Differential D32104 Diff 96373 sys/dev/cxgbe/crypto/t4_crypto.c

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sys/dev/cxgbe/crypto/t4_crypto.c

Show First 20 Lines • Show All 1,130 Lines • ▼ Show 20 Lines	if (crp->crp_aad_length + AES_BLOCK_LEN > MAX_AAD_LEN)
return (EMSGSIZE);		return (EMSGSIZE);

hash_size_in_response = s->gmac.hash_len;		hash_size_in_response = s->gmac.hash_len;
if (CRYPTO_OP_IS_ENCRYPT(crp->crp_op))		if (CRYPTO_OP_IS_ENCRYPT(crp->crp_op))
op_type = CHCR_ENCRYPT_OP;		op_type = CHCR_ENCRYPT_OP;
else		else
op_type = CHCR_DECRYPT_OP;		op_type = CHCR_DECRYPT_OP;

/*
* The IV handling for GCM in OCF is a bit more complicated in
* that IPSec provides a full 16-byte IV (including the
* counter), whereas the /dev/crypto interface sometimes
* provides a full 16-byte IV (if no IV is provided in the
* ioctl) and sometimes a 12-byte IV (if the IV was explicit).
*
* When provided a 12-byte IV, assume the IV is really 16 bytes
* with a counter in the last 4 bytes initialized to 1.
*
* While iv_len is checked below, the value is currently
* always set to 12 when creating a GCM session in this driver
* due to limitations in OCF (there is no way to know what the
* IV length of a given request will be). This means that the
* driver always assumes as 12-byte IV for now.
*/
if (s->blkcipher.iv_len == 12)
iv_len = AES_BLOCK_LEN;		iv_len = AES_BLOCK_LEN;
else
iv_len = s->blkcipher.iv_len;

/*		/*
* GCM requests should always provide an explicit IV.		* GCM requests should always provide an explicit IV.
*/		*/
if ((crp->crp_flags & CRYPTO_F_IV_SEPARATE) == 0)		if ((crp->crp_flags & CRYPTO_F_IV_SEPARATE) == 0)
return (EINVAL);		return (EINVAL);

/*		/*
▲ Show 20 Lines • Show All 121 Lines • ▼ Show 20 Lines	ccr_gcm(struct ccr_softc sc, struct ccr_session s, struct cryptop *crp)
wr = alloc_wrqe(wr_len, s->port->txq);		wr = alloc_wrqe(wr_len, s->port->txq);
if (wr == NULL) {		if (wr == NULL) {
counter_u64_add(sc->stats_wr_nomem, 1);		counter_u64_add(sc->stats_wr_nomem, 1);
return (ENOMEM);		return (ENOMEM);
}		}
crwr = wrtod(wr);		crwr = wrtod(wr);
memset(crwr, 0, wr_len);		memset(crwr, 0, wr_len);

memcpy(iv, crp->crp_iv, s->blkcipher.iv_len);		crypto_read_iv(crp, iv);
if (s->blkcipher.iv_len == 12)
(uint32_t )&iv[12] = htobe32(1);		(uint32_t )&iv[12] = htobe32(1);

ccr_populate_wreq(sc, s, crwr, kctx_len, wr_len, imm_len, sgl_len, 0,		ccr_populate_wreq(sc, s, crwr, kctx_len, wr_len, imm_len, sgl_len, 0,
crp);		crp);

crwr->sec_cpl.op_ivinsrtofst = htobe32(		crwr->sec_cpl.op_ivinsrtofst = htobe32(
V_CPL_TX_SEC_PDU_OPCODE(CPL_TX_SEC_PDU) \|		V_CPL_TX_SEC_PDU_OPCODE(CPL_TX_SEC_PDU) \|
V_CPL_TX_SEC_PDU_RXCHID(s->port->rx_channel_id) \|		V_CPL_TX_SEC_PDU_RXCHID(s->port->rx_channel_id) \|
V_CPL_TX_SEC_PDU_ACKFOLLOWS(0) \| V_CPL_TX_SEC_PDU_ULPTXLPBK(1) \|		V_CPL_TX_SEC_PDU_ACKFOLLOWS(0) \| V_CPL_TX_SEC_PDU_ULPTXLPBK(1) \|
▲ Show 20 Lines • Show All 136 Lines • ▼ Show 20 Lines	if (kschedule == NULL) {
error = ENOMEM;		error = ENOMEM;
goto out;		goto out;
}		}
error = exf->setkey(kschedule, s->blkcipher.enckey,		error = exf->setkey(kschedule, s->blkcipher.enckey,
s->blkcipher.key_len);		s->blkcipher.key_len);
if (error)		if (error)
goto out;		goto out;

/*
* This assumes a 12-byte IV from the crp. See longer comment
* above in ccr_gcm() for more details.
*/
if ((crp->crp_flags & CRYPTO_F_IV_SEPARATE) == 0) {		if ((crp->crp_flags & CRYPTO_F_IV_SEPARATE) == 0) {
error = EINVAL;		error = EINVAL;
goto out;		goto out;
}		}
memcpy(iv, crp->crp_iv, 12);		crypto_read_iv(crp, iv);
(uint32_t )&iv[12] = htobe32(1);		(uint32_t )&iv[12] = htobe32(1);

axf->Reinit(auth_ctx, iv, sizeof(iv));		axf->Reinit(auth_ctx, iv, sizeof(iv));

/* MAC the AAD. */		/* MAC the AAD. */
if (crp->crp_aad != NULL) {		if (crp->crp_aad != NULL) {
len = rounddown(crp->crp_aad_length, sizeof(block));		len = rounddown(crp->crp_aad_length, sizeof(block));
if (len != 0)		if (len != 0)
▲ Show 20 Lines • Show All 297 Lines • ▼ Show 20 Lines	ccr_ccm(struct ccr_softc sc, struct ccr_session s, struct cryptop *crp)
memset(crwr, 0, wr_len);		memset(crwr, 0, wr_len);

/*		/*
* Read the nonce from the request. Use the nonce to generate		* Read the nonce from the request. Use the nonce to generate
* the full IV with the counter set to 0.		* the full IV with the counter set to 0.
*/		*/
memset(iv, 0, iv_len);		memset(iv, 0, iv_len);
iv[0] = (15 - AES_CCM_IV_LEN) - 1;		iv[0] = (15 - AES_CCM_IV_LEN) - 1;
memcpy(iv + 1, crp->crp_iv, AES_CCM_IV_LEN);		crypto_read_iv(crp, iv + 1);

ccr_populate_wreq(sc, s, crwr, kctx_len, wr_len, imm_len, sgl_len, 0,		ccr_populate_wreq(sc, s, crwr, kctx_len, wr_len, imm_len, sgl_len, 0,
crp);		crp);

crwr->sec_cpl.op_ivinsrtofst = htobe32(		crwr->sec_cpl.op_ivinsrtofst = htobe32(
V_CPL_TX_SEC_PDU_OPCODE(CPL_TX_SEC_PDU) \|		V_CPL_TX_SEC_PDU_OPCODE(CPL_TX_SEC_PDU) \|
V_CPL_TX_SEC_PDU_RXCHID(s->port->rx_channel_id) \|		V_CPL_TX_SEC_PDU_RXCHID(s->port->rx_channel_id) \|
V_CPL_TX_SEC_PDU_ACKFOLLOWS(0) \| V_CPL_TX_SEC_PDU_ULPTXLPBK(1) \|		V_CPL_TX_SEC_PDU_ACKFOLLOWS(0) \| V_CPL_TX_SEC_PDU_ULPTXLPBK(1) \|
▲ Show 20 Lines • Show All 156 Lines • ▼ Show 20 Lines	error = exf->setkey(kschedule, s->blkcipher.enckey,
s->blkcipher.key_len);		s->blkcipher.key_len);
if (error)		if (error)
goto out;		goto out;

if ((crp->crp_flags & CRYPTO_F_IV_SEPARATE) == 0) {		if ((crp->crp_flags & CRYPTO_F_IV_SEPARATE) == 0) {
error = EINVAL;		error = EINVAL;
goto out;		goto out;
}		}
memcpy(iv, crp->crp_iv, AES_CCM_IV_LEN);		crypto_read_iv(crp, iv);

auth_ctx->aes_cbc_mac_ctx.authDataLength = crp->crp_aad_length;		auth_ctx->aes_cbc_mac_ctx.authDataLength = crp->crp_aad_length;
auth_ctx->aes_cbc_mac_ctx.cryptDataLength = crp->crp_payload_length;		auth_ctx->aes_cbc_mac_ctx.cryptDataLength = crp->crp_payload_length;
axf->Reinit(auth_ctx, iv, sizeof(iv));		axf->Reinit(auth_ctx, iv, sizeof(iv));

/* MAC the AAD. */		/* MAC the AAD. */
if (crp->crp_aad != NULL)		if (crp->crp_aad != NULL)
error = axf->Update(auth_ctx, crp->crp_aad,		error = axf->Update(auth_ctx, crp->crp_aad,
▲ Show 20 Lines • Show All 1,028 Lines • Show Last 20 Lines