Page MenuHomeFreeBSD
Differential D29719 Diff 87304 tests/sys/file/path_test.c

Changeset View

Standalone View

View Options

tests/sys/file/path_test.c

  • This file was added.
/*-
* SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-2-Clause-FreeBSD
*
* Copyright (c) 2021 The FreeBSD Foundation
*
* This software was developed by Mark Johnston under sponsorship from
* the FreeBSD Foundation.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions are
* met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
* the documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
* ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
* ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
* FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
* DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
* OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
* LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
* OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
* SUCH DAMAGE.
*/
/*
* Basic regression tests for handling of O_PATH descriptors.
*/
#include <sys/param.h>
#include <sys/event.h>
#include <sys/ioctl.h>
#include <sys/memrange.h>
#include <sys/mman.h>
#include <sys/socket.h>
#include <sys/stat.h>
#include <sys/time.h>
#include <sys/uio.h>
#include <sys/wait.h>
#include <aio.h>
#include <dirent.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <poll.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <atf-c.h>
#define FMT_ERR(s) s ": %s", strerror(errno)
#define CHECKED_CLOSE(fd) \
ATF_REQUIRE_MSG(close(fd) == 0, FMT_ERR("close"))
/* Create a temporary regular file containing some data. */
static void
mktfile(char path[PATH_MAX], const char *template)
{
char buf[BUFSIZ];
int fd;
snprintf(path, PATH_MAX, "%s", template);
fd = mkstemp(path);
ATF_REQUIRE_MSG(fd >= 0, FMT_ERR("mkstemp"));
memset(buf, 0, sizeof(buf));
ATF_REQUIRE_MSG(write(fd, buf, sizeof(buf)) == sizeof(buf),
FMT_ERR("write"));
CHECKED_CLOSE(fd);
}
/* Make a temporary directory. */
static void
mktdir(char path[PATH_MAX], const char *template)
{
snprintf(path, PATH_MAX, "%s", template);
ATF_REQUIRE_MSG(mkdtemp(path) == path, FMT_ERR("mkdtemp"));
}
ATF_TC_WITHOUT_HEAD(path_access);
ATF_TC_BODY(path_access, tc)
{
char path[PATH_MAX];
struct stat sb;
struct timespec ts[2];
struct timeval tv[2];
int pathfd;
mktfile(path, "path_access.XXXXXX");
pathfd = open(path, O_PATH);
ATF_REQUIRE_MSG(pathfd >= 0, FMT_ERR("open"));
kibUnsubmitted
Done
Inline Actions

Canonical way, AFAIU, is to not specify O_RDONLY. O_PATH is the access mode on its own. When requesting O_PATH | O_EXEC, we requesting two modes.

On the other hand, O_RDONLY is zero so it is fine either way for testing the implementation.

kib: Canonical way, AFAIU, is to not specify O_RDONLY. O_PATH is the access mode on its own. When…
ATF_REQUIRE_ERRNO(EBADF, fchmod(pathfd, 0666) == -1);
ATF_REQUIRE_ERRNO(EBADF, fchown(pathfd, getuid(), getgid()) == -1);
ATF_REQUIRE_ERRNO(EBADF, fchflags(pathfd, UF_NODUMP) == -1);
memset(tv, 0, sizeof(tv));
ATF_REQUIRE_ERRNO(EBADF, futimes(pathfd, tv) == -1);
memset(ts, 0, sizeof(ts));
ATF_REQUIRE_ERRNO(EBADF, futimens(pathfd, ts) == -1);
/* fpathconf(2) and fstat(2) are permitted. */
ATF_REQUIRE_MSG(fstat(pathfd, &sb) == 0, FMT_ERR("fstat"));
ATF_REQUIRE_MSG(fpathconf(pathfd, _PC_LINK_MAX) != -1,
FMT_ERR("fpathconf"));
CHECKED_CLOSE(pathfd);
}
/* Basic tests to verify that AIO operations fail. */
ATF_TC_WITHOUT_HEAD(path_aio);
ATF_TC_BODY(path_aio, tc)
{
struct aiocb aio;
char buf[BUFSIZ], path[PATH_MAX];
int pathfd;
mktfile(path, "path_aio.XXXXXX");
pathfd = open(path, O_PATH);
ATF_REQUIRE_MSG(pathfd >= 0, FMT_ERR("open"));
memset(&aio, 0, sizeof(aio));
aio.aio_buf = buf;
aio.aio_nbytes = sizeof(buf);
aio.aio_fildes = pathfd;
aio.aio_offset = 0;
ATF_REQUIRE_ERRNO(EBADF, aio_read(&aio) == -1);
ATF_REQUIRE_ERRNO(EBADF, aio_write(&aio) == -1);
ATF_REQUIRE_ERRNO(EBADF, aio_fsync(O_SYNC, &aio) == -1);
ATF_REQUIRE_ERRNO(EBADF, aio_fsync(O_DSYNC, &aio) == -1);
CHECKED_CLOSE(pathfd);
}
/* Verify operations on directory path descriptors. */
ATF_TC_WITHOUT_HEAD(path_directory);
ATF_TC_BODY(path_directory, tc)
{
struct dirent de;
struct stat sb;
char path[PATH_MAX];
int fd, pathfd;
mktdir(path, "path_directory.XXXXXX");
pathfd = open(path, O_PATH | O_DIRECTORY);
ATF_REQUIRE_MSG(pathfd >= 0, FMT_ERR("open"));
/* Should not be possible to list directory entries. */
ATF_REQUIRE_ERRNO(EBADF,
getdirentries(pathfd, (char *)&de, sizeof(de), NULL) == -1);
/* It should be possible to create files under pathfd. */
fd = openat(pathfd, "test", O_RDWR | O_CREAT, 0600);
ATF_REQUIRE_MSG(fd >= 0, FMT_ERR("open"));
ATF_REQUIRE_MSG(fstatat(pathfd, "test", &sb, 0) == 0,
FMT_ERR("fstatat"));
CHECKED_CLOSE(fd);
/* ... but doing so requires write access. */
if (geteuid() != 0) {
ATF_REQUIRE_ERRNO(EBADF, fchmod(pathfd, 0500) == -1);
ATF_REQUIRE_MSG(chmod(path, 0500) == 0, FMT_ERR("chmod"));
ATF_REQUIRE_ERRNO(EACCES,
openat(pathfd, "test2", O_RDWR | O_CREAT, 0600) < 0);
}
/* fchdir(2) is permitted. */
ATF_REQUIRE_MSG(fchdir(pathfd) == 0, FMT_ERR("fchdir"));
CHECKED_CLOSE(pathfd);
}
/* Validate system calls that handle AT_EMPTY_PATH. */
ATF_TC_WITHOUT_HEAD(path_empty);
ATF_TC_BODY(path_empty, tc)
{
char path[PATH_MAX];
struct timespec ts[2];
struct stat sb;
int pathfd;
mktfile(path, "path_empty.XXXXXX");
pathfd = open(path, O_PATH);
ATF_REQUIRE_MSG(pathfd >= 0, FMT_ERR("open"));
/* Various *at operations should work on path fds. */
ATF_REQUIRE_MSG(faccessat(pathfd, "", F_OK, AT_EMPTY_PATH) == 0,
FMT_ERR("faccessat"));
ATF_REQUIRE_MSG(chflagsat(pathfd, "", UF_NODUMP, AT_EMPTY_PATH) == 0,
FMT_ERR("chflagsat"));
ATF_REQUIRE_MSG(fchmodat(pathfd, "", 0600, AT_EMPTY_PATH) == 0,
FMT_ERR("fchmodat"));
ATF_REQUIRE_MSG(fchownat(pathfd, "", getuid(), getgid(),
AT_EMPTY_PATH) == 0, FMT_ERR("fchownat"));
ATF_REQUIRE_MSG(fstatat(pathfd, "", &sb, AT_EMPTY_PATH) == 0,
FMT_ERR("fstatat"));
ATF_REQUIRE_MSG(sb.st_size == BUFSIZ,
"unexpected size %ju", (uintmax_t)sb.st_size);
memset(ts, 0, sizeof(ts));
ATF_REQUIRE_MSG(utimensat(pathfd, "", ts, AT_EMPTY_PATH) == 0,
FMT_ERR("utimensat"));
CHECKED_CLOSE(pathfd);
/* Try to verify that we can't operate on privileged files. */
if (geteuid() != 0) {
pathfd = open("/dev/null", O_PATH);
ATF_REQUIRE_MSG(pathfd >= 0, FMT_ERR("open"));
ATF_REQUIRE_ERRNO(EPERM,
fchownat(pathfd, "", getuid(), getgid(), AT_EMPTY_PATH) ==
-1);
ATF_REQUIRE_ERRNO(EPERM,
linkat(pathfd, "", AT_FDCWD, "test", AT_EMPTY_PATH) == -1);
CHECKED_CLOSE(pathfd);
}
}
/* Test linkat(2) with AT_EMPTY_PATH, which requires privileges. */
ATF_TC_WITH_CLEANUP(path_empty_root);
ATF_TC_HEAD(path_empty_root, tc)
{
atf_tc_set_md_var(tc, "require.user", "root");
}
kibUnsubmitted
Not Done
Inline Actions

It would be most interesting to do something in reverse, namely, check that AT_EMPTY_PATH verifies access permissions when non-root user tries to e.g. linkat(AT_EMPTY_PATH) to file he does not own. In other words, check that AT_EMPTY_PATH does not create a security hole.

But I have no idea how to do it with atf.

kib: It would be most interesting to do something in reverse, namely, check that AT_EMPTY_PATH…
markjAuthorUnsubmitted
Done
Inline Actions

I tried to do this in the test above, with the geteuid() == 0 check. It is not ideal, nothing ensures that the test is ever run as a non-root user.

markj: I tried to do this in the test above, with the `geteuid() == 0` check. It is not ideal, nothing…
kibUnsubmitted
Not Done
Inline Actions

There is some mechanism in ATF triggered by atf_tc_set_md_var(tc, "require.user", "unprivileged");. See for instance contrib/netbsd-tests/lib/libc/sys/t_access.c access_access

But I have no idea about details.

kib: There is some mechanism in ATF triggered by `atf_tc_set_md_var(tc, "require.user"…
markjAuthorUnsubmitted
Done
Inline Actions

Thanks, I didn't know about it. Apparently it causes kyua to run the test without privileges if invoked as root.

markj: Thanks, I didn't know about it. Apparently it causes kyua to run the test without privileges if…
ATF_TC_BODY(path_empty_root, tc)
{
char path[PATH_MAX];
struct stat sb, sb2;
int pathfd;
mktfile(path, "path_empty_root.XXXXXX");
pathfd = open(path, O_PATH);
ATF_REQUIRE_MSG(pathfd >= 0, FMT_ERR("open"));
ATF_REQUIRE_MSG(fstatat(pathfd, "", &sb, AT_EMPTY_PATH) == 0,
FMT_ERR("fstatat"));
ATF_REQUIRE_MSG(linkat(pathfd, "", AT_FDCWD, "test", AT_EMPTY_PATH) ==
0, FMT_ERR("linkat"));
ATF_REQUIRE_MSG(fstatat(AT_FDCWD, "test", &sb2, 0) == 0,
FMT_ERR("fstatat"));
ATF_REQUIRE_MSG(sb.st_dev == sb2.st_dev, "st_dev mismatch");
ATF_REQUIRE_MSG(sb.st_ino == sb2.st_ino, "st_ino mismatch");
CHECKED_CLOSE(pathfd);
}
ATF_TC_CLEANUP(path_empty_root, tc)
{
}
/* poll(2) never returns an event for path fds, but kevent(2) does. */
ATF_TC_WITHOUT_HEAD(path_event);
ATF_TC_BODY(path_event, tc)
{
char buf[BUFSIZ], path[PATH_MAX];
struct kevent ev;
struct pollfd pollfd;
int kq, pathfd;
mktfile(path, "path_event.XXXXXX");
pathfd = open(path, O_PATH);
ATF_REQUIRE_MSG(pathfd >= 0, FMT_ERR("open"));
/* poll(2) should return POLLNVAL. */
pollfd.fd = pathfd;
pollfd.events = POLLIN;
pollfd.revents = 0;
ATF_REQUIRE_MSG(poll(&pollfd, 1, 0) == 1, FMT_ERR("poll"));
ATF_REQUIRE_MSG(pollfd.revents == POLLNVAL, "unexpected revents %x",
pollfd.revents);
pollfd.events = POLLOUT;
pollfd.revents = 0;
ATF_REQUIRE_MSG(poll(&pollfd, 1, 0) == 1, FMT_ERR("poll"));
ATF_REQUIRE_MSG(pollfd.revents == POLLNVAL, "unexpected revents %x",
pollfd.revents);
/* Try to get a EVFILT_READ event through a path fd. */
kq = kqueue();
ATF_REQUIRE_MSG(kq >= 0, FMT_ERR("kqueue"));
EV_SET(&ev, pathfd, EVFILT_READ, EV_ADD | EV_ENABLE, 0, 0, 0);
ATF_REQUIRE_MSG(kevent(kq, &ev, 1, NULL, 0, NULL) == 0,
FMT_ERR("kevent"));
ATF_REQUIRE_MSG(kevent(kq, NULL, 0, &ev, 1, NULL) == 1,
FMT_ERR("kevent"));
ATF_REQUIRE_MSG((ev.flags & EV_ERROR) == 0, "EV_ERROR is set");
ATF_REQUIRE_MSG(ev.data == sizeof(buf),
"data is %jd", (intmax_t)ev.data);
EV_SET(&ev, pathfd, EVFILT_READ, EV_DELETE, 0, 0, 0);
ATF_REQUIRE_MSG(kevent(kq, &ev, 1, NULL, 0, NULL) == 0,
FMT_ERR("kevent"));
/* Try to get a EVFILT_VNODE/NOTE_LINK event through a path fd. */
EV_SET(&ev, pathfd, EVFILT_VNODE, EV_ADD | EV_ENABLE, NOTE_LINK, 0, 0);
ATF_REQUIRE_MSG(kevent(kq, &ev, 1, NULL, 0, NULL) == 0,
FMT_ERR("kevent"));
ATF_REQUIRE_MSG(funlinkat(AT_FDCWD, path, pathfd, 0) == 0,
FMT_ERR("funlinkat"));
ATF_REQUIRE_MSG(kevent(kq, NULL, 0, &ev, 1, NULL) == 1,
FMT_ERR("kevent"));
EV_SET(&ev, pathfd, EVFILT_VNODE, EV_DELETE, 0, 0, 0);
ATF_REQUIRE_MSG(kevent(kq, &ev, 1, NULL, 0, NULL) == 0,
FMT_ERR("kevent"));
CHECKED_CLOSE(kq);
CHECKED_CLOSE(pathfd);
}
/* Check various fcntl(2) operations on a path desriptor. */
ATF_TC_WITHOUT_HEAD(path_fcntl);
ATF_TC_BODY(path_fcntl, tc)
{
char path[PATH_MAX];
int flags, pathfd, pathfd2;
mktfile(path, "path_fcntl.XXXXXX");
pathfd = open(path, O_PATH);
ATF_REQUIRE_MSG(pathfd >= 0, FMT_ERR("open"));
/* O_PATH should appear in the fd flags. */
flags = fcntl(pathfd, F_GETFL);
ATF_REQUIRE_MSG(flags != -1, FMT_ERR("fcntl"));
ATF_REQUIRE_MSG((flags & O_PATH) != 0, "O_PATH not set");
ATF_REQUIRE_ERRNO(EBADF,
fcntl(pathfd, F_SETFL, flags & ~O_PATH));
ATF_REQUIRE_ERRNO(EBADF,
fcntl(pathfd, F_SETFL, flags | O_APPEND));
/* A dup'ed O_PATH fd had better have O_PATH set too. */
pathfd2 = fcntl(pathfd, F_DUPFD, 0);
ATF_REQUIRE_MSG(pathfd2 >= 0, FMT_ERR("fcntl"));
flags = fcntl(pathfd2, F_GETFL);
ATF_REQUIRE_MSG(flags != -1, FMT_ERR("fcntl"));
ATF_REQUIRE_MSG((flags & O_PATH) != 0, "O_PATH not set");
CHECKED_CLOSE(pathfd2);
/* Double check with dup(2). */
pathfd2 = dup(pathfd);
ATF_REQUIRE_MSG(pathfd2 >= 0, FMT_ERR("dup"));
flags = fcntl(pathfd2, F_GETFL);
ATF_REQUIRE_MSG(flags != -1, FMT_ERR("fcntl"));
ATF_REQUIRE_MSG((flags & O_PATH) != 0, "O_PATH not set");
CHECKED_CLOSE(pathfd2);
/* It should be possible to set O_CLOEXEC. */
ATF_REQUIRE_MSG(fcntl(pathfd, F_SETFD, FD_CLOEXEC) == 0,
FMT_ERR("fcntl"));
ATF_REQUIRE_MSG(fcntl(pathfd, F_GETFD) == FD_CLOEXEC,
FMT_ERR("fcntl"));
CHECKED_CLOSE(pathfd);
}
/* Verify that we can execute a file opened with O_PATH. */
ATF_TC_WITHOUT_HEAD(path_fexecve);
ATF_TC_BODY(path_fexecve, tc)
{
char path[PATH_MAX];
pid_t child;
int error, fd, pathfd, status;
child = fork();
ATF_REQUIRE_MSG(child != -1, FMT_ERR("fork"));
if (child == 0) {
pathfd = open("/usr/bin/true", O_PATH | O_EXEC);
if (pathfd < 0)
_exit(1);
fexecve(pathfd,
(char * const[]){__DECONST(char *, "/usr/bin/true"), NULL},
NULL);
_exit(2);
}
error = waitpid(child, &status, 0);
ATF_REQUIRE_MSG(error != -1, FMT_ERR("waitpid"));
ATF_REQUIRE_MSG(WIFEXITED(status), "child exited abnormally, status %d",
status);
ATF_REQUIRE_MSG(WEXITSTATUS(status) == 0, "child exit status is %d",
WEXITSTATUS(status));
/*
* Also verify that access permissions are checked when opening with
* O_PATH.
*/
snprintf(path, sizeof(path), "path_fexecve.XXXXXX");
ATF_REQUIRE_MSG(mktemp(path) == path, FMT_ERR("mktemp"));
fd = open(path, O_CREAT | O_RDONLY, 0600);
ATF_REQUIRE_MSG(fd >= 0, FMT_ERR("open"));
pathfd = open(path, O_PATH | O_EXEC);
ATF_REQUIRE_ERRNO(EACCES, pathfd < 0);
}
/* Files may be unlinked using a path fd. */
ATF_TC_WITHOUT_HEAD(path_funlinkat);
ATF_TC_BODY(path_funlinkat, tc)
{
char path[PATH_MAX];
struct stat sb;
int pathfd;
mktfile(path, "path_rights.XXXXXX");
pathfd = open(path, O_PATH);
ATF_REQUIRE_MSG(pathfd >= 0, FMT_ERR("open"));
ATF_REQUIRE_MSG(funlinkat(AT_FDCWD, path, pathfd, 0) == 0,
FMT_ERR("funlinkat"));
ATF_REQUIRE_ERRNO(ENOENT, stat(path, &sb) == -1);
CHECKED_CLOSE(pathfd);
}
/* Verify that various I/O operations fail on an O_PATH descriptor. */
ATF_TC_WITHOUT_HEAD(path_io);
ATF_TC_BODY(path_io, tc)
{
char path[PATH_MAX], path2[PATH_MAX];
char buf[BUFSIZ];
struct iovec iov;
int error, fd, pathfd, sd[2];
/* It shouldn't be possible to create new files with O_PATH. */
snprintf(path, sizeof(path), "path_io.XXXXXX");
ATF_REQUIRE_MSG(mktemp(path) == path, FMT_ERR("mktemp"));
ATF_REQUIRE_ERRNO(ENOENT, open(path, O_PATH | O_CREAT, 0600) < 0);
/* Create a non-empty file for use in the rest of the tests. */
mktfile(path, "path_io.XXXXXX");
pathfd = open(path, O_PATH);
ATF_REQUIRE_MSG(pathfd >= 0, FMT_ERR("open"));
/* Make sure that basic I/O operations aren't possible. */
iov.iov_base = path;
iov.iov_len = strlen(path);
ATF_REQUIRE_ERRNO(EBADF,
write(pathfd, iov.iov_base, iov.iov_len) == -1);
ATF_REQUIRE_ERRNO(EBADF,
pwrite(pathfd, iov.iov_base, iov.iov_len, 0) == -1);
ATF_REQUIRE_ERRNO(EBADF,
writev(pathfd, &iov, 1) == -1);
ATF_REQUIRE_ERRNO(EBADF,
pwritev(pathfd, &iov, 1, 0) == -1);
ATF_REQUIRE_ERRNO(EBADF,
read(pathfd, path, 1) == -1);
ATF_REQUIRE_ERRNO(EBADF,
pread(pathfd, path, 1, 0) == -1);
ATF_REQUIRE_ERRNO(EBADF,
readv(pathfd, &iov, 1) == -1);
ATF_REQUIRE_ERRNO(EBADF,
preadv(pathfd, &iov, 1, 0) == -1);
/* copy_file_range() should not be permitted. */
mktfile(path2, "path_io.XXXXXX");
fd = open(path2, O_RDWR);
ATF_REQUIRE_ERRNO(EBADF,
copy_file_range(fd, NULL, pathfd, NULL, sizeof(buf), 0) == -1);
ATF_REQUIRE_ERRNO(EBADF,
copy_file_range(pathfd, NULL, fd, NULL, sizeof(buf), 0) == -1);
CHECKED_CLOSE(fd);
/* sendfile() should not be permitted. */
ATF_REQUIRE_MSG(socketpair(PF_LOCAL, SOCK_STREAM, 0, sd) == 0,
FMT_ERR("socketpair"));
ATF_REQUIRE_ERRNO(EBADF,
sendfile(pathfd, sd[0], 0, 0, NULL, NULL, 0));
CHECKED_CLOSE(sd[0]);
CHECKED_CLOSE(sd[1]);
/* No seeking. */
ATF_REQUIRE_ERRNO(ESPIPE,
lseek(pathfd, 0, SEEK_SET) == -1);
/* No operations on the file extent. */
ATF_REQUIRE_ERRNO(EINVAL,
ftruncate(pathfd, 0) == -1);
error = posix_fallocate(pathfd, 0, sizeof(buf) * 2);
ATF_REQUIRE_MSG(error == ESPIPE, "posix_fallocate() returned %d", error);
error = posix_fadvise(pathfd, 0, sizeof(buf), POSIX_FADV_NORMAL);
ATF_REQUIRE_MSG(error == ESPIPE, "posix_fadvise() returned %d", error);
/* mmap() is not allowed. */
ATF_REQUIRE_ERRNO(ENODEV,
mmap(NULL, PAGE_SIZE, PROT_READ, MAP_SHARED, pathfd, 0) ==
MAP_FAILED);
ATF_REQUIRE_ERRNO(ENODEV,
mmap(NULL, PAGE_SIZE, PROT_NONE, MAP_SHARED, pathfd, 0) ==
MAP_FAILED);
ATF_REQUIRE_ERRNO(ENODEV,
mmap(NULL, PAGE_SIZE, PROT_READ, MAP_PRIVATE, pathfd, 0) ==
MAP_FAILED);
/* No fsync() or fdatasync(). */
ATF_REQUIRE_ERRNO(EBADF, fsync(pathfd) == -1);
ATF_REQUIRE_ERRNO(EBADF, fdatasync(pathfd) == -1);
CHECKED_CLOSE(pathfd);
}
/* ioctl(2) is not permitted on path fds. */
ATF_TC_WITHOUT_HEAD(path_ioctl);
ATF_TC_BODY(path_ioctl, tc)
{
char path[PATH_MAX];
struct mem_extract me;
int pathfd, val;
mktfile(path, "path_ioctl.XXXXXX");
/* Standard file descriptor ioctls should fail. */
pathfd = open(path, O_PATH);
ATF_REQUIRE_MSG(pathfd >= 0, FMT_ERR("open"));
val = 0;
ATF_REQUIRE_ERRNO(EBADF, ioctl(pathfd, FIONBIO, &val) == -1);
ATF_REQUIRE_ERRNO(EBADF, ioctl(pathfd, FIONREAD, &val) == -1);
ATF_REQUIRE_ERRNO(EBADF, ioctl(pathfd, FIONWRITE, &val) == -1);
ATF_REQUIRE_ERRNO(EBADF, ioctl(pathfd, FIONSPACE, &val) == -1);
CHECKED_CLOSE(pathfd);
/* Device ioctls should fail. */
pathfd = open("/dev/mem", O_PATH);
ATF_REQUIRE_MSG(pathfd >= 0, FMT_ERR("open"));
me.me_vaddr = (uintptr_t)&me;
ATF_REQUIRE_ERRNO(EBADF, ioctl(pathfd, MEM_EXTRACT_PADDR, &me) == -1);
CHECKED_CLOSE(pathfd);
}
ATF_TC_WITHOUT_HEAD(path_lock);
ATF_TC_BODY(path_lock, tc)
{
char buf[BUFSIZ], path[PATH_MAX];
struct flock flk;
int fd, pathfd;
snprintf(path, sizeof(path), "path_rights.XXXXXX");
fd = mkostemp(path, O_SHLOCK);
ATF_REQUIRE_MSG(fd >= 0, FMT_ERR("mkostemp"));
memset(buf, 0, sizeof(buf));
ATF_REQUIRE_MSG(write(fd, buf, sizeof(buf)) == sizeof(buf),
FMT_ERR("write()"));
/* Verify that O_EXLOCK is ignored when combined with O_PATH. */
pathfd = open(path, O_PATH | O_EXLOCK);
ATF_REQUIRE_MSG(pathfd >= 0, FMT_ERR("open"));
CHECKED_CLOSE(fd);
/* flock(2) is prohibited. */
ATF_REQUIRE_ERRNO(EOPNOTSUPP, flock(pathfd, LOCK_SH) == -1);
ATF_REQUIRE_ERRNO(EOPNOTSUPP, flock(pathfd, LOCK_EX) == -1);
ATF_REQUIRE_ERRNO(EOPNOTSUPP, flock(pathfd, LOCK_SH | LOCK_NB) == -1);
ATF_REQUIRE_ERRNO(EOPNOTSUPP, flock(pathfd, LOCK_EX | LOCK_NB) == -1);
ATF_REQUIRE_ERRNO(EOPNOTSUPP, flock(pathfd, LOCK_UN) == -1);
/* fcntl(2) file locks are prohibited. */
memset(&flk, 0, sizeof(flk));
flk.l_whence = SEEK_CUR;
ATF_REQUIRE_ERRNO(EBADF, fcntl(pathfd, F_GETLK, &flk) == -1);
flk.l_type = F_RDLCK;
ATF_REQUIRE_ERRNO(EBADF, fcntl(pathfd, F_SETLK, &flk) == -1);
ATF_REQUIRE_ERRNO(EBADF, fcntl(pathfd, F_SETLKW, &flk) == -1);
flk.l_type = F_WRLCK;
ATF_REQUIRE_ERRNO(EBADF, fcntl(pathfd, F_SETLK, &flk) == -1);
ATF_REQUIRE_ERRNO(EBADF, fcntl(pathfd, F_SETLKW, &flk) == -1);
CHECKED_CLOSE(pathfd);
}
/* Verify that we can send an O_PATH descriptor over a unix socket. */
ATF_TC_WITHOUT_HEAD(path_rights);
ATF_TC_BODY(path_rights, tc)
{
char path[PATH_MAX];
struct cmsghdr *cmsg;
struct msghdr msg;
struct iovec iov;
int flags, pathfd, pathfd_copy, sd[2];
char c;
ATF_REQUIRE_MSG(socketpair(PF_LOCAL, SOCK_STREAM, 0, sd) == 0,
FMT_ERR("socketpair"));
mktfile(path, "path_rights.XXXXXX");
pathfd = open(path, O_PATH);
ATF_REQUIRE_MSG(pathfd >= 0, FMT_ERR("open"));
/* Package up the O_PATH and send it over the socket pair. */
cmsg = malloc(CMSG_SPACE(sizeof(pathfd)));
ATF_REQUIRE_MSG(cmsg != NULL, FMT_ERR("malloc"));
cmsg->cmsg_len = CMSG_LEN(sizeof(pathfd));
cmsg->cmsg_level = SOL_SOCKET;
cmsg->cmsg_type = SCM_RIGHTS;
*(int *)(void *)CMSG_DATA(cmsg) = pathfd;
c = 0;
iov.iov_base = &c;
iov.iov_len = 1;
memset(&msg, 0, sizeof(msg));
msg.msg_iov = &iov;
msg.msg_iovlen = 1;
msg.msg_control = cmsg;
msg.msg_controllen = CMSG_SPACE(sizeof(pathfd));
ATF_REQUIRE_MSG(sendmsg(sd[0], &msg, 0) == sizeof(c),
FMT_ERR("sendmsg"));
/* Grab the pathfd copy from the other end of the pair. */
memset(&msg, 0, sizeof(msg));
msg.msg_iov = &iov;
msg.msg_iovlen = 1;
msg.msg_control = cmsg;
msg.msg_controllen = CMSG_SPACE(sizeof(pathfd));
ATF_REQUIRE_MSG(recvmsg(sd[1], &msg, 0) == 1,
FMT_ERR("recvmsg"));
pathfd_copy = *(int *)(void *)CMSG_DATA(cmsg);
ATF_REQUIRE_MSG(pathfd_copy != pathfd,
"pathfd and pathfd_copy are equal");
/* Verify that the copy has O_PATH properties. */
flags = fcntl(pathfd_copy, F_GETFL);
ATF_REQUIRE_MSG(flags != -1, FMT_ERR("fcntl"));
ATF_REQUIRE_MSG((flags & O_PATH) != 0, "O_PATH is not set");
ATF_REQUIRE_ERRNO(EBADF,
read(pathfd_copy, &c, 1) == -1);
ATF_REQUIRE_ERRNO(EBADF,
write(pathfd_copy, &c, 1) == -1);
CHECKED_CLOSE(pathfd);
CHECKED_CLOSE(pathfd_copy);
CHECKED_CLOSE(sd[0]);
CHECKED_CLOSE(sd[1]);
}
ATF_TP_ADD_TCS(tp)
{
ATF_TP_ADD_TC(tp, path_access);
ATF_TP_ADD_TC(tp, path_aio);
ATF_TP_ADD_TC(tp, path_directory);
ATF_TP_ADD_TC(tp, path_empty);
ATF_TP_ADD_TC(tp, path_empty_root);
ATF_TP_ADD_TC(tp, path_event);
ATF_TP_ADD_TC(tp, path_fcntl);
ATF_TP_ADD_TC(tp, path_fexecve);
ATF_TP_ADD_TC(tp, path_funlinkat);
ATF_TP_ADD_TC(tp, path_io);
ATF_TP_ADD_TC(tp, path_ioctl);
ATF_TP_ADD_TC(tp, path_lock);
ATF_TP_ADD_TC(tp, path_rights);
return (atf_no_error());
}