diff --git a/crypto/openssl/crypto/x509/x509_cmp.c b/crypto/openssl/crypto/x509/x509_cmp.c index a7b90e6a42f5..62868f0c9c2e 100644 --- a/crypto/openssl/crypto/x509/x509_cmp.c +++ b/crypto/openssl/crypto/x509/x509_cmp.c @@ -1,500 +1,502 @@ /* crypto/x509/x509_cmp.c */ /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com) * All rights reserved. * * This package is an SSL implementation written * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com). * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL. * * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA, * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). * * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in * the code are not to be removed. * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution * as the author of the parts of the library used. * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software * must display the following acknowledgement: * "This product includes cryptographic software written by * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)" * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library * being used are not cryptographic related :-). * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement: * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)" * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF * SUCH DAMAGE. * * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be * copied and put under another distribution licence * [including the GNU Public Licence.] */ #include #include #include "cryptlib.h" #include #include #include #include int X509_issuer_and_serial_cmp(const X509 *a, const X509 *b) { int i; X509_CINF *ai, *bi; ai = a->cert_info; bi = b->cert_info; i = M_ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(ai->serialNumber, bi->serialNumber); if (i) return (i); return (X509_NAME_cmp(ai->issuer, bi->issuer)); } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5 unsigned long X509_issuer_and_serial_hash(X509 *a) { unsigned long ret = 0; EVP_MD_CTX ctx; unsigned char md[16]; char *f; EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ctx); f = X509_NAME_oneline(a->cert_info->issuer, NULL, 0); + if (f == NULL) + goto err; if (!EVP_DigestInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_md5(), NULL)) goto err; if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, (unsigned char *)f, strlen(f))) goto err; OPENSSL_free(f); if (!EVP_DigestUpdate (&ctx, (unsigned char *)a->cert_info->serialNumber->data, (unsigned long)a->cert_info->serialNumber->length)) goto err; if (!EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&ctx, &(md[0]), NULL)) goto err; ret = (((unsigned long)md[0]) | ((unsigned long)md[1] << 8L) | ((unsigned long)md[2] << 16L) | ((unsigned long)md[3] << 24L) ) & 0xffffffffL; err: EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&ctx); return (ret); } #endif int X509_issuer_name_cmp(const X509 *a, const X509 *b) { return (X509_NAME_cmp(a->cert_info->issuer, b->cert_info->issuer)); } int X509_subject_name_cmp(const X509 *a, const X509 *b) { return (X509_NAME_cmp(a->cert_info->subject, b->cert_info->subject)); } int X509_CRL_cmp(const X509_CRL *a, const X509_CRL *b) { return (X509_NAME_cmp(a->crl->issuer, b->crl->issuer)); } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA int X509_CRL_match(const X509_CRL *a, const X509_CRL *b) { return memcmp(a->sha1_hash, b->sha1_hash, 20); } #endif X509_NAME *X509_get_issuer_name(X509 *a) { return (a->cert_info->issuer); } unsigned long X509_issuer_name_hash(X509 *x) { return (X509_NAME_hash(x->cert_info->issuer)); } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5 unsigned long X509_issuer_name_hash_old(X509 *x) { return (X509_NAME_hash_old(x->cert_info->issuer)); } #endif X509_NAME *X509_get_subject_name(X509 *a) { return (a->cert_info->subject); } ASN1_INTEGER *X509_get_serialNumber(X509 *a) { return (a->cert_info->serialNumber); } unsigned long X509_subject_name_hash(X509 *x) { return (X509_NAME_hash(x->cert_info->subject)); } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5 unsigned long X509_subject_name_hash_old(X509 *x) { return (X509_NAME_hash_old(x->cert_info->subject)); } #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA /* * Compare two certificates: they must be identical for this to work. NB: * Although "cmp" operations are generally prototyped to take "const" * arguments (eg. for use in STACKs), the way X509 handling is - these * operations may involve ensuring the hashes are up-to-date and ensuring * certain cert information is cached. So this is the point where the * "depth-first" constification tree has to halt with an evil cast. */ int X509_cmp(const X509 *a, const X509 *b) { int rv; /* ensure hash is valid */ X509_check_purpose((X509 *)a, -1, 0); X509_check_purpose((X509 *)b, -1, 0); rv = memcmp(a->sha1_hash, b->sha1_hash, SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH); if (rv) return rv; /* Check for match against stored encoding too */ if (!a->cert_info->enc.modified && !b->cert_info->enc.modified) { rv = (int)(a->cert_info->enc.len - b->cert_info->enc.len); if (rv) return rv; return memcmp(a->cert_info->enc.enc, b->cert_info->enc.enc, a->cert_info->enc.len); } return rv; } #endif int X509_NAME_cmp(const X509_NAME *a, const X509_NAME *b) { int ret; /* Ensure canonical encoding is present and up to date */ if (!a->canon_enc || a->modified) { ret = i2d_X509_NAME((X509_NAME *)a, NULL); if (ret < 0) return -2; } if (!b->canon_enc || b->modified) { ret = i2d_X509_NAME((X509_NAME *)b, NULL); if (ret < 0) return -2; } ret = a->canon_enclen - b->canon_enclen; if (ret != 0 || a->canon_enclen == 0) return ret; return memcmp(a->canon_enc, b->canon_enc, a->canon_enclen); } unsigned long X509_NAME_hash(X509_NAME *x) { unsigned long ret = 0; unsigned char md[SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH]; /* Make sure X509_NAME structure contains valid cached encoding */ i2d_X509_NAME(x, NULL); if (!EVP_Digest(x->canon_enc, x->canon_enclen, md, NULL, EVP_sha1(), NULL)) return 0; ret = (((unsigned long)md[0]) | ((unsigned long)md[1] << 8L) | ((unsigned long)md[2] << 16L) | ((unsigned long)md[3] << 24L) ) & 0xffffffffL; return (ret); } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5 /* * I now DER encode the name and hash it. Since I cache the DER encoding, * this is reasonably efficient. */ unsigned long X509_NAME_hash_old(X509_NAME *x) { EVP_MD_CTX md_ctx; unsigned long ret = 0; unsigned char md[16]; /* Make sure X509_NAME structure contains valid cached encoding */ i2d_X509_NAME(x, NULL); EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx); EVP_MD_CTX_set_flags(&md_ctx, EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW); if (EVP_DigestInit_ex(&md_ctx, EVP_md5(), NULL) && EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, x->bytes->data, x->bytes->length) && EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&md_ctx, md, NULL)) ret = (((unsigned long)md[0]) | ((unsigned long)md[1] << 8L) | ((unsigned long)md[2] << 16L) | ((unsigned long)md[3] << 24L) ) & 0xffffffffL; EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx); return (ret); } #endif /* Search a stack of X509 for a match */ X509 *X509_find_by_issuer_and_serial(STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509_NAME *name, ASN1_INTEGER *serial) { int i; X509_CINF cinf; X509 x, *x509 = NULL; if (!sk) return NULL; x.cert_info = &cinf; cinf.serialNumber = serial; cinf.issuer = name; for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++) { x509 = sk_X509_value(sk, i); if (X509_issuer_and_serial_cmp(x509, &x) == 0) return (x509); } return (NULL); } X509 *X509_find_by_subject(STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509_NAME *name) { X509 *x509; int i; for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++) { x509 = sk_X509_value(sk, i); if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(x509), name) == 0) return (x509); } return (NULL); } EVP_PKEY *X509_get_pubkey(X509 *x) { if ((x == NULL) || (x->cert_info == NULL)) return (NULL); return (X509_PUBKEY_get(x->cert_info->key)); } ASN1_BIT_STRING *X509_get0_pubkey_bitstr(const X509 *x) { if (!x) return NULL; return x->cert_info->key->public_key; } int X509_check_private_key(X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *k) { EVP_PKEY *xk; int ret; xk = X509_get_pubkey(x); if (xk) ret = EVP_PKEY_cmp(xk, k); else ret = -2; switch (ret) { case 1: break; case 0: X509err(X509_F_X509_CHECK_PRIVATE_KEY, X509_R_KEY_VALUES_MISMATCH); break; case -1: X509err(X509_F_X509_CHECK_PRIVATE_KEY, X509_R_KEY_TYPE_MISMATCH); break; case -2: X509err(X509_F_X509_CHECK_PRIVATE_KEY, X509_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_TYPE); } if (xk) EVP_PKEY_free(xk); if (ret > 0) return 1; return 0; } /* * Check a suite B algorithm is permitted: pass in a public key and the NID * of its signature (or 0 if no signature). The pflags is a pointer to a * flags field which must contain the suite B verification flags. */ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC static int check_suite_b(EVP_PKEY *pkey, int sign_nid, unsigned long *pflags) { const EC_GROUP *grp = NULL; int curve_nid; if (pkey && pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC) grp = EC_KEY_get0_group(pkey->pkey.ec); if (!grp) return X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_ALGORITHM; curve_nid = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(grp); /* Check curve is consistent with LOS */ if (curve_nid == NID_secp384r1) { /* P-384 */ /* * Check signature algorithm is consistent with curve. */ if (sign_nid != -1 && sign_nid != NID_ecdsa_with_SHA384) return X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM; if (!(*pflags & X509_V_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS)) return X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_LOS_NOT_ALLOWED; /* If we encounter P-384 we cannot use P-256 later */ *pflags &= ~X509_V_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY; } else if (curve_nid == NID_X9_62_prime256v1) { /* P-256 */ if (sign_nid != -1 && sign_nid != NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256) return X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM; if (!(*pflags & X509_V_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY)) return X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_LOS_NOT_ALLOWED; } else return X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_CURVE; return X509_V_OK; } int X509_chain_check_suiteb(int *perror_depth, X509 *x, STACK_OF(X509) *chain, unsigned long flags) { int rv, i, sign_nid; EVP_PKEY *pk = NULL; unsigned long tflags; if (!(flags & X509_V_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS)) return X509_V_OK; tflags = flags; /* If no EE certificate passed in must be first in chain */ if (x == NULL) { x = sk_X509_value(chain, 0); i = 1; } else i = 0; if (X509_get_version(x) != 2) { rv = X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_VERSION; /* Correct error depth */ i = 0; goto end; } pk = X509_get_pubkey(x); /* Check EE key only */ rv = check_suite_b(pk, -1, &tflags); if (rv != X509_V_OK) { /* Correct error depth */ i = 0; goto end; } for (; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) { sign_nid = X509_get_signature_nid(x); x = sk_X509_value(chain, i); if (X509_get_version(x) != 2) { rv = X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_VERSION; goto end; } EVP_PKEY_free(pk); pk = X509_get_pubkey(x); rv = check_suite_b(pk, sign_nid, &tflags); if (rv != X509_V_OK) goto end; } /* Final check: root CA signature */ rv = check_suite_b(pk, X509_get_signature_nid(x), &tflags); end: if (pk) EVP_PKEY_free(pk); if (rv != X509_V_OK) { /* Invalid signature or LOS errors are for previous cert */ if ((rv == X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM || rv == X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_LOS_NOT_ALLOWED) && i) i--; /* * If we have LOS error and flags changed then we are signing P-384 * with P-256. Use more meaninggul error. */ if (rv == X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_LOS_NOT_ALLOWED && flags != tflags) rv = X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_CANNOT_SIGN_P_384_WITH_P_256; if (perror_depth) *perror_depth = i; } return rv; } int X509_CRL_check_suiteb(X509_CRL *crl, EVP_PKEY *pk, unsigned long flags) { int sign_nid; if (!(flags & X509_V_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS)) return X509_V_OK; sign_nid = OBJ_obj2nid(crl->crl->sig_alg->algorithm); return check_suite_b(pk, sign_nid, &flags); } #else int X509_chain_check_suiteb(int *perror_depth, X509 *x, STACK_OF(X509) *chain, unsigned long flags) { return 0; } int X509_CRL_check_suiteb(X509_CRL *crl, EVP_PKEY *pk, unsigned long flags) { return 0; } #endif /* * Not strictly speaking an "up_ref" as a STACK doesn't have a reference * count but it has the same effect by duping the STACK and upping the ref of * each X509 structure. */ STACK_OF(X509) *X509_chain_up_ref(STACK_OF(X509) *chain) { STACK_OF(X509) *ret; int i; ret = sk_X509_dup(chain); if (ret == NULL) return NULL; for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(ret); i++) { X509 *x = sk_X509_value(ret, i); CRYPTO_add(&x->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509); } return ret; }