Index: projects/entities/share/pgpkeys/beech.key =================================================================== --- projects/entities/share/pgpkeys/beech.key (revision 41353) +++ projects/entities/share/pgpkeys/beech.key (revision 41354) @@ -1,35 +1,50 @@ -sub 1024g/F1FD1C3D 2011-08-29 +sub 2048g/960F45D9 2013-02-26 ]]> Property changes on: projects/entities/share/pgpkeys/beech.key ___________________________________________________________________ Added: svn:eol-style ## -0,0 +1 ## +native \ No newline at end of property Added: svn:mime-type ## -0,0 +1 ## +text/plain \ No newline at end of property Index: projects/entities/share/pgpkeys/des.key =================================================================== --- projects/entities/share/pgpkeys/des.key (revision 41353) +++ projects/entities/share/pgpkeys/des.key (revision 41354) @@ -1,288 +1,232 @@ uid Dag-Erling Smørgrav uid Dag-Erling Smørgrav -uid Dag-Erling Smørgrav -uid [jpeg image of size 3315] -sub 2048g/920C3313 2006-11-11 [expires: 2012-12-31] +uid [jpeg image of size 4779] +sub 4096R/F4DE87F5 2013-02-15 [expires: 2015-01-01] ]]> Index: projects/entities/share/pgpkeys/girgen.key =================================================================== --- projects/entities/share/pgpkeys/girgen.key (nonexistent) +++ projects/entities/share/pgpkeys/girgen.key (revision 41354) @@ -0,0 +1,237 @@ + + + +uid [jpeg image of size 8260] +uid Palle Girgensohn +sub 2048R/6BC41243 2012-02-23 [expires: 2016-02-23] +]]> + Property changes on: projects/entities/share/pgpkeys/girgen.key ___________________________________________________________________ Added: svn:keywords ## -0,0 +1 ## +FreeBSD=%H \ No newline at end of property Index: projects/entities/share/pgpkeys/pgpkeys-developers.xml =================================================================== --- projects/entities/share/pgpkeys/pgpkeys-developers.xml (revision 41353) +++ projects/entities/share/pgpkeys/pgpkeys-developers.xml (revision 41354) @@ -1,1948 +1,1958 @@ &a.ariff.email; &pgpkey.ariff; &a.tabthorpe.email; &pgpkey.tabthorpe; &a.eadler.email; &pgpkey.eadler; &a.shaun.email; &pgpkey.shaun; &a.brix.email; &pgpkey.brix; &a.mandree.email; &pgpkey.mandree; &a.will.email; &pgpkey.will; &a.dim.email; &pgpkey.dim; &a.anholt.email; &pgpkey.anholt; &a.mva.email; &pgpkey.mva; &a.araujo.email; &pgpkey.araujo; &a.mat.email; &pgpkey.mat; &a.asami.email; &pgpkey.asami; &a.gavin.email; &pgpkey.gavin; &a.jsa.email; &pgpkey.jsa; &a.jadawin.email; &pgpkey.jadawin; &a.timur.email; &pgpkey.timur; &a.gjb.email; &pgpkey.gjb; &a.snb.email; &pgpkey.snb; &a.barner.email; &pgpkey.barner; &a.art.email; &pgpkey.art; &a.tobez.email; &pgpkey.tobez; &a.damien.email; &pgpkey.damien; &a.tdb.email; &pgpkey.tdb; &a.gblach.email; &pgpkey.gblach; &a.mbr.email; &pgpkey.mbr; &a.wblock.email; &pgpkey.wblock; &a.bvs.email; &pgpkey.bvs; &a.novel.email; &pgpkey.novel; &a.garga.email; &pgpkey.garga; &a.alexbl.email; &pgpkey.alexbl; &a.sbz.email; &pgpkey.sbz; &a.ebrandi.email; &pgpkey.ebrandi; &a.harti.email; &pgpkey.harti; &a.obraun.email; &pgpkey.obraun; &a.makc.email; &pgpkey.makc; &a.jmb.email; &pgpkey.jmb; &a.antoine.email; &pgpkey.antoine; &a.db.email; &pgpkey.db; &a.brueffer.email; &pgpkey.brueffer; &a.markus.email; &pgpkey.markus; &a.sbruno.email; &pgpkey.sbruno; &a.oleg.email; &pgpkey.oleg; &a.bushman.email; &pgpkey.bushman; &a.jchandra.email; &pgpkey.jchandra; &a.jcamou.email; &pgpkey.jcamou; &a.acm.email; &pgpkey.acm; &a.gahr.email; &pgpkey.gahr; &a.dchagin.email; &pgpkey.dchagin; &a.perky.email; &pgpkey.perky; &a.jon.email; &pgpkey.jon; &a.jonathan.email; &pgpkey.jonathan; &a.loader.email; &pgpkey.loader; &a.luoqi.email; &pgpkey.luoqi; &a.ache.email; &pgpkey.ache; &a.melifaro.email; &pgpkey.melifaro; &a.seanc.email; &pgpkey.seanc; &a.cjh.email; &pgpkey.cjh; &a.cjc.email; &pgpkey.cjc; &a.marcus.email; &pgpkey.marcus; &a.nik.email; &pgpkey.nik; &a.benjsc.email; &pgpkey.benjsc; &a.tijl.email; &pgpkey.tijl; &a.rakuco.email; &pgpkey.rakuco; &a.brucec.email; &pgpkey.brucec; &a.culot.email; &pgpkey.culot; &a.aaron.email; &pgpkey.aaron; &a.bapt.email; &pgpkey.bapt; &a.ceri.email; &pgpkey.ceri; &a.brd.email; &pgpkey.brd; &a.pjd.email; &pgpkey.pjd; &a.bsd.email; &pgpkey.bsd; &a.carl; &pgpkey.carl; &a.vd.email; &pgpkey.vd; &a.rdivacky.email; &pgpkey.rdivacky; &a.danfe.email; &pgpkey.danfe; &a.dd.email; &pgpkey.dd; &a.bdrewery.email; &pgpkey.bdrewery; &a.olivierd.email; &pgpkey.olivierd; &a.bruno.email; &pgpkey.bruno; &a.ale.email; &pgpkey.ale; &a.peadar.email; &pgpkey.peadar; &a.deischen.email; &pgpkey.deischen; &a.josef.email; &pgpkey.josef; &a.lme.email; &pgpkey.lme; &a.ue.email; &pgpkey.ue; &a.ru.email; &pgpkey.ru; &a.le.email; &pgpkey.le; &a.bf.email; &pgpkey.bf; &a.madpilot.email; &pgpkey.madpilot; &a.rafan.email; &pgpkey.rafan; &a.stefanf.email; &pgpkey.stefanf; &a.farrokhi.email; &pgpkey.farrokhi; &a.jedgar.email; &pgpkey.jedgar; &a.green.email; &pgpkey.green; &a.lioux.email; &pgpkey.lioux; &a.mdf.email; &pgpkey.mdf; &a.fanf.email; &pgpkey.fanf; &a.blackend.email; &pgpkey.blackend; &a.petef.email; &pgpkey.petef; &a.decke.email; &pgpkey.decke; &a.billf.email; &pgpkey.billf; &a.avg.email; &pgpkey.avg; &a.beat.email; &pgpkey.beat; &a.danger.email; &pgpkey.danger; &a.sjg.email; &pgpkey.sjg; &a.gibbs.email; &pgpkey.gibbs; &a.pfg.email; &pgpkey.pfg; + + &a.girgen; + &pgpkey.girgen; + + &a.pgollucci.email; &pgpkey.pgollucci; &a.daichi.email; &pgpkey.daichi; &a.mnag.email; &pgpkey.mnag; &a.grehan.email; &pgpkey.grehan; &a.jamie.email; &pgpkey.jamie; &a.bar.email; &pgpkey.bar; &a.jmg.email; &pgpkey.jmg; &a.mjg.email; &pgpkey.mjg; &a.jhale.email; &pgpkey.jhale; &a.dannyboy.email; &pgpkey.dannyboy; &a.dhartmei.email; &pgpkey.dhartmei; &a.ohauer.email; &pgpkey.ohauer; &a.ehaupt.email; &pgpkey.ehaupt; &a.jhay.email; &pgpkey.jhay; &a.sheldonh.email; &pgpkey.sheldonh; &a.mikeh.email; &pgpkey.mikeh; &a.mheinen.email; &pgpkey.mheinen; &a.niels.email; &pgpkey.niels; &a.jh.email; &pgpkey.jh; &a.jgh.email; &pgpkey.jgh; &a.ghelmer.email; &pgpkey.ghelmer; &a.mux.email; &pgpkey.mux; &a.wen.email; &pgpkey.wen; &a.dhn.email; &pgpkey.dhn; &a.jhibbits.email; &pgpkey.jhibbits; &a.pho.email; &pgpkey.pho; &a.mich.email; &pgpkey.mich; &a.sunpoet.email; &pgpkey.sunpoet; &a.lwhsu.email; &pgpkey.lwhsu; &a.foxfair.email; &pgpkey.foxfair; &a.chinsan.email; &pgpkey.chinsan; &a.davide.email; &pgpkey.davide; &a.jkh.email; &pgpkey.jkh; &a.versus.email; &pgpkey.versus; &a.weongyo.email; &pgpkey.weongyo; &a.peterj.email; &pgpkey.peterj; &a.jinmei.email; &pgpkey.jinmei; &a.ahze.email; &pgpkey.ahze; &a.markj.email; &pgpkey.markj; &a.trevor.email; &pgpkey.trevor; &a.tj.email; &pgpkey.tj; &a.kan.email; &pgpkey.kan; &a.bjk.email; &pgpkey.bjk; &a.phk.email; &pgpkey.phk; &a.pluknet.email; &pgpkey.pluknet; &a.cokane.email; &pgpkey.cokane; &a.kato.email; &pgpkey.kato; &a.joe.email; &pgpkey.joe; &a.vkashyap.email; &pgpkey.vkashyap; &a.kris.email; &pgpkey.kris; &a.keramida.email; &pgpkey.keramida; &a.fjoe.email; &pgpkey.fjoe; &a.manolis.email; &pgpkey.manolis; &a.jkim.email; &pgpkey.jkim; &a.zack.email; &pgpkey.zack; &a.jceel.email; &pgpkey.jceel; &a.andreas.email; &pgpkey.andreas; &a.jkois.email; &pgpkey.jkois; &a.sergei.email; &pgpkey.sergei; &a.maxim.email; &pgpkey.maxim; &a.taras.email; &pgpkey.taras; &a.jkoshy.email; &pgpkey.jkoshy; &a.wkoszek.email; &pgpkey.wkoszek; &a.ak.email; &pgpkey.ak; &a.skreuzer.email; &pgpkey.skreuzer; &a.gabor.email; &pgpkey.gabor; &a.anchie.email; &pgpkey.anchie; &a.rik.email; &pgpkey.rik; &a.rushani.email; &pgpkey.rushani; &a.kuriyama.email; &pgpkey.kuriyama; &a.rene.email; &pgpkey.rene; &a.jlaffaye.email; &pgpkey.jlaffaye; &a.clement.email; &pgpkey.clement; &a.mlaier.email; &pgpkey.mlaier; &a.erwin.email; &pgpkey.erwin; &a.martymac.email; &pgpkey.martymac; &a.glarkin.email; &pgpkey.glarkin; &a.laszlof.email; &pgpkey.laszlof; &a.dru; &pgpkey.dru; &a.lawrance.email; &pgpkey.lawrance; &a.njl.email; &pgpkey.njl; &a.jlh.email; &pgpkey.jlh; &a.leeym.email; &pgpkey.leeym; &a.sam.email; &pgpkey.sam; &a.jylefort.email; &pgpkey.jylefort; &a.netchild.email; &pgpkey.netchild; &a.ae.email; &pgpkey.ae; &a.lesi.email; &pgpkey.lesi; &a.achim; &pgpkey.achim; &a.cel.email; &pgpkey.cel; &a.glewis.email; &pgpkey.glewis; &a.delphij.email; &pgpkey.delphij; &a.avatar.email; &pgpkey.avatar; &a.ijliao.email; &pgpkey.ijliao; &a.lulf.email; &pgpkey.lulf; &a.clive.email; &pgpkey.clive; &a.pclin; &pgpkey.pclin; &a.yzlin.email; &pgpkey.yzlin; &a.linimon.email; &pgpkey.linimon; &a.arved.email; &pgpkey.arved; &a.dryice.email; &pgpkey.dryice; &a.nemoliu.email; &pgpkey.nemoliu; &a.zml.email; &pgpkey.zml; &a.nox.email; &pgpkey.nox; &a.remko.email; &pgpkey.remko; &a.avl.email; &pgpkey.avl; &a.issyl0.email; &pgpkey.issyl0; &a.scottl.email; &pgpkey.scottl; &a.rmacklem.email; &pgpkey.rmacklem; &a.bmah.email; &pgpkey.bmah; &a.rm.email; &pgpkey.rm; &a.mtm.email; &pgpkey.mtm; &a.dwmalone.email; &pgpkey.dwmalone; &a.amdmi3.email; &pgpkey.amdmi3; &a.kwm.email; &pgpkey.kwm; &a.emaste.email; &pgpkey.emaste; &a.cherry.email; &pgpkey.cherry; &a.matusita.email; &pgpkey.matusita; &a.mm.email; &pgpkey.mm; &a.sem.email; &pgpkey.sem; &a.tmclaugh.email; &pgpkey.tmclaugh; &a.jmelo.email; &pgpkey.jmelo; &a.ken.email; &pgpkey.ken; &a.dinoex.email; &pgpkey.dinoex; &a.sanpei.email; &pgpkey.sanpei; &a.rmh.email; &pgpkey.rmh; &a.stephen.email; &pgpkey.stephen; &a.marcel.email; &pgpkey.marcel; &a.kmoore.email; &pgpkey.kmoore; &a.marck.email; &pgpkey.marck; &a.mav.email; &pgpkey.mav; &a.lippe.email; &pgpkey.lippe; &a.rich.email; &pgpkey.rich; &a.knu.email; &pgpkey.knu; &a.tmm.email; &pgpkey.tmm; &a.max.email; &pgpkey.max; &a.maho.email; &pgpkey.maho; &a.yoichi.email; &pgpkey.yoichi; &a.trasz.email; &pgpkey.trasz; &a.dbn; &pgpkey.dbn; &a.bland.email; &pgpkey.bland; &a.gnn.email; &pgpkey.gnn; &a.simon.email; &pgpkey.simon; &a.rnoland.email; &pgpkey.rnoland; &a.anders.email; &pgpkey.anders; &a.lofi.email; &pgpkey.lofi; &a.obrien.email; &pgpkey.obrien; &a.olgeni.email; &pgpkey.olgeni; &a.philip.email; &pgpkey.philip; &a.jpaetzel.email; &pgpkey.jpaetzel; &a.pgj.email; &pgpkey.pgj; &a.hmp.email; &pgpkey.hmp; &a.fluffy.email; &pgpkey.fluffy; &a.sat.email; &pgpkey.sat; &a.np.email; &pgpkey.np; &a.rpaulo.email; &pgpkey.rpaulo; &a.mp.email; &pgpkey.mp; &a.roam.email; &pgpkey.roam; &a.den.email; &pgpkey.den; &a.csjp.email; &pgpkey.csjp; &a.gerald.email; &pgpkey.gerald; &a.jacula.email; &pgpkey.jacula; &a.jdp.email; &pgpkey.jdp; &a.krion.email; &pgpkey.krion; &a.sepotvin.email; &pgpkey.sepotvin; &a.markp.email; &pgpkey.markp; &a.alepulver.email; &pgpkey.alepulver; &a.thomas.email; &pgpkey.thomas; &a.hq.email; &pgpkey.hq; &a.dfr.email; &pgpkey.dfr; &a.lbr.email; &pgpkey.lbr; &a.crees.email; &pgpkey.crees; &a.rees.email; &pgpkey.rees; &a.bcr.email; &pgpkey.bcr; &a.trhodes.email; &pgpkey.trhodes; &a.benno.email; &pgpkey.benno; &a.beech.email; &pgpkey.beech; &a.matteo.email; &pgpkey.matteo; &a.roberto.email; &pgpkey.roberto; &a.rodrigc.email; &pgpkey.rodrigc; &a.guido.email; &pgpkey.guido; &a.rea.email; &pgpkey.rea; &a.ray.email; &pgpkey.ray; &a.niklas.email; &pgpkey.niklas; &a.bsam.email; &pgpkey.bsam; &a.marks.email; &pgpkey.marks; &a.bschmidt.email; &pgpkey.bschmidt; &a.wosch.email; &pgpkey.wosch; &a.ed.email; &pgpkey.ed; &a.das.email; &pgpkey.das; &a.scheidell.email; &pgpkey.scheidell; &a.schweikh.email; &pgpkey.schweikh; &a.matthew.email; &pgpkey.matthew; + + + + &a.tmseck; + &pgpkey.tmseck; &a.stas.email; &pgpkey.stas; &a.johans.email; &pgpkey.johans; &a.bakul.email; &pgpkey.bakul; &a.gshapiro.email; &pgpkey.gshapiro; &a.arun.email; &pgpkey.arun; &a.wxs.email; &pgpkey.wxs; &a.nork.email; &pgpkey.nork; &a.syrinx.email; &pgpkey.syrinx; &a.vanilla.email; &pgpkey.vanilla; &a.ashish.email; &pgpkey.ashish; &a.bms.email; &pgpkey.bms; &a.demon.email; &pgpkey.demon; &a.jesper.email; &pgpkey.jesper; &a.scop.email; &pgpkey.scop; &a.anray.email; &pgpkey.anray; &a.flo.email; &pgpkey.flo; &a.glebius.email; &pgpkey.glebius; &a.kensmith.email; &pgpkey.kensmith; &a.ben.email; &pgpkey.ben; &a.des.email; &pgpkey.des; &a.sobomax.email; &pgpkey.sobomax; &a.brian.email; &pgpkey.brian; &a.sson.email; &pgpkey.sson; &a.nsouch.email; &pgpkey.nsouch; &a.ssouhlal.email; &pgpkey.ssouhlal; &a.uqs.email; &pgpkey.uqs; &a.rink.email; &pgpkey.rink; &a.vsevolod.email; &pgpkey.vsevolod; &a.zi.email; &pgpkey.zi; &a.rrs.email; &pgpkey.rrs; &a.murray.email; &pgpkey.murray; &a.vs.email; &pgpkey.vs; &a.rstone.email; &pgpkey.rstone; &a.xride.email; &pgpkey.xride; &a.marius.email; &pgpkey.marius; &a.cs.email; &pgpkey.cs; &a.clsung.email; &pgpkey.clsung; &a.gsutter.email; &pgpkey.gsutter; &a.metal.email; &pgpkey.metal; &a.ryusuke.email; &pgpkey.ryusuke; &a.garys.email; &pgpkey.garys; &a.nyan.email; &pgpkey.nyan; &a.sahil.email; &pgpkey.sahil; &a.tota.email; &pgpkey.tota; &a.romain.email; &pgpkey.romain; &a.sylvio.email; &pgpkey.sylvio; &a.itetcu.email; &pgpkey.itetcu; &a.mi.email; &pgpkey.mi; &a.gordon.email; &pgpkey.gordon; &a.lth.email; &pgpkey.lth; &a.jase.email; &pgpkey.jase; &a.lx.email; &pgpkey.lx; &a.fabient.email; &pgpkey.fabient; &a.thierry.email; &pgpkey.thierry; &a.thompsa.email; &pgpkey.thompsa; &a.flz.email; &pgpkey.flz; &a.jilles.email; &pgpkey.jilles; &a.ganbold.email; &pgpkey.ganbold; &a.tuexen.email; &pgpkey.tuexen; &a.andrew.email; &pgpkey.andrew; &a.ume.email; &pgpkey.ume; &a.ups.email; &pgpkey.ups; &a.bryanv.email; &pgpkey.bryanv; &a.nectar.email; &pgpkey.nectar; &a.avilla.email; &pgpkey.avilla; &a.nivit.email; &pgpkey.nivit; &a.ivoras.email; &pgpkey.ivoras; &a.stefan.email; &pgpkey.stefan; &a.kaiw.email; &pgpkey.kaiw; &a.adamw.email; &pgpkey.adamw; &a.peter.email; &pgpkey.peter; &a.nwhitehorn.email; &pgpkey.nwhitehorn; &a.miwi.email; &pgpkey.miwi; &a.nate.email; &pgpkey.nate; &a.swills.email; &pgpkey.swills; &a.twinterg.email; &pgpkey.twinterg; &a.wollman.email; &pgpkey.wollman; &a.joerg.email; &pgpkey.joerg; &a.davidxu.email; &pgpkey.davidxu; &a.emax.email; &pgpkey.emax; &a.bz.email; &pgpkey.bz; &a.zeising.email; &pgpkey.zeising; &a.phantom.email; &pgpkey.phantom; &a.sephe.email; &pgpkey.sephe; &a.zont.email; &pgpkey.zont; &a.syuu.email; &pgpkey.syuu; Index: projects/entities/share/pgpkeys/pgpkeys.ent =================================================================== --- projects/entities/share/pgpkeys/pgpkeys.ent (revision 41353) +++ projects/entities/share/pgpkeys/pgpkeys.ent (revision 41354) @@ -1,416 +1,418 @@ + + Index: projects/entities/share/pgpkeys/tmseck.key =================================================================== --- projects/entities/share/pgpkeys/tmseck.key (nonexistent) +++ projects/entities/share/pgpkeys/tmseck.key (revision 41354) @@ -0,0 +1,49 @@ + + + +uid Thomas-Martin Seck (Privat) +uid Thomas-Martin Seck (FreeBSD) +sub 2048g/3DC33B0F 2000-11-22 +]]> + Property changes on: projects/entities/share/pgpkeys/tmseck.key ___________________________________________________________________ Added: svn:keywords ## -0,0 +1 ## +FreeBSD=%H \ No newline at end of property Index: projects/entities/share/security/advisories/FreeBSD-SA-13:01.bind.asc =================================================================== --- projects/entities/share/security/advisories/FreeBSD-SA-13:01.bind.asc (nonexistent) +++ projects/entities/share/security/advisories/FreeBSD-SA-13:01.bind.asc (revision 41354) @@ -0,0 +1,122 @@ +-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- +Hash: SHA1 + +============================================================================= +FreeBSD-SA-13:01.bind Security Advisory + The FreeBSD Project + +Topic: BIND remote DoS with deliberately crafted DNS64 query + +Category: contrib +Module: bind +Announced: 2013-02-19 +Affects: FreeBSD 9.x and later +Corrected: 2013-01-08 09:05:09 UTC (stable/9, 9.1-STABLE) + 2013-02-19 13:27:20 UTC (releng/9.0, 9.0-RELEASE-p6) + 2013-02-19 13:27:20 UTC (releng/9.1, 9.1-RELEASE-p1) +CVE Name: CVE-2012-5688 + +For general information regarding FreeBSD Security Advisories, +including descriptions of the fields above, security branches, and the +following sections, please visit . + +I. Background + +BIND 9 is an implementation of the Domain Name System (DNS) protocols. +The named(8) daemon is an Internet Domain Name Server. + +DNS64 is an IPv6 transition mechanism that will return a synthesized +AAAA response even if there is only an A record available. + +II. Problem Description + +Due to a software defect a crafted query can cause named(8) to crash +with an assertion failure. + +III. Impact + +If named(8) is configured to use DNS64, an attacker who can send it a +query can cause named(8) to crash, resulting in a denial of service. + +IV. Workaround + +No workaround is available, but systems not configured to use DNS64 +using the "dns64" configuration statement are not vulnerable. DNS64 +is not enabled in the default configuration on FreeBSD. + +V. Solution + +Perform one of the following: + +1) Upgrade your vulnerable system to a supported FreeBSD stable or +release / security branch (releng) dated after the correction date. + +Restart the named(8) daemon, or reboot your system. + +2) To update your vulnerable system via a source code patch: + +The following patches have been verified to apply to the applicable +FreeBSD release branches. + +a) Download the relevant patch from the location below, and verify the +detached PGP signature using your PGP utility. + +# fetch http://security.FreeBSD.org/patches/SA-13:01/bind.patch +# fetch http://security.FreeBSD.org/patches/SA-13:01/bind.patch.asc +# gpg --verify bind.patch.asc + +b) Execute the following commands as root: + +# cd /usr/src +# patch < /path/to/patch + +Recompile the operating system using buildworld and installworld as +described in . + +Restart the named(8) daemon, or reboot your system. + +3) To update your vulnerable system via a binary patch: + +Systems running a RELEASE version of FreeBSD on the i386 or amd64 +platforms can be updated via the freebsd-update(8) utility: + +# freebsd-update fetch +# freebsd-update install + +Restart the named(8) daemon, or reboot your system. + +4) Alternatively, install and run BIND from the Ports Collection after +the correction date. The following versions and newer versions of +BIND installed from the Ports Collection are not affected by this +vulnerability: + + bind98-9.8.4.1 + bind99-9.9.2.1 + +VI. Correction details + +The following list contains the revision numbers of each file that was +corrected in FreeBSD. + +Branch/path Revision +- ------------------------------------------------------------------------- +stable/9/ r245163 +releng/9.0/ r246989 +releng/9.1/ r246989 +- ------------------------------------------------------------------------- + +VII. References + +https://kb.isc.org/article/AA-00828 + +http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2012-5688 + +The latest revision of this advisory is available at +http://security.FreeBSD.org/advisories/FreeBSD-SA-13:01.bind.asc +-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- +Version: GnuPG v1.4.12 (FreeBSD) + +iEYEARECAAYFAlEjf8MACgkQFdaIBMps37JUigCeIvjGL59H2froSeFqfPvlzM7L +XpAAni7nW5GZt4AE3eSDQwE4ivCne6SK +=Rxq4 +-----END PGP SIGNATURE----- Property changes on: projects/entities/share/security/advisories/FreeBSD-SA-13:01.bind.asc ___________________________________________________________________ Added: fbsd:nokeywords ## -0,0 +1 ## +True \ No newline at end of property Added: svn:eol-style ## -0,0 +1 ## +native \ No newline at end of property Added: svn:mime-type ## -0,0 +1 ## +text/plain \ No newline at end of property Index: projects/entities/share/security/advisories/FreeBSD-SA-13:02.libc.asc =================================================================== --- projects/entities/share/security/advisories/FreeBSD-SA-13:02.libc.asc (nonexistent) +++ projects/entities/share/security/advisories/FreeBSD-SA-13:02.libc.asc (revision 41354) @@ -0,0 +1,114 @@ +-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- +Hash: SHA1 + +============================================================================= +FreeBSD-SA-13:02.libc Security Advisory + The FreeBSD Project + +Topic: glob(3) related resource exhaustion + +Category: core +Module: libc +Announced: 2013-02-19 +Affects: All supported versions of FreeBSD. +Corrected: 2013-02-05 09:53:32 UTC (stable/7, 7.4-STABLE) + 2013-02-19 13:27:20 UTC (releng/7.4, 7.4-RELEASE-p12) + 2013-02-05 09:53:32 UTC (stable/8, 8.3-STABLE) + 2013-02-19 13:27:20 UTC (releng/8.3, 8.3-RELEASE-p6) + 2013-02-05 09:53:32 UTC (stable/9, 9.1-STABLE) + 2013-02-19 13:27:20 UTC (releng/9.0, 9.0-RELEASE-p6) + 2013-02-19 13:27:20 UTC (releng/9.1, 9.1-RELEASE-p1) +CVE Name: CVE-2010-2632 + +For general information regarding FreeBSD Security Advisories, +including descriptions of the fields above, security branches, and the +following sections, please visit . + +I. Background + +The glob(3) function is a pathname generator that implements the rules for +file name pattern matching used by the shell. + +II. Problem Description + +GLOB_LIMIT is supposed to limit the number of paths to prevent against +memory or CPU attacks. The implementation however is insufficient. + +III. Impact + +An attacker that is able to exploit this vulnerability could cause excessive +memory or CPU usage, resulting in a Denial of Service. A common target for +a remote attacker could be ftpd(8). + +IV. Workaround + +No workaround is available. + +V. Solution + +Perform one of the following: + +1) Upgrade your vulnerable system to a supported FreeBSD stable or +release / security branch (releng) dated after the correction date. + +2) To update your vulnerable system via a source code patch: + +The following patches have been verified to apply to the applicable +FreeBSD release branches. + +a) Download the relevant patch from the location below, and verify the +detached PGP signature using your PGP utility. + +# fetch http://security.FreeBSD.org/patches/SA-13:02/libc.patch +# fetch http://security.FreeBSD.org/patches/SA-13:02/libc.patch.asc +# gpg --verify libc.patch.asc + +b) Execute the following commands as root: + +# cd /usr/src +# patch < /path/to/patch + +Recompile the operating system using buildworld and installworld as +described in . + +Restart all daemons, or reboot the system. + +3) To update your vulnerable system via a binary patch: + +Systems running a RELEASE version of FreeBSD on the i386 or amd64 +platforms can be updated via the freebsd-update(8) utility: + +# freebsd-update fetch +# freebsd-update install + +Restart all daemons, or reboot the system. + +VI. Correction details + +The following list contains the revision numbers of each file that was +corrected in FreeBSD. + +Branch/path Revision +- ------------------------------------------------------------------------- +stable/7/ r246357 +releng/7.4/ r246989 +stable/8/ r246357 +releng/8.3/ r246989 +stable/9/ r246357 +releng/9.0/ r246989 +releng/9.1/ r246989 +- ------------------------------------------------------------------------- + +VII. References + +http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2010-2632 + +The latest revision of this advisory is available at +http://security.FreeBSD.org/advisories/FreeBSD-SA-13:02.libc.asc +-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- +Version: GnuPG v1.4.12 (FreeBSD) + +iEYEARECAAYFAlEjf80ACgkQFdaIBMps37JFUgCfUrw8Ky4U19COja6fna49Calv +z/YAn1JSGxzHCo8vLj4XhtXqrQt68or4 +=mCPv +-----END PGP SIGNATURE----- Property changes on: projects/entities/share/security/advisories/FreeBSD-SA-13:02.libc.asc ___________________________________________________________________ Added: fbsd:nokeywords ## -0,0 +1 ## +True \ No newline at end of property Added: svn:eol-style ## -0,0 +1 ## +native \ No newline at end of property Added: svn:mime-type ## -0,0 +1 ## +text/plain \ No newline at end of property Index: projects/entities/share/security/advisories/FreeBSD-SA-13:03.openssl.asc =================================================================== --- projects/entities/share/security/advisories/FreeBSD-SA-13:03.openssl.asc (nonexistent) +++ projects/entities/share/security/advisories/FreeBSD-SA-13:03.openssl.asc (revision 41354) @@ -0,0 +1,126 @@ +-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- +Hash: SHA1 + +============================================================================= +FreeBSD-SA-13:03.openssl Security Advisory + The FreeBSD Project + +Topic: OpenSSL multiple vulnerabilities + +Category: contrib +Module: openssl +Announced: 2013-04-02 +Affects: All supported versions of FreeBSD. +Corrected: 2013-03-08 17:28:40 UTC (stable/8, 8.3-STABLE) + 2013-04-02 17:34:42 UTC (releng/8.3, 8.3-RELEASE-p7) + 2013-03-14 17:48:07 UTC (stable/9, 9.1-STABLE) + 2013-04-02 17:34:42 UTC (releng/9.0, 9.0-RELEASE-p7) + 2013-04-02 17:34:42 UTC (releng/9.1, 9.1-RELEASE-p2) +CVE Name: CVE-2013-0166, CVE-2013-0169 + +For general information regarding FreeBSD Security Advisories, +including descriptions of the fields above, security branches, and the +following sections, please visit . + +I. Background + +FreeBSD includes software from the OpenSSL Project. The OpenSSL Project is +a collaborative effort to develop a robust, commercial-grade, full-featured +Open Source toolkit implementing the Secure Sockets Layer (SSL v2/v3) +and Transport Layer Security (TLS v1) protocols as well as a full-strength +general purpose cryptography library. + +II. Problem Description + +A flaw in the OpenSSL handling of OCSP response verification could be exploited +to cause a denial of service attack. [CVE-2013-0166] + +OpenSSL has a weakness in the handling of CBC ciphersuites in SSL, TLS and +DTLS. The weakness could reveal plaintext in a timing attack. [CVE-2013-0169] + +III. Impact + +The Denial of Service could be caused in the OpenSSL server application by +using an invalid key. [CVE-2013-0166] + +A remote attacker could recover sensitive information by conducting +an attack via statistical analysis of timing data with crafted packets. +[CVE-2013-0169] + +IV. Workaround + +No workaround is available. + +V. Solution + +Perform one of the following: + +1) Upgrade your vulnerable system to a supported FreeBSD stable or +release / security branch (releng) dated dated after the correction +date. + +2) To update your vulnerable system via a source code patch: + +The following patches have been verified to apply to the applicable +FreeBSD release branches. + +a) Download the relevant patch from the location below, and verify the +detached PGP signature using your PGP utility. + +[FreeBSD 8.3 and 9.0] +# fetch http://security.FreeBSD.org/patches/SA-13:03/openssl.patch +# fetch http://security.FreeBSD.org/patches/SA-13:03/openssl.patch.asc +# gpg --verify openssl.patch.asc + +[FreeBSD 9.1] +# fetch http://security.FreeBSD.org/patches/SA-13:03/openssl-9.1.patch +# fetch http://security.FreeBSD.org/patches/SA-13:03/openssl-9.1.patch.asc +# gpg --verify openssl-9.1.patch.asc + +b) Execute the following commands as root: + +# cd /usr/src +# patch < /path/to/patch + +Recompile the operating system using buildworld and installworld as +described in . + +Restart the all deamons using the library, or reboot your the system. + +3) To update your vulnerable system via a binary patch: + +Systems running a RELEASE version of FreeBSD on the i386 or amd64 +platforms can be updated via the freebsd-update(8) utility: + +# freebsd-update fetch +# freebsd-update install + +VI. Correction details + +The following list contains the revision numbers of each file that was +corrected in FreeBSD. + +Branch/path Revision +- ------------------------------------------------------------------------- +stable/8/ r248057 +releng/8.3/ r249029 +stable/9/ r248272 +releng/9.0/ r249029 +releng/9.1/ r249029 +- ------------------------------------------------------------------------- + +VII. References + +CVE Name: +http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2013-0169 +http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2013-0166 + +The latest revision of this advisory is available at +http://security.FreeBSD.org/advisories/FreeBSD-SA-13:03.openssl.asc +-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- +Version: GnuPG v2.0.19 (FreeBSD) + +iEYEARECAAYFAlFbGXYACgkQFdaIBMps37ISqACcCovc+NpuH57guiROqIbTfw3P +4RMAn22ppeZnRVfje8up3cyOx/D8CCmI +=rQqV +-----END PGP SIGNATURE----- Property changes on: projects/entities/share/security/advisories/FreeBSD-SA-13:03.openssl.asc ___________________________________________________________________ Added: fbsd:nokeywords ## -0,0 +1 ## +y \ No newline at end of property Added: svn:eol-style ## -0,0 +1 ## +native \ No newline at end of property Added: svn:mime-type ## -0,0 +1 ## +text/plain \ No newline at end of property Index: projects/entities/share/security/advisories/FreeBSD-SA-13:04.bind.asc =================================================================== --- projects/entities/share/security/advisories/FreeBSD-SA-13:04.bind.asc (nonexistent) +++ projects/entities/share/security/advisories/FreeBSD-SA-13:04.bind.asc (revision 41354) @@ -0,0 +1,112 @@ +-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- +Hash: SHA1 + +============================================================================= +FreeBSD-SA-13:04.bind Security Advisory + The FreeBSD Project + +Topic: BIND remote denial of service + +Category: contrib +Module: bind +Announced: 2013-04-02 +Credits: Matthew Horsfall of Dyn, Inc. +Affects: FreeBSD 8.4-BETA1 and FreeBSD 9.x +Corrected: 2013-03-28 05:35:46 UTC (stable/8, 8.4-BETA1) + 2013-03-28 05:39:45 UTC (stable/9, 9.1-STABLE) + 2013-04-02 17:34:42 UTC (releng/9.0, 9.0-RELEASE-p7) + 2013-04-02 17:34:42 UTC (releng/9.1, 9.1-RELEASE-p2) +CVE Name: CVE-2013-2266 + +For general information regarding FreeBSD Security Advisories, +including descriptions of the fields above, security branches, and the +following sections, please visit . + +I. Background + +BIND 9 is an implementation of the Domain Name System (DNS) protocols. +The named(8) daemon is an Internet Domain Name Server. The libdns +library is a library of DNS protocol support functions. + +II. Problem Description + +A flaw in a library used by BIND allows an attacker to deliberately +cause excessive memory consumption by the named(8) process. This +affects both recursive and authoritative servers. + +III. Impact + +A remote attacker can cause the named(8) daemon to consume all available +memory and crash, resulting in a denial of service. Applications linked +with the libdns library, for instance dig(1), may also be affected. + +IV. Workaround + +No workaround is available, but systems not running named(8) service +and not using base system DNS utilities are not affected. + +V. Solution + +Perform one of the following: + +1) Upgrade your vulnerable system to a supported FreeBSD stable or +release / security branch (releng) dated after the correction date. + +2) To update your vulnerable system via a source code patch: + +The following patches have been verified to apply to the applicable +FreeBSD release branches. + +a) Download the relevant patch from the location below, and verify the +detached PGP signature using your PGP utility. + +# fetch http://security.FreeBSD.org/patches/SA-13:04/bind.patch +# fetch http://security.FreeBSD.org/patches/SA-13:04/bind.patch.asc +# gpg --verify bind.patch.asc + +b) Execute the following commands as root: + +# cd /usr/src +# patch < /path/to/patch + +Recompile the operating system using buildworld and installworld as +described in . + +Restart the named daemon, or reboot the system. + +3) To update your vulnerable system via a binary patch: + +Systems running a RELEASE version of FreeBSD on the i386 or amd64 +platforms can be updated via the freebsd-update(8) utility: + +# freebsd-update fetch +# freebsd-update install + +VI. Correction details + +The following list contains the revision numbers of each file that was +corrected in FreeBSD. + +Branch/path Revision +- ------------------------------------------------------------------------- +stable/8/ r248807 +stable/9/ r248808 +releng/9.0/ r249029 +releng/9.1/ r249029 +- ------------------------------------------------------------------------- + +VII. References + +https://kb.isc.org/article/AA-00871 + +http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2013-2266 + +The latest revision of this advisory is available at +http://security.FreeBSD.org/advisories/FreeBSD-SA-13:04.bind.asc +-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- +Version: GnuPG v2.0.19 (FreeBSD) + +iEYEARECAAYFAlFbGYYACgkQFdaIBMps37J4eACeNzJtWElzKJZCqXdzhrHEB+pu +1eoAn0oD7xcjoPOnB7H3xZbIeHldgGcI +=BX1M +-----END PGP SIGNATURE----- Property changes on: projects/entities/share/security/advisories/FreeBSD-SA-13:04.bind.asc ___________________________________________________________________ Added: fbsd:nokeywords ## -0,0 +1 ## +y \ No newline at end of property Added: svn:eol-style ## -0,0 +1 ## +native \ No newline at end of property Added: svn:mime-type ## -0,0 +1 ## +text/plain \ No newline at end of property Index: projects/entities/share/security/patches/SA-13:01/bind.patch =================================================================== --- projects/entities/share/security/patches/SA-13:01/bind.patch (nonexistent) +++ projects/entities/share/security/patches/SA-13:01/bind.patch (revision 41354) @@ -0,0 +1,18 @@ +Index: contrib/bind9/bin/named/query.c +=================================================================== +--- contrib/bind9/bin/named/query.c ++++ contrib/bind9/bin/named/query.c +@@ -5183,10 +5183,12 @@ + isc_result_t result; + isc_uint32_t ttl = ISC_UINT32_MAX; + ++ dns_rdataset_init(&rdataset); ++ + result = dns_db_getoriginnode(db, &node); + if (result != ISC_R_SUCCESS) + goto cleanup; +- dns_rdataset_init(&rdataset); ++ + result = dns_db_findrdataset(db, node, version, dns_rdatatype_soa, + 0, 0, &rdataset, NULL); + if (result != ISC_R_SUCCESS) Property changes on: projects/entities/share/security/patches/SA-13:01/bind.patch ___________________________________________________________________ Added: fbsd:nokeywords ## -0,0 +1 ## +True \ No newline at end of property Added: svn:eol-style ## -0,0 +1 ## +native \ No newline at end of property Added: svn:mime-type ## -0,0 +1 ## +text/plain \ No newline at end of property Index: projects/entities/share/security/patches/SA-13:01/bind.patch.asc =================================================================== --- projects/entities/share/security/patches/SA-13:01/bind.patch.asc (nonexistent) +++ projects/entities/share/security/patches/SA-13:01/bind.patch.asc (revision 41354) @@ -0,0 +1,7 @@ +-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- +Version: GnuPG v1.4.12 (FreeBSD) + +iEYEABECAAYFAlEjf/cACgkQFdaIBMps37LjHwCfQ0g0m9lvCY/AZmzYq6NfupNU +cjQAn1ovam14yAE0+WT3FAhOM0lr7INw +=gwXh +-----END PGP SIGNATURE----- Property changes on: projects/entities/share/security/patches/SA-13:01/bind.patch.asc ___________________________________________________________________ Added: fbsd:nokeywords ## -0,0 +1 ## +True \ No newline at end of property Added: svn:eol-style ## -0,0 +1 ## +native \ No newline at end of property Added: svn:mime-type ## -0,0 +1 ## +text/plain \ No newline at end of property Index: projects/entities/share/security/patches/SA-13:02/libc.patch =================================================================== --- projects/entities/share/security/patches/SA-13:02/libc.patch (nonexistent) +++ projects/entities/share/security/patches/SA-13:02/libc.patch (revision 41354) @@ -0,0 +1,215 @@ +Index: lib/libc/gen/glob.c +=================================================================== +--- lib/libc/gen/glob.c (revision 246357) ++++ lib/libc/gen/glob.c (working copy) +@@ -94,6 +94,25 @@ __FBSDID("$FreeBSD$"); + + #include "collate.h" + ++/* ++ * glob(3) expansion limits. Stop the expansion if any of these limits ++ * is reached. This caps the runtime in the face of DoS attacks. See ++ * also CVE-2010-2632 ++ */ ++#define GLOB_LIMIT_BRACE 128 /* number of brace calls */ ++#define GLOB_LIMIT_PATH 65536 /* number of path elements */ ++#define GLOB_LIMIT_READDIR 16384 /* number of readdirs */ ++#define GLOB_LIMIT_STAT 1024 /* number of stat system calls */ ++#define GLOB_LIMIT_STRING ARG_MAX /* maximum total size for paths */ ++ ++struct glob_limit { ++ size_t l_brace_cnt; ++ size_t l_path_lim; ++ size_t l_readdir_cnt; ++ size_t l_stat_cnt; ++ size_t l_string_cnt; ++}; ++ + #define DOLLAR '$' + #define DOT '.' + #define EOS '\0' +@@ -153,15 +172,18 @@ static const Char *g_strchr(const Char *, wchar_t) + static Char *g_strcat(Char *, const Char *); + #endif + static int g_stat(Char *, struct stat *, glob_t *); +-static int glob0(const Char *, glob_t *, size_t *); +-static int glob1(Char *, glob_t *, size_t *); +-static int glob2(Char *, Char *, Char *, Char *, glob_t *, size_t *); +-static int glob3(Char *, Char *, Char *, Char *, Char *, glob_t *, size_t *); +-static int globextend(const Char *, glob_t *, size_t *); +-static const Char * ++static int glob0(const Char *, glob_t *, struct glob_limit *); ++static int glob1(Char *, glob_t *, struct glob_limit *); ++static int glob2(Char *, Char *, Char *, Char *, glob_t *, ++ struct glob_limit *); ++static int glob3(Char *, Char *, Char *, Char *, Char *, glob_t *, ++ struct glob_limit *); ++static int globextend(const Char *, glob_t *, struct glob_limit *); ++static const Char * + globtilde(const Char *, Char *, size_t, glob_t *); +-static int globexp1(const Char *, glob_t *, size_t *); +-static int globexp2(const Char *, const Char *, glob_t *, int *, size_t *); ++static int globexp1(const Char *, glob_t *, struct glob_limit *); ++static int globexp2(const Char *, const Char *, glob_t *, int *, ++ struct glob_limit *); + static int match(Char *, Char *, Char *); + #ifdef DEBUG + static void qprintf(const char *, Char *); +@@ -171,8 +193,8 @@ int + glob(const char * __restrict pattern, int flags, + int (*errfunc)(const char *, int), glob_t * __restrict pglob) + { ++ struct glob_limit limit = { 0, 0, 0, 0, 0 }; + const char *patnext; +- size_t limit; + Char *bufnext, *bufend, patbuf[MAXPATHLEN], prot; + mbstate_t mbs; + wchar_t wc; +@@ -186,11 +208,10 @@ glob(const char * __restrict pattern, int flags, + pglob->gl_offs = 0; + } + if (flags & GLOB_LIMIT) { +- limit = pglob->gl_matchc; +- if (limit == 0) +- limit = ARG_MAX; +- } else +- limit = 0; ++ limit.l_path_lim = pglob->gl_matchc; ++ if (limit.l_path_lim == 0) ++ limit.l_path_lim = GLOB_LIMIT_PATH; ++ } + pglob->gl_flags = flags & ~GLOB_MAGCHAR; + pglob->gl_errfunc = errfunc; + pglob->gl_matchc = 0; +@@ -243,11 +264,17 @@ glob(const char * __restrict pattern, int flags, + * characters + */ + static int +-globexp1(const Char *pattern, glob_t *pglob, size_t *limit) ++globexp1(const Char *pattern, glob_t *pglob, struct glob_limit *limit) + { + const Char* ptr = pattern; + int rv; + ++ if ((pglob->gl_flags & GLOB_LIMIT) && ++ limit->l_brace_cnt++ >= GLOB_LIMIT_BRACE) { ++ errno = 0; ++ return (GLOB_NOSPACE); ++ } ++ + /* Protect a single {}, for find(1), like csh */ + if (pattern[0] == LBRACE && pattern[1] == RBRACE && pattern[2] == EOS) + return glob0(pattern, pglob, limit); +@@ -266,7 +293,8 @@ static int + * If it fails then it tries to glob the rest of the pattern and returns. + */ + static int +-globexp2(const Char *ptr, const Char *pattern, glob_t *pglob, int *rv, size_t *limit) ++globexp2(const Char *ptr, const Char *pattern, glob_t *pglob, int *rv, ++ struct glob_limit *limit) + { + int i; + Char *lm, *ls; +@@ -436,7 +464,7 @@ globtilde(const Char *pattern, Char *patbuf, size_ + * if things went well, nonzero if errors occurred. + */ + static int +-glob0(const Char *pattern, glob_t *pglob, size_t *limit) ++glob0(const Char *pattern, glob_t *pglob, struct glob_limit *limit) + { + const Char *qpatnext; + int err; +@@ -529,7 +557,7 @@ compare(const void *p, const void *q) + } + + static int +-glob1(Char *pattern, glob_t *pglob, size_t *limit) ++glob1(Char *pattern, glob_t *pglob, struct glob_limit *limit) + { + Char pathbuf[MAXPATHLEN]; + +@@ -547,7 +575,7 @@ static int + */ + static int + glob2(Char *pathbuf, Char *pathend, Char *pathend_last, Char *pattern, +- glob_t *pglob, size_t *limit) ++ glob_t *pglob, struct glob_limit *limit) + { + struct stat sb; + Char *p, *q; +@@ -563,6 +591,15 @@ glob2(Char *pathbuf, Char *pathend, Char *pathend_ + if (g_lstat(pathbuf, &sb, pglob)) + return(0); + ++ if ((pglob->gl_flags & GLOB_LIMIT) && ++ limit->l_stat_cnt++ >= GLOB_LIMIT_STAT) { ++ errno = 0; ++ if (pathend + 1 > pathend_last) ++ return (GLOB_ABORTED); ++ *pathend++ = SEP; ++ *pathend = EOS; ++ return (GLOB_NOSPACE); ++ } + if (((pglob->gl_flags & GLOB_MARK) && + pathend[-1] != SEP) && (S_ISDIR(sb.st_mode) + || (S_ISLNK(sb.st_mode) && +@@ -606,7 +643,7 @@ glob2(Char *pathbuf, Char *pathend, Char *pathend_ + static int + glob3(Char *pathbuf, Char *pathend, Char *pathend_last, + Char *pattern, Char *restpattern, +- glob_t *pglob, size_t *limit) ++ glob_t *pglob, struct glob_limit *limit) + { + struct dirent *dp; + DIR *dirp; +@@ -652,6 +689,19 @@ glob3(Char *pathbuf, Char *pathend, Char *pathend_ + size_t clen; + mbstate_t mbs; + ++ if ((pglob->gl_flags & GLOB_LIMIT) && ++ limit->l_readdir_cnt++ >= GLOB_LIMIT_READDIR) { ++ errno = 0; ++ if (pathend + 1 > pathend_last) ++ err = GLOB_ABORTED; ++ else { ++ *pathend++ = SEP; ++ *pathend = EOS; ++ err = GLOB_NOSPACE; ++ } ++ break; ++ } ++ + /* Initial DOT must be matched literally. */ + if (dp->d_name[0] == DOT && *pattern != DOT) + continue; +@@ -702,14 +752,15 @@ glob3(Char *pathbuf, Char *pathend, Char *pathend_ + * gl_pathv points to (gl_offs + gl_pathc + 1) items. + */ + static int +-globextend(const Char *path, glob_t *pglob, size_t *limit) ++globextend(const Char *path, glob_t *pglob, struct glob_limit *limit) + { + char **pathv; + size_t i, newsize, len; + char *copy; + const Char *p; + +- if (*limit && pglob->gl_pathc > *limit) { ++ if ((pglob->gl_flags & GLOB_LIMIT) && ++ pglob->gl_matchc > limit->l_path_lim) { + errno = 0; + return (GLOB_NOSPACE); + } +@@ -737,6 +788,12 @@ static int + for (p = path; *p++;) + continue; + len = MB_CUR_MAX * (size_t)(p - path); /* XXX overallocation */ ++ limit->l_string_cnt += len; ++ if ((pglob->gl_flags & GLOB_LIMIT) && ++ limit->l_string_cnt >= GLOB_LIMIT_STRING) { ++ errno = 0; ++ return (GLOB_NOSPACE); ++ } + if ((copy = malloc(len)) != NULL) { + if (g_Ctoc(path, copy, len)) { + free(copy); Property changes on: projects/entities/share/security/patches/SA-13:02/libc.patch ___________________________________________________________________ Added: fbsd:nokeywords ## -0,0 +1 ## +True \ No newline at end of property Added: svn:eol-style ## -0,0 +1 ## +native \ No newline at end of property Added: svn:mime-type ## -0,0 +1 ## +text/plain \ No newline at end of property Index: projects/entities/share/security/patches/SA-13:02/libc.patch.asc =================================================================== --- projects/entities/share/security/patches/SA-13:02/libc.patch.asc (nonexistent) +++ projects/entities/share/security/patches/SA-13:02/libc.patch.asc (revision 41354) @@ -0,0 +1,7 @@ +-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- +Version: GnuPG v1.4.12 (FreeBSD) + +iEYEABECAAYFAlEjf/0ACgkQFdaIBMps37Kw1ACfX+M73KQtFkdrAhFWVyVm2G44 +DLYAn2SoJT4c98Frj75ttappPsvFDgVk +=H9Gv +-----END PGP SIGNATURE----- Property changes on: projects/entities/share/security/patches/SA-13:02/libc.patch.asc ___________________________________________________________________ Added: fbsd:nokeywords ## -0,0 +1 ## +True \ No newline at end of property Added: svn:eol-style ## -0,0 +1 ## +native \ No newline at end of property Added: svn:mime-type ## -0,0 +1 ## +text/plain \ No newline at end of property Index: projects/entities/share/security/patches/SA-13:03/openssl-9.1.patch =================================================================== --- projects/entities/share/security/patches/SA-13:03/openssl-9.1.patch (nonexistent) +++ projects/entities/share/security/patches/SA-13:03/openssl-9.1.patch (revision 41354) @@ -0,0 +1,3891 @@ +Index: crypto/openssl/CHANGES +=================================================================== +--- crypto/openssl/CHANGES (revision 248771) ++++ crypto/openssl/CHANGES (working copy) +@@ -2,6 +2,35 @@ + OpenSSL CHANGES + _______________ + ++ Changes between 0.9.8x and 0.9.8y [5 Feb 2013] ++ ++ *) Make the decoding of SSLv3, TLS and DTLS CBC records constant time. ++ ++ This addresses the flaw in CBC record processing discovered by ++ Nadhem Alfardan and Kenny Paterson. Details of this attack can be found ++ at: http://www.isg.rhul.ac.uk/tls/ ++ ++ Thanks go to Nadhem Alfardan and Kenny Paterson of the Information ++ Security Group at Royal Holloway, University of London ++ (www.isg.rhul.ac.uk) for discovering this flaw and Adam Langley and ++ Emilia Käsper for the initial patch. ++ (CVE-2013-0169) ++ [Emilia Käsper, Adam Langley, Ben Laurie, Andy Polyakov, Steve Henson] ++ ++ *) Return an error when checking OCSP signatures when key is NULL. ++ This fixes a DoS attack. (CVE-2013-0166) ++ [Steve Henson] ++ ++ *) Call OCSP Stapling callback after ciphersuite has been chosen, so ++ the right response is stapled. Also change SSL_get_certificate() ++ so it returns the certificate actually sent. ++ See http://rt.openssl.org/Ticket/Display.html?id=2836. ++ (This is a backport) ++ [Rob Stradling ] ++ ++ *) Fix possible deadlock when decoding public keys. ++ [Steve Henson] ++ + Changes between 0.9.8w and 0.9.8x [10 May 2012] + + *) Sanity check record length before skipping explicit IV in DTLS +Index: crypto/openssl/Configure +=================================================================== +--- crypto/openssl/Configure (revision 248771) ++++ crypto/openssl/Configure (working copy) +@@ -162,6 +162,7 @@ my %table=( + "debug-ben-openbsd","gcc:-DBN_DEBUG -DREF_CHECK -DCONF_DEBUG -DBN_CTX_DEBUG -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG -DPEDANTIC -DDEBUG_SAFESTACK -DOPENSSL_OPENBSD_DEV_CRYPTO -DOPENSSL_NO_ASM -O2 -pedantic -Wall -Wshadow -Werror -pipe::(unknown)::::", + "debug-ben-openbsd-debug","gcc:-DBN_DEBUG -DREF_CHECK -DCONF_DEBUG -DBN_CTX_DEBUG -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG -DPEDANTIC -DDEBUG_SAFESTACK -DOPENSSL_OPENBSD_DEV_CRYPTO -DOPENSSL_NO_ASM -g3 -O2 -pedantic -Wall -Wshadow -Werror -pipe::(unknown)::::", + "debug-ben-debug", "gcc:$gcc_devteam_warn -DBN_DEBUG -DREF_CHECK -DCONF_DEBUG -DDEBUG_SAFESTACK -ggdb3 -O2 -pipe::(unknown)::::::", ++"debug-ben-debug-64", "gcc:$gcc_devteam_warn -DBN_DEBUG -DCONF_DEBUG -DDEBUG_SAFESTACK -DDEBUG_UNUSED -g3 -O3 -pipe::${BSDthreads}:::SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL:${x86_64_asm}:elf:dlfcn:bsd-gcc-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)", + "debug-ben-debug-noopt", "gcc:$gcc_devteam_warn -DBN_DEBUG -DREF_CHECK -DCONF_DEBUG -DDEBUG_SAFESTACK -ggdb3 -pipe::(unknown)::::::", + "debug-ben-strict", "gcc:-DBN_DEBUG -DREF_CHECK -DCONF_DEBUG -DBN_CTX_DEBUG -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG -DCONST_STRICT -O2 -Wall -Wshadow -Werror -Wpointer-arith -Wcast-qual -Wwrite-strings -pipe::(unknown)::::::", + "debug-rse","cc:-DTERMIOS -DL_ENDIAN -pipe -O -g -ggdb3 -Wall::(unknown):::BN_LLONG ${x86_gcc_des} ${x86_gcc_opts}:${x86_elf_asm}", +@@ -172,10 +173,10 @@ my %table=( + "debug-steve-opt", "gcc:$gcc_devteam_warn -m64 -O3 -DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -DCONF_DEBUG -DDEBUG_SAFESTACK -g -DMD32_REG_T=int::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL:${x86_64_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC:-m64:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)", + "debug-steve", "gcc:-DL_ENDIAN -DREF_CHECK -DCONF_DEBUG -DDEBUG_SAFESTACK -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG_ALL -DPEDANTIC -m32 -g -pedantic -Wno-long-long -Wall -Werror -Wshadow -pipe::-D_REENTRANT::-rdynamic -ldl:BN_LLONG ${x86_gcc_des} ${x86_gcc_opts}:${x86_elf_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared", + "debug-steve-linux-pseudo64", "gcc:-DL_ENDIAN -DREF_CHECK -DCONF_DEBUG -DBN_CTX_DEBUG -DDEBUG_SAFESTACK -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG_ALL -DOPENSSL_NO_ASM -g -mcpu=i486 -Wall -Werror -Wshadow -pipe::-D_REENTRANT::-rdynamic -ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT:${no_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared", +-"debug-levitte-linux-elf","gcc:-DLEVITTE_DEBUG -DREF_CHECK -DCONF_DEBUG -DBN_DEBUG -DBN_DEBUG_RAND -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG -DENGINE_CONF_DEBUG -DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -D_POSIX_SOURCE -DPEDANTIC -ggdb -g3 -mcpu=i486 -pedantic -ansi -Wall -Wshadow -Wcast-align -Wstrict-prototypes -Wmissing-prototypes -Wno-long-long -Wundef -Wconversion -pipe::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:BN_LLONG ${x86_gcc_des} ${x86_gcc_opts}:${x86_elf_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)", +-"debug-levitte-linux-noasm","gcc:-DLEVITTE_DEBUG -DREF_CHECK -DCONF_DEBUG -DBN_DEBUG -DBN_DEBUG_RAND -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG -DENGINE_CONF_DEBUG -DOPENSSL_NO_ASM -DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -D_POSIX_SOURCE -DPEDANTIC -ggdb -g3 -mcpu=i486 -pedantic -ansi -Wall -Wshadow -Wcast-align -Wstrict-prototypes -Wmissing-prototypes -Wno-long-long -Wundef -Wconversion -pipe::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:BN_LLONG ${x86_gcc_des} ${x86_gcc_opts}:${no_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)", +-"debug-levitte-linux-elf-extreme","gcc:-DLEVITTE_DEBUG -DREF_CHECK -DCONF_DEBUG -DBN_DEBUG -DBN_DEBUG_RAND -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG -DENGINE_CONF_DEBUG -DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -D_POSIX_SOURCE -DPEDANTIC -ggdb -g3 -mcpu=i486 -pedantic -ansi -Wall -W -Wundef -Wshadow -Wcast-align -Wstrict-prototypes -Wmissing-prototypes -Wno-long-long -Wundef -Wconversion -pipe::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:BN_LLONG ${x86_gcc_des} ${x86_gcc_opts}:${x86_elf_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)", +-"debug-levitte-linux-noasm-extreme","gcc:-DLEVITTE_DEBUG -DREF_CHECK -DCONF_DEBUG -DBN_DEBUG -DBN_DEBUG_RAND -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG -DENGINE_CONF_DEBUG -DOPENSSL_NO_ASM -DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -D_POSIX_SOURCE -DPEDANTIC -ggdb -g3 -mcpu=i486 -pedantic -ansi -Wall -W -Wundef -Wshadow -Wcast-align -Wstrict-prototypes -Wmissing-prototypes -Wno-long-long -Wundef -Wconversion -pipe::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:BN_LLONG ${x86_gcc_des} ${x86_gcc_opts}:${no_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)", ++"debug-levitte-linux-elf","gcc:-DLEVITTE_DEBUG -DBN_DEBUG -DREF_CHECK -DCONF_DEBUG -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG -DL_ENDIAN -ggdb -g3 -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:BN_LLONG ${x86_gcc_des} ${x86_gcc_opts}:${x86_elf_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)", ++"debug-levitte-linux-noasm","gcc:-DLEVITTE_DEBUG -DBN_DEBUG -DREF_CHECK -DCONF_DEBUG -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG -DOPENSSL_NO_ASM -DL_ENDIAN -ggdb -g3 -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:BN_LLONG ${x86_gcc_des} ${x86_gcc_opts}:${no_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)", ++"debug-levitte-linux-elf-extreme","gcc:-DLEVITTE_DEBUG -DREF_CHECK -DCONF_DEBUG -DBN_DEBUG -DBN_DEBUG_RAND -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG -DENGINE_CONF_DEBUG -DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -DPEDANTIC -ggdb -g3 -pedantic -ansi -Wall -W -Wundef -Wshadow -Wcast-align -Wstrict-prototypes -Wmissing-prototypes -Wno-long-long -Wundef -Wconversion -pipe::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:BN_LLONG ${x86_gcc_des} ${x86_gcc_opts}:${x86_elf_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)", ++"debug-levitte-linux-noasm-extreme","gcc:-DLEVITTE_DEBUG -DREF_CHECK -DCONF_DEBUG -DBN_DEBUG -DBN_DEBUG_RAND -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG -DENGINE_CONF_DEBUG -DOPENSSL_NO_ASM -DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -DPEDANTIC -ggdb -g3 -pedantic -ansi -Wall -W -Wundef -Wshadow -Wcast-align -Wstrict-prototypes -Wmissing-prototypes -Wno-long-long -Wundef -Wconversion -pipe::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:BN_LLONG ${x86_gcc_des} ${x86_gcc_opts}:${no_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)", + "debug-geoff","gcc:-DBN_DEBUG -DBN_DEBUG_RAND -DBN_STRICT -DPURIFY -DOPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED -DOPENSSL_NO_ASM -DOPENSSL_NO_INLINE_ASM -DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -DPEDANTIC -O1 -ggdb2 -Wall -Werror -Wundef -pedantic -Wshadow -Wpointer-arith -Wbad-function-cast -Wcast-align -Wsign-compare -Wmissing-prototypes -Wmissing-declarations -Wno-long-long::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:BN_LLONG ${x86_gcc_des} ${x86_gcc_opts}:${no_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)", + "debug-linux-pentium","gcc:-DBN_DEBUG -DREF_CHECK -DCONF_DEBUG -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG -DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -g -mcpu=pentium -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:BN_LLONG ${x86_gcc_des} ${x86_gcc_opts}:${x86_elf_asm}:dlfcn", + "debug-linux-ppro","gcc:-DBN_DEBUG -DREF_CHECK -DCONF_DEBUG -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG -DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -g -mcpu=pentiumpro -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:BN_LLONG ${x86_gcc_des} ${x86_gcc_opts}:${x86_elf_asm}:dlfcn", +@@ -428,8 +429,8 @@ my %table=( + "aix64-gcc","gcc:-maix64 -O -DB_ENDIAN::-pthread:AIX::SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHAR::aix_ppc64.o::::::::::dlfcn:aix-shared::-maix64 -shared -Wl,-G:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)::-X64", + # Below targets assume AIX 5. Idea is to effectively disregard $OBJECT_MODE + # at build time. $OBJECT_MODE is respected at ./config stage! +-"aix-cc", "cc:-q32 -O -DB_ENDIAN -qmaxmem=16384 -qro -qroconst::-qthreaded:AIX::BN_LLONG RC4_CHAR::aix_ppc32.o::::::::::dlfcn:aix-shared::-q32 -G:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)::-X 32", +-"aix64-cc", "cc:-q64 -O -DB_ENDIAN -qmaxmem=16384 -qro -qroconst::-qthreaded:AIX::SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHAR::aix_ppc64.o::::::::::dlfcn:aix-shared::-q64 -G:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)::-X 64", ++"aix-cc", "cc:-q32 -O -DB_ENDIAN -qmaxmem=16384 -qro -qroconst::-qthreaded -D_THREAD_SAFE:AIX::BN_LLONG RC4_CHAR::aix_ppc32.o::::::::::dlfcn:aix-shared::-q32 -G:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)::-X 32", ++"aix64-cc", "cc:-q64 -O -DB_ENDIAN -qmaxmem=16384 -qro -qroconst::-qthreaded -D_THREAD_SAFE:AIX::SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHAR::aix_ppc64.o::::::::::dlfcn:aix-shared::-q64 -G:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)::-X 64", + + # + # Cray T90 and similar (SDSC) +Index: crypto/openssl/FAQ +=================================================================== +--- crypto/openssl/FAQ (revision 248771) ++++ crypto/openssl/FAQ (working copy) +@@ -83,7 +83,7 @@ OpenSSL - Frequently Asked Questions + * Which is the current version of OpenSSL? + + The current version is available from . +-OpenSSL 1.0.1c was released on May 10th, 2012. ++OpenSSL 1.0.1d was released on Feb 5th, 2013. + + In addition to the current stable release, you can also access daily + snapshots of the OpenSSL development version at data, in->length, mbflag, B_ASN1_UTF8STRING); + if(ret < 0) return ret; + *out = stmp.data; +Index: crypto/openssl/crypto/asn1/a_verify.c +=================================================================== +--- crypto/openssl/crypto/asn1/a_verify.c (revision 248771) ++++ crypto/openssl/crypto/asn1/a_verify.c (working copy) +@@ -138,6 +138,12 @@ int ASN1_item_verify(const ASN1_ITEM *it, X509_ALG + unsigned char *buf_in=NULL; + int ret= -1,i,inl; + ++ if (!pkey) ++ { ++ ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_VERIFY, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER); ++ return -1; ++ } ++ + EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ctx); + i=OBJ_obj2nid(a->algorithm); + type=EVP_get_digestbyname(OBJ_nid2sn(i)); +Index: crypto/openssl/crypto/asn1/x_pubkey.c +=================================================================== +--- crypto/openssl/crypto/asn1/x_pubkey.c (revision 248771) ++++ crypto/openssl/crypto/asn1/x_pubkey.c (working copy) +@@ -371,12 +371,15 @@ EVP_PKEY *X509_PUBKEY_get(X509_PUBKEY *key) + CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_EVP_PKEY); + if (key->pkey) + { ++ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_EVP_PKEY); + EVP_PKEY_free(ret); + ret = key->pkey; + } + else ++ { + key->pkey = ret; +- CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_EVP_PKEY); ++ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_EVP_PKEY); ++ } + CRYPTO_add(&ret->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_EVP_PKEY); + return(ret); + err: +Index: crypto/openssl/crypto/bn/bn_word.c +=================================================================== +--- crypto/openssl/crypto/bn/bn_word.c (revision 248771) ++++ crypto/openssl/crypto/bn/bn_word.c (working copy) +@@ -144,26 +144,17 @@ int BN_add_word(BIGNUM *a, BN_ULONG w) + a->neg=!(a->neg); + return(i); + } +- /* Only expand (and risk failing) if it's possibly necessary */ +- if (((BN_ULONG)(a->d[a->top - 1] + 1) == 0) && +- (bn_wexpand(a,a->top+1) == NULL)) +- return(0); +- i=0; +- for (;;) ++ for (i=0;w!=0 && itop;i++) + { +- if (i >= a->top) +- l=w; +- else +- l=(a->d[i]+w)&BN_MASK2; +- a->d[i]=l; +- if (w > l) +- w=1; +- else +- break; +- i++; ++ a->d[i] = l = (a->d[i]+w)&BN_MASK2; ++ w = (w>l)?1:0; + } +- if (i >= a->top) ++ if (w && i==a->top) ++ { ++ if (bn_wexpand(a,a->top+1) == NULL) return 0; + a->top++; ++ a->d[i]=w; ++ } + bn_check_top(a); + return(1); + } +Index: crypto/openssl/crypto/cryptlib.c +=================================================================== +--- crypto/openssl/crypto/cryptlib.c (revision 248771) ++++ crypto/openssl/crypto/cryptlib.c (working copy) +@@ -542,3 +542,19 @@ void OpenSSLDie(const char *file,int line,const ch + } + + void *OPENSSL_stderr(void) { return stderr; } ++ ++#ifndef OPENSSL_FIPS ++ ++int CRYPTO_memcmp(const void *in_a, const void *in_b, size_t len) ++ { ++ size_t i; ++ const unsigned char *a = in_a; ++ const unsigned char *b = in_b; ++ unsigned char x = 0; ++ ++ for (i = 0; i < len; i++) ++ x |= a[i] ^ b[i]; ++ ++ return x; ++ } ++#endif +Index: crypto/openssl/crypto/crypto.h +=================================================================== +--- crypto/openssl/crypto/crypto.h (revision 248771) ++++ crypto/openssl/crypto/crypto.h (working copy) +@@ -591,6 +591,13 @@ int OPENSSL_isservice(void); + #define OPENSSL_HAVE_INIT 1 + void OPENSSL_init(void); + ++/* CRYPTO_memcmp returns zero iff the |len| bytes at |a| and |b| are equal. It ++ * takes an amount of time dependent on |len|, but independent of the contents ++ * of |a| and |b|. Unlike memcmp, it cannot be used to put elements into a ++ * defined order as the return value when a != b is undefined, other than to be ++ * non-zero. */ ++int CRYPTO_memcmp(const void *a, const void *b, size_t len); ++ + /* BEGIN ERROR CODES */ + /* The following lines are auto generated by the script mkerr.pl. Any changes + * made after this point may be overwritten when the script is next run. +Index: crypto/openssl/crypto/o_init.c +=================================================================== +--- crypto/openssl/crypto/o_init.c (revision 248771) ++++ crypto/openssl/crypto/o_init.c (working copy) +@@ -93,4 +93,18 @@ void OPENSSL_init(void) + #endif + } + ++#ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS + ++int CRYPTO_memcmp(const void *in_a, const void *in_b, size_t len) ++ { ++ size_t i; ++ const unsigned char *a = in_a; ++ const unsigned char *b = in_b; ++ unsigned char x = 0; ++ ++ for (i = 0; i < len; i++) ++ x |= a[i] ^ b[i]; ++ ++ return x; ++ } ++#endif +Index: crypto/openssl/crypto/ocsp/ocsp_vfy.c +=================================================================== +--- crypto/openssl/crypto/ocsp/ocsp_vfy.c (revision 248771) ++++ crypto/openssl/crypto/ocsp/ocsp_vfy.c (working copy) +@@ -91,10 +91,13 @@ int OCSP_basic_verify(OCSP_BASICRESP *bs, STACK_OF + { + EVP_PKEY *skey; + skey = X509_get_pubkey(signer); +- ret = OCSP_BASICRESP_verify(bs, skey, 0); +- EVP_PKEY_free(skey); +- if(ret <= 0) ++ if (skey) + { ++ ret = OCSP_BASICRESP_verify(bs, skey, 0); ++ EVP_PKEY_free(skey); ++ } ++ if(!skey || ret <= 0) ++ { + OCSPerr(OCSP_F_OCSP_BASIC_VERIFY, OCSP_R_SIGNATURE_FAILURE); + goto end; + } +@@ -108,6 +111,7 @@ int OCSP_basic_verify(OCSP_BASICRESP *bs, STACK_OF + init_res = X509_STORE_CTX_init(&ctx, st, signer, bs->certs); + if(!init_res) + { ++ ret = -1; + OCSPerr(OCSP_F_OCSP_BASIC_VERIFY,ERR_R_X509_LIB); + goto end; + } +Index: crypto/openssl/crypto/opensslv.h +=================================================================== +--- crypto/openssl/crypto/opensslv.h (revision 248771) ++++ crypto/openssl/crypto/opensslv.h (working copy) +@@ -25,11 +25,11 @@ + * (Prior to 0.9.5a beta1, a different scheme was used: MMNNFFRBB for + * major minor fix final patch/beta) + */ +-#define OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER 0x0090818fL ++#define OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER 0x0090819fL + #ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS +-#define OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT "OpenSSL 0.9.8x-fips 10 May 2012" ++#define OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT "OpenSSL 0.9.8y-fips 5 Feb 2013" + #else +-#define OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT "OpenSSL 0.9.8x 10 May 2012" ++#define OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT "OpenSSL 0.9.8y 5 Feb 2013" + #endif + #define OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT " part of " OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT + +Index: crypto/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_oaep.c +=================================================================== +--- crypto/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_oaep.c (revision 248771) ++++ crypto/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_oaep.c (working copy) +@@ -143,7 +143,7 @@ int RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_OAEP(unsigned char *to + + EVP_Digest((void *)param, plen, phash, NULL, EVP_sha1(), NULL); + +- if (memcmp(db, phash, SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH) != 0 || bad) ++ if (CRYPTO_memcmp(db, phash, SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH) != 0 || bad) + goto decoding_err; + else + { +Index: crypto/openssl/crypto/symhacks.h +=================================================================== +--- crypto/openssl/crypto/symhacks.h (revision 248771) ++++ crypto/openssl/crypto/symhacks.h (working copy) +@@ -252,15 +252,15 @@ + #define EC_POINT_set_compressed_coordinates_GF2m \ + EC_POINT_set_compr_coords_GF2m + #undef ec_GF2m_simple_group_clear_finish +-#define ec_GF2m_simple_group_clear_finish ec_GF2m_simple_grp_clr_finish ++#define ec_GF2m_simple_group_clear_finish ec_GF2m_simple_grp_clr_finish + #undef ec_GF2m_simple_group_check_discriminant + #define ec_GF2m_simple_group_check_discriminant ec_GF2m_simple_grp_chk_discrim + #undef ec_GF2m_simple_point_clear_finish +-#define ec_GF2m_simple_point_clear_finish ec_GF2m_simple_pt_clr_finish ++#define ec_GF2m_simple_point_clear_finish ec_GF2m_simple_pt_clr_finish + #undef ec_GF2m_simple_point_set_to_infinity +-#define ec_GF2m_simple_point_set_to_infinity ec_GF2m_simple_pt_set_to_inf ++#define ec_GF2m_simple_point_set_to_infinity ec_GF2m_simple_pt_set_to_inf + #undef ec_GF2m_simple_points_make_affine +-#define ec_GF2m_simple_points_make_affine ec_GF2m_simple_pts_make_affine ++#define ec_GF2m_simple_points_make_affine ec_GF2m_simple_pts_make_affine + #undef ec_GF2m_simple_point_set_affine_coordinates + #define ec_GF2m_simple_point_set_affine_coordinates \ + ec_GF2m_smp_pt_set_af_coords +@@ -288,8 +288,6 @@ + #define ec_GFp_simple_point_set_to_infinity ec_GFp_simple_pt_set_to_inf + #undef ec_GFp_simple_points_make_affine + #define ec_GFp_simple_points_make_affine ec_GFp_simple_pts_make_affine +-#undef ec_GFp_simple_group_get_curve_GFp +-#define ec_GFp_simple_group_get_curve_GFp ec_GFp_simple_grp_get_curve_GFp + #undef ec_GFp_simple_set_Jprojective_coordinates_GFp + #define ec_GFp_simple_set_Jprojective_coordinates_GFp \ + ec_GFp_smp_set_Jproj_coords_GFp +Index: crypto/openssl/doc/apps/CA.pl.pod +=================================================================== +--- crypto/openssl/doc/apps/CA.pl.pod (revision 248771) ++++ crypto/openssl/doc/apps/CA.pl.pod (working copy) +@@ -39,13 +39,13 @@ prints a usage message. + + =item B<-newcert> + +-creates a new self signed certificate. The private key and certificate are +-written to the file "newreq.pem". ++creates a new self signed certificate. The private key is written to the file ++"newkey.pem" and the request written to the file "newreq.pem". + + =item B<-newreq> + +-creates a new certificate request. The private key and request are +-written to the file "newreq.pem". ++creates a new certificate request. The private key is written to the file ++"newkey.pem" and the request written to the file "newreq.pem". + + =item B<-newreq-nodes> + +Index: crypto/openssl/engines/e_capi.c +=================================================================== +--- crypto/openssl/engines/e_capi.c (revision 248771) ++++ crypto/openssl/engines/e_capi.c (working copy) +@@ -1409,10 +1409,13 @@ static PCCERT_CONTEXT capi_find_cert(CAPI_CTX *ctx + static CAPI_KEY *capi_get_key(CAPI_CTX *ctx, const char *contname, char *provname, DWORD ptype, DWORD keyspec) + { + CAPI_KEY *key; ++ DWORD dwFlags = 0; + key = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(CAPI_KEY)); + CAPI_trace(ctx, "capi_get_key, contname=%s, provname=%s, type=%d\n", + contname, provname, ptype); +- if (!CryptAcquireContextA(&key->hprov, contname, provname, ptype, 0)) ++ if(ctx->store_flags & CERT_SYSTEM_STORE_LOCAL_MACHINE) ++ dwFlags = CRYPT_MACHINE_KEYSET; ++ if (!CryptAcquireContextA(&key->hprov, contname, provname, ptype, dwFlags)) + { + CAPIerr(CAPI_F_CAPI_GET_KEY, CAPI_R_CRYPTACQUIRECONTEXT_ERROR); + capi_addlasterror(); +Index: crypto/openssl/openssl.spec +=================================================================== +--- crypto/openssl/openssl.spec (revision 248771) ++++ crypto/openssl/openssl.spec (working copy) +@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@ + %define libmaj 0 + %define libmin 9 + %define librel 8 +-%define librev x ++%define librev y + Release: 1 + + %define openssldir /var/ssl +Index: crypto/openssl/ssl/Makefile +=================================================================== +--- crypto/openssl/ssl/Makefile (revision 248771) ++++ crypto/openssl/ssl/Makefile (working copy) +@@ -22,7 +22,7 @@ LIB=$(TOP)/libssl.a + SHARED_LIB= libssl$(SHLIB_EXT) + LIBSRC= \ + s2_meth.c s2_srvr.c s2_clnt.c s2_lib.c s2_enc.c s2_pkt.c \ +- s3_meth.c s3_srvr.c s3_clnt.c s3_lib.c s3_enc.c s3_pkt.c s3_both.c \ ++ s3_meth.c s3_srvr.c s3_clnt.c s3_lib.c s3_enc.c s3_pkt.c s3_both.c s3_cbc.c \ + s23_meth.c s23_srvr.c s23_clnt.c s23_lib.c s23_pkt.c \ + t1_meth.c t1_srvr.c t1_clnt.c t1_lib.c t1_enc.c \ + d1_meth.c d1_srvr.c d1_clnt.c d1_lib.c d1_pkt.c \ +@@ -33,7 +33,7 @@ LIBSRC= \ + bio_ssl.c ssl_err.c kssl.c t1_reneg.c + LIBOBJ= \ + s2_meth.o s2_srvr.o s2_clnt.o s2_lib.o s2_enc.o s2_pkt.o \ +- s3_meth.o s3_srvr.o s3_clnt.o s3_lib.o s3_enc.o s3_pkt.o s3_both.o \ ++ s3_meth.o s3_srvr.o s3_clnt.o s3_lib.o s3_enc.o s3_pkt.o s3_both.o s3_cbc.o \ + s23_meth.o s23_srvr.o s23_clnt.o s23_lib.o s23_pkt.o \ + t1_meth.o t1_srvr.o t1_clnt.o t1_lib.o t1_enc.o \ + d1_meth.o d1_srvr.o d1_clnt.o d1_lib.o d1_pkt.o \ +@@ -545,6 +545,27 @@ s3_both.o: ../include/openssl/ssl23.h ../include/o + s3_both.o: ../include/openssl/stack.h ../include/openssl/symhacks.h + s3_both.o: ../include/openssl/tls1.h ../include/openssl/x509.h + s3_both.o: ../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h s3_both.c ssl_locl.h ++s3_cbc.o: ../e_os.h ../include/openssl/asn1.h ../include/openssl/bio.h ++s3_cbc.o: ../include/openssl/bn.h ../include/openssl/buffer.h ++s3_cbc.o: ../include/openssl/comp.h ../include/openssl/crypto.h ++s3_cbc.o: ../include/openssl/dsa.h ../include/openssl/dtls1.h ++s3_cbc.o: ../include/openssl/e_os2.h ../include/openssl/ec.h ++s3_cbc.o: ../include/openssl/ecdh.h ../include/openssl/ecdsa.h ++s3_cbc.o: ../include/openssl/err.h ../include/openssl/evp.h ++s3_cbc.o: ../include/openssl/fips.h ../include/openssl/hmac.h ++s3_cbc.o: ../include/openssl/kssl.h ../include/openssl/lhash.h ++s3_cbc.o: ../include/openssl/md5.h ../include/openssl/obj_mac.h ++s3_cbc.o: ../include/openssl/objects.h ../include/openssl/opensslconf.h ++s3_cbc.o: ../include/openssl/opensslv.h ../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h ++s3_cbc.o: ../include/openssl/pem.h ../include/openssl/pem2.h ++s3_cbc.o: ../include/openssl/pkcs7.h ../include/openssl/pq_compat.h ++s3_cbc.o: ../include/openssl/pqueue.h ../include/openssl/rsa.h ++s3_cbc.o: ../include/openssl/safestack.h ../include/openssl/sha.h ++s3_cbc.o: ../include/openssl/ssl.h ../include/openssl/ssl2.h ++s3_cbc.o: ../include/openssl/ssl23.h ../include/openssl/ssl3.h ++s3_cbc.o: ../include/openssl/stack.h ../include/openssl/symhacks.h ++s3_cbc.o: ../include/openssl/tls1.h ../include/openssl/x509.h ++s3_cbc.o: ../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h s3_cbc.c ssl_locl.h + s3_clnt.o: ../e_os.h ../include/openssl/asn1.h ../include/openssl/bio.h + s3_clnt.o: ../include/openssl/bn.h ../include/openssl/buffer.h + s3_clnt.o: ../include/openssl/comp.h ../include/openssl/crypto.h +Index: crypto/openssl/ssl/d1_enc.c +=================================================================== +--- crypto/openssl/ssl/d1_enc.c (revision 248771) ++++ crypto/openssl/ssl/d1_enc.c (working copy) +@@ -126,16 +126,30 @@ + #include + #endif + ++/* dtls1_enc encrypts/decrypts the record in |s->wrec| / |s->rrec|, respectively. ++ * ++ * Returns: ++ * 0: (in non-constant time) if the record is publically invalid (i.e. too ++ * short etc). ++ * 1: if the record's padding is valid / the encryption was successful. ++ * -1: if the record's padding/AEAD-authenticator is invalid or, if sending, ++ * an internal error occured. */ + int dtls1_enc(SSL *s, int send) + { + SSL3_RECORD *rec; + EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ds; + unsigned long l; +- int bs,i,ii,j,k; ++ int bs,i,j,k,mac_size=0; + const EVP_CIPHER *enc; + + if (send) + { ++ if (s->write_hash) ++ { ++ mac_size=EVP_MD_size(s->write_hash); ++ if (mac_size < 0) ++ return -1; ++ } + ds=s->enc_write_ctx; + rec= &(s->s3->wrec); + if (s->enc_write_ctx == NULL) +@@ -156,6 +170,11 @@ int dtls1_enc(SSL *s, int send) + } + else + { ++ if (s->read_hash) ++ { ++ mac_size=EVP_MD_size(s->read_hash); ++ OPENSSL_assert(mac_size >= 0); ++ } + ds=s->enc_read_ctx; + rec= &(s->s3->rrec); + if (s->enc_read_ctx == NULL) +@@ -220,7 +239,7 @@ int dtls1_enc(SSL *s, int send) + if (!send) + { + if (l == 0 || l%bs != 0) +- return -1; ++ return 0; + } + + EVP_Cipher(ds,rec->data,rec->input,l); +@@ -235,43 +254,7 @@ int dtls1_enc(SSL *s, int send) + #endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */ + + if ((bs != 1) && !send) +- { +- ii=i=rec->data[l-1]; /* padding_length */ +- i++; +- if (s->options&SSL_OP_TLS_BLOCK_PADDING_BUG) +- { +- /* First packet is even in size, so check */ +- if ((memcmp(s->s3->read_sequence, +- "\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0",8) == 0) && !(ii & 1)) +- s->s3->flags|=TLS1_FLAGS_TLS_PADDING_BUG; +- if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_TLS_PADDING_BUG) +- i--; +- } +- /* TLS 1.0 does not bound the number of padding bytes by the block size. +- * All of them must have value 'padding_length'. */ +- if (i + bs > (int)rec->length) +- { +- /* Incorrect padding. SSLerr() and ssl3_alert are done +- * by caller: we don't want to reveal whether this is +- * a decryption error or a MAC verification failure +- * (see http://www.openssl.org/~bodo/tls-cbc.txt) +- */ +- return -1; +- } +- for (j=(int)(l-i); j<(int)l; j++) +- { +- if (rec->data[j] != ii) +- { +- /* Incorrect padding */ +- return -1; +- } +- } +- rec->length-=i; +- +- rec->data += bs; /* skip the implicit IV */ +- rec->input += bs; +- rec->length -= bs; +- } ++ return tls1_cbc_remove_padding(s, rec, bs, mac_size); + } + return(1); + } +Index: crypto/openssl/ssl/d1_pkt.c +=================================================================== +--- crypto/openssl/ssl/d1_pkt.c (revision 248771) ++++ crypto/openssl/ssl/d1_pkt.c (working copy) +@@ -327,17 +327,13 @@ dtls1_get_buffered_record(SSL *s) + static int + dtls1_process_record(SSL *s) + { +- int al; +- int clear=0; +- int enc_err; ++ int i,al; ++ int enc_err; + SSL_SESSION *sess; +- SSL3_RECORD *rr; +- unsigned int mac_size; ++ SSL3_RECORD *rr; ++ unsigned int mac_size, orig_len; + unsigned char md[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; +- int decryption_failed_or_bad_record_mac = 0; +- unsigned char *mac = NULL; + +- + rr= &(s->s3->rrec); + sess = s->session; + +@@ -366,14 +362,19 @@ dtls1_process_record(SSL *s) + + /* decrypt in place in 'rr->input' */ + rr->data=rr->input; ++ orig_len=rr->length; + + enc_err = s->method->ssl3_enc->enc(s,0); +- if (enc_err <= 0) ++ /* enc_err is: ++ * 0: (in non-constant time) if the record is publically invalid. ++ * 1: if the padding is valid ++ * -1: if the padding is invalid */ ++ if (enc_err == 0) + { +- /* To minimize information leaked via timing, we will always +- * perform all computations before discarding the message. +- */ +- decryption_failed_or_bad_record_mac = 1; ++ /* For DTLS we simply ignore bad packets. */ ++ rr->length = 0; ++ s->packet_length = 0; ++ goto err; + } + + #ifdef TLS_DEBUG +@@ -383,41 +384,59 @@ printf("\n"); + #endif + + /* r->length is now the compressed data plus mac */ +-if ( (sess == NULL) || +- (s->enc_read_ctx == NULL) || +- (s->read_hash == NULL)) +- clear=1; +- +- if (!clear) ++ if ((sess != NULL) && ++ (s->enc_read_ctx != NULL) && ++ (s->read_hash != NULL)) + { ++ /* s->read_hash != NULL => mac_size != -1 */ ++ unsigned char *mac = NULL; ++ unsigned char mac_tmp[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; + mac_size=EVP_MD_size(s->read_hash); ++ OPENSSL_assert(mac_size <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE); + +- if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH+mac_size) ++ /* orig_len is the length of the record before any padding was ++ * removed. This is public information, as is the MAC in use, ++ * therefore we can safely process the record in a different ++ * amount of time if it's too short to possibly contain a MAC. ++ */ ++ if (orig_len < mac_size || ++ /* CBC records must have a padding length byte too. */ ++ (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s->enc_read_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE && ++ orig_len < mac_size+1)) + { +-#if 0 /* OK only for stream ciphers (then rr->length is visible from ciphertext anyway) */ +- al=SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW; +- SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_RECORD,SSL_R_PRE_MAC_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); ++ al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; ++ SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_RECORD,SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT); + goto f_err; +-#else +- decryption_failed_or_bad_record_mac = 1; +-#endif + } +- /* check the MAC for rr->input (it's in mac_size bytes at the tail) */ +- if (rr->length >= mac_size) ++ ++ if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s->enc_read_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE) + { ++ /* We update the length so that the TLS header bytes ++ * can be constructed correctly but we need to extract ++ * the MAC in constant time from within the record, ++ * without leaking the contents of the padding bytes. ++ * */ ++ mac = mac_tmp; ++ ssl3_cbc_copy_mac(mac_tmp, rr, mac_size, orig_len); + rr->length -= mac_size; +- mac = &rr->data[rr->length]; + } + else +- rr->length = 0; +- s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s,md,0); +- if (mac == NULL || memcmp(md, mac, mac_size) != 0) + { +- decryption_failed_or_bad_record_mac = 1; ++ /* In this case there's no padding, so |orig_len| ++ * equals |rec->length| and we checked that there's ++ * enough bytes for |mac_size| above. */ ++ rr->length -= mac_size; ++ mac = &rr->data[rr->length]; + } ++ ++ i=s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s,md,0 /* not send */); ++ if (i < 0 || mac == NULL || CRYPTO_memcmp(md, mac, (size_t)mac_size) != 0) ++ enc_err = -1; ++ if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH+mac_size) ++ enc_err = -1; + } + +- if (decryption_failed_or_bad_record_mac) ++ if (enc_err < 0) + { + /* decryption failed, silently discard message */ + rr->length = 0; +Index: crypto/openssl/ssl/s2_clnt.c +=================================================================== +--- crypto/openssl/ssl/s2_clnt.c (revision 248771) ++++ crypto/openssl/ssl/s2_clnt.c (working copy) +@@ -935,7 +935,7 @@ static int get_server_verify(SSL *s) + s->msg_callback(0, s->version, 0, p, len, s, s->msg_callback_arg); /* SERVER-VERIFY */ + p += 1; + +- if (memcmp(p,s->s2->challenge,s->s2->challenge_length) != 0) ++ if (CRYPTO_memcmp(p,s->s2->challenge,s->s2->challenge_length) != 0) + { + ssl2_return_error(s,SSL2_PE_UNDEFINED_ERROR); + SSLerr(SSL_F_GET_SERVER_VERIFY,SSL_R_CHALLENGE_IS_DIFFERENT); +Index: crypto/openssl/ssl/s2_pkt.c +=================================================================== +--- crypto/openssl/ssl/s2_pkt.c (revision 248771) ++++ crypto/openssl/ssl/s2_pkt.c (working copy) +@@ -267,8 +267,7 @@ static int ssl2_read_internal(SSL *s, void *buf, i + s->s2->ract_data_length-=mac_size; + ssl2_mac(s,mac,0); + s->s2->ract_data_length-=s->s2->padding; +- if ( (memcmp(mac,s->s2->mac_data, +- (unsigned int)mac_size) != 0) || ++ if ( (CRYPTO_memcmp(mac,s->s2->mac_data,mac_size) != 0) || + (s->s2->rlength%EVP_CIPHER_CTX_block_size(s->enc_read_ctx) != 0)) + { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL2_READ_INTERNAL,SSL_R_BAD_MAC_DECODE); +Index: crypto/openssl/ssl/s3_both.c +=================================================================== +--- crypto/openssl/ssl/s3_both.c (revision 248771) ++++ crypto/openssl/ssl/s3_both.c (working copy) +@@ -242,7 +242,7 @@ int ssl3_get_finished(SSL *s, int a, int b) + goto f_err; + } + +- if (memcmp(p, s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md, i) != 0) ++ if (CRYPTO_memcmp(p, s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md, i) != 0) + { + al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR; + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_FINISHED,SSL_R_DIGEST_CHECK_FAILED); +Index: crypto/openssl/ssl/s3_cbc.c +=================================================================== +--- crypto/openssl/ssl/s3_cbc.c (revision 0) ++++ crypto/openssl/ssl/s3_cbc.c (working copy) +@@ -0,0 +1,762 @@ ++/* ssl/s3_cbc.c */ ++/* ==================================================================== ++ * Copyright (c) 2012 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. ++ * ++ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without ++ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions ++ * are met: ++ * ++ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright ++ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. ++ * ++ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright ++ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in ++ * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the ++ * distribution. ++ * ++ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this ++ * software must display the following acknowledgment: ++ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project ++ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)" ++ * ++ * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to ++ * endorse or promote products derived from this software without ++ * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact ++ * openssl-core@openssl.org. ++ * ++ * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL" ++ * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written ++ * permission of the OpenSSL Project. ++ * ++ * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following ++ * acknowledgment: ++ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project ++ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)" ++ * ++ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY ++ * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE ++ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR ++ * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR ++ * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, ++ * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT ++ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; ++ * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) ++ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, ++ * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ++ * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED ++ * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. ++ * ==================================================================== ++ * ++ * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young ++ * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim ++ * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). ++ * ++ */ ++ ++#include "ssl_locl.h" ++ ++#include ++#include ++ ++/* MAX_HASH_BIT_COUNT_BYTES is the maximum number of bytes in the hash's length ++ * field. (SHA-384/512 have 128-bit length.) */ ++#define MAX_HASH_BIT_COUNT_BYTES 16 ++ ++/* MAX_HASH_BLOCK_SIZE is the maximum hash block size that we'll support. ++ * Currently SHA-384/512 has a 128-byte block size and that's the largest ++ * supported by TLS.) */ ++#define MAX_HASH_BLOCK_SIZE 128 ++ ++/* Some utility functions are needed: ++ * ++ * These macros return the given value with the MSB copied to all the other ++ * bits. They use the fact that arithmetic shift shifts-in the sign bit. ++ * However, this is not ensured by the C standard so you may need to replace ++ * them with something else on odd CPUs. */ ++#define DUPLICATE_MSB_TO_ALL(x) ( (unsigned)( (int)(x) >> (sizeof(int)*8-1) ) ) ++#define DUPLICATE_MSB_TO_ALL_8(x) ((unsigned char)(DUPLICATE_MSB_TO_ALL(x))) ++ ++/* constant_time_ge returns 0xff if a>=b and 0x00 otherwise. */ ++static unsigned constant_time_ge(unsigned a, unsigned b) ++ { ++ a -= b; ++ return DUPLICATE_MSB_TO_ALL(~a); ++ } ++ ++/* constant_time_eq_8 returns 0xff if a==b and 0x00 otherwise. */ ++static unsigned char constant_time_eq_8(unsigned char a, unsigned char b) ++ { ++ unsigned c = a ^ b; ++ c--; ++ return DUPLICATE_MSB_TO_ALL_8(c); ++ } ++ ++/* ssl3_cbc_remove_padding removes padding from the decrypted, SSLv3, CBC ++ * record in |rec| by updating |rec->length| in constant time. ++ * ++ * block_size: the block size of the cipher used to encrypt the record. ++ * returns: ++ * 0: (in non-constant time) if the record is publicly invalid. ++ * 1: if the padding was valid ++ * -1: otherwise. */ ++int ssl3_cbc_remove_padding(const SSL* s, ++ SSL3_RECORD *rec, ++ unsigned block_size, ++ unsigned mac_size) ++ { ++ unsigned padding_length, good; ++ const unsigned overhead = 1 /* padding length byte */ + mac_size; ++ ++ /* These lengths are all public so we can test them in non-constant ++ * time. */ ++ if (overhead > rec->length) ++ return 0; ++ ++ padding_length = rec->data[rec->length-1]; ++ good = constant_time_ge(rec->length, padding_length+overhead); ++ /* SSLv3 requires that the padding is minimal. */ ++ good &= constant_time_ge(block_size, padding_length+1); ++ padding_length = good & (padding_length+1); ++ rec->length -= padding_length; ++ rec->type |= padding_length<<8; /* kludge: pass padding length */ ++ return (int)((good & 1) | (~good & -1)); ++} ++ ++/* tls1_cbc_remove_padding removes the CBC padding from the decrypted, TLS, CBC ++ * record in |rec| in constant time and returns 1 if the padding is valid and ++ * -1 otherwise. It also removes any explicit IV from the start of the record ++ * without leaking any timing about whether there was enough space after the ++ * padding was removed. ++ * ++ * block_size: the block size of the cipher used to encrypt the record. ++ * returns: ++ * 0: (in non-constant time) if the record is publicly invalid. ++ * 1: if the padding was valid ++ * -1: otherwise. */ ++int tls1_cbc_remove_padding(const SSL* s, ++ SSL3_RECORD *rec, ++ unsigned block_size, ++ unsigned mac_size) ++ { ++ unsigned padding_length, good, to_check, i; ++ const char has_explicit_iv = s->version == DTLS1_VERSION; ++ const unsigned overhead = 1 /* padding length byte */ + ++ mac_size + ++ (has_explicit_iv ? block_size : 0); ++ ++ /* These lengths are all public so we can test them in non-constant ++ * time. */ ++ if (overhead > rec->length) ++ return 0; ++ ++ padding_length = rec->data[rec->length-1]; ++ ++ /* NB: if compression is in operation the first packet may not be of ++ * even length so the padding bug check cannot be performed. This bug ++ * workaround has been around since SSLeay so hopefully it is either ++ * fixed now or no buggy implementation supports compression [steve] ++ */ ++ if ( (s->options&SSL_OP_TLS_BLOCK_PADDING_BUG) && !s->expand) ++ { ++ /* First packet is even in size, so check */ ++ if ((memcmp(s->s3->read_sequence, "\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0",8) == 0) && ++ !(padding_length & 1)) ++ { ++ s->s3->flags|=TLS1_FLAGS_TLS_PADDING_BUG; ++ } ++ if ((s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_TLS_PADDING_BUG) && ++ padding_length > 0) ++ { ++ padding_length--; ++ } ++ } ++ ++ good = constant_time_ge(rec->length, overhead+padding_length); ++ /* The padding consists of a length byte at the end of the record and ++ * then that many bytes of padding, all with the same value as the ++ * length byte. Thus, with the length byte included, there are i+1 ++ * bytes of padding. ++ * ++ * We can't check just |padding_length+1| bytes because that leaks ++ * decrypted information. Therefore we always have to check the maximum ++ * amount of padding possible. (Again, the length of the record is ++ * public information so we can use it.) */ ++ to_check = 255; /* maximum amount of padding. */ ++ if (to_check > rec->length-1) ++ to_check = rec->length-1; ++ ++ for (i = 0; i < to_check; i++) ++ { ++ unsigned char mask = constant_time_ge(padding_length, i); ++ unsigned char b = rec->data[rec->length-1-i]; ++ /* The final |padding_length+1| bytes should all have the value ++ * |padding_length|. Therefore the XOR should be zero. */ ++ good &= ~(mask&(padding_length ^ b)); ++ } ++ ++ /* If any of the final |padding_length+1| bytes had the wrong value, ++ * one or more of the lower eight bits of |good| will be cleared. We ++ * AND the bottom 8 bits together and duplicate the result to all the ++ * bits. */ ++ good &= good >> 4; ++ good &= good >> 2; ++ good &= good >> 1; ++ good <<= sizeof(good)*8-1; ++ good = DUPLICATE_MSB_TO_ALL(good); ++ ++ padding_length = good & (padding_length+1); ++ rec->length -= padding_length; ++ rec->type |= padding_length<<8; /* kludge: pass padding length */ ++ ++ /* We can always safely skip the explicit IV. We check at the beginning ++ * of this function that the record has at least enough space for the ++ * IV, MAC and padding length byte. (These can be checked in ++ * non-constant time because it's all public information.) So, if the ++ * padding was invalid, then we didn't change |rec->length| and this is ++ * safe. If the padding was valid then we know that we have at least ++ * overhead+padding_length bytes of space and so this is still safe ++ * because overhead accounts for the explicit IV. */ ++ if (has_explicit_iv) ++ { ++ rec->data += block_size; ++ rec->input += block_size; ++ rec->length -= block_size; ++ } ++ ++ return (int)((good & 1) | (~good & -1)); ++ } ++ ++#if defined(_M_AMD64) || defined(__x86_64__) ++#define CBC_MAC_ROTATE_IN_PLACE ++#endif ++ ++/* ssl3_cbc_copy_mac copies |md_size| bytes from the end of |rec| to |out| in ++ * constant time (independent of the concrete value of rec->length, which may ++ * vary within a 256-byte window). ++ * ++ * ssl3_cbc_remove_padding or tls1_cbc_remove_padding must be called prior to ++ * this function. ++ * ++ * On entry: ++ * rec->orig_len >= md_size ++ * md_size <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE ++ * ++ * If CBC_MAC_ROTATE_IN_PLACE is defined then the rotation is performed with ++ * variable accesses in a 64-byte-aligned buffer. Assuming that this fits into ++ * a single cache-line, then the variable memory accesses don't actually affect ++ * the timing. This has been tested to be true on Intel amd64 chips. ++ */ ++void ssl3_cbc_copy_mac(unsigned char* out, ++ const SSL3_RECORD *rec, ++ unsigned md_size,unsigned orig_len) ++ { ++#if defined(CBC_MAC_ROTATE_IN_PLACE) ++ unsigned char rotated_mac_buf[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE*2]; ++ unsigned char *rotated_mac; ++#else ++ unsigned char rotated_mac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; ++#endif ++ ++ /* mac_end is the index of |rec->data| just after the end of the MAC. */ ++ unsigned mac_end = rec->length; ++ unsigned mac_start = mac_end - md_size; ++ /* scan_start contains the number of bytes that we can ignore because ++ * the MAC's position can only vary by 255 bytes. */ ++ unsigned scan_start = 0; ++ unsigned i, j; ++ unsigned div_spoiler; ++ unsigned rotate_offset; ++ ++ OPENSSL_assert(orig_len >= md_size); ++ OPENSSL_assert(md_size <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE); ++ ++#if defined(CBC_MAC_ROTATE_IN_PLACE) ++ rotated_mac = (unsigned char*) (((intptr_t)(rotated_mac_buf + 64)) & ~63); ++#endif ++ ++ /* This information is public so it's safe to branch based on it. */ ++ if (orig_len > md_size + 255 + 1) ++ scan_start = orig_len - (md_size + 255 + 1); ++ /* div_spoiler contains a multiple of md_size that is used to cause the ++ * modulo operation to be constant time. Without this, the time varies ++ * based on the amount of padding when running on Intel chips at least. ++ * ++ * The aim of right-shifting md_size is so that the compiler doesn't ++ * figure out that it can remove div_spoiler as that would require it ++ * to prove that md_size is always even, which I hope is beyond it. */ ++ div_spoiler = md_size >> 1; ++ div_spoiler <<= (sizeof(div_spoiler)-1)*8; ++ rotate_offset = (div_spoiler + mac_start - scan_start) % md_size; ++ ++ memset(rotated_mac, 0, md_size); ++ for (i = scan_start; i < orig_len;) ++ { ++ for (j = 0; j < md_size && i < orig_len; i++, j++) ++ { ++ unsigned char mac_started = constant_time_ge(i, mac_start); ++ unsigned char mac_ended = constant_time_ge(i, mac_end); ++ unsigned char b = 0; ++ b = rec->data[i]; ++ rotated_mac[j] |= b & mac_started & ~mac_ended; ++ } ++ } ++ ++ /* Now rotate the MAC */ ++#if defined(CBC_MAC_ROTATE_IN_PLACE) ++ j = 0; ++ for (i = 0; i < md_size; i++) ++ { ++ unsigned char offset = (div_spoiler + rotate_offset + i) % md_size; ++ out[j++] = rotated_mac[offset]; ++ } ++#else ++ memset(out, 0, md_size); ++ for (i = 0; i < md_size; i++) ++ { ++ unsigned char offset = (div_spoiler + md_size - rotate_offset + i) % md_size; ++ for (j = 0; j < md_size; j++) ++ out[j] |= rotated_mac[i] & constant_time_eq_8(j, offset); ++ } ++#endif ++ } ++ ++/* These functions serialize the state of a hash and thus perform the standard ++ * "final" operation without adding the padding and length that such a function ++ * typically does. */ ++static void tls1_md5_final_raw(void* ctx, unsigned char *md_out) ++ { ++ MD5_CTX *md5 = ctx; ++ l2n(md5->A, md_out); ++ l2n(md5->B, md_out); ++ l2n(md5->C, md_out); ++ l2n(md5->D, md_out); ++ } ++ ++static void tls1_sha1_final_raw(void* ctx, unsigned char *md_out) ++ { ++ SHA_CTX *sha1 = ctx; ++ l2n(sha1->h0, md_out); ++ l2n(sha1->h1, md_out); ++ l2n(sha1->h2, md_out); ++ l2n(sha1->h3, md_out); ++ l2n(sha1->h4, md_out); ++ } ++#define LARGEST_DIGEST_CTX SHA_CTX ++ ++#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256 ++static void tls1_sha256_final_raw(void* ctx, unsigned char *md_out) ++ { ++ SHA256_CTX *sha256 = ctx; ++ unsigned i; ++ ++ for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) ++ { ++ l2n(sha256->h[i], md_out); ++ } ++ } ++#undef LARGEST_DIGEST_CTX ++#define LARGEST_DIGEST_CTX SHA256_CTX ++#endif ++ ++#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA512 ++static void tls1_sha512_final_raw(void* ctx, unsigned char *md_out) ++ { ++ SHA512_CTX *sha512 = ctx; ++ unsigned i; ++ ++ for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) ++ { ++ l2n8(sha512->h[i], md_out); ++ } ++ } ++#undef LARGEST_DIGEST_CTX ++#define LARGEST_DIGEST_CTX SHA512_CTX ++#endif ++ ++/* ssl3_cbc_record_digest_supported returns 1 iff |ctx| uses a hash function ++ * which ssl3_cbc_digest_record supports. */ ++char ssl3_cbc_record_digest_supported(const EVP_MD *digest) ++ { ++#ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS ++ if (FIPS_mode()) ++ return 0; ++#endif ++ switch (EVP_MD_type(digest)) ++ { ++ case NID_md5: ++ case NID_sha1: ++#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256 ++ case NID_sha224: ++ case NID_sha256: ++#endif ++#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA512 ++ case NID_sha384: ++ case NID_sha512: ++#endif ++ return 1; ++ default: ++ return 0; ++ } ++ } ++ ++/* ssl3_cbc_digest_record computes the MAC of a decrypted, padded SSLv3/TLS ++ * record. ++ * ++ * ctx: the EVP_MD_CTX from which we take the hash function. ++ * ssl3_cbc_record_digest_supported must return true for this EVP_MD_CTX. ++ * md_out: the digest output. At most EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE bytes will be written. ++ * md_out_size: if non-NULL, the number of output bytes is written here. ++ * header: the 13-byte, TLS record header. ++ * data: the record data itself, less any preceeding explicit IV. ++ * data_plus_mac_size: the secret, reported length of the data and MAC ++ * once the padding has been removed. ++ * data_plus_mac_plus_padding_size: the public length of the whole ++ * record, including padding. ++ * is_sslv3: non-zero if we are to use SSLv3. Otherwise, TLS. ++ * ++ * On entry: by virtue of having been through one of the remove_padding ++ * functions, above, we know that data_plus_mac_size is large enough to contain ++ * a padding byte and MAC. (If the padding was invalid, it might contain the ++ * padding too. ) */ ++void ssl3_cbc_digest_record( ++ const EVP_MD *digest, ++ unsigned char* md_out, ++ size_t* md_out_size, ++ const unsigned char header[13], ++ const unsigned char *data, ++ size_t data_plus_mac_size, ++ size_t data_plus_mac_plus_padding_size, ++ const unsigned char *mac_secret, ++ unsigned mac_secret_length, ++ char is_sslv3) ++ { ++ union { double align; ++ unsigned char c[sizeof(LARGEST_DIGEST_CTX)]; } md_state; ++ void (*md_final_raw)(void *ctx, unsigned char *md_out); ++ void (*md_transform)(void *ctx, const unsigned char *block); ++ unsigned md_size, md_block_size = 64; ++ unsigned sslv3_pad_length = 40, header_length, variance_blocks, ++ len, max_mac_bytes, num_blocks, ++ num_starting_blocks, k, mac_end_offset, c, index_a, index_b; ++ unsigned int bits; /* at most 18 bits */ ++ unsigned char length_bytes[MAX_HASH_BIT_COUNT_BYTES]; ++ /* hmac_pad is the masked HMAC key. */ ++ unsigned char hmac_pad[MAX_HASH_BLOCK_SIZE]; ++ unsigned char first_block[MAX_HASH_BLOCK_SIZE]; ++ unsigned char mac_out[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; ++ unsigned i, j, md_out_size_u; ++ EVP_MD_CTX md_ctx; ++ /* mdLengthSize is the number of bytes in the length field that terminates ++ * the hash. */ ++ unsigned md_length_size = 8; ++ ++ /* This is a, hopefully redundant, check that allows us to forget about ++ * many possible overflows later in this function. */ ++ OPENSSL_assert(data_plus_mac_plus_padding_size < 1024*1024); ++ ++ switch (EVP_MD_type(digest)) ++ { ++ case NID_md5: ++ MD5_Init((MD5_CTX*)md_state.c); ++ md_final_raw = tls1_md5_final_raw; ++ md_transform = (void(*)(void *ctx, const unsigned char *block)) MD5_Transform; ++ md_size = 16; ++ sslv3_pad_length = 48; ++ break; ++ case NID_sha1: ++ SHA1_Init((SHA_CTX*)md_state.c); ++ md_final_raw = tls1_sha1_final_raw; ++ md_transform = (void(*)(void *ctx, const unsigned char *block)) SHA1_Transform; ++ md_size = 20; ++ break; ++#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256 ++ case NID_sha224: ++ SHA224_Init((SHA256_CTX*)md_state.c); ++ md_final_raw = tls1_sha256_final_raw; ++ md_transform = (void(*)(void *ctx, const unsigned char *block)) SHA256_Transform; ++ md_size = 224/8; ++ break; ++ case NID_sha256: ++ SHA256_Init((SHA256_CTX*)md_state.c); ++ md_final_raw = tls1_sha256_final_raw; ++ md_transform = (void(*)(void *ctx, const unsigned char *block)) SHA256_Transform; ++ md_size = 32; ++ break; ++#endif ++#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA512 ++ case NID_sha384: ++ SHA384_Init((SHA512_CTX*)md_state.c); ++ md_final_raw = tls1_sha512_final_raw; ++ md_transform = (void(*)(void *ctx, const unsigned char *block)) SHA512_Transform; ++ md_size = 384/8; ++ md_block_size = 128; ++ md_length_size = 16; ++ break; ++ case NID_sha512: ++ SHA512_Init((SHA512_CTX*)md_state.c); ++ md_final_raw = tls1_sha512_final_raw; ++ md_transform = (void(*)(void *ctx, const unsigned char *block)) SHA512_Transform; ++ md_size = 64; ++ md_block_size = 128; ++ md_length_size = 16; ++ break; ++#endif ++ default: ++ /* ssl3_cbc_record_digest_supported should have been ++ * called first to check that the hash function is ++ * supported. */ ++ OPENSSL_assert(0); ++ if (md_out_size) ++ *md_out_size = -1; ++ return; ++ } ++ ++ OPENSSL_assert(md_length_size <= MAX_HASH_BIT_COUNT_BYTES); ++ OPENSSL_assert(md_block_size <= MAX_HASH_BLOCK_SIZE); ++ OPENSSL_assert(md_size <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE); ++ ++ header_length = 13; ++ if (is_sslv3) ++ { ++ header_length = ++ mac_secret_length + ++ sslv3_pad_length + ++ 8 /* sequence number */ + ++ 1 /* record type */ + ++ 2 /* record length */; ++ } ++ ++ /* variance_blocks is the number of blocks of the hash that we have to ++ * calculate in constant time because they could be altered by the ++ * padding value. ++ * ++ * In SSLv3, the padding must be minimal so the end of the plaintext ++ * varies by, at most, 15+20 = 35 bytes. (We conservatively assume that ++ * the MAC size varies from 0..20 bytes.) In case the 9 bytes of hash ++ * termination (0x80 + 64-bit length) don't fit in the final block, we ++ * say that the final two blocks can vary based on the padding. ++ * ++ * TLSv1 has MACs up to 48 bytes long (SHA-384) and the padding is not ++ * required to be minimal. Therefore we say that the final six blocks ++ * can vary based on the padding. ++ * ++ * Later in the function, if the message is short and there obviously ++ * cannot be this many blocks then variance_blocks can be reduced. */ ++ variance_blocks = is_sslv3 ? 2 : 6; ++ /* From now on we're dealing with the MAC, which conceptually has 13 ++ * bytes of `header' before the start of the data (TLS) or 71/75 bytes ++ * (SSLv3) */ ++ len = data_plus_mac_plus_padding_size + header_length; ++ /* max_mac_bytes contains the maximum bytes of bytes in the MAC, including ++ * |header|, assuming that there's no padding. */ ++ max_mac_bytes = len - md_size - 1; ++ /* num_blocks is the maximum number of hash blocks. */ ++ num_blocks = (max_mac_bytes + 1 + md_length_size + md_block_size - 1) / md_block_size; ++ /* In order to calculate the MAC in constant time we have to handle ++ * the final blocks specially because the padding value could cause the ++ * end to appear somewhere in the final |variance_blocks| blocks and we ++ * can't leak where. However, |num_starting_blocks| worth of data can ++ * be hashed right away because no padding value can affect whether ++ * they are plaintext. */ ++ num_starting_blocks = 0; ++ /* k is the starting byte offset into the conceptual header||data where ++ * we start processing. */ ++ k = 0; ++ /* mac_end_offset is the index just past the end of the data to be ++ * MACed. */ ++ mac_end_offset = data_plus_mac_size + header_length - md_size; ++ /* c is the index of the 0x80 byte in the final hash block that ++ * contains application data. */ ++ c = mac_end_offset % md_block_size; ++ /* index_a is the hash block number that contains the 0x80 terminating ++ * value. */ ++ index_a = mac_end_offset / md_block_size; ++ /* index_b is the hash block number that contains the 64-bit hash ++ * length, in bits. */ ++ index_b = (mac_end_offset + md_length_size) / md_block_size; ++ /* bits is the hash-length in bits. It includes the additional hash ++ * block for the masked HMAC key, or whole of |header| in the case of ++ * SSLv3. */ ++ ++ /* For SSLv3, if we're going to have any starting blocks then we need ++ * at least two because the header is larger than a single block. */ ++ if (num_blocks > variance_blocks + (is_sslv3 ? 1 : 0)) ++ { ++ num_starting_blocks = num_blocks - variance_blocks; ++ k = md_block_size*num_starting_blocks; ++ } ++ ++ bits = 8*mac_end_offset; ++ if (!is_sslv3) ++ { ++ /* Compute the initial HMAC block. For SSLv3, the padding and ++ * secret bytes are included in |header| because they take more ++ * than a single block. */ ++ bits += 8*md_block_size; ++ memset(hmac_pad, 0, md_block_size); ++ OPENSSL_assert(mac_secret_length <= sizeof(hmac_pad)); ++ memcpy(hmac_pad, mac_secret, mac_secret_length); ++ for (i = 0; i < md_block_size; i++) ++ hmac_pad[i] ^= 0x36; ++ ++ md_transform(md_state.c, hmac_pad); ++ } ++ ++ memset(length_bytes,0,md_length_size-4); ++ length_bytes[md_length_size-4] = (unsigned char)(bits>>24); ++ length_bytes[md_length_size-3] = (unsigned char)(bits>>16); ++ length_bytes[md_length_size-2] = (unsigned char)(bits>>8); ++ length_bytes[md_length_size-1] = (unsigned char)bits; ++ ++ if (k > 0) ++ { ++ if (is_sslv3) ++ { ++ /* The SSLv3 header is larger than a single block. ++ * overhang is the number of bytes beyond a single ++ * block that the header consumes: either 7 bytes ++ * (SHA1) or 11 bytes (MD5). */ ++ unsigned overhang = header_length-md_block_size; ++ md_transform(md_state.c, header); ++ memcpy(first_block, header + md_block_size, overhang); ++ memcpy(first_block + overhang, data, md_block_size-overhang); ++ md_transform(md_state.c, first_block); ++ for (i = 1; i < k/md_block_size - 1; i++) ++ md_transform(md_state.c, data + md_block_size*i - overhang); ++ } ++ else ++ { ++ /* k is a multiple of md_block_size. */ ++ memcpy(first_block, header, 13); ++ memcpy(first_block+13, data, md_block_size-13); ++ md_transform(md_state.c, first_block); ++ for (i = 1; i < k/md_block_size; i++) ++ md_transform(md_state.c, data + md_block_size*i - 13); ++ } ++ } ++ ++ memset(mac_out, 0, sizeof(mac_out)); ++ ++ /* We now process the final hash blocks. For each block, we construct ++ * it in constant time. If the |i==index_a| then we'll include the 0x80 ++ * bytes and zero pad etc. For each block we selectively copy it, in ++ * constant time, to |mac_out|. */ ++ for (i = num_starting_blocks; i <= num_starting_blocks+variance_blocks; i++) ++ { ++ unsigned char block[MAX_HASH_BLOCK_SIZE]; ++ unsigned char is_block_a = constant_time_eq_8(i, index_a); ++ unsigned char is_block_b = constant_time_eq_8(i, index_b); ++ for (j = 0; j < md_block_size; j++) ++ { ++ unsigned char b = 0, is_past_c, is_past_cp1; ++ if (k < header_length) ++ b = header[k]; ++ else if (k < data_plus_mac_plus_padding_size + header_length) ++ b = data[k-header_length]; ++ k++; ++ ++ is_past_c = is_block_a & constant_time_ge(j, c); ++ is_past_cp1 = is_block_a & constant_time_ge(j, c+1); ++ /* If this is the block containing the end of the ++ * application data, and we are at the offset for the ++ * 0x80 value, then overwrite b with 0x80. */ ++ b = (b&~is_past_c) | (0x80&is_past_c); ++ /* If this the the block containing the end of the ++ * application data and we're past the 0x80 value then ++ * just write zero. */ ++ b = b&~is_past_cp1; ++ /* If this is index_b (the final block), but not ++ * index_a (the end of the data), then the 64-bit ++ * length didn't fit into index_a and we're having to ++ * add an extra block of zeros. */ ++ b &= ~is_block_b | is_block_a; ++ ++ /* The final bytes of one of the blocks contains the ++ * length. */ ++ if (j >= md_block_size - md_length_size) ++ { ++ /* If this is index_b, write a length byte. */ ++ b = (b&~is_block_b) | (is_block_b&length_bytes[j-(md_block_size-md_length_size)]); ++ } ++ block[j] = b; ++ } ++ ++ md_transform(md_state.c, block); ++ md_final_raw(md_state.c, block); ++ /* If this is index_b, copy the hash value to |mac_out|. */ ++ for (j = 0; j < md_size; j++) ++ mac_out[j] |= block[j]&is_block_b; ++ } ++ ++ EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx); ++ EVP_DigestInit_ex(&md_ctx, digest, NULL /* engine */); ++ if (is_sslv3) ++ { ++ /* We repurpose |hmac_pad| to contain the SSLv3 pad2 block. */ ++ memset(hmac_pad, 0x5c, sslv3_pad_length); ++ ++ EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, mac_secret, mac_secret_length); ++ EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, hmac_pad, sslv3_pad_length); ++ EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, mac_out, md_size); ++ } ++ else ++ { ++ /* Complete the HMAC in the standard manner. */ ++ for (i = 0; i < md_block_size; i++) ++ hmac_pad[i] ^= 0x6a; ++ ++ EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, hmac_pad, md_block_size); ++ EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, mac_out, md_size); ++ } ++ EVP_DigestFinal(&md_ctx, md_out, &md_out_size_u); ++ if (md_out_size) ++ *md_out_size = md_out_size_u; ++ EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx); ++ } ++ ++#ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS ++ ++/* Due to the need to use EVP in FIPS mode we can't reimplement digests but ++ * we can ensure the number of blocks processed is equal for all cases ++ * by digesting additional data. ++ */ ++ ++void tls_fips_digest_extra( ++ const EVP_CIPHER_CTX *cipher_ctx, const EVP_MD *hash, HMAC_CTX *hctx, ++ const unsigned char *data, size_t data_len, size_t orig_len) ++ { ++ size_t block_size, digest_pad, blocks_data, blocks_orig; ++ if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(cipher_ctx) != EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE) ++ return; ++ block_size = EVP_MD_block_size(hash); ++ /* We are in FIPS mode if we get this far so we know we have only SHA* ++ * digests and TLS to deal with. ++ * Minimum digest padding length is 17 for SHA384/SHA512 and 9 ++ * otherwise. ++ * Additional header is 13 bytes. To get the number of digest blocks ++ * processed round up the amount of data plus padding to the nearest ++ * block length. Block length is 128 for SHA384/SHA512 and 64 otherwise. ++ * So we have: ++ * blocks = (payload_len + digest_pad + 13 + block_size - 1)/block_size ++ * equivalently: ++ * blocks = (payload_len + digest_pad + 12)/block_size + 1 ++ * HMAC adds a constant overhead. ++ * We're ultimately only interested in differences so this becomes ++ * blocks = (payload_len + 29)/128 ++ * for SHA384/SHA512 and ++ * blocks = (payload_len + 21)/64 ++ * otherwise. ++ */ ++ digest_pad = block_size == 64 ? 21 : 29; ++ blocks_orig = (orig_len + digest_pad)/block_size; ++ blocks_data = (data_len + digest_pad)/block_size; ++ /* MAC enough blocks to make up the difference between the original ++ * and actual lengths plus one extra block to ensure this is never a ++ * no op. The "data" pointer should always have enough space to ++ * perform this operation as it is large enough for a maximum ++ * length TLS buffer. ++ */ ++ HMAC_Update(hctx, data, ++ (blocks_orig - blocks_data + 1) * block_size); ++ } ++#endif +Index: crypto/openssl/ssl/s3_clnt.c +=================================================================== +--- crypto/openssl/ssl/s3_clnt.c (revision 248771) ++++ crypto/openssl/ssl/s3_clnt.c (working copy) +@@ -262,7 +262,16 @@ int ssl3_connect(SSL *s) + ret=ssl3_get_server_hello(s); + if (ret <= 0) goto end; + if (s->hit) ++ { + s->state=SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A; ++#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT ++ if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected) ++ { ++ /* receive renewed session ticket */ ++ s->state=SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_A; ++ } ++#endif ++ } + else + s->state=SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_A; + s->init_num=0; +Index: crypto/openssl/ssl/s3_enc.c +=================================================================== +--- crypto/openssl/ssl/s3_enc.c (revision 248771) ++++ crypto/openssl/ssl/s3_enc.c (working copy) +@@ -433,12 +433,21 @@ void ssl3_cleanup_key_block(SSL *s) + s->s3->tmp.key_block_length=0; + } + ++/* ssl3_enc encrypts/decrypts the record in |s->wrec| / |s->rrec|, respectively. ++ * ++ * Returns: ++ * 0: (in non-constant time) if the record is publically invalid (i.e. too ++ * short etc). ++ * 1: if the record's padding is valid / the encryption was successful. ++ * -1: if the record's padding is invalid or, if sending, an internal error ++ * occured. ++ */ + int ssl3_enc(SSL *s, int send) + { + SSL3_RECORD *rec; + EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ds; + unsigned long l; +- int bs,i; ++ int bs,i,mac_size=0; + const EVP_CIPHER *enc; + + if (send) +@@ -489,32 +498,17 @@ int ssl3_enc(SSL *s, int send) + if (!send) + { + if (l == 0 || l%bs != 0) +- { +- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ENC,SSL_R_BLOCK_CIPHER_PAD_IS_WRONG); +- ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_DECRYPTION_FAILED); + return 0; +- } + /* otherwise, rec->length >= bs */ + } + + EVP_Cipher(ds,rec->data,rec->input,l); + ++ if (s->read_hash != NULL) ++ mac_size = EVP_MD_size(s->read_hash); ++ + if ((bs != 1) && !send) +- { +- i=rec->data[l-1]+1; +- /* SSL 3.0 bounds the number of padding bytes by the block size; +- * padding bytes (except the last one) are arbitrary */ +- if (i > bs) +- { +- /* Incorrect padding. SSLerr() and ssl3_alert are done +- * by caller: we don't want to reveal whether this is +- * a decryption error or a MAC verification failure +- * (see http://www.openssl.org/~bodo/tls-cbc.txt) */ +- return -1; +- } +- /* now i <= bs <= rec->length */ +- rec->length-=i; +- } ++ return ssl3_cbc_remove_padding(s, rec, bs, mac_size); + } + return(1); + } +@@ -591,7 +585,7 @@ int ssl3_mac(SSL *ssl, unsigned char *md, int send + EVP_MD_CTX md_ctx; + const EVP_MD *hash; + unsigned char *p,rec_char; +- unsigned int md_size; ++ size_t md_size, orig_len; + int npad; + + if (send) +@@ -612,29 +606,73 @@ int ssl3_mac(SSL *ssl, unsigned char *md, int send + md_size=EVP_MD_size(hash); + npad=(48/md_size)*md_size; + +- /* Chop the digest off the end :-) */ +- EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx); ++ /* kludge: ssl3_cbc_remove_padding passes padding length in rec->type */ ++ orig_len = rec->length+md_size+((unsigned int)rec->type>>8); ++ rec->type &= 0xff; + +- EVP_DigestInit_ex( &md_ctx,hash, NULL); +- EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,mac_sec,md_size); +- EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,ssl3_pad_1,npad); +- EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,seq,8); +- rec_char=rec->type; +- EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&rec_char,1); +- p=md; +- s2n(rec->length,p); +- EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,md,2); +- EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,rec->input,rec->length); +- EVP_DigestFinal_ex( &md_ctx,md,NULL); ++ if (!send && ++ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(ssl->enc_read_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE && ++ ssl3_cbc_record_digest_supported(hash)) ++ { ++ /* This is a CBC-encrypted record. We must avoid leaking any ++ * timing-side channel information about how many blocks of ++ * data we are hashing because that gives an attacker a ++ * timing-oracle. */ + +- EVP_DigestInit_ex( &md_ctx,hash, NULL); +- EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,mac_sec,md_size); +- EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,ssl3_pad_2,npad); +- EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,md,md_size); +- EVP_DigestFinal_ex( &md_ctx,md,&md_size); ++ /* npad is, at most, 48 bytes and that's with MD5: ++ * 16 + 48 + 8 (sequence bytes) + 1 + 2 = 75. ++ * ++ * With SHA-1 (the largest hash speced for SSLv3) the hash size ++ * goes up 4, but npad goes down by 8, resulting in a smaller ++ * total size. */ ++ unsigned char header[75]; ++ unsigned j = 0; ++ memcpy(header+j, mac_sec, md_size); ++ j += md_size; ++ memcpy(header+j, ssl3_pad_1, npad); ++ j += npad; ++ memcpy(header+j, seq, 8); ++ j += 8; ++ header[j++] = rec->type; ++ header[j++] = rec->length >> 8; ++ header[j++] = rec->length & 0xff; + +- EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx); ++ ssl3_cbc_digest_record( ++ hash, ++ md, &md_size, ++ header, rec->input, ++ rec->length + md_size, orig_len, ++ mac_sec, md_size, ++ 1 /* is SSLv3 */); ++ } ++ else ++ { ++ unsigned int md_size_u; ++ /* Chop the digest off the end :-) */ ++ EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx); + ++ EVP_DigestInit_ex( &md_ctx,hash, NULL); ++ EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,mac_sec,md_size); ++ EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,ssl3_pad_1,npad); ++ EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,seq,8); ++ rec_char=rec->type; ++ EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&rec_char,1); ++ p=md; ++ s2n(rec->length,p); ++ EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,md,2); ++ EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,rec->input,rec->length); ++ EVP_DigestFinal_ex( &md_ctx,md,NULL); ++ ++ EVP_DigestInit_ex( &md_ctx,hash, NULL); ++ EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,mac_sec,md_size); ++ EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,ssl3_pad_2,npad); ++ EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,md,md_size); ++ EVP_DigestFinal_ex( &md_ctx,md,&md_size_u); ++ md_size = md_size_u; ++ ++ EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx); ++ } ++ + ssl3_record_sequence_update(seq); + return(md_size); + } +Index: crypto/openssl/ssl/s3_pkt.c +=================================================================== +--- crypto/openssl/ssl/s3_pkt.c (revision 248771) ++++ crypto/openssl/ssl/s3_pkt.c (working copy) +@@ -246,11 +246,8 @@ static int ssl3_get_record(SSL *s) + unsigned char *p; + unsigned char md[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; + short version; +- unsigned int mac_size; +- int clear=0; ++ unsigned mac_size, orig_len; + size_t extra; +- int decryption_failed_or_bad_record_mac = 0; +- unsigned char *mac = NULL; + + rr= &(s->s3->rrec); + sess=s->session; +@@ -354,19 +351,18 @@ again: + + /* decrypt in place in 'rr->input' */ + rr->data=rr->input; ++ orig_len=rr->length; + + enc_err = s->method->ssl3_enc->enc(s,0); +- if (enc_err <= 0) ++ /* enc_err is: ++ * 0: (in non-constant time) if the record is publically invalid. ++ * 1: if the padding is valid ++ * -1: if the padding is invalid */ ++ if (enc_err == 0) + { +- if (enc_err == 0) +- /* SSLerr() and ssl3_send_alert() have been called */ +- goto err; +- +- /* Otherwise enc_err == -1, which indicates bad padding +- * (rec->length has not been changed in this case). +- * To minimize information leaked via timing, we will perform +- * the MAC computation anyway. */ +- decryption_failed_or_bad_record_mac = 1; ++ al=SSL_AD_DECRYPTION_FAILED; ++ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_BLOCK_CIPHER_PAD_IS_WRONG); ++ goto f_err; + } + + #ifdef TLS_DEBUG +@@ -376,51 +372,59 @@ printf("\n"); + #endif + + /* r->length is now the compressed data plus mac */ +- if ( (sess == NULL) || +- (s->enc_read_ctx == NULL) || +- (s->read_hash == NULL)) +- clear=1; +- +- if (!clear) ++ if ((sess != NULL) && ++ (s->enc_read_ctx != NULL) && ++ (s->read_hash != NULL)) + { ++ /* s->read_hash != NULL => mac_size != -1 */ ++ unsigned char *mac = NULL; ++ unsigned char mac_tmp[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; + mac_size=EVP_MD_size(s->read_hash); ++ OPENSSL_assert(mac_size <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE); + +- if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH+extra+mac_size) ++ /* orig_len is the length of the record before any padding was ++ * removed. This is public information, as is the MAC in use, ++ * therefore we can safely process the record in a different ++ * amount of time if it's too short to possibly contain a MAC. ++ */ ++ if (orig_len < mac_size || ++ /* CBC records must have a padding length byte too. */ ++ (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s->enc_read_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE && ++ orig_len < mac_size+1)) + { +-#if 0 /* OK only for stream ciphers (then rr->length is visible from ciphertext anyway) */ +- al=SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW; +- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_PRE_MAC_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); ++ al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; ++ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT); + goto f_err; +-#else +- decryption_failed_or_bad_record_mac = 1; +-#endif + } +- /* check the MAC for rr->input (it's in mac_size bytes at the tail) */ +- if (rr->length >= mac_size) ++ ++ if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s->enc_read_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE) + { ++ /* We update the length so that the TLS header bytes ++ * can be constructed correctly but we need to extract ++ * the MAC in constant time from within the record, ++ * without leaking the contents of the padding bytes. ++ * */ ++ mac = mac_tmp; ++ ssl3_cbc_copy_mac(mac_tmp, rr, mac_size, orig_len); + rr->length -= mac_size; +- mac = &rr->data[rr->length]; + } + else + { +- /* record (minus padding) is too short to contain a MAC */ +-#if 0 /* OK only for stream ciphers */ +- al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; +- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT); +- goto f_err; +-#else +- decryption_failed_or_bad_record_mac = 1; +- rr->length = 0; +-#endif ++ /* In this case there's no padding, so |orig_len| ++ * equals |rec->length| and we checked that there's ++ * enough bytes for |mac_size| above. */ ++ rr->length -= mac_size; ++ mac = &rr->data[rr->length]; + } +- i=s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s,md,0); +- if (mac == NULL || memcmp(md, mac, mac_size) != 0) +- { +- decryption_failed_or_bad_record_mac = 1; +- } ++ ++ i=s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s,md,0 /* not send */); ++ if (i < 0 || mac == NULL || CRYPTO_memcmp(md, mac, (size_t)mac_size) != 0) ++ enc_err = -1; ++ if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH+extra+mac_size) ++ enc_err = -1; + } + +- if (decryption_failed_or_bad_record_mac) ++ if (enc_err < 0) + { + /* A separate 'decryption_failed' alert was introduced with TLS 1.0, + * SSL 3.0 only has 'bad_record_mac'. But unless a decryption +Index: crypto/openssl/ssl/s3_srvr.c +=================================================================== +--- crypto/openssl/ssl/s3_srvr.c (revision 248771) ++++ crypto/openssl/ssl/s3_srvr.c (working copy) +@@ -1005,7 +1005,7 @@ int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s) + goto f_err; + } + } +- if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext(s) <= 0) { ++ if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(s) <= 0) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT); + goto err; + } +@@ -1131,6 +1131,16 @@ int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s) + * s->tmp.new_cipher - the new cipher to use. + */ + ++ /* Handles TLS extensions that we couldn't check earlier */ ++ if (s->version >= SSL3_VERSION) ++ { ++ if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(s) <= 0) ++ { ++ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT); ++ goto err; ++ } ++ } ++ + if (ret < 0) ret=1; + if (0) + { +Index: crypto/openssl/ssl/ssl.h +=================================================================== +--- crypto/openssl/ssl/ssl.h (revision 248771) ++++ crypto/openssl/ssl/ssl.h (working copy) +@@ -1820,6 +1820,7 @@ void ERR_load_SSL_strings(void); + #define SSL_F_SSL_GET_NEW_SESSION 181 + #define SSL_F_SSL_GET_PREV_SESSION 217 + #define SSL_F_SSL_GET_SERVER_SEND_CERT 182 ++#define SSL_F_SSL_GET_SERVER_SEND_PKEY 317 + #define SSL_F_SSL_GET_SIGN_PKEY 183 + #define SSL_F_SSL_INIT_WBIO_BUFFER 184 + #define SSL_F_SSL_LOAD_CLIENT_CA_FILE 185 +Index: crypto/openssl/ssl/ssl_err.c +=================================================================== +--- crypto/openssl/ssl/ssl_err.c (revision 248771) ++++ crypto/openssl/ssl/ssl_err.c (working copy) +@@ -218,6 +218,7 @@ static ERR_STRING_DATA SSL_str_functs[]= + {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_GET_NEW_SESSION), "SSL_GET_NEW_SESSION"}, + {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_GET_PREV_SESSION), "SSL_GET_PREV_SESSION"}, + {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_GET_SERVER_SEND_CERT), "SSL_GET_SERVER_SEND_CERT"}, ++{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_GET_SERVER_SEND_PKEY), "SSL_GET_SERVER_SEND_PKEY"}, + {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_GET_SIGN_PKEY), "SSL_GET_SIGN_PKEY"}, + {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_INIT_WBIO_BUFFER), "SSL_INIT_WBIO_BUFFER"}, + {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_LOAD_CLIENT_CA_FILE), "SSL_load_client_CA_file"}, +Index: crypto/openssl/ssl/ssl_lib.c +=================================================================== +--- crypto/openssl/ssl/ssl_lib.c (revision 248771) ++++ crypto/openssl/ssl/ssl_lib.c (working copy) +@@ -1943,7 +1943,7 @@ int check_srvr_ecc_cert_and_alg(X509 *x, SSL_CIPHE + } + + /* THIS NEEDS CLEANING UP */ +-X509 *ssl_get_server_send_cert(SSL *s) ++CERT_PKEY *ssl_get_server_send_pkey(const SSL *s) + { + unsigned long alg,kalg; + CERT *c; +@@ -1993,14 +1993,22 @@ int check_srvr_ecc_cert_and_alg(X509 *x, SSL_CIPHE + } + else /* if (kalg & SSL_aNULL) */ + { +- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_GET_SERVER_SEND_CERT,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); ++ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_GET_SERVER_SEND_PKEY,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return(NULL); + } +- if (c->pkeys[i].x509 == NULL) return(NULL); + +- return(c->pkeys[i].x509); ++ return c->pkeys + i; + } + ++X509 *ssl_get_server_send_cert(const SSL *s) ++ { ++ CERT_PKEY *cpk; ++ cpk = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s); ++ if (!cpk) ++ return NULL; ++ return cpk->x509; ++ } ++ + EVP_PKEY *ssl_get_sign_pkey(SSL *s,SSL_CIPHER *cipher) + { + unsigned long alg; +@@ -2420,7 +2428,9 @@ void ssl_clear_cipher_ctx(SSL *s) + /* Fix this function so that it takes an optional type parameter */ + X509 *SSL_get_certificate(const SSL *s) + { +- if (s->cert != NULL) ++ if (s->server) ++ return(ssl_get_server_send_cert(s)); ++ else if (s->cert != NULL) + return(s->cert->key->x509); + else + return(NULL); +Index: crypto/openssl/ssl/ssl_locl.h +=================================================================== +--- crypto/openssl/ssl/ssl_locl.h (revision 248771) ++++ crypto/openssl/ssl/ssl_locl.h (working copy) +@@ -189,6 +189,15 @@ + *((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l)>> 8)&0xff), \ + *((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l) )&0xff)) + ++#define l2n8(l,c) (*((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l)>>56)&0xff), \ ++ *((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l)>>48)&0xff), \ ++ *((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l)>>40)&0xff), \ ++ *((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l)>>32)&0xff), \ ++ *((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l)>>24)&0xff), \ ++ *((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l)>>16)&0xff), \ ++ *((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l)>> 8)&0xff), \ ++ *((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l) )&0xff)) ++ + #define n2l6(c,l) (l =((BN_ULLONG)(*((c)++)))<<40, \ + l|=((BN_ULLONG)(*((c)++)))<<32, \ + l|=((BN_ULLONG)(*((c)++)))<<24, \ +@@ -740,7 +749,8 @@ int ssl_verify_cert_chain(SSL *s,STACK_OF(X509) *s + int ssl_undefined_function(SSL *s); + int ssl_undefined_void_function(void); + int ssl_undefined_const_function(const SSL *s); +-X509 *ssl_get_server_send_cert(SSL *); ++CERT_PKEY *ssl_get_server_send_pkey(const SSL *s); ++X509 *ssl_get_server_send_cert(const SSL *); + EVP_PKEY *ssl_get_sign_pkey(SSL *,SSL_CIPHER *); + int ssl_cert_type(X509 *x,EVP_PKEY *pkey); + void ssl_set_cert_masks(CERT *c, SSL_CIPHER *cipher); +@@ -979,7 +989,8 @@ int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned + int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **data, unsigned char *d, int n, int *al); + int ssl_prepare_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s); + int ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s); +-int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s); ++int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s); ++int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(SSL *s); + int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s); + + #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256 +@@ -1001,5 +1012,33 @@ int ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(SSL *s, un + int ssl_parse_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(SSL *s, unsigned char *d, int len, + int *al); + #endif ++/* s3_cbc.c */ ++void ssl3_cbc_copy_mac(unsigned char* out, ++ const SSL3_RECORD *rec, ++ unsigned md_size,unsigned orig_len); ++int ssl3_cbc_remove_padding(const SSL* s, ++ SSL3_RECORD *rec, ++ unsigned block_size, ++ unsigned mac_size); ++int tls1_cbc_remove_padding(const SSL* s, ++ SSL3_RECORD *rec, ++ unsigned block_size, ++ unsigned mac_size); ++char ssl3_cbc_record_digest_supported(const EVP_MD *hash); ++void ssl3_cbc_digest_record( ++ const EVP_MD *hash, ++ unsigned char* md_out, ++ size_t* md_out_size, ++ const unsigned char header[13], ++ const unsigned char *data, ++ size_t data_plus_mac_size, ++ size_t data_plus_mac_plus_padding_size, ++ const unsigned char *mac_secret, ++ unsigned mac_secret_length, ++ char is_sslv3); + ++void tls_fips_digest_extra( ++ const EVP_CIPHER_CTX *cipher_ctx, const EVP_MD *hash, HMAC_CTX *hctx, ++ const unsigned char *data, size_t data_len, size_t orig_len); ++ + #endif +Index: crypto/openssl/ssl/t1_enc.c +=================================================================== +--- crypto/openssl/ssl/t1_enc.c (revision 248771) ++++ crypto/openssl/ssl/t1_enc.c (working copy) +@@ -264,7 +264,7 @@ int tls1_change_cipher_state(SSL *s, int which) + { + int ki; + for (ki=0; kis3->tmp.key_block_length; ki++) +- printf("%02x", key_block[ki]); printf("\n"); ++ printf("%02x", s->s3->tmp.key_block[ki]); printf("\n"); + } + #endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */ + +@@ -528,12 +528,21 @@ err: + return(0); + } + ++/* tls1_enc encrypts/decrypts the record in |s->wrec| / |s->rrec|, respectively. ++ * ++ * Returns: ++ * 0: (in non-constant time) if the record is publically invalid (i.e. too ++ * short etc). ++ * 1: if the record's padding is valid / the encryption was successful. ++ * -1: if the record's padding/AEAD-authenticator is invalid or, if sending, ++ * an internal error occured. ++ */ + int tls1_enc(SSL *s, int send) + { + SSL3_RECORD *rec; + EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ds; + unsigned long l; +- int bs,i,ii,j,k; ++ int bs,i,j,k,pad=0,ret,mac_size=0; + const EVP_CIPHER *enc; + + if (send) +@@ -559,11 +568,11 @@ int tls1_enc(SSL *s, int send) + printf("tls1_enc(%d)\n", send); + #endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */ + +- if ((s->session == NULL) || (ds == NULL) || +- (enc == NULL)) ++ if ((s->session == NULL) || (ds == NULL) || (enc == NULL)) + { + memmove(rec->data,rec->input,rec->length); + rec->input=rec->data; ++ ret = 1; + } + else + { +@@ -591,14 +600,13 @@ int tls1_enc(SSL *s, int send) + + #ifdef KSSL_DEBUG + { +- unsigned long ui; ++ unsigned long ui; + printf("EVP_Cipher(ds=%p,rec->data=%p,rec->input=%p,l=%ld) ==>\n", +- (void *)ds,rec->data,rec->input,l); +- printf("\tEVP_CIPHER_CTX: %d buf_len, %d key_len [%ld %ld], %d iv_len\n", +- ds->buf_len, ds->cipher->key_len, +- (unsigned long)DES_KEY_SZ, +- (unsigned long)DES_SCHEDULE_SZ, +- ds->cipher->iv_len); ++ ds,rec->data,rec->input,l); ++ printf("\tEVP_CIPHER_CTX: %d buf_len, %d key_len [%d %d], %d iv_len\n", ++ ds->buf_len, ds->cipher->key_len, ++ DES_KEY_SZ, DES_SCHEDULE_SZ, ++ ds->cipher->iv_len); + printf("\t\tIV: "); + for (i=0; icipher->iv_len; i++) printf("%02X", ds->iv[i]); + printf("\n"); +@@ -611,11 +619,7 @@ int tls1_enc(SSL *s, int send) + if (!send) + { + if (l == 0 || l%bs != 0) +- { +- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_ENC,SSL_R_BLOCK_CIPHER_PAD_IS_WRONG); +- ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_DECRYPTION_FAILED); + return 0; +- } + } + + EVP_Cipher(ds,rec->data,rec->input,l); +@@ -629,49 +633,15 @@ int tls1_enc(SSL *s, int send) + } + #endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */ + ++ ret = 1; ++ if (s->read_hash != NULL) ++ mac_size = EVP_MD_size(s->read_hash); + if ((bs != 1) && !send) +- { +- ii=i=rec->data[l-1]; /* padding_length */ +- i++; +- /* NB: if compression is in operation the first packet +- * may not be of even length so the padding bug check +- * cannot be performed. This bug workaround has been +- * around since SSLeay so hopefully it is either fixed +- * now or no buggy implementation supports compression +- * [steve] +- */ +- if ( (s->options&SSL_OP_TLS_BLOCK_PADDING_BUG) +- && !s->expand) +- { +- /* First packet is even in size, so check */ +- if ((memcmp(s->s3->read_sequence, +- "\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0",8) == 0) && !(ii & 1)) +- s->s3->flags|=TLS1_FLAGS_TLS_PADDING_BUG; +- if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_TLS_PADDING_BUG) +- i--; +- } +- /* TLS 1.0 does not bound the number of padding bytes by the block size. +- * All of them must have value 'padding_length'. */ +- if (i > (int)rec->length) +- { +- /* Incorrect padding. SSLerr() and ssl3_alert are done +- * by caller: we don't want to reveal whether this is +- * a decryption error or a MAC verification failure +- * (see http://www.openssl.org/~bodo/tls-cbc.txt) */ +- return -1; +- } +- for (j=(int)(l-i); j<(int)l; j++) +- { +- if (rec->data[j] != ii) +- { +- /* Incorrect padding */ +- return -1; +- } +- } +- rec->length-=i; +- } ++ ret = tls1_cbc_remove_padding(s, rec, bs, mac_size); ++ if (pad && !send) ++ rec->length -= pad; + } +- return(1); ++ return ret; + } + + int tls1_cert_verify_mac(SSL *s, EVP_MD_CTX *in_ctx, unsigned char *out) +@@ -719,10 +689,10 @@ int tls1_mac(SSL *ssl, unsigned char *md, int send + SSL3_RECORD *rec; + unsigned char *mac_sec,*seq; + const EVP_MD *hash; +- unsigned int md_size; ++ size_t md_size, orig_len; + int i; + HMAC_CTX hmac; +- unsigned char buf[5]; ++ unsigned char header[13]; + + if (send) + { +@@ -741,20 +711,6 @@ int tls1_mac(SSL *ssl, unsigned char *md, int send + + md_size=EVP_MD_size(hash); + +- buf[0]=rec->type; +- if (ssl->version == DTLS1_VERSION && ssl->client_version == DTLS1_BAD_VER) +- { +- buf[1]=TLS1_VERSION_MAJOR; +- buf[2]=TLS1_VERSION_MINOR; +- } +- else { +- buf[1]=(unsigned char)(ssl->version>>8); +- buf[2]=(unsigned char)(ssl->version); +- } +- +- buf[3]=rec->length>>8; +- buf[4]=rec->length&0xff; +- + /* I should fix this up TLS TLS TLS TLS TLS XXXXXXXX */ + HMAC_CTX_init(&hmac); + HMAC_Init_ex(&hmac,mac_sec,EVP_MD_size(hash),hash,NULL); +@@ -766,16 +722,57 @@ int tls1_mac(SSL *ssl, unsigned char *md, int send + s2n(send?ssl->d1->w_epoch:ssl->d1->r_epoch, p); + memcpy (p,&seq[2],6); + +- HMAC_Update(&hmac,dtlsseq,8); ++ memcpy(header, dtlsseq, 8); + } + else +- HMAC_Update(&hmac,seq,8); ++ memcpy(header, seq, 8); + +- HMAC_Update(&hmac,buf,5); +- HMAC_Update(&hmac,rec->input,rec->length); +- HMAC_Final(&hmac,md,&md_size); ++ /* kludge: tls1_cbc_remove_padding passes padding length in rec->type */ ++ orig_len = rec->length+md_size+((unsigned int)rec->type>>8); ++ rec->type &= 0xff; ++ ++ header[8]=rec->type; ++ header[9]=(unsigned char)(ssl->version>>8); ++ header[10]=(unsigned char)(ssl->version); ++ header[11]=(rec->length)>>8; ++ header[12]=(rec->length)&0xff; ++ ++ if (!send && ++ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(ssl->enc_read_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE && ++ ssl3_cbc_record_digest_supported(hash)) ++ { ++ /* This is a CBC-encrypted record. We must avoid leaking any ++ * timing-side channel information about how many blocks of ++ * data we are hashing because that gives an attacker a ++ * timing-oracle. */ ++ ssl3_cbc_digest_record( ++ hash, ++ md, &md_size, ++ header, rec->input, ++ rec->length + md_size, orig_len, ++ ssl->s3->read_mac_secret, ++ EVP_MD_size(ssl->read_hash), ++ 0 /* not SSLv3 */); ++ } ++ else ++ { ++ unsigned mds; ++ ++ HMAC_Update(&hmac,header,sizeof(header)); ++ HMAC_Update(&hmac,rec->input,rec->length); ++ HMAC_Final(&hmac,md,&mds); ++ md_size = mds; ++#ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS ++ if (!send && FIPS_mode()) ++ tls_fips_digest_extra( ++ ssl->enc_read_ctx, ++ hash, ++ &hmac, rec->input, ++ rec->length, orig_len); ++#endif ++ } ++ + HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hmac); +- + #ifdef TLS_DEBUG + printf("sec="); + {unsigned int z; for (z=0; zinitial_ctx != NULL && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0) + ret = s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg); + ++ switch (ret) ++ { ++ case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL: ++ ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); ++ return -1; ++ ++ case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING: ++ ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, al); ++ return 1; ++ ++ case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK: ++ s->servername_done = 0; ++ ++ default: ++ return 1; ++ } ++ } ++ ++int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(SSL *s) ++ { ++ int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK; ++ int al; ++ + /* If status request then ask callback what to do. + * Note: this must be called after servername callbacks in case +- * the certificate has changed. ++ * the certificate has changed, and must be called after the cipher ++ * has been chosen because this may influence which certificate is sent + */ +- if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb) ++ if (s->tlsext_status_type != -1 && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb) + { + int r; ++ CERT_PKEY *certpkey; ++ certpkey = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s); ++ /* If no certificate can't return certificate status */ ++ if (certpkey == NULL) ++ { ++ s->tlsext_status_expected = 0; ++ return 1; ++ } ++ /* Set current certificate to one we will use so ++ * SSL_get_certificate et al can pick it up. ++ */ ++ s->cert->key = certpkey; + r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg); + switch (r) + { +@@ -785,7 +821,8 @@ int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned + } + else + s->tlsext_status_expected = 0; +- err: ++ ++ err: + switch (ret) + { + case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL: +@@ -795,11 +832,9 @@ int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned + case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING: + ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_WARNING,al); + return 1; +- +- case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK: +- s->servername_done=0; +- default: +- return 1; ++ ++ default: ++ return 1; + } + } + +@@ -977,7 +1012,7 @@ static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsign + HMAC_Update(&hctx, etick, eticklen); + HMAC_Final(&hctx, tick_hmac, NULL); + HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx); +- if (memcmp(tick_hmac, etick + eticklen, mlen)) ++ if (CRYPTO_memcmp(tick_hmac, etick + eticklen, mlen)) + goto tickerr; + /* Attempt to decrypt session data */ + /* Move p after IV to start of encrypted ticket, update length */ +Index: crypto/openssl/util/libeay.num +=================================================================== +--- crypto/openssl/util/libeay.num (revision 248771) ++++ crypto/openssl/util/libeay.num (working copy) +@@ -3510,6 +3510,7 @@ BIO_get_callback_arg 3902 EXIST + BIO_set_callback 3903 EXIST::FUNCTION: + d2i_ASIdOrRange 3904 EXIST::FUNCTION:RFC3779 + i2d_ASIdentifiers 3905 EXIST::FUNCTION:RFC3779 ++CRYPTO_memcmp 3906 EXIST::FUNCTION: + SEED_decrypt 3908 EXIST::FUNCTION:SEED + SEED_encrypt 3909 EXIST::FUNCTION:SEED + SEED_cbc_encrypt 3910 EXIST::FUNCTION:SEED +Index: secure/lib/libcrypto/Makefile.inc +=================================================================== +--- secure/lib/libcrypto/Makefile.inc (revision 248771) ++++ secure/lib/libcrypto/Makefile.inc (working copy) +@@ -3,8 +3,8 @@ + .include + + # OpenSSL version used for manual page generation +-OPENSSL_VER= 0.9.8x +-OPENSSL_DATE= 2012-05-10 ++OPENSSL_VER= 0.9.8y ++OPENSSL_DATE= 2013-02-05 + + LCRYPTO_SRC= ${.CURDIR}/../../../crypto/openssl + LCRYPTO_DOC= ${.CURDIR}/../../../crypto/openssl/doc +Index: secure/lib/libssl/Makefile +=================================================================== +--- secure/lib/libssl/Makefile (revision 248771) ++++ secure/lib/libssl/Makefile (working copy) +@@ -14,7 +14,8 @@ SRCS= bio_ssl.c d1_meth.c d1_srvr.c d1_clnt.c d1_l + d1_both.c d1_enc.c \ + s23_clnt.c s23_lib.c s23_meth.c s23_pkt.c s23_srvr.c \ + s2_clnt.c s2_enc.c s2_lib.c s2_meth.c s2_pkt.c s2_srvr.c \ +- s3_both.c s3_clnt.c s3_enc.c s3_lib.c s3_meth.c s3_pkt.c \ ++ s3_both.c s3_cbc.c s3_clnt.c s3_enc.c s3_lib.c s3_meth.c \ ++ s3_pkt.c \ + s3_srvr.c ssl_algs.c ssl_asn1.c ssl_cert.c ssl_ciph.c \ + ssl_err.c ssl_err2.c ssl_lib.c ssl_rsa.c ssl_sess.c ssl_stat.c \ + ssl_txt.c t1_clnt.c t1_enc.c t1_lib.c t1_meth.c t1_reneg.c t1_srvr.c Property changes on: projects/entities/share/security/patches/SA-13:03/openssl-9.1.patch ___________________________________________________________________ Added: fbsd:nokeywords ## -0,0 +1 ## +y \ No newline at end of property Added: svn:eol-style ## -0,0 +1 ## +native \ No newline at end of property Added: svn:mime-type ## -0,0 +1 ## +text/plain \ No newline at end of property Index: projects/entities/share/security/patches/SA-13:03/openssl-9.1.patch.asc =================================================================== --- projects/entities/share/security/patches/SA-13:03/openssl-9.1.patch.asc (nonexistent) +++ projects/entities/share/security/patches/SA-13:03/openssl-9.1.patch.asc (revision 41354) @@ -0,0 +1,7 @@ +-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- +Version: GnuPG v2.0.19 (FreeBSD) + +iEYEABECAAYFAlFbGmEACgkQFdaIBMps37K6AQCeKkxtcMShX1BrRZYpH1VX7pXP +mK0An1Ia/64Y8AWRUrz2UrxRHzU0qZut +=sjGM +-----END PGP SIGNATURE----- Property changes on: projects/entities/share/security/patches/SA-13:03/openssl-9.1.patch.asc ___________________________________________________________________ Added: fbsd:nokeywords ## -0,0 +1 ## +y \ No newline at end of property Added: svn:eol-style ## -0,0 +1 ## +native \ No newline at end of property Added: svn:mime-type ## -0,0 +1 ## +text/plain \ No newline at end of property Index: projects/entities/share/security/patches/SA-13:03/openssl.patch =================================================================== --- projects/entities/share/security/patches/SA-13:03/openssl.patch (nonexistent) +++ projects/entities/share/security/patches/SA-13:03/openssl.patch (revision 41354) @@ -0,0 +1,5576 @@ +Index: crypto/openssl/CHANGES +=================================================================== +--- crypto/openssl/CHANGES (revision 248771) ++++ crypto/openssl/CHANGES (working copy) +@@ -2,6 +2,171 @@ + OpenSSL CHANGES + _______________ + ++ Changes between 0.9.8x and 0.9.8y [5 Feb 2013] ++ ++ *) Make the decoding of SSLv3, TLS and DTLS CBC records constant time. ++ ++ This addresses the flaw in CBC record processing discovered by ++ Nadhem Alfardan and Kenny Paterson. Details of this attack can be found ++ at: http://www.isg.rhul.ac.uk/tls/ ++ ++ Thanks go to Nadhem Alfardan and Kenny Paterson of the Information ++ Security Group at Royal Holloway, University of London ++ (www.isg.rhul.ac.uk) for discovering this flaw and Adam Langley and ++ Emilia Käsper for the initial patch. ++ (CVE-2013-0169) ++ [Emilia Käsper, Adam Langley, Ben Laurie, Andy Polyakov, Steve Henson] ++ ++ *) Return an error when checking OCSP signatures when key is NULL. ++ This fixes a DoS attack. (CVE-2013-0166) ++ [Steve Henson] ++ ++ *) Call OCSP Stapling callback after ciphersuite has been chosen, so ++ the right response is stapled. Also change SSL_get_certificate() ++ so it returns the certificate actually sent. ++ See http://rt.openssl.org/Ticket/Display.html?id=2836. ++ (This is a backport) ++ [Rob Stradling ] ++ ++ *) Fix possible deadlock when decoding public keys. ++ [Steve Henson] ++ ++ Changes between 0.9.8w and 0.9.8x [10 May 2012] ++ ++ *) Sanity check record length before skipping explicit IV in DTLS ++ to fix DoS attack. ++ ++ Thanks to Codenomicon for discovering this issue using Fuzz-o-Matic ++ fuzzing as a service testing platform. ++ (CVE-2012-2333) ++ [Steve Henson] ++ ++ *) Initialise tkeylen properly when encrypting CMS messages. ++ Thanks to Solar Designer of Openwall for reporting this issue. ++ [Steve Henson] ++ ++ Changes between 0.9.8v and 0.9.8w [23 Apr 2012] ++ ++ *) The fix for CVE-2012-2110 did not take into account that the ++ 'len' argument to BUF_MEM_grow and BUF_MEM_grow_clean is an ++ int in OpenSSL 0.9.8, making it still vulnerable. Fix by ++ rejecting negative len parameter. (CVE-2012-2131) ++ [Tomas Hoger ] ++ ++ Changes between 0.9.8u and 0.9.8v [19 Apr 2012] ++ ++ *) Check for potentially exploitable overflows in asn1_d2i_read_bio ++ BUF_mem_grow and BUF_mem_grow_clean. Refuse attempts to shrink buffer ++ in CRYPTO_realloc_clean. ++ ++ Thanks to Tavis Ormandy, Google Security Team, for discovering this ++ issue and to Adam Langley for fixing it. ++ (CVE-2012-2110) ++ [Adam Langley (Google), Tavis Ormandy, Google Security Team] ++ ++ Changes between 0.9.8t and 0.9.8u [12 Mar 2012] ++ ++ *) Fix MMA (Bleichenbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA padding) weakness ++ in CMS and PKCS7 code. When RSA decryption fails use a random key for ++ content decryption and always return the same error. Note: this attack ++ needs on average 2^20 messages so it only affects automated senders. The ++ old behaviour can be reenabled in the CMS code by setting the ++ CMS_DEBUG_DECRYPT flag: this is useful for debugging and testing where ++ an MMA defence is not necessary. ++ Thanks to Ivan Nestlerode for discovering ++ this issue. (CVE-2012-0884) ++ [Steve Henson] ++ ++ *) Fix CVE-2011-4619: make sure we really are receiving a ++ client hello before rejecting multiple SGC restarts. Thanks to ++ Ivan Nestlerode for discovering this bug. ++ [Steve Henson] ++ ++ Changes between 0.9.8s and 0.9.8t [18 Jan 2012] ++ ++ *) Fix for DTLS DoS issue introduced by fix for CVE-2011-4109. ++ Thanks to Antonio Martin, Enterprise Secure Access Research and ++ Development, Cisco Systems, Inc. for discovering this bug and ++ preparing a fix. (CVE-2012-0050) ++ [Antonio Martin] ++ ++ Changes between 0.9.8r and 0.9.8s [4 Jan 2012] ++ ++ *) Nadhem Alfardan and Kenny Paterson have discovered an extension ++ of the Vaudenay padding oracle attack on CBC mode encryption ++ which enables an efficient plaintext recovery attack against ++ the OpenSSL implementation of DTLS. Their attack exploits timing ++ differences arising during decryption processing. A research ++ paper describing this attack can be found at: ++ http://www.isg.rhul.ac.uk/~kp/dtls.pdf ++ Thanks go to Nadhem Alfardan and Kenny Paterson of the Information ++ Security Group at Royal Holloway, University of London ++ (www.isg.rhul.ac.uk) for discovering this flaw and to Robin Seggelmann ++ and Michael Tuexen ++ for preparing the fix. (CVE-2011-4108) ++ [Robin Seggelmann, Michael Tuexen] ++ ++ *) Stop policy check failure freeing same buffer twice. (CVE-2011-4109) ++ [Ben Laurie, Kasper ] ++ ++ *) Clear bytes used for block padding of SSL 3.0 records. ++ (CVE-2011-4576) ++ [Adam Langley (Google)] ++ ++ *) Only allow one SGC handshake restart for SSL/TLS. Thanks to George ++ Kadianakis for discovering this issue and ++ Adam Langley for preparing the fix. (CVE-2011-4619) ++ [Adam Langley (Google)] ++ ++ *) Prevent malformed RFC3779 data triggering an assertion failure. ++ Thanks to Andrew Chi, BBN Technologies, for discovering the flaw ++ and Rob Austein for fixing it. (CVE-2011-4577) ++ [Rob Austein ] ++ ++ *) Fix ssl_ciph.c set-up race. ++ [Adam Langley (Google)] ++ ++ *) Fix spurious failures in ecdsatest.c. ++ [Emilia Käsper (Google)] ++ ++ *) Fix the BIO_f_buffer() implementation (which was mixing different ++ interpretations of the '..._len' fields). ++ [Adam Langley (Google)] ++ ++ *) Fix handling of BN_BLINDING: now BN_BLINDING_invert_ex (rather than ++ BN_BLINDING_invert_ex) calls BN_BLINDING_update, ensuring that concurrent ++ threads won't reuse the same blinding coefficients. ++ ++ This also avoids the need to obtain the CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA_BLINDING ++ lock to call BN_BLINDING_invert_ex, and avoids one use of ++ BN_BLINDING_update for each BN_BLINDING structure (previously, ++ the last update always remained unused). ++ [Emilia Käsper (Google)] ++ ++ *) Fix SSL memory handling for (EC)DH ciphersuites, in particular ++ for multi-threaded use of ECDH. ++ [Adam Langley (Google)] ++ ++ *) Fix x509_name_ex_d2i memory leak on bad inputs. ++ [Bodo Moeller] ++ ++ *) Add protection against ECDSA timing attacks as mentioned in the paper ++ by Billy Bob Brumley and Nicola Tuveri, see: ++ ++ http://eprint.iacr.org/2011/232.pdf ++ ++ [Billy Bob Brumley and Nicola Tuveri] ++ ++ Changes between 0.9.8q and 0.9.8r [8 Feb 2011] ++ ++ *) Fix parsing of OCSP stapling ClientHello extension. CVE-2011-0014 ++ [Neel Mehta, Adam Langley, Bodo Moeller (Google)] ++ ++ *) Fix bug in string printing code: if *any* escaping is enabled we must ++ escape the escape character (backslash) or the resulting string is ++ ambiguous. ++ [Steve Henson] ++ + Changes between 0.9.8p and 0.9.8q [2 Dec 2010] + + *) Disable code workaround for ancient and obsolete Netscape browsers +Index: crypto/openssl/Configure +=================================================================== +--- crypto/openssl/Configure (revision 248771) ++++ crypto/openssl/Configure (working copy) +@@ -162,6 +162,7 @@ my %table=( + "debug-ben-openbsd","gcc:-DBN_DEBUG -DREF_CHECK -DCONF_DEBUG -DBN_CTX_DEBUG -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG -DPEDANTIC -DDEBUG_SAFESTACK -DOPENSSL_OPENBSD_DEV_CRYPTO -DOPENSSL_NO_ASM -O2 -pedantic -Wall -Wshadow -Werror -pipe::(unknown)::::", + "debug-ben-openbsd-debug","gcc:-DBN_DEBUG -DREF_CHECK -DCONF_DEBUG -DBN_CTX_DEBUG -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG -DPEDANTIC -DDEBUG_SAFESTACK -DOPENSSL_OPENBSD_DEV_CRYPTO -DOPENSSL_NO_ASM -g3 -O2 -pedantic -Wall -Wshadow -Werror -pipe::(unknown)::::", + "debug-ben-debug", "gcc:$gcc_devteam_warn -DBN_DEBUG -DREF_CHECK -DCONF_DEBUG -DDEBUG_SAFESTACK -ggdb3 -O2 -pipe::(unknown)::::::", ++"debug-ben-debug-64", "gcc:$gcc_devteam_warn -DBN_DEBUG -DCONF_DEBUG -DDEBUG_SAFESTACK -DDEBUG_UNUSED -g3 -O3 -pipe::${BSDthreads}:::SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL:${x86_64_asm}:elf:dlfcn:bsd-gcc-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)", + "debug-ben-debug-noopt", "gcc:$gcc_devteam_warn -DBN_DEBUG -DREF_CHECK -DCONF_DEBUG -DDEBUG_SAFESTACK -ggdb3 -pipe::(unknown)::::::", + "debug-ben-strict", "gcc:-DBN_DEBUG -DREF_CHECK -DCONF_DEBUG -DBN_CTX_DEBUG -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG -DCONST_STRICT -O2 -Wall -Wshadow -Werror -Wpointer-arith -Wcast-qual -Wwrite-strings -pipe::(unknown)::::::", + "debug-rse","cc:-DTERMIOS -DL_ENDIAN -pipe -O -g -ggdb3 -Wall::(unknown):::BN_LLONG ${x86_gcc_des} ${x86_gcc_opts}:${x86_elf_asm}", +@@ -172,10 +173,10 @@ my %table=( + "debug-steve-opt", "gcc:$gcc_devteam_warn -m64 -O3 -DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -DCONF_DEBUG -DDEBUG_SAFESTACK -g -DMD32_REG_T=int::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL:${x86_64_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC:-m64:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)", + "debug-steve", "gcc:-DL_ENDIAN -DREF_CHECK -DCONF_DEBUG -DDEBUG_SAFESTACK -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG_ALL -DPEDANTIC -m32 -g -pedantic -Wno-long-long -Wall -Werror -Wshadow -pipe::-D_REENTRANT::-rdynamic -ldl:BN_LLONG ${x86_gcc_des} ${x86_gcc_opts}:${x86_elf_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared", + "debug-steve-linux-pseudo64", "gcc:-DL_ENDIAN -DREF_CHECK -DCONF_DEBUG -DBN_CTX_DEBUG -DDEBUG_SAFESTACK -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG_ALL -DOPENSSL_NO_ASM -g -mcpu=i486 -Wall -Werror -Wshadow -pipe::-D_REENTRANT::-rdynamic -ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT:${no_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared", +-"debug-levitte-linux-elf","gcc:-DLEVITTE_DEBUG -DREF_CHECK -DCONF_DEBUG -DBN_DEBUG -DBN_DEBUG_RAND -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG -DENGINE_CONF_DEBUG -DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -D_POSIX_SOURCE -DPEDANTIC -ggdb -g3 -mcpu=i486 -pedantic -ansi -Wall -Wshadow -Wcast-align -Wstrict-prototypes -Wmissing-prototypes -Wno-long-long -Wundef -Wconversion -pipe::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:BN_LLONG ${x86_gcc_des} ${x86_gcc_opts}:${x86_elf_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)", +-"debug-levitte-linux-noasm","gcc:-DLEVITTE_DEBUG -DREF_CHECK -DCONF_DEBUG -DBN_DEBUG -DBN_DEBUG_RAND -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG -DENGINE_CONF_DEBUG -DOPENSSL_NO_ASM -DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -D_POSIX_SOURCE -DPEDANTIC -ggdb -g3 -mcpu=i486 -pedantic -ansi -Wall -Wshadow -Wcast-align -Wstrict-prototypes -Wmissing-prototypes -Wno-long-long -Wundef -Wconversion -pipe::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:BN_LLONG ${x86_gcc_des} ${x86_gcc_opts}:${no_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)", +-"debug-levitte-linux-elf-extreme","gcc:-DLEVITTE_DEBUG -DREF_CHECK -DCONF_DEBUG -DBN_DEBUG -DBN_DEBUG_RAND -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG -DENGINE_CONF_DEBUG -DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -D_POSIX_SOURCE -DPEDANTIC -ggdb -g3 -mcpu=i486 -pedantic -ansi -Wall -W -Wundef -Wshadow -Wcast-align -Wstrict-prototypes -Wmissing-prototypes -Wno-long-long -Wundef -Wconversion -pipe::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:BN_LLONG ${x86_gcc_des} ${x86_gcc_opts}:${x86_elf_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)", +-"debug-levitte-linux-noasm-extreme","gcc:-DLEVITTE_DEBUG -DREF_CHECK -DCONF_DEBUG -DBN_DEBUG -DBN_DEBUG_RAND -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG -DENGINE_CONF_DEBUG -DOPENSSL_NO_ASM -DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -D_POSIX_SOURCE -DPEDANTIC -ggdb -g3 -mcpu=i486 -pedantic -ansi -Wall -W -Wundef -Wshadow -Wcast-align -Wstrict-prototypes -Wmissing-prototypes -Wno-long-long -Wundef -Wconversion -pipe::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:BN_LLONG ${x86_gcc_des} ${x86_gcc_opts}:${no_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)", ++"debug-levitte-linux-elf","gcc:-DLEVITTE_DEBUG -DBN_DEBUG -DREF_CHECK -DCONF_DEBUG -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG -DL_ENDIAN -ggdb -g3 -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:BN_LLONG ${x86_gcc_des} ${x86_gcc_opts}:${x86_elf_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)", ++"debug-levitte-linux-noasm","gcc:-DLEVITTE_DEBUG -DBN_DEBUG -DREF_CHECK -DCONF_DEBUG -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG -DOPENSSL_NO_ASM -DL_ENDIAN -ggdb -g3 -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:BN_LLONG ${x86_gcc_des} ${x86_gcc_opts}:${no_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)", ++"debug-levitte-linux-elf-extreme","gcc:-DLEVITTE_DEBUG -DREF_CHECK -DCONF_DEBUG -DBN_DEBUG -DBN_DEBUG_RAND -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG -DENGINE_CONF_DEBUG -DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -DPEDANTIC -ggdb -g3 -pedantic -ansi -Wall -W -Wundef -Wshadow -Wcast-align -Wstrict-prototypes -Wmissing-prototypes -Wno-long-long -Wundef -Wconversion -pipe::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:BN_LLONG ${x86_gcc_des} ${x86_gcc_opts}:${x86_elf_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)", ++"debug-levitte-linux-noasm-extreme","gcc:-DLEVITTE_DEBUG -DREF_CHECK -DCONF_DEBUG -DBN_DEBUG -DBN_DEBUG_RAND -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG -DENGINE_CONF_DEBUG -DOPENSSL_NO_ASM -DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -DPEDANTIC -ggdb -g3 -pedantic -ansi -Wall -W -Wundef -Wshadow -Wcast-align -Wstrict-prototypes -Wmissing-prototypes -Wno-long-long -Wundef -Wconversion -pipe::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:BN_LLONG ${x86_gcc_des} ${x86_gcc_opts}:${no_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)", + "debug-geoff","gcc:-DBN_DEBUG -DBN_DEBUG_RAND -DBN_STRICT -DPURIFY -DOPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED -DOPENSSL_NO_ASM -DOPENSSL_NO_INLINE_ASM -DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -DPEDANTIC -O1 -ggdb2 -Wall -Werror -Wundef -pedantic -Wshadow -Wpointer-arith -Wbad-function-cast -Wcast-align -Wsign-compare -Wmissing-prototypes -Wmissing-declarations -Wno-long-long::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:BN_LLONG ${x86_gcc_des} ${x86_gcc_opts}:${no_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)", + "debug-linux-pentium","gcc:-DBN_DEBUG -DREF_CHECK -DCONF_DEBUG -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG -DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -g -mcpu=pentium -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:BN_LLONG ${x86_gcc_des} ${x86_gcc_opts}:${x86_elf_asm}:dlfcn", + "debug-linux-ppro","gcc:-DBN_DEBUG -DREF_CHECK -DCONF_DEBUG -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG -DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -g -mcpu=pentiumpro -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:BN_LLONG ${x86_gcc_des} ${x86_gcc_opts}:${x86_elf_asm}:dlfcn", +@@ -371,6 +372,9 @@ my %table=( + "linux-alpha-ccc","ccc:-fast -readonly_strings -DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO::-D_REENTRANT:::SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_PTR DES_RISC1 DES_UNROLL:${no_asm}", + "linux-alpha+bwx-ccc","ccc:-fast -readonly_strings -DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO::-D_REENTRANT:::SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_PTR DES_RISC1 DES_UNROLL:${no_asm}", + ++# Android: Linux but without -DTERMIO and pointers to headers and libs. ++"android","gcc:-mandroid -I\$(ANDROID_DEV)/include -B\$(ANDROID_DEV)/lib -O3 -fomit-frame-pointer -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:BN_LLONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL BF_PTR:${no_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)", ++ + #### *BSD [do see comment about ${BSDthreads} above!] + "BSD-generic32","gcc:-DTERMIOS -O3 -fomit-frame-pointer -Wall::${BSDthreads}:::BN_LLONG RC2_CHAR RC4_INDEX DES_INT DES_UNROLL:${no_asm}:dlfcn:bsd-gcc-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)", + "BSD-x86", "gcc:-DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIOS -O3 -fomit-frame-pointer -Wall::${BSDthreads}:::BN_LLONG ${x86_gcc_des} ${x86_gcc_opts}:${x86_out_asm}:dlfcn:bsd-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)", +@@ -425,8 +429,8 @@ my %table=( + "aix64-gcc","gcc:-maix64 -O -DB_ENDIAN::-pthread:AIX::SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHAR::aix_ppc64.o::::::::::dlfcn:aix-shared::-maix64 -shared -Wl,-G:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)::-X64", + # Below targets assume AIX 5. Idea is to effectively disregard $OBJECT_MODE + # at build time. $OBJECT_MODE is respected at ./config stage! +-"aix-cc", "cc:-q32 -O -DB_ENDIAN -qmaxmem=16384 -qro -qroconst::-qthreaded:AIX::BN_LLONG RC4_CHAR::aix_ppc32.o::::::::::dlfcn:aix-shared::-q32 -G:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)::-X 32", +-"aix64-cc", "cc:-q64 -O -DB_ENDIAN -qmaxmem=16384 -qro -qroconst::-qthreaded:AIX::SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHAR::aix_ppc64.o::::::::::dlfcn:aix-shared::-q64 -G:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)::-X 64", ++"aix-cc", "cc:-q32 -O -DB_ENDIAN -qmaxmem=16384 -qro -qroconst::-qthreaded -D_THREAD_SAFE:AIX::BN_LLONG RC4_CHAR::aix_ppc32.o::::::::::dlfcn:aix-shared::-q32 -G:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)::-X 32", ++"aix64-cc", "cc:-q64 -O -DB_ENDIAN -qmaxmem=16384 -qro -qroconst::-qthreaded -D_THREAD_SAFE:AIX::SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHAR::aix_ppc64.o::::::::::dlfcn:aix-shared::-q64 -G:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)::-X 64", + + # + # Cray T90 and similar (SDSC) +Index: crypto/openssl/FAQ +=================================================================== +--- crypto/openssl/FAQ (revision 248771) ++++ crypto/openssl/FAQ (working copy) +@@ -10,6 +10,7 @@ OpenSSL - Frequently Asked Questions + * Why aren't tools like 'autoconf' and 'libtool' used? + * What is an 'engine' version? + * How do I check the authenticity of the OpenSSL distribution? ++* How does the versioning scheme work? + + [LEGAL] Legal questions + +@@ -82,7 +83,7 @@ OpenSSL - Frequently Asked Questions + * Which is the current version of OpenSSL? + + The current version is available from . +-OpenSSL 1.0.0c was released on Dec 2nd, 2010. ++OpenSSL 1.0.1d was released on Feb 5th, 2013. + + In addition to the current stable release, you can also access daily + snapshots of the OpenSSL development version at . Note that the online documents refer + to the very latest development versions of OpenSSL and may include features + not present in released versions. If in doubt refer to the documentation +-that came with the version of OpenSSL you are using. ++that came with the version of OpenSSL you are using. The pod format ++documentation is included in each OpenSSL distribution under the docs ++directory. + + For information on parts of libcrypto that are not yet documented, you + might want to read Ariel Glenn's documentation on SSLeay 0.9, OpenSSL's +@@ -173,6 +176,19 @@ just do: + + pgp TARBALL.asc + ++* How does the versioning scheme work? ++ ++After the release of OpenSSL 1.0.0 the versioning scheme changed. Letter ++releases (e.g. 1.0.1a) can only contain bug and security fixes and no ++new features. Minor releases change the last number (e.g. 1.0.2) and ++can contain new features that retain binary compatibility. Changes to ++the middle number are considered major releases and neither source nor ++binary compatibility is guaranteed. ++ ++Therefore the answer to the common question "when will feature X be ++backported to OpenSSL 1.0.0/0.9.8?" is "never" but it could appear ++in the next minor release. ++ + [LEGAL] ======================================================================= + + * Do I need patent licenses to use OpenSSL? +@@ -284,7 +300,7 @@ current directory in this case, but this has chang + Check out the CA.pl(1) manual page. This provides a simple wrapper round + the 'req', 'verify', 'ca' and 'pkcs12' utilities. For finer control check + out the manual pages for the individual utilities and the certificate +-extensions documentation (currently in doc/openssl.txt). ++extensions documentation (in ca(1), req(1), x509v3_config(5) ) + + + * Why can't I create certificate requests? +Index: crypto/openssl/LICENSE +=================================================================== +--- crypto/openssl/LICENSE (revision 248771) ++++ crypto/openssl/LICENSE (working copy) +@@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ + --------------- + + /* ==================================================================== +- * Copyright (c) 1998-2008 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. ++ * Copyright (c) 1998-2011 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions +Index: crypto/openssl/Makefile +=================================================================== +--- crypto/openssl/Makefile (revision 248771) ++++ crypto/openssl/Makefile (working copy) +@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ + ## Makefile for OpenSSL + ## + +-VERSION=0.9.8q ++VERSION=0.9.8y + MAJOR=0 + MINOR=9.8 + SHLIB_VERSION_NUMBER=0.9.8 +Index: crypto/openssl/NEWS +=================================================================== +--- crypto/openssl/NEWS (revision 248771) ++++ crypto/openssl/NEWS (working copy) +@@ -5,6 +5,45 @@ + This file gives a brief overview of the major changes between each OpenSSL + release. For more details please read the CHANGES file. + ++ Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8x and OpenSSL 0.9.8y: ++ ++ o Fix for SSL/TLS/DTLS CBC plaintext recovery attack CVE-2013-0169 ++ o Fix OCSP bad key DoS attack CVE-2013-0166 ++ ++ Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8w and OpenSSL 0.9.8x: ++ ++ o Fix DTLS record length checking bug CVE-2012-2333 ++ ++ Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8v and OpenSSL 0.9.8w: ++ ++ o Fix for CVE-2012-2131 (corrected fix for 0.9.8 and CVE-2012-2110) ++ ++ Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8u and OpenSSL 0.9.8v: ++ ++ o Fix for ASN1 overflow bug CVE-2012-2110 ++ ++ Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8t and OpenSSL 0.9.8u: ++ ++ o Fix for CMS/PKCS#7 MMA CVE-2012-0884 ++ o Corrected fix for CVE-2011-4619 ++ o Various DTLS fixes. ++ ++ Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8s and OpenSSL 0.9.8t: ++ ++ o Fix for DTLS DoS issue CVE-2012-0050 ++ ++ Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8r and OpenSSL 0.9.8s: ++ ++ o Fix for DTLS plaintext recovery attack CVE-2011-4108 ++ o Fix policy check double free error CVE-2011-4109 ++ o Clear block padding bytes of SSL 3.0 records CVE-2011-4576 ++ o Only allow one SGC handshake restart for SSL/TLS CVE-2011-4619 ++ o Check for malformed RFC3779 data CVE-2011-4577 ++ ++ Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8q and OpenSSL 0.9.8r: ++ ++ o Fix for security issue CVE-2011-0014 ++ + Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8p and OpenSSL 0.9.8q: + + o Fix for security issue CVE-2010-4180 +@@ -181,6 +220,11 @@ + o Added initial support for Win64. + o Added alternate pkg-config files. + ++ Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.7l and OpenSSL 0.9.7m: ++ ++ o FIPS 1.1.1 module linking. ++ o Various ciphersuite selection fixes. ++ + Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.7k and OpenSSL 0.9.7l: + + o Introduce limits to prevent malicious key DoS (CVE-2006-2940) +Index: crypto/openssl/README +=================================================================== +--- crypto/openssl/README (revision 248771) ++++ crypto/openssl/README (working copy) +@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ + +- OpenSSL 0.9.8q 2 Dec 2010 ++ OpenSSL 0.9.8y 5 Feb 2013 + +- Copyright (c) 1998-2009 The OpenSSL Project ++ Copyright (c) 1998-2011 The OpenSSL Project + Copyright (c) 1995-1998 Eric A. Young, Tim J. Hudson + All rights reserved. + +Index: crypto/openssl/apps/apps.c +=================================================================== +--- crypto/openssl/apps/apps.c (revision 248771) ++++ crypto/openssl/apps/apps.c (working copy) +@@ -2052,7 +2052,7 @@ X509_NAME *parse_name(char *subject, long chtype, + X509_NAME *n = NULL; + int nid; + +- if (!buf || !ne_types || !ne_values) ++ if (!buf || !ne_types || !ne_values || !mval) + { + BIO_printf(bio_err, "malloc error\n"); + goto error; +@@ -2156,6 +2156,7 @@ X509_NAME *parse_name(char *subject, long chtype, + OPENSSL_free(ne_values); + OPENSSL_free(ne_types); + OPENSSL_free(buf); ++ OPENSSL_free(mval); + return n; + + error: +@@ -2164,6 +2165,8 @@ error: + OPENSSL_free(ne_values); + if (ne_types) + OPENSSL_free(ne_types); ++ if (mval) ++ OPENSSL_free(mval); + if (buf) + OPENSSL_free(buf); + return NULL; +Index: crypto/openssl/apps/asn1pars.c +=================================================================== +--- crypto/openssl/apps/asn1pars.c (revision 248771) ++++ crypto/openssl/apps/asn1pars.c (working copy) +@@ -408,6 +408,7 @@ static int do_generate(BIO *bio, char *genstr, cha + + atyp = ASN1_generate_nconf(genstr, cnf); + NCONF_free(cnf); ++ cnf = NULL; + + if (!atyp) + return -1; +Index: crypto/openssl/apps/cms.c +=================================================================== +--- crypto/openssl/apps/cms.c (revision 248771) ++++ crypto/openssl/apps/cms.c (working copy) +@@ -226,6 +226,8 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char **argv) + else if (!strcmp(*args,"-camellia256")) + cipher = EVP_camellia_256_cbc(); + #endif ++ else if (!strcmp (*args, "-debug_decrypt")) ++ flags |= CMS_DEBUG_DECRYPT; + else if (!strcmp (*args, "-text")) + flags |= CMS_TEXT; + else if (!strcmp (*args, "-nointern")) +@@ -611,7 +613,7 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char **argv) + BIO_printf (bio_err, "-certsout file certificate output file\n"); + BIO_printf (bio_err, "-signer file signer certificate file\n"); + BIO_printf (bio_err, "-recip file recipient certificate file for decryption\n"); +- BIO_printf (bio_err, "-skeyid use subject key identifier\n"); ++ BIO_printf (bio_err, "-keyid use subject key identifier\n"); + BIO_printf (bio_err, "-in file input file\n"); + BIO_printf (bio_err, "-inform arg input format SMIME (default), PEM or DER\n"); + BIO_printf (bio_err, "-inkey file input private key (if not signer or recipient)\n"); +@@ -1013,6 +1015,8 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char **argv) + ret = 4; + if (operation == SMIME_DECRYPT) + { ++ if (flags & CMS_DEBUG_DECRYPT) ++ CMS_decrypt(cms, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, flags); + + if (secret_key) + { +Index: crypto/openssl/apps/dhparam.c +=================================================================== +--- crypto/openssl/apps/dhparam.c (revision 248771) ++++ crypto/openssl/apps/dhparam.c (working copy) +@@ -332,7 +332,6 @@ bad: + BIO_printf(bio_err,"This is going to take a long time\n"); + if(!dh || !DH_generate_parameters_ex(dh, num, g, &cb)) + { +- if(dh) DH_free(dh); + ERR_print_errors(bio_err); + goto end; + } +Index: crypto/openssl/apps/openssl.cnf +=================================================================== +--- crypto/openssl/apps/openssl.cnf (revision 248771) ++++ crypto/openssl/apps/openssl.cnf (working copy) +@@ -142,7 +142,7 @@ localityName = Locality Name (eg, city) + organizationalUnitName = Organizational Unit Name (eg, section) + #organizationalUnitName_default = + +-commonName = Common Name (eg, YOUR name) ++commonName = Common Name (e.g. server FQDN or YOUR name) + commonName_max = 64 + + emailAddress = Email Address +Index: crypto/openssl/apps/pkcs12.c +=================================================================== +--- crypto/openssl/apps/pkcs12.c (revision 248771) ++++ crypto/openssl/apps/pkcs12.c (working copy) +@@ -659,7 +659,7 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char **argv) + + if (!twopass) BUF_strlcpy(macpass, pass, sizeof macpass); + +- if (options & INFO) BIO_printf (bio_err, "MAC Iteration %ld\n", p12->mac->iter ? ASN1_INTEGER_get (p12->mac->iter) : 1); ++ if ((options & INFO) && p12->mac) BIO_printf (bio_err, "MAC Iteration %ld\n", p12->mac->iter ? ASN1_INTEGER_get (p12->mac->iter) : 1); + if(macver) { + #ifdef CRYPTO_MDEBUG + CRYPTO_push_info("verify MAC"); +Index: crypto/openssl/apps/s_client.c +=================================================================== +--- crypto/openssl/apps/s_client.c (revision 248771) ++++ crypto/openssl/apps/s_client.c (working copy) +@@ -345,13 +345,7 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char **argv) + char *jpake_secret = NULL; + #endif + +-#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_SSL2) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_SSL3) + meth=SSLv23_client_method(); +-#elif !defined(OPENSSL_NO_SSL3) +- meth=SSLv3_client_method(); +-#elif !defined(OPENSSL_NO_SSL2) +- meth=SSLv2_client_method(); +-#endif + + apps_startup(); + c_Pause=0; +Index: crypto/openssl/apps/s_server.c +=================================================================== +--- crypto/openssl/apps/s_server.c (revision 248771) ++++ crypto/openssl/apps/s_server.c (working copy) +@@ -781,13 +781,7 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char *argv[]) + tlsextctx tlsextcbp = {NULL, NULL, SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING}; + #endif + +-#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_SSL2) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_SSL3) + meth=SSLv23_server_method(); +-#elif !defined(OPENSSL_NO_SSL3) +- meth=SSLv3_server_method(); +-#elif !defined(OPENSSL_NO_SSL2) +- meth=SSLv2_server_method(); +-#endif + + local_argc=argc; + local_argv=argv; +@@ -1556,6 +1550,12 @@ end: + if (dpass) + OPENSSL_free(dpass); + #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT ++ if (tlscstatp.host) ++ OPENSSL_free(tlscstatp.host); ++ if (tlscstatp.port) ++ OPENSSL_free(tlscstatp.port); ++ if (tlscstatp.path) ++ OPENSSL_free(tlscstatp.path); + if (ctx2 != NULL) SSL_CTX_free(ctx2); + if (s_cert2) + X509_free(s_cert2); +Index: crypto/openssl/apps/x509.c +=================================================================== +--- crypto/openssl/apps/x509.c (revision 248771) ++++ crypto/openssl/apps/x509.c (working copy) +@@ -969,7 +969,7 @@ bad: + else + { + pk=load_key(bio_err, +- keyfile, FORMAT_PEM, 0, ++ keyfile, keyformat, 0, + passin, e, "request key"); + if (pk == NULL) goto end; + } +Index: crypto/openssl/config +=================================================================== +--- crypto/openssl/config (revision 248771) ++++ crypto/openssl/config (working copy) +@@ -790,6 +790,10 @@ esac + # options="$options -DATALLA" + #fi + ++($CC -Wa,--help -c -o /dev/null -x assembler /dev/null 2>&1 | \ ++ grep \\--noexecstack) 2>&1 > /dev/null && \ ++ options="$options -Wa,--noexecstack" ++ + # gcc < 2.8 does not support -march=ultrasparc + if [ "$OUT" = solaris-sparcv9-gcc -a $GCCVER -lt 28 ] + then +Index: crypto/openssl/crypto/asn1/a_object.c +=================================================================== +--- crypto/openssl/crypto/asn1/a_object.c (revision 248771) ++++ crypto/openssl/crypto/asn1/a_object.c (working copy) +@@ -139,7 +139,7 @@ int a2d_ASN1_OBJECT(unsigned char *out, int olen, + ASN1err(ASN1_F_A2D_ASN1_OBJECT,ASN1_R_INVALID_DIGIT); + goto err; + } +- if (!use_bn && l > (ULONG_MAX / 10L)) ++ if (!use_bn && l >= ((ULONG_MAX - 80) / 10L)) + { + use_bn = 1; + if (!bl) +@@ -294,7 +294,7 @@ ASN1_OBJECT *c2i_ASN1_OBJECT(ASN1_OBJECT **a, cons + /* Sanity check OID encoding: can't have leading 0x80 in + * subidentifiers, see: X.690 8.19.2 + */ +- for (i = 0, p = *pp + 1; i < len - 1; i++, p++) ++ for (i = 0, p = *pp; i < len; i++, p++) + { + if (*p == 0x80 && (!i || !(p[-1] & 0x80))) + { +Index: crypto/openssl/crypto/asn1/a_strex.c +=================================================================== +--- crypto/openssl/crypto/asn1/a_strex.c (revision 248771) ++++ crypto/openssl/crypto/asn1/a_strex.c (working copy) +@@ -74,7 +74,12 @@ + + #define CHARTYPE_BS_ESC (ASN1_STRFLGS_ESC_2253 | CHARTYPE_FIRST_ESC_2253 | CHARTYPE_LAST_ESC_2253) + ++#define ESC_FLAGS (ASN1_STRFLGS_ESC_2253 | \ ++ ASN1_STRFLGS_ESC_QUOTE | \ ++ ASN1_STRFLGS_ESC_CTRL | \ ++ ASN1_STRFLGS_ESC_MSB) + ++ + /* Three IO functions for sending data to memory, a BIO and + * and a FILE pointer. + */ +@@ -148,6 +153,13 @@ static int do_esc_char(unsigned long c, unsigned c + if(!io_ch(arg, tmphex, 3)) return -1; + return 3; + } ++ /* If we get this far and do any escaping at all must escape ++ * the escape character itself: backslash. ++ */ ++ if (chtmp == '\\' && flags & ESC_FLAGS) { ++ if(!io_ch(arg, "\\\\", 2)) return -1; ++ return 2; ++ } + if(!io_ch(arg, &chtmp, 1)) return -1; + return 1; + } +@@ -292,11 +304,6 @@ static const signed char tag2nbyte[] = { + 4, -1, 2 /* 28-30 */ + }; + +-#define ESC_FLAGS (ASN1_STRFLGS_ESC_2253 | \ +- ASN1_STRFLGS_ESC_QUOTE | \ +- ASN1_STRFLGS_ESC_CTRL | \ +- ASN1_STRFLGS_ESC_MSB) +- + /* This is the main function, print out an + * ASN1_STRING taking note of various escape + * and display options. Returns number of +@@ -560,6 +567,7 @@ int ASN1_STRING_to_UTF8(unsigned char **out, ASN1_ + if(mbflag == -1) return -1; + mbflag |= MBSTRING_FLAG; + stmp.data = NULL; ++ stmp.length = 0; + ret = ASN1_mbstring_copy(&str, in->data, in->length, mbflag, B_ASN1_UTF8STRING); + if(ret < 0) return ret; + *out = stmp.data; +Index: crypto/openssl/crypto/asn1/a_strnid.c +=================================================================== +--- crypto/openssl/crypto/asn1/a_strnid.c (revision 248771) ++++ crypto/openssl/crypto/asn1/a_strnid.c (working copy) +@@ -96,7 +96,7 @@ unsigned long ASN1_STRING_get_default_mask(void) + * default: the default value, Printable, T61, BMP. + */ + +-int ASN1_STRING_set_default_mask_asc(char *p) ++int ASN1_STRING_set_default_mask_asc(const char *p) + { + unsigned long mask; + char *end; +Index: crypto/openssl/crypto/asn1/a_verify.c +=================================================================== +--- crypto/openssl/crypto/asn1/a_verify.c (revision 248771) ++++ crypto/openssl/crypto/asn1/a_verify.c (working copy) +@@ -138,6 +138,12 @@ int ASN1_item_verify(const ASN1_ITEM *it, X509_ALG + unsigned char *buf_in=NULL; + int ret= -1,i,inl; + ++ if (!pkey) ++ { ++ ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_VERIFY, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER); ++ return -1; ++ } ++ + EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ctx); + i=OBJ_obj2nid(a->algorithm); + type=EVP_get_digestbyname(OBJ_nid2sn(i)); +Index: crypto/openssl/crypto/asn1/asn1.h +=================================================================== +--- crypto/openssl/crypto/asn1/asn1.h (revision 248771) ++++ crypto/openssl/crypto/asn1/asn1.h (working copy) +@@ -1051,7 +1051,7 @@ ASN1_STRING *ASN1_pack_string(void *obj, i2d_of_vo + ASN1_STRING *ASN1_item_pack(void *obj, const ASN1_ITEM *it, ASN1_OCTET_STRING **oct); + + void ASN1_STRING_set_default_mask(unsigned long mask); +-int ASN1_STRING_set_default_mask_asc(char *p); ++int ASN1_STRING_set_default_mask_asc(const char *p); + unsigned long ASN1_STRING_get_default_mask(void); + int ASN1_mbstring_copy(ASN1_STRING **out, const unsigned char *in, int len, + int inform, unsigned long mask); +Index: crypto/openssl/crypto/asn1/asn_mime.c +=================================================================== +--- crypto/openssl/crypto/asn1/asn_mime.c (revision 248771) ++++ crypto/openssl/crypto/asn1/asn_mime.c (working copy) +@@ -418,9 +418,9 @@ ASN1_VALUE *SMIME_read_ASN1(BIO *bio, BIO **bcont, + + if(strcmp(hdr->value, "application/x-pkcs7-signature") && + strcmp(hdr->value, "application/pkcs7-signature")) { +- sk_MIME_HEADER_pop_free(headers, mime_hdr_free); + ASN1err(ASN1_F_SMIME_READ_ASN1,ASN1_R_SIG_INVALID_MIME_TYPE); + ERR_add_error_data(2, "type: ", hdr->value); ++ sk_MIME_HEADER_pop_free(headers, mime_hdr_free); + sk_BIO_pop_free(parts, BIO_vfree); + return NULL; + } +@@ -790,12 +790,17 @@ static int mime_hdr_addparam(MIME_HEADER *mhdr, ch + static int mime_hdr_cmp(const MIME_HEADER * const *a, + const MIME_HEADER * const *b) + { ++ if (!(*a)->name || !(*b)->name) ++ return !!(*a)->name - !!(*b)->name; ++ + return(strcmp((*a)->name, (*b)->name)); + } + + static int mime_param_cmp(const MIME_PARAM * const *a, + const MIME_PARAM * const *b) + { ++ if (!(*a)->param_name || !(*b)->param_name) ++ return !!(*a)->param_name - !!(*b)->param_name; + return(strcmp((*a)->param_name, (*b)->param_name)); + } + +Index: crypto/openssl/crypto/asn1/x_name.c +=================================================================== +--- crypto/openssl/crypto/asn1/x_name.c (revision 248771) ++++ crypto/openssl/crypto/asn1/x_name.c (working copy) +@@ -196,7 +196,9 @@ static int x509_name_ex_d2i(ASN1_VALUE **val, cons + *val = nm.a; + *in = p; + return ret; +- err: ++err: ++ if (nm.x != NULL) ++ X509_NAME_free(nm.x); + ASN1err(ASN1_F_X509_NAME_EX_D2I, ERR_R_NESTED_ASN1_ERROR); + return 0; + } +Index: crypto/openssl/crypto/asn1/x_pubkey.c +=================================================================== +--- crypto/openssl/crypto/asn1/x_pubkey.c (revision 248771) ++++ crypto/openssl/crypto/asn1/x_pubkey.c (working copy) +@@ -367,7 +367,19 @@ EVP_PKEY *X509_PUBKEY_get(X509_PUBKEY *key) + goto err; + } + +- key->pkey = ret; ++ /* Check to see if another thread set key->pkey first */ ++ CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_EVP_PKEY); ++ if (key->pkey) ++ { ++ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_EVP_PKEY); ++ EVP_PKEY_free(ret); ++ ret = key->pkey; ++ } ++ else ++ { ++ key->pkey = ret; ++ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_EVP_PKEY); ++ } + CRYPTO_add(&ret->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_EVP_PKEY); + return(ret); + err: +Index: crypto/openssl/crypto/bio/bf_buff.c +=================================================================== +--- crypto/openssl/crypto/bio/bf_buff.c (revision 248771) ++++ crypto/openssl/crypto/bio/bf_buff.c (working copy) +@@ -209,7 +209,7 @@ start: + /* add to buffer and return */ + if (i >= inl) + { +- memcpy(&(ctx->obuf[ctx->obuf_len]),in,inl); ++ memcpy(&(ctx->obuf[ctx->obuf_off+ctx->obuf_len]),in,inl); + ctx->obuf_len+=inl; + return(num+inl); + } +@@ -219,7 +219,7 @@ start: + { + if (i > 0) /* lets fill it up if we can */ + { +- memcpy(&(ctx->obuf[ctx->obuf_len]),in,i); ++ memcpy(&(ctx->obuf[ctx->obuf_off+ctx->obuf_len]),in,i); + in+=i; + inl-=i; + num+=i; +@@ -294,9 +294,9 @@ static long buffer_ctrl(BIO *b, int cmd, long num, + case BIO_C_GET_BUFF_NUM_LINES: + ret=0; + p1=ctx->ibuf; +- for (i=ctx->ibuf_off; iibuf_len; i++) ++ for (i=0; iibuf_len; i++) + { +- if (p1[i] == '\n') ret++; ++ if (p1[ctx->ibuf_off + i] == '\n') ret++; + } + break; + case BIO_CTRL_WPENDING: +@@ -399,17 +399,18 @@ static long buffer_ctrl(BIO *b, int cmd, long num, + for (;;) + { + BIO_clear_retry_flags(b); +- if (ctx->obuf_len > ctx->obuf_off) ++ if (ctx->obuf_len > 0) + { + r=BIO_write(b->next_bio, + &(ctx->obuf[ctx->obuf_off]), +- ctx->obuf_len-ctx->obuf_off); ++ ctx->obuf_len); + #if 0 +-fprintf(stderr,"FLUSH [%3d] %3d -> %3d\n",ctx->obuf_off,ctx->obuf_len-ctx->obuf_off,r); ++fprintf(stderr,"FLUSH [%3d] %3d -> %3d\n",ctx->obuf_off,ctx->obuf_len,r); + #endif + BIO_copy_next_retry(b); + if (r <= 0) return((long)r); + ctx->obuf_off+=r; ++ ctx->obuf_len-=r; + } + else + { +Index: crypto/openssl/crypto/bio/bio.h +=================================================================== +--- crypto/openssl/crypto/bio/bio.h (revision 248771) ++++ crypto/openssl/crypto/bio/bio.h (working copy) +@@ -145,6 +145,7 @@ extern "C" { + /* #endif */ + + #define BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_QUERY_MTU 40 /* as kernel for current MTU */ ++#define BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_GET_FALLBACK_MTU 47 + #define BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_GET_MTU 41 /* get cached value for MTU */ + #define BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SET_MTU 42 /* set cached value for + * MTU. want to use this +@@ -321,6 +322,15 @@ DECLARE_STACK_OF(BIO) + + typedef struct bio_f_buffer_ctx_struct + { ++ /* Buffers are setup like this: ++ * ++ * <---------------------- size -----------------------> ++ * +---------------------------------------------------+ ++ * | consumed | remaining | free space | ++ * +---------------------------------------------------+ ++ * <-- off --><------- len -------> ++ */ ++ + /* BIO *bio; */ /* this is now in the BIO struct */ + int ibuf_size; /* how big is the input buffer */ + int obuf_size; /* how big is the output buffer */ +Index: crypto/openssl/crypto/bio/bss_dgram.c +=================================================================== +--- crypto/openssl/crypto/bio/bss_dgram.c (revision 248771) ++++ crypto/openssl/crypto/bio/bss_dgram.c (working copy) +@@ -57,7 +57,6 @@ + * + */ + +-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DGRAM + + #include + #include +@@ -65,6 +64,7 @@ + #include "cryptlib.h" + + #include ++#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DGRAM + + #if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32) || defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VMS) + #include +@@ -288,7 +288,6 @@ static int dgram_read(BIO *b, char *out, int outl) + */ + dgram_adjust_rcv_timeout(b); + ret=recvfrom(b->num,out,outl,0,&peer,(void *)&peerlen); +- dgram_reset_rcv_timeout(b); + + if ( ! data->connected && ret >= 0) + BIO_ctrl(b, BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SET_PEER, 0, &peer); +@@ -302,6 +301,8 @@ static int dgram_read(BIO *b, char *out, int outl) + data->_errno = get_last_socket_error(); + } + } ++ ++ dgram_reset_rcv_timeout(b); + } + return(ret); + } +@@ -493,6 +494,9 @@ static long dgram_ctrl(BIO *b, int cmd, long num, + ret = 0; + #endif + break; ++ case BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_GET_FALLBACK_MTU: ++ ret = 576 - 20 - 8; ++ break; + case BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_GET_MTU: + return data->mtu; + break; +@@ -654,9 +658,13 @@ static int BIO_dgram_should_retry(int i) + { + err=get_last_socket_error(); + +-#if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WINDOWS) && 0 /* more microsoft stupidity? perhaps not? Ben 4/1/99 */ +- if ((i == -1) && (err == 0)) +- return(1); ++#if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WINDOWS) ++ /* If the socket return value (i) is -1 ++ * and err is unexpectedly 0 at this point, ++ * the error code was overwritten by ++ * another system call before this error ++ * handling is called. ++ */ + #endif + + return(BIO_dgram_non_fatal_error(err)); +@@ -719,7 +727,6 @@ int BIO_dgram_non_fatal_error(int err) + } + return(0); + } +-#endif + + static void get_current_time(struct timeval *t) + { +@@ -737,3 +744,5 @@ static void get_current_time(struct timeval *t) + gettimeofday(t, NULL); + #endif + } ++ ++#endif +Index: crypto/openssl/crypto/bn/asm/mo-586.pl +=================================================================== +--- crypto/openssl/crypto/bn/asm/mo-586.pl (revision 248771) ++++ crypto/openssl/crypto/bn/asm/mo-586.pl (working copy) +@@ -539,8 +539,10 @@ $sbit=$num; + &jle (&label("sqradd")); + + &mov ($carry,"edx"); +- &lea ("edx",&DWP(0,$sbit,"edx",2)); ++ &add ("edx","edx"); + &shr ($carry,31); ++ &add ("edx",$sbit); ++ &adc ($carry,0); + &set_label("sqrlast"); + &mov ($word,$_n0); + &mov ($inp,$_np); +Index: crypto/openssl/crypto/bn/asm/ppc.pl +=================================================================== +--- crypto/openssl/crypto/bn/asm/ppc.pl (revision 248771) ++++ crypto/openssl/crypto/bn/asm/ppc.pl (working copy) +@@ -1039,7 +1039,7 @@ sub data { + addze r11,r0 + #mul_add_c(a[3],b[2],c3,c1,c2); + $LD r6,`3*$BNSZ`(r4) +- $LD r7,`2*$BNSZ`(r4) ++ $LD r7,`2*$BNSZ`(r5) + $UMULL r8,r6,r7 + $UMULH r9,r6,r7 + addc r12,r8,r12 +Index: crypto/openssl/crypto/bn/bn_blind.c +=================================================================== +--- crypto/openssl/crypto/bn/bn_blind.c (revision 248771) ++++ crypto/openssl/crypto/bn/bn_blind.c (working copy) +@@ -123,7 +123,7 @@ struct bn_blinding_st + BIGNUM *mod; /* just a reference */ + unsigned long thread_id; /* added in OpenSSL 0.9.6j and 0.9.7b; + * used only by crypto/rsa/rsa_eay.c, rsa_lib.c */ +- unsigned int counter; ++ int counter; + unsigned long flags; + BN_MONT_CTX *m_ctx; + int (*bn_mod_exp)(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p, +@@ -157,7 +157,10 @@ BN_BLINDING *BN_BLINDING_new(const BIGNUM *A, cons + if (BN_get_flags(mod, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME) != 0) + BN_set_flags(ret->mod, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); + +- ret->counter = BN_BLINDING_COUNTER; ++ /* Set the counter to the special value -1 ++ * to indicate that this is never-used fresh blinding ++ * that does not need updating before first use. */ ++ ret->counter = -1; + return(ret); + err: + if (ret != NULL) BN_BLINDING_free(ret); +@@ -186,7 +189,10 @@ int BN_BLINDING_update(BN_BLINDING *b, BN_CTX *ctx + goto err; + } + +- if (--(b->counter) == 0 && b->e != NULL && ++ if (b->counter == -1) ++ b->counter = 0; ++ ++ if (++b->counter == BN_BLINDING_COUNTER && b->e != NULL && + !(b->flags & BN_BLINDING_NO_RECREATE)) + { + /* re-create blinding parameters */ +@@ -201,8 +207,8 @@ int BN_BLINDING_update(BN_BLINDING *b, BN_CTX *ctx + + ret=1; + err: +- if (b->counter == 0) +- b->counter = BN_BLINDING_COUNTER; ++ if (b->counter == BN_BLINDING_COUNTER) ++ b->counter = 0; + return(ret); + } + +@@ -223,6 +229,12 @@ int BN_BLINDING_convert_ex(BIGNUM *n, BIGNUM *r, B + return(0); + } + ++ if (b->counter == -1) ++ /* Fresh blinding, doesn't need updating. */ ++ b->counter = 0; ++ else if (!BN_BLINDING_update(b,ctx)) ++ return(0); ++ + if (r != NULL) + { + if (!BN_copy(r, b->Ai)) ret=0; +@@ -243,22 +255,19 @@ int BN_BLINDING_invert_ex(BIGNUM *n, const BIGNUM + int ret; + + bn_check_top(n); +- if ((b->A == NULL) || (b->Ai == NULL)) +- { +- BNerr(BN_F_BN_BLINDING_INVERT_EX,BN_R_NOT_INITIALIZED); +- return(0); +- } + + if (r != NULL) + ret = BN_mod_mul(n, n, r, b->mod, ctx); + else +- ret = BN_mod_mul(n, n, b->Ai, b->mod, ctx); +- +- if (ret >= 0) + { +- if (!BN_BLINDING_update(b,ctx)) ++ if (b->Ai == NULL) ++ { ++ BNerr(BN_F_BN_BLINDING_INVERT_EX,BN_R_NOT_INITIALIZED); + return(0); ++ } ++ ret = BN_mod_mul(n, n, b->Ai, b->mod, ctx); + } ++ + bn_check_top(n); + return(ret); + } +Index: crypto/openssl/crypto/bn/bn_gf2m.c +=================================================================== +--- crypto/openssl/crypto/bn/bn_gf2m.c (revision 248771) ++++ crypto/openssl/crypto/bn/bn_gf2m.c (working copy) +@@ -607,6 +607,7 @@ int BN_GF2m_mod_inv(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, co + { + while (!BN_is_odd(u)) + { ++ if (BN_is_zero(u)) goto err; + if (!BN_rshift1(u, u)) goto err; + if (BN_is_odd(b)) + { +Index: crypto/openssl/crypto/bn/bn_word.c +=================================================================== +--- crypto/openssl/crypto/bn/bn_word.c (revision 248771) ++++ crypto/openssl/crypto/bn/bn_word.c (working copy) +@@ -144,26 +144,17 @@ int BN_add_word(BIGNUM *a, BN_ULONG w) + a->neg=!(a->neg); + return(i); + } +- /* Only expand (and risk failing) if it's possibly necessary */ +- if (((BN_ULONG)(a->d[a->top - 1] + 1) == 0) && +- (bn_wexpand(a,a->top+1) == NULL)) +- return(0); +- i=0; +- for (;;) ++ for (i=0;w!=0 && itop;i++) + { +- if (i >= a->top) +- l=w; +- else +- l=(a->d[i]+w)&BN_MASK2; +- a->d[i]=l; +- if (w > l) +- w=1; +- else +- break; +- i++; ++ a->d[i] = l = (a->d[i]+w)&BN_MASK2; ++ w = (w>l)?1:0; + } +- if (i >= a->top) ++ if (w && i==a->top) ++ { ++ if (bn_wexpand(a,a->top+1) == NULL) return 0; + a->top++; ++ a->d[i]=w; ++ } + bn_check_top(a); + return(1); + } +Index: crypto/openssl/crypto/cms/cms.h +=================================================================== +--- crypto/openssl/crypto/cms/cms.h (revision 248771) ++++ crypto/openssl/crypto/cms/cms.h (working copy) +@@ -110,6 +110,7 @@ DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS_const(CMS_ReceiptRequest) + #define CMS_PARTIAL 0x4000 + #define CMS_REUSE_DIGEST 0x8000 + #define CMS_USE_KEYID 0x10000 ++#define CMS_DEBUG_DECRYPT 0x20000 + + const ASN1_OBJECT *CMS_get0_type(CMS_ContentInfo *cms); + +Index: crypto/openssl/crypto/cms/cms_enc.c +=================================================================== +--- crypto/openssl/crypto/cms/cms_enc.c (revision 248771) ++++ crypto/openssl/crypto/cms/cms_enc.c (working copy) +@@ -73,6 +73,8 @@ BIO *cms_EncryptedContent_init_bio(CMS_EncryptedCo + const EVP_CIPHER *ciph; + X509_ALGOR *calg = ec->contentEncryptionAlgorithm; + unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH], *piv = NULL; ++ unsigned char *tkey = NULL; ++ size_t tkeylen; + + int ok = 0; + +@@ -137,32 +139,57 @@ BIO *cms_EncryptedContent_init_bio(CMS_EncryptedCo + CMS_R_CIPHER_PARAMETER_INITIALISATION_ERROR); + goto err; + } +- +- +- if (enc && !ec->key) ++ tkeylen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx); ++ /* Generate random session key */ ++ if (!enc || !ec->key) + { +- /* Generate random key */ +- if (!ec->keylen) +- ec->keylen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx); +- ec->key = OPENSSL_malloc(ec->keylen); +- if (!ec->key) ++ tkey = OPENSSL_malloc(tkeylen); ++ if (!tkey) + { + CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_ENCRYPTEDCONTENT_INIT_BIO, + ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + goto err; + } +- if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_rand_key(ctx, ec->key) <= 0) ++ if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_rand_key(ctx, tkey) <= 0) + goto err; +- keep_key = 1; + } +- else if (ec->keylen != (unsigned int)EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx)) ++ ++ if (!ec->key) + { ++ ec->key = tkey; ++ ec->keylen = tkeylen; ++ tkey = NULL; ++ if (enc) ++ keep_key = 1; ++ else ++ ERR_clear_error(); ++ ++ } ++ ++ if (ec->keylen != tkeylen) ++ { + /* If necessary set key length */ + if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_key_length(ctx, ec->keylen) <= 0) + { +- CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_ENCRYPTEDCONTENT_INIT_BIO, +- CMS_R_INVALID_KEY_LENGTH); +- goto err; ++ /* Only reveal failure if debugging so we don't ++ * leak information which may be useful in MMA. ++ */ ++ if (enc || ec->debug) ++ { ++ CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_ENCRYPTEDCONTENT_INIT_BIO, ++ CMS_R_INVALID_KEY_LENGTH); ++ goto err; ++ } ++ else ++ { ++ /* Use random key */ ++ OPENSSL_cleanse(ec->key, ec->keylen); ++ OPENSSL_free(ec->key); ++ ec->key = tkey; ++ ec->keylen = tkeylen; ++ tkey = NULL; ++ ERR_clear_error(); ++ } + } + } + +@@ -198,6 +225,11 @@ BIO *cms_EncryptedContent_init_bio(CMS_EncryptedCo + OPENSSL_free(ec->key); + ec->key = NULL; + } ++ if (tkey) ++ { ++ OPENSSL_cleanse(tkey, tkeylen); ++ OPENSSL_free(tkey); ++ } + if (ok) + return b; + BIO_free(b); +Index: crypto/openssl/crypto/cms/cms_env.c +=================================================================== +--- crypto/openssl/crypto/cms/cms_env.c (revision 248771) ++++ crypto/openssl/crypto/cms/cms_env.c (working copy) +@@ -352,6 +352,8 @@ static int cms_RecipientInfo_ktri_decrypt(CMS_Cont + unsigned char *ek = NULL; + int eklen; + int ret = 0; ++ CMS_EncryptedContentInfo *ec; ++ ec = cms->d.envelopedData->encryptedContentInfo; + + if (ktri->pkey == NULL) + { +@@ -382,9 +384,15 @@ static int cms_RecipientInfo_ktri_decrypt(CMS_Cont + + ret = 1; + +- cms->d.envelopedData->encryptedContentInfo->key = ek; +- cms->d.envelopedData->encryptedContentInfo->keylen = eklen; ++ if (ec->key) ++ { ++ OPENSSL_cleanse(ec->key, ec->keylen); ++ OPENSSL_free(ec->key); ++ } + ++ ec->key = ek; ++ ec->keylen = eklen; ++ + err: + if (!ret && ek) + OPENSSL_free(ek); +Index: crypto/openssl/crypto/cms/cms_io.c +=================================================================== +--- crypto/openssl/crypto/cms/cms_io.c (revision 248771) ++++ crypto/openssl/crypto/cms/cms_io.c (working copy) +@@ -112,7 +112,7 @@ static int cms_output_data(BIO *out, BIO *data, AS + cmsbio = tmpbio; + } + +- return 1; ++ return r; + + } + +Index: crypto/openssl/crypto/cms/cms_lcl.h +=================================================================== +--- crypto/openssl/crypto/cms/cms_lcl.h (revision 248771) ++++ crypto/openssl/crypto/cms/cms_lcl.h (working copy) +@@ -175,6 +175,8 @@ struct CMS_EncryptedContentInfo_st + const EVP_CIPHER *cipher; + unsigned char *key; + size_t keylen; ++ /* Set to 1 if we are debugging decrypt and don't fake keys for MMA */ ++ int debug; + }; + + struct CMS_RecipientInfo_st +Index: crypto/openssl/crypto/cms/cms_smime.c +=================================================================== +--- crypto/openssl/crypto/cms/cms_smime.c (revision 248771) ++++ crypto/openssl/crypto/cms/cms_smime.c (working copy) +@@ -622,7 +622,10 @@ int CMS_decrypt_set1_pkey(CMS_ContentInfo *cms, EV + STACK_OF(CMS_RecipientInfo) *ris; + CMS_RecipientInfo *ri; + int i, r; ++ int debug = 0; + ris = CMS_get0_RecipientInfos(cms); ++ if (ris) ++ debug = cms->d.envelopedData->encryptedContentInfo->debug; + for (i = 0; i < sk_CMS_RecipientInfo_num(ris); i++) + { + ri = sk_CMS_RecipientInfo_value(ris, i); +@@ -636,17 +639,38 @@ int CMS_decrypt_set1_pkey(CMS_ContentInfo *cms, EV + CMS_RecipientInfo_set0_pkey(ri, pk); + r = CMS_RecipientInfo_decrypt(cms, ri); + CMS_RecipientInfo_set0_pkey(ri, NULL); +- if (r > 0) +- return 1; + if (cert) + { ++ /* If not debugging clear any error and ++ * return success to avoid leaking of ++ * information useful to MMA ++ */ ++ if (!debug) ++ { ++ ERR_clear_error(); ++ return 1; ++ } ++ if (r > 0) ++ return 1; + CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_DECRYPT_SET1_PKEY, + CMS_R_DECRYPT_ERROR); + return 0; + } +- ERR_clear_error(); ++ /* If no cert and not debugging don't leave loop ++ * after first successful decrypt. Always attempt ++ * to decrypt all recipients to avoid leaking timing ++ * of a successful decrypt. ++ */ ++ else if (r > 0 && debug) ++ return 1; + } + } ++ /* If no cert and not debugging always return success */ ++ if (!cert && !debug) ++ { ++ ERR_clear_error(); ++ return 1; ++ } + + CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_DECRYPT_SET1_PKEY, CMS_R_NO_MATCHING_RECIPIENT); + return 0; +@@ -705,9 +729,14 @@ int CMS_decrypt(CMS_ContentInfo *cms, EVP_PKEY *pk + } + if (!dcont && !check_content(cms)) + return 0; ++ if (flags & CMS_DEBUG_DECRYPT) ++ cms->d.envelopedData->encryptedContentInfo->debug = 1; ++ else ++ cms->d.envelopedData->encryptedContentInfo->debug = 0; ++ if (!pk && !cert && !dcont && !out) ++ return 1; + if (pk && !CMS_decrypt_set1_pkey(cms, pk, cert)) + return 0; +- + cont = CMS_dataInit(cms, dcont); + if (!cont) + return 0; +Index: crypto/openssl/crypto/comp/c_rle.c +=================================================================== +--- crypto/openssl/crypto/comp/c_rle.c (revision 248771) ++++ crypto/openssl/crypto/comp/c_rle.c (working copy) +@@ -46,7 +46,7 @@ static int rle_expand_block(COMP_CTX *ctx, unsigne + { + int i; + +- if (olen < (ilen-1)) ++ if (ilen == 0 || olen < (ilen-1)) + { + /* ZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZ */ + return(-1); +@@ -59,4 +59,3 @@ static int rle_expand_block(COMP_CTX *ctx, unsigne + } + return(ilen-1); + } +- +Index: crypto/openssl/crypto/conf/conf_api.c +=================================================================== +--- crypto/openssl/crypto/conf/conf_api.c (revision 248771) ++++ crypto/openssl/crypto/conf/conf_api.c (working copy) +@@ -64,6 +64,7 @@ + #endif + + #include ++#include + #include + #include + #include +Index: crypto/openssl/crypto/cryptlib.c +=================================================================== +--- crypto/openssl/crypto/cryptlib.c (revision 248771) ++++ crypto/openssl/crypto/cryptlib.c (working copy) +@@ -396,7 +396,6 @@ BOOL WINAPI DllMain(HINSTANCE hinstDLL, DWORD fdwR + case DLL_THREAD_ATTACH: + break; + case DLL_THREAD_DETACH: +- ERR_remove_state(0); + break; + case DLL_PROCESS_DETACH: + break; +@@ -543,3 +542,19 @@ void OpenSSLDie(const char *file,int line,const ch + } + + void *OPENSSL_stderr(void) { return stderr; } ++ ++#ifndef OPENSSL_FIPS ++ ++int CRYPTO_memcmp(const void *in_a, const void *in_b, size_t len) ++ { ++ size_t i; ++ const unsigned char *a = in_a; ++ const unsigned char *b = in_b; ++ unsigned char x = 0; ++ ++ for (i = 0; i < len; i++) ++ x |= a[i] ^ b[i]; ++ ++ return x; ++ } ++#endif +Index: crypto/openssl/crypto/crypto.h +=================================================================== +--- crypto/openssl/crypto/crypto.h (revision 248771) ++++ crypto/openssl/crypto/crypto.h (working copy) +@@ -588,15 +588,22 @@ int OPENSSL_isservice(void); + + #endif /* def OPENSSL_FIPS */ + ++#define OPENSSL_HAVE_INIT 1 ++void OPENSSL_init(void); ++ ++/* CRYPTO_memcmp returns zero iff the |len| bytes at |a| and |b| are equal. It ++ * takes an amount of time dependent on |len|, but independent of the contents ++ * of |a| and |b|. Unlike memcmp, it cannot be used to put elements into a ++ * defined order as the return value when a != b is undefined, other than to be ++ * non-zero. */ ++int CRYPTO_memcmp(const void *a, const void *b, size_t len); ++ + /* BEGIN ERROR CODES */ + /* The following lines are auto generated by the script mkerr.pl. Any changes + * made after this point may be overwritten when the script is next run. + */ + void ERR_load_CRYPTO_strings(void); + +-#define OPENSSL_HAVE_INIT 1 +-void OPENSSL_init(void); +- + /* Error codes for the CRYPTO functions. */ + + /* Function codes. */ +Index: crypto/openssl/crypto/ec/ec2_smpl.c +=================================================================== +--- crypto/openssl/crypto/ec/ec2_smpl.c (revision 248771) ++++ crypto/openssl/crypto/ec/ec2_smpl.c (working copy) +@@ -821,7 +821,7 @@ int ec_GF2m_simple_is_on_curve(const EC_GROUP *gro + field_sqr = group->meth->field_sqr; + + /* only support affine coordinates */ +- if (!point->Z_is_one) goto err; ++ if (!point->Z_is_one) return -1; + + if (ctx == NULL) + { +@@ -871,6 +871,9 @@ int ec_GF2m_simple_cmp(const EC_GROUP *group, cons + { + return EC_POINT_is_at_infinity(group, b) ? 0 : 1; + } ++ ++ if (EC_POINT_is_at_infinity(group, b)) ++ return 1; + + if (a->Z_is_one && b->Z_is_one) + { +Index: crypto/openssl/crypto/ec/ec_key.c +=================================================================== +--- crypto/openssl/crypto/ec/ec_key.c (revision 248771) ++++ crypto/openssl/crypto/ec/ec_key.c (working copy) +@@ -304,7 +304,13 @@ int EC_KEY_check_key(const EC_KEY *eckey) + ECerr(EC_F_EC_KEY_CHECK_KEY, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER); + return 0; + } +- ++ ++ if (EC_POINT_is_at_infinity(eckey->group, eckey->pub_key)) ++ { ++ ECerr(EC_F_EC_KEY_CHECK_KEY, EC_R_POINT_AT_INFINITY); ++ goto err; ++ } ++ + if ((ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) + goto err; + if ((point = EC_POINT_new(eckey->group)) == NULL) +Index: crypto/openssl/crypto/ec/ecp_smpl.c +=================================================================== +--- crypto/openssl/crypto/ec/ecp_smpl.c (revision 248771) ++++ crypto/openssl/crypto/ec/ecp_smpl.c (working copy) +@@ -1406,6 +1406,9 @@ int ec_GFp_simple_cmp(const EC_GROUP *group, const + { + return EC_POINT_is_at_infinity(group, b) ? 0 : 1; + } ++ ++ if (EC_POINT_is_at_infinity(group, b)) ++ return 1; + + if (a->Z_is_one && b->Z_is_one) + { +Index: crypto/openssl/crypto/ecdsa/ecdsatest.c +=================================================================== +--- crypto/openssl/crypto/ecdsa/ecdsatest.c (revision 248771) ++++ crypto/openssl/crypto/ecdsa/ecdsatest.c (working copy) +@@ -168,10 +168,9 @@ int fbytes(unsigned char *buf, int num) + return 0; + } + fbytes_counter ++; +- ret = BN_bn2bin(tmp, buf); +- if (ret == 0 || ret != num) ++ if (num != BN_num_bytes(tmp) || !BN_bn2bin(tmp, buf)) + ret = 0; +- else ++ else + ret = 1; + if (tmp) + BN_free(tmp); +@@ -287,9 +286,13 @@ int test_builtin(BIO *out) + size_t crv_len = 0, n = 0; + EC_KEY *eckey = NULL, *wrong_eckey = NULL; + EC_GROUP *group; ++ ECDSA_SIG *ecdsa_sig = NULL; + unsigned char digest[20], wrong_digest[20]; +- unsigned char *signature = NULL; +- unsigned int sig_len; ++ unsigned char *signature = NULL; ++ const unsigned char *sig_ptr; ++ unsigned char *sig_ptr2; ++ unsigned char *raw_buf = NULL; ++ unsigned int sig_len, degree, r_len, s_len, bn_len, buf_len; + int nid, ret = 0; + + /* fill digest values with some random data */ +@@ -339,7 +342,8 @@ int test_builtin(BIO *out) + if (EC_KEY_set_group(eckey, group) == 0) + goto builtin_err; + EC_GROUP_free(group); +- if (EC_GROUP_get_degree(EC_KEY_get0_group(eckey)) < 160) ++ degree = EC_GROUP_get_degree(EC_KEY_get0_group(eckey)); ++ if (degree < 160) + /* drop the curve */ + { + EC_KEY_free(eckey); +@@ -415,26 +419,89 @@ int test_builtin(BIO *out) + } + BIO_printf(out, "."); + (void)BIO_flush(out); +- /* modify a single byte of the signature */ +- offset = signature[10] % sig_len; +- dirt = signature[11]; +- signature[offset] ^= dirt ? dirt : 1; ++ /* wrong length */ ++ if (ECDSA_verify(0, digest, 20, signature, sig_len - 1, ++ eckey) == 1) ++ { ++ BIO_printf(out, " failed\n"); ++ goto builtin_err; ++ } ++ BIO_printf(out, "."); ++ (void)BIO_flush(out); ++ ++ /* Modify a single byte of the signature: to ensure we don't ++ * garble the ASN1 structure, we read the raw signature and ++ * modify a byte in one of the bignums directly. */ ++ sig_ptr = signature; ++ if ((ecdsa_sig = d2i_ECDSA_SIG(NULL, &sig_ptr, sig_len)) == NULL) ++ { ++ BIO_printf(out, " failed\n"); ++ goto builtin_err; ++ } ++ ++ /* Store the two BIGNUMs in raw_buf. */ ++ r_len = BN_num_bytes(ecdsa_sig->r); ++ s_len = BN_num_bytes(ecdsa_sig->s); ++ bn_len = (degree + 7) / 8; ++ if ((r_len > bn_len) || (s_len > bn_len)) ++ { ++ BIO_printf(out, " failed\n"); ++ goto builtin_err; ++ } ++ buf_len = 2 * bn_len; ++ if ((raw_buf = OPENSSL_malloc(buf_len)) == NULL) ++ goto builtin_err; ++ /* Pad the bignums with leading zeroes. */ ++ memset(raw_buf, 0, buf_len); ++ BN_bn2bin(ecdsa_sig->r, raw_buf + bn_len - r_len); ++ BN_bn2bin(ecdsa_sig->s, raw_buf + buf_len - s_len); ++ ++ /* Modify a single byte in the buffer. */ ++ offset = raw_buf[10] % buf_len; ++ dirt = raw_buf[11] ? raw_buf[11] : 1; ++ raw_buf[offset] ^= dirt; ++ /* Now read the BIGNUMs back in from raw_buf. */ ++ if ((BN_bin2bn(raw_buf, bn_len, ecdsa_sig->r) == NULL) || ++ (BN_bin2bn(raw_buf + bn_len, bn_len, ecdsa_sig->s) == NULL)) ++ goto builtin_err; ++ ++ sig_ptr2 = signature; ++ sig_len = i2d_ECDSA_SIG(ecdsa_sig, &sig_ptr2); + if (ECDSA_verify(0, digest, 20, signature, sig_len, eckey) == 1) + { + BIO_printf(out, " failed\n"); + goto builtin_err; + } ++ /* Sanity check: undo the modification and verify signature. */ ++ raw_buf[offset] ^= dirt; ++ if ((BN_bin2bn(raw_buf, bn_len, ecdsa_sig->r) == NULL) || ++ (BN_bin2bn(raw_buf + bn_len, bn_len, ecdsa_sig->s) == NULL)) ++ goto builtin_err; ++ ++ sig_ptr2 = signature; ++ sig_len = i2d_ECDSA_SIG(ecdsa_sig, &sig_ptr2); ++ if (ECDSA_verify(0, digest, 20, signature, sig_len, eckey) != 1) ++ { ++ BIO_printf(out, " failed\n"); ++ goto builtin_err; ++ } + BIO_printf(out, "."); + (void)BIO_flush(out); + + BIO_printf(out, " ok\n"); + /* cleanup */ ++ /* clean bogus errors */ ++ ERR_clear_error(); + OPENSSL_free(signature); + signature = NULL; + EC_KEY_free(eckey); + eckey = NULL; + EC_KEY_free(wrong_eckey); + wrong_eckey = NULL; ++ ECDSA_SIG_free(ecdsa_sig); ++ ecdsa_sig = NULL; ++ OPENSSL_free(raw_buf); ++ raw_buf = NULL; + } + + ret = 1; +@@ -443,8 +510,12 @@ builtin_err: + EC_KEY_free(eckey); + if (wrong_eckey) + EC_KEY_free(wrong_eckey); ++ if (ecdsa_sig) ++ ECDSA_SIG_free(ecdsa_sig); + if (signature) + OPENSSL_free(signature); ++ if (raw_buf) ++ OPENSSL_free(raw_buf); + if (curves) + OPENSSL_free(curves); + +Index: crypto/openssl/crypto/ecdsa/ecs_ossl.c +=================================================================== +--- crypto/openssl/crypto/ecdsa/ecs_ossl.c (revision 248771) ++++ crypto/openssl/crypto/ecdsa/ecs_ossl.c (working copy) +@@ -144,6 +144,14 @@ static int ecdsa_sign_setup(EC_KEY *eckey, BN_CTX + } + while (BN_is_zero(k)); + ++ /* We do not want timing information to leak the length of k, ++ * so we compute G*k using an equivalent scalar of fixed ++ * bit-length. */ ++ ++ if (!BN_add(k, k, order)) goto err; ++ if (BN_num_bits(k) <= BN_num_bits(order)) ++ if (!BN_add(k, k, order)) goto err; ++ + /* compute r the x-coordinate of generator * k */ + if (!EC_POINT_mul(group, tmp_point, k, NULL, NULL, ctx)) + { +Index: crypto/openssl/crypto/evp/evp_test.c +=================================================================== +--- crypto/openssl/crypto/evp/evp_test.c (revision 248771) ++++ crypto/openssl/crypto/evp/evp_test.c (working copy) +@@ -435,6 +435,7 @@ int main(int argc,char **argv) + EXIT(3); + } + } ++ fclose(f); + + #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE + ENGINE_cleanup(); +Index: crypto/openssl/crypto/o_init.c +=================================================================== +--- crypto/openssl/crypto/o_init.c (revision 248771) ++++ crypto/openssl/crypto/o_init.c (working copy) +@@ -93,4 +93,18 @@ void OPENSSL_init(void) + #endif + } + ++#ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS + ++int CRYPTO_memcmp(const void *in_a, const void *in_b, size_t len) ++ { ++ size_t i; ++ const unsigned char *a = in_a; ++ const unsigned char *b = in_b; ++ unsigned char x = 0; ++ ++ for (i = 0; i < len; i++) ++ x |= a[i] ^ b[i]; ++ ++ return x; ++ } ++#endif +Index: crypto/openssl/crypto/ocsp/ocsp_lib.c +=================================================================== +--- crypto/openssl/crypto/ocsp/ocsp_lib.c (revision 248771) ++++ crypto/openssl/crypto/ocsp/ocsp_lib.c (working copy) +@@ -169,14 +169,14 @@ int OCSP_parse_url(char *url, char **phost, char * + + char *host, *port; + ++ *phost = NULL; ++ *pport = NULL; ++ *ppath = NULL; ++ + /* dup the buffer since we are going to mess with it */ + buf = BUF_strdup(url); + if (!buf) goto mem_err; + +- *phost = NULL; +- *pport = NULL; +- *ppath = NULL; +- + /* Check for initial colon */ + p = strchr(buf, ':'); + +Index: crypto/openssl/crypto/ocsp/ocsp_vfy.c +=================================================================== +--- crypto/openssl/crypto/ocsp/ocsp_vfy.c (revision 248771) ++++ crypto/openssl/crypto/ocsp/ocsp_vfy.c (working copy) +@@ -91,10 +91,13 @@ int OCSP_basic_verify(OCSP_BASICRESP *bs, STACK_OF + { + EVP_PKEY *skey; + skey = X509_get_pubkey(signer); +- ret = OCSP_BASICRESP_verify(bs, skey, 0); +- EVP_PKEY_free(skey); +- if(ret <= 0) ++ if (skey) + { ++ ret = OCSP_BASICRESP_verify(bs, skey, 0); ++ EVP_PKEY_free(skey); ++ } ++ if(!skey || ret <= 0) ++ { + OCSPerr(OCSP_F_OCSP_BASIC_VERIFY, OCSP_R_SIGNATURE_FAILURE); + goto end; + } +@@ -108,6 +111,7 @@ int OCSP_basic_verify(OCSP_BASICRESP *bs, STACK_OF + init_res = X509_STORE_CTX_init(&ctx, st, signer, bs->certs); + if(!init_res) + { ++ ret = -1; + OCSPerr(OCSP_F_OCSP_BASIC_VERIFY,ERR_R_X509_LIB); + goto end; + } +Index: crypto/openssl/crypto/opensslv.h +=================================================================== +--- crypto/openssl/crypto/opensslv.h (revision 248771) ++++ crypto/openssl/crypto/opensslv.h (working copy) +@@ -25,11 +25,11 @@ + * (Prior to 0.9.5a beta1, a different scheme was used: MMNNFFRBB for + * major minor fix final patch/beta) + */ +-#define OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER 0x0090811f ++#define OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER 0x0090819fL + #ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS +-#define OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT "OpenSSL 0.9.8q-fips 2 Dec 2010" ++#define OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT "OpenSSL 0.9.8y-fips 5 Feb 2013" + #else +-#define OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT "OpenSSL 0.9.8q 2 Dec 2010" ++#define OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT "OpenSSL 0.9.8y 5 Feb 2013" + #endif + #define OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT " part of " OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT + +@@ -83,7 +83,7 @@ + * should only keep the versions that are binary compatible with the current. + */ + #define SHLIB_VERSION_HISTORY "" +-#define SHLIB_VERSION_NUMBER "0.9.8" ++#define SHLIB_VERSION_NUMBER "6" + + + #endif /* HEADER_OPENSSLV_H */ +Index: crypto/openssl/crypto/perlasm/cbc.pl +=================================================================== +--- crypto/openssl/crypto/perlasm/cbc.pl (revision 248771) ++++ crypto/openssl/crypto/perlasm/cbc.pl (working copy) +@@ -158,7 +158,6 @@ sub cbc + &jmp_ptr($count); + + &set_label("ej7"); +- &xor("edx", "edx") if $ppro; # ppro friendly + &movb(&HB("edx"), &BP(6,$in,"",0)); + &shl("edx",8); + &set_label("ej6"); +@@ -170,7 +169,6 @@ sub cbc + &jmp(&label("ejend")); + &set_label("ej3"); + &movb(&HB("ecx"), &BP(2,$in,"",0)); +- &xor("ecx", "ecx") if $ppro; # ppro friendly + &shl("ecx",8); + &set_label("ej2"); + &movb(&HB("ecx"), &BP(1,$in,"",0)); +Index: crypto/openssl/crypto/pkcs7/pk7_smime.c +=================================================================== +--- crypto/openssl/crypto/pkcs7/pk7_smime.c (revision 248771) ++++ crypto/openssl/crypto/pkcs7/pk7_smime.c (working copy) +@@ -486,15 +486,34 @@ int PKCS7_decrypt(PKCS7 *p7, EVP_PKEY *pkey, X509 + return 0; + } + ret = SMIME_text(bread, data); ++ if (ret > 0 && BIO_method_type(tmpmem) == BIO_TYPE_CIPHER) ++ { ++ if (!BIO_get_cipher_status(tmpmem)) ++ ret = 0; ++ } + BIO_free_all(bread); + return ret; + } else { + for(;;) { + i = BIO_read(tmpmem, buf, sizeof(buf)); +- if(i <= 0) break; +- BIO_write(data, buf, i); ++ if(i <= 0) ++ { ++ ret = 1; ++ if (BIO_method_type(tmpmem) == BIO_TYPE_CIPHER) ++ { ++ if (!BIO_get_cipher_status(tmpmem)) ++ ret = 0; ++ } ++ ++ break; ++ } ++ if (BIO_write(data, buf, i) != i) ++ { ++ ret = 0; ++ break; ++ } + } + BIO_free_all(tmpmem); +- return 1; ++ return ret; + } + } +Index: crypto/openssl/crypto/rc4/asm/rc4-x86_64.pl +=================================================================== +--- crypto/openssl/crypto/rc4/asm/rc4-x86_64.pl (revision 248771) ++++ crypto/openssl/crypto/rc4/asm/rc4-x86_64.pl (working copy) +@@ -167,7 +167,7 @@ $code.=<<___; + movzb ($dat,$XX[0]),$TX[0]#d + test \$-8,$len + jz .Lcloop1 +- cmp \$0,260($dat) ++ cmpl \$0,260($dat) + jnz .Lcloop1 + push %rbx + jmp .Lcloop8 +Index: crypto/openssl/crypto/rc4/rc4_skey.c +=================================================================== +--- crypto/openssl/crypto/rc4/rc4_skey.c (revision 248771) ++++ crypto/openssl/crypto/rc4/rc4_skey.c (working copy) +@@ -138,9 +138,9 @@ void RC4_set_key(RC4_KEY *key, int len, const unsi + */ + #ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS + unsigned long *ia32cap_ptr = OPENSSL_ia32cap_loc(); +- if (ia32cap_ptr && (*ia32cap_ptr & (1<<28))) { ++ if (ia32cap_ptr && (*ia32cap_ptr & (1<<20))) { + #else +- if (OPENSSL_ia32cap_P & (1<<28)) { ++ if (OPENSSL_ia32cap_P & (1<<20)) { + #endif + unsigned char *cp=(unsigned char *)d; + +Index: crypto/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_eay.c +=================================================================== +--- crypto/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_eay.c (revision 248771) ++++ crypto/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_eay.c (working copy) +@@ -312,51 +312,56 @@ static BN_BLINDING *rsa_get_blinding(RSA *rsa, int + return ret; + } + +-static int rsa_blinding_convert(BN_BLINDING *b, int local, BIGNUM *f, +- BIGNUM *r, BN_CTX *ctx) +-{ +- if (local) ++static int rsa_blinding_convert(BN_BLINDING *b, BIGNUM *f, BIGNUM *unblind, ++ BN_CTX *ctx) ++ { ++ if (unblind == NULL) ++ /* Local blinding: store the unblinding factor ++ * in BN_BLINDING. */ + return BN_BLINDING_convert_ex(f, NULL, b, ctx); + else + { ++ /* Shared blinding: store the unblinding factor ++ * outside BN_BLINDING. */ + int ret; +- CRYPTO_r_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA_BLINDING); +- ret = BN_BLINDING_convert_ex(f, r, b, ctx); +- CRYPTO_r_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA_BLINDING); +- return ret; +- } +-} +- +-static int rsa_blinding_invert(BN_BLINDING *b, int local, BIGNUM *f, +- BIGNUM *r, BN_CTX *ctx) +-{ +- if (local) +- return BN_BLINDING_invert_ex(f, NULL, b, ctx); +- else +- { +- int ret; + CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA_BLINDING); +- ret = BN_BLINDING_invert_ex(f, r, b, ctx); ++ ret = BN_BLINDING_convert_ex(f, unblind, b, ctx); + CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA_BLINDING); + return ret; + } +-} ++ } + ++static int rsa_blinding_invert(BN_BLINDING *b, BIGNUM *f, BIGNUM *unblind, ++ BN_CTX *ctx) ++ { ++ /* For local blinding, unblind is set to NULL, and BN_BLINDING_invert_ex ++ * will use the unblinding factor stored in BN_BLINDING. ++ * If BN_BLINDING is shared between threads, unblind must be non-null: ++ * BN_BLINDING_invert_ex will then use the local unblinding factor, ++ * and will only read the modulus from BN_BLINDING. ++ * In both cases it's safe to access the blinding without a lock. ++ */ ++ return BN_BLINDING_invert_ex(f, unblind, b, ctx); ++ } ++ + /* signing */ + static int RSA_eay_private_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from, + unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding) + { +- BIGNUM *f, *ret, *br, *res; ++ BIGNUM *f, *ret, *res; + int i,j,k,num=0,r= -1; + unsigned char *buf=NULL; + BN_CTX *ctx=NULL; + int local_blinding = 0; ++ /* Used only if the blinding structure is shared. A non-NULL unblind ++ * instructs rsa_blinding_convert() and rsa_blinding_invert() to store ++ * the unblinding factor outside the blinding structure. */ ++ BIGNUM *unblind = NULL; + BN_BLINDING *blinding = NULL; + + if ((ctx=BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) goto err; + BN_CTX_start(ctx); + f = BN_CTX_get(ctx); +- br = BN_CTX_get(ctx); + ret = BN_CTX_get(ctx); + num = BN_num_bytes(rsa->n); + buf = OPENSSL_malloc(num); +@@ -404,8 +409,15 @@ static int RSA_eay_private_encrypt(int flen, const + } + + if (blinding != NULL) +- if (!rsa_blinding_convert(blinding, local_blinding, f, br, ctx)) ++ { ++ if (!local_blinding && ((unblind = BN_CTX_get(ctx)) == NULL)) ++ { ++ RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_ENCRYPT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + goto err; ++ } ++ if (!rsa_blinding_convert(blinding, f, unblind, ctx)) ++ goto err; ++ } + + if ( (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_EXT_PKEY) || + ((rsa->p != NULL) && +@@ -439,7 +451,7 @@ static int RSA_eay_private_encrypt(int flen, const + } + + if (blinding) +- if (!rsa_blinding_invert(blinding, local_blinding, ret, br, ctx)) ++ if (!rsa_blinding_invert(blinding, ret, unblind, ctx)) + goto err; + + if (padding == RSA_X931_PADDING) +@@ -478,18 +490,21 @@ err: + static int RSA_eay_private_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from, + unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding) + { +- BIGNUM *f, *ret, *br; ++ BIGNUM *f, *ret; + int j,num=0,r= -1; + unsigned char *p; + unsigned char *buf=NULL; + BN_CTX *ctx=NULL; + int local_blinding = 0; ++ /* Used only if the blinding structure is shared. A non-NULL unblind ++ * instructs rsa_blinding_convert() and rsa_blinding_invert() to store ++ * the unblinding factor outside the blinding structure. */ ++ BIGNUM *unblind = NULL; + BN_BLINDING *blinding = NULL; + + if((ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) goto err; + BN_CTX_start(ctx); + f = BN_CTX_get(ctx); +- br = BN_CTX_get(ctx); + ret = BN_CTX_get(ctx); + num = BN_num_bytes(rsa->n); + buf = OPENSSL_malloc(num); +@@ -527,8 +542,15 @@ static int RSA_eay_private_decrypt(int flen, const + } + + if (blinding != NULL) +- if (!rsa_blinding_convert(blinding, local_blinding, f, br, ctx)) ++ { ++ if (!local_blinding && ((unblind = BN_CTX_get(ctx)) == NULL)) ++ { ++ RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_DECRYPT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + goto err; ++ } ++ if (!rsa_blinding_convert(blinding, f, unblind, ctx)) ++ goto err; ++ } + + /* do the decrypt */ + if ( (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_EXT_PKEY) || +@@ -562,7 +584,7 @@ static int RSA_eay_private_decrypt(int flen, const + } + + if (blinding) +- if (!rsa_blinding_invert(blinding, local_blinding, ret, br, ctx)) ++ if (!rsa_blinding_invert(blinding, ret, unblind, ctx)) + goto err; + + p=buf; +Index: crypto/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_oaep.c +=================================================================== +--- crypto/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_oaep.c (revision 248771) ++++ crypto/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_oaep.c (working copy) +@@ -143,7 +143,7 @@ int RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_OAEP(unsigned char *to + + EVP_Digest((void *)param, plen, phash, NULL, EVP_sha1(), NULL); + +- if (memcmp(db, phash, SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH) != 0 || bad) ++ if (CRYPTO_memcmp(db, phash, SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH) != 0 || bad) + goto decoding_err; + else + { +Index: crypto/openssl/crypto/symhacks.h +=================================================================== +--- crypto/openssl/crypto/symhacks.h (revision 248771) ++++ crypto/openssl/crypto/symhacks.h (working copy) +@@ -252,15 +252,15 @@ + #define EC_POINT_set_compressed_coordinates_GF2m \ + EC_POINT_set_compr_coords_GF2m + #undef ec_GF2m_simple_group_clear_finish +-#define ec_GF2m_simple_group_clear_finish ec_GF2m_simple_grp_clr_finish ++#define ec_GF2m_simple_group_clear_finish ec_GF2m_simple_grp_clr_finish + #undef ec_GF2m_simple_group_check_discriminant + #define ec_GF2m_simple_group_check_discriminant ec_GF2m_simple_grp_chk_discrim + #undef ec_GF2m_simple_point_clear_finish +-#define ec_GF2m_simple_point_clear_finish ec_GF2m_simple_pt_clr_finish ++#define ec_GF2m_simple_point_clear_finish ec_GF2m_simple_pt_clr_finish + #undef ec_GF2m_simple_point_set_to_infinity +-#define ec_GF2m_simple_point_set_to_infinity ec_GF2m_simple_pt_set_to_inf ++#define ec_GF2m_simple_point_set_to_infinity ec_GF2m_simple_pt_set_to_inf + #undef ec_GF2m_simple_points_make_affine +-#define ec_GF2m_simple_points_make_affine ec_GF2m_simple_pts_make_affine ++#define ec_GF2m_simple_points_make_affine ec_GF2m_simple_pts_make_affine + #undef ec_GF2m_simple_point_set_affine_coordinates + #define ec_GF2m_simple_point_set_affine_coordinates \ + ec_GF2m_smp_pt_set_af_coords +@@ -288,8 +288,6 @@ + #define ec_GFp_simple_point_set_to_infinity ec_GFp_simple_pt_set_to_inf + #undef ec_GFp_simple_points_make_affine + #define ec_GFp_simple_points_make_affine ec_GFp_simple_pts_make_affine +-#undef ec_GFp_simple_group_get_curve_GFp +-#define ec_GFp_simple_group_get_curve_GFp ec_GFp_simple_grp_get_curve_GFp + #undef ec_GFp_simple_set_Jprojective_coordinates_GFp + #define ec_GFp_simple_set_Jprojective_coordinates_GFp \ + ec_GFp_smp_set_Jproj_coords_GFp +Index: crypto/openssl/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c +=================================================================== +--- crypto/openssl/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c (revision 248771) ++++ crypto/openssl/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c (working copy) +@@ -1097,7 +1097,7 @@ int X509_cmp_time(ASN1_TIME *ctm, time_t *cmp_time + atm.length=sizeof(buff2); + atm.data=(unsigned char *)buff2; + +- if (X509_time_adj(&atm,-offset*60, cmp_time) == NULL) ++ if (X509_time_adj(&atm, offset*60, cmp_time) == NULL) + return 0; + + if (ctm->type == V_ASN1_UTCTIME) +Index: crypto/openssl/crypto/x509v3/v3_addr.c +=================================================================== +--- crypto/openssl/crypto/x509v3/v3_addr.c (revision 248771) ++++ crypto/openssl/crypto/x509v3/v3_addr.c (working copy) +@@ -142,12 +142,13 @@ unsigned int v3_addr_get_afi(const IPAddressFamily + * Expand the bitstring form of an address into a raw byte array. + * At the moment this is coded for simplicity, not speed. + */ +-static void addr_expand(unsigned char *addr, ++static int addr_expand(unsigned char *addr, + const ASN1_BIT_STRING *bs, + const int length, + const unsigned char fill) + { +- OPENSSL_assert(bs->length >= 0 && bs->length <= length); ++ if (bs->length < 0 || bs->length > length) ++ return 0; + if (bs->length > 0) { + memcpy(addr, bs->data, bs->length); + if ((bs->flags & 7) != 0) { +@@ -159,6 +160,7 @@ unsigned int v3_addr_get_afi(const IPAddressFamily + } + } + memset(addr + bs->length, fill, length - bs->length); ++ return 1; + } + + /* +@@ -177,13 +179,17 @@ static int i2r_address(BIO *out, + unsigned char addr[ADDR_RAW_BUF_LEN]; + int i, n; + ++ if (bs->length < 0) ++ return 0; + switch (afi) { + case IANA_AFI_IPV4: +- addr_expand(addr, bs, 4, fill); ++ if (!addr_expand(addr, bs, 4, fill)) ++ return 0; + BIO_printf(out, "%d.%d.%d.%d", addr[0], addr[1], addr[2], addr[3]); + break; + case IANA_AFI_IPV6: +- addr_expand(addr, bs, 16, fill); ++ if (!addr_expand(addr, bs, 16, fill)) ++ return 0; + for (n = 16; n > 1 && addr[n-1] == 0x00 && addr[n-2] == 0x00; n -= 2) + ; + for (i = 0; i < n; i += 2) +@@ -309,6 +315,12 @@ static int i2r_IPAddrBlocks(X509V3_EXT_METHOD *met + /* + * Sort comparison function for a sequence of IPAddressOrRange + * elements. ++ * ++ * There's no sane answer we can give if addr_expand() fails, and an ++ * assertion failure on externally supplied data is seriously uncool, ++ * so we just arbitrarily declare that if given invalid inputs this ++ * function returns -1. If this messes up your preferred sort order ++ * for garbage input, tough noogies. + */ + static int IPAddressOrRange_cmp(const IPAddressOrRange *a, + const IPAddressOrRange *b, +@@ -321,22 +333,26 @@ static int IPAddressOrRange_cmp(const IPAddressOrR + + switch (a->type) { + case IPAddressOrRange_addressPrefix: +- addr_expand(addr_a, a->u.addressPrefix, length, 0x00); ++ if (!addr_expand(addr_a, a->u.addressPrefix, length, 0x00)) ++ return -1; + prefixlen_a = addr_prefixlen(a->u.addressPrefix); + break; + case IPAddressOrRange_addressRange: +- addr_expand(addr_a, a->u.addressRange->min, length, 0x00); ++ if (!addr_expand(addr_a, a->u.addressRange->min, length, 0x00)) ++ return -1; + prefixlen_a = length * 8; + break; + } + + switch (b->type) { + case IPAddressOrRange_addressPrefix: +- addr_expand(addr_b, b->u.addressPrefix, length, 0x00); ++ if (!addr_expand(addr_b, b->u.addressPrefix, length, 0x00)) ++ return -1; + prefixlen_b = addr_prefixlen(b->u.addressPrefix); + break; + case IPAddressOrRange_addressRange: +- addr_expand(addr_b, b->u.addressRange->min, length, 0x00); ++ if (!addr_expand(addr_b, b->u.addressRange->min, length, 0x00)) ++ return -1; + prefixlen_b = length * 8; + break; + } +@@ -378,6 +394,7 @@ static int range_should_be_prefix(const unsigned c + unsigned char mask; + int i, j; + ++ OPENSSL_assert(memcmp(min, max, length) <= 0); + for (i = 0; i < length && min[i] == max[i]; i++) + ; + for (j = length - 1; j >= 0 && min[j] == 0x00 && max[j] == 0xFF; j--) +@@ -651,22 +668,22 @@ int v3_addr_add_range(IPAddrBlocks *addr, + /* + * Extract min and max values from an IPAddressOrRange. + */ +-static void extract_min_max(IPAddressOrRange *aor, ++static int extract_min_max(IPAddressOrRange *aor, + unsigned char *min, + unsigned char *max, + int length) + { +- OPENSSL_assert(aor != NULL && min != NULL && max != NULL); ++ if (aor == NULL || min == NULL || max == NULL) ++ return 0; + switch (aor->type) { + case IPAddressOrRange_addressPrefix: +- addr_expand(min, aor->u.addressPrefix, length, 0x00); +- addr_expand(max, aor->u.addressPrefix, length, 0xFF); +- return; ++ return (addr_expand(min, aor->u.addressPrefix, length, 0x00) && ++ addr_expand(max, aor->u.addressPrefix, length, 0xFF)); + case IPAddressOrRange_addressRange: +- addr_expand(min, aor->u.addressRange->min, length, 0x00); +- addr_expand(max, aor->u.addressRange->max, length, 0xFF); +- return; ++ return (addr_expand(min, aor->u.addressRange->min, length, 0x00) && ++ addr_expand(max, aor->u.addressRange->max, length, 0xFF)); + } ++ return 0; + } + + /* +@@ -682,9 +699,10 @@ int v3_addr_get_range(IPAddressOrRange *aor, + if (aor == NULL || min == NULL || max == NULL || + afi_length == 0 || length < afi_length || + (aor->type != IPAddressOrRange_addressPrefix && +- aor->type != IPAddressOrRange_addressRange)) ++ aor->type != IPAddressOrRange_addressRange) || ++ !extract_min_max(aor, min, max, afi_length)) + return 0; +- extract_min_max(aor, min, max, afi_length); ++ + return afi_length; + } + +@@ -766,8 +784,9 @@ int v3_addr_is_canonical(IPAddrBlocks *addr) + IPAddressOrRange *a = sk_IPAddressOrRange_value(aors, j); + IPAddressOrRange *b = sk_IPAddressOrRange_value(aors, j + 1); + +- extract_min_max(a, a_min, a_max, length); +- extract_min_max(b, b_min, b_max, length); ++ if (!extract_min_max(a, a_min, a_max, length) || ++ !extract_min_max(b, b_min, b_max, length)) ++ return 0; + + /* + * Punt misordered list, overlapping start, or inverted range. +@@ -795,15 +814,18 @@ int v3_addr_is_canonical(IPAddrBlocks *addr) + } + + /* +- * Check final range to see if it should be a prefix. ++ * Check range to see if it's inverted or should be a ++ * prefix. + */ + j = sk_IPAddressOrRange_num(aors) - 1; + { + IPAddressOrRange *a = sk_IPAddressOrRange_value(aors, j); +- if (a->type == IPAddressOrRange_addressRange) { +- extract_min_max(a, a_min, a_max, length); +- if (range_should_be_prefix(a_min, a_max, length) >= 0) ++ if (a != NULL && a->type == IPAddressOrRange_addressRange) { ++ if (!extract_min_max(a, a_min, a_max, length)) + return 0; ++ if (memcmp(a_min, a_max, length) > 0 || ++ range_should_be_prefix(a_min, a_max, length) >= 0) ++ return 0; + } + } + } +@@ -836,10 +858,18 @@ static int IPAddressOrRanges_canonize(IPAddressOrR + unsigned char a_min[ADDR_RAW_BUF_LEN], a_max[ADDR_RAW_BUF_LEN]; + unsigned char b_min[ADDR_RAW_BUF_LEN], b_max[ADDR_RAW_BUF_LEN]; + +- extract_min_max(a, a_min, a_max, length); +- extract_min_max(b, b_min, b_max, length); ++ if (!extract_min_max(a, a_min, a_max, length) || ++ !extract_min_max(b, b_min, b_max, length)) ++ return 0; + + /* ++ * Punt inverted ranges. ++ */ ++ if (memcmp(a_min, a_max, length) > 0 || ++ memcmp(b_min, b_max, length) > 0) ++ return 0; ++ ++ /* + * Punt overlaps. + */ + if (memcmp(a_max, b_min, length) >= 0) +@@ -864,6 +894,20 @@ static int IPAddressOrRanges_canonize(IPAddressOrR + } + } + ++ /* ++ * Check for inverted final range. ++ */ ++ j = sk_IPAddressOrRange_num(aors) - 1; ++ { ++ IPAddressOrRange *a = sk_IPAddressOrRange_value(aors, j); ++ if (a != NULL && a->type == IPAddressOrRange_addressRange) { ++ unsigned char a_min[ADDR_RAW_BUF_LEN], a_max[ADDR_RAW_BUF_LEN]; ++ extract_min_max(a, a_min, a_max, length); ++ if (memcmp(a_min, a_max, length) > 0) ++ return 0; ++ } ++ } ++ + return 1; + } + +@@ -1012,6 +1056,11 @@ static void *v2i_IPAddrBlocks(struct v3_ext_method + X509V3_conf_err(val); + goto err; + } ++ if (memcmp(min, max, length_from_afi(afi)) > 0) { ++ X509V3err(X509V3_F_V2I_IPADDRBLOCKS, X509V3_R_EXTENSION_VALUE_ERROR); ++ X509V3_conf_err(val); ++ goto err; ++ } + if (!v3_addr_add_range(addr, afi, safi, min, max)) { + X509V3err(X509V3_F_V2I_IPADDRBLOCKS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + goto err; +@@ -1097,13 +1146,15 @@ static int addr_contains(IPAddressOrRanges *parent + + p = 0; + for (c = 0; c < sk_IPAddressOrRange_num(child); c++) { +- extract_min_max(sk_IPAddressOrRange_value(child, c), +- c_min, c_max, length); ++ if (!extract_min_max(sk_IPAddressOrRange_value(child, c), ++ c_min, c_max, length)) ++ return -1; + for (;; p++) { + if (p >= sk_IPAddressOrRange_num(parent)) + return 0; +- extract_min_max(sk_IPAddressOrRange_value(parent, p), +- p_min, p_max, length); ++ if (!extract_min_max(sk_IPAddressOrRange_value(parent, p), ++ p_min, p_max, length)) ++ return 0; + if (memcmp(p_max, c_max, length) < 0) + continue; + if (memcmp(p_min, c_min, length) > 0) +Index: crypto/openssl/crypto/x509v3/v3_asid.c +=================================================================== +--- crypto/openssl/crypto/x509v3/v3_asid.c (revision 248771) ++++ crypto/openssl/crypto/x509v3/v3_asid.c (working copy) +@@ -61,7 +61,6 @@ + + #include + #include +-#include + #include "cryptlib.h" + #include + #include +@@ -172,11 +171,11 @@ static int ASIdOrRange_cmp(const ASIdOrRange * con + { + const ASIdOrRange *a = *a_, *b = *b_; + +- assert((a->type == ASIdOrRange_id && a->u.id != NULL) || ++ OPENSSL_assert((a->type == ASIdOrRange_id && a->u.id != NULL) || + (a->type == ASIdOrRange_range && a->u.range != NULL && + a->u.range->min != NULL && a->u.range->max != NULL)); + +- assert((b->type == ASIdOrRange_id && b->u.id != NULL) || ++ OPENSSL_assert((b->type == ASIdOrRange_id && b->u.id != NULL) || + (b->type == ASIdOrRange_range && b->u.range != NULL && + b->u.range->min != NULL && b->u.range->max != NULL)); + +@@ -215,7 +214,7 @@ int v3_asid_add_inherit(ASIdentifiers *asid, int w + if (*choice == NULL) { + if ((*choice = ASIdentifierChoice_new()) == NULL) + return 0; +- assert((*choice)->u.inherit == NULL); ++ OPENSSL_assert((*choice)->u.inherit == NULL); + if (((*choice)->u.inherit = ASN1_NULL_new()) == NULL) + return 0; + (*choice)->type = ASIdentifierChoice_inherit; +@@ -250,7 +249,7 @@ int v3_asid_add_id_or_range(ASIdentifiers *asid, + if (*choice == NULL) { + if ((*choice = ASIdentifierChoice_new()) == NULL) + return 0; +- assert((*choice)->u.asIdsOrRanges == NULL); ++ OPENSSL_assert((*choice)->u.asIdsOrRanges == NULL); + (*choice)->u.asIdsOrRanges = sk_ASIdOrRange_new(ASIdOrRange_cmp); + if ((*choice)->u.asIdsOrRanges == NULL) + return 0; +@@ -286,7 +285,7 @@ static void extract_min_max(ASIdOrRange *aor, + ASN1_INTEGER **min, + ASN1_INTEGER **max) + { +- assert(aor != NULL && min != NULL && max != NULL); ++ OPENSSL_assert(aor != NULL && min != NULL && max != NULL); + switch (aor->type) { + case ASIdOrRange_id: + *min = aor->u.id; +@@ -359,6 +358,20 @@ static int ASIdentifierChoice_is_canonical(ASIdent + goto done; + } + ++ /* ++ * Check for inverted range. ++ */ ++ i = sk_ASIdOrRange_num(choice->u.asIdsOrRanges) - 1; ++ { ++ ASIdOrRange *a = sk_ASIdOrRange_value(choice->u.asIdsOrRanges, i); ++ ASN1_INTEGER *a_min, *a_max; ++ if (a != NULL && a->type == ASIdOrRange_range) { ++ extract_min_max(a, &a_min, &a_max); ++ if (ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(a_min, a_max) > 0) ++ goto done; ++ } ++ } ++ + ret = 1; + + done: +@@ -373,7 +386,7 @@ static int ASIdentifierChoice_is_canonical(ASIdent + int v3_asid_is_canonical(ASIdentifiers *asid) + { + return (asid == NULL || +- (ASIdentifierChoice_is_canonical(asid->asnum) || ++ (ASIdentifierChoice_is_canonical(asid->asnum) && + ASIdentifierChoice_is_canonical(asid->rdi))); + } + +@@ -393,9 +406,18 @@ static int ASIdentifierChoice_canonize(ASIdentifie + return 1; + + /* +- * We have a list. Sort it. ++ * If not a list, or if empty list, it's broken. + */ +- assert(choice->type == ASIdentifierChoice_asIdsOrRanges); ++ if (choice->type != ASIdentifierChoice_asIdsOrRanges || ++ sk_ASIdOrRange_num(choice->u.asIdsOrRanges) == 0) { ++ X509V3err(X509V3_F_ASIDENTIFIERCHOICE_CANONIZE, ++ X509V3_R_EXTENSION_VALUE_ERROR); ++ return 0; ++ } ++ ++ /* ++ * We have a non-empty list. Sort it. ++ */ + sk_ASIdOrRange_sort(choice->u.asIdsOrRanges); + + /* +@@ -413,9 +435,16 @@ static int ASIdentifierChoice_canonize(ASIdentifie + /* + * Make sure we're properly sorted (paranoia). + */ +- assert(ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(a_min, b_min) <= 0); ++ OPENSSL_assert(ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(a_min, b_min) <= 0); + + /* ++ * Punt inverted ranges. ++ */ ++ if (ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(a_min, a_max) > 0 || ++ ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(b_min, b_max) > 0) ++ goto done; ++ ++ /* + * Check for overlaps. + */ + if (ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(a_max, b_min) >= 0) { +@@ -466,14 +495,28 @@ static int ASIdentifierChoice_canonize(ASIdentifie + break; + } + ASIdOrRange_free(b); +- (void)sk_ASIdOrRange_delete(choice->u.asIdsOrRanges, i + 1); ++ (void) sk_ASIdOrRange_delete(choice->u.asIdsOrRanges, i + 1); + i--; + continue; + } + } + +- assert(ASIdentifierChoice_is_canonical(choice)); /* Paranoia */ ++ /* ++ * Check for final inverted range. ++ */ ++ i = sk_ASIdOrRange_num(choice->u.asIdsOrRanges) - 1; ++ { ++ ASIdOrRange *a = sk_ASIdOrRange_value(choice->u.asIdsOrRanges, i); ++ ASN1_INTEGER *a_min, *a_max; ++ if (a != NULL && a->type == ASIdOrRange_range) { ++ extract_min_max(a, &a_min, &a_max); ++ if (ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(a_min, a_max) > 0) ++ goto done; ++ } ++ } + ++ OPENSSL_assert(ASIdentifierChoice_is_canonical(choice)); /* Paranoia */ ++ + ret = 1; + + done: +@@ -499,6 +542,7 @@ static void *v2i_ASIdentifiers(struct v3_ext_metho + struct v3_ext_ctx *ctx, + STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *values) + { ++ ASN1_INTEGER *min = NULL, *max = NULL; + ASIdentifiers *asid = NULL; + int i; + +@@ -509,7 +553,6 @@ static void *v2i_ASIdentifiers(struct v3_ext_metho + + for (i = 0; i < sk_CONF_VALUE_num(values); i++) { + CONF_VALUE *val = sk_CONF_VALUE_value(values, i); +- ASN1_INTEGER *min = NULL, *max = NULL; + int i1, i2, i3, is_range, which; + + /* +@@ -579,18 +622,19 @@ static void *v2i_ASIdentifiers(struct v3_ext_metho + max = s2i_ASN1_INTEGER(NULL, s + i2); + OPENSSL_free(s); + if (min == NULL || max == NULL) { +- ASN1_INTEGER_free(min); +- ASN1_INTEGER_free(max); + X509V3err(X509V3_F_V2I_ASIDENTIFIERS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + goto err; + } ++ if (ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(min, max) > 0) { ++ X509V3err(X509V3_F_V2I_ASIDENTIFIERS, X509V3_R_EXTENSION_VALUE_ERROR); ++ goto err; ++ } + } + if (!v3_asid_add_id_or_range(asid, which, min, max)) { +- ASN1_INTEGER_free(min); +- ASN1_INTEGER_free(max); + X509V3err(X509V3_F_V2I_ASIDENTIFIERS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + goto err; + } ++ min = max = NULL; + } + + /* +@@ -602,6 +646,8 @@ static void *v2i_ASIdentifiers(struct v3_ext_metho + + err: + ASIdentifiers_free(asid); ++ ASN1_INTEGER_free(min); ++ ASN1_INTEGER_free(max); + return NULL; + } + +@@ -709,9 +755,9 @@ static int v3_asid_validate_path_internal(X509_STO + int i, ret = 1, inherit_as = 0, inherit_rdi = 0; + X509 *x = NULL; + +- assert(chain != NULL && sk_X509_num(chain) > 0); +- assert(ctx != NULL || ext != NULL); +- assert(ctx == NULL || ctx->verify_cb != NULL); ++ OPENSSL_assert(chain != NULL && sk_X509_num(chain) > 0); ++ OPENSSL_assert(ctx != NULL || ext != NULL); ++ OPENSSL_assert(ctx == NULL || ctx->verify_cb != NULL); + + /* + * Figure out where to start. If we don't have an extension to +@@ -723,7 +769,7 @@ static int v3_asid_validate_path_internal(X509_STO + } else { + i = 0; + x = sk_X509_value(chain, i); +- assert(x != NULL); ++ OPENSSL_assert(x != NULL); + if ((ext = x->rfc3779_asid) == NULL) + goto done; + } +@@ -756,7 +802,7 @@ static int v3_asid_validate_path_internal(X509_STO + */ + for (i++; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) { + x = sk_X509_value(chain, i); +- assert(x != NULL); ++ OPENSSL_assert(x != NULL); + if (x->rfc3779_asid == NULL) { + if (child_as != NULL || child_rdi != NULL) + validation_err(X509_V_ERR_UNNESTED_RESOURCE); +Index: crypto/openssl/doc/HOWTO/proxy_certificates.txt +=================================================================== +--- crypto/openssl/doc/HOWTO/proxy_certificates.txt (revision 248771) ++++ crypto/openssl/doc/HOWTO/proxy_certificates.txt (working copy) +@@ -57,7 +57,7 @@ following methods: + + - in all other cases, proxy certificate validation can be enabled + before starting the application by setting the envirnoment variable +- OPENSSL_ALLOW_PROXY with some non-empty value. ++ OPENSSL_ALLOW_PROXY_CERTS with some non-empty value. + + There are thoughts to allow proxy certificates with a line in the + default openssl.cnf, but that's still in the future. +Index: crypto/openssl/doc/apps/CA.pl.pod +=================================================================== +--- crypto/openssl/doc/apps/CA.pl.pod (revision 248771) ++++ crypto/openssl/doc/apps/CA.pl.pod (working copy) +@@ -39,13 +39,13 @@ prints a usage message. + + =item B<-newcert> + +-creates a new self signed certificate. The private key and certificate are +-written to the file "newreq.pem". ++creates a new self signed certificate. The private key is written to the file ++"newkey.pem" and the request written to the file "newreq.pem". + + =item B<-newreq> + +-creates a new certificate request. The private key and request are +-written to the file "newreq.pem". ++creates a new certificate request. The private key is written to the file ++"newkey.pem" and the request written to the file "newreq.pem". + + =item B<-newreq-nodes> + +Index: crypto/openssl/doc/apps/ca.pod +=================================================================== +--- crypto/openssl/doc/apps/ca.pod (revision 248771) ++++ crypto/openssl/doc/apps/ca.pod (working copy) +@@ -88,7 +88,7 @@ section for information on the required format. + =item B<-infiles> + + if present this should be the last option, all subsequent arguments +-are assumed to the the names of files containing certificate requests. ++are assumed to be the names of files containing certificate requests. + + =item B<-out filename> + +Index: crypto/openssl/doc/apps/dgst.pod +=================================================================== +--- crypto/openssl/doc/apps/dgst.pod (revision 248771) ++++ crypto/openssl/doc/apps/dgst.pod (working copy) +@@ -68,7 +68,7 @@ see the B section in L + +-verify the signature using the the public key in "filename". ++verify the signature using the public key in "filename". + The output is either "Verification OK" or "Verification Failure". + + =item B<-prverify filename> +Index: crypto/openssl/doc/crypto/engine.pod +=================================================================== +--- crypto/openssl/doc/crypto/engine.pod (revision 248771) ++++ crypto/openssl/doc/crypto/engine.pod (working copy) +@@ -517,7 +517,7 @@ implemented by ENGINEs should be numbered from. An + this symbol is considered a "generic" command is handled directly by the + OpenSSL core routines. + +-It is using these "core" control commands that one can discover the the control ++It is using these "core" control commands that one can discover the control + commands implemented by a given ENGINE, specifically the commands; + + #define ENGINE_HAS_CTRL_FUNCTION 10 +Index: crypto/openssl/doc/ssl/SSL_clear.pod +=================================================================== +--- crypto/openssl/doc/ssl/SSL_clear.pod (revision 248771) ++++ crypto/openssl/doc/ssl/SSL_clear.pod (working copy) +@@ -39,10 +39,16 @@ for a description of the method's properties. + SSL_clear() resets the SSL object to allow for another connection. The + reset operation however keeps several settings of the last sessions + (some of these settings were made automatically during the last +-handshake). It only makes sense when opening a new session (or reusing +-an old one) with the same peer that shares these settings. +-SSL_clear() is not a short form for the sequence +-L; L; . ++handshake). It only makes sense for a new connection with the exact ++same peer that shares these settings, and may fail if that peer ++changes its settings between connections. Use the sequence ++L; ++L; ++L; ++L ++instead to avoid such failures ++(or simply L; L ++if session reuse is not desired). + + =head1 RETURN VALUES + +Index: crypto/openssl/engines/e_capi.c +=================================================================== +--- crypto/openssl/engines/e_capi.c (revision 248771) ++++ crypto/openssl/engines/e_capi.c (working copy) +@@ -420,29 +420,37 @@ static int capi_init(ENGINE *e) + CAPI_CTX *ctx; + const RSA_METHOD *ossl_rsa_meth; + const DSA_METHOD *ossl_dsa_meth; +- capi_idx = ENGINE_get_ex_new_index(0, NULL, NULL, NULL, 0); +- cert_capi_idx = X509_get_ex_new_index(0, NULL, NULL, NULL, 0); + ++ if (capi_idx < 0) ++ { ++ capi_idx = ENGINE_get_ex_new_index(0, NULL, NULL, NULL, 0); ++ if (capi_idx < 0) ++ goto memerr; ++ ++ cert_capi_idx = X509_get_ex_new_index(0, NULL, NULL, NULL, 0); ++ ++ /* Setup RSA_METHOD */ ++ rsa_capi_idx = RSA_get_ex_new_index(0, NULL, NULL, NULL, 0); ++ ossl_rsa_meth = RSA_PKCS1_SSLeay(); ++ capi_rsa_method.rsa_pub_enc = ossl_rsa_meth->rsa_pub_enc; ++ capi_rsa_method.rsa_pub_dec = ossl_rsa_meth->rsa_pub_dec; ++ capi_rsa_method.rsa_mod_exp = ossl_rsa_meth->rsa_mod_exp; ++ capi_rsa_method.bn_mod_exp = ossl_rsa_meth->bn_mod_exp; ++ ++ /* Setup DSA Method */ ++ dsa_capi_idx = DSA_get_ex_new_index(0, NULL, NULL, NULL, 0); ++ ossl_dsa_meth = DSA_OpenSSL(); ++ capi_dsa_method.dsa_do_verify = ossl_dsa_meth->dsa_do_verify; ++ capi_dsa_method.dsa_mod_exp = ossl_dsa_meth->dsa_mod_exp; ++ capi_dsa_method.bn_mod_exp = ossl_dsa_meth->bn_mod_exp; ++ } ++ + ctx = capi_ctx_new(); +- if (!ctx || (capi_idx < 0)) ++ if (!ctx) + goto memerr; + + ENGINE_set_ex_data(e, capi_idx, ctx); +- /* Setup RSA_METHOD */ +- rsa_capi_idx = RSA_get_ex_new_index(0, NULL, NULL, NULL, 0); +- ossl_rsa_meth = RSA_PKCS1_SSLeay(); +- capi_rsa_method.rsa_pub_enc = ossl_rsa_meth->rsa_pub_enc; +- capi_rsa_method.rsa_pub_dec = ossl_rsa_meth->rsa_pub_dec; +- capi_rsa_method.rsa_mod_exp = ossl_rsa_meth->rsa_mod_exp; +- capi_rsa_method.bn_mod_exp = ossl_rsa_meth->bn_mod_exp; + +- /* Setup DSA Method */ +- dsa_capi_idx = DSA_get_ex_new_index(0, NULL, NULL, NULL, 0); +- ossl_dsa_meth = DSA_OpenSSL(); +- capi_dsa_method.dsa_do_verify = ossl_dsa_meth->dsa_do_verify; +- capi_dsa_method.dsa_mod_exp = ossl_dsa_meth->dsa_mod_exp; +- capi_dsa_method.bn_mod_exp = ossl_dsa_meth->bn_mod_exp; +- + #ifdef OPENSSL_CAPIENG_DIALOG + { + HMODULE cryptui = LoadLibrary(TEXT("CRYPTUI.DLL")); +@@ -1133,6 +1141,7 @@ static int capi_list_containers(CAPI_CTX *ctx, BIO + { + CAPIerr(CAPI_F_CAPI_LIST_CONTAINERS, CAPI_R_ENUMCONTAINERS_ERROR); + capi_addlasterror(); ++ CryptReleaseContext(hprov, 0); + return 0; + } + CAPI_trace(ctx, "Got max container len %d\n", buflen); +@@ -1400,10 +1409,13 @@ static PCCERT_CONTEXT capi_find_cert(CAPI_CTX *ctx + static CAPI_KEY *capi_get_key(CAPI_CTX *ctx, const char *contname, char *provname, DWORD ptype, DWORD keyspec) + { + CAPI_KEY *key; ++ DWORD dwFlags = 0; + key = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(CAPI_KEY)); + CAPI_trace(ctx, "capi_get_key, contname=%s, provname=%s, type=%d\n", + contname, provname, ptype); +- if (!CryptAcquireContextA(&key->hprov, contname, provname, ptype, 0)) ++ if(ctx->store_flags & CERT_SYSTEM_STORE_LOCAL_MACHINE) ++ dwFlags = CRYPT_MACHINE_KEYSET; ++ if (!CryptAcquireContextA(&key->hprov, contname, provname, ptype, dwFlags)) + { + CAPIerr(CAPI_F_CAPI_GET_KEY, CAPI_R_CRYPTACQUIRECONTEXT_ERROR); + capi_addlasterror(); +@@ -1550,6 +1562,8 @@ static int capi_ctx_set_provname(CAPI_CTX *ctx, LP + } + CryptReleaseContext(hprov, 0); + } ++ if (ctx->cspname) ++ OPENSSL_free(ctx->cspname); + ctx->cspname = BUF_strdup(pname); + ctx->csptype = type; + return 1; +@@ -1559,9 +1573,12 @@ static int capi_ctx_set_provname_idx(CAPI_CTX *ctx + { + LPSTR pname; + DWORD type; ++ int res; + if (capi_get_provname(ctx, &pname, &type, idx) != 1) + return 0; +- return capi_ctx_set_provname(ctx, pname, type, 0); ++ res = capi_ctx_set_provname(ctx, pname, type, 0); ++ OPENSSL_free(pname); ++ return res; + } + + static int cert_issuer_match(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_dn, X509 *x) +Index: crypto/openssl/engines/e_capi_err.h +=================================================================== +--- crypto/openssl/engines/e_capi_err.h (revision 248771) ++++ crypto/openssl/engines/e_capi_err.h (working copy) +@@ -55,6 +55,10 @@ + #ifndef HEADER_CAPI_ERR_H + #define HEADER_CAPI_ERR_H + ++#ifdef __cplusplus ++extern "C" { ++#endif ++ + /* BEGIN ERROR CODES */ + /* The following lines are auto generated by the script mkerr.pl. Any changes + * made after this point may be overwritten when the script is next run. +Index: crypto/openssl/fips/fips_canister.c +=================================================================== +--- crypto/openssl/fips/fips_canister.c (revision 248771) ++++ crypto/openssl/fips/fips_canister.c (working copy) +@@ -19,6 +19,7 @@ + (defined(__linux) && (defined(__arm) || defined(__arm__))) || \ + (defined(__i386) || defined(__i386__)) || \ + (defined(__x86_64) || defined(__x86_64__)) || \ ++ defined(__ANDROID__) || \ + (defined(vax) || defined(__vax__)) + # define POINTER_TO_FUNCTION_IS_POINTER_TO_1ST_INSTRUCTION + # endif +Index: crypto/openssl/openssl.spec +=================================================================== +--- crypto/openssl/openssl.spec (revision 248771) ++++ crypto/openssl/openssl.spec (working copy) +@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@ + %define libmaj 0 + %define libmin 9 + %define librel 8 +-%define librev q ++%define librev y + Release: 1 + + %define openssldir /var/ssl +Index: crypto/openssl/ssl/Makefile +=================================================================== +--- crypto/openssl/ssl/Makefile (revision 248771) ++++ crypto/openssl/ssl/Makefile (working copy) +@@ -22,7 +22,7 @@ LIB=$(TOP)/libssl.a + SHARED_LIB= libssl$(SHLIB_EXT) + LIBSRC= \ + s2_meth.c s2_srvr.c s2_clnt.c s2_lib.c s2_enc.c s2_pkt.c \ +- s3_meth.c s3_srvr.c s3_clnt.c s3_lib.c s3_enc.c s3_pkt.c s3_both.c \ ++ s3_meth.c s3_srvr.c s3_clnt.c s3_lib.c s3_enc.c s3_pkt.c s3_both.c s3_cbc.c \ + s23_meth.c s23_srvr.c s23_clnt.c s23_lib.c s23_pkt.c \ + t1_meth.c t1_srvr.c t1_clnt.c t1_lib.c t1_enc.c \ + d1_meth.c d1_srvr.c d1_clnt.c d1_lib.c d1_pkt.c \ +@@ -33,7 +33,7 @@ LIBSRC= \ + bio_ssl.c ssl_err.c kssl.c t1_reneg.c + LIBOBJ= \ + s2_meth.o s2_srvr.o s2_clnt.o s2_lib.o s2_enc.o s2_pkt.o \ +- s3_meth.o s3_srvr.o s3_clnt.o s3_lib.o s3_enc.o s3_pkt.o s3_both.o \ ++ s3_meth.o s3_srvr.o s3_clnt.o s3_lib.o s3_enc.o s3_pkt.o s3_both.o s3_cbc.o \ + s23_meth.o s23_srvr.o s23_clnt.o s23_lib.o s23_pkt.o \ + t1_meth.o t1_srvr.o t1_clnt.o t1_lib.o t1_enc.o \ + d1_meth.o d1_srvr.o d1_clnt.o d1_lib.o d1_pkt.o \ +@@ -545,6 +545,27 @@ s3_both.o: ../include/openssl/ssl23.h ../include/o + s3_both.o: ../include/openssl/stack.h ../include/openssl/symhacks.h + s3_both.o: ../include/openssl/tls1.h ../include/openssl/x509.h + s3_both.o: ../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h s3_both.c ssl_locl.h ++s3_cbc.o: ../e_os.h ../include/openssl/asn1.h ../include/openssl/bio.h ++s3_cbc.o: ../include/openssl/bn.h ../include/openssl/buffer.h ++s3_cbc.o: ../include/openssl/comp.h ../include/openssl/crypto.h ++s3_cbc.o: ../include/openssl/dsa.h ../include/openssl/dtls1.h ++s3_cbc.o: ../include/openssl/e_os2.h ../include/openssl/ec.h ++s3_cbc.o: ../include/openssl/ecdh.h ../include/openssl/ecdsa.h ++s3_cbc.o: ../include/openssl/err.h ../include/openssl/evp.h ++s3_cbc.o: ../include/openssl/fips.h ../include/openssl/hmac.h ++s3_cbc.o: ../include/openssl/kssl.h ../include/openssl/lhash.h ++s3_cbc.o: ../include/openssl/md5.h ../include/openssl/obj_mac.h ++s3_cbc.o: ../include/openssl/objects.h ../include/openssl/opensslconf.h ++s3_cbc.o: ../include/openssl/opensslv.h ../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h ++s3_cbc.o: ../include/openssl/pem.h ../include/openssl/pem2.h ++s3_cbc.o: ../include/openssl/pkcs7.h ../include/openssl/pq_compat.h ++s3_cbc.o: ../include/openssl/pqueue.h ../include/openssl/rsa.h ++s3_cbc.o: ../include/openssl/safestack.h ../include/openssl/sha.h ++s3_cbc.o: ../include/openssl/ssl.h ../include/openssl/ssl2.h ++s3_cbc.o: ../include/openssl/ssl23.h ../include/openssl/ssl3.h ++s3_cbc.o: ../include/openssl/stack.h ../include/openssl/symhacks.h ++s3_cbc.o: ../include/openssl/tls1.h ../include/openssl/x509.h ++s3_cbc.o: ../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h s3_cbc.c ssl_locl.h + s3_clnt.o: ../e_os.h ../include/openssl/asn1.h ../include/openssl/bio.h + s3_clnt.o: ../include/openssl/bn.h ../include/openssl/buffer.h + s3_clnt.o: ../include/openssl/comp.h ../include/openssl/crypto.h +Index: crypto/openssl/ssl/bio_ssl.c +=================================================================== +--- crypto/openssl/ssl/bio_ssl.c (revision 248771) ++++ crypto/openssl/ssl/bio_ssl.c (working copy) +@@ -348,7 +348,11 @@ static long ssl_ctrl(BIO *b, int cmd, long num, vo + break; + case BIO_C_SET_SSL: + if (ssl != NULL) ++ { + ssl_free(b); ++ if (!ssl_new(b)) ++ return 0; ++ } + b->shutdown=(int)num; + ssl=(SSL *)ptr; + ((BIO_SSL *)b->ptr)->ssl=ssl; +Index: crypto/openssl/ssl/d1_both.c +=================================================================== +--- crypto/openssl/ssl/d1_both.c (revision 248771) ++++ crypto/openssl/ssl/d1_both.c (working copy) +@@ -153,12 +153,11 @@ + #endif + + static unsigned char bitmask_start_values[] = {0xff, 0xfe, 0xfc, 0xf8, 0xf0, 0xe0, 0xc0, 0x80}; +-static unsigned char bitmask_end_values[] = {0x00, 0x01, 0x03, 0x07, 0x0f, 0x1f, 0x3f, 0x7f}; ++static unsigned char bitmask_end_values[] = {0xff, 0x01, 0x03, 0x07, 0x0f, 0x1f, 0x3f, 0x7f}; + + /* XDTLS: figure out the right values */ + static unsigned int g_probable_mtu[] = {1500 - 28, 512 - 28, 256 - 28}; + +-static unsigned int dtls1_min_mtu(void); + static unsigned int dtls1_guess_mtu(unsigned int curr_mtu); + static void dtls1_fix_message_header(SSL *s, unsigned long frag_off, + unsigned long frag_len); +@@ -228,14 +227,14 @@ int dtls1_do_write(SSL *s, int type) + unsigned int len, frag_off, mac_size, blocksize; + + /* AHA! Figure out the MTU, and stick to the right size */ +- if ( ! (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_QUERY_MTU)) ++ if (s->d1->mtu < dtls1_min_mtu() && !(SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_QUERY_MTU)) + { + s->d1->mtu = + BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_QUERY_MTU, 0, NULL); + + /* I've seen the kernel return bogus numbers when it doesn't know + * (initial write), so just make sure we have a reasonable number */ +- if ( s->d1->mtu < dtls1_min_mtu()) ++ if (s->d1->mtu < dtls1_min_mtu()) + { + s->d1->mtu = 0; + s->d1->mtu = dtls1_guess_mtu(s->d1->mtu); +@@ -264,11 +263,10 @@ int dtls1_do_write(SSL *s, int type) + return ret; + mtu = s->d1->mtu - (DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH + DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH); + } ++#endif + +- OPENSSL_assert(mtu > 0); /* should have something reasonable now */ ++ OPENSSL_assert(s->d1->mtu >= dtls1_min_mtu()); /* should have something reasonable now */ + +-#endif +- + if ( s->init_off == 0 && type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) + OPENSSL_assert(s->init_num == + (int)s->d1->w_msg_hdr.msg_len + DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH); +@@ -464,20 +462,9 @@ again: + + memset(msg_hdr, 0x00, sizeof(struct hm_header_st)); + +- s->d1->handshake_read_seq++; +- /* we just read a handshake message from the other side: +- * this means that we don't need to retransmit of the +- * buffered messages. +- * XDTLS: may be able clear out this +- * buffer a little sooner (i.e if an out-of-order +- * handshake message/record is received at the record +- * layer. +- * XDTLS: exception is that the server needs to +- * know that change cipher spec and finished messages +- * have been received by the client before clearing this +- * buffer. this can simply be done by waiting for the +- * first data segment, but is there a better way? */ +- dtls1_clear_record_buffer(s); ++ /* Don't change sequence numbers while listening */ ++ if (!s->d1->listen) ++ s->d1->handshake_read_seq++; + + s->init_msg = s->init_buf->data + DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH; + return s->init_num; +@@ -806,16 +793,24 @@ dtls1_get_message_fragment(SSL *s, int st1, int st + *ok = 0; + return i; + } +- OPENSSL_assert(i == DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH); ++ /* Handshake fails if message header is incomplete */ ++ if (i != DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH) ++ { ++ al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; ++ SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_GET_MESSAGE_FRAGMENT,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE); ++ goto f_err; ++ } + + /* parse the message fragment header */ + dtls1_get_message_header(wire, &msg_hdr); + + /* + * if this is a future (or stale) message it gets buffered +- * (or dropped)--no further processing at this time ++ * (or dropped)--no further processing at this time ++ * While listening, we accept seq 1 (ClientHello with cookie) ++ * although we're still expecting seq 0 (ClientHello) + */ +- if ( msg_hdr.seq != s->d1->handshake_read_seq) ++ if (msg_hdr.seq != s->d1->handshake_read_seq && !(s->d1->listen && msg_hdr.seq == 1)) + return dtls1_process_out_of_seq_message(s, &msg_hdr, ok); + + len = msg_hdr.msg_len; +@@ -876,7 +871,12 @@ dtls1_get_message_fragment(SSL *s, int st1, int st + + /* XDTLS: an incorrectly formatted fragment should cause the + * handshake to fail */ +- OPENSSL_assert(i == (int)frag_len); ++ if (i != (int)frag_len) ++ { ++ al=SSL3_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; ++ SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_GET_MESSAGE_FRAGMENT,SSL3_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER); ++ goto f_err; ++ } + + *ok = 1; + +@@ -1326,7 +1326,8 @@ unsigned char * + dtls1_set_message_header(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned char mt, + unsigned long len, unsigned long frag_off, unsigned long frag_len) + { +- if ( frag_off == 0) ++ /* Don't change sequence numbers while listening */ ++ if (frag_off == 0 && !s->d1->listen) + { + s->d1->handshake_write_seq = s->d1->next_handshake_write_seq; + s->d1->next_handshake_write_seq++; +@@ -1379,7 +1380,7 @@ dtls1_write_message_header(SSL *s, unsigned char * + return p; + } + +-static unsigned int ++unsigned int + dtls1_min_mtu(void) + { + return (g_probable_mtu[(sizeof(g_probable_mtu) / +Index: crypto/openssl/ssl/d1_clnt.c +=================================================================== +--- crypto/openssl/ssl/d1_clnt.c (revision 248771) ++++ crypto/openssl/ssl/d1_clnt.c (working copy) +@@ -257,7 +257,6 @@ int dtls1_connect(SSL *s) + if (ret <= 0) goto end; + else + { +- dtls1_stop_timer(s); + if (s->hit) + s->state=SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A; + else +@@ -350,6 +349,7 @@ int dtls1_connect(SSL *s) + case SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE_B: + ret=ssl3_get_server_done(s); + if (ret <= 0) goto end; ++ dtls1_stop_timer(s); + if (s->s3->tmp.cert_req) + s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_A; + else +@@ -403,7 +403,8 @@ int dtls1_connect(SSL *s) + + case SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A: + case SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_B: +- dtls1_start_timer(s); ++ if (!s->hit) ++ dtls1_start_timer(s); + ret=dtls1_send_change_cipher_spec(s, + SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A,SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_B); + if (ret <= 0) goto end; +@@ -438,7 +439,8 @@ int dtls1_connect(SSL *s) + + case SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_A: + case SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_B: +- dtls1_start_timer(s); ++ if (!s->hit) ++ dtls1_start_timer(s); + ret=dtls1_send_finished(s, + SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_A,SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_B, + s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label, +Index: crypto/openssl/ssl/d1_enc.c +=================================================================== +--- crypto/openssl/ssl/d1_enc.c (revision 248771) ++++ crypto/openssl/ssl/d1_enc.c (working copy) +@@ -126,16 +126,30 @@ + #include + #endif + ++/* dtls1_enc encrypts/decrypts the record in |s->wrec| / |s->rrec|, respectively. ++ * ++ * Returns: ++ * 0: (in non-constant time) if the record is publically invalid (i.e. too ++ * short etc). ++ * 1: if the record's padding is valid / the encryption was successful. ++ * -1: if the record's padding/AEAD-authenticator is invalid or, if sending, ++ * an internal error occured. */ + int dtls1_enc(SSL *s, int send) + { + SSL3_RECORD *rec; + EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ds; + unsigned long l; +- int bs,i,ii,j,k; ++ int bs,i,j,k,mac_size=0; + const EVP_CIPHER *enc; + + if (send) + { ++ if (s->write_hash) ++ { ++ mac_size=EVP_MD_size(s->write_hash); ++ if (mac_size < 0) ++ return -1; ++ } + ds=s->enc_write_ctx; + rec= &(s->s3->wrec); + if (s->enc_write_ctx == NULL) +@@ -156,6 +170,11 @@ int dtls1_enc(SSL *s, int send) + } + else + { ++ if (s->read_hash) ++ { ++ mac_size=EVP_MD_size(s->read_hash); ++ OPENSSL_assert(mac_size >= 0); ++ } + ds=s->enc_read_ctx; + rec= &(s->s3->rrec); + if (s->enc_read_ctx == NULL) +@@ -220,11 +239,7 @@ int dtls1_enc(SSL *s, int send) + if (!send) + { + if (l == 0 || l%bs != 0) +- { +- SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_ENC,SSL_R_BLOCK_CIPHER_PAD_IS_WRONG); +- ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_DECRYPTION_FAILED); + return 0; +- } + } + + EVP_Cipher(ds,rec->data,rec->input,l); +@@ -239,43 +254,7 @@ int dtls1_enc(SSL *s, int send) + #endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */ + + if ((bs != 1) && !send) +- { +- ii=i=rec->data[l-1]; /* padding_length */ +- i++; +- if (s->options&SSL_OP_TLS_BLOCK_PADDING_BUG) +- { +- /* First packet is even in size, so check */ +- if ((memcmp(s->s3->read_sequence, +- "\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0",8) == 0) && !(ii & 1)) +- s->s3->flags|=TLS1_FLAGS_TLS_PADDING_BUG; +- if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_TLS_PADDING_BUG) +- i--; +- } +- /* TLS 1.0 does not bound the number of padding bytes by the block size. +- * All of them must have value 'padding_length'. */ +- if (i > (int)rec->length) +- { +- /* Incorrect padding. SSLerr() and ssl3_alert are done +- * by caller: we don't want to reveal whether this is +- * a decryption error or a MAC verification failure +- * (see http://www.openssl.org/~bodo/tls-cbc.txt) +- */ +- return -1; +- } +- for (j=(int)(l-i); j<(int)l; j++) +- { +- if (rec->data[j] != ii) +- { +- /* Incorrect padding */ +- return -1; +- } +- } +- rec->length-=i; +- +- rec->data += bs; /* skip the implicit IV */ +- rec->input += bs; +- rec->length -= bs; +- } ++ return tls1_cbc_remove_padding(s, rec, bs, mac_size); + } + return(1); + } +Index: crypto/openssl/ssl/d1_lib.c +=================================================================== +--- crypto/openssl/ssl/d1_lib.c (revision 248771) ++++ crypto/openssl/ssl/d1_lib.c (working copy) +@@ -145,26 +145,33 @@ int dtls1_new(SSL *s) + return(1); + } + +-void dtls1_free(SSL *s) ++static void dtls1_clear_queues(SSL *s) + { + pitem *item = NULL; + hm_fragment *frag = NULL; ++ DTLS1_RECORD_DATA *rdata; + +- ssl3_free(s); +- + while( (item = pqueue_pop(s->d1->unprocessed_rcds.q)) != NULL) + { ++ rdata = (DTLS1_RECORD_DATA *) item->data; ++ if (rdata->rbuf.buf) ++ { ++ OPENSSL_free(rdata->rbuf.buf); ++ } + OPENSSL_free(item->data); + pitem_free(item); + } +- pqueue_free(s->d1->unprocessed_rcds.q); + + while( (item = pqueue_pop(s->d1->processed_rcds.q)) != NULL) + { ++ rdata = (DTLS1_RECORD_DATA *) item->data; ++ if (rdata->rbuf.buf) ++ { ++ OPENSSL_free(rdata->rbuf.buf); ++ } + OPENSSL_free(item->data); + pitem_free(item); + } +- pqueue_free(s->d1->processed_rcds.q); + + while( (item = pqueue_pop(s->d1->buffered_messages)) != NULL) + { +@@ -173,7 +180,6 @@ int dtls1_new(SSL *s) + OPENSSL_free(frag); + pitem_free(item); + } +- pqueue_free(s->d1->buffered_messages); + + while ( (item = pqueue_pop(s->d1->sent_messages)) != NULL) + { +@@ -182,15 +188,26 @@ int dtls1_new(SSL *s) + OPENSSL_free(frag); + pitem_free(item); + } +- pqueue_free(s->d1->sent_messages); + + while ( (item = pqueue_pop(s->d1->buffered_app_data.q)) != NULL) +- { ++ { + frag = (hm_fragment *)item->data; + OPENSSL_free(frag->fragment); + OPENSSL_free(frag); + pitem_free(item); ++ } + } ++ ++void dtls1_free(SSL *s) ++ { ++ ssl3_free(s); ++ ++ dtls1_clear_queues(s); ++ ++ pqueue_free(s->d1->unprocessed_rcds.q); ++ pqueue_free(s->d1->processed_rcds.q); ++ pqueue_free(s->d1->buffered_messages); ++ pqueue_free(s->d1->sent_messages); + pqueue_free(s->d1->buffered_app_data.q); + + pq_64bit_free(&(s->d1->bitmap.map)); +@@ -204,6 +221,61 @@ int dtls1_new(SSL *s) + + void dtls1_clear(SSL *s) + { ++ pqueue unprocessed_rcds; ++ pqueue processed_rcds; ++ pqueue buffered_messages; ++ pqueue sent_messages; ++ pqueue buffered_app_data; ++ unsigned int mtu; ++ ++ if (s->d1) ++ { ++ unprocessed_rcds = s->d1->unprocessed_rcds.q; ++ processed_rcds = s->d1->processed_rcds.q; ++ buffered_messages = s->d1->buffered_messages; ++ sent_messages = s->d1->sent_messages; ++ buffered_app_data = s->d1->buffered_app_data.q; ++ mtu = s->d1->mtu; ++ ++ dtls1_clear_queues(s); ++ ++ pq_64bit_free(&(s->d1->bitmap.map)); ++ pq_64bit_free(&(s->d1->bitmap.max_seq_num)); ++ ++ pq_64bit_free(&(s->d1->next_bitmap.map)); ++ pq_64bit_free(&(s->d1->next_bitmap.max_seq_num)); ++ ++ memset(s->d1, 0, sizeof(*(s->d1))); ++ ++ if (s->server) ++ { ++ s->d1->cookie_len = sizeof(s->d1->cookie); ++ } ++ ++ if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_QUERY_MTU) ++ { ++ s->d1->mtu = mtu; ++ } ++ ++ s->d1->unprocessed_rcds.q = unprocessed_rcds; ++ s->d1->processed_rcds.q = processed_rcds; ++ s->d1->buffered_messages = buffered_messages; ++ s->d1->sent_messages = sent_messages; ++ s->d1->buffered_app_data.q = buffered_app_data; ++ ++#if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VMS) || defined(VMS_TEST) ++ s->d1->bitmap.length=64; ++#else ++ s->d1->bitmap.length=sizeof(s->d1->bitmap.map) * 8; ++#endif ++ pq_64bit_init(&(s->d1->bitmap.map)); ++ pq_64bit_init(&(s->d1->bitmap.max_seq_num)); ++ ++ s->d1->next_bitmap.length = s->d1->bitmap.length; ++ pq_64bit_init(&(s->d1->next_bitmap.map)); ++ pq_64bit_init(&(s->d1->next_bitmap.max_seq_num)); ++ } ++ + ssl3_clear(s); + if (s->options & SSL_OP_CISCO_ANYCONNECT) + s->version=DTLS1_BAD_VER; +@@ -349,35 +421,51 @@ void dtls1_double_timeout(SSL *s) + void dtls1_stop_timer(SSL *s) + { + /* Reset everything */ ++ memset(&(s->d1->timeout), 0, sizeof(struct dtls1_timeout_st)); + memset(&(s->d1->next_timeout), 0, sizeof(struct timeval)); + s->d1->timeout_duration = 1; + BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_rbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SET_NEXT_TIMEOUT, 0, &(s->d1->next_timeout)); ++ /* Clear retransmission buffer */ ++ dtls1_clear_record_buffer(s); + } + +-int dtls1_handle_timeout(SSL *s) ++int dtls1_check_timeout_num(SSL *s) + { +- DTLS1_STATE *state; ++ s->d1->timeout.num_alerts++; + +- /* if no timer is expired, don't do anything */ +- if (!dtls1_is_timer_expired(s)) ++ /* Reduce MTU after 2 unsuccessful retransmissions */ ++ if (s->d1->timeout.num_alerts > 2) + { +- return 0; ++ s->d1->mtu = BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_GET_FALLBACK_MTU, 0, NULL); + } + +- dtls1_double_timeout(s); +- state = s->d1; +- state->timeout.num_alerts++; +- if ( state->timeout.num_alerts > DTLS1_TMO_ALERT_COUNT) ++ if (s->d1->timeout.num_alerts > DTLS1_TMO_ALERT_COUNT) + { + /* fail the connection, enough alerts have been sent */ +- SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_HANDLE_TIMEOUT,SSL_R_READ_TIMEOUT_EXPIRED); ++ SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_CHECK_TIMEOUT_NUM,SSL_R_READ_TIMEOUT_EXPIRED); ++ return -1; ++ } ++ ++ return 0; ++ } ++ ++int dtls1_handle_timeout(SSL *s) ++ { ++ /* if no timer is expired, don't do anything */ ++ if (!dtls1_is_timer_expired(s)) ++ { + return 0; + } + +- state->timeout.read_timeouts++; +- if ( state->timeout.read_timeouts > DTLS1_TMO_READ_COUNT) ++ dtls1_double_timeout(s); ++ ++ if (dtls1_check_timeout_num(s) < 0) ++ return -1; ++ ++ s->d1->timeout.read_timeouts++; ++ if (s->d1->timeout.read_timeouts > DTLS1_TMO_READ_COUNT) + { +- state->timeout.read_timeouts = 1; ++ s->d1->timeout.read_timeouts = 1; + } + + dtls1_start_timer(s); +Index: crypto/openssl/ssl/d1_pkt.c +=================================================================== +--- crypto/openssl/ssl/d1_pkt.c (revision 248771) ++++ crypto/openssl/ssl/d1_pkt.c (working copy) +@@ -139,7 +139,6 @@ static int dtls1_process_record(SSL *s); + #if PQ_64BIT_IS_INTEGER + static PQ_64BIT bytes_to_long_long(unsigned char *bytes, PQ_64BIT *num); + #endif +-static void dtls1_clear_timeouts(SSL *s); + + /* copy buffered record into SSL structure */ + static int +@@ -328,15 +327,13 @@ dtls1_get_buffered_record(SSL *s) + static int + dtls1_process_record(SSL *s) + { +- int al; +- int clear=0; +- int enc_err; ++ int i,al; ++ int enc_err; + SSL_SESSION *sess; +- SSL3_RECORD *rr; +- unsigned int mac_size; ++ SSL3_RECORD *rr; ++ unsigned int mac_size, orig_len; + unsigned char md[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; + +- + rr= &(s->s3->rrec); + sess = s->session; + +@@ -365,15 +362,18 @@ dtls1_process_record(SSL *s) + + /* decrypt in place in 'rr->input' */ + rr->data=rr->input; ++ orig_len=rr->length; + + enc_err = s->method->ssl3_enc->enc(s,0); +- if (enc_err <= 0) ++ /* enc_err is: ++ * 0: (in non-constant time) if the record is publically invalid. ++ * 1: if the padding is valid ++ * -1: if the padding is invalid */ ++ if (enc_err == 0) + { +- if (enc_err == 0) +- /* SSLerr() and ssl3_send_alert() have been called */ +- goto err; +- +- /* otherwise enc_err == -1 */ ++ /* For DTLS we simply ignore bad packets. */ ++ rr->length = 0; ++ s->packet_length = 0; + goto err; + } + +@@ -384,44 +384,66 @@ printf("\n"); + #endif + + /* r->length is now the compressed data plus mac */ +-if ( (sess == NULL) || +- (s->enc_read_ctx == NULL) || +- (s->read_hash == NULL)) +- clear=1; +- +- if (!clear) ++ if ((sess != NULL) && ++ (s->enc_read_ctx != NULL) && ++ (s->read_hash != NULL)) + { ++ /* s->read_hash != NULL => mac_size != -1 */ ++ unsigned char *mac = NULL; ++ unsigned char mac_tmp[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; + mac_size=EVP_MD_size(s->read_hash); ++ OPENSSL_assert(mac_size <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE); + +- if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH+mac_size) ++ /* orig_len is the length of the record before any padding was ++ * removed. This is public information, as is the MAC in use, ++ * therefore we can safely process the record in a different ++ * amount of time if it's too short to possibly contain a MAC. ++ */ ++ if (orig_len < mac_size || ++ /* CBC records must have a padding length byte too. */ ++ (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s->enc_read_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE && ++ orig_len < mac_size+1)) + { +-#if 0 /* OK only for stream ciphers (then rr->length is visible from ciphertext anyway) */ +- al=SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW; +- SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_RECORD,SSL_R_PRE_MAC_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); +- goto f_err; +-#else +- goto err; +-#endif +- } +- /* check the MAC for rr->input (it's in mac_size bytes at the tail) */ +- if (rr->length < mac_size) +- { +-#if 0 /* OK only for stream ciphers */ + al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; + SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_RECORD,SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT); + goto f_err; +-#else +- goto err; +-#endif + } +- rr->length-=mac_size; +- s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s,md,0); +- if (memcmp(md,&(rr->data[rr->length]),mac_size) != 0) ++ ++ if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s->enc_read_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE) + { +- goto err; ++ /* We update the length so that the TLS header bytes ++ * can be constructed correctly but we need to extract ++ * the MAC in constant time from within the record, ++ * without leaking the contents of the padding bytes. ++ * */ ++ mac = mac_tmp; ++ ssl3_cbc_copy_mac(mac_tmp, rr, mac_size, orig_len); ++ rr->length -= mac_size; + } ++ else ++ { ++ /* In this case there's no padding, so |orig_len| ++ * equals |rec->length| and we checked that there's ++ * enough bytes for |mac_size| above. */ ++ rr->length -= mac_size; ++ mac = &rr->data[rr->length]; ++ } ++ ++ i=s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s,md,0 /* not send */); ++ if (i < 0 || mac == NULL || CRYPTO_memcmp(md, mac, (size_t)mac_size) != 0) ++ enc_err = -1; ++ if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH+mac_size) ++ enc_err = -1; + } + ++ if (enc_err < 0) ++ { ++ /* decryption failed, silently discard message */ ++ rr->length = 0; ++ s->packet_length = 0; ++ goto err; ++ } ++ + /* r->length is now just compressed */ + if (s->expand != NULL) + { +@@ -615,10 +637,12 @@ again: + + /* If this record is from the next epoch (either HM or ALERT), + * and a handshake is currently in progress, buffer it since it +- * cannot be processed at this time. */ ++ * cannot be processed at this time. However, do not buffer ++ * anything while listening. ++ */ + if (is_next_epoch) + { +- if (SSL_in_init(s) || s->in_handshake) ++ if ((SSL_in_init(s) || s->in_handshake) && !s->d1->listen) + { + dtls1_buffer_record(s, &(s->d1->unprocessed_rcds), &rr->seq_num); + } +@@ -634,7 +658,6 @@ again: + goto again; /* get another record */ + } + +- dtls1_clear_timeouts(s); /* done waiting */ + return(1); + + } +@@ -1103,6 +1126,9 @@ start: + */ + if (msg_hdr.type == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) + { ++ if (dtls1_check_timeout_num(s) < 0) ++ return -1; ++ + dtls1_retransmit_buffered_messages(s); + rr->length = 0; + goto start; +@@ -1806,10 +1832,3 @@ bytes_to_long_long(unsigned char *bytes, PQ_64BIT + return _num; + } + #endif +- +- +-static void +-dtls1_clear_timeouts(SSL *s) +- { +- memset(&(s->d1->timeout), 0x00, sizeof(struct dtls1_timeout_st)); +- } +Index: crypto/openssl/ssl/d1_srvr.c +=================================================================== +--- crypto/openssl/ssl/d1_srvr.c (revision 248771) ++++ crypto/openssl/ssl/d1_srvr.c (working copy) +@@ -148,6 +148,7 @@ int dtls1_accept(SSL *s) + void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl,int type,int val)=NULL; + int ret= -1; + int new_state,state,skip=0; ++ int listen; + + RAND_add(&Time,sizeof(Time),0); + ERR_clear_error(); +@@ -157,11 +158,15 @@ int dtls1_accept(SSL *s) + cb=s->info_callback; + else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL) + cb=s->ctx->info_callback; ++ ++ listen = s->d1->listen; + + /* init things to blank */ + s->in_handshake++; + if (!SSL_in_init(s) || SSL_in_before(s)) SSL_clear(s); + ++ s->d1->listen = listen; ++ + if (s->cert == NULL) + { + SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_ACCEPT,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_SET); +@@ -271,11 +276,23 @@ int dtls1_accept(SSL *s) + + s->init_num=0; + ++ /* Reflect ClientHello sequence to remain stateless while listening */ ++ if (listen) ++ { ++ memcpy(s->s3->write_sequence, s->s3->read_sequence, sizeof(s->s3->write_sequence)); ++ } ++ + /* If we're just listening, stop here */ +- if (s->d1->listen && s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A) ++ if (listen && s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A) + { + ret = 2; + s->d1->listen = 0; ++ /* Set expected sequence numbers ++ * to continue the handshake. ++ */ ++ s->d1->handshake_read_seq = 2; ++ s->d1->handshake_write_seq = 1; ++ s->d1->next_handshake_write_seq = 1; + goto end; + } + +@@ -284,7 +301,6 @@ int dtls1_accept(SSL *s) + case DTLS1_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_A: + case DTLS1_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_B: + +- dtls1_start_timer(s); + ret = dtls1_send_hello_verify_request(s); + if ( ret <= 0) goto end; + s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH; +@@ -457,15 +473,16 @@ int dtls1_accept(SSL *s) + ret = ssl3_check_client_hello(s); + if (ret <= 0) + goto end; +- dtls1_stop_timer(s); + if (ret == 2) ++ { ++ dtls1_stop_timer(s); + s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C; ++ } + else { + /* could be sent for a DH cert, even if we + * have not asked for it :-) */ + ret=ssl3_get_client_certificate(s); + if (ret <= 0) goto end; +- dtls1_stop_timer(s); + s->init_num=0; + s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A; + } +@@ -475,7 +492,6 @@ int dtls1_accept(SSL *s) + case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B: + ret=ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(s); + if (ret <= 0) goto end; +- dtls1_stop_timer(s); + s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A; + s->init_num=0; + +@@ -497,7 +513,6 @@ int dtls1_accept(SSL *s) + /* we should decide if we expected this one */ + ret=ssl3_get_cert_verify(s); + if (ret <= 0) goto end; +- dtls1_stop_timer(s); + + s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A; + s->init_num=0; +@@ -713,9 +728,6 @@ int dtls1_send_hello_verify_request(SSL *s) + /* number of bytes to write */ + s->init_num=p-buf; + s->init_off=0; +- +- /* buffer the message to handle re-xmits */ +- dtls1_buffer_message(s, 0); + } + + /* s->state = DTLS1_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_B */ +@@ -736,7 +748,7 @@ int dtls1_send_server_hello(SSL *s) + p=s->s3->server_random; + Time=(unsigned long)time(NULL); /* Time */ + l2n(Time,p); +- RAND_pseudo_bytes(p,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE-sizeof(Time)); ++ RAND_pseudo_bytes(p,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE-4); + /* Do the message type and length last */ + d=p= &(buf[DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH]); + +Index: crypto/openssl/ssl/s2_clnt.c +=================================================================== +--- crypto/openssl/ssl/s2_clnt.c (revision 248771) ++++ crypto/openssl/ssl/s2_clnt.c (working copy) +@@ -935,7 +935,7 @@ static int get_server_verify(SSL *s) + s->msg_callback(0, s->version, 0, p, len, s, s->msg_callback_arg); /* SERVER-VERIFY */ + p += 1; + +- if (memcmp(p,s->s2->challenge,s->s2->challenge_length) != 0) ++ if (CRYPTO_memcmp(p,s->s2->challenge,s->s2->challenge_length) != 0) + { + ssl2_return_error(s,SSL2_PE_UNDEFINED_ERROR); + SSLerr(SSL_F_GET_SERVER_VERIFY,SSL_R_CHALLENGE_IS_DIFFERENT); +Index: crypto/openssl/ssl/s2_pkt.c +=================================================================== +--- crypto/openssl/ssl/s2_pkt.c (revision 248771) ++++ crypto/openssl/ssl/s2_pkt.c (working copy) +@@ -267,8 +267,7 @@ static int ssl2_read_internal(SSL *s, void *buf, i + s->s2->ract_data_length-=mac_size; + ssl2_mac(s,mac,0); + s->s2->ract_data_length-=s->s2->padding; +- if ( (memcmp(mac,s->s2->mac_data, +- (unsigned int)mac_size) != 0) || ++ if ( (CRYPTO_memcmp(mac,s->s2->mac_data,mac_size) != 0) || + (s->s2->rlength%EVP_CIPHER_CTX_block_size(s->enc_read_ctx) != 0)) + { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL2_READ_INTERNAL,SSL_R_BAD_MAC_DECODE); +Index: crypto/openssl/ssl/s2_srvr.c +=================================================================== +--- crypto/openssl/ssl/s2_srvr.c (revision 248771) ++++ crypto/openssl/ssl/s2_srvr.c (working copy) +@@ -403,13 +403,14 @@ static int get_client_master_key(SSL *s) + p+=3; + n2s(p,i); s->s2->tmp.clear=i; + n2s(p,i); s->s2->tmp.enc=i; +- n2s(p,i); s->session->key_arg_length=i; +- if(s->session->key_arg_length > SSL_MAX_KEY_ARG_LENGTH) ++ n2s(p,i); ++ if(i > SSL_MAX_KEY_ARG_LENGTH) + { + ssl2_return_error(s,SSL2_PE_UNDEFINED_ERROR); + SSLerr(SSL_F_GET_CLIENT_MASTER_KEY, SSL_R_KEY_ARG_TOO_LONG); + return -1; + } ++ s->session->key_arg_length=i; + s->state=SSL2_ST_GET_CLIENT_MASTER_KEY_B; + } + +Index: crypto/openssl/ssl/s3_both.c +=================================================================== +--- crypto/openssl/ssl/s3_both.c (revision 248771) ++++ crypto/openssl/ssl/s3_both.c (working copy) +@@ -242,7 +242,7 @@ int ssl3_get_finished(SSL *s, int a, int b) + goto f_err; + } + +- if (memcmp(p, s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md, i) != 0) ++ if (CRYPTO_memcmp(p, s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md, i) != 0) + { + al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR; + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_FINISHED,SSL_R_DIGEST_CHECK_FAILED); +Index: crypto/openssl/ssl/s3_cbc.c +=================================================================== +--- crypto/openssl/ssl/s3_cbc.c (revision 0) ++++ crypto/openssl/ssl/s3_cbc.c (working copy) +@@ -0,0 +1,762 @@ ++/* ssl/s3_cbc.c */ ++/* ==================================================================== ++ * Copyright (c) 2012 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. ++ * ++ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without ++ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions ++ * are met: ++ * ++ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright ++ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. ++ * ++ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright ++ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in ++ * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the ++ * distribution. ++ * ++ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this ++ * software must display the following acknowledgment: ++ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project ++ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)" ++ * ++ * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to ++ * endorse or promote products derived from this software without ++ * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact ++ * openssl-core@openssl.org. ++ * ++ * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL" ++ * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written ++ * permission of the OpenSSL Project. ++ * ++ * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following ++ * acknowledgment: ++ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project ++ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)" ++ * ++ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY ++ * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE ++ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR ++ * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR ++ * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, ++ * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT ++ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; ++ * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) ++ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, ++ * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ++ * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED ++ * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. ++ * ==================================================================== ++ * ++ * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young ++ * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim ++ * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). ++ * ++ */ ++ ++#include "ssl_locl.h" ++ ++#include ++#include ++ ++/* MAX_HASH_BIT_COUNT_BYTES is the maximum number of bytes in the hash's length ++ * field. (SHA-384/512 have 128-bit length.) */ ++#define MAX_HASH_BIT_COUNT_BYTES 16 ++ ++/* MAX_HASH_BLOCK_SIZE is the maximum hash block size that we'll support. ++ * Currently SHA-384/512 has a 128-byte block size and that's the largest ++ * supported by TLS.) */ ++#define MAX_HASH_BLOCK_SIZE 128 ++ ++/* Some utility functions are needed: ++ * ++ * These macros return the given value with the MSB copied to all the other ++ * bits. They use the fact that arithmetic shift shifts-in the sign bit. ++ * However, this is not ensured by the C standard so you may need to replace ++ * them with something else on odd CPUs. */ ++#define DUPLICATE_MSB_TO_ALL(x) ( (unsigned)( (int)(x) >> (sizeof(int)*8-1) ) ) ++#define DUPLICATE_MSB_TO_ALL_8(x) ((unsigned char)(DUPLICATE_MSB_TO_ALL(x))) ++ ++/* constant_time_ge returns 0xff if a>=b and 0x00 otherwise. */ ++static unsigned constant_time_ge(unsigned a, unsigned b) ++ { ++ a -= b; ++ return DUPLICATE_MSB_TO_ALL(~a); ++ } ++ ++/* constant_time_eq_8 returns 0xff if a==b and 0x00 otherwise. */ ++static unsigned char constant_time_eq_8(unsigned char a, unsigned char b) ++ { ++ unsigned c = a ^ b; ++ c--; ++ return DUPLICATE_MSB_TO_ALL_8(c); ++ } ++ ++/* ssl3_cbc_remove_padding removes padding from the decrypted, SSLv3, CBC ++ * record in |rec| by updating |rec->length| in constant time. ++ * ++ * block_size: the block size of the cipher used to encrypt the record. ++ * returns: ++ * 0: (in non-constant time) if the record is publicly invalid. ++ * 1: if the padding was valid ++ * -1: otherwise. */ ++int ssl3_cbc_remove_padding(const SSL* s, ++ SSL3_RECORD *rec, ++ unsigned block_size, ++ unsigned mac_size) ++ { ++ unsigned padding_length, good; ++ const unsigned overhead = 1 /* padding length byte */ + mac_size; ++ ++ /* These lengths are all public so we can test them in non-constant ++ * time. */ ++ if (overhead > rec->length) ++ return 0; ++ ++ padding_length = rec->data[rec->length-1]; ++ good = constant_time_ge(rec->length, padding_length+overhead); ++ /* SSLv3 requires that the padding is minimal. */ ++ good &= constant_time_ge(block_size, padding_length+1); ++ padding_length = good & (padding_length+1); ++ rec->length -= padding_length; ++ rec->type |= padding_length<<8; /* kludge: pass padding length */ ++ return (int)((good & 1) | (~good & -1)); ++} ++ ++/* tls1_cbc_remove_padding removes the CBC padding from the decrypted, TLS, CBC ++ * record in |rec| in constant time and returns 1 if the padding is valid and ++ * -1 otherwise. It also removes any explicit IV from the start of the record ++ * without leaking any timing about whether there was enough space after the ++ * padding was removed. ++ * ++ * block_size: the block size of the cipher used to encrypt the record. ++ * returns: ++ * 0: (in non-constant time) if the record is publicly invalid. ++ * 1: if the padding was valid ++ * -1: otherwise. */ ++int tls1_cbc_remove_padding(const SSL* s, ++ SSL3_RECORD *rec, ++ unsigned block_size, ++ unsigned mac_size) ++ { ++ unsigned padding_length, good, to_check, i; ++ const char has_explicit_iv = s->version == DTLS1_VERSION; ++ const unsigned overhead = 1 /* padding length byte */ + ++ mac_size + ++ (has_explicit_iv ? block_size : 0); ++ ++ /* These lengths are all public so we can test them in non-constant ++ * time. */ ++ if (overhead > rec->length) ++ return 0; ++ ++ padding_length = rec->data[rec->length-1]; ++ ++ /* NB: if compression is in operation the first packet may not be of ++ * even length so the padding bug check cannot be performed. This bug ++ * workaround has been around since SSLeay so hopefully it is either ++ * fixed now or no buggy implementation supports compression [steve] ++ */ ++ if ( (s->options&SSL_OP_TLS_BLOCK_PADDING_BUG) && !s->expand) ++ { ++ /* First packet is even in size, so check */ ++ if ((memcmp(s->s3->read_sequence, "\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0",8) == 0) && ++ !(padding_length & 1)) ++ { ++ s->s3->flags|=TLS1_FLAGS_TLS_PADDING_BUG; ++ } ++ if ((s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_TLS_PADDING_BUG) && ++ padding_length > 0) ++ { ++ padding_length--; ++ } ++ } ++ ++ good = constant_time_ge(rec->length, overhead+padding_length); ++ /* The padding consists of a length byte at the end of the record and ++ * then that many bytes of padding, all with the same value as the ++ * length byte. Thus, with the length byte included, there are i+1 ++ * bytes of padding. ++ * ++ * We can't check just |padding_length+1| bytes because that leaks ++ * decrypted information. Therefore we always have to check the maximum ++ * amount of padding possible. (Again, the length of the record is ++ * public information so we can use it.) */ ++ to_check = 255; /* maximum amount of padding. */ ++ if (to_check > rec->length-1) ++ to_check = rec->length-1; ++ ++ for (i = 0; i < to_check; i++) ++ { ++ unsigned char mask = constant_time_ge(padding_length, i); ++ unsigned char b = rec->data[rec->length-1-i]; ++ /* The final |padding_length+1| bytes should all have the value ++ * |padding_length|. Therefore the XOR should be zero. */ ++ good &= ~(mask&(padding_length ^ b)); ++ } ++ ++ /* If any of the final |padding_length+1| bytes had the wrong value, ++ * one or more of the lower eight bits of |good| will be cleared. We ++ * AND the bottom 8 bits together and duplicate the result to all the ++ * bits. */ ++ good &= good >> 4; ++ good &= good >> 2; ++ good &= good >> 1; ++ good <<= sizeof(good)*8-1; ++ good = DUPLICATE_MSB_TO_ALL(good); ++ ++ padding_length = good & (padding_length+1); ++ rec->length -= padding_length; ++ rec->type |= padding_length<<8; /* kludge: pass padding length */ ++ ++ /* We can always safely skip the explicit IV. We check at the beginning ++ * of this function that the record has at least enough space for the ++ * IV, MAC and padding length byte. (These can be checked in ++ * non-constant time because it's all public information.) So, if the ++ * padding was invalid, then we didn't change |rec->length| and this is ++ * safe. If the padding was valid then we know that we have at least ++ * overhead+padding_length bytes of space and so this is still safe ++ * because overhead accounts for the explicit IV. */ ++ if (has_explicit_iv) ++ { ++ rec->data += block_size; ++ rec->input += block_size; ++ rec->length -= block_size; ++ } ++ ++ return (int)((good & 1) | (~good & -1)); ++ } ++ ++#if defined(_M_AMD64) || defined(__x86_64__) ++#define CBC_MAC_ROTATE_IN_PLACE ++#endif ++ ++/* ssl3_cbc_copy_mac copies |md_size| bytes from the end of |rec| to |out| in ++ * constant time (independent of the concrete value of rec->length, which may ++ * vary within a 256-byte window). ++ * ++ * ssl3_cbc_remove_padding or tls1_cbc_remove_padding must be called prior to ++ * this function. ++ * ++ * On entry: ++ * rec->orig_len >= md_size ++ * md_size <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE ++ * ++ * If CBC_MAC_ROTATE_IN_PLACE is defined then the rotation is performed with ++ * variable accesses in a 64-byte-aligned buffer. Assuming that this fits into ++ * a single cache-line, then the variable memory accesses don't actually affect ++ * the timing. This has been tested to be true on Intel amd64 chips. ++ */ ++void ssl3_cbc_copy_mac(unsigned char* out, ++ const SSL3_RECORD *rec, ++ unsigned md_size,unsigned orig_len) ++ { ++#if defined(CBC_MAC_ROTATE_IN_PLACE) ++ unsigned char rotated_mac_buf[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE*2]; ++ unsigned char *rotated_mac; ++#else ++ unsigned char rotated_mac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; ++#endif ++ ++ /* mac_end is the index of |rec->data| just after the end of the MAC. */ ++ unsigned mac_end = rec->length; ++ unsigned mac_start = mac_end - md_size; ++ /* scan_start contains the number of bytes that we can ignore because ++ * the MAC's position can only vary by 255 bytes. */ ++ unsigned scan_start = 0; ++ unsigned i, j; ++ unsigned div_spoiler; ++ unsigned rotate_offset; ++ ++ OPENSSL_assert(orig_len >= md_size); ++ OPENSSL_assert(md_size <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE); ++ ++#if defined(CBC_MAC_ROTATE_IN_PLACE) ++ rotated_mac = (unsigned char*) (((intptr_t)(rotated_mac_buf + 64)) & ~63); ++#endif ++ ++ /* This information is public so it's safe to branch based on it. */ ++ if (orig_len > md_size + 255 + 1) ++ scan_start = orig_len - (md_size + 255 + 1); ++ /* div_spoiler contains a multiple of md_size that is used to cause the ++ * modulo operation to be constant time. Without this, the time varies ++ * based on the amount of padding when running on Intel chips at least. ++ * ++ * The aim of right-shifting md_size is so that the compiler doesn't ++ * figure out that it can remove div_spoiler as that would require it ++ * to prove that md_size is always even, which I hope is beyond it. */ ++ div_spoiler = md_size >> 1; ++ div_spoiler <<= (sizeof(div_spoiler)-1)*8; ++ rotate_offset = (div_spoiler + mac_start - scan_start) % md_size; ++ ++ memset(rotated_mac, 0, md_size); ++ for (i = scan_start; i < orig_len;) ++ { ++ for (j = 0; j < md_size && i < orig_len; i++, j++) ++ { ++ unsigned char mac_started = constant_time_ge(i, mac_start); ++ unsigned char mac_ended = constant_time_ge(i, mac_end); ++ unsigned char b = 0; ++ b = rec->data[i]; ++ rotated_mac[j] |= b & mac_started & ~mac_ended; ++ } ++ } ++ ++ /* Now rotate the MAC */ ++#if defined(CBC_MAC_ROTATE_IN_PLACE) ++ j = 0; ++ for (i = 0; i < md_size; i++) ++ { ++ unsigned char offset = (div_spoiler + rotate_offset + i) % md_size; ++ out[j++] = rotated_mac[offset]; ++ } ++#else ++ memset(out, 0, md_size); ++ for (i = 0; i < md_size; i++) ++ { ++ unsigned char offset = (div_spoiler + md_size - rotate_offset + i) % md_size; ++ for (j = 0; j < md_size; j++) ++ out[j] |= rotated_mac[i] & constant_time_eq_8(j, offset); ++ } ++#endif ++ } ++ ++/* These functions serialize the state of a hash and thus perform the standard ++ * "final" operation without adding the padding and length that such a function ++ * typically does. */ ++static void tls1_md5_final_raw(void* ctx, unsigned char *md_out) ++ { ++ MD5_CTX *md5 = ctx; ++ l2n(md5->A, md_out); ++ l2n(md5->B, md_out); ++ l2n(md5->C, md_out); ++ l2n(md5->D, md_out); ++ } ++ ++static void tls1_sha1_final_raw(void* ctx, unsigned char *md_out) ++ { ++ SHA_CTX *sha1 = ctx; ++ l2n(sha1->h0, md_out); ++ l2n(sha1->h1, md_out); ++ l2n(sha1->h2, md_out); ++ l2n(sha1->h3, md_out); ++ l2n(sha1->h4, md_out); ++ } ++#define LARGEST_DIGEST_CTX SHA_CTX ++ ++#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256 ++static void tls1_sha256_final_raw(void* ctx, unsigned char *md_out) ++ { ++ SHA256_CTX *sha256 = ctx; ++ unsigned i; ++ ++ for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) ++ { ++ l2n(sha256->h[i], md_out); ++ } ++ } ++#undef LARGEST_DIGEST_CTX ++#define LARGEST_DIGEST_CTX SHA256_CTX ++#endif ++ ++#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA512 ++static void tls1_sha512_final_raw(void* ctx, unsigned char *md_out) ++ { ++ SHA512_CTX *sha512 = ctx; ++ unsigned i; ++ ++ for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) ++ { ++ l2n8(sha512->h[i], md_out); ++ } ++ } ++#undef LARGEST_DIGEST_CTX ++#define LARGEST_DIGEST_CTX SHA512_CTX ++#endif ++ ++/* ssl3_cbc_record_digest_supported returns 1 iff |ctx| uses a hash function ++ * which ssl3_cbc_digest_record supports. */ ++char ssl3_cbc_record_digest_supported(const EVP_MD *digest) ++ { ++#ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS ++ if (FIPS_mode()) ++ return 0; ++#endif ++ switch (EVP_MD_type(digest)) ++ { ++ case NID_md5: ++ case NID_sha1: ++#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256 ++ case NID_sha224: ++ case NID_sha256: ++#endif ++#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA512 ++ case NID_sha384: ++ case NID_sha512: ++#endif ++ return 1; ++ default: ++ return 0; ++ } ++ } ++ ++/* ssl3_cbc_digest_record computes the MAC of a decrypted, padded SSLv3/TLS ++ * record. ++ * ++ * ctx: the EVP_MD_CTX from which we take the hash function. ++ * ssl3_cbc_record_digest_supported must return true for this EVP_MD_CTX. ++ * md_out: the digest output. At most EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE bytes will be written. ++ * md_out_size: if non-NULL, the number of output bytes is written here. ++ * header: the 13-byte, TLS record header. ++ * data: the record data itself, less any preceeding explicit IV. ++ * data_plus_mac_size: the secret, reported length of the data and MAC ++ * once the padding has been removed. ++ * data_plus_mac_plus_padding_size: the public length of the whole ++ * record, including padding. ++ * is_sslv3: non-zero if we are to use SSLv3. Otherwise, TLS. ++ * ++ * On entry: by virtue of having been through one of the remove_padding ++ * functions, above, we know that data_plus_mac_size is large enough to contain ++ * a padding byte and MAC. (If the padding was invalid, it might contain the ++ * padding too. ) */ ++void ssl3_cbc_digest_record( ++ const EVP_MD *digest, ++ unsigned char* md_out, ++ size_t* md_out_size, ++ const unsigned char header[13], ++ const unsigned char *data, ++ size_t data_plus_mac_size, ++ size_t data_plus_mac_plus_padding_size, ++ const unsigned char *mac_secret, ++ unsigned mac_secret_length, ++ char is_sslv3) ++ { ++ union { double align; ++ unsigned char c[sizeof(LARGEST_DIGEST_CTX)]; } md_state; ++ void (*md_final_raw)(void *ctx, unsigned char *md_out); ++ void (*md_transform)(void *ctx, const unsigned char *block); ++ unsigned md_size, md_block_size = 64; ++ unsigned sslv3_pad_length = 40, header_length, variance_blocks, ++ len, max_mac_bytes, num_blocks, ++ num_starting_blocks, k, mac_end_offset, c, index_a, index_b; ++ unsigned int bits; /* at most 18 bits */ ++ unsigned char length_bytes[MAX_HASH_BIT_COUNT_BYTES]; ++ /* hmac_pad is the masked HMAC key. */ ++ unsigned char hmac_pad[MAX_HASH_BLOCK_SIZE]; ++ unsigned char first_block[MAX_HASH_BLOCK_SIZE]; ++ unsigned char mac_out[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; ++ unsigned i, j, md_out_size_u; ++ EVP_MD_CTX md_ctx; ++ /* mdLengthSize is the number of bytes in the length field that terminates ++ * the hash. */ ++ unsigned md_length_size = 8; ++ ++ /* This is a, hopefully redundant, check that allows us to forget about ++ * many possible overflows later in this function. */ ++ OPENSSL_assert(data_plus_mac_plus_padding_size < 1024*1024); ++ ++ switch (EVP_MD_type(digest)) ++ { ++ case NID_md5: ++ MD5_Init((MD5_CTX*)md_state.c); ++ md_final_raw = tls1_md5_final_raw; ++ md_transform = (void(*)(void *ctx, const unsigned char *block)) MD5_Transform; ++ md_size = 16; ++ sslv3_pad_length = 48; ++ break; ++ case NID_sha1: ++ SHA1_Init((SHA_CTX*)md_state.c); ++ md_final_raw = tls1_sha1_final_raw; ++ md_transform = (void(*)(void *ctx, const unsigned char *block)) SHA1_Transform; ++ md_size = 20; ++ break; ++#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256 ++ case NID_sha224: ++ SHA224_Init((SHA256_CTX*)md_state.c); ++ md_final_raw = tls1_sha256_final_raw; ++ md_transform = (void(*)(void *ctx, const unsigned char *block)) SHA256_Transform; ++ md_size = 224/8; ++ break; ++ case NID_sha256: ++ SHA256_Init((SHA256_CTX*)md_state.c); ++ md_final_raw = tls1_sha256_final_raw; ++ md_transform = (void(*)(void *ctx, const unsigned char *block)) SHA256_Transform; ++ md_size = 32; ++ break; ++#endif ++#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA512 ++ case NID_sha384: ++ SHA384_Init((SHA512_CTX*)md_state.c); ++ md_final_raw = tls1_sha512_final_raw; ++ md_transform = (void(*)(void *ctx, const unsigned char *block)) SHA512_Transform; ++ md_size = 384/8; ++ md_block_size = 128; ++ md_length_size = 16; ++ break; ++ case NID_sha512: ++ SHA512_Init((SHA512_CTX*)md_state.c); ++ md_final_raw = tls1_sha512_final_raw; ++ md_transform = (void(*)(void *ctx, const unsigned char *block)) SHA512_Transform; ++ md_size = 64; ++ md_block_size = 128; ++ md_length_size = 16; ++ break; ++#endif ++ default: ++ /* ssl3_cbc_record_digest_supported should have been ++ * called first to check that the hash function is ++ * supported. */ ++ OPENSSL_assert(0); ++ if (md_out_size) ++ *md_out_size = -1; ++ return; ++ } ++ ++ OPENSSL_assert(md_length_size <= MAX_HASH_BIT_COUNT_BYTES); ++ OPENSSL_assert(md_block_size <= MAX_HASH_BLOCK_SIZE); ++ OPENSSL_assert(md_size <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE); ++ ++ header_length = 13; ++ if (is_sslv3) ++ { ++ header_length = ++ mac_secret_length + ++ sslv3_pad_length + ++ 8 /* sequence number */ + ++ 1 /* record type */ + ++ 2 /* record length */; ++ } ++ ++ /* variance_blocks is the number of blocks of the hash that we have to ++ * calculate in constant time because they could be altered by the ++ * padding value. ++ * ++ * In SSLv3, the padding must be minimal so the end of the plaintext ++ * varies by, at most, 15+20 = 35 bytes. (We conservatively assume that ++ * the MAC size varies from 0..20 bytes.) In case the 9 bytes of hash ++ * termination (0x80 + 64-bit length) don't fit in the final block, we ++ * say that the final two blocks can vary based on the padding. ++ * ++ * TLSv1 has MACs up to 48 bytes long (SHA-384) and the padding is not ++ * required to be minimal. Therefore we say that the final six blocks ++ * can vary based on the padding. ++ * ++ * Later in the function, if the message is short and there obviously ++ * cannot be this many blocks then variance_blocks can be reduced. */ ++ variance_blocks = is_sslv3 ? 2 : 6; ++ /* From now on we're dealing with the MAC, which conceptually has 13 ++ * bytes of `header' before the start of the data (TLS) or 71/75 bytes ++ * (SSLv3) */ ++ len = data_plus_mac_plus_padding_size + header_length; ++ /* max_mac_bytes contains the maximum bytes of bytes in the MAC, including ++ * |header|, assuming that there's no padding. */ ++ max_mac_bytes = len - md_size - 1; ++ /* num_blocks is the maximum number of hash blocks. */ ++ num_blocks = (max_mac_bytes + 1 + md_length_size + md_block_size - 1) / md_block_size; ++ /* In order to calculate the MAC in constant time we have to handle ++ * the final blocks specially because the padding value could cause the ++ * end to appear somewhere in the final |variance_blocks| blocks and we ++ * can't leak where. However, |num_starting_blocks| worth of data can ++ * be hashed right away because no padding value can affect whether ++ * they are plaintext. */ ++ num_starting_blocks = 0; ++ /* k is the starting byte offset into the conceptual header||data where ++ * we start processing. */ ++ k = 0; ++ /* mac_end_offset is the index just past the end of the data to be ++ * MACed. */ ++ mac_end_offset = data_plus_mac_size + header_length - md_size; ++ /* c is the index of the 0x80 byte in the final hash block that ++ * contains application data. */ ++ c = mac_end_offset % md_block_size; ++ /* index_a is the hash block number that contains the 0x80 terminating ++ * value. */ ++ index_a = mac_end_offset / md_block_size; ++ /* index_b is the hash block number that contains the 64-bit hash ++ * length, in bits. */ ++ index_b = (mac_end_offset + md_length_size) / md_block_size; ++ /* bits is the hash-length in bits. It includes the additional hash ++ * block for the masked HMAC key, or whole of |header| in the case of ++ * SSLv3. */ ++ ++ /* For SSLv3, if we're going to have any starting blocks then we need ++ * at least two because the header is larger than a single block. */ ++ if (num_blocks > variance_blocks + (is_sslv3 ? 1 : 0)) ++ { ++ num_starting_blocks = num_blocks - variance_blocks; ++ k = md_block_size*num_starting_blocks; ++ } ++ ++ bits = 8*mac_end_offset; ++ if (!is_sslv3) ++ { ++ /* Compute the initial HMAC block. For SSLv3, the padding and ++ * secret bytes are included in |header| because they take more ++ * than a single block. */ ++ bits += 8*md_block_size; ++ memset(hmac_pad, 0, md_block_size); ++ OPENSSL_assert(mac_secret_length <= sizeof(hmac_pad)); ++ memcpy(hmac_pad, mac_secret, mac_secret_length); ++ for (i = 0; i < md_block_size; i++) ++ hmac_pad[i] ^= 0x36; ++ ++ md_transform(md_state.c, hmac_pad); ++ } ++ ++ memset(length_bytes,0,md_length_size-4); ++ length_bytes[md_length_size-4] = (unsigned char)(bits>>24); ++ length_bytes[md_length_size-3] = (unsigned char)(bits>>16); ++ length_bytes[md_length_size-2] = (unsigned char)(bits>>8); ++ length_bytes[md_length_size-1] = (unsigned char)bits; ++ ++ if (k > 0) ++ { ++ if (is_sslv3) ++ { ++ /* The SSLv3 header is larger than a single block. ++ * overhang is the number of bytes beyond a single ++ * block that the header consumes: either 7 bytes ++ * (SHA1) or 11 bytes (MD5). */ ++ unsigned overhang = header_length-md_block_size; ++ md_transform(md_state.c, header); ++ memcpy(first_block, header + md_block_size, overhang); ++ memcpy(first_block + overhang, data, md_block_size-overhang); ++ md_transform(md_state.c, first_block); ++ for (i = 1; i < k/md_block_size - 1; i++) ++ md_transform(md_state.c, data + md_block_size*i - overhang); ++ } ++ else ++ { ++ /* k is a multiple of md_block_size. */ ++ memcpy(first_block, header, 13); ++ memcpy(first_block+13, data, md_block_size-13); ++ md_transform(md_state.c, first_block); ++ for (i = 1; i < k/md_block_size; i++) ++ md_transform(md_state.c, data + md_block_size*i - 13); ++ } ++ } ++ ++ memset(mac_out, 0, sizeof(mac_out)); ++ ++ /* We now process the final hash blocks. For each block, we construct ++ * it in constant time. If the |i==index_a| then we'll include the 0x80 ++ * bytes and zero pad etc. For each block we selectively copy it, in ++ * constant time, to |mac_out|. */ ++ for (i = num_starting_blocks; i <= num_starting_blocks+variance_blocks; i++) ++ { ++ unsigned char block[MAX_HASH_BLOCK_SIZE]; ++ unsigned char is_block_a = constant_time_eq_8(i, index_a); ++ unsigned char is_block_b = constant_time_eq_8(i, index_b); ++ for (j = 0; j < md_block_size; j++) ++ { ++ unsigned char b = 0, is_past_c, is_past_cp1; ++ if (k < header_length) ++ b = header[k]; ++ else if (k < data_plus_mac_plus_padding_size + header_length) ++ b = data[k-header_length]; ++ k++; ++ ++ is_past_c = is_block_a & constant_time_ge(j, c); ++ is_past_cp1 = is_block_a & constant_time_ge(j, c+1); ++ /* If this is the block containing the end of the ++ * application data, and we are at the offset for the ++ * 0x80 value, then overwrite b with 0x80. */ ++ b = (b&~is_past_c) | (0x80&is_past_c); ++ /* If this the the block containing the end of the ++ * application data and we're past the 0x80 value then ++ * just write zero. */ ++ b = b&~is_past_cp1; ++ /* If this is index_b (the final block), but not ++ * index_a (the end of the data), then the 64-bit ++ * length didn't fit into index_a and we're having to ++ * add an extra block of zeros. */ ++ b &= ~is_block_b | is_block_a; ++ ++ /* The final bytes of one of the blocks contains the ++ * length. */ ++ if (j >= md_block_size - md_length_size) ++ { ++ /* If this is index_b, write a length byte. */ ++ b = (b&~is_block_b) | (is_block_b&length_bytes[j-(md_block_size-md_length_size)]); ++ } ++ block[j] = b; ++ } ++ ++ md_transform(md_state.c, block); ++ md_final_raw(md_state.c, block); ++ /* If this is index_b, copy the hash value to |mac_out|. */ ++ for (j = 0; j < md_size; j++) ++ mac_out[j] |= block[j]&is_block_b; ++ } ++ ++ EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx); ++ EVP_DigestInit_ex(&md_ctx, digest, NULL /* engine */); ++ if (is_sslv3) ++ { ++ /* We repurpose |hmac_pad| to contain the SSLv3 pad2 block. */ ++ memset(hmac_pad, 0x5c, sslv3_pad_length); ++ ++ EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, mac_secret, mac_secret_length); ++ EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, hmac_pad, sslv3_pad_length); ++ EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, mac_out, md_size); ++ } ++ else ++ { ++ /* Complete the HMAC in the standard manner. */ ++ for (i = 0; i < md_block_size; i++) ++ hmac_pad[i] ^= 0x6a; ++ ++ EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, hmac_pad, md_block_size); ++ EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, mac_out, md_size); ++ } ++ EVP_DigestFinal(&md_ctx, md_out, &md_out_size_u); ++ if (md_out_size) ++ *md_out_size = md_out_size_u; ++ EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx); ++ } ++ ++#ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS ++ ++/* Due to the need to use EVP in FIPS mode we can't reimplement digests but ++ * we can ensure the number of blocks processed is equal for all cases ++ * by digesting additional data. ++ */ ++ ++void tls_fips_digest_extra( ++ const EVP_CIPHER_CTX *cipher_ctx, const EVP_MD *hash, HMAC_CTX *hctx, ++ const unsigned char *data, size_t data_len, size_t orig_len) ++ { ++ size_t block_size, digest_pad, blocks_data, blocks_orig; ++ if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(cipher_ctx) != EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE) ++ return; ++ block_size = EVP_MD_block_size(hash); ++ /* We are in FIPS mode if we get this far so we know we have only SHA* ++ * digests and TLS to deal with. ++ * Minimum digest padding length is 17 for SHA384/SHA512 and 9 ++ * otherwise. ++ * Additional header is 13 bytes. To get the number of digest blocks ++ * processed round up the amount of data plus padding to the nearest ++ * block length. Block length is 128 for SHA384/SHA512 and 64 otherwise. ++ * So we have: ++ * blocks = (payload_len + digest_pad + 13 + block_size - 1)/block_size ++ * equivalently: ++ * blocks = (payload_len + digest_pad + 12)/block_size + 1 ++ * HMAC adds a constant overhead. ++ * We're ultimately only interested in differences so this becomes ++ * blocks = (payload_len + 29)/128 ++ * for SHA384/SHA512 and ++ * blocks = (payload_len + 21)/64 ++ * otherwise. ++ */ ++ digest_pad = block_size == 64 ? 21 : 29; ++ blocks_orig = (orig_len + digest_pad)/block_size; ++ blocks_data = (data_len + digest_pad)/block_size; ++ /* MAC enough blocks to make up the difference between the original ++ * and actual lengths plus one extra block to ensure this is never a ++ * no op. The "data" pointer should always have enough space to ++ * perform this operation as it is large enough for a maximum ++ * length TLS buffer. ++ */ ++ HMAC_Update(hctx, data, ++ (blocks_orig - blocks_data + 1) * block_size); ++ } ++#endif +Index: crypto/openssl/ssl/s3_clnt.c +=================================================================== +--- crypto/openssl/ssl/s3_clnt.c (revision 248771) ++++ crypto/openssl/ssl/s3_clnt.c (working copy) +@@ -262,7 +262,16 @@ int ssl3_connect(SSL *s) + ret=ssl3_get_server_hello(s); + if (ret <= 0) goto end; + if (s->hit) ++ { + s->state=SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A; ++#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT ++ if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected) ++ { ++ /* receive renewed session ticket */ ++ s->state=SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_A; ++ } ++#endif ++ } + else + s->state=SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_A; + s->init_num=0; +@@ -878,7 +887,7 @@ int ssl3_get_server_hello(SSL *s) + /* wrong packet length */ + al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_BAD_PACKET_LENGTH); +- goto err; ++ goto f_err; + } + + return(1); +@@ -1713,7 +1722,7 @@ int ssl3_get_new_session_ticket(SSL *s) + if (n < 6) + { + /* need at least ticket_lifetime_hint + ticket length */ +- al = SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; ++ al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); + goto f_err; + } +@@ -1724,7 +1733,7 @@ int ssl3_get_new_session_ticket(SSL *s) + /* ticket_lifetime_hint + ticket_length + ticket */ + if (ticklen + 6 != n) + { +- al = SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; ++ al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); + goto f_err; + } +Index: crypto/openssl/ssl/s3_enc.c +=================================================================== +--- crypto/openssl/ssl/s3_enc.c (revision 248771) ++++ crypto/openssl/ssl/s3_enc.c (working copy) +@@ -433,12 +433,21 @@ void ssl3_cleanup_key_block(SSL *s) + s->s3->tmp.key_block_length=0; + } + ++/* ssl3_enc encrypts/decrypts the record in |s->wrec| / |s->rrec|, respectively. ++ * ++ * Returns: ++ * 0: (in non-constant time) if the record is publically invalid (i.e. too ++ * short etc). ++ * 1: if the record's padding is valid / the encryption was successful. ++ * -1: if the record's padding is invalid or, if sending, an internal error ++ * occured. ++ */ + int ssl3_enc(SSL *s, int send) + { + SSL3_RECORD *rec; + EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ds; + unsigned long l; +- int bs,i; ++ int bs,i,mac_size=0; + const EVP_CIPHER *enc; + + if (send) +@@ -489,32 +498,17 @@ int ssl3_enc(SSL *s, int send) + if (!send) + { + if (l == 0 || l%bs != 0) +- { +- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ENC,SSL_R_BLOCK_CIPHER_PAD_IS_WRONG); +- ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_DECRYPTION_FAILED); + return 0; +- } + /* otherwise, rec->length >= bs */ + } + + EVP_Cipher(ds,rec->data,rec->input,l); + ++ if (s->read_hash != NULL) ++ mac_size = EVP_MD_size(s->read_hash); ++ + if ((bs != 1) && !send) +- { +- i=rec->data[l-1]+1; +- /* SSL 3.0 bounds the number of padding bytes by the block size; +- * padding bytes (except the last one) are arbitrary */ +- if (i > bs) +- { +- /* Incorrect padding. SSLerr() and ssl3_alert are done +- * by caller: we don't want to reveal whether this is +- * a decryption error or a MAC verification failure +- * (see http://www.openssl.org/~bodo/tls-cbc.txt) */ +- return -1; +- } +- /* now i <= bs <= rec->length */ +- rec->length-=i; +- } ++ return ssl3_cbc_remove_padding(s, rec, bs, mac_size); + } + return(1); + } +@@ -591,7 +585,7 @@ int ssl3_mac(SSL *ssl, unsigned char *md, int send + EVP_MD_CTX md_ctx; + const EVP_MD *hash; + unsigned char *p,rec_char; +- unsigned int md_size; ++ size_t md_size, orig_len; + int npad; + + if (send) +@@ -612,29 +606,73 @@ int ssl3_mac(SSL *ssl, unsigned char *md, int send + md_size=EVP_MD_size(hash); + npad=(48/md_size)*md_size; + +- /* Chop the digest off the end :-) */ +- EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx); ++ /* kludge: ssl3_cbc_remove_padding passes padding length in rec->type */ ++ orig_len = rec->length+md_size+((unsigned int)rec->type>>8); ++ rec->type &= 0xff; + +- EVP_DigestInit_ex( &md_ctx,hash, NULL); +- EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,mac_sec,md_size); +- EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,ssl3_pad_1,npad); +- EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,seq,8); +- rec_char=rec->type; +- EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&rec_char,1); +- p=md; +- s2n(rec->length,p); +- EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,md,2); +- EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,rec->input,rec->length); +- EVP_DigestFinal_ex( &md_ctx,md,NULL); ++ if (!send && ++ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(ssl->enc_read_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE && ++ ssl3_cbc_record_digest_supported(hash)) ++ { ++ /* This is a CBC-encrypted record. We must avoid leaking any ++ * timing-side channel information about how many blocks of ++ * data we are hashing because that gives an attacker a ++ * timing-oracle. */ + +- EVP_DigestInit_ex( &md_ctx,hash, NULL); +- EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,mac_sec,md_size); +- EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,ssl3_pad_2,npad); +- EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,md,md_size); +- EVP_DigestFinal_ex( &md_ctx,md,&md_size); ++ /* npad is, at most, 48 bytes and that's with MD5: ++ * 16 + 48 + 8 (sequence bytes) + 1 + 2 = 75. ++ * ++ * With SHA-1 (the largest hash speced for SSLv3) the hash size ++ * goes up 4, but npad goes down by 8, resulting in a smaller ++ * total size. */ ++ unsigned char header[75]; ++ unsigned j = 0; ++ memcpy(header+j, mac_sec, md_size); ++ j += md_size; ++ memcpy(header+j, ssl3_pad_1, npad); ++ j += npad; ++ memcpy(header+j, seq, 8); ++ j += 8; ++ header[j++] = rec->type; ++ header[j++] = rec->length >> 8; ++ header[j++] = rec->length & 0xff; + +- EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx); ++ ssl3_cbc_digest_record( ++ hash, ++ md, &md_size, ++ header, rec->input, ++ rec->length + md_size, orig_len, ++ mac_sec, md_size, ++ 1 /* is SSLv3 */); ++ } ++ else ++ { ++ unsigned int md_size_u; ++ /* Chop the digest off the end :-) */ ++ EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx); + ++ EVP_DigestInit_ex( &md_ctx,hash, NULL); ++ EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,mac_sec,md_size); ++ EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,ssl3_pad_1,npad); ++ EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,seq,8); ++ rec_char=rec->type; ++ EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&rec_char,1); ++ p=md; ++ s2n(rec->length,p); ++ EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,md,2); ++ EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,rec->input,rec->length); ++ EVP_DigestFinal_ex( &md_ctx,md,NULL); ++ ++ EVP_DigestInit_ex( &md_ctx,hash, NULL); ++ EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,mac_sec,md_size); ++ EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,ssl3_pad_2,npad); ++ EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,md,md_size); ++ EVP_DigestFinal_ex( &md_ctx,md,&md_size_u); ++ md_size = md_size_u; ++ ++ EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx); ++ } ++ + ssl3_record_sequence_update(seq); + return(md_size); + } +Index: crypto/openssl/ssl/s3_lib.c +=================================================================== +--- crypto/openssl/ssl/s3_lib.c (revision 248771) ++++ crypto/openssl/ssl/s3_lib.c (working copy) +@@ -2641,4 +2641,3 @@ need to go to SSL_ST_ACCEPT. + } + return(ret); + } +- +Index: crypto/openssl/ssl/s3_pkt.c +=================================================================== +--- crypto/openssl/ssl/s3_pkt.c (revision 248771) ++++ crypto/openssl/ssl/s3_pkt.c (working copy) +@@ -246,11 +246,8 @@ static int ssl3_get_record(SSL *s) + unsigned char *p; + unsigned char md[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; + short version; +- unsigned int mac_size; +- int clear=0; ++ unsigned mac_size, orig_len; + size_t extra; +- int decryption_failed_or_bad_record_mac = 0; +- unsigned char *mac = NULL; + + rr= &(s->s3->rrec); + sess=s->session; +@@ -354,19 +351,18 @@ again: + + /* decrypt in place in 'rr->input' */ + rr->data=rr->input; ++ orig_len=rr->length; + + enc_err = s->method->ssl3_enc->enc(s,0); +- if (enc_err <= 0) ++ /* enc_err is: ++ * 0: (in non-constant time) if the record is publically invalid. ++ * 1: if the padding is valid ++ * -1: if the padding is invalid */ ++ if (enc_err == 0) + { +- if (enc_err == 0) +- /* SSLerr() and ssl3_send_alert() have been called */ +- goto err; +- +- /* Otherwise enc_err == -1, which indicates bad padding +- * (rec->length has not been changed in this case). +- * To minimize information leaked via timing, we will perform +- * the MAC computation anyway. */ +- decryption_failed_or_bad_record_mac = 1; ++ al=SSL_AD_DECRYPTION_FAILED; ++ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_BLOCK_CIPHER_PAD_IS_WRONG); ++ goto f_err; + } + + #ifdef TLS_DEBUG +@@ -376,51 +372,59 @@ printf("\n"); + #endif + + /* r->length is now the compressed data plus mac */ +- if ( (sess == NULL) || +- (s->enc_read_ctx == NULL) || +- (s->read_hash == NULL)) +- clear=1; +- +- if (!clear) ++ if ((sess != NULL) && ++ (s->enc_read_ctx != NULL) && ++ (s->read_hash != NULL)) + { ++ /* s->read_hash != NULL => mac_size != -1 */ ++ unsigned char *mac = NULL; ++ unsigned char mac_tmp[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; + mac_size=EVP_MD_size(s->read_hash); ++ OPENSSL_assert(mac_size <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE); + +- if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH+extra+mac_size) ++ /* orig_len is the length of the record before any padding was ++ * removed. This is public information, as is the MAC in use, ++ * therefore we can safely process the record in a different ++ * amount of time if it's too short to possibly contain a MAC. ++ */ ++ if (orig_len < mac_size || ++ /* CBC records must have a padding length byte too. */ ++ (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s->enc_read_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE && ++ orig_len < mac_size+1)) + { +-#if 0 /* OK only for stream ciphers (then rr->length is visible from ciphertext anyway) */ +- al=SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW; +- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_PRE_MAC_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); ++ al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; ++ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT); + goto f_err; +-#else +- decryption_failed_or_bad_record_mac = 1; +-#endif + } +- /* check the MAC for rr->input (it's in mac_size bytes at the tail) */ +- if (rr->length >= mac_size) ++ ++ if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s->enc_read_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE) + { ++ /* We update the length so that the TLS header bytes ++ * can be constructed correctly but we need to extract ++ * the MAC in constant time from within the record, ++ * without leaking the contents of the padding bytes. ++ * */ ++ mac = mac_tmp; ++ ssl3_cbc_copy_mac(mac_tmp, rr, mac_size, orig_len); + rr->length -= mac_size; +- mac = &rr->data[rr->length]; + } + else + { +- /* record (minus padding) is too short to contain a MAC */ +-#if 0 /* OK only for stream ciphers */ +- al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; +- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT); +- goto f_err; +-#else +- decryption_failed_or_bad_record_mac = 1; +- rr->length = 0; +-#endif ++ /* In this case there's no padding, so |orig_len| ++ * equals |rec->length| and we checked that there's ++ * enough bytes for |mac_size| above. */ ++ rr->length -= mac_size; ++ mac = &rr->data[rr->length]; + } +- i=s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s,md,0); +- if (mac == NULL || memcmp(md, mac, mac_size) != 0) +- { +- decryption_failed_or_bad_record_mac = 1; +- } ++ ++ i=s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s,md,0 /* not send */); ++ if (i < 0 || mac == NULL || CRYPTO_memcmp(md, mac, (size_t)mac_size) != 0) ++ enc_err = -1; ++ if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH+extra+mac_size) ++ enc_err = -1; + } + +- if (decryption_failed_or_bad_record_mac) ++ if (enc_err < 0) + { + /* A separate 'decryption_failed' alert was introduced with TLS 1.0, + * SSL 3.0 only has 'bad_record_mac'. But unless a decryption +Index: crypto/openssl/ssl/s3_srvr.c +=================================================================== +--- crypto/openssl/ssl/s3_srvr.c (revision 248771) ++++ crypto/openssl/ssl/s3_srvr.c (working copy) +@@ -1005,7 +1005,7 @@ int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s) + goto f_err; + } + } +- if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext(s) <= 0) { ++ if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(s) <= 0) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT); + goto err; + } +@@ -1131,6 +1131,16 @@ int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s) + * s->tmp.new_cipher - the new cipher to use. + */ + ++ /* Handles TLS extensions that we couldn't check earlier */ ++ if (s->version >= SSL3_VERSION) ++ { ++ if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(s) <= 0) ++ { ++ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT); ++ goto err; ++ } ++ } ++ + if (ret < 0) ret=1; + if (0) + { +@@ -1571,6 +1581,7 @@ int ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s) + (unsigned char *)encodedPoint, + encodedlen); + OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint); ++ encodedPoint = NULL; + p += encodedlen; + } + #endif +@@ -1960,6 +1971,7 @@ int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s) + if (i <= 0) + { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB); ++ BN_clear_free(pub); + goto err; + } + +Index: crypto/openssl/ssl/ssl.h +=================================================================== +--- crypto/openssl/ssl/ssl.h (revision 248771) ++++ crypto/openssl/ssl/ssl.h (working copy) +@@ -1682,6 +1682,7 @@ void ERR_load_SSL_strings(void); + #define SSL_F_DTLS1_ACCEPT 246 + #define SSL_F_DTLS1_ADD_CERT_TO_BUF 280 + #define SSL_F_DTLS1_BUFFER_RECORD 247 ++#define SSL_F_DTLS1_CHECK_TIMEOUT_NUM 293 + #define SSL_F_DTLS1_CLIENT_HELLO 248 + #define SSL_F_DTLS1_CONNECT 249 + #define SSL_F_DTLS1_ENC 250 +@@ -1819,6 +1820,7 @@ void ERR_load_SSL_strings(void); + #define SSL_F_SSL_GET_NEW_SESSION 181 + #define SSL_F_SSL_GET_PREV_SESSION 217 + #define SSL_F_SSL_GET_SERVER_SEND_CERT 182 ++#define SSL_F_SSL_GET_SERVER_SEND_PKEY 317 + #define SSL_F_SSL_GET_SIGN_PKEY 183 + #define SSL_F_SSL_INIT_WBIO_BUFFER 184 + #define SSL_F_SSL_LOAD_CLIENT_CA_FILE 185 +Index: crypto/openssl/ssl/ssl_ciph.c +=================================================================== +--- crypto/openssl/ssl/ssl_ciph.c (revision 248771) ++++ crypto/openssl/ssl/ssl_ciph.c (working copy) +@@ -303,6 +303,7 @@ static void load_builtin_compressions(void) + sk_SSL_COMP_push(ssl_comp_methods,comp); + } + } ++ sk_SSL_COMP_sort(ssl_comp_methods); + } + MemCheck_on(); + } +Index: crypto/openssl/ssl/ssl_err.c +=================================================================== +--- crypto/openssl/ssl/ssl_err.c (revision 248771) ++++ crypto/openssl/ssl/ssl_err.c (working copy) +@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@ + /* ssl/ssl_err.c */ + /* ==================================================================== +- * Copyright (c) 1999-2008 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. ++ * Copyright (c) 1999-2011 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions +@@ -80,6 +80,7 @@ static ERR_STRING_DATA SSL_str_functs[]= + {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_DTLS1_ACCEPT), "DTLS1_ACCEPT"}, + {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_DTLS1_ADD_CERT_TO_BUF), "DTLS1_ADD_CERT_TO_BUF"}, + {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_DTLS1_BUFFER_RECORD), "DTLS1_BUFFER_RECORD"}, ++{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_DTLS1_CHECK_TIMEOUT_NUM), "DTLS1_CHECK_TIMEOUT_NUM"}, + {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_DTLS1_CLIENT_HELLO), "DTLS1_CLIENT_HELLO"}, + {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_DTLS1_CONNECT), "DTLS1_CONNECT"}, + {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_DTLS1_ENC), "DTLS1_ENC"}, +@@ -217,6 +218,7 @@ static ERR_STRING_DATA SSL_str_functs[]= + {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_GET_NEW_SESSION), "SSL_GET_NEW_SESSION"}, + {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_GET_PREV_SESSION), "SSL_GET_PREV_SESSION"}, + {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_GET_SERVER_SEND_CERT), "SSL_GET_SERVER_SEND_CERT"}, ++{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_GET_SERVER_SEND_PKEY), "SSL_GET_SERVER_SEND_PKEY"}, + {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_GET_SIGN_PKEY), "SSL_GET_SIGN_PKEY"}, + {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_INIT_WBIO_BUFFER), "SSL_INIT_WBIO_BUFFER"}, + {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_LOAD_CLIENT_CA_FILE), "SSL_load_client_CA_file"}, +Index: crypto/openssl/ssl/ssl_lib.c +=================================================================== +--- crypto/openssl/ssl/ssl_lib.c (revision 248771) ++++ crypto/openssl/ssl/ssl_lib.c (working copy) +@@ -1000,6 +1000,11 @@ long SSL_ctrl(SSL *s,int cmd,long larg,void *parg) + s->max_cert_list=larg; + return(l); + case SSL_CTRL_SET_MTU: ++#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DTLS1 ++ if (larg < (long)dtls1_min_mtu()) ++ return 0; ++#endif ++ + if (SSL_version(s) == DTLS1_VERSION || + SSL_version(s) == DTLS1_BAD_VER) + { +@@ -1938,7 +1943,7 @@ int check_srvr_ecc_cert_and_alg(X509 *x, SSL_CIPHE + } + + /* THIS NEEDS CLEANING UP */ +-X509 *ssl_get_server_send_cert(SSL *s) ++CERT_PKEY *ssl_get_server_send_pkey(const SSL *s) + { + unsigned long alg,kalg; + CERT *c; +@@ -1988,14 +1993,22 @@ int check_srvr_ecc_cert_and_alg(X509 *x, SSL_CIPHE + } + else /* if (kalg & SSL_aNULL) */ + { +- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_GET_SERVER_SEND_CERT,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); ++ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_GET_SERVER_SEND_PKEY,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return(NULL); + } +- if (c->pkeys[i].x509 == NULL) return(NULL); + +- return(c->pkeys[i].x509); ++ return c->pkeys + i; + } + ++X509 *ssl_get_server_send_cert(const SSL *s) ++ { ++ CERT_PKEY *cpk; ++ cpk = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s); ++ if (!cpk) ++ return NULL; ++ return cpk->x509; ++ } ++ + EVP_PKEY *ssl_get_sign_pkey(SSL *s,SSL_CIPHER *cipher) + { + unsigned long alg; +@@ -2415,7 +2428,9 @@ void ssl_clear_cipher_ctx(SSL *s) + /* Fix this function so that it takes an optional type parameter */ + X509 *SSL_get_certificate(const SSL *s) + { +- if (s->cert != NULL) ++ if (s->server) ++ return(ssl_get_server_send_cert(s)); ++ else if (s->cert != NULL) + return(s->cert->key->x509); + else + return(NULL); +Index: crypto/openssl/ssl/ssl_locl.h +=================================================================== +--- crypto/openssl/ssl/ssl_locl.h (revision 248771) ++++ crypto/openssl/ssl/ssl_locl.h (working copy) +@@ -189,6 +189,15 @@ + *((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l)>> 8)&0xff), \ + *((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l) )&0xff)) + ++#define l2n8(l,c) (*((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l)>>56)&0xff), \ ++ *((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l)>>48)&0xff), \ ++ *((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l)>>40)&0xff), \ ++ *((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l)>>32)&0xff), \ ++ *((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l)>>24)&0xff), \ ++ *((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l)>>16)&0xff), \ ++ *((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l)>> 8)&0xff), \ ++ *((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l) )&0xff)) ++ + #define n2l6(c,l) (l =((BN_ULLONG)(*((c)++)))<<40, \ + l|=((BN_ULLONG)(*((c)++)))<<32, \ + l|=((BN_ULLONG)(*((c)++)))<<24, \ +@@ -740,7 +749,8 @@ int ssl_verify_cert_chain(SSL *s,STACK_OF(X509) *s + int ssl_undefined_function(SSL *s); + int ssl_undefined_void_function(void); + int ssl_undefined_const_function(const SSL *s); +-X509 *ssl_get_server_send_cert(SSL *); ++CERT_PKEY *ssl_get_server_send_pkey(const SSL *s); ++X509 *ssl_get_server_send_cert(const SSL *); + EVP_PKEY *ssl_get_sign_pkey(SSL *,SSL_CIPHER *); + int ssl_cert_type(X509 *x,EVP_PKEY *pkey); + void ssl_set_cert_masks(CERT *c, SSL_CIPHER *cipher); +@@ -870,6 +880,7 @@ void dtls1_get_ccs_header(unsigned char *data, str + void dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(SSL *s, int rw); + long dtls1_default_timeout(void); + struct timeval* dtls1_get_timeout(SSL *s, struct timeval* timeleft); ++int dtls1_check_timeout_num(SSL *s); + int dtls1_handle_timeout(SSL *s); + SSL_CIPHER *dtls1_get_cipher(unsigned int u); + void dtls1_start_timer(SSL *s); +@@ -877,6 +888,7 @@ void dtls1_stop_timer(SSL *s); + int dtls1_is_timer_expired(SSL *s); + void dtls1_double_timeout(SSL *s); + int dtls1_send_newsession_ticket(SSL *s); ++unsigned int dtls1_min_mtu(void); + + + /* some client-only functions */ +@@ -977,7 +989,8 @@ int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned + int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **data, unsigned char *d, int n, int *al); + int ssl_prepare_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s); + int ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s); +-int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s); ++int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s); ++int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(SSL *s); + int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s); + + #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256 +@@ -999,5 +1012,33 @@ int ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(SSL *s, un + int ssl_parse_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(SSL *s, unsigned char *d, int len, + int *al); + #endif ++/* s3_cbc.c */ ++void ssl3_cbc_copy_mac(unsigned char* out, ++ const SSL3_RECORD *rec, ++ unsigned md_size,unsigned orig_len); ++int ssl3_cbc_remove_padding(const SSL* s, ++ SSL3_RECORD *rec, ++ unsigned block_size, ++ unsigned mac_size); ++int tls1_cbc_remove_padding(const SSL* s, ++ SSL3_RECORD *rec, ++ unsigned block_size, ++ unsigned mac_size); ++char ssl3_cbc_record_digest_supported(const EVP_MD *hash); ++void ssl3_cbc_digest_record( ++ const EVP_MD *hash, ++ unsigned char* md_out, ++ size_t* md_out_size, ++ const unsigned char header[13], ++ const unsigned char *data, ++ size_t data_plus_mac_size, ++ size_t data_plus_mac_plus_padding_size, ++ const unsigned char *mac_secret, ++ unsigned mac_secret_length, ++ char is_sslv3); + ++void tls_fips_digest_extra( ++ const EVP_CIPHER_CTX *cipher_ctx, const EVP_MD *hash, HMAC_CTX *hctx, ++ const unsigned char *data, size_t data_len, size_t orig_len); ++ + #endif +Index: crypto/openssl/ssl/t1_enc.c +=================================================================== +--- crypto/openssl/ssl/t1_enc.c (revision 248771) ++++ crypto/openssl/ssl/t1_enc.c (working copy) +@@ -264,7 +264,7 @@ int tls1_change_cipher_state(SSL *s, int which) + { + int ki; + for (ki=0; kis3->tmp.key_block_length; ki++) +- printf("%02x", key_block[ki]); printf("\n"); ++ printf("%02x", s->s3->tmp.key_block[ki]); printf("\n"); + } + #endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */ + +@@ -528,12 +528,21 @@ err: + return(0); + } + ++/* tls1_enc encrypts/decrypts the record in |s->wrec| / |s->rrec|, respectively. ++ * ++ * Returns: ++ * 0: (in non-constant time) if the record is publically invalid (i.e. too ++ * short etc). ++ * 1: if the record's padding is valid / the encryption was successful. ++ * -1: if the record's padding/AEAD-authenticator is invalid or, if sending, ++ * an internal error occured. ++ */ + int tls1_enc(SSL *s, int send) + { + SSL3_RECORD *rec; + EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ds; + unsigned long l; +- int bs,i,ii,j,k; ++ int bs,i,j,k,pad=0,ret,mac_size=0; + const EVP_CIPHER *enc; + + if (send) +@@ -559,11 +568,11 @@ int tls1_enc(SSL *s, int send) + printf("tls1_enc(%d)\n", send); + #endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */ + +- if ((s->session == NULL) || (ds == NULL) || +- (enc == NULL)) ++ if ((s->session == NULL) || (ds == NULL) || (enc == NULL)) + { + memmove(rec->data,rec->input,rec->length); + rec->input=rec->data; ++ ret = 1; + } + else + { +@@ -591,14 +600,13 @@ int tls1_enc(SSL *s, int send) + + #ifdef KSSL_DEBUG + { +- unsigned long ui; ++ unsigned long ui; + printf("EVP_Cipher(ds=%p,rec->data=%p,rec->input=%p,l=%ld) ==>\n", +- (void *)ds,rec->data,rec->input,l); +- printf("\tEVP_CIPHER_CTX: %d buf_len, %d key_len [%ld %ld], %d iv_len\n", +- ds->buf_len, ds->cipher->key_len, +- (unsigned long)DES_KEY_SZ, +- (unsigned long)DES_SCHEDULE_SZ, +- ds->cipher->iv_len); ++ ds,rec->data,rec->input,l); ++ printf("\tEVP_CIPHER_CTX: %d buf_len, %d key_len [%d %d], %d iv_len\n", ++ ds->buf_len, ds->cipher->key_len, ++ DES_KEY_SZ, DES_SCHEDULE_SZ, ++ ds->cipher->iv_len); + printf("\t\tIV: "); + for (i=0; icipher->iv_len; i++) printf("%02X", ds->iv[i]); + printf("\n"); +@@ -611,11 +619,7 @@ int tls1_enc(SSL *s, int send) + if (!send) + { + if (l == 0 || l%bs != 0) +- { +- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_ENC,SSL_R_BLOCK_CIPHER_PAD_IS_WRONG); +- ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_DECRYPTION_FAILED); + return 0; +- } + } + + EVP_Cipher(ds,rec->data,rec->input,l); +@@ -629,49 +633,15 @@ int tls1_enc(SSL *s, int send) + } + #endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */ + ++ ret = 1; ++ if (s->read_hash != NULL) ++ mac_size = EVP_MD_size(s->read_hash); + if ((bs != 1) && !send) +- { +- ii=i=rec->data[l-1]; /* padding_length */ +- i++; +- /* NB: if compression is in operation the first packet +- * may not be of even length so the padding bug check +- * cannot be performed. This bug workaround has been +- * around since SSLeay so hopefully it is either fixed +- * now or no buggy implementation supports compression +- * [steve] +- */ +- if ( (s->options&SSL_OP_TLS_BLOCK_PADDING_BUG) +- && !s->expand) +- { +- /* First packet is even in size, so check */ +- if ((memcmp(s->s3->read_sequence, +- "\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0",8) == 0) && !(ii & 1)) +- s->s3->flags|=TLS1_FLAGS_TLS_PADDING_BUG; +- if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_TLS_PADDING_BUG) +- i--; +- } +- /* TLS 1.0 does not bound the number of padding bytes by the block size. +- * All of them must have value 'padding_length'. */ +- if (i > (int)rec->length) +- { +- /* Incorrect padding. SSLerr() and ssl3_alert are done +- * by caller: we don't want to reveal whether this is +- * a decryption error or a MAC verification failure +- * (see http://www.openssl.org/~bodo/tls-cbc.txt) */ +- return -1; +- } +- for (j=(int)(l-i); j<(int)l; j++) +- { +- if (rec->data[j] != ii) +- { +- /* Incorrect padding */ +- return -1; +- } +- } +- rec->length-=i; +- } ++ ret = tls1_cbc_remove_padding(s, rec, bs, mac_size); ++ if (pad && !send) ++ rec->length -= pad; + } +- return(1); ++ return ret; + } + + int tls1_cert_verify_mac(SSL *s, EVP_MD_CTX *in_ctx, unsigned char *out) +@@ -719,10 +689,10 @@ int tls1_mac(SSL *ssl, unsigned char *md, int send + SSL3_RECORD *rec; + unsigned char *mac_sec,*seq; + const EVP_MD *hash; +- unsigned int md_size; ++ size_t md_size, orig_len; + int i; + HMAC_CTX hmac; +- unsigned char buf[5]; ++ unsigned char header[13]; + + if (send) + { +@@ -741,20 +711,6 @@ int tls1_mac(SSL *ssl, unsigned char *md, int send + + md_size=EVP_MD_size(hash); + +- buf[0]=rec->type; +- if (ssl->version == DTLS1_VERSION && ssl->client_version == DTLS1_BAD_VER) +- { +- buf[1]=TLS1_VERSION_MAJOR; +- buf[2]=TLS1_VERSION_MINOR; +- } +- else { +- buf[1]=(unsigned char)(ssl->version>>8); +- buf[2]=(unsigned char)(ssl->version); +- } +- +- buf[3]=rec->length>>8; +- buf[4]=rec->length&0xff; +- + /* I should fix this up TLS TLS TLS TLS TLS XXXXXXXX */ + HMAC_CTX_init(&hmac); + HMAC_Init_ex(&hmac,mac_sec,EVP_MD_size(hash),hash,NULL); +@@ -766,16 +722,57 @@ int tls1_mac(SSL *ssl, unsigned char *md, int send + s2n(send?ssl->d1->w_epoch:ssl->d1->r_epoch, p); + memcpy (p,&seq[2],6); + +- HMAC_Update(&hmac,dtlsseq,8); ++ memcpy(header, dtlsseq, 8); + } + else +- HMAC_Update(&hmac,seq,8); ++ memcpy(header, seq, 8); + +- HMAC_Update(&hmac,buf,5); +- HMAC_Update(&hmac,rec->input,rec->length); +- HMAC_Final(&hmac,md,&md_size); ++ /* kludge: tls1_cbc_remove_padding passes padding length in rec->type */ ++ orig_len = rec->length+md_size+((unsigned int)rec->type>>8); ++ rec->type &= 0xff; ++ ++ header[8]=rec->type; ++ header[9]=(unsigned char)(ssl->version>>8); ++ header[10]=(unsigned char)(ssl->version); ++ header[11]=(rec->length)>>8; ++ header[12]=(rec->length)&0xff; ++ ++ if (!send && ++ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(ssl->enc_read_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE && ++ ssl3_cbc_record_digest_supported(hash)) ++ { ++ /* This is a CBC-encrypted record. We must avoid leaking any ++ * timing-side channel information about how many blocks of ++ * data we are hashing because that gives an attacker a ++ * timing-oracle. */ ++ ssl3_cbc_digest_record( ++ hash, ++ md, &md_size, ++ header, rec->input, ++ rec->length + md_size, orig_len, ++ ssl->s3->read_mac_secret, ++ EVP_MD_size(ssl->read_hash), ++ 0 /* not SSLv3 */); ++ } ++ else ++ { ++ unsigned mds; ++ ++ HMAC_Update(&hmac,header,sizeof(header)); ++ HMAC_Update(&hmac,rec->input,rec->length); ++ HMAC_Final(&hmac,md,&mds); ++ md_size = mds; ++#ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS ++ if (!send && FIPS_mode()) ++ tls_fips_digest_extra( ++ ssl->enc_read_ctx, ++ hash, ++ &hmac, rec->input, ++ rec->length, orig_len); ++#endif ++ } ++ + HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hmac); +- + #ifdef TLS_DEBUG + printf("sec="); + {unsigned int z; for (z=0; z 0) + { ++ if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts) ++ { ++ sk_X509_EXTENSION_pop_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, ++ X509_EXTENSION_free); ++ } ++ + s->tlsext_ocsp_exts = + d2i_X509_EXTENSIONS(NULL, + &sdata, dsize); +@@ -739,7 +745,7 @@ int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned + return 1; + } + +-int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s) ++int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s) + { + int ret=SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK; + int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME; +@@ -749,13 +755,49 @@ int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned + else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0) + ret = s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg); + ++ switch (ret) ++ { ++ case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL: ++ ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); ++ return -1; ++ ++ case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING: ++ ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, al); ++ return 1; ++ ++ case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK: ++ s->servername_done = 0; ++ ++ default: ++ return 1; ++ } ++ } ++ ++int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(SSL *s) ++ { ++ int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK; ++ int al; ++ + /* If status request then ask callback what to do. + * Note: this must be called after servername callbacks in case +- * the certificate has changed. ++ * the certificate has changed, and must be called after the cipher ++ * has been chosen because this may influence which certificate is sent + */ +- if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb) ++ if (s->tlsext_status_type != -1 && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb) + { + int r; ++ CERT_PKEY *certpkey; ++ certpkey = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s); ++ /* If no certificate can't return certificate status */ ++ if (certpkey == NULL) ++ { ++ s->tlsext_status_expected = 0; ++ return 1; ++ } ++ /* Set current certificate to one we will use so ++ * SSL_get_certificate et al can pick it up. ++ */ ++ s->cert->key = certpkey; + r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg); + switch (r) + { +@@ -779,7 +821,8 @@ int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned + } + else + s->tlsext_status_expected = 0; +- err: ++ ++ err: + switch (ret) + { + case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL: +@@ -789,11 +832,9 @@ int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned + case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING: + ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_WARNING,al); + return 1; +- +- case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK: +- s->servername_done=0; +- default: +- return 1; ++ ++ default: ++ return 1; + } + } + +@@ -971,7 +1012,7 @@ static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsign + HMAC_Update(&hctx, etick, eticklen); + HMAC_Final(&hctx, tick_hmac, NULL); + HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx); +- if (memcmp(tick_hmac, etick + eticklen, mlen)) ++ if (CRYPTO_memcmp(tick_hmac, etick + eticklen, mlen)) + goto tickerr; + /* Attempt to decrypt session data */ + /* Move p after IV to start of encrypted ticket, update length */ +Index: crypto/openssl/util/fipslink.pl +=================================================================== +--- crypto/openssl/util/fipslink.pl (revision 248771) ++++ crypto/openssl/util/fipslink.pl (working copy) +@@ -43,7 +43,12 @@ die "First stage Link failure" if $? != 0; + + + print "$fips_premain_dso $fips_target\n"; +-$fips_hash=`$fips_premain_dso $fips_target`; ++system("$fips_premain_dso $fips_target >$fips_target.sha1"); ++die "Get hash failure" if $? != 0; ++open my $sha1_res, '<', $fips_target.".sha1" or die "Get hash failure"; ++$fips_hash=<$sha1_res>; ++close $sha1_res; ++unlink $fips_target.".sha1"; + chomp $fips_hash; + die "Get hash failure" if $? != 0; + +Index: crypto/openssl/util/libeay.num +=================================================================== +--- crypto/openssl/util/libeay.num (revision 248771) ++++ crypto/openssl/util/libeay.num (working copy) +@@ -3510,6 +3510,7 @@ BIO_get_callback_arg 3902 EXIST + BIO_set_callback 3903 EXIST::FUNCTION: + d2i_ASIdOrRange 3904 EXIST::FUNCTION:RFC3779 + i2d_ASIdentifiers 3905 EXIST::FUNCTION:RFC3779 ++CRYPTO_memcmp 3906 EXIST::FUNCTION: + SEED_decrypt 3908 EXIST::FUNCTION:SEED + SEED_encrypt 3909 EXIST::FUNCTION:SEED + SEED_cbc_encrypt 3910 EXIST::FUNCTION:SEED +Index: crypto/openssl/util/mkerr.pl +=================================================================== +--- crypto/openssl/util/mkerr.pl (revision 248771) ++++ crypto/openssl/util/mkerr.pl (working copy) +@@ -313,7 +313,7 @@ foreach $lib (keys %csrc) + } else { + push @out, + "/* ====================================================================\n", +-" * Copyright (c) 2001-2010 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.\n", ++" * Copyright (c) 2001-2011 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.\n", + " *\n", + " * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without\n", + " * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions\n", +@@ -487,7 +487,7 @@ EOF + print OUT <<"EOF"; + /* $cfile */ + /* ==================================================================== +- * Copyright (c) 1999-2010 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. ++ * Copyright (c) 1999-2011 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions +@@ -680,7 +680,7 @@ EOF + undef %err_reason_strings; + } + +-if($debug && defined(%notrans)) { ++if($debug && %notrans) { + print STDERR "The following function codes were not translated:\n"; + foreach(sort keys %notrans) + { +Index: crypto/openssl/util/pl/VC-32.pl +=================================================================== +--- crypto/openssl/util/pl/VC-32.pl (revision 248771) ++++ crypto/openssl/util/pl/VC-32.pl (working copy) +@@ -391,7 +391,7 @@ sub do_lib_rule + $ret.="\tSET FIPS_SHA1_EXE=\$(FIPS_SHA1_EXE)\n"; + $ret.="\tSET FIPS_TARGET=$target\n"; + $ret.="\tSET FIPSLIB_D=\$(FIPSLIB_D)\n"; +- $ret.="\t\$(FIPSLINK) \$(MLFLAGS) /map $base_arg $efile$target "; ++ $ret.="\t\$(FIPSLINK) \$(MLFLAGS) /fixed /map $base_arg $efile$target "; + $ret.="$name @<<\n \$(SHLIB_EX_OBJ) $objs "; + $ret.="\$(OBJ_D)${o}fips_premain.obj $ex\n<<\n"; + } +@@ -434,7 +434,7 @@ sub do_link_rule + $ret.="\tSET FIPS_TARGET=$target\n"; + $ret.="\tSET FIPS_SHA1_EXE=\$(FIPS_SHA1_EXE)\n"; + $ret.="\tSET FIPSLIB_D=\$(FIPSLIB_D)\n"; +- $ret.="\t\$(FIPSLINK) \$(LFLAGS) /map $efile$target @<<\n"; ++ $ret.="\t\$(FIPSLINK) \$(LFLAGS) /fixed /map $efile$target @<<\n"; + $ret.="\t\$(APP_EX_OBJ) $files \$(OBJ_D)${o}fips_premain.obj $libs\n<<\n"; + } + else +Index: secure/lib/libcrypto/Makefile.inc +=================================================================== +--- secure/lib/libcrypto/Makefile.inc (revision 248771) ++++ secure/lib/libcrypto/Makefile.inc (working copy) +@@ -3,8 +3,8 @@ + .include + + # OpenSSL version used for manual page generation +-OPENSSL_VER= 0.9.8q +-OPENSSL_DATE= 2010-12-02 ++OPENSSL_VER= 0.9.8y ++OPENSSL_DATE= 2013-02-05 + + LCRYPTO_SRC= ${.CURDIR}/../../../crypto/openssl + LCRYPTO_DOC= ${.CURDIR}/../../../crypto/openssl/doc +Index: secure/lib/libssl/Makefile +=================================================================== +--- secure/lib/libssl/Makefile (revision 248771) ++++ secure/lib/libssl/Makefile (working copy) +@@ -14,7 +14,8 @@ SRCS= bio_ssl.c d1_meth.c d1_srvr.c d1_clnt.c d1_l + d1_both.c d1_enc.c \ + s23_clnt.c s23_lib.c s23_meth.c s23_pkt.c s23_srvr.c \ + s2_clnt.c s2_enc.c s2_lib.c s2_meth.c s2_pkt.c s2_srvr.c \ +- s3_both.c s3_clnt.c s3_enc.c s3_lib.c s3_meth.c s3_pkt.c \ ++ s3_both.c s3_cbc.c s3_clnt.c s3_enc.c s3_lib.c s3_meth.c \ ++ s3_pkt.c \ + s3_srvr.c ssl_algs.c ssl_asn1.c ssl_cert.c ssl_ciph.c \ + ssl_err.c ssl_err2.c ssl_lib.c ssl_rsa.c ssl_sess.c ssl_stat.c \ + ssl_txt.c t1_clnt.c t1_enc.c t1_lib.c t1_meth.c t1_reneg.c t1_srvr.c Property changes on: projects/entities/share/security/patches/SA-13:03/openssl.patch ___________________________________________________________________ Added: fbsd:nokeywords ## -0,0 +1 ## +y \ No newline at end of property Added: svn:eol-style ## -0,0 +1 ## +native \ No newline at end of property Added: svn:mime-type ## -0,0 +1 ## +text/plain \ No newline at end of property Index: projects/entities/share/security/patches/SA-13:03/openssl.patch.asc =================================================================== --- projects/entities/share/security/patches/SA-13:03/openssl.patch.asc (nonexistent) +++ projects/entities/share/security/patches/SA-13:03/openssl.patch.asc (revision 41354) @@ -0,0 +1,7 @@ +-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- +Version: GnuPG v2.0.19 (FreeBSD) + +iEYEABECAAYFAlFbGmQACgkQFdaIBMps37JsJwCfeL+FsfSkcpsQPd9wM1kiy3F6 +z94AnAoi2KiaTj7AnQVom035rVoeZnzb +=P3VV +-----END PGP SIGNATURE----- Property changes on: projects/entities/share/security/patches/SA-13:03/openssl.patch.asc ___________________________________________________________________ Added: fbsd:nokeywords ## -0,0 +1 ## +y \ No newline at end of property Added: svn:eol-style ## -0,0 +1 ## +native \ No newline at end of property Added: svn:mime-type ## -0,0 +1 ## +text/plain \ No newline at end of property Index: projects/entities/share/security/patches/SA-13:04/bind.patch =================================================================== --- projects/entities/share/security/patches/SA-13:04/bind.patch (nonexistent) +++ projects/entities/share/security/patches/SA-13:04/bind.patch (revision 41354) @@ -0,0 +1,13 @@ +Index: lib/bind/config.h +=================================================================== +--- lib/bind/config.h (revision 248771) ++++ lib/bind/config.h (working copy) +@@ -281,7 +281,7 @@ int sigwait(const unsigned int *set, int *sig); + /* #undef HAVE_OPENSSL_GOST */ + + /* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ +-#define HAVE_REGEX_H 1 ++/* #undef HAVE_REGEX_H */ + + /* Define to 1 if you have the `setegid' function. */ + #define HAVE_SETEGID 1 Property changes on: projects/entities/share/security/patches/SA-13:04/bind.patch ___________________________________________________________________ Added: fbsd:nokeywords ## -0,0 +1 ## +y \ No newline at end of property Added: svn:eol-style ## -0,0 +1 ## +native \ No newline at end of property Added: svn:mime-type ## -0,0 +1 ## +text/plain \ No newline at end of property Index: projects/entities/share/security/patches/SA-13:04/bind.patch.asc =================================================================== --- projects/entities/share/security/patches/SA-13:04/bind.patch.asc (nonexistent) +++ projects/entities/share/security/patches/SA-13:04/bind.patch.asc (revision 41354) @@ -0,0 +1,7 @@ +-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- +Version: GnuPG v2.0.19 (FreeBSD) + +iEYEABECAAYFAlFbGmkACgkQFdaIBMps37LS6wCgixwNY2sp5liNZzUANdl3YS5H +r6wAnjT32rIJw1ThkvddBSGhBUncJzt4 +=qO5f +-----END PGP SIGNATURE----- Property changes on: projects/entities/share/security/patches/SA-13:04/bind.patch.asc ___________________________________________________________________ Added: fbsd:nokeywords ## -0,0 +1 ## +y \ No newline at end of property Added: svn:eol-style ## -0,0 +1 ## +native \ No newline at end of property Added: svn:mime-type ## -0,0 +1 ## +text/plain \ No newline at end of property Index: projects/entities/share/xml/advisories.xml =================================================================== --- projects/entities/share/xml/advisories.xml (revision 41353) +++ projects/entities/share/xml/advisories.xml (revision 41354) @@ -1,3455 +1,3491 @@ $FreeBSD$ + 2013 + + + 4 + + + 2 + + + FreeBSD-SA-13:04.bind + + + + FreeBSD-SA-13:03.openssl + + + + + + 2 + + + 19 + + + FreeBSD-SA-13:02.libc + + + + FreeBSD-SA-13:01.bind + + + + + + 2012 11 22 FreeBSD-SA-12:08.linux FreeBSD-SA-12:07.hostapd FreeBSD-SA-12:06.bind 8 6 FreeBSD-SA-12:05.bind 6 12 FreeBSD-SA-12:04.sysret FreeBSD-SA-12:03.bind 5 30 FreeBSD-SA-12:02.crypt 30 FreeBSD-SA-12:01.openssl 2011 12 23 FreeBSD-SA-11:10.pam FreeBSD-SA-11:09.pam_ssh FreeBSD-SA-11:08.telnetd FreeBSD-SA-11:07.chroot FreeBSD-SA-11:06.bind 9 28 FreeBSD-SA-11:05.unix FreeBSD-SA-11:04.compress FreeBSD-SA-11:03.bind 5 28 FreeBSD-SA-11:02.bind 4 20 FreeBSD-SA-11:01.mountd 2010 11 29 FreeBSD-SA-10:10.openssl 10 FreeBSD-SA-10:09.pseudofs 9 20 FreeBSD-SA-10:08.bzip2 7 13 FreeBSD-SA-10:07.mbuf 5 27 FreeBSD-SA-10:06.nfsclient FreeBSD-SA-10:05.opie FreeBSD-SA-10:04.jail 1 6 FreeBSD-SA-10:03.zfs FreeBSD-SA-10:02.ntpd FreeBSD-SA-10:01.bind 2009 12 3 FreeBSD-SA-09:17.freebsd-update FreeBSD-SA-09:16.rtld FreeBSD-SA-09:15.ssl 10 2 FreeBSD-SA-09:14.devfs FreeBSD-SA-09:13.pipe 7 29 FreeBSD-SA-09:12.bind 6 10 FreeBSD-SA-09:11.ntpd FreeBSD-SA-09:10.ipv6 FreeBSD-SA-09:09.pipe 4 22 FreeBSD-SA-09:08.openssl FreeBSD-SA-09:07.libc 3 23 FreeBSD-SA-09:06.ktimer 2 16 FreeBSD-SA-09:05.telnetd 1 13 FreeBSD-SA-09:04.bind FreeBSD-SA-09:03.ntpd 7 FreeBSD-SA-09:02.openssl FreeBSD-SA-09:01.lukemftpd 2008 12 23 FreeBSD-SA-08:13.protosw FreeBSD-SA-08:12.ftpd 11 24 FreeBSD-SA-08:11.arc4random 10 2 FreeBSD-SA-08:10.nd6 9 3 FreeBSD-SA-08:09.icmp6 FreeBSD-SA-08:08.nmount FreeBSD-SA-08:07.amd64 7 13 FreeBSD-SA-08:06.bind 4 17 FreeBSD-SA-08:05.openssh 2 14 FreeBSD-SA-08:04.ipsec FreeBSD-SA-08:03.sendfile 1 18 FreeBSD 6.3-RELEASE 14 FreeBSD-SA-08:02.libc FreeBSD-SA-08:01.pty 2007 11 29 FreeBSD-SA-07:10.gtar FreeBSD-SA-07:09.random 10 3 FreeBSD-SA-07:08.openssl 8 1 FreeBSD-SA-07:07.bind FreeBSD-SA-07:06.tcpdump 7 12 FreeBSD-SA-07:05.libarchive 5 23 FreeBSD-SA-07:04.file 4 26 FreeBSD-SA-07:03.ipv6 2 9 FreeBSD-SA-07:02.bind 1 15 FreeBSD 6.2-RELEASE 11 FreeBSD-SA-07:01.jail 2006 12 6 FreeBSD-SA-06:26.gtar FreeBSD-SA-06:25.kmem 11 8 FreeBSD-SA-06:24.libarchive 9 30 FreeBSD-SA-06:22.openssh 28 FreeBSD-SA-06:23.openssl 19 FreeBSD-SA-06:21.gzip 6 FreeBSD-SA-06:20.bind FreeBSD-SA-06:19.openssl 8 23 FreeBSD-SA-06:18.ppp 6 14 FreeBSD-SA-06:17.sendmail 5 31 FreeBSD-SA-06:16.smbfs FreeBSD-SA-06:15.ypserv 25 FreeBSD 5.5-RELEASE 9 FreeBSD 6.1-RELEASE 4 19 FreeBSD-SA-06:14.fpu 3 22 FreeBSD-SA-06:13.sendmail FreeBSD-SA-06:12.opie FreeBSD-SA-06:11.ipsec 1 FreeBSD-SA-06:10.nfs FreeBSD-SA-06:09.openssh 2 1 FreeBSD-SA-06:08.sack 1 25 FreeBSD-SA-06:07.pf FreeBSD-SA-06:06.kmem 18 FreeBSD-SA-06:05.80211 11 FreeBSD-SA-06:04.ipfw FreeBSD-SA-06:03.cpio FreeBSD-SA-06:02.ee FreeBSD-SA-06:01.texindex 2005 11 4 FreeBSD 6.0-RELEASE 10 11 FreeBSD-SA-05:21.openssl 9 7 FreeBSD-SA-05:20.cvsbug 7 27 FreeBSD-SA-05:19.ipsec FreeBSD-SA-05:18.zlib 20 FreeBSD-SA-05:17.devfs 6 FreeBSD-SA-05:16.zlib 6 29 FreeBSD-SA-05:15.tcp FreeBSD-SA-05:14.bzip2 FreeBSD-SA-05:13.ipfw 9 FreeBSD-SA-05:12.bind9 FreeBSD-SA-05:11.gzip FreeBSD-SA-05:10.tcpdump 5 13 FreeBSD-SA-05:09.htt 9 FreeBSD 5.4-RELEASE 6 FreeBSD-SA-05:08.kmem FreeBSD-SA-05:07.ldt FreeBSD-SA-05:06.iir 4 22 FreeBSD-SA-05:05.cvs 15 FreeBSD-SA-05:04.ifconf 6 FreeBSD-SA-05:03.amd64 4 FreeBSD-SA-05:02.sendfile 3 28 FreeBSD-SA-05:01.telnet 1 25 FreeBSD 4.11-RELEASE 2004 12 1 FreeBSD-SA-04:17.procfs 11 18 FreeBSD-SA-04:16.fetch 6 FreeBSD 5.3-RELEASE 10 4 FreeBSD-SA-04:15.syscons 9 19 FreeBSD-SA-04:14.cvs 6 30 FreeBSD-SA-04:13.linux 7 FreeBSD-SA-04:12.jailroute 5 27 FreeBSD 4.10-RELEASE 19 FreeBSD-SA-04:11.msync 19 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FreeBSD-SA-96:08.syslog FreeBSD-SA-96:01.sliplogin 20 FreeBSD-SA-96:03.sendmail-suggestion Index: projects/entities/share/xml/authors.ent =================================================================== --- projects/entities/share/xml/authors.ent (revision 41353) +++ projects/entities/share/xml/authors.ent (revision 41354) @@ -1,2226 +1,2241 @@ aaron@FreeBSD.org"> abial@FreeBSD.org"> ache@FreeBSD.org"> achim@FreeBSD.org"> acm@FreeBSD.org"> adam@FreeBSD.org"> adamw@FreeBSD.org"> ade@FreeBSD.org"> adrian@FreeBSD.org"> ae@FreeBSD.org"> ahasty@FreeBSD.org"> ahd@FreeBSD.org"> ahze@FreeBSD.org"> ak@FreeBSD.org"> akiyama@FreeBSD.org"> alane@FreeBSD.org"> alc@FreeBSD.org"> ale@FreeBSD.org"> alepulver@FreeBSD.org"> alex@FreeBSD.org"> alexbl@FreeBSD.org"> alfred@FreeBSD.org"> alm@FreeBSD.org"> + +am@FreeBSD.org"> + ambrisko@FreeBSD.org"> amdmi3@FreeBSD.org"> amorita@FreeBSD.org"> amurai@FreeBSD.org"> anchie@FreeBSD.org"> anders@FreeBSD.org"> andre@FreeBSD.org"> andreas@FreeBSD.org"> 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laszlof@FreeBSD.org"> lawrance@FreeBSD.org"> lbr@FreeBSD.org"> le@FreeBSD.org"> leeym@FreeBSD.org"> lesi@FreeBSD.org"> lev@FreeBSD.org"> lile@FreeBSD.org"> linimon@FreeBSD.org"> lioux@FreeBSD.org"> lippe@FreeBSD.org"> ljo@FreeBSD.org"> lkoeller@FreeBSD.org"> lme@FreeBSD.org"> loader@FreeBSD.org"> lofi@FreeBSD.org"> logo@FreeBSD.org"> lstewart@FreeBSD.org"> lth@FreeBSD.org"> luigi@FreeBSD.org"> lulf@FreeBSD.org"> luoqi@FreeBSD.org"> lwhsu@FreeBSD.org"> lx@FreeBSD.org"> madpilot@FreeBSD.org"> maho@FreeBSD.org"> markj@FreeBSD.org"> markm@FreeBSD.org"> makc@FreeBSD.org"> mandree@FreeBSD.org"> manolis@FreeBSD.org"> marcel@FreeBSD.org"> marck@FreeBSD.org"> marcus@FreeBSD.org"> marius@FreeBSD.org"> markm@FreeBSD.org"> marko@FreeBSD.org"> markp@FreeBSD.org"> marks@FreeBSD.org"> markus@FreeBSD.org"> martin@FreeBSD.org"> martymac@FreeBSD.org"> mat@FreeBSD.org"> matk@FreeBSD.org"> matt@FreeBSD.org"> matteo@FreeBSD.org"> matthew@FreeBSD.org"> matusita@FreeBSD.org"> mav@FreeBSD.org"> max@FreeBSD.org"> maxim@FreeBSD.org"> mb@FreeBSD.org"> mbarkah@FreeBSD.org"> mbr@FreeBSD.org"> mckay@FreeBSD.org"> mckusick@FreeBSD.org"> mdf@FreeBSD.org"> mdodd@FreeBSD.org"> meganm@FreeBSD.rgo"> melifaro@FreeBSD.org"> metal@FreeBSD.org"> mezz@FreeBSD.org"> mharo@FreeBSD.org"> mheinen@FreeBSD.org"> mi@FreeBSD.org"> mich@FreeBSD.org"> mike@FreeBSD.org"> mikeh@FreeBSD.org"> mini@FreeBSD.org"> mita@FreeBSD.org"> miwi@FreeBSD.org"> mjacob@FreeBSD.org"> mjg@FreeBSD.org"> mks@FreeBSD.org"> mlaier@FreeBSD.org"> mm@FreeBSD.org"> mnag@FreeBSD.org"> mohans@FreeBSD.org"> monthadar@FreeBSD.org"> motoyuki@FreeBSD.org"> mp@FreeBSD.org"> mph@FreeBSD.org"> mpp@FreeBSD.org"> mr@FreeBSD.org"> msmith@FreeBSD.org"> mtaylor@FreeBSD.org"> mtm@FreeBSD.org"> murray@FreeBSD.org"> mux@FreeBSD.org"> mva@FreeBSD.org"> mwlucas@FreeBSD.org"> naddy@FreeBSD.org"> nakai@FreeBSD.org"> nate@FreeBSD.org"> nbm@FreeBSD.org"> nectar@FreeBSD.org"> neel@FreeBSD.org"> nemoliu@FreeBSD.org"> netchild@FreeBSD.org"> newton@FreeBSD.org"> n_hibma@FreeBSD.org"> niels@FreeBSD.org"> nik@FreeBSD.org"> niklas@FreeBSD.org"> nivit@FreeBSD.org"> njl@FreeBSD.org"> nobutaka@FreeBSD.org"> non@FreeBSD.org"> nork@FreeBSD.org"> novel@FreeBSD.org"> nox@FreeBSD.org"> np@FreeBSD.org"> nra@FreeBSD.org"> nsayer@FreeBSD.org"> nsj@FreeBSD.org"> nsouch@FreeBSD.org"> nwhitehorn@FreeBSD.org"> nyan@FreeBSD.org"> obraun@FreeBSD.org"> obrien@FreeBSD.org"> ohauer@FreeBSD.org"> okazaki@FreeBSD.org"> olah@FreeBSD.org"> oleg@FreeBSD.org"> olgeni@FreeBSD.org"> oliver@FreeBSD.org"> olivierd@FreeBSD.org"> olli@FreeBSD.org"> onoe@FreeBSD.org"> orion@FreeBSD.org"> osa@FreeBSD.org"> pat@FreeBSD.org"> patrick@FreeBSD.org"> paul@FreeBSD.org"> pav@FreeBSD.org"> pawel@FreeBSD.org"> pb@FreeBSD.org"> pclin@FreeBSD.org"> pdeuskar@FreeBSD.org"> pds@FreeBSD.org"> peadar@FreeBSD.org"> perky@FreeBSD.org"> petef@FreeBSD.org"> peter@FreeBSD.org"> peterj@FreeBSD.org"> pfg@FreeBSD.org"> pgj@FreeBSD.org"> pgollucci@FreeBSD.org"> phantom@FreeBSD.org"> philip@FreeBSD.org"> phk@FreeBSD.org"> pho@FreeBSD.org"> piero@FreeBSD.org"> pirzyk@FreeBSD.org"> piso@FreeBSD.org"> pjd@FreeBSD.org"> pluknet@FreeBSD.org"> proven@FreeBSD.org"> ps@FreeBSD.org"> pst@FreeBSD.org"> qingli@FreeBSD.org"> rafan@FreeBSD.org"> raj@FreeBSD.org"> rakuco@FreeBSD.org"> randi@FreeBSD.org"> ray@FreeBSD.org"> rdivacky@FreeBSD.org"> rea@FreeBSD.org"> rees@FreeBSD.org"> reg@FreeBSD.org"> remko@FreeBSD.org"> rene@FreeBSD.org"> rgrimes@FreeBSD.org"> ricardag@FreeBSD.org"> rich@FreeBSD.org"> rik@FreeBSD.org"> rink@FreeBSD.org"> rm@FreeBSD.org"> rmacklem@FreeBSD.org"> rmh@FreeBSD.org"> rnoland@FreeBSD.org"> rnordier@FreeBSD.org"> roam@FreeBSD.org"> robert@FreeBSD.org"> roberto@FreeBSD.org"> rodrigc@FreeBSD.org"> roger@FreeBSD.org"> romain@FreeBSD.org"> rpaulo@FreeBSD.org"> rpratt@FreeBSD.org"> rrs@FreeBSD.org"> rse@FreeBSD.org"> rsm@FreeBSD.org"> rstone@FreeBSD.org"> ru@FreeBSD.org"> rushani@FreeBSD.org"> rv@FreeBSD.org"> rvb@FreeBSD.org"> rwatson@FreeBSD.org"> ryusuke@FreeBSD.org"> sada@FreeBSD.org"> sah@FreeBSD.org"> sahil@FreeBSD.org"> sam@FreeBSD.org"> sanpei@FreeBSD.org"> sat@FreeBSD.org"> sbruno@FreeBSD.org"> sbz@FreeBSD.org"> scf@FreeBSD.org"> scheidell@FreeBSD.org"> schweikh@FreeBSD.org"> scop@FreeBSD.org"> scottl@FreeBSD.org"> scrappy@FreeBSD.org"> se@FreeBSD.org"> sean@FreeBSD.org"> seanc@FreeBSD.org"> sef@FreeBSD.org"> sem@FreeBSD.org"> semenu@FreeBSD.org"> sephe@FreeBSD.org"> sepotvin@FreeBSD.org"> sergei@FreeBSD.org"> sf@FreeBSD.org"> shafeeq@FreeBSD.org"> shaun@FreeBSD.org"> sheldonh@FreeBSD.org"> shiba@FreeBSD.org"> shige@FreeBSD.org"> shin@FreeBSD.org"> silby@FreeBSD.org"> simokawa@FreeBSD.org"> simon@FreeBSD.org"> sjg@FreeBSD.org"> skreuzer@FreeBSD.org"> skv@FreeBSD.org"> smace@FreeBSD.org"> + +smh@FreeBSD.org"> + smkelly@FreeBSD.org"> smpatel@FreeBSD.org"> snb@FreeBSD.org"> sobomax@FreeBSD.org"> sos@FreeBSD.org"> sperber@FreeBSD.org"> sson@FreeBSD.org"> ssouhlal@FreeBSD.org"> adam@redprince.net"> stark@FreeBSD.org"> stas@FreeBSD.org"> stb@FreeBSD.org"> stefan@FreeBSD.org"> stefanf@FreeBSD.org"> stephane@FreeBSD.org"> stephen@FreeBSD.org"> steve@FreeBSD.org"> syuu@FreeBSD.org"> sumikawa@FreeBSD.org"> sunpoet@FreeBSD.org"> suz@FreeBSD.org"> swallace@FreeBSD.org"> swills@FreeBSD.org"> sylvio@FreeBSD.org"> syrinx@FreeBSD.org"> tabthorpe@FreeBSD.org"> tackerman@FreeBSD.org"> takawata@FreeBSD.org"> tanimura@FreeBSD.org"> taoka@FreeBSD.org"> taras@FreeBSD.org"> tdb@FreeBSD.org"> tedm@FreeBSD.org"> tegge@FreeBSD.org"> tg@FreeBSD.org"> thepish@FreeBSD.org"> theraven@FreeBSD.org"> thierry@FreeBSD.org"> thomas@FreeBSD.org"> thompsa@FreeBSD.org"> ticso@FreeBSD.org"> tijl@FreeBSD.org"> timur@FreeBSD.org"> tj@FreeBSD.org"> tjr@FreeBSD.org"> tmclaugh@FreeBSD.org"> tmm@FreeBSD.org"> + + +tmseck@FreeBSD.org"> tobez@FreeBSD.org"> tom@FreeBSD.org"> tomsoft@FreeBSD.org"> torstenb@FreeBSD.org"> toshi@FreeBSD.org"> tota@FreeBSD.org"> trasz@FreeBSD.org"> trevor@FreeBSD.org"> trhodes@FreeBSD.org"> trociny@FreeBSD.org"> truckman@FreeBSD.org"> tshiozak@FreeBSD.org"> tuexen@FreeBSD.org"> tweten@FreeBSD.org"> twinterg@FreeBSD.org"> uch@FreeBSD.org"> ue@FreeBSD.org"> ugen@FreeBSD.org"> uhclem@FreeBSD.org"> ulf@FreeBSD.org"> ume@FreeBSD.org"> unfurl@FreeBSD.org"> ups@FreeBSD.org"> uqs@FreeBSD.org"> vanhu@FreeBSD.org"> vanilla@FreeBSD.org"> vd@FreeBSD.org"> versus@FreeBSD.org"> viny@FreeBSD.org"> vkashyap@FreeBSD.org"> vs@FreeBSD.org"> vsevolod@FreeBSD.org"> vwe@FreeBSD.org"> wblock@FreeBSD.org"> wen@FreeBSD.org"> weongyo@FreeBSD.org"> wes@FreeBSD.org"> whiteside@acm.org"> wilko@FreeBSD.org"> will@FreeBSD.org"> wjv@FreeBSD.org"> wkoszek@FreeBSD.org"> wolf@FreeBSD.org"> wollman@FreeBSD.org"> wosch@FreeBSD.org"> wpaul@FreeBSD.org"> wsalamon@FreeBSD.org"> wsanchez@FreeBSD.org"> wxs@FreeBSD.org"> wylie@magnesium.net"> xride@FreeBSD.org"> yar@FreeBSD.org"> yoichi@FreeBSD.org"> yokota@FreeBSD.org"> yongari@FreeBSD.org"> yzlin@FreeBSD.org"> zack@FreeBSD.org"> zarzycki@FreeBSD.org"> zec@FreeBSD.org"> zeising@FreeBSD.org"> zi@FreeBSD.org"> zml@FreeBSD.org"> znerd@FreeBSD.org"> zont@FreeBSD.org"> Index: projects/entities/share/xml/commercial.consult.xml =================================================================== --- projects/entities/share/xml/commercial.consult.xml (revision 41353) +++ projects/entities/share/xml/commercial.consult.xml (revision 41354) @@ -1,2880 +1,2891 @@ $FreeBSD$ Africa Asia Australia Europe New Zealand North America South America Aaronsen Group, Ltd http://www.aaronsen.com/freebsd/ Aaronsen Group, Ltd. advises on and implements a wide range of internetworking technologies, including remote access, wide area networks, international telecommunications, Intranetworking, web applications and local area services. Many of our custom web-enabled solutions are engineered using FreeBSD, Apache, mod_perl, and MySQL/Oracle. Please email us at info@aaronsen.com. Our web site is at http://www.aaronsen.com and we can be reached via telephone at +1.412.391.6000. Adimus GmbH & Co. KG http://www.adimus.de/ Adimus GmbH & Co. KG is a company based in Bochum, Germany. As a consulting partner we provide services in system administration for all flavors of Unix and Microsoft Windows, design and maintenance of LANs and WANs, IT security auditing and database management. Solutions for intra- and internet servers as well as our firewall toolkit are based on FreeBSD and third-party products from Compaq, Peacock, Cisco and Ascend. For more information please contact info@adimus.de or visit our website. Acadix, LLC http://www.acadix.biz Acadix, LLC offers a full range of services for FreeBSD and other platforms, including system integration, file servers, WEB servers, and programming/porting. Acadix provides on-site services to businesses, schools, and charitable organizations in the Milwaukee metro area. Programming services are available to all locations in the U.S. For more information, please visit our website. Advance Systems Group http://www.advansys.net/ Advance Systems Group builds, administrates, and maintains Intranet/Internet networks using FreeBSD and other UNIX operating systems. ASG also provides a variety of other services including domain name hosting, web site construction, and software training. For more information, please phone us at +1.317.507.4229, e-mail sales@advansys.net, or visit our web site. A-Team Systems http://www.ateamsystems.com/ A-Team Systems has over 15 years of experience helping clients leverage the power of &os; in combination with other open source software such as PHP, MySQL and Apache in a secure, customized and cohesive way. We've been with &os; since version 1.0! We can help you with your existing deployment or future plans: From encrypted backups to web and mail servers. Visit our website for more information. ALE Software http://linux.wroclaw.pl/ We offer IT consulting, systems integration and corporate information systems based on BSD software. For more information, email admin@linux.wroclaw.pl or visit our website. We operate mostly in Eastern Europe (Poland). Adminia Sistemas http://www.adminia.es/ Adminia offers technological consulting and professional system administration services, specializing in free software and virtualized high-availability environments. We have over 15 years experience in using and customizing FreeBSD systems in data processing centres, small and medium-sized businesses and universities. We are located in Madrid, Spain. Contact us for reliable and expert partnership via email or visit our website. AnonBSD Inc. https://sites.google.com/site/anonbsd/ We provide IT environment consulting. Support in FreeBSD, OpenBSD, Linux (Debian, RedHat, SUSE, Gentoo, Slackware) and OpenSolaris. High availability, virtualization, monitoring, security, deployment, network infrastructure. We service in São Paulo/SP and Campinas/SP in Brazil. Contact us via e-mail (ricardo.ichizo@gmail.com) or by phone at +55 (19) 8202-1567. BITNETS Inc. http://www.bitnets.com BITNETS Inc. specializes in BIND, Apache, Postfix, Courier-IMAP and a variety of server components running on FreeBSD with emphasis on security and stability. Services include consulting on server evaluation, installation and configuration and FreeBSD-based managed secure e-mail hosting. We are located in St. Albert, serving the Edmonton area of Alberta, Canada. Call us toll-free in North America at 1-877-BITNETS for general enquiries or e-mail us. Winners of the chamber of commerce InfoTech Award of Distinction. Blapp IT Consulting http://www.blapp-it-consulting.ch/ Located in Basel/Switzerland, Blapp-IT-Consulting provides consulting services related to complex mail routing and gateway solutions, SaaS, BSD Hosting, Internet servers and infrastructure, programming, FreeBSD and other BSD operating systems, security auditing/firewalls, system administration, etc. For more information please visit our website. B.M.K. Industries http://www.bmk.com.au B.M.K. Industries is located in Melbourne Australia and specializes in setting up low cost routers and servers (Web, E-Mail, FTP, DNS and Secure Web Servers ) all using FreeBSD. Setting up Permanent Modem & ISDN Internet Connections is also a specialty. Please visit our web page. Black Point Arts Internet Solutions GmbH http://www.bpanet.de/ Black Point Arts Internet Solutions GmbH is located in Germany (Frankfurt/Main). We have experiences with FreeBSD, Linux and Windows Servers. Our business activities include hosting/homing, programming and webdesign. We develop solutions for your intra-, extra- and internet needs. For more informations you can visit our website or write an email to service@bpanet.de. BSD Consulting http://www.bsdconsulting.no/ BSD Consulting provides consulting services related to Internet servers/infrastructure, programming, FreeBSD & BSD operating systems, security auditing/firewalls, system administration, etc. Based in Oslo, Norway. catpipe Systems http://www.catpipe.net/ catpipe Systems ApS provide managed services and support contracts for FreeBSD implemented on rackmountable servers preloaded with FreeBSD. China Internet Service http://www.1260.cn/ China Internet Services www.1260.cn is a China Internet Email and Webhosting provider offering UNIX shell accounts, web hosting, mailman and ezmlm, pop3, imap, webmail (squirrelmail), mysql, php, fastcgi and mod_perl hosting on FreeBSD servers in Nanjing. Phone: 0086-25-84527765. + + Clone Consulting + http://www.clone.co.nz/ + + Clone provides consultancy services for software development, system + architecture and FreeBSD infrastructure support. For additional + information please visit the Clone website. + + + Cloud BT IT Support http://www.it-support.com.au/ Cloud BT provides IT support and other IT services to businesses in Australia, including system maintenance, data recovery, and ongoing IT consulting. We also provide a range of scalable cloud solutions to our business clients. In our day-to-day operation we support numerous platforms including FreeBSD, Linux and other Unix-based environments. Call us on 1300 737 205 or visit our website for more information. Clue Computing, Inc. http://www.clue.com/ Clue Computing, Inc. has over 10 years of UNIX experience, specializing in system administration, networking, and security. Custom application development and testing available, including device drivers, kernel work, etc. We offer sales, assembly, and installation of FreeBSD systems for any application. For more information, email info@clue.com. Codeangels Solutions http://www.codeangels.com Codeangels Solutions GmbH based in Switzerland, region Zuerich. Offers its customers a range of IT Security, Network and UNIX Services. We utilize and support FreeBSD in our services and solutions. CodeGen Inc. http://www.codegen.com/ CodeGen, Inc. provide consulting and programming services, specializing in embedded systems. For more information, email info@codegen.com. ColoAdvisor http://www.coloadvisor.com/ Located in New Jersey, ColoAdvisor finds the best fit hosting, colocation and cloud computing services based on technical, geographical and financial needs. Contact us for an immediate site assessment and to begin the process. Either via email or via phone (+1-877-732-4003, press 1 to speak to an advisor for a free consultation). Collective Technologies http://www.colltech.com Collective Technologies is the recognized leader in systems management services for distributed enterprise computing environments. Collective Technologies highly skilled consultants combine technical expertise with solid business sense to develop world-class IT solutions. Collective Technologies specializes in keeping complex computer systems running reliably offering a full range of support services including UNIX, NT, Linux, FreeBSD, OpenBSD and NetBSD to address the needs of a client's systems management lifecycle. The company is headquartered in Austin, Texas, with 19 offices nationwide. For more information, visit our website or e-mail us at contact@colltech.com. Core Software http://www.coresoftware.net.au Core Software is based in Perth, Western Australia. We are a consulting company specializing in OpenBSD, FreeBSD, Linux and Windows. We work with firewalls, Virtual Private Networks, Database Servers, Email and Web Servers, Security, WAN/LAN implementations, Multi OS networks. You can contact us here or visit our website. DataPipe http://www.datapipe.com/ Built on a rock-solid network and immediate live customer support, DataPipe is a trusted hosting company providing secure managed solutions. Our specialized teams of passionate professionals take a personal interest in each client's unique needs, enabling businesses to outsource with confidence. With world-class facilities strategically located in the New York Metropolitan & Silicon Valley areas, Hong Kong and London, UK, DataPipe offers custom FreeBSD solutions and expert FreeBSD support 24 hours a day, 365 days a year. DeLorentz & Partners http://www.delorentz.nl/ DeLorentz & Partners is a consulting firm based in Hilversum in the Netherlands. We offer various types of consulting and support on FreeBSD. Info at info@delorentz.nl or phone us at Tel: +31 (0)35 - 624 44 66. Dextra Soluções em Informática http://www.dextra.com.br/ Dextra Soluções em Informática. Specialized consulting in TCP/IP networks, capacity and contingency planning, UNIX systems and network administration, system security and firewalls, VPNs implementation, Internet/Intranets projects. For more information, please phone us at +55.19.251.3644 (Brazil), e-mail staff@dextra.com.br, or visit our web site (in Portuguese). Die Webmaster Gmbh http://www.diewebmaster.at Die Webmaster Gmbh - We are a consulting company from Linz, Austria and offer a wide range of FreeBSD based services: FreeBSD installation, integration, troubleshooting, maintenance, FreeBSD based hosting (for example jail servers), serverhousing, hardware selection, configuration and support. e-mail: info@diewebmaster.at EscapeBox http://www.escapebox.net/en/ More than 20 years of IT experience on demand! The EscapeBox Germany GmbH, founded in 2002, is a small but agile company that offers IT consulting services. We can support our clients both from remote and on location, as desired. So, if you are looking for capable freelancers for your projects, please do not hesitate to contact us today! Essenz Consulting http://www.essenz.com Essenz Consulting is a web services and products provider. We offer custom built High-Performance Intel based Workstations and Servers. These systems are 100% FreeBSD compatible. Our systems feature Ultra2-LVD SCSI, high speed networking, Dual Pentium III and Dual Pentium III XEON processors, and many other fault tolerant and backup features. For more information contact sales@essenz.com or visit us at http://www.essenz.com. The FreeBSD Mall http://www.freebsdmall.com/ The FreeBSD Mall offers several different levels of support contracts for FreeBSD. Support is available on a per-incident basis, or as a convenient, extensible annual contract. Our highly trained technical support staff will handle your requests in a professional and efficient manner and will provide detailed responses to your needs by phone, fax, or email. The FreeBSD Mall staff has over 8 years of experience supporting FreeBSD. For more information, please see our support page. Far North Networks http://www.networks.nq.nu/ Far North Networks, Based in Innisfail, North Queensland (About 100Km South of Cairns). Focus is on business network support providing low cost file/print servers based on FreeBSD. We also specialize in setting up internet gateways/firewalls. For more information send us an email to info@networks.nq.nu. Frigate Networks http://www.frigate.com/ frigate networks provides network troubleshooting, system administration, kernel development and ports of BSD software to commercial products such as routers and firewalls. Our Email, DNS, and WWW servers run FreeBSD. We also provide network management solutions based on HTTP and tcl. For more information please visit our web site, call us at +1.650.903.2266, or send email to info@frigate.com>. FSC Internet http://www.fscinternet.com/ FSC Internet is Canada's largest FreeBSD consulting firm. FSC's clients include numerous top-tier corporations (e.g. Mazda, Heinz), as well as mid-sized companies (e.g. the Vermont Telephone Company) and the public sector. FSC provides full consulting, implementation, support, and training services for all FreeBSD applications, including a special focus on security, high-performance Web applications, and Intranets. Please email us at info@fscinternet.com or call us at +1.416.921.4280 for further information. GNUnetworks http://www.gnun.net/ GNUnetworks is a System's consultancy group focused on free software. We provide FreeBSD and Linux servers for Internet / Intranet as well as embedded systems for firewalling and data processing.

Phone: +34-937340794
web: http://www.gnun.net
mail: info@gnun.net Gurix Web Professionals http://www.gurix.com Gurix Web Professionals Web Development, design, and custom application programming using both open source and proprietary environments. Services also include private consulting, emergency response coordination and various IT solutions to maximize the effectiveness of your business. Herrin Software Development http://www.hsdi.com/ Herrin Software Development, Inc., creator of Qddb, provides custom software development, internet consulting, general computer consulting, and training services. For more information email us at info@hsdi.com or visit our web site. HNT Solutions http://www.hntsolutions.com HNT Solutions provides complete &os; support services and consulting. Please contact us at unix@hntsolutions.com or visit our website for more information. Greg Lehey http://www.lemis.com/~grog/ Greg Lehey has over 20 years industry experience in all system programming and systems administration disciplines, including device drivers, kernel debugging, compilers, libraries, performance analysis, and site planning. He is the author of The Vinum Volume Manager, a virtual disk driver which includes software RAID, and also the books Porting UNIX Software and The Complete FreeBSD. Contact him via Email, or visit his web site. IKTech http://www.iktech.net IKTech Dipl.-Ing. Gernot Schmied is a high-end systems integrator and UNIX competence center located in Vienna, Austria. We especially focus on telecommunications, networking and security aspects for NPO, corporate and Service Provider/Carrier customers. We use selected commercial products as well as FreeBSD, OpenBSD, NetBSD, Linux and Solaris and are the premier competence center with regards to advanced routing gateways. For inquiries please contact office@iktech.net. Ipsure ICT Consultancy Services http://www.ipsure.com/ Ipsure offers IT strategic planning, system integration, maintenance, administration and counsultancy services to SMEs and large enterprises. The scope of our services range from initial setup of the physical layer components through the application level tuning and auditing stages. Although we provide various solutions over any other *NIX systems, we have a seasoned experience in building and managing clustered server environments which are particularly based on FreeBSD for delivering secure and stabile applications under ultra high workloads. Our company is located in Istanbul, Turkey. Global Technopolis Corporation http://globaltechnopolis.com/ Located in Tokyo, Japan, The Global Technopolis Corporation provides computing technology consulting services including strategy and implementation proposals, administration, maintenance, hosting, support, and training for FreeBSD. Our engineers can assist your business to set up routers/gateways, web servers, applications servers, database servers, backup servers and so forth. Professional project management and on-time delivery within budget is always our commitment to our clients. For further details, please visit our web site. Hypermetrica http://www.esliadmina.net IT-consulting company Hypermetrica provides IT consulting and professional system administration services. We develop high-available environments, web and network services for small and medium-sized businesses based on FreeBSD and other UNIX operating systems. Our office is located in Moscow, Russia. Contact us for consulting via email or visit our website. Institut Manajemen Telkom http://www.imtelkom.ac.id/ Institut Manajemen Telkom is an educational institution, working thoroughly to create a free Academic Suite system standing firmly on top of FOSS (FreeBSD, Apache, MySQL, PHP). We just want to promote and encourage people (especially academician) to use FreeBSD for their platform, thus we are happily helping others by providing consultant service to train them using FreeBSD. We provide discussion and consultant service mainly in Indonesian language. Inform System Inc. http://www.inform.co.jp/ Inform System Inc. is a FreeBSD/Internet/DataBase consulting company. Located in Osaka Japan, we offer a wide range of services to school and small businesses. For further details, please visit our web site, or send email to info@inform.co.jp innominate AG http://innominate.de/ innominate AGis a Linux, *BSD and Open Source service provider based in Berlin, Germany. Not only as consulting partner but also as system administrator, programmer, supporter and trainer we offer the full range of services with a heavy focus on Open Source products. Many of our tailor-made products are engineered using apache, Perl, Zope, MySQL and Oracle running on Linux and *BSD. For further information please contact info@innominate.de or visit our website. InterACT http://www.interact.se InterACT is a Sweden based provider of Consultancy and Custom Development Services. Principal consultant Chris Lindbergh has over 10 years system software development experience on BSD based platforms. Areas of expertise include Firewall and Networking System setup, custom development in C and C++, and supply of turnkey solutions. For further information, contact us by email at: info@interact.se, or phone Sweden on +46 (0)920-888 03 IT-schulungen.com http://www.it-schulungen.com Located in Germany, IT-Schulungen.com is a portal for IT-Trainings (both individual workshops and public seminars) and offers training and consulting for different Open Source systems including FreeBSD. For further information please call 01805 120 222 (from within Germany) or visit our website. It Security Services http://www.itsecuritymn.com IT Security Services is based in Minneapolis, Minnesota and serves the Twin Cities. We provide a complete line of security services, such as audits, secure servers, and new network installations with emphasis on security. We are highly skilled with FreeBSD, and can use it to run extremely fast and reliable servers using all popular services. You can reach us at info@itsecuritymn.com, or our web site at http://www.itsecuritymn.com. iXsystems, Inc. http://www.ixsystems.com Based in the heart of Silicon Valley in San Jose, California, iXsystems offers FreeBSD technical support and custom development with a devoted Professional Services and Call Center based in the US to assist with issues. Getting FreeBSD up and running is fast and easy, but having expert help on-hand to solve your problems can take your solution to new heights. From optimizing your small office set-up to guidance on very large deployments, our team can ensure you get the most from FreeBSD. Okanagan Technology Solutions http://www.okts.ca/ Okanagan Technology Solutions specializes in open source technologies, in particular FreeBSD, Perl, Apache, and MySQL for clients in the beautiful Okanagan region of British Columbia. For more information, please visit our web site. Linux Network Care http://www.linuxnetworkcare.com/ Linux Network Care is based in Toronto, Ontario. Our company is specialized in providing Linux and FreeBSD based solutions for small, medium and corporate sized businesses. We provide ourselves on our delivery of dependable network solutions, world class server administration, tight server security and easy to understand Linux training. We also provide desktop integration with Ubuntu Linux. Lionra Support Services Ltd. http://www.lionra.com/ Lionra Support Services Ltd. provides IT solutions including tailored network infrastructure, custom-designed servers, remote administration and security audits. We have over 10 years experience in the IT sector, specializing in *BSD, GNU/Linux & Open Source software. Further information about Lionra Support Services Ltd. and the services we offer can be found at http://www.lionra.com/. Jens Schweikhardt http://www.schweikhardt.net/ Jens Schweikhardt, located near Stuttgart/Germany, is a FreeBSD committer with 20 years of Unix experience who won several national and international programming contests. If you have a problem that can be solved using the Unix toolbox (preferably C, perl, shell) he is the one to make it happen. With his background in Unix Standardization he will make sure your investment runs portably and efficiently on all the Unices you care for. Contact him via schweikh@FreeBSD.org. Julian Stacey http://www.berklix.com/~jhs/cv/ Net services & systems engineering, UNIX since 1978, Maintains a FreeBSD Commercial Consultants Index (sorted geographically & by full & part timers). Be sure to visit his page! Support.od.ua http://support.od.ua/ Support.od.ua is located in Odessa, Ukraine. We offer professional FreeBSD and Linux installation, consulting and server solutions for customers in Ukraine, Russian Federation and Kazakhstan. For more information and contact details please visit our website. MediaCenter http://www.umc.se/ MediaCenter, Umeæ, Sweden. Located in northern Sweden we offer professional consulting and programming for secure inter/intranet solutions using FreeBSD and UNIX(-like) operating systems. We also work high performance database programming, primarily using PostgreSQL. For more information, please send email to info@umc.se, or visit our website (http://www.umc.se/) MediaUp Webdesign http://www.mediaup.de MediaUp Webdesign is located in Duesseldorf, Germany. We offer professional FreeBSD installation, consulting and server solutions for business customers in Germany, Austria and Switzerland. For more information and contact details please visit our website. MindStep Corp. http://www.mindstep.com/ MindStep Corp. configure and maintain Intranet/Internet networks using FreeBSD and other Unix operating systems. MindStep also offers products and provides software development services customized to fit the needs of corporations of any size. Midwest Systems Solutions, Inc. http://www.midwestsystems.com/ Midwest Systems Solutions Inc. , based in Winnipeg Canada, provides hardware, software and consulting services including LAN, WAN, remote access, file and printer servers, Internet solutions and support and administration of FreeBSD and Linux systems. Midwest Systems specializes in Web, FTP, Internet Gateways, firewall solutions based on FreeBSD and Linux. Midwest Systems Solutions also offers both virtual and dedicated webhosting solutions. For more information, please contact mailto:info@midwestsystems.com or visit our website at www.midwestsystems.com. Nesbitt & Associates http://www.nesbitt.ca/ Nesbitt & Associates is based in Vancouver, Canada, but have worked with clients all over the world. We specialize in open source technologies, in particular, FreeBSD, Perl, Apache, mod_perl and MySQL. For more information, please visit our web site. Netgraft Corp. http://netgraft.com/ Netgraft Corp. is a technology consulting firm that specializes in open source technologies like Linux, FreeBSD, MySQL, Apache, Sendmail, BIND, etc. We're New York City based and can provide on-site support and customized business solutions based on these technologies. Netizen http://netizen.com.au/ Netizen, based in Melbourne, Australia, provide Internet and Open Source consultancy services, including FreeBSD installation, configuration, support contracts, applications development, E-Commerce solutions, etc. See http://netizen.com.au/ or email info@netizen.com.au for more information. NixSys BVBA http://www.nixsys.be/ NixSys specializes in the development, maintenance and deployment of Free and Open Source Software on any scale. Remote and on-site systems administration, particularly in the areas of mail and dns, are also available. Contact us for more information and rates. Omar Siddique http://www.heedme.com/resume Omar Siddique is a Washington, D.C. based consultant with broad experience in FreeBSD, Linux, Solaris. His specialties include internet services, systems integration, system administration, and networking. Contact him via omar@heedme.com. Omniscient Technologies http://www.omniscient.com/ Omniscient Technologies is a Washington D.C. based consulting group with a broad array of experience in *BSD, Solaris, Linux and many other varieties of UNIX specializing in highly scalable systems, systems integration and network security. Custom application design also available. Contact via info@omniscient.com. Open Source Associates, LLC http://www.OpenSourceAssociates.com/ Open Source Associates LLC is a St. Louis, Missouri based consulting firm specializing in the support of all things Open Source related with strong emphasis on FreeBSD, MySQL, Sendmail, BIND, and Apache. Open Source's highly skilled consultants are available for telephone support as well as support contracts and onsite consulting engagements anywhere in the United States. We have particular expertise in the design, implementation, and support of highly available clustered websites. We specialize in remote administration and management to keep complex systems running reliably. For more information email us at info@opensourceassociates.com or call toll-free 866-343-2589. OpenSOS SB http://www.opensos.net/ OpenSOS SB is a company which provides consulting and professional services for FreeBSD based solutions based in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. We also provide maintenance and support services in Malaysia. We can operate at short notice in any region in Asia for a truly professional quick-to-service operational capability. However we are willing to consider projects outside Malaysia. We are specialized in FreeBSD, MacOSX and basically in all kinds of UNIX systems. OpenWorld http://www.stdio.com/ OpenWorld has been providing computer, network, and security consulting since 1994. Our clients? range from Fortune 500 companies to regional small businesses. Our engineers each have at least 10 years of experience in Unix systems and networks. We provide full service consulting, implementation, installation, security, and support for FreeBSD, SUN Solaris, SCO Unixware, SCO OpenServer, SGI Irix, IBM AIX, Compaq Digital Unix, and Cisco IOS. Please email us at info@stdio.com or call us at 606-514-1800 for further information. Puryear Information Technology, LLC http://www.puryear-it.com Puryear Information Technology, LLC provides open source application support, integration services, and technology management expertise to the Southeastern United States. Our company plays a pivotal role in the design and deployment of open source solutions--we have worked with companies to design and manage FreeBSD and Linux web farms; deployed open source-based clustering software to ensure high availability of critical network services; performed critical performance tuning and software integration for a popular spam filter appliance; and integrated Samba into Internet-accessible, VPN-based file services. Phone: +1-225-343-3056. Pendulo Software http://www.pendulosoftware.com Based in Caracas, Venezuela, Pendulo Software provides and specializes in support and consulting for FreeBSD and Linux solutions. We offer onsite as well as offsite support, web development, design (2D and 3D), Multimedia, VPNs implementation, Virtualization, VoIP, high performance servers, Firewalls, custom application programming and many others services. Our experience covers the most important branches of current IT industry, from routine of server management, security audits and updates, to high performance computing and mitigating attacks. For more information about our services, please visit our multilanguage website, send an email to atencioncliente@pendulosoftware.com or infocorp@pendulosoftware.com or call us under +58 (212) 625-0708, +1 (407) 536-9895 or +1 (253) 642-6484. Peter Dufault mailto:dufault@hda.com Peter Dufault, of HD Associates. Peter has over 15 years experience in medical device control, high performance simulation systems, digital closed-loop feedback systems, realtime UNIX-like systems, and UNIX device drivers. For more information, please send email to dufault@hda.com PHB Solutions http://www.phbsolutions.com PHB Solutions, based in Belgium, provides *BSD installation, maintenance, support and consulting services (file servers, web servers, mail servers, database servers, routers). For more information, please contact philippe.bresoux@phbs olutions.com. Phil Budne http://www.ultimate.com/phil/resume.html Phil Budne is a Boston area consultant who has worked professionally with BSD and other Unix systems since 1985. Services include development and porting of kernel extensions, device drivers, network protocol implementation, and applications, as well as network and system administration. For more information contact phil+fbsd@ultimate.com. Pine Internet http://www.pine.nl/ Pine Internet implements LAN, WAN and remote access solutions, offers Unix support and administration contracts and advises ISP's and other corporate customers concerning their network and server setup. Pine specializes in Internet security, performs security auditing services on demand, and offers firewall solutions based on FreeBSD. Other products we offer are webhosting, facility management and leased lines. Among the products we use are FreeBSD, Cisco routers, PHP, Apache, Perl, Solaris and MySQL. Pine has 8+ years of Unix and Internet experience. We feature some of the largest ISP's in the Netherlands as our customers. For more information, please contact info@pine.nl or visit our website at www.pine.nl. Poul-Henning Kamp http://www.freebsd.org/~phk/ Poul-Henning Kamp has over 12 years of experience in UNIX & Networks, and is a former FreeBSD Core Team member. Poul developed phkmalloc, tcl_nm, tcl_db, tcl_snmp and more, and was the Release Engineer for several FreeBSD releases. Poul resides in Denmark, and can be reached via email at phk@FreeBSD.org. Psychsoft Consulting http://www.psychsoftek.com Psychsoft Consulting is an Industry recognized leading technology consulting firm based in Quincy, Massachusetts founded in 1987 with a highly educated, trained and experienced staff to help in all your IT needs. Psychsoft, Inc. personnel hold advanced degrees in various fields and have years of experience in IT implementation, troubleshooting, design and configuration. Areas of expertise include: Linux, Microsoft Windows, UNIX (including FreeBSD), TCP/IP, LAN, WAN, VPN, Network security, WIFI security, WIFI design, Database design, SQL, Web site design, Server design, System integration, Network printing and DSL/Broadband/T1 Internet access. Questwork Consulting Limited http://www.questwork.com/ Questwork Consulting Limited is based in Hong Kong. We provide consulting, web application development, hosting & maintenance services on FreeBSD to our clients for more than 5 years. For more information, please contact us by email at freebsd@questwork.com or visit our website. R and D Associates, Inc. http://www.RnDAssociates.com/ R & D Associates, Inc. developed ServeTheWeb.com utilizing FreeBSD running Apache. We employed consulting services from Poul-Henning Kamp to develop our Virtual Server solution (which is available in FreeBSD 4.0 and higher). R & D Associates, Inc. is an application development firm specializing in client/server application development. We use FreeBSD running Apache and utilizing PHP and MySQL (As well as NT with ASP and SQL/Access). Secnetix GmbH and Co KG http://www.secnetix.de/ Secnetix GmbH & Co KG -- located in Munich, Germany -- has a strong focus on BSD systems and offers professional consulting services, ranging from basic administration, programming and security-related tasks to sophisticated projects involving design, implementation and maintenance of complex network setups. For more information, please visit our web site or send a message to info@secnetix.de. Southern Gazer http://www.southerngazer.com Southern Gazer is a consulting company with 20 years PC technical support experience based in Sydney's idyllic Sutherland Shire. Our focus is helping businesses get their computers working right while spending as little as possible on IT. We're passionate supporters of Open Source products and can help the average business save money and gain reliability by using systems such as FreeBSD on their file servers, print servers, e-mail systems plus lots more. We also supply a complete range of Linux and BSD CD's at ultra low prices. Please drop by our website, email us at info@southerngazer.com, or call us on 02 9532 1217 to have a chat. Steuben Technologies http://www.steubentech.com/ Steuben Technologies is a consulting company offering support, administration, custom software development, legacy systems support and solutions tailored to your unique business model on a wide range of platforms including FreeBSD, NetBSD and most commercial UNIX platforms and much more. Please see our website or call us at (607)661-4431. Synetec http://www.synetec.pl/ Synetec is an IT company located in Poland. We are experienced in the installation and administration of &os;, Linux and Windows Server systems. For more informations visit our website. Syntonet Ltd http://www.syntonet.co.uk/ Syntonet Ltd is UK based provider of Consultancy and Custom Development Services. Principal consultant Rob Pickering has over 10 years system software development experience on BSD based platforms. Areas of expertise include firewall and networking system setup, custom development in C and C++, and supply of turnkey solutions. For further information, contact us by email at info@syntonet.co.uk, call +44.870.166.4400 (Voice) or +44.870.166.4411 (Fax). SysCare s. r. o. http://www.SysCare.sk/ SysCare s. r. o. is a company based in Slovakia with the aim to provide highly professional solutions, including consultancy and outsourcing services for reasonable amount of money. Our focus is on high-availability and high-performance solutions for web, database, DNS and email products built on &os;. SysCare s. r. o. has been founded by Daniel Gerzo, who is being part of the official &os; development team. For inquiries please send us an email to office@syscare.sk, or visit our web site for more information. TecVD http://www.tecvd.com/ TecVD is located in Barcelona, Spain. We are a company focused in system security and open source implementations (GNU/Linux, FreeBSD and OpenBSD) in heterogeneous infrastructure. We also have security appliances, Tseg series, and network services appliances like Tcor series. We can provide you with a complete enterprise solution tailored to your needs. See our website or email us at tecvd@tecvd.com for further information. TundraWare Inc. http://www.tundraware.com/ TundraWare Inc. provides FreeBSD related consultancy in all contexts, from Embedded to large Transaction Processing systems. We have extensive International experience and can provide services in network design, systems architecture, development, deployment and operations. Contact us via telephone on 847/827-1706, via email to info@tundraware.com or write to us at TundraWare Inc., 817 Fairmont Court, Des Plaines, IL 60018, USA. UnixPorting http://www.UnixPorting.com/ UnixPorting.com specializes in the porting of existing software to new operating systems or hardware. In addition to porting, we specialize in C and Perl programming, Unix system administration and security, and open source technologies (FreeBSD, Perl, Apache, mod_perl, MySQL, etc.). For more information, please visit our web site. UnixWorX System Design http://www.unixworx.ca/ UnixWorX System Design is a Vancouver, BC based BSD consulting firm established in 1994. For over 20 years we've provided commercial support for BSD including FreeBSD, NetBSD and OpenBSD. Our specialties include Web Servers (Apache and TomCat), Database, Content Management Systems (CMS), Email servers such as Sendmail and Postfix, DNS (BIND 8 and 9), Firewalls (PF and IPF), Routing, as well as application development and Perl / C++ Programing. We operate our own server collocation facility situated on a GIG-E Backbone. Additionally, the founder of the company, Glenn Graham, is an author for O'Reilly Publishing. We welcome new business! For more information, we invite you to visit our website. AspenWorks, Ltd. http://www.aspenworks.com/ AspenWorks is an Aspen, Colorado based consulting company with offices in Portland, OR. We specialize in network applications, and Wireless Broadband management for ISPs and WISPs. AspenWorks has been in business since 1986. Telephone: 970-925-3355 Wave2 Limited http://www.wave2.co.uk/ Wave2 Limited is an Open Source consultancy, based in the UK, providing custom solutions with an emphasis on FreeBSD. Services include software development (Java, Perl, Python, VB), Heterogeneous Network / System Administration (FreeBSD, Linux, OSX, Solaris and Windows). If you are looking for an Open Source solution, please contact me at info@wave2.org. William Richard & Associates http://www.tdl.com/~wdr/consulting.html William Richard & Associates offers FreeBSD, Internet, and e-commerce consulting, implementation, and support options for clients throughout the San Francisco Bay Area. Visit our website or e-mail us. Workgroup Technology Partners, Inc. http://www.wgtech.com Workgroup Technology Partners, Inc.We sell and support Unix systems including Solaris, HP/UX, AIX, Linux and FreeBSD. For comments refer to our site Security Audit and Control Solutions http://www.sacs.co.za/ Security Audit and Control Solutions (SACS) provides information security consultation and IT auditing services and offers professional FreeBSD support. SACS has developed a complete range of Technological Risk Management solutions using FreeBSD as an anchor for data analysis. Firewalls deployed using FreeBSD makes a cost effective solution in any organization and SACS can implement a secure FreeBSD firewall with caching engines, Network Address Translation (NAT) and proxies. For additional information please contact Mervin Pearce or visit http://www.sacs.co.za EDI Ltd Consulting Engineers http://www.ediltd.com EDI Ltd Consulting Engineers. We provide consulting services for FreeBSD as well as local and wide area network design. Our diversified staff allows us to help you in all the areas your project requires, from cabling to encryption, network security audits, network design and network health studies. We have successfully completed several FreeBSD installations for mission critical operations, using it as a firewall, web server or mail server. If you would like to discuss your project with us, please contact us as (770) 956-7000, or info@ediltd.com. White Queue Consulting http://whitequeue.com/ White Queue Consulting provides embedded FreeBSD kernel and userland development. Our services include device driver development, kernel porting, software design and development in the kernel and userland. We are able to work with clients in any location. For further information contact us through our contact form or visit the White Queue website. Crepido Systems AB http://www.crepido.com Crepido Systems AB provides services for custom software development and system design under BSD and other Unixes. We have 10+ years experience in Unix programming and system design using Unix as building block. Crepido System AB operates mainly in Sweden but requests outside Sweden are welcome. Mark Tinguely http://www.cs.ndsu.NoDak.edu/~tinguely/ Mark Tinguely has provided Network and Unix solutions for over ten years. These solutions include work with Unix kernels and Unix applications, TCP/IP applications, Local Area Network protocol debugging, and BSD device drivers. Mark has authored BSD device drivers for 3 video capture boards, an Asynchronous Transfer Mode (ATM) network card, and a Watchdog card. ITworks Consulting http://www.itworks.com.au ITworks Consulting is a privately owned information technology consultancy, situated in the central business district of Melbourne, Australia. The business consists of a specialized team of consultants who aim to provide information technology solutions to meet the needs of the business community. We provide a range of FreeBSD based web hosting, web database development and e-commerce services as well as professional FreeBSD consulting services and support contracts. For more information please visit our web site or contact us at info@itworks.com.au. Raditex AB http://raditex.nu/ Raditex AB are a firm of consultants and also do education in Unix. We have long experience with all kinds of Unix systems not only FreeBSD or Linux. For more information phone us at +46 19 4501015 or give us an email at gorhas@raditex.nu or visit our web site. Mike_Meyer http://www.mired.org/home/mwm/ Mike Meyer of Meyer Consulting has been providing Unix-based solutions since 1976, and web-based applications since 1992. These solutions range from chemical systems modeling to device drivers, and the web applications have ranged from community-building applications to web based software release systems. For more information, please contact mwm@mired.org. The Linux Box http://www.linuxbox.nu/ The Linux Box, located in Ann Arbor, Michigan, provides consulting and training services for open source operating systems and products, including FreeBSD and Linux. For more information, contact info@linuxbox.nu or view our website at www.linuxbox.nu. LANCO Global Systems http://www.lancoglobal.com/ LANCO Global Systems (LGSL), based in India, Hyderabad, with offices in USA and UK, provides and specializes in Application Development, Shell Scripting, PHP, C, C++ and Perl Programming, Networking Solutions, Unix device driver development, Web page Designing and Hosting, Web Server Solutions and configurations, ISP Services especially on Linux, FreeBSD and Solaris. For more information, please email us at services@lancoglobal.com or call us at 0091-9849043975 or FAX us at 0091-040-3755413. NS3G.COM http://www.ns3g.com/ NS3G.COM, based out of Toronto, Ontario, Canada, offers a variety of services and products. We specialize in products that run under FreeBSD and other *NIX systems but also support other platforms. Solutions for firewalls, LAN's, WAN'S and web presence are just a few that we offer. Please visit us at www.ns3g.com or contact us at info@ns3g.com for more information or to get a quote. Linast-Systemtechnik GmbH http://www.linast.de Linast-Systemtechnik GmbH is located in Sankt Augustin, Germany (near Bonn/Cologne) and provides consulting, support and training for FreeBSD, Linux, MacOS X and other Unix Systems. For more information, please call +49.2241.209467, e-mail us at info@linast.de or visit our website Cybersource Pty. Ltd http://www.cyber.com.au/ Cybersource is Australia's leading IT Professional Services Company in the areas of Unix/FreeBSD/Linux, TCP/IP Datanetworking and Open Platform application development using these technologies. With around 40 staff, are based in Melbourne and have been successfully providing IT Professional Services for 10 years. National Informatics Company http://www.nationalinformatics.com National Informatics Company provides research and development services for information technology. We work with FreeBSD to support or manage research projects for high performance computing, bioinformatics, enterprise software technologies and artificial intelligence. We also help companies make the transition from proprietary software products to Open Source products. Our phone number is (425) 740-0139. Bilch International Consulting http://www.bilch.com/ Bilch International Consulting, Hamburg is based in Germany. We are building fire walled servers and connect them to your ISDN, POTS, ATM or E1/T1 Line. BILCH Com is an ASP and application software developer. Please mail us at info@bilch.com. Parc Productions http://www.parcproductions.com/ Parc Productions. Located in the Netherlands. Started in 1997. We deliver professional system engineering services for FreeBSD, OpenBSD and MacOS X. Our services include 24/7 support, consultancy, maintenance of both hardware and software, assembly and installation of hardware, remote and on-site support, development of scripts and software for the machines we maintain etcetera. Of course we deliver hosting facilities and space for your servers at low costs as well. Visit our websites at www.parcproductions.com or www.bsdengineering.com. Please contact us by email or by telephone: +31-204892456. Worria Affordable Web Hosting http://worria.com/en/hosting.shtml Worria Affordable Web Hosting is a privately owned company in Hong Kong. We offer FreeBSD web hosting related consulting services, such as server administration and website management. For more details, please email our sales team. ZYTRAX, Inc http://www.zytrax.com/ Zytrax, Inc. is based in Montreal, Canada and provides consulting, development, implementation, hosting and maintenance services specialising in the BSD platforms. Our skill base includes Apache, PHP, Ruby, DNS, Mail, LDAP, Samba, PostgeSQL/MySQL and embedded systems. Please email us at consulting@zytrax.com. We can be reached via telephone at +1.514.285.9088. OpenTrend Solutions Ltd http://www.opentrend.net OpenTrend Solutions Ltd provides consulting and facilities management services through Canada. We specialize in supporting FreeBSD, NetBSD, OpenBSD and Linux, and have specialist skills in system administration, security and network design & management. We donate 2% of gross profits to the support of open source software and have partnered with organisations in the United States and Australia to better support multi-national clients. Daemonized Networking Services http://www.daemonized.com Daemonized Networking Services. Our staff have been supporting software and hardware development, brokerages, banks, hospitals, publishers, e-commerce, legal and medical research, telecommunications, and other environments since 1986, in the San Francisco Bay Area and Northern California. We build industrial strength web servers, running the latest release of Apache, OpenSSH, and OpenSSL, with all source, and firewall, based on FreeBSD, in less than one hour. Linux4biz http://www.linux4biz.net/ Linux4biz is an independent provider of comprehensive Internet solutions, specialising in the Solaris, LINUX, FreeBSD, OpenBSD, NetBSD operating systems and Open Source Software. Linux4biz Consultants are able to advise on all aspects of implementing and administrating Unix/Linux servers, SAMBA solutions, E-mail servers, Mailing list servers, Web servers, DNS, Internet Security, Security Audits, Intrusion detection, Stress testing, Intranet setup, High Availability server solutions, Network solutions, Remote administration solutions. We also provide onsite as well as offsite support and consultancy. For more information about our services, please visit our website. INFOMATIK http://info.matik.com.br INFOMATIK Tecnologia e Desenvolvimento - Brazilian Company is offering total site support for FreeBSD Servers. We have high performance solutions for Intranet and Internet. We are specialized in UNIX systems since 92. Please visit our Interactive Website or contact us per e-mail: info@matik.com.br LOGIOS http://www.logios.cz/ LOGIOS NETWORK SYSTEMS, located in the Czech Republic, provides system maintenance, consulting and other services on various platforms, including FreeBSD and Linux. We also offer information security services, firewalls and IDS systems, system integration, software applications etc. Xetpoint http://www.xetpoint.fi/ Xetpoint Oy is located in Pirkkala, Finland. We offer professional FreeBSD support, consulting, programming, maintenance and monitoring services. For more information, please visit our website. RackmountNet http://www.rackmountnet.com RackmountNet is a One-stop shop for rackmount Linux, FreeBSD systems. Our products include Rackmount chassis, server rack cabinet, Rackmount LCD Monitor, and related accessories. For more information, contact sales@rackmountnet.com. Silicon Landmark LLC http://siliconlandmark.com/ Silicon Landmark's mission is to supply our customers with fully customized, scalable, turn-key Information Technology solutions at competitive prices. We specialize in designing package products that will meet and your business' needs and budget. Python Byte Solutions http://www.pythonbyte.com/ Python Byte Solutions is an independent IT consulting company based in Southwestern Ontario, Canada. We provide services pertaining to software & web development, hosting, support, installation, and training. We specialize in Python, Zope, Apache, MySQL, *BSD, and Linux. You can check out our web site or contact us directly at info@pythonbyte.com. os-cillation http://www.os-cillation.de os-cillation, located in Siegen/NRW, Germany. We offer a broad range in BSD-based software-development (C/C++/Java/HTML/PHP/Perl/SQL). Installation and support of FreeBSD based mail, web, firewall, database, news, dns and ftp servers. FreeBSD and Windows desktop integration. Also experienced with NetBSD, Solaris and Linux. Forgotten Technologies http://www.forgotten.com.sg Forgotten Technologies, http://www.forgotten.com.sg is a Singapore-based company providing open source business solutions that include, but not limited to platforms such as Linux, FreeBSD and OpenBSD. Please email us at enquiries@forgotten.com.sg to find out more how we can help you in your business! Wirewalk Technologies http://www.wirewalk.com/ Wirewalk Technologies is a NYC based consulting company, with strategic partnerships around the globe. We offer onsite and remote consulting, and full integration services based on FreeBSD, as well as OpenBSD, NetBSD, Linux, MacOS, Solaris. Programming solutions in: C, C++, Java, Perl, PHP, Oracle, MySQL, Postgresql, etc. Contact us via email or call us under# 212-202-2613 or 917-217-7975. Tunix http://www.tunix.nl/ For more than 10 years TUNIX - the only Dutch firewall developer - brings you a unique combination of security-services: high-level training on Internet-technology and tailor-made security solutions. TUNIX Security offers an end-to-end solution with a full range of services such as consultancy for developing a security-policy and design of a security-architecture, project-management, turn-key implementation of firewall-appliances, multi-level support and 24x7 management and monitoring. The security solutions are build on the TUNIX Firewall, a modular, FreeBSD based proxy-level firewall. For more information, please contact sales@tunix.nl or visit our website at www.firewall.nl. ImproWare AG http://www.imp.ch/ ImproWare AG focuses on Internet and Networking Services as well as System Integration and Consulting based on FreeBSD. We offer contract programming in all major programming languages with a focus on FreeBSD, userland and kernel. NetManiacs http://www.netmaniacs.nl/ NetManiacs is a dutch company based in Eindhoven. We provide consulting, (system administration) support, custom software and a broad range of (internet/business) server solutions. For more information visit www.netmaniacs.nl or contact us at info@netmaniacs.nl. Artisan Computer Services LLC http://www.artisancomputer.com/ Artisan Computer Services LLC is based in Tucson, Arizona. We provide system administration and configuration for web, mail, DNS, database, and streaming video servers using FreeBSD. We also do computer consulting on a variety of platforms (Mac OS X, Windows, *BSD, Linux), with an emphasis on integration and security. You can reach us at info@artisancomputer.com, or our website, www.artisancomputer.com. Brain Alliance Solutions Oy / Ltd http://www.brainalliance.com/ Brain Alliance Solutions Oy / Ltd is located in Espoo, Finland. We offer professional FreeBSD installation, support, consulting and server solutions. For more information, please visit our website at http://www.brainalliance.com. Tegtmeier Internet Solutions http://www.tegtmeier.de/ Tegtmeier Internet Solutions is located in Hamburg / Germany. We offer consulting, professional support and maintenance for *BSD and Linux systems and are developing individual solutions in C/Perl/PHP/SQL/HTML/shell, based on open source products. We are focused on internet security, high availability and performance/optimization. Visit our website at http://www.tegtmeier.de. Open Sourcery http://www.opensourcery.co.uk Open Sourcery is a UK based company providing support and consultancy for Free and Open Source Software. We have experience with a wide variety of Open Source software. You can find out more and contact us at our website. Oxalide http://www.oxalide.com/ Oxalide is a consultancy firm and solution provider. Our fields of expertise include UNIX software system deployment such as secure mail systems (SMTP, POP, IMAP), advanced Web server configurations, high-availability firewalling, etc. Our knowledge of FreeBSD, *BSD, Commercial Unix and Linux is thorough. Technetics Consulting Pty. Ltd. http://www.technetics.com.au/ Technetics is located in Melbourne Australia. We provide prompt IT services & support, system maintenance, hard drive recovery services, consulting and other services on various platforms including FreeBSD, Linux and Unix. We offer on site support within Melbourne Australia and world wide via remote login. We also offer expert data recovery services for Unix based platforms. Call anytime ph. +61 3 9663 1899 or email us at info@technetics.com.au. Envescent, LLC http://www.envescent.com/ Envescent is a leading provider of technology products and services focused on FreeBSD. We offer consulting, pre-installed workstations and servers, compatible hardware, outsourced system and network administration and implementation, security auditing, technical support and much more. openMindShare http://www.openmindshare.com/ openMindShare draws on over a decade of expertise in diverse information technology fields. We handle information technology infrastructure needs and we do it with FreeBSD. We offer a myriad of services and solutions. See our web site or e-mail (info@openmindshare.com) for more information. RBJ-Consultants Unix since 1990. Remote installation (Europe-webhosting, Brasil, USA) and local. We train, install, configure and admin FreeBSD, Linux (RedHat, Suse, Gentoo, Mandrake), Solaris. Inside network - MacOSX, Windows, etc (we support too). Contact: Rui Bento <rbj@madeira.dyndns.org> TechniSoft http://www.technisoft.sn/ Located in the Senegal (west Africa). Started in 2001. We deliver professional system engineering services for FreeBSD, OpenBSD and Windows. Our services include 24/7 support, consultancy, maintenance of both hardware and software, assembly and installation of hardware, remote and on-site support, development of scripts and software for the machines we maintain etc. Of course we deliver hosting facilities and space for your servers at low costs as well. Visit our websites at http://www.technisoft.sn. Please contact us by email <info@technisoft.sn> or by telephone: +221 - 8559900. Sirius http://www.siriusit.co.uk/ Sirius leads in the deployment, support and training of Open Source technology, including FreeBSD. We support organisations across Europe in their pursuit of innovative, versatile and robust technology solutions without the financial burden of software licensing. Sectec http://www.sectec.pl *BSD consultancy, installations and configurations. Worked for government institutions as well as for large corporations. Intrusion Detection Systems, firewalls, nats, proxies, webservers, heavy load mail systems with GUI interface. Security advisor experienced in firewalling. Training. Telephone: +48 888 774 774, email: admin@bmtcordah.pl Sheridan Computers Limited http://www.sheridancomputers.co.uk We offer IT consulting, systems integration, corporate information systems and security solutions based on BSD software. For more information, send us an email or visit our website. We operate in the United Kingdom. S.C. vocalNET S.R.L. http://www.vocal.ro Over 3 years experience with designing, installing and maintaining (support and administration) security solutions (firewalls, IDS and VPN's) and voice solutions over *BSD platforms. We can secure services like mail, dns, web, ftp making them more secure and reliable. For more information, please phone us at +40788401422 or +40217255117, e-mail: contact@vocal.ro, or visit our web site. Opensourcexperts http://www.opensourcexperts.com opensourcexperts.com hosts one the largest (free) directories of companies who support Open Source software world-wide. If you provide support for FreeBSD list yourself in their FreeBSD index Mseuss Unternehmensberatung http://www.msuess.de Msuess Unternehmensberatung is a consulting company based in Schwandorf (near Regensburg), Germany. As a consulting / isv partner we are developing web-portals (using Python and ZOPE/Plone on FreeBSD) and developing individual solutions (Python, Tcl/tk, ADA) on FreeBSD. We also provide ZOPE administration and consulting on FreeBSD and other *ix-like systems. We are the main sponsor of the German ix-wiki. For more information please contact freebsd@msuess.de or visit our website. Ceintec http://www.ceintec.com Ceintec provides FreeBSD and unix-like operating systems learning courses in Spain (Instructor-Led courses). We also provide FreeBSD consulting and technical support for enterprises in Spain. For more information visit http://www.ceintec.com/empresas.html Lori Design http://www.lori-sa.com Lori Design, based in San Jose, Costa Rica offers Web Development, design, and custom application programming using both open source and proprietary environments. Services also include private consulting, emergency response coordination and various IT solutions to maximize the effectiveness of your business. Lori Design is a proud w3c member in Costa Rica. WBP Systems http://www.wbpsystems.com/ WBP Systems has a wide range of experience in a number of disciplines. Business Intelligence software is created to increase the productivity of your business. We specialize in CRM, ERP and SCM solutions. Web portals and automation of certain business processes are also available. The Infrastructure Management group is designed to manage, design and create integrated solutions for our customer's networks. UnitedWare, LLC http://united-ware.com/ UnitedWare, LLC is a Cincinnati, Ohio based company that provides FreeBSD server setup and custom web and desktop applications. We perform IT audits and solutions to identify and manage the information needs of any business. To contact us visit our website or give us a call at (513) 563-0897. Triona - Information und Technologie GmbH http://www.triona.de Triona - Information und Technologie GmbH offers FreeBSD installation and administration services, individual software development, web-, application- and database-servers. The company is based in Mainz, Germany. For more information contact us via email bsd@triona.de or visit our web site. ActivSupport, Inc. http://www.activsupport.com/ ActivSupport is a network consulting firm located in the San Francisco Bay Area specializing in cross-platform environment support including FreeBSD. ActivSupport also provides network security, and business continuity consulting. Whether you are looking for a certified consultant or specific technical support solutions please contact us at 1-877.228.4863 for immediate assistance with your technical needs, or visit our web site for more information about services we are providing. Tetrad Digital Integrity (TDI) http://www.tdisecurity.com/ TDI is an information assurance company in the Washington, DC area and specializes in providing total security solutions in the private and public sectors. TDI delivers an end-to-end solution to security problems occurring in the networks of private technology firms, the U.S. government and the military. TDI can provide consulting services for all aspects of FreeBSD secure enterprise deployment: desktop, server, infrastructure (router/firewall), etc. Our website is at http://www.tdisecurity.com and we can be reached by email at freebsd@tdisecurity.com , by phone at 202-337-5600 and by fax at 202-337-5601. Heritage Network Technologies http://www.heritagenetworktechnologies.com/ We are a privately owned Technology Consulting Company based in Baltimore area. We provide support for Open Source Operating Systems and Software, as well as training for these. We target small to medium enterprises as well as educational institutions. We can be reached at 301-807-0784 or by email at service@eissaf.net. BSD Professionals In Europe (BSDPIE) http://bsdpie.com/ We are BSD based co-operating consultants offering Consultancy, Support, Development, Installation and Internet Services located in Munich, Germany. Falcon Knight, Inc. http://www.falconknight.com/ Falcon Knight, Inc. provides FreeBSD installation, configuration, and support from the simple to the advanced. Falcon Knight performs large scale, load-balanced infrastructure planning and implementations, complete with application servers and clustered databases, all powered by FreeBSD. If your environment simply has to be up 24x7 and you have high usage demands, call Falcon Knight now at 877-625-9000 or email info@falconknight.com. Venture 37 http://www.venture37.com/ Our company provides Mail, Web and DNS hosting solutions based on OpenBSD & FreeBSD as well as Technical Support and Management (on site or remote) for Microsoft Windows, OS X, Linux and BSD-like operating systems. We also provide services such as connectivity & colocation in datacentres at Brighton and London. Check out our web site or contact us at info@venture37.com. Open Sistemas http://www.opensistemas.com We are a spanish company focused on providing business consulting and global solutions based on Open Source software and operating systems, like FreeBSD and GNU/Linux. We offer customers and partners our high quality services, from integration to low level C/C++ developments, 24x7 support, and our own or third-party open technologies. For more information contact us at info@opensistemas.com , visit our web site or contact us by phone at +34 91 445 39 36. Ibermachines Sistemas http://www.ibermachines.com Ibermachines is a spanish-based company offering open source software solutions to small and medium size organizations. We install, configure and maintain servers and workstations mainly running FreeBSD and GNU/Linux. Also mail, web, intranet, fax, file and printing solutions are popular between our customers. CTS Consulting and Trade Service http://www.ctseuro.com CTS Consulting & Trade Service is a full service Consultant and Supplier for pre-installed FreeBSD Servers. We ship Firewalls, Internet Gateways, Mail Systems with virus protection, realtime http scanner, File and Print Servers. Network planning and implementation of WANS with IPSEC tunneling, Samba and Hylafax installations. Founded in 1985 with Unix and Mainframe experience since 1978. We are based in Salzburg and Vienna, Austria and have customer references throughout Europe and Eastern Europe ranging from 5 to 60000 Users. We are also shipping pre-installed Asterisk Telephone Systems and have best the references with it. JCR Engenharia de Sistemas http://www.jcrengenharia.com.br/ JCR Engenharia has more than 10 years experience in developing FreeBSD solutions, like firewalls, Internet Servers, cluster solutions and more. We are located in Salvador, Brazil. Fortuitous Technologies http://fortuitous.com Fortuitous Technologies provides Performance Tuning, Capacity Planning, System Design, Network Design and security services for FreeBSD, Linux, and Unix systems worldwide. We cover Cloud, Grid, and Multi-tiered systems of all types. Contact us at http://Fortuitous.com for further information. NetFence http://www.netfence.it NetFence deploys and maintains Internet/intranet servers based on FreeBSD and other open source software (including Apache web server, Squid, Samba, Cyrus IMAP, PostgreSQL, OpenVPN and others). Network and client-side hardware/software/support is also offered, as well as custom programming and security coverage. It is located in Bologna, Italy and can be reached at freebsd@netfence.it. Unix Consulting http://www.unixconsulting.info Based in London, England, we are focused on BSD/Linux and Open Source consultancy and support. Whether your business already runs Linux/FreeBSD/NetBSD/OpenBSD or you are considering the introduction of Open Source technology, Unix Consulting can help you every step of the way. Techno Centre Logiciels Libres (TC2L) http://www.tc2l.ca/ TC2L is pioneers the IT industry by offering businesses and public institutions the first one-stop shop for services, open source software, and hardware to meet all IT needs. Our approach is based on a unified network of technical and strategic high level partners for service throughout Quebec. TC2L provides all the support you need for easy migration to FLOSS (including special attention to FreeBSD). From planning and implementation to training and technical support, we provide comprehensive service. User support has always been TC2L's top priority. As such, we have shared our expertise in FLOSS and computer problem solving abilities with the Government and large companies country-wide. Flozer http://www.flozer.com Spanish company focused on providing solutions and services based on FLOSS software and operating systems with FreeBSD, OpenBSD and GNU/Linux. We offer customers and partners our solutions and services (consultance, development, migrations, virtualization, support). For more information contact us at contacto@flazer.com or visit our web site . Ironkeep Technologies L.L.C. http://www.ironkeep.net Ironkeep Technologies is a Traverse City based consulting firm, specializing in internet solutions, networks, vpns, software development, programming, web development, web design, application development, web hosting, consulting, and open source software including FreeBSD. nihonsoft LLC. http://www.nihonsoft.com/ We provide consulting in English and Japanese to help your business get started in Japan. We especially like to help FOSS companies set up branches in Japan, and promote the use of FOSS systems such as Debian, Ubuntu, FreeBSD, OpenBSD and NetBSD throughout industries and schools in Japan. Technetics Data Recovery http://www.techneticsdata.com.au/ Technetics Data Recovery is one of the leading data recovery labs in Australia. With many years of experience in the data recovery industry we are the experts you can rely on in the event of data loss. Ethon Technologies GmbH http://www.ethon.de Ethon Technologies GmbH -- located in Munich, Germany -- has a strong focus on BSD driven solutions. We offer professional consulting services as well as BSD based telecommunication systems, ranging from basic PBX to telco solutions up to 10.000.000 users. Feel free to contact us at info@ethon.de or drop us a voicemail: +49.89.255456.0 Mosman Consultoria e Desenvolvimento http://www.mosman.com.br Mosman Consultoria e Desenvolvimento works at the development of a FreeBSD based ISP management solution called VirtexAdmin. Ish Pty. Ltd. http://www.ish.com.au Ish provides IT management, network security, FreeBSD and MacOS X system administration services in Sydney, Australia. We have designed and implemented BSD-based computer systems for a wide variety of commercial customers, and we're available to provide troubleshooting and advice for system administrators. As a developer of web sites, our Java/WebObjects-based services are all hosted on FreeBSD servers. Please call us for a chat on +612 9550 5001, e-mail us or visit our web site. IT Infusion Inc. http://www.itinfusion.ca IT Infusion Inc. is a consulting firm based in Calgary, Alberta that has been serving clients in the US and Canada since 1998. We have expertise in FreeBSD, Linux, thin client implementations, Windows integration, Enterprise e-mail systems, PHP/MySQL web development, and the deployment of a wide range of Open Source software solutions. For more information, please visit our website or drop us an e-mail at casey@itinfusion.ca. Zelites http://www.zelites.org Zelites is a company based in Le Mans, France. We offer many services: Support, installation, maintenance, administration, configuration of servers like firewall, VPN, IDS, web server, mail server, DNS or whatever you need. Our services offerings include a high-level of security. Our knowledge of *BSD (like FreeBSD, OpenBSD, NetBSD ..), Linux, MacOS and commercial Unix systems is wide and is your guaranty. For more information, visit our website, mail us or phone us at +33 (0) 2 43 46 94 24. Hamburgnet http://www.hamburgnet.de Hamburgnet provides you with experience in FreeBSD and OpenBSD based projects. From low-end webservers to high-end firewall and database clusters. Storage, server, Unix, cluster & consulting. You can visit our website, mail us, phone us at +49 (40) 73672322 or contact us via fax at +49 (40) 73672321. LifeBiscuit Technology http://lifebiscuit.com LifeBiscuit Technology is a Sydney based company providing technology consulting and outsourcing services for small businesses in Australia. We provide support for open source environments: FreeBSD, Linux, OpenBSD and NetBSD. OsBTI Pty. Ltd. http://www.osbti.com.au One of our specialities is the support, administration and installation of FreeBSD in SME Server Environments. Through our team of technicians, we provide support both onsite and remotely to both Australia and small select international clients. Tecno21 - Openservices http://www.tecno21.com.br/FreeBSD/ We provide setup and support for FreeBSD, OpenBSD and Linux. We have 10+ years experience with open source softwares on corporate and SMB customers. We offer custom applications (C/C++/Java/C#), network infrastructure design, security, audit and smartcard solutions. Contact us via e-mail or by phone at +55 (11) 3825-2472. CyberSecure Pty Ltd http://www.cybersecure.com.au/ CyberSecure specialises in offsite data backup, managed firewalls and BSD consulting with an emphasis on quality and security. Pate Consulting, Inc. http://www.pateconsulting.com/ We specialize in providing solid open source solutions for businesses using OpenBSD, FreeBSD, and Linux. 6 years in business. 12 years of experience - MCSE, CCNA, RHCE certifications - Also MySQL, PostgreSQL. VPNs, firewalls, wireless, DNS, squidGuard, mail - even training with FreeBSD. You can contact us via e-mail, call us at 713.333.5468 or send us a fax at 713.333.5494. secion GmbH http://www.secion.de/ secion GmbH is an IT service and consulting company located in Hamburg, Germany. With our long-term experience in *BSD, Linux and Unix, as well as in-depth Windows knowledge, we deliver commercial-grade services in designing, implementing and administering server, client and network infrastructures. Our skills includes database-, web- and network/communication programming in large IT and Telco environments. One of our main work areas is also designing and setting up larger IPSec VPNs, security systems, firewall concepts and communication systems. For more information call us at +49-40-389071-0 or visit our web site. Recover Data http://www.recoverdata.com.au Recover Data supports hard drive repair for data recovery. With over 10 years experience, our data recovery services are second to none. Specialising in recovering data for data recovery companies and RAID configurations. Webangel http://www.webangel.ie/ Webangel is a company working with open-source operating system and software from the beginning. We offer consultancy, support, development, training and remote administration services. You can reach us by email or phone: +353 85 157 04 61. We are based in Rathcoole, Co. Dublin Ireland. REMSYS http://www.remsys.net REMSYS, based in Chisinau, Moldova, provides and specializes in support and consulting for FreeBSD, BSDi, Linux and other Unix variants. We are dedicated to offering solutions for desktop and server environments. We can help installing, configuring, system administration (Exim, SMTP, Database, Webhosting, DNS, Apache Webstats etc.) Our experience covers the most important branches of current IT industry, from routine of server management, security audits and updates, to high performance computing, mitigating attacks and recovering data from crashed file systems. We offer you up to date solutions for remote systems management, keeping your network equipment up and operational 24 hours a day. For more information please visit our web site or contact us at info@remsys.net or call us at +373 22 23-20-70, +373 79-40-63-09. Collins Systems Solutions Inc. http://www.csystems.ca Collins Systems Solutions Inc. is a Toronto, Ontario Canada based consulting firm specializing in the design, implementation, and support of all things UNIX including Solaris, FreeBSD, OpenBSD, all major Linux distributions, and Microsoft Windows operating environments. Collins Systems has specialized skills in system administration, security, network design, system integration, network/server/application management and service monitoring. Remote administration is the key to providing our customers all over the world with the most efficient and effective service. For more information, email us at info@csystems.ca. FirmbIT http://www.firmbit.com/index.php FirmbIT is a high quality server management and security company providing friendly reliable support specializing in high security installations and scalable solutions with support for FreeBSD, OpenBSD, NetBSD, Redhat, Fedora, CentOS, Debian, Slackware, Gentoo, SuSe, Mandrake and Sun Solaris servers. Network Advantage LLC http://net-vantage.com/ We strive to bring the same technology advantages enjoyed by large organizations to small and medium-sized businesses, schools, and non-profits, at a realistic and practical cost. FreeBSD running SAMBA, Apache, MySQL, PHP, sql-ledger, KDE, and many other applications is often the central ingredient of this solution. Please email us for free initial consultation. Nullcube Pty Ltd http://www.nullcube.com.au/ Nullcube provides services to organisations with exceptional security needs. We use FreeBSD, OpenBSD and Linux to develop and support network architectures for security-sensitive environments, including firewalls, VPNs, proxies, and IDS / IPS solutions. We also provide IT security auditing, penetration testing, risk management, and incident response services. Call +61 1300 767 007 or send an email to info@nullcube.com for free initial consultation. E-Systems http://www.e-systems.pl/ We provide open source solutions for the small companies in Wroclaw, Poland. We are specialized in servers (*BSD, Linux). Giganetworking http://www.giganetworking.com Consulting in the areas of Internet security and data defense mainly with open source software. Particular knowledge of firewalls, internet applications, Mail, Proxy Servers, IDS and network administration. Have developed a range of routers/appliances based on Linux/BSD. For more questions please visit our web site. EDEN-FX http://www.eden-fx.com EDEN-FX is a company which develops high class technology. Founded in 1999, we are working with a team of highly qualified professionals specializing in hard and software engineering. We have broad experience with the FreeBSD operating system. EDEN-FX solutions manufactures firewalls, wireless engineering and develops network technologies. Zero Penalty http://zeropenalty.com/ Located in the city of Toronto Canada, Zero Penalty is well positioned to service clients within Canada and abroad who require Technology Consulting services. Though focused on technology infrastructure services, Zero Penalty offers a variety of products and services that include Telephony Services including VOIP Deployment and Management, Network Design, Build and Management, System Support, including Desktop Support, Hosting and Colocation.
Offshore Services is one of our core strengths, including Infrastructure Management, Monitoring and Deployment. Businesses that require offshore hosting and services will benefit from our expertise in working with international telecom providers, and our understanding of the international IT landscape.
At Zero Penalty, we strive to make our clients comfortable with the choices they make, provide value, and quality products and services. Contact us today to start a relationship that will help your business strive in its IT requirements. OSC Services http://www.orsec.fr/ We proivde technical support and expertise, around opensource software technologies, security and network solutions. Open Software Research and Education (OSRE) http://www.osre.org/ Open Software Research and Education (OSRE) is a comprehensive entity providing open infrastructure design, development, deployment, maintenance and training. We have extensive experience with FreeBSD and most other open source operating systems. We are located in Longview, Texas and provide both on-site and remote support at affordable rates. Please visit our website for more information or call us toll-free at 1.866.235.1288. Ouellet Consulting Inc. http://sirius.danosoft.com/oci/index.html OCI specialize in systems/networks design, implementation and security solutions, including solutions meeting HIPPA requirements. We spec out, configure and support firewalls, proxy-arrays, servers, switches, mail systems, web servers, databases, etc. We are familiar with and support most Windows and Unix/Linux systems including FreeBSD. We offer remote administration services worldwide, on all supported platforms. We plan and assist with Active Directory migrations. For more information please contact us via e-mail or call us +1-850-510-6162. Please see our website for complete details on what we offer. WeTi.NeT http://www.weti.net WeTi.NeT - Limberger HandelsgesmbH is a full service Consultant and Supplier for pre-installed FreeBSD Servers. We ship Firewalls, Internet Gateways, Mail Systems with virus protection, realtime http scanner, File and Print Servers. Network planning and implementation of WANS with IPSEC tunneling, Samba and Hylafax installations. Founded in 1977 with Unix and Novell experience since more than 30 years. We are based in Bad Goisern and Salzburg, Austria and have customer references throughout Austria, Switzerland, the Netherlands and Germany ranging from 5 to 60000 Users. We are also shipping pre-installed Asterisk Telephone Systems and have best the references with it. HANDTAKE GmbH http://www.handtake.de HANDTAKE GmbH is a service provider for Open Source solutions based in Munich. We provide a full range of services (consulting services, system administration, support, programming) for Linux, *BSD and other Open Source software. For further information please contact freebsd@handtake.de or visit our website www.handtake.de MIVITEC GmbH Niederlassung Muenchen http://www.mivitec.de "MIVITEC GmbH Niederlassung Muenchen" is a provides full redundant hosting infrastructure in 3 datacenters in Munich. For our client we provide IT management, network security, Linux, BSD and MacOS X system administration services. We have big experience of implementing high availability services, cluster systems and hosting infrastructures. These services are provided for clients in our datacenters as well as in your company's datacenter, even in other cities in Germany and Austria. For more information please call us at +49 89 420797870, send us an email: freebsd@mivitec.de or visit our website www.mivitec.de. You are also invited to visit us in Munich, so that we can discuss your FreeBSD based projects. Stephen Corbesero mailto:corbesero@fast.net Stephen Corbesero has over 20 years of software and hardware computing experience in various flavors of Unix (FreeBSD since 2.2, SunOS, Solaris, ...), C and C++, Perl, databases, networking, etc. He can provide system and network configuration and administration, some custom programming in the above languages, troubleshooting and repair. He is located in Eastern Pennsylvania. Please email him for more information. björn hahnefeld IT http://www.hahnefeld.de We are a company for Software-Engineering and a Hosting- and Server-Solutions provider (Web-, Application-, Database-servers) for Germany, Austria and Switzerland. We are experienced in the installation and administration of BSD and Linux systems. Our software experience is with PHP, Perl and SQL and we speak English and German. We are located in Regensburg, Germany. Please email info@hahnefeld.de for more information. Paxym http://www.paxym.com Paxym's Highly Skilled team provides software development and consulting services in the areas of Kernels, Bootloaders for new CPUs & Boards, Network Security Applications, Storage Appliances and Performance tuning of embedded SW and Network/Storage/Security Applications. Paxym provides FreeBSD SMP for OCTEON (Multicore Mips64 CPU from Cavium Networks). The port is extensively tested with OpenPosix, Apache WebBench, UnixBench, MySQL Sysbench, OHCP, Netperf, FreeNAS for stability and functional completeness. Stable port based on FreeBSD 7.0 is targeted for Network, Security and Storage Applications. Multiple cores, from 1-16 can be used in SMP mode. Supports Dynamic & Static Linking models, o32, n64 & n32 ABI. Root filesystem can be embedded in kernel memory or put on Compact-Flash/NFS. libthr for POSIX pthreads. Paxym's team has had extensive experience with Multi-core Mips (Octeon), PPC and x86 CPUs. Working on these from Rom-Monitors, boot-loaders, Operating Systems, Network Stacks, Storage protocols, Device Drivers, Security Algorithms and Embedded Applications. Paxym has been working closely on FreeBSD, Linux and proprietary OS environments. For more information, visit http://www.paxym.com/ PontoSI http://www.pontosi.pt PontoSI is portuguese company based in Vila Nova de Gaia. We are specialized in FreeBSD and OpenBSD solutions and services. Please visit our website at http://www.pontosi.pt or contact us via email geral@pontosi.pt Mejo Jose http://www.kannayath.com Open source technology consultant based in Dubai, UAE. More information on the website - www.kannayath.com Interfuture Systems Ltd http://www.interfuture.co.uk Interfuture is an UK company offering a full range of UNIX consultancy, from desktop installation and support through to mission-critical server support and troubleshooting. One of our specialist areas and preferred operating systems is FreeBSD. Visit our website for more information: http://www.interfuture.co.uk/specialists/unix.php or call +44 203 002 2111. Sense of Security Pty Ltd http://www.senseofsecurity.com.au/ Sense of Security is an Australian provider of Free BSD and Unix consulting services. We have a strong focus on building secure networks and systems, including firewalls, VPNs, web servers, etc. We are also experts at conducting security review, audit, penetration testing, and assessment services. Open Tech SmbA http://www.opentech.dk Open Tech SmbA is a Danish consultancy, that can help your business ensure and optimize production performance through a good practice of system and network administration of its information technology. Our office is located in Herlev, Copenhagen, Denmark. We can be reached by phone at +45 43 62 22 88 and by electronic mail to opentech@opentech.dk. Visit our website at www.opentech.dk and stay updated with announcements, technical procedures, system administration tasks, that we can do for you, contact details, business conditions and much more. Open Tech SmbA is a legally approved and registered company in Denmark. The JMBG Network http://www.jmbg.net We believe in quality, reliable and innovative solutions – so naturally we love FreeBSD. We are a Canadian electronic solutions provider servicing mainly South-Western Ontario. We also provide some solutions to clients in Canada and the United States. We offer a wide range of electronic solutions including consulting services and we most definitely support and recommend FreeBSD. Index: projects/entities/share/xml/navibar.ent =================================================================== --- projects/entities/share/xml/navibar.ent (revision 41353) +++ projects/entities/share/xml/navibar.ent (revision 41354) @@ -1,216 +1,216 @@

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'> Index: projects/entities/share/xml/news.xml =================================================================== --- projects/entities/share/xml/news.xml (revision 41353) +++ projects/entities/share/xml/news.xml (revision 41354) @@ -1,2173 +1,2262 @@ $FreeBSD$ 2013 + 3 + + + 27 + + +

Enhanced commit privileges: + Tijl Coosemans + (src, ports)

+ + + + + 22 + + + &os; 8.4-BETA1 Available + +

The first BETA build for the &os;-8.4 release cycle is + now available. ISO images for the amd64, i386 and pc98 + architectures are available + on most of our &os; + mirror sites.

+ + + + + 14 + + + New &os; Foundation Technical Staff Member: Konstantin + Belousov + +

The &os; Foundation is pleased to announce that + Konstantin Belousov has been hired as its first full-time + member of technical staff, a key milestone of the + Foundation's investment in staff for 2013.

+ +

Read + more...

+ + + + + 12 + + +

New member for the Ports Management team: + Bryan Drewery

+ + + + + 3 + + + October-December 2012 Status Report +

The October to December 2012 Status Report is now + available with 27 entries.

+ + + July-September 2012 Status Report +

The July to September 2012 Status Report is now + available with 12 entries.

+ + + + + 2 10

New committer: Po-Chien Lin (ports)

 + + + 1 + + +

New committer: + Thomas-Martin Seck (ports)

+ + + 1 23

New committer: Achim Leubner (src)

 22

New committer: Dru Lavigne (doc)

 16

New committer: Carl Delsey (src)

 15

Enhanced commit privileges: René Ladan (ports, full doc/www)

 14

New committer: David Naylor (ports)

 13 April-June, 2012 Status Report

The April-June, 2012 Status Report is now available with 17 entries.

 10 Ports CVS End of Life on February 28th 2013

The development of &os; ports is done in Subversion nowadays. By February 28th 2013, the &os; ports tree will no longer be exported to CVS. Therefore ports tree updates via CVS, CVSup or csup(1) will no longer be available after that date. All users who use CVS, CVSup or csup(1) to update the ports tree are encouraged to switch to portsnap(8) or for users which need more control over their ports collection checkout, use Subversion directly. More information are available in the announcement mail on the &os; ports announce mailing list.

A migration guide from CVSup or csup(1) to portsnap(8) is also available in the &os; Handbook.

 8 Faces of &os; ‐ Thomas Abthorpe

We are excited to share our next story for our Faces of &os; Series. This is a chance for us to spotlight different people who contribute to &os; and have received funding from us to work on development projects, run conferences, travel to conferences, and advocate for &os;.

Let us introduce you to Thomas Abthorpe. We helped him attend BSDCan 2009, 2011, and 2012 by helping with his travel expenses. Read his story here.

 7

New committer: Ian Lepore (src)

 2012 12 31 &os; 9.1-RELEASE Available

FreeBSD 9.1-RELEASE is now available. Please be sure to check the Release Notes (detailed version) and Release Errata before installation for any late-breaking news and/or issues with 9.1. More information about FreeBSD releases can be found on the Release Information page.

 24

New committer: Kubilay Kocak (ports)

 20 The &os; Foundation End-of-Year Newsletter is Now Available.

We are pleased to announce the publication of The &os; Foundation's 2012 End-of-Year Newsletter.

 18

New committer: Mark Johnston (src)

 PC-BSD 9.1 is Released

The PC-BSD Team announces the availablilty of PC-BSD 9.1.

+ + + +

New committer: + Steven Hartland (src)

 17 Faces of &os; ‐ Dan Langille

We are excited to share our next story for our Faces of &os; Series. This is a chance for us to spotlight different people who contribute to &os; and have received funding from us to work on development projects, run conferences, travel to conferences, and advocate for &os;.

Let us introduce you to Dan Langille. We helped him by sponsoring BSDCan since 2006. Read his story here.

 12 Stunning News Website Fundraising Contribution: Over 650 new donations raise $43,200 in three days!

Astute readers of our blog know that The &os; Foundation's annual year-end fundraising drive began last week. Every year over 50% of our donations arrive during this campaign. Read more...

 10 Faces of &os; ‐ Alberto Mijares

Are you aware of the tangible benefits derived from our support of the &os; community? In conjunction with our year-end fundraising drive we are going to be spotlighting different people on our website, blog, and Facebook page who have received funding to work on development projects, run conferences, travel to conferences, and advocate for &os;. Read more...

 5 &os; Year-End Fundraising Campaign

Your donations have helped make &os; the best OS available! By investing in The &os; Foundation you have helped us keep &os; a high-performance, secure, and stable operating system.

Thanks to people like you, the &os; Foundation has been proudly supporting the &os; Project and community for 12 years now. Read more...

 &os; Project Website is Using Google Analytics

The &os; Project has enabled Google Analytics to collect anonymised statistics on web site use. More information can be found in the official announcement.

 11 26

New committer: Takuya ASADA (src)

 25

New committer: Barbara Guida (ports)

 17 Security Incident on FreeBSD Infrastructure

On Sunday 11th of November, an intrusion was detected on two machines within the FreeBSD.org cluster. We have found no evidence of any modifications that would put any end user at risk. However, we do urge all users to read the report available at http://www.freebsd.org/news/2012-compromise.html and decide on any required actions themselves.

 5

New committer: Bryan Venteicher (src)

 4

New committer: Grzegorz Blach (ports)

 3 &os; 9.1-RC3 Available

The third RC build for the &os;-9.1 release cycle is now available. ISO images for the amd64, i386, sparc64, and powerpc64 architectures are available on most of our &os; mirror sites.

 10 24

Enhanced commit privileges: Erwin Lansing (src, ports)

 23

New committer: Simon J. Gerraty (src)

 20

Enhanced commit privileges: Eitan Adler (src, ports, doc)

 19

New member for the Ports Management team: Bernhard Fröhlich.

 10 &os; 9.1-RC2 Available

The second RC build for the &os;-9.1 release cycle is now available. ISO images for the amd64, i386, ia64, powerpc, and powerpc64 architectures are available on most of our &os; mirror sites.

 9 15

New committer: Peter Jeremy (src)

 13

New committer: Edson Brandi (doc/pt_BR, www/pt_BR)

 10

New committer: Jason E. Hale (ports)

 8 23 &os; 9.1-RC1 Available

The first RC build for the &os;-9.1 release cycle is now available. ISO images for the amd64, i386 and powerpc64 architectures are available on most of our &os; mirror sites.

 21

New committer: Andrey Zonov (src)

 1

New committer: Bryan Drewery (ports)

 7 24 New Core Team Secretary: <a href="mailto:pgj@FreeBSD.org">Gábor Páli</a>

The &os; Core Team is glad to announce that Gábor Páli has assumed the role of Core Team Secretary.

 16 &os; 9.1-BETA1 Available

The first BETA build for the &os;-9.1 release cycle is now available. ISO images for the architectures amd64, i386, powerpc64, and sparc64 are available on most of our &os; mirror sites.

 11 New &os; Core Team elected

The &os; Project is pleased to announce the completion of the 2012 Core Team election. The &os; Core Team acts as the project's "board of directors" and is responsible for approving new src committers, resolving disputes between developers, appointing sub-committees for specific purposes (security officer, release engineering, port managers, webmaster, etc ...), and making any other administrative or policy decisions as needed. The Core Team has been elected by &os; developers every two years since 2000.

More information about the election (together with a list of the new members of the Core Team) can be found in the official announcement.

 3

New committer: Niclas Zeising (doc/www, ports)

 6 19

Enhanced commit privileges: Glen Barber (doc, ports)

 4

New committer: Mateusz Guzik (src)

 5 30

New committer: Jase Thew (ports)

 29

New committer: Olivier Duchateau (ports)

 28

New committer: Tom Judge (ports)

 12 January-March, 2012 Status Report

The January-March, 2012 Status Report is now available with 27 entries.

 4 26

New committer: Isabell Long (doc/www)

 22

New committer: Jeremie Le Hen (src)

 18 &os; 8.3-RELEASE Available

FreeBSD 8.3-RELEASE is now available. Please be sure to check the Release Notes and Release Errata before installation for any late-breaking news and/or issues with 8.3. More information about FreeBSD releases can be found on the Release Information page.

New committer: Devin Teske (src)

 15

New committer: Armin Pirkovitsch (ports)

13

New committer: Monthadar Al Jaberi (src)

12

New committer: Guido Falsi (ports)

 2 &os; 8.3-RC2 Available

The second release candidate build for the &os;-8.3 release cycle is now available. ISO images for the amd64, i386, and pc98 architectures are available on most of our &os; mirror sites.

 3 23

New committer: Cherry G. Mathew (src)

 12

New committer: Benjamin Kaduk (doc/www)

 6 &os; 8.3-RC1 Available

The first RC build for the &os;-8.3 release cycle is now available. ISO images for the amd64, i386, and pc98 architectures are available on most of our &os; mirror sites.

 01

New committer: Alex Kozlov (ports)

 2 20 &os; 8.3-BETA1 Available

The first test build for the &os;-8.3 release cycle is now available. ISO images for the amd64, i386, and pc98 architectures are available on most of our &os; mirror sites.

 16

New committer: Damjan Marion (src)

New committer: Ben Gray (src)

 14

Enhanced commit privileges: Sergey Kandaurov (src, doc)

 7

New committer: Matthew Seaman (ports)

 1 27

New committer: Davide Italiano (src)

 October-December, 2011 Status Report

The October-December, 2011 Status Report is now available with 32 entries.

 12 &os; 9.0-RELEASE Available

FreeBSD 9.0-RELEASE is now available. Please be sure to check the Release Notes and Release Errata before installation for any late-breaking news and/or issues with 9.0. More information about FreeBSD releases can be found on the Release Information page.

 2011 12 16

New committer: Jason Helfman (ports)

 9 &os; 9.0-RC3 Available

The third (and probably last) RC build for the &os;-9.0 release cycle is now available. ISO images for the architectures amd64, i386, ia64, powerpc, powerpc64, and sparc64 are available on most of our &os; mirror sites. One of the many new features in 9.0 we would like to be tested is the new installer, so we encourage our users to do fresh installation on test systems. Alternatively, users upgrading existing systems may now do so using the freebsd-update(8) utility.

 8

New committer: Pedro Giffuni (src)

 2

New member for the Ports Management team: Beat Gätzi

 11 30

New committer: Justin Hibbits (src)

 17 &os; 9.0-RC2 Available

The second RC build for the &os;-9.0 release cycle is now available. ISO images for the architectures amd64, i386, ia64, powerpc, powerpc64, and sparc64 are available on most of our &os; mirror sites. One of the many new features in 9.0 we would like to be tested is the new installer, so we encourage our users to do fresh installation on test systems. Alternatively, users upgrading existing systems may now do so using the freebsd-update(8) utility.

 12

New committer: Michael Scheidell (ports)

 11

New committer: David Chisnall (src)

 9

New committer: Ruslan Mahmatkhanov (ports)

 8 July-September, 2011 Status Report

The July-September, 2011 Status Report is now available with 28 entries.

 10 23 &os; 9.0-RC1 Available

The first RC build for the &os;-9.0 release cycle is now available. ISO images for the architectures amd64, i386, ia64, powerpc, powerpc64, and sparc64 are available on most of our &os; mirror sites. One of the many new features in 9.0 we would like to be tested is the new installer, so we encourage our users to do fresh installation on test systems. Alternatively, users upgrading existing systems may now do so using the freebsd-update(8) utility.

 6

New committer: Alexander V. Chernikov (src)

 9 28 &os; 9.0-BETA3 Available

The third BETA build for the &os;-9.0 release cycle is now available. ISO images for the architectures amd64, i386, ia64, powerpc, powerpc64, and sparc64 are available on most of our &os; mirror sites. One of the many new features in 9.0 we would like to be tested is the new installer, so we encourage our users to do fresh installation on test systems.

 27

New committer: Jakub Klama (src)

 19

New committer: Gleb Kurtsou (src)

 18

New committer: Robert Millan (src)

 14

New committer: Warren Block (doc/www)

 April-June, 2011 Status Report

The April-June, 2011 Status Report is now available with 36 entries.

 13

New committer: Carlo Strub (ports)

 7 &os; 9.0-BETA2 Available

The second BETA build for the &os;-9.0 release cycle is now available. ISO images for the architectures amd64, i386, powerpc, powerpc64, and sparc64 are available on most of our &os; mirror sites. One of the many new features in 9.0 we would like to be tested is the new installer, so we encourage our users to do fresh installation on test systems.

 8 22

New committer: Raphael Kubo da Costa (ports)

 17

New committer: Eitan Adler (ports)

 9 &os; Foundation August 2011 Newsletter

The &os; Foundation has published their first Semi-Annual 2011 newsletter which summarizes what they have done to help the &os; Project and community.

 1 &os; 9.0-BETA1 Available

The first test build for the &os;-9.0 release cycle is now available. ISO images for the architectures amd64, i386, ia64, powerpc, powerpc64, and sparc64 are available on most of our &os; mirror sites. One of the many new features in 9.0 we would like to be tested is the new installer, so we encourage our users to do fresh installation on test systems.

 7 17

Enhanced commit privileges: Gavin Atkinson (src, doc)

 15

New committer: Ryan Steinmetz (ports)

 6 14

New committer: Grzegorz Bernacki (src)

 13

New committer: Stephen Montgomery-Smith (ports)

 11

New committer: Chris Rees (ports)

 6 IPv6-only &os; test images

&os; Foundation and iXsystems announce IPv6-only test images of FreeBSD and PC-BSD.

New committer: Julien Laffaye (ports)

 5 25

New committer: Aleksandr Rybalko (src)

 18

New committer: Ben Laurie (src)

 12 New Port Manager

The Ports Management Team is pleased to announce Baptiste Daroussin as a new member.

 4 27 January-March, 2011 Status Report

The January-March, 2011 Status Report is now available with 34 entries.

 3 29

New committer: Artem Belevich (src)

 27 FreeBSD Project to participate in Google Summer of Code 2011

The FreeBSD Project is pleased to announce its participation In Google's 2011 Summer of Code program, which funds summer students to participate in open source projects. This will be the FreeBSD Project's seventh year in the program, having mentored over 100 successful students through summer-long coding projects between 2005 and 2010.

Past successful projects have included improvements to Linux ABI emulation, NFSv4 ACLs, TCP regression testing, FUSE file system support, and countless other projects. Many students go on to become FreeBSD developers, as well as participating in FreeBSD developer events around the world through continuing support from the FreeBSD Foundation.

Prospective participants are invited to apply; more information is available, including proposal and deadline information, on the FreeBSD Summer Projects page.

 18

New committer: Sofian Brabez (ports)

 13

New committer: Pawel Pekala (ports)

 10

The FreeBSD Ports Management Team is pleased to announce Thomas Abthorpe as a full voting member.

 5

New committer: Steven G. Kargl (src)

 2 24 FreeBSD 8.2-RELEASE Available

FreeBSD 8.2-RELEASE is now available. Please be sure to check the Release Notes and Release Errata before installation for any late-breaking news and/or issues with 8.2. More information about FreeBSD releases can be found on the Release Information page.

 FreeBSD 7.4-RELEASE Available

FreeBSD 7.4-RELEASE is now available. Please be sure to check the Release Notes and Release Errata before installation for any late-breaking news and/or issues with 7.4. More information about FreeBSD releases can be found on the Release Information page.

 18

Enhanced commit privileges: Martin Wilke (src, ports, doc)

 3 &os; 7.4/8.2-RC3 Available

The third (and probably last) Release Candidate builds for the &os;-7.4/8.2 release cycles are now available. For 8.2-RC3 the amd64, i386, ia64, pc98, powerpc, and sparc64 architectures are available. For 7.4-RC3 the amd64, i386, pc98, and sparc64 architectures are available. ISO images for these architectures can be downloaded from most of the &os; mirror sites. Please see the official announcement for further details about these releases.

 1 25 October-December, 2010 Status Report

The October-December, 2010 Status Report is now available with 37 entries.

 23 &os; 7.4-RC2 Available

The second Release Candidate build for the &os;-7.4 release cycle is now available. ISO images for Tier-1 architectures can be downloaded from most of the &os; mirror sites. Please see the official announcement for further details about this release.

 16 &os; 8.2-RC2 Available

The second Release Candidate build for the &os;-8.2 release cycle is now available. ISO images for Tier-1 architectures can be downloaded from most of the &os; mirror sites. Please see the official announcement for further details about this release.

 2010 12 27 &os; 7.4/8.2-RC1 Available

The first Release Candidate builds for the &os;-7.4/8.2 release cycles are now available. ISO images for Tier-1 architectures can be downloaded from most of the &os; mirror sites. Please see the official announcement for further details about these releases.

 16 &os; Foundation December 2010 Newsletter

The &os; Foundation has published their End-of-Year newsletter which summarizes what they have done in 2010 to help the &os; Project and community.

 11 &os; 7.4/8.2-BETA1 Available

The first of the test builds for the &os;-7.4/8.2 release cycles is now available. ISO images for Tier-1 architectures are now available on most of the &os; mirror sites.

 7

New committer: Florian Smeets (ports)

 11 15

New committer: Eygene Ryabinkin (ports)

 5

New committer: Zack Kirsch (src)

 10 27 July-September, 2010 Status Report

The July-September, 2010 Status Report is now available with 55 entries.

 16

New committer: Frederic Culot (ports)

 7

New committer: Jonathan Anderson (src)

 5

New committer: Sergey Kandaurov (src)

 9 25

New committer: Ganael Laplanche (ports)

 21

New committer: Po-Chuan Hsieh (ports)

 5

New committer: Andreas Tobler (src)

 3

New committer: Steve Wills (ports)

 8 31

New committer: Glen Barber (full doc/www)

 30

New committer: Dimitry Andric (src)

 1

New committer: Oliver Hauer (ports)

 7 27 &os; Foundation July 2010 Newsletter

The &os; Foundation has published their Semi-Annual July 2010 newsletter which summarizes what they have done to help the &os; Project and community.

New committer: Baptiste Daroussin (ports)

 23 FreeBSD 8.1-RELEASE Available

FreeBSD 8.1-RELEASE is now available. Please be sure to check the Release Notes and Release Errata before installation for any late-breaking news and/or issues with 8.1. More information about FreeBSD releases can be found on the Release Information page.

 22 April-June, 2010 Status Report

The April-June, 2010 Status Report is now available with 47 entries.

 21

New committer: Andrew Turner (src)

 20 PC-BSD 8.1 Released

PC-BSD 8.1 has been released. PC-BSD is a successful desktop operating system based on FreeBSD that focuses on providing an easy to use desktop system for casual computer users. A list of new features/updates since the last version can be found here.

The new release can be downloaded or purchased on DVD.

 17

New committer: Tijl Coosemans (src)

 15

New committer: Joseph S. Atkinson (ports)

 14 New &os; Core Team elected

The &os; Project is pleased to announce the completion of the 2010 Core Team election. The &os; Core Team acts as the project's "board of directors" and is responsible for approving new src committers, resolving disputes between developers, appointing sub-committees for specific purposes (security officer, release engineering, port managers, webmaster, etc ...), and making any other administrative or policy decisions as needed. The Core Team has been elected by &os; developers every 2 years since 2000.

More information about the election (together with a list of the new members of the Core Team) can be found in the official announcement.

 2 &os; 8.1-RC2 available

The second (and most likely final) Release Candidate build for the &os;-8.1 release cycle is now available. CD ISO images for the amd64, i386, ia64, powerpc, and sparc64 architectures can be downloaded from most of the &os; mirror sites. Please see the official announcement for further details about this release.

 6 18 &os; 8.1-RC1 Available

The first Release Candidate build for the &os;-8.1 release cycle is now available. ISO images for Tier-1 architectures can be downloaded from most of the &os; mirror sites. Please see the official announcement for further details about this release.

 10

New committer: Ashish SHUKLA (ports)

 9

New committer: Brendan Fabeny (ports)

 4

New committer: Matthew Fleming (src)

 3

New committer: Andrey V. Elsukov (src)

New committer: Taras Korenko (doc/ru, www/ru)

 5 29 &os; 8.1-BETA1 Available

The first of the test builds for the &os;-8.1 release cycle is now available. ISO images for Tier-1 architectures are now available on most of the &os; mirror sites.

 24 Google Summer of Code Projects started

The FreeBSD Project again received many high quality applications from students participating in Google's Summer of Code program. This year 18 student proposals to work with the FreeBSD Project were accepted as part of this program. For those with projects that were not accepted this year, we'd like to note that the FreeBSD Project is always willing to help mentor students so they can learn more about operating system development through our normal community mailing lists and development forums.

Please read the official announcement for more information. The complete list of student projects selected for funding can be found in the FreeBSD Summer of Code wiki. Coding started on May 24, so please join us in welcoming the 18 new students to our community.

 19

New committer: Jayachandran C. (src)

 4 29

Enhanced commit privileges: Martin Matuška (src, ports)

 22 January-March, 2010 Status Report

The January-March, 2010 Status Report is now available with 46 entries.

 20

New committer: Randi Harper (src)

 19

New committer: Ryan Stone (src)

 14

New committer: Ana Kukec (src)

 11

Enhanced commit privileges: René Ladan (doc-nl, ports)

New committer: Sahil Tandon (ports)

 5

New committer: Giuseppe Pilichi (ports)

 4 The &os; Project Participates in the Google Summer of Code 2010 Program

&os; Project is participating in Google's Summer of Code programme for a sixth year. Undergraduate and graduate students are invited to apply for a grant to spend the summer improving the &os; operating system! More information available on the &os; Summer of code page, including a poster to hang up at a university near you!

 3 31

New committer: Bernhard Fröhlich (ports)

 23 FreeBSD 7.3-RELEASE Available

FreeBSD 7.3-RELEASE is now available. Please be sure to check the Release Notes and Release Errata before installation for any late-breaking news and/or issues with 7.3. More information about FreeBSD releases can be found on the Release Information page.

 18 New Ports Management Team Secretary: <a href="mailto:tabthorpe@FreeBSD.org">Thomas Abthorpe</a>

The &os; Ports Management Team is pleased to announce Thomas Abthorpe has assumed the role of Ports Management Team Secretary.

 7

Returning committer: Niels Heinen (ports)

 4 &os; 7.3-RC2 Available

The second Release Candidate build for the &os;-7.3 release cycle is now available. ISO images for Tier-1 architectures are now available on most of the &os; mirror sites.

 3

New committer: Neel Natu (src)

 2 22 PC-BSD 8.0 Released

PC-BSD 8.0 has been released. PC-BSD is a successful desktop operating system based on FreeBSD that focuses on providing an easy to use desktop system for casual computer users. A list of new features/updates since the last version can be found here.

The new release can be downloaded or purchased on DVD.

 15 &os; 7.3-RC1 Available

The first Release Candidate build for the &os;-7.3 release cycle is now available. ISO images for Tier-1 architectures are now available on most of the &os; mirror sites.

 12

Enhanced commit privileges: Benedict Reuschling (full doc/www)

 6

New committer: Bernhard Schmidt (src)

 2 Enhanced commit privileges: <a href="mailto:gabor@FreeBSD.org">Gábor Kövesdán</a> (src, ports, doc)

Gábor Kövesdán participated in Google Summer of Code 2008/2009 and for his work he has been given commit access to the source code. His first pieces of work will be bringing in the result of his summer work into the tree.

 1 30 &os; 7.3-BETA1 Available

The first BETA build for the &os;-7.3 release cycle is now available. ISO images for Tier-1 architectures are now available on most of the &os; mirror sites.

 29

New committer: Bruce Cran (src)

 28

New committer: Ulrich Spörlein (src)

 26

New committer: Romain Tartière (ports)

New committer: Alberto Villa (ports)

 17 October-December, 2009 Status Report

The October-December, 2009 Status Report is now available with 38 entries.

 Index: projects/entities/share/xml/press.xml =================================================================== --- projects/entities/share/xml/press.xml (revision 41353) +++ projects/entities/share/xml/press.xml (revision 41354) @@ -1,361 +1,377 @@ $FreeBSD$ 2013 + 2 + + + 2012 - A BSD Year in Retrospective + http://www.osnews.com/story/26787/2012_a_BSD_year_in_retrospective + OSnews + http://www.osnews.com/ + 14 February 2013 + Julian Djamil +

A retrospective of all the exciting developments in the BSD-family + of operating systems in 2012, focusing on FreeBSD, NetBSD, OpenBSD + and Dragonfly BSD.

+ + + + 1 A Decade of OS Access-control Extensibility https://queue.acm.org/detail.cfm?id=2430732 ACM Queue https://queue.acm.org/ 18 January 2013 Robert N. M. Watson

To discuss operating system security is to marvel at the diversity of deployed access-control models.

 2012 11 A world without Linux: Where would Apache, Microsoft — even Apple be today? http://www.infoworld.com/d/data-center/world-without-linux-where-would-apache-microsoft-even-apple-be-today-206680 Infoworld http://www.infoworld.com 12 November 2012 Paul Venezia

If Linux hadn't conquered the world, we'd all be running FreeBSD, maybe even on our desktops.

 8 FreeBSD Now Supported on Windows Server Hyper-V Via Beta Release http://redmondmag.com/articles/2012/08/09/freebsd-beta-for-windows-server-hyper-v.aspx Redmondmag http://redmondmag.com 9 August 2012 Kurt Mackie

Microsoft and collaborators today announced a beta release of drivers that enable the open source FreeBSD 8.2 server operating system to run in a virtual machine (VM) using Microsoft's Hyper-V Server.

 6 X.Org 7.7 Goes Into FreeBSD, KMS Is Ready http://www.phoronix.com/scan.php?page=news_item&px=MTExNzY phoronix http://www.phoronix.com 11 June 2012 Michael Larabel

While X.Org 7.7 was only released last week, this updated set of X packages have already worked their way into FreeBSD. The FreeBSD developers request your help in testing.

 Netflix Open Connect Network: FreeBSD, Not Linux http://www.phoronix.com/scan.php?page=news_item&px=MTExNDM phoronix http://www.phoronix.com 6 June 2012 Michael Larabel

This week Netflix announced their Open Connect Network as their own open CDN (Content Distribution Network), but rather than using Linux as the base for this open-source platform, they decided to use FreeBSD.

 5 Why Should You Use FreeBSD? Here's Some Reasons http://www.phoronix.com/scan.php?page=news_item&px=MTExMDg phoronix http://www.phoronix.com 31 May 2012 Michael Larabel

FreeBSD is wondering why are you using FreeBSD. David Chisnall of the FreeBSD project is working on updating their advocacy material regarding this leading *BSD operating system. As such, he asked on the mailing list "Why Are You Using FreeBSD?"

 Colocation Provider NYI Launches East Coast Mirror for FreeBSD Foundation http://www.thewhir.com/web-hosting-news/colocation-provider-nyi-launches-east-coast-mirror-for-freebsd-foundation The WHIR http://www.thewhir.com 25 May 2012 Nicole Henderson

Colocation provider NYI announced on Friday that it has launched the East Coast mirror for The FreeBSD Foundation. "FreeBSD has been a critical component of everything we do," Phillip Koblence, VP operations, NYI said in a statement. "We look upon this launch as our way of giving back to a community whose open source projects have enabled us to craft customized solutions for our customers from the inside out."

 FreeBSD and Microsoft Hyper-V Interoperability Expected This Summer http://redmondmag.com/articles/2012/05/14/microsoft-hyperv-interoperability.aspx Redmondmag http://redmondmag.com 14 May 2012 Kurt Mackie

Microsoft and its partnering companies are finalizing a project that will enable FreeBSD interoperability with Windows Server Hyper-V.

 FreeBSD 10 To Use Clang Compiler, Deprecate GCC http://www.phoronix.com/scan.php?page=news_item&px=MTEwMjI phoronix http://www.phoronix.com 12 May 2012 Michael Larabel

As indicated by the Q1-2012 FreeBSD Status Report, LLVM's Clang compiler is quickly replacing GCC for this popular BSD operating system. The developers are also making much progress in a GNU-free C++11 stack. For FreeBSD 10 they're aiming for Clang as the default C/C++ compiler, deprecate GCC, and to have a BSD-licensed C++ stack.

 FreeBSD Achieved A Lot In Q1'2012 http://www.phoronix.com/scan.php?page=news_item&px=MTEwMjE phoronix http://www.phoronix.com 12 May 2012 Michael Larabel

For the first three months of the 2012 calendar year, the FreeBSD project achieved a lot when it came to advancing their open operating system. Here's some of the interesting highlights from their quarterly status report.

 4 FreeBSD Gets A New X.Org With Intel KMS http://www.phoronix.com/scan.php?page=news_item&px=MTA5MTc phoronix http://www.phoronix.com 23 April 2012 Michael Larabel

The FreeBSD team working on X support have announced a set of X.Org updates to bring the FreeBSD package support to X.Org 7.5.2, which now includes Intel KMS support.

 3 Most Reliable Hosting Company Sites in March 2012 http://news.netcraft.com/archives/2012/04/02/most-reliable-hosting-company-sites-in-march-2012.html Netcraft Ltd. http://www.netcraft.com/ 02 March 2012 Netcraft

FreeBSD the OS of 3 of the top 10 most reliable hosting company sites in March 202.

 2 PC-BSD 9 review ? to FreeBSD what Ubuntu is to Debian http://www.linuxuser.co.uk/reviews/pc-bsd-9-review-to-freebsd-what-ubuntu-is-to-debian/ Linux User & Developer http://www.linuxuser.co.uk 09 February 2012 Koen Vervloesem

PC-BSD offers you a fully functional desktop environment based on rock solid FreeBSD technology, which makes it the perfect operating system for your first steps with BSD?

 1 [Review] FreeBSD 9.0 http://linuxconfig.net/review/freebsd-review/freebsd-9-0-review.html linuxconfig.net http://linuxconfig.net 10 January 2012 linuxconfig.net

This article provides an overview of some of the new features available in FreeBSD 9.0.

 2011 11 Why aren't you using FreeBSD? http://www.infoworld.com/d/data-center/why-arent-you-using-freebsd-178119?page=0,0 Infoworld http://www.infoworld.com 11 November 2011 Paul Venezia

This article writes about why Paul Venezia is using FreeBSD for his servers

 9 FreeBSD: A Faster Platform For Linux Gaming Than Linux? http://www.phoronix.com/scan.php?page=article&item=linux_games_bsd Phoronix http://www.phoronix.com/ 07 September 2011

Michael Larabel shows how FreeBSD runs some linux programs faster than linux does.

 7 Most Reliable Hosting Company Sites in June 2011 http://news.netcraft.com/archives/2011/07/08/most-reliable-hosting-company-sites-in-june-2011.html Netcraft Ltd. http://www.netcraft.com/ 08 July 2011 Jennifer Cownie

FreeBSD the OS of top 3 most reliable hosting company sites in June 2011.

 3 PC-BSD 8.2 review http://www.linuxbsdos.com/2011/03/03/pc-bsd-8-2-review/ LinuxBSDos.com http://www.linuxbsdos.com/ 03 March 2011 LinuxBSDos.com

LinuxBSDos.com looks at the installation (especially at the disk encryption features), system configuration and system management (including the installation of third party software packages via PC-BSD's PBI system) of PC-BSD 8.2.

 2 FreeBSD 8.2 expands ZFS support http://itmanagement.earthweb.com/osrc/article.php/3926181/FreeBSD-82-Expands-ZFS-Support----Without-Oracle.htm Datamation.com http://itmanagement.earthweb.com/ 25 February 2011 Sean Michael Kerner

The author looks at the status and the future of ZFS under FreeBSD. The information is based on interviews the website did with FreeBSD developer Josh Paetzel and Matt Olander from iXsystems.

 2010 8 PC-BSD 8.1 review http://www.linuxbsdos.com/2010/08/17/pc-bsd-8-1-review/ LinuxBSDos.com http://www.linuxbsdos.com/ 17 August 2010 LinuxBSDos.com

LinuxBSDos.com looks at the installation, system configuration and system management (including the installation of third party software packages via PC-BSD's PBI system) of PC-BSD 8.1.

 2 Health Check: FreeBSD - The unknown giant http://www.h-online.com/open/features/Health-Check-FreeBSD-The-unknown-giant-920248.html The H http://www.h-online.com/ 04 February 2010 Richard Hillesley

Richard Hillesley looks at the history of FreeBSD, the BSD license, Beastie and the new features in FreeBSD 8.0.

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