Index: sys/kern/uipc_ktls.c
===================================================================
--- sys/kern/uipc_ktls.c
+++ sys/kern/uipc_ktls.c
@@ -1193,11 +1193,6 @@
 	if (en->cipher_algorithm == CRYPTO_AES_CBC && !ktls_cbc_enable)
 		return (ENOTSUP);
 
-	/* TLS 1.3 is not yet supported. */
-	if (en->tls_vmajor == TLS_MAJOR_VER_ONE &&
-	    en->tls_vminor == TLS_MINOR_VER_THREE)
-		return (ENOTSUP);
-
 	error = ktls_create_session(so, en, &tls);
 	if (error)
 		return (error);
@@ -1922,6 +1917,8 @@
 	struct mbuf *control, *data, *m;
 	uint64_t seqno;
 	int error, remain, tls_len, trail_len;
+	bool tls13;
+	uint8_t vminor, record_type;
 
 	hdr = (struct tls_record_layer *)tls_header;
 	sb = &so->so_rcv;
@@ -1932,6 +1929,11 @@
 	tls = sb->sb_tls_info;
 	MPASS(tls != NULL);
 
+	tls13 = (tls->params.tls_vminor == TLS_MINOR_VER_THREE);
+	if (tls13)
+		vminor = TLS_MINOR_VER_TWO;
+	else
+		vminor = tls->params.tls_vminor;
 	for (;;) {
 		/* Is there enough queued for a TLS header? */
 		if (sb->sb_tlscc < tls->params.tls_hlen)
@@ -1941,7 +1943,9 @@
 		tls_len = sizeof(*hdr) + ntohs(hdr->tls_length);
 
 		if (hdr->tls_vmajor != tls->params.tls_vmajor ||
-		    hdr->tls_vminor != tls->params.tls_vminor)
+		    hdr->tls_vminor != vminor)
+			error = EINVAL;
+		else if (tls13 && hdr->tls_type != TLS_RLTYPE_APP)
 			error = EINVAL;
 		else if (tls_len < tls->params.tls_hlen || tls_len >
 		    tls->params.tls_hlen + TLS_MAX_MSG_SIZE_V10_2 +
@@ -1983,7 +1987,8 @@
 		SBCHECK(sb);
 		SOCKBUF_UNLOCK(sb);
 
-		error = tls->sw_decrypt(tls, hdr, data, seqno, &trail_len);
+		error = tls->sw_decrypt(tls, hdr, data, seqno, &trail_len,
+		    &record_type);
 		if (error) {
 			counter_u64_add(ktls_offload_failed_crypto, 1);
 
@@ -2016,7 +2021,7 @@
 		}
 
 		/* Allocate the control mbuf. */
-		tgr.tls_type = hdr->tls_type;
+		tgr.tls_type = record_type;
 		tgr.tls_vmajor = hdr->tls_vmajor;
 		tgr.tls_vminor = hdr->tls_vminor;
 		tgr.tls_length = htobe16(tls_len - tls->params.tls_hlen -
Index: sys/opencrypto/ktls_ocf.c
===================================================================
--- sys/opencrypto/ktls_ocf.c
+++ sys/opencrypto/ktls_ocf.c
@@ -106,11 +106,21 @@
     CTLFLAG_RD, &ocf_tls12_chacha20_encrypts,
     "Total number of OCF TLS 1.2 Chacha20-Poly1305 encryption operations");
 
+static COUNTER_U64_DEFINE_EARLY(ocf_tls13_gcm_decrypts);
+SYSCTL_COUNTER_U64(_kern_ipc_tls_stats_ocf, OID_AUTO, tls13_gcm_decrypts,
+    CTLFLAG_RD, &ocf_tls13_gcm_decrypts,
+    "Total number of OCF TLS 1.3 GCM decryption operations");
+
 static COUNTER_U64_DEFINE_EARLY(ocf_tls13_gcm_encrypts);
 SYSCTL_COUNTER_U64(_kern_ipc_tls_stats_ocf, OID_AUTO, tls13_gcm_encrypts,
     CTLFLAG_RD, &ocf_tls13_gcm_encrypts,
     "Total number of OCF TLS 1.3 GCM encryption operations");
 
+static COUNTER_U64_DEFINE_EARLY(ocf_tls13_chacha20_decrypts);
+SYSCTL_COUNTER_U64(_kern_ipc_tls_stats_ocf, OID_AUTO, tls13_chacha20_decrypts,
+    CTLFLAG_RD, &ocf_tls13_chacha20_decrypts,
+    "Total number of OCF TLS 1.3 Chacha20-Poly1305 decryption operations");
+
 static COUNTER_U64_DEFINE_EARLY(ocf_tls13_chacha20_encrypts);
 SYSCTL_COUNTER_U64(_kern_ipc_tls_stats_ocf, OID_AUTO, tls13_chacha20_encrypts,
     CTLFLAG_RD, &ocf_tls13_chacha20_encrypts,
@@ -462,7 +472,7 @@
 static int
 ktls_ocf_tls12_aead_decrypt(struct ktls_session *tls,
     const struct tls_record_layer *hdr, struct mbuf *m, uint64_t seqno,
-    int *trailer_len)
+    int *trailer_len, uint8_t *record_type)
 {
 	struct tls_aead_data ad;
 	struct cryptop crp;
@@ -519,6 +529,7 @@
 
 	crypto_destroyreq(&crp);
 	*trailer_len = tls->params.tls_tlen;
+	*record_type = hdr->tls_type;
 	return (error);
 }
 
@@ -600,6 +611,95 @@
 	return (error);
 }
 
+static int
+ktls_ocf_tls13_aead_decrypt(struct ktls_session *tls,
+    const struct tls_record_layer *hdr, struct mbuf *m, uint64_t seqno,
+    int *trailer_len, uint8_t *record_typep)
+{
+	struct tls_aead_data_13 ad;
+	struct cryptop crp;
+	struct ktls_ocf_session *os;
+	char *cp;
+	int error;
+	u_int tag_len, offset, last_offset, m_len;
+	uint8_t record_type;
+
+	os = tls->ocf_session;
+
+	if (tls->params.cipher_algorithm == CRYPTO_AES_NIST_GCM_16)
+		tag_len = AES_GMAC_HASH_LEN;
+	else
+		tag_len = POLY1305_HASH_LEN;
+
+	/* Payload must contain at least one byte for the record type. */
+	if (ntohs(hdr->tls_length) < tag_len + 1)
+		return (EBADMSG);
+
+	crypto_initreq(&crp, os->sid);
+
+	/* Setup the nonce. */
+	memcpy(crp.crp_iv, tls->params.iv, tls->params.iv_len);
+	*(uint64_t *)(crp.crp_iv + 4) ^= htobe64(seqno);
+
+	/* Setup the AAD. */
+	ad.type = hdr->tls_type;
+	ad.tls_vmajor = hdr->tls_vmajor;
+	ad.tls_vminor = hdr->tls_vminor;
+	ad.tls_length = hdr->tls_length;
+	crp.crp_aad = &ad;
+	crp.crp_aad_length = sizeof(ad);
+
+	crp.crp_payload_start = tls->params.tls_hlen;
+	crp.crp_payload_length = ntohs(hdr->tls_length) - tag_len;
+	crp.crp_digest_start = crp.crp_payload_start + crp.crp_payload_length;
+
+	crp.crp_op = CRYPTO_OP_DECRYPT | CRYPTO_OP_VERIFY_DIGEST;
+	crp.crp_flags = CRYPTO_F_CBIMM | CRYPTO_F_IV_SEPARATE;
+	crypto_use_mbuf(&crp, m);
+
+	if (tls->params.cipher_algorithm == CRYPTO_AES_NIST_GCM_16)
+		counter_u64_add(ocf_tls13_gcm_decrypts, 1);
+	else
+		counter_u64_add(ocf_tls13_chacha20_decrypts, 1);
+	error = ktls_ocf_dispatch(os, &crp);
+
+	crypto_destroyreq(&crp);
+
+	/*
+	 * Determine the length of the trailing zero padding and find
+	 * the real record type in the byte before the padding.
+	 *
+	 * Walking the mbuf chain backwards is clumsy, so another
+	 * option would be to scan forwards remembering the last
+	 * non-zero byte before the trailer.  However, it would be
+	 * expensive to scan the entire record.  Instead, find the
+	 * last non-zero byte of each mbuf in the chain keeping track
+	 * of the relative offset of that nonzero byte.
+	 */
+	last_offset = 0;
+	offset = 0;
+	for (; m != NULL && offset < crp.crp_digest_start;
+	     offset += m->m_len, m = m->m_next) {
+		/* Don't look for padding in the tag. */
+		m_len = min(crp.crp_digest_start - offset, m->m_len);
+		cp = mtod(m, char *);
+
+		/* Find last non-zero byte in this mbuf. */
+		while (m_len > 0 && cp[m_len - 1] == 0)
+			m_len--;
+		if (m_len > 0) {
+			record_type = cp[m_len - 1];
+			last_offset = offset + m_len;
+		}
+	}
+	if (last_offset < tls->params.tls_hlen)
+		return (EBADMSG);
+
+	*record_typep = record_type;
+	*trailer_len = crp.crp_digest_start + tag_len - last_offset + 1;
+	return (error);
+}
+
 void
 ktls_ocf_free(struct ktls_session *tls)
 {
@@ -639,11 +739,6 @@
 		    tls->params.tls_vminor > TLS_MINOR_VER_THREE)
 			return (EPROTONOSUPPORT);
 
-		/* TLS 1.3 is not yet supported for receive. */
-		if (direction == KTLS_RX &&
-		    tls->params.tls_vminor == TLS_MINOR_VER_THREE)
-			return (EPROTONOSUPPORT);
-
 		csp.csp_flags |= CSP_F_SEPARATE_OUTPUT | CSP_F_SEPARATE_AAD;
 		csp.csp_mode = CSP_MODE_AEAD;
 		csp.csp_cipher_alg = CRYPTO_AES_NIST_GCM_16;
@@ -711,11 +806,6 @@
 		    tls->params.tls_vminor > TLS_MINOR_VER_THREE)
 			return (EPROTONOSUPPORT);
 
-		/* TLS 1.3 is not yet supported for receive. */
-		if (direction == KTLS_RX &&
-		    tls->params.tls_vminor == TLS_MINOR_VER_THREE)
-			return (EPROTONOSUPPORT);
-
 		csp.csp_flags |= CSP_F_SEPARATE_OUTPUT | CSP_F_SEPARATE_AAD;
 		csp.csp_mode = CSP_MODE_AEAD;
 		csp.csp_cipher_alg = CRYPTO_CHACHA20_POLY1305;
@@ -759,7 +849,10 @@
 			else
 				tls->sw_encrypt = ktls_ocf_tls12_aead_encrypt;
 		} else {
-			tls->sw_decrypt = ktls_ocf_tls12_aead_decrypt;
+			if (tls->params.tls_vminor == TLS_MINOR_VER_THREE)
+				tls->sw_decrypt = ktls_ocf_tls13_aead_decrypt;
+			else
+				tls->sw_decrypt = ktls_ocf_tls12_aead_decrypt;
 		}
 	} else {
 		tls->sw_encrypt = ktls_ocf_tls_cbc_encrypt;
Index: sys/sys/ktls.h
===================================================================
--- sys/sys/ktls.h
+++ sys/sys/ktls.h
@@ -182,7 +182,7 @@
 		    struct iovec *outiov, int outiovcnt);
 		int	(*sw_decrypt)(struct ktls_session *tls,
 		    const struct tls_record_layer *hdr, struct mbuf *m,
-		    uint64_t seqno, int *trailer_len);
+		    uint64_t seqno, int *trailer_len, uint8_t *record_type);
 	};
 	struct ktls_ocf_session *ocf_session;
 	struct m_snd_tag *snd_tag;
Index: tests/sys/kern/ktls_test.c
===================================================================
--- tests/sys/kern/ktls_test.c
+++ tests/sys/kern/ktls_test.c
@@ -816,26 +816,74 @@
 	return (record_len);
 }
 
+static size_t
+encrypt_tls_13_aead(struct tls_enable *en, uint8_t record_type, uint64_t seqno,
+    const void *src, size_t len, void *dst, size_t padding)
+{
+	struct tls_record_layer *hdr;
+	struct tls_aead_data_13 aad;
+	char nonce[12];
+	char *buf;
+	size_t hdr_len, mac_len, record_len;
+
+	hdr = dst;
+
+	hdr_len = tls_header_len(en);
+	mac_len = tls_mac_len(en);
+	record_len = hdr_len + len + 1 + padding + mac_len;
+
+	hdr->tls_type = TLS_RLTYPE_APP;
+	hdr->tls_vmajor = TLS_MAJOR_VER_ONE;
+	hdr->tls_vminor = TLS_MINOR_VER_TWO;
+	hdr->tls_length = htons(record_len - sizeof(*hdr));
+
+	tls_13_aad(en, hdr, seqno, &aad);
+	tls_13_nonce(en, seqno, nonce);
+
+	/*
+	 * Have to use a temporary buffer for the input so that the record
+	 * type can be appended.
+	 */
+	buf = malloc(len + 1 + padding);
+	memcpy(buf, src, len);
+	buf[len] = record_type;
+	memset(buf + len + 1, 0, padding);
+
+	ATF_REQUIRE(aead_encrypt(tls_EVP_CIPHER(en), en->cipher_key, nonce,
+	    &aad, sizeof(aad), buf, (char *)dst + hdr_len, len + 1 + padding,
+	    (char *)dst + hdr_len + len + 1 + padding, mac_len));
+
+	free(buf);
+
+	return (record_len);
+}
+
 static size_t
 encrypt_tls_aead(struct tls_enable *en, uint8_t record_type, uint64_t seqno,
-    const void *src, size_t len, void *dst, size_t avail)
+    const void *src, size_t len, void *dst, size_t avail, size_t padding)
 {
 	size_t record_len;
 
-	record_len = tls_header_len(en) + len + tls_trailer_len(en);
+	record_len = tls_header_len(en) + len + padding + tls_trailer_len(en);
 	ATF_REQUIRE(record_len <= avail);
 
-	ATF_REQUIRE(encrypt_tls_12_aead(en, record_type, seqno, src, len,
-	    dst) == record_len);
+	if (en->tls_vminor == TLS_MINOR_VER_TWO) {
+		ATF_REQUIRE(padding == 0);
+		ATF_REQUIRE(encrypt_tls_12_aead(en, record_type, seqno, src,
+		    len, dst) == record_len);
+	} else
+		ATF_REQUIRE(encrypt_tls_13_aead(en, record_type, seqno, src,
+		    len, dst, padding) == record_len);
 
 	return (record_len);
 }
 
 static size_t
 encrypt_tls_record(struct tls_enable *en, uint8_t record_type, uint64_t seqno,
-    const void *src, size_t len, void *dst, size_t avail)
+    const void *src, size_t len, void *dst, size_t avail, size_t padding)
 {
-	return (encrypt_tls_aead(en, record_type, seqno, src, len, dst, avail));
+	return (encrypt_tls_aead(en, record_type, seqno, src, len, dst, avail,
+	    padding));
 }
 
 static void
@@ -1121,14 +1169,19 @@
 	tgr = (struct tls_get_record *)CMSG_DATA(cmsg);
 	ATF_REQUIRE(tgr->tls_type == record_type);
 	ATF_REQUIRE(tgr->tls_vmajor == en->tls_vmajor);
-	ATF_REQUIRE(tgr->tls_vminor == en->tls_vminor);
+	/* XXX: Not sure if this is what OpenSSL expects? */
+	if (en->tls_vminor == TLS_MINOR_VER_THREE)
+		ATF_REQUIRE(tgr->tls_vminor == TLS_MINOR_VER_TWO);
+	else
+		ATF_REQUIRE(tgr->tls_vminor == en->tls_vminor);
 	ATF_REQUIRE(tgr->tls_length == htons(rv));
 
 	return (rv);
 }
 
 static void
-test_ktls_receive_app_data(struct tls_enable *en, uint64_t seqno, size_t len)
+test_ktls_receive_app_data(struct tls_enable *en, uint64_t seqno, size_t len,
+    size_t padding)
 {
 	struct kevent ev;
 	char *plaintext, *received, *outbuf;
@@ -1169,11 +1222,11 @@
 			if (outbuf_len == 0) {
 				ATF_REQUIRE(written < len);
 				todo = len - written;
-				if (todo > TLS_MAX_MSG_SIZE_V10_2)
-					todo = TLS_MAX_MSG_SIZE_V10_2;
+				if (todo > TLS_MAX_MSG_SIZE_V10_2 - padding)
+					todo = TLS_MAX_MSG_SIZE_V10_2 - padding;
 				outbuf_len = encrypt_tls_record(en,
 				    TLS_RLTYPE_APP, seqno, plaintext + written,
-				    todo, outbuf, outbuf_cap);
+				    todo, outbuf, outbuf_cap, padding);
 				outbuf_sent = 0;
 				written += todo;
 				seqno++;
@@ -1229,14 +1282,6 @@
 	M(aes256_cbc_1_0_sha1, CRYPTO_AES_CBC, 256 / 8,			\
 	    CRYPTO_SHA1_HMAC)
 
-#define	TLS_12_TESTS(M)							\
-	M(aes128_gcm_1_2, CRYPTO_AES_NIST_GCM_16, 128 / 8, 0,		\
-	    TLS_MINOR_VER_TWO)						\
-	M(aes256_gcm_1_2, CRYPTO_AES_NIST_GCM_16, 256 / 8, 0,		\
-	    TLS_MINOR_VER_TWO)						\
-	M(chacha20_poly1305_1_2, CRYPTO_CHACHA20_POLY1305, 256 / 8, 0,	\
-	    TLS_MINOR_VER_TWO)
-
 #define	TLS_13_TESTS(M)							\
 	M(aes128_gcm_1_3, CRYPTO_AES_NIST_GCM_16, 128 / 8, 0,		\
 	    TLS_MINOR_VER_THREE)					\
@@ -1528,7 +1573,7 @@
 INVALID_CIPHER_SUITES(GEN_INVALID_TRANSMIT_TEST);
 
 #define GEN_RECEIVE_APP_DATA_TEST(cipher_name, cipher_alg, key_size,	\
-	    auth_alg, minor, name, len)					\
+	    auth_alg, minor, name, len, padding)			\
 ATF_TC_WITHOUT_HEAD(ktls_receive_##cipher_name##_##name);		\
 ATF_TC_BODY(ktls_receive_##cipher_name##_##name, tc)			\
 {									\
@@ -1539,7 +1584,7 @@
 	seqno = random();						\
 	build_tls_enable(cipher_alg, key_size, auth_alg, minor, seqno,	\
 	    &en);							\
-	test_ktls_receive_app_data(&en, seqno, len);			\
+	test_ktls_receive_app_data(&en, seqno, len, padding);		\
 	free_tls_enable(&en);						\
 }
 
@@ -1550,9 +1595,9 @@
 #define GEN_RECEIVE_TESTS(cipher_name, cipher_alg, key_size, auth_alg,	\
 	    minor)							\
 	GEN_RECEIVE_APP_DATA_TEST(cipher_name, cipher_alg, key_size,	\
-	    auth_alg, minor, short, 64)					\
+	    auth_alg, minor, short, 64, 0)				\
 	GEN_RECEIVE_APP_DATA_TEST(cipher_name, cipher_alg, key_size,	\
-	    auth_alg, minor, long, 64 * 1024)
+	    auth_alg, minor, long, 64 * 1024, 0)
 
 #define ADD_RECEIVE_TESTS(cipher_name, cipher_alg, key_size, auth_alg,	\
 	    minor)							\
@@ -1573,7 +1618,28 @@
  * Note that receive is currently only supported for TLS 1.2 AEAD
  * cipher suites.
  */
-TLS_12_TESTS(GEN_RECEIVE_TESTS);
+AES_GCM_TESTS(GEN_RECEIVE_TESTS);
+CHACHA20_TESTS(GEN_RECEIVE_TESTS);
+
+#define GEN_PADDING_RECEIVE_TESTS(cipher_name, cipher_alg, key_size,	\
+	    auth_alg, minor)						\
+	GEN_RECEIVE_APP_DATA_TEST(cipher_name, cipher_alg, key_size,	\
+	    auth_alg, minor, short_padded, 64, 16)			\
+	GEN_RECEIVE_APP_DATA_TEST(cipher_name, cipher_alg, key_size,	\
+	    auth_alg, minor, long_padded, 64 * 1024, 15)
+
+#define ADD_PADDING_RECEIVE_TESTS(cipher_name, cipher_alg, key_size,	\
+	    auth_alg, minor)						\
+	ADD_RECEIVE_APP_DATA_TEST(cipher_name, cipher_alg, key_size,	\
+	    auth_alg, minor, short_padded)				\
+	ADD_RECEIVE_APP_DATA_TEST(cipher_name, cipher_alg, key_size,	\
+	    auth_alg, minor, long_padded)
+
+/*
+ * For TLS 1.3 cipher suites, run two additional receive tests which
+ * use add padding to each record.
+ */
+TLS_13_TESTS(GEN_PADDING_RECEIVE_TESTS);
 
 static void
 test_ktls_invalid_receive_cipher_suite(struct tls_enable *en)
@@ -1584,12 +1650,7 @@
 
 	ATF_REQUIRE(setsockopt(sockets[1], IPPROTO_TCP, TCP_RXTLS_ENABLE, en,
 	    sizeof(*en)) == -1);
-
-	/*
-	 * XXX: TLS 1.3 fails with ENOTSUP before checking for invalid
-	 * ciphers.
-	 */
-	ATF_REQUIRE(errno == EINVAL || errno == ENOTSUP);
+	ATF_REQUIRE(errno == EINVAL);
 
 	ATF_REQUIRE(close(sockets[1]) == 0);
 	ATF_REQUIRE(close(sockets[0]) == 0);
@@ -1629,7 +1690,7 @@
 
 	ATF_REQUIRE(setsockopt(sockets[1], IPPROTO_TCP, TCP_RXTLS_ENABLE, en,
 	    sizeof(*en)) == -1);
-	ATF_REQUIRE(errno == EPROTONOSUPPORT || errno == ENOTSUP);
+	ATF_REQUIRE(errno == EPROTONOSUPPORT);
 
 	ATF_REQUIRE(close(sockets[1]) == 0);
 	ATF_REQUIRE(close(sockets[0]) == 0);
@@ -1660,7 +1721,6 @@
  * rejected.
  */
 AES_CBC_TESTS(GEN_UNSUPPORTED_RECEIVE_TEST);
-TLS_13_TESTS(GEN_UNSUPPORTED_RECEIVE_TEST);
 
 ATF_TP_ADD_TCS(tp)
 {
@@ -1674,8 +1734,9 @@
 
 	/* Receive tests */
 	AES_CBC_TESTS(ADD_UNSUPPORTED_RECEIVE_TEST);
-	TLS_12_TESTS(ADD_RECEIVE_TESTS);
-	TLS_13_TESTS(ADD_UNSUPPORTED_RECEIVE_TEST);
+	AES_GCM_TESTS(ADD_RECEIVE_TESTS);
+	CHACHA20_TESTS(ADD_RECEIVE_TESTS);
+	TLS_13_TESTS(ADD_PADDING_RECEIVE_TESTS);
 	INVALID_CIPHER_SUITES(ADD_INVALID_RECEIVE_TEST);
 
 	return (atf_no_error());