diff --git a/en_US.ISO8859-1/books/arch-handbook/mac/chapter.sgml b/en_US.ISO8859-1/books/arch-handbook/mac/chapter.sgml index 17e956af7d..478a4b8f6a 100644 --- a/en_US.ISO8859-1/books/arch-handbook/mac/chapter.sgml +++ b/en_US.ISO8859-1/books/arch-handbook/mac/chapter.sgml @@ -1,7924 +1,7948 @@ Chris Costello TrustedBSD Project
chris@FreeBSD.org
 Robert Watson TrustedBSD Project
rwatson@FreeBSD.org
 The TrustedBSD MAC Framework MAC Documentation Copyright This documentation was developed for the FreeBSD Project by Chris Costello at Safeport Network Services and Network Associates Laboratories, the Security Research Division of Network Associates, Inc. under DARPA/SPAWAR contract N66001-01-C-8035 (CBOSS), as part of the DARPA CHATS research program. Redistribution and use in source (SGML DocBook) and 'compiled' forms (SGML, HTML, PDF, PostScript, RTF and so forth) with or without modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: Redistributions of source code (SGML DocBook) must retain the above copyright notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer as the first lines of this file unmodified. Redistributions in compiled form (transformed to other DTDs, converted to PDF, PostScript, RTF and other formats) must reproduce the above copyright notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. THIS DOCUMENTATION IS PROVIDED BY THE NETWORKS ASSOCIATES TECHNOLOGY, INC "AS IS" AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL NETWORKS ASSOCIATES TECHNOLOGY, INC BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS DOCUMENTATION, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. Synopsis FreeBSD includes experimental support for several mandatory access control policies, as well as a framework for kernel security extensibility, the TrustedBSD MAC Framework. The MAC Framework is a pluggable access control framework, permitting new security policies to be easily linked into the kernel, loaded at boot, or loaded dynamically at run-time. The framework provides a variety of features to make it easier to implement new security policies, including the ability to easily tag security labels (such as confidentiality information) onto system objects. This chapter introduces the MAC policy framework and provides documentation for a sample MAC policy module. Introduction The TrustedBSD MAC framework provides a mechanism to allow the compile-time or run-time extension of the kernel access control model. New system policies may be implemented as kernel modules and linked to the kernel; if multiple policy modules are present, their results will be composed. The MAC Framework provides a variety of access control infrastructure services to assist policy writers, including support for transient and persistent policy-agnostic object security labels. This support is currently considered experimental. This chapter provides information appropriate for developers of policy modules, as well as potential consumers of MAC-enabled environments, to learn about how the MAC Framework supports access control extension of the kernel. Policy Background Mandatory Access Control (MAC), refers to a set of access control policies that are mandatorily enforced on users by the operating system. MAC policies may be contrasted with Discretionary Access Control (DAC) protections, by which non-administrative users may (at their discretion) protect objects. In traditional UNIX systems, DAC protections include file permissions and access control lists; MAC protections include process controls preventing inter-user debugging and firewalls. A variety of MAC policies have been formulated by operating system designers and security researches, including the Multi-Level Security (MLS) confidentiality policy, the Biba integrity policy, Role-Based Access Control (RBAC), Domain and Type Enforcement (DTE), and Type Enforcement (TE). Each model bases decisions on a variety of factors, including user identity, role, and security clearance, as well as security labels on objects representing concepts such as data sensitivity and integrity. The TrustedBSD MAC Framework is capable of supporting policy modules that implement all of these policies, as well as a broad class of system hardening policies, which may use existing security attributes, such as user and group IDs, as well as extended attributes on files, and other system properties. In addition, despite the name, the MAC Framework can also be used to implement purely discretionary policies, as policy modules are given substantial flexibility in how they authorize protections. MAC Framework Kernel Architecture The TrustedBSD MAC Framework permits kernel modules to extend the operating system security policy, as well as providing infrastructure functionality required by many access control modules. If multiple policies are simultaneously loaded, the MAC Framework will usefully (for some definition of useful) compose the results of the policies. Kernel Elements The MAC Framework contains a number of kernel elements: Framework management interfaces Concurrency and synchronization primitives. Policy registration Extensible security label for kernel objects Policy entry point composition operators Label management primitives Entry point API invoked by kernel services Entry point API to policy modules Entry points implementations (policy life cycle, object life cycle/label management, access control checks). Policy-agnostic label-management system calls mac_syscall() multiplex system call Various security policies implemented as MAC policy modules Framework Management Interfaces The TrustedBSD MAC Framework may be directly managed using sysctls, loader tunables, and system calls. In most cases, sysctls and loader tunables of the same name modify the same parameters, and control behavior such as enforcement of protections relating to various kernel subsystems. In addition, if MAC debugging support is compiled into the kernel, several counters will be maintained tracking label allocation. In most cases, it is advised that per-subsystem enforcement controls not be used to control policy behavior in production environments, as they broadly impact the operation of all active policies. Instead, per-policy controls should be preferred to provide greater granularity and provide greater operational consistency for policy modules. Loading and unloading of policy modules is performed using the system module management system calls and other system interfaces, including loader variables; policy modules will have the opportunity to influence load and unload events. Policy List Concurrency and Synchronization As the set of active policies may change at run-time, and the invocation of entry points is non-atomic, synchronization is required to prevent loading or unloading of policies while an entry point invocation is progress, freezing the list of policies for the duration. This is accomplished by means of a framework busy count. Whenever an entry point is entered, the busy count is incremented; whenever it is exited, the busy count is decremented. While the busy count is elevated, policy list changes are not permitted, and threads attempting to modify the policy list will sleep until the list is not busy. The busy count is protected by a mutex, and a condition variable is used to wake up sleepers waiting on policy list modifications. One side effect of this synchronization model is that recursion into the MAC Framework from within a policy module is permitted, although not generally used. Various optimizations are used to reduce the overhead of the busy count, including avoiding the full cost of incrementing and decrementing if the list is empty or contains only static entries (policies that are loaded before the system starts, and cannot be unloaded). A compile-time option is also provided which prevents any change in the set of loaded policies at run-time, which eliminates the mutex locking costs associated with supporting dynamically loaded and unloaded policies. As the MAC Framework is not permitted to block in all entry points, a normal sleep lock cannot be used; as a result, it is possible for the load or unload attempt to block for a substantial period of time waiting for the framework to become idle. Label Synchronization As many kernel objects of interest may be accessed from more than one thread at a time, and parallel entry into the MAC Framework is permitted, security attribute storage maintained by the MAC Framework is carefully synchronized. In general, existing kernel synchronization on kernel object data is used to protect MAC Framework security labels on the object: for example, MAC labels on sockets are protected using the existing socket mutex. Likewise, semantics for concurrent access are generally identical to those of the container objects: for credentials, copy-on-write semantics are maintained for label contents as with the remainder of the credential structure. The MAC Framework asserts necessary locks on objects when invoked with an object reference. Policy authors must be aware of these synchronization semantics, as they will sometimes limit the types of accesses permitted on labels: for example, when a read-only reference to a credential is passed to a policy via an entry point, only read operations are permitted on the label state attached to the credential. Policy Synchronization and Concurrency Policy modules must be written to assume that many kernel threads may simultaneously enter one more more policy entry points due to the parallel and preemption nature of the FreeBSD kernel. If the policy module makes use of mutable state, this may require the use of synchronization primitives within the policy to prevent inconsistent views on that state resulting in incorrect operation of the policy. Policies will generally be able to make use of existing FreeBSD synchronization primitives for this purpose, including mutexes, sleep locks, condition variables, and counting semaphores. However, policies should be written to employ these primitives carefully, respecting existing kernel lock orders, and recognizing that some entry points are not permitted to sleep, limiting the use of primitives in those entry points to mutexes and wakeup operations. When policy modules call out to other kernel subsytems, they will generally need to release any in-policy locks in order to avoid violating the kernel lock order or risking lock recursion. This will maintain policy locks as leaf locks in the global lock order. Policy Registration The MAC Framework maintains two lists of active policies: a static list, and a dynamic list. The lists differ only with regards to their locking semantics: an elevated reference count is not required to make use of the static list. When kernel modules containing MAC Framework policies are loaded, the policy module will use SYSINIT to invoke a registration function; when a policy module is unloaded, SYSINIT will likewise invoke a de-registration function. Registration may fail if a policy module is loaded more than once, if insufficient resources are available for the registration (for example, the policy might require labeling and insufficient labeling state might be available), or other policy prerequisites might not be met (some policies may only be loaded prior to boot). Likewise, de-registration may fail if a policy refuses an unload. Entry Points Kernel services interact with the MAC Framework in two ways: they invoke a series of APIs to notify the framework of relevant events, and they provide a policy-agnostic label structure pointer in security-relevant objects. The label pointer is maintained by the MAC Framework via label management entry points, and permits the Framework to offer a labeling service to policy modules through relatively non-invasive changes to the kernel subsystem maintaining the object. For example, label pointers have been added to processes, process credentials, sockets, pipes, vnodes, Mbufs, network interfaces, IP reassembly queues, and a variety of other security-relevant structures. Kernel services also invoke the MAC Framework when they perform important security decisions, permitting policy modules to augment those decisions based on their own criteria (possibly including data stored in security labels). Most of these security critical decisions will be explicit access control checks; however, some affect more general decision functions such as packet matching for sockets and label transition at program execution. Policy Composition When more than one policy module is loaded into the kernel at a time, the results of the policy modules will be composed by the framework using a composition operator. This operator is currently hard-coded, and requires that all active policies must approve a request for it to return success. As policies may return a variety of error conditions (success, access denied, object doesn't exist, ...), a precedence operator selects the resulting error from the set of errors returned by policies. In general, errors indicating that an object does not exist will be preferred to errors indicating that access to an object is denied. While it is not guaranteed that the resulting composition will be useful or secure, we've found that it is for many useful selections of policies. For example, traditional trusted systems often ship with two or more policies using a similar composition. Labeling Support As many interesting access control extensions rely on security labels on objects, the MAC Framework provides a set of policy-agnostic label management system calls covering a variety of user-exposed objects. Common label types include partition identifiers, sensitivity labels, integrity labels, compartments, domains, roles, and types. By policy agnostic, we mean that policy modules are able to completely define the semantics of meta-data associated with an object. Policy modules participate in the internalization and externalization of string-based labels provides by user applications, and can expose multiple label elements to applications if desired. In-memory labels are stored in slab-allocated struct label, which consists of a fixed-length array of unions, each holding a void * pointer and a long. Policies registering for label storage will be assigned a "slot" identifier, which may be used to dereference the label storage. The semantics of the storage are left entirely up to the policy module: modules are provided with a variety of entry points associated with the kernel object life cycle, including initialization, association/creation, and destruction. Using these interfaces, it is possible to implement reference counting and other storage models. Direct access to the object structure is generally not required by policy modules to retrieve a label, as the MAC Framework generally passes both a pointer to the object and a direct pointer to the object's label into entry points. The primary exception to this rule is the process credential, which must be manually dereferenced to access the credential label. This may change in future revisions of the MAC Framework. - Initialization entry points frequently include a blocking + Initialization entry points frequently include a sleeping disposition flag indicating whether or not an initialization - is permitted to block; if blocking is not permitted, a failure + is permitted to sleep; if sleeping is not permitted, a failure may be returned to cancel allocation of the label (and hence object). This may occur, for example, in the network stack during interrupt - handling, where blocking is not permitted, or while the caller + handling, where sleeping is not permitted, or while the caller holds a mutex. Due to the performance cost of maintaining labels on in-flight network packets (Mbufs), policies must specifically declare a requirement that Mbuf labels be allocated. Dynamically loaded policies making use of labels must be able to handle the case where their init function has not been called on an object, as objects may already exist when the policy is loaded. The MAC Framework guarantees that uninitialized label slots will hold a 0 or NULL value, which policies may use to detect uninitialized values. However, as allocation of Mbuf labels is conditional, policies must also be able to handle a NULL label pointer for Mbufs if they have been loaded dynamically. In the case of file system labels, special support is provided for the persistent storage of security labels in extended attributes. Where available, EA transactions are used to permit consistent compound updates of security labels on vnodes. Policy authors may choose to implement multilabel file system object labels using one (or more) extended attributes. For effiency reasons, the vnode label (v_label) is a cache of any on-disk label; policies are able to load values into the cache when the vnode is instantiated, and update the cache as needed. Currently, if a labeled policy permits dynamic unloading, its state slot cannot be reclaimed, which places a strict (and relatively low) bound on the number of unload-reload operations for labeled policies. System Calls The MAC Framework implements a number of system calls: most of these calls support the policy-agnostic label retrieval and manipulation APIs exposed to user applications. The label management calls accept a label description structure, struct mac, which contains a series of MAC label elements. Each element contains a character string name, and character string value. Each policy will be given the chance to claim a particular element name, permitting policies to expose multiple independent elements if desired. Policy modules perform the internalization and externalization between kernel labels and user-provided labels via entry points, permitting a variety of semantics. Label management system calls are generally wrapped by user library functions to perform memory allocation and error handling. In addition, mac_syscall() permits policy modules to create new system calls without allocating system calls. mac_execve() permits an atomic process credential label change when executing a new image. MAC Policy Architecture Security policies are either linked directly into the kernel, or compiled into loadable kernel modules that may be loaded at boot, or dynamically using the module loading system calls at runtime. Policy modules interact with the system through a set of declared entry points, providing access to a stream of system events and permitting the policy to influence access control decisions. Each policy contains a number of elements: Optional configuration parameters for policy. Centralized implementation of the policy logic and parameters. Optional implementation of policy life cycle events, such as initialization and destruction. Optional support for initializing, maintaining, and destroying labels on selected kernel objects. Optional support for user process inspection and modification of labels on selected objects. Implementation of selected access control entry points that are of interest to the policy. Declaration of policy identity, module entry points, and policy properties. Policy Declaration Modules may be declared using the MAC_POLICY_SET() macro, which names the policy, provides a reference to the MAC entry point vector, provides load-time flags determining how the policy framework should handle the policy, and optionally requests the allocation of label state by the framework. static struct mac_policy_ops mac_policy_ops = { .mpo_destroy = mac_policy_destroy, .mpo_init = mac_policy_init, .mpo_init_bpfdesc_label = mac_policy_init_bpfdesc_label, .mpo_init_cred_label = mac_policy_init_label, /* ... */ .mpo_check_vnode_setutimes = mac_policy_check_vnode_setutimes, .mpo_check_vnode_stat = mac_policy_check_vnode_stat, .mpo_check_vnode_write = mac_policy_check_vnode_write, }; The MAC policy entry point vector, mac_policy_ops in this example, associates functions defined in the module with specific entry points. A complete listing of available entry points and their prototypes may be found in the MAC entry point reference section. Of specific interest during module registration are the .mpo_destroy and .mpo_init entry points. .mpo_init will be invoked once a policy is successfully registered with the module framework but prior to any other entry points becoming active. This permits the policy to perform any policy-specific allocation and initialization, such as initialization of any data or locks. .mpo_destroy will be invoked when a policy module is unloaded to permit releasing of any allocated memory and destruction of locks. Currently, these two entry points are invoked with the MAC policy list mutex held to prevent any other entry points from being invoked: this will be changed, but in the mean time, policies should be careful about what kernel primitives they invoke so as to avoid lock ordering or sleeping problems. The policy declaration's module name field exists so that the module may be uniquely identified for the purposes of module dependencies. An appropriate string should be selected. The full string name of the policy is displayed to the user via the kernel log during load and unload events, and also exported when providing status information to userland processes. Policy Flags The policy declaration flags field permits the module to provide the framework with information about its capabilities at the time the module is loaded. Currently, three flags are defined: MPC_LOADTIME_FLAG_UNLOADOK This flag indicates that the policy module may be unloaded. If this flag is not provided, then the policy framework will reject requests to unload the module. This flag might be used by modules that allocate label state and are unable to free that state at runtime. MPC_LOADTIME_FLAG_NOTLATE This flag indicates that the policy module must be loaded and initialized early in the boot process. If the flag is specified, attempts to register the module following boot will be rejected. The flag may be used by policies that require pervasive labeling of all system objects, and cannot handle objects that have not been properly initialized by the policy. MPC_LOADTIME_FLAG_LABELMBUFS This flag indicates that the policy module requires labeling of Mbufs, and that memory should always be allocated for the storage of Mbuf labels. By default, the MAC Framework will not allocate label storage for Mbufs unless at least one loaded policy has this flag set. This measurably improves network performance when policies do not require Mbuf labeling. A kernel option, MAC_ALWAYS_LABEL_MBUF, exists to force the MAC Framework to allocate Mbuf label storage regardless of the setting of this flag, and may be useful in some environments. Policies using the MPC_LOADTIME_FLAG_LABELMBUFS without the MPC_LOADTIME_FLAG_NOTLATE flag set must be able to correctly handle NULL Mbuf label pointers passed into entry points. This is necessary as in-flight Mbufs without label storage may persist after a policy enabling Mbuf labeling has been loaded. If a policy is loaded before the network subsystem is active (i.e., the policy is not being loaded late), then all Mbufs are guaranteed to have label storage. Policy Entry Points Four classes of entry points are offered to policies registered with the framework: entry points associated with the registration and management of policies, entry points denoting initialization, creation, destruction, and other life cycle events for kernel objects, events associated with access control decisions that the policy module may influence, and calls associated with the management of labels on objects. In addition, a mac_syscall() entry point is provided so that policies may extend the kernel interface without registering new system calls. Policy module writers should be aware of the kernel locking strategy, as well as what object locks are available during which entry points. Writers should attempt to avoid deadlock scenarios by avoiding grabbing non-leaf locks inside of entry points, and also follow the locking protocol for object access and modification. In particular, writers should be aware that while necessary locks to access objects and their labels are generally held, sufficient locks to modify an object or its label may not be present for all entry points. Locking information for arguments is documented in the MAC framework entry point document. Policy entry points will pass a reference to the object label along with the object itself. This permits labeled policies to be unaware of the internals of the object yet still make decisions based on the label. The exception to this is the process credential, which is assumed to be understood by policies as a first class security object in the kernel. MAC Policy Entry Point Reference General-Purpose Module Entry Points <function>&mac.mpo;_init</function> void &mac.mpo;_init struct mac_policy_conf *conf &mac.thead; conf MAC policy definition Policy load event. The policy list mutex is held, so - caution should be applied. + sleep operations cannot be performed, and calls out to other + kernel subsystems must be made with caution. If potentially + sleeping memory allocations are required during policy + initialization, they should be made using a separate module + SYSINIT(). <function>&mac.mpo;_destroy</function> void &mac.mpo;_destroy struct mac_policy_conf *conf &mac.thead; conf MAC policy definition Policy load event. The policy list mutex is held, so caution should be applied. <function>&mac.mpo;_syscall</function> int &mac.mpo;_syscall struct thread *td int call void *arg &mac.thead; td Calling thread call - Syscall number + Policy-specific syscall number arg Pointer to syscall arguments This entry point provides a policy-multiplexed system call so that policies may provide additional services to user processes without registering specific system calls. The policy name provided during registration is used to demux calls from userland, and the arguments will be forwarded to this entry point. When implementing new services, security modules should be sure to invoke appropriate access control checks from the MAC framework as needed. For example, if a policy implements an augmented signal functionality, it should call the necessary signal access control checks to invoke the MAC framework and other registered policies. Modules must currently perform the copyin() of the syscall data on their own. <function>&mac.mpo;_thread_userret</function> void &mac.mpo;_thread_userret struct thread *td &mac.thead; td Returning thread This entry point permits policy modules to perform - MAC-related events when a thread returns to user space. + MAC-related events when a thread returns to user space, via + a system call return, trap return, or otherwise. This is required for policies that have floating process labels, as it is not always possible to acquire the process lock at arbitrary points in the stack during system call processing; process labels might represent traditional authentication data, process history information, or other - data. + data. To employ this mechanism, intended changes to the + process credential label may be stored in the + p_label protected by a per-policy spin + lock, and then set the per-thread + TDF_ASTPENDING flag and per-process + PS_MACPENDM flag to schedule a call + to the userret entry point. From this entry point, the + policy may create a replacement credential with less + concern about the locking context. Policy writers are + cautioned that event ordering relating to scheduling an + AST and the AST being performed may be complex and + interlaced in multithreaded applications. Label Operations <function>&mac.mpo;_init_bpfdesc_label</function> void &mac.mpo;_init_bpfdesc_label struct label *label &mac.thead; label New label to apply Initialize the label on a newly instantiated bpfdesc (BPF - descriptor) + descriptor). Sleeping is permitted. <function>&mac.mpo;_init_cred_label</function> void &mac.mpo;_init_cred_label struct label *label &mac.thead; label New label to initialize Initialize the label for a newly instantiated - user credential. + user credential. Sleeping is permitted. <function>&mac.mpo;_init_devfsdirent_label</function> void &mac.mpo;_init_devfsdirent_label struct label *label &mac.thead; label New label to apply Initialize the label on a newly instantiated devfs - entry. + entry. Sleeping is permitted. <function>&mac.mpo;_init_ifnet_label</function> void &mac.mpo;_init_ifnet_label struct label *label &mac.thead; label New label to apply Initialize the label on a newly instantiated network - interface. + interface. Sleeping is permitted. <function>&mac.mpo;_init_ipq_label</function> void &mac.mpo;_init_ipq_label struct label *label int flag &mac.thead; label New label to apply flag - Blocking/non-blocking &man.malloc.9;; see + Sleeping/non-sleeping &man.malloc.9;; see below Initialize the label on a newly instantiated IP fragment reassembly queue. The flag field may be one of M_WAITOK and M_NOWAIT, - and should be employed to avoid performing a blocking + and should be employed to avoid performing a sleeping &man.malloc.9; during this initialization call. IP fragment reassembly queue allocation frequently occurs in performance sensitive environments, and the implementation should be careful - to avoid blocking or long-lived operations. This entry point + to avoid sleeping or long-lived operations. This entry point is permitted to fail resulting in the failure to allocate the IP fragment reassembly queue. <function>&mac.mpo;_init_mbuf_label</function> void &mac.mpo;_init_mbuf_label int flag struct label *label &mac.thead; flag - Blocking/non-blocking &man.malloc.9;; see + Sleeping/non-sleeping &man.malloc.9;; see below label Policy label to initialize Initialize the label on a newly instantiated mbuf packet header (mbuf). The flag field may be one of M_WAITOK and M_NOWAIT, and - should be employed to avoid performing a blocking + should be employed to avoid performing a sleeping &man.malloc.9; during this initialization call. Mbuf allocation frequently occurs in performance sensitive environments, and the implementation should be careful to - avoid blocking or long-lived operations. This entry point + avoid sleeping or long-lived operations. This entry point is permitted to fail resulting in the failure to allocate the mbuf header. <function>&mac.mpo;_init_mount_label</function> void &mac.mpo;_init_mount_label struct label *mntlabel struct label *fslabel &mac.thead; mntlabel Policy label to be initialized for the mount itself fslabel Policy label to be initialized for the file system Initialize the labels on a newly instantiated mount - point. + point. Sleeping is permitted. <function>&mac.mpo;_init_mount_fs_label</function> void &mac.mpo;_init_mount_fs_label struct label *label &mac.thead; label Label to be initialized Initialize the label on a newly mounted file - system. + system. Sleeping is permitted <function>&mac.mpo;_init_pipe_label</function> void &mac.mpo;_init_pipe_label struct label*label &mac.thead; label Label to be filled in - Initialize a label for a newly instantiated pipe. + Initialize a label for a newly instantiated pipe. Sleeping + is permitted. <function>&mac.mpo;_init_socket_label</function> void &mac.mpo;_init_socket_label struct label *label int flag &mac.thead; label New label to initialize flag &man.malloc.9; flags Initialize a label for a newly instantiated - socket. + socket. The flag field may be one of + M_WAITOK and M_NOWAIT, and + should be employed to avoid performing a sleeping &man.malloc.9; + during this initialization call. <function>&mac.mpo;_init_socket_peer_label</function> void &mac.mpo;_init_socket_peer_label struct label *label int flag &mac.thead; label New label to initialize flag &man.malloc.9; flags Initialize the peer label for a newly instantiated - socket. + socket. The flag field may be one of + M_WAITOK and M_NOWAIT, and + should be employed to avoid performing a sleeping &man.malloc.9; + during this initialization call. <function>&mac.mpo;_init_proc_label</function> void &mac.mpo;_init_proc_label struct label *label &mac.thead; label New label to initialize Initialize the label for a newly instantiated - process. + process. Sleeping is permitted. <function>&mac.mpo;_init_vnode_label</function> void &mac.mpo;_init_vnode_label struct label *label &mac.thead; label New label to initialize - Initialize the label on a newly instantiated vnode. + Initialize the label on a newly instantiated vnode. Sleeping + is permitted. <function>&mac.mpo;_destroy_bpfdesc_label</function> void &mac.mpo;_destroy_bpfdesc_label struct label *label &mac.thead; label bpfdesc label Destroy the label on a BPF descriptor. In this entry point a policy should free any internal storage associated with label so that it may be destroyed. <function>&mac.mpo;_destroy_cred_label</function> void &mac.mpo;_destroy_cred_label struct label *label &mac.thead; label Label being destroyed Destroy the label on a credential. In this entry point, a policy module should free any internal storage associated with label so that it may be destroyed. <function>&mac.mpo;_destroy_devfsdirent_label</function> void &mac.mpo;_destroy_devfsdirent_label struct label *label &mac.thead; label Label being destroyed Destroy the label on a devfs entry. In this entry point, a policy module should free any internal storage associated with label so that it may be destroyed. <function>&mac.mpo;_destroy_ifnet_label</function> void &mac.mpo;_destroy_ifnet_label struct label *label &mac.thead; label Label being destroyed Destroy the label on a removed interface. In this entry point, a policy module should free any internal storage associated with label so that it may be destroyed. <function>&mac.mpo;_destroy_ipq_label</function> void &mac.mpo;_destroy_ipq_label struct label *label &mac.thead; label Label being destroyed Destroy the label on an IP fragment queue. In this entry point, a policy module should free any internal storage associated with label so that it may be destroyed. <function>&mac.mpo;_destroy_mbuf_label</function> void &mac.mpo;_destroy_mbuf_label struct label *label &mac.thead; label Label being destroyed Destroy the label on an mbuf header. In this entry point, a policy module should free any internal storage associated with label so that it may be destroyed. <function>&mac.mpo;_destroy_mount_label</function> void &mac.mpo;_destroy_mount_label struct label *label &mac.thead; label Mount point label being destroyed Destroy the labels on a mount point. In this entry point, a policy module should free the internal storage associated with mntlabel so that they may be destroyed. <function>&mac.mpo;_destroy_mount_label</function> void &mac.mpo;_destroy_mount_label struct label *mntlabel struct label *fslabel &mac.thead; mntlabel Mount point label being destroyed fslabel File system label being destroyed> Destroy the labels on a mount point. In this entry point, a policy module should free the internal storage associated with mntlabel and fslabel so that they may be destroyed. <function>&mac.mpo;_destroy_socket_label</function> void &mac.mpo;_destroy_socket_label struct label *label &mac.thead; label Socket label being destroyed Destroy the label on a socket. In this entry point, a policy module should free any internal storage associated with label so that it may be destroyed. <function>&mac.mpo;_destroy_socket_peer_label</function> void &mac.mpo;_destroy_socket_peer_label struct label *peerlabel &mac.thead; peerlabel Socket peer label being destroyed Destroy the peer label on a socket. In this entry point, a policy module should free any internal storage associated with label so that it may be destroyed. <function>&mac.mpo;_destroy_pipe_label</function> void &mac.mpo;_destroy_pipe_label struct label *label &mac.thead; label Pipe label Destroy the label on a pipe. In this entry point, a policy module should free any internal storage associated with label so that it may be destroyed. <function>&mac.mpo;_destroy_proc_label</function> void &mac.mpo;_destroy_proc_label struct label *label &mac.thead; label Process label Destroy the label on a process. In this entry point, a policy module should free any internal storage associated with label so that it may be destroyed. <function>&mac.mpo;_destroy_vnode_label</function> void &mac.mpo;_destroy_vnode_label struct label *label &mac.thead; label Process label Destroy the label on a vnode. In this entry point, a policy module should free any internal storage associated with label so that it may be destroyed. <function>&mac.mpo;_copy_mbuf_label</function> void &mac.mpo;_copy_mbuf_label struct label *src struct label *dest &mac.thead; src Source label dest Destination label Copy the label information in src into dest. <function>&mac.mpo;_copy_pipe_label</function> void &mac.mpo;_copy_pipe_label struct label *src struct label *dest &mac.thead; src Source label dest Destination label Copy the label information in src into dest. <function>&mac.mpo;_copy_vnode_label</function> void &mac.mpo;_copy_vnode_label struct label *src struct label *dest &mac.thead; src Source label dest Destination label Copy the label information in src into dest. <function>&mac.mpo;_externalize_cred_label</function> int &mac.mpo;_externalize_cred_label &mac.externalize.paramdefs; &mac.thead; &mac.externalize.tbody; &mac.externalize.para; <function>&mac.mpo;_externalize_ifnet_label</function> int &mac.mpo;_externalize_ifnet_label &mac.externalize.paramdefs; &mac.thead; &mac.externalize.tbody; &mac.externalize.para; <function>&mac.mpo;_externalize_pipe_label</function> int &mac.mpo;_externalize_pipe_label &mac.externalize.paramdefs; &mac.thead; &mac.externalize.tbody; &mac.externalize.para; <function>&mac.mpo;_externalize_socket_label</function> int &mac.mpo;_externalize_socket_label &mac.externalize.paramdefs; &mac.thead; &mac.externalize.tbody; &mac.externalize.para; <function>&mac.mpo;_externalize_socket_peer_label</function> int &mac.mpo;_externalize_socket_peer_label &mac.externalize.paramdefs; &mac.thead; &mac.externalize.tbody; &mac.externalize.para; <function>&mac.mpo;_externalize_vnode_label</function> int &mac.mpo;_externalize_vnode_label &mac.externalize.paramdefs; &mac.thead; &mac.externalize.tbody; &mac.externalize.para; <function>&mac.mpo;_internalize_cred_label</function> int &mac.mpo;_internalize_cred_label &mac.internalize.paramdefs; &mac.thead; &mac.internalize.tbody; &mac.internalize.para; <function>&mac.mpo;_internalize_ifnet_label</function> int &mac.mpo;_internalize_ifnet_label &mac.internalize.paramdefs; &mac.thead; &mac.internalize.tbody; &mac.internalize.para; <function>&mac.mpo;_internalize_pipe_label</function> int &mac.mpo;_internalize_pipe_label &mac.internalize.paramdefs; &mac.thead; &mac.internalize.tbody; &mac.internalize.para; <function>&mac.mpo;_internalize_socket_label</function> int &mac.mpo;_internalize_socket_label &mac.internalize.paramdefs; &mac.thead; &mac.internalize.tbody; &mac.internalize.para; <function>&mac.mpo;_internalize_vnode_label</function> int &mac.mpo;_internalize_vnode_label &mac.internalize.paramdefs; &mac.thead; &mac.internalize.tbody; &mac.internalize.para; Label Events This class of entry points is used by the MAC framework to permit policies to maintain label information on kernel objects. For each labeled kernel object of interest to a MAC policy, entry points may be registered for relevant life cycle events. All objects implement initialization, creation, and destruction hooks. Some objects will also implement relabeling, allowing user processes to change the labels on objects. Some objects will also implement object-specific events, such as label events associated with IP reassembly. A typical labeled object will have the following life cycle of entry points: Label initialization o (object-specific wait) \ Label creation o \ Relabel events, o--<--. Various object-specific, | | Access control events ~-->--o \ Label destruction o Label initialization permits policies to allocate memory and set initial values for labels without context for the use of the object. The label slot allocated to a policy will be zeroed by default, so some policies may not need to perform initialization. Label creation occurs when the kernel structure is associated with an actual kernel object. For example, Mbufs may be allocated and remain unused in a pool until they are required. mbuf allocation causes label initialization on the mbuf to take place, but mbuf creation occurs when the mbuf is associated with a datagram. Typically, context will be provided for a creation event, including the circumstances of the creation, and labels of other relevant objects in the creation process. For example, when an mbuf is created from a socket, the socket and its label will be presented to registered policies in addition to the new mbuf and its label. Memory allocation in creation events is discouraged, as it may occur in performance sensitive ports of the kernel; in addition, creation calls are not permitted to fail so a failure to allocate memory cannot be reported. Object specific events do not generally fall into the other broad classes of label events, but will generally provide an opportunity to modify or update the label on an object based on additional context. For example, the label on an IP fragment reassembly queue may be updated during the MAC_UPDATE_IPQ entry point as a result of the acceptance of an additional mbuf to that queue. Access control events are discussed in detail in the following section. Label destruction permits policies to release storage or state associated with a label during its association with an object so that the kernel data structures supporting the object may be reused or released. In addition to labels associated with specific kernel objects, an additional class of labels exists: temporary labels. These labels are used to store update information submitted by user processes. These labels are initialized and destroyed as with other label types, but the creation event is MAC_INTERNALIZE, which accepts a user label to be converted to an in-kernel representation. File System Object Labeling Event Operations <function>&mac.mpo;_associate_vnode_devfs</function> void &mac.mpo;_associate_vnode_devfs struct mount *mp struct label *fslabel struct devfs_dirent *de struct label *delabel struct vnode *vp struct label *vlabel &mac.thead; mp Devfs mount point fslabel Devfs file system label (mp->mnt_fslabel) de Devfs directory entry delabel Policy label associated with de vp vnode associated with de vlabel Policy label associated with vp Fill in the label (vlabel) for a newly created devfs vnode based on the devfs directory entry passed in de and its label. <function>&mac.mpo;_associate_vnode_extattr</function> int &mac.mpo;_associate_vnode_extattr struct mount *mp struct label *fslabel struct vnode *vp struct label *vlabel &mac.thead; mp File system mount point fslabel File system label vp Vnode to label vlabel Policy label associated with vp Attempt to retrieve the label for vp from the file system extended attributes. Upon success, the value 0 is returned. Should extended attribute retrieval not be supported, an accepted fallback is to copy fslabel into vlabel. In the event of an error, an appropriate value for errno should be returned. <function>&mac.mpo;_associate_vnode_singlelabel</function> void &mac.mpo;_associate_vnode_singlelabel struct mount *mp struct label *fslabel struct vnode *vp struct label *vlabel &mac.thead; mp File system mount point fslabel File system label vp Vnode to label vlabel Policy label associated with vp On non-multilabel file systems, this entry point is called to set the policy label for vp based on the file system label, fslabel. <function>&mac.mpo;_create_devfs_device</function> void &mac.mpo;_create_devfs_device dev_t dev struct devfs_dirent *devfs_dirent struct label *label &mac.thead; dev Device corresponding with devfs_dirent devfs_dirent Devfs directory entry to be labeled. label Label for devfs_dirent to be filled in. Fill out the label on a devfs_dirent being created for the passed device. This call will be made when the device file system is mounted, regenerated, or a new device is made available. <function>&mac.mpo;_create_devfs_directory</function> void &mac.mpo;_create_devfs_directory char *dirname int dirnamelen struct devfs_dirent *devfs_dirent struct label *label &mac.thead; dirname Name of directory being created namelen Length of string dirname devfs_dirent Devfs directory entry for directory being created. Fill out the label on a devfs_dirent being created for the passed directory. This call will be made when the device file system is mounted, regenerated, or a new device requiring a specific directory hierarchy is made available. <function>&mac.mpo;_create_devfs_symlink</function> void &mac.mpo;_create_devfs_symlink struct ucred *cred struct mount *mp struct devfs_dirent *dd struct label *ddlabel struct devfs_dirent *de struct label *delabel &mac.thead; cred Subject credential mp Devfs mount point dd Link destination ddlabel Label associated with dd de Symlink entry delabel Label associated with de Fill in the label (delabel) for a newly created &man.devfs.5; symbolic link entry. <function>&mac.mpo;_create_vnode_extattr</function> int &mac.mpo;_create_vnode_extattr struct ucred *cred struct mount *mp struct label *fslabel struct vnode *dvp struct label *dlabel struct vnode *vp struct label *vlabel struct componentname *cnp &mac.thead; cred Subject credential mount File system mount point label File system label dvp Parent directory vnode dlabel Label associated with dvp vp Newly created vnode vlabel Policy label associated with vp cnp Component name for vp Write out the label for vp to the appropriate extended attribute. If the write succeeds, fill in vlabel with the label, and return 0. Otherwise, return an appropriate error. <function>&mac.mpo;_create_mount</function> void &mac.mpo;_create_mount struct ucred *cred struct mount *mp struct label *mnt struct label *fslabel &mac.thead; cred Subject credential mp Object; file system being mounted mntlabel Policy label to be filled in for mp fslabel Policy label for the file system mp mounts. Fill out the labels on the mount point being created by the passed subject credential. This call will be made when a new file system is mounted. <function>&mac.mpo;_create_root_mount</function> void &mac.mpo;_create_root_mount struct ucred *cred struct mount *mp struct label *mntlabel struct label *fslabel &mac.thead; See . Fill out the labels on the mount point being created by the passed subject credential. This call will be made when the root file system is mounted, after &mac.mpo;_create_mount;. <function>&mac.mpo;_relabel_vnode</function> void &mac.mpo;_relabel_vnode struct ucred *cred struct vnode *vp struct label *vnodelabel struct label *newlabel &mac.thead; cred Subject credential vp vnode to relabel vnodelabel Existing policy label for vp newlabel New, possibly partial label to replace vnodelabel Update the label on the passed vnode given the passed update vnode label and the passed subject credential. <function>&mac.mpo;_setlabel_vnode_extattr</function> int &mac.mpo;_setlabel_vnode_extattr struct ucred *cred struct vnode *vp struct label *vlabel struct label *intlabel &mac.thead; cred Subject credential vp Vnode for which the label is being written vlabel Policy label associated with vp intlabel Label to write out Write out the policy from intlabel to an extended attribute. This is called from vop_stdcreatevnode_ea. <function>&mac.mpo;_update_devfsdirent</function> void &mac.mpo;_update_devfsdirent struct devfs_dirent *devfs_dirent struct label *direntlabel struct vnode *vp struct label *vnodelabel &mac.thead; devfs_dirent Object; devfs directory entry direntlabel Policy label for devfs_dirent to be updated. vp Parent vnode Locked vnodelabel Policy label for vp Update the devfs_dirent label from the passed devfs vnode label. This call will be made when a devfs vnode has been successfully relabeled to commit the label change such that it lasts even if the vnode is recycled. It will also be made when when a symlink is created in devfs, following a call to mac_vnode_create_from_vnode to initialize the vnode label. IPC Object Labeling Event Operations <function>&mac.mpo;_create_mbuf_from_socket</function> void &mac.mpo;_create_mbuf_from_socket struct socket *so struct label *socketlabel struct mbuf *m struct label *mbuflabel &mac.thead; socket Socket Socket locking WIP socketlabel Policy label for socket m Object; mbuf mbuflabel Policy label to fill in for m Set the label on a newly created mbuf header from the passed socket label. This call is made when a new datagram or message is generated by the socket and stored in the passed mbuf. <function>&mac.mpo;_create_pipe</function> void &mac.mpo;_create_pipe struct ucred *cred struct pipe *pipe struct label *pipelabel &mac.thead; cred Subject credential pipe Pipe pipelabel Policy label associated with pipe Set the label on a newly created pipe from the passed subject credential. This call is made when a new pipe is created. <function>&mac.mpo;_create_socket</function> void &mac.mpo;_create_socket struct ucred *cred struct socket *so struct label *socketlabel &mac.thead; cred Subject credential Immutable so Object; socket to label socketlabel Label to fill in for so Set the label on a newly created socket from the passed subject credential. This call is made when a socket is created. <function>&mac.mpo;_create_socket_from_socket</function> void &mac.mpo;_create_socket_from_socket struct socket *oldsocket struct label *oldsocketlabel struct socket *newsocket struct label *newsocketlabel &mac.thead; oldsocket Listening socket oldsocketlabel Policy label associated with oldsocket newsocket New socket newsocketlabel Policy label associated with newsocketlabel Label a socket, newsocket, newly &man.accept.2;ed, based on the &man.listen.2; socket, oldsocket. <function>&mac.mpo;_relabel_pipe</function> void &mac.mpo;_relabel_pipe struct ucred *cred struct pipe *pipe struct label *oldlabel struct label *newlabel &mac.thead; cred Subject credential pipe Pipe oldlabel Current policy label associated with pipe newlabel Policy label update to apply to pipe Apply a new label, newlabel, to pipe. <function>&mac.mpo;_relabel_socket</function> void &mac.mpo;_relabel_socket struct ucred *cred struct socket *so struct label *oldlabel struct label *newlabel &mac.thead; cred Subject credential Immutable so Object; socket oldlabel Current label for so newlabel Label update for so Update the label on a socket from the passed socket label update. <function>&mac.mpo;_set_socket_peer_from_mbuf</function> void &mac.mpo;_set_socket_peer_from_mbuf struct mbuf *mbuf struct label *mbuflabel struct label *oldlabel struct label *newlabel &mac.thead; mbuf First datagram received over socket mbuflabel Label for mbuf oldlabel Current label for the socket newlabel Policy label to be filled out for the socket Set the peer label on a stream socket from the passed mbuf label. This call will be made when the first datagram is received by the stream socket, with the exception of Unix domain sockets. <function>&mac.mpo;_set_socket_peer_from_socket</function> void &mac.mpo;_set_socket_peer_from_socket struct socket *oldsocket struct label *oldsocketlabel struct socket *newsocket struct label *newsocketpeerlabel &mac.thead; oldsocket Local socket oldsocketlabel Policy label for oldsocket newsocket Peer socket newsocketpeerlabel Policy label to fill in for newsocket Set the peer label on a stream UNIX domain socket from the passed remote socket endpoint. This call will be made when the socket pair is connected, and will be made for both endpoints. Network Object Labeling Event Operations <function>&mac.mpo;_create_bpfdesc</function> void &mac.mpo;_create_bpfdesc struct ucred *cred struct bpf_d *bpf_d struct label *bpflabel &mac.thead; cred Subject credential Immutable bpf_d Object; bpf descriptor bpf Policy label to be filled in for bpf_d Set the label on a newly created BPF descriptor from the passed subject credential. This call will be made when a BPF device node is opened by a process with the passed subject credential. <function>&mac.mpo;_create_ifnet</function> void &mac.mpo;_create_ifnet struct ifnet *ifnet struct label *ifnetlabel &mac.thead; ifnet Network interface ifnetlabel Policy label to fill in for ifnet Set the label on a newly created interface. This call may be made when a new physical interface becomes available to the system, or when a pseudo-interface is instantiated during the boot or as a result of a user action. <function>&mac.mpo;_create_ipq</function> void &mac.mpo;_create_ipq struct mbuf *fragment struct label *fragmentlabel struct ipq *ipq struct label *ipqlabel &mac.thead; fragment First received IP fragment fragmentlabel Policy label for fragment ipq IP reassembly queue to be labeled ipqlabel Policy label to be filled in for ipq Set the label on a newly created IP fragment reassembly queue from the mbuf header of the first received fragment. <function>&mac.mpo;_create_datagram_from_ipq</function> void &mac.mpo;_create_create_datagram_from_ipq struct ipq *ipq struct label *ipqlabel struct mbuf *datagram struct label *datagramlabel &mac.thead; ipq IP reassembly queue ipqlabel Policy label for ipq datagram Datagram to be labeled datagramlabel Policy label to be filled in for datagramlabel Set the label on a newly reassembled IP datagram from the IP fragment reassembly queue from which it was generated. <function>&mac.mpo;_create_fragment</function> void &mac.mpo;_create_fragment struct mbuf *datagram struct label *datagramlabel struct mbuf *fragment struct label *fragmentlabel &mac.thead; datagram Datagram datagramlabel Policy label for datagram fragment Fragment to be labeled fragmentlabel Policy label to be filled in for datagram Set the label on the mbuf header of a newly created IP fragment from the label on the mbuf header of the datagram it was generate from. <function>&mac.mpo;_create_mbuf_from_mbuf</function> void &mac.mpo;_create_mbuf_from_mbuf struct mbuf *oldmbuf struct label *oldmbuflabel struct mbuf *newmbuf struct label *newmbuflabel &mac.thead; oldmbuf Existing (source) mbuf oldmbuflabel Policy label for oldmbuf newmbuf New mbuf to be labeled newmbuflabel Policy label to be filled in for newmbuf Set the label on the mbuf header of a newly created datagram from the mbuf header of an existing datagram. This call may be made in a number of situations, including when an mbuf is re-allocated for alignment purposes. <function>&mac.mpo;_create_mbuf_linklayer</function> void &mac.mpo;_create_mbuf_linklayer struct ifnet *ifnet struct label *ifnetlabel struct mbuf *mbuf struct label *mbuflabel &mac.thead; ifnet Network interface ifnetlabel Policy label for ifnet mbuf mbuf header for new datagram mbuflabel Policy label to be filled in for mbuf Set the label on the mbuf header of a newly created datagram generated for the purposes of a link layer response for the passed interface. This call may be made in a number of situations, including for ARP or ND6 responses in the IPv4 and IPv6 stacks. <function>&mac.mpo;_create_mbuf_from_bpfdesc</function> void &mac.mpo;_create_mbuf_from_bpfdesc struct bpf_d *bpf_d struct label *bpflabel struct mbuf *mbuf struct label *mbuflabel &mac.thead; bpf_d BPF descriptor bpflabel Policy label for bpflabel mbuf New mbuf to be labeled mbuflabel Policy label to fill in for mbuf Set the label on the mbuf header of a newly created datagram generated using the passed BPF descriptor. This call is made when a write is performed to the BPF device associated with the passed BPF descriptor. <function>&mac.mpo;_create_mbuf_from_ifnet</function> void &mac.mpo;_create_mbuf_from_ifnet struct ifnet *ifnet struct label *ifnetlabel struct mbuf *mbuf struct label *mbuflabel &mac.thead; ifnet Network interface ifnetlabel Policy label for ifnetlabel mbuf mbuf header for new datagram mbuflabel Policy label to be filled in for mbuf Set the label on the mbuf header of a newly created datagram generated from the passed network interface. <function>&mac.mpo;_create_mbuf_multicast_encap</function> void &mac.mpo;_create_mbuf_multicast_encap struct mbuf *oldmbuf struct label *oldmbuflabel struct ifnet *ifnet struct label *ifnetlabel struct mbuf *newmbuf struct label *newmbuflabel &mac.thead; oldmbuf mbuf header for existing datagram oldmbuflabel Policy label for oldmbuf ifnet Network interface ifnetlabel Policy label for ifnet newmbuf mbuf header to be labeled for new datagram newmbuflabel Policy label to be filled in for newmbuf Set the label on the mbuf header of a newly created datagram generated from the existing passed datagram when it is processed by the passed multicast encapsulation interface. This call is made when an mbuf is to be delivered using the virtual interface. <function>&mac.mpo;_create_mbuf_netlayer</function> void &mac.mpo;_create_mbuf_netlayer struct mbuf *oldmbuf struct label *oldmbuflabel struct mbuf *newmbuf struct label *newmbuflabel &mac.thead; oldmbuf Received datagram oldmbuflabel Policy label for oldmbuf newmbuf Newly created datagram newmbuflabel Policy label for newmbuf Set the label on the mbuf header of a newly created datagram generated by the IP stack in response to an existing received datagram (oldmbuf). This call may be made in a number of situations, including when responding to ICMP request datagrams. <function>&mac.mpo;_fragment_match</function> int &mac.mpo;_fragment_match struct mbuf *fragment struct label *fragmentlabel struct ipq *ipq struct label *ipqlabel &mac.thead; fragment IP datagram fragment fragmentlabel Policy label for fragment ipq IP fragment reassembly queue ipqlabel Policy label for ipq Determine whether an mbuf header containing an IP datagram (fragment) fragment matches the label of the passed IP fragment reassembly queue (ipq). Return (1) for a successful match, or (0) for no match. This call is made when the IP stack attempts to find an existing fragment reassembly queue for a newly received fragment; if this fails, a new fragment reassembly queue may be instantiated for the fragment. Policies may use this entry point to prevent the reassembly of otherwise matching IP fragments if policy does not permit them to be reassembled based on the label or other information. <function>&mac.mpo;_relabel_ifnet</function> void &mac.mpo;_relabel_ifnet struct ucred *cred struct ifnet *ifnet struct label *ifnetlabel struct label *newlabel &mac.thead; cred Subject credential ifnet Object; Network interface ifnetlabel Policy label for ifnet newlabel Label update to apply to ifnet Update the label of network interface, ifnet, based on the passed update label, newlabel, and the passed subject credential, cred. <function>&mac.mpo;_update_ipq</function> void &mac.mpo;_update_ipq struct mbuf *fragment struct label *fragmentlabel struct ipq *ipq struct label *ipqlabel &mac.thead; mbuf IP fragment mbuflabel Policy label for mbuf ipq IP fragment reassembly queue ipqlabel Policy label to be updated for ipq Update the label on an IP fragment reassembly queue (ipq) based on the acceptance of the passed IP fragment mbuf header (mbuf). Process Labeling Event Operations <function>&mac.mpo;_create_cred</function> void &mac.mpo;_create_cred struct ucred *parent_cred struct ucred *child_cred &mac.thead; parent_cred Parent subject credential child_cred Child subject credential Set the label of a newly created subject credential from the passed subject credential. This call will be made when &man.crcopy.9; is invoked on a newly created struct ucred. This call should not be confused with a process forking or creation event. <function>&mac.mpo;_execve_transition</function> void &mac.mpo;_execve_transition struct ucred *old struct ucred *new struct vnode *vp struct label *vnodelabel &mac.thead; old Existing subject credential Immutable new New subject credential to be labeled vp File to execute Locked vnodelabel Policy label for vp Update the label of a newly created subject credential (new) from the passed existing subject credential (old) based on a label transition caused by executing the passed vnode (vp). This call occurs when a process executes the passed vnode and one of the policies returns a success from the mpo_execve_will_transition entry point. Policies may choose to implement this call simply by invoking mpo_create_cred and passing the two subject credentials so as not to implement a transitioning event. Policies should not leave this entry point unimplemented if they implement mpo_create_cred, even if they do not implement mpo_execve_will_transition. <function>&mac.mpo;_execve_will_transition</function> int &mac.mpo;_execve_will_transition struct ucred *old struct vnode *vp struct label *vnodelabel &mac.thead; old Subject credential prior to &man.execve.2; Immutable vp File to execute vnodelabel Policy label for vp Determine whether the policy will want to perform a transition event as a result of the execution of the passed vnode by the passed subject credential. Return 1 if a transition is required, 0 if not. Even if a policy returns 0, it should behave correctly in the presence of an unexpected invocation of mpo_execve_transition, as that call may happen as a result of another policy requesting a transition. <function>&mac.mpo;_create_proc0</function> void &mac.mpo;_create_proc0 struct ucred *cred &mac.thead; cred Subject credential to be filled in Create the subject credential of process 0, the parent of all kernel processes. <function>&mac.mpo;_create_proc1</function> void &mac.mpo;_create_proc1 struct ucred *cred &mac.thead; cred Subject credential to be filled in Create the subject credential of process 1, the parent of all user processes. <function>&mac.mpo;_relabel_cred</function> void &mac.mpo;_relabel_cred struct ucred *cred struct label *newlabel &mac.thead; cred Subject credential newlabel Label update to apply to cred Update the label on a subject credential from the passed update label. Access Control Checks Access control entry points permit policy modules to influence access control decisions made by the kernel. Generally, although not always, arguments to an access control entry point will include one or more authorizing credentials, information (possibly including a label) for any other objects involved in the operation. An access control entry point may return 0 to permit the operation, or an &man.errno.2; error value. The results of invoking the entry point across various registered policy modules will be composed as follows: if all modules permit the operation to succeed, success will be returned. If one or modules returns a failure, a failure will be returned. If more than one module returns a failure, the errno value to return to the user will be selected using the following precedence, implemented by the error_select() function in kern_mac.c: Most precedence EDEADLK EINVAL ESRCH EACCES Least precedence EPERM If none of the error values returned by all modules are listed in the precedence chart then an arbitrarily selected value from the set will be returned. In general, the rules provide precedence to errors in the following order: kernel failures, invalid arguments, object not present, access not permitted, other. <function>&mac.mpo;_check_bpfdesc_receive</function> int &mac.mpo;_check_bpfdesc_receive struct bpf_d *bpf_d struct label *bpflabel struct ifnet *ifnet struct label *ifnetlabel &mac.thead; bpf_d Subject; BPF descriptor bpflabel Policy label for bpf_d ifnet Object; network interface ifnetlabel Policy label for ifnet Determine whether the MAC framework should permit datagrams from the passed interface to be delivered to the buffers of the passed BPF descriptor. Return (0) for success, or an errno value for failure Suggested failure: EACCES for label mismatches, EPERM for lack of privilege. <function>&mac.mpo;_check_kenv_dump</function> int &mac.mpo;_check_kenv_dump struct ucred *cred &mac.thead; cred Subject credential Determine whether the subject should be allowed to retrieve the kernel environment (see &man.kenv.2;). <function>&mac.mpo;_check_kenv_get</function> int &mac.mpo;_check_kenv_get struct ucred *cred char *name &mac.thead; cred Subject credential name Kernel environment variable name Determine whether the subject should be allowed to retrieve the value of the specified kernel environment variable. <function>&mac.mpo;_check_kenv_set</function> int &mac.mpo;_check_kenv_set struct ucred *cred char *name &mac.thead; cred Subject credential name Kernel environment variable name Determine whether the subject should be allowed to set the specified kernel environment variable. <function>&mac.mpo;_check_kenv_unset</function> int &mac.mpo;_check_kenv_unset struct ucred *cred char *name &mac.thead; cred Subject credential name Kernel environment variable name Determine whether the subject should be allowed to unset the specified kernel environment variable. <function>&mac.mpo;_check_kld_load</function> int &mac.mpo;_check_kld_load struct ucred *cred struct vnode *vp struct label *vlabel &mac.thead; cred Subject credential vp Kernel module vnode vlabel Label associated with vp Determine whether the subject should be allowed to load the specified module file. <function>&mac.mpo;_check_kld_stat</function> int &mac.mpo;_check_kld_stat struct ucred *cred &mac.thead; cred Subject credential Determine whether the subject should be allowed to retrieve a list of loaded kernel module files and associated statistics. <function>&mac.mpo;_check_kld_unload</function> int &mac.mpo;_check_kld_unload struct ucred *cred &mac.thead; cred Subject credential Determine whether the subject should be allowed to unload a kernel module. <function>&mac.mpo;_check_pipe_ioctl</function> int &mac.mpo;_check_pipe_ioctl struct ucred *cred struct pipe *pipe struct label *pipelabel unsigned long cmd void *data &mac.thead; cred Subject credential pipe Pipe pipelabel Policy label associated with pipe cmd &man.ioctl.2; command data &man.ioctl.2; data Determine whether the subject should be allowed to make the specified &man.ioctl.2; call. <function>&mac.mpo;_check_pipe_poll</function> int &mac.mpo;_check_pipe_poll struct ucred *cred struct pipe *pipe struct label *pipelabel &mac.thead; cred Subject credential pipe Pipe pipelabel Policy label associated with pipe Determine whether the subject should be allowed to poll pipe. <function>&mac.mpo;_check_pipe_read</function> int &mac.mpo;_check_pipe_read struct ucred *cred struct pipe *pipe struct label *pipelabel &mac.thead; cred Subject credential pipe Pipe pipelabel Policy label associated with pipe Determine whether the subject should be allowed read access to pipe. <function>&mac.mpo;_check_pipe_relabel</function> int &mac.mpo;_check_pipe_relabel struct ucred *cred struct pipe *pipe struct label *pipelabel struct label *newlabel &mac.thead; cred Subject credential pipe Pipe pipelabel Current policy label associated with pipe newlabel Label update to pipelabel Determine whether the subject should be allowed to relabel pipe. <function>&mac.mpo;_check_pipe_stat</function> int &mac.mpo;_check_pipe_stat struct ucred *cred struct pipe *pipe struct label *pipelabel &mac.thead; cred Subject credential pipe Pipe pipelabel Policy label associated with pipe Determine whether the subject should be allowed to retrieve statistics related to pipe. <function>&mac.mpo;_check_pipe_write</function> int &mac.mpo;_check_pipe_write struct ucred *cred struct pipe *pipe struct label *pipelabel &mac.thead; cred Subject credential pipe Pipe pipelabel Policy label associated with pipe Determine whether the subject should be allowed to write to pipe. <function>&mac.mpo;_check_socket_bind</function> int &mac.mpo;_check_socket_bind struct ucred *cred struct socket *socket struct label *socketlabel struct sockaddr *sockaddr &mac.thead; cred Subject credential socket Socket to be bound socketlabel Policy label for socket sockaddr Address of socket <function>&mac.mpo;_check_socket_connect</function> int &mac.mpo;_check_socket_connect struct ucred *cred struct socket *socket struct label *socketlabel struct sockaddr *sockaddr &mac.thead; cred Subject credential socket Socket to be connected socketlabel Policy label for socket sockaddr Address of socket Determine whether the subject credential (cred) can connect the passed socket (socket) to the passed socket address (sockaddr). Return 0 for success, or an errno value for failure. Suggested failure: EACCES for label mismatches, EPERM for lack of privilege. <function>&mac.mpo;_check_socket_receive</function> int &mac.mpo;_check_socket_receive struct ucred *cred struct socket *so struct label *socketlabel &mac.thead; cred Subject credential so Socket socketlabel Policy label associated with so Determine whether the subject should be allowed to receive information from the socket so. <function>&mac.mpo;_check_socket_send</function> int &mac.mpo;_check_socket_send struct ucred *cred struct socket *so struct label *socketlabel &mac.thead; cred Subject credential so Socket socketlabel Policy label associated with so Determine whether the subject should be allowed to send information across the socket so. <function>&mac.mpo;_check_cred_visible</function> int &mac.mpo;_check_cred_visible struct ucred *u1 struct ucred *u2 &mac.thead; u1 Subject credential u2 Object credential Determine whether the subject credential u1 can see other subjects with the passed subject credential u2. Return 0 for success, or an errno value for failure. Suggested failure: EACCES for label mismatches, EPERM for lack of privilege, or ESRCH to hide visibility. This call may be made in a number of situations, including inter-process status sysctls used by ps, and in procfs lookups. <function>&mac.mpo;_check_socket_visible</function> int &mac.mpo;_check_socket_visible struct ucred *cred struct socket *socket struct label *socketlabel &mac.thead; cred Subject credential socket Object; socket socketlabel Policy label for socket <function>&mac.mpo;_check_ifnet_relabel</function> int &mac.mpo;_check_ifnet_relabel struct ucred *cred struct ifnet *ifnet struct label *ifnetlabel struct label *newlabel &mac.thead; cred Subject credential ifnet Object; network interface ifnetlabel Existing policy label for ifnet newlabel Policy label update to later be applied to ifnet Determine whether the subject credential can relabel the passed network interface to the passed label update. <function>&mac.mpo;_check_socket_relabel</function> int &mac.mpo;_check_socket_relabel struct ucred *cred struct socket *socket struct label *socketlabel struct label *newlabel &mac.thead; cred Subject credential socket Object; socket socketlabel Existing policy label for socket newlabel Label update to later be applied to socketlabel Determine whether the subject credential can relabel the passed socket to the passed label update. <function>&mac.mpo;_check_cred_relabel</function> int &mac.mpo;_check_cred_relabel struct ucred *cred struct label *newlabel &mac.thead; cred Subject credential newlabel Label update to later be applied to cred Determine whether the subject credential can relabel itself to the passed label update. <function>&mac.mpo;_check_vnode_relabel</function> int &mac.mpo;_check_vnode_relabel struct ucred *cred struct vnode *vp struct label *vnodelabel struct label *newlabel &mac.thead; cred Subject credential Immutable vp Object; vnode Locked vnodelabel Existing policy label for vp newlabel Policy label update to later be applied to vp Determine whether the subject credential can relabel the passed vnode to the passed label update. <function>&mac.mpo;_check_mount_stat</function> int &mac.mpo;_check_mount_stat struct ucred *cred struct mount *mp struct label *mountlabel &mac.thead; cred Subject credential mp Object; file system mount mountlabel Policy label for mp Determine whether the subject credential can see the results of a statfs performed on the file system. Return 0 for success, or an errno value for failure. Suggested failure: EACCES for label mismatches or EPERM for lack of privilege. This call may be made in a number of situations, including during invocations of &man.statfs.2; and related calls, as well as to determine what file systems to exclude from listings of file systems, such as when &man.getfsstat.2; is invoked. <function>&mac.mpo;_check_proc_debug</function> int &mac.mpo;_check_proc_debug struct ucred *cred struct proc *proc &mac.thead; cred Subject credential Immutable proc Object; process Determine whether the subject credential can debug the passed process. Return 0 for success, or an errno value for failure. Suggested failure: EACCES for label mismatch, EPERM for lack of privilege, or ESRCH to hide visibility of the target. This call may be made in a number of situations, including use of the &man.ptrace.2; and &man.ktrace.2; APIs, as well as for some types of procfs operations. <function>&mac.mpo;_check_vnode_access</function> int &mac.mpo;_check_vnode_access struct ucred *cred struct vnode *vp struct label *label int flags &mac.thead; cred Subject credential vp Object; vnode label Policy label for vp flags &man.access.2; flags Determine how invocations of &man.access.2; and related calls by the subject credential should return when performed on the passed vnode using the passed access flags. This should generally be implemented using the same semantics used in &mac.mpo;_check_vnode_open. Return 0 for success, or an errno value for failure. Suggested failure: EACCES for label mismatches or EPERM for lack of privilege. <function>&mac.mpo;_check_vnode_chdir</function> int &mac.mpo;_check_vnode_chdir struct ucred *cred struct vnode *dvp struct label *dlabel &mac.thead; cred Subject credential dvp Object; vnode to &man.chdir.2; into dlabel Policy label for dvp Determine whether the subject credential can change the process working directory to the passed vnode. Return 0 for success, or an errno value for failure. Suggested failure: EACCES for label mismatch, or EPERM for lack of privilege. <function>&mac.mpo;_check_vnode_chroot</function> int &mac.mpo;_check_vnode_chroot struct ucred *cred struct vnode *dvp struct label *dlabel &mac.thead; cred Subject credential dvp Directory vnode dlabel Policy label associated with dvp Determine whether the subject should be allowed to &man.chroot.2; into the specified directory (dvp). <function>&mac.mpo;_check_vnode_create</function> int &mac.mpo;_check_vnode_create struct ucred *cred struct vnode *dvp struct label *dlabel struct componentname *cnp struct vattr *vap &mac.thead; cred Subject credential dvp Object; vnode dlabel Policy label for dvp cnp Component name for dvp vap vnode attributes for vap Determine whether the subject credential can create a vnode with the passed parent directory, passed name information, and passed attribute information. Return 0 for success, or an errno value for failure. Suggested failure: EACCES. for label mismatch, or EPERM for lack of privilege. This call may be made in a number of situations, including as a result of calls to &man.open.2; with O_CREAT, &man.mknod.2;, &man.mkfifo.2;, and others. <function>&mac.mpo;_check_vnode_delete</function> int &mac.mpo;_check_vnode_delete struct ucred *cred struct vnode *dvp struct label *dlabel struct vnode *vp void *label struct componentname *cnp &mac.thead; cred Subject credential dvp Parent directory vnode dlabel Policy label for dvp vp Object; vnode to delete label Policy label for vp cnp Component name for vp Determine whether the subject credential can delete a vnode from the passed parent directory and passed name information. Return 0 for success, or an errno value for failure. Suggested failure: EACCES for label mismatch, or EPERM for lack of privilege. This call may be made in a number of situations, including as a result of calls to &man.unlink.2; and &man.rmdir.2;. Policies implementing this entry point should also implement mpo_check_rename_to to authorize deletion of objects as a result of being the target of a rename. <function>&mac.mpo;_check_vnode_deleteacl</function> int &mac.mpo;_check_vnode_deleteacl struct ucred *cred struct vnode *vp struct label *label acl_type_t type &mac.thead; cred Subject credential Immutable vp Object; vnode Locked label Policy label for vp type ACL type Determine whether the subject credential can delete the ACL of passed type from the passed vnode. Return 0 for success, or an errno value for failure. Suggested failure: EACCES for label mismatch, or EPERM for lack of privilege. <function>&mac.mpo;_check_vnode_exec</function> int &mac.mpo;_check_vnode_exec struct ucred *cred struct vnode *vp struct label *label &mac.thead; cred Subject credential vp Object; vnode to execute label Policy label for vp Determine whether the subject credential can execute the passed vnode. Determination of execute privilege is made separately from decisions about any transitioning event. Return 0 for success, or an errno value for failure. Suggested failure: EACCES for label mismatch, or EPERM for lack of privilege. <function>&mac.mpo;_check_vnode_getacl</function> int &mac.mpo;_check_vnode_getacl struct ucred *cred struct vnode *vp struct label *label acl_type_t type &mac.thead; cred Subject credential vp Object; vnode label Policy label for vp type ACL type Determine whether the subject credential can retrieve the ACL of passed type from the passed vnode. Return 0 for success, or an errno value for failure. Suggested failure: EACCES for label mismatch, or EPERM for lack of privilege. <function>&mac.mpo;_check_vnode_getextattr</function> int &mac.mpo;_check_vnode_getextattr struct ucred *cred struct vnode *vp struct label *label int attrnamespace const char *name struct uio *uio &mac.thead; cred Subject credential vp Object; vnode label Policy label for vp attrnamespace Extended attribute namespace name Extended attribute name uio I/O structure pointer; see &man.uio.9; Determine whether the subject credential can retrieve the extended attribute with the passed namespace and name from the passed vnode. Policies implementing labeling using extended attributes may be interested in special handling of operations on those extended attributes. Return 0 for success, or an errno value for failure. Suggested failure: EACCES for label mismatch, or EPERM for lack of privilege. <function>&mac.mpo;_check_vnode_link</function> int &mac.mpo;_check_vnode_link struct ucred *cred struct vnode *dvp struct label *dlabel struct vnode *vp struct label *label struct componentname *cnp &mac.thead; cred Subject credential dvp Directory vnode dlabel Policy label associated with dvp vp Link destination vnode label Policy label associated with vp cnp Component name for the link being created Determine whether the subject should be allowed to create a link to the vnode vp with the name specified by cnp. <function>&mac.mpo;_check_vnode_mmap</function> int &mac.mpo;_check_vnode_mmap struct ucred *cred struct vnode *vp struct label *label int prot &mac.thead; cred Subject credential vp Vnode to map label Policy label associated with vp prot Mmap protections (see &man.mmap.2;) Determine whether the subject should be allowed to map the vnode vp with the protections specified in prot. <function>&mac.mpo;_check_vnode_mmap_downgrade</function> void &mac.mpo;_check_vnode_mmap_downgrade struct ucred *cred struct vnode *vp struct label *label int *prot &mac.thead; cred See . vp label prot Mmap protections to be downgraded Downgrade the mmap protections based on the subject and object labels. <function>&mac.mpo;_check_vnode_mprotect</function> int &mac.mpo;_check_vnode_mprotect struct ucred *cred struct vnode *vp struct label *label int prot &mac.thead; cred Subject credential vp Mapped vnode prot Memory protections Determine whether the subject should be allowed to set the specified memory protections on memory mapped from the vnode vp. <function>&mac.mpo;_check_vnode_poll</function> int &mac.mpo;_check_vnode_poll struct ucred *active_cred struct ucred *file_cred struct vnode *vp struct label *label &mac.thead; active_cred Subject credential file_cred Credential associated with the struct file vp Polled vnode label Policy label associated with vp Determine whether the subject should be allowed to poll the vnode vp. <function>&mac.mpo;_check_vnode_rename_from</function> int &mac.mpo;_vnode_rename_from struct ucred *cred struct vnode *dvp struct label *dlabel struct vnode *vp struct label *label struct componentname *cnp &mac.thead; cred Subject credential dvp Directory vnode dlabel Policy label associated with dvp vp Vnode to be renamed label Policy label associated with vp cnp Component name for vp Determine whether the subject should be allowed to rename the vnode vp to something else. <function>&mac.mpo;_check_vnode_rename_to</function> int &mac.mpo;_check_vnode_rename_to struct ucred *cred struct vnode *dvp struct label *dlabel struct vnode *vp struct label *label int samedir struct componentname *cnp &mac.thead; cred Subject credential dvp Directory vnode dlabel Policy label associated with dvp vp Overwritten vnode label Policy label associated with vp samedir Boolean; 1 if the source and destination directories are the same cnp Destination component name Determine whether the subject should be allowed to rename to the vnode vp, into the directory dvp, or to the name represented by cnp. If there is no existing file to overwrite, vp and label will be NULL. <function>&mac.mpo;_check_socket_listen</function> int &mac.mpo;_check_socket_listen struct ucred *cred struct socket *socket struct label *socketlabel &mac.thead; cred Subject credential socket Object; socket socketlabel Policy label for socket Determine whether the subject credential can listen on the passed socket. Return 0 for success, or an errno value for failure. Suggested failure: EACCES for label mismatch, or EPERM for lack of privilege. <function>&mac.mpo;_check_vnode_lookup</function> int &mac.mpo;_check_vnode_lookup struct ucred *cred struct vnode *dvp struct label *dlabel struct componentname *cnp &mac.thead; cred Subject credential dvp Object; vnode dlabel Policy label for dvp cnp Component name being looked up Determine whether the subject credential can perform a lookup in the passed directory vnode for the passed name. Return 0 for success, or an errno value for failure. Suggested failure: EACCES for label mismatch, or EPERM for lack of privilege. <function>&mac.mpo;_check_vnode_open</function> int &mac.mpo;_check_vnode_open struct ucred *cred struct vnode *vp struct label *label int acc_mode &mac.thead; cred Subject credential vp Object; vnode label Policy label for vp acc_mode &man.open.2; access mode Determine whether the subject credential can perform an open operation on the passed vnode with the passed access mode. Return 0 for success, or an errno value for failure. Suggested failure: EACCES for label mismatch, or EPERM for lack of privilege. <function>&mac.mpo;_check_vnode_readdir</function> int &mac.mpo;_check_vnode_readdir struct ucred *cred struct vnode *dvp struct label *dlabel &mac.thead; cred Subject credential dvp Object; directory vnode dlabel Policy label for dvp Determine whether the subject credential can perform a readdir operation on the passed directory vnode. Return 0 for success, or an errno value for failure. Suggested failure: EACCES for label mismatch, or EPERM for lack of privilege. <function>&mac.mpo;_check_vnode_readlink</function> int &mac.mpo;_check_vnode_readlink struct ucred *cred struct vnode *vp struct label *label &mac.thead; cred Subject credential vp Object; vnode label Policy label for vp Determine whether the subject credential can perform a readlink operation on the passed symlink vnode. Return 0 for success, or an errno value for failure. Suggested failure: EACCES for label mismatch, or EPERM for lack of privilege. This call may be made in a number of situations, including an explicit readlink call by the user process, or as a result of an implicit readlink during a name lookup by the process. <function>&mac.mpo;_check_vnode_revoke</function> int &mac.mpo;_check_vnode_revoke struct ucred *cred struct vnode *vp struct label *label &mac.thead; cred Subject credential vp Object; vnode label Policy label for vp Determine whether the subject credential can revoke access to the passed vnode. Return 0 for success, or an errno value for failure. Suggested failure: EACCES for label mismatch, or EPERM for lack of privilege. <function>&mac.mpo;_check_vnode_setacl</function> int &mac.mpo;_check_vnode_setacl struct ucred *cred struct vnode *vp struct label *label acl_type_t type struct acl *acl &mac.thead; cred Subject credential vp Object; vnode label Policy label for vp type ACL type acl ACL Determine whether the subject credential can set the passed ACL of passed type on the passed vnode. Return 0 for success, or an errno value for failure. Suggested failure: EACCES for label mismatch, or EPERM for lack of privilege. <function>&mac.mpo;_check_vnode_setextattr</function> int &mac.mpo;_check_vnode_setextattr struct ucred *cred struct vnode *vp struct label *label int attrnamespace const char *name struct uio *uio &mac.thead; cred Subject credential vp Object; vnode label Policy label for vp attrnamespace Extended attribute namespace name Extended attribute name uio I/O structure pointer; see &man.uio.9; Determine whether the subject credential can set the extended attribute of passed name and passed namespace on the passed vnode. Policies implementing security labels backed into extended attributes may want to provide additional protections for those attributes. Additionally, policies should avoid making decisions based on the data referenced from uio, as there is a potential race condition between this check and the actual operation. The uio may also be NULL if a delete operation is being performed. Return 0 for success, or an errno value for failure. Suggested failure: EACCES for label mismatch, or EPERM for lack of privilege. <function>&mac.mpo;_check_vnode_setflags</function> int &mac.mpo;_check_vnode_setflags struct ucred *cred struct vnode *vp struct label *label u_long flags &mac.thead; cred Subject credential vp Object; vnode label Policy label for vp flags File flags; see &man.chflags.2; Determine whether the subject credential can set the passed flags on the passed vnode. Return 0 for success, or an errno value for failure. Suggested failure: EACCES for label mismatch, or EPERM for lack of privilege. <function>&mac.mpo;_check_vnode_setmode</function> int &mac.mpo;_check_vnode_setmode struct ucred *cred struct vnode *vp struct label *label mode_t mode &mac.thead; cred Subject credential vp Object; vnode label Policy label for vp mode File mode; see &man.chmod.2; Determine whether the subject credential can set the passed mode on the passed vnode. Return 0 for success, or an errno value for failure. Suggested failure: EACCES for label mismatch, or EPERM for lack of privilege. <function>&mac.mpo;_check_vnode_setowner</function> int &mac.mpo;_check_vnode_setowner struct ucred *cred struct vnode *vp struct label *label uid_t uid gid_t gid &mac.thead; cred Subject credential vp Object; vnode label Policy label for vp uid User ID gid Group ID Determine whether the subject credential can set the passed uid and passed gid as file uid and file gid on the passed vnode. The IDs may be set to (-1) to request no update. Return 0 for success, or an errno value for failure. Suggested failure: EACCES for label mismatch, or EPERM for lack of privilege. <function>&mac.mpo;_check_vnode_setutimes</function> int &mac.mpo;_check_vnode_setutimes struct ucred *cred struct vnode *vp struct label *label struct timespec atime struct timespec mtime &mac.thead; cred Subject credential vp Object; vp label Policy label for vp atime Access time; see &man.utimes.2; mtime Modification time; see &man.utimes.2; Determine whether the subject credential can set the passed access timestamps on the passed vnode. Return 0 for success, or an errno value for failure. Suggested failure: EACCES for label mismatch, or EPERM for lack of privilege. <function>&mac.mpo;_check_proc_sched</function> int &mac.mpo;_check_proc_sched struct ucred *ucred struct proc *proc &mac.thead; cred Subject credential proc Object; process Determine whether the subject credential can change the scheduling parameters of the passed process. Return 0 for success, or an errno value for failure. Suggested failure: EACCES for label mismatch, EPERM for lack of privilege, or ESRCH to limit visibility. See &man.setpriority.2; for more information. <function>&mac.mpo;_check_proc_signal</function> int &mac.mpo;_check_proc_signal struct ucred *cred struct proc *proc int signal &mac.thead; cred Subject credential proc Object; process signal Signal; see &man.kill.2; Determine whether the subject credential can deliver the passed signal to the passed process. Return 0 for success, or an errno value for failure. Suggested failure: EACCES for label mismatch, EPERM for lack of privilege, or ESRCH to limit visibility. <function>&mac.mpo;_check_vnode_stat</function> int &mac.mpo;_check_vnode_stat struct ucred *cred struct vnode *vp struct label *label &mac.thead; cred Subject credential vp Object; vnode label Policy label for vp Determine whether the subject credential can stat the passed vnode. Return 0 for success, or an errno value for failure. Suggested failure: EACCES for label mismatch, or EPERM for lack of privilege. See &man.stat.2; for more information. <function>&mac.mpo;_check_ifnet_transmit</function> int &mac.mpo;_check_ifnet_transmit struct ucred *cred struct ifnet *ifnet struct label *ifnetlabel struct mbuf *mbuf struct label *mbuflabel &mac.thead; cred Subject credential ifnet Network interface ifnetlabel Policy label for ifnet mbuf Object; mbuf to be sent mbuflabel Policy label for mbuf Determine whether the network interface can transmit the passed mbuf. Return 0 for success, or an errno value for failure. Suggested failure: EACCES for label mismatch, or EPERM for lack of privilege. <function>&mac.mpo;_check_socket_deliver</function> int &mac.mpo;_check_socket_deliver struct ucred *cred struct ifnet *ifnet struct label *ifnetlabel struct mbuf *mbuf struct label *mbuflabel &mac.thead; cred Subject credential ifnet Network interface ifnetlabel Policy label for ifnet mbuf Object; mbuf to be delivered mbuflabel Policy label for mbuf Determine whether the socket may receive the datagram stored in the passed mbuf header. Return 0 for success, or an errno value for failure. Suggested failures: EACCES for label mismatch, or EPERM for lack of privilege. <function>&mac.mpo;_check_socket_visible</function> int &mac.mpo;_check_socket_visible struct ucred *cred struct socket *so struct label *socketlabel &mac.thead; cred Subject credential Immutable so Object; socket socketlabel Policy label for so Determine whether the subject credential cred can "see" the passed socket (socket) using system monitoring functions, such as those employed by &man.netstat.8; and &man.sockstat.1;. Return 0 for success, or an errno value for failure. Suggested failure: EACCES for label mismatches, EPERM for lack of privilege, or ESRCH to hide visibility. <function>&mac.mpo;_check_system_acct</function> int &mac.mpo;_check_system_acct struct ucred *ucred struct vnode *vp struct label *vlabel &mac.thead; ucred Subject credential vp Accounting file; &man.acct.5; vlabel Label associated with vp Determine whether the subject should be allowed to enable accounting, based on its label and the label of the accounting log file. <function>&mac.mpo;_check_system_nfsd</function> int &mac.mpo;_check_system_nfsd struct ucred *cred &mac.thead; cred Subject credential Determine whether the subject should be allowed to call &man.nfssvc.2;. <function>&mac.mpo;_check_system_reboot</function> int &mac.mpo;_check_system_reboot struct ucred *cred int howto &mac.thead; cred Subject credential howto howto parameter from &man.reboot.2; Determine whether the subject should be allowed to reboot the system in the specified manner. <function>&mac.mpo;_check_system_settime</function> int &mac.mpo;_check_system_settime struct ucred *cred &mac.thead; cred Subject credential Determine whether the user should be allowed to set the system clock. <function>&mac.mpo;_check_system_swapon</function> int &mac.mpo;_check_system_swapon struct ucred *cred struct vnode *vp struct label *vlabel &mac.thead; cred Subject credential vp Swap device vlabel Label associated with vp Determine whether the subject should be allowed to add vp as a swap device. <function>&mac.mpo;_check_system_sysctl</function> int &mac.mpo;_check_system_sysctl struct ucred *cred int *name u_int *namelen void *old size_t *oldlenp int inkernel void *new size_t newlen &mac.thead; cred Subject credential name See &man.sysctl.3; namelen old oldlenp inkernel Boolean; 1 if called from kernel new See &man.sysctl.3; newlen Determine whether the subject should be allowed to make the specified &man.sysctl.3; transaction. Label Management Calls Relabel events occur when a user process has requested that the label on an object be modified. A two-phase update occurs: first, an access control check will be performed to determine if the update is both valid and permitted, and then the update itself is performed via a separate entry point. Relabel entry points typically accept the object, object label reference, and an update label submitted by the process. Memory allocation during relabel is discouraged, as relabel calls are not permitted to fail (failure should be reported earlier in the relabel check). Userland Architecture The TrustedBSD MAC Framework includes a number of policy-agnostic elements, including MAC library interfaces for abstractly managing labels, modifications to the system credential management and login libraries to support the assignment of MAC labels to users, and a set of tools to monitor and modify labels on processes, files, and network interfaces. More details on the user architecture will be added to this section in the near future. APIs for Policy-Agnostic Label Management The TrustedBSD MAC Framework provides a number of library and system calls permitting applications to manage MAC labels on objects using a policy-agnostic interface. This permits applications to manipulate labels for a variety of policies without being written to support specific policies. These interfaces are used by general-purpose tools such as &man.ifconfig.8;, &man.ls.1; and &man.ps.1; to view labels on network interfaces, files, and processes. The APIs also support MAC management tools including &man.getfmac.8;, &man.getpmac.8;, &man.setfmac.8;, &man.setfsmac.8;, and &man.setpmac.8;. The MAC APIs are documented in &man.mac.3;. Applications handle MAC labels in two forms: an internalized form used to return and set labels on processes and objects (mac_t), and externalized form based on C strings appropriate for storage in configuration files, display to the user, or input from the user. Each MAC label contains a number of elements, each consisting of a name and value pair. Policy modules in the kernel bind to specific names and interpret the values in policy-specific ways. In the externalized string form, labels are represented by a comma-delimited list of name and value pairs separated by the / character. Labels may be directly converted to and from text using provided APIs; when retrieving labels from the kernel, internalized label storage must first be prepared for the desired label element set. Typically, this is done in one of two ways: using &man.mac.prepare.3; and an arbitrary list of desired label elements, or one of the variants of the call that loads a default element set from the &man.mac.conf.5; configuration file. Per-object defaults permit application writers to usefully display labels associated with objects without being aware of the policies present in the system. Currently, direct manipulation of label elements other than by conversion to a text string, string editing, and conversion back to an internalized label is not supported by the MAC library. Such interfaces may be added in the future if they prove necessary for application writers. Binding of Labels to Users The standard user context management interface, &man.setusercontext.3;, has been modified to retrieve MAC labels associated with a user's class from &man.login.conf.5;. These labels are then set along with other user context when either LOGIN_SETALL is specified, or when LOGIN_SETMAC is explicitly specified. It is expected that, in a future version of FreeBSD, the MAC label database will be separated from the login.conf user class abstraction, and be maintained in a separate database. However, the &man.setusercontext.3; API should remain the same following such a change. Conclusion The TrustedBSD MAC framework permits kernel modules to augment the system security policy in a highly integrated manner. They may do this based on existing object properties, or based on label data that is maintained with the assistance of the MAC framework. The framework is sufficiently flexible to implement a variety of policy types, including information flow security policies such as MLS and Biba, as well as policies based on existing BSD credentials or file protections. Policy authors may wish to consult this documentation as well as existing security modules when implementing a new security service.