has closed the
* connection.
*/
if ((r = sshbuf_putf(stderr_buffer,
"Connection to %.300s closed by remote host.\r\n",
host)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s",
__func__, ssh_err(r));
quit_pending = 1;
return;
}
/*
* There is a kernel bug on Solaris that causes select to
* sometimes wake up even though there is no data available.
*/
if (len == -1 &&
(errno == EAGAIN || errno == EINTR || errno == EWOULDBLOCK))
len = 0;
if (len == -1) {
/*
* An error has encountered. Perhaps there is a
* network problem.
*/
if ((r = sshbuf_putf(stderr_buffer,
"Read from remote host %.300s: %.100s\r\n",
host, strerror(errno))) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s",
__func__, ssh_err(r));
quit_pending = 1;
return;
}
ssh_packet_process_incoming(ssh, buf, len);
}
}
static void
client_status_confirm(struct ssh *ssh, int type, Channel *c, void *ctx)
{
struct channel_reply_ctx *cr = (struct channel_reply_ctx *)ctx;
char errmsg[256];
int r, tochan;
/*
* If a TTY was explicitly requested, then a failure to allocate
* one is fatal.
*/
if (cr->action == CONFIRM_TTY &&
(options.request_tty == REQUEST_TTY_FORCE ||
options.request_tty == REQUEST_TTY_YES))
cr->action = CONFIRM_CLOSE;
/* XXX suppress on mux _client_ quietmode */
tochan = options.log_level >= SYSLOG_LEVEL_ERROR &&
c->ctl_chan != -1 && c->extended_usage == CHAN_EXTENDED_WRITE;
if (type == SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_SUCCESS) {
debug2("%s request accepted on channel %d",
cr->request_type, c->self);
} else if (type == SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_FAILURE) {
if (tochan) {
snprintf(errmsg, sizeof(errmsg),
"%s request failed\r\n", cr->request_type);
} else {
snprintf(errmsg, sizeof(errmsg),
"%s request failed on channel %d",
cr->request_type, c->self);
}
/* If error occurred on primary session channel, then exit */
if (cr->action == CONFIRM_CLOSE && c->self == session_ident)
fatal("%s", errmsg);
/*
* If error occurred on mux client, append to
* their stderr.
*/
if (tochan) {
if ((r = sshbuf_put(c->extended, errmsg,
strlen(errmsg))) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error %s", __func__,
ssh_err(r));
} else
error("%s", errmsg);
if (cr->action == CONFIRM_TTY) {
/*
* If a TTY allocation error occurred, then arrange
* for the correct TTY to leave raw mode.
*/
if (c->self == session_ident)
leave_raw_mode(0);
else
mux_tty_alloc_failed(ssh, c);
} else if (cr->action == CONFIRM_CLOSE) {
chan_read_failed(ssh, c);
chan_write_failed(ssh, c);
}
}
free(cr);
}
static void
client_abandon_status_confirm(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c, void *ctx)
{
free(ctx);
}
void
client_expect_confirm(struct ssh *ssh, int id, const char *request,
enum confirm_action action)
{
struct channel_reply_ctx *cr = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*cr));
cr->request_type = request;
cr->action = action;
channel_register_status_confirm(ssh, id, client_status_confirm,
client_abandon_status_confirm, cr);
}
void
client_register_global_confirm(global_confirm_cb *cb, void *ctx)
{
struct global_confirm *gc, *last_gc;
/* Coalesce identical callbacks */
last_gc = TAILQ_LAST(&global_confirms, global_confirms);
if (last_gc && last_gc->cb == cb && last_gc->ctx == ctx) {
if (++last_gc->ref_count >= INT_MAX)
fatal("%s: last_gc->ref_count = %d",
__func__, last_gc->ref_count);
return;
}
gc = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*gc));
gc->cb = cb;
gc->ctx = ctx;
gc->ref_count = 1;
TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(&global_confirms, gc, entry);
}
static void
process_cmdline(struct ssh *ssh)
{
void (*handler)(int);
char *s, *cmd;
int ok, delete = 0, local = 0, remote = 0, dynamic = 0;
struct Forward fwd;
memset(&fwd, 0, sizeof(fwd));
leave_raw_mode(options.request_tty == REQUEST_TTY_FORCE);
handler = ssh_signal(SIGINT, SIG_IGN);
cmd = s = read_passphrase("\r\nssh> ", RP_ECHO);
if (s == NULL)
goto out;
while (isspace((u_char)*s))
s++;
if (*s == '-')
s++; /* Skip cmdline '-', if any */
if (*s == '\0')
goto out;
if (*s == 'h' || *s == 'H' || *s == '?') {
logit("Commands:");
logit(" -L[bind_address:]port:host:hostport "
"Request local forward");
logit(" -R[bind_address:]port:host:hostport "
"Request remote forward");
logit(" -D[bind_address:]port "
"Request dynamic forward");
logit(" -KL[bind_address:]port "
"Cancel local forward");
logit(" -KR[bind_address:]port "
"Cancel remote forward");
logit(" -KD[bind_address:]port "
"Cancel dynamic forward");
if (!options.permit_local_command)
goto out;
logit(" !args "
"Execute local command");
goto out;
}
if (*s == '!' && options.permit_local_command) {
s++;
ssh_local_cmd(s);
goto out;
}
if (*s == 'K') {
delete = 1;
s++;
}
if (*s == 'L')
local = 1;
else if (*s == 'R')
remote = 1;
else if (*s == 'D')
dynamic = 1;
else {
logit("Invalid command.");
goto out;
}
while (isspace((u_char)*++s))
;
/* XXX update list of forwards in options */
if (delete) {
/* We pass 1 for dynamicfwd to restrict to 1 or 2 fields. */
if (!parse_forward(&fwd, s, 1, 0)) {
logit("Bad forwarding close specification.");
goto out;
}
if (remote)
ok = channel_request_rforward_cancel(ssh, &fwd) == 0;
else if (dynamic)
ok = channel_cancel_lport_listener(ssh, &fwd,
0, &options.fwd_opts) > 0;
else
ok = channel_cancel_lport_listener(ssh, &fwd,
CHANNEL_CANCEL_PORT_STATIC,
&options.fwd_opts) > 0;
if (!ok) {
logit("Unknown port forwarding.");
goto out;
}
logit("Canceled forwarding.");
} else {
if (!parse_forward(&fwd, s, dynamic, remote)) {
logit("Bad forwarding specification.");
goto out;
}
if (local || dynamic) {
if (!channel_setup_local_fwd_listener(ssh, &fwd,
&options.fwd_opts)) {
logit("Port forwarding failed.");
goto out;
}
} else {
if (channel_request_remote_forwarding(ssh, &fwd) < 0) {
logit("Port forwarding failed.");
goto out;
}
}
logit("Forwarding port.");
}
out:
ssh_signal(SIGINT, handler);
enter_raw_mode(options.request_tty == REQUEST_TTY_FORCE);
free(cmd);
free(fwd.listen_host);
free(fwd.listen_path);
free(fwd.connect_host);
free(fwd.connect_path);
}
/* reasons to suppress output of an escape command in help output */
#define SUPPRESS_NEVER 0 /* never suppress, always show */
#define SUPPRESS_MUXCLIENT 1 /* don't show in mux client sessions */
#define SUPPRESS_MUXMASTER 2 /* don't show in mux master sessions */
#define SUPPRESS_SYSLOG 4 /* don't show when logging to syslog */
struct escape_help_text {
const char *cmd;
const char *text;
unsigned int flags;
};
static struct escape_help_text esc_txt[] = {
{".", "terminate session", SUPPRESS_MUXMASTER},
{".", "terminate connection (and any multiplexed sessions)",
SUPPRESS_MUXCLIENT},
{"B", "send a BREAK to the remote system", SUPPRESS_NEVER},
{"C", "open a command line", SUPPRESS_MUXCLIENT},
{"R", "request rekey", SUPPRESS_NEVER},
{"V/v", "decrease/increase verbosity (LogLevel)", SUPPRESS_MUXCLIENT},
{"^Z", "suspend ssh", SUPPRESS_MUXCLIENT},
{"#", "list forwarded connections", SUPPRESS_NEVER},
{"&", "background ssh (when waiting for connections to terminate)",
SUPPRESS_MUXCLIENT},
{"?", "this message", SUPPRESS_NEVER},
};
static void
print_escape_help(struct sshbuf *b, int escape_char, int mux_client,
int using_stderr)
{
unsigned int i, suppress_flags;
int r;
if ((r = sshbuf_putf(b,
"%c?\r\nSupported escape sequences:\r\n", escape_char)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
suppress_flags =
(mux_client ? SUPPRESS_MUXCLIENT : 0) |
(mux_client ? 0 : SUPPRESS_MUXMASTER) |
(using_stderr ? 0 : SUPPRESS_SYSLOG);
for (i = 0; i < sizeof(esc_txt)/sizeof(esc_txt[0]); i++) {
if (esc_txt[i].flags & suppress_flags)
continue;
if ((r = sshbuf_putf(b, " %c%-3s - %s\r\n",
escape_char, esc_txt[i].cmd, esc_txt[i].text)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
}
if ((r = sshbuf_putf(b,
" %c%c - send the escape character by typing it twice\r\n"
"(Note that escapes are only recognized immediately after "
"newline.)\r\n", escape_char, escape_char)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
}
/*
* Process the characters one by one.
*/
static int
process_escapes(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c,
struct sshbuf *bin, struct sshbuf *bout, struct sshbuf *berr,
char *buf, int len)
{
pid_t pid;
int r, bytes = 0;
u_int i;
u_char ch;
char *s;
struct escape_filter_ctx *efc = c->filter_ctx == NULL ?
NULL : (struct escape_filter_ctx *)c->filter_ctx;
if (c->filter_ctx == NULL)
return 0;
if (len <= 0)
return (0);
for (i = 0; i < (u_int)len; i++) {
/* Get one character at a time. */
ch = buf[i];
if (efc->escape_pending) {
/* We have previously seen an escape character. */
/* Clear the flag now. */
efc->escape_pending = 0;
/* Process the escaped character. */
switch (ch) {
case '.':
/* Terminate the connection. */
if ((r = sshbuf_putf(berr, "%c.\r\n",
efc->escape_char)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s",
__func__, ssh_err(r));
if (c && c->ctl_chan != -1) {
chan_read_failed(ssh, c);
chan_write_failed(ssh, c);
if (c->detach_user) {
c->detach_user(ssh,
c->self, NULL);
}
c->type = SSH_CHANNEL_ABANDONED;
sshbuf_reset(c->input);
chan_ibuf_empty(ssh, c);
return 0;
} else
quit_pending = 1;
return -1;
case 'Z' - 64:
/* XXX support this for mux clients */
if (c && c->ctl_chan != -1) {
char b[16];
noescape:
if (ch == 'Z' - 64)
snprintf(b, sizeof b, "^Z");
else
snprintf(b, sizeof b, "%c", ch);
if ((r = sshbuf_putf(berr,
"%c%s escape not available to "
"multiplexed sessions\r\n",
efc->escape_char, b)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s",
__func__, ssh_err(r));
continue;
}
/* Suspend the program. Inform the user */
if ((r = sshbuf_putf(berr,
"%c^Z [suspend ssh]\r\n",
efc->escape_char)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s",
__func__, ssh_err(r));
/* Restore terminal modes and suspend. */
client_suspend_self(bin, bout, berr);
/* We have been continued. */
continue;
case 'B':
if ((r = sshbuf_putf(berr,
"%cB\r\n", efc->escape_char)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s",
__func__, ssh_err(r));
channel_request_start(ssh, c->self, "break", 0);
if ((r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, 1000)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0)
fatal("%s: send packet: %s", __func__,
ssh_err(r));
continue;
case 'R':
if (datafellows & SSH_BUG_NOREKEY)
logit("Server does not "
"support re-keying");
else
need_rekeying = 1;
continue;
case 'V':
/* FALLTHROUGH */
case 'v':
if (c && c->ctl_chan != -1)
goto noescape;
if (!log_is_on_stderr()) {
if ((r = sshbuf_putf(berr,
"%c%c [Logging to syslog]\r\n",
efc->escape_char, ch)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s",
__func__, ssh_err(r));
continue;
}
if (ch == 'V' && options.log_level >
SYSLOG_LEVEL_QUIET)
log_change_level(--options.log_level);
if (ch == 'v' && options.log_level <
SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG3)
log_change_level(++options.log_level);
if ((r = sshbuf_putf(berr,
"%c%c [LogLevel %s]\r\n",
efc->escape_char, ch,
log_level_name(options.log_level))) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s",
__func__, ssh_err(r));
continue;
case '&':
if (c && c->ctl_chan != -1)
goto noescape;
/*
* Detach the program (continue to serve
* connections, but put in background and no
* more new connections).
*/
/* Restore tty modes. */
leave_raw_mode(
options.request_tty == REQUEST_TTY_FORCE);
/* Stop listening for new connections. */
channel_stop_listening(ssh);
if ((r = sshbuf_putf(berr,
"%c& [backgrounded]\n", efc->escape_char))
!= 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s",
__func__, ssh_err(r));
/* Fork into background. */
pid = fork();
if (pid == -1) {
error("fork: %.100s", strerror(errno));
continue;
}
if (pid != 0) { /* This is the parent. */
/* The parent just exits. */
exit(0);
}
/* The child continues serving connections. */
/* fake EOF on stdin */
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(bin, 4)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s",
__func__, ssh_err(r));
return -1;
case '?':
print_escape_help(berr, efc->escape_char,
(c && c->ctl_chan != -1),
log_is_on_stderr());
continue;
case '#':
if ((r = sshbuf_putf(berr, "%c#\r\n",
efc->escape_char)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s",
__func__, ssh_err(r));
s = channel_open_message(ssh);
if ((r = sshbuf_put(berr, s, strlen(s))) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s",
__func__, ssh_err(r));
free(s);
continue;
case 'C':
if (c && c->ctl_chan != -1)
goto noescape;
process_cmdline(ssh);
continue;
default:
if (ch != efc->escape_char) {
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(bin,
efc->escape_char)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s",
__func__, ssh_err(r));
bytes++;
}
/* Escaped characters fall through here */
break;
}
} else {
/*
* The previous character was not an escape char.
* Check if this is an escape.
*/
if (last_was_cr && ch == efc->escape_char) {
/*
* It is. Set the flag and continue to
* next character.
*/
efc->escape_pending = 1;
continue;
}
}
/*
* Normal character. Record whether it was a newline,
* and append it to the buffer.
*/
last_was_cr = (ch == '\r' || ch == '\n');
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(bin, ch)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
bytes++;
}
return bytes;
}
/*
* Get packets from the connection input buffer, and process them as long as
* there are packets available.
*
* Any unknown packets received during the actual
* session cause the session to terminate. This is
* intended to make debugging easier since no
* confirmations are sent. Any compatible protocol
* extensions must be negotiated during the
* preparatory phase.
*/
static void
client_process_buffered_input_packets(struct ssh *ssh)
{
ssh_dispatch_run_fatal(ssh, DISPATCH_NONBLOCK, &quit_pending);
}
/* scan buf[] for '~' before sending data to the peer */
/* Helper: allocate a new escape_filter_ctx and fill in its escape char */
void *
client_new_escape_filter_ctx(int escape_char)
{
struct escape_filter_ctx *ret;
ret = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*ret));
ret->escape_pending = 0;
ret->escape_char = escape_char;
return (void *)ret;
}
/* Free the escape filter context on channel free */
void
client_filter_cleanup(struct ssh *ssh, int cid, void *ctx)
{
free(ctx);
}
int
client_simple_escape_filter(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c, char *buf, int len)
{
if (c->extended_usage != CHAN_EXTENDED_WRITE)
return 0;
return process_escapes(ssh, c, c->input, c->output, c->extended,
buf, len);
}
static void
client_channel_closed(struct ssh *ssh, int id, void *arg)
{
channel_cancel_cleanup(ssh, id);
session_closed = 1;
leave_raw_mode(options.request_tty == REQUEST_TTY_FORCE);
}
/*
* Implements the interactive session with the server. This is called after
* the user has been authenticated, and a command has been started on the
* remote host. If escape_char != SSH_ESCAPECHAR_NONE, it is the character
* used as an escape character for terminating or suspending the session.
*/
int
client_loop(struct ssh *ssh, int have_pty, int escape_char_arg,
int ssh2_chan_id)
{
fd_set *readset = NULL, *writeset = NULL;
double start_time, total_time;
int r, max_fd = 0, max_fd2 = 0, len;
u_int64_t ibytes, obytes;
u_int nalloc = 0;
- char buf[100];
debug("Entering interactive session.");
if (options.control_master &&
!option_clear_or_none(options.control_path)) {
debug("pledge: id");
if (pledge("stdio rpath wpath cpath unix inet dns recvfd sendfd proc exec id tty",
NULL) == -1)
fatal("%s pledge(): %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
} else if (options.forward_x11 || options.permit_local_command) {
debug("pledge: exec");
if (pledge("stdio rpath wpath cpath unix inet dns proc exec tty",
NULL) == -1)
fatal("%s pledge(): %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
} else if (options.update_hostkeys) {
debug("pledge: filesystem full");
if (pledge("stdio rpath wpath cpath unix inet dns proc tty",
NULL) == -1)
fatal("%s pledge(): %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
} else if (!option_clear_or_none(options.proxy_command) ||
fork_after_authentication_flag) {
debug("pledge: proc");
if (pledge("stdio cpath unix inet dns proc tty", NULL) == -1)
fatal("%s pledge(): %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
} else {
debug("pledge: network");
if (pledge("stdio unix inet dns proc tty", NULL) == -1)
fatal("%s pledge(): %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
}
start_time = monotime_double();
/* Initialize variables. */
last_was_cr = 1;
exit_status = -1;
connection_in = ssh_packet_get_connection_in(ssh);
connection_out = ssh_packet_get_connection_out(ssh);
max_fd = MAXIMUM(connection_in, connection_out);
quit_pending = 0;
/* Initialize buffer. */
if ((stderr_buffer = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
client_init_dispatch(ssh);
/*
* Set signal handlers, (e.g. to restore non-blocking mode)
* but don't overwrite SIG_IGN, matches behaviour from rsh(1)
*/
if (ssh_signal(SIGHUP, SIG_IGN) != SIG_IGN)
ssh_signal(SIGHUP, signal_handler);
if (ssh_signal(SIGINT, SIG_IGN) != SIG_IGN)
ssh_signal(SIGINT, signal_handler);
if (ssh_signal(SIGQUIT, SIG_IGN) != SIG_IGN)
ssh_signal(SIGQUIT, signal_handler);
if (ssh_signal(SIGTERM, SIG_IGN) != SIG_IGN)
ssh_signal(SIGTERM, signal_handler);
ssh_signal(SIGWINCH, window_change_handler);
if (have_pty)
enter_raw_mode(options.request_tty == REQUEST_TTY_FORCE);
session_ident = ssh2_chan_id;
if (session_ident != -1) {
if (escape_char_arg != SSH_ESCAPECHAR_NONE) {
channel_register_filter(ssh, session_ident,
client_simple_escape_filter, NULL,
client_filter_cleanup,
client_new_escape_filter_ctx(
escape_char_arg));
}
channel_register_cleanup(ssh, session_ident,
client_channel_closed, 0);
}
+ schedule_server_alive_check();
+
/* Main loop of the client for the interactive session mode. */
while (!quit_pending) {
/* Process buffered packets sent by the server. */
client_process_buffered_input_packets(ssh);
if (session_closed && !channel_still_open(ssh))
break;
if (ssh_packet_is_rekeying(ssh)) {
debug("rekeying in progress");
} else if (need_rekeying) {
/* manual rekey request */
debug("need rekeying");
if ((r = kex_start_rekex(ssh)) != 0)
fatal("%s: kex_start_rekex: %s", __func__,
ssh_err(r));
need_rekeying = 0;
} else {
/*
* Make packets from buffered channel data, and
* enqueue them for sending to the server.
*/
if (ssh_packet_not_very_much_data_to_write(ssh))
channel_output_poll(ssh);
/*
* Check if the window size has changed, and buffer a
* message about it to the server if so.
*/
client_check_window_change(ssh);
if (quit_pending)
break;
}
/*
* Wait until we have something to do (something becomes
* available on one of the descriptors).
*/
max_fd2 = max_fd;
client_wait_until_can_do_something(ssh, &readset, &writeset,
&max_fd2, &nalloc, ssh_packet_is_rekeying(ssh));
if (quit_pending)
break;
/* Do channel operations unless rekeying in progress. */
if (!ssh_packet_is_rekeying(ssh))
channel_after_select(ssh, readset, writeset);
/* Buffer input from the connection. */
client_process_net_input(ssh, readset);
if (quit_pending)
break;
/*
* Send as much buffered packet data as possible to the
* sender.
*/
if (FD_ISSET(connection_out, writeset)) {
if ((r = ssh_packet_write_poll(ssh)) != 0) {
sshpkt_fatal(ssh, r,
"%s: ssh_packet_write_poll", __func__);
}
}
/*
* If we are a backgrounded control master, and the
* timeout has expired without any active client
* connections, then quit.
*/
if (control_persist_exit_time > 0) {
if (monotime() >= control_persist_exit_time) {
debug("ControlPersist timeout expired");
break;
}
}
}
free(readset);
free(writeset);
/* Terminate the session. */
/* Stop watching for window change. */
ssh_signal(SIGWINCH, SIG_DFL);
if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_DISCONNECT)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, SSH2_DISCONNECT_BY_APPLICATION)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, "disconnected by user")) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, "")) != 0 || /* language tag */
(r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0 ||
(r = ssh_packet_write_wait(ssh)) != 0)
fatal("%s: send disconnect: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
channel_free_all(ssh);
if (have_pty)
leave_raw_mode(options.request_tty == REQUEST_TTY_FORCE);
/* restore blocking io */
if (!isatty(fileno(stdin)))
unset_nonblock(fileno(stdin));
if (!isatty(fileno(stdout)))
unset_nonblock(fileno(stdout));
if (!isatty(fileno(stderr)))
unset_nonblock(fileno(stderr));
/*
* If there was no shell or command requested, there will be no remote
* exit status to be returned. In that case, clear error code if the
* connection was deliberately terminated at this end.
*/
if (no_shell_flag && received_signal == SIGTERM) {
received_signal = 0;
exit_status = 0;
}
if (received_signal) {
verbose("Killed by signal %d.", (int) received_signal);
cleanup_exit(0);
}
/*
* In interactive mode (with pseudo tty) display a message indicating
* that the connection has been closed.
*/
if (have_pty && options.log_level != SYSLOG_LEVEL_QUIET) {
if ((r = sshbuf_putf(stderr_buffer,
"Connection to %.64s closed.\r\n", host)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
}
/* Output any buffered data for stderr. */
if (sshbuf_len(stderr_buffer) > 0) {
len = atomicio(vwrite, fileno(stderr),
(u_char *)sshbuf_ptr(stderr_buffer),
sshbuf_len(stderr_buffer));
if (len < 0 || (u_int)len != sshbuf_len(stderr_buffer))
error("Write failed flushing stderr buffer.");
else if ((r = sshbuf_consume(stderr_buffer, len)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
}
/* Clear and free any buffers. */
- explicit_bzero(buf, sizeof(buf));
sshbuf_free(stderr_buffer);
/* Report bytes transferred, and transfer rates. */
total_time = monotime_double() - start_time;
ssh_packet_get_bytes(ssh, &ibytes, &obytes);
verbose("Transferred: sent %llu, received %llu bytes, in %.1f seconds",
(unsigned long long)obytes, (unsigned long long)ibytes, total_time);
if (total_time > 0)
verbose("Bytes per second: sent %.1f, received %.1f",
obytes / total_time, ibytes / total_time);
/* Return the exit status of the program. */
debug("Exit status %d", exit_status);
return exit_status;
}
/*********/
static Channel *
client_request_forwarded_tcpip(struct ssh *ssh, const char *request_type,
int rchan, u_int rwindow, u_int rmaxpack)
{
Channel *c = NULL;
struct sshbuf *b = NULL;
char *listen_address, *originator_address;
u_int listen_port, originator_port;
int r;
/* Get rest of the packet */
if ((r = sshpkt_get_cstring(ssh, &listen_address, NULL)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &listen_port)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_get_cstring(ssh, &originator_address, NULL)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &originator_port)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0)
fatal("%s: parse packet: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
debug("%s: listen %s port %d, originator %s port %d", __func__,
listen_address, listen_port, originator_address, originator_port);
if (listen_port > 0xffff)
error("%s: invalid listen port", __func__);
else if (originator_port > 0xffff)
error("%s: invalid originator port", __func__);
else {
c = channel_connect_by_listen_address(ssh,
listen_address, listen_port, "forwarded-tcpip",
originator_address);
}
if (c != NULL && c->type == SSH_CHANNEL_MUX_CLIENT) {
if ((b = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) {
error("%s: alloc reply", __func__);
goto out;
}
/* reconstruct and send to muxclient */
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(b, 0)) != 0 || /* padlen */
(r = sshbuf_put_u8(b, SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, request_type)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u32(b, rchan)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u32(b, rwindow)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u32(b, rmaxpack)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, listen_address)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u32(b, listen_port)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, originator_address)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u32(b, originator_port)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_stringb(c->output, b)) != 0) {
error("%s: compose for muxclient %s", __func__,
ssh_err(r));
goto out;
}
}
out:
sshbuf_free(b);
free(originator_address);
free(listen_address);
return c;
}
static Channel *
client_request_forwarded_streamlocal(struct ssh *ssh,
const char *request_type, int rchan)
{
Channel *c = NULL;
char *listen_path;
int r;
/* Get the remote path. */
if ((r = sshpkt_get_cstring(ssh, &listen_path, NULL)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_get_string(ssh, NULL, NULL)) != 0 || /* reserved */
(r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0)
fatal("%s: parse packet: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
debug("%s: request: %s", __func__, listen_path);
c = channel_connect_by_listen_path(ssh, listen_path,
"forwarded-streamlocal@openssh.com", "forwarded-streamlocal");
free(listen_path);
return c;
}
static Channel *
client_request_x11(struct ssh *ssh, const char *request_type, int rchan)
{
Channel *c = NULL;
char *originator;
u_int originator_port;
int r, sock;
if (!options.forward_x11) {
error("Warning: ssh server tried X11 forwarding.");
error("Warning: this is probably a break-in attempt by a "
"malicious server.");
return NULL;
}
if (x11_refuse_time != 0 && (u_int)monotime() >= x11_refuse_time) {
verbose("Rejected X11 connection after ForwardX11Timeout "
"expired");
return NULL;
}
if ((r = sshpkt_get_cstring(ssh, &originator, NULL)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &originator_port)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0)
fatal("%s: parse packet: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
/* XXX check permission */
/* XXX range check originator port? */
debug("client_request_x11: request from %s %u", originator,
originator_port);
free(originator);
sock = x11_connect_display(ssh);
if (sock < 0)
return NULL;
c = channel_new(ssh, "x11",
SSH_CHANNEL_X11_OPEN, sock, sock, -1,
CHAN_TCP_WINDOW_DEFAULT, CHAN_X11_PACKET_DEFAULT, 0, "x11", 1);
c->force_drain = 1;
return c;
}
static Channel *
client_request_agent(struct ssh *ssh, const char *request_type, int rchan)
{
Channel *c = NULL;
int r, sock;
if (!options.forward_agent) {
error("Warning: ssh server tried agent forwarding.");
error("Warning: this is probably a break-in attempt by a "
"malicious server.");
return NULL;
}
if (forward_agent_sock_path == NULL) {
r = ssh_get_authentication_socket(&sock);
} else {
r = ssh_get_authentication_socket_path(forward_agent_sock_path, &sock);
}
if (r != 0) {
if (r != SSH_ERR_AGENT_NOT_PRESENT)
debug("%s: ssh_get_authentication_socket: %s",
__func__, ssh_err(r));
return NULL;
}
c = channel_new(ssh, "authentication agent connection",
SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN, sock, sock, -1,
CHAN_X11_WINDOW_DEFAULT, CHAN_TCP_PACKET_DEFAULT, 0,
"authentication agent connection", 1);
c->force_drain = 1;
return c;
}
char *
client_request_tun_fwd(struct ssh *ssh, int tun_mode,
int local_tun, int remote_tun, channel_open_fn *cb, void *cbctx)
{
Channel *c;
int r, fd;
char *ifname = NULL;
if (tun_mode == SSH_TUNMODE_NO)
return 0;
debug("Requesting tun unit %d in mode %d", local_tun, tun_mode);
/* Open local tunnel device */
if ((fd = tun_open(local_tun, tun_mode, &ifname)) == -1) {
error("Tunnel device open failed.");
return NULL;
}
debug("Tunnel forwarding using interface %s", ifname);
c = channel_new(ssh, "tun", SSH_CHANNEL_OPENING, fd, fd, -1,
CHAN_TCP_WINDOW_DEFAULT, CHAN_TCP_PACKET_DEFAULT, 0, "tun", 1);
c->datagram = 1;
#if defined(SSH_TUN_FILTER)
if (options.tun_open == SSH_TUNMODE_POINTOPOINT)
channel_register_filter(ssh, c->self, sys_tun_infilter,
sys_tun_outfilter, NULL, NULL);
#endif
if (cb != NULL)
channel_register_open_confirm(ssh, c->self, cb, cbctx);
if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, "tun@openssh.com")) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, c->self)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, c->local_window_max)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, c->local_maxpacket)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, tun_mode)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, remote_tun)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0)
sshpkt_fatal(ssh, r, "%s: send reply", __func__);
return ifname;
}
/* XXXX move to generic input handler */
static int
client_input_channel_open(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh)
{
Channel *c = NULL;
char *ctype = NULL;
int r;
u_int rchan;
size_t len;
u_int rmaxpack, rwindow;
if ((r = sshpkt_get_cstring(ssh, &ctype, &len)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &rchan)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &rwindow)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &rmaxpack)) != 0)
goto out;
debug("client_input_channel_open: ctype %s rchan %d win %d max %d",
ctype, rchan, rwindow, rmaxpack);
if (strcmp(ctype, "forwarded-tcpip") == 0) {
c = client_request_forwarded_tcpip(ssh, ctype, rchan, rwindow,
rmaxpack);
} else if (strcmp(ctype, "forwarded-streamlocal@openssh.com") == 0) {
c = client_request_forwarded_streamlocal(ssh, ctype, rchan);
} else if (strcmp(ctype, "x11") == 0) {
c = client_request_x11(ssh, ctype, rchan);
} else if (strcmp(ctype, "auth-agent@openssh.com") == 0) {
c = client_request_agent(ssh, ctype, rchan);
}
if (c != NULL && c->type == SSH_CHANNEL_MUX_CLIENT) {
debug3("proxied to downstream: %s", ctype);
} else if (c != NULL) {
debug("confirm %s", ctype);
c->remote_id = rchan;
c->have_remote_id = 1;
c->remote_window = rwindow;
c->remote_maxpacket = rmaxpack;
if (c->type != SSH_CHANNEL_CONNECTING) {
if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, c->remote_id)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, c->self)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, c->local_window)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, c->local_maxpacket)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0)
sshpkt_fatal(ssh, r, "%s: send reply", __func__);
}
} else {
debug("failure %s", ctype);
if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, rchan)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, SSH2_OPEN_ADMINISTRATIVELY_PROHIBITED)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, "open failed")) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, "")) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0)
sshpkt_fatal(ssh, r, "%s: send failure", __func__);
}
r = 0;
out:
free(ctype);
return r;
}
static int
client_input_channel_req(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh)
{
Channel *c = NULL;
char *rtype = NULL;
u_char reply;
u_int id, exitval;
int r, success = 0;
if ((r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &id)) != 0)
return r;
if (id <= INT_MAX)
c = channel_lookup(ssh, id);
if (channel_proxy_upstream(c, type, seq, ssh))
return 0;
if ((r = sshpkt_get_cstring(ssh, &rtype, NULL)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_get_u8(ssh, &reply)) != 0)
goto out;
debug("client_input_channel_req: channel %u rtype %s reply %d",
id, rtype, reply);
if (c == NULL) {
error("client_input_channel_req: channel %d: "
"unknown channel", id);
} else if (strcmp(rtype, "eow@openssh.com") == 0) {
if ((r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0)
goto out;
chan_rcvd_eow(ssh, c);
} else if (strcmp(rtype, "exit-status") == 0) {
if ((r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &exitval)) != 0)
goto out;
if (c->ctl_chan != -1) {
mux_exit_message(ssh, c, exitval);
success = 1;
} else if ((int)id == session_ident) {
/* Record exit value of local session */
success = 1;
exit_status = exitval;
} else {
/* Probably for a mux channel that has already closed */
debug("%s: no sink for exit-status on channel %d",
__func__, id);
}
if ((r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0)
goto out;
}
if (reply && c != NULL && !(c->flags & CHAN_CLOSE_SENT)) {
if (!c->have_remote_id)
fatal("%s: channel %d: no remote_id",
__func__, c->self);
if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, success ?
SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_SUCCESS : SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_FAILURE)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, c->remote_id)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0)
sshpkt_fatal(ssh, r, "%s: send failure", __func__);
}
r = 0;
out:
free(rtype);
return r;
}
struct hostkeys_update_ctx {
/* The hostname and (optionally) IP address string for the server */
char *host_str, *ip_str;
/*
* Keys received from the server and a flag for each indicating
* whether they already exist in known_hosts.
* keys_seen is filled in by hostkeys_find() and later (for new
* keys) by client_global_hostkeys_private_confirm().
*/
struct sshkey **keys;
int *keys_seen;
size_t nkeys, nnew;
/*
* Keys that are in known_hosts, but were not present in the update
* from the server (i.e. scheduled to be deleted).
* Filled in by hostkeys_find().
*/
struct sshkey **old_keys;
size_t nold;
};
static void
hostkeys_update_ctx_free(struct hostkeys_update_ctx *ctx)
{
size_t i;
if (ctx == NULL)
return;
for (i = 0; i < ctx->nkeys; i++)
sshkey_free(ctx->keys[i]);
free(ctx->keys);
free(ctx->keys_seen);
for (i = 0; i < ctx->nold; i++)
sshkey_free(ctx->old_keys[i]);
free(ctx->old_keys);
free(ctx->host_str);
free(ctx->ip_str);
free(ctx);
}
static int
hostkeys_find(struct hostkey_foreach_line *l, void *_ctx)
{
struct hostkeys_update_ctx *ctx = (struct hostkeys_update_ctx *)_ctx;
size_t i;
struct sshkey **tmp;
if (l->status != HKF_STATUS_MATCHED || l->key == NULL)
return 0;
/* Mark off keys we've already seen for this host */
for (i = 0; i < ctx->nkeys; i++) {
if (sshkey_equal(l->key, ctx->keys[i])) {
debug3("%s: found %s key at %s:%ld", __func__,
sshkey_ssh_name(ctx->keys[i]), l->path, l->linenum);
ctx->keys_seen[i] = 1;
return 0;
}
}
/* This line contained a key that not offered by the server */
debug3("%s: deprecated %s key at %s:%ld", __func__,
sshkey_ssh_name(l->key), l->path, l->linenum);
if ((tmp = recallocarray(ctx->old_keys, ctx->nold, ctx->nold + 1,
sizeof(*ctx->old_keys))) == NULL)
fatal("%s: recallocarray failed nold = %zu",
__func__, ctx->nold);
ctx->old_keys = tmp;
ctx->old_keys[ctx->nold++] = l->key;
l->key = NULL;
return 0;
}
static void
hostkey_change_preamble(LogLevel loglevel)
{
do_log2(loglevel, "The server has updated its host keys.");
do_log2(loglevel, "These changes were verified by the server's "
"existing trusted key.");
}
static void
update_known_hosts(struct hostkeys_update_ctx *ctx)
{
int r, was_raw = 0, first = 1;
int asking = options.update_hostkeys == SSH_UPDATE_HOSTKEYS_ASK;
LogLevel loglevel = asking ? SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO : SYSLOG_LEVEL_VERBOSE;
char *fp, *response;
size_t i;
struct stat sb;
for (i = 0; i < ctx->nkeys; i++) {
if (ctx->keys_seen[i] != 2)
continue;
if ((fp = sshkey_fingerprint(ctx->keys[i],
options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL)
fatal("%s: sshkey_fingerprint failed", __func__);
if (first && asking)
hostkey_change_preamble(loglevel);
do_log2(loglevel, "Learned new hostkey: %s %s",
sshkey_type(ctx->keys[i]), fp);
first = 0;
free(fp);
}
for (i = 0; i < ctx->nold; i++) {
if ((fp = sshkey_fingerprint(ctx->old_keys[i],
options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL)
fatal("%s: sshkey_fingerprint failed", __func__);
if (first && asking)
hostkey_change_preamble(loglevel);
do_log2(loglevel, "Deprecating obsolete hostkey: %s %s",
sshkey_type(ctx->old_keys[i]), fp);
first = 0;
free(fp);
}
if (options.update_hostkeys == SSH_UPDATE_HOSTKEYS_ASK) {
if (get_saved_tio() != NULL) {
leave_raw_mode(1);
was_raw = 1;
}
response = NULL;
for (i = 0; !quit_pending && i < 3; i++) {
free(response);
response = read_passphrase("Accept updated hostkeys? "
"(yes/no): ", RP_ECHO);
if (strcasecmp(response, "yes") == 0)
break;
else if (quit_pending || response == NULL ||
strcasecmp(response, "no") == 0) {
options.update_hostkeys = 0;
break;
} else {
do_log2(loglevel, "Please enter "
"\"yes\" or \"no\"");
}
}
if (quit_pending || i >= 3 || response == NULL)
options.update_hostkeys = 0;
free(response);
if (was_raw)
enter_raw_mode(1);
}
if (options.update_hostkeys == 0)
return;
/*
* Now that all the keys are verified, we can go ahead and replace
* them in known_hosts (assuming SSH_UPDATE_HOSTKEYS_ASK didn't
* cancel the operation).
*/
for (i = 0; i < options.num_user_hostfiles; i++) {
/*
* NB. keys are only added to hostfiles[0], for the rest we
* just delete the hostname entries.
*/
if (stat(options.user_hostfiles[i], &sb) != 0) {
if (errno == ENOENT) {
debug("%s: known hosts file %s does not exist",
__func__, strerror(errno));
} else {
error("%s: known hosts file %s inaccessible",
__func__, strerror(errno));
}
continue;
}
if ((r = hostfile_replace_entries(options.user_hostfiles[i],
ctx->host_str, ctx->ip_str,
i == 0 ? ctx->keys : NULL, i == 0 ? ctx->nkeys : 0,
options.hash_known_hosts, 0,
options.fingerprint_hash)) != 0) {
error("%s: hostfile_replace_entries failed for %s: %s",
__func__, options.user_hostfiles[i], ssh_err(r));
}
}
}
static void
client_global_hostkeys_private_confirm(struct ssh *ssh, int type,
u_int32_t seq, void *_ctx)
{
struct hostkeys_update_ctx *ctx = (struct hostkeys_update_ctx *)_ctx;
size_t i, ndone;
struct sshbuf *signdata;
int r, kexsigtype, use_kexsigtype;
const u_char *sig;
size_t siglen;
if (ctx->nnew == 0)
fatal("%s: ctx->nnew == 0", __func__); /* sanity */
if (type != SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_SUCCESS) {
error("Server failed to confirm ownership of "
"private host keys");
hostkeys_update_ctx_free(ctx);
return;
}
kexsigtype = sshkey_type_plain(
sshkey_type_from_name(ssh->kex->hostkey_alg));
if ((signdata = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
/* Don't want to accidentally accept an unbound signature */
if (ssh->kex->session_id_len == 0)
fatal("%s: ssh->kex->session_id_len == 0", __func__);
/*
* Expect a signature for each of the ctx->nnew private keys we
* haven't seen before. They will be in the same order as the
* ctx->keys where the corresponding ctx->keys_seen[i] == 0.
*/
for (ndone = i = 0; i < ctx->nkeys; i++) {
if (ctx->keys_seen[i])
continue;
/* Prepare data to be signed: session ID, unique string, key */
sshbuf_reset(signdata);
if ( (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(signdata,
"hostkeys-prove-00@openssh.com")) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_string(signdata, ssh->kex->session_id,
ssh->kex->session_id_len)) != 0 ||
(r = sshkey_puts(ctx->keys[i], signdata)) != 0)
fatal("%s: failed to prepare signature: %s",
__func__, ssh_err(r));
/* Extract and verify signature */
if ((r = sshpkt_get_string_direct(ssh, &sig, &siglen)) != 0) {
error("%s: couldn't parse message: %s",
__func__, ssh_err(r));
goto out;
}
/*
* For RSA keys, prefer to use the signature type negotiated
* during KEX to the default (SHA1).
*/
use_kexsigtype = kexsigtype == KEY_RSA &&
sshkey_type_plain(ctx->keys[i]->type) == KEY_RSA;
if ((r = sshkey_verify(ctx->keys[i], sig, siglen,
sshbuf_ptr(signdata), sshbuf_len(signdata),
use_kexsigtype ? ssh->kex->hostkey_alg : NULL, 0,
NULL)) != 0) {
error("%s: server gave bad signature for %s key %zu",
__func__, sshkey_type(ctx->keys[i]), i);
goto out;
}
/* Key is good. Mark it as 'seen' */
ctx->keys_seen[i] = 2;
ndone++;
}
if (ndone != ctx->nnew)
fatal("%s: ndone != ctx->nnew (%zu / %zu)", __func__,
ndone, ctx->nnew); /* Shouldn't happen */
if ((r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0) {
error("%s: protocol error", __func__);
goto out;
}
/* Make the edits to known_hosts */
update_known_hosts(ctx);
out:
hostkeys_update_ctx_free(ctx);
}
/*
* Returns non-zero if the key is accepted by HostkeyAlgorithms.
* Made slightly less trivial by the multiple RSA signature algorithm names.
*/
static int
key_accepted_by_hostkeyalgs(const struct sshkey *key)
{
const char *ktype = sshkey_ssh_name(key);
const char *hostkeyalgs = options.hostkeyalgorithms;
if (key == NULL || key->type == KEY_UNSPEC)
return 0;
if (key->type == KEY_RSA &&
(match_pattern_list("rsa-sha2-256", hostkeyalgs, 0) == 1 ||
match_pattern_list("rsa-sha2-512", hostkeyalgs, 0) == 1))
return 1;
return match_pattern_list(ktype, hostkeyalgs, 0) == 1;
}
/*
* Handle hostkeys-00@openssh.com global request to inform the client of all
* the server's hostkeys. The keys are checked against the user's
* HostkeyAlgorithms preference before they are accepted.
*/
static int
client_input_hostkeys(struct ssh *ssh)
{
const u_char *blob = NULL;
size_t i, len = 0;
struct sshbuf *buf = NULL;
struct sshkey *key = NULL, **tmp;
int r;
char *fp;
static int hostkeys_seen = 0; /* XXX use struct ssh */
extern struct sockaddr_storage hostaddr; /* XXX from ssh.c */
struct hostkeys_update_ctx *ctx = NULL;
if (hostkeys_seen)
fatal("%s: server already sent hostkeys", __func__);
if (options.update_hostkeys == SSH_UPDATE_HOSTKEYS_ASK &&
options.batch_mode)
return 1; /* won't ask in batchmode, so don't even try */
if (!options.update_hostkeys || options.num_user_hostfiles <= 0)
return 1;
ctx = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*ctx));
while (ssh_packet_remaining(ssh) > 0) {
sshkey_free(key);
key = NULL;
if ((r = sshpkt_get_string_direct(ssh, &blob, &len)) != 0) {
error("%s: couldn't parse message: %s",
__func__, ssh_err(r));
goto out;
}
if ((r = sshkey_from_blob(blob, len, &key)) != 0) {
do_log2(r == SSH_ERR_KEY_TYPE_UNKNOWN ?
SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG1 : SYSLOG_LEVEL_ERROR,
"%s: parse key: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
continue;
}
fp = sshkey_fingerprint(key, options.fingerprint_hash,
SSH_FP_DEFAULT);
debug3("%s: received %s key %s", __func__,
sshkey_type(key), fp);
free(fp);
if (!key_accepted_by_hostkeyalgs(key)) {
debug3("%s: %s key not permitted by HostkeyAlgorithms",
__func__, sshkey_ssh_name(key));
continue;
}
/* Skip certs */
if (sshkey_is_cert(key)) {
debug3("%s: %s key is a certificate; skipping",
__func__, sshkey_ssh_name(key));
continue;
}
/* Ensure keys are unique */
for (i = 0; i < ctx->nkeys; i++) {
if (sshkey_equal(key, ctx->keys[i])) {
error("%s: received duplicated %s host key",
__func__, sshkey_ssh_name(key));
goto out;
}
}
/* Key is good, record it */
if ((tmp = recallocarray(ctx->keys, ctx->nkeys, ctx->nkeys + 1,
sizeof(*ctx->keys))) == NULL)
fatal("%s: recallocarray failed nkeys = %zu",
__func__, ctx->nkeys);
ctx->keys = tmp;
ctx->keys[ctx->nkeys++] = key;
key = NULL;
}
if (ctx->nkeys == 0) {
debug("%s: server sent no hostkeys", __func__);
goto out;
}
if ((ctx->keys_seen = calloc(ctx->nkeys,
sizeof(*ctx->keys_seen))) == NULL)
fatal("%s: calloc failed", __func__);
get_hostfile_hostname_ipaddr(host,
options.check_host_ip ? (struct sockaddr *)&hostaddr : NULL,
options.port, &ctx->host_str,
options.check_host_ip ? &ctx->ip_str : NULL);
/* Find which keys we already know about. */
for (i = 0; i < options.num_user_hostfiles; i++) {
debug("%s: searching %s for %s / %s", __func__,
options.user_hostfiles[i], ctx->host_str,
ctx->ip_str ? ctx->ip_str : "(none)");
if ((r = hostkeys_foreach(options.user_hostfiles[i],
hostkeys_find, ctx, ctx->host_str, ctx->ip_str,
HKF_WANT_PARSE_KEY|HKF_WANT_MATCH)) != 0) {
if (r == SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR && errno == ENOENT) {
debug("%s: hostkeys file %s does not exist",
__func__, options.user_hostfiles[i]);
continue;
}
error("%s: hostkeys_foreach failed for %s: %s",
__func__, options.user_hostfiles[i], ssh_err(r));
goto out;
}
}
/* Figure out if we have any new keys to add */
ctx->nnew = 0;
for (i = 0; i < ctx->nkeys; i++) {
if (!ctx->keys_seen[i])
ctx->nnew++;
}
debug3("%s: %zu keys from server: %zu new, %zu retained. %zu to remove",
__func__, ctx->nkeys, ctx->nnew, ctx->nkeys - ctx->nnew, ctx->nold);
if (ctx->nnew == 0 && ctx->nold != 0) {
/* We have some keys to remove. Just do it. */
update_known_hosts(ctx);
} else if (ctx->nnew != 0) {
/*
* We have received hitherto-unseen keys from the server.
* Ask the server to confirm ownership of the private halves.
*/
debug3("%s: asking server to prove ownership for %zu keys",
__func__, ctx->nnew);
if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_GLOBAL_REQUEST)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh,
"hostkeys-prove-00@openssh.com")) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_u8(ssh, 1)) != 0) /* bool: want reply */
fatal("%s: cannot prepare packet: %s",
__func__, ssh_err(r));
if ((buf = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
fatal("%s: sshbuf_new", __func__);
for (i = 0; i < ctx->nkeys; i++) {
if (ctx->keys_seen[i])
continue;
sshbuf_reset(buf);
if ((r = sshkey_putb(ctx->keys[i], buf)) != 0)
fatal("%s: sshkey_putb: %s",
__func__, ssh_err(r));
if ((r = sshpkt_put_stringb(ssh, buf)) != 0)
fatal("%s: sshpkt_put_string: %s",
__func__, ssh_err(r));
}
if ((r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0)
fatal("%s: sshpkt_send: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
client_register_global_confirm(
client_global_hostkeys_private_confirm, ctx);
ctx = NULL; /* will be freed in callback */
}
/* Success */
out:
hostkeys_update_ctx_free(ctx);
sshkey_free(key);
sshbuf_free(buf);
/*
* NB. Return success for all cases. The server doesn't need to know
* what the client does with its hosts file.
*/
return 1;
}
static int
client_input_global_request(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh)
{
char *rtype;
u_char want_reply;
int r, success = 0;
if ((r = sshpkt_get_cstring(ssh, &rtype, NULL)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_get_u8(ssh, &want_reply)) != 0)
goto out;
debug("client_input_global_request: rtype %s want_reply %d",
rtype, want_reply);
if (strcmp(rtype, "hostkeys-00@openssh.com") == 0)
success = client_input_hostkeys(ssh);
if (want_reply) {
if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, success ? SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_SUCCESS :
SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_FAILURE)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0 ||
(r = ssh_packet_write_wait(ssh)) != 0)
goto out;
}
r = 0;
out:
free(rtype);
return r;
}
void
client_session2_setup(struct ssh *ssh, int id, int want_tty, int want_subsystem,
const char *term, struct termios *tiop, int in_fd, struct sshbuf *cmd,
char **env)
{
int i, j, matched, len, r;
char *name, *val;
Channel *c = NULL;
debug2("%s: id %d", __func__, id);
if ((c = channel_lookup(ssh, id)) == NULL)
fatal("%s: channel %d: unknown channel", __func__, id);
ssh_packet_set_interactive(ssh, want_tty,
options.ip_qos_interactive, options.ip_qos_bulk);
if (want_tty) {
struct winsize ws;
/* Store window size in the packet. */
if (ioctl(in_fd, TIOCGWINSZ, &ws) == -1)
memset(&ws, 0, sizeof(ws));
channel_request_start(ssh, id, "pty-req", 1);
client_expect_confirm(ssh, id, "PTY allocation", CONFIRM_TTY);
if ((r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, term != NULL ? term : ""))
!= 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, (u_int)ws.ws_col)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, (u_int)ws.ws_row)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, (u_int)ws.ws_xpixel)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, (u_int)ws.ws_ypixel)) != 0)
fatal("%s: build packet: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
if (tiop == NULL)
tiop = get_saved_tio();
ssh_tty_make_modes(ssh, -1, tiop);
if ((r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0)
fatal("%s: send packet: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
/* XXX wait for reply */
c->client_tty = 1;
}
/* Transfer any environment variables from client to server */
if (options.num_send_env != 0 && env != NULL) {
debug("Sending environment.");
for (i = 0; env[i] != NULL; i++) {
/* Split */
name = xstrdup(env[i]);
if ((val = strchr(name, '=')) == NULL) {
free(name);
continue;
}
*val++ = '\0';
matched = 0;
for (j = 0; j < options.num_send_env; j++) {
if (match_pattern(name, options.send_env[j])) {
matched = 1;
break;
}
}
if (!matched) {
debug3("Ignored env %s", name);
free(name);
continue;
}
debug("Sending env %s = %s", name, val);
channel_request_start(ssh, id, "env", 0);
if ((r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, name)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, val)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) {
fatal("%s: send packet: %s",
__func__, ssh_err(r));
}
free(name);
}
}
for (i = 0; i < options.num_setenv; i++) {
/* Split */
name = xstrdup(options.setenv[i]);
if ((val = strchr(name, '=')) == NULL) {
free(name);
continue;
}
*val++ = '\0';
debug("Setting env %s = %s", name, val);
channel_request_start(ssh, id, "env", 0);
if ((r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, name)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, val)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0)
fatal("%s: send packet: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
free(name);
}
len = sshbuf_len(cmd);
if (len > 0) {
if (len > 900)
len = 900;
if (want_subsystem) {
debug("Sending subsystem: %.*s",
len, (const u_char*)sshbuf_ptr(cmd));
channel_request_start(ssh, id, "subsystem", 1);
client_expect_confirm(ssh, id, "subsystem",
CONFIRM_CLOSE);
} else {
debug("Sending command: %.*s",
len, (const u_char*)sshbuf_ptr(cmd));
channel_request_start(ssh, id, "exec", 1);
client_expect_confirm(ssh, id, "exec", CONFIRM_CLOSE);
}
if ((r = sshpkt_put_stringb(ssh, cmd)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0)
fatal("%s: send command: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
} else {
channel_request_start(ssh, id, "shell", 1);
client_expect_confirm(ssh, id, "shell", CONFIRM_CLOSE);
if ((r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) {
fatal("%s: send shell request: %s",
__func__, ssh_err(r));
}
}
}
static void
client_init_dispatch(struct ssh *ssh)
{
ssh_dispatch_init(ssh, &dispatch_protocol_error);
ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE, &channel_input_oclose);
ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA, &channel_input_data);
ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_EOF, &channel_input_ieof);
ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_EXTENDED_DATA, &channel_input_extended_data);
ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN, &client_input_channel_open);
ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION, &channel_input_open_confirmation);
ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE, &channel_input_open_failure);
ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_REQUEST, &client_input_channel_req);
ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_WINDOW_ADJUST, &channel_input_window_adjust);
ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_SUCCESS, &channel_input_status_confirm);
ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_FAILURE, &channel_input_status_confirm);
ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_GLOBAL_REQUEST, &client_input_global_request);
/* rekeying */
ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT, &kex_input_kexinit);
/* global request reply messages */
ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_FAILURE, &client_global_request_reply);
ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_SUCCESS, &client_global_request_reply);
}
void
client_stop_mux(void)
{
if (options.control_path != NULL && muxserver_sock != -1)
unlink(options.control_path);
/*
* If we are in persist mode, or don't have a shell, signal that we
* should close when all active channels are closed.
*/
if (options.control_persist || no_shell_flag) {
session_closed = 1;
setproctitle("[stopped mux]");
}
}
/* client specific fatal cleanup */
void
cleanup_exit(int i)
{
leave_raw_mode(options.request_tty == REQUEST_TTY_FORCE);
if (options.control_path != NULL && muxserver_sock != -1)
unlink(options.control_path);
ssh_kill_proxy_command();
_exit(i);
}
diff --git a/compat.c b/compat.c
index 0624dc6de13f..dec8e7e93c55 100644
--- a/compat.c
+++ b/compat.c
@@ -1,235 +1,209 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: compat.c,v 1.113 2018/08/13 02:41:05 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: compat.c,v 1.115 2020/07/05 23:59:45 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
* OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
* IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
* INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
* NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
* DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
* THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
* (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
* THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
*/
#include "includes.h"
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <stdarg.h>
#include "xmalloc.h"
#include "packet.h"
#include "compat.h"
#include "log.h"
#include "match.h"
#include "kex.h"
int datafellows = 0;
/* datafellows bug compatibility */
u_int
compat_datafellows(const char *version)
{
int i;
static struct {
char *pat;
int bugs;
} check[] = {
{ "OpenSSH_2.*,"
"OpenSSH_3.0*,"
"OpenSSH_3.1*", SSH_BUG_EXTEOF|SSH_OLD_FORWARD_ADDR|
SSH_BUG_SIGTYPE},
{ "OpenSSH_3.*", SSH_OLD_FORWARD_ADDR|SSH_BUG_SIGTYPE },
{ "Sun_SSH_1.0*", SSH_BUG_NOREKEY|SSH_BUG_EXTEOF|
SSH_BUG_SIGTYPE},
{ "OpenSSH_2*,"
"OpenSSH_3*,"
"OpenSSH_4*", SSH_BUG_SIGTYPE },
{ "OpenSSH_5*", SSH_NEW_OPENSSH|SSH_BUG_DYNAMIC_RPORT|
SSH_BUG_SIGTYPE},
{ "OpenSSH_6.6.1*", SSH_NEW_OPENSSH|SSH_BUG_SIGTYPE},
{ "OpenSSH_6.5*,"
"OpenSSH_6.6*", SSH_NEW_OPENSSH|SSH_BUG_CURVE25519PAD|
SSH_BUG_SIGTYPE},
{ "OpenSSH_7.0*,"
"OpenSSH_7.1*,"
"OpenSSH_7.2*,"
"OpenSSH_7.3*,"
"OpenSSH_7.4*,"
"OpenSSH_7.5*,"
"OpenSSH_7.6*,"
"OpenSSH_7.7*", SSH_NEW_OPENSSH|SSH_BUG_SIGTYPE},
{ "OpenSSH*", SSH_NEW_OPENSSH },
{ "*MindTerm*", 0 },
{ "3.0.*", SSH_BUG_DEBUG },
{ "3.0 SecureCRT*", SSH_OLD_SESSIONID },
{ "1.7 SecureFX*", SSH_OLD_SESSIONID },
{ "1.2.18*,"
"1.2.19*,"
"1.2.20*,"
"1.2.21*,"
"1.2.22*", SSH_BUG_IGNOREMSG },
{ "1.3.2*", /* F-Secure */
SSH_BUG_IGNOREMSG },
{ "Cisco-1.*", SSH_BUG_DHGEX_LARGE|
SSH_BUG_HOSTKEYS },
{ "*SSH Compatible Server*", /* Netscreen */
SSH_BUG_PASSWORDPAD },
{ "*OSU_0*,"
"OSU_1.0*,"
"OSU_1.1*,"
"OSU_1.2*,"
"OSU_1.3*,"
"OSU_1.4*,"
"OSU_1.5alpha1*,"
"OSU_1.5alpha2*,"
"OSU_1.5alpha3*", SSH_BUG_PASSWORDPAD },
{ "*SSH_Version_Mapper*",
SSH_BUG_SCANNER },
{ "PuTTY_Local:*," /* dev versions < Sep 2014 */
"PuTTY-Release-0.5*," /* 0.50-0.57, DH-GEX in >=0.52 */
"PuTTY_Release_0.5*," /* 0.58-0.59 */
"PuTTY_Release_0.60*,"
"PuTTY_Release_0.61*,"
"PuTTY_Release_0.62*,"
"PuTTY_Release_0.63*,"
"PuTTY_Release_0.64*",
SSH_OLD_DHGEX },
{ "FuTTY*", SSH_OLD_DHGEX }, /* Putty Fork */
{ "Probe-*",
SSH_BUG_PROBE },
{ "TeraTerm SSH*,"
"TTSSH/1.5.*,"
"TTSSH/2.1*,"
"TTSSH/2.2*,"
"TTSSH/2.3*,"
"TTSSH/2.4*,"
"TTSSH/2.5*,"
"TTSSH/2.6*,"
"TTSSH/2.70*,"
"TTSSH/2.71*,"
"TTSSH/2.72*", SSH_BUG_HOSTKEYS },
{ "WinSCP_release_4*,"
"WinSCP_release_5.0*,"
"WinSCP_release_5.1,"
"WinSCP_release_5.1.*,"
"WinSCP_release_5.5,"
"WinSCP_release_5.5.*,"
"WinSCP_release_5.6,"
"WinSCP_release_5.6.*,"
"WinSCP_release_5.7,"
"WinSCP_release_5.7.1,"
"WinSCP_release_5.7.2,"
"WinSCP_release_5.7.3,"
"WinSCP_release_5.7.4",
SSH_OLD_DHGEX },
{ "ConfD-*",
SSH_BUG_UTF8TTYMODE },
{ "Twisted_*", 0 },
{ "Twisted*", SSH_BUG_DEBUG },
{ NULL, 0 }
};
/* process table, return first match */
for (i = 0; check[i].pat; i++) {
if (match_pattern_list(version, check[i].pat, 0) == 1) {
debug("match: %s pat %s compat 0x%08x",
version, check[i].pat, check[i].bugs);
datafellows = check[i].bugs; /* XXX for now */
return check[i].bugs;
}
}
debug("no match: %s", version);
return 0;
}
-#define SEP ","
-int
-proto_spec(const char *spec)
-{
- char *s, *p, *q;
- int ret = SSH_PROTO_UNKNOWN;
-
- if (spec == NULL)
- return ret;
- q = s = strdup(spec);
- if (s == NULL)
- return ret;
- for ((p = strsep(&q, SEP)); p && *p != '\0'; (p = strsep(&q, SEP))) {
- switch (atoi(p)) {
- case 2:
- ret |= SSH_PROTO_2;
- break;
- default:
- logit("ignoring bad proto spec: '%s'.", p);
- break;
- }
- }
- free(s);
- return ret;
-}
-
char *
compat_cipher_proposal(char *cipher_prop)
{
if (!(datafellows & SSH_BUG_BIGENDIANAES))
return cipher_prop;
debug2("%s: original cipher proposal: %s", __func__, cipher_prop);
- if ((cipher_prop = match_filter_blacklist(cipher_prop, "aes*")) == NULL)
- fatal("match_filter_blacklist failed");
+ if ((cipher_prop = match_filter_denylist(cipher_prop, "aes*")) == NULL)
+ fatal("match_filter_denylist failed");
debug2("%s: compat cipher proposal: %s", __func__, cipher_prop);
if (*cipher_prop == '\0')
fatal("No supported ciphers found");
return cipher_prop;
}
char *
compat_pkalg_proposal(char *pkalg_prop)
{
if (!(datafellows & SSH_BUG_RSASIGMD5))
return pkalg_prop;
debug2("%s: original public key proposal: %s", __func__, pkalg_prop);
- if ((pkalg_prop = match_filter_blacklist(pkalg_prop, "ssh-rsa")) == NULL)
- fatal("match_filter_blacklist failed");
+ if ((pkalg_prop = match_filter_denylist(pkalg_prop, "ssh-rsa")) == NULL)
+ fatal("match_filter_denylist failed");
debug2("%s: compat public key proposal: %s", __func__, pkalg_prop);
if (*pkalg_prop == '\0')
fatal("No supported PK algorithms found");
return pkalg_prop;
}
char *
compat_kex_proposal(char *p)
{
if ((datafellows & (SSH_BUG_CURVE25519PAD|SSH_OLD_DHGEX)) == 0)
return p;
debug2("%s: original KEX proposal: %s", __func__, p);
if ((datafellows & SSH_BUG_CURVE25519PAD) != 0)
- if ((p = match_filter_blacklist(p,
+ if ((p = match_filter_denylist(p,
"curve25519-sha256@libssh.org")) == NULL)
- fatal("match_filter_blacklist failed");
+ fatal("match_filter_denylist failed");
if ((datafellows & SSH_OLD_DHGEX) != 0) {
- if ((p = match_filter_blacklist(p,
+ if ((p = match_filter_denylist(p,
"diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha256,"
"diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha1")) == NULL)
- fatal("match_filter_blacklist failed");
+ fatal("match_filter_denylist failed");
}
debug2("%s: compat KEX proposal: %s", __func__, p);
if (*p == '\0')
fatal("No supported key exchange algorithms found");
return p;
}
diff --git a/compat.h b/compat.h
index d611d33e7363..66db42cc0322 100644
--- a/compat.h
+++ b/compat.h
@@ -1,73 +1,67 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: compat.h,v 1.54 2018/08/13 02:41:05 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: compat.h,v 1.55 2020/06/01 07:11:38 dtucker Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 1999, 2000, 2001 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
* OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
* IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
* INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
* NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
* DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
* THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
* (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
* THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
*/
#ifndef COMPAT_H
#define COMPAT_H
-#define SSH_PROTO_UNKNOWN 0x00
-#define SSH_PROTO_1 0x01
-#define SSH_PROTO_1_PREFERRED 0x02
-#define SSH_PROTO_2 0x04
-
#define SSH_BUG_UTF8TTYMODE 0x00000001
#define SSH_BUG_SIGTYPE 0x00000002
/* #define unused 0x00000004 */
/* #define unused 0x00000008 */
#define SSH_OLD_SESSIONID 0x00000010
/* #define unused 0x00000020 */
#define SSH_BUG_DEBUG 0x00000040
/* #define unused 0x00000080 */
#define SSH_BUG_IGNOREMSG 0x00000100
/* #define unused 0x00000200 */
#define SSH_BUG_PASSWORDPAD 0x00000400
#define SSH_BUG_SCANNER 0x00000800
#define SSH_BUG_BIGENDIANAES 0x00001000
#define SSH_BUG_RSASIGMD5 0x00002000
#define SSH_OLD_DHGEX 0x00004000
#define SSH_BUG_NOREKEY 0x00008000
/* #define unused 0x00010000 */
/* #define unused 0x00020000 */
/* #define unused 0x00040000 */
/* #define unused 0x00100000 */
#define SSH_BUG_EXTEOF 0x00200000
#define SSH_BUG_PROBE 0x00400000
/* #define unused 0x00800000 */
#define SSH_OLD_FORWARD_ADDR 0x01000000
/* #define unused 0x02000000 */
#define SSH_NEW_OPENSSH 0x04000000
#define SSH_BUG_DYNAMIC_RPORT 0x08000000
#define SSH_BUG_CURVE25519PAD 0x10000000
#define SSH_BUG_HOSTKEYS 0x20000000
#define SSH_BUG_DHGEX_LARGE 0x40000000
u_int compat_datafellows(const char *);
-int proto_spec(const char *);
char *compat_cipher_proposal(char *);
char *compat_pkalg_proposal(char *);
char *compat_kex_proposal(char *);
extern int datafellows;
#endif
diff --git a/config.h.in b/config.h.in
index 6af4bfdd105b..18e0b90c29d9 100644
--- a/config.h.in
+++ b/config.h.in
@@ -1,2038 +1,2059 @@
/* config.h.in. Generated from configure.ac by autoheader. */
/* Define if building universal (internal helper macro) */
#undef AC_APPLE_UNIVERSAL_BUILD
/* Define if you have a getaddrinfo that fails for the all-zeros IPv6 address
*/
#undef AIX_GETNAMEINFO_HACK
/* Define if your AIX loginfailed() function takes 4 arguments (AIX >= 5.2) */
#undef AIX_LOGINFAILED_4ARG
/* System only supports IPv4 audit records */
#undef AU_IPv4
/* Define if your resolver libs need this for getrrsetbyname */
#undef BIND_8_COMPAT
/* The system has incomplete BSM API */
#undef BROKEN_BSM_API
/* Define if cmsg_type is not passed correctly */
#undef BROKEN_CMSG_TYPE
/* getaddrinfo is broken (if present) */
#undef BROKEN_GETADDRINFO
/* getgroups(0,NULL) will return -1 */
#undef BROKEN_GETGROUPS
/* FreeBSD glob does not do what we need */
#undef BROKEN_GLOB
/* Define if you system's inet_ntoa is busted (e.g. Irix gcc issue) */
#undef BROKEN_INET_NTOA
/* Define if your struct dirent expects you to allocate extra space for d_name
*/
#undef BROKEN_ONE_BYTE_DIRENT_D_NAME
/* Can't do comparisons on readv */
#undef BROKEN_READV_COMPARISON
/* NetBSD read function is sometimes redirected, breaking atomicio comparisons
against it */
#undef BROKEN_READ_COMPARISON
/* Needed for NeXT */
#undef BROKEN_SAVED_UIDS
/* Define if your setregid() is broken */
#undef BROKEN_SETREGID
/* Define if your setresgid() is broken */
#undef BROKEN_SETRESGID
/* Define if your setresuid() is broken */
#undef BROKEN_SETRESUID
/* Define if your setreuid() is broken */
#undef BROKEN_SETREUID
/* LynxOS has broken setvbuf() implementation */
#undef BROKEN_SETVBUF
/* QNX shadow support is broken */
#undef BROKEN_SHADOW_EXPIRE
/* Define if your snprintf is busted */
#undef BROKEN_SNPRINTF
/* strndup broken, see APAR IY61211 */
#undef BROKEN_STRNDUP
/* strnlen broken, see APAR IY62551 */
#undef BROKEN_STRNLEN
/* strnvis detected broken */
#undef BROKEN_STRNVIS
/* tcgetattr with ICANON may hang */
#undef BROKEN_TCGETATTR_ICANON
/* updwtmpx is broken (if present) */
#undef BROKEN_UPDWTMPX
/* Define if you have BSD auth support */
#undef BSD_AUTH
/* Define if you want to specify the path to your lastlog file */
#undef CONF_LASTLOG_FILE
/* Define if you want to specify the path to your utmp file */
#undef CONF_UTMP_FILE
/* Define if you want to specify the path to your wtmpx file */
#undef CONF_WTMPX_FILE
/* Define if you want to specify the path to your wtmp file */
#undef CONF_WTMP_FILE
/* Need to call setpgrp as root */
#undef DISABLE_FD_PASSING
/* Define if you don't want to use lastlog */
#undef DISABLE_LASTLOG
/* Define if you don't want to use your system's login() call */
#undef DISABLE_LOGIN
/* Define if you don't want to use pututline() etc. to write [uw]tmp */
#undef DISABLE_PUTUTLINE
/* Define if you don't want to use pututxline() etc. to write [uw]tmpx */
#undef DISABLE_PUTUTXLINE
/* Define if you want to disable shadow passwords */
#undef DISABLE_SHADOW
/* Define if you don't want to use utmp */
#undef DISABLE_UTMP
/* Define if you don't want to use utmpx */
#undef DISABLE_UTMPX
/* Define if you don't want to use wtmp */
#undef DISABLE_WTMP
/* Define if you don't want to use wtmpx */
#undef DISABLE_WTMPX
/* Enable for PKCS#11 support */
#undef ENABLE_PKCS11
/* Enable for U2F/FIDO support */
#undef ENABLE_SK
/* Enable for built-in U2F/FIDO support */
#undef ENABLE_SK_INTERNAL
/* define if fflush(NULL) does not work */
#undef FFLUSH_NULL_BUG
/* File names may not contain backslash characters */
#undef FILESYSTEM_NO_BACKSLASH
/* fsid_t has member val */
#undef FSID_HAS_VAL
/* fsid_t has member __val */
#undef FSID_HAS___VAL
/* getpgrp takes one arg */
#undef GETPGRP_VOID
/* Conflicting defs for getspnam */
#undef GETSPNAM_CONFLICTING_DEFS
/* Define if your system glob() function has the GLOB_ALTDIRFUNC extension */
#undef GLOB_HAS_ALTDIRFUNC
/* Define if your system glob() function has gl_matchc options in glob_t */
#undef GLOB_HAS_GL_MATCHC
/* Define if your system glob() function has gl_statv options in glob_t */
#undef GLOB_HAS_GL_STATV
/* Define this if you want GSSAPI support in the version 2 protocol */
#undef GSSAPI
/* Define if you want to use shadow password expire field */
#undef HAS_SHADOW_EXPIRE
/* Define if your system uses access rights style file descriptor passing */
#undef HAVE_ACCRIGHTS_IN_MSGHDR
/* Define if you have ut_addr in utmp.h */
#undef HAVE_ADDR_IN_UTMP
/* Define if you have ut_addr in utmpx.h */
#undef HAVE_ADDR_IN_UTMPX
/* Define if you have ut_addr_v6 in utmp.h */
#undef HAVE_ADDR_V6_IN_UTMP
/* Define if you have ut_addr_v6 in utmpx.h */
#undef HAVE_ADDR_V6_IN_UTMPX
/* Define to 1 if you have the `arc4random' function. */
#undef HAVE_ARC4RANDOM
/* Define to 1 if you have the `arc4random_buf' function. */
#undef HAVE_ARC4RANDOM_BUF
/* Define to 1 if you have the `arc4random_stir' function. */
#undef HAVE_ARC4RANDOM_STIR
/* Define to 1 if you have the `arc4random_uniform' function. */
#undef HAVE_ARC4RANDOM_UNIFORM
/* Define to 1 if you have the `asprintf' function. */
#undef HAVE_ASPRINTF
/* OpenBSD's gcc has bounded */
#undef HAVE_ATTRIBUTE__BOUNDED__
/* Have attribute nonnull */
#undef HAVE_ATTRIBUTE__NONNULL__
/* OpenBSD's gcc has sentinel */
#undef HAVE_ATTRIBUTE__SENTINEL__
/* Define to 1 if you have the `aug_get_machine' function. */
#undef HAVE_AUG_GET_MACHINE
/* Define to 1 if you have the `b64_ntop' function. */
#undef HAVE_B64_NTOP
/* Define to 1 if you have the `b64_pton' function. */
#undef HAVE_B64_PTON
/* Define if you have the basename function. */
#undef HAVE_BASENAME
/* Define to 1 if you have the `bcopy' function. */
#undef HAVE_BCOPY
/* Define to 1 if you have the `bcrypt_pbkdf' function. */
#undef HAVE_BCRYPT_PBKDF
/* Define to 1 if you have the `bindresvport_sa' function. */
#undef HAVE_BINDRESVPORT_SA
/* Define to 1 if you have the `blf_enc' function. */
#undef HAVE_BLF_ENC
/* Define to 1 if you have the <blf.h> header file. */
#undef HAVE_BLF_H
/* Define to 1 if you have the `Blowfish_expand0state' function. */
#undef HAVE_BLOWFISH_EXPAND0STATE
/* Define to 1 if you have the `Blowfish_expandstate' function. */
#undef HAVE_BLOWFISH_EXPANDSTATE
/* Define to 1 if you have the `Blowfish_initstate' function. */
#undef HAVE_BLOWFISH_INITSTATE
/* Define to 1 if you have the `Blowfish_stream2word' function. */
#undef HAVE_BLOWFISH_STREAM2WORD
/* Define to 1 if you have the `BN_is_prime_ex' function. */
#undef HAVE_BN_IS_PRIME_EX
/* Define to 1 if you have the <bsd/libutil.h> header file. */
#undef HAVE_BSD_LIBUTIL_H
/* Define to 1 if you have the <bsm/audit.h> header file. */
#undef HAVE_BSM_AUDIT_H
/* Define to 1 if you have the <bstring.h> header file. */
#undef HAVE_BSTRING_H
/* Define to 1 if you have the `bzero' function. */
#undef HAVE_BZERO
/* calloc(0, x) returns NULL */
#undef HAVE_CALLOC
/* Define to 1 if you have the `cap_rights_limit' function. */
#undef HAVE_CAP_RIGHTS_LIMIT
/* Define to 1 if you have the `clock' function. */
#undef HAVE_CLOCK
/* Have clock_gettime */
#undef HAVE_CLOCK_GETTIME
/* define if you have clock_t data type */
#undef HAVE_CLOCK_T
/* Define to 1 if you have the `closefrom' function. */
#undef HAVE_CLOSEFROM
/* Define if gai_strerror() returns const char * */
#undef HAVE_CONST_GAI_STRERROR_PROTO
/* Define if your system uses ancillary data style file descriptor passing */
#undef HAVE_CONTROL_IN_MSGHDR
/* Define to 1 if you have the `crypt' function. */
#undef HAVE_CRYPT
/* Define to 1 if you have the <crypto/sha2.h> header file. */
#undef HAVE_CRYPTO_SHA2_H
/* Define to 1 if you have the <crypt.h> header file. */
#undef HAVE_CRYPT_H
/* Define if you are on Cygwin */
#undef HAVE_CYGWIN
/* Define if your libraries define daemon() */
#undef HAVE_DAEMON
/* Define to 1 if you have the declaration of `AI_NUMERICSERV', and to 0 if
you don't. */
#undef HAVE_DECL_AI_NUMERICSERV
/* Define to 1 if you have the declaration of `authenticate', and to 0 if you
don't. */
#undef HAVE_DECL_AUTHENTICATE
/* Define to 1 if you have the declaration of `bzero', and to 0 if you don't.
*/
#undef HAVE_DECL_BZERO
/* Define to 1 if you have the declaration of `getpeereid', and to 0 if you
don't. */
#undef HAVE_DECL_GETPEEREID
/* Define to 1 if you have the declaration of `GLOB_NOMATCH', and to 0 if you
don't. */
#undef HAVE_DECL_GLOB_NOMATCH
/* Define to 1 if you have the declaration of `GSS_C_NT_HOSTBASED_SERVICE',
and to 0 if you don't. */
#undef HAVE_DECL_GSS_C_NT_HOSTBASED_SERVICE
/* Define to 1 if you have the declaration of `howmany', and to 0 if you
don't. */
#undef HAVE_DECL_HOWMANY
/* Define to 1 if you have the declaration of `h_errno', and to 0 if you
don't. */
#undef HAVE_DECL_H_ERRNO
/* Define to 1 if you have the declaration of `loginfailed', and to 0 if you
don't. */
#undef HAVE_DECL_LOGINFAILED
/* Define to 1 if you have the declaration of `loginrestrictions', and to 0 if
you don't. */
#undef HAVE_DECL_LOGINRESTRICTIONS
/* Define to 1 if you have the declaration of `loginsuccess', and to 0 if you
don't. */
#undef HAVE_DECL_LOGINSUCCESS
/* Define to 1 if you have the declaration of `MAXSYMLINKS', and to 0 if you
don't. */
#undef HAVE_DECL_MAXSYMLINKS
/* Define to 1 if you have the declaration of `memmem', and to 0 if you don't.
*/
#undef HAVE_DECL_MEMMEM
/* Define to 1 if you have the declaration of `NFDBITS', and to 0 if you
don't. */
#undef HAVE_DECL_NFDBITS
/* Define to 1 if you have the declaration of `offsetof', and to 0 if you
don't. */
#undef HAVE_DECL_OFFSETOF
/* Define to 1 if you have the declaration of `O_NONBLOCK', and to 0 if you
don't. */
#undef HAVE_DECL_O_NONBLOCK
/* Define to 1 if you have the declaration of `passwdexpired', and to 0 if you
don't. */
#undef HAVE_DECL_PASSWDEXPIRED
/* Define to 1 if you have the declaration of `readv', and to 0 if you don't.
*/
#undef HAVE_DECL_READV
/* Define to 1 if you have the declaration of `setauthdb', and to 0 if you
don't. */
#undef HAVE_DECL_SETAUTHDB
/* Define to 1 if you have the declaration of `SHUT_RD', and to 0 if you
don't. */
#undef HAVE_DECL_SHUT_RD
/* Define to 1 if you have the declaration of `UINT32_MAX', and to 0 if you
don't. */
#undef HAVE_DECL_UINT32_MAX
/* Define to 1 if you have the declaration of `writev', and to 0 if you don't.
*/
#undef HAVE_DECL_WRITEV
/* Define to 1 if you have the declaration of `_getlong', and to 0 if you
don't. */
#undef HAVE_DECL__GETLONG
/* Define to 1 if you have the declaration of `_getshort', and to 0 if you
don't. */
#undef HAVE_DECL__GETSHORT
/* Define to 1 if you have the `DES_crypt' function. */
#undef HAVE_DES_CRYPT
/* Define if you have /dev/ptmx */
#undef HAVE_DEV_PTMX
/* Define if you have /dev/ptc */
#undef HAVE_DEV_PTS_AND_PTC
/* Define to 1 if you have the `DH_get0_key' function. */
#undef HAVE_DH_GET0_KEY
/* Define to 1 if you have the `DH_get0_pqg' function. */
#undef HAVE_DH_GET0_PQG
/* Define to 1 if you have the `DH_set0_key' function. */
#undef HAVE_DH_SET0_KEY
/* Define to 1 if you have the `DH_set0_pqg' function. */
#undef HAVE_DH_SET0_PQG
/* Define to 1 if you have the `DH_set_length' function. */
#undef HAVE_DH_SET_LENGTH
/* Define to 1 if you have the <dirent.h> header file. */
#undef HAVE_DIRENT_H
/* Define to 1 if you have the `dirfd' function. */
#undef HAVE_DIRFD
/* Define to 1 if you have the `dirname' function. */
#undef HAVE_DIRNAME
/* Define to 1 if you have the `dlopen' function. */
#undef HAVE_DLOPEN
/* Define to 1 if you have the `DSA_generate_parameters_ex' function. */
#undef HAVE_DSA_GENERATE_PARAMETERS_EX
/* Define to 1 if you have the `DSA_get0_key' function. */
#undef HAVE_DSA_GET0_KEY
/* Define to 1 if you have the `DSA_get0_pqg' function. */
#undef HAVE_DSA_GET0_PQG
/* Define to 1 if you have the `DSA_set0_key' function. */
#undef HAVE_DSA_SET0_KEY
/* Define to 1 if you have the `DSA_set0_pqg' function. */
#undef HAVE_DSA_SET0_PQG
/* Define to 1 if you have the `DSA_SIG_get0' function. */
#undef HAVE_DSA_SIG_GET0
/* Define to 1 if you have the `DSA_SIG_set0' function. */
#undef HAVE_DSA_SIG_SET0
/* Define to 1 if you have the `ECDSA_SIG_get0' function. */
#undef HAVE_ECDSA_SIG_GET0
/* Define to 1 if you have the `ECDSA_SIG_set0' function. */
#undef HAVE_ECDSA_SIG_SET0
/* Define to 1 if you have the `EC_KEY_METHOD_new' function. */
#undef HAVE_EC_KEY_METHOD_NEW
/* Define to 1 if you have the <elf.h> header file. */
#undef HAVE_ELF_H
/* Define to 1 if you have the `endgrent' function. */
#undef HAVE_ENDGRENT
/* Define to 1 if you have the <endian.h> header file. */
#undef HAVE_ENDIAN_H
/* Define to 1 if you have the `endutent' function. */
#undef HAVE_ENDUTENT
/* Define to 1 if you have the `endutxent' function. */
#undef HAVE_ENDUTXENT
/* Define to 1 if you have the `err' function. */
#undef HAVE_ERR
/* Define to 1 if you have the `errx' function. */
#undef HAVE_ERRX
/* Define to 1 if you have the <err.h> header file. */
#undef HAVE_ERR_H
/* Define if your system has /etc/default/login */
#undef HAVE_ETC_DEFAULT_LOGIN
/* Define to 1 if you have the `EVP_chacha20' function. */
#undef HAVE_EVP_CHACHA20
/* Define to 1 if you have the `EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl' function. */
#undef HAVE_EVP_CIPHER_CTX_CTRL
/* Define to 1 if you have the `EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_iv' function. */
#undef HAVE_EVP_CIPHER_CTX_GET_IV
/* Define to 1 if you have the `EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv' function. */
#undef HAVE_EVP_CIPHER_CTX_IV
/* Define to 1 if you have the `EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_noconst' function. */
#undef HAVE_EVP_CIPHER_CTX_IV_NOCONST
/* Define to 1 if you have the `EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_iv' function. */
#undef HAVE_EVP_CIPHER_CTX_SET_IV
/* Define to 1 if you have the `EVP_DigestFinal_ex' function. */
#undef HAVE_EVP_DIGESTFINAL_EX
/* Define to 1 if you have the `EVP_DigestInit_ex' function. */
#undef HAVE_EVP_DIGESTINIT_EX
/* Define to 1 if you have the `EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup' function. */
#undef HAVE_EVP_MD_CTX_CLEANUP
/* Define to 1 if you have the `EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex' function. */
#undef HAVE_EVP_MD_CTX_COPY_EX
/* Define to 1 if you have the `EVP_MD_CTX_free' function. */
#undef HAVE_EVP_MD_CTX_FREE
/* Define to 1 if you have the `EVP_MD_CTX_init' function. */
#undef HAVE_EVP_MD_CTX_INIT
/* Define to 1 if you have the `EVP_MD_CTX_new' function. */
#undef HAVE_EVP_MD_CTX_NEW
/* Define to 1 if you have the `EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA' function. */
#undef HAVE_EVP_PKEY_GET0_RSA
/* Define to 1 if you have the `EVP_sha256' function. */
#undef HAVE_EVP_SHA256
/* Define to 1 if you have the `EVP_sha384' function. */
#undef HAVE_EVP_SHA384
/* Define to 1 if you have the `EVP_sha512' function. */
#undef HAVE_EVP_SHA512
/* Define if you have ut_exit in utmp.h */
#undef HAVE_EXIT_IN_UTMP
/* Define to 1 if you have the `explicit_bzero' function. */
#undef HAVE_EXPLICIT_BZERO
/* Define to 1 if you have the `fchmod' function. */
#undef HAVE_FCHMOD
/* Define to 1 if you have the `fchmodat' function. */
#undef HAVE_FCHMODAT
/* Define to 1 if you have the `fchown' function. */
#undef HAVE_FCHOWN
/* Define to 1 if you have the `fchownat' function. */
#undef HAVE_FCHOWNAT
/* Use F_CLOSEM fcntl for closefrom */
#undef HAVE_FCNTL_CLOSEM
/* Define to 1 if you have the <fcntl.h> header file. */
#undef HAVE_FCNTL_H
/* Define to 1 if the system has the type `fd_mask'. */
#undef HAVE_FD_MASK
/* Define to 1 if you have the <features.h> header file. */
#undef HAVE_FEATURES_H
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `fido_cred_prot' function. */
+#undef HAVE_FIDO_CRED_PROT
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `fido_cred_set_prot' function. */
+#undef HAVE_FIDO_CRED_SET_PROT
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `fido_dev_get_touch_begin' function. */
+#undef HAVE_FIDO_DEV_GET_TOUCH_BEGIN
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `fido_dev_get_touch_status' function. */
+#undef HAVE_FIDO_DEV_GET_TOUCH_STATUS
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `fido_dev_supports_cred_prot' function. */
+#undef HAVE_FIDO_DEV_SUPPORTS_CRED_PROT
+
/* Define to 1 if you have the <floatingpoint.h> header file. */
#undef HAVE_FLOATINGPOINT_H
/* Define to 1 if you have the `flock' function. */
#undef HAVE_FLOCK
/* Define to 1 if you have the `fmt_scaled' function. */
#undef HAVE_FMT_SCALED
/* Define to 1 if you have the `fnmatch' function. */
#undef HAVE_FNMATCH
/* Define to 1 if you have the <fnmatch.h> header file. */
#undef HAVE_FNMATCH_H
/* Define to 1 if you have the `freeaddrinfo' function. */
#undef HAVE_FREEADDRINFO
/* Define to 1 if you have the `freezero' function. */
#undef HAVE_FREEZERO
/* Define to 1 if the system has the type `fsblkcnt_t'. */
#undef HAVE_FSBLKCNT_T
/* Define to 1 if the system has the type `fsfilcnt_t'. */
#undef HAVE_FSFILCNT_T
/* Define to 1 if you have the `fstatfs' function. */
#undef HAVE_FSTATFS
/* Define to 1 if you have the `fstatvfs' function. */
#undef HAVE_FSTATVFS
/* Define to 1 if you have the `futimes' function. */
#undef HAVE_FUTIMES
/* Define to 1 if you have the `gai_strerror' function. */
#undef HAVE_GAI_STRERROR
/* Define to 1 if you have the `getaddrinfo' function. */
#undef HAVE_GETADDRINFO
/* Define to 1 if you have the `getaudit' function. */
#undef HAVE_GETAUDIT
/* Define to 1 if you have the `getaudit_addr' function. */
#undef HAVE_GETAUDIT_ADDR
/* Define to 1 if you have the `getcwd' function. */
#undef HAVE_GETCWD
/* Define to 1 if you have the `getgrouplist' function. */
#undef HAVE_GETGROUPLIST
/* Define to 1 if you have the `getgrset' function. */
#undef HAVE_GETGRSET
/* Define to 1 if you have the `getlastlogxbyname' function. */
#undef HAVE_GETLASTLOGXBYNAME
/* Define to 1 if you have the `getline' function. */
#undef HAVE_GETLINE
/* Define to 1 if you have the `getluid' function. */
#undef HAVE_GETLUID
/* Define to 1 if you have the `getnameinfo' function. */
#undef HAVE_GETNAMEINFO
/* Define to 1 if you have the `getopt' function. */
#undef HAVE_GETOPT
/* Define to 1 if you have the <getopt.h> header file. */
#undef HAVE_GETOPT_H
/* Define if your getopt(3) defines and uses optreset */
#undef HAVE_GETOPT_OPTRESET
/* Define if your libraries define getpagesize() */
#undef HAVE_GETPAGESIZE
/* Define to 1 if you have the `getpeereid' function. */
#undef HAVE_GETPEEREID
/* Define to 1 if you have the `getpeerucred' function. */
#undef HAVE_GETPEERUCRED
/* Define to 1 if you have the `getpgid' function. */
#undef HAVE_GETPGID
/* Define to 1 if you have the `getpgrp' function. */
#undef HAVE_GETPGRP
/* Define to 1 if you have the `getpwanam' function. */
#undef HAVE_GETPWANAM
/* Define to 1 if you have the `getrandom' function. */
#undef HAVE_GETRANDOM
/* Define to 1 if you have the `getrlimit' function. */
#undef HAVE_GETRLIMIT
/* Define if getrrsetbyname() exists */
#undef HAVE_GETRRSETBYNAME
/* Define to 1 if you have the `getseuserbyname' function. */
#undef HAVE_GETSEUSERBYNAME
/* Define to 1 if you have the `getsid' function. */
#undef HAVE_GETSID
/* Define to 1 if you have the `gettimeofday' function. */
#undef HAVE_GETTIMEOFDAY
/* Define to 1 if you have the `getttyent' function. */
#undef HAVE_GETTTYENT
/* Define to 1 if you have the `getutent' function. */
#undef HAVE_GETUTENT
/* Define to 1 if you have the `getutid' function. */
#undef HAVE_GETUTID
/* Define to 1 if you have the `getutline' function. */
#undef HAVE_GETUTLINE
/* Define to 1 if you have the `getutxent' function. */
#undef HAVE_GETUTXENT
/* Define to 1 if you have the `getutxid' function. */
#undef HAVE_GETUTXID
/* Define to 1 if you have the `getutxline' function. */
#undef HAVE_GETUTXLINE
/* Define to 1 if you have the `getutxuser' function. */
#undef HAVE_GETUTXUSER
/* Define to 1 if you have the `get_default_context_with_level' function. */
#undef HAVE_GET_DEFAULT_CONTEXT_WITH_LEVEL
/* Define to 1 if you have the `glob' function. */
#undef HAVE_GLOB
/* Define to 1 if you have the <glob.h> header file. */
#undef HAVE_GLOB_H
/* Define to 1 if you have the `group_from_gid' function. */
#undef HAVE_GROUP_FROM_GID
/* Define to 1 if you have the <gssapi_generic.h> header file. */
#undef HAVE_GSSAPI_GENERIC_H
/* Define to 1 if you have the <gssapi/gssapi_generic.h> header file. */
#undef HAVE_GSSAPI_GSSAPI_GENERIC_H
/* Define to 1 if you have the <gssapi/gssapi.h> header file. */
#undef HAVE_GSSAPI_GSSAPI_H
/* Define to 1 if you have the <gssapi/gssapi_krb5.h> header file. */
#undef HAVE_GSSAPI_GSSAPI_KRB5_H
/* Define to 1 if you have the <gssapi.h> header file. */
#undef HAVE_GSSAPI_H
/* Define to 1 if you have the <gssapi_krb5.h> header file. */
#undef HAVE_GSSAPI_KRB5_H
/* Define if HEADER.ad exists in arpa/nameser.h */
#undef HAVE_HEADER_AD
/* Define to 1 if you have the `HMAC_CTX_init' function. */
#undef HAVE_HMAC_CTX_INIT
/* Define if you have ut_host in utmp.h */
#undef HAVE_HOST_IN_UTMP
/* Define if you have ut_host in utmpx.h */
#undef HAVE_HOST_IN_UTMPX
/* Define to 1 if you have the <iaf.h> header file. */
#undef HAVE_IAF_H
/* Define to 1 if you have the <ia.h> header file. */
#undef HAVE_IA_H
/* Define if you have ut_id in utmp.h */
#undef HAVE_ID_IN_UTMP
/* Define if you have ut_id in utmpx.h */
#undef HAVE_ID_IN_UTMPX
/* Define to 1 if you have the <ifaddrs.h> header file. */
#undef HAVE_IFADDRS_H
/* Define to 1 if you have the `inet_aton' function. */
#undef HAVE_INET_ATON
/* Define to 1 if you have the `inet_ntoa' function. */
#undef HAVE_INET_NTOA
/* Define to 1 if you have the `inet_ntop' function. */
#undef HAVE_INET_NTOP
/* Define to 1 if you have the `innetgr' function. */
#undef HAVE_INNETGR
/* define if you have int64_t data type */
#undef HAVE_INT64_T
/* Define to 1 if the system has the type `intmax_t'. */
#undef HAVE_INTMAX_T
/* Define to 1 if you have the <inttypes.h> header file. */
#undef HAVE_INTTYPES_H
/* define if you have intxx_t data type */
#undef HAVE_INTXX_T
/* Define to 1 if the system has the type `in_addr_t'. */
#undef HAVE_IN_ADDR_T
/* Define to 1 if the system has the type `in_port_t'. */
#undef HAVE_IN_PORT_T
/* Define if you have isblank(3C). */
#undef HAVE_ISBLANK
/* Define to 1 if you have the `krb5_cc_new_unique' function. */
#undef HAVE_KRB5_CC_NEW_UNIQUE
/* Define to 1 if you have the `krb5_free_error_message' function. */
#undef HAVE_KRB5_FREE_ERROR_MESSAGE
/* Define to 1 if you have the `krb5_get_error_message' function. */
#undef HAVE_KRB5_GET_ERROR_MESSAGE
/* Define to 1 if you have the <langinfo.h> header file. */
#undef HAVE_LANGINFO_H
/* Define to 1 if you have the <lastlog.h> header file. */
#undef HAVE_LASTLOG_H
/* Define if you want ldns support */
#undef HAVE_LDNS
/* Define to 1 if you have the <libaudit.h> header file. */
#undef HAVE_LIBAUDIT_H
/* Define to 1 if you have the `bsm' library (-lbsm). */
#undef HAVE_LIBBSM
/* Define to 1 if you have the `crypt' library (-lcrypt). */
#undef HAVE_LIBCRYPT
/* Define to 1 if you have the `dl' library (-ldl). */
#undef HAVE_LIBDL
/* Define to 1 if you have the <libgen.h> header file. */
#undef HAVE_LIBGEN_H
/* Define if system has libiaf that supports set_id */
#undef HAVE_LIBIAF
/* Define to 1 if you have the `network' library (-lnetwork). */
#undef HAVE_LIBNETWORK
/* Define to 1 if you have the `pam' library (-lpam). */
#undef HAVE_LIBPAM
/* Define to 1 if you have the <libproc.h> header file. */
#undef HAVE_LIBPROC_H
/* Define to 1 if you have the `socket' library (-lsocket). */
#undef HAVE_LIBSOCKET
/* Define to 1 if you have the <libutil.h> header file. */
#undef HAVE_LIBUTIL_H
/* Define to 1 if you have the `xnet' library (-lxnet). */
#undef HAVE_LIBXNET
/* Define to 1 if you have the `z' library (-lz). */
#undef HAVE_LIBZ
/* Define to 1 if you have the <limits.h> header file. */
#undef HAVE_LIMITS_H
/* Define to 1 if you have the <linux/audit.h> header file. */
#undef HAVE_LINUX_AUDIT_H
/* Define to 1 if you have the <linux/filter.h> header file. */
#undef HAVE_LINUX_FILTER_H
/* Define to 1 if you have the <linux/if_tun.h> header file. */
#undef HAVE_LINUX_IF_TUN_H
/* Define to 1 if you have the <linux/seccomp.h> header file. */
#undef HAVE_LINUX_SECCOMP_H
/* Define to 1 if you have the `llabs' function. */
#undef HAVE_LLABS
/* Define to 1 if you have the <locale.h> header file. */
#undef HAVE_LOCALE_H
/* Define to 1 if you have the `localtime_r' function. */
#undef HAVE_LOCALTIME_R
/* Define to 1 if you have the `login' function. */
#undef HAVE_LOGIN
/* Define to 1 if you have the <login_cap.h> header file. */
#undef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP_H
/* Define to 1 if you have the `login_getcapbool' function. */
#undef HAVE_LOGIN_GETCAPBOOL
/* Define to 1 if you have the <login.h> header file. */
#undef HAVE_LOGIN_H
/* Define to 1 if you have the `logout' function. */
#undef HAVE_LOGOUT
/* Define to 1 if you have the `logwtmp' function. */
#undef HAVE_LOGWTMP
/* Define to 1 if the system has the type `long double'. */
#undef HAVE_LONG_DOUBLE
/* Define to 1 if the system has the type `long long'. */
#undef HAVE_LONG_LONG
/* Define to 1 if you have the <maillock.h> header file. */
#undef HAVE_MAILLOCK_H
/* Define to 1 if your system has a GNU libc compatible `malloc' function, and
to 0 otherwise. */
#undef HAVE_MALLOC
/* Define to 1 if you have the `mblen' function. */
#undef HAVE_MBLEN
/* Define to 1 if you have the `mbtowc' function. */
#undef HAVE_MBTOWC
/* Define to 1 if you have the `md5_crypt' function. */
#undef HAVE_MD5_CRYPT
/* Define if you want to allow MD5 passwords */
#undef HAVE_MD5_PASSWORDS
/* Define to 1 if you have the `memmem' function. */
#undef HAVE_MEMMEM
/* Define to 1 if you have the `memmove' function. */
#undef HAVE_MEMMOVE
/* Define to 1 if you have the <memory.h> header file. */
#undef HAVE_MEMORY_H
/* Define to 1 if you have the `memset_s' function. */
#undef HAVE_MEMSET_S
/* Define to 1 if you have the `mkdtemp' function. */
#undef HAVE_MKDTEMP
/* define if you have mode_t data type */
#undef HAVE_MODE_T
/* Some systems put nanosleep outside of libc */
#undef HAVE_NANOSLEEP
/* Define to 1 if you have the <ndir.h> header file. */
#undef HAVE_NDIR_H
/* Define to 1 if you have the <netdb.h> header file. */
#undef HAVE_NETDB_H
/* Define to 1 if you have the <netgroup.h> header file. */
#undef HAVE_NETGROUP_H
/* Define to 1 if you have the <net/if_tun.h> header file. */
#undef HAVE_NET_IF_TUN_H
/* Define to 1 if you have the <net/route.h> header file. */
#undef HAVE_NET_ROUTE_H
/* Define if you are on NeXT */
#undef HAVE_NEXT
/* Define to 1 if you have the `ngetaddrinfo' function. */
#undef HAVE_NGETADDRINFO
/* Define to 1 if you have the `nl_langinfo' function. */
#undef HAVE_NL_LANGINFO
/* Define to 1 if you have the `nsleep' function. */
#undef HAVE_NSLEEP
/* Define to 1 if you have the `ogetaddrinfo' function. */
#undef HAVE_OGETADDRINFO
/* Define if you have an old version of PAM which takes only one argument to
pam_strerror */
#undef HAVE_OLD_PAM
/* Define to 1 if you have the `openlog_r' function. */
#undef HAVE_OPENLOG_R
/* Define to 1 if you have the `openpty' function. */
#undef HAVE_OPENPTY
/* as a macro */
#undef HAVE_OPENSSL_ADD_ALL_ALGORITHMS
/* Define to 1 if you have the `OPENSSL_init_crypto' function. */
#undef HAVE_OPENSSL_INIT_CRYPTO
/* Define to 1 if you have the `OpenSSL_version' function. */
#undef HAVE_OPENSSL_VERSION
/* Define to 1 if you have the `OpenSSL_version_num' function. */
#undef HAVE_OPENSSL_VERSION_NUM
/* Define if you have Digital Unix Security Integration Architecture */
#undef HAVE_OSF_SIA
/* Define to 1 if you have the `pam_getenvlist' function. */
#undef HAVE_PAM_GETENVLIST
/* Define to 1 if you have the <pam/pam_appl.h> header file. */
#undef HAVE_PAM_PAM_APPL_H
/* Define to 1 if you have the `pam_putenv' function. */
#undef HAVE_PAM_PUTENV
/* Define to 1 if you have the <paths.h> header file. */
#undef HAVE_PATHS_H
/* Define if you have ut_pid in utmp.h */
#undef HAVE_PID_IN_UTMP
/* define if you have pid_t data type */
#undef HAVE_PID_T
/* Define to 1 if you have the `pledge' function. */
#undef HAVE_PLEDGE
/* Define to 1 if you have the `poll' function. */
#undef HAVE_POLL
/* Define to 1 if you have the <poll.h> header file. */
#undef HAVE_POLL_H
/* Define to 1 if you have the `prctl' function. */
#undef HAVE_PRCTL
/* Define to 1 if you have the `priv_basicset' function. */
#undef HAVE_PRIV_BASICSET
/* Define to 1 if you have the <priv.h> header file. */
#undef HAVE_PRIV_H
/* Define if you have /proc/$pid/fd */
#undef HAVE_PROC_PID
/* Define to 1 if you have the `proc_pidinfo' function. */
#undef HAVE_PROC_PIDINFO
/* Define to 1 if you have the `pstat' function. */
#undef HAVE_PSTAT
/* Define to 1 if you have the <pty.h> header file. */
#undef HAVE_PTY_H
/* Define to 1 if you have the `pututline' function. */
#undef HAVE_PUTUTLINE
/* Define to 1 if you have the `pututxline' function. */
#undef HAVE_PUTUTXLINE
/* Define to 1 if you have the `raise' function. */
#undef HAVE_RAISE
/* Define to 1 if you have the `readpassphrase' function. */
#undef HAVE_READPASSPHRASE
/* Define to 1 if you have the <readpassphrase.h> header file. */
#undef HAVE_READPASSPHRASE_H
/* Define to 1 if your system has a GNU libc compatible `realloc' function,
and to 0 otherwise. */
#undef HAVE_REALLOC
/* Define to 1 if you have the `reallocarray' function. */
#undef HAVE_REALLOCARRAY
/* Define to 1 if you have the `realpath' function. */
#undef HAVE_REALPATH
/* Define to 1 if you have the `recallocarray' function. */
#undef HAVE_RECALLOCARRAY
/* Define to 1 if you have the `recvmsg' function. */
#undef HAVE_RECVMSG
/* sys/resource.h has RLIMIT_NPROC */
#undef HAVE_RLIMIT_NPROC
/* Define to 1 if you have the <rpc/types.h> header file. */
#undef HAVE_RPC_TYPES_H
/* Define to 1 if you have the `rresvport_af' function. */
#undef HAVE_RRESVPORT_AF
/* Define to 1 if you have the `RSA_generate_key_ex' function. */
#undef HAVE_RSA_GENERATE_KEY_EX
/* Define to 1 if you have the `RSA_get0_crt_params' function. */
#undef HAVE_RSA_GET0_CRT_PARAMS
/* Define to 1 if you have the `RSA_get0_factors' function. */
#undef HAVE_RSA_GET0_FACTORS
/* Define to 1 if you have the `RSA_get0_key' function. */
#undef HAVE_RSA_GET0_KEY
/* Define to 1 if you have the `RSA_get_default_method' function. */
#undef HAVE_RSA_GET_DEFAULT_METHOD
/* Define to 1 if you have the `RSA_meth_dup' function. */
#undef HAVE_RSA_METH_DUP
/* Define to 1 if you have the `RSA_meth_free' function. */
#undef HAVE_RSA_METH_FREE
/* Define to 1 if you have the `RSA_meth_get_finish' function. */
#undef HAVE_RSA_METH_GET_FINISH
/* Define to 1 if you have the `RSA_meth_set1_name' function. */
#undef HAVE_RSA_METH_SET1_NAME
/* Define to 1 if you have the `RSA_meth_set_finish' function. */
#undef HAVE_RSA_METH_SET_FINISH
/* Define to 1 if you have the `RSA_meth_set_priv_dec' function. */
#undef HAVE_RSA_METH_SET_PRIV_DEC
/* Define to 1 if you have the `RSA_meth_set_priv_enc' function. */
#undef HAVE_RSA_METH_SET_PRIV_ENC
/* Define to 1 if you have the `RSA_set0_crt_params' function. */
#undef HAVE_RSA_SET0_CRT_PARAMS
/* Define to 1 if you have the `RSA_set0_factors' function. */
#undef HAVE_RSA_SET0_FACTORS
/* Define to 1 if you have the `RSA_set0_key' function. */
#undef HAVE_RSA_SET0_KEY
/* Define to 1 if you have the <sandbox.h> header file. */
#undef HAVE_SANDBOX_H
/* Define to 1 if you have the `sandbox_init' function. */
#undef HAVE_SANDBOX_INIT
/* define if you have sa_family_t data type */
#undef HAVE_SA_FAMILY_T
/* Define to 1 if you have the `scan_scaled' function. */
#undef HAVE_SCAN_SCALED
/* Define if you have SecureWare-based protected password database */
#undef HAVE_SECUREWARE
/* Define to 1 if you have the <security/pam_appl.h> header file. */
#undef HAVE_SECURITY_PAM_APPL_H
/* Define to 1 if you have the `sendmsg' function. */
#undef HAVE_SENDMSG
/* Define to 1 if you have the `setauthdb' function. */
#undef HAVE_SETAUTHDB
/* Define to 1 if you have the `setdtablesize' function. */
#undef HAVE_SETDTABLESIZE
/* Define to 1 if you have the `setegid' function. */
#undef HAVE_SETEGID
/* Define to 1 if you have the `setenv' function. */
#undef HAVE_SETENV
/* Define to 1 if you have the `seteuid' function. */
#undef HAVE_SETEUID
/* Define to 1 if you have the `setgroupent' function. */
#undef HAVE_SETGROUPENT
/* Define to 1 if you have the `setgroups' function. */
#undef HAVE_SETGROUPS
/* Define to 1 if you have the `setlinebuf' function. */
#undef HAVE_SETLINEBUF
/* Define to 1 if you have the `setlogin' function. */
#undef HAVE_SETLOGIN
/* Define to 1 if you have the `setluid' function. */
#undef HAVE_SETLUID
/* Define to 1 if you have the `setpassent' function. */
#undef HAVE_SETPASSENT
/* Define to 1 if you have the `setpcred' function. */
#undef HAVE_SETPCRED
/* Define to 1 if you have the `setpflags' function. */
#undef HAVE_SETPFLAGS
/* Define to 1 if you have the `setppriv' function. */
#undef HAVE_SETPPRIV
/* Define to 1 if you have the `setproctitle' function. */
#undef HAVE_SETPROCTITLE
/* Define to 1 if you have the `setregid' function. */
#undef HAVE_SETREGID
/* Define to 1 if you have the `setresgid' function. */
#undef HAVE_SETRESGID
/* Define to 1 if you have the `setresuid' function. */
#undef HAVE_SETRESUID
/* Define to 1 if you have the `setreuid' function. */
#undef HAVE_SETREUID
/* Define to 1 if you have the `setrlimit' function. */
#undef HAVE_SETRLIMIT
/* Define to 1 if you have the `setsid' function. */
#undef HAVE_SETSID
/* Define to 1 if you have the `setutent' function. */
#undef HAVE_SETUTENT
/* Define to 1 if you have the `setutxdb' function. */
#undef HAVE_SETUTXDB
/* Define to 1 if you have the `setutxent' function. */
#undef HAVE_SETUTXENT
/* Define to 1 if you have the `setvbuf' function. */
#undef HAVE_SETVBUF
/* Define to 1 if you have the `set_id' function. */
#undef HAVE_SET_ID
/* Define to 1 if you have the `SHA256Update' function. */
#undef HAVE_SHA256UPDATE
/* Define to 1 if you have the <sha2.h> header file. */
#undef HAVE_SHA2_H
/* Define to 1 if you have the `SHA384Update' function. */
#undef HAVE_SHA384UPDATE
/* Define to 1 if you have the `SHA512Update' function. */
#undef HAVE_SHA512UPDATE
/* Define to 1 if you have the <shadow.h> header file. */
#undef HAVE_SHADOW_H
/* Define to 1 if you have the `sigaction' function. */
#undef HAVE_SIGACTION
/* Define to 1 if you have the `sigvec' function. */
#undef HAVE_SIGVEC
/* Define to 1 if the system has the type `sig_atomic_t'. */
#undef HAVE_SIG_ATOMIC_T
/* define if you have size_t data type */
#undef HAVE_SIZE_T
/* Define to 1 if you have the `snprintf' function. */
#undef HAVE_SNPRINTF
/* Define to 1 if you have the `socketpair' function. */
#undef HAVE_SOCKETPAIR
/* Have PEERCRED socket option */
#undef HAVE_SO_PEERCRED
/* define if you have ssize_t data type */
#undef HAVE_SSIZE_T
/* Fields in struct sockaddr_storage */
#undef HAVE_SS_FAMILY_IN_SS
+/* Define if you have ut_ss in utmpx.h */
+#undef HAVE_SS_IN_UTMPX
+
/* Define to 1 if you have the `statfs' function. */
#undef HAVE_STATFS
/* Define to 1 if you have the `statvfs' function. */
#undef HAVE_STATVFS
/* Define to 1 if you have the <stddef.h> header file. */
#undef HAVE_STDDEF_H
/* Define to 1 if you have the <stdint.h> header file. */
#undef HAVE_STDINT_H
/* Define to 1 if you have the <stdlib.h> header file. */
#undef HAVE_STDLIB_H
/* Define to 1 if you have the `strcasestr' function. */
#undef HAVE_STRCASESTR
/* Define to 1 if you have the `strdup' function. */
#undef HAVE_STRDUP
/* Define to 1 if you have the `strerror' function. */
#undef HAVE_STRERROR
/* Define to 1 if you have the `strftime' function. */
#undef HAVE_STRFTIME
/* Silly mkstemp() */
#undef HAVE_STRICT_MKSTEMP
/* Define to 1 if you have the <strings.h> header file. */
#undef HAVE_STRINGS_H
/* Define to 1 if you have the <string.h> header file. */
#undef HAVE_STRING_H
/* Define to 1 if you have the `strlcat' function. */
#undef HAVE_STRLCAT
/* Define to 1 if you have the `strlcpy' function. */
#undef HAVE_STRLCPY
/* Define to 1 if you have the `strmode' function. */
#undef HAVE_STRMODE
/* Define to 1 if you have the `strndup' function. */
#undef HAVE_STRNDUP
/* Define to 1 if you have the `strnlen' function. */
#undef HAVE_STRNLEN
/* Define to 1 if you have the `strnvis' function. */
#undef HAVE_STRNVIS
/* Define to 1 if you have the `strptime' function. */
#undef HAVE_STRPTIME
/* Define to 1 if you have the `strsep' function. */
#undef HAVE_STRSEP
/* Define to 1 if you have the `strsignal' function. */
#undef HAVE_STRSIGNAL
/* Define to 1 if you have the `strtoll' function. */
#undef HAVE_STRTOLL
/* Define to 1 if you have the `strtonum' function. */
#undef HAVE_STRTONUM
/* Define to 1 if you have the `strtoul' function. */
#undef HAVE_STRTOUL
/* Define to 1 if you have the `strtoull' function. */
#undef HAVE_STRTOULL
/* define if you have struct addrinfo data type */
#undef HAVE_STRUCT_ADDRINFO
/* define if you have struct in6_addr data type */
#undef HAVE_STRUCT_IN6_ADDR
/* Define to 1 if `pw_change' is a member of `struct passwd'. */
#undef HAVE_STRUCT_PASSWD_PW_CHANGE
/* Define to 1 if `pw_class' is a member of `struct passwd'. */
#undef HAVE_STRUCT_PASSWD_PW_CLASS
/* Define to 1 if `pw_expire' is a member of `struct passwd'. */
#undef HAVE_STRUCT_PASSWD_PW_EXPIRE
/* Define to 1 if `pw_gecos' is a member of `struct passwd'. */
#undef HAVE_STRUCT_PASSWD_PW_GECOS
/* define if you have struct sockaddr_in6 data type */
#undef HAVE_STRUCT_SOCKADDR_IN6
/* Define to 1 if `sin6_scope_id' is a member of `struct sockaddr_in6'. */
#undef HAVE_STRUCT_SOCKADDR_IN6_SIN6_SCOPE_ID
/* define if you have struct sockaddr_storage data type */
#undef HAVE_STRUCT_SOCKADDR_STORAGE
/* Define to 1 if `f_files' is a member of `struct statfs'. */
#undef HAVE_STRUCT_STATFS_F_FILES
/* Define to 1 if `f_flags' is a member of `struct statfs'. */
#undef HAVE_STRUCT_STATFS_F_FLAGS
/* Define to 1 if `st_blksize' is a member of `struct stat'. */
#undef HAVE_STRUCT_STAT_ST_BLKSIZE
/* Define to 1 if `st_mtim' is a member of `struct stat'. */
#undef HAVE_STRUCT_STAT_ST_MTIM
/* Define to 1 if `st_mtime' is a member of `struct stat'. */
#undef HAVE_STRUCT_STAT_ST_MTIME
/* define if you have struct timespec */
#undef HAVE_STRUCT_TIMESPEC
/* define if you have struct timeval */
#undef HAVE_STRUCT_TIMEVAL
/* Define to 1 if you have the `swap32' function. */
#undef HAVE_SWAP32
/* Define to 1 if you have the `sysconf' function. */
#undef HAVE_SYSCONF
/* Define if you have syslen in utmpx.h */
#undef HAVE_SYSLEN_IN_UTMPX
/* Define to 1 if you have the <sys/audit.h> header file. */
#undef HAVE_SYS_AUDIT_H
/* Define to 1 if you have the <sys/bitypes.h> header file. */
#undef HAVE_SYS_BITYPES_H
/* Define to 1 if you have the <sys/bsdtty.h> header file. */
#undef HAVE_SYS_BSDTTY_H
/* Define to 1 if you have the <sys/byteorder.h> header file. */
#undef HAVE_SYS_BYTEORDER_H
/* Define to 1 if you have the <sys/capsicum.h> header file. */
#undef HAVE_SYS_CAPSICUM_H
/* Define to 1 if you have the <sys/cdefs.h> header file. */
#undef HAVE_SYS_CDEFS_H
/* Define to 1 if you have the <sys/dir.h> header file. */
#undef HAVE_SYS_DIR_H
/* Define if your system defines sys_errlist[] */
#undef HAVE_SYS_ERRLIST
/* Define to 1 if you have the <sys/file.h> header file. */
#undef HAVE_SYS_FILE_H
/* Define to 1 if you have the <sys/label.h> header file. */
#undef HAVE_SYS_LABEL_H
/* Define to 1 if you have the <sys/mman.h> header file. */
#undef HAVE_SYS_MMAN_H
/* Define to 1 if you have the <sys/mount.h> header file. */
#undef HAVE_SYS_MOUNT_H
/* Define to 1 if you have the <sys/ndir.h> header file. */
#undef HAVE_SYS_NDIR_H
/* Define if your system defines sys_nerr */
#undef HAVE_SYS_NERR
/* Define to 1 if you have the <sys/poll.h> header file. */
#undef HAVE_SYS_POLL_H
/* Define to 1 if you have the <sys/prctl.h> header file. */
#undef HAVE_SYS_PRCTL_H
/* Define to 1 if you have the <sys/pstat.h> header file. */
#undef HAVE_SYS_PSTAT_H
/* Define to 1 if you have the <sys/ptms.h> header file. */
#undef HAVE_SYS_PTMS_H
/* Define to 1 if you have the <sys/ptrace.h> header file. */
#undef HAVE_SYS_PTRACE_H
/* Define to 1 if you have the <sys/random.h> header file. */
#undef HAVE_SYS_RANDOM_H
/* Define to 1 if you have the <sys/select.h> header file. */
#undef HAVE_SYS_SELECT_H
/* Define to 1 if you have the <sys/statvfs.h> header file. */
#undef HAVE_SYS_STATVFS_H
/* Define to 1 if you have the <sys/stat.h> header file. */
#undef HAVE_SYS_STAT_H
/* Define to 1 if you have the <sys/stream.h> header file. */
#undef HAVE_SYS_STREAM_H
/* Define to 1 if you have the <sys/stropts.h> header file. */
#undef HAVE_SYS_STROPTS_H
/* Define to 1 if you have the <sys/strtio.h> header file. */
#undef HAVE_SYS_STRTIO_H
/* Define to 1 if you have the <sys/sysctl.h> header file. */
#undef HAVE_SYS_SYSCTL_H
/* Force use of sys/syslog.h on Ultrix */
#undef HAVE_SYS_SYSLOG_H
/* Define to 1 if you have the <sys/sysmacros.h> header file. */
#undef HAVE_SYS_SYSMACROS_H
/* Define to 1 if you have the <sys/timers.h> header file. */
#undef HAVE_SYS_TIMERS_H
/* Define to 1 if you have the <sys/time.h> header file. */
#undef HAVE_SYS_TIME_H
/* Define to 1 if you have the <sys/types.h> header file. */
#undef HAVE_SYS_TYPES_H
/* Define to 1 if you have the <sys/un.h> header file. */
#undef HAVE_SYS_UN_H
/* Define to 1 if you have the <sys/vfs.h> header file. */
#undef HAVE_SYS_VFS_H
/* Define to 1 if you have the `tcgetpgrp' function. */
#undef HAVE_TCGETPGRP
/* Define to 1 if you have the `tcsendbreak' function. */
#undef HAVE_TCSENDBREAK
/* Define to 1 if you have the `time' function. */
#undef HAVE_TIME
/* Define to 1 if you have the <time.h> header file. */
#undef HAVE_TIME_H
/* Define if you have ut_time in utmp.h */
#undef HAVE_TIME_IN_UTMP
/* Define if you have ut_time in utmpx.h */
#undef HAVE_TIME_IN_UTMPX
/* Define to 1 if you have the `timingsafe_bcmp' function. */
#undef HAVE_TIMINGSAFE_BCMP
/* Define to 1 if you have the <tmpdir.h> header file. */
#undef HAVE_TMPDIR_H
/* Define to 1 if you have the `truncate' function. */
#undef HAVE_TRUNCATE
/* Define to 1 if you have the <ttyent.h> header file. */
#undef HAVE_TTYENT_H
/* Define if you have ut_tv in utmp.h */
#undef HAVE_TV_IN_UTMP
/* Define if you have ut_tv in utmpx.h */
#undef HAVE_TV_IN_UTMPX
/* Define if you have ut_type in utmp.h */
#undef HAVE_TYPE_IN_UTMP
/* Define if you have ut_type in utmpx.h */
#undef HAVE_TYPE_IN_UTMPX
/* Define to 1 if you have the <ucred.h> header file. */
#undef HAVE_UCRED_H
/* Define to 1 if the system has the type `uintmax_t'. */
#undef HAVE_UINTMAX_T
/* define if you have uintxx_t data type */
#undef HAVE_UINTXX_T
/* Define to 1 if you have the <unistd.h> header file. */
#undef HAVE_UNISTD_H
/* Define to 1 if you have the `unsetenv' function. */
#undef HAVE_UNSETENV
/* Define to 1 if the system has the type `unsigned long long'. */
#undef HAVE_UNSIGNED_LONG_LONG
/* Define to 1 if you have the `updwtmp' function. */
#undef HAVE_UPDWTMP
/* Define to 1 if you have the `updwtmpx' function. */
#undef HAVE_UPDWTMPX
/* Define to 1 if you have the <usersec.h> header file. */
#undef HAVE_USERSEC_H
/* Define to 1 if you have the `user_from_uid' function. */
#undef HAVE_USER_FROM_UID
/* Define to 1 if you have the `usleep' function. */
#undef HAVE_USLEEP
/* Define to 1 if you have the <util.h> header file. */
#undef HAVE_UTIL_H
/* Define to 1 if you have the `utimensat' function. */
#undef HAVE_UTIMENSAT
/* Define to 1 if you have the `utimes' function. */
#undef HAVE_UTIMES
/* Define to 1 if you have the <utime.h> header file. */
#undef HAVE_UTIME_H
/* Define to 1 if you have the `utmpname' function. */
#undef HAVE_UTMPNAME
/* Define to 1 if you have the `utmpxname' function. */
#undef HAVE_UTMPXNAME
/* Define to 1 if you have the <utmpx.h> header file. */
#undef HAVE_UTMPX_H
/* Define to 1 if you have the <utmp.h> header file. */
#undef HAVE_UTMP_H
/* define if you have u_char data type */
#undef HAVE_U_CHAR
/* define if you have u_int data type */
#undef HAVE_U_INT
/* define if you have u_int64_t data type */
#undef HAVE_U_INT64_T
/* define if you have u_intxx_t data type */
#undef HAVE_U_INTXX_T
/* Define to 1 if you have the `vasprintf' function. */
#undef HAVE_VASPRINTF
/* Define if va_copy exists */
#undef HAVE_VA_COPY
/* Define to 1 if you have the <vis.h> header file. */
#undef HAVE_VIS_H
/* Define to 1 if you have the `vsnprintf' function. */
#undef HAVE_VSNPRINTF
/* Define to 1 if you have the `waitpid' function. */
#undef HAVE_WAITPID
/* Define to 1 if you have the `warn' function. */
#undef HAVE_WARN
/* Define to 1 if you have the <wchar.h> header file. */
#undef HAVE_WCHAR_H
/* Define to 1 if you have the `wcwidth' function. */
#undef HAVE_WCWIDTH
/* Define to 1 if you have the `_getlong' function. */
#undef HAVE__GETLONG
/* Define to 1 if you have the `_getpty' function. */
#undef HAVE__GETPTY
/* Define to 1 if you have the `_getshort' function. */
#undef HAVE__GETSHORT
/* Define if you have struct __res_state _res as an extern */
#undef HAVE__RES_EXTERN
/* Define to 1 if you have the `__b64_ntop' function. */
#undef HAVE___B64_NTOP
/* Define to 1 if you have the `__b64_pton' function. */
#undef HAVE___B64_PTON
/* Define if compiler implements __FUNCTION__ */
#undef HAVE___FUNCTION__
/* Define if libc defines __progname */
#undef HAVE___PROGNAME
/* Fields in struct sockaddr_storage */
#undef HAVE___SS_FAMILY_IN_SS
/* Define if __va_copy exists */
#undef HAVE___VA_COPY
/* Define if compiler implements __func__ */
#undef HAVE___func__
/* Define this if you are using the Heimdal version of Kerberos V5 */
#undef HEIMDAL
/* Define if you need to use IP address instead of hostname in $DISPLAY */
#undef IPADDR_IN_DISPLAY
/* Detect IPv4 in IPv6 mapped addresses and treat as IPv4 */
#undef IPV4_IN_IPV6
/* Define if your system choked on IP TOS setting */
#undef IP_TOS_IS_BROKEN
/* Define if you want Kerberos 5 support */
#undef KRB5
/* Define if pututxline updates lastlog too */
#undef LASTLOG_WRITE_PUTUTXLINE
/* Define to whatever link() returns for "not supported" if it doesn't return
EOPNOTSUPP. */
#undef LINK_OPNOTSUPP_ERRNO
/* Adjust Linux out-of-memory killer */
#undef LINUX_OOM_ADJUST
/* max value of long long calculated by configure */
#undef LLONG_MAX
/* min value of long long calculated by configure */
#undef LLONG_MIN
/* Account locked with pw(1) */
#undef LOCKED_PASSWD_PREFIX
/* String used in /etc/passwd to denote locked account */
#undef LOCKED_PASSWD_STRING
/* String used in /etc/passwd to denote locked account */
#undef LOCKED_PASSWD_SUBSTR
/* Some systems need a utmpx entry for /bin/login to work */
#undef LOGIN_NEEDS_UTMPX
/* Set this to your mail directory if you do not have _PATH_MAILDIR */
#undef MAIL_DIRECTORY
/* Need setpgrp to for controlling tty */
#undef NEED_SETPGRP
/* compiler does not accept __attribute__ on prototype args */
#undef NO_ATTRIBUTE_ON_PROTOTYPE_ARGS
/* compiler does not accept __attribute__ on return types */
#undef NO_ATTRIBUTE_ON_RETURN_TYPE
/* SA_RESTARTed signals do no interrupt select */
#undef NO_SA_RESTART
/* Define to disable UID restoration test */
#undef NO_UID_RESTORATION_TEST
/* Define if X11 doesn't support AF_UNIX sockets on that system */
#undef NO_X11_UNIX_SOCKETS
/* Define if EVP_DigestUpdate returns void */
#undef OPENSSL_EVP_DIGESTUPDATE_VOID
/* OpenSSL has ECC */
#undef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
/* libcrypto has NID_X9_62_prime256v1 */
#undef OPENSSL_HAS_NISTP256
/* libcrypto has NID_secp384r1 */
#undef OPENSSL_HAS_NISTP384
/* libcrypto has NID_secp521r1 */
#undef OPENSSL_HAS_NISTP521
/* libcrypto has EVP AES CTR */
#undef OPENSSL_HAVE_EVPCTR
/* libcrypto has EVP AES GCM */
#undef OPENSSL_HAVE_EVPGCM
/* libcrypto is missing AES 192 and 256 bit functions */
#undef OPENSSL_LOBOTOMISED_AES
/* Define if you want the OpenSSL internally seeded PRNG only */
#undef OPENSSL_PRNG_ONLY
/* Define to the address where bug reports for this package should be sent. */
#undef PACKAGE_BUGREPORT
/* Define to the full name of this package. */
#undef PACKAGE_NAME
/* Define to the full name and version of this package. */
#undef PACKAGE_STRING
/* Define to the one symbol short name of this package. */
#undef PACKAGE_TARNAME
/* Define to the home page for this package. */
#undef PACKAGE_URL
/* Define to the version of this package. */
#undef PACKAGE_VERSION
/* Define if you are using Solaris-derived PAM which passes pam_messages to
the conversation function with an extra level of indirection */
#undef PAM_SUN_CODEBASE
/* Work around problematic Linux PAM modules handling of PAM_TTY */
#undef PAM_TTY_KLUDGE
/* must supply username to passwd */
#undef PASSWD_NEEDS_USERNAME
/* System dirs owned by bin (uid 2) */
#undef PLATFORM_SYS_DIR_UID
/* Port number of PRNGD/EGD random number socket */
#undef PRNGD_PORT
/* Location of PRNGD/EGD random number socket */
#undef PRNGD_SOCKET
/* read(1) can return 0 for a non-closed fd */
#undef PTY_ZEROREAD
/* Sandbox using capsicum */
#undef SANDBOX_CAPSICUM
/* Sandbox using Darwin sandbox_init(3) */
#undef SANDBOX_DARWIN
/* no privsep sandboxing */
#undef SANDBOX_NULL
/* Sandbox using pledge(2) */
#undef SANDBOX_PLEDGE
/* Sandbox using setrlimit(2) */
#undef SANDBOX_RLIMIT
/* Sandbox using seccomp filter */
#undef SANDBOX_SECCOMP_FILTER
/* setrlimit RLIMIT_FSIZE works */
#undef SANDBOX_SKIP_RLIMIT_FSIZE
/* define if setrlimit RLIMIT_NOFILE breaks things */
#undef SANDBOX_SKIP_RLIMIT_NOFILE
/* Sandbox using Solaris/Illumos privileges */
#undef SANDBOX_SOLARIS
/* Sandbox using systrace(4) */
#undef SANDBOX_SYSTRACE
/* Specify the system call convention in use */
#undef SECCOMP_AUDIT_ARCH
/* Define if your platform breaks doing a seteuid before a setuid */
#undef SETEUID_BREAKS_SETUID
/* The size of `int', as computed by sizeof. */
#undef SIZEOF_INT
/* The size of `long int', as computed by sizeof. */
#undef SIZEOF_LONG_INT
/* The size of `long long int', as computed by sizeof. */
#undef SIZEOF_LONG_LONG_INT
/* The size of `short int', as computed by sizeof. */
#undef SIZEOF_SHORT_INT
+/* The size of `size_t', as computed by sizeof. */
+#undef SIZEOF_SIZE_T
+
/* Define as const if snprintf() can declare const char *fmt */
#undef SNPRINTF_CONST
/* Define to a Set Process Title type if your system is supported by
bsd-setproctitle.c */
#undef SPT_TYPE
/* Define if sshd somehow reacquires a controlling TTY after setsid() */
#undef SSHD_ACQUIRES_CTTY
/* sshd PAM service name */
#undef SSHD_PAM_SERVICE
/* Define if pam_chauthtok wants real uid set to the unpriv'ed user */
#undef SSHPAM_CHAUTHTOK_NEEDS_RUID
/* Use audit debugging module */
#undef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
/* Windows is sensitive to read buffer size */
#undef SSH_IOBUFSZ
/* non-privileged user for privilege separation */
#undef SSH_PRIVSEP_USER
/* Use tunnel device compatibility to OpenBSD */
#undef SSH_TUN_COMPAT_AF
/* Open tunnel devices the FreeBSD way */
#undef SSH_TUN_FREEBSD
/* Open tunnel devices the Linux tun/tap way */
#undef SSH_TUN_LINUX
/* No layer 2 tunnel support */
#undef SSH_TUN_NO_L2
/* Open tunnel devices the OpenBSD way */
#undef SSH_TUN_OPENBSD
/* Prepend the address family to IP tunnel traffic */
#undef SSH_TUN_PREPEND_AF
/* Define to 1 if you have the ANSI C header files. */
#undef STDC_HEADERS
/* Define if you want a different $PATH for the superuser */
#undef SUPERUSER_PATH
/* syslog_r function is safe to use in in a signal handler */
#undef SYSLOG_R_SAFE_IN_SIGHAND
/* Support routing domains using Linux VRF */
#undef SYS_RDOMAIN_LINUX
/* Define to 1 if you can safely include both <sys/time.h> and <time.h>. */
#undef TIME_WITH_SYS_TIME
/* Support passwords > 8 chars */
#undef UNIXWARE_LONG_PASSWORDS
/* Specify default $PATH */
#undef USER_PATH
/* Define this if you want to use libkafs' AFS support */
#undef USE_AFS
/* Use BSM audit module */
#undef USE_BSM_AUDIT
/* Use btmp to log bad logins */
#undef USE_BTMP
/* Use libedit for sftp */
#undef USE_LIBEDIT
/* Use Linux audit module */
#undef USE_LINUX_AUDIT
/* Enable OpenSSL engine support */
#undef USE_OPENSSL_ENGINE
/* Define if you want to enable PAM support */
#undef USE_PAM
/* Use PIPES instead of a socketpair() */
#undef USE_PIPES
/* Define if you have Solaris privileges */
#undef USE_SOLARIS_PRIVS
/* Define if you have Solaris process contracts */
#undef USE_SOLARIS_PROCESS_CONTRACTS
/* Define if you have Solaris projects */
#undef USE_SOLARIS_PROJECTS
/* Define if you shouldn't strip 'tty' from your ttyname in [uw]tmp */
#undef WITH_ABBREV_NO_TTY
/* Define if you want to enable AIX4's authenticate function */
#undef WITH_AIXAUTHENTICATE
/* Define if you have/want arrays (cluster-wide session management, not C
arrays) */
#undef WITH_IRIX_ARRAY
/* Define if you want IRIX audit trails */
#undef WITH_IRIX_AUDIT
/* Define if you want IRIX kernel jobs */
#undef WITH_IRIX_JOBS
/* Define if you want IRIX project management */
#undef WITH_IRIX_PROJECT
/* use libcrypto for cryptography */
#undef WITH_OPENSSL
/* Define if you want SELinux support. */
#undef WITH_SELINUX
/* Enable zlib */
#undef WITH_ZLIB
/* Define WORDS_BIGENDIAN to 1 if your processor stores words with the most
significant byte first (like Motorola and SPARC, unlike Intel). */
#if defined AC_APPLE_UNIVERSAL_BUILD
# if defined __BIG_ENDIAN__
# define WORDS_BIGENDIAN 1
# endif
#else
# ifndef WORDS_BIGENDIAN
# undef WORDS_BIGENDIAN
# endif
#endif
/* Define if xauth is found in your path */
#undef XAUTH_PATH
/* Enable large inode numbers on Mac OS X 10.5. */
#ifndef _DARWIN_USE_64_BIT_INODE
# define _DARWIN_USE_64_BIT_INODE 1
#endif
/* Number of bits in a file offset, on hosts where this is settable. */
#undef _FILE_OFFSET_BITS
/* Define for large files, on AIX-style hosts. */
#undef _LARGE_FILES
/* log for bad login attempts */
#undef _PATH_BTMP
/* Full path of your "passwd" program */
#undef _PATH_PASSWD_PROG
/* Specify location of ssh.pid */
#undef _PATH_SSH_PIDDIR
/* Define if we don't have struct __res_state in resolv.h */
#undef __res_state
/* Define to rpl_calloc if the replacement function should be used. */
#undef calloc
/* Define to `__inline__' or `__inline' if that's what the C compiler
calls it, or to nothing if 'inline' is not supported under any name. */
#ifndef __cplusplus
#undef inline
#endif
/* Define to rpl_malloc if the replacement function should be used. */
#undef malloc
/* Define to rpl_realloc if the replacement function should be used. */
#undef realloc
/* type to use in place of socklen_t if not defined */
#undef socklen_t
diff --git a/configure b/configure
index d2465270ab18..57b261503645 100755
--- a/configure
+++ b/configure
@@ -1,21461 +1,21833 @@
#! /bin/sh
-# From configure.ac Revision: 1.583 .
# Guess values for system-dependent variables and create Makefiles.
# Generated by GNU Autoconf 2.69 for OpenSSH Portable.
#
# Report bugs to <openssh-unix-dev@mindrot.org>.
#
#
# Copyright (C) 1992-1996, 1998-2012 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
#
#
# This configure script is free software; the Free Software Foundation
# gives unlimited permission to copy, distribute and modify it.
## -------------------- ##
## M4sh Initialization. ##
## -------------------- ##
# Be more Bourne compatible
DUALCASE=1; export DUALCASE # for MKS sh
if test -n "${ZSH_VERSION+set}" && (emulate sh) >/dev/null 2>&1; then :
emulate sh
NULLCMD=:
# Pre-4.2 versions of Zsh do word splitting on ${1+"$@"}, which
# is contrary to our usage. Disable this feature.
alias -g '${1+"$@"}'='"$@"'
setopt NO_GLOB_SUBST
else
case `(set -o) 2>/dev/null` in #(
*posix*) :
set -o posix ;; #(
*) :
;;
esac
fi
as_nl='
'
export as_nl
# Printing a long string crashes Solaris 7 /usr/bin/printf.
as_echo='\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\'
as_echo=$as_echo$as_echo$as_echo$as_echo$as_echo
as_echo=$as_echo$as_echo$as_echo$as_echo$as_echo$as_echo
# Prefer a ksh shell builtin over an external printf program on Solaris,
# but without wasting forks for bash or zsh.
if test -z "$BASH_VERSION$ZSH_VERSION" \
&& (test "X`print -r -- $as_echo`" = "X$as_echo") 2>/dev/null; then
as_echo='print -r --'
as_echo_n='print -rn --'
elif (test "X`printf %s $as_echo`" = "X$as_echo") 2>/dev/null; then
as_echo='printf %s\n'
as_echo_n='printf %s'
else
if test "X`(/usr/ucb/echo -n -n $as_echo) 2>/dev/null`" = "X-n $as_echo"; then
as_echo_body='eval /usr/ucb/echo -n "$1$as_nl"'
as_echo_n='/usr/ucb/echo -n'
else
as_echo_body='eval expr "X$1" : "X\\(.*\\)"'
as_echo_n_body='eval
arg=$1;
case $arg in #(
*"$as_nl"*)
expr "X$arg" : "X\\(.*\\)$as_nl";
arg=`expr "X$arg" : ".*$as_nl\\(.*\\)"`;;
esac;
expr "X$arg" : "X\\(.*\\)" | tr -d "$as_nl"
'
export as_echo_n_body
as_echo_n='sh -c $as_echo_n_body as_echo'
fi
export as_echo_body
as_echo='sh -c $as_echo_body as_echo'
fi
# The user is always right.
if test "${PATH_SEPARATOR+set}" != set; then
PATH_SEPARATOR=:
(PATH='/bin;/bin'; FPATH=$PATH; sh -c :) >/dev/null 2>&1 && {
(PATH='/bin:/bin'; FPATH=$PATH; sh -c :) >/dev/null 2>&1 ||
PATH_SEPARATOR=';'
}
fi
# IFS
# We need space, tab and new line, in precisely that order. Quoting is
# there to prevent editors from complaining about space-tab.
# (If _AS_PATH_WALK were called with IFS unset, it would disable word
# splitting by setting IFS to empty value.)
IFS=" "" $as_nl"
# Find who we are. Look in the path if we contain no directory separator.
as_myself=
case $0 in #((
*[\\/]* ) as_myself=$0 ;;
*) as_save_IFS=$IFS; IFS=$PATH_SEPARATOR
for as_dir in $PATH
do
IFS=$as_save_IFS
test -z "$as_dir" && as_dir=.
test -r "$as_dir/$0" && as_myself=$as_dir/$0 && break
done
IFS=$as_save_IFS
;;
esac
# We did not find ourselves, most probably we were run as `sh COMMAND'
# in which case we are not to be found in the path.
if test "x$as_myself" = x; then
as_myself=$0
fi
if test ! -f "$as_myself"; then
$as_echo "$as_myself: error: cannot find myself; rerun with an absolute file name" >&2
exit 1
fi
# Unset variables that we do not need and which cause bugs (e.g. in
# pre-3.0 UWIN ksh). But do not cause bugs in bash 2.01; the "|| exit 1"
# suppresses any "Segmentation fault" message there. '((' could
# trigger a bug in pdksh 5.2.14.
for as_var in BASH_ENV ENV MAIL MAILPATH
do eval test x\${$as_var+set} = xset \
&& ( (unset $as_var) || exit 1) >/dev/null 2>&1 && unset $as_var || :
done
PS1='$ '
PS2='> '
PS4='+ '
# NLS nuisances.
LC_ALL=C
export LC_ALL
LANGUAGE=C
export LANGUAGE
# CDPATH.
(unset CDPATH) >/dev/null 2>&1 && unset CDPATH
# Use a proper internal environment variable to ensure we don't fall
# into an infinite loop, continuously re-executing ourselves.
if test x"${_as_can_reexec}" != xno && test "x$CONFIG_SHELL" != x; then
_as_can_reexec=no; export _as_can_reexec;
# We cannot yet assume a decent shell, so we have to provide a
# neutralization value for shells without unset; and this also
# works around shells that cannot unset nonexistent variables.
# Preserve -v and -x to the replacement shell.
BASH_ENV=/dev/null
ENV=/dev/null
(unset BASH_ENV) >/dev/null 2>&1 && unset BASH_ENV ENV
case $- in # ((((
*v*x* | *x*v* ) as_opts=-vx ;;
*v* ) as_opts=-v ;;
*x* ) as_opts=-x ;;
* ) as_opts= ;;
esac
exec $CONFIG_SHELL $as_opts "$as_myself" ${1+"$@"}
# Admittedly, this is quite paranoid, since all the known shells bail
# out after a failed `exec'.
$as_echo "$0: could not re-execute with $CONFIG_SHELL" >&2
as_fn_exit 255
fi
# We don't want this to propagate to other subprocesses.
{ _as_can_reexec=; unset _as_can_reexec;}
if test "x$CONFIG_SHELL" = x; then
as_bourne_compatible="if test -n \"\${ZSH_VERSION+set}\" && (emulate sh) >/dev/null 2>&1; then :
emulate sh
NULLCMD=:
# Pre-4.2 versions of Zsh do word splitting on \${1+\"\$@\"}, which
# is contrary to our usage. Disable this feature.
alias -g '\${1+\"\$@\"}'='\"\$@\"'
setopt NO_GLOB_SUBST
else
case \`(set -o) 2>/dev/null\` in #(
*posix*) :
set -o posix ;; #(
*) :
;;
esac
fi
"
as_required="as_fn_return () { (exit \$1); }
as_fn_success () { as_fn_return 0; }
as_fn_failure () { as_fn_return 1; }
as_fn_ret_success () { return 0; }
as_fn_ret_failure () { return 1; }
exitcode=0
as_fn_success || { exitcode=1; echo as_fn_success failed.; }
as_fn_failure && { exitcode=1; echo as_fn_failure succeeded.; }
as_fn_ret_success || { exitcode=1; echo as_fn_ret_success failed.; }
as_fn_ret_failure && { exitcode=1; echo as_fn_ret_failure succeeded.; }
if ( set x; as_fn_ret_success y && test x = \"\$1\" ); then :
else
exitcode=1; echo positional parameters were not saved.
fi
test x\$exitcode = x0 || exit 1
test -x / || exit 1"
as_suggested=" as_lineno_1=";as_suggested=$as_suggested$LINENO;as_suggested=$as_suggested" as_lineno_1a=\$LINENO
as_lineno_2=";as_suggested=$as_suggested$LINENO;as_suggested=$as_suggested" as_lineno_2a=\$LINENO
eval 'test \"x\$as_lineno_1'\$as_run'\" != \"x\$as_lineno_2'\$as_run'\" &&
test \"x\`expr \$as_lineno_1'\$as_run' + 1\`\" = \"x\$as_lineno_2'\$as_run'\"' || exit 1
test \$(( 1 + 1 )) = 2 || exit 1"
if (eval "$as_required") 2>/dev/null; then :
as_have_required=yes
else
as_have_required=no
fi
if test x$as_have_required = xyes && (eval "$as_suggested") 2>/dev/null; then :
else
as_save_IFS=$IFS; IFS=$PATH_SEPARATOR
as_found=false
for as_dir in /bin$PATH_SEPARATOR/usr/bin$PATH_SEPARATOR$PATH
do
IFS=$as_save_IFS
test -z "$as_dir" && as_dir=.
as_found=:
case $as_dir in #(
/*)
for as_base in sh bash ksh sh5; do
# Try only shells that exist, to save several forks.
as_shell=$as_dir/$as_base
if { test -f "$as_shell" || test -f "$as_shell.exe"; } &&
{ $as_echo "$as_bourne_compatible""$as_required" | as_run=a "$as_shell"; } 2>/dev/null; then :
CONFIG_SHELL=$as_shell as_have_required=yes
if { $as_echo "$as_bourne_compatible""$as_suggested" | as_run=a "$as_shell"; } 2>/dev/null; then :
break 2
fi
fi
done;;
esac
as_found=false
done
$as_found || { if { test -f "$SHELL" || test -f "$SHELL.exe"; } &&
{ $as_echo "$as_bourne_compatible""$as_required" | as_run=a "$SHELL"; } 2>/dev/null; then :
CONFIG_SHELL=$SHELL as_have_required=yes
fi; }
IFS=$as_save_IFS
if test "x$CONFIG_SHELL" != x; then :
export CONFIG_SHELL
# We cannot yet assume a decent shell, so we have to provide a
# neutralization value for shells without unset; and this also
# works around shells that cannot unset nonexistent variables.
# Preserve -v and -x to the replacement shell.
BASH_ENV=/dev/null
ENV=/dev/null
(unset BASH_ENV) >/dev/null 2>&1 && unset BASH_ENV ENV
case $- in # ((((
*v*x* | *x*v* ) as_opts=-vx ;;
*v* ) as_opts=-v ;;
*x* ) as_opts=-x ;;
* ) as_opts= ;;
esac
exec $CONFIG_SHELL $as_opts "$as_myself" ${1+"$@"}
# Admittedly, this is quite paranoid, since all the known shells bail
# out after a failed `exec'.
$as_echo "$0: could not re-execute with $CONFIG_SHELL" >&2
exit 255
fi
if test x$as_have_required = xno; then :
$as_echo "$0: This script requires a shell more modern than all"
$as_echo "$0: the shells that I found on your system."
if test x${ZSH_VERSION+set} = xset ; then
$as_echo "$0: In particular, zsh $ZSH_VERSION has bugs and should"
$as_echo "$0: be upgraded to zsh 4.3.4 or later."
else
$as_echo "$0: Please tell bug-autoconf@gnu.org and
$0: openssh-unix-dev@mindrot.org about your system,
$0: including any error possibly output before this
$0: message. Then install a modern shell, or manually run
$0: the script under such a shell if you do have one."
fi
exit 1
fi
fi
fi
SHELL=${CONFIG_SHELL-/bin/sh}
export SHELL
# Unset more variables known to interfere with behavior of common tools.
CLICOLOR_FORCE= GREP_OPTIONS=
unset CLICOLOR_FORCE GREP_OPTIONS
## --------------------- ##
## M4sh Shell Functions. ##
## --------------------- ##
# as_fn_unset VAR
# ---------------
# Portably unset VAR.
as_fn_unset ()
{
{ eval $1=; unset $1;}
}
as_unset=as_fn_unset
# as_fn_set_status STATUS
# -----------------------
# Set $? to STATUS, without forking.
as_fn_set_status ()
{
return $1
} # as_fn_set_status
# as_fn_exit STATUS
# -----------------
# Exit the shell with STATUS, even in a "trap 0" or "set -e" context.
as_fn_exit ()
{
set +e
as_fn_set_status $1
exit $1
} # as_fn_exit
# as_fn_mkdir_p
# -------------
# Create "$as_dir" as a directory, including parents if necessary.
as_fn_mkdir_p ()
{
case $as_dir in #(
-*) as_dir=./$as_dir;;
esac
test -d "$as_dir" || eval $as_mkdir_p || {
as_dirs=
while :; do
case $as_dir in #(
*\'*) as_qdir=`$as_echo "$as_dir" | sed "s/'/'\\\\\\\\''/g"`;; #'(
*) as_qdir=$as_dir;;
esac
as_dirs="'$as_qdir' $as_dirs"
as_dir=`$as_dirname -- "$as_dir" ||
$as_expr X"$as_dir" : 'X\(.*[^/]\)//*[^/][^/]*/*$' \| \
X"$as_dir" : 'X\(//\)[^/]' \| \
X"$as_dir" : 'X\(//\)$' \| \
X"$as_dir" : 'X\(/\)' \| . 2>/dev/null ||
$as_echo X"$as_dir" |
sed '/^X\(.*[^/]\)\/\/*[^/][^/]*\/*$/{
s//\1/
q
}
/^X\(\/\/\)[^/].*/{
s//\1/
q
}
/^X\(\/\/\)$/{
s//\1/
q
}
/^X\(\/\).*/{
s//\1/
q
}
s/.*/./; q'`
test -d "$as_dir" && break
done
test -z "$as_dirs" || eval "mkdir $as_dirs"
} || test -d "$as_dir" || as_fn_error $? "cannot create directory $as_dir"
} # as_fn_mkdir_p
# as_fn_executable_p FILE
# -----------------------
# Test if FILE is an executable regular file.
as_fn_executable_p ()
{
test -f "$1" && test -x "$1"
} # as_fn_executable_p
# as_fn_append VAR VALUE
# ----------------------
# Append the text in VALUE to the end of the definition contained in VAR. Take
# advantage of any shell optimizations that allow amortized linear growth over
# repeated appends, instead of the typical quadratic growth present in naive
# implementations.
if (eval "as_var=1; as_var+=2; test x\$as_var = x12") 2>/dev/null; then :
eval 'as_fn_append ()
{
eval $1+=\$2
}'
else
as_fn_append ()
{
eval $1=\$$1\$2
}
fi # as_fn_append
# as_fn_arith ARG...
# ------------------
# Perform arithmetic evaluation on the ARGs, and store the result in the
# global $as_val. Take advantage of shells that can avoid forks. The arguments
# must be portable across $(()) and expr.
if (eval "test \$(( 1 + 1 )) = 2") 2>/dev/null; then :
eval 'as_fn_arith ()
{
as_val=$(( $* ))
}'
else
as_fn_arith ()
{
as_val=`expr "$@" || test $? -eq 1`
}
fi # as_fn_arith
# as_fn_error STATUS ERROR [LINENO LOG_FD]
# ----------------------------------------
# Output "`basename $0`: error: ERROR" to stderr. If LINENO and LOG_FD are
# provided, also output the error to LOG_FD, referencing LINENO. Then exit the
# script with STATUS, using 1 if that was 0.
as_fn_error ()
{
as_status=$1; test $as_status -eq 0 && as_status=1
if test "$4"; then
as_lineno=${as_lineno-"$3"} as_lineno_stack=as_lineno_stack=$as_lineno_stack
$as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: error: $2" >&$4
fi
$as_echo "$as_me: error: $2" >&2
as_fn_exit $as_status
} # as_fn_error
if expr a : '\(a\)' >/dev/null 2>&1 &&
test "X`expr 00001 : '.*\(...\)'`" = X001; then
as_expr=expr
else
as_expr=false
fi
if (basename -- /) >/dev/null 2>&1 && test "X`basename -- / 2>&1`" = "X/"; then
as_basename=basename
else
as_basename=false
fi
if (as_dir=`dirname -- /` && test "X$as_dir" = X/) >/dev/null 2>&1; then
as_dirname=dirname
else
as_dirname=false
fi
as_me=`$as_basename -- "$0" ||
$as_expr X/"$0" : '.*/\([^/][^/]*\)/*$' \| \
X"$0" : 'X\(//\)$' \| \
X"$0" : 'X\(/\)' \| . 2>/dev/null ||
$as_echo X/"$0" |
sed '/^.*\/\([^/][^/]*\)\/*$/{
s//\1/
q
}
/^X\/\(\/\/\)$/{
s//\1/
q
}
/^X\/\(\/\).*/{
s//\1/
q
}
s/.*/./; q'`
# Avoid depending upon Character Ranges.
as_cr_letters='abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz'
as_cr_LETTERS='ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ'
as_cr_Letters=$as_cr_letters$as_cr_LETTERS
as_cr_digits='0123456789'
as_cr_alnum=$as_cr_Letters$as_cr_digits
as_lineno_1=$LINENO as_lineno_1a=$LINENO
as_lineno_2=$LINENO as_lineno_2a=$LINENO
eval 'test "x$as_lineno_1'$as_run'" != "x$as_lineno_2'$as_run'" &&
test "x`expr $as_lineno_1'$as_run' + 1`" = "x$as_lineno_2'$as_run'"' || {
# Blame Lee E. McMahon (1931-1989) for sed's syntax. :-)
sed -n '
p
/[$]LINENO/=
' <$as_myself |
sed '
s/[$]LINENO.*/&-/
t lineno
b
:lineno
N
:loop
s/[$]LINENO\([^'$as_cr_alnum'_].*\n\)\(.*\)/\2\1\2/
t loop
s/-\n.*//
' >$as_me.lineno &&
chmod +x "$as_me.lineno" ||
{ $as_echo "$as_me: error: cannot create $as_me.lineno; rerun with a POSIX shell" >&2; as_fn_exit 1; }
# If we had to re-execute with $CONFIG_SHELL, we're ensured to have
# already done that, so ensure we don't try to do so again and fall
# in an infinite loop. This has already happened in practice.
_as_can_reexec=no; export _as_can_reexec
# Don't try to exec as it changes $[0], causing all sort of problems
# (the dirname of $[0] is not the place where we might find the
# original and so on. Autoconf is especially sensitive to this).
. "./$as_me.lineno"
# Exit status is that of the last command.
exit
}
ECHO_C= ECHO_N= ECHO_T=
case `echo -n x` in #(((((
-n*)
case `echo 'xy\c'` in
*c*) ECHO_T=' ';; # ECHO_T is single tab character.
xy) ECHO_C='\c';;
*) echo `echo ksh88 bug on AIX 6.1` > /dev/null
ECHO_T=' ';;
esac;;
*)
ECHO_N='-n';;
esac
rm -f conf$$ conf$$.exe conf$$.file
if test -d conf$$.dir; then
rm -f conf$$.dir/conf$$.file
else
rm -f conf$$.dir
mkdir conf$$.dir 2>/dev/null
fi
if (echo >conf$$.file) 2>/dev/null; then
if ln -s conf$$.file conf$$ 2>/dev/null; then
as_ln_s='ln -s'
# ... but there are two gotchas:
# 1) On MSYS, both `ln -s file dir' and `ln file dir' fail.
# 2) DJGPP < 2.04 has no symlinks; `ln -s' creates a wrapper executable.
# In both cases, we have to default to `cp -pR'.
ln -s conf$$.file conf$$.dir 2>/dev/null && test ! -f conf$$.exe ||
as_ln_s='cp -pR'
elif ln conf$$.file conf$$ 2>/dev/null; then
as_ln_s=ln
else
as_ln_s='cp -pR'
fi
else
as_ln_s='cp -pR'
fi
rm -f conf$$ conf$$.exe conf$$.dir/conf$$.file conf$$.file
rmdir conf$$.dir 2>/dev/null
if mkdir -p . 2>/dev/null; then
as_mkdir_p='mkdir -p "$as_dir"'
else
test -d ./-p && rmdir ./-p
as_mkdir_p=false
fi
as_test_x='test -x'
as_executable_p=as_fn_executable_p
# Sed expression to map a string onto a valid CPP name.
as_tr_cpp="eval sed 'y%*$as_cr_letters%P$as_cr_LETTERS%;s%[^_$as_cr_alnum]%_%g'"
# Sed expression to map a string onto a valid variable name.
as_tr_sh="eval sed 'y%*+%pp%;s%[^_$as_cr_alnum]%_%g'"
test -n "$DJDIR" || exec 7<&0 </dev/null
exec 6>&1
# Name of the host.
# hostname on some systems (SVR3.2, old GNU/Linux) returns a bogus exit status,
# so uname gets run too.
ac_hostname=`(hostname || uname -n) 2>/dev/null | sed 1q`
#
# Initializations.
#
ac_default_prefix=/usr/local
ac_clean_files=
ac_config_libobj_dir=.
LIBOBJS=
cross_compiling=no
subdirs=
MFLAGS=
MAKEFLAGS=
# Identity of this package.
PACKAGE_NAME='OpenSSH'
PACKAGE_TARNAME='openssh'
PACKAGE_VERSION='Portable'
PACKAGE_STRING='OpenSSH Portable'
PACKAGE_BUGREPORT='openssh-unix-dev@mindrot.org'
PACKAGE_URL=''
ac_unique_file="ssh.c"
# Factoring default headers for most tests.
ac_includes_default="\
#include <stdio.h>
#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TYPES_H
# include <sys/types.h>
#endif
#ifdef HAVE_SYS_STAT_H
# include <sys/stat.h>
#endif
#ifdef STDC_HEADERS
# include <stdlib.h>
# include <stddef.h>
#else
# ifdef HAVE_STDLIB_H
# include <stdlib.h>
# endif
#endif
#ifdef HAVE_STRING_H
# if !defined STDC_HEADERS && defined HAVE_MEMORY_H
# include <memory.h>
# endif
# include <string.h>
#endif
#ifdef HAVE_STRINGS_H
# include <strings.h>
#endif
#ifdef HAVE_INTTYPES_H
# include <inttypes.h>
#endif
#ifdef HAVE_STDINT_H
# include <stdint.h>
#endif
#ifdef HAVE_UNISTD_H
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piddir
user_path
mansubdir
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KRB5CONF
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PICFLAG
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PKGCONFIG
LDNSCONFIG
LIBOBJS
LD
PATH_PASSWD_PROG
STARTUP_SCRIPT_SHELL
MAKE_PACKAGE_SUPPORTED
PATH_USERADD_PROG
PATH_GROUPADD_PROG
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TEST_SHELL
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GROFF
SH
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KILL
CAT
ac_ct_AR
AR
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OBJEXT
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ac_ct_CC
CPPFLAGS
LDFLAGS
CFLAGS
CC
target_alias
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build_alias
LIBS
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ECHO_C
DEFS
mandir
localedir
libdir
psdir
pdfdir
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htmldir
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docdir
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includedir
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sharedstatedir
sysconfdir
datadir
datarootdir
libexecdir
sbindir
bindir
program_transform_name
prefix
exec_prefix
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ac_subst_files=''
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with_cppflags
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with_ldflags_after
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with_Werror
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with_solaris_projects
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with_osfsia
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with_ldns
with_libedit
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with_openssl_header_check
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with_sandbox
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with_md5_passwords
with_shadow
with_ipaddr_display
enable_etc_default_login
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with_superuser_path
with_4in6
with_bsd_auth
with_pid_dir
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enable_wtmpx
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enable_pututxline
with_lastlog
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target_alias
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ac_unrecognized_opts=
ac_unrecognized_sep=
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no_recursion=
prefix=NONE
program_prefix=NONE
program_suffix=NONE
program_transform_name=s,x,x,
silent=
site=
srcdir=
verbose=
x_includes=NONE
x_libraries=NONE
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# (The list follows the same order as the GNU Coding Standards.)
bindir='${exec_prefix}/bin'
sbindir='${exec_prefix}/sbin'
libexecdir='${exec_prefix}/libexec'
datarootdir='${prefix}/share'
datadir='${datarootdir}'
sysconfdir='${prefix}/etc'
sharedstatedir='${prefix}/com'
localstatedir='${prefix}/var'
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includedir='${prefix}/include'
oldincludedir='/usr/include'
docdir='${datarootdir}/doc/${PACKAGE_TARNAME}'
infodir='${datarootdir}/info'
htmldir='${docdir}'
dvidir='${docdir}'
pdfdir='${docdir}'
psdir='${docdir}'
libdir='${exec_prefix}/lib'
localedir='${datarootdir}/locale'
mandir='${datarootdir}/man'
ac_prev=
ac_dashdash=
for ac_option
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ac_useropt=`expr "x$ac_option" : 'x-*disable-\(.*\)'`
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eval enable_$ac_useropt=no ;;
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docdir=$ac_optarg ;;
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exec_prefix=$ac_optarg ;;
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ac_init_help=long ;;
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ac_init_help=recursive ;;
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ac_init_help=short ;;
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ac_prev=host_alias ;;
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ac_prev=htmldir ;;
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htmldir=$ac_optarg ;;
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ac_prev=includedir ;;
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mandir=$ac_optarg ;;
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with_fp=no ;;
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no_create=yes ;;
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no_recursion=yes ;;
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ac_prev=oldincludedir ;;
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oldincludedir=$ac_optarg ;;
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ac_prev=prefix ;;
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psdir=$ac_optarg ;;
-q | -quiet | --quiet | --quie | --qui | --qu | --q \
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silent=yes ;;
+ -runstatedir | --runstatedir | --runstatedi | --runstated \
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+ ac_prev=runstatedir ;;
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+ runstatedir=$ac_optarg ;;
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#
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\`configure' configures OpenSSH Portable to adapt to many kinds of systems.
Usage: $0 [OPTION]... [VAR=VALUE]...
To assign environment variables (e.g., CC, CFLAGS...), specify them as
VAR=VALUE. See below for descriptions of some of the useful variables.
Defaults for the options are specified in brackets.
Configuration:
-h, --help display this help and exit
--help=short display options specific to this package
--help=recursive display the short help of all the included packages
-V, --version display version information and exit
-q, --quiet, --silent do not print \`checking ...' messages
--cache-file=FILE cache test results in FILE [disabled]
-C, --config-cache alias for \`--cache-file=config.cache'
-n, --no-create do not create output files
--srcdir=DIR find the sources in DIR [configure dir or \`..']
Installation directories:
--prefix=PREFIX install architecture-independent files in PREFIX
[$ac_default_prefix]
--exec-prefix=EPREFIX install architecture-dependent files in EPREFIX
[PREFIX]
By default, \`make install' will install all the files in
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Fine tuning of the installation directories:
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--sbindir=DIR system admin executables [EPREFIX/sbin]
--libexecdir=DIR program executables [EPREFIX/libexec]
--sysconfdir=DIR read-only single-machine data [PREFIX/etc]
--sharedstatedir=DIR modifiable architecture-independent data [PREFIX/com]
--localstatedir=DIR modifiable single-machine data [PREFIX/var]
+ --runstatedir=DIR modifiable per-process data [LOCALSTATEDIR/run]
--libdir=DIR object code libraries [EPREFIX/lib]
--includedir=DIR C header files [PREFIX/include]
--oldincludedir=DIR C header files for non-gcc [/usr/include]
--datarootdir=DIR read-only arch.-independent data root [PREFIX/share]
--datadir=DIR read-only architecture-independent data [DATAROOTDIR]
--infodir=DIR info documentation [DATAROOTDIR/info]
--localedir=DIR locale-dependent data [DATAROOTDIR/locale]
--mandir=DIR man documentation [DATAROOTDIR/man]
--docdir=DIR documentation root [DATAROOTDIR/doc/openssh]
--htmldir=DIR html documentation [DOCDIR]
--dvidir=DIR dvi documentation [DOCDIR]
--pdfdir=DIR pdf documentation [DOCDIR]
--psdir=DIR ps documentation [DOCDIR]
_ACEOF
cat <<\_ACEOF
System types:
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--host=HOST cross-compile to build programs to run on HOST [BUILD]
_ACEOF
fi
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Optional Features:
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--disable-FEATURE do not include FEATURE (same as --enable-FEATURE=no)
--enable-FEATURE[=ARG] include FEATURE [ARG=yes]
--disable-largefile omit support for large files
--disable-pkcs11 disable PKCS#11 support code [no]
--disable-security-key disable U2F/FIDO support code no
--disable-strip Disable calling strip(1) on install
--disable-etc-default-login Disable using PATH from /etc/default/login no
--disable-lastlog disable use of lastlog even if detected no
--disable-utmp disable use of utmp even if detected no
--disable-utmpx disable use of utmpx even if detected no
--disable-wtmp disable use of wtmp even if detected no
--disable-wtmpx disable use of wtmpx even if detected no
--disable-libutil disable use of libutil (login() etc.) no
--disable-pututline disable use of pututline() etc. (uwtmp) no
--disable-pututxline disable use of pututxline() etc. (uwtmpx) no
Optional Packages:
--with-PACKAGE[=ARG] use PACKAGE [ARG=yes]
--without-PACKAGE do not use PACKAGE (same as --with-PACKAGE=no)
--without-openssl Disable use of OpenSSL; use only limited internal crypto **EXPERIMENTAL**
--without-stackprotect Don't use compiler's stack protection
--without-hardening Don't use toolchain hardening flags
--without-rpath Disable auto-added -R linker paths
--with-cflags Specify additional flags to pass to compiler
--with-cflags-after Specify additional flags to pass to compiler after configure
--with-cppflags Specify additional flags to pass to preprocessor
--with-ldflags Specify additional flags to pass to linker
--with-ldflags-after Specify additional flags to pass to linker after configure
--with-libs Specify additional libraries to link with
--with-Werror Build main code with -Werror
--with-solaris-contracts Enable Solaris process contracts (experimental)
--with-solaris-projects Enable Solaris projects (experimental)
--with-solaris-privs Enable Solaris/Illumos privileges (experimental)
--with-osfsia Enable Digital Unix SIA
--with-zlib=PATH Use zlib in PATH
--without-zlib-version-check Disable zlib version check
--with-ldns[=PATH] Use ldns for DNSSEC support (optionally in PATH)
--with-libedit[=PATH] Enable libedit support for sftp
--with-audit=module Enable audit support (modules=debug,bsm,linux)
--with-pie Build Position Independent Executables if possible
--with-security-key-builtin include builtin U2F/FIDO support
--with-ssl-dir=PATH Specify path to OpenSSL installation
--without-openssl-header-check Disable OpenSSL version consistency check
--with-ssl-engine Enable OpenSSL (hardware) ENGINE support
--with-prngd-port=PORT read entropy from PRNGD/EGD TCP localhost:PORT
--with-prngd-socket=FILE read entropy from PRNGD/EGD socket FILE (default=/var/run/egd-pool)
--with-pam Enable PAM support
--with-pam-service=name Specify PAM service name
--with-privsep-user=user Specify non-privileged user for privilege separation
--with-sandbox=style Specify privilege separation sandbox (no, capsicum, darwin, rlimit, seccomp_filter, systrace, pledge)
--with-selinux Enable SELinux support
--with-kerberos5=PATH Enable Kerberos 5 support
--with-privsep-path=xxx Path for privilege separation chroot (default=/var/empty)
--with-xauth=PATH Specify path to xauth program
--with-maildir=/path/to/mail Specify your system mail directory
--with-mantype=man|cat|doc Set man page type
--with-md5-passwords Enable use of MD5 passwords
--without-shadow Disable shadow password support
--with-ipaddr-display Use ip address instead of hostname in $DISPLAY
--with-default-path= Specify default $PATH environment for server
--with-superuser-path= Specify different path for super-user
--with-4in6 Check for and convert IPv4 in IPv6 mapped addresses
--with-bsd-auth Enable BSD auth support
--with-pid-dir=PATH Specify location of sshd.pid file
--with-lastlog=FILE|DIR specify lastlog location common locations
Some influential environment variables:
CC C compiler command
CFLAGS C compiler flags
LDFLAGS linker flags, e.g. -L<lib dir> if you have libraries in a
nonstandard directory <lib dir>
LIBS libraries to pass to the linker, e.g. -l<library>
CPPFLAGS (Objective) C/C++ preprocessor flags, e.g. -I<include dir> if
you have headers in a nonstandard directory <include dir>
CPP C preprocessor
Use these variables to override the choices made by `configure' or to help
it to find libraries and programs with nonstandard names/locations.
Report bugs to <openssh-unix-dev@mindrot.org>.
_ACEOF
ac_status=$?
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OpenSSH configure Portable
generated by GNU Autoconf 2.69
Copyright (C) 2012 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
This configure script is free software; the Free Software Foundation
gives unlimited permission to copy, distribute and modify it.
_ACEOF
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{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: WARNING: $2: section \"Present But Cannot Be Compiled\"" >&5
$as_echo "$as_me: WARNING: $2: section \"Present But Cannot Be Compiled\"" >&2;}
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: WARNING: $2: proceeding with the compiler's result" >&5
$as_echo "$as_me: WARNING: $2: proceeding with the compiler's result" >&2;}
( $as_echo "## ------------------------------------------- ##
## Report this to openssh-unix-dev@mindrot.org ##
## ------------------------------------------- ##"
) | sed "s/^/$as_me: WARNING: /" >&2
;;
esac
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for $2" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking for $2... " >&6; }
if eval \${$3+:} false; then :
$as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
else
eval "$3=\$ac_header_compiler"
fi
eval ac_res=\$$3
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_res" >&5
$as_echo "$ac_res" >&6; }
fi
eval $as_lineno_stack; ${as_lineno_stack:+:} unset as_lineno
} # ac_fn_c_check_header_mongrel
-# ac_fn_c_check_func LINENO FUNC VAR
-# ----------------------------------
-# Tests whether FUNC exists, setting the cache variable VAR accordingly
-ac_fn_c_check_func ()
-{
- as_lineno=${as_lineno-"$1"} as_lineno_stack=as_lineno_stack=$as_lineno_stack
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for $2" >&5
-$as_echo_n "checking for $2... " >&6; }
-if eval \${$3+:} false; then :
- $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
-else
- cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
-/* end confdefs.h. */
-/* Define $2 to an innocuous variant, in case <limits.h> declares $2.
- For example, HP-UX 11i <limits.h> declares gettimeofday. */
-#define $2 innocuous_$2
-
-/* System header to define __stub macros and hopefully few prototypes,
- which can conflict with char $2 (); below.
- Prefer <limits.h> to <assert.h> if __STDC__ is defined, since
- <limits.h> exists even on freestanding compilers. */
-
-#ifdef __STDC__
-# include <limits.h>
-#else
-# include <assert.h>
-#endif
-
-#undef $2
-
-/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error.
- Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC
- builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */
-#ifdef __cplusplus
-extern "C"
-#endif
-char $2 ();
-/* The GNU C library defines this for functions which it implements
- to always fail with ENOSYS. Some functions are actually named
- something starting with __ and the normal name is an alias. */
-#if defined __stub_$2 || defined __stub___$2
-choke me
-#endif
-
-int
-main ()
-{
-return $2 ();
- ;
- return 0;
-}
-_ACEOF
-if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then :
- eval "$3=yes"
-else
- eval "$3=no"
-fi
-rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \
- conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
-fi
-eval ac_res=\$$3
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_res" >&5
-$as_echo "$ac_res" >&6; }
- eval $as_lineno_stack; ${as_lineno_stack:+:} unset as_lineno
-
-} # ac_fn_c_check_func
-
-# ac_fn_c_check_type LINENO TYPE VAR INCLUDES
-# -------------------------------------------
-# Tests whether TYPE exists after having included INCLUDES, setting cache
-# variable VAR accordingly.
-ac_fn_c_check_type ()
-{
- as_lineno=${as_lineno-"$1"} as_lineno_stack=as_lineno_stack=$as_lineno_stack
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for $2" >&5
-$as_echo_n "checking for $2... " >&6; }
-if eval \${$3+:} false; then :
- $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
-else
- eval "$3=no"
- cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
-/* end confdefs.h. */
-$4
-int
-main ()
-{
-if (sizeof ($2))
- return 0;
- ;
- return 0;
-}
-_ACEOF
-if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then :
- cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
-/* end confdefs.h. */
-$4
-int
-main ()
-{
-if (sizeof (($2)))
- return 0;
- ;
- return 0;
-}
-_ACEOF
-if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then :
-
-else
- eval "$3=yes"
-fi
-rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
-fi
-rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
-fi
-eval ac_res=\$$3
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_res" >&5
-$as_echo "$ac_res" >&6; }
- eval $as_lineno_stack; ${as_lineno_stack:+:} unset as_lineno
-
-} # ac_fn_c_check_type
-
# ac_fn_c_compute_int LINENO EXPR VAR INCLUDES
# --------------------------------------------
# Tries to find the compile-time value of EXPR in a program that includes
# INCLUDES, setting VAR accordingly. Returns whether the value could be
# computed
ac_fn_c_compute_int ()
{
as_lineno=${as_lineno-"$1"} as_lineno_stack=as_lineno_stack=$as_lineno_stack
if test "$cross_compiling" = yes; then
# Depending upon the size, compute the lo and hi bounds.
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
$4
int
main ()
{
static int test_array [1 - 2 * !(($2) >= 0)];
test_array [0] = 0;
return test_array [0];
;
return 0;
}
_ACEOF
if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then :
ac_lo=0 ac_mid=0
while :; do
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
$4
int
main ()
{
static int test_array [1 - 2 * !(($2) <= $ac_mid)];
test_array [0] = 0;
return test_array [0];
;
return 0;
}
_ACEOF
if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then :
ac_hi=$ac_mid; break
else
as_fn_arith $ac_mid + 1 && ac_lo=$as_val
if test $ac_lo -le $ac_mid; then
ac_lo= ac_hi=
break
fi
as_fn_arith 2 '*' $ac_mid + 1 && ac_mid=$as_val
fi
rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
done
else
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
$4
int
main ()
{
static int test_array [1 - 2 * !(($2) < 0)];
test_array [0] = 0;
return test_array [0];
;
return 0;
}
_ACEOF
if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then :
ac_hi=-1 ac_mid=-1
while :; do
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
$4
int
main ()
{
static int test_array [1 - 2 * !(($2) >= $ac_mid)];
test_array [0] = 0;
return test_array [0];
;
return 0;
}
_ACEOF
if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then :
ac_lo=$ac_mid; break
else
as_fn_arith '(' $ac_mid ')' - 1 && ac_hi=$as_val
if test $ac_mid -le $ac_hi; then
ac_lo= ac_hi=
break
fi
as_fn_arith 2 '*' $ac_mid && ac_mid=$as_val
fi
rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
done
else
ac_lo= ac_hi=
fi
rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
fi
rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
# Binary search between lo and hi bounds.
while test "x$ac_lo" != "x$ac_hi"; do
as_fn_arith '(' $ac_hi - $ac_lo ')' / 2 + $ac_lo && ac_mid=$as_val
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
$4
int
main ()
{
static int test_array [1 - 2 * !(($2) <= $ac_mid)];
test_array [0] = 0;
return test_array [0];
;
return 0;
}
_ACEOF
if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then :
ac_hi=$ac_mid
else
as_fn_arith '(' $ac_mid ')' + 1 && ac_lo=$as_val
fi
rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
done
case $ac_lo in #((
?*) eval "$3=\$ac_lo"; ac_retval=0 ;;
'') ac_retval=1 ;;
esac
else
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
$4
static long int longval () { return $2; }
static unsigned long int ulongval () { return $2; }
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
int
main ()
{
FILE *f = fopen ("conftest.val", "w");
if (! f)
return 1;
if (($2) < 0)
{
long int i = longval ();
if (i != ($2))
return 1;
fprintf (f, "%ld", i);
}
else
{
unsigned long int i = ulongval ();
if (i != ($2))
return 1;
fprintf (f, "%lu", i);
}
/* Do not output a trailing newline, as this causes \r\n confusion
on some platforms. */
return ferror (f) || fclose (f) != 0;
;
return 0;
}
_ACEOF
if ac_fn_c_try_run "$LINENO"; then :
echo >>conftest.val; read $3 <conftest.val; ac_retval=0
else
ac_retval=1
fi
rm -f core *.core core.conftest.* gmon.out bb.out conftest$ac_exeext \
conftest.$ac_objext conftest.beam conftest.$ac_ext
rm -f conftest.val
fi
eval $as_lineno_stack; ${as_lineno_stack:+:} unset as_lineno
as_fn_set_status $ac_retval
} # ac_fn_c_compute_int
+# ac_fn_c_check_func LINENO FUNC VAR
+# ----------------------------------
+# Tests whether FUNC exists, setting the cache variable VAR accordingly
+ac_fn_c_check_func ()
+{
+ as_lineno=${as_lineno-"$1"} as_lineno_stack=as_lineno_stack=$as_lineno_stack
+ { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for $2" >&5
+$as_echo_n "checking for $2... " >&6; }
+if eval \${$3+:} false; then :
+ $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
+else
+ cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+/* Define $2 to an innocuous variant, in case <limits.h> declares $2.
+ For example, HP-UX 11i <limits.h> declares gettimeofday. */
+#define $2 innocuous_$2
+
+/* System header to define __stub macros and hopefully few prototypes,
+ which can conflict with char $2 (); below.
+ Prefer <limits.h> to <assert.h> if __STDC__ is defined, since
+ <limits.h> exists even on freestanding compilers. */
+
+#ifdef __STDC__
+# include <limits.h>
+#else
+# include <assert.h>
+#endif
+
+#undef $2
+
+/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error.
+ Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC
+ builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+extern "C"
+#endif
+char $2 ();
+/* The GNU C library defines this for functions which it implements
+ to always fail with ENOSYS. Some functions are actually named
+ something starting with __ and the normal name is an alias. */
+#if defined __stub_$2 || defined __stub___$2
+choke me
+#endif
+
+int
+main ()
+{
+return $2 ();
+ ;
+ return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then :
+ eval "$3=yes"
+else
+ eval "$3=no"
+fi
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \
+ conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
+fi
+eval ac_res=\$$3
+ { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_res" >&5
+$as_echo "$ac_res" >&6; }
+ eval $as_lineno_stack; ${as_lineno_stack:+:} unset as_lineno
+
+} # ac_fn_c_check_func
+
+# ac_fn_c_check_type LINENO TYPE VAR INCLUDES
+# -------------------------------------------
+# Tests whether TYPE exists after having included INCLUDES, setting cache
+# variable VAR accordingly.
+ac_fn_c_check_type ()
+{
+ as_lineno=${as_lineno-"$1"} as_lineno_stack=as_lineno_stack=$as_lineno_stack
+ { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for $2" >&5
+$as_echo_n "checking for $2... " >&6; }
+if eval \${$3+:} false; then :
+ $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
+else
+ eval "$3=no"
+ cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+$4
+int
+main ()
+{
+if (sizeof ($2))
+ return 0;
+ ;
+ return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then :
+ cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+$4
+int
+main ()
+{
+if (sizeof (($2)))
+ return 0;
+ ;
+ return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then :
+
+else
+ eval "$3=yes"
+fi
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
+fi
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
+fi
+eval ac_res=\$$3
+ { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_res" >&5
+$as_echo "$ac_res" >&6; }
+ eval $as_lineno_stack; ${as_lineno_stack:+:} unset as_lineno
+
+} # ac_fn_c_check_type
+
# ac_fn_c_check_member LINENO AGGR MEMBER VAR INCLUDES
# ----------------------------------------------------
# Tries to find if the field MEMBER exists in type AGGR, after including
# INCLUDES, setting cache variable VAR accordingly.
ac_fn_c_check_member ()
{
as_lineno=${as_lineno-"$1"} as_lineno_stack=as_lineno_stack=$as_lineno_stack
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for $2.$3" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking for $2.$3... " >&6; }
if eval \${$4+:} false; then :
$as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
else
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
$5
int
main ()
{
static $2 ac_aggr;
if (ac_aggr.$3)
return 0;
;
return 0;
}
_ACEOF
if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then :
eval "$4=yes"
else
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
$5
int
main ()
{
static $2 ac_aggr;
if (sizeof ac_aggr.$3)
return 0;
;
return 0;
}
_ACEOF
if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then :
eval "$4=yes"
else
eval "$4=no"
fi
rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
fi
rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
fi
eval ac_res=\$$4
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_res" >&5
$as_echo "$ac_res" >&6; }
eval $as_lineno_stack; ${as_lineno_stack:+:} unset as_lineno
} # ac_fn_c_check_member
cat >config.log <<_ACEOF
This file contains any messages produced by compilers while
running configure, to aid debugging if configure makes a mistake.
It was created by OpenSSH $as_me Portable, which was
generated by GNU Autoconf 2.69. Invocation command line was
$ $0 $@
_ACEOF
exec 5>>config.log
{
cat <<_ASUNAME
## --------- ##
## Platform. ##
## --------- ##
hostname = `(hostname || uname -n) 2>/dev/null | sed 1q`
uname -m = `(uname -m) 2>/dev/null || echo unknown`
uname -r = `(uname -r) 2>/dev/null || echo unknown`
uname -s = `(uname -s) 2>/dev/null || echo unknown`
uname -v = `(uname -v) 2>/dev/null || echo unknown`
/usr/bin/uname -p = `(/usr/bin/uname -p) 2>/dev/null || echo unknown`
/bin/uname -X = `(/bin/uname -X) 2>/dev/null || echo unknown`
/bin/arch = `(/bin/arch) 2>/dev/null || echo unknown`
/usr/bin/arch -k = `(/usr/bin/arch -k) 2>/dev/null || echo unknown`
/usr/convex/getsysinfo = `(/usr/convex/getsysinfo) 2>/dev/null || echo unknown`
/usr/bin/hostinfo = `(/usr/bin/hostinfo) 2>/dev/null || echo unknown`
/bin/machine = `(/bin/machine) 2>/dev/null || echo unknown`
/usr/bin/oslevel = `(/usr/bin/oslevel) 2>/dev/null || echo unknown`
/bin/universe = `(/bin/universe) 2>/dev/null || echo unknown`
_ASUNAME
as_save_IFS=$IFS; IFS=$PATH_SEPARATOR
for as_dir in $PATH
do
IFS=$as_save_IFS
test -z "$as_dir" && as_dir=.
$as_echo "PATH: $as_dir"
done
IFS=$as_save_IFS
} >&5
cat >&5 <<_ACEOF
## ----------- ##
## Core tests. ##
## ----------- ##
_ACEOF
# Keep a trace of the command line.
# Strip out --no-create and --no-recursion so they do not pile up.
# Strip out --silent because we don't want to record it for future runs.
# Also quote any args containing shell meta-characters.
# Make two passes to allow for proper duplicate-argument suppression.
ac_configure_args=
ac_configure_args0=
ac_configure_args1=
ac_must_keep_next=false
for ac_pass in 1 2
do
for ac_arg
do
case $ac_arg in
-no-create | --no-c* | -n | -no-recursion | --no-r*) continue ;;
-q | -quiet | --quiet | --quie | --qui | --qu | --q \
| -silent | --silent | --silen | --sile | --sil)
continue ;;
*\'*)
ac_arg=`$as_echo "$ac_arg" | sed "s/'/'\\\\\\\\''/g"` ;;
esac
case $ac_pass in
1) as_fn_append ac_configure_args0 " '$ac_arg'" ;;
2)
as_fn_append ac_configure_args1 " '$ac_arg'"
if test $ac_must_keep_next = true; then
ac_must_keep_next=false # Got value, back to normal.
else
case $ac_arg in
*=* | --config-cache | -C | -disable-* | --disable-* \
| -enable-* | --enable-* | -gas | --g* | -nfp | --nf* \
| -q | -quiet | --q* | -silent | --sil* | -v | -verb* \
| -with-* | --with-* | -without-* | --without-* | --x)
case "$ac_configure_args0 " in
"$ac_configure_args1"*" '$ac_arg' "* ) continue ;;
esac
;;
-* ) ac_must_keep_next=true ;;
esac
fi
as_fn_append ac_configure_args " '$ac_arg'"
;;
esac
done
done
{ ac_configure_args0=; unset ac_configure_args0;}
{ ac_configure_args1=; unset ac_configure_args1;}
# When interrupted or exit'd, cleanup temporary files, and complete
# config.log. We remove comments because anyway the quotes in there
# would cause problems or look ugly.
# WARNING: Use '\'' to represent an apostrophe within the trap.
# WARNING: Do not start the trap code with a newline, due to a FreeBSD 4.0 bug.
trap 'exit_status=$?
# Save into config.log some information that might help in debugging.
{
echo
$as_echo "## ---------------- ##
## Cache variables. ##
## ---------------- ##"
echo
# The following way of writing the cache mishandles newlines in values,
(
for ac_var in `(set) 2>&1 | sed -n '\''s/^\([a-zA-Z_][a-zA-Z0-9_]*\)=.*/\1/p'\''`; do
eval ac_val=\$$ac_var
case $ac_val in #(
*${as_nl}*)
case $ac_var in #(
*_cv_*) { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: WARNING: cache variable $ac_var contains a newline" >&5
$as_echo "$as_me: WARNING: cache variable $ac_var contains a newline" >&2;} ;;
esac
case $ac_var in #(
_ | IFS | as_nl) ;; #(
BASH_ARGV | BASH_SOURCE) eval $ac_var= ;; #(
*) { eval $ac_var=; unset $ac_var;} ;;
esac ;;
esac
done
(set) 2>&1 |
case $as_nl`(ac_space='\'' '\''; set) 2>&1` in #(
*${as_nl}ac_space=\ *)
sed -n \
"s/'\''/'\''\\\\'\'''\''/g;
s/^\\([_$as_cr_alnum]*_cv_[_$as_cr_alnum]*\\)=\\(.*\\)/\\1='\''\\2'\''/p"
;; #(
*)
sed -n "/^[_$as_cr_alnum]*_cv_[_$as_cr_alnum]*=/p"
;;
esac |
sort
)
echo
$as_echo "## ----------------- ##
## Output variables. ##
## ----------------- ##"
echo
for ac_var in $ac_subst_vars
do
eval ac_val=\$$ac_var
case $ac_val in
*\'\''*) ac_val=`$as_echo "$ac_val" | sed "s/'\''/'\''\\\\\\\\'\'''\''/g"`;;
esac
$as_echo "$ac_var='\''$ac_val'\''"
done | sort
echo
if test -n "$ac_subst_files"; then
$as_echo "## ------------------- ##
## File substitutions. ##
## ------------------- ##"
echo
for ac_var in $ac_subst_files
do
eval ac_val=\$$ac_var
case $ac_val in
*\'\''*) ac_val=`$as_echo "$ac_val" | sed "s/'\''/'\''\\\\\\\\'\'''\''/g"`;;
esac
$as_echo "$ac_var='\''$ac_val'\''"
done | sort
echo
fi
if test -s confdefs.h; then
$as_echo "## ----------- ##
## confdefs.h. ##
## ----------- ##"
echo
cat confdefs.h
echo
fi
test "$ac_signal" != 0 &&
$as_echo "$as_me: caught signal $ac_signal"
$as_echo "$as_me: exit $exit_status"
} >&5
rm -f core *.core core.conftest.* &&
rm -f -r conftest* confdefs* conf$$* $ac_clean_files &&
exit $exit_status
' 0
for ac_signal in 1 2 13 15; do
trap 'ac_signal='$ac_signal'; as_fn_exit 1' $ac_signal
done
ac_signal=0
# confdefs.h avoids OS command line length limits that DEFS can exceed.
rm -f -r conftest* confdefs.h
$as_echo "/* confdefs.h */" > confdefs.h
# Predefined preprocessor variables.
cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
#define PACKAGE_NAME "$PACKAGE_NAME"
_ACEOF
cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
#define PACKAGE_TARNAME "$PACKAGE_TARNAME"
_ACEOF
cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
#define PACKAGE_VERSION "$PACKAGE_VERSION"
_ACEOF
cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
#define PACKAGE_STRING "$PACKAGE_STRING"
_ACEOF
cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
#define PACKAGE_BUGREPORT "$PACKAGE_BUGREPORT"
_ACEOF
cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
#define PACKAGE_URL "$PACKAGE_URL"
_ACEOF
# Let the site file select an alternate cache file if it wants to.
# Prefer an explicitly selected file to automatically selected ones.
ac_site_file1=NONE
ac_site_file2=NONE
if test -n "$CONFIG_SITE"; then
# We do not want a PATH search for config.site.
case $CONFIG_SITE in #((
-*) ac_site_file1=./$CONFIG_SITE;;
*/*) ac_site_file1=$CONFIG_SITE;;
*) ac_site_file1=./$CONFIG_SITE;;
esac
elif test "x$prefix" != xNONE; then
ac_site_file1=$prefix/share/config.site
ac_site_file2=$prefix/etc/config.site
else
ac_site_file1=$ac_default_prefix/share/config.site
ac_site_file2=$ac_default_prefix/etc/config.site
fi
for ac_site_file in "$ac_site_file1" "$ac_site_file2"
do
test "x$ac_site_file" = xNONE && continue
if test /dev/null != "$ac_site_file" && test -r "$ac_site_file"; then
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: loading site script $ac_site_file" >&5
$as_echo "$as_me: loading site script $ac_site_file" >&6;}
sed 's/^/| /' "$ac_site_file" >&5
. "$ac_site_file" \
|| { { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: error: in \`$ac_pwd':" >&5
$as_echo "$as_me: error: in \`$ac_pwd':" >&2;}
as_fn_error $? "failed to load site script $ac_site_file
See \`config.log' for more details" "$LINENO" 5; }
fi
done
if test -r "$cache_file"; then
# Some versions of bash will fail to source /dev/null (special files
# actually), so we avoid doing that. DJGPP emulates it as a regular file.
if test /dev/null != "$cache_file" && test -f "$cache_file"; then
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: loading cache $cache_file" >&5
$as_echo "$as_me: loading cache $cache_file" >&6;}
case $cache_file in
[\\/]* | ?:[\\/]* ) . "$cache_file";;
*) . "./$cache_file";;
esac
fi
else
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: creating cache $cache_file" >&5
$as_echo "$as_me: creating cache $cache_file" >&6;}
>$cache_file
fi
# Check that the precious variables saved in the cache have kept the same
# value.
ac_cache_corrupted=false
for ac_var in $ac_precious_vars; do
eval ac_old_set=\$ac_cv_env_${ac_var}_set
eval ac_new_set=\$ac_env_${ac_var}_set
eval ac_old_val=\$ac_cv_env_${ac_var}_value
eval ac_new_val=\$ac_env_${ac_var}_value
case $ac_old_set,$ac_new_set in
set,)
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: error: \`$ac_var' was set to \`$ac_old_val' in the previous run" >&5
$as_echo "$as_me: error: \`$ac_var' was set to \`$ac_old_val' in the previous run" >&2;}
ac_cache_corrupted=: ;;
,set)
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: error: \`$ac_var' was not set in the previous run" >&5
$as_echo "$as_me: error: \`$ac_var' was not set in the previous run" >&2;}
ac_cache_corrupted=: ;;
,);;
*)
if test "x$ac_old_val" != "x$ac_new_val"; then
# differences in whitespace do not lead to failure.
ac_old_val_w=`echo x $ac_old_val`
ac_new_val_w=`echo x $ac_new_val`
if test "$ac_old_val_w" != "$ac_new_val_w"; then
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: error: \`$ac_var' has changed since the previous run:" >&5
$as_echo "$as_me: error: \`$ac_var' has changed since the previous run:" >&2;}
ac_cache_corrupted=:
else
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: warning: ignoring whitespace changes in \`$ac_var' since the previous run:" >&5
$as_echo "$as_me: warning: ignoring whitespace changes in \`$ac_var' since the previous run:" >&2;}
eval $ac_var=\$ac_old_val
fi
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: former value: \`$ac_old_val'" >&5
$as_echo "$as_me: former value: \`$ac_old_val'" >&2;}
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: current value: \`$ac_new_val'" >&5
$as_echo "$as_me: current value: \`$ac_new_val'" >&2;}
fi;;
esac
# Pass precious variables to config.status.
if test "$ac_new_set" = set; then
case $ac_new_val in
*\'*) ac_arg=$ac_var=`$as_echo "$ac_new_val" | sed "s/'/'\\\\\\\\''/g"` ;;
*) ac_arg=$ac_var=$ac_new_val ;;
esac
case " $ac_configure_args " in
*" '$ac_arg' "*) ;; # Avoid dups. Use of quotes ensures accuracy.
*) as_fn_append ac_configure_args " '$ac_arg'" ;;
esac
fi
done
if $ac_cache_corrupted; then
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: error: in \`$ac_pwd':" >&5
$as_echo "$as_me: error: in \`$ac_pwd':" >&2;}
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: error: changes in the environment can compromise the build" >&5
$as_echo "$as_me: error: changes in the environment can compromise the build" >&2;}
as_fn_error $? "run \`make distclean' and/or \`rm $cache_file' and start over" "$LINENO" 5
fi
## -------------------- ##
## Main body of script. ##
## -------------------- ##
ac_ext=c
ac_cpp='$CPP $CPPFLAGS'
ac_compile='$CC -c $CFLAGS $CPPFLAGS conftest.$ac_ext >&5'
ac_link='$CC -o conftest$ac_exeext $CFLAGS $CPPFLAGS $LDFLAGS conftest.$ac_ext $LIBS >&5'
ac_compiler_gnu=$ac_cv_c_compiler_gnu
ac_ext=c
ac_cpp='$CPP $CPPFLAGS'
ac_compile='$CC -c $CFLAGS $CPPFLAGS conftest.$ac_ext >&5'
ac_link='$CC -o conftest$ac_exeext $CFLAGS $CPPFLAGS $LDFLAGS conftest.$ac_ext $LIBS >&5'
ac_compiler_gnu=$ac_cv_c_compiler_gnu
ac_config_headers="$ac_config_headers config.h"
ac_ext=c
ac_cpp='$CPP $CPPFLAGS'
ac_compile='$CC -c $CFLAGS $CPPFLAGS conftest.$ac_ext >&5'
ac_link='$CC -o conftest$ac_exeext $CFLAGS $CPPFLAGS $LDFLAGS conftest.$ac_ext $LIBS >&5'
ac_compiler_gnu=$ac_cv_c_compiler_gnu
if test -n "$ac_tool_prefix"; then
for ac_prog in cc gcc
do
# Extract the first word of "$ac_tool_prefix$ac_prog", so it can be a program name with args.
set dummy $ac_tool_prefix$ac_prog; ac_word=$2
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for $ac_word" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking for $ac_word... " >&6; }
if ${ac_cv_prog_CC+:} false; then :
$as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
else
if test -n "$CC"; then
ac_cv_prog_CC="$CC" # Let the user override the test.
else
as_save_IFS=$IFS; IFS=$PATH_SEPARATOR
for as_dir in $PATH
do
IFS=$as_save_IFS
test -z "$as_dir" && as_dir=.
for ac_exec_ext in '' $ac_executable_extensions; do
if as_fn_executable_p "$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"; then
ac_cv_prog_CC="$ac_tool_prefix$ac_prog"
$as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: found $as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" >&5
break 2
fi
done
done
IFS=$as_save_IFS
fi
fi
CC=$ac_cv_prog_CC
if test -n "$CC"; then
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $CC" >&5
$as_echo "$CC" >&6; }
else
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
$as_echo "no" >&6; }
fi
test -n "$CC" && break
done
fi
if test -z "$CC"; then
ac_ct_CC=$CC
for ac_prog in cc gcc
do
# Extract the first word of "$ac_prog", so it can be a program name with args.
set dummy $ac_prog; ac_word=$2
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for $ac_word" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking for $ac_word... " >&6; }
if ${ac_cv_prog_ac_ct_CC+:} false; then :
$as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
else
if test -n "$ac_ct_CC"; then
ac_cv_prog_ac_ct_CC="$ac_ct_CC" # Let the user override the test.
else
as_save_IFS=$IFS; IFS=$PATH_SEPARATOR
for as_dir in $PATH
do
IFS=$as_save_IFS
test -z "$as_dir" && as_dir=.
for ac_exec_ext in '' $ac_executable_extensions; do
if as_fn_executable_p "$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"; then
ac_cv_prog_ac_ct_CC="$ac_prog"
$as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: found $as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" >&5
break 2
fi
done
done
IFS=$as_save_IFS
fi
fi
ac_ct_CC=$ac_cv_prog_ac_ct_CC
if test -n "$ac_ct_CC"; then
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_ct_CC" >&5
$as_echo "$ac_ct_CC" >&6; }
else
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
$as_echo "no" >&6; }
fi
test -n "$ac_ct_CC" && break
done
if test "x$ac_ct_CC" = x; then
CC=""
else
case $cross_compiling:$ac_tool_warned in
yes:)
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: WARNING: using cross tools not prefixed with host triplet" >&5
$as_echo "$as_me: WARNING: using cross tools not prefixed with host triplet" >&2;}
ac_tool_warned=yes ;;
esac
CC=$ac_ct_CC
fi
fi
test -z "$CC" && { { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: error: in \`$ac_pwd':" >&5
$as_echo "$as_me: error: in \`$ac_pwd':" >&2;}
as_fn_error $? "no acceptable C compiler found in \$PATH
See \`config.log' for more details" "$LINENO" 5; }
# Provide some information about the compiler.
$as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for C compiler version" >&5
set X $ac_compile
ac_compiler=$2
for ac_option in --version -v -V -qversion; do
{ { ac_try="$ac_compiler $ac_option >&5"
case "(($ac_try" in
*\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
*) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
esac
eval ac_try_echo="\"\$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: $ac_try_echo\""
$as_echo "$ac_try_echo"; } >&5
(eval "$ac_compiler $ac_option >&5") 2>conftest.err
ac_status=$?
if test -s conftest.err; then
sed '10a\
... rest of stderr output deleted ...
10q' conftest.err >conftest.er1
cat conftest.er1 >&5
fi
rm -f conftest.er1 conftest.err
$as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
test $ac_status = 0; }
done
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
int
main ()
{
;
return 0;
}
_ACEOF
ac_clean_files_save=$ac_clean_files
ac_clean_files="$ac_clean_files a.out a.out.dSYM a.exe b.out"
# Try to create an executable without -o first, disregard a.out.
# It will help us diagnose broken compilers, and finding out an intuition
# of exeext.
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking whether the C compiler works" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking whether the C compiler works... " >&6; }
ac_link_default=`$as_echo "$ac_link" | sed 's/ -o *conftest[^ ]*//'`
# The possible output files:
ac_files="a.out conftest.exe conftest a.exe a_out.exe b.out conftest.*"
ac_rmfiles=
for ac_file in $ac_files
do
case $ac_file in
*.$ac_ext | *.xcoff | *.tds | *.d | *.pdb | *.xSYM | *.bb | *.bbg | *.map | *.inf | *.dSYM | *.o | *.obj ) ;;
* ) ac_rmfiles="$ac_rmfiles $ac_file";;
esac
done
rm -f $ac_rmfiles
if { { ac_try="$ac_link_default"
case "(($ac_try" in
*\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
*) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
esac
eval ac_try_echo="\"\$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: $ac_try_echo\""
$as_echo "$ac_try_echo"; } >&5
(eval "$ac_link_default") 2>&5
ac_status=$?
$as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
test $ac_status = 0; }; then :
# Autoconf-2.13 could set the ac_cv_exeext variable to `no'.
# So ignore a value of `no', otherwise this would lead to `EXEEXT = no'
# in a Makefile. We should not override ac_cv_exeext if it was cached,
# so that the user can short-circuit this test for compilers unknown to
# Autoconf.
for ac_file in $ac_files ''
do
test -f "$ac_file" || continue
case $ac_file in
*.$ac_ext | *.xcoff | *.tds | *.d | *.pdb | *.xSYM | *.bb | *.bbg | *.map | *.inf | *.dSYM | *.o | *.obj )
;;
[ab].out )
# We found the default executable, but exeext='' is most
# certainly right.
break;;
*.* )
if test "${ac_cv_exeext+set}" = set && test "$ac_cv_exeext" != no;
then :; else
ac_cv_exeext=`expr "$ac_file" : '[^.]*\(\..*\)'`
fi
# We set ac_cv_exeext here because the later test for it is not
# safe: cross compilers may not add the suffix if given an `-o'
# argument, so we may need to know it at that point already.
# Even if this section looks crufty: it has the advantage of
# actually working.
break;;
* )
break;;
esac
done
test "$ac_cv_exeext" = no && ac_cv_exeext=
else
ac_file=''
fi
if test -z "$ac_file"; then :
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
$as_echo "no" >&6; }
$as_echo "$as_me: failed program was:" >&5
sed 's/^/| /' conftest.$ac_ext >&5
{ { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: error: in \`$ac_pwd':" >&5
$as_echo "$as_me: error: in \`$ac_pwd':" >&2;}
as_fn_error 77 "C compiler cannot create executables
See \`config.log' for more details" "$LINENO" 5; }
else
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
$as_echo "yes" >&6; }
fi
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for C compiler default output file name" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking for C compiler default output file name... " >&6; }
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_file" >&5
$as_echo "$ac_file" >&6; }
ac_exeext=$ac_cv_exeext
rm -f -r a.out a.out.dSYM a.exe conftest$ac_cv_exeext b.out
ac_clean_files=$ac_clean_files_save
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for suffix of executables" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking for suffix of executables... " >&6; }
if { { ac_try="$ac_link"
case "(($ac_try" in
*\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
*) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
esac
eval ac_try_echo="\"\$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: $ac_try_echo\""
$as_echo "$ac_try_echo"; } >&5
(eval "$ac_link") 2>&5
ac_status=$?
$as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
test $ac_status = 0; }; then :
# If both `conftest.exe' and `conftest' are `present' (well, observable)
# catch `conftest.exe'. For instance with Cygwin, `ls conftest' will
# work properly (i.e., refer to `conftest.exe'), while it won't with
# `rm'.
for ac_file in conftest.exe conftest conftest.*; do
test -f "$ac_file" || continue
case $ac_file in
*.$ac_ext | *.xcoff | *.tds | *.d | *.pdb | *.xSYM | *.bb | *.bbg | *.map | *.inf | *.dSYM | *.o | *.obj ) ;;
*.* ) ac_cv_exeext=`expr "$ac_file" : '[^.]*\(\..*\)'`
break;;
* ) break;;
esac
done
else
{ { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: error: in \`$ac_pwd':" >&5
$as_echo "$as_me: error: in \`$ac_pwd':" >&2;}
as_fn_error $? "cannot compute suffix of executables: cannot compile and link
See \`config.log' for more details" "$LINENO" 5; }
fi
rm -f conftest conftest$ac_cv_exeext
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_exeext" >&5
$as_echo "$ac_cv_exeext" >&6; }
rm -f conftest.$ac_ext
EXEEXT=$ac_cv_exeext
ac_exeext=$EXEEXT
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
#include <stdio.h>
int
main ()
{
FILE *f = fopen ("conftest.out", "w");
return ferror (f) || fclose (f) != 0;
;
return 0;
}
_ACEOF
ac_clean_files="$ac_clean_files conftest.out"
# Check that the compiler produces executables we can run. If not, either
# the compiler is broken, or we cross compile.
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking whether we are cross compiling" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking whether we are cross compiling... " >&6; }
if test "$cross_compiling" != yes; then
{ { ac_try="$ac_link"
case "(($ac_try" in
*\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
*) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
esac
eval ac_try_echo="\"\$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: $ac_try_echo\""
$as_echo "$ac_try_echo"; } >&5
(eval "$ac_link") 2>&5
ac_status=$?
$as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
test $ac_status = 0; }
if { ac_try='./conftest$ac_cv_exeext'
{ { case "(($ac_try" in
*\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
*) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
esac
eval ac_try_echo="\"\$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: $ac_try_echo\""
$as_echo "$ac_try_echo"; } >&5
(eval "$ac_try") 2>&5
ac_status=$?
$as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
test $ac_status = 0; }; }; then
cross_compiling=no
else
if test "$cross_compiling" = maybe; then
cross_compiling=yes
else
{ { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: error: in \`$ac_pwd':" >&5
$as_echo "$as_me: error: in \`$ac_pwd':" >&2;}
as_fn_error $? "cannot run C compiled programs.
If you meant to cross compile, use \`--host'.
See \`config.log' for more details" "$LINENO" 5; }
fi
fi
fi
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $cross_compiling" >&5
$as_echo "$cross_compiling" >&6; }
rm -f conftest.$ac_ext conftest$ac_cv_exeext conftest.out
ac_clean_files=$ac_clean_files_save
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for suffix of object files" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking for suffix of object files... " >&6; }
if ${ac_cv_objext+:} false; then :
$as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
else
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
int
main ()
{
;
return 0;
}
_ACEOF
rm -f conftest.o conftest.obj
if { { ac_try="$ac_compile"
case "(($ac_try" in
*\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
*) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
esac
eval ac_try_echo="\"\$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: $ac_try_echo\""
$as_echo "$ac_try_echo"; } >&5
(eval "$ac_compile") 2>&5
ac_status=$?
$as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
test $ac_status = 0; }; then :
for ac_file in conftest.o conftest.obj conftest.*; do
test -f "$ac_file" || continue;
case $ac_file in
*.$ac_ext | *.xcoff | *.tds | *.d | *.pdb | *.xSYM | *.bb | *.bbg | *.map | *.inf | *.dSYM ) ;;
*) ac_cv_objext=`expr "$ac_file" : '.*\.\(.*\)'`
break;;
esac
done
else
$as_echo "$as_me: failed program was:" >&5
sed 's/^/| /' conftest.$ac_ext >&5
{ { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: error: in \`$ac_pwd':" >&5
$as_echo "$as_me: error: in \`$ac_pwd':" >&2;}
as_fn_error $? "cannot compute suffix of object files: cannot compile
See \`config.log' for more details" "$LINENO" 5; }
fi
rm -f conftest.$ac_cv_objext conftest.$ac_ext
fi
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_objext" >&5
$as_echo "$ac_cv_objext" >&6; }
OBJEXT=$ac_cv_objext
ac_objext=$OBJEXT
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking whether we are using the GNU C compiler" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking whether we are using the GNU C compiler... " >&6; }
if ${ac_cv_c_compiler_gnu+:} false; then :
$as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
else
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
int
main ()
{
#ifndef __GNUC__
choke me
#endif
;
return 0;
}
_ACEOF
if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then :
ac_compiler_gnu=yes
else
ac_compiler_gnu=no
fi
rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
ac_cv_c_compiler_gnu=$ac_compiler_gnu
fi
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_c_compiler_gnu" >&5
$as_echo "$ac_cv_c_compiler_gnu" >&6; }
if test $ac_compiler_gnu = yes; then
GCC=yes
else
GCC=
fi
ac_test_CFLAGS=${CFLAGS+set}
ac_save_CFLAGS=$CFLAGS
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking whether $CC accepts -g" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking whether $CC accepts -g... " >&6; }
if ${ac_cv_prog_cc_g+:} false; then :
$as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
else
ac_save_c_werror_flag=$ac_c_werror_flag
ac_c_werror_flag=yes
ac_cv_prog_cc_g=no
CFLAGS="-g"
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
int
main ()
{
;
return 0;
}
_ACEOF
if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then :
ac_cv_prog_cc_g=yes
else
CFLAGS=""
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
int
main ()
{
;
return 0;
}
_ACEOF
if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then :
else
ac_c_werror_flag=$ac_save_c_werror_flag
CFLAGS="-g"
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
int
main ()
{
;
return 0;
}
_ACEOF
if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then :
ac_cv_prog_cc_g=yes
fi
rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
fi
rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
fi
rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
ac_c_werror_flag=$ac_save_c_werror_flag
fi
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_prog_cc_g" >&5
$as_echo "$ac_cv_prog_cc_g" >&6; }
if test "$ac_test_CFLAGS" = set; then
CFLAGS=$ac_save_CFLAGS
elif test $ac_cv_prog_cc_g = yes; then
if test "$GCC" = yes; then
CFLAGS="-g -O2"
else
CFLAGS="-g"
fi
else
if test "$GCC" = yes; then
CFLAGS="-O2"
else
CFLAGS=
fi
fi
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for $CC option to accept ISO C89" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking for $CC option to accept ISO C89... " >&6; }
if ${ac_cv_prog_cc_c89+:} false; then :
$as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
else
ac_cv_prog_cc_c89=no
ac_save_CC=$CC
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
#include <stdarg.h>
#include <stdio.h>
struct stat;
/* Most of the following tests are stolen from RCS 5.7's src/conf.sh. */
struct buf { int x; };
FILE * (*rcsopen) (struct buf *, struct stat *, int);
static char *e (p, i)
char **p;
int i;
{
return p[i];
}
static char *f (char * (*g) (char **, int), char **p, ...)
{
char *s;
va_list v;
va_start (v,p);
s = g (p, va_arg (v,int));
va_end (v);
return s;
}
/* OSF 4.0 Compaq cc is some sort of almost-ANSI by default. It has
function prototypes and stuff, but not '\xHH' hex character constants.
These don't provoke an error unfortunately, instead are silently treated
as 'x'. The following induces an error, until -std is added to get
proper ANSI mode. Curiously '\x00'!='x' always comes out true, for an
array size at least. It's necessary to write '\x00'==0 to get something
that's true only with -std. */
int osf4_cc_array ['\x00' == 0 ? 1 : -1];
/* IBM C 6 for AIX is almost-ANSI by default, but it replaces macro parameters
inside strings and character constants. */
#define FOO(x) 'x'
int xlc6_cc_array[FOO(a) == 'x' ? 1 : -1];
int test (int i, double x);
struct s1 {int (*f) (int a);};
struct s2 {int (*f) (double a);};
int pairnames (int, char **, FILE *(*)(struct buf *, struct stat *, int), int, int);
int argc;
char **argv;
int
main ()
{
return f (e, argv, 0) != argv[0] || f (e, argv, 1) != argv[1];
;
return 0;
}
_ACEOF
for ac_arg in '' -qlanglvl=extc89 -qlanglvl=ansi -std \
-Ae "-Aa -D_HPUX_SOURCE" "-Xc -D__EXTENSIONS__"
do
CC="$ac_save_CC $ac_arg"
if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then :
ac_cv_prog_cc_c89=$ac_arg
fi
rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext
test "x$ac_cv_prog_cc_c89" != "xno" && break
done
rm -f conftest.$ac_ext
CC=$ac_save_CC
fi
# AC_CACHE_VAL
case "x$ac_cv_prog_cc_c89" in
x)
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: none needed" >&5
$as_echo "none needed" >&6; } ;;
xno)
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: unsupported" >&5
$as_echo "unsupported" >&6; } ;;
*)
CC="$CC $ac_cv_prog_cc_c89"
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_prog_cc_c89" >&5
$as_echo "$ac_cv_prog_cc_c89" >&6; } ;;
esac
if test "x$ac_cv_prog_cc_c89" != xno; then :
fi
ac_ext=c
ac_cpp='$CPP $CPPFLAGS'
ac_compile='$CC -c $CFLAGS $CPPFLAGS conftest.$ac_ext >&5'
ac_link='$CC -o conftest$ac_exeext $CFLAGS $CPPFLAGS $LDFLAGS conftest.$ac_ext $LIBS >&5'
ac_compiler_gnu=$ac_cv_c_compiler_gnu
ac_aux_dir=
for ac_dir in "$srcdir" "$srcdir/.." "$srcdir/../.."; do
if test -f "$ac_dir/install-sh"; then
ac_aux_dir=$ac_dir
ac_install_sh="$ac_aux_dir/install-sh -c"
break
elif test -f "$ac_dir/install.sh"; then
ac_aux_dir=$ac_dir
ac_install_sh="$ac_aux_dir/install.sh -c"
break
elif test -f "$ac_dir/shtool"; then
ac_aux_dir=$ac_dir
ac_install_sh="$ac_aux_dir/shtool install -c"
break
fi
done
if test -z "$ac_aux_dir"; then
as_fn_error $? "cannot find install-sh, install.sh, or shtool in \"$srcdir\" \"$srcdir/..\" \"$srcdir/../..\"" "$LINENO" 5
fi
# These three variables are undocumented and unsupported,
# and are intended to be withdrawn in a future Autoconf release.
# They can cause serious problems if a builder's source tree is in a directory
# whose full name contains unusual characters.
ac_config_guess="$SHELL $ac_aux_dir/config.guess" # Please don't use this var.
ac_config_sub="$SHELL $ac_aux_dir/config.sub" # Please don't use this var.
ac_configure="$SHELL $ac_aux_dir/configure" # Please don't use this var.
# Make sure we can run config.sub.
$SHELL "$ac_aux_dir/config.sub" sun4 >/dev/null 2>&1 ||
as_fn_error $? "cannot run $SHELL $ac_aux_dir/config.sub" "$LINENO" 5
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking build system type" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking build system type... " >&6; }
if ${ac_cv_build+:} false; then :
$as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
else
ac_build_alias=$build_alias
test "x$ac_build_alias" = x &&
ac_build_alias=`$SHELL "$ac_aux_dir/config.guess"`
test "x$ac_build_alias" = x &&
as_fn_error $? "cannot guess build type; you must specify one" "$LINENO" 5
ac_cv_build=`$SHELL "$ac_aux_dir/config.sub" $ac_build_alias` ||
as_fn_error $? "$SHELL $ac_aux_dir/config.sub $ac_build_alias failed" "$LINENO" 5
fi
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_build" >&5
$as_echo "$ac_cv_build" >&6; }
case $ac_cv_build in
*-*-*) ;;
*) as_fn_error $? "invalid value of canonical build" "$LINENO" 5;;
esac
build=$ac_cv_build
ac_save_IFS=$IFS; IFS='-'
set x $ac_cv_build
shift
build_cpu=$1
build_vendor=$2
shift; shift
# Remember, the first character of IFS is used to create $*,
# except with old shells:
build_os=$*
IFS=$ac_save_IFS
case $build_os in *\ *) build_os=`echo "$build_os" | sed 's/ /-/g'`;; esac
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking host system type" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking host system type... " >&6; }
if ${ac_cv_host+:} false; then :
$as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
else
if test "x$host_alias" = x; then
ac_cv_host=$ac_cv_build
else
ac_cv_host=`$SHELL "$ac_aux_dir/config.sub" $host_alias` ||
as_fn_error $? "$SHELL $ac_aux_dir/config.sub $host_alias failed" "$LINENO" 5
fi
fi
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_host" >&5
$as_echo "$ac_cv_host" >&6; }
case $ac_cv_host in
*-*-*) ;;
*) as_fn_error $? "invalid value of canonical host" "$LINENO" 5;;
esac
host=$ac_cv_host
ac_save_IFS=$IFS; IFS='-'
set x $ac_cv_host
shift
host_cpu=$1
host_vendor=$2
shift; shift
# Remember, the first character of IFS is used to create $*,
# except with old shells:
host_os=$*
IFS=$ac_save_IFS
case $host_os in *\ *) host_os=`echo "$host_os" | sed 's/ /-/g'`;; esac
ac_ext=c
ac_cpp='$CPP $CPPFLAGS'
ac_compile='$CC -c $CFLAGS $CPPFLAGS conftest.$ac_ext >&5'
ac_link='$CC -o conftest$ac_exeext $CFLAGS $CPPFLAGS $LDFLAGS conftest.$ac_ext $LIBS >&5'
ac_compiler_gnu=$ac_cv_c_compiler_gnu
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking how to run the C preprocessor" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking how to run the C preprocessor... " >&6; }
# On Suns, sometimes $CPP names a directory.
if test -n "$CPP" && test -d "$CPP"; then
CPP=
fi
if test -z "$CPP"; then
if ${ac_cv_prog_CPP+:} false; then :
$as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
else
# Double quotes because CPP needs to be expanded
for CPP in "$CC -E" "$CC -E -traditional-cpp" "/lib/cpp"
do
ac_preproc_ok=false
for ac_c_preproc_warn_flag in '' yes
do
# Use a header file that comes with gcc, so configuring glibc
# with a fresh cross-compiler works.
# Prefer <limits.h> to <assert.h> if __STDC__ is defined, since
# <limits.h> exists even on freestanding compilers.
# On the NeXT, cc -E runs the code through the compiler's parser,
# not just through cpp. "Syntax error" is here to catch this case.
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
#ifdef __STDC__
# include <limits.h>
#else
# include <assert.h>
#endif
Syntax error
_ACEOF
if ac_fn_c_try_cpp "$LINENO"; then :
else
# Broken: fails on valid input.
continue
fi
rm -f conftest.err conftest.i conftest.$ac_ext
# OK, works on sane cases. Now check whether nonexistent headers
# can be detected and how.
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
#include <ac_nonexistent.h>
_ACEOF
if ac_fn_c_try_cpp "$LINENO"; then :
# Broken: success on invalid input.
continue
else
# Passes both tests.
ac_preproc_ok=:
break
fi
rm -f conftest.err conftest.i conftest.$ac_ext
done
# Because of `break', _AC_PREPROC_IFELSE's cleaning code was skipped.
rm -f conftest.i conftest.err conftest.$ac_ext
if $ac_preproc_ok; then :
break
fi
done
ac_cv_prog_CPP=$CPP
fi
CPP=$ac_cv_prog_CPP
else
ac_cv_prog_CPP=$CPP
fi
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $CPP" >&5
$as_echo "$CPP" >&6; }
ac_preproc_ok=false
for ac_c_preproc_warn_flag in '' yes
do
# Use a header file that comes with gcc, so configuring glibc
# with a fresh cross-compiler works.
# Prefer <limits.h> to <assert.h> if __STDC__ is defined, since
# <limits.h> exists even on freestanding compilers.
# On the NeXT, cc -E runs the code through the compiler's parser,
# not just through cpp. "Syntax error" is here to catch this case.
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
#ifdef __STDC__
# include <limits.h>
#else
# include <assert.h>
#endif
Syntax error
_ACEOF
if ac_fn_c_try_cpp "$LINENO"; then :
else
# Broken: fails on valid input.
continue
fi
rm -f conftest.err conftest.i conftest.$ac_ext
# OK, works on sane cases. Now check whether nonexistent headers
# can be detected and how.
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
#include <ac_nonexistent.h>
_ACEOF
if ac_fn_c_try_cpp "$LINENO"; then :
# Broken: success on invalid input.
continue
else
# Passes both tests.
ac_preproc_ok=:
break
fi
rm -f conftest.err conftest.i conftest.$ac_ext
done
# Because of `break', _AC_PREPROC_IFELSE's cleaning code was skipped.
rm -f conftest.i conftest.err conftest.$ac_ext
if $ac_preproc_ok; then :
else
{ { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: error: in \`$ac_pwd':" >&5
$as_echo "$as_me: error: in \`$ac_pwd':" >&2;}
as_fn_error $? "C preprocessor \"$CPP\" fails sanity check
See \`config.log' for more details" "$LINENO" 5; }
fi
ac_ext=c
ac_cpp='$CPP $CPPFLAGS'
ac_compile='$CC -c $CFLAGS $CPPFLAGS conftest.$ac_ext >&5'
ac_link='$CC -o conftest$ac_exeext $CFLAGS $CPPFLAGS $LDFLAGS conftest.$ac_ext $LIBS >&5'
ac_compiler_gnu=$ac_cv_c_compiler_gnu
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for grep that handles long lines and -e" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking for grep that handles long lines and -e... " >&6; }
if ${ac_cv_path_GREP+:} false; then :
$as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
else
if test -z "$GREP"; then
ac_path_GREP_found=false
# Loop through the user's path and test for each of PROGNAME-LIST
as_save_IFS=$IFS; IFS=$PATH_SEPARATOR
for as_dir in $PATH$PATH_SEPARATOR/usr/xpg4/bin
do
IFS=$as_save_IFS
test -z "$as_dir" && as_dir=.
for ac_prog in grep ggrep; do
for ac_exec_ext in '' $ac_executable_extensions; do
ac_path_GREP="$as_dir/$ac_prog$ac_exec_ext"
as_fn_executable_p "$ac_path_GREP" || continue
# Check for GNU ac_path_GREP and select it if it is found.
# Check for GNU $ac_path_GREP
case `"$ac_path_GREP" --version 2>&1` in
*GNU*)
ac_cv_path_GREP="$ac_path_GREP" ac_path_GREP_found=:;;
*)
ac_count=0
$as_echo_n 0123456789 >"conftest.in"
while :
do
cat "conftest.in" "conftest.in" >"conftest.tmp"
mv "conftest.tmp" "conftest.in"
cp "conftest.in" "conftest.nl"
$as_echo 'GREP' >> "conftest.nl"
"$ac_path_GREP" -e 'GREP$' -e '-(cannot match)-' < "conftest.nl" >"conftest.out" 2>/dev/null || break
diff "conftest.out" "conftest.nl" >/dev/null 2>&1 || break
as_fn_arith $ac_count + 1 && ac_count=$as_val
if test $ac_count -gt ${ac_path_GREP_max-0}; then
# Best one so far, save it but keep looking for a better one
ac_cv_path_GREP="$ac_path_GREP"
ac_path_GREP_max=$ac_count
fi
# 10*(2^10) chars as input seems more than enough
test $ac_count -gt 10 && break
done
rm -f conftest.in conftest.tmp conftest.nl conftest.out;;
esac
$ac_path_GREP_found && break 3
done
done
done
IFS=$as_save_IFS
if test -z "$ac_cv_path_GREP"; then
as_fn_error $? "no acceptable grep could be found in $PATH$PATH_SEPARATOR/usr/xpg4/bin" "$LINENO" 5
fi
else
ac_cv_path_GREP=$GREP
fi
fi
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_path_GREP" >&5
$as_echo "$ac_cv_path_GREP" >&6; }
GREP="$ac_cv_path_GREP"
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for egrep" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking for egrep... " >&6; }
if ${ac_cv_path_EGREP+:} false; then :
$as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
else
if echo a | $GREP -E '(a|b)' >/dev/null 2>&1
then ac_cv_path_EGREP="$GREP -E"
else
if test -z "$EGREP"; then
ac_path_EGREP_found=false
# Loop through the user's path and test for each of PROGNAME-LIST
as_save_IFS=$IFS; IFS=$PATH_SEPARATOR
for as_dir in $PATH$PATH_SEPARATOR/usr/xpg4/bin
do
IFS=$as_save_IFS
test -z "$as_dir" && as_dir=.
for ac_prog in egrep; do
for ac_exec_ext in '' $ac_executable_extensions; do
ac_path_EGREP="$as_dir/$ac_prog$ac_exec_ext"
as_fn_executable_p "$ac_path_EGREP" || continue
# Check for GNU ac_path_EGREP and select it if it is found.
# Check for GNU $ac_path_EGREP
case `"$ac_path_EGREP" --version 2>&1` in
*GNU*)
ac_cv_path_EGREP="$ac_path_EGREP" ac_path_EGREP_found=:;;
*)
ac_count=0
$as_echo_n 0123456789 >"conftest.in"
while :
do
cat "conftest.in" "conftest.in" >"conftest.tmp"
mv "conftest.tmp" "conftest.in"
cp "conftest.in" "conftest.nl"
$as_echo 'EGREP' >> "conftest.nl"
"$ac_path_EGREP" 'EGREP$' < "conftest.nl" >"conftest.out" 2>/dev/null || break
diff "conftest.out" "conftest.nl" >/dev/null 2>&1 || break
as_fn_arith $ac_count + 1 && ac_count=$as_val
if test $ac_count -gt ${ac_path_EGREP_max-0}; then
# Best one so far, save it but keep looking for a better one
ac_cv_path_EGREP="$ac_path_EGREP"
ac_path_EGREP_max=$ac_count
fi
# 10*(2^10) chars as input seems more than enough
test $ac_count -gt 10 && break
done
rm -f conftest.in conftest.tmp conftest.nl conftest.out;;
esac
$ac_path_EGREP_found && break 3
done
done
done
IFS=$as_save_IFS
if test -z "$ac_cv_path_EGREP"; then
as_fn_error $? "no acceptable egrep could be found in $PATH$PATH_SEPARATOR/usr/xpg4/bin" "$LINENO" 5
fi
else
ac_cv_path_EGREP=$EGREP
fi
fi
fi
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_path_EGREP" >&5
$as_echo "$ac_cv_path_EGREP" >&6; }
EGREP="$ac_cv_path_EGREP"
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for ANSI C header files" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking for ANSI C header files... " >&6; }
if ${ac_cv_header_stdc+:} false; then :
$as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
else
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <stdarg.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <float.h>
int
main ()
{
;
return 0;
}
_ACEOF
if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then :
ac_cv_header_stdc=yes
else
ac_cv_header_stdc=no
fi
rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
if test $ac_cv_header_stdc = yes; then
# SunOS 4.x string.h does not declare mem*, contrary to ANSI.
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
#include <string.h>
_ACEOF
if (eval "$ac_cpp conftest.$ac_ext") 2>&5 |
$EGREP "memchr" >/dev/null 2>&1; then :
else
ac_cv_header_stdc=no
fi
rm -f conftest*
fi
if test $ac_cv_header_stdc = yes; then
# ISC 2.0.2 stdlib.h does not declare free, contrary to ANSI.
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
#include <stdlib.h>
_ACEOF
if (eval "$ac_cpp conftest.$ac_ext") 2>&5 |
$EGREP "free" >/dev/null 2>&1; then :
else
ac_cv_header_stdc=no
fi
rm -f conftest*
fi
if test $ac_cv_header_stdc = yes; then
# /bin/cc in Irix-4.0.5 gets non-ANSI ctype macros unless using -ansi.
if test "$cross_compiling" = yes; then :
:
else
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
#include <ctype.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#if ((' ' & 0x0FF) == 0x020)
# define ISLOWER(c) ('a' <= (c) && (c) <= 'z')
# define TOUPPER(c) (ISLOWER(c) ? 'A' + ((c) - 'a') : (c))
#else
# define ISLOWER(c) \
(('a' <= (c) && (c) <= 'i') \
|| ('j' <= (c) && (c) <= 'r') \
|| ('s' <= (c) && (c) <= 'z'))
# define TOUPPER(c) (ISLOWER(c) ? ((c) | 0x40) : (c))
#endif
#define XOR(e, f) (((e) && !(f)) || (!(e) && (f)))
int
main ()
{
int i;
for (i = 0; i < 256; i++)
if (XOR (islower (i), ISLOWER (i))
|| toupper (i) != TOUPPER (i))
return 2;
return 0;
}
_ACEOF
if ac_fn_c_try_run "$LINENO"; then :
else
ac_cv_header_stdc=no
fi
rm -f core *.core core.conftest.* gmon.out bb.out conftest$ac_exeext \
conftest.$ac_objext conftest.beam conftest.$ac_ext
fi
fi
fi
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_header_stdc" >&5
$as_echo "$ac_cv_header_stdc" >&6; }
if test $ac_cv_header_stdc = yes; then
$as_echo "#define STDC_HEADERS 1" >>confdefs.h
fi
# On IRIX 5.3, sys/types and inttypes.h are conflicting.
for ac_header in sys/types.h sys/stat.h stdlib.h string.h memory.h strings.h \
inttypes.h stdint.h unistd.h
do :
as_ac_Header=`$as_echo "ac_cv_header_$ac_header" | $as_tr_sh`
ac_fn_c_check_header_compile "$LINENO" "$ac_header" "$as_ac_Header" "$ac_includes_default
"
if eval test \"x\$"$as_ac_Header"\" = x"yes"; then :
cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
#define `$as_echo "HAVE_$ac_header" | $as_tr_cpp` 1
_ACEOF
fi
done
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking whether byte ordering is bigendian" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking whether byte ordering is bigendian... " >&6; }
if ${ac_cv_c_bigendian+:} false; then :
$as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
else
ac_cv_c_bigendian=unknown
# See if we're dealing with a universal compiler.
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
#ifndef __APPLE_CC__
not a universal capable compiler
#endif
typedef int dummy;
_ACEOF
if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then :
# Check for potential -arch flags. It is not universal unless
# there are at least two -arch flags with different values.
ac_arch=
ac_prev=
for ac_word in $CC $CFLAGS $CPPFLAGS $LDFLAGS; do
if test -n "$ac_prev"; then
case $ac_word in
i?86 | x86_64 | ppc | ppc64)
if test -z "$ac_arch" || test "$ac_arch" = "$ac_word"; then
ac_arch=$ac_word
else
ac_cv_c_bigendian=universal
break
fi
;;
esac
ac_prev=
elif test "x$ac_word" = "x-arch"; then
ac_prev=arch
fi
done
fi
rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
if test $ac_cv_c_bigendian = unknown; then
# See if sys/param.h defines the BYTE_ORDER macro.
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/param.h>
int
main ()
{
#if ! (defined BYTE_ORDER && defined BIG_ENDIAN \
&& defined LITTLE_ENDIAN && BYTE_ORDER && BIG_ENDIAN \
&& LITTLE_ENDIAN)
bogus endian macros
#endif
;
return 0;
}
_ACEOF
if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then :
# It does; now see whether it defined to BIG_ENDIAN or not.
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/param.h>
int
main ()
{
#if BYTE_ORDER != BIG_ENDIAN
not big endian
#endif
;
return 0;
}
_ACEOF
if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then :
ac_cv_c_bigendian=yes
else
ac_cv_c_bigendian=no
fi
rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
fi
rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
fi
if test $ac_cv_c_bigendian = unknown; then
# See if <limits.h> defines _LITTLE_ENDIAN or _BIG_ENDIAN (e.g., Solaris).
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
#include <limits.h>
int
main ()
{
#if ! (defined _LITTLE_ENDIAN || defined _BIG_ENDIAN)
bogus endian macros
#endif
;
return 0;
}
_ACEOF
if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then :
# It does; now see whether it defined to _BIG_ENDIAN or not.
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
#include <limits.h>
int
main ()
{
#ifndef _BIG_ENDIAN
not big endian
#endif
;
return 0;
}
_ACEOF
if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then :
ac_cv_c_bigendian=yes
else
ac_cv_c_bigendian=no
fi
rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
fi
rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
fi
if test $ac_cv_c_bigendian = unknown; then
# Compile a test program.
if test "$cross_compiling" = yes; then :
# Try to guess by grepping values from an object file.
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
short int ascii_mm[] =
{ 0x4249, 0x4765, 0x6E44, 0x6961, 0x6E53, 0x7953, 0 };
short int ascii_ii[] =
{ 0x694C, 0x5454, 0x656C, 0x6E45, 0x6944, 0x6E61, 0 };
int use_ascii (int i) {
return ascii_mm[i] + ascii_ii[i];
}
short int ebcdic_ii[] =
{ 0x89D3, 0xE3E3, 0x8593, 0x95C5, 0x89C4, 0x9581, 0 };
short int ebcdic_mm[] =
{ 0xC2C9, 0xC785, 0x95C4, 0x8981, 0x95E2, 0xA8E2, 0 };
int use_ebcdic (int i) {
return ebcdic_mm[i] + ebcdic_ii[i];
}
extern int foo;
int
main ()
{
return use_ascii (foo) == use_ebcdic (foo);
;
return 0;
}
_ACEOF
if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then :
if grep BIGenDianSyS conftest.$ac_objext >/dev/null; then
ac_cv_c_bigendian=yes
fi
if grep LiTTleEnDian conftest.$ac_objext >/dev/null ; then
if test "$ac_cv_c_bigendian" = unknown; then
ac_cv_c_bigendian=no
else
# finding both strings is unlikely to happen, but who knows?
ac_cv_c_bigendian=unknown
fi
fi
fi
rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
else
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
$ac_includes_default
int
main ()
{
/* Are we little or big endian? From Harbison&Steele. */
union
{
long int l;
char c[sizeof (long int)];
} u;
u.l = 1;
return u.c[sizeof (long int) - 1] == 1;
;
return 0;
}
_ACEOF
if ac_fn_c_try_run "$LINENO"; then :
ac_cv_c_bigendian=no
else
ac_cv_c_bigendian=yes
fi
rm -f core *.core core.conftest.* gmon.out bb.out conftest$ac_exeext \
conftest.$ac_objext conftest.beam conftest.$ac_ext
fi
fi
fi
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_c_bigendian" >&5
$as_echo "$ac_cv_c_bigendian" >&6; }
case $ac_cv_c_bigendian in #(
yes)
$as_echo "#define WORDS_BIGENDIAN 1" >>confdefs.h
;; #(
no)
;; #(
universal)
$as_echo "#define AC_APPLE_UNIVERSAL_BUILD 1" >>confdefs.h
;; #(
*)
as_fn_error $? "unknown endianness
presetting ac_cv_c_bigendian=no (or yes) will help" "$LINENO" 5 ;;
esac
# Checks for programs.
for ac_prog in gawk mawk nawk awk
do
# Extract the first word of "$ac_prog", so it can be a program name with args.
set dummy $ac_prog; ac_word=$2
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for $ac_word" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking for $ac_word... " >&6; }
if ${ac_cv_prog_AWK+:} false; then :
$as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
else
if test -n "$AWK"; then
ac_cv_prog_AWK="$AWK" # Let the user override the test.
else
as_save_IFS=$IFS; IFS=$PATH_SEPARATOR
for as_dir in $PATH
do
IFS=$as_save_IFS
test -z "$as_dir" && as_dir=.
for ac_exec_ext in '' $ac_executable_extensions; do
if as_fn_executable_p "$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"; then
ac_cv_prog_AWK="$ac_prog"
$as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: found $as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" >&5
break 2
fi
done
done
IFS=$as_save_IFS
fi
fi
AWK=$ac_cv_prog_AWK
if test -n "$AWK"; then
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $AWK" >&5
$as_echo "$AWK" >&6; }
else
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
$as_echo "no" >&6; }
fi
test -n "$AWK" && break
done
ac_ext=c
ac_cpp='$CPP $CPPFLAGS'
ac_compile='$CC -c $CFLAGS $CPPFLAGS conftest.$ac_ext >&5'
ac_link='$CC -o conftest$ac_exeext $CFLAGS $CPPFLAGS $LDFLAGS conftest.$ac_ext $LIBS >&5'
ac_compiler_gnu=$ac_cv_c_compiler_gnu
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking how to run the C preprocessor" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking how to run the C preprocessor... " >&6; }
# On Suns, sometimes $CPP names a directory.
if test -n "$CPP" && test -d "$CPP"; then
CPP=
fi
if test -z "$CPP"; then
if ${ac_cv_prog_CPP+:} false; then :
$as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
else
# Double quotes because CPP needs to be expanded
for CPP in "$CC -E" "$CC -E -traditional-cpp" "/lib/cpp"
do
ac_preproc_ok=false
for ac_c_preproc_warn_flag in '' yes
do
# Use a header file that comes with gcc, so configuring glibc
# with a fresh cross-compiler works.
# Prefer <limits.h> to <assert.h> if __STDC__ is defined, since
# <limits.h> exists even on freestanding compilers.
# On the NeXT, cc -E runs the code through the compiler's parser,
# not just through cpp. "Syntax error" is here to catch this case.
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
#ifdef __STDC__
# include <limits.h>
#else
# include <assert.h>
#endif
Syntax error
_ACEOF
if ac_fn_c_try_cpp "$LINENO"; then :
else
# Broken: fails on valid input.
continue
fi
rm -f conftest.err conftest.i conftest.$ac_ext
# OK, works on sane cases. Now check whether nonexistent headers
# can be detected and how.
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
#include <ac_nonexistent.h>
_ACEOF
if ac_fn_c_try_cpp "$LINENO"; then :
# Broken: success on invalid input.
continue
else
# Passes both tests.
ac_preproc_ok=:
break
fi
rm -f conftest.err conftest.i conftest.$ac_ext
done
# Because of `break', _AC_PREPROC_IFELSE's cleaning code was skipped.
rm -f conftest.i conftest.err conftest.$ac_ext
if $ac_preproc_ok; then :
break
fi
done
ac_cv_prog_CPP=$CPP
fi
CPP=$ac_cv_prog_CPP
else
ac_cv_prog_CPP=$CPP
fi
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $CPP" >&5
$as_echo "$CPP" >&6; }
ac_preproc_ok=false
for ac_c_preproc_warn_flag in '' yes
do
# Use a header file that comes with gcc, so configuring glibc
# with a fresh cross-compiler works.
# Prefer <limits.h> to <assert.h> if __STDC__ is defined, since
# <limits.h> exists even on freestanding compilers.
# On the NeXT, cc -E runs the code through the compiler's parser,
# not just through cpp. "Syntax error" is here to catch this case.
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
#ifdef __STDC__
# include <limits.h>
#else
# include <assert.h>
#endif
Syntax error
_ACEOF
if ac_fn_c_try_cpp "$LINENO"; then :
else
# Broken: fails on valid input.
continue
fi
rm -f conftest.err conftest.i conftest.$ac_ext
# OK, works on sane cases. Now check whether nonexistent headers
# can be detected and how.
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
#include <ac_nonexistent.h>
_ACEOF
if ac_fn_c_try_cpp "$LINENO"; then :
# Broken: success on invalid input.
continue
else
# Passes both tests.
ac_preproc_ok=:
break
fi
rm -f conftest.err conftest.i conftest.$ac_ext
done
# Because of `break', _AC_PREPROC_IFELSE's cleaning code was skipped.
rm -f conftest.i conftest.err conftest.$ac_ext
if $ac_preproc_ok; then :
else
{ { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: error: in \`$ac_pwd':" >&5
$as_echo "$as_me: error: in \`$ac_pwd':" >&2;}
as_fn_error $? "C preprocessor \"$CPP\" fails sanity check
See \`config.log' for more details" "$LINENO" 5; }
fi
ac_ext=c
ac_cpp='$CPP $CPPFLAGS'
ac_compile='$CC -c $CFLAGS $CPPFLAGS conftest.$ac_ext >&5'
ac_link='$CC -o conftest$ac_exeext $CFLAGS $CPPFLAGS $LDFLAGS conftest.$ac_ext $LIBS >&5'
ac_compiler_gnu=$ac_cv_c_compiler_gnu
if test -n "$ac_tool_prefix"; then
# Extract the first word of "${ac_tool_prefix}ranlib", so it can be a program name with args.
set dummy ${ac_tool_prefix}ranlib; ac_word=$2
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for $ac_word" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking for $ac_word... " >&6; }
if ${ac_cv_prog_RANLIB+:} false; then :
$as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
else
if test -n "$RANLIB"; then
ac_cv_prog_RANLIB="$RANLIB" # Let the user override the test.
else
as_save_IFS=$IFS; IFS=$PATH_SEPARATOR
for as_dir in $PATH
do
IFS=$as_save_IFS
test -z "$as_dir" && as_dir=.
for ac_exec_ext in '' $ac_executable_extensions; do
if as_fn_executable_p "$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"; then
ac_cv_prog_RANLIB="${ac_tool_prefix}ranlib"
$as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: found $as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" >&5
break 2
fi
done
done
IFS=$as_save_IFS
fi
fi
RANLIB=$ac_cv_prog_RANLIB
if test -n "$RANLIB"; then
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $RANLIB" >&5
$as_echo "$RANLIB" >&6; }
else
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
$as_echo "no" >&6; }
fi
fi
if test -z "$ac_cv_prog_RANLIB"; then
ac_ct_RANLIB=$RANLIB
# Extract the first word of "ranlib", so it can be a program name with args.
set dummy ranlib; ac_word=$2
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for $ac_word" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking for $ac_word... " >&6; }
if ${ac_cv_prog_ac_ct_RANLIB+:} false; then :
$as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
else
if test -n "$ac_ct_RANLIB"; then
ac_cv_prog_ac_ct_RANLIB="$ac_ct_RANLIB" # Let the user override the test.
else
as_save_IFS=$IFS; IFS=$PATH_SEPARATOR
for as_dir in $PATH
do
IFS=$as_save_IFS
test -z "$as_dir" && as_dir=.
for ac_exec_ext in '' $ac_executable_extensions; do
if as_fn_executable_p "$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"; then
ac_cv_prog_ac_ct_RANLIB="ranlib"
$as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: found $as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" >&5
break 2
fi
done
done
IFS=$as_save_IFS
fi
fi
ac_ct_RANLIB=$ac_cv_prog_ac_ct_RANLIB
if test -n "$ac_ct_RANLIB"; then
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_ct_RANLIB" >&5
$as_echo "$ac_ct_RANLIB" >&6; }
else
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
$as_echo "no" >&6; }
fi
if test "x$ac_ct_RANLIB" = x; then
RANLIB=":"
else
case $cross_compiling:$ac_tool_warned in
yes:)
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: WARNING: using cross tools not prefixed with host triplet" >&5
$as_echo "$as_me: WARNING: using cross tools not prefixed with host triplet" >&2;}
ac_tool_warned=yes ;;
esac
RANLIB=$ac_ct_RANLIB
fi
else
RANLIB="$ac_cv_prog_RANLIB"
fi
# Find a good install program. We prefer a C program (faster),
# so one script is as good as another. But avoid the broken or
# incompatible versions:
# SysV /etc/install, /usr/sbin/install
# SunOS /usr/etc/install
# IRIX /sbin/install
# AIX /bin/install
# AmigaOS /C/install, which installs bootblocks on floppy discs
# AIX 4 /usr/bin/installbsd, which doesn't work without a -g flag
# AFS /usr/afsws/bin/install, which mishandles nonexistent args
# SVR4 /usr/ucb/install, which tries to use the nonexistent group "staff"
# OS/2's system install, which has a completely different semantic
# ./install, which can be erroneously created by make from ./install.sh.
# Reject install programs that cannot install multiple files.
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for a BSD-compatible install" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking for a BSD-compatible install... " >&6; }
if test -z "$INSTALL"; then
if ${ac_cv_path_install+:} false; then :
$as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
else
as_save_IFS=$IFS; IFS=$PATH_SEPARATOR
for as_dir in $PATH
do
IFS=$as_save_IFS
test -z "$as_dir" && as_dir=.
# Account for people who put trailing slashes in PATH elements.
case $as_dir/ in #((
./ | .// | /[cC]/* | \
/etc/* | /usr/sbin/* | /usr/etc/* | /sbin/* | /usr/afsws/bin/* | \
?:[\\/]os2[\\/]install[\\/]* | ?:[\\/]OS2[\\/]INSTALL[\\/]* | \
/usr/ucb/* ) ;;
*)
# OSF1 and SCO ODT 3.0 have their own names for install.
# Don't use installbsd from OSF since it installs stuff as root
# by default.
for ac_prog in ginstall scoinst install; do
for ac_exec_ext in '' $ac_executable_extensions; do
if as_fn_executable_p "$as_dir/$ac_prog$ac_exec_ext"; then
if test $ac_prog = install &&
grep dspmsg "$as_dir/$ac_prog$ac_exec_ext" >/dev/null 2>&1; then
# AIX install. It has an incompatible calling convention.
:
elif test $ac_prog = install &&
grep pwplus "$as_dir/$ac_prog$ac_exec_ext" >/dev/null 2>&1; then
# program-specific install script used by HP pwplus--don't use.
:
else
rm -rf conftest.one conftest.two conftest.dir
echo one > conftest.one
echo two > conftest.two
mkdir conftest.dir
if "$as_dir/$ac_prog$ac_exec_ext" -c conftest.one conftest.two "`pwd`/conftest.dir" &&
test -s conftest.one && test -s conftest.two &&
test -s conftest.dir/conftest.one &&
test -s conftest.dir/conftest.two
then
ac_cv_path_install="$as_dir/$ac_prog$ac_exec_ext -c"
break 3
fi
fi
fi
done
done
;;
esac
done
IFS=$as_save_IFS
rm -rf conftest.one conftest.two conftest.dir
fi
if test "${ac_cv_path_install+set}" = set; then
INSTALL=$ac_cv_path_install
else
# As a last resort, use the slow shell script. Don't cache a
# value for INSTALL within a source directory, because that will
# break other packages using the cache if that directory is
# removed, or if the value is a relative name.
INSTALL=$ac_install_sh
fi
fi
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $INSTALL" >&5
$as_echo "$INSTALL" >&6; }
# Use test -z because SunOS4 sh mishandles braces in ${var-val}.
# It thinks the first close brace ends the variable substitution.
test -z "$INSTALL_PROGRAM" && INSTALL_PROGRAM='${INSTALL}'
test -z "$INSTALL_SCRIPT" && INSTALL_SCRIPT='${INSTALL}'
test -z "$INSTALL_DATA" && INSTALL_DATA='${INSTALL} -m 644'
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for egrep" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking for egrep... " >&6; }
if ${ac_cv_path_EGREP+:} false; then :
$as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
else
if echo a | $GREP -E '(a|b)' >/dev/null 2>&1
then ac_cv_path_EGREP="$GREP -E"
else
if test -z "$EGREP"; then
ac_path_EGREP_found=false
# Loop through the user's path and test for each of PROGNAME-LIST
as_save_IFS=$IFS; IFS=$PATH_SEPARATOR
for as_dir in $PATH$PATH_SEPARATOR/usr/xpg4/bin
do
IFS=$as_save_IFS
test -z "$as_dir" && as_dir=.
for ac_prog in egrep; do
for ac_exec_ext in '' $ac_executable_extensions; do
ac_path_EGREP="$as_dir/$ac_prog$ac_exec_ext"
as_fn_executable_p "$ac_path_EGREP" || continue
# Check for GNU ac_path_EGREP and select it if it is found.
# Check for GNU $ac_path_EGREP
case `"$ac_path_EGREP" --version 2>&1` in
*GNU*)
ac_cv_path_EGREP="$ac_path_EGREP" ac_path_EGREP_found=:;;
*)
ac_count=0
$as_echo_n 0123456789 >"conftest.in"
while :
do
cat "conftest.in" "conftest.in" >"conftest.tmp"
mv "conftest.tmp" "conftest.in"
cp "conftest.in" "conftest.nl"
$as_echo 'EGREP' >> "conftest.nl"
"$ac_path_EGREP" 'EGREP$' < "conftest.nl" >"conftest.out" 2>/dev/null || break
diff "conftest.out" "conftest.nl" >/dev/null 2>&1 || break
as_fn_arith $ac_count + 1 && ac_count=$as_val
if test $ac_count -gt ${ac_path_EGREP_max-0}; then
# Best one so far, save it but keep looking for a better one
ac_cv_path_EGREP="$ac_path_EGREP"
ac_path_EGREP_max=$ac_count
fi
# 10*(2^10) chars as input seems more than enough
test $ac_count -gt 10 && break
done
rm -f conftest.in conftest.tmp conftest.nl conftest.out;;
esac
$ac_path_EGREP_found && break 3
done
done
done
IFS=$as_save_IFS
if test -z "$ac_cv_path_EGREP"; then
as_fn_error $? "no acceptable egrep could be found in $PATH$PATH_SEPARATOR/usr/xpg4/bin" "$LINENO" 5
fi
else
ac_cv_path_EGREP=$EGREP
fi
fi
fi
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_path_EGREP" >&5
$as_echo "$ac_cv_path_EGREP" >&6; }
EGREP="$ac_cv_path_EGREP"
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for a thread-safe mkdir -p" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking for a thread-safe mkdir -p... " >&6; }
if test -z "$MKDIR_P"; then
if ${ac_cv_path_mkdir+:} false; then :
$as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
else
as_save_IFS=$IFS; IFS=$PATH_SEPARATOR
for as_dir in $PATH$PATH_SEPARATOR/opt/sfw/bin
do
IFS=$as_save_IFS
test -z "$as_dir" && as_dir=.
for ac_prog in mkdir gmkdir; do
for ac_exec_ext in '' $ac_executable_extensions; do
as_fn_executable_p "$as_dir/$ac_prog$ac_exec_ext" || continue
case `"$as_dir/$ac_prog$ac_exec_ext" --version 2>&1` in #(
'mkdir (GNU coreutils) '* | \
'mkdir (coreutils) '* | \
'mkdir (fileutils) '4.1*)
ac_cv_path_mkdir=$as_dir/$ac_prog$ac_exec_ext
break 3;;
esac
done
done
done
IFS=$as_save_IFS
fi
test -d ./--version && rmdir ./--version
if test "${ac_cv_path_mkdir+set}" = set; then
MKDIR_P="$ac_cv_path_mkdir -p"
else
# As a last resort, use the slow shell script. Don't cache a
# value for MKDIR_P within a source directory, because that will
# break other packages using the cache if that directory is
# removed, or if the value is a relative name.
MKDIR_P="$ac_install_sh -d"
fi
fi
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $MKDIR_P" >&5
$as_echo "$MKDIR_P" >&6; }
if test -n "$ac_tool_prefix"; then
for ac_prog in ar
do
# Extract the first word of "$ac_tool_prefix$ac_prog", so it can be a program name with args.
set dummy $ac_tool_prefix$ac_prog; ac_word=$2
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for $ac_word" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking for $ac_word... " >&6; }
if ${ac_cv_prog_AR+:} false; then :
$as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
else
if test -n "$AR"; then
ac_cv_prog_AR="$AR" # Let the user override the test.
else
as_save_IFS=$IFS; IFS=$PATH_SEPARATOR
for as_dir in $PATH
do
IFS=$as_save_IFS
test -z "$as_dir" && as_dir=.
for ac_exec_ext in '' $ac_executable_extensions; do
if as_fn_executable_p "$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"; then
ac_cv_prog_AR="$ac_tool_prefix$ac_prog"
$as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: found $as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" >&5
break 2
fi
done
done
IFS=$as_save_IFS
fi
fi
AR=$ac_cv_prog_AR
if test -n "$AR"; then
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $AR" >&5
$as_echo "$AR" >&6; }
else
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
$as_echo "no" >&6; }
fi
test -n "$AR" && break
done
fi
if test -z "$AR"; then
ac_ct_AR=$AR
for ac_prog in ar
do
# Extract the first word of "$ac_prog", so it can be a program name with args.
set dummy $ac_prog; ac_word=$2
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for $ac_word" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking for $ac_word... " >&6; }
if ${ac_cv_prog_ac_ct_AR+:} false; then :
$as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
else
if test -n "$ac_ct_AR"; then
ac_cv_prog_ac_ct_AR="$ac_ct_AR" # Let the user override the test.
else
as_save_IFS=$IFS; IFS=$PATH_SEPARATOR
for as_dir in $PATH
do
IFS=$as_save_IFS
test -z "$as_dir" && as_dir=.
for ac_exec_ext in '' $ac_executable_extensions; do
if as_fn_executable_p "$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"; then
ac_cv_prog_ac_ct_AR="$ac_prog"
$as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: found $as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" >&5
break 2
fi
done
done
IFS=$as_save_IFS
fi
fi
ac_ct_AR=$ac_cv_prog_ac_ct_AR
if test -n "$ac_ct_AR"; then
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_ct_AR" >&5
$as_echo "$ac_ct_AR" >&6; }
else
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
$as_echo "no" >&6; }
fi
test -n "$ac_ct_AR" && break
done
if test "x$ac_ct_AR" = x; then
AR=""
else
case $cross_compiling:$ac_tool_warned in
yes:)
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: WARNING: using cross tools not prefixed with host triplet" >&5
$as_echo "$as_me: WARNING: using cross tools not prefixed with host triplet" >&2;}
ac_tool_warned=yes ;;
esac
AR=$ac_ct_AR
fi
fi
# Extract the first word of "cat", so it can be a program name with args.
set dummy cat; ac_word=$2
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for $ac_word" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking for $ac_word... " >&6; }
if ${ac_cv_path_CAT+:} false; then :
$as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
else
case $CAT in
[\\/]* | ?:[\\/]*)
ac_cv_path_CAT="$CAT" # Let the user override the test with a path.
;;
*)
as_save_IFS=$IFS; IFS=$PATH_SEPARATOR
for as_dir in $PATH
do
IFS=$as_save_IFS
test -z "$as_dir" && as_dir=.
for ac_exec_ext in '' $ac_executable_extensions; do
if as_fn_executable_p "$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"; then
ac_cv_path_CAT="$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"
$as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: found $as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" >&5
break 2
fi
done
done
IFS=$as_save_IFS
;;
esac
fi
CAT=$ac_cv_path_CAT
if test -n "$CAT"; then
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $CAT" >&5
$as_echo "$CAT" >&6; }
else
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
$as_echo "no" >&6; }
fi
# Extract the first word of "kill", so it can be a program name with args.
set dummy kill; ac_word=$2
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for $ac_word" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking for $ac_word... " >&6; }
if ${ac_cv_path_KILL+:} false; then :
$as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
else
case $KILL in
[\\/]* | ?:[\\/]*)
ac_cv_path_KILL="$KILL" # Let the user override the test with a path.
;;
*)
as_save_IFS=$IFS; IFS=$PATH_SEPARATOR
for as_dir in $PATH
do
IFS=$as_save_IFS
test -z "$as_dir" && as_dir=.
for ac_exec_ext in '' $ac_executable_extensions; do
if as_fn_executable_p "$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"; then
ac_cv_path_KILL="$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"
$as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: found $as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" >&5
break 2
fi
done
done
IFS=$as_save_IFS
;;
esac
fi
KILL=$ac_cv_path_KILL
if test -n "$KILL"; then
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $KILL" >&5
$as_echo "$KILL" >&6; }
else
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
$as_echo "no" >&6; }
fi
# Extract the first word of "sed", so it can be a program name with args.
set dummy sed; ac_word=$2
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for $ac_word" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking for $ac_word... " >&6; }
if ${ac_cv_path_SED+:} false; then :
$as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
else
case $SED in
[\\/]* | ?:[\\/]*)
ac_cv_path_SED="$SED" # Let the user override the test with a path.
;;
*)
as_save_IFS=$IFS; IFS=$PATH_SEPARATOR
for as_dir in $PATH
do
IFS=$as_save_IFS
test -z "$as_dir" && as_dir=.
for ac_exec_ext in '' $ac_executable_extensions; do
if as_fn_executable_p "$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"; then
ac_cv_path_SED="$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"
$as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: found $as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" >&5
break 2
fi
done
done
IFS=$as_save_IFS
;;
esac
fi
SED=$ac_cv_path_SED
if test -n "$SED"; then
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $SED" >&5
$as_echo "$SED" >&6; }
else
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
$as_echo "no" >&6; }
fi
-# Extract the first word of "ent", so it can be a program name with args.
-set dummy ent; ac_word=$2
-{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for $ac_word" >&5
-$as_echo_n "checking for $ac_word... " >&6; }
-if ${ac_cv_path_ENT+:} false; then :
- $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
-else
- case $ENT in
- [\\/]* | ?:[\\/]*)
- ac_cv_path_ENT="$ENT" # Let the user override the test with a path.
- ;;
- *)
- as_save_IFS=$IFS; IFS=$PATH_SEPARATOR
-for as_dir in $PATH
-do
- IFS=$as_save_IFS
- test -z "$as_dir" && as_dir=.
- for ac_exec_ext in '' $ac_executable_extensions; do
- if as_fn_executable_p "$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"; then
- ac_cv_path_ENT="$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"
- $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: found $as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" >&5
- break 2
- fi
-done
- done
-IFS=$as_save_IFS
-
- ;;
-esac
-fi
-ENT=$ac_cv_path_ENT
-if test -n "$ENT"; then
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ENT" >&5
-$as_echo "$ENT" >&6; }
-else
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
-$as_echo "no" >&6; }
-fi
-
-
-
# Extract the first word of "bash", so it can be a program name with args.
set dummy bash; ac_word=$2
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for $ac_word" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking for $ac_word... " >&6; }
if ${ac_cv_path_TEST_MINUS_S_SH+:} false; then :
$as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
else
case $TEST_MINUS_S_SH in
[\\/]* | ?:[\\/]*)
ac_cv_path_TEST_MINUS_S_SH="$TEST_MINUS_S_SH" # Let the user override the test with a path.
;;
*)
as_save_IFS=$IFS; IFS=$PATH_SEPARATOR
for as_dir in $PATH
do
IFS=$as_save_IFS
test -z "$as_dir" && as_dir=.
for ac_exec_ext in '' $ac_executable_extensions; do
if as_fn_executable_p "$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"; then
ac_cv_path_TEST_MINUS_S_SH="$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"
$as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: found $as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" >&5
break 2
fi
done
done
IFS=$as_save_IFS
;;
esac
fi
TEST_MINUS_S_SH=$ac_cv_path_TEST_MINUS_S_SH
if test -n "$TEST_MINUS_S_SH"; then
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $TEST_MINUS_S_SH" >&5
$as_echo "$TEST_MINUS_S_SH" >&6; }
else
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
$as_echo "no" >&6; }
fi
# Extract the first word of "ksh", so it can be a program name with args.
set dummy ksh; ac_word=$2
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for $ac_word" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking for $ac_word... " >&6; }
if ${ac_cv_path_TEST_MINUS_S_SH+:} false; then :
$as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
else
case $TEST_MINUS_S_SH in
[\\/]* | ?:[\\/]*)
ac_cv_path_TEST_MINUS_S_SH="$TEST_MINUS_S_SH" # Let the user override the test with a path.
;;
*)
as_save_IFS=$IFS; IFS=$PATH_SEPARATOR
for as_dir in $PATH
do
IFS=$as_save_IFS
test -z "$as_dir" && as_dir=.
for ac_exec_ext in '' $ac_executable_extensions; do
if as_fn_executable_p "$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"; then
ac_cv_path_TEST_MINUS_S_SH="$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"
$as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: found $as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" >&5
break 2
fi
done
done
IFS=$as_save_IFS
;;
esac
fi
TEST_MINUS_S_SH=$ac_cv_path_TEST_MINUS_S_SH
if test -n "$TEST_MINUS_S_SH"; then
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $TEST_MINUS_S_SH" >&5
$as_echo "$TEST_MINUS_S_SH" >&6; }
else
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
$as_echo "no" >&6; }
fi
# Extract the first word of "sh", so it can be a program name with args.
set dummy sh; ac_word=$2
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for $ac_word" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking for $ac_word... " >&6; }
if ${ac_cv_path_TEST_MINUS_S_SH+:} false; then :
$as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
else
case $TEST_MINUS_S_SH in
[\\/]* | ?:[\\/]*)
ac_cv_path_TEST_MINUS_S_SH="$TEST_MINUS_S_SH" # Let the user override the test with a path.
;;
*)
as_save_IFS=$IFS; IFS=$PATH_SEPARATOR
for as_dir in $PATH
do
IFS=$as_save_IFS
test -z "$as_dir" && as_dir=.
for ac_exec_ext in '' $ac_executable_extensions; do
if as_fn_executable_p "$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"; then
ac_cv_path_TEST_MINUS_S_SH="$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"
$as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: found $as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" >&5
break 2
fi
done
done
IFS=$as_save_IFS
;;
esac
fi
TEST_MINUS_S_SH=$ac_cv_path_TEST_MINUS_S_SH
if test -n "$TEST_MINUS_S_SH"; then
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $TEST_MINUS_S_SH" >&5
$as_echo "$TEST_MINUS_S_SH" >&6; }
else
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
$as_echo "no" >&6; }
fi
# Extract the first word of "sh", so it can be a program name with args.
set dummy sh; ac_word=$2
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for $ac_word" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking for $ac_word... " >&6; }
if ${ac_cv_path_SH+:} false; then :
$as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
else
case $SH in
[\\/]* | ?:[\\/]*)
ac_cv_path_SH="$SH" # Let the user override the test with a path.
;;
*)
as_save_IFS=$IFS; IFS=$PATH_SEPARATOR
for as_dir in $PATH
do
IFS=$as_save_IFS
test -z "$as_dir" && as_dir=.
for ac_exec_ext in '' $ac_executable_extensions; do
if as_fn_executable_p "$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"; then
ac_cv_path_SH="$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"
$as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: found $as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" >&5
break 2
fi
done
done
IFS=$as_save_IFS
;;
esac
fi
SH=$ac_cv_path_SH
if test -n "$SH"; then
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $SH" >&5
$as_echo "$SH" >&6; }
else
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
$as_echo "no" >&6; }
fi
# Extract the first word of "groff", so it can be a program name with args.
set dummy groff; ac_word=$2
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for $ac_word" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking for $ac_word... " >&6; }
if ${ac_cv_path_GROFF+:} false; then :
$as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
else
case $GROFF in
[\\/]* | ?:[\\/]*)
ac_cv_path_GROFF="$GROFF" # Let the user override the test with a path.
;;
*)
as_save_IFS=$IFS; IFS=$PATH_SEPARATOR
for as_dir in $PATH
do
IFS=$as_save_IFS
test -z "$as_dir" && as_dir=.
for ac_exec_ext in '' $ac_executable_extensions; do
if as_fn_executable_p "$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"; then
ac_cv_path_GROFF="$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"
$as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: found $as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" >&5
break 2
fi
done
done
IFS=$as_save_IFS
;;
esac
fi
GROFF=$ac_cv_path_GROFF
if test -n "$GROFF"; then
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $GROFF" >&5
$as_echo "$GROFF" >&6; }
else
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
$as_echo "no" >&6; }
fi
# Extract the first word of "nroff awf", so it can be a program name with args.
set dummy nroff awf; ac_word=$2
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for $ac_word" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking for $ac_word... " >&6; }
if ${ac_cv_path_NROFF+:} false; then :
$as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
else
case $NROFF in
[\\/]* | ?:[\\/]*)
ac_cv_path_NROFF="$NROFF" # Let the user override the test with a path.
;;
*)
as_save_IFS=$IFS; IFS=$PATH_SEPARATOR
for as_dir in $PATH
do
IFS=$as_save_IFS
test -z "$as_dir" && as_dir=.
for ac_exec_ext in '' $ac_executable_extensions; do
if as_fn_executable_p "$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"; then
ac_cv_path_NROFF="$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"
$as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: found $as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" >&5
break 2
fi
done
done
IFS=$as_save_IFS
;;
esac
fi
NROFF=$ac_cv_path_NROFF
if test -n "$NROFF"; then
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $NROFF" >&5
$as_echo "$NROFF" >&6; }
else
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
$as_echo "no" >&6; }
fi
# Extract the first word of "mandoc", so it can be a program name with args.
set dummy mandoc; ac_word=$2
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for $ac_word" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking for $ac_word... " >&6; }
if ${ac_cv_path_MANDOC+:} false; then :
$as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
else
case $MANDOC in
[\\/]* | ?:[\\/]*)
ac_cv_path_MANDOC="$MANDOC" # Let the user override the test with a path.
;;
*)
as_save_IFS=$IFS; IFS=$PATH_SEPARATOR
for as_dir in $PATH
do
IFS=$as_save_IFS
test -z "$as_dir" && as_dir=.
for ac_exec_ext in '' $ac_executable_extensions; do
if as_fn_executable_p "$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"; then
ac_cv_path_MANDOC="$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"
$as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: found $as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" >&5
break 2
fi
done
done
IFS=$as_save_IFS
;;
esac
fi
MANDOC=$ac_cv_path_MANDOC
if test -n "$MANDOC"; then
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $MANDOC" >&5
$as_echo "$MANDOC" >&6; }
else
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
$as_echo "no" >&6; }
fi
TEST_SHELL=sh
if test "x$MANDOC" != "x" ; then
MANFMT="$MANDOC"
elif test "x$NROFF" != "x" ; then
MANFMT="$NROFF -mandoc"
elif test "x$GROFF" != "x" ; then
MANFMT="$GROFF -mandoc -Tascii"
else
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: WARNING: no manpage formatter found" >&5
$as_echo "$as_me: WARNING: no manpage formatter found" >&2;}
MANFMT="false"
fi
# Extract the first word of "groupadd", so it can be a program name with args.
set dummy groupadd; ac_word=$2
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for $ac_word" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking for $ac_word... " >&6; }
if ${ac_cv_path_PATH_GROUPADD_PROG+:} false; then :
$as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
else
case $PATH_GROUPADD_PROG in
[\\/]* | ?:[\\/]*)
ac_cv_path_PATH_GROUPADD_PROG="$PATH_GROUPADD_PROG" # Let the user override the test with a path.
;;
*)
as_save_IFS=$IFS; IFS=$PATH_SEPARATOR
for as_dir in /usr/sbin${PATH_SEPARATOR}/etc
do
IFS=$as_save_IFS
test -z "$as_dir" && as_dir=.
for ac_exec_ext in '' $ac_executable_extensions; do
if as_fn_executable_p "$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"; then
ac_cv_path_PATH_GROUPADD_PROG="$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"
$as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: found $as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" >&5
break 2
fi
done
done
IFS=$as_save_IFS
test -z "$ac_cv_path_PATH_GROUPADD_PROG" && ac_cv_path_PATH_GROUPADD_PROG="groupadd"
;;
esac
fi
PATH_GROUPADD_PROG=$ac_cv_path_PATH_GROUPADD_PROG
if test -n "$PATH_GROUPADD_PROG"; then
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $PATH_GROUPADD_PROG" >&5
$as_echo "$PATH_GROUPADD_PROG" >&6; }
else
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
$as_echo "no" >&6; }
fi
# Extract the first word of "useradd", so it can be a program name with args.
set dummy useradd; ac_word=$2
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for $ac_word" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking for $ac_word... " >&6; }
if ${ac_cv_path_PATH_USERADD_PROG+:} false; then :
$as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
else
case $PATH_USERADD_PROG in
[\\/]* | ?:[\\/]*)
ac_cv_path_PATH_USERADD_PROG="$PATH_USERADD_PROG" # Let the user override the test with a path.
;;
*)
as_save_IFS=$IFS; IFS=$PATH_SEPARATOR
for as_dir in /usr/sbin${PATH_SEPARATOR}/etc
do
IFS=$as_save_IFS
test -z "$as_dir" && as_dir=.
for ac_exec_ext in '' $ac_executable_extensions; do
if as_fn_executable_p "$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"; then
ac_cv_path_PATH_USERADD_PROG="$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"
$as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: found $as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" >&5
break 2
fi
done
done
IFS=$as_save_IFS
test -z "$ac_cv_path_PATH_USERADD_PROG" && ac_cv_path_PATH_USERADD_PROG="useradd"
;;
esac
fi
PATH_USERADD_PROG=$ac_cv_path_PATH_USERADD_PROG
if test -n "$PATH_USERADD_PROG"; then
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $PATH_USERADD_PROG" >&5
$as_echo "$PATH_USERADD_PROG" >&6; }
else
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
$as_echo "no" >&6; }
fi
# Extract the first word of "pkgmk", so it can be a program name with args.
set dummy pkgmk; ac_word=$2
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for $ac_word" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking for $ac_word... " >&6; }
if ${ac_cv_prog_MAKE_PACKAGE_SUPPORTED+:} false; then :
$as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
else
if test -n "$MAKE_PACKAGE_SUPPORTED"; then
ac_cv_prog_MAKE_PACKAGE_SUPPORTED="$MAKE_PACKAGE_SUPPORTED" # Let the user override the test.
else
as_save_IFS=$IFS; IFS=$PATH_SEPARATOR
for as_dir in $PATH
do
IFS=$as_save_IFS
test -z "$as_dir" && as_dir=.
for ac_exec_ext in '' $ac_executable_extensions; do
if as_fn_executable_p "$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"; then
ac_cv_prog_MAKE_PACKAGE_SUPPORTED="yes"
$as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: found $as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" >&5
break 2
fi
done
done
IFS=$as_save_IFS
test -z "$ac_cv_prog_MAKE_PACKAGE_SUPPORTED" && ac_cv_prog_MAKE_PACKAGE_SUPPORTED="no"
fi
fi
MAKE_PACKAGE_SUPPORTED=$ac_cv_prog_MAKE_PACKAGE_SUPPORTED
if test -n "$MAKE_PACKAGE_SUPPORTED"; then
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $MAKE_PACKAGE_SUPPORTED" >&5
$as_echo "$MAKE_PACKAGE_SUPPORTED" >&6; }
else
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
$as_echo "no" >&6; }
fi
if test -x /sbin/sh; then
STARTUP_SCRIPT_SHELL=/sbin/sh
else
STARTUP_SCRIPT_SHELL=/bin/sh
fi
# System features
# Check whether --enable-largefile was given.
if test "${enable_largefile+set}" = set; then :
enableval=$enable_largefile;
fi
if test "$enable_largefile" != no; then
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for special C compiler options needed for large files" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking for special C compiler options needed for large files... " >&6; }
if ${ac_cv_sys_largefile_CC+:} false; then :
$as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
else
ac_cv_sys_largefile_CC=no
if test "$GCC" != yes; then
ac_save_CC=$CC
while :; do
# IRIX 6.2 and later do not support large files by default,
# so use the C compiler's -n32 option if that helps.
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
#include <sys/types.h>
/* Check that off_t can represent 2**63 - 1 correctly.
We can't simply define LARGE_OFF_T to be 9223372036854775807,
since some C++ compilers masquerading as C compilers
incorrectly reject 9223372036854775807. */
#define LARGE_OFF_T (((off_t) 1 << 62) - 1 + ((off_t) 1 << 62))
int off_t_is_large[(LARGE_OFF_T % 2147483629 == 721
&& LARGE_OFF_T % 2147483647 == 1)
? 1 : -1];
int
main ()
{
;
return 0;
}
_ACEOF
if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then :
break
fi
rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext
CC="$CC -n32"
if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then :
ac_cv_sys_largefile_CC=' -n32'; break
fi
rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext
break
done
CC=$ac_save_CC
rm -f conftest.$ac_ext
fi
fi
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_sys_largefile_CC" >&5
$as_echo "$ac_cv_sys_largefile_CC" >&6; }
if test "$ac_cv_sys_largefile_CC" != no; then
CC=$CC$ac_cv_sys_largefile_CC
fi
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for _FILE_OFFSET_BITS value needed for large files" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking for _FILE_OFFSET_BITS value needed for large files... " >&6; }
if ${ac_cv_sys_file_offset_bits+:} false; then :
$as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
else
while :; do
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
#include <sys/types.h>
/* Check that off_t can represent 2**63 - 1 correctly.
We can't simply define LARGE_OFF_T to be 9223372036854775807,
since some C++ compilers masquerading as C compilers
incorrectly reject 9223372036854775807. */
#define LARGE_OFF_T (((off_t) 1 << 62) - 1 + ((off_t) 1 << 62))
int off_t_is_large[(LARGE_OFF_T % 2147483629 == 721
&& LARGE_OFF_T % 2147483647 == 1)
? 1 : -1];
int
main ()
{
;
return 0;
}
_ACEOF
if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then :
ac_cv_sys_file_offset_bits=no; break
fi
rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
#define _FILE_OFFSET_BITS 64
#include <sys/types.h>
/* Check that off_t can represent 2**63 - 1 correctly.
We can't simply define LARGE_OFF_T to be 9223372036854775807,
since some C++ compilers masquerading as C compilers
incorrectly reject 9223372036854775807. */
#define LARGE_OFF_T (((off_t) 1 << 62) - 1 + ((off_t) 1 << 62))
int off_t_is_large[(LARGE_OFF_T % 2147483629 == 721
&& LARGE_OFF_T % 2147483647 == 1)
? 1 : -1];
int
main ()
{
;
return 0;
}
_ACEOF
if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then :
ac_cv_sys_file_offset_bits=64; break
fi
rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
ac_cv_sys_file_offset_bits=unknown
break
done
fi
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_sys_file_offset_bits" >&5
$as_echo "$ac_cv_sys_file_offset_bits" >&6; }
case $ac_cv_sys_file_offset_bits in #(
no | unknown) ;;
*)
cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
#define _FILE_OFFSET_BITS $ac_cv_sys_file_offset_bits
_ACEOF
;;
esac
rm -rf conftest*
if test $ac_cv_sys_file_offset_bits = unknown; then
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for _LARGE_FILES value needed for large files" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking for _LARGE_FILES value needed for large files... " >&6; }
if ${ac_cv_sys_large_files+:} false; then :
$as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
else
while :; do
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
#include <sys/types.h>
/* Check that off_t can represent 2**63 - 1 correctly.
We can't simply define LARGE_OFF_T to be 9223372036854775807,
since some C++ compilers masquerading as C compilers
incorrectly reject 9223372036854775807. */
#define LARGE_OFF_T (((off_t) 1 << 62) - 1 + ((off_t) 1 << 62))
int off_t_is_large[(LARGE_OFF_T % 2147483629 == 721
&& LARGE_OFF_T % 2147483647 == 1)
? 1 : -1];
int
main ()
{
;
return 0;
}
_ACEOF
if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then :
ac_cv_sys_large_files=no; break
fi
rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
#define _LARGE_FILES 1
#include <sys/types.h>
/* Check that off_t can represent 2**63 - 1 correctly.
We can't simply define LARGE_OFF_T to be 9223372036854775807,
since some C++ compilers masquerading as C compilers
incorrectly reject 9223372036854775807. */
#define LARGE_OFF_T (((off_t) 1 << 62) - 1 + ((off_t) 1 << 62))
int off_t_is_large[(LARGE_OFF_T % 2147483629 == 721
&& LARGE_OFF_T % 2147483647 == 1)
? 1 : -1];
int
main ()
{
;
return 0;
}
_ACEOF
if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then :
ac_cv_sys_large_files=1; break
fi
rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
ac_cv_sys_large_files=unknown
break
done
fi
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_sys_large_files" >&5
$as_echo "$ac_cv_sys_large_files" >&6; }
case $ac_cv_sys_large_files in #(
no | unknown) ;;
*)
cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
#define _LARGE_FILES $ac_cv_sys_large_files
_ACEOF
;;
esac
rm -rf conftest*
fi
fi
if test -z "$AR" ; then
as_fn_error $? "*** 'ar' missing, please install or fix your \$PATH ***" "$LINENO" 5
fi
# Extract the first word of "passwd", so it can be a program name with args.
set dummy passwd; ac_word=$2
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for $ac_word" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking for $ac_word... " >&6; }
if ${ac_cv_path_PATH_PASSWD_PROG+:} false; then :
$as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
else
case $PATH_PASSWD_PROG in
[\\/]* | ?:[\\/]*)
ac_cv_path_PATH_PASSWD_PROG="$PATH_PASSWD_PROG" # Let the user override the test with a path.
;;
*)
as_save_IFS=$IFS; IFS=$PATH_SEPARATOR
for as_dir in $PATH
do
IFS=$as_save_IFS
test -z "$as_dir" && as_dir=.
for ac_exec_ext in '' $ac_executable_extensions; do
if as_fn_executable_p "$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"; then
ac_cv_path_PATH_PASSWD_PROG="$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"
$as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: found $as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" >&5
break 2
fi
done
done
IFS=$as_save_IFS
;;
esac
fi
PATH_PASSWD_PROG=$ac_cv_path_PATH_PASSWD_PROG
if test -n "$PATH_PASSWD_PROG"; then
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $PATH_PASSWD_PROG" >&5
$as_echo "$PATH_PASSWD_PROG" >&6; }
else
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
$as_echo "no" >&6; }
fi
if test ! -z "$PATH_PASSWD_PROG" ; then
cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
#define _PATH_PASSWD_PROG "$PATH_PASSWD_PROG"
_ACEOF
fi
LD="$CC"
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for inline" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking for inline... " >&6; }
if ${ac_cv_c_inline+:} false; then :
$as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
else
ac_cv_c_inline=no
for ac_kw in inline __inline__ __inline; do
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
#ifndef __cplusplus
typedef int foo_t;
static $ac_kw foo_t static_foo () {return 0; }
$ac_kw foo_t foo () {return 0; }
#endif
_ACEOF
if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then :
ac_cv_c_inline=$ac_kw
fi
rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
test "$ac_cv_c_inline" != no && break
done
fi
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_c_inline" >&5
$as_echo "$ac_cv_c_inline" >&6; }
case $ac_cv_c_inline in
inline | yes) ;;
*)
case $ac_cv_c_inline in
no) ac_val=;;
*) ac_val=$ac_cv_c_inline;;
esac
cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
#ifndef __cplusplus
#define inline $ac_val
#endif
_ACEOF
;;
esac
ac_fn_c_check_decl "$LINENO" "LLONG_MAX" "ac_cv_have_decl_LLONG_MAX" "#include <limits.h>
"
if test "x$ac_cv_have_decl_LLONG_MAX" = xyes; then :
have_llong_max=1
fi
ac_fn_c_check_decl "$LINENO" "LONG_LONG_MAX" "ac_cv_have_decl_LONG_LONG_MAX" "#include <limits.h>
"
if test "x$ac_cv_have_decl_LONG_LONG_MAX" = xyes; then :
have_long_long_max=1
fi
ac_fn_c_check_decl "$LINENO" "SYSTR_POLICY_KILL" "ac_cv_have_decl_SYSTR_POLICY_KILL" "
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/param.h>
#include <dev/systrace.h>
"
if test "x$ac_cv_have_decl_SYSTR_POLICY_KILL" = xyes; then :
have_systr_policy_kill=1
fi
ac_fn_c_check_decl "$LINENO" "RLIMIT_NPROC" "ac_cv_have_decl_RLIMIT_NPROC" "
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/resource.h>
"
if test "x$ac_cv_have_decl_RLIMIT_NPROC" = xyes; then :
$as_echo "#define HAVE_RLIMIT_NPROC /**/" >>confdefs.h
fi
ac_fn_c_check_decl "$LINENO" "PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS" "ac_cv_have_decl_PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS" "
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <linux/prctl.h>
"
if test "x$ac_cv_have_decl_PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS" = xyes; then :
have_linux_no_new_privs=1
fi
openssl=yes
# Check whether --with-openssl was given.
if test "${with_openssl+set}" = set; then :
withval=$with_openssl; if test "x$withval" = "xno" ; then
openssl=no
fi
fi
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking whether OpenSSL will be used for cryptography" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking whether OpenSSL will be used for cryptography... " >&6; }
if test "x$openssl" = "xyes" ; then
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
$as_echo "yes" >&6; }
cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
#define WITH_OPENSSL 1
_ACEOF
else
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
$as_echo "no" >&6; }
fi
use_stack_protector=1
use_toolchain_hardening=1
# Check whether --with-stackprotect was given.
if test "${with_stackprotect+set}" = set; then :
withval=$with_stackprotect;
if test "x$withval" = "xno"; then
use_stack_protector=0
fi
fi
# Check whether --with-hardening was given.
if test "${with_hardening+set}" = set; then :
withval=$with_hardening;
if test "x$withval" = "xno"; then
use_toolchain_hardening=0
fi
fi
# We use -Werror for the tests only so that we catch warnings like "this is
# on by default" for things like -fPIE.
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking if $CC supports -Werror" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking if $CC supports -Werror... " >&6; }
saved_CFLAGS="$CFLAGS"
CFLAGS="$CFLAGS -Werror"
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
int main(void) { return 0; }
_ACEOF
if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then :
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
$as_echo "yes" >&6; }
WERROR="-Werror"
else
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
$as_echo "no" >&6; }
WERROR=""
fi
rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS"
if test "$GCC" = "yes" || test "$GCC" = "egcs"; then
{
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking if $CC supports compile flag -pipe" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking if $CC supports compile flag -pipe... " >&6; }
saved_CFLAGS="$CFLAGS"
CFLAGS="$CFLAGS $WERROR -pipe"
_define_flag=""
test "x$_define_flag" = "x" && _define_flag="-pipe"
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <stdio.h>
int main(int argc, char **argv) {
+ (void)argv;
/* Some math to catch -ftrapv problems in the toolchain */
int i = 123 * argc, j = 456 + argc, k = 789 - argc;
float l = i * 2.1;
double m = l / 0.5;
long long int n = argc * 12345LL, o = 12345LL * (long long int)argc;
printf("%d %d %d %f %f %lld %lld\n", i, j, k, l, m, n, o);
+ /*
+ * Test fallthrough behaviour. clang 10's -Wimplicit-fallthrough does
+ * not understand comments and we don't use the "fallthrough" attribute
+ * that it's looking for.
+ */
+ switch(i){
+ case 0: j += i;
+ /* FALLTHROUGH */
+ default: j += k;
+ }
exit(0);
}
_ACEOF
if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then :
if $ac_cv_path_EGREP -i "unrecognized option|warning.*ignored" conftest.err >/dev/null
then
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
$as_echo "no" >&6; }
CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS"
else
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
$as_echo "yes" >&6; }
CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS $_define_flag"
fi
else
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
$as_echo "no" >&6; }
CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS"
fi
rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
}
{
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking if $CC supports compile flag -Wunknown-warning-option" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking if $CC supports compile flag -Wunknown-warning-option... " >&6; }
saved_CFLAGS="$CFLAGS"
CFLAGS="$CFLAGS $WERROR -Wunknown-warning-option"
_define_flag=""
test "x$_define_flag" = "x" && _define_flag="-Wunknown-warning-option"
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <stdio.h>
int main(int argc, char **argv) {
+ (void)argv;
/* Some math to catch -ftrapv problems in the toolchain */
int i = 123 * argc, j = 456 + argc, k = 789 - argc;
float l = i * 2.1;
double m = l / 0.5;
long long int n = argc * 12345LL, o = 12345LL * (long long int)argc;
printf("%d %d %d %f %f %lld %lld\n", i, j, k, l, m, n, o);
+ /*
+ * Test fallthrough behaviour. clang 10's -Wimplicit-fallthrough does
+ * not understand comments and we don't use the "fallthrough" attribute
+ * that it's looking for.
+ */
+ switch(i){
+ case 0: j += i;
+ /* FALLTHROUGH */
+ default: j += k;
+ }
exit(0);
}
_ACEOF
if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then :
if $ac_cv_path_EGREP -i "unrecognized option|warning.*ignored" conftest.err >/dev/null
then
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
$as_echo "no" >&6; }
CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS"
else
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
$as_echo "yes" >&6; }
CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS $_define_flag"
fi
else
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
$as_echo "no" >&6; }
CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS"
fi
rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
}
{
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking if $CC supports compile flag -Wno-error=format-truncation" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking if $CC supports compile flag -Wno-error=format-truncation... " >&6; }
saved_CFLAGS="$CFLAGS"
CFLAGS="$CFLAGS $WERROR -Wno-error=format-truncation"
_define_flag=""
test "x$_define_flag" = "x" && _define_flag="-Wno-error=format-truncation"
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <stdio.h>
int main(int argc, char **argv) {
+ (void)argv;
/* Some math to catch -ftrapv problems in the toolchain */
int i = 123 * argc, j = 456 + argc, k = 789 - argc;
float l = i * 2.1;
double m = l / 0.5;
long long int n = argc * 12345LL, o = 12345LL * (long long int)argc;
printf("%d %d %d %f %f %lld %lld\n", i, j, k, l, m, n, o);
+ /*
+ * Test fallthrough behaviour. clang 10's -Wimplicit-fallthrough does
+ * not understand comments and we don't use the "fallthrough" attribute
+ * that it's looking for.
+ */
+ switch(i){
+ case 0: j += i;
+ /* FALLTHROUGH */
+ default: j += k;
+ }
exit(0);
}
_ACEOF
if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then :
if $ac_cv_path_EGREP -i "unrecognized option|warning.*ignored" conftest.err >/dev/null
then
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
$as_echo "no" >&6; }
CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS"
else
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
$as_echo "yes" >&6; }
CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS $_define_flag"
fi
else
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
$as_echo "no" >&6; }
CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS"
fi
rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
}
{
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking if $CC supports compile flag -Qunused-arguments" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking if $CC supports compile flag -Qunused-arguments... " >&6; }
saved_CFLAGS="$CFLAGS"
CFLAGS="$CFLAGS $WERROR -Qunused-arguments"
_define_flag=""
test "x$_define_flag" = "x" && _define_flag="-Qunused-arguments"
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <stdio.h>
int main(int argc, char **argv) {
+ (void)argv;
/* Some math to catch -ftrapv problems in the toolchain */
int i = 123 * argc, j = 456 + argc, k = 789 - argc;
float l = i * 2.1;
double m = l / 0.5;
long long int n = argc * 12345LL, o = 12345LL * (long long int)argc;
printf("%d %d %d %f %f %lld %lld\n", i, j, k, l, m, n, o);
+ /*
+ * Test fallthrough behaviour. clang 10's -Wimplicit-fallthrough does
+ * not understand comments and we don't use the "fallthrough" attribute
+ * that it's looking for.
+ */
+ switch(i){
+ case 0: j += i;
+ /* FALLTHROUGH */
+ default: j += k;
+ }
exit(0);
}
_ACEOF
if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then :
if $ac_cv_path_EGREP -i "unrecognized option|warning.*ignored" conftest.err >/dev/null
then
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
$as_echo "no" >&6; }
CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS"
else
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
$as_echo "yes" >&6; }
CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS $_define_flag"
fi
else
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
$as_echo "no" >&6; }
CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS"
fi
rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
}
{
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking if $CC supports compile flag -Wall" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking if $CC supports compile flag -Wall... " >&6; }
saved_CFLAGS="$CFLAGS"
CFLAGS="$CFLAGS $WERROR -Wall"
_define_flag=""
test "x$_define_flag" = "x" && _define_flag="-Wall"
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <stdio.h>
int main(int argc, char **argv) {
+ (void)argv;
/* Some math to catch -ftrapv problems in the toolchain */
int i = 123 * argc, j = 456 + argc, k = 789 - argc;
float l = i * 2.1;
double m = l / 0.5;
long long int n = argc * 12345LL, o = 12345LL * (long long int)argc;
printf("%d %d %d %f %f %lld %lld\n", i, j, k, l, m, n, o);
+ /*
+ * Test fallthrough behaviour. clang 10's -Wimplicit-fallthrough does
+ * not understand comments and we don't use the "fallthrough" attribute
+ * that it's looking for.
+ */
+ switch(i){
+ case 0: j += i;
+ /* FALLTHROUGH */
+ default: j += k;
+ }
exit(0);
}
_ACEOF
if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then :
if $ac_cv_path_EGREP -i "unrecognized option|warning.*ignored" conftest.err >/dev/null
then
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
$as_echo "no" >&6; }
CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS"
else
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
$as_echo "yes" >&6; }
CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS $_define_flag"
fi
else
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
$as_echo "no" >&6; }
CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS"
fi
rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
}
{
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking if $CC supports compile flag -Wextra" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking if $CC supports compile flag -Wextra... " >&6; }
saved_CFLAGS="$CFLAGS"
CFLAGS="$CFLAGS $WERROR -Wextra"
_define_flag=""
test "x$_define_flag" = "x" && _define_flag="-Wextra"
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <stdio.h>
int main(int argc, char **argv) {
+ (void)argv;
/* Some math to catch -ftrapv problems in the toolchain */
int i = 123 * argc, j = 456 + argc, k = 789 - argc;
float l = i * 2.1;
double m = l / 0.5;
long long int n = argc * 12345LL, o = 12345LL * (long long int)argc;
printf("%d %d %d %f %f %lld %lld\n", i, j, k, l, m, n, o);
+ /*
+ * Test fallthrough behaviour. clang 10's -Wimplicit-fallthrough does
+ * not understand comments and we don't use the "fallthrough" attribute
+ * that it's looking for.
+ */
+ switch(i){
+ case 0: j += i;
+ /* FALLTHROUGH */
+ default: j += k;
+ }
exit(0);
}
_ACEOF
if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then :
if $ac_cv_path_EGREP -i "unrecognized option|warning.*ignored" conftest.err >/dev/null
then
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
$as_echo "no" >&6; }
CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS"
else
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
$as_echo "yes" >&6; }
CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS $_define_flag"
fi
else
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
$as_echo "no" >&6; }
CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS"
fi
rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
}
{
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking if $CC supports compile flag -Wpointer-arith" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking if $CC supports compile flag -Wpointer-arith... " >&6; }
saved_CFLAGS="$CFLAGS"
CFLAGS="$CFLAGS $WERROR -Wpointer-arith"
_define_flag=""
test "x$_define_flag" = "x" && _define_flag="-Wpointer-arith"
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <stdio.h>
int main(int argc, char **argv) {
+ (void)argv;
/* Some math to catch -ftrapv problems in the toolchain */
int i = 123 * argc, j = 456 + argc, k = 789 - argc;
float l = i * 2.1;
double m = l / 0.5;
long long int n = argc * 12345LL, o = 12345LL * (long long int)argc;
printf("%d %d %d %f %f %lld %lld\n", i, j, k, l, m, n, o);
+ /*
+ * Test fallthrough behaviour. clang 10's -Wimplicit-fallthrough does
+ * not understand comments and we don't use the "fallthrough" attribute
+ * that it's looking for.
+ */
+ switch(i){
+ case 0: j += i;
+ /* FALLTHROUGH */
+ default: j += k;
+ }
exit(0);
}
_ACEOF
if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then :
if $ac_cv_path_EGREP -i "unrecognized option|warning.*ignored" conftest.err >/dev/null
then
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
$as_echo "no" >&6; }
CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS"
else
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
$as_echo "yes" >&6; }
CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS $_define_flag"
fi
else
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
$as_echo "no" >&6; }
CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS"
fi
rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
}
{
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking if $CC supports compile flag -Wuninitialized" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking if $CC supports compile flag -Wuninitialized... " >&6; }
saved_CFLAGS="$CFLAGS"
CFLAGS="$CFLAGS $WERROR -Wuninitialized"
_define_flag=""
test "x$_define_flag" = "x" && _define_flag="-Wuninitialized"
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <stdio.h>
int main(int argc, char **argv) {
+ (void)argv;
/* Some math to catch -ftrapv problems in the toolchain */
int i = 123 * argc, j = 456 + argc, k = 789 - argc;
float l = i * 2.1;
double m = l / 0.5;
long long int n = argc * 12345LL, o = 12345LL * (long long int)argc;
printf("%d %d %d %f %f %lld %lld\n", i, j, k, l, m, n, o);
+ /*
+ * Test fallthrough behaviour. clang 10's -Wimplicit-fallthrough does
+ * not understand comments and we don't use the "fallthrough" attribute
+ * that it's looking for.
+ */
+ switch(i){
+ case 0: j += i;
+ /* FALLTHROUGH */
+ default: j += k;
+ }
exit(0);
}
_ACEOF
if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then :
if $ac_cv_path_EGREP -i "unrecognized option|warning.*ignored" conftest.err >/dev/null
then
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
$as_echo "no" >&6; }
CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS"
else
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
$as_echo "yes" >&6; }
CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS $_define_flag"
fi
else
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
$as_echo "no" >&6; }
CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS"
fi
rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
}
{
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking if $CC supports compile flag -Wsign-compare" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking if $CC supports compile flag -Wsign-compare... " >&6; }
saved_CFLAGS="$CFLAGS"
CFLAGS="$CFLAGS $WERROR -Wsign-compare"
_define_flag=""
test "x$_define_flag" = "x" && _define_flag="-Wsign-compare"
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <stdio.h>
int main(int argc, char **argv) {
+ (void)argv;
/* Some math to catch -ftrapv problems in the toolchain */
int i = 123 * argc, j = 456 + argc, k = 789 - argc;
float l = i * 2.1;
double m = l / 0.5;
long long int n = argc * 12345LL, o = 12345LL * (long long int)argc;
printf("%d %d %d %f %f %lld %lld\n", i, j, k, l, m, n, o);
+ /*
+ * Test fallthrough behaviour. clang 10's -Wimplicit-fallthrough does
+ * not understand comments and we don't use the "fallthrough" attribute
+ * that it's looking for.
+ */
+ switch(i){
+ case 0: j += i;
+ /* FALLTHROUGH */
+ default: j += k;
+ }
exit(0);
}
_ACEOF
if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then :
if $ac_cv_path_EGREP -i "unrecognized option|warning.*ignored" conftest.err >/dev/null
then
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
$as_echo "no" >&6; }
CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS"
else
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
$as_echo "yes" >&6; }
CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS $_define_flag"
fi
else
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
$as_echo "no" >&6; }
CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS"
fi
rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
}
{
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking if $CC supports compile flag -Wformat-security" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking if $CC supports compile flag -Wformat-security... " >&6; }
saved_CFLAGS="$CFLAGS"
CFLAGS="$CFLAGS $WERROR -Wformat-security"
_define_flag=""
test "x$_define_flag" = "x" && _define_flag="-Wformat-security"
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <stdio.h>
int main(int argc, char **argv) {
+ (void)argv;
/* Some math to catch -ftrapv problems in the toolchain */
int i = 123 * argc, j = 456 + argc, k = 789 - argc;
float l = i * 2.1;
double m = l / 0.5;
long long int n = argc * 12345LL, o = 12345LL * (long long int)argc;
printf("%d %d %d %f %f %lld %lld\n", i, j, k, l, m, n, o);
+ /*
+ * Test fallthrough behaviour. clang 10's -Wimplicit-fallthrough does
+ * not understand comments and we don't use the "fallthrough" attribute
+ * that it's looking for.
+ */
+ switch(i){
+ case 0: j += i;
+ /* FALLTHROUGH */
+ default: j += k;
+ }
exit(0);
}
_ACEOF
if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then :
if $ac_cv_path_EGREP -i "unrecognized option|warning.*ignored" conftest.err >/dev/null
then
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
$as_echo "no" >&6; }
CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS"
else
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
$as_echo "yes" >&6; }
CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS $_define_flag"
fi
else
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
$as_echo "no" >&6; }
CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS"
fi
rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
}
{
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking if $CC supports compile flag -Wsizeof-pointer-memaccess" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking if $CC supports compile flag -Wsizeof-pointer-memaccess... " >&6; }
saved_CFLAGS="$CFLAGS"
CFLAGS="$CFLAGS $WERROR -Wsizeof-pointer-memaccess"
_define_flag=""
test "x$_define_flag" = "x" && _define_flag="-Wsizeof-pointer-memaccess"
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <stdio.h>
int main(int argc, char **argv) {
+ (void)argv;
/* Some math to catch -ftrapv problems in the toolchain */
int i = 123 * argc, j = 456 + argc, k = 789 - argc;
float l = i * 2.1;
double m = l / 0.5;
long long int n = argc * 12345LL, o = 12345LL * (long long int)argc;
printf("%d %d %d %f %f %lld %lld\n", i, j, k, l, m, n, o);
+ /*
+ * Test fallthrough behaviour. clang 10's -Wimplicit-fallthrough does
+ * not understand comments and we don't use the "fallthrough" attribute
+ * that it's looking for.
+ */
+ switch(i){
+ case 0: j += i;
+ /* FALLTHROUGH */
+ default: j += k;
+ }
exit(0);
}
_ACEOF
if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then :
if $ac_cv_path_EGREP -i "unrecognized option|warning.*ignored" conftest.err >/dev/null
then
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
$as_echo "no" >&6; }
CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS"
else
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
$as_echo "yes" >&6; }
CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS $_define_flag"
fi
else
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
$as_echo "no" >&6; }
CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS"
fi
rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
}
{
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking if $CC supports compile flag -Wpointer-sign" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking if $CC supports compile flag -Wpointer-sign... " >&6; }
saved_CFLAGS="$CFLAGS"
CFLAGS="$CFLAGS $WERROR -Wpointer-sign"
_define_flag="-Wno-pointer-sign"
test "x$_define_flag" = "x" && _define_flag="-Wpointer-sign"
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <stdio.h>
int main(int argc, char **argv) {
+ (void)argv;
+ /* Some math to catch -ftrapv problems in the toolchain */
+ int i = 123 * argc, j = 456 + argc, k = 789 - argc;
+ float l = i * 2.1;
+ double m = l / 0.5;
+ long long int n = argc * 12345LL, o = 12345LL * (long long int)argc;
+ printf("%d %d %d %f %f %lld %lld\n", i, j, k, l, m, n, o);
+ /*
+ * Test fallthrough behaviour. clang 10's -Wimplicit-fallthrough does
+ * not understand comments and we don't use the "fallthrough" attribute
+ * that it's looking for.
+ */
+ switch(i){
+ case 0: j += i;
+ /* FALLTHROUGH */
+ default: j += k;
+ }
+ exit(0);
+}
+
+_ACEOF
+if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then :
+
+if $ac_cv_path_EGREP -i "unrecognized option|warning.*ignored" conftest.err >/dev/null
+then
+ { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
+$as_echo "no" >&6; }
+ CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS"
+else
+ { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
+$as_echo "yes" >&6; }
+ CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS $_define_flag"
+fi
+else
+ { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
+$as_echo "no" >&6; }
+ CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS"
+
+fi
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
+}
+ {
+ { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking if $CC supports compile flag -Wunused-parameter" >&5
+$as_echo_n "checking if $CC supports compile flag -Wunused-parameter... " >&6; }
+ saved_CFLAGS="$CFLAGS"
+ CFLAGS="$CFLAGS $WERROR -Wunused-parameter"
+ _define_flag="-Wno-unused-parameter"
+ test "x$_define_flag" = "x" && _define_flag="-Wunused-parameter"
+ cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+int main(int argc, char **argv) {
+ (void)argv;
/* Some math to catch -ftrapv problems in the toolchain */
int i = 123 * argc, j = 456 + argc, k = 789 - argc;
float l = i * 2.1;
double m = l / 0.5;
long long int n = argc * 12345LL, o = 12345LL * (long long int)argc;
printf("%d %d %d %f %f %lld %lld\n", i, j, k, l, m, n, o);
+ /*
+ * Test fallthrough behaviour. clang 10's -Wimplicit-fallthrough does
+ * not understand comments and we don't use the "fallthrough" attribute
+ * that it's looking for.
+ */
+ switch(i){
+ case 0: j += i;
+ /* FALLTHROUGH */
+ default: j += k;
+ }
exit(0);
}
_ACEOF
if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then :
if $ac_cv_path_EGREP -i "unrecognized option|warning.*ignored" conftest.err >/dev/null
then
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
$as_echo "no" >&6; }
CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS"
else
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
$as_echo "yes" >&6; }
CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS $_define_flag"
fi
else
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
$as_echo "no" >&6; }
CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS"
fi
rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
}
{
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking if $CC supports compile flag -Wunused-result" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking if $CC supports compile flag -Wunused-result... " >&6; }
saved_CFLAGS="$CFLAGS"
CFLAGS="$CFLAGS $WERROR -Wunused-result"
_define_flag="-Wno-unused-result"
test "x$_define_flag" = "x" && _define_flag="-Wunused-result"
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <stdio.h>
int main(int argc, char **argv) {
+ (void)argv;
/* Some math to catch -ftrapv problems in the toolchain */
int i = 123 * argc, j = 456 + argc, k = 789 - argc;
float l = i * 2.1;
double m = l / 0.5;
long long int n = argc * 12345LL, o = 12345LL * (long long int)argc;
printf("%d %d %d %f %f %lld %lld\n", i, j, k, l, m, n, o);
+ /*
+ * Test fallthrough behaviour. clang 10's -Wimplicit-fallthrough does
+ * not understand comments and we don't use the "fallthrough" attribute
+ * that it's looking for.
+ */
+ switch(i){
+ case 0: j += i;
+ /* FALLTHROUGH */
+ default: j += k;
+ }
exit(0);
}
_ACEOF
if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then :
if $ac_cv_path_EGREP -i "unrecognized option|warning.*ignored" conftest.err >/dev/null
then
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
$as_echo "no" >&6; }
CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS"
else
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
$as_echo "yes" >&6; }
CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS $_define_flag"
fi
else
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
$as_echo "no" >&6; }
CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS"
fi
rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
}
{
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking if $CC supports compile flag -Wimplicit-fallthrough" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking if $CC supports compile flag -Wimplicit-fallthrough... " >&6; }
saved_CFLAGS="$CFLAGS"
CFLAGS="$CFLAGS $WERROR -Wimplicit-fallthrough"
_define_flag=""
test "x$_define_flag" = "x" && _define_flag="-Wimplicit-fallthrough"
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <stdio.h>
int main(int argc, char **argv) {
+ (void)argv;
/* Some math to catch -ftrapv problems in the toolchain */
int i = 123 * argc, j = 456 + argc, k = 789 - argc;
float l = i * 2.1;
double m = l / 0.5;
long long int n = argc * 12345LL, o = 12345LL * (long long int)argc;
printf("%d %d %d %f %f %lld %lld\n", i, j, k, l, m, n, o);
+ /*
+ * Test fallthrough behaviour. clang 10's -Wimplicit-fallthrough does
+ * not understand comments and we don't use the "fallthrough" attribute
+ * that it's looking for.
+ */
+ switch(i){
+ case 0: j += i;
+ /* FALLTHROUGH */
+ default: j += k;
+ }
exit(0);
}
_ACEOF
if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then :
if $ac_cv_path_EGREP -i "unrecognized option|warning.*ignored" conftest.err >/dev/null
then
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
$as_echo "no" >&6; }
CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS"
else
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
$as_echo "yes" >&6; }
CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS $_define_flag"
fi
else
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
$as_echo "no" >&6; }
CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS"
fi
rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
}
{
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking if $CC supports compile flag -fno-strict-aliasing" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking if $CC supports compile flag -fno-strict-aliasing... " >&6; }
saved_CFLAGS="$CFLAGS"
CFLAGS="$CFLAGS $WERROR -fno-strict-aliasing"
_define_flag=""
test "x$_define_flag" = "x" && _define_flag="-fno-strict-aliasing"
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <stdio.h>
int main(int argc, char **argv) {
+ (void)argv;
/* Some math to catch -ftrapv problems in the toolchain */
int i = 123 * argc, j = 456 + argc, k = 789 - argc;
float l = i * 2.1;
double m = l / 0.5;
long long int n = argc * 12345LL, o = 12345LL * (long long int)argc;
printf("%d %d %d %f %f %lld %lld\n", i, j, k, l, m, n, o);
+ /*
+ * Test fallthrough behaviour. clang 10's -Wimplicit-fallthrough does
+ * not understand comments and we don't use the "fallthrough" attribute
+ * that it's looking for.
+ */
+ switch(i){
+ case 0: j += i;
+ /* FALLTHROUGH */
+ default: j += k;
+ }
exit(0);
}
_ACEOF
if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then :
if $ac_cv_path_EGREP -i "unrecognized option|warning.*ignored" conftest.err >/dev/null
then
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
$as_echo "no" >&6; }
CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS"
else
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
$as_echo "yes" >&6; }
CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS $_define_flag"
fi
else
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
$as_echo "no" >&6; }
CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS"
fi
rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
}
if test "x$use_toolchain_hardening" = "x1"; then
{
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking if $CC supports compile flag -mretpoline" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking if $CC supports compile flag -mretpoline... " >&6; }
saved_CFLAGS="$CFLAGS"
CFLAGS="$CFLAGS $WERROR -mretpoline"
_define_flag=""
test "x$_define_flag" = "x" && _define_flag="-mretpoline"
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <stdio.h>
int main(int argc, char **argv) {
+ (void)argv;
/* Some math to catch -ftrapv problems in the toolchain */
int i = 123 * argc, j = 456 + argc, k = 789 - argc;
float l = i * 2.1;
double m = l / 0.5;
long long int n = argc * 12345LL, o = 12345LL * (long long int)argc;
printf("%d %d %d %f %f %lld %lld\n", i, j, k, l, m, n, o);
+ /*
+ * Test fallthrough behaviour. clang 10's -Wimplicit-fallthrough does
+ * not understand comments and we don't use the "fallthrough" attribute
+ * that it's looking for.
+ */
+ switch(i){
+ case 0: j += i;
+ /* FALLTHROUGH */
+ default: j += k;
+ }
exit(0);
}
_ACEOF
if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then :
if $ac_cv_path_EGREP -i "unrecognized option|warning.*ignored" conftest.err >/dev/null
then
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
$as_echo "no" >&6; }
CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS"
else
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
$as_echo "yes" >&6; }
CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS $_define_flag"
fi
else
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
$as_echo "no" >&6; }
CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS"
fi
rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
} # clang
{
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking if $LD supports link flag -Wl,-z,retpolineplt" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking if $LD supports link flag -Wl,-z,retpolineplt... " >&6; }
saved_LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS"
LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS $WERROR -Wl,-z,retpolineplt"
_define_flag=""
test "x$_define_flag" = "x" && _define_flag="-Wl,-z,retpolineplt"
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <stdio.h>
int main(int argc, char **argv) {
+ (void)argv;
/* Some math to catch -ftrapv problems in the toolchain */
int i = 123 * argc, j = 456 + argc, k = 789 - argc;
float l = i * 2.1;
double m = l / 0.5;
long long int n = argc * 12345LL, o = 12345LL * (long long int)argc;
long long p = n * o;
printf("%d %d %d %f %f %lld %lld %lld\n", i, j, k, l, m, n, o, p);
exit(0);
}
_ACEOF
if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then :
if $ac_cv_path_EGREP -i "unrecognized option|warning.*ignored" conftest.err >/dev/null
then
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
$as_echo "no" >&6; }
LDFLAGS="$saved_LDFLAGS"
else
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
$as_echo "yes" >&6; }
LDFLAGS="$saved_LDFLAGS $_define_flag"
fi
else
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
$as_echo "no" >&6; }
LDFLAGS="$saved_LDFLAGS"
fi
rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \
conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
}
{
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking if $CC supports compile flag -D_FORTIFY_SOURCE=2" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking if $CC supports compile flag -D_FORTIFY_SOURCE=2... " >&6; }
saved_CFLAGS="$CFLAGS"
CFLAGS="$CFLAGS $WERROR -D_FORTIFY_SOURCE=2"
_define_flag=""
test "x$_define_flag" = "x" && _define_flag="-D_FORTIFY_SOURCE=2"
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <stdio.h>
int main(int argc, char **argv) {
+ (void)argv;
/* Some math to catch -ftrapv problems in the toolchain */
int i = 123 * argc, j = 456 + argc, k = 789 - argc;
float l = i * 2.1;
double m = l / 0.5;
long long int n = argc * 12345LL, o = 12345LL * (long long int)argc;
printf("%d %d %d %f %f %lld %lld\n", i, j, k, l, m, n, o);
+ /*
+ * Test fallthrough behaviour. clang 10's -Wimplicit-fallthrough does
+ * not understand comments and we don't use the "fallthrough" attribute
+ * that it's looking for.
+ */
+ switch(i){
+ case 0: j += i;
+ /* FALLTHROUGH */
+ default: j += k;
+ }
exit(0);
}
_ACEOF
if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then :
if $ac_cv_path_EGREP -i "unrecognized option|warning.*ignored" conftest.err >/dev/null
then
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
$as_echo "no" >&6; }
CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS"
else
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
$as_echo "yes" >&6; }
CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS $_define_flag"
fi
else
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
$as_echo "no" >&6; }
CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS"
fi
rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
}
{
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking if $LD supports link flag -Wl,-z,relro" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking if $LD supports link flag -Wl,-z,relro... " >&6; }
saved_LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS"
LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS $WERROR -Wl,-z,relro"
_define_flag=""
test "x$_define_flag" = "x" && _define_flag="-Wl,-z,relro"
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <stdio.h>
int main(int argc, char **argv) {
+ (void)argv;
/* Some math to catch -ftrapv problems in the toolchain */
int i = 123 * argc, j = 456 + argc, k = 789 - argc;
float l = i * 2.1;
double m = l / 0.5;
long long int n = argc * 12345LL, o = 12345LL * (long long int)argc;
long long p = n * o;
printf("%d %d %d %f %f %lld %lld %lld\n", i, j, k, l, m, n, o, p);
exit(0);
}
_ACEOF
if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then :
if $ac_cv_path_EGREP -i "unrecognized option|warning.*ignored" conftest.err >/dev/null
then
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
$as_echo "no" >&6; }
LDFLAGS="$saved_LDFLAGS"
else
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
$as_echo "yes" >&6; }
LDFLAGS="$saved_LDFLAGS $_define_flag"
fi
else
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
$as_echo "no" >&6; }
LDFLAGS="$saved_LDFLAGS"
fi
rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \
conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
}
{
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking if $LD supports link flag -Wl,-z,now" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking if $LD supports link flag -Wl,-z,now... " >&6; }
saved_LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS"
LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS $WERROR -Wl,-z,now"
_define_flag=""
test "x$_define_flag" = "x" && _define_flag="-Wl,-z,now"
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <stdio.h>
int main(int argc, char **argv) {
+ (void)argv;
/* Some math to catch -ftrapv problems in the toolchain */
int i = 123 * argc, j = 456 + argc, k = 789 - argc;
float l = i * 2.1;
double m = l / 0.5;
long long int n = argc * 12345LL, o = 12345LL * (long long int)argc;
long long p = n * o;
printf("%d %d %d %f %f %lld %lld %lld\n", i, j, k, l, m, n, o, p);
exit(0);
}
_ACEOF
if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then :
if $ac_cv_path_EGREP -i "unrecognized option|warning.*ignored" conftest.err >/dev/null
then
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
$as_echo "no" >&6; }
LDFLAGS="$saved_LDFLAGS"
else
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
$as_echo "yes" >&6; }
LDFLAGS="$saved_LDFLAGS $_define_flag"
fi
else
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
$as_echo "no" >&6; }
LDFLAGS="$saved_LDFLAGS"
fi
rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \
conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
}
{
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking if $LD supports link flag -Wl,-z,noexecstack" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking if $LD supports link flag -Wl,-z,noexecstack... " >&6; }
saved_LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS"
LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS $WERROR -Wl,-z,noexecstack"
_define_flag=""
test "x$_define_flag" = "x" && _define_flag="-Wl,-z,noexecstack"
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <stdio.h>
int main(int argc, char **argv) {
+ (void)argv;
/* Some math to catch -ftrapv problems in the toolchain */
int i = 123 * argc, j = 456 + argc, k = 789 - argc;
float l = i * 2.1;
double m = l / 0.5;
long long int n = argc * 12345LL, o = 12345LL * (long long int)argc;
long long p = n * o;
printf("%d %d %d %f %f %lld %lld %lld\n", i, j, k, l, m, n, o, p);
exit(0);
}
_ACEOF
if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then :
if $ac_cv_path_EGREP -i "unrecognized option|warning.*ignored" conftest.err >/dev/null
then
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
$as_echo "no" >&6; }
LDFLAGS="$saved_LDFLAGS"
else
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
$as_echo "yes" >&6; }
LDFLAGS="$saved_LDFLAGS $_define_flag"
fi
else
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
$as_echo "no" >&6; }
LDFLAGS="$saved_LDFLAGS"
fi
rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \
conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
}
# NB. -ftrapv expects certain support functions to be present in
# the compiler library (libgcc or similar) to detect integer operations
# that can overflow. We must check that the result of enabling it
# actually links. The test program compiled/linked includes a number
# of integer operations that should exercise this.
{
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking if $CC supports compile flag -ftrapv and linking succeeds" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking if $CC supports compile flag -ftrapv and linking succeeds... " >&6; }
saved_CFLAGS="$CFLAGS"
CFLAGS="$CFLAGS $WERROR -ftrapv"
_define_flag=""
test "x$_define_flag" = "x" && _define_flag="-ftrapv"
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <stdio.h>
int main(int argc, char **argv) {
+ (void)argv;
/* Some math to catch -ftrapv problems in the toolchain */
int i = 123 * argc, j = 456 + argc, k = 789 - argc;
float l = i * 2.1;
double m = l / 0.5;
long long int n = argc * 12345LL, o = 12345LL * (long long int)argc;
long long int p = n * o;
printf("%d %d %d %f %f %lld %lld %lld\n", i, j, k, l, m, n, o, p);
exit(0);
}
_ACEOF
if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then :
if $ac_cv_path_EGREP -i "unrecognized option|warning.*ignored" conftest.err >/dev/null
then
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
$as_echo "no" >&6; }
CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS"
else
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
$as_echo "yes" >&6; }
CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS $_define_flag"
fi
else
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
$as_echo "no" >&6; }
CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS"
fi
rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \
conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
}
fi
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking gcc version" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking gcc version... " >&6; }
GCC_VER=`$CC -v 2>&1 | $AWK '/gcc version /{print $3}'`
case $GCC_VER in
1.*) no_attrib_nonnull=1 ;;
2.8* | 2.9*)
no_attrib_nonnull=1
;;
2.*) no_attrib_nonnull=1 ;;
*) ;;
esac
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $GCC_VER" >&5
$as_echo "$GCC_VER" >&6; }
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking if $CC accepts -fno-builtin-memset" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking if $CC accepts -fno-builtin-memset... " >&6; }
saved_CFLAGS="$CFLAGS"
CFLAGS="$CFLAGS -fno-builtin-memset"
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
#include <string.h>
int
main ()
{
char b[10]; memset(b, 0, sizeof(b));
;
return 0;
}
_ACEOF
if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then :
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
$as_echo "yes" >&6; }
else
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
$as_echo "no" >&6; }
CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS"
fi
rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \
conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
# -fstack-protector-all doesn't always work for some GCC versions
# and/or platforms, so we test if we can. If it's not supported
# on a given platform gcc will emit a warning so we use -Werror.
if test "x$use_stack_protector" = "x1"; then
for t in -fstack-protector-strong -fstack-protector-all \
-fstack-protector; do
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking if $CC supports $t" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking if $CC supports $t... " >&6; }
saved_CFLAGS="$CFLAGS"
saved_LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS"
CFLAGS="$CFLAGS $t -Werror"
LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS $t -Werror"
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
#include <stdio.h>
int func (int t) {char b[100]; snprintf(b,sizeof b,"%d",t); return t;}
int
main ()
{
char x[256];
snprintf(x, sizeof(x), "XXX%d", func(1));
;
return 0;
}
_ACEOF
if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then :
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
$as_echo "yes" >&6; }
CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS $t"
LDFLAGS="$saved_LDFLAGS $t"
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking if $t works" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking if $t works... " >&6; }
if test "$cross_compiling" = yes; then :
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: WARNING: cross compiling: cannot test" >&5
$as_echo "$as_me: WARNING: cross compiling: cannot test" >&2;}
break
else
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
#include <stdio.h>
int func (int t) {char b[100]; snprintf(b,sizeof b,"%d",t); return t;}
int
main ()
{
char x[256];
snprintf(x, sizeof(x), "XXX%d", func(1));
;
return 0;
}
_ACEOF
if ac_fn_c_try_run "$LINENO"; then :
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
$as_echo "yes" >&6; }
break
else
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
$as_echo "no" >&6; }
fi
rm -f core *.core core.conftest.* gmon.out bb.out conftest$ac_exeext \
conftest.$ac_objext conftest.beam conftest.$ac_ext
fi
else
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
$as_echo "no" >&6; }
fi
rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \
conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS"
LDFLAGS="$saved_LDFLAGS"
done
fi
if test -z "$have_llong_max"; then
# retry LLONG_MAX with -std=gnu99, needed on some Linuxes
unset ac_cv_have_decl_LLONG_MAX
saved_CFLAGS="$CFLAGS"
CFLAGS="$CFLAGS -std=gnu99"
ac_fn_c_check_decl "$LINENO" "LLONG_MAX" "ac_cv_have_decl_LLONG_MAX" "#include <limits.h>
"
if test "x$ac_cv_have_decl_LLONG_MAX" = xyes; then :
have_llong_max=1
else
CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS"
fi
fi
fi
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking if compiler allows __attribute__ on return types" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking if compiler allows __attribute__ on return types... " >&6; }
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
#include <stdlib.h>
__attribute__((__unused__)) static void foo(void){return;}
int
main ()
{
exit(0);
;
return 0;
}
_ACEOF
if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then :
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
$as_echo "yes" >&6; }
else
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
$as_echo "no" >&6; }
$as_echo "#define NO_ATTRIBUTE_ON_RETURN_TYPE 1" >>confdefs.h
fi
rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking if compiler allows __attribute__ prototype args" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking if compiler allows __attribute__ prototype args... " >&6; }
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
#include <stdlib.h>
typedef void foo(const char *, ...) __attribute__((format(printf, 1, 2)));
int
main ()
{
exit(0);
;
return 0;
}
_ACEOF
if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then :
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
$as_echo "yes" >&6; }
else
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
$as_echo "no" >&6; }
$as_echo "#define NO_ATTRIBUTE_ON_PROTOTYPE_ARGS 1" >>confdefs.h
fi
rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
if test "x$no_attrib_nonnull" != "x1" ; then
$as_echo "#define HAVE_ATTRIBUTE__NONNULL__ 1" >>confdefs.h
fi
# Check whether --with-rpath was given.
if test "${with_rpath+set}" = set; then :
withval=$with_rpath;
if test "x$withval" = "xno" ; then
rpath_opt=""
elif test "x$withval" = "xyes" ; then
rpath_opt="-R"
else
rpath_opt="$withval"
fi
fi
# Allow user to specify flags
# Check whether --with-cflags was given.
if test "${with_cflags+set}" = set; then :
withval=$with_cflags;
if test -n "$withval" && test "x$withval" != "xno" && \
test "x${withval}" != "xyes"; then
CFLAGS="$CFLAGS $withval"
fi
fi
# Check whether --with-cflags-after was given.
if test "${with_cflags_after+set}" = set; then :
withval=$with_cflags_after;
if test -n "$withval" && test "x$withval" != "xno" && \
test "x${withval}" != "xyes"; then
CFLAGS_AFTER="$withval"
fi
fi
# Check whether --with-cppflags was given.
if test "${with_cppflags+set}" = set; then :
withval=$with_cppflags;
if test -n "$withval" && test "x$withval" != "xno" && \
test "x${withval}" != "xyes"; then
CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS $withval"
fi
fi
# Check whether --with-ldflags was given.
if test "${with_ldflags+set}" = set; then :
withval=$with_ldflags;
if test -n "$withval" && test "x$withval" != "xno" && \
test "x${withval}" != "xyes"; then
LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS $withval"
fi
fi
# Check whether --with-ldflags-after was given.
if test "${with_ldflags_after+set}" = set; then :
withval=$with_ldflags_after;
if test -n "$withval" && test "x$withval" != "xno" && \
test "x${withval}" != "xyes"; then
LDFLAGS_AFTER="$withval"
fi
fi
# Check whether --with-libs was given.
if test "${with_libs+set}" = set; then :
withval=$with_libs;
if test -n "$withval" && test "x$withval" != "xno" && \
test "x${withval}" != "xyes"; then
LIBS="$LIBS $withval"
fi
fi
# Check whether --with-Werror was given.
if test "${with_Werror+set}" = set; then :
withval=$with_Werror;
if test -n "$withval" && test "x$withval" != "xno"; then
werror_flags="-Werror"
if test "x${withval}" != "xyes"; then
werror_flags="$withval"
fi
fi
fi
for ac_header in \
blf.h \
bstring.h \
crypt.h \
crypto/sha2.h \
dirent.h \
endian.h \
elf.h \
err.h \
features.h \
fcntl.h \
floatingpoint.h \
fnmatch.h \
getopt.h \
glob.h \
ia.h \
iaf.h \
ifaddrs.h \
inttypes.h \
langinfo.h \
limits.h \
locale.h \
login.h \
maillock.h \
ndir.h \
net/if_tun.h \
netdb.h \
netgroup.h \
pam/pam_appl.h \
paths.h \
poll.h \
pty.h \
readpassphrase.h \
rpc/types.h \
security/pam_appl.h \
sha2.h \
shadow.h \
stddef.h \
stdint.h \
string.h \
strings.h \
sys/bitypes.h \
sys/byteorder.h \
sys/bsdtty.h \
sys/cdefs.h \
sys/dir.h \
sys/file.h \
sys/mman.h \
sys/label.h \
sys/ndir.h \
sys/poll.h \
sys/prctl.h \
sys/pstat.h \
sys/ptrace.h \
sys/random.h \
sys/select.h \
sys/stat.h \
sys/stream.h \
sys/stropts.h \
sys/strtio.h \
sys/statvfs.h \
sys/sysmacros.h \
sys/time.h \
sys/timers.h \
sys/vfs.h \
time.h \
tmpdir.h \
ttyent.h \
ucred.h \
unistd.h \
usersec.h \
util.h \
utime.h \
utmp.h \
utmpx.h \
vis.h \
wchar.h \
do :
as_ac_Header=`$as_echo "ac_cv_header_$ac_header" | $as_tr_sh`
ac_fn_c_check_header_mongrel "$LINENO" "$ac_header" "$as_ac_Header" "$ac_includes_default"
if eval test \"x\$"$as_ac_Header"\" = x"yes"; then :
cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
#define `$as_echo "HAVE_$ac_header" | $as_tr_cpp` 1
_ACEOF
fi
done
# On some platforms (eg SunOS4) sys/audit.h requires sys/[time|types|label.h]
# to be included first.
for ac_header in sys/audit.h
do :
ac_fn_c_check_header_compile "$LINENO" "sys/audit.h" "ac_cv_header_sys_audit_h" "
#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TIME_H
# include <sys/time.h>
#endif
#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TYPES_H
# include <sys/types.h>
#endif
#ifdef HAVE_SYS_LABEL_H
# include <sys/label.h>
#endif
"
if test "x$ac_cv_header_sys_audit_h" = xyes; then :
cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
#define HAVE_SYS_AUDIT_H 1
_ACEOF
fi
done
# sys/capsicum.h requires sys/types.h
for ac_header in sys/capsicum.h
do :
ac_fn_c_check_header_compile "$LINENO" "sys/capsicum.h" "ac_cv_header_sys_capsicum_h" "
#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TYPES_H
# include <sys/types.h>
#endif
"
if test "x$ac_cv_header_sys_capsicum_h" = xyes; then :
cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
#define HAVE_SYS_CAPSICUM_H 1
_ACEOF
fi
done
# net/route.h requires sys/socket.h and sys/types.h.
# sys/sysctl.h also requires sys/param.h
for ac_header in net/route.h sys/sysctl.h
do :
as_ac_Header=`$as_echo "ac_cv_header_$ac_header" | $as_tr_sh`
ac_fn_c_check_header_compile "$LINENO" "$ac_header" "$as_ac_Header" "
#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TYPES_H
# include <sys/types.h>
#endif
#include <sys/param.h>
#include <sys/socket.h>
"
if eval test \"x\$"$as_ac_Header"\" = x"yes"; then :
cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
#define `$as_echo "HAVE_$ac_header" | $as_tr_cpp` 1
_ACEOF
fi
done
# lastlog.h requires sys/time.h to be included first on Solaris
for ac_header in lastlog.h
do :
ac_fn_c_check_header_compile "$LINENO" "lastlog.h" "ac_cv_header_lastlog_h" "
#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TIME_H
# include <sys/time.h>
#endif
"
if test "x$ac_cv_header_lastlog_h" = xyes; then :
cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
#define HAVE_LASTLOG_H 1
_ACEOF
fi
done
# sys/ptms.h requires sys/stream.h to be included first on Solaris
for ac_header in sys/ptms.h
do :
ac_fn_c_check_header_compile "$LINENO" "sys/ptms.h" "ac_cv_header_sys_ptms_h" "
#ifdef HAVE_SYS_STREAM_H
# include <sys/stream.h>
#endif
"
if test "x$ac_cv_header_sys_ptms_h" = xyes; then :
cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
#define HAVE_SYS_PTMS_H 1
_ACEOF
fi
done
# login_cap.h requires sys/types.h on NetBSD
for ac_header in login_cap.h
do :
ac_fn_c_check_header_compile "$LINENO" "login_cap.h" "ac_cv_header_login_cap_h" "
#include <sys/types.h>
"
if test "x$ac_cv_header_login_cap_h" = xyes; then :
cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
#define HAVE_LOGIN_CAP_H 1
_ACEOF
fi
done
# older BSDs need sys/param.h before sys/mount.h
for ac_header in sys/mount.h
do :
ac_fn_c_check_header_compile "$LINENO" "sys/mount.h" "ac_cv_header_sys_mount_h" "
#include <sys/param.h>
"
if test "x$ac_cv_header_sys_mount_h" = xyes; then :
cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
#define HAVE_SYS_MOUNT_H 1
_ACEOF
fi
done
# Android requires sys/socket.h to be included before sys/un.h
for ac_header in sys/un.h
do :
ac_fn_c_check_header_compile "$LINENO" "sys/un.h" "ac_cv_header_sys_un_h" "
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/socket.h>
"
if test "x$ac_cv_header_sys_un_h" = xyes; then :
cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
#define HAVE_SYS_UN_H 1
_ACEOF
fi
done
# Messages for features tested for in target-specific section
SIA_MSG="no"
SPC_MSG="no"
SP_MSG="no"
SPP_MSG="no"
# Support for Solaris/Illumos privileges (this test is used by both
# the --with-solaris-privs option and --with-sandbox=solaris).
SOLARIS_PRIVS="no"
+# The cast to long int works around a bug in the HP C Compiler
+# version HP92453-01 B.11.11.23709.GP, which incorrectly rejects
+# declarations like `int a3[[(sizeof (unsigned char)) >= 0]];'.
+# This bug is HP SR number 8606223364.
+{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking size of size_t" >&5
+$as_echo_n "checking size of size_t... " >&6; }
+if ${ac_cv_sizeof_size_t+:} false; then :
+ $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
+else
+ if ac_fn_c_compute_int "$LINENO" "(long int) (sizeof (size_t))" "ac_cv_sizeof_size_t" "$ac_includes_default"; then :
+
+else
+ if test "$ac_cv_type_size_t" = yes; then
+ { { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: error: in \`$ac_pwd':" >&5
+$as_echo "$as_me: error: in \`$ac_pwd':" >&2;}
+as_fn_error 77 "cannot compute sizeof (size_t)
+See \`config.log' for more details" "$LINENO" 5; }
+ else
+ ac_cv_sizeof_size_t=0
+ fi
+fi
+
+fi
+{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_sizeof_size_t" >&5
+$as_echo "$ac_cv_sizeof_size_t" >&6; }
+
+
+
+cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
+#define SIZEOF_SIZE_T $ac_cv_sizeof_size_t
+_ACEOF
+
+
+
# Check for some target-specific stuff
case "$host" in
*-*-aix*)
# Some versions of VAC won't allow macro redefinitions at
# -qlanglevel=ansi, and autoconf 2.60 sometimes insists on using that
# particularly with older versions of vac or xlc.
# It also throws errors about null macro arguments, but these are
# not fatal.
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking if compiler allows macro redefinitions" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking if compiler allows macro redefinitions... " >&6; }
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
#define testmacro foo
#define testmacro bar
int
main ()
{
exit(0);
;
return 0;
}
_ACEOF
if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then :
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
$as_echo "yes" >&6; }
else
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
$as_echo "no" >&6; }
CC="`echo $CC | sed 's/-qlanglvl\=ansi//g'`"
CFLAGS="`echo $CFLAGS | sed 's/-qlanglvl\=ansi//g'`"
CPPFLAGS="`echo $CPPFLAGS | sed 's/-qlanglvl\=ansi//g'`"
fi
rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking how to specify blibpath for linker ($LD)" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking how to specify blibpath for linker ($LD)... " >&6; }
if (test -z "$blibpath"); then
blibpath="/usr/lib:/lib"
fi
saved_LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS"
if test "$GCC" = "yes"; then
flags="-Wl,-blibpath: -Wl,-rpath, -blibpath:"
else
flags="-blibpath: -Wl,-blibpath: -Wl,-rpath,"
fi
for tryflags in $flags ;do
if (test -z "$blibflags"); then
LDFLAGS="$saved_LDFLAGS $tryflags$blibpath"
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
int
main ()
{
;
return 0;
}
_ACEOF
if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then :
blibflags=$tryflags
fi
rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \
conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
fi
done
if (test -z "$blibflags"); then
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: not found" >&5
$as_echo "not found" >&6; }
as_fn_error $? "*** must be able to specify blibpath on AIX - check config.log" "$LINENO" 5
else
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $blibflags" >&5
$as_echo "$blibflags" >&6; }
fi
LDFLAGS="$saved_LDFLAGS"
ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "authenticate" "ac_cv_func_authenticate"
if test "x$ac_cv_func_authenticate" = xyes; then :
$as_echo "#define WITH_AIXAUTHENTICATE 1" >>confdefs.h
else
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for authenticate in -ls" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking for authenticate in -ls... " >&6; }
if ${ac_cv_lib_s_authenticate+:} false; then :
$as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
else
ac_check_lib_save_LIBS=$LIBS
LIBS="-ls $LIBS"
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error.
Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC
builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */
#ifdef __cplusplus
extern "C"
#endif
char authenticate ();
int
main ()
{
return authenticate ();
;
return 0;
}
_ACEOF
if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then :
ac_cv_lib_s_authenticate=yes
else
ac_cv_lib_s_authenticate=no
fi
rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \
conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
LIBS=$ac_check_lib_save_LIBS
fi
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_lib_s_authenticate" >&5
$as_echo "$ac_cv_lib_s_authenticate" >&6; }
if test "x$ac_cv_lib_s_authenticate" = xyes; then :
$as_echo "#define WITH_AIXAUTHENTICATE 1" >>confdefs.h
LIBS="$LIBS -ls"
fi
fi
ac_fn_c_check_decl "$LINENO" "authenticate" "ac_cv_have_decl_authenticate" "#include <usersec.h>
"
if test "x$ac_cv_have_decl_authenticate" = xyes; then :
ac_have_decl=1
else
ac_have_decl=0
fi
cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
#define HAVE_DECL_AUTHENTICATE $ac_have_decl
_ACEOF
ac_fn_c_check_decl "$LINENO" "loginrestrictions" "ac_cv_have_decl_loginrestrictions" "#include <usersec.h>
"
if test "x$ac_cv_have_decl_loginrestrictions" = xyes; then :
ac_have_decl=1
else
ac_have_decl=0
fi
cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
#define HAVE_DECL_LOGINRESTRICTIONS $ac_have_decl
_ACEOF
ac_fn_c_check_decl "$LINENO" "loginsuccess" "ac_cv_have_decl_loginsuccess" "#include <usersec.h>
"
if test "x$ac_cv_have_decl_loginsuccess" = xyes; then :
ac_have_decl=1
else
ac_have_decl=0
fi
cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
#define HAVE_DECL_LOGINSUCCESS $ac_have_decl
_ACEOF
ac_fn_c_check_decl "$LINENO" "passwdexpired" "ac_cv_have_decl_passwdexpired" "#include <usersec.h>
"
if test "x$ac_cv_have_decl_passwdexpired" = xyes; then :
ac_have_decl=1
else
ac_have_decl=0
fi
cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
#define HAVE_DECL_PASSWDEXPIRED $ac_have_decl
_ACEOF
ac_fn_c_check_decl "$LINENO" "setauthdb" "ac_cv_have_decl_setauthdb" "#include <usersec.h>
"
if test "x$ac_cv_have_decl_setauthdb" = xyes; then :
ac_have_decl=1
else
ac_have_decl=0
fi
cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
#define HAVE_DECL_SETAUTHDB $ac_have_decl
_ACEOF
ac_fn_c_check_decl "$LINENO" "loginfailed" "ac_cv_have_decl_loginfailed" "#include <usersec.h>
"
if test "x$ac_cv_have_decl_loginfailed" = xyes; then :
ac_have_decl=1
else
ac_have_decl=0
fi
cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
#define HAVE_DECL_LOGINFAILED $ac_have_decl
_ACEOF
if test $ac_have_decl = 1; then :
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking if loginfailed takes 4 arguments" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking if loginfailed takes 4 arguments... " >&6; }
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
#include <usersec.h>
int
main ()
{
(void)loginfailed("user","host","tty",0);
;
return 0;
}
_ACEOF
if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then :
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
$as_echo "yes" >&6; }
$as_echo "#define AIX_LOGINFAILED_4ARG 1" >>confdefs.h
else
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
$as_echo "no" >&6; }
fi
rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
fi
for ac_func in getgrset setauthdb
do :
as_ac_var=`$as_echo "ac_cv_func_$ac_func" | $as_tr_sh`
ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "$ac_func" "$as_ac_var"
if eval test \"x\$"$as_ac_var"\" = x"yes"; then :
cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
#define `$as_echo "HAVE_$ac_func" | $as_tr_cpp` 1
_ACEOF
fi
done
ac_fn_c_check_decl "$LINENO" "F_CLOSEM" "ac_cv_have_decl_F_CLOSEM" " #include <limits.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
"
if test "x$ac_cv_have_decl_F_CLOSEM" = xyes; then :
$as_echo "#define HAVE_FCNTL_CLOSEM 1" >>confdefs.h
fi
check_for_aix_broken_getaddrinfo=1
$as_echo "#define SETEUID_BREAKS_SETUID 1" >>confdefs.h
$as_echo "#define BROKEN_SETREUID 1" >>confdefs.h
$as_echo "#define BROKEN_SETREGID 1" >>confdefs.h
$as_echo "#define DISABLE_LASTLOG 1" >>confdefs.h
$as_echo "#define LOGIN_NEEDS_UTMPX 1" >>confdefs.h
$as_echo "#define SPT_TYPE SPT_REUSEARGV" >>confdefs.h
$as_echo "#define SSHPAM_CHAUTHTOK_NEEDS_RUID 1" >>confdefs.h
$as_echo "#define PTY_ZEROREAD 1" >>confdefs.h
$as_echo "#define PLATFORM_SYS_DIR_UID 2" >>confdefs.h
$as_echo "#define BROKEN_STRNDUP 1" >>confdefs.h
$as_echo "#define BROKEN_STRNLEN 1" >>confdefs.h
;;
*-*-android*)
$as_echo "#define DISABLE_UTMP 1" >>confdefs.h
$as_echo "#define DISABLE_WTMP 1" >>confdefs.h
;;
*-*-cygwin*)
check_for_libcrypt_later=1
LIBS="$LIBS /usr/lib/textreadmode.o"
$as_echo "#define HAVE_CYGWIN 1" >>confdefs.h
$as_echo "#define USE_PIPES 1" >>confdefs.h
$as_echo "#define NO_UID_RESTORATION_TEST 1" >>confdefs.h
$as_echo "#define DISABLE_SHADOW 1" >>confdefs.h
$as_echo "#define NO_X11_UNIX_SOCKETS 1" >>confdefs.h
$as_echo "#define DISABLE_FD_PASSING 1" >>confdefs.h
$as_echo "#define SSH_IOBUFSZ 65535" >>confdefs.h
$as_echo "#define FILESYSTEM_NO_BACKSLASH 1" >>confdefs.h
# Cygwin defines optargs, optargs as declspec(dllimport) for historical
# reasons which cause compile warnings, so we disable those warnings.
{
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking if $CC supports compile flag -Wno-attributes" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking if $CC supports compile flag -Wno-attributes... " >&6; }
saved_CFLAGS="$CFLAGS"
CFLAGS="$CFLAGS $WERROR -Wno-attributes"
_define_flag=""
test "x$_define_flag" = "x" && _define_flag="-Wno-attributes"
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <stdio.h>
int main(int argc, char **argv) {
+ (void)argv;
/* Some math to catch -ftrapv problems in the toolchain */
int i = 123 * argc, j = 456 + argc, k = 789 - argc;
float l = i * 2.1;
double m = l / 0.5;
long long int n = argc * 12345LL, o = 12345LL * (long long int)argc;
printf("%d %d %d %f %f %lld %lld\n", i, j, k, l, m, n, o);
+ /*
+ * Test fallthrough behaviour. clang 10's -Wimplicit-fallthrough does
+ * not understand comments and we don't use the "fallthrough" attribute
+ * that it's looking for.
+ */
+ switch(i){
+ case 0: j += i;
+ /* FALLTHROUGH */
+ default: j += k;
+ }
exit(0);
}
_ACEOF
if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then :
if $ac_cv_path_EGREP -i "unrecognized option|warning.*ignored" conftest.err >/dev/null
then
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
$as_echo "no" >&6; }
CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS"
else
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
$as_echo "yes" >&6; }
CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS $_define_flag"
fi
else
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
$as_echo "no" >&6; }
CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS"
fi
rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
}
;;
*-*-dgux*)
$as_echo "#define IP_TOS_IS_BROKEN 1" >>confdefs.h
$as_echo "#define SETEUID_BREAKS_SETUID 1" >>confdefs.h
$as_echo "#define BROKEN_SETREUID 1" >>confdefs.h
$as_echo "#define BROKEN_SETREGID 1" >>confdefs.h
;;
*-*-darwin*)
use_pie=auto
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking if we have working getaddrinfo" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking if we have working getaddrinfo... " >&6; }
if test "$cross_compiling" = yes; then :
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: assume it is working" >&5
$as_echo "assume it is working" >&6; }
else
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
- #include <mach-o/dyld.h>
+
+#include <mach-o/dyld.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
main() { if (NSVersionOfRunTimeLibrary("System") >= (60 << 16))
exit(0);
else
exit(1);
}
_ACEOF
if ac_fn_c_try_run "$LINENO"; then :
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: working" >&5
$as_echo "working" >&6; }
else
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: buggy" >&5
$as_echo "buggy" >&6; }
$as_echo "#define BROKEN_GETADDRINFO 1" >>confdefs.h
fi
rm -f core *.core core.conftest.* gmon.out bb.out conftest$ac_exeext \
conftest.$ac_objext conftest.beam conftest.$ac_ext
fi
$as_echo "#define SETEUID_BREAKS_SETUID 1" >>confdefs.h
$as_echo "#define BROKEN_SETREUID 1" >>confdefs.h
$as_echo "#define BROKEN_SETREGID 1" >>confdefs.h
$as_echo "#define BROKEN_GLOB 1" >>confdefs.h
cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
#define BIND_8_COMPAT 1
_ACEOF
$as_echo "#define SSH_TUN_FREEBSD 1" >>confdefs.h
$as_echo "#define SSH_TUN_COMPAT_AF 1" >>confdefs.h
$as_echo "#define SSH_TUN_PREPEND_AF 1" >>confdefs.h
ac_fn_c_check_decl "$LINENO" "AU_IPv4" "ac_cv_have_decl_AU_IPv4" "$ac_includes_default"
if test "x$ac_cv_have_decl_AU_IPv4" = xyes; then :
else
$as_echo "#define AU_IPv4 0" >>confdefs.h
#include <bsm/audit.h>
$as_echo "#define LASTLOG_WRITE_PUTUTXLINE 1" >>confdefs.h
fi
$as_echo "#define SPT_TYPE SPT_REUSEARGV" >>confdefs.h
for ac_func in sandbox_init
do :
ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "sandbox_init" "ac_cv_func_sandbox_init"
if test "x$ac_cv_func_sandbox_init" = xyes; then :
cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
#define HAVE_SANDBOX_INIT 1
_ACEOF
fi
done
for ac_header in sandbox.h
do :
ac_fn_c_check_header_mongrel "$LINENO" "sandbox.h" "ac_cv_header_sandbox_h" "$ac_includes_default"
if test "x$ac_cv_header_sandbox_h" = xyes; then :
cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
#define HAVE_SANDBOX_H 1
_ACEOF
fi
done
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for sandbox_apply in -lsandbox" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking for sandbox_apply in -lsandbox... " >&6; }
if ${ac_cv_lib_sandbox_sandbox_apply+:} false; then :
$as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
else
ac_check_lib_save_LIBS=$LIBS
LIBS="-lsandbox $LIBS"
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error.
Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC
builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */
#ifdef __cplusplus
extern "C"
#endif
char sandbox_apply ();
int
main ()
{
return sandbox_apply ();
;
return 0;
}
_ACEOF
if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then :
ac_cv_lib_sandbox_sandbox_apply=yes
else
ac_cv_lib_sandbox_sandbox_apply=no
fi
rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \
conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
LIBS=$ac_check_lib_save_LIBS
fi
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_lib_sandbox_sandbox_apply" >&5
$as_echo "$ac_cv_lib_sandbox_sandbox_apply" >&6; }
if test "x$ac_cv_lib_sandbox_sandbox_apply" = xyes; then :
SSHDLIBS="$SSHDLIBS -lsandbox"
fi
# proc_pidinfo()-based closefrom() replacement.
for ac_header in libproc.h
do :
ac_fn_c_check_header_mongrel "$LINENO" "libproc.h" "ac_cv_header_libproc_h" "$ac_includes_default"
if test "x$ac_cv_header_libproc_h" = xyes; then :
cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
#define HAVE_LIBPROC_H 1
_ACEOF
fi
done
for ac_func in proc_pidinfo
do :
ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "proc_pidinfo" "ac_cv_func_proc_pidinfo"
if test "x$ac_cv_func_proc_pidinfo" = xyes; then :
cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
#define HAVE_PROC_PIDINFO 1
_ACEOF
fi
done
;;
*-*-dragonfly*)
SSHDLIBS="$SSHDLIBS -lcrypt"
TEST_MALLOC_OPTIONS="AFGJPRX"
;;
*-*-haiku*)
LIBS="$LIBS -lbsd "
CFLAGS="$CFLAGS -D_BSD_SOURCE"
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for socket in -lnetwork" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking for socket in -lnetwork... " >&6; }
if ${ac_cv_lib_network_socket+:} false; then :
$as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
else
ac_check_lib_save_LIBS=$LIBS
LIBS="-lnetwork $LIBS"
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error.
Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC
builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */
#ifdef __cplusplus
extern "C"
#endif
char socket ();
int
main ()
{
return socket ();
;
return 0;
}
_ACEOF
if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then :
ac_cv_lib_network_socket=yes
else
ac_cv_lib_network_socket=no
fi
rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \
conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
LIBS=$ac_check_lib_save_LIBS
fi
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_lib_network_socket" >&5
$as_echo "$ac_cv_lib_network_socket" >&6; }
if test "x$ac_cv_lib_network_socket" = xyes; then :
cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
#define HAVE_LIBNETWORK 1
_ACEOF
LIBS="-lnetwork $LIBS"
fi
$as_echo "#define HAVE_U_INT64_T 1" >>confdefs.h
$as_echo "#define DISABLE_UTMPX 1" >>confdefs.h
MANTYPE=man
;;
*-*-hpux*)
# first we define all of the options common to all HP-UX releases
CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS -D_HPUX_SOURCE -D_XOPEN_SOURCE -D_XOPEN_SOURCE_EXTENDED=1"
IPADDR_IN_DISPLAY=yes
$as_echo "#define USE_PIPES 1" >>confdefs.h
$as_echo "#define LOGIN_NEEDS_UTMPX 1" >>confdefs.h
$as_echo "#define LOCKED_PASSWD_STRING \"*\"" >>confdefs.h
$as_echo "#define SPT_TYPE SPT_PSTAT" >>confdefs.h
$as_echo "#define PLATFORM_SYS_DIR_UID 2" >>confdefs.h
maildir="/var/mail"
LIBS="$LIBS -lsec"
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for t_error in -lxnet" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking for t_error in -lxnet... " >&6; }
if ${ac_cv_lib_xnet_t_error+:} false; then :
$as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
else
ac_check_lib_save_LIBS=$LIBS
LIBS="-lxnet $LIBS"
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error.
Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC
builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */
#ifdef __cplusplus
extern "C"
#endif
char t_error ();
int
main ()
{
return t_error ();
;
return 0;
}
_ACEOF
if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then :
ac_cv_lib_xnet_t_error=yes
else
ac_cv_lib_xnet_t_error=no
fi
rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \
conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
LIBS=$ac_check_lib_save_LIBS
fi
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_lib_xnet_t_error" >&5
$as_echo "$ac_cv_lib_xnet_t_error" >&6; }
if test "x$ac_cv_lib_xnet_t_error" = xyes; then :
cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
#define HAVE_LIBXNET 1
_ACEOF
LIBS="-lxnet $LIBS"
else
as_fn_error $? "*** -lxnet needed on HP-UX - check config.log ***" "$LINENO" 5
fi
# next, we define all of the options specific to major releases
case "$host" in
*-*-hpux10*)
if test -z "$GCC"; then
CFLAGS="$CFLAGS -Ae"
fi
;;
*-*-hpux11*)
$as_echo "#define PAM_SUN_CODEBASE 1" >>confdefs.h
$as_echo "#define DISABLE_UTMP 1" >>confdefs.h
$as_echo "#define USE_BTMP 1" >>confdefs.h
check_for_hpux_broken_getaddrinfo=1
check_for_conflicting_getspnam=1
;;
esac
# lastly, we define options specific to minor releases
case "$host" in
*-*-hpux10.26)
$as_echo "#define HAVE_SECUREWARE 1" >>confdefs.h
disable_ptmx_check=yes
LIBS="$LIBS -lsecpw"
;;
esac
;;
*-*-irix5*)
PATH="$PATH:/usr/etc"
$as_echo "#define BROKEN_INET_NTOA 1" >>confdefs.h
$as_echo "#define SETEUID_BREAKS_SETUID 1" >>confdefs.h
$as_echo "#define BROKEN_SETREUID 1" >>confdefs.h
$as_echo "#define BROKEN_SETREGID 1" >>confdefs.h
$as_echo "#define WITH_ABBREV_NO_TTY 1" >>confdefs.h
$as_echo "#define LOCKED_PASSWD_STRING \"*LK*\"" >>confdefs.h
;;
*-*-irix6*)
PATH="$PATH:/usr/etc"
$as_echo "#define WITH_IRIX_ARRAY 1" >>confdefs.h
$as_echo "#define WITH_IRIX_PROJECT 1" >>confdefs.h
$as_echo "#define WITH_IRIX_AUDIT 1" >>confdefs.h
ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "jlimit_startjob" "ac_cv_func_jlimit_startjob"
if test "x$ac_cv_func_jlimit_startjob" = xyes; then :
$as_echo "#define WITH_IRIX_JOBS 1" >>confdefs.h
fi
$as_echo "#define BROKEN_INET_NTOA 1" >>confdefs.h
$as_echo "#define SETEUID_BREAKS_SETUID 1" >>confdefs.h
$as_echo "#define BROKEN_SETREUID 1" >>confdefs.h
$as_echo "#define BROKEN_SETREGID 1" >>confdefs.h
$as_echo "#define BROKEN_UPDWTMPX 1" >>confdefs.h
$as_echo "#define WITH_ABBREV_NO_TTY 1" >>confdefs.h
$as_echo "#define LOCKED_PASSWD_STRING \"*LK*\"" >>confdefs.h
;;
*-*-k*bsd*-gnu | *-*-kopensolaris*-gnu)
check_for_libcrypt_later=1
$as_echo "#define PAM_TTY_KLUDGE 1" >>confdefs.h
$as_echo "#define LOCKED_PASSWD_PREFIX \"!\"" >>confdefs.h
$as_echo "#define SPT_TYPE SPT_REUSEARGV" >>confdefs.h
$as_echo "#define _PATH_BTMP \"/var/log/btmp\"" >>confdefs.h
$as_echo "#define USE_BTMP 1" >>confdefs.h
;;
*-*-linux*)
no_dev_ptmx=1
use_pie=auto
check_for_libcrypt_later=1
check_for_openpty_ctty_bug=1
CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS -D_XOPEN_SOURCE=600 -D_BSD_SOURCE -D_DEFAULT_SOURCE"
$as_echo "#define PAM_TTY_KLUDGE 1" >>confdefs.h
$as_echo "#define LOCKED_PASSWD_PREFIX \"!\"" >>confdefs.h
$as_echo "#define SPT_TYPE SPT_REUSEARGV" >>confdefs.h
$as_echo "#define LINK_OPNOTSUPP_ERRNO EPERM" >>confdefs.h
$as_echo "#define _PATH_BTMP \"/var/log/btmp\"" >>confdefs.h
$as_echo "#define USE_BTMP 1" >>confdefs.h
$as_echo "#define LINUX_OOM_ADJUST 1" >>confdefs.h
inet6_default_4in6=yes
case `uname -r` in
1.*|2.0.*)
$as_echo "#define BROKEN_CMSG_TYPE 1" >>confdefs.h
;;
esac
# tun(4) forwarding compat code
for ac_header in linux/if_tun.h
do :
ac_fn_c_check_header_mongrel "$LINENO" "linux/if_tun.h" "ac_cv_header_linux_if_tun_h" "$ac_includes_default"
if test "x$ac_cv_header_linux_if_tun_h" = xyes; then :
cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
#define HAVE_LINUX_IF_TUN_H 1
_ACEOF
fi
done
if test "x$ac_cv_header_linux_if_tun_h" = "xyes" ; then
$as_echo "#define SSH_TUN_LINUX 1" >>confdefs.h
$as_echo "#define SSH_TUN_COMPAT_AF 1" >>confdefs.h
$as_echo "#define SSH_TUN_PREPEND_AF 1" >>confdefs.h
fi
ac_fn_c_check_header_compile "$LINENO" "linux/if.h" "ac_cv_header_linux_if_h" "
#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TYPES_H
# include <sys/types.h>
#endif
"
if test "x$ac_cv_header_linux_if_h" = xyes; then :
$as_echo "#define SYS_RDOMAIN_LINUX 1" >>confdefs.h
fi
for ac_header in linux/seccomp.h linux/filter.h linux/audit.h
do :
as_ac_Header=`$as_echo "ac_cv_header_$ac_header" | $as_tr_sh`
ac_fn_c_check_header_compile "$LINENO" "$ac_header" "$as_ac_Header" "#include <linux/types.h>
"
if eval test \"x\$"$as_ac_Header"\" = x"yes"; then :
cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
#define `$as_echo "HAVE_$ac_header" | $as_tr_cpp` 1
_ACEOF
fi
done
# Obtain MIPS ABI
case "$host" in
mips*)
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
#if _MIPS_SIM != _ABIO32
#error
#endif
int
main ()
{
;
return 0;
}
_ACEOF
if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then :
mips_abi="o32"
else
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
#if _MIPS_SIM != _ABIN32
#error
#endif
int
main ()
{
;
return 0;
}
_ACEOF
if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then :
mips_abi="n32"
else
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
#if _MIPS_SIM != _ABI64
#error
#endif
int
main ()
{
;
return 0;
}
_ACEOF
if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then :
mips_abi="n64"
else
as_fn_error $? "unknown MIPS ABI" "$LINENO" 5
fi
rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
fi
rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
fi
rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
;;
esac
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for seccomp architecture" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking for seccomp architecture... " >&6; }
seccomp_audit_arch=
case "$host" in
x86_64-*)
seccomp_audit_arch=AUDIT_ARCH_X86_64
+ # X32: AMD64 instructions in 32bit address space.
+ if test "x$ac_cv_sizeof_size_t" = "x4" ; then
+ seccomp_audit_arch=AUDIT_ARCH_I386
+ fi
;;
i*86-*)
seccomp_audit_arch=AUDIT_ARCH_I386
;;
arm*-*)
seccomp_audit_arch=AUDIT_ARCH_ARM
;;
aarch64*-*)
seccomp_audit_arch=AUDIT_ARCH_AARCH64
;;
s390x-*)
seccomp_audit_arch=AUDIT_ARCH_S390X
;;
s390-*)
seccomp_audit_arch=AUDIT_ARCH_S390
;;
powerpc64-*)
seccomp_audit_arch=AUDIT_ARCH_PPC64
;;
powerpc64le-*)
seccomp_audit_arch=AUDIT_ARCH_PPC64LE
;;
mips-*)
seccomp_audit_arch=AUDIT_ARCH_MIPS
;;
mipsel-*)
seccomp_audit_arch=AUDIT_ARCH_MIPSEL
;;
mips64-*)
case "$mips_abi" in
"n32")
seccomp_audit_arch=AUDIT_ARCH_MIPS64N32
;;
"n64")
seccomp_audit_arch=AUDIT_ARCH_MIPS64
;;
esac
;;
mips64el-*)
case "$mips_abi" in
"n32")
seccomp_audit_arch=AUDIT_ARCH_MIPSEL64N32
;;
"n64")
seccomp_audit_arch=AUDIT_ARCH_MIPSEL64
;;
esac
;;
+ riscv64-*)
+ seccomp_audit_arch=AUDIT_ARCH_RISCV64
+ ;;
esac
if test "x$seccomp_audit_arch" != "x" ; then
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: \"$seccomp_audit_arch\"" >&5
$as_echo "\"$seccomp_audit_arch\"" >&6; }
cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
#define SECCOMP_AUDIT_ARCH $seccomp_audit_arch
_ACEOF
else
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: architecture not supported" >&5
$as_echo "architecture not supported" >&6; }
fi
;;
mips-sony-bsd|mips-sony-newsos4)
$as_echo "#define NEED_SETPGRP 1" >>confdefs.h
SONY=1
;;
*-*-netbsd*)
check_for_libcrypt_before=1
if test "x$withval" != "xno" ; then
rpath_opt="-R"
fi
CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS -D_OPENBSD_SOURCE"
$as_echo "#define SSH_TUN_FREEBSD 1" >>confdefs.h
ac_fn_c_check_header_mongrel "$LINENO" "net/if_tap.h" "ac_cv_header_net_if_tap_h" "$ac_includes_default"
if test "x$ac_cv_header_net_if_tap_h" = xyes; then :
else
$as_echo "#define SSH_TUN_NO_L2 1" >>confdefs.h
fi
$as_echo "#define SSH_TUN_PREPEND_AF 1" >>confdefs.h
TEST_MALLOC_OPTIONS="AJRX"
$as_echo "#define BROKEN_READ_COMPARISON 1" >>confdefs.h
;;
*-*-freebsd*)
check_for_libcrypt_later=1
$as_echo "#define LOCKED_PASSWD_PREFIX \"*LOCKED*\"" >>confdefs.h
$as_echo "#define SSH_TUN_FREEBSD 1" >>confdefs.h
ac_fn_c_check_header_mongrel "$LINENO" "net/if_tap.h" "ac_cv_header_net_if_tap_h" "$ac_includes_default"
if test "x$ac_cv_header_net_if_tap_h" = xyes; then :
else
$as_echo "#define SSH_TUN_NO_L2 1" >>confdefs.h
fi
$as_echo "#define BROKEN_GLOB 1" >>confdefs.h
TEST_MALLOC_OPTIONS="AJRX"
# Preauth crypto occasionally uses file descriptors for crypto offload
# and will crash if they cannot be opened.
$as_echo "#define SANDBOX_SKIP_RLIMIT_NOFILE 1" >>confdefs.h
;;
*-*-bsdi*)
$as_echo "#define SETEUID_BREAKS_SETUID 1" >>confdefs.h
$as_echo "#define BROKEN_SETREUID 1" >>confdefs.h
$as_echo "#define BROKEN_SETREGID 1" >>confdefs.h
;;
*-next-*)
conf_lastlog_location="/usr/adm/lastlog"
conf_utmp_location=/etc/utmp
conf_wtmp_location=/usr/adm/wtmp
maildir=/usr/spool/mail
$as_echo "#define HAVE_NEXT 1" >>confdefs.h
$as_echo "#define USE_PIPES 1" >>confdefs.h
$as_echo "#define BROKEN_SAVED_UIDS 1" >>confdefs.h
;;
*-*-openbsd*)
use_pie=auto
$as_echo "#define HAVE_ATTRIBUTE__SENTINEL__ 1" >>confdefs.h
$as_echo "#define HAVE_ATTRIBUTE__BOUNDED__ 1" >>confdefs.h
$as_echo "#define SSH_TUN_OPENBSD 1" >>confdefs.h
$as_echo "#define SYSLOG_R_SAFE_IN_SIGHAND 1" >>confdefs.h
TEST_MALLOC_OPTIONS="AFGJPRX"
;;
*-*-solaris*)
if test "x$withval" != "xno" ; then
rpath_opt="-R"
fi
$as_echo "#define PAM_SUN_CODEBASE 1" >>confdefs.h
$as_echo "#define LOGIN_NEEDS_UTMPX 1" >>confdefs.h
$as_echo "#define PAM_TTY_KLUDGE 1" >>confdefs.h
$as_echo "#define SSHPAM_CHAUTHTOK_NEEDS_RUID 1" >>confdefs.h
$as_echo "#define LOCKED_PASSWD_STRING \"*LK*\"" >>confdefs.h
# Pushing STREAMS modules will cause sshd to acquire a controlling tty.
$as_echo "#define SSHD_ACQUIRES_CTTY 1" >>confdefs.h
$as_echo "#define PASSWD_NEEDS_USERNAME 1" >>confdefs.h
$as_echo "#define BROKEN_TCGETATTR_ICANON 1" >>confdefs.h
external_path_file=/etc/default/login
# hardwire lastlog location (can't detect it on some versions)
conf_lastlog_location="/var/adm/lastlog"
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for obsolete utmp and wtmp in solaris2.x" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking for obsolete utmp and wtmp in solaris2.x... " >&6; }
sol2ver=`echo "$host"| sed -e 's/.*[0-9]\.//'`
if test "$sol2ver" -ge 8; then
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
$as_echo "yes" >&6; }
$as_echo "#define DISABLE_UTMP 1" >>confdefs.h
$as_echo "#define DISABLE_WTMP 1" >>confdefs.h
else
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
$as_echo "no" >&6; }
fi
for ac_func in setpflags
do :
ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "setpflags" "ac_cv_func_setpflags"
if test "x$ac_cv_func_setpflags" = xyes; then :
cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
#define HAVE_SETPFLAGS 1
_ACEOF
fi
done
for ac_func in setppriv
do :
ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "setppriv" "ac_cv_func_setppriv"
if test "x$ac_cv_func_setppriv" = xyes; then :
cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
#define HAVE_SETPPRIV 1
_ACEOF
fi
done
for ac_func in priv_basicset
do :
ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "priv_basicset" "ac_cv_func_priv_basicset"
if test "x$ac_cv_func_priv_basicset" = xyes; then :
cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
#define HAVE_PRIV_BASICSET 1
_ACEOF
fi
done
for ac_header in priv.h
do :
ac_fn_c_check_header_mongrel "$LINENO" "priv.h" "ac_cv_header_priv_h" "$ac_includes_default"
if test "x$ac_cv_header_priv_h" = xyes; then :
cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
#define HAVE_PRIV_H 1
_ACEOF
fi
done
# Check whether --with-solaris-contracts was given.
if test "${with_solaris_contracts+set}" = set; then :
withval=$with_solaris_contracts;
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for ct_tmpl_activate in -lcontract" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking for ct_tmpl_activate in -lcontract... " >&6; }
if ${ac_cv_lib_contract_ct_tmpl_activate+:} false; then :
$as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
else
ac_check_lib_save_LIBS=$LIBS
LIBS="-lcontract $LIBS"
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error.
Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC
builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */
#ifdef __cplusplus
extern "C"
#endif
char ct_tmpl_activate ();
int
main ()
{
return ct_tmpl_activate ();
;
return 0;
}
_ACEOF
if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then :
ac_cv_lib_contract_ct_tmpl_activate=yes
else
ac_cv_lib_contract_ct_tmpl_activate=no
fi
rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \
conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
LIBS=$ac_check_lib_save_LIBS
fi
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_lib_contract_ct_tmpl_activate" >&5
$as_echo "$ac_cv_lib_contract_ct_tmpl_activate" >&6; }
if test "x$ac_cv_lib_contract_ct_tmpl_activate" = xyes; then :
$as_echo "#define USE_SOLARIS_PROCESS_CONTRACTS 1" >>confdefs.h
LIBS="$LIBS -lcontract"
SPC_MSG="yes"
fi
fi
# Check whether --with-solaris-projects was given.
if test "${with_solaris_projects+set}" = set; then :
withval=$with_solaris_projects;
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for setproject in -lproject" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking for setproject in -lproject... " >&6; }
if ${ac_cv_lib_project_setproject+:} false; then :
$as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
else
ac_check_lib_save_LIBS=$LIBS
LIBS="-lproject $LIBS"
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error.
Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC
builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */
#ifdef __cplusplus
extern "C"
#endif
char setproject ();
int
main ()
{
return setproject ();
;
return 0;
}
_ACEOF
if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then :
ac_cv_lib_project_setproject=yes
else
ac_cv_lib_project_setproject=no
fi
rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \
conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
LIBS=$ac_check_lib_save_LIBS
fi
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_lib_project_setproject" >&5
$as_echo "$ac_cv_lib_project_setproject" >&6; }
if test "x$ac_cv_lib_project_setproject" = xyes; then :
$as_echo "#define USE_SOLARIS_PROJECTS 1" >>confdefs.h
LIBS="$LIBS -lproject"
SP_MSG="yes"
fi
fi
# Check whether --with-solaris-privs was given.
if test "${with_solaris_privs+set}" = set; then :
withval=$with_solaris_privs;
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for Solaris/Illumos privilege support" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking for Solaris/Illumos privilege support... " >&6; }
if test "x$ac_cv_func_setppriv" = "xyes" -a \
"x$ac_cv_header_priv_h" = "xyes" ; then
SOLARIS_PRIVS=yes
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: found" >&5
$as_echo "found" >&6; }
$as_echo "#define NO_UID_RESTORATION_TEST 1" >>confdefs.h
$as_echo "#define USE_SOLARIS_PRIVS 1" >>confdefs.h
SPP_MSG="yes"
else
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: not found" >&5
$as_echo "not found" >&6; }
as_fn_error $? "*** must have support for Solaris privileges to use --with-solaris-privs" "$LINENO" 5
fi
fi
TEST_SHELL=$SHELL # let configure find us a capable shell
;;
*-*-sunos4*)
CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS -DSUNOS4"
for ac_func in getpwanam
do :
ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "getpwanam" "ac_cv_func_getpwanam"
if test "x$ac_cv_func_getpwanam" = xyes; then :
cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
#define HAVE_GETPWANAM 1
_ACEOF
fi
done
$as_echo "#define PAM_SUN_CODEBASE 1" >>confdefs.h
conf_utmp_location=/etc/utmp
conf_wtmp_location=/var/adm/wtmp
conf_lastlog_location=/var/adm/lastlog
$as_echo "#define USE_PIPES 1" >>confdefs.h
$as_echo "#define DISABLE_UTMPX 1" >>confdefs.h
;;
*-ncr-sysv*)
LIBS="$LIBS -lc89"
$as_echo "#define USE_PIPES 1" >>confdefs.h
$as_echo "#define SSHD_ACQUIRES_CTTY 1" >>confdefs.h
$as_echo "#define SETEUID_BREAKS_SETUID 1" >>confdefs.h
$as_echo "#define BROKEN_SETREUID 1" >>confdefs.h
$as_echo "#define BROKEN_SETREGID 1" >>confdefs.h
;;
*-sni-sysv*)
# /usr/ucblib MUST NOT be searched on ReliantUNIX
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for dlsym in -ldl" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking for dlsym in -ldl... " >&6; }
if ${ac_cv_lib_dl_dlsym+:} false; then :
$as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
else
ac_check_lib_save_LIBS=$LIBS
LIBS="-ldl $LIBS"
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error.
Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC
builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */
#ifdef __cplusplus
extern "C"
#endif
char dlsym ();
int
main ()
{
return dlsym ();
;
return 0;
}
_ACEOF
if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then :
ac_cv_lib_dl_dlsym=yes
else
ac_cv_lib_dl_dlsym=no
fi
rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \
conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
LIBS=$ac_check_lib_save_LIBS
fi
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_lib_dl_dlsym" >&5
$as_echo "$ac_cv_lib_dl_dlsym" >&6; }
if test "x$ac_cv_lib_dl_dlsym" = xyes; then :
cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
#define HAVE_LIBDL 1
_ACEOF
LIBS="-ldl $LIBS"
fi
# -lresolv needs to be at the end of LIBS or DNS lookups break
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for res_query in -lresolv" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking for res_query in -lresolv... " >&6; }
if ${ac_cv_lib_resolv_res_query+:} false; then :
$as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
else
ac_check_lib_save_LIBS=$LIBS
LIBS="-lresolv $LIBS"
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error.
Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC
builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */
#ifdef __cplusplus
extern "C"
#endif
char res_query ();
int
main ()
{
return res_query ();
;
return 0;
}
_ACEOF
if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then :
ac_cv_lib_resolv_res_query=yes
else
ac_cv_lib_resolv_res_query=no
fi
rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \
conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
LIBS=$ac_check_lib_save_LIBS
fi
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_lib_resolv_res_query" >&5
$as_echo "$ac_cv_lib_resolv_res_query" >&6; }
if test "x$ac_cv_lib_resolv_res_query" = xyes; then :
LIBS="$LIBS -lresolv"
fi
IPADDR_IN_DISPLAY=yes
$as_echo "#define USE_PIPES 1" >>confdefs.h
$as_echo "#define IP_TOS_IS_BROKEN 1" >>confdefs.h
$as_echo "#define SETEUID_BREAKS_SETUID 1" >>confdefs.h
$as_echo "#define BROKEN_SETREUID 1" >>confdefs.h
$as_echo "#define BROKEN_SETREGID 1" >>confdefs.h
$as_echo "#define SSHD_ACQUIRES_CTTY 1" >>confdefs.h
external_path_file=/etc/default/login
# /usr/ucblib/libucb.a no longer needed on ReliantUNIX
# Attention: always take care to bind libsocket and libnsl before libc,
# otherwise you will find lots of "SIOCGPGRP errno 22" on syslog
;;
# UnixWare 1.x, UnixWare 2.x, and others based on code from Univel.
*-*-sysv4.2*)
$as_echo "#define USE_PIPES 1" >>confdefs.h
$as_echo "#define SETEUID_BREAKS_SETUID 1" >>confdefs.h
$as_echo "#define BROKEN_SETREUID 1" >>confdefs.h
$as_echo "#define BROKEN_SETREGID 1" >>confdefs.h
$as_echo "#define PASSWD_NEEDS_USERNAME 1" >>confdefs.h
$as_echo "#define LOCKED_PASSWD_STRING \"*LK*\"" >>confdefs.h
TEST_SHELL=$SHELL # let configure find us a capable shell
;;
# UnixWare 7.x, OpenUNIX 8
*-*-sysv5*)
CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS -Dvsnprintf=_xvsnprintf -Dsnprintf=_xsnprintf"
$as_echo "#define UNIXWARE_LONG_PASSWORDS 1" >>confdefs.h
$as_echo "#define USE_PIPES 1" >>confdefs.h
$as_echo "#define SETEUID_BREAKS_SETUID 1" >>confdefs.h
$as_echo "#define BROKEN_GETADDRINFO 1" >>confdefs.h
$as_echo "#define BROKEN_SETREUID 1" >>confdefs.h
$as_echo "#define BROKEN_SETREGID 1" >>confdefs.h
$as_echo "#define PASSWD_NEEDS_USERNAME 1" >>confdefs.h
$as_echo "#define BROKEN_TCGETATTR_ICANON 1" >>confdefs.h
TEST_SHELL=$SHELL # let configure find us a capable shell
check_for_libcrypt_later=1
case "$host" in
*-*-sysv5SCO_SV*) # SCO OpenServer 6.x
maildir=/var/spool/mail
$as_echo "#define BROKEN_UPDWTMPX 1" >>confdefs.h
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for getluid in -lprot" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking for getluid in -lprot... " >&6; }
if ${ac_cv_lib_prot_getluid+:} false; then :
$as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
else
ac_check_lib_save_LIBS=$LIBS
LIBS="-lprot $LIBS"
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error.
Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC
builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */
#ifdef __cplusplus
extern "C"
#endif
char getluid ();
int
main ()
{
return getluid ();
;
return 0;
}
_ACEOF
if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then :
ac_cv_lib_prot_getluid=yes
else
ac_cv_lib_prot_getluid=no
fi
rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \
conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
LIBS=$ac_check_lib_save_LIBS
fi
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_lib_prot_getluid" >&5
$as_echo "$ac_cv_lib_prot_getluid" >&6; }
if test "x$ac_cv_lib_prot_getluid" = xyes; then :
LIBS="$LIBS -lprot"
for ac_func in getluid setluid
do :
as_ac_var=`$as_echo "ac_cv_func_$ac_func" | $as_tr_sh`
ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "$ac_func" "$as_ac_var"
if eval test \"x\$"$as_ac_var"\" = x"yes"; then :
cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
#define `$as_echo "HAVE_$ac_func" | $as_tr_cpp` 1
_ACEOF
fi
done
fi
;;
*) $as_echo "#define LOCKED_PASSWD_STRING \"*LK*\"" >>confdefs.h
;;
esac
;;
*-*-sysv*)
;;
# SCO UNIX and OEM versions of SCO UNIX
*-*-sco3.2v4*)
as_fn_error $? "\"This Platform is no longer supported.\"" "$LINENO" 5
;;
# SCO OpenServer 5.x
*-*-sco3.2v5*)
if test -z "$GCC"; then
CFLAGS="$CFLAGS -belf"
fi
LIBS="$LIBS -lprot -lx -ltinfo -lm"
no_dev_ptmx=1
$as_echo "#define USE_PIPES 1" >>confdefs.h
$as_echo "#define HAVE_SECUREWARE 1" >>confdefs.h
$as_echo "#define DISABLE_SHADOW 1" >>confdefs.h
$as_echo "#define DISABLE_FD_PASSING 1" >>confdefs.h
$as_echo "#define SETEUID_BREAKS_SETUID 1" >>confdefs.h
$as_echo "#define BROKEN_GETADDRINFO 1" >>confdefs.h
$as_echo "#define BROKEN_SETREUID 1" >>confdefs.h
$as_echo "#define BROKEN_SETREGID 1" >>confdefs.h
$as_echo "#define WITH_ABBREV_NO_TTY 1" >>confdefs.h
$as_echo "#define BROKEN_UPDWTMPX 1" >>confdefs.h
$as_echo "#define PASSWD_NEEDS_USERNAME 1" >>confdefs.h
for ac_func in getluid setluid
do :
as_ac_var=`$as_echo "ac_cv_func_$ac_func" | $as_tr_sh`
ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "$ac_func" "$as_ac_var"
if eval test \"x\$"$as_ac_var"\" = x"yes"; then :
cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
#define `$as_echo "HAVE_$ac_func" | $as_tr_cpp` 1
_ACEOF
fi
done
MANTYPE=man
TEST_SHELL=$SHELL # let configure find us a capable shell
SKIP_DISABLE_LASTLOG_DEFINE=yes
;;
*-dec-osf*)
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for Digital Unix SIA" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking for Digital Unix SIA... " >&6; }
no_osfsia=""
# Check whether --with-osfsia was given.
if test "${with_osfsia+set}" = set; then :
withval=$with_osfsia;
if test "x$withval" = "xno" ; then
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: disabled" >&5
$as_echo "disabled" >&6; }
no_osfsia=1
fi
fi
if test -z "$no_osfsia" ; then
if test -f /etc/sia/matrix.conf; then
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
$as_echo "yes" >&6; }
$as_echo "#define HAVE_OSF_SIA 1" >>confdefs.h
$as_echo "#define DISABLE_LOGIN 1" >>confdefs.h
$as_echo "#define DISABLE_FD_PASSING 1" >>confdefs.h
LIBS="$LIBS -lsecurity -ldb -lm -laud"
SIA_MSG="yes"
else
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
$as_echo "no" >&6; }
$as_echo "#define LOCKED_PASSWD_SUBSTR \"Nologin\"" >>confdefs.h
fi
fi
$as_echo "#define BROKEN_GETADDRINFO 1" >>confdefs.h
$as_echo "#define SETEUID_BREAKS_SETUID 1" >>confdefs.h
$as_echo "#define BROKEN_SETREUID 1" >>confdefs.h
$as_echo "#define BROKEN_SETREGID 1" >>confdefs.h
$as_echo "#define BROKEN_READV_COMPARISON 1" >>confdefs.h
;;
*-*-nto-qnx*)
$as_echo "#define USE_PIPES 1" >>confdefs.h
$as_echo "#define NO_X11_UNIX_SOCKETS 1" >>confdefs.h
$as_echo "#define DISABLE_LASTLOG 1" >>confdefs.h
$as_echo "#define SSHD_ACQUIRES_CTTY 1" >>confdefs.h
$as_echo "#define BROKEN_SHADOW_EXPIRE 1" >>confdefs.h
enable_etc_default_login=no # has incompatible /etc/default/login
case "$host" in
*-*-nto-qnx6*)
$as_echo "#define DISABLE_FD_PASSING 1" >>confdefs.h
;;
esac
;;
*-*-ultrix*)
$as_echo "#define BROKEN_GETGROUPS 1" >>confdefs.h
$as_echo "#define NEED_SETPGRP 1" >>confdefs.h
$as_echo "#define HAVE_SYS_SYSLOG_H 1" >>confdefs.h
$as_echo "#define DISABLE_UTMPX 1" >>confdefs.h
# DISABLE_FD_PASSING so that we call setpgrp as root, otherwise we
# don't get a controlling tty.
$as_echo "#define DISABLE_FD_PASSING 1" >>confdefs.h
# On Ultrix some headers are not protected against multiple includes,
# so we create wrappers and put it where the compiler will find it.
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: WARNING: creating compat wrappers for headers" >&5
$as_echo "$as_me: WARNING: creating compat wrappers for headers" >&2;}
mkdir -p netinet
for header in netinet/ip.h netdb.h resolv.h; do
name=`echo $header | tr 'a-z/.' 'A-Z__'`
cat >$header <<EOD
#ifndef _SSH_COMPAT_${name}
#define _SSH_COMPAT_${name}
#include "/usr/include/${header}"
#endif
EOD
done
;;
*-*-lynxos)
CFLAGS="$CFLAGS -D__NO_INCLUDE_WARN__"
$as_echo "#define BROKEN_SETVBUF 1" >>confdefs.h
;;
esac
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking compiler and flags for sanity" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking compiler and flags for sanity... " >&6; }
if test "$cross_compiling" = yes; then :
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: WARNING: cross compiling: not checking compiler sanity" >&5
$as_echo "$as_me: WARNING: cross compiling: not checking compiler sanity" >&2;}
else
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
- #include <stdio.h>
+ #include <stdlib.h>
int
main ()
{
exit(0);
;
return 0;
}
_ACEOF
if ac_fn_c_try_run "$LINENO"; then :
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
$as_echo "yes" >&6; }
else
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
$as_echo "no" >&6; }
as_fn_error $? "*** compiler cannot create working executables, check config.log ***" "$LINENO" 5
fi
rm -f core *.core core.conftest.* gmon.out bb.out conftest$ac_exeext \
conftest.$ac_objext conftest.beam conftest.$ac_ext
fi
# Checks for libraries.
ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "setsockopt" "ac_cv_func_setsockopt"
if test "x$ac_cv_func_setsockopt" = xyes; then :
else
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for setsockopt in -lsocket" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking for setsockopt in -lsocket... " >&6; }
if ${ac_cv_lib_socket_setsockopt+:} false; then :
$as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
else
ac_check_lib_save_LIBS=$LIBS
LIBS="-lsocket $LIBS"
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error.
Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC
builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */
#ifdef __cplusplus
extern "C"
#endif
char setsockopt ();
int
main ()
{
return setsockopt ();
;
return 0;
}
_ACEOF
if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then :
ac_cv_lib_socket_setsockopt=yes
else
ac_cv_lib_socket_setsockopt=no
fi
rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \
conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
LIBS=$ac_check_lib_save_LIBS
fi
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_lib_socket_setsockopt" >&5
$as_echo "$ac_cv_lib_socket_setsockopt" >&6; }
if test "x$ac_cv_lib_socket_setsockopt" = xyes; then :
cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
#define HAVE_LIBSOCKET 1
_ACEOF
LIBS="-lsocket $LIBS"
fi
fi
for ac_func in dirname
do :
ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "dirname" "ac_cv_func_dirname"
if test "x$ac_cv_func_dirname" = xyes; then :
cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
#define HAVE_DIRNAME 1
_ACEOF
for ac_header in libgen.h
do :
ac_fn_c_check_header_mongrel "$LINENO" "libgen.h" "ac_cv_header_libgen_h" "$ac_includes_default"
if test "x$ac_cv_header_libgen_h" = xyes; then :
cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
#define HAVE_LIBGEN_H 1
_ACEOF
fi
done
else
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for dirname in -lgen" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking for dirname in -lgen... " >&6; }
if ${ac_cv_lib_gen_dirname+:} false; then :
$as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
else
ac_check_lib_save_LIBS=$LIBS
LIBS="-lgen $LIBS"
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error.
Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC
builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */
#ifdef __cplusplus
extern "C"
#endif
char dirname ();
int
main ()
{
return dirname ();
;
return 0;
}
_ACEOF
if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then :
ac_cv_lib_gen_dirname=yes
else
ac_cv_lib_gen_dirname=no
fi
rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \
conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
LIBS=$ac_check_lib_save_LIBS
fi
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_lib_gen_dirname" >&5
$as_echo "$ac_cv_lib_gen_dirname" >&6; }
if test "x$ac_cv_lib_gen_dirname" = xyes; then :
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for broken dirname" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking for broken dirname... " >&6; }
if ${ac_cv_have_broken_dirname+:} false; then :
$as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
else
save_LIBS="$LIBS"
LIBS="$LIBS -lgen"
if test "$cross_compiling" = yes; then :
ac_cv_have_broken_dirname="no"
else
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
#include <libgen.h>
#include <string.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
int main(int argc, char **argv) {
char *s, buf[32];
strncpy(buf,"/etc", 32);
s = dirname(buf);
if (!s || strncmp(s, "/", 32) != 0) {
exit(1);
} else {
exit(0);
}
}
_ACEOF
if ac_fn_c_try_run "$LINENO"; then :
ac_cv_have_broken_dirname="no"
else
ac_cv_have_broken_dirname="yes"
fi
rm -f core *.core core.conftest.* gmon.out bb.out conftest$ac_exeext \
conftest.$ac_objext conftest.beam conftest.$ac_ext
fi
LIBS="$save_LIBS"
fi
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_have_broken_dirname" >&5
$as_echo "$ac_cv_have_broken_dirname" >&6; }
if test "x$ac_cv_have_broken_dirname" = "xno" ; then
LIBS="$LIBS -lgen"
$as_echo "#define HAVE_DIRNAME 1" >>confdefs.h
for ac_header in libgen.h
do :
ac_fn_c_check_header_mongrel "$LINENO" "libgen.h" "ac_cv_header_libgen_h" "$ac_includes_default"
if test "x$ac_cv_header_libgen_h" = xyes; then :
cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
#define HAVE_LIBGEN_H 1
_ACEOF
fi
done
fi
fi
fi
done
ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "getspnam" "ac_cv_func_getspnam"
if test "x$ac_cv_func_getspnam" = xyes; then :
else
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for getspnam in -lgen" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking for getspnam in -lgen... " >&6; }
if ${ac_cv_lib_gen_getspnam+:} false; then :
$as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
else
ac_check_lib_save_LIBS=$LIBS
LIBS="-lgen $LIBS"
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error.
Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC
builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */
#ifdef __cplusplus
extern "C"
#endif
char getspnam ();
int
main ()
{
return getspnam ();
;
return 0;
}
_ACEOF
if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then :
ac_cv_lib_gen_getspnam=yes
else
ac_cv_lib_gen_getspnam=no
fi
rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \
conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
LIBS=$ac_check_lib_save_LIBS
fi
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_lib_gen_getspnam" >&5
$as_echo "$ac_cv_lib_gen_getspnam" >&6; }
if test "x$ac_cv_lib_gen_getspnam" = xyes; then :
LIBS="$LIBS -lgen"
fi
fi
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for library containing basename" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking for library containing basename... " >&6; }
if ${ac_cv_search_basename+:} false; then :
$as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
else
ac_func_search_save_LIBS=$LIBS
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error.
Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC
builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */
#ifdef __cplusplus
extern "C"
#endif
char basename ();
int
main ()
{
return basename ();
;
return 0;
}
_ACEOF
for ac_lib in '' gen; do
if test -z "$ac_lib"; then
ac_res="none required"
else
ac_res=-l$ac_lib
LIBS="-l$ac_lib $ac_func_search_save_LIBS"
fi
if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then :
ac_cv_search_basename=$ac_res
fi
rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \
conftest$ac_exeext
if ${ac_cv_search_basename+:} false; then :
break
fi
done
if ${ac_cv_search_basename+:} false; then :
else
ac_cv_search_basename=no
fi
rm conftest.$ac_ext
LIBS=$ac_func_search_save_LIBS
fi
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_search_basename" >&5
$as_echo "$ac_cv_search_basename" >&6; }
ac_res=$ac_cv_search_basename
if test "$ac_res" != no; then :
test "$ac_res" = "none required" || LIBS="$ac_res $LIBS"
$as_echo "#define HAVE_BASENAME 1" >>confdefs.h
fi
zlib=yes
# Check whether --with-zlib was given.
if test "${with_zlib+set}" = set; then :
withval=$with_zlib; if test "x$withval" = "xno" ; then
zlib=no
elif test "x$withval" != "xyes"; then
if test -d "$withval/lib"; then
if test -n "${rpath_opt}"; then
LDFLAGS="-L${withval}/lib ${rpath_opt}${withval}/lib ${LDFLAGS}"
else
LDFLAGS="-L${withval}/lib ${LDFLAGS}"
fi
else
if test -n "${rpath_opt}"; then
LDFLAGS="-L${withval} ${rpath_opt}${withval} ${LDFLAGS}"
else
LDFLAGS="-L${withval} ${LDFLAGS}"
fi
fi
if test -d "$withval/include"; then
CPPFLAGS="-I${withval}/include ${CPPFLAGS}"
else
CPPFLAGS="-I${withval} ${CPPFLAGS}"
fi
fi
fi
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for zlib" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking for zlib... " >&6; }
if test "x${zlib}" = "xno"; then
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
$as_echo "no" >&6; }
else
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
$as_echo "yes" >&6; }
$as_echo "#define WITH_ZLIB 1" >>confdefs.h
ac_fn_c_check_header_mongrel "$LINENO" "zlib.h" "ac_cv_header_zlib_h" "$ac_includes_default"
if test "x$ac_cv_header_zlib_h" = xyes; then :
else
as_fn_error $? "*** zlib.h missing - please install first or check config.log ***" "$LINENO" 5
fi
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for deflate in -lz" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking for deflate in -lz... " >&6; }
if ${ac_cv_lib_z_deflate+:} false; then :
$as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
else
ac_check_lib_save_LIBS=$LIBS
LIBS="-lz $LIBS"
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error.
Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC
builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */
#ifdef __cplusplus
extern "C"
#endif
char deflate ();
int
main ()
{
return deflate ();
;
return 0;
}
_ACEOF
if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then :
ac_cv_lib_z_deflate=yes
else
ac_cv_lib_z_deflate=no
fi
rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \
conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
LIBS=$ac_check_lib_save_LIBS
fi
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_lib_z_deflate" >&5
$as_echo "$ac_cv_lib_z_deflate" >&6; }
if test "x$ac_cv_lib_z_deflate" = xyes; then :
cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
#define HAVE_LIBZ 1
_ACEOF
LIBS="-lz $LIBS"
else
saved_CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS"
saved_LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS"
save_LIBS="$LIBS"
if test -n "${rpath_opt}"; then
LDFLAGS="-L/usr/local/lib ${rpath_opt}/usr/local/lib ${saved_LDFLAGS}"
else
LDFLAGS="-L/usr/local/lib ${saved_LDFLAGS}"
fi
CPPFLAGS="-I/usr/local/include ${saved_CPPFLAGS}"
LIBS="$LIBS -lz"
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error.
Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC
builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */
#ifdef __cplusplus
extern "C"
#endif
char deflate ();
int
main ()
{
return deflate ();
;
return 0;
}
_ACEOF
if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then :
$as_echo "#define HAVE_LIBZ 1" >>confdefs.h
else
as_fn_error $? "*** zlib missing - please install first or check config.log ***" "$LINENO" 5
fi
rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \
conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
fi
# Check whether --with-zlib-version-check was given.
if test "${with_zlib_version_check+set}" = set; then :
withval=$with_zlib_version_check; if test "x$withval" = "xno" ; then
zlib_check_nonfatal=1
fi
fi
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for possibly buggy zlib" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking for possibly buggy zlib... " >&6; }
if test "$cross_compiling" = yes; then :
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: WARNING: cross compiling: not checking zlib version" >&5
$as_echo "$as_me: WARNING: cross compiling: not checking zlib version" >&2;}
else
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <zlib.h>
int
main ()
{
int a=0, b=0, c=0, d=0, n, v;
n = sscanf(ZLIB_VERSION, "%d.%d.%d.%d", &a, &b, &c, &d);
if (n != 3 && n != 4)
exit(1);
v = a*1000000 + b*10000 + c*100 + d;
fprintf(stderr, "found zlib version %s (%d)\n", ZLIB_VERSION, v);
/* 1.1.4 is OK */
if (a == 1 && b == 1 && c >= 4)
exit(0);
/* 1.2.3 and up are OK */
if (v >= 1020300)
exit(0);
exit(2);
;
return 0;
}
_ACEOF
if ac_fn_c_try_run "$LINENO"; then :
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
$as_echo "no" >&6; }
else
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
$as_echo "yes" >&6; }
if test -z "$zlib_check_nonfatal" ; then
as_fn_error $? "*** zlib too old - check config.log ***
Your reported zlib version has known security problems. It's possible your
vendor has fixed these problems without changing the version number. If you
are sure this is the case, you can disable the check by running
\"./configure --without-zlib-version-check\".
If you are in doubt, upgrade zlib to version 1.2.3 or greater.
See http://www.gzip.org/zlib/ for details." "$LINENO" 5
else
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: WARNING: zlib version may have security problems" >&5
$as_echo "$as_me: WARNING: zlib version may have security problems" >&2;}
fi
fi
rm -f core *.core core.conftest.* gmon.out bb.out conftest$ac_exeext \
conftest.$ac_objext conftest.beam conftest.$ac_ext
fi
fi
ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "strcasecmp" "ac_cv_func_strcasecmp"
if test "x$ac_cv_func_strcasecmp" = xyes; then :
else
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for strcasecmp in -lresolv" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking for strcasecmp in -lresolv... " >&6; }
if ${ac_cv_lib_resolv_strcasecmp+:} false; then :
$as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
else
ac_check_lib_save_LIBS=$LIBS
LIBS="-lresolv $LIBS"
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error.
Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC
builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */
#ifdef __cplusplus
extern "C"
#endif
char strcasecmp ();
int
main ()
{
return strcasecmp ();
;
return 0;
}
_ACEOF
if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then :
ac_cv_lib_resolv_strcasecmp=yes
else
ac_cv_lib_resolv_strcasecmp=no
fi
rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \
conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
LIBS=$ac_check_lib_save_LIBS
fi
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_lib_resolv_strcasecmp" >&5
$as_echo "$ac_cv_lib_resolv_strcasecmp" >&6; }
if test "x$ac_cv_lib_resolv_strcasecmp" = xyes; then :
LIBS="$LIBS -lresolv"
fi
fi
for ac_func in utimes
do :
ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "utimes" "ac_cv_func_utimes"
if test "x$ac_cv_func_utimes" = xyes; then :
cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
#define HAVE_UTIMES 1
_ACEOF
else
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for utimes in -lc89" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking for utimes in -lc89... " >&6; }
if ${ac_cv_lib_c89_utimes+:} false; then :
$as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
else
ac_check_lib_save_LIBS=$LIBS
LIBS="-lc89 $LIBS"
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error.
Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC
builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */
#ifdef __cplusplus
extern "C"
#endif
char utimes ();
int
main ()
{
return utimes ();
;
return 0;
}
_ACEOF
if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then :
ac_cv_lib_c89_utimes=yes
else
ac_cv_lib_c89_utimes=no
fi
rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \
conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
LIBS=$ac_check_lib_save_LIBS
fi
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_lib_c89_utimes" >&5
$as_echo "$ac_cv_lib_c89_utimes" >&6; }
if test "x$ac_cv_lib_c89_utimes" = xyes; then :
$as_echo "#define HAVE_UTIMES 1" >>confdefs.h
LIBS="$LIBS -lc89"
fi
fi
done
for ac_header in bsd/libutil.h libutil.h
do :
as_ac_Header=`$as_echo "ac_cv_header_$ac_header" | $as_tr_sh`
ac_fn_c_check_header_mongrel "$LINENO" "$ac_header" "$as_ac_Header" "$ac_includes_default"
if eval test \"x\$"$as_ac_Header"\" = x"yes"; then :
cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
#define `$as_echo "HAVE_$ac_header" | $as_tr_cpp` 1
_ACEOF
fi
done
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for library containing fmt_scaled" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking for library containing fmt_scaled... " >&6; }
if ${ac_cv_search_fmt_scaled+:} false; then :
$as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
else
ac_func_search_save_LIBS=$LIBS
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error.
Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC
builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */
#ifdef __cplusplus
extern "C"
#endif
char fmt_scaled ();
int
main ()
{
return fmt_scaled ();
;
return 0;
}
_ACEOF
for ac_lib in '' util bsd; do
if test -z "$ac_lib"; then
ac_res="none required"
else
ac_res=-l$ac_lib
LIBS="-l$ac_lib $ac_func_search_save_LIBS"
fi
if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then :
ac_cv_search_fmt_scaled=$ac_res
fi
rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \
conftest$ac_exeext
if ${ac_cv_search_fmt_scaled+:} false; then :
break
fi
done
if ${ac_cv_search_fmt_scaled+:} false; then :
else
ac_cv_search_fmt_scaled=no
fi
rm conftest.$ac_ext
LIBS=$ac_func_search_save_LIBS
fi
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_search_fmt_scaled" >&5
$as_echo "$ac_cv_search_fmt_scaled" >&6; }
ac_res=$ac_cv_search_fmt_scaled
if test "$ac_res" != no; then :
test "$ac_res" = "none required" || LIBS="$ac_res $LIBS"
fi
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for library containing scan_scaled" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking for library containing scan_scaled... " >&6; }
if ${ac_cv_search_scan_scaled+:} false; then :
$as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
else
ac_func_search_save_LIBS=$LIBS
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error.
Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC
builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */
#ifdef __cplusplus
extern "C"
#endif
char scan_scaled ();
int
main ()
{
return scan_scaled ();
;
return 0;
}
_ACEOF
for ac_lib in '' util bsd; do
if test -z "$ac_lib"; then
ac_res="none required"
else
ac_res=-l$ac_lib
LIBS="-l$ac_lib $ac_func_search_save_LIBS"
fi
if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then :
ac_cv_search_scan_scaled=$ac_res
fi
rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \
conftest$ac_exeext
if ${ac_cv_search_scan_scaled+:} false; then :
break
fi
done
if ${ac_cv_search_scan_scaled+:} false; then :
else
ac_cv_search_scan_scaled=no
fi
rm conftest.$ac_ext
LIBS=$ac_func_search_save_LIBS
fi
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_search_scan_scaled" >&5
$as_echo "$ac_cv_search_scan_scaled" >&6; }
ac_res=$ac_cv_search_scan_scaled
if test "$ac_res" != no; then :
test "$ac_res" = "none required" || LIBS="$ac_res $LIBS"
fi
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for library containing login" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking for library containing login... " >&6; }
if ${ac_cv_search_login+:} false; then :
$as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
else
ac_func_search_save_LIBS=$LIBS
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error.
Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC
builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */
#ifdef __cplusplus
extern "C"
#endif
char login ();
int
main ()
{
return login ();
;
return 0;
}
_ACEOF
for ac_lib in '' util bsd; do
if test -z "$ac_lib"; then
ac_res="none required"
else
ac_res=-l$ac_lib
LIBS="-l$ac_lib $ac_func_search_save_LIBS"
fi
if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then :
ac_cv_search_login=$ac_res
fi
rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \
conftest$ac_exeext
if ${ac_cv_search_login+:} false; then :
break
fi
done
if ${ac_cv_search_login+:} false; then :
else
ac_cv_search_login=no
fi
rm conftest.$ac_ext
LIBS=$ac_func_search_save_LIBS
fi
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_search_login" >&5
$as_echo "$ac_cv_search_login" >&6; }
ac_res=$ac_cv_search_login
if test "$ac_res" != no; then :
test "$ac_res" = "none required" || LIBS="$ac_res $LIBS"
fi
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for library containing logout" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking for library containing logout... " >&6; }
if ${ac_cv_search_logout+:} false; then :
$as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
else
ac_func_search_save_LIBS=$LIBS
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error.
Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC
builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */
#ifdef __cplusplus
extern "C"
#endif
char logout ();
int
main ()
{
return logout ();
;
return 0;
}
_ACEOF
for ac_lib in '' util bsd; do
if test -z "$ac_lib"; then
ac_res="none required"
else
ac_res=-l$ac_lib
LIBS="-l$ac_lib $ac_func_search_save_LIBS"
fi
if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then :
ac_cv_search_logout=$ac_res
fi
rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \
conftest$ac_exeext
if ${ac_cv_search_logout+:} false; then :
break
fi
done
if ${ac_cv_search_logout+:} false; then :
else
ac_cv_search_logout=no
fi
rm conftest.$ac_ext
LIBS=$ac_func_search_save_LIBS
fi
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_search_logout" >&5
$as_echo "$ac_cv_search_logout" >&6; }
ac_res=$ac_cv_search_logout
if test "$ac_res" != no; then :
test "$ac_res" = "none required" || LIBS="$ac_res $LIBS"
fi
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for library containing logwtmp" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking for library containing logwtmp... " >&6; }
if ${ac_cv_search_logwtmp+:} false; then :
$as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
else
ac_func_search_save_LIBS=$LIBS
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error.
Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC
builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */
#ifdef __cplusplus
extern "C"
#endif
char logwtmp ();
int
main ()
{
return logwtmp ();
;
return 0;
}
_ACEOF
for ac_lib in '' util bsd; do
if test -z "$ac_lib"; then
ac_res="none required"
else
ac_res=-l$ac_lib
LIBS="-l$ac_lib $ac_func_search_save_LIBS"
fi
if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then :
ac_cv_search_logwtmp=$ac_res
fi
rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \
conftest$ac_exeext
if ${ac_cv_search_logwtmp+:} false; then :
break
fi
done
if ${ac_cv_search_logwtmp+:} false; then :
else
ac_cv_search_logwtmp=no
fi
rm conftest.$ac_ext
LIBS=$ac_func_search_save_LIBS
fi
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_search_logwtmp" >&5
$as_echo "$ac_cv_search_logwtmp" >&6; }
ac_res=$ac_cv_search_logwtmp
if test "$ac_res" != no; then :
test "$ac_res" = "none required" || LIBS="$ac_res $LIBS"
fi
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for library containing openpty" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking for library containing openpty... " >&6; }
if ${ac_cv_search_openpty+:} false; then :
$as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
else
ac_func_search_save_LIBS=$LIBS
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error.
Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC
builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */
#ifdef __cplusplus
extern "C"
#endif
char openpty ();
int
main ()
{
return openpty ();
;
return 0;
}
_ACEOF
for ac_lib in '' util bsd; do
if test -z "$ac_lib"; then
ac_res="none required"
else
ac_res=-l$ac_lib
LIBS="-l$ac_lib $ac_func_search_save_LIBS"
fi
if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then :
ac_cv_search_openpty=$ac_res
fi
rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \
conftest$ac_exeext
if ${ac_cv_search_openpty+:} false; then :
break
fi
done
if ${ac_cv_search_openpty+:} false; then :
else
ac_cv_search_openpty=no
fi
rm conftest.$ac_ext
LIBS=$ac_func_search_save_LIBS
fi
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_search_openpty" >&5
$as_echo "$ac_cv_search_openpty" >&6; }
ac_res=$ac_cv_search_openpty
if test "$ac_res" != no; then :
test "$ac_res" = "none required" || LIBS="$ac_res $LIBS"
fi
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for library containing updwtmp" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking for library containing updwtmp... " >&6; }
if ${ac_cv_search_updwtmp+:} false; then :
$as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
else
ac_func_search_save_LIBS=$LIBS
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error.
Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC
builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */
#ifdef __cplusplus
extern "C"
#endif
char updwtmp ();
int
main ()
{
return updwtmp ();
;
return 0;
}
_ACEOF
for ac_lib in '' util bsd; do
if test -z "$ac_lib"; then
ac_res="none required"
else
ac_res=-l$ac_lib
LIBS="-l$ac_lib $ac_func_search_save_LIBS"
fi
if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then :
ac_cv_search_updwtmp=$ac_res
fi
rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \
conftest$ac_exeext
if ${ac_cv_search_updwtmp+:} false; then :
break
fi
done
if ${ac_cv_search_updwtmp+:} false; then :
else
ac_cv_search_updwtmp=no
fi
rm conftest.$ac_ext
LIBS=$ac_func_search_save_LIBS
fi
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_search_updwtmp" >&5
$as_echo "$ac_cv_search_updwtmp" >&6; }
ac_res=$ac_cv_search_updwtmp
if test "$ac_res" != no; then :
test "$ac_res" = "none required" || LIBS="$ac_res $LIBS"
fi
for ac_func in fmt_scaled scan_scaled login logout openpty updwtmp logwtmp
do :
as_ac_var=`$as_echo "ac_cv_func_$ac_func" | $as_tr_sh`
ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "$ac_func" "$as_ac_var"
if eval test \"x\$"$as_ac_var"\" = x"yes"; then :
cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
#define `$as_echo "HAVE_$ac_func" | $as_tr_cpp` 1
_ACEOF
fi
done
# On some platforms, inet_ntop and gethostbyname may be found in libresolv
# or libnsl.
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for library containing inet_ntop" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking for library containing inet_ntop... " >&6; }
if ${ac_cv_search_inet_ntop+:} false; then :
$as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
else
ac_func_search_save_LIBS=$LIBS
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error.
Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC
builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */
#ifdef __cplusplus
extern "C"
#endif
char inet_ntop ();
int
main ()
{
return inet_ntop ();
;
return 0;
}
_ACEOF
for ac_lib in '' resolv nsl; do
if test -z "$ac_lib"; then
ac_res="none required"
else
ac_res=-l$ac_lib
LIBS="-l$ac_lib $ac_func_search_save_LIBS"
fi
if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then :
ac_cv_search_inet_ntop=$ac_res
fi
rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \
conftest$ac_exeext
if ${ac_cv_search_inet_ntop+:} false; then :
break
fi
done
if ${ac_cv_search_inet_ntop+:} false; then :
else
ac_cv_search_inet_ntop=no
fi
rm conftest.$ac_ext
LIBS=$ac_func_search_save_LIBS
fi
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_search_inet_ntop" >&5
$as_echo "$ac_cv_search_inet_ntop" >&6; }
ac_res=$ac_cv_search_inet_ntop
if test "$ac_res" != no; then :
test "$ac_res" = "none required" || LIBS="$ac_res $LIBS"
fi
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for library containing gethostbyname" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking for library containing gethostbyname... " >&6; }
if ${ac_cv_search_gethostbyname+:} false; then :
$as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
else
ac_func_search_save_LIBS=$LIBS
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error.
Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC
builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */
#ifdef __cplusplus
extern "C"
#endif
char gethostbyname ();
int
main ()
{
return gethostbyname ();
;
return 0;
}
_ACEOF
for ac_lib in '' resolv nsl; do
if test -z "$ac_lib"; then
ac_res="none required"
else
ac_res=-l$ac_lib
LIBS="-l$ac_lib $ac_func_search_save_LIBS"
fi
if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then :
ac_cv_search_gethostbyname=$ac_res
fi
rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \
conftest$ac_exeext
if ${ac_cv_search_gethostbyname+:} false; then :
break
fi
done
if ${ac_cv_search_gethostbyname+:} false; then :
else
ac_cv_search_gethostbyname=no
fi
rm conftest.$ac_ext
LIBS=$ac_func_search_save_LIBS
fi
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_search_gethostbyname" >&5
$as_echo "$ac_cv_search_gethostbyname" >&6; }
ac_res=$ac_cv_search_gethostbyname
if test "$ac_res" != no; then :
test "$ac_res" = "none required" || LIBS="$ac_res $LIBS"
fi
# "Particular Function Checks"
# see https://www.gnu.org/software/autoconf/manual/autoconf-2.69/html_node/Particular-Functions.html
for ac_func in strftime
do :
ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "strftime" "ac_cv_func_strftime"
if test "x$ac_cv_func_strftime" = xyes; then :
cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
#define HAVE_STRFTIME 1
_ACEOF
else
# strftime is in -lintl on SCO UNIX.
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for strftime in -lintl" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking for strftime in -lintl... " >&6; }
if ${ac_cv_lib_intl_strftime+:} false; then :
$as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
else
ac_check_lib_save_LIBS=$LIBS
LIBS="-lintl $LIBS"
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error.
Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC
builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */
#ifdef __cplusplus
extern "C"
#endif
char strftime ();
int
main ()
{
return strftime ();
;
return 0;
}
_ACEOF
if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then :
ac_cv_lib_intl_strftime=yes
else
ac_cv_lib_intl_strftime=no
fi
rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \
conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
LIBS=$ac_check_lib_save_LIBS
fi
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_lib_intl_strftime" >&5
$as_echo "$ac_cv_lib_intl_strftime" >&6; }
if test "x$ac_cv_lib_intl_strftime" = xyes; then :
$as_echo "#define HAVE_STRFTIME 1" >>confdefs.h
LIBS="-lintl $LIBS"
fi
fi
done
for ac_header in stdlib.h
do :
ac_fn_c_check_header_mongrel "$LINENO" "stdlib.h" "ac_cv_header_stdlib_h" "$ac_includes_default"
if test "x$ac_cv_header_stdlib_h" = xyes; then :
cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
#define HAVE_STDLIB_H 1
_ACEOF
fi
done
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for GNU libc compatible malloc" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking for GNU libc compatible malloc... " >&6; }
if ${ac_cv_func_malloc_0_nonnull+:} false; then :
$as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
else
if test "$cross_compiling" = yes; then :
ac_cv_func_malloc_0_nonnull=no
else
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
#if defined STDC_HEADERS || defined HAVE_STDLIB_H
# include <stdlib.h>
#else
char *malloc ();
#endif
int
main ()
{
return ! malloc (0);
;
return 0;
}
_ACEOF
if ac_fn_c_try_run "$LINENO"; then :
ac_cv_func_malloc_0_nonnull=yes
else
ac_cv_func_malloc_0_nonnull=no
fi
rm -f core *.core core.conftest.* gmon.out bb.out conftest$ac_exeext \
conftest.$ac_objext conftest.beam conftest.$ac_ext
fi
fi
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_func_malloc_0_nonnull" >&5
$as_echo "$ac_cv_func_malloc_0_nonnull" >&6; }
if test $ac_cv_func_malloc_0_nonnull = yes; then :
$as_echo "#define HAVE_MALLOC 1" >>confdefs.h
else
$as_echo "#define HAVE_MALLOC 0" >>confdefs.h
case " $LIBOBJS " in
*" malloc.$ac_objext "* ) ;;
*) LIBOBJS="$LIBOBJS malloc.$ac_objext"
;;
esac
$as_echo "#define malloc rpl_malloc" >>confdefs.h
fi
for ac_header in stdlib.h
do :
ac_fn_c_check_header_mongrel "$LINENO" "stdlib.h" "ac_cv_header_stdlib_h" "$ac_includes_default"
if test "x$ac_cv_header_stdlib_h" = xyes; then :
cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
#define HAVE_STDLIB_H 1
_ACEOF
fi
done
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for GNU libc compatible realloc" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking for GNU libc compatible realloc... " >&6; }
if ${ac_cv_func_realloc_0_nonnull+:} false; then :
$as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
else
if test "$cross_compiling" = yes; then :
ac_cv_func_realloc_0_nonnull=no
else
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
#if defined STDC_HEADERS || defined HAVE_STDLIB_H
# include <stdlib.h>
#else
char *realloc ();
#endif
int
main ()
{
return ! realloc (0, 0);
;
return 0;
}
_ACEOF
if ac_fn_c_try_run "$LINENO"; then :
ac_cv_func_realloc_0_nonnull=yes
else
ac_cv_func_realloc_0_nonnull=no
fi
rm -f core *.core core.conftest.* gmon.out bb.out conftest$ac_exeext \
conftest.$ac_objext conftest.beam conftest.$ac_ext
fi
fi
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_func_realloc_0_nonnull" >&5
$as_echo "$ac_cv_func_realloc_0_nonnull" >&6; }
if test $ac_cv_func_realloc_0_nonnull = yes; then :
$as_echo "#define HAVE_REALLOC 1" >>confdefs.h
else
$as_echo "#define HAVE_REALLOC 0" >>confdefs.h
case " $LIBOBJS " in
*" realloc.$ac_objext "* ) ;;
*) LIBOBJS="$LIBOBJS realloc.$ac_objext"
;;
esac
$as_echo "#define realloc rpl_realloc" >>confdefs.h
fi
# autoconf doesn't have AC_FUNC_CALLOC so fake it if malloc returns NULL;
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking if calloc(0, N) returns non-null" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking if calloc(0, N) returns non-null... " >&6; }
if test "$cross_compiling" = yes; then :
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: WARNING: cross compiling: assuming same as malloc" >&5
$as_echo "$as_me: WARNING: cross compiling: assuming same as malloc" >&2;}
func_calloc_0_nonnull="$ac_cv_func_malloc_0_nonnull"
else
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
#include <stdlib.h>
int
main ()
{
void *p = calloc(0, 1); exit(p == NULL);
;
return 0;
}
_ACEOF
if ac_fn_c_try_run "$LINENO"; then :
func_calloc_0_nonnull=yes
else
func_calloc_0_nonnull=no
fi
rm -f core *.core core.conftest.* gmon.out bb.out conftest$ac_exeext \
conftest.$ac_objext conftest.beam conftest.$ac_ext
fi
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $func_calloc_0_nonnull" >&5
$as_echo "$func_calloc_0_nonnull" >&6; }
if test "x$func_calloc_0_nonnull" = "xyes"; then
$as_echo "#define HAVE_CALLOC 1" >>confdefs.h
else
$as_echo "#define HAVE_CALLOC 0" >>confdefs.h
$as_echo "#define calloc rpl_calloc" >>confdefs.h
fi
# Check for ALTDIRFUNC glob() extension
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for GLOB_ALTDIRFUNC support" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking for GLOB_ALTDIRFUNC support... " >&6; }
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
#include <glob.h>
#ifdef GLOB_ALTDIRFUNC
FOUNDIT
#endif
_ACEOF
if (eval "$ac_cpp conftest.$ac_ext") 2>&5 |
$EGREP "FOUNDIT" >/dev/null 2>&1; then :
$as_echo "#define GLOB_HAS_ALTDIRFUNC 1" >>confdefs.h
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
$as_echo "yes" >&6; }
else
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
$as_echo "no" >&6; }
fi
rm -f conftest*
# Check for g.gl_matchc glob() extension
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for gl_matchc field in glob_t" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking for gl_matchc field in glob_t... " >&6; }
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
#include <glob.h>
int
main ()
{
glob_t g; g.gl_matchc = 1;
;
return 0;
}
_ACEOF
if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then :
$as_echo "#define GLOB_HAS_GL_MATCHC 1" >>confdefs.h
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
$as_echo "yes" >&6; }
else
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
$as_echo "no" >&6; }
fi
rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
# Check for g.gl_statv glob() extension
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for gl_statv and GLOB_KEEPSTAT extensions for glob" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking for gl_statv and GLOB_KEEPSTAT extensions for glob... " >&6; }
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
#include <glob.h>
int
main ()
{
#ifndef GLOB_KEEPSTAT
#error "glob does not support GLOB_KEEPSTAT extension"
#endif
glob_t g;
g.gl_statv = NULL;
;
return 0;
}
_ACEOF
if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then :
$as_echo "#define GLOB_HAS_GL_STATV 1" >>confdefs.h
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
$as_echo "yes" >&6; }
else
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
$as_echo "no" >&6; }
fi
rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
ac_fn_c_check_decl "$LINENO" "GLOB_NOMATCH" "ac_cv_have_decl_GLOB_NOMATCH" "#include <glob.h>
"
if test "x$ac_cv_have_decl_GLOB_NOMATCH" = xyes; then :
ac_have_decl=1
else
ac_have_decl=0
fi
cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
#define HAVE_DECL_GLOB_NOMATCH $ac_have_decl
_ACEOF
ac_fn_c_check_decl "$LINENO" "VIS_ALL" "ac_cv_have_decl_VIS_ALL" "#include <vis.h>
"
if test "x$ac_cv_have_decl_VIS_ALL" = xyes; then :
else
$as_echo "#define BROKEN_STRNVIS 1" >>confdefs.h
fi
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking whether struct dirent allocates space for d_name" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking whether struct dirent allocates space for d_name... " >&6; }
if test "$cross_compiling" = yes; then :
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: WARNING: cross compiling: assuming BROKEN_ONE_BYTE_DIRENT_D_NAME" >&5
$as_echo "$as_me: WARNING: cross compiling: assuming BROKEN_ONE_BYTE_DIRENT_D_NAME" >&2;}
$as_echo "#define BROKEN_ONE_BYTE_DIRENT_D_NAME 1" >>confdefs.h
else
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <dirent.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+
int
main ()
{
struct dirent d;
exit(sizeof(d.d_name)<=sizeof(char));
;
return 0;
}
_ACEOF
if ac_fn_c_try_run "$LINENO"; then :
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
$as_echo "yes" >&6; }
else
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
$as_echo "no" >&6; }
$as_echo "#define BROKEN_ONE_BYTE_DIRENT_D_NAME 1" >>confdefs.h
fi
rm -f core *.core core.conftest.* gmon.out bb.out conftest$ac_exeext \
conftest.$ac_objext conftest.beam conftest.$ac_ext
fi
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for /proc/pid/fd directory" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking for /proc/pid/fd directory... " >&6; }
if test -d "/proc/$$/fd" ; then
$as_echo "#define HAVE_PROC_PID 1" >>confdefs.h
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
$as_echo "yes" >&6; }
else
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
$as_echo "no" >&6; }
fi
# Check whether user wants to use ldns
LDNS_MSG="no"
# Check whether --with-ldns was given.
if test "${with_ldns+set}" = set; then :
withval=$with_ldns;
ldns=""
if test "x$withval" = "xyes" ; then
if test -n "$ac_tool_prefix"; then
# Extract the first word of "${ac_tool_prefix}ldns-config", so it can be a program name with args.
set dummy ${ac_tool_prefix}ldns-config; ac_word=$2
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for $ac_word" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking for $ac_word... " >&6; }
if ${ac_cv_path_LDNSCONFIG+:} false; then :
$as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
else
case $LDNSCONFIG in
[\\/]* | ?:[\\/]*)
ac_cv_path_LDNSCONFIG="$LDNSCONFIG" # Let the user override the test with a path.
;;
*)
as_save_IFS=$IFS; IFS=$PATH_SEPARATOR
for as_dir in $PATH
do
IFS=$as_save_IFS
test -z "$as_dir" && as_dir=.
for ac_exec_ext in '' $ac_executable_extensions; do
if as_fn_executable_p "$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"; then
ac_cv_path_LDNSCONFIG="$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"
$as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: found $as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" >&5
break 2
fi
done
done
IFS=$as_save_IFS
;;
esac
fi
LDNSCONFIG=$ac_cv_path_LDNSCONFIG
if test -n "$LDNSCONFIG"; then
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $LDNSCONFIG" >&5
$as_echo "$LDNSCONFIG" >&6; }
else
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
$as_echo "no" >&6; }
fi
fi
if test -z "$ac_cv_path_LDNSCONFIG"; then
ac_pt_LDNSCONFIG=$LDNSCONFIG
# Extract the first word of "ldns-config", so it can be a program name with args.
set dummy ldns-config; ac_word=$2
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for $ac_word" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking for $ac_word... " >&6; }
if ${ac_cv_path_ac_pt_LDNSCONFIG+:} false; then :
$as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
else
case $ac_pt_LDNSCONFIG in
[\\/]* | ?:[\\/]*)
ac_cv_path_ac_pt_LDNSCONFIG="$ac_pt_LDNSCONFIG" # Let the user override the test with a path.
;;
*)
as_save_IFS=$IFS; IFS=$PATH_SEPARATOR
for as_dir in $PATH
do
IFS=$as_save_IFS
test -z "$as_dir" && as_dir=.
for ac_exec_ext in '' $ac_executable_extensions; do
if as_fn_executable_p "$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"; then
ac_cv_path_ac_pt_LDNSCONFIG="$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"
$as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: found $as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" >&5
break 2
fi
done
done
IFS=$as_save_IFS
;;
esac
fi
ac_pt_LDNSCONFIG=$ac_cv_path_ac_pt_LDNSCONFIG
if test -n "$ac_pt_LDNSCONFIG"; then
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_pt_LDNSCONFIG" >&5
$as_echo "$ac_pt_LDNSCONFIG" >&6; }
else
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
$as_echo "no" >&6; }
fi
if test "x$ac_pt_LDNSCONFIG" = x; then
LDNSCONFIG="no"
else
case $cross_compiling:$ac_tool_warned in
yes:)
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: WARNING: using cross tools not prefixed with host triplet" >&5
$as_echo "$as_me: WARNING: using cross tools not prefixed with host triplet" >&2;}
ac_tool_warned=yes ;;
esac
LDNSCONFIG=$ac_pt_LDNSCONFIG
fi
else
LDNSCONFIG="$ac_cv_path_LDNSCONFIG"
fi
if test "x$LDNSCONFIG" = "xno"; then
LIBS="-lldns $LIBS"
ldns=yes
else
LIBS="$LIBS `$LDNSCONFIG --libs`"
CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS `$LDNSCONFIG --cflags`"
ldns=yes
fi
elif test "x$withval" != "xno" ; then
CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS -I${withval}/include"
LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS -L${withval}/lib"
LIBS="-lldns $LIBS"
ldns=yes
fi
# Verify that it works.
if test "x$ldns" = "xyes" ; then
$as_echo "#define HAVE_LDNS 1" >>confdefs.h
LDNS_MSG="yes"
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for ldns support" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking for ldns support... " >&6; }
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#ifdef HAVE_STDINT_H
# include <stdint.h>
#endif
#include <ldns/ldns.h>
int main() { ldns_status status = ldns_verify_trusted(NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL); status=LDNS_STATUS_OK; exit(0); }
_ACEOF
if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then :
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
$as_echo "yes" >&6; }
else
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
$as_echo "no" >&6; }
as_fn_error $? "** Incomplete or missing ldns libraries." "$LINENO" 5
fi
rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \
conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
fi
fi
# Check whether user wants libedit support
LIBEDIT_MSG="no"
# Check whether --with-libedit was given.
if test "${with_libedit+set}" = set; then :
withval=$with_libedit; if test "x$withval" != "xno" ; then
if test "x$withval" = "xyes" ; then
if test -n "$ac_tool_prefix"; then
# Extract the first word of "${ac_tool_prefix}pkg-config", so it can be a program name with args.
set dummy ${ac_tool_prefix}pkg-config; ac_word=$2
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for $ac_word" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking for $ac_word... " >&6; }
if ${ac_cv_path_PKGCONFIG+:} false; then :
$as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
else
case $PKGCONFIG in
[\\/]* | ?:[\\/]*)
ac_cv_path_PKGCONFIG="$PKGCONFIG" # Let the user override the test with a path.
;;
*)
as_save_IFS=$IFS; IFS=$PATH_SEPARATOR
for as_dir in $PATH
do
IFS=$as_save_IFS
test -z "$as_dir" && as_dir=.
for ac_exec_ext in '' $ac_executable_extensions; do
if as_fn_executable_p "$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"; then
ac_cv_path_PKGCONFIG="$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"
$as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: found $as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" >&5
break 2
fi
done
done
IFS=$as_save_IFS
;;
esac
fi
PKGCONFIG=$ac_cv_path_PKGCONFIG
if test -n "$PKGCONFIG"; then
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $PKGCONFIG" >&5
$as_echo "$PKGCONFIG" >&6; }
else
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
$as_echo "no" >&6; }
fi
fi
if test -z "$ac_cv_path_PKGCONFIG"; then
ac_pt_PKGCONFIG=$PKGCONFIG
# Extract the first word of "pkg-config", so it can be a program name with args.
set dummy pkg-config; ac_word=$2
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for $ac_word" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking for $ac_word... " >&6; }
if ${ac_cv_path_ac_pt_PKGCONFIG+:} false; then :
$as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
else
case $ac_pt_PKGCONFIG in
[\\/]* | ?:[\\/]*)
ac_cv_path_ac_pt_PKGCONFIG="$ac_pt_PKGCONFIG" # Let the user override the test with a path.
;;
*)
as_save_IFS=$IFS; IFS=$PATH_SEPARATOR
for as_dir in $PATH
do
IFS=$as_save_IFS
test -z "$as_dir" && as_dir=.
for ac_exec_ext in '' $ac_executable_extensions; do
if as_fn_executable_p "$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"; then
ac_cv_path_ac_pt_PKGCONFIG="$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"
$as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: found $as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" >&5
break 2
fi
done
done
IFS=$as_save_IFS
;;
esac
fi
ac_pt_PKGCONFIG=$ac_cv_path_ac_pt_PKGCONFIG
if test -n "$ac_pt_PKGCONFIG"; then
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_pt_PKGCONFIG" >&5
$as_echo "$ac_pt_PKGCONFIG" >&6; }
else
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
$as_echo "no" >&6; }
fi
if test "x$ac_pt_PKGCONFIG" = x; then
PKGCONFIG="no"
else
case $cross_compiling:$ac_tool_warned in
yes:)
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: WARNING: using cross tools not prefixed with host triplet" >&5
$as_echo "$as_me: WARNING: using cross tools not prefixed with host triplet" >&2;}
ac_tool_warned=yes ;;
esac
PKGCONFIG=$ac_pt_PKGCONFIG
fi
else
PKGCONFIG="$ac_cv_path_PKGCONFIG"
fi
if test "x$PKGCONFIG" != "xno"; then
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking if $PKGCONFIG knows about libedit" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking if $PKGCONFIG knows about libedit... " >&6; }
if "$PKGCONFIG" libedit; then
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
$as_echo "yes" >&6; }
use_pkgconfig_for_libedit=yes
else
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
$as_echo "no" >&6; }
fi
fi
else
CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS -I${withval}/include"
if test -n "${rpath_opt}"; then
LDFLAGS="-L${withval}/lib ${rpath_opt}${withval}/lib ${LDFLAGS}"
else
LDFLAGS="-L${withval}/lib ${LDFLAGS}"
fi
fi
if test "x$use_pkgconfig_for_libedit" = "xyes"; then
LIBEDIT=`$PKGCONFIG --libs libedit`
CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS `$PKGCONFIG --cflags libedit`"
else
LIBEDIT="-ledit -lcurses"
fi
OTHERLIBS=`echo $LIBEDIT | sed 's/-ledit//'`
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for el_init in -ledit" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking for el_init in -ledit... " >&6; }
if ${ac_cv_lib_edit_el_init+:} false; then :
$as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
else
ac_check_lib_save_LIBS=$LIBS
LIBS="-ledit $OTHERLIBS
$LIBS"
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error.
Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC
builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */
#ifdef __cplusplus
extern "C"
#endif
char el_init ();
int
main ()
{
return el_init ();
;
return 0;
}
_ACEOF
if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then :
ac_cv_lib_edit_el_init=yes
else
ac_cv_lib_edit_el_init=no
fi
rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \
conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
LIBS=$ac_check_lib_save_LIBS
fi
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_lib_edit_el_init" >&5
$as_echo "$ac_cv_lib_edit_el_init" >&6; }
if test "x$ac_cv_lib_edit_el_init" = xyes; then :
$as_echo "#define USE_LIBEDIT 1" >>confdefs.h
LIBEDIT_MSG="yes"
else
as_fn_error $? "libedit not found" "$LINENO" 5
fi
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking if libedit version is compatible" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking if libedit version is compatible... " >&6; }
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
- #include <histedit.h>
+
+#include <histedit.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+
int
main ()
{
int i = H_SETSIZE;
el_init("", NULL, NULL, NULL);
exit(0);
;
return 0;
}
_ACEOF
if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then :
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
$as_echo "yes" >&6; }
else
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
$as_echo "no" >&6; }
as_fn_error $? "libedit version is not compatible" "$LINENO" 5
fi
rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
fi
fi
AUDIT_MODULE=none
# Check whether --with-audit was given.
if test "${with_audit+set}" = set; then :
withval=$with_audit;
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for supported audit module" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking for supported audit module... " >&6; }
case "$withval" in
bsm)
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: bsm" >&5
$as_echo "bsm" >&6; }
AUDIT_MODULE=bsm
for ac_header in bsm/audit.h
do :
ac_fn_c_check_header_compile "$LINENO" "bsm/audit.h" "ac_cv_header_bsm_audit_h" "
#ifdef HAVE_TIME_H
# include <time.h>
#endif
"
if test "x$ac_cv_header_bsm_audit_h" = xyes; then :
cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
#define HAVE_BSM_AUDIT_H 1
_ACEOF
else
as_fn_error $? "BSM enabled and bsm/audit.h not found" "$LINENO" 5
fi
done
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for getaudit in -lbsm" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking for getaudit in -lbsm... " >&6; }
if ${ac_cv_lib_bsm_getaudit+:} false; then :
$as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
else
ac_check_lib_save_LIBS=$LIBS
LIBS="-lbsm $LIBS"
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error.
Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC
builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */
#ifdef __cplusplus
extern "C"
#endif
char getaudit ();
int
main ()
{
return getaudit ();
;
return 0;
}
_ACEOF
if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then :
ac_cv_lib_bsm_getaudit=yes
else
ac_cv_lib_bsm_getaudit=no
fi
rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \
conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
LIBS=$ac_check_lib_save_LIBS
fi
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_lib_bsm_getaudit" >&5
$as_echo "$ac_cv_lib_bsm_getaudit" >&6; }
if test "x$ac_cv_lib_bsm_getaudit" = xyes; then :
cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
#define HAVE_LIBBSM 1
_ACEOF
LIBS="-lbsm $LIBS"
else
as_fn_error $? "BSM enabled and required library not found" "$LINENO" 5
fi
for ac_func in getaudit
do :
ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "getaudit" "ac_cv_func_getaudit"
if test "x$ac_cv_func_getaudit" = xyes; then :
cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
#define HAVE_GETAUDIT 1
_ACEOF
else
as_fn_error $? "BSM enabled and required function not found" "$LINENO" 5
fi
done
# These are optional
for ac_func in getaudit_addr aug_get_machine
do :
as_ac_var=`$as_echo "ac_cv_func_$ac_func" | $as_tr_sh`
ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "$ac_func" "$as_ac_var"
if eval test \"x\$"$as_ac_var"\" = x"yes"; then :
cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
#define `$as_echo "HAVE_$ac_func" | $as_tr_cpp` 1
_ACEOF
fi
done
$as_echo "#define USE_BSM_AUDIT 1" >>confdefs.h
if test "$sol2ver" -ge 11; then
SSHDLIBS="$SSHDLIBS -lscf"
$as_echo "#define BROKEN_BSM_API 1" >>confdefs.h
fi
;;
linux)
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: linux" >&5
$as_echo "linux" >&6; }
AUDIT_MODULE=linux
for ac_header in libaudit.h
do :
ac_fn_c_check_header_mongrel "$LINENO" "libaudit.h" "ac_cv_header_libaudit_h" "$ac_includes_default"
if test "x$ac_cv_header_libaudit_h" = xyes; then :
cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
#define HAVE_LIBAUDIT_H 1
_ACEOF
fi
done
SSHDLIBS="$SSHDLIBS -laudit"
$as_echo "#define USE_LINUX_AUDIT 1" >>confdefs.h
;;
debug)
AUDIT_MODULE=debug
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: debug" >&5
$as_echo "debug" >&6; }
$as_echo "#define SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS 1" >>confdefs.h
;;
no)
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
$as_echo "no" >&6; }
;;
*)
as_fn_error $? "Unknown audit module $withval" "$LINENO" 5
;;
esac
fi
# Check whether --with-pie was given.
if test "${with_pie+set}" = set; then :
withval=$with_pie;
if test "x$withval" = "xno"; then
use_pie=no
fi
if test "x$withval" = "xyes"; then
use_pie=yes
fi
fi
if test "x$use_pie" = "x"; then
use_pie=no
fi
if test "x$use_toolchain_hardening" != "x1" && test "x$use_pie" = "xauto"; then
# Turn off automatic PIE when toolchain hardening is off.
use_pie=no
fi
if test "x$use_pie" = "xauto"; then
# Automatic PIE requires gcc >= 4.x
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for gcc >= 4.x" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking for gcc >= 4.x... " >&6; }
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
#if !defined(__GNUC__) || __GNUC__ < 4
#error gcc is too old
#endif
_ACEOF
if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then :
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
$as_echo "yes" >&6; }
else
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
$as_echo "no" >&6; }
use_pie=no
fi
rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
fi
if test "x$use_pie" != "xno"; then
SAVED_CFLAGS="$CFLAGS"
SAVED_LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS"
{
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking if $CC supports compile flag -fPIE" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking if $CC supports compile flag -fPIE... " >&6; }
saved_CFLAGS="$CFLAGS"
CFLAGS="$CFLAGS $WERROR -fPIE"
_define_flag=""
test "x$_define_flag" = "x" && _define_flag="-fPIE"
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <stdio.h>
int main(int argc, char **argv) {
+ (void)argv;
/* Some math to catch -ftrapv problems in the toolchain */
int i = 123 * argc, j = 456 + argc, k = 789 - argc;
float l = i * 2.1;
double m = l / 0.5;
long long int n = argc * 12345LL, o = 12345LL * (long long int)argc;
printf("%d %d %d %f %f %lld %lld\n", i, j, k, l, m, n, o);
+ /*
+ * Test fallthrough behaviour. clang 10's -Wimplicit-fallthrough does
+ * not understand comments and we don't use the "fallthrough" attribute
+ * that it's looking for.
+ */
+ switch(i){
+ case 0: j += i;
+ /* FALLTHROUGH */
+ default: j += k;
+ }
exit(0);
}
_ACEOF
if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then :
if $ac_cv_path_EGREP -i "unrecognized option|warning.*ignored" conftest.err >/dev/null
then
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
$as_echo "no" >&6; }
CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS"
else
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
$as_echo "yes" >&6; }
CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS $_define_flag"
fi
else
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
$as_echo "no" >&6; }
CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS"
fi
rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
}
{
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking if $LD supports link flag -pie" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking if $LD supports link flag -pie... " >&6; }
saved_LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS"
LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS $WERROR -pie"
_define_flag=""
test "x$_define_flag" = "x" && _define_flag="-pie"
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <stdio.h>
int main(int argc, char **argv) {
+ (void)argv;
/* Some math to catch -ftrapv problems in the toolchain */
int i = 123 * argc, j = 456 + argc, k = 789 - argc;
float l = i * 2.1;
double m = l / 0.5;
long long int n = argc * 12345LL, o = 12345LL * (long long int)argc;
long long p = n * o;
printf("%d %d %d %f %f %lld %lld %lld\n", i, j, k, l, m, n, o, p);
exit(0);
}
_ACEOF
if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then :
if $ac_cv_path_EGREP -i "unrecognized option|warning.*ignored" conftest.err >/dev/null
then
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
$as_echo "no" >&6; }
LDFLAGS="$saved_LDFLAGS"
else
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
$as_echo "yes" >&6; }
LDFLAGS="$saved_LDFLAGS $_define_flag"
fi
else
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
$as_echo "no" >&6; }
LDFLAGS="$saved_LDFLAGS"
fi
rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \
conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
}
# We use both -fPIE and -pie or neither.
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking whether both -fPIE and -pie are supported" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking whether both -fPIE and -pie are supported... " >&6; }
if echo "x $CFLAGS" | grep ' -fPIE' >/dev/null 2>&1 && \
echo "x $LDFLAGS" | grep ' -pie' >/dev/null 2>&1 ; then
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
$as_echo "yes" >&6; }
else
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
$as_echo "no" >&6; }
CFLAGS="$SAVED_CFLAGS"
LDFLAGS="$SAVED_LDFLAGS"
fi
fi
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking whether -fPIC is accepted" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking whether -fPIC is accepted... " >&6; }
SAVED_CFLAGS="$CFLAGS"
CFLAGS="$CFLAGS -fPIC"
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
#include <stdlib.h>
int
main ()
{
exit(0);
;
return 0;
}
_ACEOF
if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then :
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
$as_echo "yes" >&6; }
PICFLAG="-fPIC";
else
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
$as_echo "no" >&6; }
PICFLAG="";
fi
rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
CFLAGS="$SAVED_CFLAGS"
for ac_func in \
Blowfish_initstate \
Blowfish_expandstate \
Blowfish_expand0state \
Blowfish_stream2word \
SHA256Update \
SHA384Update \
SHA512Update \
asprintf \
b64_ntop \
__b64_ntop \
b64_pton \
__b64_pton \
bcopy \
bcrypt_pbkdf \
bindresvport_sa \
blf_enc \
bzero \
cap_rights_limit \
clock \
closefrom \
dirfd \
endgrent \
err \
errx \
explicit_bzero \
fchmod \
fchmodat \
fchown \
fchownat \
flock \
fnmatch \
freeaddrinfo \
freezero \
fstatfs \
fstatvfs \
futimes \
getaddrinfo \
getcwd \
getgrouplist \
getline \
getnameinfo \
getopt \
getpagesize \
getpeereid \
getpeerucred \
getpgid \
_getpty \
getrlimit \
getrandom \
getsid \
getttyent \
glob \
group_from_gid \
inet_aton \
inet_ntoa \
inet_ntop \
innetgr \
llabs \
localtime_r \
login_getcapbool \
md5_crypt \
memmem \
memmove \
memset_s \
mkdtemp \
ngetaddrinfo \
nsleep \
ogetaddrinfo \
openlog_r \
pledge \
poll \
prctl \
pstat \
raise \
readpassphrase \
reallocarray \
realpath \
recvmsg \
recallocarray \
rresvport_af \
sendmsg \
setdtablesize \
setegid \
setenv \
seteuid \
setgroupent \
setgroups \
setlinebuf \
setlogin \
setpassent\
setpcred \
setproctitle \
setregid \
setreuid \
setrlimit \
setsid \
setvbuf \
sigaction \
sigvec \
snprintf \
socketpair \
statfs \
statvfs \
strcasestr \
strdup \
strerror \
strlcat \
strlcpy \
strmode \
strndup \
strnlen \
strnvis \
strptime \
strsignal \
strtonum \
strtoll \
strtoul \
strtoull \
swap32 \
sysconf \
tcgetpgrp \
timingsafe_bcmp \
truncate \
unsetenv \
updwtmpx \
utimensat \
user_from_uid \
usleep \
vasprintf \
vsnprintf \
waitpid \
warn \
do :
as_ac_var=`$as_echo "ac_cv_func_$ac_func" | $as_tr_sh`
ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "$ac_func" "$as_ac_var"
if eval test \"x\$"$as_ac_var"\" = x"yes"; then :
cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
#define `$as_echo "HAVE_$ac_func" | $as_tr_cpp` 1
_ACEOF
fi
done
ac_fn_c_check_decl "$LINENO" "bzero" "ac_cv_have_decl_bzero" "$ac_includes_default"
if test "x$ac_cv_have_decl_bzero" = xyes; then :
ac_have_decl=1
else
ac_have_decl=0
fi
cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
#define HAVE_DECL_BZERO $ac_have_decl
_ACEOF
ac_fn_c_check_decl "$LINENO" "memmem" "ac_cv_have_decl_memmem" "$ac_includes_default"
if test "x$ac_cv_have_decl_memmem" = xyes; then :
ac_have_decl=1
else
ac_have_decl=0
fi
cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
#define HAVE_DECL_MEMMEM $ac_have_decl
_ACEOF
for ac_func in mblen mbtowc nl_langinfo wcwidth
do :
as_ac_var=`$as_echo "ac_cv_func_$ac_func" | $as_tr_sh`
ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "$ac_func" "$as_ac_var"
if eval test \"x\$"$as_ac_var"\" = x"yes"; then :
cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
#define `$as_echo "HAVE_$ac_func" | $as_tr_cpp` 1
_ACEOF
fi
done
TEST_SSH_UTF8=${TEST_SSH_UTF8:=yes}
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for utf8 locale support" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking for utf8 locale support... " >&6; }
if test "$cross_compiling" = yes; then :
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: WARNING: cross compiling: assuming yes" >&5
$as_echo "$as_me: WARNING: cross compiling: assuming yes" >&2;}
else
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
#include <locale.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
int
main ()
{
char *loc = setlocale(LC_CTYPE, "en_US.UTF-8");
if (loc != NULL)
exit(0);
exit(1);
;
return 0;
}
_ACEOF
if ac_fn_c_try_run "$LINENO"; then :
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
$as_echo "yes" >&6; }
else
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
$as_echo "no" >&6; }
TEST_SSH_UTF8=no
fi
rm -f core *.core core.conftest.* gmon.out bb.out conftest$ac_exeext \
conftest.$ac_objext conftest.beam conftest.$ac_ext
fi
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
#include <ctype.h>
int
main ()
{
return (isblank('a'));
;
return 0;
}
_ACEOF
if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then :
$as_echo "#define HAVE_ISBLANK 1" >>confdefs.h
fi
rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \
conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
disable_pkcs11=
# Check whether --enable-pkcs11 was given.
if test "${enable_pkcs11+set}" = set; then :
enableval=$enable_pkcs11;
if test "x$enableval" = "xno" ; then
disable_pkcs11=1
fi
fi
disable_sk=
# Check whether --enable-security-key was given.
if test "${enable_security_key+set}" = set; then :
enableval=$enable_security_key;
if test "x$enableval" = "xno" ; then
disable_sk=1
fi
fi
enable_sk_internal=
# Check whether --with-security-key-builtin was given.
if test "${with_security_key_builtin+set}" = set; then :
withval=$with_security_key_builtin;
if test "x$withval" != "xno" ; then
enable_sk_internal=yes
fi
fi
test "x$disable_sk" != "x" && enable_sk_internal=""
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for library containing dlopen" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking for library containing dlopen... " >&6; }
if ${ac_cv_search_dlopen+:} false; then :
$as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
else
ac_func_search_save_LIBS=$LIBS
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error.
Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC
builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */
#ifdef __cplusplus
extern "C"
#endif
char dlopen ();
int
main ()
{
return dlopen ();
;
return 0;
}
_ACEOF
for ac_lib in '' dl; do
if test -z "$ac_lib"; then
ac_res="none required"
else
ac_res=-l$ac_lib
LIBS="-l$ac_lib $ac_func_search_save_LIBS"
fi
if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then :
ac_cv_search_dlopen=$ac_res
fi
rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \
conftest$ac_exeext
if ${ac_cv_search_dlopen+:} false; then :
break
fi
done
if ${ac_cv_search_dlopen+:} false; then :
else
ac_cv_search_dlopen=no
fi
rm conftest.$ac_ext
LIBS=$ac_func_search_save_LIBS
fi
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_search_dlopen" >&5
$as_echo "$ac_cv_search_dlopen" >&6; }
ac_res=$ac_cv_search_dlopen
if test "$ac_res" != no; then :
test "$ac_res" = "none required" || LIBS="$ac_res $LIBS"
fi
for ac_func in dlopen
do :
ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "dlopen" "ac_cv_func_dlopen"
if test "x$ac_cv_func_dlopen" = xyes; then :
cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
#define HAVE_DLOPEN 1
_ACEOF
fi
done
ac_fn_c_check_decl "$LINENO" "RTLD_NOW" "ac_cv_have_decl_RTLD_NOW" "#include <dlfcn.h>
"
if test "x$ac_cv_have_decl_RTLD_NOW" = xyes; then :
fi
# IRIX has a const char return value for gai_strerror()
for ac_func in gai_strerror
do :
ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "gai_strerror" "ac_cv_func_gai_strerror"
if test "x$ac_cv_func_gai_strerror" = xyes; then :
cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
#define HAVE_GAI_STRERROR 1
_ACEOF
$as_echo "#define HAVE_GAI_STRERROR 1" >>confdefs.h
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/socket.h>
#include <netdb.h>
const char *gai_strerror(int);
int
main ()
{
char *str;
str = gai_strerror(0);
;
return 0;
}
_ACEOF
if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then :
$as_echo "#define HAVE_CONST_GAI_STRERROR_PROTO 1" >>confdefs.h
fi
rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
fi
done
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for library containing nanosleep" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking for library containing nanosleep... " >&6; }
if ${ac_cv_search_nanosleep+:} false; then :
$as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
else
ac_func_search_save_LIBS=$LIBS
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error.
Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC
builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */
#ifdef __cplusplus
extern "C"
#endif
char nanosleep ();
int
main ()
{
return nanosleep ();
;
return 0;
}
_ACEOF
for ac_lib in '' rt posix4; do
if test -z "$ac_lib"; then
ac_res="none required"
else
ac_res=-l$ac_lib
LIBS="-l$ac_lib $ac_func_search_save_LIBS"
fi
if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then :
ac_cv_search_nanosleep=$ac_res
fi
rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \
conftest$ac_exeext
if ${ac_cv_search_nanosleep+:} false; then :
break
fi
done
if ${ac_cv_search_nanosleep+:} false; then :
else
ac_cv_search_nanosleep=no
fi
rm conftest.$ac_ext
LIBS=$ac_func_search_save_LIBS
fi
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_search_nanosleep" >&5
$as_echo "$ac_cv_search_nanosleep" >&6; }
ac_res=$ac_cv_search_nanosleep
if test "$ac_res" != no; then :
test "$ac_res" = "none required" || LIBS="$ac_res $LIBS"
$as_echo "#define HAVE_NANOSLEEP 1" >>confdefs.h
fi
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for library containing clock_gettime" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking for library containing clock_gettime... " >&6; }
if ${ac_cv_search_clock_gettime+:} false; then :
$as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
else
ac_func_search_save_LIBS=$LIBS
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error.
Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC
builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */
#ifdef __cplusplus
extern "C"
#endif
char clock_gettime ();
int
main ()
{
return clock_gettime ();
;
return 0;
}
_ACEOF
for ac_lib in '' rt; do
if test -z "$ac_lib"; then
ac_res="none required"
else
ac_res=-l$ac_lib
LIBS="-l$ac_lib $ac_func_search_save_LIBS"
fi
if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then :
ac_cv_search_clock_gettime=$ac_res
fi
rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \
conftest$ac_exeext
if ${ac_cv_search_clock_gettime+:} false; then :
break
fi
done
if ${ac_cv_search_clock_gettime+:} false; then :
else
ac_cv_search_clock_gettime=no
fi
rm conftest.$ac_ext
LIBS=$ac_func_search_save_LIBS
fi
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_search_clock_gettime" >&5
$as_echo "$ac_cv_search_clock_gettime" >&6; }
ac_res=$ac_cv_search_clock_gettime
if test "$ac_res" != no; then :
test "$ac_res" = "none required" || LIBS="$ac_res $LIBS"
$as_echo "#define HAVE_CLOCK_GETTIME 1" >>confdefs.h
fi
ac_fn_c_check_decl "$LINENO" "localtime_r" "ac_cv_have_decl_localtime_r" " #include <time.h>
"
if test "x$ac_cv_have_decl_localtime_r" = xyes; then :
else
saved_CPPFLAGS="$CFLAGS"
CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS -D_REENTRANT"
unset ac_cv_have_decl_localtime_r
ac_fn_c_check_decl "$LINENO" "localtime_r" "ac_cv_have_decl_localtime_r" " #include <time.h>
"
if test "x$ac_cv_have_decl_localtime_r" = xyes; then :
else
CPPFLAGS="$saved_CPPFLAGS"
fi
fi
ac_fn_c_check_decl "$LINENO" "strsep" "ac_cv_have_decl_strsep" "
#ifdef HAVE_STRING_H
# include <string.h>
#endif
"
if test "x$ac_cv_have_decl_strsep" = xyes; then :
for ac_func in strsep
do :
ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "strsep" "ac_cv_func_strsep"
if test "x$ac_cv_func_strsep" = xyes; then :
cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
#define HAVE_STRSEP 1
_ACEOF
fi
done
fi
ac_fn_c_check_decl "$LINENO" "tcsendbreak" "ac_cv_have_decl_tcsendbreak" "#include <termios.h>
"
if test "x$ac_cv_have_decl_tcsendbreak" = xyes; then :
$as_echo "#define HAVE_TCSENDBREAK 1" >>confdefs.h
else
for ac_func in tcsendbreak
do :
ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "tcsendbreak" "ac_cv_func_tcsendbreak"
if test "x$ac_cv_func_tcsendbreak" = xyes; then :
cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
#define HAVE_TCSENDBREAK 1
_ACEOF
fi
done
fi
ac_fn_c_check_decl "$LINENO" "h_errno" "ac_cv_have_decl_h_errno" "#include <netdb.h>
"
if test "x$ac_cv_have_decl_h_errno" = xyes; then :
ac_have_decl=1
else
ac_have_decl=0
fi
cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
#define HAVE_DECL_H_ERRNO $ac_have_decl
_ACEOF
ac_fn_c_check_decl "$LINENO" "SHUT_RD" "ac_cv_have_decl_SHUT_RD" "
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/socket.h>
#include <unistd.h>
"
if test "x$ac_cv_have_decl_SHUT_RD" = xyes; then :
ac_have_decl=1
else
ac_have_decl=0
fi
cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
#define HAVE_DECL_SHUT_RD $ac_have_decl
_ACEOF
ac_fn_c_check_decl "$LINENO" "getpeereid" "ac_cv_have_decl_getpeereid" "
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/socket.h>
#include <unistd.h>
"
if test "x$ac_cv_have_decl_getpeereid" = xyes; then :
ac_have_decl=1
else
ac_have_decl=0
fi
cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
#define HAVE_DECL_GETPEEREID $ac_have_decl
_ACEOF
ac_fn_c_check_decl "$LINENO" "O_NONBLOCK" "ac_cv_have_decl_O_NONBLOCK" "
#include <sys/types.h>
#ifdef HAVE_SYS_STAT_H
# include <sys/stat.h>
#endif
#ifdef HAVE_FCNTL_H
# include <fcntl.h>
#endif
"
if test "x$ac_cv_have_decl_O_NONBLOCK" = xyes; then :
ac_have_decl=1
else
ac_have_decl=0
fi
cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
#define HAVE_DECL_O_NONBLOCK $ac_have_decl
_ACEOF
ac_fn_c_check_decl "$LINENO" "readv" "ac_cv_have_decl_readv" "
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/uio.h>
#include <unistd.h>
"
if test "x$ac_cv_have_decl_readv" = xyes; then :
ac_have_decl=1
else
ac_have_decl=0
fi
cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
#define HAVE_DECL_READV $ac_have_decl
_ACEOF
ac_fn_c_check_decl "$LINENO" "writev" "ac_cv_have_decl_writev" "
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/uio.h>
#include <unistd.h>
"
if test "x$ac_cv_have_decl_writev" = xyes; then :
ac_have_decl=1
else
ac_have_decl=0
fi
cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
#define HAVE_DECL_WRITEV $ac_have_decl
_ACEOF
ac_fn_c_check_decl "$LINENO" "MAXSYMLINKS" "ac_cv_have_decl_MAXSYMLINKS" "
#include <sys/param.h>
"
if test "x$ac_cv_have_decl_MAXSYMLINKS" = xyes; then :
ac_have_decl=1
else
ac_have_decl=0
fi
cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
#define HAVE_DECL_MAXSYMLINKS $ac_have_decl
_ACEOF
ac_fn_c_check_decl "$LINENO" "offsetof" "ac_cv_have_decl_offsetof" "
#include <stddef.h>
"
if test "x$ac_cv_have_decl_offsetof" = xyes; then :
ac_have_decl=1
else
ac_have_decl=0
fi
cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
#define HAVE_DECL_OFFSETOF $ac_have_decl
_ACEOF
# extra bits for select(2)
ac_fn_c_check_decl "$LINENO" "howmany" "ac_cv_have_decl_howmany" "
#include <sys/param.h>
#include <sys/types.h>
#ifdef HAVE_SYS_SYSMACROS_H
#include <sys/sysmacros.h>
#endif
#ifdef HAVE_SYS_SELECT_H
#include <sys/select.h>
#endif
#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TIME_H
#include <sys/time.h>
#endif
#ifdef HAVE_UNISTD_H
#include <unistd.h>
#endif
"
if test "x$ac_cv_have_decl_howmany" = xyes; then :
ac_have_decl=1
else
ac_have_decl=0
fi
cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
#define HAVE_DECL_HOWMANY $ac_have_decl
_ACEOF
ac_fn_c_check_decl "$LINENO" "NFDBITS" "ac_cv_have_decl_NFDBITS" "
#include <sys/param.h>
#include <sys/types.h>
#ifdef HAVE_SYS_SYSMACROS_H
#include <sys/sysmacros.h>
#endif
#ifdef HAVE_SYS_SELECT_H
#include <sys/select.h>
#endif
#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TIME_H
#include <sys/time.h>
#endif
#ifdef HAVE_UNISTD_H
#include <unistd.h>
#endif
"
if test "x$ac_cv_have_decl_NFDBITS" = xyes; then :
ac_have_decl=1
else
ac_have_decl=0
fi
cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
#define HAVE_DECL_NFDBITS $ac_have_decl
_ACEOF
ac_fn_c_check_type "$LINENO" "fd_mask" "ac_cv_type_fd_mask" "
#include <sys/param.h>
#include <sys/types.h>
#ifdef HAVE_SYS_SELECT_H
#include <sys/select.h>
#endif
#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TIME_H
#include <sys/time.h>
#endif
#ifdef HAVE_UNISTD_H
#include <unistd.h>
#endif
"
if test "x$ac_cv_type_fd_mask" = xyes; then :
cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
#define HAVE_FD_MASK 1
_ACEOF
fi
for ac_func in setresuid
do :
ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "setresuid" "ac_cv_func_setresuid"
if test "x$ac_cv_func_setresuid" = xyes; then :
cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
#define HAVE_SETRESUID 1
_ACEOF
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking if setresuid seems to work" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking if setresuid seems to work... " >&6; }
if test "$cross_compiling" = yes; then :
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: WARNING: cross compiling: not checking setresuid" >&5
$as_echo "$as_me: WARNING: cross compiling: not checking setresuid" >&2;}
else
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <errno.h>
int
main ()
{
errno=0;
setresuid(0,0,0);
if (errno==ENOSYS)
exit(1);
else
exit(0);
;
return 0;
}
_ACEOF
if ac_fn_c_try_run "$LINENO"; then :
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
$as_echo "yes" >&6; }
else
$as_echo "#define BROKEN_SETRESUID 1" >>confdefs.h
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: not implemented" >&5
$as_echo "not implemented" >&6; }
fi
rm -f core *.core core.conftest.* gmon.out bb.out conftest$ac_exeext \
conftest.$ac_objext conftest.beam conftest.$ac_ext
fi
fi
done
for ac_func in setresgid
do :
ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "setresgid" "ac_cv_func_setresgid"
if test "x$ac_cv_func_setresgid" = xyes; then :
cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
#define HAVE_SETRESGID 1
_ACEOF
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking if setresgid seems to work" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking if setresgid seems to work... " >&6; }
if test "$cross_compiling" = yes; then :
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: WARNING: cross compiling: not checking setresuid" >&5
$as_echo "$as_me: WARNING: cross compiling: not checking setresuid" >&2;}
else
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <errno.h>
int
main ()
{
errno=0;
setresgid(0,0,0);
if (errno==ENOSYS)
exit(1);
else
exit(0);
;
return 0;
}
_ACEOF
if ac_fn_c_try_run "$LINENO"; then :
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
$as_echo "yes" >&6; }
else
$as_echo "#define BROKEN_SETRESGID 1" >>confdefs.h
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: not implemented" >&5
$as_echo "not implemented" >&6; }
fi
rm -f core *.core core.conftest.* gmon.out bb.out conftest$ac_exeext \
conftest.$ac_objext conftest.beam conftest.$ac_ext
fi
fi
done
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for working fflush(NULL)" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking for working fflush(NULL)... " >&6; }
if test "$cross_compiling" = yes; then :
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: WARNING: cross compiling: assuming working" >&5
$as_echo "$as_me: WARNING: cross compiling: assuming working" >&2;}
else
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
+
#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+
int
main ()
{
fflush(NULL); exit(0);
;
return 0;
}
_ACEOF
if ac_fn_c_try_run "$LINENO"; then :
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
$as_echo "yes" >&6; }
else
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
$as_echo "no" >&6; }
$as_echo "#define FFLUSH_NULL_BUG 1" >>confdefs.h
fi
rm -f core *.core core.conftest.* gmon.out bb.out conftest$ac_exeext \
conftest.$ac_objext conftest.beam conftest.$ac_ext
fi
for ac_func in gettimeofday time
do :
as_ac_var=`$as_echo "ac_cv_func_$ac_func" | $as_tr_sh`
ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "$ac_func" "$as_ac_var"
if eval test \"x\$"$as_ac_var"\" = x"yes"; then :
cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
#define `$as_echo "HAVE_$ac_func" | $as_tr_cpp` 1
_ACEOF
fi
done
for ac_func in endutent getutent getutid getutline pututline setutent
do :
as_ac_var=`$as_echo "ac_cv_func_$ac_func" | $as_tr_sh`
ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "$ac_func" "$as_ac_var"
if eval test \"x\$"$as_ac_var"\" = x"yes"; then :
cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
#define `$as_echo "HAVE_$ac_func" | $as_tr_cpp` 1
_ACEOF
fi
done
for ac_func in utmpname
do :
ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "utmpname" "ac_cv_func_utmpname"
if test "x$ac_cv_func_utmpname" = xyes; then :
cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
#define HAVE_UTMPNAME 1
_ACEOF
fi
done
for ac_func in endutxent getutxent getutxid getutxline getutxuser pututxline
do :
as_ac_var=`$as_echo "ac_cv_func_$ac_func" | $as_tr_sh`
ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "$ac_func" "$as_ac_var"
if eval test \"x\$"$as_ac_var"\" = x"yes"; then :
cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
#define `$as_echo "HAVE_$ac_func" | $as_tr_cpp` 1
_ACEOF
fi
done
for ac_func in setutxdb setutxent utmpxname
do :
as_ac_var=`$as_echo "ac_cv_func_$ac_func" | $as_tr_sh`
ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "$ac_func" "$as_ac_var"
if eval test \"x\$"$as_ac_var"\" = x"yes"; then :
cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
#define `$as_echo "HAVE_$ac_func" | $as_tr_cpp` 1
_ACEOF
fi
done
for ac_func in getlastlogxbyname
do :
ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "getlastlogxbyname" "ac_cv_func_getlastlogxbyname"
if test "x$ac_cv_func_getlastlogxbyname" = xyes; then :
cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
#define HAVE_GETLASTLOGXBYNAME 1
_ACEOF
fi
done
ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "daemon" "ac_cv_func_daemon"
if test "x$ac_cv_func_daemon" = xyes; then :
$as_echo "#define HAVE_DAEMON 1" >>confdefs.h
else
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for daemon in -lbsd" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking for daemon in -lbsd... " >&6; }
if ${ac_cv_lib_bsd_daemon+:} false; then :
$as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
else
ac_check_lib_save_LIBS=$LIBS
LIBS="-lbsd $LIBS"
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error.
Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC
builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */
#ifdef __cplusplus
extern "C"
#endif
char daemon ();
int
main ()
{
return daemon ();
;
return 0;
}
_ACEOF
if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then :
ac_cv_lib_bsd_daemon=yes
else
ac_cv_lib_bsd_daemon=no
fi
rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \
conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
LIBS=$ac_check_lib_save_LIBS
fi
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_lib_bsd_daemon" >&5
$as_echo "$ac_cv_lib_bsd_daemon" >&6; }
if test "x$ac_cv_lib_bsd_daemon" = xyes; then :
LIBS="$LIBS -lbsd"; $as_echo "#define HAVE_DAEMON 1" >>confdefs.h
fi
fi
ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "getpagesize" "ac_cv_func_getpagesize"
if test "x$ac_cv_func_getpagesize" = xyes; then :
$as_echo "#define HAVE_GETPAGESIZE 1" >>confdefs.h
else
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for getpagesize in -lucb" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking for getpagesize in -lucb... " >&6; }
if ${ac_cv_lib_ucb_getpagesize+:} false; then :
$as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
else
ac_check_lib_save_LIBS=$LIBS
LIBS="-lucb $LIBS"
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error.
Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC
builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */
#ifdef __cplusplus
extern "C"
#endif
char getpagesize ();
int
main ()
{
return getpagesize ();
;
return 0;
}
_ACEOF
if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then :
ac_cv_lib_ucb_getpagesize=yes
else
ac_cv_lib_ucb_getpagesize=no
fi
rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \
conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
LIBS=$ac_check_lib_save_LIBS
fi
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_lib_ucb_getpagesize" >&5
$as_echo "$ac_cv_lib_ucb_getpagesize" >&6; }
if test "x$ac_cv_lib_ucb_getpagesize" = xyes; then :
LIBS="$LIBS -lucb"; $as_echo "#define HAVE_GETPAGESIZE 1" >>confdefs.h
fi
fi
# Check for broken snprintf
if test "x$ac_cv_func_snprintf" = "xyes" ; then
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking whether snprintf correctly terminates long strings" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking whether snprintf correctly terminates long strings... " >&6; }
if test "$cross_compiling" = yes; then :
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: WARNING: cross compiling: Assuming working snprintf()" >&5
$as_echo "$as_me: WARNING: cross compiling: Assuming working snprintf()" >&2;}
else
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
- #include <stdio.h>
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+
int
main ()
{
char b[5];
snprintf(b,5,"123456789");
exit(b[4]!='\0');
;
return 0;
}
_ACEOF
if ac_fn_c_try_run "$LINENO"; then :
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
$as_echo "yes" >&6; }
else
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
$as_echo "no" >&6; }
$as_echo "#define BROKEN_SNPRINTF 1" >>confdefs.h
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: WARNING: ****** Your snprintf() function is broken, complain to your vendor" >&5
$as_echo "$as_me: WARNING: ****** Your snprintf() function is broken, complain to your vendor" >&2;}
fi
rm -f core *.core core.conftest.* gmon.out bb.out conftest$ac_exeext \
conftest.$ac_objext conftest.beam conftest.$ac_ext
fi
fi
if test "x$ac_cv_func_snprintf" = "xyes" ; then
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking whether snprintf understands %zu" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking whether snprintf understands %zu... " >&6; }
if test "$cross_compiling" = yes; then :
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: WARNING: cross compiling: Assuming working snprintf()" >&5
$as_echo "$as_me: WARNING: cross compiling: Assuming working snprintf()" >&2;}
else
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
int
main ()
{
size_t a = 1, b = 2;
char z[128];
snprintf(z, sizeof z, "%zu%zu", a, b);
exit(strcmp(z, "12"));
;
return 0;
}
_ACEOF
if ac_fn_c_try_run "$LINENO"; then :
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
$as_echo "yes" >&6; }
else
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
$as_echo "no" >&6; }
$as_echo "#define BROKEN_SNPRINTF 1" >>confdefs.h
fi
rm -f core *.core core.conftest.* gmon.out bb.out conftest$ac_exeext \
conftest.$ac_objext conftest.beam conftest.$ac_ext
fi
fi
# We depend on vsnprintf returning the right thing on overflow: the
# number of characters it tried to create (as per SUSv3)
if test "x$ac_cv_func_vsnprintf" = "xyes" ; then
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking whether vsnprintf returns correct values on overflow" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking whether vsnprintf returns correct values on overflow... " >&6; }
if test "$cross_compiling" = yes; then :
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: WARNING: cross compiling: Assuming working vsnprintf()" >&5
$as_echo "$as_me: WARNING: cross compiling: Assuming working vsnprintf()" >&2;}
else
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdarg.h>
int x_snprintf(char *str, size_t count, const char *fmt, ...)
{
size_t ret;
va_list ap;
va_start(ap, fmt);
ret = vsnprintf(str, count, fmt, ap);
va_end(ap);
return ret;
}
int
main ()
{
char x[1];
if (x_snprintf(x, 1, "%s %d", "hello", 12345) != 11)
return 1;
if (x_snprintf(NULL, 0, "%s %d", "hello", 12345) != 11)
return 1;
return 0;
;
return 0;
}
_ACEOF
if ac_fn_c_try_run "$LINENO"; then :
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
$as_echo "yes" >&6; }
else
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
$as_echo "no" >&6; }
$as_echo "#define BROKEN_SNPRINTF 1" >>confdefs.h
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: WARNING: ****** Your vsnprintf() function is broken, complain to your vendor" >&5
$as_echo "$as_me: WARNING: ****** Your vsnprintf() function is broken, complain to your vendor" >&2;}
fi
rm -f core *.core core.conftest.* gmon.out bb.out conftest$ac_exeext \
conftest.$ac_objext conftest.beam conftest.$ac_ext
fi
fi
# On systems where [v]snprintf is broken, but is declared in stdio,
# check that the fmt argument is const char * or just char *.
# This is only useful for when BROKEN_SNPRINTF
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking whether snprintf can declare const char *fmt" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking whether snprintf can declare const char *fmt... " >&6; }
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
#include <stdio.h>
int snprintf(char *a, size_t b, const char *c, ...) { return 0; }
int
main ()
{
snprintf(0, 0, 0);
;
return 0;
}
_ACEOF
if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then :
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
$as_echo "yes" >&6; }
$as_echo "#define SNPRINTF_CONST const" >>confdefs.h
else
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
$as_echo "no" >&6; }
$as_echo "#define SNPRINTF_CONST /* not const */" >>confdefs.h
fi
rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
# Check for missing getpeereid (or equiv) support
NO_PEERCHECK=""
if test "x$ac_cv_func_getpeereid" != "xyes" -a "x$ac_cv_func_getpeerucred" != "xyes"; then
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking whether system supports SO_PEERCRED getsockopt" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking whether system supports SO_PEERCRED getsockopt... " >&6; }
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/socket.h>
int
main ()
{
int i = SO_PEERCRED;
;
return 0;
}
_ACEOF
if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then :
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
$as_echo "yes" >&6; }
$as_echo "#define HAVE_SO_PEERCRED 1" >>confdefs.h
else
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
$as_echo "no" >&6; }
NO_PEERCHECK=1
fi
rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
fi
if test "x$ac_cv_func_mkdtemp" = "xyes" ; then
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for (overly) strict mkstemp" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking for (overly) strict mkstemp... " >&6; }
if test "$cross_compiling" = yes; then :
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
$as_echo "yes" >&6; }
$as_echo "#define HAVE_STRICT_MKSTEMP 1" >>confdefs.h
else
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
int
main ()
{
char template[]="conftest.mkstemp-test";
if (mkstemp(template) == -1)
exit(1);
unlink(template);
exit(0);
;
return 0;
}
_ACEOF
if ac_fn_c_try_run "$LINENO"; then :
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
$as_echo "no" >&6; }
else
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
$as_echo "yes" >&6; }
$as_echo "#define HAVE_STRICT_MKSTEMP 1" >>confdefs.h
fi
rm -f core *.core core.conftest.* gmon.out bb.out conftest$ac_exeext \
conftest.$ac_objext conftest.beam conftest.$ac_ext
fi
fi
if test ! -z "$check_for_openpty_ctty_bug"; then
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking if openpty correctly handles controlling tty" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking if openpty correctly handles controlling tty... " >&6; }
if test "$cross_compiling" = yes; then :
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: cross-compiling, assuming yes" >&5
$as_echo "cross-compiling, assuming yes" >&6; }
else
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
#include <sys/fcntl.h>
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/wait.h>
int
main ()
{
pid_t pid;
int fd, ptyfd, ttyfd, status;
pid = fork();
if (pid < 0) { /* failed */
exit(1);
} else if (pid > 0) { /* parent */
waitpid(pid, &status, 0);
if (WIFEXITED(status))
exit(WEXITSTATUS(status));
else
exit(2);
} else { /* child */
close(0); close(1); close(2);
setsid();
openpty(&ptyfd, &ttyfd, NULL, NULL, NULL);
fd = open("/dev/tty", O_RDWR | O_NOCTTY);
if (fd >= 0)
exit(3); /* Acquired ctty: broken */
else
exit(0); /* Did not acquire ctty: OK */
}
;
return 0;
}
_ACEOF
if ac_fn_c_try_run "$LINENO"; then :
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
$as_echo "yes" >&6; }
else
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
$as_echo "no" >&6; }
$as_echo "#define SSHD_ACQUIRES_CTTY 1" >>confdefs.h
fi
rm -f core *.core core.conftest.* gmon.out bb.out conftest$ac_exeext \
conftest.$ac_objext conftest.beam conftest.$ac_ext
fi
fi
if test "x$ac_cv_func_getaddrinfo" = "xyes" && \
test "x$check_for_hpux_broken_getaddrinfo" = "x1"; then
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking if getaddrinfo seems to work" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking if getaddrinfo seems to work... " >&6; }
if test "$cross_compiling" = yes; then :
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: cross-compiling, assuming yes" >&5
$as_echo "cross-compiling, assuming yes" >&6; }
else
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
#include <sys/socket.h>
#include <netdb.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include <netinet/in.h>
#define TEST_PORT "2222"
int
main ()
{
int err, sock;
struct addrinfo *gai_ai, *ai, hints;
char ntop[NI_MAXHOST], strport[NI_MAXSERV], *name = NULL;
memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints));
hints.ai_family = PF_UNSPEC;
hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM;
hints.ai_flags = AI_PASSIVE;
err = getaddrinfo(name, TEST_PORT, &hints, &gai_ai);
if (err != 0) {
fprintf(stderr, "getaddrinfo failed (%s)", gai_strerror(err));
exit(1);
}
for (ai = gai_ai; ai != NULL; ai = ai->ai_next) {
if (ai->ai_family != AF_INET6)
continue;
err = getnameinfo(ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen, ntop,
sizeof(ntop), strport, sizeof(strport),
NI_NUMERICHOST|NI_NUMERICSERV);
if (err != 0) {
if (err == EAI_SYSTEM)
perror("getnameinfo EAI_SYSTEM");
else
fprintf(stderr, "getnameinfo failed: %s\n",
gai_strerror(err));
exit(2);
}
sock = socket(ai->ai_family, ai->ai_socktype, ai->ai_protocol);
if (sock < 0)
perror("socket");
if (bind(sock, ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen) < 0) {
if (errno == EBADF)
exit(3);
}
}
exit(0);
;
return 0;
}
_ACEOF
if ac_fn_c_try_run "$LINENO"; then :
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
$as_echo "yes" >&6; }
else
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
$as_echo "no" >&6; }
$as_echo "#define BROKEN_GETADDRINFO 1" >>confdefs.h
fi
rm -f core *.core core.conftest.* gmon.out bb.out conftest$ac_exeext \
conftest.$ac_objext conftest.beam conftest.$ac_ext
fi
fi
if test "x$ac_cv_func_getaddrinfo" = "xyes" && \
test "x$check_for_aix_broken_getaddrinfo" = "x1"; then
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking if getaddrinfo seems to work" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking if getaddrinfo seems to work... " >&6; }
if test "$cross_compiling" = yes; then :
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: cross-compiling, assuming no" >&5
$as_echo "cross-compiling, assuming no" >&6; }
else
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
#include <sys/socket.h>
#include <netdb.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include <netinet/in.h>
#define TEST_PORT "2222"
int
main ()
{
int err, sock;
struct addrinfo *gai_ai, *ai, hints;
char ntop[NI_MAXHOST], strport[NI_MAXSERV], *name = NULL;
memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints));
hints.ai_family = PF_UNSPEC;
hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM;
hints.ai_flags = AI_PASSIVE;
err = getaddrinfo(name, TEST_PORT, &hints, &gai_ai);
if (err != 0) {
fprintf(stderr, "getaddrinfo failed (%s)", gai_strerror(err));
exit(1);
}
for (ai = gai_ai; ai != NULL; ai = ai->ai_next) {
if (ai->ai_family != AF_INET && ai->ai_family != AF_INET6)
continue;
err = getnameinfo(ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen, ntop,
sizeof(ntop), strport, sizeof(strport),
NI_NUMERICHOST|NI_NUMERICSERV);
if (ai->ai_family == AF_INET && err != 0) {
perror("getnameinfo");
exit(2);
}
}
exit(0);
;
return 0;
}
_ACEOF
if ac_fn_c_try_run "$LINENO"; then :
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
$as_echo "yes" >&6; }
$as_echo "#define AIX_GETNAMEINFO_HACK 1" >>confdefs.h
else
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
$as_echo "no" >&6; }
$as_echo "#define BROKEN_GETADDRINFO 1" >>confdefs.h
fi
rm -f core *.core core.conftest.* gmon.out bb.out conftest$ac_exeext \
conftest.$ac_objext conftest.beam conftest.$ac_ext
fi
fi
if test "x$ac_cv_func_getaddrinfo" = "xyes"; then
ac_fn_c_check_decl "$LINENO" "AI_NUMERICSERV" "ac_cv_have_decl_AI_NUMERICSERV" "#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/socket.h>
#include <netdb.h>
"
if test "x$ac_cv_have_decl_AI_NUMERICSERV" = xyes; then :
ac_have_decl=1
else
ac_have_decl=0
fi
cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
#define HAVE_DECL_AI_NUMERICSERV $ac_have_decl
_ACEOF
fi
if test "x$check_for_conflicting_getspnam" = "x1"; then
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for conflicting getspnam in shadow.h" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking for conflicting getspnam in shadow.h... " >&6; }
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
- #include <shadow.h>
+
+#include <shadow.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+
int
main ()
{
exit(0);
;
return 0;
}
_ACEOF
if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then :
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
$as_echo "no" >&6; }
else
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
$as_echo "yes" >&6; }
$as_echo "#define GETSPNAM_CONFLICTING_DEFS 1" >>confdefs.h
fi
rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
fi
if test "x$ac_cv_func_strnvis" = "xyes"; then
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for working strnvis" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking for working strnvis... " >&6; }
if test "$cross_compiling" = yes; then :
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: WARNING: cross compiling: assuming broken" >&5
$as_echo "$as_me: WARNING: cross compiling: assuming broken" >&2;}
$as_echo "#define BROKEN_STRNVIS 1" >>confdefs.h
else
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
#include <signal.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
#include <vis.h>
static void sighandler(int sig) { _exit(1); }
int
main ()
{
char dst[16];
signal(SIGSEGV, sighandler);
if (strnvis(dst, "src", 4, 0) && strcmp(dst, "src") == 0)
exit(0);
exit(1)
;
return 0;
}
_ACEOF
if ac_fn_c_try_run "$LINENO"; then :
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
$as_echo "yes" >&6; }
else
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
$as_echo "no" >&6; }
$as_echo "#define BROKEN_STRNVIS 1" >>confdefs.h
fi
rm -f core *.core core.conftest.* gmon.out bb.out conftest$ac_exeext \
conftest.$ac_objext conftest.beam conftest.$ac_ext
fi
fi
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking if SA_RESTARTed signals interrupt select()" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking if SA_RESTARTed signals interrupt select()... " >&6; }
if test "$cross_compiling" = yes; then :
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: WARNING: cross compiling: assuming yes" >&5
$as_echo "$as_me: WARNING: cross compiling: assuming yes" >&2;}
else
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
#ifdef HAVE_SYS_SELECT
# include <sys/select.h>
#endif
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/time.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <signal.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
static void sighandler(int sig) { }
int
main ()
{
int r;
pid_t pid;
struct sigaction sa;
sa.sa_handler = sighandler;
sa.sa_flags = SA_RESTART;
(void)sigaction(SIGTERM, &sa, NULL);
if ((pid = fork()) == 0) { /* child */
pid = getppid();
sleep(1);
kill(pid, SIGTERM);
sleep(1);
if (getppid() == pid) /* if parent did not exit, shoot it */
kill(pid, SIGKILL);
exit(0);
} else { /* parent */
r = select(0, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL);
}
exit(r == -1 ? 0 : 1);
;
return 0;
}
_ACEOF
if ac_fn_c_try_run "$LINENO"; then :
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
$as_echo "yes" >&6; }
else
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
$as_echo "no" >&6; }
$as_echo "#define NO_SA_RESTART 1" >>confdefs.h
fi
rm -f core *.core core.conftest.* gmon.out bb.out conftest$ac_exeext \
conftest.$ac_objext conftest.beam conftest.$ac_ext
fi
for ac_func in getpgrp
do :
ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "getpgrp" "ac_cv_func_getpgrp"
if test "x$ac_cv_func_getpgrp" = xyes; then :
cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
#define HAVE_GETPGRP 1
_ACEOF
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking if getpgrp accepts zero args" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking if getpgrp accepts zero args... " >&6; }
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
$ac_includes_default
int
main ()
{
getpgrp();
;
return 0;
}
_ACEOF
if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then :
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
$as_echo "yes" >&6; }
$as_echo "#define GETPGRP_VOID 1" >>confdefs.h
else
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
$as_echo "no" >&6; }
$as_echo "#define GETPGRP_VOID 0" >>confdefs.h
fi
rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
fi
done
# Search for OpenSSL
saved_CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS"
saved_LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS"
# Check whether --with-ssl-dir was given.
if test "${with_ssl_dir+set}" = set; then :
withval=$with_ssl_dir;
if test "x$openssl" = "xno" ; then
as_fn_error $? "cannot use --with-ssl-dir when OpenSSL disabled" "$LINENO" 5
fi
if test "x$withval" != "xno" ; then
case "$withval" in
# Relative paths
./*|../*) withval="`pwd`/$withval"
esac
if test -d "$withval/lib"; then
if test -n "${rpath_opt}"; then
LDFLAGS="-L${withval}/lib ${rpath_opt}${withval}/lib ${LDFLAGS}"
else
LDFLAGS="-L${withval}/lib ${LDFLAGS}"
fi
elif test -d "$withval/lib64"; then
if test -n "${rpath_opt}"; then
LDFLAGS="-L${withval}/lib64 ${rpath_opt}${withval}/lib64 ${LDFLAGS}"
else
LDFLAGS="-L${withval}/lib64 ${LDFLAGS}"
fi
else
if test -n "${rpath_opt}"; then
LDFLAGS="-L${withval} ${rpath_opt}${withval} ${LDFLAGS}"
else
LDFLAGS="-L${withval} ${LDFLAGS}"
fi
fi
if test -d "$withval/include"; then
CPPFLAGS="-I${withval}/include ${CPPFLAGS}"
else
CPPFLAGS="-I${withval} ${CPPFLAGS}"
fi
fi
fi
# Check whether --with-openssl-header-check was given.
if test "${with_openssl_header_check+set}" = set; then :
withval=$with_openssl_header_check;
if test "x$withval" = "xno" ; then
openssl_check_nonfatal=1
fi
fi
openssl_engine=no
# Check whether --with-ssl-engine was given.
if test "${with_ssl_engine+set}" = set; then :
withval=$with_ssl_engine;
if test "x$withval" != "xno" ; then
if test "x$openssl" = "xno" ; then
as_fn_error $? "cannot use --with-ssl-engine when OpenSSL disabled" "$LINENO" 5
fi
openssl_engine=yes
fi
fi
if test "x$openssl" = "xyes" ; then
LIBS="-lcrypto $LIBS"
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error.
Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC
builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */
#ifdef __cplusplus
extern "C"
#endif
char RAND_add ();
int
main ()
{
return RAND_add ();
;
return 0;
}
_ACEOF
if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then :
else
as_fn_error $? "*** working libcrypto not found, check config.log" "$LINENO" 5
fi
rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \
conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
ac_fn_c_check_header_mongrel "$LINENO" "openssl/opensslv.h" "ac_cv_header_openssl_opensslv_h" "$ac_includes_default"
if test "x$ac_cv_header_openssl_opensslv_h" = xyes; then :
else
as_fn_error $? "*** OpenSSL headers missing - please install first or check config.log ***" "$LINENO" 5
fi
# Determine OpenSSL header version
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking OpenSSL header version" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking OpenSSL header version... " >&6; }
if test "$cross_compiling" = yes; then :
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: WARNING: cross compiling: not checking" >&5
$as_echo "$as_me: WARNING: cross compiling: not checking" >&2;}
else
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <openssl/opensslv.h>
#define DATA "conftest.sslincver"
int
main ()
{
FILE *fd;
int rc;
fd = fopen(DATA,"w");
if(fd == NULL)
exit(1);
if ((rc = fprintf(fd, "%08lx (%s)\n",
(unsigned long)OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER,
OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT)) < 0)
exit(1);
exit(0);
;
return 0;
}
_ACEOF
if ac_fn_c_try_run "$LINENO"; then :
ssl_header_ver=`cat conftest.sslincver`
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ssl_header_ver" >&5
$as_echo "$ssl_header_ver" >&6; }
else
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: not found" >&5
$as_echo "not found" >&6; }
as_fn_error $? "OpenSSL version header not found." "$LINENO" 5
fi
rm -f core *.core core.conftest.* gmon.out bb.out conftest$ac_exeext \
conftest.$ac_objext conftest.beam conftest.$ac_ext
fi
# Determining OpenSSL library version is version dependent.
for ac_func in OpenSSL_version OpenSSL_version_num
do :
as_ac_var=`$as_echo "ac_cv_func_$ac_func" | $as_tr_sh`
ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "$ac_func" "$as_ac_var"
if eval test \"x\$"$as_ac_var"\" = x"yes"; then :
cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
#define `$as_echo "HAVE_$ac_func" | $as_tr_cpp` 1
_ACEOF
fi
done
# Determine OpenSSL library version
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking OpenSSL library version" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking OpenSSL library version... " >&6; }
if test "$cross_compiling" = yes; then :
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: WARNING: cross compiling: not checking" >&5
$as_echo "$as_me: WARNING: cross compiling: not checking" >&2;}
else
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
#include <stdio.h>
+ #include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <openssl/opensslv.h>
#include <openssl/crypto.h>
#define DATA "conftest.ssllibver"
int
main ()
{
FILE *fd;
int rc;
fd = fopen(DATA,"w");
if(fd == NULL)
exit(1);
#ifndef OPENSSL_VERSION
# define OPENSSL_VERSION SSLEAY_VERSION
#endif
#ifndef HAVE_OPENSSL_VERSION
# define OpenSSL_version SSLeay_version
#endif
#ifndef HAVE_OPENSSL_VERSION_NUM
# define OpenSSL_version_num SSLeay
#endif
if ((rc = fprintf(fd, "%08lx (%s)\n",
(unsigned long)OpenSSL_version_num(),
OpenSSL_version(OPENSSL_VERSION))) < 0)
exit(1);
exit(0);
;
return 0;
}
_ACEOF
if ac_fn_c_try_run "$LINENO"; then :
ssl_library_ver=`cat conftest.ssllibver`
# Check version is supported.
case "$ssl_library_ver" in
10000*|0*)
as_fn_error $? "OpenSSL >= 1.0.1 required (have \"$ssl_library_ver\")" "$LINENO" 5
;;
100*) ;; # 1.0.x
101000[0123456]*)
# https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4613
as_fn_error $? "OpenSSL 1.1.x versions prior to 1.1.0g have a bug that breaks their use with OpenSSH (have \"$ssl_library_ver\")" "$LINENO" 5
;;
101*) ;; # 1.1.x
200*) ;; # LibreSSL
300*) ;; # OpenSSL development branch.
*)
as_fn_error $? "Unknown/unsupported OpenSSL version (\"$ssl_library_ver\")" "$LINENO" 5
;;
esac
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ssl_library_ver" >&5
$as_echo "$ssl_library_ver" >&6; }
else
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: not found" >&5
$as_echo "not found" >&6; }
as_fn_error $? "OpenSSL library not found." "$LINENO" 5
fi
rm -f core *.core core.conftest.* gmon.out bb.out conftest$ac_exeext \
conftest.$ac_objext conftest.beam conftest.$ac_ext
fi
# Sanity check OpenSSL headers
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking whether OpenSSL's headers match the library" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking whether OpenSSL's headers match the library... " >&6; }
if test "$cross_compiling" = yes; then :
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: WARNING: cross compiling: not checking" >&5
$as_echo "$as_me: WARNING: cross compiling: not checking" >&2;}
else
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
+ #include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <openssl/opensslv.h>
#include <openssl/crypto.h>
int
main ()
{
#ifndef HAVE_OPENSSL_VERSION_NUM
# define OpenSSL_version_num SSLeay
#endif
exit(OpenSSL_version_num() == OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER ? 0 : 1);
;
return 0;
}
_ACEOF
if ac_fn_c_try_run "$LINENO"; then :
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
$as_echo "yes" >&6; }
else
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
$as_echo "no" >&6; }
if test "x$openssl_check_nonfatal" = "x"; then
as_fn_error $? "Your OpenSSL headers do not match your
library. Check config.log for details.
If you are sure your installation is consistent, you can disable the check
by running \"./configure --without-openssl-header-check\".
Also see contrib/findssl.sh for help identifying header/library mismatches.
" "$LINENO" 5
else
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: WARNING: Your OpenSSL headers do not match your
library. Check config.log for details.
Also see contrib/findssl.sh for help identifying header/library mismatches." >&5
$as_echo "$as_me: WARNING: Your OpenSSL headers do not match your
library. Check config.log for details.
Also see contrib/findssl.sh for help identifying header/library mismatches." >&2;}
fi
fi
rm -f core *.core core.conftest.* gmon.out bb.out conftest$ac_exeext \
conftest.$ac_objext conftest.beam conftest.$ac_ext
fi
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking if programs using OpenSSL functions will link" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking if programs using OpenSSL functions will link... " >&6; }
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
#include <openssl/err.h>
int
main ()
{
ERR_load_crypto_strings();
;
return 0;
}
_ACEOF
if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then :
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
$as_echo "yes" >&6; }
else
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
$as_echo "no" >&6; }
saved_LIBS="$LIBS"
LIBS="$LIBS -ldl"
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking if programs using OpenSSL need -ldl" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking if programs using OpenSSL need -ldl... " >&6; }
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
#include <openssl/err.h>
int
main ()
{
ERR_load_crypto_strings();
;
return 0;
}
_ACEOF
if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then :
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
$as_echo "yes" >&6; }
else
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
$as_echo "no" >&6; }
LIBS="$saved_LIBS"
fi
rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \
conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
fi
rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \
conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
for ac_func in \
BN_is_prime_ex \
DSA_generate_parameters_ex \
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl \
EVP_DigestFinal_ex \
EVP_DigestInit_ex \
EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup \
EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex \
EVP_MD_CTX_init \
HMAC_CTX_init \
RSA_generate_key_ex \
RSA_get_default_method \
do :
as_ac_var=`$as_echo "ac_cv_func_$ac_func" | $as_tr_sh`
ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "$ac_func" "$as_ac_var"
if eval test \"x\$"$as_ac_var"\" = x"yes"; then :
cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
#define `$as_echo "HAVE_$ac_func" | $as_tr_cpp` 1
_ACEOF
fi
done
# OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms may be a macro.
ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms" "ac_cv_func_OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms"
if test "x$ac_cv_func_OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms" = xyes; then :
$as_echo "#define HAVE_OPENSSL_ADD_ALL_ALGORITHMS 1" >>confdefs.h
else
ac_fn_c_check_decl "$LINENO" "OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms" "ac_cv_have_decl_OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms" "#include <openssl/evp.h>
"
if test "x$ac_cv_have_decl_OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms" = xyes; then :
$as_echo "#define HAVE_OPENSSL_ADD_ALL_ALGORITHMS 1" >>confdefs.h
fi
fi
# LibreSSL/OpenSSL 1.1x API
for ac_func in \
OPENSSL_init_crypto \
DH_get0_key \
DH_get0_pqg \
DH_set0_key \
DH_set_length \
DH_set0_pqg \
DSA_get0_key \
DSA_get0_pqg \
DSA_set0_key \
DSA_set0_pqg \
DSA_SIG_get0 \
DSA_SIG_set0 \
ECDSA_SIG_get0 \
ECDSA_SIG_set0 \
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv \
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_noconst \
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_iv \
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_iv \
RSA_get0_crt_params \
RSA_get0_factors \
RSA_get0_key \
RSA_set0_crt_params \
RSA_set0_factors \
RSA_set0_key \
RSA_meth_free \
RSA_meth_dup \
RSA_meth_set1_name \
RSA_meth_get_finish \
RSA_meth_set_priv_enc \
RSA_meth_set_priv_dec \
RSA_meth_set_finish \
EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA \
EVP_MD_CTX_new \
EVP_MD_CTX_free \
EVP_chacha20 \
do :
as_ac_var=`$as_echo "ac_cv_func_$ac_func" | $as_tr_sh`
ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "$ac_func" "$as_ac_var"
if eval test \"x\$"$as_ac_var"\" = x"yes"; then :
cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
#define `$as_echo "HAVE_$ac_func" | $as_tr_cpp` 1
_ACEOF
fi
done
if test "x$openssl_engine" = "xyes" ; then
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for OpenSSL ENGINE support" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking for OpenSSL ENGINE support... " >&6; }
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
#include <openssl/engine.h>
int
main ()
{
ENGINE_load_builtin_engines();
ENGINE_register_all_complete();
;
return 0;
}
_ACEOF
if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then :
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
$as_echo "yes" >&6; }
$as_echo "#define USE_OPENSSL_ENGINE 1" >>confdefs.h
else
as_fn_error $? "OpenSSL ENGINE support not found" "$LINENO" 5
fi
rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
fi
# Check for OpenSSL without EVP_aes_{192,256}_cbc
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking whether OpenSSL has crippled AES support" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking whether OpenSSL has crippled AES support... " >&6; }
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
+ #include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <openssl/evp.h>
int
main ()
{
exit(EVP_aes_192_cbc() == NULL || EVP_aes_256_cbc() == NULL);
;
return 0;
}
_ACEOF
if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then :
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
$as_echo "no" >&6; }
else
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
$as_echo "yes" >&6; }
$as_echo "#define OPENSSL_LOBOTOMISED_AES 1" >>confdefs.h
fi
rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \
conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
# Check for OpenSSL with EVP_aes_*ctr
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking whether OpenSSL has AES CTR via EVP" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking whether OpenSSL has AES CTR via EVP... " >&6; }
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
+ #include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <openssl/evp.h>
int
main ()
{
exit(EVP_aes_128_ctr() == NULL ||
EVP_aes_192_cbc() == NULL ||
EVP_aes_256_cbc() == NULL);
;
return 0;
}
_ACEOF
if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then :
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
$as_echo "yes" >&6; }
$as_echo "#define OPENSSL_HAVE_EVPCTR 1" >>confdefs.h
else
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
$as_echo "no" >&6; }
fi
rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \
conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
# Check for OpenSSL with EVP_aes_*gcm
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking whether OpenSSL has AES GCM via EVP" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking whether OpenSSL has AES GCM via EVP... " >&6; }
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
+ #include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <openssl/evp.h>
int
main ()
{
exit(EVP_aes_128_gcm() == NULL ||
EVP_aes_256_gcm() == NULL ||
EVP_CTRL_GCM_SET_IV_FIXED == 0 ||
EVP_CTRL_GCM_IV_GEN == 0 ||
EVP_CTRL_GCM_SET_TAG == 0 ||
EVP_CTRL_GCM_GET_TAG == 0 ||
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(NULL, 0, 0, NULL) == 0);
;
return 0;
}
_ACEOF
if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then :
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
$as_echo "yes" >&6; }
$as_echo "#define OPENSSL_HAVE_EVPGCM 1" >>confdefs.h
else
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
$as_echo "no" >&6; }
unsupported_algorithms="$unsupported_cipers \
aes128-gcm@openssh.com \
aes256-gcm@openssh.com"
fi
rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \
conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking if EVP_DigestUpdate returns an int" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking if EVP_DigestUpdate returns an int... " >&6; }
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
+ #include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <openssl/evp.h>
int
main ()
{
if(EVP_DigestUpdate(NULL, NULL,0))
exit(0);
;
return 0;
}
_ACEOF
if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then :
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
$as_echo "yes" >&6; }
else
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
$as_echo "no" >&6; }
$as_echo "#define OPENSSL_EVP_DIGESTUPDATE_VOID 1" >>confdefs.h
fi
rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \
conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
# Some systems want crypt() from libcrypt, *not* the version in OpenSSL,
# because the system crypt() is more featureful.
if test "x$check_for_libcrypt_before" = "x1"; then
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for crypt in -lcrypt" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking for crypt in -lcrypt... " >&6; }
if ${ac_cv_lib_crypt_crypt+:} false; then :
$as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
else
ac_check_lib_save_LIBS=$LIBS
LIBS="-lcrypt $LIBS"
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error.
Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC
builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */
#ifdef __cplusplus
extern "C"
#endif
char crypt ();
int
main ()
{
return crypt ();
;
return 0;
}
_ACEOF
if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then :
ac_cv_lib_crypt_crypt=yes
else
ac_cv_lib_crypt_crypt=no
fi
rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \
conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
LIBS=$ac_check_lib_save_LIBS
fi
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_lib_crypt_crypt" >&5
$as_echo "$ac_cv_lib_crypt_crypt" >&6; }
if test "x$ac_cv_lib_crypt_crypt" = xyes; then :
cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
#define HAVE_LIBCRYPT 1
_ACEOF
LIBS="-lcrypt $LIBS"
fi
fi
# Some Linux systems (Slackware) need crypt() from libcrypt, *not* the
# version in OpenSSL.
if test "x$check_for_libcrypt_later" = "x1"; then
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for crypt in -lcrypt" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking for crypt in -lcrypt... " >&6; }
if ${ac_cv_lib_crypt_crypt+:} false; then :
$as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
else
ac_check_lib_save_LIBS=$LIBS
LIBS="-lcrypt $LIBS"
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error.
Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC
builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */
#ifdef __cplusplus
extern "C"
#endif
char crypt ();
int
main ()
{
return crypt ();
;
return 0;
}
_ACEOF
if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then :
ac_cv_lib_crypt_crypt=yes
else
ac_cv_lib_crypt_crypt=no
fi
rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \
conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
LIBS=$ac_check_lib_save_LIBS
fi
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_lib_crypt_crypt" >&5
$as_echo "$ac_cv_lib_crypt_crypt" >&6; }
if test "x$ac_cv_lib_crypt_crypt" = xyes; then :
LIBS="$LIBS -lcrypt"
fi
fi
for ac_func in crypt DES_crypt
do :
as_ac_var=`$as_echo "ac_cv_func_$ac_func" | $as_tr_sh`
ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "$ac_func" "$as_ac_var"
if eval test \"x\$"$as_ac_var"\" = x"yes"; then :
cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
#define `$as_echo "HAVE_$ac_func" | $as_tr_cpp` 1
_ACEOF
fi
done
# Check for SHA256, SHA384 and SHA512 support in OpenSSL
for ac_func in EVP_sha256 EVP_sha384 EVP_sha512
do :
as_ac_var=`$as_echo "ac_cv_func_$ac_func" | $as_tr_sh`
ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "$ac_func" "$as_ac_var"
if eval test \"x\$"$as_ac_var"\" = x"yes"; then :
cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
#define `$as_echo "HAVE_$ac_func" | $as_tr_cpp` 1
_ACEOF
fi
done
# Check complete ECC support in OpenSSL
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking whether OpenSSL has NID_X9_62_prime256v1" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking whether OpenSSL has NID_X9_62_prime256v1... " >&6; }
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
#include <openssl/ec.h>
#include <openssl/ecdh.h>
#include <openssl/ecdsa.h>
#include <openssl/evp.h>
#include <openssl/objects.h>
#include <openssl/opensslv.h>
int
main ()
{
EC_KEY *e = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(NID_X9_62_prime256v1);
const EVP_MD *m = EVP_sha256(); /* We need this too */
;
return 0;
}
_ACEOF
if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then :
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
$as_echo "yes" >&6; }
enable_nistp256=1
else
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
$as_echo "no" >&6; }
fi
rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \
conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking whether OpenSSL has NID_secp384r1" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking whether OpenSSL has NID_secp384r1... " >&6; }
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
#include <openssl/ec.h>
#include <openssl/ecdh.h>
#include <openssl/ecdsa.h>
#include <openssl/evp.h>
#include <openssl/objects.h>
#include <openssl/opensslv.h>
int
main ()
{
EC_KEY *e = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(NID_secp384r1);
const EVP_MD *m = EVP_sha384(); /* We need this too */
;
return 0;
}
_ACEOF
if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then :
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
$as_echo "yes" >&6; }
enable_nistp384=1
else
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
$as_echo "no" >&6; }
fi
rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \
conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking whether OpenSSL has NID_secp521r1" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking whether OpenSSL has NID_secp521r1... " >&6; }
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
#include <openssl/ec.h>
#include <openssl/ecdh.h>
#include <openssl/ecdsa.h>
#include <openssl/evp.h>
#include <openssl/objects.h>
#include <openssl/opensslv.h>
int
main ()
{
EC_KEY *e = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(NID_secp521r1);
const EVP_MD *m = EVP_sha512(); /* We need this too */
;
return 0;
}
_ACEOF
if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then :
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
$as_echo "yes" >&6; }
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking if OpenSSL's NID_secp521r1 is functional" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking if OpenSSL's NID_secp521r1 is functional... " >&6; }
if test "$cross_compiling" = yes; then :
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: WARNING: cross-compiling: assuming yes" >&5
$as_echo "$as_me: WARNING: cross-compiling: assuming yes" >&2;}
enable_nistp521=1
else
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
+ #include <stdlib.h>
#include <openssl/ec.h>
#include <openssl/ecdh.h>
#include <openssl/ecdsa.h>
#include <openssl/evp.h>
#include <openssl/objects.h>
#include <openssl/opensslv.h>
int
main ()
{
EC_KEY *e = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(NID_secp521r1);
const EVP_MD *m = EVP_sha512(); /* We need this too */
exit(e == NULL || m == NULL);
;
return 0;
}
_ACEOF
if ac_fn_c_try_run "$LINENO"; then :
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
$as_echo "yes" >&6; }
enable_nistp521=1
else
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
$as_echo "no" >&6; }
fi
rm -f core *.core core.conftest.* gmon.out bb.out conftest$ac_exeext \
conftest.$ac_objext conftest.beam conftest.$ac_ext
fi
else
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
$as_echo "no" >&6; }
fi
rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \
conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
COMMENT_OUT_ECC="#no ecc#"
TEST_SSH_ECC=no
if test x$enable_nistp256 = x1 || test x$enable_nistp384 = x1 || \
test x$enable_nistp521 = x1; then
$as_echo "#define OPENSSL_HAS_ECC 1" >>confdefs.h
for ac_func in EC_KEY_METHOD_new
do :
ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "EC_KEY_METHOD_new" "ac_cv_func_EC_KEY_METHOD_new"
if test "x$ac_cv_func_EC_KEY_METHOD_new" = xyes; then :
cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
#define HAVE_EC_KEY_METHOD_NEW 1
_ACEOF
fi
done
openssl_ecc=yes
else
openssl_ecc=no
fi
if test x$enable_nistp256 = x1; then
$as_echo "#define OPENSSL_HAS_NISTP256 1" >>confdefs.h
TEST_SSH_ECC=yes
COMMENT_OUT_ECC=""
else
unsupported_algorithms="$unsupported_algorithms \
ecdsa-sha2-nistp256 \
ecdh-sha2-nistp256 \
ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com"
fi
if test x$enable_nistp384 = x1; then
$as_echo "#define OPENSSL_HAS_NISTP384 1" >>confdefs.h
TEST_SSH_ECC=yes
COMMENT_OUT_ECC=""
else
unsupported_algorithms="$unsupported_algorithms \
ecdsa-sha2-nistp384 \
ecdh-sha2-nistp384 \
ecdsa-sha2-nistp384-cert-v01@openssh.com"
fi
if test x$enable_nistp521 = x1; then
$as_echo "#define OPENSSL_HAS_NISTP521 1" >>confdefs.h
TEST_SSH_ECC=yes
COMMENT_OUT_ECC=""
else
unsupported_algorithms="$unsupported_algorithms \
ecdh-sha2-nistp521 \
ecdsa-sha2-nistp521 \
ecdsa-sha2-nistp521-cert-v01@openssh.com"
fi
else
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for crypt in -lcrypt" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking for crypt in -lcrypt... " >&6; }
if ${ac_cv_lib_crypt_crypt+:} false; then :
$as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
else
ac_check_lib_save_LIBS=$LIBS
LIBS="-lcrypt $LIBS"
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error.
Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC
builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */
#ifdef __cplusplus
extern "C"
#endif
char crypt ();
int
main ()
{
return crypt ();
;
return 0;
}
_ACEOF
if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then :
ac_cv_lib_crypt_crypt=yes
else
ac_cv_lib_crypt_crypt=no
fi
rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \
conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
LIBS=$ac_check_lib_save_LIBS
fi
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_lib_crypt_crypt" >&5
$as_echo "$ac_cv_lib_crypt_crypt" >&6; }
if test "x$ac_cv_lib_crypt_crypt" = xyes; then :
LIBS="$LIBS -lcrypt"
fi
for ac_func in crypt
do :
ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "crypt" "ac_cv_func_crypt"
if test "x$ac_cv_func_crypt" = xyes; then :
cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
#define HAVE_CRYPT 1
_ACEOF
fi
done
fi
# PKCS11/U2F depend on OpenSSL and dlopen().
enable_pkcs11=yes
enable_sk=yes
if test "x$openssl" != "xyes" ; then
enable_pkcs11="disabled; missing libcrypto"
enable_sk="disabled; missing libcrypto"
fi
if test "x$openssl_ecc" != "xyes" ; then
enable_sk="disabled; OpenSSL has no ECC support"
fi
if test "x$ac_cv_func_dlopen" != "xyes" ; then
enable_pkcs11="disabled; missing dlopen(3)"
enable_sk="disabled; missing dlopen(3)"
fi
if test "x$ac_cv_have_decl_RTLD_NOW" != "xyes" ; then
enable_pkcs11="disabled; missing RTLD_NOW"
enable_sk="disabled; missing RTLD_NOW"
fi
if test ! -z "$disable_pkcs11" ; then
enable_pkcs11="disabled by user"
fi
if test ! -z "$disable_sk" ; then
enable_sk="disabled by user"
fi
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking whether to enable PKCS11" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking whether to enable PKCS11... " >&6; }
if test "x$enable_pkcs11" = "xyes" ; then
$as_echo "#define ENABLE_PKCS11 /**/" >>confdefs.h
fi
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $enable_pkcs11" >&5
$as_echo "$enable_pkcs11" >&6; }
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking whether to enable U2F" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking whether to enable U2F... " >&6; }
if test "x$enable_sk" = "xyes" ; then
$as_echo "#define ENABLE_SK /**/" >>confdefs.h
SK_DUMMY_LIBRARY=regress/misc/sk-dummy/sk-dummy.so
else
# Do not try to build sk-dummy library.
SK_DUMMY_LIBRARY=""
fi
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $enable_sk" >&5
$as_echo "$enable_sk" >&6; }
# Now check for built-in security key support.
if test "x$enable_sk" = "xyes" -a "x$enable_sk_internal" = "xyes" ; then
if test -n "$ac_tool_prefix"; then
# Extract the first word of "${ac_tool_prefix}pkg-config", so it can be a program name with args.
set dummy ${ac_tool_prefix}pkg-config; ac_word=$2
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for $ac_word" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking for $ac_word... " >&6; }
if ${ac_cv_path_PKGCONFIG+:} false; then :
$as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
else
case $PKGCONFIG in
[\\/]* | ?:[\\/]*)
ac_cv_path_PKGCONFIG="$PKGCONFIG" # Let the user override the test with a path.
;;
*)
as_save_IFS=$IFS; IFS=$PATH_SEPARATOR
for as_dir in $PATH
do
IFS=$as_save_IFS
test -z "$as_dir" && as_dir=.
for ac_exec_ext in '' $ac_executable_extensions; do
if as_fn_executable_p "$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"; then
ac_cv_path_PKGCONFIG="$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"
$as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: found $as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" >&5
break 2
fi
done
done
IFS=$as_save_IFS
;;
esac
fi
PKGCONFIG=$ac_cv_path_PKGCONFIG
if test -n "$PKGCONFIG"; then
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $PKGCONFIG" >&5
$as_echo "$PKGCONFIG" >&6; }
else
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
$as_echo "no" >&6; }
fi
fi
if test -z "$ac_cv_path_PKGCONFIG"; then
ac_pt_PKGCONFIG=$PKGCONFIG
# Extract the first word of "pkg-config", so it can be a program name with args.
set dummy pkg-config; ac_word=$2
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for $ac_word" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking for $ac_word... " >&6; }
if ${ac_cv_path_ac_pt_PKGCONFIG+:} false; then :
$as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
else
case $ac_pt_PKGCONFIG in
[\\/]* | ?:[\\/]*)
ac_cv_path_ac_pt_PKGCONFIG="$ac_pt_PKGCONFIG" # Let the user override the test with a path.
;;
*)
as_save_IFS=$IFS; IFS=$PATH_SEPARATOR
for as_dir in $PATH
do
IFS=$as_save_IFS
test -z "$as_dir" && as_dir=.
for ac_exec_ext in '' $ac_executable_extensions; do
if as_fn_executable_p "$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"; then
ac_cv_path_ac_pt_PKGCONFIG="$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"
$as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: found $as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" >&5
break 2
fi
done
done
IFS=$as_save_IFS
;;
esac
fi
ac_pt_PKGCONFIG=$ac_cv_path_ac_pt_PKGCONFIG
if test -n "$ac_pt_PKGCONFIG"; then
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_pt_PKGCONFIG" >&5
$as_echo "$ac_pt_PKGCONFIG" >&6; }
else
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
$as_echo "no" >&6; }
fi
if test "x$ac_pt_PKGCONFIG" = x; then
PKGCONFIG="no"
else
case $cross_compiling:$ac_tool_warned in
yes:)
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: WARNING: using cross tools not prefixed with host triplet" >&5
$as_echo "$as_me: WARNING: using cross tools not prefixed with host triplet" >&2;}
ac_tool_warned=yes ;;
esac
PKGCONFIG=$ac_pt_PKGCONFIG
fi
else
PKGCONFIG="$ac_cv_path_PKGCONFIG"
fi
use_pkgconfig_for_libfido2=
if test "x$PKGCONFIG" != "xno"; then
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking if $PKGCONFIG knows about libfido2" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking if $PKGCONFIG knows about libfido2... " >&6; }
if "$PKGCONFIG" libfido2; then
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
$as_echo "yes" >&6; }
use_pkgconfig_for_libfido2=yes
else
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
$as_echo "no" >&6; }
fi
fi
if test "x$use_pkgconfig_for_libfido2" = "xyes"; then
LIBFIDO2=`$PKGCONFIG --libs libfido2`
CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS `$PKGCONFIG --cflags libfido2`"
else
LIBFIDO2="-lfido2 -lcbor"
fi
OTHERLIBS=`echo $LIBFIDO2 | sed 's/-lfido2//'`
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for fido_init in -lfido2" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking for fido_init in -lfido2... " >&6; }
if ${ac_cv_lib_fido2_fido_init+:} false; then :
$as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
else
ac_check_lib_save_LIBS=$LIBS
LIBS="-lfido2 $OTHERLIBS
$LIBS"
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error.
Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC
builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */
#ifdef __cplusplus
extern "C"
#endif
char fido_init ();
int
main ()
{
return fido_init ();
;
return 0;
}
_ACEOF
if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then :
ac_cv_lib_fido2_fido_init=yes
else
ac_cv_lib_fido2_fido_init=no
fi
rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \
conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
LIBS=$ac_check_lib_save_LIBS
fi
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_lib_fido2_fido_init" >&5
$as_echo "$ac_cv_lib_fido2_fido_init" >&6; }
if test "x$ac_cv_lib_fido2_fido_init" = xyes; then :
$as_echo "#define ENABLE_SK_INTERNAL /**/" >>confdefs.h
enable_sk="built-in"
else
as_fn_error $? "no usable libfido2 found" "$LINENO" 5
fi
+ saved_LIBS="$LIBS"
+ LIBS="$LIBS $LIBFIDO2"
+ for ac_func in \
+ fido_cred_prot \
+ fido_cred_set_prot \
+ fido_dev_get_touch_begin \
+ fido_dev_get_touch_status \
+ fido_dev_supports_cred_prot \
+
+do :
+ as_ac_var=`$as_echo "ac_cv_func_$ac_func" | $as_tr_sh`
+ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "$ac_func" "$as_ac_var"
+if eval test \"x\$"$as_ac_var"\" = x"yes"; then :
+ cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
+#define `$as_echo "HAVE_$ac_func" | $as_tr_cpp` 1
+_ACEOF
+
+fi
+done
+
+ LIBS="$saved_LIBS"
ac_fn_c_check_header_mongrel "$LINENO" "fido.h" "ac_cv_header_fido_h" "$ac_includes_default"
if test "x$ac_cv_header_fido_h" = xyes; then :
else
as_fn_error $? "missing fido.h from libfido2" "$LINENO" 5
fi
ac_fn_c_check_header_compile "$LINENO" "fido/credman.h" "ac_cv_header_fido_credman_h" "#include <fido.h>
"
if test "x$ac_cv_header_fido_credman_h" = xyes; then :
else
as_fn_error $? "missing fido/credman.h from libfido2" "$LINENO" 5
fi
fi
for ac_func in \
arc4random \
arc4random_buf \
arc4random_stir \
arc4random_uniform \
do :
as_ac_var=`$as_echo "ac_cv_func_$ac_func" | $as_tr_sh`
ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "$ac_func" "$as_ac_var"
if eval test \"x\$"$as_ac_var"\" = x"yes"; then :
cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
#define `$as_echo "HAVE_$ac_func" | $as_tr_cpp` 1
_ACEOF
fi
done
saved_LIBS="$LIBS"
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for ia_openinfo in -liaf" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking for ia_openinfo in -liaf... " >&6; }
if ${ac_cv_lib_iaf_ia_openinfo+:} false; then :
$as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
else
ac_check_lib_save_LIBS=$LIBS
LIBS="-liaf $LIBS"
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error.
Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC
builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */
#ifdef __cplusplus
extern "C"
#endif
char ia_openinfo ();
int
main ()
{
return ia_openinfo ();
;
return 0;
}
_ACEOF
if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then :
ac_cv_lib_iaf_ia_openinfo=yes
else
ac_cv_lib_iaf_ia_openinfo=no
fi
rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \
conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
LIBS=$ac_check_lib_save_LIBS
fi
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_lib_iaf_ia_openinfo" >&5
$as_echo "$ac_cv_lib_iaf_ia_openinfo" >&6; }
if test "x$ac_cv_lib_iaf_ia_openinfo" = xyes; then :
LIBS="$LIBS -liaf"
for ac_func in set_id
do :
ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "set_id" "ac_cv_func_set_id"
if test "x$ac_cv_func_set_id" = xyes; then :
cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
#define HAVE_SET_ID 1
_ACEOF
SSHDLIBS="$SSHDLIBS -liaf"
$as_echo "#define HAVE_LIBIAF 1" >>confdefs.h
fi
done
fi
LIBS="$saved_LIBS"
### Configure cryptographic random number support
# Check whether OpenSSL seeds itself
if test "x$openssl" = "xyes" ; then
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking whether OpenSSL's PRNG is internally seeded" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking whether OpenSSL's PRNG is internally seeded... " >&6; }
if test "$cross_compiling" = yes; then :
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: WARNING: cross compiling: assuming yes" >&5
$as_echo "$as_me: WARNING: cross compiling: assuming yes" >&2;}
# This is safe, since we will fatal() at runtime if
# OpenSSL is not seeded correctly.
OPENSSL_SEEDS_ITSELF=yes
else
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
+ #include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <openssl/rand.h>
int
main ()
{
exit(RAND_status() == 1 ? 0 : 1);
;
return 0;
}
_ACEOF
if ac_fn_c_try_run "$LINENO"; then :
OPENSSL_SEEDS_ITSELF=yes
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
$as_echo "yes" >&6; }
else
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
$as_echo "no" >&6; }
fi
rm -f core *.core core.conftest.* gmon.out bb.out conftest$ac_exeext \
conftest.$ac_objext conftest.beam conftest.$ac_ext
fi
fi
# PRNGD TCP socket
# Check whether --with-prngd-port was given.
if test "${with_prngd_port+set}" = set; then :
withval=$with_prngd_port;
case "$withval" in
no)
withval=""
;;
[0-9]*)
;;
*)
as_fn_error $? "You must specify a numeric port number for --with-prngd-port" "$LINENO" 5
;;
esac
if test ! -z "$withval" ; then
PRNGD_PORT="$withval"
cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
#define PRNGD_PORT $PRNGD_PORT
_ACEOF
fi
fi
# PRNGD Unix domain socket
# Check whether --with-prngd-socket was given.
if test "${with_prngd_socket+set}" = set; then :
withval=$with_prngd_socket;
case "$withval" in
yes)
withval="/var/run/egd-pool"
;;
no)
withval=""
;;
/*)
;;
*)
as_fn_error $? "You must specify an absolute path to the entropy socket" "$LINENO" 5
;;
esac
if test ! -z "$withval" ; then
if test ! -z "$PRNGD_PORT" ; then
as_fn_error $? "You may not specify both a PRNGD/EGD port and socket" "$LINENO" 5
fi
if test ! -r "$withval" ; then
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: WARNING: Entropy socket is not readable" >&5
$as_echo "$as_me: WARNING: Entropy socket is not readable" >&2;}
fi
PRNGD_SOCKET="$withval"
cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
#define PRNGD_SOCKET "$PRNGD_SOCKET"
_ACEOF
fi
else
# Check for existing socket only if we don't have a random device already
if test "x$OPENSSL_SEEDS_ITSELF" != "xyes" ; then
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for PRNGD/EGD socket" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking for PRNGD/EGD socket... " >&6; }
# Insert other locations here
for sock in /var/run/egd-pool /dev/egd-pool /etc/entropy; do
if test -r $sock && $TEST_MINUS_S_SH -c "test -S $sock -o -p $sock" ; then
PRNGD_SOCKET="$sock"
cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
#define PRNGD_SOCKET "$PRNGD_SOCKET"
_ACEOF
break;
fi
done
if test ! -z "$PRNGD_SOCKET" ; then
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $PRNGD_SOCKET" >&5
$as_echo "$PRNGD_SOCKET" >&6; }
else
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: not found" >&5
$as_echo "not found" >&6; }
fi
fi
fi
# Which randomness source do we use?
if test ! -z "$PRNGD_PORT" ; then
RAND_MSG="PRNGd port $PRNGD_PORT"
elif test ! -z "$PRNGD_SOCKET" ; then
RAND_MSG="PRNGd socket $PRNGD_SOCKET"
elif test ! -z "$OPENSSL_SEEDS_ITSELF" ; then
$as_echo "#define OPENSSL_PRNG_ONLY 1" >>confdefs.h
RAND_MSG="OpenSSL internal ONLY"
elif test "x$openssl" = "xno" ; then
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: WARNING: OpenSSH will use /dev/urandom as a source of random numbers. It will fail if this device is not supported or accessible" >&5
$as_echo "$as_me: WARNING: OpenSSH will use /dev/urandom as a source of random numbers. It will fail if this device is not supported or accessible" >&2;}
else
as_fn_error $? "OpenSSH has no source of random numbers. Please configure OpenSSL with an entropy source or re-run configure using one of the --with-prngd-port or --with-prngd-socket options" "$LINENO" 5
fi
# Check for PAM libs
PAM_MSG="no"
# Check whether --with-pam was given.
if test "${with_pam+set}" = set; then :
withval=$with_pam;
if test "x$withval" != "xno" ; then
if test "x$ac_cv_header_security_pam_appl_h" != "xyes" && \
test "x$ac_cv_header_pam_pam_appl_h" != "xyes" ; then
as_fn_error $? "PAM headers not found" "$LINENO" 5
fi
saved_LIBS="$LIBS"
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for dlopen in -ldl" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking for dlopen in -ldl... " >&6; }
if ${ac_cv_lib_dl_dlopen+:} false; then :
$as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
else
ac_check_lib_save_LIBS=$LIBS
LIBS="-ldl $LIBS"
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error.
Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC
builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */
#ifdef __cplusplus
extern "C"
#endif
char dlopen ();
int
main ()
{
return dlopen ();
;
return 0;
}
_ACEOF
if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then :
ac_cv_lib_dl_dlopen=yes
else
ac_cv_lib_dl_dlopen=no
fi
rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \
conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
LIBS=$ac_check_lib_save_LIBS
fi
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_lib_dl_dlopen" >&5
$as_echo "$ac_cv_lib_dl_dlopen" >&6; }
if test "x$ac_cv_lib_dl_dlopen" = xyes; then :
cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
#define HAVE_LIBDL 1
_ACEOF
LIBS="-ldl $LIBS"
fi
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for pam_set_item in -lpam" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking for pam_set_item in -lpam... " >&6; }
if ${ac_cv_lib_pam_pam_set_item+:} false; then :
$as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
else
ac_check_lib_save_LIBS=$LIBS
LIBS="-lpam $LIBS"
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error.
Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC
builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */
#ifdef __cplusplus
extern "C"
#endif
char pam_set_item ();
int
main ()
{
return pam_set_item ();
;
return 0;
}
_ACEOF
if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then :
ac_cv_lib_pam_pam_set_item=yes
else
ac_cv_lib_pam_pam_set_item=no
fi
rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \
conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
LIBS=$ac_check_lib_save_LIBS
fi
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_lib_pam_pam_set_item" >&5
$as_echo "$ac_cv_lib_pam_pam_set_item" >&6; }
if test "x$ac_cv_lib_pam_pam_set_item" = xyes; then :
cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
#define HAVE_LIBPAM 1
_ACEOF
LIBS="-lpam $LIBS"
else
as_fn_error $? "*** libpam missing" "$LINENO" 5
fi
for ac_func in pam_getenvlist
do :
ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "pam_getenvlist" "ac_cv_func_pam_getenvlist"
if test "x$ac_cv_func_pam_getenvlist" = xyes; then :
cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
#define HAVE_PAM_GETENVLIST 1
_ACEOF
fi
done
for ac_func in pam_putenv
do :
ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "pam_putenv" "ac_cv_func_pam_putenv"
if test "x$ac_cv_func_pam_putenv" = xyes; then :
cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
#define HAVE_PAM_PUTENV 1
_ACEOF
fi
done
LIBS="$saved_LIBS"
PAM_MSG="yes"
SSHDLIBS="$SSHDLIBS -lpam"
$as_echo "#define USE_PAM 1" >>confdefs.h
if test $ac_cv_lib_dl_dlopen = yes; then
case "$LIBS" in
*-ldl*)
# libdl already in LIBS
;;
*)
SSHDLIBS="$SSHDLIBS -ldl"
;;
esac
fi
fi
fi
# Check whether --with-pam-service was given.
if test "${with_pam_service+set}" = set; then :
withval=$with_pam_service;
if test "x$withval" != "xno" && \
test "x$withval" != "xyes" ; then
cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
#define SSHD_PAM_SERVICE "$withval"
_ACEOF
fi
fi
# Check for older PAM
if test "x$PAM_MSG" = "xyes" ; then
# Check PAM strerror arguments (old PAM)
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking whether pam_strerror takes only one argument" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking whether pam_strerror takes only one argument... " >&6; }
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
#include <stdlib.h>
#if defined(HAVE_SECURITY_PAM_APPL_H)
#include <security/pam_appl.h>
#elif defined (HAVE_PAM_PAM_APPL_H)
#include <pam/pam_appl.h>
#endif
int
main ()
{
(void)pam_strerror((pam_handle_t *)NULL, -1);
;
return 0;
}
_ACEOF
if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then :
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
$as_echo "no" >&6; }
else
$as_echo "#define HAVE_OLD_PAM 1" >>confdefs.h
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
$as_echo "yes" >&6; }
PAM_MSG="yes (old library)"
fi
rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
fi
case "$host" in
*-*-cygwin*)
SSH_PRIVSEP_USER=CYGWIN_SSH_PRIVSEP_USER
;;
*)
SSH_PRIVSEP_USER=sshd
;;
esac
# Check whether --with-privsep-user was given.
if test "${with_privsep_user+set}" = set; then :
withval=$with_privsep_user;
if test -n "$withval" && test "x$withval" != "xno" && \
test "x${withval}" != "xyes"; then
SSH_PRIVSEP_USER=$withval
fi
fi
if test "x$SSH_PRIVSEP_USER" = "xCYGWIN_SSH_PRIVSEP_USER" ; then
cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
#define SSH_PRIVSEP_USER CYGWIN_SSH_PRIVSEP_USER
_ACEOF
else
cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
#define SSH_PRIVSEP_USER "$SSH_PRIVSEP_USER"
_ACEOF
fi
if test "x$have_linux_no_new_privs" = "x1" ; then
ac_fn_c_check_decl "$LINENO" "SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER" "ac_cv_have_decl_SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER" "
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <linux/seccomp.h>
"
if test "x$ac_cv_have_decl_SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER" = xyes; then :
have_seccomp_filter=1
fi
fi
if test "x$have_seccomp_filter" = "x1" ; then
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking kernel for seccomp_filter support" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking kernel for seccomp_filter support... " >&6; }
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
#include <errno.h>
#include <elf.h>
#include <linux/audit.h>
#include <linux/seccomp.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <sys/prctl.h>
int
main ()
{
int i = $seccomp_audit_arch;
errno = 0;
prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER, NULL, 0, 0);
exit(errno == EFAULT ? 0 : 1);
;
return 0;
}
_ACEOF
if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then :
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
$as_echo "yes" >&6; }
else
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
$as_echo "no" >&6; }
# Disable seccomp filter as a target
have_seccomp_filter=0
fi
rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \
conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
fi
# Decide which sandbox style to use
sandbox_arg=""
# Check whether --with-sandbox was given.
if test "${with_sandbox+set}" = set; then :
withval=$with_sandbox;
if test "x$withval" = "xyes" ; then
sandbox_arg=""
else
sandbox_arg="$withval"
fi
fi
# Some platforms (seems to be the ones that have a kernel poll(2)-type
# function with which they implement select(2)) use an extra file descriptor
# when calling select(2), which means we can't use the rlimit sandbox.
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking if select works with descriptor rlimit" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking if select works with descriptor rlimit... " >&6; }
if test "$cross_compiling" = yes; then :
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: WARNING: cross compiling: assuming yes" >&5
$as_echo "$as_me: WARNING: cross compiling: assuming yes" >&2;}
select_works_with_rlimit=yes
else
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
#include <sys/types.h>
#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TIME_H
# include <sys/time.h>
#endif
#include <sys/resource.h>
#ifdef HAVE_SYS_SELECT_H
# include <sys/select.h>
#endif
#include <errno.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
int
main ()
{
struct rlimit rl_zero;
int fd, r;
fd_set fds;
struct timeval tv;
fd = open("/dev/null", O_RDONLY);
FD_ZERO(&fds);
FD_SET(fd, &fds);
rl_zero.rlim_cur = rl_zero.rlim_max = 0;
setrlimit(RLIMIT_FSIZE, &rl_zero);
setrlimit(RLIMIT_NOFILE, &rl_zero);
tv.tv_sec = 1;
tv.tv_usec = 0;
r = select(fd+1, &fds, NULL, NULL, &tv);
exit (r == -1 ? 1 : 0);
;
return 0;
}
_ACEOF
if ac_fn_c_try_run "$LINENO"; then :
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
$as_echo "yes" >&6; }
select_works_with_rlimit=yes
else
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
$as_echo "no" >&6; }
select_works_with_rlimit=no
fi
rm -f core *.core core.conftest.* gmon.out bb.out conftest$ac_exeext \
conftest.$ac_objext conftest.beam conftest.$ac_ext
fi
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking if setrlimit(RLIMIT_NOFILE,{0,0}) works" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking if setrlimit(RLIMIT_NOFILE,{0,0}) works... " >&6; }
if test "$cross_compiling" = yes; then :
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: WARNING: cross compiling: assuming yes" >&5
$as_echo "$as_me: WARNING: cross compiling: assuming yes" >&2;}
rlimit_nofile_zero_works=yes
else
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
#include <sys/types.h>
#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TIME_H
# include <sys/time.h>
#endif
#include <sys/resource.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
int
main ()
{
struct rlimit rl_zero;
int r;
rl_zero.rlim_cur = rl_zero.rlim_max = 0;
r = setrlimit(RLIMIT_NOFILE, &rl_zero);
exit (r == -1 ? 1 : 0);
;
return 0;
}
_ACEOF
if ac_fn_c_try_run "$LINENO"; then :
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
$as_echo "yes" >&6; }
rlimit_nofile_zero_works=yes
else
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
$as_echo "no" >&6; }
rlimit_nofile_zero_works=no
fi
rm -f core *.core core.conftest.* gmon.out bb.out conftest$ac_exeext \
conftest.$ac_objext conftest.beam conftest.$ac_ext
fi
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking if setrlimit RLIMIT_FSIZE works" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking if setrlimit RLIMIT_FSIZE works... " >&6; }
if test "$cross_compiling" = yes; then :
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: WARNING: cross compiling: assuming yes" >&5
$as_echo "$as_me: WARNING: cross compiling: assuming yes" >&2;}
else
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/resource.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
int
main ()
{
struct rlimit rl_zero;
rl_zero.rlim_cur = rl_zero.rlim_max = 0;
exit(setrlimit(RLIMIT_FSIZE, &rl_zero) != 0);
;
return 0;
}
_ACEOF
if ac_fn_c_try_run "$LINENO"; then :
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
$as_echo "yes" >&6; }
else
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
$as_echo "no" >&6; }
$as_echo "#define SANDBOX_SKIP_RLIMIT_FSIZE 1" >>confdefs.h
fi
rm -f core *.core core.conftest.* gmon.out bb.out conftest$ac_exeext \
conftest.$ac_objext conftest.beam conftest.$ac_ext
fi
if test "x$sandbox_arg" = "xpledge" || \
( test -z "$sandbox_arg" && test "x$ac_cv_func_pledge" = "xyes" ) ; then
test "x$ac_cv_func_pledge" != "xyes" && \
as_fn_error $? "pledge sandbox requires pledge(2) support" "$LINENO" 5
SANDBOX_STYLE="pledge"
$as_echo "#define SANDBOX_PLEDGE 1" >>confdefs.h
elif test "x$sandbox_arg" = "xsystrace" || \
( test -z "$sandbox_arg" && test "x$have_systr_policy_kill" = "x1" ) ; then
test "x$have_systr_policy_kill" != "x1" && \
as_fn_error $? "systrace sandbox requires systrace headers and SYSTR_POLICY_KILL support" "$LINENO" 5
SANDBOX_STYLE="systrace"
$as_echo "#define SANDBOX_SYSTRACE 1" >>confdefs.h
elif test "x$sandbox_arg" = "xdarwin" || \
( test -z "$sandbox_arg" && test "x$ac_cv_func_sandbox_init" = "xyes" && \
test "x$ac_cv_header_sandbox_h" = "xyes") ; then
test "x$ac_cv_func_sandbox_init" != "xyes" -o \
"x$ac_cv_header_sandbox_h" != "xyes" && \
as_fn_error $? "Darwin seatbelt sandbox requires sandbox.h and sandbox_init function" "$LINENO" 5
SANDBOX_STYLE="darwin"
$as_echo "#define SANDBOX_DARWIN 1" >>confdefs.h
elif test "x$sandbox_arg" = "xseccomp_filter" || \
( test -z "$sandbox_arg" && \
test "x$have_seccomp_filter" = "x1" && \
test "x$ac_cv_header_elf_h" = "xyes" && \
test "x$ac_cv_header_linux_audit_h" = "xyes" && \
test "x$ac_cv_header_linux_filter_h" = "xyes" && \
test "x$seccomp_audit_arch" != "x" && \
test "x$have_linux_no_new_privs" = "x1" && \
test "x$ac_cv_func_prctl" = "xyes" ) ; then
test "x$seccomp_audit_arch" = "x" && \
as_fn_error $? "seccomp_filter sandbox not supported on $host" "$LINENO" 5
test "x$have_linux_no_new_privs" != "x1" && \
as_fn_error $? "seccomp_filter sandbox requires PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS" "$LINENO" 5
test "x$have_seccomp_filter" != "x1" && \
as_fn_error $? "seccomp_filter sandbox requires seccomp headers" "$LINENO" 5
test "x$ac_cv_func_prctl" != "xyes" && \
as_fn_error $? "seccomp_filter sandbox requires prctl function" "$LINENO" 5
SANDBOX_STYLE="seccomp_filter"
$as_echo "#define SANDBOX_SECCOMP_FILTER 1" >>confdefs.h
elif test "x$sandbox_arg" = "xcapsicum" || \
( test -z "$sandbox_arg" && \
test "x$ac_cv_header_sys_capsicum_h" = "xyes" && \
test "x$ac_cv_func_cap_rights_limit" = "xyes") ; then
test "x$ac_cv_header_sys_capsicum_h" != "xyes" && \
as_fn_error $? "capsicum sandbox requires sys/capsicum.h header" "$LINENO" 5
test "x$ac_cv_func_cap_rights_limit" != "xyes" && \
as_fn_error $? "capsicum sandbox requires cap_rights_limit function" "$LINENO" 5
SANDBOX_STYLE="capsicum"
$as_echo "#define SANDBOX_CAPSICUM 1" >>confdefs.h
elif test "x$sandbox_arg" = "xrlimit" || \
( test -z "$sandbox_arg" && test "x$ac_cv_func_setrlimit" = "xyes" && \
test "x$select_works_with_rlimit" = "xyes" && \
test "x$rlimit_nofile_zero_works" = "xyes" ) ; then
test "x$ac_cv_func_setrlimit" != "xyes" && \
as_fn_error $? "rlimit sandbox requires setrlimit function" "$LINENO" 5
test "x$select_works_with_rlimit" != "xyes" && \
as_fn_error $? "rlimit sandbox requires select to work with rlimit" "$LINENO" 5
SANDBOX_STYLE="rlimit"
$as_echo "#define SANDBOX_RLIMIT 1" >>confdefs.h
elif test "x$sandbox_arg" = "xsolaris" || \
( test -z "$sandbox_arg" && test "x$SOLARIS_PRIVS" = "xyes" ) ; then
SANDBOX_STYLE="solaris"
$as_echo "#define SANDBOX_SOLARIS 1" >>confdefs.h
elif test -z "$sandbox_arg" || test "x$sandbox_arg" = "xno" || \
test "x$sandbox_arg" = "xnone" || test "x$sandbox_arg" = "xnull" ; then
SANDBOX_STYLE="none"
$as_echo "#define SANDBOX_NULL 1" >>confdefs.h
else
as_fn_error $? "unsupported --with-sandbox" "$LINENO" 5
fi
# Cheap hack to ensure NEWS-OS libraries are arranged right.
if test ! -z "$SONY" ; then
LIBS="$LIBS -liberty";
fi
# Check for long long datatypes
ac_fn_c_check_type "$LINENO" "long long" "ac_cv_type_long_long" "$ac_includes_default"
if test "x$ac_cv_type_long_long" = xyes; then :
cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
#define HAVE_LONG_LONG 1
_ACEOF
fi
ac_fn_c_check_type "$LINENO" "unsigned long long" "ac_cv_type_unsigned_long_long" "$ac_includes_default"
if test "x$ac_cv_type_unsigned_long_long" = xyes; then :
cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
#define HAVE_UNSIGNED_LONG_LONG 1
_ACEOF
fi
ac_fn_c_check_type "$LINENO" "long double" "ac_cv_type_long_double" "$ac_includes_default"
if test "x$ac_cv_type_long_double" = xyes; then :
cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
#define HAVE_LONG_DOUBLE 1
_ACEOF
fi
# Check datatype sizes
# The cast to long int works around a bug in the HP C Compiler
# version HP92453-01 B.11.11.23709.GP, which incorrectly rejects
# declarations like `int a3[[(sizeof (unsigned char)) >= 0]];'.
# This bug is HP SR number 8606223364.
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking size of short int" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking size of short int... " >&6; }
if ${ac_cv_sizeof_short_int+:} false; then :
$as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
else
if ac_fn_c_compute_int "$LINENO" "(long int) (sizeof (short int))" "ac_cv_sizeof_short_int" "$ac_includes_default"; then :
else
if test "$ac_cv_type_short_int" = yes; then
{ { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: error: in \`$ac_pwd':" >&5
$as_echo "$as_me: error: in \`$ac_pwd':" >&2;}
as_fn_error 77 "cannot compute sizeof (short int)
See \`config.log' for more details" "$LINENO" 5; }
else
ac_cv_sizeof_short_int=0
fi
fi
fi
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_sizeof_short_int" >&5
$as_echo "$ac_cv_sizeof_short_int" >&6; }
cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
#define SIZEOF_SHORT_INT $ac_cv_sizeof_short_int
_ACEOF
# The cast to long int works around a bug in the HP C Compiler
# version HP92453-01 B.11.11.23709.GP, which incorrectly rejects
# declarations like `int a3[[(sizeof (unsigned char)) >= 0]];'.
# This bug is HP SR number 8606223364.
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking size of int" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking size of int... " >&6; }
if ${ac_cv_sizeof_int+:} false; then :
$as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
else
if ac_fn_c_compute_int "$LINENO" "(long int) (sizeof (int))" "ac_cv_sizeof_int" "$ac_includes_default"; then :
else
if test "$ac_cv_type_int" = yes; then
{ { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: error: in \`$ac_pwd':" >&5
$as_echo "$as_me: error: in \`$ac_pwd':" >&2;}
as_fn_error 77 "cannot compute sizeof (int)
See \`config.log' for more details" "$LINENO" 5; }
else
ac_cv_sizeof_int=0
fi
fi
fi
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_sizeof_int" >&5
$as_echo "$ac_cv_sizeof_int" >&6; }
cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
#define SIZEOF_INT $ac_cv_sizeof_int
_ACEOF
# The cast to long int works around a bug in the HP C Compiler
# version HP92453-01 B.11.11.23709.GP, which incorrectly rejects
# declarations like `int a3[[(sizeof (unsigned char)) >= 0]];'.
# This bug is HP SR number 8606223364.
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking size of long int" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking size of long int... " >&6; }
if ${ac_cv_sizeof_long_int+:} false; then :
$as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
else
if ac_fn_c_compute_int "$LINENO" "(long int) (sizeof (long int))" "ac_cv_sizeof_long_int" "$ac_includes_default"; then :
else
if test "$ac_cv_type_long_int" = yes; then
{ { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: error: in \`$ac_pwd':" >&5
$as_echo "$as_me: error: in \`$ac_pwd':" >&2;}
as_fn_error 77 "cannot compute sizeof (long int)
See \`config.log' for more details" "$LINENO" 5; }
else
ac_cv_sizeof_long_int=0
fi
fi
fi
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_sizeof_long_int" >&5
$as_echo "$ac_cv_sizeof_long_int" >&6; }
cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
#define SIZEOF_LONG_INT $ac_cv_sizeof_long_int
_ACEOF
# The cast to long int works around a bug in the HP C Compiler
# version HP92453-01 B.11.11.23709.GP, which incorrectly rejects
# declarations like `int a3[[(sizeof (unsigned char)) >= 0]];'.
# This bug is HP SR number 8606223364.
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking size of long long int" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking size of long long int... " >&6; }
if ${ac_cv_sizeof_long_long_int+:} false; then :
$as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
else
if ac_fn_c_compute_int "$LINENO" "(long int) (sizeof (long long int))" "ac_cv_sizeof_long_long_int" "$ac_includes_default"; then :
else
if test "$ac_cv_type_long_long_int" = yes; then
{ { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: error: in \`$ac_pwd':" >&5
$as_echo "$as_me: error: in \`$ac_pwd':" >&2;}
as_fn_error 77 "cannot compute sizeof (long long int)
See \`config.log' for more details" "$LINENO" 5; }
else
ac_cv_sizeof_long_long_int=0
fi
fi
fi
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_sizeof_long_long_int" >&5
$as_echo "$ac_cv_sizeof_long_long_int" >&6; }
cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
#define SIZEOF_LONG_LONG_INT $ac_cv_sizeof_long_long_int
_ACEOF
# Sanity check long long for some platforms (AIX)
if test "x$ac_cv_sizeof_long_long_int" = "x4" ; then
ac_cv_sizeof_long_long_int=0
fi
# compute LLONG_MIN and LLONG_MAX if we don't know them.
if test -z "$have_llong_max" && test -z "$have_long_long_max"; then
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for max value of long long" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking for max value of long long... " >&6; }
if test "$cross_compiling" = yes; then :
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: WARNING: cross compiling: not checking" >&5
$as_echo "$as_me: WARNING: cross compiling: not checking" >&2;}
else
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
/* Why is this so damn hard? */
#ifdef __GNUC__
# undef __GNUC__
#endif
#define __USE_ISOC99
#include <limits.h>
#define DATA "conftest.llminmax"
#define my_abs(a) ((a) < 0 ? ((a) * -1) : (a))
/*
* printf in libc on some platforms (eg old Tru64) does not understand %lld so
* we do this the hard way.
*/
static int
fprint_ll(FILE *f, long long n)
{
unsigned int i;
int l[sizeof(long long) * 8];
if (n < 0)
if (fprintf(f, "-") < 0)
return -1;
for (i = 0; n != 0; i++) {
l[i] = my_abs(n % 10);
n /= 10;
}
do {
if (fprintf(f, "%d", l[--i]) < 0)
return -1;
} while (i != 0);
if (fprintf(f, " ") < 0)
return -1;
return 0;
}
int
main ()
{
FILE *f;
long long i, llmin, llmax = 0;
if((f = fopen(DATA,"w")) == NULL)
exit(1);
#if defined(LLONG_MIN) && defined(LLONG_MAX)
fprintf(stderr, "Using system header for LLONG_MIN and LLONG_MAX\n");
llmin = LLONG_MIN;
llmax = LLONG_MAX;
#else
fprintf(stderr, "Calculating LLONG_MIN and LLONG_MAX\n");
/* This will work on one's complement and two's complement */
for (i = 1; i > llmax; i <<= 1, i++)
llmax = i;
llmin = llmax + 1LL; /* wrap */
#endif
/* Sanity check */
if (llmin + 1 < llmin || llmin - 1 < llmin || llmax + 1 > llmax
|| llmax - 1 > llmax || llmin == llmax || llmin == 0
|| llmax == 0 || llmax < LONG_MAX || llmin > LONG_MIN) {
fprintf(f, "unknown unknown\n");
exit(2);
}
if (fprint_ll(f, llmin) < 0)
exit(3);
if (fprint_ll(f, llmax) < 0)
exit(4);
if (fclose(f) < 0)
exit(5);
exit(0);
;
return 0;
}
_ACEOF
if ac_fn_c_try_run "$LINENO"; then :
llong_min=`$AWK '{print $1}' conftest.llminmax`
llong_max=`$AWK '{print $2}' conftest.llminmax`
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $llong_max" >&5
$as_echo "$llong_max" >&6; }
cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
#define LLONG_MAX ${llong_max}LL
_ACEOF
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for min value of long long" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking for min value of long long... " >&6; }
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $llong_min" >&5
$as_echo "$llong_min" >&6; }
cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
#define LLONG_MIN ${llong_min}LL
_ACEOF
else
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: not found" >&5
$as_echo "not found" >&6; }
fi
rm -f core *.core core.conftest.* gmon.out bb.out conftest$ac_exeext \
conftest.$ac_objext conftest.beam conftest.$ac_ext
fi
fi
ac_fn_c_check_decl "$LINENO" "UINT32_MAX" "ac_cv_have_decl_UINT32_MAX" "
#ifdef HAVE_SYS_LIMITS_H
# include <sys/limits.h>
#endif
#ifdef HAVE_LIMITS_H
# include <limits.h>
#endif
#ifdef HAVE_STDINT_H
# include <stdint.h>
#endif
"
if test "x$ac_cv_have_decl_UINT32_MAX" = xyes; then :
ac_have_decl=1
else
ac_have_decl=0
fi
cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
#define HAVE_DECL_UINT32_MAX $ac_have_decl
_ACEOF
# More checks for data types
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for u_int type" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking for u_int type... " >&6; }
if ${ac_cv_have_u_int+:} false; then :
$as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
else
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
#include <sys/types.h>
int
main ()
{
u_int a; a = 1;
;
return 0;
}
_ACEOF
if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then :
ac_cv_have_u_int="yes"
else
ac_cv_have_u_int="no"
fi
rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
fi
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_have_u_int" >&5
$as_echo "$ac_cv_have_u_int" >&6; }
if test "x$ac_cv_have_u_int" = "xyes" ; then
$as_echo "#define HAVE_U_INT 1" >>confdefs.h
have_u_int=1
fi
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for intXX_t types" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking for intXX_t types... " >&6; }
if ${ac_cv_have_intxx_t+:} false; then :
$as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
else
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
#include <sys/types.h>
int
main ()
{
int8_t a; int16_t b; int32_t c; a = b = c = 1;
;
return 0;
}
_ACEOF
if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then :
ac_cv_have_intxx_t="yes"
else
ac_cv_have_intxx_t="no"
fi
rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
fi
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_have_intxx_t" >&5
$as_echo "$ac_cv_have_intxx_t" >&6; }
if test "x$ac_cv_have_intxx_t" = "xyes" ; then
$as_echo "#define HAVE_INTXX_T 1" >>confdefs.h
have_intxx_t=1
fi
if (test -z "$have_intxx_t" && \
test "x$ac_cv_header_stdint_h" = "xyes")
then
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for intXX_t types in stdint.h" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking for intXX_t types in stdint.h... " >&6; }
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
#include <stdint.h>
int
main ()
{
int8_t a; int16_t b; int32_t c; a = b = c = 1;
;
return 0;
}
_ACEOF
if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then :
$as_echo "#define HAVE_INTXX_T 1" >>confdefs.h
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
$as_echo "yes" >&6; }
else
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
$as_echo "no" >&6; }
fi
rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
fi
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for int64_t type" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking for int64_t type... " >&6; }
if ${ac_cv_have_int64_t+:} false; then :
$as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
else
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
#include <sys/types.h>
#ifdef HAVE_STDINT_H
# include <stdint.h>
#endif
#include <sys/socket.h>
#ifdef HAVE_SYS_BITYPES_H
# include <sys/bitypes.h>
#endif
int
main ()
{
int64_t a; a = 1;
;
return 0;
}
_ACEOF
if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then :
ac_cv_have_int64_t="yes"
else
ac_cv_have_int64_t="no"
fi
rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
fi
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_have_int64_t" >&5
$as_echo "$ac_cv_have_int64_t" >&6; }
if test "x$ac_cv_have_int64_t" = "xyes" ; then
$as_echo "#define HAVE_INT64_T 1" >>confdefs.h
fi
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for u_intXX_t types" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking for u_intXX_t types... " >&6; }
if ${ac_cv_have_u_intxx_t+:} false; then :
$as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
else
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
#include <sys/types.h>
int
main ()
{
u_int8_t a; u_int16_t b; u_int32_t c; a = b = c = 1;
;
return 0;
}
_ACEOF
if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then :
ac_cv_have_u_intxx_t="yes"
else
ac_cv_have_u_intxx_t="no"
fi
rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
fi
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_have_u_intxx_t" >&5
$as_echo "$ac_cv_have_u_intxx_t" >&6; }
if test "x$ac_cv_have_u_intxx_t" = "xyes" ; then
$as_echo "#define HAVE_U_INTXX_T 1" >>confdefs.h
have_u_intxx_t=1
fi
if test -z "$have_u_intxx_t" ; then
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for u_intXX_t types in sys/socket.h" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking for u_intXX_t types in sys/socket.h... " >&6; }
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
#include <sys/socket.h>
int
main ()
{
u_int8_t a; u_int16_t b; u_int32_t c; a = b = c = 1;
;
return 0;
}
_ACEOF
if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then :
$as_echo "#define HAVE_U_INTXX_T 1" >>confdefs.h
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
$as_echo "yes" >&6; }
else
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
$as_echo "no" >&6; }
fi
rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
fi
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for u_int64_t types" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking for u_int64_t types... " >&6; }
if ${ac_cv_have_u_int64_t+:} false; then :
$as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
else
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
#include <sys/types.h>
int
main ()
{
u_int64_t a; a = 1;
;
return 0;
}
_ACEOF
if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then :
ac_cv_have_u_int64_t="yes"
else
ac_cv_have_u_int64_t="no"
fi
rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
fi
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_have_u_int64_t" >&5
$as_echo "$ac_cv_have_u_int64_t" >&6; }
if test "x$ac_cv_have_u_int64_t" = "xyes" ; then
$as_echo "#define HAVE_U_INT64_T 1" >>confdefs.h
have_u_int64_t=1
fi
if (test -z "$have_u_int64_t" && \
test "x$ac_cv_header_sys_bitypes_h" = "xyes")
then
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for u_int64_t type in sys/bitypes.h" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking for u_int64_t type in sys/bitypes.h... " >&6; }
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
#include <sys/bitypes.h>
int
main ()
{
u_int64_t a; a = 1
;
return 0;
}
_ACEOF
if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then :
$as_echo "#define HAVE_U_INT64_T 1" >>confdefs.h
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
$as_echo "yes" >&6; }
else
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
$as_echo "no" >&6; }
fi
rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
fi
if test -z "$have_u_intxx_t" ; then
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for uintXX_t types" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking for uintXX_t types... " >&6; }
if ${ac_cv_have_uintxx_t+:} false; then :
$as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
else
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
#include <sys/types.h>
int
main ()
{
uint8_t a;
uint16_t b;
uint32_t c;
a = b = c = 1;
;
return 0;
}
_ACEOF
if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then :
ac_cv_have_uintxx_t="yes"
else
ac_cv_have_uintxx_t="no"
fi
rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
fi
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_have_uintxx_t" >&5
$as_echo "$ac_cv_have_uintxx_t" >&6; }
if test "x$ac_cv_have_uintxx_t" = "xyes" ; then
$as_echo "#define HAVE_UINTXX_T 1" >>confdefs.h
fi
fi
if (test -z "$have_uintxx_t" && \
test "x$ac_cv_header_stdint_h" = "xyes")
then
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for uintXX_t types in stdint.h" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking for uintXX_t types in stdint.h... " >&6; }
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
#include <stdint.h>
int
main ()
{
uint8_t a; uint16_t b; uint32_t c; a = b = c = 1;
;
return 0;
}
_ACEOF
if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then :
$as_echo "#define HAVE_UINTXX_T 1" >>confdefs.h
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
$as_echo "yes" >&6; }
else
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
$as_echo "no" >&6; }
fi
rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
fi
if (test -z "$have_uintxx_t" && \
test "x$ac_cv_header_inttypes_h" = "xyes")
then
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for uintXX_t types in inttypes.h" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking for uintXX_t types in inttypes.h... " >&6; }
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
#include <inttypes.h>
int
main ()
{
uint8_t a; uint16_t b; uint32_t c; a = b = c = 1;
;
return 0;
}
_ACEOF
if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then :
$as_echo "#define HAVE_UINTXX_T 1" >>confdefs.h
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
$as_echo "yes" >&6; }
else
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
$as_echo "no" >&6; }
fi
rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
fi
if (test -z "$have_u_intxx_t" || test -z "$have_intxx_t" && \
test "x$ac_cv_header_sys_bitypes_h" = "xyes")
then
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for intXX_t and u_intXX_t types in sys/bitypes.h" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking for intXX_t and u_intXX_t types in sys/bitypes.h... " >&6; }
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
#include <sys/bitypes.h>
int
main ()
{
int8_t a; int16_t b; int32_t c;
u_int8_t e; u_int16_t f; u_int32_t g;
a = b = c = e = f = g = 1;
;
return 0;
}
_ACEOF
if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then :
$as_echo "#define HAVE_U_INTXX_T 1" >>confdefs.h
$as_echo "#define HAVE_INTXX_T 1" >>confdefs.h
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
$as_echo "yes" >&6; }
else
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
$as_echo "no" >&6; }
fi
rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
fi
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for u_char" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking for u_char... " >&6; }
if ${ac_cv_have_u_char+:} false; then :
$as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
else
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
#include <sys/types.h>
int
main ()
{
u_char foo; foo = 125;
;
return 0;
}
_ACEOF
if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then :
ac_cv_have_u_char="yes"
else
ac_cv_have_u_char="no"
fi
rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
fi
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_have_u_char" >&5
$as_echo "$ac_cv_have_u_char" >&6; }
if test "x$ac_cv_have_u_char" = "xyes" ; then
$as_echo "#define HAVE_U_CHAR 1" >>confdefs.h
fi
ac_fn_c_check_type "$LINENO" "intmax_t" "ac_cv_type_intmax_t" "
#include <sys/types.h>
#ifdef HAVE_STDINT_H
# include <stdint.h>
#endif
"
if test "x$ac_cv_type_intmax_t" = xyes; then :
cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
#define HAVE_INTMAX_T 1
_ACEOF
fi
ac_fn_c_check_type "$LINENO" "uintmax_t" "ac_cv_type_uintmax_t" "
#include <sys/types.h>
#ifdef HAVE_STDINT_H
# include <stdint.h>
#endif
"
if test "x$ac_cv_type_uintmax_t" = xyes; then :
cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
#define HAVE_UINTMAX_T 1
_ACEOF
fi
ac_fn_c_check_type "$LINENO" "socklen_t" "ac_cv_type_socklen_t" "#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/socket.h>
"
if test "x$ac_cv_type_socklen_t" = xyes; then :
else
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for socklen_t equivalent" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking for socklen_t equivalent... " >&6; }
if ${curl_cv_socklen_t_equiv+:} false; then :
$as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
else
# Systems have either "struct sockaddr *" or
# "void *" as the second argument to getpeername
curl_cv_socklen_t_equiv=
for arg2 in "struct sockaddr" void; do
for t in int size_t unsigned long "unsigned long"; do
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/socket.h>
int getpeername (int, $arg2 *, $t *);
int
main ()
{
$t len;
getpeername(0,0,&len);
;
return 0;
}
_ACEOF
if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then :
curl_cv_socklen_t_equiv="$t"
break
fi
rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
done
done
if test "x$curl_cv_socklen_t_equiv" = x; then
as_fn_error $? "Cannot find a type to use in place of socklen_t" "$LINENO" 5
fi
fi
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $curl_cv_socklen_t_equiv" >&5
$as_echo "$curl_cv_socklen_t_equiv" >&6; }
cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
#define socklen_t $curl_cv_socklen_t_equiv
_ACEOF
fi
ac_fn_c_check_type "$LINENO" "sig_atomic_t" "ac_cv_type_sig_atomic_t" "#include <signal.h>
"
if test "x$ac_cv_type_sig_atomic_t" = xyes; then :
cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
#define HAVE_SIG_ATOMIC_T 1
_ACEOF
fi
ac_fn_c_check_type "$LINENO" "fsblkcnt_t" "ac_cv_type_fsblkcnt_t" "
#include <sys/types.h>
#ifdef HAVE_SYS_BITYPES_H
#include <sys/bitypes.h>
#endif
#ifdef HAVE_SYS_STATFS_H
#include <sys/statfs.h>
#endif
#ifdef HAVE_SYS_STATVFS_H
#include <sys/statvfs.h>
#endif
"
if test "x$ac_cv_type_fsblkcnt_t" = xyes; then :
cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
#define HAVE_FSBLKCNT_T 1
_ACEOF
fi
ac_fn_c_check_type "$LINENO" "fsfilcnt_t" "ac_cv_type_fsfilcnt_t" "
#include <sys/types.h>
#ifdef HAVE_SYS_BITYPES_H
#include <sys/bitypes.h>
#endif
#ifdef HAVE_SYS_STATFS_H
#include <sys/statfs.h>
#endif
#ifdef HAVE_SYS_STATVFS_H
#include <sys/statvfs.h>
#endif
"
if test "x$ac_cv_type_fsfilcnt_t" = xyes; then :
cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
#define HAVE_FSFILCNT_T 1
_ACEOF
fi
ac_fn_c_check_member "$LINENO" "struct statfs" "f_files" "ac_cv_member_struct_statfs_f_files" "
#include <sys/param.h>
#include <sys/types.h>
#ifdef HAVE_SYS_BITYPES_H
#include <sys/bitypes.h>
#endif
#ifdef HAVE_SYS_STATFS_H
#include <sys/statfs.h>
#endif
#ifdef HAVE_SYS_STATVFS_H
#include <sys/statvfs.h>
#endif
#ifdef HAVE_SYS_VFS_H
#include <sys/vfs.h>
#endif
#ifdef HAVE_SYS_MOUNT_H
#include <sys/mount.h>
#endif
"
if test "x$ac_cv_member_struct_statfs_f_files" = xyes; then :
cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
#define HAVE_STRUCT_STATFS_F_FILES 1
_ACEOF
fi
ac_fn_c_check_member "$LINENO" "struct statfs" "f_flags" "ac_cv_member_struct_statfs_f_flags" "
#include <sys/param.h>
#include <sys/types.h>
#ifdef HAVE_SYS_BITYPES_H
#include <sys/bitypes.h>
#endif
#ifdef HAVE_SYS_STATFS_H
#include <sys/statfs.h>
#endif
#ifdef HAVE_SYS_STATVFS_H
#include <sys/statvfs.h>
#endif
#ifdef HAVE_SYS_VFS_H
#include <sys/vfs.h>
#endif
#ifdef HAVE_SYS_MOUNT_H
#include <sys/mount.h>
#endif
"
if test "x$ac_cv_member_struct_statfs_f_flags" = xyes; then :
cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
#define HAVE_STRUCT_STATFS_F_FLAGS 1
_ACEOF
fi
ac_fn_c_check_type "$LINENO" "in_addr_t" "ac_cv_type_in_addr_t" "#include <sys/types.h>
#include <netinet/in.h>
"
if test "x$ac_cv_type_in_addr_t" = xyes; then :
cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
#define HAVE_IN_ADDR_T 1
_ACEOF
fi
ac_fn_c_check_type "$LINENO" "in_port_t" "ac_cv_type_in_port_t" "#include <sys/types.h>
#include <netinet/in.h>
"
if test "x$ac_cv_type_in_port_t" = xyes; then :
cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
#define HAVE_IN_PORT_T 1
_ACEOF
fi
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for size_t" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking for size_t... " >&6; }
if ${ac_cv_have_size_t+:} false; then :
$as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
else
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
#include <sys/types.h>
int
main ()
{
size_t foo; foo = 1235;
;
return 0;
}
_ACEOF
if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then :
ac_cv_have_size_t="yes"
else
ac_cv_have_size_t="no"
fi
rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
fi
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_have_size_t" >&5
$as_echo "$ac_cv_have_size_t" >&6; }
if test "x$ac_cv_have_size_t" = "xyes" ; then
$as_echo "#define HAVE_SIZE_T 1" >>confdefs.h
fi
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for ssize_t" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking for ssize_t... " >&6; }
if ${ac_cv_have_ssize_t+:} false; then :
$as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
else
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
#include <sys/types.h>
int
main ()
{
ssize_t foo; foo = 1235;
;
return 0;
}
_ACEOF
if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then :
ac_cv_have_ssize_t="yes"
else
ac_cv_have_ssize_t="no"
fi
rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
fi
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_have_ssize_t" >&5
$as_echo "$ac_cv_have_ssize_t" >&6; }
if test "x$ac_cv_have_ssize_t" = "xyes" ; then
$as_echo "#define HAVE_SSIZE_T 1" >>confdefs.h
fi
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for clock_t" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking for clock_t... " >&6; }
if ${ac_cv_have_clock_t+:} false; then :
$as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
else
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
#include <time.h>
int
main ()
{
clock_t foo; foo = 1235;
;
return 0;
}
_ACEOF
if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then :
ac_cv_have_clock_t="yes"
else
ac_cv_have_clock_t="no"
fi
rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
fi
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_have_clock_t" >&5
$as_echo "$ac_cv_have_clock_t" >&6; }
if test "x$ac_cv_have_clock_t" = "xyes" ; then
$as_echo "#define HAVE_CLOCK_T 1" >>confdefs.h
fi
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for sa_family_t" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking for sa_family_t... " >&6; }
if ${ac_cv_have_sa_family_t+:} false; then :
$as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
else
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/socket.h>
int
main ()
{
sa_family_t foo; foo = 1235;
;
return 0;
}
_ACEOF
if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then :
ac_cv_have_sa_family_t="yes"
else
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/socket.h>
#include <netinet/in.h>
int
main ()
{
sa_family_t foo; foo = 1235;
;
return 0;
}
_ACEOF
if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then :
ac_cv_have_sa_family_t="yes"
else
ac_cv_have_sa_family_t="no"
fi
rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
fi
rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
fi
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_have_sa_family_t" >&5
$as_echo "$ac_cv_have_sa_family_t" >&6; }
if test "x$ac_cv_have_sa_family_t" = "xyes" ; then
$as_echo "#define HAVE_SA_FAMILY_T 1" >>confdefs.h
fi
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for pid_t" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking for pid_t... " >&6; }
if ${ac_cv_have_pid_t+:} false; then :
$as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
else
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
#include <sys/types.h>
int
main ()
{
pid_t foo; foo = 1235;
;
return 0;
}
_ACEOF
if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then :
ac_cv_have_pid_t="yes"
else
ac_cv_have_pid_t="no"
fi
rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
fi
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_have_pid_t" >&5
$as_echo "$ac_cv_have_pid_t" >&6; }
if test "x$ac_cv_have_pid_t" = "xyes" ; then
$as_echo "#define HAVE_PID_T 1" >>confdefs.h
fi
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for mode_t" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking for mode_t... " >&6; }
if ${ac_cv_have_mode_t+:} false; then :
$as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
else
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
#include <sys/types.h>
int
main ()
{
mode_t foo; foo = 1235;
;
return 0;
}
_ACEOF
if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then :
ac_cv_have_mode_t="yes"
else
ac_cv_have_mode_t="no"
fi
rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
fi
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_have_mode_t" >&5
$as_echo "$ac_cv_have_mode_t" >&6; }
if test "x$ac_cv_have_mode_t" = "xyes" ; then
$as_echo "#define HAVE_MODE_T 1" >>confdefs.h
fi
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for struct sockaddr_storage" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking for struct sockaddr_storage... " >&6; }
if ${ac_cv_have_struct_sockaddr_storage+:} false; then :
$as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
else
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/socket.h>
int
main ()
{
struct sockaddr_storage s;
;
return 0;
}
_ACEOF
if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then :
ac_cv_have_struct_sockaddr_storage="yes"
else
ac_cv_have_struct_sockaddr_storage="no"
fi
rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
fi
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_have_struct_sockaddr_storage" >&5
$as_echo "$ac_cv_have_struct_sockaddr_storage" >&6; }
if test "x$ac_cv_have_struct_sockaddr_storage" = "xyes" ; then
$as_echo "#define HAVE_STRUCT_SOCKADDR_STORAGE 1" >>confdefs.h
fi
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for struct sockaddr_in6" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking for struct sockaddr_in6... " >&6; }
if ${ac_cv_have_struct_sockaddr_in6+:} false; then :
$as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
else
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <netinet/in.h>
int
main ()
{
struct sockaddr_in6 s; s.sin6_family = 0;
;
return 0;
}
_ACEOF
if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then :
ac_cv_have_struct_sockaddr_in6="yes"
else
ac_cv_have_struct_sockaddr_in6="no"
fi
rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
fi
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_have_struct_sockaddr_in6" >&5
$as_echo "$ac_cv_have_struct_sockaddr_in6" >&6; }
if test "x$ac_cv_have_struct_sockaddr_in6" = "xyes" ; then
$as_echo "#define HAVE_STRUCT_SOCKADDR_IN6 1" >>confdefs.h
fi
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for struct in6_addr" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking for struct in6_addr... " >&6; }
if ${ac_cv_have_struct_in6_addr+:} false; then :
$as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
else
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <netinet/in.h>
int
main ()
{
struct in6_addr s; s.s6_addr[0] = 0;
;
return 0;
}
_ACEOF
if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then :
ac_cv_have_struct_in6_addr="yes"
else
ac_cv_have_struct_in6_addr="no"
fi
rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
fi
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_have_struct_in6_addr" >&5
$as_echo "$ac_cv_have_struct_in6_addr" >&6; }
if test "x$ac_cv_have_struct_in6_addr" = "xyes" ; then
$as_echo "#define HAVE_STRUCT_IN6_ADDR 1" >>confdefs.h
ac_fn_c_check_member "$LINENO" "struct sockaddr_in6" "sin6_scope_id" "ac_cv_member_struct_sockaddr_in6_sin6_scope_id" "
#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TYPES_H
#include <sys/types.h>
#endif
#include <netinet/in.h>
"
if test "x$ac_cv_member_struct_sockaddr_in6_sin6_scope_id" = xyes; then :
cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
#define HAVE_STRUCT_SOCKADDR_IN6_SIN6_SCOPE_ID 1
_ACEOF
fi
fi
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for struct addrinfo" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking for struct addrinfo... " >&6; }
if ${ac_cv_have_struct_addrinfo+:} false; then :
$as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
else
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/socket.h>
#include <netdb.h>
int
main ()
{
struct addrinfo s; s.ai_flags = AI_PASSIVE;
;
return 0;
}
_ACEOF
if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then :
ac_cv_have_struct_addrinfo="yes"
else
ac_cv_have_struct_addrinfo="no"
fi
rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
fi
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_have_struct_addrinfo" >&5
$as_echo "$ac_cv_have_struct_addrinfo" >&6; }
if test "x$ac_cv_have_struct_addrinfo" = "xyes" ; then
$as_echo "#define HAVE_STRUCT_ADDRINFO 1" >>confdefs.h
fi
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking whether time.h and sys/time.h may both be included" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking whether time.h and sys/time.h may both be included... " >&6; }
if ${ac_cv_header_time+:} false; then :
$as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
else
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/time.h>
#include <time.h>
int
main ()
{
if ((struct tm *) 0)
return 0;
;
return 0;
}
_ACEOF
if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then :
ac_cv_header_time=yes
else
ac_cv_header_time=no
fi
rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
fi
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_header_time" >&5
$as_echo "$ac_cv_header_time" >&6; }
if test $ac_cv_header_time = yes; then
$as_echo "#define TIME_WITH_SYS_TIME 1" >>confdefs.h
fi
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for struct timeval" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking for struct timeval... " >&6; }
if ${ac_cv_have_struct_timeval+:} false; then :
$as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
else
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
#include <sys/time.h>
int
main ()
{
struct timeval tv; tv.tv_sec = 1;
;
return 0;
}
_ACEOF
if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then :
ac_cv_have_struct_timeval="yes"
else
ac_cv_have_struct_timeval="no"
fi
rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
fi
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_have_struct_timeval" >&5
$as_echo "$ac_cv_have_struct_timeval" >&6; }
if test "x$ac_cv_have_struct_timeval" = "xyes" ; then
$as_echo "#define HAVE_STRUCT_TIMEVAL 1" >>confdefs.h
have_struct_timeval=1
fi
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for struct timespec" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking for struct timespec... " >&6; }
if ${ac_cv_have_struct_timespec+:} false; then :
$as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
else
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
#ifdef TIME_WITH_SYS_TIME
# include <sys/time.h>
# include <time.h>
#else
# ifdef HAVE_SYS_TIME_H
# include <sys/time.h>
# else
# include <time.h>
# endif
#endif
int
main ()
{
struct timespec ts; ts.tv_sec = 1;
;
return 0;
}
_ACEOF
if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then :
ac_cv_have_struct_timespec="yes"
else
ac_cv_have_struct_timespec="no"
fi
rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
fi
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_have_struct_timespec" >&5
$as_echo "$ac_cv_have_struct_timespec" >&6; }
if test "x$ac_cv_have_struct_timespec" = "xyes" ; then
$as_echo "#define HAVE_STRUCT_TIMESPEC 1" >>confdefs.h
have_struct_timespec=1
fi
# We need int64_t or else certain parts of the compile will fail.
if test "x$ac_cv_have_int64_t" = "xno" && \
test "x$ac_cv_sizeof_long_int" != "x8" && \
test "x$ac_cv_sizeof_long_long_int" = "x0" ; then
echo "OpenSSH requires int64_t support. Contact your vendor or install"
echo "an alternative compiler (I.E., GCC) before continuing."
echo ""
exit 1;
else
if test "$cross_compiling" = yes; then :
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: WARNING: cross compiling: Assuming working snprintf()" >&5
$as_echo "$as_me: WARNING: cross compiling: Assuming working snprintf()" >&2;}
else
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#ifdef HAVE_SNPRINTF
main()
{
char buf[50];
char expected_out[50];
int mazsize = 50 ;
#if (SIZEOF_LONG_INT == 8)
long int num = 0x7fffffffffffffff;
#else
long long num = 0x7fffffffffffffffll;
#endif
strcpy(expected_out, "9223372036854775807");
snprintf(buf, mazsize, "%lld", num);
if(strcmp(buf, expected_out) != 0)
exit(1);
exit(0);
}
#else
main() { exit(0); }
#endif
_ACEOF
if ac_fn_c_try_run "$LINENO"; then :
true
else
$as_echo "#define BROKEN_SNPRINTF 1" >>confdefs.h
fi
rm -f core *.core core.conftest.* gmon.out bb.out conftest$ac_exeext \
conftest.$ac_objext conftest.beam conftest.$ac_ext
fi
fi
# look for field 'ut_host' in header 'utmp.h'
ossh_safe=`echo "utmp.h" | sed 'y%./+-%__p_%'`
ossh_varname="ossh_cv_$ossh_safe""_has_"ut_host
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for ut_host field in utmp.h" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking for ut_host field in utmp.h... " >&6; }
if eval \${$ossh_varname+:} false; then :
$as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
else
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
#include <utmp.h>
_ACEOF
if (eval "$ac_cpp conftest.$ac_ext") 2>&5 |
$EGREP "ut_host" >/dev/null 2>&1; then :
eval "$ossh_varname=yes"
else
eval "$ossh_varname=no"
fi
rm -f conftest*
fi
ossh_result=`eval 'echo $'"$ossh_varname"`
if test -n "`echo $ossh_varname`"; then
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ossh_result" >&5
$as_echo "$ossh_result" >&6; }
if test "x$ossh_result" = "xyes"; then
$as_echo "#define HAVE_HOST_IN_UTMP 1" >>confdefs.h
fi
else
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
$as_echo "no" >&6; }
fi
# look for field 'ut_host' in header 'utmpx.h'
ossh_safe=`echo "utmpx.h" | sed 'y%./+-%__p_%'`
ossh_varname="ossh_cv_$ossh_safe""_has_"ut_host
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for ut_host field in utmpx.h" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking for ut_host field in utmpx.h... " >&6; }
if eval \${$ossh_varname+:} false; then :
$as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
else
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
#include <utmpx.h>
_ACEOF
if (eval "$ac_cpp conftest.$ac_ext") 2>&5 |
$EGREP "ut_host" >/dev/null 2>&1; then :
eval "$ossh_varname=yes"
else
eval "$ossh_varname=no"
fi
rm -f conftest*
fi
ossh_result=`eval 'echo $'"$ossh_varname"`
if test -n "`echo $ossh_varname`"; then
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ossh_result" >&5
$as_echo "$ossh_result" >&6; }
if test "x$ossh_result" = "xyes"; then
$as_echo "#define HAVE_HOST_IN_UTMPX 1" >>confdefs.h
fi
else
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
$as_echo "no" >&6; }
fi
# look for field 'syslen' in header 'utmpx.h'
ossh_safe=`echo "utmpx.h" | sed 'y%./+-%__p_%'`
ossh_varname="ossh_cv_$ossh_safe""_has_"syslen
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for syslen field in utmpx.h" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking for syslen field in utmpx.h... " >&6; }
if eval \${$ossh_varname+:} false; then :
$as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
else
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
#include <utmpx.h>
_ACEOF
if (eval "$ac_cpp conftest.$ac_ext") 2>&5 |
$EGREP "syslen" >/dev/null 2>&1; then :
eval "$ossh_varname=yes"
else
eval "$ossh_varname=no"
fi
rm -f conftest*
fi
ossh_result=`eval 'echo $'"$ossh_varname"`
if test -n "`echo $ossh_varname`"; then
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ossh_result" >&5
$as_echo "$ossh_result" >&6; }
if test "x$ossh_result" = "xyes"; then
$as_echo "#define HAVE_SYSLEN_IN_UTMPX 1" >>confdefs.h
fi
else
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
$as_echo "no" >&6; }
fi
# look for field 'ut_pid' in header 'utmp.h'
ossh_safe=`echo "utmp.h" | sed 'y%./+-%__p_%'`
ossh_varname="ossh_cv_$ossh_safe""_has_"ut_pid
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for ut_pid field in utmp.h" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking for ut_pid field in utmp.h... " >&6; }
if eval \${$ossh_varname+:} false; then :
$as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
else
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
#include <utmp.h>
_ACEOF
if (eval "$ac_cpp conftest.$ac_ext") 2>&5 |
$EGREP "ut_pid" >/dev/null 2>&1; then :
eval "$ossh_varname=yes"
else
eval "$ossh_varname=no"
fi
rm -f conftest*
fi
ossh_result=`eval 'echo $'"$ossh_varname"`
if test -n "`echo $ossh_varname`"; then
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ossh_result" >&5
$as_echo "$ossh_result" >&6; }
if test "x$ossh_result" = "xyes"; then
$as_echo "#define HAVE_PID_IN_UTMP 1" >>confdefs.h
fi
else
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
$as_echo "no" >&6; }
fi
# look for field 'ut_type' in header 'utmp.h'
ossh_safe=`echo "utmp.h" | sed 'y%./+-%__p_%'`
ossh_varname="ossh_cv_$ossh_safe""_has_"ut_type
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for ut_type field in utmp.h" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking for ut_type field in utmp.h... " >&6; }
if eval \${$ossh_varname+:} false; then :
$as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
else
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
#include <utmp.h>
_ACEOF
if (eval "$ac_cpp conftest.$ac_ext") 2>&5 |
$EGREP "ut_type" >/dev/null 2>&1; then :
eval "$ossh_varname=yes"
else
eval "$ossh_varname=no"
fi
rm -f conftest*
fi
ossh_result=`eval 'echo $'"$ossh_varname"`
if test -n "`echo $ossh_varname`"; then
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ossh_result" >&5
$as_echo "$ossh_result" >&6; }
if test "x$ossh_result" = "xyes"; then
$as_echo "#define HAVE_TYPE_IN_UTMP 1" >>confdefs.h
fi
else
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
$as_echo "no" >&6; }
fi
# look for field 'ut_type' in header 'utmpx.h'
ossh_safe=`echo "utmpx.h" | sed 'y%./+-%__p_%'`
ossh_varname="ossh_cv_$ossh_safe""_has_"ut_type
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for ut_type field in utmpx.h" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking for ut_type field in utmpx.h... " >&6; }
if eval \${$ossh_varname+:} false; then :
$as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
else
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
#include <utmpx.h>
_ACEOF
if (eval "$ac_cpp conftest.$ac_ext") 2>&5 |
$EGREP "ut_type" >/dev/null 2>&1; then :
eval "$ossh_varname=yes"
else
eval "$ossh_varname=no"
fi
rm -f conftest*
fi
ossh_result=`eval 'echo $'"$ossh_varname"`
if test -n "`echo $ossh_varname`"; then
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ossh_result" >&5
$as_echo "$ossh_result" >&6; }
if test "x$ossh_result" = "xyes"; then
$as_echo "#define HAVE_TYPE_IN_UTMPX 1" >>confdefs.h
fi
else
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
$as_echo "no" >&6; }
fi
# look for field 'ut_tv' in header 'utmp.h'
ossh_safe=`echo "utmp.h" | sed 'y%./+-%__p_%'`
ossh_varname="ossh_cv_$ossh_safe""_has_"ut_tv
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for ut_tv field in utmp.h" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking for ut_tv field in utmp.h... " >&6; }
if eval \${$ossh_varname+:} false; then :
$as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
else
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
#include <utmp.h>
_ACEOF
if (eval "$ac_cpp conftest.$ac_ext") 2>&5 |
$EGREP "ut_tv" >/dev/null 2>&1; then :
eval "$ossh_varname=yes"
else
eval "$ossh_varname=no"
fi
rm -f conftest*
fi
ossh_result=`eval 'echo $'"$ossh_varname"`
if test -n "`echo $ossh_varname`"; then
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ossh_result" >&5
$as_echo "$ossh_result" >&6; }
if test "x$ossh_result" = "xyes"; then
$as_echo "#define HAVE_TV_IN_UTMP 1" >>confdefs.h
fi
else
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
$as_echo "no" >&6; }
fi
# look for field 'ut_id' in header 'utmp.h'
ossh_safe=`echo "utmp.h" | sed 'y%./+-%__p_%'`
ossh_varname="ossh_cv_$ossh_safe""_has_"ut_id
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for ut_id field in utmp.h" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking for ut_id field in utmp.h... " >&6; }
if eval \${$ossh_varname+:} false; then :
$as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
else
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
#include <utmp.h>
_ACEOF
if (eval "$ac_cpp conftest.$ac_ext") 2>&5 |
$EGREP "ut_id" >/dev/null 2>&1; then :
eval "$ossh_varname=yes"
else
eval "$ossh_varname=no"
fi
rm -f conftest*
fi
ossh_result=`eval 'echo $'"$ossh_varname"`
if test -n "`echo $ossh_varname`"; then
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ossh_result" >&5
$as_echo "$ossh_result" >&6; }
if test "x$ossh_result" = "xyes"; then
$as_echo "#define HAVE_ID_IN_UTMP 1" >>confdefs.h
fi
else
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
$as_echo "no" >&6; }
fi
# look for field 'ut_id' in header 'utmpx.h'
ossh_safe=`echo "utmpx.h" | sed 'y%./+-%__p_%'`
ossh_varname="ossh_cv_$ossh_safe""_has_"ut_id
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for ut_id field in utmpx.h" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking for ut_id field in utmpx.h... " >&6; }
if eval \${$ossh_varname+:} false; then :
$as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
else
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
#include <utmpx.h>
_ACEOF
if (eval "$ac_cpp conftest.$ac_ext") 2>&5 |
$EGREP "ut_id" >/dev/null 2>&1; then :
eval "$ossh_varname=yes"
else
eval "$ossh_varname=no"
fi
rm -f conftest*
fi
ossh_result=`eval 'echo $'"$ossh_varname"`
if test -n "`echo $ossh_varname`"; then
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ossh_result" >&5
$as_echo "$ossh_result" >&6; }
if test "x$ossh_result" = "xyes"; then
$as_echo "#define HAVE_ID_IN_UTMPX 1" >>confdefs.h
fi
else
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
$as_echo "no" >&6; }
fi
# look for field 'ut_addr' in header 'utmp.h'
ossh_safe=`echo "utmp.h" | sed 'y%./+-%__p_%'`
ossh_varname="ossh_cv_$ossh_safe""_has_"ut_addr
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for ut_addr field in utmp.h" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking for ut_addr field in utmp.h... " >&6; }
if eval \${$ossh_varname+:} false; then :
$as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
else
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
#include <utmp.h>
_ACEOF
if (eval "$ac_cpp conftest.$ac_ext") 2>&5 |
$EGREP "ut_addr" >/dev/null 2>&1; then :
eval "$ossh_varname=yes"
else
eval "$ossh_varname=no"
fi
rm -f conftest*
fi
ossh_result=`eval 'echo $'"$ossh_varname"`
if test -n "`echo $ossh_varname`"; then
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ossh_result" >&5
$as_echo "$ossh_result" >&6; }
if test "x$ossh_result" = "xyes"; then
$as_echo "#define HAVE_ADDR_IN_UTMP 1" >>confdefs.h
fi
else
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
$as_echo "no" >&6; }
fi
# look for field 'ut_addr' in header 'utmpx.h'
ossh_safe=`echo "utmpx.h" | sed 'y%./+-%__p_%'`
ossh_varname="ossh_cv_$ossh_safe""_has_"ut_addr
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for ut_addr field in utmpx.h" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking for ut_addr field in utmpx.h... " >&6; }
if eval \${$ossh_varname+:} false; then :
$as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
else
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
#include <utmpx.h>
_ACEOF
if (eval "$ac_cpp conftest.$ac_ext") 2>&5 |
$EGREP "ut_addr" >/dev/null 2>&1; then :
eval "$ossh_varname=yes"
else
eval "$ossh_varname=no"
fi
rm -f conftest*
fi
ossh_result=`eval 'echo $'"$ossh_varname"`
if test -n "`echo $ossh_varname`"; then
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ossh_result" >&5
$as_echo "$ossh_result" >&6; }
if test "x$ossh_result" = "xyes"; then
$as_echo "#define HAVE_ADDR_IN_UTMPX 1" >>confdefs.h
fi
else
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
$as_echo "no" >&6; }
fi
# look for field 'ut_addr_v6' in header 'utmp.h'
ossh_safe=`echo "utmp.h" | sed 'y%./+-%__p_%'`
ossh_varname="ossh_cv_$ossh_safe""_has_"ut_addr_v6
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for ut_addr_v6 field in utmp.h" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking for ut_addr_v6 field in utmp.h... " >&6; }
if eval \${$ossh_varname+:} false; then :
$as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
else
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
#include <utmp.h>
_ACEOF
if (eval "$ac_cpp conftest.$ac_ext") 2>&5 |
$EGREP "ut_addr_v6" >/dev/null 2>&1; then :
eval "$ossh_varname=yes"
else
eval "$ossh_varname=no"
fi
rm -f conftest*
fi
ossh_result=`eval 'echo $'"$ossh_varname"`
if test -n "`echo $ossh_varname`"; then
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ossh_result" >&5
$as_echo "$ossh_result" >&6; }
if test "x$ossh_result" = "xyes"; then
$as_echo "#define HAVE_ADDR_V6_IN_UTMP 1" >>confdefs.h
fi
else
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
$as_echo "no" >&6; }
fi
# look for field 'ut_addr_v6' in header 'utmpx.h'
ossh_safe=`echo "utmpx.h" | sed 'y%./+-%__p_%'`
ossh_varname="ossh_cv_$ossh_safe""_has_"ut_addr_v6
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for ut_addr_v6 field in utmpx.h" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking for ut_addr_v6 field in utmpx.h... " >&6; }
if eval \${$ossh_varname+:} false; then :
$as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
else
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
#include <utmpx.h>
_ACEOF
if (eval "$ac_cpp conftest.$ac_ext") 2>&5 |
$EGREP "ut_addr_v6" >/dev/null 2>&1; then :
eval "$ossh_varname=yes"
else
eval "$ossh_varname=no"
fi
rm -f conftest*
fi
ossh_result=`eval 'echo $'"$ossh_varname"`
if test -n "`echo $ossh_varname`"; then
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ossh_result" >&5
$as_echo "$ossh_result" >&6; }
if test "x$ossh_result" = "xyes"; then
$as_echo "#define HAVE_ADDR_V6_IN_UTMPX 1" >>confdefs.h
fi
else
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
$as_echo "no" >&6; }
fi
# look for field 'ut_exit' in header 'utmp.h'
ossh_safe=`echo "utmp.h" | sed 'y%./+-%__p_%'`
ossh_varname="ossh_cv_$ossh_safe""_has_"ut_exit
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for ut_exit field in utmp.h" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking for ut_exit field in utmp.h... " >&6; }
if eval \${$ossh_varname+:} false; then :
$as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
else
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
#include <utmp.h>
_ACEOF
if (eval "$ac_cpp conftest.$ac_ext") 2>&5 |
$EGREP "ut_exit" >/dev/null 2>&1; then :
eval "$ossh_varname=yes"
else
eval "$ossh_varname=no"
fi
rm -f conftest*
fi
ossh_result=`eval 'echo $'"$ossh_varname"`
if test -n "`echo $ossh_varname`"; then
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ossh_result" >&5
$as_echo "$ossh_result" >&6; }
if test "x$ossh_result" = "xyes"; then
$as_echo "#define HAVE_EXIT_IN_UTMP 1" >>confdefs.h
fi
else
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
$as_echo "no" >&6; }
fi
# look for field 'ut_time' in header 'utmp.h'
ossh_safe=`echo "utmp.h" | sed 'y%./+-%__p_%'`
ossh_varname="ossh_cv_$ossh_safe""_has_"ut_time
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for ut_time field in utmp.h" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking for ut_time field in utmp.h... " >&6; }
if eval \${$ossh_varname+:} false; then :
$as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
else
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
#include <utmp.h>
_ACEOF
if (eval "$ac_cpp conftest.$ac_ext") 2>&5 |
$EGREP "ut_time" >/dev/null 2>&1; then :
eval "$ossh_varname=yes"
else
eval "$ossh_varname=no"
fi
rm -f conftest*
fi
ossh_result=`eval 'echo $'"$ossh_varname"`
if test -n "`echo $ossh_varname`"; then
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ossh_result" >&5
$as_echo "$ossh_result" >&6; }
if test "x$ossh_result" = "xyes"; then
$as_echo "#define HAVE_TIME_IN_UTMP 1" >>confdefs.h
fi
else
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
$as_echo "no" >&6; }
fi
# look for field 'ut_time' in header 'utmpx.h'
ossh_safe=`echo "utmpx.h" | sed 'y%./+-%__p_%'`
ossh_varname="ossh_cv_$ossh_safe""_has_"ut_time
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for ut_time field in utmpx.h" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking for ut_time field in utmpx.h... " >&6; }
if eval \${$ossh_varname+:} false; then :
$as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
else
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
#include <utmpx.h>
_ACEOF
if (eval "$ac_cpp conftest.$ac_ext") 2>&5 |
$EGREP "ut_time" >/dev/null 2>&1; then :
eval "$ossh_varname=yes"
else
eval "$ossh_varname=no"
fi
rm -f conftest*
fi
ossh_result=`eval 'echo $'"$ossh_varname"`
if test -n "`echo $ossh_varname`"; then
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ossh_result" >&5
$as_echo "$ossh_result" >&6; }
if test "x$ossh_result" = "xyes"; then
$as_echo "#define HAVE_TIME_IN_UTMPX 1" >>confdefs.h
fi
else
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
$as_echo "no" >&6; }
fi
# look for field 'ut_tv' in header 'utmpx.h'
ossh_safe=`echo "utmpx.h" | sed 'y%./+-%__p_%'`
ossh_varname="ossh_cv_$ossh_safe""_has_"ut_tv
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for ut_tv field in utmpx.h" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking for ut_tv field in utmpx.h... " >&6; }
if eval \${$ossh_varname+:} false; then :
$as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
else
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
#include <utmpx.h>
_ACEOF
if (eval "$ac_cpp conftest.$ac_ext") 2>&5 |
$EGREP "ut_tv" >/dev/null 2>&1; then :
eval "$ossh_varname=yes"
else
eval "$ossh_varname=no"
fi
rm -f conftest*
fi
ossh_result=`eval 'echo $'"$ossh_varname"`
if test -n "`echo $ossh_varname`"; then
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ossh_result" >&5
$as_echo "$ossh_result" >&6; }
if test "x$ossh_result" = "xyes"; then
$as_echo "#define HAVE_TV_IN_UTMPX 1" >>confdefs.h
fi
else
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
$as_echo "no" >&6; }
fi
+# look for field 'ut_ss' in header 'utmpx.h'
+ ossh_safe=`echo "utmpx.h" | sed 'y%./+-%__p_%'`
+ ossh_varname="ossh_cv_$ossh_safe""_has_"ut_ss
+ { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for ut_ss field in utmpx.h" >&5
+$as_echo_n "checking for ut_ss field in utmpx.h... " >&6; }
+ if eval \${$ossh_varname+:} false; then :
+ $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
+else
+
+ cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+#include <utmpx.h>
+
+_ACEOF
+if (eval "$ac_cpp conftest.$ac_ext") 2>&5 |
+ $EGREP "ut_ss" >/dev/null 2>&1; then :
+ eval "$ossh_varname=yes"
+else
+ eval "$ossh_varname=no"
+fi
+rm -f conftest*
+
+fi
+
+ ossh_result=`eval 'echo $'"$ossh_varname"`
+ if test -n "`echo $ossh_varname`"; then
+ { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ossh_result" >&5
+$as_echo "$ossh_result" >&6; }
+ if test "x$ossh_result" = "xyes"; then
+
+$as_echo "#define HAVE_SS_IN_UTMPX 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+ fi
+ else
+ { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
+$as_echo "no" >&6; }
+ fi
+
+
ac_fn_c_check_member "$LINENO" "struct stat" "st_blksize" "ac_cv_member_struct_stat_st_blksize" "$ac_includes_default"
if test "x$ac_cv_member_struct_stat_st_blksize" = xyes; then :
cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
#define HAVE_STRUCT_STAT_ST_BLKSIZE 1
_ACEOF
fi
ac_fn_c_check_member "$LINENO" "struct stat" "st_mtim" "ac_cv_member_struct_stat_st_mtim" "$ac_includes_default"
if test "x$ac_cv_member_struct_stat_st_mtim" = xyes; then :
cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
#define HAVE_STRUCT_STAT_ST_MTIM 1
_ACEOF
fi
ac_fn_c_check_member "$LINENO" "struct stat" "st_mtime" "ac_cv_member_struct_stat_st_mtime" "$ac_includes_default"
if test "x$ac_cv_member_struct_stat_st_mtime" = xyes; then :
cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
#define HAVE_STRUCT_STAT_ST_MTIME 1
_ACEOF
fi
ac_fn_c_check_member "$LINENO" "struct passwd" "pw_gecos" "ac_cv_member_struct_passwd_pw_gecos" "
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <pwd.h>
"
if test "x$ac_cv_member_struct_passwd_pw_gecos" = xyes; then :
cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
#define HAVE_STRUCT_PASSWD_PW_GECOS 1
_ACEOF
fi
ac_fn_c_check_member "$LINENO" "struct passwd" "pw_class" "ac_cv_member_struct_passwd_pw_class" "
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <pwd.h>
"
if test "x$ac_cv_member_struct_passwd_pw_class" = xyes; then :
cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
#define HAVE_STRUCT_PASSWD_PW_CLASS 1
_ACEOF
fi
ac_fn_c_check_member "$LINENO" "struct passwd" "pw_change" "ac_cv_member_struct_passwd_pw_change" "
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <pwd.h>
"
if test "x$ac_cv_member_struct_passwd_pw_change" = xyes; then :
cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
#define HAVE_STRUCT_PASSWD_PW_CHANGE 1
_ACEOF
fi
ac_fn_c_check_member "$LINENO" "struct passwd" "pw_expire" "ac_cv_member_struct_passwd_pw_expire" "
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <pwd.h>
"
if test "x$ac_cv_member_struct_passwd_pw_expire" = xyes; then :
cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
#define HAVE_STRUCT_PASSWD_PW_EXPIRE 1
_ACEOF
fi
ac_fn_c_check_member "$LINENO" "struct __res_state" "retrans" "ac_cv_member_struct___res_state_retrans" "
#include <stdio.h>
#if HAVE_SYS_TYPES_H
# include <sys/types.h>
#endif
#include <netinet/in.h>
#include <arpa/nameser.h>
#include <resolv.h>
"
if test "x$ac_cv_member_struct___res_state_retrans" = xyes; then :
else
$as_echo "#define __res_state state" >>confdefs.h
fi
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for ss_family field in struct sockaddr_storage" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking for ss_family field in struct sockaddr_storage... " >&6; }
if ${ac_cv_have_ss_family_in_struct_ss+:} false; then :
$as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
else
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/socket.h>
int
main ()
{
struct sockaddr_storage s; s.ss_family = 1;
;
return 0;
}
_ACEOF
if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then :
ac_cv_have_ss_family_in_struct_ss="yes"
else
ac_cv_have_ss_family_in_struct_ss="no"
fi
rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
fi
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_have_ss_family_in_struct_ss" >&5
$as_echo "$ac_cv_have_ss_family_in_struct_ss" >&6; }
if test "x$ac_cv_have_ss_family_in_struct_ss" = "xyes" ; then
$as_echo "#define HAVE_SS_FAMILY_IN_SS 1" >>confdefs.h
fi
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for __ss_family field in struct sockaddr_storage" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking for __ss_family field in struct sockaddr_storage... " >&6; }
if ${ac_cv_have___ss_family_in_struct_ss+:} false; then :
$as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
else
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/socket.h>
int
main ()
{
struct sockaddr_storage s; s.__ss_family = 1;
;
return 0;
}
_ACEOF
if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then :
ac_cv_have___ss_family_in_struct_ss="yes"
else
ac_cv_have___ss_family_in_struct_ss="no"
fi
rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
fi
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_have___ss_family_in_struct_ss" >&5
$as_echo "$ac_cv_have___ss_family_in_struct_ss" >&6; }
if test "x$ac_cv_have___ss_family_in_struct_ss" = "xyes" ; then
$as_echo "#define HAVE___SS_FAMILY_IN_SS 1" >>confdefs.h
fi
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for msg_accrights field in struct msghdr" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking for msg_accrights field in struct msghdr... " >&6; }
if ${ac_cv_have_accrights_in_msghdr+:} false; then :
$as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
else
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/socket.h>
#include <sys/uio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
int
main ()
{
#ifdef msg_accrights
#error "msg_accrights is a macro"
exit(1);
#endif
struct msghdr m;
m.msg_accrights = 0;
exit(0);
;
return 0;
}
_ACEOF
if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then :
ac_cv_have_accrights_in_msghdr="yes"
else
ac_cv_have_accrights_in_msghdr="no"
fi
rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
fi
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_have_accrights_in_msghdr" >&5
$as_echo "$ac_cv_have_accrights_in_msghdr" >&6; }
if test "x$ac_cv_have_accrights_in_msghdr" = "xyes" ; then
$as_echo "#define HAVE_ACCRIGHTS_IN_MSGHDR 1" >>confdefs.h
fi
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking if struct statvfs.f_fsid is integral type" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking if struct statvfs.f_fsid is integral type... " >&6; }
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
#include <sys/param.h>
#include <sys/stat.h>
#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TIME_H
# include <sys/time.h>
#endif
#ifdef HAVE_SYS_MOUNT_H
#include <sys/mount.h>
#endif
#ifdef HAVE_SYS_STATVFS_H
#include <sys/statvfs.h>
#endif
int
main ()
{
struct statvfs s; s.f_fsid = 0;
;
return 0;
}
_ACEOF
if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then :
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
$as_echo "yes" >&6; }
else
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
$as_echo "no" >&6; }
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking if fsid_t has member val" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking if fsid_t has member val... " >&6; }
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/statvfs.h>
int
main ()
{
fsid_t t; t.val[0] = 0;
;
return 0;
}
_ACEOF
if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then :
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
$as_echo "yes" >&6; }
$as_echo "#define FSID_HAS_VAL 1" >>confdefs.h
else
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
$as_echo "no" >&6; }
fi
rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking if f_fsid has member __val" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking if f_fsid has member __val... " >&6; }
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/statvfs.h>
int
main ()
{
fsid_t t; t.__val[0] = 0;
;
return 0;
}
_ACEOF
if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then :
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
$as_echo "yes" >&6; }
$as_echo "#define FSID_HAS___VAL 1" >>confdefs.h
else
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
$as_echo "no" >&6; }
fi
rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
fi
rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for msg_control field in struct msghdr" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking for msg_control field in struct msghdr... " >&6; }
if ${ac_cv_have_control_in_msghdr+:} false; then :
$as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
else
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/socket.h>
#include <sys/uio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
int
main ()
{
#ifdef msg_control
#error "msg_control is a macro"
exit(1);
#endif
struct msghdr m;
m.msg_control = 0;
exit(0);
;
return 0;
}
_ACEOF
if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then :
ac_cv_have_control_in_msghdr="yes"
else
ac_cv_have_control_in_msghdr="no"
fi
rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
fi
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_have_control_in_msghdr" >&5
$as_echo "$ac_cv_have_control_in_msghdr" >&6; }
if test "x$ac_cv_have_control_in_msghdr" = "xyes" ; then
$as_echo "#define HAVE_CONTROL_IN_MSGHDR 1" >>confdefs.h
fi
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking if libc defines __progname" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking if libc defines __progname... " >&6; }
if ${ac_cv_libc_defines___progname+:} false; then :
$as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
else
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
-
+ #include <stdio.h>
int
main ()
{
extern char *__progname; printf("%s", __progname);
;
return 0;
}
_ACEOF
if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then :
ac_cv_libc_defines___progname="yes"
else
ac_cv_libc_defines___progname="no"
fi
rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \
conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
fi
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_libc_defines___progname" >&5
$as_echo "$ac_cv_libc_defines___progname" >&6; }
if test "x$ac_cv_libc_defines___progname" = "xyes" ; then
$as_echo "#define HAVE___PROGNAME 1" >>confdefs.h
fi
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking whether $CC implements __FUNCTION__" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking whether $CC implements __FUNCTION__... " >&6; }
if ${ac_cv_cc_implements___FUNCTION__+:} false; then :
$as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
else
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
#include <stdio.h>
int
main ()
{
printf("%s", __FUNCTION__);
;
return 0;
}
_ACEOF
if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then :
ac_cv_cc_implements___FUNCTION__="yes"
else
ac_cv_cc_implements___FUNCTION__="no"
fi
rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \
conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
fi
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_cc_implements___FUNCTION__" >&5
$as_echo "$ac_cv_cc_implements___FUNCTION__" >&6; }
if test "x$ac_cv_cc_implements___FUNCTION__" = "xyes" ; then
$as_echo "#define HAVE___FUNCTION__ 1" >>confdefs.h
fi
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking whether $CC implements __func__" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking whether $CC implements __func__... " >&6; }
if ${ac_cv_cc_implements___func__+:} false; then :
$as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
else
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
#include <stdio.h>
int
main ()
{
printf("%s", __func__);
;
return 0;
}
_ACEOF
if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then :
ac_cv_cc_implements___func__="yes"
else
ac_cv_cc_implements___func__="no"
fi
rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \
conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
fi
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_cc_implements___func__" >&5
$as_echo "$ac_cv_cc_implements___func__" >&6; }
if test "x$ac_cv_cc_implements___func__" = "xyes" ; then
$as_echo "#define HAVE___func__ 1" >>confdefs.h
fi
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking whether va_copy exists" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking whether va_copy exists... " >&6; }
if ${ac_cv_have_va_copy+:} false; then :
$as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
else
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
#include <stdarg.h>
va_list x,y;
int
main ()
{
va_copy(x,y);
;
return 0;
}
_ACEOF
if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then :
ac_cv_have_va_copy="yes"
else
ac_cv_have_va_copy="no"
fi
rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \
conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
fi
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_have_va_copy" >&5
$as_echo "$ac_cv_have_va_copy" >&6; }
if test "x$ac_cv_have_va_copy" = "xyes" ; then
$as_echo "#define HAVE_VA_COPY 1" >>confdefs.h
fi
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking whether __va_copy exists" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking whether __va_copy exists... " >&6; }
if ${ac_cv_have___va_copy+:} false; then :
$as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
else
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
#include <stdarg.h>
va_list x,y;
int
main ()
{
__va_copy(x,y);
;
return 0;
}
_ACEOF
if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then :
ac_cv_have___va_copy="yes"
else
ac_cv_have___va_copy="no"
fi
rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \
conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
fi
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_have___va_copy" >&5
$as_echo "$ac_cv_have___va_copy" >&6; }
if test "x$ac_cv_have___va_copy" = "xyes" ; then
$as_echo "#define HAVE___VA_COPY 1" >>confdefs.h
fi
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking whether getopt has optreset support" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking whether getopt has optreset support... " >&6; }
if ${ac_cv_have_getopt_optreset+:} false; then :
$as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
else
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
#include <getopt.h>
int
main ()
{
extern int optreset; optreset = 0;
;
return 0;
}
_ACEOF
if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then :
ac_cv_have_getopt_optreset="yes"
else
ac_cv_have_getopt_optreset="no"
fi
rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \
conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
fi
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_have_getopt_optreset" >&5
$as_echo "$ac_cv_have_getopt_optreset" >&6; }
if test "x$ac_cv_have_getopt_optreset" = "xyes" ; then
$as_echo "#define HAVE_GETOPT_OPTRESET 1" >>confdefs.h
fi
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking if libc defines sys_errlist" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking if libc defines sys_errlist... " >&6; }
if ${ac_cv_libc_defines_sys_errlist+:} false; then :
$as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
else
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
-
+ #include <stdio.h>
int
main ()
{
extern const char *const sys_errlist[]; printf("%s", sys_errlist[0]);
;
return 0;
}
_ACEOF
if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then :
ac_cv_libc_defines_sys_errlist="yes"
else
ac_cv_libc_defines_sys_errlist="no"
fi
rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \
conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
fi
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_libc_defines_sys_errlist" >&5
$as_echo "$ac_cv_libc_defines_sys_errlist" >&6; }
if test "x$ac_cv_libc_defines_sys_errlist" = "xyes" ; then
$as_echo "#define HAVE_SYS_ERRLIST 1" >>confdefs.h
fi
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking if libc defines sys_nerr" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking if libc defines sys_nerr... " >&6; }
if ${ac_cv_libc_defines_sys_nerr+:} false; then :
$as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
else
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
-
+ #include <stdio.h>
int
main ()
{
extern int sys_nerr; printf("%i", sys_nerr);
;
return 0;
}
_ACEOF
if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then :
ac_cv_libc_defines_sys_nerr="yes"
else
ac_cv_libc_defines_sys_nerr="no"
fi
rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \
conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
fi
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_libc_defines_sys_nerr" >&5
$as_echo "$ac_cv_libc_defines_sys_nerr" >&6; }
if test "x$ac_cv_libc_defines_sys_nerr" = "xyes" ; then
$as_echo "#define HAVE_SYS_NERR 1" >>confdefs.h
fi
# Check libraries needed by DNS fingerprint support
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for library containing getrrsetbyname" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking for library containing getrrsetbyname... " >&6; }
if ${ac_cv_search_getrrsetbyname+:} false; then :
$as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
else
ac_func_search_save_LIBS=$LIBS
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error.
Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC
builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */
#ifdef __cplusplus
extern "C"
#endif
char getrrsetbyname ();
int
main ()
{
return getrrsetbyname ();
;
return 0;
}
_ACEOF
for ac_lib in '' resolv; do
if test -z "$ac_lib"; then
ac_res="none required"
else
ac_res=-l$ac_lib
LIBS="-l$ac_lib $ac_func_search_save_LIBS"
fi
if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then :
ac_cv_search_getrrsetbyname=$ac_res
fi
rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \
conftest$ac_exeext
if ${ac_cv_search_getrrsetbyname+:} false; then :
break
fi
done
if ${ac_cv_search_getrrsetbyname+:} false; then :
else
ac_cv_search_getrrsetbyname=no
fi
rm conftest.$ac_ext
LIBS=$ac_func_search_save_LIBS
fi
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_search_getrrsetbyname" >&5
$as_echo "$ac_cv_search_getrrsetbyname" >&6; }
ac_res=$ac_cv_search_getrrsetbyname
if test "$ac_res" != no; then :
test "$ac_res" = "none required" || LIBS="$ac_res $LIBS"
$as_echo "#define HAVE_GETRRSETBYNAME 1" >>confdefs.h
else
# Needed by our getrrsetbyname()
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for library containing res_query" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking for library containing res_query... " >&6; }
if ${ac_cv_search_res_query+:} false; then :
$as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
else
ac_func_search_save_LIBS=$LIBS
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error.
Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC
builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */
#ifdef __cplusplus
extern "C"
#endif
char res_query ();
int
main ()
{
return res_query ();
;
return 0;
}
_ACEOF
for ac_lib in '' resolv; do
if test -z "$ac_lib"; then
ac_res="none required"
else
ac_res=-l$ac_lib
LIBS="-l$ac_lib $ac_func_search_save_LIBS"
fi
if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then :
ac_cv_search_res_query=$ac_res
fi
rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \
conftest$ac_exeext
if ${ac_cv_search_res_query+:} false; then :
break
fi
done
if ${ac_cv_search_res_query+:} false; then :
else
ac_cv_search_res_query=no
fi
rm conftest.$ac_ext
LIBS=$ac_func_search_save_LIBS
fi
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_search_res_query" >&5
$as_echo "$ac_cv_search_res_query" >&6; }
ac_res=$ac_cv_search_res_query
if test "$ac_res" != no; then :
test "$ac_res" = "none required" || LIBS="$ac_res $LIBS"
fi
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for library containing dn_expand" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking for library containing dn_expand... " >&6; }
if ${ac_cv_search_dn_expand+:} false; then :
$as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
else
ac_func_search_save_LIBS=$LIBS
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error.
Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC
builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */
#ifdef __cplusplus
extern "C"
#endif
char dn_expand ();
int
main ()
{
return dn_expand ();
;
return 0;
}
_ACEOF
for ac_lib in '' resolv; do
if test -z "$ac_lib"; then
ac_res="none required"
else
ac_res=-l$ac_lib
LIBS="-l$ac_lib $ac_func_search_save_LIBS"
fi
if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then :
ac_cv_search_dn_expand=$ac_res
fi
rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \
conftest$ac_exeext
if ${ac_cv_search_dn_expand+:} false; then :
break
fi
done
if ${ac_cv_search_dn_expand+:} false; then :
else
ac_cv_search_dn_expand=no
fi
rm conftest.$ac_ext
LIBS=$ac_func_search_save_LIBS
fi
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_search_dn_expand" >&5
$as_echo "$ac_cv_search_dn_expand" >&6; }
ac_res=$ac_cv_search_dn_expand
if test "$ac_res" != no; then :
test "$ac_res" = "none required" || LIBS="$ac_res $LIBS"
fi
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking if res_query will link" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking if res_query will link... " >&6; }
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <netinet/in.h>
#include <arpa/nameser.h>
#include <netdb.h>
#include <resolv.h>
int
main ()
{
res_query (0, 0, 0, 0, 0);
;
return 0;
}
_ACEOF
if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then :
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
$as_echo "yes" >&6; }
else
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
$as_echo "no" >&6; }
saved_LIBS="$LIBS"
LIBS="$LIBS -lresolv"
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for res_query in -lresolv" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking for res_query in -lresolv... " >&6; }
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <netinet/in.h>
#include <arpa/nameser.h>
#include <netdb.h>
#include <resolv.h>
int
main ()
{
res_query (0, 0, 0, 0, 0);
;
return 0;
}
_ACEOF
if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then :
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
$as_echo "yes" >&6; }
else
LIBS="$saved_LIBS"
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
$as_echo "no" >&6; }
fi
rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \
conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
fi
rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \
conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
for ac_func in _getshort _getlong
do :
as_ac_var=`$as_echo "ac_cv_func_$ac_func" | $as_tr_sh`
ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "$ac_func" "$as_ac_var"
if eval test \"x\$"$as_ac_var"\" = x"yes"; then :
cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
#define `$as_echo "HAVE_$ac_func" | $as_tr_cpp` 1
_ACEOF
fi
done
ac_fn_c_check_decl "$LINENO" "_getshort" "ac_cv_have_decl__getshort" "#include <sys/types.h>
#include <arpa/nameser.h>
"
if test "x$ac_cv_have_decl__getshort" = xyes; then :
ac_have_decl=1
else
ac_have_decl=0
fi
cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
#define HAVE_DECL__GETSHORT $ac_have_decl
_ACEOF
ac_fn_c_check_decl "$LINENO" "_getlong" "ac_cv_have_decl__getlong" "#include <sys/types.h>
#include <arpa/nameser.h>
"
if test "x$ac_cv_have_decl__getlong" = xyes; then :
ac_have_decl=1
else
ac_have_decl=0
fi
cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
#define HAVE_DECL__GETLONG $ac_have_decl
_ACEOF
ac_fn_c_check_member "$LINENO" "HEADER" "ad" "ac_cv_member_HEADER_ad" "#include <arpa/nameser.h>
"
if test "x$ac_cv_member_HEADER_ad" = xyes; then :
$as_echo "#define HAVE_HEADER_AD 1" >>confdefs.h
fi
fi
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking if struct __res_state _res is an extern" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking if struct __res_state _res is an extern... " >&6; }
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
#include <stdio.h>
#if HAVE_SYS_TYPES_H
# include <sys/types.h>
#endif
#include <netinet/in.h>
#include <arpa/nameser.h>
#include <resolv.h>
extern struct __res_state _res;
int
main ()
{
struct __res_state *volatile p = &_res; /* force resolution of _res */
return 0;
;
return 0;
}
_ACEOF
if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then :
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
$as_echo "yes" >&6; }
$as_echo "#define HAVE__RES_EXTERN 1" >>confdefs.h
else
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
$as_echo "no" >&6; }
fi
rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \
conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
# Check whether user wants SELinux support
SELINUX_MSG="no"
LIBSELINUX=""
# Check whether --with-selinux was given.
if test "${with_selinux+set}" = set; then :
withval=$with_selinux; if test "x$withval" != "xno" ; then
save_LIBS="$LIBS"
$as_echo "#define WITH_SELINUX 1" >>confdefs.h
SELINUX_MSG="yes"
ac_fn_c_check_header_mongrel "$LINENO" "selinux/selinux.h" "ac_cv_header_selinux_selinux_h" "$ac_includes_default"
if test "x$ac_cv_header_selinux_selinux_h" = xyes; then :
else
as_fn_error $? "SELinux support requires selinux.h header" "$LINENO" 5
fi
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for setexeccon in -lselinux" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking for setexeccon in -lselinux... " >&6; }
if ${ac_cv_lib_selinux_setexeccon+:} false; then :
$as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
else
ac_check_lib_save_LIBS=$LIBS
LIBS="-lselinux $LIBS"
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error.
Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC
builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */
#ifdef __cplusplus
extern "C"
#endif
char setexeccon ();
int
main ()
{
return setexeccon ();
;
return 0;
}
_ACEOF
if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then :
ac_cv_lib_selinux_setexeccon=yes
else
ac_cv_lib_selinux_setexeccon=no
fi
rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \
conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
LIBS=$ac_check_lib_save_LIBS
fi
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_lib_selinux_setexeccon" >&5
$as_echo "$ac_cv_lib_selinux_setexeccon" >&6; }
if test "x$ac_cv_lib_selinux_setexeccon" = xyes; then :
LIBSELINUX="-lselinux"
LIBS="$LIBS -lselinux"
else
as_fn_error $? "SELinux support requires libselinux library" "$LINENO" 5
fi
- SSHLIBS="$SSHLIBS $LIBSELINUX"
- SSHDLIBS="$SSHDLIBS $LIBSELINUX"
for ac_func in getseuserbyname get_default_context_with_level
do :
as_ac_var=`$as_echo "ac_cv_func_$ac_func" | $as_tr_sh`
ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "$ac_func" "$as_ac_var"
if eval test \"x\$"$as_ac_var"\" = x"yes"; then :
cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
#define `$as_echo "HAVE_$ac_func" | $as_tr_cpp` 1
_ACEOF
fi
done
- LIBS="$save_LIBS"
+ LIBS="$save_LIBS $LIBSELINUX"
fi
fi
-
# Check whether user wants Kerberos 5 support
KRB5_MSG="no"
# Check whether --with-kerberos5 was given.
if test "${with_kerberos5+set}" = set; then :
withval=$with_kerberos5; if test "x$withval" != "xno" ; then
if test "x$withval" = "xyes" ; then
KRB5ROOT="/usr/local"
else
KRB5ROOT=${withval}
fi
$as_echo "#define KRB5 1" >>confdefs.h
KRB5_MSG="yes"
if test -n "$ac_tool_prefix"; then
# Extract the first word of "${ac_tool_prefix}krb5-config", so it can be a program name with args.
set dummy ${ac_tool_prefix}krb5-config; ac_word=$2
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for $ac_word" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking for $ac_word... " >&6; }
if ${ac_cv_path_KRB5CONF+:} false; then :
$as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
else
case $KRB5CONF in
[\\/]* | ?:[\\/]*)
ac_cv_path_KRB5CONF="$KRB5CONF" # Let the user override the test with a path.
;;
*)
as_save_IFS=$IFS; IFS=$PATH_SEPARATOR
as_dummy="$KRB5ROOT/bin:$PATH"
for as_dir in $as_dummy
do
IFS=$as_save_IFS
test -z "$as_dir" && as_dir=.
for ac_exec_ext in '' $ac_executable_extensions; do
if as_fn_executable_p "$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"; then
ac_cv_path_KRB5CONF="$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"
$as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: found $as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" >&5
break 2
fi
done
done
IFS=$as_save_IFS
;;
esac
fi
KRB5CONF=$ac_cv_path_KRB5CONF
if test -n "$KRB5CONF"; then
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $KRB5CONF" >&5
$as_echo "$KRB5CONF" >&6; }
else
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
$as_echo "no" >&6; }
fi
fi
if test -z "$ac_cv_path_KRB5CONF"; then
ac_pt_KRB5CONF=$KRB5CONF
# Extract the first word of "krb5-config", so it can be a program name with args.
set dummy krb5-config; ac_word=$2
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for $ac_word" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking for $ac_word... " >&6; }
if ${ac_cv_path_ac_pt_KRB5CONF+:} false; then :
$as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
else
case $ac_pt_KRB5CONF in
[\\/]* | ?:[\\/]*)
ac_cv_path_ac_pt_KRB5CONF="$ac_pt_KRB5CONF" # Let the user override the test with a path.
;;
*)
as_save_IFS=$IFS; IFS=$PATH_SEPARATOR
as_dummy="$KRB5ROOT/bin:$PATH"
for as_dir in $as_dummy
do
IFS=$as_save_IFS
test -z "$as_dir" && as_dir=.
for ac_exec_ext in '' $ac_executable_extensions; do
if as_fn_executable_p "$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"; then
ac_cv_path_ac_pt_KRB5CONF="$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"
$as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: found $as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" >&5
break 2
fi
done
done
IFS=$as_save_IFS
;;
esac
fi
ac_pt_KRB5CONF=$ac_cv_path_ac_pt_KRB5CONF
if test -n "$ac_pt_KRB5CONF"; then
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_pt_KRB5CONF" >&5
$as_echo "$ac_pt_KRB5CONF" >&6; }
else
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
$as_echo "no" >&6; }
fi
if test "x$ac_pt_KRB5CONF" = x; then
KRB5CONF="$KRB5ROOT/bin/krb5-config"
else
case $cross_compiling:$ac_tool_warned in
yes:)
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: WARNING: using cross tools not prefixed with host triplet" >&5
$as_echo "$as_me: WARNING: using cross tools not prefixed with host triplet" >&2;}
ac_tool_warned=yes ;;
esac
KRB5CONF=$ac_pt_KRB5CONF
fi
else
KRB5CONF="$ac_cv_path_KRB5CONF"
fi
if test -x $KRB5CONF ; then
K5CFLAGS="`$KRB5CONF --cflags`"
K5LIBS="`$KRB5CONF --libs`"
CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS $K5CFLAGS"
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for gssapi support" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking for gssapi support... " >&6; }
if $KRB5CONF | grep gssapi >/dev/null ; then
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
$as_echo "yes" >&6; }
$as_echo "#define GSSAPI 1" >>confdefs.h
GSSCFLAGS="`$KRB5CONF --cflags gssapi`"
GSSLIBS="`$KRB5CONF --libs gssapi`"
CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS $GSSCFLAGS"
else
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
$as_echo "no" >&6; }
fi
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking whether we are using Heimdal" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking whether we are using Heimdal... " >&6; }
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
#include <krb5.h>
int
main ()
{
char *tmp = heimdal_version;
;
return 0;
}
_ACEOF
if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then :
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
$as_echo "yes" >&6; }
$as_echo "#define HEIMDAL 1" >>confdefs.h
else
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
$as_echo "no" >&6; }
fi
rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
else
CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS -I${KRB5ROOT}/include"
LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS -L${KRB5ROOT}/lib"
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking whether we are using Heimdal" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking whether we are using Heimdal... " >&6; }
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
#include <krb5.h>
int
main ()
{
char *tmp = heimdal_version;
;
return 0;
}
_ACEOF
if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then :
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
$as_echo "yes" >&6; }
$as_echo "#define HEIMDAL 1" >>confdefs.h
K5LIBS="-lkrb5"
K5LIBS="$K5LIBS -lcom_err -lasn1"
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for net_write in -lroken" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking for net_write in -lroken... " >&6; }
if ${ac_cv_lib_roken_net_write+:} false; then :
$as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
else
ac_check_lib_save_LIBS=$LIBS
LIBS="-lroken $LIBS"
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error.
Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC
builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */
#ifdef __cplusplus
extern "C"
#endif
char net_write ();
int
main ()
{
return net_write ();
;
return 0;
}
_ACEOF
if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then :
ac_cv_lib_roken_net_write=yes
else
ac_cv_lib_roken_net_write=no
fi
rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \
conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
LIBS=$ac_check_lib_save_LIBS
fi
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_lib_roken_net_write" >&5
$as_echo "$ac_cv_lib_roken_net_write" >&6; }
if test "x$ac_cv_lib_roken_net_write" = xyes; then :
K5LIBS="$K5LIBS -lroken"
fi
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for des_cbc_encrypt in -ldes" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking for des_cbc_encrypt in -ldes... " >&6; }
if ${ac_cv_lib_des_des_cbc_encrypt+:} false; then :
$as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
else
ac_check_lib_save_LIBS=$LIBS
LIBS="-ldes $LIBS"
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error.
Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC
builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */
#ifdef __cplusplus
extern "C"
#endif
char des_cbc_encrypt ();
int
main ()
{
return des_cbc_encrypt ();
;
return 0;
}
_ACEOF
if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then :
ac_cv_lib_des_des_cbc_encrypt=yes
else
ac_cv_lib_des_des_cbc_encrypt=no
fi
rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \
conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
LIBS=$ac_check_lib_save_LIBS
fi
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_lib_des_des_cbc_encrypt" >&5
$as_echo "$ac_cv_lib_des_des_cbc_encrypt" >&6; }
if test "x$ac_cv_lib_des_des_cbc_encrypt" = xyes; then :
K5LIBS="$K5LIBS -ldes"
fi
else
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
$as_echo "no" >&6; }
K5LIBS="-lkrb5 -lk5crypto -lcom_err"
fi
rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for library containing dn_expand" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking for library containing dn_expand... " >&6; }
if ${ac_cv_search_dn_expand+:} false; then :
$as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
else
ac_func_search_save_LIBS=$LIBS
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error.
Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC
builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */
#ifdef __cplusplus
extern "C"
#endif
char dn_expand ();
int
main ()
{
return dn_expand ();
;
return 0;
}
_ACEOF
for ac_lib in '' resolv; do
if test -z "$ac_lib"; then
ac_res="none required"
else
ac_res=-l$ac_lib
LIBS="-l$ac_lib $ac_func_search_save_LIBS"
fi
if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then :
ac_cv_search_dn_expand=$ac_res
fi
rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \
conftest$ac_exeext
if ${ac_cv_search_dn_expand+:} false; then :
break
fi
done
if ${ac_cv_search_dn_expand+:} false; then :
else
ac_cv_search_dn_expand=no
fi
rm conftest.$ac_ext
LIBS=$ac_func_search_save_LIBS
fi
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_search_dn_expand" >&5
$as_echo "$ac_cv_search_dn_expand" >&6; }
ac_res=$ac_cv_search_dn_expand
if test "$ac_res" != no; then :
test "$ac_res" = "none required" || LIBS="$ac_res $LIBS"
fi
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for gss_init_sec_context in -lgssapi_krb5" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking for gss_init_sec_context in -lgssapi_krb5... " >&6; }
if ${ac_cv_lib_gssapi_krb5_gss_init_sec_context+:} false; then :
$as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
else
ac_check_lib_save_LIBS=$LIBS
LIBS="-lgssapi_krb5 $LIBS"
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error.
Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC
builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */
#ifdef __cplusplus
extern "C"
#endif
char gss_init_sec_context ();
int
main ()
{
return gss_init_sec_context ();
;
return 0;
}
_ACEOF
if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then :
ac_cv_lib_gssapi_krb5_gss_init_sec_context=yes
else
ac_cv_lib_gssapi_krb5_gss_init_sec_context=no
fi
rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \
conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
LIBS=$ac_check_lib_save_LIBS
fi
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_lib_gssapi_krb5_gss_init_sec_context" >&5
$as_echo "$ac_cv_lib_gssapi_krb5_gss_init_sec_context" >&6; }
if test "x$ac_cv_lib_gssapi_krb5_gss_init_sec_context" = xyes; then :
$as_echo "#define GSSAPI 1" >>confdefs.h
GSSLIBS="-lgssapi_krb5"
else
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for gss_init_sec_context in -lgssapi" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking for gss_init_sec_context in -lgssapi... " >&6; }
if ${ac_cv_lib_gssapi_gss_init_sec_context+:} false; then :
$as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
else
ac_check_lib_save_LIBS=$LIBS
LIBS="-lgssapi $LIBS"
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error.
Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC
builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */
#ifdef __cplusplus
extern "C"
#endif
char gss_init_sec_context ();
int
main ()
{
return gss_init_sec_context ();
;
return 0;
}
_ACEOF
if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then :
ac_cv_lib_gssapi_gss_init_sec_context=yes
else
ac_cv_lib_gssapi_gss_init_sec_context=no
fi
rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \
conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
LIBS=$ac_check_lib_save_LIBS
fi
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_lib_gssapi_gss_init_sec_context" >&5
$as_echo "$ac_cv_lib_gssapi_gss_init_sec_context" >&6; }
if test "x$ac_cv_lib_gssapi_gss_init_sec_context" = xyes; then :
$as_echo "#define GSSAPI 1" >>confdefs.h
GSSLIBS="-lgssapi"
else
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for gss_init_sec_context in -lgss" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking for gss_init_sec_context in -lgss... " >&6; }
if ${ac_cv_lib_gss_gss_init_sec_context+:} false; then :
$as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
else
ac_check_lib_save_LIBS=$LIBS
LIBS="-lgss $LIBS"
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error.
Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC
builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */
#ifdef __cplusplus
extern "C"
#endif
char gss_init_sec_context ();
int
main ()
{
return gss_init_sec_context ();
;
return 0;
}
_ACEOF
if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then :
ac_cv_lib_gss_gss_init_sec_context=yes
else
ac_cv_lib_gss_gss_init_sec_context=no
fi
rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \
conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
LIBS=$ac_check_lib_save_LIBS
fi
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_lib_gss_gss_init_sec_context" >&5
$as_echo "$ac_cv_lib_gss_gss_init_sec_context" >&6; }
if test "x$ac_cv_lib_gss_gss_init_sec_context" = xyes; then :
$as_echo "#define GSSAPI 1" >>confdefs.h
GSSLIBS="-lgss"
else
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: WARNING: Cannot find any suitable gss-api library - build may fail" >&5
$as_echo "$as_me: WARNING: Cannot find any suitable gss-api library - build may fail" >&2;}
fi
fi
fi
ac_fn_c_check_header_mongrel "$LINENO" "gssapi.h" "ac_cv_header_gssapi_h" "$ac_includes_default"
if test "x$ac_cv_header_gssapi_h" = xyes; then :
else
unset ac_cv_header_gssapi_h
CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS -I${KRB5ROOT}/include/gssapi"
for ac_header in gssapi.h
do :
ac_fn_c_check_header_mongrel "$LINENO" "gssapi.h" "ac_cv_header_gssapi_h" "$ac_includes_default"
if test "x$ac_cv_header_gssapi_h" = xyes; then :
cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
#define HAVE_GSSAPI_H 1
_ACEOF
else
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: WARNING: Cannot find any suitable gss-api header - build may fail" >&5
$as_echo "$as_me: WARNING: Cannot find any suitable gss-api header - build may fail" >&2;}
fi
done
fi
oldCPP="$CPPFLAGS"
CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS -I${KRB5ROOT}/include/gssapi"
ac_fn_c_check_header_mongrel "$LINENO" "gssapi_krb5.h" "ac_cv_header_gssapi_krb5_h" "$ac_includes_default"
if test "x$ac_cv_header_gssapi_krb5_h" = xyes; then :
else
CPPFLAGS="$oldCPP"
fi
fi
if test -n "${rpath_opt}" ; then
LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS ${rpath_opt}${KRB5ROOT}/lib"
fi
if test ! -z "$blibpath" ; then
blibpath="$blibpath:${KRB5ROOT}/lib"
fi
for ac_header in gssapi.h gssapi/gssapi.h
do :
as_ac_Header=`$as_echo "ac_cv_header_$ac_header" | $as_tr_sh`
ac_fn_c_check_header_mongrel "$LINENO" "$ac_header" "$as_ac_Header" "$ac_includes_default"
if eval test \"x\$"$as_ac_Header"\" = x"yes"; then :
cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
#define `$as_echo "HAVE_$ac_header" | $as_tr_cpp` 1
_ACEOF
fi
done
for ac_header in gssapi_krb5.h gssapi/gssapi_krb5.h
do :
as_ac_Header=`$as_echo "ac_cv_header_$ac_header" | $as_tr_sh`
ac_fn_c_check_header_mongrel "$LINENO" "$ac_header" "$as_ac_Header" "$ac_includes_default"
if eval test \"x\$"$as_ac_Header"\" = x"yes"; then :
cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
#define `$as_echo "HAVE_$ac_header" | $as_tr_cpp` 1
_ACEOF
fi
done
for ac_header in gssapi_generic.h gssapi/gssapi_generic.h
do :
as_ac_Header=`$as_echo "ac_cv_header_$ac_header" | $as_tr_sh`
ac_fn_c_check_header_mongrel "$LINENO" "$ac_header" "$as_ac_Header" "$ac_includes_default"
if eval test \"x\$"$as_ac_Header"\" = x"yes"; then :
cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
#define `$as_echo "HAVE_$ac_header" | $as_tr_cpp` 1
_ACEOF
fi
done
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for library containing k_hasafs" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking for library containing k_hasafs... " >&6; }
if ${ac_cv_search_k_hasafs+:} false; then :
$as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
else
ac_func_search_save_LIBS=$LIBS
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error.
Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC
builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */
#ifdef __cplusplus
extern "C"
#endif
char k_hasafs ();
int
main ()
{
return k_hasafs ();
;
return 0;
}
_ACEOF
for ac_lib in '' kafs; do
if test -z "$ac_lib"; then
ac_res="none required"
else
ac_res=-l$ac_lib
LIBS="-l$ac_lib $ac_func_search_save_LIBS"
fi
if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then :
ac_cv_search_k_hasafs=$ac_res
fi
rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \
conftest$ac_exeext
if ${ac_cv_search_k_hasafs+:} false; then :
break
fi
done
if ${ac_cv_search_k_hasafs+:} false; then :
else
ac_cv_search_k_hasafs=no
fi
rm conftest.$ac_ext
LIBS=$ac_func_search_save_LIBS
fi
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_search_k_hasafs" >&5
$as_echo "$ac_cv_search_k_hasafs" >&6; }
ac_res=$ac_cv_search_k_hasafs
if test "$ac_res" != no; then :
test "$ac_res" = "none required" || LIBS="$ac_res $LIBS"
$as_echo "#define USE_AFS 1" >>confdefs.h
fi
ac_fn_c_check_decl "$LINENO" "GSS_C_NT_HOSTBASED_SERVICE" "ac_cv_have_decl_GSS_C_NT_HOSTBASED_SERVICE" "
#ifdef HAVE_GSSAPI_H
# include <gssapi.h>
#elif defined(HAVE_GSSAPI_GSSAPI_H)
# include <gssapi/gssapi.h>
#endif
#ifdef HAVE_GSSAPI_GENERIC_H
# include <gssapi_generic.h>
#elif defined(HAVE_GSSAPI_GSSAPI_GENERIC_H)
# include <gssapi/gssapi_generic.h>
#endif
"
if test "x$ac_cv_have_decl_GSS_C_NT_HOSTBASED_SERVICE" = xyes; then :
ac_have_decl=1
else
ac_have_decl=0
fi
cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
#define HAVE_DECL_GSS_C_NT_HOSTBASED_SERVICE $ac_have_decl
_ACEOF
saved_LIBS="$LIBS"
LIBS="$LIBS $K5LIBS"
for ac_func in krb5_cc_new_unique krb5_get_error_message krb5_free_error_message
do :
as_ac_var=`$as_echo "ac_cv_func_$ac_func" | $as_tr_sh`
ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "$ac_func" "$as_ac_var"
if eval test \"x\$"$as_ac_var"\" = x"yes"; then :
cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
#define `$as_echo "HAVE_$ac_func" | $as_tr_cpp` 1
_ACEOF
fi
done
LIBS="$saved_LIBS"
fi
fi
# Looking for programs, paths and files
PRIVSEP_PATH=/var/empty
# Check whether --with-privsep-path was given.
if test "${with_privsep_path+set}" = set; then :
withval=$with_privsep_path;
if test -n "$withval" && test "x$withval" != "xno" && \
test "x${withval}" != "xyes"; then
PRIVSEP_PATH=$withval
fi
fi
# Check whether --with-xauth was given.
if test "${with_xauth+set}" = set; then :
withval=$with_xauth;
if test -n "$withval" && test "x$withval" != "xno" && \
test "x${withval}" != "xyes"; then
xauth_path=$withval
fi
else
TestPath="$PATH"
TestPath="${TestPath}${PATH_SEPARATOR}/usr/X/bin"
TestPath="${TestPath}${PATH_SEPARATOR}/usr/bin/X11"
TestPath="${TestPath}${PATH_SEPARATOR}/usr/X11R6/bin"
TestPath="${TestPath}${PATH_SEPARATOR}/usr/openwin/bin"
# Extract the first word of "xauth", so it can be a program name with args.
set dummy xauth; ac_word=$2
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for $ac_word" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking for $ac_word... " >&6; }
if ${ac_cv_path_xauth_path+:} false; then :
$as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
else
case $xauth_path in
[\\/]* | ?:[\\/]*)
ac_cv_path_xauth_path="$xauth_path" # Let the user override the test with a path.
;;
*)
as_save_IFS=$IFS; IFS=$PATH_SEPARATOR
for as_dir in $TestPath
do
IFS=$as_save_IFS
test -z "$as_dir" && as_dir=.
for ac_exec_ext in '' $ac_executable_extensions; do
if as_fn_executable_p "$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"; then
ac_cv_path_xauth_path="$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"
$as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: found $as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" >&5
break 2
fi
done
done
IFS=$as_save_IFS
;;
esac
fi
xauth_path=$ac_cv_path_xauth_path
if test -n "$xauth_path"; then
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $xauth_path" >&5
$as_echo "$xauth_path" >&6; }
else
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
$as_echo "no" >&6; }
fi
if (test ! -z "$xauth_path" && test -x "/usr/openwin/bin/xauth") ; then
xauth_path="/usr/openwin/bin/xauth"
fi
fi
STRIP_OPT=-s
# Check whether --enable-strip was given.
if test "${enable_strip+set}" = set; then :
enableval=$enable_strip;
if test "x$enableval" = "xno" ; then
STRIP_OPT=
fi
fi
if test -z "$xauth_path" ; then
XAUTH_PATH="undefined"
else
cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
#define XAUTH_PATH "$xauth_path"
_ACEOF
XAUTH_PATH=$xauth_path
fi
# Check for mail directory
# Check whether --with-maildir was given.
if test "${with_maildir+set}" = set; then :
withval=$with_maildir;
if test "X$withval" != X && test "x$withval" != xno && \
test "x${withval}" != xyes; then
cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
#define MAIL_DIRECTORY "$withval"
_ACEOF
fi
else
if test "X$maildir" != "X"; then
cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
#define MAIL_DIRECTORY "$maildir"
_ACEOF
else
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking Discovering system mail directory" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking Discovering system mail directory... " >&6; }
if test "$cross_compiling" = yes; then :
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: WARNING: cross compiling: use --with-maildir=/path/to/mail" >&5
$as_echo "$as_me: WARNING: cross compiling: use --with-maildir=/path/to/mail" >&2;}
else
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H
#include <paths.h>
#endif
#ifdef HAVE_MAILLOCK_H
#include <maillock.h>
#endif
#define DATA "conftest.maildir"
int
main ()
{
FILE *fd;
int rc;
fd = fopen(DATA,"w");
if(fd == NULL)
exit(1);
#if defined (_PATH_MAILDIR)
if ((rc = fprintf(fd ,"_PATH_MAILDIR:%s\n", _PATH_MAILDIR)) <0)
exit(1);
#elif defined (MAILDIR)
if ((rc = fprintf(fd ,"MAILDIR:%s\n", MAILDIR)) <0)
exit(1);
#elif defined (_PATH_MAIL)
if ((rc = fprintf(fd ,"_PATH_MAIL:%s\n", _PATH_MAIL)) <0)
exit(1);
#else
exit (2);
#endif
exit(0);
;
return 0;
}
_ACEOF
if ac_fn_c_try_run "$LINENO"; then :
maildir_what=`awk -F: '{print $1}' conftest.maildir`
maildir=`awk -F: '{print $2}' conftest.maildir \
| sed 's|/$||'`
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: Using: $maildir from $maildir_what" >&5
$as_echo "Using: $maildir from $maildir_what" >&6; }
if test "x$maildir_what" != "x_PATH_MAILDIR"; then
cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
#define MAIL_DIRECTORY "$maildir"
_ACEOF
fi
else
if test "X$ac_status" = "X2";then
# our test program didn't find it. Default to /var/spool/mail
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: Using: default value of /var/spool/mail" >&5
$as_echo "Using: default value of /var/spool/mail" >&6; }
cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
#define MAIL_DIRECTORY "/var/spool/mail"
_ACEOF
else
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: *** not found ***" >&5
$as_echo "*** not found ***" >&6; }
fi
fi
rm -f core *.core core.conftest.* gmon.out bb.out conftest$ac_exeext \
conftest.$ac_objext conftest.beam conftest.$ac_ext
fi
fi
fi
# maildir
if test ! -z "$cross_compiling" && test "x$cross_compiling" = "xyes"; then
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: WARNING: cross compiling: Disabling /dev/ptmx test" >&5
$as_echo "$as_me: WARNING: cross compiling: Disabling /dev/ptmx test" >&2;}
disable_ptmx_check=yes
fi
if test -z "$no_dev_ptmx" ; then
if test "x$disable_ptmx_check" != "xyes" ; then
as_ac_File=`$as_echo "ac_cv_file_"/dev/ptmx"" | $as_tr_sh`
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for \"/dev/ptmx\"" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking for \"/dev/ptmx\"... " >&6; }
if eval \${$as_ac_File+:} false; then :
$as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
else
test "$cross_compiling" = yes &&
as_fn_error $? "cannot check for file existence when cross compiling" "$LINENO" 5
if test -r ""/dev/ptmx""; then
eval "$as_ac_File=yes"
else
eval "$as_ac_File=no"
fi
fi
eval ac_res=\$$as_ac_File
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_res" >&5
$as_echo "$ac_res" >&6; }
if eval test \"x\$"$as_ac_File"\" = x"yes"; then :
cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
#define HAVE_DEV_PTMX 1
_ACEOF
have_dev_ptmx=1
fi
fi
fi
if test ! -z "$cross_compiling" && test "x$cross_compiling" != "xyes"; then
as_ac_File=`$as_echo "ac_cv_file_"/dev/ptc"" | $as_tr_sh`
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for \"/dev/ptc\"" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking for \"/dev/ptc\"... " >&6; }
if eval \${$as_ac_File+:} false; then :
$as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
else
test "$cross_compiling" = yes &&
as_fn_error $? "cannot check for file existence when cross compiling" "$LINENO" 5
if test -r ""/dev/ptc""; then
eval "$as_ac_File=yes"
else
eval "$as_ac_File=no"
fi
fi
eval ac_res=\$$as_ac_File
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_res" >&5
$as_echo "$ac_res" >&6; }
if eval test \"x\$"$as_ac_File"\" = x"yes"; then :
cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
#define HAVE_DEV_PTS_AND_PTC 1
_ACEOF
have_dev_ptc=1
fi
else
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: WARNING: cross compiling: Disabling /dev/ptc test" >&5
$as_echo "$as_me: WARNING: cross compiling: Disabling /dev/ptc test" >&2;}
fi
# Options from here on. Some of these are preset by platform above
# Check whether --with-mantype was given.
if test "${with_mantype+set}" = set; then :
withval=$with_mantype;
case "$withval" in
man|cat|doc)
MANTYPE=$withval
;;
*)
as_fn_error $? "invalid man type: $withval" "$LINENO" 5
;;
esac
fi
if test -z "$MANTYPE"; then
if ${MANDOC} ${srcdir}/ssh.1 >/dev/null 2>&1; then
MANTYPE=doc
elif ${NROFF} -mdoc ${srcdir}/ssh.1 >/dev/null 2>&1; then
MANTYPE=doc
elif ${NROFF} -man ${srcdir}/ssh.1 >/dev/null 2>&1; then
MANTYPE=man
else
MANTYPE=cat
fi
fi
if test "$MANTYPE" = "doc"; then
mansubdir=man;
else
mansubdir=$MANTYPE;
fi
# Check whether to enable MD5 passwords
MD5_MSG="no"
# Check whether --with-md5-passwords was given.
if test "${with_md5_passwords+set}" = set; then :
withval=$with_md5_passwords;
if test "x$withval" != "xno" ; then
$as_echo "#define HAVE_MD5_PASSWORDS 1" >>confdefs.h
MD5_MSG="yes"
fi
fi
# Whether to disable shadow password support
# Check whether --with-shadow was given.
if test "${with_shadow+set}" = set; then :
withval=$with_shadow;
if test "x$withval" = "xno" ; then
$as_echo "#define DISABLE_SHADOW 1" >>confdefs.h
disable_shadow=yes
fi
fi
if test -z "$disable_shadow" ; then
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking if the systems has expire shadow information" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking if the systems has expire shadow information... " >&6; }
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <shadow.h>
struct spwd sp;
int
main ()
{
sp.sp_expire = sp.sp_lstchg = sp.sp_inact = 0;
;
return 0;
}
_ACEOF
if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then :
sp_expire_available=yes
fi
rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
if test "x$sp_expire_available" = "xyes" ; then
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
$as_echo "yes" >&6; }
$as_echo "#define HAS_SHADOW_EXPIRE 1" >>confdefs.h
else
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
$as_echo "no" >&6; }
fi
fi
# Use ip address instead of hostname in $DISPLAY
if test ! -z "$IPADDR_IN_DISPLAY" ; then
DISPLAY_HACK_MSG="yes"
$as_echo "#define IPADDR_IN_DISPLAY 1" >>confdefs.h
else
DISPLAY_HACK_MSG="no"
# Check whether --with-ipaddr-display was given.
if test "${with_ipaddr_display+set}" = set; then :
withval=$with_ipaddr_display;
if test "x$withval" != "xno" ; then
$as_echo "#define IPADDR_IN_DISPLAY 1" >>confdefs.h
DISPLAY_HACK_MSG="yes"
fi
fi
fi
# check for /etc/default/login and use it if present.
# Check whether --enable-etc-default-login was given.
if test "${enable_etc_default_login+set}" = set; then :
enableval=$enable_etc_default_login; if test "x$enableval" = "xno"; then
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: /etc/default/login handling disabled" >&5
$as_echo "$as_me: /etc/default/login handling disabled" >&6;}
etc_default_login=no
else
etc_default_login=yes
fi
else
if test ! -z "$cross_compiling" && test "x$cross_compiling" = "xyes";
then
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: WARNING: cross compiling: not checking /etc/default/login" >&5
$as_echo "$as_me: WARNING: cross compiling: not checking /etc/default/login" >&2;}
etc_default_login=no
else
etc_default_login=yes
fi
fi
if test "x$etc_default_login" != "xno"; then
as_ac_File=`$as_echo "ac_cv_file_"/etc/default/login"" | $as_tr_sh`
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for \"/etc/default/login\"" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking for \"/etc/default/login\"... " >&6; }
if eval \${$as_ac_File+:} false; then :
$as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
else
test "$cross_compiling" = yes &&
as_fn_error $? "cannot check for file existence when cross compiling" "$LINENO" 5
if test -r ""/etc/default/login""; then
eval "$as_ac_File=yes"
else
eval "$as_ac_File=no"
fi
fi
eval ac_res=\$$as_ac_File
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_res" >&5
$as_echo "$ac_res" >&6; }
if eval test \"x\$"$as_ac_File"\" = x"yes"; then :
external_path_file=/etc/default/login
fi
if test "x$external_path_file" = "x/etc/default/login"; then
$as_echo "#define HAVE_ETC_DEFAULT_LOGIN 1" >>confdefs.h
fi
fi
if test $ac_cv_func_login_getcapbool = "yes" && \
test $ac_cv_header_login_cap_h = "yes" ; then
external_path_file=/etc/login.conf
fi
# Whether to mess with the default path
SERVER_PATH_MSG="(default)"
# Check whether --with-default-path was given.
if test "${with_default_path+set}" = set; then :
withval=$with_default_path;
if test "x$external_path_file" = "x/etc/login.conf" ; then
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: WARNING:
--with-default-path=PATH has no effect on this system.
Edit /etc/login.conf instead." >&5
$as_echo "$as_me: WARNING:
--with-default-path=PATH has no effect on this system.
Edit /etc/login.conf instead." >&2;}
elif test "x$withval" != "xno" ; then
if test ! -z "$external_path_file" ; then
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: WARNING:
--with-default-path=PATH will only be used if PATH is not defined in
$external_path_file ." >&5
$as_echo "$as_me: WARNING:
--with-default-path=PATH will only be used if PATH is not defined in
$external_path_file ." >&2;}
fi
user_path="$withval"
SERVER_PATH_MSG="$withval"
fi
else
if test "x$external_path_file" = "x/etc/login.conf" ; then
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: WARNING: Make sure the path to scp is in /etc/login.conf" >&5
$as_echo "$as_me: WARNING: Make sure the path to scp is in /etc/login.conf" >&2;}
else
if test ! -z "$external_path_file" ; then
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: WARNING:
If PATH is defined in $external_path_file, ensure the path to scp is included,
otherwise scp will not work." >&5
$as_echo "$as_me: WARNING:
If PATH is defined in $external_path_file, ensure the path to scp is included,
otherwise scp will not work." >&2;}
fi
if test "$cross_compiling" = yes; then :
user_path="/usr/bin:/bin:/usr/sbin:/sbin"
else
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
/* find out what STDPATH is */
#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
#ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H
# include <paths.h>
#endif
#ifndef _PATH_STDPATH
# ifdef _PATH_USERPATH /* Irix */
# define _PATH_STDPATH _PATH_USERPATH
# else
# define _PATH_STDPATH "/usr/bin:/bin:/usr/sbin:/sbin"
# endif
#endif
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/stat.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
#define DATA "conftest.stdpath"
int
main ()
{
FILE *fd;
int rc;
fd = fopen(DATA,"w");
if(fd == NULL)
exit(1);
if ((rc = fprintf(fd,"%s", _PATH_STDPATH)) < 0)
exit(1);
exit(0);
;
return 0;
}
_ACEOF
if ac_fn_c_try_run "$LINENO"; then :
user_path=`cat conftest.stdpath`
else
user_path="/usr/bin:/bin:/usr/sbin:/sbin"
fi
rm -f core *.core core.conftest.* gmon.out bb.out conftest$ac_exeext \
conftest.$ac_objext conftest.beam conftest.$ac_ext
fi
# make sure $bindir is in USER_PATH so scp will work
t_bindir="${bindir}"
while echo "${t_bindir}" | egrep '\$\{|NONE/' >/dev/null 2>&1; do
t_bindir=`eval echo ${t_bindir}`
case $t_bindir in
NONE/*) t_bindir=`echo $t_bindir | sed "s~NONE~$prefix~"` ;;
esac
case $t_bindir in
NONE/*) t_bindir=`echo $t_bindir | sed "s~NONE~$ac_default_prefix~"` ;;
esac
done
echo $user_path | grep ":$t_bindir" > /dev/null 2>&1
if test $? -ne 0 ; then
echo $user_path | grep "^$t_bindir" > /dev/null 2>&1
if test $? -ne 0 ; then
user_path=$user_path:$t_bindir
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: Adding $t_bindir to USER_PATH so scp will work" >&5
$as_echo "Adding $t_bindir to USER_PATH so scp will work" >&6; }
fi
fi
fi
fi
if test "x$external_path_file" != "x/etc/login.conf" ; then
cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
#define USER_PATH "$user_path"
_ACEOF
fi
# Set superuser path separately to user path
# Check whether --with-superuser-path was given.
if test "${with_superuser_path+set}" = set; then :
withval=$with_superuser_path;
if test -n "$withval" && test "x$withval" != "xno" && \
test "x${withval}" != "xyes"; then
cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
#define SUPERUSER_PATH "$withval"
_ACEOF
superuser_path=$withval
fi
fi
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking if we need to convert IPv4 in IPv6-mapped addresses" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking if we need to convert IPv4 in IPv6-mapped addresses... " >&6; }
IPV4_IN6_HACK_MSG="no"
# Check whether --with-4in6 was given.
if test "${with_4in6+set}" = set; then :
withval=$with_4in6;
if test "x$withval" != "xno" ; then
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
$as_echo "yes" >&6; }
$as_echo "#define IPV4_IN_IPV6 1" >>confdefs.h
IPV4_IN6_HACK_MSG="yes"
else
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
$as_echo "no" >&6; }
fi
else
if test "x$inet6_default_4in6" = "xyes"; then
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes (default)" >&5
$as_echo "yes (default)" >&6; }
$as_echo "#define IPV4_IN_IPV6 1" >>confdefs.h
IPV4_IN6_HACK_MSG="yes"
else
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no (default)" >&5
$as_echo "no (default)" >&6; }
fi
fi
# Whether to enable BSD auth support
BSD_AUTH_MSG=no
# Check whether --with-bsd-auth was given.
if test "${with_bsd_auth+set}" = set; then :
withval=$with_bsd_auth;
if test "x$withval" != "xno" ; then
$as_echo "#define BSD_AUTH 1" >>confdefs.h
BSD_AUTH_MSG=yes
fi
fi
# Where to place sshd.pid
piddir=/var/run
# make sure the directory exists
if test ! -d $piddir ; then
piddir=`eval echo ${sysconfdir}`
case $piddir in
NONE/*) piddir=`echo $piddir | sed "s~NONE~$ac_default_prefix~"` ;;
esac
fi
# Check whether --with-pid-dir was given.
if test "${with_pid_dir+set}" = set; then :
withval=$with_pid_dir;
if test -n "$withval" && test "x$withval" != "xno" && \
test "x${withval}" != "xyes"; then
piddir=$withval
if test ! -d $piddir ; then
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: WARNING: ** no $piddir directory on this system **" >&5
$as_echo "$as_me: WARNING: ** no $piddir directory on this system **" >&2;}
fi
fi
fi
cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
#define _PATH_SSH_PIDDIR "$piddir"
_ACEOF
# Check whether --enable-lastlog was given.
if test "${enable_lastlog+set}" = set; then :
enableval=$enable_lastlog;
if test "x$enableval" = "xno" ; then
$as_echo "#define DISABLE_LASTLOG 1" >>confdefs.h
fi
fi
# Check whether --enable-utmp was given.
if test "${enable_utmp+set}" = set; then :
enableval=$enable_utmp;
if test "x$enableval" = "xno" ; then
$as_echo "#define DISABLE_UTMP 1" >>confdefs.h
fi
fi
# Check whether --enable-utmpx was given.
if test "${enable_utmpx+set}" = set; then :
enableval=$enable_utmpx;
if test "x$enableval" = "xno" ; then
$as_echo "#define DISABLE_UTMPX 1" >>confdefs.h
fi
fi
# Check whether --enable-wtmp was given.
if test "${enable_wtmp+set}" = set; then :
enableval=$enable_wtmp;
if test "x$enableval" = "xno" ; then
$as_echo "#define DISABLE_WTMP 1" >>confdefs.h
fi
fi
# Check whether --enable-wtmpx was given.
if test "${enable_wtmpx+set}" = set; then :
enableval=$enable_wtmpx;
if test "x$enableval" = "xno" ; then
$as_echo "#define DISABLE_WTMPX 1" >>confdefs.h
fi
fi
# Check whether --enable-libutil was given.
if test "${enable_libutil+set}" = set; then :
enableval=$enable_libutil;
if test "x$enableval" = "xno" ; then
$as_echo "#define DISABLE_LOGIN 1" >>confdefs.h
fi
fi
# Check whether --enable-pututline was given.
if test "${enable_pututline+set}" = set; then :
enableval=$enable_pututline;
if test "x$enableval" = "xno" ; then
$as_echo "#define DISABLE_PUTUTLINE 1" >>confdefs.h
fi
fi
# Check whether --enable-pututxline was given.
if test "${enable_pututxline+set}" = set; then :
enableval=$enable_pututxline;
if test "x$enableval" = "xno" ; then
$as_echo "#define DISABLE_PUTUTXLINE 1" >>confdefs.h
fi
fi
# Check whether --with-lastlog was given.
if test "${with_lastlog+set}" = set; then :
withval=$with_lastlog;
if test "x$withval" = "xno" ; then
$as_echo "#define DISABLE_LASTLOG 1" >>confdefs.h
elif test -n "$withval" && test "x${withval}" != "xyes"; then
conf_lastlog_location=$withval
fi
fi
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking if your system defines LASTLOG_FILE" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking if your system defines LASTLOG_FILE... " >&6; }
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <utmp.h>
#ifdef HAVE_LASTLOG_H
# include <lastlog.h>
#endif
#ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H
# include <paths.h>
#endif
#ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_H
# include <login.h>
#endif
int
main ()
{
char *lastlog = LASTLOG_FILE;
;
return 0;
}
_ACEOF
if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then :
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
$as_echo "yes" >&6; }
else
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
$as_echo "no" >&6; }
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking if your system defines _PATH_LASTLOG" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking if your system defines _PATH_LASTLOG... " >&6; }
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <utmp.h>
#ifdef HAVE_LASTLOG_H
# include <lastlog.h>
#endif
#ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H
# include <paths.h>
#endif
int
main ()
{
char *lastlog = _PATH_LASTLOG;
;
return 0;
}
_ACEOF
if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then :
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
$as_echo "yes" >&6; }
else
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
$as_echo "no" >&6; }
system_lastlog_path=no
fi
rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
fi
rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
if test -z "$conf_lastlog_location"; then
if test x"$system_lastlog_path" = x"no" ; then
for f in /var/log/lastlog /usr/adm/lastlog /var/adm/lastlog /etc/security/lastlog ; do
if (test -d "$f" || test -f "$f") ; then
conf_lastlog_location=$f
fi
done
if test -z "$conf_lastlog_location"; then
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: WARNING: ** Cannot find lastlog **" >&5
$as_echo "$as_me: WARNING: ** Cannot find lastlog **" >&2;}
fi
fi
fi
if test -n "$conf_lastlog_location"; then
cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
#define CONF_LASTLOG_FILE "$conf_lastlog_location"
_ACEOF
fi
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking if your system defines UTMP_FILE" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking if your system defines UTMP_FILE... " >&6; }
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <utmp.h>
#ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H
# include <paths.h>
#endif
int
main ()
{
char *utmp = UTMP_FILE;
;
return 0;
}
_ACEOF
if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then :
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
$as_echo "yes" >&6; }
else
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
$as_echo "no" >&6; }
system_utmp_path=no
fi
rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
if test -z "$conf_utmp_location"; then
if test x"$system_utmp_path" = x"no" ; then
for f in /etc/utmp /usr/adm/utmp /var/run/utmp; do
if test -f $f ; then
conf_utmp_location=$f
fi
done
if test -z "$conf_utmp_location"; then
$as_echo "#define DISABLE_UTMP 1" >>confdefs.h
fi
fi
fi
if test -n "$conf_utmp_location"; then
cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
#define CONF_UTMP_FILE "$conf_utmp_location"
_ACEOF
fi
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking if your system defines WTMP_FILE" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking if your system defines WTMP_FILE... " >&6; }
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <utmp.h>
#ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H
# include <paths.h>
#endif
int
main ()
{
char *wtmp = WTMP_FILE;
;
return 0;
}
_ACEOF
if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then :
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
$as_echo "yes" >&6; }
else
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
$as_echo "no" >&6; }
system_wtmp_path=no
fi
rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
if test -z "$conf_wtmp_location"; then
if test x"$system_wtmp_path" = x"no" ; then
for f in /usr/adm/wtmp /var/log/wtmp; do
if test -f $f ; then
conf_wtmp_location=$f
fi
done
if test -z "$conf_wtmp_location"; then
$as_echo "#define DISABLE_WTMP 1" >>confdefs.h
fi
fi
fi
if test -n "$conf_wtmp_location"; then
cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
#define CONF_WTMP_FILE "$conf_wtmp_location"
_ACEOF
fi
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking if your system defines WTMPX_FILE" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking if your system defines WTMPX_FILE... " >&6; }
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <utmp.h>
#ifdef HAVE_UTMPX_H
#include <utmpx.h>
#endif
#ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H
# include <paths.h>
#endif
int
main ()
{
char *wtmpx = WTMPX_FILE;
;
return 0;
}
_ACEOF
if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then :
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
$as_echo "yes" >&6; }
else
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
$as_echo "no" >&6; }
system_wtmpx_path=no
fi
rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
if test -z "$conf_wtmpx_location"; then
if test x"$system_wtmpx_path" = x"no" ; then
$as_echo "#define DISABLE_WTMPX 1" >>confdefs.h
fi
else
cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
#define CONF_WTMPX_FILE "$conf_wtmpx_location"
_ACEOF
fi
if test ! -z "$blibpath" ; then
LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS $blibflags$blibpath"
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: WARNING: Please check and edit blibpath in LDFLAGS in Makefile" >&5
$as_echo "$as_me: WARNING: Please check and edit blibpath in LDFLAGS in Makefile" >&2;}
fi
ac_fn_c_check_member "$LINENO" "struct lastlog" "ll_line" "ac_cv_member_struct_lastlog_ll_line" "
#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TYPES_H
#include <sys/types.h>
#endif
#ifdef HAVE_UTMP_H
#include <utmp.h>
#endif
#ifdef HAVE_UTMPX_H
#include <utmpx.h>
#endif
#ifdef HAVE_LASTLOG_H
#include <lastlog.h>
#endif
"
if test "x$ac_cv_member_struct_lastlog_ll_line" = xyes; then :
else
if test x$SKIP_DISABLE_LASTLOG_DEFINE != "xyes" ; then
$as_echo "#define DISABLE_LASTLOG 1" >>confdefs.h
fi
fi
ac_fn_c_check_member "$LINENO" "struct utmp" "ut_line" "ac_cv_member_struct_utmp_ut_line" "
#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TYPES_H
#include <sys/types.h>
#endif
#ifdef HAVE_UTMP_H
#include <utmp.h>
#endif
#ifdef HAVE_UTMPX_H
#include <utmpx.h>
#endif
#ifdef HAVE_LASTLOG_H
#include <lastlog.h>
#endif
"
if test "x$ac_cv_member_struct_utmp_ut_line" = xyes; then :
else
$as_echo "#define DISABLE_UTMP 1" >>confdefs.h
$as_echo "#define DISABLE_WTMP 1" >>confdefs.h
fi
CFLAGS="$CFLAGS $werror_flags"
if test "x$ac_cv_func_getaddrinfo" != "xyes" ; then
TEST_SSH_IPV6=no
else
TEST_SSH_IPV6=yes
fi
ac_fn_c_check_decl "$LINENO" "BROKEN_GETADDRINFO" "ac_cv_have_decl_BROKEN_GETADDRINFO" "$ac_includes_default"
if test "x$ac_cv_have_decl_BROKEN_GETADDRINFO" = xyes; then :
TEST_SSH_IPV6=no
fi
TEST_SSH_IPV6=$TEST_SSH_IPV6
TEST_SSH_UTF8=$TEST_SSH_UTF8
TEST_MALLOC_OPTIONS=$TEST_MALLOC_OPTIONS
UNSUPPORTED_ALGORITHMS=$unsupported_algorithms
DEPEND=$(cat $srcdir/.depend)
CFLAGS="${CFLAGS} ${CFLAGS_AFTER}"
LDFLAGS="${LDFLAGS} ${LDFLAGS_AFTER}"
# Make a copy of CFLAGS/LDFLAGS without PIE options.
LDFLAGS_NOPIE=`echo "$LDFLAGS" | sed 's/ -pie//'`
CFLAGS_NOPIE=`echo "$CFLAGS" | sed 's/ -fPIE//'`
ac_config_files="$ac_config_files Makefile buildpkg.sh opensshd.init openssh.xml openbsd-compat/Makefile openbsd-compat/regress/Makefile survey.sh"
cat >confcache <<\_ACEOF
# This file is a shell script that caches the results of configure
# tests run on this system so they can be shared between configure
# scripts and configure runs, see configure's option --config-cache.
# It is not useful on other systems. If it contains results you don't
# want to keep, you may remove or edit it.
#
# config.status only pays attention to the cache file if you give it
# the --recheck option to rerun configure.
#
# `ac_cv_env_foo' variables (set or unset) will be overridden when
# loading this file, other *unset* `ac_cv_foo' will be assigned the
# following values.
_ACEOF
# The following way of writing the cache mishandles newlines in values,
# but we know of no workaround that is simple, portable, and efficient.
# So, we kill variables containing newlines.
# Ultrix sh set writes to stderr and can't be redirected directly,
# and sets the high bit in the cache file unless we assign to the vars.
(
for ac_var in `(set) 2>&1 | sed -n 's/^\([a-zA-Z_][a-zA-Z0-9_]*\)=.*/\1/p'`; do
eval ac_val=\$$ac_var
case $ac_val in #(
*${as_nl}*)
case $ac_var in #(
*_cv_*) { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: WARNING: cache variable $ac_var contains a newline" >&5
$as_echo "$as_me: WARNING: cache variable $ac_var contains a newline" >&2;} ;;
esac
case $ac_var in #(
_ | IFS | as_nl) ;; #(
BASH_ARGV | BASH_SOURCE) eval $ac_var= ;; #(
*) { eval $ac_var=; unset $ac_var;} ;;
esac ;;
esac
done
(set) 2>&1 |
case $as_nl`(ac_space=' '; set) 2>&1` in #(
*${as_nl}ac_space=\ *)
# `set' does not quote correctly, so add quotes: double-quote
# substitution turns \\\\ into \\, and sed turns \\ into \.
sed -n \
"s/'/'\\\\''/g;
s/^\\([_$as_cr_alnum]*_cv_[_$as_cr_alnum]*\\)=\\(.*\\)/\\1='\\2'/p"
;; #(
*)
# `set' quotes correctly as required by POSIX, so do not add quotes.
sed -n "/^[_$as_cr_alnum]*_cv_[_$as_cr_alnum]*=/p"
;;
esac |
sort
) |
sed '
/^ac_cv_env_/b end
t clear
:clear
s/^\([^=]*\)=\(.*[{}].*\)$/test "${\1+set}" = set || &/
t end
s/^\([^=]*\)=\(.*\)$/\1=${\1=\2}/
:end' >>confcache
if diff "$cache_file" confcache >/dev/null 2>&1; then :; else
if test -w "$cache_file"; then
if test "x$cache_file" != "x/dev/null"; then
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: updating cache $cache_file" >&5
$as_echo "$as_me: updating cache $cache_file" >&6;}
if test ! -f "$cache_file" || test -h "$cache_file"; then
cat confcache >"$cache_file"
else
case $cache_file in #(
*/* | ?:*)
mv -f confcache "$cache_file"$$ &&
mv -f "$cache_file"$$ "$cache_file" ;; #(
*)
mv -f confcache "$cache_file" ;;
esac
fi
fi
else
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: not updating unwritable cache $cache_file" >&5
$as_echo "$as_me: not updating unwritable cache $cache_file" >&6;}
fi
fi
rm -f confcache
test "x$prefix" = xNONE && prefix=$ac_default_prefix
# Let make expand exec_prefix.
test "x$exec_prefix" = xNONE && exec_prefix='${prefix}'
DEFS=-DHAVE_CONFIG_H
ac_libobjs=
ac_ltlibobjs=
U=
for ac_i in : $LIBOBJS; do test "x$ac_i" = x: && continue
# 1. Remove the extension, and $U if already installed.
ac_script='s/\$U\././;s/\.o$//;s/\.obj$//'
ac_i=`$as_echo "$ac_i" | sed "$ac_script"`
# 2. Prepend LIBOBJDIR. When used with automake>=1.10 LIBOBJDIR
# will be set to the directory where LIBOBJS objects are built.
as_fn_append ac_libobjs " \${LIBOBJDIR}$ac_i\$U.$ac_objext"
as_fn_append ac_ltlibobjs " \${LIBOBJDIR}$ac_i"'$U.lo'
done
LIBOBJS=$ac_libobjs
LTLIBOBJS=$ac_ltlibobjs
: "${CONFIG_STATUS=./config.status}"
ac_write_fail=0
ac_clean_files_save=$ac_clean_files
ac_clean_files="$ac_clean_files $CONFIG_STATUS"
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: creating $CONFIG_STATUS" >&5
$as_echo "$as_me: creating $CONFIG_STATUS" >&6;}
as_write_fail=0
cat >$CONFIG_STATUS <<_ASEOF || as_write_fail=1
#! $SHELL
# Generated by $as_me.
# Run this file to recreate the current configuration.
# Compiler output produced by configure, useful for debugging
# configure, is in config.log if it exists.
debug=false
ac_cs_recheck=false
ac_cs_silent=false
SHELL=\${CONFIG_SHELL-$SHELL}
export SHELL
_ASEOF
cat >>$CONFIG_STATUS <<\_ASEOF || as_write_fail=1
## -------------------- ##
## M4sh Initialization. ##
## -------------------- ##
# Be more Bourne compatible
DUALCASE=1; export DUALCASE # for MKS sh
if test -n "${ZSH_VERSION+set}" && (emulate sh) >/dev/null 2>&1; then :
emulate sh
NULLCMD=:
# Pre-4.2 versions of Zsh do word splitting on ${1+"$@"}, which
# is contrary to our usage. Disable this feature.
alias -g '${1+"$@"}'='"$@"'
setopt NO_GLOB_SUBST
else
case `(set -o) 2>/dev/null` in #(
*posix*) :
set -o posix ;; #(
*) :
;;
esac
fi
as_nl='
'
export as_nl
# Printing a long string crashes Solaris 7 /usr/bin/printf.
as_echo='\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\'
as_echo=$as_echo$as_echo$as_echo$as_echo$as_echo
as_echo=$as_echo$as_echo$as_echo$as_echo$as_echo$as_echo
# Prefer a ksh shell builtin over an external printf program on Solaris,
# but without wasting forks for bash or zsh.
if test -z "$BASH_VERSION$ZSH_VERSION" \
&& (test "X`print -r -- $as_echo`" = "X$as_echo") 2>/dev/null; then
as_echo='print -r --'
as_echo_n='print -rn --'
elif (test "X`printf %s $as_echo`" = "X$as_echo") 2>/dev/null; then
as_echo='printf %s\n'
as_echo_n='printf %s'
else
if test "X`(/usr/ucb/echo -n -n $as_echo) 2>/dev/null`" = "X-n $as_echo"; then
as_echo_body='eval /usr/ucb/echo -n "$1$as_nl"'
as_echo_n='/usr/ucb/echo -n'
else
as_echo_body='eval expr "X$1" : "X\\(.*\\)"'
as_echo_n_body='eval
arg=$1;
case $arg in #(
*"$as_nl"*)
expr "X$arg" : "X\\(.*\\)$as_nl";
arg=`expr "X$arg" : ".*$as_nl\\(.*\\)"`;;
esac;
expr "X$arg" : "X\\(.*\\)" | tr -d "$as_nl"
'
export as_echo_n_body
as_echo_n='sh -c $as_echo_n_body as_echo'
fi
export as_echo_body
as_echo='sh -c $as_echo_body as_echo'
fi
# The user is always right.
if test "${PATH_SEPARATOR+set}" != set; then
PATH_SEPARATOR=:
(PATH='/bin;/bin'; FPATH=$PATH; sh -c :) >/dev/null 2>&1 && {
(PATH='/bin:/bin'; FPATH=$PATH; sh -c :) >/dev/null 2>&1 ||
PATH_SEPARATOR=';'
}
fi
# IFS
# We need space, tab and new line, in precisely that order. Quoting is
# there to prevent editors from complaining about space-tab.
# (If _AS_PATH_WALK were called with IFS unset, it would disable word
# splitting by setting IFS to empty value.)
IFS=" "" $as_nl"
# Find who we are. Look in the path if we contain no directory separator.
as_myself=
case $0 in #((
*[\\/]* ) as_myself=$0 ;;
*) as_save_IFS=$IFS; IFS=$PATH_SEPARATOR
for as_dir in $PATH
do
IFS=$as_save_IFS
test -z "$as_dir" && as_dir=.
test -r "$as_dir/$0" && as_myself=$as_dir/$0 && break
done
IFS=$as_save_IFS
;;
esac
# We did not find ourselves, most probably we were run as `sh COMMAND'
# in which case we are not to be found in the path.
if test "x$as_myself" = x; then
as_myself=$0
fi
if test ! -f "$as_myself"; then
$as_echo "$as_myself: error: cannot find myself; rerun with an absolute file name" >&2
exit 1
fi
# Unset variables that we do not need and which cause bugs (e.g. in
# pre-3.0 UWIN ksh). But do not cause bugs in bash 2.01; the "|| exit 1"
# suppresses any "Segmentation fault" message there. '((' could
# trigger a bug in pdksh 5.2.14.
for as_var in BASH_ENV ENV MAIL MAILPATH
do eval test x\${$as_var+set} = xset \
&& ( (unset $as_var) || exit 1) >/dev/null 2>&1 && unset $as_var || :
done
PS1='$ '
PS2='> '
PS4='+ '
# NLS nuisances.
LC_ALL=C
export LC_ALL
LANGUAGE=C
export LANGUAGE
# CDPATH.
(unset CDPATH) >/dev/null 2>&1 && unset CDPATH
# as_fn_error STATUS ERROR [LINENO LOG_FD]
# ----------------------------------------
# Output "`basename $0`: error: ERROR" to stderr. If LINENO and LOG_FD are
# provided, also output the error to LOG_FD, referencing LINENO. Then exit the
# script with STATUS, using 1 if that was 0.
as_fn_error ()
{
as_status=$1; test $as_status -eq 0 && as_status=1
if test "$4"; then
as_lineno=${as_lineno-"$3"} as_lineno_stack=as_lineno_stack=$as_lineno_stack
$as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: error: $2" >&$4
fi
$as_echo "$as_me: error: $2" >&2
as_fn_exit $as_status
} # as_fn_error
# as_fn_set_status STATUS
# -----------------------
# Set $? to STATUS, without forking.
as_fn_set_status ()
{
return $1
} # as_fn_set_status
# as_fn_exit STATUS
# -----------------
# Exit the shell with STATUS, even in a "trap 0" or "set -e" context.
as_fn_exit ()
{
set +e
as_fn_set_status $1
exit $1
} # as_fn_exit
# as_fn_unset VAR
# ---------------
# Portably unset VAR.
as_fn_unset ()
{
{ eval $1=; unset $1;}
}
as_unset=as_fn_unset
# as_fn_append VAR VALUE
# ----------------------
# Append the text in VALUE to the end of the definition contained in VAR. Take
# advantage of any shell optimizations that allow amortized linear growth over
# repeated appends, instead of the typical quadratic growth present in naive
# implementations.
if (eval "as_var=1; as_var+=2; test x\$as_var = x12") 2>/dev/null; then :
eval 'as_fn_append ()
{
eval $1+=\$2
}'
else
as_fn_append ()
{
eval $1=\$$1\$2
}
fi # as_fn_append
# as_fn_arith ARG...
# ------------------
# Perform arithmetic evaluation on the ARGs, and store the result in the
# global $as_val. Take advantage of shells that can avoid forks. The arguments
# must be portable across $(()) and expr.
if (eval "test \$(( 1 + 1 )) = 2") 2>/dev/null; then :
eval 'as_fn_arith ()
{
as_val=$(( $* ))
}'
else
as_fn_arith ()
{
as_val=`expr "$@" || test $? -eq 1`
}
fi # as_fn_arith
if expr a : '\(a\)' >/dev/null 2>&1 &&
test "X`expr 00001 : '.*\(...\)'`" = X001; then
as_expr=expr
else
as_expr=false
fi
if (basename -- /) >/dev/null 2>&1 && test "X`basename -- / 2>&1`" = "X/"; then
as_basename=basename
else
as_basename=false
fi
if (as_dir=`dirname -- /` && test "X$as_dir" = X/) >/dev/null 2>&1; then
as_dirname=dirname
else
as_dirname=false
fi
as_me=`$as_basename -- "$0" ||
$as_expr X/"$0" : '.*/\([^/][^/]*\)/*$' \| \
X"$0" : 'X\(//\)$' \| \
X"$0" : 'X\(/\)' \| . 2>/dev/null ||
$as_echo X/"$0" |
sed '/^.*\/\([^/][^/]*\)\/*$/{
s//\1/
q
}
/^X\/\(\/\/\)$/{
s//\1/
q
}
/^X\/\(\/\).*/{
s//\1/
q
}
s/.*/./; q'`
# Avoid depending upon Character Ranges.
as_cr_letters='abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz'
as_cr_LETTERS='ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ'
as_cr_Letters=$as_cr_letters$as_cr_LETTERS
as_cr_digits='0123456789'
as_cr_alnum=$as_cr_Letters$as_cr_digits
ECHO_C= ECHO_N= ECHO_T=
case `echo -n x` in #(((((
-n*)
case `echo 'xy\c'` in
*c*) ECHO_T=' ';; # ECHO_T is single tab character.
xy) ECHO_C='\c';;
*) echo `echo ksh88 bug on AIX 6.1` > /dev/null
ECHO_T=' ';;
esac;;
*)
ECHO_N='-n';;
esac
rm -f conf$$ conf$$.exe conf$$.file
if test -d conf$$.dir; then
rm -f conf$$.dir/conf$$.file
else
rm -f conf$$.dir
mkdir conf$$.dir 2>/dev/null
fi
if (echo >conf$$.file) 2>/dev/null; then
if ln -s conf$$.file conf$$ 2>/dev/null; then
as_ln_s='ln -s'
# ... but there are two gotchas:
# 1) On MSYS, both `ln -s file dir' and `ln file dir' fail.
# 2) DJGPP < 2.04 has no symlinks; `ln -s' creates a wrapper executable.
# In both cases, we have to default to `cp -pR'.
ln -s conf$$.file conf$$.dir 2>/dev/null && test ! -f conf$$.exe ||
as_ln_s='cp -pR'
elif ln conf$$.file conf$$ 2>/dev/null; then
as_ln_s=ln
else
as_ln_s='cp -pR'
fi
else
as_ln_s='cp -pR'
fi
rm -f conf$$ conf$$.exe conf$$.dir/conf$$.file conf$$.file
rmdir conf$$.dir 2>/dev/null
# as_fn_mkdir_p
# -------------
# Create "$as_dir" as a directory, including parents if necessary.
as_fn_mkdir_p ()
{
case $as_dir in #(
-*) as_dir=./$as_dir;;
esac
test -d "$as_dir" || eval $as_mkdir_p || {
as_dirs=
while :; do
case $as_dir in #(
*\'*) as_qdir=`$as_echo "$as_dir" | sed "s/'/'\\\\\\\\''/g"`;; #'(
*) as_qdir=$as_dir;;
esac
as_dirs="'$as_qdir' $as_dirs"
as_dir=`$as_dirname -- "$as_dir" ||
$as_expr X"$as_dir" : 'X\(.*[^/]\)//*[^/][^/]*/*$' \| \
X"$as_dir" : 'X\(//\)[^/]' \| \
X"$as_dir" : 'X\(//\)$' \| \
X"$as_dir" : 'X\(/\)' \| . 2>/dev/null ||
$as_echo X"$as_dir" |
sed '/^X\(.*[^/]\)\/\/*[^/][^/]*\/*$/{
s//\1/
q
}
/^X\(\/\/\)[^/].*/{
s//\1/
q
}
/^X\(\/\/\)$/{
s//\1/
q
}
/^X\(\/\).*/{
s//\1/
q
}
s/.*/./; q'`
test -d "$as_dir" && break
done
test -z "$as_dirs" || eval "mkdir $as_dirs"
} || test -d "$as_dir" || as_fn_error $? "cannot create directory $as_dir"
} # as_fn_mkdir_p
if mkdir -p . 2>/dev/null; then
as_mkdir_p='mkdir -p "$as_dir"'
else
test -d ./-p && rmdir ./-p
as_mkdir_p=false
fi
# as_fn_executable_p FILE
# -----------------------
# Test if FILE is an executable regular file.
as_fn_executable_p ()
{
test -f "$1" && test -x "$1"
} # as_fn_executable_p
as_test_x='test -x'
as_executable_p=as_fn_executable_p
# Sed expression to map a string onto a valid CPP name.
as_tr_cpp="eval sed 'y%*$as_cr_letters%P$as_cr_LETTERS%;s%[^_$as_cr_alnum]%_%g'"
# Sed expression to map a string onto a valid variable name.
as_tr_sh="eval sed 'y%*+%pp%;s%[^_$as_cr_alnum]%_%g'"
exec 6>&1
## ----------------------------------- ##
## Main body of $CONFIG_STATUS script. ##
## ----------------------------------- ##
_ASEOF
test $as_write_fail = 0 && chmod +x $CONFIG_STATUS || ac_write_fail=1
cat >>$CONFIG_STATUS <<\_ACEOF || ac_write_fail=1
# Save the log message, to keep $0 and so on meaningful, and to
# report actual input values of CONFIG_FILES etc. instead of their
# values after options handling.
ac_log="
This file was extended by OpenSSH $as_me Portable, which was
generated by GNU Autoconf 2.69. Invocation command line was
CONFIG_FILES = $CONFIG_FILES
CONFIG_HEADERS = $CONFIG_HEADERS
CONFIG_LINKS = $CONFIG_LINKS
CONFIG_COMMANDS = $CONFIG_COMMANDS
$ $0 $@
on `(hostname || uname -n) 2>/dev/null | sed 1q`
"
_ACEOF
case $ac_config_files in *"
"*) set x $ac_config_files; shift; ac_config_files=$*;;
esac
case $ac_config_headers in *"
"*) set x $ac_config_headers; shift; ac_config_headers=$*;;
esac
cat >>$CONFIG_STATUS <<_ACEOF || ac_write_fail=1
# Files that config.status was made for.
config_files="$ac_config_files"
config_headers="$ac_config_headers"
_ACEOF
cat >>$CONFIG_STATUS <<\_ACEOF || ac_write_fail=1
ac_cs_usage="\
\`$as_me' instantiates files and other configuration actions
from templates according to the current configuration. Unless the files
and actions are specified as TAGs, all are instantiated by default.
Usage: $0 [OPTION]... [TAG]...
-h, --help print this help, then exit
-V, --version print version number and configuration settings, then exit
--config print configuration, then exit
-q, --quiet, --silent
do not print progress messages
-d, --debug don't remove temporary files
--recheck update $as_me by reconfiguring in the same conditions
--file=FILE[:TEMPLATE]
instantiate the configuration file FILE
--header=FILE[:TEMPLATE]
instantiate the configuration header FILE
Configuration files:
$config_files
Configuration headers:
$config_headers
Report bugs to <openssh-unix-dev@mindrot.org>."
_ACEOF
cat >>$CONFIG_STATUS <<_ACEOF || ac_write_fail=1
ac_cs_config="`$as_echo "$ac_configure_args" | sed 's/^ //; s/[\\""\`\$]/\\\\&/g'`"
ac_cs_version="\\
OpenSSH config.status Portable
configured by $0, generated by GNU Autoconf 2.69,
with options \\"\$ac_cs_config\\"
Copyright (C) 2012 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
This config.status script is free software; the Free Software Foundation
gives unlimited permission to copy, distribute and modify it."
ac_pwd='$ac_pwd'
srcdir='$srcdir'
INSTALL='$INSTALL'
MKDIR_P='$MKDIR_P'
AWK='$AWK'
test -n "\$AWK" || AWK=awk
_ACEOF
cat >>$CONFIG_STATUS <<\_ACEOF || ac_write_fail=1
# The default lists apply if the user does not specify any file.
ac_need_defaults=:
while test $# != 0
do
case $1 in
--*=?*)
ac_option=`expr "X$1" : 'X\([^=]*\)='`
ac_optarg=`expr "X$1" : 'X[^=]*=\(.*\)'`
ac_shift=:
;;
--*=)
ac_option=`expr "X$1" : 'X\([^=]*\)='`
ac_optarg=
ac_shift=:
;;
*)
ac_option=$1
ac_optarg=$2
ac_shift=shift
;;
esac
case $ac_option in
# Handling of the options.
-recheck | --recheck | --rechec | --reche | --rech | --rec | --re | --r)
ac_cs_recheck=: ;;
--version | --versio | --versi | --vers | --ver | --ve | --v | -V )
$as_echo "$ac_cs_version"; exit ;;
--config | --confi | --conf | --con | --co | --c )
$as_echo "$ac_cs_config"; exit ;;
--debug | --debu | --deb | --de | --d | -d )
debug=: ;;
--file | --fil | --fi | --f )
$ac_shift
case $ac_optarg in
*\'*) ac_optarg=`$as_echo "$ac_optarg" | sed "s/'/'\\\\\\\\''/g"` ;;
'') as_fn_error $? "missing file argument" ;;
esac
as_fn_append CONFIG_FILES " '$ac_optarg'"
ac_need_defaults=false;;
--header | --heade | --head | --hea )
$ac_shift
case $ac_optarg in
*\'*) ac_optarg=`$as_echo "$ac_optarg" | sed "s/'/'\\\\\\\\''/g"` ;;
esac
as_fn_append CONFIG_HEADERS " '$ac_optarg'"
ac_need_defaults=false;;
--he | --h)
# Conflict between --help and --header
as_fn_error $? "ambiguous option: \`$1'
Try \`$0 --help' for more information.";;
--help | --hel | -h )
$as_echo "$ac_cs_usage"; exit ;;
-q | -quiet | --quiet | --quie | --qui | --qu | --q \
| -silent | --silent | --silen | --sile | --sil | --si | --s)
ac_cs_silent=: ;;
# This is an error.
-*) as_fn_error $? "unrecognized option: \`$1'
Try \`$0 --help' for more information." ;;
*) as_fn_append ac_config_targets " $1"
ac_need_defaults=false ;;
esac
shift
done
ac_configure_extra_args=
if $ac_cs_silent; then
exec 6>/dev/null
ac_configure_extra_args="$ac_configure_extra_args --silent"
fi
_ACEOF
cat >>$CONFIG_STATUS <<_ACEOF || ac_write_fail=1
if \$ac_cs_recheck; then
set X $SHELL '$0' $ac_configure_args \$ac_configure_extra_args --no-create --no-recursion
shift
\$as_echo "running CONFIG_SHELL=$SHELL \$*" >&6
CONFIG_SHELL='$SHELL'
export CONFIG_SHELL
exec "\$@"
fi
_ACEOF
cat >>$CONFIG_STATUS <<\_ACEOF || ac_write_fail=1
exec 5>>config.log
{
echo
sed 'h;s/./-/g;s/^.../## /;s/...$/ ##/;p;x;p;x' <<_ASBOX
## Running $as_me. ##
_ASBOX
$as_echo "$ac_log"
} >&5
_ACEOF
cat >>$CONFIG_STATUS <<_ACEOF || ac_write_fail=1
_ACEOF
cat >>$CONFIG_STATUS <<\_ACEOF || ac_write_fail=1
# Handling of arguments.
for ac_config_target in $ac_config_targets
do
case $ac_config_target in
"config.h") CONFIG_HEADERS="$CONFIG_HEADERS config.h" ;;
"Makefile") CONFIG_FILES="$CONFIG_FILES Makefile" ;;
"buildpkg.sh") CONFIG_FILES="$CONFIG_FILES buildpkg.sh" ;;
"opensshd.init") CONFIG_FILES="$CONFIG_FILES opensshd.init" ;;
"openssh.xml") CONFIG_FILES="$CONFIG_FILES openssh.xml" ;;
"openbsd-compat/Makefile") CONFIG_FILES="$CONFIG_FILES openbsd-compat/Makefile" ;;
"openbsd-compat/regress/Makefile") CONFIG_FILES="$CONFIG_FILES openbsd-compat/regress/Makefile" ;;
"survey.sh") CONFIG_FILES="$CONFIG_FILES survey.sh" ;;
*) as_fn_error $? "invalid argument: \`$ac_config_target'" "$LINENO" 5;;
esac
done
# If the user did not use the arguments to specify the items to instantiate,
# then the envvar interface is used. Set only those that are not.
# We use the long form for the default assignment because of an extremely
# bizarre bug on SunOS 4.1.3.
if $ac_need_defaults; then
test "${CONFIG_FILES+set}" = set || CONFIG_FILES=$config_files
test "${CONFIG_HEADERS+set}" = set || CONFIG_HEADERS=$config_headers
fi
# Have a temporary directory for convenience. Make it in the build tree
# simply because there is no reason against having it here, and in addition,
# creating and moving files from /tmp can sometimes cause problems.
# Hook for its removal unless debugging.
# Note that there is a small window in which the directory will not be cleaned:
# after its creation but before its name has been assigned to `$tmp'.
$debug ||
{
tmp= ac_tmp=
trap 'exit_status=$?
: "${ac_tmp:=$tmp}"
{ test ! -d "$ac_tmp" || rm -fr "$ac_tmp"; } && exit $exit_status
' 0
trap 'as_fn_exit 1' 1 2 13 15
}
# Create a (secure) tmp directory for tmp files.
{
tmp=`(umask 077 && mktemp -d "./confXXXXXX") 2>/dev/null` &&
test -d "$tmp"
} ||
{
tmp=./conf$$-$RANDOM
(umask 077 && mkdir "$tmp")
} || as_fn_error $? "cannot create a temporary directory in ." "$LINENO" 5
ac_tmp=$tmp
# Set up the scripts for CONFIG_FILES section.
# No need to generate them if there are no CONFIG_FILES.
# This happens for instance with `./config.status config.h'.
if test -n "$CONFIG_FILES"; then
ac_cr=`echo X | tr X '\015'`
# On cygwin, bash can eat \r inside `` if the user requested igncr.
# But we know of no other shell where ac_cr would be empty at this
# point, so we can use a bashism as a fallback.
if test "x$ac_cr" = x; then
eval ac_cr=\$\'\\r\'
fi
ac_cs_awk_cr=`$AWK 'BEGIN { print "a\rb" }' </dev/null 2>/dev/null`
if test "$ac_cs_awk_cr" = "a${ac_cr}b"; then
ac_cs_awk_cr='\\r'
else
ac_cs_awk_cr=$ac_cr
fi
echo 'BEGIN {' >"$ac_tmp/subs1.awk" &&
_ACEOF
{
echo "cat >conf$$subs.awk <<_ACEOF" &&
echo "$ac_subst_vars" | sed 's/.*/&!$&$ac_delim/' &&
echo "_ACEOF"
} >conf$$subs.sh ||
as_fn_error $? "could not make $CONFIG_STATUS" "$LINENO" 5
ac_delim_num=`echo "$ac_subst_vars" | grep -c '^'`
ac_delim='%!_!# '
for ac_last_try in false false false false false :; do
. ./conf$$subs.sh ||
as_fn_error $? "could not make $CONFIG_STATUS" "$LINENO" 5
ac_delim_n=`sed -n "s/.*$ac_delim\$/X/p" conf$$subs.awk | grep -c X`
if test $ac_delim_n = $ac_delim_num; then
break
elif $ac_last_try; then
as_fn_error $? "could not make $CONFIG_STATUS" "$LINENO" 5
else
ac_delim="$ac_delim!$ac_delim _$ac_delim!! "
fi
done
rm -f conf$$subs.sh
cat >>$CONFIG_STATUS <<_ACEOF || ac_write_fail=1
cat >>"\$ac_tmp/subs1.awk" <<\\_ACAWK &&
_ACEOF
sed -n '
h
s/^/S["/; s/!.*/"]=/
p
g
s/^[^!]*!//
:repl
t repl
s/'"$ac_delim"'$//
t delim
:nl
h
s/\(.\{148\}\)..*/\1/
t more1
s/["\\]/\\&/g; s/^/"/; s/$/\\n"\\/
p
n
b repl
:more1
s/["\\]/\\&/g; s/^/"/; s/$/"\\/
p
g
s/.\{148\}//
t nl
:delim
h
s/\(.\{148\}\)..*/\1/
t more2
s/["\\]/\\&/g; s/^/"/; s/$/"/
p
b
:more2
s/["\\]/\\&/g; s/^/"/; s/$/"\\/
p
g
s/.\{148\}//
t delim
' <conf$$subs.awk | sed '
/^[^""]/{
N
s/\n//
}
' >>$CONFIG_STATUS || ac_write_fail=1
rm -f conf$$subs.awk
cat >>$CONFIG_STATUS <<_ACEOF || ac_write_fail=1
_ACAWK
cat >>"\$ac_tmp/subs1.awk" <<_ACAWK &&
for (key in S) S_is_set[key] = 1
FS = ""
}
{
line = $ 0
nfields = split(line, field, "@")
substed = 0
len = length(field[1])
for (i = 2; i < nfields; i++) {
key = field[i]
keylen = length(key)
if (S_is_set[key]) {
value = S[key]
line = substr(line, 1, len) "" value "" substr(line, len + keylen + 3)
len += length(value) + length(field[++i])
substed = 1
} else
len += 1 + keylen
}
print line
}
_ACAWK
_ACEOF
cat >>$CONFIG_STATUS <<\_ACEOF || ac_write_fail=1
if sed "s/$ac_cr//" < /dev/null > /dev/null 2>&1; then
sed "s/$ac_cr\$//; s/$ac_cr/$ac_cs_awk_cr/g"
else
cat
fi < "$ac_tmp/subs1.awk" > "$ac_tmp/subs.awk" \
|| as_fn_error $? "could not setup config files machinery" "$LINENO" 5
_ACEOF
# VPATH may cause trouble with some makes, so we remove sole $(srcdir),
# ${srcdir} and @srcdir@ entries from VPATH if srcdir is ".", strip leading and
# trailing colons and then remove the whole line if VPATH becomes empty
# (actually we leave an empty line to preserve line numbers).
if test "x$srcdir" = x.; then
ac_vpsub='/^[ ]*VPATH[ ]*=[ ]*/{
h
s///
s/^/:/
s/[ ]*$/:/
s/:\$(srcdir):/:/g
s/:\${srcdir}:/:/g
s/:@srcdir@:/:/g
s/^:*//
s/:*$//
x
s/\(=[ ]*\).*/\1/
G
s/\n//
s/^[^=]*=[ ]*$//
}'
fi
cat >>$CONFIG_STATUS <<\_ACEOF || ac_write_fail=1
fi # test -n "$CONFIG_FILES"
# Set up the scripts for CONFIG_HEADERS section.
# No need to generate them if there are no CONFIG_HEADERS.
# This happens for instance with `./config.status Makefile'.
if test -n "$CONFIG_HEADERS"; then
cat >"$ac_tmp/defines.awk" <<\_ACAWK ||
BEGIN {
_ACEOF
# Transform confdefs.h into an awk script `defines.awk', embedded as
# here-document in config.status, that substitutes the proper values into
# config.h.in to produce config.h.
# Create a delimiter string that does not exist in confdefs.h, to ease
# handling of long lines.
ac_delim='%!_!# '
for ac_last_try in false false :; do
ac_tt=`sed -n "/$ac_delim/p" confdefs.h`
if test -z "$ac_tt"; then
break
elif $ac_last_try; then
as_fn_error $? "could not make $CONFIG_HEADERS" "$LINENO" 5
else
ac_delim="$ac_delim!$ac_delim _$ac_delim!! "
fi
done
# For the awk script, D is an array of macro values keyed by name,
# likewise P contains macro parameters if any. Preserve backslash
# newline sequences.
ac_word_re=[_$as_cr_Letters][_$as_cr_alnum]*
sed -n '
s/.\{148\}/&'"$ac_delim"'/g
t rset
:rset
s/^[ ]*#[ ]*define[ ][ ]*/ /
t def
d
:def
s/\\$//
t bsnl
s/["\\]/\\&/g
s/^ \('"$ac_word_re"'\)\(([^()]*)\)[ ]*\(.*\)/P["\1"]="\2"\
D["\1"]=" \3"/p
s/^ \('"$ac_word_re"'\)[ ]*\(.*\)/D["\1"]=" \2"/p
d
:bsnl
s/["\\]/\\&/g
s/^ \('"$ac_word_re"'\)\(([^()]*)\)[ ]*\(.*\)/P["\1"]="\2"\
D["\1"]=" \3\\\\\\n"\\/p
t cont
s/^ \('"$ac_word_re"'\)[ ]*\(.*\)/D["\1"]=" \2\\\\\\n"\\/p
t cont
d
:cont
n
s/.\{148\}/&'"$ac_delim"'/g
t clear
:clear
s/\\$//
t bsnlc
s/["\\]/\\&/g; s/^/"/; s/$/"/p
d
:bsnlc
s/["\\]/\\&/g; s/^/"/; s/$/\\\\\\n"\\/p
b cont
' <confdefs.h | sed '
s/'"$ac_delim"'/"\\\
"/g' >>$CONFIG_STATUS || ac_write_fail=1
cat >>$CONFIG_STATUS <<_ACEOF || ac_write_fail=1
for (key in D) D_is_set[key] = 1
FS = ""
}
/^[\t ]*#[\t ]*(define|undef)[\t ]+$ac_word_re([\t (]|\$)/ {
line = \$ 0
split(line, arg, " ")
if (arg[1] == "#") {
defundef = arg[2]
mac1 = arg[3]
} else {
defundef = substr(arg[1], 2)
mac1 = arg[2]
}
split(mac1, mac2, "(") #)
macro = mac2[1]
prefix = substr(line, 1, index(line, defundef) - 1)
if (D_is_set[macro]) {
# Preserve the white space surrounding the "#".
print prefix "define", macro P[macro] D[macro]
next
} else {
# Replace #undef with comments. This is necessary, for example,
# in the case of _POSIX_SOURCE, which is predefined and required
# on some systems where configure will not decide to define it.
if (defundef == "undef") {
print "/*", prefix defundef, macro, "*/"
next
}
}
}
{ print }
_ACAWK
_ACEOF
cat >>$CONFIG_STATUS <<\_ACEOF || ac_write_fail=1
as_fn_error $? "could not setup config headers machinery" "$LINENO" 5
fi # test -n "$CONFIG_HEADERS"
eval set X " :F $CONFIG_FILES :H $CONFIG_HEADERS "
shift
for ac_tag
do
case $ac_tag in
:[FHLC]) ac_mode=$ac_tag; continue;;
esac
case $ac_mode$ac_tag in
:[FHL]*:*);;
:L* | :C*:*) as_fn_error $? "invalid tag \`$ac_tag'" "$LINENO" 5;;
:[FH]-) ac_tag=-:-;;
:[FH]*) ac_tag=$ac_tag:$ac_tag.in;;
esac
ac_save_IFS=$IFS
IFS=:
set x $ac_tag
IFS=$ac_save_IFS
shift
ac_file=$1
shift
case $ac_mode in
:L) ac_source=$1;;
:[FH])
ac_file_inputs=
for ac_f
do
case $ac_f in
-) ac_f="$ac_tmp/stdin";;
*) # Look for the file first in the build tree, then in the source tree
# (if the path is not absolute). The absolute path cannot be DOS-style,
# because $ac_f cannot contain `:'.
test -f "$ac_f" ||
case $ac_f in
[\\/$]*) false;;
*) test -f "$srcdir/$ac_f" && ac_f="$srcdir/$ac_f";;
esac ||
as_fn_error 1 "cannot find input file: \`$ac_f'" "$LINENO" 5;;
esac
case $ac_f in *\'*) ac_f=`$as_echo "$ac_f" | sed "s/'/'\\\\\\\\''/g"`;; esac
as_fn_append ac_file_inputs " '$ac_f'"
done
# Let's still pretend it is `configure' which instantiates (i.e., don't
# use $as_me), people would be surprised to read:
# /* config.h. Generated by config.status. */
configure_input='Generated from '`
$as_echo "$*" | sed 's|^[^:]*/||;s|:[^:]*/|, |g'
`' by configure.'
if test x"$ac_file" != x-; then
configure_input="$ac_file. $configure_input"
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: creating $ac_file" >&5
$as_echo "$as_me: creating $ac_file" >&6;}
fi
# Neutralize special characters interpreted by sed in replacement strings.
case $configure_input in #(
*\&* | *\|* | *\\* )
ac_sed_conf_input=`$as_echo "$configure_input" |
sed 's/[\\\\&|]/\\\\&/g'`;; #(
*) ac_sed_conf_input=$configure_input;;
esac
case $ac_tag in
*:-:* | *:-) cat >"$ac_tmp/stdin" \
|| as_fn_error $? "could not create $ac_file" "$LINENO" 5 ;;
esac
;;
esac
ac_dir=`$as_dirname -- "$ac_file" ||
$as_expr X"$ac_file" : 'X\(.*[^/]\)//*[^/][^/]*/*$' \| \
X"$ac_file" : 'X\(//\)[^/]' \| \
X"$ac_file" : 'X\(//\)$' \| \
X"$ac_file" : 'X\(/\)' \| . 2>/dev/null ||
$as_echo X"$ac_file" |
sed '/^X\(.*[^/]\)\/\/*[^/][^/]*\/*$/{
s//\1/
q
}
/^X\(\/\/\)[^/].*/{
s//\1/
q
}
/^X\(\/\/\)$/{
s//\1/
q
}
/^X\(\/\).*/{
s//\1/
q
}
s/.*/./; q'`
as_dir="$ac_dir"; as_fn_mkdir_p
ac_builddir=.
case "$ac_dir" in
.) ac_dir_suffix= ac_top_builddir_sub=. ac_top_build_prefix= ;;
*)
ac_dir_suffix=/`$as_echo "$ac_dir" | sed 's|^\.[\\/]||'`
# A ".." for each directory in $ac_dir_suffix.
ac_top_builddir_sub=`$as_echo "$ac_dir_suffix" | sed 's|/[^\\/]*|/..|g;s|/||'`
case $ac_top_builddir_sub in
"") ac_top_builddir_sub=. ac_top_build_prefix= ;;
*) ac_top_build_prefix=$ac_top_builddir_sub/ ;;
esac ;;
esac
ac_abs_top_builddir=$ac_pwd
ac_abs_builddir=$ac_pwd$ac_dir_suffix
# for backward compatibility:
ac_top_builddir=$ac_top_build_prefix
case $srcdir in
.) # We are building in place.
ac_srcdir=.
ac_top_srcdir=$ac_top_builddir_sub
ac_abs_top_srcdir=$ac_pwd ;;
[\\/]* | ?:[\\/]* ) # Absolute name.
ac_srcdir=$srcdir$ac_dir_suffix;
ac_top_srcdir=$srcdir
ac_abs_top_srcdir=$srcdir ;;
*) # Relative name.
ac_srcdir=$ac_top_build_prefix$srcdir$ac_dir_suffix
ac_top_srcdir=$ac_top_build_prefix$srcdir
ac_abs_top_srcdir=$ac_pwd/$srcdir ;;
esac
ac_abs_srcdir=$ac_abs_top_srcdir$ac_dir_suffix
case $ac_mode in
:F)
#
# CONFIG_FILE
#
case $INSTALL in
[\\/$]* | ?:[\\/]* ) ac_INSTALL=$INSTALL ;;
*) ac_INSTALL=$ac_top_build_prefix$INSTALL ;;
esac
ac_MKDIR_P=$MKDIR_P
case $MKDIR_P in
[\\/$]* | ?:[\\/]* ) ;;
*/*) ac_MKDIR_P=$ac_top_build_prefix$MKDIR_P ;;
esac
_ACEOF
cat >>$CONFIG_STATUS <<\_ACEOF || ac_write_fail=1
# If the template does not know about datarootdir, expand it.
# FIXME: This hack should be removed a few years after 2.60.
ac_datarootdir_hack=; ac_datarootdir_seen=
ac_sed_dataroot='
/datarootdir/ {
p
q
}
/@datadir@/p
/@docdir@/p
/@infodir@/p
/@localedir@/p
/@mandir@/p'
case `eval "sed -n \"\$ac_sed_dataroot\" $ac_file_inputs"` in
*datarootdir*) ac_datarootdir_seen=yes;;
*@datadir@*|*@docdir@*|*@infodir@*|*@localedir@*|*@mandir@*)
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: WARNING: $ac_file_inputs seems to ignore the --datarootdir setting" >&5
$as_echo "$as_me: WARNING: $ac_file_inputs seems to ignore the --datarootdir setting" >&2;}
_ACEOF
cat >>$CONFIG_STATUS <<_ACEOF || ac_write_fail=1
ac_datarootdir_hack='
s&@datadir@&$datadir&g
s&@docdir@&$docdir&g
s&@infodir@&$infodir&g
s&@localedir@&$localedir&g
s&@mandir@&$mandir&g
s&\\\${datarootdir}&$datarootdir&g' ;;
esac
_ACEOF
# Neutralize VPATH when `$srcdir' = `.'.
# Shell code in configure.ac might set extrasub.
# FIXME: do we really want to maintain this feature?
cat >>$CONFIG_STATUS <<_ACEOF || ac_write_fail=1
ac_sed_extra="$ac_vpsub
$extrasub
_ACEOF
cat >>$CONFIG_STATUS <<\_ACEOF || ac_write_fail=1
:t
/@[a-zA-Z_][a-zA-Z_0-9]*@/!b
s|@configure_input@|$ac_sed_conf_input|;t t
s&@top_builddir@&$ac_top_builddir_sub&;t t
s&@top_build_prefix@&$ac_top_build_prefix&;t t
s&@srcdir@&$ac_srcdir&;t t
s&@abs_srcdir@&$ac_abs_srcdir&;t t
s&@top_srcdir@&$ac_top_srcdir&;t t
s&@abs_top_srcdir@&$ac_abs_top_srcdir&;t t
s&@builddir@&$ac_builddir&;t t
s&@abs_builddir@&$ac_abs_builddir&;t t
s&@abs_top_builddir@&$ac_abs_top_builddir&;t t
s&@INSTALL@&$ac_INSTALL&;t t
s&@MKDIR_P@&$ac_MKDIR_P&;t t
$ac_datarootdir_hack
"
eval sed \"\$ac_sed_extra\" "$ac_file_inputs" | $AWK -f "$ac_tmp/subs.awk" \
>$ac_tmp/out || as_fn_error $? "could not create $ac_file" "$LINENO" 5
test -z "$ac_datarootdir_hack$ac_datarootdir_seen" &&
{ ac_out=`sed -n '/\${datarootdir}/p' "$ac_tmp/out"`; test -n "$ac_out"; } &&
{ ac_out=`sed -n '/^[ ]*datarootdir[ ]*:*=/p' \
"$ac_tmp/out"`; test -z "$ac_out"; } &&
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: WARNING: $ac_file contains a reference to the variable \`datarootdir'
which seems to be undefined. Please make sure it is defined" >&5
$as_echo "$as_me: WARNING: $ac_file contains a reference to the variable \`datarootdir'
which seems to be undefined. Please make sure it is defined" >&2;}
rm -f "$ac_tmp/stdin"
case $ac_file in
-) cat "$ac_tmp/out" && rm -f "$ac_tmp/out";;
*) rm -f "$ac_file" && mv "$ac_tmp/out" "$ac_file";;
esac \
|| as_fn_error $? "could not create $ac_file" "$LINENO" 5
;;
:H)
#
# CONFIG_HEADER
#
if test x"$ac_file" != x-; then
{
$as_echo "/* $configure_input */" \
&& eval '$AWK -f "$ac_tmp/defines.awk"' "$ac_file_inputs"
} >"$ac_tmp/config.h" \
|| as_fn_error $? "could not create $ac_file" "$LINENO" 5
if diff "$ac_file" "$ac_tmp/config.h" >/dev/null 2>&1; then
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: $ac_file is unchanged" >&5
$as_echo "$as_me: $ac_file is unchanged" >&6;}
else
rm -f "$ac_file"
mv "$ac_tmp/config.h" "$ac_file" \
|| as_fn_error $? "could not create $ac_file" "$LINENO" 5
fi
else
$as_echo "/* $configure_input */" \
&& eval '$AWK -f "$ac_tmp/defines.awk"' "$ac_file_inputs" \
|| as_fn_error $? "could not create -" "$LINENO" 5
fi
;;
esac
done # for ac_tag
as_fn_exit 0
_ACEOF
ac_clean_files=$ac_clean_files_save
test $ac_write_fail = 0 ||
as_fn_error $? "write failure creating $CONFIG_STATUS" "$LINENO" 5
# configure is writing to config.log, and then calls config.status.
# config.status does its own redirection, appending to config.log.
# Unfortunately, on DOS this fails, as config.log is still kept open
# by configure, so config.status won't be able to write to it; its
# output is simply discarded. So we exec the FD to /dev/null,
# effectively closing config.log, so it can be properly (re)opened and
# appended to by config.status. When coming back to configure, we
# need to make the FD available again.
if test "$no_create" != yes; then
ac_cs_success=:
ac_config_status_args=
test "$silent" = yes &&
ac_config_status_args="$ac_config_status_args --quiet"
exec 5>/dev/null
$SHELL $CONFIG_STATUS $ac_config_status_args || ac_cs_success=false
exec 5>>config.log
# Use ||, not &&, to avoid exiting from the if with $? = 1, which
# would make configure fail if this is the last instruction.
$ac_cs_success || as_fn_exit 1
fi
if test -n "$ac_unrecognized_opts" && test "$enable_option_checking" != no; then
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: WARNING: unrecognized options: $ac_unrecognized_opts" >&5
$as_echo "$as_me: WARNING: unrecognized options: $ac_unrecognized_opts" >&2;}
fi
# Print summary of options
# Someone please show me a better way :)
A=`eval echo ${prefix}` ; A=`eval echo ${A}`
B=`eval echo ${bindir}` ; B=`eval echo ${B}`
C=`eval echo ${sbindir}` ; C=`eval echo ${C}`
D=`eval echo ${sysconfdir}` ; D=`eval echo ${D}`
E=`eval echo ${libexecdir}/ssh-askpass` ; E=`eval echo ${E}`
F=`eval echo ${mandir}/${mansubdir}X` ; F=`eval echo ${F}`
G=`eval echo ${piddir}` ; G=`eval echo ${G}`
H=`eval echo ${PRIVSEP_PATH}` ; H=`eval echo ${H}`
I=`eval echo ${user_path}` ; I=`eval echo ${I}`
J=`eval echo ${superuser_path}` ; J=`eval echo ${J}`
echo ""
echo "OpenSSH has been configured with the following options:"
echo " User binaries: $B"
echo " System binaries: $C"
echo " Configuration files: $D"
echo " Askpass program: $E"
echo " Manual pages: $F"
echo " PID file: $G"
echo " Privilege separation chroot path: $H"
if test "x$external_path_file" = "x/etc/login.conf" ; then
echo " At runtime, sshd will use the path defined in $external_path_file"
echo " Make sure the path to scp is present, otherwise scp will not work"
else
echo " sshd default user PATH: $I"
if test ! -z "$external_path_file"; then
echo " (If PATH is set in $external_path_file it will be used instead. If"
echo " used, ensure the path to scp is present, otherwise scp will not work.)"
fi
fi
if test ! -z "$superuser_path" ; then
echo " sshd superuser user PATH: $J"
fi
echo " Manpage format: $MANTYPE"
echo " PAM support: $PAM_MSG"
echo " OSF SIA support: $SIA_MSG"
echo " KerberosV support: $KRB5_MSG"
echo " SELinux support: $SELINUX_MSG"
echo " MD5 password support: $MD5_MSG"
echo " libedit support: $LIBEDIT_MSG"
echo " libldns support: $LDNS_MSG"
echo " Solaris process contract support: $SPC_MSG"
echo " Solaris project support: $SP_MSG"
echo " Solaris privilege support: $SPP_MSG"
echo " IP address in \$DISPLAY hack: $DISPLAY_HACK_MSG"
echo " Translate v4 in v6 hack: $IPV4_IN6_HACK_MSG"
echo " BSD Auth support: $BSD_AUTH_MSG"
echo " Random number source: $RAND_MSG"
echo " Privsep sandbox style: $SANDBOX_STYLE"
echo " PKCS#11 support: $enable_pkcs11"
echo " U2F/FIDO support: $enable_sk"
echo ""
echo " Host: ${host}"
echo " Compiler: ${CC}"
echo " Compiler flags: ${CFLAGS}"
echo "Preprocessor flags: ${CPPFLAGS}"
echo " Linker flags: ${LDFLAGS}"
echo " Libraries: ${LIBS}"
if test ! -z "${SSHDLIBS}"; then
echo " +for sshd: ${SSHDLIBS}"
fi
-if test ! -z "${SSHLIBS}"; then
-echo " +for ssh: ${SSHLIBS}"
-fi
echo ""
if test "x$MAKE_PACKAGE_SUPPORTED" = "xyes" ; then
echo "SVR4 style packages are supported with \"make package\""
echo ""
fi
if test "x$PAM_MSG" = "xyes" ; then
echo "PAM is enabled. You may need to install a PAM control file "
echo "for sshd, otherwise password authentication may fail. "
echo "Example PAM control files can be found in the contrib/ "
echo "subdirectory"
echo ""
fi
if test ! -z "$NO_PEERCHECK" ; then
echo "WARNING: the operating system that you are using does not"
echo "appear to support getpeereid(), getpeerucred() or the"
echo "SO_PEERCRED getsockopt() option. These facilities are used to"
echo "enforce security checks to prevent unauthorised connections to"
echo "ssh-agent. Their absence increases the risk that a malicious"
echo "user can connect to your agent."
echo ""
fi
if test "$AUDIT_MODULE" = "bsm" ; then
echo "WARNING: BSM audit support is currently considered EXPERIMENTAL."
echo "See the Solaris section in README.platform for details."
fi
diff --git a/configure.ac b/configure.ac
index 460383757955..7005a503e022 100644
--- a/configure.ac
+++ b/configure.ac
@@ -1,5515 +1,5569 @@
#
# Copyright (c) 1999-2004 Damien Miller
#
# Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
# purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
# copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
#
# THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
# WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
# MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
# ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
# WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
# ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
# OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
AC_INIT([OpenSSH], [Portable], [openssh-unix-dev@mindrot.org])
-AC_REVISION($Revision: 1.583 $)
+AC_CONFIG_MACRO_DIR([m4])
AC_CONFIG_SRCDIR([ssh.c])
AC_LANG([C])
AC_CONFIG_HEADER([config.h])
AC_PROG_CC([cc gcc])
AC_CANONICAL_HOST
AC_C_BIGENDIAN
# Checks for programs.
AC_PROG_AWK
AC_PROG_CPP
AC_PROG_RANLIB
AC_PROG_INSTALL
AC_PROG_EGREP
AC_PROG_MKDIR_P
AC_CHECK_TOOLS([AR], [ar])
AC_PATH_PROG([CAT], [cat])
AC_PATH_PROG([KILL], [kill])
AC_PATH_PROG([SED], [sed])
-AC_PATH_PROG([ENT], [ent])
-AC_SUBST([ENT])
AC_PATH_PROG([TEST_MINUS_S_SH], [bash])
AC_PATH_PROG([TEST_MINUS_S_SH], [ksh])
AC_PATH_PROG([TEST_MINUS_S_SH], [sh])
AC_PATH_PROG([SH], [sh])
AC_PATH_PROG([GROFF], [groff])
AC_PATH_PROG([NROFF], [nroff awf])
AC_PATH_PROG([MANDOC], [mandoc])
AC_SUBST([TEST_SHELL], [sh])
dnl select manpage formatter to be used to build "cat" format pages.
if test "x$MANDOC" != "x" ; then
MANFMT="$MANDOC"
elif test "x$NROFF" != "x" ; then
MANFMT="$NROFF -mandoc"
elif test "x$GROFF" != "x" ; then
MANFMT="$GROFF -mandoc -Tascii"
else
AC_MSG_WARN([no manpage formatter found])
MANFMT="false"
fi
AC_SUBST([MANFMT])
dnl for buildpkg.sh
AC_PATH_PROG([PATH_GROUPADD_PROG], [groupadd], [groupadd],
[/usr/sbin${PATH_SEPARATOR}/etc])
AC_PATH_PROG([PATH_USERADD_PROG], [useradd], [useradd],
[/usr/sbin${PATH_SEPARATOR}/etc])
AC_CHECK_PROG([MAKE_PACKAGE_SUPPORTED], [pkgmk], [yes], [no])
if test -x /sbin/sh; then
AC_SUBST([STARTUP_SCRIPT_SHELL], [/sbin/sh])
else
AC_SUBST([STARTUP_SCRIPT_SHELL], [/bin/sh])
fi
# System features
AC_SYS_LARGEFILE
if test -z "$AR" ; then
AC_MSG_ERROR([*** 'ar' missing, please install or fix your \$PATH ***])
fi
AC_PATH_PROG([PATH_PASSWD_PROG], [passwd])
if test ! -z "$PATH_PASSWD_PROG" ; then
AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED([_PATH_PASSWD_PROG], ["$PATH_PASSWD_PROG"],
[Full path of your "passwd" program])
fi
dnl Since autoconf doesn't support it very well, we no longer allow users to
dnl override LD, however keeping the hook here for now in case there's a use
dnl use case we overlooked and someone needs to re-enable it. Unless a good
dnl reason is found we'll be removing this in future.
LD="$CC"
AC_SUBST([LD])
AC_C_INLINE
AC_CHECK_DECL([LLONG_MAX], [have_llong_max=1], , [#include <limits.h>])
AC_CHECK_DECL([LONG_LONG_MAX], [have_long_long_max=1], , [#include <limits.h>])
AC_CHECK_DECL([SYSTR_POLICY_KILL], [have_systr_policy_kill=1], , [
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/param.h>
#include <dev/systrace.h>
])
AC_CHECK_DECL([RLIMIT_NPROC],
[AC_DEFINE([HAVE_RLIMIT_NPROC], [], [sys/resource.h has RLIMIT_NPROC])], , [
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/resource.h>
])
AC_CHECK_DECL([PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS], [have_linux_no_new_privs=1], , [
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <linux/prctl.h>
])
openssl=yes
AC_ARG_WITH([openssl],
[ --without-openssl Disable use of OpenSSL; use only limited internal crypto **EXPERIMENTAL** ],
[ if test "x$withval" = "xno" ; then
openssl=no
fi
]
)
AC_MSG_CHECKING([whether OpenSSL will be used for cryptography])
if test "x$openssl" = "xyes" ; then
AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])
AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED([WITH_OPENSSL], [1], [use libcrypto for cryptography])
else
AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
fi
use_stack_protector=1
use_toolchain_hardening=1
AC_ARG_WITH([stackprotect],
[ --without-stackprotect Don't use compiler's stack protection], [
if test "x$withval" = "xno"; then
use_stack_protector=0
fi ])
AC_ARG_WITH([hardening],
[ --without-hardening Don't use toolchain hardening flags], [
if test "x$withval" = "xno"; then
use_toolchain_hardening=0
fi ])
# We use -Werror for the tests only so that we catch warnings like "this is
# on by default" for things like -fPIE.
AC_MSG_CHECKING([if $CC supports -Werror])
saved_CFLAGS="$CFLAGS"
CFLAGS="$CFLAGS -Werror"
AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_SOURCE([[int main(void) { return 0; }]])],
[ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])
WERROR="-Werror"],
[ AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
WERROR="" ]
)
CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS"
if test "$GCC" = "yes" || test "$GCC" = "egcs"; then
OSSH_CHECK_CFLAG_COMPILE([-pipe])
OSSH_CHECK_CFLAG_COMPILE([-Wunknown-warning-option])
OSSH_CHECK_CFLAG_COMPILE([-Wno-error=format-truncation])
OSSH_CHECK_CFLAG_COMPILE([-Qunused-arguments])
OSSH_CHECK_CFLAG_COMPILE([-Wall])
OSSH_CHECK_CFLAG_COMPILE([-Wextra])
OSSH_CHECK_CFLAG_COMPILE([-Wpointer-arith])
OSSH_CHECK_CFLAG_COMPILE([-Wuninitialized])
OSSH_CHECK_CFLAG_COMPILE([-Wsign-compare])
OSSH_CHECK_CFLAG_COMPILE([-Wformat-security])
OSSH_CHECK_CFLAG_COMPILE([-Wsizeof-pointer-memaccess])
OSSH_CHECK_CFLAG_COMPILE([-Wpointer-sign], [-Wno-pointer-sign])
+ OSSH_CHECK_CFLAG_COMPILE([-Wunused-parameter], [-Wno-unused-parameter])
OSSH_CHECK_CFLAG_COMPILE([-Wunused-result], [-Wno-unused-result])
OSSH_CHECK_CFLAG_COMPILE([-Wimplicit-fallthrough])
OSSH_CHECK_CFLAG_COMPILE([-fno-strict-aliasing])
if test "x$use_toolchain_hardening" = "x1"; then
OSSH_CHECK_CFLAG_COMPILE([-mretpoline]) # clang
OSSH_CHECK_LDFLAG_LINK([-Wl,-z,retpolineplt])
OSSH_CHECK_CFLAG_COMPILE([-D_FORTIFY_SOURCE=2])
OSSH_CHECK_LDFLAG_LINK([-Wl,-z,relro])
OSSH_CHECK_LDFLAG_LINK([-Wl,-z,now])
OSSH_CHECK_LDFLAG_LINK([-Wl,-z,noexecstack])
# NB. -ftrapv expects certain support functions to be present in
# the compiler library (libgcc or similar) to detect integer operations
# that can overflow. We must check that the result of enabling it
# actually links. The test program compiled/linked includes a number
# of integer operations that should exercise this.
OSSH_CHECK_CFLAG_LINK([-ftrapv])
fi
AC_MSG_CHECKING([gcc version])
GCC_VER=`$CC -v 2>&1 | $AWK '/gcc version /{print $3}'`
case $GCC_VER in
1.*) no_attrib_nonnull=1 ;;
2.8* | 2.9*)
no_attrib_nonnull=1
;;
2.*) no_attrib_nonnull=1 ;;
*) ;;
esac
AC_MSG_RESULT([$GCC_VER])
AC_MSG_CHECKING([if $CC accepts -fno-builtin-memset])
saved_CFLAGS="$CFLAGS"
CFLAGS="$CFLAGS -fno-builtin-memset"
AC_LINK_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include <string.h> ]],
[[ char b[10]; memset(b, 0, sizeof(b)); ]])],
[ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) ],
[ AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS" ]
)
# -fstack-protector-all doesn't always work for some GCC versions
# and/or platforms, so we test if we can. If it's not supported
# on a given platform gcc will emit a warning so we use -Werror.
if test "x$use_stack_protector" = "x1"; then
for t in -fstack-protector-strong -fstack-protector-all \
-fstack-protector; do
AC_MSG_CHECKING([if $CC supports $t])
saved_CFLAGS="$CFLAGS"
saved_LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS"
CFLAGS="$CFLAGS $t -Werror"
LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS $t -Werror"
AC_LINK_IFELSE(
[AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
#include <stdio.h>
int func (int t) {char b[100]; snprintf(b,sizeof b,"%d",t); return t;}
]],
[[
char x[256];
snprintf(x, sizeof(x), "XXX%d", func(1));
]])],
[ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])
CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS $t"
LDFLAGS="$saved_LDFLAGS $t"
AC_MSG_CHECKING([if $t works])
AC_RUN_IFELSE(
[AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
#include <stdio.h>
int func (int t) {char b[100]; snprintf(b,sizeof b,"%d",t); return t;}
]],
[[
char x[256];
snprintf(x, sizeof(x), "XXX%d", func(1));
]])],
[ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])
break ],
[ AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) ],
[ AC_MSG_WARN([cross compiling: cannot test])
break ]
)
],
[ AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) ]
)
CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS"
LDFLAGS="$saved_LDFLAGS"
done
fi
if test -z "$have_llong_max"; then
# retry LLONG_MAX with -std=gnu99, needed on some Linuxes
unset ac_cv_have_decl_LLONG_MAX
saved_CFLAGS="$CFLAGS"
CFLAGS="$CFLAGS -std=gnu99"
AC_CHECK_DECL([LLONG_MAX],
[have_llong_max=1],
[CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS"],
[#include <limits.h>]
)
fi
fi
AC_MSG_CHECKING([if compiler allows __attribute__ on return types])
AC_COMPILE_IFELSE(
[AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
#include <stdlib.h>
__attribute__((__unused__)) static void foo(void){return;}]],
[[ exit(0); ]])],
[ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) ],
[ AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
AC_DEFINE(NO_ATTRIBUTE_ON_RETURN_TYPE, 1,
[compiler does not accept __attribute__ on return types]) ]
)
AC_MSG_CHECKING([if compiler allows __attribute__ prototype args])
AC_COMPILE_IFELSE(
[AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
#include <stdlib.h>
typedef void foo(const char *, ...) __attribute__((format(printf, 1, 2)));]],
[[ exit(0); ]])],
[ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) ],
[ AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
AC_DEFINE(NO_ATTRIBUTE_ON_PROTOTYPE_ARGS, 1,
[compiler does not accept __attribute__ on prototype args]) ]
)
if test "x$no_attrib_nonnull" != "x1" ; then
AC_DEFINE([HAVE_ATTRIBUTE__NONNULL__], [1], [Have attribute nonnull])
fi
AC_ARG_WITH([rpath],
[ --without-rpath Disable auto-added -R linker paths],
[
if test "x$withval" = "xno" ; then
rpath_opt=""
elif test "x$withval" = "xyes" ; then
rpath_opt="-R"
else
rpath_opt="$withval"
fi
]
)
# Allow user to specify flags
AC_ARG_WITH([cflags],
[ --with-cflags Specify additional flags to pass to compiler],
[
if test -n "$withval" && test "x$withval" != "xno" && \
test "x${withval}" != "xyes"; then
CFLAGS="$CFLAGS $withval"
fi
]
)
AC_ARG_WITH([cflags-after],
[ --with-cflags-after Specify additional flags to pass to compiler after configure],
[
if test -n "$withval" && test "x$withval" != "xno" && \
test "x${withval}" != "xyes"; then
CFLAGS_AFTER="$withval"
fi
]
)
AC_ARG_WITH([cppflags],
[ --with-cppflags Specify additional flags to pass to preprocessor] ,
[
if test -n "$withval" && test "x$withval" != "xno" && \
test "x${withval}" != "xyes"; then
CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS $withval"
fi
]
)
AC_ARG_WITH([ldflags],
[ --with-ldflags Specify additional flags to pass to linker],
[
if test -n "$withval" && test "x$withval" != "xno" && \
test "x${withval}" != "xyes"; then
LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS $withval"
fi
]
)
AC_ARG_WITH([ldflags-after],
[ --with-ldflags-after Specify additional flags to pass to linker after configure],
[
if test -n "$withval" && test "x$withval" != "xno" && \
test "x${withval}" != "xyes"; then
LDFLAGS_AFTER="$withval"
fi
]
)
AC_ARG_WITH([libs],
[ --with-libs Specify additional libraries to link with],
[
if test -n "$withval" && test "x$withval" != "xno" && \
test "x${withval}" != "xyes"; then
LIBS="$LIBS $withval"
fi
]
)
AC_ARG_WITH([Werror],
[ --with-Werror Build main code with -Werror],
[
if test -n "$withval" && test "x$withval" != "xno"; then
werror_flags="-Werror"
if test "x${withval}" != "xyes"; then
werror_flags="$withval"
fi
fi
]
)
AC_CHECK_HEADERS([ \
blf.h \
bstring.h \
crypt.h \
crypto/sha2.h \
dirent.h \
endian.h \
elf.h \
err.h \
features.h \
fcntl.h \
floatingpoint.h \
fnmatch.h \
getopt.h \
glob.h \
ia.h \
iaf.h \
ifaddrs.h \
inttypes.h \
langinfo.h \
limits.h \
locale.h \
login.h \
maillock.h \
ndir.h \
net/if_tun.h \
netdb.h \
netgroup.h \
pam/pam_appl.h \
paths.h \
poll.h \
pty.h \
readpassphrase.h \
rpc/types.h \
security/pam_appl.h \
sha2.h \
shadow.h \
stddef.h \
stdint.h \
string.h \
strings.h \
sys/bitypes.h \
sys/byteorder.h \
sys/bsdtty.h \
sys/cdefs.h \
sys/dir.h \
sys/file.h \
sys/mman.h \
sys/label.h \
sys/ndir.h \
sys/poll.h \
sys/prctl.h \
sys/pstat.h \
sys/ptrace.h \
sys/random.h \
sys/select.h \
sys/stat.h \
sys/stream.h \
sys/stropts.h \
sys/strtio.h \
sys/statvfs.h \
sys/sysmacros.h \
sys/time.h \
sys/timers.h \
sys/vfs.h \
time.h \
tmpdir.h \
ttyent.h \
ucred.h \
unistd.h \
usersec.h \
util.h \
utime.h \
utmp.h \
utmpx.h \
vis.h \
wchar.h \
])
# On some platforms (eg SunOS4) sys/audit.h requires sys/[time|types|label.h]
# to be included first.
AC_CHECK_HEADERS([sys/audit.h], [], [], [
#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TIME_H
# include <sys/time.h>
#endif
#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TYPES_H
# include <sys/types.h>
#endif
#ifdef HAVE_SYS_LABEL_H
# include <sys/label.h>
#endif
])
# sys/capsicum.h requires sys/types.h
AC_CHECK_HEADERS([sys/capsicum.h], [], [], [
#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TYPES_H
# include <sys/types.h>
#endif
])
# net/route.h requires sys/socket.h and sys/types.h.
# sys/sysctl.h also requires sys/param.h
AC_CHECK_HEADERS([net/route.h sys/sysctl.h], [], [], [
#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TYPES_H
# include <sys/types.h>
#endif
#include <sys/param.h>
#include <sys/socket.h>
])
# lastlog.h requires sys/time.h to be included first on Solaris
AC_CHECK_HEADERS([lastlog.h], [], [], [
#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TIME_H
# include <sys/time.h>
#endif
])
# sys/ptms.h requires sys/stream.h to be included first on Solaris
AC_CHECK_HEADERS([sys/ptms.h], [], [], [
#ifdef HAVE_SYS_STREAM_H
# include <sys/stream.h>
#endif
])
# login_cap.h requires sys/types.h on NetBSD
AC_CHECK_HEADERS([login_cap.h], [], [], [
#include <sys/types.h>
])
# older BSDs need sys/param.h before sys/mount.h
AC_CHECK_HEADERS([sys/mount.h], [], [], [
#include <sys/param.h>
])
# Android requires sys/socket.h to be included before sys/un.h
AC_CHECK_HEADERS([sys/un.h], [], [], [
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/socket.h>
])
# Messages for features tested for in target-specific section
SIA_MSG="no"
SPC_MSG="no"
SP_MSG="no"
SPP_MSG="no"
# Support for Solaris/Illumos privileges (this test is used by both
# the --with-solaris-privs option and --with-sandbox=solaris).
SOLARIS_PRIVS="no"
+AC_CHECK_SIZEOF([size_t])
+
# Check for some target-specific stuff
case "$host" in
*-*-aix*)
# Some versions of VAC won't allow macro redefinitions at
# -qlanglevel=ansi, and autoconf 2.60 sometimes insists on using that
# particularly with older versions of vac or xlc.
# It also throws errors about null macro arguments, but these are
# not fatal.
AC_MSG_CHECKING([if compiler allows macro redefinitions])
AC_COMPILE_IFELSE(
[AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
#define testmacro foo
#define testmacro bar]],
[[ exit(0); ]])],
[ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) ],
[ AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
CC="`echo $CC | sed 's/-qlanglvl\=ansi//g'`"
CFLAGS="`echo $CFLAGS | sed 's/-qlanglvl\=ansi//g'`"
CPPFLAGS="`echo $CPPFLAGS | sed 's/-qlanglvl\=ansi//g'`"
]
)
AC_MSG_CHECKING([how to specify blibpath for linker ($LD)])
if (test -z "$blibpath"); then
blibpath="/usr/lib:/lib"
fi
saved_LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS"
if test "$GCC" = "yes"; then
flags="-Wl,-blibpath: -Wl,-rpath, -blibpath:"
else
flags="-blibpath: -Wl,-blibpath: -Wl,-rpath,"
fi
for tryflags in $flags ;do
if (test -z "$blibflags"); then
LDFLAGS="$saved_LDFLAGS $tryflags$blibpath"
AC_LINK_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[]], [[]])],
[blibflags=$tryflags], [])
fi
done
if (test -z "$blibflags"); then
AC_MSG_RESULT([not found])
AC_MSG_ERROR([*** must be able to specify blibpath on AIX - check config.log])
else
AC_MSG_RESULT([$blibflags])
fi
LDFLAGS="$saved_LDFLAGS"
dnl Check for authenticate. Might be in libs.a on older AIXes
AC_CHECK_FUNC([authenticate], [AC_DEFINE([WITH_AIXAUTHENTICATE], [1],
[Define if you want to enable AIX4's authenticate function])],
[AC_CHECK_LIB([s], [authenticate],
[ AC_DEFINE([WITH_AIXAUTHENTICATE])
LIBS="$LIBS -ls"
])
])
dnl Check for various auth function declarations in headers.
AC_CHECK_DECLS([authenticate, loginrestrictions, loginsuccess,
passwdexpired, setauthdb], , , [#include <usersec.h>])
dnl Check if loginfailed is declared and takes 4 arguments (AIX >= 5.2)
AC_CHECK_DECLS([loginfailed],
[AC_MSG_CHECKING([if loginfailed takes 4 arguments])
AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include <usersec.h> ]],
[[ (void)loginfailed("user","host","tty",0); ]])],
[AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])
AC_DEFINE([AIX_LOGINFAILED_4ARG], [1],
[Define if your AIX loginfailed() function
takes 4 arguments (AIX >= 5.2)])], [AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
])],
[],
[#include <usersec.h>]
)
AC_CHECK_FUNCS([getgrset setauthdb])
AC_CHECK_DECL([F_CLOSEM],
AC_DEFINE([HAVE_FCNTL_CLOSEM], [1], [Use F_CLOSEM fcntl for closefrom]),
[],
[ #include <limits.h>
#include <fcntl.h> ]
)
check_for_aix_broken_getaddrinfo=1
AC_DEFINE([SETEUID_BREAKS_SETUID], [1],
[Define if your platform breaks doing a seteuid before a setuid])
AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_SETREUID], [1], [Define if your setreuid() is broken])
AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_SETREGID], [1], [Define if your setregid() is broken])
dnl AIX handles lastlog as part of its login message
AC_DEFINE([DISABLE_LASTLOG], [1], [Define if you don't want to use lastlog])
AC_DEFINE([LOGIN_NEEDS_UTMPX], [1],
[Some systems need a utmpx entry for /bin/login to work])
AC_DEFINE([SPT_TYPE], [SPT_REUSEARGV],
[Define to a Set Process Title type if your system is
supported by bsd-setproctitle.c])
AC_DEFINE([SSHPAM_CHAUTHTOK_NEEDS_RUID], [1],
[AIX 5.2 and 5.3 (and presumably newer) require this])
AC_DEFINE([PTY_ZEROREAD], [1], [read(1) can return 0 for a non-closed fd])
AC_DEFINE([PLATFORM_SYS_DIR_UID], 2, [System dirs owned by bin (uid 2)])
AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_STRNDUP], 1, [strndup broken, see APAR IY61211])
AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_STRNLEN], 1, [strnlen broken, see APAR IY62551])
;;
*-*-android*)
AC_DEFINE([DISABLE_UTMP], [1], [Define if you don't want to use utmp])
AC_DEFINE([DISABLE_WTMP], [1], [Define if you don't want to use wtmp])
;;
*-*-cygwin*)
check_for_libcrypt_later=1
LIBS="$LIBS /usr/lib/textreadmode.o"
AC_DEFINE([HAVE_CYGWIN], [1], [Define if you are on Cygwin])
AC_DEFINE([USE_PIPES], [1], [Use PIPES instead of a socketpair()])
AC_DEFINE([NO_UID_RESTORATION_TEST], [1],
[Define to disable UID restoration test])
AC_DEFINE([DISABLE_SHADOW], [1],
[Define if you want to disable shadow passwords])
AC_DEFINE([NO_X11_UNIX_SOCKETS], [1],
[Define if X11 doesn't support AF_UNIX sockets on that system])
AC_DEFINE([DISABLE_FD_PASSING], [1],
[Define if your platform needs to skip post auth
file descriptor passing])
AC_DEFINE([SSH_IOBUFSZ], [65535], [Windows is sensitive to read buffer size])
AC_DEFINE([FILESYSTEM_NO_BACKSLASH], [1], [File names may not contain backslash characters])
# Cygwin defines optargs, optargs as declspec(dllimport) for historical
# reasons which cause compile warnings, so we disable those warnings.
OSSH_CHECK_CFLAG_COMPILE([-Wno-attributes])
;;
*-*-dgux*)
AC_DEFINE([IP_TOS_IS_BROKEN], [1],
[Define if your system choked on IP TOS setting])
AC_DEFINE([SETEUID_BREAKS_SETUID])
AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_SETREUID])
AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_SETREGID])
;;
*-*-darwin*)
use_pie=auto
AC_MSG_CHECKING([if we have working getaddrinfo])
- AC_RUN_IFELSE([AC_LANG_SOURCE([[ #include <mach-o/dyld.h>
+ AC_RUN_IFELSE([AC_LANG_SOURCE([[
+#include <mach-o/dyld.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
main() { if (NSVersionOfRunTimeLibrary("System") >= (60 << 16))
exit(0);
else
exit(1);
}
]])],
[AC_MSG_RESULT([working])],
[AC_MSG_RESULT([buggy])
AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_GETADDRINFO], [1],
[getaddrinfo is broken (if present)])
],
[AC_MSG_RESULT([assume it is working])])
AC_DEFINE([SETEUID_BREAKS_SETUID])
AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_SETREUID])
AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_SETREGID])
AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_GLOB], [1], [OS X glob does not do what we expect])
AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED([BIND_8_COMPAT], [1],
[Define if your resolver libs need this for getrrsetbyname])
AC_DEFINE([SSH_TUN_FREEBSD], [1], [Open tunnel devices the FreeBSD way])
AC_DEFINE([SSH_TUN_COMPAT_AF], [1],
[Use tunnel device compatibility to OpenBSD])
AC_DEFINE([SSH_TUN_PREPEND_AF], [1],
[Prepend the address family to IP tunnel traffic])
m4_pattern_allow([AU_IPv])
AC_CHECK_DECL([AU_IPv4], [],
AC_DEFINE([AU_IPv4], [0], [System only supports IPv4 audit records])
[#include <bsm/audit.h>]
AC_DEFINE([LASTLOG_WRITE_PUTUTXLINE], [1],
[Define if pututxline updates lastlog too])
)
AC_DEFINE([SPT_TYPE], [SPT_REUSEARGV],
[Define to a Set Process Title type if your system is
supported by bsd-setproctitle.c])
AC_CHECK_FUNCS([sandbox_init])
AC_CHECK_HEADERS([sandbox.h])
AC_CHECK_LIB([sandbox], [sandbox_apply], [
SSHDLIBS="$SSHDLIBS -lsandbox"
])
# proc_pidinfo()-based closefrom() replacement.
AC_CHECK_HEADERS([libproc.h])
AC_CHECK_FUNCS([proc_pidinfo])
;;
*-*-dragonfly*)
SSHDLIBS="$SSHDLIBS -lcrypt"
TEST_MALLOC_OPTIONS="AFGJPRX"
;;
*-*-haiku*)
LIBS="$LIBS -lbsd "
CFLAGS="$CFLAGS -D_BSD_SOURCE"
AC_CHECK_LIB([network], [socket])
AC_DEFINE([HAVE_U_INT64_T])
AC_DEFINE([DISABLE_UTMPX], [1], [no utmpx])
MANTYPE=man
;;
*-*-hpux*)
# first we define all of the options common to all HP-UX releases
CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS -D_HPUX_SOURCE -D_XOPEN_SOURCE -D_XOPEN_SOURCE_EXTENDED=1"
IPADDR_IN_DISPLAY=yes
AC_DEFINE([USE_PIPES])
AC_DEFINE([LOGIN_NEEDS_UTMPX])
AC_DEFINE([LOCKED_PASSWD_STRING], ["*"],
[String used in /etc/passwd to denote locked account])
AC_DEFINE([SPT_TYPE], [SPT_PSTAT])
AC_DEFINE([PLATFORM_SYS_DIR_UID], 2, [System dirs owned by bin (uid 2)])
maildir="/var/mail"
LIBS="$LIBS -lsec"
AC_CHECK_LIB([xnet], [t_error], ,
[AC_MSG_ERROR([*** -lxnet needed on HP-UX - check config.log ***])])
# next, we define all of the options specific to major releases
case "$host" in
*-*-hpux10*)
if test -z "$GCC"; then
CFLAGS="$CFLAGS -Ae"
fi
;;
*-*-hpux11*)
AC_DEFINE([PAM_SUN_CODEBASE], [1],
[Define if you are using Solaris-derived PAM which
passes pam_messages to the conversation function
with an extra level of indirection])
AC_DEFINE([DISABLE_UTMP], [1],
[Define if you don't want to use utmp])
AC_DEFINE([USE_BTMP], [1], [Use btmp to log bad logins])
check_for_hpux_broken_getaddrinfo=1
check_for_conflicting_getspnam=1
;;
esac
# lastly, we define options specific to minor releases
case "$host" in
*-*-hpux10.26)
AC_DEFINE([HAVE_SECUREWARE], [1],
[Define if you have SecureWare-based
protected password database])
disable_ptmx_check=yes
LIBS="$LIBS -lsecpw"
;;
esac
;;
*-*-irix5*)
PATH="$PATH:/usr/etc"
AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_INET_NTOA], [1],
[Define if you system's inet_ntoa is busted
(e.g. Irix gcc issue)])
AC_DEFINE([SETEUID_BREAKS_SETUID])
AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_SETREUID])
AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_SETREGID])
AC_DEFINE([WITH_ABBREV_NO_TTY], [1],
[Define if you shouldn't strip 'tty' from your
ttyname in [uw]tmp])
AC_DEFINE([LOCKED_PASSWD_STRING], ["*LK*"])
;;
*-*-irix6*)
PATH="$PATH:/usr/etc"
AC_DEFINE([WITH_IRIX_ARRAY], [1],
[Define if you have/want arrays
(cluster-wide session management, not C arrays)])
AC_DEFINE([WITH_IRIX_PROJECT], [1],
[Define if you want IRIX project management])
AC_DEFINE([WITH_IRIX_AUDIT], [1],
[Define if you want IRIX audit trails])
AC_CHECK_FUNC([jlimit_startjob], [AC_DEFINE([WITH_IRIX_JOBS], [1],
[Define if you want IRIX kernel jobs])])
AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_INET_NTOA])
AC_DEFINE([SETEUID_BREAKS_SETUID])
AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_SETREUID])
AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_SETREGID])
AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_UPDWTMPX], [1], [updwtmpx is broken (if present)])
AC_DEFINE([WITH_ABBREV_NO_TTY])
AC_DEFINE([LOCKED_PASSWD_STRING], ["*LK*"])
;;
*-*-k*bsd*-gnu | *-*-kopensolaris*-gnu)
check_for_libcrypt_later=1
AC_DEFINE([PAM_TTY_KLUDGE])
AC_DEFINE([LOCKED_PASSWD_PREFIX], ["!"])
AC_DEFINE([SPT_TYPE], [SPT_REUSEARGV])
AC_DEFINE([_PATH_BTMP], ["/var/log/btmp"], [log for bad login attempts])
AC_DEFINE([USE_BTMP], [1], [Use btmp to log bad logins])
;;
*-*-linux*)
no_dev_ptmx=1
use_pie=auto
check_for_libcrypt_later=1
check_for_openpty_ctty_bug=1
dnl Target SUSv3/POSIX.1-2001 plus BSD specifics.
dnl _DEFAULT_SOURCE is the new name for _BSD_SOURCE
CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS -D_XOPEN_SOURCE=600 -D_BSD_SOURCE -D_DEFAULT_SOURCE"
AC_DEFINE([PAM_TTY_KLUDGE], [1],
[Work around problematic Linux PAM modules handling of PAM_TTY])
AC_DEFINE([LOCKED_PASSWD_PREFIX], ["!"],
[String used in /etc/passwd to denote locked account])
AC_DEFINE([SPT_TYPE], [SPT_REUSEARGV])
AC_DEFINE([LINK_OPNOTSUPP_ERRNO], [EPERM],
[Define to whatever link() returns for "not supported"
if it doesn't return EOPNOTSUPP.])
AC_DEFINE([_PATH_BTMP], ["/var/log/btmp"], [log for bad login attempts])
AC_DEFINE([USE_BTMP])
AC_DEFINE([LINUX_OOM_ADJUST], [1], [Adjust Linux out-of-memory killer])
inet6_default_4in6=yes
case `uname -r` in
1.*|2.0.*)
AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_CMSG_TYPE], [1],
[Define if cmsg_type is not passed correctly])
;;
esac
# tun(4) forwarding compat code
AC_CHECK_HEADERS([linux/if_tun.h])
if test "x$ac_cv_header_linux_if_tun_h" = "xyes" ; then
AC_DEFINE([SSH_TUN_LINUX], [1],
[Open tunnel devices the Linux tun/tap way])
AC_DEFINE([SSH_TUN_COMPAT_AF], [1],
[Use tunnel device compatibility to OpenBSD])
AC_DEFINE([SSH_TUN_PREPEND_AF], [1],
[Prepend the address family to IP tunnel traffic])
fi
AC_CHECK_HEADER([linux/if.h],
AC_DEFINE([SYS_RDOMAIN_LINUX], [1],
[Support routing domains using Linux VRF]), [], [
#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TYPES_H
# include <sys/types.h>
#endif
])
AC_CHECK_HEADERS([linux/seccomp.h linux/filter.h linux/audit.h], [],
[], [#include <linux/types.h>])
# Obtain MIPS ABI
case "$host" in
mips*)
AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
#if _MIPS_SIM != _ABIO32
#error
#endif
]])],[mips_abi="o32"],[AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
#if _MIPS_SIM != _ABIN32
#error
#endif
]])],[mips_abi="n32"],[AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
#if _MIPS_SIM != _ABI64
#error
#endif
]])],[mips_abi="n64"],[AC_MSG_ERROR([unknown MIPS ABI])
])
])
])
;;
esac
AC_MSG_CHECKING([for seccomp architecture])
seccomp_audit_arch=
case "$host" in
x86_64-*)
seccomp_audit_arch=AUDIT_ARCH_X86_64
+ # X32: AMD64 instructions in 32bit address space.
+ if test "x$ac_cv_sizeof_size_t" = "x4" ; then
+ seccomp_audit_arch=AUDIT_ARCH_I386
+ fi
;;
i*86-*)
seccomp_audit_arch=AUDIT_ARCH_I386
;;
arm*-*)
seccomp_audit_arch=AUDIT_ARCH_ARM
;;
aarch64*-*)
seccomp_audit_arch=AUDIT_ARCH_AARCH64
;;
s390x-*)
seccomp_audit_arch=AUDIT_ARCH_S390X
;;
s390-*)
seccomp_audit_arch=AUDIT_ARCH_S390
;;
powerpc64-*)
seccomp_audit_arch=AUDIT_ARCH_PPC64
;;
powerpc64le-*)
seccomp_audit_arch=AUDIT_ARCH_PPC64LE
;;
mips-*)
seccomp_audit_arch=AUDIT_ARCH_MIPS
;;
mipsel-*)
seccomp_audit_arch=AUDIT_ARCH_MIPSEL
;;
mips64-*)
case "$mips_abi" in
"n32")
seccomp_audit_arch=AUDIT_ARCH_MIPS64N32
;;
"n64")
seccomp_audit_arch=AUDIT_ARCH_MIPS64
;;
esac
;;
mips64el-*)
case "$mips_abi" in
"n32")
seccomp_audit_arch=AUDIT_ARCH_MIPSEL64N32
;;
"n64")
seccomp_audit_arch=AUDIT_ARCH_MIPSEL64
;;
esac
;;
+ riscv64-*)
+ seccomp_audit_arch=AUDIT_ARCH_RISCV64
+ ;;
esac
if test "x$seccomp_audit_arch" != "x" ; then
AC_MSG_RESULT(["$seccomp_audit_arch"])
AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED([SECCOMP_AUDIT_ARCH], [$seccomp_audit_arch],
[Specify the system call convention in use])
else
AC_MSG_RESULT([architecture not supported])
fi
;;
mips-sony-bsd|mips-sony-newsos4)
AC_DEFINE([NEED_SETPGRP], [1], [Need setpgrp to acquire controlling tty])
SONY=1
;;
*-*-netbsd*)
check_for_libcrypt_before=1
if test "x$withval" != "xno" ; then
rpath_opt="-R"
fi
CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS -D_OPENBSD_SOURCE"
AC_DEFINE([SSH_TUN_FREEBSD], [1], [Open tunnel devices the FreeBSD way])
AC_CHECK_HEADER([net/if_tap.h], ,
AC_DEFINE([SSH_TUN_NO_L2], [1], [No layer 2 tunnel support]))
AC_DEFINE([SSH_TUN_PREPEND_AF], [1],
[Prepend the address family to IP tunnel traffic])
TEST_MALLOC_OPTIONS="AJRX"
AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_READ_COMPARISON], [1],
[NetBSD read function is sometimes redirected, breaking atomicio comparisons against it])
;;
*-*-freebsd*)
check_for_libcrypt_later=1
AC_DEFINE([LOCKED_PASSWD_PREFIX], ["*LOCKED*"], [Account locked with pw(1)])
AC_DEFINE([SSH_TUN_FREEBSD], [1], [Open tunnel devices the FreeBSD way])
AC_CHECK_HEADER([net/if_tap.h], ,
AC_DEFINE([SSH_TUN_NO_L2], [1], [No layer 2 tunnel support]))
AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_GLOB], [1], [FreeBSD glob does not do what we need])
TEST_MALLOC_OPTIONS="AJRX"
# Preauth crypto occasionally uses file descriptors for crypto offload
# and will crash if they cannot be opened.
AC_DEFINE([SANDBOX_SKIP_RLIMIT_NOFILE], [1],
[define if setrlimit RLIMIT_NOFILE breaks things])
;;
*-*-bsdi*)
AC_DEFINE([SETEUID_BREAKS_SETUID])
AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_SETREUID])
AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_SETREGID])
;;
*-next-*)
conf_lastlog_location="/usr/adm/lastlog"
conf_utmp_location=/etc/utmp
conf_wtmp_location=/usr/adm/wtmp
maildir=/usr/spool/mail
AC_DEFINE([HAVE_NEXT], [1], [Define if you are on NeXT])
AC_DEFINE([USE_PIPES])
AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_SAVED_UIDS], [1], [Needed for NeXT])
;;
*-*-openbsd*)
use_pie=auto
AC_DEFINE([HAVE_ATTRIBUTE__SENTINEL__], [1], [OpenBSD's gcc has sentinel])
AC_DEFINE([HAVE_ATTRIBUTE__BOUNDED__], [1], [OpenBSD's gcc has bounded])
AC_DEFINE([SSH_TUN_OPENBSD], [1], [Open tunnel devices the OpenBSD way])
AC_DEFINE([SYSLOG_R_SAFE_IN_SIGHAND], [1],
[syslog_r function is safe to use in in a signal handler])
TEST_MALLOC_OPTIONS="AFGJPRX"
;;
*-*-solaris*)
if test "x$withval" != "xno" ; then
rpath_opt="-R"
fi
AC_DEFINE([PAM_SUN_CODEBASE])
AC_DEFINE([LOGIN_NEEDS_UTMPX])
AC_DEFINE([PAM_TTY_KLUDGE])
AC_DEFINE([SSHPAM_CHAUTHTOK_NEEDS_RUID], [1],
[Define if pam_chauthtok wants real uid set
to the unpriv'ed user])
AC_DEFINE([LOCKED_PASSWD_STRING], ["*LK*"])
# Pushing STREAMS modules will cause sshd to acquire a controlling tty.
AC_DEFINE([SSHD_ACQUIRES_CTTY], [1],
[Define if sshd somehow reacquires a controlling TTY
after setsid()])
AC_DEFINE([PASSWD_NEEDS_USERNAME], [1], [must supply username to passwd
in case the name is longer than 8 chars])
AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_TCGETATTR_ICANON], [1], [tcgetattr with ICANON may hang])
external_path_file=/etc/default/login
# hardwire lastlog location (can't detect it on some versions)
conf_lastlog_location="/var/adm/lastlog"
AC_MSG_CHECKING([for obsolete utmp and wtmp in solaris2.x])
sol2ver=`echo "$host"| sed -e 's/.*[[0-9]]\.//'`
if test "$sol2ver" -ge 8; then
AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])
AC_DEFINE([DISABLE_UTMP])
AC_DEFINE([DISABLE_WTMP], [1],
[Define if you don't want to use wtmp])
else
AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
fi
AC_CHECK_FUNCS([setpflags])
AC_CHECK_FUNCS([setppriv])
AC_CHECK_FUNCS([priv_basicset])
AC_CHECK_HEADERS([priv.h])
AC_ARG_WITH([solaris-contracts],
[ --with-solaris-contracts Enable Solaris process contracts (experimental)],
[
AC_CHECK_LIB([contract], [ct_tmpl_activate],
[ AC_DEFINE([USE_SOLARIS_PROCESS_CONTRACTS], [1],
[Define if you have Solaris process contracts])
LIBS="$LIBS -lcontract"
SPC_MSG="yes" ], )
],
)
AC_ARG_WITH([solaris-projects],
[ --with-solaris-projects Enable Solaris projects (experimental)],
[
AC_CHECK_LIB([project], [setproject],
[ AC_DEFINE([USE_SOLARIS_PROJECTS], [1],
[Define if you have Solaris projects])
LIBS="$LIBS -lproject"
SP_MSG="yes" ], )
],
)
AC_ARG_WITH([solaris-privs],
[ --with-solaris-privs Enable Solaris/Illumos privileges (experimental)],
[
AC_MSG_CHECKING([for Solaris/Illumos privilege support])
if test "x$ac_cv_func_setppriv" = "xyes" -a \
"x$ac_cv_header_priv_h" = "xyes" ; then
SOLARIS_PRIVS=yes
AC_MSG_RESULT([found])
AC_DEFINE([NO_UID_RESTORATION_TEST], [1],
[Define to disable UID restoration test])
AC_DEFINE([USE_SOLARIS_PRIVS], [1],
[Define if you have Solaris privileges])
SPP_MSG="yes"
else
AC_MSG_RESULT([not found])
AC_MSG_ERROR([*** must have support for Solaris privileges to use --with-solaris-privs])
fi
],
)
TEST_SHELL=$SHELL # let configure find us a capable shell
;;
*-*-sunos4*)
CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS -DSUNOS4"
AC_CHECK_FUNCS([getpwanam])
AC_DEFINE([PAM_SUN_CODEBASE])
conf_utmp_location=/etc/utmp
conf_wtmp_location=/var/adm/wtmp
conf_lastlog_location=/var/adm/lastlog
AC_DEFINE([USE_PIPES])
AC_DEFINE([DISABLE_UTMPX], [1], [no utmpx])
;;
*-ncr-sysv*)
LIBS="$LIBS -lc89"
AC_DEFINE([USE_PIPES])
AC_DEFINE([SSHD_ACQUIRES_CTTY])
AC_DEFINE([SETEUID_BREAKS_SETUID])
AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_SETREUID])
AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_SETREGID])
;;
*-sni-sysv*)
# /usr/ucblib MUST NOT be searched on ReliantUNIX
AC_CHECK_LIB([dl], [dlsym], ,)
# -lresolv needs to be at the end of LIBS or DNS lookups break
AC_CHECK_LIB([resolv], [res_query], [ LIBS="$LIBS -lresolv" ])
IPADDR_IN_DISPLAY=yes
AC_DEFINE([USE_PIPES])
AC_DEFINE([IP_TOS_IS_BROKEN])
AC_DEFINE([SETEUID_BREAKS_SETUID])
AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_SETREUID])
AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_SETREGID])
AC_DEFINE([SSHD_ACQUIRES_CTTY])
external_path_file=/etc/default/login
# /usr/ucblib/libucb.a no longer needed on ReliantUNIX
# Attention: always take care to bind libsocket and libnsl before libc,
# otherwise you will find lots of "SIOCGPGRP errno 22" on syslog
;;
# UnixWare 1.x, UnixWare 2.x, and others based on code from Univel.
*-*-sysv4.2*)
AC_DEFINE([USE_PIPES])
AC_DEFINE([SETEUID_BREAKS_SETUID])
AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_SETREUID])
AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_SETREGID])
AC_DEFINE([PASSWD_NEEDS_USERNAME], [1], [must supply username to passwd])
AC_DEFINE([LOCKED_PASSWD_STRING], ["*LK*"])
TEST_SHELL=$SHELL # let configure find us a capable shell
;;
# UnixWare 7.x, OpenUNIX 8
*-*-sysv5*)
CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS -Dvsnprintf=_xvsnprintf -Dsnprintf=_xsnprintf"
AC_DEFINE([UNIXWARE_LONG_PASSWORDS], [1], [Support passwords > 8 chars])
AC_DEFINE([USE_PIPES])
AC_DEFINE([SETEUID_BREAKS_SETUID])
AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_GETADDRINFO])
AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_SETREUID])
AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_SETREGID])
AC_DEFINE([PASSWD_NEEDS_USERNAME])
AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_TCGETATTR_ICANON])
TEST_SHELL=$SHELL # let configure find us a capable shell
check_for_libcrypt_later=1
case "$host" in
*-*-sysv5SCO_SV*) # SCO OpenServer 6.x
maildir=/var/spool/mail
AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_UPDWTMPX])
AC_CHECK_LIB([prot], [getluid], [ LIBS="$LIBS -lprot"
AC_CHECK_FUNCS([getluid setluid], , , [-lprot])
], , )
;;
*) AC_DEFINE([LOCKED_PASSWD_STRING], ["*LK*"])
;;
esac
;;
*-*-sysv*)
;;
# SCO UNIX and OEM versions of SCO UNIX
*-*-sco3.2v4*)
AC_MSG_ERROR("This Platform is no longer supported.")
;;
# SCO OpenServer 5.x
*-*-sco3.2v5*)
if test -z "$GCC"; then
CFLAGS="$CFLAGS -belf"
fi
LIBS="$LIBS -lprot -lx -ltinfo -lm"
no_dev_ptmx=1
AC_DEFINE([USE_PIPES])
AC_DEFINE([HAVE_SECUREWARE])
AC_DEFINE([DISABLE_SHADOW])
AC_DEFINE([DISABLE_FD_PASSING])
AC_DEFINE([SETEUID_BREAKS_SETUID])
AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_GETADDRINFO])
AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_SETREUID])
AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_SETREGID])
AC_DEFINE([WITH_ABBREV_NO_TTY])
AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_UPDWTMPX])
AC_DEFINE([PASSWD_NEEDS_USERNAME])
AC_CHECK_FUNCS([getluid setluid])
MANTYPE=man
TEST_SHELL=$SHELL # let configure find us a capable shell
SKIP_DISABLE_LASTLOG_DEFINE=yes
;;
*-dec-osf*)
AC_MSG_CHECKING([for Digital Unix SIA])
no_osfsia=""
AC_ARG_WITH([osfsia],
[ --with-osfsia Enable Digital Unix SIA],
[
if test "x$withval" = "xno" ; then
AC_MSG_RESULT([disabled])
no_osfsia=1
fi
],
)
if test -z "$no_osfsia" ; then
if test -f /etc/sia/matrix.conf; then
AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])
AC_DEFINE([HAVE_OSF_SIA], [1],
[Define if you have Digital Unix Security
Integration Architecture])
AC_DEFINE([DISABLE_LOGIN], [1],
[Define if you don't want to use your
system's login() call])
AC_DEFINE([DISABLE_FD_PASSING])
LIBS="$LIBS -lsecurity -ldb -lm -laud"
SIA_MSG="yes"
else
AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
AC_DEFINE([LOCKED_PASSWD_SUBSTR], ["Nologin"],
[String used in /etc/passwd to denote locked account])
fi
fi
AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_GETADDRINFO])
AC_DEFINE([SETEUID_BREAKS_SETUID])
AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_SETREUID])
AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_SETREGID])
AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_READV_COMPARISON], [1], [Can't do comparisons on readv])
;;
*-*-nto-qnx*)
AC_DEFINE([USE_PIPES])
AC_DEFINE([NO_X11_UNIX_SOCKETS])
AC_DEFINE([DISABLE_LASTLOG])
AC_DEFINE([SSHD_ACQUIRES_CTTY])
AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_SHADOW_EXPIRE], [1], [QNX shadow support is broken])
enable_etc_default_login=no # has incompatible /etc/default/login
case "$host" in
*-*-nto-qnx6*)
AC_DEFINE([DISABLE_FD_PASSING])
;;
esac
;;
*-*-ultrix*)
AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_GETGROUPS], [1], [getgroups(0,NULL) will return -1])
AC_DEFINE([NEED_SETPGRP], [1], [Need setpgrp to for controlling tty])
AC_DEFINE([HAVE_SYS_SYSLOG_H], [1], [Force use of sys/syslog.h on Ultrix])
AC_DEFINE([DISABLE_UTMPX], [1], [Disable utmpx])
# DISABLE_FD_PASSING so that we call setpgrp as root, otherwise we
# don't get a controlling tty.
AC_DEFINE([DISABLE_FD_PASSING], [1], [Need to call setpgrp as root])
# On Ultrix some headers are not protected against multiple includes,
# so we create wrappers and put it where the compiler will find it.
AC_MSG_WARN([creating compat wrappers for headers])
mkdir -p netinet
for header in netinet/ip.h netdb.h resolv.h; do
name=`echo $header | tr 'a-z/.' 'A-Z__'`
cat >$header <<EOD
#ifndef _SSH_COMPAT_${name}
#define _SSH_COMPAT_${name}
#include "/usr/include/${header}"
#endif
EOD
done
;;
*-*-lynxos)
CFLAGS="$CFLAGS -D__NO_INCLUDE_WARN__"
AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_SETVBUF], [1],
[LynxOS has broken setvbuf() implementation])
;;
esac
AC_MSG_CHECKING([compiler and flags for sanity])
-AC_RUN_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include <stdio.h> ]], [[ exit(0); ]])],
+AC_RUN_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include <stdlib.h> ]], [[ exit(0); ]])],
[ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) ],
[
AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
AC_MSG_ERROR([*** compiler cannot create working executables, check config.log ***])
],
[ AC_MSG_WARN([cross compiling: not checking compiler sanity]) ]
)
dnl Checks for header files.
# Checks for libraries.
AC_CHECK_FUNC([setsockopt], , [AC_CHECK_LIB([socket], [setsockopt])])
dnl IRIX and Solaris 2.5.1 have dirname() in libgen
AC_CHECK_FUNCS([dirname], [AC_CHECK_HEADERS([libgen.h])] , [
AC_CHECK_LIB([gen], [dirname], [
AC_CACHE_CHECK([for broken dirname],
ac_cv_have_broken_dirname, [
save_LIBS="$LIBS"
LIBS="$LIBS -lgen"
AC_RUN_IFELSE(
[AC_LANG_SOURCE([[
#include <libgen.h>
#include <string.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
int main(int argc, char **argv) {
char *s, buf[32];
strncpy(buf,"/etc", 32);
s = dirname(buf);
if (!s || strncmp(s, "/", 32) != 0) {
exit(1);
} else {
exit(0);
}
}
]])],
[ ac_cv_have_broken_dirname="no" ],
[ ac_cv_have_broken_dirname="yes" ],
[ ac_cv_have_broken_dirname="no" ],
)
LIBS="$save_LIBS"
])
if test "x$ac_cv_have_broken_dirname" = "xno" ; then
LIBS="$LIBS -lgen"
AC_DEFINE([HAVE_DIRNAME])
AC_CHECK_HEADERS([libgen.h])
fi
])
])
AC_CHECK_FUNC([getspnam], ,
[AC_CHECK_LIB([gen], [getspnam], [LIBS="$LIBS -lgen"])])
AC_SEARCH_LIBS([basename], [gen], [AC_DEFINE([HAVE_BASENAME], [1],
[Define if you have the basename function.])])
dnl zlib defaults to enabled
zlib=yes
AC_ARG_WITH([zlib],
[ --with-zlib=PATH Use zlib in PATH],
[ if test "x$withval" = "xno" ; then
zlib=no
elif test "x$withval" != "xyes"; then
if test -d "$withval/lib"; then
if test -n "${rpath_opt}"; then
LDFLAGS="-L${withval}/lib ${rpath_opt}${withval}/lib ${LDFLAGS}"
else
LDFLAGS="-L${withval}/lib ${LDFLAGS}"
fi
else
if test -n "${rpath_opt}"; then
LDFLAGS="-L${withval} ${rpath_opt}${withval} ${LDFLAGS}"
else
LDFLAGS="-L${withval} ${LDFLAGS}"
fi
fi
if test -d "$withval/include"; then
CPPFLAGS="-I${withval}/include ${CPPFLAGS}"
else
CPPFLAGS="-I${withval} ${CPPFLAGS}"
fi
fi ]
)
AC_MSG_CHECKING([for zlib])
if test "x${zlib}" = "xno"; then
AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
else
AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])
AC_DEFINE([WITH_ZLIB], [1], [Enable zlib])
AC_CHECK_HEADER([zlib.h], ,[AC_MSG_ERROR([*** zlib.h missing - please install first or check config.log ***])])
AC_CHECK_LIB([z], [deflate], ,
[
saved_CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS"
saved_LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS"
save_LIBS="$LIBS"
dnl Check default zlib install dir
if test -n "${rpath_opt}"; then
LDFLAGS="-L/usr/local/lib ${rpath_opt}/usr/local/lib ${saved_LDFLAGS}"
else
LDFLAGS="-L/usr/local/lib ${saved_LDFLAGS}"
fi
CPPFLAGS="-I/usr/local/include ${saved_CPPFLAGS}"
LIBS="$LIBS -lz"
AC_TRY_LINK_FUNC([deflate], [AC_DEFINE([HAVE_LIBZ])],
[
AC_MSG_ERROR([*** zlib missing - please install first or check config.log ***])
]
)
]
)
AC_ARG_WITH([zlib-version-check],
[ --without-zlib-version-check Disable zlib version check],
[ if test "x$withval" = "xno" ; then
zlib_check_nonfatal=1
fi
]
)
AC_MSG_CHECKING([for possibly buggy zlib])
AC_RUN_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <zlib.h>
]],
[[
int a=0, b=0, c=0, d=0, n, v;
n = sscanf(ZLIB_VERSION, "%d.%d.%d.%d", &a, &b, &c, &d);
if (n != 3 && n != 4)
exit(1);
v = a*1000000 + b*10000 + c*100 + d;
fprintf(stderr, "found zlib version %s (%d)\n", ZLIB_VERSION, v);
/* 1.1.4 is OK */
if (a == 1 && b == 1 && c >= 4)
exit(0);
/* 1.2.3 and up are OK */
if (v >= 1020300)
exit(0);
exit(2);
]])],
AC_MSG_RESULT([no]),
[ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])
if test -z "$zlib_check_nonfatal" ; then
AC_MSG_ERROR([*** zlib too old - check config.log ***
Your reported zlib version has known security problems. It's possible your
vendor has fixed these problems without changing the version number. If you
are sure this is the case, you can disable the check by running
"./configure --without-zlib-version-check".
If you are in doubt, upgrade zlib to version 1.2.3 or greater.
See http://www.gzip.org/zlib/ for details.])
else
AC_MSG_WARN([zlib version may have security problems])
fi
],
[ AC_MSG_WARN([cross compiling: not checking zlib version]) ]
)
fi
dnl UnixWare 2.x
AC_CHECK_FUNC([strcasecmp],
[], [ AC_CHECK_LIB([resolv], [strcasecmp], [LIBS="$LIBS -lresolv"]) ]
)
AC_CHECK_FUNCS([utimes],
[], [ AC_CHECK_LIB([c89], [utimes], [AC_DEFINE([HAVE_UTIMES])
LIBS="$LIBS -lc89"]) ]
)
dnl Checks for libutil functions
AC_CHECK_HEADERS([bsd/libutil.h libutil.h])
AC_SEARCH_LIBS([fmt_scaled], [util bsd])
AC_SEARCH_LIBS([scan_scaled], [util bsd])
AC_SEARCH_LIBS([login], [util bsd])
AC_SEARCH_LIBS([logout], [util bsd])
AC_SEARCH_LIBS([logwtmp], [util bsd])
AC_SEARCH_LIBS([openpty], [util bsd])
AC_SEARCH_LIBS([updwtmp], [util bsd])
AC_CHECK_FUNCS([fmt_scaled scan_scaled login logout openpty updwtmp logwtmp])
# On some platforms, inet_ntop and gethostbyname may be found in libresolv
# or libnsl.
AC_SEARCH_LIBS([inet_ntop], [resolv nsl])
AC_SEARCH_LIBS([gethostbyname], [resolv nsl])
# "Particular Function Checks"
# see https://www.gnu.org/software/autoconf/manual/autoconf-2.69/html_node/Particular-Functions.html
AC_FUNC_STRFTIME
AC_FUNC_MALLOC
AC_FUNC_REALLOC
# autoconf doesn't have AC_FUNC_CALLOC so fake it if malloc returns NULL;
AC_MSG_CHECKING([if calloc(0, N) returns non-null])
AC_RUN_IFELSE(
[AC_LANG_PROGRAM(
[[ #include <stdlib.h> ]],
[[ void *p = calloc(0, 1); exit(p == NULL); ]]
)],
[ func_calloc_0_nonnull=yes ],
[ func_calloc_0_nonnull=no ],
[ AC_MSG_WARN([cross compiling: assuming same as malloc])
func_calloc_0_nonnull="$ac_cv_func_malloc_0_nonnull"]
)
AC_MSG_RESULT([$func_calloc_0_nonnull])
if test "x$func_calloc_0_nonnull" = "xyes"; then
AC_DEFINE(HAVE_CALLOC, 1, [calloc(0, x) returns non-null])
else
AC_DEFINE(HAVE_CALLOC, 0, [calloc(0, x) returns NULL])
AC_DEFINE(calloc, rpl_calloc,
[Define to rpl_calloc if the replacement function should be used.])
fi
# Check for ALTDIRFUNC glob() extension
AC_MSG_CHECKING([for GLOB_ALTDIRFUNC support])
AC_EGREP_CPP([FOUNDIT],
[
#include <glob.h>
#ifdef GLOB_ALTDIRFUNC
FOUNDIT
#endif
],
[
AC_DEFINE([GLOB_HAS_ALTDIRFUNC], [1],
[Define if your system glob() function has
the GLOB_ALTDIRFUNC extension])
AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])
],
[
AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
]
)
# Check for g.gl_matchc glob() extension
AC_MSG_CHECKING([for gl_matchc field in glob_t])
AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include <glob.h> ]],
[[ glob_t g; g.gl_matchc = 1; ]])],
[
AC_DEFINE([GLOB_HAS_GL_MATCHC], [1],
[Define if your system glob() function has
gl_matchc options in glob_t])
AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])
], [
AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
])
# Check for g.gl_statv glob() extension
AC_MSG_CHECKING([for gl_statv and GLOB_KEEPSTAT extensions for glob])
AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include <glob.h> ]], [[
#ifndef GLOB_KEEPSTAT
#error "glob does not support GLOB_KEEPSTAT extension"
#endif
glob_t g;
g.gl_statv = NULL;
]])],
[
AC_DEFINE([GLOB_HAS_GL_STATV], [1],
[Define if your system glob() function has
gl_statv options in glob_t])
AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])
], [
AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
])
AC_CHECK_DECLS([GLOB_NOMATCH], , , [#include <glob.h>])
AC_CHECK_DECL([VIS_ALL], ,
AC_DEFINE(BROKEN_STRNVIS, 1, [missing VIS_ALL]), [#include <vis.h>])
AC_MSG_CHECKING([whether struct dirent allocates space for d_name])
AC_RUN_IFELSE(
[AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
#include <sys/types.h>
-#include <dirent.h>]],
+#include <dirent.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+ ]],
[[
struct dirent d;
exit(sizeof(d.d_name)<=sizeof(char));
]])],
[AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])],
[
AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_ONE_BYTE_DIRENT_D_NAME], [1],
[Define if your struct dirent expects you to
allocate extra space for d_name])
],
[
AC_MSG_WARN([cross compiling: assuming BROKEN_ONE_BYTE_DIRENT_D_NAME])
AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_ONE_BYTE_DIRENT_D_NAME])
]
)
AC_MSG_CHECKING([for /proc/pid/fd directory])
if test -d "/proc/$$/fd" ; then
AC_DEFINE([HAVE_PROC_PID], [1], [Define if you have /proc/$pid/fd])
AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])
else
AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
fi
# Check whether user wants to use ldns
LDNS_MSG="no"
AC_ARG_WITH(ldns,
[ --with-ldns[[=PATH]] Use ldns for DNSSEC support (optionally in PATH)],
[
ldns=""
if test "x$withval" = "xyes" ; then
AC_PATH_TOOL([LDNSCONFIG], [ldns-config], [no])
if test "x$LDNSCONFIG" = "xno"; then
LIBS="-lldns $LIBS"
ldns=yes
else
LIBS="$LIBS `$LDNSCONFIG --libs`"
CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS `$LDNSCONFIG --cflags`"
ldns=yes
fi
elif test "x$withval" != "xno" ; then
CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS -I${withval}/include"
LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS -L${withval}/lib"
LIBS="-lldns $LIBS"
ldns=yes
fi
# Verify that it works.
if test "x$ldns" = "xyes" ; then
AC_DEFINE(HAVE_LDNS, 1, [Define if you want ldns support])
LDNS_MSG="yes"
AC_MSG_CHECKING([for ldns support])
AC_LINK_IFELSE(
[AC_LANG_SOURCE([[
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#ifdef HAVE_STDINT_H
# include <stdint.h>
#endif
#include <ldns/ldns.h>
int main() { ldns_status status = ldns_verify_trusted(NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL); status=LDNS_STATUS_OK; exit(0); }
]])
],
[AC_MSG_RESULT(yes)],
[
AC_MSG_RESULT(no)
AC_MSG_ERROR([** Incomplete or missing ldns libraries.])
])
fi
])
# Check whether user wants libedit support
LIBEDIT_MSG="no"
AC_ARG_WITH([libedit],
[ --with-libedit[[=PATH]] Enable libedit support for sftp],
[ if test "x$withval" != "xno" ; then
if test "x$withval" = "xyes" ; then
AC_PATH_TOOL([PKGCONFIG], [pkg-config], [no])
if test "x$PKGCONFIG" != "xno"; then
AC_MSG_CHECKING([if $PKGCONFIG knows about libedit])
if "$PKGCONFIG" libedit; then
AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])
use_pkgconfig_for_libedit=yes
else
AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
fi
fi
else
CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS -I${withval}/include"
if test -n "${rpath_opt}"; then
LDFLAGS="-L${withval}/lib ${rpath_opt}${withval}/lib ${LDFLAGS}"
else
LDFLAGS="-L${withval}/lib ${LDFLAGS}"
fi
fi
if test "x$use_pkgconfig_for_libedit" = "xyes"; then
LIBEDIT=`$PKGCONFIG --libs libedit`
CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS `$PKGCONFIG --cflags libedit`"
else
LIBEDIT="-ledit -lcurses"
fi
OTHERLIBS=`echo $LIBEDIT | sed 's/-ledit//'`
AC_CHECK_LIB([edit], [el_init],
[ AC_DEFINE([USE_LIBEDIT], [1], [Use libedit for sftp])
LIBEDIT_MSG="yes"
AC_SUBST([LIBEDIT])
],
[ AC_MSG_ERROR([libedit not found]) ],
[ $OTHERLIBS ]
)
AC_MSG_CHECKING([if libedit version is compatible])
AC_COMPILE_IFELSE(
- [AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include <histedit.h> ]],
+ [AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
+#include <histedit.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+ ]],
[[
int i = H_SETSIZE;
el_init("", NULL, NULL, NULL);
exit(0);
]])],
[ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) ],
[ AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
AC_MSG_ERROR([libedit version is not compatible]) ]
)
fi ]
)
AUDIT_MODULE=none
AC_ARG_WITH([audit],
[ --with-audit=module Enable audit support (modules=debug,bsm,linux)],
[
AC_MSG_CHECKING([for supported audit module])
case "$withval" in
bsm)
AC_MSG_RESULT([bsm])
AUDIT_MODULE=bsm
dnl Checks for headers, libs and functions
AC_CHECK_HEADERS([bsm/audit.h], [],
[AC_MSG_ERROR([BSM enabled and bsm/audit.h not found])],
[
#ifdef HAVE_TIME_H
# include <time.h>
#endif
]
)
AC_CHECK_LIB([bsm], [getaudit], [],
[AC_MSG_ERROR([BSM enabled and required library not found])])
AC_CHECK_FUNCS([getaudit], [],
[AC_MSG_ERROR([BSM enabled and required function not found])])
# These are optional
AC_CHECK_FUNCS([getaudit_addr aug_get_machine])
AC_DEFINE([USE_BSM_AUDIT], [1], [Use BSM audit module])
if test "$sol2ver" -ge 11; then
SSHDLIBS="$SSHDLIBS -lscf"
AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_BSM_API], [1],
[The system has incomplete BSM API])
fi
;;
linux)
AC_MSG_RESULT([linux])
AUDIT_MODULE=linux
dnl Checks for headers, libs and functions
AC_CHECK_HEADERS([libaudit.h])
SSHDLIBS="$SSHDLIBS -laudit"
AC_DEFINE([USE_LINUX_AUDIT], [1], [Use Linux audit module])
;;
debug)
AUDIT_MODULE=debug
AC_MSG_RESULT([debug])
AC_DEFINE([SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS], [1], [Use audit debugging module])
;;
no)
AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
;;
*)
AC_MSG_ERROR([Unknown audit module $withval])
;;
esac ]
)
AC_ARG_WITH([pie],
[ --with-pie Build Position Independent Executables if possible], [
if test "x$withval" = "xno"; then
use_pie=no
fi
if test "x$withval" = "xyes"; then
use_pie=yes
fi
]
)
if test "x$use_pie" = "x"; then
use_pie=no
fi
if test "x$use_toolchain_hardening" != "x1" && test "x$use_pie" = "xauto"; then
# Turn off automatic PIE when toolchain hardening is off.
use_pie=no
fi
if test "x$use_pie" = "xauto"; then
# Automatic PIE requires gcc >= 4.x
AC_MSG_CHECKING([for gcc >= 4.x])
AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_SOURCE([[
#if !defined(__GNUC__) || __GNUC__ < 4
#error gcc is too old
#endif
]])],
[ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) ],
[ AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
use_pie=no ]
)
fi
if test "x$use_pie" != "xno"; then
SAVED_CFLAGS="$CFLAGS"
SAVED_LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS"
OSSH_CHECK_CFLAG_COMPILE([-fPIE])
OSSH_CHECK_LDFLAG_LINK([-pie])
# We use both -fPIE and -pie or neither.
AC_MSG_CHECKING([whether both -fPIE and -pie are supported])
if echo "x $CFLAGS" | grep ' -fPIE' >/dev/null 2>&1 && \
echo "x $LDFLAGS" | grep ' -pie' >/dev/null 2>&1 ; then
AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])
else
AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
CFLAGS="$SAVED_CFLAGS"
LDFLAGS="$SAVED_LDFLAGS"
fi
fi
AC_MSG_CHECKING([whether -fPIC is accepted])
SAVED_CFLAGS="$CFLAGS"
CFLAGS="$CFLAGS -fPIC"
AC_COMPILE_IFELSE(
[AC_LANG_PROGRAM( [[ #include <stdlib.h> ]], [[ exit(0); ]] )],
[AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])
PICFLAG="-fPIC"; ],
[AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
PICFLAG=""; ])
CFLAGS="$SAVED_CFLAGS"
AC_SUBST([PICFLAG])
dnl Checks for library functions. Please keep in alphabetical order
AC_CHECK_FUNCS([ \
Blowfish_initstate \
Blowfish_expandstate \
Blowfish_expand0state \
Blowfish_stream2word \
SHA256Update \
SHA384Update \
SHA512Update \
asprintf \
b64_ntop \
__b64_ntop \
b64_pton \
__b64_pton \
bcopy \
bcrypt_pbkdf \
bindresvport_sa \
blf_enc \
bzero \
cap_rights_limit \
clock \
closefrom \
dirfd \
endgrent \
err \
errx \
explicit_bzero \
fchmod \
fchmodat \
fchown \
fchownat \
flock \
fnmatch \
freeaddrinfo \
freezero \
fstatfs \
fstatvfs \
futimes \
getaddrinfo \
getcwd \
getgrouplist \
getline \
getnameinfo \
getopt \
getpagesize \
getpeereid \
getpeerucred \
getpgid \
_getpty \
getrlimit \
getrandom \
getsid \
getttyent \
glob \
group_from_gid \
inet_aton \
inet_ntoa \
inet_ntop \
innetgr \
llabs \
localtime_r \
login_getcapbool \
md5_crypt \
memmem \
memmove \
memset_s \
mkdtemp \
ngetaddrinfo \
nsleep \
ogetaddrinfo \
openlog_r \
pledge \
poll \
prctl \
pstat \
raise \
readpassphrase \
reallocarray \
realpath \
recvmsg \
recallocarray \
rresvport_af \
sendmsg \
setdtablesize \
setegid \
setenv \
seteuid \
setgroupent \
setgroups \
setlinebuf \
setlogin \
setpassent\
setpcred \
setproctitle \
setregid \
setreuid \
setrlimit \
setsid \
setvbuf \
sigaction \
sigvec \
snprintf \
socketpair \
statfs \
statvfs \
strcasestr \
strdup \
strerror \
strlcat \
strlcpy \
strmode \
strndup \
strnlen \
strnvis \
strptime \
strsignal \
strtonum \
strtoll \
strtoul \
strtoull \
swap32 \
sysconf \
tcgetpgrp \
timingsafe_bcmp \
truncate \
unsetenv \
updwtmpx \
utimensat \
user_from_uid \
usleep \
vasprintf \
vsnprintf \
waitpid \
warn \
])
AC_CHECK_DECLS([bzero, memmem])
dnl Wide character support.
AC_CHECK_FUNCS([mblen mbtowc nl_langinfo wcwidth])
TEST_SSH_UTF8=${TEST_SSH_UTF8:=yes}
AC_MSG_CHECKING([for utf8 locale support])
AC_RUN_IFELSE(
[AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
#include <locale.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
]], [[
char *loc = setlocale(LC_CTYPE, "en_US.UTF-8");
if (loc != NULL)
exit(0);
exit(1);
]])],
AC_MSG_RESULT(yes),
[AC_MSG_RESULT(no)
TEST_SSH_UTF8=no],
AC_MSG_WARN([cross compiling: assuming yes])
)
AC_LINK_IFELSE(
[AC_LANG_PROGRAM(
[[ #include <ctype.h> ]],
[[ return (isblank('a')); ]])],
[AC_DEFINE([HAVE_ISBLANK], [1], [Define if you have isblank(3C).])
])
disable_pkcs11=
AC_ARG_ENABLE([pkcs11],
[ --disable-pkcs11 disable PKCS#11 support code [no]],
[
if test "x$enableval" = "xno" ; then
disable_pkcs11=1
fi
]
)
disable_sk=
AC_ARG_ENABLE([security-key],
[ --disable-security-key disable U2F/FIDO support code [no]],
[
if test "x$enableval" = "xno" ; then
disable_sk=1
fi
]
)
enable_sk_internal=
AC_ARG_WITH([security-key-builtin],
[ --with-security-key-builtin include builtin U2F/FIDO support],
[
if test "x$withval" != "xno" ; then
enable_sk_internal=yes
fi
]
)
test "x$disable_sk" != "x" && enable_sk_internal=""
AC_SEARCH_LIBS([dlopen], [dl])
AC_CHECK_FUNCS([dlopen])
AC_CHECK_DECL([RTLD_NOW], [], [], [#include <dlfcn.h>])
# IRIX has a const char return value for gai_strerror()
AC_CHECK_FUNCS([gai_strerror], [
AC_DEFINE([HAVE_GAI_STRERROR])
AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/socket.h>
#include <netdb.h>
const char *gai_strerror(int);
]], [[
char *str;
str = gai_strerror(0);
]])], [
AC_DEFINE([HAVE_CONST_GAI_STRERROR_PROTO], [1],
[Define if gai_strerror() returns const char *])], [])])
AC_SEARCH_LIBS([nanosleep], [rt posix4], [AC_DEFINE([HAVE_NANOSLEEP], [1],
[Some systems put nanosleep outside of libc])])
AC_SEARCH_LIBS([clock_gettime], [rt],
[AC_DEFINE([HAVE_CLOCK_GETTIME], [1], [Have clock_gettime])])
dnl check if we need -D_REENTRANT for localtime_r declaration.
AC_CHECK_DECL([localtime_r], [],
[ saved_CPPFLAGS="$CFLAGS"
CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS -D_REENTRANT"
unset ac_cv_have_decl_localtime_r
AC_CHECK_DECL([localtime_r], [],
[ CPPFLAGS="$saved_CPPFLAGS" ],
[ #include <time.h> ]
)
],
[ #include <time.h> ]
)
dnl Make sure prototypes are defined for these before using them.
AC_CHECK_DECL([strsep],
[AC_CHECK_FUNCS([strsep])],
[],
[
#ifdef HAVE_STRING_H
# include <string.h>
#endif
])
dnl tcsendbreak might be a macro
AC_CHECK_DECL([tcsendbreak],
[AC_DEFINE([HAVE_TCSENDBREAK])],
[AC_CHECK_FUNCS([tcsendbreak])],
[#include <termios.h>]
)
AC_CHECK_DECLS([h_errno], , ,[#include <netdb.h>])
AC_CHECK_DECLS([SHUT_RD, getpeereid], , ,
[
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/socket.h>
#include <unistd.h>
])
AC_CHECK_DECLS([O_NONBLOCK], , ,
[
#include <sys/types.h>
#ifdef HAVE_SYS_STAT_H
# include <sys/stat.h>
#endif
#ifdef HAVE_FCNTL_H
# include <fcntl.h>
#endif
])
AC_CHECK_DECLS([readv, writev], , , [
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/uio.h>
#include <unistd.h>
])
AC_CHECK_DECLS([MAXSYMLINKS], , , [
#include <sys/param.h>
])
AC_CHECK_DECLS([offsetof], , , [
#include <stddef.h>
])
# extra bits for select(2)
AC_CHECK_DECLS([howmany, NFDBITS], [], [], [[
#include <sys/param.h>
#include <sys/types.h>
#ifdef HAVE_SYS_SYSMACROS_H
#include <sys/sysmacros.h>
#endif
#ifdef HAVE_SYS_SELECT_H
#include <sys/select.h>
#endif
#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TIME_H
#include <sys/time.h>
#endif
#ifdef HAVE_UNISTD_H
#include <unistd.h>
#endif
]])
AC_CHECK_TYPES([fd_mask], [], [], [[
#include <sys/param.h>
#include <sys/types.h>
#ifdef HAVE_SYS_SELECT_H
#include <sys/select.h>
#endif
#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TIME_H
#include <sys/time.h>
#endif
#ifdef HAVE_UNISTD_H
#include <unistd.h>
#endif
]])
AC_CHECK_FUNCS([setresuid], [
dnl Some platorms have setresuid that isn't implemented, test for this
AC_MSG_CHECKING([if setresuid seems to work])
AC_RUN_IFELSE(
[AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <errno.h>
]], [[
errno=0;
setresuid(0,0,0);
if (errno==ENOSYS)
exit(1);
else
exit(0);
]])],
[AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])],
[AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_SETRESUID], [1],
[Define if your setresuid() is broken])
AC_MSG_RESULT([not implemented])],
[AC_MSG_WARN([cross compiling: not checking setresuid])]
)
])
AC_CHECK_FUNCS([setresgid], [
dnl Some platorms have setresgid that isn't implemented, test for this
AC_MSG_CHECKING([if setresgid seems to work])
AC_RUN_IFELSE(
[AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <errno.h>
]], [[
errno=0;
setresgid(0,0,0);
if (errno==ENOSYS)
exit(1);
else
exit(0);
]])],
[AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])],
[AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_SETRESGID], [1],
[Define if your setresgid() is broken])
AC_MSG_RESULT([not implemented])],
[AC_MSG_WARN([cross compiling: not checking setresuid])]
)
])
AC_MSG_CHECKING([for working fflush(NULL)])
AC_RUN_IFELSE(
- [AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[#include <stdio.h>]], [[fflush(NULL); exit(0);]])],
+ [AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+ ]],
+ [[fflush(NULL); exit(0);]])],
AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]),
[AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
AC_DEFINE([FFLUSH_NULL_BUG], [1],
[define if fflush(NULL) does not work])],
AC_MSG_WARN([cross compiling: assuming working])
)
dnl Checks for time functions
AC_CHECK_FUNCS([gettimeofday time])
dnl Checks for utmp functions
AC_CHECK_FUNCS([endutent getutent getutid getutline pututline setutent])
AC_CHECK_FUNCS([utmpname])
dnl Checks for utmpx functions
AC_CHECK_FUNCS([endutxent getutxent getutxid getutxline getutxuser pututxline])
AC_CHECK_FUNCS([setutxdb setutxent utmpxname])
dnl Checks for lastlog functions
AC_CHECK_FUNCS([getlastlogxbyname])
AC_CHECK_FUNC([daemon],
[AC_DEFINE([HAVE_DAEMON], [1], [Define if your libraries define daemon()])],
[AC_CHECK_LIB([bsd], [daemon],
[LIBS="$LIBS -lbsd"; AC_DEFINE([HAVE_DAEMON])])]
)
AC_CHECK_FUNC([getpagesize],
[AC_DEFINE([HAVE_GETPAGESIZE], [1],
[Define if your libraries define getpagesize()])],
[AC_CHECK_LIB([ucb], [getpagesize],
[LIBS="$LIBS -lucb"; AC_DEFINE([HAVE_GETPAGESIZE])])]
)
# Check for broken snprintf
if test "x$ac_cv_func_snprintf" = "xyes" ; then
AC_MSG_CHECKING([whether snprintf correctly terminates long strings])
AC_RUN_IFELSE(
- [AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include <stdio.h> ]],
+ [AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+ ]],
[[
char b[5];
snprintf(b,5,"123456789");
exit(b[4]!='\0');
]])],
[AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])],
[
AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_SNPRINTF], [1],
[Define if your snprintf is busted])
AC_MSG_WARN([****** Your snprintf() function is broken, complain to your vendor])
],
[ AC_MSG_WARN([cross compiling: Assuming working snprintf()]) ]
)
fi
if test "x$ac_cv_func_snprintf" = "xyes" ; then
AC_MSG_CHECKING([whether snprintf understands %zu])
AC_RUN_IFELSE(
[AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
]],
[[
size_t a = 1, b = 2;
char z[128];
snprintf(z, sizeof z, "%zu%zu", a, b);
exit(strcmp(z, "12"));
]])],
[AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])],
[
AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_SNPRINTF], [1],
[snprintf does not understand %zu])
],
[ AC_MSG_WARN([cross compiling: Assuming working snprintf()]) ]
)
fi
# We depend on vsnprintf returning the right thing on overflow: the
# number of characters it tried to create (as per SUSv3)
if test "x$ac_cv_func_vsnprintf" = "xyes" ; then
AC_MSG_CHECKING([whether vsnprintf returns correct values on overflow])
AC_RUN_IFELSE(
[AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdarg.h>
int x_snprintf(char *str, size_t count, const char *fmt, ...)
{
size_t ret;
va_list ap;
va_start(ap, fmt);
ret = vsnprintf(str, count, fmt, ap);
va_end(ap);
return ret;
}
]], [[
char x[1];
if (x_snprintf(x, 1, "%s %d", "hello", 12345) != 11)
return 1;
if (x_snprintf(NULL, 0, "%s %d", "hello", 12345) != 11)
return 1;
return 0;
]])],
[AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])],
[
AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_SNPRINTF], [1],
[Define if your snprintf is busted])
AC_MSG_WARN([****** Your vsnprintf() function is broken, complain to your vendor])
],
[ AC_MSG_WARN([cross compiling: Assuming working vsnprintf()]) ]
)
fi
# On systems where [v]snprintf is broken, but is declared in stdio,
# check that the fmt argument is const char * or just char *.
# This is only useful for when BROKEN_SNPRINTF
AC_MSG_CHECKING([whether snprintf can declare const char *fmt])
AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
#include <stdio.h>
int snprintf(char *a, size_t b, const char *c, ...) { return 0; }
]], [[
snprintf(0, 0, 0);
]])],
[AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])
AC_DEFINE([SNPRINTF_CONST], [const],
[Define as const if snprintf() can declare const char *fmt])],
[AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
AC_DEFINE([SNPRINTF_CONST], [/* not const */])])
# Check for missing getpeereid (or equiv) support
NO_PEERCHECK=""
if test "x$ac_cv_func_getpeereid" != "xyes" -a "x$ac_cv_func_getpeerucred" != "xyes"; then
AC_MSG_CHECKING([whether system supports SO_PEERCRED getsockopt])
AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/socket.h>]], [[int i = SO_PEERCRED;]])],
[ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])
AC_DEFINE([HAVE_SO_PEERCRED], [1], [Have PEERCRED socket option])
], [AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
NO_PEERCHECK=1
])
fi
dnl see whether mkstemp() requires XXXXXX
if test "x$ac_cv_func_mkdtemp" = "xyes" ; then
AC_MSG_CHECKING([for (overly) strict mkstemp])
AC_RUN_IFELSE(
[AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
]], [[
char template[]="conftest.mkstemp-test";
if (mkstemp(template) == -1)
exit(1);
unlink(template);
exit(0);
]])],
[
AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
],
[
AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])
AC_DEFINE([HAVE_STRICT_MKSTEMP], [1], [Silly mkstemp()])
],
[
AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])
AC_DEFINE([HAVE_STRICT_MKSTEMP])
]
)
fi
dnl make sure that openpty does not reacquire controlling terminal
if test ! -z "$check_for_openpty_ctty_bug"; then
AC_MSG_CHECKING([if openpty correctly handles controlling tty])
AC_RUN_IFELSE(
[AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
#include <sys/fcntl.h>
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/wait.h>
]], [[
pid_t pid;
int fd, ptyfd, ttyfd, status;
pid = fork();
if (pid < 0) { /* failed */
exit(1);
} else if (pid > 0) { /* parent */
waitpid(pid, &status, 0);
if (WIFEXITED(status))
exit(WEXITSTATUS(status));
else
exit(2);
} else { /* child */
close(0); close(1); close(2);
setsid();
openpty(&ptyfd, &ttyfd, NULL, NULL, NULL);
fd = open("/dev/tty", O_RDWR | O_NOCTTY);
if (fd >= 0)
exit(3); /* Acquired ctty: broken */
else
exit(0); /* Did not acquire ctty: OK */
}
]])],
[
AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])
],
[
AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
AC_DEFINE([SSHD_ACQUIRES_CTTY])
],
[
AC_MSG_RESULT([cross-compiling, assuming yes])
]
)
fi
if test "x$ac_cv_func_getaddrinfo" = "xyes" && \
test "x$check_for_hpux_broken_getaddrinfo" = "x1"; then
AC_MSG_CHECKING([if getaddrinfo seems to work])
AC_RUN_IFELSE(
[AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
#include <sys/socket.h>
#include <netdb.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include <netinet/in.h>
#define TEST_PORT "2222"
]], [[
int err, sock;
struct addrinfo *gai_ai, *ai, hints;
char ntop[NI_MAXHOST], strport[NI_MAXSERV], *name = NULL;
memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints));
hints.ai_family = PF_UNSPEC;
hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM;
hints.ai_flags = AI_PASSIVE;
err = getaddrinfo(name, TEST_PORT, &hints, &gai_ai);
if (err != 0) {
fprintf(stderr, "getaddrinfo failed (%s)", gai_strerror(err));
exit(1);
}
for (ai = gai_ai; ai != NULL; ai = ai->ai_next) {
if (ai->ai_family != AF_INET6)
continue;
err = getnameinfo(ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen, ntop,
sizeof(ntop), strport, sizeof(strport),
NI_NUMERICHOST|NI_NUMERICSERV);
if (err != 0) {
if (err == EAI_SYSTEM)
perror("getnameinfo EAI_SYSTEM");
else
fprintf(stderr, "getnameinfo failed: %s\n",
gai_strerror(err));
exit(2);
}
sock = socket(ai->ai_family, ai->ai_socktype, ai->ai_protocol);
if (sock < 0)
perror("socket");
if (bind(sock, ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen) < 0) {
if (errno == EBADF)
exit(3);
}
}
exit(0);
]])],
[
AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])
],
[
AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_GETADDRINFO])
],
[
AC_MSG_RESULT([cross-compiling, assuming yes])
]
)
fi
if test "x$ac_cv_func_getaddrinfo" = "xyes" && \
test "x$check_for_aix_broken_getaddrinfo" = "x1"; then
AC_MSG_CHECKING([if getaddrinfo seems to work])
AC_RUN_IFELSE(
[AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
#include <sys/socket.h>
#include <netdb.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include <netinet/in.h>
#define TEST_PORT "2222"
]], [[
int err, sock;
struct addrinfo *gai_ai, *ai, hints;
char ntop[NI_MAXHOST], strport[NI_MAXSERV], *name = NULL;
memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints));
hints.ai_family = PF_UNSPEC;
hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM;
hints.ai_flags = AI_PASSIVE;
err = getaddrinfo(name, TEST_PORT, &hints, &gai_ai);
if (err != 0) {
fprintf(stderr, "getaddrinfo failed (%s)", gai_strerror(err));
exit(1);
}
for (ai = gai_ai; ai != NULL; ai = ai->ai_next) {
if (ai->ai_family != AF_INET && ai->ai_family != AF_INET6)
continue;
err = getnameinfo(ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen, ntop,
sizeof(ntop), strport, sizeof(strport),
NI_NUMERICHOST|NI_NUMERICSERV);
if (ai->ai_family == AF_INET && err != 0) {
perror("getnameinfo");
exit(2);
}
}
exit(0);
]])],
[
AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])
AC_DEFINE([AIX_GETNAMEINFO_HACK], [1],
[Define if you have a getaddrinfo that fails
for the all-zeros IPv6 address])
],
[
AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_GETADDRINFO])
],
[
AC_MSG_RESULT([cross-compiling, assuming no])
]
)
fi
if test "x$ac_cv_func_getaddrinfo" = "xyes"; then
AC_CHECK_DECLS(AI_NUMERICSERV, , ,
[#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/socket.h>
#include <netdb.h>])
fi
if test "x$check_for_conflicting_getspnam" = "x1"; then
AC_MSG_CHECKING([for conflicting getspnam in shadow.h])
- AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include <shadow.h> ]],
+ AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
+#include <shadow.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+ ]],
[[ exit(0); ]])],
[
AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
],
[
AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])
AC_DEFINE([GETSPNAM_CONFLICTING_DEFS], [1],
[Conflicting defs for getspnam])
]
)
fi
dnl NetBSD added an strnvis and unfortunately made it incompatible with the
dnl existing one in OpenBSD and Linux's libbsd (the former having existed
dnl for over ten years). Despite this incompatibility being reported during
dnl development (see http://gnats.netbsd.org/44977) they still shipped it.
dnl Even more unfortunately FreeBSD and later MacOS picked up this incompatible
dnl implementation. Try to detect this mess, and assume the only safe option
dnl if we're cross compiling.
dnl
dnl OpenBSD, 2001: strnvis(char *dst, const char *src, size_t dlen, int flag);
dnl NetBSD: 2012, strnvis(char *dst, size_t dlen, const char *src, int flag);
if test "x$ac_cv_func_strnvis" = "xyes"; then
AC_MSG_CHECKING([for working strnvis])
AC_RUN_IFELSE(
[AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
#include <signal.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
#include <vis.h>
static void sighandler(int sig) { _exit(1); }
]], [[
char dst[16];
signal(SIGSEGV, sighandler);
if (strnvis(dst, "src", 4, 0) && strcmp(dst, "src") == 0)
exit(0);
exit(1)
]])],
[AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])],
[AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_STRNVIS], [1], [strnvis detected broken])],
[AC_MSG_WARN([cross compiling: assuming broken])
AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_STRNVIS], [1], [strnvis assumed broken])]
)
fi
AC_MSG_CHECKING([if SA_RESTARTed signals interrupt select()])
AC_RUN_IFELSE(
[AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
#ifdef HAVE_SYS_SELECT
# include <sys/select.h>
#endif
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/time.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <signal.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
static void sighandler(int sig) { }
]], [[
int r;
pid_t pid;
struct sigaction sa;
sa.sa_handler = sighandler;
sa.sa_flags = SA_RESTART;
(void)sigaction(SIGTERM, &sa, NULL);
if ((pid = fork()) == 0) { /* child */
pid = getppid();
sleep(1);
kill(pid, SIGTERM);
sleep(1);
if (getppid() == pid) /* if parent did not exit, shoot it */
kill(pid, SIGKILL);
exit(0);
} else { /* parent */
r = select(0, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL);
}
exit(r == -1 ? 0 : 1);
]])],
[AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])],
[AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
AC_DEFINE([NO_SA_RESTART], [1],
[SA_RESTARTed signals do no interrupt select])],
[AC_MSG_WARN([cross compiling: assuming yes])]
)
AC_CHECK_FUNCS([getpgrp],[
AC_MSG_CHECKING([if getpgrp accepts zero args])
AC_COMPILE_IFELSE(
[AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[$ac_includes_default]], [[ getpgrp(); ]])],
[ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])
AC_DEFINE([GETPGRP_VOID], [1], [getpgrp takes zero args])],
[ AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
AC_DEFINE([GETPGRP_VOID], [0], [getpgrp takes one arg])]
)
])
# Search for OpenSSL
saved_CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS"
saved_LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS"
AC_ARG_WITH([ssl-dir],
[ --with-ssl-dir=PATH Specify path to OpenSSL installation ],
[
if test "x$openssl" = "xno" ; then
AC_MSG_ERROR([cannot use --with-ssl-dir when OpenSSL disabled])
fi
if test "x$withval" != "xno" ; then
case "$withval" in
# Relative paths
./*|../*) withval="`pwd`/$withval"
esac
if test -d "$withval/lib"; then
if test -n "${rpath_opt}"; then
LDFLAGS="-L${withval}/lib ${rpath_opt}${withval}/lib ${LDFLAGS}"
else
LDFLAGS="-L${withval}/lib ${LDFLAGS}"
fi
elif test -d "$withval/lib64"; then
if test -n "${rpath_opt}"; then
LDFLAGS="-L${withval}/lib64 ${rpath_opt}${withval}/lib64 ${LDFLAGS}"
else
LDFLAGS="-L${withval}/lib64 ${LDFLAGS}"
fi
else
if test -n "${rpath_opt}"; then
LDFLAGS="-L${withval} ${rpath_opt}${withval} ${LDFLAGS}"
else
LDFLAGS="-L${withval} ${LDFLAGS}"
fi
fi
if test -d "$withval/include"; then
CPPFLAGS="-I${withval}/include ${CPPFLAGS}"
else
CPPFLAGS="-I${withval} ${CPPFLAGS}"
fi
fi
]
)
AC_ARG_WITH([openssl-header-check],
[ --without-openssl-header-check Disable OpenSSL version consistency check],
[
if test "x$withval" = "xno" ; then
openssl_check_nonfatal=1
fi
]
)
openssl_engine=no
AC_ARG_WITH([ssl-engine],
[ --with-ssl-engine Enable OpenSSL (hardware) ENGINE support ],
[
if test "x$withval" != "xno" ; then
if test "x$openssl" = "xno" ; then
AC_MSG_ERROR([cannot use --with-ssl-engine when OpenSSL disabled])
fi
openssl_engine=yes
fi
]
)
if test "x$openssl" = "xyes" ; then
LIBS="-lcrypto $LIBS"
AC_TRY_LINK_FUNC([RAND_add], ,
[AC_MSG_ERROR([*** working libcrypto not found, check config.log])])
AC_CHECK_HEADER([openssl/opensslv.h], ,
[AC_MSG_ERROR([*** OpenSSL headers missing - please install first or check config.log ***])])
# Determine OpenSSL header version
AC_MSG_CHECKING([OpenSSL header version])
AC_RUN_IFELSE(
[AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <openssl/opensslv.h>
#define DATA "conftest.sslincver"
]], [[
FILE *fd;
int rc;
fd = fopen(DATA,"w");
if(fd == NULL)
exit(1);
if ((rc = fprintf(fd, "%08lx (%s)\n",
(unsigned long)OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER,
OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT)) < 0)
exit(1);
exit(0);
]])],
[
ssl_header_ver=`cat conftest.sslincver`
AC_MSG_RESULT([$ssl_header_ver])
],
[
AC_MSG_RESULT([not found])
AC_MSG_ERROR([OpenSSL version header not found.])
],
[
AC_MSG_WARN([cross compiling: not checking])
]
)
# Determining OpenSSL library version is version dependent.
AC_CHECK_FUNCS([OpenSSL_version OpenSSL_version_num])
# Determine OpenSSL library version
AC_MSG_CHECKING([OpenSSL library version])
AC_RUN_IFELSE(
[AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
#include <stdio.h>
+ #include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <openssl/opensslv.h>
#include <openssl/crypto.h>
#define DATA "conftest.ssllibver"
]], [[
FILE *fd;
int rc;
fd = fopen(DATA,"w");
if(fd == NULL)
exit(1);
#ifndef OPENSSL_VERSION
# define OPENSSL_VERSION SSLEAY_VERSION
#endif
#ifndef HAVE_OPENSSL_VERSION
# define OpenSSL_version SSLeay_version
#endif
#ifndef HAVE_OPENSSL_VERSION_NUM
# define OpenSSL_version_num SSLeay
#endif
if ((rc = fprintf(fd, "%08lx (%s)\n",
(unsigned long)OpenSSL_version_num(),
OpenSSL_version(OPENSSL_VERSION))) < 0)
exit(1);
exit(0);
]])],
[
ssl_library_ver=`cat conftest.ssllibver`
# Check version is supported.
case "$ssl_library_ver" in
10000*|0*)
AC_MSG_ERROR([OpenSSL >= 1.0.1 required (have "$ssl_library_ver")])
;;
100*) ;; # 1.0.x
101000[[0123456]]*)
# https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4613
AC_MSG_ERROR([OpenSSL 1.1.x versions prior to 1.1.0g have a bug that breaks their use with OpenSSH (have "$ssl_library_ver")])
;;
101*) ;; # 1.1.x
200*) ;; # LibreSSL
300*) ;; # OpenSSL development branch.
*)
AC_MSG_ERROR([Unknown/unsupported OpenSSL version ("$ssl_library_ver")])
;;
esac
AC_MSG_RESULT([$ssl_library_ver])
],
[
AC_MSG_RESULT([not found])
AC_MSG_ERROR([OpenSSL library not found.])
],
[
AC_MSG_WARN([cross compiling: not checking])
]
)
# Sanity check OpenSSL headers
AC_MSG_CHECKING([whether OpenSSL's headers match the library])
AC_RUN_IFELSE(
[AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
+ #include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <openssl/opensslv.h>
#include <openssl/crypto.h>
]], [[
#ifndef HAVE_OPENSSL_VERSION_NUM
# define OpenSSL_version_num SSLeay
#endif
exit(OpenSSL_version_num() == OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER ? 0 : 1);
]])],
[
AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])
],
[
AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
if test "x$openssl_check_nonfatal" = "x"; then
AC_MSG_ERROR([Your OpenSSL headers do not match your
library. Check config.log for details.
If you are sure your installation is consistent, you can disable the check
by running "./configure --without-openssl-header-check".
Also see contrib/findssl.sh for help identifying header/library mismatches.
])
else
AC_MSG_WARN([Your OpenSSL headers do not match your
library. Check config.log for details.
Also see contrib/findssl.sh for help identifying header/library mismatches.])
fi
],
[
AC_MSG_WARN([cross compiling: not checking])
]
)
AC_MSG_CHECKING([if programs using OpenSSL functions will link])
AC_LINK_IFELSE(
[AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include <openssl/err.h> ]],
[[ ERR_load_crypto_strings(); ]])],
[
AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])
],
[
AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
saved_LIBS="$LIBS"
LIBS="$LIBS -ldl"
AC_MSG_CHECKING([if programs using OpenSSL need -ldl])
AC_LINK_IFELSE(
[AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include <openssl/err.h> ]],
[[ ERR_load_crypto_strings(); ]])],
[
AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])
],
[
AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
LIBS="$saved_LIBS"
]
)
]
)
AC_CHECK_FUNCS([ \
BN_is_prime_ex \
DSA_generate_parameters_ex \
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl \
EVP_DigestFinal_ex \
EVP_DigestInit_ex \
EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup \
EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex \
EVP_MD_CTX_init \
HMAC_CTX_init \
RSA_generate_key_ex \
RSA_get_default_method \
])
# OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms may be a macro.
AC_CHECK_FUNC(OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms,
AC_DEFINE(HAVE_OPENSSL_ADD_ALL_ALGORITHMS, 1, [as a function]),
AC_CHECK_DECL(OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms,
AC_DEFINE(HAVE_OPENSSL_ADD_ALL_ALGORITHMS, 1, [as a macro]), ,
[[#include <openssl/evp.h>]]
)
)
# LibreSSL/OpenSSL 1.1x API
AC_CHECK_FUNCS([ \
OPENSSL_init_crypto \
DH_get0_key \
DH_get0_pqg \
DH_set0_key \
DH_set_length \
DH_set0_pqg \
DSA_get0_key \
DSA_get0_pqg \
DSA_set0_key \
DSA_set0_pqg \
DSA_SIG_get0 \
DSA_SIG_set0 \
ECDSA_SIG_get0 \
ECDSA_SIG_set0 \
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv \
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_noconst \
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_iv \
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_iv \
RSA_get0_crt_params \
RSA_get0_factors \
RSA_get0_key \
RSA_set0_crt_params \
RSA_set0_factors \
RSA_set0_key \
RSA_meth_free \
RSA_meth_dup \
RSA_meth_set1_name \
RSA_meth_get_finish \
RSA_meth_set_priv_enc \
RSA_meth_set_priv_dec \
RSA_meth_set_finish \
EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA \
EVP_MD_CTX_new \
EVP_MD_CTX_free \
EVP_chacha20 \
])
if test "x$openssl_engine" = "xyes" ; then
AC_MSG_CHECKING([for OpenSSL ENGINE support])
AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
#include <openssl/engine.h>
]], [[
ENGINE_load_builtin_engines();
ENGINE_register_all_complete();
]])],
[ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])
AC_DEFINE([USE_OPENSSL_ENGINE], [1],
[Enable OpenSSL engine support])
], [ AC_MSG_ERROR([OpenSSL ENGINE support not found])
])
fi
# Check for OpenSSL without EVP_aes_{192,256}_cbc
AC_MSG_CHECKING([whether OpenSSL has crippled AES support])
AC_LINK_IFELSE(
[AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
+ #include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <openssl/evp.h>
]], [[
exit(EVP_aes_192_cbc() == NULL || EVP_aes_256_cbc() == NULL);
]])],
[
AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
],
[
AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])
AC_DEFINE([OPENSSL_LOBOTOMISED_AES], [1],
[libcrypto is missing AES 192 and 256 bit functions])
]
)
# Check for OpenSSL with EVP_aes_*ctr
AC_MSG_CHECKING([whether OpenSSL has AES CTR via EVP])
AC_LINK_IFELSE(
[AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
+ #include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <openssl/evp.h>
]], [[
exit(EVP_aes_128_ctr() == NULL ||
EVP_aes_192_cbc() == NULL ||
EVP_aes_256_cbc() == NULL);
]])],
[
AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])
AC_DEFINE([OPENSSL_HAVE_EVPCTR], [1],
[libcrypto has EVP AES CTR])
],
[
AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
]
)
# Check for OpenSSL with EVP_aes_*gcm
AC_MSG_CHECKING([whether OpenSSL has AES GCM via EVP])
AC_LINK_IFELSE(
[AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
+ #include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <openssl/evp.h>
]], [[
exit(EVP_aes_128_gcm() == NULL ||
EVP_aes_256_gcm() == NULL ||
EVP_CTRL_GCM_SET_IV_FIXED == 0 ||
EVP_CTRL_GCM_IV_GEN == 0 ||
EVP_CTRL_GCM_SET_TAG == 0 ||
EVP_CTRL_GCM_GET_TAG == 0 ||
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(NULL, 0, 0, NULL) == 0);
]])],
[
AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])
AC_DEFINE([OPENSSL_HAVE_EVPGCM], [1],
[libcrypto has EVP AES GCM])
],
[
AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
unsupported_algorithms="$unsupported_cipers \
aes128-gcm@openssh.com \
aes256-gcm@openssh.com"
]
)
AC_MSG_CHECKING([if EVP_DigestUpdate returns an int])
AC_LINK_IFELSE(
[AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
+ #include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <openssl/evp.h>
]], [[
if(EVP_DigestUpdate(NULL, NULL,0))
exit(0);
]])],
[
AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])
],
[
AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
AC_DEFINE([OPENSSL_EVP_DIGESTUPDATE_VOID], [1],
[Define if EVP_DigestUpdate returns void])
]
)
# Some systems want crypt() from libcrypt, *not* the version in OpenSSL,
# because the system crypt() is more featureful.
if test "x$check_for_libcrypt_before" = "x1"; then
AC_CHECK_LIB([crypt], [crypt])
fi
# Some Linux systems (Slackware) need crypt() from libcrypt, *not* the
# version in OpenSSL.
if test "x$check_for_libcrypt_later" = "x1"; then
AC_CHECK_LIB([crypt], [crypt], [LIBS="$LIBS -lcrypt"])
fi
AC_CHECK_FUNCS([crypt DES_crypt])
# Check for SHA256, SHA384 and SHA512 support in OpenSSL
AC_CHECK_FUNCS([EVP_sha256 EVP_sha384 EVP_sha512])
# Check complete ECC support in OpenSSL
AC_MSG_CHECKING([whether OpenSSL has NID_X9_62_prime256v1])
AC_LINK_IFELSE(
[AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
#include <openssl/ec.h>
#include <openssl/ecdh.h>
#include <openssl/ecdsa.h>
#include <openssl/evp.h>
#include <openssl/objects.h>
#include <openssl/opensslv.h>
]], [[
EC_KEY *e = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(NID_X9_62_prime256v1);
const EVP_MD *m = EVP_sha256(); /* We need this too */
]])],
[ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])
enable_nistp256=1 ],
[ AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) ]
)
AC_MSG_CHECKING([whether OpenSSL has NID_secp384r1])
AC_LINK_IFELSE(
[AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
#include <openssl/ec.h>
#include <openssl/ecdh.h>
#include <openssl/ecdsa.h>
#include <openssl/evp.h>
#include <openssl/objects.h>
#include <openssl/opensslv.h>
]], [[
EC_KEY *e = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(NID_secp384r1);
const EVP_MD *m = EVP_sha384(); /* We need this too */
]])],
[ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])
enable_nistp384=1 ],
[ AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) ]
)
AC_MSG_CHECKING([whether OpenSSL has NID_secp521r1])
AC_LINK_IFELSE(
[AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
#include <openssl/ec.h>
#include <openssl/ecdh.h>
#include <openssl/ecdsa.h>
#include <openssl/evp.h>
#include <openssl/objects.h>
#include <openssl/opensslv.h>
]], [[
EC_KEY *e = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(NID_secp521r1);
const EVP_MD *m = EVP_sha512(); /* We need this too */
]])],
[ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])
AC_MSG_CHECKING([if OpenSSL's NID_secp521r1 is functional])
AC_RUN_IFELSE(
[AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
+ #include <stdlib.h>
#include <openssl/ec.h>
#include <openssl/ecdh.h>
#include <openssl/ecdsa.h>
#include <openssl/evp.h>
#include <openssl/objects.h>
#include <openssl/opensslv.h>
]],[[
EC_KEY *e = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(NID_secp521r1);
const EVP_MD *m = EVP_sha512(); /* We need this too */
exit(e == NULL || m == NULL);
]])],
[ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])
enable_nistp521=1 ],
[ AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) ],
[ AC_MSG_WARN([cross-compiling: assuming yes])
enable_nistp521=1 ]
)],
AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
)
COMMENT_OUT_ECC="#no ecc#"
TEST_SSH_ECC=no
if test x$enable_nistp256 = x1 || test x$enable_nistp384 = x1 || \
test x$enable_nistp521 = x1; then
AC_DEFINE(OPENSSL_HAS_ECC, [1], [OpenSSL has ECC])
AC_CHECK_FUNCS([EC_KEY_METHOD_new])
openssl_ecc=yes
else
openssl_ecc=no
fi
if test x$enable_nistp256 = x1; then
AC_DEFINE([OPENSSL_HAS_NISTP256], [1],
[libcrypto has NID_X9_62_prime256v1])
TEST_SSH_ECC=yes
COMMENT_OUT_ECC=""
else
unsupported_algorithms="$unsupported_algorithms \
ecdsa-sha2-nistp256 \
ecdh-sha2-nistp256 \
ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com"
fi
if test x$enable_nistp384 = x1; then
AC_DEFINE([OPENSSL_HAS_NISTP384], [1], [libcrypto has NID_secp384r1])
TEST_SSH_ECC=yes
COMMENT_OUT_ECC=""
else
unsupported_algorithms="$unsupported_algorithms \
ecdsa-sha2-nistp384 \
ecdh-sha2-nistp384 \
ecdsa-sha2-nistp384-cert-v01@openssh.com"
fi
if test x$enable_nistp521 = x1; then
AC_DEFINE([OPENSSL_HAS_NISTP521], [1], [libcrypto has NID_secp521r1])
TEST_SSH_ECC=yes
COMMENT_OUT_ECC=""
else
unsupported_algorithms="$unsupported_algorithms \
ecdh-sha2-nistp521 \
ecdsa-sha2-nistp521 \
ecdsa-sha2-nistp521-cert-v01@openssh.com"
fi
AC_SUBST([TEST_SSH_ECC])
AC_SUBST([COMMENT_OUT_ECC])
else
AC_CHECK_LIB([crypt], [crypt], [LIBS="$LIBS -lcrypt"])
AC_CHECK_FUNCS([crypt])
fi
# PKCS11/U2F depend on OpenSSL and dlopen().
enable_pkcs11=yes
enable_sk=yes
if test "x$openssl" != "xyes" ; then
enable_pkcs11="disabled; missing libcrypto"
enable_sk="disabled; missing libcrypto"
fi
if test "x$openssl_ecc" != "xyes" ; then
enable_sk="disabled; OpenSSL has no ECC support"
fi
if test "x$ac_cv_func_dlopen" != "xyes" ; then
enable_pkcs11="disabled; missing dlopen(3)"
enable_sk="disabled; missing dlopen(3)"
fi
if test "x$ac_cv_have_decl_RTLD_NOW" != "xyes" ; then
enable_pkcs11="disabled; missing RTLD_NOW"
enable_sk="disabled; missing RTLD_NOW"
fi
if test ! -z "$disable_pkcs11" ; then
enable_pkcs11="disabled by user"
fi
if test ! -z "$disable_sk" ; then
enable_sk="disabled by user"
fi
AC_MSG_CHECKING([whether to enable PKCS11])
if test "x$enable_pkcs11" = "xyes" ; then
AC_DEFINE([ENABLE_PKCS11], [], [Enable for PKCS#11 support])
fi
AC_MSG_RESULT([$enable_pkcs11])
AC_MSG_CHECKING([whether to enable U2F])
if test "x$enable_sk" = "xyes" ; then
AC_DEFINE([ENABLE_SK], [], [Enable for U2F/FIDO support])
AC_SUBST(SK_DUMMY_LIBRARY, [regress/misc/sk-dummy/sk-dummy.so])
else
# Do not try to build sk-dummy library.
AC_SUBST(SK_DUMMY_LIBRARY, [""])
fi
AC_MSG_RESULT([$enable_sk])
# Now check for built-in security key support.
if test "x$enable_sk" = "xyes" -a "x$enable_sk_internal" = "xyes" ; then
AC_PATH_TOOL([PKGCONFIG], [pkg-config], [no])
use_pkgconfig_for_libfido2=
if test "x$PKGCONFIG" != "xno"; then
AC_MSG_CHECKING([if $PKGCONFIG knows about libfido2])
if "$PKGCONFIG" libfido2; then
AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])
use_pkgconfig_for_libfido2=yes
else
AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
fi
fi
if test "x$use_pkgconfig_for_libfido2" = "xyes"; then
LIBFIDO2=`$PKGCONFIG --libs libfido2`
CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS `$PKGCONFIG --cflags libfido2`"
else
LIBFIDO2="-lfido2 -lcbor"
fi
OTHERLIBS=`echo $LIBFIDO2 | sed 's/-lfido2//'`
AC_CHECK_LIB([fido2], [fido_init],
[
AC_SUBST([LIBFIDO2])
AC_DEFINE([ENABLE_SK_INTERNAL], [],
[Enable for built-in U2F/FIDO support])
enable_sk="built-in"
], [ AC_MSG_ERROR([no usable libfido2 found]) ],
[ $OTHERLIBS ]
)
+ saved_LIBS="$LIBS"
+ LIBS="$LIBS $LIBFIDO2"
+ AC_CHECK_FUNCS([ \
+ fido_cred_prot \
+ fido_cred_set_prot \
+ fido_dev_get_touch_begin \
+ fido_dev_get_touch_status \
+ fido_dev_supports_cred_prot \
+ ])
+ LIBS="$saved_LIBS"
AC_CHECK_HEADER([fido.h], [],
AC_MSG_ERROR([missing fido.h from libfido2]))
AC_CHECK_HEADER([fido/credman.h], [],
AC_MSG_ERROR([missing fido/credman.h from libfido2]),
[#include <fido.h>]
)
fi
AC_CHECK_FUNCS([ \
arc4random \
arc4random_buf \
arc4random_stir \
arc4random_uniform \
])
saved_LIBS="$LIBS"
AC_CHECK_LIB([iaf], [ia_openinfo], [
LIBS="$LIBS -liaf"
AC_CHECK_FUNCS([set_id], [SSHDLIBS="$SSHDLIBS -liaf"
AC_DEFINE([HAVE_LIBIAF], [1],
[Define if system has libiaf that supports set_id])
])
])
LIBS="$saved_LIBS"
### Configure cryptographic random number support
# Check whether OpenSSL seeds itself
if test "x$openssl" = "xyes" ; then
AC_MSG_CHECKING([whether OpenSSL's PRNG is internally seeded])
AC_RUN_IFELSE(
[AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
+ #include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <openssl/rand.h>
]], [[
exit(RAND_status() == 1 ? 0 : 1);
]])],
[
OPENSSL_SEEDS_ITSELF=yes
AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])
],
[
AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
],
[
AC_MSG_WARN([cross compiling: assuming yes])
# This is safe, since we will fatal() at runtime if
# OpenSSL is not seeded correctly.
OPENSSL_SEEDS_ITSELF=yes
]
)
fi
# PRNGD TCP socket
AC_ARG_WITH([prngd-port],
[ --with-prngd-port=PORT read entropy from PRNGD/EGD TCP localhost:PORT],
[
case "$withval" in
no)
withval=""
;;
[[0-9]]*)
;;
*)
AC_MSG_ERROR([You must specify a numeric port number for --with-prngd-port])
;;
esac
if test ! -z "$withval" ; then
PRNGD_PORT="$withval"
AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED([PRNGD_PORT], [$PRNGD_PORT],
[Port number of PRNGD/EGD random number socket])
fi
]
)
# PRNGD Unix domain socket
AC_ARG_WITH([prngd-socket],
[ --with-prngd-socket=FILE read entropy from PRNGD/EGD socket FILE (default=/var/run/egd-pool)],
[
case "$withval" in
yes)
withval="/var/run/egd-pool"
;;
no)
withval=""
;;
/*)
;;
*)
AC_MSG_ERROR([You must specify an absolute path to the entropy socket])
;;
esac
if test ! -z "$withval" ; then
if test ! -z "$PRNGD_PORT" ; then
AC_MSG_ERROR([You may not specify both a PRNGD/EGD port and socket])
fi
if test ! -r "$withval" ; then
AC_MSG_WARN([Entropy socket is not readable])
fi
PRNGD_SOCKET="$withval"
AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED([PRNGD_SOCKET], ["$PRNGD_SOCKET"],
[Location of PRNGD/EGD random number socket])
fi
],
[
# Check for existing socket only if we don't have a random device already
if test "x$OPENSSL_SEEDS_ITSELF" != "xyes" ; then
AC_MSG_CHECKING([for PRNGD/EGD socket])
# Insert other locations here
for sock in /var/run/egd-pool /dev/egd-pool /etc/entropy; do
if test -r $sock && $TEST_MINUS_S_SH -c "test -S $sock -o -p $sock" ; then
PRNGD_SOCKET="$sock"
AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED([PRNGD_SOCKET], ["$PRNGD_SOCKET"])
break;
fi
done
if test ! -z "$PRNGD_SOCKET" ; then
AC_MSG_RESULT([$PRNGD_SOCKET])
else
AC_MSG_RESULT([not found])
fi
fi
]
)
# Which randomness source do we use?
if test ! -z "$PRNGD_PORT" ; then
RAND_MSG="PRNGd port $PRNGD_PORT"
elif test ! -z "$PRNGD_SOCKET" ; then
RAND_MSG="PRNGd socket $PRNGD_SOCKET"
elif test ! -z "$OPENSSL_SEEDS_ITSELF" ; then
AC_DEFINE([OPENSSL_PRNG_ONLY], [1],
[Define if you want the OpenSSL internally seeded PRNG only])
RAND_MSG="OpenSSL internal ONLY"
elif test "x$openssl" = "xno" ; then
AC_MSG_WARN([OpenSSH will use /dev/urandom as a source of random numbers. It will fail if this device is not supported or accessible])
else
AC_MSG_ERROR([OpenSSH has no source of random numbers. Please configure OpenSSL with an entropy source or re-run configure using one of the --with-prngd-port or --with-prngd-socket options])
fi
# Check for PAM libs
PAM_MSG="no"
AC_ARG_WITH([pam],
[ --with-pam Enable PAM support ],
[
if test "x$withval" != "xno" ; then
if test "x$ac_cv_header_security_pam_appl_h" != "xyes" && \
test "x$ac_cv_header_pam_pam_appl_h" != "xyes" ; then
AC_MSG_ERROR([PAM headers not found])
fi
saved_LIBS="$LIBS"
AC_CHECK_LIB([dl], [dlopen], , )
AC_CHECK_LIB([pam], [pam_set_item], , [AC_MSG_ERROR([*** libpam missing])])
AC_CHECK_FUNCS([pam_getenvlist])
AC_CHECK_FUNCS([pam_putenv])
LIBS="$saved_LIBS"
PAM_MSG="yes"
SSHDLIBS="$SSHDLIBS -lpam"
AC_DEFINE([USE_PAM], [1],
[Define if you want to enable PAM support])
if test $ac_cv_lib_dl_dlopen = yes; then
case "$LIBS" in
*-ldl*)
# libdl already in LIBS
;;
*)
SSHDLIBS="$SSHDLIBS -ldl"
;;
esac
fi
fi
]
)
AC_ARG_WITH([pam-service],
[ --with-pam-service=name Specify PAM service name ],
[
if test "x$withval" != "xno" && \
test "x$withval" != "xyes" ; then
AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED([SSHD_PAM_SERVICE],
["$withval"], [sshd PAM service name])
fi
]
)
# Check for older PAM
if test "x$PAM_MSG" = "xyes" ; then
# Check PAM strerror arguments (old PAM)
AC_MSG_CHECKING([whether pam_strerror takes only one argument])
AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
#include <stdlib.h>
#if defined(HAVE_SECURITY_PAM_APPL_H)
#include <security/pam_appl.h>
#elif defined (HAVE_PAM_PAM_APPL_H)
#include <pam/pam_appl.h>
#endif
]], [[
(void)pam_strerror((pam_handle_t *)NULL, -1);
]])], [AC_MSG_RESULT([no])], [
AC_DEFINE([HAVE_OLD_PAM], [1],
[Define if you have an old version of PAM
which takes only one argument to pam_strerror])
AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])
PAM_MSG="yes (old library)"
])
fi
case "$host" in
*-*-cygwin*)
SSH_PRIVSEP_USER=CYGWIN_SSH_PRIVSEP_USER
;;
*)
SSH_PRIVSEP_USER=sshd
;;
esac
AC_ARG_WITH([privsep-user],
[ --with-privsep-user=user Specify non-privileged user for privilege separation],
[
if test -n "$withval" && test "x$withval" != "xno" && \
test "x${withval}" != "xyes"; then
SSH_PRIVSEP_USER=$withval
fi
]
)
if test "x$SSH_PRIVSEP_USER" = "xCYGWIN_SSH_PRIVSEP_USER" ; then
AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED([SSH_PRIVSEP_USER], [CYGWIN_SSH_PRIVSEP_USER],
[Cygwin function to fetch non-privileged user for privilege separation])
else
AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED([SSH_PRIVSEP_USER], ["$SSH_PRIVSEP_USER"],
[non-privileged user for privilege separation])
fi
AC_SUBST([SSH_PRIVSEP_USER])
if test "x$have_linux_no_new_privs" = "x1" ; then
AC_CHECK_DECL([SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER], [have_seccomp_filter=1], , [
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <linux/seccomp.h>
])
fi
if test "x$have_seccomp_filter" = "x1" ; then
AC_MSG_CHECKING([kernel for seccomp_filter support])
AC_LINK_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
#include <errno.h>
#include <elf.h>
#include <linux/audit.h>
#include <linux/seccomp.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <sys/prctl.h>
]],
[[ int i = $seccomp_audit_arch;
errno = 0;
prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER, NULL, 0, 0);
exit(errno == EFAULT ? 0 : 1); ]])],
[ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) ], [
AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
# Disable seccomp filter as a target
have_seccomp_filter=0
]
)
fi
# Decide which sandbox style to use
sandbox_arg=""
AC_ARG_WITH([sandbox],
[ --with-sandbox=style Specify privilege separation sandbox (no, capsicum, darwin, rlimit, seccomp_filter, systrace, pledge)],
[
if test "x$withval" = "xyes" ; then
sandbox_arg=""
else
sandbox_arg="$withval"
fi
]
)
# Some platforms (seems to be the ones that have a kernel poll(2)-type
# function with which they implement select(2)) use an extra file descriptor
# when calling select(2), which means we can't use the rlimit sandbox.
AC_MSG_CHECKING([if select works with descriptor rlimit])
AC_RUN_IFELSE(
[AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
#include <sys/types.h>
#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TIME_H
# include <sys/time.h>
#endif
#include <sys/resource.h>
#ifdef HAVE_SYS_SELECT_H
# include <sys/select.h>
#endif
#include <errno.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
]],[[
struct rlimit rl_zero;
int fd, r;
fd_set fds;
struct timeval tv;
fd = open("/dev/null", O_RDONLY);
FD_ZERO(&fds);
FD_SET(fd, &fds);
rl_zero.rlim_cur = rl_zero.rlim_max = 0;
setrlimit(RLIMIT_FSIZE, &rl_zero);
setrlimit(RLIMIT_NOFILE, &rl_zero);
tv.tv_sec = 1;
tv.tv_usec = 0;
r = select(fd+1, &fds, NULL, NULL, &tv);
exit (r == -1 ? 1 : 0);
]])],
[AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])
select_works_with_rlimit=yes],
[AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
select_works_with_rlimit=no],
[AC_MSG_WARN([cross compiling: assuming yes])
select_works_with_rlimit=yes]
)
AC_MSG_CHECKING([if setrlimit(RLIMIT_NOFILE,{0,0}) works])
AC_RUN_IFELSE(
[AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
#include <sys/types.h>
#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TIME_H
# include <sys/time.h>
#endif
#include <sys/resource.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
]],[[
struct rlimit rl_zero;
int r;
rl_zero.rlim_cur = rl_zero.rlim_max = 0;
r = setrlimit(RLIMIT_NOFILE, &rl_zero);
exit (r == -1 ? 1 : 0);
]])],
[AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])
rlimit_nofile_zero_works=yes],
[AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
rlimit_nofile_zero_works=no],
[AC_MSG_WARN([cross compiling: assuming yes])
rlimit_nofile_zero_works=yes]
)
AC_MSG_CHECKING([if setrlimit RLIMIT_FSIZE works])
AC_RUN_IFELSE(
[AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/resource.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
]],[[
struct rlimit rl_zero;
rl_zero.rlim_cur = rl_zero.rlim_max = 0;
exit(setrlimit(RLIMIT_FSIZE, &rl_zero) != 0);
]])],
[AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])],
[AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
AC_DEFINE(SANDBOX_SKIP_RLIMIT_FSIZE, 1,
[setrlimit RLIMIT_FSIZE works])],
[AC_MSG_WARN([cross compiling: assuming yes])]
)
if test "x$sandbox_arg" = "xpledge" || \
( test -z "$sandbox_arg" && test "x$ac_cv_func_pledge" = "xyes" ) ; then
test "x$ac_cv_func_pledge" != "xyes" && \
AC_MSG_ERROR([pledge sandbox requires pledge(2) support])
SANDBOX_STYLE="pledge"
AC_DEFINE([SANDBOX_PLEDGE], [1], [Sandbox using pledge(2)])
elif test "x$sandbox_arg" = "xsystrace" || \
( test -z "$sandbox_arg" && test "x$have_systr_policy_kill" = "x1" ) ; then
test "x$have_systr_policy_kill" != "x1" && \
AC_MSG_ERROR([systrace sandbox requires systrace headers and SYSTR_POLICY_KILL support])
SANDBOX_STYLE="systrace"
AC_DEFINE([SANDBOX_SYSTRACE], [1], [Sandbox using systrace(4)])
elif test "x$sandbox_arg" = "xdarwin" || \
( test -z "$sandbox_arg" && test "x$ac_cv_func_sandbox_init" = "xyes" && \
test "x$ac_cv_header_sandbox_h" = "xyes") ; then
test "x$ac_cv_func_sandbox_init" != "xyes" -o \
"x$ac_cv_header_sandbox_h" != "xyes" && \
AC_MSG_ERROR([Darwin seatbelt sandbox requires sandbox.h and sandbox_init function])
SANDBOX_STYLE="darwin"
AC_DEFINE([SANDBOX_DARWIN], [1], [Sandbox using Darwin sandbox_init(3)])
elif test "x$sandbox_arg" = "xseccomp_filter" || \
( test -z "$sandbox_arg" && \
test "x$have_seccomp_filter" = "x1" && \
test "x$ac_cv_header_elf_h" = "xyes" && \
test "x$ac_cv_header_linux_audit_h" = "xyes" && \
test "x$ac_cv_header_linux_filter_h" = "xyes" && \
test "x$seccomp_audit_arch" != "x" && \
test "x$have_linux_no_new_privs" = "x1" && \
test "x$ac_cv_func_prctl" = "xyes" ) ; then
test "x$seccomp_audit_arch" = "x" && \
AC_MSG_ERROR([seccomp_filter sandbox not supported on $host])
test "x$have_linux_no_new_privs" != "x1" && \
AC_MSG_ERROR([seccomp_filter sandbox requires PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS])
test "x$have_seccomp_filter" != "x1" && \
AC_MSG_ERROR([seccomp_filter sandbox requires seccomp headers])
test "x$ac_cv_func_prctl" != "xyes" && \
AC_MSG_ERROR([seccomp_filter sandbox requires prctl function])
SANDBOX_STYLE="seccomp_filter"
AC_DEFINE([SANDBOX_SECCOMP_FILTER], [1], [Sandbox using seccomp filter])
elif test "x$sandbox_arg" = "xcapsicum" || \
( test -z "$sandbox_arg" && \
test "x$ac_cv_header_sys_capsicum_h" = "xyes" && \
test "x$ac_cv_func_cap_rights_limit" = "xyes") ; then
test "x$ac_cv_header_sys_capsicum_h" != "xyes" && \
AC_MSG_ERROR([capsicum sandbox requires sys/capsicum.h header])
test "x$ac_cv_func_cap_rights_limit" != "xyes" && \
AC_MSG_ERROR([capsicum sandbox requires cap_rights_limit function])
SANDBOX_STYLE="capsicum"
AC_DEFINE([SANDBOX_CAPSICUM], [1], [Sandbox using capsicum])
elif test "x$sandbox_arg" = "xrlimit" || \
( test -z "$sandbox_arg" && test "x$ac_cv_func_setrlimit" = "xyes" && \
test "x$select_works_with_rlimit" = "xyes" && \
test "x$rlimit_nofile_zero_works" = "xyes" ) ; then
test "x$ac_cv_func_setrlimit" != "xyes" && \
AC_MSG_ERROR([rlimit sandbox requires setrlimit function])
test "x$select_works_with_rlimit" != "xyes" && \
AC_MSG_ERROR([rlimit sandbox requires select to work with rlimit])
SANDBOX_STYLE="rlimit"
AC_DEFINE([SANDBOX_RLIMIT], [1], [Sandbox using setrlimit(2)])
elif test "x$sandbox_arg" = "xsolaris" || \
( test -z "$sandbox_arg" && test "x$SOLARIS_PRIVS" = "xyes" ) ; then
SANDBOX_STYLE="solaris"
AC_DEFINE([SANDBOX_SOLARIS], [1], [Sandbox using Solaris/Illumos privileges])
elif test -z "$sandbox_arg" || test "x$sandbox_arg" = "xno" || \
test "x$sandbox_arg" = "xnone" || test "x$sandbox_arg" = "xnull" ; then
SANDBOX_STYLE="none"
AC_DEFINE([SANDBOX_NULL], [1], [no privsep sandboxing])
else
AC_MSG_ERROR([unsupported --with-sandbox])
fi
# Cheap hack to ensure NEWS-OS libraries are arranged right.
if test ! -z "$SONY" ; then
LIBS="$LIBS -liberty";
fi
# Check for long long datatypes
AC_CHECK_TYPES([long long, unsigned long long, long double])
# Check datatype sizes
AC_CHECK_SIZEOF([short int])
AC_CHECK_SIZEOF([int])
AC_CHECK_SIZEOF([long int])
AC_CHECK_SIZEOF([long long int])
# Sanity check long long for some platforms (AIX)
if test "x$ac_cv_sizeof_long_long_int" = "x4" ; then
ac_cv_sizeof_long_long_int=0
fi
# compute LLONG_MIN and LLONG_MAX if we don't know them.
if test -z "$have_llong_max" && test -z "$have_long_long_max"; then
AC_MSG_CHECKING([for max value of long long])
AC_RUN_IFELSE(
[AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
/* Why is this so damn hard? */
#ifdef __GNUC__
# undef __GNUC__
#endif
#define __USE_ISOC99
#include <limits.h>
#define DATA "conftest.llminmax"
#define my_abs(a) ((a) < 0 ? ((a) * -1) : (a))
/*
* printf in libc on some platforms (eg old Tru64) does not understand %lld so
* we do this the hard way.
*/
static int
fprint_ll(FILE *f, long long n)
{
unsigned int i;
int l[sizeof(long long) * 8];
if (n < 0)
if (fprintf(f, "-") < 0)
return -1;
for (i = 0; n != 0; i++) {
l[i] = my_abs(n % 10);
n /= 10;
}
do {
if (fprintf(f, "%d", l[--i]) < 0)
return -1;
} while (i != 0);
if (fprintf(f, " ") < 0)
return -1;
return 0;
}
]], [[
FILE *f;
long long i, llmin, llmax = 0;
if((f = fopen(DATA,"w")) == NULL)
exit(1);
#if defined(LLONG_MIN) && defined(LLONG_MAX)
fprintf(stderr, "Using system header for LLONG_MIN and LLONG_MAX\n");
llmin = LLONG_MIN;
llmax = LLONG_MAX;
#else
fprintf(stderr, "Calculating LLONG_MIN and LLONG_MAX\n");
/* This will work on one's complement and two's complement */
for (i = 1; i > llmax; i <<= 1, i++)
llmax = i;
llmin = llmax + 1LL; /* wrap */
#endif
/* Sanity check */
if (llmin + 1 < llmin || llmin - 1 < llmin || llmax + 1 > llmax
|| llmax - 1 > llmax || llmin == llmax || llmin == 0
|| llmax == 0 || llmax < LONG_MAX || llmin > LONG_MIN) {
fprintf(f, "unknown unknown\n");
exit(2);
}
if (fprint_ll(f, llmin) < 0)
exit(3);
if (fprint_ll(f, llmax) < 0)
exit(4);
if (fclose(f) < 0)
exit(5);
exit(0);
]])],
[
llong_min=`$AWK '{print $1}' conftest.llminmax`
llong_max=`$AWK '{print $2}' conftest.llminmax`
AC_MSG_RESULT([$llong_max])
AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED([LLONG_MAX], [${llong_max}LL],
[max value of long long calculated by configure])
AC_MSG_CHECKING([for min value of long long])
AC_MSG_RESULT([$llong_min])
AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED([LLONG_MIN], [${llong_min}LL],
[min value of long long calculated by configure])
],
[
AC_MSG_RESULT([not found])
],
[
AC_MSG_WARN([cross compiling: not checking])
]
)
fi
AC_CHECK_DECLS([UINT32_MAX], , , [[
#ifdef HAVE_SYS_LIMITS_H
# include <sys/limits.h>
#endif
#ifdef HAVE_LIMITS_H
# include <limits.h>
#endif
#ifdef HAVE_STDINT_H
# include <stdint.h>
#endif
]])
# More checks for data types
AC_CACHE_CHECK([for u_int type], ac_cv_have_u_int, [
AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include <sys/types.h> ]],
[[ u_int a; a = 1;]])],
[ ac_cv_have_u_int="yes" ], [ ac_cv_have_u_int="no"
])
])
if test "x$ac_cv_have_u_int" = "xyes" ; then
AC_DEFINE([HAVE_U_INT], [1], [define if you have u_int data type])
have_u_int=1
fi
AC_CACHE_CHECK([for intXX_t types], ac_cv_have_intxx_t, [
AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include <sys/types.h> ]],
[[ int8_t a; int16_t b; int32_t c; a = b = c = 1;]])],
[ ac_cv_have_intxx_t="yes" ], [ ac_cv_have_intxx_t="no"
])
])
if test "x$ac_cv_have_intxx_t" = "xyes" ; then
AC_DEFINE([HAVE_INTXX_T], [1], [define if you have intxx_t data type])
have_intxx_t=1
fi
if (test -z "$have_intxx_t" && \
test "x$ac_cv_header_stdint_h" = "xyes")
then
AC_MSG_CHECKING([for intXX_t types in stdint.h])
AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include <stdint.h> ]],
[[ int8_t a; int16_t b; int32_t c; a = b = c = 1;]])],
[
AC_DEFINE([HAVE_INTXX_T])
AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])
], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
])
fi
AC_CACHE_CHECK([for int64_t type], ac_cv_have_int64_t, [
AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
#include <sys/types.h>
#ifdef HAVE_STDINT_H
# include <stdint.h>
#endif
#include <sys/socket.h>
#ifdef HAVE_SYS_BITYPES_H
# include <sys/bitypes.h>
#endif
]], [[
int64_t a; a = 1;
]])],
[ ac_cv_have_int64_t="yes" ], [ ac_cv_have_int64_t="no"
])
])
if test "x$ac_cv_have_int64_t" = "xyes" ; then
AC_DEFINE([HAVE_INT64_T], [1], [define if you have int64_t data type])
fi
AC_CACHE_CHECK([for u_intXX_t types], ac_cv_have_u_intxx_t, [
AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include <sys/types.h> ]],
[[ u_int8_t a; u_int16_t b; u_int32_t c; a = b = c = 1;]])],
[ ac_cv_have_u_intxx_t="yes" ], [ ac_cv_have_u_intxx_t="no"
])
])
if test "x$ac_cv_have_u_intxx_t" = "xyes" ; then
AC_DEFINE([HAVE_U_INTXX_T], [1], [define if you have u_intxx_t data type])
have_u_intxx_t=1
fi
if test -z "$have_u_intxx_t" ; then
AC_MSG_CHECKING([for u_intXX_t types in sys/socket.h])
AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include <sys/socket.h> ]],
[[ u_int8_t a; u_int16_t b; u_int32_t c; a = b = c = 1;]])],
[
AC_DEFINE([HAVE_U_INTXX_T])
AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])
], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
])
fi
AC_CACHE_CHECK([for u_int64_t types], ac_cv_have_u_int64_t, [
AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include <sys/types.h> ]],
[[ u_int64_t a; a = 1;]])],
[ ac_cv_have_u_int64_t="yes" ], [ ac_cv_have_u_int64_t="no"
])
])
if test "x$ac_cv_have_u_int64_t" = "xyes" ; then
AC_DEFINE([HAVE_U_INT64_T], [1], [define if you have u_int64_t data type])
have_u_int64_t=1
fi
if (test -z "$have_u_int64_t" && \
test "x$ac_cv_header_sys_bitypes_h" = "xyes")
then
AC_MSG_CHECKING([for u_int64_t type in sys/bitypes.h])
AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include <sys/bitypes.h> ]],
[[ u_int64_t a; a = 1]])],
[
AC_DEFINE([HAVE_U_INT64_T])
AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])
], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
])
fi
if test -z "$have_u_intxx_t" ; then
AC_CACHE_CHECK([for uintXX_t types], ac_cv_have_uintxx_t, [
AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
#include <sys/types.h>
]], [[
uint8_t a;
uint16_t b;
uint32_t c;
a = b = c = 1;
]])],
[ ac_cv_have_uintxx_t="yes" ], [ ac_cv_have_uintxx_t="no"
])
])
if test "x$ac_cv_have_uintxx_t" = "xyes" ; then
AC_DEFINE([HAVE_UINTXX_T], [1],
[define if you have uintxx_t data type])
fi
fi
if (test -z "$have_uintxx_t" && \
test "x$ac_cv_header_stdint_h" = "xyes")
then
AC_MSG_CHECKING([for uintXX_t types in stdint.h])
AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include <stdint.h> ]],
[[ uint8_t a; uint16_t b; uint32_t c; a = b = c = 1;]])],
[
AC_DEFINE([HAVE_UINTXX_T])
AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])
], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
])
fi
if (test -z "$have_uintxx_t" && \
test "x$ac_cv_header_inttypes_h" = "xyes")
then
AC_MSG_CHECKING([for uintXX_t types in inttypes.h])
AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include <inttypes.h> ]],
[[ uint8_t a; uint16_t b; uint32_t c; a = b = c = 1;]])],
[
AC_DEFINE([HAVE_UINTXX_T])
AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])
], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
])
fi
if (test -z "$have_u_intxx_t" || test -z "$have_intxx_t" && \
test "x$ac_cv_header_sys_bitypes_h" = "xyes")
then
AC_MSG_CHECKING([for intXX_t and u_intXX_t types in sys/bitypes.h])
AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
#include <sys/bitypes.h>
]], [[
int8_t a; int16_t b; int32_t c;
u_int8_t e; u_int16_t f; u_int32_t g;
a = b = c = e = f = g = 1;
]])],
[
AC_DEFINE([HAVE_U_INTXX_T])
AC_DEFINE([HAVE_INTXX_T])
AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])
], [AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
])
fi
AC_CACHE_CHECK([for u_char], ac_cv_have_u_char, [
AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include <sys/types.h> ]],
[[ u_char foo; foo = 125; ]])],
[ ac_cv_have_u_char="yes" ], [ ac_cv_have_u_char="no"
])
])
if test "x$ac_cv_have_u_char" = "xyes" ; then
AC_DEFINE([HAVE_U_CHAR], [1], [define if you have u_char data type])
fi
AC_CHECK_TYPES([intmax_t, uintmax_t], , , [
#include <sys/types.h>
#ifdef HAVE_STDINT_H
# include <stdint.h>
#endif
])
TYPE_SOCKLEN_T
AC_CHECK_TYPES([sig_atomic_t], , , [#include <signal.h>])
AC_CHECK_TYPES([fsblkcnt_t, fsfilcnt_t], , , [
#include <sys/types.h>
#ifdef HAVE_SYS_BITYPES_H
#include <sys/bitypes.h>
#endif
#ifdef HAVE_SYS_STATFS_H
#include <sys/statfs.h>
#endif
#ifdef HAVE_SYS_STATVFS_H
#include <sys/statvfs.h>
#endif
])
AC_CHECK_MEMBERS([struct statfs.f_files, struct statfs.f_flags], [], [], [[
#include <sys/param.h>
#include <sys/types.h>
#ifdef HAVE_SYS_BITYPES_H
#include <sys/bitypes.h>
#endif
#ifdef HAVE_SYS_STATFS_H
#include <sys/statfs.h>
#endif
#ifdef HAVE_SYS_STATVFS_H
#include <sys/statvfs.h>
#endif
#ifdef HAVE_SYS_VFS_H
#include <sys/vfs.h>
#endif
#ifdef HAVE_SYS_MOUNT_H
#include <sys/mount.h>
#endif
]])
AC_CHECK_TYPES([in_addr_t, in_port_t], , ,
[#include <sys/types.h>
#include <netinet/in.h>])
AC_CACHE_CHECK([for size_t], ac_cv_have_size_t, [
AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include <sys/types.h> ]],
[[ size_t foo; foo = 1235; ]])],
[ ac_cv_have_size_t="yes" ], [ ac_cv_have_size_t="no"
])
])
if test "x$ac_cv_have_size_t" = "xyes" ; then
AC_DEFINE([HAVE_SIZE_T], [1], [define if you have size_t data type])
fi
AC_CACHE_CHECK([for ssize_t], ac_cv_have_ssize_t, [
AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include <sys/types.h> ]],
[[ ssize_t foo; foo = 1235; ]])],
[ ac_cv_have_ssize_t="yes" ], [ ac_cv_have_ssize_t="no"
])
])
if test "x$ac_cv_have_ssize_t" = "xyes" ; then
AC_DEFINE([HAVE_SSIZE_T], [1], [define if you have ssize_t data type])
fi
AC_CACHE_CHECK([for clock_t], ac_cv_have_clock_t, [
AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include <time.h> ]],
[[ clock_t foo; foo = 1235; ]])],
[ ac_cv_have_clock_t="yes" ], [ ac_cv_have_clock_t="no"
])
])
if test "x$ac_cv_have_clock_t" = "xyes" ; then
AC_DEFINE([HAVE_CLOCK_T], [1], [define if you have clock_t data type])
fi
AC_CACHE_CHECK([for sa_family_t], ac_cv_have_sa_family_t, [
AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/socket.h>
]], [[ sa_family_t foo; foo = 1235; ]])],
[ ac_cv_have_sa_family_t="yes" ],
[ AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/socket.h>
#include <netinet/in.h>
]], [[ sa_family_t foo; foo = 1235; ]])],
[ ac_cv_have_sa_family_t="yes" ],
[ ac_cv_have_sa_family_t="no" ]
)
])
])
if test "x$ac_cv_have_sa_family_t" = "xyes" ; then
AC_DEFINE([HAVE_SA_FAMILY_T], [1],
[define if you have sa_family_t data type])
fi
AC_CACHE_CHECK([for pid_t], ac_cv_have_pid_t, [
AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include <sys/types.h> ]],
[[ pid_t foo; foo = 1235; ]])],
[ ac_cv_have_pid_t="yes" ], [ ac_cv_have_pid_t="no"
])
])
if test "x$ac_cv_have_pid_t" = "xyes" ; then
AC_DEFINE([HAVE_PID_T], [1], [define if you have pid_t data type])
fi
AC_CACHE_CHECK([for mode_t], ac_cv_have_mode_t, [
AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include <sys/types.h> ]],
[[ mode_t foo; foo = 1235; ]])],
[ ac_cv_have_mode_t="yes" ], [ ac_cv_have_mode_t="no"
])
])
if test "x$ac_cv_have_mode_t" = "xyes" ; then
AC_DEFINE([HAVE_MODE_T], [1], [define if you have mode_t data type])
fi
AC_CACHE_CHECK([for struct sockaddr_storage], ac_cv_have_struct_sockaddr_storage, [
AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/socket.h>
]], [[ struct sockaddr_storage s; ]])],
[ ac_cv_have_struct_sockaddr_storage="yes" ],
[ ac_cv_have_struct_sockaddr_storage="no"
])
])
if test "x$ac_cv_have_struct_sockaddr_storage" = "xyes" ; then
AC_DEFINE([HAVE_STRUCT_SOCKADDR_STORAGE], [1],
[define if you have struct sockaddr_storage data type])
fi
AC_CACHE_CHECK([for struct sockaddr_in6], ac_cv_have_struct_sockaddr_in6, [
AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <netinet/in.h>
]], [[ struct sockaddr_in6 s; s.sin6_family = 0; ]])],
[ ac_cv_have_struct_sockaddr_in6="yes" ],
[ ac_cv_have_struct_sockaddr_in6="no"
])
])
if test "x$ac_cv_have_struct_sockaddr_in6" = "xyes" ; then
AC_DEFINE([HAVE_STRUCT_SOCKADDR_IN6], [1],
[define if you have struct sockaddr_in6 data type])
fi
AC_CACHE_CHECK([for struct in6_addr], ac_cv_have_struct_in6_addr, [
AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <netinet/in.h>
]], [[ struct in6_addr s; s.s6_addr[0] = 0; ]])],
[ ac_cv_have_struct_in6_addr="yes" ],
[ ac_cv_have_struct_in6_addr="no"
])
])
if test "x$ac_cv_have_struct_in6_addr" = "xyes" ; then
AC_DEFINE([HAVE_STRUCT_IN6_ADDR], [1],
[define if you have struct in6_addr data type])
dnl Now check for sin6_scope_id
AC_CHECK_MEMBERS([struct sockaddr_in6.sin6_scope_id], , ,
[
#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TYPES_H
#include <sys/types.h>
#endif
#include <netinet/in.h>
])
fi
AC_CACHE_CHECK([for struct addrinfo], ac_cv_have_struct_addrinfo, [
AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/socket.h>
#include <netdb.h>
]], [[ struct addrinfo s; s.ai_flags = AI_PASSIVE; ]])],
[ ac_cv_have_struct_addrinfo="yes" ],
[ ac_cv_have_struct_addrinfo="no"
])
])
if test "x$ac_cv_have_struct_addrinfo" = "xyes" ; then
AC_DEFINE([HAVE_STRUCT_ADDRINFO], [1],
[define if you have struct addrinfo data type])
fi
AC_HEADER_TIME
AC_CACHE_CHECK([for struct timeval], ac_cv_have_struct_timeval, [
AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include <sys/time.h> ]],
[[ struct timeval tv; tv.tv_sec = 1;]])],
[ ac_cv_have_struct_timeval="yes" ],
[ ac_cv_have_struct_timeval="no"
])
])
if test "x$ac_cv_have_struct_timeval" = "xyes" ; then
AC_DEFINE([HAVE_STRUCT_TIMEVAL], [1], [define if you have struct timeval])
have_struct_timeval=1
fi
AC_CACHE_CHECK([for struct timespec], ac_cv_have_struct_timespec, [
AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
#ifdef TIME_WITH_SYS_TIME
# include <sys/time.h>
# include <time.h>
#else
# ifdef HAVE_SYS_TIME_H
# include <sys/time.h>
# else
# include <time.h>
# endif
#endif
]],
[[ struct timespec ts; ts.tv_sec = 1;]])],
[ ac_cv_have_struct_timespec="yes" ],
[ ac_cv_have_struct_timespec="no"
])
])
if test "x$ac_cv_have_struct_timespec" = "xyes" ; then
AC_DEFINE([HAVE_STRUCT_TIMESPEC], [1], [define if you have struct timespec])
have_struct_timespec=1
fi
# We need int64_t or else certain parts of the compile will fail.
if test "x$ac_cv_have_int64_t" = "xno" && \
test "x$ac_cv_sizeof_long_int" != "x8" && \
test "x$ac_cv_sizeof_long_long_int" = "x0" ; then
echo "OpenSSH requires int64_t support. Contact your vendor or install"
echo "an alternative compiler (I.E., GCC) before continuing."
echo ""
exit 1;
else
dnl test snprintf (broken on SCO w/gcc)
AC_RUN_IFELSE(
[AC_LANG_SOURCE([[
#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#ifdef HAVE_SNPRINTF
main()
{
char buf[50];
char expected_out[50];
int mazsize = 50 ;
#if (SIZEOF_LONG_INT == 8)
long int num = 0x7fffffffffffffff;
#else
long long num = 0x7fffffffffffffffll;
#endif
strcpy(expected_out, "9223372036854775807");
snprintf(buf, mazsize, "%lld", num);
if(strcmp(buf, expected_out) != 0)
exit(1);
exit(0);
}
#else
main() { exit(0); }
#endif
]])], [ true ], [ AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_SNPRINTF]) ],
AC_MSG_WARN([cross compiling: Assuming working snprintf()])
)
fi
dnl Checks for structure members
OSSH_CHECK_HEADER_FOR_FIELD([ut_host], [utmp.h], [HAVE_HOST_IN_UTMP])
OSSH_CHECK_HEADER_FOR_FIELD([ut_host], [utmpx.h], [HAVE_HOST_IN_UTMPX])
OSSH_CHECK_HEADER_FOR_FIELD([syslen], [utmpx.h], [HAVE_SYSLEN_IN_UTMPX])
OSSH_CHECK_HEADER_FOR_FIELD([ut_pid], [utmp.h], [HAVE_PID_IN_UTMP])
OSSH_CHECK_HEADER_FOR_FIELD([ut_type], [utmp.h], [HAVE_TYPE_IN_UTMP])
OSSH_CHECK_HEADER_FOR_FIELD([ut_type], [utmpx.h], [HAVE_TYPE_IN_UTMPX])
OSSH_CHECK_HEADER_FOR_FIELD([ut_tv], [utmp.h], [HAVE_TV_IN_UTMP])
OSSH_CHECK_HEADER_FOR_FIELD([ut_id], [utmp.h], [HAVE_ID_IN_UTMP])
OSSH_CHECK_HEADER_FOR_FIELD([ut_id], [utmpx.h], [HAVE_ID_IN_UTMPX])
OSSH_CHECK_HEADER_FOR_FIELD([ut_addr], [utmp.h], [HAVE_ADDR_IN_UTMP])
OSSH_CHECK_HEADER_FOR_FIELD([ut_addr], [utmpx.h], [HAVE_ADDR_IN_UTMPX])
OSSH_CHECK_HEADER_FOR_FIELD([ut_addr_v6], [utmp.h], [HAVE_ADDR_V6_IN_UTMP])
OSSH_CHECK_HEADER_FOR_FIELD([ut_addr_v6], [utmpx.h], [HAVE_ADDR_V6_IN_UTMPX])
OSSH_CHECK_HEADER_FOR_FIELD([ut_exit], [utmp.h], [HAVE_EXIT_IN_UTMP])
OSSH_CHECK_HEADER_FOR_FIELD([ut_time], [utmp.h], [HAVE_TIME_IN_UTMP])
OSSH_CHECK_HEADER_FOR_FIELD([ut_time], [utmpx.h], [HAVE_TIME_IN_UTMPX])
OSSH_CHECK_HEADER_FOR_FIELD([ut_tv], [utmpx.h], [HAVE_TV_IN_UTMPX])
+OSSH_CHECK_HEADER_FOR_FIELD([ut_ss], [utmpx.h], [HAVE_SS_IN_UTMPX])
AC_CHECK_MEMBERS([struct stat.st_blksize])
AC_CHECK_MEMBERS([struct stat.st_mtim])
AC_CHECK_MEMBERS([struct stat.st_mtime])
AC_CHECK_MEMBERS([struct passwd.pw_gecos, struct passwd.pw_class,
struct passwd.pw_change, struct passwd.pw_expire],
[], [], [[
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <pwd.h>
]])
AC_CHECK_MEMBER([struct __res_state.retrans], [], [AC_DEFINE([__res_state], [state],
[Define if we don't have struct __res_state in resolv.h])],
[[
#include <stdio.h>
#if HAVE_SYS_TYPES_H
# include <sys/types.h>
#endif
#include <netinet/in.h>
#include <arpa/nameser.h>
#include <resolv.h>
]])
AC_CACHE_CHECK([for ss_family field in struct sockaddr_storage],
ac_cv_have_ss_family_in_struct_ss, [
AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/socket.h>
]], [[ struct sockaddr_storage s; s.ss_family = 1; ]])],
[ ac_cv_have_ss_family_in_struct_ss="yes" ],
[ ac_cv_have_ss_family_in_struct_ss="no" ])
])
if test "x$ac_cv_have_ss_family_in_struct_ss" = "xyes" ; then
AC_DEFINE([HAVE_SS_FAMILY_IN_SS], [1], [Fields in struct sockaddr_storage])
fi
AC_CACHE_CHECK([for __ss_family field in struct sockaddr_storage],
ac_cv_have___ss_family_in_struct_ss, [
AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/socket.h>
]], [[ struct sockaddr_storage s; s.__ss_family = 1; ]])],
[ ac_cv_have___ss_family_in_struct_ss="yes" ],
[ ac_cv_have___ss_family_in_struct_ss="no"
])
])
if test "x$ac_cv_have___ss_family_in_struct_ss" = "xyes" ; then
AC_DEFINE([HAVE___SS_FAMILY_IN_SS], [1],
[Fields in struct sockaddr_storage])
fi
dnl make sure we're using the real structure members and not defines
AC_CACHE_CHECK([for msg_accrights field in struct msghdr],
ac_cv_have_accrights_in_msghdr, [
AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/socket.h>
#include <sys/uio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
]], [[
#ifdef msg_accrights
#error "msg_accrights is a macro"
exit(1);
#endif
struct msghdr m;
m.msg_accrights = 0;
exit(0);
]])],
[ ac_cv_have_accrights_in_msghdr="yes" ],
[ ac_cv_have_accrights_in_msghdr="no" ]
)
])
if test "x$ac_cv_have_accrights_in_msghdr" = "xyes" ; then
AC_DEFINE([HAVE_ACCRIGHTS_IN_MSGHDR], [1],
[Define if your system uses access rights style
file descriptor passing])
fi
AC_MSG_CHECKING([if struct statvfs.f_fsid is integral type])
AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
#include <sys/param.h>
#include <sys/stat.h>
#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TIME_H
# include <sys/time.h>
#endif
#ifdef HAVE_SYS_MOUNT_H
#include <sys/mount.h>
#endif
#ifdef HAVE_SYS_STATVFS_H
#include <sys/statvfs.h>
#endif
]], [[ struct statvfs s; s.f_fsid = 0; ]])],
[ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) ],
[ AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
AC_MSG_CHECKING([if fsid_t has member val])
AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/statvfs.h>
]], [[ fsid_t t; t.val[0] = 0; ]])],
[ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])
AC_DEFINE([FSID_HAS_VAL], [1], [fsid_t has member val]) ],
[ AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) ])
AC_MSG_CHECKING([if f_fsid has member __val])
AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/statvfs.h>
]], [[ fsid_t t; t.__val[0] = 0; ]])],
[ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])
AC_DEFINE([FSID_HAS___VAL], [1], [fsid_t has member __val]) ],
[ AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) ])
])
AC_CACHE_CHECK([for msg_control field in struct msghdr],
ac_cv_have_control_in_msghdr, [
AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/socket.h>
#include <sys/uio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
]], [[
#ifdef msg_control
#error "msg_control is a macro"
exit(1);
#endif
struct msghdr m;
m.msg_control = 0;
exit(0);
]])],
[ ac_cv_have_control_in_msghdr="yes" ],
[ ac_cv_have_control_in_msghdr="no" ]
)
])
if test "x$ac_cv_have_control_in_msghdr" = "xyes" ; then
AC_DEFINE([HAVE_CONTROL_IN_MSGHDR], [1],
[Define if your system uses ancillary data style
file descriptor passing])
fi
AC_CACHE_CHECK([if libc defines __progname], ac_cv_libc_defines___progname, [
- AC_LINK_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[]],
+ AC_LINK_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include <stdio.h> ]],
[[ extern char *__progname; printf("%s", __progname); ]])],
[ ac_cv_libc_defines___progname="yes" ],
[ ac_cv_libc_defines___progname="no"
])
])
if test "x$ac_cv_libc_defines___progname" = "xyes" ; then
AC_DEFINE([HAVE___PROGNAME], [1], [Define if libc defines __progname])
fi
AC_CACHE_CHECK([whether $CC implements __FUNCTION__], ac_cv_cc_implements___FUNCTION__, [
AC_LINK_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include <stdio.h> ]],
[[ printf("%s", __FUNCTION__); ]])],
[ ac_cv_cc_implements___FUNCTION__="yes" ],
[ ac_cv_cc_implements___FUNCTION__="no"
])
])
if test "x$ac_cv_cc_implements___FUNCTION__" = "xyes" ; then
AC_DEFINE([HAVE___FUNCTION__], [1],
[Define if compiler implements __FUNCTION__])
fi
AC_CACHE_CHECK([whether $CC implements __func__], ac_cv_cc_implements___func__, [
AC_LINK_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include <stdio.h> ]],
[[ printf("%s", __func__); ]])],
[ ac_cv_cc_implements___func__="yes" ],
[ ac_cv_cc_implements___func__="no"
])
])
if test "x$ac_cv_cc_implements___func__" = "xyes" ; then
AC_DEFINE([HAVE___func__], [1], [Define if compiler implements __func__])
fi
AC_CACHE_CHECK([whether va_copy exists], ac_cv_have_va_copy, [
AC_LINK_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
#include <stdarg.h>
va_list x,y;
]], [[ va_copy(x,y); ]])],
[ ac_cv_have_va_copy="yes" ],
[ ac_cv_have_va_copy="no"
])
])
if test "x$ac_cv_have_va_copy" = "xyes" ; then
AC_DEFINE([HAVE_VA_COPY], [1], [Define if va_copy exists])
fi
AC_CACHE_CHECK([whether __va_copy exists], ac_cv_have___va_copy, [
AC_LINK_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
#include <stdarg.h>
va_list x,y;
]], [[ __va_copy(x,y); ]])],
[ ac_cv_have___va_copy="yes" ], [ ac_cv_have___va_copy="no"
])
])
if test "x$ac_cv_have___va_copy" = "xyes" ; then
AC_DEFINE([HAVE___VA_COPY], [1], [Define if __va_copy exists])
fi
AC_CACHE_CHECK([whether getopt has optreset support],
ac_cv_have_getopt_optreset, [
AC_LINK_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include <getopt.h> ]],
[[ extern int optreset; optreset = 0; ]])],
[ ac_cv_have_getopt_optreset="yes" ],
[ ac_cv_have_getopt_optreset="no"
])
])
if test "x$ac_cv_have_getopt_optreset" = "xyes" ; then
AC_DEFINE([HAVE_GETOPT_OPTRESET], [1],
[Define if your getopt(3) defines and uses optreset])
fi
AC_CACHE_CHECK([if libc defines sys_errlist], ac_cv_libc_defines_sys_errlist, [
- AC_LINK_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[]],
+ AC_LINK_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include <stdio.h> ]],
[[ extern const char *const sys_errlist[]; printf("%s", sys_errlist[0]);]])],
[ ac_cv_libc_defines_sys_errlist="yes" ],
[ ac_cv_libc_defines_sys_errlist="no"
])
])
if test "x$ac_cv_libc_defines_sys_errlist" = "xyes" ; then
AC_DEFINE([HAVE_SYS_ERRLIST], [1],
[Define if your system defines sys_errlist[]])
fi
AC_CACHE_CHECK([if libc defines sys_nerr], ac_cv_libc_defines_sys_nerr, [
- AC_LINK_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[]],
+ AC_LINK_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include <stdio.h> ]],
[[ extern int sys_nerr; printf("%i", sys_nerr);]])],
[ ac_cv_libc_defines_sys_nerr="yes" ],
[ ac_cv_libc_defines_sys_nerr="no"
])
])
if test "x$ac_cv_libc_defines_sys_nerr" = "xyes" ; then
AC_DEFINE([HAVE_SYS_NERR], [1], [Define if your system defines sys_nerr])
fi
# Check libraries needed by DNS fingerprint support
AC_SEARCH_LIBS([getrrsetbyname], [resolv],
[AC_DEFINE([HAVE_GETRRSETBYNAME], [1],
[Define if getrrsetbyname() exists])],
[
# Needed by our getrrsetbyname()
AC_SEARCH_LIBS([res_query], [resolv])
AC_SEARCH_LIBS([dn_expand], [resolv])
AC_MSG_CHECKING([if res_query will link])
AC_LINK_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <netinet/in.h>
#include <arpa/nameser.h>
#include <netdb.h>
#include <resolv.h>
]], [[
res_query (0, 0, 0, 0, 0);
]])],
AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]),
[AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
saved_LIBS="$LIBS"
LIBS="$LIBS -lresolv"
AC_MSG_CHECKING([for res_query in -lresolv])
AC_LINK_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <netinet/in.h>
#include <arpa/nameser.h>
#include <netdb.h>
#include <resolv.h>
]], [[
res_query (0, 0, 0, 0, 0);
]])],
[AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])],
[LIBS="$saved_LIBS"
AC_MSG_RESULT([no])])
])
AC_CHECK_FUNCS([_getshort _getlong])
AC_CHECK_DECLS([_getshort, _getlong], , ,
[#include <sys/types.h>
#include <arpa/nameser.h>])
AC_CHECK_MEMBER([HEADER.ad],
[AC_DEFINE([HAVE_HEADER_AD], [1],
[Define if HEADER.ad exists in arpa/nameser.h])], ,
[#include <arpa/nameser.h>])
])
AC_MSG_CHECKING([if struct __res_state _res is an extern])
AC_LINK_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
#include <stdio.h>
#if HAVE_SYS_TYPES_H
# include <sys/types.h>
#endif
#include <netinet/in.h>
#include <arpa/nameser.h>
#include <resolv.h>
extern struct __res_state _res;
]], [[
struct __res_state *volatile p = &_res; /* force resolution of _res */
return 0;
]],)],
[AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])
AC_DEFINE([HAVE__RES_EXTERN], [1],
[Define if you have struct __res_state _res as an extern])
],
[ AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) ]
)
# Check whether user wants SELinux support
SELINUX_MSG="no"
LIBSELINUX=""
AC_ARG_WITH([selinux],
[ --with-selinux Enable SELinux support],
[ if test "x$withval" != "xno" ; then
save_LIBS="$LIBS"
AC_DEFINE([WITH_SELINUX], [1],
[Define if you want SELinux support.])
SELINUX_MSG="yes"
AC_CHECK_HEADER([selinux/selinux.h], ,
AC_MSG_ERROR([SELinux support requires selinux.h header]))
AC_CHECK_LIB([selinux], [setexeccon],
[ LIBSELINUX="-lselinux"
LIBS="$LIBS -lselinux"
],
AC_MSG_ERROR([SELinux support requires libselinux library]))
- SSHLIBS="$SSHLIBS $LIBSELINUX"
- SSHDLIBS="$SSHDLIBS $LIBSELINUX"
AC_CHECK_FUNCS([getseuserbyname get_default_context_with_level])
- LIBS="$save_LIBS"
+ LIBS="$save_LIBS $LIBSELINUX"
fi ]
)
-AC_SUBST([SSHLIBS])
AC_SUBST([SSHDLIBS])
# Check whether user wants Kerberos 5 support
KRB5_MSG="no"
AC_ARG_WITH([kerberos5],
[ --with-kerberos5=PATH Enable Kerberos 5 support],
[ if test "x$withval" != "xno" ; then
if test "x$withval" = "xyes" ; then
KRB5ROOT="/usr/local"
else
KRB5ROOT=${withval}
fi
AC_DEFINE([KRB5], [1], [Define if you want Kerberos 5 support])
KRB5_MSG="yes"
AC_PATH_TOOL([KRB5CONF], [krb5-config],
[$KRB5ROOT/bin/krb5-config],
[$KRB5ROOT/bin:$PATH])
if test -x $KRB5CONF ; then
K5CFLAGS="`$KRB5CONF --cflags`"
K5LIBS="`$KRB5CONF --libs`"
CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS $K5CFLAGS"
AC_MSG_CHECKING([for gssapi support])
if $KRB5CONF | grep gssapi >/dev/null ; then
AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])
AC_DEFINE([GSSAPI], [1],
[Define this if you want GSSAPI
support in the version 2 protocol])
GSSCFLAGS="`$KRB5CONF --cflags gssapi`"
GSSLIBS="`$KRB5CONF --libs gssapi`"
CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS $GSSCFLAGS"
else
AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
fi
AC_MSG_CHECKING([whether we are using Heimdal])
AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include <krb5.h>
]], [[ char *tmp = heimdal_version; ]])],
[ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])
AC_DEFINE([HEIMDAL], [1],
[Define this if you are using the Heimdal
version of Kerberos V5]) ],
[AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
])
else
CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS -I${KRB5ROOT}/include"
LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS -L${KRB5ROOT}/lib"
AC_MSG_CHECKING([whether we are using Heimdal])
AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include <krb5.h>
]], [[ char *tmp = heimdal_version; ]])],
[ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])
AC_DEFINE([HEIMDAL])
K5LIBS="-lkrb5"
K5LIBS="$K5LIBS -lcom_err -lasn1"
AC_CHECK_LIB([roken], [net_write],
[K5LIBS="$K5LIBS -lroken"])
AC_CHECK_LIB([des], [des_cbc_encrypt],
[K5LIBS="$K5LIBS -ldes"])
], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
K5LIBS="-lkrb5 -lk5crypto -lcom_err"
])
AC_SEARCH_LIBS([dn_expand], [resolv])
AC_CHECK_LIB([gssapi_krb5], [gss_init_sec_context],
[ AC_DEFINE([GSSAPI])
GSSLIBS="-lgssapi_krb5" ],
[ AC_CHECK_LIB([gssapi], [gss_init_sec_context],
[ AC_DEFINE([GSSAPI])
GSSLIBS="-lgssapi" ],
[ AC_CHECK_LIB([gss], [gss_init_sec_context],
[ AC_DEFINE([GSSAPI])
GSSLIBS="-lgss" ],
AC_MSG_WARN([Cannot find any suitable gss-api library - build may fail]))
])
])
AC_CHECK_HEADER([gssapi.h], ,
[ unset ac_cv_header_gssapi_h
CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS -I${KRB5ROOT}/include/gssapi"
AC_CHECK_HEADERS([gssapi.h], ,
AC_MSG_WARN([Cannot find any suitable gss-api header - build may fail])
)
]
)
oldCPP="$CPPFLAGS"
CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS -I${KRB5ROOT}/include/gssapi"
AC_CHECK_HEADER([gssapi_krb5.h], ,
[ CPPFLAGS="$oldCPP" ])
fi
if test -n "${rpath_opt}" ; then
LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS ${rpath_opt}${KRB5ROOT}/lib"
fi
if test ! -z "$blibpath" ; then
blibpath="$blibpath:${KRB5ROOT}/lib"
fi
AC_CHECK_HEADERS([gssapi.h gssapi/gssapi.h])
AC_CHECK_HEADERS([gssapi_krb5.h gssapi/gssapi_krb5.h])
AC_CHECK_HEADERS([gssapi_generic.h gssapi/gssapi_generic.h])
AC_SEARCH_LIBS([k_hasafs], [kafs], [AC_DEFINE([USE_AFS], [1],
[Define this if you want to use libkafs' AFS support])])
AC_CHECK_DECLS([GSS_C_NT_HOSTBASED_SERVICE], [], [], [[
#ifdef HAVE_GSSAPI_H
# include <gssapi.h>
#elif defined(HAVE_GSSAPI_GSSAPI_H)
# include <gssapi/gssapi.h>
#endif
#ifdef HAVE_GSSAPI_GENERIC_H
# include <gssapi_generic.h>
#elif defined(HAVE_GSSAPI_GSSAPI_GENERIC_H)
# include <gssapi/gssapi_generic.h>
#endif
]])
saved_LIBS="$LIBS"
LIBS="$LIBS $K5LIBS"
AC_CHECK_FUNCS([krb5_cc_new_unique krb5_get_error_message krb5_free_error_message])
LIBS="$saved_LIBS"
fi
]
)
AC_SUBST([GSSLIBS])
AC_SUBST([K5LIBS])
# Looking for programs, paths and files
PRIVSEP_PATH=/var/empty
AC_ARG_WITH([privsep-path],
[ --with-privsep-path=xxx Path for privilege separation chroot (default=/var/empty)],
[
if test -n "$withval" && test "x$withval" != "xno" && \
test "x${withval}" != "xyes"; then
PRIVSEP_PATH=$withval
fi
]
)
AC_SUBST([PRIVSEP_PATH])
AC_ARG_WITH([xauth],
[ --with-xauth=PATH Specify path to xauth program ],
[
if test -n "$withval" && test "x$withval" != "xno" && \
test "x${withval}" != "xyes"; then
xauth_path=$withval
fi
],
[
TestPath="$PATH"
TestPath="${TestPath}${PATH_SEPARATOR}/usr/X/bin"
TestPath="${TestPath}${PATH_SEPARATOR}/usr/bin/X11"
TestPath="${TestPath}${PATH_SEPARATOR}/usr/X11R6/bin"
TestPath="${TestPath}${PATH_SEPARATOR}/usr/openwin/bin"
AC_PATH_PROG([xauth_path], [xauth], , [$TestPath])
if (test ! -z "$xauth_path" && test -x "/usr/openwin/bin/xauth") ; then
xauth_path="/usr/openwin/bin/xauth"
fi
]
)
STRIP_OPT=-s
AC_ARG_ENABLE([strip],
[ --disable-strip Disable calling strip(1) on install],
[
if test "x$enableval" = "xno" ; then
STRIP_OPT=
fi
]
)
AC_SUBST([STRIP_OPT])
if test -z "$xauth_path" ; then
XAUTH_PATH="undefined"
AC_SUBST([XAUTH_PATH])
else
AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED([XAUTH_PATH], ["$xauth_path"],
[Define if xauth is found in your path])
XAUTH_PATH=$xauth_path
AC_SUBST([XAUTH_PATH])
fi
dnl # --with-maildir=/path/to/mail gets top priority.
dnl # if maildir is set in the platform case statement above we use that.
dnl # Otherwise we run a program to get the dir from system headers.
dnl # We first look for _PATH_MAILDIR then MAILDIR then _PATH_MAIL
dnl # If we find _PATH_MAILDIR we do nothing because that is what
dnl # session.c expects anyway. Otherwise we set to the value found
dnl # stripping any trailing slash. If for some strage reason our program
dnl # does not find what it needs, we default to /var/spool/mail.
# Check for mail directory
AC_ARG_WITH([maildir],
[ --with-maildir=/path/to/mail Specify your system mail directory],
[
if test "X$withval" != X && test "x$withval" != xno && \
test "x${withval}" != xyes; then
AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED([MAIL_DIRECTORY], ["$withval"],
[Set this to your mail directory if you do not have _PATH_MAILDIR])
fi
],[
if test "X$maildir" != "X"; then
AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED([MAIL_DIRECTORY], ["$maildir"])
else
AC_MSG_CHECKING([Discovering system mail directory])
AC_RUN_IFELSE(
[AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H
#include <paths.h>
#endif
#ifdef HAVE_MAILLOCK_H
#include <maillock.h>
#endif
#define DATA "conftest.maildir"
]], [[
FILE *fd;
int rc;
fd = fopen(DATA,"w");
if(fd == NULL)
exit(1);
#if defined (_PATH_MAILDIR)
if ((rc = fprintf(fd ,"_PATH_MAILDIR:%s\n", _PATH_MAILDIR)) <0)
exit(1);
#elif defined (MAILDIR)
if ((rc = fprintf(fd ,"MAILDIR:%s\n", MAILDIR)) <0)
exit(1);
#elif defined (_PATH_MAIL)
if ((rc = fprintf(fd ,"_PATH_MAIL:%s\n", _PATH_MAIL)) <0)
exit(1);
#else
exit (2);
#endif
exit(0);
]])],
[
maildir_what=`awk -F: '{print $1}' conftest.maildir`
maildir=`awk -F: '{print $2}' conftest.maildir \
| sed 's|/$||'`
AC_MSG_RESULT([Using: $maildir from $maildir_what])
if test "x$maildir_what" != "x_PATH_MAILDIR"; then
AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED([MAIL_DIRECTORY], ["$maildir"])
fi
],
[
if test "X$ac_status" = "X2";then
# our test program didn't find it. Default to /var/spool/mail
AC_MSG_RESULT([Using: default value of /var/spool/mail])
AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED([MAIL_DIRECTORY], ["/var/spool/mail"])
else
AC_MSG_RESULT([*** not found ***])
fi
],
[
AC_MSG_WARN([cross compiling: use --with-maildir=/path/to/mail])
]
)
fi
]
) # maildir
if test ! -z "$cross_compiling" && test "x$cross_compiling" = "xyes"; then
AC_MSG_WARN([cross compiling: Disabling /dev/ptmx test])
disable_ptmx_check=yes
fi
if test -z "$no_dev_ptmx" ; then
if test "x$disable_ptmx_check" != "xyes" ; then
AC_CHECK_FILE(["/dev/ptmx"],
[
AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED([HAVE_DEV_PTMX], [1],
[Define if you have /dev/ptmx])
have_dev_ptmx=1
]
)
fi
fi
if test ! -z "$cross_compiling" && test "x$cross_compiling" != "xyes"; then
AC_CHECK_FILE(["/dev/ptc"],
[
AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED([HAVE_DEV_PTS_AND_PTC], [1],
[Define if you have /dev/ptc])
have_dev_ptc=1
]
)
else
AC_MSG_WARN([cross compiling: Disabling /dev/ptc test])
fi
# Options from here on. Some of these are preset by platform above
AC_ARG_WITH([mantype],
[ --with-mantype=man|cat|doc Set man page type],
[
case "$withval" in
man|cat|doc)
MANTYPE=$withval
;;
*)
AC_MSG_ERROR([invalid man type: $withval])
;;
esac
]
)
if test -z "$MANTYPE"; then
if ${MANDOC} ${srcdir}/ssh.1 >/dev/null 2>&1; then
MANTYPE=doc
elif ${NROFF} -mdoc ${srcdir}/ssh.1 >/dev/null 2>&1; then
MANTYPE=doc
elif ${NROFF} -man ${srcdir}/ssh.1 >/dev/null 2>&1; then
MANTYPE=man
else
MANTYPE=cat
fi
fi
AC_SUBST([MANTYPE])
if test "$MANTYPE" = "doc"; then
mansubdir=man;
else
mansubdir=$MANTYPE;
fi
AC_SUBST([mansubdir])
# Check whether to enable MD5 passwords
MD5_MSG="no"
AC_ARG_WITH([md5-passwords],
[ --with-md5-passwords Enable use of MD5 passwords],
[
if test "x$withval" != "xno" ; then
AC_DEFINE([HAVE_MD5_PASSWORDS], [1],
[Define if you want to allow MD5 passwords])
MD5_MSG="yes"
fi
]
)
# Whether to disable shadow password support
AC_ARG_WITH([shadow],
[ --without-shadow Disable shadow password support],
[
if test "x$withval" = "xno" ; then
AC_DEFINE([DISABLE_SHADOW])
disable_shadow=yes
fi
]
)
if test -z "$disable_shadow" ; then
AC_MSG_CHECKING([if the systems has expire shadow information])
AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <shadow.h>
struct spwd sp;
]], [[ sp.sp_expire = sp.sp_lstchg = sp.sp_inact = 0; ]])],
[ sp_expire_available=yes ], [
])
if test "x$sp_expire_available" = "xyes" ; then
AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])
AC_DEFINE([HAS_SHADOW_EXPIRE], [1],
[Define if you want to use shadow password expire field])
else
AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
fi
fi
# Use ip address instead of hostname in $DISPLAY
if test ! -z "$IPADDR_IN_DISPLAY" ; then
DISPLAY_HACK_MSG="yes"
AC_DEFINE([IPADDR_IN_DISPLAY], [1],
[Define if you need to use IP address
instead of hostname in $DISPLAY])
else
DISPLAY_HACK_MSG="no"
AC_ARG_WITH([ipaddr-display],
[ --with-ipaddr-display Use ip address instead of hostname in $DISPLAY],
[
if test "x$withval" != "xno" ; then
AC_DEFINE([IPADDR_IN_DISPLAY])
DISPLAY_HACK_MSG="yes"
fi
]
)
fi
# check for /etc/default/login and use it if present.
AC_ARG_ENABLE([etc-default-login],
[ --disable-etc-default-login Disable using PATH from /etc/default/login [no]],
[ if test "x$enableval" = "xno"; then
AC_MSG_NOTICE([/etc/default/login handling disabled])
etc_default_login=no
else
etc_default_login=yes
fi ],
[ if test ! -z "$cross_compiling" && test "x$cross_compiling" = "xyes";
then
AC_MSG_WARN([cross compiling: not checking /etc/default/login])
etc_default_login=no
else
etc_default_login=yes
fi ]
)
if test "x$etc_default_login" != "xno"; then
AC_CHECK_FILE(["/etc/default/login"],
[ external_path_file=/etc/default/login ])
if test "x$external_path_file" = "x/etc/default/login"; then
AC_DEFINE([HAVE_ETC_DEFAULT_LOGIN], [1],
[Define if your system has /etc/default/login])
fi
fi
dnl BSD systems use /etc/login.conf so --with-default-path= has no effect
if test $ac_cv_func_login_getcapbool = "yes" && \
test $ac_cv_header_login_cap_h = "yes" ; then
external_path_file=/etc/login.conf
fi
# Whether to mess with the default path
SERVER_PATH_MSG="(default)"
AC_ARG_WITH([default-path],
[ --with-default-path= Specify default $PATH environment for server],
[
if test "x$external_path_file" = "x/etc/login.conf" ; then
AC_MSG_WARN([
--with-default-path=PATH has no effect on this system.
Edit /etc/login.conf instead.])
elif test "x$withval" != "xno" ; then
if test ! -z "$external_path_file" ; then
AC_MSG_WARN([
--with-default-path=PATH will only be used if PATH is not defined in
$external_path_file .])
fi
user_path="$withval"
SERVER_PATH_MSG="$withval"
fi
],
[ if test "x$external_path_file" = "x/etc/login.conf" ; then
AC_MSG_WARN([Make sure the path to scp is in /etc/login.conf])
else
if test ! -z "$external_path_file" ; then
AC_MSG_WARN([
If PATH is defined in $external_path_file, ensure the path to scp is included,
otherwise scp will not work.])
fi
AC_RUN_IFELSE(
[AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
/* find out what STDPATH is */
#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
#ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H
# include <paths.h>
#endif
#ifndef _PATH_STDPATH
# ifdef _PATH_USERPATH /* Irix */
# define _PATH_STDPATH _PATH_USERPATH
# else
# define _PATH_STDPATH "/usr/bin:/bin:/usr/sbin:/sbin"
# endif
#endif
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/stat.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
#define DATA "conftest.stdpath"
]], [[
FILE *fd;
int rc;
fd = fopen(DATA,"w");
if(fd == NULL)
exit(1);
if ((rc = fprintf(fd,"%s", _PATH_STDPATH)) < 0)
exit(1);
exit(0);
]])],
[ user_path=`cat conftest.stdpath` ],
[ user_path="/usr/bin:/bin:/usr/sbin:/sbin" ],
[ user_path="/usr/bin:/bin:/usr/sbin:/sbin" ]
)
# make sure $bindir is in USER_PATH so scp will work
t_bindir="${bindir}"
while echo "${t_bindir}" | egrep '\$\{|NONE/' >/dev/null 2>&1; do
t_bindir=`eval echo ${t_bindir}`
case $t_bindir in
NONE/*) t_bindir=`echo $t_bindir | sed "s~NONE~$prefix~"` ;;
esac
case $t_bindir in
NONE/*) t_bindir=`echo $t_bindir | sed "s~NONE~$ac_default_prefix~"` ;;
esac
done
echo $user_path | grep ":$t_bindir" > /dev/null 2>&1
if test $? -ne 0 ; then
echo $user_path | grep "^$t_bindir" > /dev/null 2>&1
if test $? -ne 0 ; then
user_path=$user_path:$t_bindir
AC_MSG_RESULT([Adding $t_bindir to USER_PATH so scp will work])
fi
fi
fi ]
)
if test "x$external_path_file" != "x/etc/login.conf" ; then
AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED([USER_PATH], ["$user_path"], [Specify default $PATH])
AC_SUBST([user_path])
fi
# Set superuser path separately to user path
AC_ARG_WITH([superuser-path],
[ --with-superuser-path= Specify different path for super-user],
[
if test -n "$withval" && test "x$withval" != "xno" && \
test "x${withval}" != "xyes"; then
AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED([SUPERUSER_PATH], ["$withval"],
[Define if you want a different $PATH
for the superuser])
superuser_path=$withval
fi
]
)
AC_MSG_CHECKING([if we need to convert IPv4 in IPv6-mapped addresses])
IPV4_IN6_HACK_MSG="no"
AC_ARG_WITH(4in6,
[ --with-4in6 Check for and convert IPv4 in IPv6 mapped addresses],
[
if test "x$withval" != "xno" ; then
AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])
AC_DEFINE([IPV4_IN_IPV6], [1],
[Detect IPv4 in IPv6 mapped addresses
and treat as IPv4])
IPV4_IN6_HACK_MSG="yes"
else
AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
fi
], [
if test "x$inet6_default_4in6" = "xyes"; then
AC_MSG_RESULT([yes (default)])
AC_DEFINE([IPV4_IN_IPV6])
IPV4_IN6_HACK_MSG="yes"
else
AC_MSG_RESULT([no (default)])
fi
]
)
# Whether to enable BSD auth support
BSD_AUTH_MSG=no
AC_ARG_WITH([bsd-auth],
[ --with-bsd-auth Enable BSD auth support],
[
if test "x$withval" != "xno" ; then
AC_DEFINE([BSD_AUTH], [1],
[Define if you have BSD auth support])
BSD_AUTH_MSG=yes
fi
]
)
# Where to place sshd.pid
piddir=/var/run
# make sure the directory exists
if test ! -d $piddir ; then
piddir=`eval echo ${sysconfdir}`
case $piddir in
NONE/*) piddir=`echo $piddir | sed "s~NONE~$ac_default_prefix~"` ;;
esac
fi
AC_ARG_WITH([pid-dir],
[ --with-pid-dir=PATH Specify location of sshd.pid file],
[
if test -n "$withval" && test "x$withval" != "xno" && \
test "x${withval}" != "xyes"; then
piddir=$withval
if test ! -d $piddir ; then
AC_MSG_WARN([** no $piddir directory on this system **])
fi
fi
]
)
AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED([_PATH_SSH_PIDDIR], ["$piddir"],
[Specify location of ssh.pid])
AC_SUBST([piddir])
dnl allow user to disable some login recording features
AC_ARG_ENABLE([lastlog],
[ --disable-lastlog disable use of lastlog even if detected [no]],
[
if test "x$enableval" = "xno" ; then
AC_DEFINE([DISABLE_LASTLOG])
fi
]
)
AC_ARG_ENABLE([utmp],
[ --disable-utmp disable use of utmp even if detected [no]],
[
if test "x$enableval" = "xno" ; then
AC_DEFINE([DISABLE_UTMP])
fi
]
)
AC_ARG_ENABLE([utmpx],
[ --disable-utmpx disable use of utmpx even if detected [no]],
[
if test "x$enableval" = "xno" ; then
AC_DEFINE([DISABLE_UTMPX], [1],
[Define if you don't want to use utmpx])
fi
]
)
AC_ARG_ENABLE([wtmp],
[ --disable-wtmp disable use of wtmp even if detected [no]],
[
if test "x$enableval" = "xno" ; then
AC_DEFINE([DISABLE_WTMP])
fi
]
)
AC_ARG_ENABLE([wtmpx],
[ --disable-wtmpx disable use of wtmpx even if detected [no]],
[
if test "x$enableval" = "xno" ; then
AC_DEFINE([DISABLE_WTMPX], [1],
[Define if you don't want to use wtmpx])
fi
]
)
AC_ARG_ENABLE([libutil],
[ --disable-libutil disable use of libutil (login() etc.) [no]],
[
if test "x$enableval" = "xno" ; then
AC_DEFINE([DISABLE_LOGIN])
fi
]
)
AC_ARG_ENABLE([pututline],
[ --disable-pututline disable use of pututline() etc. ([uw]tmp) [no]],
[
if test "x$enableval" = "xno" ; then
AC_DEFINE([DISABLE_PUTUTLINE], [1],
[Define if you don't want to use pututline()
etc. to write [uw]tmp])
fi
]
)
AC_ARG_ENABLE([pututxline],
[ --disable-pututxline disable use of pututxline() etc. ([uw]tmpx) [no]],
[
if test "x$enableval" = "xno" ; then
AC_DEFINE([DISABLE_PUTUTXLINE], [1],
[Define if you don't want to use pututxline()
etc. to write [uw]tmpx])
fi
]
)
AC_ARG_WITH([lastlog],
[ --with-lastlog=FILE|DIR specify lastlog location [common locations]],
[
if test "x$withval" = "xno" ; then
AC_DEFINE([DISABLE_LASTLOG])
elif test -n "$withval" && test "x${withval}" != "xyes"; then
conf_lastlog_location=$withval
fi
]
)
dnl lastlog, [uw]tmpx? detection
dnl NOTE: set the paths in the platform section to avoid the
dnl need for command-line parameters
dnl lastlog and [uw]tmp are subject to a file search if all else fails
dnl lastlog detection
dnl NOTE: the code itself will detect if lastlog is a directory
AC_MSG_CHECKING([if your system defines LASTLOG_FILE])
AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <utmp.h>
#ifdef HAVE_LASTLOG_H
# include <lastlog.h>
#endif
#ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H
# include <paths.h>
#endif
#ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_H
# include <login.h>
#endif
]], [[ char *lastlog = LASTLOG_FILE; ]])],
[ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) ],
[
AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
AC_MSG_CHECKING([if your system defines _PATH_LASTLOG])
AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <utmp.h>
#ifdef HAVE_LASTLOG_H
# include <lastlog.h>
#endif
#ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H
# include <paths.h>
#endif
]], [[ char *lastlog = _PATH_LASTLOG; ]])],
[ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) ],
[
AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
system_lastlog_path=no
])
])
if test -z "$conf_lastlog_location"; then
if test x"$system_lastlog_path" = x"no" ; then
for f in /var/log/lastlog /usr/adm/lastlog /var/adm/lastlog /etc/security/lastlog ; do
if (test -d "$f" || test -f "$f") ; then
conf_lastlog_location=$f
fi
done
if test -z "$conf_lastlog_location"; then
AC_MSG_WARN([** Cannot find lastlog **])
dnl Don't define DISABLE_LASTLOG - that means we don't try wtmp/wtmpx
fi
fi
fi
if test -n "$conf_lastlog_location"; then
AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED([CONF_LASTLOG_FILE], ["$conf_lastlog_location"],
[Define if you want to specify the path to your lastlog file])
fi
dnl utmp detection
AC_MSG_CHECKING([if your system defines UTMP_FILE])
AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <utmp.h>
#ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H
# include <paths.h>
#endif
]], [[ char *utmp = UTMP_FILE; ]])],
[ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) ],
[ AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
system_utmp_path=no
])
if test -z "$conf_utmp_location"; then
if test x"$system_utmp_path" = x"no" ; then
for f in /etc/utmp /usr/adm/utmp /var/run/utmp; do
if test -f $f ; then
conf_utmp_location=$f
fi
done
if test -z "$conf_utmp_location"; then
AC_DEFINE([DISABLE_UTMP])
fi
fi
fi
if test -n "$conf_utmp_location"; then
AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED([CONF_UTMP_FILE], ["$conf_utmp_location"],
[Define if you want to specify the path to your utmp file])
fi
dnl wtmp detection
AC_MSG_CHECKING([if your system defines WTMP_FILE])
AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <utmp.h>
#ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H
# include <paths.h>
#endif
]], [[ char *wtmp = WTMP_FILE; ]])],
[ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) ],
[ AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
system_wtmp_path=no
])
if test -z "$conf_wtmp_location"; then
if test x"$system_wtmp_path" = x"no" ; then
for f in /usr/adm/wtmp /var/log/wtmp; do
if test -f $f ; then
conf_wtmp_location=$f
fi
done
if test -z "$conf_wtmp_location"; then
AC_DEFINE([DISABLE_WTMP])
fi
fi
fi
if test -n "$conf_wtmp_location"; then
AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED([CONF_WTMP_FILE], ["$conf_wtmp_location"],
[Define if you want to specify the path to your wtmp file])
fi
dnl wtmpx detection
AC_MSG_CHECKING([if your system defines WTMPX_FILE])
AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <utmp.h>
#ifdef HAVE_UTMPX_H
#include <utmpx.h>
#endif
#ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H
# include <paths.h>
#endif
]], [[ char *wtmpx = WTMPX_FILE; ]])],
[ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) ],
[ AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
system_wtmpx_path=no
])
if test -z "$conf_wtmpx_location"; then
if test x"$system_wtmpx_path" = x"no" ; then
AC_DEFINE([DISABLE_WTMPX])
fi
else
AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED([CONF_WTMPX_FILE], ["$conf_wtmpx_location"],
[Define if you want to specify the path to your wtmpx file])
fi
if test ! -z "$blibpath" ; then
LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS $blibflags$blibpath"
AC_MSG_WARN([Please check and edit blibpath in LDFLAGS in Makefile])
fi
AC_CHECK_MEMBER([struct lastlog.ll_line], [], [
if test x$SKIP_DISABLE_LASTLOG_DEFINE != "xyes" ; then
AC_DEFINE([DISABLE_LASTLOG])
fi
], [
#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TYPES_H
#include <sys/types.h>
#endif
#ifdef HAVE_UTMP_H
#include <utmp.h>
#endif
#ifdef HAVE_UTMPX_H
#include <utmpx.h>
#endif
#ifdef HAVE_LASTLOG_H
#include <lastlog.h>
#endif
])
AC_CHECK_MEMBER([struct utmp.ut_line], [], [
AC_DEFINE([DISABLE_UTMP])
AC_DEFINE([DISABLE_WTMP])
], [
#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TYPES_H
#include <sys/types.h>
#endif
#ifdef HAVE_UTMP_H
#include <utmp.h>
#endif
#ifdef HAVE_UTMPX_H
#include <utmpx.h>
#endif
#ifdef HAVE_LASTLOG_H
#include <lastlog.h>
#endif
])
dnl Adding -Werror to CFLAGS early prevents configure tests from running.
dnl Add now.
CFLAGS="$CFLAGS $werror_flags"
if test "x$ac_cv_func_getaddrinfo" != "xyes" ; then
TEST_SSH_IPV6=no
else
TEST_SSH_IPV6=yes
fi
AC_CHECK_DECL([BROKEN_GETADDRINFO], [TEST_SSH_IPV6=no])
AC_SUBST([TEST_SSH_IPV6], [$TEST_SSH_IPV6])
AC_SUBST([TEST_SSH_UTF8], [$TEST_SSH_UTF8])
AC_SUBST([TEST_MALLOC_OPTIONS], [$TEST_MALLOC_OPTIONS])
AC_SUBST([UNSUPPORTED_ALGORITHMS], [$unsupported_algorithms])
AC_SUBST([DEPEND], [$(cat $srcdir/.depend)])
CFLAGS="${CFLAGS} ${CFLAGS_AFTER}"
LDFLAGS="${LDFLAGS} ${LDFLAGS_AFTER}"
# Make a copy of CFLAGS/LDFLAGS without PIE options.
LDFLAGS_NOPIE=`echo "$LDFLAGS" | sed 's/ -pie//'`
CFLAGS_NOPIE=`echo "$CFLAGS" | sed 's/ -fPIE//'`
AC_SUBST([LDFLAGS_NOPIE])
AC_SUBST([CFLAGS_NOPIE])
AC_EXEEXT
AC_CONFIG_FILES([Makefile buildpkg.sh opensshd.init openssh.xml \
openbsd-compat/Makefile openbsd-compat/regress/Makefile \
survey.sh])
AC_OUTPUT
# Print summary of options
# Someone please show me a better way :)
A=`eval echo ${prefix}` ; A=`eval echo ${A}`
B=`eval echo ${bindir}` ; B=`eval echo ${B}`
C=`eval echo ${sbindir}` ; C=`eval echo ${C}`
D=`eval echo ${sysconfdir}` ; D=`eval echo ${D}`
E=`eval echo ${libexecdir}/ssh-askpass` ; E=`eval echo ${E}`
F=`eval echo ${mandir}/${mansubdir}X` ; F=`eval echo ${F}`
G=`eval echo ${piddir}` ; G=`eval echo ${G}`
H=`eval echo ${PRIVSEP_PATH}` ; H=`eval echo ${H}`
I=`eval echo ${user_path}` ; I=`eval echo ${I}`
J=`eval echo ${superuser_path}` ; J=`eval echo ${J}`
echo ""
echo "OpenSSH has been configured with the following options:"
echo " User binaries: $B"
echo " System binaries: $C"
echo " Configuration files: $D"
echo " Askpass program: $E"
echo " Manual pages: $F"
echo " PID file: $G"
echo " Privilege separation chroot path: $H"
if test "x$external_path_file" = "x/etc/login.conf" ; then
echo " At runtime, sshd will use the path defined in $external_path_file"
echo " Make sure the path to scp is present, otherwise scp will not work"
else
echo " sshd default user PATH: $I"
if test ! -z "$external_path_file"; then
echo " (If PATH is set in $external_path_file it will be used instead. If"
echo " used, ensure the path to scp is present, otherwise scp will not work.)"
fi
fi
if test ! -z "$superuser_path" ; then
echo " sshd superuser user PATH: $J"
fi
echo " Manpage format: $MANTYPE"
echo " PAM support: $PAM_MSG"
echo " OSF SIA support: $SIA_MSG"
echo " KerberosV support: $KRB5_MSG"
echo " SELinux support: $SELINUX_MSG"
echo " MD5 password support: $MD5_MSG"
echo " libedit support: $LIBEDIT_MSG"
echo " libldns support: $LDNS_MSG"
echo " Solaris process contract support: $SPC_MSG"
echo " Solaris project support: $SP_MSG"
echo " Solaris privilege support: $SPP_MSG"
echo " IP address in \$DISPLAY hack: $DISPLAY_HACK_MSG"
echo " Translate v4 in v6 hack: $IPV4_IN6_HACK_MSG"
echo " BSD Auth support: $BSD_AUTH_MSG"
echo " Random number source: $RAND_MSG"
echo " Privsep sandbox style: $SANDBOX_STYLE"
echo " PKCS#11 support: $enable_pkcs11"
echo " U2F/FIDO support: $enable_sk"
echo ""
echo " Host: ${host}"
echo " Compiler: ${CC}"
echo " Compiler flags: ${CFLAGS}"
echo "Preprocessor flags: ${CPPFLAGS}"
echo " Linker flags: ${LDFLAGS}"
echo " Libraries: ${LIBS}"
if test ! -z "${SSHDLIBS}"; then
echo " +for sshd: ${SSHDLIBS}"
fi
-if test ! -z "${SSHLIBS}"; then
-echo " +for ssh: ${SSHLIBS}"
-fi
echo ""
if test "x$MAKE_PACKAGE_SUPPORTED" = "xyes" ; then
echo "SVR4 style packages are supported with \"make package\""
echo ""
fi
if test "x$PAM_MSG" = "xyes" ; then
echo "PAM is enabled. You may need to install a PAM control file "
echo "for sshd, otherwise password authentication may fail. "
echo "Example PAM control files can be found in the contrib/ "
echo "subdirectory"
echo ""
fi
if test ! -z "$NO_PEERCHECK" ; then
echo "WARNING: the operating system that you are using does not"
echo "appear to support getpeereid(), getpeerucred() or the"
echo "SO_PEERCRED getsockopt() option. These facilities are used to"
echo "enforce security checks to prevent unauthorised connections to"
echo "ssh-agent. Their absence increases the risk that a malicious"
echo "user can connect to your agent."
echo ""
fi
if test "$AUDIT_MODULE" = "bsm" ; then
echo "WARNING: BSM audit support is currently considered EXPERIMENTAL."
echo "See the Solaris section in README.platform for details."
fi
diff --git a/contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass2.c b/contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass2.c
index bc83a2d670f4..f7912727c3b3 100644
--- a/contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass2.c
+++ b/contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass2.c
@@ -1,254 +1,343 @@
/*
* Copyright (c) 2000-2002 Damien Miller. All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
* OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
* IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
* INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
* NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
* DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
* THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
* (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
* THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
*/
/* GTK2 support by Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin@redhat.com> */
/*
* This is a simple GNOME SSH passphrase grabber. To use it, set the
* environment variable SSH_ASKPASS to point to the location of
* gnome-ssh-askpass before calling "ssh-add < /dev/null".
*
* There is only two run-time options: if you set the environment variable
* "GNOME_SSH_ASKPASS_GRAB_SERVER=true" then gnome-ssh-askpass will grab
* the X server. If you set "GNOME_SSH_ASKPASS_GRAB_POINTER=true", then the
* pointer will be grabbed too. These may have some benefit to security if
* you don't trust your X server. We grab the keyboard always.
*/
#define GRAB_TRIES 16
#define GRAB_WAIT 250 /* milliseconds */
#define PROMPT_ENTRY 0
#define PROMPT_CONFIRM 1
#define PROMPT_NONE 2
/*
* Compile with:
*
* cc -Wall `pkg-config --cflags gtk+-2.0` \
* gnome-ssh-askpass2.c -o gnome-ssh-askpass \
* `pkg-config --libs gtk+-2.0`
*
*/
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <unistd.h>
+
#include <X11/Xlib.h>
#include <gtk/gtk.h>
#include <gdk/gdkx.h>
+#include <gdk/gdkkeysyms.h>
static void
report_failed_grab (GtkWidget *parent_window, const char *what)
{
GtkWidget *err;
err = gtk_message_dialog_new(GTK_WINDOW(parent_window), 0,
GTK_MESSAGE_ERROR,
GTK_BUTTONS_CLOSE,
"Could not grab %s. "
"A malicious client may be eavesdropping "
"on your session.", what);
gtk_window_set_position(GTK_WINDOW(err), GTK_WIN_POS_CENTER);
gtk_dialog_run(GTK_DIALOG(err));
gtk_widget_destroy(err);
}
static void
ok_dialog(GtkWidget *entry, gpointer dialog)
{
g_return_if_fail(GTK_IS_DIALOG(dialog));
gtk_dialog_response(GTK_DIALOG(dialog), GTK_RESPONSE_OK);
}
+static gboolean
+check_none(GtkWidget *widget, GdkEventKey *event, gpointer dialog)
+{
+ switch (event->keyval) {
+ case GDK_KEY_Escape:
+ /* esc -> close dialog */
+ gtk_dialog_response(GTK_DIALOG(dialog), GTK_RESPONSE_CLOSE);
+ return TRUE;
+ case GDK_KEY_Tab:
+ /* tab -> focus close button */
+ gtk_widget_grab_focus(gtk_dialog_get_widget_for_response(
+ dialog, GTK_RESPONSE_CLOSE));
+ return TRUE;
+ default:
+ /* eat all other key events */
+ return TRUE;
+ }
+}
+
+static int
+parse_env_hex_color(const char *env, GdkColor *c)
+{
+ const char *s;
+ unsigned long ul;
+ char *ep;
+ size_t n;
+
+ if ((s = getenv(env)) == NULL)
+ return 0;
+
+ memset(c, 0, sizeof(*c));
+
+ /* Permit hex rgb or rrggbb optionally prefixed by '#' or '0x' */
+ if (*s == '#')
+ s++;
+ else if (strncmp(s, "0x", 2) == 0)
+ s += 2;
+ n = strlen(s);
+ if (n != 3 && n != 6)
+ goto bad;
+ ul = strtoul(s, &ep, 16);
+ if (*ep != '\0' || ul > 0xffffff) {
+ bad:
+ fprintf(stderr, "Invalid $%s - invalid hex color code\n", env);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ /* Valid hex sequence; expand into a GdkColor */
+ if (n == 3) {
+ /* 4-bit RGB */
+ c->red = ((ul >> 8) & 0xf) << 12;
+ c->green = ((ul >> 4) & 0xf) << 12;
+ c->blue = (ul & 0xf) << 12;
+ } else {
+ /* 8-bit RGB */
+ c->red = ((ul >> 16) & 0xff) << 8;
+ c->green = ((ul >> 8) & 0xff) << 8;
+ c->blue = (ul & 0xff) << 8;
+ }
+ return 1;
+}
+
static int
passphrase_dialog(char *message, int prompt_type)
{
const char *failed;
char *passphrase, *local;
int result, grab_tries, grab_server, grab_pointer;
int buttons, default_response;
GtkWidget *parent_window, *dialog, *entry;
GdkGrabStatus status;
+ GdkColor fg, bg;
+ int fg_set = 0, bg_set = 0;
grab_server = (getenv("GNOME_SSH_ASKPASS_GRAB_SERVER") != NULL);
grab_pointer = (getenv("GNOME_SSH_ASKPASS_GRAB_POINTER") != NULL);
grab_tries = 0;
+ fg_set = parse_env_hex_color("GNOME_SSH_ASKPASS_FG_COLOR", &fg);
+ bg_set = parse_env_hex_color("GNOME_SSH_ASKPASS_BG_COLOR", &bg);
+
/* Create an invisible parent window so that GtkDialog doesn't
* complain. */
parent_window = gtk_window_new(GTK_WINDOW_TOPLEVEL);
switch (prompt_type) {
case PROMPT_CONFIRM:
buttons = GTK_BUTTONS_YES_NO;
default_response = GTK_RESPONSE_YES;
break;
case PROMPT_NONE:
buttons = GTK_BUTTONS_CLOSE;
default_response = GTK_RESPONSE_CLOSE;
break;
default:
buttons = GTK_BUTTONS_OK_CANCEL;
default_response = GTK_RESPONSE_OK;
break;
}
dialog = gtk_message_dialog_new(GTK_WINDOW(parent_window), 0,
GTK_MESSAGE_QUESTION, buttons, "%s", message);
gtk_window_set_title(GTK_WINDOW(dialog), "OpenSSH");
gtk_window_set_position (GTK_WINDOW(dialog), GTK_WIN_POS_CENTER);
gtk_window_set_keep_above(GTK_WINDOW(dialog), TRUE);
gtk_dialog_set_default_response(GTK_DIALOG(dialog), default_response);
gtk_window_set_keep_above(GTK_WINDOW(dialog), TRUE);
- if (prompt_type == PROMPT_ENTRY) {
+ if (fg_set)
+ gtk_widget_modify_fg(dialog, GTK_STATE_NORMAL, &fg);
+ if (bg_set)
+ gtk_widget_modify_bg(dialog, GTK_STATE_NORMAL, &bg);
+
+ if (prompt_type == PROMPT_ENTRY || prompt_type == PROMPT_NONE) {
entry = gtk_entry_new();
+ if (fg_set)
+ gtk_widget_modify_fg(entry, GTK_STATE_NORMAL, &fg);
+ if (bg_set)
+ gtk_widget_modify_bg(entry, GTK_STATE_NORMAL, &bg);
gtk_box_pack_start(
GTK_BOX(gtk_dialog_get_content_area(GTK_DIALOG(dialog))),
entry, FALSE, FALSE, 0);
gtk_entry_set_visibility(GTK_ENTRY(entry), FALSE);
gtk_widget_grab_focus(entry);
- gtk_widget_show(entry);
- /* Make <enter> close dialog */
- g_signal_connect(G_OBJECT(entry), "activate",
- G_CALLBACK(ok_dialog), dialog);
+ if (prompt_type == PROMPT_ENTRY) {
+ gtk_widget_show(entry);
+ /* Make <enter> close dialog */
+ g_signal_connect(G_OBJECT(entry), "activate",
+ G_CALLBACK(ok_dialog), dialog);
+ } else {
+ /*
+ * Ensure the 'close' button is not focused by default
+ * but is still reachable via tab. This is a bit of a
+ * hack - it uses a hidden entry that responds to a
+ * couple of keypress events (escape and tab only).
+ */
+ gtk_widget_realize(entry);
+ g_signal_connect(G_OBJECT(entry), "key_press_event",
+ G_CALLBACK(check_none), dialog);
+ }
}
/* Grab focus */
gtk_widget_show_now(dialog);
if (grab_pointer) {
for(;;) {
status = gdk_pointer_grab(
(gtk_widget_get_window(GTK_WIDGET(dialog))), TRUE,
0, NULL, NULL, GDK_CURRENT_TIME);
if (status == GDK_GRAB_SUCCESS)
break;
usleep(GRAB_WAIT * 1000);
if (++grab_tries > GRAB_TRIES) {
failed = "mouse";
goto nograb;
}
}
}
for(;;) {
status = gdk_keyboard_grab(
gtk_widget_get_window(GTK_WIDGET(dialog)), FALSE,
GDK_CURRENT_TIME);
if (status == GDK_GRAB_SUCCESS)
break;
usleep(GRAB_WAIT * 1000);
if (++grab_tries > GRAB_TRIES) {
failed = "keyboard";
goto nograbkb;
}
}
if (grab_server) {
gdk_x11_grab_server();
}
result = gtk_dialog_run(GTK_DIALOG(dialog));
/* Ungrab */
if (grab_server)
XUngrabServer(gdk_x11_get_default_xdisplay());
if (grab_pointer)
gdk_pointer_ungrab(GDK_CURRENT_TIME);
gdk_keyboard_ungrab(GDK_CURRENT_TIME);
gdk_flush();
/* Report passphrase if user selected OK */
if (prompt_type == PROMPT_ENTRY) {
passphrase = g_strdup(gtk_entry_get_text(GTK_ENTRY(entry)));
if (result == GTK_RESPONSE_OK) {
local = g_locale_from_utf8(passphrase,
strlen(passphrase), NULL, NULL, NULL);
if (local != NULL) {
puts(local);
memset(local, '\0', strlen(local));
g_free(local);
} else {
puts(passphrase);
}
}
/* Zero passphrase in memory */
memset(passphrase, '\b', strlen(passphrase));
gtk_entry_set_text(GTK_ENTRY(entry), passphrase);
memset(passphrase, '\0', strlen(passphrase));
g_free(passphrase);
}
gtk_widget_destroy(dialog);
if (result != GTK_RESPONSE_OK && result != GTK_RESPONSE_YES)
return -1;
return 0;
nograbkb:
/*
* At least one grab failed - ungrab what we got, and report
* the failure to the user. Note that XGrabServer() cannot
* fail.
*/
gdk_pointer_ungrab(GDK_CURRENT_TIME);
nograb:
if (grab_server)
XUngrabServer(gdk_x11_get_default_xdisplay());
gtk_widget_destroy(dialog);
report_failed_grab(parent_window, failed);
return (-1);
}
int
main(int argc, char **argv)
{
char *message, *prompt_mode;
int result, prompt_type = PROMPT_ENTRY;
gtk_init(&argc, &argv);
if (argc > 1) {
message = g_strjoinv(" ", argv + 1);
} else {
message = g_strdup("Enter your OpenSSH passphrase:");
}
if ((prompt_mode = getenv("SSH_ASKPASS_PROMPT")) != NULL) {
if (strcasecmp(prompt_mode, "confirm") == 0)
prompt_type = PROMPT_CONFIRM;
else if (strcasecmp(prompt_mode, "none") == 0)
prompt_type = PROMPT_NONE;
}
setvbuf(stdout, 0, _IONBF, 0);
result = passphrase_dialog(message, prompt_type);
g_free(message);
return (result);
}
diff --git a/contrib/redhat/openssh.spec b/contrib/redhat/openssh.spec
index dcd57aa1966a..df99f7d73e05 100644
--- a/contrib/redhat/openssh.spec
+++ b/contrib/redhat/openssh.spec
@@ -1,843 +1,848 @@
-%global ver 8.3p1
+%global ver 8.4p1
%global rel 1%{?dist}
# OpenSSH privilege separation requires a user & group ID
%global sshd_uid 74
%global sshd_gid 74
# Version of ssh-askpass
%global aversion 1.2.4.1
# Do we want to disable building of x11-askpass? (1=yes 0=no)
%global no_x11_askpass 0
# Do we want to disable building of gnome-askpass? (1=yes 0=no)
%global no_gnome_askpass 0
# Do we want to link against a static libcrypto? (1=yes 0=no)
%global static_libcrypto 0
# Do we want smartcard support (1=yes 0=no)
%global scard 0
# Use GTK2 instead of GNOME in gnome-ssh-askpass
%global gtk2 1
# Use build6x options for older RHEL builds
# RHEL 7 not yet supported
%if 0%{?rhel} > 6
%global build6x 0
%else
%global build6x 1
%endif
%if 0%{?fedora} >= 26
%global compat_openssl 1
%else
%global compat_openssl 0
%endif
# Do we want kerberos5 support (1=yes 0=no)
%global kerberos5 1
# Reserve options to override askpass settings with:
# rpm -ba|--rebuild --define 'skip_xxx 1'
%{?skip_x11_askpass:%global no_x11_askpass 1}
%{?skip_gnome_askpass:%global no_gnome_askpass 1}
# Add option to build without GTK2 for older platforms with only GTK+.
# RedHat <= 7.2 and Red Hat Advanced Server 2.1 are examples.
# rpm -ba|--rebuild --define 'no_gtk2 1'
%{?no_gtk2:%global gtk2 0}
# Is this a build for RHL 6.x or earlier?
%{?build_6x:%global build6x 1}
# If this is RHL 6.x, the default configuration has sysconfdir in /usr/etc.
%if %{build6x}
%global _sysconfdir /etc
%endif
# Options for static OpenSSL link:
# rpm -ba|--rebuild --define "static_openssl 1"
%{?static_openssl:%global static_libcrypto 1}
# Options for Smartcard support: (needs libsectok and openssl-engine)
# rpm -ba|--rebuild --define "smartcard 1"
%{?smartcard:%global scard 1}
# Is this a build for the rescue CD (without PAM, with MD5)? (1=yes 0=no)
%global rescue 0
%{?build_rescue:%global rescue 1}
# Turn off some stuff for resuce builds
%if %{rescue}
%global kerberos5 0
%endif
Summary: The OpenSSH implementation of SSH protocol version 2.
Name: openssh
Version: %{ver}
%if %{rescue}
Release: %{rel}rescue
%else
Release: %{rel}
%endif
URL: https://www.openssh.com/portable.html
Source0: https://ftp.openbsd.org/pub/OpenBSD/OpenSSH/portable/openssh-%{version}.tar.gz
Source1: http://www.jmknoble.net/software/x11-ssh-askpass/x11-ssh-askpass-%{aversion}.tar.gz
License: BSD
Group: Applications/Internet
BuildRoot: %{_tmppath}/%{name}-%{version}-buildroot
Obsoletes: ssh
%if %{build6x}
PreReq: initscripts >= 5.00
%else
Requires: initscripts >= 5.20
%endif
BuildRequires: perl
%if %{compat_openssl}
BuildRequires: compat-openssl10-devel
%else
BuildRequires: openssl-devel >= 1.0.1
BuildRequires: openssl-devel < 1.1
%endif
BuildRequires: /bin/login
%if ! %{build6x}
BuildRequires: glibc-devel, pam
%else
BuildRequires: /usr/include/security/pam_appl.h
%endif
%if ! %{no_x11_askpass}
BuildRequires: /usr/include/X11/Xlib.h
# Xt development tools
BuildRequires: libXt-devel
# Provides xmkmf
BuildRequires: imake
# Rely on relatively recent gtk
BuildRequires: gtk2-devel
%endif
%if ! %{no_gnome_askpass}
BuildRequires: pkgconfig
%endif
%if %{kerberos5}
BuildRequires: krb5-devel
BuildRequires: krb5-libs
%endif
%package clients
Summary: OpenSSH clients.
Requires: openssh = %{version}-%{release}
Group: Applications/Internet
Obsoletes: ssh-clients
%package server
Summary: The OpenSSH server daemon.
Group: System Environment/Daemons
Obsoletes: ssh-server
Requires: openssh = %{version}-%{release}, chkconfig >= 0.9
%if ! %{build6x}
Requires: /etc/pam.d/system-auth
%endif
%package askpass
Summary: A passphrase dialog for OpenSSH and X.
Group: Applications/Internet
Requires: openssh = %{version}-%{release}
Obsoletes: ssh-extras
%package askpass-gnome
Summary: A passphrase dialog for OpenSSH, X, and GNOME.
Group: Applications/Internet
Requires: openssh = %{version}-%{release}
Obsoletes: ssh-extras
%description
SSH (Secure SHell) is a program for logging into and executing
commands on a remote machine. SSH is intended to replace rlogin and
rsh, and to provide secure encrypted communications between two
untrusted hosts over an insecure network. X11 connections and
arbitrary TCP/IP ports can also be forwarded over the secure channel.
OpenSSH is OpenBSD's version of the last free version of SSH, bringing
it up to date in terms of security and features, as well as removing
all patented algorithms to separate libraries.
This package includes the core files necessary for both the OpenSSH
client and server. To make this package useful, you should also
install openssh-clients, openssh-server, or both.
%description clients
OpenSSH is a free version of SSH (Secure SHell), a program for logging
into and executing commands on a remote machine. This package includes
the clients necessary to make encrypted connections to SSH servers.
You'll also need to install the openssh package on OpenSSH clients.
%description server
OpenSSH is a free version of SSH (Secure SHell), a program for logging
into and executing commands on a remote machine. This package contains
the secure shell daemon (sshd). The sshd daemon allows SSH clients to
securely connect to your SSH server. You also need to have the openssh
package installed.
%description askpass
OpenSSH is a free version of SSH (Secure SHell), a program for logging
into and executing commands on a remote machine. This package contains
an X11 passphrase dialog for OpenSSH.
%description askpass-gnome
OpenSSH is a free version of SSH (Secure SHell), a program for logging
into and executing commands on a remote machine. This package contains
an X11 passphrase dialog for OpenSSH and the GNOME GUI desktop
environment.
%prep
%if ! %{no_x11_askpass}
%setup -q -a 1
%else
%setup -q
%endif
%build
%if %{rescue}
CFLAGS="$RPM_OPT_FLAGS -Os"; export CFLAGS
%endif
%configure \
--sysconfdir=%{_sysconfdir}/ssh \
--libexecdir=%{_libexecdir}/openssh \
--datadir=%{_datadir}/openssh \
--with-default-path=/usr/local/bin:/bin:/usr/bin \
--with-superuser-path=/usr/local/sbin:/usr/local/bin:/sbin:/bin:/usr/sbin:/usr/bin \
--with-privsep-path=%{_var}/empty/sshd \
--with-md5-passwords \
--mandir=%{_mandir} \
--with-mantype=man \
--disable-strip \
%if %{scard}
--with-smartcard \
%endif
%if %{rescue}
--without-pam \
%else
--with-pam \
%endif
%if %{kerberos5}
--with-kerberos5=$K5DIR \
%endif
%if %{static_libcrypto}
perl -pi -e "s|-lcrypto|%{_libdir}/libcrypto.a|g" Makefile
%endif
make
%if ! %{no_x11_askpass}
pushd x11-ssh-askpass-%{aversion}
%configure --libexecdir=%{_libexecdir}/openssh
xmkmf -a
make
popd
%endif
# Define a variable to toggle gnome1/gtk2 building. This is necessary
# because RPM doesn't handle nested %if statements.
%if %{gtk2}
gtk2=yes
%else
gtk2=no
%endif
%if ! %{no_gnome_askpass}
pushd contrib
if [ $gtk2 = yes ] ; then
make gnome-ssh-askpass2
mv gnome-ssh-askpass2 gnome-ssh-askpass
else
make gnome-ssh-askpass1
mv gnome-ssh-askpass1 gnome-ssh-askpass
fi
popd
%endif
%install
rm -rf $RPM_BUILD_ROOT
mkdir -p -m755 $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_sysconfdir}/ssh
mkdir -p -m755 $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_libexecdir}/openssh
mkdir -p -m755 $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_var}/empty/sshd
make install DESTDIR=$RPM_BUILD_ROOT
install -d $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/etc/pam.d/
install -d $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/etc/rc.d/init.d
install -d $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_libexecdir}/openssh
%if %{build6x}
install -m644 contrib/redhat/sshd.pam.old $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/etc/pam.d/sshd
%else
install -m644 contrib/redhat/sshd.pam $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/etc/pam.d/sshd
%endif
install -m755 contrib/redhat/sshd.init $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/etc/rc.d/init.d/sshd
%if ! %{no_x11_askpass}
install x11-ssh-askpass-%{aversion}/x11-ssh-askpass $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_libexecdir}/openssh/x11-ssh-askpass
ln -s x11-ssh-askpass $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_libexecdir}/openssh/ssh-askpass
%endif
%if ! %{no_gnome_askpass}
install contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_libexecdir}/openssh/gnome-ssh-askpass
%endif
%if ! %{scard}
rm -f $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/usr/share/openssh/Ssh.bin
%endif
%if ! %{no_gnome_askpass}
install -m 755 -d $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_sysconfdir}/profile.d/
install -m 755 contrib/redhat/gnome-ssh-askpass.csh $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_sysconfdir}/profile.d/
install -m 755 contrib/redhat/gnome-ssh-askpass.sh $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_sysconfdir}/profile.d/
%endif
perl -pi -e "s|$RPM_BUILD_ROOT||g" $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_mandir}/man*/*
%clean
rm -rf $RPM_BUILD_ROOT
%triggerun server -- ssh-server
if [ "$1" != 0 -a -r /var/run/sshd.pid ] ; then
touch /var/run/sshd.restart
fi
%triggerun server -- openssh-server < 2.5.0p1
# Count the number of HostKey and HostDsaKey statements we have.
gawk 'BEGIN {IGNORECASE=1}
/^hostkey/ || /^hostdsakey/ {sawhostkey = sawhostkey + 1}
END {exit sawhostkey}' /etc/ssh/sshd_config
# And if we only found one, we know the client was relying on the old default
# behavior, which loaded the the SSH2 DSA host key when HostDsaKey wasn't
# specified. Now that HostKey is used for both SSH1 and SSH2 keys, specifying
# one nullifies the default, which would have loaded both.
if [ $? -eq 1 ] ; then
echo HostKey /etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key >> /etc/ssh/sshd_config
echo HostKey /etc/ssh/ssh_host_dsa_key >> /etc/ssh/sshd_config
fi
%triggerpostun server -- ssh-server
if [ "$1" != 0 ] ; then
/sbin/chkconfig --add sshd
if test -f /var/run/sshd.restart ; then
rm -f /var/run/sshd.restart
/sbin/service sshd start > /dev/null 2>&1 || :
fi
fi
%pre server
%{_sbindir}/groupadd -r -g %{sshd_gid} sshd 2>/dev/null || :
%{_sbindir}/useradd -d /var/empty/sshd -s /bin/false -u %{sshd_uid} \
-g sshd -M -r sshd 2>/dev/null || :
%post server
/sbin/chkconfig --add sshd
%postun server
/sbin/service sshd condrestart > /dev/null 2>&1 || :
%preun server
if [ "$1" = 0 ]
then
/sbin/service sshd stop > /dev/null 2>&1 || :
/sbin/chkconfig --del sshd
fi
%files
%defattr(-,root,root)
%doc CREDITS ChangeLog INSTALL LICENCE OVERVIEW README* PROTOCOL* TODO
%attr(0755,root,root) %{_bindir}/scp
%attr(0644,root,root) %{_mandir}/man1/scp.1*
%attr(0755,root,root) %dir %{_sysconfdir}/ssh
%attr(0600,root,root) %config(noreplace) %{_sysconfdir}/ssh/moduli
%if ! %{rescue}
%attr(0755,root,root) %{_bindir}/ssh-keygen
%attr(0644,root,root) %{_mandir}/man1/ssh-keygen.1*
%attr(0755,root,root) %dir %{_libexecdir}/openssh
%attr(4711,root,root) %{_libexecdir}/openssh/ssh-keysign
%attr(0755,root,root) %{_libexecdir}/openssh/ssh-pkcs11-helper
+%attr(0755,root,root) %{_libexecdir}/openssh/ssh-sk-helper
%attr(0644,root,root) %{_mandir}/man8/ssh-keysign.8*
%attr(0644,root,root) %{_mandir}/man8/ssh-pkcs11-helper.8*
+%attr(0644,root,root) %{_mandir}/man8/ssh-sk-helper.8*
%endif
%if %{scard}
%attr(0755,root,root) %dir %{_datadir}/openssh
%attr(0644,root,root) %{_datadir}/openssh/Ssh.bin
%endif
%files clients
%defattr(-,root,root)
%attr(0755,root,root) %{_bindir}/ssh
%attr(0644,root,root) %{_mandir}/man1/ssh.1*
%attr(0644,root,root) %{_mandir}/man5/ssh_config.5*
%attr(0644,root,root) %config(noreplace) %{_sysconfdir}/ssh/ssh_config
%if ! %{rescue}
%attr(2755,root,nobody) %{_bindir}/ssh-agent
%attr(0755,root,root) %{_bindir}/ssh-add
%attr(0755,root,root) %{_bindir}/ssh-keyscan
%attr(0755,root,root) %{_bindir}/sftp
%attr(0644,root,root) %{_mandir}/man1/ssh-agent.1*
%attr(0644,root,root) %{_mandir}/man1/ssh-add.1*
%attr(0644,root,root) %{_mandir}/man1/ssh-keyscan.1*
%attr(0644,root,root) %{_mandir}/man1/sftp.1*
%endif
%if ! %{rescue}
%files server
%defattr(-,root,root)
%dir %attr(0111,root,root) %{_var}/empty/sshd
%attr(0755,root,root) %{_sbindir}/sshd
%attr(0755,root,root) %{_libexecdir}/openssh/sftp-server
%attr(0644,root,root) %{_mandir}/man8/sshd.8*
%attr(0644,root,root) %{_mandir}/man5/moduli.5*
%attr(0644,root,root) %{_mandir}/man5/sshd_config.5*
%attr(0644,root,root) %{_mandir}/man8/sftp-server.8*
%attr(0755,root,root) %dir %{_sysconfdir}/ssh
%attr(0600,root,root) %config(noreplace) %{_sysconfdir}/ssh/sshd_config
%attr(0600,root,root) %config(noreplace) /etc/pam.d/sshd
%attr(0755,root,root) %config /etc/rc.d/init.d/sshd
%endif
%if ! %{no_x11_askpass}
%files askpass
%defattr(-,root,root)
%doc x11-ssh-askpass-%{aversion}/README
%doc x11-ssh-askpass-%{aversion}/ChangeLog
%doc x11-ssh-askpass-%{aversion}/SshAskpass*.ad
%{_libexecdir}/openssh/ssh-askpass
%attr(0755,root,root) %{_libexecdir}/openssh/x11-ssh-askpass
%endif
%if ! %{no_gnome_askpass}
%files askpass-gnome
%defattr(-,root,root)
%attr(0755,root,root) %config %{_sysconfdir}/profile.d/gnome-ssh-askpass.*
%attr(0755,root,root) %{_libexecdir}/openssh/gnome-ssh-askpass
%endif
%changelog
+* Mon Jul 20 2020 Damien Miller <djm@mindrto.org>
+- Add ssh-sk-helper and corresponding manual page.
+
* Sat Feb 10 2018 Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
- Update openssl-devel dependency to match current requirements.
- Handle Fedora >=6 openssl 1.0 compat libs.
- Remove SSH1 from description.
- Don't strip binaries at build time so that debuginfo package can be
created.
* Sun Nov 16 2014 Nico Kadel-Garcia <nakdel@gmail.com>
- Add '--mandir' and '--with-mantype' for RHEL 5 compatibility
- Add 'dist' option to 'ver' so package names reflect OS at build time
- Always include x11-ssh-askpass tarball in SRPM
- Add openssh-x11-aspass BuildRequires for libXT-devel, imake, gtk2-devel
- Discard 'K5DIR' reporting, not usable inside 'mock' for RHEL 5 compatibility
- Discard obsolete '--with-rsh' configure option
- Update openssl-devel dependency to 0.9.8f, as found in autoconf
* Wed Jul 14 2010 Tim Rice <tim@multitalents.net>
- test for skip_x11_askpass (line 77) should have been for no_x11_askpass
* Mon Jun 2 2003 Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
- Remove noip6 option. This may be controlled at run-time in client config
file using new AddressFamily directive
* Mon May 12 2003 Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
- Don't install profile.d scripts when not building with GNOME/GTK askpass
(patch from bet@rahul.net)
* Tue Oct 01 2002 Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
- Install ssh-agent setgid nobody to prevent ptrace() key theft attacks
* Mon Sep 30 2002 Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
- Use contrib/ Makefile for building askpass programs
* Fri Jun 21 2002 Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
- Merge in spec changes from seba@iq.pl (Sebastian Pachuta)
- Add new {ssh,sshd}_config.5 manpages
- Add new ssh-keysign program and remove setuid from ssh client
* Fri May 10 2002 Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
- Merge in spec changes from RedHat, reorgansie a little
- Add Privsep user, group and directory
* Thu Mar 7 2002 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin@redhat.com> 3.1p1-2
- bump and grind (through the build system)
* Thu Mar 7 2002 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin@redhat.com> 3.1p1-1
- require sharutils for building (mindrot #137)
- require db1-devel only when building for 6.x (#55105), which probably won't
work anyway (3.1 requires OpenSSL 0.9.6 to build), but what the heck
- require pam-devel by file (not by package name) again
- add Markus's patch to compile with OpenSSL 0.9.5a (from
http://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=141) and apply it if we're
building for 6.x
* Thu Mar 7 2002 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin@redhat.com> 3.1p1-0
- update to 3.1p1
* Tue Mar 5 2002 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin@redhat.com> SNAP-20020305
- update to SNAP-20020305
- drop debug patch, fixed upstream
* Wed Feb 20 2002 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin@redhat.com> SNAP-20020220
- update to SNAP-20020220 for testing purposes (you've been warned, if there's
anything to be warned about, gss patches won't apply, I don't mind)
* Wed Feb 13 2002 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin@redhat.com> 3.0.2p1-3
- add patches from Simon Wilkinson and Nicolas Williams for GSSAPI key
exchange, authentication, and named key support
* Wed Jan 23 2002 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin@redhat.com> 3.0.2p1-2
- remove dependency on db1-devel, which has just been swallowed up whole
by gnome-libs-devel
* Sat Dec 29 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin@redhat.com>
- adjust build dependencies so that build6x actually works right (fix
from Hugo van der Kooij)
* Tue Dec 4 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin@redhat.com> 3.0.2p1-1
- update to 3.0.2p1
* Fri Nov 16 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin@redhat.com> 3.0.1p1-1
- update to 3.0.1p1
* Tue Nov 13 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin@redhat.com>
- update to current CVS (not for use in distribution)
* Thu Nov 8 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin@redhat.com> 3.0p1-1
- merge some of Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org> changes from the upstream
3.0p1 spec file and init script
* Wed Nov 7 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin@redhat.com>
- update to 3.0p1
- update to x11-ssh-askpass 1.2.4.1
- change build dependency on a file from pam-devel to the pam-devel package
- replace primes with moduli
* Thu Sep 27 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin@redhat.com> 2.9p2-9
- incorporate fix from Markus Friedl's advisory for IP-based authorization bugs
* Thu Sep 13 2001 Bernhard Rosenkraenzer <bero@redhat.com> 2.9p2-8
- Merge changes to rescue build from current sysadmin survival cd
* Thu Sep 6 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin@redhat.com> 2.9p2-7
- fix scp's server's reporting of file sizes, and build with the proper
preprocessor define to get large-file capable open(), stat(), etc.
(sftp has been doing this correctly all along) (#51827)
- configure without --with-ipv4-default on RHL 7.x and newer (#45987,#52247)
- pull cvs patch to fix support for /etc/nologin for non-PAM logins (#47298)
- mark profile.d scriptlets as config files (#42337)
- refer to Jason Stone's mail for zsh workaround for exit-hanging quasi-bug
- change a couple of log() statements to debug() statements (#50751)
- pull cvs patch to add -t flag to sshd (#28611)
- clear fd_sets correctly (one bit per FD, not one byte per FD) (#43221)
* Mon Aug 20 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin@redhat.com> 2.9p2-6
- add db1-devel as a BuildPrerequisite (noted by Hans Ecke)
* Thu Aug 16 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin@redhat.com>
- pull cvs patch to fix remote port forwarding with protocol 2
* Thu Aug 9 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin@redhat.com>
- pull cvs patch to add session initialization to no-pty sessions
- pull cvs patch to not cut off challengeresponse auth needlessly
- refuse to do X11 forwarding if xauth isn't there, handy if you enable
it by default on a system that doesn't have X installed (#49263)
* Wed Aug 8 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin@redhat.com>
- don't apply patches to code we don't intend to build (spotted by Matt Galgoci)
* Mon Aug 6 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin@redhat.com>
- pass OPTIONS correctly to initlog (#50151)
* Wed Jul 25 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin@redhat.com>
- switch to x11-ssh-askpass 1.2.2
* Wed Jul 11 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin@redhat.com>
- rebuild in new environment
* Mon Jun 25 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin@redhat.com>
- disable the gssapi patch
* Mon Jun 18 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin@redhat.com>
- update to 2.9p2
- refresh to a new version of the gssapi patch
* Thu Jun 7 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin@redhat.com>
- change Copyright: BSD to License: BSD
- add Markus Friedl's unverified patch for the cookie file deletion problem
so that we can verify it
- drop patch to check if xauth is present (was folded into cookie patch)
- don't apply gssapi patches for the errata candidate
- clear supplemental groups list at startup
* Fri May 25 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin@redhat.com>
- fix an error parsing the new default sshd_config
- add a fix from Markus Friedl (via openssh-unix-dev) for ssh-keygen not
dealing with comments right
* Thu May 24 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin@redhat.com>
- add in Simon Wilkinson's GSSAPI patch to give it some testing in-house,
to be removed before the next beta cycle because it's a big departure
from the upstream version
* Thu May 3 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin@redhat.com>
- finish marking strings in the init script for translation
- modify init script to source /etc/sysconfig/sshd and pass $OPTIONS to sshd
at startup (change merged from openssh.com init script, originally by
Pekka Savola)
- refuse to do X11 forwarding if xauth isn't there, handy if you enable
it by default on a system that doesn't have X installed
* Wed May 2 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin@redhat.com>
- update to 2.9
- drop various patches that came from or went upstream or to or from CVS
* Wed Apr 18 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin@redhat.com>
- only require initscripts 5.00 on 6.2 (reported by Peter Bieringer)
* Sun Apr 8 2001 Preston Brown <pbrown@redhat.com>
- remove explicit openssl requirement, fixes builddistro issue
- make initscript stop() function wait until sshd really dead to avoid
races in condrestart
* Mon Apr 2 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin@redhat.com>
- mention that challengereponse supports PAM, so disabling password doesn't
limit users to pubkey and rsa auth (#34378)
- bypass the daemon() function in the init script and call initlog directly,
because daemon() won't start a daemon it detects is already running (like
open connections)
- require the version of openssl we had when we were built
* Fri Mar 23 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin@redhat.com>
- make do_pam_setcred() smart enough to know when to establish creds and
when to reinitialize them
- add in a couple of other fixes from Damien for inclusion in the errata
* Thu Mar 22 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin@redhat.com>
- update to 2.5.2p2
- call setcred() again after initgroups, because the "creds" could actually
be group memberships
* Tue Mar 20 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin@redhat.com>
- update to 2.5.2p1 (includes endianness fixes in the rijndael implementation)
- don't enable challenge-response by default until we find a way to not
have too many userauth requests (we may make up to six pubkey and up to
three password attempts as it is)
- remove build dependency on rsh to match openssh.com's packages more closely
* Sat Mar 3 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin@redhat.com>
- remove dependency on openssl -- would need to be too precise
* Fri Mar 2 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin@redhat.com>
- rebuild in new environment
* Mon Feb 26 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin@redhat.com>
- Revert the patch to move pam_open_session.
- Init script and spec file changes from Pekka Savola. (#28750)
- Patch sftp to recognize '-o protocol' arguments. (#29540)
* Thu Feb 22 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin@redhat.com>
- Chuck the closing patch.
- Add a trigger to add host keys for protocol 2 to the config file, now that
configuration file syntax requires us to specify it with HostKey if we
specify any other HostKey values, which we do.
* Tue Feb 20 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin@redhat.com>
- Redo patch to move pam_open_session after the server setuid()s to the user.
- Rework the nopam patch to use be picked up by autoconf.
* Mon Feb 19 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin@redhat.com>
- Update for 2.5.1p1.
- Add init script mods from Pekka Savola.
- Tweak the init script to match the CVS contrib script more closely.
- Redo patch to ssh-add to try to adding both identity and id_dsa to also try
adding id_rsa.
* Fri Feb 16 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin@redhat.com>
- Update for 2.5.0p1.
- Use $RPM_OPT_FLAGS instead of -O when building gnome-ssh-askpass
- Resync with parts of Damien Miller's openssh.spec from CVS, including
update of x11 askpass to 1.2.0.
- Only require openssl (don't prereq) because we generate keys in the init
script now.
* Tue Feb 13 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin@redhat.com>
- Don't open a PAM session until we've forked and become the user (#25690).
- Apply Andrew Bartlett's patch for letting pam_authenticate() know which
host the user is attempting a login from.
- Resync with parts of Damien Miller's openssh.spec from CVS.
- Don't expose KbdInt responses in debug messages (from CVS).
- Detect and handle errors in rsa_{public,private}_decrypt (from CVS).
* Wed Feb 7 2001 Trond Eivind Glomsrxd <teg@redhat.com>
- i18n-tweak to initscript.
* Tue Jan 23 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin@redhat.com>
- More gettextizing.
- Close all files after going into daemon mode (needs more testing).
- Extract patch from CVS to handle auth banners (in the client).
- Extract patch from CVS to handle compat weirdness.
* Fri Jan 19 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin@redhat.com>
- Finish with the gettextizing.
* Thu Jan 18 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin@redhat.com>
- Fix a bug in auth2-pam.c (#23877)
- Gettextize the init script.
* Wed Dec 20 2000 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin@redhat.com>
- Incorporate a switch for using PAM configs for 6.x, just in case.
* Tue Dec 5 2000 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin@redhat.com>
- Incorporate Bero's changes for a build specifically for rescue CDs.
* Wed Nov 29 2000 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin@redhat.com>
- Don't treat pam_setcred() failure as fatal unless pam_authenticate() has
succeeded, to allow public-key authentication after a failure with "none"
authentication. (#21268)
* Tue Nov 28 2000 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin@redhat.com>
- Update to x11-askpass 1.1.1. (#21301)
- Don't second-guess fixpaths, which causes paths to get fixed twice. (#21290)
* Mon Nov 27 2000 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin@redhat.com>
- Merge multiple PAM text messages into subsequent prompts when possible when
doing keyboard-interactive authentication.
* Sun Nov 26 2000 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin@redhat.com>
- Disable the built-in MD5 password support. We're using PAM.
- Take a crack at doing keyboard-interactive authentication with PAM, and
enable use of it in the default client configuration so that the client
will try it when the server disallows password authentication.
- Build with debugging flags. Build root policies strip all binaries anyway.
* Tue Nov 21 2000 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin@redhat.com>
- Use DESTDIR instead of %%makeinstall.
- Remove /usr/X11R6/bin from the path-fixing patch.
* Mon Nov 20 2000 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin@redhat.com>
- Add the primes file from the latest snapshot to the main package (#20884).
- Add the dev package to the prereq list (#19984).
- Remove the default path and mimic login's behavior in the server itself.
* Fri Nov 17 2000 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin@redhat.com>
- Resync with conditional options in Damien Miller's .spec file for an errata.
- Change libexecdir from %%{_libexecdir}/ssh to %%{_libexecdir}/openssh.
* Tue Nov 7 2000 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin@redhat.com>
- Update to OpenSSH 2.3.0p1.
- Update to x11-askpass 1.1.0.
- Enable keyboard-interactive authentication.
* Mon Oct 30 2000 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin@redhat.com>
- Update to ssh-askpass-x11 1.0.3.
- Change authentication related messages to be private (#19966).
* Tue Oct 10 2000 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin@redhat.com>
- Patch ssh-keygen to be able to list signatures for DSA public key files
it generates.
* Thu Oct 5 2000 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin@redhat.com>
- Add BuildRequires on /usr/include/security/pam_appl.h to be sure we always
build PAM authentication in.
- Try setting SSH_ASKPASS if gnome-ssh-askpass is installed.
- Clean out no-longer-used patches.
- Patch ssh-add to try to add both identity and id_dsa, and to error only
when neither exists.
* Mon Oct 2 2000 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin@redhat.com>
- Update x11-askpass to 1.0.2. (#17835)
- Add BuildRequiress for /bin/login and /usr/bin/rsh so that configure will
always find them in the right place. (#17909)
- Set the default path to be the same as the one supplied by /bin/login, but
add /usr/X11R6/bin. (#17909)
- Try to handle obsoletion of ssh-server more cleanly. Package names
are different, but init script name isn't. (#17865)
* Wed Sep 6 2000 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin@redhat.com>
- Update to 2.2.0p1. (#17835)
- Tweak the init script to allow proper restarting. (#18023)
* Wed Aug 23 2000 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin@redhat.com>
- Update to 20000823 snapshot.
- Change subpackage requirements from %%{version} to %%{version}-%%{release}
- Back out the pipe patch.
* Mon Jul 17 2000 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin@redhat.com>
- Update to 2.1.1p4, which includes fixes for config file parsing problems.
- Move the init script back.
- Add Damien's quick fix for wackiness.
* Wed Jul 12 2000 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin@redhat.com>
- Update to 2.1.1p3, which includes fixes for X11 forwarding and strtok().
* Thu Jul 6 2000 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin@redhat.com>
- Move condrestart to server postun.
- Move key generation to init script.
- Actually use the right patch for moving the key generation to the init script.
- Clean up the init script a bit.
* Wed Jul 5 2000 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin@redhat.com>
- Fix X11 forwarding, from mail post by Chan Shih-Ping Richard.
* Sun Jul 2 2000 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin@redhat.com>
- Update to 2.1.1p2.
- Use of strtok() considered harmful.
* Sat Jul 1 2000 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin@redhat.com>
- Get the build root out of the man pages.
* Thu Jun 29 2000 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin@redhat.com>
- Add and use condrestart support in the init script.
- Add newer initscripts as a prereq.
* Tue Jun 27 2000 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin@redhat.com>
- Build in new environment (release 2)
- Move -clients subpackage to Applications/Internet group
* Fri Jun 9 2000 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin@redhat.com>
- Update to 2.2.1p1
* Sat Jun 3 2000 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin@redhat.com>
- Patch to build with neither RSA nor RSAref.
- Miscellaneous FHS-compliance tweaks.
- Fix for possibly-compressed man pages.
* Wed Mar 15 2000 Damien Miller <djm@ibs.com.au>
- Updated for new location
- Updated for new gnome-ssh-askpass build
* Sun Dec 26 1999 Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
- Added Jim Knoble's <jmknoble@pobox.com> askpass
* Mon Nov 15 1999 Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
- Split subpackages further based on patch from jim knoble <jmknoble@pobox.com>
* Sat Nov 13 1999 Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
- Added 'Obsoletes' directives
* Tue Nov 09 1999 Damien Miller <djm@ibs.com.au>
- Use make install
- Subpackages
* Mon Nov 08 1999 Damien Miller <djm@ibs.com.au>
- Added links for slogin
- Fixed perms on manpages
* Sat Oct 30 1999 Damien Miller <djm@ibs.com.au>
- Renamed init script
* Fri Oct 29 1999 Damien Miller <djm@ibs.com.au>
- Back to old binary names
* Thu Oct 28 1999 Damien Miller <djm@ibs.com.au>
- Use autoconf
- New binary names
* Wed Oct 27 1999 Damien Miller <djm@ibs.com.au>
- Initial RPMification, based on Jan "Yenya" Kasprzak's <kas@fi.muni.cz> spec.
diff --git a/contrib/ssh-copy-id b/contrib/ssh-copy-id
index b83b83619896..392f64f9425f 100644
--- a/contrib/ssh-copy-id
+++ b/contrib/ssh-copy-id
@@ -1,324 +1,326 @@
#!/bin/sh
-# Copyright (c) 1999-2016 Philip Hands <phil@hands.com>
+# Copyright (c) 1999-2020 Philip Hands <phil@hands.com>
+# 2017 Sebastien Boyron <seb@boyron.eu>
# 2013 Martin Kletzander <mkletzan@redhat.com>
# 2010 Adeodato =?iso-8859-1?Q?Sim=F3?= <asp16@alu.ua.es>
# 2010 Eric Moret <eric.moret@gmail.com>
# 2009 Xr <xr@i-jeuxvideo.com>
# 2007 Justin Pryzby <justinpryzby@users.sourceforge.net>
# 2004 Reini Urban <rurban@x-ray.at>
# 2003 Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org>
# All rights reserved.
#
# Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
# modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
# are met:
# 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
# notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
# 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
# notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
# documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
#
# THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
# IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
# OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
# IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
# INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
# NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
# DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
# THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
# (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
# THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
# Shell script to install your public key(s) on a remote machine
# See the ssh-copy-id(1) man page for details
+# shellcheck shell=dash
+
# check that we have something mildly sane as our shell, or try to find something better
if false ^ printf "%s: WARNING: ancient shell, hunting for a more modern one... " "$0"
then
SANE_SH=${SANE_SH:-/usr/bin/ksh}
if printf 'true ^ false\n' | "$SANE_SH"
then
- printf "'%s' seems viable.\n" "$SANE_SH"
+ printf "'%s' seems viable.\\n" "$SANE_SH"
exec "$SANE_SH" "$0" "$@"
else
cat <<-EOF
oh dear.
If you have a more recent shell available, that supports \$(...) etc.
please try setting the environment variable SANE_SH to the path of that
shell, and then retry running this script. If that works, please report
a bug describing your setup, and the shell you used to make it work.
EOF
- printf "%s: ERROR: Less dimwitted shell required.\n" "$0"
+ printf '%s: ERROR: Less dimwitted shell required.\n' "$0"
exit 1
fi
fi
-most_recent_id="$(cd "$HOME" ; ls -t .ssh/id*.pub 2>/dev/null | grep -v -- '-cert.pub$' | head -n 1)"
-DEFAULT_PUB_ID_FILE="${most_recent_id:+$HOME/}$most_recent_id"
+# shellcheck disable=SC2010
+DEFAULT_PUB_ID_FILE=$(ls -t "${HOME}"/.ssh/id*.pub 2>/dev/null | grep -v -- '-cert.pub$' | head -n 1)
usage () {
- printf 'Usage: %s [-h|-?|-f|-n] [-i [identity_file]] [-p port] [[-o <ssh -o options>] ...] [user@]hostname\n' "$0" >&2
+ printf 'Usage: %s [-h|-?|-f|-n] [-i [identity_file]] [-p port] [-F alternative ssh_config file] [[-o <ssh -o options>] ...] [user@]hostname\n' "$0" >&2
printf '\t-f: force mode -- copy keys without trying to check if they are already installed\n' >&2
printf '\t-n: dry run -- no keys are actually copied\n' >&2
printf '\t-h|-?: print this help\n' >&2
exit 1
}
# escape any single quotes in an argument
quote() {
- printf "%s\n" "$1" | sed -e "s/'/'\\\\''/g"
+ printf '%s\n' "$1" | sed -e "s/'/'\\\\''/g"
}
use_id_file() {
local L_ID_FILE="$1"
if [ -z "$L_ID_FILE" ] ; then
- printf "%s: ERROR: no ID file found\n" "$0"
+ printf '%s: ERROR: no ID file found\n' "$0"
exit 1
fi
- if expr "$L_ID_FILE" : ".*\.pub$" >/dev/null ; then
+ if expr "$L_ID_FILE" : '.*\.pub$' >/dev/null ; then
PUB_ID_FILE="$L_ID_FILE"
else
PUB_ID_FILE="$L_ID_FILE.pub"
fi
[ "$FORCED" ] || PRIV_ID_FILE=$(dirname "$PUB_ID_FILE")/$(basename "$PUB_ID_FILE" .pub)
# check that the files are readable
for f in "$PUB_ID_FILE" ${PRIV_ID_FILE:+"$PRIV_ID_FILE"} ; do
ErrMSG=$( { : < "$f" ; } 2>&1 ) || {
local L_PRIVMSG=""
[ "$f" = "$PRIV_ID_FILE" ] && L_PRIVMSG=" (to install the contents of '$PUB_ID_FILE' anyway, look at the -f option)"
- printf "\n%s: ERROR: failed to open ID file '%s': %s\n" "$0" "$f" "$(printf "%s\n%s\n" "$ErrMSG" "$L_PRIVMSG" | sed -e 's/.*: *//')"
+ printf "\\n%s: ERROR: failed to open ID file '%s': %s\\n" "$0" "$f" "$(printf '%s\n%s\n' "$ErrMSG" "$L_PRIVMSG" | sed -e 's/.*: *//')"
exit 1
}
done
printf '%s: INFO: Source of key(s) to be installed: "%s"\n' "$0" "$PUB_ID_FILE" >&2
GET_ID="cat \"$PUB_ID_FILE\""
}
if [ -n "$SSH_AUTH_SOCK" ] && ssh-add -L >/dev/null 2>&1 ; then
GET_ID="ssh-add -L"
fi
-while test "$#" -gt 0
+while getopts "i:o:p:F:fnh?" OPT
do
- [ "${SEEN_OPT_I}" ] && expr "$1" : "[-]i" >/dev/null && {
- printf "\n%s: ERROR: -i option must not be specified more than once\n\n" "$0"
- usage
- }
-
- OPT= OPTARG=
- # implement something like getopt to avoid Solaris pain
- case "$1" in
- -i?*|-o?*|-p?*)
- OPT="$(printf -- "$1"|cut -c1-2)"
- OPTARG="$(printf -- "$1"|cut -c3-)"
- shift
- ;;
- -o|-p)
- OPT="$1"
- OPTARG="$2"
- shift 2
- ;;
- -i)
- OPT="$1"
- test "$#" -le 2 || expr "$2" : "[-]" >/dev/null || {
- OPTARG="$2"
- shift
- }
- shift
- ;;
- -f|-n|-h|-\?)
- OPT="$1"
- OPTARG=
- shift
- ;;
- --)
- shift
- while test "$#" -gt 0
- do
- SAVEARGS="${SAVEARGS:+$SAVEARGS }'$(quote "$1")'"
- shift
- done
- break
- ;;
- -*)
- printf "\n%s: ERROR: invalid option (%s)\n\n" "$0" "$1"
- usage
- ;;
- *)
- SAVEARGS="${SAVEARGS:+$SAVEARGS }'$(quote "$1")'"
- shift
- continue
- ;;
- esac
case "$OPT" in
- -i)
+ i)
+ [ "${SEEN_OPT_I}" ] && {
+ printf '\n%s: ERROR: -i option must not be specified more than once\n\n' "$0"
+ usage
+ }
SEEN_OPT_I="yes"
use_id_file "${OPTARG:-$DEFAULT_PUB_ID_FILE}"
;;
- -o|-p)
- SSH_OPTS="${SSH_OPTS:+$SSH_OPTS }$OPT '$(quote "$OPTARG")'"
+ o|p|F)
+ SSH_OPTS="${SSH_OPTS:+$SSH_OPTS }-$OPT '$(quote "${OPTARG}")'"
;;
- -f)
+ f)
FORCED=1
;;
- -n)
+ n)
DRY_RUN=1
;;
- -h|-\?)
+ h|\?)
usage
;;
esac
done
+#shift all args to keep only USER_HOST
+shift $((OPTIND-1))
+
+
-eval set -- "$SAVEARGS"
if [ $# = 0 ] ; then
usage
fi
if [ $# != 1 ] ; then
printf '%s: ERROR: Too many arguments. Expecting a target hostname, got: %s\n\n' "$0" "$SAVEARGS" >&2
usage
fi
# drop trailing colon
-USER_HOST=$(printf "%s\n" "$1" | sed 's/:$//')
+USER_HOST="$*"
# tack the hostname onto SSH_OPTS
SSH_OPTS="${SSH_OPTS:+$SSH_OPTS }'$(quote "$USER_HOST")'"
# and populate "$@" for later use (only way to get proper quoting of options)
eval set -- "$SSH_OPTS"
+# shellcheck disable=SC2086
if [ -z "$(eval $GET_ID)" ] && [ -r "${PUB_ID_FILE:=$DEFAULT_PUB_ID_FILE}" ] ; then
use_id_file "$PUB_ID_FILE"
fi
+# shellcheck disable=SC2086
if [ -z "$(eval $GET_ID)" ] ; then
printf '%s: ERROR: No identities found\n' "$0" >&2
exit 1
fi
# populate_new_ids() uses several global variables ($USER_HOST, $SSH_OPTS ...)
# and has the side effect of setting $NEW_IDS
populate_new_ids() {
local L_SUCCESS="$1"
+ # shellcheck disable=SC2086
if [ "$FORCED" ] ; then
NEW_IDS=$(eval $GET_ID)
return
fi
# repopulate "$@" inside this function
eval set -- "$SSH_OPTS"
umask 0177
- local L_TMP_ID_FILE=$(mktemp ~/.ssh/ssh-copy-id_id.XXXXXXXXXX)
+ local L_TMP_ID_FILE
+ L_TMP_ID_FILE=$(mktemp ~/.ssh/ssh-copy-id_id.XXXXXXXXXX)
if test $? -ne 0 || test "x$L_TMP_ID_FILE" = "x" ; then
printf '%s: ERROR: mktemp failed\n' "$0" >&2
exit 1
fi
local L_CLEANUP="rm -f \"$L_TMP_ID_FILE\" \"${L_TMP_ID_FILE}.stderr\""
+ # shellcheck disable=SC2064
trap "$L_CLEANUP" EXIT TERM INT QUIT
printf '%s: INFO: attempting to log in with the new key(s), to filter out any that are already installed\n' "$0" >&2
+ # shellcheck disable=SC2086
NEW_IDS=$(
eval $GET_ID | {
- while read ID || [ "$ID" ] ; do
+ while read -r ID || [ "$ID" ] ; do
printf '%s\n' "$ID" > "$L_TMP_ID_FILE"
# the next line assumes $PRIV_ID_FILE only set if using a single id file - this
# assumption will break if we implement the possibility of multiple -i options.
# The point being that if file based, ssh needs the private key, which it cannot
# find if only given the contents of the .pub file in an unrelated tmpfile
ssh -i "${PRIV_ID_FILE:-$L_TMP_ID_FILE}" \
-o ControlPath=none \
-o LogLevel=INFO \
-o PreferredAuthentications=publickey \
-o IdentitiesOnly=yes "$@" exit 2>"$L_TMP_ID_FILE.stderr" </dev/null
if [ "$?" = "$L_SUCCESS" ] ; then
: > "$L_TMP_ID_FILE"
else
grep 'Permission denied' "$L_TMP_ID_FILE.stderr" >/dev/null || {
sed -e 's/^/ERROR: /' <"$L_TMP_ID_FILE.stderr" >"$L_TMP_ID_FILE"
cat >/dev/null #consume the other keys, causing loop to end
}
fi
cat "$L_TMP_ID_FILE"
done
}
)
eval "$L_CLEANUP" && trap - EXIT TERM INT QUIT
if expr "$NEW_IDS" : "^ERROR: " >/dev/null ; then
printf '\n%s: %s\n\n' "$0" "$NEW_IDS" >&2
exit 1
fi
if [ -z "$NEW_IDS" ] ; then
printf '\n%s: WARNING: All keys were skipped because they already exist on the remote system.\n' "$0" >&2
- printf '\t\t(if you think this is a mistake, you may want to use -f option)\n\n' "$0" >&2
+ printf '\t\t(if you think this is a mistake, you may want to use -f option)\n\n' >&2
exit 0
fi
printf '%s: INFO: %d key(s) remain to be installed -- if you are prompted now it is to install the new keys\n' "$0" "$(printf '%s\n' "$NEW_IDS" | wc -l)" >&2
}
+# installkey_sh [target_path]
+# produce a one-liner to add the keys to remote authorized_keys file
+# optionally takes an alternative path for authorized_keys
+installkeys_sh() {
+ local AUTH_KEY_FILE=${1:-.ssh/authorized_keys}
+
+ # In setting INSTALLKEYS_SH:
+ # the tr puts it all on one line (to placate tcsh)
+ # (hence the excessive use of semi-colons (;) )
+ # then in the command:
+ # cd to be at $HOME, just in case;
+ # the -z `tail ...` checks for a trailing newline. The echo adds one if was missing
+ # the cat adds the keys we're getting via STDIN
+ # and if available restorecon is used to restore the SELinux context
+ INSTALLKEYS_SH=$(tr '\t\n' ' ' <<-EOF)
+ cd;
+ umask 077;
+ mkdir -p $(dirname "${AUTH_KEY_FILE}") &&
+ { [ -z \`tail -1c ${AUTH_KEY_FILE} 2>/dev/null\` ] || echo >> ${AUTH_KEY_FILE}; } &&
+ cat >> ${AUTH_KEY_FILE} ||
+ exit 1;
+ if type restorecon >/dev/null 2>&1; then
+ restorecon -F .ssh ${AUTH_KEY_FILE};
+ fi
+EOF
+
+ # to defend against quirky remote shells: use 'exec sh -c' to get POSIX;
+ printf "exec sh -c '%s'" "${INSTALLKEYS_SH}"
+}
+
REMOTE_VERSION=$(ssh -v -o PreferredAuthentications=',' -o ControlPath=none "$@" 2>&1 |
sed -ne 's/.*remote software version //p')
+# shellcheck disable=SC2029
case "$REMOTE_VERSION" in
NetScreen*)
populate_new_ids 1
for KEY in $(printf "%s" "$NEW_IDS" | cut -d' ' -f2) ; do
- KEY_NO=$(($KEY_NO + 1))
- printf "%s\n" "$KEY" | grep ssh-dss >/dev/null || {
+ KEY_NO=$((KEY_NO + 1))
+ printf '%s\n' "$KEY" | grep ssh-dss >/dev/null || {
printf '%s: WARNING: Non-dsa key (#%d) skipped (NetScreen only supports DSA keys)\n' "$0" "$KEY_NO" >&2
continue
}
[ "$DRY_RUN" ] || printf 'set ssh pka-dsa key %s\nsave\nexit\n' "$KEY" | ssh -T "$@" >/dev/null 2>&1
if [ $? = 255 ] ; then
printf '%s: ERROR: installation of key #%d failed (please report a bug describing what caused this, so that we can make this message useful)\n' "$0" "$KEY_NO" >&2
else
- ADDED=$(($ADDED + 1))
+ ADDED=$((ADDED + 1))
fi
done
if [ -z "$ADDED" ] ; then
exit 1
fi
;;
+ dropbear*)
+ populate_new_ids 0
+ [ "$DRY_RUN" ] || printf '%s\n' "$NEW_IDS" | \
+ ssh "$@" "$(installkeys_sh /etc/dropbear/authorized_keys)" \
+ || exit 1
+ ADDED=$(printf '%s\n' "$NEW_IDS" | wc -l)
+ ;;
*)
# Assuming that the remote host treats ~/.ssh/authorized_keys as one might expect
populate_new_ids 0
- # in ssh below - to defend against quirky remote shells: use 'exec sh -c' to get POSIX;
- # 'cd' to be at $HOME; add a newline if it's missing; and all on one line, because tcsh.
[ "$DRY_RUN" ] || printf '%s\n' "$NEW_IDS" | \
- ssh "$@" "exec sh -c 'cd ; umask 077 ; mkdir -p .ssh && { [ -z "'`tail -1c .ssh/authorized_keys 2>/dev/null`'" ] || echo >> .ssh/authorized_keys ; } && cat >> .ssh/authorized_keys || exit 1 ; if type restorecon >/dev/null 2>&1 ; then restorecon -F .ssh .ssh/authorized_keys ; fi'" \
+ ssh "$@" "$(installkeys_sh)" \
|| exit 1
ADDED=$(printf '%s\n' "$NEW_IDS" | wc -l)
;;
esac
if [ "$DRY_RUN" ] ; then
cat <<-EOF
=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=
Would have added the following key(s):
$NEW_IDS
=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=
EOF
else
cat <<-EOF
Number of key(s) added: $ADDED
Now try logging into the machine, with: "ssh $SSH_OPTS"
and check to make sure that only the key(s) you wanted were added.
EOF
fi
# =-=-=-=
diff --git a/contrib/ssh-copy-id.1 b/contrib/ssh-copy-id.1
index ae75c79a5793..b75a88365396 100644
--- a/contrib/ssh-copy-id.1
+++ b/contrib/ssh-copy-id.1
@@ -1,191 +1,191 @@
.ig \" -*- nroff -*-
-Copyright (c) 1999-2013 hands.com Ltd. <http://hands.com/>
+Copyright (c) 1999-2016 hands.com Ltd. <http://hands.com/>
Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
are met:
1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
(INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
..
.Dd $Mdocdate: June 17 2010 $
.Dt SSH-COPY-ID 1
.Os
.Sh NAME
.Nm ssh-copy-id
.Nd use locally available keys to authorise logins on a remote machine
.Sh SYNOPSIS
.Nm
.Op Fl f
.Op Fl n
.Op Fl i Op Ar identity_file
.Op Fl p Ar port
.Op Fl o Ar ssh_option
.Op Ar user Ns @ Ns
.Ar hostname
.Nm
.Fl h | Fl ?
.br
.Sh DESCRIPTION
.Nm
is a script that uses
.Xr ssh 1
to log into a remote machine (presumably using a login password,
so password authentication should be enabled, unless you've done some
clever use of multiple identities). It assembles a list of one or more
fingerprints (as described below) and tries to log in with each key, to
see if any of them are already installed (of course, if you are not using
.Xr ssh-agent 1
this may result in you being repeatedly prompted for pass-phrases).
It then assembles a list of those that failed to log in, and using ssh,
enables logins with those keys on the remote server. By default it adds
the keys by appending them to the remote user's
.Pa ~/.ssh/authorized_keys
(creating the file, and directory, if necessary). It is also capable
of detecting if the remote system is a NetScreen, and using its
.Ql set ssh pka-dsa key ...
command instead.
.Pp
The options are as follows:
.Bl -tag -width Ds
.It Fl i Ar identity_file
Use only the key(s) contained in
.Ar identity_file
(rather than looking for identities via
.Xr ssh-add 1
or in the
.Ic default_ID_file ) .
If the filename does not end in
.Pa .pub
this is added. If the filename is omitted, the
.Ic default_ID_file
is used.
.Pp
Note that this can be used to ensure that the keys copied have the
comment one prefers and/or extra options applied, by ensuring that the
key file has these set as preferred before the copy is attempted.
.It Fl f
Forced mode: doesn't check if the keys are present on the remote server.
This means that it does not need the private key. Of course, this can result
in more than one copy of the key being installed on the remote system.
.It Fl n
do a dry-run. Instead of installing keys on the remote system simply
prints the key(s) that would have been installed.
.It Fl h , Fl ?
Print Usage summary
.It Fl p Ar port , Fl o Ar ssh_option
These two options are simply passed through untouched, along with their
argument, to allow one to set the port or other
.Xr ssh 1
options, respectively.
.Pp
Rather than specifying these as command line options, it is often better to use (per-host) settings in
.Xr ssh 1 Ns 's
configuration file:
.Xr ssh_config 5 .
.El
.Pp
Default behaviour without
.Fl i ,
is to check if
.Ql ssh-add -L
provides any output, and if so those keys are used. Note that this results in
the comment on the key being the filename that was given to
.Xr ssh-add 1
when the key was loaded into your
.Xr ssh-agent 1
rather than the comment contained in that file, which is a bit of a shame.
Otherwise, if
.Xr ssh-add 1
provides no keys contents of the
.Ic default_ID_file
will be used.
.Pp
The
.Ic default_ID_file
is the most recent file that matches:
.Pa ~/.ssh/id*.pub ,
(excluding those that match
.Pa ~/.ssh/*-cert.pub )
so if you create a key that is not the one you want
.Nm
to use, just use
.Xr touch 1
on your preferred key's
.Pa .pub
file to reinstate it as the most recent.
.Pp
.Sh EXAMPLES
If you have already installed keys from one system on a lot of remote
hosts, and you then create a new key, on a new client machine, say,
it can be difficult to keep track of which systems on which you've
installed the new key. One way of dealing with this is to load both
the new key and old key(s) into your
.Xr ssh-agent 1 .
Load the new key first, without the
.Fl c
option, then load one or more old keys into the agent, possibly by
ssh-ing to the client machine that has that old key, using the
.Fl A
option to allow agent forwarding:
.Pp
.D1 user@newclient$ ssh-add
.D1 user@newclient$ ssh -A old.client
.D1 user@oldl$ ssh-add -c
.D1 No ... prompt for pass-phrase ...
.D1 user@old$ logoff
.D1 user@newclient$ ssh someserver
.Pp
now, if the new key is installed on the server, you'll be allowed in
unprompted, whereas if you only have the old key(s) enabled, you'll be
asked for confirmation, which is your cue to log back out and run
.Pp
.D1 user@newclient$ ssh-copy-id -i someserver
.Pp
The reason you might want to specify the -i option in this case is to
ensure that the comment on the installed key is the one from the
.Pa .pub
file, rather than just the filename that was loaded into your agent.
It also ensures that only the id you intended is installed, rather than
all the keys that you have in your
.Xr ssh-agent 1 .
Of course, you can specify another id, or use the contents of the
.Xr ssh-agent 1
as you prefer.
.Pp
Having mentioned
.Xr ssh-add 1 Ns 's
.Fl c
option, you might consider using this whenever using agent forwarding
to avoid your key being hijacked, but it is much better to instead use
.Xr ssh 1 Ns 's
.Ar ProxyCommand
and
.Fl W
option,
to bounce through remote servers while always doing direct end-to-end
authentication. This way the middle hop(s) don't get access to your
.Xr ssh-agent 1 .
A web search for
.Ql ssh proxycommand nc
should prove enlightening (N.B. the modern approach is to use the
.Fl W
option, rather than
.Xr nc 1 ) .
.Sh "SEE ALSO"
.Xr ssh 1 ,
.Xr ssh-agent 1 ,
.Xr sshd 8
diff --git a/contrib/suse/openssh.spec b/contrib/suse/openssh.spec
index a2789052d535..e6459e82d69a 100644
--- a/contrib/suse/openssh.spec
+++ b/contrib/suse/openssh.spec
@@ -1,241 +1,245 @@
# Default values for additional components
%define build_x11_askpass 1
# Define the UID/GID to use for privilege separation
%define sshd_gid 65
%define sshd_uid 71
# The version of x11-ssh-askpass to use
%define xversion 1.2.4.1
# Allow the ability to override defaults with -D skip_xxx=1
%{?skip_x11_askpass:%define build_x11_askpass 0}
Summary: OpenSSH, a free Secure Shell (SSH) protocol implementation
Name: openssh
-Version: 8.3p1
+Version: 8.4p1
URL: https://www.openssh.com/
Release: 1
Source0: openssh-%{version}.tar.gz
Source1: x11-ssh-askpass-%{xversion}.tar.gz
License: BSD
Group: Productivity/Networking/SSH
BuildRoot: %{_tmppath}/openssh-%{version}-buildroot
PreReq: openssl
Obsoletes: ssh
Provides: ssh
#
# (Build[ing] Prereq[uisites] only work for RPM 2.95 and newer.)
# building prerequisites -- stuff for
# OpenSSL (openssl-devel),
# and Gnome (glibdev, gtkdev, and gnlibsd)
#
BuildPrereq: openssl
BuildPrereq: zlib-devel
#BuildPrereq: glibdev
#BuildPrereq: gtkdev
#BuildPrereq: gnlibsd
%package askpass
Summary: A passphrase dialog for OpenSSH and the X window System.
Group: Productivity/Networking/SSH
Requires: openssh = %{version}
Obsoletes: ssh-extras
Provides: openssh:${_libdir}/ssh/ssh-askpass
%if %{build_x11_askpass}
BuildPrereq: XFree86-devel
%endif
%description
Ssh (Secure Shell) is a program for logging into a remote machine and for
executing commands in a remote machine. It is intended to replace
rlogin and rsh, and provide secure encrypted communications between
two untrusted hosts over an insecure network. X11 connections and
arbitrary TCP/IP ports can also be forwarded over the secure channel.
OpenSSH is OpenBSD's rework of the last free version of SSH, bringing it
up to date in terms of security and features, as well as removing all
patented algorithms to separate libraries (OpenSSL).
This package includes all files necessary for both the OpenSSH
client and server.
%description askpass
Ssh (Secure Shell) is a program for logging into a remote machine and for
executing commands in a remote machine. It is intended to replace
rlogin and rsh, and provide secure encrypted communications between
two untrusted hosts over an insecure network. X11 connections and
arbitrary TCP/IP ports can also be forwarded over the secure channel.
OpenSSH is OpenBSD's rework of the last free version of SSH, bringing it
up to date in terms of security and features, as well as removing all
patented algorithms to separate libraries (OpenSSL).
This package contains an X Window System passphrase dialog for OpenSSH.
%changelog
+* Mon Jul 20 2020 Damien Miller <djm@mindrto.org>
+- Add ssh-sk-helper and corresponding manual page.
* Wed Oct 26 2005 Iain Morgan <imorgan@nas.nasa.gov>
- Removed accidental inclusion of --without-zlib-version-check
* Tue Oct 25 2005 Iain Morgan <imorgan@nas.nasa.gov>
- Overhaul to deal with newer versions of SuSE and OpenSSH
* Mon Jun 12 2000 Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
- Glob manpages to catch compressed files
* Wed Mar 15 2000 Damien Miller <djm@ibs.com.au>
- Updated for new location
- Updated for new gnome-ssh-askpass build
* Sun Dec 26 1999 Chris Saia <csaia@wtower.com>
- Made symlink to gnome-ssh-askpass called ssh-askpass
* Wed Nov 24 1999 Chris Saia <csaia@wtower.com>
- Removed patches that included /etc/pam.d/sshd, /sbin/init.d/rc.sshd, and
/var/adm/fillup-templates/rc.config.sshd, since Damien merged these into
his released tarfile
- Changed permissions on ssh_config in the install procedure to 644 from 600
even though it was correct in the %files section and thus right in the RPMs
- Postinstall script for the server now only prints "Generating SSH host
key..." if we need to actually do this, in order to eliminate a confusing
message if an SSH host key is already in place
- Marked all manual pages as %doc(umentation)
* Mon Nov 22 1999 Chris Saia <csaia@wtower.com>
- Added flag to configure daemon with TCP Wrappers support
- Added building prerequisites (works in RPM 3.0 and newer)
* Thu Nov 18 1999 Chris Saia <csaia@wtower.com>
- Made this package correct for SuSE.
- Changed instances of pam_pwdb.so to pam_unix.so, since it works more properly
with SuSE, and lib_pwdb.so isn't installed by default.
* Mon Nov 15 1999 Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
- Split subpackages further based on patch from jim knoble <jmknoble@pobox.com>
* Sat Nov 13 1999 Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
- Added 'Obsoletes' directives
* Tue Nov 09 1999 Damien Miller <djm@ibs.com.au>
- Use make install
- Subpackages
* Mon Nov 08 1999 Damien Miller <djm@ibs.com.au>
- Added links for slogin
- Fixed perms on manpages
* Sat Oct 30 1999 Damien Miller <djm@ibs.com.au>
- Renamed init script
* Fri Oct 29 1999 Damien Miller <djm@ibs.com.au>
- Back to old binary names
* Thu Oct 28 1999 Damien Miller <djm@ibs.com.au>
- Use autoconf
- New binary names
* Wed Oct 27 1999 Damien Miller <djm@ibs.com.au>
- Initial RPMification, based on Jan "Yenya" Kasprzak's <kas@fi.muni.cz> spec.
%prep
%if %{build_x11_askpass}
%setup -q -a 1
%else
%setup -q
%endif
%build
CFLAGS="$RPM_OPT_FLAGS" \
%configure --prefix=/usr \
--sysconfdir=%{_sysconfdir}/ssh \
--mandir=%{_mandir} \
--with-privsep-path=/var/lib/empty \
--with-pam \
--libexecdir=%{_libdir}/ssh
make
%if %{build_x11_askpass}
cd x11-ssh-askpass-%{xversion}
%configure --mandir=/usr/X11R6/man \
--libexecdir=%{_libdir}/ssh
xmkmf -a
make
cd ..
%endif
%install
rm -rf $RPM_BUILD_ROOT
make install DESTDIR=$RPM_BUILD_ROOT/
install -d $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/etc/pam.d/
install -d $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/etc/init.d/
install -d $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/var/adm/fillup-templates
install -m644 contrib/sshd.pam.generic $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/etc/pam.d/sshd
install -m744 contrib/suse/rc.sshd $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/etc/init.d/sshd
install -m744 contrib/suse/sysconfig.ssh \
$RPM_BUILD_ROOT/var/adm/fillup-templates
%if %{build_x11_askpass}
cd x11-ssh-askpass-%{xversion}
make install install.man BINDIR=%{_libdir}/ssh DESTDIR=$RPM_BUILD_ROOT/
rm -f $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/usr/share/Ssh.bin
%endif
%clean
rm -rf $RPM_BUILD_ROOT
%pre
/usr/sbin/groupadd -g %{sshd_gid} -o -r sshd 2> /dev/null || :
/usr/sbin/useradd -r -o -g sshd -u %{sshd_uid} -s /bin/false -c "SSH Privilege Separation User" -d /var/lib/sshd sshd 2> /dev/null || :
%post
/usr/bin/ssh-keygen -A
%{fillup_and_insserv -n -y ssh sshd}
%run_permissions
%verifyscript
%verify_permissions -e /etc/ssh/sshd_config -e /etc/ssh/ssh_config -e /usr/bin/ssh
%preun
%stop_on_removal sshd
%postun
%restart_on_update sshd
%{insserv_cleanup}
%files
%defattr(-,root,root)
%doc ChangeLog OVERVIEW README* PROTOCOL*
%doc TODO CREDITS LICENCE
%attr(0755,root,root) %dir %{_sysconfdir}/ssh
%attr(0644,root,root) %config(noreplace) %{_sysconfdir}/ssh/ssh_config
%attr(0600,root,root) %config(noreplace) %{_sysconfdir}/ssh/sshd_config
%attr(0600,root,root) %config(noreplace) %{_sysconfdir}/ssh/moduli
%attr(0644,root,root) %config(noreplace) /etc/pam.d/sshd
%attr(0755,root,root) %config /etc/init.d/sshd
%attr(0755,root,root) %{_bindir}/ssh-keygen
%attr(0755,root,root) %{_bindir}/scp
%attr(0755,root,root) %{_bindir}/ssh
%attr(0755,root,root) %{_bindir}/ssh-agent
%attr(0755,root,root) %{_bindir}/ssh-add
%attr(0755,root,root) %{_bindir}/ssh-keyscan
%attr(0755,root,root) %{_bindir}/sftp
%attr(0755,root,root) %{_sbindir}/sshd
%attr(0755,root,root) %dir %{_libdir}/ssh
%attr(0755,root,root) %{_libdir}/ssh/sftp-server
%attr(4711,root,root) %{_libdir}/ssh/ssh-keysign
%attr(0755,root,root) %{_libdir}/ssh/ssh-pkcs11-helper
+%attr(0755,root,root) %{_libdir}/ssh/ssh-sk-helper
%attr(0644,root,root) %doc %{_mandir}/man1/scp.1*
%attr(0644,root,root) %doc %{_mandir}/man1/sftp.1*
%attr(0644,root,root) %doc %{_mandir}/man1/ssh.1*
%attr(0644,root,root) %doc %{_mandir}/man1/ssh-add.1*
%attr(0644,root,root) %doc %{_mandir}/man1/ssh-agent.1*
%attr(0644,root,root) %doc %{_mandir}/man1/ssh-keygen.1*
%attr(0644,root,root) %doc %{_mandir}/man1/ssh-keyscan.1*
%attr(0644,root,root) %doc %{_mandir}/man5/moduli.5*
%attr(0644,root,root) %doc %{_mandir}/man5/ssh_config.5*
%attr(0644,root,root) %doc %{_mandir}/man5/sshd_config.5*
%attr(0644,root,root) %doc %{_mandir}/man8/sftp-server.8*
%attr(0644,root,root) %doc %{_mandir}/man8/ssh-keysign.8*
%attr(0644,root,root) %doc %{_mandir}/man8/ssh-pkcs11-helper.8*
+%attr(0644,root,root) %doc %{_mandir}/man8/ssh-sk-helper.8*
%attr(0644,root,root) %doc %{_mandir}/man8/sshd.8*
%attr(0644,root,root) /var/adm/fillup-templates/sysconfig.ssh
%if %{build_x11_askpass}
%files askpass
%defattr(-,root,root)
%doc x11-ssh-askpass-%{xversion}/README
%doc x11-ssh-askpass-%{xversion}/ChangeLog
%doc x11-ssh-askpass-%{xversion}/SshAskpass*.ad
%attr(0755,root,root) %{_libdir}/ssh/ssh-askpass
%attr(0755,root,root) %{_libdir}/ssh/x11-ssh-askpass
%attr(0644,root,root) %doc /usr/X11R6/man/man1/ssh-askpass.1x*
%attr(0644,root,root) %doc /usr/X11R6/man/man1/x11-ssh-askpass.1x*
%attr(0644,root,root) %config /usr/X11R6/lib/X11/app-defaults/SshAskpass
%endif
diff --git a/defines.h b/defines.h
index b8ea88b2d21c..79dcb507feeb 100644
--- a/defines.h
+++ b/defines.h
@@ -1,901 +1,897 @@
/*
* Copyright (c) 1999-2003 Damien Miller. All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
* OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
* IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
* INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
* NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
* DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
* THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
* (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
* THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
*/
#ifndef _DEFINES_H
#define _DEFINES_H
/* Constants */
#if defined(HAVE_DECL_SHUT_RD) && HAVE_DECL_SHUT_RD == 0
enum
{
SHUT_RD = 0, /* No more receptions. */
SHUT_WR, /* No more transmissions. */
SHUT_RDWR /* No more receptions or transmissions. */
};
# define SHUT_RD SHUT_RD
# define SHUT_WR SHUT_WR
# define SHUT_RDWR SHUT_RDWR
#endif
/*
* Cygwin doesn't really have a notion of reserved ports. It is still
* is useful on the client side so for compatibility it defines as 1024 via
* netinet/in.h inside an enum. We * don't actually want that restriction
* so we want to set that to zero, but we can't do it direct in config.h
* because it'll cause a conflicting definition the first time we include
* netinet/in.h.
*/
#ifdef HAVE_CYGWIN
#define IPPORT_RESERVED 0
#endif
/*
* Definitions for IP type of service (ip_tos)
*/
#include <netinet/in_systm.h>
#include <netinet/ip.h>
#ifndef IPTOS_LOWDELAY
# define IPTOS_LOWDELAY 0x10
# define IPTOS_THROUGHPUT 0x08
# define IPTOS_RELIABILITY 0x04
# define IPTOS_LOWCOST 0x02
# define IPTOS_MINCOST IPTOS_LOWCOST
#endif /* IPTOS_LOWDELAY */
/*
* Definitions for DiffServ Codepoints as per RFC2474
*/
#ifndef IPTOS_DSCP_AF11
# define IPTOS_DSCP_AF11 0x28
# define IPTOS_DSCP_AF12 0x30
# define IPTOS_DSCP_AF13 0x38
# define IPTOS_DSCP_AF21 0x48
# define IPTOS_DSCP_AF22 0x50
# define IPTOS_DSCP_AF23 0x58
# define IPTOS_DSCP_AF31 0x68
# define IPTOS_DSCP_AF32 0x70
# define IPTOS_DSCP_AF33 0x78
# define IPTOS_DSCP_AF41 0x88
# define IPTOS_DSCP_AF42 0x90
# define IPTOS_DSCP_AF43 0x98
# define IPTOS_DSCP_EF 0xb8
#endif /* IPTOS_DSCP_AF11 */
#ifndef IPTOS_DSCP_CS0
# define IPTOS_DSCP_CS0 0x00
# define IPTOS_DSCP_CS1 0x20
# define IPTOS_DSCP_CS2 0x40
# define IPTOS_DSCP_CS3 0x60
# define IPTOS_DSCP_CS4 0x80
# define IPTOS_DSCP_CS5 0xa0
# define IPTOS_DSCP_CS6 0xc0
# define IPTOS_DSCP_CS7 0xe0
#endif /* IPTOS_DSCP_CS0 */
#ifndef IPTOS_DSCP_EF
# define IPTOS_DSCP_EF 0xb8
#endif /* IPTOS_DSCP_EF */
#ifndef IPTOS_DSCP_LE
# define IPTOS_DSCP_LE 0x01
#endif /* IPTOS_DSCP_LE */
#ifndef IPTOS_PREC_CRITIC_ECP
# define IPTOS_PREC_CRITIC_ECP 0xa0
#endif
#ifndef IPTOS_PREC_INTERNETCONTROL
# define IPTOS_PREC_INTERNETCONTROL 0xc0
#endif
#ifndef IPTOS_PREC_NETCONTROL
# define IPTOS_PREC_NETCONTROL 0xe0
#endif
#ifndef PATH_MAX
# ifdef _POSIX_PATH_MAX
# define PATH_MAX _POSIX_PATH_MAX
# endif
#endif
#ifndef MAXPATHLEN
# ifdef PATH_MAX
# define MAXPATHLEN PATH_MAX
# else /* PATH_MAX */
# define MAXPATHLEN 64
# endif /* PATH_MAX */
#endif /* MAXPATHLEN */
#ifndef HOST_NAME_MAX
# include "netdb.h" /* for MAXHOSTNAMELEN */
# if defined(_POSIX_HOST_NAME_MAX)
# define HOST_NAME_MAX _POSIX_HOST_NAME_MAX
# elif defined(MAXHOSTNAMELEN)
# define HOST_NAME_MAX MAXHOSTNAMELEN
# else
# define HOST_NAME_MAX 255
# endif
#endif /* HOST_NAME_MAX */
#if defined(HAVE_DECL_MAXSYMLINKS) && HAVE_DECL_MAXSYMLINKS == 0
# define MAXSYMLINKS 5
#endif
#ifndef STDIN_FILENO
# define STDIN_FILENO 0
#endif
#ifndef STDOUT_FILENO
# define STDOUT_FILENO 1
#endif
#ifndef STDERR_FILENO
# define STDERR_FILENO 2
#endif
#ifndef NGROUPS_MAX /* Disable groupaccess if NGROUP_MAX is not set */
#ifdef NGROUPS
#define NGROUPS_MAX NGROUPS
#else
#define NGROUPS_MAX 0
#endif
#endif
#if defined(HAVE_DECL_O_NONBLOCK) && HAVE_DECL_O_NONBLOCK == 0
# define O_NONBLOCK 00004 /* Non Blocking Open */
#endif
#ifndef S_IFSOCK
# define S_IFSOCK 0
#endif /* S_IFSOCK */
#ifndef S_ISDIR
# define S_ISDIR(mode) (((mode) & (_S_IFMT)) == (_S_IFDIR))
#endif /* S_ISDIR */
#ifndef S_ISREG
# define S_ISREG(mode) (((mode) & (_S_IFMT)) == (_S_IFREG))
#endif /* S_ISREG */
#ifndef S_ISLNK
# define S_ISLNK(mode) (((mode) & S_IFMT) == S_IFLNK)
#endif /* S_ISLNK */
#ifndef S_IXUSR
# define S_IXUSR 0000100 /* execute/search permission, */
# define S_IXGRP 0000010 /* execute/search permission, */
# define S_IXOTH 0000001 /* execute/search permission, */
# define _S_IWUSR 0000200 /* write permission, */
# define S_IWUSR _S_IWUSR /* write permission, owner */
# define S_IWGRP 0000020 /* write permission, group */
# define S_IWOTH 0000002 /* write permission, other */
# define S_IRUSR 0000400 /* read permission, owner */
# define S_IRGRP 0000040 /* read permission, group */
# define S_IROTH 0000004 /* read permission, other */
# define S_IRWXU 0000700 /* read, write, execute */
# define S_IRWXG 0000070 /* read, write, execute */
# define S_IRWXO 0000007 /* read, write, execute */
#endif /* S_IXUSR */
#if !defined(MAP_ANON) && defined(MAP_ANONYMOUS)
#define MAP_ANON MAP_ANONYMOUS
#endif
#ifndef MAP_FAILED
# define MAP_FAILED ((void *)-1)
#endif
/*
SCO Open Server 3 has INADDR_LOOPBACK defined in rpc/rpc.h but
including rpc/rpc.h breaks Solaris 6
*/
#ifndef INADDR_LOOPBACK
#define INADDR_LOOPBACK ((u_long)0x7f000001)
#endif
/* Types */
/* If sys/types.h does not supply intXX_t, supply them ourselves */
/* (or die trying) */
#ifndef HAVE_U_INT
typedef unsigned int u_int;
#endif
#ifndef HAVE_INTXX_T
typedef signed char int8_t;
# if (SIZEOF_SHORT_INT == 2)
typedef short int int16_t;
# else
# error "16 bit int type not found."
# endif
# if (SIZEOF_INT == 4)
typedef int int32_t;
# else
# error "32 bit int type not found."
# endif
#endif
/* If sys/types.h does not supply u_intXX_t, supply them ourselves */
#ifndef HAVE_U_INTXX_T
# ifdef HAVE_UINTXX_T
typedef uint8_t u_int8_t;
typedef uint16_t u_int16_t;
typedef uint32_t u_int32_t;
# define HAVE_U_INTXX_T 1
# else
typedef unsigned char u_int8_t;
# if (SIZEOF_SHORT_INT == 2)
typedef unsigned short int u_int16_t;
# else
# error "16 bit int type not found."
# endif
# if (SIZEOF_INT == 4)
typedef unsigned int u_int32_t;
# else
# error "32 bit int type not found."
# endif
# endif
#define __BIT_TYPES_DEFINED__
#endif
#if !defined(LLONG_MIN) && defined(LONG_LONG_MIN)
#define LLONG_MIN LONG_LONG_MIN
#endif
#if !defined(LLONG_MAX) && defined(LONG_LONG_MAX)
#define LLONG_MAX LONG_LONG_MAX
#endif
#ifndef UINT32_MAX
# if defined(HAVE_DECL_UINT32_MAX) && (HAVE_DECL_UINT32_MAX == 0)
# if (SIZEOF_INT == 4)
# define UINT32_MAX UINT_MAX
# endif
# endif
#endif
/* 64-bit types */
#ifndef HAVE_INT64_T
# if (SIZEOF_LONG_INT == 8)
typedef long int int64_t;
# else
# if (SIZEOF_LONG_LONG_INT == 8)
typedef long long int int64_t;
# endif
# endif
#endif
#ifndef HAVE_U_INT64_T
# if (SIZEOF_LONG_INT == 8)
typedef unsigned long int u_int64_t;
# else
# if (SIZEOF_LONG_LONG_INT == 8)
typedef unsigned long long int u_int64_t;
# endif
# endif
#endif
#ifndef HAVE_UINTXX_T
typedef u_int8_t uint8_t;
typedef u_int16_t uint16_t;
typedef u_int32_t uint32_t;
typedef u_int64_t uint64_t;
#endif
#ifndef HAVE_INTMAX_T
typedef long long intmax_t;
#endif
#ifndef HAVE_UINTMAX_T
typedef unsigned long long uintmax_t;
#endif
#ifndef HAVE_U_CHAR
typedef unsigned char u_char;
# define HAVE_U_CHAR
#endif /* HAVE_U_CHAR */
#ifndef ULLONG_MAX
# define ULLONG_MAX ((unsigned long long)-1)
#endif
#ifndef SIZE_T_MAX
#define SIZE_T_MAX ULONG_MAX
#endif /* SIZE_T_MAX */
#ifndef HAVE_SIZE_T
typedef unsigned int size_t;
# define HAVE_SIZE_T
# define SIZE_T_MAX UINT_MAX
#endif /* HAVE_SIZE_T */
#ifndef SIZE_MAX
#define SIZE_MAX SIZE_T_MAX
#endif
#ifndef INT32_MAX
# if (SIZEOF_INT == 4)
# define INT32_MAX INT_MAX
# elif (SIZEOF_LONG == 4)
# define INT32_MAX LONG_MAX
# else
# error "need INT32_MAX"
# endif
#endif
#ifndef INT64_MAX
# if (SIZEOF_INT == 8)
# define INT64_MAX INT_MAX
# elif (SIZEOF_LONG == 8)
# define INT64_MAX LONG_MAX
# elif (SIZEOF_LONG_LONG_INT == 8)
# define INT64_MAX LLONG_MAX
# else
# error "need INT64_MAX"
# endif
#endif
#ifndef HAVE_SSIZE_T
typedef int ssize_t;
#define SSIZE_MAX INT_MAX
# define HAVE_SSIZE_T
#endif /* HAVE_SSIZE_T */
#ifndef HAVE_CLOCK_T
typedef long clock_t;
# define HAVE_CLOCK_T
#endif /* HAVE_CLOCK_T */
#ifndef HAVE_SA_FAMILY_T
typedef int sa_family_t;
# define HAVE_SA_FAMILY_T
#endif /* HAVE_SA_FAMILY_T */
#ifndef HAVE_PID_T
typedef int pid_t;
# define HAVE_PID_T
#endif /* HAVE_PID_T */
#ifndef HAVE_SIG_ATOMIC_T
typedef int sig_atomic_t;
# define HAVE_SIG_ATOMIC_T
#endif /* HAVE_SIG_ATOMIC_T */
#ifndef HAVE_MODE_T
typedef int mode_t;
# define HAVE_MODE_T
#endif /* HAVE_MODE_T */
#if !defined(HAVE_SS_FAMILY_IN_SS) && defined(HAVE___SS_FAMILY_IN_SS)
# define ss_family __ss_family
#endif /* !defined(HAVE_SS_FAMILY_IN_SS) && defined(HAVE_SA_FAMILY_IN_SS) */
#ifndef HAVE_SYS_UN_H
struct sockaddr_un {
short sun_family; /* AF_UNIX */
char sun_path[108]; /* path name (gag) */
};
#endif /* HAVE_SYS_UN_H */
#ifndef HAVE_IN_ADDR_T
typedef u_int32_t in_addr_t;
#endif
#ifndef HAVE_IN_PORT_T
typedef u_int16_t in_port_t;
#endif
#if defined(BROKEN_SYS_TERMIO_H) && !defined(_STRUCT_WINSIZE)
#define _STRUCT_WINSIZE
struct winsize {
unsigned short ws_row; /* rows, in characters */
unsigned short ws_col; /* columns, in character */
unsigned short ws_xpixel; /* horizontal size, pixels */
unsigned short ws_ypixel; /* vertical size, pixels */
};
#endif
/* bits needed for select that may not be in the system headers */
#ifndef HAVE_FD_MASK
typedef unsigned long int fd_mask;
#endif
#if defined(HAVE_DECL_NFDBITS) && HAVE_DECL_NFDBITS == 0
# define NFDBITS (8 * sizeof(unsigned long))
#endif
#if defined(HAVE_DECL_HOWMANY) && HAVE_DECL_HOWMANY == 0
# define howmany(x,y) (((x)+((y)-1))/(y))
#endif
/* Paths */
#ifndef _PATH_BSHELL
# define _PATH_BSHELL "/bin/sh"
#endif
#ifdef USER_PATH
# ifdef _PATH_STDPATH
# undef _PATH_STDPATH
# endif
# define _PATH_STDPATH USER_PATH
#endif
#ifndef _PATH_STDPATH
# define _PATH_STDPATH "/usr/bin:/bin:/usr/sbin:/sbin"
#endif
#ifndef SUPERUSER_PATH
# define SUPERUSER_PATH _PATH_STDPATH
#endif
#ifndef _PATH_DEVNULL
# define _PATH_DEVNULL "/dev/null"
#endif
/* user may have set a different path */
#if defined(_PATH_MAILDIR) && defined(MAIL_DIRECTORY)
# undef _PATH_MAILDIR
#endif /* defined(_PATH_MAILDIR) && defined(MAIL_DIRECTORY) */
#ifdef MAIL_DIRECTORY
# define _PATH_MAILDIR MAIL_DIRECTORY
#endif
#ifndef _PATH_NOLOGIN
# define _PATH_NOLOGIN "/etc/nologin"
#endif
/* Define this to be the path of the xauth program. */
#ifdef XAUTH_PATH
#define _PATH_XAUTH XAUTH_PATH
#endif /* XAUTH_PATH */
/* derived from XF4/xc/lib/dps/Xlibnet.h */
#ifndef X_UNIX_PATH
# ifdef __hpux
# define X_UNIX_PATH "/var/spool/sockets/X11/%u"
# else
# define X_UNIX_PATH "/tmp/.X11-unix/X%u"
# endif
#endif /* X_UNIX_PATH */
#define _PATH_UNIX_X X_UNIX_PATH
#ifndef _PATH_TTY
# define _PATH_TTY "/dev/tty"
#endif
/* Macros */
#if defined(HAVE_LOGIN_GETCAPBOOL) && defined(HAVE_LOGIN_CAP_H)
# define HAVE_LOGIN_CAP
#endif
#ifndef MAX
# define MAX(a,b) (((a)>(b))?(a):(b))
# define MIN(a,b) (((a)<(b))?(a):(b))
#endif
#ifndef roundup
# define roundup(x, y) ((((x)+((y)-1))/(y))*(y))
#endif
#ifndef timersub
#define timersub(a, b, result) \
do { \
(result)->tv_sec = (a)->tv_sec - (b)->tv_sec; \
(result)->tv_usec = (a)->tv_usec - (b)->tv_usec; \
if ((result)->tv_usec < 0) { \
--(result)->tv_sec; \
(result)->tv_usec += 1000000; \
} \
} while (0)
#endif
#ifndef TIMEVAL_TO_TIMESPEC
#define TIMEVAL_TO_TIMESPEC(tv, ts) { \
(ts)->tv_sec = (tv)->tv_sec; \
(ts)->tv_nsec = (tv)->tv_usec * 1000; \
}
#endif
#ifndef TIMESPEC_TO_TIMEVAL
#define TIMESPEC_TO_TIMEVAL(tv, ts) { \
(tv)->tv_sec = (ts)->tv_sec; \
(tv)->tv_usec = (ts)->tv_nsec / 1000; \
}
#endif
#ifndef timespeccmp
#define timespeccmp(tsp, usp, cmp) \
(((tsp)->tv_sec == (usp)->tv_sec) ? \
((tsp)->tv_nsec cmp (usp)->tv_nsec) : \
((tsp)->tv_sec cmp (usp)->tv_sec))
#endif
#ifndef __P
# define __P(x) x
#endif
#if !defined(IN6_IS_ADDR_V4MAPPED)
# define IN6_IS_ADDR_V4MAPPED(a) \
((((u_int32_t *) (a))[0] == 0) && (((u_int32_t *) (a))[1] == 0) && \
(((u_int32_t *) (a))[2] == htonl (0xffff)))
#endif /* !defined(IN6_IS_ADDR_V4MAPPED) */
#if !defined(__GNUC__) || (__GNUC__ < 2)
# define __attribute__(x)
#endif /* !defined(__GNUC__) || (__GNUC__ < 2) */
#if !defined(HAVE_ATTRIBUTE__SENTINEL__) && !defined(__sentinel__)
# define __sentinel__
#endif
#if !defined(HAVE_ATTRIBUTE__BOUNDED__) && !defined(__bounded__)
# define __bounded__(x, y, z)
#endif
#if !defined(HAVE_ATTRIBUTE__NONNULL__) && !defined(__nonnull__)
# define __nonnull__(x)
#endif
#ifndef OSSH_ALIGNBYTES
#define OSSH_ALIGNBYTES (sizeof(int) - 1)
#endif
#ifndef __CMSG_ALIGN
#define __CMSG_ALIGN(p) (((u_int)(p) + OSSH_ALIGNBYTES) &~ OSSH_ALIGNBYTES)
#endif
/* Length of the contents of a control message of length len */
#ifndef CMSG_LEN
#define CMSG_LEN(len) (__CMSG_ALIGN(sizeof(struct cmsghdr)) + (len))
#endif
/* Length of the space taken up by a padded control message of length len */
#ifndef CMSG_SPACE
#define CMSG_SPACE(len) (__CMSG_ALIGN(sizeof(struct cmsghdr)) + __CMSG_ALIGN(len))
#endif
/* given pointer to struct cmsghdr, return pointer to data */
#ifndef CMSG_DATA
#define CMSG_DATA(cmsg) ((u_char *)(cmsg) + __CMSG_ALIGN(sizeof(struct cmsghdr)))
#endif /* CMSG_DATA */
/*
* RFC 2292 requires to check msg_controllen, in case that the kernel returns
* an empty list for some reasons.
*/
#ifndef CMSG_FIRSTHDR
#define CMSG_FIRSTHDR(mhdr) \
((mhdr)->msg_controllen >= sizeof(struct cmsghdr) ? \
(struct cmsghdr *)(mhdr)->msg_control : \
(struct cmsghdr *)NULL)
#endif /* CMSG_FIRSTHDR */
#if defined(HAVE_DECL_OFFSETOF) && HAVE_DECL_OFFSETOF == 0
# define offsetof(type, member) ((size_t) &((type *)0)->member)
#endif
/* Set up BSD-style BYTE_ORDER definition if it isn't there already */
/* XXX: doesn't try to cope with strange byte orders (PDP_ENDIAN) */
#ifndef BYTE_ORDER
# ifndef LITTLE_ENDIAN
# define LITTLE_ENDIAN 1234
# endif /* LITTLE_ENDIAN */
# ifndef BIG_ENDIAN
# define BIG_ENDIAN 4321
# endif /* BIG_ENDIAN */
# ifdef WORDS_BIGENDIAN
# define BYTE_ORDER BIG_ENDIAN
# else /* WORDS_BIGENDIAN */
# define BYTE_ORDER LITTLE_ENDIAN
# endif /* WORDS_BIGENDIAN */
#endif /* BYTE_ORDER */
/* Function replacement / compatibility hacks */
#if !defined(HAVE_GETADDRINFO) && (defined(HAVE_OGETADDRINFO) || defined(HAVE_NGETADDRINFO))
# define HAVE_GETADDRINFO
#endif
#ifndef HAVE_GETOPT_OPTRESET
# undef getopt
# undef opterr
# undef optind
# undef optopt
# undef optreset
# undef optarg
# define getopt(ac, av, o) BSDgetopt(ac, av, o)
# define opterr BSDopterr
# define optind BSDoptind
# define optopt BSDoptopt
# define optreset BSDoptreset
# define optarg BSDoptarg
#endif
#if defined(BROKEN_GETADDRINFO) && defined(HAVE_GETADDRINFO)
# undef HAVE_GETADDRINFO
#endif
#if defined(BROKEN_GETADDRINFO) && defined(HAVE_FREEADDRINFO)
# undef HAVE_FREEADDRINFO
#endif
#if defined(BROKEN_GETADDRINFO) && defined(HAVE_GAI_STRERROR)
# undef HAVE_GAI_STRERROR
#endif
#if defined(HAVE_GETADDRINFO)
# if defined(HAVE_DECL_AI_NUMERICSERV) && HAVE_DECL_AI_NUMERICSERV == 0
# define AI_NUMERICSERV 0
# endif
#endif
#if defined(BROKEN_UPDWTMPX) && defined(HAVE_UPDWTMPX)
# undef HAVE_UPDWTMPX
#endif
#if defined(BROKEN_SHADOW_EXPIRE) && defined(HAS_SHADOW_EXPIRE)
# undef HAS_SHADOW_EXPIRE
#endif
#if defined(HAVE_OPENLOG_R) && defined(SYSLOG_DATA_INIT) && \
defined(SYSLOG_R_SAFE_IN_SIGHAND)
# define DO_LOG_SAFE_IN_SIGHAND
#endif
#if !defined(HAVE_MEMMOVE) && defined(HAVE_BCOPY)
# define memmove(s1, s2, n) bcopy((s2), (s1), (n))
#endif /* !defined(HAVE_MEMMOVE) && defined(HAVE_BCOPY) */
#ifndef GETPGRP_VOID
# include <unistd.h>
# define getpgrp() getpgrp(0)
#endif
#ifdef USE_BSM_AUDIT
# define SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
# define CUSTOM_SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
#endif
#ifdef USE_LINUX_AUDIT
# define SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
# define CUSTOM_SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
#endif
#if !defined(HAVE___func__) && defined(HAVE___FUNCTION__)
# define __func__ __FUNCTION__
#elif !defined(HAVE___func__)
# define __func__ ""
#endif
#if defined(KRB5) && !defined(HEIMDAL)
# define krb5_get_err_text(context,code) error_message(code)
#endif
/* Maximum number of file descriptors available */
#ifdef HAVE_SYSCONF
# define SSH_SYSFDMAX sysconf(_SC_OPEN_MAX)
#else
# define SSH_SYSFDMAX 10000
#endif
#ifdef FSID_HAS_VAL
/* encode f_fsid into a 64 bit value */
#define FSID_TO_ULONG(f) \
((((u_int64_t)(f).val[0] & 0xffffffffUL) << 32) | \
((f).val[1] & 0xffffffffUL))
#elif defined(FSID_HAS___VAL)
#define FSID_TO_ULONG(f) \
((((u_int64_t)(f).__val[0] & 0xffffffffUL) << 32) | \
((f).__val[1] & 0xffffffffUL))
#else
# define FSID_TO_ULONG(f) ((f))
#endif
#if defined(__Lynx__)
/*
* LynxOS defines these in param.h which we do not want to include since
* it will also pull in a bunch of kernel definitions.
*/
# define ALIGNBYTES (sizeof(int) - 1)
# define ALIGN(p) (((unsigned)p + ALIGNBYTES) & ~ALIGNBYTES)
/* Missing prototypes on LynxOS */
int snprintf (char *, size_t, const char *, ...);
int mkstemp (char *);
char *crypt (const char *, const char *);
int seteuid (uid_t);
int setegid (gid_t);
char *mkdtemp (char *);
int rresvport_af (int *, sa_family_t);
int innetgr (const char *, const char *, const char *, const char *);
#endif
/*
* Define this to use pipes instead of socketpairs for communicating with the
* client program. Socketpairs do not seem to work on all systems.
*
* configure.ac sets this for a few OS's which are known to have problems
* but you may need to set it yourself
*/
/* #define USE_PIPES 1 */
/**
** login recorder definitions
**/
/* FIXME: put default paths back in */
#ifndef UTMP_FILE
# ifdef _PATH_UTMP
# define UTMP_FILE _PATH_UTMP
# else
# ifdef CONF_UTMP_FILE
# define UTMP_FILE CONF_UTMP_FILE
# endif
# endif
#endif
#ifndef WTMP_FILE
# ifdef _PATH_WTMP
# define WTMP_FILE _PATH_WTMP
# else
# ifdef CONF_WTMP_FILE
# define WTMP_FILE CONF_WTMP_FILE
# endif
# endif
#endif
/* pick up the user's location for lastlog if given */
#ifndef LASTLOG_FILE
# ifdef _PATH_LASTLOG
# define LASTLOG_FILE _PATH_LASTLOG
# else
# ifdef CONF_LASTLOG_FILE
# define LASTLOG_FILE CONF_LASTLOG_FILE
# endif
# endif
#endif
#if defined(HAVE_SHADOW_H) && !defined(DISABLE_SHADOW)
# define USE_SHADOW
#endif
/* The login() library function in libutil is first choice */
#if defined(HAVE_LOGIN) && !defined(DISABLE_LOGIN)
# define USE_LOGIN
#else
/* Simply select your favourite login types. */
/* Can't do if-else because some systems use several... <sigh> */
# if !defined(DISABLE_UTMPX)
# define USE_UTMPX
# endif
# if defined(UTMP_FILE) && !defined(DISABLE_UTMP)
# define USE_UTMP
# endif
# if defined(WTMPX_FILE) && !defined(DISABLE_WTMPX)
# define USE_WTMPX
# endif
# if defined(WTMP_FILE) && !defined(DISABLE_WTMP)
# define USE_WTMP
# endif
#endif
#ifndef UT_LINESIZE
# define UT_LINESIZE 8
#endif
/* I hope that the presence of LASTLOG_FILE is enough to detect this */
#if defined(LASTLOG_FILE) && !defined(DISABLE_LASTLOG)
# define USE_LASTLOG
#endif
#ifdef HAVE_OSF_SIA
# ifdef USE_SHADOW
# undef USE_SHADOW
# endif
# define CUSTOM_SYS_AUTH_PASSWD 1
#endif
#if defined(HAVE_LIBIAF) && defined(HAVE_SET_ID) && !defined(HAVE_SECUREWARE)
# define CUSTOM_SYS_AUTH_PASSWD 1
#endif
#if defined(HAVE_LIBIAF) && defined(HAVE_SET_ID) && !defined(BROKEN_LIBIAF)
# define USE_LIBIAF
#endif
/* HP-UX 11.11 */
#ifdef BTMP_FILE
# define _PATH_BTMP BTMP_FILE
#endif
#if defined(USE_BTMP) && defined(_PATH_BTMP)
# define CUSTOM_FAILED_LOGIN
#endif
/** end of login recorder definitions */
#ifdef BROKEN_GETGROUPS
# define getgroups(a,b) ((a)==0 && (b)==NULL ? NGROUPS_MAX : getgroups((a),(b)))
#endif
-#if defined(HAVE_MMAP) && defined(BROKEN_MMAP)
-# undef HAVE_MMAP
-#endif
-
#ifndef IOV_MAX
# if defined(_XOPEN_IOV_MAX)
# define IOV_MAX _XOPEN_IOV_MAX
# elif defined(DEF_IOV_MAX)
# define IOV_MAX DEF_IOV_MAX
# else
# define IOV_MAX 16
# endif
#endif
#ifndef EWOULDBLOCK
# define EWOULDBLOCK EAGAIN
#endif
#ifndef INET6_ADDRSTRLEN /* for non IPv6 machines */
#define INET6_ADDRSTRLEN 46
#endif
#ifndef SSH_IOBUFSZ
# define SSH_IOBUFSZ 8192
#endif
/*
* We want functions in openbsd-compat, if enabled, to override system ones.
* We no-op out the weak symbol definition rather than remove it to reduce
* future sync problems. Some compilers (eg Unixware) do not allow an
* empty statement, so we use a bogus function declaration.
*/
#define DEF_WEAK(x) void __ssh_compat_weak_##x(void)
/*
* Platforms that have arc4random_uniform() and not arc4random_stir()
* shouldn't need the latter.
*/
#if defined(HAVE_ARC4RANDOM) && defined(HAVE_ARC4RANDOM_UNIFORM) && \
!defined(HAVE_ARC4RANDOM_STIR)
# define arc4random_stir()
#endif
#ifndef HAVE_VA_COPY
# ifdef HAVE___VA_COPY
# define va_copy(dest, src) __va_copy(dest, src)
# else
# define va_copy(dest, src) (dest) = (src)
# endif
#endif
#ifndef __predict_true
# if defined(__GNUC__) && \
((__GNUC__ > (2)) || (__GNUC__ == (2) && __GNUC_MINOR__ >= (96)))
# define __predict_true(exp) __builtin_expect(((exp) != 0), 1)
# define __predict_false(exp) __builtin_expect(((exp) != 0), 0)
# else
# define __predict_true(exp) ((exp) != 0)
# define __predict_false(exp) ((exp) != 0)
# endif /* gcc version */
#endif /* __predict_true */
#if defined(HAVE_GLOB_H) && defined(GLOB_HAS_ALTDIRFUNC) && \
defined(GLOB_HAS_GL_MATCHC) && defined(GLOB_HAS_GL_STATV) && \
defined(HAVE_DECL_GLOB_NOMATCH) && HAVE_DECL_GLOB_NOMATCH != 0 && \
!defined(BROKEN_GLOB)
# define USE_SYSTEM_GLOB
#endif
#endif /* _DEFINES_H */
diff --git a/hostfile.c b/hostfile.c
index a4a355972522..936d8c9be8a2 100644
--- a/hostfile.c
+++ b/hostfile.c
@@ -1,832 +1,884 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: hostfile.c,v 1.79 2020/03/06 18:25:12 markus Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: hostfile.c,v 1.82 2020/06/26 05:42:16 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
* Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
* All rights reserved
* Functions for manipulating the known hosts files.
*
* As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
* can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this
* software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
* incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
* called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
*
*
* Copyright (c) 1999, 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
* Copyright (c) 1999 Niels Provos. All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
* OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
* IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
* INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
* NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
* DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
* THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
* (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
* THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
*/
#include "includes.h"
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/stat.h>
#include <netinet/in.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include <resolv.h>
#include <stdarg.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include "xmalloc.h"
#include "match.h"
#include "sshkey.h"
#include "hostfile.h"
#include "log.h"
#include "misc.h"
+#include "pathnames.h"
#include "ssherr.h"
#include "digest.h"
#include "hmac.h"
struct hostkeys {
struct hostkey_entry *entries;
u_int num_entries;
};
/* XXX hmac is too easy to dictionary attack; use bcrypt? */
static int
extract_salt(const char *s, u_int l, u_char *salt, size_t salt_len)
{
char *p, *b64salt;
u_int b64len;
int ret;
if (l < sizeof(HASH_MAGIC) - 1) {
debug2("extract_salt: string too short");
return (-1);
}
if (strncmp(s, HASH_MAGIC, sizeof(HASH_MAGIC) - 1) != 0) {
debug2("extract_salt: invalid magic identifier");
return (-1);
}
s += sizeof(HASH_MAGIC) - 1;
l -= sizeof(HASH_MAGIC) - 1;
if ((p = memchr(s, HASH_DELIM, l)) == NULL) {
debug2("extract_salt: missing salt termination character");
return (-1);
}
b64len = p - s;
/* Sanity check */
if (b64len == 0 || b64len > 1024) {
debug2("extract_salt: bad encoded salt length %u", b64len);
return (-1);
}
b64salt = xmalloc(1 + b64len);
memcpy(b64salt, s, b64len);
b64salt[b64len] = '\0';
ret = __b64_pton(b64salt, salt, salt_len);
free(b64salt);
if (ret == -1) {
debug2("extract_salt: salt decode error");
return (-1);
}
if (ret != (int)ssh_hmac_bytes(SSH_DIGEST_SHA1)) {
debug2("extract_salt: expected salt len %zd, got %d",
ssh_hmac_bytes(SSH_DIGEST_SHA1), ret);
return (-1);
}
return (0);
}
char *
host_hash(const char *host, const char *name_from_hostfile, u_int src_len)
{
struct ssh_hmac_ctx *ctx;
u_char salt[256], result[256];
char uu_salt[512], uu_result[512];
static char encoded[1024];
u_int len;
len = ssh_digest_bytes(SSH_DIGEST_SHA1);
if (name_from_hostfile == NULL) {
/* Create new salt */
arc4random_buf(salt, len);
} else {
/* Extract salt from known host entry */
if (extract_salt(name_from_hostfile, src_len, salt,
sizeof(salt)) == -1)
return (NULL);
}
if ((ctx = ssh_hmac_start(SSH_DIGEST_SHA1)) == NULL ||
ssh_hmac_init(ctx, salt, len) < 0 ||
ssh_hmac_update(ctx, host, strlen(host)) < 0 ||
ssh_hmac_final(ctx, result, sizeof(result)))
fatal("%s: ssh_hmac failed", __func__);
ssh_hmac_free(ctx);
if (__b64_ntop(salt, len, uu_salt, sizeof(uu_salt)) == -1 ||
__b64_ntop(result, len, uu_result, sizeof(uu_result)) == -1)
fatal("%s: __b64_ntop failed", __func__);
snprintf(encoded, sizeof(encoded), "%s%s%c%s", HASH_MAGIC, uu_salt,
HASH_DELIM, uu_result);
return (encoded);
}
/*
* Parses an RSA (number of bits, e, n) or DSA key from a string. Moves the
* pointer over the key. Skips any whitespace at the beginning and at end.
*/
int
hostfile_read_key(char **cpp, u_int *bitsp, struct sshkey *ret)
{
char *cp;
/* Skip leading whitespace. */
for (cp = *cpp; *cp == ' ' || *cp == '\t'; cp++)
;
if (sshkey_read(ret, &cp) != 0)
return 0;
/* Skip trailing whitespace. */
for (; *cp == ' ' || *cp == '\t'; cp++)
;
/* Return results. */
*cpp = cp;
if (bitsp != NULL)
*bitsp = sshkey_size(ret);
return 1;
}
static HostkeyMarker
check_markers(char **cpp)
{
char marker[32], *sp, *cp = *cpp;
int ret = MRK_NONE;
while (*cp == '@') {
/* Only one marker is allowed */
if (ret != MRK_NONE)
return MRK_ERROR;
/* Markers are terminated by whitespace */
if ((sp = strchr(cp, ' ')) == NULL &&
(sp = strchr(cp, '\t')) == NULL)
return MRK_ERROR;
/* Extract marker for comparison */
if (sp <= cp + 1 || sp >= cp + sizeof(marker))
return MRK_ERROR;
memcpy(marker, cp, sp - cp);
marker[sp - cp] = '\0';
if (strcmp(marker, CA_MARKER) == 0)
ret = MRK_CA;
else if (strcmp(marker, REVOKE_MARKER) == 0)
ret = MRK_REVOKE;
else
return MRK_ERROR;
/* Skip past marker and any whitespace that follows it */
cp = sp;
for (; *cp == ' ' || *cp == '\t'; cp++)
;
}
*cpp = cp;
return ret;
}
struct hostkeys *
init_hostkeys(void)
{
struct hostkeys *ret = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*ret));
ret->entries = NULL;
return ret;
}
struct load_callback_ctx {
const char *host;
u_long num_loaded;
struct hostkeys *hostkeys;
};
static int
record_hostkey(struct hostkey_foreach_line *l, void *_ctx)
{
struct load_callback_ctx *ctx = (struct load_callback_ctx *)_ctx;
struct hostkeys *hostkeys = ctx->hostkeys;
struct hostkey_entry *tmp;
if (l->status == HKF_STATUS_INVALID) {
/* XXX make this verbose() in the future */
debug("%s:%ld: parse error in hostkeys file",
l->path, l->linenum);
return 0;
}
debug3("%s: found %skey type %s in file %s:%lu", __func__,
l->marker == MRK_NONE ? "" :
(l->marker == MRK_CA ? "ca " : "revoked "),
sshkey_type(l->key), l->path, l->linenum);
if ((tmp = recallocarray(hostkeys->entries, hostkeys->num_entries,
hostkeys->num_entries + 1, sizeof(*hostkeys->entries))) == NULL)
return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
hostkeys->entries = tmp;
hostkeys->entries[hostkeys->num_entries].host = xstrdup(ctx->host);
hostkeys->entries[hostkeys->num_entries].file = xstrdup(l->path);
hostkeys->entries[hostkeys->num_entries].line = l->linenum;
hostkeys->entries[hostkeys->num_entries].key = l->key;
l->key = NULL; /* steal it */
hostkeys->entries[hostkeys->num_entries].marker = l->marker;
hostkeys->num_entries++;
ctx->num_loaded++;
return 0;
}
void
load_hostkeys(struct hostkeys *hostkeys, const char *host, const char *path)
{
int r;
struct load_callback_ctx ctx;
ctx.host = host;
ctx.num_loaded = 0;
ctx.hostkeys = hostkeys;
if ((r = hostkeys_foreach(path, record_hostkey, &ctx, host, NULL,
HKF_WANT_MATCH|HKF_WANT_PARSE_KEY)) != 0) {
if (r != SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR && errno != ENOENT)
debug("%s: hostkeys_foreach failed for %s: %s",
__func__, path, ssh_err(r));
}
if (ctx.num_loaded != 0)
debug3("%s: loaded %lu keys from %s", __func__,
ctx.num_loaded, host);
}
void
free_hostkeys(struct hostkeys *hostkeys)
{
u_int i;
for (i = 0; i < hostkeys->num_entries; i++) {
free(hostkeys->entries[i].host);
free(hostkeys->entries[i].file);
sshkey_free(hostkeys->entries[i].key);
explicit_bzero(hostkeys->entries + i, sizeof(*hostkeys->entries));
}
free(hostkeys->entries);
freezero(hostkeys, sizeof(*hostkeys));
}
static int
check_key_not_revoked(struct hostkeys *hostkeys, struct sshkey *k)
{
int is_cert = sshkey_is_cert(k);
u_int i;
for (i = 0; i < hostkeys->num_entries; i++) {
if (hostkeys->entries[i].marker != MRK_REVOKE)
continue;
if (sshkey_equal_public(k, hostkeys->entries[i].key))
return -1;
if (is_cert && k != NULL &&
sshkey_equal_public(k->cert->signature_key,
hostkeys->entries[i].key))
return -1;
}
return 0;
}
/*
* Match keys against a specified key, or look one up by key type.
*
* If looking for a keytype (key == NULL) and one is found then return
* HOST_FOUND, otherwise HOST_NEW.
*
* If looking for a key (key != NULL):
* 1. If the key is a cert and a matching CA is found, return HOST_OK
* 2. If the key is not a cert and a matching key is found, return HOST_OK
* 3. If no key matches but a key with a different type is found, then
* return HOST_CHANGED
* 4. If no matching keys are found, then return HOST_NEW.
*
* Finally, check any found key is not revoked.
*/
static HostStatus
check_hostkeys_by_key_or_type(struct hostkeys *hostkeys,
struct sshkey *k, int keytype, const struct hostkey_entry **found)
{
u_int i;
HostStatus end_return = HOST_NEW;
int want_cert = sshkey_is_cert(k);
HostkeyMarker want_marker = want_cert ? MRK_CA : MRK_NONE;
if (found != NULL)
*found = NULL;
for (i = 0; i < hostkeys->num_entries; i++) {
if (hostkeys->entries[i].marker != want_marker)
continue;
if (k == NULL) {
if (hostkeys->entries[i].key->type != keytype)
continue;
end_return = HOST_FOUND;
if (found != NULL)
*found = hostkeys->entries + i;
k = hostkeys->entries[i].key;
break;
}
if (want_cert) {
if (sshkey_equal_public(k->cert->signature_key,
hostkeys->entries[i].key)) {
/* A matching CA exists */
end_return = HOST_OK;
if (found != NULL)
*found = hostkeys->entries + i;
break;
}
} else {
if (sshkey_equal(k, hostkeys->entries[i].key)) {
end_return = HOST_OK;
if (found != NULL)
*found = hostkeys->entries + i;
break;
}
/* A non-maching key exists */
end_return = HOST_CHANGED;
if (found != NULL)
*found = hostkeys->entries + i;
}
}
if (check_key_not_revoked(hostkeys, k) != 0) {
end_return = HOST_REVOKED;
if (found != NULL)
*found = NULL;
}
return end_return;
}
HostStatus
check_key_in_hostkeys(struct hostkeys *hostkeys, struct sshkey *key,
const struct hostkey_entry **found)
{
if (key == NULL)
fatal("no key to look up");
return check_hostkeys_by_key_or_type(hostkeys, key, 0, found);
}
int
lookup_key_in_hostkeys_by_type(struct hostkeys *hostkeys, int keytype,
const struct hostkey_entry **found)
{
return (check_hostkeys_by_key_or_type(hostkeys, NULL, keytype,
found) == HOST_FOUND);
}
+int
+lookup_marker_in_hostkeys(struct hostkeys *hostkeys, int want_marker)
+{
+ u_int i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < hostkeys->num_entries; i++) {
+ if (hostkeys->entries[i].marker == (HostkeyMarker)want_marker)
+ return 1;
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
static int
write_host_entry(FILE *f, const char *host, const char *ip,
const struct sshkey *key, int store_hash)
{
int r, success = 0;
char *hashed_host = NULL, *lhost;
lhost = xstrdup(host);
lowercase(lhost);
if (store_hash) {
if ((hashed_host = host_hash(lhost, NULL, 0)) == NULL) {
error("%s: host_hash failed", __func__);
free(lhost);
return 0;
}
fprintf(f, "%s ", hashed_host);
} else if (ip != NULL)
fprintf(f, "%s,%s ", lhost, ip);
else {
fprintf(f, "%s ", lhost);
}
free(lhost);
if ((r = sshkey_write(key, f)) == 0)
success = 1;
else
error("%s: sshkey_write failed: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
fputc('\n', f);
return success;
}
+/*
+ * Create user ~/.ssh directory if it doesn't exist and we want to write to it.
+ * If notify is set, a message will be emitted if the directory is created.
+ */
+void
+hostfile_create_user_ssh_dir(const char *filename, int notify)
+{
+ char *dotsshdir = NULL, *p;
+ size_t len;
+ struct stat st;
+
+ if ((p = strrchr(filename, '/')) == NULL)
+ return;
+ len = p - filename;
+ dotsshdir = tilde_expand_filename("~/" _PATH_SSH_USER_DIR, getuid());
+ if (strlen(dotsshdir) > len || strncmp(filename, dotsshdir, len) != 0)
+ goto out; /* not ~/.ssh prefixed */
+ if (stat(dotsshdir, &st) == 0)
+ goto out; /* dir already exists */
+ else if (errno != ENOENT)
+ error("Could not stat %s: %s", dotsshdir, strerror(errno));
+ else {
+#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
+ ssh_selinux_setfscreatecon(dotsshdir);
+#endif
+ if (mkdir(dotsshdir, 0700) == -1)
+ error("Could not create directory '%.200s' (%s).",
+ dotsshdir, strerror(errno));
+ else if (notify)
+ logit("Created directory '%s'.", dotsshdir);
+#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
+ ssh_selinux_setfscreatecon(NULL);
+#endif
+ }
+ out:
+ free(dotsshdir);
+}
+
/*
* Appends an entry to the host file. Returns false if the entry could not
* be appended.
*/
int
add_host_to_hostfile(const char *filename, const char *host,
const struct sshkey *key, int store_hash)
{
FILE *f;
int success;
if (key == NULL)
return 1; /* XXX ? */
+ hostfile_create_user_ssh_dir(filename, 0);
f = fopen(filename, "a");
if (!f)
return 0;
success = write_host_entry(f, host, NULL, key, store_hash);
fclose(f);
return success;
}
struct host_delete_ctx {
FILE *out;
int quiet;
const char *host;
int *skip_keys; /* XXX split for host/ip? might want to ensure both */
struct sshkey * const *keys;
size_t nkeys;
int modified;
};
static int
host_delete(struct hostkey_foreach_line *l, void *_ctx)
{
struct host_delete_ctx *ctx = (struct host_delete_ctx *)_ctx;
int loglevel = ctx->quiet ? SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG1 : SYSLOG_LEVEL_VERBOSE;
size_t i;
if (l->status == HKF_STATUS_MATCHED) {
if (l->marker != MRK_NONE) {
/* Don't remove CA and revocation lines */
fprintf(ctx->out, "%s\n", l->line);
return 0;
}
/*
* If this line contains one of the keys that we will be
* adding later, then don't change it and mark the key for
* skipping.
*/
for (i = 0; i < ctx->nkeys; i++) {
if (sshkey_equal(ctx->keys[i], l->key)) {
ctx->skip_keys[i] = 1;
fprintf(ctx->out, "%s\n", l->line);
debug3("%s: %s key already at %s:%ld", __func__,
sshkey_type(l->key), l->path, l->linenum);
return 0;
}
}
/*
* Hostname matches and has no CA/revoke marker, delete it
* by *not* writing the line to ctx->out.
*/
do_log2(loglevel, "%s%s%s:%ld: Removed %s key for host %s",
ctx->quiet ? __func__ : "", ctx->quiet ? ": " : "",
l->path, l->linenum, sshkey_type(l->key), ctx->host);
ctx->modified = 1;
return 0;
}
/* Retain non-matching hosts and invalid lines when deleting */
if (l->status == HKF_STATUS_INVALID) {
do_log2(loglevel, "%s%s%s:%ld: invalid known_hosts entry",
ctx->quiet ? __func__ : "", ctx->quiet ? ": " : "",
l->path, l->linenum);
}
fprintf(ctx->out, "%s\n", l->line);
return 0;
}
int
hostfile_replace_entries(const char *filename, const char *host, const char *ip,
struct sshkey **keys, size_t nkeys, int store_hash, int quiet, int hash_alg)
{
int r, fd, oerrno = 0;
int loglevel = quiet ? SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG1 : SYSLOG_LEVEL_VERBOSE;
struct host_delete_ctx ctx;
char *fp, *temp = NULL, *back = NULL;
mode_t omask;
size_t i;
omask = umask(077);
memset(&ctx, 0, sizeof(ctx));
ctx.host = host;
ctx.quiet = quiet;
if ((ctx.skip_keys = calloc(nkeys, sizeof(*ctx.skip_keys))) == NULL)
return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
ctx.keys = keys;
ctx.nkeys = nkeys;
ctx.modified = 0;
/*
* Prepare temporary file for in-place deletion.
*/
if ((r = asprintf(&temp, "%s.XXXXXXXXXXX", filename)) == -1 ||
(r = asprintf(&back, "%s.old", filename)) == -1) {
r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
goto fail;
}
if ((fd = mkstemp(temp)) == -1) {
oerrno = errno;
error("%s: mkstemp: %s", __func__, strerror(oerrno));
r = SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR;
goto fail;
}
if ((ctx.out = fdopen(fd, "w")) == NULL) {
oerrno = errno;
close(fd);
error("%s: fdopen: %s", __func__, strerror(oerrno));
r = SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR;
goto fail;
}
/* Remove all entries for the specified host from the file */
if ((r = hostkeys_foreach(filename, host_delete, &ctx, host, ip,
HKF_WANT_PARSE_KEY)) != 0) {
oerrno = errno;
error("%s: hostkeys_foreach failed: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
goto fail;
}
/* Add the requested keys */
for (i = 0; i < nkeys; i++) {
if (ctx.skip_keys[i])
continue;
if ((fp = sshkey_fingerprint(keys[i], hash_alg,
SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL) {
r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
goto fail;
}
do_log2(loglevel, "%s%sAdding new key for %s to %s: %s %s",
quiet ? __func__ : "", quiet ? ": " : "", host, filename,
sshkey_ssh_name(keys[i]), fp);
free(fp);
if (!write_host_entry(ctx.out, host, ip, keys[i], store_hash)) {
r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
goto fail;
}
ctx.modified = 1;
}
fclose(ctx.out);
ctx.out = NULL;
if (ctx.modified) {
/* Backup the original file and replace it with the temporary */
if (unlink(back) == -1 && errno != ENOENT) {
oerrno = errno;
error("%s: unlink %.100s: %s", __func__,
back, strerror(errno));
r = SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR;
goto fail;
}
if (link(filename, back) == -1) {
oerrno = errno;
error("%s: link %.100s to %.100s: %s", __func__,
filename, back, strerror(errno));
r = SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR;
goto fail;
}
if (rename(temp, filename) == -1) {
oerrno = errno;
error("%s: rename \"%s\" to \"%s\": %s", __func__,
temp, filename, strerror(errno));
r = SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR;
goto fail;
}
} else {
/* No changes made; just delete the temporary file */
if (unlink(temp) != 0)
error("%s: unlink \"%s\": %s", __func__,
temp, strerror(errno));
}
/* success */
r = 0;
fail:
if (temp != NULL && r != 0)
unlink(temp);
free(temp);
free(back);
if (ctx.out != NULL)
fclose(ctx.out);
free(ctx.skip_keys);
umask(omask);
if (r == SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR)
errno = oerrno;
return r;
}
static int
match_maybe_hashed(const char *host, const char *names, int *was_hashed)
{
int hashed = *names == HASH_DELIM;
const char *hashed_host;
size_t nlen = strlen(names);
if (was_hashed != NULL)
*was_hashed = hashed;
if (hashed) {
if ((hashed_host = host_hash(host, names, nlen)) == NULL)
return -1;
return nlen == strlen(hashed_host) &&
strncmp(hashed_host, names, nlen) == 0;
}
return match_hostname(host, names) == 1;
}
int
hostkeys_foreach(const char *path, hostkeys_foreach_fn *callback, void *ctx,
const char *host, const char *ip, u_int options)
{
FILE *f;
char *line = NULL, ktype[128];
u_long linenum = 0;
char *cp, *cp2;
u_int kbits;
int hashed;
int s, r = 0;
struct hostkey_foreach_line lineinfo;
size_t linesize = 0, l;
memset(&lineinfo, 0, sizeof(lineinfo));
if (host == NULL && (options & HKF_WANT_MATCH) != 0)
return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
if ((f = fopen(path, "r")) == NULL)
return SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR;
debug3("%s: reading file \"%s\"", __func__, path);
while (getline(&line, &linesize, f) != -1) {
linenum++;
line[strcspn(line, "\n")] = '\0';
free(lineinfo.line);
sshkey_free(lineinfo.key);
memset(&lineinfo, 0, sizeof(lineinfo));
lineinfo.path = path;
lineinfo.linenum = linenum;
lineinfo.line = xstrdup(line);
lineinfo.marker = MRK_NONE;
lineinfo.status = HKF_STATUS_OK;
lineinfo.keytype = KEY_UNSPEC;
/* Skip any leading whitespace, comments and empty lines. */
for (cp = line; *cp == ' ' || *cp == '\t'; cp++)
;
if (!*cp || *cp == '#' || *cp == '\n') {
if ((options & HKF_WANT_MATCH) == 0) {
lineinfo.status = HKF_STATUS_COMMENT;
if ((r = callback(&lineinfo, ctx)) != 0)
break;
}
continue;
}
if ((lineinfo.marker = check_markers(&cp)) == MRK_ERROR) {
verbose("%s: invalid marker at %s:%lu",
__func__, path, linenum);
if ((options & HKF_WANT_MATCH) == 0)
goto bad;
continue;
}
/* Find the end of the host name portion. */
for (cp2 = cp; *cp2 && *cp2 != ' ' && *cp2 != '\t'; cp2++)
;
lineinfo.hosts = cp;
*cp2++ = '\0';
/* Check if the host name matches. */
if (host != NULL) {
if ((s = match_maybe_hashed(host, lineinfo.hosts,
&hashed)) == -1) {
debug2("%s: %s:%ld: bad host hash \"%.32s\"",
__func__, path, linenum, lineinfo.hosts);
goto bad;
}
if (s == 1) {
lineinfo.status = HKF_STATUS_MATCHED;
lineinfo.match |= HKF_MATCH_HOST |
(hashed ? HKF_MATCH_HOST_HASHED : 0);
}
/* Try matching IP address if supplied */
if (ip != NULL) {
if ((s = match_maybe_hashed(ip, lineinfo.hosts,
&hashed)) == -1) {
debug2("%s: %s:%ld: bad ip hash "
"\"%.32s\"", __func__, path,
linenum, lineinfo.hosts);
goto bad;
}
if (s == 1) {
lineinfo.status = HKF_STATUS_MATCHED;
lineinfo.match |= HKF_MATCH_IP |
(hashed ? HKF_MATCH_IP_HASHED : 0);
}
}
/*
* Skip this line if host matching requested and
* neither host nor address matched.
*/
if ((options & HKF_WANT_MATCH) != 0 &&
lineinfo.status != HKF_STATUS_MATCHED)
continue;
}
/* Got a match. Skip host name and any following whitespace */
for (; *cp2 == ' ' || *cp2 == '\t'; cp2++)
;
if (*cp2 == '\0' || *cp2 == '#') {
debug2("%s:%ld: truncated before key type",
path, linenum);
goto bad;
}
lineinfo.rawkey = cp = cp2;
if ((options & HKF_WANT_PARSE_KEY) != 0) {
/*
* Extract the key from the line. This will skip
* any leading whitespace. Ignore badly formatted
* lines.
*/
if ((lineinfo.key = sshkey_new(KEY_UNSPEC)) == NULL) {
error("%s: sshkey_new failed", __func__);
r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
break;
}
if (!hostfile_read_key(&cp, &kbits, lineinfo.key)) {
goto bad;
}
lineinfo.keytype = lineinfo.key->type;
lineinfo.comment = cp;
} else {
/* Extract and parse key type */
l = strcspn(lineinfo.rawkey, " \t");
if (l <= 1 || l >= sizeof(ktype) ||
lineinfo.rawkey[l] == '\0')
goto bad;
memcpy(ktype, lineinfo.rawkey, l);
ktype[l] = '\0';
lineinfo.keytype = sshkey_type_from_name(ktype);
/*
* Assume legacy RSA1 if the first component is a short
* decimal number.
*/
if (lineinfo.keytype == KEY_UNSPEC && l < 8 &&
strspn(ktype, "0123456789") == l)
goto bad;
/*
* Check that something other than whitespace follows
* the key type. This won't catch all corruption, but
* it does catch trivial truncation.
*/
cp2 += l; /* Skip past key type */
for (; *cp2 == ' ' || *cp2 == '\t'; cp2++)
;
if (*cp2 == '\0' || *cp2 == '#') {
debug2("%s:%ld: truncated after key type",
path, linenum);
lineinfo.keytype = KEY_UNSPEC;
}
if (lineinfo.keytype == KEY_UNSPEC) {
bad:
sshkey_free(lineinfo.key);
lineinfo.key = NULL;
lineinfo.status = HKF_STATUS_INVALID;
if ((r = callback(&lineinfo, ctx)) != 0)
break;
continue;
}
}
if ((r = callback(&lineinfo, ctx)) != 0)
break;
}
sshkey_free(lineinfo.key);
free(lineinfo.line);
free(line);
fclose(f);
return r;
}
diff --git a/hostfile.h b/hostfile.h
index bd2104373f82..de8b677e38c0 100644
--- a/hostfile.h
+++ b/hostfile.h
@@ -1,108 +1,111 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: hostfile.h,v 1.24 2015/02/16 22:08:57 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: hostfile.h,v 1.26 2020/06/26 05:02:03 dtucker Exp $ */
/*
* Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
* Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
* All rights reserved
*
* As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
* can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this
* software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
* incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
* called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
*/
#ifndef HOSTFILE_H
#define HOSTFILE_H
typedef enum {
HOST_OK, HOST_NEW, HOST_CHANGED, HOST_REVOKED, HOST_FOUND
} HostStatus;
typedef enum {
MRK_ERROR, MRK_NONE, MRK_REVOKE, MRK_CA
} HostkeyMarker;
struct hostkey_entry {
char *host;
char *file;
u_long line;
struct sshkey *key;
HostkeyMarker marker;
};
struct hostkeys;
struct hostkeys *init_hostkeys(void);
void load_hostkeys(struct hostkeys *, const char *, const char *);
void free_hostkeys(struct hostkeys *);
HostStatus check_key_in_hostkeys(struct hostkeys *, struct sshkey *,
const struct hostkey_entry **);
int lookup_key_in_hostkeys_by_type(struct hostkeys *, int,
const struct hostkey_entry **);
+int lookup_marker_in_hostkeys(struct hostkeys *, int);
int hostfile_read_key(char **, u_int *, struct sshkey *);
int add_host_to_hostfile(const char *, const char *,
const struct sshkey *, int);
int hostfile_replace_entries(const char *filename,
const char *host, const char *ip, struct sshkey **keys, size_t nkeys,
int store_hash, int quiet, int hash_alg);
#define HASH_MAGIC "|1|"
#define HASH_DELIM '|'
#define CA_MARKER "@cert-authority"
#define REVOKE_MARKER "@revoked"
char *host_hash(const char *, const char *, u_int);
/*
* Iterate through a hostkeys file, optionally parsing keys and matching
* hostnames. Allows access to the raw keyfile lines to allow
* streaming edits to the file to take place.
*/
#define HKF_WANT_MATCH (1) /* return only matching hosts/addrs */
#define HKF_WANT_PARSE_KEY (1<<1) /* need key parsed */
#define HKF_STATUS_OK 0 /* Line parsed, didn't match host */
#define HKF_STATUS_INVALID 1 /* line had parse error */
#define HKF_STATUS_COMMENT 2 /* valid line contained no key */
#define HKF_STATUS_MATCHED 3 /* hostname or IP matched */
#define HKF_MATCH_HOST (1) /* hostname matched */
#define HKF_MATCH_IP (1<<1) /* address matched */
#define HKF_MATCH_HOST_HASHED (1<<2) /* hostname was hashed */
#define HKF_MATCH_IP_HASHED (1<<3) /* address was hashed */
/* XXX HKF_MATCH_KEY_TYPE? */
/*
* The callback function receives this as an argument for each matching
* hostkey line. The callback may "steal" the 'key' field by setting it to NULL.
* If a parse error occurred, then "hosts" and subsequent options may be NULL.
*/
struct hostkey_foreach_line {
const char *path; /* Path of file */
u_long linenum; /* Line number */
u_int status; /* One of HKF_STATUS_* */
u_int match; /* Zero or more of HKF_MATCH_* OR'd together */
char *line; /* Entire key line; mutable by callback */
int marker; /* CA/revocation markers; indicated by MRK_* value */
const char *hosts; /* Raw hosts text, may be hashed or list multiple */
const char *rawkey; /* Text of key and any comment following it */
int keytype; /* Type of key; KEY_UNSPEC for invalid/comment lines */
struct sshkey *key; /* Key, if parsed ok and HKF_WANT_MATCH_HOST set */
const char *comment; /* Any comment following the key */
};
/*
* Callback fires for each line (or matching line if a HKF_WANT_* option
* is set). The foreach loop will terminate if the callback returns a non-
* zero exit status.
*/
typedef int hostkeys_foreach_fn(struct hostkey_foreach_line *l, void *ctx);
/* Iterate over a hostkeys file */
int hostkeys_foreach(const char *path, hostkeys_foreach_fn *callback, void *ctx,
const char *host, const char *ip, u_int options);
+void hostfile_create_user_ssh_dir(const char *, int);
+
#endif
diff --git a/kex.c b/kex.c
index 09c7258e05bd..aecb9394d805 100644
--- a/kex.c
+++ b/kex.c
@@ -1,1378 +1,1378 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: kex.c,v 1.158 2020/03/13 04:01:56 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: kex.c,v 1.159 2020/07/05 23:59:45 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 2000, 2001 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
* OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
* IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
* INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
* NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
* DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
* THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
* (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
* THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
*/
#include "includes.h"
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include <signal.h>
#include <stdarg.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#ifdef HAVE_POLL_H
#include <poll.h>
#endif
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
#include <openssl/crypto.h>
#include <openssl/dh.h>
#endif
#include "ssh.h"
#include "ssh2.h"
#include "atomicio.h"
#include "version.h"
#include "packet.h"
#include "compat.h"
#include "cipher.h"
#include "sshkey.h"
#include "kex.h"
#include "log.h"
#include "mac.h"
#include "match.h"
#include "misc.h"
#include "dispatch.h"
#include "monitor.h"
#include "ssherr.h"
#include "sshbuf.h"
#include "digest.h"
/* prototype */
static int kex_choose_conf(struct ssh *);
static int kex_input_newkeys(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *);
static const char *proposal_names[PROPOSAL_MAX] = {
"KEX algorithms",
"host key algorithms",
"ciphers ctos",
"ciphers stoc",
"MACs ctos",
"MACs stoc",
"compression ctos",
"compression stoc",
"languages ctos",
"languages stoc",
};
struct kexalg {
char *name;
u_int type;
int ec_nid;
int hash_alg;
};
static const struct kexalg kexalgs[] = {
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
{ KEX_DH1, KEX_DH_GRP1_SHA1, 0, SSH_DIGEST_SHA1 },
{ KEX_DH14_SHA1, KEX_DH_GRP14_SHA1, 0, SSH_DIGEST_SHA1 },
{ KEX_DH14_SHA256, KEX_DH_GRP14_SHA256, 0, SSH_DIGEST_SHA256 },
{ KEX_DH16_SHA512, KEX_DH_GRP16_SHA512, 0, SSH_DIGEST_SHA512 },
{ KEX_DH18_SHA512, KEX_DH_GRP18_SHA512, 0, SSH_DIGEST_SHA512 },
{ KEX_DHGEX_SHA1, KEX_DH_GEX_SHA1, 0, SSH_DIGEST_SHA1 },
#ifdef HAVE_EVP_SHA256
{ KEX_DHGEX_SHA256, KEX_DH_GEX_SHA256, 0, SSH_DIGEST_SHA256 },
#endif /* HAVE_EVP_SHA256 */
#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
{ KEX_ECDH_SHA2_NISTP256, KEX_ECDH_SHA2,
NID_X9_62_prime256v1, SSH_DIGEST_SHA256 },
{ KEX_ECDH_SHA2_NISTP384, KEX_ECDH_SHA2, NID_secp384r1,
SSH_DIGEST_SHA384 },
# ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_NISTP521
{ KEX_ECDH_SHA2_NISTP521, KEX_ECDH_SHA2, NID_secp521r1,
SSH_DIGEST_SHA512 },
# endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_NISTP521 */
#endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */
#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
#if defined(HAVE_EVP_SHA256) || !defined(WITH_OPENSSL)
{ KEX_CURVE25519_SHA256, KEX_C25519_SHA256, 0, SSH_DIGEST_SHA256 },
{ KEX_CURVE25519_SHA256_OLD, KEX_C25519_SHA256, 0, SSH_DIGEST_SHA256 },
{ KEX_SNTRUP4591761X25519_SHA512, KEX_KEM_SNTRUP4591761X25519_SHA512, 0,
SSH_DIGEST_SHA512 },
#endif /* HAVE_EVP_SHA256 || !WITH_OPENSSL */
{ NULL, 0, -1, -1},
};
char *
kex_alg_list(char sep)
{
char *ret = NULL, *tmp;
size_t nlen, rlen = 0;
const struct kexalg *k;
for (k = kexalgs; k->name != NULL; k++) {
if (ret != NULL)
ret[rlen++] = sep;
nlen = strlen(k->name);
if ((tmp = realloc(ret, rlen + nlen + 2)) == NULL) {
free(ret);
return NULL;
}
ret = tmp;
memcpy(ret + rlen, k->name, nlen + 1);
rlen += nlen;
}
return ret;
}
static const struct kexalg *
kex_alg_by_name(const char *name)
{
const struct kexalg *k;
for (k = kexalgs; k->name != NULL; k++) {
if (strcmp(k->name, name) == 0)
return k;
}
return NULL;
}
/* Validate KEX method name list */
int
kex_names_valid(const char *names)
{
char *s, *cp, *p;
if (names == NULL || strcmp(names, "") == 0)
return 0;
if ((s = cp = strdup(names)) == NULL)
return 0;
for ((p = strsep(&cp, ",")); p && *p != '\0';
(p = strsep(&cp, ","))) {
if (kex_alg_by_name(p) == NULL) {
error("Unsupported KEX algorithm \"%.100s\"", p);
free(s);
return 0;
}
}
debug3("kex names ok: [%s]", names);
free(s);
return 1;
}
/*
* Concatenate algorithm names, avoiding duplicates in the process.
* Caller must free returned string.
*/
char *
kex_names_cat(const char *a, const char *b)
{
char *ret = NULL, *tmp = NULL, *cp, *p, *m;
size_t len;
if (a == NULL || *a == '\0')
return strdup(b);
if (b == NULL || *b == '\0')
return strdup(a);
if (strlen(b) > 1024*1024)
return NULL;
len = strlen(a) + strlen(b) + 2;
if ((tmp = cp = strdup(b)) == NULL ||
(ret = calloc(1, len)) == NULL) {
free(tmp);
return NULL;
}
strlcpy(ret, a, len);
for ((p = strsep(&cp, ",")); p && *p != '\0'; (p = strsep(&cp, ","))) {
if ((m = match_list(ret, p, NULL)) != NULL) {
free(m);
continue; /* Algorithm already present */
}
if (strlcat(ret, ",", len) >= len ||
strlcat(ret, p, len) >= len) {
free(tmp);
free(ret);
return NULL; /* Shouldn't happen */
}
}
free(tmp);
return ret;
}
/*
* Assemble a list of algorithms from a default list and a string from a
* configuration file. The user-provided string may begin with '+' to
* indicate that it should be appended to the default, '-' that the
* specified names should be removed, or '^' that they should be placed
* at the head.
*/
int
kex_assemble_names(char **listp, const char *def, const char *all)
{
char *cp, *tmp, *patterns;
char *list = NULL, *ret = NULL, *matching = NULL, *opatterns = NULL;
int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
if (listp == NULL || def == NULL || all == NULL)
return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
if (*listp == NULL || **listp == '\0') {
if ((*listp = strdup(def)) == NULL)
return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
return 0;
}
list = *listp;
*listp = NULL;
if (*list == '+') {
/* Append names to default list */
if ((tmp = kex_names_cat(def, list + 1)) == NULL) {
r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
goto fail;
}
free(list);
list = tmp;
} else if (*list == '-') {
/* Remove names from default list */
- if ((*listp = match_filter_blacklist(def, list + 1)) == NULL) {
+ if ((*listp = match_filter_denylist(def, list + 1)) == NULL) {
r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
goto fail;
}
free(list);
/* filtering has already been done */
return 0;
} else if (*list == '^') {
/* Place names at head of default list */
if ((tmp = kex_names_cat(list + 1, def)) == NULL) {
r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
goto fail;
}
free(list);
list = tmp;
} else {
/* Explicit list, overrides default - just use "list" as is */
}
/*
* The supplied names may be a pattern-list. For the -list case,
* the patterns are applied above. For the +list and explicit list
* cases we need to do it now.
*/
ret = NULL;
if ((patterns = opatterns = strdup(list)) == NULL) {
r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
goto fail;
}
/* Apply positive (i.e. non-negated) patterns from the list */
while ((cp = strsep(&patterns, ",")) != NULL) {
if (*cp == '!') {
/* negated matches are not supported here */
r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
goto fail;
}
free(matching);
- if ((matching = match_filter_whitelist(all, cp)) == NULL) {
+ if ((matching = match_filter_allowlist(all, cp)) == NULL) {
r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
goto fail;
}
if ((tmp = kex_names_cat(ret, matching)) == NULL) {
r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
goto fail;
}
free(ret);
ret = tmp;
}
if (ret == NULL || *ret == '\0') {
/* An empty name-list is an error */
/* XXX better error code? */
r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
goto fail;
}
/* success */
*listp = ret;
ret = NULL;
r = 0;
fail:
free(matching);
free(opatterns);
free(list);
free(ret);
return r;
}
/* put algorithm proposal into buffer */
int
kex_prop2buf(struct sshbuf *b, char *proposal[PROPOSAL_MAX])
{
u_int i;
int r;
sshbuf_reset(b);
/*
* add a dummy cookie, the cookie will be overwritten by
* kex_send_kexinit(), each time a kexinit is set
*/
for (i = 0; i < KEX_COOKIE_LEN; i++) {
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(b, 0)) != 0)
return r;
}
for (i = 0; i < PROPOSAL_MAX; i++) {
if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, proposal[i])) != 0)
return r;
}
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(b, 0)) != 0 || /* first_kex_packet_follows */
(r = sshbuf_put_u32(b, 0)) != 0) /* uint32 reserved */
return r;
return 0;
}
/* parse buffer and return algorithm proposal */
int
kex_buf2prop(struct sshbuf *raw, int *first_kex_follows, char ***propp)
{
struct sshbuf *b = NULL;
u_char v;
u_int i;
char **proposal = NULL;
int r;
*propp = NULL;
if ((proposal = calloc(PROPOSAL_MAX, sizeof(char *))) == NULL)
return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
if ((b = sshbuf_fromb(raw)) == NULL) {
r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
goto out;
}
if ((r = sshbuf_consume(b, KEX_COOKIE_LEN)) != 0) { /* skip cookie */
error("%s: consume cookie: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
goto out;
}
/* extract kex init proposal strings */
for (i = 0; i < PROPOSAL_MAX; i++) {
if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &(proposal[i]), NULL)) != 0) {
error("%s: parse proposal %u: %s", __func__,
i, ssh_err(r));
goto out;
}
debug2("%s: %s", proposal_names[i], proposal[i]);
}
/* first kex follows / reserved */
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(b, &v)) != 0 || /* first_kex_follows */
(r = sshbuf_get_u32(b, &i)) != 0) { /* reserved */
error("%s: parse: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
goto out;
}
if (first_kex_follows != NULL)
*first_kex_follows = v;
debug2("first_kex_follows %d ", v);
debug2("reserved %u ", i);
r = 0;
*propp = proposal;
out:
if (r != 0 && proposal != NULL)
kex_prop_free(proposal);
sshbuf_free(b);
return r;
}
void
kex_prop_free(char **proposal)
{
u_int i;
if (proposal == NULL)
return;
for (i = 0; i < PROPOSAL_MAX; i++)
free(proposal[i]);
free(proposal);
}
/* ARGSUSED */
static int
kex_protocol_error(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh)
{
int r;
error("kex protocol error: type %d seq %u", type, seq);
if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_UNIMPLEMENTED)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, seq)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0)
return r;
return 0;
}
static void
kex_reset_dispatch(struct ssh *ssh)
{
ssh_dispatch_range(ssh, SSH2_MSG_TRANSPORT_MIN,
SSH2_MSG_TRANSPORT_MAX, &kex_protocol_error);
}
static int
kex_send_ext_info(struct ssh *ssh)
{
int r;
char *algs;
debug("Sending SSH2_MSG_EXT_INFO");
if ((algs = sshkey_alg_list(0, 1, 1, ',')) == NULL)
return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
/* XXX filter algs list by allowed pubkey/hostbased types */
if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_EXT_INFO)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, 1)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, "server-sig-algs")) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, algs)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) {
error("%s: compose: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
goto out;
}
/* success */
r = 0;
out:
free(algs);
return r;
}
int
kex_send_newkeys(struct ssh *ssh)
{
int r;
kex_reset_dispatch(ssh);
if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0)
return r;
debug("SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS sent");
ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS, &kex_input_newkeys);
if (ssh->kex->ext_info_c && (ssh->kex->flags & KEX_INITIAL) != 0)
if ((r = kex_send_ext_info(ssh)) != 0)
return r;
debug("expecting SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS");
return 0;
}
int
kex_input_ext_info(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh)
{
struct kex *kex = ssh->kex;
u_int32_t i, ninfo;
char *name;
u_char *val;
size_t vlen;
int r;
debug("SSH2_MSG_EXT_INFO received");
ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_EXT_INFO, &kex_protocol_error);
if ((r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &ninfo)) != 0)
return r;
for (i = 0; i < ninfo; i++) {
if ((r = sshpkt_get_cstring(ssh, &name, NULL)) != 0)
return r;
if ((r = sshpkt_get_string(ssh, &val, &vlen)) != 0) {
free(name);
return r;
}
if (strcmp(name, "server-sig-algs") == 0) {
/* Ensure no \0 lurking in value */
if (memchr(val, '\0', vlen) != NULL) {
error("%s: nul byte in %s", __func__, name);
return SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
}
debug("%s: %s=<%s>", __func__, name, val);
kex->server_sig_algs = val;
val = NULL;
} else
debug("%s: %s (unrecognised)", __func__, name);
free(name);
free(val);
}
return sshpkt_get_end(ssh);
}
static int
kex_input_newkeys(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh)
{
struct kex *kex = ssh->kex;
int r;
debug("SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS received");
ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS, &kex_protocol_error);
ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT, &kex_input_kexinit);
if ((r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0)
return r;
if ((r = ssh_set_newkeys(ssh, MODE_IN)) != 0)
return r;
kex->done = 1;
kex->flags &= ~KEX_INITIAL;
sshbuf_reset(kex->peer);
/* sshbuf_reset(kex->my); */
kex->flags &= ~KEX_INIT_SENT;
free(kex->name);
kex->name = NULL;
return 0;
}
int
kex_send_kexinit(struct ssh *ssh)
{
u_char *cookie;
struct kex *kex = ssh->kex;
int r;
if (kex == NULL) {
error("%s: no hex", __func__);
return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
}
if (kex->flags & KEX_INIT_SENT)
return 0;
kex->done = 0;
/* generate a random cookie */
if (sshbuf_len(kex->my) < KEX_COOKIE_LEN) {
error("%s: bad kex length: %zu < %d", __func__,
sshbuf_len(kex->my), KEX_COOKIE_LEN);
return SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
}
if ((cookie = sshbuf_mutable_ptr(kex->my)) == NULL) {
error("%s: buffer error", __func__);
return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
}
arc4random_buf(cookie, KEX_COOKIE_LEN);
if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_putb(ssh, kex->my)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) {
error("%s: compose reply: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
return r;
}
debug("SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT sent");
kex->flags |= KEX_INIT_SENT;
return 0;
}
/* ARGSUSED */
int
kex_input_kexinit(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh)
{
struct kex *kex = ssh->kex;
const u_char *ptr;
u_int i;
size_t dlen;
int r;
debug("SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT received");
if (kex == NULL) {
error("%s: no hex", __func__);
return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
}
ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT, NULL);
ptr = sshpkt_ptr(ssh, &dlen);
if ((r = sshbuf_put(kex->peer, ptr, dlen)) != 0)
return r;
/* discard packet */
for (i = 0; i < KEX_COOKIE_LEN; i++) {
if ((r = sshpkt_get_u8(ssh, NULL)) != 0) {
error("%s: discard cookie: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
return r;
}
}
for (i = 0; i < PROPOSAL_MAX; i++) {
if ((r = sshpkt_get_string(ssh, NULL, NULL)) != 0) {
error("%s: discard proposal: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
return r;
}
}
/*
* XXX RFC4253 sec 7: "each side MAY guess" - currently no supported
* KEX method has the server move first, but a server might be using
* a custom method or one that we otherwise don't support. We should
* be prepared to remember first_kex_follows here so we can eat a
* packet later.
* XXX2 - RFC4253 is kind of ambiguous on what first_kex_follows means
* for cases where the server *doesn't* go first. I guess we should
* ignore it when it is set for these cases, which is what we do now.
*/
if ((r = sshpkt_get_u8(ssh, NULL)) != 0 || /* first_kex_follows */
(r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, NULL)) != 0 || /* reserved */
(r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0)
return r;
if (!(kex->flags & KEX_INIT_SENT))
if ((r = kex_send_kexinit(ssh)) != 0)
return r;
if ((r = kex_choose_conf(ssh)) != 0)
return r;
if (kex->kex_type < KEX_MAX && kex->kex[kex->kex_type] != NULL)
return (kex->kex[kex->kex_type])(ssh);
error("%s: unknown kex type %u", __func__, kex->kex_type);
return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
}
struct kex *
kex_new(void)
{
struct kex *kex;
if ((kex = calloc(1, sizeof(*kex))) == NULL ||
(kex->peer = sshbuf_new()) == NULL ||
(kex->my = sshbuf_new()) == NULL ||
(kex->client_version = sshbuf_new()) == NULL ||
(kex->server_version = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) {
kex_free(kex);
return NULL;
}
return kex;
}
void
kex_free_newkeys(struct newkeys *newkeys)
{
if (newkeys == NULL)
return;
if (newkeys->enc.key) {
explicit_bzero(newkeys->enc.key, newkeys->enc.key_len);
free(newkeys->enc.key);
newkeys->enc.key = NULL;
}
if (newkeys->enc.iv) {
explicit_bzero(newkeys->enc.iv, newkeys->enc.iv_len);
free(newkeys->enc.iv);
newkeys->enc.iv = NULL;
}
free(newkeys->enc.name);
explicit_bzero(&newkeys->enc, sizeof(newkeys->enc));
free(newkeys->comp.name);
explicit_bzero(&newkeys->comp, sizeof(newkeys->comp));
mac_clear(&newkeys->mac);
if (newkeys->mac.key) {
explicit_bzero(newkeys->mac.key, newkeys->mac.key_len);
free(newkeys->mac.key);
newkeys->mac.key = NULL;
}
free(newkeys->mac.name);
explicit_bzero(&newkeys->mac, sizeof(newkeys->mac));
freezero(newkeys, sizeof(*newkeys));
}
void
kex_free(struct kex *kex)
{
u_int mode;
if (kex == NULL)
return;
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
DH_free(kex->dh);
#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
EC_KEY_free(kex->ec_client_key);
#endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */
#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
for (mode = 0; mode < MODE_MAX; mode++) {
kex_free_newkeys(kex->newkeys[mode]);
kex->newkeys[mode] = NULL;
}
sshbuf_free(kex->peer);
sshbuf_free(kex->my);
sshbuf_free(kex->client_version);
sshbuf_free(kex->server_version);
sshbuf_free(kex->client_pub);
free(kex->session_id);
free(kex->failed_choice);
free(kex->hostkey_alg);
free(kex->name);
free(kex);
}
int
kex_ready(struct ssh *ssh, char *proposal[PROPOSAL_MAX])
{
int r;
if ((r = kex_prop2buf(ssh->kex->my, proposal)) != 0)
return r;
ssh->kex->flags = KEX_INITIAL;
kex_reset_dispatch(ssh);
ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT, &kex_input_kexinit);
return 0;
}
int
kex_setup(struct ssh *ssh, char *proposal[PROPOSAL_MAX])
{
int r;
if ((r = kex_ready(ssh, proposal)) != 0)
return r;
if ((r = kex_send_kexinit(ssh)) != 0) { /* we start */
kex_free(ssh->kex);
ssh->kex = NULL;
return r;
}
return 0;
}
/*
* Request key re-exchange, returns 0 on success or a ssherr.h error
* code otherwise. Must not be called if KEX is incomplete or in-progress.
*/
int
kex_start_rekex(struct ssh *ssh)
{
if (ssh->kex == NULL) {
error("%s: no kex", __func__);
return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
}
if (ssh->kex->done == 0) {
error("%s: requested twice", __func__);
return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
}
ssh->kex->done = 0;
return kex_send_kexinit(ssh);
}
static int
choose_enc(struct sshenc *enc, char *client, char *server)
{
char *name = match_list(client, server, NULL);
if (name == NULL)
return SSH_ERR_NO_CIPHER_ALG_MATCH;
if ((enc->cipher = cipher_by_name(name)) == NULL) {
error("%s: unsupported cipher %s", __func__, name);
free(name);
return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
}
enc->name = name;
enc->enabled = 0;
enc->iv = NULL;
enc->iv_len = cipher_ivlen(enc->cipher);
enc->key = NULL;
enc->key_len = cipher_keylen(enc->cipher);
enc->block_size = cipher_blocksize(enc->cipher);
return 0;
}
static int
choose_mac(struct ssh *ssh, struct sshmac *mac, char *client, char *server)
{
char *name = match_list(client, server, NULL);
if (name == NULL)
return SSH_ERR_NO_MAC_ALG_MATCH;
if (mac_setup(mac, name) < 0) {
error("%s: unsupported MAC %s", __func__, name);
free(name);
return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
}
mac->name = name;
mac->key = NULL;
mac->enabled = 0;
return 0;
}
static int
choose_comp(struct sshcomp *comp, char *client, char *server)
{
char *name = match_list(client, server, NULL);
if (name == NULL)
return SSH_ERR_NO_COMPRESS_ALG_MATCH;
#ifdef WITH_ZLIB
if (strcmp(name, "zlib@openssh.com") == 0) {
comp->type = COMP_DELAYED;
} else if (strcmp(name, "zlib") == 0) {
comp->type = COMP_ZLIB;
} else
#endif /* WITH_ZLIB */
if (strcmp(name, "none") == 0) {
comp->type = COMP_NONE;
} else {
error("%s: unsupported compression scheme %s", __func__, name);
free(name);
return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
}
comp->name = name;
return 0;
}
static int
choose_kex(struct kex *k, char *client, char *server)
{
const struct kexalg *kexalg;
k->name = match_list(client, server, NULL);
debug("kex: algorithm: %s", k->name ? k->name : "(no match)");
if (k->name == NULL)
return SSH_ERR_NO_KEX_ALG_MATCH;
if ((kexalg = kex_alg_by_name(k->name)) == NULL) {
error("%s: unsupported KEX method %s", __func__, k->name);
return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
}
k->kex_type = kexalg->type;
k->hash_alg = kexalg->hash_alg;
k->ec_nid = kexalg->ec_nid;
return 0;
}
static int
choose_hostkeyalg(struct kex *k, char *client, char *server)
{
k->hostkey_alg = match_list(client, server, NULL);
debug("kex: host key algorithm: %s",
k->hostkey_alg ? k->hostkey_alg : "(no match)");
if (k->hostkey_alg == NULL)
return SSH_ERR_NO_HOSTKEY_ALG_MATCH;
k->hostkey_type = sshkey_type_from_name(k->hostkey_alg);
if (k->hostkey_type == KEY_UNSPEC) {
error("%s: unsupported hostkey algorithm %s", __func__,
k->hostkey_alg);
return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
}
k->hostkey_nid = sshkey_ecdsa_nid_from_name(k->hostkey_alg);
return 0;
}
static int
proposals_match(char *my[PROPOSAL_MAX], char *peer[PROPOSAL_MAX])
{
static int check[] = {
PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS, PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS, -1
};
int *idx;
char *p;
for (idx = &check[0]; *idx != -1; idx++) {
if ((p = strchr(my[*idx], ',')) != NULL)
*p = '\0';
if ((p = strchr(peer[*idx], ',')) != NULL)
*p = '\0';
if (strcmp(my[*idx], peer[*idx]) != 0) {
debug2("proposal mismatch: my %s peer %s",
my[*idx], peer[*idx]);
return (0);
}
}
debug2("proposals match");
return (1);
}
static int
kex_choose_conf(struct ssh *ssh)
{
struct kex *kex = ssh->kex;
struct newkeys *newkeys;
char **my = NULL, **peer = NULL;
char **cprop, **sprop;
int nenc, nmac, ncomp;
u_int mode, ctos, need, dh_need, authlen;
int r, first_kex_follows;
debug2("local %s KEXINIT proposal", kex->server ? "server" : "client");
if ((r = kex_buf2prop(kex->my, NULL, &my)) != 0)
goto out;
debug2("peer %s KEXINIT proposal", kex->server ? "client" : "server");
if ((r = kex_buf2prop(kex->peer, &first_kex_follows, &peer)) != 0)
goto out;
if (kex->server) {
cprop=peer;
sprop=my;
} else {
cprop=my;
sprop=peer;
}
/* Check whether client supports ext_info_c */
if (kex->server && (kex->flags & KEX_INITIAL)) {
char *ext;
ext = match_list("ext-info-c", peer[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS], NULL);
kex->ext_info_c = (ext != NULL);
free(ext);
}
/* Algorithm Negotiation */
if ((r = choose_kex(kex, cprop[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS],
sprop[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS])) != 0) {
kex->failed_choice = peer[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS];
peer[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS] = NULL;
goto out;
}
if ((r = choose_hostkeyalg(kex, cprop[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS],
sprop[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS])) != 0) {
kex->failed_choice = peer[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS];
peer[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS] = NULL;
goto out;
}
for (mode = 0; mode < MODE_MAX; mode++) {
if ((newkeys = calloc(1, sizeof(*newkeys))) == NULL) {
r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
goto out;
}
kex->newkeys[mode] = newkeys;
ctos = (!kex->server && mode == MODE_OUT) ||
(kex->server && mode == MODE_IN);
nenc = ctos ? PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_CTOS : PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_STOC;
nmac = ctos ? PROPOSAL_MAC_ALGS_CTOS : PROPOSAL_MAC_ALGS_STOC;
ncomp = ctos ? PROPOSAL_COMP_ALGS_CTOS : PROPOSAL_COMP_ALGS_STOC;
if ((r = choose_enc(&newkeys->enc, cprop[nenc],
sprop[nenc])) != 0) {
kex->failed_choice = peer[nenc];
peer[nenc] = NULL;
goto out;
}
authlen = cipher_authlen(newkeys->enc.cipher);
/* ignore mac for authenticated encryption */
if (authlen == 0 &&
(r = choose_mac(ssh, &newkeys->mac, cprop[nmac],
sprop[nmac])) != 0) {
kex->failed_choice = peer[nmac];
peer[nmac] = NULL;
goto out;
}
if ((r = choose_comp(&newkeys->comp, cprop[ncomp],
sprop[ncomp])) != 0) {
kex->failed_choice = peer[ncomp];
peer[ncomp] = NULL;
goto out;
}
debug("kex: %s cipher: %s MAC: %s compression: %s",
ctos ? "client->server" : "server->client",
newkeys->enc.name,
authlen == 0 ? newkeys->mac.name : "<implicit>",
newkeys->comp.name);
}
need = dh_need = 0;
for (mode = 0; mode < MODE_MAX; mode++) {
newkeys = kex->newkeys[mode];
need = MAXIMUM(need, newkeys->enc.key_len);
need = MAXIMUM(need, newkeys->enc.block_size);
need = MAXIMUM(need, newkeys->enc.iv_len);
need = MAXIMUM(need, newkeys->mac.key_len);
dh_need = MAXIMUM(dh_need, cipher_seclen(newkeys->enc.cipher));
dh_need = MAXIMUM(dh_need, newkeys->enc.block_size);
dh_need = MAXIMUM(dh_need, newkeys->enc.iv_len);
dh_need = MAXIMUM(dh_need, newkeys->mac.key_len);
}
/* XXX need runden? */
kex->we_need = need;
kex->dh_need = dh_need;
/* ignore the next message if the proposals do not match */
if (first_kex_follows && !proposals_match(my, peer))
ssh->dispatch_skip_packets = 1;
r = 0;
out:
kex_prop_free(my);
kex_prop_free(peer);
return r;
}
static int
derive_key(struct ssh *ssh, int id, u_int need, u_char *hash, u_int hashlen,
const struct sshbuf *shared_secret, u_char **keyp)
{
struct kex *kex = ssh->kex;
struct ssh_digest_ctx *hashctx = NULL;
char c = id;
u_int have;
size_t mdsz;
u_char *digest;
int r;
if ((mdsz = ssh_digest_bytes(kex->hash_alg)) == 0)
return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
if ((digest = calloc(1, ROUNDUP(need, mdsz))) == NULL) {
r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
goto out;
}
/* K1 = HASH(K || H || "A" || session_id) */
if ((hashctx = ssh_digest_start(kex->hash_alg)) == NULL ||
ssh_digest_update_buffer(hashctx, shared_secret) != 0 ||
ssh_digest_update(hashctx, hash, hashlen) != 0 ||
ssh_digest_update(hashctx, &c, 1) != 0 ||
ssh_digest_update(hashctx, kex->session_id,
kex->session_id_len) != 0 ||
ssh_digest_final(hashctx, digest, mdsz) != 0) {
r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
error("%s: KEX hash failed", __func__);
goto out;
}
ssh_digest_free(hashctx);
hashctx = NULL;
/*
* expand key:
* Kn = HASH(K || H || K1 || K2 || ... || Kn-1)
* Key = K1 || K2 || ... || Kn
*/
for (have = mdsz; need > have; have += mdsz) {
if ((hashctx = ssh_digest_start(kex->hash_alg)) == NULL ||
ssh_digest_update_buffer(hashctx, shared_secret) != 0 ||
ssh_digest_update(hashctx, hash, hashlen) != 0 ||
ssh_digest_update(hashctx, digest, have) != 0 ||
ssh_digest_final(hashctx, digest + have, mdsz) != 0) {
error("%s: KDF failed", __func__);
r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
goto out;
}
ssh_digest_free(hashctx);
hashctx = NULL;
}
#ifdef DEBUG_KEX
fprintf(stderr, "key '%c'== ", c);
dump_digest("key", digest, need);
#endif
*keyp = digest;
digest = NULL;
r = 0;
out:
free(digest);
ssh_digest_free(hashctx);
return r;
}
#define NKEYS 6
int
kex_derive_keys(struct ssh *ssh, u_char *hash, u_int hashlen,
const struct sshbuf *shared_secret)
{
struct kex *kex = ssh->kex;
u_char *keys[NKEYS];
u_int i, j, mode, ctos;
int r;
/* save initial hash as session id */
if (kex->session_id == NULL) {
kex->session_id_len = hashlen;
kex->session_id = malloc(kex->session_id_len);
if (kex->session_id == NULL)
return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
memcpy(kex->session_id, hash, kex->session_id_len);
}
for (i = 0; i < NKEYS; i++) {
if ((r = derive_key(ssh, 'A'+i, kex->we_need, hash, hashlen,
shared_secret, &keys[i])) != 0) {
for (j = 0; j < i; j++)
free(keys[j]);
return r;
}
}
for (mode = 0; mode < MODE_MAX; mode++) {
ctos = (!kex->server && mode == MODE_OUT) ||
(kex->server && mode == MODE_IN);
kex->newkeys[mode]->enc.iv = keys[ctos ? 0 : 1];
kex->newkeys[mode]->enc.key = keys[ctos ? 2 : 3];
kex->newkeys[mode]->mac.key = keys[ctos ? 4 : 5];
}
return 0;
}
int
kex_load_hostkey(struct ssh *ssh, struct sshkey **prvp, struct sshkey **pubp)
{
struct kex *kex = ssh->kex;
*pubp = NULL;
*prvp = NULL;
if (kex->load_host_public_key == NULL ||
kex->load_host_private_key == NULL) {
error("%s: missing hostkey loader", __func__);
return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
}
*pubp = kex->load_host_public_key(kex->hostkey_type,
kex->hostkey_nid, ssh);
*prvp = kex->load_host_private_key(kex->hostkey_type,
kex->hostkey_nid, ssh);
if (*pubp == NULL)
return SSH_ERR_NO_HOSTKEY_LOADED;
return 0;
}
int
kex_verify_host_key(struct ssh *ssh, struct sshkey *server_host_key)
{
struct kex *kex = ssh->kex;
if (kex->verify_host_key == NULL) {
error("%s: missing hostkey verifier", __func__);
return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
}
if (server_host_key->type != kex->hostkey_type ||
(kex->hostkey_type == KEY_ECDSA &&
server_host_key->ecdsa_nid != kex->hostkey_nid))
return SSH_ERR_KEY_TYPE_MISMATCH;
if (kex->verify_host_key(server_host_key, ssh) == -1)
return SSH_ERR_SIGNATURE_INVALID;
return 0;
}
#if defined(DEBUG_KEX) || defined(DEBUG_KEXDH) || defined(DEBUG_KEXECDH)
void
dump_digest(const char *msg, const u_char *digest, int len)
{
fprintf(stderr, "%s\n", msg);
sshbuf_dump_data(digest, len, stderr);
}
#endif
/*
* Send a plaintext error message to the peer, suffixed by \r\n.
* Only used during banner exchange, and there only for the server.
*/
static void
send_error(struct ssh *ssh, char *msg)
{
char *crnl = "\r\n";
if (!ssh->kex->server)
return;
if (atomicio(vwrite, ssh_packet_get_connection_out(ssh),
msg, strlen(msg)) != strlen(msg) ||
atomicio(vwrite, ssh_packet_get_connection_out(ssh),
crnl, strlen(crnl)) != strlen(crnl))
error("%s: write: %.100s", __func__, strerror(errno));
}
/*
* Sends our identification string and waits for the peer's. Will block for
* up to timeout_ms (or indefinitely if timeout_ms <= 0).
* Returns on 0 success or a ssherr.h code on failure.
*/
int
kex_exchange_identification(struct ssh *ssh, int timeout_ms,
const char *version_addendum)
{
int remote_major, remote_minor, mismatch, oerrno = 0;
size_t len, i, n;
int r, expect_nl;
u_char c;
struct sshbuf *our_version = ssh->kex->server ?
ssh->kex->server_version : ssh->kex->client_version;
struct sshbuf *peer_version = ssh->kex->server ?
ssh->kex->client_version : ssh->kex->server_version;
char *our_version_string = NULL, *peer_version_string = NULL;
char *cp, *remote_version = NULL;
/* Prepare and send our banner */
sshbuf_reset(our_version);
if (version_addendum != NULL && *version_addendum == '\0')
version_addendum = NULL;
if ((r = sshbuf_putf(our_version, "SSH-%d.%d-%.100s%s%s\r\n",
PROTOCOL_MAJOR_2, PROTOCOL_MINOR_2, SSH_VERSION,
version_addendum == NULL ? "" : " ",
version_addendum == NULL ? "" : version_addendum)) != 0) {
oerrno = errno;
error("%s: sshbuf_putf: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
goto out;
}
if (atomicio(vwrite, ssh_packet_get_connection_out(ssh),
sshbuf_mutable_ptr(our_version),
sshbuf_len(our_version)) != sshbuf_len(our_version)) {
oerrno = errno;
debug("%s: write: %.100s", __func__, strerror(errno));
r = SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR;
goto out;
}
if ((r = sshbuf_consume_end(our_version, 2)) != 0) { /* trim \r\n */
oerrno = errno;
error("%s: sshbuf_consume_end: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
goto out;
}
our_version_string = sshbuf_dup_string(our_version);
if (our_version_string == NULL) {
error("%s: sshbuf_dup_string failed", __func__);
r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
goto out;
}
debug("Local version string %.100s", our_version_string);
/* Read other side's version identification. */
for (n = 0; ; n++) {
if (n >= SSH_MAX_PRE_BANNER_LINES) {
send_error(ssh, "No SSH identification string "
"received.");
error("%s: No SSH version received in first %u lines "
"from server", __func__, SSH_MAX_PRE_BANNER_LINES);
r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
goto out;
}
sshbuf_reset(peer_version);
expect_nl = 0;
for (i = 0; ; i++) {
if (timeout_ms > 0) {
r = waitrfd(ssh_packet_get_connection_in(ssh),
&timeout_ms);
if (r == -1 && errno == ETIMEDOUT) {
send_error(ssh, "Timed out waiting "
"for SSH identification string.");
error("Connection timed out during "
"banner exchange");
r = SSH_ERR_CONN_TIMEOUT;
goto out;
} else if (r == -1) {
oerrno = errno;
error("%s: %s",
__func__, strerror(errno));
r = SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR;
goto out;
}
}
len = atomicio(read, ssh_packet_get_connection_in(ssh),
&c, 1);
if (len != 1 && errno == EPIPE) {
error("%s: Connection closed by remote host",
__func__);
r = SSH_ERR_CONN_CLOSED;
goto out;
} else if (len != 1) {
oerrno = errno;
error("%s: read: %.100s",
__func__, strerror(errno));
r = SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR;
goto out;
}
if (c == '\r') {
expect_nl = 1;
continue;
}
if (c == '\n')
break;
if (c == '\0' || expect_nl) {
error("%s: banner line contains invalid "
"characters", __func__);
goto invalid;
}
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(peer_version, c)) != 0) {
oerrno = errno;
error("%s: sshbuf_put: %s",
__func__, ssh_err(r));
goto out;
}
if (sshbuf_len(peer_version) > SSH_MAX_BANNER_LEN) {
error("%s: banner line too long", __func__);
goto invalid;
}
}
/* Is this an actual protocol banner? */
if (sshbuf_len(peer_version) > 4 &&
memcmp(sshbuf_ptr(peer_version), "SSH-", 4) == 0)
break;
/* If not, then just log the line and continue */
if ((cp = sshbuf_dup_string(peer_version)) == NULL) {
error("%s: sshbuf_dup_string failed", __func__);
r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
goto out;
}
/* Do not accept lines before the SSH ident from a client */
if (ssh->kex->server) {
error("%s: client sent invalid protocol identifier "
"\"%.256s\"", __func__, cp);
free(cp);
goto invalid;
}
debug("%s: banner line %zu: %s", __func__, n, cp);
free(cp);
}
peer_version_string = sshbuf_dup_string(peer_version);
if (peer_version_string == NULL)
error("%s: sshbuf_dup_string failed", __func__);
/* XXX must be same size for sscanf */
if ((remote_version = calloc(1, sshbuf_len(peer_version))) == NULL) {
error("%s: calloc failed", __func__);
r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
goto out;
}
/*
* Check that the versions match. In future this might accept
* several versions and set appropriate flags to handle them.
*/
if (sscanf(peer_version_string, "SSH-%d.%d-%[^\n]\n",
&remote_major, &remote_minor, remote_version) != 3) {
error("Bad remote protocol version identification: '%.100s'",
peer_version_string);
invalid:
send_error(ssh, "Invalid SSH identification string.");
r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
goto out;
}
debug("Remote protocol version %d.%d, remote software version %.100s",
remote_major, remote_minor, remote_version);
ssh->compat = compat_datafellows(remote_version);
mismatch = 0;
switch (remote_major) {
case 2:
break;
case 1:
if (remote_minor != 99)
mismatch = 1;
break;
default:
mismatch = 1;
break;
}
if (mismatch) {
error("Protocol major versions differ: %d vs. %d",
PROTOCOL_MAJOR_2, remote_major);
send_error(ssh, "Protocol major versions differ.");
r = SSH_ERR_NO_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
goto out;
}
if (ssh->kex->server && (ssh->compat & SSH_BUG_PROBE) != 0) {
logit("probed from %s port %d with %s. Don't panic.",
ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), ssh_remote_port(ssh),
peer_version_string);
r = SSH_ERR_CONN_CLOSED; /* XXX */
goto out;
}
if (ssh->kex->server && (ssh->compat & SSH_BUG_SCANNER) != 0) {
logit("scanned from %s port %d with %s. Don't panic.",
ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), ssh_remote_port(ssh),
peer_version_string);
r = SSH_ERR_CONN_CLOSED; /* XXX */
goto out;
}
if ((ssh->compat & SSH_BUG_RSASIGMD5) != 0) {
logit("Remote version \"%.100s\" uses unsafe RSA signature "
"scheme; disabling use of RSA keys", remote_version);
}
/* success */
r = 0;
out:
free(our_version_string);
free(peer_version_string);
free(remote_version);
if (r == SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR)
errno = oerrno;
return r;
}
diff --git a/kexdh.c b/kexdh.c
index 67133e339481..6e0159f9f101 100644
--- a/kexdh.c
+++ b/kexdh.c
@@ -1,201 +1,202 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: kexdh.c,v 1.32 2019/01/21 10:40:11 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: kexdh.c,v 1.33 2020/05/08 05:13:14 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 2019 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
* OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
* IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
* INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
* NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
* DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
* THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
* (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
* THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
*/
#include "includes.h"
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <signal.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <string.h>
#include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h"
#include <openssl/dh.h>
#include "sshkey.h"
#include "kex.h"
#include "sshbuf.h"
#include "digest.h"
#include "ssherr.h"
#include "dh.h"
+#include "log.h"
int
kex_dh_keygen(struct kex *kex)
{
switch (kex->kex_type) {
case KEX_DH_GRP1_SHA1:
kex->dh = dh_new_group1();
break;
case KEX_DH_GRP14_SHA1:
case KEX_DH_GRP14_SHA256:
kex->dh = dh_new_group14();
break;
case KEX_DH_GRP16_SHA512:
kex->dh = dh_new_group16();
break;
case KEX_DH_GRP18_SHA512:
kex->dh = dh_new_group18();
break;
default:
return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
}
if (kex->dh == NULL)
return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
return (dh_gen_key(kex->dh, kex->we_need * 8));
}
int
kex_dh_compute_key(struct kex *kex, BIGNUM *dh_pub, struct sshbuf *out)
{
BIGNUM *shared_secret = NULL;
u_char *kbuf = NULL;
size_t klen = 0;
int kout, r;
#ifdef DEBUG_KEXDH
fprintf(stderr, "dh_pub= ");
BN_print_fp(stderr, dh_pub);
fprintf(stderr, "\n");
debug("bits %d", BN_num_bits(dh_pub));
DHparams_print_fp(stderr, kex->dh);
fprintf(stderr, "\n");
#endif
if (!dh_pub_is_valid(kex->dh, dh_pub)) {
r = SSH_ERR_MESSAGE_INCOMPLETE;
goto out;
}
klen = DH_size(kex->dh);
if ((kbuf = malloc(klen)) == NULL ||
(shared_secret = BN_new()) == NULL) {
r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
goto out;
}
if ((kout = DH_compute_key(kbuf, dh_pub, kex->dh)) < 0 ||
BN_bin2bn(kbuf, kout, shared_secret) == NULL) {
r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
goto out;
}
#ifdef DEBUG_KEXDH
dump_digest("shared secret", kbuf, kout);
#endif
r = sshbuf_put_bignum2(out, shared_secret);
out:
freezero(kbuf, klen);
BN_clear_free(shared_secret);
return r;
}
int
kex_dh_keypair(struct kex *kex)
{
const BIGNUM *pub_key;
struct sshbuf *buf = NULL;
int r;
if ((r = kex_dh_keygen(kex)) != 0)
return r;
DH_get0_key(kex->dh, &pub_key, NULL);
if ((buf = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
if ((r = sshbuf_put_bignum2(buf, pub_key)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_u32(buf, NULL)) != 0)
goto out;
#ifdef DEBUG_KEXDH
DHparams_print_fp(stderr, kex->dh);
fprintf(stderr, "pub= ");
BN_print_fp(stderr, pub_key);
fprintf(stderr, "\n");
#endif
kex->client_pub = buf;
buf = NULL;
out:
sshbuf_free(buf);
return r;
}
int
kex_dh_enc(struct kex *kex, const struct sshbuf *client_blob,
struct sshbuf **server_blobp, struct sshbuf **shared_secretp)
{
const BIGNUM *pub_key;
struct sshbuf *server_blob = NULL;
int r;
*server_blobp = NULL;
*shared_secretp = NULL;
if ((r = kex_dh_keygen(kex)) != 0)
goto out;
DH_get0_key(kex->dh, &pub_key, NULL);
if ((server_blob = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) {
r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
goto out;
}
if ((r = sshbuf_put_bignum2(server_blob, pub_key)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_u32(server_blob, NULL)) != 0)
goto out;
if ((r = kex_dh_dec(kex, client_blob, shared_secretp)) != 0)
goto out;
*server_blobp = server_blob;
server_blob = NULL;
out:
DH_free(kex->dh);
kex->dh = NULL;
sshbuf_free(server_blob);
return r;
}
int
kex_dh_dec(struct kex *kex, const struct sshbuf *dh_blob,
struct sshbuf **shared_secretp)
{
struct sshbuf *buf = NULL;
BIGNUM *dh_pub = NULL;
int r;
*shared_secretp = NULL;
if ((buf = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) {
r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
goto out;
}
if ((r = sshbuf_put_stringb(buf, dh_blob)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_bignum2(buf, &dh_pub)) != 0)
goto out;
sshbuf_reset(buf);
if ((r = kex_dh_compute_key(kex, dh_pub, buf)) != 0)
goto out;
*shared_secretp = buf;
buf = NULL;
out:
DH_free(kex->dh);
kex->dh = NULL;
sshbuf_free(buf);
return r;
}
#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
diff --git a/krl.c b/krl.c
index c431f70475c5..3a69b636a359 100644
--- a/krl.c
+++ b/krl.c
@@ -1,1452 +1,1453 @@
/*
* Copyright (c) 2012 Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
*
* Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
* purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
* copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
*
* THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
* WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
* MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
* ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
* WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
* ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
* OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
*/
-/* $OpenBSD: krl.c,v 1.50 2020/04/03 05:48:57 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: krl.c,v 1.51 2020/08/27 01:06:18 djm Exp $ */
#include "includes.h"
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <openbsd-compat/sys-tree.h>
#include <openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <limits.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <time.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include "sshbuf.h"
#include "ssherr.h"
#include "sshkey.h"
#include "authfile.h"
#include "misc.h"
#include "log.h"
#include "digest.h"
#include "bitmap.h"
#include "utf8.h"
#include "krl.h"
/* #define DEBUG_KRL */
#ifdef DEBUG_KRL
# define KRL_DBG(x) debug3 x
#else
# define KRL_DBG(x)
#endif
/*
* Trees of revoked serial numbers, key IDs and keys. This allows
* quick searching, querying and producing lists in canonical order.
*/
/* Tree of serial numbers. XXX make smarter: really need a real sparse bitmap */
struct revoked_serial {
u_int64_t lo, hi;
RB_ENTRY(revoked_serial) tree_entry;
};
static int serial_cmp(struct revoked_serial *a, struct revoked_serial *b);
RB_HEAD(revoked_serial_tree, revoked_serial);
RB_GENERATE_STATIC(revoked_serial_tree, revoked_serial, tree_entry, serial_cmp);
/* Tree of key IDs */
struct revoked_key_id {
char *key_id;
RB_ENTRY(revoked_key_id) tree_entry;
};
static int key_id_cmp(struct revoked_key_id *a, struct revoked_key_id *b);
RB_HEAD(revoked_key_id_tree, revoked_key_id);
RB_GENERATE_STATIC(revoked_key_id_tree, revoked_key_id, tree_entry, key_id_cmp);
/* Tree of blobs (used for keys and fingerprints) */
struct revoked_blob {
u_char *blob;
size_t len;
RB_ENTRY(revoked_blob) tree_entry;
};
static int blob_cmp(struct revoked_blob *a, struct revoked_blob *b);
RB_HEAD(revoked_blob_tree, revoked_blob);
RB_GENERATE_STATIC(revoked_blob_tree, revoked_blob, tree_entry, blob_cmp);
/* Tracks revoked certs for a single CA */
struct revoked_certs {
struct sshkey *ca_key;
struct revoked_serial_tree revoked_serials;
struct revoked_key_id_tree revoked_key_ids;
TAILQ_ENTRY(revoked_certs) entry;
};
TAILQ_HEAD(revoked_certs_list, revoked_certs);
struct ssh_krl {
u_int64_t krl_version;
u_int64_t generated_date;
u_int64_t flags;
char *comment;
struct revoked_blob_tree revoked_keys;
struct revoked_blob_tree revoked_sha1s;
struct revoked_blob_tree revoked_sha256s;
struct revoked_certs_list revoked_certs;
};
/* Return equal if a and b overlap */
static int
serial_cmp(struct revoked_serial *a, struct revoked_serial *b)
{
if (a->hi >= b->lo && a->lo <= b->hi)
return 0;
return a->lo < b->lo ? -1 : 1;
}
static int
key_id_cmp(struct revoked_key_id *a, struct revoked_key_id *b)
{
return strcmp(a->key_id, b->key_id);
}
static int
blob_cmp(struct revoked_blob *a, struct revoked_blob *b)
{
int r;
if (a->len != b->len) {
if ((r = memcmp(a->blob, b->blob, MINIMUM(a->len, b->len))) != 0)
return r;
return a->len > b->len ? 1 : -1;
} else
return memcmp(a->blob, b->blob, a->len);
}
struct ssh_krl *
ssh_krl_init(void)
{
struct ssh_krl *krl;
if ((krl = calloc(1, sizeof(*krl))) == NULL)
return NULL;
RB_INIT(&krl->revoked_keys);
RB_INIT(&krl->revoked_sha1s);
RB_INIT(&krl->revoked_sha256s);
TAILQ_INIT(&krl->revoked_certs);
return krl;
}
static void
revoked_certs_free(struct revoked_certs *rc)
{
struct revoked_serial *rs, *trs;
struct revoked_key_id *rki, *trki;
RB_FOREACH_SAFE(rs, revoked_serial_tree, &rc->revoked_serials, trs) {
RB_REMOVE(revoked_serial_tree, &rc->revoked_serials, rs);
free(rs);
}
RB_FOREACH_SAFE(rki, revoked_key_id_tree, &rc->revoked_key_ids, trki) {
RB_REMOVE(revoked_key_id_tree, &rc->revoked_key_ids, rki);
free(rki->key_id);
free(rki);
}
sshkey_free(rc->ca_key);
}
void
ssh_krl_free(struct ssh_krl *krl)
{
struct revoked_blob *rb, *trb;
struct revoked_certs *rc, *trc;
if (krl == NULL)
return;
free(krl->comment);
RB_FOREACH_SAFE(rb, revoked_blob_tree, &krl->revoked_keys, trb) {
RB_REMOVE(revoked_blob_tree, &krl->revoked_keys, rb);
free(rb->blob);
free(rb);
}
RB_FOREACH_SAFE(rb, revoked_blob_tree, &krl->revoked_sha1s, trb) {
RB_REMOVE(revoked_blob_tree, &krl->revoked_sha1s, rb);
free(rb->blob);
free(rb);
}
RB_FOREACH_SAFE(rb, revoked_blob_tree, &krl->revoked_sha256s, trb) {
RB_REMOVE(revoked_blob_tree, &krl->revoked_sha256s, rb);
free(rb->blob);
free(rb);
}
TAILQ_FOREACH_SAFE(rc, &krl->revoked_certs, entry, trc) {
TAILQ_REMOVE(&krl->revoked_certs, rc, entry);
revoked_certs_free(rc);
}
}
void
ssh_krl_set_version(struct ssh_krl *krl, u_int64_t version)
{
krl->krl_version = version;
}
int
ssh_krl_set_comment(struct ssh_krl *krl, const char *comment)
{
free(krl->comment);
if ((krl->comment = strdup(comment)) == NULL)
return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
return 0;
}
/*
* Find the revoked_certs struct for a CA key. If allow_create is set then
* create a new one in the tree if one did not exist already.
*/
static int
revoked_certs_for_ca_key(struct ssh_krl *krl, const struct sshkey *ca_key,
struct revoked_certs **rcp, int allow_create)
{
struct revoked_certs *rc;
int r;
*rcp = NULL;
TAILQ_FOREACH(rc, &krl->revoked_certs, entry) {
if ((ca_key == NULL && rc->ca_key == NULL) ||
sshkey_equal(rc->ca_key, ca_key)) {
*rcp = rc;
return 0;
}
}
if (!allow_create)
return 0;
/* If this CA doesn't exist in the list then add it now */
if ((rc = calloc(1, sizeof(*rc))) == NULL)
return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
if (ca_key == NULL)
rc->ca_key = NULL;
else if ((r = sshkey_from_private(ca_key, &rc->ca_key)) != 0) {
free(rc);
return r;
}
RB_INIT(&rc->revoked_serials);
RB_INIT(&rc->revoked_key_ids);
TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(&krl->revoked_certs, rc, entry);
KRL_DBG(("%s: new CA %s", __func__,
ca_key == NULL ? "*" : sshkey_type(ca_key)));
*rcp = rc;
return 0;
}
static int
insert_serial_range(struct revoked_serial_tree *rt, u_int64_t lo, u_int64_t hi)
{
struct revoked_serial rs, *ers, *crs, *irs;
KRL_DBG(("%s: insert %llu:%llu", __func__, lo, hi));
memset(&rs, 0, sizeof(rs));
rs.lo = lo;
rs.hi = hi;
ers = RB_NFIND(revoked_serial_tree, rt, &rs);
if (ers == NULL || serial_cmp(ers, &rs) != 0) {
/* No entry matches. Just insert */
if ((irs = malloc(sizeof(rs))) == NULL)
return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
memcpy(irs, &rs, sizeof(*irs));
ers = RB_INSERT(revoked_serial_tree, rt, irs);
if (ers != NULL) {
KRL_DBG(("%s: bad: ers != NULL", __func__));
/* Shouldn't happen */
free(irs);
return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
}
ers = irs;
} else {
KRL_DBG(("%s: overlap found %llu:%llu", __func__,
ers->lo, ers->hi));
/*
* The inserted entry overlaps an existing one. Grow the
* existing entry.
*/
if (ers->lo > lo)
ers->lo = lo;
if (ers->hi < hi)
ers->hi = hi;
}
/*
* The inserted or revised range might overlap or abut adjacent ones;
* coalesce as necessary.
*/
/* Check predecessors */
while ((crs = RB_PREV(revoked_serial_tree, rt, ers)) != NULL) {
KRL_DBG(("%s: pred %llu:%llu", __func__, crs->lo, crs->hi));
if (ers->lo != 0 && crs->hi < ers->lo - 1)
break;
/* This entry overlaps. */
if (crs->lo < ers->lo) {
ers->lo = crs->lo;
KRL_DBG(("%s: pred extend %llu:%llu", __func__,
ers->lo, ers->hi));
}
RB_REMOVE(revoked_serial_tree, rt, crs);
free(crs);
}
/* Check successors */
while ((crs = RB_NEXT(revoked_serial_tree, rt, ers)) != NULL) {
KRL_DBG(("%s: succ %llu:%llu", __func__, crs->lo, crs->hi));
if (ers->hi != (u_int64_t)-1 && crs->lo > ers->hi + 1)
break;
/* This entry overlaps. */
if (crs->hi > ers->hi) {
ers->hi = crs->hi;
KRL_DBG(("%s: succ extend %llu:%llu", __func__,
ers->lo, ers->hi));
}
RB_REMOVE(revoked_serial_tree, rt, crs);
free(crs);
}
KRL_DBG(("%s: done, final %llu:%llu", __func__, ers->lo, ers->hi));
return 0;
}
int
ssh_krl_revoke_cert_by_serial(struct ssh_krl *krl, const struct sshkey *ca_key,
u_int64_t serial)
{
return ssh_krl_revoke_cert_by_serial_range(krl, ca_key, serial, serial);
}
int
ssh_krl_revoke_cert_by_serial_range(struct ssh_krl *krl,
const struct sshkey *ca_key, u_int64_t lo, u_int64_t hi)
{
struct revoked_certs *rc;
int r;
if (lo > hi || lo == 0)
return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
if ((r = revoked_certs_for_ca_key(krl, ca_key, &rc, 1)) != 0)
return r;
return insert_serial_range(&rc->revoked_serials, lo, hi);
}
int
ssh_krl_revoke_cert_by_key_id(struct ssh_krl *krl, const struct sshkey *ca_key,
const char *key_id)
{
struct revoked_key_id *rki, *erki;
struct revoked_certs *rc;
int r;
if ((r = revoked_certs_for_ca_key(krl, ca_key, &rc, 1)) != 0)
return r;
KRL_DBG(("%s: revoke %s", __func__, key_id));
if ((rki = calloc(1, sizeof(*rki))) == NULL ||
(rki->key_id = strdup(key_id)) == NULL) {
free(rki);
return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
}
erki = RB_INSERT(revoked_key_id_tree, &rc->revoked_key_ids, rki);
if (erki != NULL) {
free(rki->key_id);
free(rki);
}
return 0;
}
/* Convert "key" to a public key blob without any certificate information */
static int
plain_key_blob(const struct sshkey *key, u_char **blob, size_t *blen)
{
struct sshkey *kcopy;
int r;
if ((r = sshkey_from_private(key, &kcopy)) != 0)
return r;
if (sshkey_is_cert(kcopy)) {
if ((r = sshkey_drop_cert(kcopy)) != 0) {
sshkey_free(kcopy);
return r;
}
}
r = sshkey_to_blob(kcopy, blob, blen);
sshkey_free(kcopy);
return r;
}
/* Revoke a key blob. Ownership of blob is transferred to the tree */
static int
revoke_blob(struct revoked_blob_tree *rbt, u_char *blob, size_t len)
{
struct revoked_blob *rb, *erb;
if ((rb = calloc(1, sizeof(*rb))) == NULL)
return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
rb->blob = blob;
rb->len = len;
erb = RB_INSERT(revoked_blob_tree, rbt, rb);
if (erb != NULL) {
free(rb->blob);
free(rb);
}
return 0;
}
int
ssh_krl_revoke_key_explicit(struct ssh_krl *krl, const struct sshkey *key)
{
u_char *blob;
size_t len;
int r;
debug3("%s: revoke type %s", __func__, sshkey_type(key));
if ((r = plain_key_blob(key, &blob, &len)) != 0)
return r;
return revoke_blob(&krl->revoked_keys, blob, len);
}
static int
revoke_by_hash(struct revoked_blob_tree *target, const u_char *p, size_t len)
{
u_char *blob;
int r;
/* need to copy hash, as revoke_blob steals ownership */
if ((blob = malloc(len)) == NULL)
return SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR;
memcpy(blob, p, len);
if ((r = revoke_blob(target, blob, len)) != 0) {
free(blob);
return r;
}
return 0;
}
int
ssh_krl_revoke_key_sha1(struct ssh_krl *krl, const u_char *p, size_t len)
{
debug3("%s: revoke by sha1", __func__);
if (len != 20)
return SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
return revoke_by_hash(&krl->revoked_sha1s, p, len);
}
int
ssh_krl_revoke_key_sha256(struct ssh_krl *krl, const u_char *p, size_t len)
{
debug3("%s: revoke by sha256", __func__);
if (len != 32)
return SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
return revoke_by_hash(&krl->revoked_sha256s, p, len);
}
int
ssh_krl_revoke_key(struct ssh_krl *krl, const struct sshkey *key)
{
/* XXX replace with SHA256? */
if (!sshkey_is_cert(key))
return ssh_krl_revoke_key_explicit(krl, key);
if (key->cert->serial == 0) {
return ssh_krl_revoke_cert_by_key_id(krl,
key->cert->signature_key,
key->cert->key_id);
} else {
return ssh_krl_revoke_cert_by_serial(krl,
key->cert->signature_key,
key->cert->serial);
}
}
/*
* Select the most compact section type to emit next in a KRL based on
* the current section type, the run length of contiguous revoked serial
* numbers and the gaps from the last and to the next revoked serial.
* Applies a mostly-accurate bit cost model to select the section type
* that will minimise the size of the resultant KRL.
*/
static int
choose_next_state(int current_state, u_int64_t contig, int final,
u_int64_t last_gap, u_int64_t next_gap, int *force_new_section)
{
int new_state;
u_int64_t cost, cost_list, cost_range, cost_bitmap, cost_bitmap_restart;
/*
* Avoid unsigned overflows.
* The limits are high enough to avoid confusing the calculations.
*/
contig = MINIMUM(contig, 1ULL<<31);
last_gap = MINIMUM(last_gap, 1ULL<<31);
next_gap = MINIMUM(next_gap, 1ULL<<31);
/*
* Calculate the cost to switch from the current state to candidates.
* NB. range sections only ever contain a single range, so their
* switching cost is independent of the current_state.
*/
cost_list = cost_bitmap = cost_bitmap_restart = 0;
cost_range = 8;
switch (current_state) {
case KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_LIST:
cost_bitmap_restart = cost_bitmap = 8 + 64;
break;
case KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_BITMAP:
cost_list = 8;
cost_bitmap_restart = 8 + 64;
break;
case KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_RANGE:
case 0:
cost_bitmap_restart = cost_bitmap = 8 + 64;
cost_list = 8;
}
/* Estimate base cost in bits of each section type */
cost_list += 64 * contig + (final ? 0 : 8+64);
cost_range += (2 * 64) + (final ? 0 : 8+64);
cost_bitmap += last_gap + contig + (final ? 0 : MINIMUM(next_gap, 8+64));
cost_bitmap_restart += contig + (final ? 0 : MINIMUM(next_gap, 8+64));
/* Convert to byte costs for actual comparison */
cost_list = (cost_list + 7) / 8;
cost_bitmap = (cost_bitmap + 7) / 8;
cost_bitmap_restart = (cost_bitmap_restart + 7) / 8;
cost_range = (cost_range + 7) / 8;
/* Now pick the best choice */
*force_new_section = 0;
new_state = KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_BITMAP;
cost = cost_bitmap;
if (cost_range < cost) {
new_state = KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_RANGE;
cost = cost_range;
}
if (cost_list < cost) {
new_state = KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_LIST;
cost = cost_list;
}
if (cost_bitmap_restart < cost) {
new_state = KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_BITMAP;
*force_new_section = 1;
cost = cost_bitmap_restart;
}
KRL_DBG(("%s: contig %llu last_gap %llu next_gap %llu final %d, costs:"
"list %llu range %llu bitmap %llu new bitmap %llu, "
"selected 0x%02x%s", __func__, (long long unsigned)contig,
(long long unsigned)last_gap, (long long unsigned)next_gap, final,
(long long unsigned)cost_list, (long long unsigned)cost_range,
(long long unsigned)cost_bitmap,
(long long unsigned)cost_bitmap_restart, new_state,
*force_new_section ? " restart" : ""));
return new_state;
}
static int
put_bitmap(struct sshbuf *buf, struct bitmap *bitmap)
{
size_t len;
u_char *blob;
int r;
len = bitmap_nbytes(bitmap);
if ((blob = malloc(len)) == NULL)
return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
if (bitmap_to_string(bitmap, blob, len) != 0) {
free(blob);
return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
}
r = sshbuf_put_bignum2_bytes(buf, blob, len);
free(blob);
return r;
}
/* Generate a KRL_SECTION_CERTIFICATES KRL section */
static int
revoked_certs_generate(struct revoked_certs *rc, struct sshbuf *buf)
{
int final, force_new_sect, r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
u_int64_t i, contig, gap, last = 0, bitmap_start = 0;
struct revoked_serial *rs, *nrs;
struct revoked_key_id *rki;
int next_state, state = 0;
struct sshbuf *sect;
struct bitmap *bitmap = NULL;
if ((sect = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
/* Store the header: optional CA scope key, reserved */
if (rc->ca_key == NULL) {
if ((r = sshbuf_put_string(buf, NULL, 0)) != 0)
goto out;
} else {
if ((r = sshkey_puts(rc->ca_key, buf)) != 0)
goto out;
}
if ((r = sshbuf_put_string(buf, NULL, 0)) != 0)
goto out;
/* Store the revoked serials. */
for (rs = RB_MIN(revoked_serial_tree, &rc->revoked_serials);
rs != NULL;
rs = RB_NEXT(revoked_serial_tree, &rc->revoked_serials, rs)) {
KRL_DBG(("%s: serial %llu:%llu state 0x%02x", __func__,
(long long unsigned)rs->lo, (long long unsigned)rs->hi,
state));
/* Check contiguous length and gap to next section (if any) */
nrs = RB_NEXT(revoked_serial_tree, &rc->revoked_serials, rs);
final = nrs == NULL;
gap = nrs == NULL ? 0 : nrs->lo - rs->hi;
contig = 1 + (rs->hi - rs->lo);
/* Choose next state based on these */
next_state = choose_next_state(state, contig, final,
state == 0 ? 0 : rs->lo - last, gap, &force_new_sect);
/*
* If the current section is a range section or has a different
* type to the next section, then finish it off now.
*/
if (state != 0 && (force_new_sect || next_state != state ||
state == KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_RANGE)) {
KRL_DBG(("%s: finish state 0x%02x", __func__, state));
switch (state) {
case KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_LIST:
case KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_RANGE:
break;
case KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_BITMAP:
if ((r = put_bitmap(sect, bitmap)) != 0)
goto out;
bitmap_free(bitmap);
bitmap = NULL;
break;
}
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(buf, state)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_stringb(buf, sect)) != 0)
goto out;
sshbuf_reset(sect);
}
/* If we are starting a new section then prepare it now */
if (next_state != state || force_new_sect) {
KRL_DBG(("%s: start state 0x%02x", __func__,
next_state));
state = next_state;
sshbuf_reset(sect);
switch (state) {
case KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_LIST:
case KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_RANGE:
break;
case KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_BITMAP:
if ((bitmap = bitmap_new()) == NULL) {
r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
goto out;
}
bitmap_start = rs->lo;
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u64(sect,
bitmap_start)) != 0)
goto out;
break;
}
}
/* Perform section-specific processing */
switch (state) {
case KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_LIST:
for (i = 0; i < contig; i++) {
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u64(sect, rs->lo + i)) != 0)
goto out;
}
break;
case KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_RANGE:
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u64(sect, rs->lo)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u64(sect, rs->hi)) != 0)
goto out;
break;
case KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_BITMAP:
if (rs->lo - bitmap_start > INT_MAX) {
error("%s: insane bitmap gap", __func__);
goto out;
}
for (i = 0; i < contig; i++) {
if (bitmap_set_bit(bitmap,
rs->lo + i - bitmap_start) != 0) {
r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
goto out;
}
}
break;
}
last = rs->hi;
}
/* Flush the remaining section, if any */
if (state != 0) {
KRL_DBG(("%s: serial final flush for state 0x%02x",
__func__, state));
switch (state) {
case KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_LIST:
case KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_RANGE:
break;
case KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_BITMAP:
if ((r = put_bitmap(sect, bitmap)) != 0)
goto out;
bitmap_free(bitmap);
bitmap = NULL;
break;
}
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(buf, state)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_stringb(buf, sect)) != 0)
goto out;
}
KRL_DBG(("%s: serial done ", __func__));
/* Now output a section for any revocations by key ID */
sshbuf_reset(sect);
RB_FOREACH(rki, revoked_key_id_tree, &rc->revoked_key_ids) {
KRL_DBG(("%s: key ID %s", __func__, rki->key_id));
if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(sect, rki->key_id)) != 0)
goto out;
}
if (sshbuf_len(sect) != 0) {
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(buf, KRL_SECTION_CERT_KEY_ID)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_stringb(buf, sect)) != 0)
goto out;
}
r = 0;
out:
bitmap_free(bitmap);
sshbuf_free(sect);
return r;
}
int
ssh_krl_to_blob(struct ssh_krl *krl, struct sshbuf *buf,
struct sshkey **sign_keys, u_int nsign_keys)
{
int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
struct revoked_certs *rc;
struct revoked_blob *rb;
struct sshbuf *sect;
u_char *sblob = NULL;
size_t slen, i;
if (krl->generated_date == 0)
krl->generated_date = time(NULL);
if ((sect = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
/* Store the header */
if ((r = sshbuf_put(buf, KRL_MAGIC, sizeof(KRL_MAGIC) - 1)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u32(buf, KRL_FORMAT_VERSION)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u64(buf, krl->krl_version)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u64(buf, krl->generated_date)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u64(buf, krl->flags)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_string(buf, NULL, 0)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_cstring(buf, krl->comment)) != 0)
goto out;
/* Store sections for revoked certificates */
TAILQ_FOREACH(rc, &krl->revoked_certs, entry) {
sshbuf_reset(sect);
if ((r = revoked_certs_generate(rc, sect)) != 0)
goto out;
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(buf, KRL_SECTION_CERTIFICATES)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_stringb(buf, sect)) != 0)
goto out;
}
/* Finally, output sections for revocations by public key/hash */
sshbuf_reset(sect);
RB_FOREACH(rb, revoked_blob_tree, &krl->revoked_keys) {
KRL_DBG(("%s: key len %zu ", __func__, rb->len));
if ((r = sshbuf_put_string(sect, rb->blob, rb->len)) != 0)
goto out;
}
if (sshbuf_len(sect) != 0) {
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(buf, KRL_SECTION_EXPLICIT_KEY)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_stringb(buf, sect)) != 0)
goto out;
}
sshbuf_reset(sect);
RB_FOREACH(rb, revoked_blob_tree, &krl->revoked_sha1s) {
KRL_DBG(("%s: hash len %zu ", __func__, rb->len));
if ((r = sshbuf_put_string(sect, rb->blob, rb->len)) != 0)
goto out;
}
if (sshbuf_len(sect) != 0) {
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(buf,
KRL_SECTION_FINGERPRINT_SHA1)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_stringb(buf, sect)) != 0)
goto out;
}
sshbuf_reset(sect);
RB_FOREACH(rb, revoked_blob_tree, &krl->revoked_sha256s) {
KRL_DBG(("%s: hash len %zu ", __func__, rb->len));
if ((r = sshbuf_put_string(sect, rb->blob, rb->len)) != 0)
goto out;
}
if (sshbuf_len(sect) != 0) {
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(buf,
KRL_SECTION_FINGERPRINT_SHA256)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_stringb(buf, sect)) != 0)
goto out;
}
for (i = 0; i < nsign_keys; i++) {
KRL_DBG(("%s: signature key %s", __func__,
sshkey_ssh_name(sign_keys[i])));
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(buf, KRL_SECTION_SIGNATURE)) != 0 ||
(r = sshkey_puts(sign_keys[i], buf)) != 0)
goto out;
-
+ /* XXX support sk-* keys */
if ((r = sshkey_sign(sign_keys[i], &sblob, &slen,
- sshbuf_ptr(buf), sshbuf_len(buf), NULL, NULL, 0)) != 0)
+ sshbuf_ptr(buf), sshbuf_len(buf), NULL, NULL,
+ NULL, 0)) != 0)
goto out;
KRL_DBG(("%s: signature sig len %zu", __func__, slen));
if ((r = sshbuf_put_string(buf, sblob, slen)) != 0)
goto out;
}
r = 0;
out:
free(sblob);
sshbuf_free(sect);
return r;
}
static void
format_timestamp(u_int64_t timestamp, char *ts, size_t nts)
{
time_t t;
struct tm *tm;
t = timestamp;
tm = localtime(&t);
if (tm == NULL)
strlcpy(ts, "<INVALID>", nts);
else {
*ts = '\0';
strftime(ts, nts, "%Y%m%dT%H%M%S", tm);
}
}
static int
parse_revoked_certs(struct sshbuf *buf, struct ssh_krl *krl)
{
int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
u_char type;
const u_char *blob;
size_t blen, nbits;
struct sshbuf *subsect = NULL;
u_int64_t serial, serial_lo, serial_hi;
struct bitmap *bitmap = NULL;
char *key_id = NULL;
struct sshkey *ca_key = NULL;
if ((subsect = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
/* Header: key, reserved */
if ((r = sshbuf_get_string_direct(buf, &blob, &blen)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_skip_string(buf)) != 0)
goto out;
if (blen != 0 && (r = sshkey_from_blob(blob, blen, &ca_key)) != 0)
goto out;
while (sshbuf_len(buf) > 0) {
sshbuf_free(subsect);
subsect = NULL;
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(buf, &type)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_froms(buf, &subsect)) != 0)
goto out;
KRL_DBG(("%s: subsection type 0x%02x", __func__, type));
/* sshbuf_dump(subsect, stderr); */
switch (type) {
case KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_LIST:
while (sshbuf_len(subsect) > 0) {
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u64(subsect, &serial)) != 0)
goto out;
if ((r = ssh_krl_revoke_cert_by_serial(krl,
ca_key, serial)) != 0)
goto out;
}
break;
case KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_RANGE:
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u64(subsect, &serial_lo)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_u64(subsect, &serial_hi)) != 0)
goto out;
if ((r = ssh_krl_revoke_cert_by_serial_range(krl,
ca_key, serial_lo, serial_hi)) != 0)
goto out;
break;
case KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_BITMAP:
if ((bitmap = bitmap_new()) == NULL) {
r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
goto out;
}
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u64(subsect, &serial_lo)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_bignum2_bytes_direct(subsect,
&blob, &blen)) != 0)
goto out;
if (bitmap_from_string(bitmap, blob, blen) != 0) {
r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
goto out;
}
nbits = bitmap_nbits(bitmap);
for (serial = 0; serial < (u_int64_t)nbits; serial++) {
if (serial > 0 && serial_lo + serial == 0) {
error("%s: bitmap wraps u64", __func__);
r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
goto out;
}
if (!bitmap_test_bit(bitmap, serial))
continue;
if ((r = ssh_krl_revoke_cert_by_serial(krl,
ca_key, serial_lo + serial)) != 0)
goto out;
}
bitmap_free(bitmap);
bitmap = NULL;
break;
case KRL_SECTION_CERT_KEY_ID:
while (sshbuf_len(subsect) > 0) {
if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(subsect,
&key_id, NULL)) != 0)
goto out;
if ((r = ssh_krl_revoke_cert_by_key_id(krl,
ca_key, key_id)) != 0)
goto out;
free(key_id);
key_id = NULL;
}
break;
default:
error("Unsupported KRL certificate section %u", type);
r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
goto out;
}
if (sshbuf_len(subsect) > 0) {
error("KRL certificate section contains unparsed data");
r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
goto out;
}
}
r = 0;
out:
if (bitmap != NULL)
bitmap_free(bitmap);
free(key_id);
sshkey_free(ca_key);
sshbuf_free(subsect);
return r;
}
static int
blob_section(struct sshbuf *sect, struct revoked_blob_tree *target_tree,
size_t expected_len)
{
u_char *rdata = NULL;
size_t rlen = 0;
int r;
while (sshbuf_len(sect) > 0) {
if ((r = sshbuf_get_string(sect, &rdata, &rlen)) != 0)
return r;
if (expected_len != 0 && rlen != expected_len) {
error("%s: bad length", __func__);
free(rdata);
return SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
}
if ((r = revoke_blob(target_tree, rdata, rlen)) != 0) {
free(rdata);
return r;
}
}
return 0;
}
/* Attempt to parse a KRL, checking its signature (if any) with sign_ca_keys. */
int
ssh_krl_from_blob(struct sshbuf *buf, struct ssh_krl **krlp,
const struct sshkey **sign_ca_keys, size_t nsign_ca_keys)
{
struct sshbuf *copy = NULL, *sect = NULL;
struct ssh_krl *krl = NULL;
char timestamp[64];
int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR, sig_seen;
struct sshkey *key = NULL, **ca_used = NULL, **tmp_ca_used;
u_char type;
const u_char *blob;
size_t i, j, sig_off, sects_off, blen, nca_used;
u_int format_version;
nca_used = 0;
*krlp = NULL;
if (sshbuf_len(buf) < sizeof(KRL_MAGIC) - 1 ||
memcmp(sshbuf_ptr(buf), KRL_MAGIC, sizeof(KRL_MAGIC) - 1) != 0) {
debug3("%s: not a KRL", __func__);
return SSH_ERR_KRL_BAD_MAGIC;
}
/* Take a copy of the KRL buffer so we can verify its signature later */
if ((copy = sshbuf_fromb(buf)) == NULL) {
r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
goto out;
}
if ((r = sshbuf_consume(copy, sizeof(KRL_MAGIC) - 1)) != 0)
goto out;
if ((krl = ssh_krl_init()) == NULL) {
error("%s: alloc failed", __func__);
goto out;
}
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(copy, &format_version)) != 0)
goto out;
if (format_version != KRL_FORMAT_VERSION) {
r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
goto out;
}
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u64(copy, &krl->krl_version)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_u64(copy, &krl->generated_date)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_u64(copy, &krl->flags)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_skip_string(copy)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_cstring(copy, &krl->comment, NULL)) != 0)
goto out;
format_timestamp(krl->generated_date, timestamp, sizeof(timestamp));
debug("KRL version %llu generated at %s%s%s",
(long long unsigned)krl->krl_version, timestamp,
*krl->comment ? ": " : "", krl->comment);
/*
* 1st pass: verify signatures, if any. This is done to avoid
* detailed parsing of data whose provenance is unverified.
*/
sig_seen = 0;
if (sshbuf_len(buf) < sshbuf_len(copy)) {
/* Shouldn't happen */
r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
goto out;
}
sects_off = sshbuf_len(buf) - sshbuf_len(copy);
while (sshbuf_len(copy) > 0) {
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(copy, &type)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_string_direct(copy, &blob, &blen)) != 0)
goto out;
KRL_DBG(("%s: first pass, section 0x%02x", __func__, type));
if (type != KRL_SECTION_SIGNATURE) {
if (sig_seen) {
error("KRL contains non-signature section "
"after signature");
r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
goto out;
}
/* Not interested for now. */
continue;
}
sig_seen = 1;
/* First string component is the signing key */
if ((r = sshkey_from_blob(blob, blen, &key)) != 0) {
r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
goto out;
}
if (sshbuf_len(buf) < sshbuf_len(copy)) {
/* Shouldn't happen */
r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
goto out;
}
sig_off = sshbuf_len(buf) - sshbuf_len(copy);
/* Second string component is the signature itself */
if ((r = sshbuf_get_string_direct(copy, &blob, &blen)) != 0) {
r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
goto out;
}
/* Check signature over entire KRL up to this point */
if ((r = sshkey_verify(key, blob, blen,
sshbuf_ptr(buf), sig_off, NULL, 0, NULL)) != 0)
goto out;
/* Check if this key has already signed this KRL */
for (i = 0; i < nca_used; i++) {
if (sshkey_equal(ca_used[i], key)) {
error("KRL signed more than once with "
"the same key");
r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
goto out;
}
}
/* Record keys used to sign the KRL */
tmp_ca_used = recallocarray(ca_used, nca_used, nca_used + 1,
sizeof(*ca_used));
if (tmp_ca_used == NULL) {
r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
goto out;
}
ca_used = tmp_ca_used;
ca_used[nca_used++] = key;
key = NULL;
}
if (sshbuf_len(copy) != 0) {
/* Shouldn't happen */
r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
goto out;
}
/*
* 2nd pass: parse and load the KRL, skipping the header to the point
* where the section start.
*/
sshbuf_free(copy);
if ((copy = sshbuf_fromb(buf)) == NULL) {
r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
goto out;
}
if ((r = sshbuf_consume(copy, sects_off)) != 0)
goto out;
while (sshbuf_len(copy) > 0) {
sshbuf_free(sect);
sect = NULL;
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(copy, &type)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_froms(copy, &sect)) != 0)
goto out;
KRL_DBG(("%s: second pass, section 0x%02x", __func__, type));
switch (type) {
case KRL_SECTION_CERTIFICATES:
if ((r = parse_revoked_certs(sect, krl)) != 0)
goto out;
break;
case KRL_SECTION_EXPLICIT_KEY:
if ((r = blob_section(sect,
&krl->revoked_keys, 0)) != 0)
goto out;
break;
case KRL_SECTION_FINGERPRINT_SHA1:
if ((r = blob_section(sect,
&krl->revoked_sha1s, 20)) != 0)
goto out;
break;
case KRL_SECTION_FINGERPRINT_SHA256:
if ((r = blob_section(sect,
&krl->revoked_sha256s, 32)) != 0)
goto out;
break;
case KRL_SECTION_SIGNATURE:
/* Handled above, but still need to stay in synch */
sshbuf_free(sect);
sect = NULL;
if ((r = sshbuf_skip_string(copy)) != 0)
goto out;
break;
default:
error("Unsupported KRL section %u", type);
r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
goto out;
}
if (sect != NULL && sshbuf_len(sect) > 0) {
error("KRL section contains unparsed data");
r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
goto out;
}
}
/* Check that the key(s) used to sign the KRL weren't revoked */
sig_seen = 0;
for (i = 0; i < nca_used; i++) {
if (ssh_krl_check_key(krl, ca_used[i]) == 0)
sig_seen = 1;
else {
sshkey_free(ca_used[i]);
ca_used[i] = NULL;
}
}
if (nca_used && !sig_seen) {
error("All keys used to sign KRL were revoked");
r = SSH_ERR_KEY_REVOKED;
goto out;
}
/* If we have CA keys, then verify that one was used to sign the KRL */
if (sig_seen && nsign_ca_keys != 0) {
sig_seen = 0;
for (i = 0; !sig_seen && i < nsign_ca_keys; i++) {
for (j = 0; j < nca_used; j++) {
if (ca_used[j] == NULL)
continue;
if (sshkey_equal(ca_used[j], sign_ca_keys[i])) {
sig_seen = 1;
break;
}
}
}
if (!sig_seen) {
r = SSH_ERR_SIGNATURE_INVALID;
error("KRL not signed with any trusted key");
goto out;
}
}
*krlp = krl;
r = 0;
out:
if (r != 0)
ssh_krl_free(krl);
for (i = 0; i < nca_used; i++)
sshkey_free(ca_used[i]);
free(ca_used);
sshkey_free(key);
sshbuf_free(copy);
sshbuf_free(sect);
return r;
}
/* Checks certificate serial number and key ID revocation */
static int
is_cert_revoked(const struct sshkey *key, struct revoked_certs *rc)
{
struct revoked_serial rs, *ers;
struct revoked_key_id rki, *erki;
/* Check revocation by cert key ID */
memset(&rki, 0, sizeof(rki));
rki.key_id = key->cert->key_id;
erki = RB_FIND(revoked_key_id_tree, &rc->revoked_key_ids, &rki);
if (erki != NULL) {
KRL_DBG(("%s: revoked by key ID", __func__));
return SSH_ERR_KEY_REVOKED;
}
/*
* Zero serials numbers are ignored (it's the default when the
* CA doesn't specify one).
*/
if (key->cert->serial == 0)
return 0;
memset(&rs, 0, sizeof(rs));
rs.lo = rs.hi = key->cert->serial;
ers = RB_FIND(revoked_serial_tree, &rc->revoked_serials, &rs);
if (ers != NULL) {
KRL_DBG(("%s: revoked serial %llu matched %llu:%llu", __func__,
key->cert->serial, ers->lo, ers->hi));
return SSH_ERR_KEY_REVOKED;
}
return 0;
}
/* Checks whether a given key/cert is revoked. Does not check its CA */
static int
is_key_revoked(struct ssh_krl *krl, const struct sshkey *key)
{
struct revoked_blob rb, *erb;
struct revoked_certs *rc;
int r;
/* Check explicitly revoked hashes first */
memset(&rb, 0, sizeof(rb));
if ((r = sshkey_fingerprint_raw(key, SSH_DIGEST_SHA1,
&rb.blob, &rb.len)) != 0)
return r;
erb = RB_FIND(revoked_blob_tree, &krl->revoked_sha1s, &rb);
free(rb.blob);
if (erb != NULL) {
KRL_DBG(("%s: revoked by key SHA1", __func__));
return SSH_ERR_KEY_REVOKED;
}
memset(&rb, 0, sizeof(rb));
if ((r = sshkey_fingerprint_raw(key, SSH_DIGEST_SHA256,
&rb.blob, &rb.len)) != 0)
return r;
erb = RB_FIND(revoked_blob_tree, &krl->revoked_sha256s, &rb);
free(rb.blob);
if (erb != NULL) {
KRL_DBG(("%s: revoked by key SHA256", __func__));
return SSH_ERR_KEY_REVOKED;
}
/* Next, explicit keys */
memset(&rb, 0, sizeof(rb));
if ((r = plain_key_blob(key, &rb.blob, &rb.len)) != 0)
return r;
erb = RB_FIND(revoked_blob_tree, &krl->revoked_keys, &rb);
free(rb.blob);
if (erb != NULL) {
KRL_DBG(("%s: revoked by explicit key", __func__));
return SSH_ERR_KEY_REVOKED;
}
if (!sshkey_is_cert(key))
return 0;
/* Check cert revocation for the specified CA */
if ((r = revoked_certs_for_ca_key(krl, key->cert->signature_key,
&rc, 0)) != 0)
return r;
if (rc != NULL) {
if ((r = is_cert_revoked(key, rc)) != 0)
return r;
}
/* Check cert revocation for the wildcard CA */
if ((r = revoked_certs_for_ca_key(krl, NULL, &rc, 0)) != 0)
return r;
if (rc != NULL) {
if ((r = is_cert_revoked(key, rc)) != 0)
return r;
}
KRL_DBG(("%s: %llu no match", __func__, key->cert->serial));
return 0;
}
int
ssh_krl_check_key(struct ssh_krl *krl, const struct sshkey *key)
{
int r;
KRL_DBG(("%s: checking key", __func__));
if ((r = is_key_revoked(krl, key)) != 0)
return r;
if (sshkey_is_cert(key)) {
debug2("%s: checking CA key", __func__);
if ((r = is_key_revoked(krl, key->cert->signature_key)) != 0)
return r;
}
KRL_DBG(("%s: key okay", __func__));
return 0;
}
int
ssh_krl_file_contains_key(const char *path, const struct sshkey *key)
{
struct sshbuf *krlbuf = NULL;
struct ssh_krl *krl = NULL;
int oerrno = 0, r;
if (path == NULL)
return 0;
if ((r = sshbuf_load_file(path, &krlbuf)) != 0) {
oerrno = errno;
goto out;
}
if ((r = ssh_krl_from_blob(krlbuf, &krl, NULL, 0)) != 0)
goto out;
debug2("%s: checking KRL %s", __func__, path);
r = ssh_krl_check_key(krl, key);
out:
sshbuf_free(krlbuf);
ssh_krl_free(krl);
if (r != 0)
errno = oerrno;
return r;
}
int
krl_dump(struct ssh_krl *krl, FILE *f)
{
struct sshkey *key = NULL;
struct revoked_blob *rb;
struct revoked_certs *rc;
struct revoked_serial *rs;
struct revoked_key_id *rki;
int r, ret = 0;
char *fp, timestamp[64];
/* Try to print in a KRL spec-compatible format */
format_timestamp(krl->generated_date, timestamp, sizeof(timestamp));
fprintf(f, "# KRL version %llu\n",
(unsigned long long)krl->krl_version);
fprintf(f, "# Generated at %s\n", timestamp);
if (krl->comment != NULL && *krl->comment != '\0') {
r = INT_MAX;
asmprintf(&fp, INT_MAX, &r, "%s", krl->comment);
fprintf(f, "# Comment: %s\n", fp);
free(fp);
}
fputc('\n', f);
RB_FOREACH(rb, revoked_blob_tree, &krl->revoked_keys) {
if ((r = sshkey_from_blob(rb->blob, rb->len, &key)) != 0) {
ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
error("Parse key in KRL: %s", ssh_err(r));
continue;
}
if ((fp = sshkey_fingerprint(key, SSH_FP_HASH_DEFAULT,
SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL) {
ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
error("sshkey_fingerprint failed");
continue;
}
fprintf(f, "hash: SHA256:%s # %s\n", fp, sshkey_ssh_name(key));
free(fp);
free(key);
}
RB_FOREACH(rb, revoked_blob_tree, &krl->revoked_sha256s) {
fp = tohex(rb->blob, rb->len);
fprintf(f, "hash: SHA256:%s\n", fp);
free(fp);
}
RB_FOREACH(rb, revoked_blob_tree, &krl->revoked_sha1s) {
/*
* There is not KRL spec keyword for raw SHA1 hashes, so
* print them as comments.
*/
fp = tohex(rb->blob, rb->len);
fprintf(f, "# hash SHA1:%s\n", fp);
free(fp);
}
TAILQ_FOREACH(rc, &krl->revoked_certs, entry) {
fputc('\n', f);
if (rc->ca_key == NULL)
fprintf(f, "# Wildcard CA\n");
else {
if ((fp = sshkey_fingerprint(rc->ca_key,
SSH_FP_HASH_DEFAULT, SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL) {
ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
error("sshkey_fingerprint failed");
continue;
}
fprintf(f, "# CA key %s %s\n",
sshkey_ssh_name(rc->ca_key), fp);
free(fp);
}
RB_FOREACH(rs, revoked_serial_tree, &rc->revoked_serials) {
if (rs->lo == rs->hi) {
fprintf(f, "serial: %llu\n",
(unsigned long long)rs->lo);
} else {
fprintf(f, "serial: %llu-%llu\n",
(unsigned long long)rs->lo,
(unsigned long long)rs->hi);
}
}
RB_FOREACH(rki, revoked_key_id_tree, &rc->revoked_key_ids) {
/*
* We don't want key IDs with embedded newlines to
* mess up the display.
*/
r = INT_MAX;
asmprintf(&fp, INT_MAX, &r, "%s", rki->key_id);
fprintf(f, "id: %s\n", fp);
free(fp);
}
}
return ret;
}
diff --git a/log.c b/log.c
index d9c2d136cc68..6b1a7a31417b 100644
--- a/log.c
+++ b/log.c
@@ -1,480 +1,488 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: log.c,v 1.51 2018/07/27 12:03:17 markus Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: log.c,v 1.52 2020/07/03 06:46:41 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
* Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
* All rights reserved
*
* As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
* can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this
* software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
* incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
* called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
*/
/*
* Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
* OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
* IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
* INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
* NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
* DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
* THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
* (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
* THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
*/
#include "includes.h"
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <stdarg.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <syslog.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <errno.h>
#if defined(HAVE_STRNVIS) && defined(HAVE_VIS_H) && !defined(BROKEN_STRNVIS)
# include <vis.h>
#endif
#include "log.h"
static LogLevel log_level = SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO;
static int log_on_stderr = 1;
static int log_stderr_fd = STDERR_FILENO;
static int log_facility = LOG_AUTH;
static char *argv0;
static log_handler_fn *log_handler;
static void *log_handler_ctx;
extern char *__progname;
#define LOG_SYSLOG_VIS (VIS_CSTYLE|VIS_NL|VIS_TAB|VIS_OCTAL)
#define LOG_STDERR_VIS (VIS_SAFE|VIS_OCTAL)
/* textual representation of log-facilities/levels */
static struct {
const char *name;
SyslogFacility val;
} log_facilities[] = {
{ "DAEMON", SYSLOG_FACILITY_DAEMON },
{ "USER", SYSLOG_FACILITY_USER },
{ "AUTH", SYSLOG_FACILITY_AUTH },
#ifdef LOG_AUTHPRIV
{ "AUTHPRIV", SYSLOG_FACILITY_AUTHPRIV },
#endif
{ "LOCAL0", SYSLOG_FACILITY_LOCAL0 },
{ "LOCAL1", SYSLOG_FACILITY_LOCAL1 },
{ "LOCAL2", SYSLOG_FACILITY_LOCAL2 },
{ "LOCAL3", SYSLOG_FACILITY_LOCAL3 },
{ "LOCAL4", SYSLOG_FACILITY_LOCAL4 },
{ "LOCAL5", SYSLOG_FACILITY_LOCAL5 },
{ "LOCAL6", SYSLOG_FACILITY_LOCAL6 },
{ "LOCAL7", SYSLOG_FACILITY_LOCAL7 },
{ NULL, SYSLOG_FACILITY_NOT_SET }
};
static struct {
const char *name;
LogLevel val;
} log_levels[] =
{
{ "QUIET", SYSLOG_LEVEL_QUIET },
{ "FATAL", SYSLOG_LEVEL_FATAL },
{ "ERROR", SYSLOG_LEVEL_ERROR },
{ "INFO", SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO },
{ "VERBOSE", SYSLOG_LEVEL_VERBOSE },
{ "DEBUG", SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG1 },
{ "DEBUG1", SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG1 },
{ "DEBUG2", SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG2 },
{ "DEBUG3", SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG3 },
{ NULL, SYSLOG_LEVEL_NOT_SET }
};
LogLevel
log_level_get(void)
{
return log_level;
}
SyslogFacility
log_facility_number(char *name)
{
int i;
if (name != NULL)
for (i = 0; log_facilities[i].name; i++)
if (strcasecmp(log_facilities[i].name, name) == 0)
return log_facilities[i].val;
return SYSLOG_FACILITY_NOT_SET;
}
const char *
log_facility_name(SyslogFacility facility)
{
u_int i;
for (i = 0; log_facilities[i].name; i++)
if (log_facilities[i].val == facility)
return log_facilities[i].name;
return NULL;
}
LogLevel
log_level_number(char *name)
{
int i;
if (name != NULL)
for (i = 0; log_levels[i].name; i++)
if (strcasecmp(log_levels[i].name, name) == 0)
return log_levels[i].val;
return SYSLOG_LEVEL_NOT_SET;
}
const char *
log_level_name(LogLevel level)
{
u_int i;
for (i = 0; log_levels[i].name != NULL; i++)
if (log_levels[i].val == level)
return log_levels[i].name;
return NULL;
}
/* Error messages that should be logged. */
void
error(const char *fmt,...)
{
va_list args;
va_start(args, fmt);
do_log(SYSLOG_LEVEL_ERROR, fmt, args);
va_end(args);
}
void
sigdie(const char *fmt,...)
{
#ifdef DO_LOG_SAFE_IN_SIGHAND
va_list args;
va_start(args, fmt);
do_log(SYSLOG_LEVEL_FATAL, fmt, args);
va_end(args);
#endif
_exit(1);
}
void
logdie(const char *fmt,...)
{
va_list args;
va_start(args, fmt);
do_log(SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO, fmt, args);
va_end(args);
cleanup_exit(255);
}
/* Log this message (information that usually should go to the log). */
void
logit(const char *fmt,...)
{
va_list args;
va_start(args, fmt);
do_log(SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO, fmt, args);
va_end(args);
}
/* More detailed messages (information that does not need to go to the log). */
void
verbose(const char *fmt,...)
{
va_list args;
va_start(args, fmt);
do_log(SYSLOG_LEVEL_VERBOSE, fmt, args);
va_end(args);
}
/* Debugging messages that should not be logged during normal operation. */
void
debug(const char *fmt,...)
{
va_list args;
va_start(args, fmt);
do_log(SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG1, fmt, args);
va_end(args);
}
void
debug2(const char *fmt,...)
{
va_list args;
va_start(args, fmt);
do_log(SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG2, fmt, args);
va_end(args);
}
void
debug3(const char *fmt,...)
{
va_list args;
va_start(args, fmt);
do_log(SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG3, fmt, args);
va_end(args);
}
/*
* Initialize the log.
*/
void
log_init(char *av0, LogLevel level, SyslogFacility facility, int on_stderr)
{
#if defined(HAVE_OPENLOG_R) && defined(SYSLOG_DATA_INIT)
struct syslog_data sdata = SYSLOG_DATA_INIT;
#endif
argv0 = av0;
if (log_change_level(level) != 0) {
fprintf(stderr, "Unrecognized internal syslog level code %d\n",
(int) level);
exit(1);
}
log_handler = NULL;
log_handler_ctx = NULL;
log_on_stderr = on_stderr;
if (on_stderr)
return;
switch (facility) {
case SYSLOG_FACILITY_DAEMON:
log_facility = LOG_DAEMON;
break;
case SYSLOG_FACILITY_USER:
log_facility = LOG_USER;
break;
case SYSLOG_FACILITY_AUTH:
log_facility = LOG_AUTH;
break;
#ifdef LOG_AUTHPRIV
case SYSLOG_FACILITY_AUTHPRIV:
log_facility = LOG_AUTHPRIV;
break;
#endif
case SYSLOG_FACILITY_LOCAL0:
log_facility = LOG_LOCAL0;
break;
case SYSLOG_FACILITY_LOCAL1:
log_facility = LOG_LOCAL1;
break;
case SYSLOG_FACILITY_LOCAL2:
log_facility = LOG_LOCAL2;
break;
case SYSLOG_FACILITY_LOCAL3:
log_facility = LOG_LOCAL3;
break;
case SYSLOG_FACILITY_LOCAL4:
log_facility = LOG_LOCAL4;
break;
case SYSLOG_FACILITY_LOCAL5:
log_facility = LOG_LOCAL5;
break;
case SYSLOG_FACILITY_LOCAL6:
log_facility = LOG_LOCAL6;
break;
case SYSLOG_FACILITY_LOCAL7:
log_facility = LOG_LOCAL7;
break;
default:
fprintf(stderr,
"Unrecognized internal syslog facility code %d\n",
(int) facility);
exit(1);
}
/*
* If an external library (eg libwrap) attempts to use syslog
* immediately after reexec, syslog may be pointing to the wrong
* facility, so we force an open/close of syslog here.
*/
#if defined(HAVE_OPENLOG_R) && defined(SYSLOG_DATA_INIT)
openlog_r(argv0 ? argv0 : __progname, LOG_PID, log_facility, &sdata);
closelog_r(&sdata);
#else
openlog(argv0 ? argv0 : __progname, LOG_PID, log_facility);
closelog();
#endif
}
int
log_change_level(LogLevel new_log_level)
{
/* no-op if log_init has not been called */
if (argv0 == NULL)
return 0;
switch (new_log_level) {
case SYSLOG_LEVEL_QUIET:
case SYSLOG_LEVEL_FATAL:
case SYSLOG_LEVEL_ERROR:
case SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO:
case SYSLOG_LEVEL_VERBOSE:
case SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG1:
case SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG2:
case SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG3:
log_level = new_log_level;
return 0;
default:
return -1;
}
}
int
log_is_on_stderr(void)
{
return log_on_stderr && log_stderr_fd == STDERR_FILENO;
}
/* redirect what would usually get written to stderr to specified file */
void
log_redirect_stderr_to(const char *logfile)
{
int fd;
+ if (logfile == NULL) {
+ if (log_stderr_fd != STDERR_FILENO) {
+ close(log_stderr_fd);
+ log_stderr_fd = STDERR_FILENO;
+ }
+ return;
+ }
+
if ((fd = open(logfile, O_WRONLY|O_CREAT|O_APPEND, 0600)) == -1) {
fprintf(stderr, "Couldn't open logfile %s: %s\n", logfile,
strerror(errno));
exit(1);
}
log_stderr_fd = fd;
}
#define MSGBUFSIZ 1024
void
set_log_handler(log_handler_fn *handler, void *ctx)
{
log_handler = handler;
log_handler_ctx = ctx;
}
void
do_log2(LogLevel level, const char *fmt,...)
{
va_list args;
va_start(args, fmt);
do_log(level, fmt, args);
va_end(args);
}
void
do_log(LogLevel level, const char *fmt, va_list args)
{
#if defined(HAVE_OPENLOG_R) && defined(SYSLOG_DATA_INIT)
struct syslog_data sdata = SYSLOG_DATA_INIT;
#endif
char msgbuf[MSGBUFSIZ];
char fmtbuf[MSGBUFSIZ];
char *txt = NULL;
int pri = LOG_INFO;
int saved_errno = errno;
log_handler_fn *tmp_handler;
if (level > log_level)
return;
switch (level) {
case SYSLOG_LEVEL_FATAL:
if (!log_on_stderr)
txt = "fatal";
pri = LOG_CRIT;
break;
case SYSLOG_LEVEL_ERROR:
if (!log_on_stderr)
txt = "error";
pri = LOG_ERR;
break;
case SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO:
pri = LOG_INFO;
break;
case SYSLOG_LEVEL_VERBOSE:
pri = LOG_INFO;
break;
case SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG1:
txt = "debug1";
pri = LOG_DEBUG;
break;
case SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG2:
txt = "debug2";
pri = LOG_DEBUG;
break;
case SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG3:
txt = "debug3";
pri = LOG_DEBUG;
break;
default:
txt = "internal error";
pri = LOG_ERR;
break;
}
if (txt != NULL && log_handler == NULL) {
snprintf(fmtbuf, sizeof(fmtbuf), "%s: %s", txt, fmt);
vsnprintf(msgbuf, sizeof(msgbuf), fmtbuf, args);
} else {
vsnprintf(msgbuf, sizeof(msgbuf), fmt, args);
}
strnvis(fmtbuf, msgbuf, sizeof(fmtbuf),
log_on_stderr ? LOG_STDERR_VIS : LOG_SYSLOG_VIS);
if (log_handler != NULL) {
/* Avoid recursion */
tmp_handler = log_handler;
log_handler = NULL;
tmp_handler(level, fmtbuf, log_handler_ctx);
log_handler = tmp_handler;
} else if (log_on_stderr) {
snprintf(msgbuf, sizeof msgbuf, "%.*s\r\n",
(int)sizeof msgbuf - 3, fmtbuf);
(void)write(log_stderr_fd, msgbuf, strlen(msgbuf));
} else {
#if defined(HAVE_OPENLOG_R) && defined(SYSLOG_DATA_INIT)
openlog_r(argv0 ? argv0 : __progname, LOG_PID, log_facility, &sdata);
syslog_r(pri, &sdata, "%.500s", fmtbuf);
closelog_r(&sdata);
#else
openlog(argv0 ? argv0 : __progname, LOG_PID, log_facility);
syslog(pri, "%.500s", fmtbuf);
closelog();
#endif
}
errno = saved_errno;
}
diff --git a/loginrec.c b/loginrec.c
index e5289deb83eb..ea058fd6fa75 100644
--- a/loginrec.c
+++ b/loginrec.c
@@ -1,1726 +1,1729 @@
/*
* Copyright (c) 2000 Andre Lucas. All rights reserved.
* Portions copyright (c) 1998 Todd C. Miller
* Portions copyright (c) 1996 Jason Downs
* Portions copyright (c) 1996 Theo de Raadt
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
* OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
* IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
* INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
* NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
* DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
* THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
* (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
* THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
*/
/*
* The btmp logging code is derived from login.c from util-linux and is under
* the the following license:
*
* Copyright (c) 1980, 1987, 1988 The Regents of the University of California.
* All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms are permitted
* provided that the above copyright notice and this paragraph are
* duplicated in all such forms and that any documentation,
* advertising materials, and other materials related to such
* distribution and use acknowledge that the software was developed
* by the University of California, Berkeley. The name of the
* University may not be used to endorse or promote products derived
* from this software without specific prior written permission.
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED ``AS IS'' AND WITHOUT ANY EXPRESS OR
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, WITHOUT LIMITATION, THE IMPLIED
* WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTIBILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.
*/
/**
** loginrec.c: platform-independent login recording and lastlog retrieval
**/
/*
* The new login code explained
* ============================
*
* This code attempts to provide a common interface to login recording
* (utmp and friends) and last login time retrieval.
*
* Its primary means of achieving this is to use 'struct logininfo', a
* union of all the useful fields in the various different types of
* system login record structures one finds on UNIX variants.
*
* We depend on autoconf to define which recording methods are to be
* used, and which fields are contained in the relevant data structures
* on the local system. Many C preprocessor symbols affect which code
* gets compiled here.
*
* The code is designed to make it easy to modify a particular
* recording method, without affecting other methods nor requiring so
* many nested conditional compilation blocks as were commonplace in
* the old code.
*
* For login recording, we try to use the local system's libraries as
* these are clearly most likely to work correctly. For utmp systems
* this usually means login() and logout() or setutent() etc., probably
* in libutil, along with logwtmp() etc. On these systems, we fall back
* to writing the files directly if we have to, though this method
* requires very thorough testing so we do not corrupt local auditing
* information. These files and their access methods are very system
* specific indeed.
*
* For utmpx systems, the corresponding library functions are
* setutxent() etc. To the author's knowledge, all utmpx systems have
* these library functions and so no direct write is attempted. If such
* a system exists and needs support, direct analogues of the [uw]tmp
* code should suffice.
*
* Retrieving the time of last login ('lastlog') is in some ways even
* more problemmatic than login recording. Some systems provide a
* simple table of all users which we seek based on uid and retrieve a
* relatively standard structure. Others record the same information in
* a directory with a separate file, and others don't record the
* information separately at all. For systems in the latter category,
* we look backwards in the wtmp or wtmpx file for the last login entry
* for our user. Naturally this is slower and on busy systems could
* incur a significant performance penalty.
*
* Calling the new code
* --------------------
*
* In OpenSSH all login recording and retrieval is performed in
* login.c. Here you'll find working examples. Also, in the logintest.c
* program there are more examples.
*
* Internal handler calling method
* -------------------------------
*
* When a call is made to login_login() or login_logout(), both
* routines set a struct logininfo flag defining which action (log in,
* or log out) is to be taken. They both then call login_write(), which
* calls whichever of the many structure-specific handlers autoconf
* selects for the local system.
*
* The handlers themselves handle system data structure specifics. Both
* struct utmp and struct utmpx have utility functions (see
* construct_utmp*()) to try to make it simpler to add extra systems
* that introduce new features to either structure.
*
* While it may seem terribly wasteful to replicate so much similar
* code for each method, experience has shown that maintaining code to
* write both struct utmp and utmpx in one function, whilst maintaining
* support for all systems whether they have library support or not, is
* a difficult and time-consuming task.
*
* Lastlog support proceeds similarly. Functions login_get_lastlog()
* (and its OpenSSH-tuned friend login_get_lastlog_time()) call
* getlast_entry(), which tries one of three methods to find the last
* login time. It uses local system lastlog support if it can,
* otherwise it tries wtmp or wtmpx before giving up and returning 0,
* meaning "tilt".
*
* Maintenance
* -----------
*
* In many cases it's possible to tweak autoconf to select the correct
* methods for a particular platform, either by improving the detection
* code (best), or by presetting DISABLE_<method> or CONF_<method>_FILE
* symbols for the platform.
*
* Use logintest to check which symbols are defined before modifying
* configure.ac and loginrec.c. (You have to build logintest yourself
* with 'make logintest' as it's not built by default.)
*
* Otherwise, patches to the specific method(s) are very helpful!
*/
#include "includes.h"
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/stat.h>
#include <sys/socket.h>
#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TIME_H
# include <sys/time.h>
#endif
#include <netinet/in.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
#ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H
# include <paths.h>
#endif
#include <pwd.h>
#include <stdarg.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <time.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include "xmalloc.h"
#include "sshkey.h"
#include "hostfile.h"
#include "ssh.h"
#include "loginrec.h"
#include "log.h"
#include "atomicio.h"
#include "packet.h"
#include "canohost.h"
#include "auth.h"
#include "sshbuf.h"
#include "ssherr.h"
#ifdef HAVE_UTIL_H
# include <util.h>
#endif
/**
** prototypes for helper functions in this file
**/
#if HAVE_UTMP_H
void set_utmp_time(struct logininfo *li, struct utmp *ut);
void construct_utmp(struct logininfo *li, struct utmp *ut);
#endif
#ifdef HAVE_UTMPX_H
void set_utmpx_time(struct logininfo *li, struct utmpx *ut);
void construct_utmpx(struct logininfo *li, struct utmpx *ut);
#endif
int utmp_write_entry(struct logininfo *li);
int utmpx_write_entry(struct logininfo *li);
int wtmp_write_entry(struct logininfo *li);
int wtmpx_write_entry(struct logininfo *li);
int lastlog_write_entry(struct logininfo *li);
int syslogin_write_entry(struct logininfo *li);
int getlast_entry(struct logininfo *li);
int lastlog_get_entry(struct logininfo *li);
int utmpx_get_entry(struct logininfo *li);
int wtmp_get_entry(struct logininfo *li);
int wtmpx_get_entry(struct logininfo *li);
extern struct sshbuf *loginmsg;
/* pick the shortest string */
#define MIN_SIZEOF(s1,s2) (sizeof(s1) < sizeof(s2) ? sizeof(s1) : sizeof(s2))
/**
** platform-independent login functions
**/
/*
* login_login(struct logininfo *) - Record a login
*
* Call with a pointer to a struct logininfo initialised with
* login_init_entry() or login_alloc_entry()
*
* Returns:
* >0 if successful
* 0 on failure (will use OpenSSH's logging facilities for diagnostics)
*/
int
login_login(struct logininfo *li)
{
li->type = LTYPE_LOGIN;
return (login_write(li));
}
/*
* login_logout(struct logininfo *) - Record a logout
*
* Call as with login_login()
*
* Returns:
* >0 if successful
* 0 on failure (will use OpenSSH's logging facilities for diagnostics)
*/
int
login_logout(struct logininfo *li)
{
li->type = LTYPE_LOGOUT;
return (login_write(li));
}
/*
* login_get_lastlog_time(int) - Retrieve the last login time
*
* Retrieve the last login time for the given uid. Will try to use the
* system lastlog facilities if they are available, but will fall back
* to looking in wtmp/wtmpx if necessary
*
* Returns:
* 0 on failure, or if user has never logged in
* Time in seconds from the epoch if successful
*
* Useful preprocessor symbols:
* DISABLE_LASTLOG: If set, *never* even try to retrieve lastlog
* info
* USE_LASTLOG: If set, indicates the presence of system lastlog
* facilities. If this and DISABLE_LASTLOG are not set,
* try to retrieve lastlog information from wtmp/wtmpx.
*/
unsigned int
login_get_lastlog_time(const uid_t uid)
{
struct logininfo li;
if (login_get_lastlog(&li, uid))
return (li.tv_sec);
else
return (0);
}
/*
* login_get_lastlog(struct logininfo *, int) - Retrieve a lastlog entry
*
* Retrieve a logininfo structure populated (only partially) with
* information from the system lastlog data, or from wtmp/wtmpx if no
* system lastlog information exists.
*
* Note this routine must be given a pre-allocated logininfo.
*
* Returns:
* >0: A pointer to your struct logininfo if successful
* 0 on failure (will use OpenSSH's logging facilities for diagnostics)
*/
struct logininfo *
login_get_lastlog(struct logininfo *li, const uid_t uid)
{
struct passwd *pw;
memset(li, '\0', sizeof(*li));
li->uid = uid;
/*
* If we don't have a 'real' lastlog, we need the username to
* reliably search wtmp(x) for the last login (see
* wtmp_get_entry().)
*/
pw = getpwuid(uid);
if (pw == NULL)
fatal("%s: Cannot find account for uid %ld", __func__,
(long)uid);
if (strlcpy(li->username, pw->pw_name, sizeof(li->username)) >=
sizeof(li->username)) {
error("%s: username too long (%lu > max %lu)", __func__,
(unsigned long)strlen(pw->pw_name),
(unsigned long)sizeof(li->username) - 1);
return NULL;
}
if (getlast_entry(li))
return (li);
else
return (NULL);
}
/*
* login_alloc_entry(int, char*, char*, char*) - Allocate and initialise
* a logininfo structure
*
* This function creates a new struct logininfo, a data structure
* meant to carry the information required to portably record login info.
*
* Returns a pointer to a newly created struct logininfo. If memory
* allocation fails, the program halts.
*/
struct
logininfo *login_alloc_entry(pid_t pid, const char *username,
const char *hostname, const char *line)
{
struct logininfo *newli;
newli = xmalloc(sizeof(*newli));
login_init_entry(newli, pid, username, hostname, line);
return (newli);
}
/* login_free_entry(struct logininfo *) - free struct memory */
void
login_free_entry(struct logininfo *li)
{
free(li);
}
/* login_init_entry(struct logininfo *, int, char*, char*, char*)
* - initialise a struct logininfo
*
* Populates a new struct logininfo, a data structure meant to carry
* the information required to portably record login info.
*
* Returns: 1
*/
int
login_init_entry(struct logininfo *li, pid_t pid, const char *username,
const char *hostname, const char *line)
{
struct passwd *pw;
memset(li, 0, sizeof(*li));
li->pid = pid;
/* set the line information */
if (line)
line_fullname(li->line, line, sizeof(li->line));
if (username) {
strlcpy(li->username, username, sizeof(li->username));
pw = getpwnam(li->username);
if (pw == NULL) {
fatal("%s: Cannot find user \"%s\"", __func__,
li->username);
}
li->uid = pw->pw_uid;
}
if (hostname)
strlcpy(li->hostname, hostname, sizeof(li->hostname));
return (1);
}
/*
* login_set_current_time(struct logininfo *) - set the current time
*
* Set the current time in a logininfo structure. This function is
* meant to eliminate the need to deal with system dependencies for
* time handling.
*/
void
login_set_current_time(struct logininfo *li)
{
struct timeval tv;
gettimeofday(&tv, NULL);
li->tv_sec = tv.tv_sec;
li->tv_usec = tv.tv_usec;
}
/* copy a sockaddr_* into our logininfo */
void
login_set_addr(struct logininfo *li, const struct sockaddr *sa,
const unsigned int sa_size)
{
unsigned int bufsize = sa_size;
/* make sure we don't overrun our union */
if (sizeof(li->hostaddr) < sa_size)
bufsize = sizeof(li->hostaddr);
memcpy(&li->hostaddr.sa, sa, bufsize);
}
/**
** login_write: Call low-level recording functions based on autoconf
** results
**/
int
login_write(struct logininfo *li)
{
#ifndef HAVE_CYGWIN
if (geteuid() != 0) {
logit("Attempt to write login records by non-root user (aborting)");
return (1);
}
#endif
/* set the timestamp */
login_set_current_time(li);
#ifdef USE_LOGIN
syslogin_write_entry(li);
#endif
#ifdef USE_LASTLOG
if (li->type == LTYPE_LOGIN)
lastlog_write_entry(li);
#endif
#ifdef USE_UTMP
utmp_write_entry(li);
#endif
#ifdef USE_WTMP
wtmp_write_entry(li);
#endif
#ifdef USE_UTMPX
utmpx_write_entry(li);
#endif
#ifdef USE_WTMPX
wtmpx_write_entry(li);
#endif
#ifdef CUSTOM_SYS_AUTH_RECORD_LOGIN
if (li->type == LTYPE_LOGIN &&
!sys_auth_record_login(li->username,li->hostname,li->line,
loginmsg))
logit("Writing login record failed for %s", li->username);
#endif
#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
if (li->type == LTYPE_LOGIN)
audit_session_open(li);
else if (li->type == LTYPE_LOGOUT)
audit_session_close(li);
#endif
return (0);
}
#ifdef LOGIN_NEEDS_UTMPX
int
login_utmp_only(struct logininfo *li)
{
li->type = LTYPE_LOGIN;
login_set_current_time(li);
# ifdef USE_UTMP
utmp_write_entry(li);
# endif
# ifdef USE_WTMP
wtmp_write_entry(li);
# endif
# ifdef USE_UTMPX
utmpx_write_entry(li);
# endif
# ifdef USE_WTMPX
wtmpx_write_entry(li);
# endif
return (0);
}
#endif
/**
** getlast_entry: Call low-level functions to retrieve the last login
** time.
**/
/* take the uid in li and return the last login time */
int
getlast_entry(struct logininfo *li)
{
#ifdef USE_LASTLOG
return(lastlog_get_entry(li));
#else /* !USE_LASTLOG */
#if defined(USE_UTMPX) && defined(HAVE_SETUTXDB) && \
defined(UTXDB_LASTLOGIN) && defined(HAVE_GETUTXUSER)
return (utmpx_get_entry(li));
#endif
#if defined(DISABLE_LASTLOG)
/* On some systems we shouldn't even try to obtain last login
* time, e.g. AIX */
return (0);
# elif defined(USE_WTMP) && \
(defined(HAVE_TIME_IN_UTMP) || defined(HAVE_TV_IN_UTMP))
/* retrieve last login time from utmp */
return (wtmp_get_entry(li));
# elif defined(USE_WTMPX) && \
(defined(HAVE_TIME_IN_UTMPX) || defined(HAVE_TV_IN_UTMPX))
/* If wtmp isn't available, try wtmpx */
return (wtmpx_get_entry(li));
# else
/* Give up: No means of retrieving last login time */
return (0);
# endif /* DISABLE_LASTLOG */
#endif /* USE_LASTLOG */
}
/*
* 'line' string utility functions
*
* These functions process the 'line' string into one of three forms:
*
* 1. The full filename (including '/dev')
* 2. The stripped name (excluding '/dev')
* 3. The abbreviated name (e.g. /dev/ttyp00 -> yp00
* /dev/pts/1 -> ts/1 )
*
* Form 3 is used on some systems to identify a .tmp.? entry when
* attempting to remove it. Typically both addition and removal is
* performed by one application - say, sshd - so as long as the choice
* uniquely identifies a terminal it's ok.
*/
/*
* line_fullname(): add the leading '/dev/' if it doesn't exist make
* sure dst has enough space, if not just copy src (ugh)
*/
char *
line_fullname(char *dst, const char *src, u_int dstsize)
{
memset(dst, '\0', dstsize);
if ((strncmp(src, "/dev/", 5) == 0) || (dstsize < (strlen(src) + 5)))
strlcpy(dst, src, dstsize);
else {
strlcpy(dst, "/dev/", dstsize);
strlcat(dst, src, dstsize);
}
return (dst);
}
/* line_stripname(): strip the leading '/dev' if it exists, return dst */
char *
line_stripname(char *dst, const char *src, int dstsize)
{
memset(dst, '\0', dstsize);
if (strncmp(src, "/dev/", 5) == 0)
strlcpy(dst, src + 5, dstsize);
else
strlcpy(dst, src, dstsize);
return (dst);
}
/*
* line_abbrevname(): Return the abbreviated (usually four-character)
* form of the line (Just use the last <dstsize> characters of the
* full name.)
*
* NOTE: use strncpy because we do NOT necessarily want zero
* termination
*/
char *
line_abbrevname(char *dst, const char *src, int dstsize)
{
size_t len;
memset(dst, '\0', dstsize);
/* Always skip prefix if present */
if (strncmp(src, "/dev/", 5) == 0)
src += 5;
#ifdef WITH_ABBREV_NO_TTY
if (strncmp(src, "tty", 3) == 0)
src += 3;
#endif
len = strlen(src);
if (len > 0) {
if (((int)len - dstsize) > 0)
src += ((int)len - dstsize);
/* note: _don't_ change this to strlcpy */
strncpy(dst, src, (size_t)dstsize);
}
return (dst);
}
/**
** utmp utility functions
**
** These functions manipulate struct utmp, taking system differences
** into account.
**/
#if defined(USE_UTMP) || defined (USE_WTMP) || defined (USE_LOGIN)
/* build the utmp structure */
void
set_utmp_time(struct logininfo *li, struct utmp *ut)
{
# if defined(HAVE_TV_IN_UTMP)
ut->ut_tv.tv_sec = li->tv_sec;
ut->ut_tv.tv_usec = li->tv_usec;
# elif defined(HAVE_TIME_IN_UTMP)
ut->ut_time = li->tv_sec;
# endif
}
void
construct_utmp(struct logininfo *li,
struct utmp *ut)
{
# ifdef HAVE_ADDR_V6_IN_UTMP
struct sockaddr_in6 *sa6;
# endif
memset(ut, '\0', sizeof(*ut));
/* First fill out fields used for both logins and logouts */
# ifdef HAVE_ID_IN_UTMP
line_abbrevname(ut->ut_id, li->line, sizeof(ut->ut_id));
# endif
# ifdef HAVE_TYPE_IN_UTMP
/* This is done here to keep utmp constants out of struct logininfo */
switch (li->type) {
case LTYPE_LOGIN:
ut->ut_type = USER_PROCESS;
break;
case LTYPE_LOGOUT:
ut->ut_type = DEAD_PROCESS;
break;
}
# endif
set_utmp_time(li, ut);
line_stripname(ut->ut_line, li->line, sizeof(ut->ut_line));
# ifdef HAVE_PID_IN_UTMP
ut->ut_pid = li->pid;
# endif
/* If we're logging out, leave all other fields blank */
if (li->type == LTYPE_LOGOUT)
return;
/*
* These fields are only used when logging in, and are blank
* for logouts.
*/
/* Use strncpy because we don't necessarily want null termination */
strncpy(ut->ut_name, li->username,
MIN_SIZEOF(ut->ut_name, li->username));
# ifdef HAVE_HOST_IN_UTMP
strncpy(ut->ut_host, li->hostname,
MIN_SIZEOF(ut->ut_host, li->hostname));
# endif
# ifdef HAVE_ADDR_IN_UTMP
/* this is just a 32-bit IP address */
if (li->hostaddr.sa.sa_family == AF_INET)
ut->ut_addr = li->hostaddr.sa_in.sin_addr.s_addr;
# endif
# ifdef HAVE_ADDR_V6_IN_UTMP
/* this is just a 128-bit IPv6 address */
if (li->hostaddr.sa.sa_family == AF_INET6) {
sa6 = ((struct sockaddr_in6 *)&li->hostaddr.sa);
memcpy(ut->ut_addr_v6, sa6->sin6_addr.s6_addr, 16);
if (IN6_IS_ADDR_V4MAPPED(&sa6->sin6_addr)) {
ut->ut_addr_v6[0] = ut->ut_addr_v6[3];
ut->ut_addr_v6[1] = 0;
ut->ut_addr_v6[2] = 0;
ut->ut_addr_v6[3] = 0;
}
}
# endif
}
#endif /* USE_UTMP || USE_WTMP || USE_LOGIN */
/**
** utmpx utility functions
**
** These functions manipulate struct utmpx, accounting for system
** variations.
**/
#if defined(USE_UTMPX) || defined (USE_WTMPX)
/* build the utmpx structure */
void
set_utmpx_time(struct logininfo *li, struct utmpx *utx)
{
# if defined(HAVE_TV_IN_UTMPX)
utx->ut_tv.tv_sec = li->tv_sec;
utx->ut_tv.tv_usec = li->tv_usec;
# elif defined(HAVE_TIME_IN_UTMPX)
utx->ut_time = li->tv_sec;
# endif
}
void
construct_utmpx(struct logininfo *li, struct utmpx *utx)
{
# ifdef HAVE_ADDR_V6_IN_UTMP
struct sockaddr_in6 *sa6;
# endif
memset(utx, '\0', sizeof(*utx));
# ifdef HAVE_ID_IN_UTMPX
line_abbrevname(utx->ut_id, li->line, sizeof(utx->ut_id));
# endif
/* this is done here to keep utmp constants out of loginrec.h */
switch (li->type) {
case LTYPE_LOGIN:
utx->ut_type = USER_PROCESS;
break;
case LTYPE_LOGOUT:
utx->ut_type = DEAD_PROCESS;
break;
}
line_stripname(utx->ut_line, li->line, sizeof(utx->ut_line));
set_utmpx_time(li, utx);
utx->ut_pid = li->pid;
/* strncpy(): Don't necessarily want null termination */
strncpy(utx->ut_user, li->username,
MIN_SIZEOF(utx->ut_user, li->username));
if (li->type == LTYPE_LOGOUT)
return;
/*
* These fields are only used when logging in, and are blank
* for logouts.
*/
# ifdef HAVE_HOST_IN_UTMPX
strncpy(utx->ut_host, li->hostname,
MIN_SIZEOF(utx->ut_host, li->hostname));
# endif
+# ifdef HAVE_SS_IN_UTMPX
+ utx->ut_ss = li->hostaddr.sa_storage;
+# endif
# ifdef HAVE_ADDR_IN_UTMPX
/* this is just a 32-bit IP address */
if (li->hostaddr.sa.sa_family == AF_INET)
utx->ut_addr = li->hostaddr.sa_in.sin_addr.s_addr;
# endif
# ifdef HAVE_ADDR_V6_IN_UTMP
/* this is just a 128-bit IPv6 address */
if (li->hostaddr.sa.sa_family == AF_INET6) {
sa6 = ((struct sockaddr_in6 *)&li->hostaddr.sa);
memcpy(utx->ut_addr_v6, sa6->sin6_addr.s6_addr, 16);
if (IN6_IS_ADDR_V4MAPPED(&sa6->sin6_addr)) {
utx->ut_addr_v6[0] = utx->ut_addr_v6[3];
utx->ut_addr_v6[1] = 0;
utx->ut_addr_v6[2] = 0;
utx->ut_addr_v6[3] = 0;
}
}
# endif
# ifdef HAVE_SYSLEN_IN_UTMPX
/* ut_syslen is the length of the utx_host string */
utx->ut_syslen = MIN(strlen(li->hostname), sizeof(utx->ut_host));
# endif
}
#endif /* USE_UTMPX || USE_WTMPX */
/**
** Low-level utmp functions
**/
/* FIXME: (ATL) utmp_write_direct needs testing */
#ifdef USE_UTMP
/* if we can, use pututline() etc. */
# if !defined(DISABLE_PUTUTLINE) && defined(HAVE_SETUTENT) && \
defined(HAVE_PUTUTLINE)
# define UTMP_USE_LIBRARY
# endif
/* write a utmp entry with the system's help (pututline() and pals) */
# ifdef UTMP_USE_LIBRARY
static int
utmp_write_library(struct logininfo *li, struct utmp *ut)
{
setutent();
pututline(ut);
# ifdef HAVE_ENDUTENT
endutent();
# endif
return (1);
}
# else /* UTMP_USE_LIBRARY */
/*
* Write a utmp entry direct to the file
* This is a slightly modification of code in OpenBSD's login.c
*/
static int
utmp_write_direct(struct logininfo *li, struct utmp *ut)
{
struct utmp old_ut;
register int fd;
int tty;
/* FIXME: (ATL) ttyslot() needs local implementation */
#if defined(HAVE_GETTTYENT)
struct ttyent *ty;
tty=0;
setttyent();
while (NULL != (ty = getttyent())) {
tty++;
if (!strncmp(ty->ty_name, ut->ut_line, sizeof(ut->ut_line)))
break;
}
endttyent();
if (NULL == ty) {
logit("%s: tty not found", __func__);
return (0);
}
#else /* FIXME */
tty = ttyslot(); /* seems only to work for /dev/ttyp? style names */
#endif /* HAVE_GETTTYENT */
if (tty > 0 && (fd = open(UTMP_FILE, O_RDWR|O_CREAT, 0644)) >= 0) {
off_t pos, ret;
pos = (off_t)tty * sizeof(struct utmp);
if ((ret = lseek(fd, pos, SEEK_SET)) == -1) {
logit("%s: lseek: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
close(fd);
return (0);
}
if (ret != pos) {
logit("%s: Couldn't seek to tty %d slot in %s",
__func__, tty, UTMP_FILE);
close(fd);
return (0);
}
/*
* Prevent luser from zero'ing out ut_host.
* If the new ut_line is empty but the old one is not
* and ut_line and ut_name match, preserve the old ut_line.
*/
if (atomicio(read, fd, &old_ut, sizeof(old_ut)) == sizeof(old_ut) &&
(ut->ut_host[0] == '\0') && (old_ut.ut_host[0] != '\0') &&
(strncmp(old_ut.ut_line, ut->ut_line, sizeof(ut->ut_line)) == 0) &&
(strncmp(old_ut.ut_name, ut->ut_name, sizeof(ut->ut_name)) == 0))
memcpy(ut->ut_host, old_ut.ut_host, sizeof(ut->ut_host));
if ((ret = lseek(fd, pos, SEEK_SET)) == -1) {
logit("%s: lseek: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
close(fd);
return (0);
}
if (ret != pos) {
logit("%s: Couldn't seek to tty %d slot in %s",
__func__, tty, UTMP_FILE);
close(fd);
return (0);
}
if (atomicio(vwrite, fd, ut, sizeof(*ut)) != sizeof(*ut)) {
logit("%s: error writing %s: %s", __func__,
UTMP_FILE, strerror(errno));
close(fd);
return (0);
}
close(fd);
return (1);
} else {
return (0);
}
}
# endif /* UTMP_USE_LIBRARY */
static int
utmp_perform_login(struct logininfo *li)
{
struct utmp ut;
construct_utmp(li, &ut);
# ifdef UTMP_USE_LIBRARY
if (!utmp_write_library(li, &ut)) {
logit("%s: utmp_write_library() failed", __func__);
return (0);
}
# else
if (!utmp_write_direct(li, &ut)) {
logit("%s: utmp_write_direct() failed", __func__);
return (0);
}
# endif
return (1);
}
static int
utmp_perform_logout(struct logininfo *li)
{
struct utmp ut;
construct_utmp(li, &ut);
# ifdef UTMP_USE_LIBRARY
if (!utmp_write_library(li, &ut)) {
logit("%s: utmp_write_library() failed", __func__);
return (0);
}
# else
if (!utmp_write_direct(li, &ut)) {
logit("%s: utmp_write_direct() failed", __func__);
return (0);
}
# endif
return (1);
}
int
utmp_write_entry(struct logininfo *li)
{
switch(li->type) {
case LTYPE_LOGIN:
return (utmp_perform_login(li));
case LTYPE_LOGOUT:
return (utmp_perform_logout(li));
default:
logit("%s: invalid type field", __func__);
return (0);
}
}
#endif /* USE_UTMP */
/**
** Low-level utmpx functions
**/
/* not much point if we don't want utmpx entries */
#ifdef USE_UTMPX
/* if we have the wherewithall, use pututxline etc. */
# if !defined(DISABLE_PUTUTXLINE) && defined(HAVE_SETUTXENT) && \
defined(HAVE_PUTUTXLINE)
# define UTMPX_USE_LIBRARY
# endif
/* write a utmpx entry with the system's help (pututxline() and pals) */
# ifdef UTMPX_USE_LIBRARY
static int
utmpx_write_library(struct logininfo *li, struct utmpx *utx)
{
setutxent();
pututxline(utx);
# ifdef HAVE_ENDUTXENT
endutxent();
# endif
return (1);
}
# else /* UTMPX_USE_LIBRARY */
/* write a utmp entry direct to the file */
static int
utmpx_write_direct(struct logininfo *li, struct utmpx *utx)
{
logit("%s: not implemented!", __func__);
return (0);
}
# endif /* UTMPX_USE_LIBRARY */
static int
utmpx_perform_login(struct logininfo *li)
{
struct utmpx utx;
construct_utmpx(li, &utx);
# ifdef UTMPX_USE_LIBRARY
if (!utmpx_write_library(li, &utx)) {
logit("%s: utmp_write_library() failed", __func__);
return (0);
}
# else
if (!utmpx_write_direct(li, &ut)) {
logit("%s: utmp_write_direct() failed", __func__);
return (0);
}
# endif
return (1);
}
static int
utmpx_perform_logout(struct logininfo *li)
{
struct utmpx utx;
construct_utmpx(li, &utx);
# ifdef HAVE_ID_IN_UTMPX
line_abbrevname(utx.ut_id, li->line, sizeof(utx.ut_id));
# endif
# ifdef HAVE_TYPE_IN_UTMPX
utx.ut_type = DEAD_PROCESS;
# endif
# ifdef UTMPX_USE_LIBRARY
utmpx_write_library(li, &utx);
# else
utmpx_write_direct(li, &utx);
# endif
return (1);
}
int
utmpx_write_entry(struct logininfo *li)
{
switch(li->type) {
case LTYPE_LOGIN:
return (utmpx_perform_login(li));
case LTYPE_LOGOUT:
return (utmpx_perform_logout(li));
default:
logit("%s: invalid type field", __func__);
return (0);
}
}
#endif /* USE_UTMPX */
/**
** Low-level wtmp functions
**/
#ifdef USE_WTMP
/*
* Write a wtmp entry direct to the end of the file
* This is a slight modification of code in OpenBSD's logwtmp.c
*/
static int
wtmp_write(struct logininfo *li, struct utmp *ut)
{
struct stat buf;
int fd, ret = 1;
if ((fd = open(WTMP_FILE, O_WRONLY|O_APPEND, 0)) < 0) {
logit("%s: problem writing %s: %s", __func__,
WTMP_FILE, strerror(errno));
return (0);
}
if (fstat(fd, &buf) == 0)
if (atomicio(vwrite, fd, ut, sizeof(*ut)) != sizeof(*ut)) {
ftruncate(fd, buf.st_size);
logit("%s: problem writing %s: %s", __func__,
WTMP_FILE, strerror(errno));
ret = 0;
}
close(fd);
return (ret);
}
static int
wtmp_perform_login(struct logininfo *li)
{
struct utmp ut;
construct_utmp(li, &ut);
return (wtmp_write(li, &ut));
}
static int
wtmp_perform_logout(struct logininfo *li)
{
struct utmp ut;
construct_utmp(li, &ut);
return (wtmp_write(li, &ut));
}
int
wtmp_write_entry(struct logininfo *li)
{
switch(li->type) {
case LTYPE_LOGIN:
return (wtmp_perform_login(li));
case LTYPE_LOGOUT:
return (wtmp_perform_logout(li));
default:
logit("%s: invalid type field", __func__);
return (0);
}
}
/*
* Notes on fetching login data from wtmp/wtmpx
*
* Logouts are usually recorded with (amongst other things) a blank
* username on a given tty line. However, some systems (HP-UX is one)
* leave all fields set, but change the ut_type field to DEAD_PROCESS.
*
* Since we're only looking for logins here, we know that the username
* must be set correctly. On systems that leave it in, we check for
* ut_type==USER_PROCESS (indicating a login.)
*
* Portability: Some systems may set something other than USER_PROCESS
* to indicate a login process. I don't know of any as I write. Also,
* it's possible that some systems may both leave the username in
* place and not have ut_type.
*/
/* return true if this wtmp entry indicates a login */
static int
wtmp_islogin(struct logininfo *li, struct utmp *ut)
{
if (strncmp(li->username, ut->ut_name,
MIN_SIZEOF(li->username, ut->ut_name)) == 0) {
# ifdef HAVE_TYPE_IN_UTMP
if (ut->ut_type & USER_PROCESS)
return (1);
# else
return (1);
# endif
}
return (0);
}
int
wtmp_get_entry(struct logininfo *li)
{
struct stat st;
struct utmp ut;
int fd, found = 0;
/* Clear the time entries in our logininfo */
li->tv_sec = li->tv_usec = 0;
if ((fd = open(WTMP_FILE, O_RDONLY)) < 0) {
logit("%s: problem opening %s: %s", __func__,
WTMP_FILE, strerror(errno));
return (0);
}
if (fstat(fd, &st) != 0) {
logit("%s: couldn't stat %s: %s", __func__,
WTMP_FILE, strerror(errno));
close(fd);
return (0);
}
/* Seek to the start of the last struct utmp */
if (lseek(fd, -(off_t)sizeof(struct utmp), SEEK_END) == -1) {
/* Looks like we've got a fresh wtmp file */
close(fd);
return (0);
}
while (!found) {
if (atomicio(read, fd, &ut, sizeof(ut)) != sizeof(ut)) {
logit("%s: read of %s failed: %s", __func__,
WTMP_FILE, strerror(errno));
close (fd);
return (0);
}
if (wtmp_islogin(li, &ut) ) {
found = 1;
/*
* We've already checked for a time in struct
* utmp, in login_getlast()
*/
# ifdef HAVE_TIME_IN_UTMP
li->tv_sec = ut.ut_time;
# else
# if HAVE_TV_IN_UTMP
li->tv_sec = ut.ut_tv.tv_sec;
# endif
# endif
line_fullname(li->line, ut.ut_line,
MIN_SIZEOF(li->line, ut.ut_line));
# ifdef HAVE_HOST_IN_UTMP
strlcpy(li->hostname, ut.ut_host,
MIN_SIZEOF(li->hostname, ut.ut_host));
# endif
continue;
}
/* Seek back 2 x struct utmp */
if (lseek(fd, -(off_t)(2 * sizeof(struct utmp)), SEEK_CUR) == -1) {
/* We've found the start of the file, so quit */
close(fd);
return (0);
}
}
/* We found an entry. Tidy up and return */
close(fd);
return (1);
}
# endif /* USE_WTMP */
/**
** Low-level wtmpx functions
**/
#ifdef USE_WTMPX
/*
* Write a wtmpx entry direct to the end of the file
* This is a slight modification of code in OpenBSD's logwtmp.c
*/
static int
wtmpx_write(struct logininfo *li, struct utmpx *utx)
{
#ifndef HAVE_UPDWTMPX
struct stat buf;
int fd, ret = 1;
if ((fd = open(WTMPX_FILE, O_WRONLY|O_APPEND, 0)) < 0) {
logit("%s: problem opening %s: %s", __func__,
WTMPX_FILE, strerror(errno));
return (0);
}
if (fstat(fd, &buf) == 0)
if (atomicio(vwrite, fd, utx, sizeof(*utx)) != sizeof(*utx)) {
ftruncate(fd, buf.st_size);
logit("%s: problem writing %s: %s", __func__,
WTMPX_FILE, strerror(errno));
ret = 0;
}
close(fd);
return (ret);
#else
updwtmpx(WTMPX_FILE, utx);
return (1);
#endif
}
static int
wtmpx_perform_login(struct logininfo *li)
{
struct utmpx utx;
construct_utmpx(li, &utx);
return (wtmpx_write(li, &utx));
}
static int
wtmpx_perform_logout(struct logininfo *li)
{
struct utmpx utx;
construct_utmpx(li, &utx);
return (wtmpx_write(li, &utx));
}
int
wtmpx_write_entry(struct logininfo *li)
{
switch(li->type) {
case LTYPE_LOGIN:
return (wtmpx_perform_login(li));
case LTYPE_LOGOUT:
return (wtmpx_perform_logout(li));
default:
logit("%s: invalid type field", __func__);
return (0);
}
}
/* Please see the notes above wtmp_islogin() for information about the
next two functions */
/* Return true if this wtmpx entry indicates a login */
static int
wtmpx_islogin(struct logininfo *li, struct utmpx *utx)
{
if (strncmp(li->username, utx->ut_user,
MIN_SIZEOF(li->username, utx->ut_user)) == 0 ) {
# ifdef HAVE_TYPE_IN_UTMPX
if (utx->ut_type == USER_PROCESS)
return (1);
# else
return (1);
# endif
}
return (0);
}
int
wtmpx_get_entry(struct logininfo *li)
{
struct stat st;
struct utmpx utx;
int fd, found=0;
/* Clear the time entries */
li->tv_sec = li->tv_usec = 0;
if ((fd = open(WTMPX_FILE, O_RDONLY)) < 0) {
logit("%s: problem opening %s: %s", __func__,
WTMPX_FILE, strerror(errno));
return (0);
}
if (fstat(fd, &st) != 0) {
logit("%s: couldn't stat %s: %s", __func__,
WTMPX_FILE, strerror(errno));
close(fd);
return (0);
}
/* Seek to the start of the last struct utmpx */
if (lseek(fd, -(off_t)sizeof(struct utmpx), SEEK_END) == -1 ) {
/* probably a newly rotated wtmpx file */
close(fd);
return (0);
}
while (!found) {
if (atomicio(read, fd, &utx, sizeof(utx)) != sizeof(utx)) {
logit("%s: read of %s failed: %s", __func__,
WTMPX_FILE, strerror(errno));
close (fd);
return (0);
}
/*
* Logouts are recorded as a blank username on a particular
* line. So, we just need to find the username in struct utmpx
*/
if (wtmpx_islogin(li, &utx)) {
found = 1;
# if defined(HAVE_TV_IN_UTMPX)
li->tv_sec = utx.ut_tv.tv_sec;
# elif defined(HAVE_TIME_IN_UTMPX)
li->tv_sec = utx.ut_time;
# endif
line_fullname(li->line, utx.ut_line, sizeof(li->line));
# if defined(HAVE_HOST_IN_UTMPX)
strlcpy(li->hostname, utx.ut_host,
MIN_SIZEOF(li->hostname, utx.ut_host));
# endif
continue;
}
if (lseek(fd, -(off_t)(2 * sizeof(struct utmpx)), SEEK_CUR) == -1) {
close(fd);
return (0);
}
}
close(fd);
return (1);
}
#endif /* USE_WTMPX */
/**
** Low-level libutil login() functions
**/
#ifdef USE_LOGIN
static int
syslogin_perform_login(struct logininfo *li)
{
struct utmp *ut;
ut = xmalloc(sizeof(*ut));
construct_utmp(li, ut);
login(ut);
free(ut);
return (1);
}
static int
syslogin_perform_logout(struct logininfo *li)
{
# ifdef HAVE_LOGOUT
char line[UT_LINESIZE];
(void)line_stripname(line, li->line, sizeof(line));
if (!logout(line))
logit("%s: logout() returned an error", __func__);
# ifdef HAVE_LOGWTMP
else
logwtmp(line, "", "");
# endif
/* FIXME: (ATL - if the need arises) What to do if we have
* login, but no logout? what if logout but no logwtmp? All
* routines are in libutil so they should all be there,
* but... */
# endif
return (1);
}
int
syslogin_write_entry(struct logininfo *li)
{
switch (li->type) {
case LTYPE_LOGIN:
return (syslogin_perform_login(li));
case LTYPE_LOGOUT:
return (syslogin_perform_logout(li));
default:
logit("%s: Invalid type field", __func__);
return (0);
}
}
#endif /* USE_LOGIN */
/* end of file log-syslogin.c */
/**
** Low-level lastlog functions
**/
#ifdef USE_LASTLOG
#if !defined(LASTLOG_WRITE_PUTUTXLINE) || !defined(HAVE_GETLASTLOGXBYNAME)
/* open the file (using filemode) and seek to the login entry */
static int
lastlog_openseek(struct logininfo *li, int *fd, int filemode)
{
off_t offset;
char lastlog_file[1024];
struct stat st;
if (stat(LASTLOG_FILE, &st) != 0) {
logit("%s: Couldn't stat %s: %s", __func__,
LASTLOG_FILE, strerror(errno));
return (0);
}
if (S_ISDIR(st.st_mode)) {
snprintf(lastlog_file, sizeof(lastlog_file), "%s/%s",
LASTLOG_FILE, li->username);
} else if (S_ISREG(st.st_mode)) {
strlcpy(lastlog_file, LASTLOG_FILE, sizeof(lastlog_file));
} else {
logit("%s: %.100s is not a file or directory!", __func__,
LASTLOG_FILE);
return (0);
}
*fd = open(lastlog_file, filemode, 0600);
if (*fd < 0) {
debug("%s: Couldn't open %s: %s", __func__,
lastlog_file, strerror(errno));
return (0);
}
if (S_ISREG(st.st_mode)) {
/* find this uid's offset in the lastlog file */
offset = (off_t) ((u_long)li->uid * sizeof(struct lastlog));
if (lseek(*fd, offset, SEEK_SET) != offset) {
logit("%s: %s->lseek(): %s", __func__,
lastlog_file, strerror(errno));
close(*fd);
return (0);
}
}
return (1);
}
#endif /* !LASTLOG_WRITE_PUTUTXLINE || !HAVE_GETLASTLOGXBYNAME */
#ifdef LASTLOG_WRITE_PUTUTXLINE
int
lastlog_write_entry(struct logininfo *li)
{
switch(li->type) {
case LTYPE_LOGIN:
return 1; /* lastlog written by pututxline */
default:
logit("lastlog_write_entry: Invalid type field");
return 0;
}
}
#else /* LASTLOG_WRITE_PUTUTXLINE */
int
lastlog_write_entry(struct logininfo *li)
{
struct lastlog last;
int fd;
switch(li->type) {
case LTYPE_LOGIN:
/* create our struct lastlog */
memset(&last, '\0', sizeof(last));
line_stripname(last.ll_line, li->line, sizeof(last.ll_line));
strlcpy(last.ll_host, li->hostname,
MIN_SIZEOF(last.ll_host, li->hostname));
last.ll_time = li->tv_sec;
if (!lastlog_openseek(li, &fd, O_RDWR|O_CREAT))
return (0);
/* write the entry */
if (atomicio(vwrite, fd, &last, sizeof(last)) != sizeof(last)) {
close(fd);
logit("%s: Error writing to %s: %s", __func__,
LASTLOG_FILE, strerror(errno));
return (0);
}
close(fd);
return (1);
default:
logit("%s: Invalid type field", __func__);
return (0);
}
}
#endif /* LASTLOG_WRITE_PUTUTXLINE */
#ifdef HAVE_GETLASTLOGXBYNAME
int
lastlog_get_entry(struct logininfo *li)
{
struct lastlogx l, *ll;
if ((ll = getlastlogxbyname(li->username, &l)) == NULL) {
memset(&l, '\0', sizeof(l));
ll = &l;
}
line_fullname(li->line, ll->ll_line, sizeof(li->line));
strlcpy(li->hostname, ll->ll_host,
MIN_SIZEOF(li->hostname, ll->ll_host));
li->tv_sec = ll->ll_tv.tv_sec;
li->tv_usec = ll->ll_tv.tv_usec;
return (1);
}
#else /* HAVE_GETLASTLOGXBYNAME */
int
lastlog_get_entry(struct logininfo *li)
{
struct lastlog last;
int fd, ret;
if (!lastlog_openseek(li, &fd, O_RDONLY))
return (0);
ret = atomicio(read, fd, &last, sizeof(last));
close(fd);
switch (ret) {
case 0:
memset(&last, '\0', sizeof(last));
/* FALLTHRU */
case sizeof(last):
line_fullname(li->line, last.ll_line, sizeof(li->line));
strlcpy(li->hostname, last.ll_host,
MIN_SIZEOF(li->hostname, last.ll_host));
li->tv_sec = last.ll_time;
return (1);
case -1:
error("%s: Error reading from %s: %s", __func__,
LASTLOG_FILE, strerror(errno));
return (0);
default:
error("%s: Error reading from %s: Expecting %d, got %d",
__func__, LASTLOG_FILE, (int)sizeof(last), ret);
return (0);
}
/* NOTREACHED */
return (0);
}
#endif /* HAVE_GETLASTLOGXBYNAME */
#endif /* USE_LASTLOG */
#if defined(USE_UTMPX) && defined(HAVE_SETUTXDB) && \
defined(UTXDB_LASTLOGIN) && defined(HAVE_GETUTXUSER)
int
utmpx_get_entry(struct logininfo *li)
{
struct utmpx *utx;
if (setutxdb(UTXDB_LASTLOGIN, NULL) != 0)
return (0);
utx = getutxuser(li->username);
if (utx == NULL) {
endutxent();
return (0);
}
line_fullname(li->line, utx->ut_line,
MIN_SIZEOF(li->line, utx->ut_line));
strlcpy(li->hostname, utx->ut_host,
MIN_SIZEOF(li->hostname, utx->ut_host));
li->tv_sec = utx->ut_tv.tv_sec;
li->tv_usec = utx->ut_tv.tv_usec;
endutxent();
return (1);
}
#endif /* USE_UTMPX && HAVE_SETUTXDB && UTXDB_LASTLOGIN && HAVE_GETUTXUSER */
#ifdef USE_BTMP
/*
* Logs failed login attempts in _PATH_BTMP if that exists.
* The most common login failure is to give password instead of username.
* So the _PATH_BTMP file checked for the correct permission, so that
* only root can read it.
*/
void
record_failed_login(struct ssh *ssh, const char *username, const char *hostname,
const char *ttyn)
{
int fd;
struct utmp ut;
struct sockaddr_storage from;
socklen_t fromlen = sizeof(from);
struct sockaddr_in *a4;
struct sockaddr_in6 *a6;
time_t t;
struct stat fst;
if (geteuid() != 0)
return;
if ((fd = open(_PATH_BTMP, O_WRONLY | O_APPEND)) < 0) {
debug("Unable to open the btmp file %s: %s", _PATH_BTMP,
strerror(errno));
return;
}
if (fstat(fd, &fst) < 0) {
logit("%s: fstat of %s failed: %s", __func__, _PATH_BTMP,
strerror(errno));
goto out;
}
if((fst.st_mode & (S_IXGRP | S_IRWXO)) || (fst.st_uid != 0)){
logit("Excess permission or bad ownership on file %s",
_PATH_BTMP);
goto out;
}
memset(&ut, 0, sizeof(ut));
/* strncpy because we don't necessarily want nul termination */
strncpy(ut.ut_user, username, sizeof(ut.ut_user));
strlcpy(ut.ut_line, "ssh:notty", sizeof(ut.ut_line));
time(&t);
ut.ut_time = t; /* ut_time is not always a time_t */
ut.ut_type = LOGIN_PROCESS;
ut.ut_pid = getpid();
/* strncpy because we don't necessarily want nul termination */
strncpy(ut.ut_host, hostname, sizeof(ut.ut_host));
if (ssh_packet_connection_is_on_socket(ssh) &&
getpeername(ssh_packet_get_connection_in(ssh),
(struct sockaddr *)&from, &fromlen) == 0) {
ipv64_normalise_mapped(&from, &fromlen);
if (from.ss_family == AF_INET) {
a4 = (struct sockaddr_in *)&from;
memcpy(&ut.ut_addr, &(a4->sin_addr),
MIN_SIZEOF(ut.ut_addr, a4->sin_addr));
}
#ifdef HAVE_ADDR_V6_IN_UTMP
if (from.ss_family == AF_INET6) {
a6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)&from;
memcpy(&ut.ut_addr_v6, &(a6->sin6_addr),
MIN_SIZEOF(ut.ut_addr_v6, a6->sin6_addr));
}
#endif
}
if (atomicio(vwrite, fd, &ut, sizeof(ut)) != sizeof(ut))
error("Failed to write to %s: %s", _PATH_BTMP,
strerror(errno));
out:
close(fd);
}
#endif /* USE_BTMP */
diff --git a/aclocal.m4 b/m4/openssh.m4
similarity index 94%
copy from aclocal.m4
copy to m4/openssh.m4
index 25ecc49a2203..6a49f10fab7e 100644
--- a/aclocal.m4
+++ b/m4/openssh.m4
@@ -1,186 +1,199 @@
dnl OpenSSH-specific autoconf macros
dnl
dnl OSSH_CHECK_CFLAG_COMPILE(check_flag[, define_flag])
dnl Check that $CC accepts a flag 'check_flag'. If it is supported append
dnl 'define_flag' to $CFLAGS. If 'define_flag' is not specified, then append
dnl 'check_flag'.
AC_DEFUN([OSSH_CHECK_CFLAG_COMPILE], [{
AC_MSG_CHECKING([if $CC supports compile flag $1])
saved_CFLAGS="$CFLAGS"
CFLAGS="$CFLAGS $WERROR $1"
_define_flag="$2"
test "x$_define_flag" = "x" && _define_flag="$1"
AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_SOURCE([[
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <stdio.h>
int main(int argc, char **argv) {
+ (void)argv;
/* Some math to catch -ftrapv problems in the toolchain */
int i = 123 * argc, j = 456 + argc, k = 789 - argc;
float l = i * 2.1;
double m = l / 0.5;
long long int n = argc * 12345LL, o = 12345LL * (long long int)argc;
printf("%d %d %d %f %f %lld %lld\n", i, j, k, l, m, n, o);
+ /*
+ * Test fallthrough behaviour. clang 10's -Wimplicit-fallthrough does
+ * not understand comments and we don't use the "fallthrough" attribute
+ * that it's looking for.
+ */
+ switch(i){
+ case 0: j += i;
+ /* FALLTHROUGH */
+ default: j += k;
+ }
exit(0);
}
]])],
[
if $ac_cv_path_EGREP -i "unrecognized option|warning.*ignored" conftest.err >/dev/null
then
AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS"
else
AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])
CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS $_define_flag"
fi],
[ AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS" ]
)
}])
dnl OSSH_CHECK_CFLAG_LINK(check_flag[, define_flag])
dnl Check that $CC accepts a flag 'check_flag'. If it is supported append
dnl 'define_flag' to $CFLAGS. If 'define_flag' is not specified, then append
dnl 'check_flag'.
AC_DEFUN([OSSH_CHECK_CFLAG_LINK], [{
AC_MSG_CHECKING([if $CC supports compile flag $1 and linking succeeds])
saved_CFLAGS="$CFLAGS"
CFLAGS="$CFLAGS $WERROR $1"
_define_flag="$2"
test "x$_define_flag" = "x" && _define_flag="$1"
AC_LINK_IFELSE([AC_LANG_SOURCE([[
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <stdio.h>
int main(int argc, char **argv) {
+ (void)argv;
/* Some math to catch -ftrapv problems in the toolchain */
int i = 123 * argc, j = 456 + argc, k = 789 - argc;
float l = i * 2.1;
double m = l / 0.5;
long long int n = argc * 12345LL, o = 12345LL * (long long int)argc;
long long int p = n * o;
printf("%d %d %d %f %f %lld %lld %lld\n", i, j, k, l, m, n, o, p);
exit(0);
}
]])],
[
if $ac_cv_path_EGREP -i "unrecognized option|warning.*ignored" conftest.err >/dev/null
then
AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS"
else
AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])
CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS $_define_flag"
fi],
[ AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS" ]
)
}])
dnl OSSH_CHECK_LDFLAG_LINK(check_flag[, define_flag])
dnl Check that $LD accepts a flag 'check_flag'. If it is supported append
dnl 'define_flag' to $LDFLAGS. If 'define_flag' is not specified, then append
dnl 'check_flag'.
AC_DEFUN([OSSH_CHECK_LDFLAG_LINK], [{
AC_MSG_CHECKING([if $LD supports link flag $1])
saved_LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS"
LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS $WERROR $1"
_define_flag="$2"
test "x$_define_flag" = "x" && _define_flag="$1"
AC_LINK_IFELSE([AC_LANG_SOURCE([[
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <stdio.h>
int main(int argc, char **argv) {
+ (void)argv;
/* Some math to catch -ftrapv problems in the toolchain */
int i = 123 * argc, j = 456 + argc, k = 789 - argc;
float l = i * 2.1;
double m = l / 0.5;
long long int n = argc * 12345LL, o = 12345LL * (long long int)argc;
long long p = n * o;
printf("%d %d %d %f %f %lld %lld %lld\n", i, j, k, l, m, n, o, p);
exit(0);
}
]])],
[
if $ac_cv_path_EGREP -i "unrecognized option|warning.*ignored" conftest.err >/dev/null
then
AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
LDFLAGS="$saved_LDFLAGS"
else
AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])
LDFLAGS="$saved_LDFLAGS $_define_flag"
fi ],
[ AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
LDFLAGS="$saved_LDFLAGS" ]
)
}])
dnl OSSH_CHECK_HEADER_FOR_FIELD(field, header, symbol)
dnl Does AC_EGREP_HEADER on 'header' for the string 'field'
dnl If found, set 'symbol' to be defined. Cache the result.
dnl TODO: This is not foolproof, better to compile and read from there
-AC_DEFUN(OSSH_CHECK_HEADER_FOR_FIELD, [
+AC_DEFUN([OSSH_CHECK_HEADER_FOR_FIELD], [
# look for field '$1' in header '$2'
dnl This strips characters illegal to m4 from the header filename
ossh_safe=`echo "$2" | sed 'y%./+-%__p_%'`
dnl
ossh_varname="ossh_cv_$ossh_safe""_has_"$1
AC_MSG_CHECKING(for $1 field in $2)
AC_CACHE_VAL($ossh_varname, [
AC_EGREP_HEADER($1, $2, [ dnl
eval "$ossh_varname=yes" dnl
], [ dnl
eval "$ossh_varname=no" dnl
]) dnl
])
ossh_result=`eval 'echo $'"$ossh_varname"`
if test -n "`echo $ossh_varname`"; then
AC_MSG_RESULT($ossh_result)
if test "x$ossh_result" = "xyes"; then
AC_DEFINE($3, 1, [Define if you have $1 in $2])
fi
else
AC_MSG_RESULT(no)
fi
])
dnl Check for socklen_t: historically on BSD it is an int, and in
dnl POSIX 1g it is a type of its own, but some platforms use different
dnl types for the argument to getsockopt, getpeername, etc. So we
dnl have to test to find something that will work.
AC_DEFUN([TYPE_SOCKLEN_T],
[
AC_CHECK_TYPE([socklen_t], ,[
AC_MSG_CHECKING([for socklen_t equivalent])
AC_CACHE_VAL([curl_cv_socklen_t_equiv],
[
# Systems have either "struct sockaddr *" or
# "void *" as the second argument to getpeername
curl_cv_socklen_t_equiv=
for arg2 in "struct sockaddr" void; do
for t in int size_t unsigned long "unsigned long"; do
AC_TRY_COMPILE([
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/socket.h>
int getpeername (int, $arg2 *, $t *);
],[
$t len;
getpeername(0,0,&len);
],[
curl_cv_socklen_t_equiv="$t"
break
])
done
done
if test "x$curl_cv_socklen_t_equiv" = x; then
AC_MSG_ERROR([Cannot find a type to use in place of socklen_t])
fi
])
AC_MSG_RESULT($curl_cv_socklen_t_equiv)
AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED(socklen_t, $curl_cv_socklen_t_equiv,
[type to use in place of socklen_t if not defined])],
[#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/socket.h>])
])
diff --git a/match.c b/match.c
index 3a8fa9d78d5c..927565c188c6 100644
--- a/match.c
+++ b/match.c
@@ -1,364 +1,364 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: match.c,v 1.41 2019/11/13 04:47:52 deraadt Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: match.c,v 1.42 2020/07/05 23:59:45 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
* Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
* All rights reserved
* Simple pattern matching, with '*' and '?' as wildcards.
*
* As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
* can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this
* software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
* incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
* called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
*/
/*
* Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
* OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
* IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
* INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
* NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
* DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
* THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
* (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
* THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
*/
#include "includes.h"
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <ctype.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <stdarg.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include "xmalloc.h"
#include "match.h"
#include "misc.h"
/*
* Returns true if the given string matches the pattern (which may contain ?
* and * as wildcards), and zero if it does not match.
*/
int
match_pattern(const char *s, const char *pattern)
{
for (;;) {
/* If at end of pattern, accept if also at end of string. */
if (!*pattern)
return !*s;
if (*pattern == '*') {
/* Skip the asterisk. */
pattern++;
/* If at end of pattern, accept immediately. */
if (!*pattern)
return 1;
/* If next character in pattern is known, optimize. */
if (*pattern != '?' && *pattern != '*') {
/*
* Look instances of the next character in
* pattern, and try to match starting from
* those.
*/
for (; *s; s++)
if (*s == *pattern &&
match_pattern(s + 1, pattern + 1))
return 1;
/* Failed. */
return 0;
}
/*
* Move ahead one character at a time and try to
* match at each position.
*/
for (; *s; s++)
if (match_pattern(s, pattern))
return 1;
/* Failed. */
return 0;
}
/*
* There must be at least one more character in the string.
* If we are at the end, fail.
*/
if (!*s)
return 0;
/* Check if the next character of the string is acceptable. */
if (*pattern != '?' && *pattern != *s)
return 0;
/* Move to the next character, both in string and in pattern. */
s++;
pattern++;
}
/* NOTREACHED */
}
/*
* Tries to match the string against the
* comma-separated sequence of subpatterns (each possibly preceded by ! to
* indicate negation). Returns -1 if negation matches, 1 if there is
* a positive match, 0 if there is no match at all.
*/
int
match_pattern_list(const char *string, const char *pattern, int dolower)
{
char sub[1024];
int negated;
int got_positive;
u_int i, subi, len = strlen(pattern);
got_positive = 0;
for (i = 0; i < len;) {
/* Check if the subpattern is negated. */
if (pattern[i] == '!') {
negated = 1;
i++;
} else
negated = 0;
/*
* Extract the subpattern up to a comma or end. Convert the
* subpattern to lowercase.
*/
for (subi = 0;
i < len && subi < sizeof(sub) - 1 && pattern[i] != ',';
subi++, i++)
sub[subi] = dolower && isupper((u_char)pattern[i]) ?
tolower((u_char)pattern[i]) : pattern[i];
/* If subpattern too long, return failure (no match). */
if (subi >= sizeof(sub) - 1)
return 0;
/* If the subpattern was terminated by a comma, then skip it. */
if (i < len && pattern[i] == ',')
i++;
/* Null-terminate the subpattern. */
sub[subi] = '\0';
/* Try to match the subpattern against the string. */
if (match_pattern(string, sub)) {
if (negated)
return -1; /* Negative */
else
got_positive = 1; /* Positive */
}
}
/*
* Return success if got a positive match. If there was a negative
* match, we have already returned -1 and never get here.
*/
return got_positive;
}
/* Match a list representing users or groups. */
int
match_usergroup_pattern_list(const char *string, const char *pattern)
{
#ifdef HAVE_CYGWIN
/* Windows usernames may be Unicode and are not case sensitive */
return cygwin_ug_match_pattern_list(string, pattern);
#else
/* Case sensitive match */
return match_pattern_list(string, pattern, 0);
#endif
}
/*
* Tries to match the host name (which must be in all lowercase) against the
* comma-separated sequence of subpatterns (each possibly preceded by ! to
* indicate negation). Returns -1 if negation matches, 1 if there is
* a positive match, 0 if there is no match at all.
*/
int
match_hostname(const char *host, const char *pattern)
{
char *hostcopy = xstrdup(host);
int r;
lowercase(hostcopy);
r = match_pattern_list(hostcopy, pattern, 1);
free(hostcopy);
return r;
}
/*
* returns 0 if we get a negative match for the hostname or the ip
* or if we get no match at all. returns -1 on error, or 1 on
* successful match.
*/
int
match_host_and_ip(const char *host, const char *ipaddr,
const char *patterns)
{
int mhost, mip;
if ((mip = addr_match_list(ipaddr, patterns)) == -2)
return -1; /* error in ipaddr match */
else if (host == NULL || ipaddr == NULL || mip == -1)
return 0; /* negative ip address match, or testing pattern */
/* negative hostname match */
if ((mhost = match_hostname(host, patterns)) == -1)
return 0;
/* no match at all */
if (mhost == 0 && mip == 0)
return 0;
return 1;
}
/*
* Match user, user@host_or_ip, user@host_or_ip_list against pattern.
* If user, host and ipaddr are all NULL then validate pattern/
* Returns -1 on invalid pattern, 0 on no match, 1 on match.
*/
int
match_user(const char *user, const char *host, const char *ipaddr,
const char *pattern)
{
char *p, *pat;
int ret;
/* test mode */
if (user == NULL && host == NULL && ipaddr == NULL) {
if ((p = strchr(pattern, '@')) != NULL &&
match_host_and_ip(NULL, NULL, p + 1) < 0)
return -1;
return 0;
}
if ((p = strchr(pattern, '@')) == NULL)
return match_pattern(user, pattern);
pat = xstrdup(pattern);
p = strchr(pat, '@');
*p++ = '\0';
if ((ret = match_pattern(user, pat)) == 1)
ret = match_host_and_ip(host, ipaddr, p);
free(pat);
return ret;
}
/*
* Returns first item from client-list that is also supported by server-list,
* caller must free the returned string.
*/
#define MAX_PROP 40
#define SEP ","
char *
match_list(const char *client, const char *server, u_int *next)
{
char *sproposals[MAX_PROP];
char *c, *s, *p, *ret, *cp, *sp;
int i, j, nproposals;
c = cp = xstrdup(client);
s = sp = xstrdup(server);
for ((p = strsep(&sp, SEP)), i=0; p && *p != '\0';
(p = strsep(&sp, SEP)), i++) {
if (i < MAX_PROP)
sproposals[i] = p;
else
break;
}
nproposals = i;
for ((p = strsep(&cp, SEP)), i=0; p && *p != '\0';
(p = strsep(&cp, SEP)), i++) {
for (j = 0; j < nproposals; j++) {
if (strcmp(p, sproposals[j]) == 0) {
ret = xstrdup(p);
if (next != NULL)
*next = (cp == NULL) ?
strlen(c) : (u_int)(cp - c);
free(c);
free(s);
return ret;
}
}
}
if (next != NULL)
*next = strlen(c);
free(c);
free(s);
return NULL;
}
/*
* Filter proposal using pattern-list filter.
- * "blacklist" determines sense of filter:
+ * "denylist" determines sense of filter:
* non-zero indicates that items matching filter should be excluded.
* zero indicates that only items matching filter should be included.
* returns NULL on allocation error, otherwise caller must free result.
*/
static char *
-filter_list(const char *proposal, const char *filter, int blacklist)
+filter_list(const char *proposal, const char *filter, int denylist)
{
size_t len = strlen(proposal) + 1;
char *fix_prop = malloc(len);
char *orig_prop = strdup(proposal);
char *cp, *tmp;
int r;
if (fix_prop == NULL || orig_prop == NULL) {
free(orig_prop);
free(fix_prop);
return NULL;
}
tmp = orig_prop;
*fix_prop = '\0';
while ((cp = strsep(&tmp, ",")) != NULL) {
r = match_pattern_list(cp, filter, 0);
- if ((blacklist && r != 1) || (!blacklist && r == 1)) {
+ if ((denylist && r != 1) || (!denylist && r == 1)) {
if (*fix_prop != '\0')
strlcat(fix_prop, ",", len);
strlcat(fix_prop, cp, len);
}
}
free(orig_prop);
return fix_prop;
}
/*
* Filters a comma-separated list of strings, excluding any entry matching
* the 'filter' pattern list. Caller must free returned string.
*/
char *
-match_filter_blacklist(const char *proposal, const char *filter)
+match_filter_denylist(const char *proposal, const char *filter)
{
return filter_list(proposal, filter, 1);
}
/*
* Filters a comma-separated list of strings, including only entries matching
* the 'filter' pattern list. Caller must free returned string.
*/
char *
-match_filter_whitelist(const char *proposal, const char *filter)
+match_filter_allowlist(const char *proposal, const char *filter)
{
return filter_list(proposal, filter, 0);
}
diff --git a/match.h b/match.h
index 3a8a6ecdc1da..312ca6e1679c 100644
--- a/match.h
+++ b/match.h
@@ -1,30 +1,30 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: match.h,v 1.19 2019/03/06 22:14:23 dtucker Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: match.h,v 1.20 2020/07/05 23:59:45 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
* Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
* All rights reserved
*
* As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
* can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this
* software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
* incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
* called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
*/
#ifndef MATCH_H
#define MATCH_H
int match_pattern(const char *, const char *);
int match_pattern_list(const char *, const char *, int);
int match_usergroup_pattern_list(const char *, const char *);
int match_hostname(const char *, const char *);
int match_host_and_ip(const char *, const char *, const char *);
int match_user(const char *, const char *, const char *, const char *);
char *match_list(const char *, const char *, u_int *);
-char *match_filter_blacklist(const char *, const char *);
-char *match_filter_whitelist(const char *, const char *);
+char *match_filter_denylist(const char *, const char *);
+char *match_filter_allowlist(const char *, const char *);
/* addrmatch.c */
int addr_match_list(const char *, const char *);
int addr_match_cidr_list(const char *, const char *);
#endif
diff --git a/misc.c b/misc.c
index 554ceb0b17d1..4623b5755912 100644
--- a/misc.c
+++ b/misc.c
@@ -1,2270 +1,2417 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: misc.c,v 1.147 2020/04/25 06:59:36 dtucker Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: misc.c,v 1.153 2020/06/26 05:16:38 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
- * Copyright (c) 2005,2006 Damien Miller. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 2005-2020 Damien Miller. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 2004 Henning Brauer <henning@openbsd.org>
*
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
- * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
*
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
- * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
- * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
- * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
- * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
- * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
- * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
- * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
- * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
+ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
+ * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
*/
+
#include "includes.h"
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/ioctl.h>
#include <sys/socket.h>
#include <sys/stat.h>
#include <sys/time.h>
#include <sys/wait.h>
#include <sys/un.h>
#include <limits.h>
#ifdef HAVE_LIBGEN_H
# include <libgen.h>
#endif
#ifdef HAVE_POLL_H
#include <poll.h>
#endif
#include <signal.h>
#include <stdarg.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <time.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <netinet/in.h>
#include <netinet/in_systm.h>
#include <netinet/ip.h>
#include <netinet/tcp.h>
#include <arpa/inet.h>
#include <ctype.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <netdb.h>
#ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H
# include <paths.h>
#include <pwd.h>
#endif
#ifdef SSH_TUN_OPENBSD
#include <net/if.h>
#endif
#include "xmalloc.h"
#include "misc.h"
#include "log.h"
#include "ssh.h"
#include "sshbuf.h"
#include "ssherr.h"
#include "platform.h"
/* remove newline at end of string */
char *
chop(char *s)
{
char *t = s;
while (*t) {
if (*t == '\n' || *t == '\r') {
*t = '\0';
return s;
}
t++;
}
return s;
}
/* set/unset filedescriptor to non-blocking */
int
set_nonblock(int fd)
{
int val;
val = fcntl(fd, F_GETFL);
if (val == -1) {
error("fcntl(%d, F_GETFL): %s", fd, strerror(errno));
return (-1);
}
if (val & O_NONBLOCK) {
debug3("fd %d is O_NONBLOCK", fd);
return (0);
}
debug2("fd %d setting O_NONBLOCK", fd);
val |= O_NONBLOCK;
if (fcntl(fd, F_SETFL, val) == -1) {
debug("fcntl(%d, F_SETFL, O_NONBLOCK): %s", fd,
strerror(errno));
return (-1);
}
return (0);
}
int
unset_nonblock(int fd)
{
int val;
val = fcntl(fd, F_GETFL);
if (val == -1) {
error("fcntl(%d, F_GETFL): %s", fd, strerror(errno));
return (-1);
}
if (!(val & O_NONBLOCK)) {
debug3("fd %d is not O_NONBLOCK", fd);
return (0);
}
debug("fd %d clearing O_NONBLOCK", fd);
val &= ~O_NONBLOCK;
if (fcntl(fd, F_SETFL, val) == -1) {
debug("fcntl(%d, F_SETFL, ~O_NONBLOCK): %s",
fd, strerror(errno));
return (-1);
}
return (0);
}
const char *
ssh_gai_strerror(int gaierr)
{
if (gaierr == EAI_SYSTEM && errno != 0)
return strerror(errno);
return gai_strerror(gaierr);
}
/* disable nagle on socket */
void
set_nodelay(int fd)
{
int opt;
socklen_t optlen;
optlen = sizeof opt;
if (getsockopt(fd, IPPROTO_TCP, TCP_NODELAY, &opt, &optlen) == -1) {
debug("getsockopt TCP_NODELAY: %.100s", strerror(errno));
return;
}
if (opt == 1) {
debug2("fd %d is TCP_NODELAY", fd);
return;
}
opt = 1;
debug2("fd %d setting TCP_NODELAY", fd);
if (setsockopt(fd, IPPROTO_TCP, TCP_NODELAY, &opt, sizeof opt) == -1)
error("setsockopt TCP_NODELAY: %.100s", strerror(errno));
}
/* Allow local port reuse in TIME_WAIT */
int
set_reuseaddr(int fd)
{
int on = 1;
if (setsockopt(fd, SOL_SOCKET, SO_REUSEADDR, &on, sizeof(on)) == -1) {
error("setsockopt SO_REUSEADDR fd %d: %s", fd, strerror(errno));
return -1;
}
return 0;
}
/* Get/set routing domain */
char *
get_rdomain(int fd)
{
#if defined(HAVE_SYS_GET_RDOMAIN)
return sys_get_rdomain(fd);
#elif defined(__OpenBSD__)
int rtable;
char *ret;
socklen_t len = sizeof(rtable);
if (getsockopt(fd, SOL_SOCKET, SO_RTABLE, &rtable, &len) == -1) {
error("Failed to get routing domain for fd %d: %s",
fd, strerror(errno));
return NULL;
}
xasprintf(&ret, "%d", rtable);
return ret;
#else /* defined(__OpenBSD__) */
return NULL;
#endif
}
int
set_rdomain(int fd, const char *name)
{
#if defined(HAVE_SYS_SET_RDOMAIN)
return sys_set_rdomain(fd, name);
#elif defined(__OpenBSD__)
int rtable;
const char *errstr;
if (name == NULL)
return 0; /* default table */
rtable = (int)strtonum(name, 0, 255, &errstr);
if (errstr != NULL) {
/* Shouldn't happen */
error("Invalid routing domain \"%s\": %s", name, errstr);
return -1;
}
if (setsockopt(fd, SOL_SOCKET, SO_RTABLE,
&rtable, sizeof(rtable)) == -1) {
error("Failed to set routing domain %d on fd %d: %s",
rtable, fd, strerror(errno));
return -1;
}
return 0;
#else /* defined(__OpenBSD__) */
error("Setting routing domain is not supported on this platform");
return -1;
#endif
}
/*
* Wait up to *timeoutp milliseconds for events on fd. Updates
* *timeoutp with time remaining.
* Returns 0 if fd ready or -1 on timeout or error (see errno).
*/
static int
waitfd(int fd, int *timeoutp, short events)
{
struct pollfd pfd;
struct timeval t_start;
int oerrno, r;
monotime_tv(&t_start);
pfd.fd = fd;
pfd.events = events;
for (; *timeoutp >= 0;) {
r = poll(&pfd, 1, *timeoutp);
oerrno = errno;
ms_subtract_diff(&t_start, timeoutp);
errno = oerrno;
if (r > 0)
return 0;
- else if (r == -1 && errno != EAGAIN)
+ else if (r == -1 && errno != EAGAIN && errno != EINTR)
return -1;
else if (r == 0)
break;
}
/* timeout */
errno = ETIMEDOUT;
return -1;
}
/*
* Wait up to *timeoutp milliseconds for fd to be readable. Updates
* *timeoutp with time remaining.
* Returns 0 if fd ready or -1 on timeout or error (see errno).
*/
int
waitrfd(int fd, int *timeoutp) {
return waitfd(fd, timeoutp, POLLIN);
}
/*
* Attempt a non-blocking connect(2) to the specified address, waiting up to
* *timeoutp milliseconds for the connection to complete. If the timeout is
* <=0, then wait indefinitely.
*
* Returns 0 on success or -1 on failure.
*/
int
timeout_connect(int sockfd, const struct sockaddr *serv_addr,
socklen_t addrlen, int *timeoutp)
{
int optval = 0;
socklen_t optlen = sizeof(optval);
/* No timeout: just do a blocking connect() */
if (timeoutp == NULL || *timeoutp <= 0)
return connect(sockfd, serv_addr, addrlen);
set_nonblock(sockfd);
- if (connect(sockfd, serv_addr, addrlen) == 0) {
- /* Succeeded already? */
- unset_nonblock(sockfd);
- return 0;
- } else if (errno != EINPROGRESS)
- return -1;
+ for (;;) {
+ if (connect(sockfd, serv_addr, addrlen) == 0) {
+ /* Succeeded already? */
+ unset_nonblock(sockfd);
+ return 0;
+ } else if (errno == EINTR)
+ continue;
+ else if (errno != EINPROGRESS)
+ return -1;
+ break;
+ }
if (waitfd(sockfd, timeoutp, POLLIN | POLLOUT) == -1)
return -1;
/* Completed or failed */
if (getsockopt(sockfd, SOL_SOCKET, SO_ERROR, &optval, &optlen) == -1) {
debug("getsockopt: %s", strerror(errno));
return -1;
}
if (optval != 0) {
errno = optval;
return -1;
}
unset_nonblock(sockfd);
return 0;
}
/* Characters considered whitespace in strsep calls. */
#define WHITESPACE " \t\r\n"
#define QUOTE "\""
/* return next token in configuration line */
static char *
strdelim_internal(char **s, int split_equals)
{
char *old;
int wspace = 0;
if (*s == NULL)
return NULL;
old = *s;
*s = strpbrk(*s,
split_equals ? WHITESPACE QUOTE "=" : WHITESPACE QUOTE);
if (*s == NULL)
return (old);
if (*s[0] == '\"') {
memmove(*s, *s + 1, strlen(*s)); /* move nul too */
/* Find matching quote */
if ((*s = strpbrk(*s, QUOTE)) == NULL) {
return (NULL); /* no matching quote */
} else {
*s[0] = '\0';
*s += strspn(*s + 1, WHITESPACE) + 1;
return (old);
}
}
/* Allow only one '=' to be skipped */
if (split_equals && *s[0] == '=')
wspace = 1;
*s[0] = '\0';
/* Skip any extra whitespace after first token */
*s += strspn(*s + 1, WHITESPACE) + 1;
if (split_equals && *s[0] == '=' && !wspace)
*s += strspn(*s + 1, WHITESPACE) + 1;
return (old);
}
/*
* Return next token in configuration line; splts on whitespace or a
* single '=' character.
*/
char *
strdelim(char **s)
{
return strdelim_internal(s, 1);
}
/*
* Return next token in configuration line; splts on whitespace only.
*/
char *
strdelimw(char **s)
{
return strdelim_internal(s, 0);
}
struct passwd *
pwcopy(struct passwd *pw)
{
struct passwd *copy = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*copy));
copy->pw_name = xstrdup(pw->pw_name);
copy->pw_passwd = xstrdup(pw->pw_passwd);
#ifdef HAVE_STRUCT_PASSWD_PW_GECOS
copy->pw_gecos = xstrdup(pw->pw_gecos);
#endif
copy->pw_uid = pw->pw_uid;
copy->pw_gid = pw->pw_gid;
#ifdef HAVE_STRUCT_PASSWD_PW_EXPIRE
copy->pw_expire = pw->pw_expire;
#endif
#ifdef HAVE_STRUCT_PASSWD_PW_CHANGE
copy->pw_change = pw->pw_change;
#endif
#ifdef HAVE_STRUCT_PASSWD_PW_CLASS
copy->pw_class = xstrdup(pw->pw_class);
#endif
copy->pw_dir = xstrdup(pw->pw_dir);
copy->pw_shell = xstrdup(pw->pw_shell);
return copy;
}
/*
* Convert ASCII string to TCP/IP port number.
* Port must be >=0 and <=65535.
* Return -1 if invalid.
*/
int
a2port(const char *s)
{
struct servent *se;
long long port;
const char *errstr;
port = strtonum(s, 0, 65535, &errstr);
if (errstr == NULL)
return (int)port;
if ((se = getservbyname(s, "tcp")) != NULL)
return ntohs(se->s_port);
return -1;
}
int
a2tun(const char *s, int *remote)
{
const char *errstr = NULL;
char *sp, *ep;
int tun;
if (remote != NULL) {
*remote = SSH_TUNID_ANY;
sp = xstrdup(s);
if ((ep = strchr(sp, ':')) == NULL) {
free(sp);
return (a2tun(s, NULL));
}
ep[0] = '\0'; ep++;
*remote = a2tun(ep, NULL);
tun = a2tun(sp, NULL);
free(sp);
return (*remote == SSH_TUNID_ERR ? *remote : tun);
}
if (strcasecmp(s, "any") == 0)
return (SSH_TUNID_ANY);
tun = strtonum(s, 0, SSH_TUNID_MAX, &errstr);
if (errstr != NULL)
return (SSH_TUNID_ERR);
return (tun);
}
#define SECONDS 1
#define MINUTES (SECONDS * 60)
#define HOURS (MINUTES * 60)
#define DAYS (HOURS * 24)
#define WEEKS (DAYS * 7)
/*
* Convert a time string into seconds; format is
* a sequence of:
* time[qualifier]
*
* Valid time qualifiers are:
* <none> seconds
* s|S seconds
* m|M minutes
* h|H hours
* d|D days
* w|W weeks
*
* Examples:
* 90m 90 minutes
* 1h30m 90 minutes
* 2d 2 days
* 1w 1 week
*
* Return -1 if time string is invalid.
*/
long
convtime(const char *s)
{
- long total, secs, multiplier = 1;
+ long total, secs, multiplier;
const char *p;
char *endp;
errno = 0;
total = 0;
p = s;
if (p == NULL || *p == '\0')
return -1;
while (*p) {
secs = strtol(p, &endp, 10);
if (p == endp ||
(errno == ERANGE && (secs == LONG_MIN || secs == LONG_MAX)) ||
secs < 0)
return -1;
+ multiplier = 1;
switch (*endp++) {
case '\0':
endp--;
break;
case 's':
case 'S':
break;
case 'm':
case 'M':
multiplier = MINUTES;
break;
case 'h':
case 'H':
multiplier = HOURS;
break;
case 'd':
case 'D':
multiplier = DAYS;
break;
case 'w':
case 'W':
multiplier = WEEKS;
break;
default:
return -1;
}
if (secs >= LONG_MAX / multiplier)
return -1;
secs *= multiplier;
if (total >= LONG_MAX - secs)
return -1;
total += secs;
if (total < 0)
return -1;
p = endp;
}
return total;
}
+#define TF_BUFS 8
+#define TF_LEN 9
+
+const char *
+fmt_timeframe(time_t t)
+{
+ char *buf;
+ static char tfbuf[TF_BUFS][TF_LEN]; /* ring buffer */
+ static int idx = 0;
+ unsigned int sec, min, hrs, day;
+ unsigned long long week;
+
+ buf = tfbuf[idx++];
+ if (idx == TF_BUFS)
+ idx = 0;
+
+ week = t;
+
+ sec = week % 60;
+ week /= 60;
+ min = week % 60;
+ week /= 60;
+ hrs = week % 24;
+ week /= 24;
+ day = week % 7;
+ week /= 7;
+
+ if (week > 0)
+ snprintf(buf, TF_LEN, "%02lluw%01ud%02uh", week, day, hrs);
+ else if (day > 0)
+ snprintf(buf, TF_LEN, "%01ud%02uh%02um", day, hrs, min);
+ else
+ snprintf(buf, TF_LEN, "%02u:%02u:%02u", hrs, min, sec);
+
+ return (buf);
+}
+
/*
* Returns a standardized host+port identifier string.
* Caller must free returned string.
*/
char *
put_host_port(const char *host, u_short port)
{
char *hoststr;
if (port == 0 || port == SSH_DEFAULT_PORT)
return(xstrdup(host));
if (asprintf(&hoststr, "[%s]:%d", host, (int)port) == -1)
fatal("put_host_port: asprintf: %s", strerror(errno));
debug3("put_host_port: %s", hoststr);
return hoststr;
}
/*
* Search for next delimiter between hostnames/addresses and ports.
* Argument may be modified (for termination).
* Returns *cp if parsing succeeds.
* *cp is set to the start of the next field, if one was found.
* The delimiter char, if present, is stored in delim.
* If this is the last field, *cp is set to NULL.
*/
char *
hpdelim2(char **cp, char *delim)
{
char *s, *old;
if (cp == NULL || *cp == NULL)
return NULL;
old = s = *cp;
if (*s == '[') {
if ((s = strchr(s, ']')) == NULL)
return NULL;
else
s++;
} else if ((s = strpbrk(s, ":/")) == NULL)
s = *cp + strlen(*cp); /* skip to end (see first case below) */
switch (*s) {
case '\0':
*cp = NULL; /* no more fields*/
break;
case ':':
case '/':
if (delim != NULL)
*delim = *s;
*s = '\0'; /* terminate */
*cp = s + 1;
break;
default:
return NULL;
}
return old;
}
char *
hpdelim(char **cp)
{
return hpdelim2(cp, NULL);
}
char *
cleanhostname(char *host)
{
if (*host == '[' && host[strlen(host) - 1] == ']') {
host[strlen(host) - 1] = '\0';
return (host + 1);
} else
return host;
}
char *
colon(char *cp)
{
int flag = 0;
if (*cp == ':') /* Leading colon is part of file name. */
return NULL;
if (*cp == '[')
flag = 1;
for (; *cp; ++cp) {
if (*cp == '@' && *(cp+1) == '[')
flag = 1;
if (*cp == ']' && *(cp+1) == ':' && flag)
return (cp+1);
if (*cp == ':' && !flag)
return (cp);
if (*cp == '/')
return NULL;
}
return NULL;
}
/*
* Parse a [user@]host:[path] string.
* Caller must free returned user, host and path.
* Any of the pointer return arguments may be NULL (useful for syntax checking).
* If user was not specified then *userp will be set to NULL.
* If host was not specified then *hostp will be set to NULL.
* If path was not specified then *pathp will be set to ".".
* Returns 0 on success, -1 on failure.
*/
int
parse_user_host_path(const char *s, char **userp, char **hostp, char **pathp)
{
char *user = NULL, *host = NULL, *path = NULL;
char *sdup, *tmp;
int ret = -1;
if (userp != NULL)
*userp = NULL;
if (hostp != NULL)
*hostp = NULL;
if (pathp != NULL)
*pathp = NULL;
sdup = xstrdup(s);
/* Check for remote syntax: [user@]host:[path] */
if ((tmp = colon(sdup)) == NULL)
goto out;
/* Extract optional path */
*tmp++ = '\0';
if (*tmp == '\0')
tmp = ".";
path = xstrdup(tmp);
/* Extract optional user and mandatory host */
tmp = strrchr(sdup, '@');
if (tmp != NULL) {
*tmp++ = '\0';
host = xstrdup(cleanhostname(tmp));
if (*sdup != '\0')
user = xstrdup(sdup);
} else {
host = xstrdup(cleanhostname(sdup));
user = NULL;
}
/* Success */
if (userp != NULL) {
*userp = user;
user = NULL;
}
if (hostp != NULL) {
*hostp = host;
host = NULL;
}
if (pathp != NULL) {
*pathp = path;
path = NULL;
}
ret = 0;
out:
free(sdup);
free(user);
free(host);
free(path);
return ret;
}
/*
* Parse a [user@]host[:port] string.
* Caller must free returned user and host.
* Any of the pointer return arguments may be NULL (useful for syntax checking).
* If user was not specified then *userp will be set to NULL.
* If port was not specified then *portp will be -1.
* Returns 0 on success, -1 on failure.
*/
int
parse_user_host_port(const char *s, char **userp, char **hostp, int *portp)
{
char *sdup, *cp, *tmp;
char *user = NULL, *host = NULL;
int port = -1, ret = -1;
if (userp != NULL)
*userp = NULL;
if (hostp != NULL)
*hostp = NULL;
if (portp != NULL)
*portp = -1;
if ((sdup = tmp = strdup(s)) == NULL)
return -1;
/* Extract optional username */
if ((cp = strrchr(tmp, '@')) != NULL) {
*cp = '\0';
if (*tmp == '\0')
goto out;
if ((user = strdup(tmp)) == NULL)
goto out;
tmp = cp + 1;
}
/* Extract mandatory hostname */
if ((cp = hpdelim(&tmp)) == NULL || *cp == '\0')
goto out;
host = xstrdup(cleanhostname(cp));
/* Convert and verify optional port */
if (tmp != NULL && *tmp != '\0') {
if ((port = a2port(tmp)) <= 0)
goto out;
}
/* Success */
if (userp != NULL) {
*userp = user;
user = NULL;
}
if (hostp != NULL) {
*hostp = host;
host = NULL;
}
if (portp != NULL)
*portp = port;
ret = 0;
out:
free(sdup);
free(user);
free(host);
return ret;
}
/*
* Converts a two-byte hex string to decimal.
* Returns the decimal value or -1 for invalid input.
*/
static int
hexchar(const char *s)
{
unsigned char result[2];
int i;
for (i = 0; i < 2; i++) {
if (s[i] >= '0' && s[i] <= '9')
result[i] = (unsigned char)(s[i] - '0');
else if (s[i] >= 'a' && s[i] <= 'f')
result[i] = (unsigned char)(s[i] - 'a') + 10;
else if (s[i] >= 'A' && s[i] <= 'F')
result[i] = (unsigned char)(s[i] - 'A') + 10;
else
return -1;
}
return (result[0] << 4) | result[1];
}
/*
* Decode an url-encoded string.
* Returns a newly allocated string on success or NULL on failure.
*/
static char *
urldecode(const char *src)
{
char *ret, *dst;
int ch;
ret = xmalloc(strlen(src) + 1);
for (dst = ret; *src != '\0'; src++) {
switch (*src) {
case '+':
*dst++ = ' ';
break;
case '%':
if (!isxdigit((unsigned char)src[1]) ||
!isxdigit((unsigned char)src[2]) ||
(ch = hexchar(src + 1)) == -1) {
free(ret);
return NULL;
}
*dst++ = ch;
src += 2;
break;
default:
*dst++ = *src;
break;
}
}
*dst = '\0';
return ret;
}
/*
* Parse an (scp|ssh|sftp)://[user@]host[:port][/path] URI.
* See https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-secsh-scp-sftp-ssh-uri-04
* Either user or path may be url-encoded (but not host or port).
* Caller must free returned user, host and path.
* Any of the pointer return arguments may be NULL (useful for syntax checking)
* but the scheme must always be specified.
* If user was not specified then *userp will be set to NULL.
* If port was not specified then *portp will be -1.
* If path was not specified then *pathp will be set to NULL.
* Returns 0 on success, 1 if non-uri/wrong scheme, -1 on error/invalid uri.
*/
int
parse_uri(const char *scheme, const char *uri, char **userp, char **hostp,
int *portp, char **pathp)
{
char *uridup, *cp, *tmp, ch;
char *user = NULL, *host = NULL, *path = NULL;
int port = -1, ret = -1;
size_t len;
len = strlen(scheme);
if (strncmp(uri, scheme, len) != 0 || strncmp(uri + len, "://", 3) != 0)
return 1;
uri += len + 3;
if (userp != NULL)
*userp = NULL;
if (hostp != NULL)
*hostp = NULL;
if (portp != NULL)
*portp = -1;
if (pathp != NULL)
*pathp = NULL;
uridup = tmp = xstrdup(uri);
/* Extract optional ssh-info (username + connection params) */
if ((cp = strchr(tmp, '@')) != NULL) {
char *delim;
*cp = '\0';
/* Extract username and connection params */
if ((delim = strchr(tmp, ';')) != NULL) {
/* Just ignore connection params for now */
*delim = '\0';
}
if (*tmp == '\0') {
/* Empty username */
goto out;
}
if ((user = urldecode(tmp)) == NULL)
goto out;
tmp = cp + 1;
}
/* Extract mandatory hostname */
if ((cp = hpdelim2(&tmp, &ch)) == NULL || *cp == '\0')
goto out;
host = xstrdup(cleanhostname(cp));
if (!valid_domain(host, 0, NULL))
goto out;
if (tmp != NULL && *tmp != '\0') {
if (ch == ':') {
/* Convert and verify port. */
if ((cp = strchr(tmp, '/')) != NULL)
*cp = '\0';
if ((port = a2port(tmp)) <= 0)
goto out;
tmp = cp ? cp + 1 : NULL;
}
if (tmp != NULL && *tmp != '\0') {
/* Extract optional path */
if ((path = urldecode(tmp)) == NULL)
goto out;
}
}
/* Success */
if (userp != NULL) {
*userp = user;
user = NULL;
}
if (hostp != NULL) {
*hostp = host;
host = NULL;
}
if (portp != NULL)
*portp = port;
if (pathp != NULL) {
*pathp = path;
path = NULL;
}
ret = 0;
out:
free(uridup);
free(user);
free(host);
free(path);
return ret;
}
/* function to assist building execv() arguments */
void
addargs(arglist *args, char *fmt, ...)
{
va_list ap;
char *cp;
u_int nalloc;
int r;
va_start(ap, fmt);
r = vasprintf(&cp, fmt, ap);
va_end(ap);
if (r == -1)
fatal("addargs: argument too long");
nalloc = args->nalloc;
if (args->list == NULL) {
nalloc = 32;
args->num = 0;
} else if (args->num+2 >= nalloc)
nalloc *= 2;
args->list = xrecallocarray(args->list, args->nalloc, nalloc, sizeof(char *));
args->nalloc = nalloc;
args->list[args->num++] = cp;
args->list[args->num] = NULL;
}
void
replacearg(arglist *args, u_int which, char *fmt, ...)
{
va_list ap;
char *cp;
int r;
va_start(ap, fmt);
r = vasprintf(&cp, fmt, ap);
va_end(ap);
if (r == -1)
fatal("replacearg: argument too long");
if (which >= args->num)
fatal("replacearg: tried to replace invalid arg %d >= %d",
which, args->num);
free(args->list[which]);
args->list[which] = cp;
}
void
freeargs(arglist *args)
{
u_int i;
if (args->list != NULL) {
for (i = 0; i < args->num; i++)
free(args->list[i]);
free(args->list);
args->nalloc = args->num = 0;
args->list = NULL;
}
}
/*
* Expands tildes in the file name. Returns data allocated by xmalloc.
* Warning: this calls getpw*.
*/
char *
tilde_expand_filename(const char *filename, uid_t uid)
{
const char *path, *sep;
char user[128], *ret;
struct passwd *pw;
u_int len, slash;
if (*filename != '~')
return (xstrdup(filename));
filename++;
path = strchr(filename, '/');
if (path != NULL && path > filename) { /* ~user/path */
slash = path - filename;
if (slash > sizeof(user) - 1)
fatal("tilde_expand_filename: ~username too long");
memcpy(user, filename, slash);
user[slash] = '\0';
if ((pw = getpwnam(user)) == NULL)
fatal("tilde_expand_filename: No such user %s", user);
} else if ((pw = getpwuid(uid)) == NULL) /* ~/path */
fatal("tilde_expand_filename: No such uid %ld", (long)uid);
/* Make sure directory has a trailing '/' */
len = strlen(pw->pw_dir);
if (len == 0 || pw->pw_dir[len - 1] != '/')
sep = "/";
else
sep = "";
/* Skip leading '/' from specified path */
if (path != NULL)
filename = path + 1;
if (xasprintf(&ret, "%s%s%s", pw->pw_dir, sep, filename) >= PATH_MAX)
fatal("tilde_expand_filename: Path too long");
return (ret);
}
/*
- * Expand a string with a set of %[char] escapes. A number of escapes may be
- * specified as (char *escape_chars, char *replacement) pairs. The list must
- * be terminated by a NULL escape_char. Returns replaced string in memory
- * allocated by xmalloc.
+ * Expand a string with a set of %[char] escapes and/or ${ENVIRONMENT}
+ * substitutions. A number of escapes may be specified as
+ * (char *escape_chars, char *replacement) pairs. The list must be terminated
+ * by a NULL escape_char. Returns replaced string in memory allocated by
+ * xmalloc which the caller must free.
*/
-char *
-percent_expand(const char *string, ...)
+static char *
+vdollar_percent_expand(int *parseerror, int dollar, int percent,
+ const char *string, va_list ap)
{
#define EXPAND_MAX_KEYS 16
- u_int num_keys, i;
+ u_int num_keys = 0, i;
struct {
const char *key;
const char *repl;
} keys[EXPAND_MAX_KEYS];
struct sshbuf *buf;
- va_list ap;
- int r;
- char *ret;
+ int r, missingvar = 0;
+ char *ret = NULL, *var, *varend, *val;
+ size_t len;
if ((buf = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
-
- /* Gather keys */
- va_start(ap, string);
- for (num_keys = 0; num_keys < EXPAND_MAX_KEYS; num_keys++) {
- keys[num_keys].key = va_arg(ap, char *);
- if (keys[num_keys].key == NULL)
- break;
- keys[num_keys].repl = va_arg(ap, char *);
- if (keys[num_keys].repl == NULL)
- fatal("%s: NULL replacement", __func__);
+ if (parseerror == NULL)
+ fatal("%s: null parseerror arg", __func__);
+ *parseerror = 1;
+
+ /* Gather keys if we're doing percent expansion. */
+ if (percent) {
+ for (num_keys = 0; num_keys < EXPAND_MAX_KEYS; num_keys++) {
+ keys[num_keys].key = va_arg(ap, char *);
+ if (keys[num_keys].key == NULL)
+ break;
+ keys[num_keys].repl = va_arg(ap, char *);
+ if (keys[num_keys].repl == NULL)
+ fatal("%s: NULL replacement for token %s", __func__, keys[num_keys].key);
+ }
+ if (num_keys == EXPAND_MAX_KEYS && va_arg(ap, char *) != NULL)
+ fatal("%s: too many keys", __func__);
+ if (num_keys == 0)
+ fatal("%s: percent expansion without token list",
+ __func__);
}
- if (num_keys == EXPAND_MAX_KEYS && va_arg(ap, char *) != NULL)
- fatal("%s: too many keys", __func__);
- va_end(ap);
/* Expand string */
for (i = 0; *string != '\0'; string++) {
- if (*string != '%') {
+ /* Optionally process ${ENVIRONMENT} expansions. */
+ if (dollar && string[0] == '$' && string[1] == '{') {
+ string += 2; /* skip over '${' */
+ if ((varend = strchr(string, '}')) == NULL) {
+ error("%s: environment variable '%s' missing "
+ "closing '}'", __func__, string);
+ goto out;
+ }
+ len = varend - string;
+ if (len == 0) {
+ error("%s: zero-length environment variable",
+ __func__);
+ goto out;
+ }
+ var = xmalloc(len + 1);
+ (void)strlcpy(var, string, len + 1);
+ if ((val = getenv(var)) == NULL) {
+ error("%s: env var ${%s} has no value",
+ __func__, var);
+ missingvar = 1;
+ } else {
+ debug3("%s: expand ${%s} -> '%s'", __func__,
+ var, val);
+ if ((r = sshbuf_put(buf, val, strlen(val))) !=0)
+ fatal("%s: sshbuf_put: %s", __func__,
+ ssh_err(r));
+ }
+ free(var);
+ string += len;
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Process percent expansions if we have a list of TOKENs.
+ * If we're not doing percent expansion everything just gets
+ * appended here.
+ */
+ if (*string != '%' || !percent) {
append:
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(buf, *string)) != 0) {
fatal("%s: sshbuf_put_u8: %s",
__func__, ssh_err(r));
}
continue;
}
string++;
/* %% case */
if (*string == '%')
goto append;
- if (*string == '\0')
- fatal("%s: invalid format", __func__);
+ if (*string == '\0') {
+ error("%s: invalid format", __func__);
+ goto out;
+ }
for (i = 0; i < num_keys; i++) {
if (strchr(keys[i].key, *string) != NULL) {
if ((r = sshbuf_put(buf, keys[i].repl,
strlen(keys[i].repl))) != 0) {
fatal("%s: sshbuf_put: %s",
__func__, ssh_err(r));
}
break;
}
}
- if (i >= num_keys)
- fatal("%s: unknown key %%%c", __func__, *string);
+ if (i >= num_keys) {
+ error("%s: unknown key %%%c", __func__, *string);
+ goto out;
+ }
}
- if ((ret = sshbuf_dup_string(buf)) == NULL)
+ if (!missingvar && (ret = sshbuf_dup_string(buf)) == NULL)
fatal("%s: sshbuf_dup_string failed", __func__);
+ *parseerror = 0;
+ out:
sshbuf_free(buf);
- return ret;
+ return *parseerror ? NULL : ret;
#undef EXPAND_MAX_KEYS
}
+/*
+ * Expand only environment variables.
+ * Note that although this function is variadic like the other similar
+ * functions, any such arguments will be unused.
+ */
+
+char *
+dollar_expand(int *parseerr, const char *string, ...)
+{
+ char *ret;
+ int err;
+ va_list ap;
+
+ va_start(ap, string);
+ ret = vdollar_percent_expand(&err, 1, 0, string, ap);
+ va_end(ap);
+ if (parseerr != NULL)
+ *parseerr = err;
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Returns expanded string or NULL if a specified environment variable is
+ * not defined, or calls fatal if the string is invalid.
+ */
+char *
+percent_expand(const char *string, ...)
+{
+ char *ret;
+ int err;
+ va_list ap;
+
+ va_start(ap, string);
+ ret = vdollar_percent_expand(&err, 0, 1, string, ap);
+ va_end(ap);
+ if (err)
+ fatal("%s failed", __func__);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Returns expanded string or NULL if a specified environment variable is
+ * not defined, or calls fatal if the string is invalid.
+ */
+char *
+percent_dollar_expand(const char *string, ...)
+{
+ char *ret;
+ int err;
+ va_list ap;
+
+ va_start(ap, string);
+ ret = vdollar_percent_expand(&err, 1, 1, string, ap);
+ va_end(ap);
+ if (err)
+ fatal("%s failed", __func__);
+ return ret;
+}
+
int
tun_open(int tun, int mode, char **ifname)
{
#if defined(CUSTOM_SYS_TUN_OPEN)
return (sys_tun_open(tun, mode, ifname));
#elif defined(SSH_TUN_OPENBSD)
struct ifreq ifr;
char name[100];
int fd = -1, sock;
const char *tunbase = "tun";
if (ifname != NULL)
*ifname = NULL;
if (mode == SSH_TUNMODE_ETHERNET)
tunbase = "tap";
/* Open the tunnel device */
if (tun <= SSH_TUNID_MAX) {
snprintf(name, sizeof(name), "/dev/%s%d", tunbase, tun);
fd = open(name, O_RDWR);
} else if (tun == SSH_TUNID_ANY) {
for (tun = 100; tun >= 0; tun--) {
snprintf(name, sizeof(name), "/dev/%s%d",
tunbase, tun);
if ((fd = open(name, O_RDWR)) >= 0)
break;
}
} else {
debug("%s: invalid tunnel %u", __func__, tun);
return -1;
}
if (fd == -1) {
debug("%s: %s open: %s", __func__, name, strerror(errno));
return -1;
}
debug("%s: %s mode %d fd %d", __func__, name, mode, fd);
/* Bring interface up if it is not already */
snprintf(ifr.ifr_name, sizeof(ifr.ifr_name), "%s%d", tunbase, tun);
if ((sock = socket(PF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0)) == -1)
goto failed;
if (ioctl(sock, SIOCGIFFLAGS, &ifr) == -1) {
debug("%s: get interface %s flags: %s", __func__,
ifr.ifr_name, strerror(errno));
goto failed;
}
if (!(ifr.ifr_flags & IFF_UP)) {
ifr.ifr_flags |= IFF_UP;
if (ioctl(sock, SIOCSIFFLAGS, &ifr) == -1) {
debug("%s: activate interface %s: %s", __func__,
ifr.ifr_name, strerror(errno));
goto failed;
}
}
if (ifname != NULL)
*ifname = xstrdup(ifr.ifr_name);
close(sock);
return fd;
failed:
if (fd >= 0)
close(fd);
if (sock >= 0)
close(sock);
return -1;
#else
error("Tunnel interfaces are not supported on this platform");
return (-1);
#endif
}
void
sanitise_stdfd(void)
{
int nullfd, dupfd;
if ((nullfd = dupfd = open(_PATH_DEVNULL, O_RDWR)) == -1) {
fprintf(stderr, "Couldn't open /dev/null: %s\n",
strerror(errno));
exit(1);
}
while (++dupfd <= STDERR_FILENO) {
/* Only populate closed fds. */
if (fcntl(dupfd, F_GETFL) == -1 && errno == EBADF) {
if (dup2(nullfd, dupfd) == -1) {
fprintf(stderr, "dup2: %s\n", strerror(errno));
exit(1);
}
}
}
if (nullfd > STDERR_FILENO)
close(nullfd);
}
char *
tohex(const void *vp, size_t l)
{
const u_char *p = (const u_char *)vp;
char b[3], *r;
size_t i, hl;
if (l > 65536)
return xstrdup("tohex: length > 65536");
hl = l * 2 + 1;
r = xcalloc(1, hl);
for (i = 0; i < l; i++) {
snprintf(b, sizeof(b), "%02x", p[i]);
strlcat(r, b, hl);
}
return (r);
}
/*
* Extend string *sp by the specified format. If *sp is not NULL (or empty),
* then the separator 'sep' will be prepended before the formatted arguments.
* Extended strings are heap allocated.
*/
void
xextendf(char **sp, const char *sep, const char *fmt, ...)
{
va_list ap;
char *tmp1, *tmp2;
va_start(ap, fmt);
xvasprintf(&tmp1, fmt, ap);
va_end(ap);
if (*sp == NULL || **sp == '\0') {
free(*sp);
*sp = tmp1;
return;
}
xasprintf(&tmp2, "%s%s%s", *sp, sep == NULL ? "" : sep, tmp1);
free(tmp1);
free(*sp);
*sp = tmp2;
}
u_int64_t
get_u64(const void *vp)
{
const u_char *p = (const u_char *)vp;
u_int64_t v;
v = (u_int64_t)p[0] << 56;
v |= (u_int64_t)p[1] << 48;
v |= (u_int64_t)p[2] << 40;
v |= (u_int64_t)p[3] << 32;
v |= (u_int64_t)p[4] << 24;
v |= (u_int64_t)p[5] << 16;
v |= (u_int64_t)p[6] << 8;
v |= (u_int64_t)p[7];
return (v);
}
u_int32_t
get_u32(const void *vp)
{
const u_char *p = (const u_char *)vp;
u_int32_t v;
v = (u_int32_t)p[0] << 24;
v |= (u_int32_t)p[1] << 16;
v |= (u_int32_t)p[2] << 8;
v |= (u_int32_t)p[3];
return (v);
}
u_int32_t
get_u32_le(const void *vp)
{
const u_char *p = (const u_char *)vp;
u_int32_t v;
v = (u_int32_t)p[0];
v |= (u_int32_t)p[1] << 8;
v |= (u_int32_t)p[2] << 16;
v |= (u_int32_t)p[3] << 24;
return (v);
}
u_int16_t
get_u16(const void *vp)
{
const u_char *p = (const u_char *)vp;
u_int16_t v;
v = (u_int16_t)p[0] << 8;
v |= (u_int16_t)p[1];
return (v);
}
void
put_u64(void *vp, u_int64_t v)
{
u_char *p = (u_char *)vp;
p[0] = (u_char)(v >> 56) & 0xff;
p[1] = (u_char)(v >> 48) & 0xff;
p[2] = (u_char)(v >> 40) & 0xff;
p[3] = (u_char)(v >> 32) & 0xff;
p[4] = (u_char)(v >> 24) & 0xff;
p[5] = (u_char)(v >> 16) & 0xff;
p[6] = (u_char)(v >> 8) & 0xff;
p[7] = (u_char)v & 0xff;
}
void
put_u32(void *vp, u_int32_t v)
{
u_char *p = (u_char *)vp;
p[0] = (u_char)(v >> 24) & 0xff;
p[1] = (u_char)(v >> 16) & 0xff;
p[2] = (u_char)(v >> 8) & 0xff;
p[3] = (u_char)v & 0xff;
}
void
put_u32_le(void *vp, u_int32_t v)
{
u_char *p = (u_char *)vp;
p[0] = (u_char)v & 0xff;
p[1] = (u_char)(v >> 8) & 0xff;
p[2] = (u_char)(v >> 16) & 0xff;
p[3] = (u_char)(v >> 24) & 0xff;
}
void
put_u16(void *vp, u_int16_t v)
{
u_char *p = (u_char *)vp;
p[0] = (u_char)(v >> 8) & 0xff;
p[1] = (u_char)v & 0xff;
}
void
ms_subtract_diff(struct timeval *start, int *ms)
{
struct timeval diff, finish;
monotime_tv(&finish);
timersub(&finish, start, &diff);
*ms -= (diff.tv_sec * 1000) + (diff.tv_usec / 1000);
}
void
ms_to_timeval(struct timeval *tv, int ms)
{
if (ms < 0)
ms = 0;
tv->tv_sec = ms / 1000;
tv->tv_usec = (ms % 1000) * 1000;
}
void
monotime_ts(struct timespec *ts)
{
struct timeval tv;
#if defined(HAVE_CLOCK_GETTIME) && (defined(CLOCK_BOOTTIME) || \
defined(CLOCK_MONOTONIC) || defined(CLOCK_REALTIME))
static int gettime_failed = 0;
if (!gettime_failed) {
# ifdef CLOCK_BOOTTIME
if (clock_gettime(CLOCK_BOOTTIME, ts) == 0)
return;
# endif /* CLOCK_BOOTTIME */
# ifdef CLOCK_MONOTONIC
if (clock_gettime(CLOCK_MONOTONIC, ts) == 0)
return;
# endif /* CLOCK_MONOTONIC */
# ifdef CLOCK_REALTIME
/* Not monotonic, but we're almost out of options here. */
if (clock_gettime(CLOCK_REALTIME, ts) == 0)
return;
# endif /* CLOCK_REALTIME */
debug3("clock_gettime: %s", strerror(errno));
gettime_failed = 1;
}
#endif /* HAVE_CLOCK_GETTIME && (BOOTTIME || MONOTONIC || REALTIME) */
gettimeofday(&tv, NULL);
ts->tv_sec = tv.tv_sec;
ts->tv_nsec = (long)tv.tv_usec * 1000;
}
void
monotime_tv(struct timeval *tv)
{
struct timespec ts;
monotime_ts(&ts);
tv->tv_sec = ts.tv_sec;
tv->tv_usec = ts.tv_nsec / 1000;
}
time_t
monotime(void)
{
struct timespec ts;
monotime_ts(&ts);
return ts.tv_sec;
}
double
monotime_double(void)
{
struct timespec ts;
monotime_ts(&ts);
return ts.tv_sec + ((double)ts.tv_nsec / 1000000000);
}
void
bandwidth_limit_init(struct bwlimit *bw, u_int64_t kbps, size_t buflen)
{
bw->buflen = buflen;
bw->rate = kbps;
bw->thresh = buflen;
bw->lamt = 0;
timerclear(&bw->bwstart);
timerclear(&bw->bwend);
}
/* Callback from read/write loop to insert bandwidth-limiting delays */
void
bandwidth_limit(struct bwlimit *bw, size_t read_len)
{
u_int64_t waitlen;
struct timespec ts, rm;
bw->lamt += read_len;
if (!timerisset(&bw->bwstart)) {
monotime_tv(&bw->bwstart);
return;
}
if (bw->lamt < bw->thresh)
return;
monotime_tv(&bw->bwend);
timersub(&bw->bwend, &bw->bwstart, &bw->bwend);
if (!timerisset(&bw->bwend))
return;
bw->lamt *= 8;
waitlen = (double)1000000L * bw->lamt / bw->rate;
bw->bwstart.tv_sec = waitlen / 1000000L;
bw->bwstart.tv_usec = waitlen % 1000000L;
if (timercmp(&bw->bwstart, &bw->bwend, >)) {
timersub(&bw->bwstart, &bw->bwend, &bw->bwend);
/* Adjust the wait time */
if (bw->bwend.tv_sec) {
bw->thresh /= 2;
if (bw->thresh < bw->buflen / 4)
bw->thresh = bw->buflen / 4;
} else if (bw->bwend.tv_usec < 10000) {
bw->thresh *= 2;
if (bw->thresh > bw->buflen * 8)
bw->thresh = bw->buflen * 8;
}
TIMEVAL_TO_TIMESPEC(&bw->bwend, &ts);
while (nanosleep(&ts, &rm) == -1) {
if (errno != EINTR)
break;
ts = rm;
}
}
bw->lamt = 0;
monotime_tv(&bw->bwstart);
}
/* Make a template filename for mk[sd]temp() */
void
mktemp_proto(char *s, size_t len)
{
const char *tmpdir;
int r;
if ((tmpdir = getenv("TMPDIR")) != NULL) {
r = snprintf(s, len, "%s/ssh-XXXXXXXXXXXX", tmpdir);
if (r > 0 && (size_t)r < len)
return;
}
r = snprintf(s, len, "/tmp/ssh-XXXXXXXXXXXX");
if (r < 0 || (size_t)r >= len)
fatal("%s: template string too short", __func__);
}
static const struct {
const char *name;
int value;
} ipqos[] = {
{ "none", INT_MAX }, /* can't use 0 here; that's CS0 */
{ "af11", IPTOS_DSCP_AF11 },
{ "af12", IPTOS_DSCP_AF12 },
{ "af13", IPTOS_DSCP_AF13 },
{ "af21", IPTOS_DSCP_AF21 },
{ "af22", IPTOS_DSCP_AF22 },
{ "af23", IPTOS_DSCP_AF23 },
{ "af31", IPTOS_DSCP_AF31 },
{ "af32", IPTOS_DSCP_AF32 },
{ "af33", IPTOS_DSCP_AF33 },
{ "af41", IPTOS_DSCP_AF41 },
{ "af42", IPTOS_DSCP_AF42 },
{ "af43", IPTOS_DSCP_AF43 },
{ "cs0", IPTOS_DSCP_CS0 },
{ "cs1", IPTOS_DSCP_CS1 },
{ "cs2", IPTOS_DSCP_CS2 },
{ "cs3", IPTOS_DSCP_CS3 },
{ "cs4", IPTOS_DSCP_CS4 },
{ "cs5", IPTOS_DSCP_CS5 },
{ "cs6", IPTOS_DSCP_CS6 },
{ "cs7", IPTOS_DSCP_CS7 },
{ "ef", IPTOS_DSCP_EF },
{ "le", IPTOS_DSCP_LE },
{ "lowdelay", IPTOS_LOWDELAY },
{ "throughput", IPTOS_THROUGHPUT },
{ "reliability", IPTOS_RELIABILITY },
{ NULL, -1 }
};
int
parse_ipqos(const char *cp)
{
u_int i;
char *ep;
long val;
if (cp == NULL)
return -1;
for (i = 0; ipqos[i].name != NULL; i++) {
if (strcasecmp(cp, ipqos[i].name) == 0)
return ipqos[i].value;
}
/* Try parsing as an integer */
val = strtol(cp, &ep, 0);
if (*cp == '\0' || *ep != '\0' || val < 0 || val > 255)
return -1;
return val;
}
const char *
iptos2str(int iptos)
{
int i;
static char iptos_str[sizeof "0xff"];
for (i = 0; ipqos[i].name != NULL; i++) {
if (ipqos[i].value == iptos)
return ipqos[i].name;
}
snprintf(iptos_str, sizeof iptos_str, "0x%02x", iptos);
return iptos_str;
}
void
lowercase(char *s)
{
for (; *s; s++)
*s = tolower((u_char)*s);
}
int
unix_listener(const char *path, int backlog, int unlink_first)
{
struct sockaddr_un sunaddr;
int saved_errno, sock;
memset(&sunaddr, 0, sizeof(sunaddr));
sunaddr.sun_family = AF_UNIX;
if (strlcpy(sunaddr.sun_path, path,
sizeof(sunaddr.sun_path)) >= sizeof(sunaddr.sun_path)) {
error("%s: path \"%s\" too long for Unix domain socket",
__func__, path);
errno = ENAMETOOLONG;
return -1;
}
sock = socket(PF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0);
if (sock == -1) {
saved_errno = errno;
error("%s: socket: %.100s", __func__, strerror(errno));
errno = saved_errno;
return -1;
}
if (unlink_first == 1) {
if (unlink(path) != 0 && errno != ENOENT)
error("unlink(%s): %.100s", path, strerror(errno));
}
if (bind(sock, (struct sockaddr *)&sunaddr, sizeof(sunaddr)) == -1) {
saved_errno = errno;
error("%s: cannot bind to path %s: %s",
__func__, path, strerror(errno));
close(sock);
errno = saved_errno;
return -1;
}
if (listen(sock, backlog) == -1) {
saved_errno = errno;
error("%s: cannot listen on path %s: %s",
__func__, path, strerror(errno));
close(sock);
unlink(path);
errno = saved_errno;
return -1;
}
return sock;
}
void
sock_set_v6only(int s)
{
#if defined(IPV6_V6ONLY) && !defined(__OpenBSD__)
int on = 1;
debug3("%s: set socket %d IPV6_V6ONLY", __func__, s);
if (setsockopt(s, IPPROTO_IPV6, IPV6_V6ONLY, &on, sizeof(on)) == -1)
error("setsockopt IPV6_V6ONLY: %s", strerror(errno));
#endif
}
/*
* Compares two strings that maybe be NULL. Returns non-zero if strings
* are both NULL or are identical, returns zero otherwise.
*/
static int
strcmp_maybe_null(const char *a, const char *b)
{
if ((a == NULL && b != NULL) || (a != NULL && b == NULL))
return 0;
if (a != NULL && strcmp(a, b) != 0)
return 0;
return 1;
}
/*
* Compare two forwards, returning non-zero if they are identical or
* zero otherwise.
*/
int
forward_equals(const struct Forward *a, const struct Forward *b)
{
if (strcmp_maybe_null(a->listen_host, b->listen_host) == 0)
return 0;
if (a->listen_port != b->listen_port)
return 0;
if (strcmp_maybe_null(a->listen_path, b->listen_path) == 0)
return 0;
if (strcmp_maybe_null(a->connect_host, b->connect_host) == 0)
return 0;
if (a->connect_port != b->connect_port)
return 0;
if (strcmp_maybe_null(a->connect_path, b->connect_path) == 0)
return 0;
/* allocated_port and handle are not checked */
return 1;
}
/* returns 1 if process is already daemonized, 0 otherwise */
int
daemonized(void)
{
int fd;
if ((fd = open(_PATH_TTY, O_RDONLY | O_NOCTTY)) >= 0) {
close(fd);
return 0; /* have controlling terminal */
}
if (getppid() != 1)
return 0; /* parent is not init */
if (getsid(0) != getpid())
return 0; /* not session leader */
debug3("already daemonized");
return 1;
}
/*
* Splits 's' into an argument vector. Handles quoted string and basic
* escape characters (\\, \", \'). Caller must free the argument vector
* and its members.
*/
int
argv_split(const char *s, int *argcp, char ***argvp)
{
int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
int argc = 0, quote, i, j;
char *arg, **argv = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*argv));
*argvp = NULL;
*argcp = 0;
for (i = 0; s[i] != '\0'; i++) {
/* Skip leading whitespace */
if (s[i] == ' ' || s[i] == '\t')
continue;
/* Start of a token */
quote = 0;
if (s[i] == '\\' &&
(s[i + 1] == '\'' || s[i + 1] == '\"' || s[i + 1] == '\\'))
i++;
else if (s[i] == '\'' || s[i] == '"')
quote = s[i++];
argv = xreallocarray(argv, (argc + 2), sizeof(*argv));
arg = argv[argc++] = xcalloc(1, strlen(s + i) + 1);
argv[argc] = NULL;
/* Copy the token in, removing escapes */
for (j = 0; s[i] != '\0'; i++) {
if (s[i] == '\\') {
if (s[i + 1] == '\'' ||
s[i + 1] == '\"' ||
s[i + 1] == '\\') {
i++; /* Skip '\' */
arg[j++] = s[i];
} else {
/* Unrecognised escape */
arg[j++] = s[i];
}
} else if (quote == 0 && (s[i] == ' ' || s[i] == '\t'))
break; /* done */
else if (quote != 0 && s[i] == quote)
break; /* done */
else
arg[j++] = s[i];
}
if (s[i] == '\0') {
if (quote != 0) {
/* Ran out of string looking for close quote */
r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
goto out;
}
break;
}
}
/* Success */
*argcp = argc;
*argvp = argv;
argc = 0;
argv = NULL;
r = 0;
out:
if (argc != 0 && argv != NULL) {
for (i = 0; i < argc; i++)
free(argv[i]);
free(argv);
}
return r;
}
/*
* Reassemble an argument vector into a string, quoting and escaping as
* necessary. Caller must free returned string.
*/
char *
argv_assemble(int argc, char **argv)
{
int i, j, ws, r;
char c, *ret;
struct sshbuf *buf, *arg;
if ((buf = sshbuf_new()) == NULL || (arg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
for (i = 0; i < argc; i++) {
ws = 0;
sshbuf_reset(arg);
for (j = 0; argv[i][j] != '\0'; j++) {
r = 0;
c = argv[i][j];
switch (c) {
case ' ':
case '\t':
ws = 1;
r = sshbuf_put_u8(arg, c);
break;
case '\\':
case '\'':
case '"':
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(arg, '\\')) != 0)
break;
/* FALLTHROUGH */
default:
r = sshbuf_put_u8(arg, c);
break;
}
if (r != 0)
fatal("%s: sshbuf_put_u8: %s",
__func__, ssh_err(r));
}
if ((i != 0 && (r = sshbuf_put_u8(buf, ' ')) != 0) ||
(ws != 0 && (r = sshbuf_put_u8(buf, '"')) != 0) ||
(r = sshbuf_putb(buf, arg)) != 0 ||
(ws != 0 && (r = sshbuf_put_u8(buf, '"')) != 0))
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
}
if ((ret = malloc(sshbuf_len(buf) + 1)) == NULL)
fatal("%s: malloc failed", __func__);
memcpy(ret, sshbuf_ptr(buf), sshbuf_len(buf));
ret[sshbuf_len(buf)] = '\0';
sshbuf_free(buf);
sshbuf_free(arg);
return ret;
}
/* Returns 0 if pid exited cleanly, non-zero otherwise */
int
exited_cleanly(pid_t pid, const char *tag, const char *cmd, int quiet)
{
int status;
while (waitpid(pid, &status, 0) == -1) {
if (errno != EINTR) {
error("%s: waitpid: %s", tag, strerror(errno));
return -1;
}
}
if (WIFSIGNALED(status)) {
error("%s %s exited on signal %d", tag, cmd, WTERMSIG(status));
return -1;
} else if (WEXITSTATUS(status) != 0) {
do_log2(quiet ? SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG1 : SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO,
"%s %s failed, status %d", tag, cmd, WEXITSTATUS(status));
return -1;
}
return 0;
}
/*
* Check a given path for security. This is defined as all components
* of the path to the file must be owned by either the owner of
* of the file or root and no directories must be group or world writable.
*
* XXX Should any specific check be done for sym links ?
*
* Takes a file name, its stat information (preferably from fstat() to
* avoid races), the uid of the expected owner, their home directory and an
* error buffer plus max size as arguments.
*
* Returns 0 on success and -1 on failure
*/
int
safe_path(const char *name, struct stat *stp, const char *pw_dir,
uid_t uid, char *err, size_t errlen)
{
char buf[PATH_MAX], homedir[PATH_MAX];
char *cp;
int comparehome = 0;
struct stat st;
if (realpath(name, buf) == NULL) {
snprintf(err, errlen, "realpath %s failed: %s", name,
strerror(errno));
return -1;
}
if (pw_dir != NULL && realpath(pw_dir, homedir) != NULL)
comparehome = 1;
if (!S_ISREG(stp->st_mode)) {
snprintf(err, errlen, "%s is not a regular file", buf);
return -1;
}
if ((!platform_sys_dir_uid(stp->st_uid) && stp->st_uid != uid) ||
(stp->st_mode & 022) != 0) {
snprintf(err, errlen, "bad ownership or modes for file %s",
buf);
return -1;
}
/* for each component of the canonical path, walking upwards */
for (;;) {
if ((cp = dirname(buf)) == NULL) {
snprintf(err, errlen, "dirname() failed");
return -1;
}
strlcpy(buf, cp, sizeof(buf));
if (stat(buf, &st) == -1 ||
(!platform_sys_dir_uid(st.st_uid) && st.st_uid != uid) ||
(st.st_mode & 022) != 0) {
snprintf(err, errlen,
"bad ownership or modes for directory %s", buf);
return -1;
}
/* If are past the homedir then we can stop */
if (comparehome && strcmp(homedir, buf) == 0)
break;
/*
* dirname should always complete with a "/" path,
* but we can be paranoid and check for "." too
*/
if ((strcmp("/", buf) == 0) || (strcmp(".", buf) == 0))
break;
}
return 0;
}
/*
* Version of safe_path() that accepts an open file descriptor to
* avoid races.
*
* Returns 0 on success and -1 on failure
*/
int
safe_path_fd(int fd, const char *file, struct passwd *pw,
char *err, size_t errlen)
{
struct stat st;
/* check the open file to avoid races */
if (fstat(fd, &st) == -1) {
snprintf(err, errlen, "cannot stat file %s: %s",
file, strerror(errno));
return -1;
}
return safe_path(file, &st, pw->pw_dir, pw->pw_uid, err, errlen);
}
/*
* Sets the value of the given variable in the environment. If the variable
* already exists, its value is overridden.
*/
void
child_set_env(char ***envp, u_int *envsizep, const char *name,
const char *value)
{
char **env;
u_int envsize;
u_int i, namelen;
if (strchr(name, '=') != NULL) {
error("Invalid environment variable \"%.100s\"", name);
return;
}
/*
* If we're passed an uninitialized list, allocate a single null
* entry before continuing.
*/
if (*envp == NULL && *envsizep == 0) {
*envp = xmalloc(sizeof(char *));
*envp[0] = NULL;
*envsizep = 1;
}
/*
* Find the slot where the value should be stored. If the variable
* already exists, we reuse the slot; otherwise we append a new slot
* at the end of the array, expanding if necessary.
*/
env = *envp;
namelen = strlen(name);
for (i = 0; env[i]; i++)
if (strncmp(env[i], name, namelen) == 0 && env[i][namelen] == '=')
break;
if (env[i]) {
/* Reuse the slot. */
free(env[i]);
} else {
/* New variable. Expand if necessary. */
envsize = *envsizep;
if (i >= envsize - 1) {
if (envsize >= 1000)
fatal("child_set_env: too many env vars");
envsize += 50;
env = (*envp) = xreallocarray(env, envsize, sizeof(char *));
*envsizep = envsize;
}
/* Need to set the NULL pointer at end of array beyond the new slot. */
env[i + 1] = NULL;
}
/* Allocate space and format the variable in the appropriate slot. */
/* XXX xasprintf */
env[i] = xmalloc(strlen(name) + 1 + strlen(value) + 1);
snprintf(env[i], strlen(name) + 1 + strlen(value) + 1, "%s=%s", name, value);
}
/*
* Check and optionally lowercase a domain name, also removes trailing '.'
* Returns 1 on success and 0 on failure, storing an error message in errstr.
*/
int
valid_domain(char *name, int makelower, const char **errstr)
{
size_t i, l = strlen(name);
u_char c, last = '\0';
static char errbuf[256];
if (l == 0) {
strlcpy(errbuf, "empty domain name", sizeof(errbuf));
goto bad;
}
if (!isalpha((u_char)name[0]) && !isdigit((u_char)name[0])) {
snprintf(errbuf, sizeof(errbuf), "domain name \"%.100s\" "
"starts with invalid character", name);
goto bad;
}
for (i = 0; i < l; i++) {
c = tolower((u_char)name[i]);
if (makelower)
name[i] = (char)c;
if (last == '.' && c == '.') {
snprintf(errbuf, sizeof(errbuf), "domain name "
"\"%.100s\" contains consecutive separators", name);
goto bad;
}
if (c != '.' && c != '-' && !isalnum(c) &&
c != '_') /* technically invalid, but common */ {
snprintf(errbuf, sizeof(errbuf), "domain name "
"\"%.100s\" contains invalid characters", name);
goto bad;
}
last = c;
}
if (name[l - 1] == '.')
name[l - 1] = '\0';
if (errstr != NULL)
*errstr = NULL;
return 1;
bad:
if (errstr != NULL)
*errstr = errbuf;
return 0;
}
/*
* Verify that a environment variable name (not including initial '$') is
* valid; consisting of one or more alphanumeric or underscore characters only.
* Returns 1 on valid, 0 otherwise.
*/
int
valid_env_name(const char *name)
{
const char *cp;
if (name[0] == '\0')
return 0;
for (cp = name; *cp != '\0'; cp++) {
if (!isalnum((u_char)*cp) && *cp != '_')
return 0;
}
return 1;
}
const char *
atoi_err(const char *nptr, int *val)
{
const char *errstr = NULL;
long long num;
if (nptr == NULL || *nptr == '\0')
return "missing";
num = strtonum(nptr, 0, INT_MAX, &errstr);
if (errstr == NULL)
*val = (int)num;
return errstr;
}
int
parse_absolute_time(const char *s, uint64_t *tp)
{
struct tm tm;
time_t tt;
char buf[32], *fmt;
*tp = 0;
/*
* POSIX strptime says "The application shall ensure that there
* is white-space or other non-alphanumeric characters between
* any two conversion specifications" so arrange things this way.
*/
switch (strlen(s)) {
case 8: /* YYYYMMDD */
fmt = "%Y-%m-%d";
snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%.4s-%.2s-%.2s", s, s + 4, s + 6);
break;
case 12: /* YYYYMMDDHHMM */
fmt = "%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M";
snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%.4s-%.2s-%.2sT%.2s:%.2s",
s, s + 4, s + 6, s + 8, s + 10);
break;
case 14: /* YYYYMMDDHHMMSS */
fmt = "%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S";
snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%.4s-%.2s-%.2sT%.2s:%.2s:%.2s",
s, s + 4, s + 6, s + 8, s + 10, s + 12);
break;
default:
return SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
}
memset(&tm, 0, sizeof(tm));
if (strptime(buf, fmt, &tm) == NULL)
return SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
if ((tt = mktime(&tm)) < 0)
return SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
/* success */
*tp = (uint64_t)tt;
return 0;
}
void
format_absolute_time(uint64_t t, char *buf, size_t len)
{
time_t tt = t > INT_MAX ? INT_MAX : t; /* XXX revisit in 2038 :P */
struct tm tm;
localtime_r(&tt, &tm);
strftime(buf, len, "%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S", &tm);
}
/* check if path is absolute */
int
path_absolute(const char *path)
{
return (*path == '/') ? 1 : 0;
}
void
skip_space(char **cpp)
{
char *cp;
for (cp = *cpp; *cp == ' ' || *cp == '\t'; cp++)
;
*cpp = cp;
}
/* authorized_key-style options parsing helpers */
/*
* Match flag 'opt' in *optsp, and if allow_negate is set then also match
* 'no-opt'. Returns -1 if option not matched, 1 if option matches or 0
* if negated option matches.
* If the option or negated option matches, then *optsp is updated to
* point to the first character after the option.
*/
int
opt_flag(const char *opt, int allow_negate, const char **optsp)
{
size_t opt_len = strlen(opt);
const char *opts = *optsp;
int negate = 0;
if (allow_negate && strncasecmp(opts, "no-", 3) == 0) {
opts += 3;
negate = 1;
}
if (strncasecmp(opts, opt, opt_len) == 0) {
*optsp = opts + opt_len;
return negate ? 0 : 1;
}
return -1;
}
char *
opt_dequote(const char **sp, const char **errstrp)
{
const char *s = *sp;
char *ret;
size_t i;
*errstrp = NULL;
if (*s != '"') {
*errstrp = "missing start quote";
return NULL;
}
s++;
if ((ret = malloc(strlen((s)) + 1)) == NULL) {
*errstrp = "memory allocation failed";
return NULL;
}
for (i = 0; *s != '\0' && *s != '"';) {
if (s[0] == '\\' && s[1] == '"')
s++;
ret[i++] = *s++;
}
if (*s == '\0') {
*errstrp = "missing end quote";
free(ret);
return NULL;
}
ret[i] = '\0';
s++;
*sp = s;
return ret;
}
int
opt_match(const char **opts, const char *term)
{
if (strncasecmp((*opts), term, strlen(term)) == 0 &&
(*opts)[strlen(term)] == '=') {
*opts += strlen(term) + 1;
return 1;
}
return 0;
}
sshsig_t
ssh_signal(int signum, sshsig_t handler)
{
struct sigaction sa, osa;
/* mask all other signals while in handler */
memset(&sa, 0, sizeof(sa));
sa.sa_handler = handler;
sigfillset(&sa.sa_mask);
#if defined(SA_RESTART) && !defined(NO_SA_RESTART)
if (signum != SIGALRM)
sa.sa_flags = SA_RESTART;
#endif
if (sigaction(signum, &sa, &osa) == -1) {
debug3("sigaction(%s): %s", strsignal(signum), strerror(errno));
return SIG_ERR;
}
return osa.sa_handler;
}
diff --git a/misc.h b/misc.h
index 4a05db2da482..ab94a79c0e03 100644
--- a/misc.h
+++ b/misc.h
@@ -1,197 +1,201 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: misc.h,v 1.84 2020/01/24 23:54:40 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: misc.h,v 1.87 2020/05/29 11:17:56 dtucker Exp $ */
/*
* Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
* Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
* All rights reserved
*
* As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
* can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this
* software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
* incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
* called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
*/
#ifndef _MISC_H
#define _MISC_H
#include <sys/time.h>
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/socket.h>
/* Data structure for representing a forwarding request. */
struct Forward {
char *listen_host; /* Host (address) to listen on. */
int listen_port; /* Port to forward. */
char *listen_path; /* Path to bind domain socket. */
char *connect_host; /* Host to connect. */
int connect_port; /* Port to connect on connect_host. */
char *connect_path; /* Path to connect domain socket. */
int allocated_port; /* Dynamically allocated listen port */
int handle; /* Handle for dynamic listen ports */
};
int forward_equals(const struct Forward *, const struct Forward *);
int daemonized(void);
/* Common server and client forwarding options. */
struct ForwardOptions {
int gateway_ports; /* Allow remote connects to forwarded ports. */
mode_t streamlocal_bind_mask; /* umask for streamlocal binds */
int streamlocal_bind_unlink; /* unlink socket before bind */
};
/* misc.c */
char *chop(char *);
void skip_space(char **);
char *strdelim(char **);
char *strdelimw(char **);
int set_nonblock(int);
int unset_nonblock(int);
void set_nodelay(int);
int set_reuseaddr(int);
char *get_rdomain(int);
int set_rdomain(int, const char *);
int waitrfd(int, int *);
int timeout_connect(int, const struct sockaddr *, socklen_t, int *);
int a2port(const char *);
int a2tun(const char *, int *);
char *put_host_port(const char *, u_short);
char *hpdelim2(char **, char *);
char *hpdelim(char **);
char *cleanhostname(char *);
char *colon(char *);
int parse_user_host_path(const char *, char **, char **, char **);
int parse_user_host_port(const char *, char **, char **, int *);
int parse_uri(const char *, const char *, char **, char **, int *, char **);
long convtime(const char *);
+const char *fmt_timeframe(time_t t);
char *tilde_expand_filename(const char *, uid_t);
+
+char *dollar_expand(int *, const char *string, ...);
char *percent_expand(const char *, ...) __attribute__((__sentinel__));
+char *percent_dollar_expand(const char *, ...) __attribute__((__sentinel__));
char *tohex(const void *, size_t);
void xextendf(char **s, const char *sep, const char *fmt, ...)
__attribute__((__format__ (printf, 3, 4))) __attribute__((__nonnull__ (3)));
void sanitise_stdfd(void);
void ms_subtract_diff(struct timeval *, int *);
void ms_to_timeval(struct timeval *, int);
void monotime_ts(struct timespec *);
void monotime_tv(struct timeval *);
time_t monotime(void);
double monotime_double(void);
void lowercase(char *s);
int unix_listener(const char *, int, int);
int valid_domain(char *, int, const char **);
int valid_env_name(const char *);
const char *atoi_err(const char *, int *);
int parse_absolute_time(const char *, uint64_t *);
void format_absolute_time(uint64_t, char *, size_t);
int path_absolute(const char *);
void sock_set_v6only(int);
struct passwd *pwcopy(struct passwd *);
const char *ssh_gai_strerror(int);
typedef struct arglist arglist;
struct arglist {
char **list;
u_int num;
u_int nalloc;
};
void addargs(arglist *, char *, ...)
__attribute__((format(printf, 2, 3)));
void replacearg(arglist *, u_int, char *, ...)
__attribute__((format(printf, 3, 4)));
void freeargs(arglist *);
int tun_open(int, int, char **);
/* Common definitions for ssh tunnel device forwarding */
#define SSH_TUNMODE_NO 0x00
#define SSH_TUNMODE_POINTOPOINT 0x01
#define SSH_TUNMODE_ETHERNET 0x02
#define SSH_TUNMODE_DEFAULT SSH_TUNMODE_POINTOPOINT
#define SSH_TUNMODE_YES (SSH_TUNMODE_POINTOPOINT|SSH_TUNMODE_ETHERNET)
#define SSH_TUNID_ANY 0x7fffffff
#define SSH_TUNID_ERR (SSH_TUNID_ANY - 1)
#define SSH_TUNID_MAX (SSH_TUNID_ANY - 2)
/* Fake port to indicate that host field is really a path. */
#define PORT_STREAMLOCAL -2
/* Functions to extract or store big-endian words of various sizes */
u_int64_t get_u64(const void *)
__attribute__((__bounded__( __minbytes__, 1, 8)));
u_int32_t get_u32(const void *)
__attribute__((__bounded__( __minbytes__, 1, 4)));
u_int16_t get_u16(const void *)
__attribute__((__bounded__( __minbytes__, 1, 2)));
void put_u64(void *, u_int64_t)
__attribute__((__bounded__( __minbytes__, 1, 8)));
void put_u32(void *, u_int32_t)
__attribute__((__bounded__( __minbytes__, 1, 4)));
void put_u16(void *, u_int16_t)
__attribute__((__bounded__( __minbytes__, 1, 2)));
/* Little-endian store/load, used by umac.c */
u_int32_t get_u32_le(const void *)
__attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__, 1, 4)));
void put_u32_le(void *, u_int32_t)
__attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__, 1, 4)));
struct bwlimit {
size_t buflen;
u_int64_t rate; /* desired rate in kbit/s */
u_int64_t thresh; /* threshold after which we'll check timers */
u_int64_t lamt; /* amount written in last timer interval */
struct timeval bwstart, bwend;
};
void bandwidth_limit_init(struct bwlimit *, u_int64_t, size_t);
void bandwidth_limit(struct bwlimit *, size_t);
int parse_ipqos(const char *);
const char *iptos2str(int);
void mktemp_proto(char *, size_t);
void child_set_env(char ***envp, u_int *envsizep, const char *name,
const char *value);
int argv_split(const char *, int *, char ***);
char *argv_assemble(int, char **argv);
int exited_cleanly(pid_t, const char *, const char *, int);
struct stat;
int safe_path(const char *, struct stat *, const char *, uid_t,
char *, size_t);
int safe_path_fd(int, const char *, struct passwd *,
char *err, size_t errlen);
/* authorized_key-style options parsing helpers */
int opt_flag(const char *opt, int allow_negate, const char **optsp);
char *opt_dequote(const char **sp, const char **errstrp);
int opt_match(const char **opts, const char *term);
/* readpass.c */
#define RP_ECHO 0x0001
#define RP_ALLOW_STDIN 0x0002
#define RP_ALLOW_EOF 0x0004
#define RP_USE_ASKPASS 0x0008
struct notifier_ctx;
char *read_passphrase(const char *, int);
int ask_permission(const char *, ...) __attribute__((format(printf, 1, 2)));
struct notifier_ctx *notify_start(int, const char *, ...)
__attribute__((format(printf, 2, 3)));
void notify_complete(struct notifier_ctx *);
#define MINIMUM(a, b) (((a) < (b)) ? (a) : (b))
#define MAXIMUM(a, b) (((a) > (b)) ? (a) : (b))
#define ROUNDUP(x, y) ((((x)+((y)-1))/(y))*(y))
typedef void (*sshsig_t)(int);
sshsig_t ssh_signal(int, sshsig_t);
#endif /* _MISC_H */
diff --git a/moduli b/moduli
index 10e85440fae5..85b70a13d672 100644
--- a/moduli
+++ b/moduli
@@ -1,415 +1,454 @@
-# $OpenBSD: moduli,v 1.26 2020/02/20 05:41:50 dtucker Exp $
+# $OpenBSD: moduli,v 1.27 2020/06/03 08:23:16 dtucker Exp $
# Time Type Tests Tries Size Generator Modulus
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
-20191022074243 2 6 100 2047 5 E854C2A5759DFE93314B4F76AA4E7A249192AD0B0C70B1E62F3E0B4A37D181C7D1A233312886ED675788CBBC2B384D16C0CA8E5DED996C54F68568F21D6A2333E189848A5271AC0CA6F3DAAAE469F98E1B5223CB4253653FA82242C4D29AD65E878EA91522C51CF98774952FDD9453406B4AB50A7CDFA97BB4650F601DEC496C5839F98CD774BC0F9B57581633771865F175F3D72EFAB15D377CAB2EFBD812D6F13FAD3181323BDBD95BF44703FF38225883FDF4A536DA17F8C3441459AF90528DDA015E85A978C0ABB4708407B9394C8DFB4B654348131E7EA91FCF853C44D055ADEEAE40486AF9E1724D55CA27F97F7563A82EA86B661ED02383C10036E7A7
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
-20191022074435 2 6 100 2047 2 E854C2A5759DFE93314B4F76AA4E7A249192AD0B0C70B1E62F3E0B4A37D181C7D1A233312886ED675788CBBC2B384D16C0CA8E5DED996C54F68568F21D6A2333E189848A5271AC0CA6F3DAAAE469F98E1B5223CB4253653FA82242C4D29AD65E878EA91522C51CF98774952FDD9453406B4AB50A7CDFA97BB4650F601DEC496C5839F98CD774BC0F9B57581633771865F175F3D72EFAB15D377CAB2EFBD812D6F13FAD3181323BDBD95BF44703FF38225883FDF4A536DA17F8C3441459AF90528DDA015E85A978C0ABB4708407B9394C8DFB4B654348131E7EA91FCF853C44D055ADEEAE40486AF9E1724D55CA27F97F7563A82EA86B661ED02383C100E315C3
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
-20191022074526 2 6 100 2047 2 E854C2A5759DFE93314B4F76AA4E7A249192AD0B0C70B1E62F3E0B4A37D181C7D1A233312886ED675788CBBC2B384D16C0CA8E5DED996C54F68568F21D6A2333E189848A5271AC0CA6F3DAAAE469F98E1B5223CB4253653FA82242C4D29AD65E878EA91522C51CF98774952FDD9453406B4AB50A7CDFA97BB4650F601DEC496C5839F98CD774BC0F9B57581633771865F175F3D72EFAB15D377CAB2EFBD812D6F13FAD3181323BDBD95BF44703FF38225883FDF4A536DA17F8C3441459AF90528DDA015E85A978C0ABB4708407B9394C8DFB4B654348131E7EA91FCF853C44D055ADEEAE40486AF9E1724D55CA27F97F7563A82EA86B661ED02383C10125A5DB
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
-20191022074915 2 6 100 2047 5 E854C2A5759DFE93314B4F76AA4E7A249192AD0B0C70B1E62F3E0B4A37D181C7D1A233312886ED675788CBBC2B384D16C0CA8E5DED996C54F68568F21D6A2333E189848A5271AC0CA6F3DAAAE469F98E1B5223CB4253653FA82242C4D29AD65E878EA91522C51CF98774952FDD9453406B4AB50A7CDFA97BB4650F601DEC496C5839F98CD774BC0F9B57581633771865F175F3D72EFAB15D377CAB2EFBD812D6F13FAD3181323BDBD95BF44703FF38225883FDF4A536DA17F8C3441459AF90528DDA015E85A978C0ABB4708407B9394C8DFB4B654348131E7EA91FCF853C44D055ADEEAE40486AF9E1724D55CA27F97F7563A82EA86B661ED02383C102A7EDF7
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diff --git a/moduli.0 b/moduli.0
index d17ae428d6b2..dbbac1830eeb 100644
--- a/moduli.0
+++ b/moduli.0
@@ -1,74 +1,74 @@
MODULI(5) File Formats Manual MODULI(5)
NAME
moduli M-bM-^@M-^S Diffie-Hellman moduli
DESCRIPTION
The /etc/moduli file contains prime numbers and generators for use by
sshd(8) in the Diffie-Hellman Group Exchange key exchange method.
New moduli may be generated with ssh-keygen(1) using a two-step process.
An initial candidate generation pass, using ssh-keygen -G, calculates
numbers that are likely to be useful. A second primality testing pass,
using ssh-keygen -T, provides a high degree of assurance that the numbers
are prime and are safe for use in Diffie-Hellman operations by sshd(8).
This moduli format is used as the output from each pass.
The file consists of newline-separated records, one per modulus,
containing seven space-separated fields. These fields are as follows:
timestamp The time that the modulus was last processed as
YYYYMMDDHHMMSS.
type Decimal number specifying the internal structure of
the prime modulus. Supported types are:
0 Unknown, not tested.
2 "Safe" prime; (p-1)/2 is also prime.
4 Sophie Germain; 2p+1 is also prime.
Moduli candidates initially produced by ssh-keygen(1)
are Sophie Germain primes (type 4). Further primality
testing with ssh-keygen(1) produces safe prime moduli
(type 2) that are ready for use in sshd(8). Other
types are not used by OpenSSH.
tests Decimal number indicating the type of primality tests
that the number has been subjected to represented as a
bitmask of the following values:
0x00 Not tested.
0x01 Composite number M-bM-^@M-^S not prime.
0x02 Sieve of Eratosthenes.
0x04 Probabilistic Miller-Rabin primality tests.
The ssh-keygen(1) moduli candidate generation uses the
Sieve of Eratosthenes (flag 0x02). Subsequent
ssh-keygen(1) primality tests are Miller-Rabin tests
(flag 0x04).
trials Decimal number indicating the number of primality
trials that have been performed on the modulus.
size Decimal number indicating the size of the prime in
bits.
generator The recommended generator for use with this modulus
(hexadecimal).
modulus The modulus itself in hexadecimal.
When performing Diffie-Hellman Group Exchange, sshd(8) first estimates
the size of the modulus required to produce enough Diffie-Hellman output
to sufficiently key the selected symmetric cipher. sshd(8) then randomly
selects a modulus from /etc/moduli that best meets the size requirement.
SEE ALSO
ssh-keygen(1), sshd(8)
STANDARDS
M. Friedl, N. Provos, and W. Simpson, Diffie-Hellman Group Exchange for
the Secure Shell (SSH) Transport Layer Protocol, RFC 4419, March 2006,
2006.
-OpenBSD 6.7 September 26, 2012 OpenBSD 6.7
+OpenBSD 6.8 September 26, 2012 OpenBSD 6.8
diff --git a/monitor.c b/monitor.c
index b6e855d5d999..4cf79dfc98cd 100644
--- a/monitor.c
+++ b/monitor.c
@@ -1,1924 +1,1937 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: monitor.c,v 1.210 2020/03/13 03:17:07 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: monitor.c,v 1.214 2020/08/27 01:07:09 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright 2002 Niels Provos <provos@citi.umich.edu>
* Copyright 2002 Markus Friedl <markus@openbsd.org>
* All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
* OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
* IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
* INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
* NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
* DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
* THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
* (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
* THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
*/
#include "includes.h"
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/socket.h>
#include <sys/wait.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <limits.h>
#ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H
#include <paths.h>
#endif
#include <pwd.h>
#include <signal.h>
#ifdef HAVE_STDINT_H
# include <stdint.h>
#endif
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <stdarg.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#ifdef HAVE_POLL_H
#include <poll.h>
#else
# ifdef HAVE_SYS_POLL_H
# include <sys/poll.h>
# endif
#endif
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
#include <openssl/dh.h>
#endif
#include "openbsd-compat/sys-tree.h"
#include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h"
#include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h"
#include "atomicio.h"
#include "xmalloc.h"
#include "ssh.h"
#include "sshkey.h"
#include "sshbuf.h"
#include "hostfile.h"
#include "auth.h"
#include "cipher.h"
#include "kex.h"
#include "dh.h"
#include "auth-pam.h"
#include "packet.h"
#include "auth-options.h"
#include "sshpty.h"
#include "channels.h"
#include "session.h"
#include "sshlogin.h"
#include "canohost.h"
#include "log.h"
#include "misc.h"
#include "servconf.h"
#include "monitor.h"
#ifdef GSSAPI
#include "ssh-gss.h"
#endif
#include "monitor_wrap.h"
#include "monitor_fdpass.h"
#include "compat.h"
#include "ssh2.h"
#include "authfd.h"
#include "match.h"
#include "ssherr.h"
#include "sk-api.h"
#ifdef GSSAPI
static Gssctxt *gsscontext = NULL;
#endif
/* Imports */
extern ServerOptions options;
extern u_int utmp_len;
extern u_char session_id[];
extern struct sshbuf *loginmsg;
extern struct sshauthopt *auth_opts; /* XXX move to permanent ssh->authctxt? */
/* State exported from the child */
static struct sshbuf *child_state;
/* Functions on the monitor that answer unprivileged requests */
int mm_answer_moduli(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
int mm_answer_sign(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
int mm_answer_pwnamallow(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
int mm_answer_auth2_read_banner(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
int mm_answer_authserv(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
int mm_answer_authpassword(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
int mm_answer_bsdauthquery(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
int mm_answer_bsdauthrespond(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
int mm_answer_skeyquery(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
int mm_answer_skeyrespond(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
int mm_answer_keyallowed(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
int mm_answer_keyverify(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
int mm_answer_pty(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
int mm_answer_pty_cleanup(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
int mm_answer_term(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
int mm_answer_rsa_keyallowed(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
int mm_answer_rsa_challenge(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
int mm_answer_rsa_response(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
int mm_answer_sesskey(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
int mm_answer_sessid(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
#ifdef USE_PAM
int mm_answer_pam_start(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
int mm_answer_pam_account(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
int mm_answer_pam_init_ctx(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
int mm_answer_pam_query(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
int mm_answer_pam_respond(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
int mm_answer_pam_free_ctx(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
#endif
#ifdef GSSAPI
int mm_answer_gss_setup_ctx(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
int mm_answer_gss_accept_ctx(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
int mm_answer_gss_userok(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
int mm_answer_gss_checkmic(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
#endif
#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
int mm_answer_audit_event(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
int mm_answer_audit_command(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
#endif
static Authctxt *authctxt;
/* local state for key verify */
static u_char *key_blob = NULL;
static size_t key_bloblen = 0;
static int key_blobtype = MM_NOKEY;
static struct sshauthopt *key_opts = NULL;
static char *hostbased_cuser = NULL;
static char *hostbased_chost = NULL;
static char *auth_method = "unknown";
static char *auth_submethod = NULL;
static u_int session_id2_len = 0;
static u_char *session_id2 = NULL;
static pid_t monitor_child_pid;
struct mon_table {
enum monitor_reqtype type;
int flags;
int (*f)(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
};
#define MON_ISAUTH 0x0004 /* Required for Authentication */
#define MON_AUTHDECIDE 0x0008 /* Decides Authentication */
#define MON_ONCE 0x0010 /* Disable after calling */
#define MON_ALOG 0x0020 /* Log auth attempt without authenticating */
#define MON_AUTH (MON_ISAUTH|MON_AUTHDECIDE)
#define MON_PERMIT 0x1000 /* Request is permitted */
static int monitor_read(struct ssh *, struct monitor *, struct mon_table *,
struct mon_table **);
static int monitor_read_log(struct monitor *);
struct mon_table mon_dispatch_proto20[] = {
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
{MONITOR_REQ_MODULI, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_moduli},
#endif
{MONITOR_REQ_SIGN, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_sign},
{MONITOR_REQ_PWNAM, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_pwnamallow},
{MONITOR_REQ_AUTHSERV, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_authserv},
{MONITOR_REQ_AUTH2_READ_BANNER, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_auth2_read_banner},
{MONITOR_REQ_AUTHPASSWORD, MON_AUTH, mm_answer_authpassword},
#ifdef USE_PAM
{MONITOR_REQ_PAM_START, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_pam_start},
{MONITOR_REQ_PAM_ACCOUNT, 0, mm_answer_pam_account},
{MONITOR_REQ_PAM_INIT_CTX, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_pam_init_ctx},
{MONITOR_REQ_PAM_QUERY, 0, mm_answer_pam_query},
{MONITOR_REQ_PAM_RESPOND, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_pam_respond},
{MONITOR_REQ_PAM_FREE_CTX, MON_ONCE|MON_AUTHDECIDE, mm_answer_pam_free_ctx},
#endif
#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
{MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_EVENT, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_event},
#endif
#ifdef BSD_AUTH
{MONITOR_REQ_BSDAUTHQUERY, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_bsdauthquery},
{MONITOR_REQ_BSDAUTHRESPOND, MON_AUTH, mm_answer_bsdauthrespond},
#endif
{MONITOR_REQ_KEYALLOWED, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_keyallowed},
{MONITOR_REQ_KEYVERIFY, MON_AUTH, mm_answer_keyverify},
#ifdef GSSAPI
{MONITOR_REQ_GSSSETUP, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_gss_setup_ctx},
{MONITOR_REQ_GSSSTEP, 0, mm_answer_gss_accept_ctx},
{MONITOR_REQ_GSSUSEROK, MON_ONCE|MON_AUTHDECIDE, mm_answer_gss_userok},
{MONITOR_REQ_GSSCHECKMIC, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_gss_checkmic},
#endif
{0, 0, NULL}
};
struct mon_table mon_dispatch_postauth20[] = {
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
{MONITOR_REQ_MODULI, 0, mm_answer_moduli},
#endif
{MONITOR_REQ_SIGN, 0, mm_answer_sign},
{MONITOR_REQ_PTY, 0, mm_answer_pty},
{MONITOR_REQ_PTYCLEANUP, 0, mm_answer_pty_cleanup},
{MONITOR_REQ_TERM, 0, mm_answer_term},
#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
{MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_EVENT, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_event},
{MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_COMMAND, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_command},
#endif
{0, 0, NULL}
};
struct mon_table *mon_dispatch;
/* Specifies if a certain message is allowed at the moment */
static void
monitor_permit(struct mon_table *ent, enum monitor_reqtype type, int permit)
{
while (ent->f != NULL) {
if (ent->type == type) {
ent->flags &= ~MON_PERMIT;
ent->flags |= permit ? MON_PERMIT : 0;
return;
}
ent++;
}
}
static void
monitor_permit_authentications(int permit)
{
struct mon_table *ent = mon_dispatch;
while (ent->f != NULL) {
if (ent->flags & MON_AUTH) {
ent->flags &= ~MON_PERMIT;
ent->flags |= permit ? MON_PERMIT : 0;
}
ent++;
}
}
void
monitor_child_preauth(struct ssh *ssh, struct monitor *pmonitor)
{
struct mon_table *ent;
int authenticated = 0, partial = 0;
debug3("preauth child monitor started");
if (pmonitor->m_recvfd >= 0)
close(pmonitor->m_recvfd);
if (pmonitor->m_log_sendfd >= 0)
close(pmonitor->m_log_sendfd);
pmonitor->m_log_sendfd = pmonitor->m_recvfd = -1;
authctxt = (Authctxt *)ssh->authctxt;
memset(authctxt, 0, sizeof(*authctxt));
ssh->authctxt = authctxt;
authctxt->loginmsg = loginmsg;
mon_dispatch = mon_dispatch_proto20;
/* Permit requests for moduli and signatures */
monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_MODULI, 1);
monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_SIGN, 1);
/* The first few requests do not require asynchronous access */
while (!authenticated) {
partial = 0;
auth_method = "unknown";
auth_submethod = NULL;
auth2_authctxt_reset_info(authctxt);
authenticated = (monitor_read(ssh, pmonitor,
mon_dispatch, &ent) == 1);
/* Special handling for multiple required authentications */
if (options.num_auth_methods != 0) {
if (authenticated &&
!auth2_update_methods_lists(authctxt,
auth_method, auth_submethod)) {
debug3("%s: method %s: partial", __func__,
auth_method);
authenticated = 0;
partial = 1;
}
}
if (authenticated) {
if (!(ent->flags & MON_AUTHDECIDE))
fatal("%s: unexpected authentication from %d",
__func__, ent->type);
if (authctxt->pw->pw_uid == 0 &&
!auth_root_allowed(ssh, auth_method))
authenticated = 0;
#ifdef USE_PAM
/* PAM needs to perform account checks after auth */
if (options.use_pam && authenticated) {
struct sshbuf *m;
if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed",
__func__);
mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_sendfd,
MONITOR_REQ_PAM_ACCOUNT, m);
authenticated = mm_answer_pam_account(
ssh, pmonitor->m_sendfd, m);
sshbuf_free(m);
}
#endif
}
if (ent->flags & (MON_AUTHDECIDE|MON_ALOG)) {
auth_log(ssh, authenticated, partial,
auth_method, auth_submethod);
if (!partial && !authenticated)
authctxt->failures++;
if (authenticated || partial) {
auth2_update_session_info(authctxt,
auth_method, auth_submethod);
}
}
}
if (!authctxt->valid)
fatal("%s: authenticated invalid user", __func__);
if (strcmp(auth_method, "unknown") == 0)
fatal("%s: authentication method name unknown", __func__);
debug("%s: %s has been authenticated by privileged process",
__func__, authctxt->user);
ssh->authctxt = NULL;
ssh_packet_set_log_preamble(ssh, "user %s", authctxt->user);
mm_get_keystate(ssh, pmonitor);
/* Drain any buffered messages from the child */
while (pmonitor->m_log_recvfd != -1 && monitor_read_log(pmonitor) == 0)
;
if (pmonitor->m_recvfd >= 0)
close(pmonitor->m_recvfd);
if (pmonitor->m_log_sendfd >= 0)
close(pmonitor->m_log_sendfd);
pmonitor->m_sendfd = pmonitor->m_log_recvfd = -1;
}
static void
monitor_set_child_handler(pid_t pid)
{
monitor_child_pid = pid;
}
static void
monitor_child_handler(int sig)
{
kill(monitor_child_pid, sig);
}
void
monitor_child_postauth(struct ssh *ssh, struct monitor *pmonitor)
{
close(pmonitor->m_recvfd);
pmonitor->m_recvfd = -1;
monitor_set_child_handler(pmonitor->m_pid);
ssh_signal(SIGHUP, &monitor_child_handler);
ssh_signal(SIGTERM, &monitor_child_handler);
ssh_signal(SIGINT, &monitor_child_handler);
#ifdef SIGXFSZ
ssh_signal(SIGXFSZ, SIG_IGN);
#endif
mon_dispatch = mon_dispatch_postauth20;
/* Permit requests for moduli and signatures */
monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_MODULI, 1);
monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_SIGN, 1);
monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_TERM, 1);
if (auth_opts->permit_pty_flag) {
monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_PTY, 1);
monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_PTYCLEANUP, 1);
}
for (;;)
monitor_read(ssh, pmonitor, mon_dispatch, NULL);
}
static int
monitor_read_log(struct monitor *pmonitor)
{
struct sshbuf *logmsg;
u_int len, level;
char *msg;
u_char *p;
int r;
if ((logmsg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
fatal("%s: sshbuf_new", __func__);
/* Read length */
if ((r = sshbuf_reserve(logmsg, 4, &p)) != 0)
fatal("%s: reserve: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
if (atomicio(read, pmonitor->m_log_recvfd, p, 4) != 4) {
if (errno == EPIPE) {
sshbuf_free(logmsg);
debug("%s: child log fd closed", __func__);
close(pmonitor->m_log_recvfd);
pmonitor->m_log_recvfd = -1;
return -1;
}
fatal("%s: log fd read: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
}
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(logmsg, &len)) != 0)
fatal("%s: get len: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
if (len <= 4 || len > 8192)
fatal("%s: invalid log message length %u", __func__, len);
/* Read severity, message */
sshbuf_reset(logmsg);
if ((r = sshbuf_reserve(logmsg, len, &p)) != 0)
fatal("%s: reserve: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
if (atomicio(read, pmonitor->m_log_recvfd, p, len) != len)
fatal("%s: log fd read: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(logmsg, &level)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_cstring(logmsg, &msg, NULL)) != 0)
fatal("%s: decode: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
/* Log it */
if (log_level_name(level) == NULL)
fatal("%s: invalid log level %u (corrupted message?)",
__func__, level);
do_log2(level, "%s [preauth]", msg);
sshbuf_free(logmsg);
free(msg);
return 0;
}
static int
monitor_read(struct ssh *ssh, struct monitor *pmonitor, struct mon_table *ent,
struct mon_table **pent)
{
struct sshbuf *m;
int r, ret;
u_char type;
struct pollfd pfd[2];
for (;;) {
memset(&pfd, 0, sizeof(pfd));
pfd[0].fd = pmonitor->m_sendfd;
pfd[0].events = POLLIN;
pfd[1].fd = pmonitor->m_log_recvfd;
pfd[1].events = pfd[1].fd == -1 ? 0 : POLLIN;
if (poll(pfd, pfd[1].fd == -1 ? 1 : 2, -1) == -1) {
if (errno == EINTR || errno == EAGAIN)
continue;
fatal("%s: poll: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
}
if (pfd[1].revents) {
/*
* Drain all log messages before processing next
* monitor request.
*/
monitor_read_log(pmonitor);
continue;
}
if (pfd[0].revents)
break; /* Continues below */
}
if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
fatal("%s: sshbuf_new", __func__);
mm_request_receive(pmonitor->m_sendfd, m);
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(m, &type)) != 0)
fatal("%s: decode: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
debug3("%s: checking request %d", __func__, type);
while (ent->f != NULL) {
if (ent->type == type)
break;
ent++;
}
if (ent->f != NULL) {
if (!(ent->flags & MON_PERMIT))
fatal("%s: unpermitted request %d", __func__,
type);
ret = (*ent->f)(ssh, pmonitor->m_sendfd, m);
sshbuf_free(m);
/* The child may use this request only once, disable it */
if (ent->flags & MON_ONCE) {
debug2("%s: %d used once, disabling now", __func__,
type);
ent->flags &= ~MON_PERMIT;
}
if (pent != NULL)
*pent = ent;
return ret;
}
fatal("%s: unsupported request: %d", __func__, type);
/* NOTREACHED */
return (-1);
}
/* allowed key state */
static int
monitor_allowed_key(const u_char *blob, u_int bloblen)
{
/* make sure key is allowed */
if (key_blob == NULL || key_bloblen != bloblen ||
timingsafe_bcmp(key_blob, blob, key_bloblen))
return (0);
return (1);
}
static void
monitor_reset_key_state(void)
{
/* reset state */
free(key_blob);
free(hostbased_cuser);
free(hostbased_chost);
sshauthopt_free(key_opts);
key_blob = NULL;
key_bloblen = 0;
key_blobtype = MM_NOKEY;
key_opts = NULL;
hostbased_cuser = NULL;
hostbased_chost = NULL;
}
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
int
mm_answer_moduli(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
{
DH *dh;
const BIGNUM *dh_p, *dh_g;
int r;
u_int min, want, max;
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &min)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &want)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &max)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
debug3("%s: got parameters: %d %d %d",
__func__, min, want, max);
/* We need to check here, too, in case the child got corrupted */
if (max < min || want < min || max < want)
fatal("%s: bad parameters: %d %d %d",
__func__, min, want, max);
sshbuf_reset(m);
dh = choose_dh(min, want, max);
if (dh == NULL) {
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(m, 0)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
return (0);
} else {
/* Send first bignum */
DH_get0_pqg(dh, &dh_p, NULL, &dh_g);
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(m, 1)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_bignum2(m, dh_p)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_bignum2(m, dh_g)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
DH_free(dh);
}
mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_MODULI, m);
return (0);
}
#endif
int
mm_answer_sign(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
{
extern int auth_sock; /* XXX move to state struct? */
struct sshkey *key;
struct sshbuf *sigbuf = NULL;
u_char *p = NULL, *signature = NULL;
char *alg = NULL;
size_t datlen, siglen, alglen;
int r, is_proof = 0;
u_int keyid, compat;
const char proof_req[] = "hostkeys-prove-00@openssh.com";
debug3("%s", __func__);
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &keyid)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_string(m, &p, &datlen)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &alg, &alglen)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &compat)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
if (keyid > INT_MAX)
fatal("%s: invalid key ID", __func__);
/*
* Supported KEX types use SHA1 (20 bytes), SHA256 (32 bytes),
* SHA384 (48 bytes) and SHA512 (64 bytes).
*
* Otherwise, verify the signature request is for a hostkey
* proof.
*
* XXX perform similar check for KEX signature requests too?
* it's not trivial, since what is signed is the hash, rather
* than the full kex structure...
*/
if (datlen != 20 && datlen != 32 && datlen != 48 && datlen != 64) {
/*
* Construct expected hostkey proof and compare it to what
* the client sent us.
*/
if (session_id2_len == 0) /* hostkeys is never first */
fatal("%s: bad data length: %zu", __func__, datlen);
if ((key = get_hostkey_public_by_index(keyid, ssh)) == NULL)
fatal("%s: no hostkey for index %d", __func__, keyid);
if ((sigbuf = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
fatal("%s: sshbuf_new", __func__);
if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(sigbuf, proof_req)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_string(sigbuf, session_id2,
session_id2_len)) != 0 ||
(r = sshkey_puts(key, sigbuf)) != 0)
fatal("%s: couldn't prepare private key "
"proof buffer: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
if (datlen != sshbuf_len(sigbuf) ||
memcmp(p, sshbuf_ptr(sigbuf), sshbuf_len(sigbuf)) != 0)
fatal("%s: bad data length: %zu, hostkey proof len %zu",
__func__, datlen, sshbuf_len(sigbuf));
sshbuf_free(sigbuf);
is_proof = 1;
}
/* save session id, it will be passed on the first call */
if (session_id2_len == 0) {
session_id2_len = datlen;
session_id2 = xmalloc(session_id2_len);
memcpy(session_id2, p, session_id2_len);
}
if ((key = get_hostkey_by_index(keyid)) != NULL) {
if ((r = sshkey_sign(key, &signature, &siglen, p, datlen, alg,
- options.sk_provider, compat)) != 0)
+ options.sk_provider, NULL, compat)) != 0)
fatal("%s: sshkey_sign failed: %s",
__func__, ssh_err(r));
} else if ((key = get_hostkey_public_by_index(keyid, ssh)) != NULL &&
auth_sock > 0) {
if ((r = ssh_agent_sign(auth_sock, key, &signature, &siglen,
p, datlen, alg, compat)) != 0) {
fatal("%s: ssh_agent_sign failed: %s",
__func__, ssh_err(r));
}
} else
fatal("%s: no hostkey from index %d", __func__, keyid);
debug3("%s: %s signature %p(%zu)", __func__,
is_proof ? "hostkey proof" : "KEX", signature, siglen);
sshbuf_reset(m);
if ((r = sshbuf_put_string(m, signature, siglen)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
free(alg);
free(p);
free(signature);
mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_SIGN, m);
/* Turn on permissions for getpwnam */
monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_PWNAM, 1);
return (0);
}
/* Retrieves the password entry and also checks if the user is permitted */
int
mm_answer_pwnamallow(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
{
char *username;
struct passwd *pwent;
int r, allowed = 0;
u_int i;
debug3("%s", __func__);
if (authctxt->attempt++ != 0)
fatal("%s: multiple attempts for getpwnam", __func__);
if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &username, NULL)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
pwent = getpwnamallow(ssh, username);
authctxt->user = xstrdup(username);
setproctitle("%s [priv]", pwent ? username : "unknown");
free(username);
sshbuf_reset(m);
if (pwent == NULL) {
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(m, 0)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
authctxt->pw = fakepw();
goto out;
}
allowed = 1;
authctxt->pw = pwent;
authctxt->valid = 1;
/* XXX don't sent pwent to unpriv; send fake class/dir/shell too */
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(m, 1)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_string(m, pwent, sizeof(*pwent))) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, pwent->pw_name)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, "*")) != 0 ||
#ifdef HAVE_STRUCT_PASSWD_PW_GECOS
(r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, pwent->pw_gecos)) != 0 ||
#endif
#ifdef HAVE_STRUCT_PASSWD_PW_CLASS
(r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, pwent->pw_class)) != 0 ||
#endif
(r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, pwent->pw_dir)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, pwent->pw_shell)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
out:
ssh_packet_set_log_preamble(ssh, "%suser %s",
authctxt->valid ? "authenticating" : "invalid ", authctxt->user);
if ((r = sshbuf_put_string(m, &options, sizeof(options))) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
#define M_CP_STROPT(x) do { \
if (options.x != NULL) { \
if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, options.x)) != 0) \
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", \
__func__, ssh_err(r)); \
} \
} while (0)
#define M_CP_STRARRAYOPT(x, nx) do { \
for (i = 0; i < options.nx; i++) { \
if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, options.x[i])) != 0) \
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", \
__func__, ssh_err(r)); \
} \
} while (0)
/* See comment in servconf.h */
COPY_MATCH_STRING_OPTS();
#undef M_CP_STROPT
#undef M_CP_STRARRAYOPT
/* Create valid auth method lists */
if (auth2_setup_methods_lists(authctxt) != 0) {
/*
* The monitor will continue long enough to let the child
* run to it's packet_disconnect(), but it must not allow any
* authentication to succeed.
*/
debug("%s: no valid authentication method lists", __func__);
}
debug3("%s: sending MONITOR_ANS_PWNAM: %d", __func__, allowed);
mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_PWNAM, m);
/* Allow service/style information on the auth context */
monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_AUTHSERV, 1);
monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_AUTH2_READ_BANNER, 1);
#ifdef USE_PAM
if (options.use_pam)
monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_PAM_START, 1);
#endif
return (0);
}
int mm_answer_auth2_read_banner(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
{
char *banner;
int r;
sshbuf_reset(m);
banner = auth2_read_banner();
if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, banner != NULL ? banner : "")) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_AUTH2_READ_BANNER, m);
free(banner);
return (0);
}
int
mm_answer_authserv(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
{
int r;
monitor_permit_authentications(1);
if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &authctxt->service, NULL)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &authctxt->style, NULL)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
debug3("%s: service=%s, style=%s",
__func__, authctxt->service, authctxt->style);
if (strlen(authctxt->style) == 0) {
free(authctxt->style);
authctxt->style = NULL;
}
return (0);
}
/*
* Check that the key type appears in the supplied pattern list, ignoring
* mismatches in the signature algorithm. (Signature algorithm checks are
* performed in the unprivileged authentication code).
* Returns 1 on success, 0 otherwise.
*/
static int
key_base_type_match(const char *method, const struct sshkey *key,
const char *list)
{
char *s, *l, *ol = xstrdup(list);
int found = 0;
l = ol;
for ((s = strsep(&l, ",")); s && *s != '\0'; (s = strsep(&l, ","))) {
if (sshkey_type_from_name(s) == key->type) {
found = 1;
break;
}
}
if (!found) {
error("%s key type %s is not in permitted list %s", method,
sshkey_ssh_name(key), list);
}
free(ol);
return found;
}
int
mm_answer_authpassword(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
{
static int call_count;
char *passwd;
int r, authenticated;
size_t plen;
if (!options.password_authentication)
fatal("%s: password authentication not enabled", __func__);
if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &passwd, &plen)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
/* Only authenticate if the context is valid */
authenticated = options.password_authentication &&
auth_password(ssh, passwd);
freezero(passwd, plen);
sshbuf_reset(m);
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, authenticated)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
#ifdef USE_PAM
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, sshpam_get_maxtries_reached())) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
#endif
debug3("%s: sending result %d", __func__, authenticated);
mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_AUTHPASSWORD, m);
call_count++;
if (plen == 0 && call_count == 1)
auth_method = "none";
else
auth_method = "password";
/* Causes monitor loop to terminate if authenticated */
return (authenticated);
}
#ifdef BSD_AUTH
int
mm_answer_bsdauthquery(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
{
char *name, *infotxt;
u_int numprompts, *echo_on, success;
char **prompts;
int r;
if (!options.kbd_interactive_authentication)
fatal("%s: kbd-int authentication not enabled", __func__);
success = bsdauth_query(authctxt, &name, &infotxt, &numprompts,
&prompts, &echo_on) < 0 ? 0 : 1;
sshbuf_reset(m);
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, success)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
if (success) {
if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, prompts[0])) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
}
debug3("%s: sending challenge success: %u", __func__, success);
mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_BSDAUTHQUERY, m);
if (success) {
free(name);
free(infotxt);
free(prompts);
free(echo_on);
}
return (0);
}
int
mm_answer_bsdauthrespond(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
{
char *response;
int r, authok;
if (!options.kbd_interactive_authentication)
fatal("%s: kbd-int authentication not enabled", __func__);
if (authctxt->as == NULL)
fatal("%s: no bsd auth session", __func__);
if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &response, NULL)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
authok = options.challenge_response_authentication &&
auth_userresponse(authctxt->as, response, 0);
authctxt->as = NULL;
debug3("%s: <%s> = <%d>", __func__, response, authok);
free(response);
sshbuf_reset(m);
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, authok)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
debug3("%s: sending authenticated: %d", __func__, authok);
mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_BSDAUTHRESPOND, m);
auth_method = "keyboard-interactive";
auth_submethod = "bsdauth";
return (authok != 0);
}
#endif
#ifdef USE_PAM
int
mm_answer_pam_start(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
{
if (!options.use_pam)
fatal("UsePAM not set, but ended up in %s anyway", __func__);
start_pam(ssh);
monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_PAM_ACCOUNT, 1);
if (options.kbd_interactive_authentication)
monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_PAM_INIT_CTX, 1);
return (0);
}
int
mm_answer_pam_account(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
{
u_int ret;
int r;
if (!options.use_pam)
fatal("%s: PAM not enabled", __func__);
ret = do_pam_account();
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, ret)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_stringb(m, loginmsg)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_ACCOUNT, m);
return (ret);
}
static void *sshpam_ctxt, *sshpam_authok;
extern KbdintDevice sshpam_device;
int
mm_answer_pam_init_ctx(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
{
u_int ok = 0;
int r;
debug3("%s", __func__);
if (!options.kbd_interactive_authentication)
fatal("%s: kbd-int authentication not enabled", __func__);
if (sshpam_ctxt != NULL)
fatal("%s: already called", __func__);
sshpam_ctxt = (sshpam_device.init_ctx)(authctxt);
sshpam_authok = NULL;
sshbuf_reset(m);
if (sshpam_ctxt != NULL) {
monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_PAM_FREE_CTX, 1);
monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_PAM_QUERY, 1);
ok = 1;
}
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, ok)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_INIT_CTX, m);
return (0);
}
int
mm_answer_pam_query(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
{
char *name = NULL, *info = NULL, **prompts = NULL;
u_int i, num = 0, *echo_on = 0;
int r, ret;
debug3("%s", __func__);
sshpam_authok = NULL;
if (sshpam_ctxt == NULL)
fatal("%s: no context", __func__);
ret = (sshpam_device.query)(sshpam_ctxt, &name, &info,
&num, &prompts, &echo_on);
if (ret == 0 && num == 0)
sshpam_authok = sshpam_ctxt;
if (num > 1 || name == NULL || info == NULL)
fatal("sshpam_device.query failed");
monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_PAM_RESPOND, 1);
sshbuf_reset(m);
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, ret)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, name)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, info)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, sshpam_get_maxtries_reached())) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, num)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
free(name);
free(info);
for (i = 0; i < num; ++i) {
if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, prompts[i])) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, echo_on[i])) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
free(prompts[i]);
}
free(prompts);
free(echo_on);
auth_method = "keyboard-interactive";
auth_submethod = "pam";
mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_QUERY, m);
return (0);
}
int
mm_answer_pam_respond(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
{
char **resp;
u_int i, num;
int r, ret;
debug3("%s", __func__);
if (sshpam_ctxt == NULL)
fatal("%s: no context", __func__);
sshpam_authok = NULL;
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &num)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
if (num > 0) {
resp = xcalloc(num, sizeof(char *));
for (i = 0; i < num; ++i) {
if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &(resp[i]), NULL)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s",
__func__, ssh_err(r));
}
ret = (sshpam_device.respond)(sshpam_ctxt, num, resp);
for (i = 0; i < num; ++i)
free(resp[i]);
free(resp);
} else {
ret = (sshpam_device.respond)(sshpam_ctxt, num, NULL);
}
sshbuf_reset(m);
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, ret)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_RESPOND, m);
auth_method = "keyboard-interactive";
auth_submethod = "pam";
if (ret == 0)
sshpam_authok = sshpam_ctxt;
return (0);
}
int
mm_answer_pam_free_ctx(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
{
int r = sshpam_authok != NULL && sshpam_authok == sshpam_ctxt;
debug3("%s", __func__);
if (sshpam_ctxt == NULL)
fatal("%s: no context", __func__);
(sshpam_device.free_ctx)(sshpam_ctxt);
sshpam_ctxt = sshpam_authok = NULL;
sshbuf_reset(m);
mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_FREE_CTX, m);
/* Allow another attempt */
monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_PAM_INIT_CTX, 1);
auth_method = "keyboard-interactive";
auth_submethod = "pam";
return r;
}
#endif
int
mm_answer_keyallowed(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
{
struct sshkey *key = NULL;
char *cuser, *chost;
u_int pubkey_auth_attempt;
enum mm_keytype type = 0;
int r, allowed = 0;
struct sshauthopt *opts = NULL;
debug3("%s entering", __func__);
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &type)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &cuser, NULL)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &chost, NULL)) != 0 ||
(r = sshkey_froms(m, &key)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &pubkey_auth_attempt)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
debug3("%s: key_from_blob: %p", __func__, key);
if (key != NULL && authctxt->valid) {
/* These should not make it past the privsep child */
if (sshkey_type_plain(key->type) == KEY_RSA &&
(datafellows & SSH_BUG_RSASIGMD5) != 0)
fatal("%s: passed a SSH_BUG_RSASIGMD5 key", __func__);
switch (type) {
case MM_USERKEY:
auth_method = "publickey";
if (!options.pubkey_authentication)
break;
if (auth2_key_already_used(authctxt, key))
break;
if (!key_base_type_match(auth_method, key,
options.pubkey_key_types))
break;
allowed = user_key_allowed(ssh, authctxt->pw, key,
pubkey_auth_attempt, &opts);
break;
case MM_HOSTKEY:
auth_method = "hostbased";
if (!options.hostbased_authentication)
break;
if (auth2_key_already_used(authctxt, key))
break;
if (!key_base_type_match(auth_method, key,
options.hostbased_key_types))
break;
allowed = hostbased_key_allowed(ssh, authctxt->pw,
cuser, chost, key);
auth2_record_info(authctxt,
"client user \"%.100s\", client host \"%.100s\"",
cuser, chost);
break;
default:
fatal("%s: unknown key type %d", __func__, type);
break;
}
}
debug3("%s: %s authentication%s: %s key is %s", __func__,
auth_method, pubkey_auth_attempt ? "" : " test",
(key == NULL || !authctxt->valid) ? "invalid" : sshkey_type(key),
allowed ? "allowed" : "not allowed");
auth2_record_key(authctxt, 0, key);
/* clear temporarily storage (used by verify) */
monitor_reset_key_state();
if (allowed) {
/* Save temporarily for comparison in verify */
if ((r = sshkey_to_blob(key, &key_blob, &key_bloblen)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
key_blobtype = type;
key_opts = opts;
hostbased_cuser = cuser;
hostbased_chost = chost;
} else {
/* Log failed attempt */
auth_log(ssh, 0, 0, auth_method, NULL);
free(cuser);
free(chost);
}
sshkey_free(key);
sshbuf_reset(m);
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, allowed)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
if (opts != NULL && (r = sshauthopt_serialise(opts, m, 1)) != 0)
fatal("%s: sshauthopt_serialise: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_KEYALLOWED, m);
if (!allowed)
sshauthopt_free(opts);
return (0);
}
static int
monitor_valid_userblob(const u_char *data, u_int datalen)
{
struct sshbuf *b;
const u_char *p;
char *userstyle, *cp;
size_t len;
u_char type;
int r, fail = 0;
if ((b = sshbuf_from(data, datalen)) == NULL)
fatal("%s: sshbuf_from", __func__);
if (datafellows & SSH_OLD_SESSIONID) {
p = sshbuf_ptr(b);
len = sshbuf_len(b);
if ((session_id2 == NULL) ||
(len < session_id2_len) ||
(timingsafe_bcmp(p, session_id2, session_id2_len) != 0))
fail++;
if ((r = sshbuf_consume(b, session_id2_len)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
} else {
if ((r = sshbuf_get_string_direct(b, &p, &len)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
if ((session_id2 == NULL) ||
(len != session_id2_len) ||
(timingsafe_bcmp(p, session_id2, session_id2_len) != 0))
fail++;
}
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(b, &type)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
if (type != SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST)
fail++;
if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &cp, NULL)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
xasprintf(&userstyle, "%s%s%s", authctxt->user,
authctxt->style ? ":" : "",
authctxt->style ? authctxt->style : "");
if (strcmp(userstyle, cp) != 0) {
logit("wrong user name passed to monitor: "
"expected %s != %.100s", userstyle, cp);
fail++;
}
free(userstyle);
free(cp);
if ((r = sshbuf_skip_string(b)) != 0 || /* service */
(r = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &cp, NULL)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
if (strcmp("publickey", cp) != 0)
fail++;
free(cp);
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(b, &type)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
if (type == 0)
fail++;
if ((r = sshbuf_skip_string(b)) != 0 || /* pkalg */
(r = sshbuf_skip_string(b)) != 0) /* pkblob */
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
if (sshbuf_len(b) != 0)
fail++;
sshbuf_free(b);
return (fail == 0);
}
static int
monitor_valid_hostbasedblob(const u_char *data, u_int datalen,
const char *cuser, const char *chost)
{
struct sshbuf *b;
const u_char *p;
char *cp, *userstyle;
size_t len;
int r, fail = 0;
u_char type;
if ((b = sshbuf_from(data, datalen)) == NULL)
fatal("%s: sshbuf_new", __func__);
if ((r = sshbuf_get_string_direct(b, &p, &len)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
if ((session_id2 == NULL) ||
(len != session_id2_len) ||
(timingsafe_bcmp(p, session_id2, session_id2_len) != 0))
fail++;
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(b, &type)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
if (type != SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST)
fail++;
if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &cp, NULL)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
xasprintf(&userstyle, "%s%s%s", authctxt->user,
authctxt->style ? ":" : "",
authctxt->style ? authctxt->style : "");
if (strcmp(userstyle, cp) != 0) {
logit("wrong user name passed to monitor: "
"expected %s != %.100s", userstyle, cp);
fail++;
}
free(userstyle);
free(cp);
if ((r = sshbuf_skip_string(b)) != 0 || /* service */
(r = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &cp, NULL)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
if (strcmp(cp, "hostbased") != 0)
fail++;
free(cp);
if ((r = sshbuf_skip_string(b)) != 0 || /* pkalg */
(r = sshbuf_skip_string(b)) != 0) /* pkblob */
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
/* verify client host, strip trailing dot if necessary */
if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &cp, NULL)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
if (((len = strlen(cp)) > 0) && cp[len - 1] == '.')
cp[len - 1] = '\0';
if (strcmp(cp, chost) != 0)
fail++;
free(cp);
/* verify client user */
if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &cp, NULL)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
if (strcmp(cp, cuser) != 0)
fail++;
free(cp);
if (sshbuf_len(b) != 0)
fail++;
sshbuf_free(b);
return (fail == 0);
}
int
mm_answer_keyverify(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
{
struct sshkey *key;
const u_char *signature, *data, *blob;
char *sigalg = NULL, *fp = NULL;
size_t signaturelen, datalen, bloblen;
- int r, ret, req_presence = 0, valid_data = 0, encoded_ret;
+ int r, ret, req_presence = 0, req_verify = 0, valid_data = 0;
+ int encoded_ret;
struct sshkey_sig_details *sig_details = NULL;
if ((r = sshbuf_get_string_direct(m, &blob, &bloblen)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_string_direct(m, &signature, &signaturelen)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_string_direct(m, &data, &datalen)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &sigalg, NULL)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
if (hostbased_cuser == NULL || hostbased_chost == NULL ||
!monitor_allowed_key(blob, bloblen))
fatal("%s: bad key, not previously allowed", __func__);
/* Empty signature algorithm means NULL. */
if (*sigalg == '\0') {
free(sigalg);
sigalg = NULL;
}
/* XXX use sshkey_froms here; need to change key_blob, etc. */
if ((r = sshkey_from_blob(blob, bloblen, &key)) != 0)
fatal("%s: bad public key blob: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
switch (key_blobtype) {
case MM_USERKEY:
valid_data = monitor_valid_userblob(data, datalen);
auth_method = "publickey";
break;
case MM_HOSTKEY:
valid_data = monitor_valid_hostbasedblob(data, datalen,
hostbased_cuser, hostbased_chost);
auth_method = "hostbased";
break;
default:
valid_data = 0;
break;
}
if (!valid_data)
fatal("%s: bad signature data blob", __func__);
if ((fp = sshkey_fingerprint(key, options.fingerprint_hash,
SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL)
fatal("%s: sshkey_fingerprint failed", __func__);
ret = sshkey_verify(key, signature, signaturelen, data, datalen,
sigalg, ssh->compat, &sig_details);
debug3("%s: %s %p signature %s%s%s", __func__, auth_method, key,
(ret == 0) ? "verified" : "unverified",
(ret != 0) ? ": " : "", (ret != 0) ? ssh_err(ret) : "");
if (ret == 0 && key_blobtype == MM_USERKEY && sig_details != NULL) {
req_presence = (options.pubkey_auth_options &
PUBKEYAUTH_TOUCH_REQUIRED) ||
!key_opts->no_require_user_presence;
if (req_presence &&
(sig_details->sk_flags & SSH_SK_USER_PRESENCE_REQD) == 0) {
error("public key %s %s signature for %s%s from %.128s "
"port %d rejected: user presence "
"(authenticator touch) requirement not met ",
sshkey_type(key), fp,
authctxt->valid ? "" : "invalid user ",
authctxt->user, ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh),
ssh_remote_port(ssh));
ret = SSH_ERR_SIGNATURE_INVALID;
}
+ req_verify = (options.pubkey_auth_options &
+ PUBKEYAUTH_VERIFY_REQUIRED) || key_opts->require_verify;
+ if (req_verify &&
+ (sig_details->sk_flags & SSH_SK_USER_VERIFICATION_REQD) == 0) {
+ error("public key %s %s signature for %s%s from %.128s "
+ "port %d rejected: user verification requirement "
+ "not met ", sshkey_type(key), fp,
+ authctxt->valid ? "" : "invalid user ",
+ authctxt->user, ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh),
+ ssh_remote_port(ssh));
+ ret = SSH_ERR_SIGNATURE_INVALID;
+ }
}
auth2_record_key(authctxt, ret == 0, key);
if (key_blobtype == MM_USERKEY)
auth_activate_options(ssh, key_opts);
monitor_reset_key_state();
sshbuf_reset(m);
/* encode ret != 0 as positive integer, since we're sending u32 */
encoded_ret = (ret != 0);
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, encoded_ret)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u8(m, sig_details != NULL)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
if (sig_details != NULL) {
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, sig_details->sk_counter)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u8(m, sig_details->sk_flags)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
}
sshkey_sig_details_free(sig_details);
mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_KEYVERIFY, m);
free(sigalg);
free(fp);
sshkey_free(key);
return ret == 0;
}
static void
mm_record_login(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s, struct passwd *pw)
{
socklen_t fromlen;
struct sockaddr_storage from;
/*
* Get IP address of client. If the connection is not a socket, let
* the address be 0.0.0.0.
*/
memset(&from, 0, sizeof(from));
fromlen = sizeof(from);
if (ssh_packet_connection_is_on_socket(ssh)) {
if (getpeername(ssh_packet_get_connection_in(ssh),
(struct sockaddr *)&from, &fromlen) == -1) {
debug("getpeername: %.100s", strerror(errno));
cleanup_exit(255);
}
}
/* Record that there was a login on that tty from the remote host. */
record_login(s->pid, s->tty, pw->pw_name, pw->pw_uid,
session_get_remote_name_or_ip(ssh, utmp_len, options.use_dns),
(struct sockaddr *)&from, fromlen);
}
static void
mm_session_close(Session *s)
{
debug3("%s: session %d pid %ld", __func__, s->self, (long)s->pid);
if (s->ttyfd != -1) {
debug3("%s: tty %s ptyfd %d", __func__, s->tty, s->ptyfd);
session_pty_cleanup2(s);
}
session_unused(s->self);
}
int
mm_answer_pty(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
{
extern struct monitor *pmonitor;
Session *s;
int r, res, fd0;
debug3("%s entering", __func__);
sshbuf_reset(m);
s = session_new();
if (s == NULL)
goto error;
s->authctxt = authctxt;
s->pw = authctxt->pw;
s->pid = pmonitor->m_pid;
res = pty_allocate(&s->ptyfd, &s->ttyfd, s->tty, sizeof(s->tty));
if (res == 0)
goto error;
pty_setowner(authctxt->pw, s->tty);
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, 1)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, s->tty)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
/* We need to trick ttyslot */
if (dup2(s->ttyfd, 0) == -1)
fatal("%s: dup2", __func__);
mm_record_login(ssh, s, authctxt->pw);
/* Now we can close the file descriptor again */
close(0);
/* send messages generated by record_login */
if ((r = sshbuf_put_stringb(m, loginmsg)) != 0)
fatal("%s: put login message: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
sshbuf_reset(loginmsg);
mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_PTY, m);
if (mm_send_fd(sock, s->ptyfd) == -1 ||
mm_send_fd(sock, s->ttyfd) == -1)
fatal("%s: send fds failed", __func__);
/* make sure nothing uses fd 0 */
if ((fd0 = open(_PATH_DEVNULL, O_RDONLY)) == -1)
fatal("%s: open(/dev/null): %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
if (fd0 != 0)
error("%s: fd0 %d != 0", __func__, fd0);
- /* slave is not needed */
+ /* slave side of pty is not needed */
close(s->ttyfd);
s->ttyfd = s->ptyfd;
/* no need to dup() because nobody closes ptyfd */
s->ptymaster = s->ptyfd;
debug3("%s: tty %s ptyfd %d", __func__, s->tty, s->ttyfd);
return (0);
error:
if (s != NULL)
mm_session_close(s);
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, 0)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_PTY, m);
return (0);
}
int
mm_answer_pty_cleanup(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
{
Session *s;
char *tty;
int r;
debug3("%s entering", __func__);
if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &tty, NULL)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
if ((s = session_by_tty(tty)) != NULL)
mm_session_close(s);
sshbuf_reset(m);
free(tty);
return (0);
}
int
mm_answer_term(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *req)
{
extern struct monitor *pmonitor;
int res, status;
debug3("%s: tearing down sessions", __func__);
/* The child is terminating */
session_destroy_all(ssh, &mm_session_close);
#ifdef USE_PAM
if (options.use_pam)
sshpam_cleanup();
#endif
while (waitpid(pmonitor->m_pid, &status, 0) == -1)
if (errno != EINTR)
exit(1);
res = WIFEXITED(status) ? WEXITSTATUS(status) : 1;
/* Terminate process */
exit(res);
}
#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
/* Report that an audit event occurred */
int
mm_answer_audit_event(struct ssh *ssh, int socket, struct sshbuf *m)
{
u_int n;
ssh_audit_event_t event;
int r;
debug3("%s entering", __func__);
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &n)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
event = (ssh_audit_event_t)n;
switch (event) {
case SSH_AUTH_FAIL_PUBKEY:
case SSH_AUTH_FAIL_HOSTBASED:
case SSH_AUTH_FAIL_GSSAPI:
case SSH_LOGIN_EXCEED_MAXTRIES:
case SSH_LOGIN_ROOT_DENIED:
case SSH_CONNECTION_CLOSE:
case SSH_INVALID_USER:
audit_event(ssh, event);
break;
default:
fatal("Audit event type %d not permitted", event);
}
return (0);
}
int
mm_answer_audit_command(struct ssh *ssh, int socket, struct sshbuf *m)
{
char *cmd;
int r;
debug3("%s entering", __func__);
if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &cmd, NULL)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
/* sanity check command, if so how? */
audit_run_command(cmd);
free(cmd);
return (0);
}
#endif /* SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS */
void
monitor_clear_keystate(struct ssh *ssh, struct monitor *pmonitor)
{
ssh_clear_newkeys(ssh, MODE_IN);
ssh_clear_newkeys(ssh, MODE_OUT);
sshbuf_free(child_state);
child_state = NULL;
}
void
monitor_apply_keystate(struct ssh *ssh, struct monitor *pmonitor)
{
struct kex *kex;
int r;
debug3("%s: packet_set_state", __func__);
if ((r = ssh_packet_set_state(ssh, child_state)) != 0)
fatal("%s: packet_set_state: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
sshbuf_free(child_state);
child_state = NULL;
if ((kex = ssh->kex) != NULL) {
/* XXX set callbacks */
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP1_SHA1] = kex_gen_server;
kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP14_SHA1] = kex_gen_server;
kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP14_SHA256] = kex_gen_server;
kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP16_SHA512] = kex_gen_server;
kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP18_SHA512] = kex_gen_server;
kex->kex[KEX_DH_GEX_SHA1] = kexgex_server;
kex->kex[KEX_DH_GEX_SHA256] = kexgex_server;
# ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
kex->kex[KEX_ECDH_SHA2] = kex_gen_server;
# endif
#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
kex->kex[KEX_C25519_SHA256] = kex_gen_server;
kex->kex[KEX_KEM_SNTRUP4591761X25519_SHA512] = kex_gen_server;
kex->load_host_public_key=&get_hostkey_public_by_type;
kex->load_host_private_key=&get_hostkey_private_by_type;
kex->host_key_index=&get_hostkey_index;
kex->sign = sshd_hostkey_sign;
}
}
/* This function requires careful sanity checking */
void
mm_get_keystate(struct ssh *ssh, struct monitor *pmonitor)
{
debug3("%s: Waiting for new keys", __func__);
if ((child_state = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_sendfd, MONITOR_REQ_KEYEXPORT,
child_state);
debug3("%s: GOT new keys", __func__);
}
/* XXX */
#define FD_CLOSEONEXEC(x) do { \
if (fcntl(x, F_SETFD, FD_CLOEXEC) == -1) \
fatal("fcntl(%d, F_SETFD)", x); \
} while (0)
static void
monitor_openfds(struct monitor *mon, int do_logfds)
{
int pair[2];
#ifdef SO_ZEROIZE
int on = 1;
#endif
if (socketpair(AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0, pair) == -1)
fatal("%s: socketpair: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
#ifdef SO_ZEROIZE
if (setsockopt(pair[0], SOL_SOCKET, SO_ZEROIZE, &on, sizeof(on)) == -1)
error("setsockopt SO_ZEROIZE(0): %.100s", strerror(errno));
if (setsockopt(pair[1], SOL_SOCKET, SO_ZEROIZE, &on, sizeof(on)) == -1)
error("setsockopt SO_ZEROIZE(1): %.100s", strerror(errno));
#endif
FD_CLOSEONEXEC(pair[0]);
FD_CLOSEONEXEC(pair[1]);
mon->m_recvfd = pair[0];
mon->m_sendfd = pair[1];
if (do_logfds) {
if (pipe(pair) == -1)
fatal("%s: pipe: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
FD_CLOSEONEXEC(pair[0]);
FD_CLOSEONEXEC(pair[1]);
mon->m_log_recvfd = pair[0];
mon->m_log_sendfd = pair[1];
} else
mon->m_log_recvfd = mon->m_log_sendfd = -1;
}
#define MM_MEMSIZE 65536
struct monitor *
monitor_init(void)
{
struct monitor *mon;
mon = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*mon));
monitor_openfds(mon, 1);
return mon;
}
void
monitor_reinit(struct monitor *mon)
{
monitor_openfds(mon, 0);
}
#ifdef GSSAPI
int
mm_answer_gss_setup_ctx(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
{
gss_OID_desc goid;
OM_uint32 major;
size_t len;
u_char *p;
int r;
if (!options.gss_authentication)
fatal("%s: GSSAPI authentication not enabled", __func__);
if ((r = sshbuf_get_string(m, &p, &len)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
goid.elements = p;
goid.length = len;
major = ssh_gssapi_server_ctx(&gsscontext, &goid);
free(goid.elements);
sshbuf_reset(m);
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, major)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_GSSSETUP, m);
/* Now we have a context, enable the step */
monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSSTEP, 1);
return (0);
}
int
mm_answer_gss_accept_ctx(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
{
gss_buffer_desc in;
gss_buffer_desc out = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
OM_uint32 major, minor;
OM_uint32 flags = 0; /* GSI needs this */
int r;
if (!options.gss_authentication)
fatal("%s: GSSAPI authentication not enabled", __func__);
if ((r = ssh_gssapi_get_buffer_desc(m, &in)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
major = ssh_gssapi_accept_ctx(gsscontext, &in, &out, &flags);
free(in.value);
sshbuf_reset(m);
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, major)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_string(m, out.value, out.length)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, flags)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_GSSSTEP, m);
gss_release_buffer(&minor, &out);
if (major == GSS_S_COMPLETE) {
monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSSTEP, 0);
monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSUSEROK, 1);
monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSCHECKMIC, 1);
}
return (0);
}
int
mm_answer_gss_checkmic(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
{
gss_buffer_desc gssbuf, mic;
OM_uint32 ret;
int r;
if (!options.gss_authentication)
fatal("%s: GSSAPI authentication not enabled", __func__);
if ((r = ssh_gssapi_get_buffer_desc(m, &gssbuf)) != 0 ||
(r = ssh_gssapi_get_buffer_desc(m, &mic)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
ret = ssh_gssapi_checkmic(gsscontext, &gssbuf, &mic);
free(gssbuf.value);
free(mic.value);
sshbuf_reset(m);
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, ret)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_GSSCHECKMIC, m);
if (!GSS_ERROR(ret))
monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSUSEROK, 1);
return (0);
}
int
mm_answer_gss_userok(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
{
int r, authenticated;
const char *displayname;
if (!options.gss_authentication)
fatal("%s: GSSAPI authentication not enabled", __func__);
authenticated = authctxt->valid && ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user);
sshbuf_reset(m);
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, authenticated)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
debug3("%s: sending result %d", __func__, authenticated);
mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_GSSUSEROK, m);
auth_method = "gssapi-with-mic";
if ((displayname = ssh_gssapi_displayname()) != NULL)
auth2_record_info(authctxt, "%s", displayname);
/* Monitor loop will terminate if authenticated */
return (authenticated);
}
#endif /* GSSAPI */
diff --git a/monitor_wrap.c b/monitor_wrap.c
index 001a8fa1c99a..5e38d83eb052 100644
--- a/monitor_wrap.c
+++ b/monitor_wrap.c
@@ -1,1015 +1,1015 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: monitor_wrap.c,v 1.117 2019/12/15 18:57:30 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: monitor_wrap.c,v 1.118 2020/08/27 01:06:18 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright 2002 Niels Provos <provos@citi.umich.edu>
* Copyright 2002 Markus Friedl <markus@openbsd.org>
* All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
* OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
* IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
* INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
* NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
* DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
* THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
* (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
* THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
*/
#include "includes.h"
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/uio.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include <pwd.h>
#include <signal.h>
#include <stdarg.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
#include <openssl/bn.h>
#include <openssl/dh.h>
#include <openssl/evp.h>
#endif
#include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h"
#include "xmalloc.h"
#include "ssh.h"
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
#include "dh.h"
#endif
#include "sshbuf.h"
#include "sshkey.h"
#include "cipher.h"
#include "kex.h"
#include "hostfile.h"
#include "auth.h"
#include "auth-options.h"
#include "packet.h"
#include "mac.h"
#include "log.h"
#include "auth-pam.h"
#include "monitor.h"
#ifdef GSSAPI
#include "ssh-gss.h"
#endif
#include "monitor_wrap.h"
#include "atomicio.h"
#include "monitor_fdpass.h"
#include "misc.h"
#include "channels.h"
#include "session.h"
#include "servconf.h"
#include "ssherr.h"
/* Imports */
extern struct monitor *pmonitor;
extern struct sshbuf *loginmsg;
extern ServerOptions options;
void
mm_log_handler(LogLevel level, const char *msg, void *ctx)
{
struct sshbuf *log_msg;
struct monitor *mon = (struct monitor *)ctx;
int r;
size_t len;
if (mon->m_log_sendfd == -1)
fatal("%s: no log channel", __func__);
if ((log_msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(log_msg, 0)) != 0 || /* length; filled below */
(r = sshbuf_put_u32(log_msg, level)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_cstring(log_msg, msg)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
if ((len = sshbuf_len(log_msg)) < 4 || len > 0xffffffff)
fatal("%s: bad length %zu", __func__, len);
POKE_U32(sshbuf_mutable_ptr(log_msg), len - 4);
if (atomicio(vwrite, mon->m_log_sendfd,
sshbuf_mutable_ptr(log_msg), len) != len)
fatal("%s: write: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
sshbuf_free(log_msg);
}
int
mm_is_monitor(void)
{
/*
* m_pid is only set in the privileged part, and
* points to the unprivileged child.
*/
return (pmonitor && pmonitor->m_pid > 0);
}
void
mm_request_send(int sock, enum monitor_reqtype type, struct sshbuf *m)
{
size_t mlen = sshbuf_len(m);
u_char buf[5];
debug3("%s entering: type %d", __func__, type);
if (mlen >= 0xffffffff)
fatal("%s: bad length %zu", __func__, mlen);
POKE_U32(buf, mlen + 1);
buf[4] = (u_char) type; /* 1st byte of payload is mesg-type */
if (atomicio(vwrite, sock, buf, sizeof(buf)) != sizeof(buf))
fatal("%s: write: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
if (atomicio(vwrite, sock, sshbuf_mutable_ptr(m), mlen) != mlen)
fatal("%s: write: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
}
void
mm_request_receive(int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
{
u_char buf[4], *p = NULL;
u_int msg_len;
int r;
debug3("%s entering", __func__);
if (atomicio(read, sock, buf, sizeof(buf)) != sizeof(buf)) {
if (errno == EPIPE)
cleanup_exit(255);
fatal("%s: read: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
}
msg_len = PEEK_U32(buf);
if (msg_len > 256 * 1024)
fatal("%s: read: bad msg_len %d", __func__, msg_len);
sshbuf_reset(m);
if ((r = sshbuf_reserve(m, msg_len, &p)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
if (atomicio(read, sock, p, msg_len) != msg_len)
fatal("%s: read: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
}
void
mm_request_receive_expect(int sock, enum monitor_reqtype type, struct sshbuf *m)
{
u_char rtype;
int r;
debug3("%s entering: type %d", __func__, type);
mm_request_receive(sock, m);
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(m, &rtype)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
if (rtype != type)
fatal("%s: read: rtype %d != type %d", __func__,
rtype, type);
}
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
DH *
mm_choose_dh(int min, int nbits, int max)
{
BIGNUM *p, *g;
int r;
u_char success = 0;
struct sshbuf *m;
if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, min)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, nbits)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, max)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_MODULI, m);
debug3("%s: waiting for MONITOR_ANS_MODULI", __func__);
mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_MODULI, m);
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(m, &success)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
if (success == 0)
fatal("%s: MONITOR_ANS_MODULI failed", __func__);
if ((r = sshbuf_get_bignum2(m, &p)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_bignum2(m, &g)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
debug3("%s: remaining %zu", __func__, sshbuf_len(m));
sshbuf_free(m);
return (dh_new_group(g, p));
}
#endif
int
mm_sshkey_sign(struct ssh *ssh, struct sshkey *key, u_char **sigp, size_t *lenp,
const u_char *data, size_t datalen, const char *hostkey_alg,
- const char *sk_provider, u_int compat)
+ const char *sk_provider, const char *sk_pin, u_int compat)
{
struct kex *kex = *pmonitor->m_pkex;
struct sshbuf *m;
u_int ndx = kex->host_key_index(key, 0, ssh);
int r;
debug3("%s entering", __func__);
if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, ndx)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_string(m, data, datalen)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, hostkey_alg)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, compat)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_SIGN, m);
debug3("%s: waiting for MONITOR_ANS_SIGN", __func__);
mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_SIGN, m);
if ((r = sshbuf_get_string(m, sigp, lenp)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
sshbuf_free(m);
return (0);
}
struct passwd *
mm_getpwnamallow(struct ssh *ssh, const char *username)
{
struct sshbuf *m;
struct passwd *pw;
size_t len;
u_int i;
ServerOptions *newopts;
int r;
u_char ok;
const u_char *p;
debug3("%s entering", __func__);
if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, username)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_PWNAM, m);
debug3("%s: waiting for MONITOR_ANS_PWNAM", __func__);
mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_PWNAM, m);
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(m, &ok)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
if (ok == 0) {
pw = NULL;
goto out;
}
/* XXX don't like passing struct passwd like this */
pw = xcalloc(sizeof(*pw), 1);
if ((r = sshbuf_get_string_direct(m, &p, &len)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
if (len != sizeof(*pw))
fatal("%s: struct passwd size mismatch", __func__);
memcpy(pw, p, sizeof(*pw));
if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &pw->pw_name, NULL)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &pw->pw_passwd, NULL)) != 0 ||
#ifdef HAVE_STRUCT_PASSWD_PW_GECOS
(r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &pw->pw_gecos, NULL)) != 0 ||
#endif
#ifdef HAVE_STRUCT_PASSWD_PW_CLASS
(r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &pw->pw_class, NULL)) != 0 ||
#endif
(r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &pw->pw_dir, NULL)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &pw->pw_shell, NULL)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
out:
/* copy options block as a Match directive may have changed some */
if ((r = sshbuf_get_string_direct(m, &p, &len)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
if (len != sizeof(*newopts))
fatal("%s: option block size mismatch", __func__);
newopts = xcalloc(sizeof(*newopts), 1);
memcpy(newopts, p, sizeof(*newopts));
#define M_CP_STROPT(x) do { \
if (newopts->x != NULL) { \
if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, \
&newopts->x, NULL)) != 0) \
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", \
__func__, ssh_err(r)); \
} \
} while (0)
#define M_CP_STRARRAYOPT(x, nx) do { \
newopts->x = newopts->nx == 0 ? \
NULL : xcalloc(newopts->nx, sizeof(*newopts->x)); \
for (i = 0; i < newopts->nx; i++) { \
if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, \
&newopts->x[i], NULL)) != 0) \
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", \
__func__, ssh_err(r)); \
} \
} while (0)
/* See comment in servconf.h */
COPY_MATCH_STRING_OPTS();
#undef M_CP_STROPT
#undef M_CP_STRARRAYOPT
copy_set_server_options(&options, newopts, 1);
log_change_level(options.log_level);
process_permitopen(ssh, &options);
free(newopts);
sshbuf_free(m);
return (pw);
}
char *
mm_auth2_read_banner(void)
{
struct sshbuf *m;
char *banner;
int r;
debug3("%s entering", __func__);
if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_AUTH2_READ_BANNER, m);
sshbuf_reset(m);
mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd,
MONITOR_ANS_AUTH2_READ_BANNER, m);
if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &banner, NULL)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
sshbuf_free(m);
/* treat empty banner as missing banner */
if (strlen(banner) == 0) {
free(banner);
banner = NULL;
}
return (banner);
}
/* Inform the privileged process about service and style */
void
mm_inform_authserv(char *service, char *style)
{
struct sshbuf *m;
int r;
debug3("%s entering", __func__);
if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, service)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, style ? style : "")) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_AUTHSERV, m);
sshbuf_free(m);
}
/* Do the password authentication */
int
mm_auth_password(struct ssh *ssh, char *password)
{
struct sshbuf *m;
int r, authenticated = 0;
#ifdef USE_PAM
u_int maxtries = 0;
#endif
debug3("%s entering", __func__);
if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, password)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_AUTHPASSWORD, m);
debug3("%s: waiting for MONITOR_ANS_AUTHPASSWORD", __func__);
mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd,
MONITOR_ANS_AUTHPASSWORD, m);
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &authenticated)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
#ifdef USE_PAM
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &maxtries)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
if (maxtries > INT_MAX)
fatal("%s: bad maxtries %u", __func__, maxtries);
sshpam_set_maxtries_reached(maxtries);
#endif
sshbuf_free(m);
debug3("%s: user %sauthenticated",
__func__, authenticated ? "" : "not ");
return (authenticated);
}
int
mm_user_key_allowed(struct ssh *ssh, struct passwd *pw, struct sshkey *key,
int pubkey_auth_attempt, struct sshauthopt **authoptp)
{
return (mm_key_allowed(MM_USERKEY, NULL, NULL, key,
pubkey_auth_attempt, authoptp));
}
int
mm_hostbased_key_allowed(struct ssh *ssh, struct passwd *pw,
const char *user, const char *host, struct sshkey *key)
{
return (mm_key_allowed(MM_HOSTKEY, user, host, key, 0, NULL));
}
int
mm_key_allowed(enum mm_keytype type, const char *user, const char *host,
struct sshkey *key, int pubkey_auth_attempt, struct sshauthopt **authoptp)
{
struct sshbuf *m;
int r, allowed = 0;
struct sshauthopt *opts = NULL;
debug3("%s entering", __func__);
if (authoptp != NULL)
*authoptp = NULL;
if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, type)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, user ? user : "")) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, host ? host : "")) != 0 ||
(r = sshkey_puts(key, m)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, pubkey_auth_attempt)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_KEYALLOWED, m);
debug3("%s: waiting for MONITOR_ANS_KEYALLOWED", __func__);
mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd,
MONITOR_ANS_KEYALLOWED, m);
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &allowed)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
if (allowed && type == MM_USERKEY) {
if ((r = sshauthopt_deserialise(m, &opts)) != 0)
fatal("%s: sshauthopt_deserialise: %s",
__func__, ssh_err(r));
}
sshbuf_free(m);
if (authoptp != NULL) {
*authoptp = opts;
opts = NULL;
}
sshauthopt_free(opts);
return allowed;
}
/*
* This key verify needs to send the key type along, because the
* privileged parent makes the decision if the key is allowed
* for authentication.
*/
int
mm_sshkey_verify(const struct sshkey *key, const u_char *sig, size_t siglen,
const u_char *data, size_t datalen, const char *sigalg, u_int compat,
struct sshkey_sig_details **sig_detailsp)
{
struct sshbuf *m;
u_int encoded_ret = 0;
int r;
u_char sig_details_present, flags;
u_int counter;
debug3("%s entering", __func__);
if (sig_detailsp != NULL)
*sig_detailsp = NULL;
if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
if ((r = sshkey_puts(key, m)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_string(m, sig, siglen)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_string(m, data, datalen)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, sigalg == NULL ? "" : sigalg)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_KEYVERIFY, m);
debug3("%s: waiting for MONITOR_ANS_KEYVERIFY", __func__);
mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd,
MONITOR_ANS_KEYVERIFY, m);
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &encoded_ret)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_u8(m, &sig_details_present)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
if (sig_details_present && encoded_ret == 0) {
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &counter)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_u8(m, &flags)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
if (sig_detailsp != NULL) {
*sig_detailsp = xcalloc(1, sizeof(**sig_detailsp));
(*sig_detailsp)->sk_counter = counter;
(*sig_detailsp)->sk_flags = flags;
}
}
sshbuf_free(m);
if (encoded_ret != 0)
return SSH_ERR_SIGNATURE_INVALID;
return 0;
}
void
mm_send_keystate(struct ssh *ssh, struct monitor *monitor)
{
struct sshbuf *m;
int r;
if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
if ((r = ssh_packet_get_state(ssh, m)) != 0)
fatal("%s: get_state failed: %s",
__func__, ssh_err(r));
mm_request_send(monitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_KEYEXPORT, m);
debug3("%s: Finished sending state", __func__);
sshbuf_free(m);
}
int
mm_pty_allocate(int *ptyfd, int *ttyfd, char *namebuf, size_t namebuflen)
{
struct sshbuf *m;
char *p, *msg;
int success = 0, tmp1 = -1, tmp2 = -1, r;
/* Kludge: ensure there are fds free to receive the pty/tty */
if ((tmp1 = dup(pmonitor->m_recvfd)) == -1 ||
(tmp2 = dup(pmonitor->m_recvfd)) == -1) {
error("%s: cannot allocate fds for pty", __func__);
if (tmp1 > 0)
close(tmp1);
if (tmp2 > 0)
close(tmp2);
return 0;
}
close(tmp1);
close(tmp2);
if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_PTY, m);
debug3("%s: waiting for MONITOR_ANS_PTY", __func__);
mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_PTY, m);
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &success)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
if (success == 0) {
debug3("%s: pty alloc failed", __func__);
sshbuf_free(m);
return (0);
}
if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &p, NULL)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &msg, NULL)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
sshbuf_free(m);
strlcpy(namebuf, p, namebuflen); /* Possible truncation */
free(p);
if ((r = sshbuf_put(loginmsg, msg, strlen(msg))) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
free(msg);
if ((*ptyfd = mm_receive_fd(pmonitor->m_recvfd)) == -1 ||
(*ttyfd = mm_receive_fd(pmonitor->m_recvfd)) == -1)
fatal("%s: receive fds failed", __func__);
/* Success */
return (1);
}
void
mm_session_pty_cleanup2(Session *s)
{
struct sshbuf *m;
int r;
if (s->ttyfd == -1)
return;
if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, s->tty)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_PTYCLEANUP, m);
sshbuf_free(m);
/* closed dup'ed master */
if (s->ptymaster != -1 && close(s->ptymaster) == -1)
error("close(s->ptymaster/%d): %s",
s->ptymaster, strerror(errno));
/* unlink pty from session */
s->ttyfd = -1;
}
#ifdef USE_PAM
void
mm_start_pam(struct ssh *ssh)
{
struct sshbuf *m;
debug3("%s entering", __func__);
if (!options.use_pam)
fatal("UsePAM=no, but ended up in %s anyway", __func__);
if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_PAM_START, m);
sshbuf_free(m);
}
u_int
mm_do_pam_account(void)
{
struct sshbuf *m;
u_int ret;
char *msg;
size_t msglen;
int r;
debug3("%s entering", __func__);
if (!options.use_pam)
fatal("UsePAM=no, but ended up in %s anyway", __func__);
if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_PAM_ACCOUNT, m);
mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd,
MONITOR_ANS_PAM_ACCOUNT, m);
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &ret)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &msg, &msglen)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put(loginmsg, msg, msglen)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
free(msg);
sshbuf_free(m);
debug3("%s returning %d", __func__, ret);
return (ret);
}
void *
mm_sshpam_init_ctx(Authctxt *authctxt)
{
struct sshbuf *m;
int r, success;
debug3("%s", __func__);
if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_PAM_INIT_CTX, m);
debug3("%s: waiting for MONITOR_ANS_PAM_INIT_CTX", __func__);
mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd,
MONITOR_ANS_PAM_INIT_CTX, m);
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &success)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
if (success == 0) {
debug3("%s: pam_init_ctx failed", __func__);
sshbuf_free(m);
return (NULL);
}
sshbuf_free(m);
return (authctxt);
}
int
mm_sshpam_query(void *ctx, char **name, char **info,
u_int *num, char ***prompts, u_int **echo_on)
{
struct sshbuf *m;
u_int i, n;
int r, ret;
debug3("%s", __func__);
if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_PAM_QUERY, m);
debug3("%s: waiting for MONITOR_ANS_PAM_QUERY", __func__);
mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_QUERY, m);
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &ret)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, name, NULL)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, info, NULL)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &n)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, num)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
debug3("%s: pam_query returned %d", __func__, ret);
sshpam_set_maxtries_reached(n);
if (*num > PAM_MAX_NUM_MSG)
fatal("%s: received %u PAM messages, expected <= %u",
__func__, *num, PAM_MAX_NUM_MSG);
*prompts = xcalloc((*num + 1), sizeof(char *));
*echo_on = xcalloc((*num + 1), sizeof(u_int));
for (i = 0; i < *num; ++i) {
if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &((*prompts)[i]), NULL)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &((*echo_on)[i]))) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
}
sshbuf_free(m);
return (ret);
}
int
mm_sshpam_respond(void *ctx, u_int num, char **resp)
{
struct sshbuf *m;
u_int n, i;
int r, ret;
debug3("%s", __func__);
if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, num)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
for (i = 0; i < num; ++i) {
if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, resp[i])) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
}
mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_PAM_RESPOND, m);
debug3("%s: waiting for MONITOR_ANS_PAM_RESPOND", __func__);
mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd,
MONITOR_ANS_PAM_RESPOND, m);
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &n)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
ret = (int)n; /* XXX */
debug3("%s: pam_respond returned %d", __func__, ret);
sshbuf_free(m);
return (ret);
}
void
mm_sshpam_free_ctx(void *ctxtp)
{
struct sshbuf *m;
debug3("%s", __func__);
if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_PAM_FREE_CTX, m);
debug3("%s: waiting for MONITOR_ANS_PAM_FREE_CTX", __func__);
mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd,
MONITOR_ANS_PAM_FREE_CTX, m);
sshbuf_free(m);
}
#endif /* USE_PAM */
/* Request process termination */
void
mm_terminate(void)
{
struct sshbuf *m;
if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_TERM, m);
sshbuf_free(m);
}
static void
mm_chall_setup(char **name, char **infotxt, u_int *numprompts,
char ***prompts, u_int **echo_on)
{
*name = xstrdup("");
*infotxt = xstrdup("");
*numprompts = 1;
*prompts = xcalloc(*numprompts, sizeof(char *));
*echo_on = xcalloc(*numprompts, sizeof(u_int));
(*echo_on)[0] = 0;
}
int
mm_bsdauth_query(void *ctx, char **name, char **infotxt,
u_int *numprompts, char ***prompts, u_int **echo_on)
{
struct sshbuf *m;
u_int success;
char *challenge;
int r;
debug3("%s: entering", __func__);
if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_BSDAUTHQUERY, m);
mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd,
MONITOR_ANS_BSDAUTHQUERY, m);
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &success)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
if (success == 0) {
debug3("%s: no challenge", __func__);
sshbuf_free(m);
return (-1);
}
/* Get the challenge, and format the response */
if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &challenge, NULL)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
sshbuf_free(m);
mm_chall_setup(name, infotxt, numprompts, prompts, echo_on);
(*prompts)[0] = challenge;
debug3("%s: received challenge: %s", __func__, challenge);
return (0);
}
int
mm_bsdauth_respond(void *ctx, u_int numresponses, char **responses)
{
struct sshbuf *m;
int r, authok;
debug3("%s: entering", __func__);
if (numresponses != 1)
return (-1);
if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, responses[0])) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_BSDAUTHRESPOND, m);
mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd,
MONITOR_ANS_BSDAUTHRESPOND, m);
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &authok)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
sshbuf_free(m);
return ((authok == 0) ? -1 : 0);
}
#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
void
mm_audit_event(struct ssh *ssh, ssh_audit_event_t event)
{
struct sshbuf *m;
int r;
debug3("%s entering", __func__);
if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, event)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_EVENT, m);
sshbuf_free(m);
}
void
mm_audit_run_command(const char *command)
{
struct sshbuf *m;
int r;
debug3("%s entering command %s", __func__, command);
if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, command)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_COMMAND, m);
sshbuf_free(m);
}
#endif /* SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS */
#ifdef GSSAPI
OM_uint32
mm_ssh_gssapi_server_ctx(Gssctxt **ctx, gss_OID goid)
{
struct sshbuf *m;
OM_uint32 major;
int r;
/* Client doesn't get to see the context */
*ctx = NULL;
if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
if ((r = sshbuf_put_string(m, goid->elements, goid->length)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_GSSSETUP, m);
mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_GSSSETUP, m);
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &major)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
sshbuf_free(m);
return (major);
}
OM_uint32
mm_ssh_gssapi_accept_ctx(Gssctxt *ctx, gss_buffer_desc *in,
gss_buffer_desc *out, OM_uint32 *flagsp)
{
struct sshbuf *m;
OM_uint32 major;
u_int flags;
int r;
if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
if ((r = sshbuf_put_string(m, in->value, in->length)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_GSSSTEP, m);
mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_GSSSTEP, m);
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &major)) != 0 ||
(r = ssh_gssapi_get_buffer_desc(m, out)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
if (flagsp != NULL) {
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &flags)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
*flagsp = flags;
}
sshbuf_free(m);
return (major);
}
OM_uint32
mm_ssh_gssapi_checkmic(Gssctxt *ctx, gss_buffer_t gssbuf, gss_buffer_t gssmic)
{
struct sshbuf *m;
OM_uint32 major;
int r;
if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
if ((r = sshbuf_put_string(m, gssbuf->value, gssbuf->length)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_string(m, gssmic->value, gssmic->length)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_GSSCHECKMIC, m);
mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd,
MONITOR_ANS_GSSCHECKMIC, m);
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &major)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
sshbuf_free(m);
return(major);
}
int
mm_ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user)
{
struct sshbuf *m;
int r, authenticated = 0;
if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_GSSUSEROK, m);
mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd,
MONITOR_ANS_GSSUSEROK, m);
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &authenticated)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
sshbuf_free(m);
debug3("%s: user %sauthenticated",__func__, authenticated ? "" : "not ");
return (authenticated);
}
#endif /* GSSAPI */
diff --git a/monitor_wrap.h b/monitor_wrap.h
index 23ab096aa6de..0db38c20657f 100644
--- a/monitor_wrap.h
+++ b/monitor_wrap.h
@@ -1,101 +1,102 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: monitor_wrap.h,v 1.44 2019/11/25 00:51:37 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: monitor_wrap.h,v 1.45 2020/08/27 01:06:18 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright 2002 Niels Provos <provos@citi.umich.edu>
* All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
* OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
* IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
* INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
* NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
* DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
* THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
* (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
* THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
*/
#ifndef _MM_WRAP_H_
#define _MM_WRAP_H_
extern int use_privsep;
#define PRIVSEP(x) (use_privsep ? mm_##x : x)
enum mm_keytype { MM_NOKEY, MM_HOSTKEY, MM_USERKEY };
struct ssh;
struct monitor;
struct Authctxt;
struct sshkey;
struct sshauthopt;
struct sshkey_sig_details;
void mm_log_handler(LogLevel, const char *, void *);
int mm_is_monitor(void);
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
DH *mm_choose_dh(int, int, int);
#endif
int mm_sshkey_sign(struct ssh *, struct sshkey *, u_char **, size_t *,
- const u_char *, size_t, const char *, const char *, u_int compat);
+ const u_char *, size_t, const char *, const char *,
+ const char *, u_int compat);
void mm_inform_authserv(char *, char *);
struct passwd *mm_getpwnamallow(struct ssh *, const char *);
char *mm_auth2_read_banner(void);
int mm_auth_password(struct ssh *, char *);
int mm_key_allowed(enum mm_keytype, const char *, const char *, struct sshkey *,
int, struct sshauthopt **);
int mm_user_key_allowed(struct ssh *, struct passwd *, struct sshkey *, int,
struct sshauthopt **);
int mm_hostbased_key_allowed(struct ssh *, struct passwd *, const char *,
const char *, struct sshkey *);
int mm_sshkey_verify(const struct sshkey *, const u_char *, size_t,
const u_char *, size_t, const char *, u_int, struct sshkey_sig_details **);
#ifdef GSSAPI
OM_uint32 mm_ssh_gssapi_server_ctx(Gssctxt **, gss_OID);
OM_uint32 mm_ssh_gssapi_accept_ctx(Gssctxt *,
gss_buffer_desc *, gss_buffer_desc *, OM_uint32 *);
int mm_ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user);
OM_uint32 mm_ssh_gssapi_checkmic(Gssctxt *, gss_buffer_t, gss_buffer_t);
#endif
#ifdef USE_PAM
void mm_start_pam(struct ssh *ssh);
u_int mm_do_pam_account(void);
void *mm_sshpam_init_ctx(struct Authctxt *);
int mm_sshpam_query(void *, char **, char **, u_int *, char ***, u_int **);
int mm_sshpam_respond(void *, u_int, char **);
void mm_sshpam_free_ctx(void *);
#endif
#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
#include "audit.h"
void mm_audit_event(struct ssh *, ssh_audit_event_t);
void mm_audit_run_command(const char *);
#endif
struct Session;
void mm_terminate(void);
int mm_pty_allocate(int *, int *, char *, size_t);
void mm_session_pty_cleanup2(struct Session *);
/* Key export functions */
struct newkeys *mm_newkeys_from_blob(u_char *, int);
int mm_newkeys_to_blob(int, u_char **, u_int *);
void mm_send_keystate(struct ssh *, struct monitor*);
/* bsdauth */
int mm_bsdauth_query(void *, char **, char **, u_int *, char ***, u_int **);
int mm_bsdauth_respond(void *, u_int, char **);
#endif /* _MM_WRAP_H_ */
diff --git a/msg.c b/msg.c
index 99c25cd25271..574a566e3044 100644
--- a/msg.c
+++ b/msg.c
@@ -1,94 +1,94 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: msg.c,v 1.18 2020/01/22 04:49:16 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: msg.c,v 1.19 2020/06/24 15:08:53 markus Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 2002 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
* OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
* IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
* INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
* NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
* DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
* THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
* (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
* THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
*/
#include "includes.h"
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/uio.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <stdarg.h>
#include "sshbuf.h"
#include "ssherr.h"
#include "log.h"
#include "atomicio.h"
#include "msg.h"
#include "misc.h"
int
ssh_msg_send(int fd, u_char type, struct sshbuf *m)
{
u_char buf[5];
u_int mlen = sshbuf_len(m);
debug3("%s: type %u", __func__, (unsigned int)type & 0xff);
put_u32(buf, mlen + 1);
buf[4] = type; /* 1st byte of payload is mesg-type */
if (atomicio(vwrite, fd, buf, sizeof(buf)) != sizeof(buf)) {
error("%s: write: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
return (-1);
}
if (atomicio(vwrite, fd, sshbuf_mutable_ptr(m), mlen) != mlen) {
error("%s: write: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
return (-1);
}
return (0);
}
int
ssh_msg_recv(int fd, struct sshbuf *m)
{
u_char buf[4], *p;
u_int msg_len;
int r;
debug3("ssh_msg_recv entering");
if (atomicio(read, fd, buf, sizeof(buf)) != sizeof(buf)) {
if (errno != EPIPE)
error("%s: read header: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
return (-1);
}
msg_len = get_u32(buf);
- if (msg_len > 256 * 1024) {
+ if (msg_len > sshbuf_max_size(m)) {
error("%s: read: bad msg_len %u", __func__, msg_len);
return (-1);
}
sshbuf_reset(m);
if ((r = sshbuf_reserve(m, msg_len, &p)) != 0) {
error("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
return -1;
}
if (atomicio(read, fd, p, msg_len) != msg_len) {
error("%s: read: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
return (-1);
}
return (0);
}
diff --git a/mux.c b/mux.c
index fb31ad448d54..376f0d7119da 100644
--- a/mux.c
+++ b/mux.c
@@ -1,2402 +1,2402 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: mux.c,v 1.82 2020/04/30 17:12:20 markus Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: mux.c,v 1.83 2020/07/05 23:59:45 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 2002-2008 Damien Miller <djm@openbsd.org>
*
* Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
* purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
* copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
*
* THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
* WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
* MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
* ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
* WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
* ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
* OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
*/
/* ssh session multiplexing support */
#include "includes.h"
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/stat.h>
#include <sys/socket.h>
#include <sys/un.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <signal.h>
#include <stdarg.h>
#include <stddef.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H
#include <paths.h>
#endif
#ifdef HAVE_POLL_H
#include <poll.h>
#else
# ifdef HAVE_SYS_POLL_H
# include <sys/poll.h>
# endif
#endif
#ifdef HAVE_UTIL_H
# include <util.h>
#endif
#include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h"
#include "xmalloc.h"
#include "log.h"
#include "ssh.h"
#include "ssh2.h"
#include "pathnames.h"
#include "misc.h"
#include "match.h"
#include "sshbuf.h"
#include "channels.h"
#include "msg.h"
#include "packet.h"
#include "monitor_fdpass.h"
#include "sshpty.h"
#include "sshkey.h"
#include "readconf.h"
#include "clientloop.h"
#include "ssherr.h"
/* from ssh.c */
extern int tty_flag;
extern Options options;
extern int stdin_null_flag;
extern char *host;
extern int subsystem_flag;
extern struct sshbuf *command;
extern volatile sig_atomic_t quit_pending;
/* Context for session open confirmation callback */
struct mux_session_confirm_ctx {
u_int want_tty;
u_int want_subsys;
u_int want_x_fwd;
u_int want_agent_fwd;
struct sshbuf *cmd;
char *term;
struct termios tio;
char **env;
u_int rid;
};
/* Context for stdio fwd open confirmation callback */
struct mux_stdio_confirm_ctx {
u_int rid;
};
/* Context for global channel callback */
struct mux_channel_confirm_ctx {
u_int cid; /* channel id */
u_int rid; /* request id */
int fid; /* forward id */
};
/* fd to control socket */
int muxserver_sock = -1;
/* client request id */
u_int muxclient_request_id = 0;
/* Multiplexing control command */
u_int muxclient_command = 0;
/* Set when signalled. */
static volatile sig_atomic_t muxclient_terminate = 0;
/* PID of multiplex server */
static u_int muxserver_pid = 0;
static Channel *mux_listener_channel = NULL;
struct mux_master_state {
int hello_rcvd;
};
/* mux protocol messages */
#define MUX_MSG_HELLO 0x00000001
#define MUX_C_NEW_SESSION 0x10000002
#define MUX_C_ALIVE_CHECK 0x10000004
#define MUX_C_TERMINATE 0x10000005
#define MUX_C_OPEN_FWD 0x10000006
#define MUX_C_CLOSE_FWD 0x10000007
#define MUX_C_NEW_STDIO_FWD 0x10000008
#define MUX_C_STOP_LISTENING 0x10000009
#define MUX_C_PROXY 0x1000000f
#define MUX_S_OK 0x80000001
#define MUX_S_PERMISSION_DENIED 0x80000002
#define MUX_S_FAILURE 0x80000003
#define MUX_S_EXIT_MESSAGE 0x80000004
#define MUX_S_ALIVE 0x80000005
#define MUX_S_SESSION_OPENED 0x80000006
#define MUX_S_REMOTE_PORT 0x80000007
#define MUX_S_TTY_ALLOC_FAIL 0x80000008
#define MUX_S_PROXY 0x8000000f
/* type codes for MUX_C_OPEN_FWD and MUX_C_CLOSE_FWD */
#define MUX_FWD_LOCAL 1
#define MUX_FWD_REMOTE 2
#define MUX_FWD_DYNAMIC 3
static void mux_session_confirm(struct ssh *, int, int, void *);
static void mux_stdio_confirm(struct ssh *, int, int, void *);
static int mux_master_process_hello(struct ssh *, u_int,
Channel *, struct sshbuf *, struct sshbuf *);
static int mux_master_process_new_session(struct ssh *, u_int,
Channel *, struct sshbuf *, struct sshbuf *);
static int mux_master_process_alive_check(struct ssh *, u_int,
Channel *, struct sshbuf *, struct sshbuf *);
static int mux_master_process_terminate(struct ssh *, u_int,
Channel *, struct sshbuf *, struct sshbuf *);
static int mux_master_process_open_fwd(struct ssh *, u_int,
Channel *, struct sshbuf *, struct sshbuf *);
static int mux_master_process_close_fwd(struct ssh *, u_int,
Channel *, struct sshbuf *, struct sshbuf *);
static int mux_master_process_stdio_fwd(struct ssh *, u_int,
Channel *, struct sshbuf *, struct sshbuf *);
static int mux_master_process_stop_listening(struct ssh *, u_int,
Channel *, struct sshbuf *, struct sshbuf *);
static int mux_master_process_proxy(struct ssh *, u_int,
Channel *, struct sshbuf *, struct sshbuf *);
static const struct {
u_int type;
int (*handler)(struct ssh *, u_int, Channel *,
struct sshbuf *, struct sshbuf *);
} mux_master_handlers[] = {
{ MUX_MSG_HELLO, mux_master_process_hello },
{ MUX_C_NEW_SESSION, mux_master_process_new_session },
{ MUX_C_ALIVE_CHECK, mux_master_process_alive_check },
{ MUX_C_TERMINATE, mux_master_process_terminate },
{ MUX_C_OPEN_FWD, mux_master_process_open_fwd },
{ MUX_C_CLOSE_FWD, mux_master_process_close_fwd },
{ MUX_C_NEW_STDIO_FWD, mux_master_process_stdio_fwd },
{ MUX_C_STOP_LISTENING, mux_master_process_stop_listening },
{ MUX_C_PROXY, mux_master_process_proxy },
{ 0, NULL }
};
-/* Cleanup callback fired on closure of mux slave _session_ channel */
+/* Cleanup callback fired on closure of mux client _session_ channel */
/* ARGSUSED */
static void
mux_master_session_cleanup_cb(struct ssh *ssh, int cid, void *unused)
{
Channel *cc, *c = channel_by_id(ssh, cid);
debug3("%s: entering for channel %d", __func__, cid);
if (c == NULL)
fatal("%s: channel_by_id(%i) == NULL", __func__, cid);
if (c->ctl_chan != -1) {
if ((cc = channel_by_id(ssh, c->ctl_chan)) == NULL)
fatal("%s: channel %d missing control channel %d",
__func__, c->self, c->ctl_chan);
c->ctl_chan = -1;
cc->remote_id = 0;
cc->have_remote_id = 0;
chan_rcvd_oclose(ssh, cc);
}
channel_cancel_cleanup(ssh, c->self);
}
-/* Cleanup callback fired on closure of mux slave _control_ channel */
+/* Cleanup callback fired on closure of mux client _control_ channel */
/* ARGSUSED */
static void
mux_master_control_cleanup_cb(struct ssh *ssh, int cid, void *unused)
{
Channel *sc, *c = channel_by_id(ssh, cid);
debug3("%s: entering for channel %d", __func__, cid);
if (c == NULL)
fatal("%s: channel_by_id(%i) == NULL", __func__, cid);
if (c->have_remote_id) {
if ((sc = channel_by_id(ssh, c->remote_id)) == NULL)
fatal("%s: channel %d missing session channel %u",
__func__, c->self, c->remote_id);
c->remote_id = 0;
c->have_remote_id = 0;
sc->ctl_chan = -1;
if (sc->type != SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN &&
sc->type != SSH_CHANNEL_OPENING) {
debug2("%s: channel %d: not open", __func__, sc->self);
chan_mark_dead(ssh, sc);
} else {
if (sc->istate == CHAN_INPUT_OPEN)
chan_read_failed(ssh, sc);
if (sc->ostate == CHAN_OUTPUT_OPEN)
chan_write_failed(ssh, sc);
}
}
channel_cancel_cleanup(ssh, c->self);
}
/* Check mux client environment variables before passing them to mux master. */
static int
env_permitted(char *env)
{
int i, ret;
char name[1024], *cp;
if ((cp = strchr(env, '=')) == NULL || cp == env)
return 0;
ret = snprintf(name, sizeof(name), "%.*s", (int)(cp - env), env);
if (ret <= 0 || (size_t)ret >= sizeof(name)) {
error("%s: name '%.100s...' too long", __func__, env);
return 0;
}
for (i = 0; i < options.num_send_env; i++)
if (match_pattern(name, options.send_env[i]))
return 1;
return 0;
}
/* Mux master protocol message handlers */
static int
mux_master_process_hello(struct ssh *ssh, u_int rid,
Channel *c, struct sshbuf *m, struct sshbuf *reply)
{
u_int ver;
struct mux_master_state *state = (struct mux_master_state *)c->mux_ctx;
int r;
if (state == NULL)
fatal("%s: channel %d: c->mux_ctx == NULL", __func__, c->self);
if (state->hello_rcvd) {
error("%s: HELLO received twice", __func__);
return -1;
}
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &ver)) != 0) {
error("%s: malformed message: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
return -1;
}
if (ver != SSHMUX_VER) {
error("%s: unsupported multiplexing protocol version %u "
"(expected %u)", __func__, ver, SSHMUX_VER);
return -1;
}
- debug2("%s: channel %d slave version %u", __func__, c->self, ver);
+ debug2("%s: channel %d client version %u", __func__, c->self, ver);
/* No extensions are presently defined */
while (sshbuf_len(m) > 0) {
char *name = NULL;
size_t value_len = 0;
if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &name, NULL)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_string_direct(m, NULL, &value_len)) != 0) {
error("%s: malformed extension: %s",
__func__, ssh_err(r));
return -1;
}
debug2("%s: Unrecognised extension \"%s\" length %zu",
__func__, name, value_len);
free(name);
}
state->hello_rcvd = 1;
return 0;
}
/* Enqueue a "ok" response to the reply buffer */
static void
reply_ok(struct sshbuf *reply, u_int rid)
{
int r;
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(reply, MUX_S_OK)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u32(reply, rid)) != 0)
fatal("%s: reply: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
}
/* Enqueue an error response to the reply buffer */
static void
reply_error(struct sshbuf *reply, u_int type, u_int rid, const char *msg)
{
int r;
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(reply, type)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u32(reply, rid)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_cstring(reply, msg)) != 0)
fatal("%s: reply: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
}
static int
mux_master_process_new_session(struct ssh *ssh, u_int rid,
Channel *c, struct sshbuf *m, struct sshbuf *reply)
{
Channel *nc;
struct mux_session_confirm_ctx *cctx;
char *cmd, *cp;
u_int i, j, env_len, escape_char, window, packetmax;
int r, new_fd[3];
/* Reply for SSHMUX_COMMAND_OPEN */
cctx = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*cctx));
cctx->term = NULL;
cctx->rid = rid;
cmd = NULL;
cctx->env = NULL;
env_len = 0;
if ((r = sshbuf_skip_string(m)) != 0 || /* reserved */
(r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &cctx->want_tty)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &cctx->want_x_fwd)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &cctx->want_agent_fwd)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &cctx->want_subsys)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &escape_char)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &cctx->term, NULL)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &cmd, NULL)) != 0) {
malf:
free(cmd);
for (j = 0; j < env_len; j++)
free(cctx->env[j]);
free(cctx->env);
free(cctx->term);
free(cctx);
error("%s: malformed message", __func__);
return -1;
}
#define MUX_MAX_ENV_VARS 4096
while (sshbuf_len(m) > 0) {
if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &cp, NULL)) != 0)
goto malf;
if (!env_permitted(cp)) {
free(cp);
continue;
}
cctx->env = xreallocarray(cctx->env, env_len + 2,
sizeof(*cctx->env));
cctx->env[env_len++] = cp;
cctx->env[env_len] = NULL;
if (env_len > MUX_MAX_ENV_VARS) {
error("%s: >%d environment variables received, "
"ignoring additional", __func__, MUX_MAX_ENV_VARS);
break;
}
}
debug2("%s: channel %d: request tty %d, X %d, agent %d, subsys %d, "
"term \"%s\", cmd \"%s\", env %u", __func__, c->self,
cctx->want_tty, cctx->want_x_fwd, cctx->want_agent_fwd,
cctx->want_subsys, cctx->term, cmd, env_len);
if ((cctx->cmd = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
fatal("%s: sshbuf_new", __func__);
if ((r = sshbuf_put(cctx->cmd, cmd, strlen(cmd))) != 0)
fatal("%s: sshbuf_put: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
free(cmd);
cmd = NULL;
/* Gather fds from client */
for(i = 0; i < 3; i++) {
if ((new_fd[i] = mm_receive_fd(c->sock)) == -1) {
- error("%s: failed to receive fd %d from slave",
+ error("%s: failed to receive fd %d from client",
__func__, i);
for (j = 0; j < i; j++)
close(new_fd[j]);
for (j = 0; j < env_len; j++)
free(cctx->env[j]);
free(cctx->env);
free(cctx->term);
sshbuf_free(cctx->cmd);
free(cctx);
reply_error(reply, MUX_S_FAILURE, rid,
"did not receive file descriptors");
return -1;
}
}
debug3("%s: got fds stdin %d, stdout %d, stderr %d", __func__,
new_fd[0], new_fd[1], new_fd[2]);
/* XXX support multiple child sessions in future */
if (c->have_remote_id) {
debug2("%s: session already open", __func__);
reply_error(reply, MUX_S_FAILURE, rid,
"Multiple sessions not supported");
cleanup:
close(new_fd[0]);
close(new_fd[1]);
close(new_fd[2]);
free(cctx->term);
if (env_len != 0) {
for (i = 0; i < env_len; i++)
free(cctx->env[i]);
free(cctx->env);
}
sshbuf_free(cctx->cmd);
free(cctx);
return 0;
}
if (options.control_master == SSHCTL_MASTER_ASK ||
options.control_master == SSHCTL_MASTER_AUTO_ASK) {
if (!ask_permission("Allow shared connection to %s? ", host)) {
debug2("%s: session refused by user", __func__);
reply_error(reply, MUX_S_PERMISSION_DENIED, rid,
"Permission denied");
goto cleanup;
}
}
/* Try to pick up ttymodes from client before it goes raw */
if (cctx->want_tty && tcgetattr(new_fd[0], &cctx->tio) == -1)
error("%s: tcgetattr: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
/* enable nonblocking unless tty */
if (!isatty(new_fd[0]))
set_nonblock(new_fd[0]);
if (!isatty(new_fd[1]))
set_nonblock(new_fd[1]);
if (!isatty(new_fd[2]))
set_nonblock(new_fd[2]);
window = CHAN_SES_WINDOW_DEFAULT;
packetmax = CHAN_SES_PACKET_DEFAULT;
if (cctx->want_tty) {
window >>= 1;
packetmax >>= 1;
}
nc = channel_new(ssh, "session", SSH_CHANNEL_OPENING,
new_fd[0], new_fd[1], new_fd[2], window, packetmax,
CHAN_EXTENDED_WRITE, "client-session", /*nonblock*/0);
nc->ctl_chan = c->self; /* link session -> control channel */
c->remote_id = nc->self; /* link control -> session channel */
c->have_remote_id = 1;
if (cctx->want_tty && escape_char != 0xffffffff) {
channel_register_filter(ssh, nc->self,
client_simple_escape_filter, NULL,
client_filter_cleanup,
client_new_escape_filter_ctx((int)escape_char));
}
debug2("%s: channel_new: %d linked to control channel %d",
__func__, nc->self, nc->ctl_chan);
channel_send_open(ssh, nc->self);
channel_register_open_confirm(ssh, nc->self, mux_session_confirm, cctx);
c->mux_pause = 1; /* stop handling messages until open_confirm done */
channel_register_cleanup(ssh, nc->self,
mux_master_session_cleanup_cb, 1);
/* reply is deferred, sent by mux_session_confirm */
return 0;
}
static int
mux_master_process_alive_check(struct ssh *ssh, u_int rid,
Channel *c, struct sshbuf *m, struct sshbuf *reply)
{
int r;
debug2("%s: channel %d: alive check", __func__, c->self);
/* prepare reply */
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(reply, MUX_S_ALIVE)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u32(reply, rid)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u32(reply, (u_int)getpid())) != 0)
fatal("%s: reply: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
return 0;
}
static int
mux_master_process_terminate(struct ssh *ssh, u_int rid,
Channel *c, struct sshbuf *m, struct sshbuf *reply)
{
debug2("%s: channel %d: terminate request", __func__, c->self);
if (options.control_master == SSHCTL_MASTER_ASK ||
options.control_master == SSHCTL_MASTER_AUTO_ASK) {
if (!ask_permission("Terminate shared connection to %s? ",
host)) {
debug2("%s: termination refused by user", __func__);
reply_error(reply, MUX_S_PERMISSION_DENIED, rid,
"Permission denied");
return 0;
}
}
quit_pending = 1;
reply_ok(reply, rid);
/* XXX exit happens too soon - message never makes it to client */
return 0;
}
static char *
format_forward(u_int ftype, struct Forward *fwd)
{
char *ret;
switch (ftype) {
case MUX_FWD_LOCAL:
xasprintf(&ret, "local forward %.200s:%d -> %.200s:%d",
(fwd->listen_path != NULL) ? fwd->listen_path :
(fwd->listen_host == NULL) ?
(options.fwd_opts.gateway_ports ? "*" : "LOCALHOST") :
fwd->listen_host, fwd->listen_port,
(fwd->connect_path != NULL) ? fwd->connect_path :
fwd->connect_host, fwd->connect_port);
break;
case MUX_FWD_DYNAMIC:
xasprintf(&ret, "dynamic forward %.200s:%d -> *",
(fwd->listen_host == NULL) ?
(options.fwd_opts.gateway_ports ? "*" : "LOCALHOST") :
fwd->listen_host, fwd->listen_port);
break;
case MUX_FWD_REMOTE:
xasprintf(&ret, "remote forward %.200s:%d -> %.200s:%d",
(fwd->listen_path != NULL) ? fwd->listen_path :
(fwd->listen_host == NULL) ?
"LOCALHOST" : fwd->listen_host,
fwd->listen_port,
(fwd->connect_path != NULL) ? fwd->connect_path :
fwd->connect_host, fwd->connect_port);
break;
default:
fatal("%s: unknown forward type %u", __func__, ftype);
}
return ret;
}
static int
compare_host(const char *a, const char *b)
{
if (a == NULL && b == NULL)
return 1;
if (a == NULL || b == NULL)
return 0;
return strcmp(a, b) == 0;
}
static int
compare_forward(struct Forward *a, struct Forward *b)
{
if (!compare_host(a->listen_host, b->listen_host))
return 0;
if (!compare_host(a->listen_path, b->listen_path))
return 0;
if (a->listen_port != b->listen_port)
return 0;
if (!compare_host(a->connect_host, b->connect_host))
return 0;
if (!compare_host(a->connect_path, b->connect_path))
return 0;
if (a->connect_port != b->connect_port)
return 0;
return 1;
}
static void
mux_confirm_remote_forward(struct ssh *ssh, int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
{
struct mux_channel_confirm_ctx *fctx = ctxt;
char *failmsg = NULL;
struct Forward *rfwd;
Channel *c;
struct sshbuf *out;
u_int port;
int r;
if ((c = channel_by_id(ssh, fctx->cid)) == NULL) {
/* no channel for reply */
error("%s: unknown channel", __func__);
return;
}
if ((out = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
fatal("%s: sshbuf_new", __func__);
if (fctx->fid >= options.num_remote_forwards ||
(options.remote_forwards[fctx->fid].connect_path == NULL &&
options.remote_forwards[fctx->fid].connect_host == NULL)) {
xasprintf(&failmsg, "unknown forwarding id %d", fctx->fid);
goto fail;
}
rfwd = &options.remote_forwards[fctx->fid];
debug("%s: %s for: listen %d, connect %s:%d", __func__,
type == SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_SUCCESS ? "success" : "failure",
rfwd->listen_port, rfwd->connect_path ? rfwd->connect_path :
rfwd->connect_host, rfwd->connect_port);
if (type == SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_SUCCESS) {
if (rfwd->listen_port == 0) {
if ((r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &port)) != 0)
fatal("%s: packet error: %s",
__func__, ssh_err(r));
if (port > 65535) {
fatal("Invalid allocated port %u for "
"mux remote forward to %s:%d", port,
rfwd->connect_host, rfwd->connect_port);
}
rfwd->allocated_port = (int)port;
debug("Allocated port %u for mux remote forward"
" to %s:%d", rfwd->allocated_port,
rfwd->connect_host, rfwd->connect_port);
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(out,
MUX_S_REMOTE_PORT)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u32(out, fctx->rid)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u32(out,
rfwd->allocated_port)) != 0)
fatal("%s: reply: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
channel_update_permission(ssh, rfwd->handle,
rfwd->allocated_port);
} else {
reply_ok(out, fctx->rid);
}
goto out;
} else {
if (rfwd->listen_port == 0)
channel_update_permission(ssh, rfwd->handle, -1);
if (rfwd->listen_path != NULL)
xasprintf(&failmsg, "remote port forwarding failed for "
"listen path %s", rfwd->listen_path);
else
xasprintf(&failmsg, "remote port forwarding failed for "
"listen port %d", rfwd->listen_port);
debug2("%s: clearing registered forwarding for listen %d, "
"connect %s:%d", __func__, rfwd->listen_port,
rfwd->connect_path ? rfwd->connect_path :
rfwd->connect_host, rfwd->connect_port);
free(rfwd->listen_host);
free(rfwd->listen_path);
free(rfwd->connect_host);
free(rfwd->connect_path);
memset(rfwd, 0, sizeof(*rfwd));
}
fail:
error("%s: %s", __func__, failmsg);
reply_error(out, MUX_S_FAILURE, fctx->rid, failmsg);
free(failmsg);
out:
if ((r = sshbuf_put_stringb(c->output, out)) != 0)
fatal("%s: sshbuf_put_stringb: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
sshbuf_free(out);
if (c->mux_pause <= 0)
fatal("%s: mux_pause %d", __func__, c->mux_pause);
c->mux_pause = 0; /* start processing messages again */
}
static int
mux_master_process_open_fwd(struct ssh *ssh, u_int rid,
Channel *c, struct sshbuf *m, struct sshbuf *reply)
{
struct Forward fwd;
char *fwd_desc = NULL;
char *listen_addr, *connect_addr;
u_int ftype;
u_int lport, cport;
int r, i, ret = 0, freefwd = 1;
memset(&fwd, 0, sizeof(fwd));
/* XXX - lport/cport check redundant */
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &ftype)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &listen_addr, NULL)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &lport)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &connect_addr, NULL)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &cport)) != 0 ||
(lport != (u_int)PORT_STREAMLOCAL && lport > 65535) ||
(cport != (u_int)PORT_STREAMLOCAL && cport > 65535)) {
error("%s: malformed message", __func__);
ret = -1;
goto out;
}
if (*listen_addr == '\0') {
free(listen_addr);
listen_addr = NULL;
}
if (*connect_addr == '\0') {
free(connect_addr);
connect_addr = NULL;
}
memset(&fwd, 0, sizeof(fwd));
fwd.listen_port = lport;
if (fwd.listen_port == PORT_STREAMLOCAL)
fwd.listen_path = listen_addr;
else
fwd.listen_host = listen_addr;
fwd.connect_port = cport;
if (fwd.connect_port == PORT_STREAMLOCAL)
fwd.connect_path = connect_addr;
else
fwd.connect_host = connect_addr;
debug2("%s: channel %d: request %s", __func__, c->self,
(fwd_desc = format_forward(ftype, &fwd)));
if (ftype != MUX_FWD_LOCAL && ftype != MUX_FWD_REMOTE &&
ftype != MUX_FWD_DYNAMIC) {
logit("%s: invalid forwarding type %u", __func__, ftype);
invalid:
free(listen_addr);
free(connect_addr);
reply_error(reply, MUX_S_FAILURE, rid,
"Invalid forwarding request");
return 0;
}
if (ftype == MUX_FWD_DYNAMIC && fwd.listen_path) {
logit("%s: streamlocal and dynamic forwards "
"are mutually exclusive", __func__);
goto invalid;
}
if (fwd.listen_port != PORT_STREAMLOCAL && fwd.listen_port >= 65536) {
logit("%s: invalid listen port %u", __func__,
fwd.listen_port);
goto invalid;
}
if ((fwd.connect_port != PORT_STREAMLOCAL &&
fwd.connect_port >= 65536) ||
(ftype != MUX_FWD_DYNAMIC && ftype != MUX_FWD_REMOTE &&
fwd.connect_port == 0)) {
logit("%s: invalid connect port %u", __func__,
fwd.connect_port);
goto invalid;
}
if (ftype != MUX_FWD_DYNAMIC && fwd.connect_host == NULL &&
fwd.connect_path == NULL) {
logit("%s: missing connect host", __func__);
goto invalid;
}
/* Skip forwards that have already been requested */
switch (ftype) {
case MUX_FWD_LOCAL:
case MUX_FWD_DYNAMIC:
for (i = 0; i < options.num_local_forwards; i++) {
if (compare_forward(&fwd,
options.local_forwards + i)) {
exists:
debug2("%s: found existing forwarding",
__func__);
reply_ok(reply, rid);
goto out;
}
}
break;
case MUX_FWD_REMOTE:
for (i = 0; i < options.num_remote_forwards; i++) {
if (!compare_forward(&fwd, options.remote_forwards + i))
continue;
if (fwd.listen_port != 0)
goto exists;
debug2("%s: found allocated port", __func__);
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(reply,
MUX_S_REMOTE_PORT)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u32(reply, rid)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u32(reply,
options.remote_forwards[i].allocated_port)) != 0)
fatal("%s: reply: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
goto out;
}
break;
}
if (options.control_master == SSHCTL_MASTER_ASK ||
options.control_master == SSHCTL_MASTER_AUTO_ASK) {
if (!ask_permission("Open %s on %s?", fwd_desc, host)) {
debug2("%s: forwarding refused by user", __func__);
reply_error(reply, MUX_S_PERMISSION_DENIED, rid,
"Permission denied");
goto out;
}
}
if (ftype == MUX_FWD_LOCAL || ftype == MUX_FWD_DYNAMIC) {
if (!channel_setup_local_fwd_listener(ssh, &fwd,
&options.fwd_opts)) {
fail:
logit("%s: requested %s failed", __func__, fwd_desc);
reply_error(reply, MUX_S_FAILURE, rid,
"Port forwarding failed");
goto out;
}
add_local_forward(&options, &fwd);
freefwd = 0;
} else {
struct mux_channel_confirm_ctx *fctx;
fwd.handle = channel_request_remote_forwarding(ssh, &fwd);
if (fwd.handle < 0)
goto fail;
add_remote_forward(&options, &fwd);
fctx = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*fctx));
fctx->cid = c->self;
fctx->rid = rid;
fctx->fid = options.num_remote_forwards - 1;
client_register_global_confirm(mux_confirm_remote_forward,
fctx);
freefwd = 0;
c->mux_pause = 1; /* wait for mux_confirm_remote_forward */
/* delayed reply in mux_confirm_remote_forward */
goto out;
}
reply_ok(reply, rid);
out:
free(fwd_desc);
if (freefwd) {
free(fwd.listen_host);
free(fwd.listen_path);
free(fwd.connect_host);
free(fwd.connect_path);
}
return ret;
}
static int
mux_master_process_close_fwd(struct ssh *ssh, u_int rid,
Channel *c, struct sshbuf *m, struct sshbuf *reply)
{
struct Forward fwd, *found_fwd;
char *fwd_desc = NULL;
const char *error_reason = NULL;
char *listen_addr = NULL, *connect_addr = NULL;
u_int ftype;
int r, i, ret = 0;
u_int lport, cport;
memset(&fwd, 0, sizeof(fwd));
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &ftype)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &listen_addr, NULL)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &lport)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &connect_addr, NULL)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &cport)) != 0 ||
(lport != (u_int)PORT_STREAMLOCAL && lport > 65535) ||
(cport != (u_int)PORT_STREAMLOCAL && cport > 65535)) {
error("%s: malformed message", __func__);
ret = -1;
goto out;
}
if (*listen_addr == '\0') {
free(listen_addr);
listen_addr = NULL;
}
if (*connect_addr == '\0') {
free(connect_addr);
connect_addr = NULL;
}
memset(&fwd, 0, sizeof(fwd));
fwd.listen_port = lport;
if (fwd.listen_port == PORT_STREAMLOCAL)
fwd.listen_path = listen_addr;
else
fwd.listen_host = listen_addr;
fwd.connect_port = cport;
if (fwd.connect_port == PORT_STREAMLOCAL)
fwd.connect_path = connect_addr;
else
fwd.connect_host = connect_addr;
debug2("%s: channel %d: request cancel %s", __func__, c->self,
(fwd_desc = format_forward(ftype, &fwd)));
/* make sure this has been requested */
found_fwd = NULL;
switch (ftype) {
case MUX_FWD_LOCAL:
case MUX_FWD_DYNAMIC:
for (i = 0; i < options.num_local_forwards; i++) {
if (compare_forward(&fwd,
options.local_forwards + i)) {
found_fwd = options.local_forwards + i;
break;
}
}
break;
case MUX_FWD_REMOTE:
for (i = 0; i < options.num_remote_forwards; i++) {
if (compare_forward(&fwd,
options.remote_forwards + i)) {
found_fwd = options.remote_forwards + i;
break;
}
}
break;
}
if (found_fwd == NULL)
error_reason = "port not forwarded";
else if (ftype == MUX_FWD_REMOTE) {
/*
* This shouldn't fail unless we confused the host/port
* between options.remote_forwards and permitted_opens.
* However, for dynamic allocated listen ports we need
* to use the actual listen port.
*/
if (channel_request_rforward_cancel(ssh, found_fwd) == -1)
error_reason = "port not in permitted opens";
} else { /* local and dynamic forwards */
/* Ditto */
if (channel_cancel_lport_listener(ssh, &fwd, fwd.connect_port,
&options.fwd_opts) == -1)
error_reason = "port not found";
}
if (error_reason != NULL)
reply_error(reply, MUX_S_FAILURE, rid, error_reason);
else {
reply_ok(reply, rid);
free(found_fwd->listen_host);
free(found_fwd->listen_path);
free(found_fwd->connect_host);
free(found_fwd->connect_path);
found_fwd->listen_host = found_fwd->connect_host = NULL;
found_fwd->listen_path = found_fwd->connect_path = NULL;
found_fwd->listen_port = found_fwd->connect_port = 0;
}
out:
free(fwd_desc);
free(listen_addr);
free(connect_addr);
return ret;
}
static int
mux_master_process_stdio_fwd(struct ssh *ssh, u_int rid,
Channel *c, struct sshbuf *m, struct sshbuf *reply)
{
Channel *nc;
char *chost = NULL;
u_int cport, i, j;
int r, new_fd[2];
struct mux_stdio_confirm_ctx *cctx;
if ((r = sshbuf_skip_string(m)) != 0 || /* reserved */
(r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &chost, NULL)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &cport)) != 0) {
free(chost);
error("%s: malformed message", __func__);
return -1;
}
debug2("%s: channel %d: request stdio fwd to %s:%u",
__func__, c->self, chost, cport);
/* Gather fds from client */
for(i = 0; i < 2; i++) {
if ((new_fd[i] = mm_receive_fd(c->sock)) == -1) {
- error("%s: failed to receive fd %d from slave",
+ error("%s: failed to receive fd %d from client",
__func__, i);
for (j = 0; j < i; j++)
close(new_fd[j]);
free(chost);
/* prepare reply */
reply_error(reply, MUX_S_FAILURE, rid,
"did not receive file descriptors");
return -1;
}
}
debug3("%s: got fds stdin %d, stdout %d", __func__,
new_fd[0], new_fd[1]);
/* XXX support multiple child sessions in future */
if (c->have_remote_id) {
debug2("%s: session already open", __func__);
reply_error(reply, MUX_S_FAILURE, rid,
"Multiple sessions not supported");
cleanup:
close(new_fd[0]);
close(new_fd[1]);
free(chost);
return 0;
}
if (options.control_master == SSHCTL_MASTER_ASK ||
options.control_master == SSHCTL_MASTER_AUTO_ASK) {
if (!ask_permission("Allow forward to %s:%u? ",
chost, cport)) {
debug2("%s: stdio fwd refused by user", __func__);
reply_error(reply, MUX_S_PERMISSION_DENIED, rid,
"Permission denied");
goto cleanup;
}
}
/* enable nonblocking unless tty */
if (!isatty(new_fd[0]))
set_nonblock(new_fd[0]);
if (!isatty(new_fd[1]))
set_nonblock(new_fd[1]);
nc = channel_connect_stdio_fwd(ssh, chost, cport, new_fd[0], new_fd[1]);
free(chost);
nc->ctl_chan = c->self; /* link session -> control channel */
c->remote_id = nc->self; /* link control -> session channel */
c->have_remote_id = 1;
debug2("%s: channel_new: %d linked to control channel %d",
__func__, nc->self, nc->ctl_chan);
channel_register_cleanup(ssh, nc->self,
mux_master_session_cleanup_cb, 1);
cctx = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*cctx));
cctx->rid = rid;
channel_register_open_confirm(ssh, nc->self, mux_stdio_confirm, cctx);
c->mux_pause = 1; /* stop handling messages until open_confirm done */
/* reply is deferred, sent by mux_session_confirm */
return 0;
}
/* Callback on open confirmation in mux master for a mux stdio fwd session. */
static void
mux_stdio_confirm(struct ssh *ssh, int id, int success, void *arg)
{
struct mux_stdio_confirm_ctx *cctx = arg;
Channel *c, *cc;
struct sshbuf *reply;
int r;
if (cctx == NULL)
fatal("%s: cctx == NULL", __func__);
if ((c = channel_by_id(ssh, id)) == NULL)
fatal("%s: no channel for id %d", __func__, id);
if ((cc = channel_by_id(ssh, c->ctl_chan)) == NULL)
fatal("%s: channel %d lacks control channel %d", __func__,
id, c->ctl_chan);
if ((reply = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
fatal("%s: sshbuf_new", __func__);
if (!success) {
debug3("%s: sending failure reply", __func__);
reply_error(reply, MUX_S_FAILURE, cctx->rid,
"Session open refused by peer");
/* prepare reply */
goto done;
}
debug3("%s: sending success reply", __func__);
/* prepare reply */
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(reply, MUX_S_SESSION_OPENED)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u32(reply, cctx->rid)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u32(reply, c->self)) != 0)
fatal("%s: reply: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
done:
/* Send reply */
if ((r = sshbuf_put_stringb(cc->output, reply)) != 0)
fatal("%s: sshbuf_put_stringb: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
sshbuf_free(reply);
if (cc->mux_pause <= 0)
fatal("%s: mux_pause %d", __func__, cc->mux_pause);
cc->mux_pause = 0; /* start processing messages again */
c->open_confirm_ctx = NULL;
free(cctx);
}
static int
mux_master_process_stop_listening(struct ssh *ssh, u_int rid,
Channel *c, struct sshbuf *m, struct sshbuf *reply)
{
debug("%s: channel %d: stop listening", __func__, c->self);
if (options.control_master == SSHCTL_MASTER_ASK ||
options.control_master == SSHCTL_MASTER_AUTO_ASK) {
if (!ask_permission("Disable further multiplexing on shared "
"connection to %s? ", host)) {
debug2("%s: stop listen refused by user", __func__);
reply_error(reply, MUX_S_PERMISSION_DENIED, rid,
"Permission denied");
return 0;
}
}
if (mux_listener_channel != NULL) {
channel_free(ssh, mux_listener_channel);
client_stop_mux();
free(options.control_path);
options.control_path = NULL;
mux_listener_channel = NULL;
muxserver_sock = -1;
}
reply_ok(reply, rid);
return 0;
}
static int
mux_master_process_proxy(struct ssh *ssh, u_int rid,
Channel *c, struct sshbuf *m, struct sshbuf *reply)
{
int r;
debug("%s: channel %d: proxy request", __func__, c->self);
c->mux_rcb = channel_proxy_downstream;
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(reply, MUX_S_PROXY)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u32(reply, rid)) != 0)
fatal("%s: reply: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
return 0;
}
-/* Channel callbacks fired on read/write from mux slave fd */
+/* Channel callbacks fired on read/write from mux client fd */
static int
mux_master_read_cb(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c)
{
struct mux_master_state *state = (struct mux_master_state *)c->mux_ctx;
struct sshbuf *in = NULL, *out = NULL;
u_int type, rid, i;
int r, ret = -1;
if ((out = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
fatal("%s: sshbuf_new", __func__);
/* Setup ctx and */
if (c->mux_ctx == NULL) {
state = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*state));
c->mux_ctx = state;
channel_register_cleanup(ssh, c->self,
mux_master_control_cleanup_cb, 0);
/* Send hello */
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(out, MUX_MSG_HELLO)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u32(out, SSHMUX_VER)) != 0)
fatal("%s: reply: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
/* no extensions */
if ((r = sshbuf_put_stringb(c->output, out)) != 0)
fatal("%s: sshbuf_put_stringb: %s",
__func__, ssh_err(r));
debug3("%s: channel %d: hello sent", __func__, c->self);
ret = 0;
goto out;
}
/* Channel code ensures that we receive whole packets */
if ((r = sshbuf_froms(c->input, &in)) != 0) {
malf:
error("%s: malformed message", __func__);
goto out;
}
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(in, &type)) != 0)
goto malf;
debug3("%s: channel %d packet type 0x%08x len %zu",
__func__, c->self, type, sshbuf_len(in));
if (type == MUX_MSG_HELLO)
rid = 0;
else {
if (!state->hello_rcvd) {
error("%s: expected MUX_MSG_HELLO(0x%08x), "
"received 0x%08x", __func__, MUX_MSG_HELLO, type);
goto out;
}
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(in, &rid)) != 0)
goto malf;
}
for (i = 0; mux_master_handlers[i].handler != NULL; i++) {
if (type == mux_master_handlers[i].type) {
ret = mux_master_handlers[i].handler(ssh, rid,
c, in, out);
break;
}
}
if (mux_master_handlers[i].handler == NULL) {
error("%s: unsupported mux message 0x%08x", __func__, type);
reply_error(out, MUX_S_FAILURE, rid, "unsupported request");
ret = 0;
}
/* Enqueue reply packet */
if (sshbuf_len(out) != 0) {
if ((r = sshbuf_put_stringb(c->output, out)) != 0)
fatal("%s: sshbuf_put_stringb: %s",
__func__, ssh_err(r));
}
out:
sshbuf_free(in);
sshbuf_free(out);
return ret;
}
void
mux_exit_message(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c, int exitval)
{
struct sshbuf *m;
Channel *mux_chan;
int r;
debug3("%s: channel %d: exit message, exitval %d", __func__, c->self,
exitval);
if ((mux_chan = channel_by_id(ssh, c->ctl_chan)) == NULL)
fatal("%s: channel %d missing mux channel %d",
__func__, c->self, c->ctl_chan);
/* Append exit message packet to control socket output queue */
if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
fatal("%s: sshbuf_new", __func__);
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, MUX_S_EXIT_MESSAGE)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, c->self)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, exitval)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_stringb(mux_chan->output, m)) != 0)
fatal("%s: reply: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
sshbuf_free(m);
}
void
mux_tty_alloc_failed(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c)
{
struct sshbuf *m;
Channel *mux_chan;
int r;
debug3("%s: channel %d: TTY alloc failed", __func__, c->self);
if ((mux_chan = channel_by_id(ssh, c->ctl_chan)) == NULL)
fatal("%s: channel %d missing mux channel %d",
__func__, c->self, c->ctl_chan);
/* Append exit message packet to control socket output queue */
if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
fatal("%s: sshbuf_new", __func__);
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, MUX_S_TTY_ALLOC_FAIL)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, c->self)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_stringb(mux_chan->output, m)) != 0)
fatal("%s: reply: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
sshbuf_free(m);
}
/* Prepare a mux master to listen on a Unix domain socket. */
void
muxserver_listen(struct ssh *ssh)
{
mode_t old_umask;
char *orig_control_path = options.control_path;
char rbuf[16+1];
u_int i, r;
int oerrno;
if (options.control_path == NULL ||
options.control_master == SSHCTL_MASTER_NO)
return;
debug("setting up multiplex master socket");
/*
* Use a temporary path before listen so we can pseudo-atomically
* establish the listening socket in its final location to avoid
* other processes racing in between bind() and listen() and hitting
* an unready socket.
*/
for (i = 0; i < sizeof(rbuf) - 1; i++) {
r = arc4random_uniform(26+26+10);
rbuf[i] = (r < 26) ? 'a' + r :
(r < 26*2) ? 'A' + r - 26 :
'0' + r - 26 - 26;
}
rbuf[sizeof(rbuf) - 1] = '\0';
options.control_path = NULL;
xasprintf(&options.control_path, "%s.%s", orig_control_path, rbuf);
debug3("%s: temporary control path %s", __func__, options.control_path);
old_umask = umask(0177);
muxserver_sock = unix_listener(options.control_path, 64, 0);
oerrno = errno;
umask(old_umask);
if (muxserver_sock < 0) {
if (oerrno == EINVAL || oerrno == EADDRINUSE) {
error("ControlSocket %s already exists, "
"disabling multiplexing", options.control_path);
disable_mux_master:
if (muxserver_sock != -1) {
close(muxserver_sock);
muxserver_sock = -1;
}
free(orig_control_path);
free(options.control_path);
options.control_path = NULL;
options.control_master = SSHCTL_MASTER_NO;
return;
} else {
/* unix_listener() logs the error */
cleanup_exit(255);
}
}
/* Now atomically "move" the mux socket into position */
if (link(options.control_path, orig_control_path) != 0) {
if (errno != EEXIST) {
fatal("%s: link mux listener %s => %s: %s", __func__,
options.control_path, orig_control_path,
strerror(errno));
}
error("ControlSocket %s already exists, disabling multiplexing",
orig_control_path);
unlink(options.control_path);
goto disable_mux_master;
}
unlink(options.control_path);
free(options.control_path);
options.control_path = orig_control_path;
set_nonblock(muxserver_sock);
mux_listener_channel = channel_new(ssh, "mux listener",
SSH_CHANNEL_MUX_LISTENER, muxserver_sock, muxserver_sock, -1,
CHAN_TCP_WINDOW_DEFAULT, CHAN_TCP_PACKET_DEFAULT,
0, options.control_path, 1);
mux_listener_channel->mux_rcb = mux_master_read_cb;
debug3("%s: mux listener channel %d fd %d", __func__,
mux_listener_channel->self, mux_listener_channel->sock);
}
/* Callback on open confirmation in mux master for a mux client session. */
static void
mux_session_confirm(struct ssh *ssh, int id, int success, void *arg)
{
struct mux_session_confirm_ctx *cctx = arg;
const char *display;
Channel *c, *cc;
int i, r;
struct sshbuf *reply;
if (cctx == NULL)
fatal("%s: cctx == NULL", __func__);
if ((c = channel_by_id(ssh, id)) == NULL)
fatal("%s: no channel for id %d", __func__, id);
if ((cc = channel_by_id(ssh, c->ctl_chan)) == NULL)
fatal("%s: channel %d lacks control channel %d", __func__,
id, c->ctl_chan);
if ((reply = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
fatal("%s: sshbuf_new", __func__);
if (!success) {
debug3("%s: sending failure reply", __func__);
reply_error(reply, MUX_S_FAILURE, cctx->rid,
"Session open refused by peer");
goto done;
}
display = getenv("DISPLAY");
if (cctx->want_x_fwd && options.forward_x11 && display != NULL) {
char *proto, *data;
/* Get reasonable local authentication information. */
if (client_x11_get_proto(ssh, display, options.xauth_location,
options.forward_x11_trusted, options.forward_x11_timeout,
&proto, &data) == 0) {
/* Request forwarding with authentication spoofing. */
debug("Requesting X11 forwarding with authentication "
"spoofing.");
x11_request_forwarding_with_spoofing(ssh, id,
display, proto, data, 1);
/* XXX exit_on_forward_failure */
client_expect_confirm(ssh, id, "X11 forwarding",
CONFIRM_WARN);
}
}
if (cctx->want_agent_fwd && options.forward_agent) {
debug("Requesting authentication agent forwarding.");
channel_request_start(ssh, id, "auth-agent-req@openssh.com", 0);
if ((r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0)
fatal("%s: packet error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
}
client_session2_setup(ssh, id, cctx->want_tty, cctx->want_subsys,
cctx->term, &cctx->tio, c->rfd, cctx->cmd, cctx->env);
debug3("%s: sending success reply", __func__);
/* prepare reply */
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(reply, MUX_S_SESSION_OPENED)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u32(reply, cctx->rid)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u32(reply, c->self)) != 0)
fatal("%s: reply: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
done:
/* Send reply */
if ((r = sshbuf_put_stringb(cc->output, reply)) != 0)
fatal("%s: sshbuf_put_stringb: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
sshbuf_free(reply);
if (cc->mux_pause <= 0)
fatal("%s: mux_pause %d", __func__, cc->mux_pause);
cc->mux_pause = 0; /* start processing messages again */
c->open_confirm_ctx = NULL;
sshbuf_free(cctx->cmd);
free(cctx->term);
if (cctx->env != NULL) {
for (i = 0; cctx->env[i] != NULL; i++)
free(cctx->env[i]);
free(cctx->env);
}
free(cctx);
}
/* ** Multiplexing client support */
/* Exit signal handler */
static void
control_client_sighandler(int signo)
{
muxclient_terminate = signo;
}
/*
* Relay signal handler - used to pass some signals from mux client to
* mux master.
*/
static void
control_client_sigrelay(int signo)
{
int save_errno = errno;
if (muxserver_pid > 1)
kill(muxserver_pid, signo);
errno = save_errno;
}
static int
mux_client_read(int fd, struct sshbuf *b, size_t need)
{
size_t have;
ssize_t len;
u_char *p;
struct pollfd pfd;
int r;
pfd.fd = fd;
pfd.events = POLLIN;
if ((r = sshbuf_reserve(b, need, &p)) != 0)
fatal("%s: reserve: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
for (have = 0; have < need; ) {
if (muxclient_terminate) {
errno = EINTR;
return -1;
}
len = read(fd, p + have, need - have);
if (len == -1) {
switch (errno) {
#if defined(EWOULDBLOCK) && (EWOULDBLOCK != EAGAIN)
case EWOULDBLOCK:
#endif
case EAGAIN:
(void)poll(&pfd, 1, -1);
/* FALLTHROUGH */
case EINTR:
continue;
default:
return -1;
}
}
if (len == 0) {
errno = EPIPE;
return -1;
}
have += (size_t)len;
}
return 0;
}
static int
mux_client_write_packet(int fd, struct sshbuf *m)
{
struct sshbuf *queue;
u_int have, need;
int r, oerrno, len;
const u_char *ptr;
struct pollfd pfd;
pfd.fd = fd;
pfd.events = POLLOUT;
if ((queue = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
fatal("%s: sshbuf_new", __func__);
if ((r = sshbuf_put_stringb(queue, m)) != 0)
fatal("%s: sshbuf_put_stringb: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
need = sshbuf_len(queue);
ptr = sshbuf_ptr(queue);
for (have = 0; have < need; ) {
if (muxclient_terminate) {
sshbuf_free(queue);
errno = EINTR;
return -1;
}
len = write(fd, ptr + have, need - have);
if (len == -1) {
switch (errno) {
#if defined(EWOULDBLOCK) && (EWOULDBLOCK != EAGAIN)
case EWOULDBLOCK:
#endif
case EAGAIN:
(void)poll(&pfd, 1, -1);
/* FALLTHROUGH */
case EINTR:
continue;
default:
oerrno = errno;
sshbuf_free(queue);
errno = oerrno;
return -1;
}
}
if (len == 0) {
sshbuf_free(queue);
errno = EPIPE;
return -1;
}
have += (u_int)len;
}
sshbuf_free(queue);
return 0;
}
static int
mux_client_read_packet(int fd, struct sshbuf *m)
{
struct sshbuf *queue;
size_t need, have;
const u_char *ptr;
int r, oerrno;
if ((queue = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
fatal("%s: sshbuf_new", __func__);
if (mux_client_read(fd, queue, 4) != 0) {
if ((oerrno = errno) == EPIPE)
debug3("%s: read header failed: %s", __func__,
strerror(errno));
sshbuf_free(queue);
errno = oerrno;
return -1;
}
need = PEEK_U32(sshbuf_ptr(queue));
if (mux_client_read(fd, queue, need) != 0) {
oerrno = errno;
debug3("%s: read body failed: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
sshbuf_free(queue);
errno = oerrno;
return -1;
}
if ((r = sshbuf_get_string_direct(queue, &ptr, &have)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put(m, ptr, have)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
sshbuf_free(queue);
return 0;
}
static int
mux_client_hello_exchange(int fd)
{
struct sshbuf *m;
u_int type, ver;
int r, ret = -1;
if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
fatal("%s: sshbuf_new", __func__);
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, MUX_MSG_HELLO)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, SSHMUX_VER)) != 0)
fatal("%s: hello: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
/* no extensions */
if (mux_client_write_packet(fd, m) != 0) {
debug("%s: write packet: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
goto out;
}
sshbuf_reset(m);
/* Read their HELLO */
if (mux_client_read_packet(fd, m) != 0) {
debug("%s: read packet failed", __func__);
goto out;
}
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &type)) != 0)
fatal("%s: decode type: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
if (type != MUX_MSG_HELLO) {
error("%s: expected HELLO (%u) received %u",
__func__, MUX_MSG_HELLO, type);
goto out;
}
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &ver)) != 0)
fatal("%s: decode version: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
if (ver != SSHMUX_VER) {
error("Unsupported multiplexing protocol version %d "
"(expected %d)", ver, SSHMUX_VER);
goto out;
}
debug2("%s: master version %u", __func__, ver);
/* No extensions are presently defined */
while (sshbuf_len(m) > 0) {
char *name = NULL;
if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &name, NULL)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_skip_string(m)) != 0) { /* value */
error("%s: malformed extension: %s",
__func__, ssh_err(r));
goto out;
}
debug2("Unrecognised master extension \"%s\"", name);
free(name);
}
/* success */
ret = 0;
out:
sshbuf_free(m);
return ret;
}
static u_int
mux_client_request_alive(int fd)
{
struct sshbuf *m;
char *e;
u_int pid, type, rid;
int r;
debug3("%s: entering", __func__);
if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
fatal("%s: sshbuf_new", __func__);
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, MUX_C_ALIVE_CHECK)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, muxclient_request_id)) != 0)
fatal("%s: request: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
if (mux_client_write_packet(fd, m) != 0)
fatal("%s: write packet: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
sshbuf_reset(m);
/* Read their reply */
if (mux_client_read_packet(fd, m) != 0) {
sshbuf_free(m);
return 0;
}
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &type)) != 0)
fatal("%s: decode type: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
if (type != MUX_S_ALIVE) {
if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &e, NULL)) != 0)
fatal("%s: decode error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
fatal("%s: master returned error: %s", __func__, e);
}
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &rid)) != 0)
fatal("%s: decode remote ID: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
if (rid != muxclient_request_id)
fatal("%s: out of sequence reply: my id %u theirs %u",
__func__, muxclient_request_id, rid);
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &pid)) != 0)
fatal("%s: decode PID: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
sshbuf_free(m);
debug3("%s: done pid = %u", __func__, pid);
muxclient_request_id++;
return pid;
}
static void
mux_client_request_terminate(int fd)
{
struct sshbuf *m;
char *e;
u_int type, rid;
int r;
debug3("%s: entering", __func__);
if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
fatal("%s: sshbuf_new", __func__);
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, MUX_C_TERMINATE)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, muxclient_request_id)) != 0)
fatal("%s: request: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
if (mux_client_write_packet(fd, m) != 0)
fatal("%s: write packet: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
sshbuf_reset(m);
/* Read their reply */
if (mux_client_read_packet(fd, m) != 0) {
/* Remote end exited already */
if (errno == EPIPE) {
sshbuf_free(m);
return;
}
fatal("%s: read from master failed: %s",
__func__, strerror(errno));
}
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &type)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &rid)) != 0)
fatal("%s: decode: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
if (rid != muxclient_request_id)
fatal("%s: out of sequence reply: my id %u theirs %u",
__func__, muxclient_request_id, rid);
switch (type) {
case MUX_S_OK:
break;
case MUX_S_PERMISSION_DENIED:
if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &e, NULL)) != 0)
fatal("%s: decode error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
fatal("Master refused termination request: %s", e);
case MUX_S_FAILURE:
if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &e, NULL)) != 0)
fatal("%s: decode error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
fatal("%s: termination request failed: %s", __func__, e);
default:
fatal("%s: unexpected response from master 0x%08x",
__func__, type);
}
sshbuf_free(m);
muxclient_request_id++;
}
static int
mux_client_forward(int fd, int cancel_flag, u_int ftype, struct Forward *fwd)
{
struct sshbuf *m;
char *e, *fwd_desc;
const char *lhost, *chost;
u_int type, rid;
int r;
fwd_desc = format_forward(ftype, fwd);
debug("Requesting %s %s",
cancel_flag ? "cancellation of" : "forwarding of", fwd_desc);
free(fwd_desc);
type = cancel_flag ? MUX_C_CLOSE_FWD : MUX_C_OPEN_FWD;
if (fwd->listen_path != NULL)
lhost = fwd->listen_path;
else if (fwd->listen_host == NULL)
lhost = "";
else if (*fwd->listen_host == '\0')
lhost = "*";
else
lhost = fwd->listen_host;
if (fwd->connect_path != NULL)
chost = fwd->connect_path;
else if (fwd->connect_host == NULL)
chost = "";
else
chost = fwd->connect_host;
if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
fatal("%s: sshbuf_new", __func__);
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, type)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, muxclient_request_id)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, ftype)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, lhost)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, fwd->listen_port)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, chost)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, fwd->connect_port)) != 0)
fatal("%s: request: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
if (mux_client_write_packet(fd, m) != 0)
fatal("%s: write packet: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
sshbuf_reset(m);
/* Read their reply */
if (mux_client_read_packet(fd, m) != 0) {
sshbuf_free(m);
return -1;
}
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &type)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &rid)) != 0)
fatal("%s: decode: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
if (rid != muxclient_request_id)
fatal("%s: out of sequence reply: my id %u theirs %u",
__func__, muxclient_request_id, rid);
switch (type) {
case MUX_S_OK:
break;
case MUX_S_REMOTE_PORT:
if (cancel_flag)
fatal("%s: got MUX_S_REMOTE_PORT for cancel", __func__);
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &fwd->allocated_port)) != 0)
fatal("%s: decode port: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
verbose("Allocated port %u for remote forward to %s:%d",
fwd->allocated_port,
fwd->connect_host ? fwd->connect_host : "",
fwd->connect_port);
if (muxclient_command == SSHMUX_COMMAND_FORWARD)
fprintf(stdout, "%i\n", fwd->allocated_port);
break;
case MUX_S_PERMISSION_DENIED:
if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &e, NULL)) != 0)
fatal("%s: decode error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
sshbuf_free(m);
error("Master refused forwarding request: %s", e);
return -1;
case MUX_S_FAILURE:
if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &e, NULL)) != 0)
fatal("%s: decode error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
sshbuf_free(m);
error("%s: forwarding request failed: %s", __func__, e);
return -1;
default:
fatal("%s: unexpected response from master 0x%08x",
__func__, type);
}
sshbuf_free(m);
muxclient_request_id++;
return 0;
}
static int
mux_client_forwards(int fd, int cancel_flag)
{
int i, ret = 0;
debug3("%s: %s forwardings: %d local, %d remote", __func__,
cancel_flag ? "cancel" : "request",
options.num_local_forwards, options.num_remote_forwards);
/* XXX ExitOnForwardingFailure */
for (i = 0; i < options.num_local_forwards; i++) {
if (mux_client_forward(fd, cancel_flag,
options.local_forwards[i].connect_port == 0 ?
MUX_FWD_DYNAMIC : MUX_FWD_LOCAL,
options.local_forwards + i) != 0)
ret = -1;
}
for (i = 0; i < options.num_remote_forwards; i++) {
if (mux_client_forward(fd, cancel_flag, MUX_FWD_REMOTE,
options.remote_forwards + i) != 0)
ret = -1;
}
return ret;
}
static int
mux_client_request_session(int fd)
{
struct sshbuf *m;
char *e;
const char *term;
u_int echar, rid, sid, esid, exitval, type, exitval_seen;
extern char **environ;
int r, i, devnull, rawmode;
debug3("%s: entering", __func__);
if ((muxserver_pid = mux_client_request_alive(fd)) == 0) {
error("%s: master alive request failed", __func__);
return -1;
}
ssh_signal(SIGPIPE, SIG_IGN);
if (stdin_null_flag) {
if ((devnull = open(_PATH_DEVNULL, O_RDONLY)) == -1)
fatal("open(/dev/null): %s", strerror(errno));
if (dup2(devnull, STDIN_FILENO) == -1)
fatal("dup2: %s", strerror(errno));
if (devnull > STDERR_FILENO)
close(devnull);
}
if ((term = getenv("TERM")) == NULL)
term = "";
echar = 0xffffffff;
if (options.escape_char != SSH_ESCAPECHAR_NONE)
echar = (u_int)options.escape_char;
if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
fatal("%s: sshbuf_new", __func__);
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, MUX_C_NEW_SESSION)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, muxclient_request_id)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_string(m, NULL, 0)) != 0 || /* reserved */
(r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, tty_flag)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, options.forward_x11)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, options.forward_agent)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, subsystem_flag)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, echar)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, term)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_stringb(m, command)) != 0)
fatal("%s: request: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
/* Pass environment */
if (options.num_send_env > 0 && environ != NULL) {
for (i = 0; environ[i] != NULL; i++) {
if (!env_permitted(environ[i]))
continue;
if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, environ[i])) != 0)
fatal("%s: request: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
}
}
for (i = 0; i < options.num_setenv; i++) {
if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, options.setenv[i])) != 0)
fatal("%s: request: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
}
if (mux_client_write_packet(fd, m) != 0)
fatal("%s: write packet: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
/* Send the stdio file descriptors */
if (mm_send_fd(fd, STDIN_FILENO) == -1 ||
mm_send_fd(fd, STDOUT_FILENO) == -1 ||
mm_send_fd(fd, STDERR_FILENO) == -1)
fatal("%s: send fds failed", __func__);
debug3("%s: session request sent", __func__);
/* Read their reply */
sshbuf_reset(m);
if (mux_client_read_packet(fd, m) != 0) {
error("%s: read from master failed: %s",
__func__, strerror(errno));
sshbuf_free(m);
return -1;
}
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &type)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &rid)) != 0)
fatal("%s: decode: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
if (rid != muxclient_request_id)
fatal("%s: out of sequence reply: my id %u theirs %u",
__func__, muxclient_request_id, rid);
switch (type) {
case MUX_S_SESSION_OPENED:
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &sid)) != 0)
fatal("%s: decode ID: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
debug("%s: master session id: %u", __func__, sid);
break;
case MUX_S_PERMISSION_DENIED:
if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &e, NULL)) != 0)
fatal("%s: decode error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
error("Master refused session request: %s", e);
sshbuf_free(m);
return -1;
case MUX_S_FAILURE:
if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &e, NULL)) != 0)
fatal("%s: decode error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
error("%s: session request failed: %s", __func__, e);
sshbuf_free(m);
return -1;
default:
sshbuf_free(m);
error("%s: unexpected response from master 0x%08x",
__func__, type);
return -1;
}
muxclient_request_id++;
if (pledge("stdio proc tty", NULL) == -1)
fatal("%s pledge(): %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
platform_pledge_mux();
ssh_signal(SIGHUP, control_client_sighandler);
ssh_signal(SIGINT, control_client_sighandler);
ssh_signal(SIGTERM, control_client_sighandler);
ssh_signal(SIGWINCH, control_client_sigrelay);
rawmode = tty_flag;
if (tty_flag)
enter_raw_mode(options.request_tty == REQUEST_TTY_FORCE);
/*
* Stick around until the controlee closes the client_fd.
* Before it does, it is expected to write an exit message.
* This process must read the value and wait for the closure of
* the client_fd; if this one closes early, the multiplex master will
* terminate early too (possibly losing data).
*/
for (exitval = 255, exitval_seen = 0;;) {
sshbuf_reset(m);
if (mux_client_read_packet(fd, m) != 0)
break;
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &type)) != 0)
fatal("%s: decode type: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
switch (type) {
case MUX_S_TTY_ALLOC_FAIL:
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &esid)) != 0)
fatal("%s: decode ID: %s",
__func__, ssh_err(r));
if (esid != sid)
fatal("%s: tty alloc fail on unknown session: "
"my id %u theirs %u",
__func__, sid, esid);
leave_raw_mode(options.request_tty ==
REQUEST_TTY_FORCE);
rawmode = 0;
continue;
case MUX_S_EXIT_MESSAGE:
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &esid)) != 0)
fatal("%s: decode ID: %s",
__func__, ssh_err(r));
if (esid != sid)
fatal("%s: exit on unknown session: "
"my id %u theirs %u",
__func__, sid, esid);
if (exitval_seen)
fatal("%s: exitval sent twice", __func__);
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &exitval)) != 0)
fatal("%s: decode exit value: %s",
__func__, ssh_err(r));
exitval_seen = 1;
continue;
default:
if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &e, NULL)) != 0)
fatal("%s: decode error: %s",
__func__, ssh_err(r));
fatal("%s: master returned error: %s", __func__, e);
}
}
close(fd);
if (rawmode)
leave_raw_mode(options.request_tty == REQUEST_TTY_FORCE);
if (muxclient_terminate) {
debug2("Exiting on signal: %s", strsignal(muxclient_terminate));
exitval = 255;
} else if (!exitval_seen) {
debug2("Control master terminated unexpectedly");
exitval = 255;
} else
debug2("Received exit status from master %d", exitval);
if (tty_flag && options.log_level != SYSLOG_LEVEL_QUIET)
fprintf(stderr, "Shared connection to %s closed.\r\n", host);
exit(exitval);
}
static int
mux_client_proxy(int fd)
{
struct sshbuf *m;
char *e;
u_int type, rid;
int r;
if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
fatal("%s: sshbuf_new", __func__);
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, MUX_C_PROXY)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, muxclient_request_id)) != 0)
fatal("%s: request: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
if (mux_client_write_packet(fd, m) != 0)
fatal("%s: write packet: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
sshbuf_reset(m);
/* Read their reply */
if (mux_client_read_packet(fd, m) != 0) {
sshbuf_free(m);
return 0;
}
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &type)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &rid)) != 0)
fatal("%s: decode: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
if (rid != muxclient_request_id)
fatal("%s: out of sequence reply: my id %u theirs %u",
__func__, muxclient_request_id, rid);
if (type != MUX_S_PROXY) {
if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &e, NULL)) != 0)
fatal("%s: decode error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
fatal("%s: master returned error: %s", __func__, e);
}
sshbuf_free(m);
debug3("%s: done", __func__);
muxclient_request_id++;
return 0;
}
static int
mux_client_request_stdio_fwd(int fd)
{
struct sshbuf *m;
char *e;
u_int type, rid, sid;
int r, devnull;
debug3("%s: entering", __func__);
if ((muxserver_pid = mux_client_request_alive(fd)) == 0) {
error("%s: master alive request failed", __func__);
return -1;
}
ssh_signal(SIGPIPE, SIG_IGN);
if (stdin_null_flag) {
if ((devnull = open(_PATH_DEVNULL, O_RDONLY)) == -1)
fatal("open(/dev/null): %s", strerror(errno));
if (dup2(devnull, STDIN_FILENO) == -1)
fatal("dup2: %s", strerror(errno));
if (devnull > STDERR_FILENO)
close(devnull);
}
if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
fatal("%s: sshbuf_new", __func__);
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, MUX_C_NEW_STDIO_FWD)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, muxclient_request_id)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_string(m, NULL, 0)) != 0 || /* reserved */
(r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, options.stdio_forward_host)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, options.stdio_forward_port)) != 0)
fatal("%s: request: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
if (mux_client_write_packet(fd, m) != 0)
fatal("%s: write packet: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
/* Send the stdio file descriptors */
if (mm_send_fd(fd, STDIN_FILENO) == -1 ||
mm_send_fd(fd, STDOUT_FILENO) == -1)
fatal("%s: send fds failed", __func__);
if (pledge("stdio proc tty", NULL) == -1)
fatal("%s pledge(): %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
platform_pledge_mux();
debug3("%s: stdio forward request sent", __func__);
/* Read their reply */
sshbuf_reset(m);
if (mux_client_read_packet(fd, m) != 0) {
error("%s: read from master failed: %s",
__func__, strerror(errno));
sshbuf_free(m);
return -1;
}
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &type)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &rid)) != 0)
fatal("%s: decode: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
if (rid != muxclient_request_id)
fatal("%s: out of sequence reply: my id %u theirs %u",
__func__, muxclient_request_id, rid);
switch (type) {
case MUX_S_SESSION_OPENED:
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &sid)) != 0)
fatal("%s: decode ID: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
debug("%s: master session id: %u", __func__, sid);
break;
case MUX_S_PERMISSION_DENIED:
if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &e, NULL)) != 0)
fatal("%s: decode error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
sshbuf_free(m);
fatal("Master refused stdio forwarding request: %s", e);
case MUX_S_FAILURE:
if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &e, NULL)) != 0)
fatal("%s: decode error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
sshbuf_free(m);
fatal("Stdio forwarding request failed: %s", e);
default:
sshbuf_free(m);
error("%s: unexpected response from master 0x%08x",
__func__, type);
return -1;
}
muxclient_request_id++;
ssh_signal(SIGHUP, control_client_sighandler);
ssh_signal(SIGINT, control_client_sighandler);
ssh_signal(SIGTERM, control_client_sighandler);
ssh_signal(SIGWINCH, control_client_sigrelay);
/*
* Stick around until the controlee closes the client_fd.
*/
sshbuf_reset(m);
if (mux_client_read_packet(fd, m) != 0) {
if (errno == EPIPE ||
(errno == EINTR && muxclient_terminate != 0))
return 0;
fatal("%s: mux_client_read_packet: %s",
__func__, strerror(errno));
}
fatal("%s: master returned unexpected message %u", __func__, type);
}
static void
mux_client_request_stop_listening(int fd)
{
struct sshbuf *m;
char *e;
u_int type, rid;
int r;
debug3("%s: entering", __func__);
if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
fatal("%s: sshbuf_new", __func__);
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, MUX_C_STOP_LISTENING)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, muxclient_request_id)) != 0)
fatal("%s: request: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
if (mux_client_write_packet(fd, m) != 0)
fatal("%s: write packet: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
sshbuf_reset(m);
/* Read their reply */
if (mux_client_read_packet(fd, m) != 0)
fatal("%s: read from master failed: %s",
__func__, strerror(errno));
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &type)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &rid)) != 0)
fatal("%s: decode: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
if (rid != muxclient_request_id)
fatal("%s: out of sequence reply: my id %u theirs %u",
__func__, muxclient_request_id, rid);
switch (type) {
case MUX_S_OK:
break;
case MUX_S_PERMISSION_DENIED:
if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &e, NULL)) != 0)
fatal("%s: decode error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
fatal("Master refused stop listening request: %s", e);
case MUX_S_FAILURE:
if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &e, NULL)) != 0)
fatal("%s: decode error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
fatal("%s: stop listening request failed: %s", __func__, e);
default:
fatal("%s: unexpected response from master 0x%08x",
__func__, type);
}
sshbuf_free(m);
muxclient_request_id++;
}
/* Multiplex client main loop. */
int
muxclient(const char *path)
{
struct sockaddr_un addr;
int sock;
u_int pid;
if (muxclient_command == 0) {
if (options.stdio_forward_host != NULL)
muxclient_command = SSHMUX_COMMAND_STDIO_FWD;
else
muxclient_command = SSHMUX_COMMAND_OPEN;
}
switch (options.control_master) {
case SSHCTL_MASTER_AUTO:
case SSHCTL_MASTER_AUTO_ASK:
debug("auto-mux: Trying existing master");
/* FALLTHROUGH */
case SSHCTL_MASTER_NO:
break;
default:
return -1;
}
memset(&addr, '\0', sizeof(addr));
addr.sun_family = AF_UNIX;
if (strlcpy(addr.sun_path, path,
sizeof(addr.sun_path)) >= sizeof(addr.sun_path))
fatal("ControlPath too long ('%s' >= %u bytes)", path,
(unsigned int)sizeof(addr.sun_path));
if ((sock = socket(PF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0)) == -1)
fatal("%s socket(): %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
if (connect(sock, (struct sockaddr *)&addr, sizeof(addr)) == -1) {
switch (muxclient_command) {
case SSHMUX_COMMAND_OPEN:
case SSHMUX_COMMAND_STDIO_FWD:
break;
default:
fatal("Control socket connect(%.100s): %s", path,
strerror(errno));
}
if (errno == ECONNREFUSED &&
options.control_master != SSHCTL_MASTER_NO) {
debug("Stale control socket %.100s, unlinking", path);
unlink(path);
} else if (errno == ENOENT) {
debug("Control socket \"%.100s\" does not exist", path);
} else {
error("Control socket connect(%.100s): %s", path,
strerror(errno));
}
close(sock);
return -1;
}
set_nonblock(sock);
if (mux_client_hello_exchange(sock) != 0) {
error("%s: master hello exchange failed", __func__);
close(sock);
return -1;
}
switch (muxclient_command) {
case SSHMUX_COMMAND_ALIVE_CHECK:
if ((pid = mux_client_request_alive(sock)) == 0)
fatal("%s: master alive check failed", __func__);
fprintf(stderr, "Master running (pid=%u)\r\n", pid);
exit(0);
case SSHMUX_COMMAND_TERMINATE:
mux_client_request_terminate(sock);
if (options.log_level != SYSLOG_LEVEL_QUIET)
fprintf(stderr, "Exit request sent.\r\n");
exit(0);
case SSHMUX_COMMAND_FORWARD:
if (mux_client_forwards(sock, 0) != 0)
fatal("%s: master forward request failed", __func__);
exit(0);
case SSHMUX_COMMAND_OPEN:
if (mux_client_forwards(sock, 0) != 0) {
error("%s: master forward request failed", __func__);
return -1;
}
mux_client_request_session(sock);
return -1;
case SSHMUX_COMMAND_STDIO_FWD:
mux_client_request_stdio_fwd(sock);
exit(0);
case SSHMUX_COMMAND_STOP:
mux_client_request_stop_listening(sock);
if (options.log_level != SYSLOG_LEVEL_QUIET)
fprintf(stderr, "Stop listening request sent.\r\n");
exit(0);
case SSHMUX_COMMAND_CANCEL_FWD:
if (mux_client_forwards(sock, 1) != 0)
error("%s: master cancel forward request failed",
__func__);
exit(0);
case SSHMUX_COMMAND_PROXY:
mux_client_proxy(sock);
return (sock);
default:
fatal("unrecognised muxclient_command %d", muxclient_command);
}
}
diff --git a/openbsd-compat/bcrypt_pbkdf.c b/openbsd-compat/bcrypt_pbkdf.c
index 78523456387a..62728d38f002 100644
--- a/openbsd-compat/bcrypt_pbkdf.c
+++ b/openbsd-compat/bcrypt_pbkdf.c
@@ -1,179 +1,181 @@
/* $OpenBSD: bcrypt_pbkdf.c,v 1.13 2015/01/12 03:20:04 tedu Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 2013 Ted Unangst <tedu@openbsd.org>
*
* Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
* purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
* copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
*
* THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
* WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
* MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
* ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
* WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
* ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
* OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
*/
+/* OPENBSD ORIGINAL: lib/libutil/bcrypt_pbkdf.c */
+
#include "includes.h"
#ifndef HAVE_BCRYPT_PBKDF
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/param.h>
#ifdef HAVE_STDLIB_H
# include <stdlib.h>
#endif
#include <string.h>
#ifdef HAVE_BLF_H
# include <blf.h>
#endif
#include "crypto_api.h"
#ifdef SHA512_DIGEST_LENGTH
# undef SHA512_DIGEST_LENGTH
#endif
#define SHA512_DIGEST_LENGTH crypto_hash_sha512_BYTES
#define MINIMUM(a,b) (((a) < (b)) ? (a) : (b))
/*
* pkcs #5 pbkdf2 implementation using the "bcrypt" hash
*
* The bcrypt hash function is derived from the bcrypt password hashing
* function with the following modifications:
* 1. The input password and salt are preprocessed with SHA512.
* 2. The output length is expanded to 256 bits.
* 3. Subsequently the magic string to be encrypted is lengthened and modified
* to "OxychromaticBlowfishSwatDynamite"
* 4. The hash function is defined to perform 64 rounds of initial state
* expansion. (More rounds are performed by iterating the hash.)
*
* Note that this implementation pulls the SHA512 operations into the caller
* as a performance optimization.
*
* One modification from official pbkdf2. Instead of outputting key material
* linearly, we mix it. pbkdf2 has a known weakness where if one uses it to
* generate (e.g.) 512 bits of key material for use as two 256 bit keys, an
* attacker can merely run once through the outer loop, but the user
* always runs it twice. Shuffling output bytes requires computing the
* entirety of the key material to assemble any subkey. This is something a
* wise caller could do; we just do it for you.
*/
#define BCRYPT_WORDS 8
#define BCRYPT_HASHSIZE (BCRYPT_WORDS * 4)
static void
bcrypt_hash(u_int8_t *sha2pass, u_int8_t *sha2salt, u_int8_t *out)
{
blf_ctx state;
u_int8_t ciphertext[BCRYPT_HASHSIZE] =
"OxychromaticBlowfishSwatDynamite";
uint32_t cdata[BCRYPT_WORDS];
int i;
uint16_t j;
size_t shalen = SHA512_DIGEST_LENGTH;
/* key expansion */
Blowfish_initstate(&state);
Blowfish_expandstate(&state, sha2salt, shalen, sha2pass, shalen);
for (i = 0; i < 64; i++) {
Blowfish_expand0state(&state, sha2salt, shalen);
Blowfish_expand0state(&state, sha2pass, shalen);
}
/* encryption */
j = 0;
for (i = 0; i < BCRYPT_WORDS; i++)
cdata[i] = Blowfish_stream2word(ciphertext, sizeof(ciphertext),
&j);
for (i = 0; i < 64; i++)
- blf_enc(&state, cdata, sizeof(cdata) / sizeof(uint64_t));
+ blf_enc(&state, cdata, sizeof(cdata) / (sizeof(uint64_t)));
/* copy out */
for (i = 0; i < BCRYPT_WORDS; i++) {
out[4 * i + 3] = (cdata[i] >> 24) & 0xff;
out[4 * i + 2] = (cdata[i] >> 16) & 0xff;
out[4 * i + 1] = (cdata[i] >> 8) & 0xff;
out[4 * i + 0] = cdata[i] & 0xff;
}
/* zap */
explicit_bzero(ciphertext, sizeof(ciphertext));
explicit_bzero(cdata, sizeof(cdata));
explicit_bzero(&state, sizeof(state));
}
int
bcrypt_pbkdf(const char *pass, size_t passlen, const u_int8_t *salt, size_t saltlen,
u_int8_t *key, size_t keylen, unsigned int rounds)
{
u_int8_t sha2pass[SHA512_DIGEST_LENGTH];
u_int8_t sha2salt[SHA512_DIGEST_LENGTH];
u_int8_t out[BCRYPT_HASHSIZE];
u_int8_t tmpout[BCRYPT_HASHSIZE];
u_int8_t *countsalt;
size_t i, j, amt, stride;
uint32_t count;
size_t origkeylen = keylen;
/* nothing crazy */
if (rounds < 1)
return -1;
if (passlen == 0 || saltlen == 0 || keylen == 0 ||
keylen > sizeof(out) * sizeof(out) || saltlen > 1<<20)
return -1;
if ((countsalt = calloc(1, saltlen + 4)) == NULL)
return -1;
stride = (keylen + sizeof(out) - 1) / sizeof(out);
amt = (keylen + stride - 1) / stride;
memcpy(countsalt, salt, saltlen);
/* collapse password */
crypto_hash_sha512(sha2pass, pass, passlen);
/* generate key, sizeof(out) at a time */
for (count = 1; keylen > 0; count++) {
countsalt[saltlen + 0] = (count >> 24) & 0xff;
countsalt[saltlen + 1] = (count >> 16) & 0xff;
countsalt[saltlen + 2] = (count >> 8) & 0xff;
countsalt[saltlen + 3] = count & 0xff;
/* first round, salt is salt */
crypto_hash_sha512(sha2salt, countsalt, saltlen + 4);
bcrypt_hash(sha2pass, sha2salt, tmpout);
memcpy(out, tmpout, sizeof(out));
for (i = 1; i < rounds; i++) {
/* subsequent rounds, salt is previous output */
crypto_hash_sha512(sha2salt, tmpout, sizeof(tmpout));
bcrypt_hash(sha2pass, sha2salt, tmpout);
for (j = 0; j < sizeof(out); j++)
out[j] ^= tmpout[j];
}
/*
* pbkdf2 deviation: output the key material non-linearly.
*/
amt = MINIMUM(amt, keylen);
for (i = 0; i < amt; i++) {
size_t dest = i * stride + (count - 1);
if (dest >= origkeylen)
break;
key[dest] = out[i];
}
keylen -= i;
}
/* zap */
explicit_bzero(out, sizeof(out));
free(countsalt);
return 0;
}
#endif /* HAVE_BCRYPT_PBKDF */
diff --git a/openbsd-compat/memmem.c b/openbsd-compat/memmem.c
index 3e5e6b5e6d51..ac1243eb0d17 100644
--- a/openbsd-compat/memmem.c
+++ b/openbsd-compat/memmem.c
@@ -1,69 +1,191 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: memmem.c,v 1.4 2015/08/31 02:53:57 guenther Exp $ */
-/*-
- * Copyright (c) 2005 Pascal Gloor <pascal.gloor@spale.com>
+/* $OpenBSD: memmem.c,v 1.5 2020/04/16 12:39:28 claudio Exp $ */
+
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2005-2020 Rich Felker, et al.
*
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
- * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
- * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote
- * products derived from this software without specific prior written
- * permission.
+ * Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining
+ * a copy of this software and associated documentation files (the
+ * "Software"), to deal in the Software without restriction, including
+ * without limitation the rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish,
+ * distribute, sublicense, and/or sell copies of the Software, and to
+ * permit persons to whom the Software is furnished to do so, subject to
+ * the following conditions:
*
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
- * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
- * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
- * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
- * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
- * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
- * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
- * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
- * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
- * SUCH DAMAGE.
+ * The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be
+ * included in all copies or substantial portions of the Software.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND,
+ * EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND NONINFRINGEMENT.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS BE LIABLE FOR ANY
+ * CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN ACTION OF CONTRACT,
+ * TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE
+ * SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE SOFTWARE.
*/
#include "includes.h"
#ifndef HAVE_MEMMEM
#include <string.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_STDINT_H
+#include <stdint.h>
+#endif
+
+static char *
+twobyte_memmem(const unsigned char *h, size_t k, const unsigned char *n)
+{
+ uint16_t nw = n[0]<<8 | n[1], hw = h[0]<<8 | h[1];
+ for (h+=2, k-=2; k; k--, hw = hw<<8 | *h++)
+ if (hw == nw) return (char *)h-2;
+ return hw == nw ? (char *)h-2 : 0;
+}
+
+static char *
+threebyte_memmem(const unsigned char *h, size_t k, const unsigned char *n)
+{
+ uint32_t nw = n[0]<<24 | n[1]<<16 | n[2]<<8;
+ uint32_t hw = h[0]<<24 | h[1]<<16 | h[2]<<8;
+ for (h+=3, k-=3; k; k--, hw = (hw|*h++)<<8)
+ if (hw == nw) return (char *)h-3;
+ return hw == nw ? (char *)h-3 : 0;
+}
+
+static char *
+fourbyte_memmem(const unsigned char *h, size_t k, const unsigned char *n)
+{
+ uint32_t nw = n[0]<<24 | n[1]<<16 | n[2]<<8 | n[3];
+ uint32_t hw = h[0]<<24 | h[1]<<16 | h[2]<<8 | h[3];
+ for (h+=4, k-=4; k; k--, hw = hw<<8 | *h++)
+ if (hw == nw) return (char *)h-4;
+ return hw == nw ? (char *)h-4 : 0;
+}
+
+#define MAX(a,b) ((a)>(b)?(a):(b))
+#define MIN(a,b) ((a)<(b)?(a):(b))
+
+#define BITOP(a,b,op) \
+ ((a)[(size_t)(b)/(8*sizeof *(a))] op (size_t)1<<((size_t)(b)%(8*sizeof *(a))))
/*
- * Find the first occurrence of the byte string s in byte string l.
+ * Maxime Crochemore and Dominique Perrin, Two-way string-matching,
+ * Journal of the ACM, 38(3):651-675, July 1991.
*/
-
-void *
-memmem(const void *l, size_t l_len, const void *s, size_t s_len)
+static char *
+twoway_memmem(const unsigned char *h, const unsigned char *z,
+ const unsigned char *n, size_t l)
{
- const char *cur, *last;
- const char *cl = l;
- const char *cs = s;
+ size_t i, ip, jp, k, p, ms, p0, mem, mem0;
+ size_t byteset[32 / sizeof(size_t)] = { 0 };
+ size_t shift[256];
+
+ /* Computing length of needle and fill shift table */
+ for (i=0; i<l; i++)
+ BITOP(byteset, n[i], |=), shift[n[i]] = i+1;
+
+ /* Compute maximal suffix */
+ ip = -1; jp = 0; k = p = 1;
+ while (jp+k<l) {
+ if (n[ip+k] == n[jp+k]) {
+ if (k == p) {
+ jp += p;
+ k = 1;
+ } else k++;
+ } else if (n[ip+k] > n[jp+k]) {
+ jp += k;
+ k = 1;
+ p = jp - ip;
+ } else {
+ ip = jp++;
+ k = p = 1;
+ }
+ }
+ ms = ip;
+ p0 = p;
+
+ /* And with the opposite comparison */
+ ip = -1; jp = 0; k = p = 1;
+ while (jp+k<l) {
+ if (n[ip+k] == n[jp+k]) {
+ if (k == p) {
+ jp += p;
+ k = 1;
+ } else k++;
+ } else if (n[ip+k] < n[jp+k]) {
+ jp += k;
+ k = 1;
+ p = jp - ip;
+ } else {
+ ip = jp++;
+ k = p = 1;
+ }
+ }
+ if (ip+1 > ms+1) ms = ip;
+ else p = p0;
- /* a zero length needle should just return the haystack */
- if (s_len == 0)
- return (void *)cl;
+ /* Periodic needle? */
+ if (memcmp(n, n+p, ms+1)) {
+ mem0 = 0;
+ p = MAX(ms, l-ms-1) + 1;
+ } else mem0 = l-p;
+ mem = 0;
- /* "s" must be smaller or equal to "l" */
- if (l_len < s_len)
- return NULL;
+ /* Search loop */
+ for (;;) {
+ /* If remainder of haystack is shorter than needle, done */
+ if (z-h < l) return 0;
+
+ /* Check last byte first; advance by shift on mismatch */
+ if (BITOP(byteset, h[l-1], &)) {
+ k = l-shift[h[l-1]];
+ if (k) {
+ if (k < mem) k = mem;
+ h += k;
+ mem = 0;
+ continue;
+ }
+ } else {
+ h += l;
+ mem = 0;
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ /* Compare right half */
+ for (k=MAX(ms+1,mem); k<l && n[k] == h[k]; k++);
+ if (k < l) {
+ h += k-ms;
+ mem = 0;
+ continue;
+ }
+ /* Compare left half */
+ for (k=ms+1; k>mem && n[k-1] == h[k-1]; k--);
+ if (k <= mem) return (char *)h;
+ h += p;
+ mem = mem0;
+ }
+}
+
+void *
+memmem(const void *h0, size_t k, const void *n0, size_t l)
+{
+ const unsigned char *h = h0, *n = n0;
- /* special case where s_len == 1 */
- if (s_len == 1)
- return memchr(l, *cs, l_len);
+ /* Return immediately on empty needle */
+ if (!l) return (void *)h;
- /* the last position where its possible to find "s" in "l" */
- last = cl + l_len - s_len;
+ /* Return immediately when needle is longer than haystack */
+ if (k<l) return 0;
- for (cur = cl; cur <= last; cur++)
- if (cur[0] == cs[0] && memcmp(cur, cs, s_len) == 0)
- return (void *)cur;
+ /* Use faster algorithms for short needles */
+ h = memchr(h0, *n, k);
+ if (!h || l==1) return (void *)h;
+ k -= h - (const unsigned char *)h0;
+ if (k<l) return 0;
+ if (l==2) return twobyte_memmem(h, k, n);
+ if (l==3) return threebyte_memmem(h, k, n);
+ if (l==4) return fourbyte_memmem(h, k, n);
- return NULL;
+ return twoway_memmem(h, h+k, n, l);
}
DEF_WEAK(memmem);
#endif /* HAVE_MEMMEM */
diff --git a/openbsd-compat/port-net.c b/openbsd-compat/port-net.c
index 617bffcebe8a..d7d8c6fa1aa1 100644
--- a/openbsd-compat/port-net.c
+++ b/openbsd-compat/port-net.c
@@ -1,374 +1,377 @@
/*
* Copyright (c) 2005 Reyk Floeter <reyk@openbsd.org>
*
* Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
* purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
* copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
*
* THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
* WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
* MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
* ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
* WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
* ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
* OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
*/
#include "includes.h"
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/ioctl.h>
#include <netinet/in.h>
#include <arpa/inet.h>
#include <netinet/ip.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <stdarg.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h"
#include "log.h"
#include "misc.h"
#include "sshbuf.h"
#include "channels.h"
#include "ssherr.h"
/*
* This file contains various portability code for network support,
* including tun/tap forwarding and routing domains.
*/
#if defined(SYS_RDOMAIN_LINUX) || defined(SSH_TUN_LINUX)
#include <linux/if.h>
#endif
#if defined(SYS_RDOMAIN_LINUX)
char *
sys_get_rdomain(int fd)
{
char dev[IFNAMSIZ + 1];
socklen_t len = sizeof(dev) - 1;
if (getsockopt(fd, SOL_SOCKET, SO_BINDTODEVICE, dev, &len) == -1) {
error("%s: cannot determine VRF for fd=%d : %s",
__func__, fd, strerror(errno));
return NULL;
}
dev[len] = '\0';
return strdup(dev);
}
int
sys_set_rdomain(int fd, const char *name)
{
if (setsockopt(fd, SOL_SOCKET, SO_BINDTODEVICE,
name, strlen(name)) == -1) {
error("%s: setsockopt(%d, SO_BINDTODEVICE, %s): %s",
__func__, fd, name, strerror(errno));
return -1;
}
return 0;
}
int
sys_valid_rdomain(const char *name)
{
int fd;
/*
* This is a pretty crappy way to test. It would be better to
* check whether "name" represents a VRF device, but apparently
* that requires an rtnetlink transaction.
*/
if ((fd = socket(AF_INET, SOCK_STREAM, 0)) == -1)
return 0;
if (setsockopt(fd, SOL_SOCKET, SO_BINDTODEVICE,
name, strlen(name)) == -1) {
close(fd);
return 0;
}
close(fd);
return 1;
}
#elif defined(SYS_RDOMAIN_XXX)
/* XXX examples */
char *
sys_get_rdomain(int fd)
{
return NULL;
}
int
sys_set_rdomain(int fd, const char *name)
{
return -1;
}
int
valid_rdomain(const char *name)
{
return 0;
}
void
sys_set_process_rdomain(const char *name)
{
fatal("%s: not supported", __func__);
}
#endif /* defined(SYS_RDOMAIN_XXX) */
/*
* This is the portable version of the SSH tunnel forwarding, it
* uses some preprocessor definitions for various platform-specific
* settings.
*
* SSH_TUN_LINUX Use the (newer) Linux tun/tap device
* SSH_TUN_FREEBSD Use the FreeBSD tun/tap device
* SSH_TUN_COMPAT_AF Translate the OpenBSD address family
* SSH_TUN_PREPEND_AF Prepend/remove the address family
*/
/*
* System-specific tunnel open function
*/
#if defined(SSH_TUN_LINUX)
#include <linux/if_tun.h>
#define TUN_CTRL_DEV "/dev/net/tun"
int
sys_tun_open(int tun, int mode, char **ifname)
{
struct ifreq ifr;
int fd = -1;
const char *name = NULL;
if (ifname != NULL)
*ifname = NULL;
if ((fd = open(TUN_CTRL_DEV, O_RDWR)) == -1) {
debug("%s: failed to open tunnel control device \"%s\": %s",
__func__, TUN_CTRL_DEV, strerror(errno));
return (-1);
}
bzero(&ifr, sizeof(ifr));
if (mode == SSH_TUNMODE_ETHERNET) {
ifr.ifr_flags = IFF_TAP;
name = "tap%d";
} else {
ifr.ifr_flags = IFF_TUN;
name = "tun%d";
}
ifr.ifr_flags |= IFF_NO_PI;
if (tun != SSH_TUNID_ANY) {
if (tun > SSH_TUNID_MAX) {
debug("%s: invalid tunnel id %x: %s", __func__,
tun, strerror(errno));
goto failed;
}
snprintf(ifr.ifr_name, sizeof(ifr.ifr_name), name, tun);
}
if (ioctl(fd, TUNSETIFF, &ifr) == -1) {
debug("%s: failed to configure tunnel (mode %d): %s", __func__,
mode, strerror(errno));
goto failed;
}
if (tun == SSH_TUNID_ANY)
debug("%s: tunnel mode %d fd %d", __func__, mode, fd);
else
debug("%s: %s mode %d fd %d", __func__, ifr.ifr_name, mode, fd);
if (ifname != NULL && (*ifname = strdup(ifr.ifr_name)) == NULL)
goto failed;
return (fd);
failed:
close(fd);
return (-1);
}
#endif /* SSH_TUN_LINUX */
#ifdef SSH_TUN_FREEBSD
#include <sys/socket.h>
#include <net/if.h>
#ifdef HAVE_NET_IF_TUN_H
#include <net/if_tun.h>
#endif
int
sys_tun_open(int tun, int mode, char **ifname)
{
struct ifreq ifr;
char name[100];
- int fd = -1, sock, flag;
+ int fd = -1, sock;
const char *tunbase = "tun";
+#if defined(TUNSIFHEAD) && !defined(SSH_TUN_PREPEND_AF)
+ int flag;
+#endif
if (ifname != NULL)
*ifname = NULL;
if (mode == SSH_TUNMODE_ETHERNET) {
#ifdef SSH_TUN_NO_L2
debug("%s: no layer 2 tunnelling support", __func__);
return (-1);
#else
tunbase = "tap";
#endif
}
/* Open the tunnel device */
if (tun <= SSH_TUNID_MAX) {
snprintf(name, sizeof(name), "/dev/%s%d", tunbase, tun);
fd = open(name, O_RDWR);
} else if (tun == SSH_TUNID_ANY) {
for (tun = 100; tun >= 0; tun--) {
snprintf(name, sizeof(name), "/dev/%s%d",
tunbase, tun);
if ((fd = open(name, O_RDWR)) >= 0)
break;
}
} else {
debug("%s: invalid tunnel %u\n", __func__, tun);
return (-1);
}
if (fd < 0) {
debug("%s: %s open failed: %s", __func__, name,
strerror(errno));
return (-1);
}
/* Turn on tunnel headers */
- flag = 1;
#if defined(TUNSIFHEAD) && !defined(SSH_TUN_PREPEND_AF)
+ flag = 1;
if (mode != SSH_TUNMODE_ETHERNET &&
ioctl(fd, TUNSIFHEAD, &flag) == -1) {
debug("%s: ioctl(%d, TUNSIFHEAD, 1): %s", __func__, fd,
strerror(errno));
close(fd);
}
#endif
debug("%s: %s mode %d fd %d", __func__, name, mode, fd);
/* Set the tunnel device operation mode */
snprintf(ifr.ifr_name, sizeof(ifr.ifr_name), "%s%d", tunbase, tun);
if ((sock = socket(PF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0)) == -1)
goto failed;
if (ioctl(sock, SIOCGIFFLAGS, &ifr) == -1)
goto failed;
if ((ifr.ifr_flags & IFF_UP) == 0) {
ifr.ifr_flags |= IFF_UP;
if (ioctl(sock, SIOCSIFFLAGS, &ifr) == -1)
goto failed;
}
if (ifname != NULL && (*ifname = strdup(ifr.ifr_name)) == NULL)
goto failed;
close(sock);
return (fd);
failed:
if (fd >= 0)
close(fd);
if (sock >= 0)
close(sock);
debug("%s: failed to set %s mode %d: %s", __func__, name,
mode, strerror(errno));
return (-1);
}
#endif /* SSH_TUN_FREEBSD */
/*
* System-specific channel filters
*/
#if defined(SSH_TUN_FILTER)
/*
* The tunnel forwarding protocol prepends the address family of forwarded
* IP packets using OpenBSD's numbers.
*/
#define OPENBSD_AF_INET 2
#define OPENBSD_AF_INET6 24
int
sys_tun_infilter(struct ssh *ssh, struct Channel *c, char *buf, int _len)
{
int r;
size_t len;
char *ptr = buf;
#if defined(SSH_TUN_PREPEND_AF)
char rbuf[CHAN_RBUF];
struct ip iph;
#endif
#if defined(SSH_TUN_PREPEND_AF) || defined(SSH_TUN_COMPAT_AF)
u_int32_t af;
#endif
/* XXX update channel input filter API to use unsigned length */
if (_len < 0)
return -1;
len = _len;
#if defined(SSH_TUN_PREPEND_AF)
if (len <= sizeof(iph) || len > sizeof(rbuf) - 4)
return -1;
/* Determine address family from packet IP header. */
memcpy(&iph, buf, sizeof(iph));
af = iph.ip_v == 6 ? OPENBSD_AF_INET6 : OPENBSD_AF_INET;
/* Prepend address family to packet using OpenBSD constants */
memcpy(rbuf + 4, buf, len);
len += 4;
POKE_U32(rbuf, af);
ptr = rbuf;
#elif defined(SSH_TUN_COMPAT_AF)
/* Convert existing address family header to OpenBSD value */
if (len <= 4)
return -1;
af = PEEK_U32(buf);
/* Put it back */
POKE_U32(buf, af == AF_INET6 ? OPENBSD_AF_INET6 : OPENBSD_AF_INET);
#endif
if ((r = sshbuf_put_string(c->input, ptr, len)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
return (0);
}
u_char *
sys_tun_outfilter(struct ssh *ssh, struct Channel *c,
u_char **data, size_t *dlen)
{
u_char *buf;
u_int32_t af;
int r;
/* XXX new API is incompatible with this signature. */
if ((r = sshbuf_get_string(c->output, data, dlen)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
if (*dlen < sizeof(af))
return (NULL);
buf = *data;
#if defined(SSH_TUN_PREPEND_AF)
/* skip address family */
*dlen -= sizeof(af);
buf = *data + sizeof(af);
#elif defined(SSH_TUN_COMPAT_AF)
/* translate address family */
af = (PEEK_U32(buf) == OPENBSD_AF_INET6) ? AF_INET6 : AF_INET;
POKE_U32(buf, af);
#endif
return (buf);
}
#endif /* SSH_TUN_FILTER */
diff --git a/openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h b/openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h
index 5108f394c543..816c15cd4262 100644
--- a/openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h
+++ b/openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h
@@ -1,659 +1,628 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: queue.h,v 1.36 2012/04/11 13:29:14 naddy Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: queue.h,v 1.45 2018/07/12 14:22:54 sashan Exp $ */
/* $NetBSD: queue.h,v 1.11 1996/05/16 05:17:14 mycroft Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 1991, 1993
* The Regents of the University of California. All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
* 3. Neither the name of the University nor the names of its contributors
* may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software
* without specific prior written permission.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE REGENTS AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
* ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
* ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE REGENTS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
* FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
* DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
* OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
* LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
* OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
* SUCH DAMAGE.
*
* @(#)queue.h 8.5 (Berkeley) 8/20/94
*/
/* OPENBSD ORIGINAL: sys/sys/queue.h */
#ifndef _FAKE_QUEUE_H_
#define _FAKE_QUEUE_H_
/*
* Require for OS/X and other platforms that have old/broken/incomplete
* <sys/queue.h>.
*/
-#undef SLIST_HEAD
-#undef SLIST_HEAD_INITIALIZER
-#undef SLIST_ENTRY
-#undef SLIST_FOREACH_PREVPTR
-#undef SLIST_FOREACH_SAFE
-#undef SLIST_FIRST
-#undef SLIST_END
-#undef SLIST_EMPTY
-#undef SLIST_NEXT
-#undef SLIST_FOREACH
-#undef SLIST_INIT
-#undef SLIST_INSERT_AFTER
-#undef SLIST_INSERT_HEAD
-#undef SLIST_REMOVE_HEAD
-#undef SLIST_REMOVE_AFTER
-#undef SLIST_REMOVE
-#undef SLIST_REMOVE_NEXT
-#undef LIST_HEAD
-#undef LIST_HEAD_INITIALIZER
+#undef CIRCLEQ_EMPTY
+#undef CIRCLEQ_END
+#undef CIRCLEQ_ENTRY
+#undef CIRCLEQ_FIRST
+#undef CIRCLEQ_FOREACH
+#undef CIRCLEQ_FOREACH_REVERSE
+#undef CIRCLEQ_HEAD
+#undef CIRCLEQ_HEAD_INITIALIZER
+#undef CIRCLEQ_INIT
+#undef CIRCLEQ_INSERT_AFTER
+#undef CIRCLEQ_INSERT_BEFORE
+#undef CIRCLEQ_INSERT_HEAD
+#undef CIRCLEQ_INSERT_TAIL
+#undef CIRCLEQ_LAST
+#undef CIRCLEQ_NEXT
+#undef CIRCLEQ_PREV
+#undef CIRCLEQ_REMOVE
+#undef CIRCLEQ_REPLACE
+#undef LIST_EMPTY
+#undef LIST_END
#undef LIST_ENTRY
#undef LIST_FIRST
-#undef LIST_END
-#undef LIST_EMPTY
-#undef LIST_NEXT
#undef LIST_FOREACH
#undef LIST_FOREACH_SAFE
+#undef LIST_HEAD
+#undef LIST_HEAD_INITIALIZER
#undef LIST_INIT
#undef LIST_INSERT_AFTER
#undef LIST_INSERT_BEFORE
#undef LIST_INSERT_HEAD
+#undef LIST_NEXT
#undef LIST_REMOVE
#undef LIST_REPLACE
-#undef SIMPLEQ_HEAD
-#undef SIMPLEQ_HEAD_INITIALIZER
+#undef SIMPLEQ_CONCAT
+#undef SIMPLEQ_EMPTY
+#undef SIMPLEQ_END
#undef SIMPLEQ_ENTRY
#undef SIMPLEQ_FIRST
-#undef SIMPLEQ_END
-#undef SIMPLEQ_EMPTY
-#undef SIMPLEQ_NEXT
#undef SIMPLEQ_FOREACH
#undef SIMPLEQ_FOREACH_SAFE
+#undef SIMPLEQ_HEAD
+#undef SIMPLEQ_HEAD_INITIALIZER
#undef SIMPLEQ_INIT
+#undef SIMPLEQ_INSERT_AFTER
#undef SIMPLEQ_INSERT_HEAD
#undef SIMPLEQ_INSERT_TAIL
-#undef SIMPLEQ_INSERT_AFTER
+#undef SIMPLEQ_NEXT
+#undef SIMPLEQ_REMOVE_AFTER
#undef SIMPLEQ_REMOVE_HEAD
-#undef TAILQ_HEAD
-#undef TAILQ_HEAD_INITIALIZER
+#undef SLIST_EMPTY
+#undef SLIST_END
+#undef SLIST_ENTRY
+#undef SLIST_FIRST
+#undef SLIST_FOREACH
+#undef SLIST_FOREACH_PREVPTR
+#undef SLIST_FOREACH_SAFE
+#undef SLIST_HEAD
+#undef SLIST_HEAD_INITIALIZER
+#undef SLIST_INIT
+#undef SLIST_INSERT_AFTER
+#undef SLIST_INSERT_HEAD
+#undef SLIST_NEXT
+#undef SLIST_REMOVE
+#undef SLIST_REMOVE_AFTER
+#undef SLIST_REMOVE_HEAD
+#undef SLIST_REMOVE_NEXT
+#undef TAILQ_CONCAT
+#undef TAILQ_EMPTY
+#undef TAILQ_END
#undef TAILQ_ENTRY
#undef TAILQ_FIRST
-#undef TAILQ_END
-#undef TAILQ_NEXT
-#undef TAILQ_LAST
-#undef TAILQ_PREV
-#undef TAILQ_EMPTY
#undef TAILQ_FOREACH
#undef TAILQ_FOREACH_REVERSE
-#undef TAILQ_FOREACH_SAFE
#undef TAILQ_FOREACH_REVERSE_SAFE
+#undef TAILQ_FOREACH_SAFE
+#undef TAILQ_HEAD
+#undef TAILQ_HEAD_INITIALIZER
#undef TAILQ_INIT
-#undef TAILQ_INSERT_HEAD
-#undef TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL
#undef TAILQ_INSERT_AFTER
#undef TAILQ_INSERT_BEFORE
+#undef TAILQ_INSERT_HEAD
+#undef TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL
+#undef TAILQ_LAST
+#undef TAILQ_NEXT
+#undef TAILQ_PREV
#undef TAILQ_REMOVE
#undef TAILQ_REPLACE
-#undef CIRCLEQ_HEAD
-#undef CIRCLEQ_HEAD_INITIALIZER
-#undef CIRCLEQ_ENTRY
-#undef CIRCLEQ_FIRST
-#undef CIRCLEQ_LAST
-#undef CIRCLEQ_END
-#undef CIRCLEQ_NEXT
-#undef CIRCLEQ_PREV
-#undef CIRCLEQ_EMPTY
-#undef CIRCLEQ_FOREACH
-#undef CIRCLEQ_FOREACH_REVERSE
-#undef CIRCLEQ_INIT
-#undef CIRCLEQ_INSERT_AFTER
-#undef CIRCLEQ_INSERT_BEFORE
-#undef CIRCLEQ_INSERT_HEAD
-#undef CIRCLEQ_INSERT_TAIL
-#undef CIRCLEQ_REMOVE
-#undef CIRCLEQ_REPLACE
/*
- * This file defines five types of data structures: singly-linked lists,
- * lists, simple queues, tail queues, and circular queues.
+ * This file defines five types of data structures: singly-linked lists,
+ * lists, simple queues, tail queues and XOR simple queues.
*
*
* A singly-linked list is headed by a single forward pointer. The elements
* are singly linked for minimum space and pointer manipulation overhead at
* the expense of O(n) removal for arbitrary elements. New elements can be
* added to the list after an existing element or at the head of the list.
* Elements being removed from the head of the list should use the explicit
* macro for this purpose for optimum efficiency. A singly-linked list may
* only be traversed in the forward direction. Singly-linked lists are ideal
* for applications with large datasets and few or no removals or for
* implementing a LIFO queue.
*
* A list is headed by a single forward pointer (or an array of forward
* pointers for a hash table header). The elements are doubly linked
* so that an arbitrary element can be removed without a need to
* traverse the list. New elements can be added to the list before
* or after an existing element or at the head of the list. A list
* may only be traversed in the forward direction.
*
- * A simple queue is headed by a pair of pointers, one the head of the
+ * A simple queue is headed by a pair of pointers, one to the head of the
* list and the other to the tail of the list. The elements are singly
* linked to save space, so elements can only be removed from the
* head of the list. New elements can be added to the list before or after
* an existing element, at the head of the list, or at the end of the
* list. A simple queue may only be traversed in the forward direction.
*
* A tail queue is headed by a pair of pointers, one to the head of the
* list and the other to the tail of the list. The elements are doubly
* linked so that an arbitrary element can be removed without a need to
* traverse the list. New elements can be added to the list before or
* after an existing element, at the head of the list, or at the end of
* the list. A tail queue may be traversed in either direction.
*
- * A circle queue is headed by a pair of pointers, one to the head of the
- * list and the other to the tail of the list. The elements are doubly
- * linked so that an arbitrary element can be removed without a need to
- * traverse the list. New elements can be added to the list before or after
- * an existing element, at the head of the list, or at the end of the list.
- * A circle queue may be traversed in either direction, but has a more
- * complex end of list detection.
+ * An XOR simple queue is used in the same way as a regular simple queue.
+ * The difference is that the head structure also includes a "cookie" that
+ * is XOR'd with the queue pointer (first, last or next) to generate the
+ * real pointer value.
*
* For details on the use of these macros, see the queue(3) manual page.
*/
#if defined(QUEUE_MACRO_DEBUG) || (defined(_KERNEL) && defined(DIAGNOSTIC))
-#define _Q_INVALIDATE(a) (a) = ((void *)-1)
+#define _Q_INVALID ((void *)-1)
+#define _Q_INVALIDATE(a) (a) = _Q_INVALID
#else
#define _Q_INVALIDATE(a)
#endif
/*
* Singly-linked List definitions.
*/
#define SLIST_HEAD(name, type) \
struct name { \
struct type *slh_first; /* first element */ \
}
-
+
#define SLIST_HEAD_INITIALIZER(head) \
{ NULL }
-
+
#define SLIST_ENTRY(type) \
struct { \
struct type *sle_next; /* next element */ \
}
-
+
/*
* Singly-linked List access methods.
*/
#define SLIST_FIRST(head) ((head)->slh_first)
#define SLIST_END(head) NULL
#define SLIST_EMPTY(head) (SLIST_FIRST(head) == SLIST_END(head))
#define SLIST_NEXT(elm, field) ((elm)->field.sle_next)
#define SLIST_FOREACH(var, head, field) \
for((var) = SLIST_FIRST(head); \
(var) != SLIST_END(head); \
(var) = SLIST_NEXT(var, field))
#define SLIST_FOREACH_SAFE(var, head, field, tvar) \
for ((var) = SLIST_FIRST(head); \
(var) && ((tvar) = SLIST_NEXT(var, field), 1); \
(var) = (tvar))
/*
* Singly-linked List functions.
*/
#define SLIST_INIT(head) { \
SLIST_FIRST(head) = SLIST_END(head); \
}
#define SLIST_INSERT_AFTER(slistelm, elm, field) do { \
(elm)->field.sle_next = (slistelm)->field.sle_next; \
(slistelm)->field.sle_next = (elm); \
} while (0)
#define SLIST_INSERT_HEAD(head, elm, field) do { \
(elm)->field.sle_next = (head)->slh_first; \
(head)->slh_first = (elm); \
} while (0)
#define SLIST_REMOVE_AFTER(elm, field) do { \
(elm)->field.sle_next = (elm)->field.sle_next->field.sle_next; \
} while (0)
#define SLIST_REMOVE_HEAD(head, field) do { \
(head)->slh_first = (head)->slh_first->field.sle_next; \
} while (0)
#define SLIST_REMOVE(head, elm, type, field) do { \
if ((head)->slh_first == (elm)) { \
SLIST_REMOVE_HEAD((head), field); \
} else { \
struct type *curelm = (head)->slh_first; \
\
while (curelm->field.sle_next != (elm)) \
curelm = curelm->field.sle_next; \
curelm->field.sle_next = \
curelm->field.sle_next->field.sle_next; \
- _Q_INVALIDATE((elm)->field.sle_next); \
} \
+ _Q_INVALIDATE((elm)->field.sle_next); \
} while (0)
/*
* List definitions.
*/
#define LIST_HEAD(name, type) \
struct name { \
struct type *lh_first; /* first element */ \
}
#define LIST_HEAD_INITIALIZER(head) \
{ NULL }
#define LIST_ENTRY(type) \
struct { \
struct type *le_next; /* next element */ \
struct type **le_prev; /* address of previous next element */ \
}
/*
- * List access methods
+ * List access methods.
*/
#define LIST_FIRST(head) ((head)->lh_first)
#define LIST_END(head) NULL
#define LIST_EMPTY(head) (LIST_FIRST(head) == LIST_END(head))
#define LIST_NEXT(elm, field) ((elm)->field.le_next)
#define LIST_FOREACH(var, head, field) \
for((var) = LIST_FIRST(head); \
(var)!= LIST_END(head); \
(var) = LIST_NEXT(var, field))
#define LIST_FOREACH_SAFE(var, head, field, tvar) \
for ((var) = LIST_FIRST(head); \
(var) && ((tvar) = LIST_NEXT(var, field), 1); \
(var) = (tvar))
/*
* List functions.
*/
#define LIST_INIT(head) do { \
LIST_FIRST(head) = LIST_END(head); \
} while (0)
#define LIST_INSERT_AFTER(listelm, elm, field) do { \
if (((elm)->field.le_next = (listelm)->field.le_next) != NULL) \
(listelm)->field.le_next->field.le_prev = \
&(elm)->field.le_next; \
(listelm)->field.le_next = (elm); \
(elm)->field.le_prev = &(listelm)->field.le_next; \
} while (0)
#define LIST_INSERT_BEFORE(listelm, elm, field) do { \
(elm)->field.le_prev = (listelm)->field.le_prev; \
(elm)->field.le_next = (listelm); \
*(listelm)->field.le_prev = (elm); \
(listelm)->field.le_prev = &(elm)->field.le_next; \
} while (0)
#define LIST_INSERT_HEAD(head, elm, field) do { \
if (((elm)->field.le_next = (head)->lh_first) != NULL) \
(head)->lh_first->field.le_prev = &(elm)->field.le_next;\
(head)->lh_first = (elm); \
(elm)->field.le_prev = &(head)->lh_first; \
} while (0)
#define LIST_REMOVE(elm, field) do { \
if ((elm)->field.le_next != NULL) \
(elm)->field.le_next->field.le_prev = \
(elm)->field.le_prev; \
*(elm)->field.le_prev = (elm)->field.le_next; \
_Q_INVALIDATE((elm)->field.le_prev); \
_Q_INVALIDATE((elm)->field.le_next); \
} while (0)
#define LIST_REPLACE(elm, elm2, field) do { \
if (((elm2)->field.le_next = (elm)->field.le_next) != NULL) \
(elm2)->field.le_next->field.le_prev = \
&(elm2)->field.le_next; \
(elm2)->field.le_prev = (elm)->field.le_prev; \
*(elm2)->field.le_prev = (elm2); \
_Q_INVALIDATE((elm)->field.le_prev); \
_Q_INVALIDATE((elm)->field.le_next); \
} while (0)
/*
* Simple queue definitions.
*/
#define SIMPLEQ_HEAD(name, type) \
struct name { \
struct type *sqh_first; /* first element */ \
struct type **sqh_last; /* addr of last next element */ \
}
#define SIMPLEQ_HEAD_INITIALIZER(head) \
{ NULL, &(head).sqh_first }
#define SIMPLEQ_ENTRY(type) \
struct { \
struct type *sqe_next; /* next element */ \
}
/*
* Simple queue access methods.
*/
#define SIMPLEQ_FIRST(head) ((head)->sqh_first)
#define SIMPLEQ_END(head) NULL
#define SIMPLEQ_EMPTY(head) (SIMPLEQ_FIRST(head) == SIMPLEQ_END(head))
#define SIMPLEQ_NEXT(elm, field) ((elm)->field.sqe_next)
#define SIMPLEQ_FOREACH(var, head, field) \
for((var) = SIMPLEQ_FIRST(head); \
(var) != SIMPLEQ_END(head); \
(var) = SIMPLEQ_NEXT(var, field))
#define SIMPLEQ_FOREACH_SAFE(var, head, field, tvar) \
for ((var) = SIMPLEQ_FIRST(head); \
(var) && ((tvar) = SIMPLEQ_NEXT(var, field), 1); \
(var) = (tvar))
/*
* Simple queue functions.
*/
#define SIMPLEQ_INIT(head) do { \
(head)->sqh_first = NULL; \
(head)->sqh_last = &(head)->sqh_first; \
} while (0)
#define SIMPLEQ_INSERT_HEAD(head, elm, field) do { \
if (((elm)->field.sqe_next = (head)->sqh_first) == NULL) \
(head)->sqh_last = &(elm)->field.sqe_next; \
(head)->sqh_first = (elm); \
} while (0)
#define SIMPLEQ_INSERT_TAIL(head, elm, field) do { \
(elm)->field.sqe_next = NULL; \
*(head)->sqh_last = (elm); \
(head)->sqh_last = &(elm)->field.sqe_next; \
} while (0)
#define SIMPLEQ_INSERT_AFTER(head, listelm, elm, field) do { \
if (((elm)->field.sqe_next = (listelm)->field.sqe_next) == NULL)\
(head)->sqh_last = &(elm)->field.sqe_next; \
(listelm)->field.sqe_next = (elm); \
} while (0)
#define SIMPLEQ_REMOVE_HEAD(head, field) do { \
if (((head)->sqh_first = (head)->sqh_first->field.sqe_next) == NULL) \
(head)->sqh_last = &(head)->sqh_first; \
} while (0)
#define SIMPLEQ_REMOVE_AFTER(head, elm, field) do { \
if (((elm)->field.sqe_next = (elm)->field.sqe_next->field.sqe_next) \
== NULL) \
(head)->sqh_last = &(elm)->field.sqe_next; \
} while (0)
+#define SIMPLEQ_CONCAT(head1, head2) do { \
+ if (!SIMPLEQ_EMPTY((head2))) { \
+ *(head1)->sqh_last = (head2)->sqh_first; \
+ (head1)->sqh_last = (head2)->sqh_last; \
+ SIMPLEQ_INIT((head2)); \
+ } \
+} while (0)
+
+/*
+ * XOR Simple queue definitions.
+ */
+#define XSIMPLEQ_HEAD(name, type) \
+struct name { \
+ struct type *sqx_first; /* first element */ \
+ struct type **sqx_last; /* addr of last next element */ \
+ unsigned long sqx_cookie; \
+}
+
+#define XSIMPLEQ_ENTRY(type) \
+struct { \
+ struct type *sqx_next; /* next element */ \
+}
+
+/*
+ * XOR Simple queue access methods.
+ */
+#define XSIMPLEQ_XOR(head, ptr) ((__typeof(ptr))((head)->sqx_cookie ^ \
+ (unsigned long)(ptr)))
+#define XSIMPLEQ_FIRST(head) XSIMPLEQ_XOR(head, ((head)->sqx_first))
+#define XSIMPLEQ_END(head) NULL
+#define XSIMPLEQ_EMPTY(head) (XSIMPLEQ_FIRST(head) == XSIMPLEQ_END(head))
+#define XSIMPLEQ_NEXT(head, elm, field) XSIMPLEQ_XOR(head, ((elm)->field.sqx_next))
+
+
+#define XSIMPLEQ_FOREACH(var, head, field) \
+ for ((var) = XSIMPLEQ_FIRST(head); \
+ (var) != XSIMPLEQ_END(head); \
+ (var) = XSIMPLEQ_NEXT(head, var, field))
+
+#define XSIMPLEQ_FOREACH_SAFE(var, head, field, tvar) \
+ for ((var) = XSIMPLEQ_FIRST(head); \
+ (var) && ((tvar) = XSIMPLEQ_NEXT(head, var, field), 1); \
+ (var) = (tvar))
+
+/*
+ * XOR Simple queue functions.
+ */
+#define XSIMPLEQ_INIT(head) do { \
+ arc4random_buf(&(head)->sqx_cookie, sizeof((head)->sqx_cookie)); \
+ (head)->sqx_first = XSIMPLEQ_XOR(head, NULL); \
+ (head)->sqx_last = XSIMPLEQ_XOR(head, &(head)->sqx_first); \
+} while (0)
+
+#define XSIMPLEQ_INSERT_HEAD(head, elm, field) do { \
+ if (((elm)->field.sqx_next = (head)->sqx_first) == \
+ XSIMPLEQ_XOR(head, NULL)) \
+ (head)->sqx_last = XSIMPLEQ_XOR(head, &(elm)->field.sqx_next); \
+ (head)->sqx_first = XSIMPLEQ_XOR(head, (elm)); \
+} while (0)
+
+#define XSIMPLEQ_INSERT_TAIL(head, elm, field) do { \
+ (elm)->field.sqx_next = XSIMPLEQ_XOR(head, NULL); \
+ *(XSIMPLEQ_XOR(head, (head)->sqx_last)) = XSIMPLEQ_XOR(head, (elm)); \
+ (head)->sqx_last = XSIMPLEQ_XOR(head, &(elm)->field.sqx_next); \
+} while (0)
+
+#define XSIMPLEQ_INSERT_AFTER(head, listelm, elm, field) do { \
+ if (((elm)->field.sqx_next = (listelm)->field.sqx_next) == \
+ XSIMPLEQ_XOR(head, NULL)) \
+ (head)->sqx_last = XSIMPLEQ_XOR(head, &(elm)->field.sqx_next); \
+ (listelm)->field.sqx_next = XSIMPLEQ_XOR(head, (elm)); \
+} while (0)
+
+#define XSIMPLEQ_REMOVE_HEAD(head, field) do { \
+ if (((head)->sqx_first = XSIMPLEQ_XOR(head, \
+ (head)->sqx_first)->field.sqx_next) == XSIMPLEQ_XOR(head, NULL)) \
+ (head)->sqx_last = XSIMPLEQ_XOR(head, &(head)->sqx_first); \
+} while (0)
+
+#define XSIMPLEQ_REMOVE_AFTER(head, elm, field) do { \
+ if (((elm)->field.sqx_next = XSIMPLEQ_XOR(head, \
+ (elm)->field.sqx_next)->field.sqx_next) \
+ == XSIMPLEQ_XOR(head, NULL)) \
+ (head)->sqx_last = \
+ XSIMPLEQ_XOR(head, &(elm)->field.sqx_next); \
+} while (0)
+
+
/*
* Tail queue definitions.
*/
#define TAILQ_HEAD(name, type) \
struct name { \
struct type *tqh_first; /* first element */ \
struct type **tqh_last; /* addr of last next element */ \
}
#define TAILQ_HEAD_INITIALIZER(head) \
{ NULL, &(head).tqh_first }
#define TAILQ_ENTRY(type) \
struct { \
struct type *tqe_next; /* next element */ \
struct type **tqe_prev; /* address of previous next element */ \
}
-/*
- * tail queue access methods
+/*
+ * Tail queue access methods.
*/
#define TAILQ_FIRST(head) ((head)->tqh_first)
#define TAILQ_END(head) NULL
#define TAILQ_NEXT(elm, field) ((elm)->field.tqe_next)
#define TAILQ_LAST(head, headname) \
(*(((struct headname *)((head)->tqh_last))->tqh_last))
/* XXX */
#define TAILQ_PREV(elm, headname, field) \
(*(((struct headname *)((elm)->field.tqe_prev))->tqh_last))
#define TAILQ_EMPTY(head) \
(TAILQ_FIRST(head) == TAILQ_END(head))
#define TAILQ_FOREACH(var, head, field) \
for((var) = TAILQ_FIRST(head); \
(var) != TAILQ_END(head); \
(var) = TAILQ_NEXT(var, field))
#define TAILQ_FOREACH_SAFE(var, head, field, tvar) \
for ((var) = TAILQ_FIRST(head); \
(var) != TAILQ_END(head) && \
((tvar) = TAILQ_NEXT(var, field), 1); \
(var) = (tvar))
#define TAILQ_FOREACH_REVERSE(var, head, headname, field) \
for((var) = TAILQ_LAST(head, headname); \
(var) != TAILQ_END(head); \
(var) = TAILQ_PREV(var, headname, field))
#define TAILQ_FOREACH_REVERSE_SAFE(var, head, headname, field, tvar) \
for ((var) = TAILQ_LAST(head, headname); \
(var) != TAILQ_END(head) && \
((tvar) = TAILQ_PREV(var, headname, field), 1); \
(var) = (tvar))
/*
* Tail queue functions.
*/
#define TAILQ_INIT(head) do { \
(head)->tqh_first = NULL; \
(head)->tqh_last = &(head)->tqh_first; \
} while (0)
#define TAILQ_INSERT_HEAD(head, elm, field) do { \
if (((elm)->field.tqe_next = (head)->tqh_first) != NULL) \
(head)->tqh_first->field.tqe_prev = \
&(elm)->field.tqe_next; \
else \
(head)->tqh_last = &(elm)->field.tqe_next; \
(head)->tqh_first = (elm); \
(elm)->field.tqe_prev = &(head)->tqh_first; \
} while (0)
#define TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(head, elm, field) do { \
(elm)->field.tqe_next = NULL; \
(elm)->field.tqe_prev = (head)->tqh_last; \
*(head)->tqh_last = (elm); \
(head)->tqh_last = &(elm)->field.tqe_next; \
} while (0)
#define TAILQ_INSERT_AFTER(head, listelm, elm, field) do { \
if (((elm)->field.tqe_next = (listelm)->field.tqe_next) != NULL)\
(elm)->field.tqe_next->field.tqe_prev = \
&(elm)->field.tqe_next; \
else \
(head)->tqh_last = &(elm)->field.tqe_next; \
(listelm)->field.tqe_next = (elm); \
(elm)->field.tqe_prev = &(listelm)->field.tqe_next; \
} while (0)
#define TAILQ_INSERT_BEFORE(listelm, elm, field) do { \
(elm)->field.tqe_prev = (listelm)->field.tqe_prev; \
(elm)->field.tqe_next = (listelm); \
*(listelm)->field.tqe_prev = (elm); \
(listelm)->field.tqe_prev = &(elm)->field.tqe_next; \
} while (0)
#define TAILQ_REMOVE(head, elm, field) do { \
if (((elm)->field.tqe_next) != NULL) \
(elm)->field.tqe_next->field.tqe_prev = \
(elm)->field.tqe_prev; \
else \
(head)->tqh_last = (elm)->field.tqe_prev; \
*(elm)->field.tqe_prev = (elm)->field.tqe_next; \
_Q_INVALIDATE((elm)->field.tqe_prev); \
_Q_INVALIDATE((elm)->field.tqe_next); \
} while (0)
#define TAILQ_REPLACE(head, elm, elm2, field) do { \
if (((elm2)->field.tqe_next = (elm)->field.tqe_next) != NULL) \
(elm2)->field.tqe_next->field.tqe_prev = \
&(elm2)->field.tqe_next; \
else \
(head)->tqh_last = &(elm2)->field.tqe_next; \
(elm2)->field.tqe_prev = (elm)->field.tqe_prev; \
*(elm2)->field.tqe_prev = (elm2); \
_Q_INVALIDATE((elm)->field.tqe_prev); \
_Q_INVALIDATE((elm)->field.tqe_next); \
} while (0)
-/*
- * Circular queue definitions.
- */
-#define CIRCLEQ_HEAD(name, type) \
-struct name { \
- struct type *cqh_first; /* first element */ \
- struct type *cqh_last; /* last element */ \
-}
-
-#define CIRCLEQ_HEAD_INITIALIZER(head) \
- { CIRCLEQ_END(&head), CIRCLEQ_END(&head) }
-
-#define CIRCLEQ_ENTRY(type) \
-struct { \
- struct type *cqe_next; /* next element */ \
- struct type *cqe_prev; /* previous element */ \
-}
-
-/*
- * Circular queue access methods
- */
-#define CIRCLEQ_FIRST(head) ((head)->cqh_first)
-#define CIRCLEQ_LAST(head) ((head)->cqh_last)
-#define CIRCLEQ_END(head) ((void *)(head))
-#define CIRCLEQ_NEXT(elm, field) ((elm)->field.cqe_next)
-#define CIRCLEQ_PREV(elm, field) ((elm)->field.cqe_prev)
-#define CIRCLEQ_EMPTY(head) \
- (CIRCLEQ_FIRST(head) == CIRCLEQ_END(head))
-
-#define CIRCLEQ_FOREACH(var, head, field) \
- for((var) = CIRCLEQ_FIRST(head); \
- (var) != CIRCLEQ_END(head); \
- (var) = CIRCLEQ_NEXT(var, field))
-
-#define CIRCLEQ_FOREACH_SAFE(var, head, field, tvar) \
- for ((var) = CIRCLEQ_FIRST(head); \
- (var) != CIRCLEQ_END(head) && \
- ((tvar) = CIRCLEQ_NEXT(var, field), 1); \
- (var) = (tvar))
-
-#define CIRCLEQ_FOREACH_REVERSE(var, head, field) \
- for((var) = CIRCLEQ_LAST(head); \
- (var) != CIRCLEQ_END(head); \
- (var) = CIRCLEQ_PREV(var, field))
-
-#define CIRCLEQ_FOREACH_REVERSE_SAFE(var, head, headname, field, tvar) \
- for ((var) = CIRCLEQ_LAST(head, headname); \
- (var) != CIRCLEQ_END(head) && \
- ((tvar) = CIRCLEQ_PREV(var, headname, field), 1); \
- (var) = (tvar))
-
-/*
- * Circular queue functions.
- */
-#define CIRCLEQ_INIT(head) do { \
- (head)->cqh_first = CIRCLEQ_END(head); \
- (head)->cqh_last = CIRCLEQ_END(head); \
-} while (0)
-
-#define CIRCLEQ_INSERT_AFTER(head, listelm, elm, field) do { \
- (elm)->field.cqe_next = (listelm)->field.cqe_next; \
- (elm)->field.cqe_prev = (listelm); \
- if ((listelm)->field.cqe_next == CIRCLEQ_END(head)) \
- (head)->cqh_last = (elm); \
- else \
- (listelm)->field.cqe_next->field.cqe_prev = (elm); \
- (listelm)->field.cqe_next = (elm); \
-} while (0)
-
-#define CIRCLEQ_INSERT_BEFORE(head, listelm, elm, field) do { \
- (elm)->field.cqe_next = (listelm); \
- (elm)->field.cqe_prev = (listelm)->field.cqe_prev; \
- if ((listelm)->field.cqe_prev == CIRCLEQ_END(head)) \
- (head)->cqh_first = (elm); \
- else \
- (listelm)->field.cqe_prev->field.cqe_next = (elm); \
- (listelm)->field.cqe_prev = (elm); \
-} while (0)
-
-#define CIRCLEQ_INSERT_HEAD(head, elm, field) do { \
- (elm)->field.cqe_next = (head)->cqh_first; \
- (elm)->field.cqe_prev = CIRCLEQ_END(head); \
- if ((head)->cqh_last == CIRCLEQ_END(head)) \
- (head)->cqh_last = (elm); \
- else \
- (head)->cqh_first->field.cqe_prev = (elm); \
- (head)->cqh_first = (elm); \
-} while (0)
-
-#define CIRCLEQ_INSERT_TAIL(head, elm, field) do { \
- (elm)->field.cqe_next = CIRCLEQ_END(head); \
- (elm)->field.cqe_prev = (head)->cqh_last; \
- if ((head)->cqh_first == CIRCLEQ_END(head)) \
- (head)->cqh_first = (elm); \
- else \
- (head)->cqh_last->field.cqe_next = (elm); \
- (head)->cqh_last = (elm); \
-} while (0)
-
-#define CIRCLEQ_REMOVE(head, elm, field) do { \
- if ((elm)->field.cqe_next == CIRCLEQ_END(head)) \
- (head)->cqh_last = (elm)->field.cqe_prev; \
- else \
- (elm)->field.cqe_next->field.cqe_prev = \
- (elm)->field.cqe_prev; \
- if ((elm)->field.cqe_prev == CIRCLEQ_END(head)) \
- (head)->cqh_first = (elm)->field.cqe_next; \
- else \
- (elm)->field.cqe_prev->field.cqe_next = \
- (elm)->field.cqe_next; \
- _Q_INVALIDATE((elm)->field.cqe_prev); \
- _Q_INVALIDATE((elm)->field.cqe_next); \
-} while (0)
-
-#define CIRCLEQ_REPLACE(head, elm, elm2, field) do { \
- if (((elm2)->field.cqe_next = (elm)->field.cqe_next) == \
- CIRCLEQ_END(head)) \
- (head).cqh_last = (elm2); \
- else \
- (elm2)->field.cqe_next->field.cqe_prev = (elm2); \
- if (((elm2)->field.cqe_prev = (elm)->field.cqe_prev) == \
- CIRCLEQ_END(head)) \
- (head).cqh_first = (elm2); \
- else \
- (elm2)->field.cqe_prev->field.cqe_next = (elm2); \
- _Q_INVALIDATE((elm)->field.cqe_prev); \
- _Q_INVALIDATE((elm)->field.cqe_next); \
+#define TAILQ_CONCAT(head1, head2, field) do { \
+ if (!TAILQ_EMPTY(head2)) { \
+ *(head1)->tqh_last = (head2)->tqh_first; \
+ (head2)->tqh_first->field.tqe_prev = (head1)->tqh_last; \
+ (head1)->tqh_last = (head2)->tqh_last; \
+ TAILQ_INIT((head2)); \
+ } \
} while (0)
-#endif /* !_FAKE_QUEUE_H_ */
+#endif /* !_SYS_QUEUE_H_ */
diff --git a/packet.c b/packet.c
index e7abb3416060..00e3180cb0ab 100644
--- a/packet.c
+++ b/packet.c
@@ -1,2742 +1,2747 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: packet.c,v 1.291 2020/03/06 18:20:44 markus Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: packet.c,v 1.296 2020/07/05 23:59:45 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
* Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
* All rights reserved
* This file contains code implementing the packet protocol and communication
* with the other side. This same code is used both on client and server side.
*
* As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
* can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this
* software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
* incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
* called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
*
*
* SSH2 packet format added by Markus Friedl.
* Copyright (c) 2000, 2001 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
* OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
* IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
* INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
* NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
* DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
* THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
* (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
* THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
*/
#include "includes.h"
#include <sys/types.h>
#include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h"
#include <sys/socket.h>
#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TIME_H
# include <sys/time.h>
#endif
#include <netinet/in.h>
#include <netinet/ip.h>
#include <arpa/inet.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include <netdb.h>
#include <stdarg.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <limits.h>
#ifdef HAVE_POLL_H
#include <poll.h>
#endif
#include <signal.h>
#include <time.h>
/*
* Explicitly include OpenSSL before zlib as some versions of OpenSSL have
* "free_func" in their headers, which zlib typedefs.
*/
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
# include <openssl/bn.h>
# include <openssl/evp.h>
# ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
# include <openssl/ec.h>
# endif
#endif
#ifdef WITH_ZLIB
#include <zlib.h>
#endif
#include "xmalloc.h"
#include "compat.h"
#include "ssh2.h"
#include "cipher.h"
#include "sshkey.h"
#include "kex.h"
#include "digest.h"
#include "mac.h"
#include "log.h"
#include "canohost.h"
#include "misc.h"
#include "channels.h"
#include "ssh.h"
#include "packet.h"
#include "ssherr.h"
#include "sshbuf.h"
#ifdef PACKET_DEBUG
#define DBG(x) x
#else
#define DBG(x)
#endif
#define PACKET_MAX_SIZE (256 * 1024)
struct packet_state {
u_int32_t seqnr;
u_int32_t packets;
u_int64_t blocks;
u_int64_t bytes;
};
struct packet {
TAILQ_ENTRY(packet) next;
u_char type;
struct sshbuf *payload;
};
struct session_state {
/*
* This variable contains the file descriptors used for
* communicating with the other side. connection_in is used for
* reading; connection_out for writing. These can be the same
* descriptor, in which case it is assumed to be a socket.
*/
int connection_in;
int connection_out;
/* Protocol flags for the remote side. */
u_int remote_protocol_flags;
/* Encryption context for receiving data. Only used for decryption. */
struct sshcipher_ctx *receive_context;
/* Encryption context for sending data. Only used for encryption. */
struct sshcipher_ctx *send_context;
/* Buffer for raw input data from the socket. */
struct sshbuf *input;
/* Buffer for raw output data going to the socket. */
struct sshbuf *output;
/* Buffer for the partial outgoing packet being constructed. */
struct sshbuf *outgoing_packet;
/* Buffer for the incoming packet currently being processed. */
struct sshbuf *incoming_packet;
/* Scratch buffer for packet compression/decompression. */
struct sshbuf *compression_buffer;
#ifdef WITH_ZLIB
/* Incoming/outgoing compression dictionaries */
z_stream compression_in_stream;
z_stream compression_out_stream;
#endif
int compression_in_started;
int compression_out_started;
int compression_in_failures;
int compression_out_failures;
/* default maximum packet size */
u_int max_packet_size;
/* Flag indicating whether this module has been initialized. */
int initialized;
/* Set to true if the connection is interactive. */
int interactive_mode;
/* Set to true if we are the server side. */
int server_side;
/* Set to true if we are authenticated. */
int after_authentication;
int keep_alive_timeouts;
/* The maximum time that we will wait to send or receive a packet */
int packet_timeout_ms;
/* Session key information for Encryption and MAC */
struct newkeys *newkeys[MODE_MAX];
struct packet_state p_read, p_send;
/* Volume-based rekeying */
u_int64_t max_blocks_in, max_blocks_out, rekey_limit;
/* Time-based rekeying */
u_int32_t rekey_interval; /* how often in seconds */
time_t rekey_time; /* time of last rekeying */
/* roundup current message to extra_pad bytes */
u_char extra_pad;
/* XXX discard incoming data after MAC error */
u_int packet_discard;
size_t packet_discard_mac_already;
struct sshmac *packet_discard_mac;
/* Used in packet_read_poll2() */
u_int packlen;
/* Used in packet_send2 */
int rekeying;
/* Used in ssh_packet_send_mux() */
int mux;
/* Used in packet_set_interactive */
int set_interactive_called;
/* Used in packet_set_maxsize */
int set_maxsize_called;
/* One-off warning about weak ciphers */
int cipher_warning_done;
/* Hook for fuzzing inbound packets */
ssh_packet_hook_fn *hook_in;
void *hook_in_ctx;
TAILQ_HEAD(, packet) outgoing;
};
struct ssh *
ssh_alloc_session_state(void)
{
struct ssh *ssh = NULL;
struct session_state *state = NULL;
if ((ssh = calloc(1, sizeof(*ssh))) == NULL ||
(state = calloc(1, sizeof(*state))) == NULL ||
(ssh->kex = kex_new()) == NULL ||
(state->input = sshbuf_new()) == NULL ||
(state->output = sshbuf_new()) == NULL ||
(state->outgoing_packet = sshbuf_new()) == NULL ||
(state->incoming_packet = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
goto fail;
TAILQ_INIT(&state->outgoing);
TAILQ_INIT(&ssh->private_keys);
TAILQ_INIT(&ssh->public_keys);
state->connection_in = -1;
state->connection_out = -1;
state->max_packet_size = 32768;
state->packet_timeout_ms = -1;
state->p_send.packets = state->p_read.packets = 0;
state->initialized = 1;
/*
* ssh_packet_send2() needs to queue packets until
* we've done the initial key exchange.
*/
state->rekeying = 1;
ssh->state = state;
return ssh;
fail:
if (ssh) {
kex_free(ssh->kex);
free(ssh);
}
if (state) {
sshbuf_free(state->input);
sshbuf_free(state->output);
sshbuf_free(state->incoming_packet);
sshbuf_free(state->outgoing_packet);
free(state);
}
return NULL;
}
void
ssh_packet_set_input_hook(struct ssh *ssh, ssh_packet_hook_fn *hook, void *ctx)
{
ssh->state->hook_in = hook;
ssh->state->hook_in_ctx = ctx;
}
/* Returns nonzero if rekeying is in progress */
int
ssh_packet_is_rekeying(struct ssh *ssh)
{
- return ssh->state->rekeying || ssh->kex->done == 0;
+ return ssh->state->rekeying ||
+ (ssh->kex != NULL && ssh->kex->done == 0);
}
/*
* Sets the descriptors used for communication.
*/
struct ssh *
ssh_packet_set_connection(struct ssh *ssh, int fd_in, int fd_out)
{
struct session_state *state;
const struct sshcipher *none = cipher_by_name("none");
int r;
if (none == NULL) {
error("%s: cannot load cipher 'none'", __func__);
return NULL;
}
if (ssh == NULL)
ssh = ssh_alloc_session_state();
if (ssh == NULL) {
error("%s: could not allocate state", __func__);
return NULL;
}
state = ssh->state;
state->connection_in = fd_in;
state->connection_out = fd_out;
if ((r = cipher_init(&state->send_context, none,
(const u_char *)"", 0, NULL, 0, CIPHER_ENCRYPT)) != 0 ||
(r = cipher_init(&state->receive_context, none,
(const u_char *)"", 0, NULL, 0, CIPHER_DECRYPT)) != 0) {
error("%s: cipher_init failed: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
free(ssh); /* XXX need ssh_free_session_state? */
return NULL;
}
state->newkeys[MODE_IN] = state->newkeys[MODE_OUT] = NULL;
/*
* Cache the IP address of the remote connection for use in error
* messages that might be generated after the connection has closed.
*/
(void)ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh);
return ssh;
}
void
ssh_packet_set_timeout(struct ssh *ssh, int timeout, int count)
{
struct session_state *state = ssh->state;
if (timeout <= 0 || count <= 0) {
state->packet_timeout_ms = -1;
return;
}
if ((INT_MAX / 1000) / count < timeout)
state->packet_timeout_ms = INT_MAX;
else
state->packet_timeout_ms = timeout * count * 1000;
}
void
ssh_packet_set_mux(struct ssh *ssh)
{
ssh->state->mux = 1;
ssh->state->rekeying = 0;
+ kex_free(ssh->kex);
+ ssh->kex = NULL;
}
int
ssh_packet_get_mux(struct ssh *ssh)
{
return ssh->state->mux;
}
int
ssh_packet_set_log_preamble(struct ssh *ssh, const char *fmt, ...)
{
va_list args;
int r;
free(ssh->log_preamble);
if (fmt == NULL)
ssh->log_preamble = NULL;
else {
va_start(args, fmt);
r = vasprintf(&ssh->log_preamble, fmt, args);
va_end(args);
if (r < 0 || ssh->log_preamble == NULL)
return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
}
return 0;
}
int
ssh_packet_stop_discard(struct ssh *ssh)
{
struct session_state *state = ssh->state;
int r;
if (state->packet_discard_mac) {
char buf[1024];
size_t dlen = PACKET_MAX_SIZE;
if (dlen > state->packet_discard_mac_already)
dlen -= state->packet_discard_mac_already;
memset(buf, 'a', sizeof(buf));
while (sshbuf_len(state->incoming_packet) < dlen)
if ((r = sshbuf_put(state->incoming_packet, buf,
sizeof(buf))) != 0)
return r;
(void) mac_compute(state->packet_discard_mac,
state->p_read.seqnr,
sshbuf_ptr(state->incoming_packet), dlen,
NULL, 0);
}
logit("Finished discarding for %.200s port %d",
ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), ssh_remote_port(ssh));
return SSH_ERR_MAC_INVALID;
}
static int
ssh_packet_start_discard(struct ssh *ssh, struct sshenc *enc,
struct sshmac *mac, size_t mac_already, u_int discard)
{
struct session_state *state = ssh->state;
int r;
if (enc == NULL || !cipher_is_cbc(enc->cipher) || (mac && mac->etm)) {
if ((r = sshpkt_disconnect(ssh, "Packet corrupt")) != 0)
return r;
return SSH_ERR_MAC_INVALID;
}
/*
* Record number of bytes over which the mac has already
* been computed in order to minimize timing attacks.
*/
if (mac && mac->enabled) {
state->packet_discard_mac = mac;
state->packet_discard_mac_already = mac_already;
}
if (sshbuf_len(state->input) >= discard)
return ssh_packet_stop_discard(ssh);
state->packet_discard = discard - sshbuf_len(state->input);
return 0;
}
/* Returns 1 if remote host is connected via socket, 0 if not. */
int
ssh_packet_connection_is_on_socket(struct ssh *ssh)
{
struct session_state *state;
struct sockaddr_storage from, to;
socklen_t fromlen, tolen;
if (ssh == NULL || ssh->state == NULL)
return 0;
state = ssh->state;
if (state->connection_in == -1 || state->connection_out == -1)
return 0;
/* filedescriptors in and out are the same, so it's a socket */
if (state->connection_in == state->connection_out)
return 1;
fromlen = sizeof(from);
memset(&from, 0, sizeof(from));
if (getpeername(state->connection_in, (struct sockaddr *)&from,
&fromlen) == -1)
return 0;
tolen = sizeof(to);
memset(&to, 0, sizeof(to));
if (getpeername(state->connection_out, (struct sockaddr *)&to,
&tolen) == -1)
return 0;
if (fromlen != tolen || memcmp(&from, &to, fromlen) != 0)
return 0;
if (from.ss_family != AF_INET && from.ss_family != AF_INET6)
return 0;
return 1;
}
void
ssh_packet_get_bytes(struct ssh *ssh, u_int64_t *ibytes, u_int64_t *obytes)
{
if (ibytes)
*ibytes = ssh->state->p_read.bytes;
if (obytes)
*obytes = ssh->state->p_send.bytes;
}
int
ssh_packet_connection_af(struct ssh *ssh)
{
struct sockaddr_storage to;
socklen_t tolen = sizeof(to);
memset(&to, 0, sizeof(to));
if (getsockname(ssh->state->connection_out, (struct sockaddr *)&to,
&tolen) == -1)
return 0;
#ifdef IPV4_IN_IPV6
if (to.ss_family == AF_INET6 &&
IN6_IS_ADDR_V4MAPPED(&((struct sockaddr_in6 *)&to)->sin6_addr))
return AF_INET;
#endif
return to.ss_family;
}
/* Sets the connection into non-blocking mode. */
void
ssh_packet_set_nonblocking(struct ssh *ssh)
{
/* Set the socket into non-blocking mode. */
set_nonblock(ssh->state->connection_in);
if (ssh->state->connection_out != ssh->state->connection_in)
set_nonblock(ssh->state->connection_out);
}
/* Returns the socket used for reading. */
int
ssh_packet_get_connection_in(struct ssh *ssh)
{
return ssh->state->connection_in;
}
/* Returns the descriptor used for writing. */
int
ssh_packet_get_connection_out(struct ssh *ssh)
{
return ssh->state->connection_out;
}
/*
* Returns the IP-address of the remote host as a string. The returned
* string must not be freed.
*/
const char *
ssh_remote_ipaddr(struct ssh *ssh)
{
int sock;
/* Check whether we have cached the ipaddr. */
if (ssh->remote_ipaddr == NULL) {
if (ssh_packet_connection_is_on_socket(ssh)) {
sock = ssh->state->connection_in;
ssh->remote_ipaddr = get_peer_ipaddr(sock);
ssh->remote_port = get_peer_port(sock);
ssh->local_ipaddr = get_local_ipaddr(sock);
ssh->local_port = get_local_port(sock);
} else {
ssh->remote_ipaddr = xstrdup("UNKNOWN");
ssh->remote_port = 65535;
ssh->local_ipaddr = xstrdup("UNKNOWN");
ssh->local_port = 65535;
}
}
return ssh->remote_ipaddr;
}
/* Returns the port number of the remote host. */
int
ssh_remote_port(struct ssh *ssh)
{
(void)ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh); /* Will lookup and cache. */
return ssh->remote_port;
}
/*
* Returns the IP-address of the local host as a string. The returned
* string must not be freed.
*/
const char *
ssh_local_ipaddr(struct ssh *ssh)
{
(void)ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh); /* Will lookup and cache. */
return ssh->local_ipaddr;
}
/* Returns the port number of the local host. */
int
ssh_local_port(struct ssh *ssh)
{
(void)ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh); /* Will lookup and cache. */
return ssh->local_port;
}
/* Returns the routing domain of the input socket, or NULL if unavailable */
const char *
ssh_packet_rdomain_in(struct ssh *ssh)
{
if (ssh->rdomain_in != NULL)
return ssh->rdomain_in;
if (!ssh_packet_connection_is_on_socket(ssh))
return NULL;
ssh->rdomain_in = get_rdomain(ssh->state->connection_in);
return ssh->rdomain_in;
}
/* Closes the connection and clears and frees internal data structures. */
static void
ssh_packet_close_internal(struct ssh *ssh, int do_close)
{
struct session_state *state = ssh->state;
u_int mode;
if (!state->initialized)
return;
state->initialized = 0;
if (do_close) {
if (state->connection_in == state->connection_out) {
close(state->connection_out);
} else {
close(state->connection_in);
close(state->connection_out);
}
}
sshbuf_free(state->input);
sshbuf_free(state->output);
sshbuf_free(state->outgoing_packet);
sshbuf_free(state->incoming_packet);
for (mode = 0; mode < MODE_MAX; mode++) {
kex_free_newkeys(state->newkeys[mode]); /* current keys */
state->newkeys[mode] = NULL;
ssh_clear_newkeys(ssh, mode); /* next keys */
}
#ifdef WITH_ZLIB
/* compression state is in shared mem, so we can only release it once */
if (do_close && state->compression_buffer) {
sshbuf_free(state->compression_buffer);
if (state->compression_out_started) {
z_streamp stream = &state->compression_out_stream;
debug("compress outgoing: "
"raw data %llu, compressed %llu, factor %.2f",
(unsigned long long)stream->total_in,
(unsigned long long)stream->total_out,
stream->total_in == 0 ? 0.0 :
(double) stream->total_out / stream->total_in);
if (state->compression_out_failures == 0)
deflateEnd(stream);
}
if (state->compression_in_started) {
z_streamp stream = &state->compression_in_stream;
debug("compress incoming: "
"raw data %llu, compressed %llu, factor %.2f",
(unsigned long long)stream->total_out,
(unsigned long long)stream->total_in,
stream->total_out == 0 ? 0.0 :
(double) stream->total_in / stream->total_out);
if (state->compression_in_failures == 0)
inflateEnd(stream);
}
}
#endif /* WITH_ZLIB */
cipher_free(state->send_context);
cipher_free(state->receive_context);
state->send_context = state->receive_context = NULL;
if (do_close) {
free(ssh->local_ipaddr);
ssh->local_ipaddr = NULL;
free(ssh->remote_ipaddr);
ssh->remote_ipaddr = NULL;
free(ssh->state);
ssh->state = NULL;
+ kex_free(ssh->kex);
+ ssh->kex = NULL;
}
}
void
ssh_packet_close(struct ssh *ssh)
{
ssh_packet_close_internal(ssh, 1);
}
void
ssh_packet_clear_keys(struct ssh *ssh)
{
ssh_packet_close_internal(ssh, 0);
}
/* Sets remote side protocol flags. */
void
ssh_packet_set_protocol_flags(struct ssh *ssh, u_int protocol_flags)
{
ssh->state->remote_protocol_flags = protocol_flags;
}
/* Returns the remote protocol flags set earlier by the above function. */
u_int
ssh_packet_get_protocol_flags(struct ssh *ssh)
{
return ssh->state->remote_protocol_flags;
}
/*
* Starts packet compression from the next packet on in both directions.
* Level is compression level 1 (fastest) - 9 (slow, best) as in gzip.
*/
static int
ssh_packet_init_compression(struct ssh *ssh)
{
if (!ssh->state->compression_buffer &&
((ssh->state->compression_buffer = sshbuf_new()) == NULL))
return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
return 0;
}
#ifdef WITH_ZLIB
static int
start_compression_out(struct ssh *ssh, int level)
{
if (level < 1 || level > 9)
return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
debug("Enabling compression at level %d.", level);
if (ssh->state->compression_out_started == 1)
deflateEnd(&ssh->state->compression_out_stream);
switch (deflateInit(&ssh->state->compression_out_stream, level)) {
case Z_OK:
ssh->state->compression_out_started = 1;
break;
case Z_MEM_ERROR:
return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
default:
return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
}
return 0;
}
static int
start_compression_in(struct ssh *ssh)
{
if (ssh->state->compression_in_started == 1)
inflateEnd(&ssh->state->compression_in_stream);
switch (inflateInit(&ssh->state->compression_in_stream)) {
case Z_OK:
ssh->state->compression_in_started = 1;
break;
case Z_MEM_ERROR:
return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
default:
return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
}
return 0;
}
/* XXX remove need for separate compression buffer */
static int
compress_buffer(struct ssh *ssh, struct sshbuf *in, struct sshbuf *out)
{
u_char buf[4096];
int r, status;
if (ssh->state->compression_out_started != 1)
return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
/* This case is not handled below. */
if (sshbuf_len(in) == 0)
return 0;
/* Input is the contents of the input buffer. */
if ((ssh->state->compression_out_stream.next_in =
sshbuf_mutable_ptr(in)) == NULL)
return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
ssh->state->compression_out_stream.avail_in = sshbuf_len(in);
/* Loop compressing until deflate() returns with avail_out != 0. */
do {
/* Set up fixed-size output buffer. */
ssh->state->compression_out_stream.next_out = buf;
ssh->state->compression_out_stream.avail_out = sizeof(buf);
/* Compress as much data into the buffer as possible. */
status = deflate(&ssh->state->compression_out_stream,
Z_PARTIAL_FLUSH);
switch (status) {
case Z_MEM_ERROR:
return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
case Z_OK:
/* Append compressed data to output_buffer. */
if ((r = sshbuf_put(out, buf, sizeof(buf) -
ssh->state->compression_out_stream.avail_out)) != 0)
return r;
break;
case Z_STREAM_ERROR:
default:
ssh->state->compression_out_failures++;
return SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
}
} while (ssh->state->compression_out_stream.avail_out == 0);
return 0;
}
static int
uncompress_buffer(struct ssh *ssh, struct sshbuf *in, struct sshbuf *out)
{
u_char buf[4096];
int r, status;
if (ssh->state->compression_in_started != 1)
return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
if ((ssh->state->compression_in_stream.next_in =
sshbuf_mutable_ptr(in)) == NULL)
return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
ssh->state->compression_in_stream.avail_in = sshbuf_len(in);
for (;;) {
/* Set up fixed-size output buffer. */
ssh->state->compression_in_stream.next_out = buf;
ssh->state->compression_in_stream.avail_out = sizeof(buf);
status = inflate(&ssh->state->compression_in_stream,
Z_PARTIAL_FLUSH);
switch (status) {
case Z_OK:
if ((r = sshbuf_put(out, buf, sizeof(buf) -
ssh->state->compression_in_stream.avail_out)) != 0)
return r;
break;
case Z_BUF_ERROR:
/*
* Comments in zlib.h say that we should keep calling
* inflate() until we get an error. This appears to
* be the error that we get.
*/
return 0;
case Z_DATA_ERROR:
return SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
case Z_MEM_ERROR:
return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
case Z_STREAM_ERROR:
default:
ssh->state->compression_in_failures++;
return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
}
}
/* NOTREACHED */
}
#else /* WITH_ZLIB */
static int
start_compression_out(struct ssh *ssh, int level)
{
return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
}
static int
start_compression_in(struct ssh *ssh)
{
return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
}
static int
compress_buffer(struct ssh *ssh, struct sshbuf *in, struct sshbuf *out)
{
return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
}
static int
uncompress_buffer(struct ssh *ssh, struct sshbuf *in, struct sshbuf *out)
{
return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
}
#endif /* WITH_ZLIB */
void
ssh_clear_newkeys(struct ssh *ssh, int mode)
{
if (ssh->kex && ssh->kex->newkeys[mode]) {
kex_free_newkeys(ssh->kex->newkeys[mode]);
ssh->kex->newkeys[mode] = NULL;
}
}
int
ssh_set_newkeys(struct ssh *ssh, int mode)
{
struct session_state *state = ssh->state;
struct sshenc *enc;
struct sshmac *mac;
struct sshcomp *comp;
struct sshcipher_ctx **ccp;
struct packet_state *ps;
u_int64_t *max_blocks;
const char *wmsg;
int r, crypt_type;
const char *dir = mode == MODE_OUT ? "out" : "in";
debug2("set_newkeys: mode %d", mode);
if (mode == MODE_OUT) {
ccp = &state->send_context;
crypt_type = CIPHER_ENCRYPT;
ps = &state->p_send;
max_blocks = &state->max_blocks_out;
} else {
ccp = &state->receive_context;
crypt_type = CIPHER_DECRYPT;
ps = &state->p_read;
max_blocks = &state->max_blocks_in;
}
if (state->newkeys[mode] != NULL) {
debug("%s: rekeying %s, input %llu bytes %llu blocks, "
"output %llu bytes %llu blocks", __func__, dir,
(unsigned long long)state->p_read.bytes,
(unsigned long long)state->p_read.blocks,
(unsigned long long)state->p_send.bytes,
(unsigned long long)state->p_send.blocks);
kex_free_newkeys(state->newkeys[mode]);
state->newkeys[mode] = NULL;
}
/* note that both bytes and the seqnr are not reset */
ps->packets = ps->blocks = 0;
/* move newkeys from kex to state */
if ((state->newkeys[mode] = ssh->kex->newkeys[mode]) == NULL)
return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
ssh->kex->newkeys[mode] = NULL;
enc = &state->newkeys[mode]->enc;
mac = &state->newkeys[mode]->mac;
comp = &state->newkeys[mode]->comp;
if (cipher_authlen(enc->cipher) == 0) {
if ((r = mac_init(mac)) != 0)
return r;
}
mac->enabled = 1;
DBG(debug("%s: cipher_init_context: %s", __func__, dir));
cipher_free(*ccp);
*ccp = NULL;
if ((r = cipher_init(ccp, enc->cipher, enc->key, enc->key_len,
enc->iv, enc->iv_len, crypt_type)) != 0)
return r;
if (!state->cipher_warning_done &&
(wmsg = cipher_warning_message(*ccp)) != NULL) {
error("Warning: %s", wmsg);
state->cipher_warning_done = 1;
}
/* Deleting the keys does not gain extra security */
/* explicit_bzero(enc->iv, enc->block_size);
explicit_bzero(enc->key, enc->key_len);
explicit_bzero(mac->key, mac->key_len); */
if ((comp->type == COMP_ZLIB ||
(comp->type == COMP_DELAYED &&
state->after_authentication)) && comp->enabled == 0) {
if ((r = ssh_packet_init_compression(ssh)) < 0)
return r;
if (mode == MODE_OUT) {
if ((r = start_compression_out(ssh, 6)) != 0)
return r;
} else {
if ((r = start_compression_in(ssh)) != 0)
return r;
}
comp->enabled = 1;
}
/*
* The 2^(blocksize*2) limit is too expensive for 3DES,
* so enforce a 1GB limit for small blocksizes.
* See RFC4344 section 3.2.
*/
if (enc->block_size >= 16)
*max_blocks = (u_int64_t)1 << (enc->block_size*2);
else
*max_blocks = ((u_int64_t)1 << 30) / enc->block_size;
if (state->rekey_limit)
*max_blocks = MINIMUM(*max_blocks,
state->rekey_limit / enc->block_size);
debug("rekey %s after %llu blocks", dir,
(unsigned long long)*max_blocks);
return 0;
}
#define MAX_PACKETS (1U<<31)
static int
ssh_packet_need_rekeying(struct ssh *ssh, u_int outbound_packet_len)
{
struct session_state *state = ssh->state;
u_int32_t out_blocks;
/* XXX client can't cope with rekeying pre-auth */
if (!state->after_authentication)
return 0;
/* Haven't keyed yet or KEX in progress. */
if (ssh_packet_is_rekeying(ssh))
return 0;
/* Peer can't rekey */
if (ssh->compat & SSH_BUG_NOREKEY)
return 0;
/*
* Permit one packet in or out per rekey - this allows us to
* make progress when rekey limits are very small.
*/
if (state->p_send.packets == 0 && state->p_read.packets == 0)
return 0;
/* Time-based rekeying */
if (state->rekey_interval != 0 &&
(int64_t)state->rekey_time + state->rekey_interval <= monotime())
return 1;
/*
* Always rekey when MAX_PACKETS sent in either direction
* As per RFC4344 section 3.1 we do this after 2^31 packets.
*/
if (state->p_send.packets > MAX_PACKETS ||
state->p_read.packets > MAX_PACKETS)
return 1;
/* Rekey after (cipher-specific) maximum blocks */
out_blocks = ROUNDUP(outbound_packet_len,
state->newkeys[MODE_OUT]->enc.block_size);
return (state->max_blocks_out &&
(state->p_send.blocks + out_blocks > state->max_blocks_out)) ||
(state->max_blocks_in &&
(state->p_read.blocks > state->max_blocks_in));
}
/*
* Delayed compression for SSH2 is enabled after authentication:
* This happens on the server side after a SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_SUCCESS is sent,
* and on the client side after a SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_SUCCESS is received.
*/
static int
ssh_packet_enable_delayed_compress(struct ssh *ssh)
{
struct session_state *state = ssh->state;
struct sshcomp *comp = NULL;
int r, mode;
/*
* Remember that we are past the authentication step, so rekeying
* with COMP_DELAYED will turn on compression immediately.
*/
state->after_authentication = 1;
for (mode = 0; mode < MODE_MAX; mode++) {
/* protocol error: USERAUTH_SUCCESS received before NEWKEYS */
if (state->newkeys[mode] == NULL)
continue;
comp = &state->newkeys[mode]->comp;
if (comp && !comp->enabled && comp->type == COMP_DELAYED) {
if ((r = ssh_packet_init_compression(ssh)) != 0)
return r;
if (mode == MODE_OUT) {
if ((r = start_compression_out(ssh, 6)) != 0)
return r;
} else {
if ((r = start_compression_in(ssh)) != 0)
return r;
}
comp->enabled = 1;
}
}
return 0;
}
/* Used to mute debug logging for noisy packet types */
int
ssh_packet_log_type(u_char type)
{
switch (type) {
case SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA:
case SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_EXTENDED_DATA:
case SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_WINDOW_ADJUST:
return 0;
default:
return 1;
}
}
/*
* Finalize packet in SSH2 format (compress, mac, encrypt, enqueue)
*/
int
ssh_packet_send2_wrapped(struct ssh *ssh)
{
struct session_state *state = ssh->state;
u_char type, *cp, macbuf[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH];
u_char tmp, padlen, pad = 0;
u_int authlen = 0, aadlen = 0;
u_int len;
struct sshenc *enc = NULL;
struct sshmac *mac = NULL;
struct sshcomp *comp = NULL;
int r, block_size;
if (state->newkeys[MODE_OUT] != NULL) {
enc = &state->newkeys[MODE_OUT]->enc;
mac = &state->newkeys[MODE_OUT]->mac;
comp = &state->newkeys[MODE_OUT]->comp;
/* disable mac for authenticated encryption */
if ((authlen = cipher_authlen(enc->cipher)) != 0)
mac = NULL;
}
block_size = enc ? enc->block_size : 8;
aadlen = (mac && mac->enabled && mac->etm) || authlen ? 4 : 0;
type = (sshbuf_ptr(state->outgoing_packet))[5];
if (ssh_packet_log_type(type))
debug3("send packet: type %u", type);
#ifdef PACKET_DEBUG
fprintf(stderr, "plain: ");
sshbuf_dump(state->outgoing_packet, stderr);
#endif
if (comp && comp->enabled) {
len = sshbuf_len(state->outgoing_packet);
/* skip header, compress only payload */
if ((r = sshbuf_consume(state->outgoing_packet, 5)) != 0)
goto out;
sshbuf_reset(state->compression_buffer);
if ((r = compress_buffer(ssh, state->outgoing_packet,
state->compression_buffer)) != 0)
goto out;
sshbuf_reset(state->outgoing_packet);
if ((r = sshbuf_put(state->outgoing_packet,
"\0\0\0\0\0", 5)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_putb(state->outgoing_packet,
state->compression_buffer)) != 0)
goto out;
DBG(debug("compression: raw %d compressed %zd", len,
sshbuf_len(state->outgoing_packet)));
}
/* sizeof (packet_len + pad_len + payload) */
len = sshbuf_len(state->outgoing_packet);
/*
* calc size of padding, alloc space, get random data,
* minimum padding is 4 bytes
*/
len -= aadlen; /* packet length is not encrypted for EtM modes */
padlen = block_size - (len % block_size);
if (padlen < 4)
padlen += block_size;
if (state->extra_pad) {
tmp = state->extra_pad;
state->extra_pad =
ROUNDUP(state->extra_pad, block_size);
/* check if roundup overflowed */
if (state->extra_pad < tmp)
return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
tmp = (len + padlen) % state->extra_pad;
/* Check whether pad calculation below will underflow */
if (tmp > state->extra_pad)
return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
pad = state->extra_pad - tmp;
DBG(debug3("%s: adding %d (len %d padlen %d extra_pad %d)",
__func__, pad, len, padlen, state->extra_pad));
tmp = padlen;
padlen += pad;
/* Check whether padlen calculation overflowed */
if (padlen < tmp)
return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; /* overflow */
state->extra_pad = 0;
}
if ((r = sshbuf_reserve(state->outgoing_packet, padlen, &cp)) != 0)
goto out;
if (enc && !cipher_ctx_is_plaintext(state->send_context)) {
/* random padding */
arc4random_buf(cp, padlen);
} else {
/* clear padding */
explicit_bzero(cp, padlen);
}
/* sizeof (packet_len + pad_len + payload + padding) */
len = sshbuf_len(state->outgoing_packet);
cp = sshbuf_mutable_ptr(state->outgoing_packet);
if (cp == NULL) {
r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
goto out;
}
/* packet_length includes payload, padding and padding length field */
POKE_U32(cp, len - 4);
cp[4] = padlen;
DBG(debug("send: len %d (includes padlen %d, aadlen %d)",
len, padlen, aadlen));
/* compute MAC over seqnr and packet(length fields, payload, padding) */
if (mac && mac->enabled && !mac->etm) {
if ((r = mac_compute(mac, state->p_send.seqnr,
sshbuf_ptr(state->outgoing_packet), len,
macbuf, sizeof(macbuf))) != 0)
goto out;
DBG(debug("done calc MAC out #%d", state->p_send.seqnr));
}
/* encrypt packet and append to output buffer. */
if ((r = sshbuf_reserve(state->output,
sshbuf_len(state->outgoing_packet) + authlen, &cp)) != 0)
goto out;
if ((r = cipher_crypt(state->send_context, state->p_send.seqnr, cp,
sshbuf_ptr(state->outgoing_packet),
len - aadlen, aadlen, authlen)) != 0)
goto out;
/* append unencrypted MAC */
if (mac && mac->enabled) {
if (mac->etm) {
/* EtM: compute mac over aadlen + cipher text */
if ((r = mac_compute(mac, state->p_send.seqnr,
cp, len, macbuf, sizeof(macbuf))) != 0)
goto out;
DBG(debug("done calc MAC(EtM) out #%d",
state->p_send.seqnr));
}
if ((r = sshbuf_put(state->output, macbuf, mac->mac_len)) != 0)
goto out;
}
#ifdef PACKET_DEBUG
fprintf(stderr, "encrypted: ");
sshbuf_dump(state->output, stderr);
#endif
/* increment sequence number for outgoing packets */
if (++state->p_send.seqnr == 0)
logit("outgoing seqnr wraps around");
if (++state->p_send.packets == 0)
if (!(ssh->compat & SSH_BUG_NOREKEY))
return SSH_ERR_NEED_REKEY;
state->p_send.blocks += len / block_size;
state->p_send.bytes += len;
sshbuf_reset(state->outgoing_packet);
if (type == SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS)
r = ssh_set_newkeys(ssh, MODE_OUT);
else if (type == SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_SUCCESS && state->server_side)
r = ssh_packet_enable_delayed_compress(ssh);
else
r = 0;
out:
return r;
}
/* returns non-zero if the specified packet type is usec by KEX */
static int
ssh_packet_type_is_kex(u_char type)
{
return
type >= SSH2_MSG_TRANSPORT_MIN &&
type <= SSH2_MSG_TRANSPORT_MAX &&
type != SSH2_MSG_SERVICE_REQUEST &&
type != SSH2_MSG_SERVICE_ACCEPT &&
type != SSH2_MSG_EXT_INFO;
}
int
ssh_packet_send2(struct ssh *ssh)
{
struct session_state *state = ssh->state;
struct packet *p;
u_char type;
int r, need_rekey;
if (sshbuf_len(state->outgoing_packet) < 6)
return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
type = sshbuf_ptr(state->outgoing_packet)[5];
need_rekey = !ssh_packet_type_is_kex(type) &&
ssh_packet_need_rekeying(ssh, sshbuf_len(state->outgoing_packet));
/*
* During rekeying we can only send key exchange messages.
* Queue everything else.
*/
if ((need_rekey || state->rekeying) && !ssh_packet_type_is_kex(type)) {
if (need_rekey)
debug3("%s: rekex triggered", __func__);
debug("enqueue packet: %u", type);
p = calloc(1, sizeof(*p));
if (p == NULL)
return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
p->type = type;
p->payload = state->outgoing_packet;
TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(&state->outgoing, p, next);
state->outgoing_packet = sshbuf_new();
if (state->outgoing_packet == NULL)
return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
if (need_rekey) {
/*
* This packet triggered a rekey, so send the
* KEXINIT now.
* NB. reenters this function via kex_start_rekex().
*/
return kex_start_rekex(ssh);
}
return 0;
}
/* rekeying starts with sending KEXINIT */
if (type == SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT)
state->rekeying = 1;
if ((r = ssh_packet_send2_wrapped(ssh)) != 0)
return r;
/* after a NEWKEYS message we can send the complete queue */
if (type == SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS) {
state->rekeying = 0;
state->rekey_time = monotime();
while ((p = TAILQ_FIRST(&state->outgoing))) {
type = p->type;
/*
* If this packet triggers a rekex, then skip the
* remaining packets in the queue for now.
* NB. re-enters this function via kex_start_rekex.
*/
if (ssh_packet_need_rekeying(ssh,
sshbuf_len(p->payload))) {
debug3("%s: queued packet triggered rekex",
__func__);
return kex_start_rekex(ssh);
}
debug("dequeue packet: %u", type);
sshbuf_free(state->outgoing_packet);
state->outgoing_packet = p->payload;
TAILQ_REMOVE(&state->outgoing, p, next);
memset(p, 0, sizeof(*p));
free(p);
if ((r = ssh_packet_send2_wrapped(ssh)) != 0)
return r;
}
}
return 0;
}
/*
* Waits until a packet has been received, and returns its type. Note that
* no other data is processed until this returns, so this function should not
* be used during the interactive session.
*/
int
ssh_packet_read_seqnr(struct ssh *ssh, u_char *typep, u_int32_t *seqnr_p)
{
struct session_state *state = ssh->state;
int len, r, ms_remain;
fd_set *setp;
char buf[8192];
struct timeval timeout, start, *timeoutp = NULL;
DBG(debug("packet_read()"));
setp = calloc(howmany(state->connection_in + 1,
NFDBITS), sizeof(fd_mask));
if (setp == NULL)
return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
/*
* Since we are blocking, ensure that all written packets have
* been sent.
*/
if ((r = ssh_packet_write_wait(ssh)) != 0)
goto out;
/* Stay in the loop until we have received a complete packet. */
for (;;) {
/* Try to read a packet from the buffer. */
r = ssh_packet_read_poll_seqnr(ssh, typep, seqnr_p);
if (r != 0)
break;
/* If we got a packet, return it. */
if (*typep != SSH_MSG_NONE)
break;
/*
* Otherwise, wait for some data to arrive, add it to the
* buffer, and try again.
*/
memset(setp, 0, howmany(state->connection_in + 1,
NFDBITS) * sizeof(fd_mask));
FD_SET(state->connection_in, setp);
if (state->packet_timeout_ms > 0) {
ms_remain = state->packet_timeout_ms;
timeoutp = &timeout;
}
/* Wait for some data to arrive. */
for (;;) {
if (state->packet_timeout_ms > 0) {
ms_to_timeval(&timeout, ms_remain);
monotime_tv(&start);
}
if ((r = select(state->connection_in + 1, setp,
NULL, NULL, timeoutp)) >= 0)
break;
if (errno != EAGAIN && errno != EINTR &&
errno != EWOULDBLOCK) {
r = SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR;
goto out;
}
if (state->packet_timeout_ms <= 0)
continue;
ms_subtract_diff(&start, &ms_remain);
if (ms_remain <= 0) {
r = 0;
break;
}
}
if (r == 0) {
r = SSH_ERR_CONN_TIMEOUT;
goto out;
}
/* Read data from the socket. */
len = read(state->connection_in, buf, sizeof(buf));
if (len == 0) {
r = SSH_ERR_CONN_CLOSED;
goto out;
}
if (len == -1) {
r = SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR;
goto out;
}
/* Append it to the buffer. */
if ((r = ssh_packet_process_incoming(ssh, buf, len)) != 0)
goto out;
}
out:
free(setp);
return r;
}
int
ssh_packet_read(struct ssh *ssh)
{
u_char type;
int r;
if ((r = ssh_packet_read_seqnr(ssh, &type, NULL)) != 0)
fatal("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
return type;
}
/*
* Waits until a packet has been received, verifies that its type matches
* that given, and gives a fatal error and exits if there is a mismatch.
*/
int
ssh_packet_read_expect(struct ssh *ssh, u_int expected_type)
{
int r;
u_char type;
if ((r = ssh_packet_read_seqnr(ssh, &type, NULL)) != 0)
return r;
if (type != expected_type) {
if ((r = sshpkt_disconnect(ssh,
"Protocol error: expected packet type %d, got %d",
expected_type, type)) != 0)
return r;
return SSH_ERR_PROTOCOL_ERROR;
}
return 0;
}
static int
ssh_packet_read_poll2_mux(struct ssh *ssh, u_char *typep, u_int32_t *seqnr_p)
{
struct session_state *state = ssh->state;
const u_char *cp;
size_t need;
int r;
if (ssh->kex)
return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
*typep = SSH_MSG_NONE;
cp = sshbuf_ptr(state->input);
if (state->packlen == 0) {
if (sshbuf_len(state->input) < 4 + 1)
return 0; /* packet is incomplete */
state->packlen = PEEK_U32(cp);
if (state->packlen < 4 + 1 ||
state->packlen > PACKET_MAX_SIZE)
return SSH_ERR_MESSAGE_INCOMPLETE;
}
need = state->packlen + 4;
if (sshbuf_len(state->input) < need)
return 0; /* packet is incomplete */
sshbuf_reset(state->incoming_packet);
if ((r = sshbuf_put(state->incoming_packet, cp + 4,
state->packlen)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_consume(state->input, need)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_u8(state->incoming_packet, NULL)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_u8(state->incoming_packet, typep)) != 0)
return r;
if (ssh_packet_log_type(*typep))
debug3("%s: type %u", __func__, *typep);
/* sshbuf_dump(state->incoming_packet, stderr); */
/* reset for next packet */
state->packlen = 0;
return r;
}
int
ssh_packet_read_poll2(struct ssh *ssh, u_char *typep, u_int32_t *seqnr_p)
{
struct session_state *state = ssh->state;
u_int padlen, need;
u_char *cp;
u_int maclen, aadlen = 0, authlen = 0, block_size;
struct sshenc *enc = NULL;
struct sshmac *mac = NULL;
struct sshcomp *comp = NULL;
int r;
if (state->mux)
return ssh_packet_read_poll2_mux(ssh, typep, seqnr_p);
*typep = SSH_MSG_NONE;
if (state->packet_discard)
return 0;
if (state->newkeys[MODE_IN] != NULL) {
enc = &state->newkeys[MODE_IN]->enc;
mac = &state->newkeys[MODE_IN]->mac;
comp = &state->newkeys[MODE_IN]->comp;
/* disable mac for authenticated encryption */
if ((authlen = cipher_authlen(enc->cipher)) != 0)
mac = NULL;
}
maclen = mac && mac->enabled ? mac->mac_len : 0;
block_size = enc ? enc->block_size : 8;
aadlen = (mac && mac->enabled && mac->etm) || authlen ? 4 : 0;
if (aadlen && state->packlen == 0) {
if (cipher_get_length(state->receive_context,
&state->packlen, state->p_read.seqnr,
sshbuf_ptr(state->input), sshbuf_len(state->input)) != 0)
return 0;
if (state->packlen < 1 + 4 ||
state->packlen > PACKET_MAX_SIZE) {
#ifdef PACKET_DEBUG
sshbuf_dump(state->input, stderr);
#endif
logit("Bad packet length %u.", state->packlen);
if ((r = sshpkt_disconnect(ssh, "Packet corrupt")) != 0)
return r;
return SSH_ERR_CONN_CORRUPT;
}
sshbuf_reset(state->incoming_packet);
} else if (state->packlen == 0) {
/*
* check if input size is less than the cipher block size,
* decrypt first block and extract length of incoming packet
*/
if (sshbuf_len(state->input) < block_size)
return 0;
sshbuf_reset(state->incoming_packet);
if ((r = sshbuf_reserve(state->incoming_packet, block_size,
&cp)) != 0)
goto out;
if ((r = cipher_crypt(state->receive_context,
state->p_send.seqnr, cp, sshbuf_ptr(state->input),
block_size, 0, 0)) != 0)
goto out;
state->packlen = PEEK_U32(sshbuf_ptr(state->incoming_packet));
if (state->packlen < 1 + 4 ||
state->packlen > PACKET_MAX_SIZE) {
#ifdef PACKET_DEBUG
fprintf(stderr, "input: \n");
sshbuf_dump(state->input, stderr);
fprintf(stderr, "incoming_packet: \n");
sshbuf_dump(state->incoming_packet, stderr);
#endif
logit("Bad packet length %u.", state->packlen);
return ssh_packet_start_discard(ssh, enc, mac, 0,
PACKET_MAX_SIZE);
}
if ((r = sshbuf_consume(state->input, block_size)) != 0)
goto out;
}
DBG(debug("input: packet len %u", state->packlen+4));
if (aadlen) {
/* only the payload is encrypted */
need = state->packlen;
} else {
/*
* the payload size and the payload are encrypted, but we
* have a partial packet of block_size bytes
*/
need = 4 + state->packlen - block_size;
}
DBG(debug("partial packet: block %d, need %d, maclen %d, authlen %d,"
" aadlen %d", block_size, need, maclen, authlen, aadlen));
if (need % block_size != 0) {
logit("padding error: need %d block %d mod %d",
need, block_size, need % block_size);
return ssh_packet_start_discard(ssh, enc, mac, 0,
PACKET_MAX_SIZE - block_size);
}
/*
* check if the entire packet has been received and
* decrypt into incoming_packet:
* 'aadlen' bytes are unencrypted, but authenticated.
* 'need' bytes are encrypted, followed by either
* 'authlen' bytes of authentication tag or
* 'maclen' bytes of message authentication code.
*/
if (sshbuf_len(state->input) < aadlen + need + authlen + maclen)
return 0; /* packet is incomplete */
#ifdef PACKET_DEBUG
fprintf(stderr, "read_poll enc/full: ");
sshbuf_dump(state->input, stderr);
#endif
/* EtM: check mac over encrypted input */
if (mac && mac->enabled && mac->etm) {
if ((r = mac_check(mac, state->p_read.seqnr,
sshbuf_ptr(state->input), aadlen + need,
sshbuf_ptr(state->input) + aadlen + need + authlen,
maclen)) != 0) {
if (r == SSH_ERR_MAC_INVALID)
logit("Corrupted MAC on input.");
goto out;
}
}
if ((r = sshbuf_reserve(state->incoming_packet, aadlen + need,
&cp)) != 0)
goto out;
if ((r = cipher_crypt(state->receive_context, state->p_read.seqnr, cp,
sshbuf_ptr(state->input), need, aadlen, authlen)) != 0)
goto out;
if ((r = sshbuf_consume(state->input, aadlen + need + authlen)) != 0)
goto out;
if (mac && mac->enabled) {
/* Not EtM: check MAC over cleartext */
if (!mac->etm && (r = mac_check(mac, state->p_read.seqnr,
sshbuf_ptr(state->incoming_packet),
sshbuf_len(state->incoming_packet),
sshbuf_ptr(state->input), maclen)) != 0) {
if (r != SSH_ERR_MAC_INVALID)
goto out;
logit("Corrupted MAC on input.");
if (need + block_size > PACKET_MAX_SIZE)
return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
return ssh_packet_start_discard(ssh, enc, mac,
sshbuf_len(state->incoming_packet),
PACKET_MAX_SIZE - need - block_size);
}
/* Remove MAC from input buffer */
DBG(debug("MAC #%d ok", state->p_read.seqnr));
if ((r = sshbuf_consume(state->input, mac->mac_len)) != 0)
goto out;
}
if (seqnr_p != NULL)
*seqnr_p = state->p_read.seqnr;
if (++state->p_read.seqnr == 0)
logit("incoming seqnr wraps around");
if (++state->p_read.packets == 0)
if (!(ssh->compat & SSH_BUG_NOREKEY))
return SSH_ERR_NEED_REKEY;
state->p_read.blocks += (state->packlen + 4) / block_size;
state->p_read.bytes += state->packlen + 4;
/* get padlen */
padlen = sshbuf_ptr(state->incoming_packet)[4];
DBG(debug("input: padlen %d", padlen));
if (padlen < 4) {
if ((r = sshpkt_disconnect(ssh,
"Corrupted padlen %d on input.", padlen)) != 0 ||
(r = ssh_packet_write_wait(ssh)) != 0)
return r;
return SSH_ERR_CONN_CORRUPT;
}
/* skip packet size + padlen, discard padding */
if ((r = sshbuf_consume(state->incoming_packet, 4 + 1)) != 0 ||
((r = sshbuf_consume_end(state->incoming_packet, padlen)) != 0))
goto out;
DBG(debug("input: len before de-compress %zd",
sshbuf_len(state->incoming_packet)));
if (comp && comp->enabled) {
sshbuf_reset(state->compression_buffer);
if ((r = uncompress_buffer(ssh, state->incoming_packet,
state->compression_buffer)) != 0)
goto out;
sshbuf_reset(state->incoming_packet);
if ((r = sshbuf_putb(state->incoming_packet,
state->compression_buffer)) != 0)
goto out;
DBG(debug("input: len after de-compress %zd",
sshbuf_len(state->incoming_packet)));
}
/*
* get packet type, implies consume.
* return length of payload (without type field)
*/
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(state->incoming_packet, typep)) != 0)
goto out;
if (ssh_packet_log_type(*typep))
debug3("receive packet: type %u", *typep);
if (*typep < SSH2_MSG_MIN || *typep >= SSH2_MSG_LOCAL_MIN) {
if ((r = sshpkt_disconnect(ssh,
"Invalid ssh2 packet type: %d", *typep)) != 0 ||
(r = ssh_packet_write_wait(ssh)) != 0)
return r;
return SSH_ERR_PROTOCOL_ERROR;
}
if (state->hook_in != NULL &&
(r = state->hook_in(ssh, state->incoming_packet, typep,
state->hook_in_ctx)) != 0)
return r;
if (*typep == SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_SUCCESS && !state->server_side)
r = ssh_packet_enable_delayed_compress(ssh);
else
r = 0;
#ifdef PACKET_DEBUG
fprintf(stderr, "read/plain[%d]:\r\n", *typep);
sshbuf_dump(state->incoming_packet, stderr);
#endif
/* reset for next packet */
state->packlen = 0;
/* do we need to rekey? */
if (ssh_packet_need_rekeying(ssh, 0)) {
debug3("%s: rekex triggered", __func__);
if ((r = kex_start_rekex(ssh)) != 0)
return r;
}
out:
return r;
}
int
ssh_packet_read_poll_seqnr(struct ssh *ssh, u_char *typep, u_int32_t *seqnr_p)
{
struct session_state *state = ssh->state;
u_int reason, seqnr;
int r;
u_char *msg;
for (;;) {
msg = NULL;
r = ssh_packet_read_poll2(ssh, typep, seqnr_p);
if (r != 0)
return r;
if (*typep) {
state->keep_alive_timeouts = 0;
DBG(debug("received packet type %d", *typep));
}
switch (*typep) {
case SSH2_MSG_IGNORE:
debug3("Received SSH2_MSG_IGNORE");
break;
case SSH2_MSG_DEBUG:
if ((r = sshpkt_get_u8(ssh, NULL)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_get_string(ssh, &msg, NULL)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_get_string(ssh, NULL, NULL)) != 0) {
free(msg);
return r;
}
debug("Remote: %.900s", msg);
free(msg);
break;
case SSH2_MSG_DISCONNECT:
if ((r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &reason)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_get_string(ssh, &msg, NULL)) != 0)
return r;
/* Ignore normal client exit notifications */
do_log2(ssh->state->server_side &&
reason == SSH2_DISCONNECT_BY_APPLICATION ?
SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO : SYSLOG_LEVEL_ERROR,
"Received disconnect from %s port %d:"
"%u: %.400s", ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh),
ssh_remote_port(ssh), reason, msg);
free(msg);
return SSH_ERR_DISCONNECTED;
case SSH2_MSG_UNIMPLEMENTED:
if ((r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &seqnr)) != 0)
return r;
debug("Received SSH2_MSG_UNIMPLEMENTED for %u",
seqnr);
break;
default:
return 0;
}
}
}
/*
* Buffers the given amount of input characters. This is intended to be used
* together with packet_read_poll.
*/
int
ssh_packet_process_incoming(struct ssh *ssh, const char *buf, u_int len)
{
struct session_state *state = ssh->state;
int r;
if (state->packet_discard) {
state->keep_alive_timeouts = 0; /* ?? */
if (len >= state->packet_discard) {
if ((r = ssh_packet_stop_discard(ssh)) != 0)
return r;
}
state->packet_discard -= len;
return 0;
}
if ((r = sshbuf_put(ssh->state->input, buf, len)) != 0)
return r;
return 0;
}
int
ssh_packet_remaining(struct ssh *ssh)
{
return sshbuf_len(ssh->state->incoming_packet);
}
/*
* Sends a diagnostic message from the server to the client. This message
* can be sent at any time (but not while constructing another message). The
* message is printed immediately, but only if the client is being executed
* in verbose mode. These messages are primarily intended to ease debugging
* authentication problems. The length of the formatted message must not
* exceed 1024 bytes. This will automatically call ssh_packet_write_wait.
*/
void
ssh_packet_send_debug(struct ssh *ssh, const char *fmt,...)
{
char buf[1024];
va_list args;
int r;
if ((ssh->compat & SSH_BUG_DEBUG))
return;
va_start(args, fmt);
vsnprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), fmt, args);
va_end(args);
debug3("sending debug message: %s", buf);
if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_DEBUG)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_u8(ssh, 0)) != 0 || /* always display */
(r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, buf)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, "")) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0 ||
(r = ssh_packet_write_wait(ssh)) != 0)
fatal("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
}
void
sshpkt_fmt_connection_id(struct ssh *ssh, char *s, size_t l)
{
snprintf(s, l, "%.200s%s%s port %d",
ssh->log_preamble ? ssh->log_preamble : "",
ssh->log_preamble ? " " : "",
ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), ssh_remote_port(ssh));
}
/*
* Pretty-print connection-terminating errors and exit.
*/
static void
sshpkt_vfatal(struct ssh *ssh, int r, const char *fmt, va_list ap)
{
char *tag = NULL, remote_id[512];
int oerrno = errno;
sshpkt_fmt_connection_id(ssh, remote_id, sizeof(remote_id));
switch (r) {
case SSH_ERR_CONN_CLOSED:
ssh_packet_clear_keys(ssh);
logdie("Connection closed by %s", remote_id);
case SSH_ERR_CONN_TIMEOUT:
ssh_packet_clear_keys(ssh);
logdie("Connection %s %s timed out",
ssh->state->server_side ? "from" : "to", remote_id);
case SSH_ERR_DISCONNECTED:
ssh_packet_clear_keys(ssh);
logdie("Disconnected from %s", remote_id);
case SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR:
if (errno == ECONNRESET) {
ssh_packet_clear_keys(ssh);
logdie("Connection reset by %s", remote_id);
}
/* FALLTHROUGH */
case SSH_ERR_NO_CIPHER_ALG_MATCH:
case SSH_ERR_NO_MAC_ALG_MATCH:
case SSH_ERR_NO_COMPRESS_ALG_MATCH:
case SSH_ERR_NO_KEX_ALG_MATCH:
case SSH_ERR_NO_HOSTKEY_ALG_MATCH:
if (ssh && ssh->kex && ssh->kex->failed_choice) {
ssh_packet_clear_keys(ssh);
errno = oerrno;
logdie("Unable to negotiate with %s: %s. "
"Their offer: %s", remote_id, ssh_err(r),
ssh->kex->failed_choice);
}
/* FALLTHROUGH */
default:
if (vasprintf(&tag, fmt, ap) == -1) {
ssh_packet_clear_keys(ssh);
logdie("%s: could not allocate failure message",
__func__);
}
ssh_packet_clear_keys(ssh);
errno = oerrno;
logdie("%s%sConnection %s %s: %s",
tag != NULL ? tag : "", tag != NULL ? ": " : "",
ssh->state->server_side ? "from" : "to",
remote_id, ssh_err(r));
}
}
void
sshpkt_fatal(struct ssh *ssh, int r, const char *fmt, ...)
{
va_list ap;
va_start(ap, fmt);
sshpkt_vfatal(ssh, r, fmt, ap);
/* NOTREACHED */
va_end(ap);
logdie("%s: should have exited", __func__);
}
/*
* Logs the error plus constructs and sends a disconnect packet, closes the
* connection, and exits. This function never returns. The error message
* should not contain a newline. The length of the formatted message must
* not exceed 1024 bytes.
*/
void
ssh_packet_disconnect(struct ssh *ssh, const char *fmt,...)
{
char buf[1024], remote_id[512];
va_list args;
static int disconnecting = 0;
int r;
if (disconnecting) /* Guard against recursive invocations. */
fatal("packet_disconnect called recursively.");
disconnecting = 1;
/*
* Format the message. Note that the caller must make sure the
* message is of limited size.
*/
sshpkt_fmt_connection_id(ssh, remote_id, sizeof(remote_id));
va_start(args, fmt);
vsnprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), fmt, args);
va_end(args);
/* Display the error locally */
logit("Disconnecting %s: %.100s", remote_id, buf);
/*
* Send the disconnect message to the other side, and wait
* for it to get sent.
*/
if ((r = sshpkt_disconnect(ssh, "%s", buf)) != 0)
sshpkt_fatal(ssh, r, "%s", __func__);
if ((r = ssh_packet_write_wait(ssh)) != 0)
sshpkt_fatal(ssh, r, "%s", __func__);
/* Close the connection. */
ssh_packet_close(ssh);
cleanup_exit(255);
}
/*
* Checks if there is any buffered output, and tries to write some of
* the output.
*/
int
ssh_packet_write_poll(struct ssh *ssh)
{
struct session_state *state = ssh->state;
int len = sshbuf_len(state->output);
int r;
if (len > 0) {
len = write(state->connection_out,
sshbuf_ptr(state->output), len);
if (len == -1) {
if (errno == EINTR || errno == EAGAIN ||
errno == EWOULDBLOCK)
return 0;
return SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR;
}
if (len == 0)
return SSH_ERR_CONN_CLOSED;
if ((r = sshbuf_consume(state->output, len)) != 0)
return r;
}
return 0;
}
/*
* Calls packet_write_poll repeatedly until all pending output data has been
* written.
*/
int
ssh_packet_write_wait(struct ssh *ssh)
{
fd_set *setp;
int ret, r, ms_remain = 0;
struct timeval start, timeout, *timeoutp = NULL;
struct session_state *state = ssh->state;
setp = calloc(howmany(state->connection_out + 1,
NFDBITS), sizeof(fd_mask));
if (setp == NULL)
return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
if ((r = ssh_packet_write_poll(ssh)) != 0) {
free(setp);
return r;
}
while (ssh_packet_have_data_to_write(ssh)) {
memset(setp, 0, howmany(state->connection_out + 1,
NFDBITS) * sizeof(fd_mask));
FD_SET(state->connection_out, setp);
if (state->packet_timeout_ms > 0) {
ms_remain = state->packet_timeout_ms;
timeoutp = &timeout;
}
for (;;) {
if (state->packet_timeout_ms > 0) {
ms_to_timeval(&timeout, ms_remain);
monotime_tv(&start);
}
if ((ret = select(state->connection_out + 1,
NULL, setp, NULL, timeoutp)) >= 0)
break;
if (errno != EAGAIN && errno != EINTR &&
errno != EWOULDBLOCK)
break;
if (state->packet_timeout_ms <= 0)
continue;
ms_subtract_diff(&start, &ms_remain);
if (ms_remain <= 0) {
ret = 0;
break;
}
}
if (ret == 0) {
free(setp);
return SSH_ERR_CONN_TIMEOUT;
}
if ((r = ssh_packet_write_poll(ssh)) != 0) {
free(setp);
return r;
}
}
free(setp);
return 0;
}
/* Returns true if there is buffered data to write to the connection. */
int
ssh_packet_have_data_to_write(struct ssh *ssh)
{
return sshbuf_len(ssh->state->output) != 0;
}
/* Returns true if there is not too much data to write to the connection. */
int
ssh_packet_not_very_much_data_to_write(struct ssh *ssh)
{
if (ssh->state->interactive_mode)
return sshbuf_len(ssh->state->output) < 16384;
else
return sshbuf_len(ssh->state->output) < 128 * 1024;
}
void
ssh_packet_set_tos(struct ssh *ssh, int tos)
{
#ifndef IP_TOS_IS_BROKEN
if (!ssh_packet_connection_is_on_socket(ssh) || tos == INT_MAX)
return;
switch (ssh_packet_connection_af(ssh)) {
# ifdef IP_TOS
case AF_INET:
debug3("%s: set IP_TOS 0x%02x", __func__, tos);
if (setsockopt(ssh->state->connection_in,
IPPROTO_IP, IP_TOS, &tos, sizeof(tos)) == -1)
error("setsockopt IP_TOS %d: %.100s:",
tos, strerror(errno));
break;
# endif /* IP_TOS */
# ifdef IPV6_TCLASS
case AF_INET6:
debug3("%s: set IPV6_TCLASS 0x%02x", __func__, tos);
if (setsockopt(ssh->state->connection_in,
IPPROTO_IPV6, IPV6_TCLASS, &tos, sizeof(tos)) == -1)
error("setsockopt IPV6_TCLASS %d: %.100s:",
tos, strerror(errno));
break;
# endif /* IPV6_TCLASS */
}
#endif /* IP_TOS_IS_BROKEN */
}
/* Informs that the current session is interactive. Sets IP flags for that. */
void
ssh_packet_set_interactive(struct ssh *ssh, int interactive, int qos_interactive, int qos_bulk)
{
struct session_state *state = ssh->state;
if (state->set_interactive_called)
return;
state->set_interactive_called = 1;
/* Record that we are in interactive mode. */
state->interactive_mode = interactive;
/* Only set socket options if using a socket. */
if (!ssh_packet_connection_is_on_socket(ssh))
return;
set_nodelay(state->connection_in);
ssh_packet_set_tos(ssh, interactive ? qos_interactive :
qos_bulk);
}
/* Returns true if the current connection is interactive. */
int
ssh_packet_is_interactive(struct ssh *ssh)
{
return ssh->state->interactive_mode;
}
int
ssh_packet_set_maxsize(struct ssh *ssh, u_int s)
{
struct session_state *state = ssh->state;
if (state->set_maxsize_called) {
logit("packet_set_maxsize: called twice: old %d new %d",
state->max_packet_size, s);
return -1;
}
if (s < 4 * 1024 || s > 1024 * 1024) {
logit("packet_set_maxsize: bad size %d", s);
return -1;
}
state->set_maxsize_called = 1;
debug("packet_set_maxsize: setting to %d", s);
state->max_packet_size = s;
return s;
}
int
ssh_packet_inc_alive_timeouts(struct ssh *ssh)
{
return ++ssh->state->keep_alive_timeouts;
}
void
ssh_packet_set_alive_timeouts(struct ssh *ssh, int ka)
{
ssh->state->keep_alive_timeouts = ka;
}
u_int
ssh_packet_get_maxsize(struct ssh *ssh)
{
return ssh->state->max_packet_size;
}
void
ssh_packet_set_rekey_limits(struct ssh *ssh, u_int64_t bytes, u_int32_t seconds)
{
debug3("rekey after %llu bytes, %u seconds", (unsigned long long)bytes,
(unsigned int)seconds);
ssh->state->rekey_limit = bytes;
ssh->state->rekey_interval = seconds;
}
time_t
ssh_packet_get_rekey_timeout(struct ssh *ssh)
{
time_t seconds;
seconds = ssh->state->rekey_time + ssh->state->rekey_interval -
monotime();
return (seconds <= 0 ? 1 : seconds);
}
void
ssh_packet_set_server(struct ssh *ssh)
{
ssh->state->server_side = 1;
ssh->kex->server = 1; /* XXX unify? */
}
void
ssh_packet_set_authenticated(struct ssh *ssh)
{
ssh->state->after_authentication = 1;
}
void *
ssh_packet_get_input(struct ssh *ssh)
{
return (void *)ssh->state->input;
}
void *
ssh_packet_get_output(struct ssh *ssh)
{
return (void *)ssh->state->output;
}
/* Reset after_authentication and reset compression in post-auth privsep */
static int
ssh_packet_set_postauth(struct ssh *ssh)
{
int r;
debug("%s: called", __func__);
/* This was set in net child, but is not visible in user child */
ssh->state->after_authentication = 1;
ssh->state->rekeying = 0;
if ((r = ssh_packet_enable_delayed_compress(ssh)) != 0)
return r;
return 0;
}
/* Packet state (de-)serialization for privsep */
/* turn kex into a blob for packet state serialization */
static int
kex_to_blob(struct sshbuf *m, struct kex *kex)
{
int r;
if ((r = sshbuf_put_string(m, kex->session_id,
kex->session_id_len)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, kex->we_need)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, kex->hostkey_alg)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, kex->hostkey_type)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, kex->hostkey_nid)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, kex->kex_type)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_stringb(m, kex->my)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_stringb(m, kex->peer)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_stringb(m, kex->client_version)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_stringb(m, kex->server_version)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, kex->flags)) != 0)
return r;
return 0;
}
/* turn key exchange results into a blob for packet state serialization */
static int
newkeys_to_blob(struct sshbuf *m, struct ssh *ssh, int mode)
{
struct sshbuf *b;
struct sshcipher_ctx *cc;
struct sshcomp *comp;
struct sshenc *enc;
struct sshmac *mac;
struct newkeys *newkey;
int r;
if ((newkey = ssh->state->newkeys[mode]) == NULL)
return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
enc = &newkey->enc;
mac = &newkey->mac;
comp = &newkey->comp;
cc = (mode == MODE_OUT) ? ssh->state->send_context :
ssh->state->receive_context;
if ((r = cipher_get_keyiv(cc, enc->iv, enc->iv_len)) != 0)
return r;
if ((b = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, enc->name)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u32(b, enc->enabled)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u32(b, enc->block_size)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_string(b, enc->key, enc->key_len)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_string(b, enc->iv, enc->iv_len)) != 0)
goto out;
if (cipher_authlen(enc->cipher) == 0) {
if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, mac->name)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u32(b, mac->enabled)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_string(b, mac->key, mac->key_len)) != 0)
goto out;
}
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(b, comp->type)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, comp->name)) != 0)
goto out;
r = sshbuf_put_stringb(m, b);
out:
sshbuf_free(b);
return r;
}
/* serialize packet state into a blob */
int
ssh_packet_get_state(struct ssh *ssh, struct sshbuf *m)
{
struct session_state *state = ssh->state;
int r;
if ((r = kex_to_blob(m, ssh->kex)) != 0 ||
(r = newkeys_to_blob(m, ssh, MODE_OUT)) != 0 ||
(r = newkeys_to_blob(m, ssh, MODE_IN)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u64(m, state->rekey_limit)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, state->rekey_interval)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, state->p_send.seqnr)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u64(m, state->p_send.blocks)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, state->p_send.packets)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u64(m, state->p_send.bytes)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, state->p_read.seqnr)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u64(m, state->p_read.blocks)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, state->p_read.packets)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u64(m, state->p_read.bytes)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_stringb(m, state->input)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_stringb(m, state->output)) != 0)
return r;
return 0;
}
/* restore key exchange results from blob for packet state de-serialization */
static int
newkeys_from_blob(struct sshbuf *m, struct ssh *ssh, int mode)
{
struct sshbuf *b = NULL;
struct sshcomp *comp;
struct sshenc *enc;
struct sshmac *mac;
struct newkeys *newkey = NULL;
size_t keylen, ivlen, maclen;
int r;
if ((newkey = calloc(1, sizeof(*newkey))) == NULL) {
r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
goto out;
}
if ((r = sshbuf_froms(m, &b)) != 0)
goto out;
#ifdef DEBUG_PK
sshbuf_dump(b, stderr);
#endif
enc = &newkey->enc;
mac = &newkey->mac;
comp = &newkey->comp;
if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &enc->name, NULL)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_u32(b, (u_int *)&enc->enabled)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_u32(b, &enc->block_size)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_string(b, &enc->key, &keylen)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_string(b, &enc->iv, &ivlen)) != 0)
goto out;
if ((enc->cipher = cipher_by_name(enc->name)) == NULL) {
r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
goto out;
}
if (cipher_authlen(enc->cipher) == 0) {
if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &mac->name, NULL)) != 0)
goto out;
if ((r = mac_setup(mac, mac->name)) != 0)
goto out;
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(b, (u_int *)&mac->enabled)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_string(b, &mac->key, &maclen)) != 0)
goto out;
if (maclen > mac->key_len) {
r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
goto out;
}
mac->key_len = maclen;
}
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(b, &comp->type)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &comp->name, NULL)) != 0)
goto out;
if (sshbuf_len(b) != 0) {
r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
goto out;
}
enc->key_len = keylen;
enc->iv_len = ivlen;
ssh->kex->newkeys[mode] = newkey;
newkey = NULL;
r = 0;
out:
free(newkey);
sshbuf_free(b);
return r;
}
/* restore kex from blob for packet state de-serialization */
static int
kex_from_blob(struct sshbuf *m, struct kex **kexp)
{
struct kex *kex;
int r;
if ((kex = kex_new()) == NULL)
return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
if ((r = sshbuf_get_string(m, &kex->session_id, &kex->session_id_len)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &kex->we_need)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &kex->hostkey_alg, NULL)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, (u_int *)&kex->hostkey_type)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, (u_int *)&kex->hostkey_nid)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &kex->kex_type)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_stringb(m, kex->my)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_stringb(m, kex->peer)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_stringb(m, kex->client_version)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_stringb(m, kex->server_version)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &kex->flags)) != 0)
goto out;
kex->server = 1;
kex->done = 1;
r = 0;
out:
if (r != 0 || kexp == NULL) {
kex_free(kex);
if (kexp != NULL)
*kexp = NULL;
} else {
kex_free(*kexp);
*kexp = kex;
}
return r;
}
/*
* Restore packet state from content of blob 'm' (de-serialization).
* Note that 'm' will be partially consumed on parsing or any other errors.
*/
int
ssh_packet_set_state(struct ssh *ssh, struct sshbuf *m)
{
struct session_state *state = ssh->state;
const u_char *input, *output;
size_t ilen, olen;
int r;
if ((r = kex_from_blob(m, &ssh->kex)) != 0 ||
(r = newkeys_from_blob(m, ssh, MODE_OUT)) != 0 ||
(r = newkeys_from_blob(m, ssh, MODE_IN)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_u64(m, &state->rekey_limit)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &state->rekey_interval)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &state->p_send.seqnr)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_u64(m, &state->p_send.blocks)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &state->p_send.packets)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_u64(m, &state->p_send.bytes)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &state->p_read.seqnr)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_u64(m, &state->p_read.blocks)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &state->p_read.packets)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_u64(m, &state->p_read.bytes)) != 0)
return r;
/*
- * We set the time here so that in post-auth privsep slave we
+ * We set the time here so that in post-auth privsep child we
* count from the completion of the authentication.
*/
state->rekey_time = monotime();
/* XXX ssh_set_newkeys overrides p_read.packets? XXX */
if ((r = ssh_set_newkeys(ssh, MODE_IN)) != 0 ||
(r = ssh_set_newkeys(ssh, MODE_OUT)) != 0)
return r;
if ((r = ssh_packet_set_postauth(ssh)) != 0)
return r;
sshbuf_reset(state->input);
sshbuf_reset(state->output);
if ((r = sshbuf_get_string_direct(m, &input, &ilen)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_string_direct(m, &output, &olen)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put(state->input, input, ilen)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put(state->output, output, olen)) != 0)
return r;
if (sshbuf_len(m))
return SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
debug3("%s: done", __func__);
return 0;
}
/* NEW API */
/* put data to the outgoing packet */
int
sshpkt_put(struct ssh *ssh, const void *v, size_t len)
{
return sshbuf_put(ssh->state->outgoing_packet, v, len);
}
int
sshpkt_putb(struct ssh *ssh, const struct sshbuf *b)
{
return sshbuf_putb(ssh->state->outgoing_packet, b);
}
int
sshpkt_put_u8(struct ssh *ssh, u_char val)
{
return sshbuf_put_u8(ssh->state->outgoing_packet, val);
}
int
sshpkt_put_u32(struct ssh *ssh, u_int32_t val)
{
return sshbuf_put_u32(ssh->state->outgoing_packet, val);
}
int
sshpkt_put_u64(struct ssh *ssh, u_int64_t val)
{
return sshbuf_put_u64(ssh->state->outgoing_packet, val);
}
int
sshpkt_put_string(struct ssh *ssh, const void *v, size_t len)
{
return sshbuf_put_string(ssh->state->outgoing_packet, v, len);
}
int
sshpkt_put_cstring(struct ssh *ssh, const void *v)
{
return sshbuf_put_cstring(ssh->state->outgoing_packet, v);
}
int
sshpkt_put_stringb(struct ssh *ssh, const struct sshbuf *v)
{
return sshbuf_put_stringb(ssh->state->outgoing_packet, v);
}
int
sshpkt_getb_froms(struct ssh *ssh, struct sshbuf **valp)
{
return sshbuf_froms(ssh->state->incoming_packet, valp);
}
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
int
sshpkt_put_ec(struct ssh *ssh, const EC_POINT *v, const EC_GROUP *g)
{
return sshbuf_put_ec(ssh->state->outgoing_packet, v, g);
}
#endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */
int
sshpkt_put_bignum2(struct ssh *ssh, const BIGNUM *v)
{
return sshbuf_put_bignum2(ssh->state->outgoing_packet, v);
}
#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
/* fetch data from the incoming packet */
int
sshpkt_get(struct ssh *ssh, void *valp, size_t len)
{
return sshbuf_get(ssh->state->incoming_packet, valp, len);
}
int
sshpkt_get_u8(struct ssh *ssh, u_char *valp)
{
return sshbuf_get_u8(ssh->state->incoming_packet, valp);
}
int
sshpkt_get_u32(struct ssh *ssh, u_int32_t *valp)
{
return sshbuf_get_u32(ssh->state->incoming_packet, valp);
}
int
sshpkt_get_u64(struct ssh *ssh, u_int64_t *valp)
{
return sshbuf_get_u64(ssh->state->incoming_packet, valp);
}
int
sshpkt_get_string(struct ssh *ssh, u_char **valp, size_t *lenp)
{
return sshbuf_get_string(ssh->state->incoming_packet, valp, lenp);
}
int
sshpkt_get_string_direct(struct ssh *ssh, const u_char **valp, size_t *lenp)
{
return sshbuf_get_string_direct(ssh->state->incoming_packet, valp, lenp);
}
int
sshpkt_peek_string_direct(struct ssh *ssh, const u_char **valp, size_t *lenp)
{
return sshbuf_peek_string_direct(ssh->state->incoming_packet, valp, lenp);
}
int
sshpkt_get_cstring(struct ssh *ssh, char **valp, size_t *lenp)
{
return sshbuf_get_cstring(ssh->state->incoming_packet, valp, lenp);
}
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
int
sshpkt_get_ec(struct ssh *ssh, EC_POINT *v, const EC_GROUP *g)
{
return sshbuf_get_ec(ssh->state->incoming_packet, v, g);
}
#endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */
int
sshpkt_get_bignum2(struct ssh *ssh, BIGNUM **valp)
{
return sshbuf_get_bignum2(ssh->state->incoming_packet, valp);
}
#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
int
sshpkt_get_end(struct ssh *ssh)
{
if (sshbuf_len(ssh->state->incoming_packet) > 0)
return SSH_ERR_UNEXPECTED_TRAILING_DATA;
return 0;
}
const u_char *
sshpkt_ptr(struct ssh *ssh, size_t *lenp)
{
if (lenp != NULL)
*lenp = sshbuf_len(ssh->state->incoming_packet);
return sshbuf_ptr(ssh->state->incoming_packet);
}
/* start a new packet */
int
sshpkt_start(struct ssh *ssh, u_char type)
{
u_char buf[6]; /* u32 packet length, u8 pad len, u8 type */
DBG(debug("packet_start[%d]", type));
memset(buf, 0, sizeof(buf));
buf[sizeof(buf) - 1] = type;
sshbuf_reset(ssh->state->outgoing_packet);
return sshbuf_put(ssh->state->outgoing_packet, buf, sizeof(buf));
}
static int
ssh_packet_send_mux(struct ssh *ssh)
{
struct session_state *state = ssh->state;
u_char type, *cp;
size_t len;
int r;
if (ssh->kex)
return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
len = sshbuf_len(state->outgoing_packet);
if (len < 6)
return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
cp = sshbuf_mutable_ptr(state->outgoing_packet);
type = cp[5];
if (ssh_packet_log_type(type))
debug3("%s: type %u", __func__, type);
/* drop everything, but the connection protocol */
if (type >= SSH2_MSG_CONNECTION_MIN &&
type <= SSH2_MSG_CONNECTION_MAX) {
POKE_U32(cp, len - 4);
if ((r = sshbuf_putb(state->output,
state->outgoing_packet)) != 0)
return r;
/* sshbuf_dump(state->output, stderr); */
}
sshbuf_reset(state->outgoing_packet);
return 0;
}
/*
* 9.2. Ignored Data Message
*
* byte SSH_MSG_IGNORE
* string data
*
* All implementations MUST understand (and ignore) this message at any
* time (after receiving the protocol version). No implementation is
* required to send them. This message can be used as an additional
* protection measure against advanced traffic analysis techniques.
*/
int
sshpkt_msg_ignore(struct ssh *ssh, u_int nbytes)
{
u_int32_t rnd = 0;
int r;
u_int i;
if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_IGNORE)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, nbytes)) != 0)
return r;
for (i = 0; i < nbytes; i++) {
if (i % 4 == 0)
rnd = arc4random();
if ((r = sshpkt_put_u8(ssh, (u_char)rnd & 0xff)) != 0)
return r;
rnd >>= 8;
}
return 0;
}
/* send it */
int
sshpkt_send(struct ssh *ssh)
{
if (ssh->state && ssh->state->mux)
return ssh_packet_send_mux(ssh);
return ssh_packet_send2(ssh);
}
int
sshpkt_disconnect(struct ssh *ssh, const char *fmt,...)
{
char buf[1024];
va_list args;
int r;
va_start(args, fmt);
vsnprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), fmt, args);
va_end(args);
if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_DISCONNECT)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, SSH2_DISCONNECT_PROTOCOL_ERROR)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, buf)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, "")) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0)
return r;
return 0;
}
/* roundup current message to pad bytes */
int
sshpkt_add_padding(struct ssh *ssh, u_char pad)
{
ssh->state->extra_pad = pad;
return 0;
}
diff --git a/readconf.c b/readconf.c
index 2afcbaeca3d6..554efd7c9c02 100644
--- a/readconf.c
+++ b/readconf.c
@@ -1,2887 +1,2946 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: readconf.c,v 1.329 2020/04/24 03:33:21 dtucker Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: readconf.c,v 1.335 2020/08/27 02:11:09 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
* Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
* All rights reserved
* Functions for reading the configuration files.
*
* As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
* can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this
* software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
* incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
* called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
*/
#include "includes.h"
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/stat.h>
#include <sys/socket.h>
#include <sys/wait.h>
#include <sys/un.h>
#include <netinet/in.h>
#include <netinet/in_systm.h>
#include <netinet/ip.h>
#include <arpa/inet.h>
#include <ctype.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <limits.h>
#include <netdb.h>
#ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H
# include <paths.h>
#endif
#include <pwd.h>
#include <signal.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <stdarg.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#ifdef USE_SYSTEM_GLOB
# include <glob.h>
#else
# include "openbsd-compat/glob.h"
#endif
#ifdef HAVE_UTIL_H
#include <util.h>
#endif
#if defined(HAVE_STRNVIS) && defined(HAVE_VIS_H) && !defined(BROKEN_STRNVIS)
# include <vis.h>
#endif
#include "xmalloc.h"
#include "ssh.h"
#include "ssherr.h"
#include "compat.h"
#include "cipher.h"
#include "pathnames.h"
#include "log.h"
#include "sshkey.h"
#include "misc.h"
#include "readconf.h"
#include "match.h"
#include "kex.h"
#include "mac.h"
#include "uidswap.h"
#include "myproposal.h"
#include "digest.h"
/* Format of the configuration file:
# Configuration data is parsed as follows:
# 1. command line options
# 2. user-specific file
# 3. system-wide file
# Any configuration value is only changed the first time it is set.
# Thus, host-specific definitions should be at the beginning of the
# configuration file, and defaults at the end.
# Host-specific declarations. These may override anything above. A single
# host may match multiple declarations; these are processed in the order
# that they are given in.
Host *.ngs.fi ngs.fi
User foo
Host fake.com
Hostname another.host.name.real.org
User blaah
Port 34289
ForwardX11 no
ForwardAgent no
Host books.com
RemoteForward 9999 shadows.cs.hut.fi:9999
Ciphers 3des-cbc
Host fascist.blob.com
Port 23123
User tylonen
PasswordAuthentication no
Host puukko.hut.fi
User t35124p
ProxyCommand ssh-proxy %h %p
Host *.fr
PublicKeyAuthentication no
Host *.su
Ciphers aes128-ctr
PasswordAuthentication no
Host vpn.fake.com
Tunnel yes
TunnelDevice 3
# Defaults for various options
Host *
ForwardAgent no
ForwardX11 no
PasswordAuthentication yes
StrictHostKeyChecking yes
TcpKeepAlive no
IdentityFile ~/.ssh/identity
Port 22
EscapeChar ~
*/
static int read_config_file_depth(const char *filename, struct passwd *pw,
const char *host, const char *original_host, Options *options,
int flags, int *activep, int *want_final_pass, int depth);
static int process_config_line_depth(Options *options, struct passwd *pw,
const char *host, const char *original_host, char *line,
const char *filename, int linenum, int *activep, int flags,
int *want_final_pass, int depth);
/* Keyword tokens. */
typedef enum {
oBadOption,
oHost, oMatch, oInclude,
oForwardAgent, oForwardX11, oForwardX11Trusted, oForwardX11Timeout,
oGatewayPorts, oExitOnForwardFailure,
oPasswordAuthentication,
oChallengeResponseAuthentication, oXAuthLocation,
oIdentityFile, oHostname, oPort, oRemoteForward, oLocalForward,
oCertificateFile, oAddKeysToAgent, oIdentityAgent,
oUser, oEscapeChar, oProxyCommand,
oGlobalKnownHostsFile, oUserKnownHostsFile, oConnectionAttempts,
oBatchMode, oCheckHostIP, oStrictHostKeyChecking, oCompression,
oTCPKeepAlive, oNumberOfPasswordPrompts,
oLogFacility, oLogLevel, oCiphers, oMacs,
oPubkeyAuthentication,
oKbdInteractiveAuthentication, oKbdInteractiveDevices, oHostKeyAlias,
oDynamicForward, oPreferredAuthentications, oHostbasedAuthentication,
oHostKeyAlgorithms, oBindAddress, oBindInterface, oPKCS11Provider,
oClearAllForwardings, oNoHostAuthenticationForLocalhost,
oEnableSSHKeysign, oRekeyLimit, oVerifyHostKeyDNS, oConnectTimeout,
oAddressFamily, oGssAuthentication, oGssDelegateCreds,
oServerAliveInterval, oServerAliveCountMax, oIdentitiesOnly,
oSendEnv, oSetEnv, oControlPath, oControlMaster, oControlPersist,
oHashKnownHosts,
oTunnel, oTunnelDevice,
oLocalCommand, oPermitLocalCommand, oRemoteCommand,
oVisualHostKey,
oKexAlgorithms, oIPQoS, oRequestTTY, oIgnoreUnknown, oProxyUseFdpass,
oCanonicalDomains, oCanonicalizeHostname, oCanonicalizeMaxDots,
oCanonicalizeFallbackLocal, oCanonicalizePermittedCNAMEs,
oStreamLocalBindMask, oStreamLocalBindUnlink, oRevokedHostKeys,
oFingerprintHash, oUpdateHostkeys, oHostbasedKeyTypes,
oPubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes, oCASignatureAlgorithms, oProxyJump,
oSecurityKeyProvider,
oIgnore, oIgnoredUnknownOption, oDeprecated, oUnsupported
} OpCodes;
/* Textual representations of the tokens. */
static struct {
const char *name;
OpCodes opcode;
} keywords[] = {
/* Deprecated options */
{ "protocol", oIgnore }, /* NB. silently ignored */
{ "cipher", oDeprecated },
{ "fallbacktorsh", oDeprecated },
{ "globalknownhostsfile2", oDeprecated },
{ "rhostsauthentication", oDeprecated },
{ "userknownhostsfile2", oDeprecated },
{ "useroaming", oDeprecated },
{ "usersh", oDeprecated },
{ "useprivilegedport", oDeprecated },
/* Unsupported options */
{ "afstokenpassing", oUnsupported },
{ "kerberosauthentication", oUnsupported },
{ "kerberostgtpassing", oUnsupported },
{ "rsaauthentication", oUnsupported },
{ "rhostsrsaauthentication", oUnsupported },
{ "compressionlevel", oUnsupported },
/* Sometimes-unsupported options */
#if defined(GSSAPI)
{ "gssapiauthentication", oGssAuthentication },
{ "gssapidelegatecredentials", oGssDelegateCreds },
# else
{ "gssapiauthentication", oUnsupported },
{ "gssapidelegatecredentials", oUnsupported },
#endif
#ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11
{ "pkcs11provider", oPKCS11Provider },
{ "smartcarddevice", oPKCS11Provider },
# else
{ "smartcarddevice", oUnsupported },
{ "pkcs11provider", oUnsupported },
#endif
{ "forwardagent", oForwardAgent },
{ "forwardx11", oForwardX11 },
{ "forwardx11trusted", oForwardX11Trusted },
{ "forwardx11timeout", oForwardX11Timeout },
{ "exitonforwardfailure", oExitOnForwardFailure },
{ "xauthlocation", oXAuthLocation },
{ "gatewayports", oGatewayPorts },
{ "passwordauthentication", oPasswordAuthentication },
{ "kbdinteractiveauthentication", oKbdInteractiveAuthentication },
{ "kbdinteractivedevices", oKbdInteractiveDevices },
{ "pubkeyauthentication", oPubkeyAuthentication },
{ "dsaauthentication", oPubkeyAuthentication }, /* alias */
{ "hostbasedauthentication", oHostbasedAuthentication },
{ "challengeresponseauthentication", oChallengeResponseAuthentication },
{ "skeyauthentication", oUnsupported },
{ "tisauthentication", oChallengeResponseAuthentication }, /* alias */
{ "identityfile", oIdentityFile },
{ "identityfile2", oIdentityFile }, /* obsolete */
{ "identitiesonly", oIdentitiesOnly },
{ "certificatefile", oCertificateFile },
{ "addkeystoagent", oAddKeysToAgent },
{ "identityagent", oIdentityAgent },
{ "hostname", oHostname },
{ "hostkeyalias", oHostKeyAlias },
{ "proxycommand", oProxyCommand },
{ "port", oPort },
{ "ciphers", oCiphers },
{ "macs", oMacs },
{ "remoteforward", oRemoteForward },
{ "localforward", oLocalForward },
{ "user", oUser },
{ "host", oHost },
{ "match", oMatch },
{ "escapechar", oEscapeChar },
{ "globalknownhostsfile", oGlobalKnownHostsFile },
{ "userknownhostsfile", oUserKnownHostsFile },
{ "connectionattempts", oConnectionAttempts },
{ "batchmode", oBatchMode },
{ "checkhostip", oCheckHostIP },
{ "stricthostkeychecking", oStrictHostKeyChecking },
{ "compression", oCompression },
{ "tcpkeepalive", oTCPKeepAlive },
{ "keepalive", oTCPKeepAlive }, /* obsolete */
{ "numberofpasswordprompts", oNumberOfPasswordPrompts },
{ "syslogfacility", oLogFacility },
{ "loglevel", oLogLevel },
{ "dynamicforward", oDynamicForward },
{ "preferredauthentications", oPreferredAuthentications },
{ "hostkeyalgorithms", oHostKeyAlgorithms },
{ "casignaturealgorithms", oCASignatureAlgorithms },
{ "bindaddress", oBindAddress },
{ "bindinterface", oBindInterface },
{ "clearallforwardings", oClearAllForwardings },
{ "enablesshkeysign", oEnableSSHKeysign },
{ "verifyhostkeydns", oVerifyHostKeyDNS },
{ "nohostauthenticationforlocalhost", oNoHostAuthenticationForLocalhost },
{ "rekeylimit", oRekeyLimit },
{ "connecttimeout", oConnectTimeout },
{ "addressfamily", oAddressFamily },
{ "serveraliveinterval", oServerAliveInterval },
{ "serveralivecountmax", oServerAliveCountMax },
{ "sendenv", oSendEnv },
{ "setenv", oSetEnv },
{ "controlpath", oControlPath },
{ "controlmaster", oControlMaster },
{ "controlpersist", oControlPersist },
{ "hashknownhosts", oHashKnownHosts },
{ "include", oInclude },
{ "tunnel", oTunnel },
{ "tunneldevice", oTunnelDevice },
{ "localcommand", oLocalCommand },
{ "permitlocalcommand", oPermitLocalCommand },
{ "remotecommand", oRemoteCommand },
{ "visualhostkey", oVisualHostKey },
{ "kexalgorithms", oKexAlgorithms },
{ "ipqos", oIPQoS },
{ "requesttty", oRequestTTY },
{ "proxyusefdpass", oProxyUseFdpass },
{ "canonicaldomains", oCanonicalDomains },
{ "canonicalizefallbacklocal", oCanonicalizeFallbackLocal },
{ "canonicalizehostname", oCanonicalizeHostname },
{ "canonicalizemaxdots", oCanonicalizeMaxDots },
{ "canonicalizepermittedcnames", oCanonicalizePermittedCNAMEs },
{ "streamlocalbindmask", oStreamLocalBindMask },
{ "streamlocalbindunlink", oStreamLocalBindUnlink },
{ "revokedhostkeys", oRevokedHostKeys },
{ "fingerprinthash", oFingerprintHash },
{ "updatehostkeys", oUpdateHostkeys },
{ "hostbasedkeytypes", oHostbasedKeyTypes },
{ "pubkeyacceptedkeytypes", oPubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes },
{ "ignoreunknown", oIgnoreUnknown },
{ "proxyjump", oProxyJump },
{ "securitykeyprovider", oSecurityKeyProvider },
{ NULL, oBadOption }
};
static char *kex_default_pk_alg_filtered;
const char *
kex_default_pk_alg(void)
{
if (kex_default_pk_alg_filtered == NULL)
fatal("kex_default_pk_alg not initialized.");
return kex_default_pk_alg_filtered;
}
char *
ssh_connection_hash(const char *thishost, const char *host, const char *portstr,
const char *user)
{
struct ssh_digest_ctx *md;
u_char conn_hash[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH];
if ((md = ssh_digest_start(SSH_DIGEST_SHA1)) == NULL ||
ssh_digest_update(md, thishost, strlen(thishost)) < 0 ||
ssh_digest_update(md, host, strlen(host)) < 0 ||
ssh_digest_update(md, portstr, strlen(portstr)) < 0 ||
ssh_digest_update(md, user, strlen(user)) < 0 ||
ssh_digest_final(md, conn_hash, sizeof(conn_hash)) < 0)
fatal("%s: mux digest failed", __func__);
ssh_digest_free(md);
return tohex(conn_hash, ssh_digest_bytes(SSH_DIGEST_SHA1));
}
/*
* Adds a local TCP/IP port forward to options. Never returns if there is an
* error.
*/
void
add_local_forward(Options *options, const struct Forward *newfwd)
{
struct Forward *fwd;
int i;
/* Don't add duplicates */
for (i = 0; i < options->num_local_forwards; i++) {
if (forward_equals(newfwd, options->local_forwards + i))
return;
}
options->local_forwards = xreallocarray(options->local_forwards,
options->num_local_forwards + 1,
sizeof(*options->local_forwards));
fwd = &options->local_forwards[options->num_local_forwards++];
fwd->listen_host = newfwd->listen_host;
fwd->listen_port = newfwd->listen_port;
fwd->listen_path = newfwd->listen_path;
fwd->connect_host = newfwd->connect_host;
fwd->connect_port = newfwd->connect_port;
fwd->connect_path = newfwd->connect_path;
}
/*
* Adds a remote TCP/IP port forward to options. Never returns if there is
* an error.
*/
void
add_remote_forward(Options *options, const struct Forward *newfwd)
{
struct Forward *fwd;
int i;
/* Don't add duplicates */
for (i = 0; i < options->num_remote_forwards; i++) {
if (forward_equals(newfwd, options->remote_forwards + i))
return;
}
options->remote_forwards = xreallocarray(options->remote_forwards,
options->num_remote_forwards + 1,
sizeof(*options->remote_forwards));
fwd = &options->remote_forwards[options->num_remote_forwards++];
fwd->listen_host = newfwd->listen_host;
fwd->listen_port = newfwd->listen_port;
fwd->listen_path = newfwd->listen_path;
fwd->connect_host = newfwd->connect_host;
fwd->connect_port = newfwd->connect_port;
fwd->connect_path = newfwd->connect_path;
fwd->handle = newfwd->handle;
fwd->allocated_port = 0;
}
static void
clear_forwardings(Options *options)
{
int i;
for (i = 0; i < options->num_local_forwards; i++) {
free(options->local_forwards[i].listen_host);
free(options->local_forwards[i].listen_path);
free(options->local_forwards[i].connect_host);
free(options->local_forwards[i].connect_path);
}
if (options->num_local_forwards > 0) {
free(options->local_forwards);
options->local_forwards = NULL;
}
options->num_local_forwards = 0;
for (i = 0; i < options->num_remote_forwards; i++) {
free(options->remote_forwards[i].listen_host);
free(options->remote_forwards[i].listen_path);
free(options->remote_forwards[i].connect_host);
free(options->remote_forwards[i].connect_path);
}
if (options->num_remote_forwards > 0) {
free(options->remote_forwards);
options->remote_forwards = NULL;
}
options->num_remote_forwards = 0;
options->tun_open = SSH_TUNMODE_NO;
}
void
add_certificate_file(Options *options, const char *path, int userprovided)
{
int i;
if (options->num_certificate_files >= SSH_MAX_CERTIFICATE_FILES)
fatal("Too many certificate files specified (max %d)",
SSH_MAX_CERTIFICATE_FILES);
/* Avoid registering duplicates */
for (i = 0; i < options->num_certificate_files; i++) {
if (options->certificate_file_userprovided[i] == userprovided &&
strcmp(options->certificate_files[i], path) == 0) {
debug2("%s: ignoring duplicate key %s", __func__, path);
return;
}
}
options->certificate_file_userprovided[options->num_certificate_files] =
userprovided;
options->certificate_files[options->num_certificate_files++] =
xstrdup(path);
}
void
add_identity_file(Options *options, const char *dir, const char *filename,
int userprovided)
{
char *path;
int i;
if (options->num_identity_files >= SSH_MAX_IDENTITY_FILES)
fatal("Too many identity files specified (max %d)",
SSH_MAX_IDENTITY_FILES);
if (dir == NULL) /* no dir, filename is absolute */
path = xstrdup(filename);
else if (xasprintf(&path, "%s%s", dir, filename) >= PATH_MAX)
fatal("Identity file path %s too long", path);
/* Avoid registering duplicates */
for (i = 0; i < options->num_identity_files; i++) {
if (options->identity_file_userprovided[i] == userprovided &&
strcmp(options->identity_files[i], path) == 0) {
debug2("%s: ignoring duplicate key %s", __func__, path);
free(path);
return;
}
}
options->identity_file_userprovided[options->num_identity_files] =
userprovided;
options->identity_files[options->num_identity_files++] = path;
}
int
default_ssh_port(void)
{
static int port;
struct servent *sp;
if (port == 0) {
sp = getservbyname(SSH_SERVICE_NAME, "tcp");
port = sp ? ntohs(sp->s_port) : SSH_DEFAULT_PORT;
}
return port;
}
/*
* Execute a command in a shell.
* Return its exit status or -1 on abnormal exit.
*/
static int
execute_in_shell(const char *cmd)
{
char *shell;
pid_t pid;
int devnull, status;
if ((shell = getenv("SHELL")) == NULL)
shell = _PATH_BSHELL;
if (access(shell, X_OK) == -1) {
fatal("Shell \"%s\" is not executable: %s",
shell, strerror(errno));
}
/* Need this to redirect subprocess stdin/out */
if ((devnull = open(_PATH_DEVNULL, O_RDWR)) == -1)
fatal("open(/dev/null): %s", strerror(errno));
debug("Executing command: '%.500s'", cmd);
/* Fork and execute the command. */
if ((pid = fork()) == 0) {
char *argv[4];
/* Redirect child stdin and stdout. Leave stderr */
if (dup2(devnull, STDIN_FILENO) == -1)
fatal("dup2: %s", strerror(errno));
if (dup2(devnull, STDOUT_FILENO) == -1)
fatal("dup2: %s", strerror(errno));
if (devnull > STDERR_FILENO)
close(devnull);
closefrom(STDERR_FILENO + 1);
argv[0] = shell;
argv[1] = "-c";
argv[2] = xstrdup(cmd);
argv[3] = NULL;
execv(argv[0], argv);
error("Unable to execute '%.100s': %s", cmd, strerror(errno));
/* Die with signal to make this error apparent to parent. */
ssh_signal(SIGTERM, SIG_DFL);
kill(getpid(), SIGTERM);
_exit(1);
}
/* Parent. */
if (pid == -1)
fatal("%s: fork: %.100s", __func__, strerror(errno));
close(devnull);
while (waitpid(pid, &status, 0) == -1) {
if (errno != EINTR && errno != EAGAIN)
fatal("%s: waitpid: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
}
if (!WIFEXITED(status)) {
error("command '%.100s' exited abnormally", cmd);
return -1;
}
debug3("command returned status %d", WEXITSTATUS(status));
return WEXITSTATUS(status);
}
/*
* Parse and execute a Match directive.
*/
static int
match_cfg_line(Options *options, char **condition, struct passwd *pw,
const char *host_arg, const char *original_host, int final_pass,
int *want_final_pass, const char *filename, int linenum)
{
char *arg, *oattrib, *attrib, *cmd, *cp = *condition, *host, *criteria;
const char *ruser;
int r, port, this_result, result = 1, attributes = 0, negate;
char thishost[NI_MAXHOST], shorthost[NI_MAXHOST], portstr[NI_MAXSERV];
char uidstr[32];
/*
* Configuration is likely to be incomplete at this point so we
* must be prepared to use default values.
*/
port = options->port <= 0 ? default_ssh_port() : options->port;
ruser = options->user == NULL ? pw->pw_name : options->user;
if (final_pass) {
host = xstrdup(options->hostname);
} else if (options->hostname != NULL) {
/* NB. Please keep in sync with ssh.c:main() */
host = percent_expand(options->hostname,
"h", host_arg, (char *)NULL);
} else {
host = xstrdup(host_arg);
}
debug2("checking match for '%s' host %s originally %s",
cp, host, original_host);
while ((oattrib = attrib = strdelim(&cp)) && *attrib != '\0') {
criteria = NULL;
this_result = 1;
if ((negate = attrib[0] == '!'))
attrib++;
/* criteria "all" and "canonical" have no argument */
if (strcasecmp(attrib, "all") == 0) {
if (attributes > 1 ||
((arg = strdelim(&cp)) != NULL && *arg != '\0')) {
error("%.200s line %d: '%s' cannot be combined "
"with other Match attributes",
filename, linenum, oattrib);
result = -1;
goto out;
}
if (result)
result = negate ? 0 : 1;
goto out;
}
attributes++;
if (strcasecmp(attrib, "canonical") == 0 ||
strcasecmp(attrib, "final") == 0) {
/*
* If the config requests "Match final" then remember
* this so we can perform a second pass later.
*/
if (strcasecmp(attrib, "final") == 0 &&
want_final_pass != NULL)
*want_final_pass = 1;
r = !!final_pass; /* force bitmask member to boolean */
if (r == (negate ? 1 : 0))
this_result = result = 0;
debug3("%.200s line %d: %smatched '%s'",
filename, linenum,
this_result ? "" : "not ", oattrib);
continue;
}
/* All other criteria require an argument */
if ((arg = strdelim(&cp)) == NULL || *arg == '\0') {
error("Missing Match criteria for %s", attrib);
result = -1;
goto out;
}
if (strcasecmp(attrib, "host") == 0) {
criteria = xstrdup(host);
r = match_hostname(host, arg) == 1;
if (r == (negate ? 1 : 0))
this_result = result = 0;
} else if (strcasecmp(attrib, "originalhost") == 0) {
criteria = xstrdup(original_host);
r = match_hostname(original_host, arg) == 1;
if (r == (negate ? 1 : 0))
this_result = result = 0;
} else if (strcasecmp(attrib, "user") == 0) {
criteria = xstrdup(ruser);
r = match_pattern_list(ruser, arg, 0) == 1;
if (r == (negate ? 1 : 0))
this_result = result = 0;
} else if (strcasecmp(attrib, "localuser") == 0) {
criteria = xstrdup(pw->pw_name);
r = match_pattern_list(pw->pw_name, arg, 0) == 1;
if (r == (negate ? 1 : 0))
this_result = result = 0;
} else if (strcasecmp(attrib, "exec") == 0) {
- char *conn_hash_hex;
+ char *conn_hash_hex, *keyalias;
if (gethostname(thishost, sizeof(thishost)) == -1)
fatal("gethostname: %s", strerror(errno));
strlcpy(shorthost, thishost, sizeof(shorthost));
shorthost[strcspn(thishost, ".")] = '\0';
snprintf(portstr, sizeof(portstr), "%d", port);
snprintf(uidstr, sizeof(uidstr), "%llu",
(unsigned long long)pw->pw_uid);
conn_hash_hex = ssh_connection_hash(thishost, host,
portstr, ruser);
+ keyalias = options->host_key_alias ?
+ options->host_key_alias : host;
cmd = percent_expand(arg,
"C", conn_hash_hex,
"L", shorthost,
"d", pw->pw_dir,
"h", host,
+ "k", keyalias,
"l", thishost,
"n", original_host,
"p", portstr,
"r", ruser,
"u", pw->pw_name,
"i", uidstr,
(char *)NULL);
free(conn_hash_hex);
if (result != 1) {
/* skip execution if prior predicate failed */
debug3("%.200s line %d: skipped exec "
"\"%.100s\"", filename, linenum, cmd);
free(cmd);
continue;
}
r = execute_in_shell(cmd);
if (r == -1) {
fatal("%.200s line %d: match exec "
"'%.100s' error", filename,
linenum, cmd);
}
criteria = xstrdup(cmd);
free(cmd);
/* Force exit status to boolean */
r = r == 0;
if (r == (negate ? 1 : 0))
this_result = result = 0;
} else {
error("Unsupported Match attribute %s", attrib);
result = -1;
goto out;
}
debug3("%.200s line %d: %smatched '%s \"%.100s\"' ",
filename, linenum, this_result ? "": "not ",
oattrib, criteria);
free(criteria);
}
if (attributes == 0) {
error("One or more attributes required for Match");
result = -1;
goto out;
}
out:
if (result != -1)
debug2("match %sfound", result ? "" : "not ");
*condition = cp;
free(host);
return result;
}
/* Remove environment variable by pattern */
static void
rm_env(Options *options, const char *arg, const char *filename, int linenum)
{
- int i, j;
+ int i, j, onum_send_env = options->num_send_env;
char *cp;
/* Remove an environment variable */
for (i = 0; i < options->num_send_env; ) {
cp = xstrdup(options->send_env[i]);
if (!match_pattern(cp, arg + 1)) {
free(cp);
i++;
continue;
}
debug3("%s line %d: removing environment %s",
filename, linenum, cp);
free(cp);
free(options->send_env[i]);
options->send_env[i] = NULL;
for (j = i; j < options->num_send_env - 1; j++) {
options->send_env[j] = options->send_env[j + 1];
options->send_env[j + 1] = NULL;
}
options->num_send_env--;
/* NB. don't increment i */
}
+ if (onum_send_env != options->num_send_env) {
+ options->send_env = xrecallocarray(options->send_env,
+ onum_send_env, options->num_send_env,
+ sizeof(*options->send_env));
+ }
}
/*
* Returns the number of the token pointed to by cp or oBadOption.
*/
static OpCodes
parse_token(const char *cp, const char *filename, int linenum,
const char *ignored_unknown)
{
int i;
for (i = 0; keywords[i].name; i++)
if (strcmp(cp, keywords[i].name) == 0)
return keywords[i].opcode;
if (ignored_unknown != NULL &&
match_pattern_list(cp, ignored_unknown, 1) == 1)
return oIgnoredUnknownOption;
error("%s: line %d: Bad configuration option: %s",
filename, linenum, cp);
return oBadOption;
}
/* Multistate option parsing */
struct multistate {
char *key;
int value;
};
static const struct multistate multistate_flag[] = {
{ "true", 1 },
{ "false", 0 },
{ "yes", 1 },
{ "no", 0 },
{ NULL, -1 }
};
static const struct multistate multistate_yesnoask[] = {
{ "true", 1 },
{ "false", 0 },
{ "yes", 1 },
{ "no", 0 },
{ "ask", 2 },
{ NULL, -1 }
};
static const struct multistate multistate_strict_hostkey[] = {
{ "true", SSH_STRICT_HOSTKEY_YES },
{ "false", SSH_STRICT_HOSTKEY_OFF },
{ "yes", SSH_STRICT_HOSTKEY_YES },
{ "no", SSH_STRICT_HOSTKEY_OFF },
{ "ask", SSH_STRICT_HOSTKEY_ASK },
{ "off", SSH_STRICT_HOSTKEY_OFF },
{ "accept-new", SSH_STRICT_HOSTKEY_NEW },
{ NULL, -1 }
};
static const struct multistate multistate_yesnoaskconfirm[] = {
{ "true", 1 },
{ "false", 0 },
{ "yes", 1 },
{ "no", 0 },
{ "ask", 2 },
{ "confirm", 3 },
{ NULL, -1 }
};
static const struct multistate multistate_addressfamily[] = {
{ "inet", AF_INET },
{ "inet6", AF_INET6 },
{ "any", AF_UNSPEC },
{ NULL, -1 }
};
static const struct multistate multistate_controlmaster[] = {
{ "true", SSHCTL_MASTER_YES },
{ "yes", SSHCTL_MASTER_YES },
{ "false", SSHCTL_MASTER_NO },
{ "no", SSHCTL_MASTER_NO },
{ "auto", SSHCTL_MASTER_AUTO },
{ "ask", SSHCTL_MASTER_ASK },
{ "autoask", SSHCTL_MASTER_AUTO_ASK },
{ NULL, -1 }
};
static const struct multistate multistate_tunnel[] = {
{ "ethernet", SSH_TUNMODE_ETHERNET },
{ "point-to-point", SSH_TUNMODE_POINTOPOINT },
{ "true", SSH_TUNMODE_DEFAULT },
{ "yes", SSH_TUNMODE_DEFAULT },
{ "false", SSH_TUNMODE_NO },
{ "no", SSH_TUNMODE_NO },
{ NULL, -1 }
};
static const struct multistate multistate_requesttty[] = {
{ "true", REQUEST_TTY_YES },
{ "yes", REQUEST_TTY_YES },
{ "false", REQUEST_TTY_NO },
{ "no", REQUEST_TTY_NO },
{ "force", REQUEST_TTY_FORCE },
{ "auto", REQUEST_TTY_AUTO },
{ NULL, -1 }
};
static const struct multistate multistate_canonicalizehostname[] = {
{ "true", SSH_CANONICALISE_YES },
{ "false", SSH_CANONICALISE_NO },
{ "yes", SSH_CANONICALISE_YES },
{ "no", SSH_CANONICALISE_NO },
{ "always", SSH_CANONICALISE_ALWAYS },
{ NULL, -1 }
};
static const struct multistate multistate_compression[] = {
#ifdef WITH_ZLIB
{ "yes", COMP_ZLIB },
#endif
{ "no", COMP_NONE },
{ NULL, -1 }
};
+static int
+parse_multistate_value(const char *arg, const char *filename, int linenum,
+ const struct multistate *multistate_ptr)
+{
+ int i;
+
+ if (!arg || *arg == '\0')
+ fatal("%s line %d: missing argument.", filename, linenum);
+ for (i = 0; multistate_ptr[i].key != NULL; i++) {
+ if (strcasecmp(arg, multistate_ptr[i].key) == 0)
+ return multistate_ptr[i].value;
+ }
+ return -1;
+}
+
/*
* Processes a single option line as used in the configuration files. This
* only sets those values that have not already been set.
*/
int
process_config_line(Options *options, struct passwd *pw, const char *host,
const char *original_host, char *line, const char *filename,
int linenum, int *activep, int flags)
{
return process_config_line_depth(options, pw, host, original_host,
line, filename, linenum, activep, flags, NULL, 0);
}
#define WHITESPACE " \t\r\n"
static int
process_config_line_depth(Options *options, struct passwd *pw, const char *host,
const char *original_host, char *line, const char *filename,
int linenum, int *activep, int flags, int *want_final_pass, int depth)
{
char *s, **charptr, *endofnumber, *keyword, *arg, *arg2;
char **cpptr, fwdarg[256];
u_int i, *uintptr, max_entries = 0;
int r, oactive, negated, opcode, *intptr, value, value2, cmdline = 0;
int remotefwd, dynamicfwd;
LogLevel *log_level_ptr;
SyslogFacility *log_facility_ptr;
long long val64;
size_t len;
struct Forward fwd;
const struct multistate *multistate_ptr;
struct allowed_cname *cname;
glob_t gl;
const char *errstr;
if (activep == NULL) { /* We are processing a command line directive */
cmdline = 1;
activep = &cmdline;
}
/* Strip trailing whitespace. Allow \f (form feed) at EOL only */
if ((len = strlen(line)) == 0)
return 0;
for (len--; len > 0; len--) {
if (strchr(WHITESPACE "\f", line[len]) == NULL)
break;
line[len] = '\0';
}
s = line;
/* Get the keyword. (Each line is supposed to begin with a keyword). */
if ((keyword = strdelim(&s)) == NULL)
return 0;
/* Ignore leading whitespace. */
if (*keyword == '\0')
keyword = strdelim(&s);
if (keyword == NULL || !*keyword || *keyword == '\n' || *keyword == '#')
return 0;
/* Match lowercase keyword */
lowercase(keyword);
opcode = parse_token(keyword, filename, linenum,
options->ignored_unknown);
switch (opcode) {
case oBadOption:
/* don't panic, but count bad options */
return -1;
case oIgnore:
return 0;
case oIgnoredUnknownOption:
debug("%s line %d: Ignored unknown option \"%s\"",
filename, linenum, keyword);
return 0;
case oConnectTimeout:
intptr = &options->connection_timeout;
parse_time:
arg = strdelim(&s);
if (!arg || *arg == '\0')
fatal("%s line %d: missing time value.",
filename, linenum);
if (strcmp(arg, "none") == 0)
value = -1;
else if ((value = convtime(arg)) == -1)
fatal("%s line %d: invalid time value.",
filename, linenum);
if (*activep && *intptr == -1)
*intptr = value;
break;
case oForwardAgent:
intptr = &options->forward_agent;
arg = strdelim(&s);
if (!arg || *arg == '\0')
fatal("%s line %d: missing argument.",
filename, linenum);
value = -1;
multistate_ptr = multistate_flag;
for (i = 0; multistate_ptr[i].key != NULL; i++) {
if (strcasecmp(arg, multistate_ptr[i].key) == 0) {
value = multistate_ptr[i].value;
break;
}
}
if (value != -1) {
if (*activep && *intptr == -1)
*intptr = value;
break;
}
/* ForwardAgent wasn't 'yes' or 'no', assume a path */
if (*activep && *intptr == -1)
*intptr = 1;
charptr = &options->forward_agent_sock_path;
goto parse_agent_path;
case oForwardX11:
intptr = &options->forward_x11;
parse_flag:
multistate_ptr = multistate_flag;
parse_multistate:
arg = strdelim(&s);
- if (!arg || *arg == '\0')
- fatal("%s line %d: missing argument.",
- filename, linenum);
- value = -1;
- for (i = 0; multistate_ptr[i].key != NULL; i++) {
- if (strcasecmp(arg, multistate_ptr[i].key) == 0) {
- value = multistate_ptr[i].value;
- break;
- }
- }
- if (value == -1)
+ if ((value = parse_multistate_value(arg, filename, linenum,
+ multistate_ptr)) == -1) {
fatal("%s line %d: unsupported option \"%s\".",
filename, linenum, arg);
+ }
if (*activep && *intptr == -1)
*intptr = value;
break;
case oForwardX11Trusted:
intptr = &options->forward_x11_trusted;
goto parse_flag;
case oForwardX11Timeout:
intptr = &options->forward_x11_timeout;
goto parse_time;
case oGatewayPorts:
intptr = &options->fwd_opts.gateway_ports;
goto parse_flag;
case oExitOnForwardFailure:
intptr = &options->exit_on_forward_failure;
goto parse_flag;
case oPasswordAuthentication:
intptr = &options->password_authentication;
goto parse_flag;
case oKbdInteractiveAuthentication:
intptr = &options->kbd_interactive_authentication;
goto parse_flag;
case oKbdInteractiveDevices:
charptr = &options->kbd_interactive_devices;
goto parse_string;
case oPubkeyAuthentication:
intptr = &options->pubkey_authentication;
goto parse_flag;
case oHostbasedAuthentication:
intptr = &options->hostbased_authentication;
goto parse_flag;
case oChallengeResponseAuthentication:
intptr = &options->challenge_response_authentication;
goto parse_flag;
case oGssAuthentication:
intptr = &options->gss_authentication;
goto parse_flag;
case oGssDelegateCreds:
intptr = &options->gss_deleg_creds;
goto parse_flag;
case oBatchMode:
intptr = &options->batch_mode;
goto parse_flag;
case oCheckHostIP:
intptr = &options->check_host_ip;
goto parse_flag;
case oVerifyHostKeyDNS:
intptr = &options->verify_host_key_dns;
multistate_ptr = multistate_yesnoask;
goto parse_multistate;
case oStrictHostKeyChecking:
intptr = &options->strict_host_key_checking;
multistate_ptr = multistate_strict_hostkey;
goto parse_multistate;
case oCompression:
intptr = &options->compression;
multistate_ptr = multistate_compression;
goto parse_multistate;
case oTCPKeepAlive:
intptr = &options->tcp_keep_alive;
goto parse_flag;
case oNoHostAuthenticationForLocalhost:
intptr = &options->no_host_authentication_for_localhost;
goto parse_flag;
case oNumberOfPasswordPrompts:
intptr = &options->number_of_password_prompts;
goto parse_int;
case oRekeyLimit:
arg = strdelim(&s);
if (!arg || *arg == '\0')
fatal("%.200s line %d: Missing argument.", filename,
linenum);
if (strcmp(arg, "default") == 0) {
val64 = 0;
} else {
if (scan_scaled(arg, &val64) == -1)
fatal("%.200s line %d: Bad number '%s': %s",
filename, linenum, arg, strerror(errno));
if (val64 != 0 && val64 < 16)
fatal("%.200s line %d: RekeyLimit too small",
filename, linenum);
}
if (*activep && options->rekey_limit == -1)
options->rekey_limit = val64;
if (s != NULL) { /* optional rekey interval present */
if (strcmp(s, "none") == 0) {
(void)strdelim(&s); /* discard */
break;
}
intptr = &options->rekey_interval;
goto parse_time;
}
break;
case oIdentityFile:
arg = strdelim(&s);
if (!arg || *arg == '\0')
fatal("%.200s line %d: Missing argument.", filename, linenum);
if (*activep) {
intptr = &options->num_identity_files;
if (*intptr >= SSH_MAX_IDENTITY_FILES)
fatal("%.200s line %d: Too many identity files specified (max %d).",
filename, linenum, SSH_MAX_IDENTITY_FILES);
add_identity_file(options, NULL,
arg, flags & SSHCONF_USERCONF);
}
break;
case oCertificateFile:
arg = strdelim(&s);
if (!arg || *arg == '\0')
fatal("%.200s line %d: Missing argument.",
filename, linenum);
if (*activep) {
intptr = &options->num_certificate_files;
if (*intptr >= SSH_MAX_CERTIFICATE_FILES) {
fatal("%.200s line %d: Too many certificate "
"files specified (max %d).",
filename, linenum,
SSH_MAX_CERTIFICATE_FILES);
}
add_certificate_file(options, arg,
flags & SSHCONF_USERCONF);
}
break;
case oXAuthLocation:
charptr=&options->xauth_location;
goto parse_string;
case oUser:
charptr = &options->user;
parse_string:
arg = strdelim(&s);
if (!arg || *arg == '\0')
fatal("%.200s line %d: Missing argument.",
filename, linenum);
if (*activep && *charptr == NULL)
*charptr = xstrdup(arg);
break;
case oGlobalKnownHostsFile:
cpptr = (char **)&options->system_hostfiles;
uintptr = &options->num_system_hostfiles;
max_entries = SSH_MAX_HOSTS_FILES;
parse_char_array:
if (*activep && *uintptr == 0) {
while ((arg = strdelim(&s)) != NULL && *arg != '\0') {
if ((*uintptr) >= max_entries)
fatal("%s line %d: "
"too many known hosts files.",
filename, linenum);
cpptr[(*uintptr)++] = xstrdup(arg);
}
}
return 0;
case oUserKnownHostsFile:
cpptr = (char **)&options->user_hostfiles;
uintptr = &options->num_user_hostfiles;
max_entries = SSH_MAX_HOSTS_FILES;
goto parse_char_array;
case oHostname:
charptr = &options->hostname;
goto parse_string;
case oHostKeyAlias:
charptr = &options->host_key_alias;
goto parse_string;
case oPreferredAuthentications:
charptr = &options->preferred_authentications;
goto parse_string;
case oBindAddress:
charptr = &options->bind_address;
goto parse_string;
case oBindInterface:
charptr = &options->bind_interface;
goto parse_string;
case oPKCS11Provider:
charptr = &options->pkcs11_provider;
goto parse_string;
case oSecurityKeyProvider:
charptr = &options->sk_provider;
goto parse_string;
case oProxyCommand:
charptr = &options->proxy_command;
/* Ignore ProxyCommand if ProxyJump already specified */
if (options->jump_host != NULL)
charptr = &options->jump_host; /* Skip below */
parse_command:
if (s == NULL)
fatal("%.200s line %d: Missing argument.", filename, linenum);
len = strspn(s, WHITESPACE "=");
if (*activep && *charptr == NULL)
*charptr = xstrdup(s + len);
return 0;
case oProxyJump:
if (s == NULL) {
fatal("%.200s line %d: Missing argument.",
filename, linenum);
}
len = strspn(s, WHITESPACE "=");
if (parse_jump(s + len, options, *activep) == -1) {
fatal("%.200s line %d: Invalid ProxyJump \"%s\"",
filename, linenum, s + len);
}
return 0;
case oPort:
arg = strdelim(&s);
if (!arg || *arg == '\0')
fatal("%.200s line %d: Missing argument.",
filename, linenum);
value = a2port(arg);
if (value <= 0)
fatal("%.200s line %d: Bad port '%s'.",
filename, linenum, arg);
if (*activep && options->port == -1)
options->port = value;
break;
case oConnectionAttempts:
intptr = &options->connection_attempts;
parse_int:
arg = strdelim(&s);
if ((errstr = atoi_err(arg, &value)) != NULL)
fatal("%s line %d: integer value %s.",
filename, linenum, errstr);
if (*activep && *intptr == -1)
*intptr = value;
break;
case oCiphers:
arg = strdelim(&s);
if (!arg || *arg == '\0')
fatal("%.200s line %d: Missing argument.", filename, linenum);
if (*arg != '-' &&
!ciphers_valid(*arg == '+' || *arg == '^' ? arg + 1 : arg))
fatal("%.200s line %d: Bad SSH2 cipher spec '%s'.",
filename, linenum, arg ? arg : "<NONE>");
if (*activep && options->ciphers == NULL)
options->ciphers = xstrdup(arg);
break;
case oMacs:
arg = strdelim(&s);
if (!arg || *arg == '\0')
fatal("%.200s line %d: Missing argument.", filename, linenum);
if (*arg != '-' &&
!mac_valid(*arg == '+' || *arg == '^' ? arg + 1 : arg))
fatal("%.200s line %d: Bad SSH2 MAC spec '%s'.",
filename, linenum, arg ? arg : "<NONE>");
if (*activep && options->macs == NULL)
options->macs = xstrdup(arg);
break;
case oKexAlgorithms:
arg = strdelim(&s);
if (!arg || *arg == '\0')
fatal("%.200s line %d: Missing argument.",
filename, linenum);
if (*arg != '-' &&
!kex_names_valid(*arg == '+' || *arg == '^' ?
arg + 1 : arg))
fatal("%.200s line %d: Bad SSH2 KexAlgorithms '%s'.",
filename, linenum, arg ? arg : "<NONE>");
if (*activep && options->kex_algorithms == NULL)
options->kex_algorithms = xstrdup(arg);
break;
case oHostKeyAlgorithms:
charptr = &options->hostkeyalgorithms;
parse_keytypes:
arg = strdelim(&s);
if (!arg || *arg == '\0')
fatal("%.200s line %d: Missing argument.",
filename, linenum);
if (*arg != '-' &&
!sshkey_names_valid2(*arg == '+' || *arg == '^' ?
arg + 1 : arg, 1))
fatal("%s line %d: Bad key types '%s'.",
filename, linenum, arg ? arg : "<NONE>");
if (*activep && *charptr == NULL)
*charptr = xstrdup(arg);
break;
case oCASignatureAlgorithms:
charptr = &options->ca_sign_algorithms;
goto parse_keytypes;
case oLogLevel:
log_level_ptr = &options->log_level;
arg = strdelim(&s);
value = log_level_number(arg);
if (value == SYSLOG_LEVEL_NOT_SET)
fatal("%.200s line %d: unsupported log level '%s'",
filename, linenum, arg ? arg : "<NONE>");
if (*activep && *log_level_ptr == SYSLOG_LEVEL_NOT_SET)
*log_level_ptr = (LogLevel) value;
break;
case oLogFacility:
log_facility_ptr = &options->log_facility;
arg = strdelim(&s);
value = log_facility_number(arg);
if (value == SYSLOG_FACILITY_NOT_SET)
fatal("%.200s line %d: unsupported log facility '%s'",
filename, linenum, arg ? arg : "<NONE>");
if (*log_facility_ptr == -1)
*log_facility_ptr = (SyslogFacility) value;
break;
case oLocalForward:
case oRemoteForward:
case oDynamicForward:
arg = strdelim(&s);
if (arg == NULL || *arg == '\0')
fatal("%.200s line %d: Missing port argument.",
filename, linenum);
remotefwd = (opcode == oRemoteForward);
dynamicfwd = (opcode == oDynamicForward);
if (!dynamicfwd) {
arg2 = strdelim(&s);
if (arg2 == NULL || *arg2 == '\0') {
if (remotefwd)
dynamicfwd = 1;
else
fatal("%.200s line %d: Missing target "
"argument.", filename, linenum);
} else {
/* construct a string for parse_forward */
snprintf(fwdarg, sizeof(fwdarg), "%s:%s", arg,
arg2);
}
}
if (dynamicfwd)
strlcpy(fwdarg, arg, sizeof(fwdarg));
if (parse_forward(&fwd, fwdarg, dynamicfwd, remotefwd) == 0)
fatal("%.200s line %d: Bad forwarding specification.",
filename, linenum);
if (*activep) {
if (remotefwd) {
add_remote_forward(options, &fwd);
} else {
add_local_forward(options, &fwd);
}
}
break;
case oClearAllForwardings:
intptr = &options->clear_forwardings;
goto parse_flag;
case oHost:
if (cmdline)
fatal("Host directive not supported as a command-line "
"option");
*activep = 0;
arg2 = NULL;
while ((arg = strdelim(&s)) != NULL && *arg != '\0') {
if ((flags & SSHCONF_NEVERMATCH) != 0)
break;
negated = *arg == '!';
if (negated)
arg++;
if (match_pattern(host, arg)) {
if (negated) {
debug("%.200s line %d: Skipping Host "
"block because of negated match "
"for %.100s", filename, linenum,
arg);
*activep = 0;
break;
}
if (!*activep)
arg2 = arg; /* logged below */
*activep = 1;
}
}
if (*activep)
debug("%.200s line %d: Applying options for %.100s",
filename, linenum, arg2);
/* Avoid garbage check below, as strdelim is done. */
return 0;
case oMatch:
if (cmdline)
fatal("Host directive not supported as a command-line "
"option");
value = match_cfg_line(options, &s, pw, host, original_host,
flags & SSHCONF_FINAL, want_final_pass,
filename, linenum);
if (value < 0)
fatal("%.200s line %d: Bad Match condition", filename,
linenum);
*activep = (flags & SSHCONF_NEVERMATCH) ? 0 : value;
break;
case oEscapeChar:
intptr = &options->escape_char;
arg = strdelim(&s);
if (!arg || *arg == '\0')
fatal("%.200s line %d: Missing argument.", filename, linenum);
if (strcmp(arg, "none") == 0)
value = SSH_ESCAPECHAR_NONE;
else if (arg[1] == '\0')
value = (u_char) arg[0];
else if (arg[0] == '^' && arg[2] == 0 &&
(u_char) arg[1] >= 64 && (u_char) arg[1] < 128)
value = (u_char) arg[1] & 31;
else {
fatal("%.200s line %d: Bad escape character.",
filename, linenum);
/* NOTREACHED */
value = 0; /* Avoid compiler warning. */
}
if (*activep && *intptr == -1)
*intptr = value;
break;
case oAddressFamily:
intptr = &options->address_family;
multistate_ptr = multistate_addressfamily;
goto parse_multistate;
case oEnableSSHKeysign:
intptr = &options->enable_ssh_keysign;
goto parse_flag;
case oIdentitiesOnly:
intptr = &options->identities_only;
goto parse_flag;
case oServerAliveInterval:
intptr = &options->server_alive_interval;
goto parse_time;
case oServerAliveCountMax:
intptr = &options->server_alive_count_max;
goto parse_int;
case oSendEnv:
while ((arg = strdelim(&s)) != NULL && *arg != '\0') {
if (strchr(arg, '=') != NULL)
fatal("%s line %d: Invalid environment name.",
filename, linenum);
if (!*activep)
continue;
if (*arg == '-') {
/* Removing an env var */
rm_env(options, arg, filename, linenum);
continue;
} else {
/* Adding an env var */
if (options->num_send_env >= INT_MAX)
fatal("%s line %d: too many send env.",
filename, linenum);
options->send_env = xrecallocarray(
options->send_env, options->num_send_env,
options->num_send_env + 1,
sizeof(*options->send_env));
options->send_env[options->num_send_env++] =
xstrdup(arg);
}
}
break;
case oSetEnv:
value = options->num_setenv;
while ((arg = strdelimw(&s)) != NULL && *arg != '\0') {
if (strchr(arg, '=') == NULL)
fatal("%s line %d: Invalid SetEnv.",
filename, linenum);
if (!*activep || value != 0)
continue;
/* Adding a setenv var */
if (options->num_setenv >= INT_MAX)
fatal("%s line %d: too many SetEnv.",
filename, linenum);
options->setenv = xrecallocarray(
options->setenv, options->num_setenv,
options->num_setenv + 1, sizeof(*options->setenv));
options->setenv[options->num_setenv++] = xstrdup(arg);
}
break;
case oControlPath:
charptr = &options->control_path;
goto parse_string;
case oControlMaster:
intptr = &options->control_master;
multistate_ptr = multistate_controlmaster;
goto parse_multistate;
case oControlPersist:
/* no/false/yes/true, or a time spec */
intptr = &options->control_persist;
arg = strdelim(&s);
if (!arg || *arg == '\0')
fatal("%.200s line %d: Missing ControlPersist"
" argument.", filename, linenum);
value = 0;
value2 = 0; /* timeout */
if (strcmp(arg, "no") == 0 || strcmp(arg, "false") == 0)
value = 0;
else if (strcmp(arg, "yes") == 0 || strcmp(arg, "true") == 0)
value = 1;
else if ((value2 = convtime(arg)) >= 0)
value = 1;
else
fatal("%.200s line %d: Bad ControlPersist argument.",
filename, linenum);
if (*activep && *intptr == -1) {
*intptr = value;
options->control_persist_timeout = value2;
}
break;
case oHashKnownHosts:
intptr = &options->hash_known_hosts;
goto parse_flag;
case oTunnel:
intptr = &options->tun_open;
multistate_ptr = multistate_tunnel;
goto parse_multistate;
case oTunnelDevice:
arg = strdelim(&s);
if (!arg || *arg == '\0')
fatal("%.200s line %d: Missing argument.", filename, linenum);
value = a2tun(arg, &value2);
if (value == SSH_TUNID_ERR)
fatal("%.200s line %d: Bad tun device.", filename, linenum);
if (*activep) {
options->tun_local = value;
options->tun_remote = value2;
}
break;
case oLocalCommand:
charptr = &options->local_command;
goto parse_command;
case oPermitLocalCommand:
intptr = &options->permit_local_command;
goto parse_flag;
case oRemoteCommand:
charptr = &options->remote_command;
goto parse_command;
case oVisualHostKey:
intptr = &options->visual_host_key;
goto parse_flag;
case oInclude:
if (cmdline)
fatal("Include directive not supported as a "
"command-line option");
value = 0;
while ((arg = strdelim(&s)) != NULL && *arg != '\0') {
/*
* Ensure all paths are anchored. User configuration
* files may begin with '~/' but system configurations
* must not. If the path is relative, then treat it
* as living in ~/.ssh for user configurations or
* /etc/ssh for system ones.
*/
if (*arg == '~' && (flags & SSHCONF_USERCONF) == 0)
fatal("%.200s line %d: bad include path %s.",
filename, linenum, arg);
if (!path_absolute(arg) && *arg != '~') {
xasprintf(&arg2, "%s/%s",
(flags & SSHCONF_USERCONF) ?
"~/" _PATH_SSH_USER_DIR : SSHDIR, arg);
} else
arg2 = xstrdup(arg);
memset(&gl, 0, sizeof(gl));
r = glob(arg2, GLOB_TILDE, NULL, &gl);
if (r == GLOB_NOMATCH) {
debug("%.200s line %d: include %s matched no "
"files",filename, linenum, arg2);
free(arg2);
continue;
} else if (r != 0)
fatal("%.200s line %d: glob failed for %s.",
filename, linenum, arg2);
free(arg2);
oactive = *activep;
for (i = 0; i < gl.gl_pathc; i++) {
debug3("%.200s line %d: Including file %s "
"depth %d%s", filename, linenum,
gl.gl_pathv[i], depth,
oactive ? "" : " (parse only)");
r = read_config_file_depth(gl.gl_pathv[i],
pw, host, original_host, options,
flags | SSHCONF_CHECKPERM |
(oactive ? 0 : SSHCONF_NEVERMATCH),
activep, want_final_pass, depth + 1);
if (r != 1 && errno != ENOENT) {
fatal("Can't open user config file "
"%.100s: %.100s", gl.gl_pathv[i],
strerror(errno));
}
/*
* don't let Match in includes clobber the
* containing file's Match state.
*/
*activep = oactive;
if (r != 1)
value = -1;
}
globfree(&gl);
}
if (value != 0)
return value;
break;
case oIPQoS:
arg = strdelim(&s);
if ((value = parse_ipqos(arg)) == -1)
fatal("%s line %d: Bad IPQoS value: %s",
filename, linenum, arg);
arg = strdelim(&s);
if (arg == NULL)
value2 = value;
else if ((value2 = parse_ipqos(arg)) == -1)
fatal("%s line %d: Bad IPQoS value: %s",
filename, linenum, arg);
if (*activep) {
options->ip_qos_interactive = value;
options->ip_qos_bulk = value2;
}
break;
case oRequestTTY:
intptr = &options->request_tty;
multistate_ptr = multistate_requesttty;
goto parse_multistate;
case oIgnoreUnknown:
charptr = &options->ignored_unknown;
goto parse_string;
case oProxyUseFdpass:
intptr = &options->proxy_use_fdpass;
goto parse_flag;
case oCanonicalDomains:
value = options->num_canonical_domains != 0;
while ((arg = strdelim(&s)) != NULL && *arg != '\0') {
if (!valid_domain(arg, 1, &errstr)) {
fatal("%s line %d: %s", filename, linenum,
errstr);
}
if (!*activep || value)
continue;
if (options->num_canonical_domains >= MAX_CANON_DOMAINS)
fatal("%s line %d: too many hostname suffixes.",
filename, linenum);
options->canonical_domains[
options->num_canonical_domains++] = xstrdup(arg);
}
break;
case oCanonicalizePermittedCNAMEs:
value = options->num_permitted_cnames != 0;
while ((arg = strdelim(&s)) != NULL && *arg != '\0') {
/* Either '*' for everything or 'list:list' */
if (strcmp(arg, "*") == 0)
arg2 = arg;
else {
lowercase(arg);
if ((arg2 = strchr(arg, ':')) == NULL ||
arg2[1] == '\0') {
fatal("%s line %d: "
"Invalid permitted CNAME \"%s\"",
filename, linenum, arg);
}
*arg2 = '\0';
arg2++;
}
if (!*activep || value)
continue;
if (options->num_permitted_cnames >= MAX_CANON_DOMAINS)
fatal("%s line %d: too many permitted CNAMEs.",
filename, linenum);
cname = options->permitted_cnames +
options->num_permitted_cnames++;
cname->source_list = xstrdup(arg);
cname->target_list = xstrdup(arg2);
}
break;
case oCanonicalizeHostname:
intptr = &options->canonicalize_hostname;
multistate_ptr = multistate_canonicalizehostname;
goto parse_multistate;
case oCanonicalizeMaxDots:
intptr = &options->canonicalize_max_dots;
goto parse_int;
case oCanonicalizeFallbackLocal:
intptr = &options->canonicalize_fallback_local;
goto parse_flag;
case oStreamLocalBindMask:
arg = strdelim(&s);
if (!arg || *arg == '\0')
fatal("%.200s line %d: Missing StreamLocalBindMask argument.", filename, linenum);
/* Parse mode in octal format */
value = strtol(arg, &endofnumber, 8);
if (arg == endofnumber || value < 0 || value > 0777)
fatal("%.200s line %d: Bad mask.", filename, linenum);
options->fwd_opts.streamlocal_bind_mask = (mode_t)value;
break;
case oStreamLocalBindUnlink:
intptr = &options->fwd_opts.streamlocal_bind_unlink;
goto parse_flag;
case oRevokedHostKeys:
charptr = &options->revoked_host_keys;
goto parse_string;
case oFingerprintHash:
intptr = &options->fingerprint_hash;
arg = strdelim(&s);
if (!arg || *arg == '\0')
fatal("%.200s line %d: Missing argument.",
filename, linenum);
if ((value = ssh_digest_alg_by_name(arg)) == -1)
fatal("%.200s line %d: Invalid hash algorithm \"%s\".",
filename, linenum, arg);
if (*activep && *intptr == -1)
*intptr = value;
break;
case oUpdateHostkeys:
intptr = &options->update_hostkeys;
multistate_ptr = multistate_yesnoask;
goto parse_multistate;
case oHostbasedKeyTypes:
charptr = &options->hostbased_key_types;
goto parse_keytypes;
case oPubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes:
charptr = &options->pubkey_key_types;
goto parse_keytypes;
case oAddKeysToAgent:
- intptr = &options->add_keys_to_agent;
- multistate_ptr = multistate_yesnoaskconfirm;
- goto parse_multistate;
+ arg = strdelim(&s);
+ arg2 = strdelim(&s);
+ value = parse_multistate_value(arg, filename, linenum,
+ multistate_yesnoaskconfirm);
+ value2 = 0; /* unlimited lifespan by default */
+ if (value == 3 && arg2 != NULL) {
+ /* allow "AddKeysToAgent confirm 5m" */
+ if ((value2 = convtime(arg2)) == -1 || value2 > INT_MAX)
+ fatal("%s line %d: invalid time value.",
+ filename, linenum);
+ } else if (value == -1 && arg2 == NULL) {
+ if ((value2 = convtime(arg)) == -1 || value2 > INT_MAX)
+ fatal("%s line %d: unsupported option",
+ filename, linenum);
+ value = 1; /* yes */
+ } else if (value == -1 || arg2 != NULL) {
+ fatal("%s line %d: unsupported option",
+ filename, linenum);
+ }
+ if (*activep && options->add_keys_to_agent == -1) {
+ options->add_keys_to_agent = value;
+ options->add_keys_to_agent_lifespan = value2;
+ }
+ break;
case oIdentityAgent:
charptr = &options->identity_agent;
arg = strdelim(&s);
if (!arg || *arg == '\0')
fatal("%.200s line %d: Missing argument.",
filename, linenum);
parse_agent_path:
/* Extra validation if the string represents an env var. */
- if (arg[0] == '$' && !valid_env_name(arg + 1)) {
+ if ((arg2 = dollar_expand(&r, arg)) == NULL || r)
+ fatal("%.200s line %d: Invalid environment expansion "
+ "%s.", filename, linenum, arg);
+ free(arg2);
+ /* check for legacy environment format */
+ if (arg[0] == '$' && arg[1] != '{' && !valid_env_name(arg + 1)) {
fatal("%.200s line %d: Invalid environment name %s.",
filename, linenum, arg);
}
if (*activep && *charptr == NULL)
*charptr = xstrdup(arg);
break;
case oDeprecated:
debug("%s line %d: Deprecated option \"%s\"",
filename, linenum, keyword);
return 0;
case oUnsupported:
error("%s line %d: Unsupported option \"%s\"",
filename, linenum, keyword);
return 0;
default:
fatal("%s: Unimplemented opcode %d", __func__, opcode);
}
/* Check that there is no garbage at end of line. */
if ((arg = strdelim(&s)) != NULL && *arg != '\0') {
fatal("%.200s line %d: garbage at end of line; \"%.200s\".",
filename, linenum, arg);
}
return 0;
}
/*
* Reads the config file and modifies the options accordingly. Options
* should already be initialized before this call. This never returns if
* there is an error. If the file does not exist, this returns 0.
*/
int
read_config_file(const char *filename, struct passwd *pw, const char *host,
const char *original_host, Options *options, int flags,
int *want_final_pass)
{
int active = 1;
return read_config_file_depth(filename, pw, host, original_host,
options, flags, &active, want_final_pass, 0);
}
#define READCONF_MAX_DEPTH 16
static int
read_config_file_depth(const char *filename, struct passwd *pw,
const char *host, const char *original_host, Options *options,
int flags, int *activep, int *want_final_pass, int depth)
{
FILE *f;
char *line = NULL;
size_t linesize = 0;
int linenum;
int bad_options = 0;
if (depth < 0 || depth > READCONF_MAX_DEPTH)
fatal("Too many recursive configuration includes");
if ((f = fopen(filename, "r")) == NULL)
return 0;
if (flags & SSHCONF_CHECKPERM) {
struct stat sb;
if (fstat(fileno(f), &sb) == -1)
fatal("fstat %s: %s", filename, strerror(errno));
if (((sb.st_uid != 0 && sb.st_uid != getuid()) ||
(sb.st_mode & 022) != 0))
fatal("Bad owner or permissions on %s", filename);
}
debug("Reading configuration data %.200s", filename);
/*
* Mark that we are now processing the options. This flag is turned
* on/off by Host specifications.
*/
linenum = 0;
while (getline(&line, &linesize, f) != -1) {
/* Update line number counter. */
linenum++;
if (process_config_line_depth(options, pw, host, original_host,
line, filename, linenum, activep, flags, want_final_pass,
depth) != 0)
bad_options++;
}
free(line);
fclose(f);
if (bad_options > 0)
fatal("%s: terminating, %d bad configuration options",
filename, bad_options);
return 1;
}
/* Returns 1 if a string option is unset or set to "none" or 0 otherwise. */
int
option_clear_or_none(const char *o)
{
return o == NULL || strcasecmp(o, "none") == 0;
}
/*
* Initializes options to special values that indicate that they have not yet
* been set. Read_config_file will only set options with this value. Options
* are processed in the following order: command line, user config file,
* system config file. Last, fill_default_options is called.
*/
void
initialize_options(Options * options)
{
memset(options, 'X', sizeof(*options));
options->forward_agent = -1;
options->forward_agent_sock_path = NULL;
options->forward_x11 = -1;
options->forward_x11_trusted = -1;
options->forward_x11_timeout = -1;
options->stdio_forward_host = NULL;
options->stdio_forward_port = 0;
options->clear_forwardings = -1;
options->exit_on_forward_failure = -1;
options->xauth_location = NULL;
options->fwd_opts.gateway_ports = -1;
options->fwd_opts.streamlocal_bind_mask = (mode_t)-1;
options->fwd_opts.streamlocal_bind_unlink = -1;
options->pubkey_authentication = -1;
options->challenge_response_authentication = -1;
options->gss_authentication = -1;
options->gss_deleg_creds = -1;
options->password_authentication = -1;
options->kbd_interactive_authentication = -1;
options->kbd_interactive_devices = NULL;
options->hostbased_authentication = -1;
options->batch_mode = -1;
options->check_host_ip = -1;
options->strict_host_key_checking = -1;
options->compression = -1;
options->tcp_keep_alive = -1;
options->port = -1;
options->address_family = -1;
options->connection_attempts = -1;
options->connection_timeout = -1;
options->number_of_password_prompts = -1;
options->ciphers = NULL;
options->macs = NULL;
options->kex_algorithms = NULL;
options->hostkeyalgorithms = NULL;
options->ca_sign_algorithms = NULL;
options->num_identity_files = 0;
options->num_certificate_files = 0;
options->hostname = NULL;
options->host_key_alias = NULL;
options->proxy_command = NULL;
options->jump_user = NULL;
options->jump_host = NULL;
options->jump_port = -1;
options->jump_extra = NULL;
options->user = NULL;
options->escape_char = -1;
options->num_system_hostfiles = 0;
options->num_user_hostfiles = 0;
options->local_forwards = NULL;
options->num_local_forwards = 0;
options->remote_forwards = NULL;
options->num_remote_forwards = 0;
options->log_facility = SYSLOG_FACILITY_NOT_SET;
options->log_level = SYSLOG_LEVEL_NOT_SET;
options->preferred_authentications = NULL;
options->bind_address = NULL;
options->bind_interface = NULL;
options->pkcs11_provider = NULL;
options->sk_provider = NULL;
options->enable_ssh_keysign = - 1;
options->no_host_authentication_for_localhost = - 1;
options->identities_only = - 1;
options->rekey_limit = - 1;
options->rekey_interval = -1;
options->verify_host_key_dns = -1;
options->server_alive_interval = -1;
options->server_alive_count_max = -1;
options->send_env = NULL;
options->num_send_env = 0;
options->setenv = NULL;
options->num_setenv = 0;
options->control_path = NULL;
options->control_master = -1;
options->control_persist = -1;
options->control_persist_timeout = 0;
options->hash_known_hosts = -1;
options->tun_open = -1;
options->tun_local = -1;
options->tun_remote = -1;
options->local_command = NULL;
options->permit_local_command = -1;
options->remote_command = NULL;
options->add_keys_to_agent = -1;
+ options->add_keys_to_agent_lifespan = -1;
options->identity_agent = NULL;
options->visual_host_key = -1;
options->ip_qos_interactive = -1;
options->ip_qos_bulk = -1;
options->request_tty = -1;
options->proxy_use_fdpass = -1;
options->ignored_unknown = NULL;
options->num_canonical_domains = 0;
options->num_permitted_cnames = 0;
options->canonicalize_max_dots = -1;
options->canonicalize_fallback_local = -1;
options->canonicalize_hostname = -1;
options->revoked_host_keys = NULL;
options->fingerprint_hash = -1;
options->update_hostkeys = -1;
options->hostbased_key_types = NULL;
options->pubkey_key_types = NULL;
}
/*
* A petite version of fill_default_options() that just fills the options
* needed for hostname canonicalization to proceed.
*/
void
fill_default_options_for_canonicalization(Options *options)
{
if (options->canonicalize_max_dots == -1)
options->canonicalize_max_dots = 1;
if (options->canonicalize_fallback_local == -1)
options->canonicalize_fallback_local = 1;
if (options->canonicalize_hostname == -1)
options->canonicalize_hostname = SSH_CANONICALISE_NO;
}
/*
* Called after processing other sources of option data, this fills those
* options for which no value has been specified with their default values.
*/
void
fill_default_options(Options * options)
{
char *all_cipher, *all_mac, *all_kex, *all_key, *all_sig;
char *def_cipher, *def_mac, *def_kex, *def_key, *def_sig;
int r;
if (options->forward_agent == -1)
options->forward_agent = 0;
if (options->forward_x11 == -1)
options->forward_x11 = 0;
if (options->forward_x11_trusted == -1)
options->forward_x11_trusted = 0;
if (options->forward_x11_timeout == -1)
options->forward_x11_timeout = 1200;
/*
* stdio forwarding (-W) changes the default for these but we defer
* setting the values so they can be overridden.
*/
if (options->exit_on_forward_failure == -1)
options->exit_on_forward_failure =
options->stdio_forward_host != NULL ? 1 : 0;
if (options->clear_forwardings == -1)
options->clear_forwardings =
options->stdio_forward_host != NULL ? 1 : 0;
if (options->clear_forwardings == 1)
clear_forwardings(options);
if (options->xauth_location == NULL)
options->xauth_location = _PATH_XAUTH;
if (options->fwd_opts.gateway_ports == -1)
options->fwd_opts.gateway_ports = 0;
if (options->fwd_opts.streamlocal_bind_mask == (mode_t)-1)
options->fwd_opts.streamlocal_bind_mask = 0177;
if (options->fwd_opts.streamlocal_bind_unlink == -1)
options->fwd_opts.streamlocal_bind_unlink = 0;
if (options->pubkey_authentication == -1)
options->pubkey_authentication = 1;
if (options->challenge_response_authentication == -1)
options->challenge_response_authentication = 1;
if (options->gss_authentication == -1)
options->gss_authentication = 0;
if (options->gss_deleg_creds == -1)
options->gss_deleg_creds = 0;
if (options->password_authentication == -1)
options->password_authentication = 1;
if (options->kbd_interactive_authentication == -1)
options->kbd_interactive_authentication = 1;
if (options->hostbased_authentication == -1)
options->hostbased_authentication = 0;
if (options->batch_mode == -1)
options->batch_mode = 0;
if (options->check_host_ip == -1)
options->check_host_ip = 1;
if (options->strict_host_key_checking == -1)
options->strict_host_key_checking = SSH_STRICT_HOSTKEY_ASK;
if (options->compression == -1)
options->compression = 0;
if (options->tcp_keep_alive == -1)
options->tcp_keep_alive = 1;
if (options->port == -1)
options->port = 0; /* Filled in ssh_connect. */
if (options->address_family == -1)
options->address_family = AF_UNSPEC;
if (options->connection_attempts == -1)
options->connection_attempts = 1;
if (options->number_of_password_prompts == -1)
options->number_of_password_prompts = 3;
/* options->hostkeyalgorithms, default set in myproposals.h */
- if (options->add_keys_to_agent == -1)
+ if (options->add_keys_to_agent == -1) {
options->add_keys_to_agent = 0;
+ options->add_keys_to_agent_lifespan = 0;
+ }
if (options->num_identity_files == 0) {
add_identity_file(options, "~/", _PATH_SSH_CLIENT_ID_RSA, 0);
add_identity_file(options, "~/", _PATH_SSH_CLIENT_ID_DSA, 0);
#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
add_identity_file(options, "~/", _PATH_SSH_CLIENT_ID_ECDSA, 0);
add_identity_file(options, "~/",
_PATH_SSH_CLIENT_ID_ECDSA_SK, 0);
#endif
add_identity_file(options, "~/",
_PATH_SSH_CLIENT_ID_ED25519, 0);
add_identity_file(options, "~/",
_PATH_SSH_CLIENT_ID_ED25519_SK, 0);
add_identity_file(options, "~/", _PATH_SSH_CLIENT_ID_XMSS, 0);
}
if (options->escape_char == -1)
options->escape_char = '~';
if (options->num_system_hostfiles == 0) {
options->system_hostfiles[options->num_system_hostfiles++] =
xstrdup(_PATH_SSH_SYSTEM_HOSTFILE);
options->system_hostfiles[options->num_system_hostfiles++] =
xstrdup(_PATH_SSH_SYSTEM_HOSTFILE2);
}
if (options->update_hostkeys == -1)
options->update_hostkeys = SSH_UPDATE_HOSTKEYS_NO;
if (options->num_user_hostfiles == 0) {
options->user_hostfiles[options->num_user_hostfiles++] =
xstrdup(_PATH_SSH_USER_HOSTFILE);
options->user_hostfiles[options->num_user_hostfiles++] =
xstrdup(_PATH_SSH_USER_HOSTFILE2);
}
if (options->log_level == SYSLOG_LEVEL_NOT_SET)
options->log_level = SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO;
if (options->log_facility == SYSLOG_FACILITY_NOT_SET)
options->log_facility = SYSLOG_FACILITY_USER;
if (options->no_host_authentication_for_localhost == - 1)
options->no_host_authentication_for_localhost = 0;
if (options->identities_only == -1)
options->identities_only = 0;
if (options->enable_ssh_keysign == -1)
options->enable_ssh_keysign = 0;
if (options->rekey_limit == -1)
options->rekey_limit = 0;
if (options->rekey_interval == -1)
options->rekey_interval = 0;
if (options->verify_host_key_dns == -1)
options->verify_host_key_dns = 0;
if (options->server_alive_interval == -1)
options->server_alive_interval = 0;
if (options->server_alive_count_max == -1)
options->server_alive_count_max = 3;
if (options->control_master == -1)
options->control_master = 0;
if (options->control_persist == -1) {
options->control_persist = 0;
options->control_persist_timeout = 0;
}
if (options->hash_known_hosts == -1)
options->hash_known_hosts = 0;
if (options->tun_open == -1)
options->tun_open = SSH_TUNMODE_NO;
if (options->tun_local == -1)
options->tun_local = SSH_TUNID_ANY;
if (options->tun_remote == -1)
options->tun_remote = SSH_TUNID_ANY;
if (options->permit_local_command == -1)
options->permit_local_command = 0;
if (options->visual_host_key == -1)
options->visual_host_key = 0;
if (options->ip_qos_interactive == -1)
options->ip_qos_interactive = IPTOS_DSCP_AF21;
if (options->ip_qos_bulk == -1)
options->ip_qos_bulk = IPTOS_DSCP_CS1;
if (options->request_tty == -1)
options->request_tty = REQUEST_TTY_AUTO;
if (options->proxy_use_fdpass == -1)
options->proxy_use_fdpass = 0;
if (options->canonicalize_max_dots == -1)
options->canonicalize_max_dots = 1;
if (options->canonicalize_fallback_local == -1)
options->canonicalize_fallback_local = 1;
if (options->canonicalize_hostname == -1)
options->canonicalize_hostname = SSH_CANONICALISE_NO;
if (options->fingerprint_hash == -1)
options->fingerprint_hash = SSH_FP_HASH_DEFAULT;
#ifdef ENABLE_SK_INTERNAL
if (options->sk_provider == NULL)
options->sk_provider = xstrdup("internal");
#else
if (options->sk_provider == NULL)
options->sk_provider = xstrdup("$SSH_SK_PROVIDER");
#endif
/* Expand KEX name lists */
all_cipher = cipher_alg_list(',', 0);
all_mac = mac_alg_list(',');
all_kex = kex_alg_list(',');
all_key = sshkey_alg_list(0, 0, 1, ',');
all_sig = sshkey_alg_list(0, 1, 1, ',');
/* remove unsupported algos from default lists */
- def_cipher = match_filter_whitelist(KEX_CLIENT_ENCRYPT, all_cipher);
- def_mac = match_filter_whitelist(KEX_CLIENT_MAC, all_mac);
- def_kex = match_filter_whitelist(KEX_CLIENT_KEX, all_kex);
- def_key = match_filter_whitelist(KEX_DEFAULT_PK_ALG, all_key);
- def_sig = match_filter_whitelist(SSH_ALLOWED_CA_SIGALGS, all_sig);
+ def_cipher = match_filter_allowlist(KEX_CLIENT_ENCRYPT, all_cipher);
+ def_mac = match_filter_allowlist(KEX_CLIENT_MAC, all_mac);
+ def_kex = match_filter_allowlist(KEX_CLIENT_KEX, all_kex);
+ def_key = match_filter_allowlist(KEX_DEFAULT_PK_ALG, all_key);
+ def_sig = match_filter_allowlist(SSH_ALLOWED_CA_SIGALGS, all_sig);
#define ASSEMBLE(what, defaults, all) \
do { \
if ((r = kex_assemble_names(&options->what, \
defaults, all)) != 0) \
fatal("%s: %s: %s", __func__, #what, ssh_err(r)); \
} while (0)
ASSEMBLE(ciphers, def_cipher, all_cipher);
ASSEMBLE(macs, def_mac, all_mac);
ASSEMBLE(kex_algorithms, def_kex, all_kex);
ASSEMBLE(hostbased_key_types, def_key, all_key);
ASSEMBLE(pubkey_key_types, def_key, all_key);
ASSEMBLE(ca_sign_algorithms, def_sig, all_sig);
#undef ASSEMBLE
free(all_cipher);
free(all_mac);
free(all_kex);
free(all_key);
free(all_sig);
free(def_cipher);
free(def_mac);
free(def_kex);
kex_default_pk_alg_filtered = def_key; /* save for later use */
free(def_sig);
#define CLEAR_ON_NONE(v) \
do { \
if (option_clear_or_none(v)) { \
free(v); \
v = NULL; \
} \
} while(0)
CLEAR_ON_NONE(options->local_command);
CLEAR_ON_NONE(options->remote_command);
CLEAR_ON_NONE(options->proxy_command);
CLEAR_ON_NONE(options->control_path);
CLEAR_ON_NONE(options->revoked_host_keys);
CLEAR_ON_NONE(options->pkcs11_provider);
CLEAR_ON_NONE(options->sk_provider);
if (options->jump_host != NULL &&
strcmp(options->jump_host, "none") == 0 &&
options->jump_port == 0 && options->jump_user == NULL) {
free(options->jump_host);
options->jump_host = NULL;
}
/* options->identity_agent distinguishes NULL from 'none' */
/* options->user will be set in the main program if appropriate */
/* options->hostname will be set in the main program if appropriate */
/* options->host_key_alias should not be set by default */
/* options->preferred_authentications will be set in ssh */
}
struct fwdarg {
char *arg;
int ispath;
};
/*
* parse_fwd_field
* parses the next field in a port forwarding specification.
* sets fwd to the parsed field and advances p past the colon
* or sets it to NULL at end of string.
* returns 0 on success, else non-zero.
*/
static int
parse_fwd_field(char **p, struct fwdarg *fwd)
{
char *ep, *cp = *p;
int ispath = 0;
if (*cp == '\0') {
*p = NULL;
return -1; /* end of string */
}
/*
* A field escaped with square brackets is used literally.
* XXX - allow ']' to be escaped via backslash?
*/
if (*cp == '[') {
/* find matching ']' */
for (ep = cp + 1; *ep != ']' && *ep != '\0'; ep++) {
if (*ep == '/')
ispath = 1;
}
/* no matching ']' or not at end of field. */
if (ep[0] != ']' || (ep[1] != ':' && ep[1] != '\0'))
return -1;
/* NUL terminate the field and advance p past the colon */
*ep++ = '\0';
if (*ep != '\0')
*ep++ = '\0';
fwd->arg = cp + 1;
fwd->ispath = ispath;
*p = ep;
return 0;
}
for (cp = *p; *cp != '\0'; cp++) {
switch (*cp) {
case '\\':
memmove(cp, cp + 1, strlen(cp + 1) + 1);
if (*cp == '\0')
return -1;
break;
case '/':
ispath = 1;
break;
case ':':
*cp++ = '\0';
goto done;
}
}
done:
fwd->arg = *p;
fwd->ispath = ispath;
*p = cp;
return 0;
}
/*
* parse_forward
* parses a string containing a port forwarding specification of the form:
* dynamicfwd == 0
* [listenhost:]listenport|listenpath:connecthost:connectport|connectpath
* listenpath:connectpath
* dynamicfwd == 1
* [listenhost:]listenport
* returns number of arguments parsed or zero on error
*/
int
parse_forward(struct Forward *fwd, const char *fwdspec, int dynamicfwd, int remotefwd)
{
struct fwdarg fwdargs[4];
char *p, *cp;
- int i;
+ int i, err;
memset(fwd, 0, sizeof(*fwd));
memset(fwdargs, 0, sizeof(fwdargs));
- cp = p = xstrdup(fwdspec);
+ /*
+ * We expand environment variables before checking if we think they're
+ * paths so that if ${VAR} expands to a fully qualified path it is
+ * treated as a path.
+ */
+ cp = p = dollar_expand(&err, fwdspec);
+ if (p == NULL || err)
+ return 0;
/* skip leading spaces */
while (isspace((u_char)*cp))
cp++;
for (i = 0; i < 4; ++i) {
if (parse_fwd_field(&cp, &fwdargs[i]) != 0)
break;
}
/* Check for trailing garbage */
if (cp != NULL && *cp != '\0') {
i = 0; /* failure */
}
switch (i) {
case 1:
if (fwdargs[0].ispath) {
fwd->listen_path = xstrdup(fwdargs[0].arg);
fwd->listen_port = PORT_STREAMLOCAL;
} else {
fwd->listen_host = NULL;
fwd->listen_port = a2port(fwdargs[0].arg);
}
fwd->connect_host = xstrdup("socks");
break;
case 2:
if (fwdargs[0].ispath && fwdargs[1].ispath) {
fwd->listen_path = xstrdup(fwdargs[0].arg);
fwd->listen_port = PORT_STREAMLOCAL;
fwd->connect_path = xstrdup(fwdargs[1].arg);
fwd->connect_port = PORT_STREAMLOCAL;
} else if (fwdargs[1].ispath) {
fwd->listen_host = NULL;
fwd->listen_port = a2port(fwdargs[0].arg);
fwd->connect_path = xstrdup(fwdargs[1].arg);
fwd->connect_port = PORT_STREAMLOCAL;
} else {
fwd->listen_host = xstrdup(fwdargs[0].arg);
fwd->listen_port = a2port(fwdargs[1].arg);
fwd->connect_host = xstrdup("socks");
}
break;
case 3:
if (fwdargs[0].ispath) {
fwd->listen_path = xstrdup(fwdargs[0].arg);
fwd->listen_port = PORT_STREAMLOCAL;
fwd->connect_host = xstrdup(fwdargs[1].arg);
fwd->connect_port = a2port(fwdargs[2].arg);
} else if (fwdargs[2].ispath) {
fwd->listen_host = xstrdup(fwdargs[0].arg);
fwd->listen_port = a2port(fwdargs[1].arg);
fwd->connect_path = xstrdup(fwdargs[2].arg);
fwd->connect_port = PORT_STREAMLOCAL;
} else {
fwd->listen_host = NULL;
fwd->listen_port = a2port(fwdargs[0].arg);
fwd->connect_host = xstrdup(fwdargs[1].arg);
fwd->connect_port = a2port(fwdargs[2].arg);
}
break;
case 4:
fwd->listen_host = xstrdup(fwdargs[0].arg);
fwd->listen_port = a2port(fwdargs[1].arg);
fwd->connect_host = xstrdup(fwdargs[2].arg);
fwd->connect_port = a2port(fwdargs[3].arg);
break;
default:
i = 0; /* failure */
}
free(p);
if (dynamicfwd) {
if (!(i == 1 || i == 2))
goto fail_free;
} else {
if (!(i == 3 || i == 4)) {
if (fwd->connect_path == NULL &&
fwd->listen_path == NULL)
goto fail_free;
}
if (fwd->connect_port <= 0 && fwd->connect_path == NULL)
goto fail_free;
}
if ((fwd->listen_port < 0 && fwd->listen_path == NULL) ||
(!remotefwd && fwd->listen_port == 0))
goto fail_free;
if (fwd->connect_host != NULL &&
strlen(fwd->connect_host) >= NI_MAXHOST)
goto fail_free;
/* XXX - if connecting to a remote socket, max sun len may not match this host */
if (fwd->connect_path != NULL &&
strlen(fwd->connect_path) >= PATH_MAX_SUN)
goto fail_free;
if (fwd->listen_host != NULL &&
strlen(fwd->listen_host) >= NI_MAXHOST)
goto fail_free;
if (fwd->listen_path != NULL &&
strlen(fwd->listen_path) >= PATH_MAX_SUN)
goto fail_free;
return (i);
fail_free:
free(fwd->connect_host);
fwd->connect_host = NULL;
free(fwd->connect_path);
fwd->connect_path = NULL;
free(fwd->listen_host);
fwd->listen_host = NULL;
free(fwd->listen_path);
fwd->listen_path = NULL;
return (0);
}
int
parse_jump(const char *s, Options *o, int active)
{
char *orig, *sdup, *cp;
char *host = NULL, *user = NULL;
int ret = -1, port = -1, first;
active &= o->proxy_command == NULL && o->jump_host == NULL;
orig = sdup = xstrdup(s);
first = active;
do {
if (strcasecmp(s, "none") == 0)
break;
if ((cp = strrchr(sdup, ',')) == NULL)
cp = sdup; /* last */
else
*cp++ = '\0';
if (first) {
/* First argument and configuration is active */
if (parse_ssh_uri(cp, &user, &host, &port) == -1 ||
parse_user_host_port(cp, &user, &host, &port) != 0)
goto out;
} else {
/* Subsequent argument or inactive configuration */
if (parse_ssh_uri(cp, NULL, NULL, NULL) == -1 ||
parse_user_host_port(cp, NULL, NULL, NULL) != 0)
goto out;
}
first = 0; /* only check syntax for subsequent hosts */
} while (cp != sdup);
/* success */
if (active) {
if (strcasecmp(s, "none") == 0) {
o->jump_host = xstrdup("none");
o->jump_port = 0;
} else {
o->jump_user = user;
o->jump_host = host;
o->jump_port = port;
o->proxy_command = xstrdup("none");
user = host = NULL;
if ((cp = strrchr(s, ',')) != NULL && cp != s) {
o->jump_extra = xstrdup(s);
o->jump_extra[cp - s] = '\0';
}
}
}
ret = 0;
out:
free(orig);
free(user);
free(host);
return ret;
}
int
parse_ssh_uri(const char *uri, char **userp, char **hostp, int *portp)
{
char *path;
int r;
r = parse_uri("ssh", uri, userp, hostp, portp, &path);
if (r == 0 && path != NULL)
r = -1; /* path not allowed */
return r;
}
/* XXX the following is a near-vebatim copy from servconf.c; refactor */
static const char *
fmt_multistate_int(int val, const struct multistate *m)
{
u_int i;
for (i = 0; m[i].key != NULL; i++) {
if (m[i].value == val)
return m[i].key;
}
return "UNKNOWN";
}
static const char *
fmt_intarg(OpCodes code, int val)
{
if (val == -1)
return "unset";
switch (code) {
case oAddressFamily:
return fmt_multistate_int(val, multistate_addressfamily);
case oVerifyHostKeyDNS:
case oUpdateHostkeys:
return fmt_multistate_int(val, multistate_yesnoask);
case oStrictHostKeyChecking:
return fmt_multistate_int(val, multistate_strict_hostkey);
case oControlMaster:
return fmt_multistate_int(val, multistate_controlmaster);
case oTunnel:
return fmt_multistate_int(val, multistate_tunnel);
case oRequestTTY:
return fmt_multistate_int(val, multistate_requesttty);
case oCanonicalizeHostname:
return fmt_multistate_int(val, multistate_canonicalizehostname);
case oAddKeysToAgent:
return fmt_multistate_int(val, multistate_yesnoaskconfirm);
case oFingerprintHash:
return ssh_digest_alg_name(val);
default:
switch (val) {
case 0:
return "no";
case 1:
return "yes";
default:
return "UNKNOWN";
}
}
}
static const char *
lookup_opcode_name(OpCodes code)
{
u_int i;
for (i = 0; keywords[i].name != NULL; i++)
if (keywords[i].opcode == code)
return(keywords[i].name);
return "UNKNOWN";
}
static void
dump_cfg_int(OpCodes code, int val)
{
printf("%s %d\n", lookup_opcode_name(code), val);
}
static void
dump_cfg_fmtint(OpCodes code, int val)
{
printf("%s %s\n", lookup_opcode_name(code), fmt_intarg(code, val));
}
static void
dump_cfg_string(OpCodes code, const char *val)
{
if (val == NULL)
return;
printf("%s %s\n", lookup_opcode_name(code), val);
}
static void
dump_cfg_strarray(OpCodes code, u_int count, char **vals)
{
u_int i;
for (i = 0; i < count; i++)
printf("%s %s\n", lookup_opcode_name(code), vals[i]);
}
static void
dump_cfg_strarray_oneline(OpCodes code, u_int count, char **vals)
{
u_int i;
printf("%s", lookup_opcode_name(code));
for (i = 0; i < count; i++)
printf(" %s", vals[i]);
printf("\n");
}
static void
dump_cfg_forwards(OpCodes code, u_int count, const struct Forward *fwds)
{
const struct Forward *fwd;
u_int i;
/* oDynamicForward */
for (i = 0; i < count; i++) {
fwd = &fwds[i];
if (code == oDynamicForward && fwd->connect_host != NULL &&
strcmp(fwd->connect_host, "socks") != 0)
continue;
if (code == oLocalForward && fwd->connect_host != NULL &&
strcmp(fwd->connect_host, "socks") == 0)
continue;
printf("%s", lookup_opcode_name(code));
if (fwd->listen_port == PORT_STREAMLOCAL)
printf(" %s", fwd->listen_path);
else if (fwd->listen_host == NULL)
printf(" %d", fwd->listen_port);
else {
printf(" [%s]:%d",
fwd->listen_host, fwd->listen_port);
}
if (code != oDynamicForward) {
if (fwd->connect_port == PORT_STREAMLOCAL)
printf(" %s", fwd->connect_path);
else if (fwd->connect_host == NULL)
printf(" %d", fwd->connect_port);
else {
printf(" [%s]:%d",
fwd->connect_host, fwd->connect_port);
}
}
printf("\n");
}
}
void
dump_client_config(Options *o, const char *host)
{
int i, r;
char buf[8], *all_key;
/*
* Expand HostKeyAlgorithms name lists. This isn't handled in
* fill_default_options() like the other algorithm lists because
* the host key algorithms are by default dynamically chosen based
* on the host's keys found in known_hosts.
*/
all_key = sshkey_alg_list(0, 0, 1, ',');
if ((r = kex_assemble_names(&o->hostkeyalgorithms, kex_default_pk_alg(),
all_key)) != 0)
fatal("%s: expand HostKeyAlgorithms: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
free(all_key);
/* Most interesting options first: user, host, port */
dump_cfg_string(oUser, o->user);
dump_cfg_string(oHostname, host);
dump_cfg_int(oPort, o->port);
/* Flag options */
- dump_cfg_fmtint(oAddKeysToAgent, o->add_keys_to_agent);
dump_cfg_fmtint(oAddressFamily, o->address_family);
dump_cfg_fmtint(oBatchMode, o->batch_mode);
dump_cfg_fmtint(oCanonicalizeFallbackLocal, o->canonicalize_fallback_local);
dump_cfg_fmtint(oCanonicalizeHostname, o->canonicalize_hostname);
dump_cfg_fmtint(oChallengeResponseAuthentication, o->challenge_response_authentication);
dump_cfg_fmtint(oCheckHostIP, o->check_host_ip);
dump_cfg_fmtint(oCompression, o->compression);
dump_cfg_fmtint(oControlMaster, o->control_master);
dump_cfg_fmtint(oEnableSSHKeysign, o->enable_ssh_keysign);
dump_cfg_fmtint(oClearAllForwardings, o->clear_forwardings);
dump_cfg_fmtint(oExitOnForwardFailure, o->exit_on_forward_failure);
dump_cfg_fmtint(oFingerprintHash, o->fingerprint_hash);
dump_cfg_fmtint(oForwardX11, o->forward_x11);
dump_cfg_fmtint(oForwardX11Trusted, o->forward_x11_trusted);
dump_cfg_fmtint(oGatewayPorts, o->fwd_opts.gateway_ports);
#ifdef GSSAPI
dump_cfg_fmtint(oGssAuthentication, o->gss_authentication);
dump_cfg_fmtint(oGssDelegateCreds, o->gss_deleg_creds);
#endif /* GSSAPI */
dump_cfg_fmtint(oHashKnownHosts, o->hash_known_hosts);
dump_cfg_fmtint(oHostbasedAuthentication, o->hostbased_authentication);
dump_cfg_fmtint(oIdentitiesOnly, o->identities_only);
dump_cfg_fmtint(oKbdInteractiveAuthentication, o->kbd_interactive_authentication);
dump_cfg_fmtint(oNoHostAuthenticationForLocalhost, o->no_host_authentication_for_localhost);
dump_cfg_fmtint(oPasswordAuthentication, o->password_authentication);
dump_cfg_fmtint(oPermitLocalCommand, o->permit_local_command);
dump_cfg_fmtint(oProxyUseFdpass, o->proxy_use_fdpass);
dump_cfg_fmtint(oPubkeyAuthentication, o->pubkey_authentication);
dump_cfg_fmtint(oRequestTTY, o->request_tty);
dump_cfg_fmtint(oStreamLocalBindUnlink, o->fwd_opts.streamlocal_bind_unlink);
dump_cfg_fmtint(oStrictHostKeyChecking, o->strict_host_key_checking);
dump_cfg_fmtint(oTCPKeepAlive, o->tcp_keep_alive);
dump_cfg_fmtint(oTunnel, o->tun_open);
dump_cfg_fmtint(oVerifyHostKeyDNS, o->verify_host_key_dns);
dump_cfg_fmtint(oVisualHostKey, o->visual_host_key);
dump_cfg_fmtint(oUpdateHostkeys, o->update_hostkeys);
/* Integer options */
dump_cfg_int(oCanonicalizeMaxDots, o->canonicalize_max_dots);
dump_cfg_int(oConnectionAttempts, o->connection_attempts);
dump_cfg_int(oForwardX11Timeout, o->forward_x11_timeout);
dump_cfg_int(oNumberOfPasswordPrompts, o->number_of_password_prompts);
dump_cfg_int(oServerAliveCountMax, o->server_alive_count_max);
dump_cfg_int(oServerAliveInterval, o->server_alive_interval);
/* String options */
dump_cfg_string(oBindAddress, o->bind_address);
dump_cfg_string(oBindInterface, o->bind_interface);
dump_cfg_string(oCiphers, o->ciphers);
dump_cfg_string(oControlPath, o->control_path);
dump_cfg_string(oHostKeyAlgorithms, o->hostkeyalgorithms);
dump_cfg_string(oHostKeyAlias, o->host_key_alias);
dump_cfg_string(oHostbasedKeyTypes, o->hostbased_key_types);
dump_cfg_string(oIdentityAgent, o->identity_agent);
dump_cfg_string(oIgnoreUnknown, o->ignored_unknown);
dump_cfg_string(oKbdInteractiveDevices, o->kbd_interactive_devices);
dump_cfg_string(oKexAlgorithms, o->kex_algorithms);
dump_cfg_string(oCASignatureAlgorithms, o->ca_sign_algorithms);
dump_cfg_string(oLocalCommand, o->local_command);
dump_cfg_string(oRemoteCommand, o->remote_command);
dump_cfg_string(oLogLevel, log_level_name(o->log_level));
dump_cfg_string(oMacs, o->macs);
#ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11
dump_cfg_string(oPKCS11Provider, o->pkcs11_provider);
#endif
dump_cfg_string(oSecurityKeyProvider, o->sk_provider);
dump_cfg_string(oPreferredAuthentications, o->preferred_authentications);
dump_cfg_string(oPubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes, o->pubkey_key_types);
dump_cfg_string(oRevokedHostKeys, o->revoked_host_keys);
dump_cfg_string(oXAuthLocation, o->xauth_location);
/* Forwards */
dump_cfg_forwards(oDynamicForward, o->num_local_forwards, o->local_forwards);
dump_cfg_forwards(oLocalForward, o->num_local_forwards, o->local_forwards);
dump_cfg_forwards(oRemoteForward, o->num_remote_forwards, o->remote_forwards);
/* String array options */
dump_cfg_strarray(oIdentityFile, o->num_identity_files, o->identity_files);
dump_cfg_strarray_oneline(oCanonicalDomains, o->num_canonical_domains, o->canonical_domains);
dump_cfg_strarray(oCertificateFile, o->num_certificate_files, o->certificate_files);
dump_cfg_strarray_oneline(oGlobalKnownHostsFile, o->num_system_hostfiles, o->system_hostfiles);
dump_cfg_strarray_oneline(oUserKnownHostsFile, o->num_user_hostfiles, o->user_hostfiles);
dump_cfg_strarray(oSendEnv, o->num_send_env, o->send_env);
dump_cfg_strarray(oSetEnv, o->num_setenv, o->setenv);
/* Special cases */
+ /* AddKeysToAgent */
+ if (o->add_keys_to_agent_lifespan <= 0)
+ dump_cfg_fmtint(oAddKeysToAgent, o->add_keys_to_agent);
+ else {
+ printf("addkeystoagent%s %d\n",
+ o->add_keys_to_agent == 3 ? " confirm" : "",
+ o->add_keys_to_agent_lifespan);
+ }
+
/* oForwardAgent */
if (o->forward_agent_sock_path == NULL)
dump_cfg_fmtint(oForwardAgent, o->forward_agent);
else
dump_cfg_string(oForwardAgent, o->forward_agent_sock_path);
/* oConnectTimeout */
if (o->connection_timeout == -1)
printf("connecttimeout none\n");
else
dump_cfg_int(oConnectTimeout, o->connection_timeout);
/* oTunnelDevice */
printf("tunneldevice");
if (o->tun_local == SSH_TUNID_ANY)
printf(" any");
else
printf(" %d", o->tun_local);
if (o->tun_remote == SSH_TUNID_ANY)
printf(":any");
else
printf(":%d", o->tun_remote);
printf("\n");
/* oCanonicalizePermittedCNAMEs */
if ( o->num_permitted_cnames > 0) {
printf("canonicalizePermittedcnames");
for (i = 0; i < o->num_permitted_cnames; i++) {
printf(" %s:%s", o->permitted_cnames[i].source_list,
o->permitted_cnames[i].target_list);
}
printf("\n");
}
/* oControlPersist */
if (o->control_persist == 0 || o->control_persist_timeout == 0)
dump_cfg_fmtint(oControlPersist, o->control_persist);
else
dump_cfg_int(oControlPersist, o->control_persist_timeout);
/* oEscapeChar */
if (o->escape_char == SSH_ESCAPECHAR_NONE)
printf("escapechar none\n");
else {
vis(buf, o->escape_char, VIS_WHITE, 0);
printf("escapechar %s\n", buf);
}
/* oIPQoS */
printf("ipqos %s ", iptos2str(o->ip_qos_interactive));
printf("%s\n", iptos2str(o->ip_qos_bulk));
/* oRekeyLimit */
printf("rekeylimit %llu %d\n",
(unsigned long long)o->rekey_limit, o->rekey_interval);
/* oStreamLocalBindMask */
printf("streamlocalbindmask 0%o\n",
o->fwd_opts.streamlocal_bind_mask);
/* oLogFacility */
printf("syslogfacility %s\n", log_facility_name(o->log_facility));
/* oProxyCommand / oProxyJump */
if (o->jump_host == NULL)
dump_cfg_string(oProxyCommand, o->proxy_command);
else {
/* Check for numeric addresses */
i = strchr(o->jump_host, ':') != NULL ||
strspn(o->jump_host, "1234567890.") == strlen(o->jump_host);
snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%d", o->jump_port);
printf("proxyjump %s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s\n",
/* optional additional jump spec */
o->jump_extra == NULL ? "" : o->jump_extra,
o->jump_extra == NULL ? "" : ",",
/* optional user */
o->jump_user == NULL ? "" : o->jump_user,
o->jump_user == NULL ? "" : "@",
/* opening [ if hostname is numeric */
i ? "[" : "",
/* mandatory hostname */
o->jump_host,
/* closing ] if hostname is numeric */
i ? "]" : "",
/* optional port number */
o->jump_port <= 0 ? "" : ":",
o->jump_port <= 0 ? "" : buf);
}
}
diff --git a/readconf.h b/readconf.h
index e143a1082aec..d6a15550d8f3 100644
--- a/readconf.h
+++ b/readconf.h
@@ -1,224 +1,225 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: readconf.h,v 1.133 2020/04/03 02:27:12 dtucker Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: readconf.h,v 1.134 2020/08/11 09:49:57 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
* Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
* All rights reserved
* Functions for reading the configuration file.
*
* As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
* can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this
* software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
* incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
* called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
*/
#ifndef READCONF_H
#define READCONF_H
/* Data structure for representing option data. */
#define SSH_MAX_HOSTS_FILES 32
#define MAX_CANON_DOMAINS 32
#define PATH_MAX_SUN (sizeof((struct sockaddr_un *)0)->sun_path)
struct allowed_cname {
char *source_list;
char *target_list;
};
typedef struct {
int forward_agent; /* Forward authentication agent. */
char *forward_agent_sock_path; /* Optional path of the agent. */
int forward_x11; /* Forward X11 display. */
int forward_x11_timeout; /* Expiration for Cookies */
int forward_x11_trusted; /* Trust Forward X11 display. */
int exit_on_forward_failure; /* Exit if bind(2) fails for -L/-R */
char *xauth_location; /* Location for xauth program */
struct ForwardOptions fwd_opts; /* forwarding options */
int pubkey_authentication; /* Try ssh2 pubkey authentication. */
int hostbased_authentication; /* ssh2's rhosts_rsa */
int challenge_response_authentication;
/* Try S/Key or TIS, authentication. */
int gss_authentication; /* Try GSS authentication */
int gss_deleg_creds; /* Delegate GSS credentials */
int password_authentication; /* Try password
* authentication. */
int kbd_interactive_authentication; /* Try keyboard-interactive auth. */
char *kbd_interactive_devices; /* Keyboard-interactive auth devices. */
int batch_mode; /* Batch mode: do not ask for passwords. */
int check_host_ip; /* Also keep track of keys for IP address */
int strict_host_key_checking; /* Strict host key checking. */
int compression; /* Compress packets in both directions. */
int tcp_keep_alive; /* Set SO_KEEPALIVE. */
int ip_qos_interactive; /* IP ToS/DSCP/class for interactive */
int ip_qos_bulk; /* IP ToS/DSCP/class for bulk traffic */
SyslogFacility log_facility; /* Facility for system logging. */
LogLevel log_level; /* Level for logging. */
int port; /* Port to connect. */
int address_family;
int connection_attempts; /* Max attempts (seconds) before
* giving up */
int connection_timeout; /* Max time (seconds) before
* aborting connection attempt */
int number_of_password_prompts; /* Max number of password
* prompts. */
char *ciphers; /* SSH2 ciphers in order of preference. */
char *macs; /* SSH2 macs in order of preference. */
char *hostkeyalgorithms; /* SSH2 server key types in order of preference. */
char *kex_algorithms; /* SSH2 kex methods in order of preference. */
char *ca_sign_algorithms; /* Allowed CA signature algorithms */
char *hostname; /* Real host to connect. */
char *host_key_alias; /* hostname alias for .ssh/known_hosts */
char *proxy_command; /* Proxy command for connecting the host. */
char *user; /* User to log in as. */
int escape_char; /* Escape character; -2 = none */
u_int num_system_hostfiles; /* Paths for /etc/ssh/ssh_known_hosts */
char *system_hostfiles[SSH_MAX_HOSTS_FILES];
u_int num_user_hostfiles; /* Path for $HOME/.ssh/known_hosts */
char *user_hostfiles[SSH_MAX_HOSTS_FILES];
char *preferred_authentications;
char *bind_address; /* local socket address for connection to sshd */
char *bind_interface; /* local interface for bind address */
char *pkcs11_provider; /* PKCS#11 provider */
char *sk_provider; /* Security key provider */
int verify_host_key_dns; /* Verify host key using DNS */
int num_identity_files; /* Number of files for RSA/DSA identities. */
char *identity_files[SSH_MAX_IDENTITY_FILES];
int identity_file_userprovided[SSH_MAX_IDENTITY_FILES];
struct sshkey *identity_keys[SSH_MAX_IDENTITY_FILES];
int num_certificate_files; /* Number of extra certificates for ssh. */
char *certificate_files[SSH_MAX_CERTIFICATE_FILES];
int certificate_file_userprovided[SSH_MAX_CERTIFICATE_FILES];
struct sshkey *certificates[SSH_MAX_CERTIFICATE_FILES];
int add_keys_to_agent;
+ int add_keys_to_agent_lifespan;
char *identity_agent; /* Optional path to ssh-agent socket */
/* Local TCP/IP forward requests. */
int num_local_forwards;
struct Forward *local_forwards;
/* Remote TCP/IP forward requests. */
int num_remote_forwards;
struct Forward *remote_forwards;
int clear_forwardings;
/* stdio forwarding (-W) host and port */
char *stdio_forward_host;
int stdio_forward_port;
int enable_ssh_keysign;
int64_t rekey_limit;
int rekey_interval;
int no_host_authentication_for_localhost;
int identities_only;
int server_alive_interval;
int server_alive_count_max;
int num_send_env;
char **send_env;
int num_setenv;
char **setenv;
char *control_path;
int control_master;
int control_persist; /* ControlPersist flag */
int control_persist_timeout; /* ControlPersist timeout (seconds) */
int hash_known_hosts;
int tun_open; /* tun(4) */
int tun_local; /* force tun device (optional) */
int tun_remote; /* force tun device (optional) */
char *local_command;
int permit_local_command;
char *remote_command;
int visual_host_key;
int request_tty;
int proxy_use_fdpass;
int num_canonical_domains;
char *canonical_domains[MAX_CANON_DOMAINS];
int canonicalize_hostname;
int canonicalize_max_dots;
int canonicalize_fallback_local;
int num_permitted_cnames;
struct allowed_cname permitted_cnames[MAX_CANON_DOMAINS];
char *revoked_host_keys;
int fingerprint_hash;
int update_hostkeys; /* one of SSH_UPDATE_HOSTKEYS_* */
char *hostbased_key_types;
char *pubkey_key_types;
char *jump_user;
char *jump_host;
int jump_port;
char *jump_extra;
char *ignored_unknown; /* Pattern list of unknown tokens to ignore */
} Options;
#define SSH_CANONICALISE_NO 0
#define SSH_CANONICALISE_YES 1
#define SSH_CANONICALISE_ALWAYS 2
#define SSHCTL_MASTER_NO 0
#define SSHCTL_MASTER_YES 1
#define SSHCTL_MASTER_AUTO 2
#define SSHCTL_MASTER_ASK 3
#define SSHCTL_MASTER_AUTO_ASK 4
#define REQUEST_TTY_AUTO 0
#define REQUEST_TTY_NO 1
#define REQUEST_TTY_YES 2
#define REQUEST_TTY_FORCE 3
#define SSHCONF_CHECKPERM 1 /* check permissions on config file */
#define SSHCONF_USERCONF 2 /* user provided config file not system */
#define SSHCONF_FINAL 4 /* Final pass over config, after canon. */
#define SSHCONF_NEVERMATCH 8 /* Match/Host never matches; internal only */
#define SSH_UPDATE_HOSTKEYS_NO 0
#define SSH_UPDATE_HOSTKEYS_YES 1
#define SSH_UPDATE_HOSTKEYS_ASK 2
#define SSH_STRICT_HOSTKEY_OFF 0
#define SSH_STRICT_HOSTKEY_NEW 1
#define SSH_STRICT_HOSTKEY_YES 2
#define SSH_STRICT_HOSTKEY_ASK 3
const char *kex_default_pk_alg(void);
char *ssh_connection_hash(const char *thishost, const char *host,
const char *portstr, const char *user);
void initialize_options(Options *);
void fill_default_options(Options *);
void fill_default_options_for_canonicalization(Options *);
int process_config_line(Options *, struct passwd *, const char *,
const char *, char *, const char *, int, int *, int);
int read_config_file(const char *, struct passwd *, const char *,
const char *, Options *, int, int *);
int parse_forward(struct Forward *, const char *, int, int);
int parse_jump(const char *, Options *, int);
int parse_ssh_uri(const char *, char **, char **, int *);
int default_ssh_port(void);
int option_clear_or_none(const char *);
void dump_client_config(Options *o, const char *host);
void add_local_forward(Options *, const struct Forward *);
void add_remote_forward(Options *, const struct Forward *);
void add_identity_file(Options *, const char *, const char *, int);
void add_certificate_file(Options *, const char *, int);
#endif /* READCONF_H */
diff --git a/readpass.c b/readpass.c
index 974d67f0bfa6..122d2a87c465 100644
--- a/readpass.c
+++ b/readpass.c
@@ -1,294 +1,314 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: readpass.c,v 1.61 2020/01/23 07:10:22 dtucker Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: readpass.c,v 1.63 2020/08/11 09:45:54 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 2001 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
* OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
* IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
* INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
* NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
* DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
* THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
* (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
* THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
*/
#include "includes.h"
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/wait.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
#ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H
# include <paths.h>
#endif
#include <signal.h>
#include <stdarg.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include "xmalloc.h"
#include "misc.h"
#include "pathnames.h"
#include "log.h"
#include "ssh.h"
#include "uidswap.h"
static char *
ssh_askpass(char *askpass, const char *msg, const char *env_hint)
{
pid_t pid, ret;
size_t len;
char *pass;
int p[2], status;
char buf[1024];
void (*osigchld)(int);
if (fflush(stdout) != 0)
error("%s: fflush: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
if (askpass == NULL)
fatal("internal error: askpass undefined");
if (pipe(p) == -1) {
error("%s: pipe: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
return NULL;
}
osigchld = ssh_signal(SIGCHLD, SIG_DFL);
if ((pid = fork()) == -1) {
error("%s: fork: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
ssh_signal(SIGCHLD, osigchld);
return NULL;
}
if (pid == 0) {
close(p[0]);
if (dup2(p[1], STDOUT_FILENO) == -1)
fatal("%s: dup2: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
if (env_hint != NULL)
setenv("SSH_ASKPASS_PROMPT", env_hint, 1);
execlp(askpass, askpass, msg, (char *)NULL);
fatal("%s: exec(%s): %s", __func__, askpass, strerror(errno));
}
close(p[1]);
len = 0;
do {
ssize_t r = read(p[0], buf + len, sizeof(buf) - 1 - len);
if (r == -1 && errno == EINTR)
continue;
if (r <= 0)
break;
len += r;
} while (sizeof(buf) - 1 - len > 0);
buf[len] = '\0';
close(p[0]);
while ((ret = waitpid(pid, &status, 0)) == -1)
if (errno != EINTR)
break;
ssh_signal(SIGCHLD, osigchld);
if (ret == -1 || !WIFEXITED(status) || WEXITSTATUS(status) != 0) {
explicit_bzero(buf, sizeof(buf));
return NULL;
}
buf[strcspn(buf, "\r\n")] = '\0';
pass = xstrdup(buf);
explicit_bzero(buf, sizeof(buf));
return pass;
}
/* private/internal read_passphrase flags */
#define RP_ASK_PERMISSION 0x8000 /* pass hint to askpass for confirm UI */
/*
* Reads a passphrase from /dev/tty with echo turned off/on. Returns the
* passphrase (allocated with xmalloc). Exits if EOF is encountered. If
* RP_ALLOW_STDIN is set, the passphrase will be read from stdin if no
* tty is available
*/
char *
read_passphrase(const char *prompt, int flags)
{
char cr = '\r', *askpass = NULL, *ret, buf[1024];
- int rppflags, use_askpass = 0, ttyfd;
+ int rppflags, ttyfd, use_askpass = 0, allow_askpass = 0;
const char *askpass_hint = NULL;
+ const char *s;
+
+ if ((s = getenv("DISPLAY")) != NULL)
+ allow_askpass = *s != '\0';
+ if ((s = getenv(SSH_ASKPASS_REQUIRE_ENV)) != NULL) {
+ if (strcasecmp(s, "force") == 0) {
+ use_askpass = 1;
+ allow_askpass = 1;
+ } else if (strcasecmp(s, "prefer") == 0)
+ use_askpass = allow_askpass;
+ else if (strcasecmp(s, "never") == 0)
+ allow_askpass = 0;
+ }
rppflags = (flags & RP_ECHO) ? RPP_ECHO_ON : RPP_ECHO_OFF;
- if (flags & RP_USE_ASKPASS)
+ if (use_askpass)
+ debug("%s: requested to askpass", __func__);
+ else if (flags & RP_USE_ASKPASS)
use_askpass = 1;
else if (flags & RP_ALLOW_STDIN) {
if (!isatty(STDIN_FILENO)) {
debug("read_passphrase: stdin is not a tty");
use_askpass = 1;
}
} else {
rppflags |= RPP_REQUIRE_TTY;
ttyfd = open(_PATH_TTY, O_RDWR);
if (ttyfd >= 0) {
/*
* If we're on a tty, ensure that show the prompt at
* the beginning of the line. This will hopefully
* clobber any password characters the user has
* optimistically typed before echo is disabled.
*/
(void)write(ttyfd, &cr, 1);
close(ttyfd);
} else {
debug("read_passphrase: can't open %s: %s", _PATH_TTY,
strerror(errno));
use_askpass = 1;
}
}
- if ((flags & RP_USE_ASKPASS) && getenv("DISPLAY") == NULL)
+ if ((flags & RP_USE_ASKPASS) && !allow_askpass)
return (flags & RP_ALLOW_EOF) ? NULL : xstrdup("");
- if (use_askpass && getenv("DISPLAY")) {
+ if (use_askpass && allow_askpass) {
if (getenv(SSH_ASKPASS_ENV))
askpass = getenv(SSH_ASKPASS_ENV);
else
askpass = _PATH_SSH_ASKPASS_DEFAULT;
if ((flags & RP_ASK_PERMISSION) != 0)
askpass_hint = "confirm";
if ((ret = ssh_askpass(askpass, prompt, askpass_hint)) == NULL)
if (!(flags & RP_ALLOW_EOF))
return xstrdup("");
return ret;
}
if (readpassphrase(prompt, buf, sizeof buf, rppflags) == NULL) {
if (flags & RP_ALLOW_EOF)
return NULL;
return xstrdup("");
}
ret = xstrdup(buf);
explicit_bzero(buf, sizeof(buf));
return ret;
}
int
ask_permission(const char *fmt, ...)
{
va_list args;
char *p, prompt[1024];
int allowed = 0;
va_start(args, fmt);
vsnprintf(prompt, sizeof(prompt), fmt, args);
va_end(args);
p = read_passphrase(prompt,
RP_USE_ASKPASS|RP_ALLOW_EOF|RP_ASK_PERMISSION);
if (p != NULL) {
/*
* Accept empty responses and responses consisting
* of the word "yes" as affirmative.
*/
if (*p == '\0' || *p == '\n' ||
strcasecmp(p, "yes") == 0)
allowed = 1;
free(p);
}
return (allowed);
}
struct notifier_ctx {
pid_t pid;
void (*osigchld)(int);
};
struct notifier_ctx *
notify_start(int force_askpass, const char *fmt, ...)
{
va_list args;
char *prompt = NULL;
int devnull;
pid_t pid;
void (*osigchld)(int);
- const char *askpass;
- struct notifier_ctx *ret;
+ const char *askpass, *s;
+ struct notifier_ctx *ret = NULL;
va_start(args, fmt);
xvasprintf(&prompt, fmt, args);
va_end(args);
if (fflush(NULL) != 0)
error("%s: fflush: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
if (!force_askpass && isatty(STDERR_FILENO)) {
(void)write(STDERR_FILENO, "\r", 1);
(void)write(STDERR_FILENO, prompt, strlen(prompt));
(void)write(STDERR_FILENO, "\r\n", 2);
- free(prompt);
- return NULL;
+ goto out;
}
if ((askpass = getenv("SSH_ASKPASS")) == NULL)
askpass = _PATH_SSH_ASKPASS_DEFAULT;
- if (getenv("DISPLAY") == NULL || *askpass == '\0') {
- debug3("%s: cannot notify", __func__);
- free(prompt);
- return NULL;
+ if (*askpass == '\0') {
+ debug3("%s: cannot notify: no askpass", __func__);
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if (getenv("DISPLAY") == NULL &&
+ ((s = getenv(SSH_ASKPASS_REQUIRE_ENV)) == NULL ||
+ strcmp(s, "force") != 0)) {
+ debug3("%s: cannot notify: no display", __func__);
+ goto out;
}
osigchld = ssh_signal(SIGCHLD, SIG_DFL);
if ((pid = fork()) == -1) {
error("%s: fork: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
ssh_signal(SIGCHLD, osigchld);
free(prompt);
return NULL;
}
if (pid == 0) {
if ((devnull = open(_PATH_DEVNULL, O_RDWR)) == -1)
fatal("%s: open %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
if (dup2(devnull, STDIN_FILENO) == -1 ||
dup2(devnull, STDOUT_FILENO) == -1)
fatal("%s: dup2: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
closefrom(STDERR_FILENO + 1);
setenv("SSH_ASKPASS_PROMPT", "none", 1); /* hint to UI */
execlp(askpass, askpass, prompt, (char *)NULL);
error("%s: exec(%s): %s", __func__, askpass, strerror(errno));
_exit(1);
/* NOTREACHED */
}
if ((ret = calloc(1, sizeof(*ret))) == NULL) {
kill(pid, SIGTERM);
fatal("%s: calloc failed", __func__);
}
ret->pid = pid;
ret->osigchld = osigchld;
+ out:
free(prompt);
return ret;
}
void
notify_complete(struct notifier_ctx *ctx)
{
int ret;
if (ctx == NULL || ctx->pid <= 0) {
free(ctx);
return;
}
kill(ctx->pid, SIGTERM);
while ((ret = waitpid(ctx->pid, NULL, 0)) == -1) {
if (errno != EINTR)
break;
}
if (ret == -1)
fatal("%s: waitpid: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
ssh_signal(SIGCHLD, ctx->osigchld);
free(ctx);
}
diff --git a/regress/Makefile b/regress/Makefile
index 62794d25fc42..8b4ed9de398a 100644
--- a/regress/Makefile
+++ b/regress/Makefile
@@ -1,262 +1,265 @@
-# $OpenBSD: Makefile,v 1.108 2020/04/20 04:44:47 djm Exp $
+# $OpenBSD: Makefile,v 1.109 2020/06/19 05:07:09 dtucker Exp $
tests: prep file-tests t-exec unit
REGRESS_TARGETS= t1 t2 t3 t4 t5 t6 t7 t8 t9 t10 t11 t12
# File based tests
file-tests: $(REGRESS_TARGETS)
# Interop tests are not run by default
interop interop-tests: t-exec-interop
prep:
test "x${USE_VALGRIND}" = "x" || mkdir -p $(OBJ)/valgrind-out
clean:
for F in $(CLEANFILES); do rm -f $(OBJ)$$F; done
rm -rf $(OBJ).putty
distclean: clean
LTESTS= connect \
proxy-connect \
connect-privsep \
connect-uri \
proto-version \
proto-mismatch \
exit-status \
envpass \
transfer \
banner \
rekey \
dhgex \
stderr-data \
stderr-after-eof \
broken-pipe \
try-ciphers \
yes-head \
login-timeout \
agent \
agent-getpeereid \
agent-timeout \
agent-ptrace \
+ agent-subprocess \
keyscan \
keygen-change \
keygen-convert \
keygen-moduli \
key-options \
scp \
scp-uri \
sftp \
sftp-chroot \
sftp-cmds \
sftp-badcmds \
sftp-batch \
sftp-glob \
sftp-perm \
sftp-uri \
reconfigure \
dynamic-forward \
forwarding \
multiplex \
reexec \
brokenkeys \
sshcfgparse \
cfgparse \
cfgmatch \
cfgmatchlisten \
percent \
addrmatch \
localcommand \
forcecommand \
portnum \
keytype \
kextype \
cert-hostkey \
cert-userkey \
host-expand \
keys-command \
forward-control \
integrity \
krl \
multipubkey \
limit-keytype \
hostkey-agent \
keygen-knownhosts \
hostkey-rotate \
principals-command \
cert-file \
cfginclude \
servcfginclude \
allow-deny-users \
authinfo \
sshsig \
keygen-comment
INTEROP_TESTS= putty-transfer putty-ciphers putty-kex conch-ciphers
#INTEROP_TESTS+=ssh-com ssh-com-client ssh-com-keygen ssh-com-sftp
EXTRA_TESTS= agent-pkcs11
#EXTRA_TESTS+= cipher-speed
USERNAME= ${LOGNAME}
CLEANFILES= *.core actual agent-key.* authorized_keys_${USERNAME} \
authorized_keys_${USERNAME}.* \
authorized_principals_${USERNAME} \
banner.in banner.out cert_host_key* cert_user_key* \
copy.1 copy.2 data ed25519-agent ed25519-agent* \
ed25519-agent.pub ed25519 ed25519.pub empty.in \
expect failed-regress.log failed-ssh.log failed-sshd.log \
hkr.* host.ecdsa-sha2-nistp256 host.ecdsa-sha2-nistp384 \
host.ecdsa-sha2-nistp521 host.ssh-dss host.ssh-ed25519 \
host.ssh-rsa host_ca_key* host_krl_* host_revoked_* key.* \
key.dsa-* key.ecdsa-* key.ed25519-512 \
key.ed25519-512.pub key.rsa-* keys-command-args kh.* \
known_hosts known_hosts-cert known_hosts.* krl-* ls.copy \
modpipe netcat no_identity_config \
pidfile putty.rsa2 ready regress.log remote_pid \
revoked-* rsa rsa-agent rsa-agent.pub rsa.pub rsa_ssh2_cr.prv \
rsa_ssh2_crnl.prv scp-ssh-wrapper.exe \
scp-ssh-wrapper.scp setuid-allowed sftp-server.log \
sftp-server.sh sftp.log ssh-log-wrapper.sh ssh.log \
ssh-rsa_oldfmt \
ssh_config ssh_config.* ssh_proxy ssh_proxy_bak \
ssh_proxy_envpass sshd.log sshd_config sshd_config_minimal \
sshd_config.* sshd_proxy sshd_proxy.* sshd_proxy_bak \
sshd_proxy_orig t10.out t10.out.pub t12.out t12.out.pub \
t2.out t3.out t6.out1 t6.out2 t7.out t7.out.pub \
t8.out t8.out.pub t9.out t9.out.pub testdata \
user_*key* user_ca* user_key*
# Enable all malloc(3) randomisations and checks
TEST_ENV= "MALLOC_OPTIONS=CFGJRSUX"
TEST_SSH_SSHKEYGEN?=ssh-keygen
CPPFLAGS=-I..
t1:
${TEST_SSH_SSHKEYGEN} -if ${.CURDIR}/rsa_ssh2.prv | diff - ${.CURDIR}/rsa_openssh.prv
tr '\n' '\r' <${.CURDIR}/rsa_ssh2.prv > ${.OBJDIR}/rsa_ssh2_cr.prv
${TEST_SSH_SSHKEYGEN} -if ${.OBJDIR}/rsa_ssh2_cr.prv | diff - ${.CURDIR}/rsa_openssh.prv
awk '{print $$0 "\r"}' ${.CURDIR}/rsa_ssh2.prv > ${.OBJDIR}/rsa_ssh2_crnl.prv
${TEST_SSH_SSHKEYGEN} -if ${.OBJDIR}/rsa_ssh2_crnl.prv | diff - ${.CURDIR}/rsa_openssh.prv
t2:
cat ${.CURDIR}/rsa_openssh.prv > $(OBJ)/t2.out
chmod 600 $(OBJ)/t2.out
${TEST_SSH_SSHKEYGEN} -yf $(OBJ)/t2.out | diff - ${.CURDIR}/rsa_openssh.pub
t3:
${TEST_SSH_SSHKEYGEN} -ef ${.CURDIR}/rsa_openssh.pub >$(OBJ)/t3.out
${TEST_SSH_SSHKEYGEN} -if $(OBJ)/t3.out | diff - ${.CURDIR}/rsa_openssh.pub
t4:
${TEST_SSH_SSHKEYGEN} -E md5 -lf ${.CURDIR}/rsa_openssh.pub |\
awk '{print $$2}' | diff - ${.CURDIR}/t4.ok
t5:
${TEST_SSH_SSHKEYGEN} -Bf ${.CURDIR}/rsa_openssh.pub |\
awk '{print $$2}' | diff - ${.CURDIR}/t5.ok
t6:
${TEST_SSH_SSHKEYGEN} -if ${.CURDIR}/dsa_ssh2.prv > $(OBJ)/t6.out1
${TEST_SSH_SSHKEYGEN} -if ${.CURDIR}/dsa_ssh2.pub > $(OBJ)/t6.out2
chmod 600 $(OBJ)/t6.out1
${TEST_SSH_SSHKEYGEN} -yf $(OBJ)/t6.out1 | diff - $(OBJ)/t6.out2
$(OBJ)/t7.out:
${TEST_SSH_SSHKEYGEN} -q -t rsa -N '' -f $@
t7: $(OBJ)/t7.out
${TEST_SSH_SSHKEYGEN} -lf $(OBJ)/t7.out > /dev/null
${TEST_SSH_SSHKEYGEN} -Bf $(OBJ)/t7.out > /dev/null
$(OBJ)/t8.out:
${TEST_SSH_SSHKEYGEN} -q -t dsa -N '' -f $@
t8: $(OBJ)/t8.out
${TEST_SSH_SSHKEYGEN} -lf $(OBJ)/t8.out > /dev/null
${TEST_SSH_SSHKEYGEN} -Bf $(OBJ)/t8.out > /dev/null
$(OBJ)/t9.out:
test "${TEST_SSH_ECC}" != yes || \
${TEST_SSH_SSHKEYGEN} -q -t ecdsa -N '' -f $@
t9: $(OBJ)/t9.out
test "${TEST_SSH_ECC}" != yes || \
${TEST_SSH_SSHKEYGEN} -lf $(OBJ)/t9.out > /dev/null
test "${TEST_SSH_ECC}" != yes || \
${TEST_SSH_SSHKEYGEN} -Bf $(OBJ)/t9.out > /dev/null
$(OBJ)/t10.out:
${TEST_SSH_SSHKEYGEN} -q -t ed25519 -N '' -f $@
t10: $(OBJ)/t10.out
${TEST_SSH_SSHKEYGEN} -lf $(OBJ)/t10.out > /dev/null
${TEST_SSH_SSHKEYGEN} -Bf $(OBJ)/t10.out > /dev/null
t11:
${TEST_SSH_SSHKEYGEN} -E sha256 -lf ${.CURDIR}/rsa_openssh.pub |\
awk '{print $$2}' | diff - ${.CURDIR}/t11.ok
$(OBJ)/t12.out:
${TEST_SSH_SSHKEYGEN} -q -t ed25519 -N '' -C 'test-comment-1234' -f $@
t12: $(OBJ)/t12.out
${TEST_SSH_SSHKEYGEN} -lf $(OBJ)/t12.out.pub | grep test-comment-1234 >/dev/null
t-exec: ${LTESTS:=.sh}
@if [ "x$?" = "x" ]; then exit 0; fi; \
for TEST in ""$?; do \
skip=no; \
for t in ""$${SKIP_LTESTS}; do \
if [ "x$${t}.sh" = "x$${TEST}" ]; then skip=yes; fi; \
done; \
if [ "x$${skip}" = "xno" ]; then \
echo "run test $${TEST}" ... 1>&2; \
(env SUDO="${SUDO}" TEST_ENV=${TEST_ENV} ${TEST_SHELL} ${.CURDIR}/test-exec.sh ${.OBJDIR} ${.CURDIR}/$${TEST}) || exit $$?; \
else \
echo skip test $${TEST} 1>&2; \
fi; \
done
t-exec-interop: ${INTEROP_TESTS:=.sh}
@if [ "x$?" = "x" ]; then exit 0; fi; \
for TEST in ""$?; do \
echo "run test $${TEST}" ... 1>&2; \
(env SUDO="${SUDO}" TEST_ENV=${TEST_ENV} ${TEST_SHELL} ${.CURDIR}/test-exec.sh ${.OBJDIR} ${.CURDIR}/$${TEST}) || exit $$?; \
done
t-extra: ${EXTRA_TESTS:=.sh}
@if [ "x$?" = "x" ]; then exit 0; fi; \
for TEST in ""$?; do \
echo "run test $${TEST}" ... 1>&2; \
(env SUDO="${SUDO}" TEST_ENV=${TEST_ENV} ${TEST_SHELL} ${.CURDIR}/test-exec.sh ${.OBJDIR} ${.CURDIR}/$${TEST}) || exit $$?; \
done
# Not run by default
interop: ${INTEROP_TARGETS}
# Unit tests, built by top-level Makefile
unit:
set -e ; if test -z "${SKIP_UNIT}" ; then \
V="" ; \
test "x${USE_VALGRIND}" = "x" || \
V=${.CURDIR}/valgrind-unit.sh ; \
$$V ${.OBJDIR}/unittests/sshbuf/test_sshbuf ; \
$$V ${.OBJDIR}/unittests/sshkey/test_sshkey \
-d ${.CURDIR}/unittests/sshkey/testdata ; \
+ $$V ${.OBJDIR}/unittests/sshsig/test_sshsig \
+ -d ${.CURDIR}/unittests/sshsig/testdata ; \
$$V ${.OBJDIR}/unittests/bitmap/test_bitmap ; \
$$V ${.OBJDIR}/unittests/conversion/test_conversion ; \
$$V ${.OBJDIR}/unittests/kex/test_kex ; \
$$V ${.OBJDIR}/unittests/hostkeys/test_hostkeys \
-d ${.CURDIR}/unittests/hostkeys/testdata ; \
$$V ${.OBJDIR}/unittests/match/test_match ; \
if test "x${TEST_SSH_UTF8}" = "xyes" ; then \
$$V ${.OBJDIR}/unittests/utf8/test_utf8 ; \
fi \
fi
diff --git a/regress/addrmatch.sh b/regress/addrmatch.sh
index e7d29c3f3123..26e0c9910c47 100644
--- a/regress/addrmatch.sh
+++ b/regress/addrmatch.sh
@@ -1,56 +1,68 @@
-# $OpenBSD: addrmatch.sh,v 1.5 2020/03/13 03:18:45 djm Exp $
+# $OpenBSD: addrmatch.sh,v 1.6 2020/08/28 03:17:13 dtucker Exp $
# Placed in the Public Domain.
tid="address match"
mv $OBJ/sshd_proxy $OBJ/sshd_proxy_bak
run_trial()
{
user="$1"; addr="$2"; host="$3"; laddr="$4"; lport="$5"
expected="$6"; descr="$7"
verbose "test $descr for $user $addr $host"
result=`${SSHD} -f $OBJ/sshd_proxy -T \
-C user=${user},addr=${addr},host=${host},laddr=${laddr},lport=${lport} | \
awk '/^forcecommand/ {print $2}'`
if [ "$result" != "$expected" ]; then
fail "failed '$descr' expected $expected got $result"
fi
}
cp $OBJ/sshd_proxy_bak $OBJ/sshd_proxy
cat >>$OBJ/sshd_proxy <<EOD
ForceCommand nomatch
Match Address 192.168.0.0/16,!192.168.30.0/24,10.0.0.0/8,host.example.com
ForceCommand match1
Match Address 1.1.1.1,::1,!::3,2000::/16
ForceCommand match2
Match LocalAddress 127.0.0.1,::1
ForceCommand match3
Match LocalPort 5678
ForceCommand match4
EOD
run_trial user 192.168.0.1 somehost 1.2.3.4 1234 match1 "first entry"
run_trial user 192.168.30.1 somehost 1.2.3.4 1234 nomatch "negative match"
run_trial user 19.0.0.1 somehost 1.2.3.4 1234 nomatch "no match"
run_trial user 10.255.255.254 somehost 1.2.3.4 1234 match1 "list middle"
run_trial user 192.168.30.1 192.168.0.1 1.2.3.4 1234 nomatch "faked IP in hostname"
run_trial user 1.1.1.1 somehost.example.com 1.2.3.4 1234 match2 "bare IP4 address"
run_trial user 19.0.0.1 somehost 127.0.0.1 1234 match3 "localaddress"
run_trial user 19.0.0.1 somehost 1.2.3.4 5678 match4 "localport"
if test "$TEST_SSH_IPV6" != "no"; then
run_trial user ::1 somehost.example.com ::2 1234 match2 "bare IP6 address"
run_trial user ::2 somehost.example.com ::2 1234 nomatch "deny IPv6"
run_trial user ::3 somehost ::2 1234 nomatch "IP6 negated"
run_trial user ::4 somehost ::2 1234 nomatch "IP6 no match"
run_trial user 2000::1 somehost ::2 1234 match2 "IP6 network"
run_trial user 2001::1 somehost ::2 1234 nomatch "IP6 network"
run_trial user ::5 somehost ::1 1234 match3 "IP6 localaddress"
run_trial user ::5 somehost ::2 5678 match4 "IP6 localport"
fi
+#
+# Check that we catch invalid address/mask in Match Address/Localaddress
+#
+for i in 10.0.1.0/8 10.0.0.1/24 2000:aa:bb:01::/56; do
+ for a in address localaddress; do
+ verbose "test invalid Match $a $i"
+ echo "Match $a $i" > $OBJ/sshd_proxy
+ ${SUDO} ${SSHD} -f $OBJ/sshd_proxy -t >/dev/null 2>&1 && \
+ fail "accepted invalid match $a $i"
+ done
+done
+
cp $OBJ/sshd_proxy_bak $OBJ/sshd_proxy
rm $OBJ/sshd_proxy_bak
diff --git a/regress/agent-subprocess.sh b/regress/agent-subprocess.sh
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..2f36d70cccae
--- /dev/null
+++ b/regress/agent-subprocess.sh
@@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
+# $OpenBSD: agent-subprocess.sh,v 1.1 2020/06/19 05:07:09 dtucker Exp $
+# Placed in the Public Domain.
+
+tid="agent subprocess"
+
+trace "ensure agent exits when run as subprocess"
+${SSHAGENT} sh -c "echo \$SSH_AGENT_PID >$OBJ/pidfile; sleep 1"
+
+pid=`cat $OBJ/pidfile`
+
+# Currently ssh-agent polls every 10s so we need to wait at least that long.
+n=12
+while kill -0 $pid >/dev/null 2>&1 && test "$n" -gt "0"; do
+ n=$(($n - 1))
+ sleep 1
+done
+
+if test "$n" -eq "0"; then
+ fail "agent still running"
+fi
+
+rm -f $OBJ/pidfile
diff --git a/regress/agent.sh b/regress/agent.sh
index 39403653c34d..a3ad1385f488 100644
--- a/regress/agent.sh
+++ b/regress/agent.sh
@@ -1,164 +1,227 @@
-# $OpenBSD: agent.sh,v 1.17 2019/12/21 02:33:07 djm Exp $
+# $OpenBSD: agent.sh,v 1.19 2020/07/15 04:55:47 dtucker Exp $
# Placed in the Public Domain.
tid="simple agent test"
SSH_AUTH_SOCK=/nonexistent ${SSHADD} -l > /dev/null 2>&1
if [ $? -ne 2 ]; then
fail "ssh-add -l did not fail with exit code 2"
fi
trace "start agent, args ${EXTRA_AGENT_ARGS} -s"
eval `${SSHAGENT} ${EXTRA_AGENT_ARGS} -s` > /dev/null
r=$?
if [ $r -ne 0 ]; then
fatal "could not start ssh-agent: exit code $r"
fi
eval `${SSHAGENT} ${EXTRA_AGENT_ARGS} -s | sed 's/SSH_/FW_SSH_/g'` > /dev/null
r=$?
if [ $r -ne 0 ]; then
fatal "could not start second ssh-agent: exit code $r"
fi
${SSHADD} -l > /dev/null 2>&1
if [ $? -ne 1 ]; then
fail "ssh-add -l did not fail with exit code 1"
fi
rm -f $OBJ/user_ca_key $OBJ/user_ca_key.pub
${SSHKEYGEN} -q -N '' -t ed25519 -f $OBJ/user_ca_key \
|| fatal "ssh-keygen failed"
trace "overwrite authorized keys"
printf '' > $OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER
for t in ${SSH_KEYTYPES}; do
# generate user key for agent
rm -f $OBJ/$t-agent $OBJ/$t-agent.pub*
${SSHKEYGEN} -q -N '' -t $t -f $OBJ/$t-agent ||\
fatal "ssh-keygen for $t-agent failed"
# Make a certificate for each too.
${SSHKEYGEN} -qs $OBJ/user_ca_key -I "$t cert" \
-n estragon $OBJ/$t-agent.pub || fatal "ca sign failed"
# add to authorized keys
cat $OBJ/$t-agent.pub >> $OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER
# add private key to agent
- ${SSHADD} $OBJ/$t-agent #> /dev/null 2>&1
+ ${SSHADD} $OBJ/$t-agent > /dev/null 2>&1
if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then
fail "ssh-add failed exit code $?"
fi
# add private key to second agent
- SSH_AUTH_SOCK=$FW_SSH_AUTH_SOCK ${SSHADD} $OBJ/$t-agent #> /dev/null 2>&1
+ SSH_AUTH_SOCK=$FW_SSH_AUTH_SOCK ${SSHADD} $OBJ/$t-agent > /dev/null 2>&1
if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then
fail "ssh-add failed exit code $?"
fi
- # Remove private key to ensure that we aren't accidentally using it.
- rm -f $OBJ/$t-agent
+ # Move private key to ensure that we aren't accidentally using it.
+ # Keep the corresponding public keys/certs around for later use.
+ mv -f $OBJ/$t-agent $OBJ/$t-agent-private
+ cp -f $OBJ/$t-agent.pub $OBJ/$t-agent-private.pub
+ cp -f $OBJ/$t-agent-cert.pub $OBJ/$t-agent-private-cert.pub
done
# Remove explicit identity directives from ssh_proxy
mv $OBJ/ssh_proxy $OBJ/ssh_proxy_bak
grep -vi identityfile $OBJ/ssh_proxy_bak > $OBJ/ssh_proxy
${SSHADD} -l > /dev/null 2>&1
r=$?
if [ $r -ne 0 ]; then
fail "ssh-add -l failed: exit code $r"
fi
# the same for full pubkey output
${SSHADD} -L > /dev/null 2>&1
r=$?
if [ $r -ne 0 ]; then
fail "ssh-add -L failed: exit code $r"
fi
trace "simple connect via agent"
${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost exit 52
r=$?
if [ $r -ne 52 ]; then
fail "ssh connect with failed (exit code $r)"
fi
for t in ${SSH_KEYTYPES}; do
trace "connect via agent using $t key"
if [ "$t" = "ssh-dss" ]; then
echo "PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes +ssh-dss" >> $OBJ/ssh_proxy
echo "PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes +ssh-dss" >> $OBJ/sshd_proxy
fi
${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy -i $OBJ/$t-agent.pub -oIdentitiesOnly=yes \
somehost exit 52
r=$?
if [ $r -ne 52 ]; then
fail "ssh connect with failed (exit code $r)"
fi
done
trace "agent forwarding"
${SSH} -A -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost ${SSHADD} -l > /dev/null 2>&1
r=$?
if [ $r -ne 0 ]; then
fail "ssh-add -l via agent fwd failed (exit code $r)"
fi
${SSH} "-oForwardAgent=$SSH_AUTH_SOCK" -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost ${SSHADD} -l > /dev/null 2>&1
r=$?
if [ $r -ne 0 ]; then
fail "ssh-add -l via agent path fwd failed (exit code $r)"
fi
${SSH} -A -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost \
"${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost exit 52"
r=$?
if [ $r -ne 52 ]; then
fail "agent fwd failed (exit code $r)"
fi
trace "agent forwarding different agent"
${SSH} "-oForwardAgent=$FW_SSH_AUTH_SOCK" -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost ${SSHADD} -l > /dev/null 2>&1
r=$?
if [ $r -ne 0 ]; then
fail "ssh-add -l via agent path fwd of different agent failed (exit code $r)"
fi
${SSH} '-oForwardAgent=$FW_SSH_AUTH_SOCK' -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost ${SSHADD} -l > /dev/null 2>&1
r=$?
if [ $r -ne 0 ]; then
fail "ssh-add -l via agent path env fwd of different agent failed (exit code $r)"
fi
# Remove keys from forwarded agent, ssh-add on remote machine should now fail.
SSH_AUTH_SOCK=$FW_SSH_AUTH_SOCK ${SSHADD} -D > /dev/null 2>&1
r=$?
if [ $r -ne 0 ]; then
fail "ssh-add -D failed: exit code $r"
fi
${SSH} '-oForwardAgent=$FW_SSH_AUTH_SOCK' -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost ${SSHADD} -l > /dev/null 2>&1
r=$?
if [ $r -ne 1 ]; then
fail "ssh-add -l with different agent did not fail with exit code 1 (exit code $r)"
fi
(printf 'cert-authority,principals="estragon" '; cat $OBJ/user_ca_key.pub) \
> $OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER
for t in ${SSH_KEYTYPES}; do
if [ "$t" != "ssh-dss" ]; then
trace "connect via agent using $t key"
${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy -i $OBJ/$t-agent.pub \
-oCertificateFile=$OBJ/$t-agent-cert.pub \
-oIdentitiesOnly=yes somehost exit 52
r=$?
if [ $r -ne 52 ]; then
fail "ssh connect with failed (exit code $r)"
fi
fi
done
+## Deletion tests.
+
trace "delete all agent keys"
${SSHADD} -D > /dev/null 2>&1
r=$?
if [ $r -ne 0 ]; then
fail "ssh-add -D failed: exit code $r"
fi
+# make sure they're gone
+${SSHADD} -l > /dev/null 2>&1
+r=$?
+if [ $r -ne 1 ]; then
+ fail "ssh-add -l returned unexpected exit code: $r"
+fi
+trace "readd keys"
+# re-add keys/certs to agent
+for t in ${SSH_KEYTYPES}; do
+ ${SSHADD} $OBJ/$t-agent-private >/dev/null 2>&1 || \
+ fail "ssh-add failed exit code $?"
+done
+# make sure they are there
+${SSHADD} -l > /dev/null 2>&1
+r=$?
+if [ $r -ne 0 ]; then
+ fail "ssh-add -l failed: exit code $r"
+fi
+
+check_key_absent() {
+ ${SSHADD} -L | grep "^$1 " >/dev/null
+ if [ $? -eq 0 ]; then
+ fail "$1 key unexpectedly present"
+ fi
+}
+check_key_present() {
+ ${SSHADD} -L | grep "^$1 " >/dev/null
+ if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then
+ fail "$1 key missing from agent"
+ fi
+}
+
+# delete the ed25519 key
+trace "delete single key by file"
+${SSHADD} -qdk $OBJ/ssh-ed25519-agent || fail "ssh-add -d ed25519 failed"
+check_key_absent ssh-ed25519
+check_key_present ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com
+# Put key/cert back.
+${SSHADD} $OBJ/ssh-ed25519-agent-private >/dev/null 2>&1 || \
+ fail "ssh-add failed exit code $?"
+check_key_present ssh-ed25519
+# Delete both key and certificate.
+trace "delete key/cert by file"
+${SSHADD} -qd $OBJ/ssh-ed25519-agent || fail "ssh-add -d ed25519 failed"
+check_key_absent ssh-ed25519
+check_key_absent ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com
+# Put key/cert back.
+${SSHADD} $OBJ/ssh-ed25519-agent-private >/dev/null 2>&1 || \
+ fail "ssh-add failed exit code $?"
+check_key_present ssh-ed25519
+# Delete certificate via stdin
+${SSHADD} -qd - < $OBJ/ssh-ed25519-agent-cert.pub || fail "ssh-add -d - failed"
+check_key_present ssh-ed25519
+check_key_absent ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com
+# Delete key via stdin
+${SSHADD} -qd - < $OBJ/ssh-ed25519-agent.pub || fail "ssh-add -d - failed"
+check_key_absent ssh-ed25519
+check_key_absent ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com
trace "kill agent"
${SSHAGENT} -k > /dev/null
SSH_AGENT_PID=$FW_SSH_AGENT_PID ${SSHAGENT} -k > /dev/null
diff --git a/regress/misc/sk-dummy/sk-dummy.c b/regress/misc/sk-dummy/sk-dummy.c
index f3acb2fb7967..bf1feec1537a 100644
--- a/regress/misc/sk-dummy/sk-dummy.c
+++ b/regress/misc/sk-dummy/sk-dummy.c
@@ -1,532 +1,532 @@
/*
* Copyright (c) 2019 Markus Friedl
*
* Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
* purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
* copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
*
* THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
* WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
* MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
* ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
* WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
* ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
* OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
*/
#include "includes.h"
#ifdef HAVE_STDINT_H
#include <stdint.h>
#endif
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stddef.h>
#include <stdarg.h>
#include "crypto_api.h"
#include "sk-api.h"
#include <openssl/opensslv.h>
#include <openssl/crypto.h>
#include <openssl/evp.h>
#include <openssl/bn.h>
#include <openssl/ec.h>
#include <openssl/ecdsa.h>
#include <openssl/pem.h>
/* #define SK_DEBUG 1 */
/* Compatibility with OpenSSH 1.0.x */
#if (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10100000L)
#define ECDSA_SIG_get0(sig, pr, ps) \
do { \
(*pr) = sig->r; \
(*ps) = sig->s; \
} while (0)
#endif
-#if SSH_SK_VERSION_MAJOR != 0x00050000
+#if SSH_SK_VERSION_MAJOR != 0x00070000
# error SK API has changed, sk-dummy.c needs an update
#endif
static void skdebug(const char *func, const char *fmt, ...)
__attribute__((__format__ (printf, 2, 3)));
static void
skdebug(const char *func, const char *fmt, ...)
{
#if defined(SK_DEBUG)
va_list ap;
va_start(ap, fmt);
fprintf(stderr, "sk-dummy %s: ", func);
vfprintf(stderr, fmt, ap);
fputc('\n', stderr);
va_end(ap);
#else
(void)func; /* XXX */
(void)fmt; /* XXX */
#endif
}
uint32_t
sk_api_version(void)
{
return SSH_SK_VERSION_MAJOR;
}
static int
pack_key_ecdsa(struct sk_enroll_response *response)
{
#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
EC_KEY *key = NULL;
const EC_GROUP *g;
const EC_POINT *q;
int ret = -1;
long privlen;
BIO *bio = NULL;
char *privptr;
response->public_key = NULL;
response->public_key_len = 0;
response->key_handle = NULL;
response->key_handle_len = 0;
if ((key = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(NID_X9_62_prime256v1)) == NULL) {
skdebug(__func__, "EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name");
goto out;
}
if (EC_KEY_generate_key(key) != 1) {
skdebug(__func__, "EC_KEY_generate_key");
goto out;
}
EC_KEY_set_asn1_flag(key, OPENSSL_EC_NAMED_CURVE);
if ((bio = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem())) == NULL ||
(g = EC_KEY_get0_group(key)) == NULL ||
(q = EC_KEY_get0_public_key(key)) == NULL) {
skdebug(__func__, "couldn't get key parameters");
goto out;
}
response->public_key_len = EC_POINT_point2oct(g, q,
POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED, NULL, 0, NULL);
if (response->public_key_len == 0 || response->public_key_len > 2048) {
skdebug(__func__, "bad pubkey length %zu",
response->public_key_len);
goto out;
}
if ((response->public_key = malloc(response->public_key_len)) == NULL) {
skdebug(__func__, "malloc pubkey failed");
goto out;
}
if (EC_POINT_point2oct(g, q, POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
response->public_key, response->public_key_len, NULL) == 0) {
skdebug(__func__, "EC_POINT_point2oct failed");
goto out;
}
/* Key handle contains PEM encoded private key */
if (!PEM_write_bio_ECPrivateKey(bio, key, NULL, NULL, 0, NULL, NULL)) {
skdebug(__func__, "PEM_write_bio_ECPrivateKey failed");
goto out;
}
if ((privlen = BIO_get_mem_data(bio, &privptr)) <= 0) {
skdebug(__func__, "BIO_get_mem_data failed");
goto out;
}
if ((response->key_handle = malloc(privlen)) == NULL) {
skdebug(__func__, "malloc key_handle failed");
goto out;
}
response->key_handle_len = (size_t)privlen;
memcpy(response->key_handle, privptr, response->key_handle_len);
/* success */
ret = 0;
out:
if (ret != 0) {
if (response->public_key != NULL) {
memset(response->public_key, 0,
response->public_key_len);
free(response->public_key);
response->public_key = NULL;
}
if (response->key_handle != NULL) {
memset(response->key_handle, 0,
response->key_handle_len);
free(response->key_handle);
response->key_handle = NULL;
}
}
BIO_free(bio);
EC_KEY_free(key);
return ret;
#else
return -1;
#endif
}
static int
pack_key_ed25519(struct sk_enroll_response *response)
{
int ret = -1;
u_char pk[crypto_sign_ed25519_PUBLICKEYBYTES];
u_char sk[crypto_sign_ed25519_SECRETKEYBYTES];
response->public_key = NULL;
response->public_key_len = 0;
response->key_handle = NULL;
response->key_handle_len = 0;
memset(pk, 0, sizeof(pk));
memset(sk, 0, sizeof(sk));
crypto_sign_ed25519_keypair(pk, sk);
response->public_key_len = sizeof(pk);
if ((response->public_key = malloc(response->public_key_len)) == NULL) {
skdebug(__func__, "malloc pubkey failed");
goto out;
}
memcpy(response->public_key, pk, sizeof(pk));
/* Key handle contains sk */
response->key_handle_len = sizeof(sk);
if ((response->key_handle = malloc(response->key_handle_len)) == NULL) {
skdebug(__func__, "malloc key_handle failed");
goto out;
}
memcpy(response->key_handle, sk, sizeof(sk));
/* success */
ret = 0;
out:
if (ret != 0)
free(response->public_key);
return ret;
}
static int
check_options(struct sk_option **options)
{
size_t i;
if (options == NULL)
return 0;
for (i = 0; options[i] != NULL; i++) {
skdebug(__func__, "requested unsupported option %s",
options[i]->name);
if (options[i]->required) {
skdebug(__func__, "unknown required option");
return -1;
}
}
return 0;
}
int
sk_enroll(uint32_t alg, const uint8_t *challenge, size_t challenge_len,
const char *application, uint8_t flags, const char *pin,
struct sk_option **options, struct sk_enroll_response **enroll_response)
{
struct sk_enroll_response *response = NULL;
int ret = SSH_SK_ERR_GENERAL;
(void)flags; /* XXX; unused */
if (enroll_response == NULL) {
skdebug(__func__, "enroll_response == NULL");
goto out;
}
*enroll_response = NULL;
if (check_options(options) != 0)
goto out; /* error already logged */
if ((response = calloc(1, sizeof(*response))) == NULL) {
skdebug(__func__, "calloc response failed");
goto out;
}
switch(alg) {
case SSH_SK_ECDSA:
if (pack_key_ecdsa(response) != 0)
goto out;
break;
case SSH_SK_ED25519:
if (pack_key_ed25519(response) != 0)
goto out;
break;
default:
skdebug(__func__, "unsupported key type %d", alg);
return -1;
}
/* Have to return something here */
if ((response->signature = calloc(1, 1)) == NULL) {
skdebug(__func__, "calloc signature failed");
goto out;
}
response->signature_len = 0;
*enroll_response = response;
response = NULL;
ret = 0;
out:
if (response != NULL) {
free(response->public_key);
free(response->key_handle);
free(response->signature);
free(response->attestation_cert);
free(response);
}
return ret;
}
static void
dump(const char *preamble, const void *sv, size_t l)
{
#ifdef SK_DEBUG
const u_char *s = (const u_char *)sv;
size_t i;
fprintf(stderr, "%s (len %zu):\n", preamble, l);
for (i = 0; i < l; i++) {
if (i % 16 == 0)
fprintf(stderr, "%04zu: ", i);
fprintf(stderr, "%02x", s[i]);
if (i % 16 == 15 || i == l - 1)
fprintf(stderr, "\n");
}
#endif
}
static int
sig_ecdsa(const uint8_t *message, size_t message_len,
const char *application, uint32_t counter, uint8_t flags,
const uint8_t *key_handle, size_t key_handle_len,
struct sk_sign_response *response)
{
#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
ECDSA_SIG *sig = NULL;
const BIGNUM *sig_r, *sig_s;
int ret = -1;
BIO *bio = NULL;
EVP_PKEY *pk = NULL;
EC_KEY *ec = NULL;
SHA256_CTX ctx;
uint8_t apphash[SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH];
uint8_t sighash[SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH];
uint8_t countbuf[4];
/* Decode EC_KEY from key handle */
if ((bio = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem())) == NULL ||
BIO_write(bio, key_handle, key_handle_len) != (int)key_handle_len) {
skdebug(__func__, "BIO setup failed");
goto out;
}
if ((pk = PEM_read_bio_PrivateKey(bio, NULL, NULL, "")) == NULL) {
skdebug(__func__, "PEM_read_bio_PrivateKey failed");
goto out;
}
if (EVP_PKEY_base_id(pk) != EVP_PKEY_EC) {
skdebug(__func__, "Not an EC key: %d", EVP_PKEY_base_id(pk));
goto out;
}
if ((ec = EVP_PKEY_get1_EC_KEY(pk)) == NULL) {
skdebug(__func__, "EVP_PKEY_get1_EC_KEY failed");
goto out;
}
/* Expect message to be pre-hashed */
if (message_len != SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH) {
skdebug(__func__, "bad message len %zu", message_len);
goto out;
}
/* Prepare data to be signed */
dump("message", message, message_len);
SHA256_Init(&ctx);
SHA256_Update(&ctx, application, strlen(application));
SHA256_Final(apphash, &ctx);
dump("apphash", apphash, sizeof(apphash));
countbuf[0] = (counter >> 24) & 0xff;
countbuf[1] = (counter >> 16) & 0xff;
countbuf[2] = (counter >> 8) & 0xff;
countbuf[3] = counter & 0xff;
dump("countbuf", countbuf, sizeof(countbuf));
dump("flags", &flags, sizeof(flags));
SHA256_Init(&ctx);
SHA256_Update(&ctx, apphash, sizeof(apphash));
SHA256_Update(&ctx, &flags, sizeof(flags));
SHA256_Update(&ctx, countbuf, sizeof(countbuf));
SHA256_Update(&ctx, message, message_len);
SHA256_Final(sighash, &ctx);
dump("sighash", sighash, sizeof(sighash));
/* create and encode signature */
if ((sig = ECDSA_do_sign(sighash, sizeof(sighash), ec)) == NULL) {
skdebug(__func__, "ECDSA_do_sign failed");
goto out;
}
ECDSA_SIG_get0(sig, &sig_r, &sig_s);
response->sig_r_len = BN_num_bytes(sig_r);
response->sig_s_len = BN_num_bytes(sig_s);
if ((response->sig_r = calloc(1, response->sig_r_len)) == NULL ||
(response->sig_s = calloc(1, response->sig_s_len)) == NULL) {
skdebug(__func__, "calloc signature failed");
goto out;
}
BN_bn2bin(sig_r, response->sig_r);
BN_bn2bin(sig_s, response->sig_s);
ret = 0;
out:
explicit_bzero(&ctx, sizeof(ctx));
explicit_bzero(&apphash, sizeof(apphash));
explicit_bzero(&sighash, sizeof(sighash));
ECDSA_SIG_free(sig);
if (ret != 0) {
free(response->sig_r);
free(response->sig_s);
response->sig_r = NULL;
response->sig_s = NULL;
}
BIO_free(bio);
EC_KEY_free(ec);
EVP_PKEY_free(pk);
return ret;
#else
return -1;
#endif
}
static int
sig_ed25519(const uint8_t *message, size_t message_len,
const char *application, uint32_t counter, uint8_t flags,
const uint8_t *key_handle, size_t key_handle_len,
struct sk_sign_response *response)
{
size_t o;
int ret = -1;
SHA256_CTX ctx;
uint8_t apphash[SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH];
uint8_t signbuf[sizeof(apphash) + sizeof(flags) +
sizeof(counter) + SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH];
uint8_t sig[crypto_sign_ed25519_BYTES + sizeof(signbuf)];
unsigned long long smlen;
if (key_handle_len != crypto_sign_ed25519_SECRETKEYBYTES) {
skdebug(__func__, "bad key handle length %zu", key_handle_len);
goto out;
}
/* Expect message to be pre-hashed */
if (message_len != SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH) {
skdebug(__func__, "bad message len %zu", message_len);
goto out;
}
/* Prepare data to be signed */
dump("message", message, message_len);
SHA256_Init(&ctx);
SHA256_Update(&ctx, application, strlen(application));
SHA256_Final(apphash, &ctx);
dump("apphash", apphash, sizeof(apphash));
memcpy(signbuf, apphash, sizeof(apphash));
o = sizeof(apphash);
signbuf[o++] = flags;
signbuf[o++] = (counter >> 24) & 0xff;
signbuf[o++] = (counter >> 16) & 0xff;
signbuf[o++] = (counter >> 8) & 0xff;
signbuf[o++] = counter & 0xff;
memcpy(signbuf + o, message, message_len);
o += message_len;
if (o != sizeof(signbuf)) {
skdebug(__func__, "bad sign buf len %zu, expected %zu",
o, sizeof(signbuf));
goto out;
}
dump("signbuf", signbuf, sizeof(signbuf));
/* create and encode signature */
smlen = sizeof(signbuf);
if (crypto_sign_ed25519(sig, &smlen, signbuf, sizeof(signbuf),
key_handle) != 0) {
skdebug(__func__, "crypto_sign_ed25519 failed");
goto out;
}
if (smlen <= sizeof(signbuf)) {
skdebug(__func__, "bad sign smlen %llu, expected min %zu",
smlen, sizeof(signbuf) + 1);
goto out;
}
response->sig_r_len = (size_t)(smlen - sizeof(signbuf));
if ((response->sig_r = calloc(1, response->sig_r_len)) == NULL) {
skdebug(__func__, "calloc signature failed");
goto out;
}
memcpy(response->sig_r, sig, response->sig_r_len);
dump("sig_r", response->sig_r, response->sig_r_len);
ret = 0;
out:
explicit_bzero(&ctx, sizeof(ctx));
explicit_bzero(&apphash, sizeof(apphash));
explicit_bzero(&signbuf, sizeof(signbuf));
explicit_bzero(&sig, sizeof(sig));
if (ret != 0) {
free(response->sig_r);
response->sig_r = NULL;
}
return ret;
}
int
sk_sign(uint32_t alg, const uint8_t *data, size_t datalen,
const char *application, const uint8_t *key_handle, size_t key_handle_len,
uint8_t flags, const char *pin, struct sk_option **options,
struct sk_sign_response **sign_response)
{
struct sk_sign_response *response = NULL;
int ret = SSH_SK_ERR_GENERAL;
SHA256_CTX ctx;
uint8_t message[32];
if (sign_response == NULL) {
skdebug(__func__, "sign_response == NULL");
goto out;
}
*sign_response = NULL;
if (check_options(options) != 0)
goto out; /* error already logged */
if ((response = calloc(1, sizeof(*response))) == NULL) {
skdebug(__func__, "calloc response failed");
goto out;
}
SHA256_Init(&ctx);
SHA256_Update(&ctx, data, datalen);
SHA256_Final(message, &ctx);
response->flags = flags;
response->counter = 0x12345678;
switch(alg) {
case SSH_SK_ECDSA:
if (sig_ecdsa(message, sizeof(message), application,
response->counter, flags, key_handle, key_handle_len,
response) != 0)
goto out;
break;
case SSH_SK_ED25519:
if (sig_ed25519(message, sizeof(message), application,
response->counter, flags, key_handle, key_handle_len,
response) != 0)
goto out;
break;
default:
skdebug(__func__, "unsupported key type %d", alg);
return -1;
}
*sign_response = response;
response = NULL;
ret = 0;
out:
explicit_bzero(message, sizeof(message));
if (response != NULL) {
free(response->sig_r);
free(response->sig_s);
free(response);
}
return ret;
}
int
sk_load_resident_keys(const char *pin, struct sk_option **options,
struct sk_resident_key ***rks, size_t *nrks)
{
return SSH_SK_ERR_UNSUPPORTED;
}
diff --git a/regress/multiplex.sh b/regress/multiplex.sh
index 817ddbfa819b..4744fa3d97d6 100644
--- a/regress/multiplex.sh
+++ b/regress/multiplex.sh
@@ -1,197 +1,199 @@
-# $OpenBSD: multiplex.sh,v 1.32 2020/01/25 02:57:53 dtucker Exp $
+# $OpenBSD: multiplex.sh,v 1.33 2020/06/24 15:16:23 markus Exp $
# Placed in the Public Domain.
make_tmpdir
CTL=${SSH_REGRESS_TMP}/ctl-sock
tid="connection multiplexing"
trace "will use ProxyCommand $proxycmd"
if config_defined DISABLE_FD_PASSING ; then
echo "skipped (not supported on this platform)"
exit 0
fi
P=3301 # test port
wait_for_mux_master_ready()
{
for i in 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9; do
${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -S $CTL -Ocheck otherhost \
>/dev/null 2>&1 && return 0
sleep $i
done
fatal "mux master never becomes ready"
}
start_sshd
start_mux_master()
{
trace "start master, fork to background"
${SSH} -Nn2 -MS$CTL -F $OBJ/ssh_config -oSendEnv="_XXX_TEST" somehost \
-E $TEST_REGRESS_LOGFILE 2>&1 &
# NB. $SSH_PID will be killed by test-exec.sh:cleanup on fatal errors.
SSH_PID=$!
wait_for_mux_master_ready
}
start_mux_master
verbose "test $tid: envpass"
trace "env passing over multiplexed connection"
_XXX_TEST=blah ${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -oSendEnv="_XXX_TEST" -S$CTL otherhost sh << 'EOF'
test X"$_XXX_TEST" = X"blah"
EOF
if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then
fail "environment not found"
fi
verbose "test $tid: transfer"
rm -f ${COPY}
trace "ssh transfer over multiplexed connection and check result"
${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -S$CTL otherhost cat ${DATA} > ${COPY}
test -f ${COPY} || fail "ssh -Sctl: failed copy ${DATA}"
cmp ${DATA} ${COPY} || fail "ssh -Sctl: corrupted copy of ${DATA}"
rm -f ${COPY}
trace "ssh transfer over multiplexed connection and check result"
${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -S $CTL otherhost cat ${DATA} > ${COPY}
test -f ${COPY} || fail "ssh -S ctl: failed copy ${DATA}"
cmp ${DATA} ${COPY} || fail "ssh -S ctl: corrupted copy of ${DATA}"
rm -f ${COPY}
trace "sftp transfer over multiplexed connection and check result"
echo "get ${DATA} ${COPY}" | \
${SFTP} -S ${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -oControlPath=$CTL otherhost >>$TEST_REGRESS_LOGFILE 2>&1
test -f ${COPY} || fail "sftp: failed copy ${DATA}"
cmp ${DATA} ${COPY} || fail "sftp: corrupted copy of ${DATA}"
rm -f ${COPY}
trace "scp transfer over multiplexed connection and check result"
${SCP} -S ${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -oControlPath=$CTL otherhost:${DATA} ${COPY} >>$TEST_REGRESS_LOGFILE 2>&1
test -f ${COPY} || fail "scp: failed copy ${DATA}"
cmp ${DATA} ${COPY} || fail "scp: corrupted copy of ${DATA}"
rm -f ${COPY}
verbose "test $tid: forward"
trace "forward over TCP/IP and check result"
$NC -N -l 127.0.0.1 $((${PORT} + 1)) < ${DATA} > /dev/null &
netcat_pid=$!
${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -S $CTL -Oforward -L127.0.0.1:$((${PORT} + 2)):127.0.0.1:$((${PORT} + 1)) otherhost >>$TEST_SSH_LOGFILE 2>&1
sleep 1 # XXX remove once race fixed
$NC 127.0.0.1 $((${PORT} + 2)) < /dev/null > ${COPY}
cmp ${DATA} ${COPY} || fail "ssh: corrupted copy of ${DATA}"
kill $netcat_pid 2>/dev/null
rm -f ${COPY} $OBJ/unix-[123].fwd
trace "forward over UNIX and check result"
$NC -N -Ul $OBJ/unix-1.fwd < ${DATA} > /dev/null &
netcat_pid=$!
${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -S $CTL -Oforward -L$OBJ/unix-2.fwd:$OBJ/unix-1.fwd otherhost >>$TEST_SSH_LOGFILE 2>&1
${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -S $CTL -Oforward -R$OBJ/unix-3.fwd:$OBJ/unix-2.fwd otherhost >>$TEST_SSH_LOGFILE 2>&1
sleep 1 # XXX remove once race fixed
$NC -U $OBJ/unix-3.fwd < /dev/null > ${COPY}
cmp ${DATA} ${COPY} || fail "ssh: corrupted copy of ${DATA}"
kill $netcat_pid 2>/dev/null
rm -f ${COPY} $OBJ/unix-[123].fwd
for s in 0 1 4 5 44; do
- trace "exit status $s over multiplexed connection"
- verbose "test $tid: status $s"
- ${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -S $CTL otherhost exit $s
+ for mode in "" "-Oproxy"; do
+ trace "exit status $s over multiplexed connection ($mode)"
+ verbose "test $tid: status $s ($mode)"
+ ${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -S $CTL $mode otherhost exit $s
r=$?
if [ $r -ne $s ]; then
fail "exit code mismatch: $r != $s"
fi
# same with early close of stdout/err
- trace "exit status $s with early close over multiplexed connection"
- ${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -S $CTL -n otherhost \
+ trace "exit status $s with early close over multiplexed connection ($mode)"
+ ${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -S $CTL -n $mode otherhost \
exec sh -c \'"sleep 2; exec > /dev/null 2>&1; sleep 3; exit $s"\'
r=$?
if [ $r -ne $s ]; then
fail "exit code (with sleep) mismatch: $r != $s"
fi
+ done
done
verbose "test $tid: cmd check"
${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -S $CTL -Ocheck otherhost >>$TEST_REGRESS_LOGFILE 2>&1 \
|| fail "check command failed"
verbose "test $tid: cmd forward local (TCP)"
${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -S $CTL -Oforward -L $P:localhost:$PORT otherhost \
|| fail "request local forward failed"
sleep 1 # XXX remove once race fixed
${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -p$P otherhost true \
|| fail "connect to local forward port failed"
${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -S $CTL -Ocancel -L $P:localhost:$PORT otherhost \
|| fail "cancel local forward failed"
${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -p$P otherhost true \
&& fail "local forward port still listening"
verbose "test $tid: cmd forward remote (TCP)"
${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -S $CTL -Oforward -R $P:localhost:$PORT otherhost \
|| fail "request remote forward failed"
sleep 1 # XXX remove once race fixed
${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -p$P otherhost true \
|| fail "connect to remote forwarded port failed"
${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -S $CTL -Ocancel -R $P:localhost:$PORT otherhost \
|| fail "cancel remote forward failed"
${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -p$P otherhost true \
&& fail "remote forward port still listening"
verbose "test $tid: cmd forward local (UNIX)"
${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -S $CTL -Oforward -L $OBJ/unix-1.fwd:localhost:$PORT otherhost \
|| fail "request local forward failed"
sleep 1 # XXX remove once race fixed
echo "" | $NC -U $OBJ/unix-1.fwd | \
grep "Invalid SSH identification string" >/dev/null 2>&1 \
|| fail "connect to local forward path failed"
${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -S $CTL -Ocancel -L $OBJ/unix-1.fwd:localhost:$PORT otherhost \
|| fail "cancel local forward failed"
N=$(echo "xyzzy" | $NC -U $OBJ/unix-1.fwd 2>&1 | grep "xyzzy" | wc -l)
test ${N} -eq 0 || fail "local forward path still listening"
rm -f $OBJ/unix-1.fwd
verbose "test $tid: cmd forward remote (UNIX)"
${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -S $CTL -Oforward -R $OBJ/unix-1.fwd:localhost:$PORT otherhost \
|| fail "request remote forward failed"
sleep 1 # XXX remove once race fixed
echo "" | $NC -U $OBJ/unix-1.fwd | \
grep "Invalid SSH identification string" >/dev/null 2>&1 \
|| fail "connect to remote forwarded path failed"
${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -S $CTL -Ocancel -R $OBJ/unix-1.fwd:localhost:$PORT otherhost \
|| fail "cancel remote forward failed"
N=$(echo "xyzzy" | $NC -U $OBJ/unix-1.fwd 2>&1 | grep "xyzzy" | wc -l)
test ${N} -eq 0 || fail "remote forward path still listening"
rm -f $OBJ/unix-1.fwd
verbose "test $tid: cmd exit"
${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -S $CTL -Oexit otherhost >>$TEST_REGRESS_LOGFILE 2>&1 \
|| fail "send exit command failed"
# Wait for master to exit
wait $SSH_PID
kill -0 $SSH_PID >/dev/null 2>&1 && fail "exit command failed"
# Restart master and test -O stop command with master using -N
verbose "test $tid: cmd stop"
trace "restart master, fork to background"
start_mux_master
# start a long-running command then immediately request a stop
${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -S $CTL otherhost "sleep 10; exit 0" \
>>$TEST_REGRESS_LOGFILE 2>&1 &
SLEEP_PID=$!
${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -S $CTL -Ostop otherhost >>$TEST_REGRESS_LOGFILE 2>&1 \
|| fail "send stop command failed"
# wait until both long-running command and master have exited.
wait $SLEEP_PID
[ $! != 0 ] || fail "waiting for concurrent command"
wait $SSH_PID
[ $! != 0 ] || fail "waiting for master stop"
kill -0 $SSH_PID >/dev/null 2>&1 && fatal "stop command failed"
SSH_PID="" # Already gone, so don't kill in cleanup
diff --git a/regress/netcat.c b/regress/netcat.c
index fe94dd908a7f..d583176f1f28 100644
--- a/regress/netcat.c
+++ b/regress/netcat.c
@@ -1,1671 +1,1683 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: netcat.c,v 1.126 2014/10/30 16:08:31 tedu Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: netcat.c,v 1.131 2015/09/03 23:06:28 sobrado Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 2001 Eric Jackson <ericj@monkey.org>
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
*
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
* 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products
* derived from this software without specific prior written permission.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
* OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
* IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
* INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
* NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
* DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
* THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
* (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
* THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
*/
/*
* Re-written nc(1) for OpenBSD. Original implementation by
* *Hobbit* <hobbit@avian.org>.
*/
#include "includes.h"
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/socket.h>
#include <sys/time.h>
#include <sys/uio.h>
#include <sys/un.h>
#include <netinet/in.h>
#include <netinet/tcp.h>
#include <netinet/ip.h>
#include <errno.h>
+#include <fcntl.h>
+#include <limits.h>
#include <netdb.h>
+#include <signal.h>
#include <stdarg.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <unistd.h>
-#include <fcntl.h>
-#include <limits.h>
#include "atomicio.h"
#ifdef HAVE_POLL_H
#include <poll.h>
#else
# ifdef HAVE_SYS_POLL_H
# include <sys/poll.h>
# endif
#endif
#ifdef HAVE_ERR_H
# include <err.h>
#endif
#ifdef HAVE_SYS_BYTEORDER_H
# include <sys/byteorder.h>
#endif
/* Telnet options from arpa/telnet.h */
#define IAC 255
#define DONT 254
#define DO 253
#define WONT 252
#define WILL 251
#ifndef SUN_LEN
#define SUN_LEN(su) \
(sizeof(*(su)) - sizeof((su)->sun_path) + strlen((su)->sun_path))
#endif
#define PORT_MAX 65535
#define PORT_MAX_LEN 6
#define UNIX_DG_TMP_SOCKET_SIZE 19
#define POLL_STDIN 0
#define POLL_NETOUT 1
#define POLL_NETIN 2
#define POLL_STDOUT 3
#define BUFSIZE 16384
/* Command Line Options */
int dflag; /* detached, no stdin */
int Fflag; /* fdpass sock to stdout */
unsigned int iflag; /* Interval Flag */
int kflag; /* More than one connect */
int lflag; /* Bind to local port */
int Nflag; /* shutdown() network socket */
int nflag; /* Don't do name look up */
char *Pflag; /* Proxy username */
char *pflag; /* Localport flag */
int rflag; /* Random ports flag */
char *sflag; /* Source Address */
int tflag; /* Telnet Emulation */
int uflag; /* UDP - Default to TCP */
int vflag; /* Verbosity */
int xflag; /* Socks proxy */
int zflag; /* Port Scan Flag */
int Dflag; /* sodebug */
int Iflag; /* TCP receive buffer size */
int Oflag; /* TCP send buffer size */
int Sflag; /* TCP MD5 signature option */
int Tflag = -1; /* IP Type of Service */
int rtableid = -1;
int timeout = -1;
int family = AF_UNSPEC;
char *portlist[PORT_MAX+1];
char *unix_dg_tmp_socket;
void atelnet(int, unsigned char *, unsigned int);
void build_ports(char *);
void help(void);
int local_listen(char *, char *, struct addrinfo);
void readwrite(int);
void fdpass(int nfd) __attribute__((noreturn));
int remote_connect(const char *, const char *, struct addrinfo);
int timeout_connect(int, const struct sockaddr *, socklen_t);
int socks_connect(const char *, const char *, struct addrinfo,
const char *, const char *, struct addrinfo, int, const char *);
int udptest(int);
int unix_bind(char *);
int unix_connect(char *);
int unix_listen(char *);
-void set_common_sockopts(int);
+void set_common_sockopts(int, int);
int map_tos(char *, int *);
void report_connect(const struct sockaddr *, socklen_t);
void usage(int);
ssize_t drainbuf(int, unsigned char *, size_t *);
ssize_t fillbuf(int, unsigned char *, size_t *);
int
main(int argc, char *argv[])
{
int ch, s, ret, socksv;
char *host, *uport;
struct addrinfo hints;
struct servent *sv;
socklen_t len;
struct sockaddr_storage cliaddr;
char *proxy = NULL;
const char *errstr, *proxyhost = "", *proxyport = NULL;
struct addrinfo proxyhints;
char unix_dg_tmp_socket_buf[UNIX_DG_TMP_SOCKET_SIZE];
ret = 1;
s = 0;
socksv = 5;
host = NULL;
uport = NULL;
sv = NULL;
+ signal(SIGPIPE, SIG_IGN);
+
while ((ch = getopt(argc, argv,
"46DdFhI:i:klNnO:P:p:rSs:tT:UuV:vw:X:x:z")) != -1) {
switch (ch) {
case '4':
family = AF_INET;
break;
case '6':
family = AF_INET6;
break;
case 'U':
family = AF_UNIX;
break;
case 'X':
if (strcasecmp(optarg, "connect") == 0)
socksv = -1; /* HTTP proxy CONNECT */
else if (strcmp(optarg, "4") == 0)
socksv = 4; /* SOCKS v.4 */
else if (strcmp(optarg, "5") == 0)
socksv = 5; /* SOCKS v.5 */
else
errx(1, "unsupported proxy protocol");
break;
case 'd':
dflag = 1;
break;
case 'F':
Fflag = 1;
break;
case 'h':
help();
break;
case 'i':
iflag = strtonum(optarg, 0, UINT_MAX, &errstr);
if (errstr)
errx(1, "interval %s: %s", errstr, optarg);
break;
case 'k':
kflag = 1;
break;
case 'l':
lflag = 1;
break;
case 'N':
Nflag = 1;
break;
case 'n':
nflag = 1;
break;
case 'P':
Pflag = optarg;
break;
case 'p':
pflag = optarg;
break;
case 'r':
rflag = 1;
break;
case 's':
sflag = optarg;
break;
case 't':
tflag = 1;
break;
case 'u':
uflag = 1;
break;
#ifdef SO_RTABLE
case 'V':
rtableid = (int)strtonum(optarg, 0,
RT_TABLEID_MAX, &errstr);
if (errstr)
errx(1, "rtable %s: %s", errstr, optarg);
break;
#endif
case 'v':
vflag = 1;
break;
case 'w':
timeout = strtonum(optarg, 0, INT_MAX / 1000, &errstr);
if (errstr)
errx(1, "timeout %s: %s", errstr, optarg);
timeout *= 1000;
break;
case 'x':
xflag = 1;
if ((proxy = strdup(optarg)) == NULL)
errx(1, "strdup");
break;
case 'z':
zflag = 1;
break;
case 'D':
Dflag = 1;
break;
case 'I':
Iflag = strtonum(optarg, 1, 65536 << 14, &errstr);
if (errstr != NULL)
errx(1, "TCP receive window %s: %s",
errstr, optarg);
break;
case 'O':
Oflag = strtonum(optarg, 1, 65536 << 14, &errstr);
if (errstr != NULL)
errx(1, "TCP send window %s: %s",
errstr, optarg);
break;
case 'S':
Sflag = 1;
break;
case 'T':
errstr = NULL;
errno = 0;
if (map_tos(optarg, &Tflag))
break;
if (strlen(optarg) > 1 && optarg[0] == '0' &&
optarg[1] == 'x')
Tflag = (int)strtol(optarg, NULL, 16);
else
Tflag = (int)strtonum(optarg, 0, 255,
&errstr);
if (Tflag < 0 || Tflag > 255 || errstr || errno)
errx(1, "illegal tos value %s", optarg);
break;
default:
usage(1);
}
}
argc -= optind;
argv += optind;
/* Cruft to make sure options are clean, and used properly. */
if (argv[0] && !argv[1] && family == AF_UNIX) {
host = argv[0];
uport = NULL;
} else if (argv[0] && !argv[1]) {
if (!lflag)
usage(1);
uport = argv[0];
host = NULL;
} else if (argv[0] && argv[1]) {
host = argv[0];
uport = argv[1];
} else
usage(1);
if (lflag && sflag)
errx(1, "cannot use -s and -l");
if (lflag && pflag)
errx(1, "cannot use -p and -l");
if (lflag && zflag)
errx(1, "cannot use -z and -l");
if (!lflag && kflag)
errx(1, "must use -l with -k");
/* Get name of temporary socket for unix datagram client */
if ((family == AF_UNIX) && uflag && !lflag) {
if (sflag) {
unix_dg_tmp_socket = sflag;
} else {
strlcpy(unix_dg_tmp_socket_buf, "/tmp/nc.XXXXXXXXXX",
UNIX_DG_TMP_SOCKET_SIZE);
if (mktemp(unix_dg_tmp_socket_buf) == NULL)
err(1, "mktemp");
unix_dg_tmp_socket = unix_dg_tmp_socket_buf;
}
}
/* Initialize addrinfo structure. */
if (family != AF_UNIX) {
memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(struct addrinfo));
hints.ai_family = family;
hints.ai_socktype = uflag ? SOCK_DGRAM : SOCK_STREAM;
hints.ai_protocol = uflag ? IPPROTO_UDP : IPPROTO_TCP;
if (nflag)
hints.ai_flags |= AI_NUMERICHOST;
}
if (xflag) {
if (uflag)
errx(1, "no proxy support for UDP mode");
if (lflag)
errx(1, "no proxy support for listen");
if (family == AF_UNIX)
errx(1, "no proxy support for unix sockets");
/* XXX IPv6 transport to proxy would probably work */
if (family == AF_INET6)
errx(1, "no proxy support for IPv6");
if (sflag)
errx(1, "no proxy support for local source address");
proxyhost = strsep(&proxy, ":");
proxyport = proxy;
memset(&proxyhints, 0, sizeof(struct addrinfo));
proxyhints.ai_family = family;
proxyhints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM;
proxyhints.ai_protocol = IPPROTO_TCP;
if (nflag)
proxyhints.ai_flags |= AI_NUMERICHOST;
}
if (lflag) {
int connfd;
ret = 0;
if (family == AF_UNIX) {
if (uflag)
s = unix_bind(host);
else
s = unix_listen(host);
}
/* Allow only one connection at a time, but stay alive. */
for (;;) {
if (family != AF_UNIX)
s = local_listen(host, uport, hints);
if (s < 0)
err(1, "local_listen");
/*
* For UDP and -k, don't connect the socket, let it
* receive datagrams from multiple socket pairs.
*/
if (uflag && kflag)
readwrite(s);
/*
* For UDP and not -k, we will use recvfrom() initially
* to wait for a caller, then use the regular functions
* to talk to the caller.
*/
else if (uflag && !kflag) {
int rv, plen;
char buf[16384];
struct sockaddr_storage z;
len = sizeof(z);
plen = 2048;
rv = recvfrom(s, buf, plen, MSG_PEEK,
(struct sockaddr *)&z, &len);
if (rv < 0)
err(1, "recvfrom");
rv = connect(s, (struct sockaddr *)&z, len);
if (rv < 0)
err(1, "connect");
if (vflag)
report_connect((struct sockaddr *)&z, len);
readwrite(s);
} else {
len = sizeof(cliaddr);
connfd = accept(s, (struct sockaddr *)&cliaddr,
&len);
if (connfd == -1) {
/* For now, all errnos are fatal */
err(1, "accept");
}
if (vflag)
report_connect((struct sockaddr *)&cliaddr, len);
readwrite(connfd);
close(connfd);
}
if (family != AF_UNIX)
close(s);
else if (uflag) {
if (connect(s, NULL, 0) < 0)
err(1, "connect");
}
if (!kflag)
break;
}
} else if (family == AF_UNIX) {
ret = 0;
if ((s = unix_connect(host)) > 0 && !zflag) {
readwrite(s);
close(s);
} else
ret = 1;
if (uflag)
unlink(unix_dg_tmp_socket);
exit(ret);
} else {
int i = 0;
/* Construct the portlist[] array. */
build_ports(uport);
/* Cycle through portlist, connecting to each port. */
for (i = 0; portlist[i] != NULL; i++) {
if (s)
close(s);
if (xflag)
s = socks_connect(host, portlist[i], hints,
proxyhost, proxyport, proxyhints, socksv,
Pflag);
else
s = remote_connect(host, portlist[i], hints);
if (s < 0)
continue;
ret = 0;
if (vflag || zflag) {
/* For UDP, make sure we are connected. */
if (uflag) {
if (udptest(s) == -1) {
ret = 1;
continue;
}
}
/* Don't look up port if -n. */
if (nflag)
sv = NULL;
else {
sv = getservbyport(
ntohs(atoi(portlist[i])),
uflag ? "udp" : "tcp");
}
fprintf(stderr,
"Connection to %s %s port [%s/%s] "
"succeeded!\n", host, portlist[i],
uflag ? "udp" : "tcp",
sv ? sv->s_name : "*");
}
if (Fflag)
fdpass(s);
else if (!zflag)
readwrite(s);
}
}
if (s)
close(s);
exit(ret);
}
/*
* unix_bind()
* Returns a unix socket bound to the given path
*/
int
unix_bind(char *path)
{
struct sockaddr_un sun_sa;
int s;
/* Create unix domain socket. */
if ((s = socket(AF_UNIX, uflag ? SOCK_DGRAM : SOCK_STREAM,
0)) < 0)
return (-1);
memset(&sun_sa, 0, sizeof(struct sockaddr_un));
sun_sa.sun_family = AF_UNIX;
if (strlcpy(sun_sa.sun_path, path, sizeof(sun_sa.sun_path)) >=
sizeof(sun_sa.sun_path)) {
close(s);
errno = ENAMETOOLONG;
return (-1);
}
if (bind(s, (struct sockaddr *)&sun_sa, SUN_LEN(&sun_sa)) < 0) {
close(s);
return (-1);
}
return (s);
}
/*
* unix_connect()
* Returns a socket connected to a local unix socket. Returns -1 on failure.
*/
int
unix_connect(char *path)
{
struct sockaddr_un sun_sa;
int s;
if (uflag) {
if ((s = unix_bind(unix_dg_tmp_socket)) < 0)
return (-1);
} else {
if ((s = socket(AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0)) < 0)
return (-1);
}
(void)fcntl(s, F_SETFD, FD_CLOEXEC);
memset(&sun_sa, 0, sizeof(struct sockaddr_un));
sun_sa.sun_family = AF_UNIX;
if (strlcpy(sun_sa.sun_path, path, sizeof(sun_sa.sun_path)) >=
sizeof(sun_sa.sun_path)) {
close(s);
errno = ENAMETOOLONG;
return (-1);
}
if (connect(s, (struct sockaddr *)&sun_sa, SUN_LEN(&sun_sa)) < 0) {
close(s);
return (-1);
}
return (s);
}
/*
* unix_listen()
* Create a unix domain socket, and listen on it.
*/
int
unix_listen(char *path)
{
int s;
if ((s = unix_bind(path)) < 0)
return (-1);
if (listen(s, 5) < 0) {
close(s);
return (-1);
}
return (s);
}
/*
* remote_connect()
* Returns a socket connected to a remote host. Properly binds to a local
* port or source address if needed. Returns -1 on failure.
*/
int
remote_connect(const char *host, const char *port, struct addrinfo hints)
{
struct addrinfo *res, *res0;
int s, error;
#if defined(SO_RTABLE) || defined(SO_BINDANY)
int on = 1;
#endif
if ((error = getaddrinfo(host, port, &hints, &res)))
errx(1, "getaddrinfo: %s", gai_strerror(error));
res0 = res;
do {
if ((s = socket(res0->ai_family, res0->ai_socktype,
res0->ai_protocol)) < 0)
continue;
#ifdef SO_RTABLE
if (rtableid >= 0 && (setsockopt(s, SOL_SOCKET, SO_RTABLE,
&rtableid, sizeof(rtableid)) == -1))
err(1, "setsockopt SO_RTABLE");
#endif
/* Bind to a local port or source address if specified. */
if (sflag || pflag) {
struct addrinfo ahints, *ares;
#ifdef SO_BINDANY
/* try SO_BINDANY, but don't insist */
setsockopt(s, SOL_SOCKET, SO_BINDANY, &on, sizeof(on));
#endif
memset(&ahints, 0, sizeof(struct addrinfo));
ahints.ai_family = res0->ai_family;
ahints.ai_socktype = uflag ? SOCK_DGRAM : SOCK_STREAM;
ahints.ai_protocol = uflag ? IPPROTO_UDP : IPPROTO_TCP;
ahints.ai_flags = AI_PASSIVE;
if ((error = getaddrinfo(sflag, pflag, &ahints, &ares)))
errx(1, "getaddrinfo: %s", gai_strerror(error));
if (bind(s, (struct sockaddr *)ares->ai_addr,
ares->ai_addrlen) < 0)
err(1, "bind failed");
freeaddrinfo(ares);
}
- set_common_sockopts(s);
+ set_common_sockopts(s, res0->ai_family);
if (timeout_connect(s, res0->ai_addr, res0->ai_addrlen) == 0)
break;
else if (vflag)
warn("connect to %s port %s (%s) failed", host, port,
uflag ? "udp" : "tcp");
close(s);
s = -1;
} while ((res0 = res0->ai_next) != NULL);
freeaddrinfo(res);
return (s);
}
int
timeout_connect(int s, const struct sockaddr *name, socklen_t namelen)
{
struct pollfd pfd;
socklen_t optlen;
int flags = 0, optval;
int ret;
if (timeout != -1) {
flags = fcntl(s, F_GETFL, 0);
if (fcntl(s, F_SETFL, flags | O_NONBLOCK) == -1)
err(1, "set non-blocking mode");
}
if ((ret = connect(s, name, namelen)) != 0 && errno == EINPROGRESS) {
pfd.fd = s;
pfd.events = POLLOUT;
if ((ret = poll(&pfd, 1, timeout)) == 1) {
optlen = sizeof(optval);
if ((ret = getsockopt(s, SOL_SOCKET, SO_ERROR,
&optval, &optlen)) == 0) {
errno = optval;
ret = optval == 0 ? 0 : -1;
}
} else if (ret == 0) {
errno = ETIMEDOUT;
ret = -1;
} else
err(1, "poll failed");
}
if (timeout != -1 && fcntl(s, F_SETFL, flags) == -1)
err(1, "restoring flags");
return (ret);
}
/*
* local_listen()
* Returns a socket listening on a local port, binds to specified source
* address. Returns -1 on failure.
*/
int
local_listen(char *host, char *port, struct addrinfo hints)
{
struct addrinfo *res, *res0;
int s, ret, x = 1;
int error;
/* Allow nodename to be null. */
hints.ai_flags |= AI_PASSIVE;
/*
* In the case of binding to a wildcard address
* default to binding to an ipv4 address.
*/
if (host == NULL && hints.ai_family == AF_UNSPEC)
hints.ai_family = AF_INET;
if ((error = getaddrinfo(host, port, &hints, &res)))
errx(1, "getaddrinfo: %s", gai_strerror(error));
res0 = res;
do {
if ((s = socket(res0->ai_family, res0->ai_socktype,
res0->ai_protocol)) < 0)
continue;
#ifdef SO_RTABLE
if (rtableid >= 0 && (setsockopt(s, SOL_SOCKET, SO_RTABLE,
&rtableid, sizeof(rtableid)) == -1))
err(1, "setsockopt SO_RTABLE");
#endif
#ifdef SO_REUSEPORT
ret = setsockopt(s, SOL_SOCKET, SO_REUSEPORT, &x, sizeof(x));
if (ret == -1)
err(1, "setsockopt SO_REUSEPORT");
#endif
#ifdef SO_REUSEADDR
ret = setsockopt(s, SOL_SOCKET, SO_REUSEADDR, &x, sizeof(x));
if (ret == -1)
err(1, "setsockopt SO_REUSEADDR");
#endif
- set_common_sockopts(s);
+ set_common_sockopts(s, res0->ai_family);
if (bind(s, (struct sockaddr *)res0->ai_addr,
res0->ai_addrlen) == 0)
break;
close(s);
s = -1;
} while ((res0 = res0->ai_next) != NULL);
if (!uflag && s != -1) {
if (listen(s, 1) < 0)
err(1, "listen");
}
freeaddrinfo(res);
return (s);
}
/*
* readwrite()
* Loop that polls on the network file descriptor and stdin.
*/
void
readwrite(int net_fd)
{
struct pollfd pfd[4];
int stdin_fd = STDIN_FILENO;
int stdout_fd = STDOUT_FILENO;
unsigned char netinbuf[BUFSIZE];
size_t netinbufpos = 0;
unsigned char stdinbuf[BUFSIZE];
size_t stdinbufpos = 0;
int n, num_fds;
ssize_t ret;
/* don't read from stdin if requested */
if (dflag)
stdin_fd = -1;
/* stdin */
pfd[POLL_STDIN].fd = stdin_fd;
pfd[POLL_STDIN].events = POLLIN;
/* network out */
pfd[POLL_NETOUT].fd = net_fd;
pfd[POLL_NETOUT].events = 0;
/* network in */
pfd[POLL_NETIN].fd = net_fd;
pfd[POLL_NETIN].events = POLLIN;
/* stdout */
pfd[POLL_STDOUT].fd = stdout_fd;
pfd[POLL_STDOUT].events = 0;
while (1) {
/* both inputs are gone, buffers are empty, we are done */
if (pfd[POLL_STDIN].fd == -1 && pfd[POLL_NETIN].fd == -1
&& stdinbufpos == 0 && netinbufpos == 0) {
close(net_fd);
return;
}
/* both outputs are gone, we can't continue */
if (pfd[POLL_NETOUT].fd == -1 && pfd[POLL_STDOUT].fd == -1) {
close(net_fd);
return;
}
/* listen and net in gone, queues empty, done */
if (lflag && pfd[POLL_NETIN].fd == -1
&& stdinbufpos == 0 && netinbufpos == 0) {
close(net_fd);
return;
}
/* help says -i is for "wait between lines sent". We read and
* write arbitrary amounts of data, and we don't want to start
* scanning for newlines, so this is as good as it gets */
if (iflag)
sleep(iflag);
/* poll */
num_fds = poll(pfd, 4, timeout);
/* treat poll errors */
if (num_fds == -1) {
close(net_fd);
err(1, "polling error");
}
/* timeout happened */
if (num_fds == 0)
return;
/* treat socket error conditions */
for (n = 0; n < 4; n++) {
if (pfd[n].revents & (POLLERR|POLLNVAL)) {
pfd[n].fd = -1;
}
}
/* reading is possible after HUP */
if (pfd[POLL_STDIN].events & POLLIN &&
pfd[POLL_STDIN].revents & POLLHUP &&
! (pfd[POLL_STDIN].revents & POLLIN))
pfd[POLL_STDIN].fd = -1;
if (pfd[POLL_NETIN].events & POLLIN &&
pfd[POLL_NETIN].revents & POLLHUP &&
! (pfd[POLL_NETIN].revents & POLLIN))
pfd[POLL_NETIN].fd = -1;
if (pfd[POLL_NETOUT].revents & POLLHUP) {
if (Nflag)
shutdown(pfd[POLL_NETOUT].fd, SHUT_WR);
pfd[POLL_NETOUT].fd = -1;
}
/* if HUP, stop watching stdout */
if (pfd[POLL_STDOUT].revents & POLLHUP)
pfd[POLL_STDOUT].fd = -1;
/* if no net out, stop watching stdin */
if (pfd[POLL_NETOUT].fd == -1)
pfd[POLL_STDIN].fd = -1;
/* if no stdout, stop watching net in */
if (pfd[POLL_STDOUT].fd == -1) {
if (pfd[POLL_NETIN].fd != -1)
shutdown(pfd[POLL_NETIN].fd, SHUT_RD);
pfd[POLL_NETIN].fd = -1;
}
/* try to read from stdin */
if (pfd[POLL_STDIN].revents & POLLIN && stdinbufpos < BUFSIZE) {
ret = fillbuf(pfd[POLL_STDIN].fd, stdinbuf,
&stdinbufpos);
/* error or eof on stdin - remove from pfd */
if (ret == 0 || ret == -1)
pfd[POLL_STDIN].fd = -1;
/* read something - poll net out */
if (stdinbufpos > 0)
pfd[POLL_NETOUT].events = POLLOUT;
/* filled buffer - remove self from polling */
if (stdinbufpos == BUFSIZE)
pfd[POLL_STDIN].events = 0;
}
/* try to write to network */
if (pfd[POLL_NETOUT].revents & POLLOUT && stdinbufpos > 0) {
ret = drainbuf(pfd[POLL_NETOUT].fd, stdinbuf,
&stdinbufpos);
if (ret == -1)
pfd[POLL_NETOUT].fd = -1;
/* buffer empty - remove self from polling */
if (stdinbufpos == 0)
pfd[POLL_NETOUT].events = 0;
/* buffer no longer full - poll stdin again */
if (stdinbufpos < BUFSIZE)
pfd[POLL_STDIN].events = POLLIN;
}
/* try to read from network */
if (pfd[POLL_NETIN].revents & POLLIN && netinbufpos < BUFSIZE) {
ret = fillbuf(pfd[POLL_NETIN].fd, netinbuf,
&netinbufpos);
if (ret == -1)
pfd[POLL_NETIN].fd = -1;
/* eof on net in - remove from pfd */
if (ret == 0) {
shutdown(pfd[POLL_NETIN].fd, SHUT_RD);
pfd[POLL_NETIN].fd = -1;
}
/* read something - poll stdout */
if (netinbufpos > 0)
pfd[POLL_STDOUT].events = POLLOUT;
/* filled buffer - remove self from polling */
if (netinbufpos == BUFSIZE)
pfd[POLL_NETIN].events = 0;
/* handle telnet */
if (tflag)
atelnet(pfd[POLL_NETIN].fd, netinbuf,
netinbufpos);
}
/* try to write to stdout */
if (pfd[POLL_STDOUT].revents & POLLOUT && netinbufpos > 0) {
ret = drainbuf(pfd[POLL_STDOUT].fd, netinbuf,
&netinbufpos);
if (ret == -1)
pfd[POLL_STDOUT].fd = -1;
/* buffer empty - remove self from polling */
if (netinbufpos == 0)
pfd[POLL_STDOUT].events = 0;
/* buffer no longer full - poll net in again */
if (netinbufpos < BUFSIZE)
pfd[POLL_NETIN].events = POLLIN;
}
/* stdin gone and queue empty? */
if (pfd[POLL_STDIN].fd == -1 && stdinbufpos == 0) {
if (pfd[POLL_NETOUT].fd != -1 && Nflag)
shutdown(pfd[POLL_NETOUT].fd, SHUT_WR);
pfd[POLL_NETOUT].fd = -1;
}
/* net in gone and queue empty? */
if (pfd[POLL_NETIN].fd == -1 && netinbufpos == 0) {
pfd[POLL_STDOUT].fd = -1;
}
}
}
ssize_t
drainbuf(int fd, unsigned char *buf, size_t *bufpos)
{
ssize_t n;
ssize_t adjust;
n = write(fd, buf, *bufpos);
/* don't treat EAGAIN, EINTR as error */
if (n == -1 && (errno == EAGAIN || errno == EINTR))
n = -2;
if (n <= 0)
return n;
/* adjust buffer */
adjust = *bufpos - n;
if (adjust > 0)
memmove(buf, buf + n, adjust);
*bufpos -= n;
return n;
}
ssize_t
fillbuf(int fd, unsigned char *buf, size_t *bufpos)
{
size_t num = BUFSIZE - *bufpos;
ssize_t n;
n = read(fd, buf + *bufpos, num);
/* don't treat EAGAIN, EINTR as error */
if (n == -1 && (errno == EAGAIN || errno == EINTR))
n = -2;
if (n <= 0)
return n;
*bufpos += n;
return n;
}
/*
* fdpass()
* Pass the connected file descriptor to stdout and exit.
*/
void
fdpass(int nfd)
{
#if defined(HAVE_SENDMSG) && (defined(HAVE_ACCRIGHTS_IN_MSGHDR) || defined(HAVE_CONTROL_IN_MSGHDR))
struct msghdr msg;
#ifndef HAVE_ACCRIGHTS_IN_MSGHDR
union {
struct cmsghdr hdr;
char buf[CMSG_SPACE(sizeof(int))];
} cmsgbuf;
struct cmsghdr *cmsg;
#endif
struct iovec vec;
char ch = '\0';
struct pollfd pfd;
ssize_t r;
memset(&msg, 0, sizeof(msg));
#ifdef HAVE_ACCRIGHTS_IN_MSGHDR
msg.msg_accrights = (caddr_t)&nfd;
msg.msg_accrightslen = sizeof(nfd);
#else
memset(&cmsgbuf, 0, sizeof(cmsgbuf));
msg.msg_control = (caddr_t)&cmsgbuf.buf;
msg.msg_controllen = sizeof(cmsgbuf.buf);
cmsg = CMSG_FIRSTHDR(&msg);
cmsg->cmsg_len = CMSG_LEN(sizeof(int));
cmsg->cmsg_level = SOL_SOCKET;
cmsg->cmsg_type = SCM_RIGHTS;
*(int *)CMSG_DATA(cmsg) = nfd;
#endif
vec.iov_base = &ch;
vec.iov_len = 1;
msg.msg_iov = &vec;
msg.msg_iovlen = 1;
bzero(&pfd, sizeof(pfd));
pfd.fd = STDOUT_FILENO;
+ pfd.events = POLLOUT;
for (;;) {
r = sendmsg(STDOUT_FILENO, &msg, 0);
if (r == -1) {
if (errno == EAGAIN || errno == EINTR) {
- pfd.events = POLLOUT;
if (poll(&pfd, 1, -1) == -1)
err(1, "poll");
continue;
}
err(1, "sendmsg");
- } else if (r == -1)
+ } else if (r != 1)
errx(1, "sendmsg: unexpected return value %zd", r);
else
break;
}
exit(0);
#else
errx(1, "%s: file descriptor passing not supported", __func__);
#endif
}
/* Deal with RFC 854 WILL/WONT DO/DONT negotiation. */
void
atelnet(int nfd, unsigned char *buf, unsigned int size)
{
unsigned char *p, *end;
unsigned char obuf[4];
if (size < 3)
return;
end = buf + size - 2;
for (p = buf; p < end; p++) {
if (*p != IAC)
continue;
obuf[0] = IAC;
p++;
if ((*p == WILL) || (*p == WONT))
obuf[1] = DONT;
else if ((*p == DO) || (*p == DONT))
obuf[1] = WONT;
else
continue;
p++;
obuf[2] = *p;
if (atomicio(vwrite, nfd, obuf, 3) != 3)
warn("Write Error!");
}
}
/*
* build_ports()
* Build an array of ports in portlist[], listing each port
* that we should try to connect to.
*/
void
build_ports(char *p)
{
const char *errstr;
char *n;
int hi, lo, cp;
int x = 0;
if ((n = strchr(p, '-')) != NULL) {
*n = '\0';
n++;
/* Make sure the ports are in order: lowest->highest. */
hi = strtonum(n, 1, PORT_MAX, &errstr);
if (errstr)
errx(1, "port number %s: %s", errstr, n);
lo = strtonum(p, 1, PORT_MAX, &errstr);
if (errstr)
errx(1, "port number %s: %s", errstr, p);
if (lo > hi) {
cp = hi;
hi = lo;
lo = cp;
}
/* Load ports sequentially. */
for (cp = lo; cp <= hi; cp++) {
portlist[x] = calloc(1, PORT_MAX_LEN);
if (portlist[x] == NULL)
errx(1, "calloc");
snprintf(portlist[x], PORT_MAX_LEN, "%d", cp);
x++;
}
/* Randomly swap ports. */
if (rflag) {
int y;
char *c;
for (x = 0; x <= (hi - lo); x++) {
y = (arc4random() & 0xFFFF) % (hi - lo);
c = portlist[x];
portlist[x] = portlist[y];
portlist[y] = c;
}
}
} else {
hi = strtonum(p, 1, PORT_MAX, &errstr);
if (errstr)
errx(1, "port number %s: %s", errstr, p);
portlist[0] = strdup(p);
if (portlist[0] == NULL)
errx(1, "strdup");
}
}
/*
* udptest()
* Do a few writes to see if the UDP port is there.
* Fails once PF state table is full.
*/
int
udptest(int s)
{
int i, ret;
for (i = 0; i <= 3; i++) {
if (write(s, "X", 1) == 1)
ret = 1;
else
ret = -1;
}
return (ret);
}
void
-set_common_sockopts(int s)
+set_common_sockopts(int s, int af)
{
int x = 1;
#ifdef TCP_MD5SIG
if (Sflag) {
if (setsockopt(s, IPPROTO_TCP, TCP_MD5SIG,
&x, sizeof(x)) == -1)
err(1, "setsockopt");
}
#endif
if (Dflag) {
if (setsockopt(s, SOL_SOCKET, SO_DEBUG,
&x, sizeof(x)) == -1)
err(1, "setsockopt");
}
-#ifdef IP_TOS
+#if defined(IP_TOS) && defined(IPV6_TCLASS)
if (Tflag != -1) {
- if (setsockopt(s, IPPROTO_IP, IP_TOS,
- &Tflag, sizeof(Tflag)) == -1)
+ int proto, option;
+
+ if (af == AF_INET6) {
+ proto = IPPROTO_IPV6;
+ option = IPV6_TCLASS;
+ } else {
+ proto = IPPROTO_IP;
+ option = IP_TOS;
+ }
+
+ if (setsockopt(s, proto, option, &Tflag, sizeof(Tflag)) == -1)
err(1, "set IP ToS");
}
#endif
if (Iflag) {
if (setsockopt(s, SOL_SOCKET, SO_RCVBUF,
&Iflag, sizeof(Iflag)) == -1)
err(1, "set TCP receive buffer size");
}
if (Oflag) {
if (setsockopt(s, SOL_SOCKET, SO_SNDBUF,
&Oflag, sizeof(Oflag)) == -1)
err(1, "set TCP send buffer size");
}
}
int
map_tos(char *s, int *val)
{
#ifdef IP_TOS
/* DiffServ Codepoints and other TOS mappings */
const struct toskeywords {
const char *keyword;
int val;
} *t, toskeywords[] = {
{ "af11", IPTOS_DSCP_AF11 },
{ "af12", IPTOS_DSCP_AF12 },
{ "af13", IPTOS_DSCP_AF13 },
{ "af21", IPTOS_DSCP_AF21 },
{ "af22", IPTOS_DSCP_AF22 },
{ "af23", IPTOS_DSCP_AF23 },
{ "af31", IPTOS_DSCP_AF31 },
{ "af32", IPTOS_DSCP_AF32 },
{ "af33", IPTOS_DSCP_AF33 },
{ "af41", IPTOS_DSCP_AF41 },
{ "af42", IPTOS_DSCP_AF42 },
{ "af43", IPTOS_DSCP_AF43 },
{ "critical", IPTOS_PREC_CRITIC_ECP },
{ "cs0", IPTOS_DSCP_CS0 },
{ "cs1", IPTOS_DSCP_CS1 },
{ "cs2", IPTOS_DSCP_CS2 },
{ "cs3", IPTOS_DSCP_CS3 },
{ "cs4", IPTOS_DSCP_CS4 },
{ "cs5", IPTOS_DSCP_CS5 },
{ "cs6", IPTOS_DSCP_CS6 },
{ "cs7", IPTOS_DSCP_CS7 },
{ "ef", IPTOS_DSCP_EF },
{ "inetcontrol", IPTOS_PREC_INTERNETCONTROL },
{ "lowdelay", IPTOS_LOWDELAY },
{ "netcontrol", IPTOS_PREC_NETCONTROL },
{ "reliability", IPTOS_RELIABILITY },
{ "throughput", IPTOS_THROUGHPUT },
{ NULL, -1 },
};
for (t = toskeywords; t->keyword != NULL; t++) {
if (strcmp(s, t->keyword) == 0) {
*val = t->val;
return (1);
}
}
#endif
return (0);
}
void
report_connect(const struct sockaddr *sa, socklen_t salen)
{
char remote_host[NI_MAXHOST];
char remote_port[NI_MAXSERV];
int herr;
int flags = NI_NUMERICSERV;
if (nflag)
flags |= NI_NUMERICHOST;
if ((herr = getnameinfo(sa, salen,
remote_host, sizeof(remote_host),
remote_port, sizeof(remote_port),
flags)) != 0) {
if (herr == EAI_SYSTEM)
err(1, "getnameinfo");
else
errx(1, "getnameinfo: %s", gai_strerror(herr));
}
fprintf(stderr,
"Connection from %s %s "
"received!\n", remote_host, remote_port);
}
void
help(void)
{
usage(0);
fprintf(stderr, "\tCommand Summary:\n\
\t-4 Use IPv4\n\
\t-6 Use IPv6\n\
\t-D Enable the debug socket option\n\
\t-d Detach from stdin\n\
\t-F Pass socket fd\n\
\t-h This help text\n\
\t-I length TCP receive buffer length\n\
\t-i secs\t Delay interval for lines sent, ports scanned\n\
\t-k Keep inbound sockets open for multiple connects\n\
\t-l Listen mode, for inbound connects\n\
\t-N Shutdown the network socket after EOF on stdin\n\
\t-n Suppress name/port resolutions\n\
\t-O length TCP send buffer length\n\
\t-P proxyuser\tUsername for proxy authentication\n\
\t-p port\t Specify local port for remote connects\n\
\t-r Randomize remote ports\n\
\t-S Enable the TCP MD5 signature option\n\
\t-s addr\t Local source address\n\
\t-T toskeyword\tSet IP Type of Service\n\
\t-t Answer TELNET negotiation\n\
\t-U Use UNIX domain socket\n\
\t-u UDP mode\n\
\t-V rtable Specify alternate routing table\n\
\t-v Verbose\n\
\t-w secs\t Timeout for connects and final net reads\n\
\t-X proto Proxy protocol: \"4\", \"5\" (SOCKS) or \"connect\"\n\
\t-x addr[:port]\tSpecify proxy address and port\n\
\t-z Zero-I/O mode [used for scanning]\n\
Port numbers can be individual or ranges: lo-hi [inclusive]\n");
exit(1);
}
void
usage(int ret)
{
fprintf(stderr,
"usage: nc [-46DdFhklNnrStUuvz] [-I length] [-i interval] [-O length]\n"
- "\t [-P proxy_username] [-p source_port] [-s source] [-T ToS]\n"
+ "\t [-P proxy_username] [-p source_port] [-s source] [-T toskeyword]\n"
"\t [-V rtable] [-w timeout] [-X proxy_protocol]\n"
"\t [-x proxy_address[:port]] [destination] [port]\n");
if (ret)
exit(1);
}
/* *** src/usr.bin/nc/socks.c *** */
/* $OpenBSD: socks.c,v 1.20 2012/03/08 09:56:28 espie Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 1999 Niklas Hallqvist. All rights reserved.
* Copyright (c) 2004, 2005 Damien Miller. All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
* OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
* IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
* INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
* NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
* DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
* THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
* (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
* THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
*/
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/socket.h>
#include <netinet/in.h>
#include <arpa/inet.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include <netdb.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <resolv.h>
#define SOCKS_PORT "1080"
#define HTTP_PROXY_PORT "3128"
#define HTTP_MAXHDRS 64
#define SOCKS_V5 5
#define SOCKS_V4 4
#define SOCKS_NOAUTH 0
#define SOCKS_NOMETHOD 0xff
#define SOCKS_CONNECT 1
#define SOCKS_IPV4 1
#define SOCKS_DOMAIN 3
#define SOCKS_IPV6 4
int remote_connect(const char *, const char *, struct addrinfo);
int socks_connect(const char *, const char *, struct addrinfo,
const char *, const char *, struct addrinfo, int,
const char *);
static int
decode_addrport(const char *h, const char *p, struct sockaddr *addr,
socklen_t addrlen, int v4only, int numeric)
{
int r;
struct addrinfo hints, *res;
bzero(&hints, sizeof(hints));
hints.ai_family = v4only ? PF_INET : PF_UNSPEC;
hints.ai_flags = numeric ? AI_NUMERICHOST : 0;
hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM;
r = getaddrinfo(h, p, &hints, &res);
/* Don't fatal when attempting to convert a numeric address */
if (r != 0) {
if (!numeric) {
errx(1, "getaddrinfo(\"%.64s\", \"%.64s\"): %s", h, p,
gai_strerror(r));
}
return (-1);
}
if (addrlen < res->ai_addrlen) {
freeaddrinfo(res);
errx(1, "internal error: addrlen < res->ai_addrlen");
}
memcpy(addr, res->ai_addr, res->ai_addrlen);
freeaddrinfo(res);
return (0);
}
static int
proxy_read_line(int fd, char *buf, size_t bufsz)
{
size_t off;
for(off = 0;;) {
if (off >= bufsz)
errx(1, "proxy read too long");
if (atomicio(read, fd, buf + off, 1) != 1)
err(1, "proxy read");
/* Skip CR */
if (buf[off] == '\r')
continue;
if (buf[off] == '\n') {
buf[off] = '\0';
break;
}
off++;
}
return (off);
}
static const char *
getproxypass(const char *proxyuser, const char *proxyhost)
{
char prompt[512];
static char pw[256];
snprintf(prompt, sizeof(prompt), "Proxy password for %s@%s: ",
proxyuser, proxyhost);
if (readpassphrase(prompt, pw, sizeof(pw), RPP_REQUIRE_TTY) == NULL)
errx(1, "Unable to read proxy passphrase");
return (pw);
}
int
socks_connect(const char *host, const char *port,
struct addrinfo hints __attribute__ ((__unused__)),
const char *proxyhost, const char *proxyport, struct addrinfo proxyhints,
int socksv, const char *proxyuser)
{
int proxyfd, r, authretry = 0;
size_t hlen, wlen = 0;
unsigned char buf[1024];
size_t cnt;
struct sockaddr_storage addr;
struct sockaddr_in *in4 = (struct sockaddr_in *)&addr;
struct sockaddr_in6 *in6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)&addr;
in_port_t serverport;
const char *proxypass = NULL;
if (proxyport == NULL)
proxyport = (socksv == -1) ? HTTP_PROXY_PORT : SOCKS_PORT;
/* Abuse API to lookup port */
if (decode_addrport("0.0.0.0", port, (struct sockaddr *)&addr,
sizeof(addr), 1, 1) == -1)
errx(1, "unknown port \"%.64s\"", port);
serverport = in4->sin_port;
again:
if (authretry++ > 3)
errx(1, "Too many authentication failures");
proxyfd = remote_connect(proxyhost, proxyport, proxyhints);
if (proxyfd < 0)
return (-1);
if (socksv == 5) {
if (decode_addrport(host, port, (struct sockaddr *)&addr,
sizeof(addr), 0, 1) == -1)
addr.ss_family = 0; /* used in switch below */
/* Version 5, one method: no authentication */
buf[0] = SOCKS_V5;
buf[1] = 1;
buf[2] = SOCKS_NOAUTH;
cnt = atomicio(vwrite, proxyfd, buf, 3);
if (cnt != 3)
err(1, "write failed (%zu/3)", cnt);
cnt = atomicio(read, proxyfd, buf, 2);
if (cnt != 2)
err(1, "read failed (%zu/3)", cnt);
if (buf[1] == SOCKS_NOMETHOD)
errx(1, "authentication method negotiation failed");
switch (addr.ss_family) {
case 0:
/* Version 5, connect: domain name */
/* Max domain name length is 255 bytes */
hlen = strlen(host);
if (hlen > 255)
errx(1, "host name too long for SOCKS5");
buf[0] = SOCKS_V5;
buf[1] = SOCKS_CONNECT;
buf[2] = 0;
buf[3] = SOCKS_DOMAIN;
buf[4] = hlen;
memcpy(buf + 5, host, hlen);
memcpy(buf + 5 + hlen, &serverport, sizeof serverport);
wlen = 7 + hlen;
break;
case AF_INET:
/* Version 5, connect: IPv4 address */
buf[0] = SOCKS_V5;
buf[1] = SOCKS_CONNECT;
buf[2] = 0;
buf[3] = SOCKS_IPV4;
memcpy(buf + 4, &in4->sin_addr, sizeof in4->sin_addr);
memcpy(buf + 8, &in4->sin_port, sizeof in4->sin_port);
wlen = 10;
break;
case AF_INET6:
/* Version 5, connect: IPv6 address */
buf[0] = SOCKS_V5;
buf[1] = SOCKS_CONNECT;
buf[2] = 0;
buf[3] = SOCKS_IPV6;
memcpy(buf + 4, &in6->sin6_addr, sizeof in6->sin6_addr);
memcpy(buf + 20, &in6->sin6_port,
sizeof in6->sin6_port);
wlen = 22;
break;
default:
errx(1, "internal error: silly AF");
}
cnt = atomicio(vwrite, proxyfd, buf, wlen);
if (cnt != wlen)
err(1, "write failed (%zu/%zu)", cnt, wlen);
cnt = atomicio(read, proxyfd, buf, 4);
if (cnt != 4)
err(1, "read failed (%zu/4)", cnt);
if (buf[1] != 0)
errx(1, "connection failed, SOCKS error %d", buf[1]);
switch (buf[3]) {
case SOCKS_IPV4:
cnt = atomicio(read, proxyfd, buf + 4, 6);
if (cnt != 6)
err(1, "read failed (%zu/6)", cnt);
break;
case SOCKS_IPV6:
cnt = atomicio(read, proxyfd, buf + 4, 18);
if (cnt != 18)
err(1, "read failed (%zu/18)", cnt);
break;
default:
errx(1, "connection failed, unsupported address type");
}
} else if (socksv == 4) {
/* This will exit on lookup failure */
decode_addrport(host, port, (struct sockaddr *)&addr,
sizeof(addr), 1, 0);
/* Version 4 */
buf[0] = SOCKS_V4;
buf[1] = SOCKS_CONNECT; /* connect */
memcpy(buf + 2, &in4->sin_port, sizeof in4->sin_port);
memcpy(buf + 4, &in4->sin_addr, sizeof in4->sin_addr);
buf[8] = 0; /* empty username */
wlen = 9;
cnt = atomicio(vwrite, proxyfd, buf, wlen);
if (cnt != wlen)
err(1, "write failed (%zu/%zu)", cnt, wlen);
cnt = atomicio(read, proxyfd, buf, 8);
if (cnt != 8)
err(1, "read failed (%zu/8)", cnt);
if (buf[1] != 90)
errx(1, "connection failed, SOCKS error %d", buf[1]);
} else if (socksv == -1) {
/* HTTP proxy CONNECT */
/* Disallow bad chars in hostname */
if (strcspn(host, "\r\n\t []:") != strlen(host))
errx(1, "Invalid hostname");
/* Try to be sane about numeric IPv6 addresses */
if (strchr(host, ':') != NULL) {
r = snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf),
"CONNECT [%s]:%d HTTP/1.0\r\n",
host, ntohs(serverport));
} else {
r = snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf),
"CONNECT %s:%d HTTP/1.0\r\n",
host, ntohs(serverport));
}
if (r == -1 || (size_t)r >= sizeof(buf))
errx(1, "hostname too long");
r = strlen(buf);
cnt = atomicio(vwrite, proxyfd, buf, r);
if (cnt != (size_t)r)
err(1, "write failed (%zu/%d)", cnt, r);
if (authretry > 1) {
char resp[1024];
proxypass = getproxypass(proxyuser, proxyhost);
r = snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%s:%s",
proxyuser, proxypass);
if (r == -1 || (size_t)r >= sizeof(buf) ||
b64_ntop(buf, strlen(buf), resp,
sizeof(resp)) == -1)
errx(1, "Proxy username/password too long");
r = snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "Proxy-Authorization: "
"Basic %s\r\n", resp);
if (r == -1 || (size_t)r >= sizeof(buf))
errx(1, "Proxy auth response too long");
r = strlen(buf);
if ((cnt = atomicio(vwrite, proxyfd, buf, r)) != (size_t)r)
err(1, "write failed (%zu/%d)", cnt, r);
}
/* Terminate headers */
if ((r = atomicio(vwrite, proxyfd, "\r\n", 2)) != 2)
err(1, "write failed (2/%d)", r);
/* Read status reply */
proxy_read_line(proxyfd, buf, sizeof(buf));
if (proxyuser != NULL &&
strncmp(buf, "HTTP/1.0 407 ", 12) == 0) {
if (authretry > 1) {
fprintf(stderr, "Proxy authentication "
"failed\n");
}
close(proxyfd);
goto again;
} else if (strncmp(buf, "HTTP/1.0 200 ", 12) != 0 &&
strncmp(buf, "HTTP/1.1 200 ", 12) != 0)
errx(1, "Proxy error: \"%s\"", buf);
/* Headers continue until we hit an empty line */
for (r = 0; r < HTTP_MAXHDRS; r++) {
proxy_read_line(proxyfd, buf, sizeof(buf));
if (*buf == '\0')
break;
}
if (*buf != '\0')
errx(1, "Too many proxy headers received");
} else
errx(1, "Unknown proxy protocol %d", socksv);
return (proxyfd);
}
diff --git a/regress/percent.sh b/regress/percent.sh
index 2e891f693873..28781117e576 100644
--- a/regress/percent.sh
+++ b/regress/percent.sh
@@ -1,88 +1,119 @@
-# $OpenBSD: percent.sh,v 1.6 2020/04/10 00:54:03 dtucker Exp $
+# $OpenBSD: percent.sh,v 1.9 2020/07/17 07:10:24 dtucker Exp $
# Placed in the Public Domain.
tid="percent expansions"
if [ -x "/usr/xpg4/bin/id" ]; then
PATH=/usr/xpg4/bin:$PATH
export PATH
fi
USER=`id -u -n`
USERID=`id -u`
HOST=`hostname | cut -f1 -d.`
HOSTNAME=`hostname`
# Localcommand is evaluated after connection because %T is not available
# until then. Because of this we use a different method of exercising it,
# and we can't override the remote user otherwise authentication will fail.
# We also have to explicitly enable it.
echo "permitlocalcommand yes" >> $OBJ/ssh_proxy
trial()
{
opt="$1"; arg="$2"; expect="$3"
trace "test $opt=$arg $expect"
rm -f $OBJ/actual
+ got=""
case "$opt" in
localcommand)
${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy -o $opt="echo '$arg' >$OBJ/actual" \
somehost true
got=`cat $OBJ/actual`
;;
+ userknownhostsfile)
+ # Move the userknownhosts file to what the expansion says,
+ # make sure ssh works then put it back.
+ mv "$OBJ/known_hosts" "$OBJ/$expect"
+ ${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy -o $opt="$OBJ/$arg" somehost true && \
+ got="$expect"
+ mv "$OBJ/$expect" "$OBJ/known_hosts"
+ ;;
matchexec)
(cat $OBJ/ssh_proxy && \
echo "Match Exec \"echo '$arg' >$OBJ/actual\"") \
>$OBJ/ssh_proxy_match
${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy_match remuser@somehost true || true
got=`cat $OBJ/actual`
;;
*forward)
# LocalForward and RemoteForward take two args and only
# operate on Unix domain socket paths
got=`${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy -o $opt="/$arg /$arg" -G \
remuser@somehost | awk '$1=="'$opt'"{print $2" "$3}'`
expect="/$expect /$expect"
;;
*)
got=`${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy -o $opt="$arg" -G \
remuser@somehost | awk '$1=="'$opt'"{print $2}'`
esac
if [ "$got" != "$expect" ]; then
fail "$opt=$arg expect $expect got $got"
fi
}
for i in matchexec localcommand remotecommand controlpath identityagent \
- forwardagent localforward remoteforward; do
- verbose $tid $i
- if [ "$i" = "localcommand" ]; then
- REMUSER=$USER
+ forwardagent localforward remoteforward userknownhostsfile; do
+ verbose $tid $i percent
+ case "$i" in
+ localcommand|userknownhostsfile)
+ # Any test that's going to actually make a connection needs
+ # to use the real username.
+ REMUSER=$USER ;;
+ *)
+ REMUSER=remuser ;;
+ esac
+ if [ "$i" = "$localcommand" ]; then
trial $i '%T' NONE
- else
- REMUSER=remuser
fi
# Matches implementation in readconf.c:ssh_connection_hash()
HASH=`printf "${HOSTNAME}127.0.0.1${PORT}$REMUSER" |
openssl sha1 | cut -f2 -d' '`
trial $i '%%' '%'
trial $i '%C' $HASH
trial $i '%i' $USERID
trial $i '%h' 127.0.0.1
- trial $i '%d' $HOME
trial $i '%L' $HOST
trial $i '%l' $HOSTNAME
trial $i '%n' somehost
+ trial $i '%k' localhost-with-alias
trial $i '%p' $PORT
trial $i '%r' $REMUSER
trial $i '%u' $USER
- trial $i '%%/%C/%i/%h/%d/%L/%l/%n/%p/%r/%u' \
- "%/$HASH/$USERID/127.0.0.1/$HOME/$HOST/$HOSTNAME/somehost/$PORT/$REMUSER/$USER"
+ # We can't specify a full path outside the regress dir, so skip tests
+ # containing %d for UserKnownHostsFile
+ if [ "$i" != "userknownhostsfile" ]; then
+ trial $i '%d' $HOME
+ trial $i '%%/%C/%i/%h/%d/%L/%l/%n/%p/%r/%u' \
+ "%/$HASH/$USERID/127.0.0.1/$HOME/$HOST/$HOSTNAME/somehost/$PORT/$REMUSER/$USER"
+ fi
done
+# Subset of above since we don't expand shell-style variables on anything that
+# runs a command because the shell will expand those.
+for i in controlpath identityagent forwardagent localforward remoteforward \
+ userknownhostsfile; do
+ verbose $tid $i dollar
+ FOO=bar
+ export FOO
+ trial $i '${FOO}' $FOO
+done
+
+
# A subset of options support tilde expansion
for i in controlpath identityagent forwardagent; do
+ verbose $tid $i tilde
trial $i '~' $HOME/
trial $i '~/.ssh' $HOME/.ssh
done
diff --git a/regress/servcfginclude.sh b/regress/servcfginclude.sh
index b25c8faa8509..b6a9a248ff2b 100644
--- a/regress/servcfginclude.sh
+++ b/regress/servcfginclude.sh
@@ -1,154 +1,188 @@
# Placed in the Public Domain.
tid="server config include"
cat > $OBJ/sshd_config.i << _EOF
HostKey $OBJ/host.ssh-ed25519
Match host a
Banner /aa
Match host b
Banner /bb
Include $OBJ/sshd_config.i.*
Match host c
Include $OBJ/sshd_config.i.*
Banner /cc
Match host m
Include $OBJ/sshd_config.i.*
Match Host d
Banner /dd
Match Host e
Banner /ee
Include $OBJ/sshd_config.i.*
Match Host f
Include $OBJ/sshd_config.i.*
Banner /ff
Match Host n
Include $OBJ/sshd_config.i.*
_EOF
cat > $OBJ/sshd_config.i.0 << _EOF
Match host xxxxxx
_EOF
cat > $OBJ/sshd_config.i.1 << _EOF
Match host a
Banner /aaa
Match host b
Banner /bbb
Match host c
Banner /ccc
Match Host d
Banner /ddd
Match Host e
Banner /eee
Match Host f
Banner /fff
_EOF
cat > $OBJ/sshd_config.i.2 << _EOF
Match host a
Banner /aaaa
Match host b
Banner /bbbb
Match host c
Banner /cccc
Match Host d
Banner /dddd
Match Host e
Banner /eeee
Match Host f
Banner /ffff
Match all
Banner /xxxx
_EOF
trial() {
_host="$1"
_exp="$2"
_desc="$3"
test -z "$_desc" && _desc="test match"
trace "$_desc host=$_host expect=$_exp"
${SUDO} ${REAL_SSHD} -f $OBJ/sshd_config.i -T \
-C "host=$_host,user=test,addr=127.0.0.1" > $OBJ/sshd_config.out ||
fatal "ssh config parse failed: $_desc host=$_host expect=$_exp"
_got=`grep -i '^banner ' $OBJ/sshd_config.out | awk '{print $2}'`
if test "x$_exp" != "x$_got" ; then
fail "$desc_ host $_host include fail: expected $_exp got $_got"
fi
}
trial a /aa
trial b /bb
trial c /ccc
trial d /dd
trial e /ee
trial f /fff
trial m /xxxx
trial n /xxxx
trial x none
# Prepare an included config with an error.
cat > $OBJ/sshd_config.i.3 << _EOF
Banner xxxx
Junk
_EOF
trace "disallow invalid config host=a"
${SUDO} ${REAL_SSHD} -f $OBJ/sshd_config.i \
-C "host=a,user=test,addr=127.0.0.1" 2>/dev/null && \
fail "sshd include allowed invalid config"
trace "disallow invalid config host=x"
${SUDO} ${REAL_SSHD} -f $OBJ/sshd_config.i \
-C "host=x,user=test,addr=127.0.0.1" 2>/dev/null && \
fail "sshd include allowed invalid config"
rm -f $OBJ/sshd_config.i.*
# Ensure that a missing include is not fatal.
cat > $OBJ/sshd_config.i << _EOF
HostKey $OBJ/host.ssh-ed25519
Include $OBJ/sshd_config.i.*
Banner /aa
_EOF
trial a /aa "missing include non-fatal"
# Ensure that Match/Host in an included config does not affect parent.
cat > $OBJ/sshd_config.i.x << _EOF
Match host x
_EOF
trial a /aa "included file does not affect match state"
# Ensure the empty include directive is not accepted
cat > $OBJ/sshd_config.i.x << _EOF
Include
_EOF
trace "disallow invalid with no argument"
-${SUDO} ${REAL_SSHD} -f $OBJ/sshd_config.i.x \
+${SUDO} ${REAL_SSHD} -f $OBJ/sshd_config.i.x -T \
-C "host=x,user=test,addr=127.0.0.1" 2>/dev/null && \
fail "sshd allowed Include with no argument"
+# Ensure the Include before any Match block works as expected (bug #3122)
+cat > $OBJ/sshd_config.i << _EOF
+Banner /xx
+HostKey $OBJ/host.ssh-ed25519
+Include $OBJ/sshd_config.i.2
+Match host a
+ Banner /aaaa
+_EOF
+cat > $OBJ/sshd_config.i.2 << _EOF
+Match host a
+ Banner /aa
+_EOF
+
+trace "Include before match blocks"
+trial a /aa "included file before match blocks is properly evaluated"
+
+# Port in included file is correctly interpretted (bug #3169)
+cat > $OBJ/sshd_config.i << _EOF
+Include $OBJ/sshd_config.i.2
+Port 7722
+_EOF
+cat > $OBJ/sshd_config.i.2 << _EOF
+HostKey $OBJ/host.ssh-ed25519
+_EOF
+
+trace "Port after included files"
+${SUDO} ${REAL_SSHD} -f $OBJ/sshd_config.i -T \
+ -C "host=x,user=test,addr=127.0.0.1" > $OBJ/sshd_config.out || \
+ fail "failed to parse Port after included files"
+_port=`grep -i '^port ' $OBJ/sshd_config.out | awk '{print $2}'`
+if test "x7722" != "x$_port" ; then
+ fail "The Port in included file was intertepretted wrongly. Expected 7722, got $_port"
+fi
+
# cleanup
rm -f $OBJ/sshd_config.i $OBJ/sshd_config.i.* $OBJ/sshd_config.out
diff --git a/regress/unittests/Makefile b/regress/unittests/Makefile
index 4e56e1104562..4d26b74770e2 100644
--- a/regress/unittests/Makefile
+++ b/regress/unittests/Makefile
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
-# $OpenBSD: Makefile,v 1.11 2019/04/28 22:53:26 dtucker Exp $
+# $OpenBSD: Makefile,v 1.12 2020/06/19 04:34:21 djm Exp $
REGRESS_FAIL_EARLY?= yes
SUBDIR= test_helper sshbuf sshkey bitmap kex hostkeys utf8 match conversion
-SUBDIR+=authopt misc
+SUBDIR+=authopt misc sshsig
.include <bsd.subdir.mk>
diff --git a/regress/unittests/match/tests.c b/regress/unittests/match/tests.c
index 3d9af55f2849..4fefaf4f3756 100644
--- a/regress/unittests/match/tests.c
+++ b/regress/unittests/match/tests.c
@@ -1,132 +1,132 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: tests.c,v 1.5 2018/07/04 13:51:45 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: tests.c,v 1.7 2020/07/15 06:43:16 dtucker Exp $ */
/*
* Regress test for matching functions
*
* Placed in the public domain
*/
#include "includes.h"
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/param.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#ifdef HAVE_STDINT_H
#include <stdint.h>
#endif
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include "../test_helper/test_helper.h"
#include "match.h"
void
tests(void)
{
TEST_START("match_pattern");
ASSERT_INT_EQ(match_pattern("", ""), 1);
ASSERT_INT_EQ(match_pattern("", "aaa"), 0);
ASSERT_INT_EQ(match_pattern("aaa", ""), 0);
ASSERT_INT_EQ(match_pattern("aaa", "aaaa"), 0);
ASSERT_INT_EQ(match_pattern("aaaa", "aaa"), 0);
TEST_DONE();
TEST_START("match_pattern wildcard");
ASSERT_INT_EQ(match_pattern("", "*"), 1);
ASSERT_INT_EQ(match_pattern("a", "?"), 1);
ASSERT_INT_EQ(match_pattern("aa", "a?"), 1);
ASSERT_INT_EQ(match_pattern("a", "*"), 1);
ASSERT_INT_EQ(match_pattern("aa", "a*"), 1);
ASSERT_INT_EQ(match_pattern("aa", "?*"), 1);
ASSERT_INT_EQ(match_pattern("aa", "**"), 1);
ASSERT_INT_EQ(match_pattern("aa", "?a"), 1);
ASSERT_INT_EQ(match_pattern("aa", "*a"), 1);
ASSERT_INT_EQ(match_pattern("ba", "a?"), 0);
ASSERT_INT_EQ(match_pattern("ba", "a*"), 0);
ASSERT_INT_EQ(match_pattern("ab", "?a"), 0);
ASSERT_INT_EQ(match_pattern("ab", "*a"), 0);
TEST_DONE();
TEST_START("match_pattern_list");
ASSERT_INT_EQ(match_pattern_list("", "", 0), 0); /* no patterns */
ASSERT_INT_EQ(match_pattern_list("", "*", 0), 1);
ASSERT_INT_EQ(match_pattern_list("", "!*", 0), -1);
ASSERT_INT_EQ(match_pattern_list("", "!a,*", 0), 1);
ASSERT_INT_EQ(match_pattern_list("", "*,!a", 0), 1);
ASSERT_INT_EQ(match_pattern_list("", "a,!*", 0), -1);
ASSERT_INT_EQ(match_pattern_list("", "!*,a", 0), -1);
ASSERT_INT_EQ(match_pattern_list("a", "", 0), 0);
ASSERT_INT_EQ(match_pattern_list("a", "*", 0), 1);
ASSERT_INT_EQ(match_pattern_list("a", "!*", 0), -1);
ASSERT_INT_EQ(match_pattern_list("a", "!a", 0), -1);
/* XXX negated ASSERT_INT_EQ(match_pattern_list("a", "!b", 0), 1); */
ASSERT_INT_EQ(match_pattern_list("a", "!a,*", 0), -1);
ASSERT_INT_EQ(match_pattern_list("b", "!a,*", 0), 1);
ASSERT_INT_EQ(match_pattern_list("a", "*,!a", 0), -1);
ASSERT_INT_EQ(match_pattern_list("b", "*,!a", 0), 1);
ASSERT_INT_EQ(match_pattern_list("a", "a,!*", 0), -1);
ASSERT_INT_EQ(match_pattern_list("b", "a,!*", 0), -1);
ASSERT_INT_EQ(match_pattern_list("a", "a,!a", 0), -1);
/* XXX negated ASSERT_INT_EQ(match_pattern_list("b", "a,!a", 0), 1); */
ASSERT_INT_EQ(match_pattern_list("a", "!*,a", 0), -1);
ASSERT_INT_EQ(match_pattern_list("b", "!*,a", 0), -1);
TEST_DONE();
TEST_START("match_pattern_list lowercase");
ASSERT_INT_EQ(match_pattern_list("abc", "ABC", 0), 0);
ASSERT_INT_EQ(match_pattern_list("ABC", "abc", 0), 0);
ASSERT_INT_EQ(match_pattern_list("abc", "ABC", 1), 1);
ASSERT_INT_EQ(match_pattern_list("ABC", "abc", 1), 0);
TEST_DONE();
TEST_START("addr_match_list");
ASSERT_INT_EQ(addr_match_list("127.0.0.1", "127.0.0.1/44"), -2);
ASSERT_INT_EQ(addr_match_list(NULL, "127.0.0.1/44"), -2);
ASSERT_INT_EQ(addr_match_list("a", "*"), 0);
ASSERT_INT_EQ(addr_match_list("127.0.0.1", "*"), 1);
ASSERT_INT_EQ(addr_match_list(NULL, "*"), 0);
ASSERT_INT_EQ(addr_match_list("127.0.0.1", "127.0.0.1"), 1);
ASSERT_INT_EQ(addr_match_list("127.0.0.1", "127.0.0.2"), 0);
ASSERT_INT_EQ(addr_match_list("127.0.0.1", "!127.0.0.1"), -1);
/* XXX negated ASSERT_INT_EQ(addr_match_list("127.0.0.1", "!127.0.0.2"), 1); */
ASSERT_INT_EQ(addr_match_list("127.0.0.255", "127.0.0.0/24"), 1);
ASSERT_INT_EQ(addr_match_list("127.0.1.1", "127.0.0.0/24"), 0);
ASSERT_INT_EQ(addr_match_list("127.0.0.1", "127.0.0.0/24"), 1);
ASSERT_INT_EQ(addr_match_list("127.0.0.1", "127.0.1.0/24"), 0);
ASSERT_INT_EQ(addr_match_list("127.0.0.1", "!127.0.0.0/24"), -1);
/* XXX negated ASSERT_INT_EQ(addr_match_list("127.0.0.1", "!127.0.1.0/24"), 1); */
ASSERT_INT_EQ(addr_match_list("127.0.0.1", "10.0.0.1,!127.0.0.1"), -1);
ASSERT_INT_EQ(addr_match_list("127.0.0.1", "!127.0.0.1,10.0.0.1"), -1);
ASSERT_INT_EQ(addr_match_list("127.0.0.1", "10.0.0.1,127.0.0.2"), 0);
ASSERT_INT_EQ(addr_match_list("127.0.0.1", "127.0.0.2,10.0.0.1"), 0);
/* XXX negated ASSERT_INT_EQ(addr_match_list("127.0.0.1", "10.0.0.1,!127.0.0.2"), 1); */
/* XXX negated ASSERT_INT_EQ(addr_match_list("127.0.0.1", "!127.0.0.2,10.0.0.1"), 1); */
TEST_DONE();
#define CHECK_FILTER(string,filter,expected) \
do { \
- char *result = match_filter_blacklist((string), (filter)); \
+ char *result = match_filter_denylist((string), (filter)); \
ASSERT_STRING_EQ(result, expected); \
free(result); \
} while (0)
TEST_START("match_filter_list");
CHECK_FILTER("a,b,c", "", "a,b,c");
CHECK_FILTER("a,b,c", "a", "b,c");
CHECK_FILTER("a,b,c", "b", "a,c");
CHECK_FILTER("a,b,c", "c", "a,b");
CHECK_FILTER("a,b,c", "a,b", "c");
CHECK_FILTER("a,b,c", "a,c", "b");
CHECK_FILTER("a,b,c", "b,c", "a");
CHECK_FILTER("a,b,c", "a,b,c", "");
CHECK_FILTER("a,b,c", "b,c", "a");
CHECK_FILTER("", "a,b,c", "");
TEST_DONE();
/*
* XXX TODO
* int match_host_and_ip(const char *, const char *, const char *);
* int match_user(const char *, const char *, const char *, const char *);
* char *match_list(const char *, const char *, u_int *);
* int addr_match_cidr_list(const char *, const char *);
*/
}
diff --git a/regress/unittests/misc/tests.c b/regress/unittests/misc/tests.c
index ed775ebbd9d2..0bd0c84f9612 100644
--- a/regress/unittests/misc/tests.c
+++ b/regress/unittests/misc/tests.c
@@ -1,79 +1,161 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: tests.c,v 1.1 2019/04/28 22:53:26 dtucker Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: tests.c,v 1.3 2020/05/29 04:32:26 dtucker Exp $ */
/*
* Regress test for misc helper functions.
*
* Placed in the public domain.
*/
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/param.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdint.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include "test_helper.h"
+#include "log.h"
#include "misc.h"
void
tests(void)
{
- int port;
- char *user, *host, *path;
+ int port, parseerr;
+ char *user, *host, *path, *ret;
TEST_START("misc_parse_user_host_path");
ASSERT_INT_EQ(parse_user_host_path("someuser@some.host:some/path",
&user, &host, &path), 0);
ASSERT_STRING_EQ(user, "someuser");
ASSERT_STRING_EQ(host, "some.host");
ASSERT_STRING_EQ(path, "some/path");
free(user); free(host); free(path);
TEST_DONE();
TEST_START("misc_parse_user_ipv4_path");
ASSERT_INT_EQ(parse_user_host_path("someuser@1.22.33.144:some/path",
&user, &host, &path), 0);
ASSERT_STRING_EQ(user, "someuser");
ASSERT_STRING_EQ(host, "1.22.33.144");
ASSERT_STRING_EQ(path, "some/path");
free(user); free(host); free(path);
TEST_DONE();
TEST_START("misc_parse_user_[ipv4]_path");
ASSERT_INT_EQ(parse_user_host_path("someuser@[1.22.33.144]:some/path",
&user, &host, &path), 0);
ASSERT_STRING_EQ(user, "someuser");
ASSERT_STRING_EQ(host, "1.22.33.144");
ASSERT_STRING_EQ(path, "some/path");
free(user); free(host); free(path);
TEST_DONE();
TEST_START("misc_parse_user_[ipv4]_nopath");
ASSERT_INT_EQ(parse_user_host_path("someuser@[1.22.33.144]:",
&user, &host, &path), 0);
ASSERT_STRING_EQ(user, "someuser");
ASSERT_STRING_EQ(host, "1.22.33.144");
ASSERT_STRING_EQ(path, ".");
free(user); free(host); free(path);
TEST_DONE();
TEST_START("misc_parse_user_ipv6_path");
ASSERT_INT_EQ(parse_user_host_path("someuser@[::1]:some/path",
&user, &host, &path), 0);
ASSERT_STRING_EQ(user, "someuser");
ASSERT_STRING_EQ(host, "::1");
ASSERT_STRING_EQ(path, "some/path");
free(user); free(host); free(path);
TEST_DONE();
TEST_START("misc_parse_uri");
ASSERT_INT_EQ(parse_uri("ssh", "ssh://someuser@some.host:22/some/path",
&user, &host, &port, &path), 0);
ASSERT_STRING_EQ(user, "someuser");
ASSERT_STRING_EQ(host, "some.host");
ASSERT_INT_EQ(port, 22);
ASSERT_STRING_EQ(path, "some/path");
free(user); free(host); free(path);
TEST_DONE();
+
+ TEST_START("misc_convtime");
+ ASSERT_LONG_EQ(convtime("1"), 1);
+ ASSERT_LONG_EQ(convtime("2s"), 2);
+ ASSERT_LONG_EQ(convtime("3m"), 180);
+ ASSERT_LONG_EQ(convtime("1m30"), 90);
+ ASSERT_LONG_EQ(convtime("1m30s"), 90);
+ ASSERT_LONG_EQ(convtime("1h1s"), 3601);
+ ASSERT_LONG_EQ(convtime("1h30m"), 90 * 60);
+ ASSERT_LONG_EQ(convtime("1d"), 24 * 60 * 60);
+ ASSERT_LONG_EQ(convtime("1w"), 7 * 24 * 60 * 60);
+ ASSERT_LONG_EQ(convtime("1w2d3h4m5"), 788645);
+ ASSERT_LONG_EQ(convtime("1w2d3h4m5s"), 788645);
+ /* any negative number or error returns -1 */
+ ASSERT_LONG_EQ(convtime("-1"), -1);
+ ASSERT_LONG_EQ(convtime(""), -1);
+ ASSERT_LONG_EQ(convtime("trout"), -1);
+ ASSERT_LONG_EQ(convtime("-77"), -1);
+ TEST_DONE();
+
+ TEST_START("dollar_expand");
+ if (setenv("FOO", "bar", 1) != 0)
+ abort();
+ if (setenv("BAR", "baz", 1) != 0)
+ abort();
+ if (unsetenv("BAZ") != 0)
+ abort();
+#define ASSERT_DOLLAR_EQ(x, y) do { \
+ char *str = dollar_expand(NULL, (x)); \
+ ASSERT_STRING_EQ(str, (y)); \
+ free(str); \
+} while(0)
+ ASSERT_DOLLAR_EQ("${FOO}", "bar");
+ ASSERT_DOLLAR_EQ(" ${FOO}", " bar");
+ ASSERT_DOLLAR_EQ("${FOO} ", "bar ");
+ ASSERT_DOLLAR_EQ(" ${FOO} ", " bar ");
+ ASSERT_DOLLAR_EQ("${FOO}${BAR}", "barbaz");
+ ASSERT_DOLLAR_EQ(" ${FOO} ${BAR}", " bar baz");
+ ASSERT_DOLLAR_EQ("${FOO}${BAR} ", "barbaz ");
+ ASSERT_DOLLAR_EQ(" ${FOO} ${BAR} ", " bar baz ");
+ ASSERT_DOLLAR_EQ("$", "$");
+ ASSERT_DOLLAR_EQ(" $", " $");
+ ASSERT_DOLLAR_EQ("$ ", "$ ");
+
+ /* suppress error messages for error handing tests */
+ log_init("test_misc", SYSLOG_LEVEL_QUIET, SYSLOG_FACILITY_AUTH, 1);
+ /* error checking, non existent variable */
+ ret = dollar_expand(&parseerr, "a${BAZ}");
+ ASSERT_PTR_EQ(ret, NULL); ASSERT_INT_EQ(parseerr, 0);
+ ret = dollar_expand(&parseerr, "${BAZ}b");
+ ASSERT_PTR_EQ(ret, NULL); ASSERT_INT_EQ(parseerr, 0);
+ ret = dollar_expand(&parseerr, "a${BAZ}b");
+ ASSERT_PTR_EQ(ret, NULL); ASSERT_INT_EQ(parseerr, 0);
+ /* invalid format */
+ ret = dollar_expand(&parseerr, "${");
+ ASSERT_PTR_EQ(ret, NULL); ASSERT_INT_EQ(parseerr, 1);
+ ret = dollar_expand(&parseerr, "${F");
+ ASSERT_PTR_EQ(ret, NULL); ASSERT_INT_EQ(parseerr, 1);
+ ret = dollar_expand(&parseerr, "${FO");
+ ASSERT_PTR_EQ(ret, NULL); ASSERT_INT_EQ(parseerr, 1);
+ /* empty variable name */
+ ret = dollar_expand(&parseerr, "${}");
+ ASSERT_PTR_EQ(ret, NULL); ASSERT_INT_EQ(parseerr, 1);
+ /* restore loglevel to default */
+ log_init("test_misc", SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO, SYSLOG_FACILITY_AUTH, 1);
+ TEST_DONE();
+
+ TEST_START("percent_expand");
+ ASSERT_STRING_EQ(percent_expand("%%", "%h", "foo", NULL), "%");
+ ASSERT_STRING_EQ(percent_expand("%h", "h", "foo", NULL), "foo");
+ ASSERT_STRING_EQ(percent_expand("%h ", "h", "foo", NULL), "foo ");
+ ASSERT_STRING_EQ(percent_expand(" %h", "h", "foo", NULL), " foo");
+ ASSERT_STRING_EQ(percent_expand(" %h ", "h", "foo", NULL), " foo ");
+ ASSERT_STRING_EQ(percent_expand(" %a%b ", "a", "foo", "b", "bar", NULL),
+ " foobar ");
+ TEST_DONE();
+
+ TEST_START("percent_dollar_expand");
+ ASSERT_STRING_EQ(percent_dollar_expand("%h${FOO}", "h", "foo", NULL),
+ "foobar");
+ TEST_DONE();
}
diff --git a/regress/unittests/sshkey/mktestdata.sh b/regress/unittests/sshkey/mktestdata.sh
index 8efe6dd035e2..fcd78e990e8b 100755
--- a/regress/unittests/sshkey/mktestdata.sh
+++ b/regress/unittests/sshkey/mktestdata.sh
@@ -1,181 +1,222 @@
#!/bin/sh
-# $OpenBSD: mktestdata.sh,v 1.10 2020/05/01 04:03:14 djm Exp $
+# $OpenBSD: mktestdata.sh,v 1.11 2020/06/19 03:48:49 djm Exp $
PW=mekmitasdigoat
rsa_params() {
_in="$1"
_outbase="$2"
set -e
openssl rsa -noout -text -in $_in | \
awk '/^modulus:$/,/^publicExponent:/' | \
grep -v '^[a-zA-Z]' | tr -d ' \n:' > ${_outbase}.n
openssl rsa -noout -text -in $_in | \
awk '/^prime1:$/,/^prime2:/' | \
grep -v '^[a-zA-Z]' | tr -d ' \n:' > ${_outbase}.p
openssl rsa -noout -text -in $_in | \
awk '/^prime2:$/,/^exponent1:/' | \
grep -v '^[a-zA-Z]' | tr -d ' \n:' > ${_outbase}.q
for x in n p q ; do
echo "" >> ${_outbase}.$x
echo ============ ${_outbase}.$x
cat ${_outbase}.$x
echo ============
done
}
dsa_params() {
_in="$1"
_outbase="$2"
set -e
openssl dsa -noout -text -in $_in | \
awk '/^priv:$/,/^pub:/' | \
grep -v '^[a-zA-Z]' | tr -d ' \n:' > ${_outbase}.priv
openssl dsa -noout -text -in $_in | \
awk '/^pub:/,/^P:/' | #\
grep -v '^[a-zA-Z]' | tr -d ' \n:' > ${_outbase}.pub
openssl dsa -noout -text -in $_in | \
awk '/^G:/,0' | \
grep -v '^[a-zA-Z]' | tr -d ' \n:' > ${_outbase}.g
for x in priv pub g ; do
echo "" >> ${_outbase}.$x
echo ============ ${_outbase}.$x
cat ${_outbase}.$x
echo ============
done
}
ecdsa_params() {
_in="$1"
_outbase="$2"
set -e
openssl ec -noout -text -in $_in | \
awk '/^priv:$/,/^pub:/' | \
grep -v '^[a-zA-Z]' | tr -d ' \n:' > ${_outbase}.priv
openssl ec -noout -text -in $_in | \
awk '/^pub:/,/^ASN1 OID:/' | #\
grep -v '^[a-zA-Z]' | tr -d ' \n:' > ${_outbase}.pub
openssl ec -noout -text -in $_in | \
grep "ASN1 OID:" | \
sed 's/.*: //;s/ *$//' | tr -d '\n' > ${_outbase}.curve
for x in priv pub curve ; do
echo "" >> ${_outbase}.$x
echo ============ ${_outbase}.$x
cat ${_outbase}.$x
echo ============
done
}
set -ex
cd testdata
+if [ -f ../../../misc/sk-dummy/sk-dummy.so ] ; then
+ SK_DUMMY=../../../misc/sk-dummy/sk-dummy.so
+elif [ -f ../../../misc/sk-dummy/obj/sk-dummy.so ] ; then
+ SK_DUMMY=../../../misc/sk-dummy/obj/sk-dummy.so
+else
+ echo "Can't find sk-dummy.so" 1>&2
+ exit 1
+fi
+
rm -f rsa_1 dsa_1 ecdsa_1 ed25519_1
rm -f rsa_2 dsa_2 ecdsa_2 ed25519_2
rm -f rsa_n dsa_n ecdsa_n # new-format keys
rm -f rsa_1_pw dsa_1_pw ecdsa_1_pw ed25519_1_pw
rm -f rsa_n_pw dsa_n_pw ecdsa_n_pw
rm -f pw *.pub *.bn.* *.param.* *.fp *.fp.bb
ssh-keygen -t rsa -b 1024 -C "RSA test key #1" -N "" -f rsa_1 -m PEM
ssh-keygen -t dsa -b 1024 -C "DSA test key #1" -N "" -f dsa_1 -m PEM
ssh-keygen -t ecdsa -b 256 -C "ECDSA test key #1" -N "" -f ecdsa_1 -m PEM
ssh-keygen -t ed25519 -C "ED25519 test key #1" -N "" -f ed25519_1
+ssh-keygen -w "$SK_DUMMY" -t ecdsa-sk -C "ECDSA-SK test key #1" \
+ -N "" -f ecdsa_sk1
+ssh-keygen -w "$SK_DUMMY" -t ed25519-sk -C "ED25519-SK test key #1" \
+ -N "" -f ed25519_sk1
+
ssh-keygen -t rsa -b 2048 -C "RSA test key #2" -N "" -f rsa_2 -m PEM
ssh-keygen -t dsa -b 1024 -C "DSA test key #2" -N "" -f dsa_2 -m PEM
ssh-keygen -t ecdsa -b 521 -C "ECDSA test key #2" -N "" -f ecdsa_2 -m PEM
-ssh-keygen -t ed25519 -C "ED25519 test key #1" -N "" -f ed25519_2
+ssh-keygen -t ed25519 -C "ED25519 test key #2" -N "" -f ed25519_2
+ssh-keygen -w "$SK_DUMMY" -t ecdsa-sk -C "ECDSA-SK test key #2" \
+ -N "" -f ecdsa_sk2
+ssh-keygen -w "$SK_DUMMY" -t ed25519-sk -C "ED25519-SK test key #2" \
+ -N "" -f ed25519_sk2
cp rsa_1 rsa_n
cp dsa_1 dsa_n
cp ecdsa_1 ecdsa_n
ssh-keygen -pf rsa_n -N ""
ssh-keygen -pf dsa_n -N ""
ssh-keygen -pf ecdsa_n -N ""
cp rsa_1 rsa_1_pw
cp dsa_1 dsa_1_pw
cp ecdsa_1 ecdsa_1_pw
cp ed25519_1 ed25519_1_pw
+cp ecdsa_sk1 ecdsa_sk1_pw
+cp ed25519_sk1 ed25519_sk1_pw
cp rsa_1 rsa_n_pw
cp dsa_1 dsa_n_pw
cp ecdsa_1 ecdsa_n_pw
ssh-keygen -pf rsa_1_pw -m PEM -N "$PW"
ssh-keygen -pf dsa_1_pw -m PEM -N "$PW"
ssh-keygen -pf ecdsa_1_pw -m PEM -N "$PW"
ssh-keygen -pf ed25519_1_pw -N "$PW"
+ssh-keygen -pf ecdsa_sk1_pw -m PEM -N "$PW"
+ssh-keygen -pf ed25519_sk1_pw -N "$PW"
ssh-keygen -pf rsa_n_pw -N "$PW"
ssh-keygen -pf dsa_n_pw -N "$PW"
ssh-keygen -pf ecdsa_n_pw -N "$PW"
rsa_params rsa_1 rsa_1.param
rsa_params rsa_2 rsa_2.param
dsa_params dsa_1 dsa_1.param
dsa_params dsa_1 dsa_1.param
ecdsa_params ecdsa_1 ecdsa_1.param
ecdsa_params ecdsa_2 ecdsa_2.param
-# XXX ed25519 params
+# XXX ed25519, *sk params
ssh-keygen -s rsa_2 -I hugo -n user1,user2 \
-Oforce-command=/bin/ls -Ono-port-forwarding -Osource-address=10.0.0.0/8 \
-V 19990101:20110101 -z 1 rsa_1.pub
ssh-keygen -s rsa_2 -I hugo -n user1,user2 \
-Oforce-command=/bin/ls -Ono-port-forwarding -Osource-address=10.0.0.0/8 \
-V 19990101:20110101 -z 2 dsa_1.pub
ssh-keygen -s rsa_2 -I hugo -n user1,user2 \
-Oforce-command=/bin/ls -Ono-port-forwarding -Osource-address=10.0.0.0/8 \
-V 19990101:20110101 -z 3 ecdsa_1.pub
ssh-keygen -s rsa_2 -I hugo -n user1,user2 \
-Oforce-command=/bin/ls -Ono-port-forwarding -Osource-address=10.0.0.0/8 \
-V 19990101:20110101 -z 4 ed25519_1.pub
+ssh-keygen -s rsa_2 -I hugo -n user1,user2 \
+ -Oforce-command=/bin/ls -Ono-port-forwarding -Osource-address=10.0.0.0/8 \
+ -V 19990101:20110101 -z 4 ecdsa_sk1.pub
+ssh-keygen -s rsa_2 -I hugo -n user1,user2 \
+ -Oforce-command=/bin/ls -Ono-port-forwarding -Osource-address=10.0.0.0/8 \
+ -V 19990101:20110101 -z 4 ed25519_sk1.pub
+
# Make a few RSA variant signature too.
cp rsa_1 rsa_1_sha1
cp rsa_1 rsa_1_sha512
cp rsa_1.pub rsa_1_sha1.pub
cp rsa_1.pub rsa_1_sha512.pub
ssh-keygen -s rsa_2 -I hugo -n user1,user2 -t ssh-rsa \
-Oforce-command=/bin/ls -Ono-port-forwarding -Osource-address=10.0.0.0/8 \
-V 19990101:20110101 -z 1 rsa_1_sha1.pub
ssh-keygen -s rsa_2 -I hugo -n user1,user2 -t rsa-sha2-512 \
-Oforce-command=/bin/ls -Ono-port-forwarding -Osource-address=10.0.0.0/8 \
-V 19990101:20110101 -z 1 rsa_1_sha512.pub
ssh-keygen -s ed25519_1 -I julius -n host1,host2 -h \
-V 19990101:20110101 -z 5 rsa_1.pub
ssh-keygen -s ed25519_1 -I julius -n host1,host2 -h \
-V 19990101:20110101 -z 6 dsa_1.pub
ssh-keygen -s ecdsa_1 -I julius -n host1,host2 -h \
-V 19990101:20110101 -z 7 ecdsa_1.pub
ssh-keygen -s ed25519_1 -I julius -n host1,host2 -h \
-V 19990101:20110101 -z 8 ed25519_1.pub
+ssh-keygen -s ecdsa_1 -I julius -n host1,host2 -h \
+ -V 19990101:20110101 -z 7 ecdsa_sk1.pub
+ssh-keygen -s ed25519_1 -I julius -n host1,host2 -h \
+ -V 19990101:20110101 -z 8 ed25519_sk1.pub
ssh-keygen -lf rsa_1 | awk '{print $2}' > rsa_1.fp
ssh-keygen -lf dsa_1 | awk '{print $2}' > dsa_1.fp
ssh-keygen -lf ecdsa_1 | awk '{print $2}' > ecdsa_1.fp
ssh-keygen -lf ed25519_1 | awk '{print $2}' > ed25519_1.fp
+ssh-keygen -lf ecdsa_sk1 | awk '{print $2}' > ecdsa_sk1.fp
+ssh-keygen -lf ed25519_sk1 | awk '{print $2}' > ed25519_sk1.fp
ssh-keygen -lf rsa_2 | awk '{print $2}' > rsa_2.fp
ssh-keygen -lf dsa_2 | awk '{print $2}' > dsa_2.fp
ssh-keygen -lf ecdsa_2 | awk '{print $2}' > ecdsa_2.fp
ssh-keygen -lf ed25519_2 | awk '{print $2}' > ed25519_2.fp
+ssh-keygen -lf ecdsa_sk2 | awk '{print $2}' > ecdsa_sk2.fp
+ssh-keygen -lf ed25519_sk2 | awk '{print $2}' > ed25519_sk2.fp
+ssh-keygen -lf rsa_1-cert.pub | awk '{print $2}' > rsa_1-cert.fp
ssh-keygen -lf dsa_1-cert.pub | awk '{print $2}' > dsa_1-cert.fp
ssh-keygen -lf ecdsa_1-cert.pub | awk '{print $2}' > ecdsa_1-cert.fp
ssh-keygen -lf ed25519_1-cert.pub | awk '{print $2}' > ed25519_1-cert.fp
-ssh-keygen -lf rsa_1-cert.pub | awk '{print $2}' > rsa_1-cert.fp
+ssh-keygen -lf ecdsa_sk1-cert.pub | awk '{print $2}' > ecdsa_sk1-cert.fp
+ssh-keygen -lf ed25519_sk1-cert.pub | awk '{print $2}' > ed25519_sk1-cert.fp
ssh-keygen -Bf rsa_1 | awk '{print $2}' > rsa_1.fp.bb
ssh-keygen -Bf dsa_1 | awk '{print $2}' > dsa_1.fp.bb
ssh-keygen -Bf ecdsa_1 | awk '{print $2}' > ecdsa_1.fp.bb
ssh-keygen -Bf ed25519_1 | awk '{print $2}' > ed25519_1.fp.bb
+ssh-keygen -Bf ecdsa_sk1 | awk '{print $2}' > ecdsa_sk1.fp.bb
+ssh-keygen -Bf ed25519_sk1 | awk '{print $2}' > ed25519_sk1.fp.bb
ssh-keygen -Bf rsa_2 | awk '{print $2}' > rsa_2.fp.bb
ssh-keygen -Bf dsa_2 | awk '{print $2}' > dsa_2.fp.bb
ssh-keygen -Bf ecdsa_2 | awk '{print $2}' > ecdsa_2.fp.bb
ssh-keygen -Bf ed25519_2 | awk '{print $2}' > ed25519_2.fp.bb
-
-# XXX Extend ssh-keygen to do detached signatures (better to test/fuzz against)
+ssh-keygen -Bf ecdsa_sk2 | awk '{print $2}' > ecdsa_sk2.fp.bb
+ssh-keygen -Bf ed25519_sk2 | awk '{print $2}' > ed25519_sk2.fp.bb
echo "$PW" > pw
diff --git a/regress/unittests/sshkey/test_file.c b/regress/unittests/sshkey/test_file.c
index 55627bc12626..7d767336ef47 100644
--- a/regress/unittests/sshkey/test_file.c
+++ b/regress/unittests/sshkey/test_file.c
@@ -1,427 +1,558 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: test_file.c,v 1.8 2018/09/13 09:03:20 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: test_file.c,v 1.9 2020/06/19 03:48:49 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Regress test for sshkey.h key management API
*
* Placed in the public domain
*/
#include "includes.h"
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/param.h>
#include <sys/stat.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#ifdef HAVE_STDINT_H
#include <stdint.h>
#endif
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
#include <openssl/bn.h>
#include <openssl/rsa.h>
#include <openssl/dsa.h>
#include <openssl/objects.h>
#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_NISTP256
# include <openssl/ec.h>
#endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_NISTP256 */
#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
#include "../test_helper/test_helper.h"
#include "ssherr.h"
#include "authfile.h"
#include "sshkey.h"
#include "sshbuf.h"
#include "digest.h"
#include "common.h"
void sshkey_file_tests(void);
void
sshkey_file_tests(void)
{
struct sshkey *k1, *k2;
struct sshbuf *buf, *pw;
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
BIGNUM *a, *b, *c;
#endif
char *cp;
TEST_START("load passphrase");
pw = load_text_file("pw");
TEST_DONE();
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
TEST_START("parse RSA from private");
buf = load_file("rsa_1");
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(buf, "", &k1, NULL), 0);
sshbuf_free(buf);
ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1, NULL);
a = load_bignum("rsa_1.param.n");
b = load_bignum("rsa_1.param.p");
c = load_bignum("rsa_1.param.q");
ASSERT_BIGNUM_EQ(rsa_n(k1), a);
ASSERT_BIGNUM_EQ(rsa_p(k1), b);
ASSERT_BIGNUM_EQ(rsa_q(k1), c);
BN_free(a);
BN_free(b);
BN_free(c);
TEST_DONE();
TEST_START("parse RSA from private w/ passphrase");
buf = load_file("rsa_1_pw");
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(buf,
(const char *)sshbuf_ptr(pw), &k2, NULL), 0);
sshbuf_free(buf);
ASSERT_PTR_NE(k2, NULL);
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_equal(k1, k2), 1);
sshkey_free(k2);
TEST_DONE();
TEST_START("parse RSA from new-format");
buf = load_file("rsa_n");
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(buf, "", &k2, NULL), 0);
sshbuf_free(buf);
ASSERT_PTR_NE(k2, NULL);
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_equal(k1, k2), 1);
sshkey_free(k2);
TEST_DONE();
TEST_START("parse RSA from new-format w/ passphrase");
buf = load_file("rsa_n_pw");
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(buf,
(const char *)sshbuf_ptr(pw), &k2, NULL), 0);
sshbuf_free(buf);
ASSERT_PTR_NE(k2, NULL);
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_equal(k1, k2), 1);
sshkey_free(k2);
TEST_DONE();
TEST_START("load RSA from public");
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_load_public(test_data_file("rsa_1.pub"), &k2,
NULL), 0);
ASSERT_PTR_NE(k2, NULL);
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_equal(k1, k2), 1);
sshkey_free(k2);
TEST_DONE();
TEST_START("load RSA cert with SHA1 signature");
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_load_cert(test_data_file("rsa_1_sha1"), &k2), 0);
ASSERT_PTR_NE(k2, NULL);
ASSERT_INT_EQ(k2->type, KEY_RSA_CERT);
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_equal_public(k1, k2), 1);
ASSERT_STRING_EQ(k2->cert->signature_type, "ssh-rsa");
sshkey_free(k2);
TEST_DONE();
TEST_START("load RSA cert with SHA512 signature");
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_load_cert(test_data_file("rsa_1_sha512"), &k2), 0);
ASSERT_PTR_NE(k2, NULL);
ASSERT_INT_EQ(k2->type, KEY_RSA_CERT);
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_equal_public(k1, k2), 1);
ASSERT_STRING_EQ(k2->cert->signature_type, "rsa-sha2-512");
sshkey_free(k2);
TEST_DONE();
TEST_START("load RSA cert");
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_load_cert(test_data_file("rsa_1"), &k2), 0);
ASSERT_PTR_NE(k2, NULL);
ASSERT_INT_EQ(k2->type, KEY_RSA_CERT);
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_equal(k1, k2), 0);
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_equal_public(k1, k2), 1);
TEST_DONE();
TEST_START("RSA key hex fingerprint");
buf = load_text_file("rsa_1.fp");
cp = sshkey_fingerprint(k1, SSH_DIGEST_SHA256, SSH_FP_BASE64);
ASSERT_PTR_NE(cp, NULL);
ASSERT_STRING_EQ(cp, (const char *)sshbuf_ptr(buf));
sshbuf_free(buf);
free(cp);
TEST_DONE();
TEST_START("RSA cert hex fingerprint");
buf = load_text_file("rsa_1-cert.fp");
cp = sshkey_fingerprint(k2, SSH_DIGEST_SHA256, SSH_FP_BASE64);
ASSERT_PTR_NE(cp, NULL);
ASSERT_STRING_EQ(cp, (const char *)sshbuf_ptr(buf));
sshbuf_free(buf);
free(cp);
sshkey_free(k2);
TEST_DONE();
TEST_START("RSA key bubblebabble fingerprint");
buf = load_text_file("rsa_1.fp.bb");
cp = sshkey_fingerprint(k1, SSH_DIGEST_SHA1, SSH_FP_BUBBLEBABBLE);
ASSERT_PTR_NE(cp, NULL);
ASSERT_STRING_EQ(cp, (const char *)sshbuf_ptr(buf));
sshbuf_free(buf);
free(cp);
TEST_DONE();
sshkey_free(k1);
TEST_START("parse DSA from private");
buf = load_file("dsa_1");
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(buf, "", &k1, NULL), 0);
sshbuf_free(buf);
ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1, NULL);
a = load_bignum("dsa_1.param.g");
b = load_bignum("dsa_1.param.priv");
c = load_bignum("dsa_1.param.pub");
ASSERT_BIGNUM_EQ(dsa_g(k1), a);
ASSERT_BIGNUM_EQ(dsa_priv_key(k1), b);
ASSERT_BIGNUM_EQ(dsa_pub_key(k1), c);
BN_free(a);
BN_free(b);
BN_free(c);
TEST_DONE();
TEST_START("parse DSA from private w/ passphrase");
buf = load_file("dsa_1_pw");
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(buf,
(const char *)sshbuf_ptr(pw), &k2, NULL), 0);
sshbuf_free(buf);
ASSERT_PTR_NE(k2, NULL);
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_equal(k1, k2), 1);
sshkey_free(k2);
TEST_DONE();
TEST_START("parse DSA from new-format");
buf = load_file("dsa_n");
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(buf, "", &k2, NULL), 0);
sshbuf_free(buf);
ASSERT_PTR_NE(k2, NULL);
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_equal(k1, k2), 1);
sshkey_free(k2);
TEST_DONE();
TEST_START("parse DSA from new-format w/ passphrase");
buf = load_file("dsa_n_pw");
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(buf,
(const char *)sshbuf_ptr(pw), &k2, NULL), 0);
sshbuf_free(buf);
ASSERT_PTR_NE(k2, NULL);
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_equal(k1, k2), 1);
sshkey_free(k2);
TEST_DONE();
TEST_START("load DSA from public");
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_load_public(test_data_file("dsa_1.pub"), &k2,
NULL), 0);
ASSERT_PTR_NE(k2, NULL);
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_equal(k1, k2), 1);
sshkey_free(k2);
TEST_DONE();
TEST_START("load DSA cert");
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_load_cert(test_data_file("dsa_1"), &k2), 0);
ASSERT_PTR_NE(k2, NULL);
ASSERT_INT_EQ(k2->type, KEY_DSA_CERT);
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_equal(k1, k2), 0);
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_equal_public(k1, k2), 1);
TEST_DONE();
TEST_START("DSA key hex fingerprint");
buf = load_text_file("dsa_1.fp");
cp = sshkey_fingerprint(k1, SSH_DIGEST_SHA256, SSH_FP_BASE64);
ASSERT_PTR_NE(cp, NULL);
ASSERT_STRING_EQ(cp, (const char *)sshbuf_ptr(buf));
sshbuf_free(buf);
free(cp);
TEST_DONE();
TEST_START("DSA cert hex fingerprint");
buf = load_text_file("dsa_1-cert.fp");
cp = sshkey_fingerprint(k2, SSH_DIGEST_SHA256, SSH_FP_BASE64);
ASSERT_PTR_NE(cp, NULL);
ASSERT_STRING_EQ(cp, (const char *)sshbuf_ptr(buf));
sshbuf_free(buf);
free(cp);
sshkey_free(k2);
TEST_DONE();
TEST_START("DSA key bubblebabble fingerprint");
buf = load_text_file("dsa_1.fp.bb");
cp = sshkey_fingerprint(k1, SSH_DIGEST_SHA1, SSH_FP_BUBBLEBABBLE);
ASSERT_PTR_NE(cp, NULL);
ASSERT_STRING_EQ(cp, (const char *)sshbuf_ptr(buf));
sshbuf_free(buf);
free(cp);
TEST_DONE();
sshkey_free(k1);
#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
TEST_START("parse ECDSA from private");
buf = load_file("ecdsa_1");
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(buf, "", &k1, NULL), 0);
sshbuf_free(buf);
ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1, NULL);
buf = load_text_file("ecdsa_1.param.curve");
ASSERT_STRING_EQ((const char *)sshbuf_ptr(buf),
OBJ_nid2sn(k1->ecdsa_nid));
sshbuf_free(buf);
a = load_bignum("ecdsa_1.param.priv");
b = load_bignum("ecdsa_1.param.pub");
c = EC_POINT_point2bn(EC_KEY_get0_group(k1->ecdsa),
EC_KEY_get0_public_key(k1->ecdsa), POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
NULL, NULL);
ASSERT_PTR_NE(c, NULL);
ASSERT_BIGNUM_EQ(EC_KEY_get0_private_key(k1->ecdsa), a);
ASSERT_BIGNUM_EQ(b, c);
BN_free(a);
BN_free(b);
BN_free(c);
TEST_DONE();
TEST_START("parse ECDSA from private w/ passphrase");
buf = load_file("ecdsa_1_pw");
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(buf,
(const char *)sshbuf_ptr(pw), &k2, NULL), 0);
sshbuf_free(buf);
ASSERT_PTR_NE(k2, NULL);
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_equal(k1, k2), 1);
sshkey_free(k2);
TEST_DONE();
TEST_START("parse ECDSA from new-format");
buf = load_file("ecdsa_n");
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(buf, "", &k2, NULL), 0);
sshbuf_free(buf);
ASSERT_PTR_NE(k2, NULL);
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_equal(k1, k2), 1);
sshkey_free(k2);
TEST_DONE();
TEST_START("parse ECDSA from new-format w/ passphrase");
buf = load_file("ecdsa_n_pw");
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(buf,
(const char *)sshbuf_ptr(pw), &k2, NULL), 0);
sshbuf_free(buf);
ASSERT_PTR_NE(k2, NULL);
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_equal(k1, k2), 1);
sshkey_free(k2);
TEST_DONE();
TEST_START("load ECDSA from public");
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_load_public(test_data_file("ecdsa_1.pub"), &k2,
NULL), 0);
ASSERT_PTR_NE(k2, NULL);
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_equal(k1, k2), 1);
sshkey_free(k2);
TEST_DONE();
TEST_START("load ECDSA cert");
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_load_cert(test_data_file("ecdsa_1"), &k2), 0);
ASSERT_PTR_NE(k2, NULL);
ASSERT_INT_EQ(k2->type, KEY_ECDSA_CERT);
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_equal(k1, k2), 0);
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_equal_public(k1, k2), 1);
TEST_DONE();
TEST_START("ECDSA key hex fingerprint");
buf = load_text_file("ecdsa_1.fp");
cp = sshkey_fingerprint(k1, SSH_DIGEST_SHA256, SSH_FP_BASE64);
ASSERT_PTR_NE(cp, NULL);
ASSERT_STRING_EQ(cp, (const char *)sshbuf_ptr(buf));
sshbuf_free(buf);
free(cp);
TEST_DONE();
TEST_START("ECDSA cert hex fingerprint");
buf = load_text_file("ecdsa_1-cert.fp");
cp = sshkey_fingerprint(k2, SSH_DIGEST_SHA256, SSH_FP_BASE64);
ASSERT_PTR_NE(cp, NULL);
ASSERT_STRING_EQ(cp, (const char *)sshbuf_ptr(buf));
sshbuf_free(buf);
free(cp);
sshkey_free(k2);
TEST_DONE();
TEST_START("ECDSA key bubblebabble fingerprint");
buf = load_text_file("ecdsa_1.fp.bb");
cp = sshkey_fingerprint(k1, SSH_DIGEST_SHA1, SSH_FP_BUBBLEBABBLE);
ASSERT_PTR_NE(cp, NULL);
ASSERT_STRING_EQ(cp, (const char *)sshbuf_ptr(buf));
sshbuf_free(buf);
free(cp);
TEST_DONE();
sshkey_free(k1);
#endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */
#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
TEST_START("parse Ed25519 from private");
buf = load_file("ed25519_1");
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(buf, "", &k1, NULL), 0);
sshbuf_free(buf);
ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1, NULL);
ASSERT_INT_EQ(k1->type, KEY_ED25519);
/* XXX check key contents */
TEST_DONE();
TEST_START("parse Ed25519 from private w/ passphrase");
buf = load_file("ed25519_1_pw");
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(buf,
(const char *)sshbuf_ptr(pw), &k2, NULL), 0);
sshbuf_free(buf);
ASSERT_PTR_NE(k2, NULL);
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_equal(k1, k2), 1);
sshkey_free(k2);
TEST_DONE();
TEST_START("load Ed25519 from public");
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_load_public(test_data_file("ed25519_1.pub"), &k2,
NULL), 0);
ASSERT_PTR_NE(k2, NULL);
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_equal(k1, k2), 1);
sshkey_free(k2);
TEST_DONE();
TEST_START("load Ed25519 cert");
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_load_cert(test_data_file("ed25519_1"), &k2), 0);
ASSERT_PTR_NE(k2, NULL);
ASSERT_INT_EQ(k2->type, KEY_ED25519_CERT);
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_equal(k1, k2), 0);
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_equal_public(k1, k2), 1);
TEST_DONE();
TEST_START("Ed25519 key hex fingerprint");
buf = load_text_file("ed25519_1.fp");
cp = sshkey_fingerprint(k1, SSH_DIGEST_SHA256, SSH_FP_BASE64);
ASSERT_PTR_NE(cp, NULL);
ASSERT_STRING_EQ(cp, (const char *)sshbuf_ptr(buf));
sshbuf_free(buf);
free(cp);
TEST_DONE();
TEST_START("Ed25519 cert hex fingerprint");
buf = load_text_file("ed25519_1-cert.fp");
cp = sshkey_fingerprint(k2, SSH_DIGEST_SHA256, SSH_FP_BASE64);
ASSERT_PTR_NE(cp, NULL);
ASSERT_STRING_EQ(cp, (const char *)sshbuf_ptr(buf));
sshbuf_free(buf);
free(cp);
sshkey_free(k2);
TEST_DONE();
TEST_START("Ed25519 key bubblebabble fingerprint");
buf = load_text_file("ed25519_1.fp.bb");
cp = sshkey_fingerprint(k1, SSH_DIGEST_SHA1, SSH_FP_BUBBLEBABBLE);
ASSERT_PTR_NE(cp, NULL);
ASSERT_STRING_EQ(cp, (const char *)sshbuf_ptr(buf));
sshbuf_free(buf);
free(cp);
TEST_DONE();
sshkey_free(k1);
+#if defined(WITH_OPENSSL) && defined(OPENSSL_HAS_ECC)
+ TEST_START("parse ECDSA-SK from private");
+ buf = load_file("ecdsa_sk1");
+ ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(buf, "", &k1, NULL), 0);
+ sshbuf_free(buf);
+ ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1, NULL);
+ ASSERT_INT_EQ(k1->type, KEY_ECDSA_SK);
+ TEST_DONE();
+
+ TEST_START("parse ECDSA-SK from private w/ passphrase");
+ buf = load_file("ecdsa_sk1_pw");
+ ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(buf,
+ (const char *)sshbuf_ptr(pw), &k2, NULL), 0);
+ sshbuf_free(buf);
+ ASSERT_PTR_NE(k2, NULL);
+ ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_equal(k1, k2), 1);
+ sshkey_free(k2);
+ TEST_DONE();
+
+ TEST_START("load ECDSA-SK from public");
+ ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_load_public(test_data_file("ecdsa_sk1.pub"), &k2,
+ NULL), 0);
+ ASSERT_PTR_NE(k2, NULL);
+ ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_equal(k1, k2), 1);
+ sshkey_free(k2);
+ TEST_DONE();
+
+ TEST_START("load ECDSA-SK cert");
+ ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_load_cert(test_data_file("ecdsa_sk1"), &k2), 0);
+ ASSERT_PTR_NE(k2, NULL);
+ ASSERT_INT_EQ(k2->type, KEY_ECDSA_SK_CERT);
+ ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_equal(k1, k2), 0);
+ ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_equal_public(k1, k2), 1);
+ TEST_DONE();
+
+ TEST_START("ECDSA-SK key hex fingerprint");
+ buf = load_text_file("ecdsa_sk1.fp");
+ cp = sshkey_fingerprint(k1, SSH_DIGEST_SHA256, SSH_FP_BASE64);
+ ASSERT_PTR_NE(cp, NULL);
+ ASSERT_STRING_EQ(cp, (const char *)sshbuf_ptr(buf));
+ sshbuf_free(buf);
+ free(cp);
+ TEST_DONE();
+
+ TEST_START("ECDSA-SK cert hex fingerprint");
+ buf = load_text_file("ecdsa_sk1-cert.fp");
+ cp = sshkey_fingerprint(k2, SSH_DIGEST_SHA256, SSH_FP_BASE64);
+ ASSERT_PTR_NE(cp, NULL);
+ ASSERT_STRING_EQ(cp, (const char *)sshbuf_ptr(buf));
+ sshbuf_free(buf);
+ free(cp);
+ sshkey_free(k2);
+ TEST_DONE();
+
+ TEST_START("ECDSA-SK key bubblebabble fingerprint");
+ buf = load_text_file("ecdsa_sk1.fp.bb");
+ cp = sshkey_fingerprint(k1, SSH_DIGEST_SHA1, SSH_FP_BUBBLEBABBLE);
+ ASSERT_PTR_NE(cp, NULL);
+ ASSERT_STRING_EQ(cp, (const char *)sshbuf_ptr(buf));
+ sshbuf_free(buf);
+ free(cp);
+ TEST_DONE();
+
+ sshkey_free(k1);
+#endif
+
+ TEST_START("parse Ed25519-SK from private");
+ buf = load_file("ed25519_sk1");
+ ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(buf, "", &k1, NULL), 0);
+ sshbuf_free(buf);
+ ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1, NULL);
+ ASSERT_INT_EQ(k1->type, KEY_ED25519_SK);
+ /* XXX check key contents */
+ TEST_DONE();
+
+ TEST_START("parse Ed25519-SK from private w/ passphrase");
+ buf = load_file("ed25519_sk1_pw");
+ ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(buf,
+ (const char *)sshbuf_ptr(pw), &k2, NULL), 0);
+ sshbuf_free(buf);
+ ASSERT_PTR_NE(k2, NULL);
+ ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_equal(k1, k2), 1);
+ sshkey_free(k2);
+ TEST_DONE();
+
+ TEST_START("load Ed25519-SK from public");
+ ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_load_public(test_data_file("ed25519_sk1.pub"),
+ &k2, NULL), 0);
+ ASSERT_PTR_NE(k2, NULL);
+ ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_equal(k1, k2), 1);
+ sshkey_free(k2);
+ TEST_DONE();
+
+ TEST_START("load Ed25519-SK cert");
+ ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_load_cert(test_data_file("ed25519_sk1"), &k2), 0);
+ ASSERT_PTR_NE(k2, NULL);
+ ASSERT_INT_EQ(k2->type, KEY_ED25519_SK_CERT);
+ ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_equal(k1, k2), 0);
+ ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_equal_public(k1, k2), 1);
+ TEST_DONE();
+
+ TEST_START("Ed25519-SK key hex fingerprint");
+ buf = load_text_file("ed25519_sk1.fp");
+ cp = sshkey_fingerprint(k1, SSH_DIGEST_SHA256, SSH_FP_BASE64);
+ ASSERT_PTR_NE(cp, NULL);
+ ASSERT_STRING_EQ(cp, (const char *)sshbuf_ptr(buf));
+ sshbuf_free(buf);
+ free(cp);
+ TEST_DONE();
+
+ TEST_START("Ed25519-SK cert hex fingerprint");
+ buf = load_text_file("ed25519_sk1-cert.fp");
+ cp = sshkey_fingerprint(k2, SSH_DIGEST_SHA256, SSH_FP_BASE64);
+ ASSERT_PTR_NE(cp, NULL);
+ ASSERT_STRING_EQ(cp, (const char *)sshbuf_ptr(buf));
+ sshbuf_free(buf);
+ free(cp);
+ sshkey_free(k2);
+ TEST_DONE();
+
+ TEST_START("Ed25519-SK key bubblebabble fingerprint");
+ buf = load_text_file("ed25519_sk1.fp.bb");
+ cp = sshkey_fingerprint(k1, SSH_DIGEST_SHA1, SSH_FP_BUBBLEBABBLE);
+ ASSERT_PTR_NE(cp, NULL);
+ ASSERT_STRING_EQ(cp, (const char *)sshbuf_ptr(buf));
+ sshbuf_free(buf);
+ free(cp);
+ TEST_DONE();
+
+ sshkey_free(k1);
+
sshbuf_free(pw);
}
diff --git a/regress/unittests/sshkey/test_fuzz.c b/regress/unittests/sshkey/test_fuzz.c
index 359811893170..f111446a9398 100644
--- a/regress/unittests/sshkey/test_fuzz.c
+++ b/regress/unittests/sshkey/test_fuzz.c
@@ -1,390 +1,390 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: test_fuzz.c,v 1.11 2019/11/25 10:32:35 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: test_fuzz.c,v 1.12 2020/08/27 03:55:22 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Fuzz tests for key parsing
*
* Placed in the public domain
*/
#include "includes.h"
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/param.h>
#include <sys/stat.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#ifdef HAVE_STDINT_H
#include <stdint.h>
#endif
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <openssl/bn.h>
#include <openssl/rsa.h>
#include <openssl/dsa.h>
#include <openssl/objects.h>
#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_NISTP256
# include <openssl/ec.h>
#endif
#include "../test_helper/test_helper.h"
#include "ssherr.h"
#include "authfile.h"
#include "sshkey.h"
#include "sshbuf.h"
#include "common.h"
void sshkey_fuzz_tests(void);
static void
onerror(void *fuzz)
{
fprintf(stderr, "Failed during fuzz:\n");
fuzz_dump((struct fuzz *)fuzz);
}
static void
public_fuzz(struct sshkey *k)
{
struct sshkey *k1;
struct sshbuf *buf;
struct fuzz *fuzz;
u_int fuzzers = FUZZ_1_BIT_FLIP | FUZZ_1_BYTE_FLIP |
FUZZ_TRUNCATE_START | FUZZ_TRUNCATE_END;
if (test_is_fast())
fuzzers &= ~FUZZ_1_BIT_FLIP;
if (test_is_slow())
fuzzers |= FUZZ_2_BIT_FLIP | FUZZ_2_BYTE_FLIP;
ASSERT_PTR_NE(buf = sshbuf_new(), NULL);
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_putb(k, buf), 0);
fuzz = fuzz_begin(fuzzers, sshbuf_mutable_ptr(buf), sshbuf_len(buf));
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_from_blob(sshbuf_ptr(buf), sshbuf_len(buf),
&k1), 0);
sshkey_free(k1);
sshbuf_free(buf);
TEST_ONERROR(onerror, fuzz);
for(; !fuzz_done(fuzz); fuzz_next(fuzz)) {
if (sshkey_from_blob(fuzz_ptr(fuzz), fuzz_len(fuzz), &k1) == 0)
sshkey_free(k1);
}
fuzz_cleanup(fuzz);
}
static void
sig_fuzz(struct sshkey *k, const char *sig_alg)
{
struct fuzz *fuzz;
u_char *sig, c[] = "some junk to be signed";
size_t l;
u_int fuzzers = FUZZ_1_BIT_FLIP | FUZZ_1_BYTE_FLIP | FUZZ_2_BYTE_FLIP |
FUZZ_TRUNCATE_START | FUZZ_TRUNCATE_END;
if (test_is_fast())
fuzzers &= ~FUZZ_2_BYTE_FLIP;
if (test_is_slow())
fuzzers |= FUZZ_2_BIT_FLIP;
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_sign(k, &sig, &l, c, sizeof(c),
- sig_alg, NULL, 0), 0);
+ sig_alg, NULL, NULL, 0), 0);
ASSERT_SIZE_T_GT(l, 0);
fuzz = fuzz_begin(fuzzers, sig, l);
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_verify(k, sig, l, c, sizeof(c), NULL, 0, NULL), 0);
free(sig);
TEST_ONERROR(onerror, fuzz);
for(; !fuzz_done(fuzz); fuzz_next(fuzz)) {
/* Ensure 1-bit difference at least */
if (fuzz_matches_original(fuzz))
continue;
ASSERT_INT_NE(sshkey_verify(k, fuzz_ptr(fuzz), fuzz_len(fuzz),
c, sizeof(c), NULL, 0, NULL), 0);
}
fuzz_cleanup(fuzz);
}
#define NUM_FAST_BASE64_TESTS 1024
void
sshkey_fuzz_tests(void)
{
struct sshkey *k1;
struct sshbuf *buf, *fuzzed;
struct fuzz *fuzz;
int r, i;
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
TEST_START("fuzz RSA private");
buf = load_file("rsa_1");
fuzz = fuzz_begin(FUZZ_BASE64, sshbuf_mutable_ptr(buf),
sshbuf_len(buf));
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(buf, "", &k1, NULL), 0);
sshkey_free(k1);
sshbuf_free(buf);
ASSERT_PTR_NE(fuzzed = sshbuf_new(), NULL);
TEST_ONERROR(onerror, fuzz);
for(i = 0; !fuzz_done(fuzz); i++, fuzz_next(fuzz)) {
r = sshbuf_put(fuzzed, fuzz_ptr(fuzz), fuzz_len(fuzz));
ASSERT_INT_EQ(r, 0);
if (sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(fuzzed, "", &k1, NULL) == 0)
sshkey_free(k1);
sshbuf_reset(fuzzed);
if (test_is_fast() && i >= NUM_FAST_BASE64_TESTS)
break;
}
sshbuf_free(fuzzed);
fuzz_cleanup(fuzz);
TEST_DONE();
TEST_START("fuzz RSA new-format private");
buf = load_file("rsa_n");
fuzz = fuzz_begin(FUZZ_BASE64, sshbuf_mutable_ptr(buf),
sshbuf_len(buf));
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(buf, "", &k1, NULL), 0);
sshkey_free(k1);
sshbuf_free(buf);
ASSERT_PTR_NE(fuzzed = sshbuf_new(), NULL);
TEST_ONERROR(onerror, fuzz);
for(i = 0; !fuzz_done(fuzz); i++, fuzz_next(fuzz)) {
r = sshbuf_put(fuzzed, fuzz_ptr(fuzz), fuzz_len(fuzz));
ASSERT_INT_EQ(r, 0);
if (sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(fuzzed, "", &k1, NULL) == 0)
sshkey_free(k1);
sshbuf_reset(fuzzed);
if (test_is_fast() && i >= NUM_FAST_BASE64_TESTS)
break;
}
sshbuf_free(fuzzed);
fuzz_cleanup(fuzz);
TEST_DONE();
TEST_START("fuzz DSA private");
buf = load_file("dsa_1");
fuzz = fuzz_begin(FUZZ_BASE64, sshbuf_mutable_ptr(buf),
sshbuf_len(buf));
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(buf, "", &k1, NULL), 0);
sshkey_free(k1);
sshbuf_free(buf);
ASSERT_PTR_NE(fuzzed = sshbuf_new(), NULL);
TEST_ONERROR(onerror, fuzz);
for(i = 0; !fuzz_done(fuzz); i++, fuzz_next(fuzz)) {
r = sshbuf_put(fuzzed, fuzz_ptr(fuzz), fuzz_len(fuzz));
ASSERT_INT_EQ(r, 0);
if (sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(fuzzed, "", &k1, NULL) == 0)
sshkey_free(k1);
sshbuf_reset(fuzzed);
if (test_is_fast() && i >= NUM_FAST_BASE64_TESTS)
break;
}
sshbuf_free(fuzzed);
fuzz_cleanup(fuzz);
TEST_DONE();
TEST_START("fuzz DSA new-format private");
buf = load_file("dsa_n");
fuzz = fuzz_begin(FUZZ_BASE64, sshbuf_mutable_ptr(buf),
sshbuf_len(buf));
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(buf, "", &k1, NULL), 0);
sshkey_free(k1);
sshbuf_free(buf);
ASSERT_PTR_NE(fuzzed = sshbuf_new(), NULL);
TEST_ONERROR(onerror, fuzz);
for(i = 0; !fuzz_done(fuzz); i++, fuzz_next(fuzz)) {
r = sshbuf_put(fuzzed, fuzz_ptr(fuzz), fuzz_len(fuzz));
ASSERT_INT_EQ(r, 0);
if (sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(fuzzed, "", &k1, NULL) == 0)
sshkey_free(k1);
sshbuf_reset(fuzzed);
if (test_is_fast() && i >= NUM_FAST_BASE64_TESTS)
break;
}
sshbuf_free(fuzzed);
fuzz_cleanup(fuzz);
TEST_DONE();
#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
TEST_START("fuzz ECDSA private");
buf = load_file("ecdsa_1");
fuzz = fuzz_begin(FUZZ_BASE64, sshbuf_mutable_ptr(buf),
sshbuf_len(buf));
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(buf, "", &k1, NULL), 0);
sshkey_free(k1);
sshbuf_free(buf);
ASSERT_PTR_NE(fuzzed = sshbuf_new(), NULL);
TEST_ONERROR(onerror, fuzz);
for(i = 0; !fuzz_done(fuzz); i++, fuzz_next(fuzz)) {
r = sshbuf_put(fuzzed, fuzz_ptr(fuzz), fuzz_len(fuzz));
ASSERT_INT_EQ(r, 0);
if (sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(fuzzed, "", &k1, NULL) == 0)
sshkey_free(k1);
sshbuf_reset(fuzzed);
if (test_is_fast() && i >= NUM_FAST_BASE64_TESTS)
break;
}
sshbuf_free(fuzzed);
fuzz_cleanup(fuzz);
TEST_DONE();
TEST_START("fuzz ECDSA new-format private");
buf = load_file("ecdsa_n");
fuzz = fuzz_begin(FUZZ_BASE64, sshbuf_mutable_ptr(buf),
sshbuf_len(buf));
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(buf, "", &k1, NULL), 0);
sshkey_free(k1);
sshbuf_free(buf);
ASSERT_PTR_NE(fuzzed = sshbuf_new(), NULL);
TEST_ONERROR(onerror, fuzz);
for(i = 0; !fuzz_done(fuzz); i++, fuzz_next(fuzz)) {
r = sshbuf_put(fuzzed, fuzz_ptr(fuzz), fuzz_len(fuzz));
ASSERT_INT_EQ(r, 0);
if (sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(fuzzed, "", &k1, NULL) == 0)
sshkey_free(k1);
sshbuf_reset(fuzzed);
if (test_is_fast() && i >= NUM_FAST_BASE64_TESTS)
break;
}
sshbuf_free(fuzzed);
fuzz_cleanup(fuzz);
TEST_DONE();
#endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */
#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
TEST_START("fuzz Ed25519 private");
buf = load_file("ed25519_1");
fuzz = fuzz_begin(FUZZ_BASE64, sshbuf_mutable_ptr(buf),
sshbuf_len(buf));
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(buf, "", &k1, NULL), 0);
sshkey_free(k1);
sshbuf_free(buf);
ASSERT_PTR_NE(fuzzed = sshbuf_new(), NULL);
TEST_ONERROR(onerror, fuzz);
for(i = 0; !fuzz_done(fuzz); i++, fuzz_next(fuzz)) {
r = sshbuf_put(fuzzed, fuzz_ptr(fuzz), fuzz_len(fuzz));
ASSERT_INT_EQ(r, 0);
if (sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(fuzzed, "", &k1, NULL) == 0)
sshkey_free(k1);
sshbuf_reset(fuzzed);
if (test_is_fast() && i >= NUM_FAST_BASE64_TESTS)
break;
}
sshbuf_free(fuzzed);
fuzz_cleanup(fuzz);
TEST_DONE();
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
TEST_START("fuzz RSA public");
buf = load_file("rsa_1");
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(buf, "", &k1, NULL), 0);
sshbuf_free(buf);
public_fuzz(k1);
sshkey_free(k1);
TEST_DONE();
TEST_START("fuzz RSA cert");
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_load_cert(test_data_file("rsa_1"), &k1), 0);
public_fuzz(k1);
sshkey_free(k1);
TEST_DONE();
TEST_START("fuzz DSA public");
buf = load_file("dsa_1");
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(buf, "", &k1, NULL), 0);
sshbuf_free(buf);
public_fuzz(k1);
sshkey_free(k1);
TEST_DONE();
TEST_START("fuzz DSA cert");
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_load_cert(test_data_file("dsa_1"), &k1), 0);
public_fuzz(k1);
sshkey_free(k1);
TEST_DONE();
#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
TEST_START("fuzz ECDSA public");
buf = load_file("ecdsa_1");
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(buf, "", &k1, NULL), 0);
sshbuf_free(buf);
public_fuzz(k1);
sshkey_free(k1);
TEST_DONE();
TEST_START("fuzz ECDSA cert");
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_load_cert(test_data_file("ecdsa_1"), &k1), 0);
public_fuzz(k1);
sshkey_free(k1);
TEST_DONE();
#endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */
#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
TEST_START("fuzz Ed25519 public");
buf = load_file("ed25519_1");
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(buf, "", &k1, NULL), 0);
sshbuf_free(buf);
public_fuzz(k1);
sshkey_free(k1);
TEST_DONE();
TEST_START("fuzz Ed25519 cert");
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_load_cert(test_data_file("ed25519_1"), &k1), 0);
public_fuzz(k1);
sshkey_free(k1);
TEST_DONE();
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
TEST_START("fuzz RSA sig");
buf = load_file("rsa_1");
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(buf, "", &k1, NULL), 0);
sshbuf_free(buf);
sig_fuzz(k1, "ssh-rsa");
sshkey_free(k1);
TEST_DONE();
TEST_START("fuzz RSA SHA256 sig");
buf = load_file("rsa_1");
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(buf, "", &k1, NULL), 0);
sshbuf_free(buf);
sig_fuzz(k1, "rsa-sha2-256");
sshkey_free(k1);
TEST_DONE();
TEST_START("fuzz RSA SHA512 sig");
buf = load_file("rsa_1");
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(buf, "", &k1, NULL), 0);
sshbuf_free(buf);
sig_fuzz(k1, "rsa-sha2-512");
sshkey_free(k1);
TEST_DONE();
TEST_START("fuzz DSA sig");
buf = load_file("dsa_1");
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(buf, "", &k1, NULL), 0);
sshbuf_free(buf);
sig_fuzz(k1, NULL);
sshkey_free(k1);
TEST_DONE();
#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
TEST_START("fuzz ECDSA sig");
buf = load_file("ecdsa_1");
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(buf, "", &k1, NULL), 0);
sshbuf_free(buf);
sig_fuzz(k1, NULL);
sshkey_free(k1);
TEST_DONE();
#endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */
#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
TEST_START("fuzz Ed25519 sig");
buf = load_file("ed25519_1");
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(buf, "", &k1, NULL), 0);
sshbuf_free(buf);
sig_fuzz(k1, NULL);
sshkey_free(k1);
TEST_DONE();
/* XXX fuzz decoded new-format blobs too */
/* XXX fuzz XMSS too */
}
diff --git a/regress/unittests/sshkey/test_sshkey.c b/regress/unittests/sshkey/test_sshkey.c
index 025bb98159ca..7dc20cc857a5 100644
--- a/regress/unittests/sshkey/test_sshkey.c
+++ b/regress/unittests/sshkey/test_sshkey.c
@@ -1,526 +1,527 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: test_sshkey.c,v 1.20 2019/11/25 10:32:35 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: test_sshkey.c,v 1.21 2020/08/27 03:55:22 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Regress test for sshkey.h key management API
*
* Placed in the public domain
*/
#include "includes.h"
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/param.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#ifdef HAVE_STDINT_H
#include <stdint.h>
#endif
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <openssl/bn.h>
#include <openssl/rsa.h>
#include <openssl/dsa.h>
#if defined(OPENSSL_HAS_ECC) && defined(OPENSSL_HAS_NISTP256)
# include <openssl/ec.h>
#endif
#include "../test_helper/test_helper.h"
#include "ssherr.h"
#include "sshbuf.h"
#define SSHBUF_INTERNAL 1 /* access internals for testing */
#include "sshkey.h"
#include "authfile.h"
#include "common.h"
#include "ssh2.h"
void sshkey_tests(void);
static void
put_opt(struct sshbuf *b, const char *name, const char *value)
{
struct sshbuf *sect;
sect = sshbuf_new();
ASSERT_PTR_NE(sect, NULL);
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_cstring(b, name), 0);
if (value != NULL)
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_cstring(sect, value), 0);
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_stringb(b, sect), 0);
sshbuf_free(sect);
}
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
static void
build_cert(struct sshbuf *b, struct sshkey *k, const char *type,
struct sshkey *sign_key, struct sshkey *ca_key,
const char *sig_alg)
{
struct sshbuf *ca_buf, *pk, *principals, *critopts, *exts;
u_char *sigblob;
size_t siglen;
ca_buf = sshbuf_new();
ASSERT_PTR_NE(ca_buf, NULL);
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_putb(ca_key, ca_buf), 0);
/*
* Get the public key serialisation by rendering the key and skipping
* the type string. This is a bit of a hack :/
*/
pk = sshbuf_new();
ASSERT_PTR_NE(pk, NULL);
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_putb_plain(k, pk), 0);
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_skip_string(pk), 0);
principals = sshbuf_new();
ASSERT_PTR_NE(principals, NULL);
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_cstring(principals, "gsamsa"), 0);
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_cstring(principals, "gregor"), 0);
critopts = sshbuf_new();
ASSERT_PTR_NE(critopts, NULL);
put_opt(critopts, "force-command", "/usr/local/bin/nethack");
put_opt(critopts, "source-address", "192.168.0.0/24,127.0.0.1,::1");
exts = sshbuf_new();
ASSERT_PTR_NE(exts, NULL);
put_opt(critopts, "permit-X11-forwarding", NULL);
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_cstring(b, type), 0);
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_cstring(b, "noncenoncenonce!"), 0); /* nonce */
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_putb(b, pk), 0); /* public key serialisation */
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_u64(b, 1234), 0); /* serial */
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_u32(b, SSH2_CERT_TYPE_USER), 0); /* type */
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_cstring(b, "gregor"), 0); /* key ID */
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_stringb(b, principals), 0); /* principals */
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_u64(b, 0), 0); /* start */
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_u64(b, 0xffffffffffffffffULL), 0); /* end */
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_stringb(b, critopts), 0); /* options */
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_stringb(b, exts), 0); /* extensions */
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_string(b, NULL, 0), 0); /* reserved */
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_stringb(b, ca_buf), 0); /* signature key */
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_sign(sign_key, &sigblob, &siglen,
- sshbuf_ptr(b), sshbuf_len(b), sig_alg, NULL, 0), 0);
+ sshbuf_ptr(b), sshbuf_len(b), sig_alg, NULL, NULL, 0), 0);
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_string(b, sigblob, siglen), 0); /* signature */
free(sigblob);
sshbuf_free(ca_buf);
sshbuf_free(exts);
sshbuf_free(critopts);
sshbuf_free(principals);
sshbuf_free(pk);
}
#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
static void
signature_test(struct sshkey *k, struct sshkey *bad, const char *sig_alg,
const u_char *d, size_t l)
{
size_t len;
u_char *sig;
- ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_sign(k, &sig, &len, d, l, sig_alg, NULL, 0), 0);
+ ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_sign(k, &sig, &len, d, l, sig_alg,
+ NULL, NULL, 0), 0);
ASSERT_SIZE_T_GT(len, 8);
ASSERT_PTR_NE(sig, NULL);
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_verify(k, sig, len, d, l, NULL, 0, NULL), 0);
ASSERT_INT_NE(sshkey_verify(bad, sig, len, d, l, NULL, 0, NULL), 0);
/* Fuzz test is more comprehensive, this is just a smoke test */
sig[len - 5] ^= 0x10;
ASSERT_INT_NE(sshkey_verify(k, sig, len, d, l, NULL, 0, NULL), 0);
free(sig);
}
static void
banana(u_char *s, size_t l)
{
size_t o;
const u_char the_banana[] = { 'b', 'a', 'n', 'a', 'n', 'a' };
for (o = 0; o < l; o += sizeof(the_banana)) {
if (l - o < sizeof(the_banana)) {
memcpy(s + o, "nanananana", l - o);
break;
}
memcpy(s + o, banana, sizeof(the_banana));
}
}
static void
signature_tests(struct sshkey *k, struct sshkey *bad, const char *sig_alg)
{
u_char i, buf[2049];
size_t lens[] = {
1, 2, 7, 8, 9, 15, 16, 17, 31, 32, 33, 127, 128, 129,
255, 256, 257, 1023, 1024, 1025, 2047, 2048, 2049
};
for (i = 0; i < (sizeof(lens)/sizeof(lens[0])); i++) {
test_subtest_info("%s key, banana length %zu",
sshkey_type(k), lens[i]);
banana(buf, lens[i]);
signature_test(k, bad, sig_alg, buf, lens[i]);
}
}
static struct sshkey *
get_private(const char *n)
{
struct sshbuf *b;
struct sshkey *ret;
b = load_file(n);
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(b, "", &ret, NULL), 0);
sshbuf_free(b);
return ret;
}
void
sshkey_tests(void)
{
struct sshkey *k1, *k2, *k3, *kf;
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
struct sshkey *k4, *kr, *kd;
#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
struct sshkey *ke;
#endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */
#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
struct sshbuf *b;
TEST_START("new invalid");
k1 = sshkey_new(-42);
ASSERT_PTR_EQ(k1, NULL);
TEST_DONE();
TEST_START("new/free KEY_UNSPEC");
k1 = sshkey_new(KEY_UNSPEC);
ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1, NULL);
sshkey_free(k1);
TEST_DONE();
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
TEST_START("new/free KEY_RSA");
k1 = sshkey_new(KEY_RSA);
ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1, NULL);
ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1->rsa, NULL);
sshkey_free(k1);
TEST_DONE();
TEST_START("new/free KEY_DSA");
k1 = sshkey_new(KEY_DSA);
ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1, NULL);
ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1->dsa, NULL);
sshkey_free(k1);
TEST_DONE();
#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
TEST_START("new/free KEY_ECDSA");
k1 = sshkey_new(KEY_ECDSA);
ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1, NULL);
ASSERT_PTR_EQ(k1->ecdsa, NULL); /* Can't allocate without NID */
sshkey_free(k1);
TEST_DONE();
#endif
TEST_START("new/free KEY_ED25519");
k1 = sshkey_new(KEY_ED25519);
ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1, NULL);
/* These should be blank until key loaded or generated */
ASSERT_PTR_EQ(k1->ed25519_sk, NULL);
ASSERT_PTR_EQ(k1->ed25519_pk, NULL);
sshkey_free(k1);
TEST_DONE();
TEST_START("generate KEY_RSA too small modulus");
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_generate(KEY_RSA, 128, &k1),
SSH_ERR_KEY_LENGTH);
ASSERT_PTR_EQ(k1, NULL);
TEST_DONE();
TEST_START("generate KEY_RSA too large modulus");
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_generate(KEY_RSA, 1 << 20, &k1),
SSH_ERR_KEY_LENGTH);
ASSERT_PTR_EQ(k1, NULL);
TEST_DONE();
TEST_START("generate KEY_DSA wrong bits");
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_generate(KEY_DSA, 2048, &k1),
SSH_ERR_KEY_LENGTH);
ASSERT_PTR_EQ(k1, NULL);
sshkey_free(k1);
TEST_DONE();
#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
TEST_START("generate KEY_ECDSA wrong bits");
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_generate(KEY_ECDSA, 42, &k1),
SSH_ERR_KEY_LENGTH);
ASSERT_PTR_EQ(k1, NULL);
sshkey_free(k1);
TEST_DONE();
#endif
TEST_START("generate KEY_RSA");
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_generate(KEY_RSA, 767, &kr),
SSH_ERR_KEY_LENGTH);
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_generate(KEY_RSA, 1024, &kr), 0);
ASSERT_PTR_NE(kr, NULL);
ASSERT_PTR_NE(kr->rsa, NULL);
ASSERT_PTR_NE(rsa_n(kr), NULL);
ASSERT_PTR_NE(rsa_e(kr), NULL);
ASSERT_PTR_NE(rsa_p(kr), NULL);
ASSERT_INT_EQ(BN_num_bits(rsa_n(kr)), 1024);
TEST_DONE();
TEST_START("generate KEY_DSA");
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_generate(KEY_DSA, 1024, &kd), 0);
ASSERT_PTR_NE(kd, NULL);
ASSERT_PTR_NE(kd->dsa, NULL);
ASSERT_PTR_NE(dsa_g(kd), NULL);
ASSERT_PTR_NE(dsa_priv_key(kd), NULL);
TEST_DONE();
#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
TEST_START("generate KEY_ECDSA");
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_generate(KEY_ECDSA, 256, &ke), 0);
ASSERT_PTR_NE(ke, NULL);
ASSERT_PTR_NE(ke->ecdsa, NULL);
ASSERT_PTR_NE(EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ke->ecdsa), NULL);
ASSERT_PTR_NE(EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ke->ecdsa), NULL);
TEST_DONE();
#endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */
#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
TEST_START("generate KEY_ED25519");
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_generate(KEY_ED25519, 256, &kf), 0);
ASSERT_PTR_NE(kf, NULL);
ASSERT_INT_EQ(kf->type, KEY_ED25519);
ASSERT_PTR_NE(kf->ed25519_pk, NULL);
ASSERT_PTR_NE(kf->ed25519_sk, NULL);
TEST_DONE();
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
TEST_START("demote KEY_RSA");
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_from_private(kr, &k1), 0);
ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1, NULL);
ASSERT_PTR_NE(kr, k1);
ASSERT_INT_EQ(k1->type, KEY_RSA);
ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1->rsa, NULL);
ASSERT_PTR_NE(rsa_n(k1), NULL);
ASSERT_PTR_NE(rsa_e(k1), NULL);
ASSERT_PTR_EQ(rsa_p(k1), NULL);
TEST_DONE();
TEST_START("equal KEY_RSA/demoted KEY_RSA");
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_equal(kr, k1), 1);
sshkey_free(k1);
TEST_DONE();
TEST_START("demote KEY_DSA");
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_from_private(kd, &k1), 0);
ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1, NULL);
ASSERT_PTR_NE(kd, k1);
ASSERT_INT_EQ(k1->type, KEY_DSA);
ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1->dsa, NULL);
ASSERT_PTR_NE(dsa_g(k1), NULL);
ASSERT_PTR_EQ(dsa_priv_key(k1), NULL);
TEST_DONE();
TEST_START("equal KEY_DSA/demoted KEY_DSA");
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_equal(kd, k1), 1);
sshkey_free(k1);
TEST_DONE();
#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
TEST_START("demote KEY_ECDSA");
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_from_private(ke, &k1), 0);
ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1, NULL);
ASSERT_PTR_NE(ke, k1);
ASSERT_INT_EQ(k1->type, KEY_ECDSA);
ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1->ecdsa, NULL);
ASSERT_INT_EQ(k1->ecdsa_nid, ke->ecdsa_nid);
ASSERT_PTR_NE(EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ke->ecdsa), NULL);
ASSERT_PTR_EQ(EC_KEY_get0_private_key(k1->ecdsa), NULL);
TEST_DONE();
TEST_START("equal KEY_ECDSA/demoted KEY_ECDSA");
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_equal(ke, k1), 1);
sshkey_free(k1);
TEST_DONE();
#endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */
#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
TEST_START("demote KEY_ED25519");
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_from_private(kf, &k1), 0);
ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1, NULL);
ASSERT_PTR_NE(kf, k1);
ASSERT_INT_EQ(k1->type, KEY_ED25519);
ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1->ed25519_pk, NULL);
ASSERT_PTR_EQ(k1->ed25519_sk, NULL);
TEST_DONE();
TEST_START("equal KEY_ED25519/demoted KEY_ED25519");
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_equal(kf, k1), 1);
sshkey_free(k1);
TEST_DONE();
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
TEST_START("equal mismatched key types");
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_equal(kd, kr), 0);
#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_equal(kd, ke), 0);
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_equal(kr, ke), 0);
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_equal(ke, kf), 0);
#endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_equal(kd, kf), 0);
TEST_DONE();
#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
TEST_START("equal different keys");
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_generate(KEY_RSA, 1024, &k1), 0);
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_equal(kr, k1), 0);
sshkey_free(k1);
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_generate(KEY_DSA, 1024, &k1), 0);
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_equal(kd, k1), 0);
sshkey_free(k1);
#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_generate(KEY_ECDSA, 256, &k1), 0);
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_equal(ke, k1), 0);
sshkey_free(k1);
#endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */
#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_generate(KEY_ED25519, 256, &k1), 0);
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_equal(kf, k1), 0);
sshkey_free(k1);
TEST_DONE();
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
sshkey_free(kr);
sshkey_free(kd);
#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
sshkey_free(ke);
#endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */
#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
sshkey_free(kf);
TEST_START("certify key");
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_load_public(test_data_file("ed25519_1.pub"),
&k1, NULL), 0);
k2 = get_private("ed25519_2");
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_to_certified(k1), 0);
ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1->cert, NULL);
k1->cert->type = SSH2_CERT_TYPE_USER;
k1->cert->serial = 1234;
k1->cert->key_id = strdup("estragon");
ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1->cert->key_id, NULL);
k1->cert->principals = calloc(4, sizeof(*k1->cert->principals));
ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1->cert->principals, NULL);
k1->cert->principals[0] = strdup("estragon");
k1->cert->principals[1] = strdup("vladimir");
k1->cert->principals[2] = strdup("pozzo");
k1->cert->principals[3] = strdup("lucky");
ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1->cert->principals[0], NULL);
ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1->cert->principals[1], NULL);
ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1->cert->principals[2], NULL);
ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1->cert->principals[3], NULL);
k1->cert->nprincipals = 4;
k1->cert->valid_after = 0;
k1->cert->valid_before = (u_int64_t)-1;
sshbuf_free(k1->cert->critical);
k1->cert->critical = sshbuf_new();
ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1->cert->critical, NULL);
sshbuf_free(k1->cert->extensions);
k1->cert->extensions = sshbuf_new();
ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1->cert->extensions, NULL);
put_opt(k1->cert->critical, "force-command", "/usr/bin/true");
put_opt(k1->cert->critical, "source-address", "127.0.0.1");
put_opt(k1->cert->extensions, "permit-X11-forwarding", NULL);
put_opt(k1->cert->extensions, "permit-agent-forwarding", NULL);
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_from_private(k2, &k1->cert->signature_key), 0);
- ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_certify(k1, k2, NULL, NULL), 0);
+ ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_certify(k1, k2, NULL, NULL, NULL), 0);
b = sshbuf_new();
ASSERT_PTR_NE(b, NULL);
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_putb(k1, b), 0);
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_from_blob(sshbuf_ptr(b), sshbuf_len(b), &k3), 0);
sshkey_free(k1);
sshkey_free(k2);
sshkey_free(k3);
sshbuf_reset(b);
TEST_DONE();
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
TEST_START("sign and verify RSA");
k1 = get_private("rsa_1");
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_load_public(test_data_file("rsa_2.pub"), &k2,
NULL), 0);
signature_tests(k1, k2, "ssh-rsa");
sshkey_free(k1);
sshkey_free(k2);
TEST_DONE();
TEST_START("sign and verify RSA-SHA256");
k1 = get_private("rsa_1");
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_load_public(test_data_file("rsa_2.pub"), &k2,
NULL), 0);
signature_tests(k1, k2, "rsa-sha2-256");
sshkey_free(k1);
sshkey_free(k2);
TEST_DONE();
TEST_START("sign and verify RSA-SHA512");
k1 = get_private("rsa_1");
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_load_public(test_data_file("rsa_2.pub"), &k2,
NULL), 0);
signature_tests(k1, k2, "rsa-sha2-512");
sshkey_free(k1);
sshkey_free(k2);
TEST_DONE();
TEST_START("sign and verify DSA");
k1 = get_private("dsa_1");
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_load_public(test_data_file("dsa_2.pub"), &k2,
NULL), 0);
signature_tests(k1, k2, NULL);
sshkey_free(k1);
sshkey_free(k2);
TEST_DONE();
#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
TEST_START("sign and verify ECDSA");
k1 = get_private("ecdsa_1");
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_load_public(test_data_file("ecdsa_2.pub"), &k2,
NULL), 0);
signature_tests(k1, k2, NULL);
sshkey_free(k1);
sshkey_free(k2);
TEST_DONE();
#endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */
#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
TEST_START("sign and verify ED25519");
k1 = get_private("ed25519_1");
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_load_public(test_data_file("ed25519_2.pub"), &k2,
NULL), 0);
signature_tests(k1, k2, NULL);
sshkey_free(k1);
sshkey_free(k2);
TEST_DONE();
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
TEST_START("nested certificate");
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_load_cert(test_data_file("rsa_1"), &k1), 0);
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_load_public(test_data_file("rsa_1.pub"), &k2,
NULL), 0);
k3 = get_private("rsa_1");
build_cert(b, k2, "ssh-rsa-cert-v01@openssh.com", k3, k1, NULL);
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_from_blob(sshbuf_ptr(b), sshbuf_len(b), &k4),
SSH_ERR_KEY_CERT_INVALID_SIGN_KEY);
ASSERT_PTR_EQ(k4, NULL);
sshkey_free(k1);
sshkey_free(k2);
sshkey_free(k3);
sshbuf_free(b);
TEST_DONE();
#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
}
diff --git a/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ecdsa_sk1 b/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ecdsa_sk1
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..b51fb73d6386
--- /dev/null
+++ b/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ecdsa_sk1
@@ -0,0 +1,13 @@
+-----BEGIN OPENSSH PRIVATE KEY-----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==
+-----END OPENSSH PRIVATE KEY-----
diff --git a/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ecdsa_sk1-cert.fp b/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ecdsa_sk1-cert.fp
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..d1921451d740
--- /dev/null
+++ b/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ecdsa_sk1-cert.fp
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+SHA256:Go7HO0CVPYG+BSDSk9ZUJBKGSrtBExp6obTa9iqzIUo
diff --git a/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ecdsa_sk1-cert.pub b/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ecdsa_sk1-cert.pub
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..9586c61a7d69
--- /dev/null
+++ b/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ecdsa_sk1-cert.pub
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com 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 ECDSA-SK test key #1
diff --git a/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ecdsa_sk1.fp b/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ecdsa_sk1.fp
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..d1921451d740
--- /dev/null
+++ b/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ecdsa_sk1.fp
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+SHA256:Go7HO0CVPYG+BSDSk9ZUJBKGSrtBExp6obTa9iqzIUo
diff --git a/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ecdsa_sk1.fp.bb b/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ecdsa_sk1.fp.bb
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..cb9f4dd0dc8d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ecdsa_sk1.fp.bb
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+xovem-sacac-dageg-vovoc-symyz-bozal-cibiv-cyvat-vylyn-romib-hoxax
diff --git a/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ecdsa_sk1.pub b/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ecdsa_sk1.pub
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..c3b21e02b1f3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ecdsa_sk1.pub
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256@openssh.com AAAAInNrLWVjZHNhLXNoYTItbmlzdHAyNTZAb3BlbnNzaC5jb20AAAAIbmlzdHAyNTYAAABBBGdVPkKOLUMZ7b6rZfS8BOHotic4NX4MmuyEmiuvkaeKlbb1F+5oNezRYHpcF6P104trNVEONCu1XX1CA7px+QUAAAAEc3NoOg== ECDSA-SK test key #1
diff --git a/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ecdsa_sk1_pw b/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ecdsa_sk1_pw
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..4fa23a7383e3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ecdsa_sk1_pw
@@ -0,0 +1,14 @@
+-----BEGIN OPENSSH PRIVATE KEY-----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+-----END OPENSSH PRIVATE KEY-----
diff --git a/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ecdsa_sk2 b/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ecdsa_sk2
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..19db5a3f5690
--- /dev/null
+++ b/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ecdsa_sk2
@@ -0,0 +1,13 @@
+-----BEGIN OPENSSH PRIVATE KEY-----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==
+-----END OPENSSH PRIVATE KEY-----
diff --git a/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ecdsa_sk2.fp b/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ecdsa_sk2.fp
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..1bc99ea0d7a4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ecdsa_sk2.fp
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+SHA256:pz8VkgtRY3r50F4zSuzRlmq9c6vPTpJXLKKOgkyUcKE
diff --git a/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ecdsa_sk2.fp.bb b/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ecdsa_sk2.fp.bb
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..bfee7658a606
--- /dev/null
+++ b/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ecdsa_sk2.fp.bb
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+xobel-gavur-gorym-pedop-rarob-bunek-gucer-lofeg-syhaf-fylur-zoxix
diff --git a/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ecdsa_sk2.pub b/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ecdsa_sk2.pub
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..2629d9509ed2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ecdsa_sk2.pub
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256@openssh.com AAAAInNrLWVjZHNhLXNoYTItbmlzdHAyNTZAb3BlbnNzaC5jb20AAAAIbmlzdHAyNTYAAABBBJOX5JHqtOCU5mZxCQK0nc936VaKd7Oj+AeTihl1lxNCyYRizvroGVYa4HYHPepBEtrpxew/7gr2QCMAnvN2gVQAAAAEc3NoOg== ECDSA-SK test key #2
diff --git a/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ed25519_sk1 b/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ed25519_sk1
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..4196d9c6a2de
--- /dev/null
+++ b/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ed25519_sk1
@@ -0,0 +1,8 @@
+-----BEGIN OPENSSH PRIVATE KEY-----
+b3BlbnNzaC1rZXktdjEAAAAABG5vbmUAAAAEbm9uZQAAAAAAAAABAAAASgAAABpzay1zc2
+gtZWQyNTUxOUBvcGVuc3NoLmNvbQAAACAhaP5OS1PPOt7uumAvXlDtte9EHbqIT1EZEJ2y
+2v3XMwAAAARzc2g6AAAAuBocY6UaHGOlAAAAGnNrLXNzaC1lZDI1NTE5QG9wZW5zc2guY2
+9tAAAAICFo/k5LU8863u66YC9eUO2170QduohPURkQnbLa/dczAAAABHNzaDoBAAAAQJYq
+lGHhFoA25/q8X/rdTqDAb7dhqs4ehhd/w8x99CwiIWj+TktTzzre7rpgL15Q7bXvRB26iE
+9RGRCdstr91zMAAAAAAAAAFkVEMjU1MTktU0sgdGVzdCBrZXkgIzEBAgM=
+-----END OPENSSH PRIVATE KEY-----
diff --git a/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ed25519_sk1-cert.fp b/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ed25519_sk1-cert.fp
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..a6bb1a99cb32
--- /dev/null
+++ b/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ed25519_sk1-cert.fp
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+SHA256:6WZVJ44bqhAWLVP4Ns0TDkoSQSsZo/h2K+mEvOaNFbw
diff --git a/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ed25519_sk1-cert.pub b/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ed25519_sk1-cert.pub
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..3c72c268df94
--- /dev/null
+++ b/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ed25519_sk1-cert.pub
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+sk-ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com AAAAI3NrLXNzaC1lZDI1NTE5LWNlcnQtdjAxQG9wZW5zc2guY29tAAAAIJr7CuMntQKvHoUshx374fJLFEkyxKsEOBA1H6hk5scoAAAAICFo/k5LU8863u66YC9eUO2170QduohPURkQnbLa/dczAAAABHNzaDoAAAAAAAAACAAAAAIAAAAGanVsaXVzAAAAEgAAAAVob3N0MQAAAAVob3N0MgAAAAA2i4NgAAAAAE0d4eAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAzAAAAC3NzaC1lZDI1NTE5AAAAIOo/0xneV3iM2qWEo5RUwvUYa2bjff292T5vvuXRomGQAAAAUwAAAAtzc2gtZWQyNTUxOQAAAECgsRGLDh1SI3m66MRp9D2iLP4wabQ0OrDgGidk7LsVn2XZHV5jBZN1RtNfe6PBMeVzfRtGUzOg18sO7H7uU+EC ED25519-SK test key #1
diff --git a/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ed25519_sk1.fp b/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ed25519_sk1.fp
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..a6bb1a99cb32
--- /dev/null
+++ b/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ed25519_sk1.fp
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+SHA256:6WZVJ44bqhAWLVP4Ns0TDkoSQSsZo/h2K+mEvOaNFbw
diff --git a/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ed25519_sk1.fp.bb b/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ed25519_sk1.fp.bb
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..1bfe20a4803a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ed25519_sk1.fp.bb
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+xucac-vusip-tydoz-dudad-nerif-raran-tezun-cogyd-pamoh-bahef-ruxix
diff --git a/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ed25519_sk1.pub b/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ed25519_sk1.pub
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..60fe00c3949b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ed25519_sk1.pub
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+sk-ssh-ed25519@openssh.com AAAAGnNrLXNzaC1lZDI1NTE5QG9wZW5zc2guY29tAAAAICFo/k5LU8863u66YC9eUO2170QduohPURkQnbLa/dczAAAABHNzaDo= ED25519-SK test key #1
diff --git a/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ed25519_sk1_pw b/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ed25519_sk1_pw
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..1c29ff07fe5c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ed25519_sk1_pw
@@ -0,0 +1,9 @@
+-----BEGIN OPENSSH PRIVATE KEY-----
+b3BlbnNzaC1rZXktdjEAAAAACmFlczI1Ni1jdHIAAAAGYmNyeXB0AAAAGAAAABDr5R9Yf/
+ucEh0Ns6c34tcIAAAAEAAAAAEAAABKAAAAGnNrLXNzaC1lZDI1NTE5QG9wZW5zc2guY29t
+AAAAICFo/k5LU8863u66YC9eUO2170QduohPURkQnbLa/dczAAAABHNzaDoAAADA2T6owx
+OSgKz4DvLnS3UJ/renbuew5mbkIWB1/y8xd3y5Usm08iUCAlKxep9dVRQvmyoTrc/7rHOM
+DkokNw+WgKambnlYT/9QfqViZ9iCBtbdmhLM6ksUCgQefvquRyXoJxlWstjXUll6Ru+ZbT
+H//Ss8C1bYtAiXR68OQ+rhDrvQxA9P8J1sGIlkuV3h8YXddSpyBW2Sn0LTHHBXYZo86cXZ
+G4Lnc8aGYm65eqdHgkfRmht3eS8DTdzEBfBNH5Ml
+-----END OPENSSH PRIVATE KEY-----
diff --git a/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ed25519_sk2 b/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ed25519_sk2
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..b9b748966bca
--- /dev/null
+++ b/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ed25519_sk2
@@ -0,0 +1,8 @@
+-----BEGIN OPENSSH PRIVATE KEY-----
+b3BlbnNzaC1rZXktdjEAAAAABG5vbmUAAAAEbm9uZQAAAAAAAAABAAAASgAAABpzay1zc2
+gtZWQyNTUxOUBvcGVuc3NoLmNvbQAAACAV8fu1Sc31QLK2R/zGPdN3ve5xuFvDc7mEAWxb
+aI+YcwAAAARzc2g6AAAAuJCMX5uQjF+bAAAAGnNrLXNzaC1lZDI1NTE5QG9wZW5zc2guY2
+9tAAAAIBXx+7VJzfVAsrZH/MY903e97nG4W8NzuYQBbFtoj5hzAAAABHNzaDoBAAAAQObE
+PajcKI1W30EKOhBb6u+Fgx464kf7EjnqDSg4l7gAFfH7tUnN9UCytkf8xj3Td73ucbhbw3
+O5hAFsW2iPmHMAAAAAAAAAFkVEMjU1MTktU0sgdGVzdCBrZXkgIzIBAgM=
+-----END OPENSSH PRIVATE KEY-----
diff --git a/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ed25519_sk2.fp b/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ed25519_sk2.fp
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..1c4369a00768
--- /dev/null
+++ b/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ed25519_sk2.fp
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+SHA256:b9BVPS5vuU4yu/FgweojLLg6zbfmBBoWLUgibdxxsoo
diff --git a/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ed25519_sk2.fp.bb b/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ed25519_sk2.fp.bb
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..f5fd9efd8f9f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ed25519_sk2.fp.bb
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+xemac-tizim-dihep-supar-zupib-cukak-pasis-febeg-dyguv-hutec-dyxox
diff --git a/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ed25519_sk2.pub b/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ed25519_sk2.pub
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..c7ed9f524a49
--- /dev/null
+++ b/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ed25519_sk2.pub
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+sk-ssh-ed25519@openssh.com AAAAGnNrLXNzaC1lZDI1NTE5QG9wZW5zc2guY29tAAAAIBXx+7VJzfVAsrZH/MY903e97nG4W8NzuYQBbFtoj5hzAAAABHNzaDo= ED25519-SK test key #2
diff --git a/regress/unittests/sshsig/Makefile b/regress/unittests/sshsig/Makefile
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..4b607df457ba
--- /dev/null
+++ b/regress/unittests/sshsig/Makefile
@@ -0,0 +1,25 @@
+# $OpenBSD: Makefile,v 1.1 2020/06/19 04:32:09 djm Exp $
+
+PROG=test_sshsig
+SRCS=tests.c
+
+# From usr.bin/ssh
+SRCS+=sshbuf-getput-basic.c sshbuf-getput-crypto.c sshbuf-misc.c sshbuf.c
+SRCS+=sshbuf-io.c atomicio.c sshkey.c authfile.c cipher.c log.c ssh-rsa.c
+SRCS+=ssh-dss.c ssh-ecdsa.c ssh-ed25519.c mac.c umac.c umac128.c hmac.c misc.c
+SRCS+=ssherr.c uidswap.c cleanup.c xmalloc.c match.c krl.c fatal.c
+SRCS+=addrmatch.c bitmap.c sshsig.c
+SRCS+=ed25519.c hash.c ge25519.c fe25519.c sc25519.c verify.c
+SRCS+=cipher-chachapoly.c chacha.c poly1305.c ssh-ecdsa-sk.c ssh-sk.c
+SRCS+=ssh-ed25519-sk.c sk-usbhid.c
+
+SRCS+=digest-openssl.c
+#SRCS+=digest-libc.c
+SRCS+=utf8.c
+
+REGRESS_TARGETS=run-regress-${PROG}
+
+run-regress-${PROG}: ${PROG}
+ env ${TEST_ENV} ./${PROG} ${UNITTEST_ARGS} -d ${.CURDIR}/testdata
+
+.include <bsd.regress.mk>
diff --git a/regress/unittests/sshsig/mktestdata.sh b/regress/unittests/sshsig/mktestdata.sh
new file mode 100755
index 000000000000..d2300f9c6ee1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/regress/unittests/sshsig/mktestdata.sh
@@ -0,0 +1,42 @@
+#!/bin/sh
+# $OpenBSD: mktestdata.sh,v 1.1 2020/06/19 04:32:09 djm Exp $
+
+NAMESPACE=unittest
+
+set -ex
+
+cd testdata
+
+if [ -f ../../../misc/sk-dummy/sk-dummy.so ] ; then
+ SK_DUMMY=../../../misc/sk-dummy/sk-dummy.so
+elif [ -f ../../../misc/sk-dummy/obj/sk-dummy.so ] ; then
+ SK_DUMMY=../../../misc/sk-dummy/obj/sk-dummy.so
+else
+ echo "Can't find sk-dummy.so" 1>&2
+ exit 1
+fi
+
+rm -f signed-data namespace
+rm -f rsa dsa ecdsa ed25519 ecdsa_sk ed25519_sk
+rm -f rsa.sig dsa.sig ecdsa.sig ed25519.sig ecdsa_sk.sig ed25519_sk.sig
+
+printf "This is a test, this is only a test" > signed-data
+printf "$NAMESPACE" > namespace
+
+ssh-keygen -t rsa -C "RSA test" -N "" -f rsa -m PEM
+ssh-keygen -t dsa -C "DSA test" -N "" -f dsa -m PEM
+ssh-keygen -t ecdsa -C "ECDSA test" -N "" -f ecdsa -m PEM
+ssh-keygen -t ed25519 -C "ED25519 test key" -N "" -f ed25519
+ssh-keygen -w "$SK_DUMMY" -t ecdsa-sk -C "ECDSA-SK test key" \
+ -N "" -f ecdsa_sk
+ssh-keygen -w "$SK_DUMMY" -t ed25519-sk -C "ED25519-SK test key" \
+ -N "" -f ed25519_sk
+
+ssh-keygen -Y sign -f rsa -n $NAMESPACE - < signed-data > rsa.sig
+ssh-keygen -Y sign -f dsa -n $NAMESPACE - < signed-data > dsa.sig
+ssh-keygen -Y sign -f ecdsa -n $NAMESPACE - < signed-data > ecdsa.sig
+ssh-keygen -Y sign -f ed25519 -n $NAMESPACE - < signed-data > ed25519.sig
+ssh-keygen -w "$SK_DUMMY" \
+ -Y sign -f ecdsa_sk -n $NAMESPACE - < signed-data > ecdsa_sk.sig
+ssh-keygen -w "$SK_DUMMY" \
+ -Y sign -f ed25519_sk -n $NAMESPACE - < signed-data > ed25519_sk.sig
diff --git a/regress/unittests/sshsig/testdata/dsa b/regress/unittests/sshsig/testdata/dsa
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..7c0063efcdf5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/regress/unittests/sshsig/testdata/dsa
@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
+-----BEGIN DSA PRIVATE KEY-----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+-----END DSA PRIVATE KEY-----
diff --git a/regress/unittests/sshsig/testdata/dsa.pub b/regress/unittests/sshsig/testdata/dsa.pub
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..e77aa7ef41a0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/regress/unittests/sshsig/testdata/dsa.pub
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+ssh-dss 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 DSA test
diff --git a/regress/unittests/sshsig/testdata/dsa.sig b/regress/unittests/sshsig/testdata/dsa.sig
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..0b14ad6b8a7b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/regress/unittests/sshsig/testdata/dsa.sig
@@ -0,0 +1,13 @@
+-----BEGIN SSH SIGNATURE-----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+-----END SSH SIGNATURE-----
diff --git a/regress/unittests/sshsig/testdata/ecdsa b/regress/unittests/sshsig/testdata/ecdsa
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..55fb440e01d4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/regress/unittests/sshsig/testdata/ecdsa
@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
+-----BEGIN EC PRIVATE KEY-----
+MHcCAQEEIFg0ZCSEB5LNeLsXYL25g3kqEWsqh52DR+yNOjyQJqyZoAoGCCqGSM49
+AwEHoUQDQgAE3sud88FV0N8FPspZSV7LWqj6uPPLRZiSsenNuEYAteWPyDgrZsWb
+LzXBuUJucepaCNuW/QWgHBRbrjWj3ERm3A==
+-----END EC PRIVATE KEY-----
diff --git a/regress/unittests/sshsig/testdata/ecdsa.pub b/regress/unittests/sshsig/testdata/ecdsa.pub
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..14ec6cf1230c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/regress/unittests/sshsig/testdata/ecdsa.pub
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+ecdsa-sha2-nistp256 AAAAE2VjZHNhLXNoYTItbmlzdHAyNTYAAAAIbmlzdHAyNTYAAABBBN7LnfPBVdDfBT7KWUley1qo+rjzy0WYkrHpzbhGALXlj8g4K2bFmy81wblCbnHqWgjblv0FoBwUW641o9xEZtw= ECDSA test
diff --git a/regress/unittests/sshsig/testdata/ecdsa.sig b/regress/unittests/sshsig/testdata/ecdsa.sig
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..79781570cda1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/regress/unittests/sshsig/testdata/ecdsa.sig
@@ -0,0 +1,7 @@
+-----BEGIN SSH SIGNATURE-----
+U1NIU0lHAAAAAQAAAGgAAAATZWNkc2Etc2hhMi1uaXN0cDI1NgAAAAhuaXN0cDI1NgAAAE
+EE3sud88FV0N8FPspZSV7LWqj6uPPLRZiSsenNuEYAteWPyDgrZsWbLzXBuUJucepaCNuW
+/QWgHBRbrjWj3ERm3AAAAAh1bml0dGVzdAAAAAAAAAAGc2hhNTEyAAAAZQAAABNlY2RzYS
+1zaGEyLW5pc3RwMjU2AAAASgAAACEAycVNsTlE+XEZYyYiDxWZlliruf/pPMhEEMR/XLdQ
+a4MAAAAhALQt+5gES7L3uKGptHB6UZQMuZ2WyI0C6FJs4v6AtMIU
+-----END SSH SIGNATURE-----
diff --git a/regress/unittests/sshsig/testdata/ecdsa_sk b/regress/unittests/sshsig/testdata/ecdsa_sk
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..62ae44cb09ee
--- /dev/null
+++ b/regress/unittests/sshsig/testdata/ecdsa_sk
@@ -0,0 +1,13 @@
+-----BEGIN OPENSSH PRIVATE KEY-----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+-----END OPENSSH PRIVATE KEY-----
diff --git a/regress/unittests/sshsig/testdata/ecdsa_sk.pub b/regress/unittests/sshsig/testdata/ecdsa_sk.pub
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..385ebf15b142
--- /dev/null
+++ b/regress/unittests/sshsig/testdata/ecdsa_sk.pub
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256@openssh.com AAAAInNrLWVjZHNhLXNoYTItbmlzdHAyNTZAb3BlbnNzaC5jb20AAAAIbmlzdHAyNTYAAABBBKDVa5jRcT5V7E6ysmwVi7HJWh7p5D+hebLPakQcpnD2ajJZ6G/4WzuhlYWnclWY63JspDp299Rlhq5AT86/g8AAAAAEc3NoOg== ECDSA-SK test key
diff --git a/regress/unittests/sshsig/testdata/ecdsa_sk.sig b/regress/unittests/sshsig/testdata/ecdsa_sk.sig
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..86de36063174
--- /dev/null
+++ b/regress/unittests/sshsig/testdata/ecdsa_sk.sig
@@ -0,0 +1,8 @@
+-----BEGIN SSH SIGNATURE-----
+U1NIU0lHAAAAAQAAAH8AAAAic2stZWNkc2Etc2hhMi1uaXN0cDI1NkBvcGVuc3NoLmNvbQ
+AAAAhuaXN0cDI1NgAAAEEEoNVrmNFxPlXsTrKybBWLsclaHunkP6F5ss9qRBymcPZqMlno
+b/hbO6GVhadyVZjrcmykOnb31GWGrkBPzr+DwAAAAARzc2g6AAAACHVuaXR0ZXN0AAAAAA
+AAAAZzaGE1MTIAAAB3AAAAInNrLWVjZHNhLXNoYTItbmlzdHAyNTZAb3BlbnNzaC5jb20A
+AABIAAAAIHohGwyy8iKT3zwd1TYA9V/Ioo7h/3zCJUtyq/Qigt/HAAAAIGzidTwq7D/kFa
+7Xjcp/KkdbIs4MfQpfAW/0OciajlpzARI0Vng=
+-----END SSH SIGNATURE-----
diff --git a/regress/unittests/sshsig/testdata/ecdsa_sk_webauthn.pub b/regress/unittests/sshsig/testdata/ecdsa_sk_webauthn.pub
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..1597302ce70d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/regress/unittests/sshsig/testdata/ecdsa_sk_webauthn.pub
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256@openssh.com AAAAInNrLWVjZHNhLXNoYTItbmlzdHAyNTZAb3BlbnNzaC5jb20AAAAIbmlzdHAyNTYAAABBBBRGwDjs4HhJFcn4tJ5Gr72KcmRmCS1OirETxaXvnsNApgoOLF1a/7rxldfSMHm73eT1nhHe97W8qicPPEAKDJQAAAALbWluZHJvdC5vcmc=
diff --git a/regress/unittests/sshsig/testdata/ecdsa_sk_webauthn.sig b/regress/unittests/sshsig/testdata/ecdsa_sk_webauthn.sig
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..4bdd8edc681a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/regress/unittests/sshsig/testdata/ecdsa_sk_webauthn.sig
@@ -0,0 +1,13 @@
+-----BEGIN SSH SIGNATURE-----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=
+-----END SSH SIGNATURE-----
diff --git a/regress/unittests/sshsig/testdata/ed25519 b/regress/unittests/sshsig/testdata/ed25519
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..b44a63d3ea60
--- /dev/null
+++ b/regress/unittests/sshsig/testdata/ed25519
@@ -0,0 +1,7 @@
+-----BEGIN OPENSSH PRIVATE KEY-----
+b3BlbnNzaC1rZXktdjEAAAAABG5vbmUAAAAEbm9uZQAAAAAAAAABAAAAMwAAAAtzc2gtZW
+QyNTUxOQAAACCJYs0iDdw0Fe/FTzY1b78I4H/j+R6mz2AmLtwTjHYwBAAAAJjpGas/6Rmr
+PwAAAAtzc2gtZWQyNTUxOQAAACCJYs0iDdw0Fe/FTzY1b78I4H/j+R6mz2AmLtwTjHYwBA
+AAAEDpSKRA1QKW6kYiQftGRWh+H0fNekzYLG6c3bzseoCpEolizSIN3DQV78VPNjVvvwjg
+f+P5HqbPYCYu3BOMdjAEAAAAEEVEMjU1MTkgdGVzdCBrZXkBAgMEBQ==
+-----END OPENSSH PRIVATE KEY-----
diff --git a/regress/unittests/sshsig/testdata/ed25519.pub b/regress/unittests/sshsig/testdata/ed25519.pub
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..b078e4516fbe
--- /dev/null
+++ b/regress/unittests/sshsig/testdata/ed25519.pub
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+ssh-ed25519 AAAAC3NzaC1lZDI1NTE5AAAAIIlizSIN3DQV78VPNjVvvwjgf+P5HqbPYCYu3BOMdjAE ED25519 test key
diff --git a/regress/unittests/sshsig/testdata/ed25519.sig b/regress/unittests/sshsig/testdata/ed25519.sig
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..8e8ff2a8ac19
--- /dev/null
+++ b/regress/unittests/sshsig/testdata/ed25519.sig
@@ -0,0 +1,6 @@
+-----BEGIN SSH SIGNATURE-----
+U1NIU0lHAAAAAQAAADMAAAALc3NoLWVkMjU1MTkAAAAgiWLNIg3cNBXvxU82NW+/COB/4/
+keps9gJi7cE4x2MAQAAAAIdW5pdHRlc3QAAAAAAAAABnNoYTUxMgAAAFMAAAALc3NoLWVk
+MjU1MTkAAABAihQsbUzuNEFflk5Tw1+H9aLS7tZQk0RG8KW1DtOmDYYnWe3D3UKiG3fcJa
+DNg4vBWp1j1gLRiBMOF+gwYNegDg==
+-----END SSH SIGNATURE-----
diff --git a/regress/unittests/sshsig/testdata/ed25519_sk b/regress/unittests/sshsig/testdata/ed25519_sk
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..3a434ecb9417
--- /dev/null
+++ b/regress/unittests/sshsig/testdata/ed25519_sk
@@ -0,0 +1,8 @@
+-----BEGIN OPENSSH PRIVATE KEY-----
+b3BlbnNzaC1rZXktdjEAAAAABG5vbmUAAAAEbm9uZQAAAAAAAAABAAAASgAAABpzay1zc2
+gtZWQyNTUxOUBvcGVuc3NoLmNvbQAAACCbGg2F0GK7nOm4pQmAyCuGEjnhvs5q0TtjPbdN
+//+yxwAAAARzc2g6AAAAuBw56jAcOeowAAAAGnNrLXNzaC1lZDI1NTE5QG9wZW5zc2guY2
+9tAAAAIJsaDYXQYruc6bilCYDIK4YSOeG+zmrRO2M9t03//7LHAAAABHNzaDoBAAAAQFXc
+6dCwWewIk1EBofAouGZApW8+s0XekXenxtb78+x0mxoNhdBiu5zpuKUJgMgrhhI54b7Oat
+E7Yz23Tf//sscAAAAAAAAAE0VEMjU1MTktU0sgdGVzdCBrZXkBAgMEBQY=
+-----END OPENSSH PRIVATE KEY-----
diff --git a/regress/unittests/sshsig/testdata/ed25519_sk.pub b/regress/unittests/sshsig/testdata/ed25519_sk.pub
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..71051ec3b217
--- /dev/null
+++ b/regress/unittests/sshsig/testdata/ed25519_sk.pub
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+sk-ssh-ed25519@openssh.com AAAAGnNrLXNzaC1lZDI1NTE5QG9wZW5zc2guY29tAAAAIJsaDYXQYruc6bilCYDIK4YSOeG+zmrRO2M9t03//7LHAAAABHNzaDo= ED25519-SK test key
diff --git a/regress/unittests/sshsig/testdata/ed25519_sk.sig b/regress/unittests/sshsig/testdata/ed25519_sk.sig
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..49b6818da59f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/regress/unittests/sshsig/testdata/ed25519_sk.sig
@@ -0,0 +1,7 @@
+-----BEGIN SSH SIGNATURE-----
+U1NIU0lHAAAAAQAAAEoAAAAac2stc3NoLWVkMjU1MTlAb3BlbnNzaC5jb20AAAAgmxoNhd
+Biu5zpuKUJgMgrhhI54b7OatE7Yz23Tf//sscAAAAEc3NoOgAAAAh1bml0dGVzdAAAAAAA
+AAAGc2hhNTEyAAAAZwAAABpzay1zc2gtZWQyNTUxOUBvcGVuc3NoLmNvbQAAAEAi+7eTjW
+/+LQ2M+sCD+KFtH1n7VFFJon/SZFsxODyV8cWTlFKj617Ys1Ur5TV6uaEXQhck8rBA2oQI
+HTPANLIPARI0Vng=
+-----END SSH SIGNATURE-----
diff --git a/regress/unittests/sshsig/testdata/namespace b/regress/unittests/sshsig/testdata/namespace
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..1570cd548baa
--- /dev/null
+++ b/regress/unittests/sshsig/testdata/namespace
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+unittest
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/regress/unittests/sshsig/testdata/rsa b/regress/unittests/sshsig/testdata/rsa
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..228fad7978e9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/regress/unittests/sshsig/testdata/rsa
@@ -0,0 +1,39 @@
+-----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY-----
+MIIG4wIBAAKCAYEA386lmjRHtJpyj87BrS+ssMmtvc/1SPN0gXTPs9jZ1hYAq98P
+ca3/RYVM4HaSu6COztQJ2ZnZD3Te/XeBnIU2mfuvQEl+DiwisGeNglVyRCi7787f
+PFFfcxzZfDa7EB2qY8S3oaSGZK8QqzuGwmGAImjlQXz6J+HCd/eD/58GoCSSirIE
+CFWCAt+uNrOC/EmgAzsbfcfaIbbVzA40tlgU3hO2J42kddz8CisDTtDKQABFcOaQ
+ZycSfn7HDP+WgXLXXBUI9wVM1Tif1f+9MX08xIsvCvGzo7yLgbbTFLSGr5SkA+tO
+rYuoA7V8fge0id/3pnVtG1Ui3I7vejeAwf0HZqtFeBEnOwkIJFmZeMtFeOVf+4ki
+4h1rDqAvSscNvMtLp6OXpbAATATAuEWEkIQBl1rngnEe0iC9iU9itKMW6qJ4FtIb
+4ACH1EoU1x8vqrFecg2hvqfk5CZBJIbV28JFuGjac3OxBZ17Fqb8ljomUir1GrET
+2z66NMgb5TjDD7BVAgMBAAECggGACfjDGCPMLhfTkuS7bGP7ZcUWoKZrX1y5jCsQ
+NgsraYaBcSb3ITGHdimCS139G68DreN0rOVV7oJejRyOAdNNo367SDn+C9ObmBCF
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+6pwS5tccQPOE65OqF0i+xa19nzbmnC940Y34yZeI/UE+PYaO2+asapvOfu/sboBH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+-----END RSA PRIVATE KEY-----
diff --git a/regress/unittests/sshsig/testdata/rsa.pub b/regress/unittests/sshsig/testdata/rsa.pub
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..30142ac0aee3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/regress/unittests/sshsig/testdata/rsa.pub
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+ssh-rsa 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 RSA test
diff --git a/regress/unittests/sshsig/testdata/rsa.sig b/regress/unittests/sshsig/testdata/rsa.sig
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..15a032e0100b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/regress/unittests/sshsig/testdata/rsa.sig
@@ -0,0 +1,19 @@
+-----BEGIN SSH SIGNATURE-----
+U1NIU0lHAAAAAQAAAZcAAAAHc3NoLXJzYQAAAAMBAAEAAAGBAN/OpZo0R7Saco/Owa0vrL
+DJrb3P9UjzdIF0z7PY2dYWAKvfD3Gt/0WFTOB2krugjs7UCdmZ2Q903v13gZyFNpn7r0BJ
+fg4sIrBnjYJVckQou+/O3zxRX3Mc2Xw2uxAdqmPEt6GkhmSvEKs7hsJhgCJo5UF8+ifhwn
+f3g/+fBqAkkoqyBAhVggLfrjazgvxJoAM7G33H2iG21cwONLZYFN4TtieNpHXc/AorA07Q
+ykAARXDmkGcnEn5+xwz/loFy11wVCPcFTNU4n9X/vTF9PMSLLwrxs6O8i4G20xS0hq+UpA
+PrTq2LqAO1fH4HtInf96Z1bRtVItyO73o3gMH9B2arRXgRJzsJCCRZmXjLRXjlX/uJIuId
+aw6gL0rHDbzLS6ejl6WwAEwEwLhFhJCEAZda54JxHtIgvYlPYrSjFuqieBbSG+AAh9RKFN
+cfL6qxXnINob6n5OQmQSSG1dvCRbho2nNzsQWdexam/JY6JlIq9RqxE9s+ujTIG+U4ww+w
+VQAAAAh1bml0dGVzdAAAAAAAAAAGc2hhNTEyAAABlAAAAAxyc2Etc2hhMi01MTIAAAGACi
+nEpBrQxZi0yOrrT6h98JFfZh0XXioih4fzmvtoV0yOReWClS+otGgXoJyZHcbaKNOjDwSM
+rIkUoX6OUJmtHYP0HRELnKw35m33LdBPXpFGS4tRS7NeSpvc04KtjT6jYXY9FjWy5hcn17
+Sxc/3DnJqLgJBur8acY7FeIzpWmKixPd/dGkEjdWoD9gO6szLczGuQgrOdYmSRL4yKadTJ
+lVjz5OSeKSYYGQy33US2XQassRRNYf4e9byTA3DKvHa/OcTt7lFerea0kZdDpAboqffz7T
+Yaw/hFskAYLIEdTW3aoXBGHSOvu8AkDOtb7qwuxGSQ27pjkDLDNsp1ceCFaCaQ6X83RZuK
+ACv9JUBI5KaSf81e0bs0KezJKkhB9czeZ6dk96qISbgayEBnvhYgXvUDKtHn7HzNlCJKfK
+5ABhNxfGG2CD+NKqcrndwFgS1sQO3hbA84zPQb26ShBovT8ytHBmW1F8ZK4O9Bz61Q6EZK
+vs/u6xP6LUean/so5daa
+-----END SSH SIGNATURE-----
diff --git a/regress/unittests/sshsig/testdata/signed-data b/regress/unittests/sshsig/testdata/signed-data
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..7df4bedd135c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/regress/unittests/sshsig/testdata/signed-data
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+This is a test, this is only a test
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/regress/unittests/sshsig/tests.c b/regress/unittests/sshsig/tests.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..bf59d58d157e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/regress/unittests/sshsig/tests.c
@@ -0,0 +1,139 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: tests.c,v 1.2 2020/06/22 06:00:06 djm Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Regress test for sshbuf.h buffer API
+ *
+ * Placed in the public domain
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/param.h>
+#include <sys/stat.h>
+#include <fcntl.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_STDINT_H
+#include <stdint.h>
+#endif
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#include <openssl/crypto.h>
+
+#include "ssherr.h"
+#include "authfile.h"
+#include "sshkey.h"
+#include "sshbuf.h"
+#include "sshsig.h"
+#include "log.h"
+
+#include "../test_helper/test_helper.h"
+
+static struct sshbuf *
+load_file(const char *name)
+{
+ struct sshbuf *ret = NULL;
+
+ ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_load_file(test_data_file(name), &ret), 0);
+ ASSERT_PTR_NE(ret, NULL);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static struct sshkey *
+load_key(const char *name)
+{
+ struct sshkey *ret = NULL;
+ ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_load_public(test_data_file(name), &ret, NULL), 0);
+ ASSERT_PTR_NE(ret, NULL);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static void
+check_sig(const char *keyname, const char *signame, const struct sshbuf *msg,
+ const char *namespace)
+{
+ struct sshkey *k, *sign_key;
+ struct sshbuf *sig, *rawsig;
+ struct sshkey_sig_details *sig_details;
+
+ k = load_key(keyname);
+ sig = load_file(signame);
+ sign_key = NULL;
+ sig_details = NULL;
+ rawsig = NULL;
+ ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshsig_dearmor(sig, &rawsig), 0);
+ ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshsig_verifyb(rawsig, msg, namespace,
+ &sign_key, &sig_details), 0);
+ ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_equal(k, sign_key), 1);
+ sshkey_free(k);
+ sshkey_free(sign_key);
+ sshkey_sig_details_free(sig_details);
+ sshbuf_free(sig);
+ sshbuf_free(rawsig);
+}
+
+void
+tests(void)
+{
+ struct sshbuf *msg;
+ char *namespace;
+
+#if 0
+ log_init("test_sshsig", SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG3, SYSLOG_FACILITY_AUTH, 1);
+#endif
+
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+ OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms();
+ ERR_load_CRYPTO_strings();
+#endif
+
+ TEST_START("load data");
+ msg = load_file("namespace");
+ namespace = sshbuf_dup_string(msg);
+ ASSERT_PTR_NE(namespace, NULL);
+ sshbuf_free(msg);
+ msg = load_file("signed-data");
+ TEST_DONE();
+
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+ TEST_START("check RSA signature");
+ check_sig("rsa.pub", "rsa.sig", msg, namespace);
+ TEST_DONE();
+
+ TEST_START("check DSA signature");
+ check_sig("dsa.pub", "dsa.sig", msg, namespace);
+ TEST_DONE();
+
+#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
+ TEST_START("check ECDSA signature");
+ check_sig("ecdsa.pub", "ecdsa.sig", msg, namespace);
+ TEST_DONE();
+#endif
+#endif
+
+ TEST_START("check ED25519 signature");
+ check_sig("ed25519.pub", "ed25519.sig", msg, namespace);
+ TEST_DONE();
+
+#if defined(WITH_OPENSSL) && defined(OPENSSL_HAS_ECC)
+ TEST_START("check ECDSA-SK signature");
+ check_sig("ecdsa_sk.pub", "ecdsa_sk.sig", msg, namespace);
+ TEST_DONE();
+#endif
+
+ TEST_START("check ED25519-SK signature");
+ check_sig("ed25519_sk.pub", "ed25519_sk.sig", msg, namespace);
+ TEST_DONE();
+
+#if defined(WITH_OPENSSL) && defined(OPENSSL_HAS_ECC)
+ TEST_START("check ECDSA-SK webauthn signature");
+ check_sig("ecdsa_sk_webauthn.pub", "ecdsa_sk_webauthn.sig",
+ msg, namespace);
+ TEST_DONE();
+#endif
+
+ sshbuf_free(msg);
+ free(namespace);
+}
diff --git a/regress/unittests/sshsig/webauthn.html b/regress/unittests/sshsig/webauthn.html
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..953041e61ecb
--- /dev/null
+++ b/regress/unittests/sshsig/webauthn.html
@@ -0,0 +1,692 @@
+<html>
+<head>
+<meta http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html; charset=utf-8"/>
+<title>webauthn test</title>
+</head>
+<body onload="init()">
+<h1>webauthn test</h1>
+<p>
+This is a demo/test page for generating FIDO keys and signatures in SSH
+formats. The page initially displays a form to generate a FIDO key and
+convert it to a SSH public key.
+</p>
+<p>
+Once a key has been generated, an additional form will be displayed to
+allow signing of data using the just-generated key. The data may be signed
+as either a raw SSH signature or wrapped in a sshsig message (the latter is
+easier to test using command-line tools.
+</p>
+<p>
+Lots of debugging is printed along the way.
+</p>
+<h2>Enroll</h2>
+<span id="error" style="color: #800; font-weight: bold; font-size: 150%;"></span>
+<form id="enrollform">
+<table>
+<tr>
+<td><b>Username:</b></td>
+<td><input id="username" type="text" size="20" name="user" value="test" /></td>
+</tr>
+<tr><td></td><td><input id="assertsubmit" type="submit" value="submit" /></td></tr>
+</table>
+</form>
+<span id="enrollresult" style="visibility: hidden;">
+<h2>clientData</h2>
+<pre id="enrollresultjson" style="color: #008; font-family: monospace;"></pre>
+<h2>attestationObject raw</h2>
+<pre id="enrollresultraw" style="color: #008; font-family: monospace;"></pre>
+<h2>attestationObject</h2>
+<pre id="enrollresultattestobj" style="color: #008; font-family: monospace;"></pre>
+<h2>authData raw</h2>
+<pre id="enrollresultauthdataraw" style="color: #008; font-family: monospace;"></pre>
+<h2>authData</h2>
+<pre id="enrollresultauthdata" style="color: #008; font-family: monospace;"></pre>
+<h2>SSH pubkey blob</h2>
+<pre id="enrollresultpkblob" style="color: #008; font-family: monospace;"></pre>
+<h2>SSH pubkey string</h2>
+<pre id="enrollresultpk" style="color: #008; font-family: monospace;"></pre>
+</span>
+<span id="assertsection" style="visibility: hidden;">
+<h2>Assert</h2>
+<form id="assertform">
+<span id="asserterror" style="color: #800; font-weight: bold;"></span>
+<table>
+<tr>
+<td><b>Data to sign:</b></td>
+<td><input id="message" type="text" size="20" name="message" value="test" /></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+<td><input id="message_sshsig" type="checkbox" checked /> use sshsig format</td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+<td><b>Signature namespace:</b></td>
+<td><input id="message_namespace" type="text" size="20" name="namespace" value="test" /></td>
+</tr>
+<tr><td></td><td><input type="submit" value="submit" /></td></tr>
+</table>
+</form>
+</span>
+<span id="assertresult" style="visibility: hidden;">
+<h2>clientData</h2>
+<pre id="assertresultjson" style="color: #008; font-family: monospace;"></pre>
+<h2>signature raw</h2>
+<pre id="assertresultsigraw" style="color: #008; font-family: monospace;"></pre>
+<h2>authenticatorData raw</h2>
+<pre id="assertresultauthdataraw" style="color: #008; font-family: monospace;"></pre>
+<h2>authenticatorData</h2>
+<pre id="assertresultauthdata" style="color: #008; font-family: monospace;"></pre>
+<h2>signature in SSH format</h2>
+<pre id="assertresultsshsigraw" style="color: #008; font-family: monospace;"></pre>
+<h2>signature in SSH format (base64 encoded)</h2>
+<pre id="assertresultsshsigb64" style="color: #008; font-family: monospace;"></pre>
+</span>
+</body>
+<script>
+// ------------------------------------------------------------------
+// a crappy CBOR decoder - 20200401 djm@openbsd.org
+
+var CBORDecode = function(buffer) {
+ this.buf = buffer
+ this.v = new DataView(buffer)
+ this.offset = 0
+}
+
+CBORDecode.prototype.empty = function() {
+ return this.offset >= this.buf.byteLength
+}
+
+CBORDecode.prototype.getU8 = function() {
+ let r = this.v.getUint8(this.offset)
+ this.offset += 1
+ return r
+}
+
+CBORDecode.prototype.getU16 = function() {
+ let r = this.v.getUint16(this.offset)
+ this.offset += 2
+ return r
+}
+
+CBORDecode.prototype.getU32 = function() {
+ let r = this.v.getUint32(this.offset)
+ this.offset += 4
+ return r
+}
+
+CBORDecode.prototype.getU64 = function() {
+ let r = this.v.getUint64(this.offset)
+ this.offset += 8
+ return r
+}
+
+CBORDecode.prototype.getCBORTypeLen = function() {
+ let tl, t, l
+ tl = this.getU8()
+ t = (tl & 0xe0) >> 5
+ l = tl & 0x1f
+ return [t, this.decodeInteger(l)]
+}
+
+CBORDecode.prototype.decodeInteger = function(len) {
+ switch (len) {
+ case 0x18: return this.getU8()
+ case 0x19: return this.getU16()
+ case 0x20: return this.getU32()
+ case 0x21: return this.getU64()
+ default:
+ if (len <= 23) {
+ return len
+ }
+ throw new Error("Unsupported int type 0x" + len.toString(16))
+ }
+}
+
+CBORDecode.prototype.decodeNegint = function(len) {
+ let r = -(this.decodeInteger(len) + 1)
+ return r
+}
+
+CBORDecode.prototype.decodeByteString = function(len) {
+ let r = this.buf.slice(this.offset, this.offset + len)
+ this.offset += len
+ return r
+}
+
+CBORDecode.prototype.decodeTextString = function(len) {
+ let u8dec = new TextDecoder('utf-8')
+ r = u8dec.decode(this.decodeByteString(len))
+ return r
+}
+
+CBORDecode.prototype.decodeArray = function(len, level) {
+ let r = []
+ for (let i = 0; i < len; i++) {
+ let v = this.decodeInternal(level)
+ r.push(v)
+ // console.log("decodeArray level " + level.toString() + " index " + i.toString() + " value " + JSON.stringify(v))
+ }
+ return r
+}
+
+CBORDecode.prototype.decodeMap = function(len, level) {
+ let r = {}
+ for (let i = 0; i < len; i++) {
+ let k = this.decodeInternal(level)
+ let v = this.decodeInternal(level)
+ r[k] = v
+ // console.log("decodeMap level " + level.toString() + " key " + k.toString() + " value " + JSON.stringify(v))
+ // XXX check string keys, duplicates
+ }
+ return r
+}
+
+CBORDecode.prototype.decodePrimitive = function(t) {
+ switch (t) {
+ case 20: return false
+ case 21: return true
+ case 22: return null
+ case 23: return undefined
+ default:
+ throw new Error("Unsupported primitive 0x" + t.toString(2))
+ }
+}
+
+CBORDecode.prototype.decodeInternal = function(level) {
+ if (level > 256) {
+ throw new Error("CBOR nesting too deep")
+ }
+ let t, l, r
+ [t, l] = this.getCBORTypeLen()
+ // console.log("decode level " + level.toString() + " type " + t.toString() + " len " + l.toString())
+ switch (t) {
+ case 0:
+ r = this.decodeInteger(l)
+ break
+ case 1:
+ r = this.decodeNegint(l)
+ break
+ case 2:
+ r = this.decodeByteString(l)
+ break
+ case 3:
+ r = this.decodeTextString(l)
+ break
+ case 4:
+ r = this.decodeArray(l, level + 1)
+ break
+ case 5:
+ r = this.decodeMap(l, level + 1)
+ break
+ case 6:
+ console.log("XXX ignored semantic tag " + this.decodeInteger(l).toString())
+ break;
+ case 7:
+ r = this.decodePrimitive(l)
+ break
+ default:
+ throw new Error("Unsupported type 0x" + t.toString(2) + " len " + l.toString())
+ }
+ // console.log("decode level " + level.toString() + " value " + JSON.stringify(r))
+ return r
+}
+
+CBORDecode.prototype.decode = function() {
+ return this.decodeInternal(0)
+}
+
+// ------------------------------------------------------------------
+// a crappy SSH message packer - 20200401 djm@openbsd.org
+
+var SSHMSG = function() {
+ this.r = []
+}
+
+SSHMSG.prototype.serialise = function() {
+ let len = 0
+ for (buf of this.r) {
+ len += buf.length
+ }
+ let r = new ArrayBuffer(len)
+ let v = new Uint8Array(r)
+ let offset = 0
+ for (buf of this.r) {
+ v.set(buf, offset)
+ offset += buf.length
+ }
+ if (offset != r.byteLength) {
+ throw new Error("djm can't count")
+ }
+ return r
+}
+
+SSHMSG.prototype.serialiseBase64 = function(v) {
+ let b = this.serialise()
+ return btoa(String.fromCharCode(...new Uint8Array(b)));
+}
+
+SSHMSG.prototype.putU8 = function(v) {
+ this.r.push(new Uint8Array([v]))
+}
+
+SSHMSG.prototype.putU32 = function(v) {
+ this.r.push(new Uint8Array([
+ (v >> 24) & 0xff,
+ (v >> 16) & 0xff,
+ (v >> 8) & 0xff,
+ (v & 0xff)
+ ]))
+}
+
+SSHMSG.prototype.put = function(v) {
+ this.r.push(new Uint8Array(v))
+}
+
+SSHMSG.prototype.putString = function(v) {
+ let enc = new TextEncoder();
+ let venc = enc.encode(v)
+ this.putU32(venc.length)
+ this.put(venc)
+}
+
+SSHMSG.prototype.putSSHMSG = function(v) {
+ let msg = v.serialise()
+ this.putU32(msg.byteLength)
+ this.put(msg)
+}
+
+SSHMSG.prototype.putBytes = function(v) {
+ this.putU32(v.byteLength)
+ this.put(v)
+}
+
+SSHMSG.prototype.putECPoint = function(x, y) {
+ let x8 = new Uint8Array(x)
+ let y8 = new Uint8Array(y)
+ this.putU32(1 + x8.length + y8.length)
+ this.putU8(0x04) // Uncompressed point format.
+ this.put(x8)
+ this.put(y8)
+}
+
+// ------------------------------------------------------------------
+// webauthn to SSH glue - djm@openbsd.org 20200408
+
+function error(msg, ...args) {
+ document.getElementById("error").innerText = msg
+ console.log(msg)
+ for (const arg of args) {
+ console.dir(arg)
+ }
+}
+function hexdump(buf) {
+ const hex = Array.from(new Uint8Array(buf)).map(
+ b => b.toString(16).padStart(2, "0"))
+ const fmt = new Array()
+ for (let i = 0; i < hex.length; i++) {
+ if ((i % 16) == 0) {
+ // Prepend length every 16 bytes.
+ fmt.push(i.toString(16).padStart(4, "0"))
+ fmt.push(" ")
+ }
+ fmt.push(hex[i])
+ fmt.push(" ")
+ if ((i % 16) == 15) {
+ fmt.push("\n")
+ }
+ }
+ return fmt.join("")
+}
+function enrollform_submit(event) {
+ event.preventDefault();
+ console.log("submitted")
+ username = event.target.elements.username.value
+ if (username === "") {
+ error("no username specified")
+ return false
+ }
+ enrollStart(username)
+}
+function enrollStart(username) {
+ let challenge = new Uint8Array(32)
+ window.crypto.getRandomValues(challenge)
+ let userid = new Uint8Array(8)
+ window.crypto.getRandomValues(userid)
+
+ console.log("challenge:" + btoa(challenge))
+ console.log("userid:" + btoa(userid))
+
+ let pkopts = {
+ challenge: challenge,
+ rp: {
+ name: "mindrot.org",
+ id: "mindrot.org",
+ },
+ user: {
+ id: userid,
+ name: username,
+ displayName: username,
+ },
+ authenticatorSelection: {
+ authenticatorAttachment: "cross-platform",
+ userVerification: "discouraged",
+ },
+ pubKeyCredParams: [{alg: -7, type: "public-key"}], // ES256
+ timeout: 30 * 1000,
+ };
+ console.dir(pkopts)
+ window.enrollOpts = pkopts
+ let credpromise = navigator.credentials.create({ publicKey: pkopts });
+ credpromise.then(enrollSuccess, enrollFailure)
+}
+function enrollFailure(result) {
+ error("Enroll failed", result)
+}
+function enrollSuccess(result) {
+ console.log("Enroll succeeded")
+ console.dir(result)
+ window.enrollResult = result
+ document.getElementById("enrollresult").style.visibility = "visible"
+
+ // Show the clientData
+ let u8dec = new TextDecoder('utf-8')
+ clientData = u8dec.decode(result.response.clientDataJSON)
+ document.getElementById("enrollresultjson").innerText = clientData
+
+ // Decode and show the attestationObject
+ document.getElementById("enrollresultraw").innerText = hexdump(result.response.attestationObject)
+ let aod = new CBORDecode(result.response.attestationObject)
+ let attestationObject = aod.decode()
+ console.log("attestationObject")
+ console.dir(attestationObject)
+ document.getElementById("enrollresultattestobj").innerText = JSON.stringify(attestationObject)
+
+ // Decode and show the authData
+ document.getElementById("enrollresultauthdataraw").innerText = hexdump(attestationObject.authData)
+ let authData = decodeAuthenticatorData(attestationObject.authData, true)
+ console.log("authData")
+ console.dir(authData)
+ window.enrollAuthData = authData
+ document.getElementById("enrollresultauthdata").innerText = JSON.stringify(authData)
+
+ // Reformat the pubkey as a SSH key for easy verification
+ window.rawKey = reformatPubkey(authData.attestedCredentialData.credentialPublicKey, window.enrollOpts.rp.id)
+ console.log("SSH pubkey blob")
+ console.dir(window.rawKey)
+ document.getElementById("enrollresultpkblob").innerText = hexdump(window.rawKey)
+ let pk64 = btoa(String.fromCharCode(...new Uint8Array(window.rawKey)));
+ let pk = "sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256@openssh.com " + pk64
+ document.getElementById("enrollresultpk").innerText = pk
+
+ // Success: show the assertion form.
+ document.getElementById("assertsection").style.visibility = "visible"
+}
+
+function decodeAuthenticatorData(authData, expectCred) {
+ let r = new Object()
+ let v = new DataView(authData)
+
+ r.rpIdHash = authData.slice(0, 32)
+ r.flags = v.getUint8(32)
+ r.signCount = v.getUint32(33)
+
+ // Decode attestedCredentialData if present.
+ let offset = 37
+ let acd = new Object()
+ if (expectCred) {
+ acd.aaguid = authData.slice(offset, offset+16)
+ offset += 16
+ let credentialIdLength = v.getUint16(offset)
+ offset += 2
+ acd.credentialIdLength = credentialIdLength
+ acd.credentialId = authData.slice(offset, offset+credentialIdLength)
+ offset += credentialIdLength
+ r.attestedCredentialData = acd
+ }
+ console.log("XXXXX " + offset.toString())
+ let pubkeyrest = authData.slice(offset, authData.byteLength)
+ let pkdecode = new CBORDecode(pubkeyrest)
+ if (expectCred) {
+ // XXX unsafe: doesn't mandate COSE canonical format.
+ acd.credentialPublicKey = pkdecode.decode()
+ }
+ if (!pkdecode.empty()) {
+ // Decode extensions if present.
+ r.extensions = pkdecode.decode()
+ }
+ return r
+}
+
+function reformatPubkey(pk, rpid) {
+ // pk is in COSE format. We only care about a tiny subset.
+ if (pk[1] != 2) {
+ console.dir(pk)
+ throw new Error("pubkey is not EC")
+ }
+ if (pk[-1] != 1) {
+ throw new Error("pubkey is not in P256")
+ }
+ if (pk[3] != -7) {
+ throw new Error("pubkey is not ES256")
+ }
+ if (pk[-2].byteLength != 32 || pk[-3].byteLength != 32) {
+ throw new Error("pubkey EC coords have bad length")
+ }
+ let msg = new SSHMSG()
+ msg.putString("sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256@openssh.com") // Key type
+ msg.putString("nistp256") // Key curve
+ msg.putECPoint(pk[-2], pk[-3]) // EC key
+ msg.putString(rpid) // RP ID
+ return msg.serialise()
+}
+
+async function assertform_submit(event) {
+ event.preventDefault();
+ console.log("submitted")
+ message = event.target.elements.message.value
+ if (message === "") {
+ error("no message specified")
+ return false
+ }
+ let enc = new TextEncoder()
+ let encmsg = enc.encode(message)
+ window.assertSignRaw = !event.target.elements.message_sshsig.checked
+ console.log("using sshsig ", !window.assertSignRaw)
+ if (window.assertSignRaw) {
+ assertStart(encmsg)
+ return
+ }
+ // Format a sshsig-style message.
+ window.sigHashAlg = "sha512"
+ let msghash = await crypto.subtle.digest("SHA-512", encmsg);
+ console.log("raw message hash")
+ console.dir(msghash)
+ window.sigNamespace = event.target.elements.message_namespace.value
+ let sigbuf = new SSHMSG()
+ sigbuf.put(enc.encode("SSHSIG"))
+ sigbuf.putString(window.sigNamespace)
+ sigbuf.putU32(0) // Reserved string
+ sigbuf.putString(window.sigHashAlg)
+ sigbuf.putBytes(msghash)
+ let msg = sigbuf.serialise()
+ console.log("sigbuf")
+ console.dir(msg)
+ assertStart(msg)
+}
+
+function assertStart(message) {
+ let assertReqOpts = {
+ challenge: message,
+ rpId: "mindrot.org",
+ allowCredentials: [{
+ type: 'public-key',
+ id: window.enrollResult.rawId,
+ }],
+ userVerification: "discouraged",
+ timeout: (30 * 1000),
+ }
+ console.log("assertReqOpts")
+ console.dir(assertReqOpts)
+ window.assertReqOpts = assertReqOpts
+ let assertpromise = navigator.credentials.get({
+ publicKey: assertReqOpts
+ });
+ assertpromise.then(assertSuccess, assertFailure)
+}
+function assertFailure(result) {
+ error("Assertion failed", result)
+}
+function linewrap(s) {
+ const linelen = 70
+ let ret = ""
+ for (let i = 0; i < s.length; i += linelen) {
+ end = i + linelen
+ if (end > s.length) {
+ end = s.length
+ }
+ if (i > 0) {
+ ret += "\n"
+ }
+ ret += s.slice(i, end)
+ }
+ return ret + "\n"
+}
+function assertSuccess(result) {
+ console.log("Assertion succeeded")
+ console.dir(result)
+ window.assertResult = result
+ document.getElementById("assertresult").style.visibility = "visible"
+
+ // show the clientData.
+ let u8dec = new TextDecoder('utf-8')
+ clientData = u8dec.decode(result.response.clientDataJSON)
+ document.getElementById("assertresultjson").innerText = clientData
+
+ // show the signature.
+ document.getElementById("assertresultsigraw").innerText = hexdump(result.response.signature)
+
+ // decode and show the authData.
+ document.getElementById("assertresultauthdataraw").innerText = hexdump(result.response.authenticatorData)
+ authData = decodeAuthenticatorData(result.response.authenticatorData, false)
+ document.getElementById("assertresultauthdata").innerText = JSON.stringify(authData)
+
+ // Parse and reformat the signature to an SSH style signature.
+ let sshsig = reformatSignature(result.response.signature, clientData, authData)
+ document.getElementById("assertresultsshsigraw").innerText = hexdump(sshsig)
+ let sig64 = btoa(String.fromCharCode(...new Uint8Array(sshsig)));
+ if (window.assertSignRaw) {
+ document.getElementById("assertresultsshsigb64").innerText = sig64
+ } else {
+ document.getElementById("assertresultsshsigb64").innerText =
+ "-----BEGIN SSH SIGNATURE-----\n" + linewrap(sig64) +
+ "-----END SSH SIGNATURE-----\n";
+ }
+}
+
+function reformatSignature(sig, clientData, authData) {
+ if (sig.byteLength < 2) {
+ throw new Error("signature is too short")
+ }
+ let offset = 0
+ let v = new DataView(sig)
+ // Expect an ASN.1 SEQUENCE that exactly spans the signature.
+ if (v.getUint8(offset) != 0x30) {
+ throw new Error("signature not an ASN.1 sequence")
+ }
+ offset++
+ let seqlen = v.getUint8(offset)
+ offset++
+ if ((seqlen & 0x80) != 0 || seqlen != sig.byteLength - offset) {
+ throw new Error("signature has unexpected length " + seqlen.toString() + " vs expected " + (sig.byteLength - offset).toString())
+ }
+
+ // Parse 'r' INTEGER value.
+ if (v.getUint8(offset) != 0x02) {
+ throw new Error("signature r not an ASN.1 integer")
+ }
+ offset++
+ let rlen = v.getUint8(offset)
+ offset++
+ if ((rlen & 0x80) != 0 || rlen > sig.byteLength - offset) {
+ throw new Error("signature r has unexpected length " + rlen.toString() + " vs buffer " + (sig.byteLength - offset).toString())
+ }
+ let r = sig.slice(offset, offset + rlen)
+ offset += rlen
+ console.log("sig_r")
+ console.dir(r)
+
+ // Parse 's' INTEGER value.
+ if (v.getUint8(offset) != 0x02) {
+ throw new Error("signature r not an ASN.1 integer")
+ }
+ offset++
+ let slen = v.getUint8(offset)
+ offset++
+ if ((slen & 0x80) != 0 || slen > sig.byteLength - offset) {
+ throw new Error("signature s has unexpected length " + slen.toString() + " vs buffer " + (sig.byteLength - offset).toString())
+ }
+ let s = sig.slice(offset, offset + slen)
+ console.log("sig_s")
+ console.dir(s)
+ offset += slen
+
+ if (offset != sig.byteLength) {
+ throw new Error("unexpected final offset during signature parsing " + offset.toString() + " expected " + sig.byteLength.toString())
+ }
+
+ // Reformat as an SSH signature.
+ let clientDataParsed = JSON.parse(clientData)
+ let innersig = new SSHMSG()
+ innersig.putBytes(r)
+ innersig.putBytes(s)
+
+ let rawsshsig = new SSHMSG()
+ rawsshsig.putString("webauthn-sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256@openssh.com")
+ rawsshsig.putSSHMSG(innersig)
+ rawsshsig.putU8(authData.flags)
+ rawsshsig.putU32(authData.signCount)
+ rawsshsig.putString(clientDataParsed.origin)
+ rawsshsig.putString(clientData)
+ if (authData.extensions == undefined) {
+ rawsshsig.putU32(0)
+ } else {
+ rawsshsig.putBytes(authData.extensions)
+ }
+
+ if (window.assertSignRaw) {
+ return rawsshsig.serialise()
+ }
+ // Format as SSHSIG.
+ let enc = new TextEncoder()
+ let sshsig = new SSHMSG()
+ sshsig.put(enc.encode("SSHSIG"))
+ sshsig.putU32(0x01) // Signature version.
+ sshsig.putBytes(window.rawKey)
+ sshsig.putString(window.sigNamespace)
+ sshsig.putU32(0) // Reserved string
+ sshsig.putString(window.sigHashAlg)
+ sshsig.putBytes(rawsshsig.serialise())
+ return sshsig.serialise()
+}
+
+function toggleNamespaceVisibility() {
+ const assertsigtype = document.getElementById('message_sshsig');
+ const assertsignamespace = document.getElementById('message_namespace');
+ assertsignamespace.disabled = !assertsigtype.checked;
+}
+
+function init() {
+ if (document.location.protocol != "https:") {
+ error("This page must be loaded via https")
+ const assertsubmit = document.getElementById('assertsubmit')
+ assertsubmit.disabled = true
+ }
+ const enrollform = document.getElementById('enrollform');
+ enrollform.addEventListener('submit', enrollform_submit);
+ const assertform = document.getElementById('assertform');
+ assertform.addEventListener('submit', assertform_submit);
+ const assertsigtype = document.getElementById('message_sshsig');
+ assertsigtype.onclick = toggleNamespaceVisibility;
+}
+</script>
+
+</html>
diff --git a/scp.0 b/scp.0
index 03e6c65e75f1..826457f6adf8 100644
--- a/scp.0
+++ b/scp.0
@@ -1,183 +1,186 @@
SCP(1) General Commands Manual SCP(1)
NAME
scp M-bM-^@M-^S OpenSSH secure file copy
SYNOPSIS
- scp [-346BCpqrTv] [-c cipher] [-F ssh_config] [-i identity_file]
+ scp [-346ABCpqrTv] [-c cipher] [-F ssh_config] [-i identity_file]
[-J destination] [-l limit] [-o ssh_option] [-P port] [-S program]
source ... target
DESCRIPTION
scp copies files between hosts on a network. It uses ssh(1) for data
transfer, and uses the same authentication and provides the same security
as ssh(1). scp will ask for passwords or passphrases if they are needed
for authentication.
The source and target may be specified as a local pathname, a remote host
with optional path in the form [user@]host:[path], or a URI in the form
scp://[user@]host[:port][/path]. Local file names can be made explicit
using absolute or relative pathnames to avoid scp treating file names
containing M-bM-^@M-^X:M-bM-^@M-^Y as host specifiers.
When copying between two remote hosts, if the URI format is used, a port
may only be specified on the target if the -3 option is used.
The options are as follows:
-3 Copies between two remote hosts are transferred through the local
host. Without this option the data is copied directly between
the two remote hosts. Note that this option disables the
progress meter and selects batch mode for the second host, since
scp cannot ask for passwords or passphrases for both hosts.
-4 Forces scp to use IPv4 addresses only.
-6 Forces scp to use IPv6 addresses only.
+ -A Allows forwarding of ssh-agent(1) to the remote system. The
+ default is not to forward an authentication agent.
+
-B Selects batch mode (prevents asking for passwords or
passphrases).
-C Compression enable. Passes the -C flag to ssh(1) to enable
compression.
-c cipher
Selects the cipher to use for encrypting the data transfer. This
option is directly passed to ssh(1).
-F ssh_config
Specifies an alternative per-user configuration file for ssh.
This option is directly passed to ssh(1).
-i identity_file
Selects the file from which the identity (private key) for public
key authentication is read. This option is directly passed to
ssh(1).
-J destination
Connect to the target host by first making an scp connection to
the jump host described by destination and then establishing a
TCP forwarding to the ultimate destination from there. Multiple
jump hops may be specified separated by comma characters. This
is a shortcut to specify a ProxyJump configuration directive.
This option is directly passed to ssh(1).
-l limit
Limits the used bandwidth, specified in Kbit/s.
-o ssh_option
Can be used to pass options to ssh in the format used in
ssh_config(5). This is useful for specifying options for which
there is no separate scp command-line flag. For full details of
the options listed below, and their possible values, see
ssh_config(5).
AddressFamily
BatchMode
BindAddress
BindInterface
CanonicalDomains
CanonicalizeFallbackLocal
CanonicalizeHostname
CanonicalizeMaxDots
CanonicalizePermittedCNAMEs
CASignatureAlgorithms
CertificateFile
ChallengeResponseAuthentication
CheckHostIP
Ciphers
Compression
ConnectionAttempts
ConnectTimeout
ControlMaster
ControlPath
ControlPersist
GlobalKnownHostsFile
GSSAPIAuthentication
GSSAPIDelegateCredentials
HashKnownHosts
Host
HostbasedAuthentication
HostbasedKeyTypes
HostKeyAlgorithms
HostKeyAlias
Hostname
IdentitiesOnly
IdentityAgent
IdentityFile
IPQoS
KbdInteractiveAuthentication
KbdInteractiveDevices
KexAlgorithms
LogLevel
MACs
NoHostAuthenticationForLocalhost
NumberOfPasswordPrompts
PasswordAuthentication
PKCS11Provider
Port
PreferredAuthentications
ProxyCommand
ProxyJump
PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes
PubkeyAuthentication
RekeyLimit
SendEnv
ServerAliveInterval
ServerAliveCountMax
SetEnv
StrictHostKeyChecking
TCPKeepAlive
UpdateHostKeys
User
UserKnownHostsFile
VerifyHostKeyDNS
-P port
Specifies the port to connect to on the remote host. Note that
this option is written with a capital M-bM-^@M-^XPM-bM-^@M-^Y, because -p is already
reserved for preserving the times and modes of the file.
-p Preserves modification times, access times, and modes from the
original file.
-q Quiet mode: disables the progress meter as well as warning and
diagnostic messages from ssh(1).
-r Recursively copy entire directories. Note that scp follows
symbolic links encountered in the tree traversal.
-S program
Name of program to use for the encrypted connection. The program
must understand ssh(1) options.
-T Disable strict filename checking. By default when copying files
from a remote host to a local directory scp checks that the
received filenames match those requested on the command-line to
prevent the remote end from sending unexpected or unwanted files.
Because of differences in how various operating systems and
shells interpret filename wildcards, these checks may cause
wanted files to be rejected. This option disables these checks
at the expense of fully trusting that the server will not send
unexpected filenames.
-v Verbose mode. Causes scp and ssh(1) to print debugging messages
about their progress. This is helpful in debugging connection,
authentication, and configuration problems.
EXIT STATUS
The scp utility exitsM-BM- 0 on success, andM-BM- >0 if an error occurs.
SEE ALSO
sftp(1), ssh(1), ssh-add(1), ssh-agent(1), ssh-keygen(1), ssh_config(5),
sshd(8)
HISTORY
scp is based on the rcp program in BSD source code from the Regents of
the University of California.
AUTHORS
Timo Rinne <tri@iki.fi>
Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
-OpenBSD 6.7 April 30, 2020 OpenBSD 6.7
+OpenBSD 6.8 August 3, 2020 OpenBSD 6.8
diff --git a/scp.1 b/scp.1
index d5f65af4ebc3..feb839e9c3c8 100644
--- a/scp.1
+++ b/scp.1
@@ -1,265 +1,270 @@
.\"
.\" scp.1
.\"
.\" Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
.\"
.\" Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
.\" All rights reserved
.\"
.\" Created: Sun May 7 00:14:37 1995 ylo
.\"
-.\" $OpenBSD: scp.1,v 1.89 2020/04/30 18:28:37 jmc Exp $
+.\" $OpenBSD: scp.1,v 1.90 2020/08/03 02:43:41 djm Exp $
.\"
-.Dd $Mdocdate: April 30 2020 $
+.Dd $Mdocdate: August 3 2020 $
.Dt SCP 1
.Os
.Sh NAME
.Nm scp
.Nd OpenSSH secure file copy
.Sh SYNOPSIS
.Nm scp
-.Op Fl 346BCpqrTv
+.Op Fl 346ABCpqrTv
.Op Fl c Ar cipher
.Op Fl F Ar ssh_config
.Op Fl i Ar identity_file
.Op Fl J Ar destination
.Op Fl l Ar limit
.Op Fl o Ar ssh_option
.Op Fl P Ar port
.Op Fl S Ar program
.Ar source ... target
.Sh DESCRIPTION
.Nm
copies files between hosts on a network.
It uses
.Xr ssh 1
for data transfer, and uses the same authentication and provides the
same security as
.Xr ssh 1 .
.Nm
will ask for passwords or passphrases if they are needed for
authentication.
.Pp
The
.Ar source
and
.Ar target
may be specified as a local pathname, a remote host with optional path
in the form
.Sm off
.Oo user @ Oc host : Op path ,
.Sm on
or a URI in the form
.Sm off
.No scp:// Oo user @ Oc host Oo : port Oc Op / path .
.Sm on
Local file names can be made explicit using absolute or relative pathnames
to avoid
.Nm
treating file names containing
.Sq :\&
as host specifiers.
.Pp
When copying between two remote hosts, if the URI format is used, a
.Ar port
may only be specified on the
.Ar target
if the
.Fl 3
option is used.
.Pp
The options are as follows:
.Bl -tag -width Ds
.It Fl 3
Copies between two remote hosts are transferred through the local host.
Without this option the data is copied directly between the two remote
hosts.
Note that this option disables the progress meter and selects batch mode
for the second host, since
.Nm
cannot ask for passwords or passphrases for both hosts.
.It Fl 4
Forces
.Nm
to use IPv4 addresses only.
.It Fl 6
Forces
.Nm
to use IPv6 addresses only.
+.It Fl A
+Allows forwarding of
+.Xr ssh-agent 1
+to the remote system.
+The default is not to forward an authentication agent.
.It Fl B
Selects batch mode (prevents asking for passwords or passphrases).
.It Fl C
Compression enable.
Passes the
.Fl C
flag to
.Xr ssh 1
to enable compression.
.It Fl c Ar cipher
Selects the cipher to use for encrypting the data transfer.
This option is directly passed to
.Xr ssh 1 .
.It Fl F Ar ssh_config
Specifies an alternative
per-user configuration file for
.Nm ssh .
This option is directly passed to
.Xr ssh 1 .
.It Fl i Ar identity_file
Selects the file from which the identity (private key) for public key
authentication is read.
This option is directly passed to
.Xr ssh 1 .
.It Fl J Ar destination
Connect to the target host by first making an
.Nm
connection to the jump host described by
.Ar destination
and then establishing a TCP forwarding to the ultimate destination from
there.
Multiple jump hops may be specified separated by comma characters.
This is a shortcut to specify a
.Cm ProxyJump
configuration directive.
This option is directly passed to
.Xr ssh 1 .
.It Fl l Ar limit
Limits the used bandwidth, specified in Kbit/s.
.It Fl o Ar ssh_option
Can be used to pass options to
.Nm ssh
in the format used in
.Xr ssh_config 5 .
This is useful for specifying options
for which there is no separate
.Nm scp
command-line flag.
For full details of the options listed below, and their possible values, see
.Xr ssh_config 5 .
.Pp
.Bl -tag -width Ds -offset indent -compact
.It AddressFamily
.It BatchMode
.It BindAddress
.It BindInterface
.It CanonicalDomains
.It CanonicalizeFallbackLocal
.It CanonicalizeHostname
.It CanonicalizeMaxDots
.It CanonicalizePermittedCNAMEs
.It CASignatureAlgorithms
.It CertificateFile
.It ChallengeResponseAuthentication
.It CheckHostIP
.It Ciphers
.It Compression
.It ConnectionAttempts
.It ConnectTimeout
.It ControlMaster
.It ControlPath
.It ControlPersist
.It GlobalKnownHostsFile
.It GSSAPIAuthentication
.It GSSAPIDelegateCredentials
.It HashKnownHosts
.It Host
.It HostbasedAuthentication
.It HostbasedKeyTypes
.It HostKeyAlgorithms
.It HostKeyAlias
.It Hostname
.It IdentitiesOnly
.It IdentityAgent
.It IdentityFile
.It IPQoS
.It KbdInteractiveAuthentication
.It KbdInteractiveDevices
.It KexAlgorithms
.It LogLevel
.It MACs
.It NoHostAuthenticationForLocalhost
.It NumberOfPasswordPrompts
.It PasswordAuthentication
.It PKCS11Provider
.It Port
.It PreferredAuthentications
.It ProxyCommand
.It ProxyJump
.It PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes
.It PubkeyAuthentication
.It RekeyLimit
.It SendEnv
.It ServerAliveInterval
.It ServerAliveCountMax
.It SetEnv
.It StrictHostKeyChecking
.It TCPKeepAlive
.It UpdateHostKeys
.It User
.It UserKnownHostsFile
.It VerifyHostKeyDNS
.El
.It Fl P Ar port
Specifies the port to connect to on the remote host.
Note that this option is written with a capital
.Sq P ,
because
.Fl p
is already reserved for preserving the times and modes of the file.
.It Fl p
Preserves modification times, access times, and modes from the
original file.
.It Fl q
Quiet mode: disables the progress meter as well as warning and diagnostic
messages from
.Xr ssh 1 .
.It Fl r
Recursively copy entire directories.
Note that
.Nm
follows symbolic links encountered in the tree traversal.
.It Fl S Ar program
Name of
.Ar program
to use for the encrypted connection.
The program must understand
.Xr ssh 1
options.
.It Fl T
Disable strict filename checking.
By default when copying files from a remote host to a local directory
.Nm
checks that the received filenames match those requested on the command-line
to prevent the remote end from sending unexpected or unwanted files.
Because of differences in how various operating systems and shells interpret
filename wildcards, these checks may cause wanted files to be rejected.
This option disables these checks at the expense of fully trusting that
the server will not send unexpected filenames.
.It Fl v
Verbose mode.
Causes
.Nm
and
.Xr ssh 1
to print debugging messages about their progress.
This is helpful in
debugging connection, authentication, and configuration problems.
.El
.Sh EXIT STATUS
.Ex -std scp
.Sh SEE ALSO
.Xr sftp 1 ,
.Xr ssh 1 ,
.Xr ssh-add 1 ,
.Xr ssh-agent 1 ,
.Xr ssh-keygen 1 ,
.Xr ssh_config 5 ,
.Xr sshd 8
.Sh HISTORY
.Nm
is based on the rcp program in
.Bx
source code from the Regents of the University of California.
.Sh AUTHORS
.An Timo Rinne Aq Mt tri@iki.fi
.An Tatu Ylonen Aq Mt ylo@cs.hut.fi
diff --git a/scp.c b/scp.c
index b4492a06206a..6ae17061d69e 100644
--- a/scp.c
+++ b/scp.c
@@ -1,1733 +1,1739 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: scp.c,v 1.210 2020/05/06 20:57:38 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: scp.c,v 1.212 2020/08/03 02:43:41 djm Exp $ */
/*
* scp - secure remote copy. This is basically patched BSD rcp which
* uses ssh to do the data transfer (instead of using rcmd).
*
* NOTE: This version should NOT be suid root. (This uses ssh to
* do the transfer and ssh has the necessary privileges.)
*
* 1995 Timo Rinne <tri@iki.fi>, Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
*
* As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
* can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this
* software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
* incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
* called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
*/
/*
* Copyright (c) 1999 Theo de Raadt. All rights reserved.
* Copyright (c) 1999 Aaron Campbell. All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
* OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
* IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
* INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
* NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
* DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
* THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
* (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
* THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
*/
/*
* Parts from:
*
* Copyright (c) 1983, 1990, 1992, 1993, 1995
* The Regents of the University of California. All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
* 3. Neither the name of the University nor the names of its contributors
* may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software
* without specific prior written permission.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE REGENTS AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
* ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
* ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE REGENTS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
* FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
* DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
* OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
* LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
* OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
* SUCH DAMAGE.
*
*/
#include "includes.h"
#include <sys/types.h>
#ifdef HAVE_SYS_STAT_H
# include <sys/stat.h>
#endif
#ifdef HAVE_POLL_H
#include <poll.h>
#else
# ifdef HAVE_SYS_POLL_H
# include <sys/poll.h>
# endif
#endif
#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TIME_H
# include <sys/time.h>
#endif
#include <sys/wait.h>
#include <sys/uio.h>
#include <ctype.h>
#include <dirent.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
#ifdef HAVE_FNMATCH_H
#include <fnmatch.h>
#endif
#include <limits.h>
#include <locale.h>
#include <pwd.h>
#include <signal.h>
#include <stdarg.h>
#ifdef HAVE_STDINT_H
# include <stdint.h>
#endif
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <time.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#if defined(HAVE_STRNVIS) && defined(HAVE_VIS_H) && !defined(BROKEN_STRNVIS)
#include <vis.h>
#endif
#include "xmalloc.h"
#include "ssh.h"
#include "atomicio.h"
#include "pathnames.h"
#include "log.h"
#include "misc.h"
#include "progressmeter.h"
#include "utf8.h"
extern char *__progname;
#define COPY_BUFLEN 16384
int do_cmd(char *host, char *remuser, int port, char *cmd, int *fdin, int *fdout);
int do_cmd2(char *host, char *remuser, int port, char *cmd, int fdin, int fdout);
/* Struct for addargs */
arglist args;
arglist remote_remote_args;
/* Bandwidth limit */
long long limit_kbps = 0;
struct bwlimit bwlimit;
/* Name of current file being transferred. */
char *curfile;
/* This is set to non-zero to enable verbose mode. */
int verbose_mode = 0;
/* This is set to zero if the progressmeter is not desired. */
int showprogress = 1;
/*
* This is set to non-zero if remote-remote copy should be piped
* through this process.
*/
int throughlocal = 0;
/* Non-standard port to use for the ssh connection or -1. */
int sshport = -1;
/* This is the program to execute for the secured connection. ("ssh" or -S) */
char *ssh_program = _PATH_SSH_PROGRAM;
/* This is used to store the pid of ssh_program */
pid_t do_cmd_pid = -1;
static void
killchild(int signo)
{
if (do_cmd_pid > 1) {
kill(do_cmd_pid, signo ? signo : SIGTERM);
waitpid(do_cmd_pid, NULL, 0);
}
if (signo)
_exit(1);
exit(1);
}
static void
suspchild(int signo)
{
int status;
if (do_cmd_pid > 1) {
kill(do_cmd_pid, signo);
while (waitpid(do_cmd_pid, &status, WUNTRACED) == -1 &&
errno == EINTR)
;
kill(getpid(), SIGSTOP);
}
}
static int
do_local_cmd(arglist *a)
{
u_int i;
int status;
pid_t pid;
if (a->num == 0)
fatal("do_local_cmd: no arguments");
if (verbose_mode) {
fprintf(stderr, "Executing:");
for (i = 0; i < a->num; i++)
fmprintf(stderr, " %s", a->list[i]);
fprintf(stderr, "\n");
}
if ((pid = fork()) == -1)
fatal("do_local_cmd: fork: %s", strerror(errno));
if (pid == 0) {
execvp(a->list[0], a->list);
perror(a->list[0]);
exit(1);
}
do_cmd_pid = pid;
ssh_signal(SIGTERM, killchild);
ssh_signal(SIGINT, killchild);
ssh_signal(SIGHUP, killchild);
while (waitpid(pid, &status, 0) == -1)
if (errno != EINTR)
fatal("do_local_cmd: waitpid: %s", strerror(errno));
do_cmd_pid = -1;
if (!WIFEXITED(status) || WEXITSTATUS(status) != 0)
return (-1);
return (0);
}
/*
* This function executes the given command as the specified user on the
* given host. This returns < 0 if execution fails, and >= 0 otherwise. This
* assigns the input and output file descriptors on success.
*/
int
do_cmd(char *host, char *remuser, int port, char *cmd, int *fdin, int *fdout)
{
int pin[2], pout[2], reserved[2];
if (verbose_mode)
fmprintf(stderr,
"Executing: program %s host %s, user %s, command %s\n",
ssh_program, host,
remuser ? remuser : "(unspecified)", cmd);
if (port == -1)
port = sshport;
/*
* Reserve two descriptors so that the real pipes won't get
* descriptors 0 and 1 because that will screw up dup2 below.
*/
if (pipe(reserved) == -1)
fatal("pipe: %s", strerror(errno));
/* Create a socket pair for communicating with ssh. */
if (pipe(pin) == -1)
fatal("pipe: %s", strerror(errno));
if (pipe(pout) == -1)
fatal("pipe: %s", strerror(errno));
/* Free the reserved descriptors. */
close(reserved[0]);
close(reserved[1]);
ssh_signal(SIGTSTP, suspchild);
ssh_signal(SIGTTIN, suspchild);
ssh_signal(SIGTTOU, suspchild);
/* Fork a child to execute the command on the remote host using ssh. */
do_cmd_pid = fork();
if (do_cmd_pid == 0) {
/* Child. */
close(pin[1]);
close(pout[0]);
dup2(pin[0], 0);
dup2(pout[1], 1);
close(pin[0]);
close(pout[1]);
replacearg(&args, 0, "%s", ssh_program);
if (port != -1) {
addargs(&args, "-p");
addargs(&args, "%d", port);
}
if (remuser != NULL) {
addargs(&args, "-l");
addargs(&args, "%s", remuser);
}
addargs(&args, "--");
addargs(&args, "%s", host);
addargs(&args, "%s", cmd);
execvp(ssh_program, args.list);
perror(ssh_program);
exit(1);
} else if (do_cmd_pid == -1) {
fatal("fork: %s", strerror(errno));
}
/* Parent. Close the other side, and return the local side. */
close(pin[0]);
*fdout = pin[1];
close(pout[1]);
*fdin = pout[0];
ssh_signal(SIGTERM, killchild);
ssh_signal(SIGINT, killchild);
ssh_signal(SIGHUP, killchild);
return 0;
}
/*
* This function executes a command similar to do_cmd(), but expects the
* input and output descriptors to be setup by a previous call to do_cmd().
* This way the input and output of two commands can be connected.
*/
int
do_cmd2(char *host, char *remuser, int port, char *cmd, int fdin, int fdout)
{
pid_t pid;
int status;
if (verbose_mode)
fmprintf(stderr,
"Executing: 2nd program %s host %s, user %s, command %s\n",
ssh_program, host,
remuser ? remuser : "(unspecified)", cmd);
if (port == -1)
port = sshport;
/* Fork a child to execute the command on the remote host using ssh. */
pid = fork();
if (pid == 0) {
dup2(fdin, 0);
dup2(fdout, 1);
replacearg(&args, 0, "%s", ssh_program);
if (port != -1) {
addargs(&args, "-p");
addargs(&args, "%d", port);
}
if (remuser != NULL) {
addargs(&args, "-l");
addargs(&args, "%s", remuser);
}
addargs(&args, "-oBatchMode=yes");
addargs(&args, "--");
addargs(&args, "%s", host);
addargs(&args, "%s", cmd);
execvp(ssh_program, args.list);
perror(ssh_program);
exit(1);
} else if (pid == -1) {
fatal("fork: %s", strerror(errno));
}
while (waitpid(pid, &status, 0) == -1)
if (errno != EINTR)
fatal("do_cmd2: waitpid: %s", strerror(errno));
return 0;
}
typedef struct {
size_t cnt;
char *buf;
} BUF;
BUF *allocbuf(BUF *, int, int);
void lostconn(int);
int okname(char *);
-void run_err(const char *,...);
-int note_err(const char *,...);
+void run_err(const char *,...)
+ __attribute__((__format__ (printf, 1, 2)))
+ __attribute__((__nonnull__ (1)));
+int note_err(const char *,...)
+ __attribute__((__format__ (printf, 1, 2)));
void verifydir(char *);
struct passwd *pwd;
uid_t userid;
int errs, remin, remout;
int Tflag, pflag, iamremote, iamrecursive, targetshouldbedirectory;
#define CMDNEEDS 64
char cmd[CMDNEEDS]; /* must hold "rcp -r -p -d\0" */
int response(void);
void rsource(char *, struct stat *);
void sink(int, char *[], const char *);
void source(int, char *[]);
void tolocal(int, char *[]);
void toremote(int, char *[]);
void usage(void);
int
main(int argc, char **argv)
{
int ch, fflag, tflag, status, n;
char **newargv;
const char *errstr;
extern char *optarg;
extern int optind;
/* Ensure that fds 0, 1 and 2 are open or directed to /dev/null */
sanitise_stdfd();
seed_rng();
msetlocale();
/* Copy argv, because we modify it */
newargv = xcalloc(MAXIMUM(argc + 1, 1), sizeof(*newargv));
for (n = 0; n < argc; n++)
newargv[n] = xstrdup(argv[n]);
argv = newargv;
__progname = ssh_get_progname(argv[0]);
memset(&args, '\0', sizeof(args));
memset(&remote_remote_args, '\0', sizeof(remote_remote_args));
args.list = remote_remote_args.list = NULL;
addargs(&args, "%s", ssh_program);
addargs(&args, "-x");
- addargs(&args, "-oForwardAgent=no");
addargs(&args, "-oPermitLocalCommand=no");
addargs(&args, "-oClearAllForwardings=yes");
addargs(&args, "-oRemoteCommand=none");
addargs(&args, "-oRequestTTY=no");
fflag = Tflag = tflag = 0;
while ((ch = getopt(argc, argv,
- "dfl:prtTvBCc:i:P:q12346S:o:F:J:")) != -1) {
+ "12346ABCTdfpqrtvF:J:P:S:c:i:l:o:")) != -1) {
switch (ch) {
/* User-visible flags. */
case '1':
fatal("SSH protocol v.1 is no longer supported");
break;
case '2':
/* Ignored */
break;
+ case 'A':
case '4':
case '6':
case 'C':
addargs(&args, "-%c", ch);
addargs(&remote_remote_args, "-%c", ch);
break;
case '3':
throughlocal = 1;
break;
case 'o':
case 'c':
case 'i':
case 'F':
case 'J':
addargs(&remote_remote_args, "-%c", ch);
addargs(&remote_remote_args, "%s", optarg);
addargs(&args, "-%c", ch);
addargs(&args, "%s", optarg);
break;
case 'P':
sshport = a2port(optarg);
if (sshport <= 0)
fatal("bad port \"%s\"\n", optarg);
break;
case 'B':
addargs(&remote_remote_args, "-oBatchmode=yes");
addargs(&args, "-oBatchmode=yes");
break;
case 'l':
limit_kbps = strtonum(optarg, 1, 100 * 1024 * 1024,
&errstr);
if (errstr != NULL)
usage();
limit_kbps *= 1024; /* kbps */
bandwidth_limit_init(&bwlimit, limit_kbps, COPY_BUFLEN);
break;
case 'p':
pflag = 1;
break;
case 'r':
iamrecursive = 1;
break;
case 'S':
ssh_program = xstrdup(optarg);
break;
case 'v':
addargs(&args, "-v");
addargs(&remote_remote_args, "-v");
verbose_mode = 1;
break;
case 'q':
addargs(&args, "-q");
addargs(&remote_remote_args, "-q");
showprogress = 0;
break;
/* Server options. */
case 'd':
targetshouldbedirectory = 1;
break;
case 'f': /* "from" */
iamremote = 1;
fflag = 1;
break;
case 't': /* "to" */
iamremote = 1;
tflag = 1;
#ifdef HAVE_CYGWIN
setmode(0, O_BINARY);
#endif
break;
case 'T':
Tflag = 1;
break;
default:
usage();
}
}
argc -= optind;
argv += optind;
+ /* Do this last because we want the user to be able to override it */
+ addargs(&args, "-oForwardAgent=no");
+
if ((pwd = getpwuid(userid = getuid())) == NULL)
fatal("unknown user %u", (u_int) userid);
if (!isatty(STDOUT_FILENO))
showprogress = 0;
if (pflag) {
/* Cannot pledge: -p allows setuid/setgid files... */
} else {
if (pledge("stdio rpath wpath cpath fattr tty proc exec",
NULL) == -1) {
perror("pledge");
exit(1);
}
}
remin = STDIN_FILENO;
remout = STDOUT_FILENO;
if (fflag) {
/* Follow "protocol", send data. */
(void) response();
source(argc, argv);
exit(errs != 0);
}
if (tflag) {
/* Receive data. */
sink(argc, argv, NULL);
exit(errs != 0);
}
if (argc < 2)
usage();
if (argc > 2)
targetshouldbedirectory = 1;
remin = remout = -1;
do_cmd_pid = -1;
/* Command to be executed on remote system using "ssh". */
(void) snprintf(cmd, sizeof cmd, "scp%s%s%s%s",
verbose_mode ? " -v" : "",
iamrecursive ? " -r" : "", pflag ? " -p" : "",
targetshouldbedirectory ? " -d" : "");
(void) ssh_signal(SIGPIPE, lostconn);
if (colon(argv[argc - 1])) /* Dest is remote host. */
toremote(argc, argv);
else {
if (targetshouldbedirectory)
verifydir(argv[argc - 1]);
tolocal(argc, argv); /* Dest is local host. */
}
/*
* Finally check the exit status of the ssh process, if one was forked
* and no error has occurred yet
*/
if (do_cmd_pid != -1 && errs == 0) {
if (remin != -1)
(void) close(remin);
if (remout != -1)
(void) close(remout);
if (waitpid(do_cmd_pid, &status, 0) == -1)
errs = 1;
else {
if (!WIFEXITED(status) || WEXITSTATUS(status) != 0)
errs = 1;
}
}
exit(errs != 0);
}
/* Callback from atomicio6 to update progress meter and limit bandwidth */
static int
scpio(void *_cnt, size_t s)
{
off_t *cnt = (off_t *)_cnt;
*cnt += s;
refresh_progress_meter(0);
if (limit_kbps > 0)
bandwidth_limit(&bwlimit, s);
return 0;
}
static int
do_times(int fd, int verb, const struct stat *sb)
{
/* strlen(2^64) == 20; strlen(10^6) == 7 */
char buf[(20 + 7 + 2) * 2 + 2];
(void)snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "T%llu 0 %llu 0\n",
(unsigned long long) (sb->st_mtime < 0 ? 0 : sb->st_mtime),
(unsigned long long) (sb->st_atime < 0 ? 0 : sb->st_atime));
if (verb) {
fprintf(stderr, "File mtime %lld atime %lld\n",
(long long)sb->st_mtime, (long long)sb->st_atime);
fprintf(stderr, "Sending file timestamps: %s", buf);
}
(void) atomicio(vwrite, fd, buf, strlen(buf));
return (response());
}
static int
parse_scp_uri(const char *uri, char **userp, char **hostp, int *portp,
char **pathp)
{
int r;
r = parse_uri("scp", uri, userp, hostp, portp, pathp);
if (r == 0 && *pathp == NULL)
*pathp = xstrdup(".");
return r;
}
/* Appends a string to an array; returns 0 on success, -1 on alloc failure */
static int
append(char *cp, char ***ap, size_t *np)
{
char **tmp;
if ((tmp = reallocarray(*ap, *np + 1, sizeof(*tmp))) == NULL)
return -1;
tmp[(*np)] = cp;
(*np)++;
*ap = tmp;
return 0;
}
/*
* Finds the start and end of the first brace pair in the pattern.
* returns 0 on success or -1 for invalid patterns.
*/
static int
find_brace(const char *pattern, int *startp, int *endp)
{
int i;
int in_bracket, brace_level;
*startp = *endp = -1;
in_bracket = brace_level = 0;
for (i = 0; i < INT_MAX && *endp < 0 && pattern[i] != '\0'; i++) {
switch (pattern[i]) {
case '\\':
/* skip next character */
if (pattern[i + 1] != '\0')
i++;
break;
case '[':
in_bracket = 1;
break;
case ']':
in_bracket = 0;
break;
case '{':
if (in_bracket)
break;
if (pattern[i + 1] == '}') {
/* Protect a single {}, for find(1), like csh */
i++; /* skip */
break;
}
if (*startp == -1)
*startp = i;
brace_level++;
break;
case '}':
if (in_bracket)
break;
if (*startp < 0) {
/* Unbalanced brace */
return -1;
}
if (--brace_level <= 0)
*endp = i;
break;
}
}
/* unbalanced brackets/braces */
if (*endp < 0 && (*startp >= 0 || in_bracket))
return -1;
return 0;
}
/*
* Assembles and records a successfully-expanded pattern, returns -1 on
* alloc failure.
*/
static int
emit_expansion(const char *pattern, int brace_start, int brace_end,
int sel_start, int sel_end, char ***patternsp, size_t *npatternsp)
{
char *cp;
int o = 0, tail_len = strlen(pattern + brace_end + 1);
if ((cp = malloc(brace_start + (sel_end - sel_start) +
tail_len + 1)) == NULL)
return -1;
/* Pattern before initial brace */
if (brace_start > 0) {
memcpy(cp, pattern, brace_start);
o = brace_start;
}
/* Current braced selection */
if (sel_end - sel_start > 0) {
memcpy(cp + o, pattern + sel_start,
sel_end - sel_start);
o += sel_end - sel_start;
}
/* Remainder of pattern after closing brace */
if (tail_len > 0) {
memcpy(cp + o, pattern + brace_end + 1, tail_len);
o += tail_len;
}
cp[o] = '\0';
if (append(cp, patternsp, npatternsp) != 0) {
free(cp);
return -1;
}
return 0;
}
/*
* Expand the first encountered brace in pattern, appending the expanded
* patterns it yielded to the *patternsp array.
*
* Returns 0 on success or -1 on allocation failure.
*
* Signals whether expansion was performed via *expanded and whether
* pattern was invalid via *invalid.
*/
static int
brace_expand_one(const char *pattern, char ***patternsp, size_t *npatternsp,
int *expanded, int *invalid)
{
int i;
int in_bracket, brace_start, brace_end, brace_level;
int sel_start, sel_end;
*invalid = *expanded = 0;
if (find_brace(pattern, &brace_start, &brace_end) != 0) {
*invalid = 1;
return 0;
} else if (brace_start == -1)
return 0;
in_bracket = brace_level = 0;
for (i = sel_start = brace_start + 1; i < brace_end; i++) {
switch (pattern[i]) {
case '{':
if (in_bracket)
break;
brace_level++;
break;
case '}':
if (in_bracket)
break;
brace_level--;
break;
case '[':
in_bracket = 1;
break;
case ']':
in_bracket = 0;
break;
case '\\':
if (i < brace_end - 1)
i++; /* skip */
break;
}
if (pattern[i] == ',' || i == brace_end - 1) {
if (in_bracket || brace_level > 0)
continue;
/* End of a selection, emit an expanded pattern */
/* Adjust end index for last selection */
sel_end = (i == brace_end - 1) ? brace_end : i;
if (emit_expansion(pattern, brace_start, brace_end,
sel_start, sel_end, patternsp, npatternsp) != 0)
return -1;
/* move on to the next selection */
sel_start = i + 1;
continue;
}
}
if (in_bracket || brace_level > 0) {
*invalid = 1;
return 0;
}
/* success */
*expanded = 1;
return 0;
}
/* Expand braces from pattern. Returns 0 on success, -1 on failure */
static int
brace_expand(const char *pattern, char ***patternsp, size_t *npatternsp)
{
char *cp, *cp2, **active = NULL, **done = NULL;
size_t i, nactive = 0, ndone = 0;
int ret = -1, invalid = 0, expanded = 0;
*patternsp = NULL;
*npatternsp = 0;
/* Start the worklist with the original pattern */
if ((cp = strdup(pattern)) == NULL)
return -1;
if (append(cp, &active, &nactive) != 0) {
free(cp);
return -1;
}
while (nactive > 0) {
cp = active[nactive - 1];
nactive--;
if (brace_expand_one(cp, &active, &nactive,
&expanded, &invalid) == -1) {
free(cp);
goto fail;
}
if (invalid)
fatal("%s: invalid brace pattern \"%s\"", __func__, cp);
if (expanded) {
/*
* Current entry expanded to new entries on the
* active list; discard the progenitor pattern.
*/
free(cp);
continue;
}
/*
* Pattern did not expand; append the finename component to
* the completed list
*/
if ((cp2 = strrchr(cp, '/')) != NULL)
*cp2++ = '\0';
else
cp2 = cp;
if (append(xstrdup(cp2), &done, &ndone) != 0) {
free(cp);
goto fail;
}
free(cp);
}
/* success */
*patternsp = done;
*npatternsp = ndone;
done = NULL;
ndone = 0;
ret = 0;
fail:
for (i = 0; i < nactive; i++)
free(active[i]);
free(active);
for (i = 0; i < ndone; i++)
free(done[i]);
free(done);
return ret;
}
void
toremote(int argc, char **argv)
{
char *suser = NULL, *host = NULL, *src = NULL;
char *bp, *tuser, *thost, *targ;
int sport = -1, tport = -1;
arglist alist;
int i, r;
u_int j;
memset(&alist, '\0', sizeof(alist));
alist.list = NULL;
/* Parse target */
r = parse_scp_uri(argv[argc - 1], &tuser, &thost, &tport, &targ);
if (r == -1) {
fmprintf(stderr, "%s: invalid uri\n", argv[argc - 1]);
++errs;
goto out;
}
if (r != 0) {
if (parse_user_host_path(argv[argc - 1], &tuser, &thost,
&targ) == -1) {
fmprintf(stderr, "%s: invalid target\n", argv[argc - 1]);
++errs;
goto out;
}
}
if (tuser != NULL && !okname(tuser)) {
++errs;
goto out;
}
/* Parse source files */
for (i = 0; i < argc - 1; i++) {
free(suser);
free(host);
free(src);
r = parse_scp_uri(argv[i], &suser, &host, &sport, &src);
if (r == -1) {
fmprintf(stderr, "%s: invalid uri\n", argv[i]);
++errs;
continue;
}
if (r != 0) {
parse_user_host_path(argv[i], &suser, &host, &src);
}
if (suser != NULL && !okname(suser)) {
++errs;
continue;
}
if (host && throughlocal) { /* extended remote to remote */
xasprintf(&bp, "%s -f %s%s", cmd,
*src == '-' ? "-- " : "", src);
if (do_cmd(host, suser, sport, bp, &remin, &remout) < 0)
exit(1);
free(bp);
xasprintf(&bp, "%s -t %s%s", cmd,
*targ == '-' ? "-- " : "", targ);
if (do_cmd2(thost, tuser, tport, bp, remin, remout) < 0)
exit(1);
free(bp);
(void) close(remin);
(void) close(remout);
remin = remout = -1;
} else if (host) { /* standard remote to remote */
if (tport != -1 && tport != SSH_DEFAULT_PORT) {
/* This would require the remote support URIs */
fatal("target port not supported with two "
"remote hosts without the -3 option");
}
freeargs(&alist);
addargs(&alist, "%s", ssh_program);
addargs(&alist, "-x");
addargs(&alist, "-oClearAllForwardings=yes");
addargs(&alist, "-n");
for (j = 0; j < remote_remote_args.num; j++) {
addargs(&alist, "%s",
remote_remote_args.list[j]);
}
if (sport != -1) {
addargs(&alist, "-p");
addargs(&alist, "%d", sport);
}
if (suser) {
addargs(&alist, "-l");
addargs(&alist, "%s", suser);
}
addargs(&alist, "--");
addargs(&alist, "%s", host);
addargs(&alist, "%s", cmd);
addargs(&alist, "%s", src);
addargs(&alist, "%s%s%s:%s",
tuser ? tuser : "", tuser ? "@" : "",
thost, targ);
if (do_local_cmd(&alist) != 0)
errs = 1;
} else { /* local to remote */
if (remin == -1) {
xasprintf(&bp, "%s -t %s%s", cmd,
*targ == '-' ? "-- " : "", targ);
if (do_cmd(thost, tuser, tport, bp, &remin,
&remout) < 0)
exit(1);
if (response() < 0)
exit(1);
free(bp);
}
source(1, argv + i);
}
}
out:
free(tuser);
free(thost);
free(targ);
free(suser);
free(host);
free(src);
}
void
tolocal(int argc, char **argv)
{
char *bp, *host = NULL, *src = NULL, *suser = NULL;
arglist alist;
int i, r, sport = -1;
memset(&alist, '\0', sizeof(alist));
alist.list = NULL;
for (i = 0; i < argc - 1; i++) {
free(suser);
free(host);
free(src);
r = parse_scp_uri(argv[i], &suser, &host, &sport, &src);
if (r == -1) {
fmprintf(stderr, "%s: invalid uri\n", argv[i]);
++errs;
continue;
}
if (r != 0)
parse_user_host_path(argv[i], &suser, &host, &src);
if (suser != NULL && !okname(suser)) {
++errs;
continue;
}
if (!host) { /* Local to local. */
freeargs(&alist);
addargs(&alist, "%s", _PATH_CP);
if (iamrecursive)
addargs(&alist, "-r");
if (pflag)
addargs(&alist, "-p");
addargs(&alist, "--");
addargs(&alist, "%s", argv[i]);
addargs(&alist, "%s", argv[argc-1]);
if (do_local_cmd(&alist))
++errs;
continue;
}
/* Remote to local. */
xasprintf(&bp, "%s -f %s%s",
cmd, *src == '-' ? "-- " : "", src);
if (do_cmd(host, suser, sport, bp, &remin, &remout) < 0) {
free(bp);
++errs;
continue;
}
free(bp);
sink(1, argv + argc - 1, src);
(void) close(remin);
remin = remout = -1;
}
free(suser);
free(host);
free(src);
}
void
source(int argc, char **argv)
{
struct stat stb;
static BUF buffer;
BUF *bp;
off_t i, statbytes;
size_t amt, nr;
int fd = -1, haderr, indx;
char *last, *name, buf[PATH_MAX + 128], encname[PATH_MAX];
int len;
for (indx = 0; indx < argc; ++indx) {
name = argv[indx];
statbytes = 0;
len = strlen(name);
while (len > 1 && name[len-1] == '/')
name[--len] = '\0';
if ((fd = open(name, O_RDONLY|O_NONBLOCK, 0)) == -1)
goto syserr;
if (strchr(name, '\n') != NULL) {
strnvis(encname, name, sizeof(encname), VIS_NL);
name = encname;
}
if (fstat(fd, &stb) == -1) {
syserr: run_err("%s: %s", name, strerror(errno));
goto next;
}
if (stb.st_size < 0) {
run_err("%s: %s", name, "Negative file size");
goto next;
}
unset_nonblock(fd);
switch (stb.st_mode & S_IFMT) {
case S_IFREG:
break;
case S_IFDIR:
if (iamrecursive) {
rsource(name, &stb);
goto next;
}
/* FALLTHROUGH */
default:
run_err("%s: not a regular file", name);
goto next;
}
if ((last = strrchr(name, '/')) == NULL)
last = name;
else
++last;
curfile = last;
if (pflag) {
if (do_times(remout, verbose_mode, &stb) < 0)
goto next;
}
#define FILEMODEMASK (S_ISUID|S_ISGID|S_IRWXU|S_IRWXG|S_IRWXO)
snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "C%04o %lld %s\n",
(u_int) (stb.st_mode & FILEMODEMASK),
(long long)stb.st_size, last);
if (verbose_mode)
fmprintf(stderr, "Sending file modes: %s", buf);
(void) atomicio(vwrite, remout, buf, strlen(buf));
if (response() < 0)
goto next;
if ((bp = allocbuf(&buffer, fd, COPY_BUFLEN)) == NULL) {
next: if (fd != -1) {
(void) close(fd);
fd = -1;
}
continue;
}
if (showprogress)
start_progress_meter(curfile, stb.st_size, &statbytes);
set_nonblock(remout);
for (haderr = i = 0; i < stb.st_size; i += bp->cnt) {
amt = bp->cnt;
if (i + (off_t)amt > stb.st_size)
amt = stb.st_size - i;
if (!haderr) {
if ((nr = atomicio(read, fd,
bp->buf, amt)) != amt) {
haderr = errno;
memset(bp->buf + nr, 0, amt - nr);
}
}
/* Keep writing after error to retain sync */
if (haderr) {
(void)atomicio(vwrite, remout, bp->buf, amt);
memset(bp->buf, 0, amt);
continue;
}
if (atomicio6(vwrite, remout, bp->buf, amt, scpio,
&statbytes) != amt)
haderr = errno;
}
unset_nonblock(remout);
if (fd != -1) {
if (close(fd) == -1 && !haderr)
haderr = errno;
fd = -1;
}
if (!haderr)
(void) atomicio(vwrite, remout, "", 1);
else
run_err("%s: %s", name, strerror(haderr));
(void) response();
if (showprogress)
stop_progress_meter();
}
}
void
rsource(char *name, struct stat *statp)
{
DIR *dirp;
struct dirent *dp;
char *last, *vect[1], path[PATH_MAX];
if (!(dirp = opendir(name))) {
run_err("%s: %s", name, strerror(errno));
return;
}
last = strrchr(name, '/');
if (last == NULL)
last = name;
else
last++;
if (pflag) {
if (do_times(remout, verbose_mode, statp) < 0) {
closedir(dirp);
return;
}
}
(void) snprintf(path, sizeof path, "D%04o %d %.1024s\n",
(u_int) (statp->st_mode & FILEMODEMASK), 0, last);
if (verbose_mode)
fmprintf(stderr, "Entering directory: %s", path);
(void) atomicio(vwrite, remout, path, strlen(path));
if (response() < 0) {
closedir(dirp);
return;
}
while ((dp = readdir(dirp)) != NULL) {
if (dp->d_ino == 0)
continue;
if (!strcmp(dp->d_name, ".") || !strcmp(dp->d_name, ".."))
continue;
if (strlen(name) + 1 + strlen(dp->d_name) >= sizeof(path) - 1) {
run_err("%s/%s: name too long", name, dp->d_name);
continue;
}
(void) snprintf(path, sizeof path, "%s/%s", name, dp->d_name);
vect[0] = path;
source(1, vect);
}
(void) closedir(dirp);
(void) atomicio(vwrite, remout, "E\n", 2);
(void) response();
}
#define TYPE_OVERFLOW(type, val) \
((sizeof(type) == 4 && (val) > INT32_MAX) || \
(sizeof(type) == 8 && (val) > INT64_MAX) || \
(sizeof(type) != 4 && sizeof(type) != 8))
void
sink(int argc, char **argv, const char *src)
{
static BUF buffer;
struct stat stb;
BUF *bp;
off_t i;
size_t j, count;
int amt, exists, first, ofd;
mode_t mode, omode, mask;
off_t size, statbytes;
unsigned long long ull;
int setimes, targisdir, wrerr;
char ch, *cp, *np, *targ, *why, *vect[1], buf[2048], visbuf[2048];
char **patterns = NULL;
size_t n, npatterns = 0;
struct timeval tv[2];
#define atime tv[0]
#define mtime tv[1]
#define SCREWUP(str) { why = str; goto screwup; }
if (TYPE_OVERFLOW(time_t, 0) || TYPE_OVERFLOW(off_t, 0))
SCREWUP("Unexpected off_t/time_t size");
setimes = targisdir = 0;
mask = umask(0);
if (!pflag)
(void) umask(mask);
if (argc != 1) {
run_err("ambiguous target");
exit(1);
}
targ = *argv;
if (targetshouldbedirectory)
verifydir(targ);
(void) atomicio(vwrite, remout, "", 1);
if (stat(targ, &stb) == 0 && S_ISDIR(stb.st_mode))
targisdir = 1;
if (src != NULL && !iamrecursive && !Tflag) {
/*
* Prepare to try to restrict incoming filenames to match
* the requested destination file glob.
*/
if (brace_expand(src, &patterns, &npatterns) != 0)
fatal("%s: could not expand pattern", __func__);
}
for (first = 1;; first = 0) {
cp = buf;
if (atomicio(read, remin, cp, 1) != 1)
goto done;
if (*cp++ == '\n')
SCREWUP("unexpected <newline>");
do {
if (atomicio(read, remin, &ch, sizeof(ch)) != sizeof(ch))
SCREWUP("lost connection");
*cp++ = ch;
} while (cp < &buf[sizeof(buf) - 1] && ch != '\n');
*cp = 0;
if (verbose_mode)
fmprintf(stderr, "Sink: %s", buf);
if (buf[0] == '\01' || buf[0] == '\02') {
if (iamremote == 0) {
(void) snmprintf(visbuf, sizeof(visbuf),
NULL, "%s", buf + 1);
(void) atomicio(vwrite, STDERR_FILENO,
visbuf, strlen(visbuf));
}
if (buf[0] == '\02')
exit(1);
++errs;
continue;
}
if (buf[0] == 'E') {
(void) atomicio(vwrite, remout, "", 1);
goto done;
}
if (ch == '\n')
*--cp = 0;
cp = buf;
if (*cp == 'T') {
setimes++;
cp++;
if (!isdigit((unsigned char)*cp))
SCREWUP("mtime.sec not present");
ull = strtoull(cp, &cp, 10);
if (!cp || *cp++ != ' ')
SCREWUP("mtime.sec not delimited");
if (TYPE_OVERFLOW(time_t, ull))
setimes = 0; /* out of range */
mtime.tv_sec = ull;
mtime.tv_usec = strtol(cp, &cp, 10);
if (!cp || *cp++ != ' ' || mtime.tv_usec < 0 ||
mtime.tv_usec > 999999)
SCREWUP("mtime.usec not delimited");
if (!isdigit((unsigned char)*cp))
SCREWUP("atime.sec not present");
ull = strtoull(cp, &cp, 10);
if (!cp || *cp++ != ' ')
SCREWUP("atime.sec not delimited");
if (TYPE_OVERFLOW(time_t, ull))
setimes = 0; /* out of range */
atime.tv_sec = ull;
atime.tv_usec = strtol(cp, &cp, 10);
if (!cp || *cp++ != '\0' || atime.tv_usec < 0 ||
atime.tv_usec > 999999)
SCREWUP("atime.usec not delimited");
(void) atomicio(vwrite, remout, "", 1);
continue;
}
if (*cp != 'C' && *cp != 'D') {
/*
* Check for the case "rcp remote:foo\* local:bar".
* In this case, the line "No match." can be returned
* by the shell before the rcp command on the remote is
* executed so the ^Aerror_message convention isn't
* followed.
*/
if (first) {
run_err("%s", cp);
exit(1);
}
SCREWUP("expected control record");
}
mode = 0;
for (++cp; cp < buf + 5; cp++) {
if (*cp < '0' || *cp > '7')
SCREWUP("bad mode");
mode = (mode << 3) | (*cp - '0');
}
if (!pflag)
mode &= ~mask;
if (*cp++ != ' ')
SCREWUP("mode not delimited");
if (!isdigit((unsigned char)*cp))
SCREWUP("size not present");
ull = strtoull(cp, &cp, 10);
if (!cp || *cp++ != ' ')
SCREWUP("size not delimited");
if (TYPE_OVERFLOW(off_t, ull))
SCREWUP("size out of range");
size = (off_t)ull;
if (*cp == '\0' || strchr(cp, '/') != NULL ||
strcmp(cp, ".") == 0 || strcmp(cp, "..") == 0) {
run_err("error: unexpected filename: %s", cp);
exit(1);
}
if (npatterns > 0) {
for (n = 0; n < npatterns; n++) {
if (fnmatch(patterns[n], cp, 0) == 0)
break;
}
if (n >= npatterns)
SCREWUP("filename does not match request");
}
if (targisdir) {
static char *namebuf;
static size_t cursize;
size_t need;
need = strlen(targ) + strlen(cp) + 250;
if (need > cursize) {
free(namebuf);
namebuf = xmalloc(need);
cursize = need;
}
(void) snprintf(namebuf, need, "%s%s%s", targ,
strcmp(targ, "/") ? "/" : "", cp);
np = namebuf;
} else
np = targ;
curfile = cp;
exists = stat(np, &stb) == 0;
if (buf[0] == 'D') {
int mod_flag = pflag;
if (!iamrecursive)
SCREWUP("received directory without -r");
if (exists) {
if (!S_ISDIR(stb.st_mode)) {
errno = ENOTDIR;
goto bad;
}
if (pflag)
(void) chmod(np, mode);
} else {
/* Handle copying from a read-only
directory */
mod_flag = 1;
if (mkdir(np, mode | S_IRWXU) == -1)
goto bad;
}
vect[0] = xstrdup(np);
sink(1, vect, src);
if (setimes) {
setimes = 0;
(void) utimes(vect[0], tv);
}
if (mod_flag)
(void) chmod(vect[0], mode);
free(vect[0]);
continue;
}
omode = mode;
mode |= S_IWUSR;
if ((ofd = open(np, O_WRONLY|O_CREAT, mode)) == -1) {
bad: run_err("%s: %s", np, strerror(errno));
continue;
}
(void) atomicio(vwrite, remout, "", 1);
if ((bp = allocbuf(&buffer, ofd, COPY_BUFLEN)) == NULL) {
(void) close(ofd);
continue;
}
cp = bp->buf;
wrerr = 0;
/*
* NB. do not use run_err() unless immediately followed by
* exit() below as it may send a spurious reply that might
* desyncronise us from the peer. Use note_err() instead.
*/
statbytes = 0;
if (showprogress)
start_progress_meter(curfile, size, &statbytes);
set_nonblock(remin);
for (count = i = 0; i < size; i += bp->cnt) {
amt = bp->cnt;
if (i + amt > size)
amt = size - i;
count += amt;
do {
j = atomicio6(read, remin, cp, amt,
scpio, &statbytes);
if (j == 0) {
run_err("%s", j != EPIPE ?
strerror(errno) :
"dropped connection");
exit(1);
}
amt -= j;
cp += j;
} while (amt > 0);
if (count == bp->cnt) {
/* Keep reading so we stay sync'd up. */
if (!wrerr) {
if (atomicio(vwrite, ofd, bp->buf,
count) != count) {
note_err("%s: %s", np,
strerror(errno));
wrerr = 1;
}
}
count = 0;
cp = bp->buf;
}
}
unset_nonblock(remin);
if (count != 0 && !wrerr &&
atomicio(vwrite, ofd, bp->buf, count) != count) {
note_err("%s: %s", np, strerror(errno));
wrerr = 1;
}
if (!wrerr && (!exists || S_ISREG(stb.st_mode)) &&
ftruncate(ofd, size) != 0)
note_err("%s: truncate: %s", np, strerror(errno));
if (pflag) {
if (exists || omode != mode)
#ifdef HAVE_FCHMOD
if (fchmod(ofd, omode)) {
#else /* HAVE_FCHMOD */
if (chmod(np, omode)) {
#endif /* HAVE_FCHMOD */
note_err("%s: set mode: %s",
np, strerror(errno));
}
} else {
if (!exists && omode != mode)
#ifdef HAVE_FCHMOD
if (fchmod(ofd, omode & ~mask)) {
#else /* HAVE_FCHMOD */
if (chmod(np, omode & ~mask)) {
#endif /* HAVE_FCHMOD */
note_err("%s: set mode: %s",
np, strerror(errno));
}
}
if (close(ofd) == -1)
- note_err(np, "%s: close: %s", np, strerror(errno));
+ note_err("%s: close: %s", np, strerror(errno));
(void) response();
if (showprogress)
stop_progress_meter();
if (setimes && !wrerr) {
setimes = 0;
if (utimes(np, tv) == -1) {
note_err("%s: set times: %s",
np, strerror(errno));
}
}
/* If no error was noted then signal success for this file */
if (note_err(NULL) == 0)
(void) atomicio(vwrite, remout, "", 1);
}
done:
for (n = 0; n < npatterns; n++)
free(patterns[n]);
free(patterns);
return;
screwup:
for (n = 0; n < npatterns; n++)
free(patterns[n]);
free(patterns);
run_err("protocol error: %s", why);
exit(1);
}
int
response(void)
{
char ch, *cp, resp, rbuf[2048], visbuf[2048];
if (atomicio(read, remin, &resp, sizeof(resp)) != sizeof(resp))
lostconn(0);
cp = rbuf;
switch (resp) {
case 0: /* ok */
return (0);
default:
*cp++ = resp;
/* FALLTHROUGH */
case 1: /* error, followed by error msg */
case 2: /* fatal error, "" */
do {
if (atomicio(read, remin, &ch, sizeof(ch)) != sizeof(ch))
lostconn(0);
*cp++ = ch;
} while (cp < &rbuf[sizeof(rbuf) - 1] && ch != '\n');
if (!iamremote) {
cp[-1] = '\0';
(void) snmprintf(visbuf, sizeof(visbuf),
NULL, "%s\n", rbuf);
(void) atomicio(vwrite, STDERR_FILENO,
visbuf, strlen(visbuf));
}
++errs;
if (resp == 1)
return (-1);
exit(1);
}
/* NOTREACHED */
}
void
usage(void)
{
(void) fprintf(stderr,
- "usage: scp [-346BCpqrTv] [-c cipher] [-F ssh_config] [-i identity_file]\n"
+ "usage: scp [-346ABCpqrTv] [-c cipher] [-F ssh_config] [-i identity_file]\n"
" [-J destination] [-l limit] [-o ssh_option] [-P port]\n"
" [-S program] source ... target\n");
exit(1);
}
void
run_err(const char *fmt,...)
{
static FILE *fp;
va_list ap;
++errs;
if (fp != NULL || (remout != -1 && (fp = fdopen(remout, "w")))) {
(void) fprintf(fp, "%c", 0x01);
(void) fprintf(fp, "scp: ");
va_start(ap, fmt);
(void) vfprintf(fp, fmt, ap);
va_end(ap);
(void) fprintf(fp, "\n");
(void) fflush(fp);
}
if (!iamremote) {
va_start(ap, fmt);
vfmprintf(stderr, fmt, ap);
va_end(ap);
fprintf(stderr, "\n");
}
}
/*
* Notes a sink error for sending at the end of a file transfer. Returns 0 if
* no error has been noted or -1 otherwise. Use note_err(NULL) to flush
* any active error at the end of the transfer.
*/
int
note_err(const char *fmt, ...)
{
static char *emsg;
va_list ap;
/* Replay any previously-noted error */
if (fmt == NULL) {
if (emsg == NULL)
return 0;
run_err("%s", emsg);
free(emsg);
emsg = NULL;
return -1;
}
errs++;
/* Prefer first-noted error */
if (emsg != NULL)
return -1;
va_start(ap, fmt);
vasnmprintf(&emsg, INT_MAX, NULL, fmt, ap);
va_end(ap);
return -1;
}
void
verifydir(char *cp)
{
struct stat stb;
if (!stat(cp, &stb)) {
if (S_ISDIR(stb.st_mode))
return;
errno = ENOTDIR;
}
run_err("%s: %s", cp, strerror(errno));
killchild(0);
}
int
okname(char *cp0)
{
int c;
char *cp;
cp = cp0;
do {
c = (int)*cp;
if (c & 0200)
goto bad;
if (!isalpha(c) && !isdigit((unsigned char)c)) {
switch (c) {
case '\'':
case '"':
case '`':
case ' ':
case '#':
goto bad;
default:
break;
}
}
} while (*++cp);
return (1);
bad: fmprintf(stderr, "%s: invalid user name\n", cp0);
return (0);
}
BUF *
allocbuf(BUF *bp, int fd, int blksize)
{
size_t size;
#ifdef HAVE_STRUCT_STAT_ST_BLKSIZE
struct stat stb;
if (fstat(fd, &stb) == -1) {
run_err("fstat: %s", strerror(errno));
return (0);
}
size = ROUNDUP(stb.st_blksize, blksize);
if (size == 0)
size = blksize;
#else /* HAVE_STRUCT_STAT_ST_BLKSIZE */
size = blksize;
#endif /* HAVE_STRUCT_STAT_ST_BLKSIZE */
if (bp->cnt >= size)
return (bp);
bp->buf = xrecallocarray(bp->buf, bp->cnt, size, 1);
bp->cnt = size;
return (bp);
}
void
lostconn(int signo)
{
if (!iamremote)
(void)write(STDERR_FILENO, "lost connection\n", 16);
if (signo)
_exit(1);
else
exit(1);
}
diff --git a/servconf.c b/servconf.c
index ba0a92c7b306..f08e37477957 100644
--- a/servconf.c
+++ b/servconf.c
@@ -1,2924 +1,2943 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: servconf.c,v 1.363 2020/04/17 03:30:05 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: servconf.c,v 1.369 2020/08/28 03:15:52 dtucker Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
* All rights reserved
*
* As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
* can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this
* software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
* incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
* called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
*/
#include "includes.h"
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/socket.h>
+#include <sys/stat.h>
#ifdef __OpenBSD__
#include <sys/sysctl.h>
#endif
#include <netinet/in.h>
#include <netinet/in_systm.h>
#include <netinet/ip.h>
#ifdef HAVE_NET_ROUTE_H
#include <net/route.h>
#endif
#include <ctype.h>
#include <netdb.h>
#include <pwd.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <signal.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <limits.h>
#include <stdarg.h>
#include <errno.h>
#ifdef HAVE_UTIL_H
#include <util.h>
#endif
#ifdef USE_SYSTEM_GLOB
# include <glob.h>
#else
# include "openbsd-compat/glob.h"
#endif
#include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h"
#include "xmalloc.h"
#include "ssh.h"
#include "log.h"
#include "sshbuf.h"
#include "misc.h"
#include "servconf.h"
#include "compat.h"
#include "pathnames.h"
#include "cipher.h"
#include "sshkey.h"
#include "kex.h"
#include "mac.h"
#include "match.h"
#include "channels.h"
#include "groupaccess.h"
#include "canohost.h"
#include "packet.h"
#include "ssherr.h"
#include "hostfile.h"
#include "auth.h"
#include "myproposal.h"
#include "digest.h"
static void add_listen_addr(ServerOptions *, const char *,
const char *, int);
static void add_one_listen_addr(ServerOptions *, const char *,
const char *, int);
-void parse_server_config_depth(ServerOptions *options, const char *filename,
- struct sshbuf *conf, struct include_list *includes,
+static void parse_server_config_depth(ServerOptions *options,
+ const char *filename, struct sshbuf *conf, struct include_list *includes,
struct connection_info *connectinfo, int flags, int *activep, int depth);
/* Use of privilege separation or not */
extern int use_privsep;
extern struct sshbuf *cfg;
/* Initializes the server options to their default values. */
void
initialize_server_options(ServerOptions *options)
{
memset(options, 0, sizeof(*options));
/* Portable-specific options */
options->use_pam = -1;
/* Standard Options */
options->num_ports = 0;
options->ports_from_cmdline = 0;
options->queued_listen_addrs = NULL;
options->num_queued_listens = 0;
options->listen_addrs = NULL;
options->num_listen_addrs = 0;
options->address_family = -1;
options->routing_domain = NULL;
options->num_host_key_files = 0;
options->num_host_cert_files = 0;
options->host_key_agent = NULL;
options->pid_file = NULL;
options->login_grace_time = -1;
options->permit_root_login = PERMIT_NOT_SET;
options->ignore_rhosts = -1;
options->ignore_user_known_hosts = -1;
options->print_motd = -1;
options->print_lastlog = -1;
options->x11_forwarding = -1;
options->x11_display_offset = -1;
options->x11_use_localhost = -1;
options->permit_tty = -1;
options->permit_user_rc = -1;
options->xauth_location = NULL;
options->strict_modes = -1;
options->tcp_keep_alive = -1;
options->log_facility = SYSLOG_FACILITY_NOT_SET;
options->log_level = SYSLOG_LEVEL_NOT_SET;
options->hostbased_authentication = -1;
options->hostbased_uses_name_from_packet_only = -1;
options->hostbased_key_types = NULL;
options->hostkeyalgorithms = NULL;
options->pubkey_authentication = -1;
options->pubkey_auth_options = -1;
options->pubkey_key_types = NULL;
options->kerberos_authentication = -1;
options->kerberos_or_local_passwd = -1;
options->kerberos_ticket_cleanup = -1;
options->kerberos_get_afs_token = -1;
options->gss_authentication=-1;
options->gss_cleanup_creds = -1;
options->gss_strict_acceptor = -1;
options->password_authentication = -1;
options->kbd_interactive_authentication = -1;
options->challenge_response_authentication = -1;
options->permit_empty_passwd = -1;
options->permit_user_env = -1;
- options->permit_user_env_whitelist = NULL;
+ options->permit_user_env_allowlist = NULL;
options->compression = -1;
options->rekey_limit = -1;
options->rekey_interval = -1;
options->allow_tcp_forwarding = -1;
options->allow_streamlocal_forwarding = -1;
options->allow_agent_forwarding = -1;
options->num_allow_users = 0;
options->num_deny_users = 0;
options->num_allow_groups = 0;
options->num_deny_groups = 0;
options->ciphers = NULL;
options->macs = NULL;
options->kex_algorithms = NULL;
options->ca_sign_algorithms = NULL;
options->fwd_opts.gateway_ports = -1;
options->fwd_opts.streamlocal_bind_mask = (mode_t)-1;
options->fwd_opts.streamlocal_bind_unlink = -1;
options->num_subsystems = 0;
options->max_startups_begin = -1;
options->max_startups_rate = -1;
options->max_startups = -1;
options->max_authtries = -1;
options->max_sessions = -1;
options->banner = NULL;
options->use_dns = -1;
options->client_alive_interval = -1;
options->client_alive_count_max = -1;
options->num_authkeys_files = 0;
options->num_accept_env = 0;
options->num_setenv = 0;
options->permit_tun = -1;
options->permitted_opens = NULL;
options->permitted_listens = NULL;
options->adm_forced_command = NULL;
options->chroot_directory = NULL;
options->authorized_keys_command = NULL;
options->authorized_keys_command_user = NULL;
options->revoked_keys_file = NULL;
options->sk_provider = NULL;
options->trusted_user_ca_keys = NULL;
options->authorized_principals_file = NULL;
options->authorized_principals_command = NULL;
options->authorized_principals_command_user = NULL;
options->ip_qos_interactive = -1;
options->ip_qos_bulk = -1;
options->version_addendum = NULL;
options->fingerprint_hash = -1;
options->disable_forwarding = -1;
options->expose_userauth_info = -1;
}
/* Returns 1 if a string option is unset or set to "none" or 0 otherwise. */
static int
option_clear_or_none(const char *o)
{
return o == NULL || strcasecmp(o, "none") == 0;
}
static void
assemble_algorithms(ServerOptions *o)
{
char *all_cipher, *all_mac, *all_kex, *all_key, *all_sig;
char *def_cipher, *def_mac, *def_kex, *def_key, *def_sig;
int r;
all_cipher = cipher_alg_list(',', 0);
all_mac = mac_alg_list(',');
all_kex = kex_alg_list(',');
all_key = sshkey_alg_list(0, 0, 1, ',');
all_sig = sshkey_alg_list(0, 1, 1, ',');
/* remove unsupported algos from default lists */
- def_cipher = match_filter_whitelist(KEX_SERVER_ENCRYPT, all_cipher);
- def_mac = match_filter_whitelist(KEX_SERVER_MAC, all_mac);
- def_kex = match_filter_whitelist(KEX_SERVER_KEX, all_kex);
- def_key = match_filter_whitelist(KEX_DEFAULT_PK_ALG, all_key);
- def_sig = match_filter_whitelist(SSH_ALLOWED_CA_SIGALGS, all_sig);
+ def_cipher = match_filter_allowlist(KEX_SERVER_ENCRYPT, all_cipher);
+ def_mac = match_filter_allowlist(KEX_SERVER_MAC, all_mac);
+ def_kex = match_filter_allowlist(KEX_SERVER_KEX, all_kex);
+ def_key = match_filter_allowlist(KEX_DEFAULT_PK_ALG, all_key);
+ def_sig = match_filter_allowlist(SSH_ALLOWED_CA_SIGALGS, all_sig);
#define ASSEMBLE(what, defaults, all) \
do { \
if ((r = kex_assemble_names(&o->what, defaults, all)) != 0) \
fatal("%s: %s: %s", __func__, #what, ssh_err(r)); \
} while (0)
ASSEMBLE(ciphers, def_cipher, all_cipher);
ASSEMBLE(macs, def_mac, all_mac);
ASSEMBLE(kex_algorithms, def_kex, all_kex);
ASSEMBLE(hostkeyalgorithms, def_key, all_key);
ASSEMBLE(hostbased_key_types, def_key, all_key);
ASSEMBLE(pubkey_key_types, def_key, all_key);
ASSEMBLE(ca_sign_algorithms, def_sig, all_sig);
#undef ASSEMBLE
free(all_cipher);
free(all_mac);
free(all_kex);
free(all_key);
free(all_sig);
free(def_cipher);
free(def_mac);
free(def_kex);
free(def_key);
free(def_sig);
}
static void
array_append2(const char *file, const int line, const char *directive,
char ***array, int **iarray, u_int *lp, const char *s, int i)
{
if (*lp >= INT_MAX)
fatal("%s line %d: Too many %s entries", file, line, directive);
if (iarray != NULL) {
*iarray = xrecallocarray(*iarray, *lp, *lp + 1,
sizeof(**iarray));
(*iarray)[*lp] = i;
}
*array = xrecallocarray(*array, *lp, *lp + 1, sizeof(**array));
(*array)[*lp] = xstrdup(s);
(*lp)++;
}
static void
array_append(const char *file, const int line, const char *directive,
char ***array, u_int *lp, const char *s)
{
array_append2(file, line, directive, array, NULL, lp, s, 0);
}
void
servconf_add_hostkey(const char *file, const int line,
ServerOptions *options, const char *path, int userprovided)
{
char *apath = derelativise_path(path);
array_append2(file, line, "HostKey",
&options->host_key_files, &options->host_key_file_userprovided,
&options->num_host_key_files, apath, userprovided);
free(apath);
}
void
servconf_add_hostcert(const char *file, const int line,
ServerOptions *options, const char *path)
{
char *apath = derelativise_path(path);
array_append(file, line, "HostCertificate",
&options->host_cert_files, &options->num_host_cert_files, apath);
free(apath);
}
void
fill_default_server_options(ServerOptions *options)
{
u_int i;
/* Portable-specific options */
if (options->use_pam == -1)
options->use_pam = 0;
/* Standard Options */
if (options->num_host_key_files == 0) {
/* fill default hostkeys for protocols */
servconf_add_hostkey("[default]", 0, options,
_PATH_HOST_RSA_KEY_FILE, 0);
#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
servconf_add_hostkey("[default]", 0, options,
_PATH_HOST_ECDSA_KEY_FILE, 0);
#endif
servconf_add_hostkey("[default]", 0, options,
_PATH_HOST_ED25519_KEY_FILE, 0);
#ifdef WITH_XMSS
servconf_add_hostkey("[default]", 0, options,
_PATH_HOST_XMSS_KEY_FILE, 0);
#endif /* WITH_XMSS */
}
/* No certificates by default */
if (options->num_ports == 0)
options->ports[options->num_ports++] = SSH_DEFAULT_PORT;
if (options->address_family == -1)
options->address_family = AF_UNSPEC;
if (options->listen_addrs == NULL)
add_listen_addr(options, NULL, NULL, 0);
if (options->pid_file == NULL)
options->pid_file = xstrdup(_PATH_SSH_DAEMON_PID_FILE);
if (options->login_grace_time == -1)
options->login_grace_time = 120;
if (options->permit_root_login == PERMIT_NOT_SET)
options->permit_root_login = PERMIT_NO_PASSWD;
if (options->ignore_rhosts == -1)
options->ignore_rhosts = 1;
if (options->ignore_user_known_hosts == -1)
options->ignore_user_known_hosts = 0;
if (options->print_motd == -1)
options->print_motd = 1;
if (options->print_lastlog == -1)
options->print_lastlog = 1;
if (options->x11_forwarding == -1)
options->x11_forwarding = 0;
if (options->x11_display_offset == -1)
options->x11_display_offset = 10;
if (options->x11_use_localhost == -1)
options->x11_use_localhost = 1;
if (options->xauth_location == NULL)
options->xauth_location = xstrdup(_PATH_XAUTH);
if (options->permit_tty == -1)
options->permit_tty = 1;
if (options->permit_user_rc == -1)
options->permit_user_rc = 1;
if (options->strict_modes == -1)
options->strict_modes = 1;
if (options->tcp_keep_alive == -1)
options->tcp_keep_alive = 1;
if (options->log_facility == SYSLOG_FACILITY_NOT_SET)
options->log_facility = SYSLOG_FACILITY_AUTH;
if (options->log_level == SYSLOG_LEVEL_NOT_SET)
options->log_level = SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO;
if (options->hostbased_authentication == -1)
options->hostbased_authentication = 0;
if (options->hostbased_uses_name_from_packet_only == -1)
options->hostbased_uses_name_from_packet_only = 0;
if (options->pubkey_authentication == -1)
options->pubkey_authentication = 1;
if (options->pubkey_auth_options == -1)
options->pubkey_auth_options = 0;
if (options->kerberos_authentication == -1)
options->kerberos_authentication = 0;
if (options->kerberos_or_local_passwd == -1)
options->kerberos_or_local_passwd = 1;
if (options->kerberos_ticket_cleanup == -1)
options->kerberos_ticket_cleanup = 1;
if (options->kerberos_get_afs_token == -1)
options->kerberos_get_afs_token = 0;
if (options->gss_authentication == -1)
options->gss_authentication = 0;
if (options->gss_cleanup_creds == -1)
options->gss_cleanup_creds = 1;
if (options->gss_strict_acceptor == -1)
options->gss_strict_acceptor = 1;
if (options->password_authentication == -1)
options->password_authentication = 1;
if (options->kbd_interactive_authentication == -1)
options->kbd_interactive_authentication = 0;
if (options->challenge_response_authentication == -1)
options->challenge_response_authentication = 1;
if (options->permit_empty_passwd == -1)
options->permit_empty_passwd = 0;
if (options->permit_user_env == -1) {
options->permit_user_env = 0;
- options->permit_user_env_whitelist = NULL;
+ options->permit_user_env_allowlist = NULL;
}
if (options->compression == -1)
#ifdef WITH_ZLIB
options->compression = COMP_DELAYED;
#else
options->compression = COMP_NONE;
#endif
if (options->rekey_limit == -1)
options->rekey_limit = 0;
if (options->rekey_interval == -1)
options->rekey_interval = 0;
if (options->allow_tcp_forwarding == -1)
options->allow_tcp_forwarding = FORWARD_ALLOW;
if (options->allow_streamlocal_forwarding == -1)
options->allow_streamlocal_forwarding = FORWARD_ALLOW;
if (options->allow_agent_forwarding == -1)
options->allow_agent_forwarding = 1;
if (options->fwd_opts.gateway_ports == -1)
options->fwd_opts.gateway_ports = 0;
if (options->max_startups == -1)
options->max_startups = 100;
if (options->max_startups_rate == -1)
options->max_startups_rate = 30; /* 30% */
if (options->max_startups_begin == -1)
options->max_startups_begin = 10;
if (options->max_authtries == -1)
options->max_authtries = DEFAULT_AUTH_FAIL_MAX;
if (options->max_sessions == -1)
options->max_sessions = DEFAULT_SESSIONS_MAX;
if (options->use_dns == -1)
options->use_dns = 0;
if (options->client_alive_interval == -1)
options->client_alive_interval = 0;
if (options->client_alive_count_max == -1)
options->client_alive_count_max = 3;
if (options->num_authkeys_files == 0) {
array_append("[default]", 0, "AuthorizedKeysFiles",
&options->authorized_keys_files,
&options->num_authkeys_files,
_PATH_SSH_USER_PERMITTED_KEYS);
array_append("[default]", 0, "AuthorizedKeysFiles",
&options->authorized_keys_files,
&options->num_authkeys_files,
_PATH_SSH_USER_PERMITTED_KEYS2);
}
if (options->permit_tun == -1)
options->permit_tun = SSH_TUNMODE_NO;
if (options->ip_qos_interactive == -1)
options->ip_qos_interactive = IPTOS_DSCP_AF21;
if (options->ip_qos_bulk == -1)
options->ip_qos_bulk = IPTOS_DSCP_CS1;
if (options->version_addendum == NULL)
options->version_addendum = xstrdup("");
if (options->fwd_opts.streamlocal_bind_mask == (mode_t)-1)
options->fwd_opts.streamlocal_bind_mask = 0177;
if (options->fwd_opts.streamlocal_bind_unlink == -1)
options->fwd_opts.streamlocal_bind_unlink = 0;
if (options->fingerprint_hash == -1)
options->fingerprint_hash = SSH_FP_HASH_DEFAULT;
if (options->disable_forwarding == -1)
options->disable_forwarding = 0;
if (options->expose_userauth_info == -1)
options->expose_userauth_info = 0;
if (options->sk_provider == NULL)
options->sk_provider = xstrdup("internal");
assemble_algorithms(options);
/* Turn privilege separation and sandboxing on by default */
if (use_privsep == -1)
use_privsep = PRIVSEP_ON;
#define CLEAR_ON_NONE(v) \
do { \
if (option_clear_or_none(v)) { \
free(v); \
v = NULL; \
} \
} while(0)
CLEAR_ON_NONE(options->pid_file);
CLEAR_ON_NONE(options->xauth_location);
CLEAR_ON_NONE(options->banner);
CLEAR_ON_NONE(options->trusted_user_ca_keys);
CLEAR_ON_NONE(options->revoked_keys_file);
CLEAR_ON_NONE(options->sk_provider);
CLEAR_ON_NONE(options->authorized_principals_file);
CLEAR_ON_NONE(options->adm_forced_command);
CLEAR_ON_NONE(options->chroot_directory);
CLEAR_ON_NONE(options->routing_domain);
CLEAR_ON_NONE(options->host_key_agent);
for (i = 0; i < options->num_host_key_files; i++)
CLEAR_ON_NONE(options->host_key_files[i]);
for (i = 0; i < options->num_host_cert_files; i++)
CLEAR_ON_NONE(options->host_cert_files[i]);
#undef CLEAR_ON_NONE
/* Similar handling for AuthenticationMethods=any */
if (options->num_auth_methods == 1 &&
strcmp(options->auth_methods[0], "any") == 0) {
free(options->auth_methods[0]);
options->auth_methods[0] = NULL;
options->num_auth_methods = 0;
}
-
-#ifndef HAVE_MMAP
- if (use_privsep && options->compression == 1) {
- error("This platform does not support both privilege "
- "separation and compression");
- error("Compression disabled");
- options->compression = 0;
- }
-#endif
}
/* Keyword tokens. */
typedef enum {
sBadOption, /* == unknown option */
/* Portable-specific options */
sUsePAM,
/* Standard Options */
sPort, sHostKeyFile, sLoginGraceTime,
sPermitRootLogin, sLogFacility, sLogLevel,
sRhostsRSAAuthentication, sRSAAuthentication,
sKerberosAuthentication, sKerberosOrLocalPasswd, sKerberosTicketCleanup,
sKerberosGetAFSToken, sChallengeResponseAuthentication,
sPasswordAuthentication, sKbdInteractiveAuthentication,
sListenAddress, sAddressFamily,
sPrintMotd, sPrintLastLog, sIgnoreRhosts,
sX11Forwarding, sX11DisplayOffset, sX11UseLocalhost,
sPermitTTY, sStrictModes, sEmptyPasswd, sTCPKeepAlive,
sPermitUserEnvironment, sAllowTcpForwarding, sCompression,
sRekeyLimit, sAllowUsers, sDenyUsers, sAllowGroups, sDenyGroups,
sIgnoreUserKnownHosts, sCiphers, sMacs, sPidFile,
sGatewayPorts, sPubkeyAuthentication, sPubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes,
sXAuthLocation, sSubsystem, sMaxStartups, sMaxAuthTries, sMaxSessions,
sBanner, sUseDNS, sHostbasedAuthentication,
sHostbasedUsesNameFromPacketOnly, sHostbasedAcceptedKeyTypes,
sHostKeyAlgorithms,
sClientAliveInterval, sClientAliveCountMax, sAuthorizedKeysFile,
sGssAuthentication, sGssCleanupCreds, sGssStrictAcceptor,
sAcceptEnv, sSetEnv, sPermitTunnel,
sMatch, sPermitOpen, sPermitListen, sForceCommand, sChrootDirectory,
sUsePrivilegeSeparation, sAllowAgentForwarding,
sHostCertificate, sInclude,
sRevokedKeys, sTrustedUserCAKeys, sAuthorizedPrincipalsFile,
sAuthorizedPrincipalsCommand, sAuthorizedPrincipalsCommandUser,
sKexAlgorithms, sCASignatureAlgorithms, sIPQoS, sVersionAddendum,
sAuthorizedKeysCommand, sAuthorizedKeysCommandUser,
sAuthenticationMethods, sHostKeyAgent, sPermitUserRC,
sStreamLocalBindMask, sStreamLocalBindUnlink,
sAllowStreamLocalForwarding, sFingerprintHash, sDisableForwarding,
sExposeAuthInfo, sRDomain, sPubkeyAuthOptions, sSecurityKeyProvider,
sDeprecated, sIgnore, sUnsupported
} ServerOpCodes;
#define SSHCFG_GLOBAL 0x01 /* allowed in main section of config */
#define SSHCFG_MATCH 0x02 /* allowed inside a Match section */
#define SSHCFG_ALL (SSHCFG_GLOBAL|SSHCFG_MATCH)
#define SSHCFG_NEVERMATCH 0x04 /* Match never matches; internal only */
+#define SSHCFG_MATCH_ONLY 0x08 /* Match only in conditional blocks; internal only */
/* Textual representation of the tokens. */
static struct {
const char *name;
ServerOpCodes opcode;
u_int flags;
} keywords[] = {
/* Portable-specific options */
#ifdef USE_PAM
{ "usepam", sUsePAM, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
#else
{ "usepam", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
#endif
{ "pamauthenticationviakbdint", sDeprecated, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
/* Standard Options */
{ "port", sPort, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
{ "hostkey", sHostKeyFile, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
{ "hostdsakey", sHostKeyFile, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, /* alias */
{ "hostkeyagent", sHostKeyAgent, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
{ "pidfile", sPidFile, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
{ "serverkeybits", sDeprecated, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
{ "logingracetime", sLoginGraceTime, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
{ "keyregenerationinterval", sDeprecated, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
{ "permitrootlogin", sPermitRootLogin, SSHCFG_ALL },
{ "syslogfacility", sLogFacility, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
{ "loglevel", sLogLevel, SSHCFG_ALL },
{ "rhostsauthentication", sDeprecated, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
{ "rhostsrsaauthentication", sDeprecated, SSHCFG_ALL },
{ "hostbasedauthentication", sHostbasedAuthentication, SSHCFG_ALL },
{ "hostbasedusesnamefrompacketonly", sHostbasedUsesNameFromPacketOnly, SSHCFG_ALL },
{ "hostbasedacceptedkeytypes", sHostbasedAcceptedKeyTypes, SSHCFG_ALL },
{ "hostkeyalgorithms", sHostKeyAlgorithms, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
{ "rsaauthentication", sDeprecated, SSHCFG_ALL },
{ "pubkeyauthentication", sPubkeyAuthentication, SSHCFG_ALL },
{ "pubkeyacceptedkeytypes", sPubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes, SSHCFG_ALL },
{ "pubkeyauthoptions", sPubkeyAuthOptions, SSHCFG_ALL },
{ "dsaauthentication", sPubkeyAuthentication, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, /* alias */
#ifdef KRB5
{ "kerberosauthentication", sKerberosAuthentication, SSHCFG_ALL },
{ "kerberosorlocalpasswd", sKerberosOrLocalPasswd, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
{ "kerberosticketcleanup", sKerberosTicketCleanup, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
#ifdef USE_AFS
{ "kerberosgetafstoken", sKerberosGetAFSToken, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
#else
{ "kerberosgetafstoken", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
#endif
#else
{ "kerberosauthentication", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_ALL },
{ "kerberosorlocalpasswd", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
{ "kerberosticketcleanup", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
{ "kerberosgetafstoken", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
#endif
{ "kerberostgtpassing", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
{ "afstokenpassing", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
#ifdef GSSAPI
{ "gssapiauthentication", sGssAuthentication, SSHCFG_ALL },
{ "gssapicleanupcredentials", sGssCleanupCreds, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
{ "gssapistrictacceptorcheck", sGssStrictAcceptor, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
#else
{ "gssapiauthentication", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_ALL },
{ "gssapicleanupcredentials", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
{ "gssapistrictacceptorcheck", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
#endif
{ "passwordauthentication", sPasswordAuthentication, SSHCFG_ALL },
{ "kbdinteractiveauthentication", sKbdInteractiveAuthentication, SSHCFG_ALL },
{ "challengeresponseauthentication", sChallengeResponseAuthentication, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
{ "skeyauthentication", sDeprecated, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
{ "checkmail", sDeprecated, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
{ "listenaddress", sListenAddress, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
{ "addressfamily", sAddressFamily, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
{ "printmotd", sPrintMotd, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
#ifdef DISABLE_LASTLOG
{ "printlastlog", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
#else
{ "printlastlog", sPrintLastLog, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
#endif
{ "ignorerhosts", sIgnoreRhosts, SSHCFG_ALL },
{ "ignoreuserknownhosts", sIgnoreUserKnownHosts, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
{ "x11forwarding", sX11Forwarding, SSHCFG_ALL },
{ "x11displayoffset", sX11DisplayOffset, SSHCFG_ALL },
{ "x11uselocalhost", sX11UseLocalhost, SSHCFG_ALL },
{ "xauthlocation", sXAuthLocation, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
{ "strictmodes", sStrictModes, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
{ "permitemptypasswords", sEmptyPasswd, SSHCFG_ALL },
{ "permituserenvironment", sPermitUserEnvironment, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
{ "uselogin", sDeprecated, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
{ "compression", sCompression, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
{ "rekeylimit", sRekeyLimit, SSHCFG_ALL },
{ "tcpkeepalive", sTCPKeepAlive, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
{ "keepalive", sTCPKeepAlive, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, /* obsolete alias */
{ "allowtcpforwarding", sAllowTcpForwarding, SSHCFG_ALL },
{ "allowagentforwarding", sAllowAgentForwarding, SSHCFG_ALL },
{ "allowusers", sAllowUsers, SSHCFG_ALL },
{ "denyusers", sDenyUsers, SSHCFG_ALL },
{ "allowgroups", sAllowGroups, SSHCFG_ALL },
{ "denygroups", sDenyGroups, SSHCFG_ALL },
{ "ciphers", sCiphers, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
{ "macs", sMacs, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
{ "protocol", sIgnore, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
{ "gatewayports", sGatewayPorts, SSHCFG_ALL },
{ "subsystem", sSubsystem, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
{ "maxstartups", sMaxStartups, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
{ "maxauthtries", sMaxAuthTries, SSHCFG_ALL },
{ "maxsessions", sMaxSessions, SSHCFG_ALL },
{ "banner", sBanner, SSHCFG_ALL },
{ "usedns", sUseDNS, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
{ "verifyreversemapping", sDeprecated, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
{ "reversemappingcheck", sDeprecated, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
{ "clientaliveinterval", sClientAliveInterval, SSHCFG_ALL },
{ "clientalivecountmax", sClientAliveCountMax, SSHCFG_ALL },
{ "authorizedkeysfile", sAuthorizedKeysFile, SSHCFG_ALL },
{ "authorizedkeysfile2", sDeprecated, SSHCFG_ALL },
{ "useprivilegeseparation", sDeprecated, SSHCFG_GLOBAL},
{ "acceptenv", sAcceptEnv, SSHCFG_ALL },
{ "setenv", sSetEnv, SSHCFG_ALL },
{ "permittunnel", sPermitTunnel, SSHCFG_ALL },
{ "permittty", sPermitTTY, SSHCFG_ALL },
{ "permituserrc", sPermitUserRC, SSHCFG_ALL },
{ "match", sMatch, SSHCFG_ALL },
{ "permitopen", sPermitOpen, SSHCFG_ALL },
{ "permitlisten", sPermitListen, SSHCFG_ALL },
{ "forcecommand", sForceCommand, SSHCFG_ALL },
{ "chrootdirectory", sChrootDirectory, SSHCFG_ALL },
{ "hostcertificate", sHostCertificate, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
{ "revokedkeys", sRevokedKeys, SSHCFG_ALL },
{ "trustedusercakeys", sTrustedUserCAKeys, SSHCFG_ALL },
{ "authorizedprincipalsfile", sAuthorizedPrincipalsFile, SSHCFG_ALL },
{ "kexalgorithms", sKexAlgorithms, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
{ "include", sInclude, SSHCFG_ALL },
{ "ipqos", sIPQoS, SSHCFG_ALL },
{ "authorizedkeyscommand", sAuthorizedKeysCommand, SSHCFG_ALL },
{ "authorizedkeyscommanduser", sAuthorizedKeysCommandUser, SSHCFG_ALL },
{ "authorizedprincipalscommand", sAuthorizedPrincipalsCommand, SSHCFG_ALL },
{ "authorizedprincipalscommanduser", sAuthorizedPrincipalsCommandUser, SSHCFG_ALL },
{ "versionaddendum", sVersionAddendum, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
{ "authenticationmethods", sAuthenticationMethods, SSHCFG_ALL },
{ "streamlocalbindmask", sStreamLocalBindMask, SSHCFG_ALL },
{ "streamlocalbindunlink", sStreamLocalBindUnlink, SSHCFG_ALL },
{ "allowstreamlocalforwarding", sAllowStreamLocalForwarding, SSHCFG_ALL },
{ "fingerprinthash", sFingerprintHash, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
{ "disableforwarding", sDisableForwarding, SSHCFG_ALL },
{ "exposeauthinfo", sExposeAuthInfo, SSHCFG_ALL },
{ "rdomain", sRDomain, SSHCFG_ALL },
{ "casignaturealgorithms", sCASignatureAlgorithms, SSHCFG_ALL },
{ "securitykeyprovider", sSecurityKeyProvider, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
{ NULL, sBadOption, 0 }
};
static struct {
int val;
char *text;
} tunmode_desc[] = {
{ SSH_TUNMODE_NO, "no" },
{ SSH_TUNMODE_POINTOPOINT, "point-to-point" },
{ SSH_TUNMODE_ETHERNET, "ethernet" },
{ SSH_TUNMODE_YES, "yes" },
{ -1, NULL }
};
/* Returns an opcode name from its number */
static const char *
lookup_opcode_name(ServerOpCodes code)
{
u_int i;
for (i = 0; keywords[i].name != NULL; i++)
if (keywords[i].opcode == code)
return(keywords[i].name);
return "UNKNOWN";
}
/*
* Returns the number of the token pointed to by cp or sBadOption.
*/
static ServerOpCodes
parse_token(const char *cp, const char *filename,
int linenum, u_int *flags)
{
u_int i;
for (i = 0; keywords[i].name; i++)
if (strcasecmp(cp, keywords[i].name) == 0) {
*flags = keywords[i].flags;
return keywords[i].opcode;
}
error("%s: line %d: Bad configuration option: %s",
filename, linenum, cp);
return sBadOption;
}
char *
derelativise_path(const char *path)
{
char *expanded, *ret, cwd[PATH_MAX];
if (strcasecmp(path, "none") == 0)
return xstrdup("none");
expanded = tilde_expand_filename(path, getuid());
if (path_absolute(expanded))
return expanded;
if (getcwd(cwd, sizeof(cwd)) == NULL)
fatal("%s: getcwd: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
xasprintf(&ret, "%s/%s", cwd, expanded);
free(expanded);
return ret;
}
static void
add_listen_addr(ServerOptions *options, const char *addr,
const char *rdomain, int port)
{
u_int i;
if (port > 0)
add_one_listen_addr(options, addr, rdomain, port);
else {
for (i = 0; i < options->num_ports; i++) {
add_one_listen_addr(options, addr, rdomain,
options->ports[i]);
}
}
}
static void
add_one_listen_addr(ServerOptions *options, const char *addr,
const char *rdomain, int port)
{
struct addrinfo hints, *ai, *aitop;
char strport[NI_MAXSERV];
int gaierr;
u_int i;
/* Find listen_addrs entry for this rdomain */
for (i = 0; i < options->num_listen_addrs; i++) {
if (rdomain == NULL && options->listen_addrs[i].rdomain == NULL)
break;
if (rdomain == NULL || options->listen_addrs[i].rdomain == NULL)
continue;
if (strcmp(rdomain, options->listen_addrs[i].rdomain) == 0)
break;
}
if (i >= options->num_listen_addrs) {
/* No entry for this rdomain; allocate one */
if (i >= INT_MAX)
fatal("%s: too many listen addresses", __func__);
options->listen_addrs = xrecallocarray(options->listen_addrs,
options->num_listen_addrs, options->num_listen_addrs + 1,
sizeof(*options->listen_addrs));
i = options->num_listen_addrs++;
if (rdomain != NULL)
options->listen_addrs[i].rdomain = xstrdup(rdomain);
}
/* options->listen_addrs[i] points to the addresses for this rdomain */
memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints));
hints.ai_family = options->address_family;
hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM;
hints.ai_flags = (addr == NULL) ? AI_PASSIVE : 0;
snprintf(strport, sizeof strport, "%d", port);
if ((gaierr = getaddrinfo(addr, strport, &hints, &aitop)) != 0)
fatal("bad addr or host: %s (%s)",
addr ? addr : "<NULL>",
ssh_gai_strerror(gaierr));
for (ai = aitop; ai->ai_next; ai = ai->ai_next)
;
ai->ai_next = options->listen_addrs[i].addrs;
options->listen_addrs[i].addrs = aitop;
}
/* Returns nonzero if the routing domain name is valid */
static int
valid_rdomain(const char *name)
{
#if defined(HAVE_SYS_VALID_RDOMAIN)
return sys_valid_rdomain(name);
#elif defined(__OpenBSD__)
const char *errstr;
long long num;
struct rt_tableinfo info;
int mib[6];
size_t miblen = sizeof(mib);
if (name == NULL)
return 1;
num = strtonum(name, 0, 255, &errstr);
if (errstr != NULL)
return 0;
/* Check whether the table actually exists */
memset(mib, 0, sizeof(mib));
mib[0] = CTL_NET;
mib[1] = PF_ROUTE;
mib[4] = NET_RT_TABLE;
mib[5] = (int)num;
if (sysctl(mib, 6, &info, &miblen, NULL, 0) == -1)
return 0;
return 1;
#else /* defined(__OpenBSD__) */
error("Routing domains are not supported on this platform");
return 0;
#endif
}
/*
* Queue a ListenAddress to be processed once we have all of the Ports
* and AddressFamily options.
*/
static void
queue_listen_addr(ServerOptions *options, const char *addr,
const char *rdomain, int port)
{
struct queued_listenaddr *qla;
options->queued_listen_addrs = xrecallocarray(
options->queued_listen_addrs,
options->num_queued_listens, options->num_queued_listens + 1,
sizeof(*options->queued_listen_addrs));
qla = &options->queued_listen_addrs[options->num_queued_listens++];
qla->addr = xstrdup(addr);
qla->port = port;
qla->rdomain = rdomain == NULL ? NULL : xstrdup(rdomain);
}
/*
* Process queued (text) ListenAddress entries.
*/
static void
process_queued_listen_addrs(ServerOptions *options)
{
u_int i;
struct queued_listenaddr *qla;
if (options->num_ports == 0)
options->ports[options->num_ports++] = SSH_DEFAULT_PORT;
if (options->address_family == -1)
options->address_family = AF_UNSPEC;
for (i = 0; i < options->num_queued_listens; i++) {
qla = &options->queued_listen_addrs[i];
add_listen_addr(options, qla->addr, qla->rdomain, qla->port);
free(qla->addr);
free(qla->rdomain);
}
free(options->queued_listen_addrs);
options->queued_listen_addrs = NULL;
options->num_queued_listens = 0;
}
/*
* Inform channels layer of permitopen options for a single forwarding
* direction (local/remote).
*/
static void
process_permitopen_list(struct ssh *ssh, ServerOpCodes opcode,
char **opens, u_int num_opens)
{
u_int i;
int port;
char *host, *arg, *oarg, ch;
int where = opcode == sPermitOpen ? FORWARD_LOCAL : FORWARD_REMOTE;
const char *what = lookup_opcode_name(opcode);
channel_clear_permission(ssh, FORWARD_ADM, where);
if (num_opens == 0)
return; /* permit any */
/* handle keywords: "any" / "none" */
if (num_opens == 1 && strcmp(opens[0], "any") == 0)
return;
if (num_opens == 1 && strcmp(opens[0], "none") == 0) {
channel_disable_admin(ssh, where);
return;
}
/* Otherwise treat it as a list of permitted host:port */
for (i = 0; i < num_opens; i++) {
oarg = arg = xstrdup(opens[i]);
ch = '\0';
host = hpdelim2(&arg, &ch);
if (host == NULL || ch == '/')
fatal("%s: missing host in %s", __func__, what);
host = cleanhostname(host);
if (arg == NULL || ((port = permitopen_port(arg)) < 0))
fatal("%s: bad port number in %s", __func__, what);
/* Send it to channels layer */
channel_add_permission(ssh, FORWARD_ADM,
where, host, port);
free(oarg);
}
}
/*
* Inform channels layer of permitopen options from configuration.
*/
void
process_permitopen(struct ssh *ssh, ServerOptions *options)
{
process_permitopen_list(ssh, sPermitOpen,
options->permitted_opens, options->num_permitted_opens);
process_permitopen_list(ssh, sPermitListen,
options->permitted_listens,
options->num_permitted_listens);
}
struct connection_info *
get_connection_info(struct ssh *ssh, int populate, int use_dns)
{
static struct connection_info ci;
if (ssh == NULL || !populate)
return &ci;
ci.host = auth_get_canonical_hostname(ssh, use_dns);
ci.address = ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh);
ci.laddress = ssh_local_ipaddr(ssh);
ci.lport = ssh_local_port(ssh);
ci.rdomain = ssh_packet_rdomain_in(ssh);
return &ci;
}
/*
* The strategy for the Match blocks is that the config file is parsed twice.
*
* The first time is at startup. activep is initialized to 1 and the
* directives in the global context are processed and acted on. Hitting a
* Match directive unsets activep and the directives inside the block are
* checked for syntax only.
*
* The second time is after a connection has been established but before
* authentication. activep is initialized to 2 and global config directives
* are ignored since they have already been processed. If the criteria in a
* Match block is met, activep is set and the subsequent directives
* processed and actioned until EOF or another Match block unsets it. Any
* options set are copied into the main server config.
*
* Potential additions/improvements:
* - Add Match support for pre-kex directives, eg. Ciphers.
*
* - Add a Tag directive (idea from David Leonard) ala pf, eg:
* Match Address 192.168.0.*
* Tag trusted
* Match Group wheel
* Tag trusted
* Match Tag trusted
* AllowTcpForwarding yes
* GatewayPorts clientspecified
* [...]
*
* - Add a PermittedChannelRequests directive
* Match Group shell
* PermittedChannelRequests session,forwarded-tcpip
*/
static int
match_cfg_line_group(const char *grps, int line, const char *user)
{
int result = 0;
struct passwd *pw;
if (user == NULL)
goto out;
if ((pw = getpwnam(user)) == NULL) {
debug("Can't match group at line %d because user %.100s does "
"not exist", line, user);
} else if (ga_init(pw->pw_name, pw->pw_gid) == 0) {
debug("Can't Match group because user %.100s not in any group "
"at line %d", user, line);
} else if (ga_match_pattern_list(grps) != 1) {
debug("user %.100s does not match group list %.100s at line %d",
user, grps, line);
} else {
debug("user %.100s matched group list %.100s at line %d", user,
grps, line);
result = 1;
}
out:
ga_free();
return result;
}
static void
match_test_missing_fatal(const char *criteria, const char *attrib)
{
fatal("'Match %s' in configuration but '%s' not in connection "
"test specification.", criteria, attrib);
}
/*
* All of the attributes on a single Match line are ANDed together, so we need
* to check every attribute and set the result to zero if any attribute does
* not match.
*/
static int
match_cfg_line(char **condition, int line, struct connection_info *ci)
{
int result = 1, attributes = 0, port;
char *arg, *attrib, *cp = *condition;
if (ci == NULL)
debug3("checking syntax for 'Match %s'", cp);
else
debug3("checking match for '%s' user %s host %s addr %s "
"laddr %s lport %d", cp, ci->user ? ci->user : "(null)",
ci->host ? ci->host : "(null)",
ci->address ? ci->address : "(null)",
ci->laddress ? ci->laddress : "(null)", ci->lport);
while ((attrib = strdelim(&cp)) && *attrib != '\0') {
attributes++;
if (strcasecmp(attrib, "all") == 0) {
if (attributes != 1 ||
((arg = strdelim(&cp)) != NULL && *arg != '\0')) {
error("'all' cannot be combined with other "
"Match attributes");
return -1;
}
*condition = cp;
return 1;
}
if ((arg = strdelim(&cp)) == NULL || *arg == '\0') {
error("Missing Match criteria for %s", attrib);
return -1;
}
if (strcasecmp(attrib, "user") == 0) {
if (ci == NULL || (ci->test && ci->user == NULL)) {
result = 0;
continue;
}
if (ci->user == NULL)
match_test_missing_fatal("User", "user");
if (match_usergroup_pattern_list(ci->user, arg) != 1)
result = 0;
else
debug("user %.100s matched 'User %.100s' at "
"line %d", ci->user, arg, line);
} else if (strcasecmp(attrib, "group") == 0) {
if (ci == NULL || (ci->test && ci->user == NULL)) {
result = 0;
continue;
}
if (ci->user == NULL)
match_test_missing_fatal("Group", "user");
switch (match_cfg_line_group(arg, line, ci->user)) {
case -1:
return -1;
case 0:
result = 0;
}
} else if (strcasecmp(attrib, "host") == 0) {
if (ci == NULL || (ci->test && ci->host == NULL)) {
result = 0;
continue;
}
if (ci->host == NULL)
match_test_missing_fatal("Host", "host");
if (match_hostname(ci->host, arg) != 1)
result = 0;
else
debug("connection from %.100s matched 'Host "
"%.100s' at line %d", ci->host, arg, line);
} else if (strcasecmp(attrib, "address") == 0) {
if (ci == NULL || (ci->test && ci->address == NULL)) {
+ if (addr_match_list(NULL, arg) != 0)
+ fatal("Invalid Match address argument "
+ "'%s' at line %d", arg, line);
result = 0;
continue;
}
if (ci->address == NULL)
match_test_missing_fatal("Address", "addr");
switch (addr_match_list(ci->address, arg)) {
case 1:
debug("connection from %.100s matched 'Address "
"%.100s' at line %d", ci->address, arg, line);
break;
case 0:
case -1:
result = 0;
break;
case -2:
return -1;
}
} else if (strcasecmp(attrib, "localaddress") == 0){
if (ci == NULL || (ci->test && ci->laddress == NULL)) {
+ if (addr_match_list(NULL, arg) != 0)
+ fatal("Invalid Match localaddress "
+ "argument '%s' at line %d", arg,
+ line);
result = 0;
continue;
}
if (ci->laddress == NULL)
match_test_missing_fatal("LocalAddress",
"laddr");
switch (addr_match_list(ci->laddress, arg)) {
case 1:
debug("connection from %.100s matched "
"'LocalAddress %.100s' at line %d",
ci->laddress, arg, line);
break;
case 0:
case -1:
result = 0;
break;
case -2:
return -1;
}
} else if (strcasecmp(attrib, "localport") == 0) {
if ((port = a2port(arg)) == -1) {
error("Invalid LocalPort '%s' on Match line",
arg);
return -1;
}
if (ci == NULL || (ci->test && ci->lport == -1)) {
result = 0;
continue;
}
if (ci->lport == 0)
match_test_missing_fatal("LocalPort", "lport");
/* TODO support port lists */
if (port == ci->lport)
debug("connection from %.100s matched "
"'LocalPort %d' at line %d",
ci->laddress, port, line);
else
result = 0;
} else if (strcasecmp(attrib, "rdomain") == 0) {
if (ci == NULL || (ci->test && ci->rdomain == NULL)) {
result = 0;
continue;
}
if (ci->rdomain == NULL)
match_test_missing_fatal("RDomain", "rdomain");
if (match_pattern_list(ci->rdomain, arg, 0) != 1)
result = 0;
else
debug("user %.100s matched 'RDomain %.100s' at "
"line %d", ci->rdomain, arg, line);
} else {
error("Unsupported Match attribute %s", attrib);
return -1;
}
}
if (attributes == 0) {
error("One or more attributes required for Match");
return -1;
}
if (ci != NULL)
debug3("match %sfound", result ? "" : "not ");
*condition = cp;
return result;
}
#define WHITESPACE " \t\r\n"
/* Multistate option parsing */
struct multistate {
char *key;
int value;
};
static const struct multistate multistate_flag[] = {
{ "yes", 1 },
{ "no", 0 },
{ NULL, -1 }
};
static const struct multistate multistate_ignore_rhosts[] = {
{ "yes", IGNORE_RHOSTS_YES },
{ "no", IGNORE_RHOSTS_NO },
{ "shosts-only", IGNORE_RHOSTS_SHOSTS },
{ NULL, -1 }
};
static const struct multistate multistate_addressfamily[] = {
{ "inet", AF_INET },
{ "inet6", AF_INET6 },
{ "any", AF_UNSPEC },
{ NULL, -1 }
};
static const struct multistate multistate_permitrootlogin[] = {
{ "without-password", PERMIT_NO_PASSWD },
{ "prohibit-password", PERMIT_NO_PASSWD },
{ "forced-commands-only", PERMIT_FORCED_ONLY },
{ "yes", PERMIT_YES },
{ "no", PERMIT_NO },
{ NULL, -1 }
};
static const struct multistate multistate_compression[] = {
#ifdef WITH_ZLIB
{ "yes", COMP_DELAYED },
{ "delayed", COMP_DELAYED },
#endif
{ "no", COMP_NONE },
{ NULL, -1 }
};
static const struct multistate multistate_gatewayports[] = {
{ "clientspecified", 2 },
{ "yes", 1 },
{ "no", 0 },
{ NULL, -1 }
};
static const struct multistate multistate_tcpfwd[] = {
{ "yes", FORWARD_ALLOW },
{ "all", FORWARD_ALLOW },
{ "no", FORWARD_DENY },
{ "remote", FORWARD_REMOTE },
{ "local", FORWARD_LOCAL },
{ NULL, -1 }
};
static int
process_server_config_line_depth(ServerOptions *options, char *line,
const char *filename, int linenum, int *activep,
- struct connection_info *connectinfo, int inc_flags, int depth,
+ struct connection_info *connectinfo, int *inc_flags, int depth,
struct include_list *includes)
{
char ch, *cp, ***chararrayptr, **charptr, *arg, *arg2, *p;
int cmdline = 0, *intptr, value, value2, n, port, oactive, r, found;
SyslogFacility *log_facility_ptr;
LogLevel *log_level_ptr;
ServerOpCodes opcode;
u_int i, *uintptr, uvalue, flags = 0;
size_t len;
long long val64;
const struct multistate *multistate_ptr;
const char *errstr;
struct include_item *item;
glob_t gbuf;
/* Strip trailing whitespace. Allow \f (form feed) at EOL only */
if ((len = strlen(line)) == 0)
return 0;
for (len--; len > 0; len--) {
if (strchr(WHITESPACE "\f", line[len]) == NULL)
break;
line[len] = '\0';
}
cp = line;
if ((arg = strdelim(&cp)) == NULL)
return 0;
/* Ignore leading whitespace */
if (*arg == '\0')
arg = strdelim(&cp);
if (!arg || !*arg || *arg == '#')
return 0;
intptr = NULL;
charptr = NULL;
opcode = parse_token(arg, filename, linenum, &flags);
if (activep == NULL) { /* We are processing a command line directive */
cmdline = 1;
activep = &cmdline;
}
if (*activep && opcode != sMatch && opcode != sInclude)
debug3("%s:%d setting %s %s", filename, linenum, arg, cp);
if (*activep == 0 && !(flags & SSHCFG_MATCH)) {
if (connectinfo == NULL) {
fatal("%s line %d: Directive '%s' is not allowed "
"within a Match block", filename, linenum, arg);
} else { /* this is a directive we have already processed */
while (arg)
arg = strdelim(&cp);
return 0;
}
}
switch (opcode) {
/* Portable-specific options */
case sUsePAM:
intptr = &options->use_pam;
goto parse_flag;
/* Standard Options */
case sBadOption:
return -1;
case sPort:
/* ignore ports from configfile if cmdline specifies ports */
if (options->ports_from_cmdline)
return 0;
if (options->num_ports >= MAX_PORTS)
fatal("%s line %d: too many ports.",
filename, linenum);
arg = strdelim(&cp);
if (!arg || *arg == '\0')
fatal("%s line %d: missing port number.",
filename, linenum);
options->ports[options->num_ports++] = a2port(arg);
if (options->ports[options->num_ports-1] <= 0)
fatal("%s line %d: Badly formatted port number.",
filename, linenum);
break;
case sLoginGraceTime:
intptr = &options->login_grace_time;
parse_time:
arg = strdelim(&cp);
if (!arg || *arg == '\0')
fatal("%s line %d: missing time value.",
filename, linenum);
if ((value = convtime(arg)) == -1)
fatal("%s line %d: invalid time value.",
filename, linenum);
if (*activep && *intptr == -1)
*intptr = value;
break;
case sListenAddress:
arg = strdelim(&cp);
if (arg == NULL || *arg == '\0')
fatal("%s line %d: missing address",
filename, linenum);
/* check for bare IPv6 address: no "[]" and 2 or more ":" */
if (strchr(arg, '[') == NULL && (p = strchr(arg, ':')) != NULL
&& strchr(p+1, ':') != NULL) {
port = 0;
p = arg;
} else {
arg2 = NULL;
ch = '\0';
p = hpdelim2(&arg, &ch);
if (p == NULL || ch == '/')
fatal("%s line %d: bad address:port usage",
filename, linenum);
p = cleanhostname(p);
if (arg == NULL)
port = 0;
else if ((port = a2port(arg)) <= 0)
fatal("%s line %d: bad port number",
filename, linenum);
}
/* Optional routing table */
arg2 = NULL;
if ((arg = strdelim(&cp)) != NULL) {
if (strcmp(arg, "rdomain") != 0 ||
(arg2 = strdelim(&cp)) == NULL)
fatal("%s line %d: bad ListenAddress syntax",
filename, linenum);
if (!valid_rdomain(arg2))
fatal("%s line %d: bad routing domain",
filename, linenum);
}
queue_listen_addr(options, p, arg2, port);
break;
case sAddressFamily:
intptr = &options->address_family;
multistate_ptr = multistate_addressfamily;
parse_multistate:
arg = strdelim(&cp);
if (!arg || *arg == '\0')
fatal("%s line %d: missing argument.",
filename, linenum);
value = -1;
for (i = 0; multistate_ptr[i].key != NULL; i++) {
if (strcasecmp(arg, multistate_ptr[i].key) == 0) {
value = multistate_ptr[i].value;
break;
}
}
if (value == -1)
fatal("%s line %d: unsupported option \"%s\".",
filename, linenum, arg);
if (*activep && *intptr == -1)
*intptr = value;
break;
case sHostKeyFile:
arg = strdelim(&cp);
if (!arg || *arg == '\0')
fatal("%s line %d: missing file name.",
filename, linenum);
if (*activep) {
servconf_add_hostkey(filename, linenum,
options, arg, 1);
}
break;
case sHostKeyAgent:
charptr = &options->host_key_agent;
arg = strdelim(&cp);
if (!arg || *arg == '\0')
fatal("%s line %d: missing socket name.",
filename, linenum);
if (*activep && *charptr == NULL)
*charptr = !strcmp(arg, SSH_AUTHSOCKET_ENV_NAME) ?
xstrdup(arg) : derelativise_path(arg);
break;
case sHostCertificate:
arg = strdelim(&cp);
if (!arg || *arg == '\0')
fatal("%s line %d: missing file name.",
filename, linenum);
if (*activep)
servconf_add_hostcert(filename, linenum, options, arg);
break;
case sPidFile:
charptr = &options->pid_file;
parse_filename:
arg = strdelim(&cp);
if (!arg || *arg == '\0')
fatal("%s line %d: missing file name.",
filename, linenum);
if (*activep && *charptr == NULL) {
*charptr = derelativise_path(arg);
/* increase optional counter */
if (intptr != NULL)
*intptr = *intptr + 1;
}
break;
case sPermitRootLogin:
intptr = &options->permit_root_login;
multistate_ptr = multistate_permitrootlogin;
goto parse_multistate;
case sIgnoreRhosts:
intptr = &options->ignore_rhosts;
multistate_ptr = multistate_ignore_rhosts;
goto parse_multistate;
case sIgnoreUserKnownHosts:
intptr = &options->ignore_user_known_hosts;
parse_flag:
multistate_ptr = multistate_flag;
goto parse_multistate;
case sHostbasedAuthentication:
intptr = &options->hostbased_authentication;
goto parse_flag;
case sHostbasedUsesNameFromPacketOnly:
intptr = &options->hostbased_uses_name_from_packet_only;
goto parse_flag;
case sHostbasedAcceptedKeyTypes:
charptr = &options->hostbased_key_types;
parse_keytypes:
arg = strdelim(&cp);
if (!arg || *arg == '\0')
fatal("%s line %d: Missing argument.",
filename, linenum);
if (*arg != '-' &&
!sshkey_names_valid2(*arg == '+' || *arg == '^' ?
arg + 1 : arg, 1))
fatal("%s line %d: Bad key types '%s'.",
filename, linenum, arg ? arg : "<NONE>");
if (*activep && *charptr == NULL)
*charptr = xstrdup(arg);
break;
case sHostKeyAlgorithms:
charptr = &options->hostkeyalgorithms;
goto parse_keytypes;
case sCASignatureAlgorithms:
charptr = &options->ca_sign_algorithms;
goto parse_keytypes;
case sPubkeyAuthentication:
intptr = &options->pubkey_authentication;
goto parse_flag;
case sPubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes:
charptr = &options->pubkey_key_types;
goto parse_keytypes;
case sPubkeyAuthOptions:
intptr = &options->pubkey_auth_options;
value = 0;
while ((arg = strdelim(&cp)) && *arg != '\0') {
if (strcasecmp(arg, "none") == 0)
continue;
if (strcasecmp(arg, "touch-required") == 0)
value |= PUBKEYAUTH_TOUCH_REQUIRED;
+ else if (strcasecmp(arg, "verify-required") == 0)
+ value |= PUBKEYAUTH_VERIFY_REQUIRED;
else {
fatal("%s line %d: unsupported "
"PubkeyAuthOptions option %s",
filename, linenum, arg);
}
}
if (*activep && *intptr == -1)
*intptr = value;
break;
case sKerberosAuthentication:
intptr = &options->kerberos_authentication;
goto parse_flag;
case sKerberosOrLocalPasswd:
intptr = &options->kerberos_or_local_passwd;
goto parse_flag;
case sKerberosTicketCleanup:
intptr = &options->kerberos_ticket_cleanup;
goto parse_flag;
case sKerberosGetAFSToken:
intptr = &options->kerberos_get_afs_token;
goto parse_flag;
case sGssAuthentication:
intptr = &options->gss_authentication;
goto parse_flag;
case sGssCleanupCreds:
intptr = &options->gss_cleanup_creds;
goto parse_flag;
case sGssStrictAcceptor:
intptr = &options->gss_strict_acceptor;
goto parse_flag;
case sPasswordAuthentication:
intptr = &options->password_authentication;
goto parse_flag;
case sKbdInteractiveAuthentication:
intptr = &options->kbd_interactive_authentication;
goto parse_flag;
case sChallengeResponseAuthentication:
intptr = &options->challenge_response_authentication;
goto parse_flag;
case sPrintMotd:
intptr = &options->print_motd;
goto parse_flag;
case sPrintLastLog:
intptr = &options->print_lastlog;
goto parse_flag;
case sX11Forwarding:
intptr = &options->x11_forwarding;
goto parse_flag;
case sX11DisplayOffset:
intptr = &options->x11_display_offset;
parse_int:
arg = strdelim(&cp);
if ((errstr = atoi_err(arg, &value)) != NULL)
fatal("%s line %d: integer value %s.",
filename, linenum, errstr);
if (*activep && *intptr == -1)
*intptr = value;
break;
case sX11UseLocalhost:
intptr = &options->x11_use_localhost;
goto parse_flag;
case sXAuthLocation:
charptr = &options->xauth_location;
goto parse_filename;
case sPermitTTY:
intptr = &options->permit_tty;
goto parse_flag;
case sPermitUserRC:
intptr = &options->permit_user_rc;
goto parse_flag;
case sStrictModes:
intptr = &options->strict_modes;
goto parse_flag;
case sTCPKeepAlive:
intptr = &options->tcp_keep_alive;
goto parse_flag;
case sEmptyPasswd:
intptr = &options->permit_empty_passwd;
goto parse_flag;
case sPermitUserEnvironment:
intptr = &options->permit_user_env;
- charptr = &options->permit_user_env_whitelist;
+ charptr = &options->permit_user_env_allowlist;
arg = strdelim(&cp);
if (!arg || *arg == '\0')
fatal("%s line %d: missing argument.",
filename, linenum);
value = 0;
p = NULL;
if (strcmp(arg, "yes") == 0)
value = 1;
else if (strcmp(arg, "no") == 0)
value = 0;
else {
/* Pattern-list specified */
value = 1;
p = xstrdup(arg);
}
if (*activep && *intptr == -1) {
*intptr = value;
*charptr = p;
p = NULL;
}
free(p);
break;
case sCompression:
intptr = &options->compression;
multistate_ptr = multistate_compression;
goto parse_multistate;
case sRekeyLimit:
arg = strdelim(&cp);
if (!arg || *arg == '\0')
fatal("%.200s line %d: Missing argument.", filename,
linenum);
if (strcmp(arg, "default") == 0) {
val64 = 0;
} else {
if (scan_scaled(arg, &val64) == -1)
fatal("%.200s line %d: Bad number '%s': %s",
filename, linenum, arg, strerror(errno));
if (val64 != 0 && val64 < 16)
fatal("%.200s line %d: RekeyLimit too small",
filename, linenum);
}
if (*activep && options->rekey_limit == -1)
options->rekey_limit = val64;
if (cp != NULL) { /* optional rekey interval present */
if (strcmp(cp, "none") == 0) {
(void)strdelim(&cp); /* discard */
break;
}
intptr = &options->rekey_interval;
goto parse_time;
}
break;
case sGatewayPorts:
intptr = &options->fwd_opts.gateway_ports;
multistate_ptr = multistate_gatewayports;
goto parse_multistate;
case sUseDNS:
intptr = &options->use_dns;
goto parse_flag;
case sLogFacility:
log_facility_ptr = &options->log_facility;
arg = strdelim(&cp);
value = log_facility_number(arg);
if (value == SYSLOG_FACILITY_NOT_SET)
fatal("%.200s line %d: unsupported log facility '%s'",
filename, linenum, arg ? arg : "<NONE>");
if (*log_facility_ptr == -1)
*log_facility_ptr = (SyslogFacility) value;
break;
case sLogLevel:
log_level_ptr = &options->log_level;
arg = strdelim(&cp);
value = log_level_number(arg);
if (value == SYSLOG_LEVEL_NOT_SET)
fatal("%.200s line %d: unsupported log level '%s'",
filename, linenum, arg ? arg : "<NONE>");
if (*activep && *log_level_ptr == -1)
*log_level_ptr = (LogLevel) value;
break;
case sAllowTcpForwarding:
intptr = &options->allow_tcp_forwarding;
multistate_ptr = multistate_tcpfwd;
goto parse_multistate;
case sAllowStreamLocalForwarding:
intptr = &options->allow_streamlocal_forwarding;
multistate_ptr = multistate_tcpfwd;
goto parse_multistate;
case sAllowAgentForwarding:
intptr = &options->allow_agent_forwarding;
goto parse_flag;
case sDisableForwarding:
intptr = &options->disable_forwarding;
goto parse_flag;
case sAllowUsers:
while ((arg = strdelim(&cp)) && *arg != '\0') {
if (match_user(NULL, NULL, NULL, arg) == -1)
fatal("%s line %d: invalid AllowUsers pattern: "
"\"%.100s\"", filename, linenum, arg);
if (!*activep)
continue;
array_append(filename, linenum, "AllowUsers",
&options->allow_users, &options->num_allow_users,
arg);
}
break;
case sDenyUsers:
while ((arg = strdelim(&cp)) && *arg != '\0') {
if (match_user(NULL, NULL, NULL, arg) == -1)
fatal("%s line %d: invalid DenyUsers pattern: "
"\"%.100s\"", filename, linenum, arg);
if (!*activep)
continue;
array_append(filename, linenum, "DenyUsers",
&options->deny_users, &options->num_deny_users,
arg);
}
break;
case sAllowGroups:
while ((arg = strdelim(&cp)) && *arg != '\0') {
if (!*activep)
continue;
array_append(filename, linenum, "AllowGroups",
&options->allow_groups, &options->num_allow_groups,
arg);
}
break;
case sDenyGroups:
while ((arg = strdelim(&cp)) && *arg != '\0') {
if (!*activep)
continue;
array_append(filename, linenum, "DenyGroups",
&options->deny_groups, &options->num_deny_groups,
arg);
}
break;
case sCiphers:
arg = strdelim(&cp);
if (!arg || *arg == '\0')
fatal("%s line %d: Missing argument.", filename, linenum);
if (*arg != '-' &&
!ciphers_valid(*arg == '+' || *arg == '^' ? arg + 1 : arg))
fatal("%s line %d: Bad SSH2 cipher spec '%s'.",
filename, linenum, arg ? arg : "<NONE>");
if (options->ciphers == NULL)
options->ciphers = xstrdup(arg);
break;
case sMacs:
arg = strdelim(&cp);
if (!arg || *arg == '\0')
fatal("%s line %d: Missing argument.", filename, linenum);
if (*arg != '-' &&
!mac_valid(*arg == '+' || *arg == '^' ? arg + 1 : arg))
fatal("%s line %d: Bad SSH2 mac spec '%s'.",
filename, linenum, arg ? arg : "<NONE>");
if (options->macs == NULL)
options->macs = xstrdup(arg);
break;
case sKexAlgorithms:
arg = strdelim(&cp);
if (!arg || *arg == '\0')
fatal("%s line %d: Missing argument.",
filename, linenum);
if (*arg != '-' &&
!kex_names_valid(*arg == '+' || *arg == '^' ?
arg + 1 : arg))
fatal("%s line %d: Bad SSH2 KexAlgorithms '%s'.",
filename, linenum, arg ? arg : "<NONE>");
if (options->kex_algorithms == NULL)
options->kex_algorithms = xstrdup(arg);
break;
case sSubsystem:
if (options->num_subsystems >= MAX_SUBSYSTEMS) {
fatal("%s line %d: too many subsystems defined.",
filename, linenum);
}
arg = strdelim(&cp);
if (!arg || *arg == '\0')
fatal("%s line %d: Missing subsystem name.",
filename, linenum);
if (!*activep) {
arg = strdelim(&cp);
break;
}
for (i = 0; i < options->num_subsystems; i++)
if (strcmp(arg, options->subsystem_name[i]) == 0)
fatal("%s line %d: Subsystem '%s' already defined.",
filename, linenum, arg);
options->subsystem_name[options->num_subsystems] = xstrdup(arg);
arg = strdelim(&cp);
if (!arg || *arg == '\0')
fatal("%s line %d: Missing subsystem command.",
filename, linenum);
options->subsystem_command[options->num_subsystems] = xstrdup(arg);
/* Collect arguments (separate to executable) */
p = xstrdup(arg);
len = strlen(p) + 1;
while ((arg = strdelim(&cp)) != NULL && *arg != '\0') {
len += 1 + strlen(arg);
p = xreallocarray(p, 1, len);
strlcat(p, " ", len);
strlcat(p, arg, len);
}
options->subsystem_args[options->num_subsystems] = p;
options->num_subsystems++;
break;
case sMaxStartups:
arg = strdelim(&cp);
if (!arg || *arg == '\0')
fatal("%s line %d: Missing MaxStartups spec.",
filename, linenum);
if ((n = sscanf(arg, "%d:%d:%d",
&options->max_startups_begin,
&options->max_startups_rate,
&options->max_startups)) == 3) {
if (options->max_startups_begin >
options->max_startups ||
options->max_startups_rate > 100 ||
options->max_startups_rate < 1)
fatal("%s line %d: Illegal MaxStartups spec.",
filename, linenum);
} else if (n != 1)
fatal("%s line %d: Illegal MaxStartups spec.",
filename, linenum);
else
options->max_startups = options->max_startups_begin;
break;
case sMaxAuthTries:
intptr = &options->max_authtries;
goto parse_int;
case sMaxSessions:
intptr = &options->max_sessions;
goto parse_int;
case sBanner:
charptr = &options->banner;
goto parse_filename;
/*
* These options can contain %X options expanded at
* connect time, so that you can specify paths like:
*
* AuthorizedKeysFile /etc/ssh_keys/%u
*/
case sAuthorizedKeysFile:
if (*activep && options->num_authkeys_files == 0) {
while ((arg = strdelim(&cp)) && *arg != '\0') {
arg = tilde_expand_filename(arg, getuid());
array_append(filename, linenum,
"AuthorizedKeysFile",
&options->authorized_keys_files,
&options->num_authkeys_files, arg);
free(arg);
}
}
return 0;
case sAuthorizedPrincipalsFile:
charptr = &options->authorized_principals_file;
arg = strdelim(&cp);
if (!arg || *arg == '\0')
fatal("%s line %d: missing file name.",
filename, linenum);
if (*activep && *charptr == NULL) {
*charptr = tilde_expand_filename(arg, getuid());
/* increase optional counter */
if (intptr != NULL)
*intptr = *intptr + 1;
}
break;
case sClientAliveInterval:
intptr = &options->client_alive_interval;
goto parse_time;
case sClientAliveCountMax:
intptr = &options->client_alive_count_max;
goto parse_int;
case sAcceptEnv:
while ((arg = strdelim(&cp)) && *arg != '\0') {
if (strchr(arg, '=') != NULL)
fatal("%s line %d: Invalid environment name.",
filename, linenum);
if (!*activep)
continue;
array_append(filename, linenum, "AcceptEnv",
&options->accept_env, &options->num_accept_env,
arg);
}
break;
case sSetEnv:
uvalue = options->num_setenv;
while ((arg = strdelimw(&cp)) && *arg != '\0') {
if (strchr(arg, '=') == NULL)
fatal("%s line %d: Invalid environment.",
filename, linenum);
if (!*activep || uvalue != 0)
continue;
array_append(filename, linenum, "SetEnv",
&options->setenv, &options->num_setenv, arg);
}
break;
case sPermitTunnel:
intptr = &options->permit_tun;
arg = strdelim(&cp);
if (!arg || *arg == '\0')
fatal("%s line %d: Missing yes/point-to-point/"
"ethernet/no argument.", filename, linenum);
value = -1;
for (i = 0; tunmode_desc[i].val != -1; i++)
if (strcmp(tunmode_desc[i].text, arg) == 0) {
value = tunmode_desc[i].val;
break;
}
if (value == -1)
fatal("%s line %d: Bad yes/point-to-point/ethernet/"
"no argument: %s", filename, linenum, arg);
if (*activep && *intptr == -1)
*intptr = value;
break;
case sInclude:
if (cmdline) {
fatal("Include directive not supported as a "
"command-line option");
}
value = 0;
while ((arg2 = strdelim(&cp)) != NULL && *arg2 != '\0') {
value++;
found = 0;
if (*arg2 != '/' && *arg2 != '~') {
xasprintf(&arg, "%s/%s", SSHDIR, arg2);
} else
arg = xstrdup(arg2);
/*
* Don't let included files clobber the containing
* file's Match state.
*/
oactive = *activep;
/* consult cache of include files */
TAILQ_FOREACH(item, includes, entry) {
if (strcmp(item->selector, arg) != 0)
continue;
if (item->filename != NULL) {
parse_server_config_depth(options,
item->filename, item->contents,
includes, connectinfo,
- (oactive ? 0 : SSHCFG_NEVERMATCH),
+ (*inc_flags & SSHCFG_MATCH_ONLY
+ ? SSHCFG_MATCH_ONLY : (oactive
+ ? 0 : SSHCFG_NEVERMATCH)),
activep, depth + 1);
}
found = 1;
*activep = oactive;
}
if (found != 0) {
free(arg);
continue;
}
/* requested glob was not in cache */
debug2("%s line %d: new include %s",
filename, linenum, arg);
if ((r = glob(arg, 0, NULL, &gbuf)) != 0) {
if (r != GLOB_NOMATCH) {
fatal("%s line %d: include \"%s\" "
"glob failed", filename,
linenum, arg);
}
/*
* If no entry matched then record a
* placeholder to skip later glob calls.
*/
debug2("%s line %d: no match for %s",
filename, linenum, arg);
item = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*item));
item->selector = strdup(arg);
TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(includes,
item, entry);
}
if (gbuf.gl_pathc > INT_MAX)
fatal("%s: too many glob results", __func__);
for (n = 0; n < (int)gbuf.gl_pathc; n++) {
debug2("%s line %d: including %s",
filename, linenum, gbuf.gl_pathv[n]);
item = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*item));
item->selector = strdup(arg);
item->filename = strdup(gbuf.gl_pathv[n]);
if ((item->contents = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) {
fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed",
__func__);
}
load_server_config(item->filename,
item->contents);
parse_server_config_depth(options,
item->filename, item->contents,
includes, connectinfo,
- (oactive ? 0 : SSHCFG_NEVERMATCH),
+ (*inc_flags & SSHCFG_MATCH_ONLY
+ ? SSHCFG_MATCH_ONLY : (oactive
+ ? 0 : SSHCFG_NEVERMATCH)),
activep, depth + 1);
*activep = oactive;
TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(includes, item, entry);
}
globfree(&gbuf);
free(arg);
}
if (value == 0) {
fatal("%s line %d: Include missing filename argument",
filename, linenum);
}
break;
case sMatch:
if (cmdline)
fatal("Match directive not supported as a command-line "
"option");
- value = match_cfg_line(&cp, linenum, connectinfo);
+ value = match_cfg_line(&cp, linenum,
+ (*inc_flags & SSHCFG_NEVERMATCH ? NULL : connectinfo));
if (value < 0)
fatal("%s line %d: Bad Match condition", filename,
linenum);
- *activep = (inc_flags & SSHCFG_NEVERMATCH) ? 0 : value;
+ *activep = (*inc_flags & SSHCFG_NEVERMATCH) ? 0 : value;
+ /* The MATCH_ONLY is applicable only until the first match block */
+ *inc_flags &= ~SSHCFG_MATCH_ONLY;
break;
case sPermitListen:
case sPermitOpen:
if (opcode == sPermitListen) {
uintptr = &options->num_permitted_listens;
chararrayptr = &options->permitted_listens;
} else {
uintptr = &options->num_permitted_opens;
chararrayptr = &options->permitted_opens;
}
arg = strdelim(&cp);
if (!arg || *arg == '\0')
fatal("%s line %d: missing %s specification",
filename, linenum, lookup_opcode_name(opcode));
uvalue = *uintptr; /* modified later */
if (strcmp(arg, "any") == 0 || strcmp(arg, "none") == 0) {
if (*activep && uvalue == 0) {
*uintptr = 1;
*chararrayptr = xcalloc(1,
sizeof(**chararrayptr));
(*chararrayptr)[0] = xstrdup(arg);
}
break;
}
for (; arg != NULL && *arg != '\0'; arg = strdelim(&cp)) {
if (opcode == sPermitListen &&
strchr(arg, ':') == NULL) {
/*
* Allow bare port number for PermitListen
* to indicate a wildcard listen host.
*/
xasprintf(&arg2, "*:%s", arg);
} else {
arg2 = xstrdup(arg);
ch = '\0';
p = hpdelim2(&arg, &ch);
if (p == NULL || ch == '/') {
fatal("%s line %d: missing host in %s",
filename, linenum,
lookup_opcode_name(opcode));
}
p = cleanhostname(p);
}
if (arg == NULL ||
((port = permitopen_port(arg)) < 0)) {
fatal("%s line %d: bad port number in %s",
filename, linenum,
lookup_opcode_name(opcode));
}
if (*activep && uvalue == 0) {
array_append(filename, linenum,
lookup_opcode_name(opcode),
chararrayptr, uintptr, arg2);
}
free(arg2);
}
break;
case sForceCommand:
if (cp == NULL || *cp == '\0')
fatal("%.200s line %d: Missing argument.", filename,
linenum);
len = strspn(cp, WHITESPACE);
if (*activep && options->adm_forced_command == NULL)
options->adm_forced_command = xstrdup(cp + len);
return 0;
case sChrootDirectory:
charptr = &options->chroot_directory;
arg = strdelim(&cp);
if (!arg || *arg == '\0')
fatal("%s line %d: missing file name.",
filename, linenum);
if (*activep && *charptr == NULL)
*charptr = xstrdup(arg);
break;
case sTrustedUserCAKeys:
charptr = &options->trusted_user_ca_keys;
goto parse_filename;
case sRevokedKeys:
charptr = &options->revoked_keys_file;
goto parse_filename;
case sSecurityKeyProvider:
charptr = &options->sk_provider;
arg = strdelim(&cp);
if (!arg || *arg == '\0')
fatal("%s line %d: missing file name.",
filename, linenum);
if (*activep && *charptr == NULL) {
*charptr = strcasecmp(arg, "internal") == 0 ?
xstrdup(arg) : derelativise_path(arg);
/* increase optional counter */
if (intptr != NULL)
*intptr = *intptr + 1;
}
break;
case sIPQoS:
arg = strdelim(&cp);
if ((value = parse_ipqos(arg)) == -1)
fatal("%s line %d: Bad IPQoS value: %s",
filename, linenum, arg);
arg = strdelim(&cp);
if (arg == NULL)
value2 = value;
else if ((value2 = parse_ipqos(arg)) == -1)
fatal("%s line %d: Bad IPQoS value: %s",
filename, linenum, arg);
if (*activep) {
options->ip_qos_interactive = value;
options->ip_qos_bulk = value2;
}
break;
case sVersionAddendum:
if (cp == NULL || *cp == '\0')
fatal("%.200s line %d: Missing argument.", filename,
linenum);
len = strspn(cp, WHITESPACE);
if (*activep && options->version_addendum == NULL) {
if (strcasecmp(cp + len, "none") == 0)
options->version_addendum = xstrdup("");
else if (strchr(cp + len, '\r') != NULL)
fatal("%.200s line %d: Invalid argument",
filename, linenum);
else
options->version_addendum = xstrdup(cp + len);
}
return 0;
case sAuthorizedKeysCommand:
if (cp == NULL)
fatal("%.200s line %d: Missing argument.", filename,
linenum);
len = strspn(cp, WHITESPACE);
if (*activep && options->authorized_keys_command == NULL) {
if (cp[len] != '/' && strcasecmp(cp + len, "none") != 0)
fatal("%.200s line %d: AuthorizedKeysCommand "
"must be an absolute path",
filename, linenum);
options->authorized_keys_command = xstrdup(cp + len);
}
return 0;
case sAuthorizedKeysCommandUser:
charptr = &options->authorized_keys_command_user;
arg = strdelim(&cp);
if (!arg || *arg == '\0')
fatal("%s line %d: missing AuthorizedKeysCommandUser "
"argument.", filename, linenum);
if (*activep && *charptr == NULL)
*charptr = xstrdup(arg);
break;
case sAuthorizedPrincipalsCommand:
if (cp == NULL)
fatal("%.200s line %d: Missing argument.", filename,
linenum);
len = strspn(cp, WHITESPACE);
if (*activep &&
options->authorized_principals_command == NULL) {
if (cp[len] != '/' && strcasecmp(cp + len, "none") != 0)
fatal("%.200s line %d: "
"AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand must be "
"an absolute path", filename, linenum);
options->authorized_principals_command =
xstrdup(cp + len);
}
return 0;
case sAuthorizedPrincipalsCommandUser:
charptr = &options->authorized_principals_command_user;
arg = strdelim(&cp);
if (!arg || *arg == '\0')
fatal("%s line %d: missing "
"AuthorizedPrincipalsCommandUser argument.",
filename, linenum);
if (*activep && *charptr == NULL)
*charptr = xstrdup(arg);
break;
case sAuthenticationMethods:
if (options->num_auth_methods == 0) {
value = 0; /* seen "any" pseudo-method */
value2 = 0; /* successfully parsed any method */
while ((arg = strdelim(&cp)) && *arg != '\0') {
if (strcmp(arg, "any") == 0) {
if (options->num_auth_methods > 0) {
fatal("%s line %d: \"any\" "
"must appear alone in "
"AuthenticationMethods",
filename, linenum);
}
value = 1;
} else if (value) {
fatal("%s line %d: \"any\" must appear "
"alone in AuthenticationMethods",
filename, linenum);
} else if (auth2_methods_valid(arg, 0) != 0) {
fatal("%s line %d: invalid "
"authentication method list.",
filename, linenum);
}
value2 = 1;
if (!*activep)
continue;
array_append(filename, linenum,
"AuthenticationMethods",
&options->auth_methods,
&options->num_auth_methods, arg);
}
if (value2 == 0) {
fatal("%s line %d: no AuthenticationMethods "
"specified", filename, linenum);
}
}
return 0;
case sStreamLocalBindMask:
arg = strdelim(&cp);
if (!arg || *arg == '\0')
fatal("%s line %d: missing StreamLocalBindMask "
"argument.", filename, linenum);
/* Parse mode in octal format */
value = strtol(arg, &p, 8);
if (arg == p || value < 0 || value > 0777)
fatal("%s line %d: Bad mask.", filename, linenum);
if (*activep)
options->fwd_opts.streamlocal_bind_mask = (mode_t)value;
break;
case sStreamLocalBindUnlink:
intptr = &options->fwd_opts.streamlocal_bind_unlink;
goto parse_flag;
case sFingerprintHash:
arg = strdelim(&cp);
if (!arg || *arg == '\0')
fatal("%.200s line %d: Missing argument.",
filename, linenum);
if ((value = ssh_digest_alg_by_name(arg)) == -1)
fatal("%.200s line %d: Invalid hash algorithm \"%s\".",
filename, linenum, arg);
if (*activep)
options->fingerprint_hash = value;
break;
case sExposeAuthInfo:
intptr = &options->expose_userauth_info;
goto parse_flag;
case sRDomain:
#if !defined(__OpenBSD__) && !defined(HAVE_SYS_SET_PROCESS_RDOMAIN)
fatal("%s line %d: setting RDomain not supported on this "
"platform.", filename, linenum);
#endif
charptr = &options->routing_domain;
arg = strdelim(&cp);
if (!arg || *arg == '\0')
fatal("%.200s line %d: Missing argument.",
filename, linenum);
if (strcasecmp(arg, "none") != 0 && strcmp(arg, "%D") != 0 &&
!valid_rdomain(arg))
fatal("%s line %d: bad routing domain",
filename, linenum);
if (*activep && *charptr == NULL)
*charptr = xstrdup(arg);
break;
case sDeprecated:
case sIgnore:
case sUnsupported:
do_log2(opcode == sIgnore ?
SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG2 : SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO,
"%s line %d: %s option %s", filename, linenum,
opcode == sUnsupported ? "Unsupported" : "Deprecated", arg);
while (arg)
arg = strdelim(&cp);
break;
default:
fatal("%s line %d: Missing handler for opcode %s (%d)",
filename, linenum, arg, opcode);
}
if ((arg = strdelim(&cp)) != NULL && *arg != '\0')
fatal("%s line %d: garbage at end of line; \"%.200s\".",
filename, linenum, arg);
return 0;
}
int
process_server_config_line(ServerOptions *options, char *line,
const char *filename, int linenum, int *activep,
struct connection_info *connectinfo, struct include_list *includes)
{
+ int inc_flags = 0;
+
return process_server_config_line_depth(options, line, filename,
- linenum, activep, connectinfo, 0, 0, includes);
+ linenum, activep, connectinfo, &inc_flags, 0, includes);
}
/* Reads the server configuration file. */
void
load_server_config(const char *filename, struct sshbuf *conf)
{
+ struct stat st;
char *line = NULL, *cp;
size_t linesize = 0;
FILE *f;
int r, lineno = 0;
debug2("%s: filename %s", __func__, filename);
if ((f = fopen(filename, "r")) == NULL) {
perror(filename);
exit(1);
}
sshbuf_reset(conf);
+ /* grow buffer, so realloc is avoided for large config files */
+ if (fstat(fileno(f), &st) == 0 && st.st_size > 0 &&
+ (r = sshbuf_allocate(conf, st.st_size)) != 0)
+ fatal("%s: allocate failed: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
while (getline(&line, &linesize, f) != -1) {
lineno++;
/*
* Trim out comments and strip whitespace
* NB - preserve newlines, they are needed to reproduce
* line numbers later for error messages
*/
if ((cp = strchr(line, '#')) != NULL)
memcpy(cp, "\n", 2);
cp = line + strspn(line, " \t\r");
if ((r = sshbuf_put(conf, cp, strlen(cp))) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
}
free(line);
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(conf, 0)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
fclose(f);
debug2("%s: done config len = %zu", __func__, sshbuf_len(conf));
}
void
parse_server_match_config(ServerOptions *options,
struct include_list *includes, struct connection_info *connectinfo)
{
ServerOptions mo;
initialize_server_options(&mo);
parse_server_config(&mo, "reprocess config", cfg, includes,
connectinfo);
copy_set_server_options(options, &mo, 0);
}
int parse_server_match_testspec(struct connection_info *ci, char *spec)
{
char *p;
while ((p = strsep(&spec, ",")) && *p != '\0') {
if (strncmp(p, "addr=", 5) == 0) {
ci->address = xstrdup(p + 5);
} else if (strncmp(p, "host=", 5) == 0) {
ci->host = xstrdup(p + 5);
} else if (strncmp(p, "user=", 5) == 0) {
ci->user = xstrdup(p + 5);
} else if (strncmp(p, "laddr=", 6) == 0) {
ci->laddress = xstrdup(p + 6);
} else if (strncmp(p, "rdomain=", 8) == 0) {
ci->rdomain = xstrdup(p + 8);
} else if (strncmp(p, "lport=", 6) == 0) {
ci->lport = a2port(p + 6);
if (ci->lport == -1) {
fprintf(stderr, "Invalid port '%s' in test mode"
" specification %s\n", p+6, p);
return -1;
}
} else {
fprintf(stderr, "Invalid test mode specification %s\n",
p);
return -1;
}
}
return 0;
}
/*
* Copy any supported values that are set.
*
* If the preauth flag is set, we do not bother copying the string or
* array values that are not used pre-authentication, because any that we
* do use must be explicitly sent in mm_getpwnamallow().
*/
void
copy_set_server_options(ServerOptions *dst, ServerOptions *src, int preauth)
{
#define M_CP_INTOPT(n) do {\
if (src->n != -1) \
dst->n = src->n; \
} while (0)
M_CP_INTOPT(password_authentication);
M_CP_INTOPT(gss_authentication);
M_CP_INTOPT(pubkey_authentication);
M_CP_INTOPT(pubkey_auth_options);
M_CP_INTOPT(kerberos_authentication);
M_CP_INTOPT(hostbased_authentication);
M_CP_INTOPT(hostbased_uses_name_from_packet_only);
M_CP_INTOPT(kbd_interactive_authentication);
M_CP_INTOPT(permit_root_login);
M_CP_INTOPT(permit_empty_passwd);
M_CP_INTOPT(ignore_rhosts);
M_CP_INTOPT(allow_tcp_forwarding);
M_CP_INTOPT(allow_streamlocal_forwarding);
M_CP_INTOPT(allow_agent_forwarding);
M_CP_INTOPT(disable_forwarding);
M_CP_INTOPT(expose_userauth_info);
M_CP_INTOPT(permit_tun);
M_CP_INTOPT(fwd_opts.gateway_ports);
M_CP_INTOPT(fwd_opts.streamlocal_bind_unlink);
M_CP_INTOPT(x11_display_offset);
M_CP_INTOPT(x11_forwarding);
M_CP_INTOPT(x11_use_localhost);
M_CP_INTOPT(permit_tty);
M_CP_INTOPT(permit_user_rc);
M_CP_INTOPT(max_sessions);
M_CP_INTOPT(max_authtries);
M_CP_INTOPT(client_alive_count_max);
M_CP_INTOPT(client_alive_interval);
M_CP_INTOPT(ip_qos_interactive);
M_CP_INTOPT(ip_qos_bulk);
M_CP_INTOPT(rekey_limit);
M_CP_INTOPT(rekey_interval);
M_CP_INTOPT(log_level);
/*
* The bind_mask is a mode_t that may be unsigned, so we can't use
* M_CP_INTOPT - it does a signed comparison that causes compiler
* warnings.
*/
if (src->fwd_opts.streamlocal_bind_mask != (mode_t)-1) {
dst->fwd_opts.streamlocal_bind_mask =
src->fwd_opts.streamlocal_bind_mask;
}
/* M_CP_STROPT and M_CP_STRARRAYOPT should not appear before here */
#define M_CP_STROPT(n) do {\
if (src->n != NULL && dst->n != src->n) { \
free(dst->n); \
dst->n = src->n; \
} \
} while(0)
#define M_CP_STRARRAYOPT(s, num_s) do {\
u_int i; \
if (src->num_s != 0) { \
for (i = 0; i < dst->num_s; i++) \
free(dst->s[i]); \
free(dst->s); \
dst->s = xcalloc(src->num_s, sizeof(*dst->s)); \
for (i = 0; i < src->num_s; i++) \
dst->s[i] = xstrdup(src->s[i]); \
dst->num_s = src->num_s; \
} \
} while(0)
/* See comment in servconf.h */
COPY_MATCH_STRING_OPTS();
/* Arguments that accept '+...' need to be expanded */
assemble_algorithms(dst);
/*
* The only things that should be below this point are string options
* which are only used after authentication.
*/
if (preauth)
return;
/* These options may be "none" to clear a global setting */
M_CP_STROPT(adm_forced_command);
if (option_clear_or_none(dst->adm_forced_command)) {
free(dst->adm_forced_command);
dst->adm_forced_command = NULL;
}
M_CP_STROPT(chroot_directory);
if (option_clear_or_none(dst->chroot_directory)) {
free(dst->chroot_directory);
dst->chroot_directory = NULL;
}
}
#undef M_CP_INTOPT
#undef M_CP_STROPT
#undef M_CP_STRARRAYOPT
#define SERVCONF_MAX_DEPTH 16
-void
+static void
parse_server_config_depth(ServerOptions *options, const char *filename,
struct sshbuf *conf, struct include_list *includes,
struct connection_info *connectinfo, int flags, int *activep, int depth)
{
int linenum, bad_options = 0;
char *cp, *obuf, *cbuf;
if (depth < 0 || depth > SERVCONF_MAX_DEPTH)
fatal("Too many recursive configuration includes");
- debug2("%s: config %s len %zu", __func__, filename, sshbuf_len(conf));
+ debug2("%s: config %s len %zu%s", __func__, filename, sshbuf_len(conf),
+ (flags & SSHCFG_NEVERMATCH ? " [checking syntax only]" : ""));
if ((obuf = cbuf = sshbuf_dup_string(conf)) == NULL)
fatal("%s: sshbuf_dup_string failed", __func__);
linenum = 1;
while ((cp = strsep(&cbuf, "\n")) != NULL) {
if (process_server_config_line_depth(options, cp,
- filename, linenum++, activep, connectinfo, flags,
+ filename, linenum++, activep, connectinfo, &flags,
depth, includes) != 0)
bad_options++;
}
free(obuf);
if (bad_options > 0)
fatal("%s: terminating, %d bad configuration options",
filename, bad_options);
- process_queued_listen_addrs(options);
}
void
parse_server_config(ServerOptions *options, const char *filename,
struct sshbuf *conf, struct include_list *includes,
struct connection_info *connectinfo)
{
int active = connectinfo ? 0 : 1;
parse_server_config_depth(options, filename, conf, includes,
- connectinfo, 0, &active, 0);
+ connectinfo, (connectinfo ? SSHCFG_MATCH_ONLY : 0), &active, 0);
+ process_queued_listen_addrs(options);
}
static const char *
fmt_multistate_int(int val, const struct multistate *m)
{
u_int i;
for (i = 0; m[i].key != NULL; i++) {
if (m[i].value == val)
return m[i].key;
}
return "UNKNOWN";
}
static const char *
fmt_intarg(ServerOpCodes code, int val)
{
if (val == -1)
return "unset";
switch (code) {
case sAddressFamily:
return fmt_multistate_int(val, multistate_addressfamily);
case sPermitRootLogin:
return fmt_multistate_int(val, multistate_permitrootlogin);
case sGatewayPorts:
return fmt_multistate_int(val, multistate_gatewayports);
case sCompression:
return fmt_multistate_int(val, multistate_compression);
case sAllowTcpForwarding:
return fmt_multistate_int(val, multistate_tcpfwd);
case sAllowStreamLocalForwarding:
return fmt_multistate_int(val, multistate_tcpfwd);
case sIgnoreRhosts:
return fmt_multistate_int(val, multistate_ignore_rhosts);
case sFingerprintHash:
return ssh_digest_alg_name(val);
default:
switch (val) {
case 0:
return "no";
case 1:
return "yes";
default:
return "UNKNOWN";
}
}
}
static void
dump_cfg_int(ServerOpCodes code, int val)
{
printf("%s %d\n", lookup_opcode_name(code), val);
}
static void
dump_cfg_oct(ServerOpCodes code, int val)
{
printf("%s 0%o\n", lookup_opcode_name(code), val);
}
static void
dump_cfg_fmtint(ServerOpCodes code, int val)
{
printf("%s %s\n", lookup_opcode_name(code), fmt_intarg(code, val));
}
static void
dump_cfg_string(ServerOpCodes code, const char *val)
{
printf("%s %s\n", lookup_opcode_name(code),
val == NULL ? "none" : val);
}
static void
dump_cfg_strarray(ServerOpCodes code, u_int count, char **vals)
{
u_int i;
for (i = 0; i < count; i++)
printf("%s %s\n", lookup_opcode_name(code), vals[i]);
}
static void
dump_cfg_strarray_oneline(ServerOpCodes code, u_int count, char **vals)
{
u_int i;
if (count <= 0 && code != sAuthenticationMethods)
return;
printf("%s", lookup_opcode_name(code));
for (i = 0; i < count; i++)
printf(" %s", vals[i]);
if (code == sAuthenticationMethods && count == 0)
printf(" any");
printf("\n");
}
static char *
format_listen_addrs(struct listenaddr *la)
{
int r;
struct addrinfo *ai;
char addr[NI_MAXHOST], port[NI_MAXSERV];
char *laddr1 = xstrdup(""), *laddr2 = NULL;
/*
* ListenAddress must be after Port. add_one_listen_addr pushes
* addresses onto a stack, so to maintain ordering we need to
* print these in reverse order.
*/
for (ai = la->addrs; ai; ai = ai->ai_next) {
if ((r = getnameinfo(ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen, addr,
sizeof(addr), port, sizeof(port),
NI_NUMERICHOST|NI_NUMERICSERV)) != 0) {
error("getnameinfo: %.100s", ssh_gai_strerror(r));
continue;
}
laddr2 = laddr1;
if (ai->ai_family == AF_INET6) {
xasprintf(&laddr1, "listenaddress [%s]:%s%s%s\n%s",
addr, port,
la->rdomain == NULL ? "" : " rdomain ",
la->rdomain == NULL ? "" : la->rdomain,
laddr2);
} else {
xasprintf(&laddr1, "listenaddress %s:%s%s%s\n%s",
addr, port,
la->rdomain == NULL ? "" : " rdomain ",
la->rdomain == NULL ? "" : la->rdomain,
laddr2);
}
free(laddr2);
}
return laddr1;
}
void
dump_config(ServerOptions *o)
{
char *s;
u_int i;
/* these are usually at the top of the config */
for (i = 0; i < o->num_ports; i++)
printf("port %d\n", o->ports[i]);
dump_cfg_fmtint(sAddressFamily, o->address_family);
for (i = 0; i < o->num_listen_addrs; i++) {
s = format_listen_addrs(&o->listen_addrs[i]);
printf("%s", s);
free(s);
}
/* integer arguments */
#ifdef USE_PAM
dump_cfg_fmtint(sUsePAM, o->use_pam);
#endif
dump_cfg_int(sLoginGraceTime, o->login_grace_time);
dump_cfg_int(sX11DisplayOffset, o->x11_display_offset);
dump_cfg_int(sMaxAuthTries, o->max_authtries);
dump_cfg_int(sMaxSessions, o->max_sessions);
dump_cfg_int(sClientAliveInterval, o->client_alive_interval);
dump_cfg_int(sClientAliveCountMax, o->client_alive_count_max);
dump_cfg_oct(sStreamLocalBindMask, o->fwd_opts.streamlocal_bind_mask);
/* formatted integer arguments */
dump_cfg_fmtint(sPermitRootLogin, o->permit_root_login);
dump_cfg_fmtint(sIgnoreRhosts, o->ignore_rhosts);
dump_cfg_fmtint(sIgnoreUserKnownHosts, o->ignore_user_known_hosts);
dump_cfg_fmtint(sHostbasedAuthentication, o->hostbased_authentication);
dump_cfg_fmtint(sHostbasedUsesNameFromPacketOnly,
o->hostbased_uses_name_from_packet_only);
dump_cfg_fmtint(sPubkeyAuthentication, o->pubkey_authentication);
#ifdef KRB5
dump_cfg_fmtint(sKerberosAuthentication, o->kerberos_authentication);
dump_cfg_fmtint(sKerberosOrLocalPasswd, o->kerberos_or_local_passwd);
dump_cfg_fmtint(sKerberosTicketCleanup, o->kerberos_ticket_cleanup);
# ifdef USE_AFS
dump_cfg_fmtint(sKerberosGetAFSToken, o->kerberos_get_afs_token);
# endif
#endif
#ifdef GSSAPI
dump_cfg_fmtint(sGssAuthentication, o->gss_authentication);
dump_cfg_fmtint(sGssCleanupCreds, o->gss_cleanup_creds);
#endif
dump_cfg_fmtint(sPasswordAuthentication, o->password_authentication);
dump_cfg_fmtint(sKbdInteractiveAuthentication,
o->kbd_interactive_authentication);
dump_cfg_fmtint(sChallengeResponseAuthentication,
o->challenge_response_authentication);
dump_cfg_fmtint(sPrintMotd, o->print_motd);
#ifndef DISABLE_LASTLOG
dump_cfg_fmtint(sPrintLastLog, o->print_lastlog);
#endif
dump_cfg_fmtint(sX11Forwarding, o->x11_forwarding);
dump_cfg_fmtint(sX11UseLocalhost, o->x11_use_localhost);
dump_cfg_fmtint(sPermitTTY, o->permit_tty);
dump_cfg_fmtint(sPermitUserRC, o->permit_user_rc);
dump_cfg_fmtint(sStrictModes, o->strict_modes);
dump_cfg_fmtint(sTCPKeepAlive, o->tcp_keep_alive);
dump_cfg_fmtint(sEmptyPasswd, o->permit_empty_passwd);
dump_cfg_fmtint(sCompression, o->compression);
dump_cfg_fmtint(sGatewayPorts, o->fwd_opts.gateway_ports);
dump_cfg_fmtint(sUseDNS, o->use_dns);
dump_cfg_fmtint(sAllowTcpForwarding, o->allow_tcp_forwarding);
dump_cfg_fmtint(sAllowAgentForwarding, o->allow_agent_forwarding);
dump_cfg_fmtint(sDisableForwarding, o->disable_forwarding);
dump_cfg_fmtint(sAllowStreamLocalForwarding, o->allow_streamlocal_forwarding);
dump_cfg_fmtint(sStreamLocalBindUnlink, o->fwd_opts.streamlocal_bind_unlink);
dump_cfg_fmtint(sFingerprintHash, o->fingerprint_hash);
dump_cfg_fmtint(sExposeAuthInfo, o->expose_userauth_info);
/* string arguments */
dump_cfg_string(sPidFile, o->pid_file);
dump_cfg_string(sXAuthLocation, o->xauth_location);
dump_cfg_string(sCiphers, o->ciphers);
dump_cfg_string(sMacs, o->macs);
dump_cfg_string(sBanner, o->banner);
dump_cfg_string(sForceCommand, o->adm_forced_command);
dump_cfg_string(sChrootDirectory, o->chroot_directory);
dump_cfg_string(sTrustedUserCAKeys, o->trusted_user_ca_keys);
dump_cfg_string(sRevokedKeys, o->revoked_keys_file);
dump_cfg_string(sSecurityKeyProvider, o->sk_provider);
dump_cfg_string(sAuthorizedPrincipalsFile,
o->authorized_principals_file);
dump_cfg_string(sVersionAddendum, *o->version_addendum == '\0'
? "none" : o->version_addendum);
dump_cfg_string(sAuthorizedKeysCommand, o->authorized_keys_command);
dump_cfg_string(sAuthorizedKeysCommandUser, o->authorized_keys_command_user);
dump_cfg_string(sAuthorizedPrincipalsCommand, o->authorized_principals_command);
dump_cfg_string(sAuthorizedPrincipalsCommandUser, o->authorized_principals_command_user);
dump_cfg_string(sHostKeyAgent, o->host_key_agent);
dump_cfg_string(sKexAlgorithms, o->kex_algorithms);
dump_cfg_string(sCASignatureAlgorithms, o->ca_sign_algorithms);
dump_cfg_string(sHostbasedAcceptedKeyTypes, o->hostbased_key_types);
dump_cfg_string(sHostKeyAlgorithms, o->hostkeyalgorithms);
dump_cfg_string(sPubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes, o->pubkey_key_types);
#if defined(__OpenBSD__) || defined(HAVE_SYS_SET_PROCESS_RDOMAIN)
dump_cfg_string(sRDomain, o->routing_domain);
#endif
/* string arguments requiring a lookup */
dump_cfg_string(sLogLevel, log_level_name(o->log_level));
dump_cfg_string(sLogFacility, log_facility_name(o->log_facility));
/* string array arguments */
dump_cfg_strarray_oneline(sAuthorizedKeysFile, o->num_authkeys_files,
o->authorized_keys_files);
dump_cfg_strarray(sHostKeyFile, o->num_host_key_files,
o->host_key_files);
dump_cfg_strarray(sHostCertificate, o->num_host_cert_files,
o->host_cert_files);
dump_cfg_strarray(sAllowUsers, o->num_allow_users, o->allow_users);
dump_cfg_strarray(sDenyUsers, o->num_deny_users, o->deny_users);
dump_cfg_strarray(sAllowGroups, o->num_allow_groups, o->allow_groups);
dump_cfg_strarray(sDenyGroups, o->num_deny_groups, o->deny_groups);
dump_cfg_strarray(sAcceptEnv, o->num_accept_env, o->accept_env);
dump_cfg_strarray(sSetEnv, o->num_setenv, o->setenv);
dump_cfg_strarray_oneline(sAuthenticationMethods,
o->num_auth_methods, o->auth_methods);
/* other arguments */
for (i = 0; i < o->num_subsystems; i++)
printf("subsystem %s %s\n", o->subsystem_name[i],
o->subsystem_args[i]);
printf("maxstartups %d:%d:%d\n", o->max_startups_begin,
o->max_startups_rate, o->max_startups);
s = NULL;
for (i = 0; tunmode_desc[i].val != -1; i++) {
if (tunmode_desc[i].val == o->permit_tun) {
s = tunmode_desc[i].text;
break;
}
}
dump_cfg_string(sPermitTunnel, s);
printf("ipqos %s ", iptos2str(o->ip_qos_interactive));
printf("%s\n", iptos2str(o->ip_qos_bulk));
printf("rekeylimit %llu %d\n", (unsigned long long)o->rekey_limit,
o->rekey_interval);
printf("permitopen");
if (o->num_permitted_opens == 0)
printf(" any");
else {
for (i = 0; i < o->num_permitted_opens; i++)
printf(" %s", o->permitted_opens[i]);
}
printf("\n");
printf("permitlisten");
if (o->num_permitted_listens == 0)
printf(" any");
else {
for (i = 0; i < o->num_permitted_listens; i++)
printf(" %s", o->permitted_listens[i]);
}
printf("\n");
- if (o->permit_user_env_whitelist == NULL) {
+ if (o->permit_user_env_allowlist == NULL) {
dump_cfg_fmtint(sPermitUserEnvironment, o->permit_user_env);
} else {
printf("permituserenvironment %s\n",
- o->permit_user_env_whitelist);
+ o->permit_user_env_allowlist);
}
printf("pubkeyauthoptions");
if (o->pubkey_auth_options == 0)
printf(" none");
if (o->pubkey_auth_options & PUBKEYAUTH_TOUCH_REQUIRED)
printf(" touch-required");
+ if (o->pubkey_auth_options & PUBKEYAUTH_VERIFY_REQUIRED)
+ printf(" verify-required");
printf("\n");
}
diff --git a/servconf.h b/servconf.h
index a420f398dfe4..1df8f3db8df3 100644
--- a/servconf.h
+++ b/servconf.h
@@ -1,305 +1,306 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: servconf.h,v 1.144 2020/04/17 03:30:05 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: servconf.h,v 1.146 2020/08/27 01:07:10 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
* Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
* All rights reserved
* Definitions for server configuration data and for the functions reading it.
*
* As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
* can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this
* software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
* incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
* called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
*/
#ifndef SERVCONF_H
#define SERVCONF_H
#include <openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h>
#define MAX_PORTS 256 /* Max # ports. */
#define MAX_SUBSYSTEMS 256 /* Max # subsystems. */
/* permit_root_login */
#define PERMIT_NOT_SET -1
#define PERMIT_NO 0
#define PERMIT_FORCED_ONLY 1
#define PERMIT_NO_PASSWD 2
#define PERMIT_YES 3
/* use_privsep */
#define PRIVSEP_OFF 0
#define PRIVSEP_ON 1
#define PRIVSEP_NOSANDBOX 2
/* PermitOpen */
#define PERMITOPEN_ANY 0
#define PERMITOPEN_NONE -2
/* IgnoreRhosts */
#define IGNORE_RHOSTS_NO 0
#define IGNORE_RHOSTS_YES 1
#define IGNORE_RHOSTS_SHOSTS 2
#define DEFAULT_AUTH_FAIL_MAX 6 /* Default for MaxAuthTries */
#define DEFAULT_SESSIONS_MAX 10 /* Default for MaxSessions */
/* Magic name for internal sftp-server */
#define INTERNAL_SFTP_NAME "internal-sftp"
/* PubkeyAuthOptions flags */
-#define PUBKEYAUTH_TOUCH_REQUIRED 1
+#define PUBKEYAUTH_TOUCH_REQUIRED (1)
+#define PUBKEYAUTH_VERIFY_REQUIRED (1<<1)
struct ssh;
struct fwd_perm_list;
/*
* Used to store addresses from ListenAddr directives. These may be
* incomplete, as they may specify addresses that need to be merged
* with any ports requested by ListenPort.
*/
struct queued_listenaddr {
char *addr;
int port; /* <=0 if unspecified */
char *rdomain;
};
/* Resolved listen addresses, grouped by optional routing domain */
struct listenaddr {
char *rdomain;
struct addrinfo *addrs;
};
typedef struct {
u_int num_ports;
u_int ports_from_cmdline;
int ports[MAX_PORTS]; /* Port number to listen on. */
struct queued_listenaddr *queued_listen_addrs;
u_int num_queued_listens;
struct listenaddr *listen_addrs;
u_int num_listen_addrs;
int address_family; /* Address family used by the server. */
char *routing_domain; /* Bind session to routing domain */
char **host_key_files; /* Files containing host keys. */
int *host_key_file_userprovided; /* Key was specified by user. */
u_int num_host_key_files; /* Number of files for host keys. */
char **host_cert_files; /* Files containing host certs. */
u_int num_host_cert_files; /* Number of files for host certs. */
char *host_key_agent; /* ssh-agent socket for host keys. */
char *pid_file; /* Where to put our pid */
int login_grace_time; /* Disconnect if no auth in this time
* (sec). */
int permit_root_login; /* PERMIT_*, see above */
int ignore_rhosts; /* Ignore .rhosts and .shosts. */
int ignore_user_known_hosts; /* Ignore ~/.ssh/known_hosts
* for RhostsRsaAuth */
int print_motd; /* If true, print /etc/motd. */
int print_lastlog; /* If true, print lastlog */
int x11_forwarding; /* If true, permit inet (spoofing) X11 fwd. */
int x11_display_offset; /* What DISPLAY number to start
* searching at */
int x11_use_localhost; /* If true, use localhost for fake X11 server. */
char *xauth_location; /* Location of xauth program */
int permit_tty; /* If false, deny pty allocation */
int permit_user_rc; /* If false, deny ~/.ssh/rc execution */
int strict_modes; /* If true, require string home dir modes. */
int tcp_keep_alive; /* If true, set SO_KEEPALIVE. */
int ip_qos_interactive; /* IP ToS/DSCP/class for interactive */
int ip_qos_bulk; /* IP ToS/DSCP/class for bulk traffic */
char *ciphers; /* Supported SSH2 ciphers. */
char *macs; /* Supported SSH2 macs. */
char *kex_algorithms; /* SSH2 kex methods in order of preference. */
struct ForwardOptions fwd_opts; /* forwarding options */
SyslogFacility log_facility; /* Facility for system logging. */
LogLevel log_level; /* Level for system logging. */
int hostbased_authentication; /* If true, permit ssh2 hostbased auth */
int hostbased_uses_name_from_packet_only; /* experimental */
char *hostbased_key_types; /* Key types allowed for hostbased */
char *hostkeyalgorithms; /* SSH2 server key types */
char *ca_sign_algorithms; /* Allowed CA signature algorithms */
int pubkey_authentication; /* If true, permit ssh2 pubkey authentication. */
char *pubkey_key_types; /* Key types allowed for public key */
int pubkey_auth_options; /* -1 or mask of PUBKEYAUTH_* flags */
int kerberos_authentication; /* If true, permit Kerberos
* authentication. */
int kerberos_or_local_passwd; /* If true, permit kerberos
* and any other password
* authentication mechanism,
* such as SecurID or
* /etc/passwd */
int kerberos_ticket_cleanup; /* If true, destroy ticket
* file on logout. */
int kerberos_get_afs_token; /* If true, try to get AFS token if
* authenticated with Kerberos. */
int gss_authentication; /* If true, permit GSSAPI authentication */
int gss_cleanup_creds; /* If true, destroy cred cache on logout */
int gss_strict_acceptor; /* If true, restrict the GSSAPI acceptor name */
int password_authentication; /* If true, permit password
* authentication. */
int kbd_interactive_authentication; /* If true, permit */
int challenge_response_authentication;
int permit_empty_passwd; /* If false, do not permit empty
* passwords. */
int permit_user_env; /* If true, read ~/.ssh/environment */
- char *permit_user_env_whitelist; /* pattern-list whitelist */
+ char *permit_user_env_allowlist; /* pattern-list of allowed env names */
int compression; /* If true, compression is allowed */
int allow_tcp_forwarding; /* One of FORWARD_* */
int allow_streamlocal_forwarding; /* One of FORWARD_* */
int allow_agent_forwarding;
int disable_forwarding;
u_int num_allow_users;
char **allow_users;
u_int num_deny_users;
char **deny_users;
u_int num_allow_groups;
char **allow_groups;
u_int num_deny_groups;
char **deny_groups;
u_int num_subsystems;
char *subsystem_name[MAX_SUBSYSTEMS];
char *subsystem_command[MAX_SUBSYSTEMS];
char *subsystem_args[MAX_SUBSYSTEMS];
u_int num_accept_env;
char **accept_env;
u_int num_setenv;
char **setenv;
int max_startups_begin;
int max_startups_rate;
int max_startups;
int max_authtries;
int max_sessions;
char *banner; /* SSH-2 banner message */
int use_dns;
int client_alive_interval; /*
* poke the client this often to
* see if it's still there
*/
int client_alive_count_max; /*
* If the client is unresponsive
* for this many intervals above,
* disconnect the session
*/
u_int num_authkeys_files; /* Files containing public keys */
char **authorized_keys_files;
char *adm_forced_command;
int use_pam; /* Enable auth via PAM */
int permit_tun;
char **permitted_opens; /* May also be one of PERMITOPEN_* */
u_int num_permitted_opens;
char **permitted_listens; /* May also be one of PERMITOPEN_* */
u_int num_permitted_listens;
char *chroot_directory;
char *revoked_keys_file;
char *trusted_user_ca_keys;
char *authorized_keys_command;
char *authorized_keys_command_user;
char *authorized_principals_file;
char *authorized_principals_command;
char *authorized_principals_command_user;
int64_t rekey_limit;
int rekey_interval;
char *version_addendum; /* Appended to SSH banner */
u_int num_auth_methods;
char **auth_methods;
int fingerprint_hash;
int expose_userauth_info;
u_int64_t timing_secret;
char *sk_provider;
} ServerOptions;
/* Information about the incoming connection as used by Match */
struct connection_info {
const char *user;
const char *host; /* possibly resolved hostname */
const char *address; /* remote address */
const char *laddress; /* local address */
int lport; /* local port */
const char *rdomain; /* routing domain if available */
int test; /* test mode, allow some attributes to be
* unspecified */
};
/* List of included files for re-exec from the parsed configuration */
struct include_item {
char *selector;
char *filename;
struct sshbuf *contents;
TAILQ_ENTRY(include_item) entry;
};
TAILQ_HEAD(include_list, include_item);
/*
* These are string config options that must be copied between the
* Match sub-config and the main config, and must be sent from the
- * privsep slave to the privsep master. We use a macro to ensure all
+ * privsep child to the privsep master. We use a macro to ensure all
* the options are copied and the copies are done in the correct order.
*
* NB. an option must appear in servconf.c:copy_set_server_options() or
* COPY_MATCH_STRING_OPTS here but never both.
*/
#define COPY_MATCH_STRING_OPTS() do { \
M_CP_STROPT(banner); \
M_CP_STROPT(trusted_user_ca_keys); \
M_CP_STROPT(revoked_keys_file); \
M_CP_STROPT(authorized_keys_command); \
M_CP_STROPT(authorized_keys_command_user); \
M_CP_STROPT(authorized_principals_file); \
M_CP_STROPT(authorized_principals_command); \
M_CP_STROPT(authorized_principals_command_user); \
M_CP_STROPT(hostbased_key_types); \
M_CP_STROPT(pubkey_key_types); \
M_CP_STROPT(ca_sign_algorithms); \
M_CP_STROPT(routing_domain); \
- M_CP_STROPT(permit_user_env_whitelist); \
+ M_CP_STROPT(permit_user_env_allowlist); \
M_CP_STRARRAYOPT(authorized_keys_files, num_authkeys_files); \
M_CP_STRARRAYOPT(allow_users, num_allow_users); \
M_CP_STRARRAYOPT(deny_users, num_deny_users); \
M_CP_STRARRAYOPT(allow_groups, num_allow_groups); \
M_CP_STRARRAYOPT(deny_groups, num_deny_groups); \
M_CP_STRARRAYOPT(accept_env, num_accept_env); \
M_CP_STRARRAYOPT(auth_methods, num_auth_methods); \
M_CP_STRARRAYOPT(permitted_opens, num_permitted_opens); \
M_CP_STRARRAYOPT(permitted_listens, num_permitted_listens); \
} while (0)
struct connection_info *get_connection_info(struct ssh *, int, int);
void initialize_server_options(ServerOptions *);
void fill_default_server_options(ServerOptions *);
int process_server_config_line(ServerOptions *, char *, const char *, int,
int *, struct connection_info *, struct include_list *includes);
void process_permitopen(struct ssh *ssh, ServerOptions *options);
void load_server_config(const char *, struct sshbuf *);
void parse_server_config(ServerOptions *, const char *, struct sshbuf *,
struct include_list *includes, struct connection_info *);
void parse_server_match_config(ServerOptions *,
struct include_list *includes, struct connection_info *);
int parse_server_match_testspec(struct connection_info *, char *);
int server_match_spec_complete(struct connection_info *);
void copy_set_server_options(ServerOptions *, ServerOptions *, int);
void dump_config(ServerOptions *);
char *derelativise_path(const char *);
void servconf_add_hostkey(const char *, const int,
ServerOptions *, const char *path, int);
void servconf_add_hostcert(const char *, const int,
ServerOptions *, const char *path);
#endif /* SERVCONF_H */
diff --git a/serverloop.c b/serverloop.c
index 340b19a5a48a..48d936d2e395 100644
--- a/serverloop.c
+++ b/serverloop.c
@@ -1,982 +1,984 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: serverloop.c,v 1.222 2020/01/30 07:21:38 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: serverloop.c,v 1.223 2020/07/03 06:29:57 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
* Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
* All rights reserved
* Server main loop for handling the interactive session.
*
* As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
* can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this
* software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
* incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
* called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
*
* SSH2 support by Markus Friedl.
* Copyright (c) 2000, 2001 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
* OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
* IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
* INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
* NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
* DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
* THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
* (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
* THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
*/
#include "includes.h"
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/wait.h>
#include <sys/socket.h>
#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TIME_H
# include <sys/time.h>
#endif
#include <netinet/in.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <pwd.h>
#include <limits.h>
#include <signal.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <termios.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <stdarg.h>
#include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h"
#include "xmalloc.h"
#include "packet.h"
#include "sshbuf.h"
#include "log.h"
#include "misc.h"
#include "servconf.h"
#include "canohost.h"
#include "sshpty.h"
#include "channels.h"
#include "compat.h"
#include "ssh2.h"
#include "sshkey.h"
#include "cipher.h"
#include "kex.h"
#include "hostfile.h"
#include "auth.h"
#include "session.h"
#include "dispatch.h"
#include "auth-options.h"
#include "serverloop.h"
#include "ssherr.h"
extern ServerOptions options;
/* XXX */
extern Authctxt *the_authctxt;
extern struct sshauthopt *auth_opts;
extern int use_privsep;
static int no_more_sessions = 0; /* Disallow further sessions. */
/*
* This SIGCHLD kludge is used to detect when the child exits. The server
* will exit after that, as soon as forwarded connections have terminated.
*/
static volatile sig_atomic_t child_terminated = 0; /* The child has terminated. */
/* Cleanup on signals (!use_privsep case only) */
static volatile sig_atomic_t received_sigterm = 0;
/* prototypes */
static void server_init_dispatch(struct ssh *);
/* requested tunnel forwarding interface(s), shared with session.c */
char *tun_fwd_ifnames = NULL;
/* returns 1 if bind to specified port by specified user is permitted */
static int
bind_permitted(int port, uid_t uid)
{
if (use_privsep)
return 1; /* allow system to decide */
if (port < IPPORT_RESERVED && uid != 0)
return 0;
return 1;
}
/*
* we write to this pipe if a SIGCHLD is caught in order to avoid
* the race between select() and child_terminated
*/
static int notify_pipe[2];
static void
notify_setup(void)
{
if (pipe(notify_pipe) == -1) {
error("pipe(notify_pipe) failed %s", strerror(errno));
} else if ((fcntl(notify_pipe[0], F_SETFD, FD_CLOEXEC) == -1) ||
(fcntl(notify_pipe[1], F_SETFD, FD_CLOEXEC) == -1)) {
error("fcntl(notify_pipe, F_SETFD) failed %s", strerror(errno));
close(notify_pipe[0]);
close(notify_pipe[1]);
} else {
set_nonblock(notify_pipe[0]);
set_nonblock(notify_pipe[1]);
return;
}
notify_pipe[0] = -1; /* read end */
notify_pipe[1] = -1; /* write end */
}
static void
notify_parent(void)
{
if (notify_pipe[1] != -1)
(void)write(notify_pipe[1], "", 1);
}
static void
notify_prepare(fd_set *readset)
{
if (notify_pipe[0] != -1)
FD_SET(notify_pipe[0], readset);
}
static void
notify_done(fd_set *readset)
{
char c;
if (notify_pipe[0] != -1 && FD_ISSET(notify_pipe[0], readset))
while (read(notify_pipe[0], &c, 1) != -1)
debug2("%s: reading", __func__);
}
/*ARGSUSED*/
static void
sigchld_handler(int sig)
{
int save_errno = errno;
child_terminated = 1;
notify_parent();
errno = save_errno;
}
/*ARGSUSED*/
static void
sigterm_handler(int sig)
{
received_sigterm = sig;
}
static void
client_alive_check(struct ssh *ssh)
{
char remote_id[512];
int r, channel_id;
/* timeout, check to see how many we have had */
if (options.client_alive_count_max > 0 &&
ssh_packet_inc_alive_timeouts(ssh) >
options.client_alive_count_max) {
sshpkt_fmt_connection_id(ssh, remote_id, sizeof(remote_id));
logit("Timeout, client not responding from %s", remote_id);
cleanup_exit(255);
}
/*
* send a bogus global/channel request with "wantreply",
* we should get back a failure
*/
if ((channel_id = channel_find_open(ssh)) == -1) {
if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_GLOBAL_REQUEST)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, "keepalive@openssh.com"))
!= 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_u8(ssh, 1)) != 0) /* boolean: want reply */
fatal("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
} else {
channel_request_start(ssh, channel_id,
"keepalive@openssh.com", 1);
}
if ((r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0)
fatal("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
}
/*
* Sleep in select() until we can do something. This will initialize the
* select masks. Upon return, the masks will indicate which descriptors
* have data or can accept data. Optionally, a maximum time can be specified
* for the duration of the wait (0 = infinite).
*/
static void
wait_until_can_do_something(struct ssh *ssh,
int connection_in, int connection_out,
fd_set **readsetp, fd_set **writesetp, int *maxfdp,
u_int *nallocp, u_int64_t max_time_ms)
{
struct timeval tv, *tvp;
int ret;
time_t minwait_secs = 0;
int client_alive_scheduled = 0;
/* time we last heard from the client OR sent a keepalive */
static time_t last_client_time;
/* Allocate and update select() masks for channel descriptors. */
channel_prepare_select(ssh, readsetp, writesetp, maxfdp,
nallocp, &minwait_secs);
/* XXX need proper deadline system for rekey/client alive */
if (minwait_secs != 0)
max_time_ms = MINIMUM(max_time_ms, (u_int)minwait_secs * 1000);
/*
* if using client_alive, set the max timeout accordingly,
* and indicate that this particular timeout was for client
* alive by setting the client_alive_scheduled flag.
*
* this could be randomized somewhat to make traffic
* analysis more difficult, but we're not doing it yet.
*/
if (options.client_alive_interval) {
uint64_t keepalive_ms =
(uint64_t)options.client_alive_interval * 1000;
if (max_time_ms == 0 || max_time_ms > keepalive_ms) {
max_time_ms = keepalive_ms;
client_alive_scheduled = 1;
}
+ if (last_client_time == 0)
+ last_client_time = monotime();
}
#if 0
/* wrong: bad condition XXX */
if (channel_not_very_much_buffered_data())
#endif
FD_SET(connection_in, *readsetp);
notify_prepare(*readsetp);
/*
* If we have buffered packet data going to the client, mark that
* descriptor.
*/
if (ssh_packet_have_data_to_write(ssh))
FD_SET(connection_out, *writesetp);
/*
* If child has terminated and there is enough buffer space to read
* from it, then read as much as is available and exit.
*/
if (child_terminated && ssh_packet_not_very_much_data_to_write(ssh))
if (max_time_ms == 0 || client_alive_scheduled)
max_time_ms = 100;
if (max_time_ms == 0)
tvp = NULL;
else {
tv.tv_sec = max_time_ms / 1000;
tv.tv_usec = 1000 * (max_time_ms % 1000);
tvp = &tv;
}
/* Wait for something to happen, or the timeout to expire. */
ret = select((*maxfdp)+1, *readsetp, *writesetp, NULL, tvp);
if (ret == -1) {
memset(*readsetp, 0, *nallocp);
memset(*writesetp, 0, *nallocp);
if (errno != EINTR)
error("select: %.100s", strerror(errno));
} else if (client_alive_scheduled) {
time_t now = monotime();
/*
* If the select timed out, or returned for some other reason
* but we haven't heard from the client in time, send keepalive.
*/
if (ret == 0 || (last_client_time != 0 && last_client_time +
options.client_alive_interval <= now)) {
client_alive_check(ssh);
last_client_time = now;
} else if (FD_ISSET(connection_in, *readsetp)) {
last_client_time = now;
}
}
notify_done(*readsetp);
}
/*
* Processes input from the client and the program. Input data is stored
* in buffers and processed later.
*/
static int
process_input(struct ssh *ssh, fd_set *readset, int connection_in)
{
int r, len;
char buf[16384];
/* Read and buffer any input data from the client. */
if (FD_ISSET(connection_in, readset)) {
len = read(connection_in, buf, sizeof(buf));
if (len == 0) {
verbose("Connection closed by %.100s port %d",
ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), ssh_remote_port(ssh));
return -1;
} else if (len == -1) {
if (errno != EINTR && errno != EAGAIN &&
errno != EWOULDBLOCK) {
verbose("Read error from remote host "
"%.100s port %d: %.100s",
ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh),
ssh_remote_port(ssh), strerror(errno));
cleanup_exit(255);
}
} else {
/* Buffer any received data. */
if ((r = ssh_packet_process_incoming(ssh, buf, len))
!= 0)
fatal("%s: ssh_packet_process_incoming: %s",
__func__, ssh_err(r));
}
}
return 0;
}
/*
* Sends data from internal buffers to client program stdin.
*/
static void
process_output(struct ssh *ssh, fd_set *writeset, int connection_out)
{
int r;
/* Send any buffered packet data to the client. */
if (FD_ISSET(connection_out, writeset)) {
if ((r = ssh_packet_write_poll(ssh)) != 0) {
sshpkt_fatal(ssh, r, "%s: ssh_packet_write_poll",
__func__);
}
}
}
static void
process_buffered_input_packets(struct ssh *ssh)
{
ssh_dispatch_run_fatal(ssh, DISPATCH_NONBLOCK, NULL);
}
static void
collect_children(struct ssh *ssh)
{
pid_t pid;
sigset_t oset, nset;
int status;
/* block SIGCHLD while we check for dead children */
sigemptyset(&nset);
sigaddset(&nset, SIGCHLD);
sigprocmask(SIG_BLOCK, &nset, &oset);
if (child_terminated) {
debug("Received SIGCHLD.");
while ((pid = waitpid(-1, &status, WNOHANG)) > 0 ||
(pid == -1 && errno == EINTR))
if (pid > 0)
session_close_by_pid(ssh, pid, status);
child_terminated = 0;
}
sigprocmask(SIG_SETMASK, &oset, NULL);
}
void
server_loop2(struct ssh *ssh, Authctxt *authctxt)
{
fd_set *readset = NULL, *writeset = NULL;
int max_fd;
u_int nalloc = 0, connection_in, connection_out;
u_int64_t rekey_timeout_ms = 0;
debug("Entering interactive session for SSH2.");
ssh_signal(SIGCHLD, sigchld_handler);
child_terminated = 0;
connection_in = ssh_packet_get_connection_in(ssh);
connection_out = ssh_packet_get_connection_out(ssh);
if (!use_privsep) {
ssh_signal(SIGTERM, sigterm_handler);
ssh_signal(SIGINT, sigterm_handler);
ssh_signal(SIGQUIT, sigterm_handler);
}
notify_setup();
max_fd = MAXIMUM(connection_in, connection_out);
max_fd = MAXIMUM(max_fd, notify_pipe[0]);
server_init_dispatch(ssh);
for (;;) {
process_buffered_input_packets(ssh);
if (!ssh_packet_is_rekeying(ssh) &&
ssh_packet_not_very_much_data_to_write(ssh))
channel_output_poll(ssh);
if (options.rekey_interval > 0 &&
!ssh_packet_is_rekeying(ssh)) {
rekey_timeout_ms = ssh_packet_get_rekey_timeout(ssh) *
1000;
} else {
rekey_timeout_ms = 0;
}
wait_until_can_do_something(ssh, connection_in, connection_out,
&readset, &writeset, &max_fd, &nalloc, rekey_timeout_ms);
if (received_sigterm) {
logit("Exiting on signal %d", (int)received_sigterm);
/* Clean up sessions, utmp, etc. */
cleanup_exit(255);
}
collect_children(ssh);
if (!ssh_packet_is_rekeying(ssh))
channel_after_select(ssh, readset, writeset);
if (process_input(ssh, readset, connection_in) < 0)
break;
process_output(ssh, writeset, connection_out);
}
collect_children(ssh);
free(readset);
free(writeset);
/* free all channels, no more reads and writes */
channel_free_all(ssh);
/* free remaining sessions, e.g. remove wtmp entries */
session_destroy_all(ssh, NULL);
}
static int
server_input_keep_alive(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh)
{
debug("Got %d/%u for keepalive", type, seq);
/*
* reset timeout, since we got a sane answer from the client.
* even if this was generated by something other than
* the bogus CHANNEL_REQUEST we send for keepalives.
*/
ssh_packet_set_alive_timeouts(ssh, 0);
return 0;
}
static Channel *
server_request_direct_tcpip(struct ssh *ssh, int *reason, const char **errmsg)
{
Channel *c = NULL;
char *target = NULL, *originator = NULL;
u_int target_port = 0, originator_port = 0;
int r;
if ((r = sshpkt_get_cstring(ssh, &target, NULL)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &target_port)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_get_cstring(ssh, &originator, NULL)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &originator_port)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0)
sshpkt_fatal(ssh, r, "%s: parse packet", __func__);
if (target_port > 0xFFFF) {
error("%s: invalid target port", __func__);
*reason = SSH2_OPEN_ADMINISTRATIVELY_PROHIBITED;
goto out;
}
if (originator_port > 0xFFFF) {
error("%s: invalid originator port", __func__);
*reason = SSH2_OPEN_ADMINISTRATIVELY_PROHIBITED;
goto out;
}
debug("%s: originator %s port %u, target %s port %u", __func__,
originator, originator_port, target, target_port);
/* XXX fine grained permissions */
if ((options.allow_tcp_forwarding & FORWARD_LOCAL) != 0 &&
auth_opts->permit_port_forwarding_flag &&
!options.disable_forwarding) {
c = channel_connect_to_port(ssh, target, target_port,
"direct-tcpip", "direct-tcpip", reason, errmsg);
} else {
logit("refused local port forward: "
"originator %s port %d, target %s port %d",
originator, originator_port, target, target_port);
if (reason != NULL)
*reason = SSH2_OPEN_ADMINISTRATIVELY_PROHIBITED;
}
out:
free(originator);
free(target);
return c;
}
static Channel *
server_request_direct_streamlocal(struct ssh *ssh)
{
Channel *c = NULL;
char *target = NULL, *originator = NULL;
u_int originator_port = 0;
struct passwd *pw = the_authctxt->pw;
int r;
if (pw == NULL || !the_authctxt->valid)
fatal("%s: no/invalid user", __func__);
if ((r = sshpkt_get_cstring(ssh, &target, NULL)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_get_cstring(ssh, &originator, NULL)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &originator_port)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0)
sshpkt_fatal(ssh, r, "%s: parse packet", __func__);
if (originator_port > 0xFFFF) {
error("%s: invalid originator port", __func__);
goto out;
}
debug("%s: originator %s port %d, target %s", __func__,
originator, originator_port, target);
/* XXX fine grained permissions */
if ((options.allow_streamlocal_forwarding & FORWARD_LOCAL) != 0 &&
auth_opts->permit_port_forwarding_flag &&
!options.disable_forwarding && (pw->pw_uid == 0 || use_privsep)) {
c = channel_connect_to_path(ssh, target,
"direct-streamlocal@openssh.com", "direct-streamlocal");
} else {
logit("refused streamlocal port forward: "
"originator %s port %d, target %s",
originator, originator_port, target);
}
out:
free(originator);
free(target);
return c;
}
static Channel *
server_request_tun(struct ssh *ssh)
{
Channel *c = NULL;
u_int mode, tun;
int r, sock;
char *tmp, *ifname = NULL;
if ((r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &mode)) != 0)
sshpkt_fatal(ssh, r, "%s: parse mode", __func__);
switch (mode) {
case SSH_TUNMODE_POINTOPOINT:
case SSH_TUNMODE_ETHERNET:
break;
default:
ssh_packet_send_debug(ssh, "Unsupported tunnel device mode.");
return NULL;
}
if ((options.permit_tun & mode) == 0) {
ssh_packet_send_debug(ssh, "Server has rejected tunnel device "
"forwarding");
return NULL;
}
if ((r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &tun)) != 0)
sshpkt_fatal(ssh, r, "%s: parse device", __func__);
if (tun > INT_MAX) {
debug("%s: invalid tun", __func__);
goto done;
}
if (auth_opts->force_tun_device != -1) {
if (tun != SSH_TUNID_ANY &&
auth_opts->force_tun_device != (int)tun)
goto done;
tun = auth_opts->force_tun_device;
}
sock = tun_open(tun, mode, &ifname);
if (sock < 0)
goto done;
debug("Tunnel forwarding using interface %s", ifname);
c = channel_new(ssh, "tun", SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN, sock, sock, -1,
CHAN_TCP_WINDOW_DEFAULT, CHAN_TCP_PACKET_DEFAULT, 0, "tun", 1);
c->datagram = 1;
#if defined(SSH_TUN_FILTER)
if (mode == SSH_TUNMODE_POINTOPOINT)
channel_register_filter(ssh, c->self, sys_tun_infilter,
sys_tun_outfilter, NULL, NULL);
#endif
/*
* Update the list of names exposed to the session
* XXX remove these if the tunnels are closed (won't matter
* much if they are already in the environment though)
*/
tmp = tun_fwd_ifnames;
xasprintf(&tun_fwd_ifnames, "%s%s%s",
tun_fwd_ifnames == NULL ? "" : tun_fwd_ifnames,
tun_fwd_ifnames == NULL ? "" : ",",
ifname);
free(tmp);
free(ifname);
done:
if (c == NULL)
ssh_packet_send_debug(ssh, "Failed to open the tunnel device.");
return c;
}
static Channel *
server_request_session(struct ssh *ssh)
{
Channel *c;
int r;
debug("input_session_request");
if ((r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0)
sshpkt_fatal(ssh, r, "%s: parse packet", __func__);
if (no_more_sessions) {
ssh_packet_disconnect(ssh, "Possible attack: attempt to open a "
"session after additional sessions disabled");
}
/*
* A server session has no fd to read or write until a
* CHANNEL_REQUEST for a shell is made, so we set the type to
* SSH_CHANNEL_LARVAL. Additionally, a callback for handling all
* CHANNEL_REQUEST messages is registered.
*/
c = channel_new(ssh, "session", SSH_CHANNEL_LARVAL,
-1, -1, -1, /*window size*/0, CHAN_SES_PACKET_DEFAULT,
0, "server-session", 1);
if (session_open(the_authctxt, c->self) != 1) {
debug("session open failed, free channel %d", c->self);
channel_free(ssh, c);
return NULL;
}
channel_register_cleanup(ssh, c->self, session_close_by_channel, 0);
return c;
}
static int
server_input_channel_open(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh)
{
Channel *c = NULL;
char *ctype = NULL;
const char *errmsg = NULL;
int r, reason = SSH2_OPEN_CONNECT_FAILED;
u_int rchan = 0, rmaxpack = 0, rwindow = 0;
if ((r = sshpkt_get_cstring(ssh, &ctype, NULL)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &rchan)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &rwindow)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &rmaxpack)) != 0)
sshpkt_fatal(ssh, r, "%s: parse packet", __func__);
debug("%s: ctype %s rchan %u win %u max %u", __func__,
ctype, rchan, rwindow, rmaxpack);
if (strcmp(ctype, "session") == 0) {
c = server_request_session(ssh);
} else if (strcmp(ctype, "direct-tcpip") == 0) {
c = server_request_direct_tcpip(ssh, &reason, &errmsg);
} else if (strcmp(ctype, "direct-streamlocal@openssh.com") == 0) {
c = server_request_direct_streamlocal(ssh);
} else if (strcmp(ctype, "tun@openssh.com") == 0) {
c = server_request_tun(ssh);
}
if (c != NULL) {
debug("%s: confirm %s", __func__, ctype);
c->remote_id = rchan;
c->have_remote_id = 1;
c->remote_window = rwindow;
c->remote_maxpacket = rmaxpack;
if (c->type != SSH_CHANNEL_CONNECTING) {
if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, c->remote_id)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, c->self)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, c->local_window)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, c->local_maxpacket)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) {
sshpkt_fatal(ssh, r,
"%s: send open confirm", __func__);
}
}
} else {
debug("%s: failure %s", __func__, ctype);
if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, rchan)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, reason)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, errmsg ? errmsg : "open failed")) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, "")) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) {
sshpkt_fatal(ssh, r,
"%s: send open failure", __func__);
}
}
free(ctype);
return 0;
}
static int
server_input_hostkeys_prove(struct ssh *ssh, struct sshbuf **respp)
{
struct sshbuf *resp = NULL;
struct sshbuf *sigbuf = NULL;
struct sshkey *key = NULL, *key_pub = NULL, *key_prv = NULL;
int r, ndx, kexsigtype, use_kexsigtype, success = 0;
const u_char *blob;
u_char *sig = 0;
size_t blen, slen;
if ((resp = sshbuf_new()) == NULL || (sigbuf = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
fatal("%s: sshbuf_new", __func__);
kexsigtype = sshkey_type_plain(
sshkey_type_from_name(ssh->kex->hostkey_alg));
while (ssh_packet_remaining(ssh) > 0) {
sshkey_free(key);
key = NULL;
if ((r = sshpkt_get_string_direct(ssh, &blob, &blen)) != 0 ||
(r = sshkey_from_blob(blob, blen, &key)) != 0) {
error("%s: couldn't parse key: %s",
__func__, ssh_err(r));
goto out;
}
/*
* Better check that this is actually one of our hostkeys
* before attempting to sign anything with it.
*/
if ((ndx = ssh->kex->host_key_index(key, 1, ssh)) == -1) {
error("%s: unknown host %s key",
__func__, sshkey_type(key));
goto out;
}
/*
* XXX refactor: make kex->sign just use an index rather
* than passing in public and private keys
*/
if ((key_prv = get_hostkey_by_index(ndx)) == NULL &&
(key_pub = get_hostkey_public_by_index(ndx, ssh)) == NULL) {
error("%s: can't retrieve hostkey %d", __func__, ndx);
goto out;
}
sshbuf_reset(sigbuf);
free(sig);
sig = NULL;
/*
* For RSA keys, prefer to use the signature type negotiated
* during KEX to the default (SHA1).
*/
use_kexsigtype = kexsigtype == KEY_RSA &&
sshkey_type_plain(key->type) == KEY_RSA;
if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(sigbuf,
"hostkeys-prove-00@openssh.com")) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_string(sigbuf,
ssh->kex->session_id, ssh->kex->session_id_len)) != 0 ||
(r = sshkey_puts(key, sigbuf)) != 0 ||
(r = ssh->kex->sign(ssh, key_prv, key_pub, &sig, &slen,
sshbuf_ptr(sigbuf), sshbuf_len(sigbuf),
use_kexsigtype ? ssh->kex->hostkey_alg : NULL)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_string(resp, sig, slen)) != 0) {
error("%s: couldn't prepare signature: %s",
__func__, ssh_err(r));
goto out;
}
}
/* Success */
*respp = resp;
resp = NULL; /* don't free it */
success = 1;
out:
free(sig);
sshbuf_free(resp);
sshbuf_free(sigbuf);
sshkey_free(key);
return success;
}
static int
server_input_global_request(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh)
{
char *rtype = NULL;
u_char want_reply = 0;
int r, success = 0, allocated_listen_port = 0;
u_int port = 0;
struct sshbuf *resp = NULL;
struct passwd *pw = the_authctxt->pw;
struct Forward fwd;
memset(&fwd, 0, sizeof(fwd));
if (pw == NULL || !the_authctxt->valid)
fatal("%s: no/invalid user", __func__);
if ((r = sshpkt_get_cstring(ssh, &rtype, NULL)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_get_u8(ssh, &want_reply)) != 0)
sshpkt_fatal(ssh, r, "%s: parse packet", __func__);
debug("%s: rtype %s want_reply %d", __func__, rtype, want_reply);
/* -R style forwarding */
if (strcmp(rtype, "tcpip-forward") == 0) {
if ((r = sshpkt_get_cstring(ssh, &fwd.listen_host, NULL)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &port)) != 0)
sshpkt_fatal(ssh, r, "%s: parse tcpip-forward", __func__);
debug("%s: tcpip-forward listen %s port %u", __func__,
fwd.listen_host, port);
if (port <= INT_MAX)
fwd.listen_port = (int)port;
/* check permissions */
if (port > INT_MAX ||
(options.allow_tcp_forwarding & FORWARD_REMOTE) == 0 ||
!auth_opts->permit_port_forwarding_flag ||
options.disable_forwarding ||
(!want_reply && fwd.listen_port == 0) ||
(fwd.listen_port != 0 &&
!bind_permitted(fwd.listen_port, pw->pw_uid))) {
success = 0;
ssh_packet_send_debug(ssh, "Server has disabled port forwarding.");
} else {
/* Start listening on the port */
success = channel_setup_remote_fwd_listener(ssh, &fwd,
&allocated_listen_port, &options.fwd_opts);
}
if ((resp = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
fatal("%s: sshbuf_new", __func__);
if (allocated_listen_port != 0 &&
(r = sshbuf_put_u32(resp, allocated_listen_port)) != 0)
fatal("%s: sshbuf_put_u32: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
} else if (strcmp(rtype, "cancel-tcpip-forward") == 0) {
if ((r = sshpkt_get_cstring(ssh, &fwd.listen_host, NULL)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &port)) != 0)
sshpkt_fatal(ssh, r, "%s: parse cancel-tcpip-forward", __func__);
debug("%s: cancel-tcpip-forward addr %s port %d", __func__,
fwd.listen_host, port);
if (port <= INT_MAX) {
fwd.listen_port = (int)port;
success = channel_cancel_rport_listener(ssh, &fwd);
}
} else if (strcmp(rtype, "streamlocal-forward@openssh.com") == 0) {
if ((r = sshpkt_get_cstring(ssh, &fwd.listen_path, NULL)) != 0)
sshpkt_fatal(ssh, r, "%s: parse streamlocal-forward@openssh.com", __func__);
debug("%s: streamlocal-forward listen path %s", __func__,
fwd.listen_path);
/* check permissions */
if ((options.allow_streamlocal_forwarding & FORWARD_REMOTE) == 0
|| !auth_opts->permit_port_forwarding_flag ||
options.disable_forwarding ||
(pw->pw_uid != 0 && !use_privsep)) {
success = 0;
ssh_packet_send_debug(ssh, "Server has disabled "
"streamlocal forwarding.");
} else {
/* Start listening on the socket */
success = channel_setup_remote_fwd_listener(ssh,
&fwd, NULL, &options.fwd_opts);
}
} else if (strcmp(rtype, "cancel-streamlocal-forward@openssh.com") == 0) {
if ((r = sshpkt_get_cstring(ssh, &fwd.listen_path, NULL)) != 0)
sshpkt_fatal(ssh, r, "%s: parse cancel-streamlocal-forward@openssh.com", __func__);
debug("%s: cancel-streamlocal-forward path %s", __func__,
fwd.listen_path);
success = channel_cancel_rport_listener(ssh, &fwd);
} else if (strcmp(rtype, "no-more-sessions@openssh.com") == 0) {
no_more_sessions = 1;
success = 1;
} else if (strcmp(rtype, "hostkeys-prove-00@openssh.com") == 0) {
success = server_input_hostkeys_prove(ssh, &resp);
}
/* XXX sshpkt_get_end() */
if (want_reply) {
if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, success ?
SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_SUCCESS : SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_FAILURE)) != 0 ||
(success && resp != NULL && (r = sshpkt_putb(ssh, resp)) != 0) ||
(r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0 ||
(r = ssh_packet_write_wait(ssh)) != 0)
sshpkt_fatal(ssh, r, "%s: send reply", __func__);
}
free(fwd.listen_host);
free(fwd.listen_path);
free(rtype);
sshbuf_free(resp);
return 0;
}
static int
server_input_channel_req(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh)
{
Channel *c;
int r, success = 0;
char *rtype = NULL;
u_char want_reply = 0;
u_int id = 0;
if ((r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &id)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_get_cstring(ssh, &rtype, NULL)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_get_u8(ssh, &want_reply)) != 0)
sshpkt_fatal(ssh, r, "%s: parse packet", __func__);
debug("server_input_channel_req: channel %u request %s reply %d",
id, rtype, want_reply);
if (id >= INT_MAX || (c = channel_lookup(ssh, (int)id)) == NULL) {
ssh_packet_disconnect(ssh, "%s: unknown channel %d",
__func__, id);
}
if (!strcmp(rtype, "eow@openssh.com")) {
if ((r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0)
sshpkt_fatal(ssh, r, "%s: parse packet", __func__);
chan_rcvd_eow(ssh, c);
} else if ((c->type == SSH_CHANNEL_LARVAL ||
c->type == SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN) && strcmp(c->ctype, "session") == 0)
success = session_input_channel_req(ssh, c, rtype);
if (want_reply && !(c->flags & CHAN_CLOSE_SENT)) {
if (!c->have_remote_id)
fatal("%s: channel %d: no remote_id",
__func__, c->self);
if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, success ?
SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_SUCCESS : SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_FAILURE)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, c->remote_id)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0)
sshpkt_fatal(ssh, r, "%s: send reply", __func__);
}
free(rtype);
return 0;
}
static void
server_init_dispatch(struct ssh *ssh)
{
debug("server_init_dispatch");
ssh_dispatch_init(ssh, &dispatch_protocol_error);
ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE, &channel_input_oclose);
ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA, &channel_input_data);
ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_EOF, &channel_input_ieof);
ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_EXTENDED_DATA, &channel_input_extended_data);
ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN, &server_input_channel_open);
ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION, &channel_input_open_confirmation);
ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE, &channel_input_open_failure);
ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_REQUEST, &server_input_channel_req);
ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_WINDOW_ADJUST, &channel_input_window_adjust);
ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_GLOBAL_REQUEST, &server_input_global_request);
/* client_alive */
ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_SUCCESS, &server_input_keep_alive);
ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_FAILURE, &server_input_keep_alive);
ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_SUCCESS, &server_input_keep_alive);
ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_FAILURE, &server_input_keep_alive);
/* rekeying */
ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT, &kex_input_kexinit);
}
diff --git a/session.c b/session.c
index 18cdfa8cf450..27ca8a104dd6 100644
--- a/session.c
+++ b/session.c
@@ -1,2723 +1,2730 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: session.c,v 1.319 2020/03/13 03:17:07 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: session.c,v 1.324 2020/07/07 02:47:21 deraadt Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
* All rights reserved
*
* As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
* can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this
* software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
* incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
* called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
*
* SSH2 support by Markus Friedl.
* Copyright (c) 2000, 2001 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
* OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
* IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
* INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
* NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
* DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
* THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
* (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
* THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
*/
#include "includes.h"
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/param.h>
#ifdef HAVE_SYS_STAT_H
# include <sys/stat.h>
#endif
#include <sys/socket.h>
#include <sys/un.h>
#include <sys/wait.h>
#include <arpa/inet.h>
#include <ctype.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <grp.h>
#include <netdb.h>
#ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H
#include <paths.h>
#endif
#include <pwd.h>
#include <signal.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <stdarg.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <limits.h>
#include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h"
#include "xmalloc.h"
#include "ssh.h"
#include "ssh2.h"
#include "sshpty.h"
#include "packet.h"
#include "sshbuf.h"
#include "ssherr.h"
#include "match.h"
#include "uidswap.h"
#include "compat.h"
#include "channels.h"
#include "sshkey.h"
#include "cipher.h"
#ifdef GSSAPI
#include "ssh-gss.h"
#endif
#include "hostfile.h"
#include "auth.h"
#include "auth-options.h"
#include "authfd.h"
#include "pathnames.h"
#include "log.h"
#include "misc.h"
#include "servconf.h"
#include "sshlogin.h"
#include "serverloop.h"
#include "canohost.h"
#include "session.h"
#include "kex.h"
#include "monitor_wrap.h"
#include "sftp.h"
#include "atomicio.h"
#if defined(KRB5) && defined(USE_AFS)
#include <kafs.h>
#endif
#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
#include <selinux/selinux.h>
#endif
#define IS_INTERNAL_SFTP(c) \
(!strncmp(c, INTERNAL_SFTP_NAME, sizeof(INTERNAL_SFTP_NAME) - 1) && \
(c[sizeof(INTERNAL_SFTP_NAME) - 1] == '\0' || \
c[sizeof(INTERNAL_SFTP_NAME) - 1] == ' ' || \
c[sizeof(INTERNAL_SFTP_NAME) - 1] == '\t'))
/* func */
Session *session_new(void);
void session_set_fds(struct ssh *, Session *, int, int, int, int, int);
void session_pty_cleanup(Session *);
void session_proctitle(Session *);
int session_setup_x11fwd(struct ssh *, Session *);
int do_exec_pty(struct ssh *, Session *, const char *);
int do_exec_no_pty(struct ssh *, Session *, const char *);
int do_exec(struct ssh *, Session *, const char *);
void do_login(struct ssh *, Session *, const char *);
void do_child(struct ssh *, Session *, const char *);
void do_motd(void);
int check_quietlogin(Session *, const char *);
static void do_authenticated2(struct ssh *, Authctxt *);
static int session_pty_req(struct ssh *, Session *);
/* import */
extern ServerOptions options;
extern char *__progname;
extern int debug_flag;
extern u_int utmp_len;
extern int startup_pipe;
extern void destroy_sensitive_data(void);
extern struct sshbuf *loginmsg;
extern struct sshauthopt *auth_opts;
extern char *tun_fwd_ifnames; /* serverloop.c */
/* original command from peer. */
const char *original_command = NULL;
/* data */
static int sessions_first_unused = -1;
static int sessions_nalloc = 0;
static Session *sessions = NULL;
#define SUBSYSTEM_NONE 0
#define SUBSYSTEM_EXT 1
#define SUBSYSTEM_INT_SFTP 2
#define SUBSYSTEM_INT_SFTP_ERROR 3
#ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP
login_cap_t *lc;
#endif
static int is_child = 0;
static int in_chroot = 0;
/* File containing userauth info, if ExposeAuthInfo set */
static char *auth_info_file = NULL;
/* Name and directory of socket for authentication agent forwarding. */
static char *auth_sock_name = NULL;
static char *auth_sock_dir = NULL;
/* removes the agent forwarding socket */
static void
auth_sock_cleanup_proc(struct passwd *pw)
{
if (auth_sock_name != NULL) {
temporarily_use_uid(pw);
unlink(auth_sock_name);
rmdir(auth_sock_dir);
auth_sock_name = NULL;
restore_uid();
}
}
static int
auth_input_request_forwarding(struct ssh *ssh, struct passwd * pw)
{
Channel *nc;
int sock = -1;
if (auth_sock_name != NULL) {
error("authentication forwarding requested twice.");
return 0;
}
/* Temporarily drop privileged uid for mkdir/bind. */
temporarily_use_uid(pw);
/* Allocate a buffer for the socket name, and format the name. */
auth_sock_dir = xstrdup("/tmp/ssh-XXXXXXXXXX");
/* Create private directory for socket */
if (mkdtemp(auth_sock_dir) == NULL) {
ssh_packet_send_debug(ssh, "Agent forwarding disabled: "
"mkdtemp() failed: %.100s", strerror(errno));
restore_uid();
free(auth_sock_dir);
auth_sock_dir = NULL;
goto authsock_err;
}
xasprintf(&auth_sock_name, "%s/agent.%ld",
auth_sock_dir, (long) getpid());
/* Start a Unix listener on auth_sock_name. */
sock = unix_listener(auth_sock_name, SSH_LISTEN_BACKLOG, 0);
/* Restore the privileged uid. */
restore_uid();
/* Check for socket/bind/listen failure. */
if (sock < 0)
goto authsock_err;
/* Allocate a channel for the authentication agent socket. */
nc = channel_new(ssh, "auth socket",
SSH_CHANNEL_AUTH_SOCKET, sock, sock, -1,
CHAN_X11_WINDOW_DEFAULT, CHAN_X11_PACKET_DEFAULT,
0, "auth socket", 1);
nc->path = xstrdup(auth_sock_name);
return 1;
authsock_err:
free(auth_sock_name);
if (auth_sock_dir != NULL) {
temporarily_use_uid(pw);
rmdir(auth_sock_dir);
restore_uid();
free(auth_sock_dir);
}
if (sock != -1)
close(sock);
auth_sock_name = NULL;
auth_sock_dir = NULL;
return 0;
}
static void
display_loginmsg(void)
{
int r;
if (sshbuf_len(loginmsg) == 0)
return;
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(loginmsg, 0)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
printf("%s", (char *)sshbuf_ptr(loginmsg));
sshbuf_reset(loginmsg);
}
static void
prepare_auth_info_file(struct passwd *pw, struct sshbuf *info)
{
int fd = -1, success = 0;
if (!options.expose_userauth_info || info == NULL)
return;
temporarily_use_uid(pw);
auth_info_file = xstrdup("/tmp/sshauth.XXXXXXXXXXXXXXX");
if ((fd = mkstemp(auth_info_file)) == -1) {
error("%s: mkstemp: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
goto out;
}
if (atomicio(vwrite, fd, sshbuf_mutable_ptr(info),
sshbuf_len(info)) != sshbuf_len(info)) {
error("%s: write: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
goto out;
}
if (close(fd) != 0) {
error("%s: close: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
goto out;
}
success = 1;
out:
if (!success) {
if (fd != -1)
close(fd);
free(auth_info_file);
auth_info_file = NULL;
}
restore_uid();
}
static void
set_fwdpermit_from_authopts(struct ssh *ssh, const struct sshauthopt *opts)
{
char *tmp, *cp, *host;
int port;
size_t i;
if ((options.allow_tcp_forwarding & FORWARD_LOCAL) != 0) {
channel_clear_permission(ssh, FORWARD_USER, FORWARD_LOCAL);
for (i = 0; i < auth_opts->npermitopen; i++) {
tmp = cp = xstrdup(auth_opts->permitopen[i]);
/* This shouldn't fail as it has already been checked */
if ((host = hpdelim(&cp)) == NULL)
fatal("%s: internal error: hpdelim", __func__);
host = cleanhostname(host);
if (cp == NULL || (port = permitopen_port(cp)) < 0)
fatal("%s: internal error: permitopen port",
__func__);
channel_add_permission(ssh,
FORWARD_USER, FORWARD_LOCAL, host, port);
free(tmp);
}
}
if ((options.allow_tcp_forwarding & FORWARD_REMOTE) != 0) {
channel_clear_permission(ssh, FORWARD_USER, FORWARD_REMOTE);
for (i = 0; i < auth_opts->npermitlisten; i++) {
tmp = cp = xstrdup(auth_opts->permitlisten[i]);
/* This shouldn't fail as it has already been checked */
if ((host = hpdelim(&cp)) == NULL)
fatal("%s: internal error: hpdelim", __func__);
host = cleanhostname(host);
if (cp == NULL || (port = permitopen_port(cp)) < 0)
fatal("%s: internal error: permitlisten port",
__func__);
channel_add_permission(ssh,
FORWARD_USER, FORWARD_REMOTE, host, port);
free(tmp);
}
}
}
void
do_authenticated(struct ssh *ssh, Authctxt *authctxt)
{
setproctitle("%s", authctxt->pw->pw_name);
auth_log_authopts("active", auth_opts, 0);
/* setup the channel layer */
/* XXX - streamlocal? */
set_fwdpermit_from_authopts(ssh, auth_opts);
if (!auth_opts->permit_port_forwarding_flag ||
options.disable_forwarding) {
channel_disable_admin(ssh, FORWARD_LOCAL);
channel_disable_admin(ssh, FORWARD_REMOTE);
} else {
if ((options.allow_tcp_forwarding & FORWARD_LOCAL) == 0)
channel_disable_admin(ssh, FORWARD_LOCAL);
else
channel_permit_all(ssh, FORWARD_LOCAL);
if ((options.allow_tcp_forwarding & FORWARD_REMOTE) == 0)
channel_disable_admin(ssh, FORWARD_REMOTE);
else
channel_permit_all(ssh, FORWARD_REMOTE);
}
auth_debug_send(ssh);
prepare_auth_info_file(authctxt->pw, authctxt->session_info);
do_authenticated2(ssh, authctxt);
do_cleanup(ssh, authctxt);
}
/* Check untrusted xauth strings for metacharacters */
static int
xauth_valid_string(const char *s)
{
size_t i;
for (i = 0; s[i] != '\0'; i++) {
if (!isalnum((u_char)s[i]) &&
s[i] != '.' && s[i] != ':' && s[i] != '/' &&
s[i] != '-' && s[i] != '_')
return 0;
}
return 1;
}
#define USE_PIPES 1
/*
* This is called to fork and execute a command when we have no tty. This
* will call do_child from the child, and server_loop from the parent after
* setting up file descriptors and such.
*/
int
do_exec_no_pty(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s, const char *command)
{
pid_t pid;
#ifdef USE_PIPES
int pin[2], pout[2], perr[2];
if (s == NULL)
fatal("do_exec_no_pty: no session");
/* Allocate pipes for communicating with the program. */
if (pipe(pin) == -1) {
error("%s: pipe in: %.100s", __func__, strerror(errno));
return -1;
}
if (pipe(pout) == -1) {
error("%s: pipe out: %.100s", __func__, strerror(errno));
close(pin[0]);
close(pin[1]);
return -1;
}
if (pipe(perr) == -1) {
error("%s: pipe err: %.100s", __func__,
strerror(errno));
close(pin[0]);
close(pin[1]);
close(pout[0]);
close(pout[1]);
return -1;
}
#else
int inout[2], err[2];
if (s == NULL)
fatal("do_exec_no_pty: no session");
/* Uses socket pairs to communicate with the program. */
if (socketpair(AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0, inout) == -1) {
error("%s: socketpair #1: %.100s", __func__, strerror(errno));
return -1;
}
if (socketpair(AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0, err) == -1) {
error("%s: socketpair #2: %.100s", __func__,
strerror(errno));
close(inout[0]);
close(inout[1]);
return -1;
}
#endif
session_proctitle(s);
/* Fork the child. */
switch ((pid = fork())) {
case -1:
error("%s: fork: %.100s", __func__, strerror(errno));
#ifdef USE_PIPES
close(pin[0]);
close(pin[1]);
close(pout[0]);
close(pout[1]);
close(perr[0]);
close(perr[1]);
#else
close(inout[0]);
close(inout[1]);
close(err[0]);
close(err[1]);
#endif
return -1;
case 0:
is_child = 1;
/*
* Create a new session and process group since the 4.4BSD
* setlogin() affects the entire process group.
*/
if (setsid() == -1)
error("setsid failed: %.100s", strerror(errno));
#ifdef USE_PIPES
/*
* Redirect stdin. We close the parent side of the socket
* pair, and make the child side the standard input.
*/
close(pin[1]);
if (dup2(pin[0], 0) == -1)
perror("dup2 stdin");
close(pin[0]);
/* Redirect stdout. */
close(pout[0]);
if (dup2(pout[1], 1) == -1)
perror("dup2 stdout");
close(pout[1]);
/* Redirect stderr. */
close(perr[0]);
if (dup2(perr[1], 2) == -1)
perror("dup2 stderr");
close(perr[1]);
#else
/*
* Redirect stdin, stdout, and stderr. Stdin and stdout will
* use the same socket, as some programs (particularly rdist)
* seem to depend on it.
*/
close(inout[1]);
close(err[1]);
if (dup2(inout[0], 0) == -1) /* stdin */
perror("dup2 stdin");
if (dup2(inout[0], 1) == -1) /* stdout (same as stdin) */
perror("dup2 stdout");
close(inout[0]);
if (dup2(err[0], 2) == -1) /* stderr */
perror("dup2 stderr");
close(err[0]);
#endif
/* Do processing for the child (exec command etc). */
do_child(ssh, s, command);
/* NOTREACHED */
default:
break;
}
#ifdef HAVE_CYGWIN
cygwin_set_impersonation_token(INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE);
#endif
s->pid = pid;
/* Set interactive/non-interactive mode. */
ssh_packet_set_interactive(ssh, s->display != NULL,
options.ip_qos_interactive, options.ip_qos_bulk);
/*
* Clear loginmsg, since it's the child's responsibility to display
* it to the user, otherwise multiple sessions may accumulate
* multiple copies of the login messages.
*/
sshbuf_reset(loginmsg);
#ifdef USE_PIPES
/* We are the parent. Close the child sides of the pipes. */
close(pin[0]);
close(pout[1]);
close(perr[1]);
session_set_fds(ssh, s, pin[1], pout[0], perr[0],
s->is_subsystem, 0);
#else
/* We are the parent. Close the child sides of the socket pairs. */
close(inout[0]);
close(err[0]);
/*
* Enter the interactive session. Note: server_loop must be able to
* handle the case that fdin and fdout are the same.
*/
session_set_fds(ssh, s, inout[1], inout[1], err[1],
s->is_subsystem, 0);
#endif
return 0;
}
/*
* This is called to fork and execute a command when we have a tty. This
* will call do_child from the child, and server_loop from the parent after
* setting up file descriptors, controlling tty, updating wtmp, utmp,
* lastlog, and other such operations.
*/
int
do_exec_pty(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s, const char *command)
{
int fdout, ptyfd, ttyfd, ptymaster;
pid_t pid;
if (s == NULL)
fatal("do_exec_pty: no session");
ptyfd = s->ptyfd;
ttyfd = s->ttyfd;
/*
* Create another descriptor of the pty master side for use as the
* standard input. We could use the original descriptor, but this
* simplifies code in server_loop. The descriptor is bidirectional.
* Do this before forking (and cleanup in the child) so as to
* detect and gracefully fail out-of-fd conditions.
*/
if ((fdout = dup(ptyfd)) == -1) {
error("%s: dup #1: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
close(ttyfd);
close(ptyfd);
return -1;
}
/* we keep a reference to the pty master */
if ((ptymaster = dup(ptyfd)) == -1) {
error("%s: dup #2: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
close(ttyfd);
close(ptyfd);
close(fdout);
return -1;
}
/* Fork the child. */
switch ((pid = fork())) {
case -1:
error("%s: fork: %.100s", __func__, strerror(errno));
close(fdout);
close(ptymaster);
close(ttyfd);
close(ptyfd);
return -1;
case 0:
is_child = 1;
close(fdout);
close(ptymaster);
/* Close the master side of the pseudo tty. */
close(ptyfd);
/* Make the pseudo tty our controlling tty. */
pty_make_controlling_tty(&ttyfd, s->tty);
/* Redirect stdin/stdout/stderr from the pseudo tty. */
if (dup2(ttyfd, 0) == -1)
error("dup2 stdin: %s", strerror(errno));
if (dup2(ttyfd, 1) == -1)
error("dup2 stdout: %s", strerror(errno));
if (dup2(ttyfd, 2) == -1)
error("dup2 stderr: %s", strerror(errno));
/* Close the extra descriptor for the pseudo tty. */
close(ttyfd);
/* record login, etc. similar to login(1) */
#ifndef HAVE_OSF_SIA
do_login(ssh, s, command);
#endif
/*
* Do common processing for the child, such as execing
* the command.
*/
do_child(ssh, s, command);
/* NOTREACHED */
default:
break;
}
#ifdef HAVE_CYGWIN
cygwin_set_impersonation_token(INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE);
#endif
s->pid = pid;
/* Parent. Close the slave side of the pseudo tty. */
close(ttyfd);
/* Enter interactive session. */
s->ptymaster = ptymaster;
ssh_packet_set_interactive(ssh, 1,
options.ip_qos_interactive, options.ip_qos_bulk);
session_set_fds(ssh, s, ptyfd, fdout, -1, 1, 1);
return 0;
}
/*
* This is called to fork and execute a command. If another command is
* to be forced, execute that instead.
*/
int
do_exec(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s, const char *command)
{
int ret;
const char *forced = NULL, *tty = NULL;
char session_type[1024];
if (options.adm_forced_command) {
original_command = command;
command = options.adm_forced_command;
forced = "(config)";
} else if (auth_opts->force_command != NULL) {
original_command = command;
command = auth_opts->force_command;
forced = "(key-option)";
}
s->forced = 0;
if (forced != NULL) {
s->forced = 1;
if (IS_INTERNAL_SFTP(command)) {
s->is_subsystem = s->is_subsystem ?
SUBSYSTEM_INT_SFTP : SUBSYSTEM_INT_SFTP_ERROR;
} else if (s->is_subsystem)
s->is_subsystem = SUBSYSTEM_EXT;
snprintf(session_type, sizeof(session_type),
"forced-command %s '%.900s'", forced, command);
} else if (s->is_subsystem) {
snprintf(session_type, sizeof(session_type),
"subsystem '%.900s'", s->subsys);
} else if (command == NULL) {
snprintf(session_type, sizeof(session_type), "shell");
} else {
/* NB. we don't log unforced commands to preserve privacy */
snprintf(session_type, sizeof(session_type), "command");
}
if (s->ttyfd != -1) {
tty = s->tty;
if (strncmp(tty, "/dev/", 5) == 0)
tty += 5;
}
verbose("Starting session: %s%s%s for %s from %.200s port %d id %d",
session_type,
tty == NULL ? "" : " on ",
tty == NULL ? "" : tty,
s->pw->pw_name,
ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh),
ssh_remote_port(ssh),
s->self);
#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
if (command != NULL)
PRIVSEP(audit_run_command(command));
else if (s->ttyfd == -1) {
char *shell = s->pw->pw_shell;
if (shell[0] == '\0') /* empty shell means /bin/sh */
shell =_PATH_BSHELL;
PRIVSEP(audit_run_command(shell));
}
#endif
if (s->ttyfd != -1)
ret = do_exec_pty(ssh, s, command);
else
ret = do_exec_no_pty(ssh, s, command);
original_command = NULL;
/*
* Clear loginmsg: it's the child's responsibility to display
* it to the user, otherwise multiple sessions may accumulate
* multiple copies of the login messages.
*/
sshbuf_reset(loginmsg);
return ret;
}
/* administrative, login(1)-like work */
void
do_login(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s, const char *command)
{
socklen_t fromlen;
struct sockaddr_storage from;
struct passwd * pw = s->pw;
pid_t pid = getpid();
/*
* Get IP address of client. If the connection is not a socket, let
* the address be 0.0.0.0.
*/
memset(&from, 0, sizeof(from));
fromlen = sizeof(from);
if (ssh_packet_connection_is_on_socket(ssh)) {
if (getpeername(ssh_packet_get_connection_in(ssh),
(struct sockaddr *)&from, &fromlen) == -1) {
debug("getpeername: %.100s", strerror(errno));
cleanup_exit(255);
}
}
/* Record that there was a login on that tty from the remote host. */
if (!use_privsep)
record_login(pid, s->tty, pw->pw_name, pw->pw_uid,
session_get_remote_name_or_ip(ssh, utmp_len,
options.use_dns),
(struct sockaddr *)&from, fromlen);
#ifdef USE_PAM
/*
* If password change is needed, do it now.
* This needs to occur before the ~/.hushlogin check.
*/
if (options.use_pam && !use_privsep && s->authctxt->force_pwchange) {
display_loginmsg();
do_pam_chauthtok();
s->authctxt->force_pwchange = 0;
/* XXX - signal [net] parent to enable forwardings */
}
#endif
if (check_quietlogin(s, command))
return;
display_loginmsg();
do_motd();
}
/*
* Display the message of the day.
*/
void
do_motd(void)
{
FILE *f;
char buf[256];
if (options.print_motd) {
#ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP
f = fopen(login_getcapstr(lc, "welcome", "/etc/motd",
"/etc/motd"), "r");
#else
f = fopen("/etc/motd", "r");
#endif
if (f) {
while (fgets(buf, sizeof(buf), f))
fputs(buf, stdout);
fclose(f);
}
}
}
/*
* Check for quiet login, either .hushlogin or command given.
*/
int
check_quietlogin(Session *s, const char *command)
{
char buf[256];
struct passwd *pw = s->pw;
struct stat st;
/* Return 1 if .hushlogin exists or a command given. */
if (command != NULL)
return 1;
snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%.200s/.hushlogin", pw->pw_dir);
#ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP
if (login_getcapbool(lc, "hushlogin", 0) || stat(buf, &st) >= 0)
return 1;
#else
if (stat(buf, &st) >= 0)
return 1;
#endif
return 0;
}
/*
* Reads environment variables from the given file and adds/overrides them
* into the environment. If the file does not exist, this does nothing.
* Otherwise, it must consist of empty lines, comments (line starts with '#')
* and assignments of the form name=value. No other forms are allowed.
- * If whitelist is not NULL, then it is interpreted as a pattern list and
+ * If allowlist is not NULL, then it is interpreted as a pattern list and
* only variable names that match it will be accepted.
*/
static void
read_environment_file(char ***env, u_int *envsize,
- const char *filename, const char *whitelist)
+ const char *filename, const char *allowlist)
{
FILE *f;
char *line = NULL, *cp, *value;
size_t linesize = 0;
u_int lineno = 0;
f = fopen(filename, "r");
if (!f)
return;
while (getline(&line, &linesize, f) != -1) {
if (++lineno > 1000)
fatal("Too many lines in environment file %s", filename);
for (cp = line; *cp == ' ' || *cp == '\t'; cp++)
;
if (!*cp || *cp == '#' || *cp == '\n')
continue;
cp[strcspn(cp, "\n")] = '\0';
value = strchr(cp, '=');
if (value == NULL) {
fprintf(stderr, "Bad line %u in %.100s\n", lineno,
filename);
continue;
}
/*
* Replace the equals sign by nul, and advance value to
* the value string.
*/
*value = '\0';
value++;
- if (whitelist != NULL &&
- match_pattern_list(cp, whitelist, 0) != 1)
+ if (allowlist != NULL &&
+ match_pattern_list(cp, allowlist, 0) != 1)
continue;
child_set_env(env, envsize, cp, value);
}
free(line);
fclose(f);
}
#ifdef HAVE_ETC_DEFAULT_LOGIN
/*
* Return named variable from specified environment, or NULL if not present.
*/
static char *
child_get_env(char **env, const char *name)
{
int i;
size_t len;
len = strlen(name);
for (i=0; env[i] != NULL; i++)
if (strncmp(name, env[i], len) == 0 && env[i][len] == '=')
return(env[i] + len + 1);
return NULL;
}
/*
* Read /etc/default/login.
* We pick up the PATH (or SUPATH for root) and UMASK.
*/
static void
read_etc_default_login(char ***env, u_int *envsize, uid_t uid)
{
char **tmpenv = NULL, *var;
u_int i, tmpenvsize = 0;
u_long mask;
/*
* We don't want to copy the whole file to the child's environment,
* so we use a temporary environment and copy the variables we're
* interested in.
*/
read_environment_file(&tmpenv, &tmpenvsize, "/etc/default/login",
- options.permit_user_env_whitelist);
+ options.permit_user_env_allowlist);
if (tmpenv == NULL)
return;
if (uid == 0)
var = child_get_env(tmpenv, "SUPATH");
else
var = child_get_env(tmpenv, "PATH");
if (var != NULL)
child_set_env(env, envsize, "PATH", var);
if ((var = child_get_env(tmpenv, "UMASK")) != NULL)
if (sscanf(var, "%5lo", &mask) == 1)
umask((mode_t)mask);
for (i = 0; tmpenv[i] != NULL; i++)
free(tmpenv[i]);
free(tmpenv);
}
#endif /* HAVE_ETC_DEFAULT_LOGIN */
#if defined(USE_PAM) || defined(HAVE_CYGWIN)
static void
copy_environment_blacklist(char **source, char ***env, u_int *envsize,
const char *blacklist)
{
char *var_name, *var_val;
int i;
if (source == NULL)
return;
for(i = 0; source[i] != NULL; i++) {
var_name = xstrdup(source[i]);
if ((var_val = strstr(var_name, "=")) == NULL) {
free(var_name);
continue;
}
*var_val++ = '\0';
if (blacklist == NULL ||
match_pattern_list(var_name, blacklist, 0) != 1) {
debug3("Copy environment: %s=%s", var_name, var_val);
child_set_env(env, envsize, var_name, var_val);
}
free(var_name);
}
}
#endif /* defined(USE_PAM) || defined(HAVE_CYGWIN) */
#ifdef HAVE_CYGWIN
static void
copy_environment(char **source, char ***env, u_int *envsize)
{
copy_environment_blacklist(source, env, envsize, NULL);
}
#endif
static char **
do_setup_env(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s, const char *shell)
{
char buf[256];
size_t n;
u_int i, envsize;
char *ocp, *cp, *value, **env, *laddr;
struct passwd *pw = s->pw;
#if !defined (HAVE_LOGIN_CAP) && !defined (HAVE_CYGWIN)
char *path = NULL;
#endif
/* Initialize the environment. */
envsize = 100;
env = xcalloc(envsize, sizeof(char *));
env[0] = NULL;
#ifdef HAVE_CYGWIN
/*
* The Windows environment contains some setting which are
* important for a running system. They must not be dropped.
*/
{
char **p;
p = fetch_windows_environment();
copy_environment(p, &env, &envsize);
free_windows_environment(p);
}
#endif
#ifdef GSSAPI
/* Allow any GSSAPI methods that we've used to alter
* the child's environment as they see fit
*/
ssh_gssapi_do_child(&env, &envsize);
#endif
/* Set basic environment. */
for (i = 0; i < s->num_env; i++)
child_set_env(&env, &envsize, s->env[i].name, s->env[i].val);
child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "USER", pw->pw_name);
child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "LOGNAME", pw->pw_name);
#ifdef _AIX
child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "LOGIN", pw->pw_name);
#endif
child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "HOME", pw->pw_dir);
#ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP
if (setusercontext(lc, pw, pw->pw_uid, LOGIN_SETPATH) < 0)
child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "PATH", _PATH_STDPATH);
else
child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "PATH", getenv("PATH"));
#else /* HAVE_LOGIN_CAP */
# ifndef HAVE_CYGWIN
/*
* There's no standard path on Windows. The path contains
* important components pointing to the system directories,
* needed for loading shared libraries. So the path better
* remains intact here.
*/
# ifdef HAVE_ETC_DEFAULT_LOGIN
read_etc_default_login(&env, &envsize, pw->pw_uid);
path = child_get_env(env, "PATH");
# endif /* HAVE_ETC_DEFAULT_LOGIN */
if (path == NULL || *path == '\0') {
child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "PATH",
s->pw->pw_uid == 0 ? SUPERUSER_PATH : _PATH_STDPATH);
}
# endif /* HAVE_CYGWIN */
#endif /* HAVE_LOGIN_CAP */
if (!options.use_pam) {
snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "%.200s/%.50s",
_PATH_MAILDIR, pw->pw_name);
child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "MAIL", buf);
}
/* Normal systems set SHELL by default. */
child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "SHELL", shell);
if (getenv("TZ"))
child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "TZ", getenv("TZ"));
if (s->term)
child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "TERM", s->term);
if (s->display)
child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "DISPLAY", s->display);
/*
* Since we clear KRB5CCNAME at startup, if it's set now then it
* must have been set by a native authentication method (eg AIX or
* SIA), so copy it to the child.
*/
{
char *cp;
if ((cp = getenv("KRB5CCNAME")) != NULL)
child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "KRB5CCNAME", cp);
}
#ifdef _AIX
{
char *cp;
if ((cp = getenv("AUTHSTATE")) != NULL)
child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "AUTHSTATE", cp);
read_environment_file(&env, &envsize, "/etc/environment",
- options.permit_user_env_whitelist);
+ options.permit_user_env_allowlist);
}
#endif
#ifdef KRB5
if (s->authctxt->krb5_ccname)
child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "KRB5CCNAME",
s->authctxt->krb5_ccname);
#endif
if (auth_sock_name != NULL)
child_set_env(&env, &envsize, SSH_AUTHSOCKET_ENV_NAME,
auth_sock_name);
/* Set custom environment options from pubkey authentication. */
if (options.permit_user_env) {
for (n = 0 ; n < auth_opts->nenv; n++) {
ocp = xstrdup(auth_opts->env[n]);
cp = strchr(ocp, '=');
if (*cp == '=') {
*cp = '\0';
- /* Apply PermitUserEnvironment whitelist */
- if (options.permit_user_env_whitelist == NULL ||
+ /* Apply PermitUserEnvironment allowlist */
+ if (options.permit_user_env_allowlist == NULL ||
match_pattern_list(ocp,
- options.permit_user_env_whitelist, 0) == 1)
+ options.permit_user_env_allowlist, 0) == 1)
child_set_env(&env, &envsize,
ocp, cp + 1);
}
free(ocp);
}
}
/* read $HOME/.ssh/environment. */
if (options.permit_user_env) {
snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "%.200s/.ssh/environment",
pw->pw_dir);
read_environment_file(&env, &envsize, buf,
- options.permit_user_env_whitelist);
+ options.permit_user_env_allowlist);
}
#ifdef USE_PAM
/*
* Pull in any environment variables that may have
* been set by PAM.
*/
if (options.use_pam) {
char **p;
/*
* Don't allow PAM-internal env vars to leak
* back into the session environment.
*/
#define PAM_ENV_BLACKLIST "SSH_AUTH_INFO*,SSH_CONNECTION*"
p = fetch_pam_child_environment();
copy_environment_blacklist(p, &env, &envsize,
PAM_ENV_BLACKLIST);
free_pam_environment(p);
p = fetch_pam_environment();
copy_environment_blacklist(p, &env, &envsize,
PAM_ENV_BLACKLIST);
free_pam_environment(p);
}
#endif /* USE_PAM */
/* Environment specified by admin */
for (i = 0; i < options.num_setenv; i++) {
cp = xstrdup(options.setenv[i]);
if ((value = strchr(cp, '=')) == NULL) {
/* shouldn't happen; vars are checked in servconf.c */
fatal("Invalid config SetEnv: %s", options.setenv[i]);
}
*value++ = '\0';
child_set_env(&env, &envsize, cp, value);
}
/* SSH_CLIENT deprecated */
snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "%.50s %d %d",
ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), ssh_remote_port(ssh),
ssh_local_port(ssh));
child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "SSH_CLIENT", buf);
laddr = get_local_ipaddr(ssh_packet_get_connection_in(ssh));
snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "%.50s %d %.50s %d",
ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), ssh_remote_port(ssh),
laddr, ssh_local_port(ssh));
free(laddr);
child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "SSH_CONNECTION", buf);
if (tun_fwd_ifnames != NULL)
child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "SSH_TUNNEL", tun_fwd_ifnames);
if (auth_info_file != NULL)
child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "SSH_USER_AUTH", auth_info_file);
if (s->ttyfd != -1)
child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "SSH_TTY", s->tty);
if (original_command)
child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "SSH_ORIGINAL_COMMAND",
original_command);
if (debug_flag) {
/* dump the environment */
fprintf(stderr, "Environment:\n");
for (i = 0; env[i]; i++)
fprintf(stderr, " %.200s\n", env[i]);
}
return env;
}
/*
* Run $HOME/.ssh/rc, /etc/ssh/sshrc, or xauth (whichever is found
* first in this order).
*/
static void
do_rc_files(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s, const char *shell)
{
FILE *f = NULL;
- char cmd[1024];
+ char *cmd = NULL, *user_rc = NULL;
int do_xauth;
struct stat st;
do_xauth =
s->display != NULL && s->auth_proto != NULL && s->auth_data != NULL;
+ xasprintf(&user_rc, "%s/%s", s->pw->pw_dir, _PATH_SSH_USER_RC);
/* ignore _PATH_SSH_USER_RC for subsystems and admin forced commands */
if (!s->is_subsystem && options.adm_forced_command == NULL &&
auth_opts->permit_user_rc && options.permit_user_rc &&
- stat(_PATH_SSH_USER_RC, &st) >= 0) {
- snprintf(cmd, sizeof cmd, "%s -c '%s %s'",
- shell, _PATH_BSHELL, _PATH_SSH_USER_RC);
+ stat(user_rc, &st) >= 0) {
+ if (xasprintf(&cmd, "%s -c '%s %s'", shell, _PATH_BSHELL,
+ user_rc) == -1)
+ fatal("%s: xasprintf: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
if (debug_flag)
fprintf(stderr, "Running %s\n", cmd);
f = popen(cmd, "w");
if (f) {
if (do_xauth)
fprintf(f, "%s %s\n", s->auth_proto,
s->auth_data);
pclose(f);
} else
fprintf(stderr, "Could not run %s\n",
- _PATH_SSH_USER_RC);
+ user_rc);
} else if (stat(_PATH_SSH_SYSTEM_RC, &st) >= 0) {
if (debug_flag)
fprintf(stderr, "Running %s %s\n", _PATH_BSHELL,
_PATH_SSH_SYSTEM_RC);
f = popen(_PATH_BSHELL " " _PATH_SSH_SYSTEM_RC, "w");
if (f) {
if (do_xauth)
fprintf(f, "%s %s\n", s->auth_proto,
s->auth_data);
pclose(f);
} else
fprintf(stderr, "Could not run %s\n",
_PATH_SSH_SYSTEM_RC);
} else if (do_xauth && options.xauth_location != NULL) {
/* Add authority data to .Xauthority if appropriate. */
if (debug_flag) {
fprintf(stderr,
"Running %.500s remove %.100s\n",
options.xauth_location, s->auth_display);
fprintf(stderr,
"%.500s add %.100s %.100s %.100s\n",
options.xauth_location, s->auth_display,
s->auth_proto, s->auth_data);
}
- snprintf(cmd, sizeof cmd, "%s -q -",
- options.xauth_location);
+ if (xasprintf(&cmd, "%s -q -", options.xauth_location) == -1)
+ fatal("%s: xasprintf: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
f = popen(cmd, "w");
if (f) {
fprintf(f, "remove %s\n",
s->auth_display);
fprintf(f, "add %s %s %s\n",
s->auth_display, s->auth_proto,
s->auth_data);
pclose(f);
} else {
fprintf(stderr, "Could not run %s\n",
cmd);
}
}
+ free(cmd);
+ free(user_rc);
}
static void
do_nologin(struct passwd *pw)
{
FILE *f = NULL;
char buf[1024], *nl, *def_nl = _PATH_NOLOGIN;
struct stat sb;
#ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP
if (login_getcapbool(lc, "ignorenologin", 0) || pw->pw_uid == 0)
return;
nl = login_getcapstr(lc, "nologin", def_nl, def_nl);
#else
if (pw->pw_uid == 0)
return;
nl = def_nl;
#endif
if (stat(nl, &sb) == -1) {
if (nl != def_nl)
free(nl);
return;
}
/* /etc/nologin exists. Print its contents if we can and exit. */
logit("User %.100s not allowed because %s exists", pw->pw_name, nl);
if ((f = fopen(nl, "r")) != NULL) {
while (fgets(buf, sizeof(buf), f))
fputs(buf, stderr);
fclose(f);
}
exit(254);
}
/*
* Chroot into a directory after checking it for safety: all path components
* must be root-owned directories with strict permissions.
*/
static void
safely_chroot(const char *path, uid_t uid)
{
const char *cp;
char component[PATH_MAX];
struct stat st;
if (!path_absolute(path))
fatal("chroot path does not begin at root");
if (strlen(path) >= sizeof(component))
fatal("chroot path too long");
/*
* Descend the path, checking that each component is a
* root-owned directory with strict permissions.
*/
for (cp = path; cp != NULL;) {
if ((cp = strchr(cp, '/')) == NULL)
strlcpy(component, path, sizeof(component));
else {
cp++;
memcpy(component, path, cp - path);
component[cp - path] = '\0';
}
debug3("%s: checking '%s'", __func__, component);
if (stat(component, &st) != 0)
fatal("%s: stat(\"%s\"): %s", __func__,
component, strerror(errno));
if (st.st_uid != 0 || (st.st_mode & 022) != 0)
fatal("bad ownership or modes for chroot "
"directory %s\"%s\"",
cp == NULL ? "" : "component ", component);
if (!S_ISDIR(st.st_mode))
fatal("chroot path %s\"%s\" is not a directory",
cp == NULL ? "" : "component ", component);
}
if (chdir(path) == -1)
fatal("Unable to chdir to chroot path \"%s\": "
"%s", path, strerror(errno));
if (chroot(path) == -1)
fatal("chroot(\"%s\"): %s", path, strerror(errno));
if (chdir("/") == -1)
fatal("%s: chdir(/) after chroot: %s",
__func__, strerror(errno));
verbose("Changed root directory to \"%s\"", path);
}
/* Set login name, uid, gid, and groups. */
void
do_setusercontext(struct passwd *pw)
{
char uidstr[32], *chroot_path, *tmp;
platform_setusercontext(pw);
if (platform_privileged_uidswap()) {
#ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP
if (setusercontext(lc, pw, pw->pw_uid,
(LOGIN_SETALL & ~(LOGIN_SETPATH|LOGIN_SETUSER))) < 0) {
perror("unable to set user context");
exit(1);
}
#else
if (setlogin(pw->pw_name) < 0)
error("setlogin failed: %s", strerror(errno));
if (setgid(pw->pw_gid) < 0) {
perror("setgid");
exit(1);
}
/* Initialize the group list. */
if (initgroups(pw->pw_name, pw->pw_gid) < 0) {
perror("initgroups");
exit(1);
}
endgrent();
#endif
platform_setusercontext_post_groups(pw);
if (!in_chroot && options.chroot_directory != NULL &&
strcasecmp(options.chroot_directory, "none") != 0) {
tmp = tilde_expand_filename(options.chroot_directory,
pw->pw_uid);
snprintf(uidstr, sizeof(uidstr), "%llu",
(unsigned long long)pw->pw_uid);
chroot_path = percent_expand(tmp, "h", pw->pw_dir,
"u", pw->pw_name, "U", uidstr, (char *)NULL);
safely_chroot(chroot_path, pw->pw_uid);
free(tmp);
free(chroot_path);
/* Make sure we don't attempt to chroot again */
free(options.chroot_directory);
options.chroot_directory = NULL;
in_chroot = 1;
}
#ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP
if (setusercontext(lc, pw, pw->pw_uid, LOGIN_SETUSER) < 0) {
perror("unable to set user context (setuser)");
exit(1);
}
/*
* FreeBSD's setusercontext() will not apply the user's
* own umask setting unless running with the user's UID.
*/
(void) setusercontext(lc, pw, pw->pw_uid, LOGIN_SETUMASK);
#else
# ifdef USE_LIBIAF
/*
* In a chroot environment, the set_id() will always fail;
* typically because of the lack of necessary authentication
* services and runtime such as ./usr/lib/libiaf.so,
* ./usr/lib/libpam.so.1, and ./etc/passwd We skip it in the
* internal sftp chroot case. We'll lose auditing and ACLs but
* permanently_set_uid will take care of the rest.
*/
if (!in_chroot && set_id(pw->pw_name) != 0)
fatal("set_id(%s) Failed", pw->pw_name);
# endif /* USE_LIBIAF */
/* Permanently switch to the desired uid. */
permanently_set_uid(pw);
#endif
} else if (options.chroot_directory != NULL &&
strcasecmp(options.chroot_directory, "none") != 0) {
fatal("server lacks privileges to chroot to ChrootDirectory");
}
if (getuid() != pw->pw_uid || geteuid() != pw->pw_uid)
fatal("Failed to set uids to %u.", (u_int) pw->pw_uid);
}
static void
do_pwchange(Session *s)
{
fflush(NULL);
fprintf(stderr, "WARNING: Your password has expired.\n");
if (s->ttyfd != -1) {
fprintf(stderr,
"You must change your password now and login again!\n");
#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
setexeccon(NULL);
#endif
#ifdef PASSWD_NEEDS_USERNAME
execl(_PATH_PASSWD_PROG, "passwd", s->pw->pw_name,
(char *)NULL);
#else
execl(_PATH_PASSWD_PROG, "passwd", (char *)NULL);
#endif
perror("passwd");
} else {
fprintf(stderr,
"Password change required but no TTY available.\n");
}
exit(1);
}
static void
child_close_fds(struct ssh *ssh)
{
extern int auth_sock;
if (auth_sock != -1) {
close(auth_sock);
auth_sock = -1;
}
if (ssh_packet_get_connection_in(ssh) ==
ssh_packet_get_connection_out(ssh))
close(ssh_packet_get_connection_in(ssh));
else {
close(ssh_packet_get_connection_in(ssh));
close(ssh_packet_get_connection_out(ssh));
}
/*
* Close all descriptors related to channels. They will still remain
* open in the parent.
*/
/* XXX better use close-on-exec? -markus */
channel_close_all(ssh);
/*
* Close any extra file descriptors. Note that there may still be
* descriptors left by system functions. They will be closed later.
*/
endpwent();
+ /* Stop directing logs to a high-numbered fd before we close it */
+ log_redirect_stderr_to(NULL);
+
/*
* Close any extra open file descriptors so that we don't have them
* hanging around in clients. Note that we want to do this after
* initgroups, because at least on Solaris 2.3 it leaves file
* descriptors open.
*/
closefrom(STDERR_FILENO + 1);
}
/*
* Performs common processing for the child, such as setting up the
* environment, closing extra file descriptors, setting the user and group
* ids, and executing the command or shell.
*/
#define ARGV_MAX 10
void
do_child(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s, const char *command)
{
extern char **environ;
char **env, *argv[ARGV_MAX], remote_id[512];
const char *shell, *shell0;
struct passwd *pw = s->pw;
int r = 0;
sshpkt_fmt_connection_id(ssh, remote_id, sizeof(remote_id));
/* remove hostkey from the child's memory */
destroy_sensitive_data();
ssh_packet_clear_keys(ssh);
/* Force a password change */
if (s->authctxt->force_pwchange) {
do_setusercontext(pw);
child_close_fds(ssh);
do_pwchange(s);
exit(1);
}
/*
* Login(1) does this as well, and it needs uid 0 for the "-h"
* switch, so we let login(1) to this for us.
*/
#ifdef HAVE_OSF_SIA
session_setup_sia(pw, s->ttyfd == -1 ? NULL : s->tty);
if (!check_quietlogin(s, command))
do_motd();
#else /* HAVE_OSF_SIA */
/* When PAM is enabled we rely on it to do the nologin check */
if (!options.use_pam)
do_nologin(pw);
do_setusercontext(pw);
/*
* PAM session modules in do_setusercontext may have
* generated messages, so if this in an interactive
* login then display them too.
*/
if (!check_quietlogin(s, command))
display_loginmsg();
#endif /* HAVE_OSF_SIA */
#ifdef USE_PAM
if (options.use_pam && !is_pam_session_open()) {
debug3("PAM session not opened, exiting");
display_loginmsg();
exit(254);
}
#endif
/*
* Get the shell from the password data. An empty shell field is
* legal, and means /bin/sh.
*/
shell = (pw->pw_shell[0] == '\0') ? _PATH_BSHELL : pw->pw_shell;
/*
* Make sure $SHELL points to the shell from the password file,
* even if shell is overridden from login.conf
*/
env = do_setup_env(ssh, s, shell);
#ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP
shell = login_getcapstr(lc, "shell", (char *)shell, (char *)shell);
#endif
/*
* Close the connection descriptors; note that this is the child, and
* the server will still have the socket open, and it is important
* that we do not shutdown it. Note that the descriptors cannot be
* closed before building the environment, as we call
* ssh_remote_ipaddr there.
*/
child_close_fds(ssh);
/*
* Must take new environment into use so that .ssh/rc,
* /etc/ssh/sshrc and xauth are run in the proper environment.
*/
environ = env;
#if defined(KRB5) && defined(USE_AFS)
/*
* At this point, we check to see if AFS is active and if we have
* a valid Kerberos 5 TGT. If so, it seems like a good idea to see
* if we can (and need to) extend the ticket into an AFS token. If
* we don't do this, we run into potential problems if the user's
* home directory is in AFS and it's not world-readable.
*/
if (options.kerberos_get_afs_token && k_hasafs() &&
(s->authctxt->krb5_ctx != NULL)) {
char cell[64];
debug("Getting AFS token");
k_setpag();
if (k_afs_cell_of_file(pw->pw_dir, cell, sizeof(cell)) == 0)
krb5_afslog(s->authctxt->krb5_ctx,
s->authctxt->krb5_fwd_ccache, cell, NULL);
krb5_afslog_home(s->authctxt->krb5_ctx,
s->authctxt->krb5_fwd_ccache, NULL, NULL, pw->pw_dir);
}
#endif
/* Change current directory to the user's home directory. */
if (chdir(pw->pw_dir) == -1) {
/* Suppress missing homedir warning for chroot case */
#ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP
r = login_getcapbool(lc, "requirehome", 0);
#endif
if (r || !in_chroot) {
fprintf(stderr, "Could not chdir to home "
"directory %s: %s\n", pw->pw_dir,
strerror(errno));
}
if (r)
exit(1);
}
closefrom(STDERR_FILENO + 1);
do_rc_files(ssh, s, shell);
/* restore SIGPIPE for child */
ssh_signal(SIGPIPE, SIG_DFL);
if (s->is_subsystem == SUBSYSTEM_INT_SFTP_ERROR) {
error("Connection from %s: refusing non-sftp session",
remote_id);
printf("This service allows sftp connections only.\n");
fflush(NULL);
exit(1);
} else if (s->is_subsystem == SUBSYSTEM_INT_SFTP) {
extern int optind, optreset;
int i;
char *p, *args;
setproctitle("%s@%s", s->pw->pw_name, INTERNAL_SFTP_NAME);
args = xstrdup(command ? command : "sftp-server");
for (i = 0, (p = strtok(args, " ")); p; (p = strtok(NULL, " ")))
if (i < ARGV_MAX - 1)
argv[i++] = p;
argv[i] = NULL;
optind = optreset = 1;
__progname = argv[0];
#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
ssh_selinux_change_context("sftpd_t");
#endif
exit(sftp_server_main(i, argv, s->pw));
}
fflush(NULL);
/* Get the last component of the shell name. */
if ((shell0 = strrchr(shell, '/')) != NULL)
shell0++;
else
shell0 = shell;
/*
* If we have no command, execute the shell. In this case, the shell
* name to be passed in argv[0] is preceded by '-' to indicate that
* this is a login shell.
*/
if (!command) {
char argv0[256];
/* Start the shell. Set initial character to '-'. */
argv0[0] = '-';
if (strlcpy(argv0 + 1, shell0, sizeof(argv0) - 1)
>= sizeof(argv0) - 1) {
errno = EINVAL;
perror(shell);
exit(1);
}
/* Execute the shell. */
argv[0] = argv0;
argv[1] = NULL;
execve(shell, argv, env);
/* Executing the shell failed. */
perror(shell);
exit(1);
}
/*
* Execute the command using the user's shell. This uses the -c
* option to execute the command.
*/
argv[0] = (char *) shell0;
argv[1] = "-c";
argv[2] = (char *) command;
argv[3] = NULL;
execve(shell, argv, env);
perror(shell);
exit(1);
}
void
session_unused(int id)
{
debug3("%s: session id %d unused", __func__, id);
if (id >= options.max_sessions ||
id >= sessions_nalloc) {
fatal("%s: insane session id %d (max %d nalloc %d)",
__func__, id, options.max_sessions, sessions_nalloc);
}
memset(&sessions[id], 0, sizeof(*sessions));
sessions[id].self = id;
sessions[id].used = 0;
sessions[id].chanid = -1;
sessions[id].ptyfd = -1;
sessions[id].ttyfd = -1;
sessions[id].ptymaster = -1;
sessions[id].x11_chanids = NULL;
sessions[id].next_unused = sessions_first_unused;
sessions_first_unused = id;
}
Session *
session_new(void)
{
Session *s, *tmp;
if (sessions_first_unused == -1) {
if (sessions_nalloc >= options.max_sessions)
return NULL;
debug2("%s: allocate (allocated %d max %d)",
__func__, sessions_nalloc, options.max_sessions);
tmp = xrecallocarray(sessions, sessions_nalloc,
sessions_nalloc + 1, sizeof(*sessions));
if (tmp == NULL) {
error("%s: cannot allocate %d sessions",
__func__, sessions_nalloc + 1);
return NULL;
}
sessions = tmp;
session_unused(sessions_nalloc++);
}
if (sessions_first_unused >= sessions_nalloc ||
sessions_first_unused < 0) {
fatal("%s: insane first_unused %d max %d nalloc %d",
__func__, sessions_first_unused, options.max_sessions,
sessions_nalloc);
}
s = &sessions[sessions_first_unused];
if (s->used) {
fatal("%s: session %d already used",
__func__, sessions_first_unused);
}
sessions_first_unused = s->next_unused;
s->used = 1;
s->next_unused = -1;
debug("session_new: session %d", s->self);
return s;
}
static void
session_dump(void)
{
int i;
for (i = 0; i < sessions_nalloc; i++) {
Session *s = &sessions[i];
debug("dump: used %d next_unused %d session %d %p "
"channel %d pid %ld",
s->used,
s->next_unused,
s->self,
s,
s->chanid,
(long)s->pid);
}
}
int
session_open(Authctxt *authctxt, int chanid)
{
Session *s = session_new();
debug("session_open: channel %d", chanid);
if (s == NULL) {
error("no more sessions");
return 0;
}
s->authctxt = authctxt;
s->pw = authctxt->pw;
if (s->pw == NULL || !authctxt->valid)
fatal("no user for session %d", s->self);
debug("session_open: session %d: link with channel %d", s->self, chanid);
s->chanid = chanid;
return 1;
}
Session *
session_by_tty(char *tty)
{
int i;
for (i = 0; i < sessions_nalloc; i++) {
Session *s = &sessions[i];
if (s->used && s->ttyfd != -1 && strcmp(s->tty, tty) == 0) {
debug("session_by_tty: session %d tty %s", i, tty);
return s;
}
}
debug("session_by_tty: unknown tty %.100s", tty);
session_dump();
return NULL;
}
static Session *
session_by_channel(int id)
{
int i;
for (i = 0; i < sessions_nalloc; i++) {
Session *s = &sessions[i];
if (s->used && s->chanid == id) {
debug("session_by_channel: session %d channel %d",
i, id);
return s;
}
}
debug("session_by_channel: unknown channel %d", id);
session_dump();
return NULL;
}
static Session *
session_by_x11_channel(int id)
{
int i, j;
for (i = 0; i < sessions_nalloc; i++) {
Session *s = &sessions[i];
if (s->x11_chanids == NULL || !s->used)
continue;
for (j = 0; s->x11_chanids[j] != -1; j++) {
if (s->x11_chanids[j] == id) {
debug("session_by_x11_channel: session %d "
"channel %d", s->self, id);
return s;
}
}
}
debug("session_by_x11_channel: unknown channel %d", id);
session_dump();
return NULL;
}
static Session *
session_by_pid(pid_t pid)
{
int i;
debug("session_by_pid: pid %ld", (long)pid);
for (i = 0; i < sessions_nalloc; i++) {
Session *s = &sessions[i];
if (s->used && s->pid == pid)
return s;
}
error("session_by_pid: unknown pid %ld", (long)pid);
session_dump();
return NULL;
}
static int
session_window_change_req(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s)
{
int r;
if ((r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &s->col)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &s->row)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &s->xpixel)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &s->ypixel)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0)
sshpkt_fatal(ssh, r, "%s: parse packet", __func__);
pty_change_window_size(s->ptyfd, s->row, s->col, s->xpixel, s->ypixel);
return 1;
}
static int
session_pty_req(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s)
{
int r;
if (!auth_opts->permit_pty_flag || !options.permit_tty) {
debug("Allocating a pty not permitted for this connection.");
return 0;
}
if (s->ttyfd != -1) {
ssh_packet_disconnect(ssh, "Protocol error: you already have a pty.");
return 0;
}
if ((r = sshpkt_get_cstring(ssh, &s->term, NULL)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &s->col)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &s->row)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &s->xpixel)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &s->ypixel)) != 0)
sshpkt_fatal(ssh, r, "%s: parse packet", __func__);
if (strcmp(s->term, "") == 0) {
free(s->term);
s->term = NULL;
}
/* Allocate a pty and open it. */
debug("Allocating pty.");
if (!PRIVSEP(pty_allocate(&s->ptyfd, &s->ttyfd, s->tty,
sizeof(s->tty)))) {
free(s->term);
s->term = NULL;
s->ptyfd = -1;
s->ttyfd = -1;
error("session_pty_req: session %d alloc failed", s->self);
return 0;
}
debug("session_pty_req: session %d alloc %s", s->self, s->tty);
ssh_tty_parse_modes(ssh, s->ttyfd);
if ((r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0)
sshpkt_fatal(ssh, r, "%s: parse packet", __func__);
if (!use_privsep)
pty_setowner(s->pw, s->tty);
/* Set window size from the packet. */
pty_change_window_size(s->ptyfd, s->row, s->col, s->xpixel, s->ypixel);
session_proctitle(s);
return 1;
}
static int
session_subsystem_req(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s)
{
struct stat st;
int r, success = 0;
char *prog, *cmd;
u_int i;
if ((r = sshpkt_get_cstring(ssh, &s->subsys, NULL)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0)
sshpkt_fatal(ssh, r, "%s: parse packet", __func__);
debug2("subsystem request for %.100s by user %s", s->subsys,
s->pw->pw_name);
for (i = 0; i < options.num_subsystems; i++) {
if (strcmp(s->subsys, options.subsystem_name[i]) == 0) {
prog = options.subsystem_command[i];
cmd = options.subsystem_args[i];
if (strcmp(INTERNAL_SFTP_NAME, prog) == 0) {
s->is_subsystem = SUBSYSTEM_INT_SFTP;
debug("subsystem: %s", prog);
} else {
if (stat(prog, &st) == -1)
debug("subsystem: cannot stat %s: %s",
prog, strerror(errno));
s->is_subsystem = SUBSYSTEM_EXT;
debug("subsystem: exec() %s", cmd);
}
success = do_exec(ssh, s, cmd) == 0;
break;
}
}
if (!success)
logit("subsystem request for %.100s by user %s failed, "
"subsystem not found", s->subsys, s->pw->pw_name);
return success;
}
static int
session_x11_req(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s)
{
int r, success;
u_char single_connection = 0;
if (s->auth_proto != NULL || s->auth_data != NULL) {
error("session_x11_req: session %d: "
"x11 forwarding already active", s->self);
return 0;
}
if ((r = sshpkt_get_u8(ssh, &single_connection)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_get_cstring(ssh, &s->auth_proto, NULL)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_get_cstring(ssh, &s->auth_data, NULL)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &s->screen)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0)
sshpkt_fatal(ssh, r, "%s: parse packet", __func__);
s->single_connection = single_connection;
if (xauth_valid_string(s->auth_proto) &&
xauth_valid_string(s->auth_data))
success = session_setup_x11fwd(ssh, s);
else {
success = 0;
error("Invalid X11 forwarding data");
}
if (!success) {
free(s->auth_proto);
free(s->auth_data);
s->auth_proto = NULL;
s->auth_data = NULL;
}
return success;
}
static int
session_shell_req(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s)
{
int r;
if ((r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0)
sshpkt_fatal(ssh, r, "%s: parse packet", __func__);
return do_exec(ssh, s, NULL) == 0;
}
static int
session_exec_req(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s)
{
u_int success;
int r;
char *command = NULL;
if ((r = sshpkt_get_cstring(ssh, &command, NULL)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0)
sshpkt_fatal(ssh, r, "%s: parse packet", __func__);
success = do_exec(ssh, s, command) == 0;
free(command);
return success;
}
static int
session_break_req(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s)
{
int r;
if ((r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, NULL)) != 0 || /* ignore */
(r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0)
sshpkt_fatal(ssh, r, "%s: parse packet", __func__);
if (s->ptymaster == -1 || tcsendbreak(s->ptymaster, 0) == -1)
return 0;
return 1;
}
static int
session_env_req(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s)
{
char *name, *val;
u_int i;
int r;
if ((r = sshpkt_get_cstring(ssh, &name, NULL)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_get_cstring(ssh, &val, NULL)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0)
sshpkt_fatal(ssh, r, "%s: parse packet", __func__);
/* Don't set too many environment variables */
if (s->num_env > 128) {
debug2("Ignoring env request %s: too many env vars", name);
goto fail;
}
for (i = 0; i < options.num_accept_env; i++) {
if (match_pattern(name, options.accept_env[i])) {
debug2("Setting env %d: %s=%s", s->num_env, name, val);
s->env = xrecallocarray(s->env, s->num_env,
s->num_env + 1, sizeof(*s->env));
s->env[s->num_env].name = name;
s->env[s->num_env].val = val;
s->num_env++;
return (1);
}
}
debug2("Ignoring env request %s: disallowed name", name);
fail:
free(name);
free(val);
return (0);
}
/*
* Conversion of signals from ssh channel request names.
* Subset of signals from RFC 4254 section 6.10C, with SIGINFO as
* local extension.
*/
static int
name2sig(char *name)
{
#define SSH_SIG(x) if (strcmp(name, #x) == 0) return SIG ## x
SSH_SIG(HUP);
SSH_SIG(INT);
SSH_SIG(KILL);
SSH_SIG(QUIT);
SSH_SIG(TERM);
SSH_SIG(USR1);
SSH_SIG(USR2);
#undef SSH_SIG
#ifdef SIGINFO
if (strcmp(name, "INFO@openssh.com") == 0)
return SIGINFO;
#endif
return -1;
}
static int
session_signal_req(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s)
{
char *signame = NULL;
int r, sig, success = 0;
if ((r = sshpkt_get_cstring(ssh, &signame, NULL)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0) {
error("%s: parse packet: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
goto out;
}
if ((sig = name2sig(signame)) == -1) {
error("%s: unsupported signal \"%s\"", __func__, signame);
goto out;
}
if (s->pid <= 0) {
error("%s: no pid for session %d", __func__, s->self);
goto out;
}
if (s->forced || s->is_subsystem) {
error("%s: refusing to send signal %s to %s session", __func__,
signame, s->forced ? "forced-command" : "subsystem");
goto out;
}
if (!use_privsep || mm_is_monitor()) {
error("%s: session signalling requires privilege separation",
__func__);
goto out;
}
debug("%s: signal %s, killpg(%ld, %d)", __func__, signame,
(long)s->pid, sig);
temporarily_use_uid(s->pw);
r = killpg(s->pid, sig);
restore_uid();
if (r != 0) {
error("%s: killpg(%ld, %d): %s", __func__, (long)s->pid,
sig, strerror(errno));
goto out;
}
/* success */
success = 1;
out:
free(signame);
return success;
}
static int
session_auth_agent_req(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s)
{
static int called = 0;
int r;
if ((r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0)
sshpkt_fatal(ssh, r, "%s: parse packet", __func__);
if (!auth_opts->permit_agent_forwarding_flag ||
!options.allow_agent_forwarding) {
debug("%s: agent forwarding disabled", __func__);
return 0;
}
if (called) {
return 0;
} else {
called = 1;
return auth_input_request_forwarding(ssh, s->pw);
}
}
int
session_input_channel_req(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c, const char *rtype)
{
int success = 0;
Session *s;
if ((s = session_by_channel(c->self)) == NULL) {
logit("%s: no session %d req %.100s", __func__, c->self, rtype);
return 0;
}
debug("%s: session %d req %s", __func__, s->self, rtype);
/*
* a session is in LARVAL state until a shell, a command
* or a subsystem is executed
*/
if (c->type == SSH_CHANNEL_LARVAL) {
if (strcmp(rtype, "shell") == 0) {
success = session_shell_req(ssh, s);
} else if (strcmp(rtype, "exec") == 0) {
success = session_exec_req(ssh, s);
} else if (strcmp(rtype, "pty-req") == 0) {
success = session_pty_req(ssh, s);
} else if (strcmp(rtype, "x11-req") == 0) {
success = session_x11_req(ssh, s);
} else if (strcmp(rtype, "auth-agent-req@openssh.com") == 0) {
success = session_auth_agent_req(ssh, s);
} else if (strcmp(rtype, "subsystem") == 0) {
success = session_subsystem_req(ssh, s);
} else if (strcmp(rtype, "env") == 0) {
success = session_env_req(ssh, s);
}
}
if (strcmp(rtype, "window-change") == 0) {
success = session_window_change_req(ssh, s);
} else if (strcmp(rtype, "break") == 0) {
success = session_break_req(ssh, s);
} else if (strcmp(rtype, "signal") == 0) {
success = session_signal_req(ssh, s);
}
return success;
}
void
session_set_fds(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s,
int fdin, int fdout, int fderr, int ignore_fderr, int is_tty)
{
/*
* now that have a child and a pipe to the child,
* we can activate our channel and register the fd's
*/
if (s->chanid == -1)
fatal("no channel for session %d", s->self);
channel_set_fds(ssh, s->chanid,
fdout, fdin, fderr,
ignore_fderr ? CHAN_EXTENDED_IGNORE : CHAN_EXTENDED_READ,
1, is_tty, CHAN_SES_WINDOW_DEFAULT);
}
/*
* Function to perform pty cleanup. Also called if we get aborted abnormally
* (e.g., due to a dropped connection).
*/
void
session_pty_cleanup2(Session *s)
{
if (s == NULL) {
error("%s: no session", __func__);
return;
}
if (s->ttyfd == -1)
return;
debug("%s: session %d release %s", __func__, s->self, s->tty);
/* Record that the user has logged out. */
if (s->pid != 0)
record_logout(s->pid, s->tty, s->pw->pw_name);
/* Release the pseudo-tty. */
if (getuid() == 0)
pty_release(s->tty);
/*
* Close the server side of the socket pairs. We must do this after
* the pty cleanup, so that another process doesn't get this pty
* while we're still cleaning up.
*/
if (s->ptymaster != -1 && close(s->ptymaster) == -1)
error("close(s->ptymaster/%d): %s",
s->ptymaster, strerror(errno));
/* unlink pty from session */
s->ttyfd = -1;
}
void
session_pty_cleanup(Session *s)
{
PRIVSEP(session_pty_cleanup2(s));
}
static char *
sig2name(int sig)
{
#define SSH_SIG(x) if (sig == SIG ## x) return #x
SSH_SIG(ABRT);
SSH_SIG(ALRM);
SSH_SIG(FPE);
SSH_SIG(HUP);
SSH_SIG(ILL);
SSH_SIG(INT);
SSH_SIG(KILL);
SSH_SIG(PIPE);
SSH_SIG(QUIT);
SSH_SIG(SEGV);
SSH_SIG(TERM);
SSH_SIG(USR1);
SSH_SIG(USR2);
#undef SSH_SIG
return "SIG@openssh.com";
}
static void
session_close_x11(struct ssh *ssh, int id)
{
Channel *c;
if ((c = channel_by_id(ssh, id)) == NULL) {
debug("%s: x11 channel %d missing", __func__, id);
} else {
/* Detach X11 listener */
debug("%s: detach x11 channel %d", __func__, id);
channel_cancel_cleanup(ssh, id);
if (c->ostate != CHAN_OUTPUT_CLOSED)
chan_mark_dead(ssh, c);
}
}
static void
session_close_single_x11(struct ssh *ssh, int id, void *arg)
{
Session *s;
u_int i;
debug3("%s: channel %d", __func__, id);
channel_cancel_cleanup(ssh, id);
if ((s = session_by_x11_channel(id)) == NULL)
fatal("%s: no x11 channel %d", __func__, id);
for (i = 0; s->x11_chanids[i] != -1; i++) {
debug("%s: session %d: closing channel %d",
__func__, s->self, s->x11_chanids[i]);
/*
* The channel "id" is already closing, but make sure we
* close all of its siblings.
*/
if (s->x11_chanids[i] != id)
session_close_x11(ssh, s->x11_chanids[i]);
}
free(s->x11_chanids);
s->x11_chanids = NULL;
free(s->display);
s->display = NULL;
free(s->auth_proto);
s->auth_proto = NULL;
free(s->auth_data);
s->auth_data = NULL;
free(s->auth_display);
s->auth_display = NULL;
}
static void
session_exit_message(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s, int status)
{
Channel *c;
int r;
if ((c = channel_lookup(ssh, s->chanid)) == NULL)
fatal("%s: session %d: no channel %d",
__func__, s->self, s->chanid);
debug("%s: session %d channel %d pid %ld",
__func__, s->self, s->chanid, (long)s->pid);
if (WIFEXITED(status)) {
channel_request_start(ssh, s->chanid, "exit-status", 0);
if ((r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, WEXITSTATUS(status))) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0)
sshpkt_fatal(ssh, r, "%s: exit reply", __func__);
} else if (WIFSIGNALED(status)) {
channel_request_start(ssh, s->chanid, "exit-signal", 0);
#ifndef WCOREDUMP
# define WCOREDUMP(x) (0)
#endif
if ((r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, sig2name(WTERMSIG(status)))) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_u8(ssh, WCOREDUMP(status)? 1 : 0)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, "")) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, "")) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0)
sshpkt_fatal(ssh, r, "%s: exit reply", __func__);
} else {
/* Some weird exit cause. Just exit. */
ssh_packet_disconnect(ssh, "wait returned status %04x.", status);
}
/* disconnect channel */
debug("%s: release channel %d", __func__, s->chanid);
/*
* Adjust cleanup callback attachment to send close messages when
* the channel gets EOF. The session will be then be closed
* by session_close_by_channel when the child sessions close their fds.
*/
channel_register_cleanup(ssh, c->self, session_close_by_channel, 1);
/*
* emulate a write failure with 'chan_write_failed', nobody will be
* interested in data we write.
* Note that we must not call 'chan_read_failed', since there could
* be some more data waiting in the pipe.
*/
if (c->ostate != CHAN_OUTPUT_CLOSED)
chan_write_failed(ssh, c);
}
void
session_close(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s)
{
u_int i;
verbose("Close session: user %s from %.200s port %d id %d",
s->pw->pw_name,
ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh),
ssh_remote_port(ssh),
s->self);
if (s->ttyfd != -1)
session_pty_cleanup(s);
free(s->term);
free(s->display);
free(s->x11_chanids);
free(s->auth_display);
free(s->auth_data);
free(s->auth_proto);
free(s->subsys);
if (s->env != NULL) {
for (i = 0; i < s->num_env; i++) {
free(s->env[i].name);
free(s->env[i].val);
}
free(s->env);
}
session_proctitle(s);
session_unused(s->self);
}
void
session_close_by_pid(struct ssh *ssh, pid_t pid, int status)
{
Session *s = session_by_pid(pid);
if (s == NULL) {
debug("%s: no session for pid %ld", __func__, (long)pid);
return;
}
if (s->chanid != -1)
session_exit_message(ssh, s, status);
if (s->ttyfd != -1)
session_pty_cleanup(s);
s->pid = 0;
}
/*
* this is called when a channel dies before
* the session 'child' itself dies
*/
void
session_close_by_channel(struct ssh *ssh, int id, void *arg)
{
Session *s = session_by_channel(id);
u_int i;
if (s == NULL) {
debug("%s: no session for id %d", __func__, id);
return;
}
debug("%s: channel %d child %ld", __func__, id, (long)s->pid);
if (s->pid != 0) {
debug("%s: channel %d: has child, ttyfd %d",
__func__, id, s->ttyfd);
/*
* delay detach of session, but release pty, since
* the fd's to the child are already closed
*/
if (s->ttyfd != -1)
session_pty_cleanup(s);
return;
}
/* detach by removing callback */
channel_cancel_cleanup(ssh, s->chanid);
/* Close any X11 listeners associated with this session */
if (s->x11_chanids != NULL) {
for (i = 0; s->x11_chanids[i] != -1; i++) {
session_close_x11(ssh, s->x11_chanids[i]);
s->x11_chanids[i] = -1;
}
}
s->chanid = -1;
session_close(ssh, s);
}
void
session_destroy_all(struct ssh *ssh, void (*closefunc)(Session *))
{
int i;
for (i = 0; i < sessions_nalloc; i++) {
Session *s = &sessions[i];
if (s->used) {
if (closefunc != NULL)
closefunc(s);
else
session_close(ssh, s);
}
}
}
static char *
session_tty_list(void)
{
static char buf[1024];
int i;
char *cp;
buf[0] = '\0';
for (i = 0; i < sessions_nalloc; i++) {
Session *s = &sessions[i];
if (s->used && s->ttyfd != -1) {
if (strncmp(s->tty, "/dev/", 5) != 0) {
cp = strrchr(s->tty, '/');
cp = (cp == NULL) ? s->tty : cp + 1;
} else
cp = s->tty + 5;
if (buf[0] != '\0')
strlcat(buf, ",", sizeof buf);
strlcat(buf, cp, sizeof buf);
}
}
if (buf[0] == '\0')
strlcpy(buf, "notty", sizeof buf);
return buf;
}
void
session_proctitle(Session *s)
{
if (s->pw == NULL)
error("no user for session %d", s->self);
else
setproctitle("%s@%s", s->pw->pw_name, session_tty_list());
}
int
session_setup_x11fwd(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s)
{
struct stat st;
char display[512], auth_display[512];
char hostname[NI_MAXHOST];
u_int i;
if (!auth_opts->permit_x11_forwarding_flag) {
ssh_packet_send_debug(ssh, "X11 forwarding disabled by key options.");
return 0;
}
if (!options.x11_forwarding) {
debug("X11 forwarding disabled in server configuration file.");
return 0;
}
if (options.xauth_location == NULL ||
(stat(options.xauth_location, &st) == -1)) {
ssh_packet_send_debug(ssh, "No xauth program; cannot forward X11.");
return 0;
}
if (s->display != NULL) {
debug("X11 display already set.");
return 0;
}
if (x11_create_display_inet(ssh, options.x11_display_offset,
options.x11_use_localhost, s->single_connection,
&s->display_number, &s->x11_chanids) == -1) {
debug("x11_create_display_inet failed.");
return 0;
}
for (i = 0; s->x11_chanids[i] != -1; i++) {
channel_register_cleanup(ssh, s->x11_chanids[i],
session_close_single_x11, 0);
}
/* Set up a suitable value for the DISPLAY variable. */
if (gethostname(hostname, sizeof(hostname)) == -1)
fatal("gethostname: %.100s", strerror(errno));
/*
* auth_display must be used as the displayname when the
* authorization entry is added with xauth(1). This will be
* different than the DISPLAY string for localhost displays.
*/
if (options.x11_use_localhost) {
snprintf(display, sizeof display, "localhost:%u.%u",
s->display_number, s->screen);
snprintf(auth_display, sizeof auth_display, "unix:%u.%u",
s->display_number, s->screen);
s->display = xstrdup(display);
s->auth_display = xstrdup(auth_display);
} else {
#ifdef IPADDR_IN_DISPLAY
struct hostent *he;
struct in_addr my_addr;
he = gethostbyname(hostname);
if (he == NULL) {
error("Can't get IP address for X11 DISPLAY.");
ssh_packet_send_debug(ssh, "Can't get IP address for X11 DISPLAY.");
return 0;
}
memcpy(&my_addr, he->h_addr_list[0], sizeof(struct in_addr));
snprintf(display, sizeof display, "%.50s:%u.%u", inet_ntoa(my_addr),
s->display_number, s->screen);
#else
snprintf(display, sizeof display, "%.400s:%u.%u", hostname,
s->display_number, s->screen);
#endif
s->display = xstrdup(display);
s->auth_display = xstrdup(display);
}
return 1;
}
static void
do_authenticated2(struct ssh *ssh, Authctxt *authctxt)
{
server_loop2(ssh, authctxt);
}
void
do_cleanup(struct ssh *ssh, Authctxt *authctxt)
{
static int called = 0;
debug("do_cleanup");
/* no cleanup if we're in the child for login shell */
if (is_child)
return;
/* avoid double cleanup */
if (called)
return;
called = 1;
if (authctxt == NULL)
return;
#ifdef USE_PAM
if (options.use_pam) {
sshpam_cleanup();
sshpam_thread_cleanup();
}
#endif
if (!authctxt->authenticated)
return;
#ifdef KRB5
if (options.kerberos_ticket_cleanup &&
authctxt->krb5_ctx)
krb5_cleanup_proc(authctxt);
#endif
#ifdef GSSAPI
if (options.gss_cleanup_creds)
ssh_gssapi_cleanup_creds();
#endif
/* remove agent socket */
auth_sock_cleanup_proc(authctxt->pw);
/* remove userauth info */
if (auth_info_file != NULL) {
temporarily_use_uid(authctxt->pw);
unlink(auth_info_file);
restore_uid();
free(auth_info_file);
auth_info_file = NULL;
}
/*
* Cleanup ptys/utmp only if privsep is disabled,
* or if running in monitor.
*/
if (!use_privsep || mm_is_monitor())
session_destroy_all(ssh, session_pty_cleanup2);
}
/* Return a name for the remote host that fits inside utmp_size */
const char *
session_get_remote_name_or_ip(struct ssh *ssh, u_int utmp_size, int use_dns)
{
const char *remote = "";
if (utmp_size > 0)
remote = auth_get_canonical_hostname(ssh, use_dns);
if (utmp_size == 0 || strlen(remote) > utmp_size)
remote = ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh);
return remote;
}
diff --git a/sftp-client.c b/sftp-client.c
index 72f7fff7aa22..b8e131be67dc 100644
--- a/sftp-client.c
+++ b/sftp-client.c
@@ -1,1958 +1,1958 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: sftp-client.c,v 1.135 2019/10/04 04:31:59 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: sftp-client.c,v 1.136 2020/05/15 03:57:33 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 2001-2004 Damien Miller <djm@openbsd.org>
*
* Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
* purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
* copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
*
* THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
* WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
* MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
* ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
* WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
* ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
* OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
*/
/* XXX: memleaks */
/* XXX: signed vs unsigned */
/* XXX: remove all logging, only return status codes */
/* XXX: copy between two remote sites */
#include "includes.h"
#include <sys/types.h>
#ifdef HAVE_SYS_STATVFS_H
#include <sys/statvfs.h>
#endif
#include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h"
#ifdef HAVE_SYS_STAT_H
# include <sys/stat.h>
#endif
#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TIME_H
# include <sys/time.h>
#endif
#include <sys/uio.h>
#include <dirent.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <signal.h>
#include <stdarg.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include "xmalloc.h"
#include "ssherr.h"
#include "sshbuf.h"
#include "log.h"
#include "atomicio.h"
#include "progressmeter.h"
#include "misc.h"
#include "utf8.h"
#include "sftp.h"
#include "sftp-common.h"
#include "sftp-client.h"
extern volatile sig_atomic_t interrupted;
extern int showprogress;
/* Minimum amount of data to read at a time */
#define MIN_READ_SIZE 512
/* Maximum depth to descend in directory trees */
#define MAX_DIR_DEPTH 64
/* Directory separator characters */
#ifdef HAVE_CYGWIN
# define SFTP_DIRECTORY_CHARS "/\\"
#else /* HAVE_CYGWIN */
# define SFTP_DIRECTORY_CHARS "/"
#endif /* HAVE_CYGWIN */
struct sftp_conn {
int fd_in;
int fd_out;
u_int transfer_buflen;
u_int num_requests;
u_int version;
u_int msg_id;
#define SFTP_EXT_POSIX_RENAME 0x00000001
#define SFTP_EXT_STATVFS 0x00000002
#define SFTP_EXT_FSTATVFS 0x00000004
#define SFTP_EXT_HARDLINK 0x00000008
#define SFTP_EXT_FSYNC 0x00000010
#define SFTP_EXT_LSETSTAT 0x00000020
u_int exts;
u_int64_t limit_kbps;
struct bwlimit bwlimit_in, bwlimit_out;
};
static u_char *
get_handle(struct sftp_conn *conn, u_int expected_id, size_t *len,
const char *errfmt, ...) __attribute__((format(printf, 4, 5)));
/* ARGSUSED */
static int
sftpio(void *_bwlimit, size_t amount)
{
struct bwlimit *bwlimit = (struct bwlimit *)_bwlimit;
refresh_progress_meter(0);
if (bwlimit != NULL)
bandwidth_limit(bwlimit, amount);
return 0;
}
static void
send_msg(struct sftp_conn *conn, struct sshbuf *m)
{
u_char mlen[4];
struct iovec iov[2];
if (sshbuf_len(m) > SFTP_MAX_MSG_LENGTH)
fatal("Outbound message too long %zu", sshbuf_len(m));
/* Send length first */
put_u32(mlen, sshbuf_len(m));
iov[0].iov_base = mlen;
iov[0].iov_len = sizeof(mlen);
iov[1].iov_base = (u_char *)sshbuf_ptr(m);
iov[1].iov_len = sshbuf_len(m);
if (atomiciov6(writev, conn->fd_out, iov, 2, sftpio,
conn->limit_kbps > 0 ? &conn->bwlimit_out : NULL) !=
sshbuf_len(m) + sizeof(mlen))
fatal("Couldn't send packet: %s", strerror(errno));
sshbuf_reset(m);
}
static void
get_msg_extended(struct sftp_conn *conn, struct sshbuf *m, int initial)
{
u_int msg_len;
u_char *p;
int r;
if ((r = sshbuf_reserve(m, 4, &p)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
if (atomicio6(read, conn->fd_in, p, 4, sftpio,
conn->limit_kbps > 0 ? &conn->bwlimit_in : NULL) != 4) {
if (errno == EPIPE || errno == ECONNRESET)
fatal("Connection closed");
else
fatal("Couldn't read packet: %s", strerror(errno));
}
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &msg_len)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
if (msg_len > SFTP_MAX_MSG_LENGTH) {
do_log2(initial ? SYSLOG_LEVEL_ERROR : SYSLOG_LEVEL_FATAL,
"Received message too long %u", msg_len);
fatal("Ensure the remote shell produces no output "
"for non-interactive sessions.");
}
if ((r = sshbuf_reserve(m, msg_len, &p)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
if (atomicio6(read, conn->fd_in, p, msg_len, sftpio,
conn->limit_kbps > 0 ? &conn->bwlimit_in : NULL)
!= msg_len) {
if (errno == EPIPE)
fatal("Connection closed");
else
fatal("Read packet: %s", strerror(errno));
}
}
static void
get_msg(struct sftp_conn *conn, struct sshbuf *m)
{
get_msg_extended(conn, m, 0);
}
static void
send_string_request(struct sftp_conn *conn, u_int id, u_int code, const char *s,
u_int len)
{
struct sshbuf *msg;
int r;
if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, code)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u32(msg, id)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_string(msg, s, len)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
send_msg(conn, msg);
debug3("Sent message fd %d T:%u I:%u", conn->fd_out, code, id);
sshbuf_free(msg);
}
static void
send_string_attrs_request(struct sftp_conn *conn, u_int id, u_int code,
const void *s, u_int len, Attrib *a)
{
struct sshbuf *msg;
int r;
if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, code)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u32(msg, id)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_string(msg, s, len)) != 0 ||
(r = encode_attrib(msg, a)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
send_msg(conn, msg);
debug3("Sent message fd %d T:%u I:%u", conn->fd_out, code, id);
sshbuf_free(msg);
}
static u_int
get_status(struct sftp_conn *conn, u_int expected_id)
{
struct sshbuf *msg;
u_char type;
u_int id, status;
int r;
if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
get_msg(conn, msg);
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(msg, &type)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_u32(msg, &id)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
if (id != expected_id)
fatal("ID mismatch (%u != %u)", id, expected_id);
if (type != SSH2_FXP_STATUS)
fatal("Expected SSH2_FXP_STATUS(%u) packet, got %u",
SSH2_FXP_STATUS, type);
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(msg, &status)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
sshbuf_free(msg);
debug3("SSH2_FXP_STATUS %u", status);
return status;
}
static u_char *
get_handle(struct sftp_conn *conn, u_int expected_id, size_t *len,
const char *errfmt, ...)
{
struct sshbuf *msg;
u_int id, status;
u_char type;
u_char *handle;
char errmsg[256];
va_list args;
int r;
va_start(args, errfmt);
if (errfmt != NULL)
vsnprintf(errmsg, sizeof(errmsg), errfmt, args);
va_end(args);
if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
get_msg(conn, msg);
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(msg, &type)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_u32(msg, &id)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
if (id != expected_id)
fatal("%s: ID mismatch (%u != %u)",
errfmt == NULL ? __func__ : errmsg, id, expected_id);
if (type == SSH2_FXP_STATUS) {
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(msg, &status)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
if (errfmt != NULL)
error("%s: %s", errmsg, fx2txt(status));
sshbuf_free(msg);
return(NULL);
} else if (type != SSH2_FXP_HANDLE)
fatal("%s: Expected SSH2_FXP_HANDLE(%u) packet, got %u",
errfmt == NULL ? __func__ : errmsg, SSH2_FXP_HANDLE, type);
if ((r = sshbuf_get_string(msg, &handle, len)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
sshbuf_free(msg);
return handle;
}
static Attrib *
get_decode_stat(struct sftp_conn *conn, u_int expected_id, int quiet)
{
struct sshbuf *msg;
u_int id;
u_char type;
int r;
static Attrib a;
if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
get_msg(conn, msg);
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(msg, &type)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_u32(msg, &id)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
debug3("Received stat reply T:%u I:%u", type, id);
if (id != expected_id)
fatal("ID mismatch (%u != %u)", id, expected_id);
if (type == SSH2_FXP_STATUS) {
u_int status;
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(msg, &status)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
if (quiet)
debug("Couldn't stat remote file: %s", fx2txt(status));
else
error("Couldn't stat remote file: %s", fx2txt(status));
sshbuf_free(msg);
return(NULL);
} else if (type != SSH2_FXP_ATTRS) {
fatal("Expected SSH2_FXP_ATTRS(%u) packet, got %u",
SSH2_FXP_ATTRS, type);
}
if ((r = decode_attrib(msg, &a)) != 0) {
error("%s: couldn't decode attrib: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
sshbuf_free(msg);
return NULL;
}
sshbuf_free(msg);
return &a;
}
static int
get_decode_statvfs(struct sftp_conn *conn, struct sftp_statvfs *st,
u_int expected_id, int quiet)
{
struct sshbuf *msg;
u_char type;
u_int id;
u_int64_t flag;
int r;
if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
get_msg(conn, msg);
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(msg, &type)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_u32(msg, &id)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
debug3("Received statvfs reply T:%u I:%u", type, id);
if (id != expected_id)
fatal("ID mismatch (%u != %u)", id, expected_id);
if (type == SSH2_FXP_STATUS) {
u_int status;
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(msg, &status)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
if (quiet)
debug("Couldn't statvfs: %s", fx2txt(status));
else
error("Couldn't statvfs: %s", fx2txt(status));
sshbuf_free(msg);
return -1;
} else if (type != SSH2_FXP_EXTENDED_REPLY) {
fatal("Expected SSH2_FXP_EXTENDED_REPLY(%u) packet, got %u",
SSH2_FXP_EXTENDED_REPLY, type);
}
memset(st, 0, sizeof(*st));
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u64(msg, &st->f_bsize)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_u64(msg, &st->f_frsize)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_u64(msg, &st->f_blocks)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_u64(msg, &st->f_bfree)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_u64(msg, &st->f_bavail)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_u64(msg, &st->f_files)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_u64(msg, &st->f_ffree)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_u64(msg, &st->f_favail)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_u64(msg, &st->f_fsid)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_u64(msg, &flag)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_u64(msg, &st->f_namemax)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
st->f_flag = (flag & SSH2_FXE_STATVFS_ST_RDONLY) ? ST_RDONLY : 0;
st->f_flag |= (flag & SSH2_FXE_STATVFS_ST_NOSUID) ? ST_NOSUID : 0;
sshbuf_free(msg);
return 0;
}
struct sftp_conn *
do_init(int fd_in, int fd_out, u_int transfer_buflen, u_int num_requests,
u_int64_t limit_kbps)
{
u_char type;
struct sshbuf *msg;
struct sftp_conn *ret;
int r;
ret = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*ret));
ret->msg_id = 1;
ret->fd_in = fd_in;
ret->fd_out = fd_out;
ret->transfer_buflen = transfer_buflen;
ret->num_requests = num_requests;
ret->exts = 0;
ret->limit_kbps = 0;
if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, SSH2_FXP_INIT)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u32(msg, SSH2_FILEXFER_VERSION)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
send_msg(ret, msg);
sshbuf_reset(msg);
get_msg_extended(ret, msg, 1);
/* Expecting a VERSION reply */
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(msg, &type)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
if (type != SSH2_FXP_VERSION) {
error("Invalid packet back from SSH2_FXP_INIT (type %u)",
type);
sshbuf_free(msg);
free(ret);
return(NULL);
}
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(msg, &ret->version)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
debug2("Remote version: %u", ret->version);
/* Check for extensions */
while (sshbuf_len(msg) > 0) {
char *name;
u_char *value;
size_t vlen;
int known = 0;
if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(msg, &name, NULL)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_string(msg, &value, &vlen)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
if (strcmp(name, "posix-rename@openssh.com") == 0 &&
strcmp((char *)value, "1") == 0) {
ret->exts |= SFTP_EXT_POSIX_RENAME;
known = 1;
} else if (strcmp(name, "statvfs@openssh.com") == 0 &&
strcmp((char *)value, "2") == 0) {
ret->exts |= SFTP_EXT_STATVFS;
known = 1;
} else if (strcmp(name, "fstatvfs@openssh.com") == 0 &&
strcmp((char *)value, "2") == 0) {
ret->exts |= SFTP_EXT_FSTATVFS;
known = 1;
} else if (strcmp(name, "hardlink@openssh.com") == 0 &&
strcmp((char *)value, "1") == 0) {
ret->exts |= SFTP_EXT_HARDLINK;
known = 1;
} else if (strcmp(name, "fsync@openssh.com") == 0 &&
strcmp((char *)value, "1") == 0) {
ret->exts |= SFTP_EXT_FSYNC;
known = 1;
} else if (strcmp(name, "lsetstat@openssh.com") == 0 &&
strcmp((char *)value, "1") == 0) {
ret->exts |= SFTP_EXT_LSETSTAT;
known = 1;
}
if (known) {
debug2("Server supports extension \"%s\" revision %s",
name, value);
} else {
debug2("Unrecognised server extension \"%s\"", name);
}
free(name);
free(value);
}
sshbuf_free(msg);
/* Some filexfer v.0 servers don't support large packets */
if (ret->version == 0)
ret->transfer_buflen = MINIMUM(ret->transfer_buflen, 20480);
ret->limit_kbps = limit_kbps;
if (ret->limit_kbps > 0) {
bandwidth_limit_init(&ret->bwlimit_in, ret->limit_kbps,
ret->transfer_buflen);
bandwidth_limit_init(&ret->bwlimit_out, ret->limit_kbps,
ret->transfer_buflen);
}
return ret;
}
u_int
sftp_proto_version(struct sftp_conn *conn)
{
return conn->version;
}
int
do_close(struct sftp_conn *conn, const u_char *handle, u_int handle_len)
{
u_int id, status;
struct sshbuf *msg;
int r;
if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
id = conn->msg_id++;
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, SSH2_FXP_CLOSE)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u32(msg, id)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_string(msg, handle, handle_len)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
send_msg(conn, msg);
debug3("Sent message SSH2_FXP_CLOSE I:%u", id);
status = get_status(conn, id);
if (status != SSH2_FX_OK)
error("Couldn't close file: %s", fx2txt(status));
sshbuf_free(msg);
return status == SSH2_FX_OK ? 0 : -1;
}
static int
do_lsreaddir(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *path, int print_flag,
SFTP_DIRENT ***dir)
{
struct sshbuf *msg;
u_int count, id, i, expected_id, ents = 0;
size_t handle_len;
u_char type, *handle;
int status = SSH2_FX_FAILURE;
int r;
if (dir)
*dir = NULL;
id = conn->msg_id++;
if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, SSH2_FXP_OPENDIR)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u32(msg, id)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_cstring(msg, path)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
send_msg(conn, msg);
handle = get_handle(conn, id, &handle_len,
"remote readdir(\"%s\")", path);
if (handle == NULL) {
sshbuf_free(msg);
return -1;
}
if (dir) {
ents = 0;
*dir = xcalloc(1, sizeof(**dir));
(*dir)[0] = NULL;
}
for (; !interrupted;) {
id = expected_id = conn->msg_id++;
debug3("Sending SSH2_FXP_READDIR I:%u", id);
sshbuf_reset(msg);
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, SSH2_FXP_READDIR)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u32(msg, id)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_string(msg, handle, handle_len)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
send_msg(conn, msg);
sshbuf_reset(msg);
get_msg(conn, msg);
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(msg, &type)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_u32(msg, &id)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
debug3("Received reply T:%u I:%u", type, id);
if (id != expected_id)
fatal("ID mismatch (%u != %u)", id, expected_id);
if (type == SSH2_FXP_STATUS) {
u_int rstatus;
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(msg, &rstatus)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s",
__func__, ssh_err(r));
debug3("Received SSH2_FXP_STATUS %d", rstatus);
if (rstatus == SSH2_FX_EOF)
break;
error("Couldn't read directory: %s", fx2txt(rstatus));
goto out;
} else if (type != SSH2_FXP_NAME)
fatal("Expected SSH2_FXP_NAME(%u) packet, got %u",
SSH2_FXP_NAME, type);
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(msg, &count)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
if (count > SSHBUF_SIZE_MAX)
fatal("%s: nonsensical number of entries", __func__);
if (count == 0)
break;
debug3("Received %d SSH2_FXP_NAME responses", count);
for (i = 0; i < count; i++) {
char *filename, *longname;
Attrib a;
if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(msg, &filename,
NULL)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_cstring(msg, &longname,
NULL)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s",
__func__, ssh_err(r));
if ((r = decode_attrib(msg, &a)) != 0) {
error("%s: couldn't decode attrib: %s",
__func__, ssh_err(r));
free(filename);
free(longname);
goto out;
}
if (print_flag)
mprintf("%s\n", longname);
/*
* Directory entries should never contain '/'
* These can be used to attack recursive ops
* (e.g. send '../../../../etc/passwd')
*/
if (strpbrk(filename, SFTP_DIRECTORY_CHARS) != NULL) {
error("Server sent suspect path \"%s\" "
"during readdir of \"%s\"", filename, path);
} else if (dir) {
*dir = xreallocarray(*dir, ents + 2, sizeof(**dir));
(*dir)[ents] = xcalloc(1, sizeof(***dir));
(*dir)[ents]->filename = xstrdup(filename);
(*dir)[ents]->longname = xstrdup(longname);
memcpy(&(*dir)[ents]->a, &a, sizeof(a));
(*dir)[++ents] = NULL;
}
free(filename);
free(longname);
}
}
status = 0;
out:
sshbuf_free(msg);
do_close(conn, handle, handle_len);
free(handle);
if (status != 0 && dir != NULL) {
/* Don't return results on error */
free_sftp_dirents(*dir);
*dir = NULL;
} else if (interrupted && dir != NULL && *dir != NULL) {
/* Don't return partial matches on interrupt */
free_sftp_dirents(*dir);
*dir = xcalloc(1, sizeof(**dir));
**dir = NULL;
}
return status == SSH2_FX_OK ? 0 : -1;
}
int
do_readdir(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *path, SFTP_DIRENT ***dir)
{
return(do_lsreaddir(conn, path, 0, dir));
}
void free_sftp_dirents(SFTP_DIRENT **s)
{
int i;
if (s == NULL)
return;
for (i = 0; s[i]; i++) {
free(s[i]->filename);
free(s[i]->longname);
free(s[i]);
}
free(s);
}
int
do_rm(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *path)
{
u_int status, id;
debug2("Sending SSH2_FXP_REMOVE \"%s\"", path);
id = conn->msg_id++;
send_string_request(conn, id, SSH2_FXP_REMOVE, path, strlen(path));
status = get_status(conn, id);
if (status != SSH2_FX_OK)
error("Couldn't delete file: %s", fx2txt(status));
return status == SSH2_FX_OK ? 0 : -1;
}
int
do_mkdir(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *path, Attrib *a, int print_flag)
{
u_int status, id;
id = conn->msg_id++;
send_string_attrs_request(conn, id, SSH2_FXP_MKDIR, path,
strlen(path), a);
status = get_status(conn, id);
if (status != SSH2_FX_OK && print_flag)
error("Couldn't create directory: %s", fx2txt(status));
return status == SSH2_FX_OK ? 0 : -1;
}
int
do_rmdir(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *path)
{
u_int status, id;
id = conn->msg_id++;
send_string_request(conn, id, SSH2_FXP_RMDIR, path,
strlen(path));
status = get_status(conn, id);
if (status != SSH2_FX_OK)
error("Couldn't remove directory: %s", fx2txt(status));
return status == SSH2_FX_OK ? 0 : -1;
}
Attrib *
do_stat(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *path, int quiet)
{
u_int id;
id = conn->msg_id++;
send_string_request(conn, id,
conn->version == 0 ? SSH2_FXP_STAT_VERSION_0 : SSH2_FXP_STAT,
path, strlen(path));
return(get_decode_stat(conn, id, quiet));
}
Attrib *
do_lstat(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *path, int quiet)
{
u_int id;
if (conn->version == 0) {
if (quiet)
debug("Server version does not support lstat operation");
else
logit("Server version does not support lstat operation");
return(do_stat(conn, path, quiet));
}
id = conn->msg_id++;
send_string_request(conn, id, SSH2_FXP_LSTAT, path,
strlen(path));
return(get_decode_stat(conn, id, quiet));
}
#ifdef notyet
Attrib *
do_fstat(struct sftp_conn *conn, const u_char *handle, u_int handle_len,
int quiet)
{
u_int id;
id = conn->msg_id++;
send_string_request(conn, id, SSH2_FXP_FSTAT, handle,
handle_len);
return(get_decode_stat(conn, id, quiet));
}
#endif
int
do_setstat(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *path, Attrib *a)
{
u_int status, id;
id = conn->msg_id++;
send_string_attrs_request(conn, id, SSH2_FXP_SETSTAT, path,
strlen(path), a);
status = get_status(conn, id);
if (status != SSH2_FX_OK)
error("Couldn't setstat on \"%s\": %s", path,
fx2txt(status));
return status == SSH2_FX_OK ? 0 : -1;
}
int
do_fsetstat(struct sftp_conn *conn, const u_char *handle, u_int handle_len,
Attrib *a)
{
u_int status, id;
id = conn->msg_id++;
send_string_attrs_request(conn, id, SSH2_FXP_FSETSTAT, handle,
handle_len, a);
status = get_status(conn, id);
if (status != SSH2_FX_OK)
error("Couldn't fsetstat: %s", fx2txt(status));
return status == SSH2_FX_OK ? 0 : -1;
}
char *
do_realpath(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *path)
{
struct sshbuf *msg;
u_int expected_id, count, id;
char *filename, *longname;
Attrib a;
u_char type;
int r;
expected_id = id = conn->msg_id++;
send_string_request(conn, id, SSH2_FXP_REALPATH, path,
strlen(path));
if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
get_msg(conn, msg);
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(msg, &type)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_u32(msg, &id)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
if (id != expected_id)
fatal("ID mismatch (%u != %u)", id, expected_id);
if (type == SSH2_FXP_STATUS) {
u_int status;
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(msg, &status)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
error("Couldn't canonicalize: %s", fx2txt(status));
sshbuf_free(msg);
return NULL;
} else if (type != SSH2_FXP_NAME)
fatal("Expected SSH2_FXP_NAME(%u) packet, got %u",
SSH2_FXP_NAME, type);
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(msg, &count)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
if (count != 1)
fatal("Got multiple names (%d) from SSH_FXP_REALPATH", count);
if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(msg, &filename, NULL)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_cstring(msg, &longname, NULL)) != 0 ||
(r = decode_attrib(msg, &a)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
debug3("SSH_FXP_REALPATH %s -> %s size %lu", path, filename,
(unsigned long)a.size);
free(longname);
sshbuf_free(msg);
return(filename);
}
int
do_rename(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *oldpath, const char *newpath,
int force_legacy)
{
struct sshbuf *msg;
u_int status, id;
int r, use_ext = (conn->exts & SFTP_EXT_POSIX_RENAME) && !force_legacy;
if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
/* Send rename request */
id = conn->msg_id++;
if (use_ext) {
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, SSH2_FXP_EXTENDED)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u32(msg, id)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_cstring(msg,
"posix-rename@openssh.com")) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
} else {
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, SSH2_FXP_RENAME)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u32(msg, id)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
}
if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(msg, oldpath)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_cstring(msg, newpath)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
send_msg(conn, msg);
debug3("Sent message %s \"%s\" -> \"%s\"",
use_ext ? "posix-rename@openssh.com" :
"SSH2_FXP_RENAME", oldpath, newpath);
sshbuf_free(msg);
status = get_status(conn, id);
if (status != SSH2_FX_OK)
error("Couldn't rename file \"%s\" to \"%s\": %s", oldpath,
newpath, fx2txt(status));
return status == SSH2_FX_OK ? 0 : -1;
}
int
do_hardlink(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *oldpath, const char *newpath)
{
struct sshbuf *msg;
u_int status, id;
int r;
if ((conn->exts & SFTP_EXT_HARDLINK) == 0) {
error("Server does not support hardlink@openssh.com extension");
return -1;
}
if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
/* Send link request */
id = conn->msg_id++;
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, SSH2_FXP_EXTENDED)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u32(msg, id)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_cstring(msg, "hardlink@openssh.com")) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_cstring(msg, oldpath)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_cstring(msg, newpath)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
send_msg(conn, msg);
debug3("Sent message hardlink@openssh.com \"%s\" -> \"%s\"",
oldpath, newpath);
sshbuf_free(msg);
status = get_status(conn, id);
if (status != SSH2_FX_OK)
error("Couldn't link file \"%s\" to \"%s\": %s", oldpath,
newpath, fx2txt(status));
return status == SSH2_FX_OK ? 0 : -1;
}
int
do_symlink(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *oldpath, const char *newpath)
{
struct sshbuf *msg;
u_int status, id;
int r;
if (conn->version < 3) {
error("This server does not support the symlink operation");
return(SSH2_FX_OP_UNSUPPORTED);
}
if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
/* Send symlink request */
id = conn->msg_id++;
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, SSH2_FXP_SYMLINK)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u32(msg, id)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_cstring(msg, oldpath)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_cstring(msg, newpath)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
send_msg(conn, msg);
debug3("Sent message SSH2_FXP_SYMLINK \"%s\" -> \"%s\"", oldpath,
newpath);
sshbuf_free(msg);
status = get_status(conn, id);
if (status != SSH2_FX_OK)
error("Couldn't symlink file \"%s\" to \"%s\": %s", oldpath,
newpath, fx2txt(status));
return status == SSH2_FX_OK ? 0 : -1;
}
int
do_fsync(struct sftp_conn *conn, u_char *handle, u_int handle_len)
{
struct sshbuf *msg;
u_int status, id;
int r;
/* Silently return if the extension is not supported */
if ((conn->exts & SFTP_EXT_FSYNC) == 0)
return -1;
/* Send fsync request */
if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
id = conn->msg_id++;
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, SSH2_FXP_EXTENDED)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u32(msg, id)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_cstring(msg, "fsync@openssh.com")) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_string(msg, handle, handle_len)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
send_msg(conn, msg);
debug3("Sent message fsync@openssh.com I:%u", id);
sshbuf_free(msg);
status = get_status(conn, id);
if (status != SSH2_FX_OK)
error("Couldn't sync file: %s", fx2txt(status));
return status == SSH2_FX_OK ? 0 : -1;
}
#ifdef notyet
char *
do_readlink(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *path)
{
struct sshbuf *msg;
u_int expected_id, count, id;
char *filename, *longname;
Attrib a;
u_char type;
int r;
expected_id = id = conn->msg_id++;
send_string_request(conn, id, SSH2_FXP_READLINK, path, strlen(path));
if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
get_msg(conn, msg);
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(msg, &type)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_u32(msg, &id)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
if (id != expected_id)
fatal("ID mismatch (%u != %u)", id, expected_id);
if (type == SSH2_FXP_STATUS) {
u_int status;
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(msg, &status)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
error("Couldn't readlink: %s", fx2txt(status));
sshbuf_free(msg);
return(NULL);
} else if (type != SSH2_FXP_NAME)
fatal("Expected SSH2_FXP_NAME(%u) packet, got %u",
SSH2_FXP_NAME, type);
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(msg, &count)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
if (count != 1)
fatal("Got multiple names (%d) from SSH_FXP_READLINK", count);
if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(msg, &filename, NULL)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_cstring(msg, &longname, NULL)) != 0 ||
(r = decode_attrib(msg, &a)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
debug3("SSH_FXP_READLINK %s -> %s", path, filename);
free(longname);
sshbuf_free(msg);
return filename;
}
#endif
int
do_statvfs(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *path, struct sftp_statvfs *st,
int quiet)
{
struct sshbuf *msg;
u_int id;
int r;
if ((conn->exts & SFTP_EXT_STATVFS) == 0) {
error("Server does not support statvfs@openssh.com extension");
return -1;
}
id = conn->msg_id++;
if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, SSH2_FXP_EXTENDED)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u32(msg, id)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_cstring(msg, "statvfs@openssh.com")) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_cstring(msg, path)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
send_msg(conn, msg);
sshbuf_free(msg);
return get_decode_statvfs(conn, st, id, quiet);
}
#ifdef notyet
int
do_fstatvfs(struct sftp_conn *conn, const u_char *handle, u_int handle_len,
struct sftp_statvfs *st, int quiet)
{
struct sshbuf *msg;
u_int id;
if ((conn->exts & SFTP_EXT_FSTATVFS) == 0) {
error("Server does not support fstatvfs@openssh.com extension");
return -1;
}
id = conn->msg_id++;
if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, SSH2_FXP_EXTENDED)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u32(msg, id)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_cstring(msg, "fstatvfs@openssh.com")) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_string(msg, handle, handle_len)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
send_msg(conn, msg);
sshbuf_free(msg);
return get_decode_statvfs(conn, st, id, quiet);
}
#endif
int
do_lsetstat(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *path, Attrib *a)
{
struct sshbuf *msg;
u_int status, id;
int r;
if ((conn->exts & SFTP_EXT_LSETSTAT) == 0) {
error("Server does not support lsetstat@openssh.com extension");
return -1;
}
id = conn->msg_id++;
if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, SSH2_FXP_EXTENDED)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u32(msg, id)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_cstring(msg, "lsetstat@openssh.com")) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_cstring(msg, path)) != 0 ||
(r = encode_attrib(msg, a)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
send_msg(conn, msg);
sshbuf_free(msg);
status = get_status(conn, id);
if (status != SSH2_FX_OK)
error("Couldn't setstat on \"%s\": %s", path,
fx2txt(status));
return status == SSH2_FX_OK ? 0 : -1;
}
static void
send_read_request(struct sftp_conn *conn, u_int id, u_int64_t offset,
u_int len, const u_char *handle, u_int handle_len)
{
struct sshbuf *msg;
int r;
if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, SSH2_FXP_READ)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u32(msg, id)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_string(msg, handle, handle_len)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u64(msg, offset)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u32(msg, len)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
send_msg(conn, msg);
sshbuf_free(msg);
}
int
do_download(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *remote_path,
const char *local_path, Attrib *a, int preserve_flag, int resume_flag,
int fsync_flag)
{
Attrib junk;
struct sshbuf *msg;
u_char *handle;
int local_fd = -1, write_error;
int read_error, write_errno, lmodified = 0, reordered = 0, r;
u_int64_t offset = 0, size, highwater;
u_int mode, id, buflen, num_req, max_req, status = SSH2_FX_OK;
off_t progress_counter;
size_t handle_len;
struct stat st;
struct request {
u_int id;
size_t len;
u_int64_t offset;
TAILQ_ENTRY(request) tq;
};
TAILQ_HEAD(reqhead, request) requests;
struct request *req;
u_char type;
TAILQ_INIT(&requests);
if (a == NULL && (a = do_stat(conn, remote_path, 0)) == NULL)
return -1;
/* Do not preserve set[ug]id here, as we do not preserve ownership */
if (a->flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_PERMISSIONS)
mode = a->perm & 0777;
else
mode = 0666;
if ((a->flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_PERMISSIONS) &&
(!S_ISREG(a->perm))) {
error("Cannot download non-regular file: %s", remote_path);
return(-1);
}
if (a->flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_SIZE)
size = a->size;
else
size = 0;
buflen = conn->transfer_buflen;
if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
attrib_clear(&junk); /* Send empty attributes */
/* Send open request */
id = conn->msg_id++;
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, SSH2_FXP_OPEN)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u32(msg, id)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_cstring(msg, remote_path)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u32(msg, SSH2_FXF_READ)) != 0 ||
(r = encode_attrib(msg, &junk)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
send_msg(conn, msg);
debug3("Sent message SSH2_FXP_OPEN I:%u P:%s", id, remote_path);
handle = get_handle(conn, id, &handle_len,
"remote open(\"%s\")", remote_path);
if (handle == NULL) {
sshbuf_free(msg);
return(-1);
}
local_fd = open(local_path,
O_WRONLY | O_CREAT | (resume_flag ? 0 : O_TRUNC), mode | S_IWUSR);
if (local_fd == -1) {
error("Couldn't open local file \"%s\" for writing: %s",
local_path, strerror(errno));
goto fail;
}
offset = highwater = 0;
if (resume_flag) {
if (fstat(local_fd, &st) == -1) {
error("Unable to stat local file \"%s\": %s",
local_path, strerror(errno));
goto fail;
}
if (st.st_size < 0) {
error("\"%s\" has negative size", local_path);
goto fail;
}
if ((u_int64_t)st.st_size > size) {
error("Unable to resume download of \"%s\": "
"local file is larger than remote", local_path);
fail:
do_close(conn, handle, handle_len);
sshbuf_free(msg);
free(handle);
if (local_fd != -1)
close(local_fd);
return -1;
}
offset = highwater = st.st_size;
}
/* Read from remote and write to local */
write_error = read_error = write_errno = num_req = 0;
max_req = 1;
progress_counter = offset;
if (showprogress && size != 0)
start_progress_meter(remote_path, size, &progress_counter);
while (num_req > 0 || max_req > 0) {
u_char *data;
size_t len;
/*
* Simulate EOF on interrupt: stop sending new requests and
* allow outstanding requests to drain gracefully
*/
if (interrupted) {
if (num_req == 0) /* If we haven't started yet... */
break;
max_req = 0;
}
/* Send some more requests */
while (num_req < max_req) {
debug3("Request range %llu -> %llu (%d/%d)",
(unsigned long long)offset,
(unsigned long long)offset + buflen - 1,
num_req, max_req);
req = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*req));
req->id = conn->msg_id++;
req->len = buflen;
req->offset = offset;
offset += buflen;
num_req++;
TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(&requests, req, tq);
send_read_request(conn, req->id, req->offset,
req->len, handle, handle_len);
}
sshbuf_reset(msg);
get_msg(conn, msg);
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(msg, &type)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_u32(msg, &id)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
debug3("Received reply T:%u I:%u R:%d", type, id, max_req);
/* Find the request in our queue */
for (req = TAILQ_FIRST(&requests);
req != NULL && req->id != id;
req = TAILQ_NEXT(req, tq))
;
if (req == NULL)
fatal("Unexpected reply %u", id);
switch (type) {
case SSH2_FXP_STATUS:
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(msg, &status)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s",
__func__, ssh_err(r));
if (status != SSH2_FX_EOF)
read_error = 1;
max_req = 0;
TAILQ_REMOVE(&requests, req, tq);
free(req);
num_req--;
break;
case SSH2_FXP_DATA:
if ((r = sshbuf_get_string(msg, &data, &len)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s",
__func__, ssh_err(r));
debug3("Received data %llu -> %llu",
(unsigned long long)req->offset,
(unsigned long long)req->offset + len - 1);
if (len > req->len)
fatal("Received more data than asked for "
"%zu > %zu", len, req->len);
lmodified = 1;
if ((lseek(local_fd, req->offset, SEEK_SET) == -1 ||
atomicio(vwrite, local_fd, data, len) != len) &&
!write_error) {
write_errno = errno;
write_error = 1;
max_req = 0;
}
else if (!reordered && req->offset <= highwater)
highwater = req->offset + len;
else if (!reordered && req->offset > highwater)
reordered = 1;
progress_counter += len;
free(data);
if (len == req->len) {
TAILQ_REMOVE(&requests, req, tq);
free(req);
num_req--;
} else {
/* Resend the request for the missing data */
debug3("Short data block, re-requesting "
"%llu -> %llu (%2d)",
(unsigned long long)req->offset + len,
(unsigned long long)req->offset +
req->len - 1, num_req);
req->id = conn->msg_id++;
req->len -= len;
req->offset += len;
send_read_request(conn, req->id,
req->offset, req->len, handle, handle_len);
/* Reduce the request size */
if (len < buflen)
buflen = MAXIMUM(MIN_READ_SIZE, len);
}
if (max_req > 0) { /* max_req = 0 iff EOF received */
if (size > 0 && offset > size) {
/* Only one request at a time
* after the expected EOF */
debug3("Finish at %llu (%2d)",
(unsigned long long)offset,
num_req);
max_req = 1;
- } else if (max_req <= conn->num_requests) {
+ } else if (max_req < conn->num_requests) {
++max_req;
}
}
break;
default:
fatal("Expected SSH2_FXP_DATA(%u) packet, got %u",
SSH2_FXP_DATA, type);
}
}
if (showprogress && size)
stop_progress_meter();
/* Sanity check */
if (TAILQ_FIRST(&requests) != NULL)
fatal("Transfer complete, but requests still in queue");
/* Truncate at highest contiguous point to avoid holes on interrupt */
if (read_error || write_error || interrupted) {
if (reordered && resume_flag) {
error("Unable to resume download of \"%s\": "
"server reordered requests", local_path);
}
debug("truncating at %llu", (unsigned long long)highwater);
if (ftruncate(local_fd, highwater) == -1)
error("ftruncate \"%s\": %s", local_path,
strerror(errno));
}
if (read_error) {
error("Couldn't read from remote file \"%s\" : %s",
remote_path, fx2txt(status));
status = -1;
do_close(conn, handle, handle_len);
} else if (write_error) {
error("Couldn't write to \"%s\": %s", local_path,
strerror(write_errno));
status = SSH2_FX_FAILURE;
do_close(conn, handle, handle_len);
} else {
if (do_close(conn, handle, handle_len) != 0 || interrupted)
status = SSH2_FX_FAILURE;
else
status = SSH2_FX_OK;
/* Override umask and utimes if asked */
#ifdef HAVE_FCHMOD
if (preserve_flag && fchmod(local_fd, mode) == -1)
#else
if (preserve_flag && chmod(local_path, mode) == -1)
#endif /* HAVE_FCHMOD */
error("Couldn't set mode on \"%s\": %s", local_path,
strerror(errno));
if (preserve_flag &&
(a->flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_ACMODTIME)) {
struct timeval tv[2];
tv[0].tv_sec = a->atime;
tv[1].tv_sec = a->mtime;
tv[0].tv_usec = tv[1].tv_usec = 0;
if (utimes(local_path, tv) == -1)
error("Can't set times on \"%s\": %s",
local_path, strerror(errno));
}
if (resume_flag && !lmodified)
logit("File \"%s\" was not modified", local_path);
else if (fsync_flag) {
debug("syncing \"%s\"", local_path);
if (fsync(local_fd) == -1)
error("Couldn't sync file \"%s\": %s",
local_path, strerror(errno));
}
}
close(local_fd);
sshbuf_free(msg);
free(handle);
return status == SSH2_FX_OK ? 0 : -1;
}
static int
download_dir_internal(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *src, const char *dst,
int depth, Attrib *dirattrib, int preserve_flag, int print_flag,
int resume_flag, int fsync_flag)
{
int i, ret = 0;
SFTP_DIRENT **dir_entries;
char *filename, *new_src = NULL, *new_dst = NULL;
mode_t mode = 0777;
if (depth >= MAX_DIR_DEPTH) {
error("Maximum directory depth exceeded: %d levels", depth);
return -1;
}
if (dirattrib == NULL &&
(dirattrib = do_stat(conn, src, 1)) == NULL) {
error("Unable to stat remote directory \"%s\"", src);
return -1;
}
if (!S_ISDIR(dirattrib->perm)) {
error("\"%s\" is not a directory", src);
return -1;
}
if (print_flag)
mprintf("Retrieving %s\n", src);
if (dirattrib->flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_PERMISSIONS)
mode = dirattrib->perm & 01777;
else {
debug("Server did not send permissions for "
"directory \"%s\"", dst);
}
if (mkdir(dst, mode) == -1 && errno != EEXIST) {
error("mkdir %s: %s", dst, strerror(errno));
return -1;
}
if (do_readdir(conn, src, &dir_entries) == -1) {
error("%s: Failed to get directory contents", src);
return -1;
}
for (i = 0; dir_entries[i] != NULL && !interrupted; i++) {
free(new_dst);
free(new_src);
filename = dir_entries[i]->filename;
new_dst = path_append(dst, filename);
new_src = path_append(src, filename);
if (S_ISDIR(dir_entries[i]->a.perm)) {
if (strcmp(filename, ".") == 0 ||
strcmp(filename, "..") == 0)
continue;
if (download_dir_internal(conn, new_src, new_dst,
depth + 1, &(dir_entries[i]->a), preserve_flag,
print_flag, resume_flag, fsync_flag) == -1)
ret = -1;
} else if (S_ISREG(dir_entries[i]->a.perm) ) {
if (do_download(conn, new_src, new_dst,
&(dir_entries[i]->a), preserve_flag,
resume_flag, fsync_flag) == -1) {
error("Download of file %s to %s failed",
new_src, new_dst);
ret = -1;
}
} else
logit("%s: not a regular file\n", new_src);
}
free(new_dst);
free(new_src);
if (preserve_flag) {
if (dirattrib->flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_ACMODTIME) {
struct timeval tv[2];
tv[0].tv_sec = dirattrib->atime;
tv[1].tv_sec = dirattrib->mtime;
tv[0].tv_usec = tv[1].tv_usec = 0;
if (utimes(dst, tv) == -1)
error("Can't set times on \"%s\": %s",
dst, strerror(errno));
} else
debug("Server did not send times for directory "
"\"%s\"", dst);
}
free_sftp_dirents(dir_entries);
return ret;
}
int
download_dir(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *src, const char *dst,
Attrib *dirattrib, int preserve_flag, int print_flag, int resume_flag,
int fsync_flag)
{
char *src_canon;
int ret;
if ((src_canon = do_realpath(conn, src)) == NULL) {
error("Unable to canonicalize path \"%s\"", src);
return -1;
}
ret = download_dir_internal(conn, src_canon, dst, 0,
dirattrib, preserve_flag, print_flag, resume_flag, fsync_flag);
free(src_canon);
return ret;
}
int
do_upload(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *local_path,
const char *remote_path, int preserve_flag, int resume, int fsync_flag)
{
int r, local_fd;
u_int status = SSH2_FX_OK;
u_int id;
u_char type;
off_t offset, progress_counter;
u_char *handle, *data;
struct sshbuf *msg;
struct stat sb;
Attrib a, *c = NULL;
u_int32_t startid;
u_int32_t ackid;
struct outstanding_ack {
u_int id;
u_int len;
off_t offset;
TAILQ_ENTRY(outstanding_ack) tq;
};
TAILQ_HEAD(ackhead, outstanding_ack) acks;
struct outstanding_ack *ack = NULL;
size_t handle_len;
TAILQ_INIT(&acks);
if ((local_fd = open(local_path, O_RDONLY, 0)) == -1) {
error("Couldn't open local file \"%s\" for reading: %s",
local_path, strerror(errno));
return(-1);
}
if (fstat(local_fd, &sb) == -1) {
error("Couldn't fstat local file \"%s\": %s",
local_path, strerror(errno));
close(local_fd);
return(-1);
}
if (!S_ISREG(sb.st_mode)) {
error("%s is not a regular file", local_path);
close(local_fd);
return(-1);
}
stat_to_attrib(&sb, &a);
a.flags &= ~SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_SIZE;
a.flags &= ~SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_UIDGID;
a.perm &= 0777;
if (!preserve_flag)
a.flags &= ~SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_ACMODTIME;
if (resume) {
/* Get remote file size if it exists */
if ((c = do_stat(conn, remote_path, 0)) == NULL) {
close(local_fd);
return -1;
}
if ((off_t)c->size >= sb.st_size) {
error("destination file bigger or same size as "
"source file");
close(local_fd);
return -1;
}
if (lseek(local_fd, (off_t)c->size, SEEK_SET) == -1) {
close(local_fd);
return -1;
}
}
if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
/* Send open request */
id = conn->msg_id++;
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, SSH2_FXP_OPEN)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u32(msg, id)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_cstring(msg, remote_path)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u32(msg, SSH2_FXF_WRITE|SSH2_FXF_CREAT|
(resume ? SSH2_FXF_APPEND : SSH2_FXF_TRUNC))) != 0 ||
(r = encode_attrib(msg, &a)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
send_msg(conn, msg);
debug3("Sent message SSH2_FXP_OPEN I:%u P:%s", id, remote_path);
sshbuf_reset(msg);
handle = get_handle(conn, id, &handle_len,
"remote open(\"%s\")", remote_path);
if (handle == NULL) {
close(local_fd);
sshbuf_free(msg);
return -1;
}
startid = ackid = id + 1;
data = xmalloc(conn->transfer_buflen);
/* Read from local and write to remote */
offset = progress_counter = (resume ? c->size : 0);
if (showprogress)
start_progress_meter(local_path, sb.st_size,
&progress_counter);
for (;;) {
int len;
/*
* Can't use atomicio here because it returns 0 on EOF,
* thus losing the last block of the file.
* Simulate an EOF on interrupt, allowing ACKs from the
* server to drain.
*/
if (interrupted || status != SSH2_FX_OK)
len = 0;
else do
len = read(local_fd, data, conn->transfer_buflen);
while ((len == -1) &&
(errno == EINTR || errno == EAGAIN || errno == EWOULDBLOCK));
if (len == -1)
fatal("Couldn't read from \"%s\": %s", local_path,
strerror(errno));
if (len != 0) {
ack = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*ack));
ack->id = ++id;
ack->offset = offset;
ack->len = len;
TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(&acks, ack, tq);
sshbuf_reset(msg);
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, SSH2_FXP_WRITE)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u32(msg, ack->id)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_string(msg, handle,
handle_len)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u64(msg, offset)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_string(msg, data, len)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s",
__func__, ssh_err(r));
send_msg(conn, msg);
debug3("Sent message SSH2_FXP_WRITE I:%u O:%llu S:%u",
id, (unsigned long long)offset, len);
} else if (TAILQ_FIRST(&acks) == NULL)
break;
if (ack == NULL)
fatal("Unexpected ACK %u", id);
if (id == startid || len == 0 ||
id - ackid >= conn->num_requests) {
u_int rid;
sshbuf_reset(msg);
get_msg(conn, msg);
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(msg, &type)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_u32(msg, &rid)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s",
__func__, ssh_err(r));
if (type != SSH2_FXP_STATUS)
fatal("Expected SSH2_FXP_STATUS(%d) packet, "
"got %d", SSH2_FXP_STATUS, type);
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(msg, &status)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s",
__func__, ssh_err(r));
debug3("SSH2_FXP_STATUS %u", status);
/* Find the request in our queue */
for (ack = TAILQ_FIRST(&acks);
ack != NULL && ack->id != rid;
ack = TAILQ_NEXT(ack, tq))
;
if (ack == NULL)
fatal("Can't find request for ID %u", rid);
TAILQ_REMOVE(&acks, ack, tq);
debug3("In write loop, ack for %u %u bytes at %lld",
ack->id, ack->len, (long long)ack->offset);
++ackid;
progress_counter += ack->len;
free(ack);
}
offset += len;
if (offset < 0)
fatal("%s: offset < 0", __func__);
}
sshbuf_free(msg);
if (showprogress)
stop_progress_meter();
free(data);
if (status != SSH2_FX_OK) {
error("Couldn't write to remote file \"%s\": %s",
remote_path, fx2txt(status));
status = SSH2_FX_FAILURE;
}
if (close(local_fd) == -1) {
error("Couldn't close local file \"%s\": %s", local_path,
strerror(errno));
status = SSH2_FX_FAILURE;
}
/* Override umask and utimes if asked */
if (preserve_flag)
do_fsetstat(conn, handle, handle_len, &a);
if (fsync_flag)
(void)do_fsync(conn, handle, handle_len);
if (do_close(conn, handle, handle_len) != 0)
status = SSH2_FX_FAILURE;
free(handle);
return status == SSH2_FX_OK ? 0 : -1;
}
static int
upload_dir_internal(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *src, const char *dst,
int depth, int preserve_flag, int print_flag, int resume, int fsync_flag)
{
int ret = 0;
DIR *dirp;
struct dirent *dp;
char *filename, *new_src = NULL, *new_dst = NULL;
struct stat sb;
Attrib a, *dirattrib;
if (depth >= MAX_DIR_DEPTH) {
error("Maximum directory depth exceeded: %d levels", depth);
return -1;
}
if (stat(src, &sb) == -1) {
error("Couldn't stat directory \"%s\": %s",
src, strerror(errno));
return -1;
}
if (!S_ISDIR(sb.st_mode)) {
error("\"%s\" is not a directory", src);
return -1;
}
if (print_flag)
mprintf("Entering %s\n", src);
attrib_clear(&a);
stat_to_attrib(&sb, &a);
a.flags &= ~SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_SIZE;
a.flags &= ~SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_UIDGID;
a.perm &= 01777;
if (!preserve_flag)
a.flags &= ~SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_ACMODTIME;
/*
* sftp lacks a portable status value to match errno EEXIST,
* so if we get a failure back then we must check whether
* the path already existed and is a directory.
*/
if (do_mkdir(conn, dst, &a, 0) != 0) {
if ((dirattrib = do_stat(conn, dst, 0)) == NULL)
return -1;
if (!S_ISDIR(dirattrib->perm)) {
error("\"%s\" exists but is not a directory", dst);
return -1;
}
}
if ((dirp = opendir(src)) == NULL) {
error("Failed to open dir \"%s\": %s", src, strerror(errno));
return -1;
}
while (((dp = readdir(dirp)) != NULL) && !interrupted) {
if (dp->d_ino == 0)
continue;
free(new_dst);
free(new_src);
filename = dp->d_name;
new_dst = path_append(dst, filename);
new_src = path_append(src, filename);
if (lstat(new_src, &sb) == -1) {
logit("%s: lstat failed: %s", filename,
strerror(errno));
ret = -1;
} else if (S_ISDIR(sb.st_mode)) {
if (strcmp(filename, ".") == 0 ||
strcmp(filename, "..") == 0)
continue;
if (upload_dir_internal(conn, new_src, new_dst,
depth + 1, preserve_flag, print_flag, resume,
fsync_flag) == -1)
ret = -1;
} else if (S_ISREG(sb.st_mode)) {
if (do_upload(conn, new_src, new_dst,
preserve_flag, resume, fsync_flag) == -1) {
error("Uploading of file %s to %s failed!",
new_src, new_dst);
ret = -1;
}
} else
logit("%s: not a regular file\n", filename);
}
free(new_dst);
free(new_src);
do_setstat(conn, dst, &a);
(void) closedir(dirp);
return ret;
}
int
upload_dir(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *src, const char *dst,
int preserve_flag, int print_flag, int resume, int fsync_flag)
{
char *dst_canon;
int ret;
if ((dst_canon = do_realpath(conn, dst)) == NULL) {
error("Unable to canonicalize path \"%s\"", dst);
return -1;
}
ret = upload_dir_internal(conn, src, dst_canon, 0, preserve_flag,
print_flag, resume, fsync_flag);
free(dst_canon);
return ret;
}
char *
path_append(const char *p1, const char *p2)
{
char *ret;
size_t len = strlen(p1) + strlen(p2) + 2;
ret = xmalloc(len);
strlcpy(ret, p1, len);
if (p1[0] != '\0' && p1[strlen(p1) - 1] != '/')
strlcat(ret, "/", len);
strlcat(ret, p2, len);
return(ret);
}
diff --git a/sftp-server.0 b/sftp-server.0
index 4c5fbbb7263b..36c5f846f283 100644
--- a/sftp-server.0
+++ b/sftp-server.0
@@ -1,96 +1,98 @@
SFTP-SERVER(8) System Manager's Manual SFTP-SERVER(8)
NAME
sftp-server M-bM-^@M-^S OpenSSH SFTP server subsystem
SYNOPSIS
sftp-server [-ehR] [-d start_directory] [-f log_facility] [-l log_level]
- [-P blacklisted_requests] [-p whitelisted_requests]
- [-u umask]
+ [-P denied_requests] [-p allowed_requests] [-u umask]
sftp-server -Q protocol_feature
DESCRIPTION
sftp-server is a program that speaks the server side of SFTP protocol to
stdout and expects client requests from stdin. sftp-server is not
intended to be called directly, but from sshd(8) using the Subsystem
option.
Command-line flags to sftp-server should be specified in the Subsystem
declaration. See sshd_config(5) for more information.
Valid options are:
-d start_directory
specifies an alternate starting directory for users. The
pathname may contain the following tokens that are expanded at
runtime: %% is replaced by a literal '%', %d is replaced by the
home directory of the user being authenticated, and %u is
replaced by the username of that user. The default is to use the
user's home directory. This option is useful in conjunction with
the sshd_config(5) ChrootDirectory option.
-e Causes sftp-server to print logging information to stderr instead
of syslog for debugging.
-f log_facility
Specifies the facility code that is used when logging messages
from sftp-server. The possible values are: DAEMON, USER, AUTH,
LOCAL0, LOCAL1, LOCAL2, LOCAL3, LOCAL4, LOCAL5, LOCAL6, LOCAL7.
The default is AUTH.
-h Displays sftp-server usage information.
-l log_level
Specifies which messages will be logged by sftp-server. The
possible values are: QUIET, FATAL, ERROR, INFO, VERBOSE, DEBUG,
DEBUG1, DEBUG2, and DEBUG3. INFO and VERBOSE log transactions
that sftp-server performs on behalf of the client. DEBUG and
DEBUG1 are equivalent. DEBUG2 and DEBUG3 each specify higher
levels of debugging output. The default is ERROR.
- -P blacklisted_requests
+ -P denied_requests
Specify a comma-separated list of SFTP protocol requests that are
- banned by the server. sftp-server will reply to any blacklisted
+ banned by the server. sftp-server will reply to any denied
request with a failure. The -Q flag can be used to determine the
- supported request types. If both a blacklist and a whitelist are
- specified, then the blacklist is applied before the whitelist.
+ supported request types. If both denied and allowed lists are
+ specified, then the denied list is applied before the allowed
+ list.
- -p whitelisted_requests
+ -p allowed_requests
Specify a comma-separated list of SFTP protocol requests that are
permitted by the server. All request types that are not on the
- whitelist will be logged and replied to with a failure message.
+ allowed list will be logged and replied to with a failure
+ message.
Care must be taken when using this feature to ensure that
requests made implicitly by SFTP clients are permitted.
-Q protocol_feature
Query protocol features supported by sftp-server. At present the
only feature that may be queried is M-bM-^@M-^\requestsM-bM-^@M-^], which may be used
- for black or whitelisting (flags -P and -p respectively).
+ to deny or allow specific requests (flags -P and -p
+ respectively).
-R Places this instance of sftp-server into a read-only mode.
Attempts to open files for writing, as well as other operations
that change the state of the filesystem, will be denied.
-u umask
Sets an explicit umask(2) to be applied to newly-created files
and directories, instead of the user's default mask.
On some systems, sftp-server must be able to access /dev/log for logging
to work, and use of sftp-server in a chroot configuration therefore
requires that syslogd(8) establish a logging socket inside the chroot
directory.
SEE ALSO
sftp(1), ssh(1), sshd_config(5), sshd(8)
T. Ylonen and S. Lehtinen, SSH File Transfer Protocol, draft-ietf-secsh-
filexfer-02.txt, October 2001, work in progress material.
HISTORY
sftp-server first appeared in OpenBSD 2.8.
AUTHORS
Markus Friedl <markus@openbsd.org>
-OpenBSD 6.7 November 30, 2019 OpenBSD 6.7
+OpenBSD 6.8 June 22, 2020 OpenBSD 6.8
diff --git a/sftp-server.8 b/sftp-server.8
index 4a55dab2618c..f057da3b8b5c 100644
--- a/sftp-server.8
+++ b/sftp-server.8
@@ -1,170 +1,170 @@
-.\" $OpenBSD: sftp-server.8,v 1.28 2019/11/30 07:07:59 jmc Exp $
+.\" $OpenBSD: sftp-server.8,v 1.30 2020/06/22 06:36:40 jmc Exp $
.\"
.\" Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
.\"
.\" Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
.\" modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
.\" are met:
.\" 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
.\" notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
.\" 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
.\" notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
.\" documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
.\"
.\" THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
.\" IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
.\" OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
.\" IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
.\" INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
.\" NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
.\" DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
.\" THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
.\" (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
.\" THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
.\"
-.Dd $Mdocdate: November 30 2019 $
+.Dd $Mdocdate: June 22 2020 $
.Dt SFTP-SERVER 8
.Os
.Sh NAME
.Nm sftp-server
.Nd OpenSSH SFTP server subsystem
.Sh SYNOPSIS
.Nm sftp-server
.Bk -words
.Op Fl ehR
.Op Fl d Ar start_directory
.Op Fl f Ar log_facility
.Op Fl l Ar log_level
-.Op Fl P Ar blacklisted_requests
-.Op Fl p Ar whitelisted_requests
+.Op Fl P Ar denied_requests
+.Op Fl p Ar allowed_requests
.Op Fl u Ar umask
.Ek
.Nm
.Fl Q Ar protocol_feature
.Sh DESCRIPTION
.Nm
is a program that speaks the server side of SFTP protocol
to stdout and expects client requests from stdin.
.Nm
is not intended to be called directly, but from
.Xr sshd 8
using the
.Cm Subsystem
option.
.Pp
Command-line flags to
.Nm
should be specified in the
.Cm Subsystem
declaration.
See
.Xr sshd_config 5
for more information.
.Pp
Valid options are:
.Bl -tag -width Ds
.It Fl d Ar start_directory
specifies an alternate starting directory for users.
The pathname may contain the following tokens that are expanded at runtime:
%% is replaced by a literal '%',
%d is replaced by the home directory of the user being authenticated,
and %u is replaced by the username of that user.
The default is to use the user's home directory.
This option is useful in conjunction with the
.Xr sshd_config 5
.Cm ChrootDirectory
option.
.It Fl e
Causes
.Nm
to print logging information to stderr instead of syslog for debugging.
.It Fl f Ar log_facility
Specifies the facility code that is used when logging messages from
.Nm .
The possible values are: DAEMON, USER, AUTH, LOCAL0, LOCAL1, LOCAL2,
LOCAL3, LOCAL4, LOCAL5, LOCAL6, LOCAL7.
The default is AUTH.
.It Fl h
Displays
.Nm
usage information.
.It Fl l Ar log_level
Specifies which messages will be logged by
.Nm .
The possible values are:
QUIET, FATAL, ERROR, INFO, VERBOSE, DEBUG, DEBUG1, DEBUG2, and DEBUG3.
INFO and VERBOSE log transactions that
.Nm
performs on behalf of the client.
DEBUG and DEBUG1 are equivalent.
DEBUG2 and DEBUG3 each specify higher levels of debugging output.
The default is ERROR.
-.It Fl P Ar blacklisted_requests
+.It Fl P Ar denied_requests
Specify a comma-separated list of SFTP protocol requests that are banned by
the server.
.Nm
-will reply to any blacklisted request with a failure.
+will reply to any denied request with a failure.
The
.Fl Q
flag can be used to determine the supported request types.
-If both a blacklist and a whitelist are specified, then the blacklist is
-applied before the whitelist.
-.It Fl p Ar whitelisted_requests
+If both denied and allowed lists are specified, then the denied list is
+applied before the allowed list.
+.It Fl p Ar allowed_requests
Specify a comma-separated list of SFTP protocol requests that are permitted
by the server.
-All request types that are not on the whitelist will be logged and replied
+All request types that are not on the allowed list will be logged and replied
to with a failure message.
.Pp
Care must be taken when using this feature to ensure that requests made
implicitly by SFTP clients are permitted.
.It Fl Q Ar protocol_feature
Query protocol features supported by
.Nm .
At present the only feature that may be queried is
.Dq requests ,
-which may be used for black or whitelisting (flags
+which may be used to deny or allow specific requests (flags
.Fl P
and
.Fl p
respectively).
.It Fl R
Places this instance of
.Nm
into a read-only mode.
Attempts to open files for writing, as well as other operations that change
the state of the filesystem, will be denied.
.It Fl u Ar umask
Sets an explicit
.Xr umask 2
to be applied to newly-created files and directories, instead of the
user's default mask.
.El
.Pp
On some systems,
.Nm
must be able to access
.Pa /dev/log
for logging to work, and use of
.Nm
in a chroot configuration therefore requires that
.Xr syslogd 8
establish a logging socket inside the chroot directory.
.Sh SEE ALSO
.Xr sftp 1 ,
.Xr ssh 1 ,
.Xr sshd_config 5 ,
.Xr sshd 8
.Rs
.%A T. Ylonen
.%A S. Lehtinen
.%T "SSH File Transfer Protocol"
.%N draft-ietf-secsh-filexfer-02.txt
.%D October 2001
.%O work in progress material
.Re
.Sh HISTORY
.Nm
first appeared in
.Ox 2.8 .
.Sh AUTHORS
.An Markus Friedl Aq Mt markus@openbsd.org
diff --git a/sftp-server.c b/sftp-server.c
index 359204fa7e33..55386fa9a11d 100644
--- a/sftp-server.c
+++ b/sftp-server.c
@@ -1,1776 +1,1777 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: sftp-server.c,v 1.117 2019/07/05 04:55:40 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: sftp-server.c,v 1.119 2020/07/17 03:51:32 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 2000-2004 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
*
* Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
* purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
* copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
*
* THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
* WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
* MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
* ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
* WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
* ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
* OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
*/
#include "includes.h"
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/stat.h>
#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TIME_H
# include <sys/time.h>
#endif
#ifdef HAVE_SYS_MOUNT_H
#include <sys/mount.h>
#endif
#ifdef HAVE_SYS_STATVFS_H
#include <sys/statvfs.h>
#endif
#include <dirent.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <pwd.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <time.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <stdarg.h>
#include "xmalloc.h"
#include "sshbuf.h"
#include "ssherr.h"
#include "log.h"
#include "misc.h"
#include "match.h"
#include "uidswap.h"
#include "sftp.h"
#include "sftp-common.h"
char *sftp_realpath(const char *, char *); /* sftp-realpath.c */
/* Our verbosity */
static LogLevel log_level = SYSLOG_LEVEL_ERROR;
/* Our client */
static struct passwd *pw = NULL;
static char *client_addr = NULL;
/* input and output queue */
struct sshbuf *iqueue;
struct sshbuf *oqueue;
/* Version of client */
static u_int version;
/* SSH2_FXP_INIT received */
static int init_done;
/* Disable writes */
static int readonly;
/* Requests that are allowed/denied */
-static char *request_whitelist, *request_blacklist;
+static char *request_allowlist, *request_denylist;
/* portable attributes, etc. */
typedef struct Stat Stat;
struct Stat {
char *name;
char *long_name;
Attrib attrib;
};
/* Packet handlers */
static void process_open(u_int32_t id);
static void process_close(u_int32_t id);
static void process_read(u_int32_t id);
static void process_write(u_int32_t id);
static void process_stat(u_int32_t id);
static void process_lstat(u_int32_t id);
static void process_fstat(u_int32_t id);
static void process_setstat(u_int32_t id);
static void process_fsetstat(u_int32_t id);
static void process_opendir(u_int32_t id);
static void process_readdir(u_int32_t id);
static void process_remove(u_int32_t id);
static void process_mkdir(u_int32_t id);
static void process_rmdir(u_int32_t id);
static void process_realpath(u_int32_t id);
static void process_rename(u_int32_t id);
static void process_readlink(u_int32_t id);
static void process_symlink(u_int32_t id);
static void process_extended_posix_rename(u_int32_t id);
static void process_extended_statvfs(u_int32_t id);
static void process_extended_fstatvfs(u_int32_t id);
static void process_extended_hardlink(u_int32_t id);
static void process_extended_fsync(u_int32_t id);
static void process_extended_lsetstat(u_int32_t id);
static void process_extended(u_int32_t id);
struct sftp_handler {
const char *name; /* user-visible name for fine-grained perms */
const char *ext_name; /* extended request name */
u_int type; /* packet type, for non extended packets */
void (*handler)(u_int32_t);
int does_write; /* if nonzero, banned for readonly mode */
};
static const struct sftp_handler handlers[] = {
/* NB. SSH2_FXP_OPEN does the readonly check in the handler itself */
{ "open", NULL, SSH2_FXP_OPEN, process_open, 0 },
{ "close", NULL, SSH2_FXP_CLOSE, process_close, 0 },
{ "read", NULL, SSH2_FXP_READ, process_read, 0 },
{ "write", NULL, SSH2_FXP_WRITE, process_write, 1 },
{ "lstat", NULL, SSH2_FXP_LSTAT, process_lstat, 0 },
{ "fstat", NULL, SSH2_FXP_FSTAT, process_fstat, 0 },
{ "setstat", NULL, SSH2_FXP_SETSTAT, process_setstat, 1 },
{ "fsetstat", NULL, SSH2_FXP_FSETSTAT, process_fsetstat, 1 },
{ "opendir", NULL, SSH2_FXP_OPENDIR, process_opendir, 0 },
{ "readdir", NULL, SSH2_FXP_READDIR, process_readdir, 0 },
{ "remove", NULL, SSH2_FXP_REMOVE, process_remove, 1 },
{ "mkdir", NULL, SSH2_FXP_MKDIR, process_mkdir, 1 },
{ "rmdir", NULL, SSH2_FXP_RMDIR, process_rmdir, 1 },
{ "realpath", NULL, SSH2_FXP_REALPATH, process_realpath, 0 },
{ "stat", NULL, SSH2_FXP_STAT, process_stat, 0 },
{ "rename", NULL, SSH2_FXP_RENAME, process_rename, 1 },
{ "readlink", NULL, SSH2_FXP_READLINK, process_readlink, 0 },
{ "symlink", NULL, SSH2_FXP_SYMLINK, process_symlink, 1 },
{ NULL, NULL, 0, NULL, 0 }
};
/* SSH2_FXP_EXTENDED submessages */
static const struct sftp_handler extended_handlers[] = {
{ "posix-rename", "posix-rename@openssh.com", 0,
process_extended_posix_rename, 1 },
{ "statvfs", "statvfs@openssh.com", 0, process_extended_statvfs, 0 },
{ "fstatvfs", "fstatvfs@openssh.com", 0, process_extended_fstatvfs, 0 },
{ "hardlink", "hardlink@openssh.com", 0, process_extended_hardlink, 1 },
{ "fsync", "fsync@openssh.com", 0, process_extended_fsync, 1 },
{ "lsetstat", "lsetstat@openssh.com", 0, process_extended_lsetstat, 1 },
{ NULL, NULL, 0, NULL, 0 }
};
static int
request_permitted(const struct sftp_handler *h)
{
char *result;
if (readonly && h->does_write) {
verbose("Refusing %s request in read-only mode", h->name);
return 0;
}
- if (request_blacklist != NULL &&
- ((result = match_list(h->name, request_blacklist, NULL))) != NULL) {
+ if (request_denylist != NULL &&
+ ((result = match_list(h->name, request_denylist, NULL))) != NULL) {
free(result);
- verbose("Refusing blacklisted %s request", h->name);
+ verbose("Refusing denylisted %s request", h->name);
return 0;
}
- if (request_whitelist != NULL &&
- ((result = match_list(h->name, request_whitelist, NULL))) != NULL) {
+ if (request_allowlist != NULL &&
+ ((result = match_list(h->name, request_allowlist, NULL))) != NULL) {
free(result);
- debug2("Permitting whitelisted %s request", h->name);
+ debug2("Permitting allowlisted %s request", h->name);
return 1;
}
- if (request_whitelist != NULL) {
- verbose("Refusing non-whitelisted %s request", h->name);
+ if (request_allowlist != NULL) {
+ verbose("Refusing non-allowlisted %s request", h->name);
return 0;
}
return 1;
}
static int
errno_to_portable(int unixerrno)
{
int ret = 0;
switch (unixerrno) {
case 0:
ret = SSH2_FX_OK;
break;
case ENOENT:
case ENOTDIR:
case EBADF:
case ELOOP:
ret = SSH2_FX_NO_SUCH_FILE;
break;
case EPERM:
case EACCES:
case EFAULT:
ret = SSH2_FX_PERMISSION_DENIED;
break;
case ENAMETOOLONG:
case EINVAL:
ret = SSH2_FX_BAD_MESSAGE;
break;
case ENOSYS:
ret = SSH2_FX_OP_UNSUPPORTED;
break;
default:
ret = SSH2_FX_FAILURE;
break;
}
return ret;
}
static int
flags_from_portable(int pflags)
{
int flags = 0;
if ((pflags & SSH2_FXF_READ) &&
(pflags & SSH2_FXF_WRITE)) {
flags = O_RDWR;
} else if (pflags & SSH2_FXF_READ) {
flags = O_RDONLY;
} else if (pflags & SSH2_FXF_WRITE) {
flags = O_WRONLY;
}
if (pflags & SSH2_FXF_APPEND)
flags |= O_APPEND;
if (pflags & SSH2_FXF_CREAT)
flags |= O_CREAT;
if (pflags & SSH2_FXF_TRUNC)
flags |= O_TRUNC;
if (pflags & SSH2_FXF_EXCL)
flags |= O_EXCL;
return flags;
}
static const char *
string_from_portable(int pflags)
{
static char ret[128];
*ret = '\0';
#define PAPPEND(str) { \
if (*ret != '\0') \
strlcat(ret, ",", sizeof(ret)); \
strlcat(ret, str, sizeof(ret)); \
}
if (pflags & SSH2_FXF_READ)
PAPPEND("READ")
if (pflags & SSH2_FXF_WRITE)
PAPPEND("WRITE")
if (pflags & SSH2_FXF_APPEND)
PAPPEND("APPEND")
if (pflags & SSH2_FXF_CREAT)
PAPPEND("CREATE")
if (pflags & SSH2_FXF_TRUNC)
PAPPEND("TRUNCATE")
if (pflags & SSH2_FXF_EXCL)
PAPPEND("EXCL")
return ret;
}
/* handle handles */
typedef struct Handle Handle;
struct Handle {
int use;
DIR *dirp;
int fd;
int flags;
char *name;
u_int64_t bytes_read, bytes_write;
int next_unused;
};
enum {
HANDLE_UNUSED,
HANDLE_DIR,
HANDLE_FILE
};
static Handle *handles = NULL;
static u_int num_handles = 0;
static int first_unused_handle = -1;
static void handle_unused(int i)
{
handles[i].use = HANDLE_UNUSED;
handles[i].next_unused = first_unused_handle;
first_unused_handle = i;
}
static int
handle_new(int use, const char *name, int fd, int flags, DIR *dirp)
{
int i;
if (first_unused_handle == -1) {
if (num_handles + 1 <= num_handles)
return -1;
num_handles++;
handles = xreallocarray(handles, num_handles, sizeof(Handle));
handle_unused(num_handles - 1);
}
i = first_unused_handle;
first_unused_handle = handles[i].next_unused;
handles[i].use = use;
handles[i].dirp = dirp;
handles[i].fd = fd;
handles[i].flags = flags;
handles[i].name = xstrdup(name);
handles[i].bytes_read = handles[i].bytes_write = 0;
return i;
}
static int
handle_is_ok(int i, int type)
{
return i >= 0 && (u_int)i < num_handles && handles[i].use == type;
}
static int
handle_to_string(int handle, u_char **stringp, int *hlenp)
{
if (stringp == NULL || hlenp == NULL)
return -1;
*stringp = xmalloc(sizeof(int32_t));
put_u32(*stringp, handle);
*hlenp = sizeof(int32_t);
return 0;
}
static int
handle_from_string(const u_char *handle, u_int hlen)
{
int val;
if (hlen != sizeof(int32_t))
return -1;
val = get_u32(handle);
if (handle_is_ok(val, HANDLE_FILE) ||
handle_is_ok(val, HANDLE_DIR))
return val;
return -1;
}
static char *
handle_to_name(int handle)
{
if (handle_is_ok(handle, HANDLE_DIR)||
handle_is_ok(handle, HANDLE_FILE))
return handles[handle].name;
return NULL;
}
static DIR *
handle_to_dir(int handle)
{
if (handle_is_ok(handle, HANDLE_DIR))
return handles[handle].dirp;
return NULL;
}
static int
handle_to_fd(int handle)
{
if (handle_is_ok(handle, HANDLE_FILE))
return handles[handle].fd;
return -1;
}
static int
handle_to_flags(int handle)
{
if (handle_is_ok(handle, HANDLE_FILE))
return handles[handle].flags;
return 0;
}
static void
handle_update_read(int handle, ssize_t bytes)
{
if (handle_is_ok(handle, HANDLE_FILE) && bytes > 0)
handles[handle].bytes_read += bytes;
}
static void
handle_update_write(int handle, ssize_t bytes)
{
if (handle_is_ok(handle, HANDLE_FILE) && bytes > 0)
handles[handle].bytes_write += bytes;
}
static u_int64_t
handle_bytes_read(int handle)
{
if (handle_is_ok(handle, HANDLE_FILE))
return (handles[handle].bytes_read);
return 0;
}
static u_int64_t
handle_bytes_write(int handle)
{
if (handle_is_ok(handle, HANDLE_FILE))
return (handles[handle].bytes_write);
return 0;
}
static int
handle_close(int handle)
{
int ret = -1;
if (handle_is_ok(handle, HANDLE_FILE)) {
ret = close(handles[handle].fd);
free(handles[handle].name);
handle_unused(handle);
} else if (handle_is_ok(handle, HANDLE_DIR)) {
ret = closedir(handles[handle].dirp);
free(handles[handle].name);
handle_unused(handle);
} else {
errno = ENOENT;
}
return ret;
}
static void
handle_log_close(int handle, char *emsg)
{
if (handle_is_ok(handle, HANDLE_FILE)) {
logit("%s%sclose \"%s\" bytes read %llu written %llu",
emsg == NULL ? "" : emsg, emsg == NULL ? "" : " ",
handle_to_name(handle),
(unsigned long long)handle_bytes_read(handle),
(unsigned long long)handle_bytes_write(handle));
} else {
logit("%s%sclosedir \"%s\"",
emsg == NULL ? "" : emsg, emsg == NULL ? "" : " ",
handle_to_name(handle));
}
}
static void
handle_log_exit(void)
{
u_int i;
for (i = 0; i < num_handles; i++)
if (handles[i].use != HANDLE_UNUSED)
handle_log_close(i, "forced");
}
static int
get_handle(struct sshbuf *queue, int *hp)
{
u_char *handle;
int r;
size_t hlen;
*hp = -1;
if ((r = sshbuf_get_string(queue, &handle, &hlen)) != 0)
return r;
if (hlen < 256)
*hp = handle_from_string(handle, hlen);
free(handle);
return 0;
}
/* send replies */
static void
send_msg(struct sshbuf *m)
{
int r;
if ((r = sshbuf_put_stringb(oqueue, m)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
sshbuf_reset(m);
}
static const char *
status_to_message(u_int32_t status)
{
const char *status_messages[] = {
"Success", /* SSH_FX_OK */
"End of file", /* SSH_FX_EOF */
"No such file", /* SSH_FX_NO_SUCH_FILE */
"Permission denied", /* SSH_FX_PERMISSION_DENIED */
"Failure", /* SSH_FX_FAILURE */
"Bad message", /* SSH_FX_BAD_MESSAGE */
"No connection", /* SSH_FX_NO_CONNECTION */
"Connection lost", /* SSH_FX_CONNECTION_LOST */
"Operation unsupported", /* SSH_FX_OP_UNSUPPORTED */
"Unknown error" /* Others */
};
return (status_messages[MINIMUM(status,SSH2_FX_MAX)]);
}
static void
send_status(u_int32_t id, u_int32_t status)
{
struct sshbuf *msg;
int r;
debug3("request %u: sent status %u", id, status);
if (log_level > SYSLOG_LEVEL_VERBOSE ||
(status != SSH2_FX_OK && status != SSH2_FX_EOF))
logit("sent status %s", status_to_message(status));
if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, SSH2_FXP_STATUS)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u32(msg, id)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u32(msg, status)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
if (version >= 3) {
if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(msg,
status_to_message(status))) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_cstring(msg, "")) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
}
send_msg(msg);
sshbuf_free(msg);
}
static void
send_data_or_handle(char type, u_int32_t id, const u_char *data, int dlen)
{
struct sshbuf *msg;
int r;
if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, type)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u32(msg, id)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_string(msg, data, dlen)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
send_msg(msg);
sshbuf_free(msg);
}
static void
send_data(u_int32_t id, const u_char *data, int dlen)
{
debug("request %u: sent data len %d", id, dlen);
send_data_or_handle(SSH2_FXP_DATA, id, data, dlen);
}
static void
send_handle(u_int32_t id, int handle)
{
u_char *string;
int hlen;
handle_to_string(handle, &string, &hlen);
debug("request %u: sent handle handle %d", id, handle);
send_data_or_handle(SSH2_FXP_HANDLE, id, string, hlen);
free(string);
}
static void
send_names(u_int32_t id, int count, const Stat *stats)
{
struct sshbuf *msg;
int i, r;
if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, SSH2_FXP_NAME)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u32(msg, id)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u32(msg, count)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
debug("request %u: sent names count %d", id, count);
for (i = 0; i < count; i++) {
if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(msg, stats[i].name)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_cstring(msg, stats[i].long_name)) != 0 ||
(r = encode_attrib(msg, &stats[i].attrib)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
}
send_msg(msg);
sshbuf_free(msg);
}
static void
send_attrib(u_int32_t id, const Attrib *a)
{
struct sshbuf *msg;
int r;
debug("request %u: sent attrib have 0x%x", id, a->flags);
if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, SSH2_FXP_ATTRS)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u32(msg, id)) != 0 ||
(r = encode_attrib(msg, a)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
send_msg(msg);
sshbuf_free(msg);
}
static void
send_statvfs(u_int32_t id, struct statvfs *st)
{
struct sshbuf *msg;
u_int64_t flag;
int r;
flag = (st->f_flag & ST_RDONLY) ? SSH2_FXE_STATVFS_ST_RDONLY : 0;
flag |= (st->f_flag & ST_NOSUID) ? SSH2_FXE_STATVFS_ST_NOSUID : 0;
if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, SSH2_FXP_EXTENDED_REPLY)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u32(msg, id)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u64(msg, st->f_bsize)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u64(msg, st->f_frsize)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u64(msg, st->f_blocks)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u64(msg, st->f_bfree)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u64(msg, st->f_bavail)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u64(msg, st->f_files)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u64(msg, st->f_ffree)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u64(msg, st->f_favail)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u64(msg, FSID_TO_ULONG(st->f_fsid))) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u64(msg, flag)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u64(msg, st->f_namemax)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
send_msg(msg);
sshbuf_free(msg);
}
/* parse incoming */
static void
process_init(void)
{
struct sshbuf *msg;
int r;
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(iqueue, &version)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
verbose("received client version %u", version);
if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, SSH2_FXP_VERSION)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u32(msg, SSH2_FILEXFER_VERSION)) != 0 ||
/* POSIX rename extension */
(r = sshbuf_put_cstring(msg, "posix-rename@openssh.com")) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_cstring(msg, "1")) != 0 || /* version */
/* statvfs extension */
(r = sshbuf_put_cstring(msg, "statvfs@openssh.com")) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_cstring(msg, "2")) != 0 || /* version */
/* fstatvfs extension */
(r = sshbuf_put_cstring(msg, "fstatvfs@openssh.com")) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_cstring(msg, "2")) != 0 || /* version */
/* hardlink extension */
(r = sshbuf_put_cstring(msg, "hardlink@openssh.com")) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_cstring(msg, "1")) != 0 || /* version */
/* fsync extension */
(r = sshbuf_put_cstring(msg, "fsync@openssh.com")) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_cstring(msg, "1")) != 0 || /* version */
(r = sshbuf_put_cstring(msg, "lsetstat@openssh.com")) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_cstring(msg, "1")) != 0) /* version */
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
send_msg(msg);
sshbuf_free(msg);
}
static void
process_open(u_int32_t id)
{
u_int32_t pflags;
Attrib a;
char *name;
int r, handle, fd, flags, mode, status = SSH2_FX_FAILURE;
if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(iqueue, &name, NULL)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_u32(iqueue, &pflags)) != 0 || /* portable flags */
(r = decode_attrib(iqueue, &a)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
debug3("request %u: open flags %d", id, pflags);
flags = flags_from_portable(pflags);
mode = (a.flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_PERMISSIONS) ? a.perm : 0666;
logit("open \"%s\" flags %s mode 0%o",
name, string_from_portable(pflags), mode);
if (readonly &&
((flags & O_ACCMODE) != O_RDONLY ||
(flags & (O_CREAT|O_TRUNC)) != 0)) {
verbose("Refusing open request in read-only mode");
status = SSH2_FX_PERMISSION_DENIED;
} else {
fd = open(name, flags, mode);
if (fd == -1) {
status = errno_to_portable(errno);
} else {
handle = handle_new(HANDLE_FILE, name, fd, flags, NULL);
if (handle < 0) {
close(fd);
} else {
send_handle(id, handle);
status = SSH2_FX_OK;
}
}
}
if (status != SSH2_FX_OK)
send_status(id, status);
free(name);
}
static void
process_close(u_int32_t id)
{
int r, handle, ret, status = SSH2_FX_FAILURE;
if ((r = get_handle(iqueue, &handle)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
debug3("request %u: close handle %u", id, handle);
handle_log_close(handle, NULL);
ret = handle_close(handle);
status = (ret == -1) ? errno_to_portable(errno) : SSH2_FX_OK;
send_status(id, status);
}
static void
process_read(u_int32_t id)
{
u_char buf[64*1024];
u_int32_t len;
int r, handle, fd, ret, status = SSH2_FX_FAILURE;
u_int64_t off;
if ((r = get_handle(iqueue, &handle)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_u64(iqueue, &off)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_u32(iqueue, &len)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
debug("request %u: read \"%s\" (handle %d) off %llu len %d",
id, handle_to_name(handle), handle, (unsigned long long)off, len);
if (len > sizeof buf) {
len = sizeof buf;
debug2("read change len %d", len);
}
fd = handle_to_fd(handle);
if (fd >= 0) {
if (lseek(fd, off, SEEK_SET) == -1) {
error("process_read: seek failed");
status = errno_to_portable(errno);
} else {
ret = read(fd, buf, len);
if (ret == -1) {
status = errno_to_portable(errno);
} else if (ret == 0) {
status = SSH2_FX_EOF;
} else {
send_data(id, buf, ret);
status = SSH2_FX_OK;
handle_update_read(handle, ret);
}
}
}
if (status != SSH2_FX_OK)
send_status(id, status);
}
static void
process_write(u_int32_t id)
{
u_int64_t off;
size_t len;
int r, handle, fd, ret, status;
u_char *data;
if ((r = get_handle(iqueue, &handle)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_u64(iqueue, &off)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_string(iqueue, &data, &len)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
debug("request %u: write \"%s\" (handle %d) off %llu len %zu",
id, handle_to_name(handle), handle, (unsigned long long)off, len);
fd = handle_to_fd(handle);
if (fd < 0)
status = SSH2_FX_FAILURE;
else {
if (!(handle_to_flags(handle) & O_APPEND) &&
lseek(fd, off, SEEK_SET) == -1) {
status = errno_to_portable(errno);
- error("process_write: seek failed");
+ error("%s: seek failed", __func__);
} else {
/* XXX ATOMICIO ? */
ret = write(fd, data, len);
if (ret == -1) {
- error("process_write: write failed");
+ error("%s: write: %s", __func__,
+ strerror(errno));
status = errno_to_portable(errno);
} else if ((size_t)ret == len) {
status = SSH2_FX_OK;
handle_update_write(handle, ret);
} else {
- debug2("nothing at all written");
+ debug2("%s: nothing at all written", __func__);
status = SSH2_FX_FAILURE;
}
}
}
send_status(id, status);
free(data);
}
static void
process_do_stat(u_int32_t id, int do_lstat)
{
Attrib a;
struct stat st;
char *name;
int r, status = SSH2_FX_FAILURE;
if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(iqueue, &name, NULL)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
debug3("request %u: %sstat", id, do_lstat ? "l" : "");
verbose("%sstat name \"%s\"", do_lstat ? "l" : "", name);
r = do_lstat ? lstat(name, &st) : stat(name, &st);
if (r == -1) {
status = errno_to_portable(errno);
} else {
stat_to_attrib(&st, &a);
send_attrib(id, &a);
status = SSH2_FX_OK;
}
if (status != SSH2_FX_OK)
send_status(id, status);
free(name);
}
static void
process_stat(u_int32_t id)
{
process_do_stat(id, 0);
}
static void
process_lstat(u_int32_t id)
{
process_do_stat(id, 1);
}
static void
process_fstat(u_int32_t id)
{
Attrib a;
struct stat st;
int fd, r, handle, status = SSH2_FX_FAILURE;
if ((r = get_handle(iqueue, &handle)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
debug("request %u: fstat \"%s\" (handle %u)",
id, handle_to_name(handle), handle);
fd = handle_to_fd(handle);
if (fd >= 0) {
r = fstat(fd, &st);
if (r == -1) {
status = errno_to_portable(errno);
} else {
stat_to_attrib(&st, &a);
send_attrib(id, &a);
status = SSH2_FX_OK;
}
}
if (status != SSH2_FX_OK)
send_status(id, status);
}
static struct timeval *
attrib_to_tv(const Attrib *a)
{
static struct timeval tv[2];
tv[0].tv_sec = a->atime;
tv[0].tv_usec = 0;
tv[1].tv_sec = a->mtime;
tv[1].tv_usec = 0;
return tv;
}
static struct timespec *
attrib_to_ts(const Attrib *a)
{
static struct timespec ts[2];
ts[0].tv_sec = a->atime;
ts[0].tv_nsec = 0;
ts[1].tv_sec = a->mtime;
ts[1].tv_nsec = 0;
return ts;
}
static void
process_setstat(u_int32_t id)
{
Attrib a;
char *name;
int r, status = SSH2_FX_OK;
if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(iqueue, &name, NULL)) != 0 ||
(r = decode_attrib(iqueue, &a)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
debug("request %u: setstat name \"%s\"", id, name);
if (a.flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_SIZE) {
logit("set \"%s\" size %llu",
name, (unsigned long long)a.size);
r = truncate(name, a.size);
if (r == -1)
status = errno_to_portable(errno);
}
if (a.flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_PERMISSIONS) {
logit("set \"%s\" mode %04o", name, a.perm);
r = chmod(name, a.perm & 07777);
if (r == -1)
status = errno_to_portable(errno);
}
if (a.flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_ACMODTIME) {
char buf[64];
time_t t = a.mtime;
strftime(buf, sizeof(buf), "%Y%m%d-%H:%M:%S",
localtime(&t));
logit("set \"%s\" modtime %s", name, buf);
r = utimes(name, attrib_to_tv(&a));
if (r == -1)
status = errno_to_portable(errno);
}
if (a.flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_UIDGID) {
logit("set \"%s\" owner %lu group %lu", name,
(u_long)a.uid, (u_long)a.gid);
r = chown(name, a.uid, a.gid);
if (r == -1)
status = errno_to_portable(errno);
}
send_status(id, status);
free(name);
}
static void
process_fsetstat(u_int32_t id)
{
Attrib a;
int handle, fd, r;
int status = SSH2_FX_OK;
if ((r = get_handle(iqueue, &handle)) != 0 ||
(r = decode_attrib(iqueue, &a)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
debug("request %u: fsetstat handle %d", id, handle);
fd = handle_to_fd(handle);
if (fd < 0)
status = SSH2_FX_FAILURE;
else {
char *name = handle_to_name(handle);
if (a.flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_SIZE) {
logit("set \"%s\" size %llu",
name, (unsigned long long)a.size);
r = ftruncate(fd, a.size);
if (r == -1)
status = errno_to_portable(errno);
}
if (a.flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_PERMISSIONS) {
logit("set \"%s\" mode %04o", name, a.perm);
#ifdef HAVE_FCHMOD
r = fchmod(fd, a.perm & 07777);
#else
r = chmod(name, a.perm & 07777);
#endif
if (r == -1)
status = errno_to_portable(errno);
}
if (a.flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_ACMODTIME) {
char buf[64];
time_t t = a.mtime;
strftime(buf, sizeof(buf), "%Y%m%d-%H:%M:%S",
localtime(&t));
logit("set \"%s\" modtime %s", name, buf);
#ifdef HAVE_FUTIMES
r = futimes(fd, attrib_to_tv(&a));
#else
r = utimes(name, attrib_to_tv(&a));
#endif
if (r == -1)
status = errno_to_portable(errno);
}
if (a.flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_UIDGID) {
logit("set \"%s\" owner %lu group %lu", name,
(u_long)a.uid, (u_long)a.gid);
#ifdef HAVE_FCHOWN
r = fchown(fd, a.uid, a.gid);
#else
r = chown(name, a.uid, a.gid);
#endif
if (r == -1)
status = errno_to_portable(errno);
}
}
send_status(id, status);
}
static void
process_opendir(u_int32_t id)
{
DIR *dirp = NULL;
char *path;
int r, handle, status = SSH2_FX_FAILURE;
if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(iqueue, &path, NULL)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
debug3("request %u: opendir", id);
logit("opendir \"%s\"", path);
dirp = opendir(path);
if (dirp == NULL) {
status = errno_to_portable(errno);
} else {
handle = handle_new(HANDLE_DIR, path, 0, 0, dirp);
if (handle < 0) {
closedir(dirp);
} else {
send_handle(id, handle);
status = SSH2_FX_OK;
}
}
if (status != SSH2_FX_OK)
send_status(id, status);
free(path);
}
static void
process_readdir(u_int32_t id)
{
DIR *dirp;
struct dirent *dp;
char *path;
int r, handle;
if ((r = get_handle(iqueue, &handle)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
debug("request %u: readdir \"%s\" (handle %d)", id,
handle_to_name(handle), handle);
dirp = handle_to_dir(handle);
path = handle_to_name(handle);
if (dirp == NULL || path == NULL) {
send_status(id, SSH2_FX_FAILURE);
} else {
struct stat st;
char pathname[PATH_MAX];
Stat *stats;
int nstats = 10, count = 0, i;
stats = xcalloc(nstats, sizeof(Stat));
while ((dp = readdir(dirp)) != NULL) {
if (count >= nstats) {
nstats *= 2;
stats = xreallocarray(stats, nstats, sizeof(Stat));
}
/* XXX OVERFLOW ? */
snprintf(pathname, sizeof pathname, "%s%s%s", path,
strcmp(path, "/") ? "/" : "", dp->d_name);
if (lstat(pathname, &st) == -1)
continue;
stat_to_attrib(&st, &(stats[count].attrib));
stats[count].name = xstrdup(dp->d_name);
stats[count].long_name = ls_file(dp->d_name, &st, 0, 0);
count++;
/* send up to 100 entries in one message */
/* XXX check packet size instead */
if (count == 100)
break;
}
if (count > 0) {
send_names(id, count, stats);
for (i = 0; i < count; i++) {
free(stats[i].name);
free(stats[i].long_name);
}
} else {
send_status(id, SSH2_FX_EOF);
}
free(stats);
}
}
static void
process_remove(u_int32_t id)
{
char *name;
int r, status = SSH2_FX_FAILURE;
if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(iqueue, &name, NULL)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
debug3("request %u: remove", id);
logit("remove name \"%s\"", name);
r = unlink(name);
status = (r == -1) ? errno_to_portable(errno) : SSH2_FX_OK;
send_status(id, status);
free(name);
}
static void
process_mkdir(u_int32_t id)
{
Attrib a;
char *name;
int r, mode, status = SSH2_FX_FAILURE;
if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(iqueue, &name, NULL)) != 0 ||
(r = decode_attrib(iqueue, &a)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
mode = (a.flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_PERMISSIONS) ?
a.perm & 07777 : 0777;
debug3("request %u: mkdir", id);
logit("mkdir name \"%s\" mode 0%o", name, mode);
r = mkdir(name, mode);
status = (r == -1) ? errno_to_portable(errno) : SSH2_FX_OK;
send_status(id, status);
free(name);
}
static void
process_rmdir(u_int32_t id)
{
char *name;
int r, status;
if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(iqueue, &name, NULL)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
debug3("request %u: rmdir", id);
logit("rmdir name \"%s\"", name);
r = rmdir(name);
status = (r == -1) ? errno_to_portable(errno) : SSH2_FX_OK;
send_status(id, status);
free(name);
}
static void
process_realpath(u_int32_t id)
{
char resolvedname[PATH_MAX];
char *path;
int r;
if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(iqueue, &path, NULL)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
if (path[0] == '\0') {
free(path);
path = xstrdup(".");
}
debug3("request %u: realpath", id);
verbose("realpath \"%s\"", path);
if (sftp_realpath(path, resolvedname) == NULL) {
send_status(id, errno_to_portable(errno));
} else {
Stat s;
attrib_clear(&s.attrib);
s.name = s.long_name = resolvedname;
send_names(id, 1, &s);
}
free(path);
}
static void
process_rename(u_int32_t id)
{
char *oldpath, *newpath;
int r, status;
struct stat sb;
if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(iqueue, &oldpath, NULL)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_cstring(iqueue, &newpath, NULL)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
debug3("request %u: rename", id);
logit("rename old \"%s\" new \"%s\"", oldpath, newpath);
status = SSH2_FX_FAILURE;
if (lstat(oldpath, &sb) == -1)
status = errno_to_portable(errno);
else if (S_ISREG(sb.st_mode)) {
/* Race-free rename of regular files */
if (link(oldpath, newpath) == -1) {
if (errno == EOPNOTSUPP || errno == ENOSYS
#ifdef EXDEV
|| errno == EXDEV
#endif
#ifdef LINK_OPNOTSUPP_ERRNO
|| errno == LINK_OPNOTSUPP_ERRNO
#endif
) {
struct stat st;
/*
* fs doesn't support links, so fall back to
* stat+rename. This is racy.
*/
if (stat(newpath, &st) == -1) {
if (rename(oldpath, newpath) == -1)
status =
errno_to_portable(errno);
else
status = SSH2_FX_OK;
}
} else {
status = errno_to_portable(errno);
}
} else if (unlink(oldpath) == -1) {
status = errno_to_portable(errno);
/* clean spare link */
unlink(newpath);
} else
status = SSH2_FX_OK;
} else if (stat(newpath, &sb) == -1) {
if (rename(oldpath, newpath) == -1)
status = errno_to_portable(errno);
else
status = SSH2_FX_OK;
}
send_status(id, status);
free(oldpath);
free(newpath);
}
static void
process_readlink(u_int32_t id)
{
int r, len;
char buf[PATH_MAX];
char *path;
if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(iqueue, &path, NULL)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
debug3("request %u: readlink", id);
verbose("readlink \"%s\"", path);
if ((len = readlink(path, buf, sizeof(buf) - 1)) == -1)
send_status(id, errno_to_portable(errno));
else {
Stat s;
buf[len] = '\0';
attrib_clear(&s.attrib);
s.name = s.long_name = buf;
send_names(id, 1, &s);
}
free(path);
}
static void
process_symlink(u_int32_t id)
{
char *oldpath, *newpath;
int r, status;
if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(iqueue, &oldpath, NULL)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_cstring(iqueue, &newpath, NULL)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
debug3("request %u: symlink", id);
logit("symlink old \"%s\" new \"%s\"", oldpath, newpath);
/* this will fail if 'newpath' exists */
r = symlink(oldpath, newpath);
status = (r == -1) ? errno_to_portable(errno) : SSH2_FX_OK;
send_status(id, status);
free(oldpath);
free(newpath);
}
static void
process_extended_posix_rename(u_int32_t id)
{
char *oldpath, *newpath;
int r, status;
if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(iqueue, &oldpath, NULL)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_cstring(iqueue, &newpath, NULL)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
debug3("request %u: posix-rename", id);
logit("posix-rename old \"%s\" new \"%s\"", oldpath, newpath);
r = rename(oldpath, newpath);
status = (r == -1) ? errno_to_portable(errno) : SSH2_FX_OK;
send_status(id, status);
free(oldpath);
free(newpath);
}
static void
process_extended_statvfs(u_int32_t id)
{
char *path;
struct statvfs st;
int r;
if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(iqueue, &path, NULL)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
debug3("request %u: statvfs", id);
logit("statvfs \"%s\"", path);
if (statvfs(path, &st) != 0)
send_status(id, errno_to_portable(errno));
else
send_statvfs(id, &st);
free(path);
}
static void
process_extended_fstatvfs(u_int32_t id)
{
int r, handle, fd;
struct statvfs st;
if ((r = get_handle(iqueue, &handle)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
debug("request %u: fstatvfs \"%s\" (handle %u)",
id, handle_to_name(handle), handle);
if ((fd = handle_to_fd(handle)) < 0) {
send_status(id, SSH2_FX_FAILURE);
return;
}
if (fstatvfs(fd, &st) != 0)
send_status(id, errno_to_portable(errno));
else
send_statvfs(id, &st);
}
static void
process_extended_hardlink(u_int32_t id)
{
char *oldpath, *newpath;
int r, status;
if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(iqueue, &oldpath, NULL)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_cstring(iqueue, &newpath, NULL)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
debug3("request %u: hardlink", id);
logit("hardlink old \"%s\" new \"%s\"", oldpath, newpath);
r = link(oldpath, newpath);
status = (r == -1) ? errno_to_portable(errno) : SSH2_FX_OK;
send_status(id, status);
free(oldpath);
free(newpath);
}
static void
process_extended_fsync(u_int32_t id)
{
int handle, fd, r, status = SSH2_FX_OP_UNSUPPORTED;
if ((r = get_handle(iqueue, &handle)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
debug3("request %u: fsync (handle %u)", id, handle);
verbose("fsync \"%s\"", handle_to_name(handle));
if ((fd = handle_to_fd(handle)) < 0)
status = SSH2_FX_NO_SUCH_FILE;
else if (handle_is_ok(handle, HANDLE_FILE)) {
r = fsync(fd);
status = (r == -1) ? errno_to_portable(errno) : SSH2_FX_OK;
}
send_status(id, status);
}
static void
process_extended_lsetstat(u_int32_t id)
{
Attrib a;
char *name;
int r, status = SSH2_FX_OK;
if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(iqueue, &name, NULL)) != 0 ||
(r = decode_attrib(iqueue, &a)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
debug("request %u: lsetstat name \"%s\"", id, name);
if (a.flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_SIZE) {
/* nonsensical for links */
status = SSH2_FX_BAD_MESSAGE;
goto out;
}
if (a.flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_PERMISSIONS) {
logit("set \"%s\" mode %04o", name, a.perm);
r = fchmodat(AT_FDCWD, name,
a.perm & 07777, AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW);
if (r == -1)
status = errno_to_portable(errno);
}
if (a.flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_ACMODTIME) {
char buf[64];
time_t t = a.mtime;
strftime(buf, sizeof(buf), "%Y%m%d-%H:%M:%S",
localtime(&t));
logit("set \"%s\" modtime %s", name, buf);
r = utimensat(AT_FDCWD, name,
attrib_to_ts(&a), AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW);
if (r == -1)
status = errno_to_portable(errno);
}
if (a.flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_UIDGID) {
logit("set \"%s\" owner %lu group %lu", name,
(u_long)a.uid, (u_long)a.gid);
r = fchownat(AT_FDCWD, name, a.uid, a.gid,
AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW);
if (r == -1)
status = errno_to_portable(errno);
}
out:
send_status(id, status);
free(name);
}
static void
process_extended(u_int32_t id)
{
char *request;
int i, r;
if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(iqueue, &request, NULL)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
for (i = 0; extended_handlers[i].handler != NULL; i++) {
if (strcmp(request, extended_handlers[i].ext_name) == 0) {
if (!request_permitted(&extended_handlers[i]))
send_status(id, SSH2_FX_PERMISSION_DENIED);
else
extended_handlers[i].handler(id);
break;
}
}
if (extended_handlers[i].handler == NULL) {
error("Unknown extended request \"%.100s\"", request);
send_status(id, SSH2_FX_OP_UNSUPPORTED); /* MUST */
}
free(request);
}
/* stolen from ssh-agent */
static void
process(void)
{
u_int msg_len;
u_int buf_len;
u_int consumed;
u_char type;
const u_char *cp;
int i, r;
u_int32_t id;
buf_len = sshbuf_len(iqueue);
if (buf_len < 5)
return; /* Incomplete message. */
cp = sshbuf_ptr(iqueue);
msg_len = get_u32(cp);
if (msg_len > SFTP_MAX_MSG_LENGTH) {
error("bad message from %s local user %s",
client_addr, pw->pw_name);
sftp_server_cleanup_exit(11);
}
if (buf_len < msg_len + 4)
return;
if ((r = sshbuf_consume(iqueue, 4)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
buf_len -= 4;
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(iqueue, &type)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
switch (type) {
case SSH2_FXP_INIT:
process_init();
init_done = 1;
break;
case SSH2_FXP_EXTENDED:
if (!init_done)
fatal("Received extended request before init");
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(iqueue, &id)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
process_extended(id);
break;
default:
if (!init_done)
fatal("Received %u request before init", type);
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(iqueue, &id)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
for (i = 0; handlers[i].handler != NULL; i++) {
if (type == handlers[i].type) {
if (!request_permitted(&handlers[i])) {
send_status(id,
SSH2_FX_PERMISSION_DENIED);
} else {
handlers[i].handler(id);
}
break;
}
}
if (handlers[i].handler == NULL)
error("Unknown message %u", type);
}
/* discard the remaining bytes from the current packet */
if (buf_len < sshbuf_len(iqueue)) {
error("iqueue grew unexpectedly");
sftp_server_cleanup_exit(255);
}
consumed = buf_len - sshbuf_len(iqueue);
if (msg_len < consumed) {
error("msg_len %u < consumed %u", msg_len, consumed);
sftp_server_cleanup_exit(255);
}
if (msg_len > consumed &&
(r = sshbuf_consume(iqueue, msg_len - consumed)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
}
/* Cleanup handler that logs active handles upon normal exit */
void
sftp_server_cleanup_exit(int i)
{
if (pw != NULL && client_addr != NULL) {
handle_log_exit();
logit("session closed for local user %s from [%s]",
pw->pw_name, client_addr);
}
_exit(i);
}
static void
sftp_server_usage(void)
{
extern char *__progname;
fprintf(stderr,
"usage: %s [-ehR] [-d start_directory] [-f log_facility] "
- "[-l log_level]\n\t[-P blacklisted_requests] "
- "[-p whitelisted_requests] [-u umask]\n"
+ "[-l log_level]\n\t[-P denied_requests] "
+ "[-p allowed_requests] [-u umask]\n"
" %s -Q protocol_feature\n",
__progname, __progname);
exit(1);
}
int
sftp_server_main(int argc, char **argv, struct passwd *user_pw)
{
fd_set *rset, *wset;
int i, r, in, out, max, ch, skipargs = 0, log_stderr = 0;
ssize_t len, olen, set_size;
SyslogFacility log_facility = SYSLOG_FACILITY_AUTH;
char *cp, *homedir = NULL, uidstr[32], buf[4*4096];
long mask;
extern char *optarg;
extern char *__progname;
__progname = ssh_get_progname(argv[0]);
log_init(__progname, log_level, log_facility, log_stderr);
pw = pwcopy(user_pw);
while (!skipargs && (ch = getopt(argc, argv,
"d:f:l:P:p:Q:u:cehR")) != -1) {
switch (ch) {
case 'Q':
if (strcasecmp(optarg, "requests") != 0) {
fprintf(stderr, "Invalid query type\n");
exit(1);
}
for (i = 0; handlers[i].handler != NULL; i++)
printf("%s\n", handlers[i].name);
for (i = 0; extended_handlers[i].handler != NULL; i++)
printf("%s\n", extended_handlers[i].name);
exit(0);
break;
case 'R':
readonly = 1;
break;
case 'c':
/*
* Ignore all arguments if we are invoked as a
* shell using "sftp-server -c command"
*/
skipargs = 1;
break;
case 'e':
log_stderr = 1;
break;
case 'l':
log_level = log_level_number(optarg);
if (log_level == SYSLOG_LEVEL_NOT_SET)
error("Invalid log level \"%s\"", optarg);
break;
case 'f':
log_facility = log_facility_number(optarg);
if (log_facility == SYSLOG_FACILITY_NOT_SET)
error("Invalid log facility \"%s\"", optarg);
break;
case 'd':
cp = tilde_expand_filename(optarg, user_pw->pw_uid);
snprintf(uidstr, sizeof(uidstr), "%llu",
(unsigned long long)pw->pw_uid);
homedir = percent_expand(cp, "d", user_pw->pw_dir,
"u", user_pw->pw_name, "U", uidstr, (char *)NULL);
free(cp);
break;
case 'p':
- if (request_whitelist != NULL)
+ if (request_allowlist != NULL)
fatal("Permitted requests already set");
- request_whitelist = xstrdup(optarg);
+ request_allowlist = xstrdup(optarg);
break;
case 'P':
- if (request_blacklist != NULL)
+ if (request_denylist != NULL)
fatal("Refused requests already set");
- request_blacklist = xstrdup(optarg);
+ request_denylist = xstrdup(optarg);
break;
case 'u':
errno = 0;
mask = strtol(optarg, &cp, 8);
if (mask < 0 || mask > 0777 || *cp != '\0' ||
cp == optarg || (mask == 0 && errno != 0))
fatal("Invalid umask \"%s\"", optarg);
(void)umask((mode_t)mask);
break;
case 'h':
default:
sftp_server_usage();
}
}
log_init(__progname, log_level, log_facility, log_stderr);
/*
* On platforms where we can, avoid making /proc/self/{mem,maps}
* available to the user so that sftp access doesn't automatically
* imply arbitrary code execution access that will break
* restricted configurations.
*/
platform_disable_tracing(1); /* strict */
/* Drop any fine-grained privileges we don't need */
platform_pledge_sftp_server();
if ((cp = getenv("SSH_CONNECTION")) != NULL) {
client_addr = xstrdup(cp);
if ((cp = strchr(client_addr, ' ')) == NULL) {
error("Malformed SSH_CONNECTION variable: \"%s\"",
getenv("SSH_CONNECTION"));
sftp_server_cleanup_exit(255);
}
*cp = '\0';
} else
client_addr = xstrdup("UNKNOWN");
logit("session opened for local user %s from [%s]",
pw->pw_name, client_addr);
in = STDIN_FILENO;
out = STDOUT_FILENO;
#ifdef HAVE_CYGWIN
setmode(in, O_BINARY);
setmode(out, O_BINARY);
#endif
max = 0;
if (in > max)
max = in;
if (out > max)
max = out;
if ((iqueue = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
if ((oqueue = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
rset = xcalloc(howmany(max + 1, NFDBITS), sizeof(fd_mask));
wset = xcalloc(howmany(max + 1, NFDBITS), sizeof(fd_mask));
if (homedir != NULL) {
if (chdir(homedir) != 0) {
error("chdir to \"%s\" failed: %s", homedir,
strerror(errno));
}
}
set_size = howmany(max + 1, NFDBITS) * sizeof(fd_mask);
for (;;) {
memset(rset, 0, set_size);
memset(wset, 0, set_size);
/*
* Ensure that we can read a full buffer and handle
* the worst-case length packet it can generate,
* otherwise apply backpressure by stopping reads.
*/
if ((r = sshbuf_check_reserve(iqueue, sizeof(buf))) == 0 &&
(r = sshbuf_check_reserve(oqueue,
SFTP_MAX_MSG_LENGTH)) == 0)
FD_SET(in, rset);
else if (r != SSH_ERR_NO_BUFFER_SPACE)
fatal("%s: sshbuf_check_reserve failed: %s",
__func__, ssh_err(r));
olen = sshbuf_len(oqueue);
if (olen > 0)
FD_SET(out, wset);
if (select(max+1, rset, wset, NULL, NULL) == -1) {
if (errno == EINTR)
continue;
error("select: %s", strerror(errno));
sftp_server_cleanup_exit(2);
}
/* copy stdin to iqueue */
if (FD_ISSET(in, rset)) {
len = read(in, buf, sizeof buf);
if (len == 0) {
debug("read eof");
sftp_server_cleanup_exit(0);
} else if (len == -1) {
error("read: %s", strerror(errno));
sftp_server_cleanup_exit(1);
} else if ((r = sshbuf_put(iqueue, buf, len)) != 0) {
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s",
__func__, ssh_err(r));
}
}
/* send oqueue to stdout */
if (FD_ISSET(out, wset)) {
len = write(out, sshbuf_ptr(oqueue), olen);
if (len == -1) {
error("write: %s", strerror(errno));
sftp_server_cleanup_exit(1);
} else if ((r = sshbuf_consume(oqueue, len)) != 0) {
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s",
__func__, ssh_err(r));
}
}
/*
* Process requests from client if we can fit the results
* into the output buffer, otherwise stop processing input
* and let the output queue drain.
*/
r = sshbuf_check_reserve(oqueue, SFTP_MAX_MSG_LENGTH);
if (r == 0)
process();
else if (r != SSH_ERR_NO_BUFFER_SPACE)
fatal("%s: sshbuf_check_reserve: %s",
__func__, ssh_err(r));
}
}
diff --git a/sftp.0 b/sftp.0
index 2823313cb273..99288ebcfc96 100644
--- a/sftp.0
+++ b/sftp.0
@@ -1,399 +1,402 @@
SFTP(1) General Commands Manual SFTP(1)
NAME
sftp M-bM-^@M-^S OpenSSH secure file transfer
SYNOPSIS
- sftp [-46aCfNpqrv] [-B buffer_size] [-b batchfile] [-c cipher]
+ sftp [-46AaCfNpqrv] [-B buffer_size] [-b batchfile] [-c cipher]
[-D sftp_server_path] [-F ssh_config] [-i identity_file]
[-J destination] [-l limit] [-o ssh_option] [-P port]
[-R num_requests] [-S program] [-s subsystem | sftp_server]
destination
DESCRIPTION
sftp is a file transfer program, similar to ftp(1), which performs all
operations over an encrypted ssh(1) transport. It may also use many
features of ssh, such as public key authentication and compression.
The destination may be specified either as [user@]host[:path] or as a URI
in the form sftp://[user@]host[:port][/path].
If the destination includes a path and it is not a directory, sftp will
retrieve files automatically if a non-interactive authentication method
is used; otherwise it will do so after successful interactive
authentication.
If no path is specified, or if the path is a directory, sftp will log in
to the specified host and enter interactive command mode, changing to the
remote directory if one was specified. An optional trailing slash can be
used to force the path to be interpreted as a directory.
Since the destination formats use colon characters to delimit host names
from path names or port numbers, IPv6 addresses must be enclosed in
square brackets to avoid ambiguity.
The options are as follows:
-4 Forces sftp to use IPv4 addresses only.
-6 Forces sftp to use IPv6 addresses only.
+ -A Allows forwarding of ssh-agent(1) to the remote system. The
+ default is not to forward an authentication agent.
+
-a Attempt to continue interrupted transfers rather than overwriting
existing partial or complete copies of files. If the partial
contents differ from those being transferred, then the resultant
file is likely to be corrupt.
-B buffer_size
Specify the size of the buffer that sftp uses when transferring
files. Larger buffers require fewer round trips at the cost of
higher memory consumption. The default is 32768 bytes.
-b batchfile
Batch mode reads a series of commands from an input batchfile
instead of stdin. Since it lacks user interaction it should be
used in conjunction with non-interactive authentication to
obviate the need to enter a password at connection time (see
sshd(8) and ssh-keygen(1) for details).
A batchfile of M-bM-^@M-^X-M-bM-^@M-^Y may be used to indicate standard input. sftp
will abort if any of the following commands fail: get, put,
reget, reput, rename, ln, rm, mkdir, chdir, ls, lchdir, chmod,
chown, chgrp, lpwd, df, symlink, and lmkdir.
Termination on error can be suppressed on a command by command
basis by prefixing the command with a M-bM-^@M-^X-M-bM-^@M-^Y character (for example,
-rm /tmp/blah*). Echo of the command may be suppressed by
prefixing the command with a M-bM-^@M-^X@M-bM-^@M-^Y character. These two prefixes
may be combined in any order, for example -@ls /bsd.
-C Enables compression (via ssh's -C flag).
-c cipher
Selects the cipher to use for encrypting the data transfers.
This option is directly passed to ssh(1).
-D sftp_server_path
Connect directly to a local sftp server (rather than via ssh(1)).
This option may be useful in debugging the client and server.
-F ssh_config
Specifies an alternative per-user configuration file for ssh(1).
This option is directly passed to ssh(1).
-f Requests that files be flushed to disk immediately after
transfer. When uploading files, this feature is only enabled if
the server implements the "fsync@openssh.com" extension.
-i identity_file
Selects the file from which the identity (private key) for public
key authentication is read. This option is directly passed to
ssh(1).
-J destination
Connect to the target host by first making an sftp connection to
the jump host described by destination and then establishing a
TCP forwarding to the ultimate destination from there. Multiple
jump hops may be specified separated by comma characters. This
is a shortcut to specify a ProxyJump configuration directive.
This option is directly passed to ssh(1).
-l limit
Limits the used bandwidth, specified in Kbit/s.
-N Disables quiet mode, e.g. to override the implicit quiet mode set
by the -b flag.
-o ssh_option
Can be used to pass options to ssh in the format used in
ssh_config(5). This is useful for specifying options for which
there is no separate sftp command-line flag. For example, to
specify an alternate port use: sftp -oPort=24. For full details
of the options listed below, and their possible values, see
ssh_config(5).
AddressFamily
BatchMode
BindAddress
BindInterface
CanonicalDomains
CanonicalizeFallbackLocal
CanonicalizeHostname
CanonicalizeMaxDots
CanonicalizePermittedCNAMEs
CASignatureAlgorithms
CertificateFile
ChallengeResponseAuthentication
CheckHostIP
Ciphers
Compression
ConnectionAttempts
ConnectTimeout
ControlMaster
ControlPath
ControlPersist
GlobalKnownHostsFile
GSSAPIAuthentication
GSSAPIDelegateCredentials
HashKnownHosts
Host
HostbasedAuthentication
HostbasedKeyTypes
HostKeyAlgorithms
HostKeyAlias
Hostname
IdentitiesOnly
IdentityAgent
IdentityFile
IPQoS
KbdInteractiveAuthentication
KbdInteractiveDevices
KexAlgorithms
LogLevel
MACs
NoHostAuthenticationForLocalhost
NumberOfPasswordPrompts
PasswordAuthentication
PKCS11Provider
Port
PreferredAuthentications
ProxyCommand
ProxyJump
PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes
PubkeyAuthentication
RekeyLimit
SendEnv
ServerAliveInterval
ServerAliveCountMax
SetEnv
StrictHostKeyChecking
TCPKeepAlive
UpdateHostKeys
User
UserKnownHostsFile
VerifyHostKeyDNS
-P port
Specifies the port to connect to on the remote host.
-p Preserves modification times, access times, and modes from the
original files transferred.
-q Quiet mode: disables the progress meter as well as warning and
diagnostic messages from ssh(1).
-R num_requests
Specify how many requests may be outstanding at any one time.
Increasing this may slightly improve file transfer speed but will
increase memory usage. The default is 64 outstanding requests.
-r Recursively copy entire directories when uploading and
downloading. Note that sftp does not follow symbolic links
encountered in the tree traversal.
-S program
Name of the program to use for the encrypted connection. The
program must understand ssh(1) options.
-s subsystem | sftp_server
Specifies the SSH2 subsystem or the path for an sftp server on
the remote host. A path is useful when the remote sshd(8) does
not have an sftp subsystem configured.
-v Raise logging level. This option is also passed to ssh.
INTERACTIVE COMMANDS
Once in interactive mode, sftp understands a set of commands similar to
those of ftp(1). Commands are case insensitive. Pathnames that contain
spaces must be enclosed in quotes. Any special characters contained
within pathnames that are recognized by glob(3) must be escaped with
backslashes (M-bM-^@M-^X\M-bM-^@M-^Y).
bye Quit sftp.
cd [path]
Change remote directory to path. If path is not specified, then
change directory to the one the session started in.
chgrp [-h] grp path
Change group of file path to grp. If the -h flag is specified,
then symlinks will not be followed. path may contain glob(7)
characters and may match multiple files. grp must be a numeric
GID.
chmod [-h] mode path
Change permissions of file path to mode. If the -h flag is
specified, then symlinks will not be followed. path may contain
glob(7) characters and may match multiple files.
chown [-h] own path
Change owner of file path to own. If the -h flag is specified,
then symlinks will not be followed. path may contain glob(7)
characters and may match multiple files. own must be a numeric
UID.
df [-hi] [path]
Display usage information for the filesystem holding the current
directory (or path if specified). If the -h flag is specified,
the capacity information will be displayed using "human-readable"
suffixes. The -i flag requests display of inode information in
addition to capacity information. This command is only supported
on servers that implement the M-bM-^@M-^\statvfs@openssh.comM-bM-^@M-^] extension.
exit Quit sftp.
get [-afpR] remote-path [local-path]
Retrieve the remote-path and store it on the local machine. If
the local path name is not specified, it is given the same name
it has on the remote machine. remote-path may contain glob(7)
characters and may match multiple files. If it does and
local-path is specified, then local-path must specify a
directory.
If the -a flag is specified, then attempt to resume partial
transfers of existing files. Note that resumption assumes that
any partial copy of the local file matches the remote copy. If
the remote file contents differ from the partial local copy then
the resultant file is likely to be corrupt.
If the -f flag is specified, then fsync(2) will be called after
the file transfer has completed to flush the file to disk.
If the -p flag is specified, then full file permissions and
access times are copied too.
If the -R flag is specified then directories will be copied
recursively. Note that sftp does not follow symbolic links when
performing recursive transfers.
help Display help text.
lcd [path]
Change local directory to path. If path is not specified, then
change directory to the local user's home directory.
lls [ls-options [path]]
Display local directory listing of either path or current
directory if path is not specified. ls-options may contain any
flags supported by the local system's ls(1) command. path may
contain glob(7) characters and may match multiple files.
lmkdir path
Create local directory specified by path.
ln [-s] oldpath newpath
Create a link from oldpath to newpath. If the -s flag is
specified the created link is a symbolic link, otherwise it is a
hard link.
lpwd Print local working directory.
ls [-1afhlnrSt] [path]
Display a remote directory listing of either path or the current
directory if path is not specified. path may contain glob(7)
characters and may match multiple files.
The following flags are recognized and alter the behaviour of ls
accordingly:
-1 Produce single columnar output.
-a List files beginning with a dot (M-bM-^@M-^X.M-bM-^@M-^Y).
-f Do not sort the listing. The default sort order is
lexicographical.
-h When used with a long format option, use unit suffixes:
Byte, Kilobyte, Megabyte, Gigabyte, Terabyte, Petabyte,
and Exabyte in order to reduce the number of digits to
four or fewer using powers of 2 for sizes (K=1024,
M=1048576, etc.).
-l Display additional details including permissions and
ownership information.
-n Produce a long listing with user and group information
presented numerically.
-r Reverse the sort order of the listing.
-S Sort the listing by file size.
-t Sort the listing by last modification time.
lumask umask
Set local umask to umask.
mkdir path
Create remote directory specified by path.
progress
Toggle display of progress meter.
put [-afpR] local-path [remote-path]
Upload local-path and store it on the remote machine. If the
remote path name is not specified, it is given the same name it
has on the local machine. local-path may contain glob(7)
characters and may match multiple files. If it does and
remote-path is specified, then remote-path must specify a
directory.
If the -a flag is specified, then attempt to resume partial
transfers of existing files. Note that resumption assumes that
any partial copy of the remote file matches the local copy. If
the local file contents differ from the remote local copy then
the resultant file is likely to be corrupt.
If the -f flag is specified, then a request will be sent to the
server to call fsync(2) after the file has been transferred.
Note that this is only supported by servers that implement the
"fsync@openssh.com" extension.
If the -p flag is specified, then full file permissions and
access times are copied too.
If the -R flag is specified then directories will be copied
recursively. Note that sftp does not follow symbolic links when
performing recursive transfers.
pwd Display remote working directory.
quit Quit sftp.
reget [-fpR] remote-path [local-path]
Resume download of remote-path. Equivalent to get with the -a
flag set.
reput [-fpR] local-path [remote-path]
Resume upload of local-path. Equivalent to put with the -a flag
set.
rename oldpath newpath
Rename remote file from oldpath to newpath.
rm path
Delete remote file specified by path.
rmdir path
Remove remote directory specified by path.
symlink oldpath newpath
Create a symbolic link from oldpath to newpath.
version
Display the sftp protocol version.
!command
Execute command in local shell.
! Escape to local shell.
? Synonym for help.
SEE ALSO
ftp(1), ls(1), scp(1), ssh(1), ssh-add(1), ssh-keygen(1), ssh_config(5),
glob(7), sftp-server(8), sshd(8)
T. Ylonen and S. Lehtinen, SSH File Transfer Protocol, draft-ietf-secsh-
filexfer-00.txt, January 2001, work in progress material.
-OpenBSD 6.7 April 23, 2020 OpenBSD 6.7
+OpenBSD 6.8 August 3, 2020 OpenBSD 6.8
diff --git a/sftp.1 b/sftp.1
index a305b37d137b..1cfa5ec229e3 100644
--- a/sftp.1
+++ b/sftp.1
@@ -1,685 +1,690 @@
-.\" $OpenBSD: sftp.1,v 1.131 2020/04/23 21:28:09 jmc Exp $
+.\" $OpenBSD: sftp.1,v 1.132 2020/08/03 02:43:41 djm Exp $
.\"
.\" Copyright (c) 2001 Damien Miller. All rights reserved.
.\"
.\" Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
.\" modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
.\" are met:
.\" 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
.\" notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
.\" 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
.\" notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
.\" documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
.\"
.\" THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
.\" IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
.\" OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
.\" IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
.\" INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
.\" NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
.\" DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
.\" THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
.\" (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
.\" THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
.\"
-.Dd $Mdocdate: April 23 2020 $
+.Dd $Mdocdate: August 3 2020 $
.Dt SFTP 1
.Os
.Sh NAME
.Nm sftp
.Nd OpenSSH secure file transfer
.Sh SYNOPSIS
.Nm sftp
-.Op Fl 46aCfNpqrv
+.Op Fl 46AaCfNpqrv
.Op Fl B Ar buffer_size
.Op Fl b Ar batchfile
.Op Fl c Ar cipher
.Op Fl D Ar sftp_server_path
.Op Fl F Ar ssh_config
.Op Fl i Ar identity_file
.Op Fl J Ar destination
.Op Fl l Ar limit
.Op Fl o Ar ssh_option
.Op Fl P Ar port
.Op Fl R Ar num_requests
.Op Fl S Ar program
.Op Fl s Ar subsystem | sftp_server
.Ar destination
.Sh DESCRIPTION
.Nm
is a file transfer program, similar to
.Xr ftp 1 ,
which performs all operations over an encrypted
.Xr ssh 1
transport.
It may also use many features of ssh, such as public key authentication and
compression.
.Pp
The
.Ar destination
may be specified either as
.Sm off
.Oo user @ Oc host Op : path
.Sm on
or as a URI in the form
.Sm off
.No sftp:// Oo user @ Oc host Oo : port Oc Op / path .
.Sm on
.Pp
If the
.Ar destination
includes a
.Ar path
and it is not a directory,
.Nm
will retrieve files automatically if a non-interactive
authentication method is used; otherwise it will do so after
successful interactive authentication.
.Pp
If no
.Ar path
is specified, or if the
.Ar path
is a directory,
.Nm
will log in to the specified
.Ar host
and enter interactive command mode, changing to the remote directory
if one was specified.
An optional trailing slash can be used to force the
.Ar path
to be interpreted as a directory.
.Pp
Since the destination formats use colon characters to delimit host
names from path names or port numbers, IPv6 addresses must be
enclosed in square brackets to avoid ambiguity.
.Pp
The options are as follows:
.Bl -tag -width Ds
.It Fl 4
Forces
.Nm
to use IPv4 addresses only.
.It Fl 6
Forces
.Nm
to use IPv6 addresses only.
+.It Fl A
+Allows forwarding of
+.Xr ssh-agent 1
+to the remote system.
+The default is not to forward an authentication agent.
.It Fl a
Attempt to continue interrupted transfers rather than overwriting
existing partial or complete copies of files.
If the partial contents differ from those being transferred,
then the resultant file is likely to be corrupt.
.It Fl B Ar buffer_size
Specify the size of the buffer that
.Nm
uses when transferring files.
Larger buffers require fewer round trips at the cost of higher
memory consumption.
The default is 32768 bytes.
.It Fl b Ar batchfile
Batch mode reads a series of commands from an input
.Ar batchfile
instead of
.Em stdin .
Since it lacks user interaction it should be used in conjunction with
non-interactive authentication to obviate the need to enter a password
at connection time (see
.Xr sshd 8
and
.Xr ssh-keygen 1
for details).
.Pp
A
.Ar batchfile
of
.Sq \-
may be used to indicate standard input.
.Nm
will abort if any of the following
commands fail:
.Ic get , put , reget , reput , rename , ln ,
.Ic rm , mkdir , chdir , ls ,
.Ic lchdir , chmod , chown ,
.Ic chgrp , lpwd , df , symlink ,
and
.Ic lmkdir .
.Pp
Termination on error can be suppressed on a command by command basis by
prefixing the command with a
.Sq \-
character (for example,
.Ic -rm /tmp/blah* ) .
Echo of the command may be suppressed by prefixing the command with a
.Sq @
character.
These two prefixes may be combined in any order, for example
.Ic -@ls /bsd .
.It Fl C
Enables compression (via ssh's
.Fl C
flag).
.It Fl c Ar cipher
Selects the cipher to use for encrypting the data transfers.
This option is directly passed to
.Xr ssh 1 .
.It Fl D Ar sftp_server_path
Connect directly to a local sftp server
(rather than via
.Xr ssh 1 ) .
This option may be useful in debugging the client and server.
.It Fl F Ar ssh_config
Specifies an alternative
per-user configuration file for
.Xr ssh 1 .
This option is directly passed to
.Xr ssh 1 .
.It Fl f
Requests that files be flushed to disk immediately after transfer.
When uploading files, this feature is only enabled if the server
implements the "fsync@openssh.com" extension.
.It Fl i Ar identity_file
Selects the file from which the identity (private key) for public key
authentication is read.
This option is directly passed to
.Xr ssh 1 .
.It Fl J Ar destination
Connect to the target host by first making an
.Nm
connection to the jump host described by
.Ar destination
and then establishing a TCP forwarding to the ultimate destination from
there.
Multiple jump hops may be specified separated by comma characters.
This is a shortcut to specify a
.Cm ProxyJump
configuration directive.
This option is directly passed to
.Xr ssh 1 .
.It Fl l Ar limit
Limits the used bandwidth, specified in Kbit/s.
.It Fl N
Disables quiet mode, e.g. to override the implicit quiet mode set by the
.Fl b
flag.
.It Fl o Ar ssh_option
Can be used to pass options to
.Nm ssh
in the format used in
.Xr ssh_config 5 .
This is useful for specifying options
for which there is no separate
.Nm sftp
command-line flag.
For example, to specify an alternate port use:
.Ic sftp -oPort=24 .
For full details of the options listed below, and their possible values, see
.Xr ssh_config 5 .
.Pp
.Bl -tag -width Ds -offset indent -compact
.It AddressFamily
.It BatchMode
.It BindAddress
.It BindInterface
.It CanonicalDomains
.It CanonicalizeFallbackLocal
.It CanonicalizeHostname
.It CanonicalizeMaxDots
.It CanonicalizePermittedCNAMEs
.It CASignatureAlgorithms
.It CertificateFile
.It ChallengeResponseAuthentication
.It CheckHostIP
.It Ciphers
.It Compression
.It ConnectionAttempts
.It ConnectTimeout
.It ControlMaster
.It ControlPath
.It ControlPersist
.It GlobalKnownHostsFile
.It GSSAPIAuthentication
.It GSSAPIDelegateCredentials
.It HashKnownHosts
.It Host
.It HostbasedAuthentication
.It HostbasedKeyTypes
.It HostKeyAlgorithms
.It HostKeyAlias
.It Hostname
.It IdentitiesOnly
.It IdentityAgent
.It IdentityFile
.It IPQoS
.It KbdInteractiveAuthentication
.It KbdInteractiveDevices
.It KexAlgorithms
.It LogLevel
.It MACs
.It NoHostAuthenticationForLocalhost
.It NumberOfPasswordPrompts
.It PasswordAuthentication
.It PKCS11Provider
.It Port
.It PreferredAuthentications
.It ProxyCommand
.It ProxyJump
.It PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes
.It PubkeyAuthentication
.It RekeyLimit
.It SendEnv
.It ServerAliveInterval
.It ServerAliveCountMax
.It SetEnv
.It StrictHostKeyChecking
.It TCPKeepAlive
.It UpdateHostKeys
.It User
.It UserKnownHostsFile
.It VerifyHostKeyDNS
.El
.It Fl P Ar port
Specifies the port to connect to on the remote host.
.It Fl p
Preserves modification times, access times, and modes from the
original files transferred.
.It Fl q
Quiet mode: disables the progress meter as well as warning and
diagnostic messages from
.Xr ssh 1 .
.It Fl R Ar num_requests
Specify how many requests may be outstanding at any one time.
Increasing this may slightly improve file transfer speed
but will increase memory usage.
The default is 64 outstanding requests.
.It Fl r
Recursively copy entire directories when uploading and downloading.
Note that
.Nm
does not follow symbolic links encountered in the tree traversal.
.It Fl S Ar program
Name of the
.Ar program
to use for the encrypted connection.
The program must understand
.Xr ssh 1
options.
.It Fl s Ar subsystem | sftp_server
Specifies the SSH2 subsystem or the path for an sftp server
on the remote host.
A path is useful when the remote
.Xr sshd 8
does not have an sftp subsystem configured.
.It Fl v
Raise logging level.
This option is also passed to ssh.
.El
.Sh INTERACTIVE COMMANDS
Once in interactive mode,
.Nm
understands a set of commands similar to those of
.Xr ftp 1 .
Commands are case insensitive.
Pathnames that contain spaces must be enclosed in quotes.
Any special characters contained within pathnames that are recognized by
.Xr glob 3
must be escaped with backslashes
.Pq Sq \e .
.Bl -tag -width Ds
.It Ic bye
Quit
.Nm sftp .
.It Ic cd Op Ar path
Change remote directory to
.Ar path .
If
.Ar path
is not specified, then change directory to the one the session started in.
.It Xo Ic chgrp
.Op Fl h
.Ar grp
.Ar path
.Xc
Change group of file
.Ar path
to
.Ar grp .
If the
.Fl h
flag is specified, then symlinks will not be followed.
.Ar path
may contain
.Xr glob 7
characters and may match multiple files.
.Ar grp
must be a numeric GID.
.It Xo Ic chmod
.Op Fl h
.Ar mode
.Ar path
.Xc
Change permissions of file
.Ar path
to
.Ar mode .
If the
.Fl h
flag is specified, then symlinks will not be followed.
.Ar path
may contain
.Xr glob 7
characters and may match multiple files.
.It Xo Ic chown
.Op Fl h
.Ar own
.Ar path
.Xc
Change owner of file
.Ar path
to
.Ar own .
If the
.Fl h
flag is specified, then symlinks will not be followed.
.Ar path
may contain
.Xr glob 7
characters and may match multiple files.
.Ar own
must be a numeric UID.
.It Xo Ic df
.Op Fl hi
.Op Ar path
.Xc
Display usage information for the filesystem holding the current directory
(or
.Ar path
if specified).
If the
.Fl h
flag is specified, the capacity information will be displayed using
"human-readable" suffixes.
The
.Fl i
flag requests display of inode information in addition to capacity information.
This command is only supported on servers that implement the
.Dq statvfs@openssh.com
extension.
.It Ic exit
Quit
.Nm sftp .
.It Xo Ic get
.Op Fl afpR
.Ar remote-path
.Op Ar local-path
.Xc
Retrieve the
.Ar remote-path
and store it on the local machine.
If the local
path name is not specified, it is given the same name it has on the
remote machine.
.Ar remote-path
may contain
.Xr glob 7
characters and may match multiple files.
If it does and
.Ar local-path
is specified, then
.Ar local-path
must specify a directory.
.Pp
If the
.Fl a
flag is specified, then attempt to resume partial transfers of existing files.
Note that resumption assumes that any partial copy of the local file matches
the remote copy.
If the remote file contents differ from the partial local copy then the
resultant file is likely to be corrupt.
.Pp
If the
.Fl f
flag is specified, then
.Xr fsync 2
will be called after the file transfer has completed to flush the file
to disk.
.Pp
If the
.Fl p
.\" undocumented redundant alias
.\" or
.\" .Fl P
flag is specified, then full file permissions and access times are
copied too.
.Pp
If the
.Fl R
.\" undocumented redundant alias
.\" or
.\" .Fl r
flag is specified then directories will be copied recursively.
Note that
.Nm
does not follow symbolic links when performing recursive transfers.
.It Ic help
Display help text.
.It Ic lcd Op Ar path
Change local directory to
.Ar path .
If
.Ar path
is not specified, then change directory to the local user's home directory.
.It Ic lls Op Ar ls-options Op Ar path
Display local directory listing of either
.Ar path
or current directory if
.Ar path
is not specified.
.Ar ls-options
may contain any flags supported by the local system's
.Xr ls 1
command.
.Ar path
may contain
.Xr glob 7
characters and may match multiple files.
.It Ic lmkdir Ar path
Create local directory specified by
.Ar path .
.It Xo Ic ln
.Op Fl s
.Ar oldpath
.Ar newpath
.Xc
Create a link from
.Ar oldpath
to
.Ar newpath .
If the
.Fl s
flag is specified the created link is a symbolic link, otherwise it is
a hard link.
.It Ic lpwd
Print local working directory.
.It Xo Ic ls
.Op Fl 1afhlnrSt
.Op Ar path
.Xc
Display a remote directory listing of either
.Ar path
or the current directory if
.Ar path
is not specified.
.Ar path
may contain
.Xr glob 7
characters and may match multiple files.
.Pp
The following flags are recognized and alter the behaviour of
.Ic ls
accordingly:
.Bl -tag -width Ds
.It Fl 1
Produce single columnar output.
.It Fl a
List files beginning with a dot
.Pq Sq \&. .
.It Fl f
Do not sort the listing.
The default sort order is lexicographical.
.It Fl h
When used with a long format option, use unit suffixes: Byte, Kilobyte,
Megabyte, Gigabyte, Terabyte, Petabyte, and Exabyte in order to reduce
the number of digits to four or fewer using powers of 2 for sizes (K=1024,
M=1048576, etc.).
.It Fl l
Display additional details including permissions
and ownership information.
.It Fl n
Produce a long listing with user and group information presented
numerically.
.It Fl r
Reverse the sort order of the listing.
.It Fl S
Sort the listing by file size.
.It Fl t
Sort the listing by last modification time.
.El
.It Ic lumask Ar umask
Set local umask to
.Ar umask .
.It Ic mkdir Ar path
Create remote directory specified by
.Ar path .
.It Ic progress
Toggle display of progress meter.
.It Xo Ic put
.Op Fl afpR
.Ar local-path
.Op Ar remote-path
.Xc
Upload
.Ar local-path
and store it on the remote machine.
If the remote path name is not specified, it is given the same name it has
on the local machine.
.Ar local-path
may contain
.Xr glob 7
characters and may match multiple files.
If it does and
.Ar remote-path
is specified, then
.Ar remote-path
must specify a directory.
.Pp
If the
.Fl a
flag is specified, then attempt to resume partial
transfers of existing files.
Note that resumption assumes that any partial copy of the remote file
matches the local copy.
If the local file contents differ from the remote local copy then
the resultant file is likely to be corrupt.
.Pp
If the
.Fl f
flag is specified, then a request will be sent to the server to call
.Xr fsync 2
after the file has been transferred.
Note that this is only supported by servers that implement
the "fsync@openssh.com" extension.
.Pp
If the
.Fl p
.\" undocumented redundant alias
.\" or
.\" .Fl P
flag is specified, then full file permissions and access times are
copied too.
.Pp
If the
.Fl R
.\" undocumented redundant alias
.\" or
.\" .Fl r
flag is specified then directories will be copied recursively.
Note that
.Nm
does not follow symbolic links when performing recursive transfers.
.It Ic pwd
Display remote working directory.
.It Ic quit
Quit
.Nm sftp .
.It Xo Ic reget
.Op Fl fpR
.Ar remote-path
.Op Ar local-path
.Xc
Resume download of
.Ar remote-path .
Equivalent to
.Ic get
with the
.Fl a
flag set.
.It Xo Ic reput
.Op Fl fpR
.Ar local-path
.Op Ar remote-path
.Xc
Resume upload of
.Ar local-path .
Equivalent to
.Ic put
with the
.Fl a
flag set.
.It Ic rename Ar oldpath newpath
Rename remote file from
.Ar oldpath
to
.Ar newpath .
.It Ic rm Ar path
Delete remote file specified by
.Ar path .
.It Ic rmdir Ar path
Remove remote directory specified by
.Ar path .
.It Ic symlink Ar oldpath newpath
Create a symbolic link from
.Ar oldpath
to
.Ar newpath .
.It Ic version
Display the
.Nm
protocol version.
.It Ic \&! Ns Ar command
Execute
.Ar command
in local shell.
.It Ic \&!
Escape to local shell.
.It Ic \&?
Synonym for help.
.El
.Sh SEE ALSO
.Xr ftp 1 ,
.Xr ls 1 ,
.Xr scp 1 ,
.Xr ssh 1 ,
.Xr ssh-add 1 ,
.Xr ssh-keygen 1 ,
.Xr ssh_config 5 ,
.Xr glob 7 ,
.Xr sftp-server 8 ,
.Xr sshd 8
.Rs
.%A T. Ylonen
.%A S. Lehtinen
.%T "SSH File Transfer Protocol"
.%N draft-ietf-secsh-filexfer-00.txt
.%D January 2001
.%O work in progress material
.Re
diff --git a/sftp.c b/sftp.c
index 2799e4a109bd..c88c861185be 100644
--- a/sftp.c
+++ b/sftp.c
@@ -1,2610 +1,2613 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: sftp.c,v 1.200 2020/04/03 05:53:52 jmc Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: sftp.c,v 1.201 2020/08/03 02:43:41 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 2001-2004 Damien Miller <djm@openbsd.org>
*
* Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
* purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
* copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
*
* THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
* WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
* MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
* ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
* WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
* ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
* OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
*/
#include "includes.h"
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/ioctl.h>
#ifdef HAVE_SYS_STAT_H
# include <sys/stat.h>
#endif
#include <sys/param.h>
#include <sys/socket.h>
#include <sys/wait.h>
#ifdef HAVE_SYS_STATVFS_H
#include <sys/statvfs.h>
#endif
#include <ctype.h>
#include <errno.h>
#ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H
# include <paths.h>
#endif
#ifdef HAVE_LIBGEN_H
#include <libgen.h>
#endif
#ifdef HAVE_LOCALE_H
# include <locale.h>
#endif
#ifdef USE_LIBEDIT
#include <histedit.h>
#else
typedef void EditLine;
#endif
#include <limits.h>
#include <signal.h>
#include <stdarg.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#ifdef HAVE_UTIL_H
# include <util.h>
#endif
#include "xmalloc.h"
#include "log.h"
#include "pathnames.h"
#include "misc.h"
#include "utf8.h"
#include "sftp.h"
#include "ssherr.h"
#include "sshbuf.h"
#include "sftp-common.h"
#include "sftp-client.h"
#define DEFAULT_COPY_BUFLEN 32768 /* Size of buffer for up/download */
#define DEFAULT_NUM_REQUESTS 64 /* # concurrent outstanding requests */
/* File to read commands from */
FILE* infile;
/* Are we in batchfile mode? */
int batchmode = 0;
/* PID of ssh transport process */
static volatile pid_t sshpid = -1;
/* Suppress diagnositic messages */
int quiet = 0;
/* This is set to 0 if the progressmeter is not desired. */
int showprogress = 1;
/* When this option is set, we always recursively download/upload directories */
int global_rflag = 0;
/* When this option is set, we resume download or upload if possible */
int global_aflag = 0;
/* When this option is set, the file transfers will always preserve times */
int global_pflag = 0;
/* When this option is set, transfers will have fsync() called on each file */
int global_fflag = 0;
/* SIGINT received during command processing */
volatile sig_atomic_t interrupted = 0;
/* I wish qsort() took a separate ctx for the comparison function...*/
int sort_flag;
glob_t *sort_glob;
/* Context used for commandline completion */
struct complete_ctx {
struct sftp_conn *conn;
char **remote_pathp;
};
int remote_glob(struct sftp_conn *, const char *, int,
int (*)(const char *, int), glob_t *); /* proto for sftp-glob.c */
extern char *__progname;
/* Separators for interactive commands */
#define WHITESPACE " \t\r\n"
/* ls flags */
#define LS_LONG_VIEW 0x0001 /* Full view ala ls -l */
#define LS_SHORT_VIEW 0x0002 /* Single row view ala ls -1 */
#define LS_NUMERIC_VIEW 0x0004 /* Long view with numeric uid/gid */
#define LS_NAME_SORT 0x0008 /* Sort by name (default) */
#define LS_TIME_SORT 0x0010 /* Sort by mtime */
#define LS_SIZE_SORT 0x0020 /* Sort by file size */
#define LS_REVERSE_SORT 0x0040 /* Reverse sort order */
#define LS_SHOW_ALL 0x0080 /* Don't skip filenames starting with '.' */
#define LS_SI_UNITS 0x0100 /* Display sizes as K, M, G, etc. */
#define VIEW_FLAGS (LS_LONG_VIEW|LS_SHORT_VIEW|LS_NUMERIC_VIEW|LS_SI_UNITS)
#define SORT_FLAGS (LS_NAME_SORT|LS_TIME_SORT|LS_SIZE_SORT)
/* Commands for interactive mode */
enum sftp_command {
I_CHDIR = 1,
I_CHGRP,
I_CHMOD,
I_CHOWN,
I_DF,
I_GET,
I_HELP,
I_LCHDIR,
I_LINK,
I_LLS,
I_LMKDIR,
I_LPWD,
I_LS,
I_LUMASK,
I_MKDIR,
I_PUT,
I_PWD,
I_QUIT,
I_REGET,
I_RENAME,
I_REPUT,
I_RM,
I_RMDIR,
I_SHELL,
I_SYMLINK,
I_VERSION,
I_PROGRESS,
};
struct CMD {
const char *c;
const int n;
const int t;
};
/* Type of completion */
#define NOARGS 0
#define REMOTE 1
#define LOCAL 2
static const struct CMD cmds[] = {
{ "bye", I_QUIT, NOARGS },
{ "cd", I_CHDIR, REMOTE },
{ "chdir", I_CHDIR, REMOTE },
{ "chgrp", I_CHGRP, REMOTE },
{ "chmod", I_CHMOD, REMOTE },
{ "chown", I_CHOWN, REMOTE },
{ "df", I_DF, REMOTE },
{ "dir", I_LS, REMOTE },
{ "exit", I_QUIT, NOARGS },
{ "get", I_GET, REMOTE },
{ "help", I_HELP, NOARGS },
{ "lcd", I_LCHDIR, LOCAL },
{ "lchdir", I_LCHDIR, LOCAL },
{ "lls", I_LLS, LOCAL },
{ "lmkdir", I_LMKDIR, LOCAL },
{ "ln", I_LINK, REMOTE },
{ "lpwd", I_LPWD, LOCAL },
{ "ls", I_LS, REMOTE },
{ "lumask", I_LUMASK, NOARGS },
{ "mkdir", I_MKDIR, REMOTE },
{ "mget", I_GET, REMOTE },
{ "mput", I_PUT, LOCAL },
{ "progress", I_PROGRESS, NOARGS },
{ "put", I_PUT, LOCAL },
{ "pwd", I_PWD, REMOTE },
{ "quit", I_QUIT, NOARGS },
{ "reget", I_REGET, REMOTE },
{ "rename", I_RENAME, REMOTE },
{ "reput", I_REPUT, LOCAL },
{ "rm", I_RM, REMOTE },
{ "rmdir", I_RMDIR, REMOTE },
{ "symlink", I_SYMLINK, REMOTE },
{ "version", I_VERSION, NOARGS },
{ "!", I_SHELL, NOARGS },
{ "?", I_HELP, NOARGS },
{ NULL, -1, -1 }
};
/* ARGSUSED */
static void
killchild(int signo)
{
pid_t pid;
pid = sshpid;
if (pid > 1) {
kill(pid, SIGTERM);
waitpid(pid, NULL, 0);
}
_exit(1);
}
/* ARGSUSED */
static void
suspchild(int signo)
{
if (sshpid > 1) {
kill(sshpid, signo);
while (waitpid(sshpid, NULL, WUNTRACED) == -1 && errno == EINTR)
continue;
}
kill(getpid(), SIGSTOP);
}
/* ARGSUSED */
static void
cmd_interrupt(int signo)
{
const char msg[] = "\rInterrupt \n";
int olderrno = errno;
(void)write(STDERR_FILENO, msg, sizeof(msg) - 1);
interrupted = 1;
errno = olderrno;
}
/*ARGSUSED*/
static void
sigchld_handler(int sig)
{
int save_errno = errno;
pid_t pid;
const char msg[] = "\rConnection closed. \n";
/* Report if ssh transport process dies. */
while ((pid = waitpid(sshpid, NULL, WNOHANG)) == -1 && errno == EINTR)
continue;
if (pid == sshpid) {
(void)write(STDERR_FILENO, msg, sizeof(msg) - 1);
sshpid = -1;
}
errno = save_errno;
}
static void
help(void)
{
printf("Available commands:\n"
"bye Quit sftp\n"
"cd path Change remote directory to 'path'\n"
"chgrp [-h] grp path Change group of file 'path' to 'grp'\n"
"chmod [-h] mode path Change permissions of file 'path' to 'mode'\n"
"chown [-h] own path Change owner of file 'path' to 'own'\n"
"df [-hi] [path] Display statistics for current directory or\n"
" filesystem containing 'path'\n"
"exit Quit sftp\n"
"get [-afpR] remote [local] Download file\n"
"help Display this help text\n"
"lcd path Change local directory to 'path'\n"
"lls [ls-options [path]] Display local directory listing\n"
"lmkdir path Create local directory\n"
"ln [-s] oldpath newpath Link remote file (-s for symlink)\n"
"lpwd Print local working directory\n"
"ls [-1afhlnrSt] [path] Display remote directory listing\n"
"lumask umask Set local umask to 'umask'\n"
"mkdir path Create remote directory\n"
"progress Toggle display of progress meter\n"
"put [-afpR] local [remote] Upload file\n"
"pwd Display remote working directory\n"
"quit Quit sftp\n"
"reget [-fpR] remote [local] Resume download file\n"
"rename oldpath newpath Rename remote file\n"
"reput [-fpR] local [remote] Resume upload file\n"
"rm path Delete remote file\n"
"rmdir path Remove remote directory\n"
"symlink oldpath newpath Symlink remote file\n"
"version Show SFTP version\n"
"!command Execute 'command' in local shell\n"
"! Escape to local shell\n"
"? Synonym for help\n");
}
static void
local_do_shell(const char *args)
{
int status;
char *shell;
pid_t pid;
if (!*args)
args = NULL;
if ((shell = getenv("SHELL")) == NULL || *shell == '\0')
shell = _PATH_BSHELL;
if ((pid = fork()) == -1)
fatal("Couldn't fork: %s", strerror(errno));
if (pid == 0) {
/* XXX: child has pipe fds to ssh subproc open - issue? */
if (args) {
debug3("Executing %s -c \"%s\"", shell, args);
execl(shell, shell, "-c", args, (char *)NULL);
} else {
debug3("Executing %s", shell);
execl(shell, shell, (char *)NULL);
}
fprintf(stderr, "Couldn't execute \"%s\": %s\n", shell,
strerror(errno));
_exit(1);
}
while (waitpid(pid, &status, 0) == -1)
if (errno != EINTR)
fatal("Couldn't wait for child: %s", strerror(errno));
if (!WIFEXITED(status))
error("Shell exited abnormally");
else if (WEXITSTATUS(status))
error("Shell exited with status %d", WEXITSTATUS(status));
}
static void
local_do_ls(const char *args)
{
if (!args || !*args)
local_do_shell(_PATH_LS);
else {
int len = strlen(_PATH_LS " ") + strlen(args) + 1;
char *buf = xmalloc(len);
/* XXX: quoting - rip quoting code from ftp? */
snprintf(buf, len, _PATH_LS " %s", args);
local_do_shell(buf);
free(buf);
}
}
/* Strip one path (usually the pwd) from the start of another */
static char *
path_strip(const char *path, const char *strip)
{
size_t len;
if (strip == NULL)
return (xstrdup(path));
len = strlen(strip);
if (strncmp(path, strip, len) == 0) {
if (strip[len - 1] != '/' && path[len] == '/')
len++;
return (xstrdup(path + len));
}
return (xstrdup(path));
}
static char *
make_absolute(char *p, const char *pwd)
{
char *abs_str;
/* Derelativise */
if (p && !path_absolute(p)) {
abs_str = path_append(pwd, p);
free(p);
return(abs_str);
} else
return(p);
}
static int
parse_getput_flags(const char *cmd, char **argv, int argc,
int *aflag, int *fflag, int *pflag, int *rflag)
{
extern int opterr, optind, optopt, optreset;
int ch;
optind = optreset = 1;
opterr = 0;
*aflag = *fflag = *rflag = *pflag = 0;
while ((ch = getopt(argc, argv, "afPpRr")) != -1) {
switch (ch) {
case 'a':
*aflag = 1;
break;
case 'f':
*fflag = 1;
break;
case 'p':
case 'P':
*pflag = 1;
break;
case 'r':
case 'R':
*rflag = 1;
break;
default:
error("%s: Invalid flag -%c", cmd, optopt);
return -1;
}
}
return optind;
}
static int
parse_link_flags(const char *cmd, char **argv, int argc, int *sflag)
{
extern int opterr, optind, optopt, optreset;
int ch;
optind = optreset = 1;
opterr = 0;
*sflag = 0;
while ((ch = getopt(argc, argv, "s")) != -1) {
switch (ch) {
case 's':
*sflag = 1;
break;
default:
error("%s: Invalid flag -%c", cmd, optopt);
return -1;
}
}
return optind;
}
static int
parse_rename_flags(const char *cmd, char **argv, int argc, int *lflag)
{
extern int opterr, optind, optopt, optreset;
int ch;
optind = optreset = 1;
opterr = 0;
*lflag = 0;
while ((ch = getopt(argc, argv, "l")) != -1) {
switch (ch) {
case 'l':
*lflag = 1;
break;
default:
error("%s: Invalid flag -%c", cmd, optopt);
return -1;
}
}
return optind;
}
static int
parse_ls_flags(char **argv, int argc, int *lflag)
{
extern int opterr, optind, optopt, optreset;
int ch;
optind = optreset = 1;
opterr = 0;
*lflag = LS_NAME_SORT;
while ((ch = getopt(argc, argv, "1Safhlnrt")) != -1) {
switch (ch) {
case '1':
*lflag &= ~VIEW_FLAGS;
*lflag |= LS_SHORT_VIEW;
break;
case 'S':
*lflag &= ~SORT_FLAGS;
*lflag |= LS_SIZE_SORT;
break;
case 'a':
*lflag |= LS_SHOW_ALL;
break;
case 'f':
*lflag &= ~SORT_FLAGS;
break;
case 'h':
*lflag |= LS_SI_UNITS;
break;
case 'l':
*lflag &= ~LS_SHORT_VIEW;
*lflag |= LS_LONG_VIEW;
break;
case 'n':
*lflag &= ~LS_SHORT_VIEW;
*lflag |= LS_NUMERIC_VIEW|LS_LONG_VIEW;
break;
case 'r':
*lflag |= LS_REVERSE_SORT;
break;
case 't':
*lflag &= ~SORT_FLAGS;
*lflag |= LS_TIME_SORT;
break;
default:
error("ls: Invalid flag -%c", optopt);
return -1;
}
}
return optind;
}
static int
parse_df_flags(const char *cmd, char **argv, int argc, int *hflag, int *iflag)
{
extern int opterr, optind, optopt, optreset;
int ch;
optind = optreset = 1;
opterr = 0;
*hflag = *iflag = 0;
while ((ch = getopt(argc, argv, "hi")) != -1) {
switch (ch) {
case 'h':
*hflag = 1;
break;
case 'i':
*iflag = 1;
break;
default:
error("%s: Invalid flag -%c", cmd, optopt);
return -1;
}
}
return optind;
}
static int
parse_ch_flags(const char *cmd, char **argv, int argc, int *hflag)
{
extern int opterr, optind, optopt, optreset;
int ch;
optind = optreset = 1;
opterr = 0;
*hflag = 0;
while ((ch = getopt(argc, argv, "h")) != -1) {
switch (ch) {
case 'h':
*hflag = 1;
break;
default:
error("%s: Invalid flag -%c", cmd, optopt);
return -1;
}
}
return optind;
}
static int
parse_no_flags(const char *cmd, char **argv, int argc)
{
extern int opterr, optind, optopt, optreset;
int ch;
optind = optreset = 1;
opterr = 0;
while ((ch = getopt(argc, argv, "")) != -1) {
switch (ch) {
default:
error("%s: Invalid flag -%c", cmd, optopt);
return -1;
}
}
return optind;
}
static int
is_dir(const char *path)
{
struct stat sb;
/* XXX: report errors? */
if (stat(path, &sb) == -1)
return(0);
return(S_ISDIR(sb.st_mode));
}
static int
remote_is_dir(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *path)
{
Attrib *a;
/* XXX: report errors? */
if ((a = do_stat(conn, path, 1)) == NULL)
return(0);
if (!(a->flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_PERMISSIONS))
return(0);
return(S_ISDIR(a->perm));
}
/* Check whether path returned from glob(..., GLOB_MARK, ...) is a directory */
static int
pathname_is_dir(const char *pathname)
{
size_t l = strlen(pathname);
return l > 0 && pathname[l - 1] == '/';
}
static int
process_get(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *src, const char *dst,
const char *pwd, int pflag, int rflag, int resume, int fflag)
{
char *abs_src = NULL;
char *abs_dst = NULL;
glob_t g;
char *filename, *tmp=NULL;
int i, r, err = 0;
abs_src = xstrdup(src);
abs_src = make_absolute(abs_src, pwd);
memset(&g, 0, sizeof(g));
debug3("Looking up %s", abs_src);
if ((r = remote_glob(conn, abs_src, GLOB_MARK, NULL, &g)) != 0) {
if (r == GLOB_NOSPACE) {
error("Too many matches for \"%s\".", abs_src);
} else {
error("File \"%s\" not found.", abs_src);
}
err = -1;
goto out;
}
/*
* If multiple matches then dst must be a directory or
* unspecified.
*/
if (g.gl_matchc > 1 && dst != NULL && !is_dir(dst)) {
error("Multiple source paths, but destination "
"\"%s\" is not a directory", dst);
err = -1;
goto out;
}
for (i = 0; g.gl_pathv[i] && !interrupted; i++) {
tmp = xstrdup(g.gl_pathv[i]);
if ((filename = basename(tmp)) == NULL) {
error("basename %s: %s", tmp, strerror(errno));
free(tmp);
err = -1;
goto out;
}
if (g.gl_matchc == 1 && dst) {
if (is_dir(dst)) {
abs_dst = path_append(dst, filename);
} else {
abs_dst = xstrdup(dst);
}
} else if (dst) {
abs_dst = path_append(dst, filename);
} else {
abs_dst = xstrdup(filename);
}
free(tmp);
resume |= global_aflag;
if (!quiet && resume)
mprintf("Resuming %s to %s\n",
g.gl_pathv[i], abs_dst);
else if (!quiet && !resume)
mprintf("Fetching %s to %s\n",
g.gl_pathv[i], abs_dst);
if (pathname_is_dir(g.gl_pathv[i]) && (rflag || global_rflag)) {
if (download_dir(conn, g.gl_pathv[i], abs_dst, NULL,
pflag || global_pflag, 1, resume,
fflag || global_fflag) == -1)
err = -1;
} else {
if (do_download(conn, g.gl_pathv[i], abs_dst, NULL,
pflag || global_pflag, resume,
fflag || global_fflag) == -1)
err = -1;
}
free(abs_dst);
abs_dst = NULL;
}
out:
free(abs_src);
globfree(&g);
return(err);
}
static int
process_put(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *src, const char *dst,
const char *pwd, int pflag, int rflag, int resume, int fflag)
{
char *tmp_dst = NULL;
char *abs_dst = NULL;
char *tmp = NULL, *filename = NULL;
glob_t g;
int err = 0;
int i, dst_is_dir = 1;
struct stat sb;
if (dst) {
tmp_dst = xstrdup(dst);
tmp_dst = make_absolute(tmp_dst, pwd);
}
memset(&g, 0, sizeof(g));
debug3("Looking up %s", src);
if (glob(src, GLOB_NOCHECK | GLOB_MARK, NULL, &g)) {
error("File \"%s\" not found.", src);
err = -1;
goto out;
}
/* If we aren't fetching to pwd then stash this status for later */
if (tmp_dst != NULL)
dst_is_dir = remote_is_dir(conn, tmp_dst);
/* If multiple matches, dst may be directory or unspecified */
if (g.gl_matchc > 1 && tmp_dst && !dst_is_dir) {
error("Multiple paths match, but destination "
"\"%s\" is not a directory", tmp_dst);
err = -1;
goto out;
}
for (i = 0; g.gl_pathv[i] && !interrupted; i++) {
if (stat(g.gl_pathv[i], &sb) == -1) {
err = -1;
error("stat %s: %s", g.gl_pathv[i], strerror(errno));
continue;
}
tmp = xstrdup(g.gl_pathv[i]);
if ((filename = basename(tmp)) == NULL) {
error("basename %s: %s", tmp, strerror(errno));
free(tmp);
err = -1;
goto out;
}
if (g.gl_matchc == 1 && tmp_dst) {
/* If directory specified, append filename */
if (dst_is_dir)
abs_dst = path_append(tmp_dst, filename);
else
abs_dst = xstrdup(tmp_dst);
} else if (tmp_dst) {
abs_dst = path_append(tmp_dst, filename);
} else {
abs_dst = make_absolute(xstrdup(filename), pwd);
}
free(tmp);
resume |= global_aflag;
if (!quiet && resume)
mprintf("Resuming upload of %s to %s\n",
g.gl_pathv[i], abs_dst);
else if (!quiet && !resume)
mprintf("Uploading %s to %s\n",
g.gl_pathv[i], abs_dst);
if (pathname_is_dir(g.gl_pathv[i]) && (rflag || global_rflag)) {
if (upload_dir(conn, g.gl_pathv[i], abs_dst,
pflag || global_pflag, 1, resume,
fflag || global_fflag) == -1)
err = -1;
} else {
if (do_upload(conn, g.gl_pathv[i], abs_dst,
pflag || global_pflag, resume,
fflag || global_fflag) == -1)
err = -1;
}
}
out:
free(abs_dst);
free(tmp_dst);
globfree(&g);
return(err);
}
static int
sdirent_comp(const void *aa, const void *bb)
{
SFTP_DIRENT *a = *(SFTP_DIRENT **)aa;
SFTP_DIRENT *b = *(SFTP_DIRENT **)bb;
int rmul = sort_flag & LS_REVERSE_SORT ? -1 : 1;
#define NCMP(a,b) (a == b ? 0 : (a < b ? 1 : -1))
if (sort_flag & LS_NAME_SORT)
return (rmul * strcmp(a->filename, b->filename));
else if (sort_flag & LS_TIME_SORT)
return (rmul * NCMP(a->a.mtime, b->a.mtime));
else if (sort_flag & LS_SIZE_SORT)
return (rmul * NCMP(a->a.size, b->a.size));
fatal("Unknown ls sort type");
}
/* sftp ls.1 replacement for directories */
static int
do_ls_dir(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *path,
const char *strip_path, int lflag)
{
int n;
u_int c = 1, colspace = 0, columns = 1;
SFTP_DIRENT **d;
if ((n = do_readdir(conn, path, &d)) != 0)
return (n);
if (!(lflag & LS_SHORT_VIEW)) {
u_int m = 0, width = 80;
struct winsize ws;
char *tmp;
/* Count entries for sort and find longest filename */
for (n = 0; d[n] != NULL; n++) {
if (d[n]->filename[0] != '.' || (lflag & LS_SHOW_ALL))
m = MAXIMUM(m, strlen(d[n]->filename));
}
/* Add any subpath that also needs to be counted */
tmp = path_strip(path, strip_path);
m += strlen(tmp);
free(tmp);
if (ioctl(fileno(stdin), TIOCGWINSZ, &ws) != -1)
width = ws.ws_col;
columns = width / (m + 2);
columns = MAXIMUM(columns, 1);
colspace = width / columns;
colspace = MINIMUM(colspace, width);
}
if (lflag & SORT_FLAGS) {
for (n = 0; d[n] != NULL; n++)
; /* count entries */
sort_flag = lflag & (SORT_FLAGS|LS_REVERSE_SORT);
qsort(d, n, sizeof(*d), sdirent_comp);
}
for (n = 0; d[n] != NULL && !interrupted; n++) {
char *tmp, *fname;
if (d[n]->filename[0] == '.' && !(lflag & LS_SHOW_ALL))
continue;
tmp = path_append(path, d[n]->filename);
fname = path_strip(tmp, strip_path);
free(tmp);
if (lflag & LS_LONG_VIEW) {
if (lflag & (LS_NUMERIC_VIEW|LS_SI_UNITS)) {
char *lname;
struct stat sb;
memset(&sb, 0, sizeof(sb));
attrib_to_stat(&d[n]->a, &sb);
lname = ls_file(fname, &sb, 1,
(lflag & LS_SI_UNITS));
mprintf("%s\n", lname);
free(lname);
} else
mprintf("%s\n", d[n]->longname);
} else {
mprintf("%-*s", colspace, fname);
if (c >= columns) {
printf("\n");
c = 1;
} else
c++;
}
free(fname);
}
if (!(lflag & LS_LONG_VIEW) && (c != 1))
printf("\n");
free_sftp_dirents(d);
return (0);
}
static int
sglob_comp(const void *aa, const void *bb)
{
u_int a = *(const u_int *)aa;
u_int b = *(const u_int *)bb;
const char *ap = sort_glob->gl_pathv[a];
const char *bp = sort_glob->gl_pathv[b];
const struct stat *as = sort_glob->gl_statv[a];
const struct stat *bs = sort_glob->gl_statv[b];
int rmul = sort_flag & LS_REVERSE_SORT ? -1 : 1;
#define NCMP(a,b) (a == b ? 0 : (a < b ? 1 : -1))
if (sort_flag & LS_NAME_SORT)
return (rmul * strcmp(ap, bp));
else if (sort_flag & LS_TIME_SORT) {
#if defined(HAVE_STRUCT_STAT_ST_MTIM)
return (rmul * timespeccmp(&as->st_mtim, &bs->st_mtim, <));
#elif defined(HAVE_STRUCT_STAT_ST_MTIME)
return (rmul * NCMP(as->st_mtime, bs->st_mtime));
#else
return rmul * 1;
#endif
} else if (sort_flag & LS_SIZE_SORT)
return (rmul * NCMP(as->st_size, bs->st_size));
fatal("Unknown ls sort type");
}
/* sftp ls.1 replacement which handles path globs */
static int
do_globbed_ls(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *path,
const char *strip_path, int lflag)
{
char *fname, *lname;
glob_t g;
int err, r;
struct winsize ws;
u_int i, j, nentries, *indices = NULL, c = 1;
u_int colspace = 0, columns = 1, m = 0, width = 80;
memset(&g, 0, sizeof(g));
if ((r = remote_glob(conn, path,
GLOB_MARK|GLOB_NOCHECK|GLOB_BRACE|GLOB_KEEPSTAT|GLOB_NOSORT,
NULL, &g)) != 0 ||
(g.gl_pathc && !g.gl_matchc)) {
if (g.gl_pathc)
globfree(&g);
if (r == GLOB_NOSPACE) {
error("Can't ls: Too many matches for \"%s\"", path);
} else {
error("Can't ls: \"%s\" not found", path);
}
return -1;
}
if (interrupted)
goto out;
/*
* If the glob returns a single match and it is a directory,
* then just list its contents.
*/
if (g.gl_matchc == 1 && g.gl_statv[0] != NULL &&
S_ISDIR(g.gl_statv[0]->st_mode)) {
err = do_ls_dir(conn, g.gl_pathv[0], strip_path, lflag);
globfree(&g);
return err;
}
if (ioctl(fileno(stdin), TIOCGWINSZ, &ws) != -1)
width = ws.ws_col;
if (!(lflag & LS_SHORT_VIEW)) {
/* Count entries for sort and find longest filename */
for (i = 0; g.gl_pathv[i]; i++)
m = MAXIMUM(m, strlen(g.gl_pathv[i]));
columns = width / (m + 2);
columns = MAXIMUM(columns, 1);
colspace = width / columns;
}
/*
* Sorting: rather than mess with the contents of glob_t, prepare
* an array of indices into it and sort that. For the usual
* unsorted case, the indices are just the identity 1=1, 2=2, etc.
*/
for (nentries = 0; g.gl_pathv[nentries] != NULL; nentries++)
; /* count entries */
indices = calloc(nentries, sizeof(*indices));
for (i = 0; i < nentries; i++)
indices[i] = i;
if (lflag & SORT_FLAGS) {
sort_glob = &g;
sort_flag = lflag & (SORT_FLAGS|LS_REVERSE_SORT);
qsort(indices, nentries, sizeof(*indices), sglob_comp);
sort_glob = NULL;
}
for (j = 0; j < nentries && !interrupted; j++) {
i = indices[j];
fname = path_strip(g.gl_pathv[i], strip_path);
if (lflag & LS_LONG_VIEW) {
if (g.gl_statv[i] == NULL) {
error("no stat information for %s", fname);
continue;
}
lname = ls_file(fname, g.gl_statv[i], 1,
(lflag & LS_SI_UNITS));
mprintf("%s\n", lname);
free(lname);
} else {
mprintf("%-*s", colspace, fname);
if (c >= columns) {
printf("\n");
c = 1;
} else
c++;
}
free(fname);
}
if (!(lflag & LS_LONG_VIEW) && (c != 1))
printf("\n");
out:
if (g.gl_pathc)
globfree(&g);
free(indices);
return 0;
}
static int
do_df(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *path, int hflag, int iflag)
{
struct sftp_statvfs st;
char s_used[FMT_SCALED_STRSIZE], s_avail[FMT_SCALED_STRSIZE];
char s_root[FMT_SCALED_STRSIZE], s_total[FMT_SCALED_STRSIZE];
char s_icapacity[16], s_dcapacity[16];
if (do_statvfs(conn, path, &st, 1) == -1)
return -1;
if (st.f_files == 0)
strlcpy(s_icapacity, "ERR", sizeof(s_icapacity));
else {
snprintf(s_icapacity, sizeof(s_icapacity), "%3llu%%",
(unsigned long long)(100 * (st.f_files - st.f_ffree) /
st.f_files));
}
if (st.f_blocks == 0)
strlcpy(s_dcapacity, "ERR", sizeof(s_dcapacity));
else {
snprintf(s_dcapacity, sizeof(s_dcapacity), "%3llu%%",
(unsigned long long)(100 * (st.f_blocks - st.f_bfree) /
st.f_blocks));
}
if (iflag) {
printf(" Inodes Used Avail "
"(root) %%Capacity\n");
printf("%11llu %11llu %11llu %11llu %s\n",
(unsigned long long)st.f_files,
(unsigned long long)(st.f_files - st.f_ffree),
(unsigned long long)st.f_favail,
(unsigned long long)st.f_ffree, s_icapacity);
} else if (hflag) {
strlcpy(s_used, "error", sizeof(s_used));
strlcpy(s_avail, "error", sizeof(s_avail));
strlcpy(s_root, "error", sizeof(s_root));
strlcpy(s_total, "error", sizeof(s_total));
fmt_scaled((st.f_blocks - st.f_bfree) * st.f_frsize, s_used);
fmt_scaled(st.f_bavail * st.f_frsize, s_avail);
fmt_scaled(st.f_bfree * st.f_frsize, s_root);
fmt_scaled(st.f_blocks * st.f_frsize, s_total);
printf(" Size Used Avail (root) %%Capacity\n");
printf("%7sB %7sB %7sB %7sB %s\n",
s_total, s_used, s_avail, s_root, s_dcapacity);
} else {
printf(" Size Used Avail "
"(root) %%Capacity\n");
printf("%12llu %12llu %12llu %12llu %s\n",
(unsigned long long)(st.f_frsize * st.f_blocks / 1024),
(unsigned long long)(st.f_frsize *
(st.f_blocks - st.f_bfree) / 1024),
(unsigned long long)(st.f_frsize * st.f_bavail / 1024),
(unsigned long long)(st.f_frsize * st.f_bfree / 1024),
s_dcapacity);
}
return 0;
}
/*
* Undo escaping of glob sequences in place. Used to undo extra escaping
* applied in makeargv() when the string is destined for a function that
* does not glob it.
*/
static void
undo_glob_escape(char *s)
{
size_t i, j;
for (i = j = 0;;) {
if (s[i] == '\0') {
s[j] = '\0';
return;
}
if (s[i] != '\\') {
s[j++] = s[i++];
continue;
}
/* s[i] == '\\' */
++i;
switch (s[i]) {
case '?':
case '[':
case '*':
case '\\':
s[j++] = s[i++];
break;
case '\0':
s[j++] = '\\';
s[j] = '\0';
return;
default:
s[j++] = '\\';
s[j++] = s[i++];
break;
}
}
}
/*
* Split a string into an argument vector using sh(1)-style quoting,
* comment and escaping rules, but with some tweaks to handle glob(3)
* wildcards.
* The "sloppy" flag allows for recovery from missing terminating quote, for
* use in parsing incomplete commandlines during tab autocompletion.
*
* Returns NULL on error or a NULL-terminated array of arguments.
*
* If "lastquote" is not NULL, the quoting character used for the last
* argument is placed in *lastquote ("\0", "'" or "\"").
*
* If "terminated" is not NULL, *terminated will be set to 1 when the
* last argument's quote has been properly terminated or 0 otherwise.
* This parameter is only of use if "sloppy" is set.
*/
#define MAXARGS 128
#define MAXARGLEN 8192
static char **
makeargv(const char *arg, int *argcp, int sloppy, char *lastquote,
u_int *terminated)
{
int argc, quot;
size_t i, j;
static char argvs[MAXARGLEN];
static char *argv[MAXARGS + 1];
enum { MA_START, MA_SQUOTE, MA_DQUOTE, MA_UNQUOTED } state, q;
*argcp = argc = 0;
if (strlen(arg) > sizeof(argvs) - 1) {
args_too_longs:
error("string too long");
return NULL;
}
if (terminated != NULL)
*terminated = 1;
if (lastquote != NULL)
*lastquote = '\0';
state = MA_START;
i = j = 0;
for (;;) {
if ((size_t)argc >= sizeof(argv) / sizeof(*argv)){
error("Too many arguments.");
return NULL;
}
if (isspace((unsigned char)arg[i])) {
if (state == MA_UNQUOTED) {
/* Terminate current argument */
argvs[j++] = '\0';
argc++;
state = MA_START;
} else if (state != MA_START)
argvs[j++] = arg[i];
} else if (arg[i] == '"' || arg[i] == '\'') {
q = arg[i] == '"' ? MA_DQUOTE : MA_SQUOTE;
if (state == MA_START) {
argv[argc] = argvs + j;
state = q;
if (lastquote != NULL)
*lastquote = arg[i];
} else if (state == MA_UNQUOTED)
state = q;
else if (state == q)
state = MA_UNQUOTED;
else
argvs[j++] = arg[i];
} else if (arg[i] == '\\') {
if (state == MA_SQUOTE || state == MA_DQUOTE) {
quot = state == MA_SQUOTE ? '\'' : '"';
/* Unescape quote we are in */
/* XXX support \n and friends? */
if (arg[i + 1] == quot) {
i++;
argvs[j++] = arg[i];
} else if (arg[i + 1] == '?' ||
arg[i + 1] == '[' || arg[i + 1] == '*') {
/*
* Special case for sftp: append
* double-escaped glob sequence -
* glob will undo one level of
* escaping. NB. string can grow here.
*/
if (j >= sizeof(argvs) - 5)
goto args_too_longs;
argvs[j++] = '\\';
argvs[j++] = arg[i++];
argvs[j++] = '\\';
argvs[j++] = arg[i];
} else {
argvs[j++] = arg[i++];
argvs[j++] = arg[i];
}
} else {
if (state == MA_START) {
argv[argc] = argvs + j;
state = MA_UNQUOTED;
if (lastquote != NULL)
*lastquote = '\0';
}
if (arg[i + 1] == '?' || arg[i + 1] == '[' ||
arg[i + 1] == '*' || arg[i + 1] == '\\') {
/*
* Special case for sftp: append
* escaped glob sequence -
* glob will undo one level of
* escaping.
*/
argvs[j++] = arg[i++];
argvs[j++] = arg[i];
} else {
/* Unescape everything */
/* XXX support \n and friends? */
i++;
argvs[j++] = arg[i];
}
}
} else if (arg[i] == '#') {
if (state == MA_SQUOTE || state == MA_DQUOTE)
argvs[j++] = arg[i];
else
goto string_done;
} else if (arg[i] == '\0') {
if (state == MA_SQUOTE || state == MA_DQUOTE) {
if (sloppy) {
state = MA_UNQUOTED;
if (terminated != NULL)
*terminated = 0;
goto string_done;
}
error("Unterminated quoted argument");
return NULL;
}
string_done:
if (state == MA_UNQUOTED) {
argvs[j++] = '\0';
argc++;
}
break;
} else {
if (state == MA_START) {
argv[argc] = argvs + j;
state = MA_UNQUOTED;
if (lastquote != NULL)
*lastquote = '\0';
}
if ((state == MA_SQUOTE || state == MA_DQUOTE) &&
(arg[i] == '?' || arg[i] == '[' || arg[i] == '*')) {
/*
* Special case for sftp: escape quoted
* glob(3) wildcards. NB. string can grow
* here.
*/
if (j >= sizeof(argvs) - 3)
goto args_too_longs;
argvs[j++] = '\\';
argvs[j++] = arg[i];
} else
argvs[j++] = arg[i];
}
i++;
}
*argcp = argc;
return argv;
}
static int
parse_args(const char **cpp, int *ignore_errors, int *disable_echo, int *aflag,
int *fflag, int *hflag, int *iflag, int *lflag, int *pflag,
int *rflag, int *sflag,
unsigned long *n_arg, char **path1, char **path2)
{
const char *cmd, *cp = *cpp;
char *cp2, **argv;
int base = 0;
long l;
int path1_mandatory = 0, i, cmdnum, optidx, argc;
/* Skip leading whitespace */
cp = cp + strspn(cp, WHITESPACE);
/*
* Check for leading '-' (disable error processing) and '@' (suppress
* command echo)
*/
*ignore_errors = 0;
*disable_echo = 0;
for (;*cp != '\0'; cp++) {
if (*cp == '-') {
*ignore_errors = 1;
} else if (*cp == '@') {
*disable_echo = 1;
} else {
/* all other characters terminate prefix processing */
break;
}
}
cp = cp + strspn(cp, WHITESPACE);
/* Ignore blank lines and lines which begin with comment '#' char */
if (*cp == '\0' || *cp == '#')
return (0);
if ((argv = makeargv(cp, &argc, 0, NULL, NULL)) == NULL)
return -1;
/* Figure out which command we have */
for (i = 0; cmds[i].c != NULL; i++) {
if (argv[0] != NULL && strcasecmp(cmds[i].c, argv[0]) == 0)
break;
}
cmdnum = cmds[i].n;
cmd = cmds[i].c;
/* Special case */
if (*cp == '!') {
cp++;
cmdnum = I_SHELL;
} else if (cmdnum == -1) {
error("Invalid command.");
return -1;
}
/* Get arguments and parse flags */
*aflag = *fflag = *hflag = *iflag = *lflag = *pflag = 0;
*rflag = *sflag = 0;
*path1 = *path2 = NULL;
optidx = 1;
switch (cmdnum) {
case I_GET:
case I_REGET:
case I_REPUT:
case I_PUT:
if ((optidx = parse_getput_flags(cmd, argv, argc,
aflag, fflag, pflag, rflag)) == -1)
return -1;
/* Get first pathname (mandatory) */
if (argc - optidx < 1) {
error("You must specify at least one path after a "
"%s command.", cmd);
return -1;
}
*path1 = xstrdup(argv[optidx]);
/* Get second pathname (optional) */
if (argc - optidx > 1) {
*path2 = xstrdup(argv[optidx + 1]);
/* Destination is not globbed */
undo_glob_escape(*path2);
}
break;
case I_LINK:
if ((optidx = parse_link_flags(cmd, argv, argc, sflag)) == -1)
return -1;
goto parse_two_paths;
case I_RENAME:
if ((optidx = parse_rename_flags(cmd, argv, argc, lflag)) == -1)
return -1;
goto parse_two_paths;
case I_SYMLINK:
if ((optidx = parse_no_flags(cmd, argv, argc)) == -1)
return -1;
parse_two_paths:
if (argc - optidx < 2) {
error("You must specify two paths after a %s "
"command.", cmd);
return -1;
}
*path1 = xstrdup(argv[optidx]);
*path2 = xstrdup(argv[optidx + 1]);
/* Paths are not globbed */
undo_glob_escape(*path1);
undo_glob_escape(*path2);
break;
case I_RM:
case I_MKDIR:
case I_RMDIR:
case I_LMKDIR:
path1_mandatory = 1;
/* FALLTHROUGH */
case I_CHDIR:
case I_LCHDIR:
if ((optidx = parse_no_flags(cmd, argv, argc)) == -1)
return -1;
/* Get pathname (mandatory) */
if (argc - optidx < 1) {
if (!path1_mandatory)
break; /* return a NULL path1 */
error("You must specify a path after a %s command.",
cmd);
return -1;
}
*path1 = xstrdup(argv[optidx]);
/* Only "rm" globs */
if (cmdnum != I_RM)
undo_glob_escape(*path1);
break;
case I_DF:
if ((optidx = parse_df_flags(cmd, argv, argc, hflag,
iflag)) == -1)
return -1;
/* Default to current directory if no path specified */
if (argc - optidx < 1)
*path1 = NULL;
else {
*path1 = xstrdup(argv[optidx]);
undo_glob_escape(*path1);
}
break;
case I_LS:
if ((optidx = parse_ls_flags(argv, argc, lflag)) == -1)
return(-1);
/* Path is optional */
if (argc - optidx > 0)
*path1 = xstrdup(argv[optidx]);
break;
case I_LLS:
/* Skip ls command and following whitespace */
cp = cp + strlen(cmd) + strspn(cp, WHITESPACE);
case I_SHELL:
/* Uses the rest of the line */
break;
case I_LUMASK:
case I_CHMOD:
base = 8;
/* FALLTHROUGH */
case I_CHOWN:
case I_CHGRP:
if ((optidx = parse_ch_flags(cmd, argv, argc, hflag)) == -1)
return -1;
/* Get numeric arg (mandatory) */
if (argc - optidx < 1)
goto need_num_arg;
errno = 0;
l = strtol(argv[optidx], &cp2, base);
if (cp2 == argv[optidx] || *cp2 != '\0' ||
((l == LONG_MIN || l == LONG_MAX) && errno == ERANGE) ||
l < 0) {
need_num_arg:
error("You must supply a numeric argument "
"to the %s command.", cmd);
return -1;
}
*n_arg = l;
if (cmdnum == I_LUMASK)
break;
/* Get pathname (mandatory) */
if (argc - optidx < 2) {
error("You must specify a path after a %s command.",
cmd);
return -1;
}
*path1 = xstrdup(argv[optidx + 1]);
break;
case I_QUIT:
case I_PWD:
case I_LPWD:
case I_HELP:
case I_VERSION:
case I_PROGRESS:
if ((optidx = parse_no_flags(cmd, argv, argc)) == -1)
return -1;
break;
default:
fatal("Command not implemented");
}
*cpp = cp;
return(cmdnum);
}
static int
parse_dispatch_command(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *cmd, char **pwd,
const char *startdir, int err_abort, int echo_command)
{
const char *ocmd = cmd;
char *path1, *path2, *tmp;
int ignore_errors = 0, disable_echo = 1;
int aflag = 0, fflag = 0, hflag = 0, iflag = 0;
int lflag = 0, pflag = 0, rflag = 0, sflag = 0;
int cmdnum, i;
unsigned long n_arg = 0;
Attrib a, *aa;
char path_buf[PATH_MAX];
int err = 0;
glob_t g;
path1 = path2 = NULL;
cmdnum = parse_args(&cmd, &ignore_errors, &disable_echo, &aflag, &fflag,
&hflag, &iflag, &lflag, &pflag, &rflag, &sflag, &n_arg,
&path1, &path2);
if (ignore_errors != 0)
err_abort = 0;
if (echo_command && !disable_echo)
mprintf("sftp> %s\n", ocmd);
memset(&g, 0, sizeof(g));
/* Perform command */
switch (cmdnum) {
case 0:
/* Blank line */
break;
case -1:
/* Unrecognized command */
err = -1;
break;
case I_REGET:
aflag = 1;
/* FALLTHROUGH */
case I_GET:
err = process_get(conn, path1, path2, *pwd, pflag,
rflag, aflag, fflag);
break;
case I_REPUT:
aflag = 1;
/* FALLTHROUGH */
case I_PUT:
err = process_put(conn, path1, path2, *pwd, pflag,
rflag, aflag, fflag);
break;
case I_RENAME:
path1 = make_absolute(path1, *pwd);
path2 = make_absolute(path2, *pwd);
err = do_rename(conn, path1, path2, lflag);
break;
case I_SYMLINK:
sflag = 1;
/* FALLTHROUGH */
case I_LINK:
if (!sflag)
path1 = make_absolute(path1, *pwd);
path2 = make_absolute(path2, *pwd);
err = (sflag ? do_symlink : do_hardlink)(conn, path1, path2);
break;
case I_RM:
path1 = make_absolute(path1, *pwd);
remote_glob(conn, path1, GLOB_NOCHECK, NULL, &g);
for (i = 0; g.gl_pathv[i] && !interrupted; i++) {
if (!quiet)
mprintf("Removing %s\n", g.gl_pathv[i]);
err = do_rm(conn, g.gl_pathv[i]);
if (err != 0 && err_abort)
break;
}
break;
case I_MKDIR:
path1 = make_absolute(path1, *pwd);
attrib_clear(&a);
a.flags |= SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_PERMISSIONS;
a.perm = 0777;
err = do_mkdir(conn, path1, &a, 1);
break;
case I_RMDIR:
path1 = make_absolute(path1, *pwd);
err = do_rmdir(conn, path1);
break;
case I_CHDIR:
if (path1 == NULL || *path1 == '\0')
path1 = xstrdup(startdir);
path1 = make_absolute(path1, *pwd);
if ((tmp = do_realpath(conn, path1)) == NULL) {
err = 1;
break;
}
if ((aa = do_stat(conn, tmp, 0)) == NULL) {
free(tmp);
err = 1;
break;
}
if (!(aa->flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_PERMISSIONS)) {
error("Can't change directory: Can't check target");
free(tmp);
err = 1;
break;
}
if (!S_ISDIR(aa->perm)) {
error("Can't change directory: \"%s\" is not "
"a directory", tmp);
free(tmp);
err = 1;
break;
}
free(*pwd);
*pwd = tmp;
break;
case I_LS:
if (!path1) {
do_ls_dir(conn, *pwd, *pwd, lflag);
break;
}
/* Strip pwd off beginning of non-absolute paths */
tmp = NULL;
if (!path_absolute(path1))
tmp = *pwd;
path1 = make_absolute(path1, *pwd);
err = do_globbed_ls(conn, path1, tmp, lflag);
break;
case I_DF:
/* Default to current directory if no path specified */
if (path1 == NULL)
path1 = xstrdup(*pwd);
path1 = make_absolute(path1, *pwd);
err = do_df(conn, path1, hflag, iflag);
break;
case I_LCHDIR:
if (path1 == NULL || *path1 == '\0')
path1 = xstrdup("~");
tmp = tilde_expand_filename(path1, getuid());
free(path1);
path1 = tmp;
if (chdir(path1) == -1) {
error("Couldn't change local directory to "
"\"%s\": %s", path1, strerror(errno));
err = 1;
}
break;
case I_LMKDIR:
if (mkdir(path1, 0777) == -1) {
error("Couldn't create local directory "
"\"%s\": %s", path1, strerror(errno));
err = 1;
}
break;
case I_LLS:
local_do_ls(cmd);
break;
case I_SHELL:
local_do_shell(cmd);
break;
case I_LUMASK:
umask(n_arg);
printf("Local umask: %03lo\n", n_arg);
break;
case I_CHMOD:
path1 = make_absolute(path1, *pwd);
attrib_clear(&a);
a.flags |= SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_PERMISSIONS;
a.perm = n_arg;
remote_glob(conn, path1, GLOB_NOCHECK, NULL, &g);
for (i = 0; g.gl_pathv[i] && !interrupted; i++) {
if (!quiet)
mprintf("Changing mode on %s\n",
g.gl_pathv[i]);
err = (hflag ? do_lsetstat : do_setstat)(conn,
g.gl_pathv[i], &a);
if (err != 0 && err_abort)
break;
}
break;
case I_CHOWN:
case I_CHGRP:
path1 = make_absolute(path1, *pwd);
remote_glob(conn, path1, GLOB_NOCHECK, NULL, &g);
for (i = 0; g.gl_pathv[i] && !interrupted; i++) {
if (!(aa = (hflag ? do_lstat : do_stat)(conn,
g.gl_pathv[i], 0))) {
if (err_abort) {
err = -1;
break;
} else
continue;
}
if (!(aa->flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_UIDGID)) {
error("Can't get current ownership of "
"remote file \"%s\"", g.gl_pathv[i]);
if (err_abort) {
err = -1;
break;
} else
continue;
}
aa->flags &= SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_UIDGID;
if (cmdnum == I_CHOWN) {
if (!quiet)
mprintf("Changing owner on %s\n",
g.gl_pathv[i]);
aa->uid = n_arg;
} else {
if (!quiet)
mprintf("Changing group on %s\n",
g.gl_pathv[i]);
aa->gid = n_arg;
}
err = (hflag ? do_lsetstat : do_setstat)(conn,
g.gl_pathv[i], aa);
if (err != 0 && err_abort)
break;
}
break;
case I_PWD:
mprintf("Remote working directory: %s\n", *pwd);
break;
case I_LPWD:
if (!getcwd(path_buf, sizeof(path_buf))) {
error("Couldn't get local cwd: %s", strerror(errno));
err = -1;
break;
}
mprintf("Local working directory: %s\n", path_buf);
break;
case I_QUIT:
/* Processed below */
break;
case I_HELP:
help();
break;
case I_VERSION:
printf("SFTP protocol version %u\n", sftp_proto_version(conn));
break;
case I_PROGRESS:
showprogress = !showprogress;
if (showprogress)
printf("Progress meter enabled\n");
else
printf("Progress meter disabled\n");
break;
default:
fatal("%d is not implemented", cmdnum);
}
if (g.gl_pathc)
globfree(&g);
free(path1);
free(path2);
/* If an unignored error occurs in batch mode we should abort. */
if (err_abort && err != 0)
return (-1);
else if (cmdnum == I_QUIT)
return (1);
return (0);
}
#ifdef USE_LIBEDIT
static char *
prompt(EditLine *el)
{
return ("sftp> ");
}
/* Display entries in 'list' after skipping the first 'len' chars */
static void
complete_display(char **list, u_int len)
{
u_int y, m = 0, width = 80, columns = 1, colspace = 0, llen;
struct winsize ws;
char *tmp;
/* Count entries for sort and find longest */
for (y = 0; list[y]; y++)
m = MAXIMUM(m, strlen(list[y]));
if (ioctl(fileno(stdin), TIOCGWINSZ, &ws) != -1)
width = ws.ws_col;
m = m > len ? m - len : 0;
columns = width / (m + 2);
columns = MAXIMUM(columns, 1);
colspace = width / columns;
colspace = MINIMUM(colspace, width);
printf("\n");
m = 1;
for (y = 0; list[y]; y++) {
llen = strlen(list[y]);
tmp = llen > len ? list[y] + len : "";
mprintf("%-*s", colspace, tmp);
if (m >= columns) {
printf("\n");
m = 1;
} else
m++;
}
printf("\n");
}
/*
* Given a "list" of words that begin with a common prefix of "word",
* attempt to find an autocompletion to extends "word" by the next
* characters common to all entries in "list".
*/
static char *
complete_ambiguous(const char *word, char **list, size_t count)
{
if (word == NULL)
return NULL;
if (count > 0) {
u_int y, matchlen = strlen(list[0]);
/* Find length of common stem */
for (y = 1; list[y]; y++) {
u_int x;
for (x = 0; x < matchlen; x++)
if (list[0][x] != list[y][x])
break;
matchlen = x;
}
if (matchlen > strlen(word)) {
char *tmp = xstrdup(list[0]);
tmp[matchlen] = '\0';
return tmp;
}
}
return xstrdup(word);
}
/* Autocomplete a sftp command */
static int
complete_cmd_parse(EditLine *el, char *cmd, int lastarg, char quote,
int terminated)
{
u_int y, count = 0, cmdlen, tmplen;
char *tmp, **list, argterm[3];
const LineInfo *lf;
list = xcalloc((sizeof(cmds) / sizeof(*cmds)) + 1, sizeof(char *));
/* No command specified: display all available commands */
if (cmd == NULL) {
for (y = 0; cmds[y].c; y++)
list[count++] = xstrdup(cmds[y].c);
list[count] = NULL;
complete_display(list, 0);
for (y = 0; list[y] != NULL; y++)
free(list[y]);
free(list);
return count;
}
/* Prepare subset of commands that start with "cmd" */
cmdlen = strlen(cmd);
for (y = 0; cmds[y].c; y++) {
if (!strncasecmp(cmd, cmds[y].c, cmdlen))
list[count++] = xstrdup(cmds[y].c);
}
list[count] = NULL;
if (count == 0) {
free(list);
return 0;
}
/* Complete ambiguous command */
tmp = complete_ambiguous(cmd, list, count);
if (count > 1)
complete_display(list, 0);
for (y = 0; list[y]; y++)
free(list[y]);
free(list);
if (tmp != NULL) {
tmplen = strlen(tmp);
cmdlen = strlen(cmd);
/* If cmd may be extended then do so */
if (tmplen > cmdlen)
if (el_insertstr(el, tmp + cmdlen) == -1)
fatal("el_insertstr failed.");
lf = el_line(el);
/* Terminate argument cleanly */
if (count == 1) {
y = 0;
if (!terminated)
argterm[y++] = quote;
if (lastarg || *(lf->cursor) != ' ')
argterm[y++] = ' ';
argterm[y] = '\0';
if (y > 0 && el_insertstr(el, argterm) == -1)
fatal("el_insertstr failed.");
}
free(tmp);
}
return count;
}
/*
* Determine whether a particular sftp command's arguments (if any)
* represent local or remote files.
*/
static int
complete_is_remote(char *cmd) {
int i;
if (cmd == NULL)
return -1;
for (i = 0; cmds[i].c; i++) {
if (!strncasecmp(cmd, cmds[i].c, strlen(cmds[i].c)))
return cmds[i].t;
}
return -1;
}
/* Autocomplete a filename "file" */
static int
complete_match(EditLine *el, struct sftp_conn *conn, char *remote_path,
char *file, int remote, int lastarg, char quote, int terminated)
{
glob_t g;
char *tmp, *tmp2, ins[8];
u_int i, hadglob, pwdlen, len, tmplen, filelen, cesc, isesc, isabs;
int clen;
const LineInfo *lf;
/* Glob from "file" location */
if (file == NULL)
tmp = xstrdup("*");
else
xasprintf(&tmp, "%s*", file);
/* Check if the path is absolute. */
isabs = path_absolute(tmp);
memset(&g, 0, sizeof(g));
if (remote != LOCAL) {
tmp = make_absolute(tmp, remote_path);
remote_glob(conn, tmp, GLOB_DOOFFS|GLOB_MARK, NULL, &g);
} else
glob(tmp, GLOB_DOOFFS|GLOB_MARK, NULL, &g);
/* Determine length of pwd so we can trim completion display */
for (hadglob = tmplen = pwdlen = 0; tmp[tmplen] != 0; tmplen++) {
/* Terminate counting on first unescaped glob metacharacter */
if (tmp[tmplen] == '*' || tmp[tmplen] == '?') {
if (tmp[tmplen] != '*' || tmp[tmplen + 1] != '\0')
hadglob = 1;
break;
}
if (tmp[tmplen] == '\\' && tmp[tmplen + 1] != '\0')
tmplen++;
if (tmp[tmplen] == '/')
pwdlen = tmplen + 1; /* track last seen '/' */
}
free(tmp);
tmp = NULL;
if (g.gl_matchc == 0)
goto out;
if (g.gl_matchc > 1)
complete_display(g.gl_pathv, pwdlen);
/* Don't try to extend globs */
if (file == NULL || hadglob)
goto out;
tmp2 = complete_ambiguous(file, g.gl_pathv, g.gl_matchc);
tmp = path_strip(tmp2, isabs ? NULL : remote_path);
free(tmp2);
if (tmp == NULL)
goto out;
tmplen = strlen(tmp);
filelen = strlen(file);
/* Count the number of escaped characters in the input string. */
cesc = isesc = 0;
for (i = 0; i < filelen; i++) {
if (!isesc && file[i] == '\\' && i + 1 < filelen){
isesc = 1;
cesc++;
} else
isesc = 0;
}
if (tmplen > (filelen - cesc)) {
tmp2 = tmp + filelen - cesc;
len = strlen(tmp2);
/* quote argument on way out */
for (i = 0; i < len; i += clen) {
if ((clen = mblen(tmp2 + i, len - i)) < 0 ||
(size_t)clen > sizeof(ins) - 2)
fatal("invalid multibyte character");
ins[0] = '\\';
memcpy(ins + 1, tmp2 + i, clen);
ins[clen + 1] = '\0';
switch (tmp2[i]) {
case '\'':
case '"':
case '\\':
case '\t':
case '[':
case ' ':
case '#':
case '*':
if (quote == '\0' || tmp2[i] == quote) {
if (el_insertstr(el, ins) == -1)
fatal("el_insertstr "
"failed.");
break;
}
/* FALLTHROUGH */
default:
if (el_insertstr(el, ins + 1) == -1)
fatal("el_insertstr failed.");
break;
}
}
}
lf = el_line(el);
if (g.gl_matchc == 1) {
i = 0;
if (!terminated && quote != '\0')
ins[i++] = quote;
if (*(lf->cursor - 1) != '/' &&
(lastarg || *(lf->cursor) != ' '))
ins[i++] = ' ';
ins[i] = '\0';
if (i > 0 && el_insertstr(el, ins) == -1)
fatal("el_insertstr failed.");
}
free(tmp);
out:
globfree(&g);
return g.gl_matchc;
}
/* tab-completion hook function, called via libedit */
static unsigned char
complete(EditLine *el, int ch)
{
char **argv, *line, quote;
int argc, carg;
u_int cursor, len, terminated, ret = CC_ERROR;
const LineInfo *lf;
struct complete_ctx *complete_ctx;
lf = el_line(el);
if (el_get(el, EL_CLIENTDATA, (void**)&complete_ctx) != 0)
fatal("%s: el_get failed", __func__);
/* Figure out which argument the cursor points to */
cursor = lf->cursor - lf->buffer;
line = xmalloc(cursor + 1);
memcpy(line, lf->buffer, cursor);
line[cursor] = '\0';
argv = makeargv(line, &carg, 1, &quote, &terminated);
free(line);
/* Get all the arguments on the line */
len = lf->lastchar - lf->buffer;
line = xmalloc(len + 1);
memcpy(line, lf->buffer, len);
line[len] = '\0';
argv = makeargv(line, &argc, 1, NULL, NULL);
/* Ensure cursor is at EOL or a argument boundary */
if (line[cursor] != ' ' && line[cursor] != '\0' &&
line[cursor] != '\n') {
free(line);
return ret;
}
if (carg == 0) {
/* Show all available commands */
complete_cmd_parse(el, NULL, argc == carg, '\0', 1);
ret = CC_REDISPLAY;
} else if (carg == 1 && cursor > 0 && line[cursor - 1] != ' ') {
/* Handle the command parsing */
if (complete_cmd_parse(el, argv[0], argc == carg,
quote, terminated) != 0)
ret = CC_REDISPLAY;
} else if (carg >= 1) {
/* Handle file parsing */
int remote = complete_is_remote(argv[0]);
char *filematch = NULL;
if (carg > 1 && line[cursor-1] != ' ')
filematch = argv[carg - 1];
if (remote != 0 &&
complete_match(el, complete_ctx->conn,
*complete_ctx->remote_pathp, filematch,
remote, carg == argc, quote, terminated) != 0)
ret = CC_REDISPLAY;
}
free(line);
return ret;
}
#endif /* USE_LIBEDIT */
static int
interactive_loop(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *file1, char *file2)
{
char *remote_path;
char *dir = NULL, *startdir = NULL;
char cmd[2048];
int err, interactive;
EditLine *el = NULL;
#ifdef USE_LIBEDIT
History *hl = NULL;
HistEvent hev;
extern char *__progname;
struct complete_ctx complete_ctx;
if (!batchmode && isatty(STDIN_FILENO)) {
if ((el = el_init(__progname, stdin, stdout, stderr)) == NULL)
fatal("Couldn't initialise editline");
if ((hl = history_init()) == NULL)
fatal("Couldn't initialise editline history");
history(hl, &hev, H_SETSIZE, 100);
el_set(el, EL_HIST, history, hl);
el_set(el, EL_PROMPT, prompt);
el_set(el, EL_EDITOR, "emacs");
el_set(el, EL_TERMINAL, NULL);
el_set(el, EL_SIGNAL, 1);
el_source(el, NULL);
/* Tab Completion */
el_set(el, EL_ADDFN, "ftp-complete",
"Context sensitive argument completion", complete);
complete_ctx.conn = conn;
complete_ctx.remote_pathp = &remote_path;
el_set(el, EL_CLIENTDATA, (void*)&complete_ctx);
el_set(el, EL_BIND, "^I", "ftp-complete", NULL);
/* enable ctrl-left-arrow and ctrl-right-arrow */
el_set(el, EL_BIND, "\\e[1;5C", "em-next-word", NULL);
el_set(el, EL_BIND, "\\e\\e[C", "em-next-word", NULL);
el_set(el, EL_BIND, "\\e[1;5D", "ed-prev-word", NULL);
el_set(el, EL_BIND, "\\e\\e[D", "ed-prev-word", NULL);
/* make ^w match ksh behaviour */
el_set(el, EL_BIND, "^w", "ed-delete-prev-word", NULL);
}
#endif /* USE_LIBEDIT */
remote_path = do_realpath(conn, ".");
if (remote_path == NULL)
fatal("Need cwd");
startdir = xstrdup(remote_path);
if (file1 != NULL) {
dir = xstrdup(file1);
dir = make_absolute(dir, remote_path);
if (remote_is_dir(conn, dir) && file2 == NULL) {
if (!quiet)
mprintf("Changing to: %s\n", dir);
snprintf(cmd, sizeof cmd, "cd \"%s\"", dir);
if (parse_dispatch_command(conn, cmd,
&remote_path, startdir, 1, 0) != 0) {
free(dir);
free(startdir);
free(remote_path);
free(conn);
return (-1);
}
} else {
/* XXX this is wrong wrt quoting */
snprintf(cmd, sizeof cmd, "get%s %s%s%s",
global_aflag ? " -a" : "", dir,
file2 == NULL ? "" : " ",
file2 == NULL ? "" : file2);
err = parse_dispatch_command(conn, cmd,
&remote_path, startdir, 1, 0);
free(dir);
free(startdir);
free(remote_path);
free(conn);
return (err);
}
free(dir);
}
setvbuf(stdout, NULL, _IOLBF, 0);
setvbuf(infile, NULL, _IOLBF, 0);
interactive = !batchmode && isatty(STDIN_FILENO);
err = 0;
for (;;) {
ssh_signal(SIGINT, SIG_IGN);
if (el == NULL) {
if (interactive)
printf("sftp> ");
if (fgets(cmd, sizeof(cmd), infile) == NULL) {
if (interactive)
printf("\n");
break;
}
} else {
#ifdef USE_LIBEDIT
const char *line;
int count = 0;
if ((line = el_gets(el, &count)) == NULL ||
count <= 0) {
printf("\n");
break;
}
history(hl, &hev, H_ENTER, line);
if (strlcpy(cmd, line, sizeof(cmd)) >= sizeof(cmd)) {
fprintf(stderr, "Error: input line too long\n");
continue;
}
#endif /* USE_LIBEDIT */
}
cmd[strcspn(cmd, "\n")] = '\0';
/* Handle user interrupts gracefully during commands */
interrupted = 0;
ssh_signal(SIGINT, cmd_interrupt);
err = parse_dispatch_command(conn, cmd, &remote_path,
startdir, batchmode, !interactive && el == NULL);
if (err != 0)
break;
}
ssh_signal(SIGCHLD, SIG_DFL);
free(remote_path);
free(startdir);
free(conn);
#ifdef USE_LIBEDIT
if (el != NULL)
el_end(el);
#endif /* USE_LIBEDIT */
/* err == 1 signifies normal "quit" exit */
return (err >= 0 ? 0 : -1);
}
static void
connect_to_server(char *path, char **args, int *in, int *out)
{
int c_in, c_out;
#ifdef USE_PIPES
int pin[2], pout[2];
if ((pipe(pin) == -1) || (pipe(pout) == -1))
fatal("pipe: %s", strerror(errno));
*in = pin[0];
*out = pout[1];
c_in = pout[0];
c_out = pin[1];
#else /* USE_PIPES */
int inout[2];
if (socketpair(AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0, inout) == -1)
fatal("socketpair: %s", strerror(errno));
*in = *out = inout[0];
c_in = c_out = inout[1];
#endif /* USE_PIPES */
if ((sshpid = fork()) == -1)
fatal("fork: %s", strerror(errno));
else if (sshpid == 0) {
if ((dup2(c_in, STDIN_FILENO) == -1) ||
(dup2(c_out, STDOUT_FILENO) == -1)) {
fprintf(stderr, "dup2: %s\n", strerror(errno));
_exit(1);
}
close(*in);
close(*out);
close(c_in);
close(c_out);
/*
* The underlying ssh is in the same process group, so we must
* ignore SIGINT if we want to gracefully abort commands,
* otherwise the signal will make it to the ssh process and
* kill it too. Contrawise, since sftp sends SIGTERMs to the
* underlying ssh, it must *not* ignore that signal.
*/
ssh_signal(SIGINT, SIG_IGN);
ssh_signal(SIGTERM, SIG_DFL);
execvp(path, args);
fprintf(stderr, "exec: %s: %s\n", path, strerror(errno));
_exit(1);
}
ssh_signal(SIGTERM, killchild);
ssh_signal(SIGINT, killchild);
ssh_signal(SIGHUP, killchild);
ssh_signal(SIGTSTP, suspchild);
ssh_signal(SIGTTIN, suspchild);
ssh_signal(SIGTTOU, suspchild);
ssh_signal(SIGCHLD, sigchld_handler);
close(c_in);
close(c_out);
}
static void
usage(void)
{
extern char *__progname;
fprintf(stderr,
- "usage: %s [-46aCfNpqrv] [-B buffer_size] [-b batchfile] [-c cipher]\n"
+ "usage: %s [-46AaCfNpqrv] [-B buffer_size] [-b batchfile] [-c cipher]\n"
" [-D sftp_server_path] [-F ssh_config] [-i identity_file]\n"
" [-J destination] [-l limit] [-o ssh_option] [-P port]\n"
" [-R num_requests] [-S program] [-s subsystem | sftp_server]\n"
" destination\n",
__progname);
exit(1);
}
int
main(int argc, char **argv)
{
int in, out, ch, err, tmp, port = -1, noisy = 0;
char *host = NULL, *user, *cp, *file2 = NULL;
int debug_level = 0;
char *file1 = NULL, *sftp_server = NULL;
char *ssh_program = _PATH_SSH_PROGRAM, *sftp_direct = NULL;
const char *errstr;
LogLevel ll = SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO;
arglist args;
extern int optind;
extern char *optarg;
struct sftp_conn *conn;
size_t copy_buffer_len = DEFAULT_COPY_BUFLEN;
size_t num_requests = DEFAULT_NUM_REQUESTS;
long long limit_kbps = 0;
/* Ensure that fds 0, 1 and 2 are open or directed to /dev/null */
sanitise_stdfd();
msetlocale();
seed_rng();
__progname = ssh_get_progname(argv[0]);
memset(&args, '\0', sizeof(args));
args.list = NULL;
addargs(&args, "%s", ssh_program);
addargs(&args, "-oForwardX11 no");
- addargs(&args, "-oForwardAgent no");
addargs(&args, "-oPermitLocalCommand no");
addargs(&args, "-oClearAllForwardings yes");
ll = SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO;
infile = stdin;
while ((ch = getopt(argc, argv,
- "1246afhNpqrvCc:D:i:l:o:s:S:b:B:F:J:P:R:")) != -1) {
+ "1246AafhNpqrvCc:D:i:l:o:s:S:b:B:F:J:P:R:")) != -1) {
switch (ch) {
/* Passed through to ssh(1) */
+ case 'A':
case '4':
case '6':
case 'C':
addargs(&args, "-%c", ch);
break;
/* Passed through to ssh(1) with argument */
case 'F':
case 'J':
case 'c':
case 'i':
case 'o':
addargs(&args, "-%c", ch);
addargs(&args, "%s", optarg);
break;
case 'q':
ll = SYSLOG_LEVEL_ERROR;
quiet = 1;
showprogress = 0;
addargs(&args, "-%c", ch);
break;
case 'P':
port = a2port(optarg);
if (port <= 0)
fatal("Bad port \"%s\"\n", optarg);
break;
case 'v':
if (debug_level < 3) {
addargs(&args, "-v");
ll = SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG1 + debug_level;
}
debug_level++;
break;
case '1':
fatal("SSH protocol v.1 is no longer supported");
break;
case '2':
/* accept silently */
break;
case 'a':
global_aflag = 1;
break;
case 'B':
copy_buffer_len = strtol(optarg, &cp, 10);
if (copy_buffer_len == 0 || *cp != '\0')
fatal("Invalid buffer size \"%s\"", optarg);
break;
case 'b':
if (batchmode)
fatal("Batch file already specified.");
/* Allow "-" as stdin */
if (strcmp(optarg, "-") != 0 &&
(infile = fopen(optarg, "r")) == NULL)
fatal("%s (%s).", strerror(errno), optarg);
showprogress = 0;
quiet = batchmode = 1;
addargs(&args, "-obatchmode yes");
break;
case 'f':
global_fflag = 1;
break;
case 'N':
noisy = 1; /* Used to clear quiet mode after getopt */
break;
case 'p':
global_pflag = 1;
break;
case 'D':
sftp_direct = optarg;
break;
case 'l':
limit_kbps = strtonum(optarg, 1, 100 * 1024 * 1024,
&errstr);
if (errstr != NULL)
usage();
limit_kbps *= 1024; /* kbps */
break;
case 'r':
global_rflag = 1;
break;
case 'R':
num_requests = strtol(optarg, &cp, 10);
if (num_requests == 0 || *cp != '\0')
fatal("Invalid number of requests \"%s\"",
optarg);
break;
case 's':
sftp_server = optarg;
break;
case 'S':
ssh_program = optarg;
replacearg(&args, 0, "%s", ssh_program);
break;
case 'h':
default:
usage();
}
}
+ /* Do this last because we want the user to be able to override it */
+ addargs(&args, "-oForwardAgent no");
+
if (!isatty(STDERR_FILENO))
showprogress = 0;
if (noisy)
quiet = 0;
log_init(argv[0], ll, SYSLOG_FACILITY_USER, 1);
if (sftp_direct == NULL) {
if (optind == argc || argc > (optind + 2))
usage();
argv += optind;
switch (parse_uri("sftp", *argv, &user, &host, &tmp, &file1)) {
case -1:
usage();
break;
case 0:
if (tmp != -1)
port = tmp;
break;
default:
/* Try with user, host and path. */
if (parse_user_host_path(*argv, &user, &host,
&file1) == 0)
break;
/* Try with user and host. */
if (parse_user_host_port(*argv, &user, &host, NULL)
== 0)
break;
/* Treat as a plain hostname. */
host = xstrdup(*argv);
host = cleanhostname(host);
break;
}
file2 = *(argv + 1);
if (!*host) {
fprintf(stderr, "Missing hostname\n");
usage();
}
if (port != -1)
addargs(&args, "-oPort %d", port);
if (user != NULL) {
addargs(&args, "-l");
addargs(&args, "%s", user);
}
/* no subsystem if the server-spec contains a '/' */
if (sftp_server == NULL || strchr(sftp_server, '/') == NULL)
addargs(&args, "-s");
addargs(&args, "--");
addargs(&args, "%s", host);
addargs(&args, "%s", (sftp_server != NULL ?
sftp_server : "sftp"));
connect_to_server(ssh_program, args.list, &in, &out);
} else {
args.list = NULL;
addargs(&args, "sftp-server");
connect_to_server(sftp_direct, args.list, &in, &out);
}
freeargs(&args);
conn = do_init(in, out, copy_buffer_len, num_requests, limit_kbps);
if (conn == NULL)
fatal("Couldn't initialise connection to server");
if (!quiet) {
if (sftp_direct == NULL)
fprintf(stderr, "Connected to %s.\n", host);
else
fprintf(stderr, "Attached to %s.\n", sftp_direct);
}
err = interactive_loop(conn, file1, file2);
#if !defined(USE_PIPES)
shutdown(in, SHUT_RDWR);
shutdown(out, SHUT_RDWR);
#endif
close(in);
close(out);
if (batchmode)
fclose(infile);
while (waitpid(sshpid, NULL, 0) == -1 && sshpid > 1)
if (errno != EINTR)
fatal("Couldn't wait for ssh process: %s",
strerror(errno));
exit(err == 0 ? 0 : 1);
}
diff --git a/sk-api.h b/sk-api.h
index 1ecaa353730c..df17ca54020c 100644
--- a/sk-api.h
+++ b/sk-api.h
@@ -1,95 +1,98 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: sk-api.h,v 1.9 2020/04/28 04:02:29 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: sk-api.h,v 1.11 2020/09/09 03:08:01 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 2019 Google LLC
*
* Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
* purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
* copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
*
* THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
* WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
* MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
* ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
* WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
* ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
* OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
*/
#ifndef _SK_API_H
#define _SK_API_H 1
#include <stddef.h>
#ifdef HAVE_STDINT_H
#include <stdint.h>
#endif
/* Flags */
#define SSH_SK_USER_PRESENCE_REQD 0x01
#define SSH_SK_USER_VERIFICATION_REQD 0x04
#define SSH_SK_RESIDENT_KEY 0x20
/* Algs */
#define SSH_SK_ECDSA 0x00
#define SSH_SK_ED25519 0x01
/* Error codes */
#define SSH_SK_ERR_GENERAL -1
#define SSH_SK_ERR_UNSUPPORTED -2
#define SSH_SK_ERR_PIN_REQUIRED -3
#define SSH_SK_ERR_DEVICE_NOT_FOUND -4
struct sk_enroll_response {
uint8_t *public_key;
size_t public_key_len;
uint8_t *key_handle;
size_t key_handle_len;
uint8_t *signature;
size_t signature_len;
uint8_t *attestation_cert;
size_t attestation_cert_len;
+ uint8_t *authdata;
+ size_t authdata_len;
};
struct sk_sign_response {
uint8_t flags;
uint32_t counter;
uint8_t *sig_r;
size_t sig_r_len;
uint8_t *sig_s;
size_t sig_s_len;
};
struct sk_resident_key {
uint32_t alg;
size_t slot;
char *application;
struct sk_enroll_response key;
+ uint8_t flags;
};
struct sk_option {
char *name;
char *value;
uint8_t required;
};
-#define SSH_SK_VERSION_MAJOR 0x00050000 /* current API version */
+#define SSH_SK_VERSION_MAJOR 0x00070000 /* current API version */
#define SSH_SK_VERSION_MAJOR_MASK 0xffff0000
/* Return the version of the middleware API */
uint32_t sk_api_version(void);
/* Enroll a U2F key (private key generation) */
int sk_enroll(uint32_t alg, const uint8_t *challenge, size_t challenge_len,
const char *application, uint8_t flags, const char *pin,
struct sk_option **options, struct sk_enroll_response **enroll_response);
/* Sign a challenge */
int sk_sign(uint32_t alg, const uint8_t *message, size_t message_len,
const char *application, const uint8_t *key_handle, size_t key_handle_len,
uint8_t flags, const char *pin, struct sk_option **options,
struct sk_sign_response **sign_response);
/* Enumerate all resident keys */
int sk_load_resident_keys(const char *pin, struct sk_option **options,
struct sk_resident_key ***rks, size_t *nrks);
#endif /* _SK_API_H */
diff --git a/sk-usbhid.c b/sk-usbhid.c
index 25250824dba7..007c596447ff 100644
--- a/sk-usbhid.c
+++ b/sk-usbhid.c
@@ -1,1055 +1,1261 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: sk-usbhid.c,v 1.26 2020/09/09 03:08:01 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 2019 Markus Friedl
+ * Copyright (c) 2020 Pedro Martelletto
*
* Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
* purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
* copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
*
* THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
* WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
* MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
* ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
* WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
* ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
* OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
*/
#include "includes.h"
#ifdef ENABLE_SK_INTERNAL
#include <stdint.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stddef.h>
#include <stdarg.h>
#ifdef HAVE_SHA2_H
#include <sha2.h>
#endif
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
#include <openssl/opensslv.h>
#include <openssl/crypto.h>
#include <openssl/bn.h>
#include <openssl/ec.h>
#include <openssl/ecdsa.h>
#include <openssl/evp.h>
#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
#include <fido.h>
#include <fido/credman.h>
+/* backwards compat for libfido2 */
+#ifndef HAVE_FIDO_CRED_PROT
+#define fido_cred_prot(x) (0)
+#endif
+#ifndef HAVE_FIDO_CRED_SET_PROT
+#define fido_cred_set_prot(x, y) (FIDO_ERR_UNSUPPORTED_OPTION)
+#endif
+#ifndef HAVE_FIDO_DEV_SUPPORTS_CRED_PROT
+#define fido_dev_supports_cred_prot(x) (0)
+#endif
+#ifndef HAVE_FIDO_DEV_GET_TOUCH_BEGIN
+#define fido_dev_get_touch_begin(x) (FIDO_ERR_UNSUPPORTED_OPTION)
+#endif
+#ifndef HAVE_FIDO_DEV_GET_TOUCH_STATUS
+#define fido_dev_get_touch_status(x, y, z) (FIDO_ERR_UNSUPPORTED_OPTION)
+#endif
+#ifndef FIDO_CRED_PROT_UV_REQUIRED
+#define FIDO_CRED_PROT_UV_REQUIRED 0
+#endif
+#ifndef FIDO_CRED_PROT_UV_OPTIONAL_WITH_ID
+#define FIDO_CRED_PROT_UV_OPTIONAL_WITH_ID 0
+#endif
+
#ifndef SK_STANDALONE
# include "log.h"
# include "xmalloc.h"
+# include "misc.h"
/*
* If building as part of OpenSSH, then rename exported functions.
* This must be done before including sk-api.h.
*/
# define sk_api_version ssh_sk_api_version
# define sk_enroll ssh_sk_enroll
# define sk_sign ssh_sk_sign
# define sk_load_resident_keys ssh_sk_load_resident_keys
#endif /* !SK_STANDALONE */
#include "sk-api.h"
/* #define SK_DEBUG 1 */
-#define MAX_FIDO_DEVICES 256
+#ifdef SK_DEBUG
+#define SSH_FIDO_INIT_ARG FIDO_DEBUG
+#else
+#define SSH_FIDO_INIT_ARG 0
+#endif
+
+#define MAX_FIDO_DEVICES 8
+#define FIDO_POLL_MS 50
+#define SELECT_MS 15000
+#define POLL_SLEEP_NS 200000000
/* Compatibility with OpenSSH 1.0.x */
#if (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10100000L)
#define ECDSA_SIG_get0(sig, pr, ps) \
do { \
(*pr) = sig->r; \
(*ps) = sig->s; \
} while (0)
#endif
+struct sk_usbhid {
+ fido_dev_t *dev;
+ char *path;
+};
+
/* Return the version of the middleware API */
uint32_t sk_api_version(void);
/* Enroll a U2F key (private key generation) */
int sk_enroll(uint32_t alg, const uint8_t *challenge, size_t challenge_len,
const char *application, uint8_t flags, const char *pin,
struct sk_option **options, struct sk_enroll_response **enroll_response);
/* Sign a challenge */
int sk_sign(uint32_t alg, const uint8_t *message, size_t message_len,
const char *application, const uint8_t *key_handle, size_t key_handle_len,
uint8_t flags, const char *pin, struct sk_option **options,
struct sk_sign_response **sign_response);
/* Load resident keys */
int sk_load_resident_keys(const char *pin, struct sk_option **options,
struct sk_resident_key ***rks, size_t *nrks);
static void skdebug(const char *func, const char *fmt, ...)
__attribute__((__format__ (printf, 2, 3)));
static void
skdebug(const char *func, const char *fmt, ...)
{
#if !defined(SK_STANDALONE)
char *msg;
va_list ap;
va_start(ap, fmt);
xvasprintf(&msg, fmt, ap);
va_end(ap);
debug("%s: %s", func, msg);
free(msg);
#elif defined(SK_DEBUG)
va_list ap;
va_start(ap, fmt);
fprintf(stderr, "%s: ", func);
vfprintf(stderr, fmt, ap);
fputc('\n', stderr);
va_end(ap);
#else
(void)func; /* XXX */
(void)fmt; /* XXX */
#endif
}
uint32_t
sk_api_version(void)
{
return SSH_SK_VERSION_MAJOR;
}
-/* Select the first identified FIDO device attached to the system */
-static char *
-pick_first_device(void)
+static struct sk_usbhid *
+sk_open(const char *path)
{
- char *ret = NULL;
- fido_dev_info_t *devlist = NULL;
- size_t olen = 0;
+ struct sk_usbhid *sk;
int r;
- const fido_dev_info_t *di;
- if ((devlist = fido_dev_info_new(1)) == NULL) {
- skdebug(__func__, "fido_dev_info_new failed");
- goto out;
+ if (path == NULL) {
+ skdebug(__func__, "path == NULL");
+ return NULL;
}
- if ((r = fido_dev_info_manifest(devlist, 1, &olen)) != FIDO_OK) {
- skdebug(__func__, "fido_dev_info_manifest failed: %s",
+ if ((sk = calloc(1, sizeof(*sk))) == NULL) {
+ skdebug(__func__, "calloc sk failed");
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ if ((sk->path = strdup(path)) == NULL) {
+ skdebug(__func__, "strdup path failed");
+ free(sk);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ if ((sk->dev = fido_dev_new()) == NULL) {
+ skdebug(__func__, "fido_dev_new failed");
+ free(sk->path);
+ free(sk);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ if ((r = fido_dev_open(sk->dev, sk->path)) != FIDO_OK) {
+ skdebug(__func__, "fido_dev_open %s failed: %s", sk->path,
fido_strerr(r));
- goto out;
+ fido_dev_free(&sk->dev);
+ free(sk->path);
+ free(sk);
+ return NULL;
}
- if (olen != 1) {
- skdebug(__func__, "fido_dev_info_manifest bad len %zu", olen);
- goto out;
+ return sk;
+}
+
+static void
+sk_close(struct sk_usbhid *sk)
+{
+ if (sk == NULL)
+ return;
+ fido_dev_cancel(sk->dev); /* cancel any pending operation */
+ fido_dev_close(sk->dev);
+ fido_dev_free(&sk->dev);
+ free(sk->path);
+ free(sk);
+}
+
+static struct sk_usbhid **
+sk_openv(const fido_dev_info_t *devlist, size_t ndevs, size_t *nopen)
+{
+ const fido_dev_info_t *di;
+ struct sk_usbhid **skv;
+ size_t i;
+
+ *nopen = 0;
+ if ((skv = calloc(ndevs, sizeof(*skv))) == NULL) {
+ skdebug(__func__, "calloc skv failed");
+ return NULL;
}
- di = fido_dev_info_ptr(devlist, 0);
- if ((ret = strdup(fido_dev_info_path(di))) == NULL) {
- skdebug(__func__, "fido_dev_info_path failed");
- goto out;
+ for (i = 0; i < ndevs; i++) {
+ if ((di = fido_dev_info_ptr(devlist, i)) == NULL)
+ skdebug(__func__, "fido_dev_info_ptr failed");
+ else if ((skv[*nopen] = sk_open(fido_dev_info_path(di))) == NULL)
+ skdebug(__func__, "sk_open failed");
+ else
+ (*nopen)++;
}
- out:
- fido_dev_info_free(&devlist, 1);
- return ret;
+ if (*nopen == 0) {
+ for (i = 0; i < ndevs; i++)
+ sk_close(skv[i]);
+ free(skv);
+ skv = NULL;
+ }
+
+ return skv;
+}
+
+static void
+sk_closev(struct sk_usbhid **skv, size_t nsk)
+{
+ size_t i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < nsk; i++)
+ sk_close(skv[i]);
+ free(skv);
}
-/* Check if the specified key handle exists on a given device. */
static int
-try_device(fido_dev_t *dev, const uint8_t *message, size_t message_len,
- const char *application, const uint8_t *key_handle, size_t key_handle_len)
+sk_touch_begin(struct sk_usbhid **skv, size_t nsk)
+{
+ size_t i, ok = 0;
+ int r;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < nsk; i++)
+ if ((r = fido_dev_get_touch_begin(skv[i]->dev)) != FIDO_OK)
+ skdebug(__func__, "fido_dev_get_touch_begin %s failed:"
+ " %s", skv[i]->path, fido_strerr(r));
+ else
+ ok++;
+
+ return ok ? 0 : -1;
+}
+
+static int
+sk_touch_poll(struct sk_usbhid **skv, size_t nsk, int *touch, size_t *idx)
+{
+ struct timespec ts_pause;
+ size_t npoll, i;
+ int r;
+
+ ts_pause.tv_sec = 0;
+ ts_pause.tv_nsec = POLL_SLEEP_NS;
+ nanosleep(&ts_pause, NULL);
+ npoll = nsk;
+ for (i = 0; i < nsk; i++) {
+ if (skv[i] == NULL)
+ continue; /* device discarded */
+ skdebug(__func__, "polling %s", skv[i]->path);
+ if ((r = fido_dev_get_touch_status(skv[i]->dev, touch,
+ FIDO_POLL_MS)) != FIDO_OK) {
+ skdebug(__func__, "fido_dev_get_touch_status %s: %s",
+ skv[i]->path, fido_strerr(r));
+ sk_close(skv[i]); /* discard device */
+ skv[i] = NULL;
+ if (--npoll == 0) {
+ skdebug(__func__, "no device left to poll");
+ return -1;
+ }
+ } else if (*touch) {
+ *idx = i;
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
+ *touch = 0;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/* Calculate SHA256(m) */
+static int
+sha256_mem(const void *m, size_t mlen, u_char *d, size_t dlen)
+{
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+ u_int mdlen;
+#endif
+
+ if (dlen != 32)
+ return -1;
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+ mdlen = dlen;
+ if (!EVP_Digest(m, mlen, d, &mdlen, EVP_sha256(), NULL))
+ return -1;
+#else
+ SHA256Data(m, mlen, d);
+#endif
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/* Check if the specified key handle exists on a given sk. */
+static int
+sk_try(const struct sk_usbhid *sk, const char *application,
+ const uint8_t *key_handle, size_t key_handle_len)
{
fido_assert_t *assert = NULL;
+ /* generate an invalid signature on FIDO2 tokens */
+ const char *data = "";
+ uint8_t message[32];
int r = FIDO_ERR_INTERNAL;
+ if (sha256_mem(data, strlen(data), message, sizeof(message)) != 0) {
+ skdebug(__func__, "hash message failed");
+ goto out;
+ }
if ((assert = fido_assert_new()) == NULL) {
skdebug(__func__, "fido_assert_new failed");
goto out;
}
if ((r = fido_assert_set_clientdata_hash(assert, message,
- message_len)) != FIDO_OK) {
+ sizeof(message))) != FIDO_OK) {
skdebug(__func__, "fido_assert_set_clientdata_hash: %s",
fido_strerr(r));
goto out;
}
if ((r = fido_assert_set_rp(assert, application)) != FIDO_OK) {
skdebug(__func__, "fido_assert_set_rp: %s", fido_strerr(r));
goto out;
}
if ((r = fido_assert_allow_cred(assert, key_handle,
key_handle_len)) != FIDO_OK) {
skdebug(__func__, "fido_assert_allow_cred: %s", fido_strerr(r));
goto out;
}
if ((r = fido_assert_set_up(assert, FIDO_OPT_FALSE)) != FIDO_OK) {
skdebug(__func__, "fido_assert_up: %s", fido_strerr(r));
goto out;
}
- r = fido_dev_get_assert(dev, assert, NULL);
+ r = fido_dev_get_assert(sk->dev, assert, NULL);
skdebug(__func__, "fido_dev_get_assert: %s", fido_strerr(r));
if (r == FIDO_ERR_USER_PRESENCE_REQUIRED) {
/* U2F tokens may return this */
r = FIDO_OK;
}
out:
fido_assert_free(&assert);
return r != FIDO_OK ? -1 : 0;
}
-/* Iterate over configured devices looking for a specific key handle */
-static fido_dev_t *
-find_device(const char *path, const uint8_t *message, size_t message_len,
+static struct sk_usbhid *
+sk_select_by_cred(const fido_dev_info_t *devlist, size_t ndevs,
const char *application, const uint8_t *key_handle, size_t key_handle_len)
{
- fido_dev_info_t *devlist = NULL;
- fido_dev_t *dev = NULL;
- size_t devlist_len = 0, i;
- int r;
+ struct sk_usbhid **skv, *sk;
+ size_t skvcnt, i;
- if (path != NULL) {
- if ((dev = fido_dev_new()) == NULL) {
- skdebug(__func__, "fido_dev_new failed");
- return NULL;
- }
- if ((r = fido_dev_open(dev, path)) != FIDO_OK) {
- skdebug(__func__, "fido_dev_open failed");
- fido_dev_free(&dev);
- return NULL;
+ if ((skv = sk_openv(devlist, ndevs, &skvcnt)) == NULL) {
+ skdebug(__func__, "sk_openv failed");
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ if (skvcnt == 1) {
+ sk = skv[0];
+ skv[0] = NULL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ sk = NULL;
+ for (i = 0; i < skvcnt; i++) {
+ if (sk_try(skv[i], application, key_handle,
+ key_handle_len) == 0) {
+ sk = skv[i];
+ skv[i] = NULL;
+ skdebug(__func__, "found key in %s", sk->path);
+ break;
}
- return dev;
}
+ out:
+ sk_closev(skv, skvcnt);
+ return sk;
+}
- if ((devlist = fido_dev_info_new(MAX_FIDO_DEVICES)) == NULL) {
- skdebug(__func__, "fido_dev_info_new failed");
+static struct sk_usbhid *
+sk_select_by_touch(const fido_dev_info_t *devlist, size_t ndevs)
+{
+ struct sk_usbhid **skv, *sk;
+ struct timeval tv_start, tv_now, tv_delta;
+ size_t skvcnt, idx;
+ int touch, ms_remain;
+
+ if ((skv = sk_openv(devlist, ndevs, &skvcnt)) == NULL) {
+ skdebug(__func__, "sk_openv failed");
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ sk = NULL;
+ if (skvcnt < 2) {
+ if (skvcnt == 1) {
+ /* single candidate */
+ sk = skv[0];
+ skv[0] = NULL;
+ }
goto out;
}
- if ((r = fido_dev_info_manifest(devlist, MAX_FIDO_DEVICES,
- &devlist_len)) != FIDO_OK) {
- skdebug(__func__, "fido_dev_info_manifest: %s", fido_strerr(r));
+#ifndef HAVE_FIDO_DEV_GET_TOUCH_STATUS
+ skdebug(__func__, "libfido2 version does not support a feature needed for multiple tokens. Please upgrade to >=1.5.0");
+ goto out;
+#endif
+
+ if (sk_touch_begin(skv, skvcnt) == -1) {
+ skdebug(__func__, "sk_touch_begin failed");
goto out;
}
-
- skdebug(__func__, "found %zu device(s)", devlist_len);
-
- for (i = 0; i < devlist_len; i++) {
- const fido_dev_info_t *di = fido_dev_info_ptr(devlist, i);
-
- if (di == NULL) {
- skdebug(__func__, "fido_dev_info_ptr %zu failed", i);
- continue;
- }
- if ((path = fido_dev_info_path(di)) == NULL) {
- skdebug(__func__, "fido_dev_info_path %zu failed", i);
- continue;
- }
- skdebug(__func__, "trying device %zu: %s", i, path);
- if ((dev = fido_dev_new()) == NULL) {
- skdebug(__func__, "fido_dev_new failed");
- continue;
- }
- if ((r = fido_dev_open(dev, path)) != FIDO_OK) {
- skdebug(__func__, "fido_dev_open failed");
- fido_dev_free(&dev);
- continue;
+ monotime_tv(&tv_start);
+ do {
+ if (sk_touch_poll(skv, skvcnt, &touch, &idx) == -1) {
+ skdebug(__func__, "sk_touch_poll failed");
+ goto out;
}
- if (try_device(dev, message, message_len, application,
- key_handle, key_handle_len) == 0) {
- skdebug(__func__, "found key");
- break;
+ if (touch) {
+ sk = skv[idx];
+ skv[idx] = NULL;
+ goto out;
}
- fido_dev_close(dev);
- fido_dev_free(&dev);
- }
+ monotime_tv(&tv_now);
+ timersub(&tv_now, &tv_start, &tv_delta);
+ ms_remain = SELECT_MS - tv_delta.tv_sec * 1000 -
+ tv_delta.tv_usec / 1000;
+ } while (ms_remain >= FIDO_POLL_MS);
+ skdebug(__func__, "timeout");
+out:
+ sk_closev(skv, skvcnt);
+ return sk;
+}
- out:
- if (devlist != NULL)
- fido_dev_info_free(&devlist, MAX_FIDO_DEVICES);
+static struct sk_usbhid *
+sk_probe(const char *application, const uint8_t *key_handle,
+ size_t key_handle_len)
+{
+ struct sk_usbhid *sk;
+ fido_dev_info_t *devlist;
+ size_t ndevs;
+ int r;
- return dev;
+ if ((devlist = fido_dev_info_new(MAX_FIDO_DEVICES)) == NULL) {
+ skdebug(__func__, "fido_dev_info_new failed");
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ if ((r = fido_dev_info_manifest(devlist, MAX_FIDO_DEVICES,
+ &ndevs)) != FIDO_OK) {
+ skdebug(__func__, "fido_dev_info_manifest failed: %s",
+ fido_strerr(r));
+ fido_dev_info_free(&devlist, MAX_FIDO_DEVICES);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ skdebug(__func__, "%zu device(s) detected", ndevs);
+ if (ndevs == 0) {
+ sk = NULL;
+ } else if (application != NULL && key_handle != NULL) {
+ skdebug(__func__, "selecting sk by cred");
+ sk = sk_select_by_cred(devlist, ndevs, application, key_handle,
+ key_handle_len);
+ } else {
+ skdebug(__func__, "selecting sk by touch");
+ sk = sk_select_by_touch(devlist, ndevs);
+ }
+ fido_dev_info_free(&devlist, MAX_FIDO_DEVICES);
+ return sk;
}
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
/*
* The key returned via fido_cred_pubkey_ptr() is in affine coordinates,
* but the API expects a SEC1 octet string.
*/
static int
pack_public_key_ecdsa(const fido_cred_t *cred,
struct sk_enroll_response *response)
{
const uint8_t *ptr;
BIGNUM *x = NULL, *y = NULL;
EC_POINT *q = NULL;
EC_GROUP *g = NULL;
int ret = -1;
response->public_key = NULL;
response->public_key_len = 0;
if ((x = BN_new()) == NULL ||
(y = BN_new()) == NULL ||
(g = EC_GROUP_new_by_curve_name(NID_X9_62_prime256v1)) == NULL ||
(q = EC_POINT_new(g)) == NULL) {
skdebug(__func__, "libcrypto setup failed");
goto out;
}
if ((ptr = fido_cred_pubkey_ptr(cred)) == NULL) {
skdebug(__func__, "fido_cred_pubkey_ptr failed");
goto out;
}
if (fido_cred_pubkey_len(cred) != 64) {
skdebug(__func__, "bad fido_cred_pubkey_len %zu",
fido_cred_pubkey_len(cred));
goto out;
}
if (BN_bin2bn(ptr, 32, x) == NULL ||
BN_bin2bn(ptr + 32, 32, y) == NULL) {
skdebug(__func__, "BN_bin2bn failed");
goto out;
}
if (EC_POINT_set_affine_coordinates_GFp(g, q, x, y, NULL) != 1) {
skdebug(__func__, "EC_POINT_set_affine_coordinates_GFp failed");
goto out;
}
response->public_key_len = EC_POINT_point2oct(g, q,
POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED, NULL, 0, NULL);
if (response->public_key_len == 0 || response->public_key_len > 2048) {
skdebug(__func__, "bad pubkey length %zu",
response->public_key_len);
goto out;
}
if ((response->public_key = malloc(response->public_key_len)) == NULL) {
skdebug(__func__, "malloc pubkey failed");
goto out;
}
if (EC_POINT_point2oct(g, q, POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
response->public_key, response->public_key_len, NULL) == 0) {
skdebug(__func__, "EC_POINT_point2oct failed");
goto out;
}
/* success */
ret = 0;
out:
if (ret != 0 && response->public_key != NULL) {
memset(response->public_key, 0, response->public_key_len);
free(response->public_key);
response->public_key = NULL;
}
EC_POINT_free(q);
EC_GROUP_free(g);
BN_clear_free(x);
BN_clear_free(y);
return ret;
}
#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
static int
pack_public_key_ed25519(const fido_cred_t *cred,
struct sk_enroll_response *response)
{
const uint8_t *ptr;
size_t len;
int ret = -1;
response->public_key = NULL;
response->public_key_len = 0;
if ((len = fido_cred_pubkey_len(cred)) != 32) {
skdebug(__func__, "bad fido_cred_pubkey_len len %zu", len);
goto out;
}
if ((ptr = fido_cred_pubkey_ptr(cred)) == NULL) {
skdebug(__func__, "fido_cred_pubkey_ptr failed");
goto out;
}
response->public_key_len = len;
if ((response->public_key = malloc(response->public_key_len)) == NULL) {
skdebug(__func__, "malloc pubkey failed");
goto out;
}
memcpy(response->public_key, ptr, len);
ret = 0;
out:
if (ret != 0)
free(response->public_key);
return ret;
}
static int
pack_public_key(uint32_t alg, const fido_cred_t *cred,
struct sk_enroll_response *response)
{
switch(alg) {
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
case SSH_SK_ECDSA:
return pack_public_key_ecdsa(cred, response);
#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
case SSH_SK_ED25519:
return pack_public_key_ed25519(cred, response);
default:
return -1;
}
}
static int
fidoerr_to_skerr(int fidoerr)
{
switch (fidoerr) {
case FIDO_ERR_UNSUPPORTED_OPTION:
case FIDO_ERR_UNSUPPORTED_ALGORITHM:
return SSH_SK_ERR_UNSUPPORTED;
case FIDO_ERR_PIN_REQUIRED:
case FIDO_ERR_PIN_INVALID:
return SSH_SK_ERR_PIN_REQUIRED;
default:
return -1;
}
}
static int
check_enroll_options(struct sk_option **options, char **devicep,
uint8_t *user_id, size_t user_id_len)
{
size_t i;
if (options == NULL)
return 0;
for (i = 0; options[i] != NULL; i++) {
if (strcmp(options[i]->name, "device") == 0) {
if ((*devicep = strdup(options[i]->value)) == NULL) {
skdebug(__func__, "strdup device failed");
return -1;
}
skdebug(__func__, "requested device %s", *devicep);
} else if (strcmp(options[i]->name, "user") == 0) {
if (strlcpy(user_id, options[i]->value, user_id_len) >=
user_id_len) {
skdebug(__func__, "user too long");
return -1;
}
skdebug(__func__, "requested user %s",
(char *)user_id);
} else {
skdebug(__func__, "requested unsupported option %s",
options[i]->name);
if (options[i]->required) {
skdebug(__func__, "unknown required option");
return -1;
}
}
}
return 0;
}
int
sk_enroll(uint32_t alg, const uint8_t *challenge, size_t challenge_len,
const char *application, uint8_t flags, const char *pin,
struct sk_option **options, struct sk_enroll_response **enroll_response)
{
fido_cred_t *cred = NULL;
- fido_dev_t *dev = NULL;
const uint8_t *ptr;
uint8_t user_id[32];
+ struct sk_usbhid *sk = NULL;
struct sk_enroll_response *response = NULL;
size_t len;
+ int credprot;
int cose_alg;
int ret = SSH_SK_ERR_GENERAL;
int r;
char *device = NULL;
-#ifdef SK_DEBUG
- fido_init(FIDO_DEBUG);
-#endif
+ fido_init(SSH_FIDO_INIT_ARG);
+
if (enroll_response == NULL) {
skdebug(__func__, "enroll_response == NULL");
goto out;
}
+ *enroll_response = NULL;
memset(user_id, 0, sizeof(user_id));
- if (check_enroll_options(options, &device,
- user_id, sizeof(user_id)) != 0)
+ if (check_enroll_options(options, &device, user_id,
+ sizeof(user_id)) != 0)
goto out; /* error already logged */
- *enroll_response = NULL;
switch(alg) {
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
case SSH_SK_ECDSA:
cose_alg = COSE_ES256;
break;
#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
case SSH_SK_ED25519:
cose_alg = COSE_EDDSA;
break;
default:
skdebug(__func__, "unsupported key type %d", alg);
goto out;
}
- if (device == NULL && (device = pick_first_device()) == NULL) {
- ret = SSH_SK_ERR_DEVICE_NOT_FOUND;
- skdebug(__func__, "pick_first_device failed");
+ if (device != NULL)
+ sk = sk_open(device);
+ else
+ sk = sk_probe(NULL, NULL, 0);
+ if (sk == NULL) {
+ skdebug(__func__, "failed to find sk");
goto out;
}
- skdebug(__func__, "using device %s", device);
+ skdebug(__func__, "using device %s", sk->path);
if ((cred = fido_cred_new()) == NULL) {
skdebug(__func__, "fido_cred_new failed");
goto out;
}
if ((r = fido_cred_set_type(cred, cose_alg)) != FIDO_OK) {
skdebug(__func__, "fido_cred_set_type: %s", fido_strerr(r));
goto out;
}
if ((r = fido_cred_set_clientdata_hash(cred, challenge,
challenge_len)) != FIDO_OK) {
skdebug(__func__, "fido_cred_set_clientdata_hash: %s",
fido_strerr(r));
goto out;
}
if ((r = fido_cred_set_rk(cred, (flags & SSH_SK_RESIDENT_KEY) != 0 ?
FIDO_OPT_TRUE : FIDO_OPT_OMIT)) != FIDO_OK) {
skdebug(__func__, "fido_cred_set_rk: %s", fido_strerr(r));
goto out;
}
if ((r = fido_cred_set_user(cred, user_id, sizeof(user_id),
"openssh", "openssh", NULL)) != FIDO_OK) {
skdebug(__func__, "fido_cred_set_user: %s", fido_strerr(r));
goto out;
}
if ((r = fido_cred_set_rp(cred, application, NULL)) != FIDO_OK) {
skdebug(__func__, "fido_cred_set_rp: %s", fido_strerr(r));
goto out;
}
- if ((dev = fido_dev_new()) == NULL) {
- skdebug(__func__, "fido_dev_new failed");
- goto out;
- }
- if ((r = fido_dev_open(dev, device)) != FIDO_OK) {
- skdebug(__func__, "fido_dev_open: %s", fido_strerr(r));
+ if ((flags & (SSH_SK_RESIDENT_KEY|SSH_SK_USER_VERIFICATION_REQD)) != 0) {
+#if !defined(HAVE_FIDO_DEV_SUPPORTS_CRED_PROT) || \
+ !defined(HAVE_FIDO_CRED_SET_PROT)
+ skdebug(__func__, "libfido2 version does not support a feature required for this operation. Please upgrade to >=1.5.0");
+ ret = SSH_SK_ERR_UNSUPPORTED;
goto out;
+ credprot = 0; (void)credprot; /* avoid warning */
+#endif
+ if (!fido_dev_supports_cred_prot(sk->dev)) {
+ skdebug(__func__, "%s does not support credprot, "
+ "refusing to create unprotected "
+ "resident/verify-required key", sk->path);
+ ret = SSH_SK_ERR_UNSUPPORTED;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if ((flags & SSH_SK_USER_VERIFICATION_REQD))
+ credprot = FIDO_CRED_PROT_UV_REQUIRED;
+ else
+ credprot = FIDO_CRED_PROT_UV_OPTIONAL_WITH_ID;
+
+ if ((r = fido_cred_set_prot(cred, credprot)) != FIDO_OK) {
+ skdebug(__func__, "fido_cred_set_prot: %s",
+ fido_strerr(r));
+ ret = fidoerr_to_skerr(r);
+ goto out;
+ }
}
- if ((r = fido_dev_make_cred(dev, cred, pin)) != FIDO_OK) {
+ if ((r = fido_dev_make_cred(sk->dev, cred, pin)) != FIDO_OK) {
skdebug(__func__, "fido_dev_make_cred: %s", fido_strerr(r));
ret = fidoerr_to_skerr(r);
goto out;
}
if (fido_cred_x5c_ptr(cred) != NULL) {
if ((r = fido_cred_verify(cred)) != FIDO_OK) {
skdebug(__func__, "fido_cred_verify: %s",
fido_strerr(r));
goto out;
}
} else {
skdebug(__func__, "self-attested credential");
if ((r = fido_cred_verify_self(cred)) != FIDO_OK) {
skdebug(__func__, "fido_cred_verify_self: %s",
fido_strerr(r));
goto out;
}
}
if ((response = calloc(1, sizeof(*response))) == NULL) {
skdebug(__func__, "calloc response failed");
goto out;
}
if (pack_public_key(alg, cred, response) != 0) {
skdebug(__func__, "pack_public_key failed");
goto out;
}
if ((ptr = fido_cred_id_ptr(cred)) != NULL) {
len = fido_cred_id_len(cred);
if ((response->key_handle = calloc(1, len)) == NULL) {
skdebug(__func__, "calloc key handle failed");
goto out;
}
memcpy(response->key_handle, ptr, len);
response->key_handle_len = len;
}
if ((ptr = fido_cred_sig_ptr(cred)) != NULL) {
len = fido_cred_sig_len(cred);
if ((response->signature = calloc(1, len)) == NULL) {
skdebug(__func__, "calloc signature failed");
goto out;
}
memcpy(response->signature, ptr, len);
response->signature_len = len;
}
if ((ptr = fido_cred_x5c_ptr(cred)) != NULL) {
len = fido_cred_x5c_len(cred);
debug3("%s: attestation cert len=%zu", __func__, len);
if ((response->attestation_cert = calloc(1, len)) == NULL) {
skdebug(__func__, "calloc attestation cert failed");
goto out;
}
memcpy(response->attestation_cert, ptr, len);
response->attestation_cert_len = len;
}
+ if ((ptr = fido_cred_authdata_ptr(cred)) != NULL) {
+ len = fido_cred_authdata_len(cred);
+ debug3("%s: authdata len=%zu", __func__, len);
+ if ((response->authdata = calloc(1, len)) == NULL) {
+ skdebug(__func__, "calloc authdata failed");
+ goto out;
+ }
+ memcpy(response->authdata, ptr, len);
+ response->authdata_len = len;
+ }
*enroll_response = response;
response = NULL;
ret = 0;
out:
free(device);
if (response != NULL) {
free(response->public_key);
free(response->key_handle);
free(response->signature);
free(response->attestation_cert);
+ free(response->authdata);
free(response);
}
- if (dev != NULL) {
- fido_dev_close(dev);
- fido_dev_free(&dev);
- }
- if (cred != NULL) {
- fido_cred_free(&cred);
- }
+ sk_close(sk);
+ fido_cred_free(&cred);
return ret;
}
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
static int
pack_sig_ecdsa(fido_assert_t *assert, struct sk_sign_response *response)
{
ECDSA_SIG *sig = NULL;
const BIGNUM *sig_r, *sig_s;
const unsigned char *cp;
size_t sig_len;
int ret = -1;
cp = fido_assert_sig_ptr(assert, 0);
sig_len = fido_assert_sig_len(assert, 0);
if ((sig = d2i_ECDSA_SIG(NULL, &cp, sig_len)) == NULL) {
skdebug(__func__, "d2i_ECDSA_SIG failed");
goto out;
}
ECDSA_SIG_get0(sig, &sig_r, &sig_s);
response->sig_r_len = BN_num_bytes(sig_r);
response->sig_s_len = BN_num_bytes(sig_s);
if ((response->sig_r = calloc(1, response->sig_r_len)) == NULL ||
(response->sig_s = calloc(1, response->sig_s_len)) == NULL) {
skdebug(__func__, "calloc signature failed");
goto out;
}
BN_bn2bin(sig_r, response->sig_r);
BN_bn2bin(sig_s, response->sig_s);
ret = 0;
out:
ECDSA_SIG_free(sig);
if (ret != 0) {
free(response->sig_r);
free(response->sig_s);
response->sig_r = NULL;
response->sig_s = NULL;
}
return ret;
}
#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
static int
pack_sig_ed25519(fido_assert_t *assert, struct sk_sign_response *response)
{
const unsigned char *ptr;
size_t len;
int ret = -1;
ptr = fido_assert_sig_ptr(assert, 0);
len = fido_assert_sig_len(assert, 0);
if (len != 64) {
skdebug(__func__, "bad length %zu", len);
goto out;
}
response->sig_r_len = len;
if ((response->sig_r = calloc(1, response->sig_r_len)) == NULL) {
skdebug(__func__, "calloc signature failed");
goto out;
}
memcpy(response->sig_r, ptr, len);
ret = 0;
out:
if (ret != 0) {
free(response->sig_r);
response->sig_r = NULL;
}
return ret;
}
static int
pack_sig(uint32_t alg, fido_assert_t *assert,
struct sk_sign_response *response)
{
switch(alg) {
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
case SSH_SK_ECDSA:
return pack_sig_ecdsa(assert, response);
#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
case SSH_SK_ED25519:
return pack_sig_ed25519(assert, response);
default:
return -1;
}
}
/* Checks sk_options for sk_sign() and sk_load_resident_keys() */
static int
check_sign_load_resident_options(struct sk_option **options, char **devicep)
{
size_t i;
if (options == NULL)
return 0;
for (i = 0; options[i] != NULL; i++) {
if (strcmp(options[i]->name, "device") == 0) {
if ((*devicep = strdup(options[i]->value)) == NULL) {
skdebug(__func__, "strdup device failed");
return -1;
}
skdebug(__func__, "requested device %s", *devicep);
} else {
skdebug(__func__, "requested unsupported option %s",
options[i]->name);
if (options[i]->required) {
skdebug(__func__, "unknown required option");
return -1;
}
}
}
return 0;
}
-/* Calculate SHA256(m) */
-static int
-sha256_mem(const void *m, size_t mlen, u_char *d, size_t dlen)
-{
-#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
- u_int mdlen;
-#endif
-
- if (dlen != 32)
- return -1;
-#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
- mdlen = dlen;
- if (!EVP_Digest(m, mlen, d, &mdlen, EVP_sha256(), NULL))
- return -1;
-#else
- SHA256Data(m, mlen, d);
-#endif
- return 0;
-}
-
int
sk_sign(uint32_t alg, const uint8_t *data, size_t datalen,
const char *application,
const uint8_t *key_handle, size_t key_handle_len,
uint8_t flags, const char *pin, struct sk_option **options,
struct sk_sign_response **sign_response)
{
fido_assert_t *assert = NULL;
char *device = NULL;
- fido_dev_t *dev = NULL;
+ struct sk_usbhid *sk = NULL;
struct sk_sign_response *response = NULL;
uint8_t message[32];
int ret = SSH_SK_ERR_GENERAL;
int r;
-#ifdef SK_DEBUG
- fido_init(FIDO_DEBUG);
-#endif
+ fido_init(SSH_FIDO_INIT_ARG);
if (sign_response == NULL) {
skdebug(__func__, "sign_response == NULL");
goto out;
}
*sign_response = NULL;
if (check_sign_load_resident_options(options, &device) != 0)
goto out; /* error already logged */
/* hash data to be signed before it goes to the security key */
if ((r = sha256_mem(data, datalen, message, sizeof(message))) != 0) {
skdebug(__func__, "hash message failed");
goto out;
}
- if ((dev = find_device(device, message, sizeof(message),
- application, key_handle, key_handle_len)) == NULL) {
- skdebug(__func__, "couldn't find device for key handle");
+ if (device != NULL)
+ sk = sk_open(device);
+ else if (pin != NULL || (flags & SSH_SK_USER_VERIFICATION_REQD))
+ sk = sk_probe(NULL, NULL, 0);
+ else
+ sk = sk_probe(application, key_handle, key_handle_len);
+ if (sk == NULL) {
+ skdebug(__func__, "failed to find sk");
goto out;
}
if ((assert = fido_assert_new()) == NULL) {
skdebug(__func__, "fido_assert_new failed");
goto out;
}
if ((r = fido_assert_set_clientdata_hash(assert, message,
sizeof(message))) != FIDO_OK) {
skdebug(__func__, "fido_assert_set_clientdata_hash: %s",
fido_strerr(r));
goto out;
}
if ((r = fido_assert_set_rp(assert, application)) != FIDO_OK) {
skdebug(__func__, "fido_assert_set_rp: %s", fido_strerr(r));
goto out;
}
if ((r = fido_assert_allow_cred(assert, key_handle,
key_handle_len)) != FIDO_OK) {
skdebug(__func__, "fido_assert_allow_cred: %s", fido_strerr(r));
goto out;
}
if ((r = fido_assert_set_up(assert,
(flags & SSH_SK_USER_PRESENCE_REQD) ?
FIDO_OPT_TRUE : FIDO_OPT_FALSE)) != FIDO_OK) {
skdebug(__func__, "fido_assert_set_up: %s", fido_strerr(r));
goto out;
}
- if ((r = fido_dev_get_assert(dev, assert, NULL)) != FIDO_OK) {
+ if (pin == NULL && (flags & SSH_SK_USER_VERIFICATION_REQD) &&
+ (r = fido_assert_set_uv(assert, FIDO_OPT_TRUE)) != FIDO_OK) {
+ skdebug(__func__, "fido_assert_set_uv: %s", fido_strerr(r));
+ ret = FIDO_ERR_PIN_REQUIRED;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if ((r = fido_dev_get_assert(sk->dev, assert, pin)) != FIDO_OK) {
skdebug(__func__, "fido_dev_get_assert: %s", fido_strerr(r));
+ ret = fidoerr_to_skerr(r);
goto out;
}
if ((response = calloc(1, sizeof(*response))) == NULL) {
skdebug(__func__, "calloc response failed");
goto out;
}
response->flags = fido_assert_flags(assert, 0);
response->counter = fido_assert_sigcount(assert, 0);
if (pack_sig(alg, assert, response) != 0) {
skdebug(__func__, "pack_sig failed");
goto out;
}
*sign_response = response;
response = NULL;
ret = 0;
out:
explicit_bzero(message, sizeof(message));
free(device);
if (response != NULL) {
free(response->sig_r);
free(response->sig_s);
free(response);
}
- if (dev != NULL) {
- fido_dev_close(dev);
- fido_dev_free(&dev);
- }
- if (assert != NULL) {
- fido_assert_free(&assert);
- }
+ sk_close(sk);
+ fido_assert_free(&assert);
return ret;
}
static int
-read_rks(const char *devpath, const char *pin,
+read_rks(struct sk_usbhid *sk, const char *pin,
struct sk_resident_key ***rksp, size_t *nrksp)
{
int ret = SSH_SK_ERR_GENERAL, r = -1;
- fido_dev_t *dev = NULL;
fido_credman_metadata_t *metadata = NULL;
fido_credman_rp_t *rp = NULL;
fido_credman_rk_t *rk = NULL;
size_t i, j, nrp, nrk;
const fido_cred_t *cred;
struct sk_resident_key *srk = NULL, **tmp;
- if ((dev = fido_dev_new()) == NULL) {
- skdebug(__func__, "fido_dev_new failed");
- return ret;
- }
- if ((r = fido_dev_open(dev, devpath)) != FIDO_OK) {
- skdebug(__func__, "fido_dev_open %s failed: %s",
- devpath, fido_strerr(r));
- fido_dev_free(&dev);
- return ret;
+ if (pin == NULL) {
+ skdebug(__func__, "no PIN specified");
+ ret = SSH_SK_ERR_PIN_REQUIRED;
+ goto out;
}
if ((metadata = fido_credman_metadata_new()) == NULL) {
skdebug(__func__, "alloc failed");
goto out;
}
- if ((r = fido_credman_get_dev_metadata(dev, metadata, pin)) != 0) {
+ if ((r = fido_credman_get_dev_metadata(sk->dev, metadata, pin)) != 0) {
if (r == FIDO_ERR_INVALID_COMMAND) {
skdebug(__func__, "device %s does not support "
- "resident keys", devpath);
+ "resident keys", sk->path);
ret = 0;
goto out;
}
skdebug(__func__, "get metadata for %s failed: %s",
- devpath, fido_strerr(r));
+ sk->path, fido_strerr(r));
ret = fidoerr_to_skerr(r);
goto out;
}
skdebug(__func__, "existing %llu, remaining %llu",
(unsigned long long)fido_credman_rk_existing(metadata),
(unsigned long long)fido_credman_rk_remaining(metadata));
if ((rp = fido_credman_rp_new()) == NULL) {
skdebug(__func__, "alloc rp failed");
goto out;
}
- if ((r = fido_credman_get_dev_rp(dev, rp, pin)) != 0) {
+ if ((r = fido_credman_get_dev_rp(sk->dev, rp, pin)) != 0) {
skdebug(__func__, "get RPs for %s failed: %s",
- devpath, fido_strerr(r));
+ sk->path, fido_strerr(r));
goto out;
}
nrp = fido_credman_rp_count(rp);
skdebug(__func__, "Device %s has resident keys for %zu RPs",
- devpath, nrp);
+ sk->path, nrp);
/* Iterate over RP IDs that have resident keys */
for (i = 0; i < nrp; i++) {
skdebug(__func__, "rp %zu: name=\"%s\" id=\"%s\" hashlen=%zu",
i, fido_credman_rp_name(rp, i), fido_credman_rp_id(rp, i),
fido_credman_rp_id_hash_len(rp, i));
/* Skip non-SSH RP IDs */
if (strncasecmp(fido_credman_rp_id(rp, i), "ssh:", 4) != 0)
continue;
fido_credman_rk_free(&rk);
if ((rk = fido_credman_rk_new()) == NULL) {
skdebug(__func__, "alloc rk failed");
goto out;
}
- if ((r = fido_credman_get_dev_rk(dev, fido_credman_rp_id(rp, i),
- rk, pin)) != 0) {
+ if ((r = fido_credman_get_dev_rk(sk->dev,
+ fido_credman_rp_id(rp, i), rk, pin)) != 0) {
skdebug(__func__, "get RKs for %s slot %zu failed: %s",
- devpath, i, fido_strerr(r));
+ sk->path, i, fido_strerr(r));
goto out;
}
nrk = fido_credman_rk_count(rk);
skdebug(__func__, "RP \"%s\" has %zu resident keys",
fido_credman_rp_id(rp, i), nrk);
/* Iterate over resident keys for this RP ID */
for (j = 0; j < nrk; j++) {
if ((cred = fido_credman_rk(rk, j)) == NULL) {
skdebug(__func__, "no RK in slot %zu", j);
continue;
}
skdebug(__func__, "Device %s RP \"%s\" slot %zu: "
- "type %d", devpath, fido_credman_rp_id(rp, i), j,
- fido_cred_type(cred));
+ "type %d flags 0x%02x prot 0x%02x", sk->path,
+ fido_credman_rp_id(rp, i), j, fido_cred_type(cred),
+ fido_cred_flags(cred), fido_cred_prot(cred));
/* build response entry */
if ((srk = calloc(1, sizeof(*srk))) == NULL ||
(srk->key.key_handle = calloc(1,
fido_cred_id_len(cred))) == NULL ||
(srk->application = strdup(fido_credman_rp_id(rp,
i))) == NULL) {
skdebug(__func__, "alloc sk_resident_key");
goto out;
}
srk->key.key_handle_len = fido_cred_id_len(cred);
- memcpy(srk->key.key_handle,
- fido_cred_id_ptr(cred),
+ memcpy(srk->key.key_handle, fido_cred_id_ptr(cred),
srk->key.key_handle_len);
switch (fido_cred_type(cred)) {
case COSE_ES256:
srk->alg = SSH_SK_ECDSA;
break;
case COSE_EDDSA:
srk->alg = SSH_SK_ED25519;
break;
default:
skdebug(__func__, "unsupported key type %d",
fido_cred_type(cred));
goto out; /* XXX free rk and continue */
}
+ if (fido_cred_prot(cred) == FIDO_CRED_PROT_UV_REQUIRED)
+ srk->flags |= SSH_SK_USER_VERIFICATION_REQD;
+
if ((r = pack_public_key(srk->alg, cred,
&srk->key)) != 0) {
skdebug(__func__, "pack public key failed");
goto out;
}
/* append */
if ((tmp = recallocarray(*rksp, *nrksp, (*nrksp) + 1,
sizeof(**rksp))) == NULL) {
skdebug(__func__, "alloc rksp");
goto out;
}
*rksp = tmp;
(*rksp)[(*nrksp)++] = srk;
srk = NULL;
}
}
/* Success */
ret = 0;
out:
if (srk != NULL) {
free(srk->application);
freezero(srk->key.public_key, srk->key.public_key_len);
freezero(srk->key.key_handle, srk->key.key_handle_len);
freezero(srk, sizeof(*srk));
}
fido_credman_rp_free(&rp);
fido_credman_rk_free(&rk);
- fido_dev_close(dev);
- fido_dev_free(&dev);
fido_credman_metadata_free(&metadata);
return ret;
}
int
sk_load_resident_keys(const char *pin, struct sk_option **options,
struct sk_resident_key ***rksp, size_t *nrksp)
{
int ret = SSH_SK_ERR_GENERAL, r = -1;
- fido_dev_info_t *devlist = NULL;
- size_t i, ndev = 0, nrks = 0;
- const fido_dev_info_t *di;
+ size_t i, nrks = 0;
struct sk_resident_key **rks = NULL;
+ struct sk_usbhid *sk = NULL;
char *device = NULL;
+
*rksp = NULL;
*nrksp = 0;
+ fido_init(SSH_FIDO_INIT_ARG);
+
if (check_sign_load_resident_options(options, &device) != 0)
goto out; /* error already logged */
- if (device != NULL) {
- skdebug(__func__, "trying %s", device);
- if ((r = read_rks(device, pin, &rks, &nrks)) != 0) {
- skdebug(__func__, "read_rks failed for %s", device);
- ret = r;
- goto out;
- }
- } else {
- /* Try all devices */
- if ((devlist = fido_dev_info_new(MAX_FIDO_DEVICES)) == NULL) {
- skdebug(__func__, "fido_dev_info_new failed");
- goto out;
- }
- if ((r = fido_dev_info_manifest(devlist,
- MAX_FIDO_DEVICES, &ndev)) != FIDO_OK) {
- skdebug(__func__, "fido_dev_info_manifest failed: %s",
- fido_strerr(r));
- goto out;
- }
- for (i = 0; i < ndev; i++) {
- if ((di = fido_dev_info_ptr(devlist, i)) == NULL) {
- skdebug(__func__, "no dev info at %zu", i);
- continue;
- }
- skdebug(__func__, "trying %s", fido_dev_info_path(di));
- if ((r = read_rks(fido_dev_info_path(di), pin,
- &rks, &nrks)) != 0) {
- skdebug(__func__, "read_rks failed for %s",
- fido_dev_info_path(di));
- /* remember last error */
- ret = r;
- continue;
- }
- }
+ if (device != NULL)
+ sk = sk_open(device);
+ else
+ sk = sk_probe(NULL, NULL, 0);
+ if (sk == NULL) {
+ skdebug(__func__, "failed to find sk");
+ goto out;
+ }
+ skdebug(__func__, "trying %s", sk->path);
+ if ((r = read_rks(sk, pin, &rks, &nrks)) != 0) {
+ skdebug(__func__, "read_rks failed for %s", sk->path);
+ ret = r;
+ goto out;
}
/* success, unless we have no keys but a specific error */
if (nrks > 0 || ret == SSH_SK_ERR_GENERAL)
ret = 0;
*rksp = rks;
*nrksp = nrks;
rks = NULL;
nrks = 0;
out:
- free(device);
+ sk_close(sk);
for (i = 0; i < nrks; i++) {
free(rks[i]->application);
freezero(rks[i]->key.public_key, rks[i]->key.public_key_len);
freezero(rks[i]->key.key_handle, rks[i]->key.key_handle_len);
freezero(rks[i], sizeof(*rks[i]));
}
free(rks);
- fido_dev_info_free(&devlist, MAX_FIDO_DEVICES);
return ret;
}
#endif /* ENABLE_SK_INTERNAL */
diff --git a/ssh-add.0 b/ssh-add.0
index 698f1b891a53..d73af0f43cc1 100644
--- a/ssh-add.0
+++ b/ssh-add.0
@@ -1,144 +1,152 @@
SSH-ADD(1) General Commands Manual SSH-ADD(1)
NAME
ssh-add M-bM-^@M-^S adds private key identities to the OpenSSH authentication agent
SYNOPSIS
ssh-add [-cDdKkLlqvXx] [-E fingerprint_hash] [-S provider] [-t life]
[file ...]
ssh-add -s pkcs11
ssh-add -e pkcs11
ssh-add -T pubkey ...
DESCRIPTION
ssh-add adds private key identities to the authentication agent,
ssh-agent(1). When run without arguments, it adds the files
~/.ssh/id_rsa, ~/.ssh/id_dsa, ~/.ssh/id_ecdsa, ~/.ssh/id_ecdsa_sk,
~/.ssh/id_ed25519, and ~/.ssh/id_ed25519_sk. After loading a private
key, ssh-add will try to load corresponding certificate information from
the filename obtained by appending -cert.pub to the name of the private
key file. Alternative file names can be given on the command line.
If any file requires a passphrase, ssh-add asks for the passphrase from
the user. The passphrase is read from the user's tty. ssh-add retries
the last passphrase if multiple identity files are given.
The authentication agent must be running and the SSH_AUTH_SOCK
environment variable must contain the name of its socket for ssh-add to
work.
The options are as follows:
-c Indicates that added identities should be subject to confirmation
before being used for authentication. Confirmation is performed
by ssh-askpass(1). Successful confirmation is signaled by a zero
exit status from ssh-askpass(1), rather than text entered into
the requester.
-D Deletes all identities from the agent.
-d Instead of adding identities, removes identities from the agent.
If ssh-add has been run without arguments, the keys for the
default identities and their corresponding certificates will be
removed. Otherwise, the argument list will be interpreted as a
list of paths to public key files to specify keys and
certificates to be removed from the agent. If no public key is
- found at a given path, ssh-add will append .pub and retry.
+ found at a given path, ssh-add will append .pub and retry. If
+ the argument list consists of M-bM-^@M-^\-M-bM-^@M-^] then ssh-add will read public
+ keys to be removed from standard input.
-E fingerprint_hash
Specifies the hash algorithm used when displaying key
fingerprints. Valid options are: M-bM-^@M-^\md5M-bM-^@M-^] and M-bM-^@M-^\sha256M-bM-^@M-^]. The
default is M-bM-^@M-^\sha256M-bM-^@M-^].
-e pkcs11
Remove keys provided by the PKCS#11 shared library pkcs11.
-K Load resident keys from a FIDO authenticator.
-k When loading keys into or deleting keys from the agent, process
plain private keys only and skip certificates.
-L Lists public key parameters of all identities currently
represented by the agent.
-l Lists fingerprints of all identities currently represented by the
agent.
-q Be quiet after a successful operation.
-S provider
Specifies a path to a library that will be used when adding FIDO
authenticator-hosted keys, overriding the default of using the
internal USB HID support.
-s pkcs11
Add keys provided by the PKCS#11 shared library pkcs11.
-T pubkey ...
Tests whether the private keys that correspond to the specified
pubkey files are usable by performing sign and verify operations
on each.
-t life
Set a maximum lifetime when adding identities to an agent. The
lifetime may be specified in seconds or in a time format
specified in sshd_config(5).
-v Verbose mode. Causes ssh-add to print debugging messages about
its progress. This is helpful in debugging problems. Multiple
-v options increase the verbosity. The maximum is 3.
-X Unlock the agent.
-x Lock the agent with a password.
ENVIRONMENT
- DISPLAY and SSH_ASKPASS
+ DISPLAY, SSH_ASKPASS and SSH_ASKPASS_REQUIRE
If ssh-add needs a passphrase, it will read the passphrase from
the current terminal if it was run from a terminal. If ssh-add
does not have a terminal associated with it but DISPLAY and
SSH_ASKPASS are set, it will execute the program specified by
SSH_ASKPASS (by default M-bM-^@M-^\ssh-askpassM-bM-^@M-^]) and open an X11 window to
read the passphrase. This is particularly useful when calling
- ssh-add from a .xsession or related script. (Note that on some
- machines it may be necessary to redirect the input from /dev/null
- to make this work.)
+ ssh-add from a .xsession or related script.
+
+ SSH_ASKPASS_REQUIRE allows further control over the use of an
+ askpass program. If this variable is set to M-bM-^@M-^\neverM-bM-^@M-^] then ssh-add
+ will never attempt to use one. If it is set to M-bM-^@M-^\preferM-bM-^@M-^], then
+ ssh-add will prefer to use the askpass program instead of the TTY
+ when requesting passwords. Finally, if the variable is set to
+ M-bM-^@M-^\forceM-bM-^@M-^], then the askpass program will be used for all passphrase
+ input regardless of whether DISPLAY is set.
SSH_AUTH_SOCK
Identifies the path of a UNIX-domain socket used to communicate
with the agent.
SSH_SK_PROVIDER
Specifies a path to a library that will be used when loading any
FIDO authenticator-hosted keys, overriding the default of using
the built-in USB HID support.
FILES
~/.ssh/id_dsa
~/.ssh/id_ecdsa
~/.ssh/id_ecdsa_sk
~/.ssh/id_ed25519
~/.ssh/id_ed25519_sk
~/.ssh/id_rsa
Contains the DSA, ECDSA, authenticator-hosted ECDSA, Ed25519,
authenticator-hosted Ed25519 or RSA authentication identity of
the user.
Identity files should not be readable by anyone but the user. Note that
ssh-add ignores identity files if they are accessible by others.
EXIT STATUS
Exit status is 0 on success, 1 if the specified command fails, and 2 if
ssh-add is unable to contact the authentication agent.
SEE ALSO
ssh(1), ssh-agent(1), ssh-askpass(1), ssh-keygen(1), sshd(8)
AUTHORS
OpenSSH is a derivative of the original and free ssh 1.2.12 release by
Tatu Ylonen. Aaron Campbell, Bob Beck, Markus Friedl, Niels Provos, Theo
de Raadt and Dug Song removed many bugs, re-added newer features and
created OpenSSH. Markus Friedl contributed the support for SSH protocol
versions 1.5 and 2.0.
-OpenBSD 6.7 February 7, 2020 OpenBSD 6.7
+OpenBSD 6.8 July 14, 2020 OpenBSD 6.8
diff --git a/ssh-add.1 b/ssh-add.1
index 58d42138ed1f..2786df514178 100644
--- a/ssh-add.1
+++ b/ssh-add.1
@@ -1,241 +1,262 @@
-.\" $OpenBSD: ssh-add.1,v 1.79 2020/02/07 03:57:31 djm Exp $
+.\" $OpenBSD: ssh-add.1,v 1.81 2020/07/14 23:57:01 djm Exp $
.\"
.\" Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
.\" Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
.\" All rights reserved
.\"
.\" As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
.\" can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this
.\" software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
.\" incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
.\" called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
.\"
.\"
.\" Copyright (c) 1999,2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
.\" Copyright (c) 1999 Aaron Campbell. All rights reserved.
.\" Copyright (c) 1999 Theo de Raadt. All rights reserved.
.\"
.\" Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
.\" modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
.\" are met:
.\" 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
.\" notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
.\" 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
.\" notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
.\" documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
.\"
.\" THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
.\" IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
.\" OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
.\" IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
.\" INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
.\" NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
.\" DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
.\" THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
.\" (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
.\" THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
.\"
-.Dd $Mdocdate: February 7 2020 $
+.Dd $Mdocdate: July 14 2020 $
.Dt SSH-ADD 1
.Os
.Sh NAME
.Nm ssh-add
.Nd adds private key identities to the OpenSSH authentication agent
.Sh SYNOPSIS
.Nm ssh-add
.Op Fl cDdKkLlqvXx
.Op Fl E Ar fingerprint_hash
.Op Fl S Ar provider
.Op Fl t Ar life
.Op Ar
.Nm ssh-add
.Fl s Ar pkcs11
.Nm ssh-add
.Fl e Ar pkcs11
.Nm ssh-add
.Fl T
.Ar pubkey ...
.Sh DESCRIPTION
.Nm
adds private key identities to the authentication agent,
.Xr ssh-agent 1 .
When run without arguments, it adds the files
.Pa ~/.ssh/id_rsa ,
.Pa ~/.ssh/id_dsa ,
.Pa ~/.ssh/id_ecdsa ,
.Pa ~/.ssh/id_ecdsa_sk ,
.Pa ~/.ssh/id_ed25519 ,
and
.Pa ~/.ssh/id_ed25519_sk .
After loading a private key,
.Nm
will try to load corresponding certificate information from the
filename obtained by appending
.Pa -cert.pub
to the name of the private key file.
Alternative file names can be given on the command line.
.Pp
If any file requires a passphrase,
.Nm
asks for the passphrase from the user.
The passphrase is read from the user's tty.
.Nm
retries the last passphrase if multiple identity files are given.
.Pp
The authentication agent must be running and the
.Ev SSH_AUTH_SOCK
environment variable must contain the name of its socket for
.Nm
to work.
.Pp
The options are as follows:
.Bl -tag -width Ds
.It Fl c
Indicates that added identities should be subject to confirmation before
being used for authentication.
Confirmation is performed by
.Xr ssh-askpass 1 .
Successful confirmation is signaled by a zero exit status from
.Xr ssh-askpass 1 ,
rather than text entered into the requester.
.It Fl D
Deletes all identities from the agent.
.It Fl d
Instead of adding identities, removes identities from the agent.
If
.Nm
has been run without arguments, the keys for the default identities and
their corresponding certificates will be removed.
Otherwise, the argument list will be interpreted as a list of paths to
public key files to specify keys and certificates to be removed from the agent.
If no public key is found at a given path,
.Nm
will append
.Pa .pub
and retry.
+If the argument list consists of
+.Dq -
+then
+.Nm
+will read public keys to be removed from standard input.
.It Fl E Ar fingerprint_hash
Specifies the hash algorithm used when displaying key fingerprints.
Valid options are:
.Dq md5
and
.Dq sha256 .
The default is
.Dq sha256 .
.It Fl e Ar pkcs11
Remove keys provided by the PKCS#11 shared library
.Ar pkcs11 .
.It Fl K
Load resident keys from a FIDO authenticator.
.It Fl k
When loading keys into or deleting keys from the agent, process plain private
keys only and skip certificates.
.It Fl L
Lists public key parameters of all identities currently represented
by the agent.
.It Fl l
Lists fingerprints of all identities currently represented by the agent.
.It Fl q
Be quiet after a successful operation.
.It Fl S Ar provider
Specifies a path to a library that will be used when adding
FIDO authenticator-hosted keys, overriding the default of using the
internal USB HID support.
.It Fl s Ar pkcs11
Add keys provided by the PKCS#11 shared library
.Ar pkcs11 .
.It Fl T Ar pubkey ...
Tests whether the private keys that correspond to the specified
.Ar pubkey
files are usable by performing sign and verify operations on each.
.It Fl t Ar life
Set a maximum lifetime when adding identities to an agent.
The lifetime may be specified in seconds or in a time format
specified in
.Xr sshd_config 5 .
.It Fl v
Verbose mode.
Causes
.Nm
to print debugging messages about its progress.
This is helpful in debugging problems.
Multiple
.Fl v
options increase the verbosity.
The maximum is 3.
.It Fl X
Unlock the agent.
.It Fl x
Lock the agent with a password.
.El
.Sh ENVIRONMENT
.Bl -tag -width Ds
-.It Ev "DISPLAY" and "SSH_ASKPASS"
+.It Ev "DISPLAY", "SSH_ASKPASS" and "SSH_ASKPASS_REQUIRE"
If
.Nm
needs a passphrase, it will read the passphrase from the current
terminal if it was run from a terminal.
If
.Nm
does not have a terminal associated with it but
.Ev DISPLAY
and
.Ev SSH_ASKPASS
are set, it will execute the program specified by
.Ev SSH_ASKPASS
(by default
.Dq ssh-askpass )
and open an X11 window to read the passphrase.
This is particularly useful when calling
.Nm
from a
.Pa .xsession
or related script.
-(Note that on some machines it
-may be necessary to redirect the input from
-.Pa /dev/null
-to make this work.)
+.Pp
+.Ev SSH_ASKPASS_REQUIRE
+allows further control over the use of an askpass program.
+If this variable is set to
+.Dq never
+then
+.Nm
+will never attempt to use one.
+If it is set to
+.Dq prefer ,
+then
+.Nm
+will prefer to use the askpass program instead of the TTY when requesting
+passwords.
+Finally, if the variable is set to
+.Dq force ,
+then the askpass program will be used for all passphrase input regardless
+of whether
+.Ev DISPLAY
+is set.
.It Ev SSH_AUTH_SOCK
Identifies the path of a
.Ux Ns -domain
socket used to communicate with the agent.
.It Ev SSH_SK_PROVIDER
Specifies a path to a library that will be used when loading any
FIDO authenticator-hosted keys, overriding the default of using
the built-in USB HID support.
.El
.Sh FILES
.Bl -tag -width Ds -compact
.It Pa ~/.ssh/id_dsa
.It Pa ~/.ssh/id_ecdsa
.It Pa ~/.ssh/id_ecdsa_sk
.It Pa ~/.ssh/id_ed25519
.It Pa ~/.ssh/id_ed25519_sk
.It Pa ~/.ssh/id_rsa
Contains the DSA, ECDSA, authenticator-hosted ECDSA, Ed25519,
authenticator-hosted Ed25519 or RSA authentication identity of the user.
.El
.Pp
Identity files should not be readable by anyone but the user.
Note that
.Nm
ignores identity files if they are accessible by others.
.Sh EXIT STATUS
Exit status is 0 on success, 1 if the specified command fails,
and 2 if
.Nm
is unable to contact the authentication agent.
.Sh SEE ALSO
.Xr ssh 1 ,
.Xr ssh-agent 1 ,
.Xr ssh-askpass 1 ,
.Xr ssh-keygen 1 ,
.Xr sshd 8
.Sh AUTHORS
OpenSSH is a derivative of the original and free
ssh 1.2.12 release by Tatu Ylonen.
Aaron Campbell, Bob Beck, Markus Friedl, Niels Provos,
Theo de Raadt and Dug Song
removed many bugs, re-added newer features and
created OpenSSH.
Markus Friedl contributed the support for SSH
protocol versions 1.5 and 2.0.
diff --git a/ssh-add.c b/ssh-add.c
index a40198ab5887..936dc21287e5 100644
--- a/ssh-add.c
+++ b/ssh-add.c
@@ -1,822 +1,868 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: ssh-add.c,v 1.155 2020/03/16 02:17:02 dtucker Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: ssh-add.c,v 1.157 2020/08/31 04:33:17 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
* Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
* All rights reserved
* Adds an identity to the authentication server, or removes an identity.
*
* As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
* can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this
* software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
* incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
* called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
*
* SSH2 implementation,
* Copyright (c) 2000, 2001 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
* OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
* IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
* INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
* NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
* DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
* THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
* (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
* THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
*/
#include "includes.h"
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/stat.h>
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
# include <openssl/evp.h>
# include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h"
#endif
#include <errno.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <pwd.h>
#include <stdarg.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <limits.h>
#include "xmalloc.h"
#include "ssh.h"
#include "log.h"
#include "sshkey.h"
#include "sshbuf.h"
#include "authfd.h"
#include "authfile.h"
#include "pathnames.h"
#include "misc.h"
#include "ssherr.h"
#include "digest.h"
#include "ssh-sk.h"
+#include "sk-api.h"
/* argv0 */
extern char *__progname;
/* Default files to add */
static char *default_files[] = {
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
_PATH_SSH_CLIENT_ID_RSA,
_PATH_SSH_CLIENT_ID_DSA,
#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
_PATH_SSH_CLIENT_ID_ECDSA,
_PATH_SSH_CLIENT_ID_ECDSA_SK,
#endif
#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
_PATH_SSH_CLIENT_ID_ED25519,
_PATH_SSH_CLIENT_ID_ED25519_SK,
_PATH_SSH_CLIENT_ID_XMSS,
NULL
};
static int fingerprint_hash = SSH_FP_HASH_DEFAULT;
/* Default lifetime (0 == forever) */
static long lifetime = 0;
/* User has to confirm key use */
static int confirm = 0;
/* Maximum number of signatures (XMSS) */
static u_int maxsign = 0;
static u_int minleft = 0;
/* we keep a cache of one passphrase */
static char *pass = NULL;
static void
clear_pass(void)
{
if (pass) {
freezero(pass, strlen(pass));
pass = NULL;
}
}
+static int
+delete_one(int agent_fd, const struct sshkey *key, const char *comment,
+ const char *path, int qflag)
+{
+ int r;
+
+ if ((r = ssh_remove_identity(agent_fd, key)) != 0) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "Could not remove identity \"%s\": %s\n",
+ path, ssh_err(r));
+ return r;
+ }
+ if (!qflag) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "Identity removed: %s %s (%s)\n", path,
+ sshkey_type(key), comment);
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int
+delete_stdin(int agent_fd, int qflag)
+{
+ char *line = NULL, *cp;
+ size_t linesize = 0;
+ struct sshkey *key = NULL;
+ int lnum = 0, r, ret = -1;
+
+ while (getline(&line, &linesize, stdin) != -1) {
+ lnum++;
+ sshkey_free(key);
+ key = NULL;
+ line[strcspn(line, "\n")] = '\0';
+ cp = line + strspn(line, " \t");
+ if (*cp == '#' || *cp == '\0')
+ continue;
+ if ((key = sshkey_new(KEY_UNSPEC)) == NULL)
+ fatal("%s: sshkey_new", __func__);
+ if ((r = sshkey_read(key, &cp)) != 0) {
+ error("(stdin):%d: invalid key: %s", lnum, ssh_err(r));
+ continue;
+ }
+ if (delete_one(agent_fd, key, cp, "(stdin)", qflag) == 0)
+ ret = 0;
+ }
+ sshkey_free(key);
+ free(line);
+ return ret;
+}
+
static int
delete_file(int agent_fd, const char *filename, int key_only, int qflag)
{
struct sshkey *public, *cert = NULL;
char *certpath = NULL, *comment = NULL;
int r, ret = -1;
+ if (strcmp(filename, "-") == 0)
+ return delete_stdin(agent_fd, qflag);
+
if ((r = sshkey_load_public(filename, &public, &comment)) != 0) {
printf("Bad key file %s: %s\n", filename, ssh_err(r));
return -1;
}
- if ((r = ssh_remove_identity(agent_fd, public)) == 0) {
- if (!qflag) {
- fprintf(stderr, "Identity removed: %s (%s)\n",
- filename, comment);
- }
+ if (delete_one(agent_fd, public, comment, filename, qflag) == 0)
ret = 0;
- } else
- fprintf(stderr, "Could not remove identity \"%s\": %s\n",
- filename, ssh_err(r));
if (key_only)
goto out;
/* Now try to delete the corresponding certificate too */
free(comment);
comment = NULL;
xasprintf(&certpath, "%s-cert.pub", filename);
if ((r = sshkey_load_public(certpath, &cert, &comment)) != 0) {
if (r != SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR || errno != ENOENT)
error("Failed to load certificate \"%s\": %s",
certpath, ssh_err(r));
goto out;
}
if (!sshkey_equal_public(cert, public))
fatal("Certificate %s does not match private key %s",
certpath, filename);
- if ((r = ssh_remove_identity(agent_fd, cert)) == 0) {
- if (!qflag) {
- fprintf(stderr, "Identity removed: %s (%s)\n",
- certpath, comment);
- }
+ if (delete_one(agent_fd, cert, comment, certpath, qflag) == 0)
ret = 0;
- } else
- fprintf(stderr, "Could not remove identity \"%s\": %s\n",
- certpath, ssh_err(r));
out:
sshkey_free(cert);
sshkey_free(public);
free(certpath);
free(comment);
return ret;
}
/* Send a request to remove all identities. */
static int
delete_all(int agent_fd, int qflag)
{
int ret = -1;
/*
* Since the agent might be forwarded, old or non-OpenSSH, when asked
* to remove all keys, attempt to remove both protocol v.1 and v.2
* keys.
*/
if (ssh_remove_all_identities(agent_fd, 2) == 0)
ret = 0;
/* ignore error-code for ssh1 */
ssh_remove_all_identities(agent_fd, 1);
if (ret != 0)
fprintf(stderr, "Failed to remove all identities.\n");
else if (!qflag)
fprintf(stderr, "All identities removed.\n");
return ret;
}
static int
add_file(int agent_fd, const char *filename, int key_only, int qflag,
const char *skprovider)
{
struct sshkey *private, *cert;
char *comment = NULL;
char msg[1024], *certpath = NULL;
int r, fd, ret = -1;
size_t i;
u_int32_t left;
struct sshbuf *keyblob;
struct ssh_identitylist *idlist;
if (strcmp(filename, "-") == 0) {
fd = STDIN_FILENO;
filename = "(stdin)";
} else if ((fd = open(filename, O_RDONLY)) == -1) {
perror(filename);
return -1;
}
/*
* Since we'll try to load a keyfile multiple times, permission errors
* will occur multiple times, so check perms first and bail if wrong.
*/
if (fd != STDIN_FILENO) {
if (sshkey_perm_ok(fd, filename) != 0) {
close(fd);
return -1;
}
}
if ((r = sshbuf_load_fd(fd, &keyblob)) != 0) {
fprintf(stderr, "Error loading key \"%s\": %s\n",
filename, ssh_err(r));
sshbuf_free(keyblob);
close(fd);
return -1;
}
close(fd);
/* At first, try empty passphrase */
if ((r = sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(keyblob, "", &private,
&comment)) != 0 && r != SSH_ERR_KEY_WRONG_PASSPHRASE) {
fprintf(stderr, "Error loading key \"%s\": %s\n",
filename, ssh_err(r));
goto fail_load;
}
/* try last */
if (private == NULL && pass != NULL) {
if ((r = sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(keyblob, pass, &private,
&comment)) != 0 && r != SSH_ERR_KEY_WRONG_PASSPHRASE) {
fprintf(stderr, "Error loading key \"%s\": %s\n",
filename, ssh_err(r));
goto fail_load;
}
}
if (private == NULL) {
/* clear passphrase since it did not work */
clear_pass();
snprintf(msg, sizeof msg, "Enter passphrase for %s%s: ",
filename, confirm ? " (will confirm each use)" : "");
for (;;) {
pass = read_passphrase(msg, RP_ALLOW_STDIN);
if (strcmp(pass, "") == 0)
goto fail_load;
if ((r = sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(keyblob, pass,
&private, &comment)) == 0)
break;
else if (r != SSH_ERR_KEY_WRONG_PASSPHRASE) {
fprintf(stderr,
"Error loading key \"%s\": %s\n",
filename, ssh_err(r));
fail_load:
clear_pass();
sshbuf_free(keyblob);
return -1;
}
clear_pass();
snprintf(msg, sizeof msg,
"Bad passphrase, try again for %s%s: ", filename,
confirm ? " (will confirm each use)" : "");
}
}
if (comment == NULL || *comment == '\0')
comment = xstrdup(filename);
sshbuf_free(keyblob);
/* For XMSS */
if ((r = sshkey_set_filename(private, filename)) != 0) {
fprintf(stderr, "Could not add filename to private key: %s (%s)\n",
filename, comment);
goto out;
}
if (maxsign && minleft &&
(r = ssh_fetch_identitylist(agent_fd, &idlist)) == 0) {
for (i = 0; i < idlist->nkeys; i++) {
if (!sshkey_equal_public(idlist->keys[i], private))
continue;
left = sshkey_signatures_left(idlist->keys[i]);
if (left < minleft) {
fprintf(stderr,
"Only %d signatures left.\n", left);
break;
}
fprintf(stderr, "Skipping update: ");
if (left == minleft) {
fprintf(stderr,
"required signatures left (%d).\n", left);
} else {
fprintf(stderr,
"more signatures left (%d) than"
" required (%d).\n", left, minleft);
}
ssh_free_identitylist(idlist);
goto out;
}
ssh_free_identitylist(idlist);
}
- if (!sshkey_is_sk(private))
- skprovider = NULL; /* Don't send constraint for other keys */
- else if (skprovider == NULL) {
- fprintf(stderr, "Cannot load authenticator-hosted key %s "
- "without provider\n", filename);
- goto out;
+ if (sshkey_is_sk(private)) {
+ if (skprovider == NULL) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "Cannot load FIDO key %s "
+ "without provider\n", filename);
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if ((private->sk_flags & SSH_SK_USER_VERIFICATION_REQD) != 0) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "FIDO verify-required key %s is not "
+ "currently supported by ssh-agent\n", filename);
+ goto out;
+ }
+ } else {
+ /* Don't send provider constraint for other keys */
+ skprovider = NULL;
}
if ((r = ssh_add_identity_constrained(agent_fd, private, comment,
lifetime, confirm, maxsign, skprovider)) == 0) {
ret = 0;
if (!qflag) {
fprintf(stderr, "Identity added: %s (%s)\n",
filename, comment);
if (lifetime != 0) {
fprintf(stderr,
"Lifetime set to %ld seconds\n", lifetime);
}
if (confirm != 0) {
fprintf(stderr, "The user must confirm "
"each use of the key\n");
}
}
} else {
fprintf(stderr, "Could not add identity \"%s\": %s\n",
filename, ssh_err(r));
}
/* Skip trying to load the cert if requested */
if (key_only)
goto out;
/* Now try to add the certificate flavour too */
xasprintf(&certpath, "%s-cert.pub", filename);
if ((r = sshkey_load_public(certpath, &cert, NULL)) != 0) {
if (r != SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR || errno != ENOENT)
error("Failed to load certificate \"%s\": %s",
certpath, ssh_err(r));
goto out;
}
if (!sshkey_equal_public(cert, private)) {
error("Certificate %s does not match private key %s",
certpath, filename);
sshkey_free(cert);
goto out;
}
/* Graft with private bits */
if ((r = sshkey_to_certified(private)) != 0) {
error("%s: sshkey_to_certified: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
sshkey_free(cert);
goto out;
}
if ((r = sshkey_cert_copy(cert, private)) != 0) {
error("%s: sshkey_cert_copy: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
sshkey_free(cert);
goto out;
}
sshkey_free(cert);
if ((r = ssh_add_identity_constrained(agent_fd, private, comment,
lifetime, confirm, maxsign, skprovider)) != 0) {
error("Certificate %s (%s) add failed: %s", certpath,
private->cert->key_id, ssh_err(r));
goto out;
}
/* success */
if (!qflag) {
fprintf(stderr, "Certificate added: %s (%s)\n", certpath,
private->cert->key_id);
if (lifetime != 0) {
fprintf(stderr, "Lifetime set to %ld seconds\n",
lifetime);
}
if (confirm != 0) {
fprintf(stderr, "The user must confirm each use "
"of the key\n");
}
}
out:
free(certpath);
free(comment);
sshkey_free(private);
return ret;
}
static int
update_card(int agent_fd, int add, const char *id, int qflag)
{
char *pin = NULL;
int r, ret = -1;
if (add) {
if ((pin = read_passphrase("Enter passphrase for PKCS#11: ",
RP_ALLOW_STDIN)) == NULL)
return -1;
}
if ((r = ssh_update_card(agent_fd, add, id, pin == NULL ? "" : pin,
lifetime, confirm)) == 0) {
ret = 0;
if (!qflag) {
fprintf(stderr, "Card %s: %s\n",
add ? "added" : "removed", id);
}
} else {
fprintf(stderr, "Could not %s card \"%s\": %s\n",
add ? "add" : "remove", id, ssh_err(r));
ret = -1;
}
free(pin);
return ret;
}
static int
test_key(int agent_fd, const char *filename)
{
struct sshkey *key = NULL;
u_char *sig = NULL;
size_t slen = 0;
int r, ret = -1;
char data[1024];
if ((r = sshkey_load_public(filename, &key, NULL)) != 0) {
error("Couldn't read public key %s: %s", filename, ssh_err(r));
return -1;
}
arc4random_buf(data, sizeof(data));
if ((r = ssh_agent_sign(agent_fd, key, &sig, &slen, data, sizeof(data),
NULL, 0)) != 0) {
error("Agent signature failed for %s: %s",
filename, ssh_err(r));
goto done;
}
if ((r = sshkey_verify(key, sig, slen, data, sizeof(data),
NULL, 0, NULL)) != 0) {
error("Signature verification failed for %s: %s",
filename, ssh_err(r));
goto done;
}
/* success */
ret = 0;
done:
free(sig);
sshkey_free(key);
return ret;
}
static int
list_identities(int agent_fd, int do_fp)
{
char *fp;
int r;
struct ssh_identitylist *idlist;
u_int32_t left;
size_t i;
if ((r = ssh_fetch_identitylist(agent_fd, &idlist)) != 0) {
if (r != SSH_ERR_AGENT_NO_IDENTITIES)
fprintf(stderr, "error fetching identities: %s\n",
ssh_err(r));
else
printf("The agent has no identities.\n");
return -1;
}
for (i = 0; i < idlist->nkeys; i++) {
if (do_fp) {
fp = sshkey_fingerprint(idlist->keys[i],
fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_DEFAULT);
printf("%u %s %s (%s)\n", sshkey_size(idlist->keys[i]),
fp == NULL ? "(null)" : fp, idlist->comments[i],
sshkey_type(idlist->keys[i]));
free(fp);
} else {
if ((r = sshkey_write(idlist->keys[i], stdout)) != 0) {
fprintf(stderr, "sshkey_write: %s\n",
ssh_err(r));
continue;
}
fprintf(stdout, " %s", idlist->comments[i]);
left = sshkey_signatures_left(idlist->keys[i]);
if (left > 0)
fprintf(stdout,
" [signatures left %d]", left);
fprintf(stdout, "\n");
}
}
ssh_free_identitylist(idlist);
return 0;
}
static int
lock_agent(int agent_fd, int lock)
{
char prompt[100], *p1, *p2;
int r, passok = 1, ret = -1;
strlcpy(prompt, "Enter lock password: ", sizeof(prompt));
p1 = read_passphrase(prompt, RP_ALLOW_STDIN);
if (lock) {
strlcpy(prompt, "Again: ", sizeof prompt);
p2 = read_passphrase(prompt, RP_ALLOW_STDIN);
if (strcmp(p1, p2) != 0) {
fprintf(stderr, "Passwords do not match.\n");
passok = 0;
}
freezero(p2, strlen(p2));
}
if (passok) {
if ((r = ssh_lock_agent(agent_fd, lock, p1)) == 0) {
fprintf(stderr, "Agent %slocked.\n", lock ? "" : "un");
ret = 0;
} else {
fprintf(stderr, "Failed to %slock agent: %s\n",
lock ? "" : "un", ssh_err(r));
}
}
freezero(p1, strlen(p1));
return (ret);
}
static int
load_resident_keys(int agent_fd, const char *skprovider, int qflag)
{
struct sshkey **keys;
size_t nkeys, i;
int r, ok = 0;
char *fp;
pass = read_passphrase("Enter PIN for authenticator: ", RP_ALLOW_STDIN);
if ((r = sshsk_load_resident(skprovider, NULL, pass,
&keys, &nkeys)) != 0) {
error("Unable to load resident keys: %s", ssh_err(r));
return r;
}
for (i = 0; i < nkeys; i++) {
if ((fp = sshkey_fingerprint(keys[i],
fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL)
fatal("%s: sshkey_fingerprint failed", __func__);
if ((r = ssh_add_identity_constrained(agent_fd, keys[i], "",
lifetime, confirm, maxsign, skprovider)) != 0) {
error("Unable to add key %s %s",
sshkey_type(keys[i]), fp);
free(fp);
ok = r;
continue;
}
if (ok == 0)
ok = 1;
if (!qflag) {
fprintf(stderr, "Resident identity added: %s %s\n",
sshkey_type(keys[i]), fp);
if (lifetime != 0) {
fprintf(stderr,
"Lifetime set to %ld seconds\n", lifetime);
}
if (confirm != 0) {
fprintf(stderr, "The user must confirm "
"each use of the key\n");
}
}
free(fp);
sshkey_free(keys[i]);
}
free(keys);
if (nkeys == 0)
return SSH_ERR_KEY_NOT_FOUND;
return ok == 1 ? 0 : ok;
}
static int
do_file(int agent_fd, int deleting, int key_only, char *file, int qflag,
const char *skprovider)
{
if (deleting) {
if (delete_file(agent_fd, file, key_only, qflag) == -1)
return -1;
} else {
if (add_file(agent_fd, file, key_only, qflag, skprovider) == -1)
return -1;
}
return 0;
}
static void
usage(void)
{
fprintf(stderr,
"usage: ssh-add [-cDdKkLlqvXx] [-E fingerprint_hash] [-S provider] [-t life]\n"
#ifdef WITH_XMSS
" [-M maxsign] [-m minleft]\n"
#endif
" [file ...]\n"
" ssh-add -s pkcs11\n"
" ssh-add -e pkcs11\n"
" ssh-add -T pubkey ...\n"
);
}
int
main(int argc, char **argv)
{
extern char *optarg;
extern int optind;
int agent_fd;
char *pkcs11provider = NULL, *skprovider = NULL;
int r, i, ch, deleting = 0, ret = 0, key_only = 0, do_download = 0;
int xflag = 0, lflag = 0, Dflag = 0, qflag = 0, Tflag = 0;
SyslogFacility log_facility = SYSLOG_FACILITY_AUTH;
LogLevel log_level = SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO;
/* Ensure that fds 0, 1 and 2 are open or directed to /dev/null */
sanitise_stdfd();
__progname = ssh_get_progname(argv[0]);
seed_rng();
log_init(__progname, log_level, log_facility, 1);
setvbuf(stdout, NULL, _IOLBF, 0);
/* First, get a connection to the authentication agent. */
switch (r = ssh_get_authentication_socket(&agent_fd)) {
case 0:
break;
case SSH_ERR_AGENT_NOT_PRESENT:
fprintf(stderr, "Could not open a connection to your "
"authentication agent.\n");
exit(2);
default:
fprintf(stderr, "Error connecting to agent: %s\n", ssh_err(r));
exit(2);
}
skprovider = getenv("SSH_SK_PROVIDER");
while ((ch = getopt(argc, argv, "vkKlLcdDTxXE:e:M:m:qs:S:t:")) != -1) {
switch (ch) {
case 'v':
if (log_level == SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO)
log_level = SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG1;
else if (log_level < SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG3)
log_level++;
break;
case 'E':
fingerprint_hash = ssh_digest_alg_by_name(optarg);
if (fingerprint_hash == -1)
fatal("Invalid hash algorithm \"%s\"", optarg);
break;
case 'k':
key_only = 1;
break;
case 'K':
do_download = 1;
break;
case 'l':
case 'L':
if (lflag != 0)
fatal("-%c flag already specified", lflag);
lflag = ch;
break;
case 'x':
case 'X':
if (xflag != 0)
fatal("-%c flag already specified", xflag);
xflag = ch;
break;
case 'c':
confirm = 1;
break;
case 'm':
minleft = (int)strtonum(optarg, 1, UINT_MAX, NULL);
if (minleft == 0) {
usage();
ret = 1;
goto done;
}
break;
case 'M':
maxsign = (int)strtonum(optarg, 1, UINT_MAX, NULL);
if (maxsign == 0) {
usage();
ret = 1;
goto done;
}
break;
case 'd':
deleting = 1;
break;
case 'D':
Dflag = 1;
break;
case 's':
pkcs11provider = optarg;
break;
case 'S':
skprovider = optarg;
break;
case 'e':
deleting = 1;
pkcs11provider = optarg;
break;
case 't':
if ((lifetime = convtime(optarg)) == -1 ||
lifetime < 0 || (u_long)lifetime > UINT32_MAX) {
fprintf(stderr, "Invalid lifetime\n");
ret = 1;
goto done;
}
break;
case 'q':
qflag = 1;
break;
case 'T':
Tflag = 1;
break;
default:
usage();
ret = 1;
goto done;
}
}
log_init(__progname, log_level, log_facility, 1);
if ((xflag != 0) + (lflag != 0) + (Dflag != 0) > 1)
fatal("Invalid combination of actions");
else if (xflag) {
if (lock_agent(agent_fd, xflag == 'x' ? 1 : 0) == -1)
ret = 1;
goto done;
} else if (lflag) {
if (list_identities(agent_fd, lflag == 'l' ? 1 : 0) == -1)
ret = 1;
goto done;
} else if (Dflag) {
if (delete_all(agent_fd, qflag) == -1)
ret = 1;
goto done;
}
#ifdef ENABLE_SK_INTERNAL
if (skprovider == NULL)
skprovider = "internal";
#endif
argc -= optind;
argv += optind;
if (Tflag) {
if (argc <= 0)
fatal("no keys to test");
for (r = i = 0; i < argc; i++)
r |= test_key(agent_fd, argv[i]);
ret = r == 0 ? 0 : 1;
goto done;
}
if (pkcs11provider != NULL) {
if (update_card(agent_fd, !deleting, pkcs11provider,
qflag) == -1)
ret = 1;
goto done;
}
if (do_download) {
if (skprovider == NULL)
fatal("Cannot download keys without provider");
if (load_resident_keys(agent_fd, skprovider, qflag) != 0)
ret = 1;
goto done;
}
if (argc == 0) {
char buf[PATH_MAX];
struct passwd *pw;
struct stat st;
int count = 0;
if ((pw = getpwuid(getuid())) == NULL) {
fprintf(stderr, "No user found with uid %u\n",
(u_int)getuid());
ret = 1;
goto done;
}
for (i = 0; default_files[i]; i++) {
snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%s/%s", pw->pw_dir,
default_files[i]);
if (stat(buf, &st) == -1)
continue;
if (do_file(agent_fd, deleting, key_only, buf,
qflag, skprovider) == -1)
ret = 1;
else
count++;
}
if (count == 0)
ret = 1;
} else {
for (i = 0; i < argc; i++) {
if (do_file(agent_fd, deleting, key_only,
argv[i], qflag, skprovider) == -1)
ret = 1;
}
}
done:
clear_pass();
ssh_close_authentication_socket(agent_fd);
return ret;
}
diff --git a/ssh-agent.0 b/ssh-agent.0
index df4f0cc6cb74..71dddc27cff5 100644
--- a/ssh-agent.0
+++ b/ssh-agent.0
@@ -1,117 +1,119 @@
SSH-AGENT(1) General Commands Manual SSH-AGENT(1)
NAME
ssh-agent M-bM-^@M-^S OpenSSH authentication agent
SYNOPSIS
ssh-agent [-c | -s] [-Dd] [-a bind_address] [-E fingerprint_hash]
- [-P provider_whitelist] [-t life] [command [arg ...]]
+ [-P allowed_providers] [-t life]
+ ssh-agent [-a bind_address] [-E fingerprint_hash] [-P allowed_providers]
+ [-t life] command [arg ...]
ssh-agent [-c | -s] -k
DESCRIPTION
ssh-agent is a program to hold private keys used for public key
authentication. Through use of environment variables the agent can be
located and automatically used for authentication when logging in to
other machines using ssh(1).
The options are as follows:
-a bind_address
Bind the agent to the UNIX-domain socket bind_address. The
default is $TMPDIR/ssh-XXXXXXXXXX/agent.<ppid>.
-c Generate C-shell commands on stdout. This is the default if
SHELL looks like it's a csh style of shell.
-D Foreground mode. When this option is specified ssh-agent will
not fork.
-d Debug mode. When this option is specified ssh-agent will not
fork and will write debug information to standard error.
-E fingerprint_hash
Specifies the hash algorithm used when displaying key
fingerprints. Valid options are: M-bM-^@M-^\md5M-bM-^@M-^] and M-bM-^@M-^\sha256M-bM-^@M-^]. The
default is M-bM-^@M-^\sha256M-bM-^@M-^].
-k Kill the current agent (given by the SSH_AGENT_PID environment
variable).
- -P provider_whitelist
- Specify a pattern-list of acceptable paths for PKCS#11 and FIDO
- authenticator shared libraries that may be used with the -S or -s
- options to ssh-add(1). Libraries that do not match the whitelist
- will be refused. See PATTERNS in ssh_config(5) for a description
- of pattern-list syntax. The default whitelist is
- M-bM-^@M-^\/usr/lib/*,/usr/local/lib/*M-bM-^@M-^].
+ -P allowed_providers
+ Specify a pattern-list of acceptable paths for PKCS#11 provider
+ and FIDO authenticator middleware shared libraries that may be
+ used with the -S or -s options to ssh-add(1). Libraries that do
+ not match the pattern list will be refused. See PATTERNS in
+ ssh_config(5) for a description of pattern-list syntax. The
+ default list is M-bM-^@M-^\/usr/lib/*,/usr/local/lib/*M-bM-^@M-^].
-s Generate Bourne shell commands on stdout. This is the default if
SHELL does not look like it's a csh style of shell.
-t life
Set a default value for the maximum lifetime of identities added
to the agent. The lifetime may be specified in seconds or in a
time format specified in sshd_config(5). A lifetime specified
for an identity with ssh-add(1) overrides this value. Without
this option the default maximum lifetime is forever.
command [arg ...]
If a command (and optional arguments) is given, this is executed
as a subprocess of the agent. The agent exits automatically when
the command given on the command line terminates.
There are two main ways to get an agent set up. The first is at the
start of an X session, where all other windows or programs are started as
children of the ssh-agent program. The agent starts a command under
which its environment variables are exported, for example ssh-agent xterm
&. When the command terminates, so does the agent.
The second method is used for a login session. When ssh-agent is
started, it prints the shell commands required to set its environment
variables, which in turn can be evaluated in the calling shell, for
example eval `ssh-agent -s`.
In both cases, ssh(1) looks at these environment variables and uses them
to establish a connection to the agent.
The agent initially does not have any private keys. Keys are added using
ssh-add(1) or by ssh(1) when AddKeysToAgent is set in ssh_config(5).
Multiple identities may be stored in ssh-agent concurrently and ssh(1)
will automatically use them if present. ssh-add(1) is also used to
remove keys from ssh-agent and to query the keys that are held in one.
Connections to ssh-agent may be forwarded from further remote hosts using
the -A option to ssh(1) (but see the caveats documented therein),
avoiding the need for authentication data to be stored on other machines.
Authentication passphrases and private keys never go over the network:
the connection to the agent is forwarded over SSH remote connections and
the result is returned to the requester, allowing the user access to
their identities anywhere in the network in a secure fashion.
ENVIRONMENT
SSH_AGENT_PID When ssh-agent starts, it stores the name of the agent's
process ID (PID) in this variable.
SSH_AUTH_SOCK When ssh-agent starts, it creates a UNIX-domain socket and
stores its pathname in this variable. It is accessible
only to the current user, but is easily abused by root or
another instance of the same user.
FILES
$TMPDIR/ssh-XXXXXXXXXX/agent.<ppid>
UNIX-domain sockets used to contain the connection to the
authentication agent. These sockets should only be readable by
the owner. The sockets should get automatically removed when the
agent exits.
SEE ALSO
ssh(1), ssh-add(1), ssh-keygen(1), ssh_config(5), sshd(8)
AUTHORS
OpenSSH is a derivative of the original and free ssh 1.2.12 release by
Tatu Ylonen. Aaron Campbell, Bob Beck, Markus Friedl, Niels Provos, Theo
de Raadt and Dug Song removed many bugs, re-added newer features and
created OpenSSH. Markus Friedl contributed the support for SSH protocol
versions 1.5 and 2.0.
-OpenBSD 6.7 December 21, 2019 OpenBSD 6.7
+OpenBSD 6.8 June 22, 2020 OpenBSD 6.8
diff --git a/ssh-agent.1 b/ssh-agent.1
index fff0db6bc07c..2cf46160bf71 100644
--- a/ssh-agent.1
+++ b/ssh-agent.1
@@ -1,227 +1,232 @@
-.\" $OpenBSD: ssh-agent.1,v 1.70 2019/12/21 20:22:34 naddy Exp $
+.\" $OpenBSD: ssh-agent.1,v 1.72 2020/06/22 05:52:05 djm Exp $
.\"
.\" Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
.\" Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
.\" All rights reserved
.\"
.\" As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
.\" can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this
.\" software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
.\" incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
.\" called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
.\"
.\" Copyright (c) 1999,2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
.\" Copyright (c) 1999 Aaron Campbell. All rights reserved.
.\" Copyright (c) 1999 Theo de Raadt. All rights reserved.
.\"
.\" Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
.\" modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
.\" are met:
.\" 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
.\" notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
.\" 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
.\" notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
.\" documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
.\"
.\" THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
.\" IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
.\" OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
.\" IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
.\" INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
.\" NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
.\" DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
.\" THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
.\" (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
.\" THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
.\"
-.Dd $Mdocdate: December 21 2019 $
+.Dd $Mdocdate: June 22 2020 $
.Dt SSH-AGENT 1
.Os
.Sh NAME
.Nm ssh-agent
.Nd OpenSSH authentication agent
.Sh SYNOPSIS
.Nm ssh-agent
.Op Fl c | s
.Op Fl \&Dd
.Op Fl a Ar bind_address
.Op Fl E Ar fingerprint_hash
-.Op Fl P Ar provider_whitelist
+.Op Fl P Ar allowed_providers
.Op Fl t Ar life
-.Op Ar command Op Ar arg ...
+.Nm ssh-agent
+.Op Fl a Ar bind_address
+.Op Fl E Ar fingerprint_hash
+.Op Fl P Ar allowed_providers
+.Op Fl t Ar life
+.Ar command Op Ar arg ...
.Nm ssh-agent
.Op Fl c | s
.Fl k
.Sh DESCRIPTION
.Nm
is a program to hold private keys used for public key authentication.
Through use of environment variables the agent can be located
and automatically used for authentication when logging in to other
machines using
.Xr ssh 1 .
.Pp
The options are as follows:
.Bl -tag -width Ds
.It Fl a Ar bind_address
Bind the agent to the
.Ux Ns -domain
socket
.Ar bind_address .
The default is
.Pa $TMPDIR/ssh-XXXXXXXXXX/agent.\*(Ltppid\*(Gt .
.It Fl c
Generate C-shell commands on
.Dv stdout .
This is the default if
.Ev SHELL
looks like it's a csh style of shell.
.It Fl D
Foreground mode.
When this option is specified
.Nm
will not fork.
.It Fl d
Debug mode.
When this option is specified
.Nm
will not fork and will write debug information to standard error.
.It Fl E Ar fingerprint_hash
Specifies the hash algorithm used when displaying key fingerprints.
Valid options are:
.Dq md5
and
.Dq sha256 .
The default is
.Dq sha256 .
.It Fl k
Kill the current agent (given by the
.Ev SSH_AGENT_PID
environment variable).
-.It Fl P Ar provider_whitelist
-Specify a pattern-list of acceptable paths for PKCS#11 and FIDO authenticator
-shared libraries that may be used with the
+.It Fl P Ar allowed_providers
+Specify a pattern-list of acceptable paths for PKCS#11 provider and FIDO
+authenticator middleware shared libraries that may be used with the
.Fl S
or
.Fl s
options to
.Xr ssh-add 1 .
-Libraries that do not match the whitelist will be refused.
+Libraries that do not match the pattern list will be refused.
See PATTERNS in
.Xr ssh_config 5
for a description of pattern-list syntax.
-The default whitelist is
+The default list is
.Dq /usr/lib/*,/usr/local/lib/* .
.It Fl s
Generate Bourne shell commands on
.Dv stdout .
This is the default if
.Ev SHELL
does not look like it's a csh style of shell.
.It Fl t Ar life
Set a default value for the maximum lifetime of identities added to the agent.
The lifetime may be specified in seconds or in a time format specified in
.Xr sshd_config 5 .
A lifetime specified for an identity with
.Xr ssh-add 1
overrides this value.
Without this option the default maximum lifetime is forever.
.It Ar command Op Ar arg ...
If a command (and optional arguments) is given,
this is executed as a subprocess of the agent.
The agent exits automatically when the command given on the command
line terminates.
.El
.Pp
There are two main ways to get an agent set up.
The first is at the start of an X session,
where all other windows or programs are started as children of the
.Nm
program.
The agent starts a command under which its environment
variables are exported, for example
.Cm ssh-agent xterm & .
When the command terminates, so does the agent.
.Pp
The second method is used for a login session.
When
.Nm
is started,
it prints the shell commands required to set its environment variables,
which in turn can be evaluated in the calling shell, for example
.Cm eval `ssh-agent -s` .
.Pp
In both cases,
.Xr ssh 1
looks at these environment variables and uses them to establish a connection to the agent.
.Pp
The agent initially does not have any private keys.
Keys are added using
.Xr ssh-add 1
or by
.Xr ssh 1
when
.Cm AddKeysToAgent
is set in
.Xr ssh_config 5 .
Multiple identities may be stored in
.Nm
concurrently and
.Xr ssh 1
will automatically use them if present.
.Xr ssh-add 1
is also used to remove keys from
.Nm
and to query the keys that are held in one.
.Pp
Connections to
.Nm
may be forwarded from further remote hosts using the
.Fl A
option to
.Xr ssh 1
(but see the caveats documented therein),
avoiding the need for authentication data to be stored on other machines.
Authentication passphrases and private keys never go over the network:
the connection to the agent is forwarded over SSH remote connections
and the result is returned to the requester,
allowing the user access to their identities anywhere in the network
in a secure fashion.
.Sh ENVIRONMENT
.Bl -tag -width "SSH_AGENT_PID"
.It Ev SSH_AGENT_PID
When
.Nm
starts, it stores the name of the agent's process ID (PID) in this variable.
.It Ev SSH_AUTH_SOCK
When
.Nm
starts, it creates a
.Ux Ns -domain
socket and stores its pathname in this variable.
It is accessible only to the current user,
but is easily abused by root or another instance of the same user.
.El
.Sh FILES
.Bl -tag -width Ds
.It Pa $TMPDIR/ssh-XXXXXXXXXX/agent.<ppid>
.Ux Ns -domain
sockets used to contain the connection to the authentication agent.
These sockets should only be readable by the owner.
The sockets should get automatically removed when the agent exits.
.El
.Sh SEE ALSO
.Xr ssh 1 ,
.Xr ssh-add 1 ,
.Xr ssh-keygen 1 ,
.Xr ssh_config 5 ,
.Xr sshd 8
.Sh AUTHORS
.An -nosplit
OpenSSH is a derivative of the original and free ssh 1.2.12 release by
.An Tatu Ylonen .
.An Aaron Campbell , Bob Beck , Markus Friedl , Niels Provos , Theo de Raadt
and
.An Dug Song
removed many bugs, re-added newer features and created OpenSSH.
.An Markus Friedl
contributed the support for SSH protocol versions 1.5 and 2.0.
diff --git a/ssh-agent.c b/ssh-agent.c
index e081413b8154..e1fd1f3f689a 100644
--- a/ssh-agent.c
+++ b/ssh-agent.c
@@ -1,1449 +1,1549 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: ssh-agent.c,v 1.257 2020/03/06 18:28:27 markus Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: ssh-agent.c,v 1.264 2020/09/18 08:16:38 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
* Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
* All rights reserved
* The authentication agent program.
*
* As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
* can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this
* software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
* incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
* called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
*
* Copyright (c) 2000, 2001 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
* OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
* IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
* INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
* NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
* DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
* THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
* (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
* THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
*/
#include "includes.h"
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/param.h>
#include <sys/resource.h>
#include <sys/stat.h>
#include <sys/socket.h>
#include <sys/wait.h>
#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TIME_H
# include <sys/time.h>
#endif
#ifdef HAVE_SYS_UN_H
# include <sys/un.h>
#endif
#include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h"
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
#include <openssl/evp.h>
#include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h"
#endif
#include <errno.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <limits.h>
#ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H
# include <paths.h>
#endif
#ifdef HAVE_POLL_H
# include <poll.h>
#endif
#include <signal.h>
#include <stdarg.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <time.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#ifdef HAVE_UTIL_H
# include <util.h>
#endif
#include "xmalloc.h"
#include "ssh.h"
+#include "ssh2.h"
#include "sshbuf.h"
#include "sshkey.h"
#include "authfd.h"
#include "compat.h"
#include "log.h"
#include "misc.h"
#include "digest.h"
#include "ssherr.h"
#include "match.h"
#include "msg.h"
#include "ssherr.h"
#include "pathnames.h"
#include "ssh-pkcs11.h"
#include "sk-api.h"
-#ifndef DEFAULT_PROVIDER_WHITELIST
-# define DEFAULT_PROVIDER_WHITELIST "/usr/lib*/*,/usr/local/lib*/*"
+#ifndef DEFAULT_ALLOWED_PROVIDERS
+# define DEFAULT_ALLOWED_PROVIDERS "/usr/lib*/*,/usr/local/lib*/*"
#endif
/* Maximum accepted message length */
#define AGENT_MAX_LEN (256*1024)
/* Maximum bytes to read from client socket */
#define AGENT_RBUF_LEN (4096)
typedef enum {
AUTH_UNUSED,
AUTH_SOCKET,
AUTH_CONNECTION
} sock_type;
typedef struct {
int fd;
sock_type type;
struct sshbuf *input;
struct sshbuf *output;
struct sshbuf *request;
} SocketEntry;
u_int sockets_alloc = 0;
SocketEntry *sockets = NULL;
typedef struct identity {
TAILQ_ENTRY(identity) next;
struct sshkey *key;
char *comment;
char *provider;
time_t death;
u_int confirm;
char *sk_provider;
} Identity;
struct idtable {
int nentries;
TAILQ_HEAD(idqueue, identity) idlist;
};
/* private key table */
struct idtable *idtab;
int max_fd = 0;
/* pid of shell == parent of agent */
pid_t parent_pid = -1;
time_t parent_alive_interval = 0;
/* pid of process for which cleanup_socket is applicable */
pid_t cleanup_pid = 0;
/* pathname and directory for AUTH_SOCKET */
char socket_name[PATH_MAX];
char socket_dir[PATH_MAX];
-/* PKCS#11/Security key path whitelist */
-static char *provider_whitelist;
+/* Pattern-list of allowed PKCS#11/Security key paths */
+static char *allowed_providers;
/* locking */
#define LOCK_SIZE 32
#define LOCK_SALT_SIZE 16
#define LOCK_ROUNDS 1
int locked = 0;
u_char lock_pwhash[LOCK_SIZE];
u_char lock_salt[LOCK_SALT_SIZE];
extern char *__progname;
/* Default lifetime in seconds (0 == forever) */
static long lifetime = 0;
static int fingerprint_hash = SSH_FP_HASH_DEFAULT;
+/* Refuse signing of non-SSH messages for web-origin FIDO keys */
+static int restrict_websafe = 1;
+
static void
close_socket(SocketEntry *e)
{
close(e->fd);
e->fd = -1;
e->type = AUTH_UNUSED;
sshbuf_free(e->input);
sshbuf_free(e->output);
sshbuf_free(e->request);
}
static void
idtab_init(void)
{
idtab = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*idtab));
TAILQ_INIT(&idtab->idlist);
idtab->nentries = 0;
}
static void
free_identity(Identity *id)
{
sshkey_free(id->key);
free(id->provider);
free(id->comment);
free(id->sk_provider);
free(id);
}
/* return matching private key for given public key */
static Identity *
lookup_identity(struct sshkey *key)
{
Identity *id;
TAILQ_FOREACH(id, &idtab->idlist, next) {
if (sshkey_equal(key, id->key))
return (id);
}
return (NULL);
}
/* Check confirmation of keysign request */
static int
confirm_key(Identity *id)
{
char *p;
int ret = -1;
p = sshkey_fingerprint(id->key, fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_DEFAULT);
if (p != NULL &&
ask_permission("Allow use of key %s?\nKey fingerprint %s.",
id->comment, p))
ret = 0;
free(p);
return (ret);
}
static void
send_status(SocketEntry *e, int success)
{
int r;
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(e->output, 1)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u8(e->output, success ?
SSH_AGENT_SUCCESS : SSH_AGENT_FAILURE)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
}
/* send list of supported public keys to 'client' */
static void
process_request_identities(SocketEntry *e)
{
Identity *id;
struct sshbuf *msg;
int r;
if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, SSH2_AGENT_IDENTITIES_ANSWER)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u32(msg, idtab->nentries)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
TAILQ_FOREACH(id, &idtab->idlist, next) {
if ((r = sshkey_puts_opts(id->key, msg, SSHKEY_SERIALIZE_INFO))
!= 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_cstring(msg, id->comment)) != 0) {
error("%s: put key/comment: %s", __func__,
ssh_err(r));
continue;
}
}
if ((r = sshbuf_put_stringb(e->output, msg)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
sshbuf_free(msg);
}
static char *
agent_decode_alg(struct sshkey *key, u_int flags)
{
if (key->type == KEY_RSA) {
if (flags & SSH_AGENT_RSA_SHA2_256)
return "rsa-sha2-256";
else if (flags & SSH_AGENT_RSA_SHA2_512)
return "rsa-sha2-512";
} else if (key->type == KEY_RSA_CERT) {
if (flags & SSH_AGENT_RSA_SHA2_256)
return "rsa-sha2-256-cert-v01@openssh.com";
else if (flags & SSH_AGENT_RSA_SHA2_512)
return "rsa-sha2-512-cert-v01@openssh.com";
}
return NULL;
}
+/*
+ * This function inspects a message to be signed by a FIDO key that has a
+ * web-like application string (i.e. one that does not begin with "ssh:".
+ * It checks that the message is one of those expected for SSH operations
+ * (pubkey userauth, sshsig, CA key signing) to exclude signing challenges
+ * for the web.
+ */
+static int
+check_websafe_message_contents(struct sshkey *key,
+ const u_char *msg, size_t len)
+{
+ int matched = 0;
+ struct sshbuf *b;
+ u_char m, n;
+ char *cp1 = NULL, *cp2 = NULL;
+ int r;
+ struct sshkey *mkey = NULL;
+
+ if ((b = sshbuf_from(msg, len)) == NULL)
+ fatal("%s: sshbuf_new", __func__);
+
+ /* SSH userauth request */
+ if ((r = sshbuf_get_string_direct(b, NULL, NULL)) == 0 && /* sess_id */
+ (r = sshbuf_get_u8(b, &m)) == 0 && /* SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST */
+ (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, NULL, NULL)) == 0 && /* server user */
+ (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &cp1, NULL)) == 0 && /* service */
+ (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &cp2, NULL)) == 0 && /* method */
+ (r = sshbuf_get_u8(b, &n)) == 0 && /* sig-follows */
+ (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, NULL, NULL)) == 0 && /* alg */
+ (r = sshkey_froms(b, &mkey)) == 0 && /* key */
+ sshbuf_len(b) == 0) {
+ debug("%s: parsed userauth", __func__);
+ if (m == SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST && n == 1 &&
+ strcmp(cp1, "ssh-connection") == 0 &&
+ strcmp(cp2, "publickey") == 0 &&
+ sshkey_equal(key, mkey)) {
+ debug("%s: well formed userauth", __func__);
+ matched = 1;
+ }
+ }
+ free(cp1);
+ free(cp2);
+ sshkey_free(mkey);
+ sshbuf_free(b);
+ if (matched)
+ return 1;
+
+ if ((b = sshbuf_from(msg, len)) == NULL)
+ fatal("%s: sshbuf_new", __func__);
+ cp1 = cp2 = NULL;
+ mkey = NULL;
+
+ /* SSHSIG */
+ if ((r = sshbuf_cmp(b, 0, "SSHSIG", 6)) == 0 &&
+ (r = sshbuf_consume(b, 6)) == 0 &&
+ (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, NULL, NULL)) == 0 && /* namespace */
+ (r = sshbuf_get_string_direct(b, NULL, NULL)) == 0 && /* reserved */
+ (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, NULL, NULL)) == 0 && /* hashalg */
+ (r = sshbuf_get_string_direct(b, NULL, NULL)) == 0 && /* H(msg) */
+ sshbuf_len(b) == 0) {
+ debug("%s: parsed sshsig", __func__);
+ matched = 1;
+ }
+
+ sshbuf_free(b);
+ if (matched)
+ return 1;
+
+ /* XXX CA signature operation */
+
+ error("web-origin key attempting to sign non-SSH message");
+ return 0;
+}
+
/* ssh2 only */
static void
process_sign_request2(SocketEntry *e)
{
const u_char *data;
u_char *signature = NULL;
size_t dlen, slen = 0;
u_int compat = 0, flags;
int r, ok = -1;
char *fp = NULL;
struct sshbuf *msg;
struct sshkey *key = NULL;
struct identity *id;
struct notifier_ctx *notifier = NULL;
if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
if ((r = sshkey_froms(e->request, &key)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_string_direct(e->request, &data, &dlen)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_u32(e->request, &flags)) != 0) {
error("%s: couldn't parse request: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
goto send;
}
if ((id = lookup_identity(key)) == NULL) {
verbose("%s: %s key not found", __func__, sshkey_type(key));
goto send;
}
if (id->confirm && confirm_key(id) != 0) {
verbose("%s: user refused key", __func__);
goto send;
}
- if (sshkey_is_sk(id->key) &&
- (id->key->sk_flags & SSH_SK_USER_PRESENCE_REQD)) {
- if ((fp = sshkey_fingerprint(key, SSH_FP_HASH_DEFAULT,
- SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL)
- fatal("%s: fingerprint failed", __func__);
- notifier = notify_start(0,
- "Confirm user presence for key %s %s",
- sshkey_type(id->key), fp);
+ if (sshkey_is_sk(id->key)) {
+ if (strncmp(id->key->sk_application, "ssh:", 4) != 0 &&
+ !check_websafe_message_contents(key, data, dlen)) {
+ /* error already logged */
+ goto send;
+ }
+ if ((id->key->sk_flags & SSH_SK_USER_PRESENCE_REQD)) {
+ if ((fp = sshkey_fingerprint(key, SSH_FP_HASH_DEFAULT,
+ SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL)
+ fatal("%s: fingerprint failed", __func__);
+ notifier = notify_start(0,
+ "Confirm user presence for key %s %s",
+ sshkey_type(id->key), fp);
+ }
}
+ /* XXX support PIN required FIDO keys */
if ((r = sshkey_sign(id->key, &signature, &slen,
data, dlen, agent_decode_alg(key, flags),
- id->sk_provider, compat)) != 0) {
+ id->sk_provider, NULL, compat)) != 0) {
error("%s: sshkey_sign: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
goto send;
}
/* Success */
ok = 0;
send:
notify_complete(notifier);
sshkey_free(key);
free(fp);
if (ok == 0) {
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, SSH2_AGENT_SIGN_RESPONSE)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_string(msg, signature, slen)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
} else if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, SSH_AGENT_FAILURE)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
if ((r = sshbuf_put_stringb(e->output, msg)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
sshbuf_free(msg);
free(signature);
}
/* shared */
static void
process_remove_identity(SocketEntry *e)
{
int r, success = 0;
struct sshkey *key = NULL;
Identity *id;
if ((r = sshkey_froms(e->request, &key)) != 0) {
error("%s: get key: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
goto done;
}
if ((id = lookup_identity(key)) == NULL) {
debug("%s: key not found", __func__);
goto done;
}
/* We have this key, free it. */
if (idtab->nentries < 1)
fatal("%s: internal error: nentries %d",
__func__, idtab->nentries);
TAILQ_REMOVE(&idtab->idlist, id, next);
free_identity(id);
idtab->nentries--;
sshkey_free(key);
success = 1;
done:
send_status(e, success);
}
static void
process_remove_all_identities(SocketEntry *e)
{
Identity *id;
/* Loop over all identities and clear the keys. */
for (id = TAILQ_FIRST(&idtab->idlist); id;
id = TAILQ_FIRST(&idtab->idlist)) {
TAILQ_REMOVE(&idtab->idlist, id, next);
free_identity(id);
}
/* Mark that there are no identities. */
idtab->nentries = 0;
/* Send success. */
send_status(e, 1);
}
/* removes expired keys and returns number of seconds until the next expiry */
static time_t
reaper(void)
{
time_t deadline = 0, now = monotime();
Identity *id, *nxt;
for (id = TAILQ_FIRST(&idtab->idlist); id; id = nxt) {
nxt = TAILQ_NEXT(id, next);
if (id->death == 0)
continue;
if (now >= id->death) {
debug("expiring key '%s'", id->comment);
TAILQ_REMOVE(&idtab->idlist, id, next);
free_identity(id);
idtab->nentries--;
} else
deadline = (deadline == 0) ? id->death :
MINIMUM(deadline, id->death);
}
if (deadline == 0 || deadline <= now)
return 0;
else
return (deadline - now);
}
static void
process_add_identity(SocketEntry *e)
{
Identity *id;
int success = 0, confirm = 0;
u_int seconds = 0, maxsign;
char *fp, *comment = NULL, *ext_name = NULL, *sk_provider = NULL;
char canonical_provider[PATH_MAX];
time_t death = 0;
struct sshkey *k = NULL;
u_char ctype;
int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
if ((r = sshkey_private_deserialize(e->request, &k)) != 0 ||
k == NULL ||
(r = sshbuf_get_cstring(e->request, &comment, NULL)) != 0) {
error("%s: decode private key: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
goto err;
}
while (sshbuf_len(e->request)) {
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(e->request, &ctype)) != 0) {
error("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
goto err;
}
switch (ctype) {
case SSH_AGENT_CONSTRAIN_LIFETIME:
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(e->request, &seconds)) != 0) {
error("%s: bad lifetime constraint: %s",
__func__, ssh_err(r));
goto err;
}
death = monotime() + seconds;
break;
case SSH_AGENT_CONSTRAIN_CONFIRM:
confirm = 1;
break;
case SSH_AGENT_CONSTRAIN_MAXSIGN:
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(e->request, &maxsign)) != 0) {
error("%s: bad maxsign constraint: %s",
__func__, ssh_err(r));
goto err;
}
if ((r = sshkey_enable_maxsign(k, maxsign)) != 0) {
error("%s: cannot enable maxsign: %s",
__func__, ssh_err(r));
goto err;
}
break;
case SSH_AGENT_CONSTRAIN_EXTENSION:
if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(e->request,
&ext_name, NULL)) != 0) {
error("%s: cannot parse extension: %s",
__func__, ssh_err(r));
goto err;
}
debug("%s: constraint ext %s", __func__, ext_name);
if (strcmp(ext_name, "sk-provider@openssh.com") == 0) {
if (sk_provider != NULL) {
error("%s already set", ext_name);
goto err;
}
if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(e->request,
&sk_provider, NULL)) != 0) {
error("%s: cannot parse %s: %s",
__func__, ext_name, ssh_err(r));
goto err;
}
} else {
error("%s: unsupported constraint \"%s\"",
__func__, ext_name);
goto err;
}
free(ext_name);
break;
default:
error("%s: Unknown constraint %d", __func__, ctype);
err:
free(sk_provider);
free(ext_name);
sshbuf_reset(e->request);
free(comment);
sshkey_free(k);
goto send;
}
}
if (sk_provider != NULL) {
if (!sshkey_is_sk(k)) {
error("Cannot add provider: %s is not an "
"authenticator-hosted key", sshkey_type(k));
free(sk_provider);
goto send;
}
if (strcasecmp(sk_provider, "internal") == 0) {
debug("%s: internal provider", __func__);
} else {
if (realpath(sk_provider, canonical_provider) == NULL) {
verbose("failed provider \"%.100s\": "
"realpath: %s", sk_provider,
strerror(errno));
free(sk_provider);
goto send;
}
free(sk_provider);
sk_provider = xstrdup(canonical_provider);
if (match_pattern_list(sk_provider,
- provider_whitelist, 0) != 1) {
+ allowed_providers, 0) != 1) {
error("Refusing add key: "
- "provider %s not whitelisted", sk_provider);
+ "provider %s not allowed", sk_provider);
free(sk_provider);
goto send;
}
}
}
if ((r = sshkey_shield_private(k)) != 0) {
error("%s: shield private key: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
goto err;
}
success = 1;
if (lifetime && !death)
death = monotime() + lifetime;
if ((id = lookup_identity(k)) == NULL) {
id = xcalloc(1, sizeof(Identity));
TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(&idtab->idlist, id, next);
/* Increment the number of identities. */
idtab->nentries++;
} else {
/* key state might have been updated */
sshkey_free(id->key);
free(id->comment);
free(id->sk_provider);
}
id->key = k;
id->comment = comment;
id->death = death;
id->confirm = confirm;
id->sk_provider = sk_provider;
if ((fp = sshkey_fingerprint(k, SSH_FP_HASH_DEFAULT,
SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL)
fatal("%s: sshkey_fingerprint failed", __func__);
debug("%s: add %s %s \"%.100s\" (life: %u) (confirm: %u) "
"(provider: %s)", __func__, sshkey_ssh_name(k), fp, comment,
seconds, confirm, sk_provider == NULL ? "none" : sk_provider);
free(fp);
send:
send_status(e, success);
}
/* XXX todo: encrypt sensitive data with passphrase */
static void
process_lock_agent(SocketEntry *e, int lock)
{
int r, success = 0, delay;
char *passwd;
u_char passwdhash[LOCK_SIZE];
static u_int fail_count = 0;
size_t pwlen;
/*
* This is deliberately fatal: the user has requested that we lock,
* but we can't parse their request properly. The only safe thing to
* do is abort.
*/
if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(e->request, &passwd, &pwlen)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
if (pwlen == 0) {
debug("empty password not supported");
} else if (locked && !lock) {
if (bcrypt_pbkdf(passwd, pwlen, lock_salt, sizeof(lock_salt),
passwdhash, sizeof(passwdhash), LOCK_ROUNDS) < 0)
fatal("bcrypt_pbkdf");
if (timingsafe_bcmp(passwdhash, lock_pwhash, LOCK_SIZE) == 0) {
debug("agent unlocked");
locked = 0;
fail_count = 0;
explicit_bzero(lock_pwhash, sizeof(lock_pwhash));
success = 1;
} else {
/* delay in 0.1s increments up to 10s */
if (fail_count < 100)
fail_count++;
delay = 100000 * fail_count;
debug("unlock failed, delaying %0.1lf seconds",
(double)delay/1000000);
usleep(delay);
}
explicit_bzero(passwdhash, sizeof(passwdhash));
} else if (!locked && lock) {
debug("agent locked");
locked = 1;
arc4random_buf(lock_salt, sizeof(lock_salt));
if (bcrypt_pbkdf(passwd, pwlen, lock_salt, sizeof(lock_salt),
lock_pwhash, sizeof(lock_pwhash), LOCK_ROUNDS) < 0)
fatal("bcrypt_pbkdf");
success = 1;
}
freezero(passwd, pwlen);
send_status(e, success);
}
static void
no_identities(SocketEntry *e)
{
struct sshbuf *msg;
int r;
if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, SSH2_AGENT_IDENTITIES_ANSWER)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u32(msg, 0)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_stringb(e->output, msg)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
sshbuf_free(msg);
}
#ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11
static void
process_add_smartcard_key(SocketEntry *e)
{
char *provider = NULL, *pin = NULL, canonical_provider[PATH_MAX];
char **comments = NULL;
int r, i, count = 0, success = 0, confirm = 0;
u_int seconds;
time_t death = 0;
u_char type;
struct sshkey **keys = NULL, *k;
Identity *id;
if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(e->request, &provider, NULL)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_cstring(e->request, &pin, NULL)) != 0) {
error("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
goto send;
}
while (sshbuf_len(e->request)) {
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(e->request, &type)) != 0) {
error("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
goto send;
}
switch (type) {
case SSH_AGENT_CONSTRAIN_LIFETIME:
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(e->request, &seconds)) != 0) {
error("%s: buffer error: %s",
__func__, ssh_err(r));
goto send;
}
death = monotime() + seconds;
break;
case SSH_AGENT_CONSTRAIN_CONFIRM:
confirm = 1;
break;
default:
error("%s: Unknown constraint type %d", __func__, type);
goto send;
}
}
if (realpath(provider, canonical_provider) == NULL) {
verbose("failed PKCS#11 add of \"%.100s\": realpath: %s",
provider, strerror(errno));
goto send;
}
- if (match_pattern_list(canonical_provider, provider_whitelist, 0) != 1) {
+ if (match_pattern_list(canonical_provider, allowed_providers, 0) != 1) {
verbose("refusing PKCS#11 add of \"%.100s\": "
- "provider not whitelisted", canonical_provider);
+ "provider not allowed", canonical_provider);
goto send;
}
debug("%s: add %.100s", __func__, canonical_provider);
if (lifetime && !death)
death = monotime() + lifetime;
count = pkcs11_add_provider(canonical_provider, pin, &keys, &comments);
for (i = 0; i < count; i++) {
k = keys[i];
if (lookup_identity(k) == NULL) {
id = xcalloc(1, sizeof(Identity));
id->key = k;
keys[i] = NULL; /* transferred */
id->provider = xstrdup(canonical_provider);
if (*comments[i] != '\0') {
id->comment = comments[i];
comments[i] = NULL; /* transferred */
} else {
id->comment = xstrdup(canonical_provider);
}
id->death = death;
id->confirm = confirm;
TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(&idtab->idlist, id, next);
idtab->nentries++;
success = 1;
}
sshkey_free(keys[i]);
free(comments[i]);
}
send:
free(pin);
free(provider);
free(keys);
free(comments);
send_status(e, success);
}
static void
process_remove_smartcard_key(SocketEntry *e)
{
char *provider = NULL, *pin = NULL, canonical_provider[PATH_MAX];
int r, success = 0;
Identity *id, *nxt;
if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(e->request, &provider, NULL)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_cstring(e->request, &pin, NULL)) != 0) {
error("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
goto send;
}
free(pin);
if (realpath(provider, canonical_provider) == NULL) {
verbose("failed PKCS#11 add of \"%.100s\": realpath: %s",
provider, strerror(errno));
goto send;
}
debug("%s: remove %.100s", __func__, canonical_provider);
for (id = TAILQ_FIRST(&idtab->idlist); id; id = nxt) {
nxt = TAILQ_NEXT(id, next);
/* Skip file--based keys */
if (id->provider == NULL)
continue;
if (!strcmp(canonical_provider, id->provider)) {
TAILQ_REMOVE(&idtab->idlist, id, next);
free_identity(id);
idtab->nentries--;
}
}
if (pkcs11_del_provider(canonical_provider) == 0)
success = 1;
else
error("%s: pkcs11_del_provider failed", __func__);
send:
free(provider);
send_status(e, success);
}
#endif /* ENABLE_PKCS11 */
-/* dispatch incoming messages */
-
+/*
+ * dispatch incoming message.
+ * returns 1 on success, 0 for incomplete messages or -1 on error.
+ */
static int
process_message(u_int socknum)
{
u_int msg_len;
u_char type;
const u_char *cp;
int r;
SocketEntry *e;
if (socknum >= sockets_alloc) {
fatal("%s: socket number %u >= allocated %u",
__func__, socknum, sockets_alloc);
}
e = &sockets[socknum];
if (sshbuf_len(e->input) < 5)
return 0; /* Incomplete message header. */
cp = sshbuf_ptr(e->input);
msg_len = PEEK_U32(cp);
if (msg_len > AGENT_MAX_LEN) {
debug("%s: socket %u (fd=%d) message too long %u > %u",
__func__, socknum, e->fd, msg_len, AGENT_MAX_LEN);
return -1;
}
if (sshbuf_len(e->input) < msg_len + 4)
return 0; /* Incomplete message body. */
/* move the current input to e->request */
sshbuf_reset(e->request);
if ((r = sshbuf_get_stringb(e->input, e->request)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_u8(e->request, &type)) != 0) {
if (r == SSH_ERR_MESSAGE_INCOMPLETE ||
r == SSH_ERR_STRING_TOO_LARGE) {
debug("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
return -1;
}
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
}
debug("%s: socket %u (fd=%d) type %d", __func__, socknum, e->fd, type);
/* check whether agent is locked */
if (locked && type != SSH_AGENTC_UNLOCK) {
sshbuf_reset(e->request);
switch (type) {
case SSH2_AGENTC_REQUEST_IDENTITIES:
/* send empty lists */
no_identities(e);
break;
default:
/* send a fail message for all other request types */
send_status(e, 0);
}
- return 0;
+ return 1;
}
switch (type) {
case SSH_AGENTC_LOCK:
case SSH_AGENTC_UNLOCK:
process_lock_agent(e, type == SSH_AGENTC_LOCK);
break;
case SSH_AGENTC_REMOVE_ALL_RSA_IDENTITIES:
process_remove_all_identities(e); /* safe for !WITH_SSH1 */
break;
/* ssh2 */
case SSH2_AGENTC_SIGN_REQUEST:
process_sign_request2(e);
break;
case SSH2_AGENTC_REQUEST_IDENTITIES:
process_request_identities(e);
break;
case SSH2_AGENTC_ADD_IDENTITY:
case SSH2_AGENTC_ADD_ID_CONSTRAINED:
process_add_identity(e);
break;
case SSH2_AGENTC_REMOVE_IDENTITY:
process_remove_identity(e);
break;
case SSH2_AGENTC_REMOVE_ALL_IDENTITIES:
process_remove_all_identities(e);
break;
#ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11
case SSH_AGENTC_ADD_SMARTCARD_KEY:
case SSH_AGENTC_ADD_SMARTCARD_KEY_CONSTRAINED:
process_add_smartcard_key(e);
break;
case SSH_AGENTC_REMOVE_SMARTCARD_KEY:
process_remove_smartcard_key(e);
break;
#endif /* ENABLE_PKCS11 */
default:
/* Unknown message. Respond with failure. */
error("Unknown message %d", type);
sshbuf_reset(e->request);
send_status(e, 0);
break;
}
- return 0;
+ return 1;
}
static void
new_socket(sock_type type, int fd)
{
u_int i, old_alloc, new_alloc;
set_nonblock(fd);
if (fd > max_fd)
max_fd = fd;
for (i = 0; i < sockets_alloc; i++)
if (sockets[i].type == AUTH_UNUSED) {
sockets[i].fd = fd;
if ((sockets[i].input = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
if ((sockets[i].output = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
if ((sockets[i].request = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
sockets[i].type = type;
return;
}
old_alloc = sockets_alloc;
new_alloc = sockets_alloc + 10;
sockets = xreallocarray(sockets, new_alloc, sizeof(sockets[0]));
for (i = old_alloc; i < new_alloc; i++)
sockets[i].type = AUTH_UNUSED;
sockets_alloc = new_alloc;
sockets[old_alloc].fd = fd;
if ((sockets[old_alloc].input = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
if ((sockets[old_alloc].output = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
if ((sockets[old_alloc].request = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
sockets[old_alloc].type = type;
}
static int
handle_socket_read(u_int socknum)
{
struct sockaddr_un sunaddr;
socklen_t slen;
uid_t euid;
gid_t egid;
int fd;
slen = sizeof(sunaddr);
fd = accept(sockets[socknum].fd, (struct sockaddr *)&sunaddr, &slen);
if (fd == -1) {
error("accept from AUTH_SOCKET: %s", strerror(errno));
return -1;
}
if (getpeereid(fd, &euid, &egid) == -1) {
error("getpeereid %d failed: %s", fd, strerror(errno));
close(fd);
return -1;
}
if ((euid != 0) && (getuid() != euid)) {
error("uid mismatch: peer euid %u != uid %u",
(u_int) euid, (u_int) getuid());
close(fd);
return -1;
}
new_socket(AUTH_CONNECTION, fd);
return 0;
}
static int
handle_conn_read(u_int socknum)
{
char buf[AGENT_RBUF_LEN];
ssize_t len;
int r;
if ((len = read(sockets[socknum].fd, buf, sizeof(buf))) <= 0) {
if (len == -1) {
if (errno == EAGAIN || errno == EINTR)
return 0;
error("%s: read error on socket %u (fd %d): %s",
__func__, socknum, sockets[socknum].fd,
strerror(errno));
}
return -1;
}
if ((r = sshbuf_put(sockets[socknum].input, buf, len)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
explicit_bzero(buf, sizeof(buf));
- process_message(socknum);
+ for (;;) {
+ if ((r = process_message(socknum)) == -1)
+ return -1;
+ else if (r == 0)
+ break;
+ }
return 0;
}
static int
handle_conn_write(u_int socknum)
{
ssize_t len;
int r;
if (sshbuf_len(sockets[socknum].output) == 0)
return 0; /* shouldn't happen */
if ((len = write(sockets[socknum].fd,
sshbuf_ptr(sockets[socknum].output),
sshbuf_len(sockets[socknum].output))) <= 0) {
if (len == -1) {
if (errno == EAGAIN || errno == EINTR)
return 0;
error("%s: read error on socket %u (fd %d): %s",
__func__, socknum, sockets[socknum].fd,
strerror(errno));
}
return -1;
}
if ((r = sshbuf_consume(sockets[socknum].output, len)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
return 0;
}
static void
after_poll(struct pollfd *pfd, size_t npfd, u_int maxfds)
{
size_t i;
u_int socknum, activefds = npfd;
for (i = 0; i < npfd; i++) {
if (pfd[i].revents == 0)
continue;
/* Find sockets entry */
for (socknum = 0; socknum < sockets_alloc; socknum++) {
if (sockets[socknum].type != AUTH_SOCKET &&
sockets[socknum].type != AUTH_CONNECTION)
continue;
if (pfd[i].fd == sockets[socknum].fd)
break;
}
if (socknum >= sockets_alloc) {
error("%s: no socket for fd %d", __func__, pfd[i].fd);
continue;
}
/* Process events */
switch (sockets[socknum].type) {
case AUTH_SOCKET:
if ((pfd[i].revents & (POLLIN|POLLERR)) == 0)
break;
if (npfd > maxfds) {
debug3("out of fds (active %u >= limit %u); "
"skipping accept", activefds, maxfds);
break;
}
if (handle_socket_read(socknum) == 0)
activefds++;
break;
case AUTH_CONNECTION:
if ((pfd[i].revents & (POLLIN|POLLERR)) != 0 &&
handle_conn_read(socknum) != 0) {
goto close_sock;
}
if ((pfd[i].revents & (POLLOUT|POLLHUP)) != 0 &&
handle_conn_write(socknum) != 0) {
close_sock:
if (activefds == 0)
fatal("activefds == 0 at close_sock");
close_socket(&sockets[socknum]);
activefds--;
break;
}
break;
default:
break;
}
}
}
static int
prepare_poll(struct pollfd **pfdp, size_t *npfdp, int *timeoutp, u_int maxfds)
{
struct pollfd *pfd = *pfdp;
size_t i, j, npfd = 0;
time_t deadline;
int r;
/* Count active sockets */
for (i = 0; i < sockets_alloc; i++) {
switch (sockets[i].type) {
case AUTH_SOCKET:
case AUTH_CONNECTION:
npfd++;
break;
case AUTH_UNUSED:
break;
default:
fatal("Unknown socket type %d", sockets[i].type);
break;
}
}
if (npfd != *npfdp &&
(pfd = recallocarray(pfd, *npfdp, npfd, sizeof(*pfd))) == NULL)
fatal("%s: recallocarray failed", __func__);
*pfdp = pfd;
*npfdp = npfd;
for (i = j = 0; i < sockets_alloc; i++) {
switch (sockets[i].type) {
case AUTH_SOCKET:
if (npfd > maxfds) {
debug3("out of fds (active %zu >= limit %u); "
"skipping arming listener", npfd, maxfds);
break;
}
pfd[j].fd = sockets[i].fd;
pfd[j].revents = 0;
pfd[j].events = POLLIN;
j++;
break;
case AUTH_CONNECTION:
pfd[j].fd = sockets[i].fd;
pfd[j].revents = 0;
/*
* Only prepare to read if we can handle a full-size
* input read buffer and enqueue a max size reply..
*/
if ((r = sshbuf_check_reserve(sockets[i].input,
AGENT_RBUF_LEN)) == 0 &&
(r = sshbuf_check_reserve(sockets[i].output,
AGENT_MAX_LEN)) == 0)
pfd[j].events = POLLIN;
else if (r != SSH_ERR_NO_BUFFER_SPACE) {
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s",
__func__, ssh_err(r));
}
if (sshbuf_len(sockets[i].output) > 0)
pfd[j].events |= POLLOUT;
j++;
break;
default:
break;
}
}
deadline = reaper();
if (parent_alive_interval != 0)
deadline = (deadline == 0) ? parent_alive_interval :
MINIMUM(deadline, parent_alive_interval);
if (deadline == 0) {
*timeoutp = -1; /* INFTIM */
} else {
if (deadline > INT_MAX / 1000)
*timeoutp = INT_MAX / 1000;
else
*timeoutp = deadline * 1000;
}
return (1);
}
static void
cleanup_socket(void)
{
if (cleanup_pid != 0 && getpid() != cleanup_pid)
return;
debug("%s: cleanup", __func__);
if (socket_name[0])
unlink(socket_name);
if (socket_dir[0])
rmdir(socket_dir);
}
void
cleanup_exit(int i)
{
cleanup_socket();
_exit(i);
}
/*ARGSUSED*/
static void
cleanup_handler(int sig)
{
cleanup_socket();
#ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11
pkcs11_terminate();
#endif
_exit(2);
}
static void
check_parent_exists(void)
{
/*
* If our parent has exited then getppid() will return (pid_t)1,
* so testing for that should be safe.
*/
if (parent_pid != -1 && getppid() != parent_pid) {
/* printf("Parent has died - Authentication agent exiting.\n"); */
cleanup_socket();
_exit(2);
}
}
static void
usage(void)
{
fprintf(stderr,
"usage: ssh-agent [-c | -s] [-Dd] [-a bind_address] [-E fingerprint_hash]\n"
- " [-P provider_whitelist] [-t life] [command [arg ...]]\n"
+ " [-P allowed_providers] [-t life]\n"
+ " ssh-agent [-a bind_address] [-E fingerprint_hash] [-P allowed_providers]\n"
+ " [-t life] command [arg ...]\n"
" ssh-agent [-c | -s] -k\n");
exit(1);
}
int
main(int ac, char **av)
{
int c_flag = 0, d_flag = 0, D_flag = 0, k_flag = 0, s_flag = 0;
int sock, fd, ch, result, saved_errno;
char *shell, *format, *pidstr, *agentsocket = NULL;
#ifdef HAVE_SETRLIMIT
struct rlimit rlim;
#endif
extern int optind;
extern char *optarg;
pid_t pid;
char pidstrbuf[1 + 3 * sizeof pid];
size_t len;
mode_t prev_mask;
int timeout = -1; /* INFTIM */
struct pollfd *pfd = NULL;
size_t npfd = 0;
u_int maxfds;
/* Ensure that fds 0, 1 and 2 are open or directed to /dev/null */
sanitise_stdfd();
/* drop */
setegid(getgid());
setgid(getgid());
platform_disable_tracing(0); /* strict=no */
#ifdef RLIMIT_NOFILE
if (getrlimit(RLIMIT_NOFILE, &rlim) == -1)
fatal("%s: getrlimit: %s", __progname, strerror(errno));
#endif
__progname = ssh_get_progname(av[0]);
seed_rng();
- while ((ch = getopt(ac, av, "cDdksE:a:P:t:")) != -1) {
+ while ((ch = getopt(ac, av, "cDdksE:a:O:P:t:")) != -1) {
switch (ch) {
case 'E':
fingerprint_hash = ssh_digest_alg_by_name(optarg);
if (fingerprint_hash == -1)
fatal("Invalid hash algorithm \"%s\"", optarg);
break;
case 'c':
if (s_flag)
usage();
c_flag++;
break;
case 'k':
k_flag++;
break;
+ case 'O':
+ if (strcmp(optarg, "no-restrict-websafe") == 0)
+ restrict_websafe = 0;
+ else
+ fatal("Unknown -O option");
+ break;
case 'P':
- if (provider_whitelist != NULL)
+ if (allowed_providers != NULL)
fatal("-P option already specified");
- provider_whitelist = xstrdup(optarg);
+ allowed_providers = xstrdup(optarg);
break;
case 's':
if (c_flag)
usage();
s_flag++;
break;
case 'd':
if (d_flag || D_flag)
usage();
d_flag++;
break;
case 'D':
if (d_flag || D_flag)
usage();
D_flag++;
break;
case 'a':
agentsocket = optarg;
break;
case 't':
if ((lifetime = convtime(optarg)) == -1) {
fprintf(stderr, "Invalid lifetime\n");
usage();
}
break;
default:
usage();
}
}
ac -= optind;
av += optind;
if (ac > 0 && (c_flag || k_flag || s_flag || d_flag || D_flag))
usage();
- if (provider_whitelist == NULL)
- provider_whitelist = xstrdup(DEFAULT_PROVIDER_WHITELIST);
+ if (allowed_providers == NULL)
+ allowed_providers = xstrdup(DEFAULT_ALLOWED_PROVIDERS);
if (ac == 0 && !c_flag && !s_flag) {
shell = getenv("SHELL");
if (shell != NULL && (len = strlen(shell)) > 2 &&
strncmp(shell + len - 3, "csh", 3) == 0)
c_flag = 1;
}
if (k_flag) {
const char *errstr = NULL;
pidstr = getenv(SSH_AGENTPID_ENV_NAME);
if (pidstr == NULL) {
fprintf(stderr, "%s not set, cannot kill agent\n",
SSH_AGENTPID_ENV_NAME);
exit(1);
}
pid = (int)strtonum(pidstr, 2, INT_MAX, &errstr);
if (errstr) {
fprintf(stderr,
"%s=\"%s\", which is not a good PID: %s\n",
SSH_AGENTPID_ENV_NAME, pidstr, errstr);
exit(1);
}
if (kill(pid, SIGTERM) == -1) {
perror("kill");
exit(1);
}
format = c_flag ? "unsetenv %s;\n" : "unset %s;\n";
printf(format, SSH_AUTHSOCKET_ENV_NAME);
printf(format, SSH_AGENTPID_ENV_NAME);
printf("echo Agent pid %ld killed;\n", (long)pid);
exit(0);
}
/*
* Minimum file descriptors:
* stdio (3) + listener (1) + syslog (1 maybe) + connection (1) +
* a few spare for libc / stack protectors / sanitisers, etc.
*/
#define SSH_AGENT_MIN_FDS (3+1+1+1+4)
if (rlim.rlim_cur < SSH_AGENT_MIN_FDS)
fatal("%s: file descriptor rlimit %lld too low (minimum %u)",
__progname, (long long)rlim.rlim_cur, SSH_AGENT_MIN_FDS);
maxfds = rlim.rlim_cur - SSH_AGENT_MIN_FDS;
parent_pid = getpid();
if (agentsocket == NULL) {
/* Create private directory for agent socket */
mktemp_proto(socket_dir, sizeof(socket_dir));
if (mkdtemp(socket_dir) == NULL) {
perror("mkdtemp: private socket dir");
exit(1);
}
snprintf(socket_name, sizeof socket_name, "%s/agent.%ld", socket_dir,
(long)parent_pid);
} else {
/* Try to use specified agent socket */
socket_dir[0] = '\0';
strlcpy(socket_name, agentsocket, sizeof socket_name);
}
/*
* Create socket early so it will exist before command gets run from
* the parent.
*/
prev_mask = umask(0177);
sock = unix_listener(socket_name, SSH_LISTEN_BACKLOG, 0);
if (sock < 0) {
/* XXX - unix_listener() calls error() not perror() */
*socket_name = '\0'; /* Don't unlink any existing file */
cleanup_exit(1);
}
umask(prev_mask);
/*
* Fork, and have the parent execute the command, if any, or present
* the socket data. The child continues as the authentication agent.
*/
if (D_flag || d_flag) {
log_init(__progname,
d_flag ? SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG3 : SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO,
SYSLOG_FACILITY_AUTH, 1);
format = c_flag ? "setenv %s %s;\n" : "%s=%s; export %s;\n";
printf(format, SSH_AUTHSOCKET_ENV_NAME, socket_name,
SSH_AUTHSOCKET_ENV_NAME);
printf("echo Agent pid %ld;\n", (long)parent_pid);
fflush(stdout);
goto skip;
}
pid = fork();
if (pid == -1) {
perror("fork");
cleanup_exit(1);
}
if (pid != 0) { /* Parent - execute the given command. */
close(sock);
snprintf(pidstrbuf, sizeof pidstrbuf, "%ld", (long)pid);
if (ac == 0) {
format = c_flag ? "setenv %s %s;\n" : "%s=%s; export %s;\n";
printf(format, SSH_AUTHSOCKET_ENV_NAME, socket_name,
SSH_AUTHSOCKET_ENV_NAME);
printf(format, SSH_AGENTPID_ENV_NAME, pidstrbuf,
SSH_AGENTPID_ENV_NAME);
printf("echo Agent pid %ld;\n", (long)pid);
exit(0);
}
if (setenv(SSH_AUTHSOCKET_ENV_NAME, socket_name, 1) == -1 ||
setenv(SSH_AGENTPID_ENV_NAME, pidstrbuf, 1) == -1) {
perror("setenv");
exit(1);
}
execvp(av[0], av);
perror(av[0]);
exit(1);
}
/* child */
log_init(__progname, SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO, SYSLOG_FACILITY_AUTH, 0);
if (setsid() == -1) {
error("setsid: %s", strerror(errno));
cleanup_exit(1);
}
(void)chdir("/");
if ((fd = open(_PATH_DEVNULL, O_RDWR, 0)) != -1) {
/* XXX might close listen socket */
(void)dup2(fd, STDIN_FILENO);
(void)dup2(fd, STDOUT_FILENO);
(void)dup2(fd, STDERR_FILENO);
if (fd > 2)
close(fd);
}
#ifdef HAVE_SETRLIMIT
/* deny core dumps, since memory contains unencrypted private keys */
rlim.rlim_cur = rlim.rlim_max = 0;
if (setrlimit(RLIMIT_CORE, &rlim) == -1) {
error("setrlimit RLIMIT_CORE: %s", strerror(errno));
cleanup_exit(1);
}
#endif
skip:
cleanup_pid = getpid();
#ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11
pkcs11_init(0);
#endif
new_socket(AUTH_SOCKET, sock);
if (ac > 0)
parent_alive_interval = 10;
idtab_init();
ssh_signal(SIGPIPE, SIG_IGN);
ssh_signal(SIGINT, (d_flag | D_flag) ? cleanup_handler : SIG_IGN);
ssh_signal(SIGHUP, cleanup_handler);
ssh_signal(SIGTERM, cleanup_handler);
if (pledge("stdio rpath cpath unix id proc exec", NULL) == -1)
fatal("%s: pledge: %s", __progname, strerror(errno));
platform_pledge_agent();
while (1) {
prepare_poll(&pfd, &npfd, &timeout, maxfds);
result = poll(pfd, npfd, timeout);
saved_errno = errno;
if (parent_alive_interval != 0)
check_parent_exists();
(void) reaper(); /* remove expired keys */
if (result == -1) {
if (saved_errno == EINTR)
continue;
fatal("poll: %s", strerror(saved_errno));
} else if (result > 0)
after_poll(pfd, npfd, maxfds);
}
/* NOTREACHED */
}
diff --git a/ssh-ecdsa-sk.c b/ssh-ecdsa-sk.c
index 981d60d740fe..c6927ecb27c8 100644
--- a/ssh-ecdsa-sk.c
+++ b/ssh-ecdsa-sk.c
@@ -1,209 +1,324 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: ssh-ecdsa-sk.c,v 1.5 2019/11/26 03:04:27 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: ssh-ecdsa-sk.c,v 1.8 2020/06/22 23:44:27 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
* Copyright (c) 2010 Damien Miller. All rights reserved.
* Copyright (c) 2019 Google Inc. All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
* OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
* IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
* INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
* NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
* DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
* THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
* (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
* THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
*/
/* #define DEBUG_SK 1 */
#include "includes.h"
#include <sys/types.h>
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
#include <openssl/bn.h>
#include <openssl/ec.h>
#include <openssl/ecdsa.h>
#include <openssl/evp.h>
#endif
#include <string.h>
#include <stdio.h> /* needed for DEBUG_SK only */
#include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h"
#include "sshbuf.h"
#include "ssherr.h"
#include "digest.h"
#define SSHKEY_INTERNAL
#include "sshkey.h"
+#ifndef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
+/* ARGSUSED */
+int
+ssh_ecdsa_sk_verify(const struct sshkey *key,
+ const u_char *signature, size_t signaturelen,
+ const u_char *data, size_t datalen, u_int compat,
+ struct sshkey_sig_details **detailsp)
+{
+ return SSH_ERR_FEATURE_UNSUPPORTED;
+}
+#else /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */
+
+/*
+ * Check FIDO/W3C webauthn signatures clientData field against the expected
+ * format and prepare a hash of it for use in signature verification.
+ *
+ * webauthn signatures do not sign the hash of the message directly, but
+ * instead sign a JSON-like "clientData" wrapper structure that contains the
+ * message hash along with a other information.
+ *
+ * Fortunately this structure has a fixed format so it is possible to verify
+ * that the hash of the signed message is present within the clientData
+ * structure without needing to implement any JSON parsing.
+ */
+static int
+webauthn_check_prepare_hash(const u_char *data, size_t datalen,
+ const char *origin, const struct sshbuf *wrapper,
+ uint8_t flags, const struct sshbuf *extensions,
+ u_char *msghash, size_t msghashlen)
+{
+ int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ struct sshbuf *chall = NULL, *m = NULL;
+
+ if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL ||
+ (chall = sshbuf_from(data, datalen)) == NULL) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ /*
+ * Ensure origin contains no quote character and that the flags are
+ * consistent with what we received
+ */
+ if (strchr(origin, '\"') != NULL ||
+ (flags & 0x40) != 0 /* AD */ ||
+ ((flags & 0x80) == 0 /* ED */) != (sshbuf_len(extensions) == 0)) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Prepare the preamble to clientData that we expect, poking the
+ * challenge and origin into their canonical positions in the
+ * structure. The crossOrigin flag and any additional extension
+ * fields present are ignored.
+ */
+#define WEBAUTHN_0 "{\"type\":\"webauthn.get\",\"challenge\":\""
+#define WEBAUTHN_1 "\",\"origin\":\""
+#define WEBAUTHN_2 "\""
+ if ((r = sshbuf_put(m, WEBAUTHN_0, sizeof(WEBAUTHN_0) - 1)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_dtourlb64(chall, m, 0)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put(m, WEBAUTHN_1, sizeof(WEBAUTHN_1) - 1)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put(m, origin, strlen(origin))) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put(m, WEBAUTHN_2, sizeof(WEBAUTHN_2) - 1)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+#ifdef DEBUG_SK
+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: received origin: %s\n", __func__, origin);
+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: received clientData:\n", __func__);
+ sshbuf_dump(wrapper, stderr);
+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: expected clientData premable:\n", __func__);
+ sshbuf_dump(m, stderr);
+#endif
+ /* Check that the supplied clientData has the preamble we expect */
+ if ((r = sshbuf_cmp(wrapper, 0, sshbuf_ptr(m), sshbuf_len(m))) != 0)
+ goto out;
+
+ /* Prepare hash of clientData */
+ if ((r = ssh_digest_buffer(SSH_DIGEST_SHA256, wrapper,
+ msghash, msghashlen)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+
+ /* success */
+ r = 0;
+ out:
+ sshbuf_free(chall);
+ sshbuf_free(m);
+ return r;
+}
+
/* ARGSUSED */
int
ssh_ecdsa_sk_verify(const struct sshkey *key,
const u_char *signature, size_t signaturelen,
const u_char *data, size_t datalen, u_int compat,
struct sshkey_sig_details **detailsp)
{
-#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
ECDSA_SIG *sig = NULL;
BIGNUM *sig_r = NULL, *sig_s = NULL;
u_char sig_flags;
u_char msghash[32], apphash[32], sighash[32];
u_int sig_counter;
- int ret = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ int is_webauthn = 0, ret = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
struct sshbuf *b = NULL, *sigbuf = NULL, *original_signed = NULL;
- char *ktype = NULL;
+ struct sshbuf *webauthn_wrapper = NULL, *webauthn_exts = NULL;
+ char *ktype = NULL, *webauthn_origin = NULL;
struct sshkey_sig_details *details = NULL;
#ifdef DEBUG_SK
char *tmp = NULL;
#endif
if (detailsp != NULL)
*detailsp = NULL;
if (key == NULL || key->ecdsa == NULL ||
sshkey_type_plain(key->type) != KEY_ECDSA_SK ||
signature == NULL || signaturelen == 0)
return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
if (key->ecdsa_nid != NID_X9_62_prime256v1)
return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
/* fetch signature */
if ((b = sshbuf_from(signature, signaturelen)) == NULL)
return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
- if (sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &ktype, NULL) != 0 ||
- sshbuf_froms(b, &sigbuf) != 0 ||
+ if ((details = calloc(1, sizeof(*details))) == NULL) {
+ ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if (sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &ktype, NULL) != 0) {
+ ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if (strcmp(ktype, "webauthn-sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256@openssh.com") == 0)
+ is_webauthn = 1;
+ else if (strcmp(ktype, "sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256@openssh.com") != 0) {
+ ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if (sshbuf_froms(b, &sigbuf) != 0 ||
sshbuf_get_u8(b, &sig_flags) != 0 ||
sshbuf_get_u32(b, &sig_counter) != 0) {
ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
goto out;
}
- if (strcmp(sshkey_ssh_name_plain(key), ktype) != 0) {
- ret = SSH_ERR_KEY_TYPE_MISMATCH;
- goto out;
+ if (is_webauthn) {
+ if (sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &webauthn_origin, NULL) != 0 ||
+ sshbuf_froms(b, &webauthn_wrapper) != 0 ||
+ sshbuf_froms(b, &webauthn_exts) != 0) {
+ ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
+ goto out;
+ }
}
if (sshbuf_len(b) != 0) {
ret = SSH_ERR_UNEXPECTED_TRAILING_DATA;
goto out;
}
/* parse signature */
if (sshbuf_get_bignum2(sigbuf, &sig_r) != 0 ||
sshbuf_get_bignum2(sigbuf, &sig_s) != 0) {
ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
goto out;
}
- if ((sig = ECDSA_SIG_new()) == NULL) {
- ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
- goto out;
- }
- if (!ECDSA_SIG_set0(sig, sig_r, sig_s)) {
- ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+ if (sshbuf_len(sigbuf) != 0) {
+ ret = SSH_ERR_UNEXPECTED_TRAILING_DATA;
goto out;
}
+
#ifdef DEBUG_SK
fprintf(stderr, "%s: data: (len %zu)\n", __func__, datalen);
/* sshbuf_dump_data(data, datalen, stderr); */
fprintf(stderr, "%s: sig_r: %s\n", __func__, (tmp = BN_bn2hex(sig_r)));
free(tmp);
fprintf(stderr, "%s: sig_s: %s\n", __func__, (tmp = BN_bn2hex(sig_s)));
free(tmp);
fprintf(stderr, "%s: sig_flags = 0x%02x, sig_counter = %u\n",
__func__, sig_flags, sig_counter);
+ if (is_webauthn) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: webauthn origin: %s\n", __func__,
+ webauthn_origin);
+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: webauthn_wrapper:\n", __func__);
+ sshbuf_dump(webauthn_wrapper, stderr);
+ }
#endif
- sig_r = sig_s = NULL; /* transferred */
-
- if (sshbuf_len(sigbuf) != 0) {
- ret = SSH_ERR_UNEXPECTED_TRAILING_DATA;
+ if ((sig = ECDSA_SIG_new()) == NULL) {
+ ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
goto out;
}
+ if (!ECDSA_SIG_set0(sig, sig_r, sig_s)) {
+ ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ sig_r = sig_s = NULL; /* transferred */
/* Reconstruct data that was supposedly signed */
if ((original_signed = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) {
ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
goto out;
}
- if ((ret = ssh_digest_memory(SSH_DIGEST_SHA256, data, datalen,
+ if (is_webauthn) {
+ if ((ret = webauthn_check_prepare_hash(data, datalen,
+ webauthn_origin, webauthn_wrapper, sig_flags, webauthn_exts,
+ msghash, sizeof(msghash))) != 0)
+ goto out;
+ } else if ((ret = ssh_digest_memory(SSH_DIGEST_SHA256, data, datalen,
msghash, sizeof(msghash))) != 0)
goto out;
/* Application value is hashed before signature */
if ((ret = ssh_digest_memory(SSH_DIGEST_SHA256, key->sk_application,
strlen(key->sk_application), apphash, sizeof(apphash))) != 0)
goto out;
#ifdef DEBUG_SK
fprintf(stderr, "%s: hashed application:\n", __func__);
sshbuf_dump_data(apphash, sizeof(apphash), stderr);
fprintf(stderr, "%s: hashed message:\n", __func__);
sshbuf_dump_data(msghash, sizeof(msghash), stderr);
#endif
if ((ret = sshbuf_put(original_signed,
apphash, sizeof(apphash))) != 0 ||
(ret = sshbuf_put_u8(original_signed, sig_flags)) != 0 ||
(ret = sshbuf_put_u32(original_signed, sig_counter)) != 0 ||
+ (ret = sshbuf_putb(original_signed, webauthn_exts)) != 0 ||
(ret = sshbuf_put(original_signed, msghash, sizeof(msghash))) != 0)
goto out;
/* Signature is over H(original_signed) */
if ((ret = ssh_digest_buffer(SSH_DIGEST_SHA256, original_signed,
sighash, sizeof(sighash))) != 0)
goto out;
- if ((details = calloc(1, sizeof(*details))) == NULL) {
- ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
- goto out;
- }
details->sk_counter = sig_counter;
details->sk_flags = sig_flags;
#ifdef DEBUG_SK
fprintf(stderr, "%s: signed buf:\n", __func__);
sshbuf_dump(original_signed, stderr);
fprintf(stderr, "%s: signed hash:\n", __func__);
sshbuf_dump_data(sighash, sizeof(sighash), stderr);
#endif
/* Verify it */
switch (ECDSA_do_verify(sighash, sizeof(sighash), sig, key->ecdsa)) {
case 1:
ret = 0;
break;
case 0:
ret = SSH_ERR_SIGNATURE_INVALID;
goto out;
default:
ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
goto out;
}
/* success */
if (detailsp != NULL) {
*detailsp = details;
details = NULL;
}
out:
explicit_bzero(&sig_flags, sizeof(sig_flags));
explicit_bzero(&sig_counter, sizeof(sig_counter));
explicit_bzero(msghash, sizeof(msghash));
explicit_bzero(sighash, sizeof(msghash));
explicit_bzero(apphash, sizeof(apphash));
sshkey_sig_details_free(details);
+ sshbuf_free(webauthn_wrapper);
+ sshbuf_free(webauthn_exts);
+ free(webauthn_origin);
sshbuf_free(original_signed);
sshbuf_free(sigbuf);
sshbuf_free(b);
ECDSA_SIG_free(sig);
BN_clear_free(sig_r);
BN_clear_free(sig_s);
free(ktype);
return ret;
-#else
- return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
-#endif
}
+
+#endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */
diff --git a/ssh-keygen.0 b/ssh-keygen.0
index c388cdf7a527..111eb9e08aa2 100644
--- a/ssh-keygen.0
+++ b/ssh-keygen.0
@@ -1,790 +1,809 @@
SSH-KEYGEN(1) General Commands Manual SSH-KEYGEN(1)
NAME
ssh-keygen M-bM-^@M-^S OpenSSH authentication key utility
SYNOPSIS
- ssh-keygen [-q] [-b bits] [-C comment] [-f output_keyfile] [-m format]
+ ssh-keygen [-q] [-a rounds] [-b bits] [-C comment] [-f output_keyfile]
+ [-m format] [-N new_passphrase] [-O option]
[-t dsa | ecdsa | ecdsa-sk | ed25519 | ed25519-sk | rsa]
- [-N new_passphrase] [-O option] [-w provider]
- ssh-keygen -p [-f keyfile] [-m format] [-N new_passphrase]
+ [-w provider]
+ ssh-keygen -p [-a rounds] [-f keyfile] [-m format] [-N new_passphrase]
[-P old_passphrase]
ssh-keygen -i [-f input_keyfile] [-m key_format]
ssh-keygen -e [-f input_keyfile] [-m key_format]
ssh-keygen -y [-f input_keyfile]
- ssh-keygen -c [-C comment] [-f keyfile] [-P passphrase]
+ ssh-keygen -c [-a rounds] [-C comment] [-f keyfile] [-P passphrase]
ssh-keygen -l [-v] [-E fingerprint_hash] [-f input_keyfile]
ssh-keygen -B [-f input_keyfile]
ssh-keygen -D pkcs11
ssh-keygen -F hostname [-lv] [-f known_hosts_file]
ssh-keygen -H [-f known_hosts_file]
- ssh-keygen -K [-w provider]
+ ssh-keygen -K [-a rounds] [-w provider]
ssh-keygen -R hostname [-f known_hosts_file]
ssh-keygen -r hostname [-g] [-f input_keyfile]
ssh-keygen -M generate [-O option] output_file
ssh-keygen -M screen [-f input_file] [-O option] output_file
ssh-keygen -I certificate_identity -s ca_key [-hU] [-D pkcs11_provider]
[-n principals] [-O option] [-V validity_interval]
[-z serial_number] file ...
ssh-keygen -L [-f input_keyfile]
- ssh-keygen -A [-f prefix_path]
+ ssh-keygen -A [-a rounds] [-f prefix_path]
ssh-keygen -k -f krl_file [-u] [-s ca_public] [-z version_number]
file ...
ssh-keygen -Q [-l] -f krl_file file ...
ssh-keygen -Y find-principals -s signature_file -f allowed_signers_file
ssh-keygen -Y check-novalidate -n namespace -s signature_file
ssh-keygen -Y sign -f key_file -n namespace file ...
ssh-keygen -Y verify -f allowed_signers_file -I signer_identity
-n namespace -s signature_file [-r revocation_file]
DESCRIPTION
ssh-keygen generates, manages and converts authentication keys for
ssh(1). ssh-keygen can create keys for use by SSH protocol version 2.
The type of key to be generated is specified with the -t option. If
invoked without any arguments, ssh-keygen will generate an RSA key.
ssh-keygen is also used to generate groups for use in Diffie-Hellman
group exchange (DH-GEX). See the MODULI GENERATION section for details.
Finally, ssh-keygen can be used to generate and update Key Revocation
Lists, and to test whether given keys have been revoked by one. See the
KEY REVOCATION LISTS section for details.
Normally each user wishing to use SSH with public key authentication runs
this once to create the authentication key in ~/.ssh/id_dsa,
~/.ssh/id_ecdsa, ~/.ssh/id_ecdsa_sk, ~/.ssh/id_ed25519,
~/.ssh/id_ed25519_sk or ~/.ssh/id_rsa. Additionally, the system
administrator may use this to generate host keys, as seen in /etc/rc.
Normally this program generates the key and asks for a file in which to
store the private key. The public key is stored in a file with the same
name but M-bM-^@M-^\.pubM-bM-^@M-^] appended. The program also asks for a passphrase. The
passphrase may be empty to indicate no passphrase (host keys must have an
empty passphrase), or it may be a string of arbitrary length. A
passphrase is similar to a password, except it can be a phrase with a
series of words, punctuation, numbers, whitespace, or any string of
characters you want. Good passphrases are 10-30 characters long, are not
simple sentences or otherwise easily guessable (English prose has only
1-2 bits of entropy per character, and provides very bad passphrases),
and contain a mix of upper and lowercase letters, numbers, and non-
alphanumeric characters. The passphrase can be changed later by using
the -p option.
There is no way to recover a lost passphrase. If the passphrase is lost
or forgotten, a new key must be generated and the corresponding public
key copied to other machines.
ssh-keygen will by default write keys in an OpenSSH-specific format.
This format is preferred as it offers better protection for keys at rest
as well as allowing storage of key comments within the private key file
itself. The key comment may be useful to help identify the key. The
comment is initialized to M-bM-^@M-^\user@hostM-bM-^@M-^] when the key is created, but can be
changed using the -c option.
It is still possible for ssh-keygen to write the previously-used PEM
format private keys using the -m flag. This may be used when generating
new keys, and existing new-format keys may be converted using this option
in conjunction with the -p (change passphrase) flag.
- After a key is generated, instructions below detail where the keys should
- be placed to be activated.
+ After a key is generated, ssh-keygen will ask where the keys should be
+ placed to be activated.
The options are as follows:
-A For each of the key types (rsa, dsa, ecdsa and ed25519) for which
host keys do not exist, generate the host keys with the default
key file path, an empty passphrase, default bits for the key
type, and default comment. If -f has also been specified, its
argument is used as a prefix to the default path for the
resulting host key files. This is used by /etc/rc to generate
new host keys.
-a rounds
When saving a private key, this option specifies the number of
KDF (key derivation function) rounds used. Higher numbers result
in slower passphrase verification and increased resistance to
- brute-force password cracking (should the keys be stolen).
+ brute-force password cracking (should the keys be stolen). The
+ default is 16 rounds.
-B Show the bubblebabble digest of specified private or public key
file.
-b bits
Specifies the number of bits in the key to create. For RSA keys,
the minimum size is 1024 bits and the default is 3072 bits.
Generally, 3072 bits is considered sufficient. DSA keys must be
exactly 1024 bits as specified by FIPS 186-2. For ECDSA keys,
the -b flag determines the key length by selecting from one of
three elliptic curve sizes: 256, 384 or 521 bits. Attempting to
use bit lengths other than these three values for ECDSA keys will
fail. ECDSA-SK, Ed25519 and Ed25519-SK keys have a fixed length
and the -b flag will be ignored.
-C comment
Provides a new comment.
-c Requests changing the comment in the private and public key
files. The program will prompt for the file containing the
private keys, for the passphrase if the key has one, and for the
new comment.
-D pkcs11
Download the public keys provided by the PKCS#11 shared library
pkcs11. When used in combination with -s, this option indicates
that a CA key resides in a PKCS#11 token (see the CERTIFICATES
section for details).
-E fingerprint_hash
Specifies the hash algorithm used when displaying key
fingerprints. Valid options are: M-bM-^@M-^\md5M-bM-^@M-^] and M-bM-^@M-^\sha256M-bM-^@M-^]. The
default is M-bM-^@M-^\sha256M-bM-^@M-^].
-e This option will read a private or public OpenSSH key file and
print to stdout a public key in one of the formats specified by
the -m option. The default export format is M-bM-^@M-^\RFC4716M-bM-^@M-^]. This
option allows exporting OpenSSH keys for use by other programs,
including several commercial SSH implementations.
-F hostname | [hostname]:port
Search for the specified hostname (with optional port number) in
a known_hosts file, listing any occurrences found. This option
is useful to find hashed host names or addresses and may also be
used in conjunction with the -H option to print found keys in a
hashed format.
-f filename
Specifies the filename of the key file.
-g Use generic DNS format when printing fingerprint resource records
using the -r command.
-H Hash a known_hosts file. This replaces all hostnames and
addresses with hashed representations within the specified file;
the original content is moved to a file with a .old suffix.
These hashes may be used normally by ssh and sshd, but they do
not reveal identifying information should the file's contents be
disclosed. This option will not modify existing hashed hostnames
and is therefore safe to use on files that mix hashed and non-
hashed names.
-h When signing a key, create a host certificate instead of a user
certificate. Please see the CERTIFICATES section for details.
-I certificate_identity
Specify the key identity when signing a public key. Please see
the CERTIFICATES section for details.
-i This option will read an unencrypted private (or public) key file
in the format specified by the -m option and print an OpenSSH
compatible private (or public) key to stdout. This option allows
importing keys from other software, including several commercial
SSH implementations. The default import format is M-bM-^@M-^\RFC4716M-bM-^@M-^].
-K Download resident keys from a FIDO authenticator. Public and
private key files will be written to the current directory for
- each downloaded key.
+ each downloaded key. If multiple FIDO authenticators are
+ attached, keys will be downloaded from the first touched
+ authenticator.
-k Generate a KRL file. In this mode, ssh-keygen will generate a
KRL file at the location specified via the -f flag that revokes
every key or certificate presented on the command line.
Keys/certificates to be revoked may be specified by public key
file or using the format described in the KEY REVOCATION LISTS
section.
-L Prints the contents of one or more certificates.
-l Show fingerprint of specified public key file. For RSA and DSA
keys ssh-keygen tries to find the matching public key file and
prints its fingerprint. If combined with -v, a visual ASCII art
representation of the key is supplied with the fingerprint.
-M generate
Generate candidate Diffie-Hellman Group Exchange (DH-GEX)
parameters for eventual use by the
M-bM-^@M-^Xdiffie-hellman-group-exchange-*M-bM-^@M-^Y key exchange methods. The
numbers generated by this operation must be further screened
before use. See the MODULI GENERATION section for more
information.
-M screen
Screen candidate parameters for Diffie-Hellman Group Exchange.
This will accept a list of candidate numbers and test that they
are safe (Sophie Germain) primes with acceptable group
generators. The results of this operation may be added to the
/etc/moduli file. See the MODULI GENERATION section for more
information.
-m key_format
Specify a key format for key generation, the -i (import), -e
(export) conversion options, and the -p change passphrase
operation. The latter may be used to convert between OpenSSH
private key and PEM private key formats. The supported key
formats are: M-bM-^@M-^\RFC4716M-bM-^@M-^] (RFC 4716/SSH2 public or private key),
M-bM-^@M-^\PKCS8M-bM-^@M-^] (PKCS8 public or private key) or M-bM-^@M-^\PEMM-bM-^@M-^] (PEM public key).
By default OpenSSH will write newly-generated private keys in its
own format, but when converting public keys for export the
default format is M-bM-^@M-^\RFC4716M-bM-^@M-^]. Setting a format of M-bM-^@M-^\PEMM-bM-^@M-^] when
generating or updating a supported private key type will cause
the key to be stored in the legacy PEM private key format.
-N new_passphrase
Provides the new passphrase.
-n principals
Specify one or more principals (user or host names) to be
included in a certificate when signing a key. Multiple
principals may be specified, separated by commas. Please see the
CERTIFICATES section for details.
-O option
Specify a key/value option. These are specific to the operation
that ssh-keygen has been requested to perform.
When signing certificates, one of the options listed in the
CERTIFICATES section may be specified here.
When performing moduli generation or screening, one of the
options listed in the MODULI GENERATION section may be specified.
When generating a key that will be hosted on a FIDO
authenticator, this flag may be used to specify key-specific
options. Those supported at present are:
application
Override the default FIDO application/origin string of
M-bM-^@M-^\ssh:M-bM-^@M-^]. This may be useful when generating host or
domain-specific resident keys. The specified application
string must begin with M-bM-^@M-^\ssh:M-bM-^@M-^].
challenge=path
Specifies a path to a challenge string that will be
passed to the FIDO token during key generation. The
challenge string may be used as part of an out-of-band
protocol for key enrollment (a random challenge is used
by default).
device Explicitly specify a fido(4) device to use, rather than
letting the token middleware select one.
no-touch-required
Indicate that the generated private key should not
require touch events (user presence) when making
signatures. Note that sshd(8) will refuse such
signatures by default, unless overridden via an
authorized_keys option.
resident
Indicate that the key should be stored on the FIDO
authenticator itself. Resident keys may be supported on
FIDO2 tokens and typically require that a PIN be set on
the token prior to generation. Resident keys may be
loaded off the token using ssh-add(1).
user A username to be associated with a resident key,
overriding the empty default username. Specifying a
username may be useful when generating multiple resident
keys for the same application name.
+ verify-required
+ Indicate that this private key should require user
+ verification for each signature. Not all FIDO tokens
+ support this option. Currently PIN authentication is the
+ only supported verification method, but other methods may
+ be supported in the future.
+
write-attestation=path
May be used at key generation time to record the
- attestation certificate returned from FIDO tokens during
- key generation. By default this information is
+ attestation data returned from FIDO tokens during key
+ generation. Please note that this information is
+ potentially sensitive. By default, this information is
discarded.
The -O option may be specified multiple times.
-P passphrase
Provides the (old) passphrase.
-p Requests changing the passphrase of a private key file instead of
creating a new private key. The program will prompt for the file
containing the private key, for the old passphrase, and twice for
the new passphrase.
-Q Test whether keys have been revoked in a KRL. If the -l option
is also specified then the contents of the KRL will be printed.
-q Silence ssh-keygen.
-R hostname | [hostname]:port
Removes all keys belonging to the specified hostname (with
optional port number) from a known_hosts file. This option is
useful to delete hashed hosts (see the -H option above).
-r hostname
Print the SSHFP fingerprint resource record named hostname for
the specified public key file.
-s ca_key
Certify (sign) a public key using the specified CA key. Please
see the CERTIFICATES section for details.
When generating a KRL, -s specifies a path to a CA public key
file used to revoke certificates directly by key ID or serial
number. See the KEY REVOCATION LISTS section for details.
-t dsa | ecdsa | ecdsa-sk | ed25519 | ed25519-sk | rsa
Specifies the type of key to create. The possible values are
M-bM-^@M-^\dsaM-bM-^@M-^], M-bM-^@M-^\ecdsaM-bM-^@M-^], M-bM-^@M-^\ecdsa-skM-bM-^@M-^], M-bM-^@M-^\ed25519M-bM-^@M-^], M-bM-^@M-^\ed25519-skM-bM-^@M-^], or M-bM-^@M-^\rsaM-bM-^@M-^].
This flag may also be used to specify the desired signature type
when signing certificates using an RSA CA key. The available RSA
signature variants are M-bM-^@M-^\ssh-rsaM-bM-^@M-^] (SHA1 signatures, not
recommended), M-bM-^@M-^\rsa-sha2-256M-bM-^@M-^], and M-bM-^@M-^\rsa-sha2-512M-bM-^@M-^] (the default).
-U When used in combination with -s, this option indicates that a CA
key resides in a ssh-agent(1). See the CERTIFICATES section for
more information.
-u Update a KRL. When specified with -k, keys listed via the
command line are added to the existing KRL rather than a new KRL
being created.
-V validity_interval
Specify a validity interval when signing a certificate. A
validity interval may consist of a single time, indicating that
the certificate is valid beginning now and expiring at that time,
or may consist of two times separated by a colon to indicate an
explicit time interval.
The start time may be specified as the string M-bM-^@M-^\alwaysM-bM-^@M-^] to
indicate the certificate has no specified start time, a date in
YYYYMMDD format, a time in YYYYMMDDHHMM[SS] format, a relative
time (to the current time) consisting of a minus sign followed by
an interval in the format described in the TIME FORMATS section
of sshd_config(5).
The end time may be specified as a YYYYMMDD date, a
YYYYMMDDHHMM[SS] time, a relative time starting with a plus
character or the string M-bM-^@M-^\foreverM-bM-^@M-^] to indicate that the
certificate has no expiry date.
For example: M-bM-^@M-^\+52w1dM-bM-^@M-^] (valid from now to 52 weeks and one day
from now), M-bM-^@M-^\-4w:+4wM-bM-^@M-^] (valid from four weeks ago to four weeks
from now), M-bM-^@M-^\20100101123000:20110101123000M-bM-^@M-^] (valid from 12:30 PM,
January 1st, 2010 to 12:30 PM, January 1st, 2011), M-bM-^@M-^\-1d:20110101M-bM-^@M-^]
(valid from yesterday to midnight, January 1st, 2011).
M-bM-^@M-^\-1m:foreverM-bM-^@M-^] (valid from one minute ago and never expiring).
-v Verbose mode. Causes ssh-keygen to print debugging messages
about its progress. This is helpful for debugging moduli
generation. Multiple -v options increase the verbosity. The
maximum is 3.
-w provider
Specifies a path to a library that will be used when creating
FIDO authenticator-hosted keys, overriding the default of using
the internal USB HID support.
-Y find-principals
Find the principal(s) associated with the public key of a
signature, provided using the -s flag in an authorized signers
file provided using the -f flag. The format of the allowed
signers file is documented in the ALLOWED SIGNERS section below.
If one or more matching principals are found, they are returned
on standard output.
-Y check-novalidate
Checks that a signature generated using ssh-keygen -Y sign has a
valid structure. This does not validate if a signature comes
from an authorized signer. When testing a signature, ssh-keygen
accepts a message on standard input and a signature namespace
using -n. A file containing the corresponding signature must
also be supplied using the -s flag. Successful testing of the
signature is signalled by ssh-keygen returning a zero exit
status.
-Y sign
Cryptographically sign a file or some data using a SSH key. When
signing, ssh-keygen accepts zero or more files to sign on the
command-line - if no files are specified then ssh-keygen will
sign data presented on standard input. Signatures are written to
the path of the input file with M-bM-^@M-^\.sigM-bM-^@M-^] appended, or to standard
output if the message to be signed was read from standard input.
The key used for signing is specified using the -f option and may
refer to either a private key, or a public key with the private
half available via ssh-agent(1). An additional signature
namespace, used to prevent signature confusion across different
domains of use (e.g. file signing vs email signing) must be
provided via the -n flag. Namespaces are arbitrary strings, and
may include: M-bM-^@M-^\fileM-bM-^@M-^] for file signing, M-bM-^@M-^\emailM-bM-^@M-^] for email signing.
For custom uses, it is recommended to use names following a
NAMESPACE@YOUR.DOMAIN pattern to generate unambiguous namespaces.
-Y verify
Request to verify a signature generated using ssh-keygen -Y sign
as described above. When verifying a signature, ssh-keygen
accepts a message on standard input and a signature namespace
using -n. A file containing the corresponding signature must
also be supplied using the -s flag, along with the identity of
the signer using -I and a list of allowed signers via the -f
flag. The format of the allowed signers file is documented in
the ALLOWED SIGNERS section below. A file containing revoked
keys can be passed using the -r flag. The revocation file may be
a KRL or a one-per-line list of public keys. Successful
verification by an authorized signer is signalled by ssh-keygen
returning a zero exit status.
-y This option will read a private OpenSSH format file and print an
OpenSSH public key to stdout.
-z serial_number
Specifies a serial number to be embedded in the certificate to
distinguish this certificate from others from the same CA. If
the serial_number is prefixed with a M-bM-^@M-^X+M-bM-^@M-^Y character, then the
serial number will be incremented for each certificate signed on
a single command-line. The default serial number is zero.
When generating a KRL, the -z flag is used to specify a KRL
version number.
MODULI GENERATION
ssh-keygen may be used to generate groups for the Diffie-Hellman Group
Exchange (DH-GEX) protocol. Generating these groups is a two-step
process: first, candidate primes are generated using a fast, but memory
intensive process. These candidate primes are then tested for
suitability (a CPU-intensive process).
Generation of primes is performed using the -M generate option. The
desired length of the primes may be specified by the -O bits option. For
example:
# ssh-keygen -M generate -O bits=2048 moduli-2048.candidates
By default, the search for primes begins at a random point in the desired
length range. This may be overridden using the -O start option, which
specifies a different start point (in hex).
Once a set of candidates have been generated, they must be screened for
suitability. This may be performed using the -M screen option. In this
mode ssh-keygen will read candidates from standard input (or a file
specified using the -f option). For example:
# ssh-keygen -M screen -f moduli-2048.candidates moduli-2048
By default, each candidate will be subjected to 100 primality tests.
This may be overridden using the -O prime-tests option. The DH generator
value will be chosen automatically for the prime under consideration. If
a specific generator is desired, it may be requested using the -O
generator option. Valid generator values are 2, 3, and 5.
Screened DH groups may be installed in /etc/moduli. It is important that
this file contains moduli of a range of bit lengths and that both ends of
a connection share common moduli.
A number of options are available for moduli generation and screening via
the -O flag:
lines=number
Exit after screening the specified number of lines while
performing DH candidate screening.
start-line=line-number
Start screening at the specified line number while performing DH
candidate screening.
checkpoint=filename
Write the last line processed to the specified file while
performing DH candidate screening. This will be used to skip
lines in the input file that have already been processed if the
job is restarted.
memory=mbytes
Specify the amount of memory to use (in megabytes) when
generating candidate moduli for DH-GEX.
start=hex-value
Specify start point (in hex) when generating candidate moduli for
DH-GEX.
generator=value
Specify desired generator (in decimal) when testing candidate
moduli for DH-GEX.
CERTIFICATES
ssh-keygen supports signing of keys to produce certificates that may be
used for user or host authentication. Certificates consist of a public
key, some identity information, zero or more principal (user or host)
names and a set of options that are signed by a Certification Authority
(CA) key. Clients or servers may then trust only the CA key and verify
its signature on a certificate rather than trusting many user/host keys.
Note that OpenSSH certificates are a different, and much simpler, format
to the X.509 certificates used in ssl(8).
ssh-keygen supports two types of certificates: user and host. User
certificates authenticate users to servers, whereas host certificates
authenticate server hosts to users. To generate a user certificate:
$ ssh-keygen -s /path/to/ca_key -I key_id /path/to/user_key.pub
The resultant certificate will be placed in /path/to/user_key-cert.pub.
A host certificate requires the -h option:
$ ssh-keygen -s /path/to/ca_key -I key_id -h /path/to/host_key.pub
The host certificate will be output to /path/to/host_key-cert.pub.
It is possible to sign using a CA key stored in a PKCS#11 token by
providing the token library using -D and identifying the CA key by
providing its public half as an argument to -s:
$ ssh-keygen -s ca_key.pub -D libpkcs11.so -I key_id user_key.pub
Similarly, it is possible for the CA key to be hosted in a ssh-agent(1).
This is indicated by the -U flag and, again, the CA key must be
identified by its public half.
$ ssh-keygen -Us ca_key.pub -I key_id user_key.pub
In all cases, key_id is a "key identifier" that is logged by the server
when the certificate is used for authentication.
Certificates may be limited to be valid for a set of principal
(user/host) names. By default, generated certificates are valid for all
users or hosts. To generate a certificate for a specified set of
principals:
$ ssh-keygen -s ca_key -I key_id -n user1,user2 user_key.pub
$ ssh-keygen -s ca_key -I key_id -h -n host.domain host_key.pub
Additional limitations on the validity and use of user certificates may
be specified through certificate options. A certificate option may
disable features of the SSH session, may be valid only when presented
from particular source addresses or may force the use of a specific
command.
The options that are valid for user certificates are:
clear Clear all enabled permissions. This is useful for clearing the
default set of permissions so permissions may be added
individually.
critical:name[=contents]
extension:name[=contents]
Includes an arbitrary certificate critical option or extension.
The specified name should include a domain suffix, e.g.
M-bM-^@M-^\name@example.comM-bM-^@M-^]. If contents is specified then it is included
as the contents of the extension/option encoded as a string,
otherwise the extension/option is created with no contents
(usually indicating a flag). Extensions may be ignored by a
client or server that does not recognise them, whereas unknown
critical options will cause the certificate to be refused.
force-command=command
Forces the execution of command instead of any shell or command
specified by the user when the certificate is used for
authentication.
no-agent-forwarding
Disable ssh-agent(1) forwarding (permitted by default).
no-port-forwarding
Disable port forwarding (permitted by default).
no-pty Disable PTY allocation (permitted by default).
no-user-rc
Disable execution of ~/.ssh/rc by sshd(8) (permitted by default).
no-x11-forwarding
Disable X11 forwarding (permitted by default).
permit-agent-forwarding
Allows ssh-agent(1) forwarding.
permit-port-forwarding
Allows port forwarding.
permit-pty
Allows PTY allocation.
permit-user-rc
Allows execution of ~/.ssh/rc by sshd(8).
permit-X11-forwarding
Allows X11 forwarding.
no-touch-required
- Do not require signatures made using this key require
+ Do not require signatures made using this key include
demonstration of user presence (e.g. by having the user touch the
authenticator). This option only makes sense for the FIDO
authenticator algorithms ecdsa-sk and ed25519-sk.
source-address=address_list
Restrict the source addresses from which the certificate is
considered valid. The address_list is a comma-separated list of
one or more address/netmask pairs in CIDR format.
+ verify-required
+ Require signatures made using this key indicate that the user was
+ first verified. This option only makes sense for the FIDO
+ authenticator algorithms ecdsa-sk and ed25519-sk. Currently PIN
+ authentication is the only supported verification method, but
+ other methods may be supported in the future.
+
At present, no standard options are valid for host keys.
Finally, certificates may be defined with a validity lifetime. The -V
option allows specification of certificate start and end times. A
certificate that is presented at a time outside this range will not be
considered valid. By default, certificates are valid from UNIX Epoch to
the distant future.
For certificates to be used for user or host authentication, the CA
public key must be trusted by sshd(8) or ssh(1). Please refer to those
manual pages for details.
KEY REVOCATION LISTS
ssh-keygen is able to manage OpenSSH format Key Revocation Lists (KRLs).
These binary files specify keys or certificates to be revoked using a
compact format, taking as little as one bit per certificate if they are
being revoked by serial number.
KRLs may be generated using the -k flag. This option reads one or more
files from the command line and generates a new KRL. The files may
either contain a KRL specification (see below) or public keys, listed one
per line. Plain public keys are revoked by listing their hash or
contents in the KRL and certificates revoked by serial number or key ID
(if the serial is zero or not available).
Revoking keys using a KRL specification offers explicit control over the
types of record used to revoke keys and may be used to directly revoke
certificates by serial number or key ID without having the complete
original certificate on hand. A KRL specification consists of lines
containing one of the following directives followed by a colon and some
directive-specific information.
serial: serial_number[-serial_number]
Revokes a certificate with the specified serial number. Serial
numbers are 64-bit values, not including zero and may be
expressed in decimal, hex or octal. If two serial numbers are
specified separated by a hyphen, then the range of serial numbers
including and between each is revoked. The CA key must have been
specified on the ssh-keygen command line using the -s option.
id: key_id
Revokes a certificate with the specified key ID string. The CA
key must have been specified on the ssh-keygen command line using
the -s option.
key: public_key
Revokes the specified key. If a certificate is listed, then it
is revoked as a plain public key.
sha1: public_key
Revokes the specified key by including its SHA1 hash in the KRL.
sha256: public_key
Revokes the specified key by including its SHA256 hash in the
KRL. KRLs that revoke keys by SHA256 hash are not supported by
OpenSSH versions prior to 7.9.
hash: fingerprint
Revokes a key using a fingerprint hash, as obtained from a
sshd(8) authentication log message or the ssh-keygen -l flag.
Only SHA256 fingerprints are supported here and resultant KRLs
are not supported by OpenSSH versions prior to 7.9.
KRLs may be updated using the -u flag in addition to -k. When this
option is specified, keys listed via the command line are merged into the
KRL, adding to those already there.
It is also possible, given a KRL, to test whether it revokes a particular
key (or keys). The -Q flag will query an existing KRL, testing each key
specified on the command line. If any key listed on the command line has
been revoked (or an error encountered) then ssh-keygen will exit with a
non-zero exit status. A zero exit status will only be returned if no key
was revoked.
ALLOWED SIGNERS
When verifying signatures, ssh-keygen uses a simple list of identities
and keys to determine whether a signature comes from an authorized
source. This "allowed signers" file uses a format patterned after the
AUTHORIZED_KEYS FILE FORMAT described in sshd(8). Each line of the file
contains the following space-separated fields: principals, options,
keytype, base64-encoded key. Empty lines and lines starting with a M-bM-^@M-^X#M-bM-^@M-^Y
are ignored as comments.
The principals field is a pattern-list (See PATTERNS in ssh_config(5))
consisting of one or more comma-separated USER@DOMAIN identity patterns
that are accepted for signing. When verifying, the identity presented
via the -I option must match a principals pattern in order for the
corresponding key to be considered acceptable for verification.
The options (if present) consist of comma-separated option
specifications. No spaces are permitted, except within double quotes.
The following option specifications are supported (note that option
keywords are case-insensitive):
cert-authority
Indicates that this key is accepted as a certificate authority
(CA) and that certificates signed by this CA may be accepted for
verification.
namespaces="namespace-list"
Specifies a pattern-list of namespaces that are accepted for this
key. If this option is present, the signature namespace embedded
in the signature object and presented on the verification
command-line must match the specified list before the key will be
considered acceptable.
When verifying signatures made by certificates, the expected principal
name must match both the principals pattern in the allowed signers file
and the principals embedded in the certificate itself.
An example allowed signers file:
# Comments allowed at start of line
user1@example.com,user2@example.com ssh-rsa AAAAX1...
# A certificate authority, trusted for all principals in a domain.
*@example.com cert-authority ssh-ed25519 AAAB4...
# A key that is accepted only for file signing.
user2@example.com namespaces="file" ssh-ed25519 AAA41...
ENVIRONMENT
SSH_SK_PROVIDER
Specifies a path to a library that will be used when loading any
FIDO authenticator-hosted keys, overriding the default of using
the built-in USB HID support.
FILES
~/.ssh/id_dsa
~/.ssh/id_ecdsa
~/.ssh/id_ecdsa_sk
~/.ssh/id_ed25519
~/.ssh/id_ed25519_sk
~/.ssh/id_rsa
Contains the DSA, ECDSA, authenticator-hosted ECDSA, Ed25519,
authenticator-hosted Ed25519 or RSA authentication identity of
the user. This file should not be readable by anyone but the
user. It is possible to specify a passphrase when generating the
key; that passphrase will be used to encrypt the private part of
this file using 128-bit AES. This file is not automatically
accessed by ssh-keygen but it is offered as the default file for
the private key. ssh(1) will read this file when a login attempt
is made.
~/.ssh/id_dsa.pub
~/.ssh/id_ecdsa.pub
~/.ssh/id_ecdsa_sk.pub
~/.ssh/id_ed25519.pub
~/.ssh/id_ed25519_sk.pub
~/.ssh/id_rsa.pub
Contains the DSA, ECDSA, authenticator-hosted ECDSA, Ed25519,
authenticator-hosted Ed25519 or RSA public key for
authentication. The contents of this file should be added to
~/.ssh/authorized_keys on all machines where the user wishes to
log in using public key authentication. There is no need to keep
the contents of this file secret.
/etc/moduli
Contains Diffie-Hellman groups used for DH-GEX. The file format
is described in moduli(5).
SEE ALSO
ssh(1), ssh-add(1), ssh-agent(1), moduli(5), sshd(8)
The Secure Shell (SSH) Public Key File Format, RFC 4716, 2006.
AUTHORS
OpenSSH is a derivative of the original and free ssh 1.2.12 release by
Tatu Ylonen. Aaron Campbell, Bob Beck, Markus Friedl, Niels Provos, Theo
de Raadt and Dug Song removed many bugs, re-added newer features and
created OpenSSH. Markus Friedl contributed the support for SSH protocol
versions 1.5 and 2.0.
-OpenBSD 6.7 April 3, 2020 OpenBSD 6.7
+OpenBSD 6.8 September 9, 2020 OpenBSD 6.8
diff --git a/ssh-keygen.1 b/ssh-keygen.1
index 059c1b0341e8..3ae596caac82 100644
--- a/ssh-keygen.1
+++ b/ssh-keygen.1
@@ -1,1185 +1,1212 @@
-.\" $OpenBSD: ssh-keygen.1,v 1.203 2020/04/03 02:26:56 djm Exp $
+.\" $OpenBSD: ssh-keygen.1,v 1.209 2020/09/09 03:08:01 djm Exp $
.\"
.\" Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
.\" Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
.\" All rights reserved
.\"
.\" As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
.\" can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this
.\" software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
.\" incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
.\" called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
.\"
.\"
.\" Copyright (c) 1999,2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
.\" Copyright (c) 1999 Aaron Campbell. All rights reserved.
.\" Copyright (c) 1999 Theo de Raadt. All rights reserved.
.\"
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.\" modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
.\" are met:
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.\" notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
.\" documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
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-.Dd $Mdocdate: April 3 2020 $
+.Dd $Mdocdate: September 9 2020 $
.Dt SSH-KEYGEN 1
.Os
.Sh NAME
.Nm ssh-keygen
.Nd OpenSSH authentication key utility
.Sh SYNOPSIS
.Nm ssh-keygen
.Op Fl q
+.Op Fl a Ar rounds
.Op Fl b Ar bits
.Op Fl C Ar comment
.Op Fl f Ar output_keyfile
.Op Fl m Ar format
-.Op Fl t Cm dsa | ecdsa | ecdsa-sk | ed25519 | ed25519-sk | rsa
.Op Fl N Ar new_passphrase
.Op Fl O Ar option
+.Op Fl t Cm dsa | ecdsa | ecdsa-sk | ed25519 | ed25519-sk | rsa
.Op Fl w Ar provider
.Nm ssh-keygen
.Fl p
+.Op Fl a Ar rounds
.Op Fl f Ar keyfile
.Op Fl m Ar format
.Op Fl N Ar new_passphrase
.Op Fl P Ar old_passphrase
.Nm ssh-keygen
.Fl i
.Op Fl f Ar input_keyfile
.Op Fl m Ar key_format
.Nm ssh-keygen
.Fl e
.Op Fl f Ar input_keyfile
.Op Fl m Ar key_format
.Nm ssh-keygen
.Fl y
.Op Fl f Ar input_keyfile
.Nm ssh-keygen
.Fl c
+.Op Fl a Ar rounds
.Op Fl C Ar comment
.Op Fl f Ar keyfile
.Op Fl P Ar passphrase
.Nm ssh-keygen
.Fl l
.Op Fl v
.Op Fl E Ar fingerprint_hash
.Op Fl f Ar input_keyfile
.Nm ssh-keygen
.Fl B
.Op Fl f Ar input_keyfile
.Nm ssh-keygen
.Fl D Ar pkcs11
.Nm ssh-keygen
.Fl F Ar hostname
.Op Fl lv
.Op Fl f Ar known_hosts_file
.Nm ssh-keygen
.Fl H
.Op Fl f Ar known_hosts_file
.Nm ssh-keygen
.Fl K
+.Op Fl a Ar rounds
.Op Fl w Ar provider
.Nm ssh-keygen
.Fl R Ar hostname
.Op Fl f Ar known_hosts_file
.Nm ssh-keygen
.Fl r Ar hostname
.Op Fl g
.Op Fl f Ar input_keyfile
.Nm ssh-keygen
.Fl M Cm generate
.Op Fl O Ar option
.Ar output_file
.Nm ssh-keygen
.Fl M Cm screen
.Op Fl f Ar input_file
.Op Fl O Ar option
.Ar output_file
.Nm ssh-keygen
.Fl I Ar certificate_identity
.Fl s Ar ca_key
.Op Fl hU
.Op Fl D Ar pkcs11_provider
.Op Fl n Ar principals
.Op Fl O Ar option
.Op Fl V Ar validity_interval
.Op Fl z Ar serial_number
.Ar
.Nm ssh-keygen
.Fl L
.Op Fl f Ar input_keyfile
.Nm ssh-keygen
.Fl A
+.Op Fl a Ar rounds
.Op Fl f Ar prefix_path
.Nm ssh-keygen
.Fl k
.Fl f Ar krl_file
.Op Fl u
.Op Fl s Ar ca_public
.Op Fl z Ar version_number
.Ar
.Nm ssh-keygen
.Fl Q
.Op Fl l
.Fl f Ar krl_file
.Ar
.Nm ssh-keygen
.Fl Y Cm find-principals
.Fl s Ar signature_file
.Fl f Ar allowed_signers_file
.Nm ssh-keygen
.Fl Y Cm check-novalidate
.Fl n Ar namespace
.Fl s Ar signature_file
.Nm ssh-keygen
.Fl Y Cm sign
.Fl f Ar key_file
.Fl n Ar namespace
.Ar
.Nm ssh-keygen
.Fl Y Cm verify
.Fl f Ar allowed_signers_file
.Fl I Ar signer_identity
.Fl n Ar namespace
.Fl s Ar signature_file
.Op Fl r Ar revocation_file
.Sh DESCRIPTION
.Nm
generates, manages and converts authentication keys for
.Xr ssh 1 .
.Nm
can create keys for use by SSH protocol version 2.
.Pp
The type of key to be generated is specified with the
.Fl t
option.
If invoked without any arguments,
.Nm
will generate an RSA key.
.Pp
.Nm
is also used to generate groups for use in Diffie-Hellman group
exchange (DH-GEX).
See the
.Sx MODULI GENERATION
section for details.
.Pp
Finally,
.Nm
can be used to generate and update Key Revocation Lists, and to test whether
given keys have been revoked by one.
See the
.Sx KEY REVOCATION LISTS
section for details.
.Pp
Normally each user wishing to use SSH
with public key authentication runs this once to create the authentication
key in
.Pa ~/.ssh/id_dsa ,
.Pa ~/.ssh/id_ecdsa ,
.Pa ~/.ssh/id_ecdsa_sk ,
.Pa ~/.ssh/id_ed25519 ,
.Pa ~/.ssh/id_ed25519_sk
or
.Pa ~/.ssh/id_rsa .
Additionally, the system administrator may use this to generate host keys,
as seen in
.Pa /etc/rc .
.Pp
Normally this program generates the key and asks for a file in which
to store the private key.
The public key is stored in a file with the same name but
.Dq .pub
appended.
The program also asks for a passphrase.
The passphrase may be empty to indicate no passphrase
(host keys must have an empty passphrase), or it may be a string of
arbitrary length.
A passphrase is similar to a password, except it can be a phrase with a
series of words, punctuation, numbers, whitespace, or any string of
characters you want.
Good passphrases are 10-30 characters long, are
not simple sentences or otherwise easily guessable (English
prose has only 1-2 bits of entropy per character, and provides very bad
passphrases), and contain a mix of upper and lowercase letters,
numbers, and non-alphanumeric characters.
The passphrase can be changed later by using the
.Fl p
option.
.Pp
There is no way to recover a lost passphrase.
If the passphrase is lost or forgotten, a new key must be generated
and the corresponding public key copied to other machines.
.Pp
.Nm
will by default write keys in an OpenSSH-specific format.
This format is preferred as it offers better protection for
keys at rest as well as allowing storage of key comments within
the private key file itself.
The key comment may be useful to help identify the key.
The comment is initialized to
.Dq user@host
when the key is created, but can be changed using the
.Fl c
option.
.Pp
It is still possible for
.Nm
to write the previously-used PEM format private keys using the
.Fl m
flag.
This may be used when generating new keys, and existing new-format
keys may be converted using this option in conjunction with the
.Fl p
(change passphrase) flag.
.Pp
-After a key is generated, instructions below detail where the keys
+After a key is generated,
+.Nm
+will ask where the keys
should be placed to be activated.
.Pp
The options are as follows:
.Bl -tag -width Ds
.It Fl A
For each of the key types (rsa, dsa, ecdsa and ed25519)
for which host keys
do not exist, generate the host keys with the default key file path,
an empty passphrase, default bits for the key type, and default comment.
If
.Fl f
has also been specified, its argument is used as a prefix to the
default path for the resulting host key files.
This is used by
.Pa /etc/rc
to generate new host keys.
.It Fl a Ar rounds
When saving a private key, this option specifies the number of KDF
(key derivation function) rounds used.
Higher numbers result in slower passphrase verification and increased
resistance to brute-force password cracking (should the keys be stolen).
+The default is 16 rounds.
.It Fl B
Show the bubblebabble digest of specified private or public key file.
.It Fl b Ar bits
Specifies the number of bits in the key to create.
For RSA keys, the minimum size is 1024 bits and the default is 3072 bits.
Generally, 3072 bits is considered sufficient.
DSA keys must be exactly 1024 bits as specified by FIPS 186-2.
For ECDSA keys, the
.Fl b
flag determines the key length by selecting from one of three elliptic
curve sizes: 256, 384 or 521 bits.
Attempting to use bit lengths other than these three values for ECDSA keys
will fail.
ECDSA-SK, Ed25519 and Ed25519-SK keys have a fixed length and the
.Fl b
flag will be ignored.
.It Fl C Ar comment
Provides a new comment.
.It Fl c
Requests changing the comment in the private and public key files.
The program will prompt for the file containing the private keys, for
the passphrase if the key has one, and for the new comment.
.It Fl D Ar pkcs11
Download the public keys provided by the PKCS#11 shared library
.Ar pkcs11 .
When used in combination with
.Fl s ,
this option indicates that a CA key resides in a PKCS#11 token (see the
.Sx CERTIFICATES
section for details).
.It Fl E Ar fingerprint_hash
Specifies the hash algorithm used when displaying key fingerprints.
Valid options are:
.Dq md5
and
.Dq sha256 .
The default is
.Dq sha256 .
.It Fl e
This option will read a private or public OpenSSH key file and
print to stdout a public key in one of the formats specified by the
.Fl m
option.
The default export format is
.Dq RFC4716 .
This option allows exporting OpenSSH keys for use by other programs, including
several commercial SSH implementations.
.It Fl F Ar hostname | [hostname]:port
Search for the specified
.Ar hostname
(with optional port number)
in a
.Pa known_hosts
file, listing any occurrences found.
This option is useful to find hashed host names or addresses and may also be
used in conjunction with the
.Fl H
option to print found keys in a hashed format.
.It Fl f Ar filename
Specifies the filename of the key file.
.It Fl g
Use generic DNS format when printing fingerprint resource records using the
.Fl r
command.
.It Fl H
Hash a
.Pa known_hosts
file.
This replaces all hostnames and addresses with hashed representations
within the specified file; the original content is moved to a file with
a .old suffix.
These hashes may be used normally by
.Nm ssh
and
.Nm sshd ,
but they do not reveal identifying information should the file's contents
be disclosed.
This option will not modify existing hashed hostnames and is therefore safe
to use on files that mix hashed and non-hashed names.
.It Fl h
When signing a key, create a host certificate instead of a user
certificate.
Please see the
.Sx CERTIFICATES
section for details.
.It Fl I Ar certificate_identity
Specify the key identity when signing a public key.
Please see the
.Sx CERTIFICATES
section for details.
.It Fl i
This option will read an unencrypted private (or public) key file
in the format specified by the
.Fl m
option and print an OpenSSH compatible private
(or public) key to stdout.
This option allows importing keys from other software, including several
commercial SSH implementations.
The default import format is
.Dq RFC4716 .
.It Fl K
Download resident keys from a FIDO authenticator.
Public and private key files will be written to the current directory for
each downloaded key.
+If multiple FIDO authenticators are attached, keys will be downloaded from
+the first touched authenticator.
.It Fl k
Generate a KRL file.
In this mode,
.Nm
will generate a KRL file at the location specified via the
.Fl f
flag that revokes every key or certificate presented on the command line.
Keys/certificates to be revoked may be specified by public key file or
using the format described in the
.Sx KEY REVOCATION LISTS
section.
.It Fl L
Prints the contents of one or more certificates.
.It Fl l
Show fingerprint of specified public key file.
For RSA and DSA keys
.Nm
tries to find the matching public key file and prints its fingerprint.
If combined with
.Fl v ,
a visual ASCII art representation of the key is supplied with the
fingerprint.
.It Fl M Cm generate
Generate candidate Diffie-Hellman Group Exchange (DH-GEX) parameters for
eventual use by the
.Sq diffie-hellman-group-exchange-*
key exchange methods.
The numbers generated by this operation must be further screened before
use.
See the
.Sx MODULI GENERATION
section for more information.
.It Fl M Cm screen
Screen candidate parameters for Diffie-Hellman Group Exchange.
This will accept a list of candidate numbers and test that they are
safe (Sophie Germain) primes with acceptable group generators.
The results of this operation may be added to the
.Pa /etc/moduli
file.
See the
.Sx MODULI GENERATION
section for more information.
.It Fl m Ar key_format
Specify a key format for key generation, the
.Fl i
(import),
.Fl e
(export) conversion options, and the
.Fl p
change passphrase operation.
The latter may be used to convert between OpenSSH private key and PEM
private key formats.
The supported key formats are:
.Dq RFC4716
(RFC 4716/SSH2 public or private key),
.Dq PKCS8
(PKCS8 public or private key)
or
.Dq PEM
(PEM public key).
By default OpenSSH will write newly-generated private keys in its own
format, but when converting public keys for export the default format is
.Dq RFC4716 .
Setting a format of
.Dq PEM
when generating or updating a supported private key type will cause the
key to be stored in the legacy PEM private key format.
.It Fl N Ar new_passphrase
Provides the new passphrase.
.It Fl n Ar principals
Specify one or more principals (user or host names) to be included in
a certificate when signing a key.
Multiple principals may be specified, separated by commas.
Please see the
.Sx CERTIFICATES
section for details.
.It Fl O Ar option
Specify a key/value option.
These are specific to the operation that
.Nm
has been requested to perform.
.Pp
When signing certificates, one of the options listed in the
.Sx CERTIFICATES
section may be specified here.
.Pp
When performing moduli generation or screening, one of the options
listed in the
.Sx MODULI GENERATION
section may be specified.
.Pp
When generating a key that will be hosted on a FIDO authenticator,
this flag may be used to specify key-specific options.
Those supported at present are:
.Bl -tag -width Ds
.It Cm application
Override the default FIDO application/origin string of
.Dq ssh: .
This may be useful when generating host or domain-specific resident keys.
The specified application string must begin with
.Dq ssh: .
.It Cm challenge Ns = Ns Ar path
Specifies a path to a challenge string that will be passed to the
FIDO token during key generation.
The challenge string may be used as part of an out-of-band
protocol for key enrollment
(a random challenge is used by default).
.It Cm device
Explicitly specify a
.Xr fido 4
device to use, rather than letting the token middleware select one.
.It Cm no-touch-required
Indicate that the generated private key should not require touch
events (user presence) when making signatures.
Note that
.Xr sshd 8
will refuse such signatures by default, unless overridden via
an authorized_keys option.
.It Cm resident
Indicate that the key should be stored on the FIDO authenticator itself.
Resident keys may be supported on FIDO2 tokens and typically require that
a PIN be set on the token prior to generation.
Resident keys may be loaded off the token using
.Xr ssh-add 1 .
.It Cm user
A username to be associated with a resident key,
overriding the empty default username.
Specifying a username may be useful when generating multiple resident keys
for the same application name.
+.It Cm verify-required
+Indicate that this private key should require user verification for
+each signature.
+Not all FIDO tokens support this option.
+Currently PIN authentication is the only supported verification method,
+but other methods may be supported in the future.
.It Cm write-attestation Ns = Ns Ar path
-May be used at key generation time to record the attestation certificate
+May be used at key generation time to record the attestation data
returned from FIDO tokens during key generation.
-By default this information is discarded.
+Please note that this information is potentially sensitive.
+By default, this information is discarded.
.El
.Pp
The
.Fl O
option may be specified multiple times.
.It Fl P Ar passphrase
Provides the (old) passphrase.
.It Fl p
Requests changing the passphrase of a private key file instead of
creating a new private key.
The program will prompt for the file
containing the private key, for the old passphrase, and twice for the
new passphrase.
.It Fl Q
Test whether keys have been revoked in a KRL.
If the
.Fl l
option is also specified then the contents of the KRL will be printed.
.It Fl q
Silence
.Nm ssh-keygen .
.It Fl R Ar hostname | [hostname]:port
Removes all keys belonging to the specified
.Ar hostname
(with optional port number)
from a
.Pa known_hosts
file.
This option is useful to delete hashed hosts (see the
.Fl H
option above).
.It Fl r Ar hostname
Print the SSHFP fingerprint resource record named
.Ar hostname
for the specified public key file.
.It Fl s Ar ca_key
Certify (sign) a public key using the specified CA key.
Please see the
.Sx CERTIFICATES
section for details.
.Pp
When generating a KRL,
.Fl s
specifies a path to a CA public key file used to revoke certificates directly
by key ID or serial number.
See the
.Sx KEY REVOCATION LISTS
section for details.
.It Fl t Cm dsa | ecdsa | ecdsa-sk | ed25519 | ed25519-sk | rsa
Specifies the type of key to create.
The possible values are
.Dq dsa ,
.Dq ecdsa ,
.Dq ecdsa-sk ,
.Dq ed25519 ,
.Dq ed25519-sk ,
or
.Dq rsa .
.Pp
This flag may also be used to specify the desired signature type when
signing certificates using an RSA CA key.
The available RSA signature variants are
.Dq ssh-rsa
(SHA1 signatures, not recommended),
.Dq rsa-sha2-256 ,
and
.Dq rsa-sha2-512
(the default).
.It Fl U
When used in combination with
.Fl s ,
this option indicates that a CA key resides in a
.Xr ssh-agent 1 .
See the
.Sx CERTIFICATES
section for more information.
.It Fl u
Update a KRL.
When specified with
.Fl k ,
keys listed via the command line are added to the existing KRL rather than
a new KRL being created.
.It Fl V Ar validity_interval
Specify a validity interval when signing a certificate.
A validity interval may consist of a single time, indicating that the
certificate is valid beginning now and expiring at that time, or may consist
of two times separated by a colon to indicate an explicit time interval.
.Pp
The start time may be specified as the string
.Dq always
to indicate the certificate has no specified start time,
a date in YYYYMMDD format, a time in YYYYMMDDHHMM[SS] format,
a relative time (to the current time) consisting of a minus sign followed by
an interval in the format described in the
TIME FORMATS section of
.Xr sshd_config 5 .
.Pp
The end time may be specified as a YYYYMMDD date, a YYYYMMDDHHMM[SS] time,
a relative time starting with a plus character or the string
.Dq forever
to indicate that the certificate has no expiry date.
.Pp
For example:
.Dq +52w1d
(valid from now to 52 weeks and one day from now),
.Dq -4w:+4w
(valid from four weeks ago to four weeks from now),
.Dq 20100101123000:20110101123000
(valid from 12:30 PM, January 1st, 2010 to 12:30 PM, January 1st, 2011),
.Dq -1d:20110101
(valid from yesterday to midnight, January 1st, 2011).
.Dq -1m:forever
(valid from one minute ago and never expiring).
.It Fl v
Verbose mode.
Causes
.Nm
to print debugging messages about its progress.
This is helpful for debugging moduli generation.
Multiple
.Fl v
options increase the verbosity.
The maximum is 3.
.It Fl w Ar provider
Specifies a path to a library that will be used when creating
FIDO authenticator-hosted keys, overriding the default of using
the internal USB HID support.
.It Fl Y Cm find-principals
Find the principal(s) associated with the public key of a signature,
provided using the
.Fl s
flag in an authorized signers file provided using the
.Fl f
flag.
The format of the allowed signers file is documented in the
.Sx ALLOWED SIGNERS
section below.
If one or more matching principals are found, they are returned on
standard output.
.It Fl Y Cm check-novalidate
Checks that a signature generated using
.Nm
.Fl Y Cm sign
has a valid structure.
This does not validate if a signature comes from an authorized signer.
When testing a signature,
.Nm
accepts a message on standard input and a signature namespace using
.Fl n .
A file containing the corresponding signature must also be supplied using the
.Fl s
flag.
Successful testing of the signature is signalled by
.Nm
returning a zero exit status.
.It Fl Y Cm sign
Cryptographically sign a file or some data using a SSH key.
When signing,
.Nm
accepts zero or more files to sign on the command-line - if no files
are specified then
.Nm
will sign data presented on standard input.
Signatures are written to the path of the input file with
.Dq .sig
appended, or to standard output if the message to be signed was read from
standard input.
.Pp
The key used for signing is specified using the
.Fl f
option and may refer to either a private key, or a public key with the private
half available via
.Xr ssh-agent 1 .
An additional signature namespace, used to prevent signature confusion across
different domains of use (e.g. file signing vs email signing) must be provided
via the
.Fl n
flag.
Namespaces are arbitrary strings, and may include:
.Dq file
for file signing,
.Dq email
for email signing.
For custom uses, it is recommended to use names following a
NAMESPACE@YOUR.DOMAIN pattern to generate unambiguous namespaces.
.It Fl Y Cm verify
Request to verify a signature generated using
.Nm
.Fl Y Cm sign
as described above.
When verifying a signature,
.Nm
accepts a message on standard input and a signature namespace using
.Fl n .
A file containing the corresponding signature must also be supplied using the
.Fl s
flag, along with the identity of the signer using
.Fl I
and a list of allowed signers via the
.Fl f
flag.
The format of the allowed signers file is documented in the
.Sx ALLOWED SIGNERS
section below.
A file containing revoked keys can be passed using the
.Fl r
flag.
The revocation file may be a KRL or a one-per-line list of public keys.
Successful verification by an authorized signer is signalled by
.Nm
returning a zero exit status.
.It Fl y
This option will read a private
OpenSSH format file and print an OpenSSH public key to stdout.
.It Fl z Ar serial_number
Specifies a serial number to be embedded in the certificate to distinguish
this certificate from others from the same CA.
If the
.Ar serial_number
is prefixed with a
.Sq +
character, then the serial number will be incremented for each certificate
signed on a single command-line.
The default serial number is zero.
.Pp
When generating a KRL, the
.Fl z
flag is used to specify a KRL version number.
.El
.Sh MODULI GENERATION
.Nm
may be used to generate groups for the Diffie-Hellman Group Exchange
(DH-GEX) protocol.
Generating these groups is a two-step process: first, candidate
primes are generated using a fast, but memory intensive process.
These candidate primes are then tested for suitability (a CPU-intensive
process).
.Pp
Generation of primes is performed using the
.Fl M Cm generate
option.
The desired length of the primes may be specified by the
.Fl O Cm bits
option.
For example:
.Pp
.Dl # ssh-keygen -M generate -O bits=2048 moduli-2048.candidates
.Pp
By default, the search for primes begins at a random point in the
desired length range.
This may be overridden using the
.Fl O Cm start
option, which specifies a different start point (in hex).
.Pp
Once a set of candidates have been generated, they must be screened for
suitability.
This may be performed using the
.Fl M Cm screen
option.
In this mode
.Nm
will read candidates from standard input (or a file specified using the
.Fl f
option).
For example:
.Pp
.Dl # ssh-keygen -M screen -f moduli-2048.candidates moduli-2048
.Pp
By default, each candidate will be subjected to 100 primality tests.
This may be overridden using the
.Fl O Cm prime-tests
option.
The DH generator value will be chosen automatically for the
prime under consideration.
If a specific generator is desired, it may be requested using the
.Fl O Cm generator
option.
Valid generator values are 2, 3, and 5.
.Pp
Screened DH groups may be installed in
.Pa /etc/moduli .
It is important that this file contains moduli of a range of bit lengths and
that both ends of a connection share common moduli.
.Pp
A number of options are available for moduli generation and screening via the
.Fl O
flag:
.Bl -tag -width Ds
.It Ic lines Ns = Ns Ar number
Exit after screening the specified number of lines while performing DH
candidate screening.
.It Ic start-line Ns = Ns Ar line-number
Start screening at the specified line number while performing DH candidate
screening.
.It Ic checkpoint Ns = Ns Ar filename
Write the last line processed to the specified file while performing DH
candidate screening.
This will be used to skip lines in the input file that have already been
processed if the job is restarted.
.It Ic memory Ns = Ns Ar mbytes
Specify the amount of memory to use (in megabytes) when generating
candidate moduli for DH-GEX.
.It Ic start Ns = Ns Ar hex-value
Specify start point (in hex) when generating candidate moduli for DH-GEX.
.It Ic generator Ns = Ns Ar value
Specify desired generator (in decimal) when testing candidate moduli for DH-GEX.
.El
.Sh CERTIFICATES
.Nm
supports signing of keys to produce certificates that may be used for
user or host authentication.
Certificates consist of a public key, some identity information, zero or
more principal (user or host) names and a set of options that
are signed by a Certification Authority (CA) key.
Clients or servers may then trust only the CA key and verify its signature
on a certificate rather than trusting many user/host keys.
Note that OpenSSH certificates are a different, and much simpler, format to
the X.509 certificates used in
.Xr ssl 8 .
.Pp
.Nm
supports two types of certificates: user and host.
User certificates authenticate users to servers, whereas host certificates
authenticate server hosts to users.
To generate a user certificate:
.Pp
.Dl $ ssh-keygen -s /path/to/ca_key -I key_id /path/to/user_key.pub
.Pp
The resultant certificate will be placed in
.Pa /path/to/user_key-cert.pub .
A host certificate requires the
.Fl h
option:
.Pp
.Dl $ ssh-keygen -s /path/to/ca_key -I key_id -h /path/to/host_key.pub
.Pp
The host certificate will be output to
.Pa /path/to/host_key-cert.pub .
.Pp
It is possible to sign using a CA key stored in a PKCS#11 token by
providing the token library using
.Fl D
and identifying the CA key by providing its public half as an argument
to
.Fl s :
.Pp
.Dl $ ssh-keygen -s ca_key.pub -D libpkcs11.so -I key_id user_key.pub
.Pp
Similarly, it is possible for the CA key to be hosted in a
.Xr ssh-agent 1 .
This is indicated by the
.Fl U
flag and, again, the CA key must be identified by its public half.
.Pp
.Dl $ ssh-keygen -Us ca_key.pub -I key_id user_key.pub
.Pp
In all cases,
.Ar key_id
is a "key identifier" that is logged by the server when the certificate
is used for authentication.
.Pp
Certificates may be limited to be valid for a set of principal (user/host)
names.
By default, generated certificates are valid for all users or hosts.
To generate a certificate for a specified set of principals:
.Pp
.Dl $ ssh-keygen -s ca_key -I key_id -n user1,user2 user_key.pub
.Dl "$ ssh-keygen -s ca_key -I key_id -h -n host.domain host_key.pub"
.Pp
Additional limitations on the validity and use of user certificates may
be specified through certificate options.
A certificate option may disable features of the SSH session, may be
valid only when presented from particular source addresses or may
force the use of a specific command.
.Pp
The options that are valid for user certificates are:
.Pp
.Bl -tag -width Ds -compact
.It Ic clear
Clear all enabled permissions.
This is useful for clearing the default set of permissions so permissions may
be added individually.
.Pp
.It Ic critical : Ns Ar name Ns Op Ns = Ns Ar contents
.It Ic extension : Ns Ar name Ns Op Ns = Ns Ar contents
Includes an arbitrary certificate critical option or extension.
The specified
.Ar name
should include a domain suffix, e.g.\&
.Dq name@example.com .
If
.Ar contents
is specified then it is included as the contents of the extension/option
encoded as a string, otherwise the extension/option is created with no
contents (usually indicating a flag).
Extensions may be ignored by a client or server that does not recognise them,
whereas unknown critical options will cause the certificate to be refused.
.Pp
.It Ic force-command Ns = Ns Ar command
Forces the execution of
.Ar command
instead of any shell or command specified by the user when
the certificate is used for authentication.
.Pp
.It Ic no-agent-forwarding
Disable
.Xr ssh-agent 1
forwarding (permitted by default).
.Pp
.It Ic no-port-forwarding
Disable port forwarding (permitted by default).
.Pp
.It Ic no-pty
Disable PTY allocation (permitted by default).
.Pp
.It Ic no-user-rc
Disable execution of
.Pa ~/.ssh/rc
by
.Xr sshd 8
(permitted by default).
.Pp
.It Ic no-x11-forwarding
Disable X11 forwarding (permitted by default).
.Pp
.It Ic permit-agent-forwarding
Allows
.Xr ssh-agent 1
forwarding.
.Pp
.It Ic permit-port-forwarding
Allows port forwarding.
.Pp
.It Ic permit-pty
Allows PTY allocation.
.Pp
.It Ic permit-user-rc
Allows execution of
.Pa ~/.ssh/rc
by
.Xr sshd 8 .
.Pp
.It Ic permit-X11-forwarding
Allows X11 forwarding.
.Pp
.It Ic no-touch-required
-Do not require signatures made using this key require demonstration
+Do not require signatures made using this key include demonstration
of user presence (e.g. by having the user touch the authenticator).
This option only makes sense for the FIDO authenticator algorithms
.Cm ecdsa-sk
and
.Cm ed25519-sk .
.Pp
.It Ic source-address Ns = Ns Ar address_list
Restrict the source addresses from which the certificate is considered valid.
The
.Ar address_list
is a comma-separated list of one or more address/netmask pairs in CIDR
format.
+.Pp
+.It Ic verify-required
+Require signatures made using this key indicate that the user was first
+verified.
+This option only makes sense for the FIDO authenticator algorithms
+.Cm ecdsa-sk
+and
+.Cm ed25519-sk .
+Currently PIN authentication is the only supported verification method,
+but other methods may be supported in the future.
.El
.Pp
At present, no standard options are valid for host keys.
.Pp
Finally, certificates may be defined with a validity lifetime.
The
.Fl V
option allows specification of certificate start and end times.
A certificate that is presented at a time outside this range will not be
considered valid.
By default, certificates are valid from
.Ux
Epoch to the distant future.
.Pp
For certificates to be used for user or host authentication, the CA
public key must be trusted by
.Xr sshd 8
or
.Xr ssh 1 .
Please refer to those manual pages for details.
.Sh KEY REVOCATION LISTS
.Nm
is able to manage OpenSSH format Key Revocation Lists (KRLs).
These binary files specify keys or certificates to be revoked using a
compact format, taking as little as one bit per certificate if they are being
revoked by serial number.
.Pp
KRLs may be generated using the
.Fl k
flag.
This option reads one or more files from the command line and generates a new
KRL.
The files may either contain a KRL specification (see below) or public keys,
listed one per line.
Plain public keys are revoked by listing their hash or contents in the KRL and
certificates revoked by serial number or key ID (if the serial is zero or
not available).
.Pp
Revoking keys using a KRL specification offers explicit control over the
types of record used to revoke keys and may be used to directly revoke
certificates by serial number or key ID without having the complete original
certificate on hand.
A KRL specification consists of lines containing one of the following directives
followed by a colon and some directive-specific information.
.Bl -tag -width Ds
.It Cm serial : Ar serial_number Ns Op - Ns Ar serial_number
Revokes a certificate with the specified serial number.
Serial numbers are 64-bit values, not including zero and may be expressed
in decimal, hex or octal.
If two serial numbers are specified separated by a hyphen, then the range
of serial numbers including and between each is revoked.
The CA key must have been specified on the
.Nm
command line using the
.Fl s
option.
.It Cm id : Ar key_id
Revokes a certificate with the specified key ID string.
The CA key must have been specified on the
.Nm
command line using the
.Fl s
option.
.It Cm key : Ar public_key
Revokes the specified key.
If a certificate is listed, then it is revoked as a plain public key.
.It Cm sha1 : Ar public_key
Revokes the specified key by including its SHA1 hash in the KRL.
.It Cm sha256 : Ar public_key
Revokes the specified key by including its SHA256 hash in the KRL.
KRLs that revoke keys by SHA256 hash are not supported by OpenSSH versions
prior to 7.9.
.It Cm hash : Ar fingerprint
Revokes a key using a fingerprint hash, as obtained from a
.Xr sshd 8
authentication log message or the
.Nm
.Fl l
flag.
Only SHA256 fingerprints are supported here and resultant KRLs are
not supported by OpenSSH versions prior to 7.9.
.El
.Pp
KRLs may be updated using the
.Fl u
flag in addition to
.Fl k .
When this option is specified, keys listed via the command line are merged into
the KRL, adding to those already there.
.Pp
It is also possible, given a KRL, to test whether it revokes a particular key
(or keys).
The
.Fl Q
flag will query an existing KRL, testing each key specified on the command line.
If any key listed on the command line has been revoked (or an error encountered)
then
.Nm
will exit with a non-zero exit status.
A zero exit status will only be returned if no key was revoked.
.Sh ALLOWED SIGNERS
When verifying signatures,
.Nm
uses a simple list of identities and keys to determine whether a signature
comes from an authorized source.
This "allowed signers" file uses a format patterned after the
AUTHORIZED_KEYS FILE FORMAT described in
.Xr sshd 8 .
Each line of the file contains the following space-separated fields:
principals, options, keytype, base64-encoded key.
Empty lines and lines starting with a
.Ql #
are ignored as comments.
.Pp
The principals field is a pattern-list (See PATTERNS in
.Xr ssh_config 5 )
consisting of one or more comma-separated USER@DOMAIN identity patterns
that are accepted for signing.
When verifying, the identity presented via the
.Fl I
option must match a principals pattern in order for the corresponding key to be
considered acceptable for verification.
.Pp
The options (if present) consist of comma-separated option specifications.
No spaces are permitted, except within double quotes.
The following option specifications are supported (note that option keywords
are case-insensitive):
.Bl -tag -width Ds
.It Cm cert-authority
Indicates that this key is accepted as a certificate authority (CA) and
that certificates signed by this CA may be accepted for verification.
.It Cm namespaces="namespace-list"
Specifies a pattern-list of namespaces that are accepted for this key.
If this option is present, the signature namespace embedded in the
signature object and presented on the verification command-line must
match the specified list before the key will be considered acceptable.
.El
.Pp
When verifying signatures made by certificates, the expected principal
name must match both the principals pattern in the allowed signers file and
the principals embedded in the certificate itself.
.Pp
An example allowed signers file:
.Bd -literal -offset 3n
# Comments allowed at start of line
user1@example.com,user2@example.com ssh-rsa AAAAX1...
# A certificate authority, trusted for all principals in a domain.
*@example.com cert-authority ssh-ed25519 AAAB4...
# A key that is accepted only for file signing.
user2@example.com namespaces="file" ssh-ed25519 AAA41...
.Ed
.Sh ENVIRONMENT
.Bl -tag -width Ds
.It Ev SSH_SK_PROVIDER
Specifies a path to a library that will be used when loading any
FIDO authenticator-hosted keys, overriding the default of using
the built-in USB HID support.
.El
.Sh FILES
.Bl -tag -width Ds -compact
.It Pa ~/.ssh/id_dsa
.It Pa ~/.ssh/id_ecdsa
.It Pa ~/.ssh/id_ecdsa_sk
.It Pa ~/.ssh/id_ed25519
.It Pa ~/.ssh/id_ed25519_sk
.It Pa ~/.ssh/id_rsa
Contains the DSA, ECDSA, authenticator-hosted ECDSA, Ed25519,
authenticator-hosted Ed25519 or RSA authentication identity of the user.
This file should not be readable by anyone but the user.
It is possible to
specify a passphrase when generating the key; that passphrase will be
used to encrypt the private part of this file using 128-bit AES.
This file is not automatically accessed by
.Nm
but it is offered as the default file for the private key.
.Xr ssh 1
will read this file when a login attempt is made.
.Pp
.It Pa ~/.ssh/id_dsa.pub
.It Pa ~/.ssh/id_ecdsa.pub
.It Pa ~/.ssh/id_ecdsa_sk.pub
.It Pa ~/.ssh/id_ed25519.pub
.It Pa ~/.ssh/id_ed25519_sk.pub
.It Pa ~/.ssh/id_rsa.pub
Contains the DSA, ECDSA, authenticator-hosted ECDSA, Ed25519,
authenticator-hosted Ed25519 or RSA public key for authentication.
The contents of this file should be added to
.Pa ~/.ssh/authorized_keys
on all machines
where the user wishes to log in using public key authentication.
There is no need to keep the contents of this file secret.
.Pp
.It Pa /etc/moduli
Contains Diffie-Hellman groups used for DH-GEX.
The file format is described in
.Xr moduli 5 .
.El
.Sh SEE ALSO
.Xr ssh 1 ,
.Xr ssh-add 1 ,
.Xr ssh-agent 1 ,
.Xr moduli 5 ,
.Xr sshd 8
.Rs
.%R RFC 4716
.%T "The Secure Shell (SSH) Public Key File Format"
.%D 2006
.Re
.Sh AUTHORS
OpenSSH is a derivative of the original and free
ssh 1.2.12 release by Tatu Ylonen.
Aaron Campbell, Bob Beck, Markus Friedl, Niels Provos,
Theo de Raadt and Dug Song
removed many bugs, re-added newer features and
created OpenSSH.
Markus Friedl contributed the support for SSH
protocol versions 1.5 and 2.0.
diff --git a/ssh-keygen.c b/ssh-keygen.c
index 2c5c75db7f08..a12b79a5606d 100644
--- a/ssh-keygen.c
+++ b/ssh-keygen.c
@@ -1,3692 +1,3746 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: ssh-keygen.c,v 1.409.2.1 2020/05/18 19:02:13 benno Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: ssh-keygen.c,v 1.420 2020/09/09 03:08:01 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
* Copyright (c) 1994 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
* All rights reserved
* Identity and host key generation and maintenance.
*
* As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
* can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this
* software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
* incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
* called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
*/
#include "includes.h"
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/socket.h>
#include <sys/stat.h>
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
#include <openssl/evp.h>
#include <openssl/pem.h>
#include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h"
#endif
#ifdef HAVE_STDINT_H
# include <stdint.h>
#endif
#include <errno.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <netdb.h>
#ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H
# include <paths.h>
#endif
#include <pwd.h>
#include <stdarg.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <limits.h>
#include <locale.h>
#include <time.h>
#include "xmalloc.h"
#include "sshkey.h"
#include "authfile.h"
#include "sshbuf.h"
#include "pathnames.h"
#include "log.h"
#include "misc.h"
#include "match.h"
#include "hostfile.h"
#include "dns.h"
#include "ssh.h"
#include "ssh2.h"
#include "ssherr.h"
#include "ssh-pkcs11.h"
#include "atomicio.h"
#include "krl.h"
#include "digest.h"
#include "utf8.h"
#include "authfd.h"
#include "sshsig.h"
#include "ssh-sk.h"
#include "sk-api.h" /* XXX for SSH_SK_USER_PRESENCE_REQD; remove */
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
# define DEFAULT_KEY_TYPE_NAME "rsa"
#else
# define DEFAULT_KEY_TYPE_NAME "ed25519"
#endif
/*
* Default number of bits in the RSA, DSA and ECDSA keys. These value can be
* overridden on the command line.
*
* These values, with the exception of DSA, provide security equivalent to at
* least 128 bits of security according to NIST Special Publication 800-57:
* Recommendation for Key Management Part 1 rev 4 section 5.6.1.
* For DSA it (and FIPS-186-4 section 4.2) specifies that the only size for
* which a 160bit hash is acceptable is 1kbit, and since ssh-dss specifies only
* SHA1 we limit the DSA key size 1k bits.
*/
#define DEFAULT_BITS 3072
#define DEFAULT_BITS_DSA 1024
#define DEFAULT_BITS_ECDSA 256
static int quiet = 0;
/* Flag indicating that we just want to see the key fingerprint */
static int print_fingerprint = 0;
static int print_bubblebabble = 0;
/* Hash algorithm to use for fingerprints. */
static int fingerprint_hash = SSH_FP_HASH_DEFAULT;
/* The identity file name, given on the command line or entered by the user. */
static char identity_file[PATH_MAX];
static int have_identity = 0;
/* This is set to the passphrase if given on the command line. */
static char *identity_passphrase = NULL;
/* This is set to the new passphrase if given on the command line. */
static char *identity_new_passphrase = NULL;
/* Key type when certifying */
static u_int cert_key_type = SSH2_CERT_TYPE_USER;
/* "key ID" of signed key */
static char *cert_key_id = NULL;
/* Comma-separated list of principal names for certifying keys */
static char *cert_principals = NULL;
/* Validity period for certificates */
static u_int64_t cert_valid_from = 0;
static u_int64_t cert_valid_to = ~0ULL;
/* Certificate options */
#define CERTOPT_X_FWD (1)
#define CERTOPT_AGENT_FWD (1<<1)
#define CERTOPT_PORT_FWD (1<<2)
#define CERTOPT_PTY (1<<3)
#define CERTOPT_USER_RC (1<<4)
#define CERTOPT_NO_REQUIRE_USER_PRESENCE (1<<5)
#define CERTOPT_DEFAULT (CERTOPT_X_FWD|CERTOPT_AGENT_FWD| \
CERTOPT_PORT_FWD|CERTOPT_PTY|CERTOPT_USER_RC)
static u_int32_t certflags_flags = CERTOPT_DEFAULT;
static char *certflags_command = NULL;
static char *certflags_src_addr = NULL;
/* Arbitrary extensions specified by user */
-struct cert_userext {
+struct cert_ext {
char *key;
char *val;
int crit;
};
-static struct cert_userext *cert_userext;
-static size_t ncert_userext;
+static struct cert_ext *cert_ext;
+static size_t ncert_ext;
/* Conversion to/from various formats */
enum {
FMT_RFC4716,
FMT_PKCS8,
FMT_PEM
} convert_format = FMT_RFC4716;
static char *key_type_name = NULL;
/* Load key from this PKCS#11 provider */
static char *pkcs11provider = NULL;
/* FIDO/U2F provider to use */
static char *sk_provider = NULL;
/* Format for writing private keys */
static int private_key_format = SSHKEY_PRIVATE_OPENSSH;
/* Cipher for new-format private keys */
static char *openssh_format_cipher = NULL;
/* Number of KDF rounds to derive new format keys. */
static int rounds = 0;
/* argv0 */
extern char *__progname;
static char hostname[NI_MAXHOST];
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
/* moduli.c */
int gen_candidates(FILE *, u_int32_t, u_int32_t, BIGNUM *);
int prime_test(FILE *, FILE *, u_int32_t, u_int32_t, char *, unsigned long,
unsigned long);
#endif
static void
type_bits_valid(int type, const char *name, u_int32_t *bitsp)
{
if (type == KEY_UNSPEC)
fatal("unknown key type %s", key_type_name);
if (*bitsp == 0) {
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
u_int nid;
switch(type) {
case KEY_DSA:
*bitsp = DEFAULT_BITS_DSA;
break;
case KEY_ECDSA:
if (name != NULL &&
(nid = sshkey_ecdsa_nid_from_name(name)) > 0)
*bitsp = sshkey_curve_nid_to_bits(nid);
if (*bitsp == 0)
*bitsp = DEFAULT_BITS_ECDSA;
break;
case KEY_RSA:
*bitsp = DEFAULT_BITS;
break;
}
#endif
}
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
switch (type) {
case KEY_DSA:
if (*bitsp != 1024)
fatal("Invalid DSA key length: must be 1024 bits");
break;
case KEY_RSA:
if (*bitsp < SSH_RSA_MINIMUM_MODULUS_SIZE)
fatal("Invalid RSA key length: minimum is %d bits",
SSH_RSA_MINIMUM_MODULUS_SIZE);
else if (*bitsp > OPENSSL_RSA_MAX_MODULUS_BITS)
fatal("Invalid RSA key length: maximum is %d bits",
OPENSSL_RSA_MAX_MODULUS_BITS);
break;
case KEY_ECDSA:
if (sshkey_ecdsa_bits_to_nid(*bitsp) == -1)
fatal("Invalid ECDSA key length: valid lengths are "
#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_NISTP521
"256, 384 or 521 bits");
#else
"256 or 384 bits");
#endif
}
#endif
}
/*
* Checks whether a file exists and, if so, asks the user whether they wish
* to overwrite it.
* Returns nonzero if the file does not already exist or if the user agrees to
* overwrite, or zero otherwise.
*/
static int
confirm_overwrite(const char *filename)
{
char yesno[3];
struct stat st;
if (stat(filename, &st) != 0)
return 1;
printf("%s already exists.\n", filename);
printf("Overwrite (y/n)? ");
fflush(stdout);
if (fgets(yesno, sizeof(yesno), stdin) == NULL)
return 0;
if (yesno[0] != 'y' && yesno[0] != 'Y')
return 0;
return 1;
}
static void
ask_filename(struct passwd *pw, const char *prompt)
{
char buf[1024];
char *name = NULL;
if (key_type_name == NULL)
name = _PATH_SSH_CLIENT_ID_RSA;
else {
switch (sshkey_type_from_name(key_type_name)) {
case KEY_DSA_CERT:
case KEY_DSA:
name = _PATH_SSH_CLIENT_ID_DSA;
break;
#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
case KEY_ECDSA_CERT:
case KEY_ECDSA:
name = _PATH_SSH_CLIENT_ID_ECDSA;
break;
case KEY_ECDSA_SK_CERT:
case KEY_ECDSA_SK:
name = _PATH_SSH_CLIENT_ID_ECDSA_SK;
break;
#endif
case KEY_RSA_CERT:
case KEY_RSA:
name = _PATH_SSH_CLIENT_ID_RSA;
break;
case KEY_ED25519:
case KEY_ED25519_CERT:
name = _PATH_SSH_CLIENT_ID_ED25519;
break;
case KEY_ED25519_SK:
case KEY_ED25519_SK_CERT:
name = _PATH_SSH_CLIENT_ID_ED25519_SK;
break;
case KEY_XMSS:
case KEY_XMSS_CERT:
name = _PATH_SSH_CLIENT_ID_XMSS;
break;
default:
fatal("bad key type");
}
}
snprintf(identity_file, sizeof(identity_file),
"%s/%s", pw->pw_dir, name);
printf("%s (%s): ", prompt, identity_file);
fflush(stdout);
if (fgets(buf, sizeof(buf), stdin) == NULL)
exit(1);
buf[strcspn(buf, "\n")] = '\0';
if (strcmp(buf, "") != 0)
strlcpy(identity_file, buf, sizeof(identity_file));
have_identity = 1;
}
static struct sshkey *
load_identity(const char *filename, char **commentp)
{
char *pass;
struct sshkey *prv;
int r;
if (commentp != NULL)
*commentp = NULL;
if ((r = sshkey_load_private(filename, "", &prv, commentp)) == 0)
return prv;
if (r != SSH_ERR_KEY_WRONG_PASSPHRASE)
fatal("Load key \"%s\": %s", filename, ssh_err(r));
if (identity_passphrase)
pass = xstrdup(identity_passphrase);
else
pass = read_passphrase("Enter passphrase: ", RP_ALLOW_STDIN);
r = sshkey_load_private(filename, pass, &prv, commentp);
freezero(pass, strlen(pass));
if (r != 0)
fatal("Load key \"%s\": %s", filename, ssh_err(r));
return prv;
}
#define SSH_COM_PUBLIC_BEGIN "---- BEGIN SSH2 PUBLIC KEY ----"
#define SSH_COM_PUBLIC_END "---- END SSH2 PUBLIC KEY ----"
#define SSH_COM_PRIVATE_BEGIN "---- BEGIN SSH2 ENCRYPTED PRIVATE KEY ----"
#define SSH_COM_PRIVATE_KEY_MAGIC 0x3f6ff9eb
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
static void
do_convert_to_ssh2(struct passwd *pw, struct sshkey *k)
{
struct sshbuf *b;
char comment[61], *b64;
int r;
if ((b = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
if ((r = sshkey_putb(k, b)) != 0)
fatal("key_to_blob failed: %s", ssh_err(r));
if ((b64 = sshbuf_dtob64_string(b, 1)) == NULL)
fatal("%s: sshbuf_dtob64_string failed", __func__);
/* Comment + surrounds must fit into 72 chars (RFC 4716 sec 3.3) */
snprintf(comment, sizeof(comment),
"%u-bit %s, converted by %s@%s from OpenSSH",
sshkey_size(k), sshkey_type(k),
pw->pw_name, hostname);
sshkey_free(k);
sshbuf_free(b);
fprintf(stdout, "%s\n", SSH_COM_PUBLIC_BEGIN);
fprintf(stdout, "Comment: \"%s\"\n%s", comment, b64);
fprintf(stdout, "%s\n", SSH_COM_PUBLIC_END);
free(b64);
exit(0);
}
static void
do_convert_to_pkcs8(struct sshkey *k)
{
switch (sshkey_type_plain(k->type)) {
case KEY_RSA:
if (!PEM_write_RSA_PUBKEY(stdout, k->rsa))
fatal("PEM_write_RSA_PUBKEY failed");
break;
case KEY_DSA:
if (!PEM_write_DSA_PUBKEY(stdout, k->dsa))
fatal("PEM_write_DSA_PUBKEY failed");
break;
#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
case KEY_ECDSA:
if (!PEM_write_EC_PUBKEY(stdout, k->ecdsa))
fatal("PEM_write_EC_PUBKEY failed");
break;
#endif
default:
fatal("%s: unsupported key type %s", __func__, sshkey_type(k));
}
exit(0);
}
static void
do_convert_to_pem(struct sshkey *k)
{
switch (sshkey_type_plain(k->type)) {
case KEY_RSA:
if (!PEM_write_RSAPublicKey(stdout, k->rsa))
fatal("PEM_write_RSAPublicKey failed");
break;
case KEY_DSA:
if (!PEM_write_DSA_PUBKEY(stdout, k->dsa))
fatal("PEM_write_DSA_PUBKEY failed");
break;
#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
case KEY_ECDSA:
if (!PEM_write_EC_PUBKEY(stdout, k->ecdsa))
fatal("PEM_write_EC_PUBKEY failed");
break;
#endif
default:
fatal("%s: unsupported key type %s", __func__, sshkey_type(k));
}
exit(0);
}
static void
do_convert_to(struct passwd *pw)
{
struct sshkey *k;
struct stat st;
int r;
if (!have_identity)
ask_filename(pw, "Enter file in which the key is");
if (stat(identity_file, &st) == -1)
fatal("%s: %s: %s", __progname, identity_file, strerror(errno));
if ((r = sshkey_load_public(identity_file, &k, NULL)) != 0)
k = load_identity(identity_file, NULL);
switch (convert_format) {
case FMT_RFC4716:
do_convert_to_ssh2(pw, k);
break;
case FMT_PKCS8:
do_convert_to_pkcs8(k);
break;
case FMT_PEM:
do_convert_to_pem(k);
break;
default:
fatal("%s: unknown key format %d", __func__, convert_format);
}
exit(0);
}
/*
* This is almost exactly the bignum1 encoding, but with 32 bit for length
* instead of 16.
*/
static void
buffer_get_bignum_bits(struct sshbuf *b, BIGNUM *value)
{
u_int bytes, bignum_bits;
int r;
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(b, &bignum_bits)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
bytes = (bignum_bits + 7) / 8;
if (sshbuf_len(b) < bytes)
fatal("%s: input buffer too small: need %d have %zu",
__func__, bytes, sshbuf_len(b));
if (BN_bin2bn(sshbuf_ptr(b), bytes, value) == NULL)
fatal("%s: BN_bin2bn failed", __func__);
if ((r = sshbuf_consume(b, bytes)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
}
static struct sshkey *
do_convert_private_ssh2(struct sshbuf *b)
{
struct sshkey *key = NULL;
char *type, *cipher;
u_char e1, e2, e3, *sig = NULL, data[] = "abcde12345";
int r, rlen, ktype;
u_int magic, i1, i2, i3, i4;
size_t slen;
u_long e;
BIGNUM *dsa_p = NULL, *dsa_q = NULL, *dsa_g = NULL;
BIGNUM *dsa_pub_key = NULL, *dsa_priv_key = NULL;
BIGNUM *rsa_n = NULL, *rsa_e = NULL, *rsa_d = NULL;
BIGNUM *rsa_p = NULL, *rsa_q = NULL, *rsa_iqmp = NULL;
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(b, &magic)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
if (magic != SSH_COM_PRIVATE_KEY_MAGIC) {
error("bad magic 0x%x != 0x%x", magic,
SSH_COM_PRIVATE_KEY_MAGIC);
return NULL;
}
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(b, &i1)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &type, NULL)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &cipher, NULL)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_u32(b, &i2)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_u32(b, &i3)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_u32(b, &i4)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
debug("ignore (%d %d %d %d)", i1, i2, i3, i4);
if (strcmp(cipher, "none") != 0) {
error("unsupported cipher %s", cipher);
free(cipher);
free(type);
return NULL;
}
free(cipher);
if (strstr(type, "dsa")) {
ktype = KEY_DSA;
} else if (strstr(type, "rsa")) {
ktype = KEY_RSA;
} else {
free(type);
return NULL;
}
if ((key = sshkey_new(ktype)) == NULL)
fatal("sshkey_new failed");
free(type);
switch (key->type) {
case KEY_DSA:
if ((dsa_p = BN_new()) == NULL ||
(dsa_q = BN_new()) == NULL ||
(dsa_g = BN_new()) == NULL ||
(dsa_pub_key = BN_new()) == NULL ||
(dsa_priv_key = BN_new()) == NULL)
fatal("%s: BN_new", __func__);
buffer_get_bignum_bits(b, dsa_p);
buffer_get_bignum_bits(b, dsa_g);
buffer_get_bignum_bits(b, dsa_q);
buffer_get_bignum_bits(b, dsa_pub_key);
buffer_get_bignum_bits(b, dsa_priv_key);
if (!DSA_set0_pqg(key->dsa, dsa_p, dsa_q, dsa_g))
fatal("%s: DSA_set0_pqg failed", __func__);
dsa_p = dsa_q = dsa_g = NULL; /* transferred */
if (!DSA_set0_key(key->dsa, dsa_pub_key, dsa_priv_key))
fatal("%s: DSA_set0_key failed", __func__);
dsa_pub_key = dsa_priv_key = NULL; /* transferred */
break;
case KEY_RSA:
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(b, &e1)) != 0 ||
(e1 < 30 && (r = sshbuf_get_u8(b, &e2)) != 0) ||
(e1 < 30 && (r = sshbuf_get_u8(b, &e3)) != 0))
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
e = e1;
debug("e %lx", e);
if (e < 30) {
e <<= 8;
e += e2;
debug("e %lx", e);
e <<= 8;
e += e3;
debug("e %lx", e);
}
if ((rsa_e = BN_new()) == NULL)
fatal("%s: BN_new", __func__);
if (!BN_set_word(rsa_e, e)) {
BN_clear_free(rsa_e);
sshkey_free(key);
return NULL;
}
if ((rsa_n = BN_new()) == NULL ||
(rsa_d = BN_new()) == NULL ||
(rsa_p = BN_new()) == NULL ||
(rsa_q = BN_new()) == NULL ||
(rsa_iqmp = BN_new()) == NULL)
fatal("%s: BN_new", __func__);
buffer_get_bignum_bits(b, rsa_d);
buffer_get_bignum_bits(b, rsa_n);
buffer_get_bignum_bits(b, rsa_iqmp);
buffer_get_bignum_bits(b, rsa_q);
buffer_get_bignum_bits(b, rsa_p);
if (!RSA_set0_key(key->rsa, rsa_n, rsa_e, rsa_d))
fatal("%s: RSA_set0_key failed", __func__);
rsa_n = rsa_e = rsa_d = NULL; /* transferred */
if (!RSA_set0_factors(key->rsa, rsa_p, rsa_q))
fatal("%s: RSA_set0_factors failed", __func__);
rsa_p = rsa_q = NULL; /* transferred */
if ((r = ssh_rsa_complete_crt_parameters(key, rsa_iqmp)) != 0)
fatal("generate RSA parameters failed: %s", ssh_err(r));
BN_clear_free(rsa_iqmp);
break;
}
rlen = sshbuf_len(b);
if (rlen != 0)
error("%s: remaining bytes in key blob %d", __func__, rlen);
/* try the key */
if (sshkey_sign(key, &sig, &slen, data, sizeof(data),
- NULL, NULL, 0) != 0 ||
+ NULL, NULL, NULL, 0) != 0 ||
sshkey_verify(key, sig, slen, data, sizeof(data),
NULL, 0, NULL) != 0) {
sshkey_free(key);
free(sig);
return NULL;
}
free(sig);
return key;
}
static int
get_line(FILE *fp, char *line, size_t len)
{
int c;
size_t pos = 0;
line[0] = '\0';
while ((c = fgetc(fp)) != EOF) {
if (pos >= len - 1)
fatal("input line too long.");
switch (c) {
case '\r':
c = fgetc(fp);
if (c != EOF && c != '\n' && ungetc(c, fp) == EOF)
fatal("unget: %s", strerror(errno));
return pos;
case '\n':
return pos;
}
line[pos++] = c;
line[pos] = '\0';
}
/* We reached EOF */
return -1;
}
static void
do_convert_from_ssh2(struct passwd *pw, struct sshkey **k, int *private)
{
int r, blen, escaped = 0;
u_int len;
char line[1024];
struct sshbuf *buf;
char encoded[8096];
FILE *fp;
if ((buf = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
fatal("sshbuf_new failed");
if ((fp = fopen(identity_file, "r")) == NULL)
fatal("%s: %s: %s", __progname, identity_file, strerror(errno));
encoded[0] = '\0';
while ((blen = get_line(fp, line, sizeof(line))) != -1) {
if (blen > 0 && line[blen - 1] == '\\')
escaped++;
if (strncmp(line, "----", 4) == 0 ||
strstr(line, ": ") != NULL) {
if (strstr(line, SSH_COM_PRIVATE_BEGIN) != NULL)
*private = 1;
if (strstr(line, " END ") != NULL) {
break;
}
/* fprintf(stderr, "ignore: %s", line); */
continue;
}
if (escaped) {
escaped--;
/* fprintf(stderr, "escaped: %s", line); */
continue;
}
strlcat(encoded, line, sizeof(encoded));
}
len = strlen(encoded);
if (((len % 4) == 3) &&
(encoded[len-1] == '=') &&
(encoded[len-2] == '=') &&
(encoded[len-3] == '='))
encoded[len-3] = '\0';
if ((r = sshbuf_b64tod(buf, encoded)) != 0)
fatal("%s: base64 decoding failed: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
if (*private) {
if ((*k = do_convert_private_ssh2(buf)) == NULL)
fatal("%s: private key conversion failed", __func__);
} else if ((r = sshkey_fromb(buf, k)) != 0)
fatal("decode blob failed: %s", ssh_err(r));
sshbuf_free(buf);
fclose(fp);
}
static void
do_convert_from_pkcs8(struct sshkey **k, int *private)
{
EVP_PKEY *pubkey;
FILE *fp;
if ((fp = fopen(identity_file, "r")) == NULL)
fatal("%s: %s: %s", __progname, identity_file, strerror(errno));
if ((pubkey = PEM_read_PUBKEY(fp, NULL, NULL, NULL)) == NULL) {
fatal("%s: %s is not a recognised public key format", __func__,
identity_file);
}
fclose(fp);
switch (EVP_PKEY_base_id(pubkey)) {
case EVP_PKEY_RSA:
if ((*k = sshkey_new(KEY_UNSPEC)) == NULL)
fatal("sshkey_new failed");
(*k)->type = KEY_RSA;
(*k)->rsa = EVP_PKEY_get1_RSA(pubkey);
break;
case EVP_PKEY_DSA:
if ((*k = sshkey_new(KEY_UNSPEC)) == NULL)
fatal("sshkey_new failed");
(*k)->type = KEY_DSA;
(*k)->dsa = EVP_PKEY_get1_DSA(pubkey);
break;
#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
case EVP_PKEY_EC:
if ((*k = sshkey_new(KEY_UNSPEC)) == NULL)
fatal("sshkey_new failed");
(*k)->type = KEY_ECDSA;
(*k)->ecdsa = EVP_PKEY_get1_EC_KEY(pubkey);
(*k)->ecdsa_nid = sshkey_ecdsa_key_to_nid((*k)->ecdsa);
break;
#endif
default:
fatal("%s: unsupported pubkey type %d", __func__,
EVP_PKEY_base_id(pubkey));
}
EVP_PKEY_free(pubkey);
return;
}
static void
do_convert_from_pem(struct sshkey **k, int *private)
{
FILE *fp;
RSA *rsa;
if ((fp = fopen(identity_file, "r")) == NULL)
fatal("%s: %s: %s", __progname, identity_file, strerror(errno));
if ((rsa = PEM_read_RSAPublicKey(fp, NULL, NULL, NULL)) != NULL) {
if ((*k = sshkey_new(KEY_UNSPEC)) == NULL)
fatal("sshkey_new failed");
(*k)->type = KEY_RSA;
(*k)->rsa = rsa;
fclose(fp);
return;
}
fatal("%s: unrecognised raw private key format", __func__);
}
static void
do_convert_from(struct passwd *pw)
{
struct sshkey *k = NULL;
int r, private = 0, ok = 0;
struct stat st;
if (!have_identity)
ask_filename(pw, "Enter file in which the key is");
if (stat(identity_file, &st) == -1)
fatal("%s: %s: %s", __progname, identity_file, strerror(errno));
switch (convert_format) {
case FMT_RFC4716:
do_convert_from_ssh2(pw, &k, &private);
break;
case FMT_PKCS8:
do_convert_from_pkcs8(&k, &private);
break;
case FMT_PEM:
do_convert_from_pem(&k, &private);
break;
default:
fatal("%s: unknown key format %d", __func__, convert_format);
}
if (!private) {
if ((r = sshkey_write(k, stdout)) == 0)
ok = 1;
if (ok)
fprintf(stdout, "\n");
} else {
switch (k->type) {
case KEY_DSA:
ok = PEM_write_DSAPrivateKey(stdout, k->dsa, NULL,
NULL, 0, NULL, NULL);
break;
#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
case KEY_ECDSA:
ok = PEM_write_ECPrivateKey(stdout, k->ecdsa, NULL,
NULL, 0, NULL, NULL);
break;
#endif
case KEY_RSA:
ok = PEM_write_RSAPrivateKey(stdout, k->rsa, NULL,
NULL, 0, NULL, NULL);
break;
default:
fatal("%s: unsupported key type %s", __func__,
sshkey_type(k));
}
}
if (!ok)
fatal("key write failed");
sshkey_free(k);
exit(0);
}
#endif
static void
do_print_public(struct passwd *pw)
{
struct sshkey *prv;
struct stat st;
int r;
char *comment = NULL;
if (!have_identity)
ask_filename(pw, "Enter file in which the key is");
if (stat(identity_file, &st) == -1)
fatal("%s: %s", identity_file, strerror(errno));
prv = load_identity(identity_file, &comment);
if ((r = sshkey_write(prv, stdout)) != 0)
error("sshkey_write failed: %s", ssh_err(r));
- sshkey_free(prv);
if (comment != NULL && *comment != '\0')
fprintf(stdout, " %s", comment);
fprintf(stdout, "\n");
+ if (sshkey_is_sk(prv)) {
+ debug("sk_application: \"%s\", sk_flags 0x%02x",
+ prv->sk_application, prv->sk_flags);
+ }
+ sshkey_free(prv);
free(comment);
exit(0);
}
static void
do_download(struct passwd *pw)
{
#ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11
struct sshkey **keys = NULL;
int i, nkeys;
enum sshkey_fp_rep rep;
int fptype;
char *fp, *ra, **comments = NULL;
fptype = print_bubblebabble ? SSH_DIGEST_SHA1 : fingerprint_hash;
rep = print_bubblebabble ? SSH_FP_BUBBLEBABBLE : SSH_FP_DEFAULT;
pkcs11_init(1);
nkeys = pkcs11_add_provider(pkcs11provider, NULL, &keys, &comments);
if (nkeys <= 0)
fatal("cannot read public key from pkcs11");
for (i = 0; i < nkeys; i++) {
if (print_fingerprint) {
fp = sshkey_fingerprint(keys[i], fptype, rep);
ra = sshkey_fingerprint(keys[i], fingerprint_hash,
SSH_FP_RANDOMART);
if (fp == NULL || ra == NULL)
fatal("%s: sshkey_fingerprint fail", __func__);
printf("%u %s %s (PKCS11 key)\n", sshkey_size(keys[i]),
fp, sshkey_type(keys[i]));
if (log_level_get() >= SYSLOG_LEVEL_VERBOSE)
printf("%s\n", ra);
free(ra);
free(fp);
} else {
(void) sshkey_write(keys[i], stdout); /* XXX check */
fprintf(stdout, "%s%s\n",
*(comments[i]) == '\0' ? "" : " ", comments[i]);
}
free(comments[i]);
sshkey_free(keys[i]);
}
free(comments);
free(keys);
pkcs11_terminate();
exit(0);
#else
fatal("no pkcs11 support");
#endif /* ENABLE_PKCS11 */
}
static struct sshkey *
try_read_key(char **cpp)
{
struct sshkey *ret;
int r;
if ((ret = sshkey_new(KEY_UNSPEC)) == NULL)
fatal("sshkey_new failed");
if ((r = sshkey_read(ret, cpp)) == 0)
return ret;
/* Not a key */
sshkey_free(ret);
return NULL;
}
static void
fingerprint_one_key(const struct sshkey *public, const char *comment)
{
char *fp = NULL, *ra = NULL;
enum sshkey_fp_rep rep;
int fptype;
fptype = print_bubblebabble ? SSH_DIGEST_SHA1 : fingerprint_hash;
rep = print_bubblebabble ? SSH_FP_BUBBLEBABBLE : SSH_FP_DEFAULT;
fp = sshkey_fingerprint(public, fptype, rep);
ra = sshkey_fingerprint(public, fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_RANDOMART);
if (fp == NULL || ra == NULL)
fatal("%s: sshkey_fingerprint failed", __func__);
mprintf("%u %s %s (%s)\n", sshkey_size(public), fp,
comment ? comment : "no comment", sshkey_type(public));
if (log_level_get() >= SYSLOG_LEVEL_VERBOSE)
printf("%s\n", ra);
free(ra);
free(fp);
}
static void
fingerprint_private(const char *path)
{
struct stat st;
char *comment = NULL;
struct sshkey *privkey = NULL, *pubkey = NULL;
int r;
if (stat(identity_file, &st) == -1)
fatal("%s: %s", path, strerror(errno));
if ((r = sshkey_load_public(path, &pubkey, &comment)) != 0)
debug("load public \"%s\": %s", path, ssh_err(r));
if (pubkey == NULL || comment == NULL || *comment == '\0') {
free(comment);
if ((r = sshkey_load_private(path, NULL,
&privkey, &comment)) != 0)
debug("load private \"%s\": %s", path, ssh_err(r));
}
if (pubkey == NULL && privkey == NULL)
fatal("%s is not a key file.", path);
fingerprint_one_key(pubkey == NULL ? privkey : pubkey, comment);
sshkey_free(pubkey);
sshkey_free(privkey);
free(comment);
}
static void
do_fingerprint(struct passwd *pw)
{
FILE *f;
struct sshkey *public = NULL;
char *comment = NULL, *cp, *ep, *line = NULL;
size_t linesize = 0;
int i, invalid = 1;
const char *path;
u_long lnum = 0;
if (!have_identity)
ask_filename(pw, "Enter file in which the key is");
path = identity_file;
if (strcmp(identity_file, "-") == 0) {
f = stdin;
path = "(stdin)";
} else if ((f = fopen(path, "r")) == NULL)
fatal("%s: %s: %s", __progname, path, strerror(errno));
while (getline(&line, &linesize, f) != -1) {
lnum++;
cp = line;
cp[strcspn(cp, "\n")] = '\0';
/* Trim leading space and comments */
cp = line + strspn(line, " \t");
if (*cp == '#' || *cp == '\0')
continue;
/*
* Input may be plain keys, private keys, authorized_keys
* or known_hosts.
*/
/*
* Try private keys first. Assume a key is private if
* "SSH PRIVATE KEY" appears on the first line and we're
* not reading from stdin (XXX support private keys on stdin).
*/
if (lnum == 1 && strcmp(identity_file, "-") != 0 &&
strstr(cp, "PRIVATE KEY") != NULL) {
free(line);
fclose(f);
fingerprint_private(path);
exit(0);
}
/*
* If it's not a private key, then this must be prepared to
* accept a public key prefixed with a hostname or options.
* Try a bare key first, otherwise skip the leading stuff.
*/
if ((public = try_read_key(&cp)) == NULL) {
i = strtol(cp, &ep, 10);
if (i == 0 || ep == NULL ||
(*ep != ' ' && *ep != '\t')) {
int quoted = 0;
comment = cp;
for (; *cp && (quoted || (*cp != ' ' &&
*cp != '\t')); cp++) {
if (*cp == '\\' && cp[1] == '"')
cp++; /* Skip both */
else if (*cp == '"')
quoted = !quoted;
}
if (!*cp)
continue;
*cp++ = '\0';
}
}
/* Retry after parsing leading hostname/key options */
if (public == NULL && (public = try_read_key(&cp)) == NULL) {
debug("%s:%lu: not a public key", path, lnum);
continue;
}
/* Find trailing comment, if any */
for (; *cp == ' ' || *cp == '\t'; cp++)
;
if (*cp != '\0' && *cp != '#')
comment = cp;
fingerprint_one_key(public, comment);
sshkey_free(public);
invalid = 0; /* One good key in the file is sufficient */
}
fclose(f);
free(line);
if (invalid)
fatal("%s is not a public key file.", path);
exit(0);
}
static void
do_gen_all_hostkeys(struct passwd *pw)
{
struct {
char *key_type;
char *key_type_display;
char *path;
} key_types[] = {
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
{ "rsa", "RSA" ,_PATH_HOST_RSA_KEY_FILE },
{ "dsa", "DSA", _PATH_HOST_DSA_KEY_FILE },
#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
{ "ecdsa", "ECDSA",_PATH_HOST_ECDSA_KEY_FILE },
#endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */
#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
{ "ed25519", "ED25519",_PATH_HOST_ED25519_KEY_FILE },
#ifdef WITH_XMSS
{ "xmss", "XMSS",_PATH_HOST_XMSS_KEY_FILE },
#endif /* WITH_XMSS */
{ NULL, NULL, NULL }
};
u_int32_t bits = 0;
int first = 0;
struct stat st;
struct sshkey *private, *public;
char comment[1024], *prv_tmp, *pub_tmp, *prv_file, *pub_file;
int i, type, fd, r;
for (i = 0; key_types[i].key_type; i++) {
public = private = NULL;
prv_tmp = pub_tmp = prv_file = pub_file = NULL;
xasprintf(&prv_file, "%s%s",
identity_file, key_types[i].path);
/* Check whether private key exists and is not zero-length */
if (stat(prv_file, &st) == 0) {
if (st.st_size != 0)
goto next;
} else if (errno != ENOENT) {
error("Could not stat %s: %s", key_types[i].path,
strerror(errno));
goto failnext;
}
/*
* Private key doesn't exist or is invalid; proceed with
* key generation.
*/
xasprintf(&prv_tmp, "%s%s.XXXXXXXXXX",
identity_file, key_types[i].path);
xasprintf(&pub_tmp, "%s%s.pub.XXXXXXXXXX",
identity_file, key_types[i].path);
xasprintf(&pub_file, "%s%s.pub",
identity_file, key_types[i].path);
if (first == 0) {
first = 1;
printf("%s: generating new host keys: ", __progname);
}
printf("%s ", key_types[i].key_type_display);
fflush(stdout);
type = sshkey_type_from_name(key_types[i].key_type);
if ((fd = mkstemp(prv_tmp)) == -1) {
error("Could not save your private key in %s: %s",
prv_tmp, strerror(errno));
goto failnext;
}
(void)close(fd); /* just using mkstemp() to reserve a name */
bits = 0;
type_bits_valid(type, NULL, &bits);
if ((r = sshkey_generate(type, bits, &private)) != 0) {
error("sshkey_generate failed: %s", ssh_err(r));
goto failnext;
}
if ((r = sshkey_from_private(private, &public)) != 0)
fatal("sshkey_from_private failed: %s", ssh_err(r));
snprintf(comment, sizeof comment, "%s@%s", pw->pw_name,
hostname);
if ((r = sshkey_save_private(private, prv_tmp, "",
comment, private_key_format, openssh_format_cipher,
rounds)) != 0) {
error("Saving key \"%s\" failed: %s",
prv_tmp, ssh_err(r));
goto failnext;
}
if ((fd = mkstemp(pub_tmp)) == -1) {
error("Could not save your public key in %s: %s",
pub_tmp, strerror(errno));
goto failnext;
}
(void)fchmod(fd, 0644);
(void)close(fd);
if ((r = sshkey_save_public(public, pub_tmp, comment)) != 0) {
fatal("Unable to save public key to %s: %s",
identity_file, ssh_err(r));
goto failnext;
}
/* Rename temporary files to their permanent locations. */
if (rename(pub_tmp, pub_file) != 0) {
error("Unable to move %s into position: %s",
pub_file, strerror(errno));
goto failnext;
}
if (rename(prv_tmp, prv_file) != 0) {
error("Unable to move %s into position: %s",
key_types[i].path, strerror(errno));
failnext:
first = 0;
goto next;
}
next:
sshkey_free(private);
sshkey_free(public);
free(prv_tmp);
free(pub_tmp);
free(prv_file);
free(pub_file);
}
if (first != 0)
printf("\n");
}
struct known_hosts_ctx {
const char *host; /* Hostname searched for in find/delete case */
FILE *out; /* Output file, stdout for find_hosts case */
int has_unhashed; /* When hashing, original had unhashed hosts */
int found_key; /* For find/delete, host was found */
int invalid; /* File contained invalid items; don't delete */
int hash_hosts; /* Hash hostnames as we go */
int find_host; /* Search for specific hostname */
int delete_host; /* Delete host from known_hosts */
};
static int
known_hosts_hash(struct hostkey_foreach_line *l, void *_ctx)
{
struct known_hosts_ctx *ctx = (struct known_hosts_ctx *)_ctx;
char *hashed, *cp, *hosts, *ohosts;
int has_wild = l->hosts && strcspn(l->hosts, "*?!") != strlen(l->hosts);
int was_hashed = l->hosts && l->hosts[0] == HASH_DELIM;
switch (l->status) {
case HKF_STATUS_OK:
case HKF_STATUS_MATCHED:
/*
* Don't hash hosts already already hashed, with wildcard
* characters or a CA/revocation marker.
*/
if (was_hashed || has_wild || l->marker != MRK_NONE) {
fprintf(ctx->out, "%s\n", l->line);
if (has_wild && !ctx->find_host) {
logit("%s:%lu: ignoring host name "
"with wildcard: %.64s", l->path,
l->linenum, l->hosts);
}
return 0;
}
/*
* Split any comma-separated hostnames from the host list,
* hash and store separately.
*/
ohosts = hosts = xstrdup(l->hosts);
while ((cp = strsep(&hosts, ",")) != NULL && *cp != '\0') {
lowercase(cp);
if ((hashed = host_hash(cp, NULL, 0)) == NULL)
fatal("hash_host failed");
fprintf(ctx->out, "%s %s\n", hashed, l->rawkey);
ctx->has_unhashed = 1;
}
free(ohosts);
return 0;
case HKF_STATUS_INVALID:
/* Retain invalid lines, but mark file as invalid. */
ctx->invalid = 1;
logit("%s:%lu: invalid line", l->path, l->linenum);
/* FALLTHROUGH */
default:
fprintf(ctx->out, "%s\n", l->line);
return 0;
}
/* NOTREACHED */
return -1;
}
static int
known_hosts_find_delete(struct hostkey_foreach_line *l, void *_ctx)
{
struct known_hosts_ctx *ctx = (struct known_hosts_ctx *)_ctx;
enum sshkey_fp_rep rep;
int fptype;
char *fp = NULL, *ra = NULL;
fptype = print_bubblebabble ? SSH_DIGEST_SHA1 : fingerprint_hash;
rep = print_bubblebabble ? SSH_FP_BUBBLEBABBLE : SSH_FP_DEFAULT;
if (l->status == HKF_STATUS_MATCHED) {
if (ctx->delete_host) {
if (l->marker != MRK_NONE) {
/* Don't remove CA and revocation lines */
fprintf(ctx->out, "%s\n", l->line);
} else {
/*
* Hostname matches and has no CA/revoke
* marker, delete it by *not* writing the
* line to ctx->out.
*/
ctx->found_key = 1;
if (!quiet)
printf("# Host %s found: line %lu\n",
ctx->host, l->linenum);
}
return 0;
} else if (ctx->find_host) {
ctx->found_key = 1;
if (!quiet) {
printf("# Host %s found: line %lu %s\n",
ctx->host,
l->linenum, l->marker == MRK_CA ? "CA" :
(l->marker == MRK_REVOKE ? "REVOKED" : ""));
}
if (ctx->hash_hosts)
known_hosts_hash(l, ctx);
else if (print_fingerprint) {
fp = sshkey_fingerprint(l->key, fptype, rep);
ra = sshkey_fingerprint(l->key,
fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_RANDOMART);
if (fp == NULL || ra == NULL)
fatal("%s: sshkey_fingerprint failed",
__func__);
mprintf("%s %s %s%s%s\n", ctx->host,
sshkey_type(l->key), fp,
l->comment[0] ? " " : "",
l->comment);
if (log_level_get() >= SYSLOG_LEVEL_VERBOSE)
printf("%s\n", ra);
free(ra);
free(fp);
} else
fprintf(ctx->out, "%s\n", l->line);
return 0;
}
} else if (ctx->delete_host) {
/* Retain non-matching hosts when deleting */
if (l->status == HKF_STATUS_INVALID) {
ctx->invalid = 1;
logit("%s:%lu: invalid line", l->path, l->linenum);
}
fprintf(ctx->out, "%s\n", l->line);
}
return 0;
}
static void
do_known_hosts(struct passwd *pw, const char *name, int find_host,
int delete_host, int hash_hosts)
{
char *cp, tmp[PATH_MAX], old[PATH_MAX];
int r, fd, oerrno, inplace = 0;
struct known_hosts_ctx ctx;
u_int foreach_options;
+ struct stat sb;
if (!have_identity) {
cp = tilde_expand_filename(_PATH_SSH_USER_HOSTFILE, pw->pw_uid);
if (strlcpy(identity_file, cp, sizeof(identity_file)) >=
sizeof(identity_file))
fatal("Specified known hosts path too long");
free(cp);
have_identity = 1;
}
+ if (stat(identity_file, &sb) != 0)
+ fatal("Cannot stat %s: %s", identity_file, strerror(errno));
memset(&ctx, 0, sizeof(ctx));
ctx.out = stdout;
ctx.host = name;
ctx.hash_hosts = hash_hosts;
ctx.find_host = find_host;
ctx.delete_host = delete_host;
/*
* Find hosts goes to stdout, hash and deletions happen in-place
* A corner case is ssh-keygen -HF foo, which should go to stdout
*/
if (!find_host && (hash_hosts || delete_host)) {
if (strlcpy(tmp, identity_file, sizeof(tmp)) >= sizeof(tmp) ||
strlcat(tmp, ".XXXXXXXXXX", sizeof(tmp)) >= sizeof(tmp) ||
strlcpy(old, identity_file, sizeof(old)) >= sizeof(old) ||
strlcat(old, ".old", sizeof(old)) >= sizeof(old))
fatal("known_hosts path too long");
umask(077);
if ((fd = mkstemp(tmp)) == -1)
fatal("mkstemp: %s", strerror(errno));
if ((ctx.out = fdopen(fd, "w")) == NULL) {
oerrno = errno;
unlink(tmp);
fatal("fdopen: %s", strerror(oerrno));
}
+ fchmod(fd, sb.st_mode & 0644);
inplace = 1;
}
/* XXX support identity_file == "-" for stdin */
foreach_options = find_host ? HKF_WANT_MATCH : 0;
foreach_options |= print_fingerprint ? HKF_WANT_PARSE_KEY : 0;
if ((r = hostkeys_foreach(identity_file, (find_host || !hash_hosts) ?
known_hosts_find_delete : known_hosts_hash, &ctx, name, NULL,
foreach_options)) != 0) {
if (inplace)
unlink(tmp);
fatal("%s: hostkeys_foreach failed: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
}
if (inplace)
fclose(ctx.out);
if (ctx.invalid) {
error("%s is not a valid known_hosts file.", identity_file);
if (inplace) {
error("Not replacing existing known_hosts "
"file because of errors");
unlink(tmp);
}
exit(1);
} else if (delete_host && !ctx.found_key) {
logit("Host %s not found in %s", name, identity_file);
if (inplace)
unlink(tmp);
} else if (inplace) {
/* Backup existing file */
if (unlink(old) == -1 && errno != ENOENT)
fatal("unlink %.100s: %s", old, strerror(errno));
if (link(identity_file, old) == -1)
fatal("link %.100s to %.100s: %s", identity_file, old,
strerror(errno));
/* Move new one into place */
if (rename(tmp, identity_file) == -1) {
error("rename\"%s\" to \"%s\": %s", tmp, identity_file,
strerror(errno));
unlink(tmp);
unlink(old);
exit(1);
}
printf("%s updated.\n", identity_file);
printf("Original contents retained as %s\n", old);
if (ctx.has_unhashed) {
logit("WARNING: %s contains unhashed entries", old);
logit("Delete this file to ensure privacy "
"of hostnames");
}
}
exit (find_host && !ctx.found_key);
}
/*
* Perform changing a passphrase. The argument is the passwd structure
* for the current user.
*/
static void
do_change_passphrase(struct passwd *pw)
{
char *comment;
char *old_passphrase, *passphrase1, *passphrase2;
struct stat st;
struct sshkey *private;
int r;
if (!have_identity)
ask_filename(pw, "Enter file in which the key is");
if (stat(identity_file, &st) == -1)
fatal("%s: %s", identity_file, strerror(errno));
/* Try to load the file with empty passphrase. */
r = sshkey_load_private(identity_file, "", &private, &comment);
if (r == SSH_ERR_KEY_WRONG_PASSPHRASE) {
if (identity_passphrase)
old_passphrase = xstrdup(identity_passphrase);
else
old_passphrase =
read_passphrase("Enter old passphrase: ",
RP_ALLOW_STDIN);
r = sshkey_load_private(identity_file, old_passphrase,
&private, &comment);
freezero(old_passphrase, strlen(old_passphrase));
if (r != 0)
goto badkey;
} else if (r != 0) {
badkey:
fatal("Failed to load key %s: %s", identity_file, ssh_err(r));
}
if (comment)
mprintf("Key has comment '%s'\n", comment);
/* Ask the new passphrase (twice). */
if (identity_new_passphrase) {
passphrase1 = xstrdup(identity_new_passphrase);
passphrase2 = NULL;
} else {
passphrase1 =
read_passphrase("Enter new passphrase (empty for no "
"passphrase): ", RP_ALLOW_STDIN);
passphrase2 = read_passphrase("Enter same passphrase again: ",
RP_ALLOW_STDIN);
/* Verify that they are the same. */
if (strcmp(passphrase1, passphrase2) != 0) {
explicit_bzero(passphrase1, strlen(passphrase1));
explicit_bzero(passphrase2, strlen(passphrase2));
free(passphrase1);
free(passphrase2);
printf("Pass phrases do not match. Try again.\n");
exit(1);
}
/* Destroy the other copy. */
freezero(passphrase2, strlen(passphrase2));
}
/* Save the file using the new passphrase. */
if ((r = sshkey_save_private(private, identity_file, passphrase1,
comment, private_key_format, openssh_format_cipher, rounds)) != 0) {
error("Saving key \"%s\" failed: %s.",
identity_file, ssh_err(r));
freezero(passphrase1, strlen(passphrase1));
sshkey_free(private);
free(comment);
exit(1);
}
/* Destroy the passphrase and the copy of the key in memory. */
freezero(passphrase1, strlen(passphrase1));
sshkey_free(private); /* Destroys contents */
free(comment);
printf("Your identification has been saved with the new passphrase.\n");
exit(0);
}
/*
* Print the SSHFP RR.
*/
static int
do_print_resource_record(struct passwd *pw, char *fname, char *hname,
int print_generic)
{
struct sshkey *public;
char *comment = NULL;
struct stat st;
int r;
if (fname == NULL)
fatal("%s: no filename", __func__);
if (stat(fname, &st) == -1) {
if (errno == ENOENT)
return 0;
fatal("%s: %s", fname, strerror(errno));
}
if ((r = sshkey_load_public(fname, &public, &comment)) != 0)
fatal("Failed to read v2 public key from \"%s\": %s.",
fname, ssh_err(r));
export_dns_rr(hname, public, stdout, print_generic);
sshkey_free(public);
free(comment);
return 1;
}
/*
* Change the comment of a private key file.
*/
static void
do_change_comment(struct passwd *pw, const char *identity_comment)
{
char new_comment[1024], *comment, *passphrase;
struct sshkey *private;
struct sshkey *public;
struct stat st;
int r;
if (!have_identity)
ask_filename(pw, "Enter file in which the key is");
if (stat(identity_file, &st) == -1)
fatal("%s: %s", identity_file, strerror(errno));
if ((r = sshkey_load_private(identity_file, "",
&private, &comment)) == 0)
passphrase = xstrdup("");
else if (r != SSH_ERR_KEY_WRONG_PASSPHRASE)
fatal("Cannot load private key \"%s\": %s.",
identity_file, ssh_err(r));
else {
if (identity_passphrase)
passphrase = xstrdup(identity_passphrase);
else if (identity_new_passphrase)
passphrase = xstrdup(identity_new_passphrase);
else
passphrase = read_passphrase("Enter passphrase: ",
RP_ALLOW_STDIN);
/* Try to load using the passphrase. */
if ((r = sshkey_load_private(identity_file, passphrase,
&private, &comment)) != 0) {
freezero(passphrase, strlen(passphrase));
fatal("Cannot load private key \"%s\": %s.",
identity_file, ssh_err(r));
}
}
if (private->type != KEY_ED25519 && private->type != KEY_XMSS &&
private_key_format != SSHKEY_PRIVATE_OPENSSH) {
error("Comments are only supported for keys stored in "
"the new format (-o).");
explicit_bzero(passphrase, strlen(passphrase));
sshkey_free(private);
exit(1);
}
if (comment)
printf("Old comment: %s\n", comment);
else
printf("No existing comment\n");
if (identity_comment) {
strlcpy(new_comment, identity_comment, sizeof(new_comment));
} else {
printf("New comment: ");
fflush(stdout);
if (!fgets(new_comment, sizeof(new_comment), stdin)) {
explicit_bzero(passphrase, strlen(passphrase));
sshkey_free(private);
exit(1);
}
new_comment[strcspn(new_comment, "\n")] = '\0';
}
if (comment != NULL && strcmp(comment, new_comment) == 0) {
printf("No change to comment\n");
free(passphrase);
sshkey_free(private);
free(comment);
exit(0);
}
/* Save the file using the new passphrase. */
if ((r = sshkey_save_private(private, identity_file, passphrase,
new_comment, private_key_format, openssh_format_cipher,
rounds)) != 0) {
error("Saving key \"%s\" failed: %s",
identity_file, ssh_err(r));
freezero(passphrase, strlen(passphrase));
sshkey_free(private);
free(comment);
exit(1);
}
freezero(passphrase, strlen(passphrase));
if ((r = sshkey_from_private(private, &public)) != 0)
fatal("sshkey_from_private failed: %s", ssh_err(r));
sshkey_free(private);
strlcat(identity_file, ".pub", sizeof(identity_file));
if ((r = sshkey_save_public(public, identity_file, new_comment)) != 0) {
fatal("Unable to save public key to %s: %s",
identity_file, ssh_err(r));
}
sshkey_free(public);
free(comment);
if (strlen(new_comment) > 0)
printf("Comment '%s' applied\n", new_comment);
else
printf("Comment removed\n");
exit(0);
}
static void
-add_flag_option(struct sshbuf *c, const char *name)
+cert_ext_add(const char *key, const char *value, int iscrit)
{
- int r;
-
- debug3("%s: %s", __func__, name);
- if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(c, name)) != 0 ||
- (r = sshbuf_put_string(c, NULL, 0)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ cert_ext = xreallocarray(cert_ext, ncert_ext + 1, sizeof(*cert_ext));
+ cert_ext[ncert_ext].key = xstrdup(key);
+ cert_ext[ncert_ext].val = value == NULL ? NULL : xstrdup(value);
+ cert_ext[ncert_ext].crit = iscrit;
+ ncert_ext++;
}
-static void
-add_string_option(struct sshbuf *c, const char *name, const char *value)
+/* qsort(3) comparison function for certificate extensions */
+static int
+cert_ext_cmp(const void *_a, const void *_b)
{
- struct sshbuf *b;
+ const struct cert_ext *a = (const struct cert_ext *)_a;
+ const struct cert_ext *b = (const struct cert_ext *)_b;
int r;
- debug3("%s: %s=%s", __func__, name, value);
- if ((b = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
- fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
- if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, value)) != 0 ||
- (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(c, name)) != 0 ||
- (r = sshbuf_put_stringb(c, b)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
-
- sshbuf_free(b);
+ if (a->crit != b->crit)
+ return (a->crit < b->crit) ? -1 : 1;
+ if ((r = strcmp(a->key, b->key)) != 0)
+ return r;
+ if ((a->val == NULL) != (b->val == NULL))
+ return (a->val == NULL) ? -1 : 1;
+ if (a->val != NULL && (r = strcmp(a->val, b->val)) != 0)
+ return r;
+ return 0;
}
#define OPTIONS_CRITICAL 1
#define OPTIONS_EXTENSIONS 2
static void
prepare_options_buf(struct sshbuf *c, int which)
{
+ struct sshbuf *b;
size_t i;
+ int r;
+ const struct cert_ext *ext;
+ if ((b = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
+ fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
sshbuf_reset(c);
- if ((which & OPTIONS_CRITICAL) != 0 &&
- certflags_command != NULL)
- add_string_option(c, "force-command", certflags_command);
- if ((which & OPTIONS_EXTENSIONS) != 0 &&
- (certflags_flags & CERTOPT_X_FWD) != 0)
- add_flag_option(c, "permit-X11-forwarding");
- if ((which & OPTIONS_EXTENSIONS) != 0 &&
- (certflags_flags & CERTOPT_AGENT_FWD) != 0)
- add_flag_option(c, "permit-agent-forwarding");
- if ((which & OPTIONS_EXTENSIONS) != 0 &&
- (certflags_flags & CERTOPT_PORT_FWD) != 0)
- add_flag_option(c, "permit-port-forwarding");
- if ((which & OPTIONS_EXTENSIONS) != 0 &&
- (certflags_flags & CERTOPT_PTY) != 0)
- add_flag_option(c, "permit-pty");
- if ((which & OPTIONS_EXTENSIONS) != 0 &&
- (certflags_flags & CERTOPT_USER_RC) != 0)
- add_flag_option(c, "permit-user-rc");
- if ((which & OPTIONS_EXTENSIONS) != 0 &&
- (certflags_flags & CERTOPT_NO_REQUIRE_USER_PRESENCE) != 0)
- add_flag_option(c, "no-touch-required");
- if ((which & OPTIONS_CRITICAL) != 0 &&
- certflags_src_addr != NULL)
- add_string_option(c, "source-address", certflags_src_addr);
- for (i = 0; i < ncert_userext; i++) {
- if ((cert_userext[i].crit && (which & OPTIONS_EXTENSIONS)) ||
- (!cert_userext[i].crit && (which & OPTIONS_CRITICAL)))
+ for (i = 0; i < ncert_ext; i++) {
+ ext = &cert_ext[i];
+ if ((ext->crit && (which & OPTIONS_EXTENSIONS)) ||
+ (!ext->crit && (which & OPTIONS_CRITICAL)))
continue;
- if (cert_userext[i].val == NULL)
- add_flag_option(c, cert_userext[i].key);
- else {
- add_string_option(c, cert_userext[i].key,
- cert_userext[i].val);
+ if (ext->val == NULL) {
+ /* flag option */
+ debug3("%s: %s", __func__, ext->key);
+ if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(c, ext->key)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_string(c, NULL, 0)) != 0)
+ fatal("%s: buffer: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ } else {
+ /* key/value option */
+ debug3("%s: %s=%s", __func__, ext->key, ext->val);
+ sshbuf_reset(b);
+ if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(c, ext->key)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, ext->val)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_stringb(c, b)) != 0)
+ fatal("%s: buffer: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
}
}
+ sshbuf_free(b);
+}
+
+static void
+finalise_cert_exts(void)
+{
+ /* critical options */
+ if (certflags_command != NULL)
+ cert_ext_add("force-command", certflags_command, 1);
+ if (certflags_src_addr != NULL)
+ cert_ext_add("source-address", certflags_src_addr, 1);
+ /* extensions */
+ if ((certflags_flags & CERTOPT_X_FWD) != 0)
+ cert_ext_add("permit-X11-forwarding", NULL, 0);
+ if ((certflags_flags & CERTOPT_AGENT_FWD) != 0)
+ cert_ext_add("permit-agent-forwarding", NULL, 0);
+ if ((certflags_flags & CERTOPT_PORT_FWD) != 0)
+ cert_ext_add("permit-port-forwarding", NULL, 0);
+ if ((certflags_flags & CERTOPT_PTY) != 0)
+ cert_ext_add("permit-pty", NULL, 0);
+ if ((certflags_flags & CERTOPT_USER_RC) != 0)
+ cert_ext_add("permit-user-rc", NULL, 0);
+ if ((certflags_flags & CERTOPT_NO_REQUIRE_USER_PRESENCE) != 0)
+ cert_ext_add("no-touch-required", NULL, 0);
+ /* order lexically by key */
+ if (ncert_ext > 0)
+ qsort(cert_ext, ncert_ext, sizeof(*cert_ext), cert_ext_cmp);
}
static struct sshkey *
load_pkcs11_key(char *path)
{
#ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11
struct sshkey **keys = NULL, *public, *private = NULL;
int r, i, nkeys;
if ((r = sshkey_load_public(path, &public, NULL)) != 0)
fatal("Couldn't load CA public key \"%s\": %s",
path, ssh_err(r));
nkeys = pkcs11_add_provider(pkcs11provider, identity_passphrase,
&keys, NULL);
debug3("%s: %d keys", __func__, nkeys);
if (nkeys <= 0)
fatal("cannot read public key from pkcs11");
for (i = 0; i < nkeys; i++) {
if (sshkey_equal_public(public, keys[i])) {
private = keys[i];
continue;
}
sshkey_free(keys[i]);
}
free(keys);
sshkey_free(public);
return private;
#else
fatal("no pkcs11 support");
#endif /* ENABLE_PKCS11 */
}
/* Signer for sshkey_certify_custom that uses the agent */
static int
agent_signer(struct sshkey *key, u_char **sigp, size_t *lenp,
const u_char *data, size_t datalen,
- const char *alg, const char *provider, u_int compat, void *ctx)
+ const char *alg, const char *provider, const char *pin,
+ u_int compat, void *ctx)
{
int *agent_fdp = (int *)ctx;
return ssh_agent_sign(*agent_fdp, key, sigp, lenp,
data, datalen, alg, compat);
}
static void
do_ca_sign(struct passwd *pw, const char *ca_key_path, int prefer_agent,
unsigned long long cert_serial, int cert_serial_autoinc,
int argc, char **argv)
{
int r, i, found, agent_fd = -1;
u_int n;
struct sshkey *ca, *public;
char valid[64], *otmp, *tmp, *cp, *out, *comment;
- char *ca_fp = NULL, **plist = NULL;
+ char *ca_fp = NULL, **plist = NULL, *pin = NULL;
struct ssh_identitylist *agent_ids;
size_t j;
struct notifier_ctx *notifier = NULL;
#ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11
pkcs11_init(1);
#endif
tmp = tilde_expand_filename(ca_key_path, pw->pw_uid);
if (pkcs11provider != NULL) {
/* If a PKCS#11 token was specified then try to use it */
if ((ca = load_pkcs11_key(tmp)) == NULL)
fatal("No PKCS#11 key matching %s found", ca_key_path);
} else if (prefer_agent) {
/*
* Agent signature requested. Try to use agent after making
* sure the public key specified is actually present in the
* agent.
*/
if ((r = sshkey_load_public(tmp, &ca, NULL)) != 0)
fatal("Cannot load CA public key %s: %s",
tmp, ssh_err(r));
if ((r = ssh_get_authentication_socket(&agent_fd)) != 0)
fatal("Cannot use public key for CA signature: %s",
ssh_err(r));
if ((r = ssh_fetch_identitylist(agent_fd, &agent_ids)) != 0)
fatal("Retrieve agent key list: %s", ssh_err(r));
found = 0;
for (j = 0; j < agent_ids->nkeys; j++) {
if (sshkey_equal(ca, agent_ids->keys[j])) {
found = 1;
break;
}
}
if (!found)
fatal("CA key %s not found in agent", tmp);
ssh_free_identitylist(agent_ids);
ca->flags |= SSHKEY_FLAG_EXT;
} else {
/* CA key is assumed to be a private key on the filesystem */
ca = load_identity(tmp, NULL);
+ if (sshkey_is_sk(ca) &&
+ (ca->sk_flags & SSH_SK_USER_VERIFICATION_REQD)) {
+ if ((pin = read_passphrase("Enter PIN for CA key: ",
+ RP_ALLOW_STDIN)) == NULL)
+ fatal("%s: couldn't read PIN", __func__);
+ }
}
free(tmp);
if (key_type_name != NULL) {
if (sshkey_type_from_name(key_type_name) != ca->type) {
fatal("CA key type %s doesn't match specified %s",
sshkey_ssh_name(ca), key_type_name);
}
} else if (ca->type == KEY_RSA) {
/* Default to a good signature algorithm */
key_type_name = "rsa-sha2-512";
}
ca_fp = sshkey_fingerprint(ca, fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_DEFAULT);
+ finalise_cert_exts();
for (i = 0; i < argc; i++) {
/* Split list of principals */
n = 0;
if (cert_principals != NULL) {
otmp = tmp = xstrdup(cert_principals);
plist = NULL;
for (; (cp = strsep(&tmp, ",")) != NULL; n++) {
plist = xreallocarray(plist, n + 1, sizeof(*plist));
if (*(plist[n] = xstrdup(cp)) == '\0')
fatal("Empty principal name");
}
free(otmp);
}
if (n > SSHKEY_CERT_MAX_PRINCIPALS)
fatal("Too many certificate principals specified");
tmp = tilde_expand_filename(argv[i], pw->pw_uid);
if ((r = sshkey_load_public(tmp, &public, &comment)) != 0)
fatal("%s: unable to open \"%s\": %s",
__func__, tmp, ssh_err(r));
if (sshkey_is_cert(public))
fatal("%s: key \"%s\" type %s cannot be certified",
__func__, tmp, sshkey_type(public));
/* Prepare certificate to sign */
if ((r = sshkey_to_certified(public)) != 0)
fatal("Could not upgrade key %s to certificate: %s",
tmp, ssh_err(r));
public->cert->type = cert_key_type;
public->cert->serial = (u_int64_t)cert_serial;
public->cert->key_id = xstrdup(cert_key_id);
public->cert->nprincipals = n;
public->cert->principals = plist;
public->cert->valid_after = cert_valid_from;
public->cert->valid_before = cert_valid_to;
prepare_options_buf(public->cert->critical, OPTIONS_CRITICAL);
prepare_options_buf(public->cert->extensions,
OPTIONS_EXTENSIONS);
if ((r = sshkey_from_private(ca,
&public->cert->signature_key)) != 0)
fatal("sshkey_from_private (ca key): %s", ssh_err(r));
if (agent_fd != -1 && (ca->flags & SSHKEY_FLAG_EXT) != 0) {
if ((r = sshkey_certify_custom(public, ca,
- key_type_name, sk_provider, agent_signer,
+ key_type_name, sk_provider, NULL, agent_signer,
&agent_fd)) != 0)
fatal("Couldn't certify key %s via agent: %s",
tmp, ssh_err(r));
} else {
if (sshkey_is_sk(ca) &&
(ca->sk_flags & SSH_SK_USER_PRESENCE_REQD)) {
notifier = notify_start(0,
"Confirm user presence for key %s %s",
sshkey_type(ca), ca_fp);
}
r = sshkey_certify(public, ca, key_type_name,
- sk_provider);
+ sk_provider, pin);
notify_complete(notifier);
if (r != 0)
fatal("Couldn't certify key %s: %s",
tmp, ssh_err(r));
}
if ((cp = strrchr(tmp, '.')) != NULL && strcmp(cp, ".pub") == 0)
*cp = '\0';
xasprintf(&out, "%s-cert.pub", tmp);
free(tmp);
if ((r = sshkey_save_public(public, out, comment)) != 0) {
fatal("Unable to save public key to %s: %s",
identity_file, ssh_err(r));
}
if (!quiet) {
sshkey_format_cert_validity(public->cert,
valid, sizeof(valid));
logit("Signed %s key %s: id \"%s\" serial %llu%s%s "
"valid %s", sshkey_cert_type(public),
out, public->cert->key_id,
(unsigned long long)public->cert->serial,
cert_principals != NULL ? " for " : "",
cert_principals != NULL ? cert_principals : "",
valid);
}
sshkey_free(public);
free(out);
if (cert_serial_autoinc)
cert_serial++;
}
+ if (pin != NULL)
+ freezero(pin, strlen(pin));
free(ca_fp);
#ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11
pkcs11_terminate();
#endif
exit(0);
}
static u_int64_t
parse_relative_time(const char *s, time_t now)
{
int64_t mul, secs;
mul = *s == '-' ? -1 : 1;
if ((secs = convtime(s + 1)) == -1)
fatal("Invalid relative certificate time %s", s);
if (mul == -1 && secs > now)
fatal("Certificate time %s cannot be represented", s);
return now + (u_int64_t)(secs * mul);
}
static void
parse_cert_times(char *timespec)
{
char *from, *to;
time_t now = time(NULL);
int64_t secs;
/* +timespec relative to now */
if (*timespec == '+' && strchr(timespec, ':') == NULL) {
if ((secs = convtime(timespec + 1)) == -1)
fatal("Invalid relative certificate life %s", timespec);
cert_valid_to = now + secs;
/*
* Backdate certificate one minute to avoid problems on hosts
* with poorly-synchronised clocks.
*/
cert_valid_from = ((now - 59)/ 60) * 60;
return;
}
/*
* from:to, where
* from := [+-]timespec | YYYYMMDD | YYYYMMDDHHMMSS | "always"
* to := [+-]timespec | YYYYMMDD | YYYYMMDDHHMMSS | "forever"
*/
from = xstrdup(timespec);
to = strchr(from, ':');
if (to == NULL || from == to || *(to + 1) == '\0')
fatal("Invalid certificate life specification %s", timespec);
*to++ = '\0';
if (*from == '-' || *from == '+')
cert_valid_from = parse_relative_time(from, now);
else if (strcmp(from, "always") == 0)
cert_valid_from = 0;
else if (parse_absolute_time(from, &cert_valid_from) != 0)
fatal("Invalid from time \"%s\"", from);
if (*to == '-' || *to == '+')
cert_valid_to = parse_relative_time(to, now);
else if (strcmp(to, "forever") == 0)
cert_valid_to = ~(u_int64_t)0;
else if (parse_absolute_time(to, &cert_valid_to) != 0)
fatal("Invalid to time \"%s\"", to);
if (cert_valid_to <= cert_valid_from)
fatal("Empty certificate validity interval");
free(from);
}
static void
add_cert_option(char *opt)
{
char *val, *cp;
int iscrit = 0;
if (strcasecmp(opt, "clear") == 0)
certflags_flags = 0;
else if (strcasecmp(opt, "no-x11-forwarding") == 0)
certflags_flags &= ~CERTOPT_X_FWD;
else if (strcasecmp(opt, "permit-x11-forwarding") == 0)
certflags_flags |= CERTOPT_X_FWD;
else if (strcasecmp(opt, "no-agent-forwarding") == 0)
certflags_flags &= ~CERTOPT_AGENT_FWD;
else if (strcasecmp(opt, "permit-agent-forwarding") == 0)
certflags_flags |= CERTOPT_AGENT_FWD;
else if (strcasecmp(opt, "no-port-forwarding") == 0)
certflags_flags &= ~CERTOPT_PORT_FWD;
else if (strcasecmp(opt, "permit-port-forwarding") == 0)
certflags_flags |= CERTOPT_PORT_FWD;
else if (strcasecmp(opt, "no-pty") == 0)
certflags_flags &= ~CERTOPT_PTY;
else if (strcasecmp(opt, "permit-pty") == 0)
certflags_flags |= CERTOPT_PTY;
else if (strcasecmp(opt, "no-user-rc") == 0)
certflags_flags &= ~CERTOPT_USER_RC;
else if (strcasecmp(opt, "permit-user-rc") == 0)
certflags_flags |= CERTOPT_USER_RC;
else if (strcasecmp(opt, "touch-required") == 0)
certflags_flags &= ~CERTOPT_NO_REQUIRE_USER_PRESENCE;
else if (strcasecmp(opt, "no-touch-required") == 0)
certflags_flags |= CERTOPT_NO_REQUIRE_USER_PRESENCE;
else if (strncasecmp(opt, "force-command=", 14) == 0) {
val = opt + 14;
if (*val == '\0')
fatal("Empty force-command option");
if (certflags_command != NULL)
fatal("force-command already specified");
certflags_command = xstrdup(val);
} else if (strncasecmp(opt, "source-address=", 15) == 0) {
val = opt + 15;
if (*val == '\0')
fatal("Empty source-address option");
if (certflags_src_addr != NULL)
fatal("source-address already specified");
if (addr_match_cidr_list(NULL, val) != 0)
fatal("Invalid source-address list");
certflags_src_addr = xstrdup(val);
} else if (strncasecmp(opt, "extension:", 10) == 0 ||
(iscrit = (strncasecmp(opt, "critical:", 9) == 0))) {
val = xstrdup(strchr(opt, ':') + 1);
if ((cp = strchr(val, '=')) != NULL)
*cp++ = '\0';
- cert_userext = xreallocarray(cert_userext, ncert_userext + 1,
- sizeof(*cert_userext));
- cert_userext[ncert_userext].key = val;
- cert_userext[ncert_userext].val = cp == NULL ?
- NULL : xstrdup(cp);
- cert_userext[ncert_userext].crit = iscrit;
- ncert_userext++;
+ cert_ext_add(val, cp, iscrit);
+ free(val);
} else
fatal("Unsupported certificate option \"%s\"", opt);
}
static void
show_options(struct sshbuf *optbuf, int in_critical)
{
- char *name, *arg;
+ char *name, *arg, *hex;
struct sshbuf *options, *option = NULL;
int r;
if ((options = sshbuf_fromb(optbuf)) == NULL)
fatal("%s: sshbuf_fromb failed", __func__);
while (sshbuf_len(options) != 0) {
sshbuf_free(option);
option = NULL;
if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(options, &name, NULL)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_froms(options, &option)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
printf(" %s", name);
if (!in_critical &&
(strcmp(name, "permit-X11-forwarding") == 0 ||
strcmp(name, "permit-agent-forwarding") == 0 ||
strcmp(name, "permit-port-forwarding") == 0 ||
strcmp(name, "permit-pty") == 0 ||
strcmp(name, "permit-user-rc") == 0 ||
strcmp(name, "no-touch-required") == 0)) {
printf("\n");
} else if (in_critical &&
(strcmp(name, "force-command") == 0 ||
strcmp(name, "source-address") == 0)) {
if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(option, &arg, NULL)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s",
__func__, ssh_err(r));
printf(" %s\n", arg);
free(arg);
- } else {
- printf(" UNKNOWN OPTION (len %zu)\n",
- sshbuf_len(option));
+ } else if (sshbuf_len(option) > 0) {
+ hex = sshbuf_dtob16(option);
+ printf(" UNKNOWN OPTION: %s (len %zu)\n",
+ hex, sshbuf_len(option));
sshbuf_reset(option);
- }
+ free(hex);
+ } else
+ printf(" UNKNOWN FLAG OPTION\n");
free(name);
if (sshbuf_len(option) != 0)
fatal("Option corrupt: extra data at end");
}
sshbuf_free(option);
sshbuf_free(options);
}
static void
print_cert(struct sshkey *key)
{
char valid[64], *key_fp, *ca_fp;
u_int i;
key_fp = sshkey_fingerprint(key, fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_DEFAULT);
ca_fp = sshkey_fingerprint(key->cert->signature_key,
fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_DEFAULT);
if (key_fp == NULL || ca_fp == NULL)
fatal("%s: sshkey_fingerprint fail", __func__);
sshkey_format_cert_validity(key->cert, valid, sizeof(valid));
printf(" Type: %s %s certificate\n", sshkey_ssh_name(key),
sshkey_cert_type(key));
printf(" Public key: %s %s\n", sshkey_type(key), key_fp);
printf(" Signing CA: %s %s (using %s)\n",
sshkey_type(key->cert->signature_key), ca_fp,
key->cert->signature_type);
printf(" Key ID: \"%s\"\n", key->cert->key_id);
printf(" Serial: %llu\n", (unsigned long long)key->cert->serial);
printf(" Valid: %s\n", valid);
printf(" Principals: ");
if (key->cert->nprincipals == 0)
printf("(none)\n");
else {
for (i = 0; i < key->cert->nprincipals; i++)
printf("\n %s",
key->cert->principals[i]);
printf("\n");
}
printf(" Critical Options: ");
if (sshbuf_len(key->cert->critical) == 0)
printf("(none)\n");
else {
printf("\n");
show_options(key->cert->critical, 1);
}
printf(" Extensions: ");
if (sshbuf_len(key->cert->extensions) == 0)
printf("(none)\n");
else {
printf("\n");
show_options(key->cert->extensions, 0);
}
}
static void
do_show_cert(struct passwd *pw)
{
struct sshkey *key = NULL;
struct stat st;
int r, is_stdin = 0, ok = 0;
FILE *f;
char *cp, *line = NULL;
const char *path;
size_t linesize = 0;
u_long lnum = 0;
if (!have_identity)
ask_filename(pw, "Enter file in which the key is");
if (strcmp(identity_file, "-") != 0 && stat(identity_file, &st) == -1)
fatal("%s: %s: %s", __progname, identity_file, strerror(errno));
path = identity_file;
if (strcmp(path, "-") == 0) {
f = stdin;
path = "(stdin)";
is_stdin = 1;
} else if ((f = fopen(identity_file, "r")) == NULL)
fatal("fopen %s: %s", identity_file, strerror(errno));
while (getline(&line, &linesize, f) != -1) {
lnum++;
sshkey_free(key);
key = NULL;
/* Trim leading space and comments */
cp = line + strspn(line, " \t");
if (*cp == '#' || *cp == '\0')
continue;
if ((key = sshkey_new(KEY_UNSPEC)) == NULL)
fatal("sshkey_new");
if ((r = sshkey_read(key, &cp)) != 0) {
error("%s:%lu: invalid key: %s", path,
lnum, ssh_err(r));
continue;
}
if (!sshkey_is_cert(key)) {
error("%s:%lu is not a certificate", path, lnum);
continue;
}
ok = 1;
if (!is_stdin && lnum == 1)
printf("%s:\n", path);
else
printf("%s:%lu:\n", path, lnum);
print_cert(key);
}
free(line);
sshkey_free(key);
fclose(f);
exit(ok ? 0 : 1);
}
static void
load_krl(const char *path, struct ssh_krl **krlp)
{
struct sshbuf *krlbuf;
int r;
if ((r = sshbuf_load_file(path, &krlbuf)) != 0)
fatal("Unable to load KRL: %s", ssh_err(r));
/* XXX check sigs */
if ((r = ssh_krl_from_blob(krlbuf, krlp, NULL, 0)) != 0 ||
*krlp == NULL)
fatal("Invalid KRL file: %s", ssh_err(r));
sshbuf_free(krlbuf);
}
static void
hash_to_blob(const char *cp, u_char **blobp, size_t *lenp,
const char *file, u_long lnum)
{
char *tmp;
size_t tlen;
struct sshbuf *b;
int r;
if (strncmp(cp, "SHA256:", 7) != 0)
fatal("%s:%lu: unsupported hash algorithm", file, lnum);
cp += 7;
/*
* OpenSSH base64 hashes omit trailing '='
* characters; put them back for decode.
*/
tlen = strlen(cp);
tmp = xmalloc(tlen + 4 + 1);
strlcpy(tmp, cp, tlen + 1);
while ((tlen % 4) != 0) {
tmp[tlen++] = '=';
tmp[tlen] = '\0';
}
if ((b = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
if ((r = sshbuf_b64tod(b, tmp)) != 0)
fatal("%s:%lu: decode hash failed: %s", file, lnum, ssh_err(r));
free(tmp);
*lenp = sshbuf_len(b);
*blobp = xmalloc(*lenp);
memcpy(*blobp, sshbuf_ptr(b), *lenp);
sshbuf_free(b);
}
static void
update_krl_from_file(struct passwd *pw, const char *file, int wild_ca,
const struct sshkey *ca, struct ssh_krl *krl)
{
struct sshkey *key = NULL;
u_long lnum = 0;
char *path, *cp, *ep, *line = NULL;
u_char *blob = NULL;
size_t blen = 0, linesize = 0;
unsigned long long serial, serial2;
int i, was_explicit_key, was_sha1, was_sha256, was_hash, r;
FILE *krl_spec;
path = tilde_expand_filename(file, pw->pw_uid);
if (strcmp(path, "-") == 0) {
krl_spec = stdin;
free(path);
path = xstrdup("(standard input)");
} else if ((krl_spec = fopen(path, "r")) == NULL)
fatal("fopen %s: %s", path, strerror(errno));
if (!quiet)
printf("Revoking from %s\n", path);
while (getline(&line, &linesize, krl_spec) != -1) {
lnum++;
was_explicit_key = was_sha1 = was_sha256 = was_hash = 0;
cp = line + strspn(line, " \t");
/* Trim trailing space, comments and strip \n */
for (i = 0, r = -1; cp[i] != '\0'; i++) {
if (cp[i] == '#' || cp[i] == '\n') {
cp[i] = '\0';
break;
}
if (cp[i] == ' ' || cp[i] == '\t') {
/* Remember the start of a span of whitespace */
if (r == -1)
r = i;
} else
r = -1;
}
if (r != -1)
cp[r] = '\0';
if (*cp == '\0')
continue;
if (strncasecmp(cp, "serial:", 7) == 0) {
if (ca == NULL && !wild_ca) {
fatal("revoking certificates by serial number "
"requires specification of a CA key");
}
cp += 7;
cp = cp + strspn(cp, " \t");
errno = 0;
serial = strtoull(cp, &ep, 0);
if (*cp == '\0' || (*ep != '\0' && *ep != '-'))
fatal("%s:%lu: invalid serial \"%s\"",
path, lnum, cp);
if (errno == ERANGE && serial == ULLONG_MAX)
fatal("%s:%lu: serial out of range",
path, lnum);
serial2 = serial;
if (*ep == '-') {
cp = ep + 1;
errno = 0;
serial2 = strtoull(cp, &ep, 0);
if (*cp == '\0' || *ep != '\0')
fatal("%s:%lu: invalid serial \"%s\"",
path, lnum, cp);
if (errno == ERANGE && serial2 == ULLONG_MAX)
fatal("%s:%lu: serial out of range",
path, lnum);
if (serial2 <= serial)
fatal("%s:%lu: invalid serial range "
"%llu:%llu", path, lnum,
(unsigned long long)serial,
(unsigned long long)serial2);
}
if (ssh_krl_revoke_cert_by_serial_range(krl,
ca, serial, serial2) != 0) {
fatal("%s: revoke serial failed",
__func__);
}
} else if (strncasecmp(cp, "id:", 3) == 0) {
if (ca == NULL && !wild_ca) {
fatal("revoking certificates by key ID "
"requires specification of a CA key");
}
cp += 3;
cp = cp + strspn(cp, " \t");
if (ssh_krl_revoke_cert_by_key_id(krl, ca, cp) != 0)
fatal("%s: revoke key ID failed", __func__);
} else if (strncasecmp(cp, "hash:", 5) == 0) {
cp += 5;
cp = cp + strspn(cp, " \t");
hash_to_blob(cp, &blob, &blen, file, lnum);
r = ssh_krl_revoke_key_sha256(krl, blob, blen);
if (r != 0)
fatal("%s: revoke key failed: %s",
__func__, ssh_err(r));
} else {
if (strncasecmp(cp, "key:", 4) == 0) {
cp += 4;
cp = cp + strspn(cp, " \t");
was_explicit_key = 1;
} else if (strncasecmp(cp, "sha1:", 5) == 0) {
cp += 5;
cp = cp + strspn(cp, " \t");
was_sha1 = 1;
} else if (strncasecmp(cp, "sha256:", 7) == 0) {
cp += 7;
cp = cp + strspn(cp, " \t");
was_sha256 = 1;
/*
* Just try to process the line as a key.
* Parsing will fail if it isn't.
*/
}
if ((key = sshkey_new(KEY_UNSPEC)) == NULL)
fatal("sshkey_new");
if ((r = sshkey_read(key, &cp)) != 0)
fatal("%s:%lu: invalid key: %s",
path, lnum, ssh_err(r));
if (was_explicit_key)
r = ssh_krl_revoke_key_explicit(krl, key);
else if (was_sha1) {
if (sshkey_fingerprint_raw(key,
SSH_DIGEST_SHA1, &blob, &blen) != 0) {
fatal("%s:%lu: fingerprint failed",
file, lnum);
}
r = ssh_krl_revoke_key_sha1(krl, blob, blen);
} else if (was_sha256) {
if (sshkey_fingerprint_raw(key,
SSH_DIGEST_SHA256, &blob, &blen) != 0) {
fatal("%s:%lu: fingerprint failed",
file, lnum);
}
r = ssh_krl_revoke_key_sha256(krl, blob, blen);
} else
r = ssh_krl_revoke_key(krl, key);
if (r != 0)
fatal("%s: revoke key failed: %s",
__func__, ssh_err(r));
freezero(blob, blen);
blob = NULL;
blen = 0;
sshkey_free(key);
}
}
if (strcmp(path, "-") != 0)
fclose(krl_spec);
free(line);
free(path);
}
static void
do_gen_krl(struct passwd *pw, int updating, const char *ca_key_path,
unsigned long long krl_version, const char *krl_comment,
int argc, char **argv)
{
struct ssh_krl *krl;
struct stat sb;
struct sshkey *ca = NULL;
int i, r, wild_ca = 0;
char *tmp;
struct sshbuf *kbuf;
if (*identity_file == '\0')
fatal("KRL generation requires an output file");
if (stat(identity_file, &sb) == -1) {
if (errno != ENOENT)
fatal("Cannot access KRL \"%s\": %s",
identity_file, strerror(errno));
if (updating)
fatal("KRL \"%s\" does not exist", identity_file);
}
if (ca_key_path != NULL) {
if (strcasecmp(ca_key_path, "none") == 0)
wild_ca = 1;
else {
tmp = tilde_expand_filename(ca_key_path, pw->pw_uid);
if ((r = sshkey_load_public(tmp, &ca, NULL)) != 0)
fatal("Cannot load CA public key %s: %s",
tmp, ssh_err(r));
free(tmp);
}
}
if (updating)
load_krl(identity_file, &krl);
else if ((krl = ssh_krl_init()) == NULL)
fatal("couldn't create KRL");
if (krl_version != 0)
ssh_krl_set_version(krl, krl_version);
if (krl_comment != NULL)
ssh_krl_set_comment(krl, krl_comment);
for (i = 0; i < argc; i++)
update_krl_from_file(pw, argv[i], wild_ca, ca, krl);
if ((kbuf = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
fatal("sshbuf_new failed");
if (ssh_krl_to_blob(krl, kbuf, NULL, 0) != 0)
fatal("Couldn't generate KRL");
if ((r = sshbuf_write_file(identity_file, kbuf)) != 0)
fatal("write %s: %s", identity_file, strerror(errno));
sshbuf_free(kbuf);
ssh_krl_free(krl);
sshkey_free(ca);
}
static void
do_check_krl(struct passwd *pw, int print_krl, int argc, char **argv)
{
int i, r, ret = 0;
char *comment;
struct ssh_krl *krl;
struct sshkey *k;
if (*identity_file == '\0')
fatal("KRL checking requires an input file");
load_krl(identity_file, &krl);
if (print_krl)
krl_dump(krl, stdout);
for (i = 0; i < argc; i++) {
if ((r = sshkey_load_public(argv[i], &k, &comment)) != 0)
fatal("Cannot load public key %s: %s",
argv[i], ssh_err(r));
r = ssh_krl_check_key(krl, k);
printf("%s%s%s%s: %s\n", argv[i],
*comment ? " (" : "", comment, *comment ? ")" : "",
r == 0 ? "ok" : "REVOKED");
if (r != 0)
ret = 1;
sshkey_free(k);
free(comment);
}
ssh_krl_free(krl);
exit(ret);
}
static struct sshkey *
load_sign_key(const char *keypath, const struct sshkey *pubkey)
{
size_t i, slen, plen = strlen(keypath);
char *privpath = xstrdup(keypath);
const char *suffixes[] = { "-cert.pub", ".pub", NULL };
struct sshkey *ret = NULL, *privkey = NULL;
int r;
/*
* If passed a public key filename, then try to locate the corresponding
* private key. This lets us specify certificates on the command-line
* and have ssh-keygen find the appropriate private key.
*/
for (i = 0; suffixes[i]; i++) {
slen = strlen(suffixes[i]);
if (plen <= slen ||
strcmp(privpath + plen - slen, suffixes[i]) != 0)
continue;
privpath[plen - slen] = '\0';
debug("%s: %s looks like a public key, using private key "
"path %s instead", __func__, keypath, privpath);
}
if ((privkey = load_identity(privpath, NULL)) == NULL) {
error("Couldn't load identity %s", keypath);
goto done;
}
if (!sshkey_equal_public(pubkey, privkey)) {
error("Public key %s doesn't match private %s",
keypath, privpath);
goto done;
}
if (sshkey_is_cert(pubkey) && !sshkey_is_cert(privkey)) {
/*
* Graft the certificate onto the private key to make
* it capable of signing.
*/
if ((r = sshkey_to_certified(privkey)) != 0) {
error("%s: sshkey_to_certified: %s", __func__,
ssh_err(r));
goto done;
}
if ((r = sshkey_cert_copy(pubkey, privkey)) != 0) {
error("%s: sshkey_cert_copy: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
goto done;
}
}
/* success */
ret = privkey;
privkey = NULL;
done:
sshkey_free(privkey);
free(privpath);
return ret;
}
static int
sign_one(struct sshkey *signkey, const char *filename, int fd,
const char *sig_namespace, sshsig_signer *signer, void *signer_ctx)
{
struct sshbuf *sigbuf = NULL, *abuf = NULL;
int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR, wfd = -1, oerrno;
char *wfile = NULL, *asig = NULL, *fp = NULL;
+ char *pin = NULL, *prompt = NULL;
if (!quiet) {
if (fd == STDIN_FILENO)
fprintf(stderr, "Signing data on standard input\n");
else
fprintf(stderr, "Signing file %s\n", filename);
}
- if (signer == NULL && sshkey_is_sk(signkey) &&
- (signkey->sk_flags & SSH_SK_USER_PRESENCE_REQD)) {
- if ((fp = sshkey_fingerprint(signkey, fingerprint_hash,
- SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL)
- fatal("%s: sshkey_fingerprint failed", __func__);
- fprintf(stderr, "Confirm user presence for key %s %s\n",
- sshkey_type(signkey), fp);
- free(fp);
+ if (signer == NULL && sshkey_is_sk(signkey)) {
+ if ((signkey->sk_flags & SSH_SK_USER_VERIFICATION_REQD)) {
+ xasprintf(&prompt, "Enter PIN for %s key: ",
+ sshkey_type(signkey));
+ if ((pin = read_passphrase(prompt,
+ RP_ALLOW_STDIN)) == NULL)
+ fatal("%s: couldn't read PIN", __func__);
+ }
+ if ((signkey->sk_flags & SSH_SK_USER_PRESENCE_REQD)) {
+ if ((fp = sshkey_fingerprint(signkey, fingerprint_hash,
+ SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL)
+ fatal("%s: fingerprint failed", __func__);
+ fprintf(stderr, "Confirm user presence for key %s %s\n",
+ sshkey_type(signkey), fp);
+ free(fp);
+ }
}
- if ((r = sshsig_sign_fd(signkey, NULL, sk_provider, fd, sig_namespace,
- &sigbuf, signer, signer_ctx)) != 0) {
+ if ((r = sshsig_sign_fd(signkey, NULL, sk_provider, pin,
+ fd, sig_namespace, &sigbuf, signer, signer_ctx)) != 0) {
error("Signing %s failed: %s", filename, ssh_err(r));
goto out;
}
if ((r = sshsig_armor(sigbuf, &abuf)) != 0) {
error("%s: sshsig_armor: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
goto out;
}
if ((asig = sshbuf_dup_string(abuf)) == NULL) {
error("%s: buffer error", __func__);
r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
goto out;
}
if (fd == STDIN_FILENO) {
fputs(asig, stdout);
fflush(stdout);
} else {
xasprintf(&wfile, "%s.sig", filename);
if (confirm_overwrite(wfile)) {
if ((wfd = open(wfile, O_WRONLY|O_CREAT|O_TRUNC,
0666)) == -1) {
oerrno = errno;
error("Cannot open %s: %s",
wfile, strerror(errno));
errno = oerrno;
r = SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR;
goto out;
}
if (atomicio(vwrite, wfd, asig,
strlen(asig)) != strlen(asig)) {
oerrno = errno;
error("Cannot write to %s: %s",
wfile, strerror(errno));
errno = oerrno;
r = SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR;
goto out;
}
if (!quiet) {
fprintf(stderr, "Write signature to %s\n",
wfile);
}
}
}
/* success */
r = 0;
out:
free(wfile);
+ free(prompt);
free(asig);
+ if (pin != NULL)
+ freezero(pin, strlen(pin));
sshbuf_free(abuf);
sshbuf_free(sigbuf);
if (wfd != -1)
close(wfd);
return r;
}
static int
sig_sign(const char *keypath, const char *sig_namespace, int argc, char **argv)
{
int i, fd = -1, r, ret = -1;
int agent_fd = -1;
struct sshkey *pubkey = NULL, *privkey = NULL, *signkey = NULL;
sshsig_signer *signer = NULL;
/* Check file arguments. */
for (i = 0; i < argc; i++) {
if (strcmp(argv[i], "-") != 0)
continue;
if (i > 0 || argc > 1)
fatal("Cannot sign mix of paths and standard input");
}
if ((r = sshkey_load_public(keypath, &pubkey, NULL)) != 0) {
error("Couldn't load public key %s: %s", keypath, ssh_err(r));
goto done;
}
if ((r = ssh_get_authentication_socket(&agent_fd)) != 0)
debug("Couldn't get agent socket: %s", ssh_err(r));
else {
if ((r = ssh_agent_has_key(agent_fd, pubkey)) == 0)
signer = agent_signer;
else
debug("Couldn't find key in agent: %s", ssh_err(r));
}
if (signer == NULL) {
/* Not using agent - try to load private key */
if ((privkey = load_sign_key(keypath, pubkey)) == NULL)
goto done;
signkey = privkey;
} else {
/* Will use key in agent */
signkey = pubkey;
}
if (argc == 0) {
if ((r = sign_one(signkey, "(stdin)", STDIN_FILENO,
sig_namespace, signer, &agent_fd)) != 0)
goto done;
} else {
for (i = 0; i < argc; i++) {
if (strcmp(argv[i], "-") == 0)
fd = STDIN_FILENO;
else if ((fd = open(argv[i], O_RDONLY)) == -1) {
error("Cannot open %s for signing: %s",
argv[i], strerror(errno));
goto done;
}
if ((r = sign_one(signkey, argv[i], fd, sig_namespace,
signer, &agent_fd)) != 0)
goto done;
if (fd != STDIN_FILENO)
close(fd);
fd = -1;
}
}
ret = 0;
done:
if (fd != -1 && fd != STDIN_FILENO)
close(fd);
sshkey_free(pubkey);
sshkey_free(privkey);
return ret;
}
static int
sig_verify(const char *signature, const char *sig_namespace,
const char *principal, const char *allowed_keys, const char *revoked_keys)
{
int r, ret = -1;
struct sshbuf *sigbuf = NULL, *abuf = NULL;
struct sshkey *sign_key = NULL;
char *fp = NULL;
struct sshkey_sig_details *sig_details = NULL;
memset(&sig_details, 0, sizeof(sig_details));
if ((r = sshbuf_load_file(signature, &abuf)) != 0) {
error("Couldn't read signature file: %s", ssh_err(r));
goto done;
}
if ((r = sshsig_dearmor(abuf, &sigbuf)) != 0) {
error("%s: sshsig_armor: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
goto done;
}
if ((r = sshsig_verify_fd(sigbuf, STDIN_FILENO, sig_namespace,
&sign_key, &sig_details)) != 0)
goto done; /* sshsig_verify() prints error */
if ((fp = sshkey_fingerprint(sign_key, fingerprint_hash,
SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL)
fatal("%s: sshkey_fingerprint failed", __func__);
debug("Valid (unverified) signature from key %s", fp);
if (sig_details != NULL) {
debug2("%s: signature details: counter = %u, flags = 0x%02x",
__func__, sig_details->sk_counter, sig_details->sk_flags);
}
free(fp);
fp = NULL;
if (revoked_keys != NULL) {
if ((r = sshkey_check_revoked(sign_key, revoked_keys)) != 0) {
debug3("sshkey_check_revoked failed: %s", ssh_err(r));
goto done;
}
}
if (allowed_keys != NULL &&
(r = sshsig_check_allowed_keys(allowed_keys, sign_key,
principal, sig_namespace)) != 0) {
debug3("sshsig_check_allowed_keys failed: %s", ssh_err(r));
goto done;
}
/* success */
ret = 0;
done:
if (!quiet) {
if (ret == 0) {
if ((fp = sshkey_fingerprint(sign_key, fingerprint_hash,
SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL) {
fatal("%s: sshkey_fingerprint failed",
__func__);
}
if (principal == NULL) {
printf("Good \"%s\" signature with %s key %s\n",
sig_namespace, sshkey_type(sign_key), fp);
} else {
printf("Good \"%s\" signature for %s with %s key %s\n",
sig_namespace, principal,
sshkey_type(sign_key), fp);
}
} else {
printf("Could not verify signature.\n");
}
}
sshbuf_free(sigbuf);
sshbuf_free(abuf);
sshkey_free(sign_key);
sshkey_sig_details_free(sig_details);
free(fp);
return ret;
}
static int
sig_find_principals(const char *signature, const char *allowed_keys) {
int r, ret = -1;
struct sshbuf *sigbuf = NULL, *abuf = NULL;
struct sshkey *sign_key = NULL;
char *principals = NULL, *cp, *tmp;
if ((r = sshbuf_load_file(signature, &abuf)) != 0) {
error("Couldn't read signature file: %s", ssh_err(r));
goto done;
}
if ((r = sshsig_dearmor(abuf, &sigbuf)) != 0) {
error("%s: sshsig_armor: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
goto done;
}
if ((r = sshsig_get_pubkey(sigbuf, &sign_key)) != 0) {
error("%s: sshsig_get_pubkey: %s",
__func__, ssh_err(r));
goto done;
}
if ((r = sshsig_find_principals(allowed_keys, sign_key,
&principals)) != 0) {
error("%s: sshsig_get_principal: %s",
__func__, ssh_err(r));
goto done;
}
ret = 0;
done:
if (ret == 0 ) {
/* Emit matching principals one per line */
tmp = principals;
while ((cp = strsep(&tmp, ",")) != NULL && *cp != '\0')
puts(cp);
} else {
fprintf(stderr, "No principal matched.\n");
}
sshbuf_free(sigbuf);
sshbuf_free(abuf);
sshkey_free(sign_key);
free(principals);
return ret;
}
static void
do_moduli_gen(const char *out_file, char **opts, size_t nopts)
{
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
/* Moduli generation/screening */
u_int32_t memory = 0;
BIGNUM *start = NULL;
int moduli_bits = 0;
FILE *out;
size_t i;
const char *errstr;
/* Parse options */
for (i = 0; i < nopts; i++) {
if (strncmp(opts[i], "memory=", 7) == 0) {
memory = (u_int32_t)strtonum(opts[i]+7, 1,
UINT_MAX, &errstr);
if (errstr) {
fatal("Memory limit is %s: %s",
errstr, opts[i]+7);
}
} else if (strncmp(opts[i], "start=", 6) == 0) {
/* XXX - also compare length against bits */
if (BN_hex2bn(&start, opts[i]+6) == 0)
fatal("Invalid start point.");
} else if (strncmp(opts[i], "bits=", 5) == 0) {
moduli_bits = (int)strtonum(opts[i]+5, 1,
INT_MAX, &errstr);
if (errstr) {
fatal("Invalid number: %s (%s)",
opts[i]+12, errstr);
}
} else {
fatal("Option \"%s\" is unsupported for moduli "
"generation", opts[i]);
}
}
if ((out = fopen(out_file, "w")) == NULL) {
fatal("Couldn't open modulus candidate file \"%s\": %s",
out_file, strerror(errno));
}
setvbuf(out, NULL, _IOLBF, 0);
if (moduli_bits == 0)
moduli_bits = DEFAULT_BITS;
if (gen_candidates(out, memory, moduli_bits, start) != 0)
fatal("modulus candidate generation failed");
#else /* WITH_OPENSSL */
fatal("Moduli generation is not supported");
#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
}
static void
do_moduli_screen(const char *out_file, char **opts, size_t nopts)
{
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
/* Moduli generation/screening */
char *checkpoint = NULL;
u_int32_t generator_wanted = 0;
unsigned long start_lineno = 0, lines_to_process = 0;
int prime_tests = 0;
FILE *out, *in = stdin;
size_t i;
const char *errstr;
/* Parse options */
for (i = 0; i < nopts; i++) {
if (strncmp(opts[i], "lines=", 6) == 0) {
lines_to_process = strtoul(opts[i]+6, NULL, 10);
} else if (strncmp(opts[i], "start-line=", 11) == 0) {
start_lineno = strtoul(opts[i]+11, NULL, 10);
} else if (strncmp(opts[i], "checkpoint=", 11) == 0) {
checkpoint = xstrdup(opts[i]+11);
} else if (strncmp(opts[i], "generator=", 10) == 0) {
generator_wanted = (u_int32_t)strtonum(
opts[i]+10, 1, UINT_MAX, &errstr);
if (errstr != NULL) {
fatal("Generator invalid: %s (%s)",
opts[i]+10, errstr);
}
} else if (strncmp(opts[i], "prime-tests=", 12) == 0) {
prime_tests = (int)strtonum(opts[i]+12, 1,
INT_MAX, &errstr);
if (errstr) {
fatal("Invalid number: %s (%s)",
opts[i]+12, errstr);
}
} else {
fatal("Option \"%s\" is unsupported for moduli "
"screening", opts[i]);
}
}
if (have_identity && strcmp(identity_file, "-") != 0) {
if ((in = fopen(identity_file, "r")) == NULL) {
fatal("Couldn't open modulus candidate "
"file \"%s\": %s", identity_file,
strerror(errno));
}
}
if ((out = fopen(out_file, "a")) == NULL) {
fatal("Couldn't open moduli file \"%s\": %s",
out_file, strerror(errno));
}
setvbuf(out, NULL, _IOLBF, 0);
if (prime_test(in, out, prime_tests == 0 ? 100 : prime_tests,
generator_wanted, checkpoint,
start_lineno, lines_to_process) != 0)
fatal("modulus screening failed");
#else /* WITH_OPENSSL */
fatal("Moduli screening is not supported");
#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
}
static char *
private_key_passphrase(void)
{
char *passphrase1, *passphrase2;
/* Ask for a passphrase (twice). */
if (identity_passphrase)
passphrase1 = xstrdup(identity_passphrase);
else if (identity_new_passphrase)
passphrase1 = xstrdup(identity_new_passphrase);
else {
passphrase_again:
passphrase1 =
read_passphrase("Enter passphrase (empty for no "
"passphrase): ", RP_ALLOW_STDIN);
passphrase2 = read_passphrase("Enter same passphrase again: ",
RP_ALLOW_STDIN);
if (strcmp(passphrase1, passphrase2) != 0) {
/*
* The passphrases do not match. Clear them and
* retry.
*/
freezero(passphrase1, strlen(passphrase1));
freezero(passphrase2, strlen(passphrase2));
printf("Passphrases do not match. Try again.\n");
goto passphrase_again;
}
/* Clear the other copy of the passphrase. */
freezero(passphrase2, strlen(passphrase2));
}
return passphrase1;
}
static const char *
skip_ssh_url_preamble(const char *s)
{
if (strncmp(s, "ssh://", 6) == 0)
return s + 6;
else if (strncmp(s, "ssh:", 4) == 0)
return s + 4;
return s;
}
static int
do_download_sk(const char *skprovider, const char *device)
{
struct sshkey **keys;
size_t nkeys, i;
- int r, ok = -1;
+ int r, ret = -1;
char *fp, *pin = NULL, *pass = NULL, *path, *pubpath;
const char *ext;
if (skprovider == NULL)
fatal("Cannot download keys without provider");
- for (i = 0; i < 2; i++) {
- if (i == 1) {
- pin = read_passphrase("Enter PIN for authenticator: ",
- RP_ALLOW_STDIN);
- }
- if ((r = sshsk_load_resident(skprovider, device, pin,
- &keys, &nkeys)) != 0) {
- if (i == 0 && r == SSH_ERR_KEY_WRONG_PASSPHRASE)
- continue;
- if (pin != NULL)
- freezero(pin, strlen(pin));
- error("Unable to load resident keys: %s", ssh_err(r));
- return -1;
- }
+ pin = read_passphrase("Enter PIN for authenticator: ", RP_ALLOW_STDIN);
+ if (!quiet) {
+ printf("You may need to touch your authenticator "
+ "to authorize key download.\n");
+ }
+ if ((r = sshsk_load_resident(skprovider, device, pin,
+ &keys, &nkeys)) != 0) {
+ if (pin != NULL)
+ freezero(pin, strlen(pin));
+ error("Unable to load resident keys: %s", ssh_err(r));
+ return -1;
}
if (nkeys == 0)
logit("No keys to download");
if (pin != NULL)
freezero(pin, strlen(pin));
for (i = 0; i < nkeys; i++) {
if (keys[i]->type != KEY_ECDSA_SK &&
keys[i]->type != KEY_ED25519_SK) {
error("Unsupported key type %s (%d)",
sshkey_type(keys[i]), keys[i]->type);
continue;
}
if ((fp = sshkey_fingerprint(keys[i],
fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL)
fatal("%s: sshkey_fingerprint failed", __func__);
debug("%s: key %zu: %s %s %s (flags 0x%02x)", __func__, i,
sshkey_type(keys[i]), fp, keys[i]->sk_application,
keys[i]->sk_flags);
ext = skip_ssh_url_preamble(keys[i]->sk_application);
xasprintf(&path, "id_%s_rk%s%s",
keys[i]->type == KEY_ECDSA_SK ? "ecdsa_sk" : "ed25519_sk",
*ext == '\0' ? "" : "_", ext);
/* If the file already exists, ask the user to confirm. */
if (!confirm_overwrite(path)) {
free(path);
break;
}
/* Save the key with the application string as the comment */
if (pass == NULL)
pass = private_key_passphrase();
if ((r = sshkey_save_private(keys[i], path, pass,
keys[i]->sk_application, private_key_format,
openssh_format_cipher, rounds)) != 0) {
error("Saving key \"%s\" failed: %s",
path, ssh_err(r));
free(path);
break;
}
if (!quiet) {
printf("Saved %s key%s%s to %s\n",
sshkey_type(keys[i]),
*ext != '\0' ? " " : "",
*ext != '\0' ? keys[i]->sk_application : "",
path);
}
/* Save public key too */
xasprintf(&pubpath, "%s.pub", path);
free(path);
if ((r = sshkey_save_public(keys[i], pubpath,
keys[i]->sk_application)) != 0) {
error("Saving public key \"%s\" failed: %s",
pubpath, ssh_err(r));
free(pubpath);
break;
}
free(pubpath);
}
if (i >= nkeys)
- ok = 0; /* success */
+ ret = 0; /* success */
if (pass != NULL)
freezero(pass, strlen(pass));
for (i = 0; i < nkeys; i++)
sshkey_free(keys[i]);
free(keys);
- return ok ? 0 : -1;
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static void
+save_attestation(struct sshbuf *attest, const char *path)
+{
+ mode_t omask;
+ int r;
+
+ if (path == NULL)
+ return; /* nothing to do */
+ if (attest == NULL || sshbuf_len(attest) == 0)
+ fatal("Enrollment did not return attestation data");
+ omask = umask(077);
+ r = sshbuf_write_file(path, attest);
+ umask(omask);
+ if (r != 0)
+ fatal("Unable to write attestation data \"%s\": %s", path,
+ ssh_err(r));
+ if (!quiet)
+ printf("Your FIDO attestation certificate has been saved in "
+ "%s\n", path);
}
static void
usage(void)
{
fprintf(stderr,
- "usage: ssh-keygen [-q] [-b bits] [-C comment] [-f output_keyfile] [-m format]\n"
+ "usage: ssh-keygen [-q] [-a rounds] [-b bits] [-C comment] [-f output_keyfile]\n"
+ " [-m format] [-N new_passphrase] [-O option]\n"
" [-t dsa | ecdsa | ecdsa-sk | ed25519 | ed25519-sk | rsa]\n"
- " [-N new_passphrase] [-O option] [-w provider]\n"
- " ssh-keygen -p [-f keyfile] [-m format] [-N new_passphrase]\n"
+ " [-w provider]\n"
+ " ssh-keygen -p [-a rounds] [-f keyfile] [-m format] [-N new_passphrase]\n"
" [-P old_passphrase]\n"
" ssh-keygen -i [-f input_keyfile] [-m key_format]\n"
" ssh-keygen -e [-f input_keyfile] [-m key_format]\n"
" ssh-keygen -y [-f input_keyfile]\n"
- " ssh-keygen -c [-C comment] [-f keyfile] [-P passphrase]\n"
+ " ssh-keygen -c [-a rounds] [-C comment] [-f keyfile] [-P passphrase]\n"
" ssh-keygen -l [-v] [-E fingerprint_hash] [-f input_keyfile]\n"
" ssh-keygen -B [-f input_keyfile]\n");
#ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11
fprintf(stderr,
" ssh-keygen -D pkcs11\n");
#endif
fprintf(stderr,
" ssh-keygen -F hostname [-lv] [-f known_hosts_file]\n"
" ssh-keygen -H [-f known_hosts_file]\n"
- " ssh-keygen -K [-w provider]\n"
+ " ssh-keygen -K [-a rounds] [-w provider]\n"
" ssh-keygen -R hostname [-f known_hosts_file]\n"
" ssh-keygen -r hostname [-g] [-f input_keyfile]\n"
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
" ssh-keygen -M generate [-O option] output_file\n"
" ssh-keygen -M screen [-f input_file] [-O option] output_file\n"
#endif
" ssh-keygen -I certificate_identity -s ca_key [-hU] [-D pkcs11_provider]\n"
" [-n principals] [-O option] [-V validity_interval]\n"
" [-z serial_number] file ...\n"
" ssh-keygen -L [-f input_keyfile]\n"
- " ssh-keygen -A [-f prefix_path]\n"
+ " ssh-keygen -A [-a rounds] [-f prefix_path]\n"
" ssh-keygen -k -f krl_file [-u] [-s ca_public] [-z version_number]\n"
" file ...\n"
" ssh-keygen -Q [-l] -f krl_file [file ...]\n"
" ssh-keygen -Y find-principals -s signature_file -f allowed_signers_file\n"
" ssh-keygen -Y check-novalidate -n namespace -s signature_file\n"
" ssh-keygen -Y sign -f key_file -n namespace file ...\n"
" ssh-keygen -Y verify -f allowed_signers_file -I signer_identity\n"
" -n namespace -s signature_file [-r revocation_file]\n");
exit(1);
}
/*
* Main program for key management.
*/
int
main(int argc, char **argv)
{
- char dotsshdir[PATH_MAX], comment[1024], *passphrase;
+ char comment[1024], *passphrase;
char *rr_hostname = NULL, *ep, *fp, *ra;
struct sshkey *private, *public;
struct passwd *pw;
- struct stat st;
int r, opt, type;
int change_passphrase = 0, change_comment = 0, show_cert = 0;
int find_host = 0, delete_host = 0, hash_hosts = 0;
int gen_all_hostkeys = 0, gen_krl = 0, update_krl = 0, check_krl = 0;
int prefer_agent = 0, convert_to = 0, convert_from = 0;
int print_public = 0, print_generic = 0, cert_serial_autoinc = 0;
int do_gen_candidates = 0, do_screen_candidates = 0, download_sk = 0;
unsigned long long cert_serial = 0;
char *identity_comment = NULL, *ca_key_path = NULL, **opts = NULL;
char *sk_application = NULL, *sk_device = NULL, *sk_user = NULL;
- char *sk_attestaion_path = NULL;
+ char *sk_attestation_path = NULL;
struct sshbuf *challenge = NULL, *attest = NULL;
size_t i, nopts = 0;
u_int32_t bits = 0;
uint8_t sk_flags = SSH_SK_USER_PRESENCE_REQD;
const char *errstr;
int log_level = SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO;
char *sign_op = NULL;
extern int optind;
extern char *optarg;
/* Ensure that fds 0, 1 and 2 are open or directed to /dev/null */
sanitise_stdfd();
__progname = ssh_get_progname(argv[0]);
seed_rng();
log_init(argv[0], SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO, SYSLOG_FACILITY_USER, 1);
msetlocale();
/* we need this for the home * directory. */
pw = getpwuid(getuid());
if (!pw)
fatal("No user exists for uid %lu", (u_long)getuid());
if (gethostname(hostname, sizeof(hostname)) == -1)
fatal("gethostname: %s", strerror(errno));
sk_provider = getenv("SSH_SK_PROVIDER");
/* Remaining characters: dGjJSTWx */
while ((opt = getopt(argc, argv, "ABHKLQUXceghiklopquvy"
"C:D:E:F:I:M:N:O:P:R:V:Y:Z:"
"a:b:f:g:m:n:r:s:t:w:z:")) != -1) {
switch (opt) {
case 'A':
gen_all_hostkeys = 1;
break;
case 'b':
bits = (u_int32_t)strtonum(optarg, 1, UINT32_MAX,
&errstr);
if (errstr)
fatal("Bits has bad value %s (%s)",
optarg, errstr);
break;
case 'E':
fingerprint_hash = ssh_digest_alg_by_name(optarg);
if (fingerprint_hash == -1)
fatal("Invalid hash algorithm \"%s\"", optarg);
break;
case 'F':
find_host = 1;
rr_hostname = optarg;
break;
case 'H':
hash_hosts = 1;
break;
case 'I':
cert_key_id = optarg;
break;
case 'R':
delete_host = 1;
rr_hostname = optarg;
break;
case 'L':
show_cert = 1;
break;
case 'l':
print_fingerprint = 1;
break;
case 'B':
print_bubblebabble = 1;
break;
case 'm':
if (strcasecmp(optarg, "RFC4716") == 0 ||
strcasecmp(optarg, "ssh2") == 0) {
convert_format = FMT_RFC4716;
break;
}
if (strcasecmp(optarg, "PKCS8") == 0) {
convert_format = FMT_PKCS8;
private_key_format = SSHKEY_PRIVATE_PKCS8;
break;
}
if (strcasecmp(optarg, "PEM") == 0) {
convert_format = FMT_PEM;
private_key_format = SSHKEY_PRIVATE_PEM;
break;
}
fatal("Unsupported conversion format \"%s\"", optarg);
case 'n':
cert_principals = optarg;
break;
case 'o':
/* no-op; new format is already the default */
break;
case 'p':
change_passphrase = 1;
break;
case 'c':
change_comment = 1;
break;
case 'f':
if (strlcpy(identity_file, optarg,
sizeof(identity_file)) >= sizeof(identity_file))
fatal("Identity filename too long");
have_identity = 1;
break;
case 'g':
print_generic = 1;
break;
case 'K':
download_sk = 1;
break;
case 'P':
identity_passphrase = optarg;
break;
case 'N':
identity_new_passphrase = optarg;
break;
case 'Q':
check_krl = 1;
break;
case 'O':
opts = xrecallocarray(opts, nopts, nopts + 1,
sizeof(*opts));
opts[nopts++] = xstrdup(optarg);
break;
case 'Z':
openssh_format_cipher = optarg;
break;
case 'C':
identity_comment = optarg;
break;
case 'q':
quiet = 1;
break;
case 'e':
/* export key */
convert_to = 1;
break;
case 'h':
cert_key_type = SSH2_CERT_TYPE_HOST;
certflags_flags = 0;
break;
case 'k':
gen_krl = 1;
break;
case 'i':
case 'X':
/* import key */
convert_from = 1;
break;
case 'y':
print_public = 1;
break;
case 's':
ca_key_path = optarg;
break;
case 't':
key_type_name = optarg;
break;
case 'D':
pkcs11provider = optarg;
break;
case 'U':
prefer_agent = 1;
break;
case 'u':
update_krl = 1;
break;
case 'v':
if (log_level == SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO)
log_level = SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG1;
else {
if (log_level >= SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG1 &&
log_level < SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG3)
log_level++;
}
break;
case 'r':
rr_hostname = optarg;
break;
case 'a':
rounds = (int)strtonum(optarg, 1, INT_MAX, &errstr);
if (errstr)
fatal("Invalid number: %s (%s)",
optarg, errstr);
break;
case 'V':
parse_cert_times(optarg);
break;
case 'Y':
sign_op = optarg;
break;
case 'w':
sk_provider = optarg;
break;
case 'z':
errno = 0;
if (*optarg == '+') {
cert_serial_autoinc = 1;
optarg++;
}
cert_serial = strtoull(optarg, &ep, 10);
if (*optarg < '0' || *optarg > '9' || *ep != '\0' ||
(errno == ERANGE && cert_serial == ULLONG_MAX))
fatal("Invalid serial number \"%s\"", optarg);
break;
case 'M':
if (strcmp(optarg, "generate") == 0)
do_gen_candidates = 1;
else if (strcmp(optarg, "screen") == 0)
do_screen_candidates = 1;
else
fatal("Unsupported moduli option %s", optarg);
break;
case '?':
default:
usage();
}
}
#ifdef ENABLE_SK_INTERNAL
if (sk_provider == NULL)
sk_provider = "internal";
#endif
/* reinit */
log_init(argv[0], log_level, SYSLOG_FACILITY_USER, 1);
argv += optind;
argc -= optind;
if (sign_op != NULL) {
if (strncmp(sign_op, "find-principals", 15) == 0) {
if (ca_key_path == NULL) {
error("Too few arguments for find-principals:"
"missing signature file");
exit(1);
}
if (!have_identity) {
error("Too few arguments for find-principals:"
"missing allowed keys file");
exit(1);
}
return sig_find_principals(ca_key_path, identity_file);
} else if (strncmp(sign_op, "sign", 4) == 0) {
if (cert_principals == NULL ||
*cert_principals == '\0') {
error("Too few arguments for sign: "
"missing namespace");
exit(1);
}
if (!have_identity) {
error("Too few arguments for sign: "
"missing key");
exit(1);
}
return sig_sign(identity_file, cert_principals,
argc, argv);
} else if (strncmp(sign_op, "check-novalidate", 16) == 0) {
if (ca_key_path == NULL) {
error("Too few arguments for check-novalidate: "
"missing signature file");
exit(1);
}
return sig_verify(ca_key_path, cert_principals,
NULL, NULL, NULL);
} else if (strncmp(sign_op, "verify", 6) == 0) {
if (cert_principals == NULL ||
*cert_principals == '\0') {
error("Too few arguments for verify: "
"missing namespace");
exit(1);
}
if (ca_key_path == NULL) {
error("Too few arguments for verify: "
"missing signature file");
exit(1);
}
if (!have_identity) {
error("Too few arguments for sign: "
"missing allowed keys file");
exit(1);
}
if (cert_key_id == NULL) {
error("Too few arguments for verify: "
"missing principal ID");
exit(1);
}
return sig_verify(ca_key_path, cert_principals,
cert_key_id, identity_file, rr_hostname);
}
error("Unsupported operation for -Y: \"%s\"", sign_op);
usage();
/* NOTREACHED */
}
if (ca_key_path != NULL) {
if (argc < 1 && !gen_krl) {
error("Too few arguments.");
usage();
}
} else if (argc > 0 && !gen_krl && !check_krl &&
!do_gen_candidates && !do_screen_candidates) {
error("Too many arguments.");
usage();
}
if (change_passphrase && change_comment) {
error("Can only have one of -p and -c.");
usage();
}
if (print_fingerprint && (delete_host || hash_hosts)) {
error("Cannot use -l with -H or -R.");
usage();
}
if (gen_krl) {
do_gen_krl(pw, update_krl, ca_key_path,
cert_serial, identity_comment, argc, argv);
return (0);
}
if (check_krl) {
do_check_krl(pw, print_fingerprint, argc, argv);
return (0);
}
if (ca_key_path != NULL) {
if (cert_key_id == NULL)
fatal("Must specify key id (-I) when certifying");
for (i = 0; i < nopts; i++)
add_cert_option(opts[i]);
do_ca_sign(pw, ca_key_path, prefer_agent,
cert_serial, cert_serial_autoinc, argc, argv);
}
if (show_cert)
do_show_cert(pw);
if (delete_host || hash_hosts || find_host) {
do_known_hosts(pw, rr_hostname, find_host,
delete_host, hash_hosts);
}
if (pkcs11provider != NULL)
do_download(pw);
if (download_sk) {
for (i = 0; i < nopts; i++) {
if (strncasecmp(opts[i], "device=", 7) == 0) {
sk_device = xstrdup(opts[i] + 7);
} else {
fatal("Option \"%s\" is unsupported for "
"FIDO authenticator download", opts[i]);
}
}
return do_download_sk(sk_provider, sk_device);
}
if (print_fingerprint || print_bubblebabble)
do_fingerprint(pw);
if (change_passphrase)
do_change_passphrase(pw);
if (change_comment)
do_change_comment(pw, identity_comment);
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
if (convert_to)
do_convert_to(pw);
if (convert_from)
do_convert_from(pw);
#else /* WITH_OPENSSL */
if (convert_to || convert_from)
fatal("key conversion disabled at compile time");
#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
if (print_public)
do_print_public(pw);
if (rr_hostname != NULL) {
unsigned int n = 0;
if (have_identity) {
n = do_print_resource_record(pw, identity_file,
rr_hostname, print_generic);
if (n == 0)
fatal("%s: %s", identity_file, strerror(errno));
exit(0);
} else {
n += do_print_resource_record(pw,
_PATH_HOST_RSA_KEY_FILE, rr_hostname,
print_generic);
n += do_print_resource_record(pw,
_PATH_HOST_DSA_KEY_FILE, rr_hostname,
print_generic);
n += do_print_resource_record(pw,
_PATH_HOST_ECDSA_KEY_FILE, rr_hostname,
print_generic);
n += do_print_resource_record(pw,
_PATH_HOST_ED25519_KEY_FILE, rr_hostname,
print_generic);
n += do_print_resource_record(pw,
_PATH_HOST_XMSS_KEY_FILE, rr_hostname,
print_generic);
if (n == 0)
fatal("no keys found.");
exit(0);
}
}
if (do_gen_candidates || do_screen_candidates) {
if (argc <= 0)
fatal("No output file specified");
else if (argc > 1)
fatal("Too many output files specified");
}
if (do_gen_candidates) {
do_moduli_gen(argv[0], opts, nopts);
return 0;
}
if (do_screen_candidates) {
do_moduli_screen(argv[0], opts, nopts);
return 0;
}
if (gen_all_hostkeys) {
do_gen_all_hostkeys(pw);
return (0);
}
if (key_type_name == NULL)
key_type_name = DEFAULT_KEY_TYPE_NAME;
type = sshkey_type_from_name(key_type_name);
type_bits_valid(type, key_type_name, &bits);
if (!quiet)
printf("Generating public/private %s key pair.\n",
key_type_name);
switch (type) {
case KEY_ECDSA_SK:
case KEY_ED25519_SK:
for (i = 0; i < nopts; i++) {
if (strcasecmp(opts[i], "no-touch-required") == 0) {
sk_flags &= ~SSH_SK_USER_PRESENCE_REQD;
+ } else if (strcasecmp(opts[i], "verify-required") == 0) {
+ sk_flags |= SSH_SK_USER_VERIFICATION_REQD;
} else if (strcasecmp(opts[i], "resident") == 0) {
sk_flags |= SSH_SK_RESIDENT_KEY;
} else if (strncasecmp(opts[i], "device=", 7) == 0) {
sk_device = xstrdup(opts[i] + 7);
} else if (strncasecmp(opts[i], "user=", 5) == 0) {
sk_user = xstrdup(opts[i] + 5);
} else if (strncasecmp(opts[i], "challenge=", 10) == 0) {
if ((r = sshbuf_load_file(opts[i] + 10,
&challenge)) != 0) {
fatal("Unable to load FIDO enrollment "
"challenge \"%s\": %s",
opts[i] + 10, ssh_err(r));
}
} else if (strncasecmp(opts[i],
"write-attestation=", 18) == 0) {
- sk_attestaion_path = opts[i] + 18;
+ sk_attestation_path = opts[i] + 18;
} else if (strncasecmp(opts[i],
"application=", 12) == 0) {
sk_application = xstrdup(opts[i] + 12);
if (strncmp(sk_application, "ssh:", 4) != 0) {
fatal("FIDO application string must "
"begin with \"ssh:\"");
}
} else {
fatal("Option \"%s\" is unsupported for "
"FIDO authenticator enrollment", opts[i]);
}
}
if (!quiet) {
printf("You may need to touch your authenticator "
"to authorize key generation.\n");
}
- passphrase = NULL;
if ((attest = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
fatal("sshbuf_new failed");
+ if ((sk_flags &
+ (SSH_SK_USER_VERIFICATION_REQD|SSH_SK_RESIDENT_KEY))) {
+ passphrase = read_passphrase("Enter PIN for "
+ "authenticator: ", RP_ALLOW_STDIN);
+ } else {
+ passphrase = NULL;
+ }
for (i = 0 ; ; i++) {
fflush(stdout);
r = sshsk_enroll(type, sk_provider, sk_device,
sk_application == NULL ? "ssh:" : sk_application,
sk_user, sk_flags, passphrase, challenge,
&private, attest);
if (r == 0)
break;
if (r != SSH_ERR_KEY_WRONG_PASSPHRASE)
fatal("Key enrollment failed: %s", ssh_err(r));
- else if (i > 0)
+ else if (passphrase != NULL) {
error("PIN incorrect");
- if (passphrase != NULL) {
freezero(passphrase, strlen(passphrase));
passphrase = NULL;
}
if (i >= 3)
fatal("Too many incorrect PINs");
passphrase = read_passphrase("Enter PIN for "
"authenticator: ", RP_ALLOW_STDIN);
+ if (!quiet) {
+ printf("You may need to touch your "
+ "authenticator (again) to authorize "
+ "key generation.\n");
+ }
}
if (passphrase != NULL) {
freezero(passphrase, strlen(passphrase));
passphrase = NULL;
}
break;
default:
if ((r = sshkey_generate(type, bits, &private)) != 0)
fatal("sshkey_generate failed");
break;
}
if ((r = sshkey_from_private(private, &public)) != 0)
fatal("sshkey_from_private failed: %s\n", ssh_err(r));
if (!have_identity)
ask_filename(pw, "Enter file in which to save the key");
/* Create ~/.ssh directory if it doesn't already exist. */
- snprintf(dotsshdir, sizeof dotsshdir, "%s/%s",
- pw->pw_dir, _PATH_SSH_USER_DIR);
- if (strstr(identity_file, dotsshdir) != NULL) {
- if (stat(dotsshdir, &st) == -1) {
- if (errno != ENOENT) {
- error("Could not stat %s: %s", dotsshdir,
- strerror(errno));
- } else if (mkdir(dotsshdir, 0700) == -1) {
- error("Could not create directory '%s': %s",
- dotsshdir, strerror(errno));
- } else if (!quiet)
- printf("Created directory '%s'.\n", dotsshdir);
- }
- }
+ hostfile_create_user_ssh_dir(identity_file, !quiet);
+
/* If the file already exists, ask the user to confirm. */
if (!confirm_overwrite(identity_file))
exit(1);
/* Determine the passphrase for the private key */
passphrase = private_key_passphrase();
if (identity_comment) {
strlcpy(comment, identity_comment, sizeof(comment));
} else {
/* Create default comment field for the passphrase. */
snprintf(comment, sizeof comment, "%s@%s", pw->pw_name, hostname);
}
/* Save the key with the given passphrase and comment. */
if ((r = sshkey_save_private(private, identity_file, passphrase,
comment, private_key_format, openssh_format_cipher, rounds)) != 0) {
error("Saving key \"%s\" failed: %s",
identity_file, ssh_err(r));
freezero(passphrase, strlen(passphrase));
exit(1);
}
freezero(passphrase, strlen(passphrase));
sshkey_free(private);
if (!quiet) {
printf("Your identification has been saved in %s\n",
identity_file);
}
strlcat(identity_file, ".pub", sizeof(identity_file));
if ((r = sshkey_save_public(public, identity_file, comment)) != 0) {
fatal("Unable to save public key to %s: %s",
identity_file, ssh_err(r));
}
if (!quiet) {
fp = sshkey_fingerprint(public, fingerprint_hash,
SSH_FP_DEFAULT);
ra = sshkey_fingerprint(public, fingerprint_hash,
SSH_FP_RANDOMART);
if (fp == NULL || ra == NULL)
fatal("sshkey_fingerprint failed");
printf("Your public key has been saved in %s\n",
identity_file);
printf("The key fingerprint is:\n");
printf("%s %s\n", fp, comment);
printf("The key's randomart image is:\n");
printf("%s\n", ra);
free(ra);
free(fp);
}
- if (sk_attestaion_path != NULL) {
- if (attest == NULL || sshbuf_len(attest) == 0) {
- fatal("Enrollment did not return attestation "
- "certificate");
- }
- if ((r = sshbuf_write_file(sk_attestaion_path, attest)) != 0) {
- fatal("Unable to write attestation certificate "
- "\"%s\": %s", sk_attestaion_path, ssh_err(r));
- }
- if (!quiet) {
- printf("Your FIDO attestation certificate has been "
- "saved in %s\n", sk_attestaion_path);
- }
- }
+ if (sk_attestation_path != NULL)
+ save_attestation(attest, sk_attestation_path);
+
sshbuf_free(attest);
sshkey_free(public);
exit(0);
}
diff --git a/ssh-keyscan.0 b/ssh-keyscan.0
index 3bf9fa3aa355..1a5fefcbfc1d 100644
--- a/ssh-keyscan.0
+++ b/ssh-keyscan.0
@@ -1,96 +1,96 @@
SSH-KEYSCAN(1) General Commands Manual SSH-KEYSCAN(1)
NAME
ssh-keyscan M-bM-^@M-^S gather SSH public keys from servers
SYNOPSIS
ssh-keyscan [-46cDHv] [-f file] [-p port] [-T timeout] [-t type]
[host | addrlist namelist]
DESCRIPTION
ssh-keyscan is a utility for gathering the public SSH host keys of a
number of hosts. It was designed to aid in building and verifying
ssh_known_hosts files, the format of which is documented in sshd(8).
ssh-keyscan provides a minimal interface suitable for use by shell and
perl scripts.
ssh-keyscan uses non-blocking socket I/O to contact as many hosts as
possible in parallel, so it is very efficient. The keys from a domain of
1,000 hosts can be collected in tens of seconds, even when some of those
hosts are down or do not run sshd(8). For scanning, one does not need
login access to the machines that are being scanned, nor does the
scanning process involve any encryption.
The options are as follows:
-4 Force ssh-keyscan to use IPv4 addresses only.
-6 Force ssh-keyscan to use IPv6 addresses only.
-c Request certificates from target hosts instead of plain keys.
-D Print keys found as SSHFP DNS records. The default is to print
keys in a format usable as a ssh(1) known_hosts file.
-f file
Read hosts or M-bM-^@M-^\addrlist namelistM-bM-^@M-^] pairs from file, one per line.
If M-bM-^@M-^X-M-bM-^@M-^Y is supplied instead of a filename, ssh-keyscan will read
from the standard input. Input is expected in the format:
1.2.3.4,1.2.4.4 name.my.domain,name,n.my.domain,n,1.2.3.4,1.2.4.4
-H Hash all hostnames and addresses in the output. Hashed names may
be used normally by ssh(1) and sshd(8), but they do not reveal
identifying information should the file's contents be disclosed.
-p port
Connect to port on the remote host.
-T timeout
Set the timeout for connection attempts. If timeout seconds have
elapsed since a connection was initiated to a host or since the
last time anything was read from that host, the connection is
closed and the host in question considered unavailable. The
default is 5 seconds.
-t type
Specify the type of the key to fetch from the scanned hosts. The
possible values are M-bM-^@M-^\dsaM-bM-^@M-^], M-bM-^@M-^\ecdsaM-bM-^@M-^], M-bM-^@M-^\ed25519M-bM-^@M-^], or M-bM-^@M-^\rsaM-bM-^@M-^].
Multiple values may be specified by separating them with commas.
The default is to fetch M-bM-^@M-^\rsaM-bM-^@M-^], M-bM-^@M-^\ecdsaM-bM-^@M-^], and M-bM-^@M-^\ed25519M-bM-^@M-^] keys.
-v Verbose mode: print debugging messages about progress.
If an ssh_known_hosts file is constructed using ssh-keyscan without
verifying the keys, users will be vulnerable to man in the middle
attacks. On the other hand, if the security model allows such a risk,
ssh-keyscan can help in the detection of tampered keyfiles or man in the
middle attacks which have begun after the ssh_known_hosts file was
created.
FILES
/etc/ssh/ssh_known_hosts
EXAMPLES
Print the RSA host key for machine hostname:
$ ssh-keyscan -t rsa hostname
Find all hosts from the file ssh_hosts which have new or different keys
from those in the sorted file ssh_known_hosts:
$ ssh-keyscan -t rsa,dsa,ecdsa,ed25519 -f ssh_hosts | \
sort -u - ssh_known_hosts | diff ssh_known_hosts -
SEE ALSO
ssh(1), sshd(8)
Using DNS to Securely Publish Secure Shell (SSH) Key Fingerprints, RFC
4255, 2006.
AUTHORS
David Mazieres <dm@lcs.mit.edu> wrote the initial version, and Wayne
Davison <wayned@users.sourceforge.net> added support for protocol version
2.
-OpenBSD 6.7 November 30, 2019 OpenBSD 6.7
+OpenBSD 6.8 November 30, 2019 OpenBSD 6.8
diff --git a/ssh-keyscan.c b/ssh-keyscan.c
index a5e6440764b3..ca190428a78b 100644
--- a/ssh-keyscan.c
+++ b/ssh-keyscan.c
@@ -1,834 +1,826 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: ssh-keyscan.c,v 1.131 2019/12/15 19:47:10 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: ssh-keyscan.c,v 1.132 2020/08/12 01:23:45 cheloha Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright 1995, 1996 by David Mazieres <dm@lcs.mit.edu>.
*
* Modification and redistribution in source and binary forms is
* permitted provided that due credit is given to the author and the
* OpenBSD project by leaving this copyright notice intact.
*/
#include "includes.h"
#include <sys/types.h>
#include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h"
#include <sys/resource.h>
#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TIME_H
# include <sys/time.h>
#endif
#include <netinet/in.h>
#include <arpa/inet.h>
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
#include <openssl/bn.h>
#endif
#include <netdb.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include <stdarg.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <signal.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include "xmalloc.h"
#include "ssh.h"
#include "sshbuf.h"
#include "sshkey.h"
#include "cipher.h"
#include "kex.h"
#include "compat.h"
#include "myproposal.h"
#include "packet.h"
#include "dispatch.h"
#include "log.h"
#include "atomicio.h"
#include "misc.h"
#include "hostfile.h"
#include "ssherr.h"
#include "ssh_api.h"
#include "dns.h"
/* Flag indicating whether IPv4 or IPv6. This can be set on the command line.
Default value is AF_UNSPEC means both IPv4 and IPv6. */
int IPv4or6 = AF_UNSPEC;
int ssh_port = SSH_DEFAULT_PORT;
#define KT_DSA (1)
#define KT_RSA (1<<1)
#define KT_ECDSA (1<<2)
#define KT_ED25519 (1<<3)
#define KT_XMSS (1<<4)
#define KT_ECDSA_SK (1<<5)
#define KT_ED25519_SK (1<<6)
#define KT_MIN KT_DSA
#define KT_MAX KT_ED25519_SK
int get_cert = 0;
int get_keytypes = KT_RSA|KT_ECDSA|KT_ED25519|KT_ECDSA_SK|KT_ED25519_SK;
int hash_hosts = 0; /* Hash hostname on output */
int print_sshfp = 0; /* Print SSHFP records instead of known_hosts */
int found_one = 0; /* Successfully found a key */
#define MAXMAXFD 256
/* The number of seconds after which to give up on a TCP connection */
int timeout = 5;
int maxfd;
#define MAXCON (maxfd - 10)
extern char *__progname;
fd_set *read_wait;
size_t read_wait_nfdset;
int ncon;
/*
* Keep a connection structure for each file descriptor. The state
* associated with file descriptor n is held in fdcon[n].
*/
typedef struct Connection {
u_char c_status; /* State of connection on this file desc. */
#define CS_UNUSED 0 /* File descriptor unused */
#define CS_CON 1 /* Waiting to connect/read greeting */
#define CS_SIZE 2 /* Waiting to read initial packet size */
#define CS_KEYS 3 /* Waiting to read public key packet */
int c_fd; /* Quick lookup: c->c_fd == c - fdcon */
int c_plen; /* Packet length field for ssh packet */
int c_len; /* Total bytes which must be read. */
int c_off; /* Length of data read so far. */
int c_keytype; /* Only one of KT_* */
sig_atomic_t c_done; /* SSH2 done */
char *c_namebase; /* Address to free for c_name and c_namelist */
char *c_name; /* Hostname of connection for errors */
char *c_namelist; /* Pointer to other possible addresses */
char *c_output_name; /* Hostname of connection for output */
char *c_data; /* Data read from this fd */
struct ssh *c_ssh; /* SSH-connection */
struct timeval c_tv; /* Time at which connection gets aborted */
TAILQ_ENTRY(Connection) c_link; /* List of connections in timeout order. */
} con;
TAILQ_HEAD(conlist, Connection) tq; /* Timeout Queue */
con *fdcon;
static void keyprint(con *c, struct sshkey *key);
static int
fdlim_get(int hard)
{
#if defined(HAVE_GETRLIMIT) && defined(RLIMIT_NOFILE)
struct rlimit rlfd;
if (getrlimit(RLIMIT_NOFILE, &rlfd) == -1)
return (-1);
if ((hard ? rlfd.rlim_max : rlfd.rlim_cur) == RLIM_INFINITY)
return SSH_SYSFDMAX;
else
return hard ? rlfd.rlim_max : rlfd.rlim_cur;
#else
return SSH_SYSFDMAX;
#endif
}
static int
fdlim_set(int lim)
{
#if defined(HAVE_SETRLIMIT) && defined(RLIMIT_NOFILE)
struct rlimit rlfd;
#endif
if (lim <= 0)
return (-1);
#if defined(HAVE_SETRLIMIT) && defined(RLIMIT_NOFILE)
if (getrlimit(RLIMIT_NOFILE, &rlfd) == -1)
return (-1);
rlfd.rlim_cur = lim;
if (setrlimit(RLIMIT_NOFILE, &rlfd) == -1)
return (-1);
#elif defined (HAVE_SETDTABLESIZE)
setdtablesize(lim);
#endif
return (0);
}
/*
* This is an strsep function that returns a null field for adjacent
* separators. This is the same as the 4.4BSD strsep, but different from the
* one in the GNU libc.
*/
static char *
xstrsep(char **str, const char *delim)
{
char *s, *e;
if (!**str)
return (NULL);
s = *str;
e = s + strcspn(s, delim);
if (*e != '\0')
*e++ = '\0';
*str = e;
return (s);
}
/*
* Get the next non-null token (like GNU strsep). Strsep() will return a
* null token for two adjacent separators, so we may have to loop.
*/
static char *
strnnsep(char **stringp, char *delim)
{
char *tok;
do {
tok = xstrsep(stringp, delim);
} while (tok && *tok == '\0');
return (tok);
}
static int
key_print_wrapper(struct sshkey *hostkey, struct ssh *ssh)
{
con *c;
if ((c = ssh_get_app_data(ssh)) != NULL)
keyprint(c, hostkey);
/* always abort key exchange */
return -1;
}
static int
ssh2_capable(int remote_major, int remote_minor)
{
switch (remote_major) {
case 1:
if (remote_minor == 99)
return 1;
break;
case 2:
return 1;
default:
break;
}
return 0;
}
static void
keygrab_ssh2(con *c)
{
char *myproposal[PROPOSAL_MAX] = { KEX_CLIENT };
int r;
switch (c->c_keytype) {
case KT_DSA:
myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS] = get_cert ?
"ssh-dss-cert-v01@openssh.com" : "ssh-dss";
break;
case KT_RSA:
myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS] = get_cert ?
"rsa-sha2-512-cert-v01@openssh.com,"
"rsa-sha2-256-cert-v01@openssh.com,"
"ssh-rsa-cert-v01@openssh.com" :
"rsa-sha2-512,"
"rsa-sha2-256,"
"ssh-rsa";
break;
case KT_ED25519:
myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS] = get_cert ?
"ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com" : "ssh-ed25519";
break;
case KT_XMSS:
myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS] = get_cert ?
"ssh-xmss-cert-v01@openssh.com" : "ssh-xmss@openssh.com";
break;
case KT_ECDSA:
myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS] = get_cert ?
"ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com,"
"ecdsa-sha2-nistp384-cert-v01@openssh.com,"
"ecdsa-sha2-nistp521-cert-v01@openssh.com" :
"ecdsa-sha2-nistp256,"
"ecdsa-sha2-nistp384,"
"ecdsa-sha2-nistp521";
break;
case KT_ECDSA_SK:
myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS] = get_cert ?
"sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com" :
"sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256@openssh.com";
break;
case KT_ED25519_SK:
myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS] = get_cert ?
"sk-ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com" :
"sk-ssh-ed25519@openssh.com";
break;
default:
fatal("unknown key type %d", c->c_keytype);
break;
}
if ((r = kex_setup(c->c_ssh, myproposal)) != 0) {
free(c->c_ssh);
fprintf(stderr, "kex_setup: %s\n", ssh_err(r));
exit(1);
}
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
c->c_ssh->kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP1_SHA1] = kex_gen_client;
c->c_ssh->kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP14_SHA1] = kex_gen_client;
c->c_ssh->kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP14_SHA256] = kex_gen_client;
c->c_ssh->kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP16_SHA512] = kex_gen_client;
c->c_ssh->kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP18_SHA512] = kex_gen_client;
c->c_ssh->kex->kex[KEX_DH_GEX_SHA1] = kexgex_client;
c->c_ssh->kex->kex[KEX_DH_GEX_SHA256] = kexgex_client;
# ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
c->c_ssh->kex->kex[KEX_ECDH_SHA2] = kex_gen_client;
# endif
#endif
c->c_ssh->kex->kex[KEX_C25519_SHA256] = kex_gen_client;
c->c_ssh->kex->kex[KEX_KEM_SNTRUP4591761X25519_SHA512] = kex_gen_client;
ssh_set_verify_host_key_callback(c->c_ssh, key_print_wrapper);
/*
* do the key-exchange until an error occurs or until
* the key_print_wrapper() callback sets c_done.
*/
ssh_dispatch_run(c->c_ssh, DISPATCH_BLOCK, &c->c_done);
}
static void
keyprint_one(const char *host, struct sshkey *key)
{
char *hostport;
const char *known_host, *hashed;
found_one = 1;
if (print_sshfp) {
export_dns_rr(host, key, stdout, 0);
return;
}
hostport = put_host_port(host, ssh_port);
lowercase(hostport);
if (hash_hosts && (hashed = host_hash(host, NULL, 0)) == NULL)
fatal("host_hash failed");
known_host = hash_hosts ? hashed : hostport;
if (!get_cert)
fprintf(stdout, "%s ", known_host);
sshkey_write(key, stdout);
fputs("\n", stdout);
free(hostport);
}
static void
keyprint(con *c, struct sshkey *key)
{
char *hosts = c->c_output_name ? c->c_output_name : c->c_name;
char *host, *ohosts;
if (key == NULL)
return;
if (get_cert || (!hash_hosts && ssh_port == SSH_DEFAULT_PORT)) {
keyprint_one(hosts, key);
return;
}
ohosts = hosts = xstrdup(hosts);
while ((host = strsep(&hosts, ",")) != NULL)
keyprint_one(host, key);
free(ohosts);
}
static int
tcpconnect(char *host)
{
struct addrinfo hints, *ai, *aitop;
char strport[NI_MAXSERV];
int gaierr, s = -1;
snprintf(strport, sizeof strport, "%d", ssh_port);
memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints));
hints.ai_family = IPv4or6;
hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM;
if ((gaierr = getaddrinfo(host, strport, &hints, &aitop)) != 0) {
error("getaddrinfo %s: %s", host, ssh_gai_strerror(gaierr));
return -1;
}
for (ai = aitop; ai; ai = ai->ai_next) {
s = socket(ai->ai_family, ai->ai_socktype, ai->ai_protocol);
if (s == -1) {
error("socket: %s", strerror(errno));
continue;
}
if (set_nonblock(s) == -1)
fatal("%s: set_nonblock(%d)", __func__, s);
if (connect(s, ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen) == -1 &&
errno != EINPROGRESS)
error("connect (`%s'): %s", host, strerror(errno));
else
break;
close(s);
s = -1;
}
freeaddrinfo(aitop);
return s;
}
static int
conalloc(char *iname, char *oname, int keytype)
{
char *namebase, *name, *namelist;
int s;
namebase = namelist = xstrdup(iname);
do {
name = xstrsep(&namelist, ",");
if (!name) {
free(namebase);
return (-1);
}
} while ((s = tcpconnect(name)) < 0);
if (s >= maxfd)
fatal("conalloc: fdno %d too high", s);
if (fdcon[s].c_status)
fatal("conalloc: attempt to reuse fdno %d", s);
debug3("%s: oname %s kt %d", __func__, oname, keytype);
fdcon[s].c_fd = s;
fdcon[s].c_status = CS_CON;
fdcon[s].c_namebase = namebase;
fdcon[s].c_name = name;
fdcon[s].c_namelist = namelist;
fdcon[s].c_output_name = xstrdup(oname);
fdcon[s].c_data = (char *) &fdcon[s].c_plen;
fdcon[s].c_len = 4;
fdcon[s].c_off = 0;
fdcon[s].c_keytype = keytype;
monotime_tv(&fdcon[s].c_tv);
fdcon[s].c_tv.tv_sec += timeout;
TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(&tq, &fdcon[s], c_link);
FD_SET(s, read_wait);
ncon++;
return (s);
}
static void
confree(int s)
{
if (s >= maxfd || fdcon[s].c_status == CS_UNUSED)
fatal("confree: attempt to free bad fdno %d", s);
free(fdcon[s].c_namebase);
free(fdcon[s].c_output_name);
if (fdcon[s].c_status == CS_KEYS)
free(fdcon[s].c_data);
fdcon[s].c_status = CS_UNUSED;
fdcon[s].c_keytype = 0;
if (fdcon[s].c_ssh) {
ssh_packet_close(fdcon[s].c_ssh);
free(fdcon[s].c_ssh);
fdcon[s].c_ssh = NULL;
} else
close(s);
TAILQ_REMOVE(&tq, &fdcon[s], c_link);
FD_CLR(s, read_wait);
ncon--;
}
static void
contouch(int s)
{
TAILQ_REMOVE(&tq, &fdcon[s], c_link);
monotime_tv(&fdcon[s].c_tv);
fdcon[s].c_tv.tv_sec += timeout;
TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(&tq, &fdcon[s], c_link);
}
static int
conrecycle(int s)
{
con *c = &fdcon[s];
int ret;
ret = conalloc(c->c_namelist, c->c_output_name, c->c_keytype);
confree(s);
return (ret);
}
static void
congreet(int s)
{
int n = 0, remote_major = 0, remote_minor = 0;
char buf[256], *cp;
char remote_version[sizeof buf];
size_t bufsiz;
con *c = &fdcon[s];
/* send client banner */
n = snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "SSH-%d.%d-OpenSSH-keyscan\r\n",
PROTOCOL_MAJOR_2, PROTOCOL_MINOR_2);
if (n < 0 || (size_t)n >= sizeof(buf)) {
error("snprintf: buffer too small");
confree(s);
return;
}
if (atomicio(vwrite, s, buf, n) != (size_t)n) {
error("write (%s): %s", c->c_name, strerror(errno));
confree(s);
return;
}
for (;;) {
memset(buf, '\0', sizeof(buf));
bufsiz = sizeof(buf);
cp = buf;
while (bufsiz-- &&
(n = atomicio(read, s, cp, 1)) == 1 && *cp != '\n') {
if (*cp == '\r')
*cp = '\n';
cp++;
}
if (n != 1 || strncmp(buf, "SSH-", 4) == 0)
break;
}
if (n == 0) {
switch (errno) {
case EPIPE:
error("%s: Connection closed by remote host", c->c_name);
break;
case ECONNREFUSED:
break;
default:
error("read (%s): %s", c->c_name, strerror(errno));
break;
}
conrecycle(s);
return;
}
if (*cp != '\n' && *cp != '\r') {
error("%s: bad greeting", c->c_name);
confree(s);
return;
}
*cp = '\0';
if ((c->c_ssh = ssh_packet_set_connection(NULL, s, s)) == NULL)
fatal("ssh_packet_set_connection failed");
ssh_packet_set_timeout(c->c_ssh, timeout, 1);
ssh_set_app_data(c->c_ssh, c); /* back link */
if (sscanf(buf, "SSH-%d.%d-%[^\n]\n",
&remote_major, &remote_minor, remote_version) == 3)
c->c_ssh->compat = compat_datafellows(remote_version);
else
c->c_ssh->compat = 0;
if (!ssh2_capable(remote_major, remote_minor)) {
debug("%s doesn't support ssh2", c->c_name);
confree(s);
return;
}
fprintf(stderr, "%c %s:%d %s\n", print_sshfp ? ';' : '#',
c->c_name, ssh_port, chop(buf));
keygrab_ssh2(c);
confree(s);
}
static void
conread(int s)
{
con *c = &fdcon[s];
size_t n;
if (c->c_status == CS_CON) {
congreet(s);
return;
}
n = atomicio(read, s, c->c_data + c->c_off, c->c_len - c->c_off);
if (n == 0) {
error("read (%s): %s", c->c_name, strerror(errno));
confree(s);
return;
}
c->c_off += n;
if (c->c_off == c->c_len)
switch (c->c_status) {
case CS_SIZE:
c->c_plen = htonl(c->c_plen);
c->c_len = c->c_plen + 8 - (c->c_plen & 7);
c->c_off = 0;
c->c_data = xmalloc(c->c_len);
c->c_status = CS_KEYS;
break;
default:
fatal("conread: invalid status %d", c->c_status);
break;
}
contouch(s);
}
static void
conloop(void)
{
struct timeval seltime, now;
fd_set *r, *e;
con *c;
int i;
monotime_tv(&now);
c = TAILQ_FIRST(&tq);
- if (c && (c->c_tv.tv_sec > now.tv_sec ||
- (c->c_tv.tv_sec == now.tv_sec && c->c_tv.tv_usec > now.tv_usec))) {
- seltime = c->c_tv;
- seltime.tv_sec -= now.tv_sec;
- seltime.tv_usec -= now.tv_usec;
- if (seltime.tv_usec < 0) {
- seltime.tv_usec += 1000000;
- seltime.tv_sec--;
- }
- } else
+ if (c && timercmp(&c->c_tv, &now, >))
+ timersub(&c->c_tv, &now, &seltime);
+ else
timerclear(&seltime);
r = xcalloc(read_wait_nfdset, sizeof(fd_mask));
e = xcalloc(read_wait_nfdset, sizeof(fd_mask));
memcpy(r, read_wait, read_wait_nfdset * sizeof(fd_mask));
memcpy(e, read_wait, read_wait_nfdset * sizeof(fd_mask));
while (select(maxfd, r, NULL, e, &seltime) == -1 &&
(errno == EAGAIN || errno == EINTR || errno == EWOULDBLOCK))
;
for (i = 0; i < maxfd; i++) {
if (FD_ISSET(i, e)) {
error("%s: exception!", fdcon[i].c_name);
confree(i);
} else if (FD_ISSET(i, r))
conread(i);
}
free(r);
free(e);
c = TAILQ_FIRST(&tq);
- while (c && (c->c_tv.tv_sec < now.tv_sec ||
- (c->c_tv.tv_sec == now.tv_sec && c->c_tv.tv_usec < now.tv_usec))) {
+ while (c && timercmp(&c->c_tv, &now, <)) {
int s = c->c_fd;
c = TAILQ_NEXT(c, c_link);
conrecycle(s);
}
}
static void
do_host(char *host)
{
char *name = strnnsep(&host, " \t\n");
int j;
if (name == NULL)
return;
for (j = KT_MIN; j <= KT_MAX; j *= 2) {
if (get_keytypes & j) {
while (ncon >= MAXCON)
conloop();
conalloc(name, *host ? host : name, j);
}
}
}
void
fatal(const char *fmt,...)
{
va_list args;
va_start(args, fmt);
do_log(SYSLOG_LEVEL_FATAL, fmt, args);
va_end(args);
exit(255);
}
static void
usage(void)
{
fprintf(stderr,
"usage: %s [-46cDHv] [-f file] [-p port] [-T timeout] [-t type]\n"
"\t\t [host | addrlist namelist]\n",
__progname);
exit(1);
}
int
main(int argc, char **argv)
{
int debug_flag = 0, log_level = SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO;
int opt, fopt_count = 0, j;
char *tname, *cp, *line = NULL;
size_t linesize = 0;
FILE *fp;
extern int optind;
extern char *optarg;
__progname = ssh_get_progname(argv[0]);
seed_rng();
TAILQ_INIT(&tq);
/* Ensure that fds 0, 1 and 2 are open or directed to /dev/null */
sanitise_stdfd();
if (argc <= 1)
usage();
while ((opt = getopt(argc, argv, "cDHv46p:T:t:f:")) != -1) {
switch (opt) {
case 'H':
hash_hosts = 1;
break;
case 'c':
get_cert = 1;
break;
case 'D':
print_sshfp = 1;
break;
case 'p':
ssh_port = a2port(optarg);
if (ssh_port <= 0) {
fprintf(stderr, "Bad port '%s'\n", optarg);
exit(1);
}
break;
case 'T':
timeout = convtime(optarg);
if (timeout == -1 || timeout == 0) {
fprintf(stderr, "Bad timeout '%s'\n", optarg);
usage();
}
break;
case 'v':
if (!debug_flag) {
debug_flag = 1;
log_level = SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG1;
}
else if (log_level < SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG3)
log_level++;
else
fatal("Too high debugging level.");
break;
case 'f':
if (strcmp(optarg, "-") == 0)
optarg = NULL;
argv[fopt_count++] = optarg;
break;
case 't':
get_keytypes = 0;
tname = strtok(optarg, ",");
while (tname) {
int type = sshkey_type_from_name(tname);
switch (type) {
case KEY_DSA:
get_keytypes |= KT_DSA;
break;
case KEY_ECDSA:
get_keytypes |= KT_ECDSA;
break;
case KEY_RSA:
get_keytypes |= KT_RSA;
break;
case KEY_ED25519:
get_keytypes |= KT_ED25519;
break;
case KEY_XMSS:
get_keytypes |= KT_XMSS;
break;
case KEY_ED25519_SK:
get_keytypes |= KT_ED25519_SK;
break;
case KEY_ECDSA_SK:
get_keytypes |= KT_ECDSA_SK;
break;
case KEY_UNSPEC:
default:
fatal("Unknown key type \"%s\"", tname);
}
tname = strtok(NULL, ",");
}
break;
case '4':
IPv4or6 = AF_INET;
break;
case '6':
IPv4or6 = AF_INET6;
break;
case '?':
default:
usage();
}
}
if (optind == argc && !fopt_count)
usage();
log_init("ssh-keyscan", log_level, SYSLOG_FACILITY_USER, 1);
maxfd = fdlim_get(1);
if (maxfd < 0)
fatal("%s: fdlim_get: bad value", __progname);
if (maxfd > MAXMAXFD)
maxfd = MAXMAXFD;
if (MAXCON <= 0)
fatal("%s: not enough file descriptors", __progname);
if (maxfd > fdlim_get(0))
fdlim_set(maxfd);
fdcon = xcalloc(maxfd, sizeof(con));
read_wait_nfdset = howmany(maxfd, NFDBITS);
read_wait = xcalloc(read_wait_nfdset, sizeof(fd_mask));
for (j = 0; j < fopt_count; j++) {
if (argv[j] == NULL)
fp = stdin;
else if ((fp = fopen(argv[j], "r")) == NULL)
fatal("%s: %s: %s", __progname, argv[j],
strerror(errno));
while (getline(&line, &linesize, fp) != -1) {
/* Chomp off trailing whitespace and comments */
if ((cp = strchr(line, '#')) == NULL)
cp = line + strlen(line) - 1;
while (cp >= line) {
if (*cp == ' ' || *cp == '\t' ||
*cp == '\n' || *cp == '#')
*cp-- = '\0';
else
break;
}
/* Skip empty lines */
if (*line == '\0')
continue;
do_host(line);
}
if (ferror(fp))
fatal("%s: %s: %s", __progname, argv[j],
strerror(errno));
fclose(fp);
}
free(line);
while (optind < argc)
do_host(argv[optind++]);
while (ncon > 0)
conloop();
return found_one ? 0 : 1;
}
diff --git a/ssh-keysign.0 b/ssh-keysign.0
index c2a5dfdb1b9c..b4ec3cc64a53 100644
--- a/ssh-keysign.0
+++ b/ssh-keysign.0
@@ -1,52 +1,52 @@
SSH-KEYSIGN(8) System Manager's Manual SSH-KEYSIGN(8)
NAME
ssh-keysign M-bM-^@M-^S OpenSSH helper for host-based authentication
SYNOPSIS
ssh-keysign
DESCRIPTION
ssh-keysign is used by ssh(1) to access the local host keys and generate
the digital signature required during host-based authentication.
ssh-keysign is disabled by default and can only be enabled in the global
client configuration file /etc/ssh/ssh_config by setting EnableSSHKeysign
to M-bM-^@M-^\yesM-bM-^@M-^].
ssh-keysign is not intended to be invoked by the user, but from ssh(1).
See ssh(1) and sshd(8) for more information about host-based
authentication.
FILES
/etc/ssh/ssh_config
Controls whether ssh-keysign is enabled.
/etc/ssh/ssh_host_dsa_key
/etc/ssh/ssh_host_ecdsa_key
/etc/ssh/ssh_host_ed25519_key
/etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key
These files contain the private parts of the host keys used to
generate the digital signature. They should be owned by root,
readable only by root, and not accessible to others. Since they
are readable only by root, ssh-keysign must be set-uid root if
host-based authentication is used.
/etc/ssh/ssh_host_dsa_key-cert.pub
/etc/ssh/ssh_host_ecdsa_key-cert.pub
/etc/ssh/ssh_host_ed25519_key-cert.pub
/etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key-cert.pub
If these files exist they are assumed to contain public
certificate information corresponding with the private keys
above.
SEE ALSO
ssh(1), ssh-keygen(1), ssh_config(5), sshd(8)
HISTORY
ssh-keysign first appeared in OpenBSD 3.2.
AUTHORS
Markus Friedl <markus@openbsd.org>
-OpenBSD 6.7 November 30, 2019 OpenBSD 6.7
+OpenBSD 6.8 November 30, 2019 OpenBSD 6.8
diff --git a/ssh-keysign.c b/ssh-keysign.c
index 3e3ea3e1481d..7991e0f01694 100644
--- a/ssh-keysign.c
+++ b/ssh-keysign.c
@@ -1,293 +1,293 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: ssh-keysign.c,v 1.63 2019/11/18 16:10:05 naddy Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: ssh-keysign.c,v 1.64 2020/08/27 01:06:18 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 2002 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
* OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
* IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
* INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
* NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
* DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
* THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
* (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
* THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
*/
#include "includes.h"
#include <fcntl.h>
#ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H
#include <paths.h>
#endif
#include <pwd.h>
#include <stdarg.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <errno.h>
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
#include <openssl/evp.h>
#include <openssl/rand.h>
#include <openssl/rsa.h>
#include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h"
#endif
#include "xmalloc.h"
#include "log.h"
#include "sshkey.h"
#include "ssh.h"
#include "ssh2.h"
#include "misc.h"
#include "sshbuf.h"
#include "authfile.h"
#include "msg.h"
#include "canohost.h"
#include "pathnames.h"
#include "readconf.h"
#include "uidswap.h"
#include "ssherr.h"
extern char *__progname;
static int
valid_request(struct passwd *pw, char *host, struct sshkey **ret,
u_char *data, size_t datalen)
{
struct sshbuf *b;
struct sshkey *key = NULL;
u_char type, *pkblob;
char *p;
size_t blen, len;
char *pkalg, *luser;
int r, pktype, fail;
if (ret != NULL)
*ret = NULL;
fail = 0;
if ((b = sshbuf_from(data, datalen)) == NULL)
fatal("%s: sshbuf_from failed", __func__);
/* session id, currently limited to SHA1 (20 bytes) or SHA256 (32) */
if ((r = sshbuf_get_string(b, NULL, &len)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
if (len != 20 && len != 32)
fail++;
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(b, &type)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
if (type != SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST)
fail++;
/* server user */
if ((r = sshbuf_skip_string(b)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
/* service */
if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &p, NULL)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
if (strcmp("ssh-connection", p) != 0)
fail++;
free(p);
/* method */
if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &p, NULL)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
if (strcmp("hostbased", p) != 0)
fail++;
free(p);
/* pubkey */
if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &pkalg, NULL)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_string(b, &pkblob, &blen)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
pktype = sshkey_type_from_name(pkalg);
if (pktype == KEY_UNSPEC)
fail++;
else if ((r = sshkey_from_blob(pkblob, blen, &key)) != 0) {
error("%s: bad key blob: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
fail++;
} else if (key->type != pktype)
fail++;
free(pkalg);
free(pkblob);
/* client host name, handle trailing dot */
if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &p, &len)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
debug2("%s: check expect chost %s got %s", __func__, host, p);
if (strlen(host) != len - 1)
fail++;
else if (p[len - 1] != '.')
fail++;
else if (strncasecmp(host, p, len - 1) != 0)
fail++;
free(p);
/* local user */
if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &luser, NULL)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
if (strcmp(pw->pw_name, luser) != 0)
fail++;
free(luser);
/* end of message */
if (sshbuf_len(b) != 0)
fail++;
sshbuf_free(b);
debug3("%s: fail %d", __func__, fail);
if (fail)
sshkey_free(key);
else if (ret != NULL)
*ret = key;
return (fail ? -1 : 0);
}
int
main(int argc, char **argv)
{
struct sshbuf *b;
Options options;
#define NUM_KEYTYPES 5
struct sshkey *keys[NUM_KEYTYPES], *key = NULL;
struct passwd *pw;
int r, key_fd[NUM_KEYTYPES], i, found, version = 2, fd;
u_char *signature, *data, rver;
char *host, *fp;
size_t slen, dlen;
if (pledge("stdio rpath getpw dns id", NULL) != 0)
fatal("%s: pledge: %s", __progname, strerror(errno));
/* Ensure that stdin and stdout are connected */
if ((fd = open(_PATH_DEVNULL, O_RDWR)) < 2)
exit(1);
/* Leave /dev/null fd iff it is attached to stderr */
if (fd > 2)
close(fd);
i = 0;
/* XXX This really needs to read sshd_config for the paths */
key_fd[i++] = open(_PATH_HOST_DSA_KEY_FILE, O_RDONLY);
key_fd[i++] = open(_PATH_HOST_ECDSA_KEY_FILE, O_RDONLY);
key_fd[i++] = open(_PATH_HOST_ED25519_KEY_FILE, O_RDONLY);
key_fd[i++] = open(_PATH_HOST_XMSS_KEY_FILE, O_RDONLY);
key_fd[i++] = open(_PATH_HOST_RSA_KEY_FILE, O_RDONLY);
if ((pw = getpwuid(getuid())) == NULL)
fatal("getpwuid failed");
pw = pwcopy(pw);
permanently_set_uid(pw);
seed_rng();
#ifdef DEBUG_SSH_KEYSIGN
log_init("ssh-keysign", SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG3, SYSLOG_FACILITY_AUTH, 0);
#endif
/* verify that ssh-keysign is enabled by the admin */
initialize_options(&options);
(void)read_config_file(_PATH_HOST_CONFIG_FILE, pw, "", "",
&options, 0, NULL);
fill_default_options(&options);
if (options.enable_ssh_keysign != 1)
fatal("ssh-keysign not enabled in %s",
_PATH_HOST_CONFIG_FILE);
for (i = found = 0; i < NUM_KEYTYPES; i++) {
if (key_fd[i] != -1)
found = 1;
}
if (found == 0)
fatal("could not open any host key");
found = 0;
for (i = 0; i < NUM_KEYTYPES; i++) {
keys[i] = NULL;
if (key_fd[i] == -1)
continue;
r = sshkey_load_private_type_fd(key_fd[i], KEY_UNSPEC,
NULL, &key, NULL);
close(key_fd[i]);
if (r != 0)
debug("parse key %d: %s", i, ssh_err(r));
else if (key != NULL) {
keys[i] = key;
found = 1;
}
}
if (!found)
fatal("no hostkey found");
if (pledge("stdio dns", NULL) != 0)
fatal("%s: pledge: %s", __progname, strerror(errno));
if ((b = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __progname);
if (ssh_msg_recv(STDIN_FILENO, b) < 0)
fatal("ssh_msg_recv failed");
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(b, &rver)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __progname, ssh_err(r));
if (rver != version)
fatal("bad version: received %d, expected %d", rver, version);
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(b, (u_int *)&fd)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __progname, ssh_err(r));
if (fd < 0 || fd == STDIN_FILENO || fd == STDOUT_FILENO)
fatal("bad fd = %d", fd);
if ((host = get_local_name(fd)) == NULL)
fatal("cannot get local name for fd");
if ((r = sshbuf_get_string(b, &data, &dlen)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __progname, ssh_err(r));
if (valid_request(pw, host, &key, data, dlen) < 0)
fatal("not a valid request");
free(host);
found = 0;
for (i = 0; i < NUM_KEYTYPES; i++) {
if (keys[i] != NULL &&
sshkey_equal_public(key, keys[i])) {
found = 1;
break;
}
}
if (!found) {
if ((fp = sshkey_fingerprint(key, options.fingerprint_hash,
SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL)
fatal("%s: sshkey_fingerprint failed", __progname);
fatal("no matching hostkey found for key %s %s",
sshkey_type(key), fp ? fp : "");
}
if ((r = sshkey_sign(keys[i], &signature, &slen, data, dlen,
- NULL, NULL, 0)) != 0)
+ NULL, NULL, NULL, 0)) != 0)
fatal("sshkey_sign failed: %s", ssh_err(r));
free(data);
/* send reply */
sshbuf_reset(b);
if ((r = sshbuf_put_string(b, signature, slen)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __progname, ssh_err(r));
if (ssh_msg_send(STDOUT_FILENO, version, b) == -1)
fatal("ssh_msg_send failed");
return (0);
}
diff --git a/ssh-pkcs11-helper.0 b/ssh-pkcs11-helper.0
index c6698046da2a..973b551a5b8d 100644
--- a/ssh-pkcs11-helper.0
+++ b/ssh-pkcs11-helper.0
@@ -1,35 +1,35 @@
SSH-PKCS11-HELPER(8) System Manager's Manual SSH-PKCS11-HELPER(8)
NAME
ssh-pkcs11-helper M-bM-^@M-^S OpenSSH helper for PKCS#11 support
SYNOPSIS
ssh-pkcs11-helper [-v]
DESCRIPTION
ssh-pkcs11-helper is used by ssh-agent(1) to access keys provided by a
PKCS#11 token.
ssh-pkcs11-helper is not intended to be invoked by the user, but from
ssh-agent(1).
A single option is supported:
-v Verbose mode. Causes ssh-pkcs11-helper to print debugging
messages about its progress. This is helpful in debugging
problems. Multiple -v options increase the verbosity. The
maximum is 3.
Note that ssh-agent(1) will automatically pass the -v flag to
ssh-pkcs11-helper when it has itself been placed in debug mode.
SEE ALSO
ssh(1), ssh-add(1), ssh-agent(1)
HISTORY
ssh-pkcs11-helper first appeared in OpenBSD 4.7.
AUTHORS
Markus Friedl <markus@openbsd.org>
-OpenBSD 6.7 November 30, 2019 OpenBSD 6.7
+OpenBSD 6.8 November 30, 2019 OpenBSD 6.8
diff --git a/ssh-pkcs11.c b/ssh-pkcs11.c
index ec0e91865ffe..f495883d1043 100644
--- a/ssh-pkcs11.c
+++ b/ssh-pkcs11.c
@@ -1,1873 +1,1874 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: ssh-pkcs11.c,v 1.49 2020/03/13 04:16:27 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: ssh-pkcs11.c,v 1.50 2020/05/29 03:14:02 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 2010 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
* Copyright (c) 2014 Pedro Martelletto. All rights reserved.
*
* Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
* purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
* copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
*
* THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
* WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
* MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
* ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
* WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
* ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
* OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
*/
#include "includes.h"
#ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11
#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TIME_H
# include <sys/time.h>
#endif
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <stdarg.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <ctype.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <dlfcn.h>
#include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h"
#include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h"
#include <openssl/ecdsa.h>
#include <openssl/x509.h>
#include <openssl/err.h>
#define CRYPTOKI_COMPAT
#include "pkcs11.h"
#include "log.h"
#include "misc.h"
#include "sshkey.h"
#include "ssh-pkcs11.h"
#include "xmalloc.h"
struct pkcs11_slotinfo {
CK_TOKEN_INFO token;
CK_SESSION_HANDLE session;
int logged_in;
};
struct pkcs11_provider {
char *name;
void *handle;
CK_FUNCTION_LIST *function_list;
CK_INFO info;
CK_ULONG nslots;
CK_SLOT_ID *slotlist;
struct pkcs11_slotinfo *slotinfo;
int valid;
int refcount;
TAILQ_ENTRY(pkcs11_provider) next;
};
TAILQ_HEAD(, pkcs11_provider) pkcs11_providers;
struct pkcs11_key {
struct pkcs11_provider *provider;
CK_ULONG slotidx;
char *keyid;
int keyid_len;
};
int pkcs11_interactive = 0;
#ifdef HAVE_EC_KEY_METHOD_NEW
static void
ossl_error(const char *msg)
{
unsigned long e;
error("%s: %s", __func__, msg);
while ((e = ERR_get_error()) != 0)
error("%s: libcrypto error: %.100s", __func__,
ERR_error_string(e, NULL));
}
#endif /* HAVE_EC_KEY_METHOD_NEW */
int
pkcs11_init(int interactive)
{
pkcs11_interactive = interactive;
TAILQ_INIT(&pkcs11_providers);
return (0);
}
/*
* finalize a provider shared library, it's no longer usable.
* however, there might still be keys referencing this provider,
* so the actual freeing of memory is handled by pkcs11_provider_unref().
* this is called when a provider gets unregistered.
*/
static void
pkcs11_provider_finalize(struct pkcs11_provider *p)
{
CK_RV rv;
CK_ULONG i;
debug("pkcs11_provider_finalize: %p refcount %d valid %d",
p, p->refcount, p->valid);
if (!p->valid)
return;
for (i = 0; i < p->nslots; i++) {
if (p->slotinfo[i].session &&
(rv = p->function_list->C_CloseSession(
p->slotinfo[i].session)) != CKR_OK)
error("C_CloseSession failed: %lu", rv);
}
if ((rv = p->function_list->C_Finalize(NULL)) != CKR_OK)
error("C_Finalize failed: %lu", rv);
p->valid = 0;
p->function_list = NULL;
dlclose(p->handle);
}
/*
* remove a reference to the provider.
* called when a key gets destroyed or when the provider is unregistered.
*/
static void
pkcs11_provider_unref(struct pkcs11_provider *p)
{
debug("pkcs11_provider_unref: %p refcount %d", p, p->refcount);
if (--p->refcount <= 0) {
if (p->valid)
error("pkcs11_provider_unref: %p still valid", p);
free(p->name);
free(p->slotlist);
free(p->slotinfo);
free(p);
}
}
/* unregister all providers, keys might still point to the providers */
void
pkcs11_terminate(void)
{
struct pkcs11_provider *p;
while ((p = TAILQ_FIRST(&pkcs11_providers)) != NULL) {
TAILQ_REMOVE(&pkcs11_providers, p, next);
pkcs11_provider_finalize(p);
pkcs11_provider_unref(p);
}
}
/* lookup provider by name */
static struct pkcs11_provider *
pkcs11_provider_lookup(char *provider_id)
{
struct pkcs11_provider *p;
TAILQ_FOREACH(p, &pkcs11_providers, next) {
debug("check %p %s", p, p->name);
if (!strcmp(provider_id, p->name))
return (p);
}
return (NULL);
}
/* unregister provider by name */
int
pkcs11_del_provider(char *provider_id)
{
struct pkcs11_provider *p;
if ((p = pkcs11_provider_lookup(provider_id)) != NULL) {
TAILQ_REMOVE(&pkcs11_providers, p, next);
pkcs11_provider_finalize(p);
pkcs11_provider_unref(p);
return (0);
}
return (-1);
}
static RSA_METHOD *rsa_method;
static int rsa_idx = 0;
#ifdef HAVE_EC_KEY_METHOD_NEW
static EC_KEY_METHOD *ec_key_method;
static int ec_key_idx = 0;
#endif
/* release a wrapped object */
static void
pkcs11_k11_free(void *parent, void *ptr, CRYPTO_EX_DATA *ad, int idx,
long argl, void *argp)
{
struct pkcs11_key *k11 = ptr;
debug("%s: parent %p ptr %p idx %d", __func__, parent, ptr, idx);
if (k11 == NULL)
return;
if (k11->provider)
pkcs11_provider_unref(k11->provider);
free(k11->keyid);
free(k11);
}
/* find a single 'obj' for given attributes */
static int
pkcs11_find(struct pkcs11_provider *p, CK_ULONG slotidx, CK_ATTRIBUTE *attr,
CK_ULONG nattr, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE *obj)
{
CK_FUNCTION_LIST *f;
CK_SESSION_HANDLE session;
CK_ULONG nfound = 0;
CK_RV rv;
int ret = -1;
f = p->function_list;
session = p->slotinfo[slotidx].session;
if ((rv = f->C_FindObjectsInit(session, attr, nattr)) != CKR_OK) {
error("C_FindObjectsInit failed (nattr %lu): %lu", nattr, rv);
return (-1);
}
if ((rv = f->C_FindObjects(session, obj, 1, &nfound)) != CKR_OK ||
nfound != 1) {
debug("C_FindObjects failed (nfound %lu nattr %lu): %lu",
nfound, nattr, rv);
} else
ret = 0;
if ((rv = f->C_FindObjectsFinal(session)) != CKR_OK)
error("C_FindObjectsFinal failed: %lu", rv);
return (ret);
}
static int
pkcs11_login_slot(struct pkcs11_provider *provider, struct pkcs11_slotinfo *si,
CK_USER_TYPE type)
{
char *pin = NULL, prompt[1024];
CK_RV rv;
if (provider == NULL || si == NULL || !provider->valid) {
error("no pkcs11 (valid) provider found");
return (-1);
}
if (!pkcs11_interactive) {
error("need pin entry%s",
(si->token.flags & CKF_PROTECTED_AUTHENTICATION_PATH) ?
" on reader keypad" : "");
return (-1);
}
if (si->token.flags & CKF_PROTECTED_AUTHENTICATION_PATH)
verbose("Deferring PIN entry to reader keypad.");
else {
snprintf(prompt, sizeof(prompt), "Enter PIN for '%s': ",
si->token.label);
if ((pin = read_passphrase(prompt, RP_ALLOW_EOF)) == NULL) {
debug("%s: no pin specified", __func__);
return (-1); /* bail out */
}
}
rv = provider->function_list->C_Login(si->session, type, (u_char *)pin,
(pin != NULL) ? strlen(pin) : 0);
if (pin != NULL)
freezero(pin, strlen(pin));
switch (rv) {
case CKR_OK:
case CKR_USER_ALREADY_LOGGED_IN:
/* success */
break;
case CKR_PIN_LEN_RANGE:
error("PKCS#11 login failed: PIN length out of range");
return -1;
case CKR_PIN_INCORRECT:
error("PKCS#11 login failed: PIN incorrect");
return -1;
case CKR_PIN_LOCKED:
error("PKCS#11 login failed: PIN locked");
return -1;
default:
error("PKCS#11 login failed: error %lu", rv);
return -1;
}
si->logged_in = 1;
return (0);
}
static int
pkcs11_login(struct pkcs11_key *k11, CK_USER_TYPE type)
{
if (k11 == NULL || k11->provider == NULL || !k11->provider->valid) {
error("no pkcs11 (valid) provider found");
return (-1);
}
return pkcs11_login_slot(k11->provider,
&k11->provider->slotinfo[k11->slotidx], type);
}
static int
pkcs11_check_obj_bool_attrib(struct pkcs11_key *k11, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE obj,
CK_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE type, int *val)
{
struct pkcs11_slotinfo *si;
CK_FUNCTION_LIST *f;
CK_BBOOL flag = 0;
CK_ATTRIBUTE attr;
CK_RV rv;
*val = 0;
if (!k11->provider || !k11->provider->valid) {
error("no pkcs11 (valid) provider found");
return (-1);
}
f = k11->provider->function_list;
si = &k11->provider->slotinfo[k11->slotidx];
attr.type = type;
attr.pValue = &flag;
attr.ulValueLen = sizeof(flag);
rv = f->C_GetAttributeValue(si->session, obj, &attr, 1);
if (rv != CKR_OK) {
error("C_GetAttributeValue failed: %lu", rv);
return (-1);
}
*val = flag != 0;
debug("%s: provider %p slot %lu object %lu: attrib %lu = %d",
__func__, k11->provider, k11->slotidx, obj, type, *val);
return (0);
}
static int
pkcs11_get_key(struct pkcs11_key *k11, CK_MECHANISM_TYPE mech_type)
{
struct pkcs11_slotinfo *si;
CK_FUNCTION_LIST *f;
CK_OBJECT_HANDLE obj;
CK_RV rv;
CK_OBJECT_CLASS private_key_class;
CK_BBOOL true_val;
CK_MECHANISM mech;
CK_ATTRIBUTE key_filter[3];
int always_auth = 0;
int did_login = 0;
if (!k11->provider || !k11->provider->valid) {
error("no pkcs11 (valid) provider found");
return (-1);
}
f = k11->provider->function_list;
si = &k11->provider->slotinfo[k11->slotidx];
if ((si->token.flags & CKF_LOGIN_REQUIRED) && !si->logged_in) {
if (pkcs11_login(k11, CKU_USER) < 0) {
error("login failed");
return (-1);
}
did_login = 1;
}
memset(&key_filter, 0, sizeof(key_filter));
private_key_class = CKO_PRIVATE_KEY;
key_filter[0].type = CKA_CLASS;
key_filter[0].pValue = &private_key_class;
key_filter[0].ulValueLen = sizeof(private_key_class);
key_filter[1].type = CKA_ID;
key_filter[1].pValue = k11->keyid;
key_filter[1].ulValueLen = k11->keyid_len;
true_val = CK_TRUE;
key_filter[2].type = CKA_SIGN;
key_filter[2].pValue = &true_val;
key_filter[2].ulValueLen = sizeof(true_val);
/* try to find object w/CKA_SIGN first, retry w/o */
if (pkcs11_find(k11->provider, k11->slotidx, key_filter, 3, &obj) < 0 &&
pkcs11_find(k11->provider, k11->slotidx, key_filter, 2, &obj) < 0) {
error("cannot find private key");
return (-1);
}
memset(&mech, 0, sizeof(mech));
mech.mechanism = mech_type;
mech.pParameter = NULL_PTR;
mech.ulParameterLen = 0;
if ((rv = f->C_SignInit(si->session, &mech, obj)) != CKR_OK) {
error("C_SignInit failed: %lu", rv);
return (-1);
}
pkcs11_check_obj_bool_attrib(k11, obj, CKA_ALWAYS_AUTHENTICATE,
&always_auth); /* ignore errors here */
if (always_auth && !did_login) {
debug("%s: always-auth key", __func__);
if (pkcs11_login(k11, CKU_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC) < 0) {
error("login failed for always-auth key");
return (-1);
}
}
return (0);
}
/* openssl callback doing the actual signing operation */
static int
pkcs11_rsa_private_encrypt(int flen, const u_char *from, u_char *to, RSA *rsa,
int padding)
{
struct pkcs11_key *k11;
struct pkcs11_slotinfo *si;
CK_FUNCTION_LIST *f;
CK_ULONG tlen = 0;
CK_RV rv;
int rval = -1;
if ((k11 = RSA_get_ex_data(rsa, rsa_idx)) == NULL) {
error("RSA_get_ex_data failed for rsa %p", rsa);
return (-1);
}
if (pkcs11_get_key(k11, CKM_RSA_PKCS) == -1) {
error("pkcs11_get_key failed");
return (-1);
}
f = k11->provider->function_list;
si = &k11->provider->slotinfo[k11->slotidx];
tlen = RSA_size(rsa);
/* XXX handle CKR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL */
rv = f->C_Sign(si->session, (CK_BYTE *)from, flen, to, &tlen);
if (rv == CKR_OK)
rval = tlen;
else
error("C_Sign failed: %lu", rv);
return (rval);
}
static int
pkcs11_rsa_private_decrypt(int flen, const u_char *from, u_char *to, RSA *rsa,
int padding)
{
return (-1);
}
static int
pkcs11_rsa_start_wrapper(void)
{
if (rsa_method != NULL)
return (0);
rsa_method = RSA_meth_dup(RSA_get_default_method());
if (rsa_method == NULL)
return (-1);
rsa_idx = RSA_get_ex_new_index(0, "ssh-pkcs11-rsa",
NULL, NULL, pkcs11_k11_free);
if (rsa_idx == -1)
return (-1);
if (!RSA_meth_set1_name(rsa_method, "pkcs11") ||
!RSA_meth_set_priv_enc(rsa_method, pkcs11_rsa_private_encrypt) ||
!RSA_meth_set_priv_dec(rsa_method, pkcs11_rsa_private_decrypt)) {
error("%s: setup pkcs11 method failed", __func__);
return (-1);
}
return (0);
}
/* redirect private key operations for rsa key to pkcs11 token */
static int
pkcs11_rsa_wrap(struct pkcs11_provider *provider, CK_ULONG slotidx,
CK_ATTRIBUTE *keyid_attrib, RSA *rsa)
{
struct pkcs11_key *k11;
if (pkcs11_rsa_start_wrapper() == -1)
return (-1);
k11 = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*k11));
k11->provider = provider;
provider->refcount++; /* provider referenced by RSA key */
k11->slotidx = slotidx;
/* identify key object on smartcard */
k11->keyid_len = keyid_attrib->ulValueLen;
if (k11->keyid_len > 0) {
k11->keyid = xmalloc(k11->keyid_len);
memcpy(k11->keyid, keyid_attrib->pValue, k11->keyid_len);
}
RSA_set_method(rsa, rsa_method);
RSA_set_ex_data(rsa, rsa_idx, k11);
return (0);
}
#ifdef HAVE_EC_KEY_METHOD_NEW
/* openssl callback doing the actual signing operation */
static ECDSA_SIG *
ecdsa_do_sign(const unsigned char *dgst, int dgst_len, const BIGNUM *inv,
const BIGNUM *rp, EC_KEY *ec)
{
struct pkcs11_key *k11;
struct pkcs11_slotinfo *si;
CK_FUNCTION_LIST *f;
CK_ULONG siglen = 0, bnlen;
CK_RV rv;
ECDSA_SIG *ret = NULL;
u_char *sig;
BIGNUM *r = NULL, *s = NULL;
if ((k11 = EC_KEY_get_ex_data(ec, ec_key_idx)) == NULL) {
ossl_error("EC_KEY_get_key_method_data failed for ec");
return (NULL);
}
if (pkcs11_get_key(k11, CKM_ECDSA) == -1) {
error("pkcs11_get_key failed");
return (NULL);
}
f = k11->provider->function_list;
si = &k11->provider->slotinfo[k11->slotidx];
siglen = ECDSA_size(ec);
sig = xmalloc(siglen);
/* XXX handle CKR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL */
rv = f->C_Sign(si->session, (CK_BYTE *)dgst, dgst_len, sig, &siglen);
if (rv != CKR_OK) {
error("C_Sign failed: %lu", rv);
goto done;
}
if (siglen < 64 || siglen > 132 || siglen % 2) {
ossl_error("d2i_ECDSA_SIG failed");
goto done;
}
bnlen = siglen/2;
if ((ret = ECDSA_SIG_new()) == NULL) {
error("ECDSA_SIG_new failed");
goto done;
}
if ((r = BN_bin2bn(sig, bnlen, NULL)) == NULL ||
(s = BN_bin2bn(sig+bnlen, bnlen, NULL)) == NULL) {
ossl_error("d2i_ECDSA_SIG failed");
ECDSA_SIG_free(ret);
ret = NULL;
goto done;
}
if (!ECDSA_SIG_set0(ret, r, s)) {
error("%s: ECDSA_SIG_set0 failed", __func__);
ECDSA_SIG_free(ret);
ret = NULL;
goto done;
}
r = s = NULL; /* now owned by ret */
/* success */
done:
BN_free(r);
BN_free(s);
free(sig);
return (ret);
}
static int
pkcs11_ecdsa_start_wrapper(void)
{
int (*orig_sign)(int, const unsigned char *, int, unsigned char *,
unsigned int *, const BIGNUM *, const BIGNUM *, EC_KEY *) = NULL;
if (ec_key_method != NULL)
return (0);
ec_key_idx = EC_KEY_get_ex_new_index(0, "ssh-pkcs11-ecdsa",
NULL, NULL, pkcs11_k11_free);
if (ec_key_idx == -1)
return (-1);
ec_key_method = EC_KEY_METHOD_new(EC_KEY_OpenSSL());
if (ec_key_method == NULL)
return (-1);
EC_KEY_METHOD_get_sign(ec_key_method, &orig_sign, NULL, NULL);
EC_KEY_METHOD_set_sign(ec_key_method, orig_sign, NULL, ecdsa_do_sign);
return (0);
}
static int
pkcs11_ecdsa_wrap(struct pkcs11_provider *provider, CK_ULONG slotidx,
CK_ATTRIBUTE *keyid_attrib, EC_KEY *ec)
{
struct pkcs11_key *k11;
if (pkcs11_ecdsa_start_wrapper() == -1)
return (-1);
k11 = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*k11));
k11->provider = provider;
provider->refcount++; /* provider referenced by ECDSA key */
k11->slotidx = slotidx;
/* identify key object on smartcard */
k11->keyid_len = keyid_attrib->ulValueLen;
k11->keyid = xmalloc(k11->keyid_len);
memcpy(k11->keyid, keyid_attrib->pValue, k11->keyid_len);
EC_KEY_set_method(ec, ec_key_method);
EC_KEY_set_ex_data(ec, ec_key_idx, k11);
return (0);
}
#endif /* HAVE_EC_KEY_METHOD_NEW */
/* remove trailing spaces */
static void
rmspace(u_char *buf, size_t len)
{
size_t i;
if (!len)
return;
for (i = len - 1; i > 0; i--)
if (i == len - 1 || buf[i] == ' ')
buf[i] = '\0';
else
break;
}
/*
* open a pkcs11 session and login if required.
* if pin == NULL we delay login until key use
*/
static int
pkcs11_open_session(struct pkcs11_provider *p, CK_ULONG slotidx, char *pin,
CK_ULONG user)
{
struct pkcs11_slotinfo *si;
CK_FUNCTION_LIST *f;
CK_RV rv;
CK_SESSION_HANDLE session;
int login_required, ret;
f = p->function_list;
si = &p->slotinfo[slotidx];
login_required = si->token.flags & CKF_LOGIN_REQUIRED;
/* fail early before opening session */
if (login_required && !pkcs11_interactive &&
(pin == NULL || strlen(pin) == 0)) {
error("pin required");
return (-SSH_PKCS11_ERR_PIN_REQUIRED);
}
if ((rv = f->C_OpenSession(p->slotlist[slotidx], CKF_RW_SESSION|
CKF_SERIAL_SESSION, NULL, NULL, &session)) != CKR_OK) {
error("C_OpenSession failed: %lu", rv);
return (-1);
}
if (login_required && pin != NULL && strlen(pin) != 0) {
rv = f->C_Login(session, user, (u_char *)pin, strlen(pin));
if (rv != CKR_OK && rv != CKR_USER_ALREADY_LOGGED_IN) {
error("C_Login failed: %lu", rv);
ret = (rv == CKR_PIN_LOCKED) ?
-SSH_PKCS11_ERR_PIN_LOCKED :
-SSH_PKCS11_ERR_LOGIN_FAIL;
if ((rv = f->C_CloseSession(session)) != CKR_OK)
error("C_CloseSession failed: %lu", rv);
return (ret);
}
si->logged_in = 1;
}
si->session = session;
return (0);
}
static int
pkcs11_key_included(struct sshkey ***keysp, int *nkeys, struct sshkey *key)
{
int i;
for (i = 0; i < *nkeys; i++)
if (sshkey_equal(key, (*keysp)[i]))
return (1);
return (0);
}
#ifdef HAVE_EC_KEY_METHOD_NEW
static struct sshkey *
pkcs11_fetch_ecdsa_pubkey(struct pkcs11_provider *p, CK_ULONG slotidx,
CK_OBJECT_HANDLE *obj)
{
CK_ATTRIBUTE key_attr[3];
CK_SESSION_HANDLE session;
CK_FUNCTION_LIST *f = NULL;
CK_RV rv;
ASN1_OCTET_STRING *octet = NULL;
EC_KEY *ec = NULL;
EC_GROUP *group = NULL;
struct sshkey *key = NULL;
const unsigned char *attrp = NULL;
int i;
int nid;
memset(&key_attr, 0, sizeof(key_attr));
key_attr[0].type = CKA_ID;
key_attr[1].type = CKA_EC_POINT;
key_attr[2].type = CKA_EC_PARAMS;
session = p->slotinfo[slotidx].session;
f = p->function_list;
/* figure out size of the attributes */
rv = f->C_GetAttributeValue(session, *obj, key_attr, 3);
if (rv != CKR_OK) {
error("C_GetAttributeValue failed: %lu", rv);
return (NULL);
}
/*
* Allow CKA_ID (always first attribute) to be empty, but
* ensure that none of the others are zero length.
* XXX assumes CKA_ID is always first.
*/
if (key_attr[1].ulValueLen == 0 ||
key_attr[2].ulValueLen == 0) {
error("invalid attribute length");
return (NULL);
}
/* allocate buffers for attributes */
for (i = 0; i < 3; i++)
if (key_attr[i].ulValueLen > 0)
key_attr[i].pValue = xcalloc(1, key_attr[i].ulValueLen);
/* retrieve ID, public point and curve parameters of EC key */
rv = f->C_GetAttributeValue(session, *obj, key_attr, 3);
if (rv != CKR_OK) {
error("C_GetAttributeValue failed: %lu", rv);
goto fail;
}
ec = EC_KEY_new();
if (ec == NULL) {
error("EC_KEY_new failed");
goto fail;
}
attrp = key_attr[2].pValue;
group = d2i_ECPKParameters(NULL, &attrp, key_attr[2].ulValueLen);
if (group == NULL) {
ossl_error("d2i_ECPKParameters failed");
goto fail;
}
if (EC_KEY_set_group(ec, group) == 0) {
ossl_error("EC_KEY_set_group failed");
goto fail;
}
if (key_attr[1].ulValueLen <= 2) {
error("CKA_EC_POINT too small");
goto fail;
}
attrp = key_attr[1].pValue;
octet = d2i_ASN1_OCTET_STRING(NULL, &attrp, key_attr[1].ulValueLen);
if (octet == NULL) {
ossl_error("d2i_ASN1_OCTET_STRING failed");
goto fail;
}
attrp = octet->data;
if (o2i_ECPublicKey(&ec, &attrp, octet->length) == NULL) {
ossl_error("o2i_ECPublicKey failed");
goto fail;
}
nid = sshkey_ecdsa_key_to_nid(ec);
if (nid < 0) {
error("couldn't get curve nid");
goto fail;
}
if (pkcs11_ecdsa_wrap(p, slotidx, &key_attr[0], ec))
goto fail;
key = sshkey_new(KEY_UNSPEC);
if (key == NULL) {
error("sshkey_new failed");
goto fail;
}
key->ecdsa = ec;
key->ecdsa_nid = nid;
key->type = KEY_ECDSA;
key->flags |= SSHKEY_FLAG_EXT;
ec = NULL; /* now owned by key */
fail:
for (i = 0; i < 3; i++)
free(key_attr[i].pValue);
if (ec)
EC_KEY_free(ec);
if (group)
EC_GROUP_free(group);
if (octet)
ASN1_OCTET_STRING_free(octet);
return (key);
}
#endif /* HAVE_EC_KEY_METHOD_NEW */
static struct sshkey *
pkcs11_fetch_rsa_pubkey(struct pkcs11_provider *p, CK_ULONG slotidx,
CK_OBJECT_HANDLE *obj)
{
CK_ATTRIBUTE key_attr[3];
CK_SESSION_HANDLE session;
CK_FUNCTION_LIST *f = NULL;
CK_RV rv;
RSA *rsa = NULL;
BIGNUM *rsa_n, *rsa_e;
struct sshkey *key = NULL;
int i;
memset(&key_attr, 0, sizeof(key_attr));
key_attr[0].type = CKA_ID;
key_attr[1].type = CKA_MODULUS;
key_attr[2].type = CKA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT;
session = p->slotinfo[slotidx].session;
f = p->function_list;
/* figure out size of the attributes */
rv = f->C_GetAttributeValue(session, *obj, key_attr, 3);
if (rv != CKR_OK) {
error("C_GetAttributeValue failed: %lu", rv);
return (NULL);
}
/*
* Allow CKA_ID (always first attribute) to be empty, but
* ensure that none of the others are zero length.
* XXX assumes CKA_ID is always first.
*/
if (key_attr[1].ulValueLen == 0 ||
key_attr[2].ulValueLen == 0) {
error("invalid attribute length");
return (NULL);
}
/* allocate buffers for attributes */
for (i = 0; i < 3; i++)
if (key_attr[i].ulValueLen > 0)
key_attr[i].pValue = xcalloc(1, key_attr[i].ulValueLen);
/* retrieve ID, modulus and public exponent of RSA key */
rv = f->C_GetAttributeValue(session, *obj, key_attr, 3);
if (rv != CKR_OK) {
error("C_GetAttributeValue failed: %lu", rv);
goto fail;
}
rsa = RSA_new();
if (rsa == NULL) {
error("RSA_new failed");
goto fail;
}
rsa_n = BN_bin2bn(key_attr[1].pValue, key_attr[1].ulValueLen, NULL);
rsa_e = BN_bin2bn(key_attr[2].pValue, key_attr[2].ulValueLen, NULL);
if (rsa_n == NULL || rsa_e == NULL) {
error("BN_bin2bn failed");
goto fail;
}
if (!RSA_set0_key(rsa, rsa_n, rsa_e, NULL))
fatal("%s: set key", __func__);
rsa_n = rsa_e = NULL; /* transferred */
if (pkcs11_rsa_wrap(p, slotidx, &key_attr[0], rsa))
goto fail;
key = sshkey_new(KEY_UNSPEC);
if (key == NULL) {
error("sshkey_new failed");
goto fail;
}
key->rsa = rsa;
key->type = KEY_RSA;
key->flags |= SSHKEY_FLAG_EXT;
rsa = NULL; /* now owned by key */
fail:
for (i = 0; i < 3; i++)
free(key_attr[i].pValue);
RSA_free(rsa);
return (key);
}
static int
pkcs11_fetch_x509_pubkey(struct pkcs11_provider *p, CK_ULONG slotidx,
CK_OBJECT_HANDLE *obj, struct sshkey **keyp, char **labelp)
{
CK_ATTRIBUTE cert_attr[3];
CK_SESSION_HANDLE session;
CK_FUNCTION_LIST *f = NULL;
CK_RV rv;
X509 *x509 = NULL;
X509_NAME *x509_name = NULL;
EVP_PKEY *evp;
RSA *rsa = NULL;
#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
EC_KEY *ec = NULL;
#endif
struct sshkey *key = NULL;
int i;
#ifdef HAVE_EC_KEY_METHOD_NEW
int nid;
#endif
const u_char *cp;
char *subject = NULL;
*keyp = NULL;
*labelp = NULL;
memset(&cert_attr, 0, sizeof(cert_attr));
cert_attr[0].type = CKA_ID;
cert_attr[1].type = CKA_SUBJECT;
cert_attr[2].type = CKA_VALUE;
session = p->slotinfo[slotidx].session;
f = p->function_list;
/* figure out size of the attributes */
rv = f->C_GetAttributeValue(session, *obj, cert_attr, 3);
if (rv != CKR_OK) {
error("C_GetAttributeValue failed: %lu", rv);
return -1;
}
/*
* Allow CKA_ID (always first attribute) to be empty, but
* ensure that none of the others are zero length.
* XXX assumes CKA_ID is always first.
*/
if (cert_attr[1].ulValueLen == 0 ||
cert_attr[2].ulValueLen == 0) {
error("invalid attribute length");
return -1;
}
/* allocate buffers for attributes */
for (i = 0; i < 3; i++)
if (cert_attr[i].ulValueLen > 0)
cert_attr[i].pValue = xcalloc(1, cert_attr[i].ulValueLen);
/* retrieve ID, subject and value of certificate */
rv = f->C_GetAttributeValue(session, *obj, cert_attr, 3);
if (rv != CKR_OK) {
error("C_GetAttributeValue failed: %lu", rv);
goto out;
}
/* Decode DER-encoded cert subject */
cp = cert_attr[2].pValue;
if ((x509_name = d2i_X509_NAME(NULL, &cp,
cert_attr[1].ulValueLen)) == NULL ||
(subject = X509_NAME_oneline(x509_name, NULL, 0)) == NULL)
subject = xstrdup("invalid subject");
X509_NAME_free(x509_name);
cp = cert_attr[2].pValue;
if ((x509 = d2i_X509(NULL, &cp, cert_attr[2].ulValueLen)) == NULL) {
error("d2i_x509 failed");
goto out;
}
if ((evp = X509_get_pubkey(x509)) == NULL) {
error("X509_get_pubkey failed");
goto out;
}
if (EVP_PKEY_base_id(evp) == EVP_PKEY_RSA) {
if (EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(evp) == NULL) {
error("invalid x509; no rsa key");
goto out;
}
if ((rsa = RSAPublicKey_dup(EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(evp))) == NULL) {
error("RSAPublicKey_dup failed");
goto out;
}
if (pkcs11_rsa_wrap(p, slotidx, &cert_attr[0], rsa))
goto out;
key = sshkey_new(KEY_UNSPEC);
if (key == NULL) {
error("sshkey_new failed");
goto out;
}
key->rsa = rsa;
key->type = KEY_RSA;
key->flags |= SSHKEY_FLAG_EXT;
rsa = NULL; /* now owned by key */
#ifdef HAVE_EC_KEY_METHOD_NEW
} else if (EVP_PKEY_base_id(evp) == EVP_PKEY_EC) {
if (EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(evp) == NULL) {
error("invalid x509; no ec key");
goto out;
}
if ((ec = EC_KEY_dup(EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(evp))) == NULL) {
error("EC_KEY_dup failed");
goto out;
}
nid = sshkey_ecdsa_key_to_nid(ec);
if (nid < 0) {
error("couldn't get curve nid");
goto out;
}
if (pkcs11_ecdsa_wrap(p, slotidx, &cert_attr[0], ec))
goto out;
key = sshkey_new(KEY_UNSPEC);
if (key == NULL) {
error("sshkey_new failed");
goto out;
}
key->ecdsa = ec;
key->ecdsa_nid = nid;
key->type = KEY_ECDSA;
key->flags |= SSHKEY_FLAG_EXT;
ec = NULL; /* now owned by key */
#endif /* HAVE_EC_KEY_METHOD_NEW */
} else {
error("unknown certificate key type");
goto out;
}
out:
for (i = 0; i < 3; i++)
free(cert_attr[i].pValue);
X509_free(x509);
RSA_free(rsa);
#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
EC_KEY_free(ec);
#endif
if (key == NULL) {
free(subject);
return -1;
}
/* success */
*keyp = key;
*labelp = subject;
return 0;
}
#if 0
static int
have_rsa_key(const RSA *rsa)
{
const BIGNUM *rsa_n, *rsa_e;
RSA_get0_key(rsa, &rsa_n, &rsa_e, NULL);
return rsa_n != NULL && rsa_e != NULL;
}
#endif
/*
* lookup certificates for token in slot identified by slotidx,
* add 'wrapped' public keys to the 'keysp' array and increment nkeys.
* keysp points to an (possibly empty) array with *nkeys keys.
*/
static int
pkcs11_fetch_certs(struct pkcs11_provider *p, CK_ULONG slotidx,
struct sshkey ***keysp, char ***labelsp, int *nkeys)
{
struct sshkey *key = NULL;
CK_OBJECT_CLASS key_class;
CK_ATTRIBUTE key_attr[1];
CK_SESSION_HANDLE session;
CK_FUNCTION_LIST *f = NULL;
CK_RV rv;
CK_OBJECT_HANDLE obj;
CK_ULONG n = 0;
int ret = -1;
char *label;
memset(&key_attr, 0, sizeof(key_attr));
memset(&obj, 0, sizeof(obj));
key_class = CKO_CERTIFICATE;
key_attr[0].type = CKA_CLASS;
key_attr[0].pValue = &key_class;
key_attr[0].ulValueLen = sizeof(key_class);
session = p->slotinfo[slotidx].session;
f = p->function_list;
rv = f->C_FindObjectsInit(session, key_attr, 1);
if (rv != CKR_OK) {
error("C_FindObjectsInit failed: %lu", rv);
goto fail;
}
while (1) {
CK_CERTIFICATE_TYPE ck_cert_type;
rv = f->C_FindObjects(session, &obj, 1, &n);
if (rv != CKR_OK) {
error("C_FindObjects failed: %lu", rv);
goto fail;
}
if (n == 0)
break;
memset(&ck_cert_type, 0, sizeof(ck_cert_type));
memset(&key_attr, 0, sizeof(key_attr));
key_attr[0].type = CKA_CERTIFICATE_TYPE;
key_attr[0].pValue = &ck_cert_type;
key_attr[0].ulValueLen = sizeof(ck_cert_type);
rv = f->C_GetAttributeValue(session, obj, key_attr, 1);
if (rv != CKR_OK) {
error("C_GetAttributeValue failed: %lu", rv);
goto fail;
}
key = NULL;
label = NULL;
switch (ck_cert_type) {
case CKC_X_509:
if (pkcs11_fetch_x509_pubkey(p, slotidx, &obj,
&key, &label) != 0) {
error("failed to fetch key");
continue;
}
break;
default:
error("skipping unsupported certificate type %lu",
ck_cert_type);
continue;
}
if (pkcs11_key_included(keysp, nkeys, key)) {
sshkey_free(key);
} else {
/* expand key array and add key */
*keysp = xrecallocarray(*keysp, *nkeys,
*nkeys + 1, sizeof(struct sshkey *));
(*keysp)[*nkeys] = key;
if (labelsp != NULL) {
*labelsp = xrecallocarray(*labelsp, *nkeys,
*nkeys + 1, sizeof(char *));
(*labelsp)[*nkeys] = xstrdup((char *)label);
}
*nkeys = *nkeys + 1;
debug("have %d keys", *nkeys);
}
}
ret = 0;
fail:
rv = f->C_FindObjectsFinal(session);
if (rv != CKR_OK) {
error("C_FindObjectsFinal failed: %lu", rv);
ret = -1;
}
return (ret);
}
/*
* lookup public keys for token in slot identified by slotidx,
* add 'wrapped' public keys to the 'keysp' array and increment nkeys.
* keysp points to an (possibly empty) array with *nkeys keys.
*/
static int
pkcs11_fetch_keys(struct pkcs11_provider *p, CK_ULONG slotidx,
struct sshkey ***keysp, char ***labelsp, int *nkeys)
{
struct sshkey *key = NULL;
CK_OBJECT_CLASS key_class;
CK_ATTRIBUTE key_attr[2];
CK_SESSION_HANDLE session;
CK_FUNCTION_LIST *f = NULL;
CK_RV rv;
CK_OBJECT_HANDLE obj;
CK_ULONG n = 0;
int ret = -1;
memset(&key_attr, 0, sizeof(key_attr));
memset(&obj, 0, sizeof(obj));
key_class = CKO_PUBLIC_KEY;
key_attr[0].type = CKA_CLASS;
key_attr[0].pValue = &key_class;
key_attr[0].ulValueLen = sizeof(key_class);
session = p->slotinfo[slotidx].session;
f = p->function_list;
rv = f->C_FindObjectsInit(session, key_attr, 1);
if (rv != CKR_OK) {
error("C_FindObjectsInit failed: %lu", rv);
goto fail;
}
while (1) {
CK_KEY_TYPE ck_key_type;
CK_UTF8CHAR label[256];
rv = f->C_FindObjects(session, &obj, 1, &n);
if (rv != CKR_OK) {
error("C_FindObjects failed: %lu", rv);
goto fail;
}
if (n == 0)
break;
memset(&ck_key_type, 0, sizeof(ck_key_type));
memset(&key_attr, 0, sizeof(key_attr));
key_attr[0].type = CKA_KEY_TYPE;
key_attr[0].pValue = &ck_key_type;
key_attr[0].ulValueLen = sizeof(ck_key_type);
key_attr[1].type = CKA_LABEL;
key_attr[1].pValue = &label;
key_attr[1].ulValueLen = sizeof(label) - 1;
rv = f->C_GetAttributeValue(session, obj, key_attr, 2);
if (rv != CKR_OK) {
error("C_GetAttributeValue failed: %lu", rv);
goto fail;
}
label[key_attr[1].ulValueLen] = '\0';
switch (ck_key_type) {
case CKK_RSA:
key = pkcs11_fetch_rsa_pubkey(p, slotidx, &obj);
break;
#ifdef HAVE_EC_KEY_METHOD_NEW
case CKK_ECDSA:
key = pkcs11_fetch_ecdsa_pubkey(p, slotidx, &obj);
break;
#endif /* HAVE_EC_KEY_METHOD_NEW */
default:
/* XXX print key type? */
key = NULL;
error("skipping unsupported key type");
}
if (key == NULL) {
error("failed to fetch key");
continue;
}
if (pkcs11_key_included(keysp, nkeys, key)) {
sshkey_free(key);
} else {
/* expand key array and add key */
*keysp = xrecallocarray(*keysp, *nkeys,
*nkeys + 1, sizeof(struct sshkey *));
(*keysp)[*nkeys] = key;
if (labelsp != NULL) {
*labelsp = xrecallocarray(*labelsp, *nkeys,
*nkeys + 1, sizeof(char *));
(*labelsp)[*nkeys] = xstrdup((char *)label);
}
*nkeys = *nkeys + 1;
debug("have %d keys", *nkeys);
}
}
ret = 0;
fail:
rv = f->C_FindObjectsFinal(session);
if (rv != CKR_OK) {
error("C_FindObjectsFinal failed: %lu", rv);
ret = -1;
}
return (ret);
}
#ifdef WITH_PKCS11_KEYGEN
#define FILL_ATTR(attr, idx, typ, val, len) \
{ (attr[idx]).type=(typ); (attr[idx]).pValue=(val); (attr[idx]).ulValueLen=len; idx++; }
static struct sshkey *
pkcs11_rsa_generate_private_key(struct pkcs11_provider *p, CK_ULONG slotidx,
char *label, CK_ULONG bits, CK_BYTE keyid, u_int32_t *err)
{
struct pkcs11_slotinfo *si;
char *plabel = label ? label : "";
int npub = 0, npriv = 0;
CK_RV rv;
CK_FUNCTION_LIST *f;
CK_SESSION_HANDLE session;
CK_BBOOL true_val = CK_TRUE, false_val = CK_FALSE;
CK_OBJECT_HANDLE pubKey, privKey;
CK_ATTRIBUTE tpub[16], tpriv[16];
CK_MECHANISM mech = {
CKM_RSA_PKCS_KEY_PAIR_GEN, NULL_PTR, 0
};
CK_BYTE pubExponent[] = {
0x01, 0x00, 0x01 /* RSA_F4 in bytes */
};
pubkey_filter[0].pValue = &pubkey_class;
cert_filter[0].pValue = &cert_class;
*err = 0;
FILL_ATTR(tpub, npub, CKA_TOKEN, &true_val, sizeof(true_val));
FILL_ATTR(tpub, npub, CKA_LABEL, plabel, strlen(plabel));
FILL_ATTR(tpub, npub, CKA_ENCRYPT, &false_val, sizeof(false_val));
FILL_ATTR(tpub, npub, CKA_VERIFY, &true_val, sizeof(true_val));
FILL_ATTR(tpub, npub, CKA_VERIFY_RECOVER, &false_val,
sizeof(false_val));
FILL_ATTR(tpub, npub, CKA_WRAP, &false_val, sizeof(false_val));
FILL_ATTR(tpub, npub, CKA_DERIVE, &false_val, sizeof(false_val));
FILL_ATTR(tpub, npub, CKA_MODULUS_BITS, &bits, sizeof(bits));
FILL_ATTR(tpub, npub, CKA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT, pubExponent,
sizeof(pubExponent));
FILL_ATTR(tpub, npub, CKA_ID, &keyid, sizeof(keyid));
FILL_ATTR(tpriv, npriv, CKA_TOKEN, &true_val, sizeof(true_val));
FILL_ATTR(tpriv, npriv, CKA_LABEL, plabel, strlen(plabel));
FILL_ATTR(tpriv, npriv, CKA_PRIVATE, &true_val, sizeof(true_val));
FILL_ATTR(tpriv, npriv, CKA_SENSITIVE, &true_val, sizeof(true_val));
FILL_ATTR(tpriv, npriv, CKA_DECRYPT, &false_val, sizeof(false_val));
FILL_ATTR(tpriv, npriv, CKA_SIGN, &true_val, sizeof(true_val));
FILL_ATTR(tpriv, npriv, CKA_SIGN_RECOVER, &false_val,
sizeof(false_val));
FILL_ATTR(tpriv, npriv, CKA_UNWRAP, &false_val, sizeof(false_val));
FILL_ATTR(tpriv, npriv, CKA_DERIVE, &false_val, sizeof(false_val));
FILL_ATTR(tpriv, npriv, CKA_ID, &keyid, sizeof(keyid));
f = p->function_list;
si = &p->slotinfo[slotidx];
session = si->session;
if ((rv = f->C_GenerateKeyPair(session, &mech, tpub, npub, tpriv, npriv,
&pubKey, &privKey)) != CKR_OK) {
error("%s: key generation failed: error 0x%lx", __func__, rv);
*err = rv;
return NULL;
}
return pkcs11_fetch_rsa_pubkey(p, slotidx, &pubKey);
}
static int
pkcs11_decode_hex(const char *hex, unsigned char **dest, size_t *rlen)
{
size_t i, len;
char ptr[3];
if (dest)
*dest = NULL;
if (rlen)
*rlen = 0;
if ((len = strlen(hex)) % 2)
return -1;
len /= 2;
*dest = xmalloc(len);
ptr[2] = '\0';
for (i = 0; i < len; i++) {
ptr[0] = hex[2 * i];
ptr[1] = hex[(2 * i) + 1];
if (!isxdigit(ptr[0]) || !isxdigit(ptr[1]))
return -1;
(*dest)[i] = (unsigned char)strtoul(ptr, NULL, 16);
}
if (rlen)
*rlen = len;
return 0;
}
static struct ec_curve_info {
const char *name;
const char *oid;
const char *oid_encoded;
size_t size;
} ec_curve_infos[] = {
{"prime256v1", "1.2.840.10045.3.1.7", "06082A8648CE3D030107", 256},
{"secp384r1", "1.3.132.0.34", "06052B81040022", 384},
{"secp521r1", "1.3.132.0.35", "06052B81040023", 521},
{NULL, NULL, NULL, 0},
};
static struct sshkey *
pkcs11_ecdsa_generate_private_key(struct pkcs11_provider *p, CK_ULONG slotidx,
char *label, CK_ULONG bits, CK_BYTE keyid, u_int32_t *err)
{
struct pkcs11_slotinfo *si;
char *plabel = label ? label : "";
int i;
size_t ecparams_size;
unsigned char *ecparams = NULL;
int npub = 0, npriv = 0;
CK_RV rv;
CK_FUNCTION_LIST *f;
CK_SESSION_HANDLE session;
CK_BBOOL true_val = CK_TRUE, false_val = CK_FALSE;
CK_OBJECT_HANDLE pubKey, privKey;
CK_MECHANISM mech = {
CKM_EC_KEY_PAIR_GEN, NULL_PTR, 0
};
CK_ATTRIBUTE tpub[16], tpriv[16];
*err = 0;
for (i = 0; ec_curve_infos[i].name; i++) {
if (ec_curve_infos[i].size == bits)
break;
}
if (!ec_curve_infos[i].name) {
error("%s: invalid key size %lu", __func__, bits);
return NULL;
}
if (pkcs11_decode_hex(ec_curve_infos[i].oid_encoded, &ecparams,
&ecparams_size) == -1) {
error("%s: invalid oid", __func__);
return NULL;
}
FILL_ATTR(tpub, npub, CKA_TOKEN, &true_val, sizeof(true_val));
FILL_ATTR(tpub, npub, CKA_LABEL, plabel, strlen(plabel));
FILL_ATTR(tpub, npub, CKA_ENCRYPT, &false_val, sizeof(false_val));
FILL_ATTR(tpub, npub, CKA_VERIFY, &true_val, sizeof(true_val));
FILL_ATTR(tpub, npub, CKA_VERIFY_RECOVER, &false_val,
sizeof(false_val));
FILL_ATTR(tpub, npub, CKA_WRAP, &false_val, sizeof(false_val));
FILL_ATTR(tpub, npub, CKA_DERIVE, &false_val, sizeof(false_val));
FILL_ATTR(tpub, npub, CKA_EC_PARAMS, ecparams, ecparams_size);
FILL_ATTR(tpub, npub, CKA_ID, &keyid, sizeof(keyid));
FILL_ATTR(tpriv, npriv, CKA_TOKEN, &true_val, sizeof(true_val));
FILL_ATTR(tpriv, npriv, CKA_LABEL, plabel, strlen(plabel));
FILL_ATTR(tpriv, npriv, CKA_PRIVATE, &true_val, sizeof(true_val));
FILL_ATTR(tpriv, npriv, CKA_SENSITIVE, &true_val, sizeof(true_val));
FILL_ATTR(tpriv, npriv, CKA_DECRYPT, &false_val, sizeof(false_val));
FILL_ATTR(tpriv, npriv, CKA_SIGN, &true_val, sizeof(true_val));
FILL_ATTR(tpriv, npriv, CKA_SIGN_RECOVER, &false_val,
sizeof(false_val));
FILL_ATTR(tpriv, npriv, CKA_UNWRAP, &false_val, sizeof(false_val));
FILL_ATTR(tpriv, npriv, CKA_DERIVE, &false_val, sizeof(false_val));
FILL_ATTR(tpriv, npriv, CKA_ID, &keyid, sizeof(keyid));
f = p->function_list;
si = &p->slotinfo[slotidx];
session = si->session;
if ((rv = f->C_GenerateKeyPair(session, &mech, tpub, npub, tpriv, npriv,
&pubKey, &privKey)) != CKR_OK) {
error("%s: key generation failed: error 0x%lx", __func__, rv);
*err = rv;
return NULL;
}
return pkcs11_fetch_ecdsa_pubkey(p, slotidx, &pubKey);
}
#endif /* WITH_PKCS11_KEYGEN */
/*
* register a new provider, fails if provider already exists. if
* keyp is provided, fetch keys.
*/
static int
pkcs11_register_provider(char *provider_id, char *pin,
struct sshkey ***keyp, char ***labelsp,
struct pkcs11_provider **providerp, CK_ULONG user)
{
int nkeys, need_finalize = 0;
int ret = -1;
struct pkcs11_provider *p = NULL;
void *handle = NULL;
CK_RV (*getfunctionlist)(CK_FUNCTION_LIST **);
CK_RV rv;
CK_FUNCTION_LIST *f = NULL;
CK_TOKEN_INFO *token;
CK_ULONG i;
if (providerp == NULL)
goto fail;
*providerp = NULL;
if (keyp != NULL)
*keyp = NULL;
if (labelsp != NULL)
*labelsp = NULL;
if (pkcs11_provider_lookup(provider_id) != NULL) {
debug("%s: provider already registered: %s",
__func__, provider_id);
goto fail;
}
/* open shared pkcs11-library */
if ((handle = dlopen(provider_id, RTLD_NOW)) == NULL) {
error("dlopen %s failed: %s", provider_id, dlerror());
goto fail;
}
if ((getfunctionlist = dlsym(handle, "C_GetFunctionList")) == NULL) {
error("dlsym(C_GetFunctionList) failed: %s", dlerror());
goto fail;
}
p = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*p));
p->name = xstrdup(provider_id);
p->handle = handle;
/* setup the pkcs11 callbacks */
if ((rv = (*getfunctionlist)(&f)) != CKR_OK) {
error("C_GetFunctionList for provider %s failed: %lu",
provider_id, rv);
goto fail;
}
p->function_list = f;
if ((rv = f->C_Initialize(NULL)) != CKR_OK) {
error("C_Initialize for provider %s failed: %lu",
provider_id, rv);
goto fail;
}
need_finalize = 1;
if ((rv = f->C_GetInfo(&p->info)) != CKR_OK) {
error("C_GetInfo for provider %s failed: %lu",
provider_id, rv);
goto fail;
}
rmspace(p->info.manufacturerID, sizeof(p->info.manufacturerID));
rmspace(p->info.libraryDescription, sizeof(p->info.libraryDescription));
debug("provider %s: manufacturerID <%s> cryptokiVersion %d.%d"
" libraryDescription <%s> libraryVersion %d.%d",
provider_id,
p->info.manufacturerID,
p->info.cryptokiVersion.major,
p->info.cryptokiVersion.minor,
p->info.libraryDescription,
p->info.libraryVersion.major,
p->info.libraryVersion.minor);
if ((rv = f->C_GetSlotList(CK_TRUE, NULL, &p->nslots)) != CKR_OK) {
error("C_GetSlotList failed: %lu", rv);
goto fail;
}
if (p->nslots == 0) {
debug("%s: provider %s returned no slots", __func__,
provider_id);
ret = -SSH_PKCS11_ERR_NO_SLOTS;
goto fail;
}
p->slotlist = xcalloc(p->nslots, sizeof(CK_SLOT_ID));
if ((rv = f->C_GetSlotList(CK_TRUE, p->slotlist, &p->nslots))
!= CKR_OK) {
error("C_GetSlotList for provider %s failed: %lu",
provider_id, rv);
goto fail;
}
p->slotinfo = xcalloc(p->nslots, sizeof(struct pkcs11_slotinfo));
p->valid = 1;
nkeys = 0;
for (i = 0; i < p->nslots; i++) {
token = &p->slotinfo[i].token;
if ((rv = f->C_GetTokenInfo(p->slotlist[i], token))
!= CKR_OK) {
error("C_GetTokenInfo for provider %s slot %lu "
"failed: %lu", provider_id, (unsigned long)i, rv);
continue;
}
if ((token->flags & CKF_TOKEN_INITIALIZED) == 0) {
debug2("%s: ignoring uninitialised token in "
"provider %s slot %lu", __func__,
provider_id, (unsigned long)i);
continue;
}
rmspace(token->label, sizeof(token->label));
rmspace(token->manufacturerID, sizeof(token->manufacturerID));
rmspace(token->model, sizeof(token->model));
rmspace(token->serialNumber, sizeof(token->serialNumber));
debug("provider %s slot %lu: label <%s> manufacturerID <%s> "
"model <%s> serial <%s> flags 0x%lx",
provider_id, (unsigned long)i,
token->label, token->manufacturerID, token->model,
token->serialNumber, token->flags);
/*
* open session, login with pin and retrieve public
* keys (if keyp is provided)
*/
if ((ret = pkcs11_open_session(p, i, pin, user)) != 0 ||
keyp == NULL)
continue;
pkcs11_fetch_keys(p, i, keyp, labelsp, &nkeys);
pkcs11_fetch_certs(p, i, keyp, labelsp, &nkeys);
if (nkeys == 0 && !p->slotinfo[i].logged_in &&
pkcs11_interactive) {
/*
* Some tokens require login before they will
* expose keys.
*/
if (pkcs11_login_slot(p, &p->slotinfo[i],
CKU_USER) < 0) {
error("login failed");
continue;
}
pkcs11_fetch_keys(p, i, keyp, labelsp, &nkeys);
pkcs11_fetch_certs(p, i, keyp, labelsp, &nkeys);
}
}
/* now owned by caller */
*providerp = p;
TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(&pkcs11_providers, p, next);
p->refcount++; /* add to provider list */
return (nkeys);
fail:
if (need_finalize && (rv = f->C_Finalize(NULL)) != CKR_OK)
error("C_Finalize for provider %s failed: %lu",
provider_id, rv);
if (p) {
free(p->name);
free(p->slotlist);
free(p->slotinfo);
free(p);
}
if (handle)
dlclose(handle);
if (ret > 0)
ret = -1;
return (ret);
}
/*
* register a new provider and get number of keys hold by the token,
* fails if provider already exists
*/
int
pkcs11_add_provider(char *provider_id, char *pin, struct sshkey ***keyp,
char ***labelsp)
{
struct pkcs11_provider *p = NULL;
int nkeys;
nkeys = pkcs11_register_provider(provider_id, pin, keyp, labelsp,
&p, CKU_USER);
/* no keys found or some other error, de-register provider */
if (nkeys <= 0 && p != NULL) {
TAILQ_REMOVE(&pkcs11_providers, p, next);
pkcs11_provider_finalize(p);
pkcs11_provider_unref(p);
}
if (nkeys == 0)
debug("%s: provider %s returned no keys", __func__,
provider_id);
return (nkeys);
}
#ifdef WITH_PKCS11_KEYGEN
struct sshkey *
pkcs11_gakp(char *provider_id, char *pin, unsigned int slotidx, char *label,
unsigned int type, unsigned int bits, unsigned char keyid, u_int32_t *err)
{
struct pkcs11_provider *p = NULL;
struct pkcs11_slotinfo *si;
CK_FUNCTION_LIST *f;
CK_SESSION_HANDLE session;
struct sshkey *k = NULL;
int ret = -1, reset_pin = 0, reset_provider = 0;
CK_RV rv;
*err = 0;
if ((p = pkcs11_provider_lookup(provider_id)) != NULL)
debug("%s: provider \"%s\" available", __func__, provider_id);
else if ((ret = pkcs11_register_provider(provider_id, pin, NULL, NULL,
&p, CKU_SO)) < 0) {
debug("%s: could not register provider %s", __func__,
provider_id);
goto out;
} else
reset_provider = 1;
f = p->function_list;
si = &p->slotinfo[slotidx];
session = si->session;
if ((rv = f->C_SetOperationState(session , pin, strlen(pin),
CK_INVALID_HANDLE, CK_INVALID_HANDLE)) != CKR_OK) {
debug("%s: could not supply SO pin: %lu", __func__, rv);
reset_pin = 0;
} else
reset_pin = 1;
switch (type) {
case KEY_RSA:
if ((k = pkcs11_rsa_generate_private_key(p, slotidx, label,
bits, keyid, err)) == NULL) {
debug("%s: failed to generate RSA key", __func__);
goto out;
}
break;
case KEY_ECDSA:
if ((k = pkcs11_ecdsa_generate_private_key(p, slotidx, label,
bits, keyid, err)) == NULL) {
debug("%s: failed to generate ECDSA key", __func__);
goto out;
}
break;
default:
*err = SSH_PKCS11_ERR_GENERIC;
debug("%s: unknown type %d", __func__, type);
goto out;
}
out:
if (reset_pin)
f->C_SetOperationState(session , NULL, 0, CK_INVALID_HANDLE,
CK_INVALID_HANDLE);
if (reset_provider)
pkcs11_del_provider(provider_id);
return (k);
}
struct sshkey *
pkcs11_destroy_keypair(char *provider_id, char *pin, unsigned long slotidx,
unsigned char keyid, u_int32_t *err)
{
struct pkcs11_provider *p = NULL;
struct pkcs11_slotinfo *si;
struct sshkey *k = NULL;
int reset_pin = 0, reset_provider = 0;
CK_ULONG nattrs;
CK_FUNCTION_LIST *f;
CK_SESSION_HANDLE session;
CK_ATTRIBUTE attrs[16];
CK_OBJECT_CLASS key_class;
CK_KEY_TYPE key_type;
CK_OBJECT_HANDLE obj = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
CK_RV rv;
*err = 0;
if ((p = pkcs11_provider_lookup(provider_id)) != NULL) {
debug("%s: using provider \"%s\"", __func__, provider_id);
} else if (pkcs11_register_provider(provider_id, pin, NULL, NULL, &p,
CKU_SO) < 0) {
debug("%s: could not register provider %s", __func__,
provider_id);
goto out;
} else
reset_provider = 1;
f = p->function_list;
si = &p->slotinfo[slotidx];
session = si->session;
if ((rv = f->C_SetOperationState(session , pin, strlen(pin),
CK_INVALID_HANDLE, CK_INVALID_HANDLE)) != CKR_OK) {
debug("%s: could not supply SO pin: %lu", __func__, rv);
reset_pin = 0;
} else
reset_pin = 1;
/* private key */
nattrs = 0;
key_class = CKO_PRIVATE_KEY;
FILL_ATTR(attrs, nattrs, CKA_CLASS, &key_class, sizeof(key_class));
FILL_ATTR(attrs, nattrs, CKA_ID, &keyid, sizeof(keyid));
if (pkcs11_find(p, slotidx, attrs, nattrs, &obj) == 0 &&
obj != CK_INVALID_HANDLE) {
if ((rv = f->C_DestroyObject(session, obj)) != CKR_OK) {
debug("%s: could not destroy private key 0x%hhx",
__func__, keyid);
*err = rv;
goto out;
}
}
/* public key */
nattrs = 0;
key_class = CKO_PUBLIC_KEY;
FILL_ATTR(attrs, nattrs, CKA_CLASS, &key_class, sizeof(key_class));
FILL_ATTR(attrs, nattrs, CKA_ID, &keyid, sizeof(keyid));
if (pkcs11_find(p, slotidx, attrs, nattrs, &obj) == 0 &&
obj != CK_INVALID_HANDLE) {
/* get key type */
nattrs = 0;
FILL_ATTR(attrs, nattrs, CKA_KEY_TYPE, &key_type,
sizeof(key_type));
rv = f->C_GetAttributeValue(session, obj, attrs, nattrs);
if (rv != CKR_OK) {
debug("%s: could not get key type of public key 0x%hhx",
__func__, keyid);
*err = rv;
key_type = -1;
}
if (key_type == CKK_RSA)
k = pkcs11_fetch_rsa_pubkey(p, slotidx, &obj);
else if (key_type == CKK_ECDSA)
k = pkcs11_fetch_ecdsa_pubkey(p, slotidx, &obj);
if ((rv = f->C_DestroyObject(session, obj)) != CKR_OK) {
debug("%s: could not destroy public key 0x%hhx",
__func__, keyid);
*err = rv;
goto out;
}
}
out:
if (reset_pin)
f->C_SetOperationState(session , NULL, 0, CK_INVALID_HANDLE,
CK_INVALID_HANDLE);
if (reset_provider)
pkcs11_del_provider(provider_id);
return (k);
}
#endif /* WITH_PKCS11_KEYGEN */
#else /* ENABLE_PKCS11 */
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <stdarg.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include "log.h"
#include "sshkey.h"
int
pkcs11_init(int interactive)
{
error("%s: dlopen() not supported", __func__);
return (-1);
}
int
-pkcs11_add_provider(char *provider_id, char *pin, struct sshkey ***keyp)
+pkcs11_add_provider(char *provider_id, char *pin, struct sshkey ***keyp,
+ char ***labelsp)
{
error("%s: dlopen() not supported", __func__);
return (-1);
}
void
pkcs11_terminate(void)
{
error("%s: dlopen() not supported", __func__);
}
#endif /* ENABLE_PKCS11 */
diff --git a/ssh-sk-helper.c b/ssh-sk-helper.c
index 2f93ad716b92..8f92f4e23c7a 100644
--- a/ssh-sk-helper.c
+++ b/ssh-sk-helper.c
@@ -1,360 +1,363 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: ssh-sk-helper.c,v 1.9 2020/01/25 23:13:09 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: ssh-sk-helper.c,v 1.10 2020/05/26 01:59:46 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 2019 Google LLC
*
* Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
* purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
* copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
*
* THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
* WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
* MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
* ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
* WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
* ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
* OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
*/
/*
* This is a tiny program used to isolate the address space used for
* security key middleware signing operations from ssh-agent. It is similar
* to ssh-pkcs11-helper.c but considerably simpler as the operations for
* security keys are stateless.
*
* Please crank SSH_SK_HELPER_VERSION in sshkey.h for any incompatible
* protocol changes.
*/
#include "includes.h"
#include <limits.h>
#include <stdarg.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include "xmalloc.h"
#include "log.h"
#include "sshkey.h"
#include "authfd.h"
#include "misc.h"
#include "sshbuf.h"
#include "msg.h"
#include "uidswap.h"
#include "sshkey.h"
#include "ssherr.h"
#include "ssh-sk.h"
#ifdef ENABLE_SK
extern char *__progname;
static struct sshbuf *reply_error(int r, char *fmt, ...)
__attribute__((__format__ (printf, 2, 3)));
static struct sshbuf *
reply_error(int r, char *fmt, ...)
{
char *msg;
va_list ap;
struct sshbuf *resp;
va_start(ap, fmt);
xvasprintf(&msg, fmt, ap);
va_end(ap);
debug("%s: %s", __progname, msg);
free(msg);
if (r >= 0)
fatal("%s: invalid error code %d", __func__, r);
if ((resp = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __progname);
if (sshbuf_put_u32(resp, SSH_SK_HELPER_ERROR) != 0 ||
sshbuf_put_u32(resp, (u_int)-r) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error", __progname);
return resp;
}
/* If the specified string is zero length, then free it and replace with NULL */
static void
null_empty(char **s)
{
if (s == NULL || *s == NULL || **s != '\0')
return;
free(*s);
*s = NULL;
}
static struct sshbuf *
process_sign(struct sshbuf *req)
{
int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
struct sshbuf *resp, *kbuf;
- struct sshkey *key;
+ struct sshkey *key = NULL;
uint32_t compat;
const u_char *message;
- u_char *sig;
- size_t msglen, siglen;
- char *provider, *pin;
+ u_char *sig = NULL;
+ size_t msglen, siglen = 0;
+ char *provider = NULL, *pin = NULL;
if ((r = sshbuf_froms(req, &kbuf)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_cstring(req, &provider, NULL)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_string_direct(req, &message, &msglen)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_cstring(req, NULL, NULL)) != 0 || /* alg */
(r = sshbuf_get_u32(req, &compat)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_cstring(req, &pin, NULL)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __progname, ssh_err(r));
if (sshbuf_len(req) != 0)
fatal("%s: trailing data in request", __progname);
if ((r = sshkey_private_deserialize(kbuf, &key)) != 0)
fatal("Unable to parse private key: %s", ssh_err(r));
if (!sshkey_is_sk(key))
fatal("Unsupported key type %s", sshkey_ssh_name(key));
debug("%s: ready to sign with key %s, provider %s: "
"msg len %zu, compat 0x%lx", __progname, sshkey_type(key),
provider, msglen, (u_long)compat);
null_empty(&pin);
if ((r = sshsk_sign(provider, key, &sig, &siglen,
message, msglen, compat, pin)) != 0) {
resp = reply_error(r, "Signing failed: %s", ssh_err(r));
goto out;
}
if ((resp = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __progname);
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(resp, SSH_SK_HELPER_SIGN)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_string(resp, sig, siglen)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __progname, ssh_err(r));
out:
+ sshkey_free(key);
sshbuf_free(kbuf);
free(provider);
+ if (sig != NULL)
+ freezero(sig, siglen);
if (pin != NULL)
freezero(pin, strlen(pin));
return resp;
}
static struct sshbuf *
process_enroll(struct sshbuf *req)
{
int r;
u_int type;
char *provider, *application, *pin, *device, *userid;
uint8_t flags;
struct sshbuf *challenge, *attest, *kbuf, *resp;
struct sshkey *key;
if ((attest = sshbuf_new()) == NULL ||
(kbuf = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __progname);
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(req, &type)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_cstring(req, &provider, NULL)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_cstring(req, &device, NULL)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_cstring(req, &application, NULL)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_cstring(req, &userid, NULL)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_u8(req, &flags)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_cstring(req, &pin, NULL)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_froms(req, &challenge)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __progname, ssh_err(r));
if (sshbuf_len(req) != 0)
fatal("%s: trailing data in request", __progname);
if (type > INT_MAX)
fatal("%s: bad type %u", __progname, type);
if (sshbuf_len(challenge) == 0) {
sshbuf_free(challenge);
challenge = NULL;
}
null_empty(&device);
null_empty(&userid);
null_empty(&pin);
if ((r = sshsk_enroll((int)type, provider, device, application, userid,
flags, pin, challenge, &key, attest)) != 0) {
resp = reply_error(r, "Enrollment failed: %s", ssh_err(r));
goto out;
}
if ((resp = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __progname);
if ((r = sshkey_private_serialize(key, kbuf)) != 0)
fatal("%s: serialize private key: %s", __progname, ssh_err(r));
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(resp, SSH_SK_HELPER_ENROLL)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_stringb(resp, kbuf)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_stringb(resp, attest)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __progname, ssh_err(r));
out:
sshkey_free(key);
sshbuf_free(kbuf);
sshbuf_free(attest);
sshbuf_free(challenge);
free(provider);
free(application);
if (pin != NULL)
freezero(pin, strlen(pin));
return resp;
}
static struct sshbuf *
process_load_resident(struct sshbuf *req)
{
int r;
char *provider, *pin, *device;
struct sshbuf *kbuf, *resp;
struct sshkey **keys = NULL;
size_t nkeys = 0, i;
if ((kbuf = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __progname);
if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(req, &provider, NULL)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_cstring(req, &device, NULL)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_cstring(req, &pin, NULL)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __progname, ssh_err(r));
if (sshbuf_len(req) != 0)
fatal("%s: trailing data in request", __progname);
null_empty(&device);
null_empty(&pin);
if ((r = sshsk_load_resident(provider, device, pin,
&keys, &nkeys)) != 0) {
resp = reply_error(r, " sshsk_load_resident failed: %s",
ssh_err(r));
goto out;
}
if ((resp = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __progname);
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(resp, SSH_SK_HELPER_LOAD_RESIDENT)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __progname, ssh_err(r));
for (i = 0; i < nkeys; i++) {
debug("%s: key %zu %s %s", __func__, i,
sshkey_type(keys[i]), keys[i]->sk_application);
sshbuf_reset(kbuf);
if ((r = sshkey_private_serialize(keys[i], kbuf)) != 0)
fatal("%s: serialize private key: %s",
__progname, ssh_err(r));
if ((r = sshbuf_put_stringb(resp, kbuf)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_cstring(resp, "")) != 0) /* comment */
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __progname, ssh_err(r));
}
out:
for (i = 0; i < nkeys; i++)
sshkey_free(keys[i]);
free(keys);
sshbuf_free(kbuf);
free(provider);
if (pin != NULL)
freezero(pin, strlen(pin));
return resp;
}
int
main(int argc, char **argv)
{
SyslogFacility log_facility = SYSLOG_FACILITY_AUTH;
LogLevel log_level = SYSLOG_LEVEL_ERROR;
struct sshbuf *req, *resp;
int in, out, ch, r, vflag = 0;
u_int rtype, ll = 0;
uint8_t version, log_stderr = 0;
sanitise_stdfd();
log_init(__progname, log_level, log_facility, log_stderr);
while ((ch = getopt(argc, argv, "v")) != -1) {
switch (ch) {
case 'v':
vflag = 1;
if (log_level == SYSLOG_LEVEL_ERROR)
log_level = SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG1;
else if (log_level < SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG3)
log_level++;
break;
default:
fprintf(stderr, "usage: %s [-v]\n", __progname);
exit(1);
}
}
log_init(__progname, log_level, log_facility, vflag);
/*
* Rearrange our file descriptors a little; we don't trust the
* providers not to fiddle with stdin/out.
*/
closefrom(STDERR_FILENO + 1);
if ((in = dup(STDIN_FILENO)) == -1 || (out = dup(STDOUT_FILENO)) == -1)
fatal("%s: dup: %s", __progname, strerror(errno));
close(STDIN_FILENO);
close(STDOUT_FILENO);
sanitise_stdfd(); /* resets to /dev/null */
if ((req = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __progname);
if (ssh_msg_recv(in, req) < 0)
fatal("ssh_msg_recv failed");
close(in);
debug("%s: received message len %zu", __progname, sshbuf_len(req));
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(req, &version)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __progname, ssh_err(r));
if (version != SSH_SK_HELPER_VERSION) {
fatal("unsupported version: received %d, expected %d",
version, SSH_SK_HELPER_VERSION);
}
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(req, &rtype)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_u8(req, &log_stderr)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_u32(req, &ll)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __progname, ssh_err(r));
if (!vflag && log_level_name((LogLevel)ll) != NULL)
log_init(__progname, (LogLevel)ll, log_facility, log_stderr);
switch (rtype) {
case SSH_SK_HELPER_SIGN:
resp = process_sign(req);
break;
case SSH_SK_HELPER_ENROLL:
resp = process_enroll(req);
break;
case SSH_SK_HELPER_LOAD_RESIDENT:
resp = process_load_resident(req);
break;
default:
fatal("%s: unsupported request type %u", __progname, rtype);
}
sshbuf_free(req);
debug("%s: reply len %zu", __progname, sshbuf_len(resp));
if (ssh_msg_send(out, SSH_SK_HELPER_VERSION, resp) == -1)
fatal("ssh_msg_send failed");
sshbuf_free(resp);
close(out);
return (0);
}
#else /* ENABLE_SK */
#include <stdio.h>
int
main(int argc, char **argv)
{
fprintf(stderr, "ssh-sk-helper: disabled at compile time\n");
return -1;
}
#endif /* ENABLE_SK */
diff --git a/ssh-sk.c b/ssh-sk.c
index 1afb205f86b0..1455df635ff8 100644
--- a/ssh-sk.c
+++ b/ssh-sk.c
@@ -1,807 +1,824 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: ssh-sk.c,v 1.30 2020/04/28 04:02:29 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: ssh-sk.c,v 1.32 2020/09/09 03:08:02 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 2019 Google LLC
*
* Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
* purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
* copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
*
* THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
* WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
* MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
* ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
* WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
* ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
* OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
*/
/* #define DEBUG_SK 1 */
#include "includes.h"
#ifdef ENABLE_SK
#include <dlfcn.h>
#include <stddef.h>
#ifdef HAVE_STDINT_H
# include <stdint.h>
#endif
#include <string.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
#include <openssl/objects.h>
#include <openssl/ec.h>
#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
#include "log.h"
#include "misc.h"
#include "sshbuf.h"
#include "sshkey.h"
#include "ssherr.h"
#include "digest.h"
#include "ssh-sk.h"
#include "sk-api.h"
#include "crypto_api.h"
struct sshsk_provider {
char *path;
void *dlhandle;
/* Return the version of the middleware API */
uint32_t (*sk_api_version)(void);
/* Enroll a U2F key (private key generation) */
int (*sk_enroll)(int alg, const uint8_t *challenge,
size_t challenge_len, const char *application, uint8_t flags,
const char *pin, struct sk_option **opts,
struct sk_enroll_response **enroll_response);
/* Sign a challenge */
int (*sk_sign)(int alg, const uint8_t *message, size_t message_len,
const char *application,
const uint8_t *key_handle, size_t key_handle_len,
uint8_t flags, const char *pin, struct sk_option **opts,
struct sk_sign_response **sign_response);
/* Enumerate resident keys */
int (*sk_load_resident_keys)(const char *pin, struct sk_option **opts,
struct sk_resident_key ***rks, size_t *nrks);
};
/* Built-in version */
int ssh_sk_enroll(int alg, const uint8_t *challenge,
size_t challenge_len, const char *application, uint8_t flags,
const char *pin, struct sk_option **opts,
struct sk_enroll_response **enroll_response);
int ssh_sk_sign(int alg, const uint8_t *message, size_t message_len,
const char *application,
const uint8_t *key_handle, size_t key_handle_len,
uint8_t flags, const char *pin, struct sk_option **opts,
struct sk_sign_response **sign_response);
int ssh_sk_load_resident_keys(const char *pin, struct sk_option **opts,
struct sk_resident_key ***rks, size_t *nrks);
static void
sshsk_free(struct sshsk_provider *p)
{
if (p == NULL)
return;
free(p->path);
if (p->dlhandle != NULL)
dlclose(p->dlhandle);
free(p);
}
static struct sshsk_provider *
sshsk_open(const char *path)
{
struct sshsk_provider *ret = NULL;
uint32_t version;
if (path == NULL || *path == '\0') {
error("No FIDO SecurityKeyProvider specified");
return NULL;
}
if ((ret = calloc(1, sizeof(*ret))) == NULL) {
error("%s: calloc failed", __func__);
return NULL;
}
if ((ret->path = strdup(path)) == NULL) {
error("%s: strdup failed", __func__);
goto fail;
}
/* Skip the rest if we're using the linked in middleware */
if (strcasecmp(ret->path, "internal") == 0) {
#ifdef ENABLE_SK_INTERNAL
ret->sk_enroll = ssh_sk_enroll;
ret->sk_sign = ssh_sk_sign;
ret->sk_load_resident_keys = ssh_sk_load_resident_keys;
#else
error("internal security key support not enabled");
#endif
return ret;
}
if ((ret->dlhandle = dlopen(path, RTLD_NOW)) == NULL) {
error("Provider \"%s\" dlopen failed: %s", path, dlerror());
goto fail;
}
if ((ret->sk_api_version = dlsym(ret->dlhandle,
"sk_api_version")) == NULL) {
error("Provider \"%s\" dlsym(sk_api_version) failed: %s",
path, dlerror());
goto fail;
}
version = ret->sk_api_version();
debug("%s: provider %s implements version 0x%08lx", __func__,
ret->path, (u_long)version);
if ((version & SSH_SK_VERSION_MAJOR_MASK) != SSH_SK_VERSION_MAJOR) {
error("Provider \"%s\" implements unsupported "
"version 0x%08lx (supported: 0x%08lx)",
path, (u_long)version, (u_long)SSH_SK_VERSION_MAJOR);
goto fail;
}
if ((ret->sk_enroll = dlsym(ret->dlhandle, "sk_enroll")) == NULL) {
error("Provider %s dlsym(sk_enroll) failed: %s",
path, dlerror());
goto fail;
}
if ((ret->sk_sign = dlsym(ret->dlhandle, "sk_sign")) == NULL) {
error("Provider \"%s\" dlsym(sk_sign) failed: %s",
path, dlerror());
goto fail;
}
if ((ret->sk_load_resident_keys = dlsym(ret->dlhandle,
"sk_load_resident_keys")) == NULL) {
error("Provider \"%s\" dlsym(sk_load_resident_keys) "
"failed: %s", path, dlerror());
goto fail;
}
/* success */
return ret;
fail:
sshsk_free(ret);
return NULL;
}
static void
sshsk_free_enroll_response(struct sk_enroll_response *r)
{
if (r == NULL)
return;
freezero(r->key_handle, r->key_handle_len);
freezero(r->public_key, r->public_key_len);
freezero(r->signature, r->signature_len);
freezero(r->attestation_cert, r->attestation_cert_len);
+ freezero(r->authdata, r->authdata_len);
freezero(r, sizeof(*r));
}
static void
sshsk_free_sign_response(struct sk_sign_response *r)
{
if (r == NULL)
return;
freezero(r->sig_r, r->sig_r_len);
freezero(r->sig_s, r->sig_s_len);
freezero(r, sizeof(*r));
}
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
/* Assemble key from response */
static int
sshsk_ecdsa_assemble(struct sk_enroll_response *resp, struct sshkey **keyp)
{
struct sshkey *key = NULL;
struct sshbuf *b = NULL;
EC_POINT *q = NULL;
int r;
*keyp = NULL;
if ((key = sshkey_new(KEY_ECDSA_SK)) == NULL) {
error("%s: sshkey_new failed", __func__);
r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
goto out;
}
key->ecdsa_nid = NID_X9_62_prime256v1;
if ((key->ecdsa = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(key->ecdsa_nid)) == NULL ||
(q = EC_POINT_new(EC_KEY_get0_group(key->ecdsa))) == NULL ||
(b = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) {
error("%s: allocation failed", __func__);
r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
goto out;
}
if ((r = sshbuf_put_string(b,
resp->public_key, resp->public_key_len)) != 0) {
error("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
goto out;
}
if ((r = sshbuf_get_ec(b, q, EC_KEY_get0_group(key->ecdsa))) != 0) {
error("%s: parse key: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
goto out;
}
if (sshkey_ec_validate_public(EC_KEY_get0_group(key->ecdsa), q) != 0) {
error("Authenticator returned invalid ECDSA key");
r = SSH_ERR_KEY_INVALID_EC_VALUE;
goto out;
}
if (EC_KEY_set_public_key(key->ecdsa, q) != 1) {
/* XXX assume it is a allocation error */
error("%s: allocation failed", __func__);
r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
goto out;
}
/* success */
*keyp = key;
key = NULL; /* transferred */
r = 0;
out:
EC_POINT_free(q);
sshkey_free(key);
sshbuf_free(b);
return r;
}
#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
static int
sshsk_ed25519_assemble(struct sk_enroll_response *resp, struct sshkey **keyp)
{
struct sshkey *key = NULL;
int r;
*keyp = NULL;
if (resp->public_key_len != ED25519_PK_SZ) {
error("%s: invalid size: %zu", __func__, resp->public_key_len);
r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
goto out;
}
if ((key = sshkey_new(KEY_ED25519_SK)) == NULL) {
error("%s: sshkey_new failed", __func__);
r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
goto out;
}
if ((key->ed25519_pk = malloc(ED25519_PK_SZ)) == NULL) {
error("%s: malloc failed", __func__);
r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
goto out;
}
memcpy(key->ed25519_pk, resp->public_key, ED25519_PK_SZ);
/* success */
*keyp = key;
key = NULL; /* transferred */
r = 0;
out:
sshkey_free(key);
return r;
}
static int
sshsk_key_from_response(int alg, const char *application, uint8_t flags,
struct sk_enroll_response *resp, struct sshkey **keyp)
{
struct sshkey *key = NULL;
int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
*keyp = NULL;
/* Check response validity */
if (resp->public_key == NULL || resp->key_handle == NULL) {
error("%s: sk_enroll response invalid", __func__);
r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
goto out;
}
switch (alg) {
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
case SSH_SK_ECDSA:
if ((r = sshsk_ecdsa_assemble(resp, &key)) != 0)
goto out;
break;
#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
case SSH_SK_ED25519:
if ((r = sshsk_ed25519_assemble(resp, &key)) != 0)
goto out;
break;
default:
error("%s: unsupported algorithm %d", __func__, alg);
r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
goto out;
}
key->sk_flags = flags;
if ((key->sk_key_handle = sshbuf_new()) == NULL ||
(key->sk_reserved = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) {
error("%s: allocation failed", __func__);
r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
goto out;
}
if ((key->sk_application = strdup(application)) == NULL) {
error("%s: strdup application failed", __func__);
r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
goto out;
}
if ((r = sshbuf_put(key->sk_key_handle, resp->key_handle,
resp->key_handle_len)) != 0) {
error("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
goto out;
}
/* success */
r = 0;
*keyp = key;
key = NULL;
out:
sshkey_free(key);
return r;
}
static int
skerr_to_ssherr(int skerr)
{
switch (skerr) {
case SSH_SK_ERR_UNSUPPORTED:
return SSH_ERR_FEATURE_UNSUPPORTED;
case SSH_SK_ERR_PIN_REQUIRED:
return SSH_ERR_KEY_WRONG_PASSPHRASE;
case SSH_SK_ERR_DEVICE_NOT_FOUND:
return SSH_ERR_DEVICE_NOT_FOUND;
case SSH_SK_ERR_GENERAL:
default:
return SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
}
}
static void
sshsk_free_options(struct sk_option **opts)
{
size_t i;
if (opts == NULL)
return;
for (i = 0; opts[i] != NULL; i++) {
free(opts[i]->name);
free(opts[i]->value);
free(opts[i]);
}
free(opts);
}
static int
sshsk_add_option(struct sk_option ***optsp, size_t *noptsp,
const char *name, const char *value, uint8_t required)
{
struct sk_option **opts = *optsp;
size_t nopts = *noptsp;
if ((opts = recallocarray(opts, nopts, nopts + 2, /* extra for NULL */
sizeof(*opts))) == NULL) {
error("%s: array alloc failed", __func__);
return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
}
*optsp = opts;
*noptsp = nopts + 1;
if ((opts[nopts] = calloc(1, sizeof(**opts))) == NULL) {
error("%s: alloc failed", __func__);
return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
}
if ((opts[nopts]->name = strdup(name)) == NULL ||
(opts[nopts]->value = strdup(value)) == NULL) {
error("%s: alloc failed", __func__);
return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
}
opts[nopts]->required = required;
return 0;
}
static int
make_options(const char *device, const char *user_id,
struct sk_option ***optsp)
{
struct sk_option **opts = NULL;
size_t nopts = 0;
int r, ret = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
if (device != NULL &&
(r = sshsk_add_option(&opts, &nopts, "device", device, 0)) != 0) {
ret = r;
goto out;
}
if (user_id != NULL &&
(r = sshsk_add_option(&opts, &nopts, "user", user_id, 0)) != 0) {
ret = r;
goto out;
}
/* success */
*optsp = opts;
opts = NULL;
nopts = 0;
ret = 0;
out:
sshsk_free_options(opts);
return ret;
}
+
+static int
+fill_attestation_blob(const struct sk_enroll_response *resp,
+ struct sshbuf *attest)
+{
+ int r;
+
+ if (attest == NULL)
+ return 0; /* nothing to do */
+ if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(attest, "ssh-sk-attest-v01")) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_string(attest,
+ resp->attestation_cert, resp->attestation_cert_len)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_string(attest,
+ resp->signature, resp->signature_len)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_string(attest,
+ resp->authdata, resp->authdata_len)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_u32(attest, 0)) != 0 || /* resvd flags */
+ (r = sshbuf_put_string(attest, NULL, 0)) != 0 /* resvd */) {
+ error("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ return r;
+ }
+ /* success */
+ return 0;
+}
+
int
sshsk_enroll(int type, const char *provider_path, const char *device,
const char *application, const char *userid, uint8_t flags,
const char *pin, struct sshbuf *challenge_buf,
struct sshkey **keyp, struct sshbuf *attest)
{
struct sshsk_provider *skp = NULL;
struct sshkey *key = NULL;
u_char randchall[32];
const u_char *challenge;
size_t challenge_len;
struct sk_enroll_response *resp = NULL;
struct sk_option **opts = NULL;
int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
int alg;
debug("%s: provider \"%s\", device \"%s\", application \"%s\", "
"userid \"%s\", flags 0x%02x, challenge len %zu%s", __func__,
provider_path, device, application, userid, flags,
challenge_buf == NULL ? 0 : sshbuf_len(challenge_buf),
(pin != NULL && *pin != '\0') ? " with-pin" : "");
*keyp = NULL;
if (attest)
sshbuf_reset(attest);
if ((r = make_options(device, userid, &opts)) != 0)
goto out;
switch (type) {
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
case KEY_ECDSA_SK:
alg = SSH_SK_ECDSA;
break;
#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
case KEY_ED25519_SK:
alg = SSH_SK_ED25519;
break;
default:
error("%s: unsupported key type", __func__);
r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
goto out;
}
if (provider_path == NULL) {
error("%s: missing provider", __func__);
r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
goto out;
}
if (application == NULL || *application == '\0') {
error("%s: missing application", __func__);
r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
goto out;
}
if (challenge_buf == NULL) {
debug("%s: using random challenge", __func__);
arc4random_buf(randchall, sizeof(randchall));
challenge = randchall;
challenge_len = sizeof(randchall);
} else if (sshbuf_len(challenge_buf) == 0) {
error("Missing enrollment challenge");
r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
goto out;
} else {
challenge = sshbuf_ptr(challenge_buf);
challenge_len = sshbuf_len(challenge_buf);
debug3("%s: using explicit challenge len=%zd",
__func__, challenge_len);
}
if ((skp = sshsk_open(provider_path)) == NULL) {
r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; /* XXX sshsk_open return code? */
goto out;
}
/* XXX validate flags? */
/* enroll key */
if ((r = skp->sk_enroll(alg, challenge, challenge_len, application,
flags, pin, opts, &resp)) != 0) {
debug("%s: provider \"%s\" returned failure %d", __func__,
provider_path, r);
r = skerr_to_ssherr(r);
goto out;
}
if ((r = sshsk_key_from_response(alg, application, flags,
resp, &key)) != 0)
goto out;
/* Optionally fill in the attestation information */
- if (attest != NULL) {
- if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(attest,
- "ssh-sk-attest-v00")) != 0 ||
- (r = sshbuf_put_string(attest,
- resp->attestation_cert, resp->attestation_cert_len)) != 0 ||
- (r = sshbuf_put_string(attest,
- resp->signature, resp->signature_len)) != 0 ||
- (r = sshbuf_put_u32(attest, 0)) != 0 || /* resvd flags */
- (r = sshbuf_put_string(attest, NULL, 0)) != 0 /* resvd */) {
- error("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
- goto out;
- }
- }
+ if ((r = fill_attestation_blob(resp, attest)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+
/* success */
*keyp = key;
key = NULL; /* transferred */
r = 0;
out:
sshsk_free_options(opts);
sshsk_free(skp);
sshkey_free(key);
sshsk_free_enroll_response(resp);
explicit_bzero(randchall, sizeof(randchall));
return r;
}
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
static int
sshsk_ecdsa_sig(struct sk_sign_response *resp, struct sshbuf *sig)
{
struct sshbuf *inner_sig = NULL;
int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
/* Check response validity */
if (resp->sig_r == NULL || resp->sig_s == NULL) {
error("%s: sk_sign response invalid", __func__);
r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
goto out;
}
if ((inner_sig = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) {
r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
goto out;
}
/* Prepare and append inner signature object */
if ((r = sshbuf_put_bignum2_bytes(inner_sig,
resp->sig_r, resp->sig_r_len)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_bignum2_bytes(inner_sig,
resp->sig_s, resp->sig_s_len)) != 0) {
debug("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
goto out;
}
if ((r = sshbuf_put_stringb(sig, inner_sig)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u8(sig, resp->flags)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u32(sig, resp->counter)) != 0) {
debug("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
goto out;
}
#ifdef DEBUG_SK
fprintf(stderr, "%s: sig_r:\n", __func__);
sshbuf_dump_data(resp->sig_r, resp->sig_r_len, stderr);
fprintf(stderr, "%s: sig_s:\n", __func__);
sshbuf_dump_data(resp->sig_s, resp->sig_s_len, stderr);
fprintf(stderr, "%s: inner:\n", __func__);
sshbuf_dump(inner_sig, stderr);
#endif
r = 0;
out:
sshbuf_free(inner_sig);
return r;
}
#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
static int
sshsk_ed25519_sig(struct sk_sign_response *resp, struct sshbuf *sig)
{
int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
/* Check response validity */
if (resp->sig_r == NULL) {
error("%s: sk_sign response invalid", __func__);
r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
goto out;
}
if ((r = sshbuf_put_string(sig,
resp->sig_r, resp->sig_r_len)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u8(sig, resp->flags)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u32(sig, resp->counter)) != 0) {
debug("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
goto out;
}
#ifdef DEBUG_SK
fprintf(stderr, "%s: sig_r:\n", __func__);
sshbuf_dump_data(resp->sig_r, resp->sig_r_len, stderr);
#endif
r = 0;
out:
return r;
}
int
sshsk_sign(const char *provider_path, struct sshkey *key,
u_char **sigp, size_t *lenp, const u_char *data, size_t datalen,
u_int compat, const char *pin)
{
struct sshsk_provider *skp = NULL;
int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
int type, alg;
struct sk_sign_response *resp = NULL;
struct sshbuf *inner_sig = NULL, *sig = NULL;
struct sk_option **opts = NULL;
debug("%s: provider \"%s\", key %s, flags 0x%02x%s", __func__,
provider_path, sshkey_type(key), key->sk_flags,
(pin != NULL && *pin != '\0') ? " with-pin" : "");
if (sigp != NULL)
*sigp = NULL;
if (lenp != NULL)
*lenp = 0;
type = sshkey_type_plain(key->type);
switch (type) {
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
case KEY_ECDSA_SK:
alg = SSH_SK_ECDSA;
break;
#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
case KEY_ED25519_SK:
alg = SSH_SK_ED25519;
break;
default:
return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
}
if (provider_path == NULL ||
key->sk_key_handle == NULL ||
key->sk_application == NULL || *key->sk_application == '\0') {
r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
goto out;
}
if ((skp = sshsk_open(provider_path)) == NULL) {
r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; /* XXX sshsk_open return code? */
goto out;
}
if ((r = skp->sk_sign(alg, data, datalen, key->sk_application,
sshbuf_ptr(key->sk_key_handle), sshbuf_len(key->sk_key_handle),
key->sk_flags, pin, opts, &resp)) != 0) {
debug("%s: sk_sign failed with code %d", __func__, r);
r = skerr_to_ssherr(r);
goto out;
}
/* Assemble signature */
if ((sig = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) {
r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
goto out;
}
if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(sig, sshkey_ssh_name_plain(key))) != 0) {
debug("%s: buffer error (outer): %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
goto out;
}
switch (type) {
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
case KEY_ECDSA_SK:
if ((r = sshsk_ecdsa_sig(resp, sig)) != 0)
goto out;
break;
#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
case KEY_ED25519_SK:
if ((r = sshsk_ed25519_sig(resp, sig)) != 0)
goto out;
break;
}
#ifdef DEBUG_SK
fprintf(stderr, "%s: sig_flags = 0x%02x, sig_counter = %u\n",
__func__, resp->flags, resp->counter);
fprintf(stderr, "%s: hashed message:\n", __func__);
sshbuf_dump_data(message, sizeof(message), stderr);
fprintf(stderr, "%s: sigbuf:\n", __func__);
sshbuf_dump(sig, stderr);
#endif
if (sigp != NULL) {
if ((*sigp = malloc(sshbuf_len(sig))) == NULL) {
r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
goto out;
}
memcpy(*sigp, sshbuf_ptr(sig), sshbuf_len(sig));
}
if (lenp != NULL)
*lenp = sshbuf_len(sig);
/* success */
r = 0;
out:
sshsk_free_options(opts);
sshsk_free(skp);
sshsk_free_sign_response(resp);
sshbuf_free(sig);
sshbuf_free(inner_sig);
return r;
}
static void
sshsk_free_sk_resident_keys(struct sk_resident_key **rks, size_t nrks)
{
size_t i;
if (nrks == 0 || rks == NULL)
return;
for (i = 0; i < nrks; i++) {
free(rks[i]->application);
freezero(rks[i]->key.key_handle, rks[i]->key.key_handle_len);
freezero(rks[i]->key.public_key, rks[i]->key.public_key_len);
freezero(rks[i]->key.signature, rks[i]->key.signature_len);
freezero(rks[i]->key.attestation_cert,
rks[i]->key.attestation_cert_len);
freezero(rks[i], sizeof(**rks));
}
free(rks);
}
int
sshsk_load_resident(const char *provider_path, const char *device,
const char *pin, struct sshkey ***keysp, size_t *nkeysp)
{
struct sshsk_provider *skp = NULL;
int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
struct sk_resident_key **rks = NULL;
size_t i, nrks = 0, nkeys = 0;
struct sshkey *key = NULL, **keys = NULL, **tmp;
uint8_t flags;
struct sk_option **opts = NULL;
debug("%s: provider \"%s\"%s", __func__, provider_path,
(pin != NULL && *pin != '\0') ? ", have-pin": "");
if (keysp == NULL || nkeysp == NULL)
return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
*keysp = NULL;
*nkeysp = 0;
if ((r = make_options(device, NULL, &opts)) != 0)
goto out;
if ((skp = sshsk_open(provider_path)) == NULL) {
r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; /* XXX sshsk_open return code? */
goto out;
}
if ((r = skp->sk_load_resident_keys(pin, opts, &rks, &nrks)) != 0) {
error("Provider \"%s\" returned failure %d", provider_path, r);
r = skerr_to_ssherr(r);
goto out;
}
for (i = 0; i < nrks; i++) {
debug3("%s: rk %zu: slot = %zu, alg = %d, application = \"%s\"",
__func__, i, rks[i]->slot, rks[i]->alg,
rks[i]->application);
/* XXX need better filter here */
if (strncmp(rks[i]->application, "ssh:", 4) != 0)
continue;
switch (rks[i]->alg) {
case SSH_SK_ECDSA:
case SSH_SK_ED25519:
break;
default:
continue;
}
- /* XXX where to get flags? */
flags = SSH_SK_USER_PRESENCE_REQD|SSH_SK_RESIDENT_KEY;
+ if ((rks[i]->flags & SSH_SK_USER_VERIFICATION_REQD))
+ flags |= SSH_SK_USER_VERIFICATION_REQD;
if ((r = sshsk_key_from_response(rks[i]->alg,
rks[i]->application, flags, &rks[i]->key, &key)) != 0)
goto out;
if ((tmp = recallocarray(keys, nkeys, nkeys + 1,
sizeof(*tmp))) == NULL) {
error("%s: recallocarray failed", __func__);
r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
goto out;
}
keys = tmp;
keys[nkeys++] = key;
key = NULL;
/* XXX synthesise comment */
}
/* success */
*keysp = keys;
*nkeysp = nkeys;
keys = NULL;
nkeys = 0;
r = 0;
out:
sshsk_free_options(opts);
sshsk_free(skp);
sshsk_free_sk_resident_keys(rks, nrks);
sshkey_free(key);
if (nkeys != 0) {
for (i = 0; i < nkeys; i++)
sshkey_free(keys[i]);
free(keys);
}
return r;
}
#endif /* ENABLE_SK */
diff --git a/ssh.0 b/ssh.0
index 474bb1e2e3d5..86ae537650ab 100644
--- a/ssh.0
+++ b/ssh.0
@@ -1,992 +1,1002 @@
SSH(1) General Commands Manual SSH(1)
NAME
ssh M-bM-^@M-^S OpenSSH remote login client
SYNOPSIS
ssh [-46AaCfGgKkMNnqsTtVvXxYy] [-B bind_interface] [-b bind_address]
[-c cipher_spec] [-D [bind_address:]port] [-E log_file]
[-e escape_char] [-F configfile] [-I pkcs11] [-i identity_file]
[-J destination] [-L address] [-l login_name] [-m mac_spec]
[-O ctl_cmd] [-o option] [-p port] [-Q query_option] [-R address]
[-S ctl_path] [-W host:port] [-w local_tun[:remote_tun]] destination
[command]
DESCRIPTION
ssh (SSH client) is a program for logging into a remote machine and for
executing commands on a remote machine. It is intended to provide secure
encrypted communications between two untrusted hosts over an insecure
network. X11 connections, arbitrary TCP ports and UNIX-domain sockets
can also be forwarded over the secure channel.
ssh connects and logs into the specified destination, which may be
specified as either [user@]hostname or a URI of the form
ssh://[user@]hostname[:port]. The user must prove his/her identity to
the remote machine using one of several methods (see below).
If a command is specified, it is executed on the remote host instead of a
login shell.
The options are as follows:
-4 Forces ssh to use IPv4 addresses only.
-6 Forces ssh to use IPv6 addresses only.
-A Enables forwarding of connections from an authentication agent
such as ssh-agent(1). This can also be specified on a per-host
basis in a configuration file.
Agent forwarding should be enabled with caution. Users with the
ability to bypass file permissions on the remote host (for the
agent's UNIX-domain socket) can access the local agent through
the forwarded connection. An attacker cannot obtain key material
from the agent, however they can perform operations on the keys
that enable them to authenticate using the identities loaded into
the agent. A safer alternative may be to use a jump host (see
-J).
-a Disables forwarding of the authentication agent connection.
-B bind_interface
Bind to the address of bind_interface before attempting to
connect to the destination host. This is only useful on systems
with more than one address.
-b bind_address
Use bind_address on the local machine as the source address of
the connection. Only useful on systems with more than one
address.
-C Requests compression of all data (including stdin, stdout,
stderr, and data for forwarded X11, TCP and UNIX-domain
connections). The compression algorithm is the same used by
gzip(1). Compression is desirable on modem lines and other slow
connections, but will only slow down things on fast networks.
The default value can be set on a host-by-host basis in the
configuration files; see the Compression option.
-c cipher_spec
Selects the cipher specification for encrypting the session.
cipher_spec is a comma-separated list of ciphers listed in order
of preference. See the Ciphers keyword in ssh_config(5) for more
information.
-D [bind_address:]port
Specifies a local M-bM-^@M-^\dynamicM-bM-^@M-^] application-level port forwarding.
This works by allocating a socket to listen to port on the local
side, optionally bound to the specified bind_address. Whenever a
connection is made to this port, the connection is forwarded over
the secure channel, and the application protocol is then used to
determine where to connect to from the remote machine. Currently
the SOCKS4 and SOCKS5 protocols are supported, and ssh will act
as a SOCKS server. Only root can forward privileged ports.
Dynamic port forwardings can also be specified in the
configuration file.
IPv6 addresses can be specified by enclosing the address in
square brackets. Only the superuser can forward privileged
ports. By default, the local port is bound in accordance with
the GatewayPorts setting. However, an explicit bind_address may
be used to bind the connection to a specific address. The
bind_address of M-bM-^@M-^\localhostM-bM-^@M-^] indicates that the listening port be
bound for local use only, while an empty address or M-bM-^@M-^X*M-bM-^@M-^Y indicates
that the port should be available from all interfaces.
-E log_file
Append debug logs to log_file instead of standard error.
-e escape_char
Sets the escape character for sessions with a pty (default: M-bM-^@M-^X~M-bM-^@M-^Y).
The escape character is only recognized at the beginning of a
line. The escape character followed by a dot (M-bM-^@M-^X.M-bM-^@M-^Y) closes the
connection; followed by control-Z suspends the connection; and
followed by itself sends the escape character once. Setting the
character to M-bM-^@M-^\noneM-bM-^@M-^] disables any escapes and makes the session
fully transparent.
-F configfile
Specifies an alternative per-user configuration file. If a
configuration file is given on the command line, the system-wide
configuration file (/etc/ssh/ssh_config) will be ignored. The
default for the per-user configuration file is ~/.ssh/config. If
set to M-bM-^@M-^\noneM-bM-^@M-^], no configuration files will be read.
-f Requests ssh to go to background just before command execution.
This is useful if ssh is going to ask for passwords or
passphrases, but the user wants it in the background. This
implies -n. The recommended way to start X11 programs at a
remote site is with something like ssh -f host xterm.
If the ExitOnForwardFailure configuration option is set to M-bM-^@M-^\yesM-bM-^@M-^],
then a client started with -f will wait for all remote port
forwards to be successfully established before placing itself in
the background.
-G Causes ssh to print its configuration after evaluating Host and
Match blocks and exit.
-g Allows remote hosts to connect to local forwarded ports. If used
on a multiplexed connection, then this option must be specified
on the master process.
-I pkcs11
Specify the PKCS#11 shared library ssh should use to communicate
with a PKCS#11 token providing keys for user authentication.
-i identity_file
Selects a file from which the identity (private key) for public
key authentication is read. The default is ~/.ssh/id_dsa,
~/.ssh/id_ecdsa, ~/.ssh/id_ecdsa_sk, ~/.ssh/id_ed25519,
~/.ssh/id_ed25519_sk and ~/.ssh/id_rsa. Identity files may also
be specified on a per-host basis in the configuration file. It
is possible to have multiple -i options (and multiple identities
specified in configuration files). If no certificates have been
explicitly specified by the CertificateFile directive, ssh will
also try to load certificate information from the filename
obtained by appending -cert.pub to identity filenames.
-J destination
Connect to the target host by first making a ssh connection to
the jump host described by destination and then establishing a
TCP forwarding to the ultimate destination from there. Multiple
jump hops may be specified separated by comma characters. This
is a shortcut to specify a ProxyJump configuration directive.
Note that configuration directives supplied on the command-line
generally apply to the destination host and not any specified
jump hosts. Use ~/.ssh/config to specify configuration for jump
hosts.
-K Enables GSSAPI-based authentication and forwarding (delegation)
of GSSAPI credentials to the server.
-k Disables forwarding (delegation) of GSSAPI credentials to the
server.
-L [bind_address:]port:host:hostport
-L [bind_address:]port:remote_socket
-L local_socket:host:hostport
-L local_socket:remote_socket
Specifies that connections to the given TCP port or Unix socket
on the local (client) host are to be forwarded to the given host
and port, or Unix socket, on the remote side. This works by
allocating a socket to listen to either a TCP port on the local
side, optionally bound to the specified bind_address, or to a
Unix socket. Whenever a connection is made to the local port or
socket, the connection is forwarded over the secure channel, and
a connection is made to either host port hostport, or the Unix
socket remote_socket, from the remote machine.
Port forwardings can also be specified in the configuration file.
Only the superuser can forward privileged ports. IPv6 addresses
can be specified by enclosing the address in square brackets.
By default, the local port is bound in accordance with the
GatewayPorts setting. However, an explicit bind_address may be
used to bind the connection to a specific address. The
bind_address of M-bM-^@M-^\localhostM-bM-^@M-^] indicates that the listening port be
bound for local use only, while an empty address or M-bM-^@M-^X*M-bM-^@M-^Y indicates
that the port should be available from all interfaces.
-l login_name
Specifies the user to log in as on the remote machine. This also
may be specified on a per-host basis in the configuration file.
-M Places the ssh client into M-bM-^@M-^\masterM-bM-^@M-^] mode for connection sharing.
Multiple -M options places ssh into M-bM-^@M-^\masterM-bM-^@M-^] mode but with
confirmation required using ssh-askpass(1) before each operation
that changes the multiplexing state (e.g. opening a new session).
Refer to the description of ControlMaster in ssh_config(5) for
details.
-m mac_spec
A comma-separated list of MAC (message authentication code)
algorithms, specified in order of preference. See the MACs
keyword for more information.
-N Do not execute a remote command. This is useful for just
forwarding ports.
-n Redirects stdin from /dev/null (actually, prevents reading from
stdin). This must be used when ssh is run in the background. A
common trick is to use this to run X11 programs on a remote
machine. For example, ssh -n shadows.cs.hut.fi emacs & will
start an emacs on shadows.cs.hut.fi, and the X11 connection will
be automatically forwarded over an encrypted channel. The ssh
program will be put in the background. (This does not work if
ssh needs to ask for a password or passphrase; see also the -f
option.)
-O ctl_cmd
Control an active connection multiplexing master process. When
the -O option is specified, the ctl_cmd argument is interpreted
and passed to the master process. Valid commands are: M-bM-^@M-^\checkM-bM-^@M-^]
(check that the master process is running), M-bM-^@M-^\forwardM-bM-^@M-^] (request
forwardings without command execution), M-bM-^@M-^\cancelM-bM-^@M-^] (cancel
forwardings), M-bM-^@M-^\exitM-bM-^@M-^] (request the master to exit), and M-bM-^@M-^\stopM-bM-^@M-^]
(request the master to stop accepting further multiplexing
requests).
-o option
Can be used to give options in the format used in the
configuration file. This is useful for specifying options for
which there is no separate command-line flag. For full details
of the options listed below, and their possible values, see
ssh_config(5).
AddKeysToAgent
AddressFamily
BatchMode
BindAddress
CanonicalDomains
CanonicalizeFallbackLocal
CanonicalizeHostname
CanonicalizeMaxDots
CanonicalizePermittedCNAMEs
CASignatureAlgorithms
CertificateFile
ChallengeResponseAuthentication
CheckHostIP
Ciphers
ClearAllForwardings
Compression
ConnectionAttempts
ConnectTimeout
ControlMaster
ControlPath
ControlPersist
DynamicForward
EscapeChar
ExitOnForwardFailure
FingerprintHash
ForwardAgent
ForwardX11
ForwardX11Timeout
ForwardX11Trusted
GatewayPorts
GlobalKnownHostsFile
GSSAPIAuthentication
GSSAPIDelegateCredentials
HashKnownHosts
Host
HostbasedAuthentication
HostbasedKeyTypes
HostKeyAlgorithms
HostKeyAlias
Hostname
IdentitiesOnly
IdentityAgent
IdentityFile
IPQoS
KbdInteractiveAuthentication
KbdInteractiveDevices
KexAlgorithms
LocalCommand
LocalForward
LogLevel
MACs
Match
NoHostAuthenticationForLocalhost
NumberOfPasswordPrompts
PasswordAuthentication
PermitLocalCommand
PKCS11Provider
Port
PreferredAuthentications
ProxyCommand
ProxyJump
ProxyUseFdpass
PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes
PubkeyAuthentication
RekeyLimit
RemoteCommand
RemoteForward
RequestTTY
SendEnv
ServerAliveInterval
ServerAliveCountMax
SetEnv
StreamLocalBindMask
StreamLocalBindUnlink
StrictHostKeyChecking
TCPKeepAlive
Tunnel
TunnelDevice
UpdateHostKeys
User
UserKnownHostsFile
VerifyHostKeyDNS
VisualHostKey
XAuthLocation
-p port
Port to connect to on the remote host. This can be specified on
a per-host basis in the configuration file.
-Q query_option
Queries ssh for the algorithms supported for the specified
version 2. The available features are: cipher (supported
symmetric ciphers), cipher-auth (supported symmetric ciphers that
support authenticated encryption), help (supported query terms
for use with the -Q flag), mac (supported message integrity
codes), kex (key exchange algorithms), key (key types), key-cert
(certificate key types), key-plain (non-certificate key types),
key-sig (all key types and signature algorithms),
protocol-version (supported SSH protocol versions), and sig
(supported signature algorithms). Alternatively, any keyword
from ssh_config(5) or sshd_config(5) that takes an algorithm list
may be used as an alias for the corresponding query_option.
-q Quiet mode. Causes most warning and diagnostic messages to be
suppressed.
-R [bind_address:]port:host:hostport
-R [bind_address:]port:local_socket
-R remote_socket:host:hostport
-R remote_socket:local_socket
-R [bind_address:]port
Specifies that connections to the given TCP port or Unix socket
on the remote (server) host are to be forwarded to the local
side.
This works by allocating a socket to listen to either a TCP port
or to a Unix socket on the remote side. Whenever a connection is
made to this port or Unix socket, the connection is forwarded
over the secure channel, and a connection is made from the local
machine to either an explicit destination specified by host port
hostport, or local_socket, or, if no explicit destination was
specified, ssh will act as a SOCKS 4/5 proxy and forward
connections to the destinations requested by the remote SOCKS
client.
Port forwardings can also be specified in the configuration file.
Privileged ports can be forwarded only when logging in as root on
the remote machine. IPv6 addresses can be specified by enclosing
the address in square brackets.
By default, TCP listening sockets on the server will be bound to
the loopback interface only. This may be overridden by
specifying a bind_address. An empty bind_address, or the address
M-bM-^@M-^X*M-bM-^@M-^Y, indicates that the remote socket should listen on all
interfaces. Specifying a remote bind_address will only succeed
if the server's GatewayPorts option is enabled (see
sshd_config(5)).
If the port argument is M-bM-^@M-^X0M-bM-^@M-^Y, the listen port will be dynamically
allocated on the server and reported to the client at run time.
When used together with -O forward the allocated port will be
printed to the standard output.
-S ctl_path
Specifies the location of a control socket for connection
sharing, or the string M-bM-^@M-^\noneM-bM-^@M-^] to disable connection sharing.
Refer to the description of ControlPath and ControlMaster in
ssh_config(5) for details.
-s May be used to request invocation of a subsystem on the remote
system. Subsystems facilitate the use of SSH as a secure
transport for other applications (e.g. sftp(1)). The subsystem
is specified as the remote command.
-T Disable pseudo-terminal allocation.
-t Force pseudo-terminal allocation. This can be used to execute
arbitrary screen-based programs on a remote machine, which can be
very useful, e.g. when implementing menu services. Multiple -t
options force tty allocation, even if ssh has no local tty.
-V Display the version number and exit.
-v Verbose mode. Causes ssh to print debugging messages about its
progress. This is helpful in debugging connection,
authentication, and configuration problems. Multiple -v options
increase the verbosity. The maximum is 3.
-W host:port
Requests that standard input and output on the client be
forwarded to host on port over the secure channel. Implies -N,
-T, ExitOnForwardFailure and ClearAllForwardings, though these
can be overridden in the configuration file or using -o command
line options.
-w local_tun[:remote_tun]
Requests tunnel device forwarding with the specified tun(4)
devices between the client (local_tun) and the server
(remote_tun).
The devices may be specified by numerical ID or the keyword
M-bM-^@M-^\anyM-bM-^@M-^], which uses the next available tunnel device. If
remote_tun is not specified, it defaults to M-bM-^@M-^\anyM-bM-^@M-^]. See also the
Tunnel and TunnelDevice directives in ssh_config(5).
If the Tunnel directive is unset, it will be set to the default
tunnel mode, which is M-bM-^@M-^\point-to-pointM-bM-^@M-^]. If a different Tunnel
forwarding mode it desired, then it should be specified before
-w.
-X Enables X11 forwarding. This can also be specified on a per-host
basis in a configuration file.
X11 forwarding should be enabled with caution. Users with the
ability to bypass file permissions on the remote host (for the
user's X authorization database) can access the local X11 display
through the forwarded connection. An attacker may then be able
to perform activities such as keystroke monitoring.
For this reason, X11 forwarding is subjected to X11 SECURITY
extension restrictions by default. Please refer to the ssh -Y
option and the ForwardX11Trusted directive in ssh_config(5) for
more information.
-x Disables X11 forwarding.
-Y Enables trusted X11 forwarding. Trusted X11 forwardings are not
subjected to the X11 SECURITY extension controls.
-y Send log information using the syslog(3) system module. By
default this information is sent to stderr.
ssh may additionally obtain configuration data from a per-user
configuration file and a system-wide configuration file. The file format
and configuration options are described in ssh_config(5).
AUTHENTICATION
The OpenSSH SSH client supports SSH protocol 2.
The methods available for authentication are: GSSAPI-based
authentication, host-based authentication, public key authentication,
challenge-response authentication, and password authentication.
Authentication methods are tried in the order specified above, though
PreferredAuthentications can be used to change the default order.
Host-based authentication works as follows: If the machine the user logs
in from is listed in /etc/hosts.equiv or /etc/shosts.equiv on the remote
machine, the user is non-root and the user names are the same on both
sides, or if the files ~/.rhosts or ~/.shosts exist in the user's home
directory on the remote machine and contain a line containing the name of
the client machine and the name of the user on that machine, the user is
considered for login. Additionally, the server must be able to verify
the client's host key (see the description of /etc/ssh/ssh_known_hosts
and ~/.ssh/known_hosts, below) for login to be permitted. This
authentication method closes security holes due to IP spoofing, DNS
spoofing, and routing spoofing. [Note to the administrator:
/etc/hosts.equiv, ~/.rhosts, and the rlogin/rsh protocol in general, are
inherently insecure and should be disabled if security is desired.]
Public key authentication works as follows: The scheme is based on
public-key cryptography, using cryptosystems where encryption and
decryption are done using separate keys, and it is unfeasible to derive
the decryption key from the encryption key. The idea is that each user
creates a public/private key pair for authentication purposes. The
server knows the public key, and only the user knows the private key.
ssh implements public key authentication protocol automatically, using
one of the DSA, ECDSA, Ed25519 or RSA algorithms. The HISTORY section of
ssl(8) contains a brief discussion of the DSA and RSA algorithms.
The file ~/.ssh/authorized_keys lists the public keys that are permitted
for logging in. When the user logs in, the ssh program tells the server
which key pair it would like to use for authentication. The client
proves that it has access to the private key and the server checks that
the corresponding public key is authorized to accept the account.
The server may inform the client of errors that prevented public key
authentication from succeeding after authentication completes using a
different method. These may be viewed by increasing the LogLevel to
DEBUG or higher (e.g. by using the -v flag).
The user creates his/her key pair by running ssh-keygen(1). This stores
the private key in ~/.ssh/id_dsa (DSA), ~/.ssh/id_ecdsa (ECDSA),
~/.ssh/id_ecdsa_sk (authenticator-hosted ECDSA), ~/.ssh/id_ed25519
(Ed25519), ~/.ssh/id_ed25519_sk (authenticator-hosted Ed25519), or
~/.ssh/id_rsa (RSA) and stores the public key in ~/.ssh/id_dsa.pub (DSA),
~/.ssh/id_ecdsa.pub (ECDSA), ~/.ssh/id_ecdsa_sk.pub (authenticator-hosted
ECDSA), ~/.ssh/id_ed25519.pub (Ed25519), ~/.ssh/id_ed25519_sk.pub
(authenticator-hosted Ed25519), or ~/.ssh/id_rsa.pub (RSA) in the user's
home directory. The user should then copy the public key to
~/.ssh/authorized_keys in his/her home directory on the remote machine.
The authorized_keys file corresponds to the conventional ~/.rhosts file,
and has one key per line, though the lines can be very long. After this,
the user can log in without giving the password.
A variation on public key authentication is available in the form of
certificate authentication: instead of a set of public/private keys,
signed certificates are used. This has the advantage that a single
trusted certification authority can be used in place of many
public/private keys. See the CERTIFICATES section of ssh-keygen(1) for
more information.
The most convenient way to use public key or certificate authentication
may be with an authentication agent. See ssh-agent(1) and (optionally)
the AddKeysToAgent directive in ssh_config(5) for more information.
Challenge-response authentication works as follows: The server sends an
arbitrary "challenge" text, and prompts for a response. Examples of
challenge-response authentication include BSD Authentication (see
login.conf(5)) and PAM (some non-OpenBSD systems).
Finally, if other authentication methods fail, ssh prompts the user for a
password. The password is sent to the remote host for checking; however,
since all communications are encrypted, the password cannot be seen by
someone listening on the network.
ssh automatically maintains and checks a database containing
identification for all hosts it has ever been used with. Host keys are
stored in ~/.ssh/known_hosts in the user's home directory. Additionally,
the file /etc/ssh/ssh_known_hosts is automatically checked for known
hosts. Any new hosts are automatically added to the user's file. If a
host's identification ever changes, ssh warns about this and disables
password authentication to prevent server spoofing or man-in-the-middle
attacks, which could otherwise be used to circumvent the encryption. The
StrictHostKeyChecking option can be used to control logins to machines
whose host key is not known or has changed.
When the user's identity has been accepted by the server, the server
either executes the given command in a non-interactive session or, if no
command has been specified, logs into the machine and gives the user a
normal shell as an interactive session. All communication with the
remote command or shell will be automatically encrypted.
If an interactive session is requested ssh by default will only request a
pseudo-terminal (pty) for interactive sessions when the client has one.
The flags -T and -t can be used to override this behaviour.
If a pseudo-terminal has been allocated the user may use the escape
characters noted below.
If no pseudo-terminal has been allocated, the session is transparent and
can be used to reliably transfer binary data. On most systems, setting
the escape character to M-bM-^@M-^\noneM-bM-^@M-^] will also make the session transparent
even if a tty is used.
The session terminates when the command or shell on the remote machine
exits and all X11 and TCP connections have been closed.
ESCAPE CHARACTERS
When a pseudo-terminal has been requested, ssh supports a number of
functions through the use of an escape character.
A single tilde character can be sent as ~~ or by following the tilde by a
character other than those described below. The escape character must
always follow a newline to be interpreted as special. The escape
character can be changed in configuration files using the EscapeChar
configuration directive or on the command line by the -e option.
The supported escapes (assuming the default M-bM-^@M-^X~M-bM-^@M-^Y) are:
~. Disconnect.
~^Z Background ssh.
~# List forwarded connections.
~& Background ssh at logout when waiting for forwarded connection /
X11 sessions to terminate.
~? Display a list of escape characters.
~B Send a BREAK to the remote system (only useful if the peer
supports it).
~C Open command line. Currently this allows the addition of port
forwardings using the -L, -R and -D options (see above). It also
allows the cancellation of existing port-forwardings with
-KL[bind_address:]port for local, -KR[bind_address:]port for
remote and -KD[bind_address:]port for dynamic port-forwardings.
!command allows the user to execute a local command if the
PermitLocalCommand option is enabled in ssh_config(5). Basic
help is available, using the -h option.
~R Request rekeying of the connection (only useful if the peer
supports it).
~V Decrease the verbosity (LogLevel) when errors are being written
to stderr.
~v Increase the verbosity (LogLevel) when errors are being written
to stderr.
TCP FORWARDING
Forwarding of arbitrary TCP connections over a secure channel can be
specified either on the command line or in a configuration file. One
possible application of TCP forwarding is a secure connection to a mail
server; another is going through firewalls.
In the example below, we look at encrypting communication for an IRC
client, even though the IRC server it connects to does not directly
support encrypted communication. This works as follows: the user
connects to the remote host using ssh, specifying the ports to be used to
forward the connection. After that it is possible to start the program
locally, and ssh will encrypt and forward the connection to the remote
server.
The following example tunnels an IRC session from the client to an IRC
server at M-bM-^@M-^\server.example.comM-bM-^@M-^], joining channel M-bM-^@M-^\#usersM-bM-^@M-^], nickname
M-bM-^@M-^\pinkyM-bM-^@M-^], using the standard IRC port, 6667:
$ ssh -f -L 6667:localhost:6667 server.example.com sleep 10
$ irc -c '#users' pinky IRC/127.0.0.1
The -f option backgrounds ssh and the remote command M-bM-^@M-^\sleep 10M-bM-^@M-^] is
specified to allow an amount of time (10 seconds, in the example) to
start the program which is going to use the tunnel. If no connections
are made within the time specified, ssh will exit.
X11 FORWARDING
If the ForwardX11 variable is set to M-bM-^@M-^\yesM-bM-^@M-^] (or see the description of the
-X, -x, and -Y options above) and the user is using X11 (the DISPLAY
environment variable is set), the connection to the X11 display is
automatically forwarded to the remote side in such a way that any X11
programs started from the shell (or command) will go through the
encrypted channel, and the connection to the real X server will be made
from the local machine. The user should not manually set DISPLAY.
Forwarding of X11 connections can be configured on the command line or in
configuration files.
The DISPLAY value set by ssh will point to the server machine, but with a
display number greater than zero. This is normal, and happens because
ssh creates a M-bM-^@M-^\proxyM-bM-^@M-^] X server on the server machine for forwarding the
connections over the encrypted channel.
ssh will also automatically set up Xauthority data on the server machine.
For this purpose, it will generate a random authorization cookie, store
it in Xauthority on the server, and verify that any forwarded connections
carry this cookie and replace it by the real cookie when the connection
is opened. The real authentication cookie is never sent to the server
machine (and no cookies are sent in the plain).
If the ForwardAgent variable is set to M-bM-^@M-^\yesM-bM-^@M-^] (or see the description of
the -A and -a options above) and the user is using an authentication
agent, the connection to the agent is automatically forwarded to the
remote side.
VERIFYING HOST KEYS
When connecting to a server for the first time, a fingerprint of the
server's public key is presented to the user (unless the option
StrictHostKeyChecking has been disabled). Fingerprints can be determined
using ssh-keygen(1):
$ ssh-keygen -l -f /etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key
If the fingerprint is already known, it can be matched and the key can be
accepted or rejected. If only legacy (MD5) fingerprints for the server
are available, the ssh-keygen(1) -E option may be used to downgrade the
fingerprint algorithm to match.
Because of the difficulty of comparing host keys just by looking at
fingerprint strings, there is also support to compare host keys visually,
using random art. By setting the VisualHostKey option to M-bM-^@M-^\yesM-bM-^@M-^], a small
ASCII graphic gets displayed on every login to a server, no matter if the
session itself is interactive or not. By learning the pattern a known
server produces, a user can easily find out that the host key has changed
when a completely different pattern is displayed. Because these patterns
are not unambiguous however, a pattern that looks similar to the pattern
remembered only gives a good probability that the host key is the same,
not guaranteed proof.
To get a listing of the fingerprints along with their random art for all
known hosts, the following command line can be used:
$ ssh-keygen -lv -f ~/.ssh/known_hosts
If the fingerprint is unknown, an alternative method of verification is
available: SSH fingerprints verified by DNS. An additional resource
record (RR), SSHFP, is added to a zonefile and the connecting client is
able to match the fingerprint with that of the key presented.
In this example, we are connecting a client to a server,
M-bM-^@M-^\host.example.comM-bM-^@M-^]. The SSHFP resource records should first be added to
the zonefile for host.example.com:
$ ssh-keygen -r host.example.com.
The output lines will have to be added to the zonefile. To check that
the zone is answering fingerprint queries:
$ dig -t SSHFP host.example.com
Finally the client connects:
$ ssh -o "VerifyHostKeyDNS ask" host.example.com
[...]
Matching host key fingerprint found in DNS.
Are you sure you want to continue connecting (yes/no)?
See the VerifyHostKeyDNS option in ssh_config(5) for more information.
SSH-BASED VIRTUAL PRIVATE NETWORKS
ssh contains support for Virtual Private Network (VPN) tunnelling using
the tun(4) network pseudo-device, allowing two networks to be joined
securely. The sshd_config(5) configuration option PermitTunnel controls
whether the server supports this, and at what level (layer 2 or 3
traffic).
The following example would connect client network 10.0.50.0/24 with
remote network 10.0.99.0/24 using a point-to-point connection from
10.1.1.1 to 10.1.1.2, provided that the SSH server running on the gateway
to the remote network, at 192.168.1.15, allows it.
On the client:
# ssh -f -w 0:1 192.168.1.15 true
# ifconfig tun0 10.1.1.1 10.1.1.2 netmask 255.255.255.252
# route add 10.0.99.0/24 10.1.1.2
On the server:
# ifconfig tun1 10.1.1.2 10.1.1.1 netmask 255.255.255.252
# route add 10.0.50.0/24 10.1.1.1
Client access may be more finely tuned via the /root/.ssh/authorized_keys
file (see below) and the PermitRootLogin server option. The following
entry would permit connections on tun(4) device 1 from user M-bM-^@M-^\janeM-bM-^@M-^] and on
tun device 2 from user M-bM-^@M-^\johnM-bM-^@M-^], if PermitRootLogin is set to
M-bM-^@M-^\forced-commands-onlyM-bM-^@M-^]:
tunnel="1",command="sh /etc/netstart tun1" ssh-rsa ... jane
tunnel="2",command="sh /etc/netstart tun2" ssh-rsa ... john
Since an SSH-based setup entails a fair amount of overhead, it may be
more suited to temporary setups, such as for wireless VPNs. More
permanent VPNs are better provided by tools such as ipsecctl(8) and
isakmpd(8).
ENVIRONMENT
ssh will normally set the following environment variables:
DISPLAY The DISPLAY variable indicates the location of the
X11 server. It is automatically set by ssh to
point to a value of the form M-bM-^@M-^\hostname:nM-bM-^@M-^], where
M-bM-^@M-^\hostnameM-bM-^@M-^] indicates the host where the shell runs,
and M-bM-^@M-^XnM-bM-^@M-^Y is an integer M-bM-^IM-% 1. ssh uses this special
value to forward X11 connections over the secure
channel. The user should normally not set DISPLAY
explicitly, as that will render the X11 connection
insecure (and will require the user to manually
copy any required authorization cookies).
HOME Set to the path of the user's home directory.
LOGNAME Synonym for USER; set for compatibility with
systems that use this variable.
MAIL Set to the path of the user's mailbox.
PATH Set to the default PATH, as specified when
compiling ssh.
SSH_ASKPASS If ssh needs a passphrase, it will read the
passphrase from the current terminal if it was run
from a terminal. If ssh does not have a terminal
associated with it but DISPLAY and SSH_ASKPASS are
set, it will execute the program specified by
SSH_ASKPASS and open an X11 window to read the
passphrase. This is particularly useful when
calling ssh from a .xsession or related script.
(Note that on some machines it may be necessary to
redirect the input from /dev/null to make this
work.)
+ SSH_ASKPASS_REQUIRE Allows further control over the use of an askpass
+ program. If this variable is set to M-bM-^@M-^\neverM-bM-^@M-^] then
+ ssh will never attempt to use one. If it is set to
+ M-bM-^@M-^\preferM-bM-^@M-^], then ssh will prefer to use the askpass
+ program instead of the TTY when requesting
+ passwords. Finally, if the variable is set to
+ M-bM-^@M-^\forceM-bM-^@M-^], then the askpass program will be used for
+ all passphrase input regardless of whether DISPLAY
+ is set.
+
SSH_AUTH_SOCK Identifies the path of a UNIX-domain socket used to
communicate with the agent.
SSH_CONNECTION Identifies the client and server ends of the
connection. The variable contains four space-
separated values: client IP address, client port
number, server IP address, and server port number.
SSH_ORIGINAL_COMMAND This variable contains the original command line if
a forced command is executed. It can be used to
extract the original arguments.
SSH_TTY This is set to the name of the tty (path to the
device) associated with the current shell or
command. If the current session has no tty, this
variable is not set.
SSH_TUNNEL Optionally set by sshd(8) to contain the interface
names assigned if tunnel forwarding was requested
by the client.
SSH_USER_AUTH Optionally set by sshd(8), this variable may
contain a pathname to a file that lists the
authentication methods successfully used when the
session was established, including any public keys
that were used.
TZ This variable is set to indicate the present time
zone if it was set when the daemon was started
(i.e. the daemon passes the value on to new
connections).
USER Set to the name of the user logging in.
Additionally, ssh reads ~/.ssh/environment, and adds lines of the format
M-bM-^@M-^\VARNAME=valueM-bM-^@M-^] to the environment if the file exists and users are
allowed to change their environment. For more information, see the
PermitUserEnvironment option in sshd_config(5).
FILES
~/.rhosts
This file is used for host-based authentication (see above). On
some machines this file may need to be world-readable if the
user's home directory is on an NFS partition, because sshd(8)
reads it as root. Additionally, this file must be owned by the
user, and must not have write permissions for anyone else. The
recommended permission for most machines is read/write for the
user, and not accessible by others.
~/.shosts
This file is used in exactly the same way as .rhosts, but allows
host-based authentication without permitting login with
rlogin/rsh.
~/.ssh/
This directory is the default location for all user-specific
configuration and authentication information. There is no
general requirement to keep the entire contents of this directory
secret, but the recommended permissions are read/write/execute
for the user, and not accessible by others.
~/.ssh/authorized_keys
Lists the public keys (DSA, ECDSA, Ed25519, RSA) that can be used
for logging in as this user. The format of this file is
described in the sshd(8) manual page. This file is not highly
sensitive, but the recommended permissions are read/write for the
user, and not accessible by others.
~/.ssh/config
This is the per-user configuration file. The file format and
configuration options are described in ssh_config(5). Because of
the potential for abuse, this file must have strict permissions:
read/write for the user, and not writable by others.
~/.ssh/environment
Contains additional definitions for environment variables; see
ENVIRONMENT, above.
~/.ssh/id_dsa
~/.ssh/id_ecdsa
~/.ssh/id_ecdsa_sk
~/.ssh/id_ed25519
~/.ssh/id_ed25519_sk
~/.ssh/id_rsa
Contains the private key for authentication. These files contain
sensitive data and should be readable by the user but not
accessible by others (read/write/execute). ssh will simply
ignore a private key file if it is accessible by others. It is
possible to specify a passphrase when generating the key which
will be used to encrypt the sensitive part of this file using
AES-128.
~/.ssh/id_dsa.pub
~/.ssh/id_ecdsa.pub
~/.ssh/id_ecdsa_sk.pub
~/.ssh/id_ed25519.pub
~/.ssh/id_ed25519_sk.pub
~/.ssh/id_rsa.pub
Contains the public key for authentication. These files are not
sensitive and can (but need not) be readable by anyone.
~/.ssh/known_hosts
Contains a list of host keys for all hosts the user has logged
into that are not already in the systemwide list of known host
keys. See sshd(8) for further details of the format of this
file.
~/.ssh/rc
Commands in this file are executed by ssh when the user logs in,
just before the user's shell (or command) is started. See the
sshd(8) manual page for more information.
/etc/hosts.equiv
This file is for host-based authentication (see above). It
should only be writable by root.
/etc/shosts.equiv
This file is used in exactly the same way as hosts.equiv, but
allows host-based authentication without permitting login with
rlogin/rsh.
/etc/ssh/ssh_config
Systemwide configuration file. The file format and configuration
options are described in ssh_config(5).
/etc/ssh/ssh_host_key
/etc/ssh/ssh_host_dsa_key
/etc/ssh/ssh_host_ecdsa_key
/etc/ssh/ssh_host_ed25519_key
/etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key
These files contain the private parts of the host keys and are
used for host-based authentication.
/etc/ssh/ssh_known_hosts
Systemwide list of known host keys. This file should be prepared
by the system administrator to contain the public host keys of
all machines in the organization. It should be world-readable.
See sshd(8) for further details of the format of this file.
/etc/ssh/sshrc
Commands in this file are executed by ssh when the user logs in,
just before the user's shell (or command) is started. See the
sshd(8) manual page for more information.
EXIT STATUS
ssh exits with the exit status of the remote command or with 255 if an
error occurred.
SEE ALSO
scp(1), sftp(1), ssh-add(1), ssh-agent(1), ssh-keygen(1), ssh-keyscan(1),
tun(4), ssh_config(5), ssh-keysign(8), sshd(8)
STANDARDS
S. Lehtinen and C. Lonvick, The Secure Shell (SSH) Protocol Assigned
Numbers, RFC 4250, January 2006.
T. Ylonen and C. Lonvick, The Secure Shell (SSH) Protocol Architecture,
RFC 4251, January 2006.
T. Ylonen and C. Lonvick, The Secure Shell (SSH) Authentication Protocol,
RFC 4252, January 2006.
T. Ylonen and C. Lonvick, The Secure Shell (SSH) Transport Layer
Protocol, RFC 4253, January 2006.
T. Ylonen and C. Lonvick, The Secure Shell (SSH) Connection Protocol, RFC
4254, January 2006.
J. Schlyter and W. Griffin, Using DNS to Securely Publish Secure Shell
(SSH) Key Fingerprints, RFC 4255, January 2006.
F. Cusack and M. Forssen, Generic Message Exchange Authentication for the
Secure Shell Protocol (SSH), RFC 4256, January 2006.
J. Galbraith and P. Remaker, The Secure Shell (SSH) Session Channel Break
Extension, RFC 4335, January 2006.
M. Bellare, T. Kohno, and C. Namprempre, The Secure Shell (SSH) Transport
Layer Encryption Modes, RFC 4344, January 2006.
B. Harris, Improved Arcfour Modes for the Secure Shell (SSH) Transport
Layer Protocol, RFC 4345, January 2006.
M. Friedl, N. Provos, and W. Simpson, Diffie-Hellman Group Exchange for
the Secure Shell (SSH) Transport Layer Protocol, RFC 4419, March 2006.
J. Galbraith and R. Thayer, The Secure Shell (SSH) Public Key File
Format, RFC 4716, November 2006.
D. Stebila and J. Green, Elliptic Curve Algorithm Integration in the
Secure Shell Transport Layer, RFC 5656, December 2009.
A. Perrig and D. Song, Hash Visualization: a New Technique to improve
Real-World Security, 1999, International Workshop on Cryptographic
Techniques and E-Commerce (CrypTEC '99).
AUTHORS
OpenSSH is a derivative of the original and free ssh 1.2.12 release by
Tatu Ylonen. Aaron Campbell, Bob Beck, Markus Friedl, Niels Provos, Theo
de Raadt and Dug Song removed many bugs, re-added newer features and
created OpenSSH. Markus Friedl contributed the support for SSH protocol
versions 1.5 and 2.0.
-OpenBSD 6.7 April 17, 2020 OpenBSD 6.7
+OpenBSD 6.8 July 15, 2020 OpenBSD 6.8
diff --git a/ssh.1 b/ssh.1
index dce5f404b3a8..555317887e14 100644
--- a/ssh.1
+++ b/ssh.1
@@ -1,1729 +1,1748 @@
.\"
.\" Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
.\" Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
.\" All rights reserved
.\"
.\" As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
.\" can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this
.\" software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
.\" incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
.\" called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
.\"
.\" Copyright (c) 1999,2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
.\" Copyright (c) 1999 Aaron Campbell. All rights reserved.
.\" Copyright (c) 1999 Theo de Raadt. All rights reserved.
.\"
.\" Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
.\" modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
.\" are met:
.\" 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
.\" notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
.\" 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
.\" notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
.\" documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
.\"
.\" THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
.\" IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
.\" OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
.\" IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
.\" INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
.\" NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
.\" DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
.\" THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
.\" (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
.\" THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
.\"
-.\" $OpenBSD: ssh.1,v 1.412 2020/04/17 03:34:42 djm Exp $
-.Dd $Mdocdate: April 17 2020 $
+.\" $OpenBSD: ssh.1,v 1.414 2020/07/15 05:40:05 jmc Exp $
+.Dd $Mdocdate: July 15 2020 $
.Dt SSH 1
.Os
.Sh NAME
.Nm ssh
.Nd OpenSSH remote login client
.Sh SYNOPSIS
.Nm ssh
.Op Fl 46AaCfGgKkMNnqsTtVvXxYy
.Op Fl B Ar bind_interface
.Op Fl b Ar bind_address
.Op Fl c Ar cipher_spec
.Op Fl D Oo Ar bind_address : Oc Ns Ar port
.Op Fl E Ar log_file
.Op Fl e Ar escape_char
.Op Fl F Ar configfile
.Op Fl I Ar pkcs11
.Op Fl i Ar identity_file
.Op Fl J Ar destination
.Op Fl L Ar address
.Op Fl l Ar login_name
.Op Fl m Ar mac_spec
.Op Fl O Ar ctl_cmd
.Op Fl o Ar option
.Op Fl p Ar port
.Op Fl Q Ar query_option
.Op Fl R Ar address
.Op Fl S Ar ctl_path
.Op Fl W Ar host : Ns Ar port
.Op Fl w Ar local_tun Ns Op : Ns Ar remote_tun
.Ar destination
.Op Ar command
.Sh DESCRIPTION
.Nm
(SSH client) is a program for logging into a remote machine and for
executing commands on a remote machine.
It is intended to provide secure encrypted communications between
two untrusted hosts over an insecure network.
X11 connections, arbitrary TCP ports and
.Ux Ns -domain
sockets can also be forwarded over the secure channel.
.Pp
.Nm
connects and logs into the specified
.Ar destination ,
which may be specified as either
.Sm off
.Oo user @ Oc hostname
.Sm on
or a URI of the form
.Sm off
.No ssh:// Oo user @ Oc hostname Op : port .
.Sm on
The user must prove
his/her identity to the remote machine using one of several methods
(see below).
.Pp
If a
.Ar command
is specified,
it is executed on the remote host instead of a login shell.
.Pp
The options are as follows:
.Pp
.Bl -tag -width Ds -compact
.It Fl 4
Forces
.Nm
to use IPv4 addresses only.
.Pp
.It Fl 6
Forces
.Nm
to use IPv6 addresses only.
.Pp
.It Fl A
Enables forwarding of connections from an authentication agent such as
.Xr ssh-agent 1 .
This can also be specified on a per-host basis in a configuration file.
.Pp
Agent forwarding should be enabled with caution.
Users with the ability to bypass file permissions on the remote host
(for the agent's
.Ux Ns -domain
socket) can access the local agent through the forwarded connection.
An attacker cannot obtain key material from the agent,
however they can perform operations on the keys that enable them to
authenticate using the identities loaded into the agent.
A safer alternative may be to use a jump host
(see
.Fl J ) .
.Pp
.It Fl a
Disables forwarding of the authentication agent connection.
.Pp
.It Fl B Ar bind_interface
Bind to the address of
.Ar bind_interface
before attempting to connect to the destination host.
This is only useful on systems with more than one address.
.Pp
.It Fl b Ar bind_address
Use
.Ar bind_address
on the local machine as the source address
of the connection.
Only useful on systems with more than one address.
.Pp
.It Fl C
Requests compression of all data (including stdin, stdout, stderr, and
data for forwarded X11, TCP and
.Ux Ns -domain
connections).
The compression algorithm is the same used by
.Xr gzip 1 .
Compression is desirable on modem lines and other
slow connections, but will only slow down things on fast networks.
The default value can be set on a host-by-host basis in the
configuration files; see the
.Cm Compression
option.
.Pp
.It Fl c Ar cipher_spec
Selects the cipher specification for encrypting the session.
.Ar cipher_spec
is a comma-separated list of ciphers
listed in order of preference.
See the
.Cm Ciphers
keyword in
.Xr ssh_config 5
for more information.
.Pp
.It Fl D Xo
.Sm off
.Oo Ar bind_address : Oc
.Ar port
.Sm on
.Xc
Specifies a local
.Dq dynamic
application-level port forwarding.
This works by allocating a socket to listen to
.Ar port
on the local side, optionally bound to the specified
.Ar bind_address .
Whenever a connection is made to this port, the
connection is forwarded over the secure channel, and the application
protocol is then used to determine where to connect to from the
remote machine.
Currently the SOCKS4 and SOCKS5 protocols are supported, and
.Nm
will act as a SOCKS server.
Only root can forward privileged ports.
Dynamic port forwardings can also be specified in the configuration file.
.Pp
IPv6 addresses can be specified by enclosing the address in square brackets.
Only the superuser can forward privileged ports.
By default, the local port is bound in accordance with the
.Cm GatewayPorts
setting.
However, an explicit
.Ar bind_address
may be used to bind the connection to a specific address.
The
.Ar bind_address
of
.Dq localhost
indicates that the listening port be bound for local use only, while an
empty address or
.Sq *
indicates that the port should be available from all interfaces.
.Pp
.It Fl E Ar log_file
Append debug logs to
.Ar log_file
instead of standard error.
.Pp
.It Fl e Ar escape_char
Sets the escape character for sessions with a pty (default:
.Ql ~ ) .
The escape character is only recognized at the beginning of a line.
The escape character followed by a dot
.Pq Ql \&.
closes the connection;
followed by control-Z suspends the connection;
and followed by itself sends the escape character once.
Setting the character to
.Dq none
disables any escapes and makes the session fully transparent.
.Pp
.It Fl F Ar configfile
Specifies an alternative per-user configuration file.
If a configuration file is given on the command line,
the system-wide configuration file
.Pq Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_config
will be ignored.
The default for the per-user configuration file is
.Pa ~/.ssh/config .
If set to
.Dq none ,
no configuration files will be read.
.Pp
.It Fl f
Requests
.Nm
to go to background just before command execution.
This is useful if
.Nm
is going to ask for passwords or passphrases, but the user
wants it in the background.
This implies
.Fl n .
The recommended way to start X11 programs at a remote site is with
something like
.Ic ssh -f host xterm .
.Pp
If the
.Cm ExitOnForwardFailure
configuration option is set to
.Dq yes ,
then a client started with
.Fl f
will wait for all remote port forwards to be successfully established
before placing itself in the background.
.Pp
.It Fl G
Causes
.Nm
to print its configuration after evaluating
.Cm Host
and
.Cm Match
blocks and exit.
.Pp
.It Fl g
Allows remote hosts to connect to local forwarded ports.
If used on a multiplexed connection, then this option must be specified
on the master process.
.Pp
.It Fl I Ar pkcs11
Specify the PKCS#11 shared library
.Nm
should use to communicate with a PKCS#11 token providing keys for user
authentication.
.Pp
.It Fl i Ar identity_file
Selects a file from which the identity (private key) for
public key authentication is read.
The default is
.Pa ~/.ssh/id_dsa ,
.Pa ~/.ssh/id_ecdsa ,
.Pa ~/.ssh/id_ecdsa_sk ,
.Pa ~/.ssh/id_ed25519 ,
.Pa ~/.ssh/id_ed25519_sk
and
.Pa ~/.ssh/id_rsa .
Identity files may also be specified on
a per-host basis in the configuration file.
It is possible to have multiple
.Fl i
options (and multiple identities specified in
configuration files).
If no certificates have been explicitly specified by the
.Cm CertificateFile
directive,
.Nm
will also try to load certificate information from the filename obtained
by appending
.Pa -cert.pub
to identity filenames.
.Pp
.It Fl J Ar destination
Connect to the target host by first making a
.Nm
connection to the jump host described by
.Ar destination
and then establishing a TCP forwarding to the ultimate destination from
there.
Multiple jump hops may be specified separated by comma characters.
This is a shortcut to specify a
.Cm ProxyJump
configuration directive.
Note that configuration directives supplied on the command-line generally
apply to the destination host and not any specified jump hosts.
Use
.Pa ~/.ssh/config
to specify configuration for jump hosts.
.Pp
.It Fl K
Enables GSSAPI-based authentication and forwarding (delegation) of GSSAPI
credentials to the server.
.Pp
.It Fl k
Disables forwarding (delegation) of GSSAPI credentials to the server.
.Pp
.It Fl L Xo
.Sm off
.Oo Ar bind_address : Oc
.Ar port : host : hostport
.Sm on
.Xc
.It Fl L Xo
.Sm off
.Oo Ar bind_address : Oc
.Ar port : remote_socket
.Sm on
.Xc
.It Fl L Xo
.Sm off
.Ar local_socket : host : hostport
.Sm on
.Xc
.It Fl L Xo
.Sm off
.Ar local_socket : remote_socket
.Sm on
.Xc
Specifies that connections to the given TCP port or Unix socket on the local
(client) host are to be forwarded to the given host and port, or Unix socket,
on the remote side.
This works by allocating a socket to listen to either a TCP
.Ar port
on the local side, optionally bound to the specified
.Ar bind_address ,
or to a Unix socket.
Whenever a connection is made to the local port or socket, the
connection is forwarded over the secure channel, and a connection is
made to either
.Ar host
port
.Ar hostport ,
or the Unix socket
.Ar remote_socket ,
from the remote machine.
.Pp
Port forwardings can also be specified in the configuration file.
Only the superuser can forward privileged ports.
IPv6 addresses can be specified by enclosing the address in square brackets.
.Pp
By default, the local port is bound in accordance with the
.Cm GatewayPorts
setting.
However, an explicit
.Ar bind_address
may be used to bind the connection to a specific address.
The
.Ar bind_address
of
.Dq localhost
indicates that the listening port be bound for local use only, while an
empty address or
.Sq *
indicates that the port should be available from all interfaces.
.Pp
.It Fl l Ar login_name
Specifies the user to log in as on the remote machine.
This also may be specified on a per-host basis in the configuration file.
.Pp
.It Fl M
Places the
.Nm
client into
.Dq master
mode for connection sharing.
Multiple
.Fl M
options places
.Nm
into
.Dq master
mode but with confirmation required using
.Xr ssh-askpass 1
before each operation that changes the multiplexing state
(e.g. opening a new session).
Refer to the description of
.Cm ControlMaster
in
.Xr ssh_config 5
for details.
.Pp
.It Fl m Ar mac_spec
A comma-separated list of MAC (message authentication code) algorithms,
specified in order of preference.
See the
.Cm MACs
keyword for more information.
.Pp
.It Fl N
Do not execute a remote command.
This is useful for just forwarding ports.
.Pp
.It Fl n
Redirects stdin from
.Pa /dev/null
(actually, prevents reading from stdin).
This must be used when
.Nm
is run in the background.
A common trick is to use this to run X11 programs on a remote machine.
For example,
.Ic ssh -n shadows.cs.hut.fi emacs &
will start an emacs on shadows.cs.hut.fi, and the X11
connection will be automatically forwarded over an encrypted channel.
The
.Nm
program will be put in the background.
(This does not work if
.Nm
needs to ask for a password or passphrase; see also the
.Fl f
option.)
.Pp
.It Fl O Ar ctl_cmd
Control an active connection multiplexing master process.
When the
.Fl O
option is specified, the
.Ar ctl_cmd
argument is interpreted and passed to the master process.
Valid commands are:
.Dq check
(check that the master process is running),
.Dq forward
(request forwardings without command execution),
.Dq cancel
(cancel forwardings),
.Dq exit
(request the master to exit), and
.Dq stop
(request the master to stop accepting further multiplexing requests).
.Pp
.It Fl o Ar option
Can be used to give options in the format used in the configuration file.
This is useful for specifying options for which there is no separate
command-line flag.
For full details of the options listed below, and their possible values, see
.Xr ssh_config 5 .
.Pp
.Bl -tag -width Ds -offset indent -compact
.It AddKeysToAgent
.It AddressFamily
.It BatchMode
.It BindAddress
.It CanonicalDomains
.It CanonicalizeFallbackLocal
.It CanonicalizeHostname
.It CanonicalizeMaxDots
.It CanonicalizePermittedCNAMEs
.It CASignatureAlgorithms
.It CertificateFile
.It ChallengeResponseAuthentication
.It CheckHostIP
.It Ciphers
.It ClearAllForwardings
.It Compression
.It ConnectionAttempts
.It ConnectTimeout
.It ControlMaster
.It ControlPath
.It ControlPersist
.It DynamicForward
.It EscapeChar
.It ExitOnForwardFailure
.It FingerprintHash
.It ForwardAgent
.It ForwardX11
.It ForwardX11Timeout
.It ForwardX11Trusted
.It GatewayPorts
.It GlobalKnownHostsFile
.It GSSAPIAuthentication
.It GSSAPIDelegateCredentials
.It HashKnownHosts
.It Host
.It HostbasedAuthentication
.It HostbasedKeyTypes
.It HostKeyAlgorithms
.It HostKeyAlias
.It Hostname
.It IdentitiesOnly
.It IdentityAgent
.It IdentityFile
.It IPQoS
.It KbdInteractiveAuthentication
.It KbdInteractiveDevices
.It KexAlgorithms
.It LocalCommand
.It LocalForward
.It LogLevel
.It MACs
.It Match
.It NoHostAuthenticationForLocalhost
.It NumberOfPasswordPrompts
.It PasswordAuthentication
.It PermitLocalCommand
.It PKCS11Provider
.It Port
.It PreferredAuthentications
.It ProxyCommand
.It ProxyJump
.It ProxyUseFdpass
.It PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes
.It PubkeyAuthentication
.It RekeyLimit
.It RemoteCommand
.It RemoteForward
.It RequestTTY
.It SendEnv
.It ServerAliveInterval
.It ServerAliveCountMax
.It SetEnv
.It StreamLocalBindMask
.It StreamLocalBindUnlink
.It StrictHostKeyChecking
.It TCPKeepAlive
.It Tunnel
.It TunnelDevice
.It UpdateHostKeys
.It User
.It UserKnownHostsFile
.It VerifyHostKeyDNS
.It VisualHostKey
.It XAuthLocation
.El
.Pp
.It Fl p Ar port
Port to connect to on the remote host.
This can be specified on a
per-host basis in the configuration file.
.Pp
.It Fl Q Ar query_option
Queries
.Nm
for the algorithms supported for the specified version 2.
The available features are:
.Ar cipher
(supported symmetric ciphers),
.Ar cipher-auth
(supported symmetric ciphers that support authenticated encryption),
.Ar help
(supported query terms for use with the
.Fl Q
flag),
.Ar mac
(supported message integrity codes),
.Ar kex
(key exchange algorithms),
.Ar key
(key types),
.Ar key-cert
(certificate key types),
.Ar key-plain
(non-certificate key types),
.Ar key-sig
(all key types and signature algorithms),
.Ar protocol-version
(supported SSH protocol versions), and
.Ar sig
(supported signature algorithms).
Alternatively, any keyword from
.Xr ssh_config 5
or
.Xr sshd_config 5
that takes an algorithm list may be used as an alias for the corresponding
query_option.
.Pp
.It Fl q
Quiet mode.
Causes most warning and diagnostic messages to be suppressed.
.Pp
.It Fl R Xo
.Sm off
.Oo Ar bind_address : Oc
.Ar port : host : hostport
.Sm on
.Xc
.It Fl R Xo
.Sm off
.Oo Ar bind_address : Oc
.Ar port : local_socket
.Sm on
.Xc
.It Fl R Xo
.Sm off
.Ar remote_socket : host : hostport
.Sm on
.Xc
.It Fl R Xo
.Sm off
.Ar remote_socket : local_socket
.Sm on
.Xc
.It Fl R Xo
.Sm off
.Oo Ar bind_address : Oc
.Ar port
.Sm on
.Xc
Specifies that connections to the given TCP port or Unix socket on the remote
(server) host are to be forwarded to the local side.
.Pp
This works by allocating a socket to listen to either a TCP
.Ar port
or to a Unix socket on the remote side.
Whenever a connection is made to this port or Unix socket, the
connection is forwarded over the secure channel, and a connection
is made from the local machine to either an explicit destination specified by
.Ar host
port
.Ar hostport ,
or
.Ar local_socket ,
or, if no explicit destination was specified,
.Nm
will act as a SOCKS 4/5 proxy and forward connections to the destinations
requested by the remote SOCKS client.
.Pp
Port forwardings can also be specified in the configuration file.
Privileged ports can be forwarded only when
logging in as root on the remote machine.
IPv6 addresses can be specified by enclosing the address in square brackets.
.Pp
By default, TCP listening sockets on the server will be bound to the loopback
interface only.
This may be overridden by specifying a
.Ar bind_address .
An empty
.Ar bind_address ,
or the address
.Ql * ,
indicates that the remote socket should listen on all interfaces.
Specifying a remote
.Ar bind_address
will only succeed if the server's
.Cm GatewayPorts
option is enabled (see
.Xr sshd_config 5 ) .
.Pp
If the
.Ar port
argument is
.Ql 0 ,
the listen port will be dynamically allocated on the server and reported
to the client at run time.
When used together with
.Ic -O forward
the allocated port will be printed to the standard output.
.Pp
.It Fl S Ar ctl_path
Specifies the location of a control socket for connection sharing,
or the string
.Dq none
to disable connection sharing.
Refer to the description of
.Cm ControlPath
and
.Cm ControlMaster
in
.Xr ssh_config 5
for details.
.Pp
.It Fl s
May be used to request invocation of a subsystem on the remote system.
Subsystems facilitate the use of SSH
as a secure transport for other applications (e.g.\&
.Xr sftp 1 ) .
The subsystem is specified as the remote command.
.Pp
.It Fl T
Disable pseudo-terminal allocation.
.Pp
.It Fl t
Force pseudo-terminal allocation.
This can be used to execute arbitrary
screen-based programs on a remote machine, which can be very useful,
e.g. when implementing menu services.
Multiple
.Fl t
options force tty allocation, even if
.Nm
has no local tty.
.Pp
.It Fl V
Display the version number and exit.
.Pp
.It Fl v
Verbose mode.
Causes
.Nm
to print debugging messages about its progress.
This is helpful in
debugging connection, authentication, and configuration problems.
Multiple
.Fl v
options increase the verbosity.
The maximum is 3.
.Pp
.It Fl W Ar host : Ns Ar port
Requests that standard input and output on the client be forwarded to
.Ar host
on
.Ar port
over the secure channel.
Implies
.Fl N ,
.Fl T ,
.Cm ExitOnForwardFailure
and
.Cm ClearAllForwardings ,
though these can be overridden in the configuration file or using
.Fl o
command line options.
.Pp
.It Fl w Xo
.Ar local_tun Ns Op : Ns Ar remote_tun
.Xc
Requests
tunnel
device forwarding with the specified
.Xr tun 4
devices between the client
.Pq Ar local_tun
and the server
.Pq Ar remote_tun .
.Pp
The devices may be specified by numerical ID or the keyword
.Dq any ,
which uses the next available tunnel device.
If
.Ar remote_tun
is not specified, it defaults to
.Dq any .
See also the
.Cm Tunnel
and
.Cm TunnelDevice
directives in
.Xr ssh_config 5 .
.Pp
If the
.Cm Tunnel
directive is unset, it will be set to the default tunnel mode, which is
.Dq point-to-point .
If a different
.Cm Tunnel
forwarding mode it desired, then it should be specified before
.Fl w .
.Pp
.It Fl X
Enables X11 forwarding.
This can also be specified on a per-host basis in a configuration file.
.Pp
X11 forwarding should be enabled with caution.
Users with the ability to bypass file permissions on the remote host
(for the user's X authorization database)
can access the local X11 display through the forwarded connection.
An attacker may then be able to perform activities such as keystroke monitoring.
.Pp
For this reason, X11 forwarding is subjected to X11 SECURITY extension
restrictions by default.
Please refer to the
.Nm
.Fl Y
option and the
.Cm ForwardX11Trusted
directive in
.Xr ssh_config 5
for more information.
.Pp
.It Fl x
Disables X11 forwarding.
.Pp
.It Fl Y
Enables trusted X11 forwarding.
Trusted X11 forwardings are not subjected to the X11 SECURITY extension
controls.
.Pp
.It Fl y
Send log information using the
.Xr syslog 3
system module.
By default this information is sent to stderr.
.El
.Pp
.Nm
may additionally obtain configuration data from
a per-user configuration file and a system-wide configuration file.
The file format and configuration options are described in
.Xr ssh_config 5 .
.Sh AUTHENTICATION
The OpenSSH SSH client supports SSH protocol 2.
.Pp
The methods available for authentication are:
GSSAPI-based authentication,
host-based authentication,
public key authentication,
challenge-response authentication,
and password authentication.
Authentication methods are tried in the order specified above,
though
.Cm PreferredAuthentications
can be used to change the default order.
.Pp
Host-based authentication works as follows:
If the machine the user logs in from is listed in
.Pa /etc/hosts.equiv
or
.Pa /etc/shosts.equiv
on the remote machine, the user is non-root and the user names are
the same on both sides, or if the files
.Pa ~/.rhosts
or
.Pa ~/.shosts
exist in the user's home directory on the
remote machine and contain a line containing the name of the client
machine and the name of the user on that machine, the user is
considered for login.
Additionally, the server
.Em must
be able to verify the client's
host key (see the description of
.Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_known_hosts
and
.Pa ~/.ssh/known_hosts ,
below)
for login to be permitted.
This authentication method closes security holes due to IP
spoofing, DNS spoofing, and routing spoofing.
[Note to the administrator:
.Pa /etc/hosts.equiv ,
.Pa ~/.rhosts ,
and the rlogin/rsh protocol in general, are inherently insecure and should be
disabled if security is desired.]
.Pp
Public key authentication works as follows:
The scheme is based on public-key cryptography,
using cryptosystems
where encryption and decryption are done using separate keys,
and it is unfeasible to derive the decryption key from the encryption key.
The idea is that each user creates a public/private
key pair for authentication purposes.
The server knows the public key, and only the user knows the private key.
.Nm
implements public key authentication protocol automatically,
using one of the DSA, ECDSA, Ed25519 or RSA algorithms.
The HISTORY section of
.Xr ssl 8
contains a brief discussion of the DSA and RSA algorithms.
.Pp
The file
.Pa ~/.ssh/authorized_keys
lists the public keys that are permitted for logging in.
When the user logs in, the
.Nm
program tells the server which key pair it would like to use for
authentication.
The client proves that it has access to the private key
and the server checks that the corresponding public key
is authorized to accept the account.
.Pp
The server may inform the client of errors that prevented public key
authentication from succeeding after authentication completes using a
different method.
These may be viewed by increasing the
.Cm LogLevel
to
.Cm DEBUG
or higher (e.g. by using the
.Fl v
flag).
.Pp
The user creates his/her key pair by running
.Xr ssh-keygen 1 .
This stores the private key in
.Pa ~/.ssh/id_dsa
(DSA),
.Pa ~/.ssh/id_ecdsa
(ECDSA),
.Pa ~/.ssh/id_ecdsa_sk
(authenticator-hosted ECDSA),
.Pa ~/.ssh/id_ed25519
(Ed25519),
.Pa ~/.ssh/id_ed25519_sk
(authenticator-hosted Ed25519),
or
.Pa ~/.ssh/id_rsa
(RSA)
and stores the public key in
.Pa ~/.ssh/id_dsa.pub
(DSA),
.Pa ~/.ssh/id_ecdsa.pub
(ECDSA),
.Pa ~/.ssh/id_ecdsa_sk.pub
(authenticator-hosted ECDSA),
.Pa ~/.ssh/id_ed25519.pub
(Ed25519),
.Pa ~/.ssh/id_ed25519_sk.pub
(authenticator-hosted Ed25519),
or
.Pa ~/.ssh/id_rsa.pub
(RSA)
in the user's home directory.
The user should then copy the public key
to
.Pa ~/.ssh/authorized_keys
in his/her home directory on the remote machine.
The
.Pa authorized_keys
file corresponds to the conventional
.Pa ~/.rhosts
file, and has one key
per line, though the lines can be very long.
After this, the user can log in without giving the password.
.Pp
A variation on public key authentication
is available in the form of certificate authentication:
instead of a set of public/private keys,
signed certificates are used.
This has the advantage that a single trusted certification authority
can be used in place of many public/private keys.
See the CERTIFICATES section of
.Xr ssh-keygen 1
for more information.
.Pp
The most convenient way to use public key or certificate authentication
may be with an authentication agent.
See
.Xr ssh-agent 1
and (optionally) the
.Cm AddKeysToAgent
directive in
.Xr ssh_config 5
for more information.
.Pp
Challenge-response authentication works as follows:
The server sends an arbitrary
.Qq challenge
text, and prompts for a response.
Examples of challenge-response authentication include
.Bx
Authentication (see
.Xr login.conf 5 )
and PAM (some
.Pf non- Ox
systems).
.Pp
Finally, if other authentication methods fail,
.Nm
prompts the user for a password.
The password is sent to the remote
host for checking; however, since all communications are encrypted,
the password cannot be seen by someone listening on the network.
.Pp
.Nm
automatically maintains and checks a database containing
identification for all hosts it has ever been used with.
Host keys are stored in
.Pa ~/.ssh/known_hosts
in the user's home directory.
Additionally, the file
.Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_known_hosts
is automatically checked for known hosts.
Any new hosts are automatically added to the user's file.
If a host's identification ever changes,
.Nm
warns about this and disables password authentication to prevent
server spoofing or man-in-the-middle attacks,
which could otherwise be used to circumvent the encryption.
The
.Cm StrictHostKeyChecking
option can be used to control logins to machines whose
host key is not known or has changed.
.Pp
When the user's identity has been accepted by the server, the server
either executes the given command in a non-interactive session or,
if no command has been specified, logs into the machine and gives
the user a normal shell as an interactive session.
All communication with
the remote command or shell will be automatically encrypted.
.Pp
If an interactive session is requested
.Nm
by default will only request a pseudo-terminal (pty) for interactive
sessions when the client has one.
The flags
.Fl T
and
.Fl t
can be used to override this behaviour.
.Pp
If a pseudo-terminal has been allocated the
user may use the escape characters noted below.
.Pp
If no pseudo-terminal has been allocated,
the session is transparent and can be used to reliably transfer binary data.
On most systems, setting the escape character to
.Dq none
will also make the session transparent even if a tty is used.
.Pp
The session terminates when the command or shell on the remote
machine exits and all X11 and TCP connections have been closed.
.Sh ESCAPE CHARACTERS
When a pseudo-terminal has been requested,
.Nm
supports a number of functions through the use of an escape character.
.Pp
A single tilde character can be sent as
.Ic ~~
or by following the tilde by a character other than those described below.
The escape character must always follow a newline to be interpreted as
special.
The escape character can be changed in configuration files using the
.Cm EscapeChar
configuration directive or on the command line by the
.Fl e
option.
.Pp
The supported escapes (assuming the default
.Ql ~ )
are:
.Bl -tag -width Ds
.It Cm ~.
Disconnect.
.It Cm ~^Z
Background
.Nm .
.It Cm ~#
List forwarded connections.
.It Cm ~&
Background
.Nm
at logout when waiting for forwarded connection / X11 sessions to terminate.
.It Cm ~?
Display a list of escape characters.
.It Cm ~B
Send a BREAK to the remote system
(only useful if the peer supports it).
.It Cm ~C
Open command line.
Currently this allows the addition of port forwardings using the
.Fl L ,
.Fl R
and
.Fl D
options (see above).
It also allows the cancellation of existing port-forwardings
with
.Sm off
.Fl KL Oo Ar bind_address : Oc Ar port
.Sm on
for local,
.Sm off
.Fl KR Oo Ar bind_address : Oc Ar port
.Sm on
for remote and
.Sm off
.Fl KD Oo Ar bind_address : Oc Ar port
.Sm on
for dynamic port-forwardings.
.Ic !\& Ns Ar command
allows the user to execute a local command if the
.Ic PermitLocalCommand
option is enabled in
.Xr ssh_config 5 .
Basic help is available, using the
.Fl h
option.
.It Cm ~R
Request rekeying of the connection
(only useful if the peer supports it).
.It Cm ~V
Decrease the verbosity
.Pq Ic LogLevel
when errors are being written to stderr.
.It Cm ~v
Increase the verbosity
.Pq Ic LogLevel
when errors are being written to stderr.
.El
.Sh TCP FORWARDING
Forwarding of arbitrary TCP connections over a secure channel
can be specified either on the command line or in a configuration file.
One possible application of TCP forwarding is a secure connection to a
mail server; another is going through firewalls.
.Pp
In the example below, we look at encrypting communication for an IRC client,
even though the IRC server it connects to does not directly
support encrypted communication.
This works as follows:
the user connects to the remote host using
.Nm ,
specifying the ports to be used to forward the connection.
After that it is possible to start the program locally,
and
.Nm
will encrypt and forward the connection to the remote server.
.Pp
The following example tunnels an IRC session from the client
to an IRC server at
.Dq server.example.com ,
joining channel
.Dq #users ,
nickname
.Dq pinky ,
using the standard IRC port, 6667:
.Bd -literal -offset 4n
$ ssh -f -L 6667:localhost:6667 server.example.com sleep 10
$ irc -c '#users' pinky IRC/127.0.0.1
.Ed
.Pp
The
.Fl f
option backgrounds
.Nm
and the remote command
.Dq sleep 10
is specified to allow an amount of time
(10 seconds, in the example)
to start the program which is going to use the tunnel.
If no connections are made within the time specified,
.Nm
will exit.
.Sh X11 FORWARDING
If the
.Cm ForwardX11
variable is set to
.Dq yes
(or see the description of the
.Fl X ,
.Fl x ,
and
.Fl Y
options above)
and the user is using X11 (the
.Ev DISPLAY
environment variable is set), the connection to the X11 display is
automatically forwarded to the remote side in such a way that any X11
programs started from the shell (or command) will go through the
encrypted channel, and the connection to the real X server will be made
from the local machine.
The user should not manually set
.Ev DISPLAY .
Forwarding of X11 connections can be
configured on the command line or in configuration files.
.Pp
The
.Ev DISPLAY
value set by
.Nm
will point to the server machine, but with a display number greater than zero.
This is normal, and happens because
.Nm
creates a
.Dq proxy
X server on the server machine for forwarding the
connections over the encrypted channel.
.Pp
.Nm
will also automatically set up Xauthority data on the server machine.
For this purpose, it will generate a random authorization cookie,
store it in Xauthority on the server, and verify that any forwarded
connections carry this cookie and replace it by the real cookie when
the connection is opened.
The real authentication cookie is never
sent to the server machine (and no cookies are sent in the plain).
.Pp
If the
.Cm ForwardAgent
variable is set to
.Dq yes
(or see the description of the
.Fl A
and
.Fl a
options above) and
the user is using an authentication agent, the connection to the agent
is automatically forwarded to the remote side.
.Sh VERIFYING HOST KEYS
When connecting to a server for the first time,
a fingerprint of the server's public key is presented to the user
(unless the option
.Cm StrictHostKeyChecking
has been disabled).
Fingerprints can be determined using
.Xr ssh-keygen 1 :
.Pp
.Dl $ ssh-keygen -l -f /etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key
.Pp
If the fingerprint is already known, it can be matched
and the key can be accepted or rejected.
If only legacy (MD5) fingerprints for the server are available, the
.Xr ssh-keygen 1
.Fl E
option may be used to downgrade the fingerprint algorithm to match.
.Pp
Because of the difficulty of comparing host keys
just by looking at fingerprint strings,
there is also support to compare host keys visually,
using
.Em random art .
By setting the
.Cm VisualHostKey
option to
.Dq yes ,
a small ASCII graphic gets displayed on every login to a server, no matter
if the session itself is interactive or not.
By learning the pattern a known server produces, a user can easily
find out that the host key has changed when a completely different pattern
is displayed.
Because these patterns are not unambiguous however, a pattern that looks
similar to the pattern remembered only gives a good probability that the
host key is the same, not guaranteed proof.
.Pp
To get a listing of the fingerprints along with their random art for
all known hosts, the following command line can be used:
.Pp
.Dl $ ssh-keygen -lv -f ~/.ssh/known_hosts
.Pp
If the fingerprint is unknown,
an alternative method of verification is available:
SSH fingerprints verified by DNS.
An additional resource record (RR),
SSHFP,
is added to a zonefile
and the connecting client is able to match the fingerprint
with that of the key presented.
.Pp
In this example, we are connecting a client to a server,
.Dq host.example.com .
The SSHFP resource records should first be added to the zonefile for
host.example.com:
.Bd -literal -offset indent
$ ssh-keygen -r host.example.com.
.Ed
.Pp
The output lines will have to be added to the zonefile.
To check that the zone is answering fingerprint queries:
.Pp
.Dl $ dig -t SSHFP host.example.com
.Pp
Finally the client connects:
.Bd -literal -offset indent
$ ssh -o "VerifyHostKeyDNS ask" host.example.com
[...]
Matching host key fingerprint found in DNS.
Are you sure you want to continue connecting (yes/no)?
.Ed
.Pp
See the
.Cm VerifyHostKeyDNS
option in
.Xr ssh_config 5
for more information.
.Sh SSH-BASED VIRTUAL PRIVATE NETWORKS
.Nm
contains support for Virtual Private Network (VPN) tunnelling
using the
.Xr tun 4
network pseudo-device,
allowing two networks to be joined securely.
The
.Xr sshd_config 5
configuration option
.Cm PermitTunnel
controls whether the server supports this,
and at what level (layer 2 or 3 traffic).
.Pp
The following example would connect client network 10.0.50.0/24
with remote network 10.0.99.0/24 using a point-to-point connection
from 10.1.1.1 to 10.1.1.2,
provided that the SSH server running on the gateway to the remote network,
at 192.168.1.15, allows it.
.Pp
On the client:
.Bd -literal -offset indent
# ssh -f -w 0:1 192.168.1.15 true
# ifconfig tun0 10.1.1.1 10.1.1.2 netmask 255.255.255.252
# route add 10.0.99.0/24 10.1.1.2
.Ed
.Pp
On the server:
.Bd -literal -offset indent
# ifconfig tun1 10.1.1.2 10.1.1.1 netmask 255.255.255.252
# route add 10.0.50.0/24 10.1.1.1
.Ed
.Pp
Client access may be more finely tuned via the
.Pa /root/.ssh/authorized_keys
file (see below) and the
.Cm PermitRootLogin
server option.
The following entry would permit connections on
.Xr tun 4
device 1 from user
.Dq jane
and on tun device 2 from user
.Dq john ,
if
.Cm PermitRootLogin
is set to
.Dq forced-commands-only :
.Bd -literal -offset 2n
tunnel="1",command="sh /etc/netstart tun1" ssh-rsa ... jane
tunnel="2",command="sh /etc/netstart tun2" ssh-rsa ... john
.Ed
.Pp
Since an SSH-based setup entails a fair amount of overhead,
it may be more suited to temporary setups,
such as for wireless VPNs.
More permanent VPNs are better provided by tools such as
.Xr ipsecctl 8
and
.Xr isakmpd 8 .
.Sh ENVIRONMENT
.Nm
will normally set the following environment variables:
.Bl -tag -width "SSH_ORIGINAL_COMMAND"
.It Ev DISPLAY
The
.Ev DISPLAY
variable indicates the location of the X11 server.
It is automatically set by
.Nm
to point to a value of the form
.Dq hostname:n ,
where
.Dq hostname
indicates the host where the shell runs, and
.Sq n
is an integer \*(Ge 1.
.Nm
uses this special value to forward X11 connections over the secure
channel.
The user should normally not set
.Ev DISPLAY
explicitly, as that
will render the X11 connection insecure (and will require the user to
manually copy any required authorization cookies).
.It Ev HOME
Set to the path of the user's home directory.
.It Ev LOGNAME
Synonym for
.Ev USER ;
set for compatibility with systems that use this variable.
.It Ev MAIL
Set to the path of the user's mailbox.
.It Ev PATH
Set to the default
.Ev PATH ,
as specified when compiling
.Nm .
.It Ev SSH_ASKPASS
If
.Nm
needs a passphrase, it will read the passphrase from the current
terminal if it was run from a terminal.
If
.Nm
does not have a terminal associated with it but
.Ev DISPLAY
and
.Ev SSH_ASKPASS
are set, it will execute the program specified by
.Ev SSH_ASKPASS
and open an X11 window to read the passphrase.
This is particularly useful when calling
.Nm
from a
.Pa .xsession
or related script.
(Note that on some machines it
may be necessary to redirect the input from
.Pa /dev/null
to make this work.)
+.It Ev SSH_ASKPASS_REQUIRE
+Allows further control over the use of an askpass program.
+If this variable is set to
+.Dq never
+then
+.Nm
+will never attempt to use one.
+If it is set to
+.Dq prefer ,
+then
+.Nm
+will prefer to use the askpass program instead of the TTY when requesting
+passwords.
+Finally, if the variable is set to
+.Dq force ,
+then the askpass program will be used for all passphrase input regardless
+of whether
+.Ev DISPLAY
+is set.
.It Ev SSH_AUTH_SOCK
Identifies the path of a
.Ux Ns -domain
socket used to communicate with the agent.
.It Ev SSH_CONNECTION
Identifies the client and server ends of the connection.
The variable contains
four space-separated values: client IP address, client port number,
server IP address, and server port number.
.It Ev SSH_ORIGINAL_COMMAND
This variable contains the original command line if a forced command
is executed.
It can be used to extract the original arguments.
.It Ev SSH_TTY
This is set to the name of the tty (path to the device) associated
with the current shell or command.
If the current session has no tty,
this variable is not set.
.It Ev SSH_TUNNEL
Optionally set by
.Xr sshd 8
to contain the interface names assigned if tunnel forwarding was
requested by the client.
.It Ev SSH_USER_AUTH
Optionally set by
.Xr sshd 8 ,
this variable may contain a pathname to a file that lists the authentication
methods successfully used when the session was established, including any
public keys that were used.
.It Ev TZ
This variable is set to indicate the present time zone if it
was set when the daemon was started (i.e. the daemon passes the value
on to new connections).
.It Ev USER
Set to the name of the user logging in.
.El
.Pp
Additionally,
.Nm
reads
.Pa ~/.ssh/environment ,
and adds lines of the format
.Dq VARNAME=value
to the environment if the file exists and users are allowed to
change their environment.
For more information, see the
.Cm PermitUserEnvironment
option in
.Xr sshd_config 5 .
.Sh FILES
.Bl -tag -width Ds -compact
.It Pa ~/.rhosts
This file is used for host-based authentication (see above).
On some machines this file may need to be
world-readable if the user's home directory is on an NFS partition,
because
.Xr sshd 8
reads it as root.
Additionally, this file must be owned by the user,
and must not have write permissions for anyone else.
The recommended
permission for most machines is read/write for the user, and not
accessible by others.
.Pp
.It Pa ~/.shosts
This file is used in exactly the same way as
.Pa .rhosts ,
but allows host-based authentication without permitting login with
rlogin/rsh.
.Pp
.It Pa ~/.ssh/
This directory is the default location for all user-specific configuration
and authentication information.
There is no general requirement to keep the entire contents of this directory
secret, but the recommended permissions are read/write/execute for the user,
and not accessible by others.
.Pp
.It Pa ~/.ssh/authorized_keys
Lists the public keys (DSA, ECDSA, Ed25519, RSA)
that can be used for logging in as this user.
The format of this file is described in the
.Xr sshd 8
manual page.
This file is not highly sensitive, but the recommended
permissions are read/write for the user, and not accessible by others.
.Pp
.It Pa ~/.ssh/config
This is the per-user configuration file.
The file format and configuration options are described in
.Xr ssh_config 5 .
Because of the potential for abuse, this file must have strict permissions:
read/write for the user, and not writable by others.
.Pp
.It Pa ~/.ssh/environment
Contains additional definitions for environment variables; see
.Sx ENVIRONMENT ,
above.
.Pp
.It Pa ~/.ssh/id_dsa
.It Pa ~/.ssh/id_ecdsa
.It Pa ~/.ssh/id_ecdsa_sk
.It Pa ~/.ssh/id_ed25519
.It Pa ~/.ssh/id_ed25519_sk
.It Pa ~/.ssh/id_rsa
Contains the private key for authentication.
These files
contain sensitive data and should be readable by the user but not
accessible by others (read/write/execute).
.Nm
will simply ignore a private key file if it is accessible by others.
It is possible to specify a passphrase when
generating the key which will be used to encrypt the
sensitive part of this file using AES-128.
.Pp
.It Pa ~/.ssh/id_dsa.pub
.It Pa ~/.ssh/id_ecdsa.pub
.It Pa ~/.ssh/id_ecdsa_sk.pub
.It Pa ~/.ssh/id_ed25519.pub
.It Pa ~/.ssh/id_ed25519_sk.pub
.It Pa ~/.ssh/id_rsa.pub
Contains the public key for authentication.
These files are not
sensitive and can (but need not) be readable by anyone.
.Pp
.It Pa ~/.ssh/known_hosts
Contains a list of host keys for all hosts the user has logged into
that are not already in the systemwide list of known host keys.
See
.Xr sshd 8
for further details of the format of this file.
.Pp
.It Pa ~/.ssh/rc
Commands in this file are executed by
.Nm
when the user logs in, just before the user's shell (or command) is
started.
See the
.Xr sshd 8
manual page for more information.
.Pp
.It Pa /etc/hosts.equiv
This file is for host-based authentication (see above).
It should only be writable by root.
.Pp
.It Pa /etc/shosts.equiv
This file is used in exactly the same way as
.Pa hosts.equiv ,
but allows host-based authentication without permitting login with
rlogin/rsh.
.Pp
.It Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_config
Systemwide configuration file.
The file format and configuration options are described in
.Xr ssh_config 5 .
.Pp
.It Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_key
.It Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_dsa_key
.It Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ecdsa_key
.It Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ed25519_key
.It Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key
These files contain the private parts of the host keys
and are used for host-based authentication.
.Pp
.It Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_known_hosts
Systemwide list of known host keys.
This file should be prepared by the
system administrator to contain the public host keys of all machines in the
organization.
It should be world-readable.
See
.Xr sshd 8
for further details of the format of this file.
.Pp
.It Pa /etc/ssh/sshrc
Commands in this file are executed by
.Nm
when the user logs in, just before the user's shell (or command) is started.
See the
.Xr sshd 8
manual page for more information.
.El
.Sh EXIT STATUS
.Nm
exits with the exit status of the remote command or with 255
if an error occurred.
.Sh SEE ALSO
.Xr scp 1 ,
.Xr sftp 1 ,
.Xr ssh-add 1 ,
.Xr ssh-agent 1 ,
.Xr ssh-keygen 1 ,
.Xr ssh-keyscan 1 ,
.Xr tun 4 ,
.Xr ssh_config 5 ,
.Xr ssh-keysign 8 ,
.Xr sshd 8
.Sh STANDARDS
.Rs
.%A S. Lehtinen
.%A C. Lonvick
.%D January 2006
.%R RFC 4250
.%T The Secure Shell (SSH) Protocol Assigned Numbers
.Re
.Pp
.Rs
.%A T. Ylonen
.%A C. Lonvick
.%D January 2006
.%R RFC 4251
.%T The Secure Shell (SSH) Protocol Architecture
.Re
.Pp
.Rs
.%A T. Ylonen
.%A C. Lonvick
.%D January 2006
.%R RFC 4252
.%T The Secure Shell (SSH) Authentication Protocol
.Re
.Pp
.Rs
.%A T. Ylonen
.%A C. Lonvick
.%D January 2006
.%R RFC 4253
.%T The Secure Shell (SSH) Transport Layer Protocol
.Re
.Pp
.Rs
.%A T. Ylonen
.%A C. Lonvick
.%D January 2006
.%R RFC 4254
.%T The Secure Shell (SSH) Connection Protocol
.Re
.Pp
.Rs
.%A J. Schlyter
.%A W. Griffin
.%D January 2006
.%R RFC 4255
.%T Using DNS to Securely Publish Secure Shell (SSH) Key Fingerprints
.Re
.Pp
.Rs
.%A F. Cusack
.%A M. Forssen
.%D January 2006
.%R RFC 4256
.%T Generic Message Exchange Authentication for the Secure Shell Protocol (SSH)
.Re
.Pp
.Rs
.%A J. Galbraith
.%A P. Remaker
.%D January 2006
.%R RFC 4335
.%T The Secure Shell (SSH) Session Channel Break Extension
.Re
.Pp
.Rs
.%A M. Bellare
.%A T. Kohno
.%A C. Namprempre
.%D January 2006
.%R RFC 4344
.%T The Secure Shell (SSH) Transport Layer Encryption Modes
.Re
.Pp
.Rs
.%A B. Harris
.%D January 2006
.%R RFC 4345
.%T Improved Arcfour Modes for the Secure Shell (SSH) Transport Layer Protocol
.Re
.Pp
.Rs
.%A M. Friedl
.%A N. Provos
.%A W. Simpson
.%D March 2006
.%R RFC 4419
.%T Diffie-Hellman Group Exchange for the Secure Shell (SSH) Transport Layer Protocol
.Re
.Pp
.Rs
.%A J. Galbraith
.%A R. Thayer
.%D November 2006
.%R RFC 4716
.%T The Secure Shell (SSH) Public Key File Format
.Re
.Pp
.Rs
.%A D. Stebila
.%A J. Green
.%D December 2009
.%R RFC 5656
.%T Elliptic Curve Algorithm Integration in the Secure Shell Transport Layer
.Re
.Pp
.Rs
.%A A. Perrig
.%A D. Song
.%D 1999
.%O International Workshop on Cryptographic Techniques and E-Commerce (CrypTEC '99)
.%T Hash Visualization: a New Technique to improve Real-World Security
.Re
.Sh AUTHORS
OpenSSH is a derivative of the original and free
ssh 1.2.12 release by Tatu Ylonen.
Aaron Campbell, Bob Beck, Markus Friedl, Niels Provos,
Theo de Raadt and Dug Song
removed many bugs, re-added newer features and
created OpenSSH.
Markus Friedl contributed the support for SSH
protocol versions 1.5 and 2.0.
diff --git a/ssh.c b/ssh.c
index 98b6ce788a81..f34ca0d71c4d 100644
--- a/ssh.c
+++ b/ssh.c
@@ -1,2308 +1,2356 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: ssh.c,v 1.527 2020/04/10 00:52:07 dtucker Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: ssh.c,v 1.536 2020/09/21 07:29:09 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
* Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
* All rights reserved
* Ssh client program. This program can be used to log into a remote machine.
* The software supports strong authentication, encryption, and forwarding
* of X11, TCP/IP, and authentication connections.
*
* As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
* can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this
* software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
* incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
* called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
*
* Copyright (c) 1999 Niels Provos. All rights reserved.
* Copyright (c) 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
*
- * Modified to work with SSL by Niels Provos <provos@citi.umich.edu>
+ * Modified to work with SSLeay by Niels Provos <provos@citi.umich.edu>
* in Canada (German citizen).
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
* OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
* IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
* INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
* NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
* DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
* THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
* (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
* THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
*/
#include "includes.h"
#include <sys/types.h>
#ifdef HAVE_SYS_STAT_H
# include <sys/stat.h>
#endif
#include <sys/resource.h>
#include <sys/ioctl.h>
#include <sys/socket.h>
#include <sys/wait.h>
#include <ctype.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <netdb.h>
#ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H
#include <paths.h>
#endif
#include <pwd.h>
#include <signal.h>
#include <stdarg.h>
#include <stddef.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <stdarg.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <limits.h>
#include <locale.h>
#include <netinet/in.h>
#include <arpa/inet.h>
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
#include <openssl/evp.h>
#include <openssl/err.h>
#endif
#include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h"
#include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h"
#include "xmalloc.h"
#include "ssh.h"
#include "ssh2.h"
#include "canohost.h"
#include "compat.h"
#include "cipher.h"
#include "packet.h"
#include "sshbuf.h"
#include "channels.h"
#include "sshkey.h"
#include "authfd.h"
#include "authfile.h"
#include "pathnames.h"
#include "dispatch.h"
#include "clientloop.h"
#include "log.h"
#include "misc.h"
#include "readconf.h"
#include "sshconnect.h"
#include "kex.h"
#include "mac.h"
#include "sshpty.h"
#include "match.h"
#include "msg.h"
#include "version.h"
#include "ssherr.h"
#include "myproposal.h"
#include "utf8.h"
#ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11
#include "ssh-pkcs11.h"
#endif
extern char *__progname;
/* Saves a copy of argv for setproctitle emulation */
#ifndef HAVE_SETPROCTITLE
static char **saved_av;
#endif
/* Flag indicating whether debug mode is on. May be set on the command line. */
int debug_flag = 0;
/* Flag indicating whether a tty should be requested */
int tty_flag = 0;
/* don't exec a shell */
int no_shell_flag = 0;
/*
* Flag indicating that nothing should be read from stdin. This can be set
* on the command line.
*/
int stdin_null_flag = 0;
/*
* Flag indicating that the current process should be backgrounded and
- * a new slave launched in the foreground for ControlPersist.
+ * a new mux-client launched in the foreground for ControlPersist.
*/
int need_controlpersist_detach = 0;
-/* Copies of flags for ControlPersist foreground slave */
+/* Copies of flags for ControlPersist foreground mux-client */
int ostdin_null_flag, ono_shell_flag, otty_flag, orequest_tty;
/*
* Flag indicating that ssh should fork after authentication. This is useful
* so that the passphrase can be entered manually, and then ssh goes to the
* background.
*/
int fork_after_authentication_flag = 0;
/*
* General data structure for command line options and options configurable
* in configuration files. See readconf.h.
*/
Options options;
/* optional user configfile */
char *config = NULL;
/*
* Name of the host we are connecting to. This is the name given on the
* command line, or the Hostname specified for the user-supplied name in a
* configuration file.
*/
char *host;
/*
* A config can specify a path to forward, overriding SSH_AUTH_SOCK. If this is
* not NULL, forward the socket at this path instead.
*/
char *forward_agent_sock_path = NULL;
/* Various strings used to to percent_expand() arguments */
static char thishost[NI_MAXHOST], shorthost[NI_MAXHOST], portstr[NI_MAXSERV];
static char uidstr[32], *host_arg, *conn_hash_hex;
+static const char *keyalias;
/* socket address the host resolves to */
struct sockaddr_storage hostaddr;
/* Private host keys. */
Sensitive sensitive_data;
/* command to be executed */
struct sshbuf *command;
/* Should we execute a command or invoke a subsystem? */
int subsystem_flag = 0;
/* # of replies received for global requests */
static int forward_confirms_pending = -1;
/* mux.c */
extern int muxserver_sock;
extern u_int muxclient_command;
/* Prints a help message to the user. This function never returns. */
static void
usage(void)
{
fprintf(stderr,
"usage: ssh [-46AaCfGgKkMNnqsTtVvXxYy] [-B bind_interface]\n"
" [-b bind_address] [-c cipher_spec] [-D [bind_address:]port]\n"
" [-E log_file] [-e escape_char] [-F configfile] [-I pkcs11]\n"
" [-i identity_file] [-J [user@]host[:port]] [-L address]\n"
" [-l login_name] [-m mac_spec] [-O ctl_cmd] [-o option] [-p port]\n"
" [-Q query_option] [-R address] [-S ctl_path] [-W host:port]\n"
" [-w local_tun[:remote_tun]] destination [command]\n"
);
exit(255);
}
static int ssh_session2(struct ssh *, struct passwd *);
static void load_public_identity_files(struct passwd *);
static void main_sigchld_handler(int);
/* ~/ expand a list of paths. NB. assumes path[n] is heap-allocated. */
static void
tilde_expand_paths(char **paths, u_int num_paths)
{
u_int i;
char *cp;
for (i = 0; i < num_paths; i++) {
cp = tilde_expand_filename(paths[i], getuid());
free(paths[i]);
paths[i] = cp;
}
}
#define DEFAULT_CLIENT_PERCENT_EXPAND_ARGS \
"C", conn_hash_hex, \
"L", shorthost, \
"i", uidstr, \
+ "k", keyalias, \
"l", thishost, \
"n", host_arg, \
"p", portstr
/*
* Expands the set of percent_expand options used by the majority of keywords
* in the client that support percent expansion.
* Caller must free returned string.
*/
static char *
default_client_percent_expand(const char *str, const char *homedir,
const char *remhost, const char *remuser, const char *locuser)
{
return percent_expand(str,
/* values from statics above */
DEFAULT_CLIENT_PERCENT_EXPAND_ARGS,
/* values from arguments */
"d", homedir,
"h", remhost,
"r", remuser,
"u", locuser,
(char *)NULL);
}
+/*
+ * Expands the set of percent_expand options used by the majority of keywords
+ * AND perform environment variable substitution.
+ * Caller must free returned string.
+ */
+static char *
+default_client_percent_dollar_expand(const char *str, const char *homedir,
+ const char *remhost, const char *remuser, const char *locuser)
+{
+ char *ret;
+
+ ret = percent_dollar_expand(str,
+ /* values from statics above */
+ DEFAULT_CLIENT_PERCENT_EXPAND_ARGS,
+ /* values from arguments */
+ "d", homedir,
+ "h", remhost,
+ "r", remuser,
+ "u", locuser,
+ (char *)NULL);
+ if (ret == NULL)
+ fatal("invalid environment variable expansion");
+ return ret;
+}
+
/*
* Attempt to resolve a host name / port to a set of addresses and
* optionally return any CNAMEs encountered along the way.
* Returns NULL on failure.
* NB. this function must operate with a options having undefined members.
*/
static struct addrinfo *
resolve_host(const char *name, int port, int logerr, char *cname, size_t clen)
{
char strport[NI_MAXSERV];
struct addrinfo hints, *res;
int gaierr;
LogLevel loglevel = SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG1;
if (port <= 0)
port = default_ssh_port();
if (cname != NULL)
*cname = '\0';
snprintf(strport, sizeof strport, "%d", port);
memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints));
hints.ai_family = options.address_family == -1 ?
AF_UNSPEC : options.address_family;
hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM;
if (cname != NULL)
hints.ai_flags = AI_CANONNAME;
if ((gaierr = getaddrinfo(name, strport, &hints, &res)) != 0) {
if (logerr || (gaierr != EAI_NONAME && gaierr != EAI_NODATA))
loglevel = SYSLOG_LEVEL_ERROR;
do_log2(loglevel, "%s: Could not resolve hostname %.100s: %s",
__progname, name, ssh_gai_strerror(gaierr));
return NULL;
}
if (cname != NULL && res->ai_canonname != NULL) {
if (strlcpy(cname, res->ai_canonname, clen) >= clen) {
error("%s: host \"%s\" cname \"%s\" too long (max %lu)",
__func__, name, res->ai_canonname, (u_long)clen);
if (clen > 0)
*cname = '\0';
}
}
return res;
}
/* Returns non-zero if name can only be an address and not a hostname */
static int
is_addr_fast(const char *name)
{
return (strchr(name, '%') != NULL || strchr(name, ':') != NULL ||
strspn(name, "0123456789.") == strlen(name));
}
/* Returns non-zero if name represents a valid, single address */
static int
is_addr(const char *name)
{
char strport[NI_MAXSERV];
struct addrinfo hints, *res;
if (is_addr_fast(name))
return 1;
snprintf(strport, sizeof strport, "%u", default_ssh_port());
memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints));
hints.ai_family = options.address_family == -1 ?
AF_UNSPEC : options.address_family;
hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM;
hints.ai_flags = AI_NUMERICHOST|AI_NUMERICSERV;
if (getaddrinfo(name, strport, &hints, &res) != 0)
return 0;
if (res == NULL || res->ai_next != NULL) {
freeaddrinfo(res);
return 0;
}
freeaddrinfo(res);
return 1;
}
/*
* Attempt to resolve a numeric host address / port to a single address.
* Returns a canonical address string.
* Returns NULL on failure.
* NB. this function must operate with a options having undefined members.
*/
static struct addrinfo *
resolve_addr(const char *name, int port, char *caddr, size_t clen)
{
char addr[NI_MAXHOST], strport[NI_MAXSERV];
struct addrinfo hints, *res;
int gaierr;
if (port <= 0)
port = default_ssh_port();
snprintf(strport, sizeof strport, "%u", port);
memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints));
hints.ai_family = options.address_family == -1 ?
AF_UNSPEC : options.address_family;
hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM;
hints.ai_flags = AI_NUMERICHOST|AI_NUMERICSERV;
if ((gaierr = getaddrinfo(name, strport, &hints, &res)) != 0) {
debug2("%s: could not resolve name %.100s as address: %s",
__func__, name, ssh_gai_strerror(gaierr));
return NULL;
}
if (res == NULL) {
debug("%s: getaddrinfo %.100s returned no addresses",
__func__, name);
return NULL;
}
if (res->ai_next != NULL) {
debug("%s: getaddrinfo %.100s returned multiple addresses",
__func__, name);
goto fail;
}
if ((gaierr = getnameinfo(res->ai_addr, res->ai_addrlen,
addr, sizeof(addr), NULL, 0, NI_NUMERICHOST)) != 0) {
debug("%s: Could not format address for name %.100s: %s",
__func__, name, ssh_gai_strerror(gaierr));
goto fail;
}
if (strlcpy(caddr, addr, clen) >= clen) {
error("%s: host \"%s\" addr \"%s\" too long (max %lu)",
__func__, name, addr, (u_long)clen);
if (clen > 0)
*caddr = '\0';
fail:
freeaddrinfo(res);
return NULL;
}
return res;
}
/*
* Check whether the cname is a permitted replacement for the hostname
* and perform the replacement if it is.
* NB. this function must operate with a options having undefined members.
*/
static int
check_follow_cname(int direct, char **namep, const char *cname)
{
int i;
struct allowed_cname *rule;
if (*cname == '\0' || options.num_permitted_cnames == 0 ||
strcmp(*namep, cname) == 0)
return 0;
if (options.canonicalize_hostname == SSH_CANONICALISE_NO)
return 0;
/*
* Don't attempt to canonicalize names that will be interpreted by
* a proxy or jump host unless the user specifically requests so.
*/
if (!direct &&
options.canonicalize_hostname != SSH_CANONICALISE_ALWAYS)
return 0;
debug3("%s: check \"%s\" CNAME \"%s\"", __func__, *namep, cname);
for (i = 0; i < options.num_permitted_cnames; i++) {
rule = options.permitted_cnames + i;
if (match_pattern_list(*namep, rule->source_list, 1) != 1 ||
match_pattern_list(cname, rule->target_list, 1) != 1)
continue;
verbose("Canonicalized DNS aliased hostname "
"\"%s\" => \"%s\"", *namep, cname);
free(*namep);
*namep = xstrdup(cname);
return 1;
}
return 0;
}
/*
* Attempt to resolve the supplied hostname after applying the user's
* canonicalization rules. Returns the address list for the host or NULL
* if no name was found after canonicalization.
* NB. this function must operate with a options having undefined members.
*/
static struct addrinfo *
resolve_canonicalize(char **hostp, int port)
{
int i, direct, ndots;
char *cp, *fullhost, newname[NI_MAXHOST];
struct addrinfo *addrs;
/*
* Attempt to canonicalise addresses, regardless of
* whether hostname canonicalisation was requested
*/
if ((addrs = resolve_addr(*hostp, port,
newname, sizeof(newname))) != NULL) {
debug2("%s: hostname %.100s is address", __func__, *hostp);
if (strcasecmp(*hostp, newname) != 0) {
debug2("%s: canonicalised address \"%s\" => \"%s\"",
__func__, *hostp, newname);
free(*hostp);
*hostp = xstrdup(newname);
}
return addrs;
}
/*
* If this looks like an address but didn't parse as one, it might
* be an address with an invalid interface scope. Skip further
* attempts at canonicalisation.
*/
if (is_addr_fast(*hostp)) {
debug("%s: hostname %.100s is an unrecognised address",
__func__, *hostp);
return NULL;
}
if (options.canonicalize_hostname == SSH_CANONICALISE_NO)
return NULL;
/*
* Don't attempt to canonicalize names that will be interpreted by
* a proxy unless the user specifically requests so.
*/
direct = option_clear_or_none(options.proxy_command) &&
options.jump_host == NULL;
if (!direct &&
options.canonicalize_hostname != SSH_CANONICALISE_ALWAYS)
return NULL;
/* If domain name is anchored, then resolve it now */
if ((*hostp)[strlen(*hostp) - 1] == '.') {
debug3("%s: name is fully qualified", __func__);
fullhost = xstrdup(*hostp);
if ((addrs = resolve_host(fullhost, port, 0,
newname, sizeof(newname))) != NULL)
goto found;
free(fullhost);
goto notfound;
}
/* Don't apply canonicalization to sufficiently-qualified hostnames */
ndots = 0;
for (cp = *hostp; *cp != '\0'; cp++) {
if (*cp == '.')
ndots++;
}
if (ndots > options.canonicalize_max_dots) {
debug3("%s: not canonicalizing hostname \"%s\" (max dots %d)",
__func__, *hostp, options.canonicalize_max_dots);
return NULL;
}
/* Attempt each supplied suffix */
for (i = 0; i < options.num_canonical_domains; i++) {
xasprintf(&fullhost, "%s.%s.", *hostp,
options.canonical_domains[i]);
debug3("%s: attempting \"%s\" => \"%s\"", __func__,
*hostp, fullhost);
if ((addrs = resolve_host(fullhost, port, 0,
newname, sizeof(newname))) == NULL) {
free(fullhost);
continue;
}
found:
/* Remove trailing '.' */
fullhost[strlen(fullhost) - 1] = '\0';
/* Follow CNAME if requested */
if (!check_follow_cname(direct, &fullhost, newname)) {
debug("Canonicalized hostname \"%s\" => \"%s\"",
*hostp, fullhost);
}
free(*hostp);
*hostp = fullhost;
return addrs;
}
notfound:
if (!options.canonicalize_fallback_local)
fatal("%s: Could not resolve host \"%s\"", __progname, *hostp);
debug2("%s: host %s not found in any suffix", __func__, *hostp);
return NULL;
}
/*
* Check the result of hostkey loading, ignoring some errors and
* fatal()ing for others.
*/
static void
check_load(int r, const char *path, const char *message)
{
switch (r) {
case 0:
break;
case SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR:
case SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL:
fatal("load %s \"%s\": %s", message, path, ssh_err(r));
case SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR:
/* Ignore missing files */
if (errno == ENOENT)
break;
/* FALLTHROUGH */
default:
error("load %s \"%s\": %s", message, path, ssh_err(r));
break;
}
}
/*
* Read per-user configuration file. Ignore the system wide config
* file if the user specifies a config file on the command line.
*/
static void
process_config_files(const char *host_name, struct passwd *pw, int final_pass,
int *want_final_pass)
{
char buf[PATH_MAX];
int r;
if (config != NULL) {
if (strcasecmp(config, "none") != 0 &&
!read_config_file(config, pw, host, host_name, &options,
SSHCONF_USERCONF | (final_pass ? SSHCONF_FINAL : 0),
want_final_pass))
fatal("Can't open user config file %.100s: "
"%.100s", config, strerror(errno));
} else {
r = snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "%s/%s", pw->pw_dir,
_PATH_SSH_USER_CONFFILE);
if (r > 0 && (size_t)r < sizeof(buf))
(void)read_config_file(buf, pw, host, host_name,
&options, SSHCONF_CHECKPERM | SSHCONF_USERCONF |
(final_pass ? SSHCONF_FINAL : 0), want_final_pass);
/* Read systemwide configuration file after user config. */
(void)read_config_file(_PATH_HOST_CONFIG_FILE, pw,
host, host_name, &options,
final_pass ? SSHCONF_FINAL : 0, want_final_pass);
}
}
/* Rewrite the port number in an addrinfo list of addresses */
static void
set_addrinfo_port(struct addrinfo *addrs, int port)
{
struct addrinfo *addr;
for (addr = addrs; addr != NULL; addr = addr->ai_next) {
switch (addr->ai_family) {
case AF_INET:
((struct sockaddr_in *)addr->ai_addr)->
sin_port = htons(port);
break;
case AF_INET6:
((struct sockaddr_in6 *)addr->ai_addr)->
sin6_port = htons(port);
break;
}
}
}
/*
* Main program for the ssh client.
*/
int
main(int ac, char **av)
{
struct ssh *ssh = NULL;
int i, r, opt, exit_status, use_syslog, direct, timeout_ms;
int was_addr, config_test = 0, opt_terminated = 0, want_final_pass = 0;
- char *p, *cp, *line, *argv0, buf[PATH_MAX], *logfile;
+ char *p, *cp, *line, *argv0, *logfile;
char cname[NI_MAXHOST];
struct stat st;
struct passwd *pw;
extern int optind, optreset;
extern char *optarg;
struct Forward fwd;
struct addrinfo *addrs = NULL;
size_t n, len;
+ u_int j;
/* Ensure that fds 0, 1 and 2 are open or directed to /dev/null */
sanitise_stdfd();
__progname = ssh_get_progname(av[0]);
#ifndef HAVE_SETPROCTITLE
/* Prepare for later setproctitle emulation */
/* Save argv so it isn't clobbered by setproctitle() emulation */
saved_av = xcalloc(ac + 1, sizeof(*saved_av));
for (i = 0; i < ac; i++)
saved_av[i] = xstrdup(av[i]);
saved_av[i] = NULL;
compat_init_setproctitle(ac, av);
av = saved_av;
#endif
seed_rng();
/*
* Discard other fds that are hanging around. These can cause problem
* with backgrounded ssh processes started by ControlPersist.
*/
closefrom(STDERR_FILENO + 1);
/* Get user data. */
pw = getpwuid(getuid());
if (!pw) {
logit("No user exists for uid %lu", (u_long)getuid());
exit(255);
}
/* Take a copy of the returned structure. */
pw = pwcopy(pw);
/*
* Set our umask to something reasonable, as some files are created
* with the default umask. This will make them world-readable but
* writable only by the owner, which is ok for all files for which we
* don't set the modes explicitly.
*/
umask(022);
msetlocale();
/*
* Initialize option structure to indicate that no values have been
* set.
*/
initialize_options(&options);
/*
* Prepare main ssh transport/connection structures
*/
if ((ssh = ssh_alloc_session_state()) == NULL)
fatal("Couldn't allocate session state");
channel_init_channels(ssh);
/* Parse command-line arguments. */
host = NULL;
use_syslog = 0;
logfile = NULL;
argv0 = av[0];
again:
while ((opt = getopt(ac, av, "1246ab:c:e:fgi:kl:m:no:p:qstvx"
"AB:CD:E:F:GI:J:KL:MNO:PQ:R:S:TVw:W:XYy")) != -1) {
switch (opt) {
case '1':
fatal("SSH protocol v.1 is no longer supported");
break;
case '2':
/* Ignored */
break;
case '4':
options.address_family = AF_INET;
break;
case '6':
options.address_family = AF_INET6;
break;
case 'n':
stdin_null_flag = 1;
break;
case 'f':
fork_after_authentication_flag = 1;
stdin_null_flag = 1;
break;
case 'x':
options.forward_x11 = 0;
break;
case 'X':
options.forward_x11 = 1;
break;
case 'y':
use_syslog = 1;
break;
case 'E':
logfile = optarg;
break;
case 'G':
config_test = 1;
break;
case 'Y':
options.forward_x11 = 1;
options.forward_x11_trusted = 1;
break;
case 'g':
options.fwd_opts.gateway_ports = 1;
break;
case 'O':
if (options.stdio_forward_host != NULL)
fatal("Cannot specify multiplexing "
"command with -W");
else if (muxclient_command != 0)
fatal("Multiplexing command already specified");
if (strcmp(optarg, "check") == 0)
muxclient_command = SSHMUX_COMMAND_ALIVE_CHECK;
else if (strcmp(optarg, "forward") == 0)
muxclient_command = SSHMUX_COMMAND_FORWARD;
else if (strcmp(optarg, "exit") == 0)
muxclient_command = SSHMUX_COMMAND_TERMINATE;
else if (strcmp(optarg, "stop") == 0)
muxclient_command = SSHMUX_COMMAND_STOP;
else if (strcmp(optarg, "cancel") == 0)
muxclient_command = SSHMUX_COMMAND_CANCEL_FWD;
else if (strcmp(optarg, "proxy") == 0)
muxclient_command = SSHMUX_COMMAND_PROXY;
else
fatal("Invalid multiplex command.");
break;
case 'P': /* deprecated */
break;
case 'Q':
cp = NULL;
if (strcmp(optarg, "cipher") == 0 ||
strcasecmp(optarg, "Ciphers") == 0)
cp = cipher_alg_list('\n', 0);
else if (strcmp(optarg, "cipher-auth") == 0)
cp = cipher_alg_list('\n', 1);
else if (strcmp(optarg, "mac") == 0 ||
strcasecmp(optarg, "MACs") == 0)
cp = mac_alg_list('\n');
else if (strcmp(optarg, "kex") == 0 ||
strcasecmp(optarg, "KexAlgorithms") == 0)
cp = kex_alg_list('\n');
else if (strcmp(optarg, "key") == 0)
cp = sshkey_alg_list(0, 0, 0, '\n');
else if (strcmp(optarg, "key-cert") == 0)
cp = sshkey_alg_list(1, 0, 0, '\n');
else if (strcmp(optarg, "key-plain") == 0)
cp = sshkey_alg_list(0, 1, 0, '\n');
else if (strcmp(optarg, "key-sig") == 0 ||
strcasecmp(optarg, "PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes") == 0 ||
strcasecmp(optarg, "HostKeyAlgorithms") == 0 ||
strcasecmp(optarg, "HostbasedKeyTypes") == 0 ||
strcasecmp(optarg, "HostbasedAcceptedKeyTypes") == 0)
cp = sshkey_alg_list(0, 0, 1, '\n');
else if (strcmp(optarg, "sig") == 0)
cp = sshkey_alg_list(0, 1, 1, '\n');
else if (strcmp(optarg, "protocol-version") == 0)
cp = xstrdup("2");
else if (strcmp(optarg, "compression") == 0) {
cp = xstrdup(compression_alg_list(0));
len = strlen(cp);
for (n = 0; n < len; n++)
if (cp[n] == ',')
cp[n] = '\n';
} else if (strcmp(optarg, "help") == 0) {
cp = xstrdup(
"cipher\ncipher-auth\ncompression\nkex\n"
"key\nkey-cert\nkey-plain\nkey-sig\nmac\n"
"protocol-version\nsig");
}
if (cp == NULL)
fatal("Unsupported query \"%s\"", optarg);
printf("%s\n", cp);
free(cp);
exit(0);
break;
case 'a':
options.forward_agent = 0;
break;
case 'A':
options.forward_agent = 1;
break;
case 'k':
options.gss_deleg_creds = 0;
break;
case 'K':
options.gss_authentication = 1;
options.gss_deleg_creds = 1;
break;
case 'i':
p = tilde_expand_filename(optarg, getuid());
if (stat(p, &st) == -1)
fprintf(stderr, "Warning: Identity file %s "
"not accessible: %s.\n", p,
strerror(errno));
else
add_identity_file(&options, NULL, p, 1);
free(p);
break;
case 'I':
#ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11
free(options.pkcs11_provider);
options.pkcs11_provider = xstrdup(optarg);
#else
fprintf(stderr, "no support for PKCS#11.\n");
#endif
break;
case 'J':
if (options.jump_host != NULL) {
fatal("Only a single -J option is permitted "
"(use commas to separate multiple "
"jump hops)");
}
if (options.proxy_command != NULL)
fatal("Cannot specify -J with ProxyCommand");
if (parse_jump(optarg, &options, 1) == -1)
fatal("Invalid -J argument");
options.proxy_command = xstrdup("none");
break;
case 't':
if (options.request_tty == REQUEST_TTY_YES)
options.request_tty = REQUEST_TTY_FORCE;
else
options.request_tty = REQUEST_TTY_YES;
break;
case 'v':
if (debug_flag == 0) {
debug_flag = 1;
options.log_level = SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG1;
} else {
if (options.log_level < SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG3) {
debug_flag++;
options.log_level++;
}
}
break;
case 'V':
fprintf(stderr, "%s, %s\n",
SSH_RELEASE,
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
OpenSSL_version(OPENSSL_VERSION)
#else
"without OpenSSL"
#endif
);
if (opt == 'V')
exit(0);
break;
case 'w':
if (options.tun_open == -1)
options.tun_open = SSH_TUNMODE_DEFAULT;
options.tun_local = a2tun(optarg, &options.tun_remote);
if (options.tun_local == SSH_TUNID_ERR) {
fprintf(stderr,
"Bad tun device '%s'\n", optarg);
exit(255);
}
break;
case 'W':
if (options.stdio_forward_host != NULL)
fatal("stdio forward already specified");
if (muxclient_command != 0)
fatal("Cannot specify stdio forward with -O");
if (parse_forward(&fwd, optarg, 1, 0)) {
options.stdio_forward_host = fwd.listen_host;
options.stdio_forward_port = fwd.listen_port;
free(fwd.connect_host);
} else {
fprintf(stderr,
"Bad stdio forwarding specification '%s'\n",
optarg);
exit(255);
}
options.request_tty = REQUEST_TTY_NO;
no_shell_flag = 1;
break;
case 'q':
options.log_level = SYSLOG_LEVEL_QUIET;
break;
case 'e':
if (optarg[0] == '^' && optarg[2] == 0 &&
(u_char) optarg[1] >= 64 &&
(u_char) optarg[1] < 128)
options.escape_char = (u_char) optarg[1] & 31;
else if (strlen(optarg) == 1)
options.escape_char = (u_char) optarg[0];
else if (strcmp(optarg, "none") == 0)
options.escape_char = SSH_ESCAPECHAR_NONE;
else {
fprintf(stderr, "Bad escape character '%s'.\n",
optarg);
exit(255);
}
break;
case 'c':
if (!ciphers_valid(*optarg == '+' || *optarg == '^' ?
optarg + 1 : optarg)) {
fprintf(stderr, "Unknown cipher type '%s'\n",
optarg);
exit(255);
}
free(options.ciphers);
options.ciphers = xstrdup(optarg);
break;
case 'm':
if (mac_valid(optarg)) {
free(options.macs);
options.macs = xstrdup(optarg);
} else {
fprintf(stderr, "Unknown mac type '%s'\n",
optarg);
exit(255);
}
break;
case 'M':
if (options.control_master == SSHCTL_MASTER_YES)
options.control_master = SSHCTL_MASTER_ASK;
else
options.control_master = SSHCTL_MASTER_YES;
break;
case 'p':
if (options.port == -1) {
options.port = a2port(optarg);
if (options.port <= 0) {
fprintf(stderr, "Bad port '%s'\n",
optarg);
exit(255);
}
}
break;
case 'l':
if (options.user == NULL)
options.user = optarg;
break;
case 'L':
if (parse_forward(&fwd, optarg, 0, 0))
add_local_forward(&options, &fwd);
else {
fprintf(stderr,
"Bad local forwarding specification '%s'\n",
optarg);
exit(255);
}
break;
case 'R':
if (parse_forward(&fwd, optarg, 0, 1) ||
parse_forward(&fwd, optarg, 1, 1)) {
add_remote_forward(&options, &fwd);
} else {
fprintf(stderr,
"Bad remote forwarding specification "
"'%s'\n", optarg);
exit(255);
}
break;
case 'D':
if (parse_forward(&fwd, optarg, 1, 0)) {
add_local_forward(&options, &fwd);
} else {
fprintf(stderr,
"Bad dynamic forwarding specification "
"'%s'\n", optarg);
exit(255);
}
break;
case 'C':
#ifdef WITH_ZLIB
options.compression = 1;
#else
error("Compression not supported, disabling.");
#endif
break;
case 'N':
no_shell_flag = 1;
options.request_tty = REQUEST_TTY_NO;
break;
case 'T':
options.request_tty = REQUEST_TTY_NO;
break;
case 'o':
line = xstrdup(optarg);
if (process_config_line(&options, pw,
host ? host : "", host ? host : "", line,
"command-line", 0, NULL, SSHCONF_USERCONF) != 0)
exit(255);
free(line);
break;
case 's':
subsystem_flag = 1;
break;
case 'S':
free(options.control_path);
options.control_path = xstrdup(optarg);
break;
case 'b':
options.bind_address = optarg;
break;
case 'B':
options.bind_interface = optarg;
break;
case 'F':
config = optarg;
break;
default:
usage();
}
}
if (optind > 1 && strcmp(av[optind - 1], "--") == 0)
opt_terminated = 1;
ac -= optind;
av += optind;
if (ac > 0 && !host) {
int tport;
char *tuser;
switch (parse_ssh_uri(*av, &tuser, &host, &tport)) {
case -1:
usage();
break;
case 0:
if (options.user == NULL) {
options.user = tuser;
tuser = NULL;
}
free(tuser);
if (options.port == -1 && tport != -1)
options.port = tport;
break;
default:
p = xstrdup(*av);
cp = strrchr(p, '@');
if (cp != NULL) {
if (cp == p)
usage();
if (options.user == NULL) {
options.user = p;
p = NULL;
}
*cp++ = '\0';
host = xstrdup(cp);
free(p);
} else
host = p;
break;
}
if (ac > 1 && !opt_terminated) {
optind = optreset = 1;
goto again;
}
ac--, av++;
}
/* Check that we got a host name. */
if (!host)
usage();
host_arg = xstrdup(host);
/* Initialize the command to execute on remote host. */
if ((command = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
fatal("sshbuf_new failed");
/*
* Save the command to execute on the remote host in a buffer. There
* is no limit on the length of the command, except by the maximum
* packet size. Also sets the tty flag if there is no command.
*/
if (!ac) {
/* No command specified - execute shell on a tty. */
if (subsystem_flag) {
fprintf(stderr,
"You must specify a subsystem to invoke.\n");
usage();
}
} else {
/* A command has been specified. Store it into the buffer. */
for (i = 0; i < ac; i++) {
if ((r = sshbuf_putf(command, "%s%s",
i ? " " : "", av[i])) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s",
__func__, ssh_err(r));
}
}
/*
* Initialize "log" output. Since we are the client all output
* goes to stderr unless otherwise specified by -y or -E.
*/
if (use_syslog && logfile != NULL)
fatal("Can't specify both -y and -E");
if (logfile != NULL)
log_redirect_stderr_to(logfile);
log_init(argv0,
options.log_level == SYSLOG_LEVEL_NOT_SET ?
SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO : options.log_level,
options.log_facility == SYSLOG_FACILITY_NOT_SET ?
SYSLOG_FACILITY_USER : options.log_facility,
!use_syslog);
if (debug_flag)
logit("%s, %s", SSH_RELEASE,
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
OpenSSL_version(OPENSSL_VERSION)
#else
"without OpenSSL"
#endif
);
/* Parse the configuration files */
process_config_files(host_arg, pw, 0, &want_final_pass);
if (want_final_pass)
debug("configuration requests final Match pass");
/* Hostname canonicalisation needs a few options filled. */
fill_default_options_for_canonicalization(&options);
/* If the user has replaced the hostname then take it into use now */
if (options.hostname != NULL) {
/* NB. Please keep in sync with readconf.c:match_cfg_line() */
cp = percent_expand(options.hostname,
"h", host, (char *)NULL);
free(host);
host = cp;
free(options.hostname);
options.hostname = xstrdup(host);
}
/* Don't lowercase addresses, they will be explicitly canonicalised */
if ((was_addr = is_addr(host)) == 0)
lowercase(host);
/*
* Try to canonicalize if requested by configuration or the
* hostname is an address.
*/
if (options.canonicalize_hostname != SSH_CANONICALISE_NO || was_addr)
addrs = resolve_canonicalize(&host, options.port);
/*
* If CanonicalizePermittedCNAMEs have been specified but
* other canonicalization did not happen (by not being requested
* or by failing with fallback) then the hostname may still be changed
* as a result of CNAME following.
*
* Try to resolve the bare hostname name using the system resolver's
* usual search rules and then apply the CNAME follow rules.
*
* Skip the lookup if a ProxyCommand is being used unless the user
* has specifically requested canonicalisation for this case via
* CanonicalizeHostname=always
*/
direct = option_clear_or_none(options.proxy_command) &&
options.jump_host == NULL;
if (addrs == NULL && options.num_permitted_cnames != 0 && (direct ||
options.canonicalize_hostname == SSH_CANONICALISE_ALWAYS)) {
if ((addrs = resolve_host(host, options.port,
direct, cname, sizeof(cname))) == NULL) {
/* Don't fatal proxied host names not in the DNS */
if (direct)
cleanup_exit(255); /* logged in resolve_host */
} else
check_follow_cname(direct, &host, cname);
}
/*
* If canonicalisation is enabled then re-parse the configuration
* files as new stanzas may match.
*/
if (options.canonicalize_hostname != 0 && !want_final_pass) {
debug("hostname canonicalisation enabled, "
"will re-parse configuration");
want_final_pass = 1;
}
if (want_final_pass) {
debug("re-parsing configuration");
free(options.hostname);
options.hostname = xstrdup(host);
process_config_files(host_arg, pw, 1, NULL);
/*
* Address resolution happens early with canonicalisation
* enabled and the port number may have changed since, so
* reset it in address list
*/
if (addrs != NULL && options.port > 0)
set_addrinfo_port(addrs, options.port);
}
/* Fill configuration defaults. */
fill_default_options(&options);
+ if (options.user == NULL)
+ options.user = xstrdup(pw->pw_name);
+
/*
* If ProxyJump option specified, then construct a ProxyCommand now.
*/
if (options.jump_host != NULL) {
char port_s[8];
- const char *sshbin = argv0;
+ const char *jumpuser = options.jump_user, *sshbin = argv0;
int port = options.port, jumpport = options.jump_port;
if (port <= 0)
port = default_ssh_port();
if (jumpport <= 0)
jumpport = default_ssh_port();
- if (strcmp(options.jump_host, host) == 0 && port == jumpport)
+ if (jumpuser == NULL)
+ jumpuser = options.user;
+ if (strcmp(options.jump_host, host) == 0 && port == jumpport &&
+ strcmp(options.user, jumpuser) == 0)
fatal("jumphost loop via %s", options.jump_host);
/*
* Try to use SSH indicated by argv[0], but fall back to
* "ssh" if it appears unavailable.
*/
if (strchr(argv0, '/') != NULL && access(argv0, X_OK) != 0)
sshbin = "ssh";
/* Consistency check */
if (options.proxy_command != NULL)
fatal("inconsistent options: ProxyCommand+ProxyJump");
/* Never use FD passing for ProxyJump */
options.proxy_use_fdpass = 0;
snprintf(port_s, sizeof(port_s), "%d", options.jump_port);
xasprintf(&options.proxy_command,
"%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%.*s -W '[%%h]:%%p' %s",
sshbin,
/* Optional "-l user" argument if jump_user set */
options.jump_user == NULL ? "" : " -l ",
options.jump_user == NULL ? "" : options.jump_user,
/* Optional "-p port" argument if jump_port set */
options.jump_port <= 0 ? "" : " -p ",
options.jump_port <= 0 ? "" : port_s,
/* Optional additional jump hosts ",..." */
options.jump_extra == NULL ? "" : " -J ",
options.jump_extra == NULL ? "" : options.jump_extra,
/* Optional "-F" argumment if -F specified */
config == NULL ? "" : " -F ",
config == NULL ? "" : config,
/* Optional "-v" arguments if -v set */
debug_flag ? " -" : "",
debug_flag, "vvv",
/* Mandatory hostname */
options.jump_host);
debug("Setting implicit ProxyCommand from ProxyJump: %s",
options.proxy_command);
}
if (options.port == 0)
options.port = default_ssh_port();
channel_set_af(ssh, options.address_family);
/* Tidy and check options */
if (options.host_key_alias != NULL)
lowercase(options.host_key_alias);
if (options.proxy_command != NULL &&
strcmp(options.proxy_command, "-") == 0 &&
options.proxy_use_fdpass)
fatal("ProxyCommand=- and ProxyUseFDPass are incompatible");
if (options.update_hostkeys == SSH_UPDATE_HOSTKEYS_ASK) {
if (options.control_persist && options.control_path != NULL) {
debug("UpdateHostKeys=ask is incompatible with "
"ControlPersist; disabling");
options.update_hostkeys = 0;
} else if (sshbuf_len(command) != 0 ||
options.remote_command != NULL ||
options.request_tty == REQUEST_TTY_NO) {
debug("UpdateHostKeys=ask is incompatible with "
"remote command execution; disabling");
options.update_hostkeys = 0;
} else if (options.log_level < SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO) {
/* no point logging anything; user won't see it */
options.update_hostkeys = 0;
}
}
if (options.connection_attempts <= 0)
fatal("Invalid number of ConnectionAttempts");
if (sshbuf_len(command) != 0 && options.remote_command != NULL)
fatal("Cannot execute command-line and remote command.");
/* Cannot fork to background if no command. */
if (fork_after_authentication_flag && sshbuf_len(command) == 0 &&
options.remote_command == NULL && !no_shell_flag)
fatal("Cannot fork into background without a command "
"to execute.");
/* reinit */
log_init(argv0, options.log_level, options.log_facility, !use_syslog);
if (options.request_tty == REQUEST_TTY_YES ||
options.request_tty == REQUEST_TTY_FORCE)
tty_flag = 1;
/* Allocate a tty by default if no command specified. */
if (sshbuf_len(command) == 0 && options.remote_command == NULL)
tty_flag = options.request_tty != REQUEST_TTY_NO;
/* Force no tty */
if (options.request_tty == REQUEST_TTY_NO ||
(muxclient_command && muxclient_command != SSHMUX_COMMAND_PROXY))
tty_flag = 0;
/* Do not allocate a tty if stdin is not a tty. */
if ((!isatty(fileno(stdin)) || stdin_null_flag) &&
options.request_tty != REQUEST_TTY_FORCE) {
if (tty_flag)
logit("Pseudo-terminal will not be allocated because "
"stdin is not a terminal.");
tty_flag = 0;
}
- if (options.user == NULL)
- options.user = xstrdup(pw->pw_name);
-
/* Set up strings used to percent_expand() arguments */
if (gethostname(thishost, sizeof(thishost)) == -1)
fatal("gethostname: %s", strerror(errno));
strlcpy(shorthost, thishost, sizeof(shorthost));
shorthost[strcspn(thishost, ".")] = '\0';
snprintf(portstr, sizeof(portstr), "%d", options.port);
snprintf(uidstr, sizeof(uidstr), "%llu",
(unsigned long long)pw->pw_uid);
+ keyalias = options.host_key_alias ? options.host_key_alias : host_arg;
conn_hash_hex = ssh_connection_hash(thishost, host, portstr,
options.user);
/*
* Expand tokens in arguments. NB. LocalCommand is expanded later,
* after port-forwarding is set up, so it may pick up any local
* tunnel interface name allocated.
*/
if (options.remote_command != NULL) {
debug3("expanding RemoteCommand: %s", options.remote_command);
cp = options.remote_command;
options.remote_command = default_client_percent_expand(cp,
pw->pw_dir, host, options.user, pw->pw_name);
debug3("expanded RemoteCommand: %s", options.remote_command);
free(cp);
if ((r = sshbuf_put(command, options.remote_command,
strlen(options.remote_command))) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
}
if (options.control_path != NULL) {
cp = tilde_expand_filename(options.control_path, getuid());
free(options.control_path);
- options.control_path = default_client_percent_expand(cp,
+ options.control_path = default_client_percent_dollar_expand(cp,
pw->pw_dir, host, options.user, pw->pw_name);
free(cp);
}
if (options.identity_agent != NULL) {
p = tilde_expand_filename(options.identity_agent, getuid());
- cp = default_client_percent_expand(p,
+ cp = default_client_percent_dollar_expand(p,
pw->pw_dir, host, options.user, pw->pw_name);
free(p);
free(options.identity_agent);
options.identity_agent = cp;
}
if (options.forward_agent_sock_path != NULL) {
p = tilde_expand_filename(options.forward_agent_sock_path,
getuid());
- cp = default_client_percent_expand(p,
+ cp = default_client_percent_dollar_expand(p,
pw->pw_dir, host, options.user, pw->pw_name);
free(p);
free(options.forward_agent_sock_path);
options.forward_agent_sock_path = cp;
}
+ for (j = 0; j < options.num_user_hostfiles; j++) {
+ if (options.user_hostfiles[j] != NULL) {
+ cp = tilde_expand_filename(options.user_hostfiles[j],
+ getuid());
+ p = default_client_percent_dollar_expand(cp,
+ pw->pw_dir, host, options.user, pw->pw_name);
+ if (strcmp(options.user_hostfiles[j], p) != 0)
+ debug3("expanded UserKnownHostsFile '%s' -> "
+ "'%s'", options.user_hostfiles[j], p);
+ free(options.user_hostfiles[j]);
+ free(cp);
+ options.user_hostfiles[j] = p;
+ }
+ }
+
for (i = 0; i < options.num_local_forwards; i++) {
if (options.local_forwards[i].listen_path != NULL) {
cp = options.local_forwards[i].listen_path;
p = options.local_forwards[i].listen_path =
default_client_percent_expand(cp,
pw->pw_dir, host, options.user, pw->pw_name);
if (strcmp(cp, p) != 0)
debug3("expanded LocalForward listen path "
"'%s' -> '%s'", cp, p);
free(cp);
}
if (options.local_forwards[i].connect_path != NULL) {
cp = options.local_forwards[i].connect_path;
p = options.local_forwards[i].connect_path =
default_client_percent_expand(cp,
pw->pw_dir, host, options.user, pw->pw_name);
if (strcmp(cp, p) != 0)
debug3("expanded LocalForward connect path "
"'%s' -> '%s'", cp, p);
free(cp);
}
}
for (i = 0; i < options.num_remote_forwards; i++) {
if (options.remote_forwards[i].listen_path != NULL) {
cp = options.remote_forwards[i].listen_path;
p = options.remote_forwards[i].listen_path =
default_client_percent_expand(cp,
pw->pw_dir, host, options.user, pw->pw_name);
if (strcmp(cp, p) != 0)
debug3("expanded RemoteForward listen path "
"'%s' -> '%s'", cp, p);
free(cp);
}
if (options.remote_forwards[i].connect_path != NULL) {
cp = options.remote_forwards[i].connect_path;
p = options.remote_forwards[i].connect_path =
default_client_percent_expand(cp,
pw->pw_dir, host, options.user, pw->pw_name);
if (strcmp(cp, p) != 0)
debug3("expanded RemoteForward connect path "
"'%s' -> '%s'", cp, p);
free(cp);
}
}
if (config_test) {
dump_client_config(&options, host);
exit(0);
}
/* Expand SecurityKeyProvider if it refers to an environment variable */
if (options.sk_provider != NULL && *options.sk_provider == '$' &&
strlen(options.sk_provider) > 1) {
if ((cp = getenv(options.sk_provider + 1)) == NULL) {
debug("Authenticator provider %s did not resolve; "
"disabling", options.sk_provider);
free(options.sk_provider);
options.sk_provider = NULL;
} else {
debug2("resolved SecurityKeyProvider %s => %s",
options.sk_provider, cp);
free(options.sk_provider);
options.sk_provider = xstrdup(cp);
}
}
if (muxclient_command != 0 && options.control_path == NULL)
fatal("No ControlPath specified for \"-O\" command");
if (options.control_path != NULL) {
int sock;
if ((sock = muxclient(options.control_path)) >= 0) {
ssh_packet_set_connection(ssh, sock, sock);
ssh_packet_set_mux(ssh);
goto skip_connect;
}
}
/*
* If hostname canonicalisation was not enabled, then we may not
* have yet resolved the hostname. Do so now.
*/
if (addrs == NULL && options.proxy_command == NULL) {
debug2("resolving \"%s\" port %d", host, options.port);
if ((addrs = resolve_host(host, options.port, 1,
cname, sizeof(cname))) == NULL)
cleanup_exit(255); /* resolve_host logs the error */
}
timeout_ms = options.connection_timeout * 1000;
/* Open a connection to the remote host. */
if (ssh_connect(ssh, host, host_arg, addrs, &hostaddr, options.port,
options.address_family, options.connection_attempts,
&timeout_ms, options.tcp_keep_alive) != 0)
exit(255);
if (addrs != NULL)
freeaddrinfo(addrs);
ssh_packet_set_timeout(ssh, options.server_alive_interval,
options.server_alive_count_max);
if (timeout_ms > 0)
debug3("timeout: %d ms remain after connect", timeout_ms);
/*
* If we successfully made the connection and we have hostbased auth
* enabled, load the public keys so we can later use the ssh-keysign
* helper to sign challenges.
*/
sensitive_data.nkeys = 0;
sensitive_data.keys = NULL;
if (options.hostbased_authentication) {
sensitive_data.nkeys = 10;
sensitive_data.keys = xcalloc(sensitive_data.nkeys,
sizeof(struct sshkey));
/* XXX check errors? */
#define L_PUBKEY(p,o) do { \
if ((o) >= sensitive_data.nkeys) \
fatal("%s pubkey out of array bounds", __func__); \
check_load(sshkey_load_public(p, &(sensitive_data.keys[o]), NULL), \
p, "pubkey"); \
} while (0)
#define L_CERT(p,o) do { \
if ((o) >= sensitive_data.nkeys) \
fatal("%s cert out of array bounds", __func__); \
check_load(sshkey_load_cert(p, &(sensitive_data.keys[o])), p, "cert"); \
} while (0)
if (options.hostbased_authentication == 1) {
L_CERT(_PATH_HOST_ECDSA_KEY_FILE, 0);
L_CERT(_PATH_HOST_ED25519_KEY_FILE, 1);
L_CERT(_PATH_HOST_RSA_KEY_FILE, 2);
L_CERT(_PATH_HOST_DSA_KEY_FILE, 3);
L_PUBKEY(_PATH_HOST_ECDSA_KEY_FILE, 4);
L_PUBKEY(_PATH_HOST_ED25519_KEY_FILE, 5);
L_PUBKEY(_PATH_HOST_RSA_KEY_FILE, 6);
L_PUBKEY(_PATH_HOST_DSA_KEY_FILE, 7);
L_CERT(_PATH_HOST_XMSS_KEY_FILE, 8);
L_PUBKEY(_PATH_HOST_XMSS_KEY_FILE, 9);
}
}
- /* Create ~/.ssh * directory if it doesn't already exist. */
- if (config == NULL) {
- r = snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "%s%s%s", pw->pw_dir,
- strcmp(pw->pw_dir, "/") ? "/" : "", _PATH_SSH_USER_DIR);
- if (r > 0 && (size_t)r < sizeof(buf) && stat(buf, &st) == -1) {
-#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
- ssh_selinux_setfscreatecon(buf);
-#endif
- if (mkdir(buf, 0700) < 0)
- error("Could not create directory '%.200s'.",
- buf);
-#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
- ssh_selinux_setfscreatecon(NULL);
-#endif
- }
- }
/* load options.identity_files */
load_public_identity_files(pw);
/* optionally set the SSH_AUTHSOCKET_ENV_NAME variable */
if (options.identity_agent &&
strcmp(options.identity_agent, SSH_AUTHSOCKET_ENV_NAME) != 0) {
if (strcmp(options.identity_agent, "none") == 0) {
unsetenv(SSH_AUTHSOCKET_ENV_NAME);
} else {
cp = options.identity_agent;
- if (cp[0] == '$') {
+ /* legacy (limited) format */
+ if (cp[0] == '$' && cp[1] != '{') {
if (!valid_env_name(cp + 1)) {
fatal("Invalid IdentityAgent "
"environment variable name %s", cp);
}
if ((p = getenv(cp + 1)) == NULL)
unsetenv(SSH_AUTHSOCKET_ENV_NAME);
else
setenv(SSH_AUTHSOCKET_ENV_NAME, p, 1);
} else {
/* identity_agent specifies a path directly */
setenv(SSH_AUTHSOCKET_ENV_NAME, cp, 1);
}
}
}
if (options.forward_agent && options.forward_agent_sock_path != NULL) {
cp = options.forward_agent_sock_path;
if (cp[0] == '$') {
if (!valid_env_name(cp + 1)) {
fatal("Invalid ForwardAgent environment variable name %s", cp);
}
if ((p = getenv(cp + 1)) != NULL)
forward_agent_sock_path = p;
else
options.forward_agent = 0;
free(cp);
} else {
forward_agent_sock_path = cp;
}
}
/* Expand ~ in known host file names. */
tilde_expand_paths(options.system_hostfiles,
options.num_system_hostfiles);
tilde_expand_paths(options.user_hostfiles, options.num_user_hostfiles);
ssh_signal(SIGPIPE, SIG_IGN); /* ignore SIGPIPE early */
ssh_signal(SIGCHLD, main_sigchld_handler);
/* Log into the remote system. Never returns if the login fails. */
ssh_login(ssh, &sensitive_data, host, (struct sockaddr *)&hostaddr,
options.port, pw, timeout_ms);
if (ssh_packet_connection_is_on_socket(ssh)) {
verbose("Authenticated to %s ([%s]:%d).", host,
ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), ssh_remote_port(ssh));
} else {
verbose("Authenticated to %s (via proxy).", host);
}
/* We no longer need the private host keys. Clear them now. */
if (sensitive_data.nkeys != 0) {
for (i = 0; i < sensitive_data.nkeys; i++) {
if (sensitive_data.keys[i] != NULL) {
/* Destroys contents safely */
debug3("clear hostkey %d", i);
sshkey_free(sensitive_data.keys[i]);
sensitive_data.keys[i] = NULL;
}
}
free(sensitive_data.keys);
}
for (i = 0; i < options.num_identity_files; i++) {
free(options.identity_files[i]);
options.identity_files[i] = NULL;
if (options.identity_keys[i]) {
sshkey_free(options.identity_keys[i]);
options.identity_keys[i] = NULL;
}
}
for (i = 0; i < options.num_certificate_files; i++) {
free(options.certificate_files[i]);
options.certificate_files[i] = NULL;
}
skip_connect:
exit_status = ssh_session2(ssh, pw);
ssh_packet_close(ssh);
if (options.control_path != NULL && muxserver_sock != -1)
unlink(options.control_path);
/* Kill ProxyCommand if it is running. */
ssh_kill_proxy_command();
return exit_status;
}
static void
control_persist_detach(void)
{
pid_t pid;
int devnull, keep_stderr;
debug("%s: backgrounding master process", __func__);
/*
* master (current process) into the background, and make the
* foreground process a client of the backgrounded master.
*/
switch ((pid = fork())) {
case -1:
fatal("%s: fork: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
case 0:
/* Child: master process continues mainloop */
break;
default:
- /* Parent: set up mux slave to connect to backgrounded master */
+ /* Parent: set up mux client to connect to backgrounded master */
debug2("%s: background process is %ld", __func__, (long)pid);
stdin_null_flag = ostdin_null_flag;
options.request_tty = orequest_tty;
tty_flag = otty_flag;
close(muxserver_sock);
muxserver_sock = -1;
options.control_master = SSHCTL_MASTER_NO;
muxclient(options.control_path);
/* muxclient() doesn't return on success. */
fatal("Failed to connect to new control master");
}
if ((devnull = open(_PATH_DEVNULL, O_RDWR)) == -1) {
error("%s: open(\"/dev/null\"): %s", __func__,
strerror(errno));
} else {
keep_stderr = log_is_on_stderr() && debug_flag;
if (dup2(devnull, STDIN_FILENO) == -1 ||
dup2(devnull, STDOUT_FILENO) == -1 ||
(!keep_stderr && dup2(devnull, STDERR_FILENO) == -1))
error("%s: dup2: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
if (devnull > STDERR_FILENO)
close(devnull);
}
daemon(1, 1);
setproctitle("%s [mux]", options.control_path);
}
/* Do fork() after authentication. Used by "ssh -f" */
static void
fork_postauth(void)
{
+ int devnull, keep_stderr;
+
if (need_controlpersist_detach)
control_persist_detach();
debug("forking to background");
fork_after_authentication_flag = 0;
if (daemon(1, 1) == -1)
fatal("daemon() failed: %.200s", strerror(errno));
+ if ((devnull = open(_PATH_DEVNULL, O_WRONLY)) == -1)
+ error("%s: open %s: %s", __func__,
+ _PATH_DEVNULL, strerror(errno));
+ else {
+ keep_stderr = log_is_on_stderr() && debug_flag;
+ if (dup2(devnull, STDIN_FILENO) == -1 ||
+ dup2(devnull, STDOUT_FILENO) == -1 ||
+ (!keep_stderr && dup2(devnull, STDOUT_FILENO) == -1))
+ fatal("%s: dup2() stdio failed", __func__);
+ if (devnull > STDERR_FILENO)
+ close(devnull);
+ }
}
static void
forwarding_success(void)
{
if (forward_confirms_pending == -1)
return;
if (--forward_confirms_pending == 0) {
debug("%s: all expected forwarding replies received", __func__);
if (fork_after_authentication_flag)
fork_postauth();
} else {
debug2("%s: %d expected forwarding replies remaining",
__func__, forward_confirms_pending);
}
}
/* Callback for remote forward global requests */
static void
ssh_confirm_remote_forward(struct ssh *ssh, int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
{
struct Forward *rfwd = (struct Forward *)ctxt;
u_int port;
int r;
/* XXX verbose() on failure? */
debug("remote forward %s for: listen %s%s%d, connect %s:%d",
type == SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_SUCCESS ? "success" : "failure",
rfwd->listen_path ? rfwd->listen_path :
rfwd->listen_host ? rfwd->listen_host : "",
(rfwd->listen_path || rfwd->listen_host) ? ":" : "",
rfwd->listen_port, rfwd->connect_path ? rfwd->connect_path :
rfwd->connect_host, rfwd->connect_port);
if (rfwd->listen_path == NULL && rfwd->listen_port == 0) {
if (type == SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_SUCCESS) {
if ((r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &port)) != 0)
fatal("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
if (port > 65535) {
error("Invalid allocated port %u for remote "
"forward to %s:%d", port,
rfwd->connect_host, rfwd->connect_port);
/* Ensure failure processing runs below */
type = SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_FAILURE;
channel_update_permission(ssh,
rfwd->handle, -1);
} else {
rfwd->allocated_port = (int)port;
logit("Allocated port %u for remote "
"forward to %s:%d",
rfwd->allocated_port, rfwd->connect_host,
rfwd->connect_port);
channel_update_permission(ssh,
rfwd->handle, rfwd->allocated_port);
}
} else {
channel_update_permission(ssh, rfwd->handle, -1);
}
}
if (type == SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_FAILURE) {
if (options.exit_on_forward_failure) {
if (rfwd->listen_path != NULL)
fatal("Error: remote port forwarding failed "
"for listen path %s", rfwd->listen_path);
else
fatal("Error: remote port forwarding failed "
"for listen port %d", rfwd->listen_port);
} else {
if (rfwd->listen_path != NULL)
logit("Warning: remote port forwarding failed "
"for listen path %s", rfwd->listen_path);
else
logit("Warning: remote port forwarding failed "
"for listen port %d", rfwd->listen_port);
}
}
forwarding_success();
}
static void
client_cleanup_stdio_fwd(struct ssh *ssh, int id, void *arg)
{
debug("stdio forwarding: done");
cleanup_exit(0);
}
static void
ssh_stdio_confirm(struct ssh *ssh, int id, int success, void *arg)
{
if (!success)
fatal("stdio forwarding failed");
}
static void
ssh_tun_confirm(struct ssh *ssh, int id, int success, void *arg)
{
if (!success) {
error("Tunnel forwarding failed");
if (options.exit_on_forward_failure)
cleanup_exit(255);
}
debug("%s: tunnel forward established, id=%d", __func__, id);
forwarding_success();
}
static void
ssh_init_stdio_forwarding(struct ssh *ssh)
{
Channel *c;
int in, out;
if (options.stdio_forward_host == NULL)
return;
debug3("%s: %s:%d", __func__, options.stdio_forward_host,
options.stdio_forward_port);
if ((in = dup(STDIN_FILENO)) == -1 ||
(out = dup(STDOUT_FILENO)) == -1)
fatal("channel_connect_stdio_fwd: dup() in/out failed");
if ((c = channel_connect_stdio_fwd(ssh, options.stdio_forward_host,
options.stdio_forward_port, in, out)) == NULL)
fatal("%s: channel_connect_stdio_fwd failed", __func__);
channel_register_cleanup(ssh, c->self, client_cleanup_stdio_fwd, 0);
channel_register_open_confirm(ssh, c->self, ssh_stdio_confirm, NULL);
}
static void
ssh_init_forwarding(struct ssh *ssh, char **ifname)
{
int success = 0;
int i;
if (options.exit_on_forward_failure)
forward_confirms_pending = 0; /* track pending requests */
/* Initiate local TCP/IP port forwardings. */
for (i = 0; i < options.num_local_forwards; i++) {
debug("Local connections to %.200s:%d forwarded to remote "
"address %.200s:%d",
(options.local_forwards[i].listen_path != NULL) ?
options.local_forwards[i].listen_path :
(options.local_forwards[i].listen_host == NULL) ?
(options.fwd_opts.gateway_ports ? "*" : "LOCALHOST") :
options.local_forwards[i].listen_host,
options.local_forwards[i].listen_port,
(options.local_forwards[i].connect_path != NULL) ?
options.local_forwards[i].connect_path :
options.local_forwards[i].connect_host,
options.local_forwards[i].connect_port);
success += channel_setup_local_fwd_listener(ssh,
&options.local_forwards[i], &options.fwd_opts);
}
if (i > 0 && success != i && options.exit_on_forward_failure)
fatal("Could not request local forwarding.");
if (i > 0 && success == 0)
error("Could not request local forwarding.");
/* Initiate remote TCP/IP port forwardings. */
for (i = 0; i < options.num_remote_forwards; i++) {
debug("Remote connections from %.200s:%d forwarded to "
"local address %.200s:%d",
(options.remote_forwards[i].listen_path != NULL) ?
options.remote_forwards[i].listen_path :
(options.remote_forwards[i].listen_host == NULL) ?
"LOCALHOST" : options.remote_forwards[i].listen_host,
options.remote_forwards[i].listen_port,
(options.remote_forwards[i].connect_path != NULL) ?
options.remote_forwards[i].connect_path :
options.remote_forwards[i].connect_host,
options.remote_forwards[i].connect_port);
if ((options.remote_forwards[i].handle =
channel_request_remote_forwarding(ssh,
&options.remote_forwards[i])) >= 0) {
client_register_global_confirm(
ssh_confirm_remote_forward,
&options.remote_forwards[i]);
forward_confirms_pending++;
} else if (options.exit_on_forward_failure)
fatal("Could not request remote forwarding.");
else
logit("Warning: Could not request remote forwarding.");
}
/* Initiate tunnel forwarding. */
if (options.tun_open != SSH_TUNMODE_NO) {
if ((*ifname = client_request_tun_fwd(ssh,
options.tun_open, options.tun_local,
options.tun_remote, ssh_tun_confirm, NULL)) != NULL)
forward_confirms_pending++;
else if (options.exit_on_forward_failure)
fatal("Could not request tunnel forwarding.");
else
error("Could not request tunnel forwarding.");
}
if (forward_confirms_pending > 0) {
debug("%s: expecting replies for %d forwards", __func__,
forward_confirms_pending);
}
}
static void
check_agent_present(void)
{
int r;
if (options.forward_agent) {
/* Clear agent forwarding if we don't have an agent. */
if ((r = ssh_get_authentication_socket(NULL)) != 0) {
options.forward_agent = 0;
if (r != SSH_ERR_AGENT_NOT_PRESENT)
debug("ssh_get_authentication_socket: %s",
ssh_err(r));
}
}
}
static void
ssh_session2_setup(struct ssh *ssh, int id, int success, void *arg)
{
extern char **environ;
const char *display;
int r, interactive = tty_flag;
char *proto = NULL, *data = NULL;
if (!success)
return; /* No need for error message, channels code sens one */
display = getenv("DISPLAY");
if (display == NULL && options.forward_x11)
debug("X11 forwarding requested but DISPLAY not set");
if (options.forward_x11 && client_x11_get_proto(ssh, display,
options.xauth_location, options.forward_x11_trusted,
options.forward_x11_timeout, &proto, &data) == 0) {
/* Request forwarding with authentication spoofing. */
debug("Requesting X11 forwarding with authentication "
"spoofing.");
x11_request_forwarding_with_spoofing(ssh, id, display, proto,
data, 1);
client_expect_confirm(ssh, id, "X11 forwarding", CONFIRM_WARN);
/* XXX exit_on_forward_failure */
interactive = 1;
}
check_agent_present();
if (options.forward_agent) {
debug("Requesting authentication agent forwarding.");
channel_request_start(ssh, id, "auth-agent-req@openssh.com", 0);
if ((r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0)
fatal("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
}
/* Tell the packet module whether this is an interactive session. */
ssh_packet_set_interactive(ssh, interactive,
options.ip_qos_interactive, options.ip_qos_bulk);
client_session2_setup(ssh, id, tty_flag, subsystem_flag, getenv("TERM"),
NULL, fileno(stdin), command, environ);
}
/* open new channel for a session */
static int
ssh_session2_open(struct ssh *ssh)
{
Channel *c;
int window, packetmax, in, out, err;
if (stdin_null_flag) {
in = open(_PATH_DEVNULL, O_RDONLY);
} else {
in = dup(STDIN_FILENO);
}
out = dup(STDOUT_FILENO);
err = dup(STDERR_FILENO);
if (in == -1 || out == -1 || err == -1)
fatal("dup() in/out/err failed");
/* enable nonblocking unless tty */
if (!isatty(in))
set_nonblock(in);
if (!isatty(out))
set_nonblock(out);
if (!isatty(err))
set_nonblock(err);
window = CHAN_SES_WINDOW_DEFAULT;
packetmax = CHAN_SES_PACKET_DEFAULT;
if (tty_flag) {
window >>= 1;
packetmax >>= 1;
}
c = channel_new(ssh,
"session", SSH_CHANNEL_OPENING, in, out, err,
window, packetmax, CHAN_EXTENDED_WRITE,
"client-session", /*nonblock*/0);
debug3("%s: channel_new: %d", __func__, c->self);
channel_send_open(ssh, c->self);
if (!no_shell_flag)
channel_register_open_confirm(ssh, c->self,
ssh_session2_setup, NULL);
return c->self;
}
static int
ssh_session2(struct ssh *ssh, struct passwd *pw)
{
int r, devnull, id = -1;
char *cp, *tun_fwd_ifname = NULL;
/* XXX should be pre-session */
if (!options.control_persist)
ssh_init_stdio_forwarding(ssh);
ssh_init_forwarding(ssh, &tun_fwd_ifname);
if (options.local_command != NULL) {
debug3("expanding LocalCommand: %s", options.local_command);
cp = options.local_command;
options.local_command = percent_expand(cp,
DEFAULT_CLIENT_PERCENT_EXPAND_ARGS,
"d", pw->pw_dir,
"h", host,
"r", options.user,
"u", pw->pw_name,
"T", tun_fwd_ifname == NULL ? "NONE" : tun_fwd_ifname,
(char *)NULL);
debug3("expanded LocalCommand: %s", options.local_command);
free(cp);
}
/* Start listening for multiplex clients */
if (!ssh_packet_get_mux(ssh))
muxserver_listen(ssh);
/*
* If we are in control persist mode and have a working mux listen
* socket, then prepare to background ourselves and have a foreground
- * client attach as a control slave.
+ * client attach as a control client.
* NB. we must save copies of the flags that we override for
- * the backgrounding, since we defer attachment of the slave until
+ * the backgrounding, since we defer attachment of the client until
* after the connection is fully established (in particular,
* async rfwd replies have been received for ExitOnForwardFailure).
*/
if (options.control_persist && muxserver_sock != -1) {
ostdin_null_flag = stdin_null_flag;
ono_shell_flag = no_shell_flag;
orequest_tty = options.request_tty;
otty_flag = tty_flag;
stdin_null_flag = 1;
no_shell_flag = 1;
tty_flag = 0;
if (!fork_after_authentication_flag)
need_controlpersist_detach = 1;
fork_after_authentication_flag = 1;
}
/*
* ControlPersist mux listen socket setup failed, attempt the
* stdio forward setup that we skipped earlier.
*/
if (options.control_persist && muxserver_sock == -1)
ssh_init_stdio_forwarding(ssh);
if (!no_shell_flag)
id = ssh_session2_open(ssh);
else {
ssh_packet_set_interactive(ssh,
options.control_master == SSHCTL_MASTER_NO,
options.ip_qos_interactive, options.ip_qos_bulk);
}
/* If we don't expect to open a new session, then disallow it */
if (options.control_master == SSHCTL_MASTER_NO &&
(datafellows & SSH_NEW_OPENSSH)) {
debug("Requesting no-more-sessions@openssh.com");
if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_GLOBAL_REQUEST)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh,
"no-more-sessions@openssh.com")) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_u8(ssh, 0)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0)
fatal("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
}
/* Execute a local command */
if (options.local_command != NULL &&
options.permit_local_command)
ssh_local_cmd(options.local_command);
/*
* stdout is now owned by the session channel; clobber it here
* so future channel closes are propagated to the local fd.
* NB. this can only happen after LocalCommand has completed,
* as it may want to write to stdout.
*/
if (!need_controlpersist_detach) {
- if ((devnull = open(_PATH_DEVNULL, O_WRONLY)) == -1)
+ if ((devnull = open(_PATH_DEVNULL, O_WRONLY)) == -1) {
error("%s: open %s: %s", __func__,
_PATH_DEVNULL, strerror(errno));
- if (dup2(devnull, STDOUT_FILENO) == -1)
- fatal("%s: dup2() stdout failed", __func__);
- if (devnull > STDERR_FILENO)
- close(devnull);
+ } else {
+ if (dup2(devnull, STDOUT_FILENO) == -1)
+ fatal("%s: dup2() stdout failed", __func__);
+ if (devnull > STDERR_FILENO)
+ close(devnull);
+ }
}
/*
* If requested and we are not interested in replies to remote
* forwarding requests, then let ssh continue in the background.
*/
if (fork_after_authentication_flag) {
if (options.exit_on_forward_failure &&
options.num_remote_forwards > 0) {
debug("deferring postauth fork until remote forward "
"confirmation received");
} else
fork_postauth();
}
return client_loop(ssh, tty_flag, tty_flag ?
options.escape_char : SSH_ESCAPECHAR_NONE, id);
}
/* Loads all IdentityFile and CertificateFile keys */
static void
load_public_identity_files(struct passwd *pw)
{
char *filename, *cp;
struct sshkey *public;
int i;
u_int n_ids, n_certs;
char *identity_files[SSH_MAX_IDENTITY_FILES];
struct sshkey *identity_keys[SSH_MAX_IDENTITY_FILES];
int identity_file_userprovided[SSH_MAX_IDENTITY_FILES];
char *certificate_files[SSH_MAX_CERTIFICATE_FILES];
struct sshkey *certificates[SSH_MAX_CERTIFICATE_FILES];
int certificate_file_userprovided[SSH_MAX_CERTIFICATE_FILES];
#ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11
struct sshkey **keys = NULL;
char **comments = NULL;
int nkeys;
#endif /* PKCS11 */
n_ids = n_certs = 0;
memset(identity_files, 0, sizeof(identity_files));
memset(identity_keys, 0, sizeof(identity_keys));
memset(identity_file_userprovided, 0,
sizeof(identity_file_userprovided));
memset(certificate_files, 0, sizeof(certificate_files));
memset(certificates, 0, sizeof(certificates));
memset(certificate_file_userprovided, 0,
sizeof(certificate_file_userprovided));
#ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11
if (options.pkcs11_provider != NULL &&
options.num_identity_files < SSH_MAX_IDENTITY_FILES &&
(pkcs11_init(!options.batch_mode) == 0) &&
(nkeys = pkcs11_add_provider(options.pkcs11_provider, NULL,
&keys, &comments)) > 0) {
for (i = 0; i < nkeys; i++) {
if (n_ids >= SSH_MAX_IDENTITY_FILES) {
sshkey_free(keys[i]);
free(comments[i]);
continue;
}
identity_keys[n_ids] = keys[i];
identity_files[n_ids] = comments[i]; /* transferred */
n_ids++;
}
free(keys);
free(comments);
}
#endif /* ENABLE_PKCS11 */
for (i = 0; i < options.num_identity_files; i++) {
if (n_ids >= SSH_MAX_IDENTITY_FILES ||
strcasecmp(options.identity_files[i], "none") == 0) {
free(options.identity_files[i]);
options.identity_files[i] = NULL;
continue;
}
cp = tilde_expand_filename(options.identity_files[i], getuid());
- filename = default_client_percent_expand(cp,
+ filename = default_client_percent_dollar_expand(cp,
pw->pw_dir, host, options.user, pw->pw_name);
free(cp);
check_load(sshkey_load_public(filename, &public, NULL),
filename, "pubkey");
debug("identity file %s type %d", filename,
public ? public->type : -1);
free(options.identity_files[i]);
identity_files[n_ids] = filename;
identity_keys[n_ids] = public;
identity_file_userprovided[n_ids] =
options.identity_file_userprovided[i];
if (++n_ids >= SSH_MAX_IDENTITY_FILES)
continue;
/*
* If no certificates have been explicitly listed then try
* to add the default certificate variant too.
*/
if (options.num_certificate_files != 0)
continue;
xasprintf(&cp, "%s-cert", filename);
check_load(sshkey_load_public(cp, &public, NULL),
filename, "pubkey");
debug("identity file %s type %d", cp,
public ? public->type : -1);
if (public == NULL) {
free(cp);
continue;
}
if (!sshkey_is_cert(public)) {
debug("%s: key %s type %s is not a certificate",
__func__, cp, sshkey_type(public));
sshkey_free(public);
free(cp);
continue;
}
/* NB. leave filename pointing to private key */
identity_files[n_ids] = xstrdup(filename);
identity_keys[n_ids] = public;
identity_file_userprovided[n_ids] =
options.identity_file_userprovided[i];
n_ids++;
}
if (options.num_certificate_files > SSH_MAX_CERTIFICATE_FILES)
fatal("%s: too many certificates", __func__);
for (i = 0; i < options.num_certificate_files; i++) {
cp = tilde_expand_filename(options.certificate_files[i],
getuid());
- filename = default_client_percent_expand(cp,
+ filename = default_client_percent_dollar_expand(cp,
pw->pw_dir, host, options.user, pw->pw_name);
free(cp);
check_load(sshkey_load_public(filename, &public, NULL),
filename, "certificate");
debug("certificate file %s type %d", filename,
public ? public->type : -1);
free(options.certificate_files[i]);
options.certificate_files[i] = NULL;
if (public == NULL) {
free(filename);
continue;
}
if (!sshkey_is_cert(public)) {
debug("%s: key %s type %s is not a certificate",
__func__, filename, sshkey_type(public));
sshkey_free(public);
free(filename);
continue;
}
certificate_files[n_certs] = filename;
certificates[n_certs] = public;
certificate_file_userprovided[n_certs] =
options.certificate_file_userprovided[i];
++n_certs;
}
options.num_identity_files = n_ids;
memcpy(options.identity_files, identity_files, sizeof(identity_files));
memcpy(options.identity_keys, identity_keys, sizeof(identity_keys));
memcpy(options.identity_file_userprovided,
identity_file_userprovided, sizeof(identity_file_userprovided));
options.num_certificate_files = n_certs;
memcpy(options.certificate_files,
certificate_files, sizeof(certificate_files));
memcpy(options.certificates, certificates, sizeof(certificates));
memcpy(options.certificate_file_userprovided,
certificate_file_userprovided,
sizeof(certificate_file_userprovided));
}
static void
main_sigchld_handler(int sig)
{
int save_errno = errno;
pid_t pid;
int status;
while ((pid = waitpid(-1, &status, WNOHANG)) > 0 ||
(pid == -1 && errno == EINTR))
;
errno = save_errno;
}
diff --git a/ssh.h b/ssh.h
index dda6f617e695..8110c060287f 100644
--- a/ssh.h
+++ b/ssh.h
@@ -1,99 +1,104 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: ssh.h,v 1.89 2018/12/27 03:25:25 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: ssh.h,v 1.90 2020/07/14 23:57:01 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
* Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
* All rights reserved
*
* As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
* can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this
* software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
* incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
* called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
*/
/* Cipher used for encrypting authentication files. */
#define SSH_AUTHFILE_CIPHER SSH_CIPHER_3DES
/* Default port number. */
#define SSH_DEFAULT_PORT 22
/*
* Maximum number of certificate files that can be specified
* in configuration files or on the command line.
*/
#define SSH_MAX_CERTIFICATE_FILES 100
/*
* Maximum number of RSA authentication identity files that can be specified
* in configuration files or on the command line.
*/
#define SSH_MAX_IDENTITY_FILES 100
/*
* Major protocol version. Different version indicates major incompatibility
* that prevents communication.
*
* Minor protocol version. Different version indicates minor incompatibility
* that does not prevent interoperation.
*/
#define PROTOCOL_MAJOR_1 1
#define PROTOCOL_MINOR_1 5
/* We support only SSH2 */
#define PROTOCOL_MAJOR_2 2
#define PROTOCOL_MINOR_2 0
/*
* Name for the service. The port named by this service overrides the
* default port if present.
*/
#define SSH_SERVICE_NAME "ssh"
/*
* Name of the environment variable containing the process ID of the
* authentication agent.
*/
#define SSH_AGENTPID_ENV_NAME "SSH_AGENT_PID"
/*
* Name of the environment variable containing the pathname of the
* authentication socket.
*/
#define SSH_AUTHSOCKET_ENV_NAME "SSH_AUTH_SOCK"
/*
* Environment variable for overwriting the default location of askpass
*/
#define SSH_ASKPASS_ENV "SSH_ASKPASS"
+/*
+ * Environment variable to control whether or not askpass is used.
+ */
+#define SSH_ASKPASS_REQUIRE_ENV "SSH_ASKPASS_REQUIRE"
+
/*
* Force host key length and server key length to differ by at least this
* many bits. This is to make double encryption with rsaref work.
*/
#define SSH_KEY_BITS_RESERVED 128
/*
* Length of the session key in bytes. (Specified as 256 bits in the
* protocol.)
*/
#define SSH_SESSION_KEY_LENGTH 32
/* Used to identify ``EscapeChar none'' */
#define SSH_ESCAPECHAR_NONE -2
/*
* unprivileged user when UsePrivilegeSeparation=yes;
* sshd will change its privileges to this user and its
* primary group.
*/
#ifndef SSH_PRIVSEP_USER
#define SSH_PRIVSEP_USER "sshd"
#endif
/* Listen backlog for sshd, ssh-agent and forwarding sockets */
#define SSH_LISTEN_BACKLOG 128
/* Limits for banner exchange */
#define SSH_MAX_BANNER_LEN 8192
#define SSH_MAX_PRE_BANNER_LINES 1024
diff --git a/ssh_api.c b/ssh_api.c
index e0b1955212df..129404b207b8 100644
--- a/ssh_api.c
+++ b/ssh_api.c
@@ -1,573 +1,571 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: ssh_api.c,v 1.19 2019/10/31 21:23:19 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: ssh_api.c,v 1.21 2020/08/27 01:06:18 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 2012 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
*
* Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
* purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
* copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
*
* THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
* WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
* MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
* ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
* WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
* ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
* OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
*/
#include "includes.h"
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include "ssh_api.h"
#include "compat.h"
#include "log.h"
#include "authfile.h"
#include "sshkey.h"
#include "misc.h"
#include "ssh2.h"
#include "version.h"
#include "myproposal.h"
#include "ssherr.h"
#include "sshbuf.h"
#include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h"
#include <string.h>
int _ssh_exchange_banner(struct ssh *);
int _ssh_send_banner(struct ssh *, struct sshbuf *);
int _ssh_read_banner(struct ssh *, struct sshbuf *);
int _ssh_order_hostkeyalgs(struct ssh *);
int _ssh_verify_host_key(struct sshkey *, struct ssh *);
struct sshkey *_ssh_host_public_key(int, int, struct ssh *);
struct sshkey *_ssh_host_private_key(int, int, struct ssh *);
int _ssh_host_key_sign(struct ssh *, struct sshkey *, struct sshkey *,
u_char **, size_t *, const u_char *, size_t, const char *);
/*
* stubs for the server side implementation of kex.
* disable privsep so our stubs will never be called.
*/
int use_privsep = 0;
int mm_sshkey_sign(struct sshkey *, u_char **, u_int *,
- const u_char *, u_int, const char *, const char *, u_int);
+ const u_char *, u_int, const char *, const char *, const char *, u_int);
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
DH *mm_choose_dh(int, int, int);
#endif
/* Define these two variables here so that they are part of the library */
u_char *session_id2 = NULL;
u_int session_id2_len = 0;
int
mm_sshkey_sign(struct sshkey *key, u_char **sigp, u_int *lenp,
- const u_char *data, u_int datalen, const char *alg, const char *sk_provider,
- u_int compat)
+ const u_char *data, u_int datalen, const char *alg,
+ const char *sk_provider, const char *sk_pin, u_int compat)
{
return (-1);
}
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
DH *
mm_choose_dh(int min, int nbits, int max)
{
return (NULL);
}
#endif
/* API */
int
ssh_init(struct ssh **sshp, int is_server, struct kex_params *kex_params)
{
char *myproposal[PROPOSAL_MAX] = { KEX_CLIENT };
struct ssh *ssh;
char **proposal;
static int called;
int r;
if (!called) {
seed_rng();
called = 1;
}
if ((ssh = ssh_packet_set_connection(NULL, -1, -1)) == NULL)
return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
if (is_server)
ssh_packet_set_server(ssh);
/* Initialize key exchange */
proposal = kex_params ? kex_params->proposal : myproposal;
if ((r = kex_ready(ssh, proposal)) != 0) {
ssh_free(ssh);
return r;
}
ssh->kex->server = is_server;
if (is_server) {
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
ssh->kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP1_SHA1] = kex_gen_server;
ssh->kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP14_SHA1] = kex_gen_server;
ssh->kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP14_SHA256] = kex_gen_server;
ssh->kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP16_SHA512] = kex_gen_server;
ssh->kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP18_SHA512] = kex_gen_server;
ssh->kex->kex[KEX_DH_GEX_SHA1] = kexgex_server;
ssh->kex->kex[KEX_DH_GEX_SHA256] = kexgex_server;
# ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
ssh->kex->kex[KEX_ECDH_SHA2] = kex_gen_server;
# endif
#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
ssh->kex->kex[KEX_C25519_SHA256] = kex_gen_server;
ssh->kex->kex[KEX_KEM_SNTRUP4591761X25519_SHA512] = kex_gen_server;
ssh->kex->load_host_public_key=&_ssh_host_public_key;
ssh->kex->load_host_private_key=&_ssh_host_private_key;
ssh->kex->sign=&_ssh_host_key_sign;
} else {
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
ssh->kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP1_SHA1] = kex_gen_client;
ssh->kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP14_SHA1] = kex_gen_client;
ssh->kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP14_SHA256] = kex_gen_client;
ssh->kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP16_SHA512] = kex_gen_client;
ssh->kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP18_SHA512] = kex_gen_client;
ssh->kex->kex[KEX_DH_GEX_SHA1] = kexgex_client;
ssh->kex->kex[KEX_DH_GEX_SHA256] = kexgex_client;
# ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
ssh->kex->kex[KEX_ECDH_SHA2] = kex_gen_client;
# endif
#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
ssh->kex->kex[KEX_C25519_SHA256] = kex_gen_client;
ssh->kex->kex[KEX_KEM_SNTRUP4591761X25519_SHA512] = kex_gen_client;
ssh->kex->verify_host_key =&_ssh_verify_host_key;
}
*sshp = ssh;
return 0;
}
void
ssh_free(struct ssh *ssh)
{
struct key_entry *k;
- ssh_packet_close(ssh);
/*
* we've only created the public keys variants in case we
* are a acting as a server.
*/
while ((k = TAILQ_FIRST(&ssh->public_keys)) != NULL) {
TAILQ_REMOVE(&ssh->public_keys, k, next);
if (ssh->kex && ssh->kex->server)
sshkey_free(k->key);
free(k);
}
while ((k = TAILQ_FIRST(&ssh->private_keys)) != NULL) {
TAILQ_REMOVE(&ssh->private_keys, k, next);
free(k);
}
- if (ssh->kex)
- kex_free(ssh->kex);
+ ssh_packet_close(ssh);
free(ssh);
}
void
ssh_set_app_data(struct ssh *ssh, void *app_data)
{
ssh->app_data = app_data;
}
void *
ssh_get_app_data(struct ssh *ssh)
{
return ssh->app_data;
}
/* Returns < 0 on error, 0 otherwise */
int
ssh_add_hostkey(struct ssh *ssh, struct sshkey *key)
{
struct sshkey *pubkey = NULL;
struct key_entry *k = NULL, *k_prv = NULL;
int r;
if (ssh->kex->server) {
if ((r = sshkey_from_private(key, &pubkey)) != 0)
return r;
if ((k = malloc(sizeof(*k))) == NULL ||
(k_prv = malloc(sizeof(*k_prv))) == NULL) {
free(k);
sshkey_free(pubkey);
return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
}
k_prv->key = key;
TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(&ssh->private_keys, k_prv, next);
/* add the public key, too */
k->key = pubkey;
TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(&ssh->public_keys, k, next);
r = 0;
} else {
if ((k = malloc(sizeof(*k))) == NULL)
return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
k->key = key;
TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(&ssh->public_keys, k, next);
r = 0;
}
return r;
}
int
ssh_set_verify_host_key_callback(struct ssh *ssh,
int (*cb)(struct sshkey *, struct ssh *))
{
if (cb == NULL || ssh->kex == NULL)
return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
ssh->kex->verify_host_key = cb;
return 0;
}
int
ssh_input_append(struct ssh *ssh, const u_char *data, size_t len)
{
return sshbuf_put(ssh_packet_get_input(ssh), data, len);
}
int
ssh_packet_next(struct ssh *ssh, u_char *typep)
{
int r;
u_int32_t seqnr;
u_char type;
/*
* Try to read a packet. Return SSH_MSG_NONE if no packet or not
* enough data.
*/
*typep = SSH_MSG_NONE;
if (sshbuf_len(ssh->kex->client_version) == 0 ||
sshbuf_len(ssh->kex->server_version) == 0)
return _ssh_exchange_banner(ssh);
/*
* If we enough data and a dispatch function then
* call the function and get the next packet.
* Otherwise return the packet type to the caller so it
* can decide how to go on.
*
* We will only call the dispatch function for:
* 20-29 Algorithm negotiation
* 30-49 Key exchange method specific (numbers can be reused for
* different authentication methods)
*/
for (;;) {
if ((r = ssh_packet_read_poll2(ssh, &type, &seqnr)) != 0)
return r;
if (type > 0 && type < DISPATCH_MAX &&
type >= SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT && type <= SSH2_MSG_TRANSPORT_MAX &&
ssh->dispatch[type] != NULL) {
if ((r = (*ssh->dispatch[type])(type, seqnr, ssh)) != 0)
return r;
} else {
*typep = type;
return 0;
}
}
}
const u_char *
ssh_packet_payload(struct ssh *ssh, size_t *lenp)
{
return sshpkt_ptr(ssh, lenp);
}
int
ssh_packet_put(struct ssh *ssh, int type, const u_char *data, size_t len)
{
int r;
if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, type)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put(ssh, data, len)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0)
return r;
return 0;
}
const u_char *
ssh_output_ptr(struct ssh *ssh, size_t *len)
{
struct sshbuf *output = ssh_packet_get_output(ssh);
*len = sshbuf_len(output);
return sshbuf_ptr(output);
}
int
ssh_output_consume(struct ssh *ssh, size_t len)
{
return sshbuf_consume(ssh_packet_get_output(ssh), len);
}
int
ssh_output_space(struct ssh *ssh, size_t len)
{
return (0 == sshbuf_check_reserve(ssh_packet_get_output(ssh), len));
}
int
ssh_input_space(struct ssh *ssh, size_t len)
{
return (0 == sshbuf_check_reserve(ssh_packet_get_input(ssh), len));
}
/* Read other side's version identification. */
int
_ssh_read_banner(struct ssh *ssh, struct sshbuf *banner)
{
struct sshbuf *input = ssh_packet_get_input(ssh);
const char *mismatch = "Protocol mismatch.\r\n";
const u_char *s = sshbuf_ptr(input);
u_char c;
char *cp = NULL, *remote_version = NULL;
int r = 0, remote_major, remote_minor, expect_nl;
size_t n, j;
for (j = n = 0;;) {
sshbuf_reset(banner);
expect_nl = 0;
for (;;) {
if (j >= sshbuf_len(input))
return 0; /* insufficient data in input buf */
c = s[j++];
if (c == '\r') {
expect_nl = 1;
continue;
}
if (c == '\n')
break;
if (expect_nl)
goto bad;
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(banner, c)) != 0)
return r;
if (sshbuf_len(banner) > SSH_MAX_BANNER_LEN)
goto bad;
}
if (sshbuf_len(banner) >= 4 &&
memcmp(sshbuf_ptr(banner), "SSH-", 4) == 0)
break;
debug("%s: %.*s", __func__, (int)sshbuf_len(banner),
sshbuf_ptr(banner));
/* Accept lines before banner only on client */
if (ssh->kex->server || ++n > SSH_MAX_PRE_BANNER_LINES) {
bad:
if ((r = sshbuf_put(ssh_packet_get_output(ssh),
mismatch, strlen(mismatch))) != 0)
return r;
return SSH_ERR_NO_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
}
}
if ((r = sshbuf_consume(input, j)) != 0)
return r;
/* XXX remote version must be the same size as banner for sscanf */
if ((cp = sshbuf_dup_string(banner)) == NULL ||
(remote_version = calloc(1, sshbuf_len(banner))) == NULL) {
r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
goto out;
}
/*
* Check that the versions match. In future this might accept
* several versions and set appropriate flags to handle them.
*/
if (sscanf(cp, "SSH-%d.%d-%[^\n]\n",
&remote_major, &remote_minor, remote_version) != 3) {
r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
goto out;
}
debug("Remote protocol version %d.%d, remote software version %.100s",
remote_major, remote_minor, remote_version);
ssh->compat = compat_datafellows(remote_version);
if (remote_major == 1 && remote_minor == 99) {
remote_major = 2;
remote_minor = 0;
}
if (remote_major != 2)
r = SSH_ERR_PROTOCOL_MISMATCH;
debug("Remote version string %.100s", cp);
out:
free(cp);
free(remote_version);
return r;
}
/* Send our own protocol version identification. */
int
_ssh_send_banner(struct ssh *ssh, struct sshbuf *banner)
{
char *cp;
int r;
if ((r = sshbuf_putf(banner, "SSH-2.0-%.100s\r\n", SSH_VERSION)) != 0)
return r;
if ((r = sshbuf_putb(ssh_packet_get_output(ssh), banner)) != 0)
return r;
/* Remove trailing \r\n */
if ((r = sshbuf_consume_end(banner, 2)) != 0)
return r;
if ((cp = sshbuf_dup_string(banner)) == NULL)
return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
debug("Local version string %.100s", cp);
free(cp);
return 0;
}
int
_ssh_exchange_banner(struct ssh *ssh)
{
struct kex *kex = ssh->kex;
int r;
/*
* if _ssh_read_banner() cannot parse a full version string
* it will return NULL and we end up calling it again.
*/
r = 0;
if (kex->server) {
if (sshbuf_len(ssh->kex->server_version) == 0)
r = _ssh_send_banner(ssh, ssh->kex->server_version);
if (r == 0 &&
sshbuf_len(ssh->kex->server_version) != 0 &&
sshbuf_len(ssh->kex->client_version) == 0)
r = _ssh_read_banner(ssh, ssh->kex->client_version);
} else {
if (sshbuf_len(ssh->kex->server_version) == 0)
r = _ssh_read_banner(ssh, ssh->kex->server_version);
if (r == 0 &&
sshbuf_len(ssh->kex->server_version) != 0 &&
sshbuf_len(ssh->kex->client_version) == 0)
r = _ssh_send_banner(ssh, ssh->kex->client_version);
}
if (r != 0)
return r;
/* start initial kex as soon as we have exchanged the banners */
if (sshbuf_len(ssh->kex->server_version) != 0 &&
sshbuf_len(ssh->kex->client_version) != 0) {
if ((r = _ssh_order_hostkeyalgs(ssh)) != 0 ||
(r = kex_send_kexinit(ssh)) != 0)
return r;
}
return 0;
}
struct sshkey *
_ssh_host_public_key(int type, int nid, struct ssh *ssh)
{
struct key_entry *k;
debug3("%s: need %d", __func__, type);
TAILQ_FOREACH(k, &ssh->public_keys, next) {
debug3("%s: check %s", __func__, sshkey_type(k->key));
if (k->key->type == type &&
(type != KEY_ECDSA || k->key->ecdsa_nid == nid))
return (k->key);
}
return (NULL);
}
struct sshkey *
_ssh_host_private_key(int type, int nid, struct ssh *ssh)
{
struct key_entry *k;
debug3("%s: need %d", __func__, type);
TAILQ_FOREACH(k, &ssh->private_keys, next) {
debug3("%s: check %s", __func__, sshkey_type(k->key));
if (k->key->type == type &&
(type != KEY_ECDSA || k->key->ecdsa_nid == nid))
return (k->key);
}
return (NULL);
}
int
_ssh_verify_host_key(struct sshkey *hostkey, struct ssh *ssh)
{
struct key_entry *k;
debug3("%s: need %s", __func__, sshkey_type(hostkey));
TAILQ_FOREACH(k, &ssh->public_keys, next) {
debug3("%s: check %s", __func__, sshkey_type(k->key));
if (sshkey_equal_public(hostkey, k->key))
return (0); /* ok */
}
return (-1); /* failed */
}
/* offer hostkey algorithms in kexinit depending on registered keys */
int
_ssh_order_hostkeyalgs(struct ssh *ssh)
{
struct key_entry *k;
char *orig, *avail, *oavail = NULL, *alg, *replace = NULL;
char **proposal;
size_t maxlen;
int ktype, r;
/* XXX we de-serialize ssh->kex->my, modify it, and change it */
if ((r = kex_buf2prop(ssh->kex->my, NULL, &proposal)) != 0)
return r;
orig = proposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS];
if ((oavail = avail = strdup(orig)) == NULL) {
r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
goto out;
}
maxlen = strlen(avail) + 1;
if ((replace = calloc(1, maxlen)) == NULL) {
r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
goto out;
}
*replace = '\0';
while ((alg = strsep(&avail, ",")) && *alg != '\0') {
if ((ktype = sshkey_type_from_name(alg)) == KEY_UNSPEC)
continue;
TAILQ_FOREACH(k, &ssh->public_keys, next) {
if (k->key->type == ktype ||
(sshkey_is_cert(k->key) && k->key->type ==
sshkey_type_plain(ktype))) {
if (*replace != '\0')
strlcat(replace, ",", maxlen);
strlcat(replace, alg, maxlen);
break;
}
}
}
if (*replace != '\0') {
debug2("%s: orig/%d %s", __func__, ssh->kex->server, orig);
debug2("%s: replace/%d %s", __func__, ssh->kex->server, replace);
free(orig);
proposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS] = replace;
replace = NULL; /* owned by proposal */
r = kex_prop2buf(ssh->kex->my, proposal);
}
out:
free(oavail);
free(replace);
kex_prop_free(proposal);
return r;
}
int
_ssh_host_key_sign(struct ssh *ssh, struct sshkey *privkey,
struct sshkey *pubkey, u_char **signature, size_t *slen,
const u_char *data, size_t dlen, const char *alg)
{
return sshkey_sign(privkey, signature, slen, data, dlen,
- alg, NULL, ssh->compat);
+ alg, NULL, NULL, ssh->compat);
}
diff --git a/ssh_config b/ssh_config
index 5e8ef548bb50..842ea866c72a 100644
--- a/ssh_config
+++ b/ssh_config
@@ -1,45 +1,46 @@
-# $OpenBSD: ssh_config,v 1.34 2019/02/04 02:39:42 dtucker Exp $
+# $OpenBSD: ssh_config,v 1.35 2020/07/17 03:43:42 dtucker Exp $
# This is the ssh client system-wide configuration file. See
# ssh_config(5) for more information. This file provides defaults for
# users, and the values can be changed in per-user configuration files
# or on the command line.
# Configuration data is parsed as follows:
# 1. command line options
# 2. user-specific file
# 3. system-wide file
# Any configuration value is only changed the first time it is set.
# Thus, host-specific definitions should be at the beginning of the
# configuration file, and defaults at the end.
# Site-wide defaults for some commonly used options. For a comprehensive
# list of available options, their meanings and defaults, please see the
# ssh_config(5) man page.
# Host *
# ForwardAgent no
# ForwardX11 no
# PasswordAuthentication yes
# HostbasedAuthentication no
# GSSAPIAuthentication no
# GSSAPIDelegateCredentials no
# BatchMode no
# CheckHostIP yes
# AddressFamily any
# ConnectTimeout 0
# StrictHostKeyChecking ask
# IdentityFile ~/.ssh/id_rsa
# IdentityFile ~/.ssh/id_dsa
# IdentityFile ~/.ssh/id_ecdsa
# IdentityFile ~/.ssh/id_ed25519
# Port 22
# Ciphers aes128-ctr,aes192-ctr,aes256-ctr,aes128-cbc,3des-cbc
# MACs hmac-md5,hmac-sha1,umac-64@openssh.com
# EscapeChar ~
# Tunnel no
# TunnelDevice any:any
# PermitLocalCommand no
# VisualHostKey no
# ProxyCommand ssh -q -W %h:%p gateway.example.com
# RekeyLimit 1G 1h
+# UserKnownHostsFile ~/.ssh/known_hosts.d/%k
diff --git a/ssh_config.0 b/ssh_config.0
index 316b2e1ef863..ae98748d2825 100644
--- a/ssh_config.0
+++ b/ssh_config.0
@@ -1,1167 +1,1194 @@
SSH_CONFIG(5) File Formats Manual SSH_CONFIG(5)
NAME
ssh_config M-bM-^@M-^S OpenSSH client configuration file
DESCRIPTION
ssh(1) obtains configuration data from the following sources in the
following order:
1. command-line options
2. user's configuration file (~/.ssh/config)
3. system-wide configuration file (/etc/ssh/ssh_config)
For each parameter, the first obtained value will be used. The
configuration files contain sections separated by Host specifications,
and that section is only applied for hosts that match one of the patterns
given in the specification. The matched host name is usually the one
given on the command line (see the CanonicalizeHostname option for
exceptions).
Since the first obtained value for each parameter is used, more host-
specific declarations should be given near the beginning of the file, and
general defaults at the end.
The file contains keyword-argument pairs, one per line. Lines starting
with M-bM-^@M-^X#M-bM-^@M-^Y and empty lines are interpreted as comments. Arguments may
optionally be enclosed in double quotes (") in order to represent
arguments containing spaces. Configuration options may be separated by
whitespace or optional whitespace and exactly one M-bM-^@M-^X=M-bM-^@M-^Y; the latter format
is useful to avoid the need to quote whitespace when specifying
configuration options using the ssh, scp, and sftp -o option.
The possible keywords and their meanings are as follows (note that
keywords are case-insensitive and arguments are case-sensitive):
Host Restricts the following declarations (up to the next Host or
Match keyword) to be only for those hosts that match one of the
patterns given after the keyword. If more than one pattern is
provided, they should be separated by whitespace. A single M-bM-^@M-^X*M-bM-^@M-^Y
as a pattern can be used to provide global defaults for all
hosts. The host is usually the hostname argument given on the
command line (see the CanonicalizeHostname keyword for
exceptions).
A pattern entry may be negated by prefixing it with an
exclamation mark (M-bM-^@M-^X!M-bM-^@M-^Y). If a negated entry is matched, then the
Host entry is ignored, regardless of whether any other patterns
on the line match. Negated matches are therefore useful to
provide exceptions for wildcard matches.
See PATTERNS for more information on patterns.
Match Restricts the following declarations (up to the next Host or
Match keyword) to be used only when the conditions following the
Match keyword are satisfied. Match conditions are specified
using one or more criteria or the single token all which always
matches. The available criteria keywords are: canonical, final,
exec, host, originalhost, user, and localuser. The all criteria
must appear alone or immediately after canonical or final. Other
criteria may be combined arbitrarily. All criteria but all,
canonical, and final require an argument. Criteria may be
negated by prepending an exclamation mark (M-bM-^@M-^X!M-bM-^@M-^Y).
The canonical keyword matches only when the configuration file is
being re-parsed after hostname canonicalization (see the
CanonicalizeHostname option). This may be useful to specify
conditions that work with canonical host names only.
The final keyword requests that the configuration be re-parsed
(regardless of whether CanonicalizeHostname is enabled), and
matches only during this final pass. If CanonicalizeHostname is
enabled, then canonical and final match during the same pass.
The exec keyword executes the specified command under the user's
shell. If the command returns a zero exit status then the
condition is considered true. Commands containing whitespace
characters must be quoted. Arguments to exec accept the tokens
described in the TOKENS section.
The other keywords' criteria must be single entries or comma-
separated lists and may use the wildcard and negation operators
described in the PATTERNS section. The criteria for the host
keyword are matched against the target hostname, after any
substitution by the Hostname or CanonicalizeHostname options.
The originalhost keyword matches against the hostname as it was
specified on the command-line. The user keyword matches against
the target username on the remote host. The localuser keyword
matches against the name of the local user running ssh(1) (this
keyword may be useful in system-wide ssh_config files).
AddKeysToAgent
Specifies whether keys should be automatically added to a running
ssh-agent(1). If this option is set to yes and a key is loaded
from a file, the key and its passphrase are added to the agent
with the default lifetime, as if by ssh-add(1). If this option
is set to ask, ssh(1) will require confirmation using the
SSH_ASKPASS program before adding a key (see ssh-add(1) for
details). If this option is set to confirm, each use of the key
must be confirmed, as if the -c option was specified to
ssh-add(1). If this option is set to no, no keys are added to
- the agent. The argument must be yes, confirm, ask, or no (the
- default).
+ the agent. Alternately, this option may be specified as a time
+ interval using the format described in the TIME FORMATS section
+ of sshd_config(5) to specify the key's lifetime in ssh-agent(1),
+ after which it will automatically be removed. The argument must
+ be no (the default), yes, confirm (optionally followed by a time
+ interval), ask or a time interval.
AddressFamily
Specifies which address family to use when connecting. Valid
arguments are any (the default), inet (use IPv4 only), or inet6
(use IPv6 only).
BatchMode
If set to yes, user interaction such as password prompts and host
key confirmation requests will be disabled. This option is
useful in scripts and other batch jobs where no user is present
to interact with ssh(1). The argument must be yes or no (the
default).
BindAddress
Use the specified address on the local machine as the source
address of the connection. Only useful on systems with more than
one address.
BindInterface
Use the address of the specified interface on the local machine
as the source address of the connection.
CanonicalDomains
When CanonicalizeHostname is enabled, this option specifies the
list of domain suffixes in which to search for the specified
destination host.
CanonicalizeFallbackLocal
Specifies whether to fail with an error when hostname
canonicalization fails. The default, yes, will attempt to look
up the unqualified hostname using the system resolver's search
rules. A value of no will cause ssh(1) to fail instantly if
CanonicalizeHostname is enabled and the target hostname cannot be
found in any of the domains specified by CanonicalDomains.
CanonicalizeHostname
Controls whether explicit hostname canonicalization is performed.
The default, no, is not to perform any name rewriting and let the
system resolver handle all hostname lookups. If set to yes then,
for connections that do not use a ProxyCommand or ProxyJump,
ssh(1) will attempt to canonicalize the hostname specified on the
command line using the CanonicalDomains suffixes and
CanonicalizePermittedCNAMEs rules. If CanonicalizeHostname is
set to always, then canonicalization is applied to proxied
connections too.
If this option is enabled, then the configuration files are
processed again using the new target name to pick up any new
configuration in matching Host and Match stanzas.
CanonicalizeMaxDots
Specifies the maximum number of dot characters in a hostname
before canonicalization is disabled. The default, 1, allows a
single dot (i.e. hostname.subdomain).
CanonicalizePermittedCNAMEs
Specifies rules to determine whether CNAMEs should be followed
when canonicalizing hostnames. The rules consist of one or more
arguments of source_domain_list:target_domain_list, where
source_domain_list is a pattern-list of domains that may follow
CNAMEs in canonicalization, and target_domain_list is a pattern-
list of domains that they may resolve to.
For example, "*.a.example.com:*.b.example.com,*.c.example.com"
will allow hostnames matching "*.a.example.com" to be
canonicalized to names in the "*.b.example.com" or
"*.c.example.com" domains.
CASignatureAlgorithms
Specifies which algorithms are allowed for signing of
certificates by certificate authorities (CAs). The default is:
ecdsa-sha2-nistp256,ecdsa-sha2-nistp384,ecdsa-sha2-nistp521,
ssh-ed25519,rsa-sha2-512,rsa-sha2-256,ssh-rsa
ssh(1) will not accept host certificates signed using algorithms
other than those specified.
CertificateFile
Specifies a file from which the user's certificate is read. A
corresponding private key must be provided separately in order to
use this certificate either from an IdentityFile directive or -i
flag to ssh(1), via ssh-agent(1), or via a PKCS11Provider or
SecurityKeyProvider.
Arguments to CertificateFile may use the tilde syntax to refer to
- a user's home directory or the tokens described in the TOKENS
- section.
+ a user's home directory, the tokens described in the TOKENS
+ section and environment variables as described in the ENVIRONMENT
+ VARIABLES section.
It is possible to have multiple certificate files specified in
configuration files; these certificates will be tried in
sequence. Multiple CertificateFile directives will add to the
list of certificates used for authentication.
ChallengeResponseAuthentication
Specifies whether to use challenge-response authentication. The
argument to this keyword must be yes (the default) or no.
CheckHostIP
If set to yes (the default), ssh(1) will additionally check the
host IP address in the known_hosts file. This allows it to
detect if a host key changed due to DNS spoofing and will add
addresses of destination hosts to ~/.ssh/known_hosts in the
process, regardless of the setting of StrictHostKeyChecking. If
the option is set to no, the check will not be executed.
Ciphers
Specifies the ciphers allowed and their order of preference.
Multiple ciphers must be comma-separated. If the specified list
begins with a M-bM-^@M-^X+M-bM-^@M-^Y character, then the specified ciphers will be
appended to the default set instead of replacing them. If the
specified list begins with a M-bM-^@M-^X-M-bM-^@M-^Y character, then the specified
ciphers (including wildcards) will be removed from the default
set instead of replacing them. If the specified list begins with
a M-bM-^@M-^X^M-bM-^@M-^Y character, then the specified ciphers will be placed at the
head of the default set.
The supported ciphers are:
3des-cbc
aes128-cbc
aes192-cbc
aes256-cbc
aes128-ctr
aes192-ctr
aes256-ctr
aes128-gcm@openssh.com
aes256-gcm@openssh.com
chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com
The default is:
chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com,
aes128-ctr,aes192-ctr,aes256-ctr,
aes128-gcm@openssh.com,aes256-gcm@openssh.com
The list of available ciphers may also be obtained using "ssh -Q
cipher".
ClearAllForwardings
Specifies that all local, remote, and dynamic port forwardings
specified in the configuration files or on the command line be
cleared. This option is primarily useful when used from the
ssh(1) command line to clear port forwardings set in
configuration files, and is automatically set by scp(1) and
sftp(1). The argument must be yes or no (the default).
Compression
Specifies whether to use compression. The argument must be yes
or no (the default).
ConnectionAttempts
Specifies the number of tries (one per second) to make before
exiting. The argument must be an integer. This may be useful in
scripts if the connection sometimes fails. The default is 1.
ConnectTimeout
Specifies the timeout (in seconds) used when connecting to the
SSH server, instead of using the default system TCP timeout.
This timeout is applied both to establishing the connection and
to performing the initial SSH protocol handshake and key
exchange.
ControlMaster
Enables the sharing of multiple sessions over a single network
connection. When set to yes, ssh(1) will listen for connections
on a control socket specified using the ControlPath argument.
Additional sessions can connect to this socket using the same
ControlPath with ControlMaster set to no (the default). These
sessions will try to reuse the master instance's network
connection rather than initiating new ones, but will fall back to
connecting normally if the control socket does not exist, or is
not listening.
Setting this to ask will cause ssh(1) to listen for control
connections, but require confirmation using ssh-askpass(1). If
the ControlPath cannot be opened, ssh(1) will continue without
connecting to a master instance.
X11 and ssh-agent(1) forwarding is supported over these
multiplexed connections, however the display and agent forwarded
will be the one belonging to the master connection i.e. it is not
possible to forward multiple displays or agents.
Two additional options allow for opportunistic multiplexing: try
to use a master connection but fall back to creating a new one if
one does not already exist. These options are: auto and autoask.
The latter requires confirmation like the ask option.
ControlPath
Specify the path to the control socket used for connection
sharing as described in the ControlMaster section above or the
string none to disable connection sharing. Arguments to
ControlPath may use the tilde syntax to refer to a user's home
- directory or the tokens described in the TOKENS section. It is
- recommended that any ControlPath used for opportunistic
- connection sharing include at least %h, %p, and %r (or
- alternatively %C) and be placed in a directory that is not
+ directory, the tokens described in the TOKENS section and
+ environment variables as described in the ENVIRONMENT VARIABLES
+ section. It is recommended that any ControlPath used for
+ opportunistic connection sharing include at least %h, %p, and %r
+ (or alternatively %C) and be placed in a directory that is not
writable by other users. This ensures that shared connections
are uniquely identified.
ControlPersist
When used in conjunction with ControlMaster, specifies that the
master connection should remain open in the background (waiting
for future client connections) after the initial client
connection has been closed. If set to no (the default), then the
master connection will not be placed into the background, and
will close as soon as the initial client connection is closed.
If set to yes or 0, then the master connection will remain in the
background indefinitely (until killed or closed via a mechanism
such as the "ssh -O exit"). If set to a time in seconds, or a
time in any of the formats documented in sshd_config(5), then the
backgrounded master connection will automatically terminate after
it has remained idle (with no client connections) for the
specified time.
DynamicForward
Specifies that a TCP port on the local machine be forwarded over
the secure channel, and the application protocol is then used to
determine where to connect to from the remote machine.
The argument must be [bind_address:]port. IPv6 addresses can be
specified by enclosing addresses in square brackets. By default,
the local port is bound in accordance with the GatewayPorts
setting. However, an explicit bind_address may be used to bind
the connection to a specific address. The bind_address of
localhost indicates that the listening port be bound for local
use only, while an empty address or M-bM-^@M-^X*M-bM-^@M-^Y indicates that the port
should be available from all interfaces.
Currently the SOCKS4 and SOCKS5 protocols are supported, and
ssh(1) will act as a SOCKS server. Multiple forwardings may be
specified, and additional forwardings can be given on the command
line. Only the superuser can forward privileged ports.
EnableSSHKeysign
Setting this option to yes in the global client configuration
file /etc/ssh/ssh_config enables the use of the helper program
ssh-keysign(8) during HostbasedAuthentication. The argument must
be yes or no (the default). This option should be placed in the
non-hostspecific section. See ssh-keysign(8) for more
information.
EscapeChar
Sets the escape character (default: M-bM-^@M-^X~M-bM-^@M-^Y). The escape character
can also be set on the command line. The argument should be a
single character, M-bM-^@M-^X^M-bM-^@M-^Y followed by a letter, or none to disable
the escape character entirely (making the connection transparent
for binary data).
ExitOnForwardFailure
Specifies whether ssh(1) should terminate the connection if it
cannot set up all requested dynamic, tunnel, local, and remote
port forwardings, (e.g. if either end is unable to bind and
listen on a specified port). Note that ExitOnForwardFailure does
not apply to connections made over port forwardings and will not,
for example, cause ssh(1) to exit if TCP connections to the
ultimate forwarding destination fail. The argument must be yes
or no (the default).
FingerprintHash
Specifies the hash algorithm used when displaying key
fingerprints. Valid options are: md5 and sha256 (the default).
ForwardAgent
Specifies whether the connection to the authentication agent (if
any) will be forwarded to the remote machine. The argument may
be yes, no (the default), an explicit path to an agent socket or
the name of an environment variable (beginning with M-bM-^@M-^X$M-bM-^@M-^Y) in which
to find the path.
Agent forwarding should be enabled with caution. Users with the
ability to bypass file permissions on the remote host (for the
agent's Unix-domain socket) can access the local agent through
the forwarded connection. An attacker cannot obtain key material
from the agent, however they can perform operations on the keys
that enable them to authenticate using the identities loaded into
the agent.
ForwardX11
Specifies whether X11 connections will be automatically
redirected over the secure channel and DISPLAY set. The argument
must be yes or no (the default).
X11 forwarding should be enabled with caution. Users with the
ability to bypass file permissions on the remote host (for the
user's X11 authorization database) can access the local X11
display through the forwarded connection. An attacker may then
be able to perform activities such as keystroke monitoring if the
ForwardX11Trusted option is also enabled.
ForwardX11Timeout
Specify a timeout for untrusted X11 forwarding using the format
described in the TIME FORMATS section of sshd_config(5). X11
connections received by ssh(1) after this time will be refused.
Setting ForwardX11Timeout to zero will disable the timeout and
permit X11 forwarding for the life of the connection. The
default is to disable untrusted X11 forwarding after twenty
minutes has elapsed.
ForwardX11Trusted
If this option is set to yes, remote X11 clients will have full
access to the original X11 display.
If this option is set to no (the default), remote X11 clients
will be considered untrusted and prevented from stealing or
tampering with data belonging to trusted X11 clients.
Furthermore, the xauth(1) token used for the session will be set
to expire after 20 minutes. Remote clients will be refused
access after this time.
See the X11 SECURITY extension specification for full details on
the restrictions imposed on untrusted clients.
GatewayPorts
Specifies whether remote hosts are allowed to connect to local
forwarded ports. By default, ssh(1) binds local port forwardings
to the loopback address. This prevents other remote hosts from
connecting to forwarded ports. GatewayPorts can be used to
specify that ssh should bind local port forwardings to the
wildcard address, thus allowing remote hosts to connect to
forwarded ports. The argument must be yes or no (the default).
GlobalKnownHostsFile
Specifies one or more files to use for the global host key
database, separated by whitespace. The default is
/etc/ssh/ssh_known_hosts, /etc/ssh/ssh_known_hosts2.
GSSAPIAuthentication
Specifies whether user authentication based on GSSAPI is allowed.
The default is no.
GSSAPIDelegateCredentials
Forward (delegate) credentials to the server. The default is no.
HashKnownHosts
Indicates that ssh(1) should hash host names and addresses when
they are added to ~/.ssh/known_hosts. These hashed names may be
used normally by ssh(1) and sshd(8), but they do not visually
reveal identifying information if the file's contents are
disclosed. The default is no. Note that existing names and
addresses in known hosts files will not be converted
automatically, but may be manually hashed using ssh-keygen(1).
HostbasedAuthentication
Specifies whether to try rhosts based authentication with public
key authentication. The argument must be yes or no (the
default).
HostbasedKeyTypes
Specifies the key types that will be used for hostbased
authentication as a comma-separated list of patterns.
Alternately if the specified list begins with a M-bM-^@M-^X+M-bM-^@M-^Y character,
then the specified key types will be appended to the default set
instead of replacing them. If the specified list begins with a
M-bM-^@M-^X-M-bM-^@M-^Y character, then the specified key types (including wildcards)
will be removed from the default set instead of replacing them.
If the specified list begins with a M-bM-^@M-^X^M-bM-^@M-^Y character, then the
specified key types will be placed at the head of the default
set. The default for this option is:
ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com,
ecdsa-sha2-nistp384-cert-v01@openssh.com,
ecdsa-sha2-nistp521-cert-v01@openssh.com,
sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com,
ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com,
sk-ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com,
rsa-sha2-512-cert-v01@openssh.com,
rsa-sha2-256-cert-v01@openssh.com,
ssh-rsa-cert-v01@openssh.com,
ecdsa-sha2-nistp256,ecdsa-sha2-nistp384,ecdsa-sha2-nistp521,
sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256@openssh.com,
ssh-ed25519,sk-ssh-ed25519@openssh.com,
rsa-sha2-512,rsa-sha2-256,ssh-rsa
The -Q option of ssh(1) may be used to list supported key types.
HostKeyAlgorithms
Specifies the host key algorithms that the client wants to use in
order of preference. Alternately if the specified list begins
with a M-bM-^@M-^X+M-bM-^@M-^Y character, then the specified key types will be
appended to the default set instead of replacing them. If the
specified list begins with a M-bM-^@M-^X-M-bM-^@M-^Y character, then the specified
key types (including wildcards) will be removed from the default
set instead of replacing them. If the specified list begins with
a M-bM-^@M-^X^M-bM-^@M-^Y character, then the specified key types will be placed at
the head of the default set. The default for this option is:
ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com,
ecdsa-sha2-nistp384-cert-v01@openssh.com,
ecdsa-sha2-nistp521-cert-v01@openssh.com,
sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com,
ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com,
sk-ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com,
rsa-sha2-512-cert-v01@openssh.com,
rsa-sha2-256-cert-v01@openssh.com,
ssh-rsa-cert-v01@openssh.com,
ecdsa-sha2-nistp256,ecdsa-sha2-nistp384,ecdsa-sha2-nistp521,
sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256@openssh.com,
ssh-ed25519,sk-ssh-ed25519@openssh.com,
rsa-sha2-512,rsa-sha2-256,ssh-rsa
If hostkeys are known for the destination host then this default
is modified to prefer their algorithms.
The list of available key types may also be obtained using "ssh
-Q HostKeyAlgorithms".
HostKeyAlias
Specifies an alias that should be used instead of the real host
name when looking up or saving the host key in the host key
database files and when validating host certificates. This
option is useful for tunneling SSH connections or for multiple
servers running on a single host.
Hostname
Specifies the real host name to log into. This can be used to
specify nicknames or abbreviations for hosts. Arguments to
Hostname accept the tokens described in the TOKENS section.
Numeric IP addresses are also permitted (both on the command line
and in Hostname specifications). The default is the name given
on the command line.
IdentitiesOnly
Specifies that ssh(1) should only use the configured
authentication identity and certificate files (either the default
files, or those explicitly configured in the ssh_config files or
passed on the ssh(1) command-line), even if ssh-agent(1) or a
PKCS11Provider or SecurityKeyProvider offers more identities.
The argument to this keyword must be yes or no (the default).
This option is intended for situations where ssh-agent offers
many different identities.
IdentityAgent
Specifies the UNIX-domain socket used to communicate with the
authentication agent.
This option overrides the SSH_AUTH_SOCK environment variable and
can be used to select a specific agent. Setting the socket name
to none disables the use of an authentication agent. If the
string "SSH_AUTH_SOCK" is specified, the location of the socket
will be read from the SSH_AUTH_SOCK environment variable.
Otherwise if the specified value begins with a M-bM-^@M-^X$M-bM-^@M-^Y character,
then it will be treated as an environment variable containing the
location of the socket.
Arguments to IdentityAgent may use the tilde syntax to refer to a
- user's home directory or the tokens described in the TOKENS
- section.
+ user's home directory, the tokens described in the TOKENS section
+ and environment variables as described in the ENVIRONMENT
+ VARIABLES section.
IdentityFile
Specifies a file from which the user's DSA, ECDSA, authenticator-
hosted ECDSA, Ed25519, authenticator-hosted Ed25519 or RSA
authentication identity is read. The default is ~/.ssh/id_dsa,
~/.ssh/id_ecdsa, ~/.ssh/id_ecdsa_sk, ~/.ssh/id_ed25519,
~/.ssh/id_ed25519_sk and ~/.ssh/id_rsa. Additionally, any
identities represented by the authentication agent will be used
for authentication unless IdentitiesOnly is set. If no
certificates have been explicitly specified by CertificateFile,
ssh(1) will try to load certificate information from the filename
obtained by appending -cert.pub to the path of a specified
IdentityFile.
Arguments to IdentityFile may use the tilde syntax to refer to a
user's home directory or the tokens described in the TOKENS
section.
It is possible to have multiple identity files specified in
configuration files; all these identities will be tried in
sequence. Multiple IdentityFile directives will add to the list
of identities tried (this behaviour differs from that of other
configuration directives).
IdentityFile may be used in conjunction with IdentitiesOnly to
select which identities in an agent are offered during
authentication. IdentityFile may also be used in conjunction
with CertificateFile in order to provide any certificate also
needed for authentication with the identity.
IgnoreUnknown
Specifies a pattern-list of unknown options to be ignored if they
are encountered in configuration parsing. This may be used to
suppress errors if ssh_config contains options that are
unrecognised by ssh(1). It is recommended that IgnoreUnknown be
listed early in the configuration file as it will not be applied
to unknown options that appear before it.
Include
Include the specified configuration file(s). Multiple pathnames
may be specified and each pathname may contain glob(7) wildcards
and, for user configurations, shell-like M-bM-^@M-^X~M-bM-^@M-^Y references to user
- home directories. Files without absolute paths are assumed to be
- in ~/.ssh if included in a user configuration file or /etc/ssh if
+ home directories. Wildcards will be expanded and processed in
+ lexical order. Files without absolute paths are assumed to be in
+ ~/.ssh if included in a user configuration file or /etc/ssh if
included from the system configuration file. Include directive
may appear inside a Match or Host block to perform conditional
inclusion.
IPQoS Specifies the IPv4 type-of-service or DSCP class for connections.
Accepted values are af11, af12, af13, af21, af22, af23, af31,
af32, af33, af41, af42, af43, cs0, cs1, cs2, cs3, cs4, cs5, cs6,
cs7, ef, le, lowdelay, throughput, reliability, a numeric value,
or none to use the operating system default. This option may
take one or two arguments, separated by whitespace. If one
argument is specified, it is used as the packet class
unconditionally. If two values are specified, the first is
automatically selected for interactive sessions and the second
for non-interactive sessions. The default is af21 (Low-Latency
Data) for interactive sessions and cs1 (Lower Effort) for non-
interactive sessions.
KbdInteractiveAuthentication
Specifies whether to use keyboard-interactive authentication.
The argument to this keyword must be yes (the default) or no.
KbdInteractiveDevices
Specifies the list of methods to use in keyboard-interactive
authentication. Multiple method names must be comma-separated.
The default is to use the server specified list. The methods
available vary depending on what the server supports. For an
OpenSSH server, it may be zero or more of: bsdauth and pam.
KexAlgorithms
Specifies the available KEX (Key Exchange) algorithms. Multiple
algorithms must be comma-separated. If the specified list begins
with a M-bM-^@M-^X+M-bM-^@M-^Y character, then the specified methods will be appended
to the default set instead of replacing them. If the specified
list begins with a M-bM-^@M-^X-M-bM-^@M-^Y character, then the specified methods
(including wildcards) will be removed from the default set
instead of replacing them. If the specified list begins with a
M-bM-^@M-^X^M-bM-^@M-^Y character, then the specified methods will be placed at the
head of the default set. The default is:
curve25519-sha256,curve25519-sha256@libssh.org,
ecdh-sha2-nistp256,ecdh-sha2-nistp384,ecdh-sha2-nistp521,
diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha256,
diffie-hellman-group16-sha512,
diffie-hellman-group18-sha512,
diffie-hellman-group14-sha256
The list of available key exchange algorithms may also be
obtained using "ssh -Q kex".
LocalCommand
Specifies a command to execute on the local machine after
successfully connecting to the server. The command string
extends to the end of the line, and is executed with the user's
shell. Arguments to LocalCommand accept the tokens described in
the TOKENS section.
The command is run synchronously and does not have access to the
session of the ssh(1) that spawned it. It should not be used for
interactive commands.
This directive is ignored unless PermitLocalCommand has been
enabled.
LocalForward
Specifies that a TCP port on the local machine be forwarded over
the secure channel to the specified host and port from the remote
machine. The first argument specifies the listener and may be
[bind_address:]port or a Unix domain socket path. The second
argument is the destination and may be host:hostport or a Unix
domain socket path if the remote host supports it.
IPv6 addresses can be specified by enclosing addresses in square
brackets. Multiple forwardings may be specified, and additional
forwardings can be given on the command line. Only the superuser
can forward privileged ports. By default, the local port is
bound in accordance with the GatewayPorts setting. However, an
explicit bind_address may be used to bind the connection to a
specific address. The bind_address of localhost indicates that
the listening port be bound for local use only, while an empty
address or M-bM-^@M-^X*M-bM-^@M-^Y indicates that the port should be available from
- all interfaces. Unix domain socket paths accept the tokens
- described in the TOKENS section.
+ all interfaces. Unix domain socket paths may use the tokens
+ described in the TOKENS section and environment variables as
+ described in the ENVIRONMENT VARIABLES section.
LogLevel
Gives the verbosity level that is used when logging messages from
ssh(1). The possible values are: QUIET, FATAL, ERROR, INFO,
VERBOSE, DEBUG, DEBUG1, DEBUG2, and DEBUG3. The default is INFO.
DEBUG and DEBUG1 are equivalent. DEBUG2 and DEBUG3 each specify
higher levels of verbose output.
MACs Specifies the MAC (message authentication code) algorithms in
order of preference. The MAC algorithm is used for data
integrity protection. Multiple algorithms must be comma-
separated. If the specified list begins with a M-bM-^@M-^X+M-bM-^@M-^Y character,
then the specified algorithms will be appended to the default set
instead of replacing them. If the specified list begins with a
M-bM-^@M-^X-M-bM-^@M-^Y character, then the specified algorithms (including
wildcards) will be removed from the default set instead of
replacing them. If the specified list begins with a M-bM-^@M-^X^M-bM-^@M-^Y
character, then the specified algorithms will be placed at the
head of the default set.
The algorithms that contain "-etm" calculate the MAC after
encryption (encrypt-then-mac). These are considered safer and
their use recommended.
The default is:
umac-64-etm@openssh.com,umac-128-etm@openssh.com,
hmac-sha2-256-etm@openssh.com,hmac-sha2-512-etm@openssh.com,
hmac-sha1-etm@openssh.com,
umac-64@openssh.com,umac-128@openssh.com,
hmac-sha2-256,hmac-sha2-512,hmac-sha1
The list of available MAC algorithms may also be obtained using
"ssh -Q mac".
NoHostAuthenticationForLocalhost
Disable host authentication for localhost (loopback addresses).
The argument to this keyword must be yes or no (the default).
NumberOfPasswordPrompts
Specifies the number of password prompts before giving up. The
argument to this keyword must be an integer. The default is 3.
PasswordAuthentication
Specifies whether to use password authentication. The argument
to this keyword must be yes (the default) or no.
PermitLocalCommand
Allow local command execution via the LocalCommand option or
using the !command escape sequence in ssh(1). The argument must
be yes or no (the default).
PKCS11Provider
Specifies which PKCS#11 provider to use or none to indicate that
no provider should be used (the default). The argument to this
keyword is a path to the PKCS#11 shared library ssh(1) should use
to communicate with a PKCS#11 token providing keys for user
authentication.
Port Specifies the port number to connect on the remote host. The
default is 22.
PreferredAuthentications
Specifies the order in which the client should try authentication
methods. This allows a client to prefer one method (e.g.
keyboard-interactive) over another method (e.g. password). The
default is:
gssapi-with-mic,hostbased,publickey,
keyboard-interactive,password
ProxyCommand
Specifies the command to use to connect to the server. The
command string extends to the end of the line, and is executed
using the user's shell M-bM-^@M-^XexecM-bM-^@M-^Y directive to avoid a lingering
shell process.
Arguments to ProxyCommand accept the tokens described in the
TOKENS section. The command can be basically anything, and
should read from its standard input and write to its standard
output. It should eventually connect an sshd(8) server running
on some machine, or execute sshd -i somewhere. Host key
management will be done using the Hostname of the host being
connected (defaulting to the name typed by the user). Setting
the command to none disables this option entirely. Note that
CheckHostIP is not available for connects with a proxy command.
This directive is useful in conjunction with nc(1) and its proxy
support. For example, the following directive would connect via
an HTTP proxy at 192.0.2.0:
ProxyCommand /usr/bin/nc -X connect -x 192.0.2.0:8080 %h %p
ProxyJump
Specifies one or more jump proxies as either [user@]host[:port]
or an ssh URI. Multiple proxies may be separated by comma
characters and will be visited sequentially. Setting this option
will cause ssh(1) to connect to the target host by first making a
ssh(1) connection to the specified ProxyJump host and then
establishing a TCP forwarding to the ultimate target from there.
Note that this option will compete with the ProxyCommand option -
whichever is specified first will prevent later instances of the
other from taking effect.
Note also that the configuration for the destination host (either
supplied via the command-line or the configuration file) is not
generally applied to jump hosts. ~/.ssh/config should be used if
specific configuration is required for jump hosts.
ProxyUseFdpass
Specifies that ProxyCommand will pass a connected file descriptor
back to ssh(1) instead of continuing to execute and pass data.
The default is no.
PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes
Specifies the key types that will be used for public key
authentication as a comma-separated list of patterns. If the
specified list begins with a M-bM-^@M-^X+M-bM-^@M-^Y character, then the key types
after it will be appended to the default instead of replacing it.
If the specified list begins with a M-bM-^@M-^X-M-bM-^@M-^Y character, then the
specified key types (including wildcards) will be removed from
the default set instead of replacing them. If the specified list
begins with a M-bM-^@M-^X^M-bM-^@M-^Y character, then the specified key types will be
placed at the head of the default set. The default for this
option is:
ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com,
ecdsa-sha2-nistp384-cert-v01@openssh.com,
ecdsa-sha2-nistp521-cert-v01@openssh.com,
sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com,
ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com,
sk-ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com,
rsa-sha2-512-cert-v01@openssh.com,
rsa-sha2-256-cert-v01@openssh.com,
ssh-rsa-cert-v01@openssh.com,
ecdsa-sha2-nistp256,ecdsa-sha2-nistp384,ecdsa-sha2-nistp521,
sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256@openssh.com,
ssh-ed25519,sk-ssh-ed25519@openssh.com,
rsa-sha2-512,rsa-sha2-256,ssh-rsa
The list of available key types may also be obtained using "ssh
-Q PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes".
PubkeyAuthentication
Specifies whether to try public key authentication. The argument
to this keyword must be yes (the default) or no.
RekeyLimit
Specifies the maximum amount of data that may be transmitted
before the session key is renegotiated, optionally followed a
maximum amount of time that may pass before the session key is
renegotiated. The first argument is specified in bytes and may
have a suffix of M-bM-^@M-^XKM-bM-^@M-^Y, M-bM-^@M-^XMM-bM-^@M-^Y, or M-bM-^@M-^XGM-bM-^@M-^Y to indicate Kilobytes,
Megabytes, or Gigabytes, respectively. The default is between
M-bM-^@M-^X1GM-bM-^@M-^Y and M-bM-^@M-^X4GM-bM-^@M-^Y, depending on the cipher. The optional second
value is specified in seconds and may use any of the units
documented in the TIME FORMATS section of sshd_config(5). The
default value for RekeyLimit is default none, which means that
rekeying is performed after the cipher's default amount of data
has been sent or received and no time based rekeying is done.
RemoteCommand
Specifies a command to execute on the remote machine after
successfully connecting to the server. The command string
extends to the end of the line, and is executed with the user's
shell. Arguments to RemoteCommand accept the tokens described in
the TOKENS section.
RemoteForward
Specifies that a TCP port on the remote machine be forwarded over
the secure channel. The remote port may either be forwarded to a
specified host and port from the local machine, or may act as a
SOCKS 4/5 proxy that allows a remote client to connect to
arbitrary destinations from the local machine. The first
argument is the listening specification and may be
[bind_address:]port or, if the remote host supports it, a Unix
domain socket path. If forwarding to a specific destination then
the second argument must be host:hostport or a Unix domain socket
path, otherwise if no destination argument is specified then the
remote forwarding will be established as a SOCKS proxy.
IPv6 addresses can be specified by enclosing addresses in square
brackets. Multiple forwardings may be specified, and additional
forwardings can be given on the command line. Privileged ports
can be forwarded only when logging in as root on the remote
- machine. Unix domain socket paths accept the tokens described in
- the TOKENS section.
+ machine. Unix domain socket paths may use the tokens described
+ in the TOKENS section and environment variables as described in
+ the ENVIRONMENT VARIABLES section.
If the port argument is 0, the listen port will be dynamically
allocated on the server and reported to the client at run time.
If the bind_address is not specified, the default is to only bind
to loopback addresses. If the bind_address is M-bM-^@M-^X*M-bM-^@M-^Y or an empty
string, then the forwarding is requested to listen on all
interfaces. Specifying a remote bind_address will only succeed
if the server's GatewayPorts option is enabled (see
sshd_config(5)).
RequestTTY
Specifies whether to request a pseudo-tty for the session. The
argument may be one of: no (never request a TTY), yes (always
request a TTY when standard input is a TTY), force (always
request a TTY) or auto (request a TTY when opening a login
session). This option mirrors the -t and -T flags for ssh(1).
RevokedHostKeys
Specifies revoked host public keys. Keys listed in this file
will be refused for host authentication. Note that if this file
does not exist or is not readable, then host authentication will
be refused for all hosts. Keys may be specified as a text file,
listing one public key per line, or as an OpenSSH Key Revocation
List (KRL) as generated by ssh-keygen(1). For more information
on KRLs, see the KEY REVOCATION LISTS section in ssh-keygen(1).
SecurityKeyProvider
Specifies a path to a library that will be used when loading any
FIDO authenticator-hosted keys, overriding the default of using
the built-in USB HID support.
If the specified value begins with a M-bM-^@M-^X$M-bM-^@M-^Y character, then it will
be treated as an environment variable containing the path to the
library.
SendEnv
Specifies what variables from the local environ(7) should be sent
to the server. The server must also support it, and the server
must be configured to accept these environment variables. Note
that the TERM environment variable is always sent whenever a
pseudo-terminal is requested as it is required by the protocol.
Refer to AcceptEnv in sshd_config(5) for how to configure the
server. Variables are specified by name, which may contain
wildcard characters. Multiple environment variables may be
separated by whitespace or spread across multiple SendEnv
directives.
See PATTERNS for more information on patterns.
It is possible to clear previously set SendEnv variable names by
prefixing patterns with -. The default is not to send any
environment variables.
ServerAliveCountMax
Sets the number of server alive messages (see below) which may be
sent without ssh(1) receiving any messages back from the server.
If this threshold is reached while server alive messages are
being sent, ssh will disconnect from the server, terminating the
session. It is important to note that the use of server alive
messages is very different from TCPKeepAlive (below). The server
alive messages are sent through the encrypted channel and
therefore will not be spoofable. The TCP keepalive option
enabled by TCPKeepAlive is spoofable. The server alive mechanism
is valuable when the client or server depend on knowing when a
connection has become unresponsive.
The default value is 3. If, for example, ServerAliveInterval
(see below) is set to 15 and ServerAliveCountMax is left at the
default, if the server becomes unresponsive, ssh will disconnect
after approximately 45 seconds.
ServerAliveInterval
Sets a timeout interval in seconds after which if no data has
been received from the server, ssh(1) will send a message through
the encrypted channel to request a response from the server. The
default is 0, indicating that these messages will not be sent to
the server.
SetEnv Directly specify one or more environment variables and their
contents to be sent to the server. Similarly to SendEnv, the
server must be prepared to accept the environment variable.
StreamLocalBindMask
Sets the octal file creation mode mask (umask) used when creating
a Unix-domain socket file for local or remote port forwarding.
This option is only used for port forwarding to a Unix-domain
socket file.
The default value is 0177, which creates a Unix-domain socket
file that is readable and writable only by the owner. Note that
not all operating systems honor the file mode on Unix-domain
socket files.
StreamLocalBindUnlink
Specifies whether to remove an existing Unix-domain socket file
for local or remote port forwarding before creating a new one.
If the socket file already exists and StreamLocalBindUnlink is
not enabled, ssh will be unable to forward the port to the Unix-
domain socket file. This option is only used for port forwarding
to a Unix-domain socket file.
The argument must be yes or no (the default).
StrictHostKeyChecking
If this flag is set to yes, ssh(1) will never automatically add
host keys to the ~/.ssh/known_hosts file, and refuses to connect
to hosts whose host key has changed. This provides maximum
protection against man-in-the-middle (MITM) attacks, though it
can be annoying when the /etc/ssh/ssh_known_hosts file is poorly
maintained or when connections to new hosts are frequently made.
This option forces the user to manually add all new hosts.
If this flag is set to M-bM-^@M-^\accept-newM-bM-^@M-^] then ssh will automatically
add new host keys to the user known hosts files, but will not
permit connections to hosts with changed host keys. If this flag
is set to M-bM-^@M-^\noM-bM-^@M-^] or M-bM-^@M-^\offM-bM-^@M-^], ssh will automatically add new host keys
to the user known hosts files and allow connections to hosts with
changed hostkeys to proceed, subject to some restrictions. If
this flag is set to ask (the default), new host keys will be
added to the user known host files only after the user has
confirmed that is what they really want to do, and ssh will
refuse to connect to hosts whose host key has changed. The host
keys of known hosts will be verified automatically in all cases.
SyslogFacility
Gives the facility code that is used when logging messages from
ssh(1). The possible values are: DAEMON, USER, AUTH, LOCAL0,
LOCAL1, LOCAL2, LOCAL3, LOCAL4, LOCAL5, LOCAL6, LOCAL7. The
default is USER.
TCPKeepAlive
Specifies whether the system should send TCP keepalive messages
to the other side. If they are sent, death of the connection or
crash of one of the machines will be properly noticed. However,
this means that connections will die if the route is down
temporarily, and some people find it annoying.
The default is yes (to send TCP keepalive messages), and the
client will notice if the network goes down or the remote host
dies. This is important in scripts, and many users want it too.
To disable TCP keepalive messages, the value should be set to no.
See also ServerAliveInterval for protocol-level keepalives.
Tunnel Request tun(4) device forwarding between the client and the
server. The argument must be yes, point-to-point (layer 3),
ethernet (layer 2), or no (the default). Specifying yes requests
the default tunnel mode, which is point-to-point.
TunnelDevice
Specifies the tun(4) devices to open on the client (local_tun)
and the server (remote_tun).
The argument must be local_tun[:remote_tun]. The devices may be
specified by numerical ID or the keyword any, which uses the next
available tunnel device. If remote_tun is not specified, it
defaults to any. The default is any:any.
UpdateHostKeys
Specifies whether ssh(1) should accept notifications of
additional hostkeys from the server sent after authentication has
completed and add them to UserKnownHostsFile. The argument must
be yes, no or ask. This option allows learning alternate
hostkeys for a server and supports graceful key rotation by
allowing a server to send replacement public keys before old ones
are removed. Additional hostkeys are only accepted if the key
used to authenticate the host was already trusted or explicitly
accepted by the user.
UpdateHostKeys is enabled by default if the user has not
overridden the default UserKnownHostsFile setting, otherwise
UpdateHostKeys will be set to ask.
If UpdateHostKeys is set to ask, then the user is asked to
confirm the modifications to the known_hosts file. Confirmation
is currently incompatible with ControlPersist, and will be
disabled if it is enabled.
Presently, only sshd(8) from OpenSSH 6.8 and greater support the
"hostkeys@openssh.com" protocol extension used to inform the
client of all the server's hostkeys.
User Specifies the user to log in as. This can be useful when a
different user name is used on different machines. This saves
the trouble of having to remember to give the user name on the
command line.
UserKnownHostsFile
Specifies one or more files to use for the user host key
- database, separated by whitespace. The default is
+ database, separated by whitespace. Each filename may use tilde
+ notation to refer to the user's home directory, the tokens
+ described in the TOKENS section and environment variables as
+ described in the ENVIRONMENT VARIABLES section. The default is
~/.ssh/known_hosts, ~/.ssh/known_hosts2.
VerifyHostKeyDNS
Specifies whether to verify the remote key using DNS and SSHFP
resource records. If this option is set to yes, the client will
implicitly trust keys that match a secure fingerprint from DNS.
Insecure fingerprints will be handled as if this option was set
to ask. If this option is set to ask, information on fingerprint
match will be displayed, but the user will still need to confirm
new host keys according to the StrictHostKeyChecking option. The
default is no.
See also VERIFYING HOST KEYS in ssh(1).
VisualHostKey
If this flag is set to yes, an ASCII art representation of the
remote host key fingerprint is printed in addition to the
fingerprint string at login and for unknown host keys. If this
flag is set to no (the default), no fingerprint strings are
printed at login and only the fingerprint string will be printed
for unknown host keys.
XAuthLocation
Specifies the full pathname of the xauth(1) program. The default
is /usr/X11R6/bin/xauth.
PATTERNS
A pattern consists of zero or more non-whitespace characters, M-bM-^@M-^X*M-bM-^@M-^Y (a
wildcard that matches zero or more characters), or M-bM-^@M-^X?M-bM-^@M-^Y (a wildcard that
matches exactly one character). For example, to specify a set of
declarations for any host in the ".co.uk" set of domains, the following
pattern could be used:
Host *.co.uk
The following pattern would match any host in the 192.168.0.[0-9] network
range:
Host 192.168.0.?
A pattern-list is a comma-separated list of patterns. Patterns within
pattern-lists may be negated by preceding them with an exclamation mark
(M-bM-^@M-^X!M-bM-^@M-^Y). For example, to allow a key to be used from anywhere within an
organization except from the "dialup" pool, the following entry (in
authorized_keys) could be used:
from="!*.dialup.example.com,*.example.com"
Note that a negated match will never produce a positive result by itself.
For example, attempting to match "host3" against the following pattern-
list will fail:
from="!host1,!host2"
The solution here is to include a term that will yield a positive match,
such as a wildcard:
from="!host1,!host2,*"
TOKENS
Arguments to some keywords can make use of tokens, which are expanded at
runtime:
%% A literal M-bM-^@M-^X%M-bM-^@M-^Y.
%C Hash of %l%h%p%r.
%d Local user's home directory.
%h The remote hostname.
%i The local user ID.
+ %k The host key alias if specified, otherwise the orignal remote
+ hostname given on the command line.
%L The local hostname.
%l The local hostname, including the domain name.
%n The original remote hostname, as given on the command line.
%p The remote port.
%r The remote username.
%T The local tun(4) or tap(4) network interface assigned if
tunnel forwarding was requested, or "NONE" otherwise.
%u The local username.
CertificateFile, ControlPath, IdentityAgent, IdentityFile, LocalForward,
- Match exec, RemoteCommand, and RemoteForward accept the tokens %%, %C,
- %d, %h, %i, %L, %l, %n, %p, %r, and %u.
+ Match exec, RemoteCommand, RemoteForward, and UserKnownHostsFile accept
+ the tokens %%, %C, %d, %h, %i, %L, %l, %n, %p, %r, and %u.
Hostname accepts the tokens %% and %h.
LocalCommand accepts all tokens.
ProxyCommand accepts the tokens %%, %h, %n, %p, and %r.
+ENVIRONMENT VARIABLES
+ Arguments to some keywords can be expanded at runtime from environment
+ variables on the client by enclosing them in ${}, for example
+ ${HOME}/.ssh would refer to the user's .ssh directory. If a specified
+ environment variable does not exist then an error will be returned and
+ the setting for that keyword will be ignored.
+
+ The keywords CertificateFile, ControlPath, IdentityAgent, IdentityFile
+ and UserKnownHostsFile support environment variables. The keywords
+ LocalForward and RemoteForward support environment variables only for
+ Unix domain socket paths.
+
FILES
~/.ssh/config
This is the per-user configuration file. The format of this file
is described above. This file is used by the SSH client.
Because of the potential for abuse, this file must have strict
permissions: read/write for the user, and not writable by others.
/etc/ssh/ssh_config
Systemwide configuration file. This file provides defaults for
those values that are not specified in the user's configuration
file, and for those users who do not have a configuration file.
This file must be world-readable.
SEE ALSO
ssh(1)
AUTHORS
OpenSSH is a derivative of the original and free ssh 1.2.12 release by
Tatu Ylonen. Aaron Campbell, Bob Beck, Markus Friedl, Niels Provos, Theo
de Raadt and Dug Song removed many bugs, re-added newer features and
created OpenSSH. Markus Friedl contributed the support for SSH protocol
versions 1.5 and 2.0.
-OpenBSD 6.7 April 11, 2020 OpenBSD 6.7
+OpenBSD 6.8 August 11, 2020 OpenBSD 6.8
diff --git a/ssh_config.5 b/ssh_config.5
index dc010ccbd5f2..6be1f1aa2176 100644
--- a/ssh_config.5
+++ b/ssh_config.5
@@ -1,1907 +1,1960 @@
.\"
.\" Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
.\" Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
.\" All rights reserved
.\"
.\" As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
.\" can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this
.\" software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
.\" incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
.\" called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
.\"
.\" Copyright (c) 1999,2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
.\" Copyright (c) 1999 Aaron Campbell. All rights reserved.
.\" Copyright (c) 1999 Theo de Raadt. All rights reserved.
.\"
.\" Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
.\" modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
.\" are met:
.\" 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
.\" notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
.\" 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
.\" notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
.\" documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
.\"
.\" THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
.\" IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
.\" OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
.\" IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
.\" INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
.\" NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
.\" DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
.\" THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
.\" (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
.\" THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
.\"
-.\" $OpenBSD: ssh_config.5,v 1.325 2020/04/11 20:20:09 jmc Exp $
-.Dd $Mdocdate: April 11 2020 $
+.\" $OpenBSD: ssh_config.5,v 1.332 2020/08/11 09:49:57 djm Exp $
+.Dd $Mdocdate: August 11 2020 $
.Dt SSH_CONFIG 5
.Os
.Sh NAME
.Nm ssh_config
.Nd OpenSSH client configuration file
.Sh DESCRIPTION
.Xr ssh 1
obtains configuration data from the following sources in
the following order:
.Pp
.Bl -enum -offset indent -compact
.It
command-line options
.It
user's configuration file
.Pq Pa ~/.ssh/config
.It
system-wide configuration file
.Pq Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_config
.El
.Pp
For each parameter, the first obtained value
will be used.
The configuration files contain sections separated by
.Cm Host
specifications, and that section is only applied for hosts that
match one of the patterns given in the specification.
The matched host name is usually the one given on the command line
(see the
.Cm CanonicalizeHostname
option for exceptions).
.Pp
Since the first obtained value for each parameter is used, more
host-specific declarations should be given near the beginning of the
file, and general defaults at the end.
.Pp
The file contains keyword-argument pairs, one per line.
Lines starting with
.Ql #
and empty lines are interpreted as comments.
Arguments may optionally be enclosed in double quotes
.Pq \&"
in order to represent arguments containing spaces.
Configuration options may be separated by whitespace or
optional whitespace and exactly one
.Ql = ;
the latter format is useful to avoid the need to quote whitespace
when specifying configuration options using the
.Nm ssh ,
.Nm scp ,
and
.Nm sftp
.Fl o
option.
.Pp
The possible
keywords and their meanings are as follows (note that
keywords are case-insensitive and arguments are case-sensitive):
.Bl -tag -width Ds
.It Cm Host
Restricts the following declarations (up to the next
.Cm Host
or
.Cm Match
keyword) to be only for those hosts that match one of the patterns
given after the keyword.
If more than one pattern is provided, they should be separated by whitespace.
A single
.Ql *
as a pattern can be used to provide global
defaults for all hosts.
The host is usually the
.Ar hostname
argument given on the command line
(see the
.Cm CanonicalizeHostname
keyword for exceptions).
.Pp
A pattern entry may be negated by prefixing it with an exclamation mark
.Pq Sq !\& .
If a negated entry is matched, then the
.Cm Host
entry is ignored, regardless of whether any other patterns on the line
match.
Negated matches are therefore useful to provide exceptions for wildcard
matches.
.Pp
See
.Sx PATTERNS
for more information on patterns.
.It Cm Match
Restricts the following declarations (up to the next
.Cm Host
or
.Cm Match
keyword) to be used only when the conditions following the
.Cm Match
keyword are satisfied.
Match conditions are specified using one or more criteria
or the single token
.Cm all
which always matches.
The available criteria keywords are:
.Cm canonical ,
.Cm final ,
.Cm exec ,
.Cm host ,
.Cm originalhost ,
.Cm user ,
and
.Cm localuser .
The
.Cm all
criteria must appear alone or immediately after
.Cm canonical
or
.Cm final .
Other criteria may be combined arbitrarily.
All criteria but
.Cm all ,
.Cm canonical ,
and
.Cm final
require an argument.
Criteria may be negated by prepending an exclamation mark
.Pq Sq !\& .
.Pp
The
.Cm canonical
keyword matches only when the configuration file is being re-parsed
after hostname canonicalization (see the
.Cm CanonicalizeHostname
option).
This may be useful to specify conditions that work with canonical host
names only.
.Pp
The
.Cm final
keyword requests that the configuration be re-parsed (regardless of whether
.Cm CanonicalizeHostname
is enabled), and matches only during this final pass.
If
.Cm CanonicalizeHostname
is enabled, then
.Cm canonical
and
.Cm final
match during the same pass.
.Pp
The
.Cm exec
keyword executes the specified command under the user's shell.
If the command returns a zero exit status then the condition is considered true.
Commands containing whitespace characters must be quoted.
Arguments to
.Cm exec
accept the tokens described in the
.Sx TOKENS
section.
.Pp
The other keywords' criteria must be single entries or comma-separated
lists and may use the wildcard and negation operators described in the
.Sx PATTERNS
section.
The criteria for the
.Cm host
keyword are matched against the target hostname, after any substitution
by the
.Cm Hostname
or
.Cm CanonicalizeHostname
options.
The
.Cm originalhost
keyword matches against the hostname as it was specified on the command-line.
The
.Cm user
keyword matches against the target username on the remote host.
The
.Cm localuser
keyword matches against the name of the local user running
.Xr ssh 1
(this keyword may be useful in system-wide
.Nm
files).
.It Cm AddKeysToAgent
Specifies whether keys should be automatically added to a running
.Xr ssh-agent 1 .
If this option is set to
.Cm yes
and a key is loaded from a file, the key and its passphrase are added to
the agent with the default lifetime, as if by
.Xr ssh-add 1 .
If this option is set to
.Cm ask ,
.Xr ssh 1
will require confirmation using the
.Ev SSH_ASKPASS
program before adding a key (see
.Xr ssh-add 1
for details).
If this option is set to
.Cm confirm ,
each use of the key must be confirmed, as if the
.Fl c
option was specified to
.Xr ssh-add 1 .
If this option is set to
.Cm no ,
no keys are added to the agent.
+Alternately, this option may be specified as a time interval
+using the format described in the
+.Sx TIME FORMATS
+section of
+.Xr sshd_config 5
+to specify the key's lifetime in
+.Xr ssh-agent 1 ,
+after which it will automatically be removed.
The argument must be
-.Cm yes ,
-.Cm confirm ,
-.Cm ask ,
-or
.Cm no
-(the default).
+(the default),
+.Cm yes ,
+.Cm confirm
+(optionally followed by a time interval),
+.Cm ask
+or a time interval.
.It Cm AddressFamily
Specifies which address family to use when connecting.
Valid arguments are
.Cm any
(the default),
.Cm inet
(use IPv4 only), or
.Cm inet6
(use IPv6 only).
.It Cm BatchMode
If set to
.Cm yes ,
user interaction such as password prompts and host key confirmation requests
will be disabled.
This option is useful in scripts and other batch jobs where no user
is present to interact with
.Xr ssh 1 .
The argument must be
.Cm yes
or
.Cm no
(the default).
.It Cm BindAddress
Use the specified address on the local machine as the source address of
the connection.
Only useful on systems with more than one address.
.It Cm BindInterface
Use the address of the specified interface on the local machine as the
source address of the connection.
.It Cm CanonicalDomains
When
.Cm CanonicalizeHostname
is enabled, this option specifies the list of domain suffixes in which to
search for the specified destination host.
.It Cm CanonicalizeFallbackLocal
Specifies whether to fail with an error when hostname canonicalization fails.
The default,
.Cm yes ,
will attempt to look up the unqualified hostname using the system resolver's
search rules.
A value of
.Cm no
will cause
.Xr ssh 1
to fail instantly if
.Cm CanonicalizeHostname
is enabled and the target hostname cannot be found in any of the domains
specified by
.Cm CanonicalDomains .
.It Cm CanonicalizeHostname
Controls whether explicit hostname canonicalization is performed.
The default,
.Cm no ,
is not to perform any name rewriting and let the system resolver handle all
hostname lookups.
If set to
.Cm yes
then, for connections that do not use a
.Cm ProxyCommand
or
.Cm ProxyJump ,
.Xr ssh 1
will attempt to canonicalize the hostname specified on the command line
using the
.Cm CanonicalDomains
suffixes and
.Cm CanonicalizePermittedCNAMEs
rules.
If
.Cm CanonicalizeHostname
is set to
.Cm always ,
then canonicalization is applied to proxied connections too.
.Pp
If this option is enabled, then the configuration files are processed
again using the new target name to pick up any new configuration in matching
.Cm Host
and
.Cm Match
stanzas.
.It Cm CanonicalizeMaxDots
Specifies the maximum number of dot characters in a hostname before
canonicalization is disabled.
The default, 1,
allows a single dot (i.e. hostname.subdomain).
.It Cm CanonicalizePermittedCNAMEs
Specifies rules to determine whether CNAMEs should be followed when
canonicalizing hostnames.
The rules consist of one or more arguments of
.Ar source_domain_list : Ns Ar target_domain_list ,
where
.Ar source_domain_list
is a pattern-list of domains that may follow CNAMEs in canonicalization,
and
.Ar target_domain_list
is a pattern-list of domains that they may resolve to.
.Pp
For example,
.Qq *.a.example.com:*.b.example.com,*.c.example.com
will allow hostnames matching
.Qq *.a.example.com
to be canonicalized to names in the
.Qq *.b.example.com
or
.Qq *.c.example.com
domains.
.It Cm CASignatureAlgorithms
Specifies which algorithms are allowed for signing of certificates
by certificate authorities (CAs).
The default is:
.Bd -literal -offset indent
ecdsa-sha2-nistp256,ecdsa-sha2-nistp384,ecdsa-sha2-nistp521,
ssh-ed25519,rsa-sha2-512,rsa-sha2-256,ssh-rsa
.Ed
.Pp
.Xr ssh 1
will not accept host certificates signed using algorithms other than those
specified.
.It Cm CertificateFile
Specifies a file from which the user's certificate is read.
A corresponding private key must be provided separately in order
to use this certificate either
from an
.Cm IdentityFile
directive or
.Fl i
flag to
.Xr ssh 1 ,
via
.Xr ssh-agent 1 ,
or via a
.Cm PKCS11Provider
or
.Cm SecurityKeyProvider .
.Pp
Arguments to
.Cm CertificateFile
-may use the tilde syntax to refer to a user's home directory
-or the tokens described in the
+may use the tilde syntax to refer to a user's home directory,
+the tokens described in the
.Sx TOKENS
+section and environment variables as described in the
+.Sx ENVIRONMENT VARIABLES
section.
.Pp
It is possible to have multiple certificate files specified in
configuration files; these certificates will be tried in sequence.
Multiple
.Cm CertificateFile
directives will add to the list of certificates used for
authentication.
.It Cm ChallengeResponseAuthentication
Specifies whether to use challenge-response authentication.
The argument to this keyword must be
.Cm yes
(the default)
or
.Cm no .
.It Cm CheckHostIP
If set to
.Cm yes
(the default),
.Xr ssh 1
will additionally check the host IP address in the
.Pa known_hosts
file.
This allows it to detect if a host key changed due to DNS spoofing
and will add addresses of destination hosts to
.Pa ~/.ssh/known_hosts
in the process, regardless of the setting of
.Cm StrictHostKeyChecking .
If the option is set to
.Cm no ,
the check will not be executed.
.It Cm Ciphers
Specifies the ciphers allowed and their order of preference.
Multiple ciphers must be comma-separated.
If the specified list begins with a
.Sq +
character, then the specified ciphers will be appended to the default set
instead of replacing them.
If the specified list begins with a
.Sq -
character, then the specified ciphers (including wildcards) will be removed
from the default set instead of replacing them.
If the specified list begins with a
.Sq ^
character, then the specified ciphers will be placed at the head of the
default set.
.Pp
The supported ciphers are:
.Bd -literal -offset indent
3des-cbc
aes128-cbc
aes192-cbc
aes256-cbc
aes128-ctr
aes192-ctr
aes256-ctr
aes128-gcm@openssh.com
aes256-gcm@openssh.com
chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com
.Ed
.Pp
The default is:
.Bd -literal -offset indent
chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com,
aes128-ctr,aes192-ctr,aes256-ctr,
aes128-gcm@openssh.com,aes256-gcm@openssh.com
.Ed
.Pp
The list of available ciphers may also be obtained using
.Qq ssh -Q cipher .
.It Cm ClearAllForwardings
Specifies that all local, remote, and dynamic port forwardings
specified in the configuration files or on the command line be
cleared.
This option is primarily useful when used from the
.Xr ssh 1
command line to clear port forwardings set in
configuration files, and is automatically set by
.Xr scp 1
and
.Xr sftp 1 .
The argument must be
.Cm yes
or
.Cm no
(the default).
.It Cm Compression
Specifies whether to use compression.
The argument must be
.Cm yes
or
.Cm no
(the default).
.It Cm ConnectionAttempts
Specifies the number of tries (one per second) to make before exiting.
The argument must be an integer.
This may be useful in scripts if the connection sometimes fails.
The default is 1.
.It Cm ConnectTimeout
Specifies the timeout (in seconds) used when connecting to the
SSH server, instead of using the default system TCP timeout.
This timeout is applied both to establishing the connection and to performing
the initial SSH protocol handshake and key exchange.
.It Cm ControlMaster
Enables the sharing of multiple sessions over a single network connection.
When set to
.Cm yes ,
.Xr ssh 1
will listen for connections on a control socket specified using the
.Cm ControlPath
argument.
Additional sessions can connect to this socket using the same
.Cm ControlPath
with
.Cm ControlMaster
set to
.Cm no
(the default).
These sessions will try to reuse the master instance's network connection
rather than initiating new ones, but will fall back to connecting normally
if the control socket does not exist, or is not listening.
.Pp
Setting this to
.Cm ask
will cause
.Xr ssh 1
to listen for control connections, but require confirmation using
.Xr ssh-askpass 1 .
If the
.Cm ControlPath
cannot be opened,
.Xr ssh 1
will continue without connecting to a master instance.
.Pp
X11 and
.Xr ssh-agent 1
forwarding is supported over these multiplexed connections, however the
display and agent forwarded will be the one belonging to the master
connection i.e. it is not possible to forward multiple displays or agents.
.Pp
Two additional options allow for opportunistic multiplexing: try to use a
master connection but fall back to creating a new one if one does not already
exist.
These options are:
.Cm auto
and
.Cm autoask .
The latter requires confirmation like the
.Cm ask
option.
.It Cm ControlPath
Specify the path to the control socket used for connection sharing as described
in the
.Cm ControlMaster
section above or the string
.Cm none
to disable connection sharing.
Arguments to
.Cm ControlPath
-may use the tilde syntax to refer to a user's home directory
-or the tokens described in the
+may use the tilde syntax to refer to a user's home directory,
+the tokens described in the
.Sx TOKENS
+section and environment variables as described in the
+.Sx ENVIRONMENT VARIABLES
section.
It is recommended that any
.Cm ControlPath
used for opportunistic connection sharing include
at least %h, %p, and %r (or alternatively %C) and be placed in a directory
that is not writable by other users.
This ensures that shared connections are uniquely identified.
.It Cm ControlPersist
When used in conjunction with
.Cm ControlMaster ,
specifies that the master connection should remain open
in the background (waiting for future client connections)
after the initial client connection has been closed.
If set to
.Cm no
(the default),
then the master connection will not be placed into the background,
and will close as soon as the initial client connection is closed.
If set to
.Cm yes
or 0,
then the master connection will remain in the background indefinitely
(until killed or closed via a mechanism such as the
.Qq ssh -O exit ) .
If set to a time in seconds, or a time in any of the formats documented in
.Xr sshd_config 5 ,
then the backgrounded master connection will automatically terminate
after it has remained idle (with no client connections) for the
specified time.
.It Cm DynamicForward
Specifies that a TCP port on the local machine be forwarded
over the secure channel, and the application
protocol is then used to determine where to connect to from the
remote machine.
.Pp
The argument must be
.Sm off
.Oo Ar bind_address : Oc Ar port .
.Sm on
IPv6 addresses can be specified by enclosing addresses in square brackets.
By default, the local port is bound in accordance with the
.Cm GatewayPorts
setting.
However, an explicit
.Ar bind_address
may be used to bind the connection to a specific address.
The
.Ar bind_address
of
.Cm localhost
indicates that the listening port be bound for local use only, while an
empty address or
.Sq *
indicates that the port should be available from all interfaces.
.Pp
Currently the SOCKS4 and SOCKS5 protocols are supported, and
.Xr ssh 1
will act as a SOCKS server.
Multiple forwardings may be specified, and
additional forwardings can be given on the command line.
Only the superuser can forward privileged ports.
.It Cm EnableSSHKeysign
Setting this option to
.Cm yes
in the global client configuration file
.Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_config
enables the use of the helper program
.Xr ssh-keysign 8
during
.Cm HostbasedAuthentication .
The argument must be
.Cm yes
or
.Cm no
(the default).
This option should be placed in the non-hostspecific section.
See
.Xr ssh-keysign 8
for more information.
.It Cm EscapeChar
Sets the escape character (default:
.Ql ~ ) .
The escape character can also
be set on the command line.
The argument should be a single character,
.Ql ^
followed by a letter, or
.Cm none
to disable the escape
character entirely (making the connection transparent for binary
data).
.It Cm ExitOnForwardFailure
Specifies whether
.Xr ssh 1
should terminate the connection if it cannot set up all requested
dynamic, tunnel, local, and remote port forwardings, (e.g.\&
if either end is unable to bind and listen on a specified port).
Note that
.Cm ExitOnForwardFailure
does not apply to connections made over port forwardings and will not,
for example, cause
.Xr ssh 1
to exit if TCP connections to the ultimate forwarding destination fail.
The argument must be
.Cm yes
or
.Cm no
(the default).
.It Cm FingerprintHash
Specifies the hash algorithm used when displaying key fingerprints.
Valid options are:
.Cm md5
and
.Cm sha256
(the default).
.It Cm ForwardAgent
Specifies whether the connection to the authentication agent (if any)
will be forwarded to the remote machine.
The argument may be
.Cm yes ,
.Cm no
(the default),
an explicit path to an agent socket or the name of an environment variable
(beginning with
.Sq $ )
in which to find the path.
.Pp
Agent forwarding should be enabled with caution.
Users with the ability to bypass file permissions on the remote host
(for the agent's Unix-domain socket)
can access the local agent through the forwarded connection.
An attacker cannot obtain key material from the agent,
however they can perform operations on the keys that enable them to
authenticate using the identities loaded into the agent.
.It Cm ForwardX11
Specifies whether X11 connections will be automatically redirected
over the secure channel and
.Ev DISPLAY
set.
The argument must be
.Cm yes
or
.Cm no
(the default).
.Pp
X11 forwarding should be enabled with caution.
Users with the ability to bypass file permissions on the remote host
(for the user's X11 authorization database)
can access the local X11 display through the forwarded connection.
An attacker may then be able to perform activities such as keystroke monitoring
if the
.Cm ForwardX11Trusted
option is also enabled.
.It Cm ForwardX11Timeout
Specify a timeout for untrusted X11 forwarding
using the format described in the
.Sx TIME FORMATS
section of
.Xr sshd_config 5 .
X11 connections received by
.Xr ssh 1
after this time will be refused.
Setting
.Cm ForwardX11Timeout
to zero will disable the timeout and permit X11 forwarding for the life
of the connection.
The default is to disable untrusted X11 forwarding after twenty minutes has
elapsed.
.It Cm ForwardX11Trusted
If this option is set to
.Cm yes ,
remote X11 clients will have full access to the original X11 display.
.Pp
If this option is set to
.Cm no
(the default),
remote X11 clients will be considered untrusted and prevented
from stealing or tampering with data belonging to trusted X11
clients.
Furthermore, the
.Xr xauth 1
token used for the session will be set to expire after 20 minutes.
Remote clients will be refused access after this time.
.Pp
See the X11 SECURITY extension specification for full details on
the restrictions imposed on untrusted clients.
.It Cm GatewayPorts
Specifies whether remote hosts are allowed to connect to local
forwarded ports.
By default,
.Xr ssh 1
binds local port forwardings to the loopback address.
This prevents other remote hosts from connecting to forwarded ports.
.Cm GatewayPorts
can be used to specify that ssh
should bind local port forwardings to the wildcard address,
thus allowing remote hosts to connect to forwarded ports.
The argument must be
.Cm yes
or
.Cm no
(the default).
.It Cm GlobalKnownHostsFile
Specifies one or more files to use for the global
host key database, separated by whitespace.
The default is
.Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_known_hosts ,
.Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_known_hosts2 .
.It Cm GSSAPIAuthentication
Specifies whether user authentication based on GSSAPI is allowed.
The default is
.Cm no .
.It Cm GSSAPIDelegateCredentials
Forward (delegate) credentials to the server.
The default is
.Cm no .
.It Cm HashKnownHosts
Indicates that
.Xr ssh 1
should hash host names and addresses when they are added to
.Pa ~/.ssh/known_hosts .
These hashed names may be used normally by
.Xr ssh 1
and
.Xr sshd 8 ,
but they do not visually reveal identifying information if the
file's contents are disclosed.
The default is
.Cm no .
Note that existing names and addresses in known hosts files
will not be converted automatically,
but may be manually hashed using
.Xr ssh-keygen 1 .
.It Cm HostbasedAuthentication
Specifies whether to try rhosts based authentication with public key
authentication.
The argument must be
.Cm yes
or
.Cm no
(the default).
.It Cm HostbasedKeyTypes
Specifies the key types that will be used for hostbased authentication
as a comma-separated list of patterns.
Alternately if the specified list begins with a
.Sq +
character, then the specified key types will be appended to the default set
instead of replacing them.
If the specified list begins with a
.Sq -
character, then the specified key types (including wildcards) will be removed
from the default set instead of replacing them.
If the specified list begins with a
.Sq ^
character, then the specified key types will be placed at the head of the
default set.
The default for this option is:
.Bd -literal -offset 3n
ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com,
ecdsa-sha2-nistp384-cert-v01@openssh.com,
ecdsa-sha2-nistp521-cert-v01@openssh.com,
sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com,
ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com,
sk-ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com,
rsa-sha2-512-cert-v01@openssh.com,
rsa-sha2-256-cert-v01@openssh.com,
ssh-rsa-cert-v01@openssh.com,
ecdsa-sha2-nistp256,ecdsa-sha2-nistp384,ecdsa-sha2-nistp521,
sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256@openssh.com,
ssh-ed25519,sk-ssh-ed25519@openssh.com,
rsa-sha2-512,rsa-sha2-256,ssh-rsa
.Ed
.Pp
The
.Fl Q
option of
.Xr ssh 1
may be used to list supported key types.
.It Cm HostKeyAlgorithms
Specifies the host key algorithms
that the client wants to use in order of preference.
Alternately if the specified list begins with a
.Sq +
character, then the specified key types will be appended to the default set
instead of replacing them.
If the specified list begins with a
.Sq -
character, then the specified key types (including wildcards) will be removed
from the default set instead of replacing them.
If the specified list begins with a
.Sq ^
character, then the specified key types will be placed at the head of the
default set.
The default for this option is:
.Bd -literal -offset 3n
ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com,
ecdsa-sha2-nistp384-cert-v01@openssh.com,
ecdsa-sha2-nistp521-cert-v01@openssh.com,
sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com,
ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com,
sk-ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com,
rsa-sha2-512-cert-v01@openssh.com,
rsa-sha2-256-cert-v01@openssh.com,
ssh-rsa-cert-v01@openssh.com,
ecdsa-sha2-nistp256,ecdsa-sha2-nistp384,ecdsa-sha2-nistp521,
sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256@openssh.com,
ssh-ed25519,sk-ssh-ed25519@openssh.com,
rsa-sha2-512,rsa-sha2-256,ssh-rsa
.Ed
.Pp
If hostkeys are known for the destination host then this default is modified
to prefer their algorithms.
.Pp
The list of available key types may also be obtained using
.Qq ssh -Q HostKeyAlgorithms .
.It Cm HostKeyAlias
Specifies an alias that should be used instead of the
real host name when looking up or saving the host key
in the host key database files and when validating host certificates.
This option is useful for tunneling SSH connections
or for multiple servers running on a single host.
.It Cm Hostname
Specifies the real host name to log into.
This can be used to specify nicknames or abbreviations for hosts.
Arguments to
.Cm Hostname
accept the tokens described in the
.Sx TOKENS
section.
Numeric IP addresses are also permitted (both on the command line and in
.Cm Hostname
specifications).
The default is the name given on the command line.
.It Cm IdentitiesOnly
Specifies that
.Xr ssh 1
should only use the configured authentication identity and certificate files
(either the default files, or those explicitly configured in the
.Nm
files
or passed on the
.Xr ssh 1
command-line),
even if
.Xr ssh-agent 1
or a
.Cm PKCS11Provider
or
.Cm SecurityKeyProvider
offers more identities.
The argument to this keyword must be
.Cm yes
or
.Cm no
(the default).
This option is intended for situations where ssh-agent
offers many different identities.
.It Cm IdentityAgent
Specifies the
.Ux Ns -domain
socket used to communicate with the authentication agent.
.Pp
This option overrides the
.Ev SSH_AUTH_SOCK
environment variable and can be used to select a specific agent.
Setting the socket name to
.Cm none
disables the use of an authentication agent.
If the string
.Qq SSH_AUTH_SOCK
is specified, the location of the socket will be read from the
.Ev SSH_AUTH_SOCK
environment variable.
Otherwise if the specified value begins with a
.Sq $
character, then it will be treated as an environment variable containing
the location of the socket.
.Pp
Arguments to
.Cm IdentityAgent
-may use the tilde syntax to refer to a user's home directory
-or the tokens described in the
+may use the tilde syntax to refer to a user's home directory,
+the tokens described in the
.Sx TOKENS
+section and environment variables as described in the
+.Sx ENVIRONMENT VARIABLES
section.
.It Cm IdentityFile
Specifies a file from which the user's DSA, ECDSA, authenticator-hosted ECDSA,
Ed25519, authenticator-hosted Ed25519 or RSA authentication identity is read.
The default is
.Pa ~/.ssh/id_dsa ,
.Pa ~/.ssh/id_ecdsa ,
.Pa ~/.ssh/id_ecdsa_sk ,
.Pa ~/.ssh/id_ed25519 ,
.Pa ~/.ssh/id_ed25519_sk
and
.Pa ~/.ssh/id_rsa .
Additionally, any identities represented by the authentication agent
will be used for authentication unless
.Cm IdentitiesOnly
is set.
If no certificates have been explicitly specified by
.Cm CertificateFile ,
.Xr ssh 1
will try to load certificate information from the filename obtained by
appending
.Pa -cert.pub
to the path of a specified
.Cm IdentityFile .
.Pp
Arguments to
.Cm IdentityFile
may use the tilde syntax to refer to a user's home directory
or the tokens described in the
.Sx TOKENS
section.
.Pp
It is possible to have
multiple identity files specified in configuration files; all these
identities will be tried in sequence.
Multiple
.Cm IdentityFile
directives will add to the list of identities tried (this behaviour
differs from that of other configuration directives).
.Pp
.Cm IdentityFile
may be used in conjunction with
.Cm IdentitiesOnly
to select which identities in an agent are offered during authentication.
.Cm IdentityFile
may also be used in conjunction with
.Cm CertificateFile
in order to provide any certificate also needed for authentication with
the identity.
.It Cm IgnoreUnknown
Specifies a pattern-list of unknown options to be ignored if they are
encountered in configuration parsing.
This may be used to suppress errors if
.Nm
contains options that are unrecognised by
.Xr ssh 1 .
It is recommended that
.Cm IgnoreUnknown
be listed early in the configuration file as it will not be applied
to unknown options that appear before it.
.It Cm Include
Include the specified configuration file(s).
Multiple pathnames may be specified and each pathname may contain
.Xr glob 7
wildcards and, for user configurations, shell-like
.Sq ~
references to user home directories.
+Wildcards will be expanded and processed in lexical order.
Files without absolute paths are assumed to be in
.Pa ~/.ssh
if included in a user configuration file or
.Pa /etc/ssh
if included from the system configuration file.
.Cm Include
directive may appear inside a
.Cm Match
or
.Cm Host
block
to perform conditional inclusion.
.It Cm IPQoS
Specifies the IPv4 type-of-service or DSCP class for connections.
Accepted values are
.Cm af11 ,
.Cm af12 ,
.Cm af13 ,
.Cm af21 ,
.Cm af22 ,
.Cm af23 ,
.Cm af31 ,
.Cm af32 ,
.Cm af33 ,
.Cm af41 ,
.Cm af42 ,
.Cm af43 ,
.Cm cs0 ,
.Cm cs1 ,
.Cm cs2 ,
.Cm cs3 ,
.Cm cs4 ,
.Cm cs5 ,
.Cm cs6 ,
.Cm cs7 ,
.Cm ef ,
.Cm le ,
.Cm lowdelay ,
.Cm throughput ,
.Cm reliability ,
a numeric value, or
.Cm none
to use the operating system default.
This option may take one or two arguments, separated by whitespace.
If one argument is specified, it is used as the packet class unconditionally.
If two values are specified, the first is automatically selected for
interactive sessions and the second for non-interactive sessions.
The default is
.Cm af21
(Low-Latency Data)
for interactive sessions and
.Cm cs1
(Lower Effort)
for non-interactive sessions.
.It Cm KbdInteractiveAuthentication
Specifies whether to use keyboard-interactive authentication.
The argument to this keyword must be
.Cm yes
(the default)
or
.Cm no .
.It Cm KbdInteractiveDevices
Specifies the list of methods to use in keyboard-interactive authentication.
Multiple method names must be comma-separated.
The default is to use the server specified list.
The methods available vary depending on what the server supports.
For an OpenSSH server,
it may be zero or more of:
.Cm bsdauth
and
.Cm pam .
.It Cm KexAlgorithms
Specifies the available KEX (Key Exchange) algorithms.
Multiple algorithms must be comma-separated.
If the specified list begins with a
.Sq +
character, then the specified methods will be appended to the default set
instead of replacing them.
If the specified list begins with a
.Sq -
character, then the specified methods (including wildcards) will be removed
from the default set instead of replacing them.
If the specified list begins with a
.Sq ^
character, then the specified methods will be placed at the head of the
default set.
The default is:
.Bd -literal -offset indent
curve25519-sha256,curve25519-sha256@libssh.org,
ecdh-sha2-nistp256,ecdh-sha2-nistp384,ecdh-sha2-nistp521,
diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha256,
diffie-hellman-group16-sha512,
diffie-hellman-group18-sha512,
diffie-hellman-group14-sha256
.Ed
.Pp
The list of available key exchange algorithms may also be obtained using
.Qq ssh -Q kex .
.It Cm LocalCommand
Specifies a command to execute on the local machine after successfully
connecting to the server.
The command string extends to the end of the line, and is executed with
the user's shell.
Arguments to
.Cm LocalCommand
accept the tokens described in the
.Sx TOKENS
section.
.Pp
The command is run synchronously and does not have access to the
session of the
.Xr ssh 1
that spawned it.
It should not be used for interactive commands.
.Pp
This directive is ignored unless
.Cm PermitLocalCommand
has been enabled.
.It Cm LocalForward
Specifies that a TCP port on the local machine be forwarded over
the secure channel to the specified host and port from the remote machine.
The first argument specifies the listener and may be
.Sm off
.Oo Ar bind_address : Oc Ar port
.Sm on
or a Unix domain socket path.
The second argument is the destination and may be
.Ar host : Ns Ar hostport
or a Unix domain socket path if the remote host supports it.
.Pp
IPv6 addresses can be specified by enclosing addresses in square brackets.
Multiple forwardings may be specified, and additional forwardings can be
given on the command line.
Only the superuser can forward privileged ports.
By default, the local port is bound in accordance with the
.Cm GatewayPorts
setting.
However, an explicit
.Ar bind_address
may be used to bind the connection to a specific address.
The
.Ar bind_address
of
.Cm localhost
indicates that the listening port be bound for local use only, while an
empty address or
.Sq *
indicates that the port should be available from all interfaces.
-Unix domain socket paths accept the tokens described in the
+Unix domain socket paths may use the tokens described in the
.Sx TOKENS
+section and environment variables as described in the
+.Sx ENVIRONMENT VARIABLES
section.
.It Cm LogLevel
Gives the verbosity level that is used when logging messages from
.Xr ssh 1 .
The possible values are:
QUIET, FATAL, ERROR, INFO, VERBOSE, DEBUG, DEBUG1, DEBUG2, and DEBUG3.
The default is INFO.
DEBUG and DEBUG1 are equivalent.
DEBUG2 and DEBUG3 each specify higher levels of verbose output.
.It Cm MACs
Specifies the MAC (message authentication code) algorithms
in order of preference.
The MAC algorithm is used for data integrity protection.
Multiple algorithms must be comma-separated.
If the specified list begins with a
.Sq +
character, then the specified algorithms will be appended to the default set
instead of replacing them.
If the specified list begins with a
.Sq -
character, then the specified algorithms (including wildcards) will be removed
from the default set instead of replacing them.
If the specified list begins with a
.Sq ^
character, then the specified algorithms will be placed at the head of the
default set.
.Pp
The algorithms that contain
.Qq -etm
calculate the MAC after encryption (encrypt-then-mac).
These are considered safer and their use recommended.
.Pp
The default is:
.Bd -literal -offset indent
umac-64-etm@openssh.com,umac-128-etm@openssh.com,
hmac-sha2-256-etm@openssh.com,hmac-sha2-512-etm@openssh.com,
hmac-sha1-etm@openssh.com,
umac-64@openssh.com,umac-128@openssh.com,
hmac-sha2-256,hmac-sha2-512,hmac-sha1
.Ed
.Pp
The list of available MAC algorithms may also be obtained using
.Qq ssh -Q mac .
.It Cm NoHostAuthenticationForLocalhost
Disable host authentication for localhost (loopback addresses).
The argument to this keyword must be
.Cm yes
or
.Cm no
(the default).
.It Cm NumberOfPasswordPrompts
Specifies the number of password prompts before giving up.
The argument to this keyword must be an integer.
The default is 3.
.It Cm PasswordAuthentication
Specifies whether to use password authentication.
The argument to this keyword must be
.Cm yes
(the default)
or
.Cm no .
.It Cm PermitLocalCommand
Allow local command execution via the
.Ic LocalCommand
option or using the
.Ic !\& Ns Ar command
escape sequence in
.Xr ssh 1 .
The argument must be
.Cm yes
or
.Cm no
(the default).
.It Cm PKCS11Provider
Specifies which PKCS#11 provider to use or
.Cm none
to indicate that no provider should be used (the default).
The argument to this keyword is a path to the PKCS#11 shared library
.Xr ssh 1
should use to communicate with a PKCS#11 token providing keys for user
authentication.
.It Cm Port
Specifies the port number to connect on the remote host.
The default is 22.
.It Cm PreferredAuthentications
Specifies the order in which the client should try authentication methods.
This allows a client to prefer one method (e.g.\&
.Cm keyboard-interactive )
over another method (e.g.\&
.Cm password ) .
The default is:
.Bd -literal -offset indent
gssapi-with-mic,hostbased,publickey,
keyboard-interactive,password
.Ed
.It Cm ProxyCommand
Specifies the command to use to connect to the server.
The command
string extends to the end of the line, and is executed
using the user's shell
.Ql exec
directive to avoid a lingering shell process.
.Pp
Arguments to
.Cm ProxyCommand
accept the tokens described in the
.Sx TOKENS
section.
The command can be basically anything,
and should read from its standard input and write to its standard output.
It should eventually connect an
.Xr sshd 8
server running on some machine, or execute
.Ic sshd -i
somewhere.
Host key management will be done using the
.Cm Hostname
of the host being connected (defaulting to the name typed by the user).
Setting the command to
.Cm none
disables this option entirely.
Note that
.Cm CheckHostIP
is not available for connects with a proxy command.
.Pp
This directive is useful in conjunction with
.Xr nc 1
and its proxy support.
For example, the following directive would connect via an HTTP proxy at
192.0.2.0:
.Bd -literal -offset 3n
ProxyCommand /usr/bin/nc -X connect -x 192.0.2.0:8080 %h %p
.Ed
.It Cm ProxyJump
Specifies one or more jump proxies as either
.Xo
.Sm off
.Op Ar user No @
.Ar host
.Op : Ns Ar port
.Sm on
or an ssh URI
.Xc .
Multiple proxies may be separated by comma characters and will be visited
sequentially.
Setting this option will cause
.Xr ssh 1
to connect to the target host by first making a
.Xr ssh 1
connection to the specified
.Cm ProxyJump
host and then establishing a
TCP forwarding to the ultimate target from there.
.Pp
Note that this option will compete with the
.Cm ProxyCommand
option - whichever is specified first will prevent later instances of the
other from taking effect.
.Pp
Note also that the configuration for the destination host (either supplied
via the command-line or the configuration file) is not generally applied
to jump hosts.
.Pa ~/.ssh/config
should be used if specific configuration is required for jump hosts.
.It Cm ProxyUseFdpass
Specifies that
.Cm ProxyCommand
will pass a connected file descriptor back to
.Xr ssh 1
instead of continuing to execute and pass data.
The default is
.Cm no .
.It Cm PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes
Specifies the key types that will be used for public key authentication
as a comma-separated list of patterns.
If the specified list begins with a
.Sq +
character, then the key types after it will be appended to the default
instead of replacing it.
If the specified list begins with a
.Sq -
character, then the specified key types (including wildcards) will be removed
from the default set instead of replacing them.
If the specified list begins with a
.Sq ^
character, then the specified key types will be placed at the head of the
default set.
The default for this option is:
.Bd -literal -offset 3n
ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com,
ecdsa-sha2-nistp384-cert-v01@openssh.com,
ecdsa-sha2-nistp521-cert-v01@openssh.com,
sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com,
ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com,
sk-ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com,
rsa-sha2-512-cert-v01@openssh.com,
rsa-sha2-256-cert-v01@openssh.com,
ssh-rsa-cert-v01@openssh.com,
ecdsa-sha2-nistp256,ecdsa-sha2-nistp384,ecdsa-sha2-nistp521,
sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256@openssh.com,
ssh-ed25519,sk-ssh-ed25519@openssh.com,
rsa-sha2-512,rsa-sha2-256,ssh-rsa
.Ed
.Pp
The list of available key types may also be obtained using
.Qq ssh -Q PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes .
.It Cm PubkeyAuthentication
Specifies whether to try public key authentication.
The argument to this keyword must be
.Cm yes
(the default)
or
.Cm no .
.It Cm RekeyLimit
Specifies the maximum amount of data that may be transmitted before the
session key is renegotiated, optionally followed a maximum amount of
time that may pass before the session key is renegotiated.
The first argument is specified in bytes and may have a suffix of
.Sq K ,
.Sq M ,
or
.Sq G
to indicate Kilobytes, Megabytes, or Gigabytes, respectively.
The default is between
.Sq 1G
and
.Sq 4G ,
depending on the cipher.
The optional second value is specified in seconds and may use any of the
units documented in the TIME FORMATS section of
.Xr sshd_config 5 .
The default value for
.Cm RekeyLimit
is
.Cm default none ,
which means that rekeying is performed after the cipher's default amount
of data has been sent or received and no time based rekeying is done.
.It Cm RemoteCommand
Specifies a command to execute on the remote machine after successfully
connecting to the server.
The command string extends to the end of the line, and is executed with
the user's shell.
Arguments to
.Cm RemoteCommand
accept the tokens described in the
.Sx TOKENS
section.
.It Cm RemoteForward
Specifies that a TCP port on the remote machine be forwarded over
the secure channel.
The remote port may either be forwarded to a specified host and port
from the local machine, or may act as a SOCKS 4/5 proxy that allows a remote
client to connect to arbitrary destinations from the local machine.
The first argument is the listening specification and may be
.Sm off
.Oo Ar bind_address : Oc Ar port
.Sm on
or, if the remote host supports it, a Unix domain socket path.
If forwarding to a specific destination then the second argument must be
.Ar host : Ns Ar hostport
or a Unix domain socket path,
otherwise if no destination argument is specified then the remote forwarding
will be established as a SOCKS proxy.
.Pp
IPv6 addresses can be specified by enclosing addresses in square brackets.
Multiple forwardings may be specified, and additional
forwardings can be given on the command line.
Privileged ports can be forwarded only when
logging in as root on the remote machine.
-Unix domain socket paths accept the tokens described in the
+Unix domain socket paths may use the tokens described in the
.Sx TOKENS
+section and environment variables as described in the
+.Sx ENVIRONMENT VARIABLES
section.
.Pp
If the
.Ar port
argument is 0,
the listen port will be dynamically allocated on the server and reported
to the client at run time.
.Pp
If the
.Ar bind_address
is not specified, the default is to only bind to loopback addresses.
If the
.Ar bind_address
is
.Ql *
or an empty string, then the forwarding is requested to listen on all
interfaces.
Specifying a remote
.Ar bind_address
will only succeed if the server's
.Cm GatewayPorts
option is enabled (see
.Xr sshd_config 5 ) .
.It Cm RequestTTY
Specifies whether to request a pseudo-tty for the session.
The argument may be one of:
.Cm no
(never request a TTY),
.Cm yes
(always request a TTY when standard input is a TTY),
.Cm force
(always request a TTY) or
.Cm auto
(request a TTY when opening a login session).
This option mirrors the
.Fl t
and
.Fl T
flags for
.Xr ssh 1 .
.It Cm RevokedHostKeys
Specifies revoked host public keys.
Keys listed in this file will be refused for host authentication.
Note that if this file does not exist or is not readable,
then host authentication will be refused for all hosts.
Keys may be specified as a text file, listing one public key per line, or as
an OpenSSH Key Revocation List (KRL) as generated by
.Xr ssh-keygen 1 .
For more information on KRLs, see the KEY REVOCATION LISTS section in
.Xr ssh-keygen 1 .
.It Cm SecurityKeyProvider
Specifies a path to a library that will be used when loading any
FIDO authenticator-hosted keys, overriding the default of using
the built-in USB HID support.
.Pp
If the specified value begins with a
.Sq $
character, then it will be treated as an environment variable containing
the path to the library.
.It Cm SendEnv
Specifies what variables from the local
.Xr environ 7
should be sent to the server.
The server must also support it, and the server must be configured to
accept these environment variables.
Note that the
.Ev TERM
environment variable is always sent whenever a
pseudo-terminal is requested as it is required by the protocol.
Refer to
.Cm AcceptEnv
in
.Xr sshd_config 5
for how to configure the server.
Variables are specified by name, which may contain wildcard characters.
Multiple environment variables may be separated by whitespace or spread
across multiple
.Cm SendEnv
directives.
.Pp
See
.Sx PATTERNS
for more information on patterns.
.Pp
It is possible to clear previously set
.Cm SendEnv
variable names by prefixing patterns with
.Pa - .
The default is not to send any environment variables.
.It Cm ServerAliveCountMax
Sets the number of server alive messages (see below) which may be
sent without
.Xr ssh 1
receiving any messages back from the server.
If this threshold is reached while server alive messages are being sent,
ssh will disconnect from the server, terminating the session.
It is important to note that the use of server alive messages is very
different from
.Cm TCPKeepAlive
(below).
The server alive messages are sent through the encrypted channel
and therefore will not be spoofable.
The TCP keepalive option enabled by
.Cm TCPKeepAlive
is spoofable.
The server alive mechanism is valuable when the client or
server depend on knowing when a connection has become unresponsive.
.Pp
The default value is 3.
If, for example,
.Cm ServerAliveInterval
(see below) is set to 15 and
.Cm ServerAliveCountMax
is left at the default, if the server becomes unresponsive,
ssh will disconnect after approximately 45 seconds.
.It Cm ServerAliveInterval
Sets a timeout interval in seconds after which if no data has been received
from the server,
.Xr ssh 1
will send a message through the encrypted
channel to request a response from the server.
The default
is 0, indicating that these messages will not be sent to the server.
.It Cm SetEnv
Directly specify one or more environment variables and their contents to
be sent to the server.
Similarly to
.Cm SendEnv ,
the server must be prepared to accept the environment variable.
.It Cm StreamLocalBindMask
Sets the octal file creation mode mask
.Pq umask
used when creating a Unix-domain socket file for local or remote
port forwarding.
This option is only used for port forwarding to a Unix-domain socket file.
.Pp
The default value is 0177, which creates a Unix-domain socket file that is
readable and writable only by the owner.
Note that not all operating systems honor the file mode on Unix-domain
socket files.
.It Cm StreamLocalBindUnlink
Specifies whether to remove an existing Unix-domain socket file for local
or remote port forwarding before creating a new one.
If the socket file already exists and
.Cm StreamLocalBindUnlink
is not enabled,
.Nm ssh
will be unable to forward the port to the Unix-domain socket file.
This option is only used for port forwarding to a Unix-domain socket file.
.Pp
The argument must be
.Cm yes
or
.Cm no
(the default).
.It Cm StrictHostKeyChecking
If this flag is set to
.Cm yes ,
.Xr ssh 1
will never automatically add host keys to the
.Pa ~/.ssh/known_hosts
file, and refuses to connect to hosts whose host key has changed.
This provides maximum protection against man-in-the-middle (MITM) attacks,
though it can be annoying when the
.Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_known_hosts
file is poorly maintained or when connections to new hosts are
frequently made.
This option forces the user to manually
add all new hosts.
.Pp
If this flag is set to
.Dq accept-new
then ssh will automatically add new host keys to the user
known hosts files, but will not permit connections to hosts with
changed host keys.
If this flag is set to
.Dq no
or
.Dq off ,
ssh will automatically add new host keys to the user known hosts files
and allow connections to hosts with changed hostkeys to proceed,
subject to some restrictions.
If this flag is set to
.Cm ask
(the default),
new host keys
will be added to the user known host files only after the user
has confirmed that is what they really want to do, and
ssh will refuse to connect to hosts whose host key has changed.
The host keys of
known hosts will be verified automatically in all cases.
.It Cm SyslogFacility
Gives the facility code that is used when logging messages from
.Xr ssh 1 .
The possible values are: DAEMON, USER, AUTH, LOCAL0, LOCAL1, LOCAL2,
LOCAL3, LOCAL4, LOCAL5, LOCAL6, LOCAL7.
The default is USER.
.It Cm TCPKeepAlive
Specifies whether the system should send TCP keepalive messages to the
other side.
If they are sent, death of the connection or crash of one
of the machines will be properly noticed.
However, this means that
connections will die if the route is down temporarily, and some people
find it annoying.
.Pp
The default is
.Cm yes
(to send TCP keepalive messages), and the client will notice
if the network goes down or the remote host dies.
This is important in scripts, and many users want it too.
.Pp
To disable TCP keepalive messages, the value should be set to
.Cm no .
See also
.Cm ServerAliveInterval
for protocol-level keepalives.
.It Cm Tunnel
Request
.Xr tun 4
device forwarding between the client and the server.
The argument must be
.Cm yes ,
.Cm point-to-point
(layer 3),
.Cm ethernet
(layer 2),
or
.Cm no
(the default).
Specifying
.Cm yes
requests the default tunnel mode, which is
.Cm point-to-point .
.It Cm TunnelDevice
Specifies the
.Xr tun 4
devices to open on the client
.Pq Ar local_tun
and the server
.Pq Ar remote_tun .
.Pp
The argument must be
.Sm off
.Ar local_tun Op : Ar remote_tun .
.Sm on
The devices may be specified by numerical ID or the keyword
.Cm any ,
which uses the next available tunnel device.
If
.Ar remote_tun
is not specified, it defaults to
.Cm any .
The default is
.Cm any:any .
.It Cm UpdateHostKeys
Specifies whether
.Xr ssh 1
should accept notifications of additional hostkeys from the server sent
after authentication has completed and add them to
.Cm UserKnownHostsFile .
The argument must be
.Cm yes ,
.Cm no
or
.Cm ask .
This option allows learning alternate hostkeys for a server
and supports graceful key rotation by allowing a server to send replacement
public keys before old ones are removed.
Additional hostkeys are only accepted if the key used to authenticate the
host was already trusted or explicitly accepted by the user.
.Pp
.Cm UpdateHostKeys
is enabled by default if the user has not overridden the default
.Cm UserKnownHostsFile
setting, otherwise
.Cm UpdateHostKeys
will be set to
.Cm ask .
.Pp
If
.Cm UpdateHostKeys
is set to
.Cm ask ,
then the user is asked to confirm the modifications to the known_hosts file.
Confirmation is currently incompatible with
.Cm ControlPersist ,
and will be disabled if it is enabled.
.Pp
Presently, only
.Xr sshd 8
from OpenSSH 6.8 and greater support the
.Qq hostkeys@openssh.com
protocol extension used to inform the client of all the server's hostkeys.
.It Cm User
Specifies the user to log in as.
This can be useful when a different user name is used on different machines.
This saves the trouble of
having to remember to give the user name on the command line.
.It Cm UserKnownHostsFile
Specifies one or more files to use for the user
host key database, separated by whitespace.
+Each filename may use tilde notation to refer to the user's home directory,
+the tokens described in the
+.Sx TOKENS
+section and environment variables as described in the
+.Sx ENVIRONMENT VARIABLES
+section.
The default is
.Pa ~/.ssh/known_hosts ,
.Pa ~/.ssh/known_hosts2 .
.It Cm VerifyHostKeyDNS
Specifies whether to verify the remote key using DNS and SSHFP resource
records.
If this option is set to
.Cm yes ,
the client will implicitly trust keys that match a secure fingerprint
from DNS.
Insecure fingerprints will be handled as if this option was set to
.Cm ask .
If this option is set to
.Cm ask ,
information on fingerprint match will be displayed, but the user will still
need to confirm new host keys according to the
.Cm StrictHostKeyChecking
option.
The default is
.Cm no .
.Pp
See also
.Sx VERIFYING HOST KEYS
in
.Xr ssh 1 .
.It Cm VisualHostKey
If this flag is set to
.Cm yes ,
an ASCII art representation of the remote host key fingerprint is
printed in addition to the fingerprint string at login and
for unknown host keys.
If this flag is set to
.Cm no
(the default),
no fingerprint strings are printed at login and
only the fingerprint string will be printed for unknown host keys.
.It Cm XAuthLocation
Specifies the full pathname of the
.Xr xauth 1
program.
The default is
.Pa /usr/X11R6/bin/xauth .
.El
.Sh PATTERNS
A
.Em pattern
consists of zero or more non-whitespace characters,
.Sq *
(a wildcard that matches zero or more characters),
or
.Sq ?\&
(a wildcard that matches exactly one character).
For example, to specify a set of declarations for any host in the
.Qq .co.uk
set of domains,
the following pattern could be used:
.Pp
.Dl Host *.co.uk
.Pp
The following pattern
would match any host in the 192.168.0.[0-9] network range:
.Pp
.Dl Host 192.168.0.?
.Pp
A
.Em pattern-list
is a comma-separated list of patterns.
Patterns within pattern-lists may be negated
by preceding them with an exclamation mark
.Pq Sq !\& .
For example,
to allow a key to be used from anywhere within an organization
except from the
.Qq dialup
pool,
the following entry (in authorized_keys) could be used:
.Pp
.Dl from=\&"!*.dialup.example.com,*.example.com\&"
.Pp
Note that a negated match will never produce a positive result by itself.
For example, attempting to match
.Qq host3
against the following pattern-list will fail:
.Pp
.Dl from=\&"!host1,!host2\&"
.Pp
The solution here is to include a term that will yield a positive match,
such as a wildcard:
.Pp
.Dl from=\&"!host1,!host2,*\&"
.Sh TOKENS
Arguments to some keywords can make use of tokens,
which are expanded at runtime:
.Pp
.Bl -tag -width XXXX -offset indent -compact
.It %%
A literal
.Sq % .
.It \&%C
Hash of %l%h%p%r.
.It %d
Local user's home directory.
.It %h
The remote hostname.
.It %i
The local user ID.
+.It %k
+The host key alias if specified, otherwise the orignal remote hostname given
+on the command line.
.It %L
The local hostname.
.It %l
The local hostname, including the domain name.
.It %n
The original remote hostname, as given on the command line.
.It %p
The remote port.
.It %r
The remote username.
.It \&%T
The local
.Xr tun 4
or
.Xr tap 4
network interface assigned if
tunnel forwarding was requested, or
.Qq NONE
otherwise.
.It %u
The local username.
.El
.Pp
.Cm CertificateFile ,
.Cm ControlPath ,
.Cm IdentityAgent ,
.Cm IdentityFile ,
.Cm LocalForward ,
.Cm Match exec ,
.Cm RemoteCommand ,
+.Cm RemoteForward ,
and
-.Cm RemoteForward
+.Cm UserKnownHostsFile
accept the tokens %%, %C, %d, %h, %i, %L, %l, %n, %p, %r, and %u.
.Pp
.Cm Hostname
accepts the tokens %% and %h.
.Pp
.Cm LocalCommand
accepts all tokens.
.Pp
.Cm ProxyCommand
accepts the tokens %%, %h, %n, %p, and %r.
+.Sh ENVIRONMENT VARIABLES
+Arguments to some keywords can be expanded at runtime from environment
+variables on the client by enclosing them in
+.Ic ${} ,
+for example
+.Ic ${HOME}/.ssh
+would refer to the user's .ssh directory.
+If a specified environment variable does not exist then an error will be
+returned and the setting for that keyword will be ignored.
+.Pp
+The keywords
+.Cm CertificateFile ,
+.Cm ControlPath ,
+.Cm IdentityAgent ,
+.Cm IdentityFile
+and
+.Cm UserKnownHostsFile
+support environment variables.
+The keywords
+.Cm LocalForward
+and
+.Cm RemoteForward
+support environment variables only for Unix domain socket paths.
.Sh FILES
.Bl -tag -width Ds
.It Pa ~/.ssh/config
This is the per-user configuration file.
The format of this file is described above.
This file is used by the SSH client.
Because of the potential for abuse, this file must have strict permissions:
read/write for the user, and not writable by others.
.It Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_config
Systemwide configuration file.
This file provides defaults for those
values that are not specified in the user's configuration file, and
for those users who do not have a configuration file.
This file must be world-readable.
.El
.Sh SEE ALSO
.Xr ssh 1
.Sh AUTHORS
.An -nosplit
OpenSSH is a derivative of the original and free
ssh 1.2.12 release by
.An Tatu Ylonen .
.An Aaron Campbell , Bob Beck , Markus Friedl ,
.An Niels Provos , Theo de Raadt
and
.An Dug Song
removed many bugs, re-added newer features and
created OpenSSH.
.An Markus Friedl
contributed the support for SSH protocol versions 1.5 and 2.0.
diff --git a/sshbuf-getput-basic.c b/sshbuf-getput-basic.c
index da834d0080c6..9803fb5ed904 100644
--- a/sshbuf-getput-basic.c
+++ b/sshbuf-getput-basic.c
@@ -1,631 +1,633 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: sshbuf-getput-basic.c,v 1.10 2019/12/13 19:09:37 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: sshbuf-getput-basic.c,v 1.11 2020/06/05 03:25:35 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 2011 Damien Miller
*
* Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
* purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
* copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
*
* THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
* WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
* MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
* ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
* WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
* ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
* OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
*/
#define SSHBUF_INTERNAL
#include "includes.h"
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <stdarg.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <string.h>
#ifdef HAVE_STDINT_H
# include <stdint.h>
#endif
#include "ssherr.h"
#include "sshbuf.h"
int
sshbuf_get(struct sshbuf *buf, void *v, size_t len)
{
const u_char *p = sshbuf_ptr(buf);
int r;
if ((r = sshbuf_consume(buf, len)) < 0)
return r;
if (v != NULL && len != 0)
memcpy(v, p, len);
return 0;
}
int
sshbuf_get_u64(struct sshbuf *buf, u_int64_t *valp)
{
const u_char *p = sshbuf_ptr(buf);
int r;
if ((r = sshbuf_consume(buf, 8)) < 0)
return r;
if (valp != NULL)
*valp = PEEK_U64(p);
return 0;
}
int
sshbuf_get_u32(struct sshbuf *buf, u_int32_t *valp)
{
const u_char *p = sshbuf_ptr(buf);
int r;
if ((r = sshbuf_consume(buf, 4)) < 0)
return r;
if (valp != NULL)
*valp = PEEK_U32(p);
return 0;
}
int
sshbuf_get_u16(struct sshbuf *buf, u_int16_t *valp)
{
const u_char *p = sshbuf_ptr(buf);
int r;
if ((r = sshbuf_consume(buf, 2)) < 0)
return r;
if (valp != NULL)
*valp = PEEK_U16(p);
return 0;
}
int
sshbuf_get_u8(struct sshbuf *buf, u_char *valp)
{
const u_char *p = sshbuf_ptr(buf);
int r;
if ((r = sshbuf_consume(buf, 1)) < 0)
return r;
if (valp != NULL)
*valp = (u_int8_t)*p;
return 0;
}
static int
check_offset(const struct sshbuf *buf, int wr, size_t offset, size_t len)
{
if (sshbuf_ptr(buf) == NULL) /* calls sshbuf_check_sanity() */
return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
if (offset >= SIZE_MAX - len)
return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
if (offset + len > sshbuf_len(buf)) {
return wr ?
SSH_ERR_NO_BUFFER_SPACE : SSH_ERR_MESSAGE_INCOMPLETE;
}
return 0;
}
static int
check_roffset(const struct sshbuf *buf, size_t offset, size_t len,
const u_char **p)
{
int r;
*p = NULL;
if ((r = check_offset(buf, 0, offset, len)) != 0)
return r;
*p = sshbuf_ptr(buf) + offset;
return 0;
}
int
sshbuf_peek_u64(const struct sshbuf *buf, size_t offset, u_int64_t *valp)
{
const u_char *p = NULL;
int r;
if (valp != NULL)
*valp = 0;
if ((r = check_roffset(buf, offset, 8, &p)) != 0)
return r;
if (valp != NULL)
*valp = PEEK_U64(p);
return 0;
}
int
sshbuf_peek_u32(const struct sshbuf *buf, size_t offset, u_int32_t *valp)
{
const u_char *p = NULL;
int r;
if (valp != NULL)
*valp = 0;
if ((r = check_roffset(buf, offset, 4, &p)) != 0)
return r;
if (valp != NULL)
*valp = PEEK_U32(p);
return 0;
}
int
sshbuf_peek_u16(const struct sshbuf *buf, size_t offset, u_int16_t *valp)
{
const u_char *p = NULL;
int r;
if (valp != NULL)
*valp = 0;
if ((r = check_roffset(buf, offset, 2, &p)) != 0)
return r;
if (valp != NULL)
*valp = PEEK_U16(p);
return 0;
}
int
sshbuf_peek_u8(const struct sshbuf *buf, size_t offset, u_char *valp)
{
const u_char *p = NULL;
int r;
if (valp != NULL)
*valp = 0;
if ((r = check_roffset(buf, offset, 1, &p)) != 0)
return r;
if (valp != NULL)
*valp = *p;
return 0;
}
int
sshbuf_get_string(struct sshbuf *buf, u_char **valp, size_t *lenp)
{
const u_char *val;
size_t len;
int r;
if (valp != NULL)
*valp = NULL;
if (lenp != NULL)
*lenp = 0;
if ((r = sshbuf_get_string_direct(buf, &val, &len)) < 0)
return r;
if (valp != NULL) {
if ((*valp = malloc(len + 1)) == NULL) {
SSHBUF_DBG(("SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL"));
return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
}
if (len != 0)
memcpy(*valp, val, len);
(*valp)[len] = '\0';
}
if (lenp != NULL)
*lenp = len;
return 0;
}
int
sshbuf_get_string_direct(struct sshbuf *buf, const u_char **valp, size_t *lenp)
{
size_t len;
const u_char *p;
int r;
if (valp != NULL)
*valp = NULL;
if (lenp != NULL)
*lenp = 0;
if ((r = sshbuf_peek_string_direct(buf, &p, &len)) < 0)
return r;
if (valp != NULL)
*valp = p;
if (lenp != NULL)
*lenp = len;
if (sshbuf_consume(buf, len + 4) != 0) {
/* Shouldn't happen */
SSHBUF_DBG(("SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR"));
SSHBUF_ABORT();
return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
}
return 0;
}
int
sshbuf_peek_string_direct(const struct sshbuf *buf, const u_char **valp,
size_t *lenp)
{
u_int32_t len;
const u_char *p = sshbuf_ptr(buf);
if (valp != NULL)
*valp = NULL;
if (lenp != NULL)
*lenp = 0;
if (sshbuf_len(buf) < 4) {
SSHBUF_DBG(("SSH_ERR_MESSAGE_INCOMPLETE"));
return SSH_ERR_MESSAGE_INCOMPLETE;
}
len = PEEK_U32(p);
if (len > SSHBUF_SIZE_MAX - 4) {
SSHBUF_DBG(("SSH_ERR_STRING_TOO_LARGE"));
return SSH_ERR_STRING_TOO_LARGE;
}
if (sshbuf_len(buf) - 4 < len) {
SSHBUF_DBG(("SSH_ERR_MESSAGE_INCOMPLETE"));
return SSH_ERR_MESSAGE_INCOMPLETE;
}
if (valp != NULL)
*valp = p + 4;
if (lenp != NULL)
*lenp = len;
return 0;
}
int
sshbuf_get_cstring(struct sshbuf *buf, char **valp, size_t *lenp)
{
size_t len;
const u_char *p, *z;
int r;
if (valp != NULL)
*valp = NULL;
if (lenp != NULL)
*lenp = 0;
if ((r = sshbuf_peek_string_direct(buf, &p, &len)) != 0)
return r;
/* Allow a \0 only at the end of the string */
if (len > 0 &&
(z = memchr(p , '\0', len)) != NULL && z < p + len - 1) {
SSHBUF_DBG(("SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT"));
return SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
}
if ((r = sshbuf_skip_string(buf)) != 0)
return -1;
if (valp != NULL) {
if ((*valp = malloc(len + 1)) == NULL) {
SSHBUF_DBG(("SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL"));
return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
}
if (len != 0)
memcpy(*valp, p, len);
(*valp)[len] = '\0';
}
if (lenp != NULL)
*lenp = (size_t)len;
return 0;
}
int
sshbuf_get_stringb(struct sshbuf *buf, struct sshbuf *v)
{
u_int32_t len;
u_char *p;
int r;
/*
* Use sshbuf_peek_string_direct() to figure out if there is
* a complete string in 'buf' and copy the string directly
* into 'v'.
*/
if ((r = sshbuf_peek_string_direct(buf, NULL, NULL)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_u32(buf, &len)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_reserve(v, len, &p)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get(buf, p, len)) != 0)
return r;
return 0;
}
int
sshbuf_put(struct sshbuf *buf, const void *v, size_t len)
{
u_char *p;
int r;
if ((r = sshbuf_reserve(buf, len, &p)) < 0)
return r;
if (len != 0)
memcpy(p, v, len);
return 0;
}
int
sshbuf_putb(struct sshbuf *buf, const struct sshbuf *v)
{
+ if (v == NULL)
+ return 0;
return sshbuf_put(buf, sshbuf_ptr(v), sshbuf_len(v));
}
int
sshbuf_putf(struct sshbuf *buf, const char *fmt, ...)
{
va_list ap;
int r;
va_start(ap, fmt);
r = sshbuf_putfv(buf, fmt, ap);
va_end(ap);
return r;
}
int
sshbuf_putfv(struct sshbuf *buf, const char *fmt, va_list ap)
{
va_list ap2;
int r, len;
u_char *p;
VA_COPY(ap2, ap);
if ((len = vsnprintf(NULL, 0, fmt, ap2)) < 0) {
r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
goto out;
}
if (len == 0) {
r = 0;
goto out; /* Nothing to do */
}
va_end(ap2);
VA_COPY(ap2, ap);
if ((r = sshbuf_reserve(buf, (size_t)len + 1, &p)) < 0)
goto out;
if ((r = vsnprintf((char *)p, len + 1, fmt, ap2)) != len) {
r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
goto out; /* Shouldn't happen */
}
/* Consume terminating \0 */
if ((r = sshbuf_consume_end(buf, 1)) != 0)
goto out;
r = 0;
out:
va_end(ap2);
return r;
}
int
sshbuf_put_u64(struct sshbuf *buf, u_int64_t val)
{
u_char *p;
int r;
if ((r = sshbuf_reserve(buf, 8, &p)) < 0)
return r;
POKE_U64(p, val);
return 0;
}
int
sshbuf_put_u32(struct sshbuf *buf, u_int32_t val)
{
u_char *p;
int r;
if ((r = sshbuf_reserve(buf, 4, &p)) < 0)
return r;
POKE_U32(p, val);
return 0;
}
int
sshbuf_put_u16(struct sshbuf *buf, u_int16_t val)
{
u_char *p;
int r;
if ((r = sshbuf_reserve(buf, 2, &p)) < 0)
return r;
POKE_U16(p, val);
return 0;
}
int
sshbuf_put_u8(struct sshbuf *buf, u_char val)
{
u_char *p;
int r;
if ((r = sshbuf_reserve(buf, 1, &p)) < 0)
return r;
p[0] = val;
return 0;
}
static int
check_woffset(struct sshbuf *buf, size_t offset, size_t len, u_char **p)
{
int r;
*p = NULL;
if ((r = check_offset(buf, 1, offset, len)) != 0)
return r;
if (sshbuf_mutable_ptr(buf) == NULL)
return SSH_ERR_BUFFER_READ_ONLY;
*p = sshbuf_mutable_ptr(buf) + offset;
return 0;
}
int
sshbuf_poke_u64(struct sshbuf *buf, size_t offset, u_int64_t val)
{
u_char *p = NULL;
int r;
if ((r = check_woffset(buf, offset, 8, &p)) != 0)
return r;
POKE_U64(p, val);
return 0;
}
int
sshbuf_poke_u32(struct sshbuf *buf, size_t offset, u_int32_t val)
{
u_char *p = NULL;
int r;
if ((r = check_woffset(buf, offset, 4, &p)) != 0)
return r;
POKE_U32(p, val);
return 0;
}
int
sshbuf_poke_u16(struct sshbuf *buf, size_t offset, u_int16_t val)
{
u_char *p = NULL;
int r;
if ((r = check_woffset(buf, offset, 2, &p)) != 0)
return r;
POKE_U16(p, val);
return 0;
}
int
sshbuf_poke_u8(struct sshbuf *buf, size_t offset, u_char val)
{
u_char *p = NULL;
int r;
if ((r = check_woffset(buf, offset, 1, &p)) != 0)
return r;
*p = val;
return 0;
}
int
sshbuf_poke(struct sshbuf *buf, size_t offset, void *v, size_t len)
{
u_char *p = NULL;
int r;
if ((r = check_woffset(buf, offset, len, &p)) != 0)
return r;
memcpy(p, v, len);
return 0;
}
int
sshbuf_put_string(struct sshbuf *buf, const void *v, size_t len)
{
u_char *d;
int r;
if (len > SSHBUF_SIZE_MAX - 4) {
SSHBUF_DBG(("SSH_ERR_NO_BUFFER_SPACE"));
return SSH_ERR_NO_BUFFER_SPACE;
}
if ((r = sshbuf_reserve(buf, len + 4, &d)) < 0)
return r;
POKE_U32(d, len);
if (len != 0)
memcpy(d + 4, v, len);
return 0;
}
int
sshbuf_put_cstring(struct sshbuf *buf, const char *v)
{
return sshbuf_put_string(buf, v, v == NULL ? 0 : strlen(v));
}
int
sshbuf_put_stringb(struct sshbuf *buf, const struct sshbuf *v)
{
if (v == NULL)
return sshbuf_put_string(buf, NULL, 0);
return sshbuf_put_string(buf, sshbuf_ptr(v), sshbuf_len(v));
}
int
sshbuf_froms(struct sshbuf *buf, struct sshbuf **bufp)
{
const u_char *p;
size_t len;
struct sshbuf *ret;
int r;
if (buf == NULL || bufp == NULL)
return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
*bufp = NULL;
if ((r = sshbuf_peek_string_direct(buf, &p, &len)) != 0)
return r;
if ((ret = sshbuf_from(p, len)) == NULL)
return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
if ((r = sshbuf_consume(buf, len + 4)) != 0 || /* Shouldn't happen */
(r = sshbuf_set_parent(ret, buf)) != 0) {
sshbuf_free(ret);
return r;
}
*bufp = ret;
return 0;
}
int
sshbuf_put_bignum2_bytes(struct sshbuf *buf, const void *v, size_t len)
{
u_char *d;
const u_char *s = (const u_char *)v;
int r, prepend;
if (len > SSHBUF_SIZE_MAX - 5) {
SSHBUF_DBG(("SSH_ERR_NO_BUFFER_SPACE"));
return SSH_ERR_NO_BUFFER_SPACE;
}
/* Skip leading zero bytes */
for (; len > 0 && *s == 0; len--, s++)
;
/*
* If most significant bit is set then prepend a zero byte to
* avoid interpretation as a negative number.
*/
prepend = len > 0 && (s[0] & 0x80) != 0;
if ((r = sshbuf_reserve(buf, len + 4 + prepend, &d)) < 0)
return r;
POKE_U32(d, len + prepend);
if (prepend)
d[4] = 0;
if (len != 0)
memcpy(d + 4 + prepend, s, len);
return 0;
}
int
sshbuf_get_bignum2_bytes_direct(struct sshbuf *buf,
const u_char **valp, size_t *lenp)
{
const u_char *d;
size_t len, olen;
int r;
if ((r = sshbuf_peek_string_direct(buf, &d, &olen)) < 0)
return r;
len = olen;
/* Refuse negative (MSB set) bignums */
if ((len != 0 && (*d & 0x80) != 0))
return SSH_ERR_BIGNUM_IS_NEGATIVE;
/* Refuse overlong bignums, allow prepended \0 to avoid MSB set */
if (len > SSHBUF_MAX_BIGNUM + 1 ||
(len == SSHBUF_MAX_BIGNUM + 1 && *d != 0))
return SSH_ERR_BIGNUM_TOO_LARGE;
/* Trim leading zeros */
while (len > 0 && *d == 0x00) {
d++;
len--;
}
if (valp != NULL)
*valp = d;
if (lenp != NULL)
*lenp = len;
if (sshbuf_consume(buf, olen + 4) != 0) {
/* Shouldn't happen */
SSHBUF_DBG(("SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR"));
SSHBUF_ABORT();
return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
}
return 0;
}
diff --git a/sshbuf-misc.c b/sshbuf-misc.c
index 9b5aa208cd97..afaab8d61c8b 100644
--- a/sshbuf-misc.c
+++ b/sshbuf-misc.c
@@ -1,228 +1,271 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: sshbuf-misc.c,v 1.14 2020/02/26 13:40:09 jsg Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: sshbuf-misc.c,v 1.16 2020/06/22 05:54:10 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 2011 Damien Miller
*
* Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
* purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
* copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
*
* THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
* WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
* MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
* ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
* WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
* ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
* OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
*/
#include "includes.h"
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/socket.h>
#include <netinet/in.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#ifdef HAVE_STDINT_H
# include <stdint.h>
#endif
#include <stdio.h>
#include <limits.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <resolv.h>
#include <ctype.h>
#include "ssherr.h"
#define SSHBUF_INTERNAL
#include "sshbuf.h"
void
sshbuf_dump_data(const void *s, size_t len, FILE *f)
{
size_t i, j;
const u_char *p = (const u_char *)s;
for (i = 0; i < len; i += 16) {
fprintf(f, "%.4zu: ", i);
for (j = i; j < i + 16; j++) {
if (j < len)
fprintf(f, "%02x ", p[j]);
else
fprintf(f, " ");
}
fprintf(f, " ");
for (j = i; j < i + 16; j++) {
if (j < len) {
if (isascii(p[j]) && isprint(p[j]))
fprintf(f, "%c", p[j]);
else
fprintf(f, ".");
}
}
fprintf(f, "\n");
}
}
void
-sshbuf_dump(struct sshbuf *buf, FILE *f)
+sshbuf_dump(const struct sshbuf *buf, FILE *f)
{
fprintf(f, "buffer %p len = %zu\n", buf, sshbuf_len(buf));
sshbuf_dump_data(sshbuf_ptr(buf), sshbuf_len(buf), f);
}
char *
sshbuf_dtob16(struct sshbuf *buf)
{
size_t i, j, len = sshbuf_len(buf);
const u_char *p = sshbuf_ptr(buf);
char *ret;
const char hex[] = "0123456789abcdef";
if (len == 0)
return strdup("");
if (SIZE_MAX / 2 <= len || (ret = malloc(len * 2 + 1)) == NULL)
return NULL;
for (i = j = 0; i < len; i++) {
ret[j++] = hex[(p[i] >> 4) & 0xf];
ret[j++] = hex[p[i] & 0xf];
}
ret[j] = '\0';
return ret;
}
int
sshbuf_dtob64(const struct sshbuf *d, struct sshbuf *b64, int wrap)
{
size_t i, slen = 0;
char *s = NULL;
int r;
if (d == NULL || b64 == NULL || sshbuf_len(d) >= SIZE_MAX / 2)
return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
if (sshbuf_len(d) == 0)
return 0;
slen = ((sshbuf_len(d) + 2) / 3) * 4 + 1;
if ((s = malloc(slen)) == NULL)
return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
if (b64_ntop(sshbuf_ptr(d), sshbuf_len(d), s, slen) == -1) {
r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
goto fail;
}
if (wrap) {
for (i = 0; s[i] != '\0'; i++) {
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(b64, s[i])) != 0)
goto fail;
if (i % 70 == 69 && (r = sshbuf_put_u8(b64, '\n')) != 0)
goto fail;
}
if ((i - 1) % 70 != 69 && (r = sshbuf_put_u8(b64, '\n')) != 0)
goto fail;
} else {
if ((r = sshbuf_put(b64, s, strlen(s))) != 0)
goto fail;
}
/* Success */
r = 0;
fail:
freezero(s, slen);
return r;
}
char *
sshbuf_dtob64_string(const struct sshbuf *buf, int wrap)
{
struct sshbuf *tmp;
char *ret;
if ((tmp = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
return NULL;
if (sshbuf_dtob64(buf, tmp, wrap) != 0) {
sshbuf_free(tmp);
return NULL;
}
ret = sshbuf_dup_string(tmp);
sshbuf_free(tmp);
return ret;
}
int
sshbuf_b64tod(struct sshbuf *buf, const char *b64)
{
size_t plen = strlen(b64);
int nlen, r;
u_char *p;
if (plen == 0)
return 0;
if ((p = malloc(plen)) == NULL)
return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
if ((nlen = b64_pton(b64, p, plen)) < 0) {
freezero(p, plen);
return SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
}
if ((r = sshbuf_put(buf, p, nlen)) < 0) {
freezero(p, plen);
return r;
}
freezero(p, plen);
return 0;
}
+int
+sshbuf_dtourlb64(const struct sshbuf *d, struct sshbuf *b64, int wrap)
+{
+ int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ u_char *p;
+ struct sshbuf *b = NULL;
+ size_t i, l;
+
+ if ((b = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
+ return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ /* Encode using regular base64; we'll transform it once done */
+ if ((r = sshbuf_dtob64(d, b, wrap)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+ /* remove padding from end of encoded string*/
+ for (;;) {
+ l = sshbuf_len(b);
+ if (l <= 1 || sshbuf_ptr(b) == NULL) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if (sshbuf_ptr(b)[l - 1] != '=')
+ break;
+ if ((r = sshbuf_consume_end(b, 1)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+ }
+ /* Replace characters with rfc4648 equivalents */
+ l = sshbuf_len(b);
+ if ((p = sshbuf_mutable_ptr(b)) == NULL) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ for (i = 0; i < l; i++) {
+ if (p[i] == '+')
+ p[i] = '-';
+ else if (p[i] == '/')
+ p[i] = '_';
+ }
+ r = sshbuf_putb(b64, b);
+ out:
+ sshbuf_free(b);
+ return r;
+}
+
char *
sshbuf_dup_string(struct sshbuf *buf)
{
const u_char *p = NULL, *s = sshbuf_ptr(buf);
size_t l = sshbuf_len(buf);
char *r;
if (s == NULL || l > SIZE_MAX)
return NULL;
/* accept a nul only as the last character in the buffer */
if (l > 0 && (p = memchr(s, '\0', l)) != NULL) {
if (p != s + l - 1)
return NULL;
l--; /* the nul is put back below */
}
if ((r = malloc(l + 1)) == NULL)
return NULL;
if (l > 0)
memcpy(r, s, l);
r[l] = '\0';
return r;
}
int
sshbuf_cmp(const struct sshbuf *b, size_t offset,
const void *s, size_t len)
{
if (sshbuf_ptr(b) == NULL)
return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
if (offset > SSHBUF_SIZE_MAX || len > SSHBUF_SIZE_MAX || len == 0)
return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
if (offset + len > sshbuf_len(b))
return SSH_ERR_MESSAGE_INCOMPLETE;
if (timingsafe_bcmp(sshbuf_ptr(b) + offset, s, len) != 0)
return SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
return 0;
}
int
sshbuf_find(const struct sshbuf *b, size_t start_offset,
const void *s, size_t len, size_t *offsetp)
{
void *p;
if (offsetp != NULL)
*offsetp = 0;
if (sshbuf_ptr(b) == NULL)
return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
if (start_offset > SSHBUF_SIZE_MAX || len > SSHBUF_SIZE_MAX || len == 0)
return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
if (start_offset > sshbuf_len(b) || start_offset + len > sshbuf_len(b))
return SSH_ERR_MESSAGE_INCOMPLETE;
if ((p = memmem(sshbuf_ptr(b) + start_offset,
sshbuf_len(b) - start_offset, s, len)) == NULL)
return SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
if (offsetp != NULL)
*offsetp = (const u_char *)p - sshbuf_ptr(b);
return 0;
}
diff --git a/sshbuf.h b/sshbuf.h
index 94392c8beaa8..2ad0e61be120 100644
--- a/sshbuf.h
+++ b/sshbuf.h
@@ -1,409 +1,411 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: sshbuf.h,v 1.21 2020/04/26 09:38:14 dtucker Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: sshbuf.h,v 1.23 2020/06/22 05:54:10 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 2011 Damien Miller
*
* Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
* purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
* copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
*
* THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
* WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
* MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
* ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
* WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
* ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
* OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
*/
#ifndef _SSHBUF_H
#define _SSHBUF_H
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <stdarg.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
# include <openssl/bn.h>
# ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
# include <openssl/ec.h>
# endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */
#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
#define SSHBUF_SIZE_MAX 0x8000000 /* Hard maximum size */
#define SSHBUF_REFS_MAX 0x100000 /* Max child buffers */
#define SSHBUF_MAX_BIGNUM (16384 / 8) /* Max bignum *bytes* */
#define SSHBUF_MAX_ECPOINT ((528 * 2 / 8) + 1) /* Max EC point *bytes* */
/*
* NB. do not depend on the internals of this. It will be made opaque
* one day.
*/
struct sshbuf {
u_char *d; /* Data */
const u_char *cd; /* Const data */
size_t off; /* First available byte is buf->d + buf->off */
size_t size; /* Last byte is buf->d + buf->size - 1 */
size_t max_size; /* Maximum size of buffer */
size_t alloc; /* Total bytes allocated to buf->d */
int readonly; /* Refers to external, const data */
int dont_free; /* Kludge to support sshbuf_init */
u_int refcount; /* Tracks self and number of child buffers */
struct sshbuf *parent; /* If child, pointer to parent */
};
/*
* Create a new sshbuf buffer.
* Returns pointer to buffer on success, or NULL on allocation failure.
*/
struct sshbuf *sshbuf_new(void);
/*
* Create a new, read-only sshbuf buffer from existing data.
* Returns pointer to buffer on success, or NULL on allocation failure.
*/
struct sshbuf *sshbuf_from(const void *blob, size_t len);
/*
* Create a new, read-only sshbuf buffer from the contents of an existing
* buffer. The contents of "buf" must not change in the lifetime of the
* resultant buffer.
* Returns pointer to buffer on success, or NULL on allocation failure.
*/
struct sshbuf *sshbuf_fromb(struct sshbuf *buf);
/*
* Create a new, read-only sshbuf buffer from the contents of a string in
* an existing buffer (the string is consumed in the process).
* The contents of "buf" must not change in the lifetime of the resultant
* buffer.
* Returns pointer to buffer on success, or NULL on allocation failure.
*/
int sshbuf_froms(struct sshbuf *buf, struct sshbuf **bufp);
/*
* Clear and free buf
*/
void sshbuf_free(struct sshbuf *buf);
/*
* Reset buf, clearing its contents. NB. max_size is preserved.
*/
void sshbuf_reset(struct sshbuf *buf);
/*
* Return the maximum size of buf
*/
size_t sshbuf_max_size(const struct sshbuf *buf);
/*
* Set the maximum size of buf
* Returns 0 on success, or a negative SSH_ERR_* error code on failure.
*/
int sshbuf_set_max_size(struct sshbuf *buf, size_t max_size);
/*
* Returns the length of data in buf
*/
size_t sshbuf_len(const struct sshbuf *buf);
/*
* Returns number of bytes left in buffer before hitting max_size.
*/
size_t sshbuf_avail(const struct sshbuf *buf);
/*
* Returns a read-only pointer to the start of the data in buf
*/
const u_char *sshbuf_ptr(const struct sshbuf *buf);
/*
* Returns a mutable pointer to the start of the data in buf, or
* NULL if the buffer is read-only.
*/
u_char *sshbuf_mutable_ptr(const struct sshbuf *buf);
/*
* Check whether a reservation of size len will succeed in buf
* Safer to use than direct comparisons again sshbuf_avail as it copes
* with unsigned overflows correctly.
* Returns 0 on success, or a negative SSH_ERR_* error code on failure.
*/
int sshbuf_check_reserve(const struct sshbuf *buf, size_t len);
/*
* Preallocates len additional bytes in buf.
* Useful for cases where the caller knows how many bytes will ultimately be
* required to avoid realloc in the buffer code.
* Returns 0 on success, or a negative SSH_ERR_* error code on failure.
*/
int sshbuf_allocate(struct sshbuf *buf, size_t len);
/*
* Reserve len bytes in buf.
* Returns 0 on success and a pointer to the first reserved byte via the
* optional dpp parameter or a negative SSH_ERR_* error code on failure.
*/
int sshbuf_reserve(struct sshbuf *buf, size_t len, u_char **dpp);
/*
* Consume len bytes from the start of buf
* Returns 0 on success, or a negative SSH_ERR_* error code on failure.
*/
int sshbuf_consume(struct sshbuf *buf, size_t len);
/*
* Consume len bytes from the end of buf
* Returns 0 on success, or a negative SSH_ERR_* error code on failure.
*/
int sshbuf_consume_end(struct sshbuf *buf, size_t len);
/* Extract or deposit some bytes */
int sshbuf_get(struct sshbuf *buf, void *v, size_t len);
int sshbuf_put(struct sshbuf *buf, const void *v, size_t len);
int sshbuf_putb(struct sshbuf *buf, const struct sshbuf *v);
/* Append using a printf(3) format */
int sshbuf_putf(struct sshbuf *buf, const char *fmt, ...)
__attribute__((format(printf, 2, 3)));
int sshbuf_putfv(struct sshbuf *buf, const char *fmt, va_list ap);
/* Functions to extract or store big-endian words of various sizes */
int sshbuf_get_u64(struct sshbuf *buf, u_int64_t *valp);
int sshbuf_get_u32(struct sshbuf *buf, u_int32_t *valp);
int sshbuf_get_u16(struct sshbuf *buf, u_int16_t *valp);
int sshbuf_get_u8(struct sshbuf *buf, u_char *valp);
int sshbuf_put_u64(struct sshbuf *buf, u_int64_t val);
int sshbuf_put_u32(struct sshbuf *buf, u_int32_t val);
int sshbuf_put_u16(struct sshbuf *buf, u_int16_t val);
int sshbuf_put_u8(struct sshbuf *buf, u_char val);
/* Functions to peek at the contents of a buffer without modifying it. */
int sshbuf_peek_u64(const struct sshbuf *buf, size_t offset,
u_int64_t *valp);
int sshbuf_peek_u32(const struct sshbuf *buf, size_t offset,
u_int32_t *valp);
int sshbuf_peek_u16(const struct sshbuf *buf, size_t offset,
u_int16_t *valp);
int sshbuf_peek_u8(const struct sshbuf *buf, size_t offset,
u_char *valp);
/*
* Functions to poke values into an existing buffer (e.g. a length header
* to a packet). The destination bytes must already exist in the buffer.
*/
int sshbuf_poke_u64(struct sshbuf *buf, size_t offset, u_int64_t val);
int sshbuf_poke_u32(struct sshbuf *buf, size_t offset, u_int32_t val);
int sshbuf_poke_u16(struct sshbuf *buf, size_t offset, u_int16_t val);
int sshbuf_poke_u8(struct sshbuf *buf, size_t offset, u_char val);
int sshbuf_poke(struct sshbuf *buf, size_t offset, void *v, size_t len);
/*
* Functions to extract or store SSH wire encoded strings (u32 len || data)
* The "cstring" variants admit no \0 characters in the string contents.
* Caller must free *valp.
*/
int sshbuf_get_string(struct sshbuf *buf, u_char **valp, size_t *lenp);
int sshbuf_get_cstring(struct sshbuf *buf, char **valp, size_t *lenp);
int sshbuf_get_stringb(struct sshbuf *buf, struct sshbuf *v);
int sshbuf_put_string(struct sshbuf *buf, const void *v, size_t len);
int sshbuf_put_cstring(struct sshbuf *buf, const char *v);
int sshbuf_put_stringb(struct sshbuf *buf, const struct sshbuf *v);
/*
* "Direct" variant of sshbuf_get_string, returns pointer into the sshbuf to
* avoid an malloc+memcpy. The pointer is guaranteed to be valid until the
* next sshbuf-modifying function call. Caller does not free.
*/
int sshbuf_get_string_direct(struct sshbuf *buf, const u_char **valp,
size_t *lenp);
/* Skip past a string */
#define sshbuf_skip_string(buf) sshbuf_get_string_direct(buf, NULL, NULL)
/* Another variant: "peeks" into the buffer without modifying it */
int sshbuf_peek_string_direct(const struct sshbuf *buf, const u_char **valp,
size_t *lenp);
/*
* Functions to extract or store SSH wire encoded bignums and elliptic
* curve points.
*/
int sshbuf_put_bignum2_bytes(struct sshbuf *buf, const void *v, size_t len);
int sshbuf_get_bignum2_bytes_direct(struct sshbuf *buf,
const u_char **valp, size_t *lenp);
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
int sshbuf_get_bignum2(struct sshbuf *buf, BIGNUM **valp);
int sshbuf_put_bignum2(struct sshbuf *buf, const BIGNUM *v);
# ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
int sshbuf_get_ec(struct sshbuf *buf, EC_POINT *v, const EC_GROUP *g);
int sshbuf_get_eckey(struct sshbuf *buf, EC_KEY *v);
int sshbuf_put_ec(struct sshbuf *buf, const EC_POINT *v, const EC_GROUP *g);
int sshbuf_put_eckey(struct sshbuf *buf, const EC_KEY *v);
# endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */
#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
/* Dump the contents of the buffer in a human-readable format */
-void sshbuf_dump(struct sshbuf *buf, FILE *f);
+void sshbuf_dump(const struct sshbuf *buf, FILE *f);
/* Dump specified memory in a human-readable format */
void sshbuf_dump_data(const void *s, size_t len, FILE *f);
/* Return the hexadecimal representation of the contents of the buffer */
char *sshbuf_dtob16(struct sshbuf *buf);
/* Encode the contents of the buffer as base64 */
char *sshbuf_dtob64_string(const struct sshbuf *buf, int wrap);
int sshbuf_dtob64(const struct sshbuf *d, struct sshbuf *b64, int wrap);
+/* RFC4648 "base64url" encoding variant */
+int sshbuf_dtourlb64(const struct sshbuf *d, struct sshbuf *b64, int wrap);
/* Decode base64 data and append it to the buffer */
int sshbuf_b64tod(struct sshbuf *buf, const char *b64);
/*
* Tests whether the buffer contains the specified byte sequence at the
* specified offset. Returns 0 on successful match, or a ssherr.h code
* otherwise. SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT indicates sufficient bytes were
* present but the buffer contents did not match those supplied. Zero-
* length comparisons are not allowed.
*
* If sufficient data is present to make a comparison, then it is
* performed with timing independent of the value of the data. If
* insufficient data is present then the comparison is not attempted at
* all.
*/
int sshbuf_cmp(const struct sshbuf *b, size_t offset,
const void *s, size_t len);
/*
* Searches the buffer for the specified string. Returns 0 on success
* and updates *offsetp with the offset of the first match, relative to
* the start of the buffer. Otherwise sshbuf_find will return a ssherr.h
* error code. SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT indicates sufficient bytes were
* present in the buffer for a match to be possible but none was found.
* Searches for zero-length data are not allowed.
*/
int
sshbuf_find(const struct sshbuf *b, size_t start_offset,
const void *s, size_t len, size_t *offsetp);
/*
* Duplicate the contents of a buffer to a string (caller to free).
* Returns NULL on buffer error, or if the buffer contains a premature
* nul character.
*/
char *sshbuf_dup_string(struct sshbuf *buf);
/*
* Fill a buffer from a file descriptor or filename. Both allocate the
* buffer for the caller.
*/
int sshbuf_load_fd(int, struct sshbuf **)
__attribute__((__nonnull__ (2)));
int sshbuf_load_file(const char *, struct sshbuf **)
__attribute__((__nonnull__ (2)));
/*
* Write a buffer to a path, creating/truncating as needed (mode 0644,
* subject to umask). The buffer contents are not modified.
*/
int sshbuf_write_file(const char *path, struct sshbuf *buf)
__attribute__((__nonnull__ (2)));
/* Macros for decoding/encoding integers */
#define PEEK_U64(p) \
(((u_int64_t)(((const u_char *)(p))[0]) << 56) | \
((u_int64_t)(((const u_char *)(p))[1]) << 48) | \
((u_int64_t)(((const u_char *)(p))[2]) << 40) | \
((u_int64_t)(((const u_char *)(p))[3]) << 32) | \
((u_int64_t)(((const u_char *)(p))[4]) << 24) | \
((u_int64_t)(((const u_char *)(p))[5]) << 16) | \
((u_int64_t)(((const u_char *)(p))[6]) << 8) | \
(u_int64_t)(((const u_char *)(p))[7]))
#define PEEK_U32(p) \
(((u_int32_t)(((const u_char *)(p))[0]) << 24) | \
((u_int32_t)(((const u_char *)(p))[1]) << 16) | \
((u_int32_t)(((const u_char *)(p))[2]) << 8) | \
(u_int32_t)(((const u_char *)(p))[3]))
#define PEEK_U16(p) \
(((u_int16_t)(((const u_char *)(p))[0]) << 8) | \
(u_int16_t)(((const u_char *)(p))[1]))
#define POKE_U64(p, v) \
do { \
const u_int64_t __v = (v); \
((u_char *)(p))[0] = (__v >> 56) & 0xff; \
((u_char *)(p))[1] = (__v >> 48) & 0xff; \
((u_char *)(p))[2] = (__v >> 40) & 0xff; \
((u_char *)(p))[3] = (__v >> 32) & 0xff; \
((u_char *)(p))[4] = (__v >> 24) & 0xff; \
((u_char *)(p))[5] = (__v >> 16) & 0xff; \
((u_char *)(p))[6] = (__v >> 8) & 0xff; \
((u_char *)(p))[7] = __v & 0xff; \
} while (0)
#define POKE_U32(p, v) \
do { \
const u_int32_t __v = (v); \
((u_char *)(p))[0] = (__v >> 24) & 0xff; \
((u_char *)(p))[1] = (__v >> 16) & 0xff; \
((u_char *)(p))[2] = (__v >> 8) & 0xff; \
((u_char *)(p))[3] = __v & 0xff; \
} while (0)
#define POKE_U16(p, v) \
do { \
const u_int16_t __v = (v); \
((u_char *)(p))[0] = (__v >> 8) & 0xff; \
((u_char *)(p))[1] = __v & 0xff; \
} while (0)
/* Internal definitions follow. Exposed for regress tests */
#ifdef SSHBUF_INTERNAL
/*
* Return the allocation size of buf
*/
size_t sshbuf_alloc(const struct sshbuf *buf);
/*
* Increment the reference count of buf.
*/
int sshbuf_set_parent(struct sshbuf *child, struct sshbuf *parent);
/*
* Return the parent buffer of buf, or NULL if it has no parent.
*/
const struct sshbuf *sshbuf_parent(const struct sshbuf *buf);
/*
* Return the reference count of buf
*/
u_int sshbuf_refcount(const struct sshbuf *buf);
# define SSHBUF_SIZE_INIT 256 /* Initial allocation */
# define SSHBUF_SIZE_INC 256 /* Preferred increment length */
# define SSHBUF_PACK_MIN 8192 /* Minimim packable offset */
/* # define SSHBUF_ABORT abort */
/* # define SSHBUF_DEBUG */
# ifndef SSHBUF_ABORT
# define SSHBUF_ABORT()
# endif
# ifdef SSHBUF_DEBUG
# define SSHBUF_TELL(what) do { \
printf("%s:%d %s: %s size %zu alloc %zu off %zu max %zu\n", \
__FILE__, __LINE__, __func__, what, \
buf->size, buf->alloc, buf->off, buf->max_size); \
fflush(stdout); \
} while (0)
# define SSHBUF_DBG(x) do { \
printf("%s:%d %s: ", __FILE__, __LINE__, __func__); \
printf x; \
printf("\n"); \
fflush(stdout); \
} while (0)
# else
# define SSHBUF_TELL(what)
# define SSHBUF_DBG(x)
# endif
#endif /* SSHBUF_INTERNAL */
#endif /* _SSHBUF_H */
diff --git a/sshconnect.c b/sshconnect.c
index af08be4154d9..9ec0618a9c25 100644
--- a/sshconnect.c
+++ b/sshconnect.c
@@ -1,1439 +1,1443 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: sshconnect.c,v 1.329 2020/03/13 04:01:56 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: sshconnect.c,v 1.332 2020/09/09 21:57:27 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
* Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
* All rights reserved
* Code to connect to a remote host, and to perform the client side of the
* login (authentication) dialog.
*
* As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
* can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this
* software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
* incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
* called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
*/
#include "includes.h"
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/wait.h>
#include <sys/stat.h>
#include <sys/socket.h>
#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TIME_H
# include <sys/time.h>
#endif
#include <net/if.h>
#include <netinet/in.h>
#include <arpa/inet.h>
#include <ctype.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <netdb.h>
#ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H
#include <paths.h>
#endif
#include <pwd.h>
#ifdef HAVE_POLL_H
#include <poll.h>
#endif
#include <signal.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <stdarg.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#ifdef HAVE_IFADDRS_H
# include <ifaddrs.h>
#endif
#include "xmalloc.h"
#include "hostfile.h"
#include "ssh.h"
#include "sshbuf.h"
#include "packet.h"
#include "compat.h"
#include "sshkey.h"
#include "sshconnect.h"
#include "log.h"
#include "misc.h"
#include "readconf.h"
#include "atomicio.h"
#include "dns.h"
#include "monitor_fdpass.h"
#include "ssh2.h"
#include "version.h"
#include "authfile.h"
#include "ssherr.h"
#include "authfd.h"
#include "kex.h"
struct sshkey *previous_host_key = NULL;
static int matching_host_key_dns = 0;
static pid_t proxy_command_pid = 0;
/* import */
extern int debug_flag;
extern Options options;
extern char *__progname;
static int show_other_keys(struct hostkeys *, struct sshkey *);
static void warn_changed_key(struct sshkey *);
/* Expand a proxy command */
static char *
expand_proxy_command(const char *proxy_command, const char *user,
const char *host, const char *host_arg, int port)
{
char *tmp, *ret, strport[NI_MAXSERV];
+ const char *keyalias = options.host_key_alias ?
+ options.host_key_alias : host_arg;
snprintf(strport, sizeof strport, "%d", port);
xasprintf(&tmp, "exec %s", proxy_command);
ret = percent_expand(tmp,
"h", host,
+ "k", keyalias,
"n", host_arg,
"p", strport,
"r", options.user,
(char *)NULL);
free(tmp);
return ret;
}
static void
stderr_null(void)
{
int devnull;
if ((devnull = open(_PATH_DEVNULL, O_WRONLY)) == -1) {
error("Can't open %s for stderr redirection: %s",
_PATH_DEVNULL, strerror(errno));
return;
}
if (devnull == STDERR_FILENO)
return;
if (dup2(devnull, STDERR_FILENO) == -1)
error("Cannot redirect stderr to %s", _PATH_DEVNULL);
if (devnull > STDERR_FILENO)
close(devnull);
}
/*
* Connect to the given ssh server using a proxy command that passes a
* a connected fd back to us.
*/
static int
ssh_proxy_fdpass_connect(struct ssh *ssh, const char *host,
const char *host_arg, u_short port, const char *proxy_command)
{
char *command_string;
int sp[2], sock;
pid_t pid;
char *shell;
if ((shell = getenv("SHELL")) == NULL)
shell = _PATH_BSHELL;
if (socketpair(AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0, sp) == -1)
fatal("Could not create socketpair to communicate with "
"proxy dialer: %.100s", strerror(errno));
command_string = expand_proxy_command(proxy_command, options.user,
host, host_arg, port);
debug("Executing proxy dialer command: %.500s", command_string);
/* Fork and execute the proxy command. */
if ((pid = fork()) == 0) {
char *argv[10];
close(sp[1]);
/* Redirect stdin and stdout. */
if (sp[0] != 0) {
if (dup2(sp[0], 0) == -1)
perror("dup2 stdin");
}
if (sp[0] != 1) {
if (dup2(sp[0], 1) == -1)
perror("dup2 stdout");
}
if (sp[0] >= 2)
close(sp[0]);
/*
* Stderr is left for non-ControlPersist connections is so
* error messages may be printed on the user's terminal.
*/
if (!debug_flag && options.control_path != NULL &&
options.control_persist)
stderr_null();
argv[0] = shell;
argv[1] = "-c";
argv[2] = command_string;
argv[3] = NULL;
/*
* Execute the proxy command.
* Note that we gave up any extra privileges above.
*/
execv(argv[0], argv);
perror(argv[0]);
exit(1);
}
/* Parent. */
if (pid == -1)
fatal("fork failed: %.100s", strerror(errno));
close(sp[0]);
free(command_string);
if ((sock = mm_receive_fd(sp[1])) == -1)
fatal("proxy dialer did not pass back a connection");
close(sp[1]);
while (waitpid(pid, NULL, 0) == -1)
if (errno != EINTR)
fatal("Couldn't wait for child: %s", strerror(errno));
/* Set the connection file descriptors. */
if (ssh_packet_set_connection(ssh, sock, sock) == NULL)
return -1; /* ssh_packet_set_connection logs error */
return 0;
}
/*
* Connect to the given ssh server using a proxy command.
*/
static int
ssh_proxy_connect(struct ssh *ssh, const char *host, const char *host_arg,
u_short port, const char *proxy_command)
{
char *command_string;
int pin[2], pout[2];
pid_t pid;
char *shell;
if ((shell = getenv("SHELL")) == NULL || *shell == '\0')
shell = _PATH_BSHELL;
/* Create pipes for communicating with the proxy. */
if (pipe(pin) == -1 || pipe(pout) == -1)
fatal("Could not create pipes to communicate with the proxy: %.100s",
strerror(errno));
command_string = expand_proxy_command(proxy_command, options.user,
host, host_arg, port);
debug("Executing proxy command: %.500s", command_string);
/* Fork and execute the proxy command. */
if ((pid = fork()) == 0) {
char *argv[10];
/* Redirect stdin and stdout. */
close(pin[1]);
if (pin[0] != 0) {
if (dup2(pin[0], 0) == -1)
perror("dup2 stdin");
close(pin[0]);
}
close(pout[0]);
if (dup2(pout[1], 1) == -1)
perror("dup2 stdout");
/* Cannot be 1 because pin allocated two descriptors. */
close(pout[1]);
/*
* Stderr is left for non-ControlPersist connections is so
* error messages may be printed on the user's terminal.
*/
if (!debug_flag && options.control_path != NULL &&
options.control_persist)
stderr_null();
argv[0] = shell;
argv[1] = "-c";
argv[2] = command_string;
argv[3] = NULL;
/* Execute the proxy command. Note that we gave up any
extra privileges above. */
ssh_signal(SIGPIPE, SIG_DFL);
execv(argv[0], argv);
perror(argv[0]);
exit(1);
}
/* Parent. */
if (pid == -1)
fatal("fork failed: %.100s", strerror(errno));
else
proxy_command_pid = pid; /* save pid to clean up later */
/* Close child side of the descriptors. */
close(pin[0]);
close(pout[1]);
/* Free the command name. */
free(command_string);
/* Set the connection file descriptors. */
if (ssh_packet_set_connection(ssh, pout[0], pin[1]) == NULL)
return -1; /* ssh_packet_set_connection logs error */
return 0;
}
void
ssh_kill_proxy_command(void)
{
/*
* Send SIGHUP to proxy command if used. We don't wait() in
* case it hangs and instead rely on init to reap the child
*/
if (proxy_command_pid > 1)
kill(proxy_command_pid, SIGHUP);
}
#ifdef HAVE_IFADDRS_H
/*
* Search a interface address list (returned from getifaddrs(3)) for an
* address that matches the desired address family on the specified interface.
* Returns 0 and fills in *resultp and *rlenp on success. Returns -1 on failure.
*/
static int
check_ifaddrs(const char *ifname, int af, const struct ifaddrs *ifaddrs,
struct sockaddr_storage *resultp, socklen_t *rlenp)
{
struct sockaddr_in6 *sa6;
struct sockaddr_in *sa;
struct in6_addr *v6addr;
const struct ifaddrs *ifa;
int allow_local;
/*
* Prefer addresses that are not loopback or linklocal, but use them
* if nothing else matches.
*/
for (allow_local = 0; allow_local < 2; allow_local++) {
for (ifa = ifaddrs; ifa != NULL; ifa = ifa->ifa_next) {
if (ifa->ifa_addr == NULL || ifa->ifa_name == NULL ||
(ifa->ifa_flags & IFF_UP) == 0 ||
ifa->ifa_addr->sa_family != af ||
strcmp(ifa->ifa_name, options.bind_interface) != 0)
continue;
switch (ifa->ifa_addr->sa_family) {
case AF_INET:
sa = (struct sockaddr_in *)ifa->ifa_addr;
if (!allow_local && sa->sin_addr.s_addr ==
htonl(INADDR_LOOPBACK))
continue;
if (*rlenp < sizeof(struct sockaddr_in)) {
error("%s: v4 addr doesn't fit",
__func__);
return -1;
}
*rlenp = sizeof(struct sockaddr_in);
memcpy(resultp, sa, *rlenp);
return 0;
case AF_INET6:
sa6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)ifa->ifa_addr;
v6addr = &sa6->sin6_addr;
if (!allow_local &&
(IN6_IS_ADDR_LINKLOCAL(v6addr) ||
IN6_IS_ADDR_LOOPBACK(v6addr)))
continue;
if (*rlenp < sizeof(struct sockaddr_in6)) {
error("%s: v6 addr doesn't fit",
__func__);
return -1;
}
*rlenp = sizeof(struct sockaddr_in6);
memcpy(resultp, sa6, *rlenp);
return 0;
}
}
}
return -1;
}
#endif
/*
* Creates a socket for use as the ssh connection.
*/
static int
ssh_create_socket(struct addrinfo *ai)
{
int sock, r;
struct sockaddr_storage bindaddr;
socklen_t bindaddrlen = 0;
struct addrinfo hints, *res = NULL;
#ifdef HAVE_IFADDRS_H
struct ifaddrs *ifaddrs = NULL;
#endif
char ntop[NI_MAXHOST];
sock = socket(ai->ai_family, ai->ai_socktype, ai->ai_protocol);
if (sock == -1) {
error("socket: %s", strerror(errno));
return -1;
}
fcntl(sock, F_SETFD, FD_CLOEXEC);
/* Bind the socket to an alternative local IP address */
if (options.bind_address == NULL && options.bind_interface == NULL)
return sock;
if (options.bind_address != NULL) {
memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints));
hints.ai_family = ai->ai_family;
hints.ai_socktype = ai->ai_socktype;
hints.ai_protocol = ai->ai_protocol;
hints.ai_flags = AI_PASSIVE;
if ((r = getaddrinfo(options.bind_address, NULL,
&hints, &res)) != 0) {
error("getaddrinfo: %s: %s", options.bind_address,
ssh_gai_strerror(r));
goto fail;
}
if (res == NULL) {
error("getaddrinfo: no addrs");
goto fail;
}
memcpy(&bindaddr, res->ai_addr, res->ai_addrlen);
bindaddrlen = res->ai_addrlen;
} else if (options.bind_interface != NULL) {
#ifdef HAVE_IFADDRS_H
if ((r = getifaddrs(&ifaddrs)) != 0) {
error("getifaddrs: %s: %s", options.bind_interface,
strerror(errno));
goto fail;
}
bindaddrlen = sizeof(bindaddr);
if (check_ifaddrs(options.bind_interface, ai->ai_family,
ifaddrs, &bindaddr, &bindaddrlen) != 0) {
logit("getifaddrs: %s: no suitable addresses",
options.bind_interface);
goto fail;
}
#else
error("BindInterface not supported on this platform.");
#endif
}
if ((r = getnameinfo((struct sockaddr *)&bindaddr, bindaddrlen,
ntop, sizeof(ntop), NULL, 0, NI_NUMERICHOST)) != 0) {
error("%s: getnameinfo failed: %s", __func__,
ssh_gai_strerror(r));
goto fail;
}
if (bind(sock, (struct sockaddr *)&bindaddr, bindaddrlen) != 0) {
error("bind %s: %s", ntop, strerror(errno));
goto fail;
}
debug("%s: bound to %s", __func__, ntop);
/* success */
goto out;
fail:
close(sock);
sock = -1;
out:
if (res != NULL)
freeaddrinfo(res);
#ifdef HAVE_IFADDRS_H
if (ifaddrs != NULL)
freeifaddrs(ifaddrs);
#endif
return sock;
}
/*
* Opens a TCP/IP connection to the remote server on the given host.
* The address of the remote host will be returned in hostaddr.
* If port is 0, the default port will be used.
* Connection_attempts specifies the maximum number of tries (one per
* second). If proxy_command is non-NULL, it specifies the command (with %h
* and %p substituted for host and port, respectively) to use to contact
* the daemon.
*/
static int
ssh_connect_direct(struct ssh *ssh, const char *host, struct addrinfo *aitop,
struct sockaddr_storage *hostaddr, u_short port, int family,
int connection_attempts, int *timeout_ms, int want_keepalive)
{
int on = 1, saved_timeout_ms = *timeout_ms;
int oerrno, sock = -1, attempt;
char ntop[NI_MAXHOST], strport[NI_MAXSERV];
struct addrinfo *ai;
debug2("%s", __func__);
memset(ntop, 0, sizeof(ntop));
memset(strport, 0, sizeof(strport));
for (attempt = 0; attempt < connection_attempts; attempt++) {
if (attempt > 0) {
/* Sleep a moment before retrying. */
sleep(1);
debug("Trying again...");
}
/*
* Loop through addresses for this host, and try each one in
* sequence until the connection succeeds.
*/
for (ai = aitop; ai; ai = ai->ai_next) {
if (ai->ai_family != AF_INET &&
ai->ai_family != AF_INET6) {
errno = EAFNOSUPPORT;
continue;
}
if (getnameinfo(ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen,
ntop, sizeof(ntop), strport, sizeof(strport),
NI_NUMERICHOST|NI_NUMERICSERV) != 0) {
oerrno = errno;
error("%s: getnameinfo failed", __func__);
errno = oerrno;
continue;
}
debug("Connecting to %.200s [%.100s] port %s.",
host, ntop, strport);
/* Create a socket for connecting. */
sock = ssh_create_socket(ai);
if (sock < 0) {
/* Any error is already output */
errno = 0;
continue;
}
*timeout_ms = saved_timeout_ms;
if (timeout_connect(sock, ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen,
timeout_ms) >= 0) {
/* Successful connection. */
memcpy(hostaddr, ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen);
break;
} else {
oerrno = errno;
debug("connect to address %s port %s: %s",
ntop, strport, strerror(errno));
close(sock);
sock = -1;
errno = oerrno;
}
}
if (sock != -1)
break; /* Successful connection. */
}
/* Return failure if we didn't get a successful connection. */
if (sock == -1) {
error("ssh: connect to host %s port %s: %s",
host, strport, errno == 0 ? "failure" : strerror(errno));
return -1;
}
debug("Connection established.");
/* Set SO_KEEPALIVE if requested. */
if (want_keepalive &&
setsockopt(sock, SOL_SOCKET, SO_KEEPALIVE, (void *)&on,
sizeof(on)) == -1)
error("setsockopt SO_KEEPALIVE: %.100s", strerror(errno));
/* Set the connection. */
if (ssh_packet_set_connection(ssh, sock, sock) == NULL)
return -1; /* ssh_packet_set_connection logs error */
return 0;
}
int
ssh_connect(struct ssh *ssh, const char *host, const char *host_arg,
struct addrinfo *addrs, struct sockaddr_storage *hostaddr, u_short port,
int family, int connection_attempts, int *timeout_ms, int want_keepalive)
{
int in, out;
if (options.proxy_command == NULL) {
return ssh_connect_direct(ssh, host, addrs, hostaddr, port,
family, connection_attempts, timeout_ms, want_keepalive);
} else if (strcmp(options.proxy_command, "-") == 0) {
if ((in = dup(STDIN_FILENO)) == -1 ||
(out = dup(STDOUT_FILENO)) == -1) {
if (in >= 0)
close(in);
error("%s: dup() in/out failed", __func__);
return -1; /* ssh_packet_set_connection logs error */
}
if ((ssh_packet_set_connection(ssh, in, out)) == NULL)
return -1; /* ssh_packet_set_connection logs error */
return 0;
} else if (options.proxy_use_fdpass) {
return ssh_proxy_fdpass_connect(ssh, host, host_arg, port,
options.proxy_command);
}
return ssh_proxy_connect(ssh, host, host_arg, port,
options.proxy_command);
}
/* defaults to 'no' */
static int
confirm(const char *prompt, const char *fingerprint)
{
const char *msg, *again = "Please type 'yes' or 'no': ";
const char *again_fp = "Please type 'yes', 'no' or the fingerprint: ";
char *p, *cp;
int ret = -1;
if (options.batch_mode)
return 0;
for (msg = prompt;;msg = fingerprint ? again_fp : again) {
cp = p = read_passphrase(msg, RP_ECHO);
if (p == NULL)
return 0;
p += strspn(p, " \t"); /* skip leading whitespace */
p[strcspn(p, " \t\n")] = '\0'; /* remove trailing whitespace */
if (p[0] == '\0' || strcasecmp(p, "no") == 0)
ret = 0;
else if (strcasecmp(p, "yes") == 0 || (fingerprint != NULL &&
- strcasecmp(p, fingerprint) == 0))
+ strcmp(p, fingerprint) == 0))
ret = 1;
free(cp);
if (ret != -1)
return ret;
}
}
static int
check_host_cert(const char *host, const struct sshkey *key)
{
const char *reason;
int r;
if (sshkey_cert_check_authority(key, 1, 0, host, &reason) != 0) {
error("%s", reason);
return 0;
}
if (sshbuf_len(key->cert->critical) != 0) {
error("Certificate for %s contains unsupported "
"critical options(s)", host);
return 0;
}
if ((r = sshkey_check_cert_sigtype(key,
options.ca_sign_algorithms)) != 0) {
logit("%s: certificate signature algorithm %s: %s", __func__,
(key->cert == NULL || key->cert->signature_type == NULL) ?
"(null)" : key->cert->signature_type, ssh_err(r));
return 0;
}
return 1;
}
static int
sockaddr_is_local(struct sockaddr *hostaddr)
{
switch (hostaddr->sa_family) {
case AF_INET:
return (ntohl(((struct sockaddr_in *)hostaddr)->
sin_addr.s_addr) >> 24) == IN_LOOPBACKNET;
case AF_INET6:
return IN6_IS_ADDR_LOOPBACK(
&(((struct sockaddr_in6 *)hostaddr)->sin6_addr));
default:
return 0;
}
}
/*
* Prepare the hostname and ip address strings that are used to lookup
* host keys in known_hosts files. These may have a port number appended.
*/
void
get_hostfile_hostname_ipaddr(char *hostname, struct sockaddr *hostaddr,
u_short port, char **hostfile_hostname, char **hostfile_ipaddr)
{
char ntop[NI_MAXHOST];
socklen_t addrlen;
switch (hostaddr == NULL ? -1 : hostaddr->sa_family) {
case -1:
addrlen = 0;
break;
case AF_INET:
addrlen = sizeof(struct sockaddr_in);
break;
case AF_INET6:
addrlen = sizeof(struct sockaddr_in6);
break;
default:
addrlen = sizeof(struct sockaddr);
break;
}
/*
* We don't have the remote ip-address for connections
* using a proxy command
*/
if (hostfile_ipaddr != NULL) {
if (options.proxy_command == NULL) {
if (getnameinfo(hostaddr, addrlen,
ntop, sizeof(ntop), NULL, 0, NI_NUMERICHOST) != 0)
fatal("%s: getnameinfo failed", __func__);
*hostfile_ipaddr = put_host_port(ntop, port);
} else {
*hostfile_ipaddr = xstrdup("<no hostip for proxy "
"command>");
}
}
/*
* Allow the user to record the key under a different name or
* differentiate a non-standard port. This is useful for ssh
* tunneling over forwarded connections or if you run multiple
* sshd's on different ports on the same machine.
*/
if (hostfile_hostname != NULL) {
if (options.host_key_alias != NULL) {
*hostfile_hostname = xstrdup(options.host_key_alias);
debug("using hostkeyalias: %s", *hostfile_hostname);
} else {
*hostfile_hostname = put_host_port(hostname, port);
}
}
}
/*
* check whether the supplied host key is valid, return -1 if the key
* is not valid. user_hostfile[0] will not be updated if 'readonly' is true.
*/
#define RDRW 0
#define RDONLY 1
#define ROQUIET 2
static int
check_host_key(char *hostname, struct sockaddr *hostaddr, u_short port,
struct sshkey *host_key, int readonly,
char **user_hostfiles, u_int num_user_hostfiles,
char **system_hostfiles, u_int num_system_hostfiles)
{
HostStatus host_status;
HostStatus ip_status;
struct sshkey *raw_key = NULL;
char *ip = NULL, *host = NULL;
char hostline[1000], *hostp, *fp, *ra;
char msg[1024];
const char *type;
const struct hostkey_entry *host_found, *ip_found;
int len, cancelled_forwarding = 0, confirmed;
int local = sockaddr_is_local(hostaddr);
int r, want_cert = sshkey_is_cert(host_key), host_ip_differ = 0;
int hostkey_trusted = 0; /* Known or explicitly accepted by user */
struct hostkeys *host_hostkeys, *ip_hostkeys;
u_int i;
/*
* Force accepting of the host key for loopback/localhost. The
* problem is that if the home directory is NFS-mounted to multiple
* machines, localhost will refer to a different machine in each of
* them, and the user will get bogus HOST_CHANGED warnings. This
* essentially disables host authentication for localhost; however,
* this is probably not a real problem.
*/
if (options.no_host_authentication_for_localhost == 1 && local &&
options.host_key_alias == NULL) {
debug("Forcing accepting of host key for "
"loopback/localhost.");
return 0;
}
/*
* Prepare the hostname and address strings used for hostkey lookup.
* In some cases, these will have a port number appended.
*/
get_hostfile_hostname_ipaddr(hostname, hostaddr, port, &host, &ip);
/*
* Turn off check_host_ip if the connection is to localhost, via proxy
* command or if we don't have a hostname to compare with
*/
if (options.check_host_ip && (local ||
strcmp(hostname, ip) == 0 || options.proxy_command != NULL))
options.check_host_ip = 0;
host_hostkeys = init_hostkeys();
for (i = 0; i < num_user_hostfiles; i++)
load_hostkeys(host_hostkeys, host, user_hostfiles[i]);
for (i = 0; i < num_system_hostfiles; i++)
load_hostkeys(host_hostkeys, host, system_hostfiles[i]);
ip_hostkeys = NULL;
if (!want_cert && options.check_host_ip) {
ip_hostkeys = init_hostkeys();
for (i = 0; i < num_user_hostfiles; i++)
load_hostkeys(ip_hostkeys, ip, user_hostfiles[i]);
for (i = 0; i < num_system_hostfiles; i++)
load_hostkeys(ip_hostkeys, ip, system_hostfiles[i]);
}
retry:
/* Reload these as they may have changed on cert->key downgrade */
want_cert = sshkey_is_cert(host_key);
type = sshkey_type(host_key);
/*
* Check if the host key is present in the user's list of known
* hosts or in the systemwide list.
*/
host_status = check_key_in_hostkeys(host_hostkeys, host_key,
&host_found);
/*
* Also perform check for the ip address, skip the check if we are
* localhost, looking for a certificate, or the hostname was an ip
* address to begin with.
*/
if (!want_cert && ip_hostkeys != NULL) {
ip_status = check_key_in_hostkeys(ip_hostkeys, host_key,
&ip_found);
if (host_status == HOST_CHANGED &&
(ip_status != HOST_CHANGED ||
(ip_found != NULL &&
!sshkey_equal(ip_found->key, host_found->key))))
host_ip_differ = 1;
} else
ip_status = host_status;
switch (host_status) {
case HOST_OK:
/* The host is known and the key matches. */
debug("Host '%.200s' is known and matches the %s host %s.",
host, type, want_cert ? "certificate" : "key");
debug("Found %s in %s:%lu", want_cert ? "CA key" : "key",
host_found->file, host_found->line);
if (want_cert &&
!check_host_cert(options.host_key_alias == NULL ?
hostname : options.host_key_alias, host_key))
goto fail;
if (options.check_host_ip && ip_status == HOST_NEW) {
if (readonly || want_cert)
logit("%s host key for IP address "
"'%.128s' not in list of known hosts.",
type, ip);
else if (!add_host_to_hostfile(user_hostfiles[0], ip,
host_key, options.hash_known_hosts))
logit("Failed to add the %s host key for IP "
"address '%.128s' to the list of known "
"hosts (%.500s).", type, ip,
user_hostfiles[0]);
else
logit("Warning: Permanently added the %s host "
"key for IP address '%.128s' to the list "
"of known hosts.", type, ip);
} else if (options.visual_host_key) {
fp = sshkey_fingerprint(host_key,
options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_DEFAULT);
ra = sshkey_fingerprint(host_key,
options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_RANDOMART);
if (fp == NULL || ra == NULL)
fatal("%s: sshkey_fingerprint fail", __func__);
logit("Host key fingerprint is %s\n%s", fp, ra);
free(ra);
free(fp);
}
hostkey_trusted = 1;
break;
case HOST_NEW:
if (options.host_key_alias == NULL && port != 0 &&
port != SSH_DEFAULT_PORT) {
debug("checking without port identifier");
if (check_host_key(hostname, hostaddr, 0, host_key,
ROQUIET, user_hostfiles, num_user_hostfiles,
system_hostfiles, num_system_hostfiles) == 0) {
debug("found matching key w/out port");
break;
}
}
if (readonly || want_cert)
goto fail;
/* The host is new. */
if (options.strict_host_key_checking ==
SSH_STRICT_HOSTKEY_YES) {
/*
* User has requested strict host key checking. We
* will not add the host key automatically. The only
* alternative left is to abort.
*/
error("No %s host key is known for %.200s and you "
"have requested strict checking.", type, host);
goto fail;
} else if (options.strict_host_key_checking ==
SSH_STRICT_HOSTKEY_ASK) {
char msg1[1024], msg2[1024];
if (show_other_keys(host_hostkeys, host_key))
snprintf(msg1, sizeof(msg1),
"\nbut keys of different type are already"
" known for this host.");
else
snprintf(msg1, sizeof(msg1), ".");
/* The default */
fp = sshkey_fingerprint(host_key,
options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_DEFAULT);
ra = sshkey_fingerprint(host_key,
options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_RANDOMART);
if (fp == NULL || ra == NULL)
fatal("%s: sshkey_fingerprint fail", __func__);
msg2[0] = '\0';
if (options.verify_host_key_dns) {
if (matching_host_key_dns)
snprintf(msg2, sizeof(msg2),
"Matching host key fingerprint"
" found in DNS.\n");
else
snprintf(msg2, sizeof(msg2),
"No matching host key fingerprint"
" found in DNS.\n");
}
snprintf(msg, sizeof(msg),
"The authenticity of host '%.200s (%s)' can't be "
"established%s\n"
"%s key fingerprint is %s.%s%s\n%s"
"Are you sure you want to continue connecting "
"(yes/no/[fingerprint])? ",
host, ip, msg1, type, fp,
options.visual_host_key ? "\n" : "",
options.visual_host_key ? ra : "",
msg2);
free(ra);
confirmed = confirm(msg, fp);
free(fp);
if (!confirmed)
goto fail;
hostkey_trusted = 1; /* user explicitly confirmed */
}
/*
* If in "new" or "off" strict mode, add the key automatically
* to the local known_hosts file.
*/
if (options.check_host_ip && ip_status == HOST_NEW) {
snprintf(hostline, sizeof(hostline), "%s,%s", host, ip);
hostp = hostline;
if (options.hash_known_hosts) {
/* Add hash of host and IP separately */
r = add_host_to_hostfile(user_hostfiles[0],
host, host_key, options.hash_known_hosts) &&
add_host_to_hostfile(user_hostfiles[0], ip,
host_key, options.hash_known_hosts);
} else {
/* Add unhashed "host,ip" */
r = add_host_to_hostfile(user_hostfiles[0],
hostline, host_key,
options.hash_known_hosts);
}
} else {
r = add_host_to_hostfile(user_hostfiles[0], host,
host_key, options.hash_known_hosts);
hostp = host;
}
if (!r)
logit("Failed to add the host to the list of known "
"hosts (%.500s).", user_hostfiles[0]);
else
logit("Warning: Permanently added '%.200s' (%s) to the "
"list of known hosts.", hostp, type);
break;
case HOST_REVOKED:
error("@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@");
error("@ WARNING: REVOKED HOST KEY DETECTED! @");
error("@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@");
error("The %s host key for %s is marked as revoked.", type, host);
error("This could mean that a stolen key is being used to");
error("impersonate this host.");
/*
* If strict host key checking is in use, the user will have
* to edit the key manually and we can only abort.
*/
if (options.strict_host_key_checking !=
SSH_STRICT_HOSTKEY_OFF) {
error("%s host key for %.200s was revoked and you have "
"requested strict checking.", type, host);
goto fail;
}
goto continue_unsafe;
case HOST_CHANGED:
if (want_cert) {
/*
* This is only a debug() since it is valid to have
* CAs with wildcard DNS matches that don't match
* all hosts that one might visit.
*/
debug("Host certificate authority does not "
"match %s in %s:%lu", CA_MARKER,
host_found->file, host_found->line);
goto fail;
}
if (readonly == ROQUIET)
goto fail;
if (options.check_host_ip && host_ip_differ) {
char *key_msg;
if (ip_status == HOST_NEW)
key_msg = "is unknown";
else if (ip_status == HOST_OK)
key_msg = "is unchanged";
else
key_msg = "has a different value";
error("@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@");
error("@ WARNING: POSSIBLE DNS SPOOFING DETECTED! @");
error("@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@");
error("The %s host key for %s has changed,", type, host);
error("and the key for the corresponding IP address %s", ip);
error("%s. This could either mean that", key_msg);
error("DNS SPOOFING is happening or the IP address for the host");
error("and its host key have changed at the same time.");
if (ip_status != HOST_NEW)
error("Offending key for IP in %s:%lu",
ip_found->file, ip_found->line);
}
/* The host key has changed. */
warn_changed_key(host_key);
error("Add correct host key in %.100s to get rid of this message.",
user_hostfiles[0]);
error("Offending %s key in %s:%lu",
sshkey_type(host_found->key),
host_found->file, host_found->line);
/*
* If strict host key checking is in use, the user will have
* to edit the key manually and we can only abort.
*/
if (options.strict_host_key_checking !=
SSH_STRICT_HOSTKEY_OFF) {
error("%s host key for %.200s has changed and you have "
"requested strict checking.", type, host);
goto fail;
}
continue_unsafe:
/*
* If strict host key checking has not been requested, allow
* the connection but without MITM-able authentication or
* forwarding.
*/
if (options.password_authentication) {
error("Password authentication is disabled to avoid "
"man-in-the-middle attacks.");
options.password_authentication = 0;
cancelled_forwarding = 1;
}
if (options.kbd_interactive_authentication) {
error("Keyboard-interactive authentication is disabled"
" to avoid man-in-the-middle attacks.");
options.kbd_interactive_authentication = 0;
options.challenge_response_authentication = 0;
cancelled_forwarding = 1;
}
if (options.challenge_response_authentication) {
error("Challenge/response authentication is disabled"
" to avoid man-in-the-middle attacks.");
options.challenge_response_authentication = 0;
cancelled_forwarding = 1;
}
if (options.forward_agent) {
error("Agent forwarding is disabled to avoid "
"man-in-the-middle attacks.");
options.forward_agent = 0;
cancelled_forwarding = 1;
}
if (options.forward_x11) {
error("X11 forwarding is disabled to avoid "
"man-in-the-middle attacks.");
options.forward_x11 = 0;
cancelled_forwarding = 1;
}
if (options.num_local_forwards > 0 ||
options.num_remote_forwards > 0) {
error("Port forwarding is disabled to avoid "
"man-in-the-middle attacks.");
options.num_local_forwards =
options.num_remote_forwards = 0;
cancelled_forwarding = 1;
}
if (options.tun_open != SSH_TUNMODE_NO) {
error("Tunnel forwarding is disabled to avoid "
"man-in-the-middle attacks.");
options.tun_open = SSH_TUNMODE_NO;
cancelled_forwarding = 1;
}
if (options.exit_on_forward_failure && cancelled_forwarding)
fatal("Error: forwarding disabled due to host key "
"check failure");
/*
* XXX Should permit the user to change to use the new id.
* This could be done by converting the host key to an
* identifying sentence, tell that the host identifies itself
* by that sentence, and ask the user if he/she wishes to
* accept the authentication.
*/
break;
case HOST_FOUND:
fatal("internal error");
break;
}
if (options.check_host_ip && host_status != HOST_CHANGED &&
ip_status == HOST_CHANGED) {
snprintf(msg, sizeof(msg),
"Warning: the %s host key for '%.200s' "
"differs from the key for the IP address '%.128s'"
"\nOffending key for IP in %s:%lu",
type, host, ip, ip_found->file, ip_found->line);
if (host_status == HOST_OK) {
len = strlen(msg);
snprintf(msg + len, sizeof(msg) - len,
"\nMatching host key in %s:%lu",
host_found->file, host_found->line);
}
if (options.strict_host_key_checking ==
SSH_STRICT_HOSTKEY_ASK) {
strlcat(msg, "\nAre you sure you want "
"to continue connecting (yes/no)? ", sizeof(msg));
if (!confirm(msg, NULL))
goto fail;
} else if (options.strict_host_key_checking !=
SSH_STRICT_HOSTKEY_OFF) {
logit("%s", msg);
error("Exiting, you have requested strict checking.");
goto fail;
} else {
logit("%s", msg);
}
}
if (!hostkey_trusted && options.update_hostkeys) {
debug("%s: hostkey not known or explicitly trusted: "
"disabling UpdateHostkeys", __func__);
options.update_hostkeys = 0;
}
free(ip);
free(host);
if (host_hostkeys != NULL)
free_hostkeys(host_hostkeys);
if (ip_hostkeys != NULL)
free_hostkeys(ip_hostkeys);
return 0;
fail:
if (want_cert && host_status != HOST_REVOKED) {
/*
* No matching certificate. Downgrade cert to raw key and
* search normally.
*/
debug("No matching CA found. Retry with plain key");
if ((r = sshkey_from_private(host_key, &raw_key)) != 0)
fatal("%s: sshkey_from_private: %s",
__func__, ssh_err(r));
if ((r = sshkey_drop_cert(raw_key)) != 0)
fatal("Couldn't drop certificate: %s", ssh_err(r));
host_key = raw_key;
goto retry;
}
sshkey_free(raw_key);
free(ip);
free(host);
if (host_hostkeys != NULL)
free_hostkeys(host_hostkeys);
if (ip_hostkeys != NULL)
free_hostkeys(ip_hostkeys);
return -1;
}
/* returns 0 if key verifies or -1 if key does NOT verify */
int
verify_host_key(char *host, struct sockaddr *hostaddr, struct sshkey *host_key)
{
u_int i;
int r = -1, flags = 0;
char valid[64], *fp = NULL, *cafp = NULL;
struct sshkey *plain = NULL;
if ((fp = sshkey_fingerprint(host_key,
options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL) {
error("%s: fingerprint host key: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
r = -1;
goto out;
}
if (sshkey_is_cert(host_key)) {
if ((cafp = sshkey_fingerprint(host_key->cert->signature_key,
options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL) {
error("%s: fingerprint CA key: %s",
__func__, ssh_err(r));
r = -1;
goto out;
}
sshkey_format_cert_validity(host_key->cert,
valid, sizeof(valid));
debug("Server host certificate: %s %s, serial %llu "
"ID \"%s\" CA %s %s valid %s",
sshkey_ssh_name(host_key), fp,
(unsigned long long)host_key->cert->serial,
host_key->cert->key_id,
sshkey_ssh_name(host_key->cert->signature_key), cafp,
valid);
for (i = 0; i < host_key->cert->nprincipals; i++) {
debug2("Server host certificate hostname: %s",
host_key->cert->principals[i]);
}
} else {
debug("Server host key: %s %s", sshkey_ssh_name(host_key), fp);
}
if (sshkey_equal(previous_host_key, host_key)) {
debug2("%s: server host key %s %s matches cached key",
__func__, sshkey_type(host_key), fp);
r = 0;
goto out;
}
/* Check in RevokedHostKeys file if specified */
if (options.revoked_host_keys != NULL) {
r = sshkey_check_revoked(host_key, options.revoked_host_keys);
switch (r) {
case 0:
break; /* not revoked */
case SSH_ERR_KEY_REVOKED:
error("Host key %s %s revoked by file %s",
sshkey_type(host_key), fp,
options.revoked_host_keys);
r = -1;
goto out;
default:
error("Error checking host key %s %s in "
"revoked keys file %s: %s", sshkey_type(host_key),
fp, options.revoked_host_keys, ssh_err(r));
r = -1;
goto out;
}
}
if (options.verify_host_key_dns) {
/*
* XXX certs are not yet supported for DNS, so downgrade
* them and try the plain key.
*/
if ((r = sshkey_from_private(host_key, &plain)) != 0)
goto out;
if (sshkey_is_cert(plain))
sshkey_drop_cert(plain);
if (verify_host_key_dns(host, hostaddr, plain, &flags) == 0) {
if (flags & DNS_VERIFY_FOUND) {
if (options.verify_host_key_dns == 1 &&
flags & DNS_VERIFY_MATCH &&
flags & DNS_VERIFY_SECURE) {
r = 0;
goto out;
}
if (flags & DNS_VERIFY_MATCH) {
matching_host_key_dns = 1;
} else {
warn_changed_key(plain);
error("Update the SSHFP RR in DNS "
"with the new host key to get rid "
"of this message.");
}
}
}
}
r = check_host_key(host, hostaddr, options.port, host_key, RDRW,
options.user_hostfiles, options.num_user_hostfiles,
options.system_hostfiles, options.num_system_hostfiles);
out:
sshkey_free(plain);
free(fp);
free(cafp);
if (r == 0 && host_key != NULL) {
sshkey_free(previous_host_key);
r = sshkey_from_private(host_key, &previous_host_key);
}
return r;
}
/*
* Starts a dialog with the server, and authenticates the current user on the
* server. This does not need any extra privileges. The basic connection
* to the server must already have been established before this is called.
* If login fails, this function prints an error and never returns.
* This function does not require super-user privileges.
*/
void
ssh_login(struct ssh *ssh, Sensitive *sensitive, const char *orighost,
struct sockaddr *hostaddr, u_short port, struct passwd *pw, int timeout_ms)
{
char *host;
char *server_user, *local_user;
int r;
local_user = xstrdup(pw->pw_name);
server_user = options.user ? options.user : local_user;
/* Convert the user-supplied hostname into all lowercase. */
host = xstrdup(orighost);
lowercase(host);
/* Exchange protocol version identification strings with the server. */
if ((r = kex_exchange_identification(ssh, timeout_ms, NULL)) != 0)
sshpkt_fatal(ssh, r, "banner exchange");
/* Put the connection into non-blocking mode. */
ssh_packet_set_nonblocking(ssh);
/* key exchange */
/* authenticate user */
debug("Authenticating to %s:%d as '%s'", host, port, server_user);
ssh_kex2(ssh, host, hostaddr, port);
ssh_userauth2(ssh, local_user, server_user, host, sensitive);
free(local_user);
free(host);
}
/* print all known host keys for a given host, but skip keys of given type */
static int
show_other_keys(struct hostkeys *hostkeys, struct sshkey *key)
{
int type[] = {
KEY_RSA,
KEY_DSA,
KEY_ECDSA,
KEY_ED25519,
KEY_XMSS,
-1
};
int i, ret = 0;
char *fp, *ra;
const struct hostkey_entry *found;
for (i = 0; type[i] != -1; i++) {
if (type[i] == key->type)
continue;
if (!lookup_key_in_hostkeys_by_type(hostkeys, type[i], &found))
continue;
fp = sshkey_fingerprint(found->key,
options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_DEFAULT);
ra = sshkey_fingerprint(found->key,
options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_RANDOMART);
if (fp == NULL || ra == NULL)
fatal("%s: sshkey_fingerprint fail", __func__);
logit("WARNING: %s key found for host %s\n"
"in %s:%lu\n"
"%s key fingerprint %s.",
sshkey_type(found->key),
found->host, found->file, found->line,
sshkey_type(found->key), fp);
if (options.visual_host_key)
logit("%s", ra);
free(ra);
free(fp);
ret = 1;
}
return ret;
}
static void
warn_changed_key(struct sshkey *host_key)
{
char *fp;
fp = sshkey_fingerprint(host_key, options.fingerprint_hash,
SSH_FP_DEFAULT);
if (fp == NULL)
fatal("%s: sshkey_fingerprint fail", __func__);
error("@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@");
error("@ WARNING: REMOTE HOST IDENTIFICATION HAS CHANGED! @");
error("@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@");
error("IT IS POSSIBLE THAT SOMEONE IS DOING SOMETHING NASTY!");
error("Someone could be eavesdropping on you right now (man-in-the-middle attack)!");
error("It is also possible that a host key has just been changed.");
error("The fingerprint for the %s key sent by the remote host is\n%s.",
sshkey_type(host_key), fp);
error("Please contact your system administrator.");
free(fp);
}
/*
* Execute a local command
*/
int
ssh_local_cmd(const char *args)
{
char *shell;
pid_t pid;
int status;
void (*osighand)(int);
if (!options.permit_local_command ||
args == NULL || !*args)
return (1);
if ((shell = getenv("SHELL")) == NULL || *shell == '\0')
shell = _PATH_BSHELL;
osighand = ssh_signal(SIGCHLD, SIG_DFL);
pid = fork();
if (pid == 0) {
ssh_signal(SIGPIPE, SIG_DFL);
debug3("Executing %s -c \"%s\"", shell, args);
execl(shell, shell, "-c", args, (char *)NULL);
error("Couldn't execute %s -c \"%s\": %s",
shell, args, strerror(errno));
_exit(1);
} else if (pid == -1)
fatal("fork failed: %.100s", strerror(errno));
while (waitpid(pid, &status, 0) == -1)
if (errno != EINTR)
fatal("Couldn't wait for child: %s", strerror(errno));
ssh_signal(SIGCHLD, osighand);
if (!WIFEXITED(status))
return (1);
return (WEXITSTATUS(status));
}
void
maybe_add_key_to_agent(const char *authfile, struct sshkey *private,
const char *comment, const char *passphrase)
{
int auth_sock = -1, r;
const char *skprovider = NULL;
if (options.add_keys_to_agent == 0)
return;
if ((r = ssh_get_authentication_socket(&auth_sock)) != 0) {
debug3("no authentication agent, not adding key");
return;
}
if (options.add_keys_to_agent == 2 &&
!ask_permission("Add key %s (%s) to agent?", authfile, comment)) {
debug3("user denied adding this key");
close(auth_sock);
return;
}
if (sshkey_is_sk(private))
skprovider = options.sk_provider;
if ((r = ssh_add_identity_constrained(auth_sock, private,
- comment == NULL ? authfile : comment, 0,
+ comment == NULL ? authfile : comment,
+ options.add_keys_to_agent_lifespan,
(options.add_keys_to_agent == 3), 0, skprovider)) == 0)
debug("identity added to agent: %s", authfile);
else
debug("could not add identity to agent: %s (%d)", authfile, r);
close(auth_sock);
}
diff --git a/sshconnect2.c b/sshconnect2.c
index 1a6545edf026..f64aae66af35 100644
--- a/sshconnect2.c
+++ b/sshconnect2.c
@@ -1,2261 +1,2314 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: sshconnect2.c,v 1.321 2020/04/17 03:38:47 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: sshconnect2.c,v 1.326 2020/09/18 05:23:03 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
* Copyright (c) 2008 Damien Miller. All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
* OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
* IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
* INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
* NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
* DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
* THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
* (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
* THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
*/
#include "includes.h"
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/socket.h>
#include <sys/wait.h>
#include <sys/stat.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <netdb.h>
#include <pwd.h>
#include <signal.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <stdarg.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#if defined(HAVE_STRNVIS) && defined(HAVE_VIS_H) && !defined(BROKEN_STRNVIS)
#include <vis.h>
#endif
#include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h"
#include "xmalloc.h"
#include "ssh.h"
#include "ssh2.h"
#include "sshbuf.h"
#include "packet.h"
#include "compat.h"
#include "cipher.h"
#include "sshkey.h"
#include "kex.h"
#include "myproposal.h"
#include "sshconnect.h"
#include "authfile.h"
#include "dh.h"
#include "authfd.h"
#include "log.h"
#include "misc.h"
#include "readconf.h"
#include "match.h"
#include "dispatch.h"
#include "canohost.h"
#include "msg.h"
#include "pathnames.h"
#include "uidswap.h"
#include "hostfile.h"
#include "ssherr.h"
#include "utf8.h"
#include "ssh-sk.h"
#include "sk-api.h"
#ifdef GSSAPI
#include "ssh-gss.h"
#endif
/* import */
extern char *client_version_string;
extern char *server_version_string;
extern Options options;
/*
* SSH2 key exchange
*/
u_char *session_id2 = NULL;
u_int session_id2_len = 0;
char *xxx_host;
struct sockaddr *xxx_hostaddr;
static int
verify_host_key_callback(struct sshkey *hostkey, struct ssh *ssh)
{
if (verify_host_key(xxx_host, xxx_hostaddr, hostkey) == -1)
fatal("Host key verification failed.");
return 0;
}
+/* Returns the first item from a comma-separated algorithm list */
+static char *
+first_alg(const char *algs)
+{
+ char *ret, *cp;
+
+ ret = xstrdup(algs);
+ if ((cp = strchr(ret, ',')) != NULL)
+ *cp = '\0';
+ return ret;
+}
+
static char *
order_hostkeyalgs(char *host, struct sockaddr *hostaddr, u_short port)
{
- char *oavail, *avail, *first, *last, *alg, *hostname, *ret;
+ char *oavail = NULL, *avail = NULL, *first = NULL, *last = NULL;
+ char *alg = NULL, *hostname = NULL, *ret = NULL, *best = NULL;
size_t maxlen;
- struct hostkeys *hostkeys;
+ struct hostkeys *hostkeys = NULL;
int ktype;
u_int i;
/* Find all hostkeys for this hostname */
get_hostfile_hostname_ipaddr(host, hostaddr, port, &hostname, NULL);
hostkeys = init_hostkeys();
for (i = 0; i < options.num_user_hostfiles; i++)
load_hostkeys(hostkeys, hostname, options.user_hostfiles[i]);
for (i = 0; i < options.num_system_hostfiles; i++)
load_hostkeys(hostkeys, hostname, options.system_hostfiles[i]);
+ /*
+ * If a plain public key exists that matches the type of the best
+ * preference HostkeyAlgorithms, then use the whole list as is.
+ * Note that we ignore whether the best preference algorithm is a
+ * certificate type, as sshconnect.c will downgrade certs to
+ * plain keys if necessary.
+ */
+ best = first_alg(options.hostkeyalgorithms);
+ if (lookup_key_in_hostkeys_by_type(hostkeys,
+ sshkey_type_plain(sshkey_type_from_name(best)), NULL)) {
+ debug3("%s: have matching best-preference key type %s, "
+ "using HostkeyAlgorithms verbatim", __func__, best);
+ ret = xstrdup(options.hostkeyalgorithms);
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Otherwise, prefer the host key algorithms that match known keys
+ * while keeping the ordering of HostkeyAlgorithms as much as possible.
+ */
oavail = avail = xstrdup(options.hostkeyalgorithms);
maxlen = strlen(avail) + 1;
first = xmalloc(maxlen);
last = xmalloc(maxlen);
*first = *last = '\0';
#define ALG_APPEND(to, from) \
do { \
if (*to != '\0') \
strlcat(to, ",", maxlen); \
strlcat(to, from, maxlen); \
} while (0)
while ((alg = strsep(&avail, ",")) && *alg != '\0') {
if ((ktype = sshkey_type_from_name(alg)) == KEY_UNSPEC)
fatal("%s: unknown alg %s", __func__, alg);
+ /*
+ * If we have a @cert-authority marker in known_hosts then
+ * prefer all certificate algorithms.
+ */
+ if (sshkey_type_is_cert(ktype) &&
+ lookup_marker_in_hostkeys(hostkeys, MRK_CA)) {
+ ALG_APPEND(first, alg);
+ continue;
+ }
+ /* If the key appears in known_hosts then prefer it */
if (lookup_key_in_hostkeys_by_type(hostkeys,
- sshkey_type_plain(ktype), NULL))
+ sshkey_type_plain(ktype), NULL)) {
ALG_APPEND(first, alg);
- else
- ALG_APPEND(last, alg);
+ continue;
+ }
+ /* Otherwise, put it last */
+ ALG_APPEND(last, alg);
}
#undef ALG_APPEND
xasprintf(&ret, "%s%s%s", first,
(*first == '\0' || *last == '\0') ? "" : ",", last);
if (*first != '\0')
debug3("%s: prefer hostkeyalgs: %s", __func__, first);
+ out:
+ free(best);
free(first);
free(last);
free(hostname);
free(oavail);
free_hostkeys(hostkeys);
return ret;
}
void
ssh_kex2(struct ssh *ssh, char *host, struct sockaddr *hostaddr, u_short port)
{
char *myproposal[PROPOSAL_MAX] = { KEX_CLIENT };
char *s, *all_key;
int r, use_known_hosts_order = 0;
xxx_host = host;
xxx_hostaddr = hostaddr;
/*
* If the user has not specified HostkeyAlgorithms, or has only
* appended or removed algorithms from that list then prefer algorithms
* that are in the list that are supported by known_hosts keys.
*/
if (options.hostkeyalgorithms == NULL ||
options.hostkeyalgorithms[0] == '-' ||
options.hostkeyalgorithms[0] == '+')
use_known_hosts_order = 1;
/* Expand or fill in HostkeyAlgorithms */
all_key = sshkey_alg_list(0, 0, 1, ',');
if (kex_assemble_names(&options.hostkeyalgorithms,
kex_default_pk_alg(), all_key) != 0)
fatal("%s: kex_assemble_namelist", __func__);
free(all_key);
if ((s = kex_names_cat(options.kex_algorithms, "ext-info-c")) == NULL)
fatal("%s: kex_names_cat", __func__);
myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS] = compat_kex_proposal(s);
myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_CTOS] =
compat_cipher_proposal(options.ciphers);
myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_STOC] =
compat_cipher_proposal(options.ciphers);
myproposal[PROPOSAL_COMP_ALGS_CTOS] =
myproposal[PROPOSAL_COMP_ALGS_STOC] =
(char *)compression_alg_list(options.compression);
myproposal[PROPOSAL_MAC_ALGS_CTOS] =
myproposal[PROPOSAL_MAC_ALGS_STOC] = options.macs;
if (use_known_hosts_order) {
/* Query known_hosts and prefer algorithms that appear there */
myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS] =
compat_pkalg_proposal(
order_hostkeyalgs(host, hostaddr, port));
} else {
/* Use specified HostkeyAlgorithms exactly */
myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS] =
compat_pkalg_proposal(options.hostkeyalgorithms);
}
if (options.rekey_limit || options.rekey_interval)
ssh_packet_set_rekey_limits(ssh, options.rekey_limit,
options.rekey_interval);
/* start key exchange */
if ((r = kex_setup(ssh, myproposal)) != 0)
fatal("kex_setup: %s", ssh_err(r));
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
ssh->kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP1_SHA1] = kex_gen_client;
ssh->kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP14_SHA1] = kex_gen_client;
ssh->kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP14_SHA256] = kex_gen_client;
ssh->kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP16_SHA512] = kex_gen_client;
ssh->kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP18_SHA512] = kex_gen_client;
ssh->kex->kex[KEX_DH_GEX_SHA1] = kexgex_client;
ssh->kex->kex[KEX_DH_GEX_SHA256] = kexgex_client;
# ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
ssh->kex->kex[KEX_ECDH_SHA2] = kex_gen_client;
# endif
#endif
ssh->kex->kex[KEX_C25519_SHA256] = kex_gen_client;
ssh->kex->kex[KEX_KEM_SNTRUP4591761X25519_SHA512] = kex_gen_client;
ssh->kex->verify_host_key=&verify_host_key_callback;
ssh_dispatch_run_fatal(ssh, DISPATCH_BLOCK, &ssh->kex->done);
/* remove ext-info from the KEX proposals for rekeying */
myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS] =
compat_kex_proposal(options.kex_algorithms);
if ((r = kex_prop2buf(ssh->kex->my, myproposal)) != 0)
fatal("kex_prop2buf: %s", ssh_err(r));
session_id2 = ssh->kex->session_id;
session_id2_len = ssh->kex->session_id_len;
#ifdef DEBUG_KEXDH
/* send 1st encrypted/maced/compressed message */
if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_IGNORE)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, "markus")) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0 ||
(r = ssh_packet_write_wait(ssh)) != 0)
fatal("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
#endif
}
/*
* Authenticate user
*/
typedef struct cauthctxt Authctxt;
typedef struct cauthmethod Authmethod;
typedef struct identity Identity;
typedef struct idlist Idlist;
struct identity {
TAILQ_ENTRY(identity) next;
int agent_fd; /* >=0 if agent supports key */
struct sshkey *key; /* public/private key */
char *filename; /* comment for agent-only keys */
int tried;
int isprivate; /* key points to the private key */
int userprovided;
};
TAILQ_HEAD(idlist, identity);
struct cauthctxt {
const char *server_user;
const char *local_user;
const char *host;
const char *service;
struct cauthmethod *method;
sig_atomic_t success;
char *authlist;
#ifdef GSSAPI
/* gssapi */
gss_OID_set gss_supported_mechs;
u_int mech_tried;
#endif
/* pubkey */
struct idlist keys;
int agent_fd;
/* hostbased */
Sensitive *sensitive;
char *oktypes, *ktypes;
const char *active_ktype;
/* kbd-interactive */
int info_req_seen;
int attempt_kbdint;
/* password */
int attempt_passwd;
/* generic */
void *methoddata;
};
struct cauthmethod {
char *name; /* string to compare against server's list */
int (*userauth)(struct ssh *ssh);
void (*cleanup)(struct ssh *ssh);
int *enabled; /* flag in option struct that enables method */
int *batch_flag; /* flag in option struct that disables method */
};
static int input_userauth_service_accept(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *);
static int input_userauth_ext_info(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *);
static int input_userauth_success(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *);
static int input_userauth_failure(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *);
static int input_userauth_banner(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *);
static int input_userauth_error(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *);
static int input_userauth_info_req(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *);
static int input_userauth_pk_ok(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *);
static int input_userauth_passwd_changereq(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *);
static int userauth_none(struct ssh *);
static int userauth_pubkey(struct ssh *);
static int userauth_passwd(struct ssh *);
static int userauth_kbdint(struct ssh *);
static int userauth_hostbased(struct ssh *);
#ifdef GSSAPI
static int userauth_gssapi(struct ssh *);
static void userauth_gssapi_cleanup(struct ssh *);
static int input_gssapi_response(int type, u_int32_t, struct ssh *);
static int input_gssapi_token(int type, u_int32_t, struct ssh *);
static int input_gssapi_error(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *);
static int input_gssapi_errtok(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *);
#endif
void userauth(struct ssh *, char *);
static void pubkey_cleanup(struct ssh *);
static int sign_and_send_pubkey(struct ssh *ssh, Identity *);
static void pubkey_prepare(Authctxt *);
static void pubkey_reset(Authctxt *);
static struct sshkey *load_identity_file(Identity *);
static Authmethod *authmethod_get(char *authlist);
static Authmethod *authmethod_lookup(const char *name);
static char *authmethods_get(void);
Authmethod authmethods[] = {
#ifdef GSSAPI
{"gssapi-with-mic",
userauth_gssapi,
userauth_gssapi_cleanup,
&options.gss_authentication,
NULL},
#endif
{"hostbased",
userauth_hostbased,
NULL,
&options.hostbased_authentication,
NULL},
{"publickey",
userauth_pubkey,
NULL,
&options.pubkey_authentication,
NULL},
{"keyboard-interactive",
userauth_kbdint,
NULL,
&options.kbd_interactive_authentication,
&options.batch_mode},
{"password",
userauth_passwd,
NULL,
&options.password_authentication,
&options.batch_mode},
{"none",
userauth_none,
NULL,
NULL,
NULL},
{NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL}
};
void
ssh_userauth2(struct ssh *ssh, const char *local_user,
const char *server_user, char *host, Sensitive *sensitive)
{
Authctxt authctxt;
int r;
if (options.challenge_response_authentication)
options.kbd_interactive_authentication = 1;
if (options.preferred_authentications == NULL)
options.preferred_authentications = authmethods_get();
/* setup authentication context */
memset(&authctxt, 0, sizeof(authctxt));
authctxt.server_user = server_user;
authctxt.local_user = local_user;
authctxt.host = host;
authctxt.service = "ssh-connection"; /* service name */
authctxt.success = 0;
authctxt.method = authmethod_lookup("none");
authctxt.authlist = NULL;
authctxt.methoddata = NULL;
authctxt.sensitive = sensitive;
authctxt.active_ktype = authctxt.oktypes = authctxt.ktypes = NULL;
authctxt.info_req_seen = 0;
authctxt.attempt_kbdint = 0;
authctxt.attempt_passwd = 0;
#if GSSAPI
authctxt.gss_supported_mechs = NULL;
authctxt.mech_tried = 0;
#endif
authctxt.agent_fd = -1;
pubkey_prepare(&authctxt);
if (authctxt.method == NULL) {
fatal("%s: internal error: cannot send userauth none request",
__func__);
}
if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_SERVICE_REQUEST)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, "ssh-userauth")) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0)
fatal("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
ssh->authctxt = &authctxt;
ssh_dispatch_init(ssh, &input_userauth_error);
ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_EXT_INFO, &input_userauth_ext_info);
ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_SERVICE_ACCEPT, &input_userauth_service_accept);
ssh_dispatch_run_fatal(ssh, DISPATCH_BLOCK, &authctxt.success); /* loop until success */
pubkey_cleanup(ssh);
ssh->authctxt = NULL;
ssh_dispatch_range(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_MIN, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_MAX, NULL);
if (!authctxt.success)
fatal("Authentication failed.");
debug("Authentication succeeded (%s).", authctxt.method->name);
}
/* ARGSUSED */
static int
input_userauth_service_accept(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh)
{
int r;
if (ssh_packet_remaining(ssh) > 0) {
char *reply;
if ((r = sshpkt_get_cstring(ssh, &reply, NULL)) != 0)
goto out;
debug2("service_accept: %s", reply);
free(reply);
} else {
debug2("buggy server: service_accept w/o service");
}
if ((r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0)
goto out;
debug("SSH2_MSG_SERVICE_ACCEPT received");
/* initial userauth request */
userauth_none(ssh);
ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_EXT_INFO, &input_userauth_error);
ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_SUCCESS, &input_userauth_success);
ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_FAILURE, &input_userauth_failure);
ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_BANNER, &input_userauth_banner);
r = 0;
out:
return r;
}
/* ARGSUSED */
static int
input_userauth_ext_info(int type, u_int32_t seqnr, struct ssh *ssh)
{
return kex_input_ext_info(type, seqnr, ssh);
}
void
userauth(struct ssh *ssh, char *authlist)
{
Authctxt *authctxt = (Authctxt *)ssh->authctxt;
if (authctxt->method != NULL && authctxt->method->cleanup != NULL)
authctxt->method->cleanup(ssh);
free(authctxt->methoddata);
authctxt->methoddata = NULL;
if (authlist == NULL) {
authlist = authctxt->authlist;
} else {
free(authctxt->authlist);
authctxt->authlist = authlist;
}
for (;;) {
Authmethod *method = authmethod_get(authlist);
if (method == NULL)
fatal("%s@%s: Permission denied (%s).",
authctxt->server_user, authctxt->host, authlist);
authctxt->method = method;
/* reset the per method handler */
ssh_dispatch_range(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_PER_METHOD_MIN,
SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_PER_METHOD_MAX, NULL);
/* and try new method */
if (method->userauth(ssh) != 0) {
debug2("we sent a %s packet, wait for reply", method->name);
break;
} else {
debug2("we did not send a packet, disable method");
method->enabled = NULL;
}
}
}
/* ARGSUSED */
static int
input_userauth_error(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh)
{
fatal("%s: bad message during authentication: type %d", __func__, type);
return 0;
}
/* ARGSUSED */
static int
input_userauth_banner(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh)
{
char *msg = NULL;
size_t len;
int r;
debug3("%s", __func__);
if ((r = sshpkt_get_cstring(ssh, &msg, &len)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_get_cstring(ssh, NULL, NULL)) != 0)
goto out;
if (len > 0 && options.log_level >= SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO)
fmprintf(stderr, "%s", msg);
r = 0;
out:
free(msg);
return r;
}
/* ARGSUSED */
static int
input_userauth_success(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh)
{
Authctxt *authctxt = ssh->authctxt;
if (authctxt == NULL)
fatal("%s: no authentication context", __func__);
free(authctxt->authlist);
authctxt->authlist = NULL;
if (authctxt->method != NULL && authctxt->method->cleanup != NULL)
authctxt->method->cleanup(ssh);
free(authctxt->methoddata);
authctxt->methoddata = NULL;
authctxt->success = 1; /* break out */
return 0;
}
#if 0
static int
input_userauth_success_unexpected(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh)
{
Authctxt *authctxt = ssh->authctxt;
if (authctxt == NULL)
fatal("%s: no authentication context", __func__);
fatal("Unexpected authentication success during %s.",
authctxt->method->name);
return 0;
}
#endif
/* ARGSUSED */
static int
input_userauth_failure(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh)
{
Authctxt *authctxt = ssh->authctxt;
char *authlist = NULL;
u_char partial;
if (authctxt == NULL)
fatal("input_userauth_failure: no authentication context");
if (sshpkt_get_cstring(ssh, &authlist, NULL) != 0 ||
sshpkt_get_u8(ssh, &partial) != 0 ||
sshpkt_get_end(ssh) != 0)
goto out;
if (partial != 0) {
verbose("Authenticated with partial success.");
/* reset state */
pubkey_reset(authctxt);
}
debug("Authentications that can continue: %s", authlist);
userauth(ssh, authlist);
authlist = NULL;
out:
free(authlist);
return 0;
}
/*
* Format an identity for logging including filename, key type, fingerprint
* and location (agent, etc.). Caller must free.
*/
static char *
format_identity(Identity *id)
{
char *fp = NULL, *ret = NULL;
const char *note = "";
if (id->key != NULL) {
fp = sshkey_fingerprint(id->key, options.fingerprint_hash,
SSH_FP_DEFAULT);
}
if (id->key) {
if ((id->key->flags & SSHKEY_FLAG_EXT) != 0)
note = " token";
else if (sshkey_is_sk(id->key))
note = " authenticator";
}
xasprintf(&ret, "%s %s%s%s%s%s%s",
id->filename,
id->key ? sshkey_type(id->key) : "", id->key ? " " : "",
fp ? fp : "",
id->userprovided ? " explicit" : "", note,
id->agent_fd != -1 ? " agent" : "");
free(fp);
return ret;
}
/* ARGSUSED */
static int
input_userauth_pk_ok(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh)
{
Authctxt *authctxt = ssh->authctxt;
struct sshkey *key = NULL;
Identity *id = NULL;
int pktype, found = 0, sent = 0;
size_t blen;
char *pkalg = NULL, *fp = NULL, *ident = NULL;
u_char *pkblob = NULL;
int r;
if (authctxt == NULL)
fatal("input_userauth_pk_ok: no authentication context");
if ((r = sshpkt_get_cstring(ssh, &pkalg, NULL)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_get_string(ssh, &pkblob, &blen)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0)
goto done;
if ((pktype = sshkey_type_from_name(pkalg)) == KEY_UNSPEC) {
debug("%s: server sent unknown pkalg %s", __func__, pkalg);
goto done;
}
if ((r = sshkey_from_blob(pkblob, blen, &key)) != 0) {
debug("no key from blob. pkalg %s: %s", pkalg, ssh_err(r));
goto done;
}
if (key->type != pktype) {
error("input_userauth_pk_ok: type mismatch "
"for decoded key (received %d, expected %d)",
key->type, pktype);
goto done;
}
/*
* search keys in the reverse order, because last candidate has been
* moved to the end of the queue. this also avoids confusion by
* duplicate keys
*/
TAILQ_FOREACH_REVERSE(id, &authctxt->keys, idlist, next) {
if (sshkey_equal(key, id->key)) {
found = 1;
break;
}
}
if (!found || id == NULL) {
fp = sshkey_fingerprint(key, options.fingerprint_hash,
SSH_FP_DEFAULT);
error("%s: server replied with unknown key: %s %s", __func__,
sshkey_type(key), fp == NULL ? "<ERROR>" : fp);
goto done;
}
ident = format_identity(id);
debug("Server accepts key: %s", ident);
sent = sign_and_send_pubkey(ssh, id);
r = 0;
done:
sshkey_free(key);
free(ident);
free(fp);
free(pkalg);
free(pkblob);
/* try another method if we did not send a packet */
if (r == 0 && sent == 0)
userauth(ssh, NULL);
return r;
}
#ifdef GSSAPI
static int
userauth_gssapi(struct ssh *ssh)
{
Authctxt *authctxt = (Authctxt *)ssh->authctxt;
Gssctxt *gssctxt = NULL;
OM_uint32 min;
int r, ok = 0;
gss_OID mech = NULL;
/* Try one GSSAPI method at a time, rather than sending them all at
* once. */
if (authctxt->gss_supported_mechs == NULL)
gss_indicate_mechs(&min, &authctxt->gss_supported_mechs);
/* Check to see whether the mechanism is usable before we offer it */
while (authctxt->mech_tried < authctxt->gss_supported_mechs->count &&
!ok) {
mech = &authctxt->gss_supported_mechs->
elements[authctxt->mech_tried];
/* My DER encoding requires length<128 */
if (mech->length < 128 && ssh_gssapi_check_mechanism(&gssctxt,
mech, authctxt->host)) {
ok = 1; /* Mechanism works */
} else {
authctxt->mech_tried++;
}
}
if (!ok || mech == NULL)
return 0;
authctxt->methoddata=(void *)gssctxt;
if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, authctxt->server_user)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, authctxt->service)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, authctxt->method->name)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, 1)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, (mech->length) + 2)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_u8(ssh, SSH_GSS_OIDTYPE)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_u8(ssh, mech->length)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put(ssh, mech->elements, mech->length)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0)
fatal("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_RESPONSE, &input_gssapi_response);
ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_TOKEN, &input_gssapi_token);
ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_ERROR, &input_gssapi_error);
ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_ERRTOK, &input_gssapi_errtok);
authctxt->mech_tried++; /* Move along to next candidate */
return 1;
}
static void
userauth_gssapi_cleanup(struct ssh *ssh)
{
Authctxt *authctxt = (Authctxt *)ssh->authctxt;
Gssctxt *gssctxt = (Gssctxt *)authctxt->methoddata;
ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(&gssctxt);
authctxt->methoddata = NULL;
free(authctxt->gss_supported_mechs);
authctxt->gss_supported_mechs = NULL;
}
static OM_uint32
process_gssapi_token(struct ssh *ssh, gss_buffer_t recv_tok)
{
Authctxt *authctxt = ssh->authctxt;
Gssctxt *gssctxt = authctxt->methoddata;
gss_buffer_desc send_tok = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
gss_buffer_desc mic = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
gss_buffer_desc gssbuf;
OM_uint32 status, ms, flags;
int r;
status = ssh_gssapi_init_ctx(gssctxt, options.gss_deleg_creds,
recv_tok, &send_tok, &flags);
if (send_tok.length > 0) {
u_char type = GSS_ERROR(status) ?
SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_ERRTOK :
SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_TOKEN;
if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, type)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_string(ssh, send_tok.value,
send_tok.length)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0)
fatal("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
gss_release_buffer(&ms, &send_tok);
}
if (status == GSS_S_COMPLETE) {
/* send either complete or MIC, depending on mechanism */
if (!(flags & GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG)) {
if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh,
SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_EXCHANGE_COMPLETE)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0)
fatal("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
} else {
struct sshbuf *b;
if ((b = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
ssh_gssapi_buildmic(b, authctxt->server_user,
authctxt->service, "gssapi-with-mic");
if ((gssbuf.value = sshbuf_mutable_ptr(b)) == NULL)
fatal("%s: sshbuf_mutable_ptr failed", __func__);
gssbuf.length = sshbuf_len(b);
status = ssh_gssapi_sign(gssctxt, &gssbuf, &mic);
if (!GSS_ERROR(status)) {
if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh,
SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_MIC)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_string(ssh, mic.value,
mic.length)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0)
fatal("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
}
sshbuf_free(b);
gss_release_buffer(&ms, &mic);
}
}
return status;
}
/* ARGSUSED */
static int
input_gssapi_response(int type, u_int32_t plen, struct ssh *ssh)
{
Authctxt *authctxt = ssh->authctxt;
Gssctxt *gssctxt;
size_t oidlen;
u_char *oidv = NULL;
int r;
if (authctxt == NULL)
fatal("input_gssapi_response: no authentication context");
gssctxt = authctxt->methoddata;
/* Setup our OID */
if ((r = sshpkt_get_string(ssh, &oidv, &oidlen)) != 0)
goto done;
if (oidlen <= 2 ||
oidv[0] != SSH_GSS_OIDTYPE ||
oidv[1] != oidlen - 2) {
debug("Badly encoded mechanism OID received");
userauth(ssh, NULL);
goto ok;
}
if (!ssh_gssapi_check_oid(gssctxt, oidv + 2, oidlen - 2))
fatal("Server returned different OID than expected");
if ((r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0)
goto done;
if (GSS_ERROR(process_gssapi_token(ssh, GSS_C_NO_BUFFER))) {
/* Start again with next method on list */
debug("Trying to start again");
userauth(ssh, NULL);
goto ok;
}
ok:
r = 0;
done:
free(oidv);
return r;
}
/* ARGSUSED */
static int
input_gssapi_token(int type, u_int32_t plen, struct ssh *ssh)
{
Authctxt *authctxt = ssh->authctxt;
gss_buffer_desc recv_tok;
u_char *p = NULL;
size_t len;
OM_uint32 status;
int r;
if (authctxt == NULL)
fatal("input_gssapi_response: no authentication context");
if ((r = sshpkt_get_string(ssh, &p, &len)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0)
goto out;
recv_tok.value = p;
recv_tok.length = len;
status = process_gssapi_token(ssh, &recv_tok);
/* Start again with the next method in the list */
if (GSS_ERROR(status)) {
userauth(ssh, NULL);
/* ok */
}
r = 0;
out:
free(p);
return r;
}
/* ARGSUSED */
static int
input_gssapi_errtok(int type, u_int32_t plen, struct ssh *ssh)
{
Authctxt *authctxt = ssh->authctxt;
Gssctxt *gssctxt;
gss_buffer_desc send_tok = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
gss_buffer_desc recv_tok;
OM_uint32 ms;
u_char *p = NULL;
size_t len;
int r;
if (authctxt == NULL)
fatal("input_gssapi_response: no authentication context");
gssctxt = authctxt->methoddata;
if ((r = sshpkt_get_string(ssh, &p, &len)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0) {
free(p);
return r;
}
/* Stick it into GSSAPI and see what it says */
recv_tok.value = p;
recv_tok.length = len;
(void)ssh_gssapi_init_ctx(gssctxt, options.gss_deleg_creds,
&recv_tok, &send_tok, NULL);
free(p);
gss_release_buffer(&ms, &send_tok);
/* Server will be returning a failed packet after this one */
return 0;
}
/* ARGSUSED */
static int
input_gssapi_error(int type, u_int32_t plen, struct ssh *ssh)
{
char *msg = NULL;
char *lang = NULL;
int r;
if ((r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, NULL)) != 0 || /* maj */
(r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, NULL)) != 0 || /* min */
(r = sshpkt_get_cstring(ssh, &msg, NULL)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_get_cstring(ssh, &lang, NULL)) != 0)
goto out;
r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh);
debug("Server GSSAPI Error:\n%s", msg);
out:
free(msg);
free(lang);
return r;
}
#endif /* GSSAPI */
static int
userauth_none(struct ssh *ssh)
{
Authctxt *authctxt = (Authctxt *)ssh->authctxt;
int r;
/* initial userauth request */
if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, authctxt->server_user)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, authctxt->service)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, authctxt->method->name)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0)
fatal("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
return 1;
}
static int
userauth_passwd(struct ssh *ssh)
{
Authctxt *authctxt = (Authctxt *)ssh->authctxt;
char *password, *prompt = NULL;
const char *host = options.host_key_alias ? options.host_key_alias :
authctxt->host;
int r;
if (authctxt->attempt_passwd++ >= options.number_of_password_prompts)
return 0;
if (authctxt->attempt_passwd != 1)
error("Permission denied, please try again.");
xasprintf(&prompt, "%s@%s's password: ", authctxt->server_user, host);
password = read_passphrase(prompt, 0);
if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, authctxt->server_user)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, authctxt->service)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, authctxt->method->name)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_u8(ssh, 0)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, password)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_add_padding(ssh, 64)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0)
fatal("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
free(prompt);
if (password != NULL)
freezero(password, strlen(password));
ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_PASSWD_CHANGEREQ,
&input_userauth_passwd_changereq);
return 1;
}
/*
* parse PASSWD_CHANGEREQ, prompt user and send SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST
*/
/* ARGSUSED */
static int
input_userauth_passwd_changereq(int type, u_int32_t seqnr, struct ssh *ssh)
{
Authctxt *authctxt = ssh->authctxt;
char *info = NULL, *lang = NULL, *password = NULL, *retype = NULL;
char prompt[256];
const char *host;
int r;
debug2("input_userauth_passwd_changereq");
if (authctxt == NULL)
fatal("input_userauth_passwd_changereq: "
"no authentication context");
host = options.host_key_alias ? options.host_key_alias : authctxt->host;
if ((r = sshpkt_get_cstring(ssh, &info, NULL)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_get_cstring(ssh, &lang, NULL)) != 0)
goto out;
if (strlen(info) > 0)
logit("%s", info);
if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, authctxt->server_user)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, authctxt->service)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, authctxt->method->name)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_u8(ssh, 1)) != 0) /* additional info */
goto out;
snprintf(prompt, sizeof(prompt),
"Enter %.30s@%.128s's old password: ",
authctxt->server_user, host);
password = read_passphrase(prompt, 0);
if ((r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, password)) != 0)
goto out;
freezero(password, strlen(password));
password = NULL;
while (password == NULL) {
snprintf(prompt, sizeof(prompt),
"Enter %.30s@%.128s's new password: ",
authctxt->server_user, host);
password = read_passphrase(prompt, RP_ALLOW_EOF);
if (password == NULL) {
/* bail out */
r = 0;
goto out;
}
snprintf(prompt, sizeof(prompt),
"Retype %.30s@%.128s's new password: ",
authctxt->server_user, host);
retype = read_passphrase(prompt, 0);
if (strcmp(password, retype) != 0) {
freezero(password, strlen(password));
logit("Mismatch; try again, EOF to quit.");
password = NULL;
}
freezero(retype, strlen(retype));
}
if ((r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, password)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_add_padding(ssh, 64)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0)
goto out;
ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_PASSWD_CHANGEREQ,
&input_userauth_passwd_changereq);
r = 0;
out:
if (password)
freezero(password, strlen(password));
free(info);
free(lang);
return r;
}
/*
* Select an algorithm for publickey signatures.
* Returns algorithm (caller must free) or NULL if no mutual algorithm found.
*
* Call with ssh==NULL to ignore server-sig-algs extension list and
* only attempt with the key's base signature type.
*/
static char *
key_sig_algorithm(struct ssh *ssh, const struct sshkey *key)
{
char *allowed, *oallowed, *cp, *tmp, *alg = NULL;
/*
* The signature algorithm will only differ from the key algorithm
* for RSA keys/certs and when the server advertises support for
* newer (SHA2) algorithms.
*/
if (ssh == NULL || ssh->kex->server_sig_algs == NULL ||
(key->type != KEY_RSA && key->type != KEY_RSA_CERT) ||
(key->type == KEY_RSA_CERT && (datafellows & SSH_BUG_SIGTYPE))) {
/* Filter base key signature alg against our configuration */
return match_list(sshkey_ssh_name(key),
options.pubkey_key_types, NULL);
}
/*
* For RSA keys/certs, since these might have a different sig type:
* find the first entry in PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes of the right type
* that also appears in the supported signature algorithms list from
* the server.
*/
oallowed = allowed = xstrdup(options.pubkey_key_types);
while ((cp = strsep(&allowed, ",")) != NULL) {
if (sshkey_type_from_name(cp) != key->type)
continue;
- tmp = match_list(sshkey_sigalg_by_name(cp), ssh->kex->server_sig_algs, NULL);
+ tmp = match_list(sshkey_sigalg_by_name(cp),
+ ssh->kex->server_sig_algs, NULL);
if (tmp != NULL)
alg = xstrdup(cp);
free(tmp);
if (alg != NULL)
break;
}
free(oallowed);
return alg;
}
static int
identity_sign(struct identity *id, u_char **sigp, size_t *lenp,
const u_char *data, size_t datalen, u_int compat, const char *alg)
{
struct sshkey *sign_key = NULL, *prv = NULL;
int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
struct notifier_ctx *notifier = NULL;
- char *fp = NULL;
+ char *fp = NULL, *pin = NULL, *prompt = NULL;
*sigp = NULL;
*lenp = 0;
/* The agent supports this key. */
if (id->key != NULL && id->agent_fd != -1) {
return ssh_agent_sign(id->agent_fd, id->key, sigp, lenp,
data, datalen, alg, compat);
}
/*
* We have already loaded the private key or the private key is
* stored in external hardware.
*/
if (id->key != NULL &&
(id->isprivate || (id->key->flags & SSHKEY_FLAG_EXT))) {
sign_key = id->key;
} else {
/* Load the private key from the file. */
if ((prv = load_identity_file(id)) == NULL)
return SSH_ERR_KEY_NOT_FOUND;
if (id->key != NULL && !sshkey_equal_public(prv, id->key)) {
error("%s: private key %s contents do not match public",
__func__, id->filename);
r = SSH_ERR_KEY_NOT_FOUND;
goto out;
}
sign_key = prv;
- if (sshkey_is_sk(sign_key) &&
- (sign_key->sk_flags & SSH_SK_USER_PRESENCE_REQD)) {
- /* XXX match batch mode should just skip these keys? */
- if ((fp = sshkey_fingerprint(sign_key,
- options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL)
- fatal("%s: sshkey_fingerprint", __func__);
- notifier = notify_start(options.batch_mode,
- "Confirm user presence for key %s %s",
- sshkey_type(sign_key), fp);
- free(fp);
+ if (sshkey_is_sk(sign_key)) {
+ if ((sign_key->sk_flags &
+ SSH_SK_USER_VERIFICATION_REQD)) {
+ xasprintf(&prompt, "Enter PIN for %s key %s: ",
+ sshkey_type(sign_key), id->filename);
+ pin = read_passphrase(prompt, 0);
+ }
+ if ((sign_key->sk_flags & SSH_SK_USER_PRESENCE_REQD)) {
+ /* XXX should batch mode just skip these? */
+ if ((fp = sshkey_fingerprint(sign_key,
+ options.fingerprint_hash,
+ SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL)
+ fatal("%s: fingerprint", __func__);
+ notifier = notify_start(options.batch_mode,
+ "Confirm user presence for key %s %s",
+ sshkey_type(sign_key), fp);
+ free(fp);
+ }
}
}
if ((r = sshkey_sign(sign_key, sigp, lenp, data, datalen,
- alg, options.sk_provider, compat)) != 0) {
+ alg, options.sk_provider, pin, compat)) != 0) {
debug("%s: sshkey_sign: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
goto out;
}
/*
* PKCS#11 tokens may not support all signature algorithms,
* so check what we get back.
*/
if ((r = sshkey_check_sigtype(*sigp, *lenp, alg)) != 0) {
debug("%s: sshkey_check_sigtype: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
goto out;
}
/* success */
r = 0;
out:
+ free(prompt);
+ if (pin != NULL)
+ freezero(pin, strlen(pin));
notify_complete(notifier);
sshkey_free(prv);
return r;
}
static int
id_filename_matches(Identity *id, Identity *private_id)
{
const char *suffixes[] = { ".pub", "-cert.pub", NULL };
size_t len = strlen(id->filename), plen = strlen(private_id->filename);
size_t i, slen;
if (strcmp(id->filename, private_id->filename) == 0)
return 1;
for (i = 0; suffixes[i]; i++) {
slen = strlen(suffixes[i]);
if (len > slen && plen == len - slen &&
strcmp(id->filename + (len - slen), suffixes[i]) == 0 &&
memcmp(id->filename, private_id->filename, plen) == 0)
return 1;
}
return 0;
}
static int
sign_and_send_pubkey(struct ssh *ssh, Identity *id)
{
Authctxt *authctxt = (Authctxt *)ssh->authctxt;
struct sshbuf *b = NULL;
Identity *private_id, *sign_id = NULL;
u_char *signature = NULL;
size_t slen = 0, skip = 0;
int r, fallback_sigtype, sent = 0;
char *alg = NULL, *fp = NULL;
const char *loc = "";
if ((fp = sshkey_fingerprint(id->key, options.fingerprint_hash,
SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL)
return 0;
debug3("%s: %s %s", __func__, sshkey_type(id->key), fp);
/*
* If the key is an certificate, try to find a matching private key
* and use it to complete the signature.
* If no such private key exists, fall back to trying the certificate
* key itself in case it has a private half already loaded.
* This will try to set sign_id to the private key that will perform
* the signature.
*/
if (sshkey_is_cert(id->key)) {
TAILQ_FOREACH(private_id, &authctxt->keys, next) {
if (sshkey_equal_public(id->key, private_id->key) &&
id->key->type != private_id->key->type) {
sign_id = private_id;
break;
}
}
/*
* Exact key matches are preferred, but also allow
* filename matches for non-PKCS#11/agent keys that
* didn't load public keys. This supports the case
* of keeping just a private key file and public
* certificate on disk.
*/
if (sign_id == NULL &&
!id->isprivate && id->agent_fd == -1 &&
(id->key->flags & SSHKEY_FLAG_EXT) == 0) {
TAILQ_FOREACH(private_id, &authctxt->keys, next) {
if (private_id->key == NULL &&
id_filename_matches(id, private_id)) {
sign_id = private_id;
break;
}
}
}
if (sign_id != NULL) {
debug2("%s: using private key \"%s\"%s for "
"certificate", __func__, id->filename,
id->agent_fd != -1 ? " from agent" : "");
} else {
debug("%s: no separate private key for certificate "
"\"%s\"", __func__, id->filename);
}
}
/*
* If the above didn't select another identity to do the signing
* then default to the one we started with.
*/
if (sign_id == NULL)
sign_id = id;
/* assemble and sign data */
for (fallback_sigtype = 0; fallback_sigtype <= 1; fallback_sigtype++) {
free(alg);
slen = 0;
signature = NULL;
if ((alg = key_sig_algorithm(fallback_sigtype ? NULL : ssh,
id->key)) == NULL) {
error("%s: no mutual signature supported", __func__);
goto out;
}
debug3("%s: signing using %s %s", __func__, alg, fp);
sshbuf_free(b);
if ((b = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
if (datafellows & SSH_OLD_SESSIONID) {
if ((r = sshbuf_put(b, session_id2,
session_id2_len)) != 0) {
fatal("%s: sshbuf_put: %s",
__func__, ssh_err(r));
}
} else {
if ((r = sshbuf_put_string(b, session_id2,
session_id2_len)) != 0) {
fatal("%s: sshbuf_put_string: %s",
__func__, ssh_err(r));
}
}
skip = sshbuf_len(b);
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(b, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, authctxt->server_user)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, authctxt->service)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, authctxt->method->name)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u8(b, 1)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, alg)) != 0 ||
(r = sshkey_puts(id->key, b)) != 0) {
fatal("%s: assemble signed data: %s",
__func__, ssh_err(r));
}
/* generate signature */
r = identity_sign(sign_id, &signature, &slen,
sshbuf_ptr(b), sshbuf_len(b), datafellows, alg);
if (r == 0)
break;
else if (r == SSH_ERR_KEY_NOT_FOUND)
goto out; /* soft failure */
else if (r == SSH_ERR_SIGN_ALG_UNSUPPORTED &&
!fallback_sigtype) {
if (sign_id->agent_fd != -1)
loc = "agent ";
else if ((sign_id->key->flags & SSHKEY_FLAG_EXT) != 0)
loc = "token ";
logit("%skey %s %s returned incorrect signature type",
loc, sshkey_type(id->key), fp);
continue;
}
error("%s: signing failed for %s \"%s\"%s: %s", __func__,
sshkey_type(sign_id->key), sign_id->filename,
id->agent_fd != -1 ? " from agent" : "", ssh_err(r));
goto out;
}
if (slen == 0 || signature == NULL) /* shouldn't happen */
fatal("%s: no signature", __func__);
/* append signature */
if ((r = sshbuf_put_string(b, signature, slen)) != 0)
fatal("%s: append signature: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
#ifdef DEBUG_PK
sshbuf_dump(b, stderr);
#endif
/* skip session id and packet type */
if ((r = sshbuf_consume(b, skip + 1)) != 0)
fatal("%s: consume: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
/* put remaining data from buffer into packet */
if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_putb(ssh, b)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0)
fatal("%s: enqueue request: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
/* success */
sent = 1;
out:
free(fp);
free(alg);
sshbuf_free(b);
freezero(signature, slen);
return sent;
}
static int
send_pubkey_test(struct ssh *ssh, Identity *id)
{
Authctxt *authctxt = (Authctxt *)ssh->authctxt;
u_char *blob = NULL;
char *alg = NULL;
size_t bloblen;
u_int have_sig = 0;
int sent = 0, r;
if ((alg = key_sig_algorithm(ssh, id->key)) == NULL) {
debug("%s: no mutual signature algorithm", __func__);
goto out;
}
if ((r = sshkey_to_blob(id->key, &blob, &bloblen)) != 0) {
/* we cannot handle this key */
debug3("%s: cannot handle key", __func__);
goto out;
}
/* register callback for USERAUTH_PK_OK message */
ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_PK_OK, &input_userauth_pk_ok);
if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, authctxt->server_user)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, authctxt->service)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, authctxt->method->name)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_u8(ssh, have_sig)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, alg)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_string(ssh, blob, bloblen)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0)
fatal("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
sent = 1;
out:
free(alg);
free(blob);
return sent;
}
static struct sshkey *
load_identity_file(Identity *id)
{
struct sshkey *private = NULL;
char prompt[300], *passphrase, *comment;
int r, quit = 0, i;
struct stat st;
if (stat(id->filename, &st) == -1) {
(id->userprovided ? logit : debug3)("no such identity: %s: %s",
id->filename, strerror(errno));
return NULL;
}
snprintf(prompt, sizeof prompt,
"Enter passphrase for key '%.100s': ", id->filename);
for (i = 0; i <= options.number_of_password_prompts; i++) {
if (i == 0)
passphrase = "";
else {
passphrase = read_passphrase(prompt, 0);
if (*passphrase == '\0') {
debug2("no passphrase given, try next key");
free(passphrase);
break;
}
}
switch ((r = sshkey_load_private_type(KEY_UNSPEC, id->filename,
passphrase, &private, &comment))) {
case 0:
break;
case SSH_ERR_KEY_WRONG_PASSPHRASE:
if (options.batch_mode) {
quit = 1;
break;
}
if (i != 0)
debug2("bad passphrase given, try again...");
break;
case SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR:
if (errno == ENOENT) {
debug2("Load key \"%s\": %s",
id->filename, ssh_err(r));
quit = 1;
break;
}
/* FALLTHROUGH */
default:
error("Load key \"%s\": %s", id->filename, ssh_err(r));
quit = 1;
break;
}
if (private != NULL && sshkey_is_sk(private) &&
options.sk_provider == NULL) {
debug("key \"%s\" is an authenticator-hosted key, "
"but no provider specified", id->filename);
sshkey_free(private);
private = NULL;
quit = 1;
}
if (!quit && private != NULL && id->agent_fd == -1 &&
!(id->key && id->isprivate))
maybe_add_key_to_agent(id->filename, private, comment,
passphrase);
if (i > 0)
freezero(passphrase, strlen(passphrase));
free(comment);
if (private != NULL || quit)
break;
}
return private;
}
static int
key_type_allowed_by_config(struct sshkey *key)
{
if (match_pattern_list(sshkey_ssh_name(key),
options.pubkey_key_types, 0) == 1)
return 1;
/* RSA keys/certs might be allowed by alternate signature types */
switch (key->type) {
case KEY_RSA:
if (match_pattern_list("rsa-sha2-512",
options.pubkey_key_types, 0) == 1)
return 1;
if (match_pattern_list("rsa-sha2-256",
options.pubkey_key_types, 0) == 1)
return 1;
break;
case KEY_RSA_CERT:
if (match_pattern_list("rsa-sha2-512-cert-v01@openssh.com",
options.pubkey_key_types, 0) == 1)
return 1;
if (match_pattern_list("rsa-sha2-256-cert-v01@openssh.com",
options.pubkey_key_types, 0) == 1)
return 1;
break;
}
return 0;
}
/*
* try keys in the following order:
* 1. certificates listed in the config file
* 2. other input certificates
* 3. agent keys that are found in the config file
* 4. other agent keys
* 5. keys that are only listed in the config file
*/
static void
pubkey_prepare(Authctxt *authctxt)
{
struct identity *id, *id2, *tmp;
struct idlist agent, files, *preferred;
struct sshkey *key;
int agent_fd = -1, i, r, found;
size_t j;
struct ssh_identitylist *idlist;
char *ident;
TAILQ_INIT(&agent); /* keys from the agent */
TAILQ_INIT(&files); /* keys from the config file */
preferred = &authctxt->keys;
TAILQ_INIT(preferred); /* preferred order of keys */
/* list of keys stored in the filesystem and PKCS#11 */
for (i = 0; i < options.num_identity_files; i++) {
key = options.identity_keys[i];
if (key && key->cert &&
key->cert->type != SSH2_CERT_TYPE_USER) {
debug("%s: ignoring certificate %s: not a user "
"certificate", __func__,
options.identity_files[i]);
continue;
}
if (key && sshkey_is_sk(key) && options.sk_provider == NULL) {
debug("%s: ignoring authenticator-hosted key %s as no "
"SecurityKeyProvider has been specified",
__func__, options.identity_files[i]);
continue;
}
options.identity_keys[i] = NULL;
id = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*id));
id->agent_fd = -1;
id->key = key;
id->filename = xstrdup(options.identity_files[i]);
id->userprovided = options.identity_file_userprovided[i];
TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(&files, id, next);
}
/* list of certificates specified by user */
for (i = 0; i < options.num_certificate_files; i++) {
key = options.certificates[i];
if (!sshkey_is_cert(key) || key->cert == NULL ||
key->cert->type != SSH2_CERT_TYPE_USER) {
debug("%s: ignoring certificate %s: not a user "
"certificate", __func__,
options.identity_files[i]);
continue;
}
if (key && sshkey_is_sk(key) && options.sk_provider == NULL) {
debug("%s: ignoring authenticator-hosted key "
"certificate %s as no "
"SecurityKeyProvider has been specified",
__func__, options.identity_files[i]);
continue;
}
id = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*id));
id->agent_fd = -1;
id->key = key;
id->filename = xstrdup(options.certificate_files[i]);
id->userprovided = options.certificate_file_userprovided[i];
TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(preferred, id, next);
}
/* list of keys supported by the agent */
if ((r = ssh_get_authentication_socket(&agent_fd)) != 0) {
if (r != SSH_ERR_AGENT_NOT_PRESENT)
debug("%s: ssh_get_authentication_socket: %s",
__func__, ssh_err(r));
} else if ((r = ssh_fetch_identitylist(agent_fd, &idlist)) != 0) {
if (r != SSH_ERR_AGENT_NO_IDENTITIES)
debug("%s: ssh_fetch_identitylist: %s",
__func__, ssh_err(r));
close(agent_fd);
} else {
for (j = 0; j < idlist->nkeys; j++) {
found = 0;
TAILQ_FOREACH(id, &files, next) {
/*
* agent keys from the config file are
* preferred
*/
if (sshkey_equal(idlist->keys[j], id->key)) {
TAILQ_REMOVE(&files, id, next);
TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(preferred, id, next);
id->agent_fd = agent_fd;
found = 1;
break;
}
}
if (!found && !options.identities_only) {
id = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*id));
/* XXX "steals" key/comment from idlist */
id->key = idlist->keys[j];
id->filename = idlist->comments[j];
idlist->keys[j] = NULL;
idlist->comments[j] = NULL;
id->agent_fd = agent_fd;
TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(&agent, id, next);
}
}
ssh_free_identitylist(idlist);
/* append remaining agent keys */
- for (id = TAILQ_FIRST(&agent); id; id = TAILQ_FIRST(&agent)) {
- TAILQ_REMOVE(&agent, id, next);
- TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(preferred, id, next);
- }
+ TAILQ_CONCAT(preferred, &agent, next);
authctxt->agent_fd = agent_fd;
}
/* Prefer PKCS11 keys that are explicitly listed */
TAILQ_FOREACH_SAFE(id, &files, next, tmp) {
if (id->key == NULL || (id->key->flags & SSHKEY_FLAG_EXT) == 0)
continue;
found = 0;
TAILQ_FOREACH(id2, &files, next) {
if (id2->key == NULL ||
(id2->key->flags & SSHKEY_FLAG_EXT) != 0)
continue;
if (sshkey_equal(id->key, id2->key)) {
TAILQ_REMOVE(&files, id, next);
TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(preferred, id, next);
found = 1;
break;
}
}
/* If IdentitiesOnly set and key not found then don't use it */
if (!found && options.identities_only) {
TAILQ_REMOVE(&files, id, next);
freezero(id, sizeof(*id));
}
}
/* append remaining keys from the config file */
- for (id = TAILQ_FIRST(&files); id; id = TAILQ_FIRST(&files)) {
- TAILQ_REMOVE(&files, id, next);
- TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(preferred, id, next);
- }
+ TAILQ_CONCAT(preferred, &files, next);
/* finally, filter by PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes */
TAILQ_FOREACH_SAFE(id, preferred, next, id2) {
if (id->key != NULL && !key_type_allowed_by_config(id->key)) {
debug("Skipping %s key %s - "
"not in PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes",
sshkey_ssh_name(id->key), id->filename);
TAILQ_REMOVE(preferred, id, next);
sshkey_free(id->key);
free(id->filename);
memset(id, 0, sizeof(*id));
continue;
}
}
/* List the keys we plan on using */
TAILQ_FOREACH_SAFE(id, preferred, next, id2) {
ident = format_identity(id);
debug("Will attempt key: %s", ident);
free(ident);
}
debug2("%s: done", __func__);
}
static void
pubkey_cleanup(struct ssh *ssh)
{
Authctxt *authctxt = (Authctxt *)ssh->authctxt;
Identity *id;
if (authctxt->agent_fd != -1) {
ssh_close_authentication_socket(authctxt->agent_fd);
authctxt->agent_fd = -1;
}
for (id = TAILQ_FIRST(&authctxt->keys); id;
id = TAILQ_FIRST(&authctxt->keys)) {
TAILQ_REMOVE(&authctxt->keys, id, next);
sshkey_free(id->key);
free(id->filename);
free(id);
}
}
static void
pubkey_reset(Authctxt *authctxt)
{
Identity *id;
TAILQ_FOREACH(id, &authctxt->keys, next)
id->tried = 0;
}
static int
try_identity(Identity *id)
{
if (!id->key)
return (0);
if (sshkey_type_plain(id->key->type) == KEY_RSA &&
(datafellows & SSH_BUG_RSASIGMD5) != 0) {
debug("Skipped %s key %s for RSA/MD5 server",
sshkey_type(id->key), id->filename);
return (0);
}
return 1;
}
static int
userauth_pubkey(struct ssh *ssh)
{
Authctxt *authctxt = (Authctxt *)ssh->authctxt;
Identity *id;
int sent = 0;
char *ident;
while ((id = TAILQ_FIRST(&authctxt->keys))) {
if (id->tried++)
return (0);
/* move key to the end of the queue */
TAILQ_REMOVE(&authctxt->keys, id, next);
TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(&authctxt->keys, id, next);
/*
* send a test message if we have the public key. for
* encrypted keys we cannot do this and have to load the
* private key instead
*/
if (id->key != NULL) {
if (try_identity(id)) {
ident = format_identity(id);
debug("Offering public key: %s", ident);
free(ident);
sent = send_pubkey_test(ssh, id);
}
} else {
debug("Trying private key: %s", id->filename);
id->key = load_identity_file(id);
if (id->key != NULL) {
if (try_identity(id)) {
id->isprivate = 1;
sent = sign_and_send_pubkey(ssh, id);
}
sshkey_free(id->key);
id->key = NULL;
id->isprivate = 0;
}
}
if (sent)
return (sent);
}
return (0);
}
/*
* Send userauth request message specifying keyboard-interactive method.
*/
static int
userauth_kbdint(struct ssh *ssh)
{
Authctxt *authctxt = (Authctxt *)ssh->authctxt;
int r;
if (authctxt->attempt_kbdint++ >= options.number_of_password_prompts)
return 0;
/* disable if no SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_INFO_REQUEST has been seen */
if (authctxt->attempt_kbdint > 1 && !authctxt->info_req_seen) {
debug3("userauth_kbdint: disable: no info_req_seen");
ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_INFO_REQUEST, NULL);
return 0;
}
debug2("userauth_kbdint");
if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, authctxt->server_user)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, authctxt->service)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, authctxt->method->name)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, "")) != 0 || /* lang */
(r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, options.kbd_interactive_devices ?
options.kbd_interactive_devices : "")) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0)
fatal("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_INFO_REQUEST, &input_userauth_info_req);
return 1;
}
/*
* parse INFO_REQUEST, prompt user and send INFO_RESPONSE
*/
static int
input_userauth_info_req(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh)
{
Authctxt *authctxt = ssh->authctxt;
char *name = NULL, *inst = NULL, *lang = NULL, *prompt = NULL;
char *response = NULL;
u_char echo = 0;
u_int num_prompts, i;
int r;
debug2("input_userauth_info_req");
if (authctxt == NULL)
fatal("input_userauth_info_req: no authentication context");
authctxt->info_req_seen = 1;
if ((r = sshpkt_get_cstring(ssh, &name, NULL)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_get_cstring(ssh, &inst, NULL)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_get_cstring(ssh, &lang, NULL)) != 0)
goto out;
if (strlen(name) > 0)
logit("%s", name);
if (strlen(inst) > 0)
logit("%s", inst);
if ((r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &num_prompts)) != 0)
goto out;
/*
* Begin to build info response packet based on prompts requested.
* We commit to providing the correct number of responses, so if
* further on we run into a problem that prevents this, we have to
* be sure and clean this up and send a correct error response.
*/
if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_INFO_RESPONSE)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, num_prompts)) != 0)
goto out;
debug2("input_userauth_info_req: num_prompts %d", num_prompts);
for (i = 0; i < num_prompts; i++) {
if ((r = sshpkt_get_cstring(ssh, &prompt, NULL)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_get_u8(ssh, &echo)) != 0)
goto out;
response = read_passphrase(prompt, echo ? RP_ECHO : 0);
if ((r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, response)) != 0)
goto out;
freezero(response, strlen(response));
free(prompt);
response = prompt = NULL;
}
/* done with parsing incoming message. */
if ((r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_add_padding(ssh, 64)) != 0)
goto out;
r = sshpkt_send(ssh);
out:
if (response)
freezero(response, strlen(response));
free(prompt);
free(name);
free(inst);
free(lang);
return r;
}
static int
ssh_keysign(struct ssh *ssh, struct sshkey *key, u_char **sigp, size_t *lenp,
const u_char *data, size_t datalen)
{
struct sshbuf *b;
struct stat st;
pid_t pid;
int r, to[2], from[2], status;
int sock = ssh_packet_get_connection_in(ssh);
u_char rversion = 0, version = 2;
void (*osigchld)(int);
*sigp = NULL;
*lenp = 0;
if (stat(_PATH_SSH_KEY_SIGN, &st) == -1) {
error("%s: not installed: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
return -1;
}
if (fflush(stdout) != 0) {
error("%s: fflush: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
return -1;
}
if (pipe(to) == -1) {
error("%s: pipe: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
return -1;
}
if (pipe(from) == -1) {
error("%s: pipe: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
return -1;
}
if ((pid = fork()) == -1) {
error("%s: fork: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
return -1;
}
osigchld = ssh_signal(SIGCHLD, SIG_DFL);
if (pid == 0) {
close(from[0]);
if (dup2(from[1], STDOUT_FILENO) == -1)
fatal("%s: dup2: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
close(to[1]);
if (dup2(to[0], STDIN_FILENO) == -1)
fatal("%s: dup2: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
close(from[1]);
close(to[0]);
if (dup2(sock, STDERR_FILENO + 1) == -1)
fatal("%s: dup2: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
sock = STDERR_FILENO + 1;
fcntl(sock, F_SETFD, 0); /* keep the socket on exec */
closefrom(sock + 1);
debug3("%s: [child] pid=%ld, exec %s",
__func__, (long)getpid(), _PATH_SSH_KEY_SIGN);
execl(_PATH_SSH_KEY_SIGN, _PATH_SSH_KEY_SIGN, (char *)NULL);
fatal("%s: exec(%s): %s", __func__, _PATH_SSH_KEY_SIGN,
strerror(errno));
}
close(from[1]);
close(to[0]);
sock = STDERR_FILENO + 1;
if ((b = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
/* send # of sock, data to be signed */
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(b, sock)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_string(b, data, datalen)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
if (ssh_msg_send(to[1], version, b) == -1)
fatal("%s: couldn't send request", __func__);
sshbuf_reset(b);
r = ssh_msg_recv(from[0], b);
close(from[0]);
close(to[1]);
if (r < 0) {
error("%s: no reply", __func__);
goto fail;
}
errno = 0;
while (waitpid(pid, &status, 0) == -1) {
if (errno != EINTR) {
error("%s: waitpid %ld: %s",
__func__, (long)pid, strerror(errno));
goto fail;
}
}
if (!WIFEXITED(status)) {
error("%s: exited abnormally", __func__);
goto fail;
}
if (WEXITSTATUS(status) != 0) {
error("%s: exited with status %d",
__func__, WEXITSTATUS(status));
goto fail;
}
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(b, &rversion)) != 0) {
error("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
goto fail;
}
if (rversion != version) {
error("%s: bad version", __func__);
goto fail;
}
if ((r = sshbuf_get_string(b, sigp, lenp)) != 0) {
error("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
fail:
ssh_signal(SIGCHLD, osigchld);
sshbuf_free(b);
return -1;
}
ssh_signal(SIGCHLD, osigchld);
sshbuf_free(b);
return 0;
}
static int
userauth_hostbased(struct ssh *ssh)
{
Authctxt *authctxt = (Authctxt *)ssh->authctxt;
struct sshkey *private = NULL;
struct sshbuf *b = NULL;
u_char *sig = NULL, *keyblob = NULL;
char *fp = NULL, *chost = NULL, *lname = NULL;
size_t siglen = 0, keylen = 0;
int i, r, success = 0;
if (authctxt->ktypes == NULL) {
authctxt->oktypes = xstrdup(options.hostbased_key_types);
authctxt->ktypes = authctxt->oktypes;
}
/*
* Work through each listed type pattern in HostbasedKeyTypes,
* trying each hostkey that matches the type in turn.
*/
for (;;) {
if (authctxt->active_ktype == NULL)
authctxt->active_ktype = strsep(&authctxt->ktypes, ",");
if (authctxt->active_ktype == NULL ||
*authctxt->active_ktype == '\0')
break;
debug3("%s: trying key type %s", __func__,
authctxt->active_ktype);
/* check for a useful key */
private = NULL;
for (i = 0; i < authctxt->sensitive->nkeys; i++) {
if (authctxt->sensitive->keys[i] == NULL ||
authctxt->sensitive->keys[i]->type == KEY_UNSPEC)
continue;
if (match_pattern_list(
sshkey_ssh_name(authctxt->sensitive->keys[i]),
authctxt->active_ktype, 0) != 1)
continue;
/* we take and free the key */
private = authctxt->sensitive->keys[i];
authctxt->sensitive->keys[i] = NULL;
break;
}
/* Found one */
if (private != NULL)
break;
/* No more keys of this type; advance */
authctxt->active_ktype = NULL;
}
if (private == NULL) {
free(authctxt->oktypes);
authctxt->oktypes = authctxt->ktypes = NULL;
authctxt->active_ktype = NULL;
debug("No more client hostkeys for hostbased authentication.");
goto out;
}
if ((fp = sshkey_fingerprint(private, options.fingerprint_hash,
SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL) {
error("%s: sshkey_fingerprint failed", __func__);
goto out;
}
debug("%s: trying hostkey %s %s",
__func__, sshkey_ssh_name(private), fp);
/* figure out a name for the client host */
lname = get_local_name(ssh_packet_get_connection_in(ssh));
if (lname == NULL) {
error("%s: cannot get local ipaddr/name", __func__);
goto out;
}
/* XXX sshbuf_put_stringf? */
xasprintf(&chost, "%s.", lname);
debug2("%s: chost %s", __func__, chost);
/* construct data */
if ((b = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) {
error("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
goto out;
}
if ((r = sshkey_to_blob(private, &keyblob, &keylen)) != 0) {
error("%s: sshkey_to_blob: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
goto out;
}
if ((r = sshbuf_put_string(b, session_id2, session_id2_len)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u8(b, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, authctxt->server_user)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, authctxt->service)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, authctxt->method->name)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, sshkey_ssh_name(private))) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_string(b, keyblob, keylen)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, chost)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, authctxt->local_user)) != 0) {
error("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
goto out;
}
#ifdef DEBUG_PK
sshbuf_dump(b, stderr);
#endif
if ((r = ssh_keysign(ssh, private, &sig, &siglen,
sshbuf_ptr(b), sshbuf_len(b))) != 0) {
error("sign using hostkey %s %s failed",
sshkey_ssh_name(private), fp);
goto out;
}
if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, authctxt->server_user)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, authctxt->service)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, authctxt->method->name)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, sshkey_ssh_name(private))) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_string(ssh, keyblob, keylen)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, chost)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, authctxt->local_user)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_string(ssh, sig, siglen)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) {
error("%s: packet error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
goto out;
}
success = 1;
out:
if (sig != NULL)
freezero(sig, siglen);
free(keyblob);
free(lname);
free(fp);
free(chost);
sshkey_free(private);
sshbuf_free(b);
return success;
}
/* find auth method */
/*
* given auth method name, if configurable options permit this method fill
* in auth_ident field and return true, otherwise return false.
*/
static int
authmethod_is_enabled(Authmethod *method)
{
if (method == NULL)
return 0;
/* return false if options indicate this method is disabled */
if (method->enabled == NULL || *method->enabled == 0)
return 0;
/* return false if batch mode is enabled but method needs interactive mode */
if (method->batch_flag != NULL && *method->batch_flag != 0)
return 0;
return 1;
}
static Authmethod *
authmethod_lookup(const char *name)
{
Authmethod *method = NULL;
if (name != NULL)
for (method = authmethods; method->name != NULL; method++)
if (strcmp(name, method->name) == 0)
return method;
debug2("Unrecognized authentication method name: %s", name ? name : "NULL");
return NULL;
}
/* XXX internal state */
static Authmethod *current = NULL;
static char *supported = NULL;
static char *preferred = NULL;
/*
* Given the authentication method list sent by the server, return the
* next method we should try. If the server initially sends a nil list,
* use a built-in default list.
*/
static Authmethod *
authmethod_get(char *authlist)
{
char *name = NULL;
u_int next;
/* Use a suitable default if we're passed a nil list. */
if (authlist == NULL || strlen(authlist) == 0)
authlist = options.preferred_authentications;
if (supported == NULL || strcmp(authlist, supported) != 0) {
debug3("start over, passed a different list %s", authlist);
free(supported);
supported = xstrdup(authlist);
preferred = options.preferred_authentications;
debug3("preferred %s", preferred);
current = NULL;
} else if (current != NULL && authmethod_is_enabled(current))
return current;
for (;;) {
if ((name = match_list(preferred, supported, &next)) == NULL) {
debug("No more authentication methods to try.");
current = NULL;
return NULL;
}
preferred += next;
debug3("authmethod_lookup %s", name);
debug3("remaining preferred: %s", preferred);
if ((current = authmethod_lookup(name)) != NULL &&
authmethod_is_enabled(current)) {
debug3("authmethod_is_enabled %s", name);
debug("Next authentication method: %s", name);
free(name);
return current;
}
free(name);
}
}
static char *
authmethods_get(void)
{
Authmethod *method = NULL;
struct sshbuf *b;
char *list;
int r;
if ((b = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
for (method = authmethods; method->name != NULL; method++) {
if (authmethod_is_enabled(method)) {
if ((r = sshbuf_putf(b, "%s%s",
sshbuf_len(b) ? "," : "", method->name)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s",
__func__, ssh_err(r));
}
}
if ((list = sshbuf_dup_string(b)) == NULL)
fatal("%s: sshbuf_dup_string failed", __func__);
sshbuf_free(b);
return list;
}
diff --git a/sshd.0 b/sshd.0
index 5f9aadd66e4f..e32e0082cab5 100644
--- a/sshd.0
+++ b/sshd.0
@@ -1,667 +1,672 @@
SSHD(8) System Manager's Manual SSHD(8)
NAME
sshd M-bM-^@M-^S OpenSSH daemon
SYNOPSIS
sshd [-46DdeiqTt] [-C connection_spec] [-c host_certificate_file]
[-E log_file] [-f config_file] [-g login_grace_time]
[-h host_key_file] [-o option] [-p port] [-u len]
DESCRIPTION
sshd (OpenSSH Daemon) is the daemon program for ssh(1). Together these
programs replace rlogin and rsh, and provide secure encrypted
communications between two untrusted hosts over an insecure network.
sshd listens for connections from clients. It is normally started at
boot from /etc/rc. It forks a new daemon for each incoming connection.
The forked daemons handle key exchange, encryption, authentication,
command execution, and data exchange.
sshd can be configured using command-line options or a configuration file
(by default sshd_config(5)); command-line options override values
specified in the configuration file. sshd rereads its configuration file
when it receives a hangup signal, SIGHUP, by executing itself with the
name and options it was started with, e.g. /usr/sbin/sshd.
The options are as follows:
-4 Forces sshd to use IPv4 addresses only.
-6 Forces sshd to use IPv6 addresses only.
-C connection_spec
Specify the connection parameters to use for the -T extended test
mode. If provided, any Match directives in the configuration
file that would apply are applied before the configuration is
written to standard output. The connection parameters are
supplied as keyword=value pairs and may be supplied in any order,
either with multiple -C options or as a comma-separated list.
The keywords are M-bM-^@M-^\addr,M-bM-^@M-^] M-bM-^@M-^\userM-bM-^@M-^], M-bM-^@M-^\hostM-bM-^@M-^], M-bM-^@M-^\laddrM-bM-^@M-^], M-bM-^@M-^\lportM-bM-^@M-^], and
M-bM-^@M-^\rdomainM-bM-^@M-^] and correspond to source address, user, resolved source
host name, local address, local port number and routing domain
respectively.
-c host_certificate_file
Specifies a path to a certificate file to identify sshd during
key exchange. The certificate file must match a host key file
specified using the -h option or the HostKey configuration
directive.
-D When this option is specified, sshd will not detach and does not
become a daemon. This allows easy monitoring of sshd.
-d Debug mode. The server sends verbose debug output to standard
error, and does not put itself in the background. The server
also will not fork and will only process one connection. This
option is only intended for debugging for the server. Multiple
-d options increase the debugging level. Maximum is 3.
-E log_file
Append debug logs to log_file instead of the system log.
-e Write debug logs to standard error instead of the system log.
-f config_file
Specifies the name of the configuration file. The default is
/etc/ssh/sshd_config. sshd refuses to start if there is no
configuration file.
-g login_grace_time
Gives the grace time for clients to authenticate themselves
(default 120 seconds). If the client fails to authenticate the
user within this many seconds, the server disconnects and exits.
A value of zero indicates no limit.
-h host_key_file
Specifies a file from which a host key is read. This option must
be given if sshd is not run as root (as the normal host key files
are normally not readable by anyone but root). The default is
/etc/ssh/ssh_host_ecdsa_key, /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ed25519_key and
/etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key. It is possible to have multiple host
key files for the different host key algorithms.
-i Specifies that sshd is being run from inetd(8).
-o option
Can be used to give options in the format used in the
configuration file. This is useful for specifying options for
which there is no separate command-line flag. For full details
of the options, and their values, see sshd_config(5).
-p port
Specifies the port on which the server listens for connections
(default 22). Multiple port options are permitted. Ports
specified in the configuration file with the Port option are
ignored when a command-line port is specified. Ports specified
using the ListenAddress option override command-line ports.
-q Quiet mode. Nothing is sent to the system log. Normally the
beginning, authentication, and termination of each connection is
logged.
-T Extended test mode. Check the validity of the configuration
file, output the effective configuration to stdout and then exit.
Optionally, Match rules may be applied by specifying the
connection parameters using one or more -C options.
-t Test mode. Only check the validity of the configuration file and
sanity of the keys. This is useful for updating sshd reliably as
configuration options may change.
-u len This option is used to specify the size of the field in the utmp
structure that holds the remote host name. If the resolved host
name is longer than len, the dotted decimal value will be used
instead. This allows hosts with very long host names that
overflow this field to still be uniquely identified. Specifying
-u0 indicates that only dotted decimal addresses should be put
into the utmp file. -u0 may also be used to prevent sshd from
making DNS requests unless the authentication mechanism or
configuration requires it. Authentication mechanisms that may
require DNS include HostbasedAuthentication and using a
from="pattern-list" option in a key file. Configuration options
that require DNS include using a USER@HOST pattern in AllowUsers
or DenyUsers.
AUTHENTICATION
The OpenSSH SSH daemon supports SSH protocol 2 only. Each host has a
host-specific key, used to identify the host. Whenever a client
connects, the daemon responds with its public host key. The client
compares the host key against its own database to verify that it has not
changed. Forward secrecy is provided through a Diffie-Hellman key
agreement. This key agreement results in a shared session key. The rest
of the session is encrypted using a symmetric cipher. The client selects
the encryption algorithm to use from those offered by the server.
Additionally, session integrity is provided through a cryptographic
message authentication code (MAC).
Finally, the server and the client enter an authentication dialog. The
client tries to authenticate itself using host-based authentication,
public key authentication, challenge-response authentication, or password
authentication.
Regardless of the authentication type, the account is checked to ensure
that it is accessible. An account is not accessible if it is locked,
listed in DenyUsers or its group is listed in DenyGroups . The
definition of a locked account is system dependent. Some platforms have
their own account database (eg AIX) and some modify the passwd field (
M-bM-^@M-^X*LK*M-bM-^@M-^Y on Solaris and UnixWare, M-bM-^@M-^X*M-bM-^@M-^Y on HP-UX, containing M-bM-^@M-^XNologinM-bM-^@M-^Y on
Tru64, a leading M-bM-^@M-^X*LOCKED*M-bM-^@M-^Y on FreeBSD and a leading M-bM-^@M-^X!M-bM-^@M-^Y on most
Linuxes). If there is a requirement to disable password authentication
for the account while allowing still public-key, then the passwd field
should be set to something other than these values (eg M-bM-^@M-^XNPM-bM-^@M-^Y or M-bM-^@M-^X*NP*M-bM-^@M-^Y ).
If the client successfully authenticates itself, a dialog for preparing
the session is entered. At this time the client may request things like
allocating a pseudo-tty, forwarding X11 connections, forwarding TCP
connections, or forwarding the authentication agent connection over the
secure channel.
After this, the client either requests a shell or execution of a command.
The sides then enter session mode. In this mode, either side may send
data at any time, and such data is forwarded to/from the shell or command
on the server side, and the user terminal in the client side.
When the user program terminates and all forwarded X11 and other
connections have been closed, the server sends command exit status to the
client, and both sides exit.
LOGIN PROCESS
When a user successfully logs in, sshd does the following:
1. If the login is on a tty, and no command has been specified,
prints last login time and /etc/motd (unless prevented in the
configuration file or by ~/.hushlogin; see the FILES section).
2. If the login is on a tty, records login time.
3. Checks /etc/nologin; if it exists, prints contents and quits
(unless root).
4. Changes to run with normal user privileges.
5. Sets up basic environment.
6. Reads the file ~/.ssh/environment, if it exists, and users are
allowed to change their environment. See the
PermitUserEnvironment option in sshd_config(5).
7. Changes to user's home directory.
8. If ~/.ssh/rc exists and the sshd_config(5) PermitUserRC option
is set, runs it; else if /etc/ssh/sshrc exists, runs it;
otherwise runs xauth. The M-bM-^@M-^\rcM-bM-^@M-^] files are given the X11
authentication protocol and cookie in standard input. See
SSHRC, below.
9. Runs user's shell or command. All commands are run under the
user's login shell as specified in the system password
database.
SSHRC
If the file ~/.ssh/rc exists, sh(1) runs it after reading the environment
files but before starting the user's shell or command. It must not
produce any output on stdout; stderr must be used instead. If X11
forwarding is in use, it will receive the "proto cookie" pair in its
standard input (and DISPLAY in its environment). The script must call
xauth(1) because sshd will not run xauth automatically to add X11
cookies.
The primary purpose of this file is to run any initialization routines
which may be needed before the user's home directory becomes accessible;
AFS is a particular example of such an environment.
This file will probably contain some initialization code followed by
something similar to:
if read proto cookie && [ -n "$DISPLAY" ]; then
if [ `echo $DISPLAY | cut -c1-10` = 'localhost:' ]; then
# X11UseLocalhost=yes
echo add unix:`echo $DISPLAY |
cut -c11-` $proto $cookie
else
# X11UseLocalhost=no
echo add $DISPLAY $proto $cookie
fi | xauth -q -
fi
If this file does not exist, /etc/ssh/sshrc is run, and if that does not
exist either, xauth is used to add the cookie.
AUTHORIZED_KEYS FILE FORMAT
AuthorizedKeysFile specifies the files containing public keys for public
key authentication; if this option is not specified, the default is
~/.ssh/authorized_keys and ~/.ssh/authorized_keys2. Each line of the
file contains one key (empty lines and lines starting with a M-bM-^@M-^X#M-bM-^@M-^Y are
ignored as comments). Public keys consist of the following space-
separated fields: options, keytype, base64-encoded key, comment. The
options field is optional. The supported key types are:
sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256@openssh.com
ecdsa-sha2-nistp256
ecdsa-sha2-nistp384
ecdsa-sha2-nistp521
sk-ssh-ed25519@openssh.com
ssh-ed25519
ssh-dss
ssh-rsa
The comment field is not used for anything (but may be convenient for the
user to identify the key).
Note that lines in this file can be several hundred bytes long (because
of the size of the public key encoding) up to a limit of 8 kilobytes,
which permits RSA keys up to 16 kilobits. You don't want to type them
in; instead, copy the id_dsa.pub, id_ecdsa.pub, id_ecdsa_sk.pub,
id_ed25519.pub, id_ed25519_sk.pub, or the id_rsa.pub file and edit it.
sshd enforces a minimum RSA key modulus size of 1024 bits.
The options (if present) consist of comma-separated option
specifications. No spaces are permitted, except within double quotes.
The following option specifications are supported (note that option
keywords are case-insensitive):
agent-forwarding
Enable authentication agent forwarding previously disabled by the
restrict option.
cert-authority
Specifies that the listed key is a certification authority (CA)
that is trusted to validate signed certificates for user
authentication.
Certificates may encode access restrictions similar to these key
options. If both certificate restrictions and key options are
present, the most restrictive union of the two is applied.
command="command"
Specifies that the command is executed whenever this key is used
for authentication. The command supplied by the user (if any) is
ignored. The command is run on a pty if the client requests a
pty; otherwise it is run without a tty. If an 8-bit clean
channel is required, one must not request a pty or should specify
no-pty. A quote may be included in the command by quoting it
with a backslash.
This option might be useful to restrict certain public keys to
perform just a specific operation. An example might be a key
that permits remote backups but nothing else. Note that the
client may specify TCP and/or X11 forwarding unless they are
explicitly prohibited, e.g. using the restrict key option.
The command originally supplied by the client is available in the
SSH_ORIGINAL_COMMAND environment variable. Note that this option
applies to shell, command or subsystem execution. Also note that
this command may be superseded by a sshd_config(5) ForceCommand
directive.
If a command is specified and a forced-command is embedded in a
certificate used for authentication, then the certificate will be
accepted only if the two commands are identical.
environment="NAME=value"
Specifies that the string is to be added to the environment when
logging in using this key. Environment variables set this way
override other default environment values. Multiple options of
this type are permitted. Environment processing is disabled by
default and is controlled via the PermitUserEnvironment option.
expiry-time="timespec"
Specifies a time after which the key will not be accepted. The
time may be specified as a YYYYMMDD date or a YYYYMMDDHHMM[SS]
time in the system time-zone.
from="pattern-list"
Specifies that in addition to public key authentication, either
the canonical name of the remote host or its IP address must be
present in the comma-separated list of patterns. See PATTERNS in
ssh_config(5) for more information on patterns.
In addition to the wildcard matching that may be applied to
hostnames or addresses, a from stanza may match IP addresses
using CIDR address/masklen notation.
The purpose of this option is to optionally increase security:
public key authentication by itself does not trust the network or
name servers or anything (but the key); however, if somebody
somehow steals the key, the key permits an intruder to log in
from anywhere in the world. This additional option makes using a
stolen key more difficult (name servers and/or routers would have
to be compromised in addition to just the key).
no-agent-forwarding
Forbids authentication agent forwarding when this key is used for
authentication.
no-port-forwarding
Forbids TCP forwarding when this key is used for authentication.
Any port forward requests by the client will return an error.
This might be used, e.g. in connection with the command option.
no-pty Prevents tty allocation (a request to allocate a pty will fail).
no-user-rc
Disables execution of ~/.ssh/rc.
no-X11-forwarding
Forbids X11 forwarding when this key is used for authentication.
Any X11 forward requests by the client will return an error.
permitlisten="[host:]port"
Limit remote port forwarding with the ssh(1) -R option such that
it may only listen on the specified host (optional) and port.
IPv6 addresses can be specified by enclosing the address in
square brackets. Multiple permitlisten options may be applied
separated by commas. Hostnames may include wildcards as
described in the PATTERNS section in ssh_config(5). A port
specification of * matches any port. Note that the setting of
GatewayPorts may further restrict listen addresses. Note that
ssh(1) will send a hostname of M-bM-^@M-^\localhostM-bM-^@M-^] if a listen host was
not specified when the forwarding was requested, and that this
name is treated differently to the explicit localhost addresses
M-bM-^@M-^\127.0.0.1M-bM-^@M-^] and M-bM-^@M-^\::1M-bM-^@M-^].
permitopen="host:port"
Limit local port forwarding with the ssh(1) -L option such that
it may only connect to the specified host and port. IPv6
addresses can be specified by enclosing the address in square
brackets. Multiple permitopen options may be applied separated
by commas. No pattern matching or name lookup is performed on
the specified hostnames, they must be literal host names and/or
addresses. A port specification of * matches any port.
port-forwarding
Enable port forwarding previously disabled by the restrict
option.
principals="principals"
On a cert-authority line, specifies allowed principals for
certificate authentication as a comma-separated list. At least
one name from the list must appear in the certificate's list of
principals for the certificate to be accepted. This option is
ignored for keys that are not marked as trusted certificate
signers using the cert-authority option.
pty Permits tty allocation previously disabled by the restrict
option.
no-touch-required
Do not require demonstration of user presence for signatures made
using this key. This option only makes sense for the FIDO
authenticator algorithms ecdsa-sk and ed25519-sk.
+ verify-required
+ Require that signatures made using this key attest that they
+ verified the user, e.g. via a PIN. This option only makes sense
+ for the FIDO authenticator algorithms ecdsa-sk and ed25519-sk.
+
restrict
Enable all restrictions, i.e. disable port, agent and X11
forwarding, as well as disabling PTY allocation and execution of
~/.ssh/rc. If any future restriction capabilities are added to
authorized_keys files they will be included in this set.
tunnel="n"
Force a tun(4) device on the server. Without this option, the
next available device will be used if the client requests a
tunnel.
user-rc
Enables execution of ~/.ssh/rc previously disabled by the
restrict option.
X11-forwarding
Permits X11 forwarding previously disabled by the restrict
option.
An example authorized_keys file:
# Comments allowed at start of line
ssh-rsa AAAAB3Nza...LiPk== user@example.net
from="*.sales.example.net,!pc.sales.example.net" ssh-rsa
AAAAB2...19Q== john@example.net
command="dump /home",no-pty,no-port-forwarding ssh-rsa
AAAAC3...51R== example.net
permitopen="192.0.2.1:80",permitopen="192.0.2.2:25" ssh-rsa
AAAAB5...21S==
permitlisten="localhost:8080",permitopen="localhost:22000" ssh-rsa
AAAAB5...21S==
tunnel="0",command="sh /etc/netstart tun0" ssh-rsa AAAA...==
jane@example.net
restrict,command="uptime" ssh-rsa AAAA1C8...32Tv==
user@example.net
restrict,pty,command="nethack" ssh-rsa AAAA1f8...IrrC5==
user@example.net
no-touch-required sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256@openssh.com AAAAInN...Ko==
user@example.net
SSH_KNOWN_HOSTS FILE FORMAT
The /etc/ssh/ssh_known_hosts and ~/.ssh/known_hosts files contain host
public keys for all known hosts. The global file should be prepared by
the administrator (optional), and the per-user file is maintained
automatically: whenever the user connects to an unknown host, its key is
added to the per-user file.
Each line in these files contains the following fields: markers
(optional), hostnames, keytype, base64-encoded key, comment. The fields
are separated by spaces.
The marker is optional, but if it is present then it must be one of
M-bM-^@M-^\@cert-authorityM-bM-^@M-^], to indicate that the line contains a certification
authority (CA) key, or M-bM-^@M-^\@revokedM-bM-^@M-^], to indicate that the key contained on
the line is revoked and must not ever be accepted. Only one marker
should be used on a key line.
Hostnames is a comma-separated list of patterns (M-bM-^@M-^X*M-bM-^@M-^Y and M-bM-^@M-^X?M-bM-^@M-^Y act as
wildcards); each pattern in turn is matched against the host name. When
sshd is authenticating a client, such as when using
HostbasedAuthentication, this will be the canonical client host name.
When ssh(1) is authenticating a server, this will be the host name given
by the user, the value of the ssh(1) HostkeyAlias if it was specified, or
the canonical server hostname if the ssh(1) CanonicalizeHostname option
was used.
A pattern may also be preceded by M-bM-^@M-^X!M-bM-^@M-^Y to indicate negation: if the host
name matches a negated pattern, it is not accepted (by that line) even if
it matched another pattern on the line. A hostname or address may
optionally be enclosed within M-bM-^@M-^X[M-bM-^@M-^Y and M-bM-^@M-^X]M-bM-^@M-^Y brackets then followed by M-bM-^@M-^X:M-bM-^@M-^Y
and a non-standard port number.
Alternately, hostnames may be stored in a hashed form which hides host
names and addresses should the file's contents be disclosed. Hashed
hostnames start with a M-bM-^@M-^X|M-bM-^@M-^Y character. Only one hashed hostname may
appear on a single line and none of the above negation or wildcard
operators may be applied.
The keytype and base64-encoded key are taken directly from the host key;
they can be obtained, for example, from /etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key.pub.
The optional comment field continues to the end of the line, and is not
used.
Lines starting with M-bM-^@M-^X#M-bM-^@M-^Y and empty lines are ignored as comments.
When performing host authentication, authentication is accepted if any
matching line has the proper key; either one that matches exactly or, if
the server has presented a certificate for authentication, the key of the
certification authority that signed the certificate. For a key to be
trusted as a certification authority, it must use the M-bM-^@M-^\@cert-authorityM-bM-^@M-^]
marker described above.
The known hosts file also provides a facility to mark keys as revoked,
for example when it is known that the associated private key has been
stolen. Revoked keys are specified by including the M-bM-^@M-^\@revokedM-bM-^@M-^] marker at
the beginning of the key line, and are never accepted for authentication
or as certification authorities, but instead will produce a warning from
ssh(1) when they are encountered.
It is permissible (but not recommended) to have several lines or
different host keys for the same names. This will inevitably happen when
short forms of host names from different domains are put in the file. It
is possible that the files contain conflicting information;
authentication is accepted if valid information can be found from either
file.
Note that the lines in these files are typically hundreds of characters
long, and you definitely don't want to type in the host keys by hand.
Rather, generate them by a script, ssh-keyscan(1) or by taking, for
example, /etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key.pub and adding the host names at the
front. ssh-keygen(1) also offers some basic automated editing for
~/.ssh/known_hosts including removing hosts matching a host name and
converting all host names to their hashed representations.
An example ssh_known_hosts file:
# Comments allowed at start of line
closenet,...,192.0.2.53 1024 37 159...93 closenet.example.net
cvs.example.net,192.0.2.10 ssh-rsa AAAA1234.....=
# A hashed hostname
|1|JfKTdBh7rNbXkVAQCRp4OQoPfmI=|USECr3SWf1JUPsms5AqfD5QfxkM= ssh-rsa
AAAA1234.....=
# A revoked key
@revoked * ssh-rsa AAAAB5W...
# A CA key, accepted for any host in *.mydomain.com or *.mydomain.org
@cert-authority *.mydomain.org,*.mydomain.com ssh-rsa AAAAB5W...
FILES
~/.hushlogin
This file is used to suppress printing the last login time and
/etc/motd, if PrintLastLog and PrintMotd, respectively, are
enabled. It does not suppress printing of the banner specified
by Banner.
~/.rhosts
This file is used for host-based authentication (see ssh(1) for
more information). On some machines this file may need to be
world-readable if the user's home directory is on an NFS
partition, because sshd reads it as root. Additionally, this
file must be owned by the user, and must not have write
permissions for anyone else. The recommended permission for most
machines is read/write for the user, and not accessible by
others.
~/.shosts
This file is used in exactly the same way as .rhosts, but allows
host-based authentication without permitting login with
rlogin/rsh.
~/.ssh/
This directory is the default location for all user-specific
configuration and authentication information. There is no
general requirement to keep the entire contents of this directory
secret, but the recommended permissions are read/write/execute
for the user, and not accessible by others.
~/.ssh/authorized_keys
Lists the public keys (DSA, ECDSA, Ed25519, RSA) that can be used
for logging in as this user. The format of this file is
described above. The content of the file is not highly
sensitive, but the recommended permissions are read/write for the
user, and not accessible by others.
If this file, the ~/.ssh directory, or the user's home directory
are writable by other users, then the file could be modified or
replaced by unauthorized users. In this case, sshd will not
allow it to be used unless the StrictModes option has been set to
M-bM-^@M-^\noM-bM-^@M-^].
~/.ssh/environment
This file is read into the environment at login (if it exists).
It can only contain empty lines, comment lines (that start with
M-bM-^@M-^X#M-bM-^@M-^Y), and assignment lines of the form name=value. The file
should be writable only by the user; it need not be readable by
anyone else. Environment processing is disabled by default and
is controlled via the PermitUserEnvironment option.
~/.ssh/known_hosts
Contains a list of host keys for all hosts the user has logged
into that are not already in the systemwide list of known host
keys. The format of this file is described above. This file
should be writable only by root/the owner and can, but need not
be, world-readable.
~/.ssh/rc
Contains initialization routines to be run before the user's home
directory becomes accessible. This file should be writable only
by the user, and need not be readable by anyone else.
/etc/hosts.equiv
This file is for host-based authentication (see ssh(1)). It
should only be writable by root.
/etc/moduli
Contains Diffie-Hellman groups used for the "Diffie-Hellman Group
Exchange" key exchange method. The file format is described in
moduli(5). If no usable groups are found in this file then fixed
internal groups will be used.
/etc/motd
See motd(5).
/etc/nologin
If this file exists, sshd refuses to let anyone except root log
in. The contents of the file are displayed to anyone trying to
log in, and non-root connections are refused. The file should be
world-readable.
/etc/shosts.equiv
This file is used in exactly the same way as hosts.equiv, but
allows host-based authentication without permitting login with
rlogin/rsh.
/etc/ssh/ssh_host_ecdsa_key
/etc/ssh/ssh_host_ed25519_key
/etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key
These files contain the private parts of the host keys. These
files should only be owned by root, readable only by root, and
not accessible to others. Note that sshd does not start if these
files are group/world-accessible.
/etc/ssh/ssh_host_ecdsa_key.pub
/etc/ssh/ssh_host_ed25519_key.pub
/etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key.pub
These files contain the public parts of the host keys. These
files should be world-readable but writable only by root. Their
contents should match the respective private parts. These files
are not really used for anything; they are provided for the
convenience of the user so their contents can be copied to known
hosts files. These files are created using ssh-keygen(1).
/etc/ssh/ssh_known_hosts
Systemwide list of known host keys. This file should be prepared
by the system administrator to contain the public host keys of
all machines in the organization. The format of this file is
described above. This file should be writable only by root/the
owner and should be world-readable.
/etc/ssh/sshd_config
Contains configuration data for sshd. The file format and
configuration options are described in sshd_config(5).
/etc/ssh/sshrc
Similar to ~/.ssh/rc, it can be used to specify machine-specific
login-time initializations globally. This file should be
writable only by root, and should be world-readable.
/var/empty
chroot(2) directory used by sshd during privilege separation in
the pre-authentication phase. The directory should not contain
any files and must be owned by root and not group or world-
writable.
/var/run/sshd.pid
Contains the process ID of the sshd listening for connections (if
there are several daemons running concurrently for different
ports, this contains the process ID of the one started last).
The content of this file is not sensitive; it can be world-
readable.
SEE ALSO
scp(1), sftp(1), ssh(1), ssh-add(1), ssh-agent(1), ssh-keygen(1),
ssh-keyscan(1), chroot(2), login.conf(5), moduli(5), sshd_config(5),
inetd(8), sftp-server(8)
AUTHORS
OpenSSH is a derivative of the original and free ssh 1.2.12 release by
Tatu Ylonen. Aaron Campbell, Bob Beck, Markus Friedl, Niels Provos, Theo
de Raadt and Dug Song removed many bugs, re-added newer features and
created OpenSSH. Markus Friedl contributed the support for SSH protocol
versions 1.5 and 2.0. Niels Provos and Markus Friedl contributed support
for privilege separation.
-OpenBSD 6.7 January 25, 2020 OpenBSD 6.7
+OpenBSD 6.8 August 27, 2020 OpenBSD 6.8
diff --git a/sshd.8 b/sshd.8
index c5f8987d228f..b2fad56d3e3a 100644
--- a/sshd.8
+++ b/sshd.8
@@ -1,1013 +1,1020 @@
.\"
.\" Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
.\" Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
.\" All rights reserved
.\"
.\" As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
.\" can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this
.\" software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
.\" incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
.\" called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
.\"
.\" Copyright (c) 1999,2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
.\" Copyright (c) 1999 Aaron Campbell. All rights reserved.
.\" Copyright (c) 1999 Theo de Raadt. All rights reserved.
.\"
.\" Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
.\" modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
.\" are met:
.\" 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
.\" notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
.\" 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
.\" notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
.\" documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
.\"
.\" THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
.\" IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
.\" OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
.\" IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
.\" INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
.\" NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
.\" DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
.\" THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
.\" (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
.\" THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
.\"
-.\" $OpenBSD: sshd.8,v 1.312 2020/01/25 06:03:10 djm Exp $
-.Dd $Mdocdate: January 25 2020 $
+.\" $OpenBSD: sshd.8,v 1.313 2020/08/27 01:07:10 djm Exp $
+.Dd $Mdocdate: August 27 2020 $
.Dt SSHD 8
.Os
.Sh NAME
.Nm sshd
.Nd OpenSSH daemon
.Sh SYNOPSIS
.Nm sshd
.Bk -words
.Op Fl 46DdeiqTt
.Op Fl C Ar connection_spec
.Op Fl c Ar host_certificate_file
.Op Fl E Ar log_file
.Op Fl f Ar config_file
.Op Fl g Ar login_grace_time
.Op Fl h Ar host_key_file
.Op Fl o Ar option
.Op Fl p Ar port
.Op Fl u Ar len
.Ek
.Sh DESCRIPTION
.Nm
(OpenSSH Daemon) is the daemon program for
.Xr ssh 1 .
Together these programs replace rlogin and rsh,
and provide secure encrypted communications between two untrusted hosts
over an insecure network.
.Pp
.Nm
listens for connections from clients.
It is normally started at boot from
.Pa /etc/rc .
It forks a new
daemon for each incoming connection.
The forked daemons handle
key exchange, encryption, authentication, command execution,
and data exchange.
.Pp
.Nm
can be configured using command-line options or a configuration file
(by default
.Xr sshd_config 5 ) ;
command-line options override values specified in the
configuration file.
.Nm
rereads its configuration file when it receives a hangup signal,
.Dv SIGHUP ,
by executing itself with the name and options it was started with, e.g.\&
.Pa /usr/sbin/sshd .
.Pp
The options are as follows:
.Bl -tag -width Ds
.It Fl 4
Forces
.Nm
to use IPv4 addresses only.
.It Fl 6
Forces
.Nm
to use IPv6 addresses only.
.It Fl C Ar connection_spec
Specify the connection parameters to use for the
.Fl T
extended test mode.
If provided, any
.Cm Match
directives in the configuration file that would apply are applied before the
configuration is written to standard output.
The connection parameters are supplied as keyword=value pairs and may be
supplied in any order, either with multiple
.Fl C
options or as a comma-separated list.
The keywords are
.Dq addr,
.Dq user ,
.Dq host ,
.Dq laddr ,
.Dq lport ,
and
.Dq rdomain
and correspond to source address, user, resolved source host name,
local address, local port number and routing domain respectively.
.It Fl c Ar host_certificate_file
Specifies a path to a certificate file to identify
.Nm
during key exchange.
The certificate file must match a host key file specified using the
.Fl h
option or the
.Cm HostKey
configuration directive.
.It Fl D
When this option is specified,
.Nm
will not detach and does not become a daemon.
This allows easy monitoring of
.Nm sshd .
.It Fl d
Debug mode.
The server sends verbose debug output to standard error,
and does not put itself in the background.
The server also will not fork and will only process one connection.
This option is only intended for debugging for the server.
Multiple
.Fl d
options increase the debugging level.
Maximum is 3.
.It Fl E Ar log_file
Append debug logs to
.Ar log_file
instead of the system log.
.It Fl e
Write debug logs to standard error instead of the system log.
.It Fl f Ar config_file
Specifies the name of the configuration file.
The default is
.Pa /etc/ssh/sshd_config .
.Nm
refuses to start if there is no configuration file.
.It Fl g Ar login_grace_time
Gives the grace time for clients to authenticate themselves (default
120 seconds).
If the client fails to authenticate the user within
this many seconds, the server disconnects and exits.
A value of zero indicates no limit.
.It Fl h Ar host_key_file
Specifies a file from which a host key is read.
This option must be given if
.Nm
is not run as root (as the normal
host key files are normally not readable by anyone but root).
The default is
.Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ecdsa_key ,
.Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ed25519_key
and
.Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key .
It is possible to have multiple host key files for
the different host key algorithms.
.It Fl i
Specifies that
.Nm
is being run from
.Xr inetd 8 .
.It Fl o Ar option
Can be used to give options in the format used in the configuration file.
This is useful for specifying options for which there is no separate
command-line flag.
For full details of the options, and their values, see
.Xr sshd_config 5 .
.It Fl p Ar port
Specifies the port on which the server listens for connections
(default 22).
Multiple port options are permitted.
Ports specified in the configuration file with the
.Cm Port
option are ignored when a command-line port is specified.
Ports specified using the
.Cm ListenAddress
option override command-line ports.
.It Fl q
Quiet mode.
Nothing is sent to the system log.
Normally the beginning,
authentication, and termination of each connection is logged.
.It Fl T
Extended test mode.
Check the validity of the configuration file, output the effective configuration
to stdout and then exit.
Optionally,
.Cm Match
rules may be applied by specifying the connection parameters using one or more
.Fl C
options.
.It Fl t
Test mode.
Only check the validity of the configuration file and sanity of the keys.
This is useful for updating
.Nm
reliably as configuration options may change.
.It Fl u Ar len
This option is used to specify the size of the field
in the
.Li utmp
structure that holds the remote host name.
If the resolved host name is longer than
.Ar len ,
the dotted decimal value will be used instead.
This allows hosts with very long host names that
overflow this field to still be uniquely identified.
Specifying
.Fl u0
indicates that only dotted decimal addresses
should be put into the
.Pa utmp
file.
.Fl u0
may also be used to prevent
.Nm
from making DNS requests unless the authentication
mechanism or configuration requires it.
Authentication mechanisms that may require DNS include
.Cm HostbasedAuthentication
and using a
.Cm from="pattern-list"
option in a key file.
Configuration options that require DNS include using a
USER@HOST pattern in
.Cm AllowUsers
or
.Cm DenyUsers .
.El
.Sh AUTHENTICATION
The OpenSSH SSH daemon supports SSH protocol 2 only.
Each host has a host-specific key,
used to identify the host.
Whenever a client connects, the daemon responds with its public
host key.
The client compares the
host key against its own database to verify that it has not changed.
Forward secrecy is provided through a Diffie-Hellman key agreement.
This key agreement results in a shared session key.
The rest of the session is encrypted using a symmetric cipher.
The client selects the encryption algorithm
to use from those offered by the server.
Additionally, session integrity is provided
through a cryptographic message authentication code (MAC).
.Pp
Finally, the server and the client enter an authentication dialog.
The client tries to authenticate itself using
host-based authentication,
public key authentication,
challenge-response authentication,
or password authentication.
.Pp
Regardless of the authentication type, the account is checked to
ensure that it is accessible. An account is not accessible if it is
locked, listed in
.Cm DenyUsers
or its group is listed in
.Cm DenyGroups
\&. The definition of a locked account is system dependent. Some platforms
have their own account database (eg AIX) and some modify the passwd field (
.Ql \&*LK\&*
on Solaris and UnixWare,
.Ql \&*
on HP-UX, containing
.Ql Nologin
on Tru64,
a leading
.Ql \&*LOCKED\&*
on FreeBSD and a leading
.Ql \&!
on most Linuxes).
If there is a requirement to disable password authentication
for the account while allowing still public-key, then the passwd field
should be set to something other than these values (eg
.Ql NP
or
.Ql \&*NP\&*
).
.Pp
If the client successfully authenticates itself, a dialog for
preparing the session is entered.
At this time the client may request
things like allocating a pseudo-tty, forwarding X11 connections,
forwarding TCP connections, or forwarding the authentication agent
connection over the secure channel.
.Pp
After this, the client either requests a shell or execution of a command.
The sides then enter session mode.
In this mode, either side may send
data at any time, and such data is forwarded to/from the shell or
command on the server side, and the user terminal in the client side.
.Pp
When the user program terminates and all forwarded X11 and other
connections have been closed, the server sends command exit status to
the client, and both sides exit.
.Sh LOGIN PROCESS
When a user successfully logs in,
.Nm
does the following:
.Bl -enum -offset indent
.It
If the login is on a tty, and no command has been specified,
prints last login time and
.Pa /etc/motd
(unless prevented in the configuration file or by
.Pa ~/.hushlogin ;
see the
.Sx FILES
section).
.It
If the login is on a tty, records login time.
.It
Checks
.Pa /etc/nologin ;
if it exists, prints contents and quits
(unless root).
.It
Changes to run with normal user privileges.
.It
Sets up basic environment.
.It
Reads the file
.Pa ~/.ssh/environment ,
if it exists, and users are allowed to change their environment.
See the
.Cm PermitUserEnvironment
option in
.Xr sshd_config 5 .
.It
Changes to user's home directory.
.It
If
.Pa ~/.ssh/rc
exists and the
.Xr sshd_config 5
.Cm PermitUserRC
option is set, runs it; else if
.Pa /etc/ssh/sshrc
exists, runs
it; otherwise runs xauth.
The
.Dq rc
files are given the X11
authentication protocol and cookie in standard input.
See
.Sx SSHRC ,
below.
.It
Runs user's shell or command.
All commands are run under the user's login shell as specified in the
system password database.
.El
.Sh SSHRC
If the file
.Pa ~/.ssh/rc
exists,
.Xr sh 1
runs it after reading the
environment files but before starting the user's shell or command.
It must not produce any output on stdout; stderr must be used
instead.
If X11 forwarding is in use, it will receive the "proto cookie" pair in
its standard input (and
.Ev DISPLAY
in its environment).
The script must call
.Xr xauth 1
because
.Nm
will not run xauth automatically to add X11 cookies.
.Pp
The primary purpose of this file is to run any initialization routines
which may be needed before the user's home directory becomes
accessible; AFS is a particular example of such an environment.
.Pp
This file will probably contain some initialization code followed by
something similar to:
.Bd -literal -offset 3n
if read proto cookie && [ -n "$DISPLAY" ]; then
if [ `echo $DISPLAY | cut -c1-10` = 'localhost:' ]; then
# X11UseLocalhost=yes
echo add unix:`echo $DISPLAY |
cut -c11-` $proto $cookie
else
# X11UseLocalhost=no
echo add $DISPLAY $proto $cookie
fi | xauth -q -
fi
.Ed
.Pp
If this file does not exist,
.Pa /etc/ssh/sshrc
is run, and if that
does not exist either, xauth is used to add the cookie.
.Sh AUTHORIZED_KEYS FILE FORMAT
.Cm AuthorizedKeysFile
specifies the files containing public keys for
public key authentication;
if this option is not specified, the default is
.Pa ~/.ssh/authorized_keys
and
.Pa ~/.ssh/authorized_keys2 .
Each line of the file contains one
key (empty lines and lines starting with a
.Ql #
are ignored as
comments).
Public keys consist of the following space-separated fields:
options, keytype, base64-encoded key, comment.
The options field is optional.
The supported key types are:
.Pp
.Bl -item -compact -offset indent
.It
sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256@openssh.com
.It
ecdsa-sha2-nistp256
.It
ecdsa-sha2-nistp384
.It
ecdsa-sha2-nistp521
.It
sk-ssh-ed25519@openssh.com
.It
ssh-ed25519
.It
ssh-dss
.It
ssh-rsa
.El
.Pp
The comment field is not used for anything (but may be convenient for the
user to identify the key).
.Pp
Note that lines in this file can be several hundred bytes long
(because of the size of the public key encoding) up to a limit of
8 kilobytes, which permits RSA keys up to 16 kilobits.
You don't want to type them in; instead, copy the
.Pa id_dsa.pub ,
.Pa id_ecdsa.pub ,
.Pa id_ecdsa_sk.pub ,
.Pa id_ed25519.pub ,
.Pa id_ed25519_sk.pub ,
or the
.Pa id_rsa.pub
file and edit it.
.Pp
.Nm
enforces a minimum RSA key modulus size of 1024 bits.
.Pp
The options (if present) consist of comma-separated option
specifications.
No spaces are permitted, except within double quotes.
The following option specifications are supported (note
that option keywords are case-insensitive):
.Bl -tag -width Ds
.It Cm agent-forwarding
Enable authentication agent forwarding previously disabled by the
.Cm restrict
option.
.It Cm cert-authority
Specifies that the listed key is a certification authority (CA) that is
trusted to validate signed certificates for user authentication.
.Pp
Certificates may encode access restrictions similar to these key options.
If both certificate restrictions and key options are present, the most
restrictive union of the two is applied.
.It Cm command="command"
Specifies that the command is executed whenever this key is used for
authentication.
The command supplied by the user (if any) is ignored.
The command is run on a pty if the client requests a pty;
otherwise it is run without a tty.
If an 8-bit clean channel is required,
one must not request a pty or should specify
.Cm no-pty .
A quote may be included in the command by quoting it with a backslash.
.Pp
This option might be useful
to restrict certain public keys to perform just a specific operation.
An example might be a key that permits remote backups but nothing else.
Note that the client may specify TCP and/or X11
forwarding unless they are explicitly prohibited, e.g. using the
.Cm restrict
key option.
.Pp
The command originally supplied by the client is available in the
.Ev SSH_ORIGINAL_COMMAND
environment variable.
Note that this option applies to shell, command or subsystem execution.
Also note that this command may be superseded by a
.Xr sshd_config 5
.Cm ForceCommand
directive.
.Pp
If a command is specified and a forced-command is embedded in a certificate
used for authentication, then the certificate will be accepted only if the
two commands are identical.
.It Cm environment="NAME=value"
Specifies that the string is to be added to the environment when
logging in using this key.
Environment variables set this way
override other default environment values.
Multiple options of this type are permitted.
Environment processing is disabled by default and is
controlled via the
.Cm PermitUserEnvironment
option.
.It Cm expiry-time="timespec"
Specifies a time after which the key will not be accepted.
The time may be specified as a YYYYMMDD date or a YYYYMMDDHHMM[SS] time
in the system time-zone.
.It Cm from="pattern-list"
Specifies that in addition to public key authentication, either the canonical
name of the remote host or its IP address must be present in the
comma-separated list of patterns.
See PATTERNS in
.Xr ssh_config 5
for more information on patterns.
.Pp
In addition to the wildcard matching that may be applied to hostnames or
addresses, a
.Cm from
stanza may match IP addresses using CIDR address/masklen notation.
.Pp
The purpose of this option is to optionally increase security: public key
authentication by itself does not trust the network or name servers or
anything (but the key); however, if somebody somehow steals the key, the key
permits an intruder to log in from anywhere in the world.
This additional option makes using a stolen key more difficult (name
servers and/or routers would have to be compromised in addition to
just the key).
.It Cm no-agent-forwarding
Forbids authentication agent forwarding when this key is used for
authentication.
.It Cm no-port-forwarding
Forbids TCP forwarding when this key is used for authentication.
Any port forward requests by the client will return an error.
This might be used, e.g. in connection with the
.Cm command
option.
.It Cm no-pty
Prevents tty allocation (a request to allocate a pty will fail).
.It Cm no-user-rc
Disables execution of
.Pa ~/.ssh/rc .
.It Cm no-X11-forwarding
Forbids X11 forwarding when this key is used for authentication.
Any X11 forward requests by the client will return an error.
.It Cm permitlisten="[host:]port"
Limit remote port forwarding with the
.Xr ssh 1
.Fl R
option such that it may only listen on the specified host (optional) and port.
IPv6 addresses can be specified by enclosing the address in square brackets.
Multiple
.Cm permitlisten
options may be applied separated by commas.
Hostnames may include wildcards as described in the PATTERNS section in
.Xr ssh_config 5 .
A port specification of
.Cm *
matches any port.
Note that the setting of
.Cm GatewayPorts
may further restrict listen addresses.
Note that
.Xr ssh 1
will send a hostname of
.Dq localhost
if a listen host was not specified when the forwarding was requested, and
that this name is treated differently to the explicit localhost addresses
.Dq 127.0.0.1
and
.Dq ::1 .
.It Cm permitopen="host:port"
Limit local port forwarding with the
.Xr ssh 1
.Fl L
option such that it may only connect to the specified host and port.
IPv6 addresses can be specified by enclosing the address in square brackets.
Multiple
.Cm permitopen
options may be applied separated by commas.
No pattern matching or name lookup is performed on the
specified hostnames, they must be literal host names and/or addresses.
A port specification of
.Cm *
matches any port.
.It Cm port-forwarding
Enable port forwarding previously disabled by the
.Cm restrict
option.
.It Cm principals="principals"
On a
.Cm cert-authority
line, specifies allowed principals for certificate authentication as a
comma-separated list.
At least one name from the list must appear in the certificate's
list of principals for the certificate to be accepted.
This option is ignored for keys that are not marked as trusted certificate
signers using the
.Cm cert-authority
option.
.It Cm pty
Permits tty allocation previously disabled by the
.Cm restrict
option.
.It Cm no-touch-required
Do not require demonstration of user presence
for signatures made using this key.
This option only makes sense for the FIDO authenticator algorithms
.Cm ecdsa-sk
and
.Cm ed25519-sk .
+.It Cm verify-required
+Require that signatures made using this key attest that they verified
+the user, e.g. via a PIN.
+This option only makes sense for the FIDO authenticator algorithms
+.Cm ecdsa-sk
+and
+.Cm ed25519-sk .
.It Cm restrict
Enable all restrictions, i.e. disable port, agent and X11 forwarding,
as well as disabling PTY allocation
and execution of
.Pa ~/.ssh/rc .
If any future restriction capabilities are added to authorized_keys files
they will be included in this set.
.It Cm tunnel="n"
Force a
.Xr tun 4
device on the server.
Without this option, the next available device will be used if
the client requests a tunnel.
.It Cm user-rc
Enables execution of
.Pa ~/.ssh/rc
previously disabled by the
.Cm restrict
option.
.It Cm X11-forwarding
Permits X11 forwarding previously disabled by the
.Cm restrict
option.
.El
.Pp
An example authorized_keys file:
.Bd -literal -offset 3n
# Comments allowed at start of line
ssh-rsa AAAAB3Nza...LiPk== user@example.net
from="*.sales.example.net,!pc.sales.example.net" ssh-rsa
AAAAB2...19Q== john@example.net
command="dump /home",no-pty,no-port-forwarding ssh-rsa
AAAAC3...51R== example.net
permitopen="192.0.2.1:80",permitopen="192.0.2.2:25" ssh-rsa
AAAAB5...21S==
permitlisten="localhost:8080",permitopen="localhost:22000" ssh-rsa
AAAAB5...21S==
tunnel="0",command="sh /etc/netstart tun0" ssh-rsa AAAA...==
jane@example.net
restrict,command="uptime" ssh-rsa AAAA1C8...32Tv==
user@example.net
restrict,pty,command="nethack" ssh-rsa AAAA1f8...IrrC5==
user@example.net
no-touch-required sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256@openssh.com AAAAInN...Ko==
user@example.net
.Ed
.Sh SSH_KNOWN_HOSTS FILE FORMAT
The
.Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_known_hosts
and
.Pa ~/.ssh/known_hosts
files contain host public keys for all known hosts.
The global file should
be prepared by the administrator (optional), and the per-user file is
maintained automatically: whenever the user connects to an unknown host,
its key is added to the per-user file.
.Pp
Each line in these files contains the following fields: markers (optional),
hostnames, keytype, base64-encoded key, comment.
The fields are separated by spaces.
.Pp
The marker is optional, but if it is present then it must be one of
.Dq @cert-authority ,
to indicate that the line contains a certification authority (CA) key,
or
.Dq @revoked ,
to indicate that the key contained on the line is revoked and must not ever
be accepted.
Only one marker should be used on a key line.
.Pp
Hostnames is a comma-separated list of patterns
.Pf ( Ql *
and
.Ql \&?
act as
wildcards); each pattern in turn is matched against the host name.
When
.Nm sshd
is authenticating a client, such as when using
.Cm HostbasedAuthentication ,
this will be the canonical client host name.
When
.Xr ssh 1
is authenticating a server, this will be the host name
given by the user, the value of the
.Xr ssh 1
.Cm HostkeyAlias
if it was specified, or the canonical server hostname if the
.Xr ssh 1
.Cm CanonicalizeHostname
option was used.
.Pp
A pattern may also be preceded by
.Ql \&!
to indicate negation: if the host name matches a negated
pattern, it is not accepted (by that line) even if it matched another
pattern on the line.
A hostname or address may optionally be enclosed within
.Ql \&[
and
.Ql \&]
brackets then followed by
.Ql \&:
and a non-standard port number.
.Pp
Alternately, hostnames may be stored in a hashed form which hides host names
and addresses should the file's contents be disclosed.
Hashed hostnames start with a
.Ql |
character.
Only one hashed hostname may appear on a single line and none of the above
negation or wildcard operators may be applied.
.Pp
The keytype and base64-encoded key are taken directly from the host key; they
can be obtained, for example, from
.Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key.pub .
The optional comment field continues to the end of the line, and is not used.
.Pp
Lines starting with
.Ql #
and empty lines are ignored as comments.
.Pp
When performing host authentication, authentication is accepted if any
matching line has the proper key; either one that matches exactly or,
if the server has presented a certificate for authentication, the key
of the certification authority that signed the certificate.
For a key to be trusted as a certification authority, it must use the
.Dq @cert-authority
marker described above.
.Pp
The known hosts file also provides a facility to mark keys as revoked,
for example when it is known that the associated private key has been
stolen.
Revoked keys are specified by including the
.Dq @revoked
marker at the beginning of the key line, and are never accepted for
authentication or as certification authorities, but instead will
produce a warning from
.Xr ssh 1
when they are encountered.
.Pp
It is permissible (but not
recommended) to have several lines or different host keys for the same
names.
This will inevitably happen when short forms of host names
from different domains are put in the file.
It is possible
that the files contain conflicting information; authentication is
accepted if valid information can be found from either file.
.Pp
Note that the lines in these files are typically hundreds of characters
long, and you definitely don't want to type in the host keys by hand.
Rather, generate them by a script,
.Xr ssh-keyscan 1
or by taking, for example,
.Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key.pub
and adding the host names at the front.
.Xr ssh-keygen 1
also offers some basic automated editing for
.Pa ~/.ssh/known_hosts
including removing hosts matching a host name and converting all host
names to their hashed representations.
.Pp
An example ssh_known_hosts file:
.Bd -literal -offset 3n
# Comments allowed at start of line
closenet,...,192.0.2.53 1024 37 159...93 closenet.example.net
cvs.example.net,192.0.2.10 ssh-rsa AAAA1234.....=
# A hashed hostname
|1|JfKTdBh7rNbXkVAQCRp4OQoPfmI=|USECr3SWf1JUPsms5AqfD5QfxkM= ssh-rsa
AAAA1234.....=
# A revoked key
@revoked * ssh-rsa AAAAB5W...
# A CA key, accepted for any host in *.mydomain.com or *.mydomain.org
@cert-authority *.mydomain.org,*.mydomain.com ssh-rsa AAAAB5W...
.Ed
.Sh FILES
.Bl -tag -width Ds -compact
.It Pa ~/.hushlogin
This file is used to suppress printing the last login time and
.Pa /etc/motd ,
if
.Cm PrintLastLog
and
.Cm PrintMotd ,
respectively,
are enabled.
It does not suppress printing of the banner specified by
.Cm Banner .
.Pp
.It Pa ~/.rhosts
This file is used for host-based authentication (see
.Xr ssh 1
for more information).
On some machines this file may need to be
world-readable if the user's home directory is on an NFS partition,
because
.Nm
reads it as root.
Additionally, this file must be owned by the user,
and must not have write permissions for anyone else.
The recommended
permission for most machines is read/write for the user, and not
accessible by others.
.Pp
.It Pa ~/.shosts
This file is used in exactly the same way as
.Pa .rhosts ,
but allows host-based authentication without permitting login with
rlogin/rsh.
.Pp
.It Pa ~/.ssh/
This directory is the default location for all user-specific configuration
and authentication information.
There is no general requirement to keep the entire contents of this directory
secret, but the recommended permissions are read/write/execute for the user,
and not accessible by others.
.Pp
.It Pa ~/.ssh/authorized_keys
Lists the public keys (DSA, ECDSA, Ed25519, RSA)
that can be used for logging in as this user.
The format of this file is described above.
The content of the file is not highly sensitive, but the recommended
permissions are read/write for the user, and not accessible by others.
.Pp
If this file, the
.Pa ~/.ssh
directory, or the user's home directory are writable
by other users, then the file could be modified or replaced by unauthorized
users.
In this case,
.Nm
will not allow it to be used unless the
.Cm StrictModes
option has been set to
.Dq no .
.Pp
.It Pa ~/.ssh/environment
This file is read into the environment at login (if it exists).
It can only contain empty lines, comment lines (that start with
.Ql # ) ,
and assignment lines of the form name=value.
The file should be writable
only by the user; it need not be readable by anyone else.
Environment processing is disabled by default and is
controlled via the
.Cm PermitUserEnvironment
option.
.Pp
.It Pa ~/.ssh/known_hosts
Contains a list of host keys for all hosts the user has logged into
that are not already in the systemwide list of known host keys.
The format of this file is described above.
This file should be writable only by root/the owner and
can, but need not be, world-readable.
.Pp
.It Pa ~/.ssh/rc
Contains initialization routines to be run before
the user's home directory becomes accessible.
This file should be writable only by the user, and need not be
readable by anyone else.
.Pp
.It Pa /etc/hosts.equiv
This file is for host-based authentication (see
.Xr ssh 1 ) .
It should only be writable by root.
.Pp
.It Pa /etc/moduli
Contains Diffie-Hellman groups used for the "Diffie-Hellman Group Exchange"
key exchange method.
The file format is described in
.Xr moduli 5 .
If no usable groups are found in this file then fixed internal groups will
be used.
.Pp
.It Pa /etc/motd
See
.Xr motd 5 .
.Pp
.It Pa /etc/nologin
If this file exists,
.Nm
refuses to let anyone except root log in.
The contents of the file
are displayed to anyone trying to log in, and non-root connections are
refused.
The file should be world-readable.
.Pp
.It Pa /etc/shosts.equiv
This file is used in exactly the same way as
.Pa hosts.equiv ,
but allows host-based authentication without permitting login with
rlogin/rsh.
.Pp
.It Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ecdsa_key
.It Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ed25519_key
.It Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key
These files contain the private parts of the host keys.
These files should only be owned by root, readable only by root, and not
accessible to others.
Note that
.Nm
does not start if these files are group/world-accessible.
.Pp
.It Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ecdsa_key.pub
.It Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ed25519_key.pub
.It Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key.pub
These files contain the public parts of the host keys.
These files should be world-readable but writable only by
root.
Their contents should match the respective private parts.
These files are not
really used for anything; they are provided for the convenience of
the user so their contents can be copied to known hosts files.
These files are created using
.Xr ssh-keygen 1 .
.Pp
.It Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_known_hosts
Systemwide list of known host keys.
This file should be prepared by the
system administrator to contain the public host keys of all machines in the
organization.
The format of this file is described above.
This file should be writable only by root/the owner and
should be world-readable.
.Pp
.It Pa /etc/ssh/sshd_config
Contains configuration data for
.Nm sshd .
The file format and configuration options are described in
.Xr sshd_config 5 .
.Pp
.It Pa /etc/ssh/sshrc
Similar to
.Pa ~/.ssh/rc ,
it can be used to specify
machine-specific login-time initializations globally.
This file should be writable only by root, and should be world-readable.
.Pp
.It Pa /var/empty
.Xr chroot 2
directory used by
.Nm
during privilege separation in the pre-authentication phase.
The directory should not contain any files and must be owned by root
and not group or world-writable.
.Pp
.It Pa /var/run/sshd.pid
Contains the process ID of the
.Nm
listening for connections (if there are several daemons running
concurrently for different ports, this contains the process ID of the one
started last).
The content of this file is not sensitive; it can be world-readable.
.El
.Sh SEE ALSO
.Xr scp 1 ,
.Xr sftp 1 ,
.Xr ssh 1 ,
.Xr ssh-add 1 ,
.Xr ssh-agent 1 ,
.Xr ssh-keygen 1 ,
.Xr ssh-keyscan 1 ,
.Xr chroot 2 ,
.Xr login.conf 5 ,
.Xr moduli 5 ,
.Xr sshd_config 5 ,
.Xr inetd 8 ,
.Xr sftp-server 8
.Sh AUTHORS
OpenSSH is a derivative of the original and free
ssh 1.2.12 release by Tatu Ylonen.
Aaron Campbell, Bob Beck, Markus Friedl, Niels Provos,
Theo de Raadt and Dug Song
removed many bugs, re-added newer features and
created OpenSSH.
Markus Friedl contributed the support for SSH
protocol versions 1.5 and 2.0.
Niels Provos and Markus Friedl contributed support
for privilege separation.
diff --git a/sshd.c b/sshd.c
index 6f8f11a3bdac..8aa7f3df61b8 100644
--- a/sshd.c
+++ b/sshd.c
@@ -1,2404 +1,2456 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: sshd.c,v 1.552 2020/03/13 04:01:57 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: sshd.c,v 1.561 2020/08/27 01:06:19 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
* Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
* All rights reserved
* This program is the ssh daemon. It listens for connections from clients,
* and performs authentication, executes use commands or shell, and forwards
* information to/from the application to the user client over an encrypted
* connection. This can also handle forwarding of X11, TCP/IP, and
* authentication agent connections.
*
* As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
* can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this
* software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
* incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
* called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
*
* SSH2 implementation:
* Privilege Separation:
*
* Copyright (c) 2000, 2001, 2002 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
* Copyright (c) 2002 Niels Provos. All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
* OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
* IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
* INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
* NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
* DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
* THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
* (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
* THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
*/
#include "includes.h"
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/ioctl.h>
#include <sys/socket.h>
#ifdef HAVE_SYS_STAT_H
# include <sys/stat.h>
#endif
#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TIME_H
# include <sys/time.h>
#endif
#include "openbsd-compat/sys-tree.h"
#include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h"
#include <sys/wait.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <netdb.h>
#ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H
#include <paths.h>
#endif
#include <grp.h>
#include <pwd.h>
#include <signal.h>
#include <stdarg.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <limits.h>
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
#include <openssl/dh.h>
#include <openssl/bn.h>
#include <openssl/rand.h>
#include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h"
#endif
#ifdef HAVE_SECUREWARE
#include <sys/security.h>
#include <prot.h>
#endif
#include "xmalloc.h"
#include "ssh.h"
#include "ssh2.h"
#include "sshpty.h"
#include "packet.h"
#include "log.h"
#include "sshbuf.h"
#include "misc.h"
#include "match.h"
#include "servconf.h"
#include "uidswap.h"
#include "compat.h"
#include "cipher.h"
#include "digest.h"
#include "sshkey.h"
#include "kex.h"
#include "myproposal.h"
#include "authfile.h"
#include "pathnames.h"
#include "atomicio.h"
#include "canohost.h"
#include "hostfile.h"
#include "auth.h"
#include "authfd.h"
#include "msg.h"
#include "dispatch.h"
#include "channels.h"
#include "session.h"
#include "monitor.h"
#ifdef GSSAPI
#include "ssh-gss.h"
#endif
#include "monitor_wrap.h"
#include "ssh-sandbox.h"
#include "auth-options.h"
#include "version.h"
#include "ssherr.h"
#include "sk-api.h"
/* Re-exec fds */
#define REEXEC_DEVCRYPTO_RESERVED_FD (STDERR_FILENO + 1)
#define REEXEC_STARTUP_PIPE_FD (STDERR_FILENO + 2)
#define REEXEC_CONFIG_PASS_FD (STDERR_FILENO + 3)
#define REEXEC_MIN_FREE_FD (STDERR_FILENO + 4)
extern char *__progname;
/* Server configuration options. */
ServerOptions options;
/* Name of the server configuration file. */
char *config_file_name = _PATH_SERVER_CONFIG_FILE;
/*
* Debug mode flag. This can be set on the command line. If debug
* mode is enabled, extra debugging output will be sent to the system
* log, the daemon will not go to background, and will exit after processing
* the first connection.
*/
int debug_flag = 0;
/*
* Indicating that the daemon should only test the configuration and keys.
* If test_flag > 1 ("-T" flag), then sshd will also dump the effective
* configuration, optionally using connection information provided by the
* "-C" flag.
*/
static int test_flag = 0;
/* Flag indicating that the daemon is being started from inetd. */
static int inetd_flag = 0;
/* Flag indicating that sshd should not detach and become a daemon. */
static int no_daemon_flag = 0;
/* debug goes to stderr unless inetd_flag is set */
static int log_stderr = 0;
/* Saved arguments to main(). */
static char **saved_argv;
static int saved_argc;
/* re-exec */
static int rexeced_flag = 0;
static int rexec_flag = 1;
static int rexec_argc = 0;
static char **rexec_argv;
/*
* The sockets that the server is listening; this is used in the SIGHUP
* signal handler.
*/
#define MAX_LISTEN_SOCKS 16
static int listen_socks[MAX_LISTEN_SOCKS];
static int num_listen_socks = 0;
/* Daemon's agent connection */
int auth_sock = -1;
static int have_agent = 0;
/*
* Any really sensitive data in the application is contained in this
* structure. The idea is that this structure could be locked into memory so
* that the pages do not get written into swap. However, there are some
* problems. The private key contains BIGNUMs, and we do not (in principle)
* have access to the internals of them, and locking just the structure is
* not very useful. Currently, memory locking is not implemented.
*/
struct {
struct sshkey **host_keys; /* all private host keys */
struct sshkey **host_pubkeys; /* all public host keys */
struct sshkey **host_certificates; /* all public host certificates */
int have_ssh2_key;
} sensitive_data;
/* This is set to true when a signal is received. */
static volatile sig_atomic_t received_sighup = 0;
static volatile sig_atomic_t received_sigterm = 0;
/* session identifier, used by RSA-auth */
u_char session_id[16];
/* same for ssh2 */
u_char *session_id2 = NULL;
u_int session_id2_len = 0;
/* record remote hostname or ip */
u_int utmp_len = HOST_NAME_MAX+1;
/*
* startup_pipes/flags are used for tracking children of the listening sshd
* process early in their lifespans. This tracking is needed for three things:
*
* 1) Implementing the MaxStartups limit of concurrent unauthenticated
* connections.
* 2) Avoiding a race condition for SIGHUP processing, where child processes
* may have listen_socks open that could collide with main listener process
* after it restarts.
* 3) Ensuring that rexec'd sshd processes have received their initial state
* from the parent listen process before handling SIGHUP.
*
* Child processes signal that they have completed closure of the listen_socks
* and (if applicable) received their rexec state by sending a char over their
* sock. Child processes signal that authentication has completed by closing
* the sock (or by exiting).
*/
static int *startup_pipes = NULL;
static int *startup_flags = NULL; /* Indicates child closed listener */
static int startup_pipe = -1; /* in child */
/* variables used for privilege separation */
int use_privsep = -1;
struct monitor *pmonitor = NULL;
int privsep_is_preauth = 1;
static int privsep_chroot = 1;
/* global connection state and authentication contexts */
Authctxt *the_authctxt = NULL;
struct ssh *the_active_state;
/* global key/cert auth options. XXX move to permanent ssh->authctxt? */
struct sshauthopt *auth_opts = NULL;
/* sshd_config buffer */
struct sshbuf *cfg;
/* Included files from the configuration file */
struct include_list includes = TAILQ_HEAD_INITIALIZER(includes);
/* message to be displayed after login */
struct sshbuf *loginmsg;
/* Unprivileged user */
struct passwd *privsep_pw = NULL;
/* Prototypes for various functions defined later in this file. */
void destroy_sensitive_data(void);
void demote_sensitive_data(void);
static void do_ssh2_kex(struct ssh *);
static char *listener_proctitle;
/*
* Close all listening sockets
*/
static void
close_listen_socks(void)
{
int i;
for (i = 0; i < num_listen_socks; i++)
close(listen_socks[i]);
num_listen_socks = -1;
}
static void
close_startup_pipes(void)
{
int i;
if (startup_pipes)
for (i = 0; i < options.max_startups; i++)
if (startup_pipes[i] != -1)
close(startup_pipes[i]);
}
/*
* Signal handler for SIGHUP. Sshd execs itself when it receives SIGHUP;
* the effect is to reread the configuration file (and to regenerate
* the server key).
*/
/*ARGSUSED*/
static void
sighup_handler(int sig)
{
received_sighup = 1;
}
/*
* Called from the main program after receiving SIGHUP.
* Restarts the server.
*/
static void
sighup_restart(void)
{
logit("Received SIGHUP; restarting.");
if (options.pid_file != NULL)
unlink(options.pid_file);
platform_pre_restart();
close_listen_socks();
close_startup_pipes();
ssh_signal(SIGHUP, SIG_IGN); /* will be restored after exec */
execv(saved_argv[0], saved_argv);
logit("RESTART FAILED: av[0]='%.100s', error: %.100s.", saved_argv[0],
strerror(errno));
exit(1);
}
/*
* Generic signal handler for terminating signals in the master daemon.
*/
/*ARGSUSED*/
static void
sigterm_handler(int sig)
{
received_sigterm = sig;
}
/*
* SIGCHLD handler. This is called whenever a child dies. This will then
* reap any zombies left by exited children.
*/
/*ARGSUSED*/
static void
main_sigchld_handler(int sig)
{
int save_errno = errno;
pid_t pid;
int status;
debug("main_sigchld_handler: %s", strsignal(sig));
while ((pid = waitpid(-1, &status, WNOHANG)) > 0 ||
(pid == -1 && errno == EINTR))
;
errno = save_errno;
}
/*
* Signal handler for the alarm after the login grace period has expired.
*/
/*ARGSUSED*/
static void
grace_alarm_handler(int sig)
{
if (use_privsep && pmonitor != NULL && pmonitor->m_pid > 0)
kill(pmonitor->m_pid, SIGALRM);
/*
* Try to kill any processes that we have spawned, E.g. authorized
* keys command helpers.
*/
if (getpgid(0) == getpid()) {
ssh_signal(SIGTERM, SIG_IGN);
kill(0, SIGTERM);
}
/* XXX pre-format ipaddr/port so we don't need to access active_state */
/* Log error and exit. */
sigdie("Timeout before authentication for %s port %d",
ssh_remote_ipaddr(the_active_state),
ssh_remote_port(the_active_state));
}
/* Destroy the host and server keys. They will no longer be needed. */
void
destroy_sensitive_data(void)
{
u_int i;
for (i = 0; i < options.num_host_key_files; i++) {
if (sensitive_data.host_keys[i]) {
sshkey_free(sensitive_data.host_keys[i]);
sensitive_data.host_keys[i] = NULL;
}
if (sensitive_data.host_certificates[i]) {
sshkey_free(sensitive_data.host_certificates[i]);
sensitive_data.host_certificates[i] = NULL;
}
}
}
/* Demote private to public keys for network child */
void
demote_sensitive_data(void)
{
struct sshkey *tmp;
u_int i;
int r;
for (i = 0; i < options.num_host_key_files; i++) {
if (sensitive_data.host_keys[i]) {
if ((r = sshkey_from_private(
sensitive_data.host_keys[i], &tmp)) != 0)
fatal("could not demote host %s key: %s",
sshkey_type(sensitive_data.host_keys[i]),
ssh_err(r));
sshkey_free(sensitive_data.host_keys[i]);
sensitive_data.host_keys[i] = tmp;
}
/* Certs do not need demotion */
}
}
static void
reseed_prngs(void)
{
u_int32_t rnd[256];
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
RAND_poll();
#endif
arc4random_stir(); /* noop on recent arc4random() implementations */
arc4random_buf(rnd, sizeof(rnd)); /* let arc4random notice PID change */
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
RAND_seed(rnd, sizeof(rnd));
/* give libcrypto a chance to notice the PID change */
if ((RAND_bytes((u_char *)rnd, 1)) != 1)
fatal("%s: RAND_bytes failed", __func__);
#endif
explicit_bzero(rnd, sizeof(rnd));
}
static void
privsep_preauth_child(void)
{
gid_t gidset[1];
/* Enable challenge-response authentication for privilege separation */
privsep_challenge_enable();
#ifdef GSSAPI
/* Cache supported mechanism OIDs for later use */
ssh_gssapi_prepare_supported_oids();
#endif
reseed_prngs();
/* Demote the private keys to public keys. */
demote_sensitive_data();
/* Demote the child */
if (privsep_chroot) {
/* Change our root directory */
if (chroot(_PATH_PRIVSEP_CHROOT_DIR) == -1)
fatal("chroot(\"%s\"): %s", _PATH_PRIVSEP_CHROOT_DIR,
strerror(errno));
if (chdir("/") == -1)
fatal("chdir(\"/\"): %s", strerror(errno));
/* Drop our privileges */
debug3("privsep user:group %u:%u", (u_int)privsep_pw->pw_uid,
(u_int)privsep_pw->pw_gid);
gidset[0] = privsep_pw->pw_gid;
if (setgroups(1, gidset) == -1)
fatal("setgroups: %.100s", strerror(errno));
permanently_set_uid(privsep_pw);
}
}
static int
privsep_preauth(struct ssh *ssh)
{
int status, r;
pid_t pid;
struct ssh_sandbox *box = NULL;
/* Set up unprivileged child process to deal with network data */
pmonitor = monitor_init();
/* Store a pointer to the kex for later rekeying */
pmonitor->m_pkex = &ssh->kex;
if (use_privsep == PRIVSEP_ON)
box = ssh_sandbox_init(pmonitor);
pid = fork();
if (pid == -1) {
fatal("fork of unprivileged child failed");
} else if (pid != 0) {
debug2("Network child is on pid %ld", (long)pid);
pmonitor->m_pid = pid;
if (have_agent) {
r = ssh_get_authentication_socket(&auth_sock);
if (r != 0) {
error("Could not get agent socket: %s",
ssh_err(r));
have_agent = 0;
}
}
if (box != NULL)
ssh_sandbox_parent_preauth(box, pid);
monitor_child_preauth(ssh, pmonitor);
/* Wait for the child's exit status */
while (waitpid(pid, &status, 0) == -1) {
if (errno == EINTR)
continue;
pmonitor->m_pid = -1;
fatal("%s: waitpid: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
}
privsep_is_preauth = 0;
pmonitor->m_pid = -1;
if (WIFEXITED(status)) {
if (WEXITSTATUS(status) != 0)
fatal("%s: preauth child exited with status %d",
__func__, WEXITSTATUS(status));
} else if (WIFSIGNALED(status))
fatal("%s: preauth child terminated by signal %d",
__func__, WTERMSIG(status));
if (box != NULL)
ssh_sandbox_parent_finish(box);
return 1;
} else {
/* child */
close(pmonitor->m_sendfd);
close(pmonitor->m_log_recvfd);
/* Arrange for logging to be sent to the monitor */
set_log_handler(mm_log_handler, pmonitor);
privsep_preauth_child();
setproctitle("%s", "[net]");
if (box != NULL)
ssh_sandbox_child(box);
return 0;
}
}
static void
privsep_postauth(struct ssh *ssh, Authctxt *authctxt)
{
#ifdef DISABLE_FD_PASSING
if (1) {
#else
if (authctxt->pw->pw_uid == 0) {
#endif
/* File descriptor passing is broken or root login */
use_privsep = 0;
goto skip;
}
/* New socket pair */
monitor_reinit(pmonitor);
pmonitor->m_pid = fork();
if (pmonitor->m_pid == -1)
fatal("fork of unprivileged child failed");
else if (pmonitor->m_pid != 0) {
verbose("User child is on pid %ld", (long)pmonitor->m_pid);
sshbuf_reset(loginmsg);
monitor_clear_keystate(ssh, pmonitor);
monitor_child_postauth(ssh, pmonitor);
/* NEVERREACHED */
exit(0);
}
/* child */
close(pmonitor->m_sendfd);
pmonitor->m_sendfd = -1;
/* Demote the private keys to public keys. */
demote_sensitive_data();
reseed_prngs();
/* Drop privileges */
do_setusercontext(authctxt->pw);
skip:
/* It is safe now to apply the key state */
monitor_apply_keystate(ssh, pmonitor);
/*
* Tell the packet layer that authentication was successful, since
* this information is not part of the key state.
*/
ssh_packet_set_authenticated(ssh);
}
static void
append_hostkey_type(struct sshbuf *b, const char *s)
{
int r;
if (match_pattern_list(s, options.hostkeyalgorithms, 0) != 1) {
debug3("%s: %s key not permitted by HostkeyAlgorithms",
__func__, s);
return;
}
if ((r = sshbuf_putf(b, "%s%s", sshbuf_len(b) > 0 ? "," : "", s)) != 0)
fatal("%s: sshbuf_putf: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
}
static char *
list_hostkey_types(void)
{
struct sshbuf *b;
struct sshkey *key;
char *ret;
u_int i;
if ((b = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
for (i = 0; i < options.num_host_key_files; i++) {
key = sensitive_data.host_keys[i];
if (key == NULL)
key = sensitive_data.host_pubkeys[i];
if (key == NULL)
continue;
switch (key->type) {
case KEY_RSA:
/* for RSA we also support SHA2 signatures */
append_hostkey_type(b, "rsa-sha2-512");
append_hostkey_type(b, "rsa-sha2-256");
/* FALLTHROUGH */
case KEY_DSA:
case KEY_ECDSA:
case KEY_ED25519:
case KEY_ECDSA_SK:
case KEY_ED25519_SK:
case KEY_XMSS:
append_hostkey_type(b, sshkey_ssh_name(key));
break;
}
/* If the private key has a cert peer, then list that too */
key = sensitive_data.host_certificates[i];
if (key == NULL)
continue;
switch (key->type) {
case KEY_RSA_CERT:
/* for RSA we also support SHA2 signatures */
append_hostkey_type(b,
"rsa-sha2-512-cert-v01@openssh.com");
append_hostkey_type(b,
"rsa-sha2-256-cert-v01@openssh.com");
/* FALLTHROUGH */
case KEY_DSA_CERT:
case KEY_ECDSA_CERT:
case KEY_ED25519_CERT:
case KEY_ECDSA_SK_CERT:
case KEY_ED25519_SK_CERT:
case KEY_XMSS_CERT:
append_hostkey_type(b, sshkey_ssh_name(key));
break;
}
}
if ((ret = sshbuf_dup_string(b)) == NULL)
fatal("%s: sshbuf_dup_string failed", __func__);
sshbuf_free(b);
debug("%s: %s", __func__, ret);
return ret;
}
static struct sshkey *
get_hostkey_by_type(int type, int nid, int need_private, struct ssh *ssh)
{
u_int i;
struct sshkey *key;
for (i = 0; i < options.num_host_key_files; i++) {
switch (type) {
case KEY_RSA_CERT:
case KEY_DSA_CERT:
case KEY_ECDSA_CERT:
case KEY_ED25519_CERT:
case KEY_ECDSA_SK_CERT:
case KEY_ED25519_SK_CERT:
case KEY_XMSS_CERT:
key = sensitive_data.host_certificates[i];
break;
default:
key = sensitive_data.host_keys[i];
if (key == NULL && !need_private)
key = sensitive_data.host_pubkeys[i];
break;
}
if (key == NULL || key->type != type)
continue;
switch (type) {
case KEY_ECDSA:
case KEY_ECDSA_SK:
case KEY_ECDSA_CERT:
case KEY_ECDSA_SK_CERT:
if (key->ecdsa_nid != nid)
continue;
/* FALLTHROUGH */
default:
return need_private ?
sensitive_data.host_keys[i] : key;
}
}
return NULL;
}
struct sshkey *
get_hostkey_public_by_type(int type, int nid, struct ssh *ssh)
{
return get_hostkey_by_type(type, nid, 0, ssh);
}
struct sshkey *
get_hostkey_private_by_type(int type, int nid, struct ssh *ssh)
{
return get_hostkey_by_type(type, nid, 1, ssh);
}
struct sshkey *
get_hostkey_by_index(int ind)
{
if (ind < 0 || (u_int)ind >= options.num_host_key_files)
return (NULL);
return (sensitive_data.host_keys[ind]);
}
struct sshkey *
get_hostkey_public_by_index(int ind, struct ssh *ssh)
{
if (ind < 0 || (u_int)ind >= options.num_host_key_files)
return (NULL);
return (sensitive_data.host_pubkeys[ind]);
}
int
get_hostkey_index(struct sshkey *key, int compare, struct ssh *ssh)
{
u_int i;
for (i = 0; i < options.num_host_key_files; i++) {
if (sshkey_is_cert(key)) {
if (key == sensitive_data.host_certificates[i] ||
(compare && sensitive_data.host_certificates[i] &&
sshkey_equal(key,
sensitive_data.host_certificates[i])))
return (i);
} else {
if (key == sensitive_data.host_keys[i] ||
(compare && sensitive_data.host_keys[i] &&
sshkey_equal(key, sensitive_data.host_keys[i])))
return (i);
if (key == sensitive_data.host_pubkeys[i] ||
(compare && sensitive_data.host_pubkeys[i] &&
sshkey_equal(key, sensitive_data.host_pubkeys[i])))
return (i);
}
}
return (-1);
}
/* Inform the client of all hostkeys */
static void
notify_hostkeys(struct ssh *ssh)
{
struct sshbuf *buf;
struct sshkey *key;
u_int i, nkeys;
int r;
char *fp;
/* Some clients cannot cope with the hostkeys message, skip those. */
if (ssh->compat & SSH_BUG_HOSTKEYS)
return;
if ((buf = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
fatal("%s: sshbuf_new", __func__);
for (i = nkeys = 0; i < options.num_host_key_files; i++) {
key = get_hostkey_public_by_index(i, ssh);
if (key == NULL || key->type == KEY_UNSPEC ||
sshkey_is_cert(key))
continue;
fp = sshkey_fingerprint(key, options.fingerprint_hash,
SSH_FP_DEFAULT);
debug3("%s: key %d: %s %s", __func__, i,
sshkey_ssh_name(key), fp);
free(fp);
if (nkeys == 0) {
/*
* Start building the request when we find the
* first usable key.
*/
if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_GLOBAL_REQUEST)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, "hostkeys-00@openssh.com")) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_u8(ssh, 0)) != 0) /* want reply */
sshpkt_fatal(ssh, r, "%s: start request", __func__);
}
/* Append the key to the request */
sshbuf_reset(buf);
if ((r = sshkey_putb(key, buf)) != 0)
fatal("%s: couldn't put hostkey %d: %s",
__func__, i, ssh_err(r));
if ((r = sshpkt_put_stringb(ssh, buf)) != 0)
sshpkt_fatal(ssh, r, "%s: append key", __func__);
nkeys++;
}
debug3("%s: sent %u hostkeys", __func__, nkeys);
if (nkeys == 0)
fatal("%s: no hostkeys", __func__);
if ((r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0)
sshpkt_fatal(ssh, r, "%s: send", __func__);
sshbuf_free(buf);
}
/*
* returns 1 if connection should be dropped, 0 otherwise.
* dropping starts at connection #max_startups_begin with a probability
* of (max_startups_rate/100). the probability increases linearly until
* all connections are dropped for startups > max_startups
*/
static int
-drop_connection(int startups)
+should_drop_connection(int startups)
{
int p, r;
if (startups < options.max_startups_begin)
return 0;
if (startups >= options.max_startups)
return 1;
if (options.max_startups_rate == 100)
return 1;
p = 100 - options.max_startups_rate;
p *= startups - options.max_startups_begin;
p /= options.max_startups - options.max_startups_begin;
p += options.max_startups_rate;
r = arc4random_uniform(100);
- debug("drop_connection: p %d, r %d", p, r);
+ debug("%s: p %d, r %d", __func__, p, r);
return (r < p) ? 1 : 0;
}
+/*
+ * Check whether connection should be accepted by MaxStartups.
+ * Returns 0 if the connection is accepted. If the connection is refused,
+ * returns 1 and attempts to send notification to client.
+ * Logs when the MaxStartups condition is entered or exited, and periodically
+ * while in that state.
+ */
+static int
+drop_connection(int sock, int startups)
+{
+ char *laddr, *raddr;
+ const char msg[] = "Exceeded MaxStartups\r\n";
+ static time_t last_drop, first_drop;
+ static u_int ndropped;
+ LogLevel drop_level = SYSLOG_LEVEL_VERBOSE;
+ time_t now;
+
+ now = monotime();
+ if (!should_drop_connection(startups)) {
+ if (last_drop != 0 &&
+ startups < options.max_startups_begin - 1) {
+ /* XXX maybe need better hysteresis here */
+ logit("exited MaxStartups throttling after %s, "
+ "%u connections dropped",
+ fmt_timeframe(now - first_drop), ndropped);
+ last_drop = 0;
+ }
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+#define SSHD_MAXSTARTUPS_LOG_INTERVAL (5 * 60)
+ if (last_drop == 0) {
+ error("beginning MaxStartups throttling");
+ drop_level = SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO;
+ first_drop = now;
+ ndropped = 0;
+ } else if (last_drop + SSHD_MAXSTARTUPS_LOG_INTERVAL < now) {
+ /* Periodic logs */
+ error("in MaxStartups throttling for %s, "
+ "%u connections dropped",
+ fmt_timeframe(now - first_drop), ndropped + 1);
+ drop_level = SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO;
+ }
+ last_drop = now;
+ ndropped++;
+
+ laddr = get_local_ipaddr(sock);
+ raddr = get_peer_ipaddr(sock);
+ do_log2(drop_level, "drop connection #%d from [%s]:%d on [%s]:%d "
+ "past MaxStartups", startups, raddr, get_peer_port(sock),
+ laddr, get_local_port(sock));
+ free(laddr);
+ free(raddr);
+ /* best-effort notification to client */
+ (void)write(sock, msg, sizeof(msg) - 1);
+ return 1;
+}
+
static void
usage(void)
{
fprintf(stderr, "%s, %s\n",
SSH_RELEASE,
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
OpenSSL_version(OPENSSL_VERSION)
#else
"without OpenSSL"
#endif
);
fprintf(stderr,
"usage: sshd [-46DdeiqTt] [-C connection_spec] [-c host_cert_file]\n"
" [-E log_file] [-f config_file] [-g login_grace_time]\n"
" [-h host_key_file] [-o option] [-p port] [-u len]\n"
);
exit(1);
}
static void
send_rexec_state(int fd, struct sshbuf *conf)
{
struct sshbuf *m = NULL, *inc = NULL;
struct include_item *item = NULL;
int r;
debug3("%s: entering fd = %d config len %zu", __func__, fd,
sshbuf_len(conf));
if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL || (inc = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
/* pack includes into a string */
TAILQ_FOREACH(item, &includes, entry) {
if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(inc, item->selector)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_cstring(inc, item->filename)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_stringb(inc, item->contents)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
}
/*
* Protocol from reexec master to child:
* string configuration
* string included_files[] {
* string selector
* string filename
* string contents
* }
* string rng_seed (if required)
*/
if ((r = sshbuf_put_stringb(m, conf)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_stringb(m, inc)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
#if defined(WITH_OPENSSL) && !defined(OPENSSL_PRNG_ONLY)
rexec_send_rng_seed(m);
#endif
if (ssh_msg_send(fd, 0, m) == -1)
- fatal("%s: ssh_msg_send failed", __func__);
+ error("%s: ssh_msg_send failed", __func__);
sshbuf_free(m);
sshbuf_free(inc);
debug3("%s: done", __func__);
}
static void
recv_rexec_state(int fd, struct sshbuf *conf)
{
struct sshbuf *m, *inc;
u_char *cp, ver;
size_t len;
int r;
struct include_item *item;
debug3("%s: entering fd = %d", __func__, fd);
if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL || (inc = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
if (ssh_msg_recv(fd, m) == -1)
fatal("%s: ssh_msg_recv failed", __func__);
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(m, &ver)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
if (ver != 0)
fatal("%s: rexec version mismatch", __func__);
if ((r = sshbuf_get_string(m, &cp, &len)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_stringb(m, inc)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
#if defined(WITH_OPENSSL) && !defined(OPENSSL_PRNG_ONLY)
rexec_recv_rng_seed(m);
#endif
if (conf != NULL && (r = sshbuf_put(conf, cp, len)))
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
while (sshbuf_len(inc) != 0) {
item = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*item));
if ((item->contents = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(inc, &item->selector, NULL)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_cstring(inc, &item->filename, NULL)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_stringb(inc, item->contents)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(&includes, item, entry);
}
free(cp);
sshbuf_free(m);
debug3("%s: done", __func__);
}
/* Accept a connection from inetd */
static void
server_accept_inetd(int *sock_in, int *sock_out)
{
int fd;
if (rexeced_flag) {
close(REEXEC_CONFIG_PASS_FD);
*sock_in = *sock_out = dup(STDIN_FILENO);
} else {
*sock_in = dup(STDIN_FILENO);
*sock_out = dup(STDOUT_FILENO);
}
/*
* We intentionally do not close the descriptors 0, 1, and 2
* as our code for setting the descriptors won't work if
* ttyfd happens to be one of those.
*/
if ((fd = open(_PATH_DEVNULL, O_RDWR, 0)) != -1) {
dup2(fd, STDIN_FILENO);
dup2(fd, STDOUT_FILENO);
if (!log_stderr)
dup2(fd, STDERR_FILENO);
if (fd > (log_stderr ? STDERR_FILENO : STDOUT_FILENO))
close(fd);
}
debug("inetd sockets after dupping: %d, %d", *sock_in, *sock_out);
}
/*
* Listen for TCP connections
*/
static void
listen_on_addrs(struct listenaddr *la)
{
int ret, listen_sock;
struct addrinfo *ai;
char ntop[NI_MAXHOST], strport[NI_MAXSERV];
for (ai = la->addrs; ai; ai = ai->ai_next) {
if (ai->ai_family != AF_INET && ai->ai_family != AF_INET6)
continue;
if (num_listen_socks >= MAX_LISTEN_SOCKS)
fatal("Too many listen sockets. "
"Enlarge MAX_LISTEN_SOCKS");
if ((ret = getnameinfo(ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen,
ntop, sizeof(ntop), strport, sizeof(strport),
NI_NUMERICHOST|NI_NUMERICSERV)) != 0) {
error("getnameinfo failed: %.100s",
ssh_gai_strerror(ret));
continue;
}
/* Create socket for listening. */
listen_sock = socket(ai->ai_family, ai->ai_socktype,
ai->ai_protocol);
if (listen_sock == -1) {
/* kernel may not support ipv6 */
verbose("socket: %.100s", strerror(errno));
continue;
}
if (set_nonblock(listen_sock) == -1) {
close(listen_sock);
continue;
}
if (fcntl(listen_sock, F_SETFD, FD_CLOEXEC) == -1) {
verbose("socket: CLOEXEC: %s", strerror(errno));
close(listen_sock);
continue;
}
/* Socket options */
set_reuseaddr(listen_sock);
if (la->rdomain != NULL &&
set_rdomain(listen_sock, la->rdomain) == -1) {
close(listen_sock);
continue;
}
/* Only communicate in IPv6 over AF_INET6 sockets. */
if (ai->ai_family == AF_INET6)
sock_set_v6only(listen_sock);
debug("Bind to port %s on %s.", strport, ntop);
/* Bind the socket to the desired port. */
if (bind(listen_sock, ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen) == -1) {
error("Bind to port %s on %s failed: %.200s.",
strport, ntop, strerror(errno));
close(listen_sock);
continue;
}
listen_socks[num_listen_socks] = listen_sock;
num_listen_socks++;
/* Start listening on the port. */
if (listen(listen_sock, SSH_LISTEN_BACKLOG) == -1)
fatal("listen on [%s]:%s: %.100s",
ntop, strport, strerror(errno));
logit("Server listening on %s port %s%s%s.",
ntop, strport,
la->rdomain == NULL ? "" : " rdomain ",
la->rdomain == NULL ? "" : la->rdomain);
}
}
static void
server_listen(void)
{
u_int i;
for (i = 0; i < options.num_listen_addrs; i++) {
listen_on_addrs(&options.listen_addrs[i]);
freeaddrinfo(options.listen_addrs[i].addrs);
free(options.listen_addrs[i].rdomain);
memset(&options.listen_addrs[i], 0,
sizeof(options.listen_addrs[i]));
}
free(options.listen_addrs);
options.listen_addrs = NULL;
options.num_listen_addrs = 0;
if (!num_listen_socks)
fatal("Cannot bind any address.");
}
/*
* The main TCP accept loop. Note that, for the non-debug case, returns
* from this function are in a forked subprocess.
*/
static void
server_accept_loop(int *sock_in, int *sock_out, int *newsock, int *config_s)
{
fd_set *fdset;
int i, j, ret, maxfd;
int ostartups = -1, startups = 0, listening = 0, lameduck = 0;
int startup_p[2] = { -1 , -1 };
char c = 0;
struct sockaddr_storage from;
socklen_t fromlen;
pid_t pid;
u_char rnd[256];
/* setup fd set for accept */
fdset = NULL;
maxfd = 0;
for (i = 0; i < num_listen_socks; i++)
if (listen_socks[i] > maxfd)
maxfd = listen_socks[i];
/* pipes connected to unauthenticated child sshd processes */
startup_pipes = xcalloc(options.max_startups, sizeof(int));
startup_flags = xcalloc(options.max_startups, sizeof(int));
for (i = 0; i < options.max_startups; i++)
startup_pipes[i] = -1;
/*
* Stay listening for connections until the system crashes or
* the daemon is killed with a signal.
*/
for (;;) {
if (ostartups != startups) {
setproctitle("%s [listener] %d of %d-%d startups",
listener_proctitle, startups,
options.max_startups_begin, options.max_startups);
ostartups = startups;
}
if (received_sighup) {
if (!lameduck) {
debug("Received SIGHUP; waiting for children");
close_listen_socks();
lameduck = 1;
}
if (listening <= 0)
sighup_restart();
}
free(fdset);
fdset = xcalloc(howmany(maxfd + 1, NFDBITS),
sizeof(fd_mask));
for (i = 0; i < num_listen_socks; i++)
FD_SET(listen_socks[i], fdset);
for (i = 0; i < options.max_startups; i++)
if (startup_pipes[i] != -1)
FD_SET(startup_pipes[i], fdset);
/* Wait in select until there is a connection. */
ret = select(maxfd+1, fdset, NULL, NULL, NULL);
if (ret == -1 && errno != EINTR)
error("select: %.100s", strerror(errno));
if (received_sigterm) {
logit("Received signal %d; terminating.",
(int) received_sigterm);
close_listen_socks();
if (options.pid_file != NULL)
unlink(options.pid_file);
exit(received_sigterm == SIGTERM ? 0 : 255);
}
if (ret == -1)
continue;
for (i = 0; i < options.max_startups; i++) {
if (startup_pipes[i] == -1 ||
!FD_ISSET(startup_pipes[i], fdset))
continue;
switch (read(startup_pipes[i], &c, sizeof(c))) {
case -1:
if (errno == EINTR || errno == EAGAIN)
continue;
if (errno != EPIPE) {
error("%s: startup pipe %d (fd=%d): "
"read %s", __func__, i,
startup_pipes[i], strerror(errno));
}
/* FALLTHROUGH */
case 0:
/* child exited or completed auth */
close(startup_pipes[i]);
startup_pipes[i] = -1;
startups--;
if (startup_flags[i])
listening--;
break;
case 1:
/* child has finished preliminaries */
if (startup_flags[i]) {
listening--;
startup_flags[i] = 0;
}
break;
}
}
for (i = 0; i < num_listen_socks; i++) {
if (!FD_ISSET(listen_socks[i], fdset))
continue;
fromlen = sizeof(from);
*newsock = accept(listen_socks[i],
(struct sockaddr *)&from, &fromlen);
if (*newsock == -1) {
if (errno != EINTR && errno != EWOULDBLOCK &&
errno != ECONNABORTED && errno != EAGAIN)
error("accept: %.100s",
strerror(errno));
if (errno == EMFILE || errno == ENFILE)
usleep(100 * 1000);
continue;
}
- if (unset_nonblock(*newsock) == -1) {
- close(*newsock);
- continue;
- }
- if (drop_connection(startups) == 1) {
- char *laddr = get_local_ipaddr(*newsock);
- char *raddr = get_peer_ipaddr(*newsock);
- char msg[] = "Exceeded MaxStartups\r\n";
-
- verbose("drop connection #%d from [%s]:%d "
- "on [%s]:%d past MaxStartups", startups,
- raddr, get_peer_port(*newsock),
- laddr, get_local_port(*newsock));
- free(laddr);
- free(raddr);
- /* best-effort notification to client */
- (void)write(*newsock, msg, strlen(msg));
- close(*newsock);
- continue;
- }
- if (pipe(startup_p) == -1) {
+ if (unset_nonblock(*newsock) == -1 ||
+ drop_connection(*newsock, startups) ||
+ pipe(startup_p) == -1) {
close(*newsock);
continue;
}
if (rexec_flag && socketpair(AF_UNIX,
SOCK_STREAM, 0, config_s) == -1) {
error("reexec socketpair: %s",
strerror(errno));
close(*newsock);
close(startup_p[0]);
close(startup_p[1]);
continue;
}
for (j = 0; j < options.max_startups; j++)
if (startup_pipes[j] == -1) {
startup_pipes[j] = startup_p[0];
if (maxfd < startup_p[0])
maxfd = startup_p[0];
startups++;
startup_flags[j] = 1;
break;
}
/*
* Got connection. Fork a child to handle it, unless
* we are in debugging mode.
*/
if (debug_flag) {
/*
* In debugging mode. Close the listening
* socket, and start processing the
* connection without forking.
*/
debug("Server will not fork when running in debugging mode.");
close_listen_socks();
*sock_in = *newsock;
*sock_out = *newsock;
close(startup_p[0]);
close(startup_p[1]);
startup_pipe = -1;
pid = getpid();
if (rexec_flag) {
send_rexec_state(config_s[0], cfg);
close(config_s[0]);
}
return;
}
/*
* Normal production daemon. Fork, and have
* the child process the connection. The
* parent continues listening.
*/
platform_pre_fork();
listening++;
if ((pid = fork()) == 0) {
/*
* Child. Close the listening and
* max_startup sockets. Start using
* the accepted socket. Reinitialize
* logging (since our pid has changed).
* We return from this function to handle
* the connection.
*/
platform_post_fork_child();
startup_pipe = startup_p[1];
close_startup_pipes();
close_listen_socks();
*sock_in = *newsock;
*sock_out = *newsock;
log_init(__progname,
options.log_level,
options.log_facility,
log_stderr);
if (rexec_flag)
close(config_s[0]);
else {
/*
* Signal parent that the preliminaries
* for this child are complete. For the
* re-exec case, this happens after the
* child has received the rexec state
* from the server.
*/
(void)atomicio(vwrite, startup_pipe,
"\0", 1);
}
return;
}
/* Parent. Stay in the loop. */
platform_post_fork_parent(pid);
if (pid == -1)
error("fork: %.100s", strerror(errno));
else
debug("Forked child %ld.", (long)pid);
close(startup_p[1]);
if (rexec_flag) {
+ close(config_s[1]);
send_rexec_state(config_s[0], cfg);
close(config_s[0]);
- close(config_s[1]);
}
close(*newsock);
/*
* Ensure that our random state differs
* from that of the child
*/
arc4random_stir();
arc4random_buf(rnd, sizeof(rnd));
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
RAND_seed(rnd, sizeof(rnd));
if ((RAND_bytes((u_char *)rnd, 1)) != 1)
fatal("%s: RAND_bytes failed", __func__);
#endif
explicit_bzero(rnd, sizeof(rnd));
}
}
}
/*
* If IP options are supported, make sure there are none (log and
* return an error if any are found). Basically we are worried about
* source routing; it can be used to pretend you are somebody
* (ip-address) you are not. That itself may be "almost acceptable"
* under certain circumstances, but rhosts authentication is useless
* if source routing is accepted. Notice also that if we just dropped
* source routing here, the other side could use IP spoofing to do
* rest of the interaction and could still bypass security. So we
* exit here if we detect any IP options.
*/
static void
check_ip_options(struct ssh *ssh)
{
#ifdef IP_OPTIONS
int sock_in = ssh_packet_get_connection_in(ssh);
struct sockaddr_storage from;
u_char opts[200];
socklen_t i, option_size = sizeof(opts), fromlen = sizeof(from);
char text[sizeof(opts) * 3 + 1];
memset(&from, 0, sizeof(from));
if (getpeername(sock_in, (struct sockaddr *)&from,
&fromlen) == -1)
return;
if (from.ss_family != AF_INET)
return;
/* XXX IPv6 options? */
if (getsockopt(sock_in, IPPROTO_IP, IP_OPTIONS, opts,
&option_size) >= 0 && option_size != 0) {
text[0] = '\0';
for (i = 0; i < option_size; i++)
snprintf(text + i*3, sizeof(text) - i*3,
" %2.2x", opts[i]);
fatal("Connection from %.100s port %d with IP opts: %.800s",
ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), ssh_remote_port(ssh), text);
}
return;
#endif /* IP_OPTIONS */
}
/* Set the routing domain for this process */
static void
set_process_rdomain(struct ssh *ssh, const char *name)
{
#if defined(HAVE_SYS_SET_PROCESS_RDOMAIN)
if (name == NULL)
return; /* default */
if (strcmp(name, "%D") == 0) {
/* "expands" to routing domain of connection */
if ((name = ssh_packet_rdomain_in(ssh)) == NULL)
return;
}
/* NB. We don't pass 'ssh' to sys_set_process_rdomain() */
return sys_set_process_rdomain(name);
#elif defined(__OpenBSD__)
int rtable, ortable = getrtable();
const char *errstr;
if (name == NULL)
return; /* default */
if (strcmp(name, "%D") == 0) {
/* "expands" to routing domain of connection */
if ((name = ssh_packet_rdomain_in(ssh)) == NULL)
return;
}
rtable = (int)strtonum(name, 0, 255, &errstr);
if (errstr != NULL) /* Shouldn't happen */
fatal("Invalid routing domain \"%s\": %s", name, errstr);
if (rtable != ortable && setrtable(rtable) != 0)
fatal("Unable to set routing domain %d: %s",
rtable, strerror(errno));
debug("%s: set routing domain %d (was %d)", __func__, rtable, ortable);
#else /* defined(__OpenBSD__) */
fatal("Unable to set routing domain: not supported in this platform");
#endif
}
static void
accumulate_host_timing_secret(struct sshbuf *server_cfg,
struct sshkey *key)
{
static struct ssh_digest_ctx *ctx;
u_char *hash;
size_t len;
struct sshbuf *buf;
int r;
if (ctx == NULL && (ctx = ssh_digest_start(SSH_DIGEST_SHA512)) == NULL)
fatal("%s: ssh_digest_start", __func__);
if (key == NULL) { /* finalize */
/* add server config in case we are using agent for host keys */
if (ssh_digest_update(ctx, sshbuf_ptr(server_cfg),
sshbuf_len(server_cfg)) != 0)
fatal("%s: ssh_digest_update", __func__);
len = ssh_digest_bytes(SSH_DIGEST_SHA512);
hash = xmalloc(len);
if (ssh_digest_final(ctx, hash, len) != 0)
fatal("%s: ssh_digest_final", __func__);
options.timing_secret = PEEK_U64(hash);
freezero(hash, len);
ssh_digest_free(ctx);
ctx = NULL;
return;
}
if ((buf = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
fatal("%s could not allocate buffer", __func__);
if ((r = sshkey_private_serialize(key, buf)) != 0)
fatal("sshkey_private_serialize: %s", ssh_err(r));
if (ssh_digest_update(ctx, sshbuf_ptr(buf), sshbuf_len(buf)) != 0)
fatal("%s: ssh_digest_update", __func__);
sshbuf_reset(buf);
sshbuf_free(buf);
}
static char *
prepare_proctitle(int ac, char **av)
{
char *ret = NULL;
int i;
for (i = 0; i < ac; i++)
xextendf(&ret, " ", "%s", av[i]);
return ret;
}
/*
* Main program for the daemon.
*/
int
main(int ac, char **av)
{
struct ssh *ssh = NULL;
extern char *optarg;
extern int optind;
int r, opt, on = 1, already_daemon, remote_port;
int sock_in = -1, sock_out = -1, newsock = -1;
const char *remote_ip, *rdomain;
char *fp, *line, *laddr, *logfile = NULL;
int config_s[2] = { -1 , -1 };
u_int i, j;
u_int64_t ibytes, obytes;
mode_t new_umask;
struct sshkey *key;
struct sshkey *pubkey;
int keytype;
Authctxt *authctxt;
struct connection_info *connection_info = NULL;
#ifdef HAVE_SECUREWARE
(void)set_auth_parameters(ac, av);
#endif
__progname = ssh_get_progname(av[0]);
/* Save argv. Duplicate so setproctitle emulation doesn't clobber it */
saved_argc = ac;
rexec_argc = ac;
saved_argv = xcalloc(ac + 1, sizeof(*saved_argv));
for (i = 0; (int)i < ac; i++)
saved_argv[i] = xstrdup(av[i]);
saved_argv[i] = NULL;
#ifndef HAVE_SETPROCTITLE
/* Prepare for later setproctitle emulation */
compat_init_setproctitle(ac, av);
av = saved_argv;
#endif
if (geteuid() == 0 && setgroups(0, NULL) == -1)
debug("setgroups(): %.200s", strerror(errno));
/* Ensure that fds 0, 1 and 2 are open or directed to /dev/null */
sanitise_stdfd();
seed_rng();
/* Initialize configuration options to their default values. */
initialize_server_options(&options);
/* Parse command-line arguments. */
while ((opt = getopt(ac, av,
"C:E:b:c:f:g:h:k:o:p:u:46DQRTdeiqrt")) != -1) {
switch (opt) {
case '4':
options.address_family = AF_INET;
break;
case '6':
options.address_family = AF_INET6;
break;
case 'f':
config_file_name = optarg;
break;
case 'c':
servconf_add_hostcert("[command-line]", 0,
&options, optarg);
break;
case 'd':
if (debug_flag == 0) {
debug_flag = 1;
options.log_level = SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG1;
} else if (options.log_level < SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG3)
options.log_level++;
break;
case 'D':
no_daemon_flag = 1;
break;
case 'E':
logfile = optarg;
/* FALLTHROUGH */
case 'e':
log_stderr = 1;
break;
case 'i':
inetd_flag = 1;
break;
case 'r':
rexec_flag = 0;
break;
case 'R':
rexeced_flag = 1;
inetd_flag = 1;
break;
case 'Q':
/* ignored */
break;
case 'q':
options.log_level = SYSLOG_LEVEL_QUIET;
break;
case 'b':
/* protocol 1, ignored */
break;
case 'p':
options.ports_from_cmdline = 1;
if (options.num_ports >= MAX_PORTS) {
fprintf(stderr, "too many ports.\n");
exit(1);
}
options.ports[options.num_ports++] = a2port(optarg);
if (options.ports[options.num_ports-1] <= 0) {
fprintf(stderr, "Bad port number.\n");
exit(1);
}
break;
case 'g':
if ((options.login_grace_time = convtime(optarg)) == -1) {
fprintf(stderr, "Invalid login grace time.\n");
exit(1);
}
break;
case 'k':
/* protocol 1, ignored */
break;
case 'h':
servconf_add_hostkey("[command-line]", 0,
&options, optarg, 1);
break;
case 't':
test_flag = 1;
break;
case 'T':
test_flag = 2;
break;
case 'C':
connection_info = get_connection_info(ssh, 0, 0);
if (parse_server_match_testspec(connection_info,
optarg) == -1)
exit(1);
break;
case 'u':
utmp_len = (u_int)strtonum(optarg, 0, HOST_NAME_MAX+1+1, NULL);
if (utmp_len > HOST_NAME_MAX+1) {
fprintf(stderr, "Invalid utmp length.\n");
exit(1);
}
break;
case 'o':
line = xstrdup(optarg);
if (process_server_config_line(&options, line,
"command-line", 0, NULL, NULL, &includes) != 0)
exit(1);
free(line);
break;
case '?':
default:
usage();
break;
}
}
if (rexeced_flag || inetd_flag)
rexec_flag = 0;
if (!test_flag && rexec_flag && !path_absolute(av[0]))
fatal("sshd re-exec requires execution with an absolute path");
if (rexeced_flag)
closefrom(REEXEC_MIN_FREE_FD);
else
closefrom(REEXEC_DEVCRYPTO_RESERVED_FD);
/* If requested, redirect the logs to the specified logfile. */
if (logfile != NULL)
log_redirect_stderr_to(logfile);
/*
* Force logging to stderr until we have loaded the private host
* key (unless started from inetd)
*/
log_init(__progname,
options.log_level == SYSLOG_LEVEL_NOT_SET ?
SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO : options.log_level,
options.log_facility == SYSLOG_FACILITY_NOT_SET ?
SYSLOG_FACILITY_AUTH : options.log_facility,
log_stderr || !inetd_flag || debug_flag);
/*
* Unset KRB5CCNAME, otherwise the user's session may inherit it from
* root's environment
*/
if (getenv("KRB5CCNAME") != NULL)
(void) unsetenv("KRB5CCNAME");
sensitive_data.have_ssh2_key = 0;
/*
* If we're not doing an extended test do not silently ignore connection
* test params.
*/
if (test_flag < 2 && connection_info != NULL)
fatal("Config test connection parameter (-C) provided without "
"test mode (-T)");
/* Fetch our configuration */
if ((cfg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
if (rexeced_flag) {
+ setproctitle("%s", "[rexeced]");
recv_rexec_state(REEXEC_CONFIG_PASS_FD, cfg);
if (!debug_flag) {
startup_pipe = dup(REEXEC_STARTUP_PIPE_FD);
close(REEXEC_STARTUP_PIPE_FD);
/*
* Signal parent that this child is at a point where
* they can go away if they have a SIGHUP pending.
*/
(void)atomicio(vwrite, startup_pipe, "\0", 1);
}
} else if (strcasecmp(config_file_name, "none") != 0)
load_server_config(config_file_name, cfg);
parse_server_config(&options, rexeced_flag ? "rexec" : config_file_name,
cfg, &includes, NULL);
/* Fill in default values for those options not explicitly set. */
fill_default_server_options(&options);
/* challenge-response is implemented via keyboard interactive */
if (options.challenge_response_authentication)
options.kbd_interactive_authentication = 1;
/* Check that options are sensible */
if (options.authorized_keys_command_user == NULL &&
(options.authorized_keys_command != NULL &&
strcasecmp(options.authorized_keys_command, "none") != 0))
fatal("AuthorizedKeysCommand set without "
"AuthorizedKeysCommandUser");
if (options.authorized_principals_command_user == NULL &&
(options.authorized_principals_command != NULL &&
strcasecmp(options.authorized_principals_command, "none") != 0))
fatal("AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand set without "
"AuthorizedPrincipalsCommandUser");
/*
* Check whether there is any path through configured auth methods.
* Unfortunately it is not possible to verify this generally before
* daemonisation in the presence of Match block, but this catches
* and warns for trivial misconfigurations that could break login.
*/
if (options.num_auth_methods != 0) {
for (i = 0; i < options.num_auth_methods; i++) {
if (auth2_methods_valid(options.auth_methods[i],
1) == 0)
break;
}
if (i >= options.num_auth_methods)
fatal("AuthenticationMethods cannot be satisfied by "
"enabled authentication methods");
}
/* Check that there are no remaining arguments. */
if (optind < ac) {
fprintf(stderr, "Extra argument %s.\n", av[optind]);
exit(1);
}
debug("sshd version %s, %s", SSH_VERSION,
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
OpenSSL_version(OPENSSL_VERSION)
#else
"without OpenSSL"
#endif
);
/* Store privilege separation user for later use if required. */
privsep_chroot = use_privsep && (getuid() == 0 || geteuid() == 0);
if ((privsep_pw = getpwnam(SSH_PRIVSEP_USER)) == NULL) {
if (privsep_chroot || options.kerberos_authentication)
fatal("Privilege separation user %s does not exist",
SSH_PRIVSEP_USER);
} else {
privsep_pw = pwcopy(privsep_pw);
freezero(privsep_pw->pw_passwd, strlen(privsep_pw->pw_passwd));
privsep_pw->pw_passwd = xstrdup("*");
}
endpwent();
/* load host keys */
sensitive_data.host_keys = xcalloc(options.num_host_key_files,
sizeof(struct sshkey *));
sensitive_data.host_pubkeys = xcalloc(options.num_host_key_files,
sizeof(struct sshkey *));
if (options.host_key_agent) {
if (strcmp(options.host_key_agent, SSH_AUTHSOCKET_ENV_NAME))
setenv(SSH_AUTHSOCKET_ENV_NAME,
options.host_key_agent, 1);
if ((r = ssh_get_authentication_socket(NULL)) == 0)
have_agent = 1;
else
error("Could not connect to agent \"%s\": %s",
options.host_key_agent, ssh_err(r));
}
for (i = 0; i < options.num_host_key_files; i++) {
int ll = options.host_key_file_userprovided[i] ?
SYSLOG_LEVEL_ERROR : SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG1;
if (options.host_key_files[i] == NULL)
continue;
if ((r = sshkey_load_private(options.host_key_files[i], "",
&key, NULL)) != 0 && r != SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR)
do_log2(ll, "Unable to load host key \"%s\": %s",
options.host_key_files[i], ssh_err(r));
if (sshkey_is_sk(key) &&
key->sk_flags & SSH_SK_USER_PRESENCE_REQD) {
debug("host key %s requires user presence, ignoring",
options.host_key_files[i]);
key->sk_flags &= ~SSH_SK_USER_PRESENCE_REQD;
}
if (r == 0 && key != NULL &&
(r = sshkey_shield_private(key)) != 0) {
do_log2(ll, "Unable to shield host key \"%s\": %s",
options.host_key_files[i], ssh_err(r));
sshkey_free(key);
key = NULL;
}
if ((r = sshkey_load_public(options.host_key_files[i],
&pubkey, NULL)) != 0 && r != SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR)
do_log2(ll, "Unable to load host key \"%s\": %s",
options.host_key_files[i], ssh_err(r));
- if (pubkey == NULL && key != NULL)
+ if (pubkey != NULL && key != NULL) {
+ if (!sshkey_equal(pubkey, key)) {
+ error("Public key for %s does not match "
+ "private key", options.host_key_files[i]);
+ sshkey_free(pubkey);
+ pubkey = NULL;
+ }
+ }
+ if (pubkey == NULL && key != NULL) {
if ((r = sshkey_from_private(key, &pubkey)) != 0)
fatal("Could not demote key: \"%s\": %s",
options.host_key_files[i], ssh_err(r));
+ }
sensitive_data.host_keys[i] = key;
sensitive_data.host_pubkeys[i] = pubkey;
if (key == NULL && pubkey != NULL && have_agent) {
debug("will rely on agent for hostkey %s",
options.host_key_files[i]);
keytype = pubkey->type;
} else if (key != NULL) {
keytype = key->type;
accumulate_host_timing_secret(cfg, key);
} else {
do_log2(ll, "Unable to load host key: %s",
options.host_key_files[i]);
sensitive_data.host_keys[i] = NULL;
sensitive_data.host_pubkeys[i] = NULL;
continue;
}
switch (keytype) {
case KEY_RSA:
case KEY_DSA:
case KEY_ECDSA:
case KEY_ED25519:
case KEY_ECDSA_SK:
case KEY_ED25519_SK:
case KEY_XMSS:
if (have_agent || key != NULL)
sensitive_data.have_ssh2_key = 1;
break;
}
if ((fp = sshkey_fingerprint(pubkey, options.fingerprint_hash,
SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL)
fatal("sshkey_fingerprint failed");
debug("%s host key #%d: %s %s",
key ? "private" : "agent", i, sshkey_ssh_name(pubkey), fp);
free(fp);
}
accumulate_host_timing_secret(cfg, NULL);
if (!sensitive_data.have_ssh2_key) {
logit("sshd: no hostkeys available -- exiting.");
exit(1);
}
/*
* Load certificates. They are stored in an array at identical
* indices to the public keys that they relate to.
*/
sensitive_data.host_certificates = xcalloc(options.num_host_key_files,
sizeof(struct sshkey *));
for (i = 0; i < options.num_host_key_files; i++)
sensitive_data.host_certificates[i] = NULL;
for (i = 0; i < options.num_host_cert_files; i++) {
if (options.host_cert_files[i] == NULL)
continue;
if ((r = sshkey_load_public(options.host_cert_files[i],
&key, NULL)) != 0) {
error("Could not load host certificate \"%s\": %s",
options.host_cert_files[i], ssh_err(r));
continue;
}
if (!sshkey_is_cert(key)) {
error("Certificate file is not a certificate: %s",
options.host_cert_files[i]);
sshkey_free(key);
continue;
}
/* Find matching private key */
for (j = 0; j < options.num_host_key_files; j++) {
if (sshkey_equal_public(key,
sensitive_data.host_keys[j])) {
sensitive_data.host_certificates[j] = key;
break;
}
}
if (j >= options.num_host_key_files) {
error("No matching private key for certificate: %s",
options.host_cert_files[i]);
sshkey_free(key);
continue;
}
sensitive_data.host_certificates[j] = key;
debug("host certificate: #%u type %d %s", j, key->type,
sshkey_type(key));
}
if (privsep_chroot) {
struct stat st;
if ((stat(_PATH_PRIVSEP_CHROOT_DIR, &st) == -1) ||
(S_ISDIR(st.st_mode) == 0))
fatal("Missing privilege separation directory: %s",
_PATH_PRIVSEP_CHROOT_DIR);
#ifdef HAVE_CYGWIN
if (check_ntsec(_PATH_PRIVSEP_CHROOT_DIR) &&
(st.st_uid != getuid () ||
(st.st_mode & (S_IWGRP|S_IWOTH)) != 0))
#else
if (st.st_uid != 0 || (st.st_mode & (S_IWGRP|S_IWOTH)) != 0)
#endif
fatal("%s must be owned by root and not group or "
"world-writable.", _PATH_PRIVSEP_CHROOT_DIR);
}
if (test_flag > 1) {
/*
* If no connection info was provided by -C then use
* use a blank one that will cause no predicate to match.
*/
if (connection_info == NULL)
connection_info = get_connection_info(ssh, 0, 0);
connection_info->test = 1;
parse_server_match_config(&options, &includes, connection_info);
dump_config(&options);
}
/* Configuration looks good, so exit if in test mode. */
if (test_flag)
exit(0);
/*
* Clear out any supplemental groups we may have inherited. This
* prevents inadvertent creation of files with bad modes (in the
* portable version at least, it's certainly possible for PAM
* to create a file, and we can't control the code in every
* module which might be used).
*/
if (setgroups(0, NULL) < 0)
debug("setgroups() failed: %.200s", strerror(errno));
if (rexec_flag) {
if (rexec_argc < 0)
fatal("rexec_argc %d < 0", rexec_argc);
rexec_argv = xcalloc(rexec_argc + 2, sizeof(char *));
for (i = 0; i < (u_int)rexec_argc; i++) {
debug("rexec_argv[%d]='%s'", i, saved_argv[i]);
rexec_argv[i] = saved_argv[i];
}
rexec_argv[rexec_argc] = "-R";
rexec_argv[rexec_argc + 1] = NULL;
}
listener_proctitle = prepare_proctitle(ac, av);
/* Ensure that umask disallows at least group and world write */
new_umask = umask(0077) | 0022;
(void) umask(new_umask);
/* Initialize the log (it is reinitialized below in case we forked). */
if (debug_flag && (!inetd_flag || rexeced_flag))
log_stderr = 1;
log_init(__progname, options.log_level, options.log_facility, log_stderr);
/*
* If not in debugging mode, not started from inetd and not already
* daemonized (eg re-exec via SIGHUP), disconnect from the controlling
* terminal, and fork. The original process exits.
*/
already_daemon = daemonized();
if (!(debug_flag || inetd_flag || no_daemon_flag || already_daemon)) {
if (daemon(0, 0) == -1)
fatal("daemon() failed: %.200s", strerror(errno));
disconnect_controlling_tty();
}
/* Reinitialize the log (because of the fork above). */
log_init(__progname, options.log_level, options.log_facility, log_stderr);
/* Chdir to the root directory so that the current disk can be
unmounted if desired. */
if (chdir("/") == -1)
error("chdir(\"/\"): %s", strerror(errno));
/* ignore SIGPIPE */
ssh_signal(SIGPIPE, SIG_IGN);
/* Get a connection, either from inetd or a listening TCP socket */
if (inetd_flag) {
server_accept_inetd(&sock_in, &sock_out);
} else {
platform_pre_listen();
server_listen();
ssh_signal(SIGHUP, sighup_handler);
ssh_signal(SIGCHLD, main_sigchld_handler);
ssh_signal(SIGTERM, sigterm_handler);
ssh_signal(SIGQUIT, sigterm_handler);
/*
* Write out the pid file after the sigterm handler
* is setup and the listen sockets are bound
*/
if (options.pid_file != NULL && !debug_flag) {
FILE *f = fopen(options.pid_file, "w");
if (f == NULL) {
error("Couldn't create pid file \"%s\": %s",
options.pid_file, strerror(errno));
} else {
fprintf(f, "%ld\n", (long) getpid());
fclose(f);
}
}
/* Accept a connection and return in a forked child */
server_accept_loop(&sock_in, &sock_out,
&newsock, config_s);
}
/* This is the child processing a new connection. */
setproctitle("%s", "[accepted]");
/*
* Create a new session and process group since the 4.4BSD
* setlogin() affects the entire process group. We don't
* want the child to be able to affect the parent.
*/
#if !defined(SSHD_ACQUIRES_CTTY)
/*
* If setsid is called, on some platforms sshd will later acquire a
* controlling terminal which will result in "could not set
* controlling tty" errors.
*/
if (!debug_flag && !inetd_flag && setsid() == -1)
error("setsid: %.100s", strerror(errno));
#endif
if (rexec_flag) {
int fd;
debug("rexec start in %d out %d newsock %d pipe %d sock %d",
sock_in, sock_out, newsock, startup_pipe, config_s[0]);
dup2(newsock, STDIN_FILENO);
dup2(STDIN_FILENO, STDOUT_FILENO);
if (startup_pipe == -1)
close(REEXEC_STARTUP_PIPE_FD);
else if (startup_pipe != REEXEC_STARTUP_PIPE_FD) {
dup2(startup_pipe, REEXEC_STARTUP_PIPE_FD);
close(startup_pipe);
startup_pipe = REEXEC_STARTUP_PIPE_FD;
}
dup2(config_s[1], REEXEC_CONFIG_PASS_FD);
close(config_s[1]);
+ ssh_signal(SIGHUP, SIG_IGN); /* avoid reset to SIG_DFL */
execv(rexec_argv[0], rexec_argv);
/* Reexec has failed, fall back and continue */
error("rexec of %s failed: %s", rexec_argv[0], strerror(errno));
recv_rexec_state(REEXEC_CONFIG_PASS_FD, NULL);
log_init(__progname, options.log_level,
options.log_facility, log_stderr);
/* Clean up fds */
close(REEXEC_CONFIG_PASS_FD);
newsock = sock_out = sock_in = dup(STDIN_FILENO);
if ((fd = open(_PATH_DEVNULL, O_RDWR, 0)) != -1) {
dup2(fd, STDIN_FILENO);
dup2(fd, STDOUT_FILENO);
if (fd > STDERR_FILENO)
close(fd);
}
debug("rexec cleanup in %d out %d newsock %d pipe %d sock %d",
sock_in, sock_out, newsock, startup_pipe, config_s[0]);
}
/* Executed child processes don't need these. */
fcntl(sock_out, F_SETFD, FD_CLOEXEC);
fcntl(sock_in, F_SETFD, FD_CLOEXEC);
/* We will not restart on SIGHUP since it no longer makes sense. */
ssh_signal(SIGALRM, SIG_DFL);
ssh_signal(SIGHUP, SIG_DFL);
ssh_signal(SIGTERM, SIG_DFL);
ssh_signal(SIGQUIT, SIG_DFL);
ssh_signal(SIGCHLD, SIG_DFL);
ssh_signal(SIGINT, SIG_DFL);
/*
* Register our connection. This turns encryption off because we do
* not have a key.
*/
if ((ssh = ssh_packet_set_connection(NULL, sock_in, sock_out)) == NULL)
fatal("Unable to create connection");
the_active_state = ssh;
ssh_packet_set_server(ssh);
check_ip_options(ssh);
/* Prepare the channels layer */
channel_init_channels(ssh);
channel_set_af(ssh, options.address_family);
process_permitopen(ssh, &options);
/* Set SO_KEEPALIVE if requested. */
if (options.tcp_keep_alive && ssh_packet_connection_is_on_socket(ssh) &&
setsockopt(sock_in, SOL_SOCKET, SO_KEEPALIVE, &on, sizeof(on)) == -1)
error("setsockopt SO_KEEPALIVE: %.100s", strerror(errno));
if ((remote_port = ssh_remote_port(ssh)) < 0) {
debug("ssh_remote_port failed");
cleanup_exit(255);
}
if (options.routing_domain != NULL)
set_process_rdomain(ssh, options.routing_domain);
/*
* The rest of the code depends on the fact that
* ssh_remote_ipaddr() caches the remote ip, even if
* the socket goes away.
*/
remote_ip = ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh);
#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
audit_connection_from(remote_ip, remote_port);
#endif
rdomain = ssh_packet_rdomain_in(ssh);
/* Log the connection. */
laddr = get_local_ipaddr(sock_in);
verbose("Connection from %s port %d on %s port %d%s%s%s",
remote_ip, remote_port, laddr, ssh_local_port(ssh),
rdomain == NULL ? "" : " rdomain \"",
rdomain == NULL ? "" : rdomain,
rdomain == NULL ? "" : "\"");
free(laddr);
/*
* We don't want to listen forever unless the other side
* successfully authenticates itself. So we set up an alarm which is
* cleared after successful authentication. A limit of zero
* indicates no limit. Note that we don't set the alarm in debugging
* mode; it is just annoying to have the server exit just when you
* are about to discover the bug.
*/
ssh_signal(SIGALRM, grace_alarm_handler);
if (!debug_flag)
alarm(options.login_grace_time);
if ((r = kex_exchange_identification(ssh, -1,
options.version_addendum)) != 0)
sshpkt_fatal(ssh, r, "banner exchange");
ssh_packet_set_nonblocking(ssh);
/* allocate authentication context */
authctxt = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*authctxt));
ssh->authctxt = authctxt;
authctxt->loginmsg = loginmsg;
/* XXX global for cleanup, access from other modules */
the_authctxt = authctxt;
/* Set default key authentication options */
if ((auth_opts = sshauthopt_new_with_keys_defaults()) == NULL)
fatal("allocation failed");
/* prepare buffer to collect messages to display to user after login */
if ((loginmsg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
auth_debug_reset();
if (use_privsep) {
if (privsep_preauth(ssh) == 1)
goto authenticated;
} else if (have_agent) {
if ((r = ssh_get_authentication_socket(&auth_sock)) != 0) {
error("Unable to get agent socket: %s", ssh_err(r));
have_agent = 0;
}
}
/* perform the key exchange */
/* authenticate user and start session */
do_ssh2_kex(ssh);
do_authentication2(ssh);
/*
* If we use privilege separation, the unprivileged child transfers
* the current keystate and exits
*/
if (use_privsep) {
mm_send_keystate(ssh, pmonitor);
ssh_packet_clear_keys(ssh);
exit(0);
}
authenticated:
/*
* Cancel the alarm we set to limit the time taken for
* authentication.
*/
alarm(0);
ssh_signal(SIGALRM, SIG_DFL);
authctxt->authenticated = 1;
if (startup_pipe != -1) {
close(startup_pipe);
startup_pipe = -1;
}
#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
audit_event(ssh, SSH_AUTH_SUCCESS);
#endif
#ifdef GSSAPI
if (options.gss_authentication) {
temporarily_use_uid(authctxt->pw);
ssh_gssapi_storecreds();
restore_uid();
}
#endif
#ifdef USE_PAM
if (options.use_pam) {
do_pam_setcred(1);
do_pam_session(ssh);
}
#endif
/*
* In privilege separation, we fork another child and prepare
* file descriptor passing.
*/
if (use_privsep) {
privsep_postauth(ssh, authctxt);
/* the monitor process [priv] will not return */
}
ssh_packet_set_timeout(ssh, options.client_alive_interval,
options.client_alive_count_max);
/* Try to send all our hostkeys to the client */
notify_hostkeys(ssh);
/* Start session. */
do_authenticated(ssh, authctxt);
/* The connection has been terminated. */
ssh_packet_get_bytes(ssh, &ibytes, &obytes);
verbose("Transferred: sent %llu, received %llu bytes",
(unsigned long long)obytes, (unsigned long long)ibytes);
verbose("Closing connection to %.500s port %d", remote_ip, remote_port);
#ifdef USE_PAM
if (options.use_pam)
finish_pam();
#endif /* USE_PAM */
#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
PRIVSEP(audit_event(ssh, SSH_CONNECTION_CLOSE));
#endif
ssh_packet_close(ssh);
if (use_privsep)
mm_terminate();
exit(0);
}
int
sshd_hostkey_sign(struct ssh *ssh, struct sshkey *privkey,
struct sshkey *pubkey, u_char **signature, size_t *slenp,
const u_char *data, size_t dlen, const char *alg)
{
int r;
if (use_privsep) {
if (privkey) {
if (mm_sshkey_sign(ssh, privkey, signature, slenp,
- data, dlen, alg, options.sk_provider,
+ data, dlen, alg, options.sk_provider, NULL,
ssh->compat) < 0)
fatal("%s: privkey sign failed", __func__);
} else {
if (mm_sshkey_sign(ssh, pubkey, signature, slenp,
- data, dlen, alg, options.sk_provider,
+ data, dlen, alg, options.sk_provider, NULL,
ssh->compat) < 0)
fatal("%s: pubkey sign failed", __func__);
}
} else {
if (privkey) {
if (sshkey_sign(privkey, signature, slenp, data, dlen,
- alg, options.sk_provider, ssh->compat) < 0)
+ alg, options.sk_provider, NULL, ssh->compat) < 0)
fatal("%s: privkey sign failed", __func__);
} else {
if ((r = ssh_agent_sign(auth_sock, pubkey,
signature, slenp, data, dlen, alg,
ssh->compat)) != 0) {
fatal("%s: agent sign failed: %s",
__func__, ssh_err(r));
}
}
}
return 0;
}
/* SSH2 key exchange */
static void
do_ssh2_kex(struct ssh *ssh)
{
char *myproposal[PROPOSAL_MAX] = { KEX_SERVER };
struct kex *kex;
int r;
myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS] = compat_kex_proposal(
options.kex_algorithms);
myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_CTOS] = compat_cipher_proposal(
options.ciphers);
myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_STOC] = compat_cipher_proposal(
options.ciphers);
myproposal[PROPOSAL_MAC_ALGS_CTOS] =
myproposal[PROPOSAL_MAC_ALGS_STOC] = options.macs;
if (options.compression == COMP_NONE) {
myproposal[PROPOSAL_COMP_ALGS_CTOS] =
myproposal[PROPOSAL_COMP_ALGS_STOC] = "none";
}
if (options.rekey_limit || options.rekey_interval)
ssh_packet_set_rekey_limits(ssh, options.rekey_limit,
options.rekey_interval);
myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS] = compat_pkalg_proposal(
list_hostkey_types());
/* start key exchange */
if ((r = kex_setup(ssh, myproposal)) != 0)
fatal("kex_setup: %s", ssh_err(r));
kex = ssh->kex;
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP1_SHA1] = kex_gen_server;
kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP14_SHA1] = kex_gen_server;
kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP14_SHA256] = kex_gen_server;
kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP16_SHA512] = kex_gen_server;
kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP18_SHA512] = kex_gen_server;
kex->kex[KEX_DH_GEX_SHA1] = kexgex_server;
kex->kex[KEX_DH_GEX_SHA256] = kexgex_server;
# ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
kex->kex[KEX_ECDH_SHA2] = kex_gen_server;
# endif
#endif
kex->kex[KEX_C25519_SHA256] = kex_gen_server;
kex->kex[KEX_KEM_SNTRUP4591761X25519_SHA512] = kex_gen_server;
kex->load_host_public_key=&get_hostkey_public_by_type;
kex->load_host_private_key=&get_hostkey_private_by_type;
kex->host_key_index=&get_hostkey_index;
kex->sign = sshd_hostkey_sign;
ssh_dispatch_run_fatal(ssh, DISPATCH_BLOCK, &kex->done);
session_id2 = kex->session_id;
session_id2_len = kex->session_id_len;
#ifdef DEBUG_KEXDH
/* send 1st encrypted/maced/compressed message */
- packet_start(SSH2_MSG_IGNORE);
- packet_put_cstring("markus");
- packet_send();
- packet_write_wait();
+ if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_IGNORE)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, "markus")) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0 ||
+ (r = ssh_packet_write_wait(ssh)) != 0)
+ fatal("%s: send test: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
#endif
debug("KEX done");
}
/* server specific fatal cleanup */
void
cleanup_exit(int i)
{
if (the_active_state != NULL && the_authctxt != NULL) {
do_cleanup(the_active_state, the_authctxt);
if (use_privsep && privsep_is_preauth &&
pmonitor != NULL && pmonitor->m_pid > 1) {
debug("Killing privsep child %d", pmonitor->m_pid);
if (kill(pmonitor->m_pid, SIGKILL) != 0 &&
errno != ESRCH)
error("%s: kill(%d): %s", __func__,
pmonitor->m_pid, strerror(errno));
}
}
#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
/* done after do_cleanup so it can cancel the PAM auth 'thread' */
if (the_active_state != NULL && (!use_privsep || mm_is_monitor()))
audit_event(the_active_state, SSH_CONNECTION_ABANDON);
#endif
_exit(i);
}
diff --git a/sshd_config.0 b/sshd_config.0
index e75ed1b3243d..8132c3f15cc1 100644
--- a/sshd_config.0
+++ b/sshd_config.0
@@ -1,1146 +1,1153 @@
SSHD_CONFIG(5) File Formats Manual SSHD_CONFIG(5)
NAME
sshd_config M-bM-^@M-^S OpenSSH daemon configuration file
DESCRIPTION
sshd(8) reads configuration data from /etc/ssh/sshd_config (or the file
specified with -f on the command line). The file contains keyword-
argument pairs, one per line. For each keyword, the first obtained value
will be used. Lines starting with M-bM-^@M-^X#M-bM-^@M-^Y and empty lines are interpreted as
comments. Arguments may optionally be enclosed in double quotes (") in
order to represent arguments containing spaces.
The possible keywords and their meanings are as follows (note that
keywords are case-insensitive and arguments are case-sensitive):
AcceptEnv
Specifies what environment variables sent by the client will be
copied into the session's environ(7). See SendEnv and SetEnv in
ssh_config(5) for how to configure the client. The TERM
environment variable is always accepted whenever the client
requests a pseudo-terminal as it is required by the protocol.
Variables are specified by name, which may contain the wildcard
characters M-bM-^@M-^X*M-bM-^@M-^Y and M-bM-^@M-^X?M-bM-^@M-^Y. Multiple environment variables may be
separated by whitespace or spread across multiple AcceptEnv
directives. Be warned that some environment variables could be
used to bypass restricted user environments. For this reason,
care should be taken in the use of this directive. The default
is not to accept any environment variables.
AddressFamily
Specifies which address family should be used by sshd(8). Valid
arguments are any (the default), inet (use IPv4 only), or inet6
(use IPv6 only).
AllowAgentForwarding
Specifies whether ssh-agent(1) forwarding is permitted. The
default is yes. Note that disabling agent forwarding does not
improve security unless users are also denied shell access, as
they can always install their own forwarders.
AllowGroups
This keyword can be followed by a list of group name patterns,
separated by spaces. If specified, login is allowed only for
users whose primary group or supplementary group list matches one
of the patterns. Only group names are valid; a numerical group
ID is not recognized. By default, login is allowed for all
groups. The allow/deny groups directives are processed in the
following order: DenyGroups, AllowGroups.
See PATTERNS in ssh_config(5) for more information on patterns.
AllowStreamLocalForwarding
Specifies whether StreamLocal (Unix-domain socket) forwarding is
permitted. The available options are yes (the default) or all to
allow StreamLocal forwarding, no to prevent all StreamLocal
forwarding, local to allow local (from the perspective of ssh(1))
forwarding only or remote to allow remote forwarding only. Note
that disabling StreamLocal forwarding does not improve security
unless users are also denied shell access, as they can always
install their own forwarders.
AllowTcpForwarding
Specifies whether TCP forwarding is permitted. The available
options are yes (the default) or all to allow TCP forwarding, no
to prevent all TCP forwarding, local to allow local (from the
perspective of ssh(1)) forwarding only or remote to allow remote
forwarding only. Note that disabling TCP forwarding does not
improve security unless users are also denied shell access, as
they can always install their own forwarders.
AllowUsers
This keyword can be followed by a list of user name patterns,
separated by spaces. If specified, login is allowed only for
user names that match one of the patterns. Only user names are
valid; a numerical user ID is not recognized. By default, login
is allowed for all users. If the pattern takes the form
USER@HOST then USER and HOST are separately checked, restricting
logins to particular users from particular hosts. HOST criteria
may additionally contain addresses to match in CIDR
address/masklen format. The allow/deny users directives are
processed in the following order: DenyUsers, AllowUsers.
See PATTERNS in ssh_config(5) for more information on patterns.
AuthenticationMethods
Specifies the authentication methods that must be successfully
completed for a user to be granted access. This option must be
followed by one or more lists of comma-separated authentication
method names, or by the single string any to indicate the default
behaviour of accepting any single authentication method. If the
default is overridden, then successful authentication requires
completion of every method in at least one of these lists.
For example, "publickey,password publickey,keyboard-interactive"
would require the user to complete public key authentication,
followed by either password or keyboard interactive
authentication. Only methods that are next in one or more lists
are offered at each stage, so for this example it would not be
possible to attempt password or keyboard-interactive
authentication before public key.
For keyboard interactive authentication it is also possible to
restrict authentication to a specific device by appending a colon
followed by the device identifier bsdauth or pam. depending on
the server configuration. For example,
"keyboard-interactive:bsdauth" would restrict keyboard
interactive authentication to the bsdauth device.
If the publickey method is listed more than once, sshd(8)
verifies that keys that have been used successfully are not
reused for subsequent authentications. For example,
"publickey,publickey" requires successful authentication using
two different public keys.
Note that each authentication method listed should also be
explicitly enabled in the configuration.
The available authentication methods are: "gssapi-with-mic",
"hostbased", "keyboard-interactive", "none" (used for access to
password-less accounts when PermitEmptyPasswords is enabled),
"password" and "publickey".
AuthorizedKeysCommand
Specifies a program to be used to look up the user's public keys.
The program must be owned by root, not writable by group or
others and specified by an absolute path. Arguments to
AuthorizedKeysCommand accept the tokens described in the TOKENS
section. If no arguments are specified then the username of the
target user is used.
The program should produce on standard output zero or more lines
of authorized_keys output (see AUTHORIZED_KEYS in sshd(8)).
AuthorizedKeysCommand is tried after the usual AuthorizedKeysFile
files and will not be executed if a matching key is found there.
By default, no AuthorizedKeysCommand is run.
AuthorizedKeysCommandUser
Specifies the user under whose account the AuthorizedKeysCommand
is run. It is recommended to use a dedicated user that has no
other role on the host than running authorized keys commands. If
AuthorizedKeysCommand is specified but AuthorizedKeysCommandUser
is not, then sshd(8) will refuse to start.
AuthorizedKeysFile
Specifies the file that contains the public keys used for user
authentication. The format is described in the AUTHORIZED_KEYS
FILE FORMAT section of sshd(8). Arguments to AuthorizedKeysFile
accept the tokens described in the TOKENS section. After
expansion, AuthorizedKeysFile is taken to be an absolute path or
one relative to the user's home directory. Multiple files may be
listed, separated by whitespace. Alternately this option may be
set to none to skip checking for user keys in files. The default
is ".ssh/authorized_keys .ssh/authorized_keys2".
AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand
Specifies a program to be used to generate the list of allowed
certificate principals as per AuthorizedPrincipalsFile. The
program must be owned by root, not writable by group or others
and specified by an absolute path. Arguments to
AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand accept the tokens described in the
TOKENS section. If no arguments are specified then the username
of the target user is used.
The program should produce on standard output zero or more lines
of AuthorizedPrincipalsFile output. If either
AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand or AuthorizedPrincipalsFile is
specified, then certificates offered by the client for
authentication must contain a principal that is listed. By
default, no AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand is run.
AuthorizedPrincipalsCommandUser
Specifies the user under whose account the
AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand is run. It is recommended to use a
dedicated user that has no other role on the host than running
authorized principals commands. If AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand
is specified but AuthorizedPrincipalsCommandUser is not, then
sshd(8) will refuse to start.
AuthorizedPrincipalsFile
Specifies a file that lists principal names that are accepted for
certificate authentication. When using certificates signed by a
key listed in TrustedUserCAKeys, this file lists names, one of
which must appear in the certificate for it to be accepted for
authentication. Names are listed one per line preceded by key
options (as described in AUTHORIZED_KEYS FILE FORMAT in sshd(8)).
Empty lines and comments starting with M-bM-^@M-^X#M-bM-^@M-^Y are ignored.
Arguments to AuthorizedPrincipalsFile accept the tokens described
in the TOKENS section. After expansion, AuthorizedPrincipalsFile
is taken to be an absolute path or one relative to the user's
home directory. The default is none, i.e. not to use a
principals file M-bM-^@M-^S in this case, the username of the user must
appear in a certificate's principals list for it to be accepted.
Note that AuthorizedPrincipalsFile is only used when
authentication proceeds using a CA listed in TrustedUserCAKeys
and is not consulted for certification authorities trusted via
~/.ssh/authorized_keys, though the principals= key option offers
a similar facility (see sshd(8) for details).
Banner The contents of the specified file are sent to the remote user
before authentication is allowed. If the argument is none then
no banner is displayed. By default, no banner is displayed.
CASignatureAlgorithms
Specifies which algorithms are allowed for signing of
certificates by certificate authorities (CAs). The default is:
ecdsa-sha2-nistp256,ecdsa-sha2-nistp384,ecdsa-sha2-nistp521,
ssh-ed25519,rsa-sha2-512,rsa-sha2-256,ssh-rsa
Certificates signed using other algorithms will not be accepted
for public key or host-based authentication.
ChallengeResponseAuthentication
Specifies whether challenge-response authentication is allowed
(e.g. via PAM or through authentication styles supported in
login.conf(5)) The default is yes.
ChrootDirectory
Specifies the pathname of a directory to chroot(2) to after
authentication. At session startup sshd(8) checks that all
components of the pathname are root-owned directories which are
not writable by any other user or group. After the chroot,
sshd(8) changes the working directory to the user's home
directory. Arguments to ChrootDirectory accept the tokens
described in the TOKENS section.
The ChrootDirectory must contain the necessary files and
directories to support the user's session. For an interactive
session this requires at least a shell, typically sh(1), and
basic /dev nodes such as null(4), zero(4), stdin(4), stdout(4),
stderr(4), and tty(4) devices. For file transfer sessions using
SFTP no additional configuration of the environment is necessary
if the in-process sftp-server is used, though sessions which use
logging may require /dev/log inside the chroot directory on some
operating systems (see sftp-server(8) for details).
For safety, it is very important that the directory hierarchy be
prevented from modification by other processes on the system
(especially those outside the jail). Misconfiguration can lead
to unsafe environments which sshd(8) cannot detect.
The default is none, indicating not to chroot(2).
Ciphers
Specifies the ciphers allowed. Multiple ciphers must be comma-
separated. If the specified list begins with a M-bM-^@M-^X+M-bM-^@M-^Y character,
then the specified ciphers will be appended to the default set
instead of replacing them. If the specified list begins with a
M-bM-^@M-^X-M-bM-^@M-^Y character, then the specified ciphers (including wildcards)
will be removed from the default set instead of replacing them.
If the specified list begins with a M-bM-^@M-^X^M-bM-^@M-^Y character, then the
specified ciphers will be placed at the head of the default set.
The supported ciphers are:
3des-cbc
aes128-cbc
aes192-cbc
aes256-cbc
aes128-ctr
aes192-ctr
aes256-ctr
aes128-gcm@openssh.com
aes256-gcm@openssh.com
chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com
The default is:
chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com,
aes128-ctr,aes192-ctr,aes256-ctr,
aes128-gcm@openssh.com,aes256-gcm@openssh.com
The list of available ciphers may also be obtained using "ssh -Q
cipher".
ClientAliveCountMax
Sets the number of client alive messages which may be sent
without sshd(8) receiving any messages back from the client. If
this threshold is reached while client alive messages are being
sent, sshd will disconnect the client, terminating the session.
It is important to note that the use of client alive messages is
very different from TCPKeepAlive. The client alive messages are
sent through the encrypted channel and therefore will not be
spoofable. The TCP keepalive option enabled by TCPKeepAlive is
spoofable. The client alive mechanism is valuable when the
client or server depend on knowing when a connection has become
unresponsive.
The default value is 3. If ClientAliveInterval is set to 15, and
ClientAliveCountMax is left at the default, unresponsive SSH
clients will be disconnected after approximately 45 seconds.
Setting a zero ClientAliveCountMax disables connection
termination.
ClientAliveInterval
Sets a timeout interval in seconds after which if no data has
been received from the client, sshd(8) will send a message
through the encrypted channel to request a response from the
client. The default is 0, indicating that these messages will
not be sent to the client.
Compression
Specifies whether compression is enabled after the user has
authenticated successfully. The argument must be yes, delayed (a
legacy synonym for yes) or no. The default is yes.
DenyGroups
This keyword can be followed by a list of group name patterns,
separated by spaces. Login is disallowed for users whose primary
group or supplementary group list matches one of the patterns.
Only group names are valid; a numerical group ID is not
recognized. By default, login is allowed for all groups. The
allow/deny groups directives are processed in the following
order: DenyGroups, AllowGroups.
See PATTERNS in ssh_config(5) for more information on patterns.
DenyUsers
This keyword can be followed by a list of user name patterns,
separated by spaces. Login is disallowed for user names that
match one of the patterns. Only user names are valid; a
numerical user ID is not recognized. By default, login is
allowed for all users. If the pattern takes the form USER@HOST
then USER and HOST are separately checked, restricting logins to
particular users from particular hosts. HOST criteria may
additionally contain addresses to match in CIDR address/masklen
format. The allow/deny users directives are processed in the
following order: DenyUsers, AllowUsers.
See PATTERNS in ssh_config(5) for more information on patterns.
DisableForwarding
Disables all forwarding features, including X11, ssh-agent(1),
TCP and StreamLocal. This option overrides all other forwarding-
related options and may simplify restricted configurations.
ExposeAuthInfo
Writes a temporary file containing a list of authentication
methods and public credentials (e.g. keys) used to authenticate
the user. The location of the file is exposed to the user
session through the SSH_USER_AUTH environment variable. The
default is no.
FingerprintHash
Specifies the hash algorithm used when logging key fingerprints.
Valid options are: md5 and sha256. The default is sha256.
ForceCommand
Forces the execution of the command specified by ForceCommand,
ignoring any command supplied by the client and ~/.ssh/rc if
present. The command is invoked by using the user's login shell
with the -c option. This applies to shell, command, or subsystem
execution. It is most useful inside a Match block. The command
originally supplied by the client is available in the
SSH_ORIGINAL_COMMAND environment variable. Specifying a command
of internal-sftp will force the use of an in-process SFTP server
that requires no support files when used with ChrootDirectory.
The default is none.
GatewayPorts
Specifies whether remote hosts are allowed to connect to ports
forwarded for the client. By default, sshd(8) binds remote port
forwardings to the loopback address. This prevents other remote
hosts from connecting to forwarded ports. GatewayPorts can be
used to specify that sshd should allow remote port forwardings to
bind to non-loopback addresses, thus allowing other hosts to
connect. The argument may be no to force remote port forwardings
to be available to the local host only, yes to force remote port
forwardings to bind to the wildcard address, or clientspecified
to allow the client to select the address to which the forwarding
is bound. The default is no.
GSSAPIAuthentication
Specifies whether user authentication based on GSSAPI is allowed.
The default is no.
GSSAPICleanupCredentials
Specifies whether to automatically destroy the user's credentials
cache on logout. The default is yes.
GSSAPIStrictAcceptorCheck
Determines whether to be strict about the identity of the GSSAPI
acceptor a client authenticates against. If set to yes then the
client must authenticate against the host service on the current
hostname. If set to no then the client may authenticate against
any service key stored in the machine's default store. This
facility is provided to assist with operation on multi homed
machines. The default is yes.
HostbasedAcceptedKeyTypes
Specifies the key types that will be accepted for hostbased
authentication as a list of comma-separated patterns.
Alternately if the specified list begins with a M-bM-^@M-^X+M-bM-^@M-^Y character,
then the specified key types will be appended to the default set
instead of replacing them. If the specified list begins with a
M-bM-^@M-^X-M-bM-^@M-^Y character, then the specified key types (including wildcards)
will be removed from the default set instead of replacing them.
If the specified list begins with a M-bM-^@M-^X^M-bM-^@M-^Y character, then the
specified key types will be placed at the head of the default
set. The default for this option is:
ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com,
ecdsa-sha2-nistp384-cert-v01@openssh.com,
ecdsa-sha2-nistp521-cert-v01@openssh.com,
sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com,
ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com,
sk-ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com,
rsa-sha2-512-cert-v01@openssh.com,
rsa-sha2-256-cert-v01@openssh.com,
ssh-rsa-cert-v01@openssh.com,
ecdsa-sha2-nistp256,ecdsa-sha2-nistp384,ecdsa-sha2-nistp521,
sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256@openssh.com,
ssh-ed25519,sk-ssh-ed25519@openssh.com,
rsa-sha2-512,rsa-sha2-256,ssh-rsa
The list of available key types may also be obtained using "ssh
-Q HostbasedAcceptedKeyTypes".
HostbasedAuthentication
Specifies whether rhosts or /etc/hosts.equiv authentication
together with successful public key client host authentication is
allowed (host-based authentication). The default is no.
HostbasedUsesNameFromPacketOnly
Specifies whether or not the server will attempt to perform a
reverse name lookup when matching the name in the ~/.shosts,
~/.rhosts, and /etc/hosts.equiv files during
HostbasedAuthentication. A setting of yes means that sshd(8)
uses the name supplied by the client rather than attempting to
resolve the name from the TCP connection itself. The default is
no.
HostCertificate
Specifies a file containing a public host certificate. The
certificate's public key must match a private host key already
specified by HostKey. The default behaviour of sshd(8) is not to
load any certificates.
HostKey
Specifies a file containing a private host key used by SSH. The
defaults are /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ecdsa_key,
/etc/ssh/ssh_host_ed25519_key and /etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key.
Note that sshd(8) will refuse to use a file if it is group/world-
accessible and that the HostKeyAlgorithms option restricts which
of the keys are actually used by sshd(8).
It is possible to have multiple host key files. It is also
possible to specify public host key files instead. In this case
operations on the private key will be delegated to an
ssh-agent(1).
HostKeyAgent
Identifies the UNIX-domain socket used to communicate with an
agent that has access to the private host keys. If the string
"SSH_AUTH_SOCK" is specified, the location of the socket will be
read from the SSH_AUTH_SOCK environment variable.
HostKeyAlgorithms
Specifies the host key algorithms that the server offers. The
default for this option is:
ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com,
ecdsa-sha2-nistp384-cert-v01@openssh.com,
ecdsa-sha2-nistp521-cert-v01@openssh.com,
sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com,
ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com,
sk-ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com,
rsa-sha2-512-cert-v01@openssh.com,
rsa-sha2-256-cert-v01@openssh.com,
ssh-rsa-cert-v01@openssh.com,
ecdsa-sha2-nistp256,ecdsa-sha2-nistp384,ecdsa-sha2-nistp521,
sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256@openssh.com,
ssh-ed25519,sk-ssh-ed25519@openssh.com,
rsa-sha2-512,rsa-sha2-256,ssh-rsa
The list of available key types may also be obtained using "ssh
-Q HostKeyAlgorithms".
IgnoreRhosts
Specifies whether to ignore per-user .rhosts and .shosts files
during HostbasedAuthentication. The system-wide /etc/hosts.equiv
and /etc/shosts.equiv are still used regardless of this setting.
Accepted values are yes (the default) to ignore all per-user
files, shosts-only to allow the use of .shosts but to ignore
.rhosts or no to allow both .shosts and rhosts.
IgnoreUserKnownHosts
Specifies whether sshd(8) should ignore the user's
~/.ssh/known_hosts during HostbasedAuthentication and use only
the system-wide known hosts file /etc/ssh/known_hosts. The
default is M-bM-^@M-^\noM-bM-^@M-^].
Include
Include the specified configuration file(s). Multiple pathnames
- may be specified and each pathname may contain glob(7) wildcards.
- Files without absolute paths are assumed to be in /etc/ssh. An
- Include directive may appear inside a Match block to perform
- conditional inclusion.
+ may be specified and each pathname may contain glob(7) wildcards
+ that will be expanded and processed in lexical order. Files
+ without absolute paths are assumed to be in /etc/ssh. An Include
+ directive may appear inside a Match block to perform conditional
+ inclusion.
IPQoS Specifies the IPv4 type-of-service or DSCP class for the
connection. Accepted values are af11, af12, af13, af21, af22,
af23, af31, af32, af33, af41, af42, af43, cs0, cs1, cs2, cs3,
cs4, cs5, cs6, cs7, ef, le, lowdelay, throughput, reliability, a
numeric value, or none to use the operating system default. This
option may take one or two arguments, separated by whitespace.
If one argument is specified, it is used as the packet class
unconditionally. If two values are specified, the first is
automatically selected for interactive sessions and the second
for non-interactive sessions. The default is af21 (Low-Latency
Data) for interactive sessions and cs1 (Lower Effort) for non-
interactive sessions.
KbdInteractiveAuthentication
Specifies whether to allow keyboard-interactive authentication.
The argument to this keyword must be yes or no. The default is
to use whatever value ChallengeResponseAuthentication is set to
(by default yes).
KerberosAuthentication
Specifies whether the password provided by the user for
PasswordAuthentication will be validated through the Kerberos
KDC. To use this option, the server needs a Kerberos servtab
which allows the verification of the KDC's identity. The default
is no.
KerberosGetAFSToken
If AFS is active and the user has a Kerberos 5 TGT, attempt to
acquire an AFS token before accessing the user's home directory.
The default is no.
KerberosOrLocalPasswd
If password authentication through Kerberos fails then the
password will be validated via any additional local mechanism
such as /etc/passwd. The default is yes.
KerberosTicketCleanup
Specifies whether to automatically destroy the user's ticket
cache file on logout. The default is yes.
KexAlgorithms
Specifies the available KEX (Key Exchange) algorithms. Multiple
algorithms must be comma-separated. Alternately if the specified
list begins with a M-bM-^@M-^X+M-bM-^@M-^Y character, then the specified methods will
be appended to the default set instead of replacing them. If the
specified list begins with a M-bM-^@M-^X-M-bM-^@M-^Y character, then the specified
methods (including wildcards) will be removed from the default
set instead of replacing them. If the specified list begins with
a M-bM-^@M-^X^M-bM-^@M-^Y character, then the specified methods will be placed at the
head of the default set. The supported algorithms are:
curve25519-sha256
curve25519-sha256@libssh.org
diffie-hellman-group1-sha1
diffie-hellman-group14-sha1
diffie-hellman-group14-sha256
diffie-hellman-group16-sha512
diffie-hellman-group18-sha512
diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha1
diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha256
ecdh-sha2-nistp256
ecdh-sha2-nistp384
ecdh-sha2-nistp521
sntrup4591761x25519-sha512@tinyssh.org
The default is:
curve25519-sha256,curve25519-sha256@libssh.org,
ecdh-sha2-nistp256,ecdh-sha2-nistp384,ecdh-sha2-nistp521,
diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha256,
diffie-hellman-group16-sha512,diffie-hellman-group18-sha512,
diffie-hellman-group14-sha256
The list of available key exchange algorithms may also be
obtained using "ssh -Q KexAlgorithms".
ListenAddress
Specifies the local addresses sshd(8) should listen on. The
following forms may be used:
ListenAddress hostname|address [rdomain domain]
ListenAddress hostname:port [rdomain domain]
ListenAddress IPv4_address:port [rdomain domain]
ListenAddress [hostname|address]:port [rdomain domain]
The optional rdomain qualifier requests sshd(8) listen in an
explicit routing domain. If port is not specified, sshd will
listen on the address and all Port options specified. The
default is to listen on all local addresses on the current
default routing domain. Multiple ListenAddress options are
permitted. For more information on routing domains, see
rdomain(4).
LoginGraceTime
The server disconnects after this time if the user has not
successfully logged in. If the value is 0, there is no time
limit. The default is 120 seconds.
LogLevel
Gives the verbosity level that is used when logging messages from
sshd(8). The possible values are: QUIET, FATAL, ERROR, INFO,
VERBOSE, DEBUG, DEBUG1, DEBUG2, and DEBUG3. The default is INFO.
DEBUG and DEBUG1 are equivalent. DEBUG2 and DEBUG3 each specify
higher levels of debugging output. Logging with a DEBUG level
violates the privacy of users and is not recommended.
MACs Specifies the available MAC (message authentication code)
algorithms. The MAC algorithm is used for data integrity
protection. Multiple algorithms must be comma-separated. If the
specified list begins with a M-bM-^@M-^X+M-bM-^@M-^Y character, then the specified
algorithms will be appended to the default set instead of
replacing them. If the specified list begins with a M-bM-^@M-^X-M-bM-^@M-^Y
character, then the specified algorithms (including wildcards)
will be removed from the default set instead of replacing them.
If the specified list begins with a M-bM-^@M-^X^M-bM-^@M-^Y character, then the
specified algorithms will be placed at the head of the default
set.
The algorithms that contain "-etm" calculate the MAC after
encryption (encrypt-then-mac). These are considered safer and
their use recommended. The supported MACs are:
hmac-md5
hmac-md5-96
hmac-sha1
hmac-sha1-96
hmac-sha2-256
hmac-sha2-512
umac-64@openssh.com
umac-128@openssh.com
hmac-md5-etm@openssh.com
hmac-md5-96-etm@openssh.com
hmac-sha1-etm@openssh.com
hmac-sha1-96-etm@openssh.com
hmac-sha2-256-etm@openssh.com
hmac-sha2-512-etm@openssh.com
umac-64-etm@openssh.com
umac-128-etm@openssh.com
The default is:
umac-64-etm@openssh.com,umac-128-etm@openssh.com,
hmac-sha2-256-etm@openssh.com,hmac-sha2-512-etm@openssh.com,
hmac-sha1-etm@openssh.com,
umac-64@openssh.com,umac-128@openssh.com,
hmac-sha2-256,hmac-sha2-512,hmac-sha1
The list of available MAC algorithms may also be obtained using
"ssh -Q mac".
Match Introduces a conditional block. If all of the criteria on the
Match line are satisfied, the keywords on the following lines
override those set in the global section of the config file,
until either another Match line or the end of the file. If a
keyword appears in multiple Match blocks that are satisfied, only
the first instance of the keyword is applied.
The arguments to Match are one or more criteria-pattern pairs or
the single token All which matches all criteria. The available
criteria are User, Group, Host, LocalAddress, LocalPort, RDomain,
and Address (with RDomain representing the rdomain(4) on which
the connection was received).
The match patterns may consist of single entries or comma-
separated lists and may use the wildcard and negation operators
described in the PATTERNS section of ssh_config(5).
The patterns in an Address criteria may additionally contain
addresses to match in CIDR address/masklen format, such as
192.0.2.0/24 or 2001:db8::/32. Note that the mask length
provided must be consistent with the address - it is an error to
specify a mask length that is too long for the address or one
with bits set in this host portion of the address. For example,
192.0.2.0/33 and 192.0.2.0/8, respectively.
Only a subset of keywords may be used on the lines following a
Match keyword. Available keywords are AcceptEnv,
AllowAgentForwarding, AllowGroups, AllowStreamLocalForwarding,
AllowTcpForwarding, AllowUsers, AuthenticationMethods,
AuthorizedKeysCommand, AuthorizedKeysCommandUser,
AuthorizedKeysFile, AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand,
AuthorizedPrincipalsCommandUser, AuthorizedPrincipalsFile,
Banner, ChrootDirectory, ClientAliveCountMax,
ClientAliveInterval, DenyGroups, DenyUsers, ForceCommand,
GatewayPorts, GSSAPIAuthentication, HostbasedAcceptedKeyTypes,
HostbasedAuthentication, HostbasedUsesNameFromPacketOnly,
IgnoreRhosts, Include, IPQoS, KbdInteractiveAuthentication,
KerberosAuthentication, LogLevel, MaxAuthTries, MaxSessions,
PasswordAuthentication, PermitEmptyPasswords, PermitListen,
PermitOpen, PermitRootLogin, PermitTTY, PermitTunnel,
PermitUserRC, PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes, PubkeyAuthentication,
RekeyLimit, RevokedKeys, RDomain, SetEnv, StreamLocalBindMask,
StreamLocalBindUnlink, TrustedUserCAKeys, X11DisplayOffset,
X11Forwarding and X11UseLocalhost.
MaxAuthTries
Specifies the maximum number of authentication attempts permitted
per connection. Once the number of failures reaches half this
value, additional failures are logged. The default is 6.
MaxSessions
Specifies the maximum number of open shell, login or subsystem
(e.g. sftp) sessions permitted per network connection. Multiple
sessions may be established by clients that support connection
multiplexing. Setting MaxSessions to 1 will effectively disable
session multiplexing, whereas setting it to 0 will prevent all
shell, login and subsystem sessions while still permitting
forwarding. The default is 10.
MaxStartups
Specifies the maximum number of concurrent unauthenticated
connections to the SSH daemon. Additional connections will be
dropped until authentication succeeds or the LoginGraceTime
expires for a connection. The default is 10:30:100.
Alternatively, random early drop can be enabled by specifying the
three colon separated values start:rate:full (e.g. "10:30:60").
sshd(8) will refuse connection attempts with a probability of
rate/100 (30%) if there are currently start (10) unauthenticated
connections. The probability increases linearly and all
connection attempts are refused if the number of unauthenticated
connections reaches full (60).
PasswordAuthentication
Specifies whether password authentication is allowed. The
default is yes.
PermitEmptyPasswords
When password authentication is allowed, it specifies whether the
server allows login to accounts with empty password strings. The
default is no.
PermitListen
Specifies the addresses/ports on which a remote TCP port
forwarding may listen. The listen specification must be one of
the following forms:
PermitListen port
PermitListen host:port
Multiple permissions may be specified by separating them with
whitespace. An argument of any can be used to remove all
restrictions and permit any listen requests. An argument of none
can be used to prohibit all listen requests. The host name may
contain wildcards as described in the PATTERNS section in
ssh_config(5). The wildcard M-bM-^@M-^X*M-bM-^@M-^Y can also be used in place of a
port number to allow all ports. By default all port forwarding
listen requests are permitted. Note that the GatewayPorts option
may further restrict which addresses may be listened on. Note
also that ssh(1) will request a listen host of M-bM-^@M-^\localhostM-bM-^@M-^] if no
listen host was specifically requested, and this name is treated
differently to explicit localhost addresses of M-bM-^@M-^\127.0.0.1M-bM-^@M-^] and
M-bM-^@M-^\::1M-bM-^@M-^].
PermitOpen
Specifies the destinations to which TCP port forwarding is
permitted. The forwarding specification must be one of the
following forms:
PermitOpen host:port
PermitOpen IPv4_addr:port
PermitOpen [IPv6_addr]:port
Multiple forwards may be specified by separating them with
whitespace. An argument of any can be used to remove all
restrictions and permit any forwarding requests. An argument of
none can be used to prohibit all forwarding requests. The
wildcard M-bM-^@M-^X*M-bM-^@M-^Y can be used for host or port to allow all hosts or
ports respectively. Otherwise, no pattern matching or address
lookups are performed on supplied names. By default all port
forwarding requests are permitted.
PermitRootLogin
Specifies whether root can log in using ssh(1). The argument
must be yes, prohibit-password, forced-commands-only, or no. The
default is prohibit-password.
If this option is set to prohibit-password (or its deprecated
alias, without-password), password and keyboard-interactive
authentication are disabled for root.
If this option is set to forced-commands-only, root login with
public key authentication will be allowed, but only if the
command option has been specified (which may be useful for taking
remote backups even if root login is normally not allowed). All
other authentication methods are disabled for root.
If this option is set to no, root is not allowed to log in.
PermitTTY
Specifies whether pty(4) allocation is permitted. The default is
yes.
PermitTunnel
Specifies whether tun(4) device forwarding is allowed. The
argument must be yes, point-to-point (layer 3), ethernet (layer
2), or no. Specifying yes permits both point-to-point and
ethernet. The default is no.
Independent of this setting, the permissions of the selected
tun(4) device must allow access to the user.
PermitUserEnvironment
Specifies whether ~/.ssh/environment and environment= options in
~/.ssh/authorized_keys are processed by sshd(8). Valid options
are yes, no or a pattern-list specifying which environment
variable names to accept (for example "LANG,LC_*"). The default
is no. Enabling environment processing may enable users to
bypass access restrictions in some configurations using
mechanisms such as LD_PRELOAD.
PermitUserRC
Specifies whether any ~/.ssh/rc file is executed. The default is
yes.
PidFile
Specifies the file that contains the process ID of the SSH
daemon, or none to not write one. The default is
/var/run/sshd.pid.
Port Specifies the port number that sshd(8) listens on. The default
is 22. Multiple options of this type are permitted. See also
ListenAddress.
PrintLastLog
Specifies whether sshd(8) should print the date and time of the
last user login when a user logs in interactively. The default
is yes.
PrintMotd
Specifies whether sshd(8) should print /etc/motd when a user logs
in interactively. (On some systems it is also printed by the
shell, /etc/profile, or equivalent.) The default is yes.
PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes
Specifies the key types that will be accepted for public key
authentication as a list of comma-separated patterns.
Alternately if the specified list begins with a M-bM-^@M-^X+M-bM-^@M-^Y character,
then the specified key types will be appended to the default set
instead of replacing them. If the specified list begins with a
M-bM-^@M-^X-M-bM-^@M-^Y character, then the specified key types (including wildcards)
will be removed from the default set instead of replacing them.
If the specified list begins with a M-bM-^@M-^X^M-bM-^@M-^Y character, then the
specified key types will be placed at the head of the default
set. The default for this option is:
ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com,
ecdsa-sha2-nistp384-cert-v01@openssh.com,
ecdsa-sha2-nistp521-cert-v01@openssh.com,
sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com,
ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com,
sk-ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com,
rsa-sha2-512-cert-v01@openssh.com,
rsa-sha2-256-cert-v01@openssh.com,
ssh-rsa-cert-v01@openssh.com,
ecdsa-sha2-nistp256,ecdsa-sha2-nistp384,ecdsa-sha2-nistp521,
sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256@openssh.com,
ssh-ed25519,sk-ssh-ed25519@openssh.com,
rsa-sha2-512,rsa-sha2-256,ssh-rsa
The list of available key types may also be obtained using "ssh
-Q PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes".
PubkeyAuthOptions
- Sets one or more public key authentication options. Two option
- keywords are currently supported: none (the default; indicating
- no additional options are enabled) and touch-required.
+ Sets one or more public key authentication options. The
+ supported keywords are: none (the default; indicating no
+ additional options are enabled), touch-required and
+ verify-required.
The touch-required option causes public key authentication using
a FIDO authenticator algorithm (i.e. ecdsa-sk or ed25519-sk) to
always require the signature to attest that a physically present
user explicitly confirmed the authentication (usually by touching
the authenticator). By default, sshd(8) requires user presence
unless overridden with an authorized_keys option. The
- touch-required flag disables this override. This option has no
- effect for other, non-authenticator public key types.
+ touch-required flag disables this override.
+
+ The verify-required option requires a FIDO key signature attest
+ that the user was verified, e.g. via a PIN.
+
+ Neither the touch-required or verify-required options have any
+ effect for other, non-FIDO, public key types.
PubkeyAuthentication
Specifies whether public key authentication is allowed. The
default is yes.
RekeyLimit
Specifies the maximum amount of data that may be transmitted
before the session key is renegotiated, optionally followed a
maximum amount of time that may pass before the session key is
renegotiated. The first argument is specified in bytes and may
have a suffix of M-bM-^@M-^XKM-bM-^@M-^Y, M-bM-^@M-^XMM-bM-^@M-^Y, or M-bM-^@M-^XGM-bM-^@M-^Y to indicate Kilobytes,
Megabytes, or Gigabytes, respectively. The default is between
M-bM-^@M-^X1GM-bM-^@M-^Y and M-bM-^@M-^X4GM-bM-^@M-^Y, depending on the cipher. The optional second
value is specified in seconds and may use any of the units
documented in the TIME FORMATS section. The default value for
RekeyLimit is default none, which means that rekeying is
performed after the cipher's default amount of data has been sent
or received and no time based rekeying is done.
RevokedKeys
Specifies revoked public keys file, or none to not use one. Keys
listed in this file will be refused for public key
authentication. Note that if this file is not readable, then
public key authentication will be refused for all users. Keys
may be specified as a text file, listing one public key per line,
or as an OpenSSH Key Revocation List (KRL) as generated by
ssh-keygen(1). For more information on KRLs, see the KEY
REVOCATION LISTS section in ssh-keygen(1).
RDomain
Specifies an explicit routing domain that is applied after
authentication has completed. The user session, as well and any
forwarded or listening IP sockets, will be bound to this
rdomain(4). If the routing domain is set to %D, then the domain
in which the incoming connection was received will be applied.
SecurityKeyProvider
Specifies a path to a library that will be used when loading FIDO
authenticator-hosted keys, overriding the default of using the
built-in USB HID support.
SetEnv Specifies one or more environment variables to set in child
sessions started by sshd(8) as M-bM-^@M-^\NAME=VALUEM-bM-^@M-^]. The environment
value may be quoted (e.g. if it contains whitespace characters).
Environment variables set by SetEnv override the default
environment and any variables specified by the user via AcceptEnv
or PermitUserEnvironment.
StreamLocalBindMask
Sets the octal file creation mode mask (umask) used when creating
a Unix-domain socket file for local or remote port forwarding.
This option is only used for port forwarding to a Unix-domain
socket file.
The default value is 0177, which creates a Unix-domain socket
file that is readable and writable only by the owner. Note that
not all operating systems honor the file mode on Unix-domain
socket files.
StreamLocalBindUnlink
Specifies whether to remove an existing Unix-domain socket file
for local or remote port forwarding before creating a new one.
If the socket file already exists and StreamLocalBindUnlink is
not enabled, sshd will be unable to forward the port to the Unix-
domain socket file. This option is only used for port forwarding
to a Unix-domain socket file.
The argument must be yes or no. The default is no.
StrictModes
Specifies whether sshd(8) should check file modes and ownership
of the user's files and home directory before accepting login.
This is normally desirable because novices sometimes accidentally
leave their directory or files world-writable. The default is
yes. Note that this does not apply to ChrootDirectory, whose
permissions and ownership are checked unconditionally.
Subsystem
Configures an external subsystem (e.g. file transfer daemon).
Arguments should be a subsystem name and a command (with optional
arguments) to execute upon subsystem request.
The command sftp-server implements the SFTP file transfer
subsystem.
Alternately the name internal-sftp implements an in-process SFTP
server. This may simplify configurations using ChrootDirectory
to force a different filesystem root on clients.
By default no subsystems are defined.
SyslogFacility
Gives the facility code that is used when logging messages from
sshd(8). The possible values are: DAEMON, USER, AUTH, LOCAL0,
LOCAL1, LOCAL2, LOCAL3, LOCAL4, LOCAL5, LOCAL6, LOCAL7. The
default is AUTH.
TCPKeepAlive
Specifies whether the system should send TCP keepalive messages
to the other side. If they are sent, death of the connection or
crash of one of the machines will be properly noticed. However,
this means that connections will die if the route is down
temporarily, and some people find it annoying. On the other
hand, if TCP keepalives are not sent, sessions may hang
indefinitely on the server, leaving "ghost" users and consuming
server resources.
The default is yes (to send TCP keepalive messages), and the
server will notice if the network goes down or the client host
crashes. This avoids infinitely hanging sessions.
To disable TCP keepalive messages, the value should be set to no.
TrustedUserCAKeys
Specifies a file containing public keys of certificate
authorities that are trusted to sign user certificates for
authentication, or none to not use one. Keys are listed one per
line; empty lines and comments starting with M-bM-^@M-^X#M-bM-^@M-^Y are allowed. If
a certificate is presented for authentication and has its signing
CA key listed in this file, then it may be used for
authentication for any user listed in the certificate's
principals list. Note that certificates that lack a list of
principals will not be permitted for authentication using
TrustedUserCAKeys. For more details on certificates, see the
CERTIFICATES section in ssh-keygen(1).
UseDNS Specifies whether sshd(8) should look up the remote host name,
and to check that the resolved host name for the remote IP
address maps back to the very same IP address.
If this option is set to no (the default) then only addresses and
not host names may be used in ~/.ssh/authorized_keys from and
sshd_config Match Host directives.
UsePAM Enables the Pluggable Authentication Module interface. If set to
yes this will enable PAM authentication using
ChallengeResponseAuthentication and PasswordAuthentication in
addition to PAM account and session module processing for all
authentication types.
Because PAM challenge-response authentication usually serves an
equivalent role to password authentication, you should disable
either PasswordAuthentication or ChallengeResponseAuthentication.
If UsePAM is enabled, you will not be able to run sshd(8) as a
non-root user. The default is no.
VersionAddendum
Optionally specifies additional text to append to the SSH
protocol banner sent by the server upon connection. The default
is none.
X11DisplayOffset
Specifies the first display number available for sshd(8)'s X11
forwarding. This prevents sshd from interfering with real X11
servers. The default is 10.
X11Forwarding
Specifies whether X11 forwarding is permitted. The argument must
be yes or no. The default is no.
When X11 forwarding is enabled, there may be additional exposure
to the server and to client displays if the sshd(8) proxy display
is configured to listen on the wildcard address (see
X11UseLocalhost), though this is not the default. Additionally,
the authentication spoofing and authentication data verification
and substitution occur on the client side. The security risk of
using X11 forwarding is that the client's X11 display server may
be exposed to attack when the SSH client requests forwarding (see
the warnings for ForwardX11 in ssh_config(5)). A system
administrator may have a stance in which they want to protect
clients that may expose themselves to attack by unwittingly
requesting X11 forwarding, which can warrant a no setting.
Note that disabling X11 forwarding does not prevent users from
forwarding X11 traffic, as users can always install their own
forwarders.
X11UseLocalhost
Specifies whether sshd(8) should bind the X11 forwarding server
to the loopback address or to the wildcard address. By default,
sshd binds the forwarding server to the loopback address and sets
the hostname part of the DISPLAY environment variable to
localhost. This prevents remote hosts from connecting to the
proxy display. However, some older X11 clients may not function
with this configuration. X11UseLocalhost may be set to no to
specify that the forwarding server should be bound to the
wildcard address. The argument must be yes or no. The default
is yes.
XAuthLocation
Specifies the full pathname of the xauth(1) program, or none to
not use one. The default is /usr/X11R6/bin/xauth.
TIME FORMATS
sshd(8) command-line arguments and configuration file options that
specify time may be expressed using a sequence of the form:
time[qualifier], where time is a positive integer value and qualifier is
one of the following:
M-bM-^_M-(noneM-bM-^_M-) seconds
s | S seconds
m | M minutes
h | H hours
d | D days
w | W weeks
Each member of the sequence is added together to calculate the total time
value.
Time format examples:
600 600 seconds (10 minutes)
10m 10 minutes
1h30m 1 hour 30 minutes (90 minutes)
TOKENS
Arguments to some keywords can make use of tokens, which are expanded at
runtime:
%% A literal M-bM-^@M-^X%M-bM-^@M-^Y.
%D The routing domain in which the incoming connection was
received.
%F The fingerprint of the CA key.
%f The fingerprint of the key or certificate.
%h The home directory of the user.
%i The key ID in the certificate.
%K The base64-encoded CA key.
%k The base64-encoded key or certificate for authentication.
%s The serial number of the certificate.
%T The type of the CA key.
%t The key or certificate type.
%U The numeric user ID of the target user.
%u The username.
AuthorizedKeysCommand accepts the tokens %%, %f, %h, %k, %t, %U, and %u.
AuthorizedKeysFile accepts the tokens %%, %h, %U, and %u.
AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand accepts the tokens %%, %F, %f, %h, %i, %K,
%k, %s, %T, %t, %U, and %u.
AuthorizedPrincipalsFile accepts the tokens %%, %h, %U, and %u.
ChrootDirectory accepts the tokens %%, %h, %U, and %u.
RoutingDomain accepts the token %D.
FILES
/etc/ssh/sshd_config
Contains configuration data for sshd(8). This file should be
writable by root only, but it is recommended (though not
necessary) that it be world-readable.
SEE ALSO
sftp-server(8), sshd(8)
AUTHORS
OpenSSH is a derivative of the original and free ssh 1.2.12 release by
Tatu Ylonen. Aaron Campbell, Bob Beck, Markus Friedl, Niels Provos, Theo
de Raadt and Dug Song removed many bugs, re-added newer features and
created OpenSSH. Markus Friedl contributed the support for SSH protocol
versions 1.5 and 2.0. Niels Provos and Markus Friedl contributed support
for privilege separation.
-OpenBSD 6.7 April 17, 2020 OpenBSD 6.7
+OpenBSD 6.8 August 27, 2020 OpenBSD 6.8
diff --git a/sshd_config.5 b/sshd_config.5
index b294efc2dc0e..6fa421caed64 100644
--- a/sshd_config.5
+++ b/sshd_config.5
@@ -1,1905 +1,1916 @@
.\"
.\" Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
.\" Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
.\" All rights reserved
.\"
.\" As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
.\" can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this
.\" software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
.\" incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
.\" called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
.\"
.\" Copyright (c) 1999,2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
.\" Copyright (c) 1999 Aaron Campbell. All rights reserved.
.\" Copyright (c) 1999 Theo de Raadt. All rights reserved.
.\"
.\" Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
.\" modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
.\" are met:
.\" 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
.\" notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
.\" 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
.\" notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
.\" documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
.\"
.\" THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
.\" IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
.\" OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
.\" IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
.\" INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
.\" NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
.\" DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
.\" THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
.\" (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
.\" THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
.\"
-.\" $OpenBSD: sshd_config.5,v 1.311 2020/04/17 06:12:41 jmc Exp $
-.Dd $Mdocdate: April 17 2020 $
+.\" $OpenBSD: sshd_config.5,v 1.315 2020/08/27 12:34:00 jmc Exp $
+.Dd $Mdocdate: August 27 2020 $
.Dt SSHD_CONFIG 5
.Os
.Sh NAME
.Nm sshd_config
.Nd OpenSSH daemon configuration file
.Sh DESCRIPTION
.Xr sshd 8
reads configuration data from
.Pa /etc/ssh/sshd_config
(or the file specified with
.Fl f
on the command line).
The file contains keyword-argument pairs, one per line.
For each keyword, the first obtained value will be used.
Lines starting with
.Ql #
and empty lines are interpreted as comments.
Arguments may optionally be enclosed in double quotes
.Pq \&"
in order to represent arguments containing spaces.
.Pp
The possible
keywords and their meanings are as follows (note that
keywords are case-insensitive and arguments are case-sensitive):
.Bl -tag -width Ds
.It Cm AcceptEnv
Specifies what environment variables sent by the client will be copied into
the session's
.Xr environ 7 .
See
.Cm SendEnv
and
.Cm SetEnv
in
.Xr ssh_config 5
for how to configure the client.
The
.Ev TERM
environment variable is always accepted whenever the client
requests a pseudo-terminal as it is required by the protocol.
Variables are specified by name, which may contain the wildcard characters
.Ql *
and
.Ql \&? .
Multiple environment variables may be separated by whitespace or spread
across multiple
.Cm AcceptEnv
directives.
Be warned that some environment variables could be used to bypass restricted
user environments.
For this reason, care should be taken in the use of this directive.
The default is not to accept any environment variables.
.It Cm AddressFamily
Specifies which address family should be used by
.Xr sshd 8 .
Valid arguments are
.Cm any
(the default),
.Cm inet
(use IPv4 only), or
.Cm inet6
(use IPv6 only).
.It Cm AllowAgentForwarding
Specifies whether
.Xr ssh-agent 1
forwarding is permitted.
The default is
.Cm yes .
Note that disabling agent forwarding does not improve security
unless users are also denied shell access, as they can always install
their own forwarders.
.It Cm AllowGroups
This keyword can be followed by a list of group name patterns, separated
by spaces.
If specified, login is allowed only for users whose primary
group or supplementary group list matches one of the patterns.
Only group names are valid; a numerical group ID is not recognized.
By default, login is allowed for all groups.
The allow/deny groups directives are processed in the following order:
.Cm DenyGroups ,
.Cm AllowGroups .
.Pp
See PATTERNS in
.Xr ssh_config 5
for more information on patterns.
.It Cm AllowStreamLocalForwarding
Specifies whether StreamLocal (Unix-domain socket) forwarding is permitted.
The available options are
.Cm yes
(the default)
or
.Cm all
to allow StreamLocal forwarding,
.Cm no
to prevent all StreamLocal forwarding,
.Cm local
to allow local (from the perspective of
.Xr ssh 1 )
forwarding only or
.Cm remote
to allow remote forwarding only.
Note that disabling StreamLocal forwarding does not improve security unless
users are also denied shell access, as they can always install their
own forwarders.
.It Cm AllowTcpForwarding
Specifies whether TCP forwarding is permitted.
The available options are
.Cm yes
(the default)
or
.Cm all
to allow TCP forwarding,
.Cm no
to prevent all TCP forwarding,
.Cm local
to allow local (from the perspective of
.Xr ssh 1 )
forwarding only or
.Cm remote
to allow remote forwarding only.
Note that disabling TCP forwarding does not improve security unless
users are also denied shell access, as they can always install their
own forwarders.
.It Cm AllowUsers
This keyword can be followed by a list of user name patterns, separated
by spaces.
If specified, login is allowed only for user names that
match one of the patterns.
Only user names are valid; a numerical user ID is not recognized.
By default, login is allowed for all users.
If the pattern takes the form USER@HOST then USER and HOST
are separately checked, restricting logins to particular
users from particular hosts.
HOST criteria may additionally contain addresses to match in CIDR
address/masklen format.
The allow/deny users directives are processed in the following order:
.Cm DenyUsers ,
.Cm AllowUsers .
.Pp
See PATTERNS in
.Xr ssh_config 5
for more information on patterns.
.It Cm AuthenticationMethods
Specifies the authentication methods that must be successfully completed
for a user to be granted access.
This option must be followed by one or more lists of comma-separated
authentication method names, or by the single string
.Cm any
to indicate the default behaviour of accepting any single authentication
method.
If the default is overridden, then successful authentication requires
completion of every method in at least one of these lists.
.Pp
For example,
.Qq publickey,password publickey,keyboard-interactive
would require the user to complete public key authentication, followed by
either password or keyboard interactive authentication.
Only methods that are next in one or more lists are offered at each stage,
so for this example it would not be possible to attempt password or
keyboard-interactive authentication before public key.
.Pp
For keyboard interactive authentication it is also possible to
restrict authentication to a specific device by appending a
colon followed by the device identifier
.Cm bsdauth
or
.Cm pam .
depending on the server configuration.
For example,
.Qq keyboard-interactive:bsdauth
would restrict keyboard interactive authentication to the
.Cm bsdauth
device.
.Pp
If the publickey method is listed more than once,
.Xr sshd 8
verifies that keys that have been used successfully are not reused for
subsequent authentications.
For example,
.Qq publickey,publickey
requires successful authentication using two different public keys.
.Pp
Note that each authentication method listed should also be explicitly enabled
in the configuration.
.Pp
The available authentication methods are:
.Qq gssapi-with-mic ,
.Qq hostbased ,
.Qq keyboard-interactive ,
.Qq none
(used for access to password-less accounts when
.Cm PermitEmptyPasswords
is enabled),
.Qq password
and
.Qq publickey .
.It Cm AuthorizedKeysCommand
Specifies a program to be used to look up the user's public keys.
The program must be owned by root, not writable by group or others and
specified by an absolute path.
Arguments to
.Cm AuthorizedKeysCommand
accept the tokens described in the
.Sx TOKENS
section.
If no arguments are specified then the username of the target user is used.
.Pp
The program should produce on standard output zero or
more lines of authorized_keys output (see
.Sx AUTHORIZED_KEYS
in
.Xr sshd 8 ) .
.Cm AuthorizedKeysCommand
is tried after the usual
.Cm AuthorizedKeysFile
files and will not be executed if a matching key is found there.
By default, no
.Cm AuthorizedKeysCommand
is run.
.It Cm AuthorizedKeysCommandUser
Specifies the user under whose account the
.Cm AuthorizedKeysCommand
is run.
It is recommended to use a dedicated user that has no other role on the host
than running authorized keys commands.
If
.Cm AuthorizedKeysCommand
is specified but
.Cm AuthorizedKeysCommandUser
is not, then
.Xr sshd 8
will refuse to start.
.It Cm AuthorizedKeysFile
Specifies the file that contains the public keys used for user authentication.
The format is described in the AUTHORIZED_KEYS FILE FORMAT section of
.Xr sshd 8 .
Arguments to
.Cm AuthorizedKeysFile
accept the tokens described in the
.Sx TOKENS
section.
After expansion,
.Cm AuthorizedKeysFile
is taken to be an absolute path or one relative to the user's home
directory.
Multiple files may be listed, separated by whitespace.
Alternately this option may be set to
.Cm none
to skip checking for user keys in files.
The default is
.Qq .ssh/authorized_keys .ssh/authorized_keys2 .
.It Cm AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand
Specifies a program to be used to generate the list of allowed
certificate principals as per
.Cm AuthorizedPrincipalsFile .
The program must be owned by root, not writable by group or others and
specified by an absolute path.
Arguments to
.Cm AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand
accept the tokens described in the
.Sx TOKENS
section.
If no arguments are specified then the username of the target user is used.
.Pp
The program should produce on standard output zero or
more lines of
.Cm AuthorizedPrincipalsFile
output.
If either
.Cm AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand
or
.Cm AuthorizedPrincipalsFile
is specified, then certificates offered by the client for authentication
must contain a principal that is listed.
By default, no
.Cm AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand
is run.
.It Cm AuthorizedPrincipalsCommandUser
Specifies the user under whose account the
.Cm AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand
is run.
It is recommended to use a dedicated user that has no other role on the host
than running authorized principals commands.
If
.Cm AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand
is specified but
.Cm AuthorizedPrincipalsCommandUser
is not, then
.Xr sshd 8
will refuse to start.
.It Cm AuthorizedPrincipalsFile
Specifies a file that lists principal names that are accepted for
certificate authentication.
When using certificates signed by a key listed in
.Cm TrustedUserCAKeys ,
this file lists names, one of which must appear in the certificate for it
to be accepted for authentication.
Names are listed one per line preceded by key options (as described in
.Sx AUTHORIZED_KEYS FILE FORMAT
in
.Xr sshd 8 ) .
Empty lines and comments starting with
.Ql #
are ignored.
.Pp
Arguments to
.Cm AuthorizedPrincipalsFile
accept the tokens described in the
.Sx TOKENS
section.
After expansion,
.Cm AuthorizedPrincipalsFile
is taken to be an absolute path or one relative to the user's home directory.
The default is
.Cm none ,
i.e. not to use a principals file \(en in this case, the username
of the user must appear in a certificate's principals list for it to be
accepted.
.Pp
Note that
.Cm AuthorizedPrincipalsFile
is only used when authentication proceeds using a CA listed in
.Cm TrustedUserCAKeys
and is not consulted for certification authorities trusted via
.Pa ~/.ssh/authorized_keys ,
though the
.Cm principals=
key option offers a similar facility (see
.Xr sshd 8
for details).
.It Cm Banner
The contents of the specified file are sent to the remote user before
authentication is allowed.
If the argument is
.Cm none
then no banner is displayed.
By default, no banner is displayed.
.It Cm CASignatureAlgorithms
Specifies which algorithms are allowed for signing of certificates
by certificate authorities (CAs).
The default is:
.Bd -literal -offset indent
ecdsa-sha2-nistp256,ecdsa-sha2-nistp384,ecdsa-sha2-nistp521,
ssh-ed25519,rsa-sha2-512,rsa-sha2-256,ssh-rsa
.Ed
.Pp
Certificates signed using other algorithms will not be accepted for
public key or host-based authentication.
.It Cm ChallengeResponseAuthentication
Specifies whether challenge-response authentication is allowed (e.g. via
PAM or through authentication styles supported in
.Xr login.conf 5 )
The default is
.Cm yes .
.It Cm ChrootDirectory
Specifies the pathname of a directory to
.Xr chroot 2
to after authentication.
At session startup
.Xr sshd 8
checks that all components of the pathname are root-owned directories
which are not writable by any other user or group.
After the chroot,
.Xr sshd 8
changes the working directory to the user's home directory.
Arguments to
.Cm ChrootDirectory
accept the tokens described in the
.Sx TOKENS
section.
.Pp
The
.Cm ChrootDirectory
must contain the necessary files and directories to support the
user's session.
For an interactive session this requires at least a shell, typically
.Xr sh 1 ,
and basic
.Pa /dev
nodes such as
.Xr null 4 ,
.Xr zero 4 ,
.Xr stdin 4 ,
.Xr stdout 4 ,
.Xr stderr 4 ,
and
.Xr tty 4
devices.
For file transfer sessions using SFTP
no additional configuration of the environment is necessary if the in-process
sftp-server is used,
though sessions which use logging may require
.Pa /dev/log
inside the chroot directory on some operating systems (see
.Xr sftp-server 8
for details).
.Pp
For safety, it is very important that the directory hierarchy be
prevented from modification by other processes on the system (especially
those outside the jail).
Misconfiguration can lead to unsafe environments which
.Xr sshd 8
cannot detect.
.Pp
The default is
.Cm none ,
indicating not to
.Xr chroot 2 .
.It Cm Ciphers
Specifies the ciphers allowed.
Multiple ciphers must be comma-separated.
If the specified list begins with a
.Sq +
character, then the specified ciphers will be appended to the default set
instead of replacing them.
If the specified list begins with a
.Sq -
character, then the specified ciphers (including wildcards) will be removed
from the default set instead of replacing them.
If the specified list begins with a
.Sq ^
character, then the specified ciphers will be placed at the head of the
default set.
.Pp
The supported ciphers are:
.Pp
.Bl -item -compact -offset indent
.It
3des-cbc
.It
aes128-cbc
.It
aes192-cbc
.It
aes256-cbc
.It
aes128-ctr
.It
aes192-ctr
.It
aes256-ctr
.It
aes128-gcm@openssh.com
.It
aes256-gcm@openssh.com
.It
chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com
.El
.Pp
The default is:
.Bd -literal -offset indent
chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com,
aes128-ctr,aes192-ctr,aes256-ctr,
aes128-gcm@openssh.com,aes256-gcm@openssh.com
.Ed
.Pp
The list of available ciphers may also be obtained using
.Qq ssh -Q cipher .
.It Cm ClientAliveCountMax
Sets the number of client alive messages which may be sent without
.Xr sshd 8
receiving any messages back from the client.
If this threshold is reached while client alive messages are being sent,
sshd will disconnect the client, terminating the session.
It is important to note that the use of client alive messages is very
different from
.Cm TCPKeepAlive .
The client alive messages are sent through the encrypted channel
and therefore will not be spoofable.
The TCP keepalive option enabled by
.Cm TCPKeepAlive
is spoofable.
The client alive mechanism is valuable when the client or
server depend on knowing when a connection has become unresponsive.
.Pp
The default value is 3.
If
.Cm ClientAliveInterval
is set to 15, and
.Cm ClientAliveCountMax
is left at the default, unresponsive SSH clients
will be disconnected after approximately 45 seconds.
Setting a zero
.Cm ClientAliveCountMax
disables connection termination.
.It Cm ClientAliveInterval
Sets a timeout interval in seconds after which if no data has been received
from the client,
.Xr sshd 8
will send a message through the encrypted
channel to request a response from the client.
The default
is 0, indicating that these messages will not be sent to the client.
.It Cm Compression
Specifies whether compression is enabled after
the user has authenticated successfully.
The argument must be
.Cm yes ,
.Cm delayed
(a legacy synonym for
.Cm yes )
or
.Cm no .
The default is
.Cm yes .
.It Cm DenyGroups
This keyword can be followed by a list of group name patterns, separated
by spaces.
Login is disallowed for users whose primary group or supplementary
group list matches one of the patterns.
Only group names are valid; a numerical group ID is not recognized.
By default, login is allowed for all groups.
The allow/deny groups directives are processed in the following order:
.Cm DenyGroups ,
.Cm AllowGroups .
.Pp
See PATTERNS in
.Xr ssh_config 5
for more information on patterns.
.It Cm DenyUsers
This keyword can be followed by a list of user name patterns, separated
by spaces.
Login is disallowed for user names that match one of the patterns.
Only user names are valid; a numerical user ID is not recognized.
By default, login is allowed for all users.
If the pattern takes the form USER@HOST then USER and HOST
are separately checked, restricting logins to particular
users from particular hosts.
HOST criteria may additionally contain addresses to match in CIDR
address/masklen format.
The allow/deny users directives are processed in the following order:
.Cm DenyUsers ,
.Cm AllowUsers .
.Pp
See PATTERNS in
.Xr ssh_config 5
for more information on patterns.
.It Cm DisableForwarding
Disables all forwarding features, including X11,
.Xr ssh-agent 1 ,
TCP and StreamLocal.
This option overrides all other forwarding-related options and may
simplify restricted configurations.
.It Cm ExposeAuthInfo
Writes a temporary file containing a list of authentication methods and
public credentials (e.g. keys) used to authenticate the user.
The location of the file is exposed to the user session through the
.Ev SSH_USER_AUTH
environment variable.
The default is
.Cm no .
.It Cm FingerprintHash
Specifies the hash algorithm used when logging key fingerprints.
Valid options are:
.Cm md5
and
.Cm sha256 .
The default is
.Cm sha256 .
.It Cm ForceCommand
Forces the execution of the command specified by
.Cm ForceCommand ,
ignoring any command supplied by the client and
.Pa ~/.ssh/rc
if present.
The command is invoked by using the user's login shell with the -c option.
This applies to shell, command, or subsystem execution.
It is most useful inside a
.Cm Match
block.
The command originally supplied by the client is available in the
.Ev SSH_ORIGINAL_COMMAND
environment variable.
Specifying a command of
.Cm internal-sftp
will force the use of an in-process SFTP server that requires no support
files when used with
.Cm ChrootDirectory .
The default is
.Cm none .
.It Cm GatewayPorts
Specifies whether remote hosts are allowed to connect to ports
forwarded for the client.
By default,
.Xr sshd 8
binds remote port forwardings to the loopback address.
This prevents other remote hosts from connecting to forwarded ports.
.Cm GatewayPorts
can be used to specify that sshd
should allow remote port forwardings to bind to non-loopback addresses, thus
allowing other hosts to connect.
The argument may be
.Cm no
to force remote port forwardings to be available to the local host only,
.Cm yes
to force remote port forwardings to bind to the wildcard address, or
.Cm clientspecified
to allow the client to select the address to which the forwarding is bound.
The default is
.Cm no .
.It Cm GSSAPIAuthentication
Specifies whether user authentication based on GSSAPI is allowed.
The default is
.Cm no .
.It Cm GSSAPICleanupCredentials
Specifies whether to automatically destroy the user's credentials cache
on logout.
The default is
.Cm yes .
.It Cm GSSAPIStrictAcceptorCheck
Determines whether to be strict about the identity of the GSSAPI acceptor
a client authenticates against.
If set to
.Cm yes
then the client must authenticate against the host
service on the current hostname.
If set to
.Cm no
then the client may authenticate against any service key stored in the
machine's default store.
This facility is provided to assist with operation on multi homed machines.
The default is
.Cm yes .
.It Cm HostbasedAcceptedKeyTypes
Specifies the key types that will be accepted for hostbased authentication
as a list of comma-separated patterns.
Alternately if the specified list begins with a
.Sq +
character, then the specified key types will be appended to the default set
instead of replacing them.
If the specified list begins with a
.Sq -
character, then the specified key types (including wildcards) will be removed
from the default set instead of replacing them.
If the specified list begins with a
.Sq ^
character, then the specified key types will be placed at the head of the
default set.
The default for this option is:
.Bd -literal -offset 3n
ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com,
ecdsa-sha2-nistp384-cert-v01@openssh.com,
ecdsa-sha2-nistp521-cert-v01@openssh.com,
sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com,
ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com,
sk-ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com,
rsa-sha2-512-cert-v01@openssh.com,
rsa-sha2-256-cert-v01@openssh.com,
ssh-rsa-cert-v01@openssh.com,
ecdsa-sha2-nistp256,ecdsa-sha2-nistp384,ecdsa-sha2-nistp521,
sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256@openssh.com,
ssh-ed25519,sk-ssh-ed25519@openssh.com,
rsa-sha2-512,rsa-sha2-256,ssh-rsa
.Ed
.Pp
The list of available key types may also be obtained using
.Qq ssh -Q HostbasedAcceptedKeyTypes .
.It Cm HostbasedAuthentication
Specifies whether rhosts or /etc/hosts.equiv authentication together
with successful public key client host authentication is allowed
(host-based authentication).
The default is
.Cm no .
.It Cm HostbasedUsesNameFromPacketOnly
Specifies whether or not the server will attempt to perform a reverse
name lookup when matching the name in the
.Pa ~/.shosts ,
.Pa ~/.rhosts ,
and
.Pa /etc/hosts.equiv
files during
.Cm HostbasedAuthentication .
A setting of
.Cm yes
means that
.Xr sshd 8
uses the name supplied by the client rather than
attempting to resolve the name from the TCP connection itself.
The default is
.Cm no .
.It Cm HostCertificate
Specifies a file containing a public host certificate.
The certificate's public key must match a private host key already specified
by
.Cm HostKey .
The default behaviour of
.Xr sshd 8
is not to load any certificates.
.It Cm HostKey
Specifies a file containing a private host key
used by SSH.
The defaults are
.Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ecdsa_key ,
.Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ed25519_key
and
.Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key .
.Pp
Note that
.Xr sshd 8
will refuse to use a file if it is group/world-accessible
and that the
.Cm HostKeyAlgorithms
option restricts which of the keys are actually used by
.Xr sshd 8 .
.Pp
It is possible to have multiple host key files.
It is also possible to specify public host key files instead.
In this case operations on the private key will be delegated
to an
.Xr ssh-agent 1 .
.It Cm HostKeyAgent
Identifies the UNIX-domain socket used to communicate
with an agent that has access to the private host keys.
If the string
.Qq SSH_AUTH_SOCK
is specified, the location of the socket will be read from the
.Ev SSH_AUTH_SOCK
environment variable.
.It Cm HostKeyAlgorithms
Specifies the host key algorithms
that the server offers.
The default for this option is:
.Bd -literal -offset 3n
ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com,
ecdsa-sha2-nistp384-cert-v01@openssh.com,
ecdsa-sha2-nistp521-cert-v01@openssh.com,
sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com,
ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com,
sk-ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com,
rsa-sha2-512-cert-v01@openssh.com,
rsa-sha2-256-cert-v01@openssh.com,
ssh-rsa-cert-v01@openssh.com,
ecdsa-sha2-nistp256,ecdsa-sha2-nistp384,ecdsa-sha2-nistp521,
sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256@openssh.com,
ssh-ed25519,sk-ssh-ed25519@openssh.com,
rsa-sha2-512,rsa-sha2-256,ssh-rsa
.Ed
.Pp
The list of available key types may also be obtained using
.Qq ssh -Q HostKeyAlgorithms .
.It Cm IgnoreRhosts
Specifies whether to ignore per-user
.Pa .rhosts
and
.Pa .shosts
files during
.Cm HostbasedAuthentication .
The system-wide
.Pa /etc/hosts.equiv
and
.Pa /etc/shosts.equiv
are still used regardless of this setting.
.Pp
Accepted values are
.Cm yes
(the default) to ignore all per-user files,
.Cm shosts-only
to allow the use of
.Pa .shosts
but to ignore
.Pa .rhosts
or
.Cm no
to allow both
.Pa .shosts
and
.Pa rhosts .
.It Cm IgnoreUserKnownHosts
Specifies whether
.Xr sshd 8
should ignore the user's
.Pa ~/.ssh/known_hosts
during
.Cm HostbasedAuthentication
and use only the system-wide known hosts file
.Pa /etc/ssh/known_hosts .
The default is
.Dq no .
.It Cm Include
Include the specified configuration file(s).
Multiple pathnames may be specified and each pathname may contain
.Xr glob 7
-wildcards.
+wildcards that will be expanded and processed in lexical order.
Files without absolute paths are assumed to be in
.Pa /etc/ssh .
An
.Cm Include
directive may appear inside a
.Cm Match
block
to perform conditional inclusion.
.It Cm IPQoS
Specifies the IPv4 type-of-service or DSCP class for the connection.
Accepted values are
.Cm af11 ,
.Cm af12 ,
.Cm af13 ,
.Cm af21 ,
.Cm af22 ,
.Cm af23 ,
.Cm af31 ,
.Cm af32 ,
.Cm af33 ,
.Cm af41 ,
.Cm af42 ,
.Cm af43 ,
.Cm cs0 ,
.Cm cs1 ,
.Cm cs2 ,
.Cm cs3 ,
.Cm cs4 ,
.Cm cs5 ,
.Cm cs6 ,
.Cm cs7 ,
.Cm ef ,
.Cm le ,
.Cm lowdelay ,
.Cm throughput ,
.Cm reliability ,
a numeric value, or
.Cm none
to use the operating system default.
This option may take one or two arguments, separated by whitespace.
If one argument is specified, it is used as the packet class unconditionally.
If two values are specified, the first is automatically selected for
interactive sessions and the second for non-interactive sessions.
The default is
.Cm af21
(Low-Latency Data)
for interactive sessions and
.Cm cs1
(Lower Effort)
for non-interactive sessions.
.It Cm KbdInteractiveAuthentication
Specifies whether to allow keyboard-interactive authentication.
The argument to this keyword must be
.Cm yes
or
.Cm no .
The default is to use whatever value
.Cm ChallengeResponseAuthentication
is set to
(by default
.Cm yes ) .
.It Cm KerberosAuthentication
Specifies whether the password provided by the user for
.Cm PasswordAuthentication
will be validated through the Kerberos KDC.
To use this option, the server needs a
Kerberos servtab which allows the verification of the KDC's identity.
The default is
.Cm no .
.It Cm KerberosGetAFSToken
If AFS is active and the user has a Kerberos 5 TGT, attempt to acquire
an AFS token before accessing the user's home directory.
The default is
.Cm no .
.It Cm KerberosOrLocalPasswd
If password authentication through Kerberos fails then
the password will be validated via any additional local mechanism
such as
.Pa /etc/passwd .
The default is
.Cm yes .
.It Cm KerberosTicketCleanup
Specifies whether to automatically destroy the user's ticket cache
file on logout.
The default is
.Cm yes .
.It Cm KexAlgorithms
Specifies the available KEX (Key Exchange) algorithms.
Multiple algorithms must be comma-separated.
Alternately if the specified list begins with a
.Sq +
character, then the specified methods will be appended to the default set
instead of replacing them.
If the specified list begins with a
.Sq -
character, then the specified methods (including wildcards) will be removed
from the default set instead of replacing them.
If the specified list begins with a
.Sq ^
character, then the specified methods will be placed at the head of the
default set.
The supported algorithms are:
.Pp
.Bl -item -compact -offset indent
.It
curve25519-sha256
.It
curve25519-sha256@libssh.org
.It
diffie-hellman-group1-sha1
.It
diffie-hellman-group14-sha1
.It
diffie-hellman-group14-sha256
.It
diffie-hellman-group16-sha512
.It
diffie-hellman-group18-sha512
.It
diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha1
.It
diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha256
.It
ecdh-sha2-nistp256
.It
ecdh-sha2-nistp384
.It
ecdh-sha2-nistp521
.It
sntrup4591761x25519-sha512@tinyssh.org
.El
.Pp
The default is:
.Bd -literal -offset indent
curve25519-sha256,curve25519-sha256@libssh.org,
ecdh-sha2-nistp256,ecdh-sha2-nistp384,ecdh-sha2-nistp521,
diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha256,
diffie-hellman-group16-sha512,diffie-hellman-group18-sha512,
diffie-hellman-group14-sha256
.Ed
.Pp
The list of available key exchange algorithms may also be obtained using
.Qq ssh -Q KexAlgorithms .
.It Cm ListenAddress
Specifies the local addresses
.Xr sshd 8
should listen on.
The following forms may be used:
.Pp
.Bl -item -offset indent -compact
.It
.Cm ListenAddress
.Sm off
.Ar hostname | address
.Sm on
.Op Cm rdomain Ar domain
.It
.Cm ListenAddress
.Sm off
.Ar hostname : port
.Sm on
.Op Cm rdomain Ar domain
.It
.Cm ListenAddress
.Sm off
.Ar IPv4_address : port
.Sm on
.Op Cm rdomain Ar domain
.It
.Cm ListenAddress
.Sm off
.Oo Ar hostname | address Oc : Ar port
.Sm on
.Op Cm rdomain Ar domain
.El
.Pp
The optional
.Cm rdomain
qualifier requests
.Xr sshd 8
listen in an explicit routing domain.
If
.Ar port
is not specified,
sshd will listen on the address and all
.Cm Port
options specified.
The default is to listen on all local addresses on the current default
routing domain.
Multiple
.Cm ListenAddress
options are permitted.
For more information on routing domains, see
.Xr rdomain 4 .
.It Cm LoginGraceTime
The server disconnects after this time if the user has not
successfully logged in.
If the value is 0, there is no time limit.
The default is 120 seconds.
.It Cm LogLevel
Gives the verbosity level that is used when logging messages from
.Xr sshd 8 .
The possible values are:
QUIET, FATAL, ERROR, INFO, VERBOSE, DEBUG, DEBUG1, DEBUG2, and DEBUG3.
The default is INFO.
DEBUG and DEBUG1 are equivalent.
DEBUG2 and DEBUG3 each specify higher levels of debugging output.
Logging with a DEBUG level violates the privacy of users and is not recommended.
.It Cm MACs
Specifies the available MAC (message authentication code) algorithms.
The MAC algorithm is used for data integrity protection.
Multiple algorithms must be comma-separated.
If the specified list begins with a
.Sq +
character, then the specified algorithms will be appended to the default set
instead of replacing them.
If the specified list begins with a
.Sq -
character, then the specified algorithms (including wildcards) will be removed
from the default set instead of replacing them.
If the specified list begins with a
.Sq ^
character, then the specified algorithms will be placed at the head of the
default set.
.Pp
The algorithms that contain
.Qq -etm
calculate the MAC after encryption (encrypt-then-mac).
These are considered safer and their use recommended.
The supported MACs are:
.Pp
.Bl -item -compact -offset indent
.It
hmac-md5
.It
hmac-md5-96
.It
hmac-sha1
.It
hmac-sha1-96
.It
hmac-sha2-256
.It
hmac-sha2-512
.It
umac-64@openssh.com
.It
umac-128@openssh.com
.It
hmac-md5-etm@openssh.com
.It
hmac-md5-96-etm@openssh.com
.It
hmac-sha1-etm@openssh.com
.It
hmac-sha1-96-etm@openssh.com
.It
hmac-sha2-256-etm@openssh.com
.It
hmac-sha2-512-etm@openssh.com
.It
umac-64-etm@openssh.com
.It
umac-128-etm@openssh.com
.El
.Pp
The default is:
.Bd -literal -offset indent
umac-64-etm@openssh.com,umac-128-etm@openssh.com,
hmac-sha2-256-etm@openssh.com,hmac-sha2-512-etm@openssh.com,
hmac-sha1-etm@openssh.com,
umac-64@openssh.com,umac-128@openssh.com,
hmac-sha2-256,hmac-sha2-512,hmac-sha1
.Ed
.Pp
The list of available MAC algorithms may also be obtained using
.Qq ssh -Q mac .
.It Cm Match
Introduces a conditional block.
If all of the criteria on the
.Cm Match
line are satisfied, the keywords on the following lines override those
set in the global section of the config file, until either another
.Cm Match
line or the end of the file.
If a keyword appears in multiple
.Cm Match
blocks that are satisfied, only the first instance of the keyword is
applied.
.Pp
The arguments to
.Cm Match
are one or more criteria-pattern pairs or the single token
.Cm All
which matches all criteria.
The available criteria are
.Cm User ,
.Cm Group ,
.Cm Host ,
.Cm LocalAddress ,
.Cm LocalPort ,
.Cm RDomain ,
and
.Cm Address
(with
.Cm RDomain
representing the
.Xr rdomain 4
on which the connection was received).
.Pp
The match patterns may consist of single entries or comma-separated
lists and may use the wildcard and negation operators described in the
.Sx PATTERNS
section of
.Xr ssh_config 5 .
.Pp
The patterns in an
.Cm Address
criteria may additionally contain addresses to match in CIDR
address/masklen format,
such as 192.0.2.0/24 or 2001:db8::/32.
Note that the mask length provided must be consistent with the address -
it is an error to specify a mask length that is too long for the address
or one with bits set in this host portion of the address.
For example, 192.0.2.0/33 and 192.0.2.0/8, respectively.
.Pp
Only a subset of keywords may be used on the lines following a
.Cm Match
keyword.
Available keywords are
.Cm AcceptEnv ,
.Cm AllowAgentForwarding ,
.Cm AllowGroups ,
.Cm AllowStreamLocalForwarding ,
.Cm AllowTcpForwarding ,
.Cm AllowUsers ,
.Cm AuthenticationMethods ,
.Cm AuthorizedKeysCommand ,
.Cm AuthorizedKeysCommandUser ,
.Cm AuthorizedKeysFile ,
.Cm AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand ,
.Cm AuthorizedPrincipalsCommandUser ,
.Cm AuthorizedPrincipalsFile ,
.Cm Banner ,
.Cm ChrootDirectory ,
.Cm ClientAliveCountMax ,
.Cm ClientAliveInterval ,
.Cm DenyGroups ,
.Cm DenyUsers ,
.Cm ForceCommand ,
.Cm GatewayPorts ,
.Cm GSSAPIAuthentication ,
.Cm HostbasedAcceptedKeyTypes ,
.Cm HostbasedAuthentication ,
.Cm HostbasedUsesNameFromPacketOnly ,
.Cm IgnoreRhosts ,
.Cm Include ,
.Cm IPQoS ,
.Cm KbdInteractiveAuthentication ,
.Cm KerberosAuthentication ,
.Cm LogLevel ,
.Cm MaxAuthTries ,
.Cm MaxSessions ,
.Cm PasswordAuthentication ,
.Cm PermitEmptyPasswords ,
.Cm PermitListen ,
.Cm PermitOpen ,
.Cm PermitRootLogin ,
.Cm PermitTTY ,
.Cm PermitTunnel ,
.Cm PermitUserRC ,
.Cm PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes ,
.Cm PubkeyAuthentication ,
.Cm RekeyLimit ,
.Cm RevokedKeys ,
.Cm RDomain ,
.Cm SetEnv ,
.Cm StreamLocalBindMask ,
.Cm StreamLocalBindUnlink ,
.Cm TrustedUserCAKeys ,
.Cm X11DisplayOffset ,
.Cm X11Forwarding
and
.Cm X11UseLocalhost .
.It Cm MaxAuthTries
Specifies the maximum number of authentication attempts permitted per
connection.
Once the number of failures reaches half this value,
additional failures are logged.
The default is 6.
.It Cm MaxSessions
Specifies the maximum number of open shell, login or subsystem (e.g. sftp)
sessions permitted per network connection.
Multiple sessions may be established by clients that support connection
multiplexing.
Setting
.Cm MaxSessions
to 1 will effectively disable session multiplexing, whereas setting it to 0
will prevent all shell, login and subsystem sessions while still permitting
forwarding.
The default is 10.
.It Cm MaxStartups
Specifies the maximum number of concurrent unauthenticated connections to the
SSH daemon.
Additional connections will be dropped until authentication succeeds or the
.Cm LoginGraceTime
expires for a connection.
The default is 10:30:100.
.Pp
Alternatively, random early drop can be enabled by specifying
the three colon separated values
start:rate:full (e.g. "10:30:60").
.Xr sshd 8
will refuse connection attempts with a probability of rate/100 (30%)
if there are currently start (10) unauthenticated connections.
The probability increases linearly and all connection attempts
are refused if the number of unauthenticated connections reaches full (60).
.It Cm PasswordAuthentication
Specifies whether password authentication is allowed.
The default is
.Cm yes .
.It Cm PermitEmptyPasswords
When password authentication is allowed, it specifies whether the
server allows login to accounts with empty password strings.
The default is
.Cm no .
.It Cm PermitListen
Specifies the addresses/ports on which a remote TCP port forwarding may listen.
The listen specification must be one of the following forms:
.Pp
.Bl -item -offset indent -compact
.It
.Cm PermitListen
.Sm off
.Ar port
.Sm on
.It
.Cm PermitListen
.Sm off
.Ar host : port
.Sm on
.El
.Pp
Multiple permissions may be specified by separating them with whitespace.
An argument of
.Cm any
can be used to remove all restrictions and permit any listen requests.
An argument of
.Cm none
can be used to prohibit all listen requests.
The host name may contain wildcards as described in the PATTERNS section in
.Xr ssh_config 5 .
The wildcard
.Sq *
can also be used in place of a port number to allow all ports.
By default all port forwarding listen requests are permitted.
Note that the
.Cm GatewayPorts
option may further restrict which addresses may be listened on.
Note also that
.Xr ssh 1
will request a listen host of
.Dq localhost
if no listen host was specifically requested, and this name is
treated differently to explicit localhost addresses of
.Dq 127.0.0.1
and
.Dq ::1 .
.It Cm PermitOpen
Specifies the destinations to which TCP port forwarding is permitted.
The forwarding specification must be one of the following forms:
.Pp
.Bl -item -offset indent -compact
.It
.Cm PermitOpen
.Sm off
.Ar host : port
.Sm on
.It
.Cm PermitOpen
.Sm off
.Ar IPv4_addr : port
.Sm on
.It
.Cm PermitOpen
.Sm off
.Ar \&[ IPv6_addr \&] : port
.Sm on
.El
.Pp
Multiple forwards may be specified by separating them with whitespace.
An argument of
.Cm any
can be used to remove all restrictions and permit any forwarding requests.
An argument of
.Cm none
can be used to prohibit all forwarding requests.
The wildcard
.Sq *
can be used for host or port to allow all hosts or ports respectively.
Otherwise, no pattern matching or address lookups are performed on supplied
names.
By default all port forwarding requests are permitted.
.It Cm PermitRootLogin
Specifies whether root can log in using
.Xr ssh 1 .
The argument must be
.Cm yes ,
.Cm prohibit-password ,
.Cm forced-commands-only ,
or
.Cm no .
The default is
.Cm prohibit-password .
.Pp
If this option is set to
.Cm prohibit-password
(or its deprecated alias,
.Cm without-password ) ,
password and keyboard-interactive authentication are disabled for root.
.Pp
If this option is set to
.Cm forced-commands-only ,
root login with public key authentication will be allowed,
but only if the
.Ar command
option has been specified
(which may be useful for taking remote backups even if root login is
normally not allowed).
All other authentication methods are disabled for root.
.Pp
If this option is set to
.Cm no ,
root is not allowed to log in.
.It Cm PermitTTY
Specifies whether
.Xr pty 4
allocation is permitted.
The default is
.Cm yes .
.It Cm PermitTunnel
Specifies whether
.Xr tun 4
device forwarding is allowed.
The argument must be
.Cm yes ,
.Cm point-to-point
(layer 3),
.Cm ethernet
(layer 2), or
.Cm no .
Specifying
.Cm yes
permits both
.Cm point-to-point
and
.Cm ethernet .
The default is
.Cm no .
.Pp
Independent of this setting, the permissions of the selected
.Xr tun 4
device must allow access to the user.
.It Cm PermitUserEnvironment
Specifies whether
.Pa ~/.ssh/environment
and
.Cm environment=
options in
.Pa ~/.ssh/authorized_keys
are processed by
.Xr sshd 8 .
Valid options are
.Cm yes ,
.Cm no
or a pattern-list specifying which environment variable names to accept
(for example
.Qq LANG,LC_* ) .
The default is
.Cm no .
Enabling environment processing may enable users to bypass access
restrictions in some configurations using mechanisms such as
.Ev LD_PRELOAD .
.It Cm PermitUserRC
Specifies whether any
.Pa ~/.ssh/rc
file is executed.
The default is
.Cm yes .
.It Cm PidFile
Specifies the file that contains the process ID of the
SSH daemon, or
.Cm none
to not write one.
The default is
.Pa /var/run/sshd.pid .
.It Cm Port
Specifies the port number that
.Xr sshd 8
listens on.
The default is 22.
Multiple options of this type are permitted.
See also
.Cm ListenAddress .
.It Cm PrintLastLog
Specifies whether
.Xr sshd 8
should print the date and time of the last user login when a user logs
in interactively.
The default is
.Cm yes .
.It Cm PrintMotd
Specifies whether
.Xr sshd 8
should print
.Pa /etc/motd
when a user logs in interactively.
(On some systems it is also printed by the shell,
.Pa /etc/profile ,
or equivalent.)
The default is
.Cm yes .
.It Cm PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes
Specifies the key types that will be accepted for public key authentication
as a list of comma-separated patterns.
Alternately if the specified list begins with a
.Sq +
character, then the specified key types will be appended to the default set
instead of replacing them.
If the specified list begins with a
.Sq -
character, then the specified key types (including wildcards) will be removed
from the default set instead of replacing them.
If the specified list begins with a
.Sq ^
character, then the specified key types will be placed at the head of the
default set.
The default for this option is:
.Bd -literal -offset 3n
ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com,
ecdsa-sha2-nistp384-cert-v01@openssh.com,
ecdsa-sha2-nistp521-cert-v01@openssh.com,
sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com,
ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com,
sk-ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com,
rsa-sha2-512-cert-v01@openssh.com,
rsa-sha2-256-cert-v01@openssh.com,
ssh-rsa-cert-v01@openssh.com,
ecdsa-sha2-nistp256,ecdsa-sha2-nistp384,ecdsa-sha2-nistp521,
sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256@openssh.com,
ssh-ed25519,sk-ssh-ed25519@openssh.com,
rsa-sha2-512,rsa-sha2-256,ssh-rsa
.Ed
.Pp
The list of available key types may also be obtained using
.Qq ssh -Q PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes .
.It Cm PubkeyAuthOptions
Sets one or more public key authentication options.
-Two option keywords are currently supported:
+The supported keywords are:
.Cm none
-(the default; indicating no additional options are enabled)
+(the default; indicating no additional options are enabled),
+.Cm touch-required
and
-.Cm touch-required .
+.Cm verify-required .
.Pp
The
.Cm touch-required
option causes public key authentication using a FIDO authenticator algorithm
(i.e.\&
.Cm ecdsa-sk
or
.Cm ed25519-sk )
to always require the signature to attest that a physically present user
explicitly confirmed the authentication (usually by touching the authenticator).
By default,
.Xr sshd 8
requires user presence unless overridden with an authorized_keys option.
The
.Cm touch-required
flag disables this override.
-This option has no effect for other, non-authenticator public key types.
+.Pp
+The
+.Cm verify-required
+option requires a FIDO key signature attest that the user was verified,
+e.g. via a PIN.
+.Pp
+Neither the
+.Cm touch-required
+or
+.Cm verify-required
+options have any effect for other, non-FIDO, public key types.
.It Cm PubkeyAuthentication
Specifies whether public key authentication is allowed.
The default is
.Cm yes .
.It Cm RekeyLimit
Specifies the maximum amount of data that may be transmitted before the
session key is renegotiated, optionally followed a maximum amount of
time that may pass before the session key is renegotiated.
The first argument is specified in bytes and may have a suffix of
.Sq K ,
.Sq M ,
or
.Sq G
to indicate Kilobytes, Megabytes, or Gigabytes, respectively.
The default is between
.Sq 1G
and
.Sq 4G ,
depending on the cipher.
The optional second value is specified in seconds and may use any of the
units documented in the
.Sx TIME FORMATS
section.
The default value for
.Cm RekeyLimit
is
.Cm default none ,
which means that rekeying is performed after the cipher's default amount
of data has been sent or received and no time based rekeying is done.
.It Cm RevokedKeys
Specifies revoked public keys file, or
.Cm none
to not use one.
Keys listed in this file will be refused for public key authentication.
Note that if this file is not readable, then public key authentication will
be refused for all users.
Keys may be specified as a text file, listing one public key per line, or as
an OpenSSH Key Revocation List (KRL) as generated by
.Xr ssh-keygen 1 .
For more information on KRLs, see the KEY REVOCATION LISTS section in
.Xr ssh-keygen 1 .
.It Cm RDomain
Specifies an explicit routing domain that is applied after authentication
has completed.
The user session, as well and any forwarded or listening IP sockets,
will be bound to this
.Xr rdomain 4 .
If the routing domain is set to
.Cm \&%D ,
then the domain in which the incoming connection was received will be applied.
.It Cm SecurityKeyProvider
Specifies a path to a library that will be used when loading
FIDO authenticator-hosted keys, overriding the default of using
the built-in USB HID support.
.It Cm SetEnv
Specifies one or more environment variables to set in child sessions started
by
.Xr sshd 8
as
.Dq NAME=VALUE .
The environment value may be quoted (e.g. if it contains whitespace
characters).
Environment variables set by
.Cm SetEnv
override the default environment and any variables specified by the user
via
.Cm AcceptEnv
or
.Cm PermitUserEnvironment .
.It Cm StreamLocalBindMask
Sets the octal file creation mode mask
.Pq umask
used when creating a Unix-domain socket file for local or remote
port forwarding.
This option is only used for port forwarding to a Unix-domain socket file.
.Pp
The default value is 0177, which creates a Unix-domain socket file that is
readable and writable only by the owner.
Note that not all operating systems honor the file mode on Unix-domain
socket files.
.It Cm StreamLocalBindUnlink
Specifies whether to remove an existing Unix-domain socket file for local
or remote port forwarding before creating a new one.
If the socket file already exists and
.Cm StreamLocalBindUnlink
is not enabled,
.Nm sshd
will be unable to forward the port to the Unix-domain socket file.
This option is only used for port forwarding to a Unix-domain socket file.
.Pp
The argument must be
.Cm yes
or
.Cm no .
The default is
.Cm no .
.It Cm StrictModes
Specifies whether
.Xr sshd 8
should check file modes and ownership of the
user's files and home directory before accepting login.
This is normally desirable because novices sometimes accidentally leave their
directory or files world-writable.
The default is
.Cm yes .
Note that this does not apply to
.Cm ChrootDirectory ,
whose permissions and ownership are checked unconditionally.
.It Cm Subsystem
Configures an external subsystem (e.g. file transfer daemon).
Arguments should be a subsystem name and a command (with optional arguments)
to execute upon subsystem request.
.Pp
The command
.Cm sftp-server
implements the SFTP file transfer subsystem.
.Pp
Alternately the name
.Cm internal-sftp
implements an in-process SFTP server.
This may simplify configurations using
.Cm ChrootDirectory
to force a different filesystem root on clients.
.Pp
By default no subsystems are defined.
.It Cm SyslogFacility
Gives the facility code that is used when logging messages from
.Xr sshd 8 .
The possible values are: DAEMON, USER, AUTH, LOCAL0, LOCAL1, LOCAL2,
LOCAL3, LOCAL4, LOCAL5, LOCAL6, LOCAL7.
The default is AUTH.
.It Cm TCPKeepAlive
Specifies whether the system should send TCP keepalive messages to the
other side.
If they are sent, death of the connection or crash of one
of the machines will be properly noticed.
However, this means that
connections will die if the route is down temporarily, and some people
find it annoying.
On the other hand, if TCP keepalives are not sent,
sessions may hang indefinitely on the server, leaving
.Qq ghost
users and consuming server resources.
.Pp
The default is
.Cm yes
(to send TCP keepalive messages), and the server will notice
if the network goes down or the client host crashes.
This avoids infinitely hanging sessions.
.Pp
To disable TCP keepalive messages, the value should be set to
.Cm no .
.It Cm TrustedUserCAKeys
Specifies a file containing public keys of certificate authorities that are
trusted to sign user certificates for authentication, or
.Cm none
to not use one.
Keys are listed one per line; empty lines and comments starting with
.Ql #
are allowed.
If a certificate is presented for authentication and has its signing CA key
listed in this file, then it may be used for authentication for any user
listed in the certificate's principals list.
Note that certificates that lack a list of principals will not be permitted
for authentication using
.Cm TrustedUserCAKeys .
For more details on certificates, see the CERTIFICATES section in
.Xr ssh-keygen 1 .
.It Cm UseDNS
Specifies whether
.Xr sshd 8
should look up the remote host name, and to check that
the resolved host name for the remote IP address maps back to the
very same IP address.
.Pp
If this option is set to
.Cm no
(the default) then only addresses and not host names may be used in
.Pa ~/.ssh/authorized_keys
.Cm from
and
.Nm
.Cm Match
.Cm Host
directives.
.It Cm UsePAM
Enables the Pluggable Authentication Module interface.
If set to
.Cm yes
this will enable PAM authentication using
.Cm ChallengeResponseAuthentication
and
.Cm PasswordAuthentication
in addition to PAM account and session module processing for all
authentication types.
.Pp
Because PAM challenge-response authentication usually serves an equivalent
role to password authentication, you should disable either
.Cm PasswordAuthentication
or
.Cm ChallengeResponseAuthentication.
.Pp
If
.Cm UsePAM
is enabled, you will not be able to run
.Xr sshd 8
as a non-root user.
The default is
.Cm no .
.It Cm VersionAddendum
Optionally specifies additional text to append to the SSH protocol banner
sent by the server upon connection.
The default is
.Cm none .
.It Cm X11DisplayOffset
Specifies the first display number available for
.Xr sshd 8 Ns 's
X11 forwarding.
This prevents sshd from interfering with real X11 servers.
The default is 10.
.It Cm X11Forwarding
Specifies whether X11 forwarding is permitted.
The argument must be
.Cm yes
or
.Cm no .
The default is
.Cm no .
.Pp
When X11 forwarding is enabled, there may be additional exposure to
the server and to client displays if the
.Xr sshd 8
proxy display is configured to listen on the wildcard address (see
.Cm X11UseLocalhost ) ,
though this is not the default.
Additionally, the authentication spoofing and authentication data
verification and substitution occur on the client side.
The security risk of using X11 forwarding is that the client's X11
display server may be exposed to attack when the SSH client requests
forwarding (see the warnings for
.Cm ForwardX11
in
.Xr ssh_config 5 ) .
A system administrator may have a stance in which they want to
protect clients that may expose themselves to attack by unwittingly
requesting X11 forwarding, which can warrant a
.Cm no
setting.
.Pp
Note that disabling X11 forwarding does not prevent users from
forwarding X11 traffic, as users can always install their own forwarders.
.It Cm X11UseLocalhost
Specifies whether
.Xr sshd 8
should bind the X11 forwarding server to the loopback address or to
the wildcard address.
By default,
sshd binds the forwarding server to the loopback address and sets the
hostname part of the
.Ev DISPLAY
environment variable to
.Cm localhost .
This prevents remote hosts from connecting to the proxy display.
However, some older X11 clients may not function with this
configuration.
.Cm X11UseLocalhost
may be set to
.Cm no
to specify that the forwarding server should be bound to the wildcard
address.
The argument must be
.Cm yes
or
.Cm no .
The default is
.Cm yes .
.It Cm XAuthLocation
Specifies the full pathname of the
.Xr xauth 1
program, or
.Cm none
to not use one.
The default is
.Pa /usr/X11R6/bin/xauth .
.El
.Sh TIME FORMATS
.Xr sshd 8
command-line arguments and configuration file options that specify time
may be expressed using a sequence of the form:
.Sm off
.Ar time Op Ar qualifier ,
.Sm on
where
.Ar time
is a positive integer value and
.Ar qualifier
is one of the following:
.Pp
.Bl -tag -width Ds -compact -offset indent
.It Aq Cm none
seconds
.It Cm s | Cm S
seconds
.It Cm m | Cm M
minutes
.It Cm h | Cm H
hours
.It Cm d | Cm D
days
.It Cm w | Cm W
weeks
.El
.Pp
Each member of the sequence is added together to calculate
the total time value.
.Pp
Time format examples:
.Pp
.Bl -tag -width Ds -compact -offset indent
.It 600
600 seconds (10 minutes)
.It 10m
10 minutes
.It 1h30m
1 hour 30 minutes (90 minutes)
.El
.Sh TOKENS
Arguments to some keywords can make use of tokens,
which are expanded at runtime:
.Pp
.Bl -tag -width XXXX -offset indent -compact
.It %%
A literal
.Sq % .
.It \&%D
The routing domain in which the incoming connection was received.
.It %F
The fingerprint of the CA key.
.It %f
The fingerprint of the key or certificate.
.It %h
The home directory of the user.
.It %i
The key ID in the certificate.
.It %K
The base64-encoded CA key.
.It %k
The base64-encoded key or certificate for authentication.
.It %s
The serial number of the certificate.
.It \&%T
The type of the CA key.
.It %t
The key or certificate type.
.It \&%U
The numeric user ID of the target user.
.It %u
The username.
.El
.Pp
.Cm AuthorizedKeysCommand
accepts the tokens %%, %f, %h, %k, %t, %U, and %u.
.Pp
.Cm AuthorizedKeysFile
accepts the tokens %%, %h, %U, and %u.
.Pp
.Cm AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand
accepts the tokens %%, %F, %f, %h, %i, %K, %k, %s, %T, %t, %U, and %u.
.Pp
.Cm AuthorizedPrincipalsFile
accepts the tokens %%, %h, %U, and %u.
.Pp
.Cm ChrootDirectory
accepts the tokens %%, %h, %U, and %u.
.Pp
.Cm RoutingDomain
accepts the token %D.
.Sh FILES
.Bl -tag -width Ds
.It Pa /etc/ssh/sshd_config
Contains configuration data for
.Xr sshd 8 .
This file should be writable by root only, but it is recommended
(though not necessary) that it be world-readable.
.El
.Sh SEE ALSO
.Xr sftp-server 8 ,
.Xr sshd 8
.Sh AUTHORS
.An -nosplit
OpenSSH is a derivative of the original and free
ssh 1.2.12 release by
.An Tatu Ylonen .
.An Aaron Campbell , Bob Beck , Markus Friedl , Niels Provos ,
.An Theo de Raadt
and
.An Dug Song
removed many bugs, re-added newer features and
created OpenSSH.
.An Markus Friedl
contributed the support for SSH protocol versions 1.5 and 2.0.
.An Niels Provos
and
.An Markus Friedl
contributed support for privilege separation.
diff --git a/sshkey.c b/sshkey.c
index 1571e3d93878..ac451f1a84c2 100644
--- a/sshkey.c
+++ b/sshkey.c
@@ -1,4775 +1,4781 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: sshkey.c,v 1.108 2020/04/11 10:16:11 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: sshkey.c,v 1.111 2020/08/27 01:06:19 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 2000, 2001 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
* Copyright (c) 2008 Alexander von Gernler. All rights reserved.
* Copyright (c) 2010,2011 Damien Miller. All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
* OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
* IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
* INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
* NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
* DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
* THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
* (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
* THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
*/
#include "includes.h"
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <netinet/in.h>
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
#include <openssl/evp.h>
#include <openssl/err.h>
#include <openssl/pem.h>
#endif
#include "crypto_api.h"
#include <errno.h>
#include <limits.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <resolv.h>
#include <time.h>
#ifdef HAVE_UTIL_H
#include <util.h>
#endif /* HAVE_UTIL_H */
#include "ssh2.h"
#include "ssherr.h"
#include "misc.h"
#include "sshbuf.h"
#include "cipher.h"
#include "digest.h"
#define SSHKEY_INTERNAL
#include "sshkey.h"
#include "match.h"
#include "ssh-sk.h"
#ifdef WITH_XMSS
#include "sshkey-xmss.h"
#include "xmss_fast.h"
#endif
#include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h"
/* openssh private key file format */
#define MARK_BEGIN "-----BEGIN OPENSSH PRIVATE KEY-----\n"
#define MARK_END "-----END OPENSSH PRIVATE KEY-----\n"
#define MARK_BEGIN_LEN (sizeof(MARK_BEGIN) - 1)
#define MARK_END_LEN (sizeof(MARK_END) - 1)
#define KDFNAME "bcrypt"
#define AUTH_MAGIC "openssh-key-v1"
#define SALT_LEN 16
#define DEFAULT_CIPHERNAME "aes256-ctr"
#define DEFAULT_ROUNDS 16
/* Version identification string for SSH v1 identity files. */
#define LEGACY_BEGIN "SSH PRIVATE KEY FILE FORMAT 1.1\n"
/*
* Constants relating to "shielding" support; protection of keys expected
* to remain in memory for long durations
*/
#define SSHKEY_SHIELD_PREKEY_LEN (16 * 1024)
#define SSHKEY_SHIELD_CIPHER "aes256-ctr" /* XXX want AES-EME* */
#define SSHKEY_SHIELD_PREKEY_HASH SSH_DIGEST_SHA512
int sshkey_private_serialize_opt(struct sshkey *key,
struct sshbuf *buf, enum sshkey_serialize_rep);
static int sshkey_from_blob_internal(struct sshbuf *buf,
struct sshkey **keyp, int allow_cert);
/* Supported key types */
struct keytype {
const char *name;
const char *shortname;
const char *sigalg;
int type;
int nid;
int cert;
int sigonly;
};
static const struct keytype keytypes[] = {
{ "ssh-ed25519", "ED25519", NULL, KEY_ED25519, 0, 0, 0 },
{ "ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com", "ED25519-CERT", NULL,
KEY_ED25519_CERT, 0, 1, 0 },
{ "sk-ssh-ed25519@openssh.com", "ED25519-SK", NULL,
KEY_ED25519_SK, 0, 0, 0 },
{ "sk-ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com", "ED25519-SK-CERT", NULL,
KEY_ED25519_SK_CERT, 0, 1, 0 },
#ifdef WITH_XMSS
{ "ssh-xmss@openssh.com", "XMSS", NULL, KEY_XMSS, 0, 0, 0 },
{ "ssh-xmss-cert-v01@openssh.com", "XMSS-CERT", NULL,
KEY_XMSS_CERT, 0, 1, 0 },
#endif /* WITH_XMSS */
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
{ "ssh-rsa", "RSA", NULL, KEY_RSA, 0, 0, 0 },
{ "rsa-sha2-256", "RSA", NULL, KEY_RSA, 0, 0, 1 },
{ "rsa-sha2-512", "RSA", NULL, KEY_RSA, 0, 0, 1 },
{ "ssh-dss", "DSA", NULL, KEY_DSA, 0, 0, 0 },
# ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
{ "ecdsa-sha2-nistp256", "ECDSA", NULL,
KEY_ECDSA, NID_X9_62_prime256v1, 0, 0 },
{ "ecdsa-sha2-nistp384", "ECDSA", NULL,
KEY_ECDSA, NID_secp384r1, 0, 0 },
# ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_NISTP521
{ "ecdsa-sha2-nistp521", "ECDSA", NULL,
KEY_ECDSA, NID_secp521r1, 0, 0 },
# endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_NISTP521 */
{ "sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256@openssh.com", "ECDSA-SK", NULL,
KEY_ECDSA_SK, NID_X9_62_prime256v1, 0, 0 },
+ { "webauthn-sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256@openssh.com", "ECDSA-SK", NULL,
+ KEY_ECDSA_SK, NID_X9_62_prime256v1, 0, 1 },
# endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */
{ "ssh-rsa-cert-v01@openssh.com", "RSA-CERT", NULL,
KEY_RSA_CERT, 0, 1, 0 },
{ "rsa-sha2-256-cert-v01@openssh.com", "RSA-CERT",
"rsa-sha2-256", KEY_RSA_CERT, 0, 1, 1 },
{ "rsa-sha2-512-cert-v01@openssh.com", "RSA-CERT",
"rsa-sha2-512", KEY_RSA_CERT, 0, 1, 1 },
{ "ssh-dss-cert-v01@openssh.com", "DSA-CERT", NULL,
KEY_DSA_CERT, 0, 1, 0 },
# ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
{ "ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com", "ECDSA-CERT", NULL,
KEY_ECDSA_CERT, NID_X9_62_prime256v1, 1, 0 },
{ "ecdsa-sha2-nistp384-cert-v01@openssh.com", "ECDSA-CERT", NULL,
KEY_ECDSA_CERT, NID_secp384r1, 1, 0 },
# ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_NISTP521
{ "ecdsa-sha2-nistp521-cert-v01@openssh.com", "ECDSA-CERT", NULL,
KEY_ECDSA_CERT, NID_secp521r1, 1, 0 },
# endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_NISTP521 */
{ "sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com", "ECDSA-SK-CERT", NULL,
KEY_ECDSA_SK_CERT, NID_X9_62_prime256v1, 1, 0 },
# endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */
#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
{ NULL, NULL, NULL, -1, -1, 0, 0 }
};
const char *
sshkey_type(const struct sshkey *k)
{
const struct keytype *kt;
for (kt = keytypes; kt->type != -1; kt++) {
if (kt->type == k->type)
return kt->shortname;
}
return "unknown";
}
static const char *
sshkey_ssh_name_from_type_nid(int type, int nid)
{
const struct keytype *kt;
for (kt = keytypes; kt->type != -1; kt++) {
if (kt->type == type && (kt->nid == 0 || kt->nid == nid))
return kt->name;
}
return "ssh-unknown";
}
int
sshkey_type_is_cert(int type)
{
const struct keytype *kt;
for (kt = keytypes; kt->type != -1; kt++) {
if (kt->type == type)
return kt->cert;
}
return 0;
}
const char *
sshkey_ssh_name(const struct sshkey *k)
{
return sshkey_ssh_name_from_type_nid(k->type, k->ecdsa_nid);
}
const char *
sshkey_ssh_name_plain(const struct sshkey *k)
{
return sshkey_ssh_name_from_type_nid(sshkey_type_plain(k->type),
k->ecdsa_nid);
}
int
sshkey_type_from_name(const char *name)
{
const struct keytype *kt;
for (kt = keytypes; kt->type != -1; kt++) {
/* Only allow shortname matches for plain key types */
if ((kt->name != NULL && strcmp(name, kt->name) == 0) ||
(!kt->cert && strcasecmp(kt->shortname, name) == 0))
return kt->type;
}
return KEY_UNSPEC;
}
static int
key_type_is_ecdsa_variant(int type)
{
switch (type) {
case KEY_ECDSA:
case KEY_ECDSA_CERT:
case KEY_ECDSA_SK:
case KEY_ECDSA_SK_CERT:
return 1;
}
return 0;
}
int
sshkey_ecdsa_nid_from_name(const char *name)
{
const struct keytype *kt;
for (kt = keytypes; kt->type != -1; kt++) {
if (!key_type_is_ecdsa_variant(kt->type))
continue;
if (kt->name != NULL && strcmp(name, kt->name) == 0)
return kt->nid;
}
return -1;
}
char *
sshkey_alg_list(int certs_only, int plain_only, int include_sigonly, char sep)
{
char *tmp, *ret = NULL;
size_t nlen, rlen = 0;
const struct keytype *kt;
for (kt = keytypes; kt->type != -1; kt++) {
if (kt->name == NULL)
continue;
if (!include_sigonly && kt->sigonly)
continue;
if ((certs_only && !kt->cert) || (plain_only && kt->cert))
continue;
if (ret != NULL)
ret[rlen++] = sep;
nlen = strlen(kt->name);
if ((tmp = realloc(ret, rlen + nlen + 2)) == NULL) {
free(ret);
return NULL;
}
ret = tmp;
memcpy(ret + rlen, kt->name, nlen + 1);
rlen += nlen;
}
return ret;
}
int
sshkey_names_valid2(const char *names, int allow_wildcard)
{
char *s, *cp, *p;
const struct keytype *kt;
int type;
if (names == NULL || strcmp(names, "") == 0)
return 0;
if ((s = cp = strdup(names)) == NULL)
return 0;
for ((p = strsep(&cp, ",")); p && *p != '\0';
(p = strsep(&cp, ","))) {
type = sshkey_type_from_name(p);
if (type == KEY_UNSPEC) {
if (allow_wildcard) {
/*
* Try matching key types against the string.
* If any has a positive or negative match then
* the component is accepted.
*/
for (kt = keytypes; kt->type != -1; kt++) {
if (match_pattern_list(kt->name,
p, 0) != 0)
break;
}
if (kt->type != -1)
continue;
}
free(s);
return 0;
}
}
free(s);
return 1;
}
u_int
sshkey_size(const struct sshkey *k)
{
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
const BIGNUM *rsa_n, *dsa_p;
#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
switch (k->type) {
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
case KEY_RSA:
case KEY_RSA_CERT:
if (k->rsa == NULL)
return 0;
RSA_get0_key(k->rsa, &rsa_n, NULL, NULL);
return BN_num_bits(rsa_n);
case KEY_DSA:
case KEY_DSA_CERT:
if (k->dsa == NULL)
return 0;
DSA_get0_pqg(k->dsa, &dsa_p, NULL, NULL);
return BN_num_bits(dsa_p);
case KEY_ECDSA:
case KEY_ECDSA_CERT:
case KEY_ECDSA_SK:
case KEY_ECDSA_SK_CERT:
return sshkey_curve_nid_to_bits(k->ecdsa_nid);
#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
case KEY_ED25519:
case KEY_ED25519_CERT:
case KEY_ED25519_SK:
case KEY_ED25519_SK_CERT:
case KEY_XMSS:
case KEY_XMSS_CERT:
return 256; /* XXX */
}
return 0;
}
static int
sshkey_type_is_valid_ca(int type)
{
switch (type) {
case KEY_RSA:
case KEY_DSA:
case KEY_ECDSA:
case KEY_ECDSA_SK:
case KEY_ED25519:
case KEY_ED25519_SK:
case KEY_XMSS:
return 1;
default:
return 0;
}
}
int
sshkey_is_cert(const struct sshkey *k)
{
if (k == NULL)
return 0;
return sshkey_type_is_cert(k->type);
}
int
sshkey_is_sk(const struct sshkey *k)
{
if (k == NULL)
return 0;
switch (sshkey_type_plain(k->type)) {
case KEY_ECDSA_SK:
case KEY_ED25519_SK:
return 1;
default:
return 0;
}
}
/* Return the cert-less equivalent to a certified key type */
int
sshkey_type_plain(int type)
{
switch (type) {
case KEY_RSA_CERT:
return KEY_RSA;
case KEY_DSA_CERT:
return KEY_DSA;
case KEY_ECDSA_CERT:
return KEY_ECDSA;
case KEY_ECDSA_SK_CERT:
return KEY_ECDSA_SK;
case KEY_ED25519_CERT:
return KEY_ED25519;
case KEY_ED25519_SK_CERT:
return KEY_ED25519_SK;
case KEY_XMSS_CERT:
return KEY_XMSS;
default:
return type;
}
}
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
/* XXX: these are really begging for a table-driven approach */
int
sshkey_curve_name_to_nid(const char *name)
{
if (strcmp(name, "nistp256") == 0)
return NID_X9_62_prime256v1;
else if (strcmp(name, "nistp384") == 0)
return NID_secp384r1;
# ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_NISTP521
else if (strcmp(name, "nistp521") == 0)
return NID_secp521r1;
# endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_NISTP521 */
else
return -1;
}
u_int
sshkey_curve_nid_to_bits(int nid)
{
switch (nid) {
case NID_X9_62_prime256v1:
return 256;
case NID_secp384r1:
return 384;
# ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_NISTP521
case NID_secp521r1:
return 521;
# endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_NISTP521 */
default:
return 0;
}
}
int
sshkey_ecdsa_bits_to_nid(int bits)
{
switch (bits) {
case 256:
return NID_X9_62_prime256v1;
case 384:
return NID_secp384r1;
# ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_NISTP521
case 521:
return NID_secp521r1;
# endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_NISTP521 */
default:
return -1;
}
}
const char *
sshkey_curve_nid_to_name(int nid)
{
switch (nid) {
case NID_X9_62_prime256v1:
return "nistp256";
case NID_secp384r1:
return "nistp384";
# ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_NISTP521
case NID_secp521r1:
return "nistp521";
# endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_NISTP521 */
default:
return NULL;
}
}
int
sshkey_ec_nid_to_hash_alg(int nid)
{
int kbits = sshkey_curve_nid_to_bits(nid);
if (kbits <= 0)
return -1;
/* RFC5656 section 6.2.1 */
if (kbits <= 256)
return SSH_DIGEST_SHA256;
else if (kbits <= 384)
return SSH_DIGEST_SHA384;
else
return SSH_DIGEST_SHA512;
}
#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
static void
cert_free(struct sshkey_cert *cert)
{
u_int i;
if (cert == NULL)
return;
sshbuf_free(cert->certblob);
sshbuf_free(cert->critical);
sshbuf_free(cert->extensions);
free(cert->key_id);
for (i = 0; i < cert->nprincipals; i++)
free(cert->principals[i]);
free(cert->principals);
sshkey_free(cert->signature_key);
free(cert->signature_type);
freezero(cert, sizeof(*cert));
}
static struct sshkey_cert *
cert_new(void)
{
struct sshkey_cert *cert;
if ((cert = calloc(1, sizeof(*cert))) == NULL)
return NULL;
if ((cert->certblob = sshbuf_new()) == NULL ||
(cert->critical = sshbuf_new()) == NULL ||
(cert->extensions = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) {
cert_free(cert);
return NULL;
}
cert->key_id = NULL;
cert->principals = NULL;
cert->signature_key = NULL;
cert->signature_type = NULL;
return cert;
}
struct sshkey *
sshkey_new(int type)
{
struct sshkey *k;
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
RSA *rsa;
DSA *dsa;
#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
if ((k = calloc(1, sizeof(*k))) == NULL)
return NULL;
k->type = type;
k->ecdsa = NULL;
k->ecdsa_nid = -1;
k->dsa = NULL;
k->rsa = NULL;
k->cert = NULL;
k->ed25519_sk = NULL;
k->ed25519_pk = NULL;
k->xmss_sk = NULL;
k->xmss_pk = NULL;
switch (k->type) {
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
case KEY_RSA:
case KEY_RSA_CERT:
if ((rsa = RSA_new()) == NULL) {
free(k);
return NULL;
}
k->rsa = rsa;
break;
case KEY_DSA:
case KEY_DSA_CERT:
if ((dsa = DSA_new()) == NULL) {
free(k);
return NULL;
}
k->dsa = dsa;
break;
case KEY_ECDSA:
case KEY_ECDSA_CERT:
case KEY_ECDSA_SK:
case KEY_ECDSA_SK_CERT:
/* Cannot do anything until we know the group */
break;
#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
case KEY_ED25519:
case KEY_ED25519_CERT:
case KEY_ED25519_SK:
case KEY_ED25519_SK_CERT:
case KEY_XMSS:
case KEY_XMSS_CERT:
/* no need to prealloc */
break;
case KEY_UNSPEC:
break;
default:
free(k);
return NULL;
}
if (sshkey_is_cert(k)) {
if ((k->cert = cert_new()) == NULL) {
sshkey_free(k);
return NULL;
}
}
return k;
}
void
sshkey_free(struct sshkey *k)
{
if (k == NULL)
return;
switch (k->type) {
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
case KEY_RSA:
case KEY_RSA_CERT:
RSA_free(k->rsa);
k->rsa = NULL;
break;
case KEY_DSA:
case KEY_DSA_CERT:
DSA_free(k->dsa);
k->dsa = NULL;
break;
# ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
case KEY_ECDSA_SK:
case KEY_ECDSA_SK_CERT:
free(k->sk_application);
sshbuf_free(k->sk_key_handle);
sshbuf_free(k->sk_reserved);
/* FALLTHROUGH */
case KEY_ECDSA:
case KEY_ECDSA_CERT:
EC_KEY_free(k->ecdsa);
k->ecdsa = NULL;
break;
# endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */
#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
case KEY_ED25519_SK:
case KEY_ED25519_SK_CERT:
free(k->sk_application);
sshbuf_free(k->sk_key_handle);
sshbuf_free(k->sk_reserved);
/* FALLTHROUGH */
case KEY_ED25519:
case KEY_ED25519_CERT:
freezero(k->ed25519_pk, ED25519_PK_SZ);
k->ed25519_pk = NULL;
freezero(k->ed25519_sk, ED25519_SK_SZ);
k->ed25519_sk = NULL;
break;
#ifdef WITH_XMSS
case KEY_XMSS:
case KEY_XMSS_CERT:
freezero(k->xmss_pk, sshkey_xmss_pklen(k));
k->xmss_pk = NULL;
freezero(k->xmss_sk, sshkey_xmss_sklen(k));
k->xmss_sk = NULL;
sshkey_xmss_free_state(k);
free(k->xmss_name);
k->xmss_name = NULL;
free(k->xmss_filename);
k->xmss_filename = NULL;
break;
#endif /* WITH_XMSS */
case KEY_UNSPEC:
break;
default:
break;
}
if (sshkey_is_cert(k))
cert_free(k->cert);
freezero(k->shielded_private, k->shielded_len);
freezero(k->shield_prekey, k->shield_prekey_len);
freezero(k, sizeof(*k));
}
static int
cert_compare(struct sshkey_cert *a, struct sshkey_cert *b)
{
if (a == NULL && b == NULL)
return 1;
if (a == NULL || b == NULL)
return 0;
if (sshbuf_len(a->certblob) != sshbuf_len(b->certblob))
return 0;
if (timingsafe_bcmp(sshbuf_ptr(a->certblob), sshbuf_ptr(b->certblob),
sshbuf_len(a->certblob)) != 0)
return 0;
return 1;
}
/*
* Compare public portions of key only, allowing comparisons between
* certificates and plain keys too.
*/
int
sshkey_equal_public(const struct sshkey *a, const struct sshkey *b)
{
#if defined(WITH_OPENSSL)
const BIGNUM *rsa_e_a, *rsa_n_a;
const BIGNUM *rsa_e_b, *rsa_n_b;
const BIGNUM *dsa_p_a, *dsa_q_a, *dsa_g_a, *dsa_pub_key_a;
const BIGNUM *dsa_p_b, *dsa_q_b, *dsa_g_b, *dsa_pub_key_b;
#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
if (a == NULL || b == NULL ||
sshkey_type_plain(a->type) != sshkey_type_plain(b->type))
return 0;
switch (a->type) {
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
case KEY_RSA_CERT:
case KEY_RSA:
if (a->rsa == NULL || b->rsa == NULL)
return 0;
RSA_get0_key(a->rsa, &rsa_n_a, &rsa_e_a, NULL);
RSA_get0_key(b->rsa, &rsa_n_b, &rsa_e_b, NULL);
return BN_cmp(rsa_e_a, rsa_e_b) == 0 &&
BN_cmp(rsa_n_a, rsa_n_b) == 0;
case KEY_DSA_CERT:
case KEY_DSA:
if (a->dsa == NULL || b->dsa == NULL)
return 0;
DSA_get0_pqg(a->dsa, &dsa_p_a, &dsa_q_a, &dsa_g_a);
DSA_get0_pqg(b->dsa, &dsa_p_b, &dsa_q_b, &dsa_g_b);
DSA_get0_key(a->dsa, &dsa_pub_key_a, NULL);
DSA_get0_key(b->dsa, &dsa_pub_key_b, NULL);
return BN_cmp(dsa_p_a, dsa_p_b) == 0 &&
BN_cmp(dsa_q_a, dsa_q_b) == 0 &&
BN_cmp(dsa_g_a, dsa_g_b) == 0 &&
BN_cmp(dsa_pub_key_a, dsa_pub_key_b) == 0;
# ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
case KEY_ECDSA_SK:
case KEY_ECDSA_SK_CERT:
if (a->sk_application == NULL || b->sk_application == NULL)
return 0;
if (strcmp(a->sk_application, b->sk_application) != 0)
return 0;
/* FALLTHROUGH */
case KEY_ECDSA_CERT:
case KEY_ECDSA:
if (a->ecdsa == NULL || b->ecdsa == NULL ||
EC_KEY_get0_public_key(a->ecdsa) == NULL ||
EC_KEY_get0_public_key(b->ecdsa) == NULL)
return 0;
if (EC_GROUP_cmp(EC_KEY_get0_group(a->ecdsa),
EC_KEY_get0_group(b->ecdsa), NULL) != 0 ||
EC_POINT_cmp(EC_KEY_get0_group(a->ecdsa),
EC_KEY_get0_public_key(a->ecdsa),
EC_KEY_get0_public_key(b->ecdsa), NULL) != 0)
return 0;
return 1;
# endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */
#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
case KEY_ED25519_SK:
case KEY_ED25519_SK_CERT:
if (a->sk_application == NULL || b->sk_application == NULL)
return 0;
if (strcmp(a->sk_application, b->sk_application) != 0)
return 0;
/* FALLTHROUGH */
case KEY_ED25519:
case KEY_ED25519_CERT:
return a->ed25519_pk != NULL && b->ed25519_pk != NULL &&
memcmp(a->ed25519_pk, b->ed25519_pk, ED25519_PK_SZ) == 0;
#ifdef WITH_XMSS
case KEY_XMSS:
case KEY_XMSS_CERT:
return a->xmss_pk != NULL && b->xmss_pk != NULL &&
sshkey_xmss_pklen(a) == sshkey_xmss_pklen(b) &&
memcmp(a->xmss_pk, b->xmss_pk, sshkey_xmss_pklen(a)) == 0;
#endif /* WITH_XMSS */
default:
return 0;
}
/* NOTREACHED */
}
int
sshkey_equal(const struct sshkey *a, const struct sshkey *b)
{
if (a == NULL || b == NULL || a->type != b->type)
return 0;
if (sshkey_is_cert(a)) {
if (!cert_compare(a->cert, b->cert))
return 0;
}
return sshkey_equal_public(a, b);
}
static int
to_blob_buf(const struct sshkey *key, struct sshbuf *b, int force_plain,
enum sshkey_serialize_rep opts)
{
int type, ret = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
const char *typename;
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
const BIGNUM *rsa_n, *rsa_e, *dsa_p, *dsa_q, *dsa_g, *dsa_pub_key;
#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
if (key == NULL)
return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
if (sshkey_is_cert(key)) {
if (key->cert == NULL)
return SSH_ERR_EXPECTED_CERT;
if (sshbuf_len(key->cert->certblob) == 0)
return SSH_ERR_KEY_LACKS_CERTBLOB;
}
type = force_plain ? sshkey_type_plain(key->type) : key->type;
typename = sshkey_ssh_name_from_type_nid(type, key->ecdsa_nid);
switch (type) {
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
case KEY_DSA_CERT:
case KEY_ECDSA_CERT:
case KEY_ECDSA_SK_CERT:
case KEY_RSA_CERT:
#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
case KEY_ED25519_CERT:
case KEY_ED25519_SK_CERT:
#ifdef WITH_XMSS
case KEY_XMSS_CERT:
#endif /* WITH_XMSS */
/* Use the existing blob */
/* XXX modified flag? */
if ((ret = sshbuf_putb(b, key->cert->certblob)) != 0)
return ret;
break;
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
case KEY_DSA:
if (key->dsa == NULL)
return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
DSA_get0_pqg(key->dsa, &dsa_p, &dsa_q, &dsa_g);
DSA_get0_key(key->dsa, &dsa_pub_key, NULL);
if ((ret = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, typename)) != 0 ||
(ret = sshbuf_put_bignum2(b, dsa_p)) != 0 ||
(ret = sshbuf_put_bignum2(b, dsa_q)) != 0 ||
(ret = sshbuf_put_bignum2(b, dsa_g)) != 0 ||
(ret = sshbuf_put_bignum2(b, dsa_pub_key)) != 0)
return ret;
break;
# ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
case KEY_ECDSA:
case KEY_ECDSA_SK:
if (key->ecdsa == NULL)
return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
if ((ret = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, typename)) != 0 ||
(ret = sshbuf_put_cstring(b,
sshkey_curve_nid_to_name(key->ecdsa_nid))) != 0 ||
(ret = sshbuf_put_eckey(b, key->ecdsa)) != 0)
return ret;
if (type == KEY_ECDSA_SK) {
if ((ret = sshbuf_put_cstring(b,
key->sk_application)) != 0)
return ret;
}
break;
# endif
case KEY_RSA:
if (key->rsa == NULL)
return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
RSA_get0_key(key->rsa, &rsa_n, &rsa_e, NULL);
if ((ret = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, typename)) != 0 ||
(ret = sshbuf_put_bignum2(b, rsa_e)) != 0 ||
(ret = sshbuf_put_bignum2(b, rsa_n)) != 0)
return ret;
break;
#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
case KEY_ED25519:
case KEY_ED25519_SK:
if (key->ed25519_pk == NULL)
return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
if ((ret = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, typename)) != 0 ||
(ret = sshbuf_put_string(b,
key->ed25519_pk, ED25519_PK_SZ)) != 0)
return ret;
if (type == KEY_ED25519_SK) {
if ((ret = sshbuf_put_cstring(b,
key->sk_application)) != 0)
return ret;
}
break;
#ifdef WITH_XMSS
case KEY_XMSS:
if (key->xmss_name == NULL || key->xmss_pk == NULL ||
sshkey_xmss_pklen(key) == 0)
return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
if ((ret = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, typename)) != 0 ||
(ret = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, key->xmss_name)) != 0 ||
(ret = sshbuf_put_string(b,
key->xmss_pk, sshkey_xmss_pklen(key))) != 0 ||
(ret = sshkey_xmss_serialize_pk_info(key, b, opts)) != 0)
return ret;
break;
#endif /* WITH_XMSS */
default:
return SSH_ERR_KEY_TYPE_UNKNOWN;
}
return 0;
}
int
sshkey_putb(const struct sshkey *key, struct sshbuf *b)
{
return to_blob_buf(key, b, 0, SSHKEY_SERIALIZE_DEFAULT);
}
int
sshkey_puts_opts(const struct sshkey *key, struct sshbuf *b,
enum sshkey_serialize_rep opts)
{
struct sshbuf *tmp;
int r;
if ((tmp = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
r = to_blob_buf(key, tmp, 0, opts);
if (r == 0)
r = sshbuf_put_stringb(b, tmp);
sshbuf_free(tmp);
return r;
}
int
sshkey_puts(const struct sshkey *key, struct sshbuf *b)
{
return sshkey_puts_opts(key, b, SSHKEY_SERIALIZE_DEFAULT);
}
int
sshkey_putb_plain(const struct sshkey *key, struct sshbuf *b)
{
return to_blob_buf(key, b, 1, SSHKEY_SERIALIZE_DEFAULT);
}
static int
to_blob(const struct sshkey *key, u_char **blobp, size_t *lenp, int force_plain,
enum sshkey_serialize_rep opts)
{
int ret = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
size_t len;
struct sshbuf *b = NULL;
if (lenp != NULL)
*lenp = 0;
if (blobp != NULL)
*blobp = NULL;
if ((b = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
if ((ret = to_blob_buf(key, b, force_plain, opts)) != 0)
goto out;
len = sshbuf_len(b);
if (lenp != NULL)
*lenp = len;
if (blobp != NULL) {
if ((*blobp = malloc(len)) == NULL) {
ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
goto out;
}
memcpy(*blobp, sshbuf_ptr(b), len);
}
ret = 0;
out:
sshbuf_free(b);
return ret;
}
int
sshkey_to_blob(const struct sshkey *key, u_char **blobp, size_t *lenp)
{
return to_blob(key, blobp, lenp, 0, SSHKEY_SERIALIZE_DEFAULT);
}
int
sshkey_plain_to_blob(const struct sshkey *key, u_char **blobp, size_t *lenp)
{
return to_blob(key, blobp, lenp, 1, SSHKEY_SERIALIZE_DEFAULT);
}
int
sshkey_fingerprint_raw(const struct sshkey *k, int dgst_alg,
u_char **retp, size_t *lenp)
{
u_char *blob = NULL, *ret = NULL;
size_t blob_len = 0;
int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
if (retp != NULL)
*retp = NULL;
if (lenp != NULL)
*lenp = 0;
if (ssh_digest_bytes(dgst_alg) == 0) {
r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
goto out;
}
if ((r = to_blob(k, &blob, &blob_len, 1, SSHKEY_SERIALIZE_DEFAULT))
!= 0)
goto out;
if ((ret = calloc(1, SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH)) == NULL) {
r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
goto out;
}
if ((r = ssh_digest_memory(dgst_alg, blob, blob_len,
ret, SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH)) != 0)
goto out;
/* success */
if (retp != NULL) {
*retp = ret;
ret = NULL;
}
if (lenp != NULL)
*lenp = ssh_digest_bytes(dgst_alg);
r = 0;
out:
free(ret);
if (blob != NULL)
freezero(blob, blob_len);
return r;
}
static char *
fingerprint_b64(const char *alg, u_char *dgst_raw, size_t dgst_raw_len)
{
char *ret;
size_t plen = strlen(alg) + 1;
size_t rlen = ((dgst_raw_len + 2) / 3) * 4 + plen + 1;
if (dgst_raw_len > 65536 || (ret = calloc(1, rlen)) == NULL)
return NULL;
strlcpy(ret, alg, rlen);
strlcat(ret, ":", rlen);
if (dgst_raw_len == 0)
return ret;
if (b64_ntop(dgst_raw, dgst_raw_len, ret + plen, rlen - plen) == -1) {
freezero(ret, rlen);
return NULL;
}
/* Trim padding characters from end */
ret[strcspn(ret, "=")] = '\0';
return ret;
}
static char *
fingerprint_hex(const char *alg, u_char *dgst_raw, size_t dgst_raw_len)
{
char *retval, hex[5];
size_t i, rlen = dgst_raw_len * 3 + strlen(alg) + 2;
if (dgst_raw_len > 65536 || (retval = calloc(1, rlen)) == NULL)
return NULL;
strlcpy(retval, alg, rlen);
strlcat(retval, ":", rlen);
for (i = 0; i < dgst_raw_len; i++) {
snprintf(hex, sizeof(hex), "%s%02x",
i > 0 ? ":" : "", dgst_raw[i]);
strlcat(retval, hex, rlen);
}
return retval;
}
static char *
fingerprint_bubblebabble(u_char *dgst_raw, size_t dgst_raw_len)
{
char vowels[] = { 'a', 'e', 'i', 'o', 'u', 'y' };
char consonants[] = { 'b', 'c', 'd', 'f', 'g', 'h', 'k', 'l', 'm',
'n', 'p', 'r', 's', 't', 'v', 'z', 'x' };
u_int i, j = 0, rounds, seed = 1;
char *retval;
rounds = (dgst_raw_len / 2) + 1;
if ((retval = calloc(rounds, 6)) == NULL)
return NULL;
retval[j++] = 'x';
for (i = 0; i < rounds; i++) {
u_int idx0, idx1, idx2, idx3, idx4;
if ((i + 1 < rounds) || (dgst_raw_len % 2 != 0)) {
idx0 = (((((u_int)(dgst_raw[2 * i])) >> 6) & 3) +
seed) % 6;
idx1 = (((u_int)(dgst_raw[2 * i])) >> 2) & 15;
idx2 = ((((u_int)(dgst_raw[2 * i])) & 3) +
(seed / 6)) % 6;
retval[j++] = vowels[idx0];
retval[j++] = consonants[idx1];
retval[j++] = vowels[idx2];
if ((i + 1) < rounds) {
idx3 = (((u_int)(dgst_raw[(2 * i) + 1])) >> 4) & 15;
idx4 = (((u_int)(dgst_raw[(2 * i) + 1]))) & 15;
retval[j++] = consonants[idx3];
retval[j++] = '-';
retval[j++] = consonants[idx4];
seed = ((seed * 5) +
((((u_int)(dgst_raw[2 * i])) * 7) +
((u_int)(dgst_raw[(2 * i) + 1])))) % 36;
}
} else {
idx0 = seed % 6;
idx1 = 16;
idx2 = seed / 6;
retval[j++] = vowels[idx0];
retval[j++] = consonants[idx1];
retval[j++] = vowels[idx2];
}
}
retval[j++] = 'x';
retval[j++] = '\0';
return retval;
}
/*
* Draw an ASCII-Art representing the fingerprint so human brain can
* profit from its built-in pattern recognition ability.
* This technique is called "random art" and can be found in some
* scientific publications like this original paper:
*
* "Hash Visualization: a New Technique to improve Real-World Security",
* Perrig A. and Song D., 1999, International Workshop on Cryptographic
* Techniques and E-Commerce (CrypTEC '99)
* sparrow.ece.cmu.edu/~adrian/projects/validation/validation.pdf
*
* The subject came up in a talk by Dan Kaminsky, too.
*
* If you see the picture is different, the key is different.
* If the picture looks the same, you still know nothing.
*
* The algorithm used here is a worm crawling over a discrete plane,
* leaving a trace (augmenting the field) everywhere it goes.
* Movement is taken from dgst_raw 2bit-wise. Bumping into walls
* makes the respective movement vector be ignored for this turn.
* Graphs are not unambiguous, because circles in graphs can be
* walked in either direction.
*/
/*
* Field sizes for the random art. Have to be odd, so the starting point
* can be in the exact middle of the picture, and FLDBASE should be >=8 .
* Else pictures would be too dense, and drawing the frame would
* fail, too, because the key type would not fit in anymore.
*/
#define FLDBASE 8
#define FLDSIZE_Y (FLDBASE + 1)
#define FLDSIZE_X (FLDBASE * 2 + 1)
static char *
fingerprint_randomart(const char *alg, u_char *dgst_raw, size_t dgst_raw_len,
const struct sshkey *k)
{
/*
* Chars to be used after each other every time the worm
* intersects with itself. Matter of taste.
*/
char *augmentation_string = " .o+=*BOX@%&#/^SE";
char *retval, *p, title[FLDSIZE_X], hash[FLDSIZE_X];
u_char field[FLDSIZE_X][FLDSIZE_Y];
size_t i, tlen, hlen;
u_int b;
int x, y, r;
size_t len = strlen(augmentation_string) - 1;
if ((retval = calloc((FLDSIZE_X + 3), (FLDSIZE_Y + 2))) == NULL)
return NULL;
/* initialize field */
memset(field, 0, FLDSIZE_X * FLDSIZE_Y * sizeof(char));
x = FLDSIZE_X / 2;
y = FLDSIZE_Y / 2;
/* process raw key */
for (i = 0; i < dgst_raw_len; i++) {
int input;
/* each byte conveys four 2-bit move commands */
input = dgst_raw[i];
for (b = 0; b < 4; b++) {
/* evaluate 2 bit, rest is shifted later */
x += (input & 0x1) ? 1 : -1;
y += (input & 0x2) ? 1 : -1;
/* assure we are still in bounds */
x = MAXIMUM(x, 0);
y = MAXIMUM(y, 0);
x = MINIMUM(x, FLDSIZE_X - 1);
y = MINIMUM(y, FLDSIZE_Y - 1);
/* augment the field */
if (field[x][y] < len - 2)
field[x][y]++;
input = input >> 2;
}
}
/* mark starting point and end point*/
field[FLDSIZE_X / 2][FLDSIZE_Y / 2] = len - 1;
field[x][y] = len;
/* assemble title */
r = snprintf(title, sizeof(title), "[%s %u]",
sshkey_type(k), sshkey_size(k));
/* If [type size] won't fit, then try [type]; fits "[ED25519-CERT]" */
if (r < 0 || r > (int)sizeof(title))
r = snprintf(title, sizeof(title), "[%s]", sshkey_type(k));
tlen = (r <= 0) ? 0 : strlen(title);
/* assemble hash ID. */
r = snprintf(hash, sizeof(hash), "[%s]", alg);
hlen = (r <= 0) ? 0 : strlen(hash);
/* output upper border */
p = retval;
*p++ = '+';
for (i = 0; i < (FLDSIZE_X - tlen) / 2; i++)
*p++ = '-';
memcpy(p, title, tlen);
p += tlen;
for (i += tlen; i < FLDSIZE_X; i++)
*p++ = '-';
*p++ = '+';
*p++ = '\n';
/* output content */
for (y = 0; y < FLDSIZE_Y; y++) {
*p++ = '|';
for (x = 0; x < FLDSIZE_X; x++)
*p++ = augmentation_string[MINIMUM(field[x][y], len)];
*p++ = '|';
*p++ = '\n';
}
/* output lower border */
*p++ = '+';
for (i = 0; i < (FLDSIZE_X - hlen) / 2; i++)
*p++ = '-';
memcpy(p, hash, hlen);
p += hlen;
for (i += hlen; i < FLDSIZE_X; i++)
*p++ = '-';
*p++ = '+';
return retval;
}
char *
sshkey_fingerprint(const struct sshkey *k, int dgst_alg,
enum sshkey_fp_rep dgst_rep)
{
char *retval = NULL;
u_char *dgst_raw;
size_t dgst_raw_len;
if (sshkey_fingerprint_raw(k, dgst_alg, &dgst_raw, &dgst_raw_len) != 0)
return NULL;
switch (dgst_rep) {
case SSH_FP_DEFAULT:
if (dgst_alg == SSH_DIGEST_MD5) {
retval = fingerprint_hex(ssh_digest_alg_name(dgst_alg),
dgst_raw, dgst_raw_len);
} else {
retval = fingerprint_b64(ssh_digest_alg_name(dgst_alg),
dgst_raw, dgst_raw_len);
}
break;
case SSH_FP_HEX:
retval = fingerprint_hex(ssh_digest_alg_name(dgst_alg),
dgst_raw, dgst_raw_len);
break;
case SSH_FP_BASE64:
retval = fingerprint_b64(ssh_digest_alg_name(dgst_alg),
dgst_raw, dgst_raw_len);
break;
case SSH_FP_BUBBLEBABBLE:
retval = fingerprint_bubblebabble(dgst_raw, dgst_raw_len);
break;
case SSH_FP_RANDOMART:
retval = fingerprint_randomart(ssh_digest_alg_name(dgst_alg),
dgst_raw, dgst_raw_len, k);
break;
default:
freezero(dgst_raw, dgst_raw_len);
return NULL;
}
freezero(dgst_raw, dgst_raw_len);
return retval;
}
static int
peek_type_nid(const char *s, size_t l, int *nid)
{
const struct keytype *kt;
for (kt = keytypes; kt->type != -1; kt++) {
if (kt->name == NULL || strlen(kt->name) != l)
continue;
if (memcmp(s, kt->name, l) == 0) {
*nid = -1;
if (key_type_is_ecdsa_variant(kt->type))
*nid = kt->nid;
return kt->type;
}
}
return KEY_UNSPEC;
}
/* XXX this can now be made const char * */
int
sshkey_read(struct sshkey *ret, char **cpp)
{
struct sshkey *k;
char *cp, *blobcopy;
size_t space;
int r, type, curve_nid = -1;
struct sshbuf *blob;
if (ret == NULL)
return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
switch (ret->type) {
case KEY_UNSPEC:
case KEY_RSA:
case KEY_DSA:
case KEY_ECDSA:
case KEY_ECDSA_SK:
case KEY_ED25519:
case KEY_ED25519_SK:
case KEY_DSA_CERT:
case KEY_ECDSA_CERT:
case KEY_ECDSA_SK_CERT:
case KEY_RSA_CERT:
case KEY_ED25519_CERT:
case KEY_ED25519_SK_CERT:
#ifdef WITH_XMSS
case KEY_XMSS:
case KEY_XMSS_CERT:
#endif /* WITH_XMSS */
break; /* ok */
default:
return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
}
/* Decode type */
cp = *cpp;
space = strcspn(cp, " \t");
if (space == strlen(cp))
return SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
if ((type = peek_type_nid(cp, space, &curve_nid)) == KEY_UNSPEC)
return SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
/* skip whitespace */
for (cp += space; *cp == ' ' || *cp == '\t'; cp++)
;
if (*cp == '\0')
return SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
if (ret->type != KEY_UNSPEC && ret->type != type)
return SSH_ERR_KEY_TYPE_MISMATCH;
if ((blob = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
/* find end of keyblob and decode */
space = strcspn(cp, " \t");
if ((blobcopy = strndup(cp, space)) == NULL) {
sshbuf_free(blob);
return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
}
if ((r = sshbuf_b64tod(blob, blobcopy)) != 0) {
free(blobcopy);
sshbuf_free(blob);
return r;
}
free(blobcopy);
if ((r = sshkey_fromb(blob, &k)) != 0) {
sshbuf_free(blob);
return r;
}
sshbuf_free(blob);
/* skip whitespace and leave cp at start of comment */
for (cp += space; *cp == ' ' || *cp == '\t'; cp++)
;
/* ensure type of blob matches type at start of line */
if (k->type != type) {
sshkey_free(k);
return SSH_ERR_KEY_TYPE_MISMATCH;
}
if (key_type_is_ecdsa_variant(type) && curve_nid != k->ecdsa_nid) {
sshkey_free(k);
return SSH_ERR_EC_CURVE_MISMATCH;
}
/* Fill in ret from parsed key */
ret->type = type;
if (sshkey_is_cert(ret)) {
if (!sshkey_is_cert(k)) {
sshkey_free(k);
return SSH_ERR_EXPECTED_CERT;
}
if (ret->cert != NULL)
cert_free(ret->cert);
ret->cert = k->cert;
k->cert = NULL;
}
switch (sshkey_type_plain(ret->type)) {
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
case KEY_RSA:
RSA_free(ret->rsa);
ret->rsa = k->rsa;
k->rsa = NULL;
#ifdef DEBUG_PK
RSA_print_fp(stderr, ret->rsa, 8);
#endif
break;
case KEY_DSA:
DSA_free(ret->dsa);
ret->dsa = k->dsa;
k->dsa = NULL;
#ifdef DEBUG_PK
DSA_print_fp(stderr, ret->dsa, 8);
#endif
break;
# ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
case KEY_ECDSA:
EC_KEY_free(ret->ecdsa);
ret->ecdsa = k->ecdsa;
ret->ecdsa_nid = k->ecdsa_nid;
k->ecdsa = NULL;
k->ecdsa_nid = -1;
#ifdef DEBUG_PK
sshkey_dump_ec_key(ret->ecdsa);
#endif
break;
case KEY_ECDSA_SK:
EC_KEY_free(ret->ecdsa);
ret->ecdsa = k->ecdsa;
ret->ecdsa_nid = k->ecdsa_nid;
ret->sk_application = k->sk_application;
k->ecdsa = NULL;
k->ecdsa_nid = -1;
k->sk_application = NULL;
#ifdef DEBUG_PK
sshkey_dump_ec_key(ret->ecdsa);
fprintf(stderr, "App: %s\n", ret->sk_application);
#endif
break;
# endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */
#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
case KEY_ED25519:
freezero(ret->ed25519_pk, ED25519_PK_SZ);
ret->ed25519_pk = k->ed25519_pk;
k->ed25519_pk = NULL;
#ifdef DEBUG_PK
/* XXX */
#endif
break;
case KEY_ED25519_SK:
freezero(ret->ed25519_pk, ED25519_PK_SZ);
ret->ed25519_pk = k->ed25519_pk;
ret->sk_application = k->sk_application;
k->ed25519_pk = NULL;
k->sk_application = NULL;
break;
#ifdef WITH_XMSS
case KEY_XMSS:
free(ret->xmss_pk);
ret->xmss_pk = k->xmss_pk;
k->xmss_pk = NULL;
free(ret->xmss_state);
ret->xmss_state = k->xmss_state;
k->xmss_state = NULL;
free(ret->xmss_name);
ret->xmss_name = k->xmss_name;
k->xmss_name = NULL;
free(ret->xmss_filename);
ret->xmss_filename = k->xmss_filename;
k->xmss_filename = NULL;
#ifdef DEBUG_PK
/* XXX */
#endif
break;
#endif /* WITH_XMSS */
default:
sshkey_free(k);
return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
}
sshkey_free(k);
/* success */
*cpp = cp;
return 0;
}
int
sshkey_to_base64(const struct sshkey *key, char **b64p)
{
int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
struct sshbuf *b = NULL;
char *uu = NULL;
if (b64p != NULL)
*b64p = NULL;
if ((b = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
if ((r = sshkey_putb(key, b)) != 0)
goto out;
if ((uu = sshbuf_dtob64_string(b, 0)) == NULL) {
r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
goto out;
}
/* Success */
if (b64p != NULL) {
*b64p = uu;
uu = NULL;
}
r = 0;
out:
sshbuf_free(b);
free(uu);
return r;
}
int
sshkey_format_text(const struct sshkey *key, struct sshbuf *b)
{
int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
char *uu = NULL;
if ((r = sshkey_to_base64(key, &uu)) != 0)
goto out;
if ((r = sshbuf_putf(b, "%s %s",
sshkey_ssh_name(key), uu)) != 0)
goto out;
r = 0;
out:
free(uu);
return r;
}
int
sshkey_write(const struct sshkey *key, FILE *f)
{
struct sshbuf *b = NULL;
int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
if ((b = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
if ((r = sshkey_format_text(key, b)) != 0)
goto out;
if (fwrite(sshbuf_ptr(b), sshbuf_len(b), 1, f) != 1) {
if (feof(f))
errno = EPIPE;
r = SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR;
goto out;
}
/* Success */
r = 0;
out:
sshbuf_free(b);
return r;
}
const char *
sshkey_cert_type(const struct sshkey *k)
{
switch (k->cert->type) {
case SSH2_CERT_TYPE_USER:
return "user";
case SSH2_CERT_TYPE_HOST:
return "host";
default:
return "unknown";
}
}
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
static int
rsa_generate_private_key(u_int bits, RSA **rsap)
{
RSA *private = NULL;
BIGNUM *f4 = NULL;
int ret = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
if (rsap == NULL)
return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
if (bits < SSH_RSA_MINIMUM_MODULUS_SIZE ||
bits > SSHBUF_MAX_BIGNUM * 8)
return SSH_ERR_KEY_LENGTH;
*rsap = NULL;
if ((private = RSA_new()) == NULL || (f4 = BN_new()) == NULL) {
ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
goto out;
}
if (!BN_set_word(f4, RSA_F4) ||
!RSA_generate_key_ex(private, bits, f4, NULL)) {
ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
goto out;
}
*rsap = private;
private = NULL;
ret = 0;
out:
RSA_free(private);
BN_free(f4);
return ret;
}
static int
dsa_generate_private_key(u_int bits, DSA **dsap)
{
DSA *private;
int ret = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
if (dsap == NULL)
return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
if (bits != 1024)
return SSH_ERR_KEY_LENGTH;
if ((private = DSA_new()) == NULL) {
ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
goto out;
}
*dsap = NULL;
if (!DSA_generate_parameters_ex(private, bits, NULL, 0, NULL,
NULL, NULL) || !DSA_generate_key(private)) {
ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
goto out;
}
*dsap = private;
private = NULL;
ret = 0;
out:
DSA_free(private);
return ret;
}
# ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
int
sshkey_ecdsa_key_to_nid(EC_KEY *k)
{
EC_GROUP *eg;
int nids[] = {
NID_X9_62_prime256v1,
NID_secp384r1,
# ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_NISTP521
NID_secp521r1,
# endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_NISTP521 */
-1
};
int nid;
u_int i;
const EC_GROUP *g = EC_KEY_get0_group(k);
/*
* The group may be stored in a ASN.1 encoded private key in one of two
* ways: as a "named group", which is reconstituted by ASN.1 object ID
* or explicit group parameters encoded into the key blob. Only the
* "named group" case sets the group NID for us, but we can figure
* it out for the other case by comparing against all the groups that
* are supported.
*/
if ((nid = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(g)) > 0)
return nid;
for (i = 0; nids[i] != -1; i++) {
if ((eg = EC_GROUP_new_by_curve_name(nids[i])) == NULL)
return -1;
if (EC_GROUP_cmp(g, eg, NULL) == 0)
break;
EC_GROUP_free(eg);
}
if (nids[i] != -1) {
/* Use the group with the NID attached */
EC_GROUP_set_asn1_flag(eg, OPENSSL_EC_NAMED_CURVE);
if (EC_KEY_set_group(k, eg) != 1) {
EC_GROUP_free(eg);
return -1;
}
}
return nids[i];
}
static int
ecdsa_generate_private_key(u_int bits, int *nid, EC_KEY **ecdsap)
{
EC_KEY *private;
int ret = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
if (nid == NULL || ecdsap == NULL)
return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
if ((*nid = sshkey_ecdsa_bits_to_nid(bits)) == -1)
return SSH_ERR_KEY_LENGTH;
*ecdsap = NULL;
if ((private = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(*nid)) == NULL) {
ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
goto out;
}
if (EC_KEY_generate_key(private) != 1) {
ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
goto out;
}
EC_KEY_set_asn1_flag(private, OPENSSL_EC_NAMED_CURVE);
*ecdsap = private;
private = NULL;
ret = 0;
out:
EC_KEY_free(private);
return ret;
}
# endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */
#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
int
sshkey_generate(int type, u_int bits, struct sshkey **keyp)
{
struct sshkey *k;
int ret = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
if (keyp == NULL)
return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
*keyp = NULL;
if ((k = sshkey_new(KEY_UNSPEC)) == NULL)
return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
switch (type) {
case KEY_ED25519:
if ((k->ed25519_pk = malloc(ED25519_PK_SZ)) == NULL ||
(k->ed25519_sk = malloc(ED25519_SK_SZ)) == NULL) {
ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
break;
}
crypto_sign_ed25519_keypair(k->ed25519_pk, k->ed25519_sk);
ret = 0;
break;
#ifdef WITH_XMSS
case KEY_XMSS:
ret = sshkey_xmss_generate_private_key(k, bits);
break;
#endif /* WITH_XMSS */
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
case KEY_DSA:
ret = dsa_generate_private_key(bits, &k->dsa);
break;
# ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
case KEY_ECDSA:
ret = ecdsa_generate_private_key(bits, &k->ecdsa_nid,
&k->ecdsa);
break;
# endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */
case KEY_RSA:
ret = rsa_generate_private_key(bits, &k->rsa);
break;
#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
default:
ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
}
if (ret == 0) {
k->type = type;
*keyp = k;
} else
sshkey_free(k);
return ret;
}
int
sshkey_cert_copy(const struct sshkey *from_key, struct sshkey *to_key)
{
u_int i;
const struct sshkey_cert *from;
struct sshkey_cert *to;
int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
if (to_key == NULL || (from = from_key->cert) == NULL)
return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
if ((to = cert_new()) == NULL)
return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
if ((r = sshbuf_putb(to->certblob, from->certblob)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_putb(to->critical, from->critical)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_putb(to->extensions, from->extensions)) != 0)
goto out;
to->serial = from->serial;
to->type = from->type;
if (from->key_id == NULL)
to->key_id = NULL;
else if ((to->key_id = strdup(from->key_id)) == NULL) {
r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
goto out;
}
to->valid_after = from->valid_after;
to->valid_before = from->valid_before;
if (from->signature_key == NULL)
to->signature_key = NULL;
else if ((r = sshkey_from_private(from->signature_key,
&to->signature_key)) != 0)
goto out;
if (from->signature_type != NULL &&
(to->signature_type = strdup(from->signature_type)) == NULL) {
r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
goto out;
}
if (from->nprincipals > SSHKEY_CERT_MAX_PRINCIPALS) {
r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
goto out;
}
if (from->nprincipals > 0) {
if ((to->principals = calloc(from->nprincipals,
sizeof(*to->principals))) == NULL) {
r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
goto out;
}
for (i = 0; i < from->nprincipals; i++) {
to->principals[i] = strdup(from->principals[i]);
if (to->principals[i] == NULL) {
to->nprincipals = i;
r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
goto out;
}
}
}
to->nprincipals = from->nprincipals;
/* success */
cert_free(to_key->cert);
to_key->cert = to;
to = NULL;
r = 0;
out:
cert_free(to);
return r;
}
int
sshkey_from_private(const struct sshkey *k, struct sshkey **pkp)
{
struct sshkey *n = NULL;
int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
const BIGNUM *rsa_n, *rsa_e;
BIGNUM *rsa_n_dup = NULL, *rsa_e_dup = NULL;
const BIGNUM *dsa_p, *dsa_q, *dsa_g, *dsa_pub_key;
BIGNUM *dsa_p_dup = NULL, *dsa_q_dup = NULL, *dsa_g_dup = NULL;
BIGNUM *dsa_pub_key_dup = NULL;
#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
*pkp = NULL;
if ((n = sshkey_new(k->type)) == NULL) {
r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
goto out;
}
switch (k->type) {
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
case KEY_DSA:
case KEY_DSA_CERT:
DSA_get0_pqg(k->dsa, &dsa_p, &dsa_q, &dsa_g);
DSA_get0_key(k->dsa, &dsa_pub_key, NULL);
if ((dsa_p_dup = BN_dup(dsa_p)) == NULL ||
(dsa_q_dup = BN_dup(dsa_q)) == NULL ||
(dsa_g_dup = BN_dup(dsa_g)) == NULL ||
(dsa_pub_key_dup = BN_dup(dsa_pub_key)) == NULL) {
r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
goto out;
}
if (!DSA_set0_pqg(n->dsa, dsa_p_dup, dsa_q_dup, dsa_g_dup)) {
r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
goto out;
}
dsa_p_dup = dsa_q_dup = dsa_g_dup = NULL; /* transferred */
if (!DSA_set0_key(n->dsa, dsa_pub_key_dup, NULL)) {
r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
goto out;
}
dsa_pub_key_dup = NULL; /* transferred */
break;
# ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
case KEY_ECDSA:
case KEY_ECDSA_CERT:
case KEY_ECDSA_SK:
case KEY_ECDSA_SK_CERT:
n->ecdsa_nid = k->ecdsa_nid;
n->ecdsa = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(k->ecdsa_nid);
if (n->ecdsa == NULL) {
r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
goto out;
}
if (EC_KEY_set_public_key(n->ecdsa,
EC_KEY_get0_public_key(k->ecdsa)) != 1) {
r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
goto out;
}
if (k->type != KEY_ECDSA_SK && k->type != KEY_ECDSA_SK_CERT)
break;
/* Append security-key application string */
if ((n->sk_application = strdup(k->sk_application)) == NULL)
goto out;
break;
# endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */
case KEY_RSA:
case KEY_RSA_CERT:
RSA_get0_key(k->rsa, &rsa_n, &rsa_e, NULL);
if ((rsa_n_dup = BN_dup(rsa_n)) == NULL ||
(rsa_e_dup = BN_dup(rsa_e)) == NULL) {
r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
goto out;
}
if (!RSA_set0_key(n->rsa, rsa_n_dup, rsa_e_dup, NULL)) {
r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
goto out;
}
rsa_n_dup = rsa_e_dup = NULL; /* transferred */
break;
#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
case KEY_ED25519:
case KEY_ED25519_CERT:
case KEY_ED25519_SK:
case KEY_ED25519_SK_CERT:
if (k->ed25519_pk != NULL) {
if ((n->ed25519_pk = malloc(ED25519_PK_SZ)) == NULL) {
r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
goto out;
}
memcpy(n->ed25519_pk, k->ed25519_pk, ED25519_PK_SZ);
}
if (k->type != KEY_ED25519_SK &&
k->type != KEY_ED25519_SK_CERT)
break;
/* Append security-key application string */
if ((n->sk_application = strdup(k->sk_application)) == NULL)
goto out;
break;
#ifdef WITH_XMSS
case KEY_XMSS:
case KEY_XMSS_CERT:
if ((r = sshkey_xmss_init(n, k->xmss_name)) != 0)
goto out;
if (k->xmss_pk != NULL) {
u_int32_t left;
size_t pklen = sshkey_xmss_pklen(k);
if (pklen == 0 || sshkey_xmss_pklen(n) != pklen) {
r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
goto out;
}
if ((n->xmss_pk = malloc(pklen)) == NULL) {
r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
goto out;
}
memcpy(n->xmss_pk, k->xmss_pk, pklen);
/* simulate number of signatures left on pubkey */
left = sshkey_xmss_signatures_left(k);
if (left)
sshkey_xmss_enable_maxsign(n, left);
}
break;
#endif /* WITH_XMSS */
default:
r = SSH_ERR_KEY_TYPE_UNKNOWN;
goto out;
}
if (sshkey_is_cert(k) && (r = sshkey_cert_copy(k, n)) != 0)
goto out;
/* success */
*pkp = n;
n = NULL;
r = 0;
out:
sshkey_free(n);
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
BN_clear_free(rsa_n_dup);
BN_clear_free(rsa_e_dup);
BN_clear_free(dsa_p_dup);
BN_clear_free(dsa_q_dup);
BN_clear_free(dsa_g_dup);
BN_clear_free(dsa_pub_key_dup);
#endif
return r;
}
int
sshkey_is_shielded(struct sshkey *k)
{
return k != NULL && k->shielded_private != NULL;
}
int
sshkey_shield_private(struct sshkey *k)
{
struct sshbuf *prvbuf = NULL;
u_char *prekey = NULL, *enc = NULL, keyiv[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH];
struct sshcipher_ctx *cctx = NULL;
const struct sshcipher *cipher;
size_t i, enclen = 0;
struct sshkey *kswap = NULL, tmp;
int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
#ifdef DEBUG_PK
fprintf(stderr, "%s: entering for %s\n", __func__, sshkey_ssh_name(k));
#endif
if ((cipher = cipher_by_name(SSHKEY_SHIELD_CIPHER)) == NULL) {
r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
goto out;
}
if (cipher_keylen(cipher) + cipher_ivlen(cipher) >
ssh_digest_bytes(SSHKEY_SHIELD_PREKEY_HASH)) {
r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
goto out;
}
/* Prepare a random pre-key, and from it an ephemeral key */
if ((prekey = malloc(SSHKEY_SHIELD_PREKEY_LEN)) == NULL) {
r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
goto out;
}
arc4random_buf(prekey, SSHKEY_SHIELD_PREKEY_LEN);
if ((r = ssh_digest_memory(SSHKEY_SHIELD_PREKEY_HASH,
prekey, SSHKEY_SHIELD_PREKEY_LEN,
keyiv, SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH)) != 0)
goto out;
#ifdef DEBUG_PK
fprintf(stderr, "%s: key+iv\n", __func__);
sshbuf_dump_data(keyiv, ssh_digest_bytes(SSHKEY_SHIELD_PREKEY_HASH),
stderr);
#endif
if ((r = cipher_init(&cctx, cipher, keyiv, cipher_keylen(cipher),
keyiv + cipher_keylen(cipher), cipher_ivlen(cipher), 1)) != 0)
goto out;
/* Serialise and encrypt the private key using the ephemeral key */
if ((prvbuf = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) {
r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
goto out;
}
if (sshkey_is_shielded(k) && (r = sshkey_unshield_private(k)) != 0)
goto out;
if ((r = sshkey_private_serialize_opt(k, prvbuf,
SSHKEY_SERIALIZE_SHIELD)) != 0)
goto out;
/* pad to cipher blocksize */
i = 0;
while (sshbuf_len(prvbuf) % cipher_blocksize(cipher)) {
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(prvbuf, ++i & 0xff)) != 0)
goto out;
}
#ifdef DEBUG_PK
fprintf(stderr, "%s: serialised\n", __func__);
sshbuf_dump(prvbuf, stderr);
#endif
/* encrypt */
enclen = sshbuf_len(prvbuf);
if ((enc = malloc(enclen)) == NULL) {
r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
goto out;
}
if ((r = cipher_crypt(cctx, 0, enc,
sshbuf_ptr(prvbuf), sshbuf_len(prvbuf), 0, 0)) != 0)
goto out;
#ifdef DEBUG_PK
fprintf(stderr, "%s: encrypted\n", __func__);
sshbuf_dump_data(enc, enclen, stderr);
#endif
/* Make a scrubbed, public-only copy of our private key argument */
if ((r = sshkey_from_private(k, &kswap)) != 0)
goto out;
/* Swap the private key out (it will be destroyed below) */
tmp = *kswap;
*kswap = *k;
*k = tmp;
/* Insert the shielded key into our argument */
k->shielded_private = enc;
k->shielded_len = enclen;
k->shield_prekey = prekey;
k->shield_prekey_len = SSHKEY_SHIELD_PREKEY_LEN;
enc = prekey = NULL; /* transferred */
enclen = 0;
/* preserve key fields that are required for correct operation */
k->sk_flags = kswap->sk_flags;
/* success */
r = 0;
out:
/* XXX behaviour on error - invalidate original private key? */
cipher_free(cctx);
explicit_bzero(keyiv, sizeof(keyiv));
explicit_bzero(&tmp, sizeof(tmp));
freezero(enc, enclen);
freezero(prekey, SSHKEY_SHIELD_PREKEY_LEN);
sshkey_free(kswap);
sshbuf_free(prvbuf);
return r;
}
int
sshkey_unshield_private(struct sshkey *k)
{
struct sshbuf *prvbuf = NULL;
u_char pad, *cp, keyiv[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH];
struct sshcipher_ctx *cctx = NULL;
const struct sshcipher *cipher;
size_t i;
struct sshkey *kswap = NULL, tmp;
int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
#ifdef DEBUG_PK
fprintf(stderr, "%s: entering for %s\n", __func__, sshkey_ssh_name(k));
#endif
if (!sshkey_is_shielded(k))
return 0; /* nothing to do */
if ((cipher = cipher_by_name(SSHKEY_SHIELD_CIPHER)) == NULL) {
r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
goto out;
}
if (cipher_keylen(cipher) + cipher_ivlen(cipher) >
ssh_digest_bytes(SSHKEY_SHIELD_PREKEY_HASH)) {
r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
goto out;
}
/* check size of shielded key blob */
if (k->shielded_len < cipher_blocksize(cipher) ||
(k->shielded_len % cipher_blocksize(cipher)) != 0) {
r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
goto out;
}
/* Calculate the ephemeral key from the prekey */
if ((r = ssh_digest_memory(SSHKEY_SHIELD_PREKEY_HASH,
k->shield_prekey, k->shield_prekey_len,
keyiv, SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH)) != 0)
goto out;
if ((r = cipher_init(&cctx, cipher, keyiv, cipher_keylen(cipher),
keyiv + cipher_keylen(cipher), cipher_ivlen(cipher), 0)) != 0)
goto out;
#ifdef DEBUG_PK
fprintf(stderr, "%s: key+iv\n", __func__);
sshbuf_dump_data(keyiv, ssh_digest_bytes(SSHKEY_SHIELD_PREKEY_HASH),
stderr);
#endif
/* Decrypt and parse the shielded private key using the ephemeral key */
if ((prvbuf = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) {
r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
goto out;
}
if ((r = sshbuf_reserve(prvbuf, k->shielded_len, &cp)) != 0)
goto out;
/* decrypt */
#ifdef DEBUG_PK
fprintf(stderr, "%s: encrypted\n", __func__);
sshbuf_dump_data(k->shielded_private, k->shielded_len, stderr);
#endif
if ((r = cipher_crypt(cctx, 0, cp,
k->shielded_private, k->shielded_len, 0, 0)) != 0)
goto out;
#ifdef DEBUG_PK
fprintf(stderr, "%s: serialised\n", __func__);
sshbuf_dump(prvbuf, stderr);
#endif
/* Parse private key */
if ((r = sshkey_private_deserialize(prvbuf, &kswap)) != 0)
goto out;
/* Check deterministic padding */
i = 0;
while (sshbuf_len(prvbuf)) {
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(prvbuf, &pad)) != 0)
goto out;
if (pad != (++i & 0xff)) {
r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
goto out;
}
}
/* Swap the parsed key back into place */
tmp = *kswap;
*kswap = *k;
*k = tmp;
/* success */
r = 0;
out:
cipher_free(cctx);
explicit_bzero(keyiv, sizeof(keyiv));
explicit_bzero(&tmp, sizeof(tmp));
sshkey_free(kswap);
sshbuf_free(prvbuf);
return r;
}
static int
cert_parse(struct sshbuf *b, struct sshkey *key, struct sshbuf *certbuf)
{
struct sshbuf *principals = NULL, *crit = NULL;
struct sshbuf *exts = NULL, *ca = NULL;
u_char *sig = NULL;
size_t signed_len = 0, slen = 0, kidlen = 0;
int ret = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
/* Copy the entire key blob for verification and later serialisation */
if ((ret = sshbuf_putb(key->cert->certblob, certbuf)) != 0)
return ret;
/* Parse body of certificate up to signature */
if ((ret = sshbuf_get_u64(b, &key->cert->serial)) != 0 ||
(ret = sshbuf_get_u32(b, &key->cert->type)) != 0 ||
(ret = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &key->cert->key_id, &kidlen)) != 0 ||
(ret = sshbuf_froms(b, &principals)) != 0 ||
(ret = sshbuf_get_u64(b, &key->cert->valid_after)) != 0 ||
(ret = sshbuf_get_u64(b, &key->cert->valid_before)) != 0 ||
(ret = sshbuf_froms(b, &crit)) != 0 ||
(ret = sshbuf_froms(b, &exts)) != 0 ||
(ret = sshbuf_get_string_direct(b, NULL, NULL)) != 0 ||
(ret = sshbuf_froms(b, &ca)) != 0) {
/* XXX debug print error for ret */
ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
goto out;
}
/* Signature is left in the buffer so we can calculate this length */
signed_len = sshbuf_len(key->cert->certblob) - sshbuf_len(b);
if ((ret = sshbuf_get_string(b, &sig, &slen)) != 0) {
ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
goto out;
}
if (key->cert->type != SSH2_CERT_TYPE_USER &&
key->cert->type != SSH2_CERT_TYPE_HOST) {
ret = SSH_ERR_KEY_CERT_UNKNOWN_TYPE;
goto out;
}
/* Parse principals section */
while (sshbuf_len(principals) > 0) {
char *principal = NULL;
char **oprincipals = NULL;
if (key->cert->nprincipals >= SSHKEY_CERT_MAX_PRINCIPALS) {
ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
goto out;
}
if ((ret = sshbuf_get_cstring(principals, &principal,
NULL)) != 0) {
ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
goto out;
}
oprincipals = key->cert->principals;
key->cert->principals = recallocarray(key->cert->principals,
key->cert->nprincipals, key->cert->nprincipals + 1,
sizeof(*key->cert->principals));
if (key->cert->principals == NULL) {
free(principal);
key->cert->principals = oprincipals;
ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
goto out;
}
key->cert->principals[key->cert->nprincipals++] = principal;
}
/*
* Stash a copies of the critical options and extensions sections
* for later use.
*/
if ((ret = sshbuf_putb(key->cert->critical, crit)) != 0 ||
(exts != NULL &&
(ret = sshbuf_putb(key->cert->extensions, exts)) != 0))
goto out;
/*
* Validate critical options and extensions sections format.
*/
while (sshbuf_len(crit) != 0) {
if ((ret = sshbuf_get_string_direct(crit, NULL, NULL)) != 0 ||
(ret = sshbuf_get_string_direct(crit, NULL, NULL)) != 0) {
sshbuf_reset(key->cert->critical);
ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
goto out;
}
}
while (exts != NULL && sshbuf_len(exts) != 0) {
if ((ret = sshbuf_get_string_direct(exts, NULL, NULL)) != 0 ||
(ret = sshbuf_get_string_direct(exts, NULL, NULL)) != 0) {
sshbuf_reset(key->cert->extensions);
ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
goto out;
}
}
/* Parse CA key and check signature */
if (sshkey_from_blob_internal(ca, &key->cert->signature_key, 0) != 0) {
ret = SSH_ERR_KEY_CERT_INVALID_SIGN_KEY;
goto out;
}
if (!sshkey_type_is_valid_ca(key->cert->signature_key->type)) {
ret = SSH_ERR_KEY_CERT_INVALID_SIGN_KEY;
goto out;
}
if ((ret = sshkey_verify(key->cert->signature_key, sig, slen,
sshbuf_ptr(key->cert->certblob), signed_len, NULL, 0, NULL)) != 0)
goto out;
if ((ret = sshkey_get_sigtype(sig, slen,
&key->cert->signature_type)) != 0)
goto out;
/* Success */
ret = 0;
out:
sshbuf_free(ca);
sshbuf_free(crit);
sshbuf_free(exts);
sshbuf_free(principals);
free(sig);
return ret;
}
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
static int
check_rsa_length(const RSA *rsa)
{
const BIGNUM *rsa_n;
RSA_get0_key(rsa, &rsa_n, NULL, NULL);
if (BN_num_bits(rsa_n) < SSH_RSA_MINIMUM_MODULUS_SIZE)
return SSH_ERR_KEY_LENGTH;
return 0;
}
#endif
static int
sshkey_from_blob_internal(struct sshbuf *b, struct sshkey **keyp,
int allow_cert)
{
int type, ret = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
char *ktype = NULL, *curve = NULL, *xmss_name = NULL;
struct sshkey *key = NULL;
size_t len;
u_char *pk = NULL;
struct sshbuf *copy;
#if defined(WITH_OPENSSL)
BIGNUM *rsa_n = NULL, *rsa_e = NULL;
BIGNUM *dsa_p = NULL, *dsa_q = NULL, *dsa_g = NULL, *dsa_pub_key = NULL;
# if defined(OPENSSL_HAS_ECC)
EC_POINT *q = NULL;
# endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */
#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
#ifdef DEBUG_PK /* XXX */
sshbuf_dump(b, stderr);
#endif
if (keyp != NULL)
*keyp = NULL;
if ((copy = sshbuf_fromb(b)) == NULL) {
ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
goto out;
}
if (sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &ktype, NULL) != 0) {
ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
goto out;
}
type = sshkey_type_from_name(ktype);
if (!allow_cert && sshkey_type_is_cert(type)) {
ret = SSH_ERR_KEY_CERT_INVALID_SIGN_KEY;
goto out;
}
switch (type) {
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
case KEY_RSA_CERT:
/* Skip nonce */
if (sshbuf_get_string_direct(b, NULL, NULL) != 0) {
ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
goto out;
}
/* FALLTHROUGH */
case KEY_RSA:
if ((key = sshkey_new(type)) == NULL) {
ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
goto out;
}
if (sshbuf_get_bignum2(b, &rsa_e) != 0 ||
sshbuf_get_bignum2(b, &rsa_n) != 0) {
ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
goto out;
}
if (!RSA_set0_key(key->rsa, rsa_n, rsa_e, NULL)) {
ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
goto out;
}
rsa_n = rsa_e = NULL; /* transferred */
if ((ret = check_rsa_length(key->rsa)) != 0)
goto out;
#ifdef DEBUG_PK
RSA_print_fp(stderr, key->rsa, 8);
#endif
break;
case KEY_DSA_CERT:
/* Skip nonce */
if (sshbuf_get_string_direct(b, NULL, NULL) != 0) {
ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
goto out;
}
/* FALLTHROUGH */
case KEY_DSA:
if ((key = sshkey_new(type)) == NULL) {
ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
goto out;
}
if (sshbuf_get_bignum2(b, &dsa_p) != 0 ||
sshbuf_get_bignum2(b, &dsa_q) != 0 ||
sshbuf_get_bignum2(b, &dsa_g) != 0 ||
sshbuf_get_bignum2(b, &dsa_pub_key) != 0) {
ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
goto out;
}
if (!DSA_set0_pqg(key->dsa, dsa_p, dsa_q, dsa_g)) {
ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
goto out;
}
dsa_p = dsa_q = dsa_g = NULL; /* transferred */
if (!DSA_set0_key(key->dsa, dsa_pub_key, NULL)) {
ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
goto out;
}
dsa_pub_key = NULL; /* transferred */
#ifdef DEBUG_PK
DSA_print_fp(stderr, key->dsa, 8);
#endif
break;
# ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
case KEY_ECDSA_CERT:
case KEY_ECDSA_SK_CERT:
/* Skip nonce */
if (sshbuf_get_string_direct(b, NULL, NULL) != 0) {
ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
goto out;
}
/* FALLTHROUGH */
case KEY_ECDSA:
case KEY_ECDSA_SK:
if ((key = sshkey_new(type)) == NULL) {
ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
goto out;
}
key->ecdsa_nid = sshkey_ecdsa_nid_from_name(ktype);
if (sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &curve, NULL) != 0) {
ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
goto out;
}
if (key->ecdsa_nid != sshkey_curve_name_to_nid(curve)) {
ret = SSH_ERR_EC_CURVE_MISMATCH;
goto out;
}
EC_KEY_free(key->ecdsa);
if ((key->ecdsa = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(key->ecdsa_nid))
== NULL) {
ret = SSH_ERR_EC_CURVE_INVALID;
goto out;
}
if ((q = EC_POINT_new(EC_KEY_get0_group(key->ecdsa))) == NULL) {
ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
goto out;
}
if (sshbuf_get_ec(b, q, EC_KEY_get0_group(key->ecdsa)) != 0) {
ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
goto out;
}
if (sshkey_ec_validate_public(EC_KEY_get0_group(key->ecdsa),
q) != 0) {
ret = SSH_ERR_KEY_INVALID_EC_VALUE;
goto out;
}
if (EC_KEY_set_public_key(key->ecdsa, q) != 1) {
/* XXX assume it is a allocation error */
ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
goto out;
}
#ifdef DEBUG_PK
sshkey_dump_ec_point(EC_KEY_get0_group(key->ecdsa), q);
#endif
if (type == KEY_ECDSA_SK || type == KEY_ECDSA_SK_CERT) {
/* Parse additional security-key application string */
if (sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &key->sk_application,
NULL) != 0) {
ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
goto out;
}
#ifdef DEBUG_PK
fprintf(stderr, "App: %s\n", key->sk_application);
#endif
}
break;
# endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */
#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
case KEY_ED25519_CERT:
case KEY_ED25519_SK_CERT:
/* Skip nonce */
if (sshbuf_get_string_direct(b, NULL, NULL) != 0) {
ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
goto out;
}
/* FALLTHROUGH */
case KEY_ED25519:
case KEY_ED25519_SK:
if ((ret = sshbuf_get_string(b, &pk, &len)) != 0)
goto out;
if (len != ED25519_PK_SZ) {
ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
goto out;
}
if ((key = sshkey_new(type)) == NULL) {
ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
goto out;
}
if (type == KEY_ED25519_SK || type == KEY_ED25519_SK_CERT) {
/* Parse additional security-key application string */
if (sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &key->sk_application,
NULL) != 0) {
ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
goto out;
}
#ifdef DEBUG_PK
fprintf(stderr, "App: %s\n", key->sk_application);
#endif
}
key->ed25519_pk = pk;
pk = NULL;
break;
#ifdef WITH_XMSS
case KEY_XMSS_CERT:
/* Skip nonce */
if (sshbuf_get_string_direct(b, NULL, NULL) != 0) {
ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
goto out;
}
/* FALLTHROUGH */
case KEY_XMSS:
if ((ret = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &xmss_name, NULL)) != 0)
goto out;
if ((key = sshkey_new(type)) == NULL) {
ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
goto out;
}
if ((ret = sshkey_xmss_init(key, xmss_name)) != 0)
goto out;
if ((ret = sshbuf_get_string(b, &pk, &len)) != 0)
goto out;
if (len == 0 || len != sshkey_xmss_pklen(key)) {
ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
goto out;
}
key->xmss_pk = pk;
pk = NULL;
if (type != KEY_XMSS_CERT &&
(ret = sshkey_xmss_deserialize_pk_info(key, b)) != 0)
goto out;
break;
#endif /* WITH_XMSS */
case KEY_UNSPEC:
default:
ret = SSH_ERR_KEY_TYPE_UNKNOWN;
goto out;
}
/* Parse certificate potion */
if (sshkey_is_cert(key) && (ret = cert_parse(b, key, copy)) != 0)
goto out;
if (key != NULL && sshbuf_len(b) != 0) {
ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
goto out;
}
ret = 0;
if (keyp != NULL) {
*keyp = key;
key = NULL;
}
out:
sshbuf_free(copy);
sshkey_free(key);
free(xmss_name);
free(ktype);
free(curve);
free(pk);
#if defined(WITH_OPENSSL)
BN_clear_free(rsa_n);
BN_clear_free(rsa_e);
BN_clear_free(dsa_p);
BN_clear_free(dsa_q);
BN_clear_free(dsa_g);
BN_clear_free(dsa_pub_key);
# if defined(OPENSSL_HAS_ECC)
EC_POINT_free(q);
# endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */
#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
return ret;
}
int
sshkey_from_blob(const u_char *blob, size_t blen, struct sshkey **keyp)
{
struct sshbuf *b;
int r;
if ((b = sshbuf_from(blob, blen)) == NULL)
return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
r = sshkey_from_blob_internal(b, keyp, 1);
sshbuf_free(b);
return r;
}
int
sshkey_fromb(struct sshbuf *b, struct sshkey **keyp)
{
return sshkey_from_blob_internal(b, keyp, 1);
}
int
sshkey_froms(struct sshbuf *buf, struct sshkey **keyp)
{
struct sshbuf *b;
int r;
if ((r = sshbuf_froms(buf, &b)) != 0)
return r;
r = sshkey_from_blob_internal(b, keyp, 1);
sshbuf_free(b);
return r;
}
int
sshkey_get_sigtype(const u_char *sig, size_t siglen, char **sigtypep)
{
int r;
struct sshbuf *b = NULL;
char *sigtype = NULL;
if (sigtypep != NULL)
*sigtypep = NULL;
if ((b = sshbuf_from(sig, siglen)) == NULL)
return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &sigtype, NULL)) != 0)
goto out;
/* success */
if (sigtypep != NULL) {
*sigtypep = sigtype;
sigtype = NULL;
}
r = 0;
out:
free(sigtype);
sshbuf_free(b);
return r;
}
/*
*
* Checks whether a certificate's signature type is allowed.
* Returns 0 (success) if the certificate signature type appears in the
* "allowed" pattern-list, or the key is not a certificate to begin with.
* Otherwise returns a ssherr.h code.
*/
int
sshkey_check_cert_sigtype(const struct sshkey *key, const char *allowed)
{
if (key == NULL || allowed == NULL)
return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
if (!sshkey_type_is_cert(key->type))
return 0;
if (key->cert == NULL || key->cert->signature_type == NULL)
return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
if (match_pattern_list(key->cert->signature_type, allowed, 0) != 1)
return SSH_ERR_SIGN_ALG_UNSUPPORTED;
return 0;
}
/*
* Returns the expected signature algorithm for a given public key algorithm.
*/
const char *
sshkey_sigalg_by_name(const char *name)
{
const struct keytype *kt;
for (kt = keytypes; kt->type != -1; kt++) {
if (strcmp(kt->name, name) != 0)
continue;
if (kt->sigalg != NULL)
return kt->sigalg;
if (!kt->cert)
return kt->name;
return sshkey_ssh_name_from_type_nid(
sshkey_type_plain(kt->type), kt->nid);
}
return NULL;
}
/*
* Verifies that the signature algorithm appearing inside the signature blob
* matches that which was requested.
*/
int
sshkey_check_sigtype(const u_char *sig, size_t siglen,
const char *requested_alg)
{
const char *expected_alg;
char *sigtype = NULL;
int r;
if (requested_alg == NULL)
return 0;
if ((expected_alg = sshkey_sigalg_by_name(requested_alg)) == NULL)
return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
if ((r = sshkey_get_sigtype(sig, siglen, &sigtype)) != 0)
return r;
r = strcmp(expected_alg, sigtype) == 0;
free(sigtype);
return r ? 0 : SSH_ERR_SIGN_ALG_UNSUPPORTED;
}
int
sshkey_sign(struct sshkey *key,
u_char **sigp, size_t *lenp,
const u_char *data, size_t datalen,
- const char *alg, const char *sk_provider, u_int compat)
+ const char *alg, const char *sk_provider, const char *sk_pin, u_int compat)
{
int was_shielded = sshkey_is_shielded(key);
int r2, r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
if (sigp != NULL)
*sigp = NULL;
if (lenp != NULL)
*lenp = 0;
if (datalen > SSH_KEY_MAX_SIGN_DATA_SIZE)
return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
if ((r = sshkey_unshield_private(key)) != 0)
return r;
switch (key->type) {
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
case KEY_DSA_CERT:
case KEY_DSA:
r = ssh_dss_sign(key, sigp, lenp, data, datalen, compat);
break;
# ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
case KEY_ECDSA_CERT:
case KEY_ECDSA:
r = ssh_ecdsa_sign(key, sigp, lenp, data, datalen, compat);
break;
# endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */
case KEY_RSA_CERT:
case KEY_RSA:
r = ssh_rsa_sign(key, sigp, lenp, data, datalen, alg);
break;
#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
case KEY_ED25519:
case KEY_ED25519_CERT:
r = ssh_ed25519_sign(key, sigp, lenp, data, datalen, compat);
break;
case KEY_ED25519_SK:
case KEY_ED25519_SK_CERT:
case KEY_ECDSA_SK_CERT:
case KEY_ECDSA_SK:
r = sshsk_sign(sk_provider, key, sigp, lenp, data,
- datalen, compat, /* XXX PIN */ NULL);
+ datalen, compat, sk_pin);
break;
#ifdef WITH_XMSS
case KEY_XMSS:
case KEY_XMSS_CERT:
r = ssh_xmss_sign(key, sigp, lenp, data, datalen, compat);
break;
#endif /* WITH_XMSS */
default:
r = SSH_ERR_KEY_TYPE_UNKNOWN;
break;
}
if (was_shielded && (r2 = sshkey_shield_private(key)) != 0)
return r2;
return r;
}
/*
* ssh_key_verify returns 0 for a correct signature and < 0 on error.
* If "alg" specified, then the signature must use that algorithm.
*/
int
sshkey_verify(const struct sshkey *key,
const u_char *sig, size_t siglen,
const u_char *data, size_t dlen, const char *alg, u_int compat,
struct sshkey_sig_details **detailsp)
{
if (detailsp != NULL)
*detailsp = NULL;
if (siglen == 0 || dlen > SSH_KEY_MAX_SIGN_DATA_SIZE)
return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
switch (key->type) {
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
case KEY_DSA_CERT:
case KEY_DSA:
return ssh_dss_verify(key, sig, siglen, data, dlen, compat);
# ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
case KEY_ECDSA_CERT:
case KEY_ECDSA:
return ssh_ecdsa_verify(key, sig, siglen, data, dlen, compat);
case KEY_ECDSA_SK_CERT:
case KEY_ECDSA_SK:
return ssh_ecdsa_sk_verify(key, sig, siglen, data, dlen,
compat, detailsp);
# endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */
case KEY_RSA_CERT:
case KEY_RSA:
return ssh_rsa_verify(key, sig, siglen, data, dlen, alg);
#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
case KEY_ED25519:
case KEY_ED25519_CERT:
return ssh_ed25519_verify(key, sig, siglen, data, dlen, compat);
case KEY_ED25519_SK:
case KEY_ED25519_SK_CERT:
return ssh_ed25519_sk_verify(key, sig, siglen, data, dlen,
compat, detailsp);
#ifdef WITH_XMSS
case KEY_XMSS:
case KEY_XMSS_CERT:
return ssh_xmss_verify(key, sig, siglen, data, dlen, compat);
#endif /* WITH_XMSS */
default:
return SSH_ERR_KEY_TYPE_UNKNOWN;
}
}
/* Convert a plain key to their _CERT equivalent */
int
sshkey_to_certified(struct sshkey *k)
{
int newtype;
switch (k->type) {
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
case KEY_RSA:
newtype = KEY_RSA_CERT;
break;
case KEY_DSA:
newtype = KEY_DSA_CERT;
break;
case KEY_ECDSA:
newtype = KEY_ECDSA_CERT;
break;
case KEY_ECDSA_SK:
newtype = KEY_ECDSA_SK_CERT;
break;
#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
case KEY_ED25519_SK:
newtype = KEY_ED25519_SK_CERT;
break;
case KEY_ED25519:
newtype = KEY_ED25519_CERT;
break;
#ifdef WITH_XMSS
case KEY_XMSS:
newtype = KEY_XMSS_CERT;
break;
#endif /* WITH_XMSS */
default:
return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
}
if ((k->cert = cert_new()) == NULL)
return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
k->type = newtype;
return 0;
}
/* Convert a certificate to its raw key equivalent */
int
sshkey_drop_cert(struct sshkey *k)
{
if (!sshkey_type_is_cert(k->type))
return SSH_ERR_KEY_TYPE_UNKNOWN;
cert_free(k->cert);
k->cert = NULL;
k->type = sshkey_type_plain(k->type);
return 0;
}
/* Sign a certified key, (re-)generating the signed certblob. */
int
sshkey_certify_custom(struct sshkey *k, struct sshkey *ca, const char *alg,
- const char *sk_provider, sshkey_certify_signer *signer, void *signer_ctx)
+ const char *sk_provider, const char *sk_pin,
+ sshkey_certify_signer *signer, void *signer_ctx)
{
struct sshbuf *principals = NULL;
u_char *ca_blob = NULL, *sig_blob = NULL, nonce[32];
size_t i, ca_len, sig_len;
int ret = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
struct sshbuf *cert = NULL;
char *sigtype = NULL;
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
const BIGNUM *rsa_n, *rsa_e, *dsa_p, *dsa_q, *dsa_g, *dsa_pub_key;
#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
if (k == NULL || k->cert == NULL ||
k->cert->certblob == NULL || ca == NULL)
return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
if (!sshkey_is_cert(k))
return SSH_ERR_KEY_TYPE_UNKNOWN;
if (!sshkey_type_is_valid_ca(ca->type))
return SSH_ERR_KEY_CERT_INVALID_SIGN_KEY;
/*
* If no alg specified as argument but a signature_type was set,
* then prefer that. If both were specified, then they must match.
*/
if (alg == NULL)
alg = k->cert->signature_type;
else if (k->cert->signature_type != NULL &&
strcmp(alg, k->cert->signature_type) != 0)
return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
/*
* If no signing algorithm or signature_type was specified and we're
* using a RSA key, then default to a good signature algorithm.
*/
if (alg == NULL && ca->type == KEY_RSA)
alg = "rsa-sha2-512";
if ((ret = sshkey_to_blob(ca, &ca_blob, &ca_len)) != 0)
return SSH_ERR_KEY_CERT_INVALID_SIGN_KEY;
cert = k->cert->certblob; /* for readability */
sshbuf_reset(cert);
if ((ret = sshbuf_put_cstring(cert, sshkey_ssh_name(k))) != 0)
goto out;
/* -v01 certs put nonce first */
arc4random_buf(&nonce, sizeof(nonce));
if ((ret = sshbuf_put_string(cert, nonce, sizeof(nonce))) != 0)
goto out;
/* XXX this substantially duplicates to_blob(); refactor */
switch (k->type) {
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
case KEY_DSA_CERT:
DSA_get0_pqg(k->dsa, &dsa_p, &dsa_q, &dsa_g);
DSA_get0_key(k->dsa, &dsa_pub_key, NULL);
if ((ret = sshbuf_put_bignum2(cert, dsa_p)) != 0 ||
(ret = sshbuf_put_bignum2(cert, dsa_q)) != 0 ||
(ret = sshbuf_put_bignum2(cert, dsa_g)) != 0 ||
(ret = sshbuf_put_bignum2(cert, dsa_pub_key)) != 0)
goto out;
break;
# ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
case KEY_ECDSA_CERT:
case KEY_ECDSA_SK_CERT:
if ((ret = sshbuf_put_cstring(cert,
sshkey_curve_nid_to_name(k->ecdsa_nid))) != 0 ||
(ret = sshbuf_put_ec(cert,
EC_KEY_get0_public_key(k->ecdsa),
EC_KEY_get0_group(k->ecdsa))) != 0)
goto out;
if (k->type == KEY_ECDSA_SK_CERT) {
if ((ret = sshbuf_put_cstring(cert,
k->sk_application)) != 0)
goto out;
}
break;
# endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */
case KEY_RSA_CERT:
RSA_get0_key(k->rsa, &rsa_n, &rsa_e, NULL);
if ((ret = sshbuf_put_bignum2(cert, rsa_e)) != 0 ||
(ret = sshbuf_put_bignum2(cert, rsa_n)) != 0)
goto out;
break;
#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
case KEY_ED25519_CERT:
case KEY_ED25519_SK_CERT:
if ((ret = sshbuf_put_string(cert,
k->ed25519_pk, ED25519_PK_SZ)) != 0)
goto out;
if (k->type == KEY_ED25519_SK_CERT) {
if ((ret = sshbuf_put_cstring(cert,
k->sk_application)) != 0)
goto out;
}
break;
#ifdef WITH_XMSS
case KEY_XMSS_CERT:
if (k->xmss_name == NULL) {
ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
goto out;
}
if ((ret = sshbuf_put_cstring(cert, k->xmss_name)) ||
(ret = sshbuf_put_string(cert,
k->xmss_pk, sshkey_xmss_pklen(k))) != 0)
goto out;
break;
#endif /* WITH_XMSS */
default:
ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
goto out;
}
if ((ret = sshbuf_put_u64(cert, k->cert->serial)) != 0 ||
(ret = sshbuf_put_u32(cert, k->cert->type)) != 0 ||
(ret = sshbuf_put_cstring(cert, k->cert->key_id)) != 0)
goto out;
if ((principals = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) {
ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
goto out;
}
for (i = 0; i < k->cert->nprincipals; i++) {
if ((ret = sshbuf_put_cstring(principals,
k->cert->principals[i])) != 0)
goto out;
}
if ((ret = sshbuf_put_stringb(cert, principals)) != 0 ||
(ret = sshbuf_put_u64(cert, k->cert->valid_after)) != 0 ||
(ret = sshbuf_put_u64(cert, k->cert->valid_before)) != 0 ||
(ret = sshbuf_put_stringb(cert, k->cert->critical)) != 0 ||
(ret = sshbuf_put_stringb(cert, k->cert->extensions)) != 0 ||
(ret = sshbuf_put_string(cert, NULL, 0)) != 0 || /* Reserved */
(ret = sshbuf_put_string(cert, ca_blob, ca_len)) != 0)
goto out;
/* Sign the whole mess */
if ((ret = signer(ca, &sig_blob, &sig_len, sshbuf_ptr(cert),
- sshbuf_len(cert), alg, sk_provider, 0, signer_ctx)) != 0)
+ sshbuf_len(cert), alg, sk_provider, sk_pin, 0, signer_ctx)) != 0)
goto out;
/* Check and update signature_type against what was actually used */
if ((ret = sshkey_get_sigtype(sig_blob, sig_len, &sigtype)) != 0)
goto out;
if (alg != NULL && strcmp(alg, sigtype) != 0) {
ret = SSH_ERR_SIGN_ALG_UNSUPPORTED;
goto out;
}
if (k->cert->signature_type == NULL) {
k->cert->signature_type = sigtype;
sigtype = NULL;
}
/* Append signature and we are done */
if ((ret = sshbuf_put_string(cert, sig_blob, sig_len)) != 0)
goto out;
ret = 0;
out:
if (ret != 0)
sshbuf_reset(cert);
free(sig_blob);
free(ca_blob);
free(sigtype);
sshbuf_free(principals);
return ret;
}
static int
default_key_sign(struct sshkey *key, u_char **sigp, size_t *lenp,
const u_char *data, size_t datalen,
- const char *alg, const char *sk_provider, u_int compat, void *ctx)
+ const char *alg, const char *sk_provider, const char *sk_pin,
+ u_int compat, void *ctx)
{
if (ctx != NULL)
return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
return sshkey_sign(key, sigp, lenp, data, datalen, alg,
- sk_provider, compat);
+ sk_provider, sk_pin, compat);
}
int
sshkey_certify(struct sshkey *k, struct sshkey *ca, const char *alg,
- const char *sk_provider)
+ const char *sk_provider, const char *sk_pin)
{
- return sshkey_certify_custom(k, ca, alg, sk_provider,
+ return sshkey_certify_custom(k, ca, alg, sk_provider, sk_pin,
default_key_sign, NULL);
}
int
sshkey_cert_check_authority(const struct sshkey *k,
int want_host, int require_principal,
const char *name, const char **reason)
{
u_int i, principal_matches;
time_t now = time(NULL);
if (reason == NULL)
return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
if (want_host) {
if (k->cert->type != SSH2_CERT_TYPE_HOST) {
*reason = "Certificate invalid: not a host certificate";
return SSH_ERR_KEY_CERT_INVALID;
}
} else {
if (k->cert->type != SSH2_CERT_TYPE_USER) {
*reason = "Certificate invalid: not a user certificate";
return SSH_ERR_KEY_CERT_INVALID;
}
}
if (now < 0) {
/* yikes - system clock before epoch! */
*reason = "Certificate invalid: not yet valid";
return SSH_ERR_KEY_CERT_INVALID;
}
if ((u_int64_t)now < k->cert->valid_after) {
*reason = "Certificate invalid: not yet valid";
return SSH_ERR_KEY_CERT_INVALID;
}
if ((u_int64_t)now >= k->cert->valid_before) {
*reason = "Certificate invalid: expired";
return SSH_ERR_KEY_CERT_INVALID;
}
if (k->cert->nprincipals == 0) {
if (require_principal) {
*reason = "Certificate lacks principal list";
return SSH_ERR_KEY_CERT_INVALID;
}
} else if (name != NULL) {
principal_matches = 0;
for (i = 0; i < k->cert->nprincipals; i++) {
if (strcmp(name, k->cert->principals[i]) == 0) {
principal_matches = 1;
break;
}
}
if (!principal_matches) {
*reason = "Certificate invalid: name is not a listed "
"principal";
return SSH_ERR_KEY_CERT_INVALID;
}
}
return 0;
}
size_t
sshkey_format_cert_validity(const struct sshkey_cert *cert, char *s, size_t l)
{
char from[32], to[32], ret[64];
time_t tt;
struct tm *tm;
*from = *to = '\0';
if (cert->valid_after == 0 &&
cert->valid_before == 0xffffffffffffffffULL)
return strlcpy(s, "forever", l);
if (cert->valid_after != 0) {
/* XXX revisit INT_MAX in 2038 :) */
tt = cert->valid_after > INT_MAX ?
INT_MAX : cert->valid_after;
tm = localtime(&tt);
strftime(from, sizeof(from), "%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S", tm);
}
if (cert->valid_before != 0xffffffffffffffffULL) {
/* XXX revisit INT_MAX in 2038 :) */
tt = cert->valid_before > INT_MAX ?
INT_MAX : cert->valid_before;
tm = localtime(&tt);
strftime(to, sizeof(to), "%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S", tm);
}
if (cert->valid_after == 0)
snprintf(ret, sizeof(ret), "before %s", to);
else if (cert->valid_before == 0xffffffffffffffffULL)
snprintf(ret, sizeof(ret), "after %s", from);
else
snprintf(ret, sizeof(ret), "from %s to %s", from, to);
return strlcpy(s, ret, l);
}
int
sshkey_private_serialize_opt(struct sshkey *key, struct sshbuf *buf,
enum sshkey_serialize_rep opts)
{
int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
int was_shielded = sshkey_is_shielded(key);
struct sshbuf *b = NULL;
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
const BIGNUM *rsa_n, *rsa_e, *rsa_d, *rsa_iqmp, *rsa_p, *rsa_q;
const BIGNUM *dsa_p, *dsa_q, *dsa_g, *dsa_pub_key, *dsa_priv_key;
#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
if ((r = sshkey_unshield_private(key)) != 0)
return r;
if ((b = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, sshkey_ssh_name(key))) != 0)
goto out;
switch (key->type) {
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
case KEY_RSA:
RSA_get0_key(key->rsa, &rsa_n, &rsa_e, &rsa_d);
RSA_get0_factors(key->rsa, &rsa_p, &rsa_q);
RSA_get0_crt_params(key->rsa, NULL, NULL, &rsa_iqmp);
if ((r = sshbuf_put_bignum2(b, rsa_n)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_bignum2(b, rsa_e)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_bignum2(b, rsa_d)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_bignum2(b, rsa_iqmp)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_bignum2(b, rsa_p)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_bignum2(b, rsa_q)) != 0)
goto out;
break;
case KEY_RSA_CERT:
if (key->cert == NULL || sshbuf_len(key->cert->certblob) == 0) {
r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
goto out;
}
RSA_get0_key(key->rsa, NULL, NULL, &rsa_d);
RSA_get0_factors(key->rsa, &rsa_p, &rsa_q);
RSA_get0_crt_params(key->rsa, NULL, NULL, &rsa_iqmp);
if ((r = sshbuf_put_stringb(b, key->cert->certblob)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_bignum2(b, rsa_d)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_bignum2(b, rsa_iqmp)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_bignum2(b, rsa_p)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_bignum2(b, rsa_q)) != 0)
goto out;
break;
case KEY_DSA:
DSA_get0_pqg(key->dsa, &dsa_p, &dsa_q, &dsa_g);
DSA_get0_key(key->dsa, &dsa_pub_key, &dsa_priv_key);
if ((r = sshbuf_put_bignum2(b, dsa_p)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_bignum2(b, dsa_q)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_bignum2(b, dsa_g)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_bignum2(b, dsa_pub_key)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_bignum2(b, dsa_priv_key)) != 0)
goto out;
break;
case KEY_DSA_CERT:
if (key->cert == NULL || sshbuf_len(key->cert->certblob) == 0) {
r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
goto out;
}
DSA_get0_key(key->dsa, NULL, &dsa_priv_key);
if ((r = sshbuf_put_stringb(b, key->cert->certblob)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_bignum2(b, dsa_priv_key)) != 0)
goto out;
break;
# ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
case KEY_ECDSA:
if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b,
sshkey_curve_nid_to_name(key->ecdsa_nid))) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_eckey(b, key->ecdsa)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_bignum2(b,
EC_KEY_get0_private_key(key->ecdsa))) != 0)
goto out;
break;
case KEY_ECDSA_CERT:
if (key->cert == NULL || sshbuf_len(key->cert->certblob) == 0) {
r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
goto out;
}
if ((r = sshbuf_put_stringb(b, key->cert->certblob)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_bignum2(b,
EC_KEY_get0_private_key(key->ecdsa))) != 0)
goto out;
break;
case KEY_ECDSA_SK:
if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b,
sshkey_curve_nid_to_name(key->ecdsa_nid))) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_eckey(b, key->ecdsa)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, key->sk_application)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u8(b, key->sk_flags)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_stringb(b, key->sk_key_handle)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_stringb(b, key->sk_reserved)) != 0)
goto out;
break;
case KEY_ECDSA_SK_CERT:
if (key->cert == NULL || sshbuf_len(key->cert->certblob) == 0) {
r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
goto out;
}
if ((r = sshbuf_put_stringb(b, key->cert->certblob)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, key->sk_application)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u8(b, key->sk_flags)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_stringb(b, key->sk_key_handle)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_stringb(b, key->sk_reserved)) != 0)
goto out;
break;
# endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */
#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
case KEY_ED25519:
if ((r = sshbuf_put_string(b, key->ed25519_pk,
ED25519_PK_SZ)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_string(b, key->ed25519_sk,
ED25519_SK_SZ)) != 0)
goto out;
break;
case KEY_ED25519_CERT:
if (key->cert == NULL || sshbuf_len(key->cert->certblob) == 0) {
r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
goto out;
}
if ((r = sshbuf_put_stringb(b, key->cert->certblob)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_string(b, key->ed25519_pk,
ED25519_PK_SZ)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_string(b, key->ed25519_sk,
ED25519_SK_SZ)) != 0)
goto out;
break;
case KEY_ED25519_SK:
if ((r = sshbuf_put_string(b, key->ed25519_pk,
ED25519_PK_SZ)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, key->sk_application)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u8(b, key->sk_flags)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_stringb(b, key->sk_key_handle)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_stringb(b, key->sk_reserved)) != 0)
goto out;
break;
case KEY_ED25519_SK_CERT:
if (key->cert == NULL || sshbuf_len(key->cert->certblob) == 0) {
r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
goto out;
}
if ((r = sshbuf_put_stringb(b, key->cert->certblob)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_string(b, key->ed25519_pk,
ED25519_PK_SZ)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, key->sk_application)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u8(b, key->sk_flags)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_stringb(b, key->sk_key_handle)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_stringb(b, key->sk_reserved)) != 0)
goto out;
break;
#ifdef WITH_XMSS
case KEY_XMSS:
if (key->xmss_name == NULL) {
r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
goto out;
}
if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, key->xmss_name)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_string(b, key->xmss_pk,
sshkey_xmss_pklen(key))) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_string(b, key->xmss_sk,
sshkey_xmss_sklen(key))) != 0 ||
(r = sshkey_xmss_serialize_state_opt(key, b, opts)) != 0)
goto out;
break;
case KEY_XMSS_CERT:
if (key->cert == NULL || sshbuf_len(key->cert->certblob) == 0 ||
key->xmss_name == NULL) {
r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
goto out;
}
if ((r = sshbuf_put_stringb(b, key->cert->certblob)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, key->xmss_name)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_string(b, key->xmss_pk,
sshkey_xmss_pklen(key))) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_string(b, key->xmss_sk,
sshkey_xmss_sklen(key))) != 0 ||
(r = sshkey_xmss_serialize_state_opt(key, b, opts)) != 0)
goto out;
break;
#endif /* WITH_XMSS */
default:
r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
goto out;
}
/*
* success (but we still need to append the output to buf after
* possibly re-shielding the private key)
*/
r = 0;
out:
if (was_shielded)
r = sshkey_shield_private(key);
if (r == 0)
r = sshbuf_putb(buf, b);
sshbuf_free(b);
return r;
}
int
sshkey_private_serialize(struct sshkey *key, struct sshbuf *b)
{
return sshkey_private_serialize_opt(key, b,
SSHKEY_SERIALIZE_DEFAULT);
}
int
sshkey_private_deserialize(struct sshbuf *buf, struct sshkey **kp)
{
char *tname = NULL, *curve = NULL, *xmss_name = NULL;
struct sshkey *k = NULL;
size_t pklen = 0, sklen = 0;
int type, r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
u_char *ed25519_pk = NULL, *ed25519_sk = NULL;
u_char *xmss_pk = NULL, *xmss_sk = NULL;
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
BIGNUM *exponent = NULL;
BIGNUM *rsa_n = NULL, *rsa_e = NULL, *rsa_d = NULL;
BIGNUM *rsa_iqmp = NULL, *rsa_p = NULL, *rsa_q = NULL;
BIGNUM *dsa_p = NULL, *dsa_q = NULL, *dsa_g = NULL;
BIGNUM *dsa_pub_key = NULL, *dsa_priv_key = NULL;
#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
if (kp != NULL)
*kp = NULL;
if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(buf, &tname, NULL)) != 0)
goto out;
type = sshkey_type_from_name(tname);
if (sshkey_type_is_cert(type)) {
/*
* Certificate key private keys begin with the certificate
* itself. Make sure this matches the type of the enclosing
* private key.
*/
if ((r = sshkey_froms(buf, &k)) != 0)
goto out;
if (k->type != type) {
r = SSH_ERR_KEY_CERT_MISMATCH;
goto out;
}
/* For ECDSA keys, the group must match too */
if (k->type == KEY_ECDSA &&
k->ecdsa_nid != sshkey_ecdsa_nid_from_name(tname)) {
r = SSH_ERR_KEY_CERT_MISMATCH;
goto out;
}
} else {
if ((k = sshkey_new(type)) == NULL) {
r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
goto out;
}
}
switch (type) {
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
case KEY_DSA:
if ((r = sshbuf_get_bignum2(buf, &dsa_p)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_bignum2(buf, &dsa_q)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_bignum2(buf, &dsa_g)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_bignum2(buf, &dsa_pub_key)) != 0)
goto out;
if (!DSA_set0_pqg(k->dsa, dsa_p, dsa_q, dsa_g)) {
r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
goto out;
}
dsa_p = dsa_q = dsa_g = NULL; /* transferred */
if (!DSA_set0_key(k->dsa, dsa_pub_key, NULL)) {
r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
goto out;
}
dsa_pub_key = NULL; /* transferred */
/* FALLTHROUGH */
case KEY_DSA_CERT:
if ((r = sshbuf_get_bignum2(buf, &dsa_priv_key)) != 0)
goto out;
if (!DSA_set0_key(k->dsa, NULL, dsa_priv_key)) {
r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
goto out;
}
dsa_priv_key = NULL; /* transferred */
break;
# ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
case KEY_ECDSA:
if ((k->ecdsa_nid = sshkey_ecdsa_nid_from_name(tname)) == -1) {
r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
goto out;
}
if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(buf, &curve, NULL)) != 0)
goto out;
if (k->ecdsa_nid != sshkey_curve_name_to_nid(curve)) {
r = SSH_ERR_EC_CURVE_MISMATCH;
goto out;
}
k->ecdsa = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(k->ecdsa_nid);
if (k->ecdsa == NULL) {
r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
goto out;
}
if ((r = sshbuf_get_eckey(buf, k->ecdsa)) != 0)
goto out;
/* FALLTHROUGH */
case KEY_ECDSA_CERT:
if ((r = sshbuf_get_bignum2(buf, &exponent)) != 0)
goto out;
if (EC_KEY_set_private_key(k->ecdsa, exponent) != 1) {
r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
goto out;
}
if ((r = sshkey_ec_validate_public(EC_KEY_get0_group(k->ecdsa),
EC_KEY_get0_public_key(k->ecdsa))) != 0 ||
(r = sshkey_ec_validate_private(k->ecdsa)) != 0)
goto out;
break;
case KEY_ECDSA_SK:
if ((k->ecdsa_nid = sshkey_ecdsa_nid_from_name(tname)) == -1) {
r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
goto out;
}
if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(buf, &curve, NULL)) != 0)
goto out;
if (k->ecdsa_nid != sshkey_curve_name_to_nid(curve)) {
r = SSH_ERR_EC_CURVE_MISMATCH;
goto out;
}
if ((k->sk_key_handle = sshbuf_new()) == NULL ||
(k->sk_reserved = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) {
r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
goto out;
}
k->ecdsa = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(k->ecdsa_nid);
if (k->ecdsa == NULL) {
r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
goto out;
}
if ((r = sshbuf_get_eckey(buf, k->ecdsa)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_cstring(buf, &k->sk_application,
NULL)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_u8(buf, &k->sk_flags)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_stringb(buf, k->sk_key_handle)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_stringb(buf, k->sk_reserved)) != 0)
goto out;
if ((r = sshkey_ec_validate_public(EC_KEY_get0_group(k->ecdsa),
EC_KEY_get0_public_key(k->ecdsa))) != 0)
goto out;
break;
case KEY_ECDSA_SK_CERT:
if ((k->sk_key_handle = sshbuf_new()) == NULL ||
(k->sk_reserved = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) {
r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
goto out;
}
if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(buf, &k->sk_application,
NULL)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_u8(buf, &k->sk_flags)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_stringb(buf, k->sk_key_handle)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_stringb(buf, k->sk_reserved)) != 0)
goto out;
if ((r = sshkey_ec_validate_public(EC_KEY_get0_group(k->ecdsa),
EC_KEY_get0_public_key(k->ecdsa))) != 0)
goto out;
break;
# endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */
case KEY_RSA:
if ((r = sshbuf_get_bignum2(buf, &rsa_n)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_bignum2(buf, &rsa_e)) != 0)
goto out;
if (!RSA_set0_key(k->rsa, rsa_n, rsa_e, NULL)) {
r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
goto out;
}
rsa_n = rsa_e = NULL; /* transferred */
/* FALLTHROUGH */
case KEY_RSA_CERT:
if ((r = sshbuf_get_bignum2(buf, &rsa_d)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_bignum2(buf, &rsa_iqmp)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_bignum2(buf, &rsa_p)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_bignum2(buf, &rsa_q)) != 0)
goto out;
if (!RSA_set0_key(k->rsa, NULL, NULL, rsa_d)) {
r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
goto out;
}
rsa_d = NULL; /* transferred */
if (!RSA_set0_factors(k->rsa, rsa_p, rsa_q)) {
r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
goto out;
}
rsa_p = rsa_q = NULL; /* transferred */
if ((r = check_rsa_length(k->rsa)) != 0)
goto out;
if ((r = ssh_rsa_complete_crt_parameters(k, rsa_iqmp)) != 0)
goto out;
break;
#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
case KEY_ED25519:
case KEY_ED25519_CERT:
if ((r = sshbuf_get_string(buf, &ed25519_pk, &pklen)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_string(buf, &ed25519_sk, &sklen)) != 0)
goto out;
if (pklen != ED25519_PK_SZ || sklen != ED25519_SK_SZ) {
r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
goto out;
}
k->ed25519_pk = ed25519_pk;
k->ed25519_sk = ed25519_sk;
ed25519_pk = ed25519_sk = NULL; /* transferred */
break;
case KEY_ED25519_SK:
case KEY_ED25519_SK_CERT:
if ((r = sshbuf_get_string(buf, &ed25519_pk, &pklen)) != 0)
goto out;
if (pklen != ED25519_PK_SZ) {
r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
goto out;
}
if ((k->sk_key_handle = sshbuf_new()) == NULL ||
(k->sk_reserved = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) {
r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
goto out;
}
if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(buf, &k->sk_application,
NULL)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_u8(buf, &k->sk_flags)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_stringb(buf, k->sk_key_handle)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_stringb(buf, k->sk_reserved)) != 0)
goto out;
k->ed25519_pk = ed25519_pk;
ed25519_pk = NULL; /* transferred */
break;
#ifdef WITH_XMSS
case KEY_XMSS:
case KEY_XMSS_CERT:
if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(buf, &xmss_name, NULL)) != 0 ||
- (r = sshkey_xmss_init(k, xmss_name)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_string(buf, &xmss_pk, &pklen)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_string(buf, &xmss_sk, &sklen)) != 0)
goto out;
+ if (type == KEY_XMSS &&
+ (r = sshkey_xmss_init(k, xmss_name)) != 0)
+ goto out;
if (pklen != sshkey_xmss_pklen(k) ||
sklen != sshkey_xmss_sklen(k)) {
r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
goto out;
}
k->xmss_pk = xmss_pk;
k->xmss_sk = xmss_sk;
xmss_pk = xmss_sk = NULL;
/* optional internal state */
if ((r = sshkey_xmss_deserialize_state_opt(k, buf)) != 0)
goto out;
break;
#endif /* WITH_XMSS */
default:
r = SSH_ERR_KEY_TYPE_UNKNOWN;
goto out;
}
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
/* enable blinding */
switch (k->type) {
case KEY_RSA:
case KEY_RSA_CERT:
if (RSA_blinding_on(k->rsa, NULL) != 1) {
r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
goto out;
}
break;
}
#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
/* success */
r = 0;
if (kp != NULL) {
*kp = k;
k = NULL;
}
out:
free(tname);
free(curve);
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
BN_clear_free(exponent);
BN_clear_free(dsa_p);
BN_clear_free(dsa_q);
BN_clear_free(dsa_g);
BN_clear_free(dsa_pub_key);
BN_clear_free(dsa_priv_key);
BN_clear_free(rsa_n);
BN_clear_free(rsa_e);
BN_clear_free(rsa_d);
BN_clear_free(rsa_p);
BN_clear_free(rsa_q);
BN_clear_free(rsa_iqmp);
#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
sshkey_free(k);
freezero(ed25519_pk, pklen);
freezero(ed25519_sk, sklen);
free(xmss_name);
freezero(xmss_pk, pklen);
freezero(xmss_sk, sklen);
return r;
}
#if defined(WITH_OPENSSL) && defined(OPENSSL_HAS_ECC)
int
sshkey_ec_validate_public(const EC_GROUP *group, const EC_POINT *public)
{
EC_POINT *nq = NULL;
BIGNUM *order = NULL, *x = NULL, *y = NULL, *tmp = NULL;
int ret = SSH_ERR_KEY_INVALID_EC_VALUE;
/*
* NB. This assumes OpenSSL has already verified that the public
* point lies on the curve. This is done by EC_POINT_oct2point()
* implicitly calling EC_POINT_is_on_curve(). If this code is ever
* reachable with public points not unmarshalled using
* EC_POINT_oct2point then the caller will need to explicitly check.
*/
/*
* We shouldn't ever hit this case because bignum_get_ecpoint()
* refuses to load GF2m points.
*/
if (EC_METHOD_get_field_type(EC_GROUP_method_of(group)) !=
NID_X9_62_prime_field)
goto out;
/* Q != infinity */
if (EC_POINT_is_at_infinity(group, public))
goto out;
if ((x = BN_new()) == NULL ||
(y = BN_new()) == NULL ||
(order = BN_new()) == NULL ||
(tmp = BN_new()) == NULL) {
ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
goto out;
}
/* log2(x) > log2(order)/2, log2(y) > log2(order)/2 */
if (EC_GROUP_get_order(group, order, NULL) != 1 ||
EC_POINT_get_affine_coordinates_GFp(group, public,
x, y, NULL) != 1) {
ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
goto out;
}
if (BN_num_bits(x) <= BN_num_bits(order) / 2 ||
BN_num_bits(y) <= BN_num_bits(order) / 2)
goto out;
/* nQ == infinity (n == order of subgroup) */
if ((nq = EC_POINT_new(group)) == NULL) {
ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
goto out;
}
if (EC_POINT_mul(group, nq, NULL, public, order, NULL) != 1) {
ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
goto out;
}
if (EC_POINT_is_at_infinity(group, nq) != 1)
goto out;
/* x < order - 1, y < order - 1 */
if (!BN_sub(tmp, order, BN_value_one())) {
ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
goto out;
}
if (BN_cmp(x, tmp) >= 0 || BN_cmp(y, tmp) >= 0)
goto out;
ret = 0;
out:
BN_clear_free(x);
BN_clear_free(y);
BN_clear_free(order);
BN_clear_free(tmp);
EC_POINT_free(nq);
return ret;
}
int
sshkey_ec_validate_private(const EC_KEY *key)
{
BIGNUM *order = NULL, *tmp = NULL;
int ret = SSH_ERR_KEY_INVALID_EC_VALUE;
if ((order = BN_new()) == NULL || (tmp = BN_new()) == NULL) {
ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
goto out;
}
/* log2(private) > log2(order)/2 */
if (EC_GROUP_get_order(EC_KEY_get0_group(key), order, NULL) != 1) {
ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
goto out;
}
if (BN_num_bits(EC_KEY_get0_private_key(key)) <=
BN_num_bits(order) / 2)
goto out;
/* private < order - 1 */
if (!BN_sub(tmp, order, BN_value_one())) {
ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
goto out;
}
if (BN_cmp(EC_KEY_get0_private_key(key), tmp) >= 0)
goto out;
ret = 0;
out:
BN_clear_free(order);
BN_clear_free(tmp);
return ret;
}
void
sshkey_dump_ec_point(const EC_GROUP *group, const EC_POINT *point)
{
BIGNUM *x = NULL, *y = NULL;
if (point == NULL) {
fputs("point=(NULL)\n", stderr);
return;
}
if ((x = BN_new()) == NULL || (y = BN_new()) == NULL) {
fprintf(stderr, "%s: BN_new failed\n", __func__);
goto out;
}
if (EC_METHOD_get_field_type(EC_GROUP_method_of(group)) !=
NID_X9_62_prime_field) {
fprintf(stderr, "%s: group is not a prime field\n", __func__);
goto out;
}
if (EC_POINT_get_affine_coordinates_GFp(group, point,
x, y, NULL) != 1) {
fprintf(stderr, "%s: EC_POINT_get_affine_coordinates_GFp\n",
__func__);
goto out;
}
fputs("x=", stderr);
BN_print_fp(stderr, x);
fputs("\ny=", stderr);
BN_print_fp(stderr, y);
fputs("\n", stderr);
out:
BN_clear_free(x);
BN_clear_free(y);
}
void
sshkey_dump_ec_key(const EC_KEY *key)
{
const BIGNUM *exponent;
sshkey_dump_ec_point(EC_KEY_get0_group(key),
EC_KEY_get0_public_key(key));
fputs("exponent=", stderr);
if ((exponent = EC_KEY_get0_private_key(key)) == NULL)
fputs("(NULL)", stderr);
else
BN_print_fp(stderr, EC_KEY_get0_private_key(key));
fputs("\n", stderr);
}
#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL && OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */
static int
sshkey_private_to_blob2(struct sshkey *prv, struct sshbuf *blob,
const char *passphrase, const char *comment, const char *ciphername,
int rounds)
{
u_char *cp, *key = NULL, *pubkeyblob = NULL;
u_char salt[SALT_LEN];
char *b64 = NULL;
size_t i, pubkeylen, keylen, ivlen, blocksize, authlen;
u_int check;
int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
struct sshcipher_ctx *ciphercontext = NULL;
const struct sshcipher *cipher;
const char *kdfname = KDFNAME;
struct sshbuf *encoded = NULL, *encrypted = NULL, *kdf = NULL;
if (rounds <= 0)
rounds = DEFAULT_ROUNDS;
if (passphrase == NULL || !strlen(passphrase)) {
ciphername = "none";
kdfname = "none";
} else if (ciphername == NULL)
ciphername = DEFAULT_CIPHERNAME;
if ((cipher = cipher_by_name(ciphername)) == NULL) {
r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
goto out;
}
if ((kdf = sshbuf_new()) == NULL ||
(encoded = sshbuf_new()) == NULL ||
(encrypted = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) {
r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
goto out;
}
blocksize = cipher_blocksize(cipher);
keylen = cipher_keylen(cipher);
ivlen = cipher_ivlen(cipher);
authlen = cipher_authlen(cipher);
if ((key = calloc(1, keylen + ivlen)) == NULL) {
r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
goto out;
}
if (strcmp(kdfname, "bcrypt") == 0) {
arc4random_buf(salt, SALT_LEN);
if (bcrypt_pbkdf(passphrase, strlen(passphrase),
salt, SALT_LEN, key, keylen + ivlen, rounds) < 0) {
r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
goto out;
}
if ((r = sshbuf_put_string(kdf, salt, SALT_LEN)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u32(kdf, rounds)) != 0)
goto out;
} else if (strcmp(kdfname, "none") != 0) {
/* Unsupported KDF type */
r = SSH_ERR_KEY_UNKNOWN_CIPHER;
goto out;
}
if ((r = cipher_init(&ciphercontext, cipher, key, keylen,
key + keylen, ivlen, 1)) != 0)
goto out;
if ((r = sshbuf_put(encoded, AUTH_MAGIC, sizeof(AUTH_MAGIC))) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_cstring(encoded, ciphername)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_cstring(encoded, kdfname)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_stringb(encoded, kdf)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u32(encoded, 1)) != 0 || /* number of keys */
(r = sshkey_to_blob(prv, &pubkeyblob, &pubkeylen)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_string(encoded, pubkeyblob, pubkeylen)) != 0)
goto out;
/* set up the buffer that will be encrypted */
/* Random check bytes */
check = arc4random();
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(encrypted, check)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u32(encrypted, check)) != 0)
goto out;
/* append private key and comment*/
if ((r = sshkey_private_serialize_opt(prv, encrypted,
SSHKEY_SERIALIZE_FULL)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_cstring(encrypted, comment)) != 0)
goto out;
/* padding */
i = 0;
while (sshbuf_len(encrypted) % blocksize) {
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(encrypted, ++i & 0xff)) != 0)
goto out;
}
/* length in destination buffer */
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(encoded, sshbuf_len(encrypted))) != 0)
goto out;
/* encrypt */
if ((r = sshbuf_reserve(encoded,
sshbuf_len(encrypted) + authlen, &cp)) != 0)
goto out;
if ((r = cipher_crypt(ciphercontext, 0, cp,
sshbuf_ptr(encrypted), sshbuf_len(encrypted), 0, authlen)) != 0)
goto out;
sshbuf_reset(blob);
/* assemble uuencoded key */
if ((r = sshbuf_put(blob, MARK_BEGIN, MARK_BEGIN_LEN)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_dtob64(encoded, blob, 1)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put(blob, MARK_END, MARK_END_LEN)) != 0)
goto out;
/* success */
r = 0;
out:
sshbuf_free(kdf);
sshbuf_free(encoded);
sshbuf_free(encrypted);
cipher_free(ciphercontext);
explicit_bzero(salt, sizeof(salt));
if (key != NULL)
freezero(key, keylen + ivlen);
if (pubkeyblob != NULL)
freezero(pubkeyblob, pubkeylen);
if (b64 != NULL)
freezero(b64, strlen(b64));
return r;
}
static int
private2_uudecode(struct sshbuf *blob, struct sshbuf **decodedp)
{
const u_char *cp;
size_t encoded_len;
int r;
u_char last;
struct sshbuf *encoded = NULL, *decoded = NULL;
if (blob == NULL || decodedp == NULL)
return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
*decodedp = NULL;
if ((encoded = sshbuf_new()) == NULL ||
(decoded = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) {
r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
goto out;
}
/* check preamble */
cp = sshbuf_ptr(blob);
encoded_len = sshbuf_len(blob);
if (encoded_len < (MARK_BEGIN_LEN + MARK_END_LEN) ||
memcmp(cp, MARK_BEGIN, MARK_BEGIN_LEN) != 0) {
r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
goto out;
}
cp += MARK_BEGIN_LEN;
encoded_len -= MARK_BEGIN_LEN;
/* Look for end marker, removing whitespace as we go */
while (encoded_len > 0) {
if (*cp != '\n' && *cp != '\r') {
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(encoded, *cp)) != 0)
goto out;
}
last = *cp;
encoded_len--;
cp++;
if (last == '\n') {
if (encoded_len >= MARK_END_LEN &&
memcmp(cp, MARK_END, MARK_END_LEN) == 0) {
/* \0 terminate */
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(encoded, 0)) != 0)
goto out;
break;
}
}
}
if (encoded_len == 0) {
r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
goto out;
}
/* decode base64 */
if ((r = sshbuf_b64tod(decoded, (char *)sshbuf_ptr(encoded))) != 0)
goto out;
/* check magic */
if (sshbuf_len(decoded) < sizeof(AUTH_MAGIC) ||
memcmp(sshbuf_ptr(decoded), AUTH_MAGIC, sizeof(AUTH_MAGIC))) {
r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
goto out;
}
/* success */
*decodedp = decoded;
decoded = NULL;
r = 0;
out:
sshbuf_free(encoded);
sshbuf_free(decoded);
return r;
}
static int
private2_decrypt(struct sshbuf *decoded, const char *passphrase,
struct sshbuf **decryptedp, struct sshkey **pubkeyp)
{
char *ciphername = NULL, *kdfname = NULL;
const struct sshcipher *cipher = NULL;
int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
size_t keylen = 0, ivlen = 0, authlen = 0, slen = 0;
struct sshbuf *kdf = NULL, *decrypted = NULL;
struct sshcipher_ctx *ciphercontext = NULL;
struct sshkey *pubkey = NULL;
u_char *key = NULL, *salt = NULL, *dp;
u_int blocksize, rounds, nkeys, encrypted_len, check1, check2;
if (decoded == NULL || decryptedp == NULL || pubkeyp == NULL)
return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
*decryptedp = NULL;
*pubkeyp = NULL;
if ((decrypted = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) {
r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
goto out;
}
/* parse public portion of key */
if ((r = sshbuf_consume(decoded, sizeof(AUTH_MAGIC))) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_cstring(decoded, &ciphername, NULL)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_cstring(decoded, &kdfname, NULL)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_froms(decoded, &kdf)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_u32(decoded, &nkeys)) != 0)
goto out;
if (nkeys != 1) {
/* XXX only one key supported at present */
r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
goto out;
}
if ((r = sshkey_froms(decoded, &pubkey)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_u32(decoded, &encrypted_len)) != 0)
goto out;
if ((cipher = cipher_by_name(ciphername)) == NULL) {
r = SSH_ERR_KEY_UNKNOWN_CIPHER;
goto out;
}
if (strcmp(kdfname, "none") != 0 && strcmp(kdfname, "bcrypt") != 0) {
r = SSH_ERR_KEY_UNKNOWN_CIPHER;
goto out;
}
if (strcmp(kdfname, "none") == 0 && strcmp(ciphername, "none") != 0) {
r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
goto out;
}
if ((passphrase == NULL || strlen(passphrase) == 0) &&
strcmp(kdfname, "none") != 0) {
/* passphrase required */
r = SSH_ERR_KEY_WRONG_PASSPHRASE;
goto out;
}
/* check size of encrypted key blob */
blocksize = cipher_blocksize(cipher);
if (encrypted_len < blocksize || (encrypted_len % blocksize) != 0) {
r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
goto out;
}
/* setup key */
keylen = cipher_keylen(cipher);
ivlen = cipher_ivlen(cipher);
authlen = cipher_authlen(cipher);
if ((key = calloc(1, keylen + ivlen)) == NULL) {
r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
goto out;
}
if (strcmp(kdfname, "bcrypt") == 0) {
if ((r = sshbuf_get_string(kdf, &salt, &slen)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_u32(kdf, &rounds)) != 0)
goto out;
if (bcrypt_pbkdf(passphrase, strlen(passphrase), salt, slen,
key, keylen + ivlen, rounds) < 0) {
r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
goto out;
}
}
/* check that an appropriate amount of auth data is present */
if (sshbuf_len(decoded) < authlen ||
sshbuf_len(decoded) - authlen < encrypted_len) {
r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
goto out;
}
/* decrypt private portion of key */
if ((r = sshbuf_reserve(decrypted, encrypted_len, &dp)) != 0 ||
(r = cipher_init(&ciphercontext, cipher, key, keylen,
key + keylen, ivlen, 0)) != 0)
goto out;
if ((r = cipher_crypt(ciphercontext, 0, dp, sshbuf_ptr(decoded),
encrypted_len, 0, authlen)) != 0) {
/* an integrity error here indicates an incorrect passphrase */
if (r == SSH_ERR_MAC_INVALID)
r = SSH_ERR_KEY_WRONG_PASSPHRASE;
goto out;
}
if ((r = sshbuf_consume(decoded, encrypted_len + authlen)) != 0)
goto out;
/* there should be no trailing data */
if (sshbuf_len(decoded) != 0) {
r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
goto out;
}
/* check check bytes */
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(decrypted, &check1)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_u32(decrypted, &check2)) != 0)
goto out;
if (check1 != check2) {
r = SSH_ERR_KEY_WRONG_PASSPHRASE;
goto out;
}
/* success */
*decryptedp = decrypted;
decrypted = NULL;
*pubkeyp = pubkey;
pubkey = NULL;
r = 0;
out:
cipher_free(ciphercontext);
free(ciphername);
free(kdfname);
sshkey_free(pubkey);
if (salt != NULL) {
explicit_bzero(salt, slen);
free(salt);
}
if (key != NULL) {
explicit_bzero(key, keylen + ivlen);
free(key);
}
sshbuf_free(kdf);
sshbuf_free(decrypted);
return r;
}
/* Check deterministic padding after private key */
static int
private2_check_padding(struct sshbuf *decrypted)
{
u_char pad;
size_t i;
int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
i = 0;
while (sshbuf_len(decrypted)) {
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(decrypted, &pad)) != 0)
goto out;
if (pad != (++i & 0xff)) {
r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
goto out;
}
}
/* success */
r = 0;
out:
explicit_bzero(&pad, sizeof(pad));
explicit_bzero(&i, sizeof(i));
return r;
}
static int
sshkey_parse_private2(struct sshbuf *blob, int type, const char *passphrase,
struct sshkey **keyp, char **commentp)
{
char *comment = NULL;
int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
struct sshbuf *decoded = NULL, *decrypted = NULL;
struct sshkey *k = NULL, *pubkey = NULL;
if (keyp != NULL)
*keyp = NULL;
if (commentp != NULL)
*commentp = NULL;
/* Undo base64 encoding and decrypt the private section */
if ((r = private2_uudecode(blob, &decoded)) != 0 ||
(r = private2_decrypt(decoded, passphrase,
&decrypted, &pubkey)) != 0)
goto out;
if (type != KEY_UNSPEC &&
sshkey_type_plain(type) != sshkey_type_plain(pubkey->type)) {
r = SSH_ERR_KEY_TYPE_MISMATCH;
goto out;
}
/* Load the private key and comment */
if ((r = sshkey_private_deserialize(decrypted, &k)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_cstring(decrypted, &comment, NULL)) != 0)
goto out;
/* Check deterministic padding after private section */
if ((r = private2_check_padding(decrypted)) != 0)
goto out;
/* Check that the public key in the envelope matches the private key */
if (!sshkey_equal(pubkey, k)) {
r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
goto out;
}
/* success */
r = 0;
if (keyp != NULL) {
*keyp = k;
k = NULL;
}
if (commentp != NULL) {
*commentp = comment;
comment = NULL;
}
out:
free(comment);
sshbuf_free(decoded);
sshbuf_free(decrypted);
sshkey_free(k);
sshkey_free(pubkey);
return r;
}
static int
sshkey_parse_private2_pubkey(struct sshbuf *blob, int type,
struct sshkey **keyp)
{
int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
struct sshbuf *decoded = NULL;
struct sshkey *pubkey = NULL;
u_int nkeys = 0;
if (keyp != NULL)
*keyp = NULL;
if ((r = private2_uudecode(blob, &decoded)) != 0)
goto out;
/* parse public key from unencrypted envelope */
if ((r = sshbuf_consume(decoded, sizeof(AUTH_MAGIC))) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_skip_string(decoded)) != 0 || /* cipher */
(r = sshbuf_skip_string(decoded)) != 0 || /* KDF alg */
(r = sshbuf_skip_string(decoded)) != 0 || /* KDF hint */
(r = sshbuf_get_u32(decoded, &nkeys)) != 0)
goto out;
if (nkeys != 1) {
/* XXX only one key supported at present */
r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
goto out;
}
/* Parse the public key */
if ((r = sshkey_froms(decoded, &pubkey)) != 0)
goto out;
if (type != KEY_UNSPEC &&
sshkey_type_plain(type) != sshkey_type_plain(pubkey->type)) {
r = SSH_ERR_KEY_TYPE_MISMATCH;
goto out;
}
/* success */
r = 0;
if (keyp != NULL) {
*keyp = pubkey;
pubkey = NULL;
}
out:
sshbuf_free(decoded);
sshkey_free(pubkey);
return r;
}
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
/* convert SSH v2 key to PEM or PKCS#8 format */
static int
sshkey_private_to_blob_pem_pkcs8(struct sshkey *key, struct sshbuf *buf,
int format, const char *_passphrase, const char *comment)
{
int was_shielded = sshkey_is_shielded(key);
int success, r;
int blen, len = strlen(_passphrase);
u_char *passphrase = (len > 0) ? (u_char *)_passphrase : NULL;
const EVP_CIPHER *cipher = (len > 0) ? EVP_aes_128_cbc() : NULL;
char *bptr;
BIO *bio = NULL;
struct sshbuf *blob;
EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
if (len > 0 && len <= 4)
return SSH_ERR_PASSPHRASE_TOO_SHORT;
if ((blob = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
if ((bio = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem())) == NULL) {
r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
goto out;
}
if (format == SSHKEY_PRIVATE_PKCS8 && (pkey = EVP_PKEY_new()) == NULL) {
r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
goto out;
}
if ((r = sshkey_unshield_private(key)) != 0)
goto out;
switch (key->type) {
case KEY_DSA:
if (format == SSHKEY_PRIVATE_PEM) {
success = PEM_write_bio_DSAPrivateKey(bio, key->dsa,
cipher, passphrase, len, NULL, NULL);
} else {
success = EVP_PKEY_set1_DSA(pkey, key->dsa);
}
break;
#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
case KEY_ECDSA:
if (format == SSHKEY_PRIVATE_PEM) {
success = PEM_write_bio_ECPrivateKey(bio, key->ecdsa,
cipher, passphrase, len, NULL, NULL);
} else {
success = EVP_PKEY_set1_EC_KEY(pkey, key->ecdsa);
}
break;
#endif
case KEY_RSA:
if (format == SSHKEY_PRIVATE_PEM) {
success = PEM_write_bio_RSAPrivateKey(bio, key->rsa,
cipher, passphrase, len, NULL, NULL);
} else {
success = EVP_PKEY_set1_RSA(pkey, key->rsa);
}
break;
default:
success = 0;
break;
}
if (success == 0) {
r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
goto out;
}
if (format == SSHKEY_PRIVATE_PKCS8) {
if ((success = PEM_write_bio_PrivateKey(bio, pkey, cipher,
passphrase, len, NULL, NULL)) == 0) {
r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
goto out;
}
}
if ((blen = BIO_get_mem_data(bio, &bptr)) <= 0) {
r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
goto out;
}
if ((r = sshbuf_put(blob, bptr, blen)) != 0)
goto out;
r = 0;
out:
if (was_shielded)
r = sshkey_shield_private(key);
if (r == 0)
r = sshbuf_putb(buf, blob);
EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
sshbuf_free(blob);
BIO_free(bio);
return r;
}
#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
/* Serialise "key" to buffer "blob" */
int
sshkey_private_to_fileblob(struct sshkey *key, struct sshbuf *blob,
const char *passphrase, const char *comment,
int format, const char *openssh_format_cipher, int openssh_format_rounds)
{
switch (key->type) {
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
case KEY_DSA:
case KEY_ECDSA:
case KEY_RSA:
break; /* see below */
#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
case KEY_ED25519:
case KEY_ED25519_SK:
#ifdef WITH_XMSS
case KEY_XMSS:
#endif /* WITH_XMSS */
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
case KEY_ECDSA_SK:
#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
return sshkey_private_to_blob2(key, blob, passphrase,
comment, openssh_format_cipher, openssh_format_rounds);
default:
return SSH_ERR_KEY_TYPE_UNKNOWN;
}
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
switch (format) {
case SSHKEY_PRIVATE_OPENSSH:
return sshkey_private_to_blob2(key, blob, passphrase,
comment, openssh_format_cipher, openssh_format_rounds);
case SSHKEY_PRIVATE_PEM:
case SSHKEY_PRIVATE_PKCS8:
return sshkey_private_to_blob_pem_pkcs8(key, blob,
format, passphrase, comment);
default:
return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
}
#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
}
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
static int
translate_libcrypto_error(unsigned long pem_err)
{
int pem_reason = ERR_GET_REASON(pem_err);
switch (ERR_GET_LIB(pem_err)) {
case ERR_LIB_PEM:
switch (pem_reason) {
case PEM_R_BAD_PASSWORD_READ:
case PEM_R_PROBLEMS_GETTING_PASSWORD:
case PEM_R_BAD_DECRYPT:
return SSH_ERR_KEY_WRONG_PASSPHRASE;
default:
return SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
}
case ERR_LIB_EVP:
switch (pem_reason) {
case EVP_R_BAD_DECRYPT:
return SSH_ERR_KEY_WRONG_PASSPHRASE;
#ifdef EVP_R_BN_DECODE_ERROR
case EVP_R_BN_DECODE_ERROR:
#endif
case EVP_R_DECODE_ERROR:
#ifdef EVP_R_PRIVATE_KEY_DECODE_ERROR
case EVP_R_PRIVATE_KEY_DECODE_ERROR:
#endif
return SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
default:
return SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
}
case ERR_LIB_ASN1:
return SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
}
return SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
}
static void
clear_libcrypto_errors(void)
{
while (ERR_get_error() != 0)
;
}
/*
* Translate OpenSSL error codes to determine whether
* passphrase is required/incorrect.
*/
static int
convert_libcrypto_error(void)
{
/*
* Some password errors are reported at the beginning
* of the error queue.
*/
if (translate_libcrypto_error(ERR_peek_error()) ==
SSH_ERR_KEY_WRONG_PASSPHRASE)
return SSH_ERR_KEY_WRONG_PASSPHRASE;
return translate_libcrypto_error(ERR_peek_last_error());
}
static int
pem_passphrase_cb(char *buf, int size, int rwflag, void *u)
{
char *p = (char *)u;
size_t len;
if (p == NULL || (len = strlen(p)) == 0)
return -1;
if (size < 0 || len > (size_t)size)
return -1;
memcpy(buf, p, len);
return (int)len;
}
static int
sshkey_parse_private_pem_fileblob(struct sshbuf *blob, int type,
const char *passphrase, struct sshkey **keyp)
{
EVP_PKEY *pk = NULL;
struct sshkey *prv = NULL;
BIO *bio = NULL;
int r;
if (keyp != NULL)
*keyp = NULL;
if ((bio = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem())) == NULL || sshbuf_len(blob) > INT_MAX)
return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
if (BIO_write(bio, sshbuf_ptr(blob), sshbuf_len(blob)) !=
(int)sshbuf_len(blob)) {
r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
goto out;
}
clear_libcrypto_errors();
if ((pk = PEM_read_bio_PrivateKey(bio, NULL, pem_passphrase_cb,
(char *)passphrase)) == NULL) {
/*
* libcrypto may return various ASN.1 errors when attempting
* to parse a key with an incorrect passphrase.
* Treat all format errors as "incorrect passphrase" if a
* passphrase was supplied.
*/
if (passphrase != NULL && *passphrase != '\0')
r = SSH_ERR_KEY_WRONG_PASSPHRASE;
else
r = convert_libcrypto_error();
goto out;
}
if (EVP_PKEY_base_id(pk) == EVP_PKEY_RSA &&
(type == KEY_UNSPEC || type == KEY_RSA)) {
if ((prv = sshkey_new(KEY_UNSPEC)) == NULL) {
r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
goto out;
}
prv->rsa = EVP_PKEY_get1_RSA(pk);
prv->type = KEY_RSA;
#ifdef DEBUG_PK
RSA_print_fp(stderr, prv->rsa, 8);
#endif
if (RSA_blinding_on(prv->rsa, NULL) != 1) {
r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
goto out;
}
if ((r = check_rsa_length(prv->rsa)) != 0)
goto out;
} else if (EVP_PKEY_base_id(pk) == EVP_PKEY_DSA &&
(type == KEY_UNSPEC || type == KEY_DSA)) {
if ((prv = sshkey_new(KEY_UNSPEC)) == NULL) {
r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
goto out;
}
prv->dsa = EVP_PKEY_get1_DSA(pk);
prv->type = KEY_DSA;
#ifdef DEBUG_PK
DSA_print_fp(stderr, prv->dsa, 8);
#endif
#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
} else if (EVP_PKEY_base_id(pk) == EVP_PKEY_EC &&
(type == KEY_UNSPEC || type == KEY_ECDSA)) {
if ((prv = sshkey_new(KEY_UNSPEC)) == NULL) {
r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
goto out;
}
prv->ecdsa = EVP_PKEY_get1_EC_KEY(pk);
prv->type = KEY_ECDSA;
prv->ecdsa_nid = sshkey_ecdsa_key_to_nid(prv->ecdsa);
if (prv->ecdsa_nid == -1 ||
sshkey_curve_nid_to_name(prv->ecdsa_nid) == NULL ||
sshkey_ec_validate_public(EC_KEY_get0_group(prv->ecdsa),
EC_KEY_get0_public_key(prv->ecdsa)) != 0 ||
sshkey_ec_validate_private(prv->ecdsa) != 0) {
r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
goto out;
}
# ifdef DEBUG_PK
if (prv != NULL && prv->ecdsa != NULL)
sshkey_dump_ec_key(prv->ecdsa);
# endif
#endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */
} else {
r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
goto out;
}
r = 0;
if (keyp != NULL) {
*keyp = prv;
prv = NULL;
}
out:
BIO_free(bio);
EVP_PKEY_free(pk);
sshkey_free(prv);
return r;
}
#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
int
sshkey_parse_private_fileblob_type(struct sshbuf *blob, int type,
const char *passphrase, struct sshkey **keyp, char **commentp)
{
int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
if (keyp != NULL)
*keyp = NULL;
if (commentp != NULL)
*commentp = NULL;
switch (type) {
case KEY_ED25519:
case KEY_XMSS:
/* No fallback for new-format-only keys */
return sshkey_parse_private2(blob, type, passphrase,
keyp, commentp);
default:
r = sshkey_parse_private2(blob, type, passphrase, keyp,
commentp);
/* Only fallback to PEM parser if a format error occurred. */
if (r != SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT)
return r;
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
return sshkey_parse_private_pem_fileblob(blob, type,
passphrase, keyp);
#else
return SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
}
}
int
sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(struct sshbuf *buffer, const char *passphrase,
struct sshkey **keyp, char **commentp)
{
if (keyp != NULL)
*keyp = NULL;
if (commentp != NULL)
*commentp = NULL;
return sshkey_parse_private_fileblob_type(buffer, KEY_UNSPEC,
passphrase, keyp, commentp);
}
void
sshkey_sig_details_free(struct sshkey_sig_details *details)
{
freezero(details, sizeof(*details));
}
int
sshkey_parse_pubkey_from_private_fileblob_type(struct sshbuf *blob, int type,
struct sshkey **pubkeyp)
{
int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
if (pubkeyp != NULL)
*pubkeyp = NULL;
/* only new-format private keys bundle a public key inside */
if ((r = sshkey_parse_private2_pubkey(blob, type, pubkeyp)) != 0)
return r;
return 0;
}
#ifdef WITH_XMSS
/*
* serialize the key with the current state and forward the state
* maxsign times.
*/
int
sshkey_private_serialize_maxsign(struct sshkey *k, struct sshbuf *b,
u_int32_t maxsign, sshkey_printfn *pr)
{
int r, rupdate;
if (maxsign == 0 ||
sshkey_type_plain(k->type) != KEY_XMSS)
return sshkey_private_serialize_opt(k, b,
SSHKEY_SERIALIZE_DEFAULT);
if ((r = sshkey_xmss_get_state(k, pr)) != 0 ||
(r = sshkey_private_serialize_opt(k, b,
SSHKEY_SERIALIZE_STATE)) != 0 ||
(r = sshkey_xmss_forward_state(k, maxsign)) != 0)
goto out;
r = 0;
out:
if ((rupdate = sshkey_xmss_update_state(k, pr)) != 0) {
if (r == 0)
r = rupdate;
}
return r;
}
u_int32_t
sshkey_signatures_left(const struct sshkey *k)
{
if (sshkey_type_plain(k->type) == KEY_XMSS)
return sshkey_xmss_signatures_left(k);
return 0;
}
int
sshkey_enable_maxsign(struct sshkey *k, u_int32_t maxsign)
{
if (sshkey_type_plain(k->type) != KEY_XMSS)
return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
return sshkey_xmss_enable_maxsign(k, maxsign);
}
int
sshkey_set_filename(struct sshkey *k, const char *filename)
{
if (k == NULL)
return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
if (sshkey_type_plain(k->type) != KEY_XMSS)
return 0;
if (filename == NULL)
return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
if ((k->xmss_filename = strdup(filename)) == NULL)
return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
return 0;
}
#else
int
sshkey_private_serialize_maxsign(struct sshkey *k, struct sshbuf *b,
u_int32_t maxsign, sshkey_printfn *pr)
{
return sshkey_private_serialize_opt(k, b, SSHKEY_SERIALIZE_DEFAULT);
}
u_int32_t
sshkey_signatures_left(const struct sshkey *k)
{
return 0;
}
int
sshkey_enable_maxsign(struct sshkey *k, u_int32_t maxsign)
{
return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
}
int
sshkey_set_filename(struct sshkey *k, const char *filename)
{
if (k == NULL)
return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
return 0;
}
#endif /* WITH_XMSS */
diff --git a/sshkey.h b/sshkey.h
index 9c1d4f6372f6..2d8b6249708c 100644
--- a/sshkey.h
+++ b/sshkey.h
@@ -1,332 +1,333 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: sshkey.h,v 1.45 2020/04/08 00:08:46 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: sshkey.h,v 1.46 2020/08/27 01:06:19 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 2000, 2001 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
* OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
* IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
* INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
* NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
* DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
* THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
* (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
* THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
*/
#ifndef SSHKEY_H
#define SSHKEY_H
#include <sys/types.h>
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
#include <openssl/rsa.h>
#include <openssl/dsa.h>
# ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
# include <openssl/ec.h>
# include <openssl/ecdsa.h>
# else /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */
# define EC_KEY void
# define EC_GROUP void
# define EC_POINT void
# endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */
#else /* WITH_OPENSSL */
# define BIGNUM void
# define RSA void
# define DSA void
# define EC_KEY void
# define EC_GROUP void
# define EC_POINT void
#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
#define SSH_RSA_MINIMUM_MODULUS_SIZE 1024
#define SSH_KEY_MAX_SIGN_DATA_SIZE (1 << 20)
struct sshbuf;
/* Key types */
enum sshkey_types {
KEY_RSA,
KEY_DSA,
KEY_ECDSA,
KEY_ED25519,
KEY_RSA_CERT,
KEY_DSA_CERT,
KEY_ECDSA_CERT,
KEY_ED25519_CERT,
KEY_XMSS,
KEY_XMSS_CERT,
KEY_ECDSA_SK,
KEY_ECDSA_SK_CERT,
KEY_ED25519_SK,
KEY_ED25519_SK_CERT,
KEY_UNSPEC
};
/* Default fingerprint hash */
#define SSH_FP_HASH_DEFAULT SSH_DIGEST_SHA256
/* Fingerprint representation formats */
enum sshkey_fp_rep {
SSH_FP_DEFAULT = 0,
SSH_FP_HEX,
SSH_FP_BASE64,
SSH_FP_BUBBLEBABBLE,
SSH_FP_RANDOMART
};
/* Private key serialisation formats, used on the wire */
enum sshkey_serialize_rep {
SSHKEY_SERIALIZE_DEFAULT = 0,
SSHKEY_SERIALIZE_STATE = 1, /* only state is serialized */
SSHKEY_SERIALIZE_FULL = 2, /* include keys for saving to disk */
SSHKEY_SERIALIZE_SHIELD = 3, /* everything, for encrypting in ram */
SSHKEY_SERIALIZE_INFO = 254, /* minimal information */
};
/* Private key disk formats */
enum sshkey_private_format {
SSHKEY_PRIVATE_OPENSSH = 0,
SSHKEY_PRIVATE_PEM = 1,
SSHKEY_PRIVATE_PKCS8 = 2,
};
/* key is stored in external hardware */
#define SSHKEY_FLAG_EXT 0x0001
#define SSHKEY_CERT_MAX_PRINCIPALS 256
/* XXX opaquify? */
struct sshkey_cert {
struct sshbuf *certblob; /* Kept around for use on wire */
u_int type; /* SSH2_CERT_TYPE_USER or SSH2_CERT_TYPE_HOST */
u_int64_t serial;
char *key_id;
u_int nprincipals;
char **principals;
u_int64_t valid_after, valid_before;
struct sshbuf *critical;
struct sshbuf *extensions;
struct sshkey *signature_key;
char *signature_type;
};
/* XXX opaquify? */
struct sshkey {
int type;
int flags;
/* KEY_RSA */
RSA *rsa;
/* KEY_DSA */
DSA *dsa;
/* KEY_ECDSA and KEY_ECDSA_SK */
int ecdsa_nid; /* NID of curve */
EC_KEY *ecdsa;
/* KEY_ED25519 and KEY_ED25519_SK */
u_char *ed25519_sk;
u_char *ed25519_pk;
/* KEY_XMSS */
char *xmss_name;
char *xmss_filename; /* for state file updates */
void *xmss_state; /* depends on xmss_name, opaque */
u_char *xmss_sk;
u_char *xmss_pk;
/* KEY_ECDSA_SK and KEY_ED25519_SK */
char *sk_application;
uint8_t sk_flags;
struct sshbuf *sk_key_handle;
struct sshbuf *sk_reserved;
/* Certificates */
struct sshkey_cert *cert;
/* Private key shielding */
u_char *shielded_private;
size_t shielded_len;
u_char *shield_prekey;
size_t shield_prekey_len;
};
#define ED25519_SK_SZ crypto_sign_ed25519_SECRETKEYBYTES
#define ED25519_PK_SZ crypto_sign_ed25519_PUBLICKEYBYTES
/* Additional fields contained in signature */
struct sshkey_sig_details {
uint32_t sk_counter; /* U2F signature counter */
uint8_t sk_flags; /* U2F signature flags; see ssh-sk.h */
};
struct sshkey *sshkey_new(int);
void sshkey_free(struct sshkey *);
int sshkey_equal_public(const struct sshkey *,
const struct sshkey *);
int sshkey_equal(const struct sshkey *, const struct sshkey *);
char *sshkey_fingerprint(const struct sshkey *,
int, enum sshkey_fp_rep);
int sshkey_fingerprint_raw(const struct sshkey *k,
int, u_char **retp, size_t *lenp);
const char *sshkey_type(const struct sshkey *);
const char *sshkey_cert_type(const struct sshkey *);
int sshkey_format_text(const struct sshkey *, struct sshbuf *);
int sshkey_write(const struct sshkey *, FILE *);
int sshkey_read(struct sshkey *, char **);
u_int sshkey_size(const struct sshkey *);
int sshkey_generate(int type, u_int bits, struct sshkey **keyp);
int sshkey_from_private(const struct sshkey *, struct sshkey **);
int sshkey_is_shielded(struct sshkey *);
int sshkey_shield_private(struct sshkey *);
int sshkey_unshield_private(struct sshkey *);
int sshkey_type_from_name(const char *);
int sshkey_is_cert(const struct sshkey *);
int sshkey_is_sk(const struct sshkey *);
int sshkey_type_is_cert(int);
int sshkey_type_plain(int);
int sshkey_to_certified(struct sshkey *);
int sshkey_drop_cert(struct sshkey *);
int sshkey_cert_copy(const struct sshkey *, struct sshkey *);
int sshkey_cert_check_authority(const struct sshkey *, int, int,
const char *, const char **);
size_t sshkey_format_cert_validity(const struct sshkey_cert *,
char *, size_t) __attribute__((__bounded__(__string__, 2, 3)));
int sshkey_check_cert_sigtype(const struct sshkey *, const char *);
int sshkey_certify(struct sshkey *, struct sshkey *,
- const char *, const char *);
+ const char *, const char *, const char *);
/* Variant allowing use of a custom signature function (e.g. for ssh-agent) */
typedef int sshkey_certify_signer(struct sshkey *, u_char **, size_t *,
- const u_char *, size_t, const char *, const char *, u_int, void *);
+ const u_char *, size_t, const char *, const char *, const char *,
+ u_int, void *);
int sshkey_certify_custom(struct sshkey *, struct sshkey *, const char *,
- const char *, sshkey_certify_signer *, void *);
+ const char *, const char *, sshkey_certify_signer *, void *);
int sshkey_ecdsa_nid_from_name(const char *);
int sshkey_curve_name_to_nid(const char *);
const char * sshkey_curve_nid_to_name(int);
u_int sshkey_curve_nid_to_bits(int);
int sshkey_ecdsa_bits_to_nid(int);
int sshkey_ecdsa_key_to_nid(EC_KEY *);
int sshkey_ec_nid_to_hash_alg(int nid);
int sshkey_ec_validate_public(const EC_GROUP *, const EC_POINT *);
int sshkey_ec_validate_private(const EC_KEY *);
const char *sshkey_ssh_name(const struct sshkey *);
const char *sshkey_ssh_name_plain(const struct sshkey *);
int sshkey_names_valid2(const char *, int);
char *sshkey_alg_list(int, int, int, char);
int sshkey_from_blob(const u_char *, size_t, struct sshkey **);
int sshkey_fromb(struct sshbuf *, struct sshkey **);
int sshkey_froms(struct sshbuf *, struct sshkey **);
int sshkey_to_blob(const struct sshkey *, u_char **, size_t *);
int sshkey_to_base64(const struct sshkey *, char **);
int sshkey_putb(const struct sshkey *, struct sshbuf *);
int sshkey_puts(const struct sshkey *, struct sshbuf *);
int sshkey_puts_opts(const struct sshkey *, struct sshbuf *,
enum sshkey_serialize_rep);
int sshkey_plain_to_blob(const struct sshkey *, u_char **, size_t *);
int sshkey_putb_plain(const struct sshkey *, struct sshbuf *);
int sshkey_sign(struct sshkey *, u_char **, size_t *,
- const u_char *, size_t, const char *, const char *, u_int);
+ const u_char *, size_t, const char *, const char *, const char *, u_int);
int sshkey_verify(const struct sshkey *, const u_char *, size_t,
const u_char *, size_t, const char *, u_int, struct sshkey_sig_details **);
int sshkey_check_sigtype(const u_char *, size_t, const char *);
const char *sshkey_sigalg_by_name(const char *);
int sshkey_get_sigtype(const u_char *, size_t, char **);
/* for debug */
void sshkey_dump_ec_point(const EC_GROUP *, const EC_POINT *);
void sshkey_dump_ec_key(const EC_KEY *);
/* private key parsing and serialisation */
int sshkey_private_serialize(struct sshkey *key, struct sshbuf *buf);
int sshkey_private_serialize_opt(struct sshkey *key, struct sshbuf *buf,
enum sshkey_serialize_rep);
int sshkey_private_deserialize(struct sshbuf *buf, struct sshkey **keyp);
/* private key file format parsing and serialisation */
int sshkey_private_to_fileblob(struct sshkey *key, struct sshbuf *blob,
const char *passphrase, const char *comment,
int format, const char *openssh_format_cipher, int openssh_format_rounds);
int sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(struct sshbuf *buffer,
const char *passphrase, struct sshkey **keyp, char **commentp);
int sshkey_parse_private_fileblob_type(struct sshbuf *blob, int type,
const char *passphrase, struct sshkey **keyp, char **commentp);
int sshkey_parse_pubkey_from_private_fileblob_type(struct sshbuf *blob,
int type, struct sshkey **pubkeyp);
/* XXX should be internal, but used by ssh-keygen */
int ssh_rsa_complete_crt_parameters(struct sshkey *, const BIGNUM *);
/* stateful keys (e.g. XMSS) */
#ifdef NO_ATTRIBUTE_ON_PROTOTYPE_ARGS
typedef void sshkey_printfn(const char *, ...);
#else
typedef void sshkey_printfn(const char *, ...) __attribute__((format(printf, 1, 2)));
#endif
int sshkey_set_filename(struct sshkey *, const char *);
int sshkey_enable_maxsign(struct sshkey *, u_int32_t);
u_int32_t sshkey_signatures_left(const struct sshkey *);
int sshkey_forward_state(const struct sshkey *, u_int32_t, sshkey_printfn *);
int sshkey_private_serialize_maxsign(struct sshkey *key, struct sshbuf *buf,
u_int32_t maxsign, sshkey_printfn *pr);
void sshkey_sig_details_free(struct sshkey_sig_details *);
#ifdef SSHKEY_INTERNAL
int ssh_rsa_sign(const struct sshkey *key,
u_char **sigp, size_t *lenp, const u_char *data, size_t datalen,
const char *ident);
int ssh_rsa_verify(const struct sshkey *key,
const u_char *sig, size_t siglen, const u_char *data, size_t datalen,
const char *alg);
int ssh_dss_sign(const struct sshkey *key, u_char **sigp, size_t *lenp,
const u_char *data, size_t datalen, u_int compat);
int ssh_dss_verify(const struct sshkey *key,
const u_char *signature, size_t signaturelen,
const u_char *data, size_t datalen, u_int compat);
int ssh_ecdsa_sign(const struct sshkey *key, u_char **sigp, size_t *lenp,
const u_char *data, size_t datalen, u_int compat);
int ssh_ecdsa_verify(const struct sshkey *key,
const u_char *signature, size_t signaturelen,
const u_char *data, size_t datalen, u_int compat);
int ssh_ecdsa_sk_verify(const struct sshkey *key,
const u_char *signature, size_t signaturelen,
const u_char *data, size_t datalen, u_int compat,
struct sshkey_sig_details **detailsp);
int ssh_ed25519_sign(const struct sshkey *key, u_char **sigp, size_t *lenp,
const u_char *data, size_t datalen, u_int compat);
int ssh_ed25519_verify(const struct sshkey *key,
const u_char *signature, size_t signaturelen,
const u_char *data, size_t datalen, u_int compat);
int ssh_ed25519_sk_verify(const struct sshkey *key,
const u_char *signature, size_t signaturelen,
const u_char *data, size_t datalen, u_int compat,
struct sshkey_sig_details **detailsp);
int ssh_xmss_sign(const struct sshkey *key, u_char **sigp, size_t *lenp,
const u_char *data, size_t datalen, u_int compat);
int ssh_xmss_verify(const struct sshkey *key,
const u_char *signature, size_t signaturelen,
const u_char *data, size_t datalen, u_int compat);
#endif
#if !defined(WITH_OPENSSL)
# undef RSA
# undef DSA
# undef EC_KEY
# undef EC_GROUP
# undef EC_POINT
#elif !defined(OPENSSL_HAS_ECC)
# undef EC_KEY
# undef EC_GROUP
# undef EC_POINT
#endif
#endif /* SSHKEY_H */
diff --git a/sshsig.c b/sshsig.c
index 15f9cead697f..0bd7e5cb79d6 100644
--- a/sshsig.c
+++ b/sshsig.c
@@ -1,1041 +1,1044 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: sshsig.c,v 1.17 2020/08/31 00:17:41 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 2019 Google LLC
*
* Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
* purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
* copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
*
* THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
* WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
* MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
* ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
* WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
* ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
* OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
*/
#include "includes.h"
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <stdarg.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include "authfd.h"
#include "authfile.h"
#include "log.h"
#include "misc.h"
#include "sshbuf.h"
#include "sshsig.h"
#include "ssherr.h"
#include "sshkey.h"
#include "match.h"
#include "digest.h"
#define SIG_VERSION 0x01
#define MAGIC_PREAMBLE "SSHSIG"
#define MAGIC_PREAMBLE_LEN (sizeof(MAGIC_PREAMBLE) - 1)
#define BEGIN_SIGNATURE "-----BEGIN SSH SIGNATURE-----\n"
#define END_SIGNATURE "-----END SSH SIGNATURE-----"
#define RSA_SIGN_ALG "rsa-sha2-512" /* XXX maybe make configurable */
#define RSA_SIGN_ALLOWED "rsa-sha2-512,rsa-sha2-256"
#define HASHALG_DEFAULT "sha512" /* XXX maybe make configurable */
#define HASHALG_ALLOWED "sha256,sha512"
int
sshsig_armor(const struct sshbuf *blob, struct sshbuf **out)
{
struct sshbuf *buf = NULL;
int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
*out = NULL;
if ((buf = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) {
error("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
goto out;
}
if ((r = sshbuf_put(buf, BEGIN_SIGNATURE,
sizeof(BEGIN_SIGNATURE)-1)) != 0) {
error("%s: sshbuf_putf failed: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
goto out;
}
if ((r = sshbuf_dtob64(blob, buf, 1)) != 0) {
error("%s: Couldn't base64 encode signature blob: %s",
__func__, ssh_err(r));
goto out;
}
if ((r = sshbuf_put(buf, END_SIGNATURE,
sizeof(END_SIGNATURE)-1)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u8(buf, '\n')) != 0) {
error("%s: sshbuf_put failed: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
goto out;
}
/* success */
*out = buf;
buf = NULL; /* transferred */
r = 0;
out:
sshbuf_free(buf);
return r;
}
int
sshsig_dearmor(struct sshbuf *sig, struct sshbuf **out)
{
int r;
size_t eoffset = 0;
struct sshbuf *buf = NULL;
struct sshbuf *sbuf = NULL;
char *b64 = NULL;
if ((sbuf = sshbuf_fromb(sig)) == NULL) {
error("%s: sshbuf_fromb failed", __func__);
return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
}
if ((r = sshbuf_cmp(sbuf, 0,
BEGIN_SIGNATURE, sizeof(BEGIN_SIGNATURE)-1)) != 0) {
error("Couldn't parse signature: missing header");
goto done;
}
if ((r = sshbuf_consume(sbuf, sizeof(BEGIN_SIGNATURE)-1)) != 0) {
error("%s: sshbuf_consume failed: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
goto done;
}
if ((r = sshbuf_find(sbuf, 0, "\n" END_SIGNATURE,
sizeof("\n" END_SIGNATURE)-1, &eoffset)) != 0) {
error("Couldn't parse signature: missing footer");
goto done;
}
if ((r = sshbuf_consume_end(sbuf, sshbuf_len(sbuf)-eoffset)) != 0) {
error("%s: sshbuf_consume failed: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
goto done;
}
if ((b64 = sshbuf_dup_string(sbuf)) == NULL) {
error("%s: sshbuf_dup_string failed", __func__);
r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
goto done;
}
if ((buf = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) {
error("%s: sshbuf_new() failed", __func__);
r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
goto done;
}
if ((r = sshbuf_b64tod(buf, b64)) != 0) {
error("Couldn't decode signature: %s", ssh_err(r));
goto done;
}
/* success */
*out = buf;
r = 0;
buf = NULL; /* transferred */
done:
sshbuf_free(buf);
sshbuf_free(sbuf);
free(b64);
return r;
}
static int
sshsig_wrap_sign(struct sshkey *key, const char *hashalg,
- const char *sk_provider, const struct sshbuf *h_message,
+ const char *sk_provider, const char *sk_pin, const struct sshbuf *h_message,
const char *sig_namespace, struct sshbuf **out,
sshsig_signer *signer, void *signer_ctx)
{
int r;
size_t slen = 0;
u_char *sig = NULL;
struct sshbuf *blob = NULL;
struct sshbuf *tosign = NULL;
const char *sign_alg = NULL;
if ((tosign = sshbuf_new()) == NULL ||
(blob = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) {
error("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
goto done;
}
if ((r = sshbuf_put(tosign, MAGIC_PREAMBLE, MAGIC_PREAMBLE_LEN)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_cstring(tosign, sig_namespace)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_string(tosign, NULL, 0)) != 0 || /* reserved */
(r = sshbuf_put_cstring(tosign, hashalg)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_stringb(tosign, h_message)) != 0) {
error("Couldn't construct message to sign: %s", ssh_err(r));
goto done;
}
/* If using RSA keys then default to a good signature algorithm */
if (sshkey_type_plain(key->type) == KEY_RSA)
sign_alg = RSA_SIGN_ALG;
if (signer != NULL) {
if ((r = signer(key, &sig, &slen,
sshbuf_ptr(tosign), sshbuf_len(tosign),
- sign_alg, sk_provider, 0, signer_ctx)) != 0) {
+ sign_alg, sk_provider, sk_pin, 0, signer_ctx)) != 0) {
error("Couldn't sign message: %s", ssh_err(r));
goto done;
}
} else {
if ((r = sshkey_sign(key, &sig, &slen,
sshbuf_ptr(tosign), sshbuf_len(tosign),
- sign_alg, sk_provider, 0)) != 0) {
+ sign_alg, sk_provider, sk_pin, 0)) != 0) {
error("Couldn't sign message: %s", ssh_err(r));
goto done;
}
}
if ((r = sshbuf_put(blob, MAGIC_PREAMBLE, MAGIC_PREAMBLE_LEN)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u32(blob, SIG_VERSION)) != 0 ||
(r = sshkey_puts(key, blob)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_cstring(blob, sig_namespace)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_string(blob, NULL, 0)) != 0 || /* reserved */
(r = sshbuf_put_cstring(blob, hashalg)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_string(blob, sig, slen)) != 0) {
error("Couldn't populate blob: %s", ssh_err(r));
goto done;
}
if (out != NULL) {
*out = blob;
blob = NULL;
}
r = 0;
done:
free(sig);
sshbuf_free(blob);
sshbuf_free(tosign);
return r;
}
/* Check preamble and version. */
static int
sshsig_parse_preamble(struct sshbuf *buf)
{
int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
uint32_t sversion;
if ((r = sshbuf_cmp(buf, 0, MAGIC_PREAMBLE, MAGIC_PREAMBLE_LEN)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_consume(buf, (sizeof(MAGIC_PREAMBLE)-1))) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_u32(buf, &sversion)) != 0) {
error("Couldn't verify signature: invalid format");
return r;
}
if (sversion > SIG_VERSION) {
error("Signature version %lu is larger than supported "
"version %u", (unsigned long)sversion, SIG_VERSION);
return SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
}
return 0;
}
static int
sshsig_check_hashalg(const char *hashalg)
{
if (hashalg == NULL ||
match_pattern_list(hashalg, HASHALG_ALLOWED, 0) == 1)
return 0;
error("%s: unsupported hash algorithm \"%.100s\"", __func__, hashalg);
return SSH_ERR_SIGN_ALG_UNSUPPORTED;
}
static int
sshsig_peek_hashalg(struct sshbuf *signature, char **hashalgp)
{
struct sshbuf *buf = NULL;
char *hashalg = NULL;
int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
if (hashalgp != NULL)
*hashalgp = NULL;
if ((buf = sshbuf_fromb(signature)) == NULL)
return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
if ((r = sshsig_parse_preamble(buf)) != 0)
goto done;
if ((r = sshbuf_get_string_direct(buf, NULL, NULL)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_string_direct(buf, NULL, NULL)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_string(buf, NULL, NULL)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_cstring(buf, &hashalg, NULL)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_string_direct(buf, NULL, NULL)) != 0) {
error("Couldn't parse signature blob: %s", ssh_err(r));
goto done;
}
/* success */
r = 0;
*hashalgp = hashalg;
hashalg = NULL;
done:
free(hashalg);
sshbuf_free(buf);
return r;
}
static int
sshsig_wrap_verify(struct sshbuf *signature, const char *hashalg,
const struct sshbuf *h_message, const char *expect_namespace,
struct sshkey **sign_keyp, struct sshkey_sig_details **sig_details)
{
int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
struct sshbuf *buf = NULL, *toverify = NULL;
struct sshkey *key = NULL;
const u_char *sig;
char *got_namespace = NULL, *sigtype = NULL, *sig_hashalg = NULL;
size_t siglen;
debug("%s: verify message length %zu", __func__, sshbuf_len(h_message));
if (sig_details != NULL)
*sig_details = NULL;
if (sign_keyp != NULL)
*sign_keyp = NULL;
if ((toverify = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) {
error("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
goto done;
}
if ((r = sshbuf_put(toverify, MAGIC_PREAMBLE,
MAGIC_PREAMBLE_LEN)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_cstring(toverify, expect_namespace)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_string(toverify, NULL, 0)) != 0 || /* reserved */
(r = sshbuf_put_cstring(toverify, hashalg)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_stringb(toverify, h_message)) != 0) {
error("Couldn't construct message to verify: %s", ssh_err(r));
goto done;
}
if ((r = sshsig_parse_preamble(signature)) != 0)
goto done;
if ((r = sshkey_froms(signature, &key)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_cstring(signature, &got_namespace, NULL)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_string(signature, NULL, NULL)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_cstring(signature, &sig_hashalg, NULL)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_string_direct(signature, &sig, &siglen)) != 0) {
error("Couldn't parse signature blob: %s", ssh_err(r));
goto done;
}
if (sshbuf_len(signature) != 0) {
error("Signature contains trailing data");
r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
goto done;
}
if (strcmp(expect_namespace, got_namespace) != 0) {
error("Couldn't verify signature: namespace does not match");
debug("%s: expected namespace \"%s\" received \"%s\"",
__func__, expect_namespace, got_namespace);
r = SSH_ERR_SIGNATURE_INVALID;
goto done;
}
if (strcmp(hashalg, sig_hashalg) != 0) {
error("Couldn't verify signature: hash algorithm mismatch");
debug("%s: expected algorithm \"%s\" received \"%s\"",
__func__, hashalg, sig_hashalg);
r = SSH_ERR_SIGNATURE_INVALID;
goto done;
}
/* Ensure that RSA keys use an acceptable signature algorithm */
if (sshkey_type_plain(key->type) == KEY_RSA) {
if ((r = sshkey_get_sigtype(sig, siglen, &sigtype)) != 0) {
error("Couldn't verify signature: unable to get "
"signature type: %s", ssh_err(r));
goto done;
}
if (match_pattern_list(sigtype, RSA_SIGN_ALLOWED, 0) != 1) {
error("Couldn't verify signature: unsupported RSA "
"signature algorithm %s", sigtype);
r = SSH_ERR_SIGN_ALG_UNSUPPORTED;
goto done;
}
}
if ((r = sshkey_verify(key, sig, siglen, sshbuf_ptr(toverify),
sshbuf_len(toverify), NULL, 0, sig_details)) != 0) {
error("Signature verification failed: %s", ssh_err(r));
goto done;
}
/* success */
r = 0;
if (sign_keyp != NULL) {
*sign_keyp = key;
key = NULL; /* transferred */
}
done:
free(got_namespace);
free(sigtype);
free(sig_hashalg);
sshbuf_free(buf);
sshbuf_free(toverify);
sshkey_free(key);
return r;
}
static int
hash_buffer(const struct sshbuf *m, const char *hashalg, struct sshbuf **bp)
{
char *hex, hash[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH];
int alg, r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
struct sshbuf *b = NULL;
*bp = NULL;
memset(hash, 0, sizeof(hash));
if ((r = sshsig_check_hashalg(hashalg)) != 0)
return r;
if ((alg = ssh_digest_alg_by_name(hashalg)) == -1) {
error("%s: can't look up hash algorithm %s",
__func__, hashalg);
return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
}
if ((r = ssh_digest_buffer(alg, m, hash, sizeof(hash))) != 0) {
error("%s: ssh_digest_buffer failed: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
return r;
}
if ((hex = tohex(hash, ssh_digest_bytes(alg))) != NULL) {
debug3("%s: final hash: %s", __func__, hex);
freezero(hex, strlen(hex));
}
if ((b = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) {
r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
goto out;
}
if ((r = sshbuf_put(b, hash, ssh_digest_bytes(alg))) != 0) {
error("%s: sshbuf_put: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
goto out;
}
*bp = b;
b = NULL; /* transferred */
/* success */
r = 0;
out:
sshbuf_free(b);
explicit_bzero(hash, sizeof(hash));
return r;
}
int
-sshsig_signb(struct sshkey *key, const char *hashalg, const char *sk_provider,
+sshsig_signb(struct sshkey *key, const char *hashalg,
+ const char *sk_provider, const char *sk_pin,
const struct sshbuf *message, const char *sig_namespace,
struct sshbuf **out, sshsig_signer *signer, void *signer_ctx)
{
struct sshbuf *b = NULL;
int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
if (hashalg == NULL)
hashalg = HASHALG_DEFAULT;
if (out != NULL)
*out = NULL;
if ((r = hash_buffer(message, hashalg, &b)) != 0) {
error("%s: hash_buffer failed: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
goto out;
}
- if ((r = sshsig_wrap_sign(key, hashalg, sk_provider, b,
+ if ((r = sshsig_wrap_sign(key, hashalg, sk_provider, sk_pin, b,
sig_namespace, out, signer, signer_ctx)) != 0)
goto out;
/* success */
r = 0;
out:
sshbuf_free(b);
return r;
}
int
sshsig_verifyb(struct sshbuf *signature, const struct sshbuf *message,
const char *expect_namespace, struct sshkey **sign_keyp,
struct sshkey_sig_details **sig_details)
{
struct sshbuf *b = NULL;
int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
char *hashalg = NULL;
if (sig_details != NULL)
*sig_details = NULL;
if (sign_keyp != NULL)
*sign_keyp = NULL;
if ((r = sshsig_peek_hashalg(signature, &hashalg)) != 0)
return r;
debug("%s: signature made with hash \"%s\"", __func__, hashalg);
if ((r = hash_buffer(message, hashalg, &b)) != 0) {
error("%s: hash_buffer failed: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
goto out;
}
if ((r = sshsig_wrap_verify(signature, hashalg, b, expect_namespace,
sign_keyp, sig_details)) != 0)
goto out;
/* success */
r = 0;
out:
sshbuf_free(b);
free(hashalg);
return r;
}
static int
hash_file(int fd, const char *hashalg, struct sshbuf **bp)
{
char *hex, rbuf[8192], hash[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH];
ssize_t n, total = 0;
struct ssh_digest_ctx *ctx;
int alg, oerrno, r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
struct sshbuf *b = NULL;
*bp = NULL;
memset(hash, 0, sizeof(hash));
if ((r = sshsig_check_hashalg(hashalg)) != 0)
return r;
if ((alg = ssh_digest_alg_by_name(hashalg)) == -1) {
error("%s: can't look up hash algorithm %s",
__func__, hashalg);
return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
}
if ((ctx = ssh_digest_start(alg)) == NULL) {
error("%s: ssh_digest_start failed", __func__);
return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
}
for (;;) {
if ((n = read(fd, rbuf, sizeof(rbuf))) == -1) {
if (errno == EINTR || errno == EAGAIN)
continue;
oerrno = errno;
error("%s: read: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
ssh_digest_free(ctx);
errno = oerrno;
r = SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR;
goto out;
} else if (n == 0) {
debug2("%s: hashed %zu bytes", __func__, total);
break; /* EOF */
}
total += (size_t)n;
if ((r = ssh_digest_update(ctx, rbuf, (size_t)n)) != 0) {
error("%s: ssh_digest_update: %s",
__func__, ssh_err(r));
goto out;
}
}
if ((r = ssh_digest_final(ctx, hash, sizeof(hash))) != 0) {
error("%s: ssh_digest_final: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
goto out;
}
if ((hex = tohex(hash, ssh_digest_bytes(alg))) != NULL) {
debug3("%s: final hash: %s", __func__, hex);
freezero(hex, strlen(hex));
}
if ((b = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) {
r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
goto out;
}
if ((r = sshbuf_put(b, hash, ssh_digest_bytes(alg))) != 0) {
error("%s: sshbuf_put: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
goto out;
}
*bp = b;
b = NULL; /* transferred */
/* success */
r = 0;
out:
sshbuf_free(b);
ssh_digest_free(ctx);
explicit_bzero(hash, sizeof(hash));
return r;
}
int
-sshsig_sign_fd(struct sshkey *key, const char *hashalg, const char *sk_provider,
+sshsig_sign_fd(struct sshkey *key, const char *hashalg,
+ const char *sk_provider, const char *sk_pin,
int fd, const char *sig_namespace, struct sshbuf **out,
sshsig_signer *signer, void *signer_ctx)
{
struct sshbuf *b = NULL;
int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
if (hashalg == NULL)
hashalg = HASHALG_DEFAULT;
if (out != NULL)
*out = NULL;
if ((r = hash_file(fd, hashalg, &b)) != 0) {
error("%s: hash_file failed: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
return r;
}
- if ((r = sshsig_wrap_sign(key, hashalg, sk_provider, b,
+ if ((r = sshsig_wrap_sign(key, hashalg, sk_provider, sk_pin, b,
sig_namespace, out, signer, signer_ctx)) != 0)
goto out;
/* success */
r = 0;
out:
sshbuf_free(b);
return r;
}
int
sshsig_verify_fd(struct sshbuf *signature, int fd,
const char *expect_namespace, struct sshkey **sign_keyp,
struct sshkey_sig_details **sig_details)
{
struct sshbuf *b = NULL;
int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
char *hashalg = NULL;
if (sig_details != NULL)
*sig_details = NULL;
if (sign_keyp != NULL)
*sign_keyp = NULL;
if ((r = sshsig_peek_hashalg(signature, &hashalg)) != 0)
return r;
debug("%s: signature made with hash \"%s\"", __func__, hashalg);
if ((r = hash_file(fd, hashalg, &b)) != 0) {
error("%s: hash_file failed: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
goto out;
}
if ((r = sshsig_wrap_verify(signature, hashalg, b, expect_namespace,
sign_keyp, sig_details)) != 0)
goto out;
/* success */
r = 0;
out:
sshbuf_free(b);
free(hashalg);
return r;
}
struct sshsigopt {
int ca;
char *namespaces;
};
struct sshsigopt *
sshsigopt_parse(const char *opts, const char *path, u_long linenum,
const char **errstrp)
{
struct sshsigopt *ret;
int r;
const char *errstr = NULL;
if ((ret = calloc(1, sizeof(*ret))) == NULL)
return NULL;
if (opts == NULL || *opts == '\0')
return ret; /* Empty options yields empty options :) */
while (*opts && *opts != ' ' && *opts != '\t') {
/* flag options */
if ((r = opt_flag("cert-authority", 0, &opts)) != -1) {
ret->ca = 1;
} else if (opt_match(&opts, "namespaces")) {
if (ret->namespaces != NULL) {
errstr = "multiple \"namespaces\" clauses";
goto fail;
}
ret->namespaces = opt_dequote(&opts, &errstr);
if (ret->namespaces == NULL)
goto fail;
}
/*
* Skip the comma, and move to the next option
* (or break out if there are no more).
*/
if (*opts == '\0' || *opts == ' ' || *opts == '\t')
break; /* End of options. */
/* Anything other than a comma is an unknown option */
if (*opts != ',') {
errstr = "unknown key option";
goto fail;
}
opts++;
if (*opts == '\0') {
errstr = "unexpected end-of-options";
goto fail;
}
}
/* success */
return ret;
fail:
if (errstrp != NULL)
*errstrp = errstr;
sshsigopt_free(ret);
return NULL;
}
void
sshsigopt_free(struct sshsigopt *opts)
{
if (opts == NULL)
return;
free(opts->namespaces);
free(opts);
}
static int
parse_principals_key_and_options(const char *path, u_long linenum, char *line,
const char *required_principal, char **principalsp, struct sshkey **keyp,
struct sshsigopt **sigoptsp)
{
char *opts = NULL, *tmp, *cp, *principals = NULL;
const char *reason = NULL;
struct sshsigopt *sigopts = NULL;
struct sshkey *key = NULL;
int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
if (principalsp != NULL)
*principalsp = NULL;
if (sigoptsp != NULL)
*sigoptsp = NULL;
if (keyp != NULL)
*keyp = NULL;
cp = line;
cp = cp + strspn(cp, " \t"); /* skip leading whitespace */
if (*cp == '#' || *cp == '\0')
return SSH_ERR_KEY_NOT_FOUND; /* blank or all-comment line */
/* format: identity[,identity...] [option[,option...]] key */
if ((tmp = strdelimw(&cp)) == NULL) {
error("%s:%lu: invalid line", path, linenum);
r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
goto out;
}
if ((principals = strdup(tmp)) == NULL) {
error("%s: strdup failed", __func__);
r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
goto out;
}
/*
* Bail out early if we're looking for a particular principal and this
* line does not list it.
*/
if (required_principal != NULL) {
if (match_pattern_list(required_principal,
principals, 0) != 1) {
/* principal didn't match */
r = SSH_ERR_KEY_NOT_FOUND;
goto out;
}
debug("%s: %s:%lu: matched principal \"%s\"",
__func__, path, linenum, required_principal);
}
if ((key = sshkey_new(KEY_UNSPEC)) == NULL) {
error("%s: sshkey_new failed", __func__);
r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
goto out;
}
if (sshkey_read(key, &cp) != 0) {
/* no key? Check for options */
opts = cp;
if (sshkey_advance_past_options(&cp) != 0) {
error("%s:%lu: invalid options", path, linenum);
r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
goto out;
}
*cp++ = '\0';
skip_space(&cp);
if (sshkey_read(key, &cp) != 0) {
error("%s:%lu: invalid key", path, linenum);
r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
goto out;
}
}
debug3("%s:%lu: options %s", path, linenum, opts == NULL ? "" : opts);
if ((sigopts = sshsigopt_parse(opts, path, linenum, &reason)) == NULL) {
error("%s:%lu: bad options: %s", path, linenum, reason);
r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
goto out;
}
/* success */
if (principalsp != NULL) {
*principalsp = principals;
principals = NULL; /* transferred */
}
if (sigoptsp != NULL) {
*sigoptsp = sigopts;
sigopts = NULL; /* transferred */
}
if (keyp != NULL) {
*keyp = key;
key = NULL; /* transferred */
}
r = 0;
out:
free(principals);
sshsigopt_free(sigopts);
sshkey_free(key);
return r;
}
static int
check_allowed_keys_line(const char *path, u_long linenum, char *line,
const struct sshkey *sign_key, const char *principal,
const char *sig_namespace)
{
struct sshkey *found_key = NULL;
int r, found = 0;
const char *reason = NULL;
struct sshsigopt *sigopts = NULL;
/* Parse the line */
if ((r = parse_principals_key_and_options(path, linenum, line,
principal, NULL, &found_key, &sigopts)) != 0) {
/* error already logged */
goto done;
}
/* Check whether options preclude the use of this key */
if (sigopts->namespaces != NULL &&
match_pattern_list(sig_namespace, sigopts->namespaces, 0) != 1) {
error("%s:%lu: key is not permitted for use in signature "
"namespace \"%s\"", path, linenum, sig_namespace);
goto done;
}
if (!sigopts->ca && sshkey_equal(found_key, sign_key)) {
/* Exact match of key */
debug("%s:%lu: matched key and principal", path, linenum);
/* success */
found = 1;
} else if (sigopts->ca && sshkey_is_cert(sign_key) &&
sshkey_equal_public(sign_key->cert->signature_key, found_key)) {
/* Match of certificate's CA key */
if ((r = sshkey_cert_check_authority(sign_key, 0, 1,
principal, &reason)) != 0) {
error("%s:%lu: certificate not authorized: %s",
path, linenum, reason);
goto done;
}
debug("%s:%lu: matched certificate CA key", path, linenum);
/* success */
found = 1;
} else {
/* Principal matched but key didn't */
goto done;
}
done:
sshkey_free(found_key);
sshsigopt_free(sigopts);
return found ? 0 : SSH_ERR_KEY_NOT_FOUND;
}
int
sshsig_check_allowed_keys(const char *path, const struct sshkey *sign_key,
const char *principal, const char *sig_namespace)
{
FILE *f = NULL;
char *line = NULL;
size_t linesize = 0;
u_long linenum = 0;
int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR, oerrno;
/* Check key and principal against file */
if ((f = fopen(path, "r")) == NULL) {
oerrno = errno;
error("Unable to open allowed keys file \"%s\": %s",
path, strerror(errno));
errno = oerrno;
return SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR;
}
while (getline(&line, &linesize, f) != -1) {
linenum++;
r = check_allowed_keys_line(path, linenum, line, sign_key,
principal, sig_namespace);
free(line);
line = NULL;
if (r == SSH_ERR_KEY_NOT_FOUND)
continue;
else if (r == 0) {
/* success */
fclose(f);
return 0;
} else
break;
}
/* Either we hit an error parsing or we simply didn't find the key */
fclose(f);
free(line);
return r == 0 ? SSH_ERR_KEY_NOT_FOUND : r;
}
static int
cert_filter_principals(const char *path, u_long linenum,
char **principalsp, const struct sshkey *cert)
{
char *cp, *oprincipals, *principals;
const char *reason;
struct sshbuf *nprincipals;
int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR, success = 0;
oprincipals = principals = *principalsp;
*principalsp = NULL;
if ((nprincipals = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) {
r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
goto out;
}
while ((cp = strsep(&principals, ",")) != NULL && *cp != '\0') {
if (strcspn(cp, "!?*") != strlen(cp)) {
debug("%s:%lu: principal \"%s\" not authorized: "
"contains wildcards", path, linenum, cp);
continue;
}
/* Check against principals list in certificate */
if ((r = sshkey_cert_check_authority(cert, 0, 1,
cp, &reason)) != 0) {
debug("%s:%lu: principal \"%s\" not authorized: %s",
path, linenum, cp, reason);
continue;
}
if ((r = sshbuf_putf(nprincipals, "%s%s",
sshbuf_len(nprincipals) != 0 ? "," : "", cp)) != 0) {
error("%s: buffer error", __func__);
goto out;
}
}
if (sshbuf_len(nprincipals) == 0) {
error("%s:%lu: no valid principals found", path, linenum);
r = SSH_ERR_KEY_CERT_INVALID;
goto out;
}
if ((principals = sshbuf_dup_string(nprincipals)) == NULL) {
error("%s: buffer error", __func__);
goto out;
}
/* success */
success = 1;
*principalsp = principals;
out:
sshbuf_free(nprincipals);
free(oprincipals);
return success ? 0 : r;
}
static int
get_matching_principals_from_line(const char *path, u_long linenum, char *line,
const struct sshkey *sign_key, char **principalsp)
{
struct sshkey *found_key = NULL;
char *principals = NULL;
int r, found = 0;
struct sshsigopt *sigopts = NULL;
if (principalsp != NULL)
*principalsp = NULL;
/* Parse the line */
if ((r = parse_principals_key_and_options(path, linenum, line,
NULL, &principals, &found_key, &sigopts)) != 0) {
/* error already logged */
goto done;
}
if (!sigopts->ca && sshkey_equal(found_key, sign_key)) {
/* Exact match of key */
debug("%s:%lu: matched key", path, linenum);
/* success */
found = 1;
} else if (sigopts->ca && sshkey_is_cert(sign_key) &&
sshkey_equal_public(sign_key->cert->signature_key, found_key)) {
/* Remove principals listed in file but not allowed by cert */
if ((r = cert_filter_principals(path, linenum,
&principals, sign_key)) != 0) {
/* error already displayed */
debug("%s:%lu: cert_filter_principals: %s",
path, linenum, ssh_err(r));
goto done;
}
debug("%s:%lu: matched certificate CA key", path, linenum);
/* success */
found = 1;
} else {
/* Key didn't match */
goto done;
}
done:
if (found && principalsp != NULL) {
*principalsp = principals;
principals = NULL; /* transferred */
}
free(principals);
sshkey_free(found_key);
sshsigopt_free(sigopts);
return found ? 0 : SSH_ERR_KEY_NOT_FOUND;
}
int
sshsig_find_principals(const char *path, const struct sshkey *sign_key,
char **principals)
{
FILE *f = NULL;
char *line = NULL;
size_t linesize = 0;
u_long linenum = 0;
int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR, oerrno;
if ((f = fopen(path, "r")) == NULL) {
oerrno = errno;
error("Unable to open allowed keys file \"%s\": %s",
path, strerror(errno));
errno = oerrno;
return SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR;
}
while (getline(&line, &linesize, f) != -1) {
linenum++;
r = get_matching_principals_from_line(path, linenum, line,
sign_key, principals);
free(line);
line = NULL;
if (r == SSH_ERR_KEY_NOT_FOUND)
continue;
else if (r == 0) {
/* success */
fclose(f);
return 0;
} else
break;
}
free(line);
/* Either we hit an error parsing or we simply didn't find the key */
if (ferror(f) != 0) {
oerrno = errno;
fclose(f);
error("Unable to read allowed keys file \"%s\": %s",
path, strerror(errno));
errno = oerrno;
return SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR;
}
fclose(f);
return r == 0 ? SSH_ERR_KEY_NOT_FOUND : r;
}
int
sshsig_get_pubkey(struct sshbuf *signature, struct sshkey **pubkey)
{
struct sshkey *pk = NULL;
int r = SSH_ERR_SIGNATURE_INVALID;
if (pubkey == NULL)
return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
if ((r = sshsig_parse_preamble(signature)) != 0)
return r;
if ((r = sshkey_froms(signature, &pk)) != 0)
return r;
*pubkey = pk;
pk = NULL;
return 0;
}
diff --git a/sshsig.h b/sshsig.h
index 63cc1ad1a203..67794a971478 100644
--- a/sshsig.h
+++ b/sshsig.h
@@ -1,104 +1,107 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: sshsig.h,v 1.9 2020/08/31 00:17:41 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 2019 Google LLC
*
* Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
* purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
* copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
*
* THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
* WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
* MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
* ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
* WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
* ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
* OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
*/
#ifndef SSHSIG_H
#define SSHSIG_H
struct sshbuf;
struct sshkey;
struct sshsigopt;
struct sshkey_sig_details;
typedef int sshsig_signer(struct sshkey *, u_char **, size_t *,
- const u_char *, size_t, const char *, const char *, u_int, void *);
+ const u_char *, size_t, const char *, const char *, const char *,
+ u_int, void *);
/* Buffer-oriented API */
/*
* Creates a detached SSH signature for a given buffer.
* Returns 0 on success or a negative SSH_ERR_* error code on failure.
* out is populated with the detached signature, or NULL on failure.
*/
int sshsig_signb(struct sshkey *key, const char *hashalg,
- const char *sk_provider, const struct sshbuf *message,
+ const char *sk_provider, const char *sk_pin, const struct sshbuf *message,
const char *sig_namespace, struct sshbuf **out,
sshsig_signer *signer, void *signer_ctx);
/*
* Verifies that a detached signature is valid and optionally returns key
* used to sign via argument.
* Returns 0 on success or a negative SSH_ERR_* error code on failure.
*/
int sshsig_verifyb(struct sshbuf *signature,
const struct sshbuf *message, const char *sig_namespace,
struct sshkey **sign_keyp, struct sshkey_sig_details **sig_details);
/* File/FD-oriented API */
/*
* Creates a detached SSH signature for a given file.
* Returns 0 on success or a negative SSH_ERR_* error code on failure.
* out is populated with the detached signature, or NULL on failure.
*/
int sshsig_sign_fd(struct sshkey *key, const char *hashalg,
- const char *sk_provider, int fd, const char *sig_namespace,
+ const char *sk_provider, const char *sk_pin,
+ int fd, const char *sig_namespace,
struct sshbuf **out, sshsig_signer *signer, void *signer_ctx);
/*
* Verifies that a detached signature over a file is valid and optionally
* returns key used to sign via argument.
* Returns 0 on success or a negative SSH_ERR_* error code on failure.
*/
int sshsig_verify_fd(struct sshbuf *signature, int fd,
const char *sig_namespace, struct sshkey **sign_keyp,
struct sshkey_sig_details **sig_details);
/* Utility functions */
/*
* Return a base64 encoded "ASCII armoured" version of a raw signature.
*/
int sshsig_armor(const struct sshbuf *blob, struct sshbuf **out);
/*
* Decode a base64 encoded armoured signature to a raw signature.
*/
int sshsig_dearmor(struct sshbuf *sig, struct sshbuf **out);
/*
* Checks whether a particular key/principal/namespace is permitted by
* an allowed_keys file. Returns 0 on success.
*/
int sshsig_check_allowed_keys(const char *path, const struct sshkey *sign_key,
const char *principal, const char *ns);
/* Parse zero or more allowed_keys signature options */
struct sshsigopt *sshsigopt_parse(const char *opts,
const char *path, u_long linenum, const char **errstrp);
/* Free signature options */
void sshsigopt_free(struct sshsigopt *opts);
/* Get public key from signature */
int sshsig_get_pubkey(struct sshbuf *signature, struct sshkey **pubkey);
/* Find principal in allowed_keys file, given a sshkey. Returns
* 0 on success.
*/
int sshsig_find_principals(const char *path, const struct sshkey *sign_key,
char **principal);
#endif /* SSHSIG_H */
diff --git a/version.h b/version.h
index a2eca3ec8ce2..c2f9c55bb917 100644
--- a/version.h
+++ b/version.h
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: version.h,v 1.87 2020/05/06 20:58:01 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: version.h,v 1.88 2020/09/27 07:22:05 djm Exp $ */
-#define SSH_VERSION "OpenSSH_8.3"
+#define SSH_VERSION "OpenSSH_8.4"
#define SSH_PORTABLE "p1"
#define SSH_RELEASE SSH_VERSION SSH_PORTABLE

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