diff --git a/usr.sbin/Makefile.sav b/usr.sbin/Makefile --- a/usr.sbin/Makefile.sav +++ b/usr.sbin/Makefile @@ -182,6 +182,8 @@ SUBDIR.${MK_NIS}+= ypset SUBDIR.${MK_NTP}+= ntp SUBDIR.${MK_OPENSSL}+= keyserv +SUBDIR.${MK_OPENSSL_KTLS}+= rpc.tlsclntd +SUBDIR.${MK_OPENSSL_KTLS}+= rpc.tlsservd SUBDIR.${MK_PF}+= ftp-proxy SUBDIR.${MK_PKGBOOTSTRAP}+= pkg SUBDIR.${MK_PMC}+= pmc pmcannotate pmccontrol pmcstat pmcstudy diff --git a/usr.sbin/rpc.tlsclntd/Makefile.sav b/usr.sbin/rpc.tlsclntd/Makefile --- a/usr.sbin/rpc.tlsclntd/Makefile.sav +++ b/usr.sbin/rpc.tlsclntd/Makefile @@ -0,0 +1,29 @@ +# $FreeBSD$ + +.include + +PROG= rpc.tlsclntd +MAN= rpc.tlsclntd.8 +SRCS= rpc.tlsclntd.c rpc.tlscommon.c rpctlscd.h rpctlscd_svc.c rpctlscd_xdr.c + +CFLAGS+= -I. -I${SRCTOP}/usr.sbin/rpc.tlsservd + +LIBADD= ssl crypto util + +CLEANFILES= rpctlscd_svc.c rpctlscd_xdr.c rpctlscd.h + +RPCSRC= ${SRCTOP}/sys/rpc/rpcsec_tls/rpctlscd.x +RPCGEN= RPCGEN_CPP=${CPP:Q} rpcgen -L -C -M + +rpctlscd_svc.c: ${RPCSRC} rpctlscd.h + ${RPCGEN} -m -o ${.TARGET} ${RPCSRC} + +rpctlscd_xdr.c: ${RPCSRC} rpctlscd.h + ${RPCGEN} -c -o ${.TARGET} ${RPCSRC} + +rpctlscd.h: ${RPCSRC} + ${RPCGEN} -h -o ${.TARGET} ${RPCSRC} + +.PATH: ${SRCTOP}/sys/rpc/rpcsec_tls ${SRCTOP}/usr.sbin/rpc.tlsservd + +.include diff --git a/usr.sbin/rpc.tlsclntd/rpc.tlsclntd.8.sav b/usr.sbin/rpc.tlsclntd/rpc.tlsclntd.8 --- a/usr.sbin/rpc.tlsclntd/rpc.tlsclntd.8.sav +++ b/usr.sbin/rpc.tlsclntd/rpc.tlsclntd.8 @@ -0,0 +1,190 @@ +.\" Copyright (c) 2008 Isilon Inc http://www.isilon.com/ +.\" Authors: Doug Rabson +.\" Developed with Red Inc: Alfred Perlstein +.\" +.\" Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without +.\" modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions +.\" are met: +.\" 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright +.\" notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. +.\" 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright +.\" notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the +.\" documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. +.\" +.\" THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND +.\" ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE +.\" IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE +.\" ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE +.\" FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL +.\" DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS +.\" OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) +.\" HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT +.\" LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY +.\" OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF +.\" SUCH DAMAGE. +.\" +.\" $FreeBSD$ +.\" +.\" Modified from gssd.8 for rpc.tlsclntd.8 by Rick Macklem. +.Dd January 29, 2021 +.Dt RPC.TLSCLNTD 8 +.Os +.Sh NAME +.Nm rpc.tlsclntd +.Nd "Sun RPC over TLS Client Daemon" +.Sh SYNOPSIS +.Nm +.Op Fl D Ar certdir +.Op Fl d +.Op Fl l Ar CAfile +.Op Fl m +.Op Fl p Ar CApath +.Op Fl r Ar CRLfile +.Op Fl v +.Sh DESCRIPTION +The +.Nm +program provides support for the client side of the kernel Sun RPC over TLS +implementation. +This daemon must be running for the kernel RPC to be able to do a TLS +connection to a server for an NFS over TLS mount. +This daemon requires that the kernel be built with +.Dq options KERNEL_TLS +and be running on an architecture such as +.Dq amd64 +that supports a direct map (not i386) with +.Xr ktls 4 +enabled. +.Pp +If either of the +.Fl l +or +.Fl p +options have been specified, the daemon will require the server's +certificate to verify +and have a Fully Qualified Domain Name (FQDN) in it. +This FQDN must match +the reverse DNS name for the IP address that +the server is using for the TCP connection. +The FQDN may be +in either the DNS field of the subjectAltName or the CN field of the +subjectName in the certificate and +cannot have a wildcard +.Dq * +in it. +.Pp +If a SIGHUP signal is sent to the daemon it will reload the +.Dq CRLfile +and will shut down any extant connections that presented certificates +during TLS handshake that have been revoked. +If the +.Fl r +option was not specified, the SIGHUP signal will be ignored. +.Pp +The daemon will log failed certificate verifications via +.Xr syslogd 8 +using LOG_INFO | LOG_DAEMON when the +.Fl l +or +.Fl p +option has been specified. +.Pp +The options are as follows: +.Bl -tag -width indent +.It Fl D Ar certdir , Fl Fl certdir= Ns Ar certdir +Use +.Dq certdir +instead of /etc/rpc.tlsclntd for the +.Fl m +option. +.It Fl d , Fl Fl debuglevel +Run in debug mode. +In this mode, +.Nm +will not fork when it starts. +.It Fl l Ar CAfile , Fl Fl verifylocs= Ns Ar CAfile +This specifies the path name of a CAfile which holds the information +for server certificate verification. +This path name is used in +.Dq SSL_CTX_load_verify_locations(ctx,CAfile,NULL) +and +.Dq SSL_CTX_set0_CA_list(ctx,SSL_load_client_CA_file(CAfile)) +openssl library calls. +Note that this is a path name for the file and is not assumed to be +in +.Dq certdir . +.It Fl m , Fl Fl mutualverf +Enable support for mutual authentication. +A certificate and associated key must be found in /etc/rpc.tlsclntd +(or the directory specified by the +.Fl D +option) +in case a server requests a peer certificate. +The first certificate needs to be in a file named +.Dq cert.pem +and the associated key in a file named +.Dq certkey.pem . +The +.Xr mount_nfs 8 +option +.Fl tlscertname +can be used to override the default certificate for a given +NFS mount, where the files use the alternate naming specified by the option. +If there is a passphrase on the +.Dq certkey.pem +file, this daemon will prompt for the passphrase during startup. +The keys for alternate certificates cannot have passphrases. +.It Fl p Ar CApath , Fl Fl verifydir= Ns Ar CApath +This option is similar to the +.Fl l +option, but specifies the path of a directory with CA +certificates in it. +When this option is used, +.Dq SSL_CTX_set0_CA_list(ctx,SSL_load_client_CA_file()) +is not called, so a list of CA names is not be passed +to the server during the TLS handshake. +The openssl documentation indicates this call is rarely needed. +.It Fl r Ar CRLfile , Fl Fl crl= Ns Ar CRLfile +This option specifies a Certificate Revocation List (CRL) file +that is to be loaded into the verify certificate store and +checked during verification of the server's certificate. +This option is meaningless unless either the +.Fl l +or +.Fl p +have been specified. +.It Fl v , Fl Fl verbose +Run in verbose mode. +In this mode, +.Nm +will log activity messages to syslog using LOG_INFO | LOG_DAEMON or to +stderr, if the +.Fl d +option has also been specified. +.El +.Sh EXIT STATUS +.Ex -std +.Sh SEE ALSO +.Xr openssl 1 , +.Xr ktls 4 , +.Xr mount_nfs 8 , +.Xr rpc.tlsservd 8 , +.Xr syslogd 8 +.Sh STANDARDS +The implementation is based on the specification in +.Rs +.%B "RFC NNNN" +.%T "Towards Remote Procedure Call Encryption By Default" +.Re +.Sh HISTORY +The +.Nm +manual page first appeared in +.Fx 13.0 . +.Sh BUGS +This daemon cannot be safely shut down and restarted if there are +any active RPC-over-TLS connections. +Doing so will orphan the KERNEL_TLS connections, so that they +can no longer do upcalls successfully, since the +.Dq SSL * +structures in userspace have been lost. diff --git a/usr.sbin/rpc.tlsclntd/rpc.tlsclntd.c.sav b/usr.sbin/rpc.tlsclntd/rpc.tlsclntd.c --- a/usr.sbin/rpc.tlsclntd/rpc.tlsclntd.c.sav +++ b/usr.sbin/rpc.tlsclntd/rpc.tlsclntd.c @@ -0,0 +1,733 @@ +/*- + * SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-2-Clause-FreeBSD + * + * Copyright (c) 2008 Isilon Inc http://www.isilon.com/ + * Authors: Doug Rabson + * Developed with Red Inc: Alfred Perlstein + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +/* + * Extensively modified from /usr/src/usr.sbin/gssd.c r344402 for + * the client side of kernel RPC-over-TLS by Rick Macklem. + */ + +#include +__FBSDID("$FreeBSD$"); + +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include + +#include +#include +#include + +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include + +#include "rpctlscd.h" +#include "rpc.tlscommon.h" + +#ifndef _PATH_RPCTLSCDSOCK +#define _PATH_RPCTLSCDSOCK "/var/run/rpc.tlsclntd.sock" +#endif +#ifndef _PATH_CERTANDKEY +#define _PATH_CERTANDKEY "/etc/rpc.tlsclntd/" +#endif +#ifndef _PATH_RPCTLSCDPID +#define _PATH_RPCTLSCDPID "/var/run/rpc.tlsclntd.pid" +#endif +#ifndef _PREFERRED_CIPHERS +#define _PREFERRED_CIPHERS "AES128-GCM-SHA256" +#endif + +/* Global variables also used by rpc.tlscommon.c. */ +int rpctls_debug_level; +bool rpctls_verbose; +SSL_CTX *rpctls_ctx = NULL; +const char *rpctls_verify_cafile = NULL; +const char *rpctls_verify_capath = NULL; +char *rpctls_crlfile = NULL; +bool rpctls_cert = false; +bool rpctls_gothup = false; +struct ssl_list rpctls_ssllist; + +static struct pidfh *rpctls_pfh = NULL; +static const char *rpctls_certdir = _PATH_CERTANDKEY; +static uint64_t rpctls_ssl_refno = 0; +static uint64_t rpctls_ssl_sec = 0; +static uint64_t rpctls_ssl_usec = 0; + +static void rpctlscd_terminate(int); +static SSL_CTX *rpctls_setupcl_ssl(void); +static SSL *rpctls_connect(SSL_CTX *ctx, int s, char *certname, + u_int certlen, X509 **certp); +static void rpctls_huphandler(int sig __unused); + +extern void rpctlscd_1(struct svc_req *rqstp, SVCXPRT *transp); + +static struct option longopts[] = { + { "certdir", required_argument, NULL, 'D' }, + { "debuglevel", no_argument, NULL, 'd' }, + { "verifylocs", required_argument, NULL, 'l' }, + { "mutualverf", no_argument, NULL, 'm' }, + { "verifydir", required_argument, NULL, 'p' }, + { "crl", required_argument, NULL, 'r' }, + { "verbose", no_argument, NULL, 'v' }, + { NULL, 0, NULL, 0 } +}; + +int +main(int argc, char **argv) +{ + /* + * We provide an RPC service on a local-domain socket. The + * kernel rpctls code will upcall to this daemon to do the initial + * TLS handshake. + */ + struct sockaddr_un sun; + int ch, fd, oldmask; + SVCXPRT *xprt; + bool tls_enable; + struct timeval tm; + struct timezone tz; + pid_t otherpid; + size_t tls_enable_len; + +#if !defined(BIO_get_ktls_send) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_KTLS) + errx(1, "Requires OpenSSL libraries with KTLS support"); +#endif + /* Check that another rpctlscd isn't already running. */ + rpctls_pfh = pidfile_open(_PATH_RPCTLSCDPID, 0600, &otherpid); + if (rpctls_pfh == NULL) { + if (errno == EEXIST) + errx(1, "rpctlscd already running, pid: %d.", otherpid); + warn("cannot open or create pidfile"); + } + + /* Check to see that the ktls is enabled. */ + tls_enable_len = sizeof(tls_enable); + if (sysctlbyname("kern.ipc.tls.enable", &tls_enable, &tls_enable_len, + NULL, 0) != 0 || !tls_enable) + errx(1, "Kernel TLS not enabled"); + + /* Get the time when this daemon is started. */ + gettimeofday(&tm, &tz); + rpctls_ssl_sec = tm.tv_sec; + rpctls_ssl_usec = tm.tv_usec; + + rpctls_verbose = false; + while ((ch = getopt_long(argc, argv, "D:dl:mp:r:v", longopts, NULL)) != + -1) { + switch (ch) { + case 'D': + rpctls_certdir = optarg; + break; + case 'd': + rpctls_debug_level++; + break; + case 'l': + rpctls_verify_cafile = optarg; + break; + case 'm': + rpctls_cert = true; + break; + case 'p': + rpctls_verify_capath = optarg; + break; + case 'r': + rpctls_crlfile = optarg; + break; + case 'v': + rpctls_verbose = true; + break; + default: + fprintf(stderr, "usage: %s " + "[-D/--certdir certdir] [-d/--debuglevel] " + "[-l/--verifylocs CAfile] [-m/--mutualverf] " + "[-p/--verifydir CApath] [-r/--crl CRLfile] " + "[-v/--verbose]\n", argv[0]); + exit(1); + break; + } + } + if (rpctls_crlfile != NULL && rpctls_verify_cafile == NULL && + rpctls_verify_capath == NULL) + errx(1, "-r requires the -l and/or " + "-p options"); + + if (modfind("krpc") < 0) { + /* Not present in kernel, try loading it */ + if (kldload("krpc") < 0 || modfind("krpc") < 0) + errx(1, "Kernel RPC is not available"); + } + + /* + * Set up the SSL_CTX *. + * Do it now, before daemonizing, in case the private key + * is encrypted and requires a passphrase to be entered. + */ + rpctls_ctx = rpctls_setupcl_ssl(); + if (rpctls_ctx == NULL) { + if (rpctls_debug_level == 0) { + syslog(LOG_ERR, "Can't set up TLS context"); + exit(1); + } + err(1, "Can't set up TLS context"); + } + LIST_INIT(&rpctls_ssllist); + + if (!rpctls_debug_level) { + if (daemon(0, 0) != 0) + err(1, "Can't daemonize"); + signal(SIGINT, SIG_IGN); + signal(SIGQUIT, SIG_IGN); + signal(SIGHUP, SIG_IGN); + } + signal(SIGTERM, rpctlscd_terminate); + signal(SIGPIPE, SIG_IGN); + signal(SIGHUP, rpctls_huphandler); + + pidfile_write(rpctls_pfh); + + memset(&sun, 0, sizeof sun); + sun.sun_family = AF_LOCAL; + unlink(_PATH_RPCTLSCDSOCK); + strcpy(sun.sun_path, _PATH_RPCTLSCDSOCK); + sun.sun_len = SUN_LEN(&sun); + fd = socket(AF_LOCAL, SOCK_STREAM, 0); + if (fd < 0) { + if (rpctls_debug_level == 0) { + syslog(LOG_ERR, "Can't create local rpctlscd socket"); + exit(1); + } + err(1, "Can't create local rpctlscd socket"); + } + oldmask = umask(S_IXUSR|S_IRWXG|S_IRWXO); + if (bind(fd, (struct sockaddr *)&sun, sun.sun_len) < 0) { + if (rpctls_debug_level == 0) { + syslog(LOG_ERR, "Can't bind local rpctlscd socket"); + exit(1); + } + err(1, "Can't bind local rpctlscd socket"); + } + umask(oldmask); + if (listen(fd, SOMAXCONN) < 0) { + if (rpctls_debug_level == 0) { + syslog(LOG_ERR, + "Can't listen on local rpctlscd socket"); + exit(1); + } + err(1, "Can't listen on local rpctlscd socket"); + } + xprt = svc_vc_create(fd, RPC_MAXDATASIZE, RPC_MAXDATASIZE); + if (!xprt) { + if (rpctls_debug_level == 0) { + syslog(LOG_ERR, + "Can't create transport for local rpctlscd socket"); + exit(1); + } + err(1, "Can't create transport for local rpctlscd socket"); + } + if (!svc_reg(xprt, RPCTLSCD, RPCTLSCDVERS, rpctlscd_1, NULL)) { + if (rpctls_debug_level == 0) { + syslog(LOG_ERR, + "Can't register service for local rpctlscd socket"); + exit(1); + } + err(1, "Can't register service for local rpctlscd socket"); + } + + rpctls_syscall(RPCTLS_SYSC_CLSETPATH, _PATH_RPCTLSCDSOCK); + + rpctls_svc_run(); + + rpctls_syscall(RPCTLS_SYSC_CLSHUTDOWN, ""); + + SSL_CTX_free(rpctls_ctx); + EVP_cleanup(); + return (0); +} + +bool_t +rpctlscd_null_1_svc(__unused void *argp, __unused void *result, + __unused struct svc_req *rqstp) +{ + + rpctls_verbose_out("rpctlscd_null: done\n"); + return (TRUE); +} + +bool_t +rpctlscd_connect_1_svc(struct rpctlscd_connect_arg *argp, + struct rpctlscd_connect_res *result, __unused struct svc_req *rqstp) +{ + int s; + SSL *ssl; + struct ssl_entry *newslp; + X509 *cert; + + rpctls_verbose_out("rpctlsd_connect: started\n"); + /* Get the socket fd from the kernel. */ + s = rpctls_syscall(RPCTLS_SYSC_CLSOCKET, ""); + if (s < 0) { + result->reterr = RPCTLSERR_NOSOCKET; + return (TRUE); + } + + /* Do a TLS connect handshake. */ + ssl = rpctls_connect(rpctls_ctx, s, argp->certname.certname_val, + argp->certname.certname_len, &cert); + if (ssl == NULL) { + rpctls_verbose_out("rpctlsd_connect: can't do TLS " + "handshake\n"); + result->reterr = RPCTLSERR_NOSSL; + } else { + result->reterr = RPCTLSERR_OK; + result->sec = rpctls_ssl_sec; + result->usec = rpctls_ssl_usec; + result->ssl = ++rpctls_ssl_refno; + /* Hard to believe this will ever wrap around.. */ + if (rpctls_ssl_refno == 0) + result->ssl = ++rpctls_ssl_refno; + } + + if (ssl == NULL) { + /* + * For RPC-over-TLS, this upcall is expected + * to close off the socket. + */ + close(s); + return (TRUE); + } + + /* Maintain list of all current SSL *'s */ + newslp = malloc(sizeof(*newslp)); + newslp->refno = rpctls_ssl_refno; + newslp->s = s; + newslp->shutoff = false; + newslp->ssl = ssl; + newslp->cert = cert; + LIST_INSERT_HEAD(&rpctls_ssllist, newslp, next); + return (TRUE); +} + +bool_t +rpctlscd_handlerecord_1_svc(struct rpctlscd_handlerecord_arg *argp, + struct rpctlscd_handlerecord_res *result, __unused struct svc_req *rqstp) +{ + struct ssl_entry *slp; + int ret; + char junk; + + slp = NULL; + if (argp->sec == rpctls_ssl_sec && argp->usec == + rpctls_ssl_usec) { + LIST_FOREACH(slp, &rpctls_ssllist, next) { + if (slp->refno == argp->ssl) + break; + } + } + + if (slp != NULL) { + rpctls_verbose_out("rpctlscd_handlerecord fd=%d\n", + slp->s); + /* + * An SSL_read() of 0 bytes should fail, but it should + * handle the non-application data record before doing so. + */ + ret = SSL_read(slp->ssl, &junk, 0); + if (ret <= 0) { + /* Check to see if this was a close alert. */ + ret = SSL_get_shutdown(slp->ssl); + if ((ret & (SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN | + SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN)) == SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN) + SSL_shutdown(slp->ssl); + } else { + if (rpctls_debug_level == 0) + syslog(LOG_ERR, "SSL_read returned %d", ret); + else + fprintf(stderr, "SSL_read returned %d\n", ret); + } + result->reterr = RPCTLSERR_OK; + } else + result->reterr = RPCTLSERR_NOSSL; + return (TRUE); +} + +bool_t +rpctlscd_disconnect_1_svc(struct rpctlscd_disconnect_arg *argp, + struct rpctlscd_disconnect_res *result, __unused struct svc_req *rqstp) +{ + struct ssl_entry *slp; + int ret; + + slp = NULL; + if (argp->sec == rpctls_ssl_sec && argp->usec == + rpctls_ssl_usec) { + LIST_FOREACH(slp, &rpctls_ssllist, next) { + if (slp->refno == argp->ssl) + break; + } + } + + if (slp != NULL) { + rpctls_verbose_out("rpctlscd_disconnect: fd=%d closed\n", + slp->s); + LIST_REMOVE(slp, next); + if (!slp->shutoff) { + ret = SSL_get_shutdown(slp->ssl); + /* + * Do an SSL_shutdown() unless a close alert has + * already been sent. + */ + if ((ret & SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN) == 0) + SSL_shutdown(slp->ssl); + } + SSL_free(slp->ssl); + if (slp->cert != NULL) + X509_free(slp->cert); + /* + * For RPC-over-TLS, this upcall is expected + * to close off the socket. + */ + if (!slp->shutoff) + shutdown(slp->s, SHUT_WR); + close(slp->s); + free(slp); + result->reterr = RPCTLSERR_OK; + } else + result->reterr = RPCTLSERR_NOCLOSE; + return (TRUE); +} + +int +rpctlscd_1_freeresult(__unused SVCXPRT *transp, __unused xdrproc_t xdr_result, + __unused caddr_t result) +{ + + return (TRUE); +} + +static void +rpctlscd_terminate(int sig __unused) +{ + + rpctls_syscall(RPCTLS_SYSC_CLSHUTDOWN, ""); + pidfile_remove(rpctls_pfh); + exit(0); +} + +static SSL_CTX * +rpctls_setupcl_ssl(void) +{ + SSL_CTX *ctx; + long flags; + char path[PATH_MAX]; + size_t len, rlen; + int ret; + + SSL_library_init(); + SSL_load_error_strings(); + OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms(); + + ctx = SSL_CTX_new(TLS_client_method()); + if (ctx == NULL) { + rpctls_verbose_out("rpctls_setupcl_ssl: SSL_CTX_new " + "failed\n"); + return (NULL); + } + SSL_CTX_set_ecdh_auto(ctx, 1); + + /* + * Set preferred ciphers, since KERN_TLS only supports a + * few of them. + */ + ret = SSL_CTX_set_cipher_list(ctx, _PREFERRED_CIPHERS); + if (ret == 0) { + rpctls_verbose_out("rpctls_setupcl_ssl: " + "SSL_CTX_set_cipher_list failed to set any ciphers\n"); + SSL_CTX_free(ctx); + return (NULL); + } + + /* + * If rpctls_cert is true, a certificate and key exists in + * rpctls_certdir, so that it can do mutual authentication. + */ + if (rpctls_cert) { + /* Get the cert.pem and certkey.pem files. */ + len = strlcpy(path, rpctls_certdir, sizeof(path)); + rlen = sizeof(path) - len; + if (strlcpy(&path[len], "cert.pem", rlen) != 8) { + SSL_CTX_free(ctx); + return (NULL); + } + ret = SSL_CTX_use_certificate_file(ctx, path, + SSL_FILETYPE_PEM); + if (ret != 1) { + rpctls_verbose_out("rpctls_setupcl_ssl: can't use " + "certificate file path=%s ret=%d\n", path, ret); + SSL_CTX_free(ctx); + return (NULL); + } + if (strlcpy(&path[len], "certkey.pem", rlen) != 11) { + SSL_CTX_free(ctx); + return (NULL); + } + ret = SSL_CTX_use_PrivateKey_file(ctx, path, + SSL_FILETYPE_PEM); + if (ret != 1) { + rpctls_verbose_out("rpctls_setupcl_ssl: Can't use " + "private key path=%s ret=%d\n", path, ret); + SSL_CTX_free(ctx); + return (NULL); + } + } + + if (rpctls_verify_cafile != NULL || rpctls_verify_capath != NULL) { + if (rpctls_crlfile != NULL) { + ret = rpctls_loadcrlfile(ctx); + if (ret == 0) { + rpctls_verbose_out("rpctls_setupcl_ssl: " + "Load CRLfile failed\n"); + SSL_CTX_free(ctx); + return (NULL); + } + } +#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x30000000 + ret = 1; + if (rpctls_verify_cafile != NULL) + ret = SSL_CTX_load_verify_file(ctx, + rpctls_verify_cafile); + if (ret != 0 && rpctls_verify_capath != NULL) + ret = SSL_CTX_load_verify_dir(ctx, + rpctls_verify_capath); +#else + ret = SSL_CTX_load_verify_locations(ctx, + rpctls_verify_cafile, rpctls_verify_capath); +#endif + if (ret == 0) { + rpctls_verbose_out("rpctls_setupcl_ssl: " + "Can't load verify locations\n"); + SSL_CTX_free(ctx); + return (NULL); + } + /* + * The man page says that the + * SSL_CTX_set0_CA_list() call is not normally + * needed, but I believe it is harmless. + */ + if (rpctls_verify_cafile != NULL) + SSL_CTX_set0_CA_list(ctx, + SSL_load_client_CA_file(rpctls_verify_cafile)); + } + + /* RPC-over-TLS must use TLSv1.3, according to the IETF draft.*/ +#ifdef notyet + flags = SSL_OP_NO_SSLv2 | SSL_OP_NO_SSLv3 | SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1 | + SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1 | SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_2; +#else + flags = SSL_OP_NO_SSLv2 | SSL_OP_NO_SSLv3 | SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_3; +#endif + SSL_CTX_set_options(ctx, flags); +#ifdef SSL_MODE_NO_KTLS_TX + SSL_CTX_clear_mode(ctx, SSL_MODE_NO_KTLS_TX | SSL_MODE_NO_KTLS_RX); +#endif + return (ctx); +} + +static SSL * +rpctls_connect(SSL_CTX *ctx, int s, char *certname, u_int certlen, X509 **certp) +{ + SSL *ssl; + X509 *cert; + struct sockaddr_storage ad; + struct sockaddr *sad; + char hostnam[NI_MAXHOST], path[PATH_MAX]; + int gethostret, ret; + char *cp, *cp2; + size_t len, rlen; + long verfret; + + *certp = NULL; + sad = (struct sockaddr *)&ad; + ssl = SSL_new(ctx); + if (ssl == NULL) { + rpctls_verbose_out("rpctls_connect: " + "SSL_new failed\n"); + return (NULL); + } + if (SSL_set_fd(ssl, s) != 1) { + rpctls_verbose_out("rpctls_connect: " + "SSL_set_fd failed\n"); + SSL_free(ssl); + return (NULL); + } + + /* + * If rpctls_cert is true and certname is set, a alternate certificate + * and key exists in files named .pem and key.pem + * in rpctls_certdir that is to be used for mutual authentication. + */ + if (rpctls_cert && certlen > 0) { + len = strlcpy(path, rpctls_certdir, sizeof(path)); + rlen = sizeof(path) - len; + if (rlen <= certlen) { + SSL_free(ssl); + return (NULL); + } + memcpy(&path[len], certname, certlen); + rlen -= certlen; + len += certlen; + path[len] = '\0'; + if (strlcpy(&path[len], ".pem", rlen) != 4) { + SSL_free(ssl); + return (NULL); + } + ret = SSL_use_certificate_file(ssl, path, SSL_FILETYPE_PEM); + if (ret != 1) { + rpctls_verbose_out("rpctls_connect: can't use " + "certificate file path=%s ret=%d\n", path, ret); + SSL_free(ssl); + return (NULL); + } + if (strlcpy(&path[len], "key.pem", rlen) != 7) { + SSL_free(ssl); + return (NULL); + } + ret = SSL_use_PrivateKey_file(ssl, path, SSL_FILETYPE_PEM); + if (ret != 1) { + rpctls_verbose_out("rpctls_connect: Can't use " + "private key path=%s ret=%d\n", path, ret); + SSL_free(ssl); + return (NULL); + } + } + + ret = SSL_connect(ssl); + if (ret != 1) { + rpctls_verbose_out("rpctls_connect: " + "SSL_connect failed %d\n", + ret); + SSL_free(ssl); + return (NULL); + } + + cert = SSL_get_peer_certificate(ssl); + if (cert == NULL) { + rpctls_verbose_out("rpctls_connect: get peer" + " certificate failed\n"); + SSL_free(ssl); + return (NULL); + } + gethostret = rpctls_gethost(s, sad, hostnam, sizeof(hostnam)); + if (gethostret == 0) + hostnam[0] = '\0'; + verfret = SSL_get_verify_result(ssl); + if (verfret == X509_V_OK && (rpctls_verify_cafile != NULL || + rpctls_verify_capath != NULL) && (gethostret == 0 || + rpctls_checkhost(sad, cert, X509_CHECK_FLAG_NO_WILDCARDS) != 1)) + verfret = X509_V_ERR_HOSTNAME_MISMATCH; + if (verfret != X509_V_OK && (rpctls_verify_cafile != NULL || + rpctls_verify_capath != NULL)) { + if (verfret != X509_V_OK) { + cp = X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_issuer_name(cert), + NULL, 0); + cp2 = X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_subject_name(cert), + NULL, 0); + if (rpctls_debug_level == 0) + syslog(LOG_INFO | LOG_DAEMON, + "rpctls_connect: client IP %s " + "issuerName=%s subjectName=%s verify " + "failed %s\n", hostnam, cp, cp2, + X509_verify_cert_error_string(verfret)); + else + fprintf(stderr, + "rpctls_connect: client IP %s " + "issuerName=%s subjectName=%s verify " + "failed %s\n", hostnam, cp, cp2, + X509_verify_cert_error_string(verfret)); + } + X509_free(cert); + SSL_free(ssl); + return (NULL); + } + +#ifdef BIO_get_ktls_send + /* Check to see if ktls is enabled on the connection. */ + ret = BIO_get_ktls_send(SSL_get_wbio(ssl)); + rpctls_verbose_out("rpctls_connect: BIO_get_ktls_send=%d\n", ret); + if (ret != 0) { + ret = BIO_get_ktls_recv(SSL_get_rbio(ssl)); + rpctls_verbose_out("rpctls_connect: BIO_get_ktls_recv=%d\n", + ret); + } +#else + ret = 0; +#endif + if (ret == 0) { + if (rpctls_debug_level == 0) + syslog(LOG_ERR, "ktls not working\n"); + else + fprintf(stderr, "ktls not working\n"); + X509_free(cert); + SSL_free(ssl); + return (NULL); + } + if (ret == X509_V_OK && (rpctls_verify_cafile != NULL || + rpctls_verify_capath != NULL) && rpctls_crlfile != NULL) + *certp = cert; + else + X509_free(cert); + + return (ssl); +} + +static void +rpctls_huphandler(int sig __unused) +{ + + rpctls_gothup = true; +} diff --git a/usr.sbin/rpc.tlsservd/Makefile.sav b/usr.sbin/rpc.tlsservd/Makefile --- a/usr.sbin/rpc.tlsservd/Makefile.sav +++ b/usr.sbin/rpc.tlsservd/Makefile @@ -0,0 +1,29 @@ +# $FreeBSD$ + +.include + +PROG= rpc.tlsservd +MAN= rpc.tlsservd.8 +SRCS= rpc.tlsservd.c rpc.tlscommon.c rpctlssd.h rpctlssd_svc.c rpctlssd_xdr.c + +CFLAGS+= -I. + +LIBADD= ssl crypto util + +CLEANFILES= rpctlssd_svc.c rpctlssd_xdr.c rpctlssd.h + +RPCSRC= ${SRCTOP}/sys/rpc/rpcsec_tls/rpctlssd.x +RPCGEN= RPCGEN_CPP=${CPP:Q} rpcgen -L -C -M + +rpctlssd_svc.c: ${RPCSRC} rpctlssd.h + ${RPCGEN} -m -o ${.TARGET} ${RPCSRC} + +rpctlssd_xdr.c: ${RPCSRC} rpctlssd.h + ${RPCGEN} -c -o ${.TARGET} ${RPCSRC} + +rpctlssd.h: ${RPCSRC} + ${RPCGEN} -h -o ${.TARGET} ${RPCSRC} + +.PATH: ${SRCTOP}/sys/rpc/rpcsec_tls + +.include diff --git a/usr.sbin/rpc.tlsservd/rpc.tlscommon.h.sav b/usr.sbin/rpc.tlsservd/rpc.tlscommon.h --- a/usr.sbin/rpc.tlsservd/rpc.tlscommon.h.sav +++ b/usr.sbin/rpc.tlsservd/rpc.tlscommon.h @@ -0,0 +1,68 @@ +/*- + * SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-2-Clause-FreeBSD + * + * Copyright (c) 2021 Rick Macklem + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + * + * $FreeBSD$ + */ + +/* + * Functions in rpc.tlscommon.c used by both rpc.tlsservd.c and rpc.tlsclntd.c. + */ +int rpctls_gethost(int s, struct sockaddr *sad, + char *hostip, size_t hostlen); +int rpctls_checkhost(struct sockaddr *sad, X509 *cert, + unsigned int wildcard); +int rpctls_loadcrlfile(SSL_CTX *ctx); +void rpctls_checkcrl(void); +void rpctls_verbose_out(const char *fmt, ...); +void rpctls_svc_run(void); + +/* + * A linked list of all current "SSL *"s and socket "fd"s + * for kernel RPC TLS connections is maintained. + * The "refno" field is a unique 64bit value used to + * identify which entry a kernel RPC upcall refers to. + */ +LIST_HEAD(ssl_list, ssl_entry); +struct ssl_entry { + LIST_ENTRY(ssl_entry) next; + uint64_t refno; + int s; + bool shutoff; + SSL *ssl; + X509 *cert; +}; + +/* Global variables shared between rpc.tlscommon.c and the daemons. */ +extern int rpctls_debug_level; +extern bool rpctls_verbose; +extern SSL_CTX *rpctls_ctx; +extern const char *rpctls_verify_cafile; +extern const char *rpctls_verify_capath; +extern char *rpctls_crlfile; +extern bool rpctls_cert; +extern bool rpctls_gothup; +extern struct ssl_list rpctls_ssllist; + diff --git a/usr.sbin/rpc.tlsservd/rpc.tlscommon.c.sav b/usr.sbin/rpc.tlsservd/rpc.tlscommon.c --- a/usr.sbin/rpc.tlsservd/rpc.tlscommon.c.sav +++ b/usr.sbin/rpc.tlsservd/rpc.tlscommon.c @@ -0,0 +1,295 @@ +/*- + * SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-2-Clause-FreeBSD + * + * Copyright (c) 2021 Rick Macklem + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + * + */ + +#include +__FBSDID("$FreeBSD$"); + +#include +#include +#include +#include + +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include + +#include + +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include + +#include "rpc.tlscommon.h" + +/* + * How long to delay a reload of the CRL when there are RPC request(s) + * to process, in usec. Must be less than 1second. + */ +#define RELOADDELAY 250000 + +void +rpctls_svc_run(void) +{ + int ret; + struct timeval tv; + fd_set readfds; + uint64_t curtime, nexttime; + struct timespec tp; + sigset_t sighup_mask; + + /* Expand svc_run() here so that we can call rpctls_loadcrlfile(). */ + curtime = nexttime = 0; + sigemptyset(&sighup_mask); + sigaddset(&sighup_mask, SIGHUP); + for (;;) { + clock_gettime(CLOCK_MONOTONIC, &tp); + curtime = tp.tv_sec; + curtime = curtime * 1000000 + tp.tv_nsec / 1000; + sigprocmask(SIG_BLOCK, &sighup_mask, NULL); + if (rpctls_gothup && curtime >= nexttime) { + rpctls_gothup = false; + sigprocmask(SIG_UNBLOCK, &sighup_mask, NULL); + ret = rpctls_loadcrlfile(rpctls_ctx); + if (ret != 0) + rpctls_checkcrl(); + else + rpctls_verbose_out("rpc.tlsservd: Can't " + "reload CRLfile\n"); + clock_gettime(CLOCK_MONOTONIC, &tp); + nexttime = tp.tv_sec; + nexttime = nexttime * 1000000 + tp.tv_nsec / 1000 + + RELOADDELAY; + } else + sigprocmask(SIG_UNBLOCK, &sighup_mask, NULL); + + /* + * If a reload is pending, poll for received request(s), + * otherwise set a RELOADDELAY timeout, since a SIGHUP + * could be processed between the got_sighup test and + * the select() system call. + */ + tv.tv_sec = 0; + if (rpctls_gothup) + tv.tv_usec = 0; + else + tv.tv_usec = RELOADDELAY; + readfds = svc_fdset; + switch (select(svc_maxfd + 1, &readfds, NULL, NULL, &tv)) { + case -1: + if (errno == EINTR) { + /* Allow a reload now. */ + nexttime = 0; + continue; + } + syslog(LOG_ERR, "rpc.tls daemon died: select: %m"); + exit(1); + case 0: + /* Allow a reload now. */ + nexttime = 0; + continue; + default: + svc_getreqset(&readfds); + } + } +} + +/* + * (re)load the CRLfile into the certificate verification store. + */ +int +rpctls_loadcrlfile(SSL_CTX *ctx) +{ + X509_STORE *certstore; + X509_LOOKUP *certlookup; + int ret; + + if ((rpctls_verify_cafile != NULL || + rpctls_verify_capath != NULL) && + rpctls_crlfile != NULL) { + certstore = SSL_CTX_get_cert_store(ctx); + certlookup = X509_STORE_add_lookup( + certstore, X509_LOOKUP_file()); + ret = 0; + if (certlookup != NULL) + ret = X509_load_crl_file(certlookup, + rpctls_crlfile, X509_FILETYPE_PEM); + if (ret != 0) + ret = X509_STORE_set_flags(certstore, + X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK | + X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK_ALL); + if (ret == 0) { + rpctls_verbose_out( + "rpctls_loadcrlfile: Can't" + " load CRLfile=%s\n", + rpctls_crlfile); + return (ret); + } + } + return (1); +} + +/* + * Read the CRL file and check for any extant connections + * that might now be revoked. + */ +void +rpctls_checkcrl(void) +{ + struct ssl_entry *slp; + BIO *infile; + X509_CRL *crl; + X509_REVOKED *revoked; + char *cp, *cp2, nullstr[1]; + int ret; + + if (rpctls_crlfile == NULL || (rpctls_verify_cafile == NULL && + rpctls_verify_capath == NULL)) + return; + infile = BIO_new(BIO_s_file()); + if (infile == NULL) { + rpctls_verbose_out("rpctls_checkcrl: Cannot BIO_new\n"); + return; + } + ret = BIO_read_filename(infile, rpctls_crlfile); + if (ret != 1) { + rpctls_verbose_out("rpctls_checkcrl: Cannot read CRL file\n"); + BIO_free(infile); + return; + } + + nullstr[0] = '\0'; + for (crl = PEM_read_bio_X509_CRL(infile, NULL, NULL, nullstr); + crl != NULL; crl = PEM_read_bio_X509_CRL(infile, NULL, NULL, + nullstr)) { + LIST_FOREACH(slp, &rpctls_ssllist, next) { + if (slp->cert != NULL) { + ret = X509_CRL_get0_by_cert(crl, &revoked, + slp->cert); + /* + * Do a shutdown on the socket, so that it + * can no longer be used. The kernel RPC + * code will notice the socket is disabled + * and will do a disconnect upcall, which will + * close the socket. + */ + if (ret == 1) { + cp2 = X509_NAME_oneline( + X509_get_subject_name(slp->cert), + NULL, 0); + cp = X509_NAME_oneline( + X509_get_issuer_name(slp->cert), + NULL, 0); + if (rpctls_debug_level == 0) + syslog(LOG_INFO | LOG_DAEMON, + "rpctls_daemon: Certificate" + " Revoked " + "issuerName=%s " + "subjectName=%s: " + "TCP connection closed", + cp, cp2); + else + fprintf(stderr, + "rpctls_daemon: Certificate" + " Revoked " + "issuerName=%s " + "subjectName=%s: " + "TCP connection closed", + cp, cp2); + shutdown(slp->s, SHUT_WR); + slp->shutoff = true; + } + } + } + X509_CRL_free(crl); + } + BIO_free(infile); +} + +void +rpctls_verbose_out(const char *fmt, ...) +{ + va_list ap; + + if (rpctls_verbose) { + va_start(ap, fmt); + if (rpctls_debug_level == 0) + vsyslog(LOG_INFO | LOG_DAEMON, fmt, ap); + else + vfprintf(stderr, fmt, ap); + va_end(ap); + } +} + +/* + * Check a IP address against any host address in the + * certificate. Basically getnameinfo(3) and + * X509_check_host(). + */ +int +rpctls_checkhost(struct sockaddr *sad, X509 *cert, unsigned int wildcard) +{ + char hostnam[NI_MAXHOST]; + int ret; + + if (getnameinfo((const struct sockaddr *)sad, + sad->sa_len, hostnam, sizeof(hostnam), + NULL, 0, NI_NAMEREQD) != 0) + return (0); + rpctls_verbose_out("rpctls_checkhost: DNS %s\n", + hostnam); + ret = X509_check_host(cert, hostnam, strlen(hostnam), + wildcard, NULL); + return (ret); +} + +/* + * Get the peer's IP address. + */ +int +rpctls_gethost(int s, struct sockaddr *sad, char *hostip, size_t hostlen) +{ + socklen_t slen; + int ret; + + slen = sizeof(struct sockaddr_storage); + if (getpeername(s, sad, &slen) < 0) + return (0); + ret = 0; + if (getnameinfo((const struct sockaddr *)sad, + sad->sa_len, hostip, hostlen, + NULL, 0, NI_NUMERICHOST) == 0) { + rpctls_verbose_out("rpctls_gethost: %s\n", + hostip); + ret = 1; + } + return (ret); +} diff --git a/usr.sbin/rpc.tlsservd/rpc.tlsservd.8.sav b/usr.sbin/rpc.tlsservd/rpc.tlsservd.8 --- a/usr.sbin/rpc.tlsservd/rpc.tlsservd.8.sav +++ b/usr.sbin/rpc.tlsservd/rpc.tlsservd.8 @@ -0,0 +1,348 @@ +.\" Copyright (c) 2008 Isilon Inc http://www.isilon.com/ +.\" Authors: Doug Rabson +.\" Developed with Red Inc: Alfred Perlstein +.\" +.\" Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without +.\" modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions +.\" are met: +.\" 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright +.\" notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. +.\" 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright +.\" notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the +.\" documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. +.\" +.\" THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND +.\" ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE +.\" IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE +.\" ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE +.\" FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL +.\" DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS +.\" OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) +.\" HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT +.\" LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY +.\" OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF +.\" SUCH DAMAGE. +.\" +.\" $FreeBSD$ +.\" +.\" Modified from gssd.8 for rpc.tlsservd.8 by Rick Macklem. +.Dd January 29, 2021 +.Dt RPC.TLSSERVD 8 +.Os +.Sh NAME +.Nm rpc.tlsservd +.Nd "Sun RPC over TLS Server Daemon" +.Sh SYNOPSIS +.Nm +.Op Fl D Ar certdir +.Op Fl d +.Op Fl h +.Op Fl l Ar CAfile +.Op Fl m +.Op Fl n Ar domain +.Op Fl p Ar CApath +.Op Fl r Ar CRLfile +.Op Fl u +.Op Fl v +.Op Fl W +.Op Fl w +.Sh DESCRIPTION +The +.Nm +program provides support for the server side of the kernel Sun RPC over TLS +implementation. +This daemon must be running to allow the kernel RPC to perform the TLS +handshake after a TCP client has sent the STARTTLS Null RPC request to +the server. +This daemon requires that the kernel be built with +.Dq options KERNEL_TLS +and be running on an architecture such as +.Dq amd64 +that supports a direct map (not i386) with +.Xr ktls 4 +enabled. +Note that the +.Fl tls +option in the +.Xr exports 5 +file specifies that the client must use RPC over TLS. +The +.Fl tlscert +option in the +.Xr exports 5 +file specifies that the client must provide a certificate +that verifies. +The +.Fl tlscertuser +option in the +.Xr exports 5 +file specifies that the client must provide a certificate +that verifies and has a otherName:1.3.6.1.4.1.2238.1.1.1;UTF8: field of +subjectAltName of the form +.Dq user@domain +where +.Dq domain +matches the one for this server and +.Dq user +is a valid user name that maps to a . +For the latter two cases, the +.Fl m +and either the +.Fl l +or +.Fl p +options must be specified. +The +.Fl tlscertuser +option also requires that the +.Fl u +option on this daemon be specified. +.Pp +Also, if the IP address used by the client cannot be trusted, +the rules in +.Xr exports 5 +cannot be applied safely. +As such, the +.Fl h +option can be used along with +.Fl m +and either the +.Fl l +or +.Fl p +options to require that the client certificate have the correct +Fully Qualified Domain Name (FQDN) in it. +.Pp +A certificate and associated key must exist in /etc/rpc.tlsservd +(or the +.Dq certdir +specified by the +.Fl D +option) +in files named +.Dq cert.pem +and +.Dq certkey.pem . +.Pp +If a SIGHUP signal is sent to the daemon it will reload the +.Dq CRLfile +and will shut down any extant connections that presented certificates +during TLS handshake that have been revoked. +If the +.Fl r +option was not specified, the SIGHUP signal will be ignored. +.Pp +The daemon will log failed certificate verifications via +.Xr syslogd 8 +using LOG_INFO | LOG_DAEMON when the +.Fl m +option has been specified. +.Pp +The options are as follows: +.Bl -tag -width indent +.It Fl D Ar certdir , Fl Fl certdir= Ns Ar certdir +Use +.Dq certdir +instead of /etc/rpc.tlsservd as the location for the +certificate in a file called +.Dq cert.pem +and associated key in +.Dq certkey.pem . +.It Fl d , Fl Fl debuglevel +Run in debug mode. +In this mode, +.Nm +will not fork when it starts. +.It Fl h , Fl Fl checkhost +This option specifies that the client must provide a certificate +that both verifies and has a FQDN that matches the reverse +DNS name for the IP address that +the client uses to connect to the server. +The FQDN should be +in the DNS field of the subjectAltName, but is also allowed +to be in the CN field of the +subjectName in the certificate. +By default, a wildcard "*" in the FQDN is not allowed. +With this option, a failure to verify the client certificate +or match the FQDN will result in the +server sending AUTH_REJECTEDCRED replies to all client RPCs. +This option requires the +.Fl m +and either the +.Fl l +or +.Fl p +options. +.It Fl l Ar CAfile , Fl Fl verifylocs= Ns Ar CAfile +This option specifies the path name of a CA certificate(s) file +in pem format, which is used to verify client certificates and to +set the list of CA(s) sent to the client so that it knows which +certificate to send to the server during the TLS handshake. +This path name is used in +.Dq SSL_CTX_load_verify_locations(ctx,CAfile,NULL) +and +.Dq SSL_CTX_set_client_CA_list(ctx,SSL_load_client_CA_file(CAfile)) +openssl library calls. +Note that this is a path name for the file and is not assumed to be +in +.Dq certdir . +Either this option or the +.Fl p +option must be specified when the +.Fl m +option is specified so that the daemon can verify the client's +certificate. +.It Fl m , Fl Fl mutualverf +This option specifies that the server is to request a certificate +from the client during the TLS handshake. +It does not require that the client provide a certificate. +It should be specified unless no client doing RPC over TLS is +required to have a certificate. +For NFS, either the +.Xr exports 5 +option +.Fl tlscert +or +.Fl tlscertuser +may be used to require a client to provide a certificate +that verifies. +See +.Xr exports 5 . +.It Fl n Ar domain , Fl Fl domain= Ns Ar domain +This option specifies what the +.Dq domain +is for use with the +.Fl u +option, overriding the domain taken from the +.Xr gethostname 2 +of the server this daemon is running on. +If you have specified the +.Fl domain +command line option for +.Xr nfsuserd 8 +then you should specify this option with the same +.Dq domain +that was specified for +.Xr nfsuserd 8 . +This option is only meaningful when used with the +.Fl u +option. +.It Fl p Ar CApath , Fl Fl verifydir= Ns Ar CApath +This option is similar to the +.Fl l +option, but specifies the path of a directory with CA +certificates in it. +When this option is used, +.Dq SSL_CTX_set_client_CA_list(ctx,SSL_load_client_CA_file()) +is not called, so a list of CA names might not be passed +to the client during the TLS handshake. +.It Fl r Ar CRLfile , Fl Fl crl= Ns Ar CRLfile +This option specifies a Certificate Revocation List (CRL) file +that is to be loaded into the verify certificate store and +checked during verification. +This option is only meaningful when either the +.Fl l +or +.Fl p +have been specified. +.It Fl u , Fl Fl certuser +This option specifies that if the client provides a certificate +that both verifies and has a subjectAltName with an otherName +component of the form +.Dq otherName:1.3.6.1.4.1.2238.1.1.1;UTF8:user@domain +where +.Dq domain +matches the one for this server, +then the daemon will attempt to map +.Dq user +in the above +to a user credential . +There should only be one of these otherName components for each +.Dq domain . +If +.Dq user +is a valid username in the password database, +then the for +.Dq user +will be used for all +RPCs on the mount instead of the credentials in the RPC request +header. +This option requires the +.Fl m +and either the +.Fl l +or +.Fl p +options. +Use of this option might not conform to RFC-NNNN, which does +not allow certificates to be used for user authentication. +.It Fl v , Fl Fl verbose +Run in verbose mode. +In this mode, +.Nm +will log activity messages to +.Xr syslogd 8 +using LOG_INFO | LOG_DAEMON or to +stderr, if the +.Fl d +option has also been specified. +.It Fl W , Fl Fl multiwild +This option is used with the +.Fl h +option to allow use of a wildcard +.Dq * +that matches multiple +components of the reverse DNS name for the client's IP +address. +For example, the FQDN +.Dq *.uoguelph.ca +would match both +.Dq laptop21.uoguelph.ca +and +.Dq laptop3.cis.uoguelph.ca . +.It Fl w , Fl Fl singlewild +Similar to +.Fl W +but allows the wildcard +.Dq * +to match a single component of the reverse DNS name. +For example, the FQDN +.Dq *.uoguelph.ca +would match +.Dq laptop21.uoguelph.ca +but not +.Dq laptop3.cis.uoguelph.ca . +Only one of the +.Fl W +and +.Fl w +options is allowed. +.El +.Sh EXIT STATUS +.Ex -std +.Sh SEE ALSO +.Xr openssl 1 , +.Xr ktls 4 , +.Xr exports 5 , +.Xr mount_nfs 8 , +.Xr nfsuserd 8 , +.Xr rpc.tlsclntd 8 , +.Xr syslogd 8 +.Sh STANDARDS +The implementation is based on the specification in +.Rs +.%B "RFC NNNN" +.%T "Towards Remote Procedure Call Encryption By Default" +.Re +.Sh HISTORY +The +.Nm +manual page first appeared in +.Fx 13.0 . +.Sh BUGS +This daemon cannot be safely shut down and restarted if there are +any active RPC-over-TLS connections. +Doing so will orphan the KERNEL_TLS connections, so that they +can no longer do upcalls successfully, since the +.Dq SSL * +structures in userspace have been lost. diff --git a/usr.sbin/rpc.tlsservd/rpc.tlsservd.c.sav b/usr.sbin/rpc.tlsservd/rpc.tlsservd.c --- a/usr.sbin/rpc.tlsservd/rpc.tlsservd.c.sav +++ b/usr.sbin/rpc.tlsservd/rpc.tlsservd.c @@ -0,0 +1,895 @@ +/*- + * SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-2-Clause-FreeBSD + * + * Copyright (c) 2008 Isilon Inc http://www.isilon.com/ + * Authors: Doug Rabson + * Developed with Red Inc: Alfred Perlstein + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +/* + * Extensively modified from /usr/src/usr.sbin/gssd.c r344402 for + * the server side of kernel RPC-over-TLS by Rick Macklem. + */ + +#include +__FBSDID("$FreeBSD$"); + +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include + +#include +#include +#include + +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include + +#include "rpctlssd.h" +#include "rpc.tlscommon.h" + +#ifndef _PATH_RPCTLSSDSOCK +#define _PATH_RPCTLSSDSOCK "/var/run/rpc.tlsservd.sock" +#endif +#ifndef _PATH_CERTANDKEY +#define _PATH_CERTANDKEY "/etc/rpc.tlsservd/" +#endif +#ifndef _PATH_RPCTLSSDPID +#define _PATH_RPCTLSSDPID "/var/run/rpc.tlsservd.pid" +#endif +#ifndef _PREFERRED_CIPHERS +#define _PREFERRED_CIPHERS "AES128-GCM-SHA256" +#endif + +/* Global variables also used by rpc.tlscommon.c. */ +int rpctls_debug_level; +bool rpctls_verbose; +SSL_CTX *rpctls_ctx = NULL; +const char *rpctls_verify_cafile = NULL; +const char *rpctls_verify_capath = NULL; +char *rpctls_crlfile = NULL; +bool rpctls_gothup = false; +struct ssl_list rpctls_ssllist; + +static struct pidfh *rpctls_pfh = NULL; +static bool rpctls_do_mutual = false; +static const char *rpctls_certdir = _PATH_CERTANDKEY; +static bool rpctls_comparehost = false; +static unsigned int rpctls_wildcard = X509_CHECK_FLAG_NO_WILDCARDS; +static uint64_t rpctls_ssl_refno = 0; +static uint64_t rpctls_ssl_sec = 0; +static uint64_t rpctls_ssl_usec = 0; +static bool rpctls_cnuser = false; +static char *rpctls_dnsname; +static const char *rpctls_cnuseroid = "1.3.6.1.4.1.2238.1.1.1"; + +static void rpctlssd_terminate(int); +static SSL_CTX *rpctls_setup_ssl(const char *certdir); +static SSL *rpctls_server(SSL_CTX *ctx, int s, + uint32_t *flags, uint32_t *uidp, + int *ngrps, uint32_t *gidp, X509 **certp); +static int rpctls_cnname(X509 *cert, uint32_t *uidp, + int *ngrps, uint32_t *gidp); +static char *rpctls_getdnsname(char *dnsname); +static void rpctls_huphandler(int sig __unused); + +extern void rpctlssd_1(struct svc_req *rqstp, SVCXPRT *transp); + +static struct option longopts[] = { + { "certdir", required_argument, NULL, 'D' }, + { "debuglevel", no_argument, NULL, 'd' }, + { "checkhost", no_argument, NULL, 'h' }, + { "verifylocs", required_argument, NULL, 'l' }, + { "mutualverf", no_argument, NULL, 'm' }, + { "domain", required_argument, NULL, 'n' }, + { "verifydir", required_argument, NULL, 'p' }, + { "crl", required_argument, NULL, 'r' }, + { "certuser", no_argument, NULL, 'u' }, + { "verbose", no_argument, NULL, 'v' }, + { "multiwild", no_argument, NULL, 'W' }, + { "singlewild", no_argument, NULL, 'w' }, + { NULL, 0, NULL, 0 } +}; + +int +main(int argc, char **argv) +{ + /* + * We provide an RPC service on a local-domain socket. The + * kernel rpctls code will upcall to this daemon to do the initial + * TLS handshake. + */ + struct sockaddr_un sun; + int ch, debug, fd, oldmask; + SVCXPRT *xprt; + struct timeval tm; + struct timezone tz; + char hostname[MAXHOSTNAMELEN + 2]; + pid_t otherpid; + bool tls_enable; + size_t tls_enable_len; + +#if !defined(BIO_get_ktls_send) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_KTLS) + errx(1, "Requires OpenSSL libraries with KTLS support"); +#endif + /* Check that another rpctlssd isn't already running. */ + rpctls_pfh = pidfile_open(_PATH_RPCTLSSDPID, 0600, &otherpid); + if (rpctls_pfh == NULL) { + if (errno == EEXIST) + errx(1, "rpctlssd already running, pid: %d.", otherpid); + warn("cannot open or create pidfile"); + } + + /* Check to see that the ktls is enabled. */ + tls_enable_len = sizeof(tls_enable); + if (sysctlbyname("kern.ipc.tls.enable", &tls_enable, &tls_enable_len, + NULL, 0) != 0 || !tls_enable) + errx(1, "Kernel TLS not enabled"); + + /* Get the time when this daemon is started. */ + gettimeofday(&tm, &tz); + rpctls_ssl_sec = tm.tv_sec; + rpctls_ssl_usec = tm.tv_usec; + + /* Set the dns name for the server. */ + rpctls_dnsname = rpctls_getdnsname(hostname); + if (rpctls_dnsname == NULL) { + strcpy(hostname, "@default.domain"); + rpctls_dnsname = hostname; + } + + debug = 0; + rpctls_verbose = false; + while ((ch = getopt_long(argc, argv, "D:dhl:n:mp:r:uvWw", longopts, + NULL)) != -1) { + switch (ch) { + case 'D': + rpctls_certdir = optarg; + break; + case 'd': + rpctls_debug_level++; + break; + case 'h': + rpctls_comparehost = true; + break; + case 'l': + rpctls_verify_cafile = optarg; + break; + case 'm': + rpctls_do_mutual = true; + break; + case 'n': + hostname[0] = '@'; + strlcpy(&hostname[1], optarg, MAXHOSTNAMELEN + 1); + rpctls_dnsname = hostname; + break; + case 'p': + rpctls_verify_capath = optarg; + break; + case 'r': + rpctls_crlfile = optarg; + break; + case 'u': + rpctls_cnuser = true; + break; + case 'v': + rpctls_verbose = true; + break; + case 'W': + if (rpctls_wildcard != X509_CHECK_FLAG_NO_WILDCARDS) + errx(1, "options -w and -W are mutually " + "exclusive"); + rpctls_wildcard = X509_CHECK_FLAG_MULTI_LABEL_WILDCARDS; + break; + case 'w': + if (rpctls_wildcard != X509_CHECK_FLAG_NO_WILDCARDS) + errx(1, "options -w and -W are mutually " + "exclusive"); + rpctls_wildcard = 0; + break; + default: + fprintf(stderr, "usage: %s " + "[-D/--certdir certdir] [-d/--debuglevel] " + "[-h/--checkhost] " + "[-l/--verifylocs CAfile] [-m/--mutualverf] " + "[-n/--domain domain_name] " + "[-p/--verifydir CApath] [-r/--crl CRLfile] " + "[-u/--certuser] [-v/--verbose] [-W/--multiwild] " + "[-w/--singlewild]\n", argv[0]); + exit(1); + } + } + if (rpctls_do_mutual && rpctls_verify_cafile == NULL && + rpctls_verify_capath == NULL) + errx(1, "-m requires the -l and/or " + "-p options"); + if (rpctls_comparehost && (!rpctls_do_mutual || + (rpctls_verify_cafile == NULL && rpctls_verify_capath == NULL))) + errx(1, "-h requires the -m plus the " + "-l and/or -p options"); + if (!rpctls_comparehost && rpctls_wildcard != + X509_CHECK_FLAG_NO_WILDCARDS) + errx(1, "The -w or -W options require the -h option"); + if (rpctls_cnuser && (!rpctls_do_mutual || + (rpctls_verify_cafile == NULL && rpctls_verify_capath == NULL))) + errx(1, "-u requires the -m plus the " + "-l and/or -p options"); + + if (modfind("krpc") < 0) { + /* Not present in kernel, try loading it */ + if (kldload("krpc") < 0 || modfind("krpc") < 0) + errx(1, "Kernel RPC is not available"); + } + + if (rpctls_debug_level == 0) { + if (daemon(0, 0) != 0) + err(1, "Can't daemonize"); + signal(SIGINT, SIG_IGN); + signal(SIGQUIT, SIG_IGN); + signal(SIGHUP, SIG_IGN); + } + signal(SIGTERM, rpctlssd_terminate); + signal(SIGPIPE, SIG_IGN); + signal(SIGHUP, rpctls_huphandler); + + pidfile_write(rpctls_pfh); + + memset(&sun, 0, sizeof sun); + sun.sun_family = AF_LOCAL; + unlink(_PATH_RPCTLSSDSOCK); + strcpy(sun.sun_path, _PATH_RPCTLSSDSOCK); + sun.sun_len = SUN_LEN(&sun); + fd = socket(AF_LOCAL, SOCK_STREAM, 0); + if (fd < 0) { + if (rpctls_debug_level == 0) { + syslog(LOG_ERR, "Can't create local rpctlssd socket"); + exit(1); + } + err(1, "Can't create local rpctlssd socket"); + } + oldmask = umask(S_IXUSR|S_IRWXG|S_IRWXO); + if (bind(fd, (struct sockaddr *)&sun, sun.sun_len) < 0) { + if (rpctls_debug_level == 0) { + syslog(LOG_ERR, "Can't bind local rpctlssd socket"); + exit(1); + } + err(1, "Can't bind local rpctlssd socket"); + } + umask(oldmask); + if (listen(fd, SOMAXCONN) < 0) { + if (rpctls_debug_level == 0) { + syslog(LOG_ERR, + "Can't listen on local rpctlssd socket"); + exit(1); + } + err(1, "Can't listen on local rpctlssd socket"); + } + xprt = svc_vc_create(fd, RPC_MAXDATASIZE, RPC_MAXDATASIZE); + if (!xprt) { + if (rpctls_debug_level == 0) { + syslog(LOG_ERR, + "Can't create transport for local rpctlssd socket"); + exit(1); + } + err(1, "Can't create transport for local rpctlssd socket"); + } + if (!svc_reg(xprt, RPCTLSSD, RPCTLSSDVERS, rpctlssd_1, NULL)) { + if (rpctls_debug_level == 0) { + syslog(LOG_ERR, + "Can't register service for local rpctlssd socket"); + exit(1); + } + err(1, "Can't register service for local rpctlssd socket"); + } + + rpctls_ctx = rpctls_setup_ssl(rpctls_certdir); + if (rpctls_ctx == NULL) { + if (rpctls_debug_level == 0) { + syslog(LOG_ERR, "Can't create SSL context"); + exit(1); + } + err(1, "Can't create SSL context"); + } + rpctls_gothup = false; + LIST_INIT(&rpctls_ssllist); + + rpctls_syscall(RPCTLS_SYSC_SRVSETPATH, _PATH_RPCTLSSDSOCK); + + rpctls_svc_run(); + + rpctls_syscall(RPCTLS_SYSC_SRVSHUTDOWN, ""); + + SSL_CTX_free(rpctls_ctx); + EVP_cleanup(); + return (0); +} + +bool_t +rpctlssd_null_1_svc(__unused void *argp, __unused void *result, + __unused struct svc_req *rqstp) +{ + + rpctls_verbose_out("rpctlssd_null_svc: done\n"); + return (TRUE); +} + +bool_t +rpctlssd_connect_1_svc(__unused void *argp, + struct rpctlssd_connect_res *result, __unused struct svc_req *rqstp) +{ + int ngrps, s; + SSL *ssl; + uint32_t flags; + struct ssl_entry *newslp; + uint32_t uid; + uint32_t *gidp; + X509 *cert; + + rpctls_verbose_out("rpctlsd_connect_svc: started\n"); + memset(result, 0, sizeof(*result)); + /* Get the socket fd from the kernel. */ + s = rpctls_syscall(RPCTLS_SYSC_SRVSOCKET, ""); + if (s < 0) + return (FALSE); + + /* Do the server side of a TLS handshake. */ + gidp = calloc(NGROUPS, sizeof(*gidp)); + ssl = rpctls_server(rpctls_ctx, s, &flags, &uid, &ngrps, gidp, &cert); + if (ssl == NULL) { + free(gidp); + rpctls_verbose_out("rpctlssd_connect_svc: ssl " + "accept failed\n"); + /* + * For RPC-over-TLS, this upcall is expected + * to close off the socket upon handshake failure. + */ + close(s); + return (FALSE); + } else { + rpctls_verbose_out("rpctlssd_connect_svc: " + "succeeded flags=0x%x\n", flags); + result->flags = flags; + result->sec = rpctls_ssl_sec; + result->usec = rpctls_ssl_usec; + result->ssl = ++rpctls_ssl_refno; + /* Hard to believe this could ever wrap around.. */ + if (rpctls_ssl_refno == 0) + result->ssl = ++rpctls_ssl_refno; + if ((flags & RPCTLS_FLAGS_CERTUSER) != 0) { + result->uid = uid; + result->gid.gid_len = ngrps; + result->gid.gid_val = gidp; + } else { + result->uid = 0; + result->gid.gid_len = 0; + result->gid.gid_val = gidp; + } + } + + /* Maintain list of all current SSL *'s */ + newslp = malloc(sizeof(*newslp)); + newslp->ssl = ssl; + newslp->s = s; + newslp->shutoff = false; + newslp->refno = rpctls_ssl_refno; + newslp->cert = cert; + LIST_INSERT_HEAD(&rpctls_ssllist, newslp, next); + return (TRUE); +} + +bool_t +rpctlssd_handlerecord_1_svc(struct rpctlssd_handlerecord_arg *argp, + struct rpctlssd_handlerecord_res *result, __unused struct svc_req *rqstp) +{ + struct ssl_entry *slp; + int ret; + char junk; + + slp = NULL; + if (argp->sec == rpctls_ssl_sec && argp->usec == + rpctls_ssl_usec) { + LIST_FOREACH(slp, &rpctls_ssllist, next) { + if (slp->refno == argp->ssl) + break; + } + } + + if (slp != NULL) { + rpctls_verbose_out("rpctlssd_handlerecord fd=%d\n", + slp->s); + /* + * An SSL_read() of 0 bytes should fail, but it should + * handle the non-application data record before doing so. + */ + ret = SSL_read(slp->ssl, &junk, 0); + if (ret <= 0) { + /* Check to see if this was a close alert. */ + ret = SSL_get_shutdown(slp->ssl); + if ((ret & (SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN | + SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN)) == SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN) + SSL_shutdown(slp->ssl); + } else { + if (rpctls_debug_level == 0) + syslog(LOG_ERR, "SSL_read returned %d", ret); + else + fprintf(stderr, "SSL_read returned %d\n", ret); + } + result->reterr = RPCTLSERR_OK; + } else + result->reterr = RPCTLSERR_NOSSL; + return (TRUE); +} + +bool_t +rpctlssd_disconnect_1_svc(struct rpctlssd_disconnect_arg *argp, + struct rpctlssd_disconnect_res *result, __unused struct svc_req *rqstp) +{ + struct ssl_entry *slp; + int ret; + + slp = NULL; + if (argp->sec == rpctls_ssl_sec && argp->usec == + rpctls_ssl_usec) { + LIST_FOREACH(slp, &rpctls_ssllist, next) { + if (slp->refno == argp->ssl) + break; + } + } + + if (slp != NULL) { + rpctls_verbose_out("rpctlssd_disconnect fd=%d closed\n", + slp->s); + LIST_REMOVE(slp, next); + if (!slp->shutoff) { + ret = SSL_get_shutdown(slp->ssl); + /* + * Do an SSL_shutdown() unless a close alert has + * already been sent. + */ + if ((ret & SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN) == 0) + SSL_shutdown(slp->ssl); + } + SSL_free(slp->ssl); + if (slp->cert != NULL) + X509_free(slp->cert); + /* + * For RPC-over-TLS, this upcall is expected + * to close off the socket. + */ + if (!slp->shutoff) + shutdown(slp->s, SHUT_WR); + close(slp->s); + free(slp); + result->reterr = RPCTLSERR_OK; + } else + result->reterr = RPCTLSERR_NOCLOSE; + return (TRUE); +} + +int +rpctlssd_1_freeresult(__unused SVCXPRT *transp, xdrproc_t xdr_result, + caddr_t result) +{ + rpctlssd_connect_res *res; + + if (xdr_result == (xdrproc_t)xdr_rpctlssd_connect_res) { + res = (rpctlssd_connect_res *)(void *)result; + free(res->gid.gid_val); + } + return (TRUE); +} + +static void +rpctlssd_terminate(int sig __unused) +{ + struct ssl_entry *slp; + + rpctls_syscall(RPCTLS_SYSC_SRVSHUTDOWN, ""); + pidfile_remove(rpctls_pfh); + + LIST_FOREACH(slp, &rpctls_ssllist, next) + shutdown(slp->s, SHUT_RD); + exit(0); +} + +/* Allow the handshake to proceed. */ +static int +rpctls_verify_callback(__unused int preverify_ok, + __unused X509_STORE_CTX *x509_ctx) +{ + + return (1); +} + +static SSL_CTX * +rpctls_setup_ssl(const char *certdir) +{ + SSL_CTX *ctx; + char path[PATH_MAX]; + size_t len, rlen; + int ret; + + SSL_library_init(); + SSL_load_error_strings(); + OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms(); + + ctx = SSL_CTX_new(TLS_server_method()); + if (ctx == NULL) { + rpctls_verbose_out("rpctls_setup_ssl: SSL_CTX_new failed\n"); + return (NULL); + } + SSL_CTX_set_ecdh_auto(ctx, 1); + + /* + * Set preferred ciphers, since KERN_TLS only supports a + * few of them. + */ + ret = SSL_CTX_set_cipher_list(ctx, _PREFERRED_CIPHERS); + if (ret == 0) { + rpctls_verbose_out("rpctls_setup_ssl: " + "SSL_CTX_set_cipher_list failed to set any ciphers\n"); + SSL_CTX_free(ctx); + return (NULL); + } + + /* Get the cert.pem and certkey.pem files from the directory certdir. */ + len = strlcpy(path, certdir, sizeof(path)); + rlen = sizeof(path) - len; + if (strlcpy(&path[len], "cert.pem", rlen) != 8) { + SSL_CTX_free(ctx); + return (NULL); + } + ret = SSL_CTX_use_certificate_file(ctx, path, SSL_FILETYPE_PEM); + if (ret != 1) { + rpctls_verbose_out("rpctls_setup_ssl: can't use certificate " + "file path=%s ret=%d\n", path, ret); + SSL_CTX_free(ctx); + return (NULL); + } + if (strlcpy(&path[len], "certkey.pem", rlen) != 11) { + SSL_CTX_free(ctx); + return (NULL); + } + ret = SSL_CTX_use_PrivateKey_file(ctx, path, SSL_FILETYPE_PEM); + if (ret != 1) { + rpctls_verbose_out("rpctls_setup_ssl: Can't use private " + "key path=%s ret=%d\n", path, ret); + SSL_CTX_free(ctx); + return (NULL); + } + + /* Set Mutual authentication, as required. */ + if (rpctls_do_mutual) { + if (rpctls_verify_cafile != NULL || + rpctls_verify_capath != NULL) { + if (rpctls_crlfile != NULL) { + ret = rpctls_loadcrlfile(ctx); + if (ret == 0) { + rpctls_verbose_out("rpctls_setup_ssl:" + " Load CRLfile failed\n"); + SSL_CTX_free(ctx); + return (NULL); + } + } +#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x30000000 + ret = 1; + if (rpctls_verify_cafile != NULL) + ret = SSL_CTX_load_verify_file(ctx, + rpctls_verify_cafile); + if (ret != 0 && rpctls_verify_capath != NULL) + ret = SSL_CTX_load_verify_dir(ctx, + rpctls_verify_capath); +#else + ret = SSL_CTX_load_verify_locations(ctx, + rpctls_verify_cafile, rpctls_verify_capath); +#endif + if (ret == 0) { + rpctls_verbose_out("rpctls_setup_ssl: " + "Can't load verify locations\n"); + SSL_CTX_free(ctx); + return (NULL); + } + if (rpctls_verify_cafile != NULL) + SSL_CTX_set_client_CA_list(ctx, + SSL_load_client_CA_file( + rpctls_verify_cafile)); + } + SSL_CTX_set_verify(ctx, SSL_VERIFY_PEER, + rpctls_verify_callback); + } +#ifdef SSL_MODE_NO_KTLS_TX + SSL_CTX_clear_mode(ctx, SSL_MODE_NO_KTLS_TX | SSL_MODE_NO_KTLS_RX); +#endif + return (ctx); +} + +static SSL * +rpctls_server(SSL_CTX *ctx, int s, uint32_t *flags, uint32_t *uidp, + int *ngrps, uint32_t *gidp, X509 **certp) +{ + SSL *ssl; + X509 *cert; + struct sockaddr *sad; + struct sockaddr_storage ad; + char hostnam[NI_MAXHOST]; + int gethostret, ret; + char *cp, *cp2; + long verfret; + + *flags = 0; + *certp = NULL; + sad = (struct sockaddr *)&ad; + ssl = SSL_new(ctx); + if (ssl == NULL) { + rpctls_verbose_out("rpctls_server: SSL_new failed\n"); + return (NULL); + } + if (SSL_set_fd(ssl, s) != 1) { + rpctls_verbose_out("rpctls_server: SSL_set_fd failed\n"); + SSL_free(ssl); + return (NULL); + } + ret = SSL_accept(ssl); + if (ret != 1) { + rpctls_verbose_out("rpctls_server: SSL_accept " + "failed ret=%d\n", ret); + SSL_free(ssl); + return (NULL); + } + *flags |= RPCTLS_FLAGS_HANDSHAKE; + if (rpctls_do_mutual) { + cert = SSL_get_peer_certificate(ssl); + if (cert != NULL) { + gethostret = rpctls_gethost(s, sad, hostnam, + sizeof(hostnam)); + if (gethostret == 0) + hostnam[0] = '\0'; + cp2 = X509_NAME_oneline( + X509_get_subject_name(cert), NULL, 0); + *flags |= RPCTLS_FLAGS_GOTCERT; + verfret = SSL_get_verify_result(ssl); + if (verfret != X509_V_OK) { + cp = X509_NAME_oneline( + X509_get_issuer_name(cert), NULL, 0); + if (rpctls_debug_level == 0) + syslog(LOG_INFO | LOG_DAEMON, + "rpctls_server: client IP %s " + "issuerName=%s subjectName=%s" + " verify failed %s\n", hostnam, + cp, cp2, + X509_verify_cert_error_string( + verfret)); + else + fprintf(stderr, + "rpctls_server: client IP %s " + "issuerName=%s subjectName=%s" + " verify failed %s\n", hostnam, + cp, cp2, + X509_verify_cert_error_string( + verfret)); + } + if (verfret == + X509_V_ERR_DEPTH_ZERO_SELF_SIGNED_CERT || + verfret == X509_V_ERR_SELF_SIGNED_CERT_IN_CHAIN) + *flags |= RPCTLS_FLAGS_SELFSIGNED; + else if (verfret == X509_V_OK) { + if (rpctls_comparehost) { + ret = 0; + if (gethostret != 0) + ret = rpctls_checkhost(sad, + cert, rpctls_wildcard); + if (ret != 1) { + *flags |= + RPCTLS_FLAGS_DISABLED; + rpctls_verbose_out( + "rpctls_server: " + "checkhost " + "failed\n"); + } + } + if (rpctls_cnuser) { + ret = rpctls_cnname(cert, uidp, + ngrps, gidp); + if (ret != 0) + *flags |= RPCTLS_FLAGS_CERTUSER; + } + *flags |= RPCTLS_FLAGS_VERIFIED; + *certp = cert; + cert = NULL; + } + if (cert != NULL) + X509_free(cert); + } else + rpctls_verbose_out("rpctls_server: " + "No peer certificate\n"); + } + +#ifdef BIO_get_ktls_send + /* Check to see that ktls is working for the connection. */ + ret = BIO_get_ktls_send(SSL_get_wbio(ssl)); + rpctls_verbose_out("rpctls_server: BIO_get_ktls_send=%d\n", ret); + if (ret != 0) { + ret = BIO_get_ktls_recv(SSL_get_rbio(ssl)); + rpctls_verbose_out("rpctls_server: BIO_get_ktls_recv=%d\n", + ret); + } +#else + ret = 0; +#endif + if (ret == 0) { + if (rpctls_debug_level == 0) + syslog(LOG_ERR, "ktls not working"); + else + fprintf(stderr, "ktls not working\n"); + /* + * The handshake has completed, so all that can be + * done is disable the connection. + */ + *flags |= RPCTLS_FLAGS_DISABLED; + } + + return (ssl); +} + +/* + * Acquire the dnsname for this server. + */ +static char * +rpctls_getdnsname(char *hostname) +{ + char *cp, *dnsname; + struct addrinfo *aip, hints; + int error; + + dnsname = NULL; + if (gethostname(hostname, MAXHOSTNAMELEN) == 0) { + if ((cp = strchr(hostname, '.')) != NULL && + *(cp + 1) != '\0') { + *cp = '@'; + dnsname = cp; + } else { + memset((void *)&hints, 0, sizeof (hints)); + hints.ai_flags = AI_CANONNAME; + error = getaddrinfo(hostname, NULL, &hints, &aip); + if (error == 0) { + if (aip->ai_canonname != NULL && + (cp = strchr(aip->ai_canonname, '.')) != + NULL && *(cp + 1) != '\0') { + hostname[0] = '@'; + strlcpy(&hostname[1], cp + 1, + MAXHOSTNAMELEN + 1); + dnsname = hostname; + } + freeaddrinfo(aip); + } + } + } + return (dnsname); +} + +/* + * Check for an otherName component of subjectAltName where the OID + * matches and the "domain" matches that of this server. + * If found, map "user" to a for it. + */ +static int +rpctls_cnname(X509 *cert, uint32_t *uidp, int *ngrps, uint32_t *gidp) +{ + char *cp, usern[1024 + 1]; + struct passwd *pwd; + gid_t gids[NGROUPS]; + int i, j; + GENERAL_NAMES *genlist; + GENERAL_NAME *genname; + OTHERNAME *val; + size_t slen; + + /* First, find the otherName in the subjectAltName. */ + genlist = X509_get_ext_d2i(cert, NID_subject_alt_name, NULL, NULL); + if (genlist == NULL) + return (0); + cp = NULL; + for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(genlist); i++) { + genname = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(genlist, i); + if (genname->type != GEN_OTHERNAME) + continue; + val = genname->d.otherName; + + /* Check to see that it is the correct OID. */ + slen = i2t_ASN1_OBJECT(usern, sizeof(usern), val->type_id); + if (slen != strlen(rpctls_cnuseroid) || memcmp(usern, + rpctls_cnuseroid, slen) != 0) + continue; + + /* Sanity check the otherName. */ + if (val->value->type != V_ASN1_UTF8STRING || + val->value->value.utf8string->length < 3 || + (size_t)val->value->value.utf8string->length > sizeof(usern) + - 1) { + rpctls_verbose_out("rpctls_cnname: invalid cnuser " + "type=%d\n", val->value->type); + continue; + } + + /* Look for a "user" in the otherName */ + memcpy(usern, val->value->value.utf8string->data, + val->value->value.utf8string->length); + usern[val->value->value.utf8string->length] = '\0'; + + /* Now, look for the @dnsname suffix in the commonName. */ + cp = strcasestr(usern, rpctls_dnsname); + if (cp == NULL) + continue; + if (*(cp + strlen(rpctls_dnsname)) != '\0') { + cp = NULL; + continue; + } + *cp = '\0'; + break; + } + if (cp == NULL) + return (0); + + /* See if the "user" is in the passwd database. */ + pwd = getpwnam(usern); + if (pwd == NULL) + return (0); + *uidp = pwd->pw_uid; + *ngrps = NGROUPS; + if (getgrouplist(pwd->pw_name, pwd->pw_gid, gids, ngrps) < 0) + return (0); + rpctls_verbose_out("mapped user=%s ngrps=%d uid=%d\n", pwd->pw_name, + *ngrps, pwd->pw_uid); + for (j = 0; j < *ngrps; j++) + gidp[j] = gids[j]; + return (1); +} + +static void +rpctls_huphandler(int sig __unused) +{ + + rpctls_gothup = true; +}