diff --git a/include/stdio.h b/include/stdio.h index fe7a6f7d6f82..30bc638082d8 100644 --- a/include/stdio.h +++ b/include/stdio.h @@ -1,533 +1,536 @@ /*- * SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause * * Copyright (c) 1990, 1993 * The Regents of the University of California. All rights reserved. * * This code is derived from software contributed to Berkeley by * Chris Torek. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * 3. Neither the name of the University nor the names of its contributors * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software * without specific prior written permission. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE REGENTS AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE REGENTS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF * SUCH DAMAGE. */ #ifndef _STDIO_H_ #define _STDIO_H_ #include #include #include __NULLABILITY_PRAGMA_PUSH typedef __off_t fpos_t; #ifndef _SIZE_T_DECLARED typedef __size_t size_t; #define _SIZE_T_DECLARED #endif #ifndef _RSIZE_T_DEFINED #define _RSIZE_T_DEFINED typedef size_t rsize_t; #endif #if __POSIX_VISIBLE >= 200809 #ifndef _OFF_T_DECLARED #define _OFF_T_DECLARED typedef __off_t off_t; #endif #ifndef _SSIZE_T_DECLARED #define _SSIZE_T_DECLARED typedef __ssize_t ssize_t; #endif #endif #ifndef _OFF64_T_DECLARED #define _OFF64_T_DECLARED typedef __off64_t off64_t; #endif #if __POSIX_VISIBLE >= 200112 || __XSI_VISIBLE #ifndef _VA_LIST_DECLARED typedef __va_list va_list; #define _VA_LIST_DECLARED #endif #endif #define _FSTDIO /* Define for new stdio with functions. */ /* * NB: to fit things in six character monocase externals, the stdio * code uses the prefix `__s' for stdio objects, typically followed * by a three-character attempt at a mnemonic. */ /* stdio buffers */ struct __sbuf { unsigned char *_base; int _size; }; /* * stdio state variables. * * The following always hold: * * if (_flags&(__SLBF|__SWR)) == (__SLBF|__SWR), * _lbfsize is -_bf._size, else _lbfsize is 0 * if _flags&__SRD, _w is 0 * if _flags&__SWR, _r is 0 * * This ensures that the getc and putc macros (or inline functions) never * try to write or read from a file that is in `read' or `write' mode. * (Moreover, they can, and do, automatically switch from read mode to * write mode, and back, on "r+" and "w+" files.) * * _lbfsize is used only to make the inline line-buffered output stream * code as compact as possible. * * _ub, _up, and _ur are used when ungetc() pushes back more characters * than fit in the current _bf, or when ungetc() pushes back a character * that does not match the previous one in _bf. When this happens, * _ub._base becomes non-nil (i.e., a stream has ungetc() data iff * _ub._base!=NULL) and _up and _ur save the current values of _p and _r. * * Certain members of __sFILE are accessed directly via macros or * inline functions. To preserve ABI compat, these members must not * be disturbed. These members are marked below with (*). */ struct __sFILE { unsigned char *_p; /* (*) current position in (some) buffer */ int _r; /* (*) read space left for getc() */ int _w; /* (*) write space left for putc() */ short _flags; /* (*) flags, below; this FILE is free if 0 */ short _file; /* (*) fileno, if Unix descriptor, else -1 */ struct __sbuf _bf; /* (*) the buffer (at least 1 byte, if !NULL) */ int _lbfsize; /* (*) 0 or -_bf._size, for inline putc */ /* operations */ void *_cookie; /* (*) cookie passed to io functions */ int (* _Nullable _close)(void *); int (* _Nullable _read)(void *, char *, int); fpos_t (* _Nullable _seek)(void *, fpos_t, int); int (* _Nullable _write)(void *, const char *, int); /* separate buffer for long sequences of ungetc() */ struct __sbuf _ub; /* ungetc buffer */ unsigned char *_up; /* saved _p when _p is doing ungetc data */ int _ur; /* saved _r when _r is counting ungetc data */ /* tricks to meet minimum requirements even when malloc() fails */ unsigned char _ubuf[3]; /* guarantee an ungetc() buffer */ unsigned char _nbuf[1]; /* guarantee a getc() buffer */ /* separate buffer for fgetln() when line crosses buffer boundary */ struct __sbuf _lb; /* buffer for fgetln() */ /* Unix stdio files get aligned to block boundaries on fseek() */ int _blksize; /* stat.st_blksize (may be != _bf._size) */ fpos_t _offset; /* current lseek offset */ struct pthread_mutex *_fl_mutex; /* used for MT-safety */ struct pthread *_fl_owner; /* current owner */ int _fl_count; /* recursive lock count */ int _orientation; /* orientation for fwide() */ __mbstate_t _mbstate; /* multibyte conversion state */ int _flags2; /* additional flags */ }; #ifndef _STDFILE_DECLARED #define _STDFILE_DECLARED typedef struct __sFILE FILE; #endif #ifndef _STDSTREAM_DECLARED __BEGIN_DECLS extern FILE *__stdinp; extern FILE *__stdoutp; extern FILE *__stderrp; __END_DECLS #define _STDSTREAM_DECLARED #endif #define __SLBF 0x0001 /* line buffered */ #define __SNBF 0x0002 /* unbuffered */ #define __SRD 0x0004 /* OK to read */ #define __SWR 0x0008 /* OK to write */ /* RD and WR are never simultaneously asserted */ #define __SRW 0x0010 /* open for reading & writing */ #define __SEOF 0x0020 /* found EOF */ #define __SERR 0x0040 /* found error */ #define __SMBF 0x0080 /* _bf._base is from malloc */ #define __SAPP 0x0100 /* fdopen()ed in append mode */ #define __SSTR 0x0200 /* this is an sprintf/snprintf string */ #define __SOPT 0x0400 /* do fseek() optimization */ #define __SNPT 0x0800 /* do not do fseek() optimization */ #define __SOFF 0x1000 /* set iff _offset is in fact correct */ #define __SMOD 0x2000 /* true => fgetln modified _p text */ #define __SALC 0x4000 /* allocate string space dynamically */ #define __SIGN 0x8000 /* ignore this file in _fwalk */ #define __S2OAP 0x0001 /* O_APPEND mode is set */ /* * The following three definitions are for ANSI C, which took them * from System V, which brilliantly took internal interface macros and * made them official arguments to setvbuf(), without renaming them. * Hence, these ugly _IOxxx names are *supposed* to appear in user code. * * Although numbered as their counterparts above, the implementation * does not rely on this. */ #define _IOFBF 0 /* setvbuf should set fully buffered */ #define _IOLBF 1 /* setvbuf should set line buffered */ #define _IONBF 2 /* setvbuf should set unbuffered */ #define BUFSIZ 1024 /* size of buffer used by setbuf */ #define EOF (-1) /* * FOPEN_MAX is a minimum maximum, and is the number of streams that * stdio can provide without attempting to allocate further resources * (which could fail). Do not use this for anything. */ /* must be == _POSIX_STREAM_MAX */ #ifndef FOPEN_MAX #define FOPEN_MAX 20 /* must be <= OPEN_MAX */ #endif #define FILENAME_MAX 1024 /* must be <= PATH_MAX */ /* System V/ANSI C; this is the wrong way to do this, do *not* use these. */ #if __XSI_VISIBLE #define P_tmpdir "/tmp/" #endif #define L_tmpnam 1024 /* XXX must be == PATH_MAX */ #define TMP_MAX 308915776 #ifndef SEEK_SET #define SEEK_SET 0 /* set file offset to offset */ #endif #ifndef SEEK_CUR #define SEEK_CUR 1 /* set file offset to current plus offset */ #endif #ifndef SEEK_END #define SEEK_END 2 /* set file offset to EOF plus offset */ #endif #define stdin __stdinp #define stdout __stdoutp #define stderr __stderrp __BEGIN_DECLS #ifdef _XLOCALE_H_ #include #endif /* * Functions defined in ANSI C standard. */ void clearerr(FILE *); int fclose(FILE *); int feof(FILE *); int ferror(FILE *); int fflush(FILE *); int fgetc(FILE *); int fgetpos(FILE * __restrict, fpos_t * __restrict); char *fgets(char * __restrict, int, FILE * __restrict); FILE *fopen(const char * __restrict, const char * __restrict); int fprintf(FILE * __restrict, const char * __restrict, ...); int fputc(int, FILE *); int fputs(const char * __restrict, FILE * __restrict); size_t fread(void * __restrict, size_t, size_t, FILE * __restrict); FILE *freopen(const char * __restrict, const char * __restrict, FILE * __restrict); int fscanf(FILE * __restrict, const char * __restrict, ...); int fseek(FILE *, long, int); int fsetpos(FILE *, const fpos_t *); long ftell(FILE *); size_t fwrite(const void * __restrict, size_t, size_t, FILE * __restrict); int getc(FILE *); int getchar(void); #if __EXT1_VISIBLE char *gets_s(char *, rsize_t); #endif void perror(const char *); int printf(const char * __restrict, ...); int putc(int, FILE *); int putchar(int); int puts(const char *); int remove(const char *); int rename(const char *, const char *); void rewind(FILE *); int scanf(const char * __restrict, ...); void setbuf(FILE * __restrict, char * __restrict); int setvbuf(FILE * __restrict, char * __restrict, int, size_t); int sprintf(char * __restrict, const char * __restrict, ...); int sscanf(const char * __restrict, const char * __restrict, ...); FILE *tmpfile(void); char *tmpnam(char *); int ungetc(int, FILE *); int vfprintf(FILE * __restrict, const char * __restrict, __va_list); int vprintf(const char * __restrict, __va_list); int vsprintf(char * __restrict, const char * __restrict, __va_list); #if __ISO_C_VISIBLE >= 1999 || __POSIX_VISIBLE >= 199506 int snprintf(char * __restrict, size_t, const char * __restrict, ...) __printflike(3, 4); int vsnprintf(char * __restrict, size_t, const char * __restrict, __va_list) __printflike(3, 0); #endif #if __ISO_C_VISIBLE >= 1999 int vfscanf(FILE * __restrict, const char * __restrict, __va_list) __scanflike(2, 0); int vscanf(const char * __restrict, __va_list) __scanflike(1, 0); int vsscanf(const char * __restrict, const char * __restrict, __va_list) __scanflike(2, 0); #endif /* * Functions defined in all versions of POSIX 1003.1. */ #if __BSD_VISIBLE || (__POSIX_VISIBLE && __POSIX_VISIBLE <= 199506) #define L_cuserid 17 /* size for cuserid(3); MAXLOGNAME, legacy */ #endif #if __POSIX_VISIBLE #define L_ctermid 1024 /* size for ctermid(3); PATH_MAX */ char *ctermid(char *); FILE *fdopen(int, const char *); int fileno(FILE *); #endif /* __POSIX_VISIBLE */ #if __POSIX_VISIBLE >= 199209 int pclose(FILE *); FILE *popen(const char *, const char *); #endif #if __POSIX_VISIBLE >= 199506 int ftrylockfile(FILE *); void flockfile(FILE *); void funlockfile(FILE *); /* * These are normally used through macros as defined below, but POSIX * requires functions as well. */ int getc_unlocked(FILE *); int getchar_unlocked(void); int putc_unlocked(int, FILE *); int putchar_unlocked(int); #endif #if __BSD_VISIBLE void clearerr_unlocked(FILE *); int feof_unlocked(FILE *); int ferror_unlocked(FILE *); int fflush_unlocked(FILE *); int fileno_unlocked(FILE *); int fputc_unlocked(int, FILE *); int fputs_unlocked(const char * __restrict, FILE * __restrict); size_t fread_unlocked(void * __restrict, size_t, size_t, FILE * __restrict); size_t fwrite_unlocked(const void * __restrict, size_t, size_t, FILE * __restrict); #endif #if __POSIX_VISIBLE >= 200112 || __XSI_VISIBLE >= 500 int fseeko(FILE *, __off_t, int); __off_t ftello(FILE *); #endif #if __BSD_VISIBLE || __XSI_VISIBLE > 0 && __XSI_VISIBLE < 600 int getw(FILE *); int putw(int, FILE *); #endif /* BSD or X/Open before issue 6 */ #if __XSI_VISIBLE char *tempnam(const char *, const char *); #endif #if __POSIX_VISIBLE >= 200809 FILE *fmemopen(void * __restrict, size_t, const char * __restrict); ssize_t getdelim(char ** __restrict, size_t * __restrict, int, FILE * __restrict); FILE *open_memstream(char **, size_t *); int renameat(int, const char *, int, const char *); int vdprintf(int, const char * __restrict, __va_list) __printflike(2, 0); /* _WITH_GETLINE to allow pre 11 sources to build on 11+ systems */ ssize_t getline(char ** __restrict, size_t * __restrict, FILE * __restrict); int dprintf(int, const char * __restrict, ...) __printflike(2, 3); #endif /* __POSIX_VISIBLE >= 200809 */ /* * Routines that are purely local. */ #if __BSD_VISIBLE int asprintf(char **, const char *, ...) __printflike(2, 3); char *ctermid_r(char *); void fcloseall(void); int fdclose(FILE *, int *); char *fgetln(FILE *, size_t *); const char *fmtcheck(const char *, const char *) __format_arg(2); int fpurge(FILE *); void setbuffer(FILE *, char *, int); int setlinebuf(FILE *); int vasprintf(char **, const char *, __va_list) __printflike(2, 0); /* * The system error table contains messages for the first sys_nerr * positive errno values. Use strerror() or strerror_r() from * instead. */ extern const int sys_nerr; extern const char * const sys_errlist[]; /* * Stdio function-access interface. */ FILE *funopen(const void *, int (* _Nullable)(void *, char *, int), int (* _Nullable)(void *, const char *, int), fpos_t (* _Nullable)(void *, fpos_t, int), int (* _Nullable)(void *)); #define fropen(cookie, fn) funopen(cookie, fn, 0, 0, 0) #define fwopen(cookie, fn) funopen(cookie, 0, fn, 0, 0) #if __BSD_VISIBLE typedef __ssize_t cookie_read_function_t(void *, char *, size_t); typedef __ssize_t cookie_write_function_t(void *, const char *, size_t); typedef int cookie_seek_function_t(void *, off64_t *, int); typedef int cookie_close_function_t(void *); typedef struct { cookie_read_function_t *read; cookie_write_function_t *write; cookie_seek_function_t *seek; cookie_close_function_t *close; } cookie_io_functions_t; FILE *fopencookie(void *, const char *, cookie_io_functions_t); #endif /* * Portability hacks. See . */ #ifndef _FTRUNCATE_DECLARED #define _FTRUNCATE_DECLARED int ftruncate(int, __off_t); #endif #ifndef _LSEEK_DECLARED #define _LSEEK_DECLARED __off_t lseek(int, __off_t, int); #endif #ifndef _MMAP_DECLARED #define _MMAP_DECLARED void *mmap(void *, size_t, int, int, int, __off_t); #endif #ifndef _TRUNCATE_DECLARED #define _TRUNCATE_DECLARED int truncate(const char *, __off_t); #endif #endif /* __BSD_VISIBLE */ /* * Functions internal to the implementation. */ int __srget(FILE *); int __swbuf(int, FILE *); /* * The __sfoo macros are here so that we can * define function versions in the C library. */ #define __sgetc(p) (--(p)->_r < 0 ? __srget(p) : (int)(*(p)->_p++)) #if defined(__GNUC__) && defined(__STDC__) static __inline int __sputc(int _c, FILE *_p) { if (--_p->_w >= 0 || (_p->_w >= _p->_lbfsize && (char)_c != '\n')) return (*_p->_p++ = _c); else return (__swbuf(_c, _p)); } #else /* * This has been tuned to generate reasonable code on the vax using pcc. */ #define __sputc(c, p) \ (--(p)->_w < 0 ? \ (p)->_w >= (p)->_lbfsize ? \ (*(p)->_p = (c)), *(p)->_p != '\n' ? \ (int)*(p)->_p++ : \ __swbuf('\n', p) : \ __swbuf((int)(c), p) : \ (*(p)->_p = (c), (int)*(p)->_p++)) #endif #ifndef __LIBC_ISTHREADED_DECLARED #define __LIBC_ISTHREADED_DECLARED extern int __isthreaded; #endif #ifndef __cplusplus #define __sfeof(p) (((p)->_flags & __SEOF) != 0) #define __sferror(p) (((p)->_flags & __SERR) != 0) #define __sclearerr(p) ((void)((p)->_flags &= ~(__SERR|__SEOF))) #define __sfileno(p) ((p)->_file) #define feof(p) (!__isthreaded ? __sfeof(p) : (feof)(p)) #define ferror(p) (!__isthreaded ? __sferror(p) : (ferror)(p)) #define clearerr(p) (!__isthreaded ? __sclearerr(p) : (clearerr)(p)) #if __POSIX_VISIBLE #define fileno(p) (!__isthreaded ? __sfileno(p) : (fileno)(p)) #endif #define getc(fp) (!__isthreaded ? __sgetc(fp) : (getc)(fp)) #define putc(x, fp) (!__isthreaded ? __sputc(x, fp) : (putc)(x, fp)) #define getchar() getc(stdin) #define putchar(x) putc(x, stdout) #if __BSD_VISIBLE /* * See ISO/IEC 9945-1 ANSI/IEEE Std 1003.1 Second Edition 1996-07-12 * B.8.2.7 for the rationale behind the *_unlocked() macros. */ #define clearerr_unlocked(p) __sclearerr(p) #define feof_unlocked(p) __sfeof(p) #define ferror_unlocked(p) __sferror(p) #define fileno_unlocked(p) __sfileno(p) #define fputc_unlocked(s, p) __sputc(s, p) #endif #if __POSIX_VISIBLE >= 199506 #define getc_unlocked(fp) __sgetc(fp) #define putc_unlocked(x, fp) __sputc(x, fp) #define getchar_unlocked() getc_unlocked(stdin) #define putchar_unlocked(x) putc_unlocked(x, stdout) #endif #endif /* __cplusplus */ __END_DECLS __NULLABILITY_PRAGMA_POP +#if defined(_FORTIFY_SOURCE) && _FORTIFY_SOURCE > 0 +#include +#endif #endif /* !_STDIO_H_ */ diff --git a/include/string.h b/include/string.h index 597308020cdb..a595f6e3e260 100644 --- a/include/string.h +++ b/include/string.h @@ -1,171 +1,174 @@ /*- * SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause * * Copyright (c) 1990, 1993 * The Regents of the University of California. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * 3. Neither the name of the University nor the names of its contributors * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software * without specific prior written permission. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE REGENTS AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE REGENTS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF * SUCH DAMAGE. */ #ifndef _STRING_H_ #define _STRING_H_ #include #include #include /* * Prototype functions which were historically defined in , but * are required by POSIX to be prototyped in . */ #if __BSD_VISIBLE #include #endif #ifndef _SIZE_T_DECLARED typedef __size_t size_t; #define _SIZE_T_DECLARED #endif __BEGIN_DECLS #if __XSI_VISIBLE >= 600 void *memccpy(void * __restrict, const void * __restrict, int, size_t); #endif void *memchr(const void *, int, size_t) __pure; #if __BSD_VISIBLE void *memrchr(const void *, int, size_t) __pure; #endif int memcmp(const void *, const void *, size_t) __pure; void *memcpy(void * __restrict, const void * __restrict, size_t); #if __BSD_VISIBLE void *memmem(const void *, size_t, const void *, size_t) __pure; #endif void *memmove(void *, const void *, size_t); #if __BSD_VISIBLE void *mempcpy(void * __restrict, const void * __restrict, size_t); #endif void *memset(void *, int, size_t); #if __POSIX_VISIBLE >= 200809 char *stpcpy(char * __restrict, const char * __restrict); char *stpncpy(char * __restrict, const char * __restrict, size_t); #endif #if __BSD_VISIBLE char *strcasestr(const char *, const char *) __pure; #endif char *strcat(char * __restrict, const char * __restrict); char *strchr(const char *, int) __pure; #if __BSD_VISIBLE char *strchrnul(const char*, int) __pure; int strverscmp(const char *, const char *) __pure; #endif int strcmp(const char *, const char *) __pure; int strcoll(const char *, const char *); char *strcpy(char * __restrict, const char * __restrict); size_t strcspn(const char *, const char *) __pure; #if __POSIX_VISIBLE >= 200112 || __XSI_VISIBLE char *strdup(const char *) __malloc_like; #endif char *strerror(int); #if __POSIX_VISIBLE >= 200112 int strerror_r(int, char *, size_t); #endif #if __BSD_VISIBLE size_t strlcat(char * __restrict, const char * __restrict, size_t); size_t strlcpy(char * __restrict, const char * __restrict, size_t); #endif size_t strlen(const char *) __pure; #if __BSD_VISIBLE #ifndef _MODE_T_DECLARED typedef __mode_t mode_t; #define _MODE_T_DECLARED #endif void strmode(mode_t, char *); #endif char *strncat(char * __restrict, const char * __restrict, size_t); int strncmp(const char *, const char *, size_t) __pure; char *strncpy(char * __restrict, const char * __restrict, size_t); #if __POSIX_VISIBLE >= 200809 char *strndup(const char *, size_t) __malloc_like; size_t strnlen(const char *, size_t) __pure; #endif #if __BSD_VISIBLE char *strnstr(const char *, const char *, size_t) __pure; #endif char *strpbrk(const char *, const char *) __pure; char *strrchr(const char *, int) __pure; #if __BSD_VISIBLE char *strsep(char **, const char *); #endif #if __POSIX_VISIBLE >= 200809 char *strsignal(int); #endif size_t strspn(const char *, const char *) __pure; char *strstr(const char *, const char *) __pure; char *strtok(char * __restrict, const char * __restrict); #if __POSIX_VISIBLE >= 199506 || __XSI_VISIBLE >= 500 char *strtok_r(char *, const char *, char **); #endif size_t strxfrm(char * __restrict, const char * __restrict, size_t); #if __BSD_VISIBLE #ifndef _SWAB_DECLARED #define _SWAB_DECLARED #ifndef _SSIZE_T_DECLARED typedef __ssize_t ssize_t; #define _SSIZE_T_DECLARED #endif /* _SIZE_T_DECLARED */ void swab(const void * __restrict, void * __restrict, ssize_t); #endif /* _SWAB_DECLARED */ int timingsafe_bcmp(const void *, const void *, size_t); int timingsafe_memcmp(const void *, const void *, size_t); #endif /* __BSD_VISIBLE */ #if __POSIX_VISIBLE >= 200112 || defined(_XLOCALE_H_) #include #endif #if __EXT1_VISIBLE #ifndef _RSIZE_T_DEFINED #define _RSIZE_T_DEFINED typedef size_t rsize_t; #endif #ifndef _ERRNO_T_DEFINED #define _ERRNO_T_DEFINED typedef int errno_t; #endif /* ISO/IEC 9899:2011 K.3.7.4.1.1 */ errno_t memset_s(void *, rsize_t, int, rsize_t); #endif /* __EXT1_VISIBLE */ __END_DECLS +#if defined(_FORTIFY_SOURCE) && _FORTIFY_SOURCE > 0 +#include +#endif #endif /* _STRING_H_ */ diff --git a/include/strings.h b/include/strings.h index fde007186e04..6fe6a09e7dd3 100644 --- a/include/strings.h +++ b/include/strings.h @@ -1,71 +1,74 @@ /*- * SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-2-Clause * * Copyright (c) 2002 Mike Barcroft * All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF * SUCH DAMAGE. */ #ifndef _STRINGS_H_ #define _STRINGS_H_ #include #include #ifndef _SIZE_T_DECLARED typedef __size_t size_t; #define _SIZE_T_DECLARED #endif __BEGIN_DECLS #if __BSD_VISIBLE || __POSIX_VISIBLE <= 200112 int bcmp(const void *, const void *, size_t) __pure; /* LEGACY */ void bcopy(const void *, void *, size_t); /* LEGACY */ void bzero(void *, size_t); /* LEGACY */ #endif #if __BSD_VISIBLE void explicit_bzero(void *, size_t); #endif #if __XSI_VISIBLE int ffs(int) __pure2; #endif #if __BSD_VISIBLE int ffsl(long) __pure2; int ffsll(long long) __pure2; int fls(int) __pure2; int flsl(long) __pure2; int flsll(long long) __pure2; #endif #if __BSD_VISIBLE || __POSIX_VISIBLE <= 200112 char *index(const char *, int) __pure; /* LEGACY */ char *rindex(const char *, int) __pure; /* LEGACY */ #endif int strcasecmp(const char *, const char *) __pure; int strncasecmp(const char *, const char *, size_t) __pure; #if __POSIX_VISIBLE >= 200809 || defined(_XLOCALE_H_) #include #endif __END_DECLS +#if defined(_FORTIFY_SOURCE) && _FORTIFY_SOURCE > 0 +#include +#endif #endif /* _STRINGS_H_ */ diff --git a/include/unistd.h b/include/unistd.h index e4e5c62fbb67..59738cbf6e68 100644 --- a/include/unistd.h +++ b/include/unistd.h @@ -1,596 +1,600 @@ /*- * SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause * * Copyright (c) 1991, 1993, 1994 * The Regents of the University of California. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * 3. Neither the name of the University nor the names of its contributors * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software * without specific prior written permission. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE REGENTS AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE REGENTS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF * SUCH DAMAGE. */ #ifndef _UNISTD_H_ #define _UNISTD_H_ #include /* XXX adds too much pollution. */ #include #include #include +#if defined(_FORTIFY_SOURCE) && _FORTIFY_SOURCE > 0 +#include +#endif + #ifndef _GID_T_DECLARED typedef __gid_t gid_t; #define _GID_T_DECLARED #endif #ifndef _OFF_T_DECLARED typedef __off_t off_t; #define _OFF_T_DECLARED #endif #ifndef _PID_T_DECLARED typedef __pid_t pid_t; #define _PID_T_DECLARED #endif #ifndef _SIZE_T_DECLARED typedef __size_t size_t; #define _SIZE_T_DECLARED #endif #ifndef _SSIZE_T_DECLARED typedef __ssize_t ssize_t; #define _SSIZE_T_DECLARED #endif #ifndef _UID_T_DECLARED typedef __uid_t uid_t; #define _UID_T_DECLARED #endif #ifndef _USECONDS_T_DECLARED typedef __useconds_t useconds_t; #define _USECONDS_T_DECLARED #endif #define STDIN_FILENO 0 /* standard input file descriptor */ #define STDOUT_FILENO 1 /* standard output file descriptor */ #define STDERR_FILENO 2 /* standard error file descriptor */ #if __XSI_VISIBLE || __POSIX_VISIBLE >= 200112 #define F_ULOCK 0 /* unlock locked section */ #define F_LOCK 1 /* lock a section for exclusive use */ #define F_TLOCK 2 /* test and lock a section for exclusive use */ #define F_TEST 3 /* test a section for locks by other procs */ #endif /* * POSIX options and option groups we unconditionally do or don't * implement. This list includes those options which are exclusively * implemented (or not) in user mode. Please keep this list in * alphabetical order. * * Anything which is defined as zero below **must** have an * implementation for the corresponding sysconf() which is able to * determine conclusively whether or not the feature is supported. * Anything which is defined as other than -1 below **must** have * complete headers, types, and function declarations as specified by * the POSIX standard; however, if the relevant sysconf() function * returns -1, the functions may be stubbed out. */ #define _POSIX_BARRIERS 200112L #define _POSIX_CPUTIME 200112L #define _POSIX_READER_WRITER_LOCKS 200112L #define _POSIX_REGEXP 1 #define _POSIX_SHELL 1 #define _POSIX_SPAWN 200112L #define _POSIX_SPIN_LOCKS 200112L #define _POSIX_THREAD_ATTR_STACKADDR 200112L #define _POSIX_THREAD_ATTR_STACKSIZE 200112L #define _POSIX_THREAD_CPUTIME 200112L #define _POSIX_THREAD_PRIO_INHERIT 200112L #define _POSIX_THREAD_PRIO_PROTECT 200112L #define _POSIX_THREAD_PRIORITY_SCHEDULING 200112L #define _POSIX_THREAD_PROCESS_SHARED 200112L #define _POSIX_THREAD_SAFE_FUNCTIONS -1 #define _POSIX_THREAD_SPORADIC_SERVER -1 #define _POSIX_THREADS 200112L #define _POSIX_TRACE -1 #define _POSIX_TRACE_EVENT_FILTER -1 #define _POSIX_TRACE_INHERIT -1 #define _POSIX_TRACE_LOG -1 #define _POSIX2_C_BIND 200112L /* mandatory */ #define _POSIX2_C_DEV -1 /* need c99 utility */ #define _POSIX2_CHAR_TERM 1 #define _POSIX2_FORT_DEV -1 /* need fort77 utility */ #define _POSIX2_FORT_RUN 200112L #define _POSIX2_LOCALEDEF -1 #define _POSIX2_PBS -1 #define _POSIX2_PBS_ACCOUNTING -1 #define _POSIX2_PBS_CHECKPOINT -1 #define _POSIX2_PBS_LOCATE -1 #define _POSIX2_PBS_MESSAGE -1 #define _POSIX2_PBS_TRACK -1 #define _POSIX2_SW_DEV -1 /* XXX ??? */ #define _POSIX2_UPE 200112L #define _V6_ILP32_OFF32 -1 #define _V6_ILP32_OFFBIG 0 #define _V6_LP64_OFF64 0 #define _V6_LPBIG_OFFBIG -1 #if __XSI_VISIBLE #define _XOPEN_CRYPT -1 /* XXX ??? */ #define _XOPEN_ENH_I18N -1 /* mandatory in XSI */ #define _XOPEN_LEGACY -1 #define _XOPEN_REALTIME -1 #define _XOPEN_REALTIME_THREADS -1 #define _XOPEN_UNIX -1 #endif /* Define the POSIX.2 version we target for compliance. */ #define _POSIX2_VERSION 199212L /* * POSIX-style system configuration variable accessors (for the * sysconf function). The kernel does not directly implement the * sysconf() interface; rather, a C library stub translates references * to sysconf() into calls to sysctl() using a giant switch statement. * Those that are marked `user' are implemented entirely in the C * library and never query the kernel. pathconf() is implemented * directly by the kernel so those are not defined here. */ #define _SC_ARG_MAX 1 #define _SC_CHILD_MAX 2 #define _SC_CLK_TCK 3 #define _SC_NGROUPS_MAX 4 #define _SC_OPEN_MAX 5 #define _SC_JOB_CONTROL 6 #define _SC_SAVED_IDS 7 #define _SC_VERSION 8 #define _SC_BC_BASE_MAX 9 /* user */ #define _SC_BC_DIM_MAX 10 /* user */ #define _SC_BC_SCALE_MAX 11 /* user */ #define _SC_BC_STRING_MAX 12 /* user */ #define _SC_COLL_WEIGHTS_MAX 13 /* user */ #define _SC_EXPR_NEST_MAX 14 /* user */ #define _SC_LINE_MAX 15 /* user */ #define _SC_RE_DUP_MAX 16 /* user */ #define _SC_2_VERSION 17 /* user */ #define _SC_2_C_BIND 18 /* user */ #define _SC_2_C_DEV 19 /* user */ #define _SC_2_CHAR_TERM 20 /* user */ #define _SC_2_FORT_DEV 21 /* user */ #define _SC_2_FORT_RUN 22 /* user */ #define _SC_2_LOCALEDEF 23 /* user */ #define _SC_2_SW_DEV 24 /* user */ #define _SC_2_UPE 25 /* user */ #define _SC_STREAM_MAX 26 /* user */ #define _SC_TZNAME_MAX 27 /* user */ #if __POSIX_VISIBLE >= 199309 #define _SC_ASYNCHRONOUS_IO 28 #define _SC_MAPPED_FILES 29 #define _SC_MEMLOCK 30 #define _SC_MEMLOCK_RANGE 31 #define _SC_MEMORY_PROTECTION 32 #define _SC_MESSAGE_PASSING 33 #define _SC_PRIORITIZED_IO 34 #define _SC_PRIORITY_SCHEDULING 35 #define _SC_REALTIME_SIGNALS 36 #define _SC_SEMAPHORES 37 #define _SC_FSYNC 38 #define _SC_SHARED_MEMORY_OBJECTS 39 #define _SC_SYNCHRONIZED_IO 40 #define _SC_TIMERS 41 #define _SC_AIO_LISTIO_MAX 42 #define _SC_AIO_MAX 43 #define _SC_AIO_PRIO_DELTA_MAX 44 #define _SC_DELAYTIMER_MAX 45 #define _SC_MQ_OPEN_MAX 46 #define _SC_PAGESIZE 47 #define _SC_RTSIG_MAX 48 #define _SC_SEM_NSEMS_MAX 49 #define _SC_SEM_VALUE_MAX 50 #define _SC_SIGQUEUE_MAX 51 #define _SC_TIMER_MAX 52 #endif #if __POSIX_VISIBLE >= 200112 #define _SC_2_PBS 59 /* user */ #define _SC_2_PBS_ACCOUNTING 60 /* user */ #define _SC_2_PBS_CHECKPOINT 61 /* user */ #define _SC_2_PBS_LOCATE 62 /* user */ #define _SC_2_PBS_MESSAGE 63 /* user */ #define _SC_2_PBS_TRACK 64 /* user */ #define _SC_ADVISORY_INFO 65 #define _SC_BARRIERS 66 /* user */ #define _SC_CLOCK_SELECTION 67 #define _SC_CPUTIME 68 #define _SC_FILE_LOCKING 69 #define _SC_GETGR_R_SIZE_MAX 70 /* user */ #define _SC_GETPW_R_SIZE_MAX 71 /* user */ #define _SC_HOST_NAME_MAX 72 #define _SC_LOGIN_NAME_MAX 73 #define _SC_MONOTONIC_CLOCK 74 #define _SC_MQ_PRIO_MAX 75 #define _SC_READER_WRITER_LOCKS 76 /* user */ #define _SC_REGEXP 77 /* user */ #define _SC_SHELL 78 /* user */ #define _SC_SPAWN 79 /* user */ #define _SC_SPIN_LOCKS 80 /* user */ #define _SC_SPORADIC_SERVER 81 #define _SC_THREAD_ATTR_STACKADDR 82 /* user */ #define _SC_THREAD_ATTR_STACKSIZE 83 /* user */ #define _SC_THREAD_CPUTIME 84 /* user */ #define _SC_THREAD_DESTRUCTOR_ITERATIONS 85 /* user */ #define _SC_THREAD_KEYS_MAX 86 /* user */ #define _SC_THREAD_PRIO_INHERIT 87 /* user */ #define _SC_THREAD_PRIO_PROTECT 88 /* user */ #define _SC_THREAD_PRIORITY_SCHEDULING 89 /* user */ #define _SC_THREAD_PROCESS_SHARED 90 /* user */ #define _SC_THREAD_SAFE_FUNCTIONS 91 /* user */ #define _SC_THREAD_SPORADIC_SERVER 92 /* user */ #define _SC_THREAD_STACK_MIN 93 /* user */ #define _SC_THREAD_THREADS_MAX 94 /* user */ #define _SC_TIMEOUTS 95 /* user */ #define _SC_THREADS 96 /* user */ #define _SC_TRACE 97 /* user */ #define _SC_TRACE_EVENT_FILTER 98 /* user */ #define _SC_TRACE_INHERIT 99 /* user */ #define _SC_TRACE_LOG 100 /* user */ #define _SC_TTY_NAME_MAX 101 /* user */ #define _SC_TYPED_MEMORY_OBJECTS 102 #define _SC_V6_ILP32_OFF32 103 /* user */ #define _SC_V6_ILP32_OFFBIG 104 /* user */ #define _SC_V6_LP64_OFF64 105 /* user */ #define _SC_V6_LPBIG_OFFBIG 106 /* user */ #define _SC_IPV6 118 #define _SC_RAW_SOCKETS 119 #define _SC_SYMLOOP_MAX 120 #endif #if __XSI_VISIBLE #define _SC_ATEXIT_MAX 107 /* user */ #define _SC_IOV_MAX 56 #define _SC_PAGE_SIZE _SC_PAGESIZE #define _SC_XOPEN_CRYPT 108 /* user */ #define _SC_XOPEN_ENH_I18N 109 /* user */ #define _SC_XOPEN_LEGACY 110 /* user */ #define _SC_XOPEN_REALTIME 111 #define _SC_XOPEN_REALTIME_THREADS 112 #define _SC_XOPEN_SHM 113 #define _SC_XOPEN_STREAMS 114 #define _SC_XOPEN_UNIX 115 #define _SC_XOPEN_VERSION 116 #define _SC_XOPEN_XCU_VERSION 117 /* user */ #endif #if __BSD_VISIBLE #define _SC_NPROCESSORS_CONF 57 #define _SC_NPROCESSORS_ONLN 58 #define _SC_CPUSET_SIZE 122 #endif /* Extensions found in Solaris and Linux. */ #define _SC_PHYS_PAGES 121 /* Keys for the confstr(3) function. */ #if __POSIX_VISIBLE >= 199209 #define _CS_PATH 1 /* default value of PATH */ #endif #if __POSIX_VISIBLE >= 200112 #define _CS_POSIX_V6_ILP32_OFF32_CFLAGS 2 #define _CS_POSIX_V6_ILP32_OFF32_LDFLAGS 3 #define _CS_POSIX_V6_ILP32_OFF32_LIBS 4 #define _CS_POSIX_V6_ILP32_OFFBIG_CFLAGS 5 #define _CS_POSIX_V6_ILP32_OFFBIG_LDFLAGS 6 #define _CS_POSIX_V6_ILP32_OFFBIG_LIBS 7 #define _CS_POSIX_V6_LP64_OFF64_CFLAGS 8 #define _CS_POSIX_V6_LP64_OFF64_LDFLAGS 9 #define _CS_POSIX_V6_LP64_OFF64_LIBS 10 #define _CS_POSIX_V6_LPBIG_OFFBIG_CFLAGS 11 #define _CS_POSIX_V6_LPBIG_OFFBIG_LDFLAGS 12 #define _CS_POSIX_V6_LPBIG_OFFBIG_LIBS 13 #define _CS_POSIX_V6_WIDTH_RESTRICTED_ENVS 14 #endif __BEGIN_DECLS /* 1003.1-1990 */ void _exit(int) __dead2; int access(const char *, int); unsigned int alarm(unsigned int); int chdir(const char *); int chown(const char *, uid_t, gid_t); int close(int); void closefrom(int); int dup(int); int dup2(int, int); int execl(const char *, const char *, ...) __null_sentinel; int execle(const char *, const char *, ...); int execlp(const char *, const char *, ...) __null_sentinel; int execv(const char *, char * const *); int execve(const char *, char * const *, char * const *); int execvp(const char *, char * const *); pid_t fork(void); long fpathconf(int, int); char *getcwd(char *, size_t); gid_t getegid(void); uid_t geteuid(void); gid_t getgid(void); int getgroups(int, gid_t []); char *getlogin(void); pid_t getpgrp(void); pid_t getpid(void); pid_t getppid(void); uid_t getuid(void); int isatty(int); int link(const char *, const char *); #ifndef _LSEEK_DECLARED #define _LSEEK_DECLARED off_t lseek(int, off_t, int); #endif long pathconf(const char *, int); int pause(void); int pipe(int *); ssize_t read(int, void *, size_t); int rmdir(const char *); int setgid(gid_t); int setpgid(pid_t, pid_t); pid_t setsid(void); int setuid(uid_t); unsigned int sleep(unsigned int); long sysconf(int); pid_t tcgetpgrp(int); int tcsetpgrp(int, pid_t); char *ttyname(int); int ttyname_r(int, char *, size_t); int unlink(const char *); ssize_t write(int, const void *, size_t); /* 1003.2-1992 */ #if __POSIX_VISIBLE >= 199209 || __XSI_VISIBLE size_t confstr(int, char *, size_t); #ifndef _GETOPT_DECLARED #define _GETOPT_DECLARED int getopt(int, char * const [], const char *); extern char *optarg; /* getopt(3) external variables */ extern int optind, opterr, optopt; #endif /* _GETOPT_DECLARED */ #endif /* ISO/IEC 9945-1: 1996 */ #if __POSIX_VISIBLE >= 199506 || __XSI_VISIBLE int fsync(int); int fdatasync(int); /* * ftruncate() was in the POSIX Realtime Extension (it's used for shared * memory), but truncate() was not. */ #ifndef _FTRUNCATE_DECLARED #define _FTRUNCATE_DECLARED int ftruncate(int, off_t); #endif #endif #if __POSIX_VISIBLE >= 199506 int getlogin_r(char *, size_t); #endif /* 1003.1-2001 */ #if __POSIX_VISIBLE >= 200112 || __XSI_VISIBLE int fchown(int, uid_t, gid_t); ssize_t readlink(const char * __restrict, char * __restrict, size_t); #endif #if __POSIX_VISIBLE >= 200112 int gethostname(char *, size_t); int setegid(gid_t); int seteuid(uid_t); #endif /* 1003.1-2008 */ #if __POSIX_VISIBLE >= 200809 || __XSI_VISIBLE int getsid(pid_t _pid); int fchdir(int); int getpgid(pid_t _pid); int lchown(const char *, uid_t, gid_t); ssize_t pread(int, void *, size_t, off_t); ssize_t pwrite(int, const void *, size_t, off_t); /* See comment at ftruncate() above. */ #ifndef _TRUNCATE_DECLARED #define _TRUNCATE_DECLARED int truncate(const char *, off_t); #endif #endif /* __POSIX_VISIBLE >= 200809 || __XSI_VISIBLE */ #if __POSIX_VISIBLE >= 200809 int faccessat(int, const char *, int, int); int fchownat(int, const char *, uid_t, gid_t, int); int fexecve(int, char *const [], char *const []); int linkat(int, const char *, int, const char *, int); ssize_t readlinkat(int, const char * __restrict, char * __restrict, size_t); int symlinkat(const char *, int, const char *); int unlinkat(int, const char *, int); #endif /* __POSIX_VISIBLE >= 200809 */ /* * symlink() was originally in POSIX.1a, which was withdrawn after * being overtaken by events (1003.1-2001). It was in XPG4.2, and of * course has been in BSD since 4.2. */ #if __POSIX_VISIBLE >= 200112 || __XSI_VISIBLE >= 402 int symlink(const char * __restrict, const char * __restrict); #endif /* X/Open System Interfaces */ #if __XSI_VISIBLE char *crypt(const char *, const char *); long gethostid(void); int lockf(int, int, off_t); int nice(int); int setregid(gid_t, gid_t); int setreuid(uid_t, uid_t); #ifndef _SWAB_DECLARED #define _SWAB_DECLARED void swab(const void * __restrict, void * __restrict, ssize_t); #endif /* _SWAB_DECLARED */ void sync(void); #endif /* __XSI_VISIBLE */ #if (__XSI_VISIBLE && __XSI_VISIBLE <= 500) || __BSD_VISIBLE int brk(const void *); int chroot(const char *); int getdtablesize(void); int getpagesize(void) __pure2; char *getpass(const char *); void *sbrk(intptr_t); #endif #if (__XSI_VISIBLE && __XSI_VISIBLE <= 600) || __BSD_VISIBLE char *getwd(char *); /* obsoleted by getcwd() */ useconds_t ualarm(useconds_t, useconds_t); int usleep(useconds_t); pid_t vfork(void) __returns_twice; #endif #if __BSD_VISIBLE struct timeval; /* select(2) */ struct crypt_data { int initialized; /* For compatibility with glibc. */ char __buf[256]; /* Buffer returned by crypt_r(). */ }; int acct(const char *); int async_daemon(void); int check_utility_compat(const char *); int close_range(unsigned int, unsigned int, int); ssize_t copy_file_range(int, off_t *, int, off_t *, size_t, unsigned int); const char * crypt_get_format(void); char *crypt_r(const char *, const char *, struct crypt_data *); int crypt_set_format(const char *); int dup3(int, int, int); int eaccess(const char *, int); void endusershell(void); int exect(const char *, char * const *, char * const *); int execvP(const char *, const char *, char * const *); int execvpe(const char *, char * const *, char * const *); int feature_present(const char *); char *fflagstostr(u_long); int getdomainname(char *, int); int getentropy(void *, size_t); int getgrouplist(const char *, gid_t, gid_t *, int *); int getloginclass(char *, size_t); mode_t getmode(const void *, mode_t); int getosreldate(void); int getpeereid(int, uid_t *, gid_t *); int getresgid(gid_t *, gid_t *, gid_t *); int getresuid(uid_t *, uid_t *, uid_t *); char *getusershell(void); int initgroups(const char *, gid_t); int iruserok(unsigned long, int, const char *, const char *); int iruserok_sa(const void *, int, int, const char *, const char *); int issetugid(void); void __FreeBSD_libc_enter_restricted_mode(void); int kcmp(pid_t pid1, pid_t pid2, int type, uintptr_t idx1, uintptr_t idx2); long lpathconf(const char *, int); #ifndef _MKDTEMP_DECLARED char *mkdtemp(char *); #define _MKDTEMP_DECLARED #endif #ifndef _MKNOD_DECLARED int mknod(const char *, mode_t, dev_t); #define _MKNOD_DECLARED #endif #ifndef _MKSTEMP_DECLARED int mkstemp(char *); #define _MKSTEMP_DECLARED #endif int mkstemps(char *, int); #ifndef _MKTEMP_DECLARED char *mktemp(char *); #define _MKTEMP_DECLARED #endif int nfssvc(int, void *); int nlm_syscall(int, int, int, char **); int pipe2(int *, int); int profil(char *, size_t, vm_offset_t, int); int rcmd(char **, int, const char *, const char *, const char *, int *); int rcmd_af(char **, int, const char *, const char *, const char *, int *, int); int rcmdsh(char **, int, const char *, const char *, const char *, const char *); char *re_comp(const char *); int re_exec(const char *); int reboot(int); int revoke(const char *); pid_t rfork(int) __returns_twice; pid_t rfork_thread(int, void *, int (*)(void *), void *); int rresvport(int *); int rresvport_af(int *, int); int ruserok(const char *, int, const char *, const char *); #ifndef _SELECT_DECLARED #define _SELECT_DECLARED int select(int, fd_set *, fd_set *, fd_set *, struct timeval *); #endif int setdomainname(const char *, int); int setgroups(int, const gid_t *); void sethostid(long); int sethostname(const char *, int); int setlogin(const char *); int setloginclass(const char *); void *setmode(const char *); int setpgrp(pid_t, pid_t); /* obsoleted by setpgid() */ void setproctitle(const char *_fmt, ...) __printf0like(1, 2); void setproctitle_fast(const char *_fmt, ...) __printf0like(1, 2); int setresgid(gid_t, gid_t, gid_t); int setresuid(uid_t, uid_t, uid_t); int setrgid(gid_t); int setruid(uid_t); void setusershell(void); int strtofflags(char **, u_long *, u_long *); int swapon(const char *); int swapoff(const char *, u_int); int syscall(int, ...); off_t __syscall(quad_t, ...); int undelete(const char *); int unwhiteout(const char *); void *valloc(size_t); /* obsoleted by malloc() */ int funlinkat(int, const char *, int, int); pid_t _Fork(void); #ifndef _OPTRESET_DECLARED #define _OPTRESET_DECLARED extern int optreset; /* getopt(3) external variable */ #endif #endif /* __BSD_VISIBLE */ __END_DECLS #endif /* !_UNISTD_H_ */ diff --git a/lib/libthr/Makefile b/lib/libthr/Makefile index a5bf5da44170..85c028f521a1 100644 --- a/lib/libthr/Makefile +++ b/lib/libthr/Makefile @@ -1,95 +1,98 @@ PACKAGE= clibs SHLIBDIR?= /lib LIBADD= c sys .if defined(COMPAT_libcompat) # XXX: work around gcc -m32 + bfd ld path issue for DT_NEEDED symbols. # https://sourceware.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=31395 LDFLAGS+= -Wl,--rpath=/usr/lib${COMPAT_libcompat} .endif .include MK_SSP= no +# SSP forced off already implies FORTIFY_SOURCE=0, but we must make sure that +# one cannot turn it back on. +FORTIFY_SOURCE= 0 LIB=thr SHLIB_MAJOR= 3 NO_WTHREAD_SAFETY=1 NO_WCAST_ALIGN.gcc=1 # for gcc 4.2 CFLAGS+=-DPTHREAD_KERNEL CFLAGS+=-I${SRCTOP}/lib/libc/include CFLAGS+=-I${SRCTOP}/lib/libc/${MACHINE_CPUARCH} CFLAGS+=-I${.CURDIR}/thread CFLAGS+=-I${.CURDIR}/arch/${MACHINE_CPUARCH}/include CFLAGS+=-I${.CURDIR}/sys CFLAGS+=-I${SRCTOP}/libexec/rtld-elf CFLAGS+=-I${SRCTOP}/libexec/rtld-elf/${MACHINE_CPUARCH} CFLAGS+=-I${SRCTOP}/lib/libthread_db CFLAGS.thr_stack.c+= -Wno-cast-align CFLAGS.rtld_malloc.c+= -Wno-cast-align CFLAGS.thr_symbols.c+= -Wno-missing-variable-declarations .if ${MK_ASAN} != "no" # False-positive ASAN error claiming the local "struct sigaction act;" is # overflowed by handle_signal() reading from the ucontext_t argument. This # could be caused by ASAN not treating this function as a signal handler. CFLAGS.thr_sig.c+= -fno-sanitize=address .endif .if ${MACHINE_CPUARCH} == "arm" NO_THREAD_UNWIND_STACK= yes .endif .ifndef NO_THREAD_UNWIND_STACK CFLAGS+=-fexceptions CFLAGS+=-D_PTHREAD_FORCED_UNWIND .endif LDFLAGS+=-Wl,-znodelete LDFLAGS+=-Wl,--auxiliary,libsys.so.7 VERSION_DEF=${SRCTOP}/lib/libc/Versions.def SYMBOL_MAPS=${.CURDIR}/pthread.map MAN= libthr.3 .if ${MK_PTHREADS_ASSERTIONS} != "no" # enable extra internal consistency checks CFLAGS+=-D_PTHREADS_INVARIANTS .endif PRECIOUSLIB= .PATH: ${.CURDIR}/arch/${MACHINE_CPUARCH}/${MACHINE_CPUARCH} .PATH: ${SRCTOP}/libexec/rtld-elf .if exists(${.CURDIR}/arch/${MACHINE_CPUARCH}/Makefile.inc) .include "${.CURDIR}/arch/${MACHINE_CPUARCH}/Makefile.inc" .endif .include "${.CURDIR}/sys/Makefile.inc" .include "${.CURDIR}/thread/Makefile.inc" SRCS+= rtld_malloc.c LIBSYS_SRCTOP= ${.CURDIR:H}/libsys .if exists(${LIBSYS_SRCTOP}/${MACHINE_CPUARCH}/_umtx_op_err.S) .PATH: ${LIBSYS_SRCTOP}/${MACHINE_CPUARCH} .else .PATH: ${LIBSYS_SRCTOP} .endif OBJS+= _umtx_op_err.o .if ${MK_INSTALLLIB} != "no" SYMLINKS+=lib${LIB}.a ${LIBDIR}/libpthread.a .endif .if !defined(NO_PIC) SYMLINKS+=lib${LIB}.so ${LIBDIR}/libpthread.so .endif .if ${MK_PROFILE} != "no" SYMLINKS+=lib${LIB}_p.a ${LIBDIR}/libpthread_p.a .endif HAS_TESTS= SUBDIR.${MK_TESTS}+= tests .include diff --git a/libexec/rtld-elf/Makefile b/libexec/rtld-elf/Makefile index 37c3840538d5..864448ad782a 100644 --- a/libexec/rtld-elf/Makefile +++ b/libexec/rtld-elf/Makefile @@ -1,127 +1,131 @@ # Use the following command to build local debug version of dynamic # linker: # make DEBUG_FLAGS=-g WITHOUT_TESTS=yes all RTLD_ELF_DIR:= ${.PARSEDIR} .include PACKAGE= clibs MK_PIE= no # Always position independent using local rules # Not compatible with sanitizer instrumentation or SSP. MK_ASAN= no MK_SSP= no MK_UBSAN= no .include +# SSP forced off already implies FORTIFY_SOURCE=0, but we must make sure that +# one cannot turn it back on. +FORTIFY_SOURCE= 0 + .if !defined(NEED_COMPAT) CONFS= libmap.conf .endif PROG?= ld-elf.so.1 .for _libcompat in ${_ALL_libcompats} .if ${PROG:M*ld-elf${_libcompat}[-.]*} != "" TAGS+= lib${_libcompat} .endif .endfor SRCS= \ crtbrand.S \ rtld_start.S \ reloc.c \ rtld.c \ rtld_lock.c \ rtld_malloc.c \ rtld_printf.c \ map_object.c \ xmalloc.c \ debug.c \ libmap.c MAN?= rtld.1 ACFLAGS+= -DLOCORE CFLAGS+= -Wall -DIN_RTLD -ffreestanding CFLAGS+= -I${SRCTOP}/lib/csu/common .if exists(${RTLD_ELF_DIR}/${MACHINE_ARCH:S/powerpc64le/powerpc64/}) RTLD_ARCH= ${MACHINE_ARCH:S/powerpc64le/powerpc64/} .else RTLD_ARCH= ${MACHINE_CPUARCH} .endif CFLAGS+= -I${RTLD_ELF_DIR}/${RTLD_ARCH} -I${RTLD_ELF_DIR} NO_WCAST_ALIGN= yes INSTALLFLAGS= -C -b PRECIOUSPROG= BINDIR= /libexec SYMLINKS= ../..${BINDIR}/${PROG} ${LIBEXECDIR}/${PROG} MLINKS?= rtld.1 ld-elf.so.1.1 \ rtld.1 ld.so.1 CFLAGS+= -fpic -DPIC $(DEBUG) LDFLAGS+= -shared -Wl,-Bsymbolic -Wl,-z,defs -nostdlib -e ${RTLD_ENTRY} # Pull in the dependencies that we use from libc .include "rtld-libc/Makefile.inc" VERSION_DEF= ${LIBCSRCDIR}/Versions.def SYMBOL_MAPS= ${RTLD_ELF_DIR}/Symbol.map VERSION_MAP= Version.map LDFLAGS+= -Wl,--version-script=${VERSION_MAP} .if exists(${RTLD_ELF_DIR}/${RTLD_ARCH}/Symbol.map) SYMBOL_MAPS+= ${RTLD_ELF_DIR}/${RTLD_ARCH}/Symbol.map .endif .sinclude "${RTLD_ELF_DIR}/${RTLD_ARCH}/Makefile.inc" RTLD_ENTRY?= .rtld_start # Always produce the map file so that may be inspected to confirm # undesired code is not linked from libsys/libc. MAPFILE= ld-elf.so.1.map LDFLAGS+= -Wl,-Map=${MAPFILE} -Wl,--cref CLEANFILES+= ${MAPFILE} afterbuild: @if grep __libsys_interposing ${MAPFILE} >/dev/null ; then \ echo "libsys_interposing leaked" 1>&2 ; \ exit 1 ; \ fi @if grep __libc_interposing ${MAPFILE} >/dev/null ; then \ echo "libc_interposing leaked" 1>&2 ; \ exit 1 ; \ fi @if grep xlocale ${MAPFILE} >/dev/null ; then \ echo "xlocale leaked" 1>&2 ; \ exit 1 ; \ fi @if grep fprintf ${MAPFILE} >/dev/null ; then \ echo "stdio leaked" 1>&2 ; \ exit 1 ; \ fi # Since moving rtld-elf to /libexec, we need to create a symlink. # Fixup the existing binary that's there so we can symlink over it. beforeinstall: .if exists(${DESTDIR}/usr/libexec/${PROG}) && ${MK_STAGING} == "no" -chflags -h noschg ${DESTDIR}/usr/libexec/${PROG} .endif .PATH: ${RTLD_ELF_DIR}/${RTLD_ARCH} ${SRCTOP}/lib/csu/common .if ${.CURDIR} == ${RTLD_ELF_DIR} HAS_TESTS= SUBDIR.${MK_TESTS}+= tests .endif # Some of the required math functions (div & mod) are implemented in # libcompiler_rt on some architectures. LIBADD+= compiler_rt .include ${PROG_FULL}: ${VERSION_MAP} .include .if ${COMPILER_TYPE} == "gcc" # GCC warns about redeclarations even though they have __exported # and are therefore not identical to the ones from the system headers. CFLAGS+= -Wno-redundant-decls .endif diff --git a/share/man/man7/security.7 b/share/man/man7/security.7 index ccbeeb4575ce..2e690e35d534 100644 --- a/share/man/man7/security.7 +++ b/share/man/man7/security.7 @@ -1,1118 +1,1193 @@ .\" Copyright (C) 1998 Matthew Dillon. All rights reserved. .\" Copyright (c) 2019 The FreeBSD Foundation, Inc. .\" .\" Parts of this documentation were written by .\" Konstantin Belousov under sponsorship .\" from the FreeBSD Foundation. .\" .\" Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without .\" modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions .\" are met: .\" 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright .\" notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. .\" 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright .\" notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the .\" documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. .\" .\" THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY AUTHOR AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND .\" ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE .\" IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE .\" ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE .\" FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL .\" DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS .\" OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) .\" HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT .\" LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY .\" OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF .\" SUCH DAMAGE. .\" .Dd October 5, 2023 .Dt SECURITY 7 .Os .Sh NAME .Nm security .Nd introduction to security under FreeBSD .Sh DESCRIPTION Security is a function that begins and ends with the system administrator. While all .Bx multi-user systems have some inherent security, the job of building and maintaining additional security mechanisms to keep users .Dq honest is probably one of the single largest undertakings of the sysadmin. Machines are only as secure as you make them, and security concerns are ever competing with the human necessity for convenience. .Ux systems, in general, are capable of running a huge number of simultaneous processes and many of these processes operate as servers \(em meaning that external entities can connect and talk to them. As yesterday's mini-computers and mainframes become today's desktops, and as computers become networked and internetworked, security becomes an ever bigger issue. .Pp Security is best implemented through a layered onion approach. In a nutshell, what you want to do is to create as many layers of security as are convenient and then carefully monitor the system for intrusions. .Pp System security also pertains to dealing with various forms of attacks, including attacks that attempt to crash or otherwise make a system unusable but do not attempt to break root. Security concerns can be split up into several categories: .Bl -enum -offset indent .It Denial of Service attacks (DoS) .It User account compromises .It Root compromise through accessible servers .It Root compromise via user accounts .It Backdoor creation .El .Pp A denial of service attack is an action that deprives the machine of needed resources. Typically, DoS attacks are brute-force mechanisms that attempt to crash or otherwise make a machine unusable by overwhelming its servers or network stack. Some DoS attacks try to take advantages of bugs in the networking stack to crash a machine with a single packet. The latter can only be fixed by applying a bug fix to the kernel. Attacks on servers can often be fixed by properly specifying options to limit the load the servers incur on the system under adverse conditions. Brute-force network attacks are harder to deal with. A spoofed-packet attack, for example, is nearly impossible to stop short of cutting your system off from the Internet. It may not be able to take your machine down, but it can fill up your Internet pipe. .Pp A user account compromise is even more common than a DoS attack. Some sysadmins still run .Nm telnetd and .Xr ftpd 8 servers on their machines. These servers, by default, do not operate over encrypted connections. The result is that if you have any moderate-sized user base, one or more of your users logging into your system from a remote location (which is the most common and convenient way to log in to a system) will have his or her password sniffed. The attentive system administrator will analyze his remote access logs looking for suspicious source addresses even for successful logins. .Pp One must always assume that once an attacker has access to a user account, the attacker can break root. However, the reality is that in a well secured and maintained system, access to a user account does not necessarily give the attacker access to root. The distinction is important because without access to root the attacker cannot generally hide his tracks and may, at best, be able to do nothing more than mess with the user's files or crash the machine. User account compromises are very common because users tend not to take the precautions that sysadmins take. .Pp System administrators must keep in mind that there are potentially many ways to break root on a machine. The attacker may know the root password, the attacker may find a bug in a root-run server and be able to break root over a network connection to that server, or the attacker may know of a bug in an SUID-root program that allows the attacker to break root once he has broken into a user's account. If an attacker has found a way to break root on a machine, the attacker may not have a need to install a backdoor. Many of the root holes found and closed to date involve a considerable amount of work by the attacker to clean up after himself, so most attackers do install backdoors. This gives you a convenient way to detect the attacker. Making it impossible for an attacker to install a backdoor may actually be detrimental to your security because it will not close off the hole the attacker used to break in originally. .Pp Security remedies should always be implemented with a multi-layered .Dq onion peel approach and can be categorized as follows: .Bl -enum -offset indent .It Securing root and staff accounts .It Securing root \(em root-run servers and SUID/SGID binaries .It Securing user accounts .It Securing the password file .It Securing the kernel core, raw devices, and file systems .It Quick detection of inappropriate changes made to the system .It Paranoia .El .Sh SECURING THE ROOT ACCOUNT AND SECURING STAFF ACCOUNTS Do not bother securing staff accounts if you have not secured the root account. Most systems have a password assigned to the root account. The first thing you do is assume that the password is .Em always compromised. This does not mean that you should remove the password. The password is almost always necessary for console access to the machine. What it does mean is that you should not make it possible to use the password outside of the console or possibly even with a .Xr su 1 utility. For example, make sure that your PTYs are specified as being .Dq Li insecure in the .Pa /etc/ttys file so that direct root logins via .Xr telnet 1 are disallowed. If using other login services such as .Xr sshd 8 , make sure that direct root logins are disabled there as well. Consider every access method \(em services such as .Xr ftp 1 often fall through the cracks. Direct root logins should only be allowed via the system console. .Pp Of course, as a sysadmin you have to be able to get to root, so we open up a few holes. But we make sure these holes require additional password verification to operate. One way to make root accessible is to add appropriate staff accounts to the .Dq Li wheel group (in .Pa /etc/group ) . The staff members placed in the .Li wheel group are allowed to .Xr su 1 to root. You should never give staff members native .Li wheel access by putting them in the .Li wheel group in their password entry. Staff accounts should be placed in a .Dq Li staff group, and then added to the .Li wheel group via the .Pa /etc/group file. Only those staff members who actually need to have root access should be placed in the .Li wheel group. It is also possible, when using an authentication method such as Kerberos, to use Kerberos's .Pa .k5login file in the root account to allow a .Xr ksu 1 to root without having to place anyone at all in the .Li wheel group. This may be the better solution since the .Li wheel mechanism still allows an intruder to break root if the intruder has gotten hold of your password file and can break into a staff account. While having the .Li wheel mechanism is better than having nothing at all, it is not necessarily the safest option. .Pp An indirect way to secure the root account is to secure your staff accounts by using an alternative login access method and *'ing out the crypted password for the staff accounts. This way an intruder may be able to steal the password file but will not be able to break into any staff accounts or root, even if root has a crypted password associated with it (assuming, of course, that you have limited root access to the console). Staff members get into their staff accounts through a secure login mechanism such as .Xr kerberos 8 or .Xr ssh 1 using a private/public key pair. When you use something like Kerberos you generally must secure the machines which run the Kerberos servers and your desktop workstation. When you use a public/private key pair with SSH, you must generally secure the machine you are logging in .Em from (typically your workstation), but you can also add an additional layer of protection to the key pair by password protecting the keypair when you create it with .Xr ssh-keygen 1 . Being able to star-out the passwords for staff accounts also guarantees that staff members can only log in through secure access methods that you have set up. You can thus force all staff members to use secure, encrypted connections for all their sessions which closes an important hole used by many intruders: that of sniffing the network from an unrelated, less secure machine. .Pp The more indirect security mechanisms also assume that you are logging in from a more restrictive server to a less restrictive server. For example, if your main box is running all sorts of servers, your workstation should not be running any. In order for your workstation to be reasonably secure you should run as few servers as possible, up to and including no servers at all, and you should run a password-protected screen blanker. Of course, given physical access to a workstation, an attacker can break any sort of security you put on it. This is definitely a problem that you should consider but you should also consider the fact that the vast majority of break-ins occur remotely, over a network, from people who do not have physical access to your workstation or servers. .Pp Using something like Kerberos also gives you the ability to disable or change the password for a staff account in one place and have it immediately affect all the machines the staff member may have an account on. If a staff member's account gets compromised, the ability to instantly change his password on all machines should not be underrated. With discrete passwords, changing a password on N machines can be a mess. You can also impose re-passwording restrictions with Kerberos: not only can a Kerberos ticket be made to timeout after a while, but the Kerberos system can require that the user choose a new password after a certain period of time (say, once a month). .Sh SECURING ROOT \(em ROOT-RUN SERVERS AND SUID/SGID BINARIES The prudent sysadmin only runs the servers he needs to, no more, no less. Be aware that third party servers are often the most bug-prone. For example, running an old version of .Xr imapd 8 or .Xr popper 8 Pq Pa ports/mail/popper is like giving a universal root ticket out to the entire world. Never run a server that you have not checked out carefully. Many servers do not need to be run as root. For example, the .Xr talkd 8 , .Xr comsat 8 , and .Xr fingerd 8 daemons can be run in special user .Dq sandboxes . A sandbox is not perfect unless you go to a large amount of trouble, but the onion approach to security still stands: if someone is able to break in through a server running in a sandbox, they still have to break out of the sandbox. The more layers the attacker must break through, the lower the likelihood of his success. Root holes have historically been found in virtually every server ever run as root, including basic system servers. If you are running a machine through which people only log in via .Xr sshd 8 and never log in via .Nm telnetd then turn off this service! .Pp .Fx now defaults to running .Xr talkd 8 , .Xr comsat 8 , and .Xr fingerd 8 in a sandbox. Depending on whether you are installing a new system or upgrading an existing system, the special user accounts used by these sandboxes may not be installed. The prudent sysadmin would research and implement sandboxes for servers whenever possible. .Pp There are a number of other servers that typically do not run in sandboxes: .Xr sendmail 8 , .Xr popper 8 , .Xr imapd 8 , .Xr ftpd 8 , and others. There are alternatives to some of these, but installing them may require more work than you are willing to put (the convenience factor strikes again). You may have to run these servers as root and rely on other mechanisms to detect break-ins that might occur through them. .Pp The other big potential root hole in a system are the SUID-root and SGID binaries installed on the system. Most of these binaries, such as .Xr su 1 , reside in .Pa /bin , /sbin , /usr/bin , or .Pa /usr/sbin . While nothing is 100% safe, the system-default SUID and SGID binaries can be considered reasonably safe. Still, root holes are occasionally found in these binaries. A root hole was found in Xlib in 1998 that made .Xr xterm 1 Pq Pa ports/x11/xterm (which is typically SUID) vulnerable. It is better to be safe than sorry and the prudent sysadmin will restrict SUID binaries that only staff should run to a special group that only staff can access, and get rid of .Pq Dq Li "chmod 000" any SUID binaries that nobody uses. A server with no display generally does not need an .Xr xterm 1 Pq Pa ports/x11/xterm binary. SGID binaries can be almost as dangerous. If an intruder can break an SGID-kmem binary the intruder might be able to read .Pa /dev/kmem and thus read the crypted password file, potentially compromising any passworded account. Alternatively an intruder who breaks group .Dq Li kmem can monitor keystrokes sent through PTYs, including PTYs used by users who log in through secure methods. An intruder that breaks the .Dq Li tty group can write to almost any user's TTY. If a user is running a terminal program or emulator with a keyboard-simulation feature, the intruder can potentially generate a data stream that causes the user's terminal to echo a command, which is then run as that user. .Sh SECURING USER ACCOUNTS User accounts are usually the most difficult to secure. While you can impose draconian access restrictions on your staff and *-out their passwords, you may not be able to do so with any general user accounts you might have. If you do have sufficient control then you may win out and be able to secure the user accounts properly. If not, you simply have to be more vigilant in your monitoring of those accounts. Use of SSH and Kerberos for user accounts is more problematic due to the extra administration and technical support required, but still a very good solution compared to a crypted password file. .Sh SECURING THE PASSWORD FILE The only sure fire way is to *-out as many passwords as you can and use SSH or Kerberos for access to those accounts. Even though the crypted password file .Pq Pa /etc/spwd.db can only be read by root, it may be possible for an intruder to obtain read access to that file even if the attacker cannot obtain root-write access. .Pp Your security scripts should always check for and report changes to the password file (see .Sx CHECKING FILE INTEGRITY below). .Sh SECURING THE KERNEL CORE, RAW DEVICES, AND FILE SYSTEMS If an attacker breaks root he can do just about anything, but there are certain conveniences. For example, most modern kernels have a packet sniffing device driver built in. Under .Fx it is called the .Xr bpf 4 device. An intruder will commonly attempt to run a packet sniffer on a compromised machine. You do not need to give the intruder the capability and most systems should not have the .Xr bpf 4 device compiled in. .Pp But even if you turn off the .Xr bpf 4 device, you still have .Pa /dev/mem and .Pa /dev/kmem to worry about. For that matter, the intruder can still write to raw disk devices. Also, there is another kernel feature called the module loader, .Xr kldload 8 . An enterprising intruder can use a KLD module to install his own .Xr bpf 4 device or other sniffing device on a running kernel. To avoid these problems you have to run the kernel at a higher security level, at least level 1. The security level can be set with a .Xr sysctl 8 on the .Va kern.securelevel variable. Once you have set the security level to 1, write access to raw devices will be denied and special .Xr chflags 1 flags, such as .Cm schg , will be enforced. You must also ensure that the .Cm schg flag is set on critical startup binaries, directories, and script files \(em everything that gets run up to the point where the security level is set. This might be overdoing it, and upgrading the system is much more difficult when you operate at a higher security level. You may compromise and run the system at a higher security level but not set the .Cm schg flag for every system file and directory under the sun. Another possibility is to simply mount .Pa / and .Pa /usr read-only. It should be noted that being too draconian in what you attempt to protect may prevent the all-important detection of an intrusion. .Pp The kernel runs with five different security levels. Any super-user process can raise the level, but no process can lower it. The security levels are: .Bl -tag -width flag .It Ic -1 Permanently insecure mode \- always run the system in insecure mode. This is the default initial value. .It Ic 0 Insecure mode \- immutable and append-only flags may be turned off. All devices may be read or written subject to their permissions. .It Ic 1 Secure mode \- the system immutable and system append-only flags may not be turned off; disks for mounted file systems, .Pa /dev/mem and .Pa /dev/kmem may not be opened for writing; .Pa /dev/io (if your platform has it) may not be opened at all; kernel modules (see .Xr kld 4 ) may not be loaded or unloaded. The kernel debugger may not be entered using the .Va debug.kdb.enter sysctl unless a .Xr MAC 9 policy grants access, for example using .Xr mac_ddb 4 . A panic or trap cannot be forced using the .Va debug.kdb.panic , .Va debug.kdb.panic_str and other sysctl's. .It Ic 2 Highly secure mode \- same as secure mode, plus disks may not be opened for writing (except by .Xr mount 2 ) whether mounted or not. This level precludes tampering with file systems by unmounting them, but also inhibits running .Xr newfs 8 while the system is multi-user. .Pp In addition, kernel time changes are restricted to less than or equal to one second. Attempts to change the time by more than this will log the message .Dq Time adjustment clamped to +1 second . .It Ic 3 Network secure mode \- same as highly secure mode, plus IP packet filter rules (see .Xr ipfw 8 , .Xr ipfirewall 4 and .Xr pfctl 8 ) cannot be changed and .Xr dummynet 4 or .Xr pf 4 configuration cannot be adjusted. .El .Pp The security level can be configured with variables documented in .Xr rc.conf 5 . .Sh CHECKING FILE INTEGRITY: BINARIES, CONFIG FILES, ETC When it comes right down to it, you can only protect your core system configuration and control files so much before the convenience factor rears its ugly head. For example, using .Xr chflags 1 to set the .Cm schg bit on most of the files in .Pa / and .Pa /usr is probably counterproductive because while it may protect the files, it also closes a detection window. The last layer of your security onion is perhaps the most important \(em detection. The rest of your security is pretty much useless (or, worse, presents you with a false sense of safety) if you cannot detect potential incursions. Half the job of the onion is to slow down the attacker rather than stop him in order to give the detection layer a chance to catch him in the act. .Pp The best way to detect an incursion is to look for modified, missing, or unexpected files. The best way to look for modified files is from another (often centralized) limited-access system. Writing your security scripts on the extra-secure limited-access system makes them mostly invisible to potential attackers, and this is important. In order to take maximum advantage you generally have to give the limited-access box significant access to the other machines in the business, usually either by doing a read-only NFS export of the other machines to the limited-access box, or by setting up SSH keypairs to allow the limit-access box to SSH to the other machines. Except for its network traffic, NFS is the least visible method \(em allowing you to monitor the file systems on each client box virtually undetected. If your limited-access server is connected to the client boxes through a switch, the NFS method is often the better choice. If your limited-access server is connected to the client boxes through a hub or through several layers of routing, the NFS method may be too insecure (network-wise) and using SSH may be the better choice even with the audit-trail tracks that SSH lays. .Pp Once you give a limit-access box at least read access to the client systems it is supposed to monitor, you must write scripts to do the actual monitoring. Given an NFS mount, you can write scripts out of simple system utilities such as .Xr find 1 and .Xr md5 1 . It is best to physically .Xr md5 1 the client-box files boxes at least once a day, and to test control files such as those found in .Pa /etc and .Pa /usr/local/etc even more often. When mismatches are found relative to the base MD5 information the limited-access machine knows is valid, it should scream at a sysadmin to go check it out. A good security script will also check for inappropriate SUID binaries and for new or deleted files on system partitions such as .Pa / and .Pa /usr . .Pp When using SSH rather than NFS, writing the security script is much more difficult. You essentially have to .Xr scp 1 the scripts to the client box in order to run them, making them visible, and for safety you also need to .Xr scp 1 the binaries (such as .Xr find 1 ) that those scripts use. The .Xr sshd 8 daemon on the client box may already be compromised. All in all, using SSH may be necessary when running over unsecure links, but it is also a lot harder to deal with. .Pp A good security script will also check for changes to user and staff members access configuration files: .Pa .rhosts , .shosts , .ssh/authorized_keys and so forth, files that might fall outside the purview of the MD5 check. .Pp If you have a huge amount of user disk space it may take too long to run through every file on those partitions. In this case, setting mount flags to disallow SUID binaries on those partitions is a good idea. The .Cm nosuid option (see .Xr mount 8 ) is what you want to look into. I would scan them anyway at least once a week, since the object of this layer is to detect a break-in whether or not the break-in is effective. .Pp Process accounting (see .Xr accton 8 ) is a relatively low-overhead feature of the operating system which I recommend using as a post-break-in evaluation mechanism. It is especially useful in tracking down how an intruder has actually broken into a system, assuming the file is still intact after the break-in occurs. .Pp Finally, security scripts should process the log files and the logs themselves should be generated in as secure a manner as possible \(em remote syslog can be very useful. An intruder tries to cover his tracks, and log files are critical to the sysadmin trying to track down the time and method of the initial break-in. One way to keep a permanent record of the log files is to run the system console to a serial port and collect the information on a continuing basis through a secure machine monitoring the consoles. .Sh PARANOIA A little paranoia never hurts. As a rule, a sysadmin can add any number of security features as long as they do not affect convenience, and can add security features that do affect convenience with some added thought. Even more importantly, a security administrator should mix it up a bit \(em if you use recommendations such as those given by this manual page verbatim, you give away your methodologies to the prospective attacker who also has access to this manual page. .Sh SPECIAL SECTION ON DoS ATTACKS This section covers Denial of Service attacks. A DoS attack is typically a packet attack. While there is not much you can do about modern spoofed packet attacks that saturate your network, you can generally limit the damage by ensuring that the attacks cannot take down your servers. .Bl -enum -offset indent .It Limiting server forks .It Limiting springboard attacks (ICMP response attacks, ping broadcast, etc.) .It Kernel Route Cache .El .Pp A common DoS attack is against a forking server that attempts to cause the server to eat processes, file descriptors, and memory until the machine dies. The .Xr inetd 8 server has several options to limit this sort of attack. It should be noted that while it is possible to prevent a machine from going down it is not generally possible to prevent a service from being disrupted by the attack. Read the .Xr inetd 8 manual page carefully and pay specific attention to the .Fl c , C , and .Fl R options. Note that spoofed-IP attacks will circumvent the .Fl C option to .Xr inetd 8 , so typically a combination of options must be used. Some standalone servers have self-fork-limitation parameters. .Pp The .Xr sendmail 8 daemon has its .Fl OMaxDaemonChildren option which tends to work much better than trying to use .Xr sendmail 8 Ns 's load limiting options due to the load lag. You should specify a .Va MaxDaemonChildren parameter when you start .Xr sendmail 8 high enough to handle your expected load but not so high that the computer cannot handle that number of .Nm sendmail Ns 's without falling on its face. It is also prudent to run .Xr sendmail 8 in .Dq queued mode .Pq Fl ODeliveryMode=queued and to run the daemon .Pq Dq Nm sendmail Fl bd separate from the queue-runs .Pq Dq Nm sendmail Fl q15m . If you still want real-time delivery you can run the queue at a much lower interval, such as .Fl q1m , but be sure to specify a reasonable .Va MaxDaemonChildren option for that .Xr sendmail 8 to prevent cascade failures. .Pp The .Xr syslogd 8 daemon can be attacked directly and it is strongly recommended that you use the .Fl s option whenever possible, and the .Fl a option otherwise. .Pp You should also be fairly careful with connect-back services such as tcpwrapper's reverse-identd, which can be attacked directly. You generally do not want to use the reverse-ident feature of tcpwrappers for this reason. .Pp It is a very good idea to protect internal services from external access by firewalling them off at your border routers. The idea here is to prevent saturation attacks from outside your LAN, not so much to protect internal services from network-based root compromise. Always configure an exclusive firewall, i.e., .So firewall everything .Em except ports A, B, C, D, and M-Z .Sc . This way you can firewall off all of your low ports except for certain specific services such as .Xr talkd 8 , .Xr sendmail 8 , and other internet-accessible services. If you try to configure the firewall the other way \(em as an inclusive or permissive firewall, there is a good chance that you will forget to .Dq close a couple of services or that you will add a new internal service and forget to update the firewall. You can still open up the high-numbered port range on the firewall to allow permissive-like operation without compromising your low ports. Also take note that .Fx allows you to control the range of port numbers used for dynamic binding via the various .Va net.inet.ip.portrange sysctl's .Pq Dq Li "sysctl net.inet.ip.portrange" , which can also ease the complexity of your firewall's configuration. I usually use a normal first/last range of 4000 to 5000, and a hiport range of 49152 to 65535, then block everything under 4000 off in my firewall (except for certain specific internet-accessible ports, of course). .Pp Another common DoS attack is called a springboard attack \(em to attack a server in a manner that causes the server to generate responses which then overload the server, the local network, or some other machine. The most common attack of this nature is the ICMP PING BROADCAST attack. The attacker spoofs ping packets sent to your LAN's broadcast address with the source IP address set to the actual machine they wish to attack. If your border routers are not configured to stomp on ping's to broadcast addresses, your LAN winds up generating sufficient responses to the spoofed source address to saturate the victim, especially when the attacker uses the same trick on several dozen broadcast addresses over several dozen different networks at once. Broadcast attacks of over a hundred and twenty megabits have been measured. A second common springboard attack is against the ICMP error reporting system. By constructing packets that generate ICMP error responses, an attacker can saturate a server's incoming network and cause the server to saturate its outgoing network with ICMP responses. This type of attack can also crash the server by running it out of .Vt mbuf Ns 's , especially if the server cannot drain the ICMP responses it generates fast enough. The .Fx kernel has a new kernel compile option called .Dv ICMP_BANDLIM which limits the effectiveness of these sorts of attacks. The last major class of springboard attacks is related to certain internal .Xr inetd 8 services such as the UDP echo service. An attacker simply spoofs a UDP packet with the source address being server A's echo port, and the destination address being server B's echo port, where server A and B are both on your LAN. The two servers then bounce this one packet back and forth between each other. The attacker can overload both servers and their LANs simply by injecting a few packets in this manner. Similar problems exist with the internal chargen port. A competent sysadmin will turn off all of these .Xr inetd 8 Ns -internal test services. .Sh ACCESS ISSUES WITH KERBEROS AND SSH There are a few issues with both Kerberos and SSH that need to be addressed if you intend to use them. Kerberos5 is an excellent authentication protocol but the kerberized .Xr telnet 1 suck rocks. There are bugs that make them unsuitable for dealing with binary streams. Also, by default Kerberos does not encrypt a session unless you use the .Fl x option. SSH encrypts everything by default. .Pp SSH works quite well in every respect except when it is set up to forward encryption keys. What this means is that if you have a secure workstation holding keys that give you access to the rest of the system, and you .Xr ssh 1 to an unsecure machine, your keys become exposed. The actual keys themselves are not exposed, but .Xr ssh 1 installs a forwarding port for the duration of your login and if an attacker has broken root on the unsecure machine he can utilize that port to use your keys to gain access to any other machine that your keys unlock. .Pp We recommend that you use SSH in combination with Kerberos whenever possible for staff logins. SSH can be compiled with Kerberos support. This reduces your reliance on potentially exposable SSH keys while at the same time protecting passwords via Kerberos. SSH keys should only be used for automated tasks from secure machines (something that Kerberos is unsuited to). We also recommend that you either turn off key-forwarding in the SSH configuration, or that you make use of the .Va from Ns = Ns Ar IP/DOMAIN option that SSH allows in its .Pa authorized_keys file to make the key only usable to entities logging in from specific machines. +.Sh STACK OVERFLOW PROTECTION +.Fx +supports stack overflow protection using the Stack Smashing Protector +.Pq SSP +compiler feature. +In userland, SSP adds a per-process randomized canary at the end of every stack +frame which is checked for corruption upon return from the function. +In the kernel, a single randomized canary is used globally except on aarch64, +which has a +.Dv PERTHREAD_SSP +.Xr config 8 +option to enable per-thread randomized canaries. +If stack corruption is detected, then the process aborts to avoid potentially +malicious execution as a result of the corruption. +SSP may be enabled or disabled when building +.Fx +base with the +.Xr src.conf 5 +SSP knob. +.Pp +When +.Va WITH_SSP +is enabled, which is the default, world is built with the +.Fl fstack-protector-strong +compiler option. +The kernel is built with the +.Fl fstack-protector +option. +.Pp +In addition to SSP, a +.Dq FORTIFY_SOURCE +implementation is supported up to level 2 by defining +.Va _FORTIFY_SOURCE +to +.Dv 1 +or +.Dv 2 +before including any +.Fx +headers. +.Fx +world builds can set +.Va FORTIFY_SOURCE +to provide a default value for +.Va _FORTIFY_SOURCE . +When enabled, +.Dq FORTIFY_SOURCE +enables extra bounds checking in various functions that accept buffers to be +written into. +These functions currently have extra bounds checking support: +.Bl -column -offset indent "snprintf" "memmove" "strncpy" "vsnprintf" "readlink" +.It bcopy Ta bzero Ta fgets Ta getcwd Ta gets +.It memcpy Ta memmove Ta memset Ta read Ta readlink +.It snprintf Ta sprintf Ta stpcpy Ta stpncpy Ta strcat +.It strcpy Ta strncat Ta strncpy Ta vsnprintf Ta vsprintf +.El +.Pp +.Dq FORTIFY_SOURCE +requires compiler support from +.Xr clang 1 +or +.Xr gcc 1 , +which provide the +.Xr __builtin_object_size 3 +function that is used to determine the bounds of an object. +This feature works best at optimization levels +.Fl O1 +and above, as some object sizes may be less obvious without some data that the +compiler would collect in an optimization pass. +.Pp +Similar to SSP, violating the bounds of an object will cause the program to +abort in an effort to avoid malicious execution. +This effectively provides finer-grained protection than SSP for some class of +function and system calls, along with some protection for buffers allocated as +part of the program data. .Sh KNOBS AND TWEAKS .Fx provides several knobs and tweak handles that make some introspection information access more restricted. Some people consider this as improving system security, so the knobs are briefly listed there, together with controls which enable some mitigations of the hardware state leaks. .Pp Hardware mitigation sysctl knobs described below have been moved under .Pa machdep.mitigations , with backwards-compatibility shims to accept the existing names. A future change will rationalize the sense of the individual sysctls (so that enabled / true always indicates that the mitigation is active). For that reason the previous names remain the canonical way to set the mitigations, and are documented here. Backwards compatibility shims for the interim sysctls under .Pa machdep.mitigations will not be added. .Bl -tag -width security.bsd.unprivileged_proc_debug .It Dv security.bsd.see_other_uids Controls visibility and reachability of subjects (e.g., processes) and objects (e.g., sockets) owned by a different uid. The knob directly affects the .Dv kern.proc sysctls filtering of data, which results in restricted output from utilities like .Xr ps 1 . .It Dv security.bsd.see_other_gids Same, for subjects and objects owned by a different gid. .It Dv security.bsd.see_jail_proc Same, for subjects and objects belonging to a different jail, including sub-jails. .It Dv security.bsd.conservative_signals When enabled, unprivileged users are only allowed to send job control and usual termination signals like .Dv SIGKILL , .Dv SIGINT , and .Dv SIGTERM , to the processes executing programs with changed uids. .It Dv security.bsd.unprivileged_proc_debug Controls availability of the process debugging facilities to non-root users. See also .Xr proccontrol 1 mode .Dv trace . .It Dv vm.pmap.pti Tunable, amd64-only. Enables mode of operation of virtual memory system where usermode page tables are sanitized to prevent so-called Meltdown information leak on some Intel CPUs. By default, the system detects whether the CPU needs the workaround, and enables it automatically. See also .Xr proccontrol 1 mode .Dv kpti . .It Dv machdep.mitigations.flush_rsb_ctxsw amd64. Controls Return Stack Buffer flush on context switch, to prevent cross-process ret2spec attacks. Only needed, and only enabled by default, if the machine supports SMEP, otherwise IBRS would do necessary flushing on kernel entry anyway. .It Dv hw.mds_disable amd64 and i386. Controls Microarchitectural Data Sampling hardware information leak mitigation. .It Dv hw.spec_store_bypass_disable amd64 and i386. Controls Speculative Store Bypass hardware information leak mitigation. .It Dv hw.ibrs_disable amd64 and i386. Controls Indirect Branch Restricted Speculation hardware information leak mitigation. .It Dv machdep.syscall_ret_flush_l1d amd64. Controls force-flush of L1D cache on return from syscalls which report errors other than .Ev EEXIST , .Ev EAGAIN , .Ev EXDEV , .Ev ENOENT , .Ev ENOTCONN , and .Ev EINPROGRESS . This is mostly a paranoid setting added to prevent hypothetical exploitation of unknown gadgets for unknown hardware issues. The error codes exclusion list is composed of the most common errors which typically occurs on normal system operation. .It Dv machdep.nmi_flush_l1d_sw amd64. Controls force-flush of L1D cache on NMI; this provides software assist for bhyve mitigation of L1 terminal fault hardware information leak. .It Dv hw.vmm.vmx.l1d_flush amd64. Controls the mitigation of L1 Terminal Fault in bhyve hypervisor. .It Dv vm.pmap.allow_2m_x_ept amd64. Allows the use of superpages for executable mappings under the EPT page table format used by hypervisors on Intel CPUs to map the guest physical address space to machine physical memory. May be disabled to work around a CPU Erratum called Machine Check Error Avoidance on Page Size Change. .It Dv machdep.mitigations.rngds.enable amd64 and i386. Controls mitigation of Special Register Buffer Data Sampling versus optimization of the MCU access. When set to zero, the mitigation is disabled, and the RDSEED and RDRAND instructions do not incur serialization overhead for shared buffer accesses, and do not serialize off-core memory accesses. .It Dv kern.elf32.aslr.enable Controls system-global Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR) for normal non-PIE (Position Independent Executable) 32-bit ELF binaries. See also the .Xr proccontrol 1 .Dv aslr mode, also affected by the per-image control note flag. .It Dv kern.elf32.aslr.pie_enable Controls system-global Address Space Layout Randomization for position-independent (PIE) 32-bit binaries. .It Dv kern.elf32.aslr.honor_sbrk Makes ASLR less aggressive and more compatible with old binaries relying on the sbrk area. .It Dv kern.elf32.aslr.stack Enable randomization of the stack for 32-bit binaries. Otherwise, the stack is mapped at a fixed location determined by the process ABI. .It Dv kern.elf64.aslr.enable ASLR control for 64-bit ELF binaries. .It Dv kern.elf64.aslr.pie_enable ASLR control for 64-bit ELF PIEs. .It Dv kern.elf64.aslr.honor_sbrk ASLR sbrk compatibility control for 64-bit binaries. .It Dv kern.elf64.aslr.stack Controls stack address randomization for 64-bit binaries. .It Dv kern.elf32.nxstack Enables non-executable stack for 32-bit processes. Enabled by default if supported by hardware and corresponding binary. .It Dv kern.elf64.nxstack Enables non-executable stack for 64-bit processes. .It Dv kern.elf32.allow_wx Enables mapping of simultaneously writable and executable pages for 32-bit processes. .It Dv kern.elf64.allow_wx Enables mapping of simultaneously writable and executable pages for 64-bit processes. .El .Sh SEE ALSO .Xr chflags 1 , .Xr find 1 , .Xr md5 1 , .Xr netstat 1 , .Xr openssl 1 , .Xr proccontrol 1 , .Xr ps 1 , .Xr ssh 1 , .Xr xdm 1 Pq Pa ports/x11/xorg-clients , .Xr group 5 , .Xr ttys 5 , .Xr mitigations 7 , .Xr accton 8 , .Xr init 8 , .Xr sshd 8 , .Xr sysctl 8 , .Xr syslogd 8 , .Xr vipw 8 .Sh HISTORY The .Nm manual page was originally written by .An Matthew Dillon and first appeared in .Fx 3.1 , December 1998. diff --git a/share/mk/bsd.sys.mk b/share/mk/bsd.sys.mk index de91e00d8cc7..52c3d07746c7 100644 --- a/share/mk/bsd.sys.mk +++ b/share/mk/bsd.sys.mk @@ -1,515 +1,522 @@ # # This file contains common settings used for building FreeBSD # sources. # Enable various levels of compiler warning checks. These may be # overridden (e.g. if using a non-gcc compiler) by defining MK_WARNS=no. # for GCC: https://gcc.gnu.org/onlinedocs/gcc/Warning-Options.html # for clang: https://clang.llvm.org/docs/DiagnosticsReference.html .include # the default is gnu99 for now CSTD?= gnu99 .if ${CSTD} == "c89" || ${CSTD} == "c90" CFLAGS+= -std=iso9899:1990 .elif ${CSTD} == "c94" || ${CSTD} == "c95" CFLAGS+= -std=iso9899:199409 .elif ${CSTD} == "c99" CFLAGS+= -std=iso9899:1999 .else # CSTD CFLAGS+= -std=${CSTD} .endif # CSTD .if !empty(CXXSTD) CXXFLAGS+= -std=${CXXSTD} .endif # This gives the Makefile we're evaluating at the top-level a chance to set # WARNS. If it doesn't do so, we may freely pull a DEFAULTWARNS if it's set # and use that. This allows us to default WARNS to 6 for src builds without # needing to set the default in various Makefile.inc. .if !defined(WARNS) && defined(DEFAULTWARNS) WARNS= ${DEFAULTWARNS} .endif # -pedantic is problematic because it also imposes namespace restrictions #CFLAGS+= -pedantic .if defined(WARNS) .if ${WARNS} >= 1 CWARNFLAGS+= -Wsystem-headers .if ${MK_WERROR} != "no" && ${MK_WERROR.${COMPILER_TYPE}:Uyes} != "no" CWARNFLAGS+= -Werror .endif # ${MK_WERROR} != "no" && ${MK_WERROR.${COMPILER_TYPE}:Uyes} != "no" .endif # WARNS >= 1 .if ${WARNS} >= 2 CWARNFLAGS+= -Wall -Wno-format-y2k .endif # WARNS >= 2 .if ${WARNS} >= 3 CWARNFLAGS+= -W -Wno-unused-parameter .if ${COMPILER_TYPE} == "clang" CWARNFLAGS+= -Wstrict-prototypes .endif CWARNFLAGS+= -Wmissing-prototypes -Wpointer-arith .endif # WARNS >= 3 .if ${WARNS} >= 4 CWARNFLAGS+= -Wreturn-type -Wcast-qual -Wwrite-strings -Wswitch -Wshadow\ -Wunused-parameter .if !defined(NO_WCAST_ALIGN) && !defined(NO_WCAST_ALIGN.${COMPILER_TYPE}) CWARNFLAGS+= -Wcast-align .endif # !NO_WCAST_ALIGN !NO_WCAST_ALIGN.${COMPILER_TYPE} .endif # WARNS >= 4 .if ${WARNS} >= 6 CWARNFLAGS+= -Wchar-subscripts -Wnested-externs \ -Wold-style-definition .if !defined(NO_WMISSING_VARIABLE_DECLARATIONS) CWARNFLAGS.clang+= -Wmissing-variable-declarations .endif .if !defined(NO_WTHREAD_SAFETY) CWARNFLAGS.clang+= -Wthread-safety .endif .endif # WARNS >= 6 .if ${WARNS} >= 2 && ${WARNS} <= 4 # XXX Delete -Wuninitialized by default for now -- the compiler doesn't # XXX always get it right. CWARNFLAGS+= -Wno-uninitialized .endif # WARNS >=2 && WARNS <= 4 CWARNFLAGS+= -Wno-pointer-sign .if !defined(NO_WDATE_TIME) CWARNFLAGS+= -Wdate-time .endif # NO_WDATE_TIME # Clang has more warnings enabled by default, and when using -Wall, so if WARNS # is set to low values, these have to be disabled explicitly. .if ${WARNS} <= 6 CWARNFLAGS.clang+= -Wno-empty-body -Wno-string-plus-int CWARNFLAGS.clang+= -Wno-unused-const-variable .if ${COMPILER_TYPE} == "clang" && ${COMPILER_VERSION} >= 150000 CWARNFLAGS.clang+= -Wno-error=unused-but-set-parameter .endif .endif # WARNS <= 6 .if ${WARNS} <= 3 CWARNFLAGS.clang+= -Wno-tautological-compare -Wno-unused-value\ -Wno-parentheses-equality -Wno-unused-function -Wno-enum-conversion CWARNFLAGS.clang+= -Wno-unused-local-typedef CWARNFLAGS.clang+= -Wno-address-of-packed-member .if ${COMPILER_TYPE} == "gcc" && ${COMPILER_VERSION} >= 90100 CWARNFLAGS.gcc+= -Wno-address-of-packed-member .endif .endif # WARNS <= 3 .if ${WARNS} <= 2 CWARNFLAGS.clang+= -Wno-switch -Wno-switch-enum -Wno-knr-promoted-parameter .endif # WARNS <= 2 .if ${WARNS} <= 1 CWARNFLAGS.clang+= -Wno-parentheses .endif # WARNS <= 1 .if defined(NO_WARRAY_BOUNDS) CWARNFLAGS.clang+= -Wno-array-bounds .endif # NO_WARRAY_BOUNDS .if defined(NO_WMISLEADING_INDENTATION) && \ ((${COMPILER_TYPE} == "clang" && ${COMPILER_VERSION} >= 100000) || \ ${COMPILER_TYPE} == "gcc") CWARNFLAGS+= -Wno-misleading-indentation .endif # NO_WMISLEADING_INDENTATION .if ${COMPILER_VERSION} >= 130000 NO_WUNUSED_BUT_SET_VARIABLE= -Wno-unused-but-set-variable .endif .if ${COMPILER_TYPE} == "clang" && ${COMPILER_VERSION} >= 140000 NO_WBITWISE_INSTEAD_OF_LOGICAL= -Wno-bitwise-instead-of-logical .endif .if ${COMPILER_TYPE} == "clang" && ${COMPILER_VERSION} >= 150000 NO_WARRAY_PARAMETER= -Wno-array-parameter NO_WSTRICT_PROTOTYPES= -Wno-strict-prototypes NO_WDEPRECATED_NON_PROTOTYPE=-Wno-deprecated-non-prototype .endif .if ${COMPILER_TYPE} == "gcc" && ${COMPILER_VERSION} >= 50200 NO_WUNUSED_BUT_SET_VARIABLE=-Wno-unused-but-set-variable .endif .if ${COMPILER_TYPE} == "gcc" && ${COMPILER_VERSION} >= 100100 NO_WZERO_LENGTH_BOUNDS= -Wno-zero-length-bounds .endif .if ${COMPILER_TYPE} == "gcc" && ${COMPILER_VERSION} >= 110100 NO_WARRAY_PARAMETER= -Wno-array-parameter .endif .if ${COMPILER_TYPE} == "gcc" && ${COMPILER_VERSION} >= 120100 NO_WUSE_AFTER_FREE= -Wno-use-after-free NO_WDANGLING_POINTER= -Wno-dangling-pointer .endif .endif # WARNS .if defined(FORMAT_AUDIT) WFORMAT= 1 .endif # FORMAT_AUDIT .if defined(WFORMAT) .if ${WFORMAT} > 0 #CWARNFLAGS+= -Wformat-nonliteral -Wformat-security -Wno-format-extra-args CWARNFLAGS+= -Wformat=2 -Wno-format-extra-args .if ${WARNS:U0} <= 3 CWARNFLAGS.clang+= -Wno-format-nonliteral .endif # WARNS <= 3 .if ${MK_WERROR} != "no" && ${MK_WERROR.${COMPILER_TYPE}:Uyes} != "no" CWARNFLAGS+= -Werror .endif # ${MK_WERROR} != "no" && ${MK_WERROR.${COMPILER_TYPE}:Uyes} != "no" .endif # WFORMAT > 0 .endif # WFORMAT .if defined(NO_WFORMAT) || defined(NO_WFORMAT.${COMPILER_TYPE}) CWARNFLAGS+= -Wno-format .endif # NO_WFORMAT || NO_WFORMAT.${COMPILER_TYPE} # GCC # We should clean up warnings produced with these flags. # They were originally added as a quick hack to enable gcc5/6. # The base system requires at least GCC 6.4, but some ports # use this file with older compilers. Request an exprun # before changing these. .if ${COMPILER_TYPE} == "gcc" # GCC 5.2.0 .if ${COMPILER_VERSION} >= 50200 CWARNFLAGS+= -Wno-error=address \ -Wno-error=array-bounds \ -Wno-error=attributes \ -Wno-error=bool-compare \ -Wno-error=cast-align \ -Wno-error=clobbered \ -Wno-error=deprecated-declarations \ -Wno-error=enum-compare \ -Wno-error=extra \ -Wno-error=logical-not-parentheses \ -Wno-error=strict-aliasing \ -Wno-error=uninitialized \ -Wno-error=unused-function \ -Wno-error=unused-value .endif # GCC 6.1.0 .if ${COMPILER_VERSION} >= 60100 CWARNFLAGS+= -Wno-error=empty-body \ -Wno-error=maybe-uninitialized \ -Wno-error=nonnull-compare \ -Wno-error=shift-negative-value \ -Wno-error=tautological-compare \ -Wno-error=unused-const-variable .endif # GCC 7.1.0 .if ${COMPILER_VERSION} >= 70100 CWARNFLAGS+= -Wno-error=bool-operation \ -Wno-error=deprecated \ -Wno-error=expansion-to-defined \ -Wno-error=format-overflow \ -Wno-error=format-truncation \ -Wno-error=implicit-fallthrough \ -Wno-error=int-in-bool-context \ -Wno-error=memset-elt-size \ -Wno-error=noexcept-type \ -Wno-error=nonnull \ -Wno-error=pointer-compare \ -Wno-error=stringop-overflow .endif # GCC 8.1.0 .if ${COMPILER_VERSION} >= 80100 CWARNFLAGS+= -Wno-error=aggressive-loop-optimizations \ -Wno-error=cast-function-type \ -Wno-error=catch-value \ -Wno-error=multistatement-macros \ -Wno-error=restrict \ -Wno-error=sizeof-pointer-memaccess \ -Wno-error=stringop-truncation .endif # GCC 9.2.0 .if ${COMPILER_VERSION} >= 90200 .if ${MACHINE_ARCH} == "i386" CWARNFLAGS+= -Wno-error=overflow .endif .endif # GCC 12.1.0 .if ${COMPILER_VERSION} >= 120100 # These warnings are raised by headers in libc++ so are disabled # globally for all C++ CXXWARNFLAGS+= -Wno-literal-suffix \ -Wno-error=unknown-pragmas .endif # GCC 13.1.0 .if ${COMPILER_VERSION} >= 130100 # These warnings are raised by headers in libc++ so are disabled # globally for all C++ CXXWARNFLAGS+= -Wno-dangling-reference .endif # GCC produces false positives for functions that switch on an # enum (GCC bug 87950) CWARNFLAGS+= -Wno-return-type # GCC's own arm_neon.h triggers various warnings .if ${MACHINE_CPUARCH} == "aarch64" CWARNFLAGS+= -Wno-system-headers .endif .endif # gcc # How to handle FreeBSD custom printf format specifiers. .if ${COMPILER_TYPE} == "clang" || \ (${COMPILER_TYPE} == "gcc" && ${COMPILER_VERSION} >= 120100) FORMAT_EXTENSIONS= -D__printf__=__freebsd_kprintf__ .else FORMAT_EXTENSIONS= -fformat-extensions .endif .if defined(IGNORE_PRAGMA) CWARNFLAGS+= -Wno-unknown-pragmas .endif # IGNORE_PRAGMA # This warning is utter nonsense CFLAGS+= -Wno-format-zero-length .if ${COMPILER_TYPE} == "clang" # The headers provided by clang are incompatible with the FreeBSD headers. # If the version of clang is not one that has been patched to omit the # incompatible headers, we need to compile with -nobuiltininc and add the # resource dir to the end of the search paths. This ensures that headers such as # immintrin.h are still found but stddef.h, etc. are picked up from FreeBSD. # # XXX: This is a hack to support complete external installs of clang while # we work to synchronize our decleration guards with those in the clang tree. .if ${MK_CLANG_BOOTSTRAP:Uno} == "no" && \ ${COMPILER_RESOURCE_DIR} != "unknown" && !defined(BOOTSTRAPPING) CFLAGS+=-nobuiltininc -idirafter ${COMPILER_RESOURCE_DIR}/include .endif .endif CLANG_OPT_SMALL= -mstack-alignment=8 -mllvm -inline-threshold=3 .if ${COMPILER_VERSION} < 130000 CLANG_OPT_SMALL+= -mllvm -simplifycfg-dup-ret .endif CLANG_OPT_SMALL+= -mllvm -enable-load-pre=false CFLAGS.clang+= -Qunused-arguments # The libc++ headers use c++11 extensions. These are normally silenced because # they are treated as system headers, but we explicitly disable that warning # suppression when building the base system to catch bugs in our headers. # Eventually we'll want to start building the base system C++ code as C++11, # but not yet. CXXFLAGS.clang+= -Wno-c++11-extensions +# XXX This should be defaulted to 2 when WITH_SSP is in use after further +# testing and soak time. +FORTIFY_SOURCE?= 0 .if ${MK_SSP} != "no" # Don't use -Wstack-protector as it breaks world with -Werror. SSP_CFLAGS?= -fstack-protector-strong CFLAGS+= ${SSP_CFLAGS} .endif # SSP +.if ${FORTIFY_SOURCE} > 0 +CFLAGS+= -D_FORTIFY_SOURCE=${FORTIFY_SOURCE} +CXXFLAGS+= -D_FORTIFY_SOURCE=${FORTIFY_SOURCE} +.endif # Additional flags passed in CFLAGS and CXXFLAGS when MK_DEBUG_FILES is # enabled. DEBUG_FILES_CFLAGS?= -g -gz=zlib # Allow user-specified additional warning flags, plus compiler and file # specific flag overrides, unless we've overridden this... .if ${MK_WARNS} != "no" CFLAGS+= ${CWARNFLAGS:M*} ${CWARNFLAGS.${COMPILER_TYPE}} CFLAGS+= ${CWARNFLAGS.${.IMPSRC:T}} CXXFLAGS+= ${CXXWARNFLAGS:M*} ${CXXWARNFLAGS.${COMPILER_TYPE}} CXXFLAGS+= ${CXXWARNFLAGS.${.IMPSRC:T}} .endif CFLAGS+= ${CFLAGS.${COMPILER_TYPE}} CXXFLAGS+= ${CXXFLAGS.${COMPILER_TYPE}} AFLAGS+= ${AFLAGS.${.IMPSRC:T}} AFLAGS+= ${AFLAGS.${.TARGET:T}} ACFLAGS+= ${ACFLAGS.${.IMPSRC:T}} ACFLAGS+= ${ACFLAGS.${.TARGET:T}} CFLAGS+= ${CFLAGS.${.IMPSRC:T}} CXXFLAGS+= ${CXXFLAGS.${.IMPSRC:T}} LDFLAGS+= ${LDFLAGS.${LINKER_TYPE}} # Only allow .TARGET when not using PROGS as it has the same syntax # per PROG which is ambiguous with this syntax. This is only needed # for PROG_VARS vars. # # Some directories (currently just clang) also need to disable this since # CFLAGS.${COMPILER_TYPE}, CFLAGS.${.IMPSRC:T} and CFLAGS.${.TARGET:T} all live # in the same namespace, meaning that, for example, GCC builds of clang pick up # CFLAGS.clang via CFLAGS.${.TARGET:T} and thus try to pass Clang-specific # flags. Ideally the different sources of CFLAGS would be namespaced to avoid # collisions. .if !defined(_RECURSING_PROGS) && !defined(NO_TARGET_FLAGS) .if ${MK_WARNS} != "no" CFLAGS+= ${CWARNFLAGS.${.TARGET:T}} .endif CFLAGS+= ${CFLAGS.${.TARGET:T}} CXXFLAGS+= ${CXXFLAGS.${.TARGET:T}} LDFLAGS+= ${LDFLAGS.${.TARGET:T}} LDADD+= ${LDADD.${.TARGET:T}} LIBADD+= ${LIBADD.${.TARGET:T}} .endif .if defined(SRCTOP) # Prevent rebuilding during install to support read-only objdirs. .if ${.TARGETS:M*install*} == ${.TARGETS} && empty(.MAKE.MODE:Mmeta) CFLAGS+= ERROR-tried-to-rebuild-during-make-install .endif .endif # Please keep this if in sync with kern.mk .if ${LD} != "ld" && (${CC:[1]:H} != ${LD:[1]:H} || ${LD:[1]:T} != "ld") # Add -fuse-ld=${LD} if $LD is in a different directory or not called "ld". .if ${COMPILER_TYPE} == "clang" # Note: Clang does not like relative paths for ld so we map ld.lld -> lld. .if ${COMPILER_VERSION} >= 120000 LDFLAGS+= --ld-path=${LD:[1]:S/^ld.//1W} .else LDFLAGS+= -fuse-ld=${LD:[1]:S/^ld.//1W} .endif .elif ${COMPILER_TYPE} == "gcc" # GCC does not support an absolute path for -fuse-ld so we just print this # warning instead and let the user add the required symlinks. # However, we can avoid this warning if -B is set appropriately (e.g. for # CROSS_TOOLCHAIN=...-gcc). .if !(${LD:[1]:T} == "ld" && ${CC:tw:M-B${LD:[1]:H}/}) .warning LD (${LD}) is not the default linker for ${CC} but -fuse-ld= is not supported .endif .endif .endif # Tell bmake not to mistake standard targets for things to be searched for # or expect to ever be up-to-date. PHONY_NOTMAIN = analyze afterdepend afterinstall all beforedepend beforeinstall \ beforelinking build build-tools buildconfig buildfiles \ buildincludes check checkdpadd clean cleandepend cleandir \ cleanobj configure depend distclean distribute exe \ files html includes install installconfig installdirs \ installfiles installincludes lint obj objlink objs objwarn \ realinstall tags whereobj # we don't want ${PROG} to be PHONY .PHONY: ${PHONY_NOTMAIN:N${PROG:U}} .NOTMAIN: ${PHONY_NOTMAIN:Nall} .if ${MK_STAGING} != "no" .if defined(_SKIP_BUILD) || (!make(all) && !make(clean*) && !make(*clean)) _SKIP_STAGING?= yes .endif .if ${_SKIP_STAGING:Uno} == "yes" staging stage_libs stage_files stage_as stage_links stage_symlinks: .else # allow targets like beforeinstall to be leveraged DESTDIR= ${STAGE_OBJTOP} .export DESTDIR .if target(beforeinstall) .if !empty(_LIBS) || (${MK_STAGING_PROG} != "no" && !defined(INTERNALPROG)) staging: beforeinstall .endif .endif # normally only libs and includes are staged .if ${MK_STAGING_PROG} != "no" && !defined(INTERNALPROG) STAGE_DIR.prog= ${STAGE_OBJTOP}${BINDIR} .if !empty(PROG) .if defined(PROGNAME) STAGE_AS_SETS+= prog STAGE_AS_${PROG}= ${PROGNAME} stage_as.prog: ${PROG} .else STAGE_SETS+= prog stage_files.prog: ${PROG} STAGE_TARGETS+= stage_files .endif .endif .endif .if !empty(_LIBS) && !defined(INTERNALLIB) .if defined(SHLIBDIR) && ${SHLIBDIR} != ${LIBDIR} && ${_LIBS:Uno:M*.so.*} != "" STAGE_SETS+= shlib STAGE_DIR.shlib= ${STAGE_OBJTOP}${SHLIBDIR} STAGE_FILES.shlib+= ${_LIBS:M*.so.*} stage_files.shlib: ${_LIBS:M*.so.*} .endif .if defined(SHLIB_LINK) && commands(${SHLIB_LINK:R}.ld) STAGE_AS_SETS+= ldscript STAGE_AS.ldscript+= ${SHLIB_LINK:R}.ld stage_as.ldscript: ${SHLIB_LINK:R}.ld STAGE_DIR.ldscript = ${STAGE_LIBDIR} STAGE_AS_${SHLIB_LINK:R}.ld:= ${SHLIB_LINK} NO_SHLIB_LINKS= .endif .if defined(STATIC_LDSCRIPT) && target(lib${LIB}.ald) STAGE_AS_SETS+= ald STAGE_DIR.ald = ${STAGE_LIBDIR} STAGE_AS.ald+= lib${LIB}.ald STAGE_AS_lib${LIB}.ald = lib${LIB}.a stage_as.ald: lib${LIB}.ald .endif .if target(stage_files.shlib) stage_libs: ${_LIBS} .if defined(DEBUG_FLAGS) && target(${SHLIB_NAME}.symbols) stage_files.shlib: ${SHLIB_NAME}.symbols .endif .else stage_libs: ${_LIBS} .endif .if defined(SHLIB_NAME) && defined(DEBUG_FLAGS) && target(${SHLIB_NAME}.symbols) stage_libs: ${SHLIB_NAME}.symbols .endif .endif .if !empty(INCS) || !empty(INCSGROUPS) && target(buildincludes) .if !defined(NO_BEFOREBUILD_INCLUDES) stage_includes: buildincludes beforebuild: stage_includes .endif .endif .for t in stage_libs stage_files stage_as .if target($t) STAGE_TARGETS+= $t .endif .endfor .if !empty(STAGE_AS_SETS) STAGE_TARGETS+= stage_as .endif .if !empty(STAGE_TARGETS) || (${MK_STAGING_PROG} != "no" && !defined(INTERNALPROG)) .if !empty(LINKS) STAGE_TARGETS+= stage_links .if ${MAKE_VERSION} < 20131001 stage_links.links: ${_LIBS} ${PROG} .endif STAGE_SETS+= links STAGE_LINKS.links= ${LINKS} .endif .if !empty(SYMLINKS) STAGE_TARGETS+= stage_symlinks STAGE_SETS+= links STAGE_SYMLINKS.links= ${SYMLINKS} .endif .endif .include .endif .endif .if defined(META_TARGETS) .for _tgt in ${META_TARGETS} .if target(${_tgt}) ${_tgt}: ${META_DEPS} .endif .endfor .endif # we are generally the last makefile read CFLAGS+= ${CFLAGS_LAST} CXXFLAGS+= ${CXXFLAGS_LAST} LDFLAGS+= ${LDFLAGS_LAST} diff --git a/tools/build/options/WITHOUT_SSP b/tools/build/options/WITHOUT_SSP index 88162cecf14a..7a773fe1e5aa 100644 --- a/tools/build/options/WITHOUT_SSP +++ b/tools/build/options/WITHOUT_SSP @@ -1 +1,4 @@ Do not build world with stack smashing protection. +See +.Xr security 7 +for more information. diff --git a/tools/build/options/WITH_SSP b/tools/build/options/WITH_SSP index 0088dd133782..4f06a73d4173 100644 --- a/tools/build/options/WITH_SSP +++ b/tools/build/options/WITH_SSP @@ -1 +1,4 @@ Build world with stack smashing protection. +See +.Xr security 7 +for more information.