Index: head/security/wpa_supplicant/Makefile =================================================================== --- head/security/wpa_supplicant/Makefile +++ head/security/wpa_supplicant/Makefile @@ -1,8 +1,7 @@ # $FreeBSD$ PORTNAME= wpa_supplicant -PORTVERSION= 2.5 -PORTREVISION= 2 +PORTVERSION= 2.6 CATEGORIES= security net MASTER_SITES= http://w1.fi/releases/ @@ -96,15 +95,22 @@ .include +.if ${PORT_OPTIONS:MNDIS} && ${PORT_OPTIONS:MPRIVSEP} +BROKEN= Fails to compile with both NDIS and PRIVSEP +.endif + +.if ${PORT_OPTIONS:MIEEE80211AC} && ${PORT_OPTIONS:MIEEE80211N} +BROKEN= Fails to compile with both IEEE80211AC and IEEE80211N +.endif + .if ${PORT_OPTIONS:MSIM} || ${PORT_OPTIONS:MAKA} || ${PORT_OPTIONS:MAKA_PRIME} LIB_DEPENDS+= libpcsclite.so:devel/pcsc-lite CFLAGS+= -I${LOCALBASE}/include/PCSC LDFLAGS+= -L${LOCALBASE}/lib .endif - post-patch: - ${CP} ${FILESDIR}/Packet32.[ch] ${FILESDIR}/ntddndis.h \ + @${CP} ${FILESDIR}/Packet32.[ch] ${FILESDIR}/ntddndis.h \ ${WRKSRC}/src/utils # Set driver(s) .for item in BSD NDIS WIRED ROBOSWITCH TEST NONE @@ -157,12 +163,12 @@ ${INSTALL_DATA} ${BUILD_WRKSRC}/wpa_supplicant.conf \ ${STAGEDIR}${PREFIX}/etc/wpa_supplicant.conf.sample -do-install-PRIVSEP-on: - ${INSTALL_PROGRAM} ${BUILD_WRKSRC}/wpa_priv ${STAGEDIR}${PREFIX}/sbin - do-install-DOCS-on: @${MKDIR} ${STAGEDIR}${DOCSDIR} (cd ${BUILD_WRKSRC} && \ ${INSTALL_DATA} ${PORTDOCS} ${STAGEDIR}${DOCSDIR}) +do-install-PRIVSEP-on: + ${INSTALL_PROGRAM} ${BUILD_WRKSRC}/wpa_priv ${STAGEDIR}${PREFIX}/sbin + .include Index: head/security/wpa_supplicant/distinfo =================================================================== --- head/security/wpa_supplicant/distinfo +++ head/security/wpa_supplicant/distinfo @@ -1,2 +1,3 @@ -SHA256 (wpa_supplicant-2.5.tar.gz) = cce55bae483b364eae55c35ba567c279be442ed8bab5b80a3c7fb0d057b9b316 -SIZE (wpa_supplicant-2.5.tar.gz) = 2607336 +TIMESTAMP = 1478049569 +SHA256 (wpa_supplicant-2.6.tar.gz) = b4936d34c4e6cdd44954beba74296d964bc2c9668ecaa5255e499636fe2b1450 +SIZE (wpa_supplicant-2.6.tar.gz) = 2753524 Index: head/security/wpa_supplicant/files/patch-2015-6-backported-WNM-Ignore-Key-Data-in-WNM-Sleep-Mode-Response-frame =================================================================== --- head/security/wpa_supplicant/files/patch-2015-6-backported-WNM-Ignore-Key-Data-in-WNM-Sleep-Mode-Response-frame +++ head/security/wpa_supplicant/files/patch-2015-6-backported-WNM-Ignore-Key-Data-in-WNM-Sleep-Mode-Response-frame @@ -1,30 +0,0 @@ -From 6b12d93d2c7428a34bfd4b3813ba339ed57b698a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: Jouni Malinen -Date: Sun, 25 Oct 2015 15:45:50 +0200 -Subject: [PATCH] WNM: Ignore Key Data in WNM Sleep Mode Response frame if no - PMF in use - -WNM Sleep Mode Response frame is used to update GTK/IGTK only if PMF is -enabled. Verify that PMF is in use before using this field on station -side to avoid accepting unauthenticated key updates. (CVE-2015-5310) - -Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen ---- - wpa_supplicant/wnm_sta.c | 6 ++++++ - 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+) - ---- wpa_supplicant/wnm_sta.c -+++ wpa_supplicant/wnm_sta.c -@@ -187,6 +187,12 @@ static void wnm_sleep_mode_exit_success(struct wpa_supplicant *wpa_s, - end = ptr + key_len_total; - wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "WNM: Key Data", ptr, key_len_total); - -+ if (key_len_total && !wpa_sm_pmf_enabled(wpa_s->wpa)) { -+ wpa_msg(wpa_s, MSG_INFO, -+ "WNM: Ignore Key Data in WNM-Sleep Mode Response - PMF not enabled"); -+ return; -+ } -+ - while (ptr + 1 < end) { - if (ptr + 2 + ptr[1] > end) { - wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "WNM: Invalid Key Data element " Index: head/security/wpa_supplicant/files/patch-2015-7-EAP-pwd-peer-Fix-last-fragment-length-validation =================================================================== --- head/security/wpa_supplicant/files/patch-2015-7-EAP-pwd-peer-Fix-last-fragment-length-validation +++ head/security/wpa_supplicant/files/patch-2015-7-EAP-pwd-peer-Fix-last-fragment-length-validation @@ -1,52 +0,0 @@ -From 8057821706784608b828e769ccefbced95591e50 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: Jouni Malinen -Date: Sun, 1 Nov 2015 18:18:17 +0200 -Subject: [PATCH] EAP-pwd peer: Fix last fragment length validation - -All but the last fragment had their length checked against the remaining -room in the reassembly buffer. This allowed a suitably constructed last -fragment frame to try to add extra data that would go beyond the buffer. -The length validation code in wpabuf_put_data() prevents an actual -buffer write overflow from occurring, but this results in process -termination. (CVE-2015-5315) - -Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen ---- - src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c | 7 +++---- - 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) - ---- src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c -+++ src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c -@@ -903,7 +903,7 @@ eap_pwd_process(struct eap_sm *sm, void *priv, struct eap_method_ret *ret, - /* - * buffer and ACK the fragment - */ -- if (EAP_PWD_GET_MORE_BIT(lm_exch)) { -+ if (EAP_PWD_GET_MORE_BIT(lm_exch) || data->in_frag_pos) { - data->in_frag_pos += len; - if (data->in_frag_pos > wpabuf_size(data->inbuf)) { - wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "EAP-pwd: Buffer overflow attack " -@@ -916,7 +916,8 @@ eap_pwd_process(struct eap_sm *sm, void *priv, struct eap_method_ret *ret, - return NULL; - } - wpabuf_put_data(data->inbuf, pos, len); -- -+ } -+ if (EAP_PWD_GET_MORE_BIT(lm_exch)) { - resp = eap_msg_alloc(EAP_VENDOR_IETF, EAP_TYPE_PWD, - EAP_PWD_HDR_SIZE, - EAP_CODE_RESPONSE, eap_get_id(reqData)); -@@ -930,10 +931,8 @@ eap_pwd_process(struct eap_sm *sm, void *priv, struct eap_method_ret *ret, - * we're buffering and this is the last fragment - */ - if (data->in_frag_pos) { -- wpabuf_put_data(data->inbuf, pos, len); - wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-pwd: Last fragment, %d bytes", - (int) len); -- data->in_frag_pos += len; - pos = wpabuf_head_u8(data->inbuf); - len = data->in_frag_pos; - } --- -1.9.1 - Index: head/security/wpa_supplicant/files/patch-2015-7-EAP-pwd-server-Fix-last-fragment-length-validation =================================================================== --- head/security/wpa_supplicant/files/patch-2015-7-EAP-pwd-server-Fix-last-fragment-length-validation +++ head/security/wpa_supplicant/files/patch-2015-7-EAP-pwd-server-Fix-last-fragment-length-validation @@ -1,49 +0,0 @@ -From bef802ece03f9ae9d52a21f0cf4f1bc2c5a1f8aa Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: Jouni Malinen -Date: Sun, 1 Nov 2015 18:24:16 +0200 -Subject: [PATCH] EAP-pwd server: Fix last fragment length validation - -All but the last fragment had their length checked against the remaining -room in the reassembly buffer. This allowed a suitably constructed last -fragment frame to try to add extra data that would go beyond the buffer. -The length validation code in wpabuf_put_data() prevents an actual -buffer write overflow from occurring, but this results in process -termination. (CVE-2015-5314) - -Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen ---- - src/eap_server/eap_server_pwd.c | 6 +++--- - 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) - ---- src/eap_server/eap_server_pwd.c -+++ src/eap_server/eap_server_pwd.c -@@ -970,7 +970,7 @@ static void eap_pwd_process(struct eap_sm *sm, void *priv, - /* - * the first and all intermediate fragments have the M bit set - */ -- if (EAP_PWD_GET_MORE_BIT(lm_exch)) { -+ if (EAP_PWD_GET_MORE_BIT(lm_exch) || data->in_frag_pos) { - if ((data->in_frag_pos + len) > wpabuf_size(data->inbuf)) { - wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-pwd: Buffer overflow " - "attack detected! (%d+%d > %d)", -@@ -981,6 +981,8 @@ static void eap_pwd_process(struct eap_sm *sm, void *priv, - } - wpabuf_put_data(data->inbuf, pos, len); - data->in_frag_pos += len; -+ } -+ if (EAP_PWD_GET_MORE_BIT(lm_exch)) { - wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-pwd: Got a %d byte fragment", - (int) len); - return; -@@ -990,8 +992,6 @@ static void eap_pwd_process(struct eap_sm *sm, void *priv, - * buffering fragments so that's how we know it's the last) - */ - if (data->in_frag_pos) { -- wpabuf_put_data(data->inbuf, pos, len); -- data->in_frag_pos += len; - pos = wpabuf_head_u8(data->inbuf); - len = data->in_frag_pos; - wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-pwd: Last fragment, %d bytes", --- -1.9.1 - Index: head/security/wpa_supplicant/files/patch-2015-8-EAP-pwd-peer-Fix-error-path-for-unexpected-Confirm-m =================================================================== --- head/security/wpa_supplicant/files/patch-2015-8-EAP-pwd-peer-Fix-error-path-for-unexpected-Confirm-m +++ head/security/wpa_supplicant/files/patch-2015-8-EAP-pwd-peer-Fix-error-path-for-unexpected-Confirm-m @@ -1,32 +0,0 @@ -From 95577884ca4fa76be91344ff7a8d5d1e6dc3da61 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: Jouni Malinen -Date: Sun, 1 Nov 2015 19:35:44 +0200 -Subject: [PATCH] EAP-pwd peer: Fix error path for unexpected Confirm message - -If the Confirm message is received from the server before the Identity -exchange has been completed, the group has not yet been determined and -data->grp is NULL. The error path in eap_pwd_perform_confirm_exchange() -did not take this corner case into account and could end up -dereferencing a NULL pointer and terminating the process if invalid -message sequence is received. (CVE-2015-5316) - -Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen ---- - src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c | 3 ++- - 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) - ---- src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c -+++ src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c -@@ -774,7 +774,8 @@ eap_pwd_perform_confirm_exchange(struct eap_sm *sm, struct eap_pwd_data *data, - wpabuf_put_data(data->outbuf, conf, SHA256_MAC_LEN); - - fin: -- bin_clear_free(cruft, BN_num_bytes(data->grp->prime)); -+ if (data->grp) -+ bin_clear_free(cruft, BN_num_bytes(data->grp->prime)); - BN_clear_free(x); - BN_clear_free(y); - if (data->outbuf == NULL) { --- -1.9.1 - Index: head/security/wpa_supplicant/files/patch-2016_1_1-WPS-Reject-a-Credential-with-invalid-passphrase =================================================================== --- head/security/wpa_supplicant/files/patch-2016_1_1-WPS-Reject-a-Credential-with-invalid-passphrase +++ head/security/wpa_supplicant/files/patch-2016_1_1-WPS-Reject-a-Credential-with-invalid-passphrase @@ -1,76 +0,0 @@ -From ecbb0b3dc122b0d290987cf9c84010bbe53e1022 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: Jouni Malinen -Date: Fri, 4 Mar 2016 17:20:18 +0200 -Subject: [PATCH 1/5] WPS: Reject a Credential with invalid passphrase - -WPA/WPA2-Personal passphrase is not allowed to include control -characters. Reject a Credential received from a WPS Registrar both as -STA (Credential) and AP (AP Settings) if the credential is for WPAPSK or -WPA2PSK authentication type and includes an invalid passphrase. - -This fixes an issue where hostapd or wpa_supplicant could have updated -the configuration file PSK/passphrase parameter with arbitrary data from -an external device (Registrar) that may not be fully trusted. Should -such data include a newline character, the resulting configuration file -could become invalid and fail to be parsed. - -Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen ---- - src/utils/common.c | 12 ++++++++++++ - src/utils/common.h | 1 + - src/wps/wps_attr_process.c | 10 ++++++++++ - 3 files changed, 23 insertions(+) - ---- src/utils/common.c -+++ src/utils/common.c -@@ -697,6 +697,18 @@ int is_hex(const u8 *data, size_t len) - } - - -+int has_ctrl_char(const u8 *data, size_t len) -+{ -+ size_t i; -+ -+ for (i = 0; i < len; i++) { -+ if (data[i] < 32 || data[i] == 127) -+ return 1; -+ } -+ return 0; -+} -+ -+ - size_t merge_byte_arrays(u8 *res, size_t res_len, - const u8 *src1, size_t src1_len, - const u8 *src2, size_t src2_len) ---- src/utils/common.h -+++ src/utils/common.h -@@ -488,6 +488,7 @@ const char * wpa_ssid_txt(const u8 *ssid, size_t ssid_len); - - char * wpa_config_parse_string(const char *value, size_t *len); - int is_hex(const u8 *data, size_t len); -+int has_ctrl_char(const u8 *data, size_t len); - size_t merge_byte_arrays(u8 *res, size_t res_len, - const u8 *src1, size_t src1_len, - const u8 *src2, size_t src2_len); ---- src/wps/wps_attr_process.c -+++ src/wps/wps_attr_process.c -@@ -229,6 +229,16 @@ static int wps_workaround_cred_key(struct wps_credential *cred) - cred->key_len--; - #endif /* CONFIG_WPS_STRICT */ - } -+ -+ -+ if (cred->auth_type & (WPS_AUTH_WPAPSK | WPS_AUTH_WPA2PSK) && -+ (cred->key_len < 8 || has_ctrl_char(cred->key, cred->key_len))) { -+ wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "WPS: Reject credential with invalid WPA/WPA2-Personal passphrase"); -+ wpa_hexdump_ascii_key(MSG_INFO, "WPS: Network Key", -+ cred->key, cred->key_len); -+ return -1; -+ } -+ - return 0; - } - --- -1.9.1 - Index: head/security/wpa_supplicant/files/patch-2016_1_2-Reject-psk-parameter-set-with-invalid-passphrase-cha =================================================================== --- head/security/wpa_supplicant/files/patch-2016_1_2-Reject-psk-parameter-set-with-invalid-passphrase-cha +++ head/security/wpa_supplicant/files/patch-2016_1_2-Reject-psk-parameter-set-with-invalid-passphrase-cha @@ -1,49 +0,0 @@ -From 73e4abb24a936014727924d8b0b2965edfc117dd Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: Jouni Malinen -Date: Fri, 4 Mar 2016 18:46:41 +0200 -Subject: [PATCH 2/5] Reject psk parameter set with invalid passphrase - character - -WPA/WPA2-Personal passphrase is not allowed to include control -characters. Reject a passphrase configuration attempt if that passphrase -includes an invalid passphrase. - -This fixes an issue where wpa_supplicant could have updated the -configuration file psk parameter with arbitrary data from the control -interface or D-Bus interface. While those interfaces are supposed to be -accessible only for trusted users/applications, it may be possible that -an untrusted user has access to a management software component that -does not validate the passphrase value before passing it to -wpa_supplicant. - -This could allow such an untrusted user to inject up to 63 characters of -almost arbitrary data into the configuration file. Such configuration -file could result in wpa_supplicant trying to load a library (e.g., -opensc_engine_path, pkcs11_engine_path, pkcs11_module_path, -load_dynamic_eap) from user controlled location when starting again. -This would allow code from that library to be executed under the -wpa_supplicant process privileges. - -Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen ---- - wpa_supplicant/config.c | 6 ++++++ - 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+) - ---- wpa_supplicant/config.c -+++ wpa_supplicant/config.c -@@ -478,6 +478,12 @@ static int wpa_config_parse_psk(const struct parse_data *data, - } - wpa_hexdump_ascii_key(MSG_MSGDUMP, "PSK (ASCII passphrase)", - (u8 *) value, len); -+ if (has_ctrl_char((u8 *) value, len)) { -+ wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR, -+ "Line %d: Invalid passphrase character", -+ line); -+ return -1; -+ } - if (ssid->passphrase && os_strlen(ssid->passphrase) == len && - os_memcmp(ssid->passphrase, value, len) == 0) { - /* No change to the previously configured value */ --- -1.9.1 - Index: head/security/wpa_supplicant/files/patch-2016_1_3-Remove-newlines-from-wpa_supplicant-config-network-o =================================================================== --- head/security/wpa_supplicant/files/patch-2016_1_3-Remove-newlines-from-wpa_supplicant-config-network-o +++ head/security/wpa_supplicant/files/patch-2016_1_3-Remove-newlines-from-wpa_supplicant-config-network-o @@ -1,76 +0,0 @@ -From 0fe5a234240a108b294a87174ad197f6b5cb38e9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: Paul Stewart -Date: Thu, 3 Mar 2016 15:40:19 -0800 -Subject: [PATCH 3/5] Remove newlines from wpa_supplicant config network - output - -Spurious newlines output while writing the config file can corrupt the -wpa_supplicant configuration. Avoid writing these for the network block -parameters. This is a generic filter that cover cases that may not have -been explicitly addressed with a more specific commit to avoid control -characters in the psk parameter. - -Signed-off-by: Paul Stewart ---- - src/utils/common.c | 11 +++++++++++ - src/utils/common.h | 1 + - wpa_supplicant/config.c | 15 +++++++++++++-- - 3 files changed, 25 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) - ---- src/utils/common.c -+++ src/utils/common.c -@@ -709,6 +709,17 @@ int has_ctrl_char(const u8 *data, size_t len) - } - - -+int has_newline(const char *str) -+{ -+ while (*str) { -+ if (*str == '\n' || *str == '\r') -+ return 1; -+ str++; -+ } -+ return 0; -+} -+ -+ - size_t merge_byte_arrays(u8 *res, size_t res_len, - const u8 *src1, size_t src1_len, - const u8 *src2, size_t src2_len) ---- src/utils/common.h -+++ src/utils/common.h -@@ -489,6 +489,7 @@ const char * wpa_ssid_txt(const u8 *ssid, size_t ssid_len); - char * wpa_config_parse_string(const char *value, size_t *len); - int is_hex(const u8 *data, size_t len); - int has_ctrl_char(const u8 *data, size_t len); -+int has_newline(const char *str); - size_t merge_byte_arrays(u8 *res, size_t res_len, - const u8 *src1, size_t src1_len, - const u8 *src2, size_t src2_len); ---- wpa_supplicant/config.c -+++ wpa_supplicant/config.c -@@ -2699,8 +2699,19 @@ char * wpa_config_get(struct wpa_ssid *ssid, const char *var) - - for (i = 0; i < NUM_SSID_FIELDS; i++) { - const struct parse_data *field = &ssid_fields[i]; -- if (os_strcmp(var, field->name) == 0) -- return field->writer(field, ssid); -+ if (os_strcmp(var, field->name) == 0) { -+ char *ret = field->writer(field, ssid); -+ -+ if (ret && has_newline(ret)) { -+ wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR, -+ "Found newline in value for %s; not returning it", -+ var); -+ os_free(ret); -+ ret = NULL; -+ } -+ -+ return ret; -+ } - } - - return NULL; --- -1.9.1 - Index: head/security/wpa_supplicant/files/patch-2016_1_4-Reject-SET_CRED-commands-with-newline-characters-in =================================================================== --- head/security/wpa_supplicant/files/patch-2016_1_4-Reject-SET_CRED-commands-with-newline-characters-in +++ head/security/wpa_supplicant/files/patch-2016_1_4-Reject-SET_CRED-commands-with-newline-characters-in @@ -1,60 +0,0 @@ -From b166cd84a77a6717be9600bf95378a0055d6f5a5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: Jouni Malinen -Date: Tue, 5 Apr 2016 23:33:10 +0300 -Subject: [PATCH 4/5] Reject SET_CRED commands with newline characters in the - string values - -Most of the cred block parameters are written as strings without -filtering and if there is an embedded newline character in the value, -unexpected configuration file data might be written. - -This fixes an issue where wpa_supplicant could have updated the -configuration file cred parameter with arbitrary data from the control -interface or D-Bus interface. While those interfaces are supposed to be -accessible only for trusted users/applications, it may be possible that -an untrusted user has access to a management software component that -does not validate the credential value before passing it to -wpa_supplicant. - -This could allow such an untrusted user to inject almost arbitrary data -into the configuration file. Such configuration file could result in -wpa_supplicant trying to load a library (e.g., opensc_engine_path, -pkcs11_engine_path, pkcs11_module_path, load_dynamic_eap) from user -controlled location when starting again. This would allow code from that -library to be executed under the wpa_supplicant process privileges. - -Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen ---- - wpa_supplicant/config.c | 9 ++++++++- - 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) - ---- wpa_supplicant/config.c -+++ wpa_supplicant/config.c -@@ -2896,6 +2896,8 @@ int wpa_config_set_cred(struct wpa_cred *cred, const char *var, - - if (os_strcmp(var, "password") == 0 && - os_strncmp(value, "ext:", 4) == 0) { -+ if (has_newline(value)) -+ return -1; - str_clear_free(cred->password); - cred->password = os_strdup(value); - cred->ext_password = 1; -@@ -2946,9 +2948,14 @@ int wpa_config_set_cred(struct wpa_cred *cred, const char *var, - } - - val = wpa_config_parse_string(value, &len); -- if (val == NULL) { -+ if (val == NULL || -+ (os_strcmp(var, "excluded_ssid") != 0 && -+ os_strcmp(var, "roaming_consortium") != 0 && -+ os_strcmp(var, "required_roaming_consortium") != 0 && -+ has_newline(val))) { - wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR, "Line %d: invalid field '%s' string " - "value '%s'.", line, var, value); -+ os_free(val); - return -1; - } - --- -1.9.1 - Index: head/security/wpa_supplicant/files/patch-2016_1_5-Reject-SET-commands-with-newline-characters-in-the-s =================================================================== --- head/security/wpa_supplicant/files/patch-2016_1_5-Reject-SET-commands-with-newline-characters-in-the-s +++ head/security/wpa_supplicant/files/patch-2016_1_5-Reject-SET-commands-with-newline-characters-in-the-s @@ -1,48 +0,0 @@ -From 2a3f56502b52375c3bf113cf92adfa99bad6b488 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: Jouni Malinen -Date: Tue, 5 Apr 2016 23:55:48 +0300 -Subject: [PATCH 5/5] Reject SET commands with newline characters in the - string values - -Many of the global configuration parameters are written as strings -without filtering and if there is an embedded newline character in the -value, unexpected configuration file data might be written. - -This fixes an issue where wpa_supplicant could have updated the -configuration file global parameter with arbitrary data from the control -interface or D-Bus interface. While those interfaces are supposed to be -accessible only for trusted users/applications, it may be possible that -an untrusted user has access to a management software component that -does not validate the value of a parameter before passing it to -wpa_supplicant. - -This could allow such an untrusted user to inject almost arbitrary data -into the configuration file. Such configuration file could result in -wpa_supplicant trying to load a library (e.g., opensc_engine_path, -pkcs11_engine_path, pkcs11_module_path, load_dynamic_eap) from user -controlled location when starting again. This would allow code from that -library to be executed under the wpa_supplicant process privileges. - -Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen ---- - wpa_supplicant/config.c | 6 ++++++ - 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+) - ---- wpa_supplicant/config.c -+++ wpa_supplicant/config.c -@@ -3764,6 +3764,12 @@ static int wpa_global_config_parse_str(const struct global_parse_data *data, - return -1; - } - -+ if (has_newline(pos)) { -+ wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR, "Line %d: invalid %s value with newline", -+ line, data->name); -+ return -1; -+ } -+ - tmp = os_strdup(pos); - if (tmp == NULL) - return -1; --- -1.9.1 - Index: head/security/wpa_supplicant/files/patch-src_crypto_crypto__openssl.c =================================================================== --- head/security/wpa_supplicant/files/patch-src_crypto_crypto__openssl.c +++ head/security/wpa_supplicant/files/patch-src_crypto_crypto__openssl.c @@ -0,0 +1,20 @@ +--- src/crypto/crypto_openssl.c.orig 2016-11-02 18:04:18 UTC ++++ src/crypto/crypto_openssl.c +@@ -611,7 +611,7 @@ void crypto_cipher_deinit(struct crypto_ + + void * dh5_init(struct wpabuf **priv, struct wpabuf **publ) + { +-#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10100000L ++#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10100000L || defined(LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER) + DH *dh; + struct wpabuf *pubkey = NULL, *privkey = NULL; + size_t publen, privlen; +@@ -712,7 +712,7 @@ err: + + void * dh5_init_fixed(const struct wpabuf *priv, const struct wpabuf *publ) + { +-#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10100000L ++#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10100000L || defined(LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER) + DH *dh; + + dh = DH_new(); Index: head/security/wpa_supplicant/files/patch-src_crypto_tls__openssl.c =================================================================== --- head/security/wpa_supplicant/files/patch-src_crypto_tls__openssl.c +++ head/security/wpa_supplicant/files/patch-src_crypto_tls__openssl.c @@ -1,67 +1,29 @@ -Compatibility fixes for LibreSSL - ---- src/crypto/tls_openssl.c.orig 2015-09-27 19:02:05 UTC +--- src/crypto/tls_openssl.c.orig 2016-11-02 18:46:25 UTC +++ src/crypto/tls_openssl.c -@@ -2229,7 +2229,7 @@ static int tls_parse_pkcs12(struct tls_d - } - - if (certs) { --#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10002000L -+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10002000L && !defined(LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER) - SSL_clear_chain_certs(ssl); - while ((cert = sk_X509_pop(certs)) != NULL) { - X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_subject_name(cert), buf, -@@ -2247,7 +2247,7 @@ static int tls_parse_pkcs12(struct tls_d - /* Try to continue anyway */ +@@ -919,7 +919,7 @@ void * tls_init(const struct tls_config } - sk_X509_free(certs); --#ifndef OPENSSL_IS_BORINGSSL -+#if !defined(OPENSSL_IS_BORINGSSL) && !defined(LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER) - res = SSL_build_cert_chain(ssl, - SSL_BUILD_CHAIN_FLAG_CHECK | - SSL_BUILD_CHAIN_FLAG_IGNORE_ERROR); -@@ -2812,7 +2812,7 @@ int tls_connection_get_random(void *ssl_ - if (conn == NULL || keys == NULL) - return -1; - ssl = conn->ssl; + #endif /* OPENSSL_FIPS */ + #endif /* CONFIG_FIPS */ -#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10100000L +#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10100000L || defined(LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER) - if (ssl == NULL || ssl->s3 == NULL || ssl->session == NULL) - return -1; + SSL_load_error_strings(); + SSL_library_init(); + #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256 +@@ -1043,7 +1043,7 @@ void tls_deinit(void *ssl_ctx) -@@ -2841,7 +2841,7 @@ int tls_connection_get_random(void *ssl_ - #ifndef CONFIG_FIPS - static int openssl_get_keyblock_size(SSL *ssl) - { --#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10100000L -+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10100000L || defined(LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER) - const EVP_CIPHER *c; - const EVP_MD *h; - int md_size; -@@ -2911,7 +2911,7 @@ static int openssl_tls_prf(struct tls_co - "mode"); - return -1; - #else /* CONFIG_FIPS */ + tls_openssl_ref_count--; + if (tls_openssl_ref_count == 0) { -#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10100000L +#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10100000L || defined(LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER) - SSL *ssl; - u8 *rnd; - int ret = -1; -@@ -3394,7 +3394,7 @@ int tls_connection_set_cipher_list(void + #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE + ENGINE_cleanup(); + #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE */ +@@ -3976,7 +3976,7 @@ int tls_connection_set_params(void *tls_ + engine_id = "pkcs11"; - wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "OpenSSL: cipher suites: %s", buf + 1); - --#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10100000L -+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10100000L && !defined(LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER) #if defined(EAP_FAST) || defined(EAP_FAST_DYNAMIC) || defined(EAP_SERVER_FAST) - if (os_strstr(buf, ":ADH-")) { - /* -@@ -3977,7 +3977,7 @@ static int tls_sess_sec_cb(SSL *s, void - struct tls_connection *conn = arg; - int ret; - -#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10100000L +#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10100000L || defined(LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER) - if (conn == NULL || conn->session_ticket_cb == NULL) - return 0; - + if (params->flags & TLS_CONN_EAP_FAST) { + wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, + "OpenSSL: Use TLSv1_method() for EAP-FAST"); Index: head/security/wpa_supplicant/files/patch-src_utils_os__unix.c =================================================================== --- head/security/wpa_supplicant/files/patch-src_utils_os__unix.c +++ head/security/wpa_supplicant/files/patch-src_utils_os__unix.c @@ -1,73 +0,0 @@ ---- src/utils/os_unix.c.orig 2015-09-27 19:02:05 UTC -+++ src/utils/os_unix.c -@@ -214,17 +214,42 @@ static int os_daemon(int nochdir, int no - #define os_daemon daemon - #endif /* __APPLE__ */ - -+#if defined(__FreeBSD__) || defined(__DragonFly__) -+#define FREE_DRAGON -+#include -+#include -+#include -+#endif /* __FreeBSD__ || __DragonFly__ */ - - int os_daemonize(const char *pid_file) - { - #if defined(__uClinux__) || defined(__sun__) - return -1; - #else /* defined(__uClinux__) || defined(__sun__) */ -+#ifdef FREE_DRAGON -+ pid_t otherpid; -+ struct pidfh *pfh; -+ -+ pfh = pidfile_open(pid_file, 0600, &otherpid); -+ if (pfh == NULL) { -+ if (errno == EEXIST) { -+ errx(1, "Daemon already running, pid: %jd.", -+ (intmax_t)otherpid); -+ } -+ warn("Cannot open or create pidfile."); -+ } -+#endif /* FREE_DRAGON */ - if (os_daemon(0, 0)) { - perror("daemon"); -+#ifdef FREE_DRAGON -+ pidfile_remove(pfh); -+#endif /* FREE_DRAGON */ - return -1; - } - -+#ifdef FREE_DRAGON -+ pidfile_write(pfh); -+#else - if (pid_file) { - FILE *f = fopen(pid_file, "w"); - if (f) { -@@ -232,6 +257,7 @@ int os_daemonize(const char *pid_file) - fclose(f); - } - } -+#endif /* FREE_DRAGON */ - - return -0; - #endif /* defined(__uClinux__) || defined(__sun__) */ -@@ -384,7 +410,7 @@ int os_setenv(const char *name, const ch - - int os_unsetenv(const char *name) - { --#if defined(__FreeBSD__) || defined(__NetBSD__) || defined(__APPLE__) || \ -+#if defined(FREE_DRAGON) || defined(__NetBSD__) || defined(__APPLE__) || \ - defined(__OpenBSD__) - unsetenv(name); - return 0; -@@ -445,7 +471,9 @@ int os_file_exists(const char *fname) - int os_fdatasync(FILE *stream) - { - if (!fflush(stream)) { --#ifndef __MACH__ -+#ifdef FREE_DRAGON -+ return fsync(fileno(stream)); -+#elif !defined __MACH__ - return fdatasync(fileno(stream)); - #else /* __MACH__ */ - #ifdef F_FULLFSYNC Index: head/security/wpa_supplicant/files/patch-wpa__supplicant_main.c =================================================================== --- head/security/wpa_supplicant/files/patch-wpa__supplicant_main.c +++ head/security/wpa_supplicant/files/patch-wpa__supplicant_main.c @@ -1,6 +1,25 @@ ---- wpa_supplicant/main.c.orig 2015-03-15 17:30:39 UTC +--- wpa_supplicant/main.c.orig 2016-11-05 20:56:30 UTC +++ wpa_supplicant/main.c -@@ -173,6 +173,11 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[]) +@@ -66,7 +66,7 @@ static void usage(void) + " -c = Configuration file\n" + " -C = ctrl_interface parameter (only used if -c is not)\n" + " -d = increase debugging verbosity (-dd even more)\n" +- " -D = driver name (can be multiple drivers: nl80211,wext)\n" ++ " -D = driver name (can be multiple drivers: bsd,wired)\n" + " -e = entropy file\n" + #ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_FILE + " -f = log output to debug file instead of stdout\n" +@@ -105,8 +105,7 @@ static void usage(void) + " -W = wait for a control interface monitor before starting\n"); + + printf("example:\n" +- " wpa_supplicant -D%s -iwlan0 -c/etc/wpa_supplicant.conf\n", +- wpa_drivers[0] ? wpa_drivers[0]->name : "nl80211"); ++ " wpa_supplicant -Dbsd -iwlan0 -c/etc/wpa_supplicant.conf\n"); + #endif /* CONFIG_NO_STDOUT_DEBUG */ + } + +@@ -199,6 +198,11 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[]) wpa_supplicant_fd_workaround(1); @@ -11,4 +30,4 @@ + for (;;) { c = getopt(argc, argv, - "b:Bc:C:D:de:f:g:G:hi:I:KLm:No:O:p:P:qsTtuvW"); + "b:Bc:C:D:de:f:g:G:hi:I:KLMm:No:O:p:P:qsTtuvW");