diff --git a/sys/kern/kern_prot.c b/sys/kern/kern_prot.c index 983e6ae21493..3d8f3e222b4c 100644 --- a/sys/kern/kern_prot.c +++ b/sys/kern/kern_prot.c @@ -1,2493 +1,2494 @@ /*- * SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause * * Copyright (c) 1982, 1986, 1989, 1990, 1991, 1993 * The Regents of the University of California. * (c) UNIX System Laboratories, Inc. * Copyright (c) 2000-2001 Robert N. M. Watson. * All rights reserved. * * All or some portions of this file are derived from material licensed * to the University of California by American Telephone and Telegraph * Co. or Unix System Laboratories, Inc. and are reproduced herein with * the permission of UNIX System Laboratories, Inc. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * 3. Neither the name of the University nor the names of its contributors * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software * without specific prior written permission. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE REGENTS AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE REGENTS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF * SUCH DAMAGE. * * @(#)kern_prot.c 8.6 (Berkeley) 1/21/94 */ /* * System calls related to processes and protection */ #include __FBSDID("$FreeBSD$"); #include "opt_inet.h" #include "opt_inet6.h" #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #ifdef COMPAT_43 #include #endif #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #ifdef REGRESSION FEATURE(regression, "Kernel support for interfaces necessary for regression testing (SECURITY RISK!)"); #endif #include #include static MALLOC_DEFINE(M_CRED, "cred", "credentials"); SYSCTL_NODE(_security, OID_AUTO, bsd, CTLFLAG_RW | CTLFLAG_MPSAFE, 0, "BSD security policy"); static void crfree_final(struct ucred *cr); static void crsetgroups_locked(struct ucred *cr, int ngrp, gid_t *groups); #ifndef _SYS_SYSPROTO_H_ struct getpid_args { int dummy; }; #endif /* ARGSUSED */ int sys_getpid(struct thread *td, struct getpid_args *uap) { struct proc *p = td->td_proc; td->td_retval[0] = p->p_pid; #if defined(COMPAT_43) if (SV_PROC_FLAG(p, SV_AOUT)) td->td_retval[1] = kern_getppid(td); #endif return (0); } #ifndef _SYS_SYSPROTO_H_ struct getppid_args { int dummy; }; #endif /* ARGSUSED */ int sys_getppid(struct thread *td, struct getppid_args *uap) { td->td_retval[0] = kern_getppid(td); return (0); } int kern_getppid(struct thread *td) { struct proc *p = td->td_proc; return (p->p_oppid); } /* * Get process group ID; note that POSIX getpgrp takes no parameter. */ #ifndef _SYS_SYSPROTO_H_ struct getpgrp_args { int dummy; }; #endif int sys_getpgrp(struct thread *td, struct getpgrp_args *uap) { struct proc *p = td->td_proc; PROC_LOCK(p); td->td_retval[0] = p->p_pgrp->pg_id; PROC_UNLOCK(p); return (0); } /* Get an arbitrary pid's process group id */ #ifndef _SYS_SYSPROTO_H_ struct getpgid_args { pid_t pid; }; #endif int sys_getpgid(struct thread *td, struct getpgid_args *uap) { struct proc *p; int error; if (uap->pid == 0) { p = td->td_proc; PROC_LOCK(p); } else { p = pfind(uap->pid); if (p == NULL) return (ESRCH); error = p_cansee(td, p); if (error) { PROC_UNLOCK(p); return (error); } } td->td_retval[0] = p->p_pgrp->pg_id; PROC_UNLOCK(p); return (0); } /* * Get an arbitrary pid's session id. */ #ifndef _SYS_SYSPROTO_H_ struct getsid_args { pid_t pid; }; #endif int sys_getsid(struct thread *td, struct getsid_args *uap) { return (kern_getsid(td, uap->pid)); } int kern_getsid(struct thread *td, pid_t pid) { struct proc *p; int error; if (pid == 0) { p = td->td_proc; PROC_LOCK(p); } else { p = pfind(pid); if (p == NULL) return (ESRCH); error = p_cansee(td, p); if (error) { PROC_UNLOCK(p); return (error); } } td->td_retval[0] = p->p_session->s_sid; PROC_UNLOCK(p); return (0); } #ifndef _SYS_SYSPROTO_H_ struct getuid_args { int dummy; }; #endif /* ARGSUSED */ int sys_getuid(struct thread *td, struct getuid_args *uap) { td->td_retval[0] = td->td_ucred->cr_ruid; #if defined(COMPAT_43) td->td_retval[1] = td->td_ucred->cr_uid; #endif return (0); } #ifndef _SYS_SYSPROTO_H_ struct geteuid_args { int dummy; }; #endif /* ARGSUSED */ int sys_geteuid(struct thread *td, struct geteuid_args *uap) { td->td_retval[0] = td->td_ucred->cr_uid; return (0); } #ifndef _SYS_SYSPROTO_H_ struct getgid_args { int dummy; }; #endif /* ARGSUSED */ int sys_getgid(struct thread *td, struct getgid_args *uap) { td->td_retval[0] = td->td_ucred->cr_rgid; #if defined(COMPAT_43) td->td_retval[1] = td->td_ucred->cr_groups[0]; #endif return (0); } /* * Get effective group ID. The "egid" is groups[0], and could be obtained * via getgroups. This syscall exists because it is somewhat painful to do * correctly in a library function. */ #ifndef _SYS_SYSPROTO_H_ struct getegid_args { int dummy; }; #endif /* ARGSUSED */ int sys_getegid(struct thread *td, struct getegid_args *uap) { td->td_retval[0] = td->td_ucred->cr_groups[0]; return (0); } #ifndef _SYS_SYSPROTO_H_ struct getgroups_args { int gidsetsize; gid_t *gidset; }; #endif int sys_getgroups(struct thread *td, struct getgroups_args *uap) { struct ucred *cred; int ngrp, error; cred = td->td_ucred; ngrp = cred->cr_ngroups; if (uap->gidsetsize == 0) { error = 0; goto out; } if (uap->gidsetsize < ngrp) return (EINVAL); error = copyout(cred->cr_groups, uap->gidset, ngrp * sizeof(gid_t)); out: td->td_retval[0] = ngrp; return (error); } #ifndef _SYS_SYSPROTO_H_ struct setsid_args { int dummy; }; #endif /* ARGSUSED */ int sys_setsid(struct thread *td, struct setsid_args *uap) { struct pgrp *pgrp; int error; struct proc *p = td->td_proc; struct pgrp *newpgrp; struct session *newsess; error = 0; pgrp = NULL; newpgrp = uma_zalloc(pgrp_zone, M_WAITOK); newsess = malloc(sizeof(struct session), M_SESSION, M_WAITOK | M_ZERO); sx_xlock(&proctree_lock); if (p->p_pgid == p->p_pid || (pgrp = pgfind(p->p_pid)) != NULL) { if (pgrp != NULL) PGRP_UNLOCK(pgrp); error = EPERM; } else { (void)enterpgrp(p, p->p_pid, newpgrp, newsess); td->td_retval[0] = p->p_pid; newpgrp = NULL; newsess = NULL; } sx_xunlock(&proctree_lock); uma_zfree(pgrp_zone, newpgrp); free(newsess, M_SESSION); return (error); } /* * set process group (setpgid/old setpgrp) * * caller does setpgid(targpid, targpgid) * * pid must be caller or child of caller (ESRCH) * if a child * pid must be in same session (EPERM) * pid can't have done an exec (EACCES) * if pgid != pid * there must exist some pid in same session having pgid (EPERM) * pid must not be session leader (EPERM) */ #ifndef _SYS_SYSPROTO_H_ struct setpgid_args { int pid; /* target process id */ int pgid; /* target pgrp id */ }; #endif /* ARGSUSED */ int sys_setpgid(struct thread *td, struct setpgid_args *uap) { struct proc *curp = td->td_proc; struct proc *targp; /* target process */ struct pgrp *pgrp; /* target pgrp */ int error; struct pgrp *newpgrp; if (uap->pgid < 0) return (EINVAL); error = 0; newpgrp = uma_zalloc(pgrp_zone, M_WAITOK); sx_xlock(&proctree_lock); if (uap->pid != 0 && uap->pid != curp->p_pid) { if ((targp = pfind(uap->pid)) == NULL) { error = ESRCH; goto done; } if (!inferior(targp)) { PROC_UNLOCK(targp); error = ESRCH; goto done; } if ((error = p_cansee(td, targp))) { PROC_UNLOCK(targp); goto done; } if (targp->p_pgrp == NULL || targp->p_session != curp->p_session) { PROC_UNLOCK(targp); error = EPERM; goto done; } if (targp->p_flag & P_EXEC) { PROC_UNLOCK(targp); error = EACCES; goto done; } PROC_UNLOCK(targp); } else targp = curp; if (SESS_LEADER(targp)) { error = EPERM; goto done; } if (uap->pgid == 0) uap->pgid = targp->p_pid; if ((pgrp = pgfind(uap->pgid)) == NULL) { if (uap->pgid == targp->p_pid) { error = enterpgrp(targp, uap->pgid, newpgrp, NULL); if (error == 0) newpgrp = NULL; } else error = EPERM; } else { if (pgrp == targp->p_pgrp) { PGRP_UNLOCK(pgrp); goto done; } if (pgrp->pg_id != targp->p_pid && pgrp->pg_session != curp->p_session) { PGRP_UNLOCK(pgrp); error = EPERM; goto done; } PGRP_UNLOCK(pgrp); error = enterthispgrp(targp, pgrp); } done: sx_xunlock(&proctree_lock); KASSERT((error == 0) || (newpgrp != NULL), ("setpgid failed and newpgrp is NULL")); uma_zfree(pgrp_zone, newpgrp); return (error); } /* * Use the clause in B.4.2.2 that allows setuid/setgid to be 4.2/4.3BSD * compatible. It says that setting the uid/gid to euid/egid is a special * case of "appropriate privilege". Once the rules are expanded out, this * basically means that setuid(nnn) sets all three id's, in all permitted * cases unless _POSIX_SAVED_IDS is enabled. In that case, setuid(getuid()) * does not set the saved id - this is dangerous for traditional BSD * programs. For this reason, we *really* do not want to set * _POSIX_SAVED_IDS and do not want to clear POSIX_APPENDIX_B_4_2_2. */ #define POSIX_APPENDIX_B_4_2_2 #ifndef _SYS_SYSPROTO_H_ struct setuid_args { uid_t uid; }; #endif /* ARGSUSED */ int sys_setuid(struct thread *td, struct setuid_args *uap) { struct proc *p = td->td_proc; struct ucred *newcred, *oldcred; uid_t uid; struct uidinfo *uip; int error; uid = uap->uid; AUDIT_ARG_UID(uid); newcred = crget(); uip = uifind(uid); PROC_LOCK(p); /* * Copy credentials so other references do not see our changes. */ oldcred = crcopysafe(p, newcred); #ifdef MAC error = mac_cred_check_setuid(oldcred, uid); if (error) goto fail; #endif /* * See if we have "permission" by POSIX 1003.1 rules. * * Note that setuid(geteuid()) is a special case of * "appropriate privileges" in appendix B.4.2.2. We need * to use this clause to be compatible with traditional BSD * semantics. Basically, it means that "setuid(xx)" sets all * three id's (assuming you have privs). * * Notes on the logic. We do things in three steps. * 1: We determine if the euid is going to change, and do EPERM * right away. We unconditionally change the euid later if this * test is satisfied, simplifying that part of the logic. * 2: We determine if the real and/or saved uids are going to * change. Determined by compile options. * 3: Change euid last. (after tests in #2 for "appropriate privs") */ if (uid != oldcred->cr_ruid && /* allow setuid(getuid()) */ #ifdef _POSIX_SAVED_IDS uid != oldcred->cr_svuid && /* allow setuid(saved gid) */ #endif #ifdef POSIX_APPENDIX_B_4_2_2 /* Use BSD-compat clause from B.4.2.2 */ uid != oldcred->cr_uid && /* allow setuid(geteuid()) */ #endif (error = priv_check_cred(oldcred, PRIV_CRED_SETUID)) != 0) goto fail; #ifdef _POSIX_SAVED_IDS /* * Do we have "appropriate privileges" (are we root or uid == euid) * If so, we are changing the real uid and/or saved uid. */ if ( #ifdef POSIX_APPENDIX_B_4_2_2 /* Use the clause from B.4.2.2 */ uid == oldcred->cr_uid || #endif /* We are using privs. */ priv_check_cred(oldcred, PRIV_CRED_SETUID) == 0) #endif { /* * Set the real uid and transfer proc count to new user. */ if (uid != oldcred->cr_ruid) { change_ruid(newcred, uip); setsugid(p); } /* * Set saved uid * * XXX always set saved uid even if not _POSIX_SAVED_IDS, as * the security of seteuid() depends on it. B.4.2.2 says it * is important that we should do this. */ if (uid != oldcred->cr_svuid) { change_svuid(newcred, uid); setsugid(p); } } /* * In all permitted cases, we are changing the euid. */ if (uid != oldcred->cr_uid) { change_euid(newcred, uip); setsugid(p); } proc_set_cred(p, newcred); #ifdef RACCT racct_proc_ucred_changed(p, oldcred, newcred); crhold(newcred); #endif PROC_UNLOCK(p); #ifdef RCTL rctl_proc_ucred_changed(p, newcred); crfree(newcred); #endif uifree(uip); crfree(oldcred); return (0); fail: PROC_UNLOCK(p); uifree(uip); crfree(newcred); return (error); } #ifndef _SYS_SYSPROTO_H_ struct seteuid_args { uid_t euid; }; #endif /* ARGSUSED */ int sys_seteuid(struct thread *td, struct seteuid_args *uap) { struct proc *p = td->td_proc; struct ucred *newcred, *oldcred; uid_t euid; struct uidinfo *euip; int error; euid = uap->euid; AUDIT_ARG_EUID(euid); newcred = crget(); euip = uifind(euid); PROC_LOCK(p); /* * Copy credentials so other references do not see our changes. */ oldcred = crcopysafe(p, newcred); #ifdef MAC error = mac_cred_check_seteuid(oldcred, euid); if (error) goto fail; #endif if (euid != oldcred->cr_ruid && /* allow seteuid(getuid()) */ euid != oldcred->cr_svuid && /* allow seteuid(saved uid) */ (error = priv_check_cred(oldcred, PRIV_CRED_SETEUID)) != 0) goto fail; /* * Everything's okay, do it. */ if (oldcred->cr_uid != euid) { change_euid(newcred, euip); setsugid(p); } proc_set_cred(p, newcred); PROC_UNLOCK(p); uifree(euip); crfree(oldcred); return (0); fail: PROC_UNLOCK(p); uifree(euip); crfree(newcred); return (error); } #ifndef _SYS_SYSPROTO_H_ struct setgid_args { gid_t gid; }; #endif /* ARGSUSED */ int sys_setgid(struct thread *td, struct setgid_args *uap) { struct proc *p = td->td_proc; struct ucred *newcred, *oldcred; gid_t gid; int error; gid = uap->gid; AUDIT_ARG_GID(gid); newcred = crget(); PROC_LOCK(p); oldcred = crcopysafe(p, newcred); #ifdef MAC error = mac_cred_check_setgid(oldcred, gid); if (error) goto fail; #endif /* * See if we have "permission" by POSIX 1003.1 rules. * * Note that setgid(getegid()) is a special case of * "appropriate privileges" in appendix B.4.2.2. We need * to use this clause to be compatible with traditional BSD * semantics. Basically, it means that "setgid(xx)" sets all * three id's (assuming you have privs). * * For notes on the logic here, see setuid() above. */ if (gid != oldcred->cr_rgid && /* allow setgid(getgid()) */ #ifdef _POSIX_SAVED_IDS gid != oldcred->cr_svgid && /* allow setgid(saved gid) */ #endif #ifdef POSIX_APPENDIX_B_4_2_2 /* Use BSD-compat clause from B.4.2.2 */ gid != oldcred->cr_groups[0] && /* allow setgid(getegid()) */ #endif (error = priv_check_cred(oldcred, PRIV_CRED_SETGID)) != 0) goto fail; #ifdef _POSIX_SAVED_IDS /* * Do we have "appropriate privileges" (are we root or gid == egid) * If so, we are changing the real uid and saved gid. */ if ( #ifdef POSIX_APPENDIX_B_4_2_2 /* use the clause from B.4.2.2 */ gid == oldcred->cr_groups[0] || #endif /* We are using privs. */ priv_check_cred(oldcred, PRIV_CRED_SETGID) == 0) #endif { /* * Set real gid */ if (oldcred->cr_rgid != gid) { change_rgid(newcred, gid); setsugid(p); } /* * Set saved gid * * XXX always set saved gid even if not _POSIX_SAVED_IDS, as * the security of setegid() depends on it. B.4.2.2 says it * is important that we should do this. */ if (oldcred->cr_svgid != gid) { change_svgid(newcred, gid); setsugid(p); } } /* * In all cases permitted cases, we are changing the egid. * Copy credentials so other references do not see our changes. */ if (oldcred->cr_groups[0] != gid) { change_egid(newcred, gid); setsugid(p); } proc_set_cred(p, newcred); PROC_UNLOCK(p); crfree(oldcred); return (0); fail: PROC_UNLOCK(p); crfree(newcred); return (error); } #ifndef _SYS_SYSPROTO_H_ struct setegid_args { gid_t egid; }; #endif /* ARGSUSED */ int sys_setegid(struct thread *td, struct setegid_args *uap) { struct proc *p = td->td_proc; struct ucred *newcred, *oldcred; gid_t egid; int error; egid = uap->egid; AUDIT_ARG_EGID(egid); newcred = crget(); PROC_LOCK(p); oldcred = crcopysafe(p, newcred); #ifdef MAC error = mac_cred_check_setegid(oldcred, egid); if (error) goto fail; #endif if (egid != oldcred->cr_rgid && /* allow setegid(getgid()) */ egid != oldcred->cr_svgid && /* allow setegid(saved gid) */ (error = priv_check_cred(oldcred, PRIV_CRED_SETEGID)) != 0) goto fail; if (oldcred->cr_groups[0] != egid) { change_egid(newcred, egid); setsugid(p); } proc_set_cred(p, newcred); PROC_UNLOCK(p); crfree(oldcred); return (0); fail: PROC_UNLOCK(p); crfree(newcred); return (error); } #ifndef _SYS_SYSPROTO_H_ struct setgroups_args { int gidsetsize; gid_t *gidset; }; #endif /* ARGSUSED */ int sys_setgroups(struct thread *td, struct setgroups_args *uap) { gid_t smallgroups[XU_NGROUPS]; gid_t *groups; int gidsetsize, error; gidsetsize = uap->gidsetsize; if (gidsetsize > ngroups_max + 1 || gidsetsize < 0) return (EINVAL); if (gidsetsize > XU_NGROUPS) groups = malloc(gidsetsize * sizeof(gid_t), M_TEMP, M_WAITOK); else groups = smallgroups; error = copyin(uap->gidset, groups, gidsetsize * sizeof(gid_t)); if (error == 0) error = kern_setgroups(td, gidsetsize, groups); if (gidsetsize > XU_NGROUPS) free(groups, M_TEMP); return (error); } int kern_setgroups(struct thread *td, u_int ngrp, gid_t *groups) { struct proc *p = td->td_proc; struct ucred *newcred, *oldcred; int error; MPASS(ngrp <= ngroups_max + 1); AUDIT_ARG_GROUPSET(groups, ngrp); newcred = crget(); crextend(newcred, ngrp); PROC_LOCK(p); oldcred = crcopysafe(p, newcred); #ifdef MAC error = mac_cred_check_setgroups(oldcred, ngrp, groups); if (error) goto fail; #endif error = priv_check_cred(oldcred, PRIV_CRED_SETGROUPS); if (error) goto fail; if (ngrp == 0) { /* * setgroups(0, NULL) is a legitimate way of clearing the * groups vector on non-BSD systems (which generally do not * have the egid in the groups[0]). We risk security holes * when running non-BSD software if we do not do the same. */ newcred->cr_ngroups = 1; } else { crsetgroups_locked(newcred, ngrp, groups); } setsugid(p); proc_set_cred(p, newcred); PROC_UNLOCK(p); crfree(oldcred); return (0); fail: PROC_UNLOCK(p); crfree(newcred); return (error); } #ifndef _SYS_SYSPROTO_H_ struct setreuid_args { uid_t ruid; uid_t euid; }; #endif /* ARGSUSED */ int sys_setreuid(struct thread *td, struct setreuid_args *uap) { struct proc *p = td->td_proc; struct ucred *newcred, *oldcred; uid_t euid, ruid; struct uidinfo *euip, *ruip; int error; euid = uap->euid; ruid = uap->ruid; AUDIT_ARG_EUID(euid); AUDIT_ARG_RUID(ruid); newcred = crget(); euip = uifind(euid); ruip = uifind(ruid); PROC_LOCK(p); oldcred = crcopysafe(p, newcred); #ifdef MAC error = mac_cred_check_setreuid(oldcred, ruid, euid); if (error) goto fail; #endif if (((ruid != (uid_t)-1 && ruid != oldcred->cr_ruid && ruid != oldcred->cr_svuid) || (euid != (uid_t)-1 && euid != oldcred->cr_uid && euid != oldcred->cr_ruid && euid != oldcred->cr_svuid)) && (error = priv_check_cred(oldcred, PRIV_CRED_SETREUID)) != 0) goto fail; if (euid != (uid_t)-1 && oldcred->cr_uid != euid) { change_euid(newcred, euip); setsugid(p); } if (ruid != (uid_t)-1 && oldcred->cr_ruid != ruid) { change_ruid(newcred, ruip); setsugid(p); } if ((ruid != (uid_t)-1 || newcred->cr_uid != newcred->cr_ruid) && newcred->cr_svuid != newcred->cr_uid) { change_svuid(newcred, newcred->cr_uid); setsugid(p); } proc_set_cred(p, newcred); #ifdef RACCT racct_proc_ucred_changed(p, oldcred, newcred); crhold(newcred); #endif PROC_UNLOCK(p); #ifdef RCTL rctl_proc_ucred_changed(p, newcred); crfree(newcred); #endif uifree(ruip); uifree(euip); crfree(oldcred); return (0); fail: PROC_UNLOCK(p); uifree(ruip); uifree(euip); crfree(newcred); return (error); } #ifndef _SYS_SYSPROTO_H_ struct setregid_args { gid_t rgid; gid_t egid; }; #endif /* ARGSUSED */ int sys_setregid(struct thread *td, struct setregid_args *uap) { struct proc *p = td->td_proc; struct ucred *newcred, *oldcred; gid_t egid, rgid; int error; egid = uap->egid; rgid = uap->rgid; AUDIT_ARG_EGID(egid); AUDIT_ARG_RGID(rgid); newcred = crget(); PROC_LOCK(p); oldcred = crcopysafe(p, newcred); #ifdef MAC error = mac_cred_check_setregid(oldcred, rgid, egid); if (error) goto fail; #endif if (((rgid != (gid_t)-1 && rgid != oldcred->cr_rgid && rgid != oldcred->cr_svgid) || (egid != (gid_t)-1 && egid != oldcred->cr_groups[0] && egid != oldcred->cr_rgid && egid != oldcred->cr_svgid)) && (error = priv_check_cred(oldcred, PRIV_CRED_SETREGID)) != 0) goto fail; if (egid != (gid_t)-1 && oldcred->cr_groups[0] != egid) { change_egid(newcred, egid); setsugid(p); } if (rgid != (gid_t)-1 && oldcred->cr_rgid != rgid) { change_rgid(newcred, rgid); setsugid(p); } if ((rgid != (gid_t)-1 || newcred->cr_groups[0] != newcred->cr_rgid) && newcred->cr_svgid != newcred->cr_groups[0]) { change_svgid(newcred, newcred->cr_groups[0]); setsugid(p); } proc_set_cred(p, newcred); PROC_UNLOCK(p); crfree(oldcred); return (0); fail: PROC_UNLOCK(p); crfree(newcred); return (error); } /* * setresuid(ruid, euid, suid) is like setreuid except control over the saved * uid is explicit. */ #ifndef _SYS_SYSPROTO_H_ struct setresuid_args { uid_t ruid; uid_t euid; uid_t suid; }; #endif /* ARGSUSED */ int sys_setresuid(struct thread *td, struct setresuid_args *uap) { struct proc *p = td->td_proc; struct ucred *newcred, *oldcred; uid_t euid, ruid, suid; struct uidinfo *euip, *ruip; int error; euid = uap->euid; ruid = uap->ruid; suid = uap->suid; AUDIT_ARG_EUID(euid); AUDIT_ARG_RUID(ruid); AUDIT_ARG_SUID(suid); newcred = crget(); euip = uifind(euid); ruip = uifind(ruid); PROC_LOCK(p); oldcred = crcopysafe(p, newcred); #ifdef MAC error = mac_cred_check_setresuid(oldcred, ruid, euid, suid); if (error) goto fail; #endif if (((ruid != (uid_t)-1 && ruid != oldcred->cr_ruid && ruid != oldcred->cr_svuid && ruid != oldcred->cr_uid) || (euid != (uid_t)-1 && euid != oldcred->cr_ruid && euid != oldcred->cr_svuid && euid != oldcred->cr_uid) || (suid != (uid_t)-1 && suid != oldcred->cr_ruid && suid != oldcred->cr_svuid && suid != oldcred->cr_uid)) && (error = priv_check_cred(oldcred, PRIV_CRED_SETRESUID)) != 0) goto fail; if (euid != (uid_t)-1 && oldcred->cr_uid != euid) { change_euid(newcred, euip); setsugid(p); } if (ruid != (uid_t)-1 && oldcred->cr_ruid != ruid) { change_ruid(newcred, ruip); setsugid(p); } if (suid != (uid_t)-1 && oldcred->cr_svuid != suid) { change_svuid(newcred, suid); setsugid(p); } proc_set_cred(p, newcred); #ifdef RACCT racct_proc_ucred_changed(p, oldcred, newcred); crhold(newcred); #endif PROC_UNLOCK(p); #ifdef RCTL rctl_proc_ucred_changed(p, newcred); crfree(newcred); #endif uifree(ruip); uifree(euip); crfree(oldcred); return (0); fail: PROC_UNLOCK(p); uifree(ruip); uifree(euip); crfree(newcred); return (error); } /* * setresgid(rgid, egid, sgid) is like setregid except control over the saved * gid is explicit. */ #ifndef _SYS_SYSPROTO_H_ struct setresgid_args { gid_t rgid; gid_t egid; gid_t sgid; }; #endif /* ARGSUSED */ int sys_setresgid(struct thread *td, struct setresgid_args *uap) { struct proc *p = td->td_proc; struct ucred *newcred, *oldcred; gid_t egid, rgid, sgid; int error; egid = uap->egid; rgid = uap->rgid; sgid = uap->sgid; AUDIT_ARG_EGID(egid); AUDIT_ARG_RGID(rgid); AUDIT_ARG_SGID(sgid); newcred = crget(); PROC_LOCK(p); oldcred = crcopysafe(p, newcred); #ifdef MAC error = mac_cred_check_setresgid(oldcred, rgid, egid, sgid); if (error) goto fail; #endif if (((rgid != (gid_t)-1 && rgid != oldcred->cr_rgid && rgid != oldcred->cr_svgid && rgid != oldcred->cr_groups[0]) || (egid != (gid_t)-1 && egid != oldcred->cr_rgid && egid != oldcred->cr_svgid && egid != oldcred->cr_groups[0]) || (sgid != (gid_t)-1 && sgid != oldcred->cr_rgid && sgid != oldcred->cr_svgid && sgid != oldcred->cr_groups[0])) && (error = priv_check_cred(oldcred, PRIV_CRED_SETRESGID)) != 0) goto fail; if (egid != (gid_t)-1 && oldcred->cr_groups[0] != egid) { change_egid(newcred, egid); setsugid(p); } if (rgid != (gid_t)-1 && oldcred->cr_rgid != rgid) { change_rgid(newcred, rgid); setsugid(p); } if (sgid != (gid_t)-1 && oldcred->cr_svgid != sgid) { change_svgid(newcred, sgid); setsugid(p); } proc_set_cred(p, newcred); PROC_UNLOCK(p); crfree(oldcred); return (0); fail: PROC_UNLOCK(p); crfree(newcred); return (error); } #ifndef _SYS_SYSPROTO_H_ struct getresuid_args { uid_t *ruid; uid_t *euid; uid_t *suid; }; #endif /* ARGSUSED */ int sys_getresuid(struct thread *td, struct getresuid_args *uap) { struct ucred *cred; int error1 = 0, error2 = 0, error3 = 0; cred = td->td_ucred; if (uap->ruid) error1 = copyout(&cred->cr_ruid, uap->ruid, sizeof(cred->cr_ruid)); if (uap->euid) error2 = copyout(&cred->cr_uid, uap->euid, sizeof(cred->cr_uid)); if (uap->suid) error3 = copyout(&cred->cr_svuid, uap->suid, sizeof(cred->cr_svuid)); return (error1 ? error1 : error2 ? error2 : error3); } #ifndef _SYS_SYSPROTO_H_ struct getresgid_args { gid_t *rgid; gid_t *egid; gid_t *sgid; }; #endif /* ARGSUSED */ int sys_getresgid(struct thread *td, struct getresgid_args *uap) { struct ucred *cred; int error1 = 0, error2 = 0, error3 = 0; cred = td->td_ucred; if (uap->rgid) error1 = copyout(&cred->cr_rgid, uap->rgid, sizeof(cred->cr_rgid)); if (uap->egid) error2 = copyout(&cred->cr_groups[0], uap->egid, sizeof(cred->cr_groups[0])); if (uap->sgid) error3 = copyout(&cred->cr_svgid, uap->sgid, sizeof(cred->cr_svgid)); return (error1 ? error1 : error2 ? error2 : error3); } #ifndef _SYS_SYSPROTO_H_ struct issetugid_args { int dummy; }; #endif /* ARGSUSED */ int sys_issetugid(struct thread *td, struct issetugid_args *uap) { struct proc *p = td->td_proc; /* * Note: OpenBSD sets a P_SUGIDEXEC flag set at execve() time, * we use P_SUGID because we consider changing the owners as * "tainting" as well. * This is significant for procs that start as root and "become" * a user without an exec - programs cannot know *everything* * that libc *might* have put in their data segment. */ td->td_retval[0] = (p->p_flag & P_SUGID) ? 1 : 0; return (0); } int sys___setugid(struct thread *td, struct __setugid_args *uap) { #ifdef REGRESSION struct proc *p; p = td->td_proc; switch (uap->flag) { case 0: PROC_LOCK(p); p->p_flag &= ~P_SUGID; PROC_UNLOCK(p); return (0); case 1: PROC_LOCK(p); p->p_flag |= P_SUGID; PROC_UNLOCK(p); return (0); default: return (EINVAL); } #else /* !REGRESSION */ return (ENOSYS); #endif /* REGRESSION */ } /* * Check if gid is a member of the group set. */ int groupmember(gid_t gid, struct ucred *cred) { int l; int h; int m; if (cred->cr_groups[0] == gid) return(1); /* * If gid was not our primary group, perform a binary search * of the supplemental groups. This is possible because we * sort the groups in crsetgroups(). */ l = 1; h = cred->cr_ngroups; while (l < h) { m = l + ((h - l) / 2); if (cred->cr_groups[m] < gid) l = m + 1; else h = m; } if ((l < cred->cr_ngroups) && (cred->cr_groups[l] == gid)) return (1); return (0); } /* * Test the active securelevel against a given level. securelevel_gt() * implements (securelevel > level). securelevel_ge() implements * (securelevel >= level). Note that the logic is inverted -- these * functions return EPERM on "success" and 0 on "failure". * * Due to care taken when setting the securelevel, we know that no jail will * be less secure that its parent (or the physical system), so it is sufficient * to test the current jail only. * * XXXRW: Possibly since this has to do with privilege, it should move to * kern_priv.c. */ int securelevel_gt(struct ucred *cr, int level) { return (cr->cr_prison->pr_securelevel > level ? EPERM : 0); } int securelevel_ge(struct ucred *cr, int level) { return (cr->cr_prison->pr_securelevel >= level ? EPERM : 0); } /* * 'see_other_uids' determines whether or not visibility of processes * and sockets with credentials holding different real uids is possible * using a variety of system MIBs. * XXX: data declarations should be together near the beginning of the file. */ static int see_other_uids = 1; SYSCTL_INT(_security_bsd, OID_AUTO, see_other_uids, CTLFLAG_RW, &see_other_uids, 0, "Unprivileged processes may see subjects/objects with different real uid"); /*- * Determine if u1 "can see" the subject specified by u2, according to the * 'see_other_uids' policy. * Returns: 0 for permitted, ESRCH otherwise * Locks: none * References: *u1 and *u2 must not change during the call * u1 may equal u2, in which case only one reference is required */ int cr_canseeotheruids(struct ucred *u1, struct ucred *u2) { if (!see_other_uids && u1->cr_ruid != u2->cr_ruid) { if (priv_check_cred(u1, PRIV_SEEOTHERUIDS) != 0) return (ESRCH); } return (0); } /* * 'see_other_gids' determines whether or not visibility of processes * and sockets with credentials holding different real gids is possible * using a variety of system MIBs. * XXX: data declarations should be together near the beginning of the file. */ static int see_other_gids = 1; SYSCTL_INT(_security_bsd, OID_AUTO, see_other_gids, CTLFLAG_RW, &see_other_gids, 0, "Unprivileged processes may see subjects/objects with different real gid"); /* * Determine if u1 can "see" the subject specified by u2, according to the * 'see_other_gids' policy. * Returns: 0 for permitted, ESRCH otherwise * Locks: none * References: *u1 and *u2 must not change during the call * u1 may equal u2, in which case only one reference is required */ int cr_canseeothergids(struct ucred *u1, struct ucred *u2) { int i, match; if (!see_other_gids) { match = 0; for (i = 0; i < u1->cr_ngroups; i++) { if (groupmember(u1->cr_groups[i], u2)) match = 1; if (match) break; } if (!match) { if (priv_check_cred(u1, PRIV_SEEOTHERGIDS) != 0) return (ESRCH); } } return (0); } /* * 'see_jail_proc' determines whether or not visibility of processes and * sockets with credentials holding different jail ids is possible using a * variety of system MIBs. * * XXX: data declarations should be together near the beginning of the file. */ static int see_jail_proc = 1; SYSCTL_INT(_security_bsd, OID_AUTO, see_jail_proc, CTLFLAG_RW, &see_jail_proc, 0, "Unprivileged processes may see subjects/objects with different jail ids"); /*- * Determine if u1 "can see" the subject specified by u2, according to the * 'see_jail_proc' policy. * Returns: 0 for permitted, ESRCH otherwise * Locks: none * References: *u1 and *u2 must not change during the call * u1 may equal u2, in which case only one reference is required */ int cr_canseejailproc(struct ucred *u1, struct ucred *u2) { if (u1->cr_uid == 0) return (0); return (!see_jail_proc && u1->cr_prison != u2->cr_prison ? ESRCH : 0); } /*- * Determine if u1 "can see" the subject specified by u2. * Returns: 0 for permitted, an errno value otherwise * Locks: none * References: *u1 and *u2 must not change during the call * u1 may equal u2, in which case only one reference is required */ int cr_cansee(struct ucred *u1, struct ucred *u2) { int error; if ((error = prison_check(u1, u2))) return (error); #ifdef MAC if ((error = mac_cred_check_visible(u1, u2))) return (error); #endif if ((error = cr_canseeotheruids(u1, u2))) return (error); if ((error = cr_canseeothergids(u1, u2))) return (error); if ((error = cr_canseejailproc(u1, u2))) return (error); return (0); } /*- * Determine if td "can see" the subject specified by p. * Returns: 0 for permitted, an errno value otherwise * Locks: Sufficient locks to protect p->p_ucred must be held. td really * should be curthread. * References: td and p must be valid for the lifetime of the call */ int p_cansee(struct thread *td, struct proc *p) { /* Wrap cr_cansee() for all functionality. */ KASSERT(td == curthread, ("%s: td not curthread", __func__)); PROC_LOCK_ASSERT(p, MA_OWNED); if (td->td_proc == p) return (0); return (cr_cansee(td->td_ucred, p->p_ucred)); } /* * 'conservative_signals' prevents the delivery of a broad class of * signals by unprivileged processes to processes that have changed their * credentials since the last invocation of execve(). This can prevent * the leakage of cached information or retained privileges as a result * of a common class of signal-related vulnerabilities. However, this * may interfere with some applications that expect to be able to * deliver these signals to peer processes after having given up * privilege. */ static int conservative_signals = 1; SYSCTL_INT(_security_bsd, OID_AUTO, conservative_signals, CTLFLAG_RW, &conservative_signals, 0, "Unprivileged processes prevented from " "sending certain signals to processes whose credentials have changed"); /*- * Determine whether cred may deliver the specified signal to proc. * Returns: 0 for permitted, an errno value otherwise. * Locks: A lock must be held for proc. * References: cred and proc must be valid for the lifetime of the call. */ int cr_cansignal(struct ucred *cred, struct proc *proc, int signum) { int error; PROC_LOCK_ASSERT(proc, MA_OWNED); /* * Jail semantics limit the scope of signalling to proc in the * same jail as cred, if cred is in jail. */ error = prison_check(cred, proc->p_ucred); if (error) return (error); #ifdef MAC if ((error = mac_proc_check_signal(cred, proc, signum))) return (error); #endif if ((error = cr_canseeotheruids(cred, proc->p_ucred))) return (error); if ((error = cr_canseeothergids(cred, proc->p_ucred))) return (error); /* * UNIX signal semantics depend on the status of the P_SUGID * bit on the target process. If the bit is set, then additional * restrictions are placed on the set of available signals. */ if (conservative_signals && (proc->p_flag & P_SUGID)) { switch (signum) { case 0: case SIGKILL: case SIGINT: case SIGTERM: case SIGALRM: case SIGSTOP: case SIGTTIN: case SIGTTOU: case SIGTSTP: case SIGHUP: case SIGUSR1: case SIGUSR2: /* * Generally, permit job and terminal control * signals. */ break; default: /* Not permitted without privilege. */ error = priv_check_cred(cred, PRIV_SIGNAL_SUGID); if (error) return (error); } } /* * Generally, the target credential's ruid or svuid must match the * subject credential's ruid or euid. */ if (cred->cr_ruid != proc->p_ucred->cr_ruid && cred->cr_ruid != proc->p_ucred->cr_svuid && cred->cr_uid != proc->p_ucred->cr_ruid && cred->cr_uid != proc->p_ucred->cr_svuid) { error = priv_check_cred(cred, PRIV_SIGNAL_DIFFCRED); if (error) return (error); } return (0); } /*- * Determine whether td may deliver the specified signal to p. * Returns: 0 for permitted, an errno value otherwise * Locks: Sufficient locks to protect various components of td and p * must be held. td must be curthread, and a lock must be * held for p. * References: td and p must be valid for the lifetime of the call */ int p_cansignal(struct thread *td, struct proc *p, int signum) { KASSERT(td == curthread, ("%s: td not curthread", __func__)); PROC_LOCK_ASSERT(p, MA_OWNED); if (td->td_proc == p) return (0); /* * UNIX signalling semantics require that processes in the same * session always be able to deliver SIGCONT to one another, * overriding the remaining protections. */ /* XXX: This will require an additional lock of some sort. */ if (signum == SIGCONT && td->td_proc->p_session == p->p_session) return (0); /* * Some compat layers use SIGTHR and higher signals for * communication between different kernel threads of the same * process, so that they expect that it's always possible to * deliver them, even for suid applications where cr_cansignal() can * deny such ability for security consideration. It should be * pretty safe to do since the only way to create two processes * with the same p_leader is via rfork(2). */ if (td->td_proc->p_leader != NULL && signum >= SIGTHR && signum < SIGTHR + 4 && td->td_proc->p_leader == p->p_leader) return (0); return (cr_cansignal(td->td_ucred, p, signum)); } /*- * Determine whether td may reschedule p. * Returns: 0 for permitted, an errno value otherwise * Locks: Sufficient locks to protect various components of td and p * must be held. td must be curthread, and a lock must * be held for p. * References: td and p must be valid for the lifetime of the call */ int p_cansched(struct thread *td, struct proc *p) { int error; KASSERT(td == curthread, ("%s: td not curthread", __func__)); PROC_LOCK_ASSERT(p, MA_OWNED); if (td->td_proc == p) return (0); if ((error = prison_check(td->td_ucred, p->p_ucred))) return (error); #ifdef MAC if ((error = mac_proc_check_sched(td->td_ucred, p))) return (error); #endif if ((error = cr_canseeotheruids(td->td_ucred, p->p_ucred))) return (error); if ((error = cr_canseeothergids(td->td_ucred, p->p_ucred))) return (error); if (td->td_ucred->cr_ruid != p->p_ucred->cr_ruid && td->td_ucred->cr_uid != p->p_ucred->cr_ruid) { error = priv_check(td, PRIV_SCHED_DIFFCRED); if (error) return (error); } return (0); } /* * Handle getting or setting the prison's unprivileged_proc_debug * value. */ static int sysctl_unprivileged_proc_debug(SYSCTL_HANDLER_ARGS) { int error, val; val = prison_allow(req->td->td_ucred, PR_ALLOW_UNPRIV_DEBUG); error = sysctl_handle_int(oidp, &val, 0, req); if (error != 0 || req->newptr == NULL) return (error); if (val != 0 && val != 1) return (EINVAL); prison_set_allow(req->td->td_ucred, PR_ALLOW_UNPRIV_DEBUG, val); return (0); } /* * The 'unprivileged_proc_debug' flag may be used to disable a variety of * unprivileged inter-process debugging services, including some procfs * functionality, ptrace(), and ktrace(). In the past, inter-process * debugging has been involved in a variety of security problems, and sites * not requiring the service might choose to disable it when hardening * systems. */ SYSCTL_PROC(_security_bsd, OID_AUTO, unprivileged_proc_debug, CTLTYPE_INT | CTLFLAG_RW | CTLFLAG_PRISON | CTLFLAG_SECURE | CTLFLAG_MPSAFE, 0, 0, sysctl_unprivileged_proc_debug, "I", "Unprivileged processes may use process debugging facilities"); /*- * Determine whether td may debug p. * Returns: 0 for permitted, an errno value otherwise * Locks: Sufficient locks to protect various components of td and p * must be held. td must be curthread, and a lock must * be held for p. * References: td and p must be valid for the lifetime of the call */ int p_candebug(struct thread *td, struct proc *p) { int error, grpsubset, i, uidsubset; KASSERT(td == curthread, ("%s: td not curthread", __func__)); PROC_LOCK_ASSERT(p, MA_OWNED); if (td->td_proc == p) return (0); if ((error = priv_check(td, PRIV_DEBUG_UNPRIV))) return (error); if ((error = prison_check(td->td_ucred, p->p_ucred))) return (error); #ifdef MAC if ((error = mac_proc_check_debug(td->td_ucred, p))) return (error); #endif if ((error = cr_canseeotheruids(td->td_ucred, p->p_ucred))) return (error); if ((error = cr_canseeothergids(td->td_ucred, p->p_ucred))) return (error); /* * Is p's group set a subset of td's effective group set? This * includes p's egid, group access list, rgid, and svgid. */ grpsubset = 1; for (i = 0; i < p->p_ucred->cr_ngroups; i++) { if (!groupmember(p->p_ucred->cr_groups[i], td->td_ucred)) { grpsubset = 0; break; } } grpsubset = grpsubset && groupmember(p->p_ucred->cr_rgid, td->td_ucred) && groupmember(p->p_ucred->cr_svgid, td->td_ucred); /* * Are the uids present in p's credential equal to td's * effective uid? This includes p's euid, svuid, and ruid. */ uidsubset = (td->td_ucred->cr_uid == p->p_ucred->cr_uid && td->td_ucred->cr_uid == p->p_ucred->cr_svuid && td->td_ucred->cr_uid == p->p_ucred->cr_ruid); /* * If p's gids aren't a subset, or the uids aren't a subset, * or the credential has changed, require appropriate privilege * for td to debug p. */ if (!grpsubset || !uidsubset) { error = priv_check(td, PRIV_DEBUG_DIFFCRED); if (error) return (error); } /* * Has the credential of the process changed since the last exec()? */ if ((p->p_flag & P_SUGID) != 0) { error = priv_check(td, PRIV_DEBUG_SUGID); if (error) return (error); } /* Can't trace init when securelevel > 0. */ if (p == initproc) { error = securelevel_gt(td->td_ucred, 0); if (error) return (error); } /* * Can't trace a process that's currently exec'ing. * * XXX: Note, this is not a security policy decision, it's a * basic correctness/functionality decision. Therefore, this check * should be moved to the caller's of p_candebug(). */ if ((p->p_flag & P_INEXEC) != 0) return (EBUSY); /* Denied explicitly */ if ((p->p_flag2 & P2_NOTRACE) != 0) { error = priv_check(td, PRIV_DEBUG_DENIED); if (error != 0) return (error); } return (0); } /*- * Determine whether the subject represented by cred can "see" a socket. * Returns: 0 for permitted, ENOENT otherwise. */ int cr_canseesocket(struct ucred *cred, struct socket *so) { int error; error = prison_check(cred, so->so_cred); if (error) return (ENOENT); #ifdef MAC error = mac_socket_check_visible(cred, so); if (error) return (error); #endif if (cr_canseeotheruids(cred, so->so_cred)) return (ENOENT); if (cr_canseeothergids(cred, so->so_cred)) return (ENOENT); return (0); } /*- * Determine whether td can wait for the exit of p. * Returns: 0 for permitted, an errno value otherwise * Locks: Sufficient locks to protect various components of td and p * must be held. td must be curthread, and a lock must * be held for p. * References: td and p must be valid for the lifetime of the call */ int p_canwait(struct thread *td, struct proc *p) { int error; KASSERT(td == curthread, ("%s: td not curthread", __func__)); PROC_LOCK_ASSERT(p, MA_OWNED); if ((error = prison_check(td->td_ucred, p->p_ucred))) return (error); #ifdef MAC if ((error = mac_proc_check_wait(td->td_ucred, p))) return (error); #endif #if 0 /* XXXMAC: This could have odd effects on some shells. */ if ((error = cr_canseeotheruids(td->td_ucred, p->p_ucred))) return (error); #endif return (0); } /* * Credential management. * * struct ucred objects are rarely allocated but gain and lose references all * the time (e.g., on struct file alloc/dealloc) turning refcount updates into * a significant source of cache-line ping ponging. Common cases are worked * around by modifying thread-local counter instead if the cred to operate on * matches td_realucred. * * The counter is split into 2 parts: * - cr_users -- total count of all struct proc and struct thread objects * which have given cred in p_ucred and td_ucred respectively * - cr_ref -- the actual ref count, only valid if cr_users == 0 * * If users == 0 then cr_ref behaves similarly to refcount(9), in particular if * the count reaches 0 the object is freeable. * If users > 0 and curthread->td_realucred == cred, then updates are performed * against td_ucredref. * In other cases updates are performed against cr_ref. * * Changing td_realucred into something else decrements cr_users and transfers * accumulated updates. */ struct ucred * crcowget(struct ucred *cr) { mtx_lock(&cr->cr_mtx); KASSERT(cr->cr_users > 0, ("%s: users %d not > 0 on cred %p", __func__, cr->cr_users, cr)); cr->cr_users++; cr->cr_ref++; mtx_unlock(&cr->cr_mtx); return (cr); } static struct ucred * crunuse(struct thread *td) { struct ucred *cr, *crold; MPASS(td->td_realucred == td->td_ucred); cr = td->td_realucred; mtx_lock(&cr->cr_mtx); cr->cr_ref += td->td_ucredref; td->td_ucredref = 0; KASSERT(cr->cr_users > 0, ("%s: users %d not > 0 on cred %p", __func__, cr->cr_users, cr)); cr->cr_users--; if (cr->cr_users == 0) { - KASSERT(cr->cr_ref > 0, ("%s: ref %d not > 0 on cred %p", + KASSERT(cr->cr_ref > 0, ("%s: ref %ld not > 0 on cred %p", __func__, cr->cr_ref, cr)); crold = cr; } else { cr->cr_ref--; crold = NULL; } mtx_unlock(&cr->cr_mtx); td->td_realucred = NULL; return (crold); } static void crunusebatch(struct ucred *cr, int users, int ref) { KASSERT(users > 0, ("%s: passed users %d not > 0 ; cred %p", __func__, users, cr)); mtx_lock(&cr->cr_mtx); KASSERT(cr->cr_users >= users, ("%s: users %d not > %d on cred %p", __func__, cr->cr_users, users, cr)); cr->cr_users -= users; cr->cr_ref += ref; cr->cr_ref -= users; if (cr->cr_users > 0) { mtx_unlock(&cr->cr_mtx); return; } - KASSERT(cr->cr_ref >= 0, ("%s: ref %d not >= 0 on cred %p", + KASSERT(cr->cr_ref >= 0, ("%s: ref %ld not >= 0 on cred %p", __func__, cr->cr_ref, cr)); if (cr->cr_ref > 0) { mtx_unlock(&cr->cr_mtx); return; } crfree_final(cr); } void crcowfree(struct thread *td) { struct ucred *cr; cr = crunuse(td); if (cr != NULL) crfree(cr); } struct ucred * crcowsync(void) { struct thread *td; struct proc *p; struct ucred *crnew, *crold; td = curthread; p = td->td_proc; PROC_LOCK_ASSERT(p, MA_OWNED); MPASS(td->td_realucred == td->td_ucred); if (td->td_realucred == p->p_ucred) return (NULL); crnew = crcowget(p->p_ucred); crold = crunuse(td); td->td_realucred = crnew; td->td_ucred = td->td_realucred; return (crold); } /* * Batching. */ void credbatch_add(struct credbatch *crb, struct thread *td) { struct ucred *cr; MPASS(td->td_realucred != NULL); MPASS(td->td_realucred == td->td_ucred); MPASS(TD_GET_STATE(td) == TDS_INACTIVE); cr = td->td_realucred; KASSERT(cr->cr_users > 0, ("%s: users %d not > 0 on cred %p", __func__, cr->cr_users, cr)); if (crb->cred != cr) { if (crb->users > 0) { MPASS(crb->cred != NULL); crunusebatch(crb->cred, crb->users, crb->ref); crb->users = 0; crb->ref = 0; } } crb->cred = cr; crb->users++; crb->ref += td->td_ucredref; td->td_ucredref = 0; td->td_realucred = NULL; } void credbatch_final(struct credbatch *crb) { MPASS(crb->cred != NULL); MPASS(crb->users > 0); crunusebatch(crb->cred, crb->users, crb->ref); } /* * Allocate a zeroed cred structure. */ struct ucred * crget(void) { struct ucred *cr; cr = malloc(sizeof(*cr), M_CRED, M_WAITOK | M_ZERO); mtx_init(&cr->cr_mtx, "cred", NULL, MTX_DEF); cr->cr_ref = 1; #ifdef AUDIT audit_cred_init(cr); #endif #ifdef MAC mac_cred_init(cr); #endif cr->cr_groups = cr->cr_smallgroups; cr->cr_agroups = sizeof(cr->cr_smallgroups) / sizeof(cr->cr_smallgroups[0]); return (cr); } /* * Claim another reference to a ucred structure. */ struct ucred * crhold(struct ucred *cr) { struct thread *td; td = curthread; if (__predict_true(td->td_realucred == cr)) { KASSERT(cr->cr_users > 0, ("%s: users %d not > 0 on cred %p", __func__, cr->cr_users, cr)); td->td_ucredref++; return (cr); } mtx_lock(&cr->cr_mtx); cr->cr_ref++; mtx_unlock(&cr->cr_mtx); return (cr); } /* * Free a cred structure. Throws away space when ref count gets to 0. */ void crfree(struct ucred *cr) { struct thread *td; td = curthread; if (__predict_true(td->td_realucred == cr)) { KASSERT(cr->cr_users > 0, ("%s: users %d not > 0 on cred %p", __func__, cr->cr_users, cr)); td->td_ucredref--; return; } mtx_lock(&cr->cr_mtx); KASSERT(cr->cr_users >= 0, ("%s: users %d not >= 0 on cred %p", __func__, cr->cr_users, cr)); cr->cr_ref--; if (cr->cr_users > 0) { mtx_unlock(&cr->cr_mtx); return; } - KASSERT(cr->cr_ref >= 0, ("%s: ref %d not >= 0 on cred %p", + KASSERT(cr->cr_ref >= 0, ("%s: ref %ld not >= 0 on cred %p", __func__, cr->cr_ref, cr)); if (cr->cr_ref > 0) { mtx_unlock(&cr->cr_mtx); return; } crfree_final(cr); } static void crfree_final(struct ucred *cr) { KASSERT(cr->cr_users == 0, ("%s: users %d not == 0 on cred %p", __func__, cr->cr_users, cr)); - KASSERT(cr->cr_ref == 0, ("%s: ref %d not == 0 on cred %p", + KASSERT(cr->cr_ref == 0, ("%s: ref %ld not == 0 on cred %p", __func__, cr->cr_ref, cr)); /* * Some callers of crget(), such as nfs_statfs(), allocate a temporary * credential, but don't allocate a uidinfo structure. */ if (cr->cr_uidinfo != NULL) uifree(cr->cr_uidinfo); if (cr->cr_ruidinfo != NULL) uifree(cr->cr_ruidinfo); if (cr->cr_prison != NULL) prison_free(cr->cr_prison); if (cr->cr_loginclass != NULL) loginclass_free(cr->cr_loginclass); #ifdef AUDIT audit_cred_destroy(cr); #endif #ifdef MAC mac_cred_destroy(cr); #endif mtx_destroy(&cr->cr_mtx); if (cr->cr_groups != cr->cr_smallgroups) free(cr->cr_groups, M_CRED); free(cr, M_CRED); } /* * Copy a ucred's contents from a template. Does not block. */ void crcopy(struct ucred *dest, struct ucred *src) { KASSERT(dest->cr_ref == 1, ("crcopy of shared ucred")); bcopy(&src->cr_startcopy, &dest->cr_startcopy, (unsigned)((caddr_t)&src->cr_endcopy - (caddr_t)&src->cr_startcopy)); + dest->cr_flags = src->cr_flags; crsetgroups(dest, src->cr_ngroups, src->cr_groups); uihold(dest->cr_uidinfo); uihold(dest->cr_ruidinfo); prison_hold(dest->cr_prison); loginclass_hold(dest->cr_loginclass); #ifdef AUDIT audit_cred_copy(src, dest); #endif #ifdef MAC mac_cred_copy(src, dest); #endif } /* * Dup cred struct to a new held one. */ struct ucred * crdup(struct ucred *cr) { struct ucred *newcr; newcr = crget(); crcopy(newcr, cr); return (newcr); } /* * Fill in a struct xucred based on a struct ucred. */ void cru2x(struct ucred *cr, struct xucred *xcr) { int ngroups; bzero(xcr, sizeof(*xcr)); xcr->cr_version = XUCRED_VERSION; xcr->cr_uid = cr->cr_uid; ngroups = MIN(cr->cr_ngroups, XU_NGROUPS); xcr->cr_ngroups = ngroups; bcopy(cr->cr_groups, xcr->cr_groups, ngroups * sizeof(*cr->cr_groups)); } void cru2xt(struct thread *td, struct xucred *xcr) { cru2x(td->td_ucred, xcr); xcr->cr_pid = td->td_proc->p_pid; } /* * Set initial process credentials. * Callers are responsible for providing the reference for provided credentials. */ void proc_set_cred_init(struct proc *p, struct ucred *newcred) { p->p_ucred = crcowget(newcred); } /* * Change process credentials. * Callers are responsible for providing the reference for passed credentials * and for freeing old ones. * * Process has to be locked except when it does not have credentials (as it * should not be visible just yet) or when newcred is NULL (as this can be * only used when the process is about to be freed, at which point it should * not be visible anymore). */ void proc_set_cred(struct proc *p, struct ucred *newcred) { struct ucred *cr; cr = p->p_ucred; MPASS(cr != NULL); PROC_LOCK_ASSERT(p, MA_OWNED); KASSERT(newcred->cr_users == 0, ("%s: users %d not 0 on cred %p", __func__, newcred->cr_users, newcred)); mtx_lock(&cr->cr_mtx); KASSERT(cr->cr_users > 0, ("%s: users %d not > 0 on cred %p", __func__, cr->cr_users, cr)); cr->cr_users--; mtx_unlock(&cr->cr_mtx); p->p_ucred = newcred; newcred->cr_users = 1; PROC_UPDATE_COW(p); } void proc_unset_cred(struct proc *p) { struct ucred *cr; MPASS(p->p_state == PRS_ZOMBIE || p->p_state == PRS_NEW); cr = p->p_ucred; p->p_ucred = NULL; KASSERT(cr->cr_users > 0, ("%s: users %d not > 0 on cred %p", __func__, cr->cr_users, cr)); mtx_lock(&cr->cr_mtx); cr->cr_users--; if (cr->cr_users == 0) - KASSERT(cr->cr_ref > 0, ("%s: ref %d not > 0 on cred %p", + KASSERT(cr->cr_ref > 0, ("%s: ref %ld not > 0 on cred %p", __func__, cr->cr_ref, cr)); mtx_unlock(&cr->cr_mtx); crfree(cr); } struct ucred * crcopysafe(struct proc *p, struct ucred *cr) { struct ucred *oldcred; int groups; PROC_LOCK_ASSERT(p, MA_OWNED); oldcred = p->p_ucred; while (cr->cr_agroups < oldcred->cr_agroups) { groups = oldcred->cr_agroups; PROC_UNLOCK(p); crextend(cr, groups); PROC_LOCK(p); oldcred = p->p_ucred; } crcopy(cr, oldcred); return (oldcred); } /* * Extend the passed in credential to hold n items. */ void crextend(struct ucred *cr, int n) { int cnt; /* Truncate? */ if (n <= cr->cr_agroups) return; /* * We extend by 2 each time since we're using a power of two * allocator until we need enough groups to fill a page. * Once we're allocating multiple pages, only allocate as many * as we actually need. The case of processes needing a * non-power of two number of pages seems more likely than * a real world process that adds thousands of groups one at a * time. */ if ( n < PAGE_SIZE / sizeof(gid_t) ) { if (cr->cr_agroups == 0) cnt = MAX(1, MINALLOCSIZE / sizeof(gid_t)); else cnt = cr->cr_agroups * 2; while (cnt < n) cnt *= 2; } else cnt = roundup2(n, PAGE_SIZE / sizeof(gid_t)); /* Free the old array. */ if (cr->cr_groups != cr->cr_smallgroups) free(cr->cr_groups, M_CRED); cr->cr_groups = malloc(cnt * sizeof(gid_t), M_CRED, M_WAITOK | M_ZERO); cr->cr_agroups = cnt; } /* * Copy groups in to a credential, preserving any necessary invariants. * Currently this includes the sorting of all supplemental gids. * crextend() must have been called before hand to ensure sufficient * space is available. */ static void crsetgroups_locked(struct ucred *cr, int ngrp, gid_t *groups) { int i; int j; gid_t g; KASSERT(cr->cr_agroups >= ngrp, ("cr_ngroups is too small")); bcopy(groups, cr->cr_groups, ngrp * sizeof(gid_t)); cr->cr_ngroups = ngrp; /* * Sort all groups except cr_groups[0] to allow groupmember to * perform a binary search. * * XXX: If large numbers of groups become common this should * be replaced with shell sort like linux uses or possibly * heap sort. */ for (i = 2; i < ngrp; i++) { g = cr->cr_groups[i]; for (j = i-1; j >= 1 && g < cr->cr_groups[j]; j--) cr->cr_groups[j + 1] = cr->cr_groups[j]; cr->cr_groups[j + 1] = g; } } /* * Copy groups in to a credential after expanding it if required. * Truncate the list to (ngroups_max + 1) if it is too large. */ void crsetgroups(struct ucred *cr, int ngrp, gid_t *groups) { if (ngrp > ngroups_max + 1) ngrp = ngroups_max + 1; crextend(cr, ngrp); crsetgroups_locked(cr, ngrp, groups); } /* * Get login name, if available. */ #ifndef _SYS_SYSPROTO_H_ struct getlogin_args { char *namebuf; u_int namelen; }; #endif /* ARGSUSED */ int sys_getlogin(struct thread *td, struct getlogin_args *uap) { char login[MAXLOGNAME]; struct proc *p = td->td_proc; size_t len; if (uap->namelen > MAXLOGNAME) uap->namelen = MAXLOGNAME; PROC_LOCK(p); SESS_LOCK(p->p_session); len = strlcpy(login, p->p_session->s_login, uap->namelen) + 1; SESS_UNLOCK(p->p_session); PROC_UNLOCK(p); if (len > uap->namelen) return (ERANGE); return (copyout(login, uap->namebuf, len)); } /* * Set login name. */ #ifndef _SYS_SYSPROTO_H_ struct setlogin_args { char *namebuf; }; #endif /* ARGSUSED */ int sys_setlogin(struct thread *td, struct setlogin_args *uap) { struct proc *p = td->td_proc; int error; char logintmp[MAXLOGNAME]; CTASSERT(sizeof(p->p_session->s_login) >= sizeof(logintmp)); error = priv_check(td, PRIV_PROC_SETLOGIN); if (error) return (error); error = copyinstr(uap->namebuf, logintmp, sizeof(logintmp), NULL); if (error != 0) { if (error == ENAMETOOLONG) error = EINVAL; return (error); } AUDIT_ARG_LOGIN(logintmp); PROC_LOCK(p); SESS_LOCK(p->p_session); strcpy(p->p_session->s_login, logintmp); SESS_UNLOCK(p->p_session); PROC_UNLOCK(p); return (0); } void setsugid(struct proc *p) { PROC_LOCK_ASSERT(p, MA_OWNED); p->p_flag |= P_SUGID; } /*- * Change a process's effective uid. * Side effects: newcred->cr_uid and newcred->cr_uidinfo will be modified. * References: newcred must be an exclusive credential reference for the * duration of the call. */ void change_euid(struct ucred *newcred, struct uidinfo *euip) { newcred->cr_uid = euip->ui_uid; uihold(euip); uifree(newcred->cr_uidinfo); newcred->cr_uidinfo = euip; } /*- * Change a process's effective gid. * Side effects: newcred->cr_gid will be modified. * References: newcred must be an exclusive credential reference for the * duration of the call. */ void change_egid(struct ucred *newcred, gid_t egid) { newcred->cr_groups[0] = egid; } /*- * Change a process's real uid. * Side effects: newcred->cr_ruid will be updated, newcred->cr_ruidinfo * will be updated, and the old and new cr_ruidinfo proc * counts will be updated. * References: newcred must be an exclusive credential reference for the * duration of the call. */ void change_ruid(struct ucred *newcred, struct uidinfo *ruip) { (void)chgproccnt(newcred->cr_ruidinfo, -1, 0); newcred->cr_ruid = ruip->ui_uid; uihold(ruip); uifree(newcred->cr_ruidinfo); newcred->cr_ruidinfo = ruip; (void)chgproccnt(newcred->cr_ruidinfo, 1, 0); } /*- * Change a process's real gid. * Side effects: newcred->cr_rgid will be updated. * References: newcred must be an exclusive credential reference for the * duration of the call. */ void change_rgid(struct ucred *newcred, gid_t rgid) { newcred->cr_rgid = rgid; } /*- * Change a process's saved uid. * Side effects: newcred->cr_svuid will be updated. * References: newcred must be an exclusive credential reference for the * duration of the call. */ void change_svuid(struct ucred *newcred, uid_t svuid) { newcred->cr_svuid = svuid; } /*- * Change a process's saved gid. * Side effects: newcred->cr_svgid will be updated. * References: newcred must be an exclusive credential reference for the * duration of the call. */ void change_svgid(struct ucred *newcred, gid_t svgid) { newcred->cr_svgid = svgid; } bool allow_ptrace = true; SYSCTL_BOOL(_security_bsd, OID_AUTO, allow_ptrace, CTLFLAG_RWTUN, &allow_ptrace, 0, "Deny ptrace(2) use by returning ENOSYS"); diff --git a/sys/sys/proc.h b/sys/sys/proc.h index c6670bdc96f8..172e716d8785 100644 --- a/sys/sys/proc.h +++ b/sys/sys/proc.h @@ -1,1355 +1,1355 @@ /*- * SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause * * Copyright (c) 1986, 1989, 1991, 1993 * The Regents of the University of California. All rights reserved. * (c) UNIX System Laboratories, Inc. * All or some portions of this file are derived from material licensed * to the University of California by American Telephone and Telegraph * Co. or Unix System Laboratories, Inc. and are reproduced herein with * the permission of UNIX System Laboratories, Inc. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * 3. Neither the name of the University nor the names of its contributors * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software * without specific prior written permission. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE REGENTS AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE REGENTS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF * SUCH DAMAGE. * * @(#)proc.h 8.15 (Berkeley) 5/19/95 * $FreeBSD$ */ #ifndef _SYS_PROC_H_ #define _SYS_PROC_H_ #include /* For struct callout. */ #include /* For struct klist. */ #ifdef _KERNEL #include #endif #include #ifndef _KERNEL #include #endif #include #include #include #include #include #include #include /* XXX. */ #include #include #include #include #include #ifndef _KERNEL #include /* For structs itimerval, timeval. */ #else #include #include #endif #include #include #include #include #include /* Machine-dependent proc substruct. */ #ifdef _KERNEL #include #endif /* * One structure allocated per session. * * List of locks * (m) locked by s_mtx mtx * (e) locked by proctree_lock sx * (c) const until freeing */ struct session { u_int s_count; /* Ref cnt; pgrps in session - atomic. */ struct proc *s_leader; /* (m + e) Session leader. */ struct vnode *s_ttyvp; /* (m) Vnode of controlling tty. */ struct cdev_priv *s_ttydp; /* (m) Device of controlling tty. */ struct tty *s_ttyp; /* (e) Controlling tty. */ pid_t s_sid; /* (c) Session ID. */ /* (m) Setlogin() name: */ char s_login[roundup(MAXLOGNAME, sizeof(long))]; struct mtx s_mtx; /* Mutex to protect members. */ }; /* * One structure allocated per process group. * * List of locks * (m) locked by pg_mtx mtx * (e) locked by proctree_lock sx * (c) const until freeing */ struct pgrp { LIST_ENTRY(pgrp) pg_hash; /* (e) Hash chain. */ LIST_HEAD(, proc) pg_members; /* (m + e) Pointer to pgrp members. */ struct session *pg_session; /* (c) Pointer to session. */ struct sigiolst pg_sigiolst; /* (m) List of sigio sources. */ pid_t pg_id; /* (c) Process group id. */ struct mtx pg_mtx; /* Mutex to protect members */ int pg_flags; /* (m) PGRP_ flags */ }; #define PGRP_ORPHANED 0x00000001 /* Group is orphaned */ /* * pargs, used to hold a copy of the command line, if it had a sane length. */ struct pargs { u_int ar_ref; /* Reference count. */ u_int ar_length; /* Length. */ u_char ar_args[1]; /* Arguments. */ }; /*- * Description of a process. * * This structure contains the information needed to manage a thread of * control, known in UN*X as a process; it has references to substructures * containing descriptions of things that the process uses, but may share * with related processes. The process structure and the substructures * are always addressable except for those marked "(CPU)" below, * which might be addressable only on a processor on which the process * is running. * * Below is a key of locks used to protect each member of struct proc. The * lock is indicated by a reference to a specific character in parens in the * associated comment. * * - not yet protected * a - only touched by curproc or parent during fork/wait * b - created at fork, never changes * (exception aiods switch vmspaces, but they are also * marked 'P_SYSTEM' so hopefully it will be left alone) * c - locked by proc mtx * d - locked by allproc_lock lock * e - locked by proctree_lock lock * f - session mtx * g - process group mtx * h - callout_lock mtx * i - by curproc or the master session mtx * j - locked by proc slock * k - only accessed by curthread * k*- only accessed by curthread and from an interrupt * kx- only accessed by curthread and by debugger * l - the attaching proc or attaching proc parent * n - not locked, lazy * o - ktrace lock * q - td_contested lock * r - p_peers lock * s - see sleepq_switch(), sleeping_on_old_rtc(), and sleep(9) * t - thread lock * u - process stat lock * w - process timer lock * x - created at fork, only changes during single threading in exec * y - created at first aio, doesn't change until exit or exec at which * point we are single-threaded and only curthread changes it * * If the locking key specifies two identifiers (for example, p_pptr) then * either lock is sufficient for read access, but both locks must be held * for write access. */ struct cpuset; struct filecaps; struct filemon; struct kaioinfo; struct kaudit_record; struct kcov_info; struct kdtrace_proc; struct kdtrace_thread; struct kmsan_td; struct kq_timer_cb_data; struct mqueue_notifier; struct p_sched; struct proc; struct procdesc; struct racct; struct sbuf; struct sleepqueue; struct socket; struct td_sched; struct thread; struct trapframe; struct turnstile; struct vm_map; struct vm_map_entry; struct epoch_tracker; struct syscall_args { u_int code; u_int original_code; struct sysent *callp; register_t args[8]; }; /* * XXX: Does this belong in resource.h or resourcevar.h instead? * Resource usage extension. The times in rusage structs in the kernel are * never up to date. The actual times are kept as runtimes and tick counts * (with control info in the "previous" times), and are converted when * userland asks for rusage info. Backwards compatibility prevents putting * this directly in the user-visible rusage struct. * * Locking for p_rux: (cu) means (u) for p_rux and (c) for p_crux. * Locking for td_rux: (t) for all fields. */ struct rusage_ext { uint64_t rux_runtime; /* (cu) Real time. */ uint64_t rux_uticks; /* (cu) Statclock hits in user mode. */ uint64_t rux_sticks; /* (cu) Statclock hits in sys mode. */ uint64_t rux_iticks; /* (cu) Statclock hits in intr mode. */ uint64_t rux_uu; /* (c) Previous user time in usec. */ uint64_t rux_su; /* (c) Previous sys time in usec. */ uint64_t rux_tu; /* (c) Previous total time in usec. */ }; /* * Kernel runnable context (thread). * This is what is put to sleep and reactivated. * Thread context. Processes may have multiple threads. */ struct thread { struct mtx *volatile td_lock; /* replaces sched lock */ struct proc *td_proc; /* (*) Associated process. */ TAILQ_ENTRY(thread) td_plist; /* (*) All threads in this proc. */ TAILQ_ENTRY(thread) td_runq; /* (t) Run queue. */ union { TAILQ_ENTRY(thread) td_slpq; /* (t) Sleep queue. */ struct thread *td_zombie; /* Zombie list linkage */ }; TAILQ_ENTRY(thread) td_lockq; /* (t) Lock queue. */ LIST_ENTRY(thread) td_hash; /* (d) Hash chain. */ struct cpuset *td_cpuset; /* (t) CPU affinity mask. */ struct domainset_ref td_domain; /* (a) NUMA policy */ struct seltd *td_sel; /* Select queue/channel. */ struct sleepqueue *td_sleepqueue; /* (k) Associated sleep queue. */ struct turnstile *td_turnstile; /* (k) Associated turnstile. */ struct rl_q_entry *td_rlqe; /* (k) Associated range lock entry. */ struct umtx_q *td_umtxq; /* (c?) Link for when we're blocked. */ lwpid_t td_tid; /* (b) Thread ID. */ sigqueue_t td_sigqueue; /* (c) Sigs arrived, not delivered. */ #define td_siglist td_sigqueue.sq_signals u_char td_lend_user_pri; /* (t) Lend user pri. */ u_char td_allocdomain; /* (b) NUMA domain backing this struct thread. */ u_char td_base_ithread_pri; /* (t) Base ithread pri */ struct kmsan_td *td_kmsan; /* (k) KMSAN state */ /* Cleared during fork1(), thread_create(), or kthread_add(). */ #define td_startzero td_flags int td_flags; /* (t) TDF_* flags. */ int td_ast; /* (t) TDA_* indicators */ int td_inhibitors; /* (t) Why can not run. */ int td_pflags; /* (k) Private thread (TDP_*) flags. */ int td_pflags2; /* (k) Private thread (TDP2_*) flags. */ int td_dupfd; /* (k) Ret value from fdopen. XXX */ int td_sqqueue; /* (t) Sleepqueue queue blocked on. */ const void *td_wchan; /* (t) Sleep address. */ const char *td_wmesg; /* (t) Reason for sleep. */ volatile u_char td_owepreempt; /* (k*) Preempt on last critical_exit */ u_char td_tsqueue; /* (t) Turnstile queue blocked on. */ short td_locks; /* (k) Debug: count of non-spin locks */ short td_rw_rlocks; /* (k) Count of rwlock read locks. */ short td_sx_slocks; /* (k) Count of sx shared locks. */ short td_lk_slocks; /* (k) Count of lockmgr shared locks. */ short td_stopsched; /* (k) Scheduler stopped. */ struct turnstile *td_blocked; /* (t) Lock thread is blocked on. */ const char *td_lockname; /* (t) Name of lock blocked on. */ LIST_HEAD(, turnstile) td_contested; /* (q) Contested locks. */ struct lock_list_entry *td_sleeplocks; /* (k) Held sleep locks. */ int td_intr_nesting_level; /* (k) Interrupt recursion. */ int td_pinned; /* (k) Temporary cpu pin count. */ struct ucred *td_realucred; /* (k) Reference to credentials. */ struct ucred *td_ucred; /* (k) Used credentials, temporarily switchable. */ struct plimit *td_limit; /* (k) Resource limits. */ int td_slptick; /* (t) Time at sleep. */ int td_blktick; /* (t) Time spent blocked. */ int td_swvoltick; /* (t) Time at last SW_VOL switch. */ int td_swinvoltick; /* (t) Time at last SW_INVOL switch. */ u_int td_cow; /* (*) Number of copy-on-write faults */ struct rusage td_ru; /* (t) rusage information. */ struct rusage_ext td_rux; /* (t) Internal rusage information. */ uint64_t td_incruntime; /* (t) Cpu ticks to transfer to proc. */ uint64_t td_runtime; /* (t) How many cpu ticks we've run. */ u_int td_pticks; /* (t) Statclock hits for profiling */ u_int td_sticks; /* (t) Statclock hits in system mode. */ u_int td_iticks; /* (t) Statclock hits in intr mode. */ u_int td_uticks; /* (t) Statclock hits in user mode. */ int td_intrval; /* (t) Return value for sleepq. */ sigset_t td_oldsigmask; /* (k) Saved mask from pre sigpause. */ volatile u_int td_generation; /* (k) For detection of preemption */ stack_t td_sigstk; /* (k) Stack ptr and on-stack flag. */ int td_xsig; /* (c) Signal for ptrace */ u_long td_profil_addr; /* (k) Temporary addr until AST. */ u_int td_profil_ticks; /* (k) Temporary ticks until AST. */ char td_name[MAXCOMLEN + 1]; /* (*) Thread name. */ struct file *td_fpop; /* (k) file referencing cdev under op */ int td_dbgflags; /* (c) Userland debugger flags */ siginfo_t td_si; /* (c) For debugger or core file */ int td_ng_outbound; /* (k) Thread entered ng from above. */ struct osd td_osd; /* (k) Object specific data. */ struct vm_map_entry *td_map_def_user; /* (k) Deferred entries. */ pid_t td_dbg_forked; /* (c) Child pid for debugger. */ struct vnode *td_vp_reserved;/* (k) Preallocated vnode. */ u_int td_no_sleeping; /* (k) Sleeping disabled count. */ void *td_su; /* (k) FFS SU private */ sbintime_t td_sleeptimo; /* (t) Sleep timeout. */ int td_rtcgen; /* (s) rtc_generation of abs. sleep */ int td_errno; /* (k) Error from last syscall. */ size_t td_vslock_sz; /* (k) amount of vslock-ed space */ struct kcov_info *td_kcov_info; /* (*) Kernel code coverage data */ - u_int td_ucredref; /* (k) references on td_realucred */ + long td_ucredref; /* (k) references on td_realucred */ #define td_endzero td_sigmask /* Copied during fork1(), thread_create(), or kthread_add(). */ #define td_startcopy td_endzero sigset_t td_sigmask; /* (c) Current signal mask. */ u_char td_rqindex; /* (t) Run queue index. */ u_char td_base_pri; /* (t) Thread base kernel priority. */ u_char td_priority; /* (t) Thread active priority. */ u_char td_pri_class; /* (t) Scheduling class. */ u_char td_user_pri; /* (t) User pri from estcpu and nice. */ u_char td_base_user_pri; /* (t) Base user pri */ uintptr_t td_rb_list; /* (k) Robust list head. */ uintptr_t td_rbp_list; /* (k) Robust priv list head. */ uintptr_t td_rb_inact; /* (k) Current in-action mutex loc. */ struct syscall_args td_sa; /* (kx) Syscall parameters. Copied on fork for child tracing. */ void *td_sigblock_ptr; /* (k) uptr for fast sigblock. */ uint32_t td_sigblock_val; /* (k) fast sigblock value read at td_sigblock_ptr on kern entry */ #define td_endcopy td_pcb /* * Fields that must be manually set in fork1(), thread_create(), kthread_add(), * or already have been set in the allocator, constructor, etc. */ struct pcb *td_pcb; /* (k) Kernel VA of pcb and kstack. */ enum td_states { TDS_INACTIVE = 0x0, TDS_INHIBITED, TDS_CAN_RUN, TDS_RUNQ, TDS_RUNNING } td_state; /* (t) thread state */ /* Note: td_state must be accessed using TD_{GET,SET}_STATE(). */ union { syscallarg_t tdu_retval[2]; off_t tdu_off; } td_uretoff; /* (k) Syscall aux returns. */ #define td_retval td_uretoff.tdu_retval u_int td_cowgen; /* (k) Generation of COW pointers. */ /* LP64 hole */ struct callout td_slpcallout; /* (h) Callout for sleep. */ struct trapframe *td_frame; /* (k) */ vm_offset_t td_kstack; /* (a) Kernel VA of kstack. */ int td_kstack_pages; /* (a) Size of the kstack. */ volatile u_int td_critnest; /* (k*) Critical section nest level. */ struct mdthread td_md; /* (k) Any machine-dependent fields. */ struct kaudit_record *td_ar; /* (k) Active audit record, if any. */ struct lpohead td_lprof[2]; /* (a) lock profiling objects. */ struct kdtrace_thread *td_dtrace; /* (*) DTrace-specific data. */ struct vnet *td_vnet; /* (k) Effective vnet. */ const char *td_vnet_lpush; /* (k) Debugging vnet push / pop. */ struct trapframe *td_intr_frame;/* (k) Frame of the current irq */ struct proc *td_rfppwait_p; /* (k) The vforked child */ struct vm_page **td_ma; /* (k) uio pages held */ int td_ma_cnt; /* (k) size of *td_ma */ /* LP64 hole */ void *td_emuldata; /* Emulator state data */ int td_lastcpu; /* (t) Last cpu we were on. */ int td_oncpu; /* (t) Which cpu we are on. */ void *td_lkpi_task; /* LinuxKPI task struct pointer */ int td_pmcpend; void *td_remotereq; /* (c) dbg remote request. */ off_t td_ktr_io_lim; /* (k) limit for ktrace file size */ #ifdef EPOCH_TRACE SLIST_HEAD(, epoch_tracker) td_epochs; #endif }; struct thread0_storage { struct thread t0st_thread; uint64_t t0st_sched[10]; }; struct mtx *thread_lock_block(struct thread *); void thread_lock_block_wait(struct thread *); void thread_lock_set(struct thread *, struct mtx *); void thread_lock_unblock(struct thread *, struct mtx *); #define THREAD_LOCK_ASSERT(td, type) \ mtx_assert((td)->td_lock, (type)) #define THREAD_LOCK_BLOCKED_ASSERT(td, type) \ do { \ struct mtx *__m = (td)->td_lock; \ if (__m != &blocked_lock) \ mtx_assert(__m, (type)); \ } while (0) #ifdef INVARIANTS #define THREAD_LOCKPTR_ASSERT(td, lock) \ do { \ struct mtx *__m; \ __m = (td)->td_lock; \ KASSERT(__m == (lock), \ ("Thread %p lock %p does not match %p", td, __m, (lock))); \ } while (0) #define THREAD_LOCKPTR_BLOCKED_ASSERT(td, lock) \ do { \ struct mtx *__m; \ __m = (td)->td_lock; \ KASSERT(__m == (lock) || __m == &blocked_lock, \ ("Thread %p lock %p does not match %p", td, __m, (lock))); \ } while (0) #define TD_LOCKS_INC(td) ((td)->td_locks++) #define TD_LOCKS_DEC(td) do { \ KASSERT(SCHEDULER_STOPPED_TD(td) || (td)->td_locks > 0, \ ("thread %p owns no locks", (td))); \ (td)->td_locks--; \ } while (0) #else #define THREAD_LOCKPTR_ASSERT(td, lock) #define THREAD_LOCKPTR_BLOCKED_ASSERT(td, lock) #define TD_LOCKS_INC(td) #define TD_LOCKS_DEC(td) #endif /* * Flags kept in td_flags: * To change these you MUST have the scheduler lock. */ #define TDF_BORROWING 0x00000001 /* Thread is borrowing pri from another. */ #define TDF_INPANIC 0x00000002 /* Caused a panic, let it drive crashdump. */ #define TDF_INMEM 0x00000004 /* Thread's stack is in memory. */ #define TDF_SINTR 0x00000008 /* Sleep is interruptible. */ #define TDF_TIMEOUT 0x00000010 /* Timing out during sleep. */ #define TDF_IDLETD 0x00000020 /* This is a per-CPU idle thread. */ #define TDF_CANSWAP 0x00000040 /* Thread can be swapped. */ #define TDF_SIGWAIT 0x00000080 /* Ignore ignored signals */ #define TDF_KTH_SUSP 0x00000100 /* kthread is suspended */ #define TDF_ALLPROCSUSP 0x00000200 /* suspended by SINGLE_ALLPROC */ #define TDF_BOUNDARY 0x00000400 /* Thread suspended at user boundary */ #define TDF_UNUSED1 0x00000800 /* Available */ #define TDF_UNUSED2 0x00001000 /* Available */ #define TDF_SBDRY 0x00002000 /* Stop only on usermode boundary. */ #define TDF_UPIBLOCKED 0x00004000 /* Thread blocked on user PI mutex. */ #define TDF_UNUSED3 0x00008000 /* Available */ #define TDF_UNUSED4 0x00010000 /* Available */ #define TDF_UNUSED5 0x00020000 /* Available */ #define TDF_NOLOAD 0x00040000 /* Ignore during load avg calculations. */ #define TDF_SERESTART 0x00080000 /* ERESTART on stop attempts. */ #define TDF_THRWAKEUP 0x00100000 /* Libthr thread must not suspend itself. */ #define TDF_SEINTR 0x00200000 /* EINTR on stop attempts. */ #define TDF_SWAPINREQ 0x00400000 /* Swapin request due to wakeup. */ #define TDF_UNUSED6 0x00800000 /* Available */ #define TDF_SCHED0 0x01000000 /* Reserved for scheduler private use */ #define TDF_SCHED1 0x02000000 /* Reserved for scheduler private use */ #define TDF_SCHED2 0x04000000 /* Reserved for scheduler private use */ #define TDF_SCHED3 0x08000000 /* Reserved for scheduler private use */ #define TDF_UNUSED7 0x10000000 /* Available */ #define TDF_UNUSED8 0x20000000 /* Available */ #define TDF_UNUSED9 0x40000000 /* Available */ #define TDF_UNUSED10 0x80000000 /* Available */ enum { TDA_AST = 0, /* Special: call all non-flagged AST handlers */ TDA_OWEUPC, TDA_HWPMC, TDA_VFORK, TDA_ALRM, TDA_PROF, TDA_MAC, TDA_SCHED, TDA_UFS, TDA_GEOM, TDA_KQUEUE, TDA_RACCT, TDA_MOD1, /* For third party use, before signals are */ TAD_MOD2, /* processed .. */ TDA_SIG, TDA_KTRACE, TDA_SUSPEND, TDA_SIGSUSPEND, TDA_MOD3, /* .. and after */ TAD_MOD4, TDA_MAX, }; #define TDAI(tda) (1U << (tda)) #define td_ast_pending(td, tda) ((td->td_ast & TDAI(tda)) != 0) /* Userland debug flags */ #define TDB_SUSPEND 0x00000001 /* Thread is suspended by debugger */ #define TDB_XSIG 0x00000002 /* Thread is exchanging signal under trace */ #define TDB_USERWR 0x00000004 /* Debugger modified memory or registers */ #define TDB_SCE 0x00000008 /* Thread performs syscall enter */ #define TDB_SCX 0x00000010 /* Thread performs syscall exit */ #define TDB_EXEC 0x00000020 /* TDB_SCX from exec(2) family */ #define TDB_FORK 0x00000040 /* TDB_SCX from fork(2) that created new process */ #define TDB_STOPATFORK 0x00000080 /* Stop at the return from fork (child only) */ #define TDB_CHILD 0x00000100 /* New child indicator for ptrace() */ #define TDB_BORN 0x00000200 /* New LWP indicator for ptrace() */ #define TDB_EXIT 0x00000400 /* Exiting LWP indicator for ptrace() */ #define TDB_VFORK 0x00000800 /* vfork indicator for ptrace() */ #define TDB_FSTP 0x00001000 /* The thread is PT_ATTACH leader */ #define TDB_STEP 0x00002000 /* (x86) PSL_T set for PT_STEP */ #define TDB_SSWITCH 0x00004000 /* Suspended in ptracestop */ #define TDB_BOUNDARY 0x00008000 /* ptracestop() at boundary */ #define TDB_COREDUMPREQ 0x00010000 /* Coredump request */ #define TDB_SCREMOTEREQ 0x00020000 /* Remote syscall request */ /* * "Private" flags kept in td_pflags: * These are only written by curthread and thus need no locking. */ #define TDP_OLDMASK 0x00000001 /* Need to restore mask after suspend. */ #define TDP_INKTR 0x00000002 /* Thread is currently in KTR code. */ #define TDP_INKTRACE 0x00000004 /* Thread is currently in KTRACE code. */ #define TDP_BUFNEED 0x00000008 /* Do not recurse into the buf flush */ #define TDP_COWINPROGRESS 0x00000010 /* Snapshot copy-on-write in progress. */ #define TDP_ALTSTACK 0x00000020 /* Have alternate signal stack. */ #define TDP_DEADLKTREAT 0x00000040 /* Lock acquisition - deadlock treatment. */ #define TDP_NOFAULTING 0x00000080 /* Do not handle page faults. */ #define TDP_SIGFASTBLOCK 0x00000100 /* Fast sigblock active */ #define TDP_OWEUPC 0x00000200 /* Call addupc() at next AST. */ #define TDP_ITHREAD 0x00000400 /* Thread is an interrupt thread. */ #define TDP_SYNCIO 0x00000800 /* Local override, disable async i/o. */ #define TDP_SCHED1 0x00001000 /* Reserved for scheduler private use */ #define TDP_SCHED2 0x00002000 /* Reserved for scheduler private use */ #define TDP_SCHED3 0x00004000 /* Reserved for scheduler private use */ #define TDP_SCHED4 0x00008000 /* Reserved for scheduler private use */ #define TDP_GEOM 0x00010000 /* Settle GEOM before finishing syscall */ #define TDP_SOFTDEP 0x00020000 /* Stuck processing softdep worklist */ #define TDP_NORUNNINGBUF 0x00040000 /* Ignore runningbufspace check */ #define TDP_WAKEUP 0x00080000 /* Don't sleep in umtx cond_wait */ #define TDP_INBDFLUSH 0x00100000 /* Already in BO_BDFLUSH, do not recurse */ #define TDP_KTHREAD 0x00200000 /* This is an official kernel thread */ #define TDP_CALLCHAIN 0x00400000 /* Capture thread's callchain */ #define TDP_IGNSUSP 0x00800000 /* Permission to ignore the MNTK_SUSPEND* */ #define TDP_AUDITREC 0x01000000 /* Audit record pending on thread */ #define TDP_RFPPWAIT 0x02000000 /* Handle RFPPWAIT on syscall exit */ #define TDP_RESETSPUR 0x04000000 /* Reset spurious page fault history. */ #define TDP_NERRNO 0x08000000 /* Last errno is already in td_errno */ #define TDP_UIOHELD 0x10000000 /* Current uio has pages held in td_ma */ #define TDP_INTCPCALLOUT 0x20000000 /* used by netinet/tcp_timer.c */ #define TDP_EXECVMSPC 0x40000000 /* Execve destroyed old vmspace */ #define TDP_SIGFASTPENDING 0x80000000 /* Pending signal due to sigfastblock */ #define TDP2_SBPAGES 0x00000001 /* Owns sbusy on some pages */ #define TDP2_COMPAT32RB 0x00000002 /* compat32 ABI for robust lists */ #define TDP2_ACCT 0x00000004 /* Doing accounting */ /* * Reasons that the current thread can not be run yet. * More than one may apply. */ #define TDI_SUSPENDED 0x0001 /* On suspension queue. */ #define TDI_SLEEPING 0x0002 /* Actually asleep! (tricky). */ #define TDI_SWAPPED 0x0004 /* Stack not in mem. Bad juju if run. */ #define TDI_LOCK 0x0008 /* Stopped on a lock. */ #define TDI_IWAIT 0x0010 /* Awaiting interrupt. */ #define TD_IS_SLEEPING(td) ((td)->td_inhibitors & TDI_SLEEPING) #define TD_ON_SLEEPQ(td) ((td)->td_wchan != NULL) #define TD_IS_SUSPENDED(td) ((td)->td_inhibitors & TDI_SUSPENDED) #define TD_IS_SWAPPED(td) ((td)->td_inhibitors & TDI_SWAPPED) #define TD_ON_LOCK(td) ((td)->td_inhibitors & TDI_LOCK) #define TD_AWAITING_INTR(td) ((td)->td_inhibitors & TDI_IWAIT) #ifdef _KERNEL #define TD_GET_STATE(td) atomic_load_int(&(td)->td_state) #else #define TD_GET_STATE(td) ((td)->td_state) #endif #define TD_IS_RUNNING(td) (TD_GET_STATE(td) == TDS_RUNNING) #define TD_ON_RUNQ(td) (TD_GET_STATE(td) == TDS_RUNQ) #define TD_CAN_RUN(td) (TD_GET_STATE(td) == TDS_CAN_RUN) #define TD_IS_INHIBITED(td) (TD_GET_STATE(td) == TDS_INHIBITED) #define TD_ON_UPILOCK(td) ((td)->td_flags & TDF_UPIBLOCKED) #define TD_IS_IDLETHREAD(td) ((td)->td_flags & TDF_IDLETD) #define TD_CAN_ABORT(td) (TD_ON_SLEEPQ((td)) && \ ((td)->td_flags & TDF_SINTR) != 0) #define KTDSTATE(td) \ (((td)->td_inhibitors & TDI_SLEEPING) != 0 ? "sleep" : \ ((td)->td_inhibitors & TDI_SUSPENDED) != 0 ? "suspended" : \ ((td)->td_inhibitors & TDI_SWAPPED) != 0 ? "swapped" : \ ((td)->td_inhibitors & TDI_LOCK) != 0 ? "blocked" : \ ((td)->td_inhibitors & TDI_IWAIT) != 0 ? "iwait" : "yielding") #define TD_SET_INHIB(td, inhib) do { \ TD_SET_STATE(td, TDS_INHIBITED); \ (td)->td_inhibitors |= (inhib); \ } while (0) #define TD_CLR_INHIB(td, inhib) do { \ if (((td)->td_inhibitors & (inhib)) && \ (((td)->td_inhibitors &= ~(inhib)) == 0)) \ TD_SET_STATE(td, TDS_CAN_RUN); \ } while (0) #define TD_SET_SLEEPING(td) TD_SET_INHIB((td), TDI_SLEEPING) #define TD_SET_SWAPPED(td) TD_SET_INHIB((td), TDI_SWAPPED) #define TD_SET_LOCK(td) TD_SET_INHIB((td), TDI_LOCK) #define TD_SET_SUSPENDED(td) TD_SET_INHIB((td), TDI_SUSPENDED) #define TD_SET_IWAIT(td) TD_SET_INHIB((td), TDI_IWAIT) #define TD_SET_EXITING(td) TD_SET_INHIB((td), TDI_EXITING) #define TD_CLR_SLEEPING(td) TD_CLR_INHIB((td), TDI_SLEEPING) #define TD_CLR_SWAPPED(td) TD_CLR_INHIB((td), TDI_SWAPPED) #define TD_CLR_LOCK(td) TD_CLR_INHIB((td), TDI_LOCK) #define TD_CLR_SUSPENDED(td) TD_CLR_INHIB((td), TDI_SUSPENDED) #define TD_CLR_IWAIT(td) TD_CLR_INHIB((td), TDI_IWAIT) #ifdef _KERNEL #define TD_SET_STATE(td, state) atomic_store_int(&(td)->td_state, state) #else #define TD_SET_STATE(td, state) (td)->td_state = state #endif #define TD_SET_RUNNING(td) TD_SET_STATE(td, TDS_RUNNING) #define TD_SET_RUNQ(td) TD_SET_STATE(td, TDS_RUNQ) #define TD_SET_CAN_RUN(td) TD_SET_STATE(td, TDS_CAN_RUN) #define TD_SBDRY_INTR(td) \ (((td)->td_flags & (TDF_SEINTR | TDF_SERESTART)) != 0) #define TD_SBDRY_ERRNO(td) \ (((td)->td_flags & TDF_SEINTR) != 0 ? EINTR : ERESTART) /* * Process structure. */ struct proc { LIST_ENTRY(proc) p_list; /* (d) List of all processes. */ TAILQ_HEAD(, thread) p_threads; /* (c) all threads. */ struct mtx p_slock; /* process spin lock */ struct ucred *p_ucred; /* (c) Process owner's identity. */ struct filedesc *p_fd; /* (b) Open files. */ struct filedesc_to_leader *p_fdtol; /* (b) Tracking node */ struct pwddesc *p_pd; /* (b) Cwd, chroot, jail, umask */ struct pstats *p_stats; /* (b) Accounting/statistics (CPU). */ struct plimit *p_limit; /* (c) Resource limits. */ struct callout p_limco; /* (c) Limit callout handle */ struct sigacts *p_sigacts; /* (x) Signal actions, state (CPU). */ int p_flag; /* (c) P_* flags. */ int p_flag2; /* (c) P2_* flags. */ enum p_states { PRS_NEW = 0, /* In creation */ PRS_NORMAL, /* threads can be run. */ PRS_ZOMBIE } p_state; /* (j/c) Process status. */ pid_t p_pid; /* (b) Process identifier. */ LIST_ENTRY(proc) p_hash; /* (d) Hash chain. */ LIST_ENTRY(proc) p_pglist; /* (g + e) List of processes in pgrp. */ struct proc *p_pptr; /* (c + e) Pointer to parent process. */ LIST_ENTRY(proc) p_sibling; /* (e) List of sibling processes. */ LIST_HEAD(, proc) p_children; /* (e) Pointer to list of children. */ struct proc *p_reaper; /* (e) My reaper. */ LIST_HEAD(, proc) p_reaplist; /* (e) List of my descendants (if I am reaper). */ LIST_ENTRY(proc) p_reapsibling; /* (e) List of siblings - descendants of the same reaper. */ struct mtx p_mtx; /* (n) Lock for this struct. */ struct mtx p_statmtx; /* Lock for the stats */ struct mtx p_itimmtx; /* Lock for the virt/prof timers */ struct mtx p_profmtx; /* Lock for the profiling */ struct ksiginfo *p_ksi; /* Locked by parent proc lock */ sigqueue_t p_sigqueue; /* (c) Sigs not delivered to a td. */ #define p_siglist p_sigqueue.sq_signals pid_t p_oppid; /* (c + e) Real parent pid. */ /* The following fields are all zeroed upon creation in fork. */ #define p_startzero p_vmspace struct vmspace *p_vmspace; /* (b) Address space. */ u_int p_swtick; /* (c) Tick when swapped in or out. */ u_int p_cowgen; /* (c) Generation of COW pointers. */ struct itimerval p_realtimer; /* (c) Alarm timer. */ struct rusage p_ru; /* (a) Exit information. */ struct rusage_ext p_rux; /* (cu) Internal resource usage. */ struct rusage_ext p_crux; /* (c) Internal child resource usage. */ int p_profthreads; /* (c) Num threads in addupc_task. */ volatile int p_exitthreads; /* (j) Number of threads exiting */ int p_traceflag; /* (o) Kernel trace points. */ struct ktr_io_params *p_ktrioparms; /* (c + o) Params for ktrace. */ struct vnode *p_textvp; /* (b) Vnode of executable. */ struct vnode *p_textdvp; /* (b) Dir containing textvp. */ char *p_binname; /* (b) Binary hardlink name. */ u_int p_lock; /* (c) Proclock (prevent swap) count. */ struct sigiolst p_sigiolst; /* (c) List of sigio sources. */ int p_sigparent; /* (c) Signal to parent on exit. */ int p_sig; /* (n) For core dump/debugger XXX. */ u_int p_ptevents; /* (c + e) ptrace() event mask. */ struct kaioinfo *p_aioinfo; /* (y) ASYNC I/O info. */ struct thread *p_singlethread;/* (c + j) If single threading this is it */ int p_suspcount; /* (j) Num threads in suspended mode. */ struct thread *p_xthread; /* (c) Trap thread */ int p_boundary_count;/* (j) Num threads at user boundary */ int p_pendingcnt; /* how many signals are pending */ struct itimers *p_itimers; /* (c) POSIX interval timers. */ struct procdesc *p_procdesc; /* (e) Process descriptor, if any. */ u_int p_treeflag; /* (e) P_TREE flags */ int p_pendingexits; /* (c) Count of pending thread exits. */ struct filemon *p_filemon; /* (c) filemon-specific data. */ int p_pdeathsig; /* (c) Signal from parent on exit. */ /* End area that is zeroed on creation. */ #define p_endzero p_magic /* The following fields are all copied upon creation in fork. */ #define p_startcopy p_endzero u_int p_magic; /* (b) Magic number. */ int p_osrel; /* (x) osreldate for the binary (from ELF note, if any) */ uint32_t p_fctl0; /* (x) ABI feature control, ELF note */ char p_comm[MAXCOMLEN + 1]; /* (x) Process name. */ struct sysentvec *p_sysent; /* (b) Syscall dispatch info. */ struct pargs *p_args; /* (c) Process arguments. */ rlim_t p_cpulimit; /* (c) Current CPU limit in seconds. */ signed char p_nice; /* (c) Process "nice" value. */ int p_fibnum; /* in this routing domain XXX MRT */ pid_t p_reapsubtree; /* (e) Pid of the direct child of the reaper which spawned our subtree. */ uint64_t p_elf_flags; /* (x) ELF flags */ void *p_elf_brandinfo; /* (x) Elf_Brandinfo, NULL for non ELF binaries. */ /* End area that is copied on creation. */ #define p_endcopy p_xexit u_int p_xexit; /* (c) Exit code. */ u_int p_xsig; /* (c) Stop/kill sig. */ struct pgrp *p_pgrp; /* (c + e) Pointer to process group. */ struct knlist *p_klist; /* (c) Knotes attached to this proc. */ int p_numthreads; /* (c) Number of threads. */ struct mdproc p_md; /* Any machine-dependent fields. */ struct callout p_itcallout; /* (h + c) Interval timer callout. */ u_short p_acflag; /* (c) Accounting flags. */ struct proc *p_peers; /* (r) */ struct proc *p_leader; /* (b) */ void *p_emuldata; /* (c) Emulator state data. */ struct label *p_label; /* (*) Proc (not subject) MAC label. */ STAILQ_HEAD(, ktr_request) p_ktr; /* (o) KTR event queue. */ LIST_HEAD(, mqueue_notifier) p_mqnotifier; /* (c) mqueue notifiers.*/ struct kdtrace_proc *p_dtrace; /* (*) DTrace-specific data. */ struct cv p_pwait; /* (*) wait cv for exit/exec. */ uint64_t p_prev_runtime; /* (c) Resource usage accounting. */ struct racct *p_racct; /* (b) Resource accounting. */ int p_throttled; /* (c) Flag for racct pcpu throttling */ /* * An orphan is the child that has been re-parented to the * debugger as a result of attaching to it. Need to keep * track of them for parent to be able to collect the exit * status of what used to be children. */ LIST_ENTRY(proc) p_orphan; /* (e) List of orphan processes. */ LIST_HEAD(, proc) p_orphans; /* (e) Pointer to list of orphans. */ TAILQ_HEAD(, kq_timer_cb_data) p_kqtim_stop; /* (c) */ LIST_ENTRY(proc) p_jaillist; /* (d) Jail process linkage. */ }; #define p_session p_pgrp->pg_session #define p_pgid p_pgrp->pg_id #define NOCPU (-1) /* For when we aren't on a CPU. */ #define NOCPU_OLD (255) #define MAXCPU_OLD (254) #define PROC_SLOCK(p) mtx_lock_spin(&(p)->p_slock) #define PROC_SUNLOCK(p) mtx_unlock_spin(&(p)->p_slock) #define PROC_SLOCK_ASSERT(p, type) mtx_assert(&(p)->p_slock, (type)) #define PROC_STATLOCK(p) mtx_lock_spin(&(p)->p_statmtx) #define PROC_STATUNLOCK(p) mtx_unlock_spin(&(p)->p_statmtx) #define PROC_STATLOCK_ASSERT(p, type) mtx_assert(&(p)->p_statmtx, (type)) #define PROC_ITIMLOCK(p) mtx_lock_spin(&(p)->p_itimmtx) #define PROC_ITIMUNLOCK(p) mtx_unlock_spin(&(p)->p_itimmtx) #define PROC_ITIMLOCK_ASSERT(p, type) mtx_assert(&(p)->p_itimmtx, (type)) #define PROC_PROFLOCK(p) mtx_lock_spin(&(p)->p_profmtx) #define PROC_PROFUNLOCK(p) mtx_unlock_spin(&(p)->p_profmtx) #define PROC_PROFLOCK_ASSERT(p, type) mtx_assert(&(p)->p_profmtx, (type)) /* These flags are kept in p_flag. */ #define P_ADVLOCK 0x00000001 /* Process may hold a POSIX advisory lock. */ #define P_CONTROLT 0x00000002 /* Has a controlling terminal. */ #define P_KPROC 0x00000004 /* Kernel process. */ #define P_UNUSED3 0x00000008 /* --available-- */ #define P_PPWAIT 0x00000010 /* Parent is waiting for child to exec/exit. */ #define P_PROFIL 0x00000020 /* Has started profiling. */ #define P_STOPPROF 0x00000040 /* Has thread requesting to stop profiling. */ #define P_HADTHREADS 0x00000080 /* Has had threads (no cleanup shortcuts) */ #define P_SUGID 0x00000100 /* Had set id privileges since last exec. */ #define P_SYSTEM 0x00000200 /* System proc: no sigs, stats or swapping. */ #define P_SINGLE_EXIT 0x00000400 /* Threads suspending should exit, not wait. */ #define P_TRACED 0x00000800 /* Debugged process being traced. */ #define P_WAITED 0x00001000 /* Someone is waiting for us. */ #define P_WEXIT 0x00002000 /* Working on exiting. */ #define P_EXEC 0x00004000 /* Process called exec. */ #define P_WKILLED 0x00008000 /* Killed, go to kernel/user boundary ASAP. */ #define P_CONTINUED 0x00010000 /* Proc has continued from a stopped state. */ #define P_STOPPED_SIG 0x00020000 /* Stopped due to SIGSTOP/SIGTSTP. */ #define P_STOPPED_TRACE 0x00040000 /* Stopped because of tracing. */ #define P_STOPPED_SINGLE 0x00080000 /* Only 1 thread can continue (not to user). */ #define P_PROTECTED 0x00100000 /* Do not kill on memory overcommit. */ #define P_SIGEVENT 0x00200000 /* Process pending signals changed. */ #define P_SINGLE_BOUNDARY 0x00400000 /* Threads should suspend at user boundary. */ #define P_HWPMC 0x00800000 /* Process is using HWPMCs */ #define P_JAILED 0x01000000 /* Process is in jail. */ #define P_TOTAL_STOP 0x02000000 /* Stopped in stop_all_proc. */ #define P_INEXEC 0x04000000 /* Process is in execve(). */ #define P_STATCHILD 0x08000000 /* Child process stopped or exited. */ #define P_INMEM 0x10000000 /* Loaded into memory. */ #define P_SWAPPINGOUT 0x20000000 /* Process is being swapped out. */ #define P_SWAPPINGIN 0x40000000 /* Process is being swapped in. */ #define P_PPTRACE 0x80000000 /* PT_TRACEME by vforked child. */ #define P_STOPPED (P_STOPPED_SIG|P_STOPPED_SINGLE|P_STOPPED_TRACE) #define P_SHOULDSTOP(p) ((p)->p_flag & P_STOPPED) #define P_KILLED(p) ((p)->p_flag & P_WKILLED) /* These flags are kept in p_flag2. */ #define P2_INHERIT_PROTECTED 0x00000001 /* New children get P_PROTECTED. */ #define P2_NOTRACE 0x00000002 /* No ptrace(2) attach or coredumps. */ #define P2_NOTRACE_EXEC 0x00000004 /* Keep P2_NOPTRACE on exec(2). */ #define P2_AST_SU 0x00000008 /* Handles SU ast for kthreads. */ #define P2_PTRACE_FSTP 0x00000010 /* SIGSTOP from PT_ATTACH not yet handled. */ #define P2_TRAPCAP 0x00000020 /* SIGTRAP on ENOTCAPABLE */ #define P2_ASLR_ENABLE 0x00000040 /* Force enable ASLR. */ #define P2_ASLR_DISABLE 0x00000080 /* Force disable ASLR. */ #define P2_ASLR_IGNSTART 0x00000100 /* Enable ASLR to consume sbrk area. */ #define P2_PROTMAX_ENABLE 0x00000200 /* Force enable implied PROT_MAX. */ #define P2_PROTMAX_DISABLE 0x00000400 /* Force disable implied PROT_MAX. */ #define P2_STKGAP_DISABLE 0x00000800 /* Disable stack gap for MAP_STACK */ #define P2_STKGAP_DISABLE_EXEC 0x00001000 /* Stack gap disabled after exec */ #define P2_ITSTOPPED 0x00002000 #define P2_PTRACEREQ 0x00004000 /* Active ptrace req */ #define P2_NO_NEW_PRIVS 0x00008000 /* Ignore setuid */ #define P2_WXORX_DISABLE 0x00010000 /* WX mappings enabled */ #define P2_WXORX_ENABLE_EXEC 0x00020000 /* WXORX enabled after exec */ #define P2_WEXIT 0x00040000 /* exit just started, no external thread_single() is permitted */ /* Flags protected by proctree_lock, kept in p_treeflags. */ #define P_TREE_ORPHANED 0x00000001 /* Reparented, on orphan list */ #define P_TREE_FIRST_ORPHAN 0x00000002 /* First element of orphan list */ #define P_TREE_REAPER 0x00000004 /* Reaper of subtree */ #define P_TREE_GRPEXITED 0x00000008 /* exit1() done with job ctl */ /* * These were process status values (p_stat), now they are only used in * legacy conversion code. */ #define SIDL 1 /* Process being created by fork. */ #define SRUN 2 /* Currently runnable. */ #define SSLEEP 3 /* Sleeping on an address. */ #define SSTOP 4 /* Process debugging or suspension. */ #define SZOMB 5 /* Awaiting collection by parent. */ #define SWAIT 6 /* Waiting for interrupt. */ #define SLOCK 7 /* Blocked on a lock. */ #define P_MAGIC 0xbeefface #ifdef _KERNEL /* Types and flags for mi_switch(9). */ #define SW_TYPE_MASK 0xff /* First 8 bits are switch type */ #define SWT_OWEPREEMPT 1 /* Switching due to owepreempt. */ #define SWT_TURNSTILE 2 /* Turnstile contention. */ #define SWT_SLEEPQ 3 /* Sleepq wait. */ #define SWT_RELINQUISH 4 /* yield call. */ #define SWT_NEEDRESCHED 5 /* NEEDRESCHED was set. */ #define SWT_IDLE 6 /* Switching from the idle thread. */ #define SWT_IWAIT 7 /* Waiting for interrupts. */ #define SWT_SUSPEND 8 /* Thread suspended. */ #define SWT_REMOTEPREEMPT 9 /* Remote processor preempted. */ #define SWT_REMOTEWAKEIDLE 10 /* Remote processor preempted idle. */ #define SWT_BIND 11 /* Thread bound to a new CPU. */ #define SWT_COUNT 12 /* Number of switch types. */ /* Flags */ #define SW_VOL 0x0100 /* Voluntary switch. */ #define SW_INVOL 0x0200 /* Involuntary switch. */ #define SW_PREEMPT 0x0400 /* The invol switch is a preemption */ /* How values for thread_single(). */ #define SINGLE_NO_EXIT 0 #define SINGLE_EXIT 1 #define SINGLE_BOUNDARY 2 #define SINGLE_ALLPROC 3 #ifdef MALLOC_DECLARE MALLOC_DECLARE(M_PARGS); MALLOC_DECLARE(M_SESSION); MALLOC_DECLARE(M_SUBPROC); #endif #define FOREACH_PROC_IN_SYSTEM(p) \ LIST_FOREACH((p), &allproc, p_list) #define FOREACH_THREAD_IN_PROC(p, td) \ TAILQ_FOREACH((td), &(p)->p_threads, td_plist) #define FIRST_THREAD_IN_PROC(p) TAILQ_FIRST(&(p)->p_threads) /* * We use process IDs <= pid_max <= PID_MAX; PID_MAX + 1 must also fit * in a pid_t, as it is used to represent "no process group". */ #define PID_MAX 99999 #define NO_PID 100000 #define THREAD0_TID NO_PID extern pid_t pid_max; #define SESS_LEADER(p) ((p)->p_session->s_leader == (p)) /* Lock and unlock a process. */ #define PROC_LOCK(p) mtx_lock(&(p)->p_mtx) #define PROC_TRYLOCK(p) mtx_trylock(&(p)->p_mtx) #define PROC_UNLOCK(p) mtx_unlock(&(p)->p_mtx) #define PROC_LOCKED(p) mtx_owned(&(p)->p_mtx) #define PROC_WAIT_UNLOCKED(p) mtx_wait_unlocked(&(p)->p_mtx) #define PROC_LOCK_ASSERT(p, type) mtx_assert(&(p)->p_mtx, (type)) /* Lock and unlock a process group. */ #define PGRP_LOCK(pg) mtx_lock(&(pg)->pg_mtx) #define PGRP_UNLOCK(pg) mtx_unlock(&(pg)->pg_mtx) #define PGRP_LOCKED(pg) mtx_owned(&(pg)->pg_mtx) #define PGRP_LOCK_ASSERT(pg, type) mtx_assert(&(pg)->pg_mtx, (type)) #define PGRP_LOCK_PGSIGNAL(pg) do { \ if ((pg) != NULL) \ PGRP_LOCK(pg); \ } while (0) #define PGRP_UNLOCK_PGSIGNAL(pg) do { \ if ((pg) != NULL) \ PGRP_UNLOCK(pg); \ } while (0) /* Lock and unlock a session. */ #define SESS_LOCK(s) mtx_lock(&(s)->s_mtx) #define SESS_UNLOCK(s) mtx_unlock(&(s)->s_mtx) #define SESS_LOCKED(s) mtx_owned(&(s)->s_mtx) #define SESS_LOCK_ASSERT(s, type) mtx_assert(&(s)->s_mtx, (type)) /* * Non-zero p_lock ensures that: * - exit1() is not performed until p_lock reaches zero; * - the process' threads stack are not swapped out if they are currently * not (P_INMEM). * * PHOLD() asserts that the process (except the current process) is * not exiting, increments p_lock and swaps threads stacks into memory, * if needed. * _PHOLD() is same as PHOLD(), it takes the process locked. * _PHOLD_LITE() also takes the process locked, but comparing with * _PHOLD(), it only guarantees that exit1() is not executed, * faultin() is not called. */ #define PHOLD(p) do { \ PROC_LOCK(p); \ _PHOLD(p); \ PROC_UNLOCK(p); \ } while (0) #define _PHOLD(p) do { \ PROC_LOCK_ASSERT((p), MA_OWNED); \ KASSERT(!((p)->p_flag & P_WEXIT) || (p) == curproc, \ ("PHOLD of exiting process %p", p)); \ (p)->p_lock++; \ if (((p)->p_flag & P_INMEM) == 0) \ faultin((p)); \ } while (0) #define _PHOLD_LITE(p) do { \ PROC_LOCK_ASSERT((p), MA_OWNED); \ KASSERT(!((p)->p_flag & P_WEXIT) || (p) == curproc, \ ("PHOLD of exiting process %p", p)); \ (p)->p_lock++; \ } while (0) #define PROC_ASSERT_HELD(p) do { \ KASSERT((p)->p_lock > 0, ("process %p not held", p)); \ } while (0) #define PRELE(p) do { \ PROC_LOCK((p)); \ _PRELE((p)); \ PROC_UNLOCK((p)); \ } while (0) #define _PRELE(p) do { \ PROC_LOCK_ASSERT((p), MA_OWNED); \ PROC_ASSERT_HELD(p); \ (--(p)->p_lock); \ if (((p)->p_flag & P_WEXIT) && (p)->p_lock == 0) \ wakeup(&(p)->p_lock); \ } while (0) #define PROC_ASSERT_NOT_HELD(p) do { \ KASSERT((p)->p_lock == 0, ("process %p held", p)); \ } while (0) #define PROC_UPDATE_COW(p) do { \ struct proc *_p = (p); \ PROC_LOCK_ASSERT((_p), MA_OWNED); \ atomic_store_int(&_p->p_cowgen, _p->p_cowgen + 1); \ } while (0) #define PROC_COW_CHANGECOUNT(td, p) ({ \ struct thread *_td = (td); \ struct proc *_p = (p); \ MPASS(_td == curthread); \ PROC_LOCK_ASSERT(_p, MA_OWNED); \ _p->p_cowgen - _td->td_cowgen; \ }) /* Check whether a thread is safe to be swapped out. */ #define thread_safetoswapout(td) ((td)->td_flags & TDF_CANSWAP) /* Control whether or not it is safe for curthread to sleep. */ #define THREAD_NO_SLEEPING() do { \ curthread->td_no_sleeping++; \ MPASS(curthread->td_no_sleeping > 0); \ } while (0) #define THREAD_SLEEPING_OK() do { \ MPASS(curthread->td_no_sleeping > 0); \ curthread->td_no_sleeping--; \ } while (0) #define THREAD_CAN_SLEEP() ((curthread)->td_no_sleeping == 0) #define PIDHASH(pid) (&pidhashtbl[(pid) & pidhash]) #define PIDHASHLOCK(pid) (&pidhashtbl_lock[((pid) & pidhashlock)]) extern LIST_HEAD(pidhashhead, proc) *pidhashtbl; extern struct sx *pidhashtbl_lock; extern u_long pidhash; extern u_long pidhashlock; #define PGRPHASH(pgid) (&pgrphashtbl[(pgid) & pgrphash]) extern LIST_HEAD(pgrphashhead, pgrp) *pgrphashtbl; extern u_long pgrphash; extern struct sx allproc_lock; extern int allproc_gen; extern struct sx proctree_lock; extern struct mtx ppeers_lock; extern struct mtx procid_lock; extern struct proc proc0; /* Process slot for swapper. */ extern struct thread0_storage thread0_st; /* Primary thread in proc0. */ #define thread0 (thread0_st.t0st_thread) extern struct vmspace vmspace0; /* VM space for proc0. */ extern int hogticks; /* Limit on kernel cpu hogs. */ extern int lastpid; extern int nprocs, maxproc; /* Current and max number of procs. */ extern int maxprocperuid; /* Max procs per uid. */ extern u_long ps_arg_cache_limit; LIST_HEAD(proclist, proc); TAILQ_HEAD(procqueue, proc); TAILQ_HEAD(threadqueue, thread); extern struct proclist allproc; /* List of all processes. */ extern struct proc *initproc, *pageproc; /* Process slots for init, pager. */ extern struct uma_zone *proc_zone; extern struct uma_zone *pgrp_zone; struct proc *pfind(pid_t); /* Find process by id. */ struct proc *pfind_any(pid_t); /* Find (zombie) process by id. */ struct proc *pfind_any_locked(pid_t pid); /* Find process by id, locked. */ struct pgrp *pgfind(pid_t); /* Find process group by id. */ void pidhash_slockall(void); /* Shared lock all pid hash lists. */ void pidhash_sunlockall(void); /* Shared unlock all pid hash lists. */ struct fork_req { int fr_flags; int fr_pages; int *fr_pidp; struct proc **fr_procp; int *fr_pd_fd; int fr_pd_flags; struct filecaps *fr_pd_fcaps; int fr_flags2; #define FR2_DROPSIG_CAUGHT 0x00000001 /* Drop caught non-DFL signals */ #define FR2_SHARE_PATHS 0x00000002 /* Invert sense of RFFDG for paths */ #define FR2_KPROC 0x00000004 /* Create a kernel process */ }; /* * pget() flags. */ #define PGET_HOLD 0x00001 /* Hold the process. */ #define PGET_CANSEE 0x00002 /* Check against p_cansee(). */ #define PGET_CANDEBUG 0x00004 /* Check against p_candebug(). */ #define PGET_ISCURRENT 0x00008 /* Check that the found process is current. */ #define PGET_NOTWEXIT 0x00010 /* Check that the process is not in P_WEXIT. */ #define PGET_NOTINEXEC 0x00020 /* Check that the process is not in P_INEXEC. */ #define PGET_NOTID 0x00040 /* Do not assume tid if pid > PID_MAX. */ #define PGET_WANTREAD (PGET_HOLD | PGET_CANDEBUG | PGET_NOTWEXIT) int pget(pid_t pid, int flags, struct proc **pp); /* ast_register() flags */ #define ASTR_ASTF_REQUIRED 0x0001 /* td_ast TDAI(TDA_X) flag set is required for call */ #define ASTR_TDP 0x0002 /* td_pflags flag set is required */ #define ASTR_KCLEAR 0x0004 /* call me on ast_kclear() */ #define ASTR_UNCOND 0x0008 /* call me always */ void ast(struct trapframe *framep); void ast_kclear(struct thread *td); void ast_register(int ast, int ast_flags, int tdp, void (*f)(struct thread *td, int asts)); void ast_deregister(int tda); void ast_sched_locked(struct thread *td, int tda); void ast_sched_mask(struct thread *td, int ast); void ast_sched(struct thread *td, int tda); void ast_unsched_locked(struct thread *td, int tda); struct thread *choosethread(void); int cr_cansee(struct ucred *u1, struct ucred *u2); int cr_canseesocket(struct ucred *cred, struct socket *so); int cr_canseeothergids(struct ucred *u1, struct ucred *u2); int cr_canseeotheruids(struct ucred *u1, struct ucred *u2); int cr_canseejailproc(struct ucred *u1, struct ucred *u2); int cr_cansignal(struct ucred *cred, struct proc *proc, int signum); int enterpgrp(struct proc *p, pid_t pgid, struct pgrp *pgrp, struct session *sess); int enterthispgrp(struct proc *p, struct pgrp *pgrp); void faultin(struct proc *p); int fork1(struct thread *, struct fork_req *); void fork_exit(void (*)(void *, struct trapframe *), void *, struct trapframe *); void fork_return(struct thread *, struct trapframe *); int inferior(struct proc *p); void itimer_proc_continue(struct proc *p); void kqtimer_proc_continue(struct proc *p); void kern_proc_vmmap_resident(struct vm_map *map, struct vm_map_entry *entry, int *resident_count, bool *super); void kern_yield(int); void kick_proc0(void); void killjobc(void); int leavepgrp(struct proc *p); int maybe_preempt(struct thread *td); void maybe_yield(void); void mi_switch(int flags); int p_candebug(struct thread *td, struct proc *p); int p_cansee(struct thread *td, struct proc *p); int p_cansched(struct thread *td, struct proc *p); int p_cansignal(struct thread *td, struct proc *p, int signum); int p_canwait(struct thread *td, struct proc *p); struct pargs *pargs_alloc(int len); void pargs_drop(struct pargs *pa); void pargs_hold(struct pargs *pa); void proc_add_orphan(struct proc *child, struct proc *parent); int proc_get_binpath(struct proc *p, char *binname, char **fullpath, char **freepath); int proc_getargv(struct thread *td, struct proc *p, struct sbuf *sb); int proc_getauxv(struct thread *td, struct proc *p, struct sbuf *sb); int proc_getenvv(struct thread *td, struct proc *p, struct sbuf *sb); void procinit(void); int proc_iterate(int (*cb)(struct proc *, void *), void *cbarg); void proc_linkup0(struct proc *p, struct thread *td); void proc_linkup(struct proc *p, struct thread *td); struct proc *proc_realparent(struct proc *child); void proc_reap(struct thread *td, struct proc *p, int *status, int options); void proc_reparent(struct proc *child, struct proc *newparent, bool set_oppid); void proc_set_p2_wexit(struct proc *p); void proc_set_traced(struct proc *p, bool stop); void proc_wkilled(struct proc *p); struct pstats *pstats_alloc(void); void pstats_fork(struct pstats *src, struct pstats *dst); void pstats_free(struct pstats *ps); void proc_clear_orphan(struct proc *p); void reaper_abandon_children(struct proc *p, bool exiting); int securelevel_ge(struct ucred *cr, int level); int securelevel_gt(struct ucred *cr, int level); void sess_hold(struct session *); void sess_release(struct session *); int setrunnable(struct thread *, int); void setsugid(struct proc *p); bool should_yield(void); int sigonstack(size_t sp); void stopevent(struct proc *, u_int, u_int); struct thread *tdfind(lwpid_t, pid_t); void threadinit(void); void tidhash_add(struct thread *); void tidhash_remove(struct thread *); void cpu_idle(int); int cpu_idle_wakeup(int); extern void (*cpu_idle_hook)(sbintime_t); /* Hook to machdep CPU idler. */ void cpu_switch(struct thread *, struct thread *, struct mtx *); void cpu_throw(struct thread *, struct thread *) __dead2; bool curproc_sigkilled(void); void userret(struct thread *, struct trapframe *); void cpu_exit(struct thread *); void exit1(struct thread *, int, int) __dead2; void cpu_copy_thread(struct thread *td, struct thread *td0); bool cpu_exec_vmspace_reuse(struct proc *p, struct vm_map *map); int cpu_fetch_syscall_args(struct thread *td); void cpu_fork(struct thread *, struct proc *, struct thread *, int); void cpu_fork_kthread_handler(struct thread *, void (*)(void *), void *); int cpu_procctl(struct thread *td, int idtype, id_t id, int com, void *data); void cpu_set_syscall_retval(struct thread *, int); void cpu_set_upcall(struct thread *, void (*)(void *), void *, stack_t *); int cpu_set_user_tls(struct thread *, void *tls_base); void cpu_thread_alloc(struct thread *); void cpu_thread_clean(struct thread *); void cpu_thread_exit(struct thread *); void cpu_thread_free(struct thread *); void cpu_thread_swapin(struct thread *); void cpu_thread_swapout(struct thread *); struct thread *thread_alloc(int pages); int thread_alloc_stack(struct thread *, int pages); int thread_check_susp(struct thread *td, bool sleep); void thread_cow_get_proc(struct thread *newtd, struct proc *p); void thread_cow_get(struct thread *newtd, struct thread *td); void thread_cow_free(struct thread *td); void thread_cow_update(struct thread *td); void thread_cow_synced(struct thread *td); int thread_create(struct thread *td, struct rtprio *rtp, int (*initialize_thread)(struct thread *, void *), void *thunk); void thread_exit(void) __dead2; void thread_free(struct thread *td); void thread_link(struct thread *td, struct proc *p); void thread_reap_barrier(void); int thread_single(struct proc *p, int how); void thread_single_end(struct proc *p, int how); void thread_stash(struct thread *td); void thread_stopped(struct proc *p); void childproc_stopped(struct proc *child, int reason); void childproc_continued(struct proc *child); void childproc_exited(struct proc *child); void thread_run_flash(struct thread *td); int thread_suspend_check(int how); bool thread_suspend_check_needed(void); void thread_suspend_switch(struct thread *, struct proc *p); void thread_suspend_one(struct thread *td); void thread_unlink(struct thread *td); void thread_unsuspend(struct proc *p); void thread_wait(struct proc *p); bool stop_all_proc_block(void); void stop_all_proc_unblock(void); void stop_all_proc(void); void resume_all_proc(void); static __inline int curthread_pflags_set(int flags) { struct thread *td; int save; td = curthread; save = ~flags | (td->td_pflags & flags); td->td_pflags |= flags; return (save); } static __inline void curthread_pflags_restore(int save) { curthread->td_pflags &= save; } static __inline int curthread_pflags2_set(int flags) { struct thread *td; int save; td = curthread; save = ~flags | (td->td_pflags2 & flags); td->td_pflags2 |= flags; return (save); } static __inline void curthread_pflags2_restore(int save) { curthread->td_pflags2 &= save; } static __inline __pure2 struct td_sched * td_get_sched(struct thread *td) { return ((struct td_sched *)&td[1]); } #define PROC_ID_PID 0 #define PROC_ID_GROUP 1 #define PROC_ID_SESSION 2 #define PROC_ID_REAP 3 void proc_id_set(int type, pid_t id); void proc_id_set_cond(int type, pid_t id); void proc_id_clear(int type, pid_t id); EVENTHANDLER_LIST_DECLARE(process_ctor); EVENTHANDLER_LIST_DECLARE(process_dtor); EVENTHANDLER_LIST_DECLARE(process_init); EVENTHANDLER_LIST_DECLARE(process_fini); EVENTHANDLER_LIST_DECLARE(process_exit); EVENTHANDLER_LIST_DECLARE(process_fork); EVENTHANDLER_LIST_DECLARE(process_exec); EVENTHANDLER_LIST_DECLARE(thread_ctor); EVENTHANDLER_LIST_DECLARE(thread_dtor); EVENTHANDLER_LIST_DECLARE(thread_init); #endif /* _KERNEL */ #endif /* !_SYS_PROC_H_ */ diff --git a/sys/sys/ucred.h b/sys/sys/ucred.h index 5ec54be70c2e..73b5fb7ab118 100644 --- a/sys/sys/ucred.h +++ b/sys/sys/ucred.h @@ -1,165 +1,165 @@ /*- * SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause * * Copyright (c) 1989, 1993 * The Regents of the University of California. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * 3. Neither the name of the University nor the names of its contributors * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software * without specific prior written permission. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE REGENTS AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE REGENTS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF * SUCH DAMAGE. * * @(#)ucred.h 8.4 (Berkeley) 1/9/95 * $FreeBSD$ */ #ifndef _SYS_UCRED_H_ #define _SYS_UCRED_H_ #if defined(_KERNEL) || defined(_WANT_UCRED) #include #include #endif #include struct loginclass; #define XU_NGROUPS 16 /* * Credentials. * * Please do not inspect cr_uid directly to determine superuserness. The * priv(9) interface should be used to check for privilege. * * Lock reference: * c - cr_mtx * * Unmarked fields are constant after creation. * * See "Credential management" comment in kern_prot.c for more information. */ #if defined(_KERNEL) || defined(_WANT_UCRED) struct ucred { struct mtx cr_mtx; - int cr_ref; /* (c) reference count */ + long cr_ref; /* (c) reference count */ u_int cr_users; /* (c) proc + thread using this cred */ + u_int cr_flags; /* credential flags */ struct auditinfo_addr cr_audit; /* Audit properties. */ #define cr_startcopy cr_uid uid_t cr_uid; /* effective user id */ uid_t cr_ruid; /* real user id */ uid_t cr_svuid; /* saved user id */ int cr_ngroups; /* number of groups */ gid_t cr_rgid; /* real group id */ gid_t cr_svgid; /* saved group id */ struct uidinfo *cr_uidinfo; /* per euid resource consumption */ struct uidinfo *cr_ruidinfo; /* per ruid resource consumption */ struct prison *cr_prison; /* jail(2) */ struct loginclass *cr_loginclass; /* login class */ - u_int cr_flags; /* credential flags */ void *cr_pspare2[2]; /* general use 2 */ #define cr_endcopy cr_label struct label *cr_label; /* MAC label */ gid_t *cr_groups; /* groups */ int cr_agroups; /* Available groups */ gid_t cr_smallgroups[XU_NGROUPS]; /* storage for small groups */ }; #define NOCRED ((struct ucred *)0) /* no credential available */ #define FSCRED ((struct ucred *)-1) /* filesystem credential */ #endif /* _KERNEL || _WANT_UCRED */ /* * Flags for cr_flags. */ #define CRED_FLAG_CAPMODE 0x00000001 /* In capability mode. */ /* * This is the external representation of struct ucred. */ struct xucred { u_int cr_version; /* structure layout version */ uid_t cr_uid; /* effective user id */ short cr_ngroups; /* number of groups */ gid_t cr_groups[XU_NGROUPS]; /* groups */ union { void *_cr_unused1; /* compatibility with old ucred */ pid_t cr_pid; }; }; #define XUCRED_VERSION 0 /* This can be used for both ucred and xucred structures. */ #define cr_gid cr_groups[0] #ifdef _KERNEL struct proc; struct thread; struct credbatch { struct ucred *cred; int users; int ref; }; static inline void credbatch_prep(struct credbatch *crb) { crb->cred = NULL; crb->users = 0; crb->ref = 0; } void credbatch_add(struct credbatch *crb, struct thread *td); static inline void credbatch_process(struct credbatch *crb __unused) { } void credbatch_final(struct credbatch *crb); void change_egid(struct ucred *newcred, gid_t egid); void change_euid(struct ucred *newcred, struct uidinfo *euip); void change_rgid(struct ucred *newcred, gid_t rgid); void change_ruid(struct ucred *newcred, struct uidinfo *ruip); void change_svgid(struct ucred *newcred, gid_t svgid); void change_svuid(struct ucred *newcred, uid_t svuid); void crcopy(struct ucred *dest, struct ucred *src); struct ucred *crcopysafe(struct proc *p, struct ucred *cr); struct ucred *crdup(struct ucred *cr); void crextend(struct ucred *cr, int n); void proc_set_cred_init(struct proc *p, struct ucred *cr); void proc_set_cred(struct proc *p, struct ucred *cr); void proc_unset_cred(struct proc *p); void crfree(struct ucred *cr); struct ucred *crcowsync(void); struct ucred *crget(void); struct ucred *crhold(struct ucred *cr); struct ucred *crcowget(struct ucred *cr); void crcowfree(struct thread *td); void cru2x(struct ucred *cr, struct xucred *xcr); void cru2xt(struct thread *td, struct xucred *xcr); void crsetgroups(struct ucred *cr, int n, gid_t *groups); int groupmember(gid_t gid, struct ucred *cred); #endif /* _KERNEL */ #endif /* !_SYS_UCRED_H_ */