diff --git a/crypto/openssl/crypto/bn/bn_local.h b/crypto/openssl/crypto/bn/bn_local.h index 7c4d1d3ab78a..50e9d26e215b 100644 --- a/crypto/openssl/crypto/bn/bn_local.h +++ b/crypto/openssl/crypto/bn/bn_local.h @@ -1,700 +1,680 @@ /* * Copyright 1995-2023 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #ifndef OSSL_CRYPTO_BN_LOCAL_H # define OSSL_CRYPTO_BN_LOCAL_H /* * The EDK2 build doesn't use bn_conf.h; it sets THIRTY_TWO_BIT or * SIXTY_FOUR_BIT in its own environment since it doesn't re-run our * Configure script and needs to support both 32-bit and 64-bit. */ # include # if !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_UEFI) # include "crypto/bn_conf.h" # endif # include "crypto/bn.h" # include "internal/cryptlib.h" # include "internal/numbers.h" /* * These preprocessor symbols control various aspects of the bignum headers * and library code. They're not defined by any "normal" configuration, as * they are intended for development and testing purposes. NB: defining * them can be useful for debugging application code as well as openssl * itself. BN_DEBUG - turn on various debugging alterations to the bignum * code BN_RAND_DEBUG - uses random poisoning of unused words to trip up * mismanagement of bignum internals. Enable BN_RAND_DEBUG is known to * break some of the OpenSSL tests. */ # if defined(BN_RAND_DEBUG) && !defined(BN_DEBUG) # define BN_DEBUG # endif # if defined(BN_RAND_DEBUG) # include # endif /* * This should limit the stack usage due to alloca to about 4K. * BN_SOFT_LIMIT is a soft limit equivalent to 2*OPENSSL_RSA_MAX_MODULUS_BITS. * Beyond that size bn_mul_mont is no longer used, and the constant time * assembler code is disabled, due to the blatant alloca and bn_mul_mont usage. * Note that bn_mul_mont does an alloca that is hidden away in assembly. * It is not recommended to do computations with numbers exceeding this limit, * since the result will be highly version dependent: * While the current OpenSSL version will use non-optimized, but safe code, * previous versions will use optimized code, that may crash due to unexpected * stack overflow, and future versions may very well turn this into a hard * limit. * Note however, that it is possible to override the size limit using * "./config -DBN_SOFT_LIMIT=" if necessary, and the O/S specific * stack limit is known and taken into consideration. */ # ifndef BN_SOFT_LIMIT # define BN_SOFT_LIMIT (4096 / BN_BYTES) # endif -/* - * This should limit the stack usage due to alloca to about 4K. - * BN_SOFT_LIMIT is a soft limit equivalent to 2*OPENSSL_RSA_MAX_MODULUS_BITS. - * Beyond that size bn_mul_mont is no longer used, and the constant time - * assembler code is disabled, due to the blatant alloca and bn_mul_mont usage. - * Note that bn_mul_mont does an alloca that is hidden away in assembly. - * It is not recommended to do computations with numbers exceeding this limit, - * since the result will be highly version dependent: - * While the current OpenSSL version will use non-optimized, but safe code, - * previous versions will use optimized code, that may crash due to unexpected - * stack overflow, and future versions may very well turn this into a hard - * limit. - * Note however, that it is possible to override the size limit using - * "./config -DBN_SOFT_LIMIT=" if necessary, and the O/S specific - * stack limit is known and taken into consideration. - */ -# ifndef BN_SOFT_LIMIT -# define BN_SOFT_LIMIT (4096 / BN_BYTES) -# endif - # ifndef OPENSSL_SMALL_FOOTPRINT # define BN_MUL_COMBA # define BN_SQR_COMBA # define BN_RECURSION # endif /* * This next option uses the C libraries (2 word)/(1 word) function. If it is * not defined, I use my C version (which is slower). The reason for this * flag is that when the particular C compiler library routine is used, and * the library is linked with a different compiler, the library is missing. * This mostly happens when the library is built with gcc and then linked * using normal cc. This would be a common occurrence because gcc normally * produces code that is 2 times faster than system compilers for the big * number stuff. For machines with only one compiler (or shared libraries), * this should be on. Again this in only really a problem on machines using * "long long's", are 32bit, and are not using my assembler code. */ # if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_MSDOS) || defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WINDOWS) || \ defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32) || defined(linux) # define BN_DIV2W # endif /* * 64-bit processor with LP64 ABI */ # ifdef SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG # define BN_ULLONG unsigned long long # define BN_BITS4 32 # define BN_MASK2 (0xffffffffffffffffL) # define BN_MASK2l (0xffffffffL) # define BN_MASK2h (0xffffffff00000000L) # define BN_MASK2h1 (0xffffffff80000000L) # define BN_DEC_CONV (10000000000000000000UL) # define BN_DEC_NUM 19 # define BN_DEC_FMT1 "%lu" # define BN_DEC_FMT2 "%019lu" # endif /* * 64-bit processor other than LP64 ABI */ # ifdef SIXTY_FOUR_BIT # undef BN_LLONG # undef BN_ULLONG # define BN_BITS4 32 # define BN_MASK2 (0xffffffffffffffffLL) # define BN_MASK2l (0xffffffffL) # define BN_MASK2h (0xffffffff00000000LL) # define BN_MASK2h1 (0xffffffff80000000LL) # define BN_DEC_CONV (10000000000000000000ULL) # define BN_DEC_NUM 19 # define BN_DEC_FMT1 "%llu" # define BN_DEC_FMT2 "%019llu" # endif # ifdef THIRTY_TWO_BIT # ifdef BN_LLONG # if defined(_WIN32) && !defined(__GNUC__) # define BN_ULLONG unsigned __int64 # else # define BN_ULLONG unsigned long long # endif # endif # define BN_BITS4 16 # define BN_MASK2 (0xffffffffL) # define BN_MASK2l (0xffff) # define BN_MASK2h1 (0xffff8000L) # define BN_MASK2h (0xffff0000L) # define BN_DEC_CONV (1000000000L) # define BN_DEC_NUM 9 # define BN_DEC_FMT1 "%u" # define BN_DEC_FMT2 "%09u" # endif /*- * Bignum consistency macros * There is one "API" macro, bn_fix_top(), for stripping leading zeroes from * bignum data after direct manipulations on the data. There is also an * "internal" macro, bn_check_top(), for verifying that there are no leading * zeroes. Unfortunately, some auditing is required due to the fact that * bn_fix_top() has become an overabused duct-tape because bignum data is * occasionally passed around in an inconsistent state. So the following * changes have been made to sort this out; * - bn_fix_top()s implementation has been moved to bn_correct_top() * - if BN_DEBUG isn't defined, bn_fix_top() maps to bn_correct_top(), and * bn_check_top() is as before. * - if BN_DEBUG *is* defined; * - bn_check_top() tries to pollute unused words even if the bignum 'top' is * consistent. (ed: only if BN_RAND_DEBUG is defined) * - bn_fix_top() maps to bn_check_top() rather than "fixing" anything. * The idea is to have debug builds flag up inconsistent bignums when they * occur. If that occurs in a bn_fix_top(), we examine the code in question; if * the use of bn_fix_top() was appropriate (ie. it follows directly after code * that manipulates the bignum) it is converted to bn_correct_top(), and if it * was not appropriate, we convert it permanently to bn_check_top() and track * down the cause of the bug. Eventually, no internal code should be using the * bn_fix_top() macro. External applications and libraries should try this with * their own code too, both in terms of building against the openssl headers * with BN_DEBUG defined *and* linking with a version of OpenSSL built with it * defined. This not only improves external code, it provides more test * coverage for openssl's own code. */ # ifdef BN_DEBUG /* * The new BN_FLG_FIXED_TOP flag marks vectors that were not treated with * bn_correct_top, in other words such vectors are permitted to have zeros * in most significant limbs. Such vectors are used internally to achieve * execution time invariance for critical operations with private keys. * It's BN_DEBUG-only flag, because user application is not supposed to * observe it anyway. Moreover, optimizing compiler would actually remove * all operations manipulating the bit in question in non-BN_DEBUG build. */ # define BN_FLG_FIXED_TOP 0x10000 # ifdef BN_RAND_DEBUG # define bn_pollute(a) \ do { \ const BIGNUM *_bnum1 = (a); \ if (_bnum1->top < _bnum1->dmax) { \ unsigned char _tmp_char; \ /* We cast away const without the compiler knowing, any \ * *genuinely* constant variables that aren't mutable \ * wouldn't be constructed with top!=dmax. */ \ BN_ULONG *_not_const; \ memcpy(&_not_const, &_bnum1->d, sizeof(_not_const)); \ (void)RAND_bytes(&_tmp_char, 1); /* Debug only - safe to ignore error return */\ memset(_not_const + _bnum1->top, _tmp_char, \ sizeof(*_not_const) * (_bnum1->dmax - _bnum1->top)); \ } \ } while(0) # else # define bn_pollute(a) # endif # define bn_check_top(a) \ do { \ const BIGNUM *_bnum2 = (a); \ if (_bnum2 != NULL) { \ int _top = _bnum2->top; \ (void)ossl_assert((_top == 0 && !_bnum2->neg) || \ (_top && ((_bnum2->flags & BN_FLG_FIXED_TOP) \ || _bnum2->d[_top - 1] != 0))); \ bn_pollute(_bnum2); \ } \ } while(0) # define bn_fix_top(a) bn_check_top(a) # define bn_check_size(bn, bits) bn_wcheck_size(bn, ((bits+BN_BITS2-1))/BN_BITS2) # define bn_wcheck_size(bn, words) \ do { \ const BIGNUM *_bnum2 = (bn); \ assert((words) <= (_bnum2)->dmax && \ (words) >= (_bnum2)->top); \ /* avoid unused variable warning with NDEBUG */ \ (void)(_bnum2); \ } while(0) # else /* !BN_DEBUG */ # define BN_FLG_FIXED_TOP 0 # define bn_pollute(a) # define bn_check_top(a) # define bn_fix_top(a) bn_correct_top(a) # define bn_check_size(bn, bits) # define bn_wcheck_size(bn, words) # endif BN_ULONG bn_mul_add_words(BN_ULONG *rp, const BN_ULONG *ap, int num, BN_ULONG w); BN_ULONG bn_mul_words(BN_ULONG *rp, const BN_ULONG *ap, int num, BN_ULONG w); void bn_sqr_words(BN_ULONG *rp, const BN_ULONG *ap, int num); BN_ULONG bn_div_words(BN_ULONG h, BN_ULONG l, BN_ULONG d); BN_ULONG bn_add_words(BN_ULONG *rp, const BN_ULONG *ap, const BN_ULONG *bp, int num); BN_ULONG bn_sub_words(BN_ULONG *rp, const BN_ULONG *ap, const BN_ULONG *bp, int num); struct bignum_st { BN_ULONG *d; /* Pointer to an array of 'BN_BITS2' bit * chunks. */ int top; /* Index of last used d +1. */ /* The next are internal book keeping for bn_expand. */ int dmax; /* Size of the d array. */ int neg; /* one if the number is negative */ int flags; }; /* Used for montgomery multiplication */ struct bn_mont_ctx_st { int ri; /* number of bits in R */ BIGNUM RR; /* used to convert to montgomery form, possibly zero-padded */ BIGNUM N; /* The modulus */ BIGNUM Ni; /* R*(1/R mod N) - N*Ni = 1 (Ni is only * stored for bignum algorithm) */ BN_ULONG n0[2]; /* least significant word(s) of Ni; (type * changed with 0.9.9, was "BN_ULONG n0;" * before) */ int flags; }; /* * Used for reciprocal division/mod functions It cannot be shared between * threads */ struct bn_recp_ctx_st { BIGNUM N; /* the divisor */ BIGNUM Nr; /* the reciprocal */ int num_bits; int shift; int flags; }; /* Used for slow "generation" functions. */ struct bn_gencb_st { unsigned int ver; /* To handle binary (in)compatibility */ void *arg; /* callback-specific data */ union { /* if (ver==1) - handles old style callbacks */ void (*cb_1) (int, int, void *); /* if (ver==2) - new callback style */ int (*cb_2) (int, int, BN_GENCB *); } cb; }; /*- * BN_window_bits_for_exponent_size -- macro for sliding window mod_exp functions * * * For window size 'w' (w >= 2) and a random 'b' bits exponent, * the number of multiplications is a constant plus on average * * 2^(w-1) + (b-w)/(w+1); * * here 2^(w-1) is for precomputing the table (we actually need * entries only for windows that have the lowest bit set), and * (b-w)/(w+1) is an approximation for the expected number of * w-bit windows, not counting the first one. * * Thus we should use * * w >= 6 if b > 671 * w = 5 if 671 > b > 239 * w = 4 if 239 > b > 79 * w = 3 if 79 > b > 23 * w <= 2 if 23 > b * * (with draws in between). Very small exponents are often selected * with low Hamming weight, so we use w = 1 for b <= 23. */ # define BN_window_bits_for_exponent_size(b) \ ((b) > 671 ? 6 : \ (b) > 239 ? 5 : \ (b) > 79 ? 4 : \ (b) > 23 ? 3 : 1) /* * BN_mod_exp_mont_consttime is based on the assumption that the L1 data cache * line width of the target processor is at least the following value. */ # define MOD_EXP_CTIME_MIN_CACHE_LINE_WIDTH ( 64 ) # define MOD_EXP_CTIME_MIN_CACHE_LINE_MASK (MOD_EXP_CTIME_MIN_CACHE_LINE_WIDTH - 1) /* * Window sizes optimized for fixed window size modular exponentiation * algorithm (BN_mod_exp_mont_consttime). To achieve the security goals of * BN_mode_exp_mont_consttime, the maximum size of the window must not exceed * log_2(MOD_EXP_CTIME_MIN_CACHE_LINE_WIDTH). Window size thresholds are * defined for cache line sizes of 32 and 64, cache line sizes where * log_2(32)=5 and log_2(64)=6 respectively. A window size of 7 should only be * used on processors that have a 128 byte or greater cache line size. */ # if MOD_EXP_CTIME_MIN_CACHE_LINE_WIDTH == 64 # define BN_window_bits_for_ctime_exponent_size(b) \ ((b) > 937 ? 6 : \ (b) > 306 ? 5 : \ (b) > 89 ? 4 : \ (b) > 22 ? 3 : 1) # define BN_MAX_WINDOW_BITS_FOR_CTIME_EXPONENT_SIZE (6) # elif MOD_EXP_CTIME_MIN_CACHE_LINE_WIDTH == 32 # define BN_window_bits_for_ctime_exponent_size(b) \ ((b) > 306 ? 5 : \ (b) > 89 ? 4 : \ (b) > 22 ? 3 : 1) # define BN_MAX_WINDOW_BITS_FOR_CTIME_EXPONENT_SIZE (5) # endif /* Pentium pro 16,16,16,32,64 */ /* Alpha 16,16,16,16.64 */ # define BN_MULL_SIZE_NORMAL (16)/* 32 */ # define BN_MUL_RECURSIVE_SIZE_NORMAL (16)/* 32 less than */ # define BN_SQR_RECURSIVE_SIZE_NORMAL (16)/* 32 */ # define BN_MUL_LOW_RECURSIVE_SIZE_NORMAL (32)/* 32 */ # define BN_MONT_CTX_SET_SIZE_WORD (64)/* 32 */ # if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ASM) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_INLINE_ASM) && !defined(PEDANTIC) /* * BN_UMULT_HIGH section. * If the compiler doesn't support 2*N integer type, then you have to * replace every N*N multiplication with 4 (N/2)*(N/2) accompanied by some * shifts and additions which unavoidably results in severe performance * penalties. Of course provided that the hardware is capable of producing * 2*N result... That's when you normally start considering assembler * implementation. However! It should be pointed out that some CPUs (e.g., * PowerPC, Alpha, and IA-64) provide *separate* instruction calculating * the upper half of the product placing the result into a general * purpose register. Now *if* the compiler supports inline assembler, * then it's not impossible to implement the "bignum" routines (and have * the compiler optimize 'em) exhibiting "native" performance in C. That's * what BN_UMULT_HIGH macro is about:-) Note that more recent compilers do * support 2*64 integer type, which is also used here. */ # if defined(__SIZEOF_INT128__) && __SIZEOF_INT128__==16 && \ (defined(SIXTY_FOUR_BIT) || defined(SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG)) # define BN_UMULT_HIGH(a,b) (((uint128_t)(a)*(b))>>64) # define BN_UMULT_LOHI(low,high,a,b) ({ \ uint128_t ret=(uint128_t)(a)*(b); \ (high)=ret>>64; (low)=ret; }) # elif defined(__alpha) && (defined(SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG) || defined(SIXTY_FOUR_BIT)) # if defined(__DECC) # include # define BN_UMULT_HIGH(a,b) (BN_ULONG)asm("umulh %a0,%a1,%v0",(a),(b)) # elif defined(__GNUC__) && __GNUC__>=2 # define BN_UMULT_HIGH(a,b) ({ \ register BN_ULONG ret; \ asm ("umulh %1,%2,%0" \ : "=r"(ret) \ : "r"(a), "r"(b)); \ ret; }) # endif /* compiler */ # elif defined(_ARCH_PPC64) && defined(SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG) # if defined(__GNUC__) && __GNUC__>=2 # define BN_UMULT_HIGH(a,b) ({ \ register BN_ULONG ret; \ asm ("mulhdu %0,%1,%2" \ : "=r"(ret) \ : "r"(a), "r"(b)); \ ret; }) # endif /* compiler */ # elif (defined(__x86_64) || defined(__x86_64__)) && \ (defined(SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG) || defined(SIXTY_FOUR_BIT)) # if defined(__GNUC__) && __GNUC__>=2 # define BN_UMULT_HIGH(a,b) ({ \ register BN_ULONG ret,discard; \ asm ("mulq %3" \ : "=a"(discard),"=d"(ret) \ : "a"(a), "g"(b) \ : "cc"); \ ret; }) # define BN_UMULT_LOHI(low,high,a,b) \ asm ("mulq %3" \ : "=a"(low),"=d"(high) \ : "a"(a),"g"(b) \ : "cc"); # endif # elif (defined(_M_AMD64) || defined(_M_X64)) && defined(SIXTY_FOUR_BIT) # if defined(_MSC_VER) && _MSC_VER>=1400 unsigned __int64 __umulh(unsigned __int64 a, unsigned __int64 b); unsigned __int64 _umul128(unsigned __int64 a, unsigned __int64 b, unsigned __int64 *h); # pragma intrinsic(__umulh,_umul128) # define BN_UMULT_HIGH(a,b) __umulh((a),(b)) # define BN_UMULT_LOHI(low,high,a,b) ((low)=_umul128((a),(b),&(high))) # endif # elif defined(__mips) && (defined(SIXTY_FOUR_BIT) || defined(SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG)) # if defined(__GNUC__) && __GNUC__>=2 # define BN_UMULT_HIGH(a,b) ({ \ register BN_ULONG ret; \ asm ("dmultu %1,%2" \ : "=h"(ret) \ : "r"(a), "r"(b) : "l"); \ ret; }) # define BN_UMULT_LOHI(low,high,a,b) \ asm ("dmultu %2,%3" \ : "=l"(low),"=h"(high) \ : "r"(a), "r"(b)); # endif # elif defined(__aarch64__) && defined(SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG) # if defined(__GNUC__) && __GNUC__>=2 # define BN_UMULT_HIGH(a,b) ({ \ register BN_ULONG ret; \ asm ("umulh %0,%1,%2" \ : "=r"(ret) \ : "r"(a), "r"(b)); \ ret; }) # endif # endif /* cpu */ # endif /* OPENSSL_NO_ASM */ # ifdef BN_RAND_DEBUG # define bn_clear_top2max(a) \ { \ int ind = (a)->dmax - (a)->top; \ BN_ULONG *ftl = &(a)->d[(a)->top-1]; \ for (; ind != 0; ind--) \ *(++ftl) = 0x0; \ } # else # define bn_clear_top2max(a) # endif # ifdef BN_LLONG /******************************************************************* * Using the long long type, has to be twice as wide as BN_ULONG... */ # define Lw(t) (((BN_ULONG)(t))&BN_MASK2) # define Hw(t) (((BN_ULONG)((t)>>BN_BITS2))&BN_MASK2) # define mul_add(r,a,w,c) { \ BN_ULLONG t; \ t=(BN_ULLONG)w * (a) + (r) + (c); \ (r)= Lw(t); \ (c)= Hw(t); \ } # define mul(r,a,w,c) { \ BN_ULLONG t; \ t=(BN_ULLONG)w * (a) + (c); \ (r)= Lw(t); \ (c)= Hw(t); \ } # define sqr(r0,r1,a) { \ BN_ULLONG t; \ t=(BN_ULLONG)(a)*(a); \ (r0)=Lw(t); \ (r1)=Hw(t); \ } # elif defined(BN_UMULT_LOHI) # define mul_add(r,a,w,c) { \ BN_ULONG high,low,ret,tmp=(a); \ ret = (r); \ BN_UMULT_LOHI(low,high,w,tmp); \ ret += (c); \ (c) = (ret<(c)); \ (c) += high; \ ret += low; \ (c) += (ret>BN_BITS4)&BN_MASK2l) # define L2HBITS(a) (((a)<>BN_BITS2)&BN_MASKl) # define LL2HBITS(a) ((BN_ULLONG)((a)&BN_MASKl)<>(BN_BITS4-1); \ m =(m&BN_MASK2l)<<(BN_BITS4+1); \ l=(l+m)&BN_MASK2; h += (l < m); \ (lo)=l; \ (ho)=h; \ } # define mul_add(r,a,bl,bh,c) { \ BN_ULONG l,h; \ \ h= (a); \ l=LBITS(h); \ h=HBITS(h); \ mul64(l,h,(bl),(bh)); \ \ /* non-multiply part */ \ l=(l+(c))&BN_MASK2; h += (l < (c)); \ (c)=(r); \ l=(l+(c))&BN_MASK2; h += (l < (c)); \ (c)=h&BN_MASK2; \ (r)=l; \ } # define mul(r,a,bl,bh,c) { \ BN_ULONG l,h; \ \ h= (a); \ l=LBITS(h); \ h=HBITS(h); \ mul64(l,h,(bl),(bh)); \ \ /* non-multiply part */ \ l+=(c); h += ((l&BN_MASK2) < (c)); \ (c)=h&BN_MASK2; \ (r)=l&BN_MASK2; \ } # endif /* !BN_LLONG */ void BN_RECP_CTX_init(BN_RECP_CTX *recp); void BN_MONT_CTX_init(BN_MONT_CTX *ctx); void bn_init(BIGNUM *a); void bn_mul_normal(BN_ULONG *r, BN_ULONG *a, int na, BN_ULONG *b, int nb); void bn_mul_comba8(BN_ULONG *r, BN_ULONG *a, BN_ULONG *b); void bn_mul_comba4(BN_ULONG *r, BN_ULONG *a, BN_ULONG *b); void bn_sqr_normal(BN_ULONG *r, const BN_ULONG *a, int n, BN_ULONG *tmp); void bn_sqr_comba8(BN_ULONG *r, const BN_ULONG *a); void bn_sqr_comba4(BN_ULONG *r, const BN_ULONG *a); int bn_cmp_words(const BN_ULONG *a, const BN_ULONG *b, int n); int bn_cmp_part_words(const BN_ULONG *a, const BN_ULONG *b, int cl, int dl); void bn_mul_recursive(BN_ULONG *r, BN_ULONG *a, BN_ULONG *b, int n2, int dna, int dnb, BN_ULONG *t); void bn_mul_part_recursive(BN_ULONG *r, BN_ULONG *a, BN_ULONG *b, int n, int tna, int tnb, BN_ULONG *t); void bn_sqr_recursive(BN_ULONG *r, const BN_ULONG *a, int n2, BN_ULONG *t); void bn_mul_low_normal(BN_ULONG *r, BN_ULONG *a, BN_ULONG *b, int n); void bn_mul_low_recursive(BN_ULONG *r, BN_ULONG *a, BN_ULONG *b, int n2, BN_ULONG *t); BN_ULONG bn_sub_part_words(BN_ULONG *r, const BN_ULONG *a, const BN_ULONG *b, int cl, int dl); int bn_mul_mont(BN_ULONG *rp, const BN_ULONG *ap, const BN_ULONG *bp, const BN_ULONG *np, const BN_ULONG *n0, int num); void bn_correct_top_consttime(BIGNUM *a); BIGNUM *int_bn_mod_inverse(BIGNUM *in, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *n, BN_CTX *ctx, int *noinv); static ossl_inline BIGNUM *bn_expand(BIGNUM *a, int bits) { if (bits > (INT_MAX - BN_BITS2 + 1)) return NULL; if (((bits+BN_BITS2-1)/BN_BITS2) <= (a)->dmax) return a; return bn_expand2((a),(bits+BN_BITS2-1)/BN_BITS2); } int ossl_bn_check_prime(const BIGNUM *w, int checks, BN_CTX *ctx, int do_trial_division, BN_GENCB *cb); #endif diff --git a/crypto/openssl/doc/man3/SSL_CTX_set_options.pod b/crypto/openssl/doc/man3/SSL_CTX_set_options.pod index 1d5656b3ca63..176f8d25fc31 100644 --- a/crypto/openssl/doc/man3/SSL_CTX_set_options.pod +++ b/crypto/openssl/doc/man3/SSL_CTX_set_options.pod @@ -1,489 +1,466 @@ =pod =head1 NAME SSL_CTX_set_options, SSL_set_options, SSL_CTX_clear_options, SSL_clear_options, SSL_CTX_get_options, SSL_get_options, SSL_get_secure_renegotiation_support - manipulate SSL options =head1 SYNOPSIS #include uint64_t SSL_CTX_set_options(SSL_CTX *ctx, uint64_t options); uint64_t SSL_set_options(SSL *ssl, uint64_t options); uint64_t SSL_CTX_clear_options(SSL_CTX *ctx, uint64_t options); uint64_t SSL_clear_options(SSL *ssl, uint64_t options); uint64_t SSL_CTX_get_options(const SSL_CTX *ctx); uint64_t SSL_get_options(const SSL *ssl); long SSL_get_secure_renegotiation_support(SSL *ssl); =head1 DESCRIPTION SSL_CTX_set_options() adds the options set via bit-mask in B to B. Options already set before are not cleared! SSL_set_options() adds the options set via bit-mask in B to B. Options already set before are not cleared! SSL_CTX_clear_options() clears the options set via bit-mask in B to B. SSL_clear_options() clears the options set via bit-mask in B to B. SSL_CTX_get_options() returns the options set for B. SSL_get_options() returns the options set for B. SSL_get_secure_renegotiation_support() indicates whether the peer supports secure renegotiation. Note, this is implemented via a macro. =head1 NOTES The behaviour of the SSL library can be changed by setting several options. The options are coded as bit-masks and can be combined by a bitwise B operation (|). SSL_CTX_set_options() and SSL_set_options() affect the (external) protocol behaviour of the SSL library. The (internal) behaviour of the API can be changed by using the similar L and SSL_set_mode() functions. During a handshake, the option settings of the SSL object are used. When a new SSL object is created from a context using SSL_new(), the current option setting is copied. Changes to B do not affect already created SSL objects. SSL_clear() does not affect the settings. The following B options are available: =over 4 =item SSL_OP_CRYPTOPRO_TLSEXT_BUG Add server-hello extension from the early version of cryptopro draft when GOST ciphersuite is negotiated. Required for interoperability with CryptoPro CSP 3.x. =item SSL_OP_DONT_INSERT_EMPTY_FRAGMENTS Disables a countermeasure against a SSL 3.0/TLS 1.0 protocol vulnerability affecting CBC ciphers, which cannot be handled by some broken SSL implementations. This option has no effect for connections using other ciphers. =item SSL_OP_SAFARI_ECDHE_ECDSA_BUG Don't prefer ECDHE-ECDSA ciphers when the client appears to be Safari on OS X. OS X 10.8..10.8.3 has broken support for ECDHE-ECDSA ciphers. =item SSL_OP_TLSEXT_PADDING Adds a padding extension to ensure the ClientHello size is never between 256 and 511 bytes in length. This is needed as a workaround for some implementations. =item SSL_OP_ALL All of the above bug workarounds. =back It is usually safe to use B to enable the bug workaround options if compatibility with somewhat broken implementations is desired. The following B options are available: =over 4 =item SSL_OP_ALLOW_CLIENT_RENEGOTIATION Client-initiated renegotiation is disabled by default. Use this option to enable it. =item SSL_OP_ALLOW_NO_DHE_KEX In TLSv1.3 allow a non-(ec)dhe based key exchange mode on resumption. This means that there will be no forward secrecy for the resumed session. =item SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION Allow legacy insecure renegotiation between OpenSSL and unpatched clients or servers. See the B section for more details. =item SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE When choosing a cipher, use the server's preferences instead of the client preferences. When not set, the SSL server will always follow the clients preferences. When set, the SSL/TLS server will choose following its own preferences. =item SSL_OP_CISCO_ANYCONNECT Use Cisco's version identifier of DTLS_BAD_VER when establishing a DTLSv1 connection. Only available when using the deprecated DTLSv1_client_method() API. =item SSL_OP_CLEANSE_PLAINTEXT By default TLS connections keep a copy of received plaintext application data in a static buffer until it is overwritten by the next portion of data. When enabling SSL_OP_CLEANSE_PLAINTEXT deciphered application data is cleansed by calling OPENSSL_cleanse(3) after passing data to the application. Data is also cleansed when releasing the connection (e.g. L). Since OpenSSL only cleanses internal buffers, the application is still responsible for cleansing all other buffers. Most notably, this applies to buffers passed to functions like L, L but also like L. =item SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE Turn on Cookie Exchange as described in RFC4347 Section 4.2.1. Only affects DTLS connections. =item SSL_OP_DISABLE_TLSEXT_CA_NAMES Disable TLS Extension CA Names. You may want to disable it for security reasons or for compatibility with some Windows TLS implementations crashing when this extension is larger than 1024 bytes. =item SSL_OP_ENABLE_KTLS Enable the use of kernel TLS. In order to benefit from kernel TLS OpenSSL must have been compiled with support for it, and it must be supported by the negotiated ciphersuites and extensions. The specific ciphersuites and extensions that are supported may vary by platform and kernel version. The kernel TLS data-path implements the record layer, and the encryption algorithm. The kernel will utilize the best hardware available for encryption. Using the kernel data-path should reduce the memory footprint of OpenSSL because no buffering is required. Also, the throughput should improve because data copy is avoided when user data is encrypted into kernel memory instead of the usual encrypt then copy to kernel. Kernel TLS might not support all the features of OpenSSL. For instance, renegotiation, and setting the maximum fragment size is not possible as of Linux 4.20. Note that with kernel TLS enabled some cryptographic operations are performed by the kernel directly and not via any available OpenSSL Providers. This might be undesirable if, for example, the application requires all cryptographic operations to be performed by the FIPS provider. =item SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT If set then dummy Change Cipher Spec (CCS) messages are sent in TLSv1.3. This has the effect of making TLSv1.3 look more like TLSv1.2 so that middleboxes that do not understand TLSv1.3 will not drop the connection. Regardless of whether this option is set or not CCS messages received from the peer will always be ignored in TLSv1.3. This option is set by default. To switch it off use SSL_clear_options(). A future version of OpenSSL may not set this by default. =item SSL_OP_IGNORE_UNEXPECTED_EOF Some TLS implementations do not send the mandatory close_notify alert on shutdown. If the application tries to wait for the close_notify alert but the peer closes the connection without sending it, an error is generated. When this option is enabled the peer does not need to send the close_notify alert and a closed connection will be treated as if the close_notify alert was received. You should only enable this option if the protocol running over TLS can detect a truncation attack itself, and that the application is checking for that truncation attack. For more information on shutting down a connection, see L. =item SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT Allow legacy insecure renegotiation between OpenSSL and unpatched servers B. See the B section for more details. =item SSL_OP_NO_ANTI_REPLAY By default, when a server is configured for early data (i.e., max_early_data > 0), OpenSSL will switch on replay protection. See L for a description of the replay protection feature. Anti-replay measures are required to comply with the TLSv1.3 specification. Some applications may be able to mitigate the replay risks in other ways and in such cases the built in OpenSSL functionality is not required. Those applications can turn this feature off by setting this option. This is a server-side option only. It is ignored by clients. =item SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION Do not use compression even if it is supported. This option is set by default. To switch it off use SSL_clear_options(). =item SSL_OP_NO_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC Normally clients and servers will transparently attempt to negotiate the RFC7366 Encrypt-then-MAC option on TLS and DTLS connection. If this option is set, Encrypt-then-MAC is disabled. Clients will not propose, and servers will not accept the extension. =item SSL_OP_NO_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET Normally clients and servers will transparently attempt to negotiate the RFC7627 Extended Master Secret option on TLS and DTLS connection. If this option is set, Extended Master Secret is disabled. Clients will not propose, and servers will not accept the extension. =item SSL_OP_NO_QUERY_MTU Do not query the MTU. Only affects DTLS connections. =item SSL_OP_NO_RENEGOTIATION Disable all renegotiation in TLSv1.2 and earlier. Do not send HelloRequest messages, and ignore renegotiation requests via ClientHello. =item SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION When performing renegotiation as a server, always start a new session (i.e., session resumption requests are only accepted in the initial handshake). This option is not needed for clients. =item SSL_OP_NO_SSLv3, SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1, SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1, SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_2, SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_3, SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1, SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1_2 These options turn off the SSLv3, TLSv1, TLSv1.1, TLSv1.2 or TLSv1.3 protocol versions with TLS or the DTLSv1, DTLSv1.2 versions with DTLS, respectively. As of OpenSSL 1.1.0, these options are deprecated, use L and L instead. =item SSL_OP_NO_TICKET SSL/TLS supports two mechanisms for resuming sessions: session ids and stateless session tickets. When using session ids a copy of the session information is cached on the server and a unique id is sent to the client. When the client wishes to resume it provides the unique id so that the server can retrieve the session information from its cache. When using stateless session tickets the server uses a session ticket encryption key to encrypt the session information. This encrypted data is sent to the client as a "ticket". When the client wishes to resume it sends the encrypted data back to the server. The server uses its key to decrypt the data and resume the session. In this way the server can operate statelessly - no session information needs to be cached locally. The TLSv1.3 protocol only supports tickets and does not directly support session ids. However, OpenSSL allows two modes of ticket operation in TLSv1.3: stateful and stateless. Stateless tickets work the same way as in TLSv1.2 and below. Stateful tickets mimic the session id behaviour available in TLSv1.2 and below. The session information is cached on the server and the session id is wrapped up in a ticket and sent back to the client. When the client wishes to resume, it presents a ticket in the same way as for stateless tickets. The server can then extract the session id from the ticket and retrieve the session information from its cache. By default OpenSSL will use stateless tickets. The SSL_OP_NO_TICKET option will cause stateless tickets to not be issued. In TLSv1.2 and below this means no ticket gets sent to the client at all. In TLSv1.3 a stateful ticket will be sent. This is a server-side option only. In TLSv1.3 it is possible to suppress all tickets (stateful and stateless) from being sent by calling L or L. =item SSL_OP_PRIORITIZE_CHACHA When SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE is set, temporarily reprioritize ChaCha20-Poly1305 ciphers to the top of the server cipher list if a ChaCha20-Poly1305 cipher is at the top of the client cipher list. This helps those clients (e.g. mobile) use ChaCha20-Poly1305 if that cipher is anywhere in the server cipher list; but still allows other clients to use AES and other ciphers. Requires B. =item SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG Disable version rollback attack detection. During the client key exchange, the client must send the same information about acceptable SSL/TLS protocol levels as during the first hello. Some clients violate this rule by adapting to the server's answer. (Example: the client sends a SSLv2 hello and accepts up to SSLv3.1=TLSv1, the server only understands up to SSLv3. In this case the client must still use the same SSLv3.1=TLSv1 announcement. Some clients step down to SSLv3 with respect to the server's answer and violate the version rollback protection.) -=item SSL_OP_ENABLE_KTLS - -Enable the use of kernel TLS. In order to benefit from kernel TLS OpenSSL must -have been compiled with support for it, and it must be supported by the -negotiated ciphersuites and extensions. The specific ciphersuites and extensions -that are supported may vary by platform and kernel version. - -The kernel TLS data-path implements the record layer, and the encryption -algorithm. The kernel will utilize the best hardware -available for encryption. Using the kernel data-path should reduce the memory -footprint of OpenSSL because no buffering is required. Also, the throughput -should improve because data copy is avoided when user data is encrypted into -kernel memory instead of the usual encrypt then copy to kernel. - -Kernel TLS might not support all the features of OpenSSL. For instance, -renegotiation, and setting the maximum fragment size is not possible as of -Linux 4.20. - -Note that with kernel TLS enabled some cryptographic operations are performed -by the kernel directly and not via any available OpenSSL Providers. This might -be undesirable if, for example, the application requires all cryptographic -operations to be performed by the FIPS provider. - =back The following options no longer have any effect but their identifiers are retained for compatibility purposes: =over 4 =item SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_REUSE_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG =item SSL_OP_MICROSOFT_BIG_SSLV3_BUFFER =item SSL_OP_SSLEAY_080_CLIENT_DH_BUG =item SSL_OP_TLS_D5_BUG =item SSL_OP_TLS_BLOCK_PADDING_BUG =item SSL_OP_MSIE_SSLV2_RSA_PADDING =item SSL_OP_SSLREF2_REUSE_CERT_TYPE_BUG =item SSL_OP_MICROSOFT_SESS_ID_BUG =item SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_CHALLENGE_BUG =item SSL_OP_PKCS1_CHECK_1 =item SSL_OP_PKCS1_CHECK_2 =item SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE =item SSL_OP_SINGLE_ECDH_USE =item SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA =item SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_CA_DN_BUG =item SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_DEMO_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG =back =head1 SECURE RENEGOTIATION OpenSSL always attempts to use secure renegotiation as described in RFC5746. This counters the prefix attack described in CVE-2009-3555 and elsewhere. This attack has far reaching consequences which application writers should be aware of. In the description below an implementation supporting secure renegotiation is referred to as I. A server not supporting secure renegotiation is referred to as I. The following sections describe the operations permitted by OpenSSL's secure renegotiation implementation. =head2 Patched client and server Connections and renegotiation are always permitted by OpenSSL implementations. =head2 Unpatched client and patched OpenSSL server The initial connection succeeds but client renegotiation is denied by the server with a B warning alert if TLS v1.0 is used or a fatal B alert in SSL v3.0. If the patched OpenSSL server attempts to renegotiate a fatal B alert is sent. This is because the server code may be unaware of the unpatched nature of the client. If the option B is set then renegotiation B succeeds. =head2 Patched OpenSSL client and unpatched server If the option B or B is set then initial connections and renegotiation between patched OpenSSL clients and unpatched servers succeeds. If neither option is set then initial connections to unpatched servers will fail. Setting the option B has security implications; clients that are willing to connect to servers that do not implement RFC 5746 secure renegotiation are subject to attacks such as CVE-2009-3555. OpenSSL client applications wishing to ensure they can connect to unpatched servers should always B B OpenSSL client applications that want to ensure they can B connect to unpatched servers (and thus avoid any security issues) should always B B using SSL_CTX_clear_options() or SSL_clear_options(). The difference between the B and B options is that B enables initial connections and secure renegotiation between OpenSSL clients and unpatched servers B, while B allows initial connections and renegotiation between OpenSSL and unpatched clients or servers. =head1 RETURN VALUES SSL_CTX_set_options() and SSL_set_options() return the new options bit-mask after adding B. SSL_CTX_clear_options() and SSL_clear_options() return the new options bit-mask after clearing B. SSL_CTX_get_options() and SSL_get_options() return the current bit-mask. SSL_get_secure_renegotiation_support() returns 1 is the peer supports secure renegotiation and 0 if it does not. =head1 SEE ALSO L, L, L, L L, L, L =head1 HISTORY The attempt to always try to use secure renegotiation was added in OpenSSL 0.9.8m. The B and B options were added in OpenSSL 1.1.1. The B and B options were added in OpenSSL 3.0. The B constants and the corresponding parameter and return values of the affected functions were changed to C type in OpenSSL 3.0. For that reason it is no longer possible use the B macro values in preprocessor C<#if> conditions. However it is still possible to test whether these macros are defined or not. =head1 COPYRIGHT Copyright 2001-2023 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at L. =cut