Differential D40642 Diff 127925 sys/kern/kern_prot.c

Changeset View

Standalone View

sys/kern/kern_prot.c

	Show First 20 Lines • Show All 1,401 Lines • ▼ Show 20 Lines
	* 'see_other_gids' policy.			* 'see_other_gids' policy.
	* Returns: 0 for permitted, ESRCH otherwise			* Returns: 0 for permitted, ESRCH otherwise
	* Locks: none			* Locks: none
	* References: u1 and u2 must not change during the call			* References: u1 and u2 must not change during the call
	* u1 may equal u2, in which case only one reference is required			* u1 may equal u2, in which case only one reference is required
	*/			*/
	static int			static int
	cr_canseeothergids(struct ucred u1, struct ucred u2)			cr_canseeothergids(struct ucred u1, struct ucred u2)
	{			{
	int i, match;

	if (!see_other_gids) {			if (!see_other_gids) {
				mhorneUnsubmitted Done Inline Actions This is a style regression. Even though `see_other_gids` has an `int` type, it is a boolean variable and so we should check its truthiness directly. mhorne: This is a style regression. Even though `see_other_gids` has an `int` type, it is a boolean…
	match = 0;			if (realgroupmember(u1->cr_rgid, u2))
	for (i = 0; i < u1->cr_ngroups; i++) {			return (0);
	if (groupmember(u1->cr_groups[i], u2))
	match = 1;			for (int i = 1; i < u1->cr_ngroups; i++)
	if (match)			if (realgroupmember(u1->cr_groups[i], u2))
	break;			return (0);
	}
	if (!match) {
	if (priv_check_cred(u1, PRIV_SEEOTHERGIDS) != 0)			if (priv_check_cred(u1, PRIV_SEEOTHERGIDS) != 0)
	return (ESRCH);			return (ESRCH);
	}			}
	}
				mhorneUnsubmitted Done Inline Actions My only clarification... `u1->cr_groups[0]` contains the effective gid, right? That is why you have split this statement from the loop? mhorne: My only clarification... `u1->cr_groups[0]` contains the effective gid, right? That is why you…
				olceAuthorUnsubmitted Done Inline Actions Exactly. That's also why next loop starts with index 1. olce: Exactly. That's also why next loop starts with index 1.
	return (0);			return (0);
	}			}

	/*			/*
	* 'see_jail_proc' determines whether or not visibility of processes and			* 'see_jail_proc' determines whether or not visibility of processes and
	* sockets with credentials holding different jail ids is possible using a			* sockets with credentials holding different jail ids is possible using a
	* variety of system MIBs.			* variety of system MIBs.
	*			*
	▲ Show 20 Lines • Show All 1,101 Lines • Show Last 20 Lines